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GIFT OF 
 MICHAEL REE^E 
 
I 
 
THE 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 
 
 OF 
 
 LEIBNITZ 
 
 COMPRISING 
 
 The Monadology, New System of Nature, Principles of Nature and 
 
 of Grace, Letters to Clarke, Refutation of Spinoza, and his 
 
 other important philosophical opuscules, together 
 
 with the Abridgment of the Theodicy and 
 
 extracts from the New Essays on 
 
 Human Understanding. 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN AND FRENCH. 
 
 WITH NOTES 
 
 BY 
 
 GEORGE MARTIN DUNCAN, 
 
 Instructor in Mental and Moral philosophy, Yale University. 
 
 UNIVERBITT 
 
 NEW HAVEN. 
 
 TUTTLE, MOREHOUSE & TAYLOR, PUBLISHERS. 
 
 1890. 
 

 Copyright, 1890, 
 
 BY 
 
 TuTTLE, Morehouse & Taylor. 
 ^ 3 ^2-y, 
 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 This translation of the more important pliilosophical works of Leibnitz 
 furnishes much needed assistance to all teachers of philosophy and its 
 history, in this country or in England. Until recently no collection, at 
 once complete and trustworthy, of the writings of this great and versatile 
 thinker has ever been made. The magnificent edition of Gerhardt has now 
 rendered it possible for the translator to select, from all the recorded 
 philosophical utterances of Leibnitz (including his voluminous and elaborate 
 letters), those portions which will give the most satisfactory survey of his 
 system of thinking. The selections of the present volume appear judicious ; 
 they are sufficient to afford a tolerably comprehensive and circumstantial 
 account of this system. 
 
 It is not, however, to teachers of philosophy alone that I commend this 
 volume. The interests and scholarship of Leibnitz were unexampled as 
 respects range and variety. He was eminent in mathematics, physical 
 science, languages, history, theology, philosophy, and belles-lettres. Even 
 his more definitely philosophical writings are framed in accordance with 
 this varied eminence. They therefore contain much which appeals to any 
 person who is inclined at all to approach the problems of philosophy, from 
 whatever point of view. Their style is free from certain characteristics 
 which lovers of good literature often find repulsive in works of more 
 definitely pedagogical, or systematic and technical, character. Indeed, the 
 principal tenets of Leibnitz are all to be discovered, at least in their inchoate 
 form, in his interesting and instructive letters to various notable persons of 
 his day. 
 
 It has not been possible for me to compare any considerable portion of this 
 translation with the original. But my confidence in Mr. Duncan's compe- 
 tence and accuracy of scholarship is so great that I have no doubt of its 
 excellence. 
 
 It gives me great pleasure, therefore, to welcome, and to aid in introduc- 
 ing this book. It certainly fills— and, I believe, it well fills— an important 
 gap in our philosophical literature. 
 
 George Trumbull Ladd. 
 Yale University, December, 1890. 
 
TABLE OF COl^TETSTTS. 
 
 Pag© ^ 
 X— On the Philosophy of Descartes, 1679-1680, . . . . \^ 
 
 II— Notes on Spinoza's ^^Tiics, c. 1679, ^rT ' .... 11 
 
 ^11— Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas, 1684, X . . . 27 n 
 
 IV— On a General Principle useful in the Explanation of the Laws of 
 
 Nature, 1687, . . . . . . . 33^"^ 
 
 V— Statement of personal views on Metaphysics and Physics, 1690, . 37 >^y 
 YJ — Does the Essence of Body consist in extension? 1691, . . 41 ^ 
 
 VII — Animadversions on Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, books 1 , 
 
 ■^ and 3, 1692, 46K 
 
 VIII — Reply of Leibnitz to the Extract of the Letter of Foucher, canon ^>» 
 
 x..,^^^ of Dijon, published in the Journal des Savans of March 16, 1693, 64 
 
 IX— On the Philosophy of Descartes, 1693, .... 66 /^ 
 
 VX — On the reform of Metaphysics and of the Notion of Substance, 
 
 1694, . . . . . . . . .68 
 
 "-XI — A New System of Nature, and of the Interaction of Substances, 
 as well as of the Union which exists between the Soul and the 
 V Body, 1695, . . ." . . . . . 71 ^ " 
 
 XII — The Reply of Foucher to Leibnitz concerning his New System, 
 
 1695, "- -8l't-^ 
 
 XIII— Explanation of the New System, 1695, .... 85 / 
 
 XIV— Second Explanation of the New System, 1696, . . . 90 ^ 
 
 ^V— Third Explanation of the New System, 1696, ... 92 '""' 
 
 ^k^VI — Observations on Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, 1696, 94 
 
 ^^VII- On the Ultimate Origin of Things, 1697, 100 
 
 2rVIII — On Certain Consequences of the Philosophy of Descartes, 1797, lOli^ 
 XIX— On Nature in Itself, 1698, . . . . . .112 
 
 XX— Ethical Definitions, 1697-1698, 137 
 
 XXI — On the Cartesian Demonstration of the Existence of God, 1700- ^ 
 
 1701, 133 
 
 ^Xll — Considerations on the Doctrine of a Universal Spirit, 1702, . 139 
 ^^XIII — On the Supersensible in Knowledge and on the Immaterial in t 
 
 Nature, 1702, 149^ 
 
 XXIV — Explanation of Points in his Philosophy, 1704, 
 XXV -On the Principle of Life, 170o, .... 
 ^^X VI— Necessity an^jContingeney, 1707, . . . 
 
 ^XVII — Refutation of Spinoza, c. 1708, 
 I^XV^n — Remarks on the Doctrine of Malebranche, 1708, 
 XXIX— On the Active Force of the Body, the Soul, and the Souls of 
 
 Brutes, 1710, 
 
 XXX— Abridgment of the Theodicy, 1710, . 
 XXXI— On Wisdom— the Art of Reasoning, etc., 1711, 
 i^XXII— The Principles of Nature and of Grace, 1714, . 
 
 XXXIII— The Monadology, f}'14, "^ . 
 ^XXXIV— On the Doctrine of Malebranche, 1715, . 
 ^ XXXV— Five Letters to Samuel Clarke, 1716, 
 
 XXXVI — Extracts from tik)3 Nouveaux Essais, 1704, 
 
 159 
 
 163 
 
 170 
 
 1751^ 
 
 185 
 
 190^ 
 194 
 
 209 Un 
 
 218 ..^ 
 
 233 
 238 
 
 287 
 
 Notes. . . 1 . . . . . . 363 
 
"One day I happened to say that the Cartesian philosophy in so far as 
 it was true was but the ante-chamber of the true philosophy. A gentleman 
 of the company who frequented the Court, who was a man of some reading 
 and who even took part in discussion on the sciences, pushed the figure to 
 an allegory and perhaps a little too far ; for he asked me thereupon, if I did 
 not believe that it might be said that the ancients had shown us the stairs, 
 that the modem school had come as far as into the ante-chamber, and that 
 he should wish me the honor of introducing us into the cabinet of nature ? 
 This tirade of parallels made us all laugh, and I said to him ' You see, sir, 
 that your comparison has pleased the company ; but you have forgotten 
 that there is the audience chamber between the ante-chamber and the 
 cabinet, and that it will be enough if we obtain audience without pretending 
 to penetrate into the interior.'" 
 
 Leibnitz, Letter to a friend on Cartesianism, 1695. 
 
LEIBI^ITZ. 
 
 I. 
 
 On the Philosophy of Descartes. 1679-1680. 
 [From the French,] 
 
 As to the Philosoplij of Descartes, of wliich you ask my 
 opinion, I do not hesitate to say absolutely that it leads to atheism. 
 It is true that there are some things very suspicious to me who 
 have considered it attentively : for example, these two passages, 
 that final cause ought not to be considered in physics, and that 
 matter takes successively all the forms of which it is capable. 
 There is an admirable passage in the Phaedo of Plato which justly 
 blames Anaxagoras for the very thing which displeases me in 
 Descartes. For myself, I believe that the laws of mechanics which 
 serve as a basis for the whole system depend on final causes ; that 
 is to say, on the will of God determined to make what is most per- 
 fect, and that matter does not take all possible forms but only the 
 most perfect ; otherwise it would be necessary to say that there 
 will be a time when all will be evil in turn, which is far removed 
 from the perfection of the author of things. As for the rest, if 
 Descartes had been less given to imaginary hypotheses and if he 
 had been more attached to experiments, I think that his physics 
 would have been worthy of being followed. For it must be 
 admitted that he had great penetration. As for his geometry and 
 analysis they are far from being as perfect as those pretend who 
 are given but to the investigation of minor problems. There are 
 ^veral errors in his metaphysics, and he has not known the true 
 source of truths nor that general analysis of notions which Jung, 
 in my opinion, has better understood than he.' Nevertheless, I 
 confess that the reading of Descartes is very useful and very 
 
instructive, and that I like incomparably more to have to do with 
 a Cartesian than with a man from some other school. Finally, I 
 consider this philosophy as the ante-chamber of the true philos- 
 ophy. — Extract from a letter to Philipp^ 1679. 
 
 I esteem Descartes almost as highly as it is possible to esteem a 
 man, and although there are among his opinions some which 
 appear to me false and even dangerous, I do not hesitate to say 
 that we owe almost as much to Galileo and to him in matters 
 of philosophy'"as to all antiquity. I remember at present but 
 one of the two dangerous propositions of which you wish me to 
 indicate the place, viz : Principiorum Philosophicorum Part. 3^ 
 Articulo ^7, his verbis : " Atque omnino parum refert, quid hoc 
 pacto supponatur, quia postea jnsta leges naturae est mutandnm. 
 Et vix aliquid supponi potest ex quo non idem effectus, quanquam 
 fortasse operosius, deduci possit. Cum enim. illarum ope materia 
 formas omnes quarum est capax successive assumat, si f ormas istas 
 ordine consideremus, tandem ad illam quae est hujus mundi pote- 
 rimus devenire, adeo ut hie nihil erroris ex falsa hypothesi sit 
 timendum." 1 do not think that it is possible. to form a more dan- 
 gerous proposition than this. For if matter receive successively 
 all possible forms it would follow that nothing so absurd, so strange 
 and contrary to what we call justice, could be imagined, which has 
 not occurred or would not some day occur. These are exactly the 
 opinions which Spinoza has more clearly explained, namely, that 
 justice, beanty, order belong only to things in relation to us, but 
 that the perfection of God consists in a fullness of action such that 
 nothing can be possible or conceivable which he does not actually 
 produce. This is also the opinion of Hobbes who maintains that 
 all that is possible is past, or present, or future, and that there will 
 be no room for relying on providence if God produces all and 
 makes^ no choice among possible beings. Descartes took care not 
 to speak so plainly, but he could not help revealing his opinions in 
 passing, with such address that he would not be understood save by 
 those who examine profoundly these kinds of subjects. This, in 
 my opinion, is the npajzov i[;€udo^, the foundation of atheistic 
 philosophy, which does not cease to say things beautiful in appear- 
 ance of God. But the true philosophy ought to give us an entirely 
 different notion of the perfection of God which could serve us 
 
both in physics- and in morals ; and I, for my part, hold that f£^r 
 from -.excluding fijaal_causes from the consideration of physic^ as 
 Descartes pretends, Part 1, Article 28, it is rather by them that all ^ 
 should be determined, since the efficient cause .oithingsis intelli- 
 gent, havmg~alwTirand consequently tending toward the Good, that 
 which is still farlrcm the opinion of Descartes who holds that 
 goodness, truth and justice are so simply because God by a free act 
 of his will has established them, which is very strange. For if 
 things are not good or bad, save by an effect of the will of God, 
 tlii^OTjd will"ff6Tl)e a motive of his will since it is subsequent to 
 the will. And his will would be a certain absolute decree, with- 
 out reason; here are his own words, Ites'p. ad object, sext. n. 8: 
 " Attendenti ad Dei immensitatem manifestum est, nihil omnino 
 esse posse quod ad ipso nor pendeat, non modo nihil subsistens, sed " 
 etiam nullum ordinem, nu.lam legam, nuUamve rationem Veri et 
 l)oni, alioqui enim, ut pailo ante dicebatur, non fuisset plane 
 indifferens ad ea creanda qi ae creavit [he was then indifferent as 
 ^"(^gards tij^e things which A'e call just an^. unjust, and if it had 
 (eased him to create a world in which th**^ffood had been forever 
 nhappy and the wicked (diat is to sayv^tho^e who seek only to 
 -istroy the others) happy, that would be^just. Thus we cannot 
 letennine anything as to the justice of God, and it may be that he 
 has made things in a way which ^^e call jinjust, since there is no 
 notion of justice as respects him, and if.it turns out that we are 
 unhappy in spite of our p ety, or that the soul perishes with the 
 body, this will also be just.— -He continues] : jS"am si quae ratio 
 l)oni ejus per ordinationen antecessisset, ilia ipsum determinasset 
 • n it qiiod optimum est faciendum [without doubt, and this is the 
 of providence and of all our hopes; namely, that there is 
 •juiething good and just n itseK, and that God, being Wisdom 
 -iself, does not fail to choose the best]. Sed contra quod se deter- 
 minavit"ad ea jam sunt ficienda, idcirco, ut habetur in Genesi, 
 imt valde bona [this is cros.^ reasoning. If things are not good by 
 ny idea or notion of goodness in themselves, but because God 
 rills them, God, in Genesis-, had but to consider them when they 
 ere made and to be sajfsded with his work, saying that all was 
 good ; it would have sufficed for liim to say, T will it, or to have 
 remembered that he willed them, if there is no formal difference 
 I'etween the two things, to be willed by Gp^vand to be good. But 
 
it is apparent that the author of Genesis was of another opinion, 
 introducing a God who would not be content with having niadt 
 them unless he found further that, he had made them well.] hoc 
 est ratio eorum bonitatis ex eo pendet, quod voluerit ipsa sic facere.'' 
 This is as distinct an expression as one could desire. But after 
 this it is useless to speak of the goodness and justice of God, and 
 providence will be but a chimera. It is evident that even the will 
 of God will be but a fiction employed to daz5:le those who do not 
 sufficiently strive to fathom these things. For what kind of a will 
 (good God!) is that which has not the Good as object or motive? 
 What is more this God will not even have understanding. For if 
 truth itself depends only on the will of God and not on the nature 
 of things, and the understanding being necessarily .before the will 
 (I speak de jprioritate naturae^ non ternjporis), the understanding of 
 God will be before the truth of things and consequently will not 
 have truth for its object. Such an understanding is undoubtedly 
 nothing but a chimera, and consequently it will be necessary to 
 conceive God, after the manner of Spinoza, as a being who has 
 neither understanding nor will, but who produces quite indiffer- 
 ently good or bad, and who is indifferent respecting things t.nd 
 dShsequently inclined by no reason toward one rather than the 
 other. Thus, he will either do nothing or he will do all. But to saV 
 that such a God has made things, or to say that they have been pro- 
 duced by a blind necessity, the one, it seems to me, is as good as the 
 other. I have been sorry myself to find these things in Descartes, 
 but I have seen no means of excusing them. I wish he could clear 
 himself from these, as well as from some other imputations with 
 which Morus and Parker have charged him. For to wish to 
 explain everything mechanically in physics is not a crime nor 
 impiety, since God has made all things according to the laws of 
 mathematics ; that is, according to the eternal truths which are the 
 object of wisdom. 
 
 There are still many other things in the works of Descartes 
 which I consider erroneous and by which I judge that he has not 
 penetrated so far in advance as is imagined. For example, in 
 geometry, I do not really believe that he has made any paralogism 
 (as you inform me that some one has said to you) ; he was a suffi- 
 ciently skillful man to avoid that, and you see by this that I judge 
 him equitably: but hf^ Iirk pweA thrmurh t/>n much presumption, 
 
holding all for impossible at which he saw no means of arriving ; 
 for example, he believed it was impossible to find a proportion 
 between a curved line and a straight line. Here are his own 
 words : Lib. ^, Geom., articnlo 9 fin. editionis Schotenianae de 
 cmno, 1659^ jp. 39 : cum ratio quae inter rectas et curvas existit, 
 non cognita sit nee etiam ah hominihus ut arhitror cognosci queat. 
 In which, estimating the powers of all posterity by his own, he 
 was very mnch mistaken. For a little while after his death a 
 method was found of giving an infinity of curved lines to which 
 could be geometrically assigned equal straight lines. He would 
 have perceived it himself if he had considered sufficiently the dex- 
 terity of Archimedes. He is persuaded that all problems may be 
 reduced to equations {quo modo per inethodum qua utor, inquit, 
 p. 96, lib. 3, Geom., id omne quod sub Geometricam contempla- 
 tioneiYh cadit^ ad uhum idemque genus jproblematum reducatur^ 
 quod est ut quaeratur valor radicum alicujus aequationis). This 
 is wholly false, as Huygens, Hudde and others who thoroughly 
 understand Descartes' geometry, have frankly avowed to me. 
 This is why there is need of much before algebra can do all that is 
 promised for her. I do not speak lightly and there are few people 
 who have examined the matter with as much care as I. 
 
 The physics of Descartes has a great defect ; this is that his rules 
 of motion or laws of nature, which should serve as its foundation, 
 are for the most part false. There is demonstration of th^. His 
 great principle also that the same quantity of motion is preserved 
 in the world is an error. What I say here is acknowledged by the 
 ablest men of France and England. 
 
 Judge from this, sir, whether there is reason for taking the opin- 
 ions of Descartes for oracles. But this does not hinder me from con- 
 sidering him an admirable man, and for saying between ourselves 
 that if he still lived perhaps he alone would advance farther in 
 physics than a great number of others, although very able men. That 
 befalls me here which ordinarily befalls moderate men. The Peripa- 
 tetics regard me as a Cartesian, and the Cartesians are surprised 
 that I do not yield to all their pretended lights. For when I speak 
 to prepossessed men of th^ school who treat Descartes with scorn, I 
 extol the brilliancy of his qualities ; but when I have to do with a 
 too zealous Cartesian I find myself obliged to change my note in 
 order to modify a little the too high opinion which they have of their 
 
6 
 
 master. The greatest men of the time in these matters are not Car- 
 tesians, or if they have been in their youth they have gotten over it, 
 and I notice among the people who make a profession of philos- 
 ophy and of mathematics, that those who are properly Cartesians 
 ordinarily remain among the mediocre and invent nothing of 
 importance, being but commentators of their master, although for 
 the rest they may be more able than the man of the school. — 
 Letter to Philipp, Jan., 1680. 
 
 [The following is an extract from a letter of about the same date as the 
 preceding and on the same subject, written to an unknown correspondent.] 
 
 Sir, since you desire very much that I express freely my 
 thoughts on Cartesianism, I shall not conceal aught of what I think 
 of it, and which I can say in few words ; and I shall advance noth- 
 ing without giving or being able to give a reason for it. In the 
 first place, all those who give themselves over absolutely to the 
 opinions of any author are in a slavery and render themselves sus- 
 pected of error, for to say that Descartes is the only author who is 
 exempt from considerable error, is a proposition which could be 
 true but is not likely to be so. In fact, such attachment iDelongs 
 only to small minds who have not the force or the leisure to medi- 
 tate themselves, or will not give themselves the trouble to do so. 
 This is why the three illustrious academies of our times, the Royal 
 Society of England, which was established first, and then the 
 Academic Royale des Sciences, at Paris, and the Academia del 
 Cimento, at Florence, have loudly protested that they wish to be 
 known neither as Aristotelians, nor Cartesians, nor Epicureans, nor 
 followers of any author whatever. 
 
 I have also recognized by experience that those who are wholly 
 Cartesians are not adepts in inventing, they are but interpreters or 
 commentators of their master, as the philosophers of the school 
 were of Aristotle ; and of the many beautiful discoveries which 
 have been made since Descartes, I know of not one which comes 
 from a true Cartesian. I know these gentlemen a little and I defy 
 them to name one coming from them. This is an evidence that 
 Descartes did not know the true method or that he has not trans- 
 mitted it to them. 
 
 Descartes himself had a sufiiciently limited mind. Of all men 
 he excelled in speculations, but in them he found nothing useful 
 
for life which is evident to the senses and which serves in the 
 practice of the arts. All his meditations were either too abstracfj 
 like his metaphysics and his geometry, or too imaginary, like his prin- 
 ciples of natural philosophy. The only thing of use which he be- 
 lieved he had given was his telescope, made according to the hyper- 
 bolic line, with which he promised^to make us see animals, or parts as 
 small as animals, in the moon. Unfortunately he was never able to 
 find workmen capable of executing his design, and since then it 
 has even been demonstrated that the advantage of the hyperbolic 
 line is not so great as he believed. It is true that. Descartes was a 
 great genius and that the sciences are under great obligations to 
 him, but notin^the way the Cartesians believe. I must therefore 
 Tenter a little into details and give examples of what he has taken 
 from others, of what he has himself done, and of what he has left 
 to be done. From this it will be seen whether I speak without 
 knowledge of the subject. In the first place, his Ethics is a com- 
 pound of the opinions of the Stoics and of the Epicureans, 
 something not very difficult, for Seneca had already reconciled 
 them very well. He wishes us to follow reason, or the nature of 
 things as the Stoics said, with which everybody will agree. He 
 adds that we ought not to be disturbed by the things which are not 
 in our power. This is exactly the dogma of the Portico which 
 established the greatness and liberty of their "sage, so praised for 
 the strength of mind which he had in resolving to do without the 
 things which do not depend upon us and to endure them when 
 they come in spite of us. It is for this reason that I am wont to 
 call this ethics the art of patience. The Sovereign Good, accord- 
 ing to the Stoics and according to Aristotle himself, was to act in 
 accordance with virtue or prudence, and the pleasure resulting 
 therefrom together with the resolution mentioned above is prop- 
 erly that tranquility of the soul, or indolence, which the Stoics and 
 Epicureans sought and equally recommended under different 
 names. One has only to examine the incomparable Manual of 
 Epictetus and the Epiottrus of Laertius to acknowledge that 
 Descartes has not advanced the practice of morals. But it seems 
 to me that this art of patience in which he makes the art of living 
 consist, is yet not the whole. A patience without hope does not 
 endure and does not console, and it is here that Plato, in my 
 opinion, surpasses the others, for by good arguments he makes us 
 
hope for a better life and approaches nearest to Christianity. It is 
 sufficient to read the excellent dialogue on the Immortality of the 
 Soul or the Death of Socrates^ which Theophile has translated into 
 French, to conceive a high idea of it. I think that Pythagoras 
 did the same, and that his metempsychosis was merely to accom- 
 modate himself to the range of common people, but that among his 
 disciples he reasoned quite differently. Also Ocellus Lucanus, who 
 was one of them, and from whom we have a small but excellent 
 fragment on the universe, says not a word of it. It will be said 
 that Descartes establishes very well the existence of God and the 
 immortality of the soul. But I fear that we are deceived by fine 
 words, for the God, or Perfect Being, of Descartes is not a God 
 such as we imagine him and such as we desire ; that is to say, just 
 and wise, doing everything for the good of creatures as far as is 
 possible, but rather he is similar to the God of Spinoza, namely, 
 the principle of things, and a certain sovereign powder or primitive 
 nature which sets everything in action and does everything which 
 is feasible. The God of Descartes has neither will nor under- 
 standing^ since according to Descartes he has not the Good as the 
 object of the will nor the True as object of the understanding. 
 Also he does not wish that his God should act according to some 
 end, and for this reason he rejects from philosophy the search after 
 final causes, under the adroit pretext that we are not capable of 
 knowing the ends of God. Plato, on the contrary, has very well 
 shown that God being the author of things and provided he acts 
 according to wisdom, true physics is to know the ends and the uses 
 of things, for science is the knowledge of reasons, and the reasons 
 of what has been made by an understanding are the final causes or 
 the designs of him who made them, and these appear from the use 
 and the function which they have. This is why the consideration 
 of the use of parts is so useful in anatomy. This is why a God 
 such as that of Descartes leaves us no other consolation than that 
 of ^SitiQUCQ par force. He says in some passages that matter passes 
 successively through all possible forms ; that is to say, that his God 
 does everything which is feasible and passes, following a necessary 
 and fated order, through all possible combinations ; but for this 
 the mere necessity of matter sufficed, or rather his God is nothing 
 but this necessity, or this principle of necessity, acting in matter as 
 it can. It must not, therefore, be believed that this God has any 
 
9 
 
 more care of intelligent creatures than of the others. Each one 
 will be happy or unhappy, according as it will find itself involved 
 in great torrents or whirlpools ; and he is right in recommending 
 to us patience without hope (in place of felicity). But some one 
 of the better class of Cartesians, deluded by the fine discourses of 
 his master, will say to me that he nevertheless establishes very well 
 the IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL and Consequently a better life. When 
 I hear these things I am astonished at the ease with which the 
 world is deceived, if one can merely play adroitly with agreeable 
 words, although their meaning is corrupted ; for just as hypocrites 
 abuse piety, heretics the scriptures, and the seditious the word lib- 
 erty, so the Cartesians have abused those grand words, the 
 existence.of Grod and the immortality of the soul. It is necessary, 
 therefore, to unravel this mystery and to show them that the 
 immortality of the soul, following Descartes, is worth no more than 
 his God. I well believe that I shall not please some, for people do 
 not enjoy being awakened when their minds are occupied with an 
 agreeable dream. But what is to be done ? Descartes teaches that 
 false thoughts should be uprooted before true ones are introduced ; 
 his example ought to be followed, and I shall think that I am ren- 
 dering a service to the public if I can disabuse them of such 
 dangerous doctrines. I say then that the immortality of the soul, 
 as it is established by Descartes, is of no use and can in no way 
 console us. For grant that the soul is a substance and that no sub- 
 stance perishes ; this being so the soul will not perish, but in reality 
 also nothing perishes in nature. But like matter the soul too will 
 change in form, and as the matter composing a man has at other 
 times formed plants and other animals, so this soul may be immor- 
 tal in reality but it will pass through a thousand changes and not 
 remember at all what it has been. But this immortality without 
 memory is altogether useless, viewed ethically, for it destroys all 
 reward, all recompense, and all punishment. Of what use would it 
 be to you, sir, to become king of China on condition of forgetting 
 what you have been. Would it not be the same thing as if God at 
 the same time that he destroyed you created a king in China? 
 This is why, in order to satisfy the hope of the human race, it 
 must be proved that the God who governs all is wise and just, and 
 that he will leave nothing without recompense and without punish- 
 ment. These are the great foundations of ethics ; but the doctrine 
 
10 
 
 of a God who does not act for the Good, and of a soul which is 
 immortal without memory, serves only to deceive the simple and 
 to pervert the spiritually minded. 
 
 I could, however, show mistakes in the pretended demonstration 
 of Descartes, for there are still many things to be proved in order 
 to complete it. But I think that at present it is useless to amuse 
 one's self thus, since these demonstrations would be of almost no 
 use, as I have just shown, even if they were good. 
 
II. 
 
 Notes on Spinoza's Ethics. 
 [From the Latin.] 
 
 Part I. — Concerning God. 
 
 Definition 1. Self- Caused is that the essence of which involves 
 existence. 
 
 Definition 2. That a thing is finite^ which can be limited by 
 another thing of the same kind, is obscure. For what is thought 
 Kmited by thought ? Or what other greater than it is given ? He 
 says that a body is limited because another greater than it can be 
 conceived. Add to this what is said below, Prop. 8. 
 
 Definition 3. Suhstance is that which is in itself and is con- 
 ceived throuo^h itseK. This also is obscure. For what is it to be 
 in itself ? Then we must ask. Are to be in itself and to be con- 
 ceived through itself conjoined cumulatively or disjunctively? 
 That is, whether this means : Substance is that which is in itself, 
 also substance is that which is conceived through itself ; or, indeed, 
 whether it means : Substance is that in which both these concur ; 
 namely, that it both is in itself and is conceived through itself. 
 Or it will be necessary for him to demonstrate that what has the 
 one, has also the other, when rather, on the contrary, it seems that 
 there are some things which are in themselves although they are 
 not conceived through themselves. And so men usually conceive 
 substances. He -adds : Substance is that, the conception of which 
 does not require the conception of another thing. But there is 
 also a difficulty in this, for in the following definition he says. An 
 attribute is that which the intellect perceives of substance as con- 
 stituting its essence. Therefore the concept of attribute is neces- 
 sary for the formation of the concept of substance. If you say 
 that the attribute is not the thing itself, but require indeed that 
 substance shall not need the conception of another thing, I reply : 
 You must explain what is called thing, that we may understand the 
 definition and how the attribute is not the thing. 
 
 Definition 4. That an attribute is that which the intellect per- 
 ceives of substance as constituting its essence, is also obscure. For 
 
12 
 
 we ask whether by attribute he understands every reciprocal predi- 
 cate ; or every essential predicate whether reciprocal or not ; or, 
 finally, every first or undemonstrable essential predicate. Vide 
 Definition 5. 
 
 Definition 5. A 7?iode is that which is in another and is con- 
 ceived through another. It seems, therefore, to differ from 
 attribute in this, that attribute is indeed something in substance, 
 yet is conceived through itself. And this explanation added, the 
 obscurity of Definition 4, is removed. 
 
 Definition 6. God, he says, I define as a being absolutely 
 infinite, or a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which 
 each expresses eternal and infinite essence. He ought to show 
 that these two definitions are equivalents, otherwise he cannot sub- 
 stitute the one in place of the other. But they will be equivalents 
 when he shall have shown that there are many attributes or predi- 
 cates in the nature of things, which are conceived through them- 
 selves ; likewise, when he shall have shown that many predicates 
 can co-exist. Moreover, every definition (although it may be true 
 and clear), is imperfect, which, although understood, allows of 
 doubt as to the possibility of the thing defined. This, moreover, is 
 such a definition, for thus far it may be doubted whether being 
 does not imply having infinite attributes. Or for this reason, 
 because it may be questioned whether the same simple essence can 
 be expressed by many diverse attributes. There are, indeed, many 
 definitions of compound things but only a single one of a simple 
 thing, nor does it seem that its essence can be expressed except in a 
 single way. 
 
 Definition T. A free thing is that which exfets and is deter- 
 mined to action by the necessity of its own nature ; a eonstra'i/ned 
 thing is that which is determined to existence and to action by 
 another. 
 
 Definition 8. By eternity I understand existence itself so far 
 as it is conceived to follow from the essence of a thing. These 
 definitions [i. e., 7 and 8], I approve. 
 
 As to the Axioms, I note these things : The first is obscure as 
 long as it is not established what to he in itself is. The second and 
 seventh require no comment. The sixth seems incongruous, for 
 every idea agrees with its ideate, nor do I see what a false idea can 
 be. The third, fourth and fifth can, I think, be demonstrated. 
 
13 
 
 Proposition 1. Substance is by nature prior to its modiiica- 
 tions ; that is, modes, for in Def. 5 he said that by modifications of 
 substance he understands modes. Still he did not explain what to 
 he hy naUire prior is, and thus this proposition cannot be demon- 
 strated from what precedes. Moreover, hy nature prior to another 
 seems to mean that through which another is conceived. Besides 
 I confess that there is some difficulty in this, for it seems that not 
 only can posterior things be conceived through the prior, but also 
 prior things through the posterior. Nevertheless, prior hy nature 
 may be defined in this way, as that which can be conceived 
 without another thing being conceived; as also, on the other 
 hand, the other, second thing, cannot be conceived except 
 the first itself be conceived. But if I may say what the 
 matter is, prior hy nature is a little too broad ; for example, the 
 property of ten, that it is 6 + 4, is by nature posterior to this, that 
 it is 6 + 3+1 (because the latter is nearer to the first of all : ten is 
 1 + 1 + 1+1 + 1 + 1+1 + 1 + 1+1) and nevertheless it can be con- 
 ceived without this ; nay, w^hat is more, it can be demonstrated 
 without it. I add another example : The property in a triangle, 
 that the three internal angles are equal to two right angles is by 
 nature posterior to this : that two internal angles are equal to the 
 external angle of the third, and nevertheless the former can be con- 
 ceived without the latter ; nay, even, although not equally easily, 
 it can be demonstrated without it. 
 
 Proposition 2. Two substances whose attributes are diverse 
 have nothing in common. If by attributes he means predicates 
 which are conceived through themselves, I concede the proposi- 
 tion, it being posited, however, that there are two substances, A 
 and B, and that c is an attribute of substance A, d an attribute of 
 substance B ; or if <?, ^ are all the attributes of substance A, like- 
 wise rZ, f are all the attributes of substance B. It is not so if these 
 two substances have some diverse attributes, some common attri- 
 butes, as if the attributes of A itself were <?, d and of B itself were 
 d^f. But if he denies that this can happen, the impossibility must 
 be demonstrated. He will, perchance, in case of objection, dem- 
 onstrate the proposition itself in this way : Because d and c equally 
 express the same essence (since ex hypothesi they are attributes of 
 the same substance. A), and for the same reason also d and f (since 
 also ex hypothesi they are attributes of the same substance, B); 
 
14 
 
 therefore c and /' express the same essence. Whence it follows 
 that A and B are the same substance, which is contrary to the 
 hypothesis ; therefore it is absurd to say that two diverse substances 
 have anything in common. I reply, that I do not concede that 
 there could be two attributes which can be conceived through 
 themselves, and nevertheless express the same thing. For when- 
 ever this happens then these two attributes, expressing the same 
 thing in a diverse way, can moreover be resolved, or at least one or 
 the other of them. This I can easily demonstrate. 
 
 Fboposition 3. Things which have nothing in common cannot 
 be the one the cause of the other, by Axioms 5 and 4. 
 
 Proposition 4. Two or more distinct things are distinguished 
 one from the other, either by the difference of the attributes of the 
 substances or by the difference of their modifications. He demon- 
 strates this thus : Everything which exists, exists either in itself or 
 in something else, by Axiom 1 ; that is, by Defs. 3 and 5, nothing 
 is granted in addition to the understanding, except substances and 
 their modifications. [Here I am surprised that he forgets attri- 
 butes for, Def. 5, by modification of substance he understands only 
 modes ; it follows, therefore, either that he spoke ambiguously, or 
 that attributes are not numbered by him among the things existing 
 outside of the understanding, but only substances and modes. 
 Still he could have proved the proposition more easily if only he 
 had added, that things which can be conceived through attributes or 
 modifications are necessarily known and therefore distinguished.] 
 
 Proposition 5. There cannot be given in the nature of things 
 two or more substances having the same nature or attribute. 
 
 [I note here what seems to be obscure in this, viz : in the nature 
 of things. Does he mean, in the universe of existing things, or in 
 the region of ideas or possible essences. Then it is not clear 
 whether he wishes to say that many essences are not given having 
 the same common attribute, or whether he wishes to say many 
 individuals are not given having the same essence. I wonder 
 indeed why he 'here employs the words nature and attribute as 
 equivalents, unless he understands by attribute that which contains 
 the whole nature. Which being posited, I do not see how there 
 can be given many attributes of the same substance which may be 
 conceived through themselves.] Demonstration : If they are dis- 
 tinguished, they are distinguished either by their modifications or 
 
15 
 
 by their attributes ; if by their modifications, then since substance 
 is by nature prior to its modifications, by Prop. 1, their modifica- 
 tions being put aside, they must still be distinguished, therefore, by 
 their attributes ; if by their attributes, then two substances are not 
 given possessing the same attribute. I reply that a paralogism 
 seems to lurk here. For two substances can be distinguished by 
 attributes, and yet have some common attribute, provided they also 
 have in addition some which are peculiar. For example, A and B ; 
 
 cd de 
 
 the attribute of the one being c d, of the other, d e. I remark that 
 Prop. 1 is only useful for this. But it might have been omitted 
 because it suffices that substance can be conceived without modifi- 
 cations whether it be by nature prior or not. • 
 
 Proposition 6. One substance cannot be produced by another 
 substance, for two substances, by Prop. 6, do not possess the same 
 attribute, therefore they have nothing in common, by Prop. 2 ; 
 therefore, it cannot be that one is the cause of the other, by Axiom 5. 
 The same in other words and more briefly : Because what is con- 
 ceived through itseK cannot be conceived through another as cause, 
 by Axiom 4. But I reply, that I grant the demonstration, if sub- 
 stance is understood as a thing which is conceived through itself ; 
 it is otherwise if it is understood as a thing which is in itself, as 
 men commonly understand it, unless it be shown that it be in itself 
 and to be conceived through itseK are the same thing. 
 
 Proposition 7. Existence belongs to the nature of substance. 
 Substance cannot be produced by anything else. Prop. 6. There- 
 fore it is the cause of itself ; that is, by Def. 1, its essence involves 
 existence. He is not unjustly censured because sometimes he 
 employs cause of itself as a definite something to which he ascribes 
 a peculiar signification, Def . 1 ; sometimes he uses it in the 
 common and vulgar meaning. Nevertheless, the remedy is easy, if 
 he converts this Def. 1 into an Axiom and says : Whatever is not 
 by another, is by itseK or of its own essence. But here other diffi- 
 culties still exist : the reasoning, namely, is valid only when it is 
 posited that substance can exist. For it is then necessary that, 
 since it cannot be produced by another, it exists by itseK, and thus 
 necessarily exist ; but it must be demonstrated that it is a possible 
 substance ; that is, that it can be conceived. It seems that it can 
 be demonstrated from the fact that if nothing can be conceived 
 
16 
 
 through itself nothing also can be conceived through another, and 
 hence nothing at all can be conceived. But that it may be shown 
 distinctly, we must consider that if a is posited as conceived 
 through h, there is in the conception of a itself the conception of h 
 itself. And again, if h is conceived through c, there is in the con. 
 ception of h the conception of e itself, and thus the conception of c 
 itself will be in the conception of a itself, and so on to the last. 
 But if any one reply that the last is not given, I answer, neither is 
 the first, which I thus show. Because in the conception of that 
 which is conceived through another there is nothing except what 
 belongs to the other, so step by step through many there will either 
 be nothing at all in it or nothing except what is conceived through 
 it itself ; which demonstration, I think, is wholly new but infalli- 
 ble. By this means we can demonstrate that what is conceived 
 through itself can be conceived. But nevertheless, thus far it can 
 be doubted whether it be possible in the way in which it is here 
 assumed to be possible, certainly not for that which can be con- 
 ceived, but for that of which some cause can be conceived, to be 
 resolved into the first. For those things which can be conceived 
 by us, nevertheless cannot therefore all be produced, on account of 
 others which are preferable and with which they are incompatible. 
 Therefore, being which is conceived through itself must be proved 
 to be in actual existence by the additional evidence that because 
 those things exist which are conceived through another, therefore 
 that also through which they are conceived, exists. You see what 
 very different reasoning is needed for accurately proving that a 
 thing exists through itself. However, perhaps there is no need of 
 this extreme caution. 
 
 Proposition 8. Every substance is necessarily infinite, since 
 otherwise it would be limited by another of the same nature, by 
 Def . 2, and two substances would be given with the same attribute, 
 contrary to Prop. 5. This proposition must be understood thus : 
 A thing which is conceived through itself is infinite in its own 
 kind, and thus is to be admitted. But the demonstration labors 
 not only with obscurity as respects this is limited, but also with 
 uncertainty, by reason of Prop. 5. In the scholium he has excellent 
 reasoning to prove that the thing which is conceived through itself 
 is one, of course after its kind, since many individuals are posited 
 as existing, therefore there ought to be a reason in nature why 
 
17 
 
 there are so many, not more. The reason which accounts for there 
 being so many accounts for this one and tliat one ; hence also for 
 this other one. But this reason is not found in one of these rather 
 than in another. Therefore it is outside of all. One objection 
 might be made, if it were said that the number of these is bound- 
 less or none, or that it exceeds every number. But it can be 
 disposed of, if we assume only some of these and ask why these 
 exist, or if we posit more having something in common, for exam- 
 ple existing in the same place, why they exist in this place. 
 
 Proposition 9. The more reality or being a thing has the 
 greater the number of its attributes. [He ought to have explained 
 what is meant by reality or being, for these terms are liable to 
 various significations.] Demonstration : It is clear from Def. 4. 
 Thus the author. It seems to me not to be clear from it. For one 
 thing may have more of reality than another, as w^hat is itself 
 greater in its own kind, or has a greater part of some attribute ; 
 for example, a circle has more extension than the inscribed square. 
 And still it may be doubted whether there are many attributes of 
 the same substance, in the way in which the author employs attri- 
 butes. I confess, however, that if this be admitted and if it is 
 posited that attributes are compatible, substance is more perfect 
 according as it has more attributes. 
 
 Proposition 10. Each particular attribute of the one substance 
 must be conceived through itself, by Defs. 4 and 3. But hence it 
 follows, as I have several times urged, that there is but a single 
 attribute of one substance, if it expresses the whole essence. 
 
 Proposition 11. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attri- 
 butes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essence, 
 necessarily exists. He oifers three demonstrations of this. First^ 
 because he is substance ; therefore, by Prop. Y, he exists. But in 
 this he supposes both that substance necessarily exists, which, up to 
 Prop. 7, was not sufiiciently demonstrated, and that God is a possi- 
 ble substance, which is not equally easy to demonstrate. Second. 
 There must be a reason as well why a thing is as why it is not. 
 But there can be no reason why God does not exist, not in his own 
 nature for it does not involve a contradiction ; not in another, for 
 that other will either have the same nature and attribute, and hence 
 will be God, or will not have them and hence will have nothing in 
 common with God, and thus it can neither posit nor prevent his 
 2 
 
18 
 
 existence. I reply, 1st, that it is not yet proved that the nature of 
 God does not involve a contradiction, although the author says it is 
 absurd to assert, without proof, that it does. 2d. There might be 
 something having the same nature with God in some things, not in 
 all. Third. Finite beings exist (by experience) ; therefore if tlie 
 infinite does not exist there will be beings more powerful than the 
 infinite being. It may be answered, if it implies anything, infinite 
 being will have no power at all. I need say nothing of the impro- 
 priety of calling the potentiality of existence a power. 
 
 Pkopositions 12 and 13. No attribute of substance can be 
 conceived, from which it would follow that substance can be 
 divided ; or substance taken absolutely is indivisible. For it will be 
 destroyed by division and the parts will not be infinite and hence 
 not substances. Many substances of the same nature would be 
 given. I grant it of a thing existing through itself. Hence the 
 corollary follows that no substance, and therefore no corporeal sub- 
 stance is divisible. 
 
 Proposition 14. Besides God, no substance can be granted or 
 conceived. Because all attributes belong to God, nor are several 
 substances having the same attribute given ; therefore, no sub- 
 stance besides God is given. All these suppose the definition of 
 substance, namely, being which is conceived through itself, and 
 many others noted above which are not to be admitted. [It does 
 not yet seem certain to me that bodies are substances. It is other- 
 wise with minds.] 
 
 Corollary 1. God is one. • 
 
 Corollary 2. Extension or thought are either attributes of 
 God, or, by Axiom . . ., modifications of attributes of God. [This 
 is speaking confusedly ; besides he has not yet shown that extension 
 and thought are attributes or conceived through themselves.] 
 
 Proposition 15. Whatever is, is in God, and without God 
 nothing can be, or be conceived. For since there is no substance 
 except God, Prop. 14, so all other things will be modifications of 
 God, or modes, since besides substances and modes nothing is given. 
 [Again he omits attributes.] 
 
 Proposition 16. From the necessity of the divine nature must 
 follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways ; that is, all 
 things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect, by 
 Def. 6. 
 
19 
 
 Corollary 1. Hence it follows that God is the efficient cause 
 of all things which fall under his intellect. 
 
 Corollary 2. God is a cause through himself, not indeed per 
 aceidens. 
 
 Corollary 3. God is the absolutely first cause. 
 
 Proposition 1Y. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, 
 and is not constrained by any one, since there is nothing outside of 
 himself. 
 
 Corollary 1. Hence it follows, 1st, that there can be no cause 
 which, either extrinsically or intrinsically, besides the perfection of 
 his own nature, moves God to act. 
 
 Corollary 2. God only is a free cause. 
 
 In the Scholium he further explains that God created everything 
 which is in his intellect (although, nevertheless, it seems that he 
 has created only those which he wished). He says also that the 
 intellect of God differs from our intellect in essence, and that, 
 except equivocally, the name intellect cannot be attributed to both, 
 just as the Dog, the heavenly constellation, and a dog, a barking 
 animal, differ. The thing caused differs from its cause in that 
 which it has from the cause. A man differs from man as respects 
 the existence which he has from that man ; he differs from God as 
 respects the essence which he has from God. 
 
 Proposition 18. God is the immanent, not the transient cause 
 of all things. From this it follows that God only is substance ; 
 other things are its modes. 
 
 Proposition 19. God, or all his attributes are eternal. For his 
 essence involves existence, and his attributes involve his essence. 
 In addition, the author cites and approves the way in which he 
 demonstrated this in Prop. 19 of his " Principles of Descartes." 
 
 Proposition 20. The essence of God and his existence are one 
 and the same thing. He proves all this from the fact that the 
 attributes of God because eternal (by Prop. 19), express existence 
 (by the definition of eternity). But they also express essence, by 
 the definition of attribute. Therefore essence and existence are 
 the same thing in God. I answer that this does not follow, but 
 only that they are expressed by the same. I note, moreover, that 
 this proposition supposes the preceding, but if in place of the pre- 
 ceding proposition its demonstration be employed in the demon- 
 stration of this, a senseless circumlocution will be apparent. Thus : 
 
20 
 
 I prove that the essence and existence of God are one and the same 
 thing, because the attributes of God express both existence and 
 essence. Thej express essence by the definition of attribute, they 
 express existence because tliey are eternal; they are, moreover, 
 eternal because they involve existence, for they express the essence 
 of God which involves existence. What need is there, therefore, 
 of mentioning the eternity of the attributes and Prop. 19, when the 
 point merely is to prove that the existence and essence of God 
 are one and the same thing, since the essence of God involves 
 existence. The rest is pompously introduced that it may be fash- 
 ioned into a sort of demonstration. Keasonings of this sort are 
 exceedingly common with those who do not possess the true art of 
 demonstration. 
 
 Corollary 1. Hence it follows that God's existence, like his 
 essence, is an eternal truth. I do not see how this proposition fol- 
 lows from the preceding ; on the contrary, it is far truer and clearer 
 than the preceding. For it is immediately apparent when it is 
 posited that the essence of God involves existence, although it may 
 not be admitted that they are one and the same. 
 
 Corollary 2. God and all his attributes are immutable. This 
 the author proposes and proves obscurely and confusedly. 
 
 Proposition 21. All things which follow from the absolute 
 nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite ; 
 or, in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attri- 
 bute. He demonstrates this obscurely and quite at length, 
 although it is easy. 
 
 Proposition 22. Whatsoever follows from any attribute of 
 God, in so far as it is modified by a modification which exists. nec- 
 essarily and as infinite through the said attribute, must also exist 
 necessarily and as infinite. He says the demonstration proceeds as 
 in the preceding. Therefore, also obscurely. I could wish that he 
 had given an example of such a modification. 
 
 Proposition 23. Every mode, which exists both necessarily and 
 as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature 
 of some attribute of God, or from some attribute modified by a 
 modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite. That is," 
 such a mode follows from the absolute nature of some attribute 
 either immediately or mediately through another such mode. 
 
21 
 
 Proposition 24. The essence of things produced by God does 
 not involve existence ; otherwise, by Def. 1, they would be the 
 cause of themselves, which is contrary to the hypothesis. This 
 from elsewhere is manifest ; but this demonstration is a paralogism. 
 For caiose of itself^ by his Def. 1, has not retained its common 
 meaning, but has received a peculiar one. Therefore the author 
 cannot substitute the common meaning of the word for the pecul- 
 iar one assumed by him at his will, unless he shows that they are 
 equivalent. [Leibnitz has remarked on the margin of the manu- 
 script : From this proposition it follows, contrary to Spinoza him- 
 self, that things are not necessary. For that is not necessary whose 
 essence does not involve existence. — Gerha/rdt.\ 
 
 Proposition 25. God is the efficient cause not only of the 
 existence of things but also of their essence. Otherwise the essence 
 of things could be conceived without God, by Axiom 4. But this 
 proof is of no moment. For even if we concede that the essence 
 of things cannot be conceived without God, from Prop. 15, it does 
 not therefore follow that God is the cause of the essence of things. 
 For the fourth axiom does not say this : That without which a 
 thing cannot he conceived is its cause (which would indeed be 
 false, for a circle cannot be conceived without a center, a line with- 
 out a point, but the center is not the cause of the circle nor the 
 point the cause of the line), but it says only this : Knowledge of the 
 effect involves knowledge of the cause^ wliich is quite different. 
 For this axiom is not convertible ; not to mention that to involve 
 is one thing, not able to he conceived without it is another. Knowl- 
 edge of a parabola involves in it knowledge of a focus, nevertheless 
 it can be conceived without it. 
 
 Corollary. Individual things are nothing but modifications of 
 the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are 
 expressed in a fixed and definite manner. This, he says, is evident 
 from Def. 5 and Prop. 15, but it does not appear in what way the 
 corollary is connected with this Prop. 25. Certainly Spinoza is 
 not a great master of demonstration. This corollary is sufficiently 
 evident from what was said above ; but it is true if it is understood 
 in a right sense, not indeed that things are such modes, but modes 
 of conceiving particular things are determinate modes of conceiv- 
 ing divine attributes. 
 
22 
 
 Proposition 28. Every individual thing, or everything which 
 is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be condi- 
 tioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a 
 cause other than itself, which also is finite, and has a conditioned 
 existence ; and likewise this by another, and so on ad infinitum. 
 Because nothing conditioned, finite and existing in a certain time, 
 can follow from the absolute essence of God. From this o}3inion 
 strictly taken many absurd consequences follow. For indeed 
 things will not follow in this way from the nature of God. For 
 the conditioning thing itself is again conditioned by another, and 
 so on ad infinitum. In no way, therefore, are things determined by 
 God. God only contributes of himself certain absolute and gen- 
 eral things. . It would be more correct to say, that one particular 
 thing is not determined by another in a progression ad infinitum.^ 
 for otherwise, indeed, they always remain indeterminate, however 
 far you progress ; but rather all particular things are determined 
 by God. ISTor are posterior things the full cause of prior things, 
 but rather God creates posterior things so that they are connected 
 with the prior, according to rules of wisdom. If we say that prior 
 things are the efficient causes of the posterior, the posterior will in 
 turn be in a way the final causes of the prior, according to the 
 view of those who claim that God operates according to ends. 
 
 Proposition 29. Nothing in the nature of things is contingent, 
 but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular 
 manner by the necessity of the divine nature. The demonstration 
 is obscure and abrupt, deduced from preceding propositions abrupt, 
 obscure and doubtful. It depends upon the definition of contin- 
 gent^ which he has nowhere given. I, with others, employ 
 contingent for that the essence of which does not involve existence. 
 In this meaning, particular things are contingent, according to 
 Spinoza himself, by Prop. 24. But if you employ contingent 
 according to the custom of certain scholastics, a custom unknown 
 to Aristotle and to other men and to the usage of life, for that 
 which happens, so that a reason can in no way be given why it 
 should occur thus rather than otherwise ; the cause of which also, 
 all the requisites as well within as without it having been posited, 
 was equally disposed toward acting or not acting ; I think that such 
 a contingent implies that all things are by their nature, according 
 to the hypothesis of the divine nature and the condition of things, 
 
23 
 
 certain and determinate, although unknown to us, and do not have 
 their determination in themselves but through the supposition or 
 hypothesis of things external to them. 
 
 Proposition 30. Intellect, in action {actu) finite, or in action 
 infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the modifica- 
 tions of God, and nothing else. This proposition, which is sufii- 
 ciently clear from the preceding and in a right sense true, our 
 author according to his custom proves by others which are obscure, 
 doubtful and remote ; namely, that a true idea must agree with its 
 ideate, that is, as known per se (so he says, although I do not see 
 how what is known per se is any the more true) ; that what is 
 contained in the intellect objectively must necessarily be granted 
 in nature ; that but one substance is given, namely, God. ]S"ever- 
 theless, these propositions are obscure, doubtful and far-fetched. 
 The genius of the author seems to have been greatly distorted. 
 He rarely proceeds by a clear and natural road ; he always goes by 
 an abrupt and circuitous one. And most of his demonstrations 
 rather surprise {surprennent) the mind than enlighten it. 
 
 Proposition 31. The intellect in action, whether finite or 
 infinite, as will, desire, love, etc., should be referred to passive 
 nature {natura naturata\ not to active nature (natura naturans). 
 He understands by active nature, God and his absolute attributes ; 
 by passive nature, his modes. But the intellect is nothing else 
 than a certain mode of thought. Hence elsewhere he says that 
 God properly does not know or will. I do not assent to this. 
 
 Proposition 32. Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a 
 necessary cause, because, forsooth, that is free which is determined 
 by itself. The will, moreover, is a mode of thought and so is mod- 
 ified by another. 
 
 Proposition 33. Things could have been produced by God in 
 no other manner or order than that in which they have been pro- 
 duced. For they follow from the immutable nature of God. This 
 proposition is true or false according as it is -explained. On the 
 hypothesis of a divine will choosing the best or operating most 
 perfectly, certainly nothing but these could have been produced; 
 but according to the nature of things regarded in themselves, things 
 might have been produced otherwise. Just as we say that the 
 angels confirmed [in lioliness] cannot sin, in spite of their hbei-ty ; 
 they can if they will but they do not will. They may be able, 
 
24 
 
 •abeolutelj speaking, to will it, but in this existing state of affairs 
 they are not able to will it. The author rightly acknowledges in 
 the scholium that a thing is rendered impossible in two ways, either 
 because it implies it in itself or because no external cause is given 
 suitable for producing it. In the second scholium he denies that 
 God does all things with the Good in view {suh rations honi). He 
 certainly has denied to him will, and he thinks that those differing 
 from him subject God to fate, although nevertheless he himself 
 confesses that God does all things by reason of the Perfect {suh 
 ratione jperfecti). 
 
 Peoposition 34. God's power is his very essence, because it 
 follows from the nature of essence that he is the cause of himself 
 and of other things. 
 
 Proposition 35. Whatever exists in the power of God exists 
 necessarily ; that is, follows from his essence. 
 
 Proposition 36. Nothing exists from whose nature some effect 
 does not follow, because it expresses the nature of God in a certain 
 and determined mode ; that is, by Prop. 34, the power of God [it 
 does not follow, but it is nevertheless true]. 
 
 He adds an Appendix against those who think that God acts 
 with an end in view, mingling true with false. For although it 
 may be true that all things do not happen for the sake of man, 
 nevertheless it does not follow that God acts without will or with- 
 out knowledge of good. 
 
 In the copy of Spinoza's Opera Posthuma, now contained in the 
 royal library at Hanover, Leibnitz has written the following notes : 
 
 Part Second of the " Ethics." 
 
 On Def . 4, " By an adequate idea, I mean an idea which, in so 
 far as it is considered in itself, without relation to the object has all 
 the properties or intrinsic marks of a true idea," Leibnitz \\Tites : 
 He had therefore to explain what a true idea is, for Part I, 
 Axiom 1, it is employed only as agreement with its ideate. 
 
 At the end of the Proof of Prop. 1, " Thought is an attribute of 
 God or God is a thinking thing," Leibnitz adds : In the same way 
 he will prove that God fears and hopes. If you reply that they 
 are modes of thought, it can perhaps be said that thought is a 
 mode of another attribute. 
 
25 
 
 On Prop. 6, " The modes of any given attribute are caused by 
 God, in so far as he is considered through the attribute of which 
 they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any 
 other attribute," Leibnitz remarks : I doubt it, because it seems 
 that something besides is required for modifying any attribute. 
 The reason is the same with that which concludes that not all 
 exist ; on the contrary, that certain distinct ones exist. 
 
 On Prop. 12, " Whatever comes to pass in the object of the idea, 
 which constitutes the human mind, must be perceived by the 
 human mind, or there will necessarily be an idea in the human 
 mind of this occurrence. That is, if the object of the idea constitut- 
 ing the human mind be a body, nothing can take place in that body 
 without being perceived by the mind," is written : Ideas do not 
 act. The mind acts. The whole world is indeed the object of 
 each mind. The whole world in a certain way is perceived by any 
 mind whatever. The world is one, and nevertheless minds are 
 diverse. Therefore the mind is made not through the idea of the 
 body, but because God in various ways intuites the world as I do a 
 city. 
 
 To Prop. 13, " The object of the idea constituting the human 
 mind is the body; in other words, a certain mode of extension 
 which actually exists, and nothing else," Leibnitz adds: Hence it 
 follows that some mind is momentarily, at least, in the same man. 
 
 At the end of the Proof to Prop. 15, " The idea which consti- 
 tutes the actual being of the human mind, is not simple, but 
 compounded of a great number of ideas," he remarks : Therefore, 
 also, the human mind is an aggregate of many minds. 
 
 On Prop. 20, " The idea or knowledge of the human rnind, is 
 also in God, following in God in the same manner, and being referred 
 to God in the same manner, as the idea or knowledge of the 
 human body," he writes : Therefore the idea of the idea is given. 
 Hence it would follow that the thing would go on in infinitum, if 
 indeed the hurhan mind is an idea. 
 
 On the words of the Scholium to Prop. 21, '' That is, mind and 
 body are one and the same individual, conceived now under the 
 attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension," he 
 remarks : Therefore, in fact, mind and body do not differ any more 
 than a city regarded in different ways differs from itself. It fol- 
 lows that extension does not in fact differ from thought, drona^ 
 
26 
 
 At the end of this scholium Leibnitz adds : Hence it follows that 
 to understand the idea of the body, or the mind, there is no need 
 of another idea. 
 
 On Prop. 23, " The mind does not know itself, except in so far 
 as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body," he 
 writes : If the mind perceives itself in any way whatsoever, it fol- 
 lows that there is no idea of the mind in God, other than from the 
 mind itself, for it perceives itself in so far as it expresses God per- 
 ceiving the mind. 
 
 On the words in the proof of this proposition, " The human mind 
 does not know the human body itself," he remarks : On the con- 
 trary, just as God or the mind knows the body through the ideas 
 of the modifications of the body, so they know the mind through 
 the ideas of the modifications of the mind. 
 
 Part Third of the "Ethios." 
 
 On Def. 3, " By emotion I rnean the modifications of the body 
 by which the active power of the body itself is increased or dimin- 
 ished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of these modifica- 
 tions," he remarks : Emotion is understood also when we do not 
 think of the body. 
 
 To Prop. 23, " When we love a thing similar to ourselves we 
 endeavor, as far as we can, to bring about that it should love us in 
 return," he writes : The reason why we endeavor to do good to it 
 is to bring about that we may be loved. But this can and ought 
 to be proved otherwise, for any one can will to do good although 
 he does not seek and think to be loved in return. 
 
 On Def. 2 of the Emotions, " Joy is the transition of a man 
 from less to greater perfection," he remarks : I can increase the 
 perfection of the body, so that I am not aware that I am becoming 
 more beautiful and that my ^mbs are growing to greater strength. 
 It may be replied that this transition is insensible, and so also is 
 the joy. 
 
 On Parts lY and Y of the Ethics no remarks are found. 
 
III. 
 
 Thoughts on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas. 
 [From the Latin. Acta Eruditorum Lipsiensium, Nov., 1684.] 
 
 Since eminent men are to-day raising discussions concerning true 
 and false ideas, and since this subject, which even Descartes has 
 not always satisfactorily explained, is of the greatest importance 
 for the knowledge of truth, I propose to explain in a few words, 
 what, in mj opinion, may be said with certainty regarding the 
 distinctions and the criteria of our ideas and of our knowledge. 
 Thus knowledge is either obscure or clear^ and clear knowledge is 
 farther either confused or distinct, and distinct knowledge is either 
 inadequate or adequate, or again, symbolical or intuitive ; and if 
 it is at the same time Xsymholicat^ and intuitive, it is perfect in 
 every respect. 
 
 A notion is obscure when it is not sufficient to enable us to 
 recognize the thing represented ; as for example, where I should 
 have some vague idea of a flower or of an animal which I should 
 have already seen but not sufficiently to be able to recognize it if 
 offered to my sight, nor to distinguish it from some neighboring 
 animal ; or where I should consider some term badly defined in 
 the schools, such as the entelechy of Aristotle, or ca^ose in so far 
 as it is common to matter, to form, to efficient cause, or to end, 
 and other expressions of which we have no fixed definition ; this 
 renders the proposition of which such a notion forms part equally 
 obscure. Knowledge then is clear when it is sufficient to enable 
 me to recognize the thing represented, and it is farther either con- 
 futed or distinct / confised, when I cannot enumerate separately 
 the marks necessary to distinguish one thing from others, notwith- 
 standing that the object has in reality such marks, as well as data 
 requisite to the analysis of the notion. It is thus that we recog- 
 nize clearly enough, colors, odors, flavors and other particular 
 objects of the senses, and that we distinguish the one from the 
 other by the simple testimony of the senses and not by enunci- 
 able signs. This is why we cannot explain to a blind person what 
 red is, nor can we make other people recognize qualities of this 
 
28 
 
 kind except by placing them in direct communication with them, 
 that is, by making them see, smell and taste, or at least by 
 recalling to them a certain sensation which they have already 
 experienced ; and nevertheless it is certain that the notions of 
 these qualities are composite and may be analyzed, because they 
 have their causes. Just so we often see painters or other artists 
 who judge very correctly that a work is good or defective, without 
 being able to account for their judgment, and who reply to those 
 who ask their opinion, that that of which they disapprove, lacks 
 somethings, I know not what. But a distinct notion resembles 
 that which the assayers have of gold, by the aid of distinctive signs 
 and of means of comparison sufficient to distinguish the object 
 from all other similar bodies. Such are the means of which we 
 make use for notions common to several senses, such as those of 
 number, of magnitude and of figure, as well as for many affections 
 of the mind, such as hope and fear : in a word, for all the objects 
 of which we have a nominal definition^ which is nothing else than 
 an enumeration of sufficient distinctive marks. We have however 
 a distinct knowledge of an indefinable tiling when it is primitive, 
 or when it is only the mark of itself — that is, when it is irreducible 
 and is only understood through itself, and consequently does not 
 possess the requisite marks. As for composite notions where each 
 of the component marks is sometimes clearly known, although in 
 a confused way, as gravity, color, aqua fortis, which form a part 
 of those [the marks] of gold, it follows that such a knowledge of 
 gold is distinct without always being adequate. But when all the 
 elements of a distinct notion are themselves also known distinctly, 
 or when its analysis is complete, the idea is adequate. I do not 
 know that men can give a perfect example of this, although the 
 knowledge of numbers approaches it very nearly. It very often 
 happens, nevertheless, especially in a long analysis, that we do not 
 perceive the whole nature of the object at one time, but substitute 
 in place of the things, signs, the explanation of which, in any 
 present thought, we are accustomed for the sake of abbreviation 
 to omit, knowing or believing that we can give it ; thus when I 
 think a chiliogon, or polygon with a thousand equal sides, I do 
 not always consider the nature of a side, of equality, and of the 
 number thousand (or of the cube of ten) ; but these words, the 
 sense of which presents itself to my mind in an obscure, or at least 
 
29 
 
 imperfect manner, take the place to me of the ideas which I have 
 of them, because my memory attests to me that I know the signifi- 
 cation of these words, and that their explanation is not now neces- 
 sary for any judgment. I am accustomed to call this thought 
 blind or again symboliGol / and we make use of it in algebra, in 
 arithmetic and almost everywhere. And assuredly when a ques- 
 tion is very complex, we cannot embrace in thought at the same 
 time all the elementary notions w^hich compose it ; but when this 
 can be done, or at least as far as this can be done, I call this 
 thought intuitive. We can only have an intuitive knowledge of a 
 distinct, primitive notion, as most often we have only a symbohcal 
 knowledge of composite ideas. 
 
 From this it clearly follows that even of the things which we 
 know distinctly, we only conceive the ideas in as far as they form 
 the object of intuitive thought. Also it often happens that we 
 imagine that we have in our minds the ideas of things, from suppos- 
 ing wrongly that we have already explained to ourselves the terms 
 of which we make use. And it is not true, as some say, or at least 
 it is very uncertain, that we cannot speak of anything, understand- 
 ing fully what we say, without having an idea of it. For often 
 we vaguely understand each of these terms or we remember that 
 we have formerly understood them ; but as we content ourselves 
 with this blind thought and as we do not push far enough the 
 analysis of notions, it happens that unwittingly we fall into the 
 contradiction which the composite idea may imply. I have been 
 led to examine this question more closely by an argument, long 
 celebrated in the schools and renewed by Descartes, for proving 
 the existence of God. It is as follows : All that follows from the 
 idea or from the definition of a thing may be aflfirmed of the thing 
 itself. From the idea of God (or the most perfect being, or one a 
 greater than whom cannot be conceived), existence follows. (For 
 the most perfect being involves all perfections, among which is 
 also existence). Therefore existence may be affirmed of God. But 
 it must be known how it comes about that if God be possiUe, it 
 follows that he exists. For to conclude, we cannot safely use 
 definitions before knowing whether they are real and do not 
 involve any contradiction. The reason of this is, that if the ideas 
 involve contradiction, opposite things may be concluded at the 
 same time, which is absurd. I am accustomed, in order to render 
 
30 
 
 this truth clear, to make use of the example of quickest motion, 
 which involves an absurdity. Suppose then that a wheel turn w4th 
 the quickest motion, who does not see that a spoke prolonged will 
 move more rapidly at its extremity than at the center of the cir- 
 cumference ; therefore the motion is not the quickest, which is 
 contrary to the hypothesis. However it seems at first view, as if 
 we might have an idea of quickest motion, for we understand fully 
 what we say, and yet we cannot have an idea of impossible things. 
 So it does not sufiice that we think the most perfect being, to 
 assure us that we have the idea of such a being, and in the demon- 
 stration which we have just produced, the possibility of the most 
 perfect being must be shown or supposed, if the conclusion be 
 legitimately drawn. However it is very true both that we have 
 an idea of God, and that the most perfect being is possible^ and 
 even necessary^ but the argument is not conclusive and has already 
 been rejected by Thomas Aquinas. 
 
 And it is thus that we find a difference between nominal defini- 
 tions, which only contain the marks of the thing which is to be 
 distinguished from others, and real definitions which show clearly 
 that the thing is possible. And in this way answer is made to 
 Hobbes, who pretended that truths were arbitrary, because they 
 depended on nominal definitions, not considering that the reality 
 of the definition is independent of arbitrariness, and that no- 
 tions are not always reconcilable among themselves. Nominal 
 definitions are only sufficient to a perfect science when it is well 
 established otherwise that the thing defined is possible. It is very 
 evident also what a true idea is, what a false ; the idea is true when 
 the notion is possible ; it is false when the notion involves contra- 
 diction. Now we know the possibility of a thing either a priori or 
 a posteriori. A priori, when we resolve the notion into its 
 elements, or into other notions of known possibility, and when we 
 know that it includes nothing which is incompatible ; and, to cite 
 but one case, this takes place when we understand by what means a 
 thing may be produced, a fact which makes causal definitions more 
 useful than any others : a posteriori, when experience shows us the 
 thing actually existing ; for that which exists in fact is necessarily 
 possible. Every time that we have an adequate knowledge, we 
 have also knowledge of the possibility a priori ; for if we push the 
 analysis to the end and no contradiction appears, the notion is 
 
31 
 
 necessarily possible. Now, is it possible that men should ever con- 
 struct a perfect analysis of notions, or that they should reduce their 
 thoughts down to first possihilities, to irreducible notions, or what 
 is the same thing, down to the absolute attributes of God ; that is, 
 to the first causes and to the final reason of things ? I should not 
 dare to actually decide this question. Most often we content our- 
 selves with learning from experience the reality of certain notions, 
 from which afterwards we compose others, after the example of 
 nature. 
 
 Whence I think it may be understood that it is not always safe 
 to appeal to ideas, and that many abuse this specious title for 
 establishing certain imaginations of their own. For we. have not 
 always immediately the idea of the thing of which we are conscious 
 of thinking, as we have shown above in the example of greatest swift- 
 ness. And I see that none the less to-day do men abuse this famous 
 principle : Everything that I concewe dearly and distinctly of a 
 thing is true or may he predicated of it. For often men, judging 
 hastily, imagine things clear and distinct which are obscure and 
 confused. The axiom is therefore useless unless the criteria of 
 clearness and distinctness, which we have indicated be applied, and 
 the truth of the ideas be well established. As for the rest, it is not 
 necessary in the exposition of truth to reject as criteria the rules of 
 ordinary logic of which geometricians make use and which consist 
 in admitting nothing as certain which is not proved by exact expe- 
 rience or solid demonstration. ]^ow a solid demonstration is one 
 which observes the form prescribed by logic, without, however, 
 always having need of syllogisms disposed in the regular order of 
 the schools (like those of which Christianus Herlinus and Conradus 
 Dasypodius made use for the demonstration of the first six books 
 of Euclid) ; but at least in such a way that the reasoning is conclu- 
 sive by virtue of its form — an example of such reasoning conceived 
 in the regular form may be found in any legitimate calculus. 
 Thus no necessary premise will be omitted, and all the previous 
 premises must be either proved or at least admitted as hypotheses, 
 in which case the conclusion is hypothetical. Those who will care- 
 fully observe these rules will easily guard themselves from 
 deceptive ideas. It is in accordance with such principles that the 
 great genius, Pascal, in an excellent dissertation on the Matheniatr 
 ical Genius (a fragment of which exists in the remarkable book of 
 
32 
 
 the celebrated Antoine Arnauld, On the Art of Thinking Well), says 
 that the geometrician must define all terms in the least obscure and 
 prove all truths in the least doubtful. But I wish he had defined 
 the limits beyond which a notion or an affirmation is no longer in 
 the least obscure or doubtful. However, we may judge what there 
 is in it by an attentive examination of the considerations which we 
 have just mentioned, for now I wish to be brief. 
 
 As to the question whether we see all things in God (an old 
 opinion, too, which reasonably understood ought not to be 
 altogether rejected), or whether we have ideas of our own, it must 
 be understood that even if we see all things in God it is none the 
 less necessary that we have also ideas of our own ; that is, not as it 
 were certain Httle images, but affections or modifications of our 
 mind, answering to that which we perceive in God. For since our 
 thoughts are constantly being succeeded by others, a certain change 
 is wrought in our mind ; as for the things not actually conceived 
 by us, ideas of them are in our mind as the statue of Hercules in 
 the rough marble. But with God, on the contrary, must neces- 
 sarily exist in actuality the idea not only of absolute and infinite 
 extension, but also of each figure, which is nothing else than the 
 modification of absolute extension. Moreover, when we perceive 
 colors and odors we have no other perception but that of figures 
 and motions, but so multiplex and delicate that our mind, in its 
 present state, is incapable of distinctly considering each one and 
 consequently it does not notice that the perception is only com- 
 posed of extremely small figures and motions. So when, after 
 having mixed yellow powder with blue we perceive a green color, 
 we do not perceive anything but the yellow and blue minutely 
 mixed, although we do not notice it, or rather imagine that we per- 
 ceive some new entity. 
 
lY. 
 
 Extract from a Letter to Bayle, Concerning a General 
 Principle useful in the Explanation of the Laws of 
 JSTature. 1687. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 I HAVE seen the reply of Malebranclie to the remark which I 
 made concerning certain laws of nature which he had estab- 
 lished in the Search after Truth. He seems sufficiently disposed 
 to abandon them himself, and this ingenuousness is highly praise- 
 worthy; but as he gives reasons and restrictions, which would 
 land us in the obscurity from which I think I have relieved this 
 subject, and which clash with a certain princijple of general order 
 which I have observed, I hope that he will have the kindness to 
 permit me to avail myself of the present opportunity to explain 
 this principle, which is of great use in reasoning and which I think 
 is not yet sufficiently employed nor sufficiently known in all its 
 bearing. It takes its origin from the infinite / it is absolutely nec- 
 essary in geometry but it holds good also in physics, for this reason 
 that the sovereign wisdom which is the source of all things acts as 
 a perfect geometrician, and according to a harmony to which noth- 
 ing can be added. This is why this principle often serves as proof 
 or test to show at first sight and from without, the error of a badly 
 constructed opinion, even before coming to the discussion of the 
 matter itself. It may be stated thus : When the difference of two 
 cases may be diminished below any magnitude given in datis or in 
 that which is posited, it must also be found diminished below any 
 magnitude given in quaesitis or in that which results therefrom. 
 Or to express it more familiarly, when the cases (or that which is 
 given), continually approach each other and finally lose themselves 
 one in the other, the results or events (or that which is required), 
 must also do the same. This depends again on a more general 
 principle, to wit: datis ordinatis etiam quaesita sunt ordinata. 
 But in order to understand it examples are necessary. 
 
 It is known that the case or the supposition of an illipse may 
 approach the case of a parabola as much as may be, so that 
 3 
 
34 
 
 the difference of the illipse and of the parabola may become less 
 than any given difference, provided that one of the foci of the 
 ilKpse be sufficiently distant from the other, for then the radii com- 
 ing from this distant focus will differ from the parallel radii as 
 little as may be, and consequently all the geometrical theorems 
 which are true of the illipse in general can be applied to the 
 parabola by considering the latter as an illipse, one of the foci of 
 which is infinitely distant, or (to avoid this expression), as a figure 
 which differs from some illipse less than any given difference. 
 The same principle holds good in physics ; for example, rest may 
 be considered as an infinitely small velocity, or as an infinite slow- 
 ness. This is why all that is true in respect to slowness or velocity 
 in general, must be true also of rest thus understood ; so much so 
 that the rule of rest ought to be considered as a particular case of 
 the rule of motion ; otherwise, if this does not hold, it will be a 
 sure sign that the rules are badly contrived. So equality may be 
 considered as an infinitely small inequality, and inequality may be 
 made to approach equality as much as you please. 
 
 It is among other faults of this consideration that Descartes, very 
 able man as he was, failed in more than one way in his pretended 
 laws of nature. For (not to repeat here what I said before of the 
 other source of his error, when he took the quantity of movement 
 for force), his first and his second rules, for example, do not agree ; 
 the second says that two bodies, B and C, meeting in the same 
 line with equal velocities, and B being as little as possible larger, 
 C will be turned back with its first velocity, but B will continue its 
 movement; whereas according to the first rule, B and C being 
 equal, both will turn back and retrograde with a velocity equal to 
 that which had carried them thither. But the difference in the 
 results of these two cases is not reasonable ; for the inequality of 
 the two bodies may be as slight as you please, and the difference 
 which is in the suppositions of these two cases, to wit : the differ- 
 ence between such an inequality and a perfect equality could be 
 less than any given ; hence, by virtue of our principle, the differ- 
 ence between the results or outcomes ought also to be less than any 
 given ; notwithstanding if the second rule were as true as the first 
 the contrary would happen, for according to this second rule 
 any increase, however small, of body B before equal to C, makes 
 a difference grandissime in the effect, such that it changes absolute 
 
35 
 
 retrogression into absolute continuation, which is a great leap from 
 one extremity to the other, whereas in this case body B ought to 
 turn back a little less, and body C a little more than in the case 
 of equality, from which this case can hardly be distinguished. 
 
 There are many other like incongruities resulting from the Car- 
 tesian rules, which the attention of a reader applying our principle 
 will easily remark, and the like case which I had found in the 
 rules of the Search after Truth came from the same source. 
 Malebranche in a way avows that there are inconsistencies, but he 
 does not cease to believe that the laws of movement depending on 
 the good pleasure of God, are regulated by his wisdom, and the 
 geometricians would be also almost as much surprised to see these 
 kinds of irregularities coming into nature as to see a parabola to 
 which might be applied the properties of an illipse with an infin- 
 itely distant focus. Also such inconsistencies will never be 
 encountered in nature, I think. The better it is kno\sTi tlie more 
 it is found to be geometrical. It is easy to judge from this that 
 these inconsistencies do not properly come from that which Male- 
 branche asserts they do, to wit : from the false hypothesis of the 
 perfect hardness of bodies, which I admit is not found in nature. 
 For even if we should suppose in it this hardness, regarding it as 
 infinitely quick elasticity, there would result from it nothing which 
 could not be adjusted perfectly to the true laws of nature as 
 regards elastic bodies in general, and never shall we encounter rules 
 so little connected as these in which I have found something to 
 censure. It is true that in composite things sometimes a little 
 change may produce a great effect ; as for example, a spark falling 
 into a great mass of gunpowder is capable of overturning a whole 
 city ; but this is not contrary to our principle, and these cases may 
 be accounted for by even general principles, but as respects ele- 
 ments or simple things, nothing similar could happen, otherwise 
 nature would not be the effect of infinite wisdom. 
 
 Whence it is seen (a little better than in what is commonly said 
 of it), how true physics must be derived really from the source of 
 the divine perfections. It is God who is the final reason of things 
 and the knowledge of God is no less the principle of the sciences 
 than his essence and his will are the principles of beings. The 
 most reasonable philosophers agree in this, but there are very few 
 of them who can make use of it to discover truths of importance. 
 
36 
 
 Perhaps these little attempts will arouse some to go much farther. 
 It is sanctifying philosophy to make its streams flow from the 
 fountain of the attributes of God. Far from excluding ^^^Z causes 
 and the consideration of a being acting with wisdom, it is from 
 thence that all must be derived in physics. This it is which 
 Socrates in the Phaedo of Plato has already admirably remarked, 
 when reasoning against Anaxagoras and other material philoso- 
 phers who, after having at first recognized an intelligent principle 
 above matter, do not employ it at all when they come to philoso- 
 phize on the universe, and instead of showing that this intelligence 
 does everything for the best, and that this is the reason of the 
 things which it has found good to produce conformably to its ends, 
 try to explain everything by the mere concourse of senseless parti- 
 cles, confounding the conditions and instruments with the true 
 cause. It is (said Socrates), as if in order to explain why I am 
 seated in prison awaiting the fatal stroke and am not on the 
 way to the Boeotians or other peoples, whither, it is known, I 
 might have escaped, it should be said that it is because I have 
 bones, tendons and muscles which can be bent as is necessary in 
 order to be seated. My faith (he says), these bones and these mus- 
 cles would not b§ here, and you would not see me in this posture if 
 my mind had ' not judged that it is more worthy of Socrates to 
 suffer what the laws of the country ordain. This passage in Plato 
 deserves to be read entire, for these are very beautiful and solid 
 reflections. ISTevertheless I admit that particular effects of nature 
 may and must be explained mechanically, without forgetting, how- 
 ever, their admirable designs and uses which Providence has known 
 how to take care of, but the general principles of physics and even 
 of mechanics themselves depend on the direction of a sovereign 
 intelligence, and cannot be explained without taking it into consid- 
 eration. Thus it is that piety must be reconciled with reason, and 
 that good people may be satisfied who fear the results of the 
 mechanical or corpuscular philosophy, as if it would lead us from 
 God and immaterial substances, whereas with the required correc- 
 tions and everything well understood, it ought to lead us to him. 
 
Y. 
 
 Letter from Leibnitz to Arnauld in which he states his 
 
 Personal Yiews on Metaphysics and Physics. 1690. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 Sir — I am now on the point of returning home after a long 
 journey, undertaken at the order of my prince for the purpose of 
 historical researches, in which I found certificates, titles and indu- 
 bitable proofs sufficient to justify the common origin of the illus- 
 trious houses of Brunswick and Este, which Messrs. Justel, 
 du Cange and others had good reasons for calling in question, 
 because there were contradictions and falsities in the historians of 
 Este in this respect, together with an utter confusion of times and 
 persons. At present I think of returning and resuming my former 
 course of life, and having written to you two years ago shortly 
 before my departure, I take the same liberty to-day, to inform 
 myself of your health, and to make known to you how the idea of 
 your eminent merit is always present in my mind. When I was at 
 Pome I saw the denunciation of a new heresy attributed to you, or 
 to your friends, and afterwards I saw the letter of reverend Father 
 Mabillon to one of my friends, in which there was the statement 
 that the defense by the reverend Father Le Tellier of the mission- 
 aries against the practical morals of the Jesuits, had given to many 
 people impressions favorable to these Fathers, but that he had heard 
 that you had replied to it and that it was said that you had overthrow^!! 
 by geometrical reasoning the arguments of that Father. All of 
 which leads me to think that you are still in condition to render 
 service to the public, and I pray God that it may be so for a long 
 time to come. It is true that this is to my interest, but it is a 
 praiseworthy interest which may give me the means of learning, 
 Whether it be in common with all others who shall read your 
 works, or personally, when your judgments shall instnict me — if 
 the little leisure you have may permit me again to hope sometimes 
 for that advantage. 
 
 As this voyage has in part served to relieve my mind from its 
 ordinary occupations, I have had the satisfaction of conversing on 
 
38 
 
 matters of science and erudition with several able men, and I have 
 communicated my personal views, which you know, to some in 
 order to profit by their doubts and difficulties ; and there have been 
 some who, not satisfied with the common doctrines, have found an 
 extraordinary satisfaction in some of my views. This has led me 
 to write them down that they may be the more easily communi- 
 cated, and perhaps I shall cause some copies to be printed some 
 day without my name, merely to send them to my friends in order 
 that I may have their judgment on them. I would like you to be 
 able to examine them first, and for that reason I have made the 
 following abstract : 
 
 Body is an aggregate of substances, and not properly speaking 
 one substance. It must be, consequently, that everywhere in body 
 there are found indivisible substances, ingenerable and incorruptible, 
 having something corresponding to souls. That all these substances 
 have always been and always will be united to organic bodies differ- 
 ently transformable. That each of these sul)stances contains in its 
 nature legem continuationis se^'iei suobvum oj^erationutn and all 
 that has happened or will happen to it. That all its actions come 
 from its own depths, except dependence on God. That each sub- 
 stance expresses the entire universe, but one more distinctly than 
 an other, especially each as regards certain things and according to 
 its own point of view. That the union of soul with body, and the 
 operation also of one substance or another consists merely in that 
 perfect mutual accord, expressly established by order of the first 
 creation, in virtue of which each substance following its own laws 
 agrees in what the others demand ; and tlie operations of the one 
 follow or accompany thus the operation or change of the otlier. 
 That intelligences or souls capable of reflection and of the knowl- 
 edge of eternal truths and of God,' have many privileges which 
 exempt them from the vicissitudes of bodies. That for them moral 
 laws must be added to physical. That all things are made princi- 
 pally for them. That they form together the republic of the 
 universe, of which God is the monarch. That there is a perfect 
 justice and police observed in this city of God, and that there is no 
 wrong action without chastisement, nor good action without pro- 
 portioned recompense. That the more we come to know things, 
 the more we will find them beautiful and conformed to that Avdiich 
 a sage would desire. That we should always be content with the 
 
39 
 
 order of the past, because it is conformed to the absolute will of 
 God which is known by the event ; but that we must try to render 
 the future as far as it depends on us, conformable to the presump- 
 tive will of God or to his commandments ; to beautify our Sparta 
 and to labor to do good, without being depressed, however, when 
 success fails, and this in the firm belief that God can discover the 
 times most suited for changes for the better. That those who are 
 not satisfied with the order of things cannot boast of loving God as 
 he should be loved. That justice is but the love of the sage. 
 That love is a universal benevolence which the sage fulfils con- 
 formably to the measure of reason, to the end of obtaining lasting 
 contentment, which consists in a continual advance to greater per- 
 fection, or at least in the variation of a like degree of perfection. 
 
 As regards physics, it is necessary to understand the nature of force, 
 a thing entirely different from motion, which is something more rel- 
 ative. That this force is to be measured by the quantity of effect. 
 That there is an absolute force, a directive force and a respective 
 force. That each of these forces continues in the same degree in 
 the universe, or in each machine not in communication with others, 
 and that the two latter forces, taken together, compose the first or 
 absolute. But that the same quantity of movement is not pre- 
 served, since I show that otherwise the perpetual movement would 
 be all found, and that the effect would be more powerful than its 
 cause. 
 
 It is now some time ago that I published in the Leipsic Acta an 
 essay on physics, to find the physical cause of the movements of 
 the stars. I lay down as basis that all movement of a soHd in a 
 liquid, taking place in a curved line or the velocity of which is 
 continually changing, comes from the movement of the liquid 
 itself; whence I draw the inference that the stars have con- 
 forming but fluid orbits. I have demonstrated an important 
 general proposition, viz : that every body that moves with a circu- 
 lation which is harmonious (i. e., such that the distances from the 
 center being in arithmetical progression the velocities are in har- 
 monious progression, or reciprocal to the distances), and which 
 furthermore has a paracentric movement, that is, of gravity or of 
 levity as regards the same center (a certain law which this attrac- 
 tion or repulsion keeps), the said body has the areas necessarily as 
 the times, just as Kepler observed among the planets. Then con- 
 
40 
 
 sidering ex ohservationihus^ that this movement is elliptic, I find 
 that the laws of paracentric motion, which motion joined to har- 
 monious circulation describes ellipses, must be such that the 
 gravitations are reciprocally as the squares of the distances ; i. e., as 
 the illuminations ex sole. 
 
 I shall say nothing to you of my calculus of increments or differ- 
 ences, by which I determine the tangents, without eliminating the 
 irrational quantities and fractions even when the unknown quan- 
 tity is involved in them, and I subject quadratics and the 
 transcendent problems to analysis. And I will not speak either of 
 an entirely new analysis which belongs to geometry and is entirely 
 different from algebra ; and still less of some other things on which 
 I have not yet had time to prepare essays. All of which I should 
 like to be able to explain to you in few words, in order to have 
 your opinion, which would be of greatest use to me, on them ; if 
 you had as much leisure as I have deference for your judgment. 
 But your time is too precious, and my letter is already sufficiently 
 long. Therefore I close here, and am, sir. 
 
 Your obedient and humble servant, 
 
 Leibnitz. 
 Venice, March 23, 1690. 
 
YI. 
 
 Letter on the Question, Whether the Essence of Body 
 Consists in Extension. 1691. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 You ask, sir, the reasons which I have for beheving that the 
 idea of body or of matter is other than that of extension. It is 
 true; as you say, that many able men are to-day of the opinion that 
 the essence of body consists in length, breadth and depth. Never- 
 theless there are still others who cannot be accused of too much 
 attachment to scholasticism, who are not content with this opinion. 
 
 M. Nicole, in a certain place in his Essais, states that he is of" this 
 number and it seems to him that there is more of bias than of 
 insight in those who do not appear repelled by the difficulties 
 which are therein encountered^ 
 
 It would require a very full discourse to explain clearly what I 
 think on the subject. However, here are some considerations 
 which I submit to your judgment, and I beg you to make it known 
 to me. 
 
 If the essence of body consisted in extension, this extension 
 alone ought to be sufficient to account for all the properties of 
 body. But this is not so. We notice in matter a quality, called 
 by some natural inertia^ by which body resists movement in a cer- 
 tain way ; so that it is necessary to employ some force to set it in 
 motion (even making abstraction of the weight), and a large body 
 is moved with more difficulty than a small body. For example : 
 
 Fig. I. ( ) 
 
 if body A, in motion, encounters body B, at rest, it is evident that 
 if body B were indifferent to motion or to rest, it would allow itself 
 to be pushed by body A without resisting it, and without decreas- 
 ing the velocity or changing the direction of body A ; and after 
 their meeting A would continue its path and B would go in com- 
 pany with it, preceding it. But it is not thus in nature. The 
 
42 
 
 larger body B is, the more it will decrease the velocity with which 
 body A moves, even to compelling it to retrograde if B is much 
 larger than A. I^ow if there were nothing in hodies hut exten- 
 sion, or situation, that is, that which geometricians recognize in 
 them, joined to the one notion of change ; this extension would be 
 entirely indifferent respecting this change, and the results of the 
 meeting of bodies would be explained by the mere geometrical 
 composition of movements ; that is to say, the body after the meet- 
 ing would advance with a movement composed of the impression 
 which it had before the shock and of that which it received from 
 the concurrent, in order not to. hinder it; that is, in this case of 
 meeting it would go with the difference of the two velocities and 
 from the side of the direction. 
 
 As the velocity of 2 A 3 A, or 2 B 3 B, in figure II, is tlie differ- 
 ence between 1 A 2 A and 1 B 2 B ; and in the case of contact^ 
 figure III, when the 
 
 Fig. 
 
 "O 
 
 Pig. hi. 
 
 1 A 
 
 2 A 
 
 2 B 
 
 
 6 • 
 
 
 o 
 
 1 A 
 
 1 B 
 
 2 A 2 B 1 
 
 
 
 »• ' ** 
 
 
 
 \ 
 
 1 B 
 
 3A 
 
 
 S 
 
 
 
 jk 
 
 
 3 A 
 
 3 B 
 
 \ I 
 
 ;. ^1 
 
 3 B 
 
 quickest should touch a slower one which precedes it, the slower 
 would receive the velocity of the other, and in general they would 
 proceed always together after the meeting ; and in particular, as I 
 said at the beginning, that one which is in motion would carry for- 
 ward the one in repose, without receiving any diminution of its 
 speed, and without the size, equality or inequality of the two 
 bodies changing in any respect ; a thing utterly irreconcilable with 
 experience. And even if we should suppose that size ought to make 
 a change in the movement we should have no principle for deter- 
 mining the means of estimating it in detail, and for knowing the 
 
43 
 
 resulting direction and velocity. In any case we should incline to 
 the opinion of the conservation of motion ; whereas I believe that I 
 have proved that the same force is preserved, and that its quantity 
 is different from the quantity of the motion. 
 
 All this shows that there is in matter something other than 
 what is purely geometrical ; that is, than extension and " its 
 change pure and simple. And when we consider it well we 
 perceive that there must be joined to it some higher or metaphys- 
 ical notion, to wit : that of substance^ action and force ; and that 
 these notions show that everything which suffers must act recipro- 
 cally, and that everything which acts must suffer some reaction ; 
 and consequently that a body at rest cannot be carried along by 
 another in motion without changing something of the direction and 
 of the velocity of the agent. 
 
 I agree that naturally every body is extended, and that there is 
 no extension without body. JS'evertheless the notions of place, of 
 space, of pure extension, must not be confounded with the notion 
 of substance which besides extension includes resistance, that is 
 action and passion. 
 
 This consideration seems to me important, not only in order to 
 know the nature of extended substance, but also in order not to 
 slight in physics the higher and immaterial principles, to the 
 prejudice of piety. For although I am persuaded that everything 
 takes place mechanically in corporeal nature I do not cease to 
 believe also that even the principles of mechanics, that is, the first 
 laws of motion, have a more exalted origin than that which pure 
 mathematics can furnish. And I imagine that if this were better 
 known or more considered many pious persons would not have 
 such Bl3ad opinion of the corpuscular philosophy, and modern phi- 
 losophers would better join the knowledge of nature with that of 
 its author. 
 
 I do not enlarge upon other reasons touching the nature of body 
 for that would lead me too far. 
 
 [Extract from a Letter in Support of what he published in the " Journal des 
 Savans " of June 18, 1691. 1693.] 
 
 To prove that the nature of the hody does not consist in extension 
 I made use of an argument explained in the Journal des Savans of 
 June 18, 1691, the gist of which is that we cannot explain by mere 
 extension the natural inertia of hodies ; that is, that which 
 
4:4 
 
 causes matter to resist movement, or in other words that which 
 brings it about that a body which is already in motion cannot carry 
 along with it another which is at rest, without being retarded 
 thereby. For extension in itself, being indifferent to movement 
 and to rest, nothing ought to hinder the two bodies from going 
 along together with all the velocity of the first, which it tries to 
 impress upon the second. To this, answer is made in the Journal 
 of July 16th of the same year (as I learned only a short time ago), 
 that really hody oioght to he indifferent to movement or to rest^ 
 supposing that its essence consists only in heing extended ; but that 
 nevertheless a body impelling another must be retarded by it (not 
 because of extension but because of force), because the same force 
 which %cas applied to one of the bodies is now applied to hoth. 
 Now the force which moves one of the bodies with a certain 
 velocity must move the two together with less velocity. It is as if 
 it were said in other words that body, if it consist in extension, 
 ought to be indifferent to motion, but that in reality not being 
 indifferent to it, since it resists that which ought to give it motion, 
 it is necessary to employ, in addition to the notion of extension, 
 that of force. Thus this reply grants just what I wish. And in 
 truth those who are in favor of the system of Occasional Causes 
 have already clearly perceived that force and the laws of motion 
 which depend on it, cannot be drawn from extension alone, and as 
 they have taken for granted that there is only extension in matter^ 
 they have been obliged to deny to it force and action and to have 
 recourse to the general cause, which is the pure will and action of 
 God. As to which it may be said that they have very well rea- 
 soned ex hypothesi. But the hypothesis has not yet been proved ; 
 and as the conclusion appears not to accord in physics, there is more 
 probability for saying that there is a mistake in the hypothesis 
 (which moreover involves many other difficulties), and that there 
 must be recognized in matter something more than what consists 
 in the mere relation of extension ; which, like space, is incapable 
 of action and of resistance, these pertaining only to substances. 
 Those who hold that extension itself is a substance reverse the 
 order of words as well as of thoughts. Besides extension, there 
 must be a subject which is extended, that is, a substance to which 
 it belongs to be repeated or continued. For extension signifies only 
 a repetition or continued multiplication of that which is extended ; 
 
45 
 
 a plurality^ continuity and co-existence of parts / and hence exten- 
 sion is not sufficient to explain the nature of the extended or 
 repeated substance, the notion of which is anterior to that of its 
 repetition. 
 
YII. 
 
 Animadversions on Descartes' Principles of Philosophy. 1692. 
 
 [From the Latin.] 
 
 On Article 1. As to what is said by Descartes, that we must 
 doubt all tilings in which there is the least uncertainty, it would be 
 preferable to express it by this better and more expressive precept : 
 We ought to think what degree of acceptance or dissent everything 
 merits ; or more simply. We ought to inquire after the reasons of 
 any dogma. Thus the Cartesian wranglings concerning doubt 
 would cease. But perhaps the author preferred Tiapado^oXoyt^v^m 
 order that he might excite the listless reader by novelty. But I 
 could wish that he himself had remembered his own precept, or 
 rather, that he had conceived its true force. We shall explain it 
 and its use best by the example of the geometers. It is agreed 
 among them that there are axioms or postulates, on the truth of 
 which all other things rests. We admit these, both because they 
 immediately satisfy the mind and because they are verified by 
 numberless examples ; and nevertheless it would be of importance 
 to the perfection of science that they be demonstrated. This, 
 Apollonius and Proclus in olden time and recently Robervallius, 
 among others, have attempted. And certainly just as Euclid 
 wished to demonstrate that two sides of a triangle taken together 
 are greater than- the third (as a certain one of the ancients jest- 
 ingly said, even asses know enough to go after their food by a 
 straight line, not by a roundabout way), because indeed he wished 
 that geometrical truths should rest not on images of the senses but 
 on reasons ; so also he could have demon.'^trated that two right lines 
 (which if extended do not meet) can have only one common point, 
 if he had had a good definition of right. And I know that the 
 demonstrating of axioms is of great use to a true analysis or art of 
 discovery. Thus if Descartes had wished to follow what is best in 
 his precept, he ought to have labored toward demonstrating the 
 principles of the sciences, and to have done in philosophy what 
 Proclus wished to do in. geometry where it is less necessary. But 
 it seemed preferable to our author to have applause, rather than to 
 have certainty, l^or would I blame him for being content with 
 
4c7 
 
 probability, if he had not aroused our minds by such a great pro- 
 fession of strictness : but I blame Euclid much less when he makes 
 assumptions without proof, for he maintained that we know that if 
 a few hypotheses are admitted, all else is sure and thus equal to them 
 in trustworthiness. If Descartes or other philosophers had done 
 something similar to this, we would not be troubled. And the 
 skeptics also, who condemn the sciences on the pretext that they 
 use principles not immediately demonstrated, ought to regard this 
 as said to them. I, on the contrary, hold that the geometers ought 
 rather to be praised because they prop up the sciences by these, as 
 it were, pegs, and devise an art of proceeding and of deducing 
 many things from few ; for if they had wished to defer the inven- 
 tion of theorems or problems until all axioms or postulates had been 
 demonstrated, we should perhaps to-day have no geometry. 
 
 On Article 2. For the_j;est^ I do not see of what use it is to 
 consider dqubtfuljhings as false. This would not be to cast aside 
 prejudices, but to change them. But if fiction is so understood, it 
 must not be abused, as, for example, when later on in Article 8 a 
 paralogism will seem to arise when the distinction of the mind 
 from the body is discussed. 
 
 On Aeticle 4. Moreover we can neither know nor ought we 
 to desire anything of sensible things than that they harmonize as 
 w^ell among themselves as with indubitable reasons and in such a 
 way that future things may, in a certain degree, be foreseen from 
 past things. Any other truth or reality will be sought in them in 
 vain than that which this vouches for, nor ought skeptics ask any- 
 thing else nor the dogmatics promise it. 
 
 On Aeticle 5. We cannot otherwise doubt of mathematical 
 demonstrations except as error may be feared in the reckoning of 
 arithmeticians. This cannot be remedied except by examining the 
 reckoning often, or by different reckonings, confirming proofs 
 being added. This w^eakness of the human mind, arising from want 
 of attention and of memory, cannot be perfectly removed, and 
 what is adduced by Descartes as a remedy is useless. The same 
 thing suffices as guarantee in other departments which suffices in 
 mathematics ; indeed all reasoning, even the Cartesian, however 
 proved or accurate, will yet be subject to this doubt, whatever may 
 finally be thought of any powerful deceptive genius or of the dif- 
 ference between sleep and wakefulness. 
 
48 
 
 On Article 6. We have free will not in thinking but in act- 
 ing. It is not in my will whether honey shall seem to be sweet or 
 bitter, bnt neither is it in the power of my will whether a theorem 
 proposed to me shall seem true or false, but it is a matter of con- 
 sciousness alone to consider what seems so. Whoever has affirmed 
 anything is conscious either of a present feeling or reason, or, at 
 least, of a present memory renewing a past feeling or a perception 
 of a past reason ; although we are often deceived in this by failure 
 of memory or lack of attention. But consciousness of anything 
 present or past assuredly does not belong to our will. We know 
 that this one thing is in the power of our faculty of will ; namely, 
 that it may command attention and zeal, and thus, although it may 
 not make an opinion in us, it can nevertheless indirectly contribute 
 to it. So it happens that often men finally believe that what they 
 wish is true, after they have accustomed the mind to attending 
 most of all to those things which favor it; in which way they 
 bring about that it satisfies not only the will but also conscious- 
 ness. Cf. Art. 31. 
 
 On Article 7. / think therefore I mn is well remarked by 
 Descartes to be among first truths. But it was but just that he 
 should not neglect others equal to this. In general, therefore, it may 
 be said : Truths are either of fact or of reason. The first of the 
 truths of reason is, as Aristotle rightly observed, the principle of 
 contradiction or, what amounts to the same thing, of identity. 
 First truths of fact are as many as the immediate perceptions, or 
 those of consciousness, so to speak. Moreover not only am I con- 
 scious of my thinking but also of my thoughts. E^or is it more 
 certain that I think than that this or that is thought by me. Thus 
 first truths of fact may be not inconveniently referred to these two, 
 I thinJc, and Various things are thought hy me. Whence it fol- 
 lows not only that I am but al^o that I am affected in various ways. 
 On Article 8. This is not valid: ''I am able to assume or 
 imagine that no corporeal things exist but I am not able to imagine 
 that I do "not exist or that I do not think ; therefore I am not cor- 
 poreal, nor is thought a mode of body." And I marvel that such 
 an able man could attribute so nmcli to so light a sophism ; certainly 
 he adds nothing more in this article. What he brings forward in 
 his Meditations will be examined in its proper place. He who 
 thinks that the mind is corporeal, will not admit that you can affirm 
 
49 
 
 that no corporeal things exist ; but he will admit this, that you can 
 doubt (as long as you are ignorant of the nature of the mind) 
 whether corporeal things exist or do not exist ; and since, never- 
 theless, you see clearly that your mind does exist, he will concede 
 that this one thing thence follows, namely that you can doubt 
 whether the mind is corporeal; nor will anything further be 
 wrested by any tortures from this argument. But this furnished a 
 handle to the paralogism in Art. 2 above, the liberty being assumed 
 of rejecting what is doubted as if it were false, as if it were ad- 
 missible to assume that there are no corporeal things because it can 
 be doubted whether they exist, which ought not be conceded. It 
 would be otherwise if we knew the nature of the mind as perfectly 
 as we know its existence, for thus whatever did not appear in it, 
 it would be agreed was not in it. 
 
 On Article 13. 1 have already remarked, on Art. 5, that the 
 errors which may arise from want of memory or attention and 
 which occur also in arithmetical calculations (even after a perfect 
 method has been found as in numbers) are recounted here to no 
 purpose, since no art can be devised in which they are not to be 
 feared, especially when the reasoning must be long drawn out ; and 
 that therefore w^e must have recourse to examinations. As for the 
 rest, God seems to be summoned hither for a sort of show or pomp ; 
 not to mention that the strange liction or doubt, whether we are not 
 made to err even in matters most evident, ought to move no one, 
 since the nature of evidence is against it and the experiences and 
 successes of all life are contrary to it. And if ever this doubt 
 could justly be raised, it would be absolutely insuperable ; it would 
 confront even Descartes himself and every one else even when 
 presenting the most evident things ; this I say, not to mention that 
 it must be known that this doubt is not established by denying 
 God nor removed by introducing him. For even if there were no 
 God, provided it were possible for us to continue to exist, there 
 would be no reason for our being less capable of truth; and 
 although it be conceded that there is a God, it does not therefore 
 follow that a creature exceedingly fallible and imperfect does not 
 exist, especially when it may be that its imperfection is not native, 
 but perhaps superinduced by a great sin, as Christian theologians 
 teach concerning original sin, yet so that this sin cannot be imputed 
 to God. Moreover although God does not seem to be here aptly in- 
 
50 
 
 troduced, I think, nevertheless, but in a different way, that true 
 knowledge of God is the principle of higher wisdom ; for God is 
 not less the first cause than the ultimate reason of things ; nor are 
 things known better than from their causes and reasons. 
 
 On Akticle 14. The argument for the existence of God drawn 
 from the notion itself of him, Anselm, Archbishop of Canter- 
 bury, first, so far as is known, discovered and stated in his ex- 
 tant Liber contra Insipientem. And it was examined here and 
 there by the writers of the scholastic theology and by Aquinas 
 himself, whence Descartes, not without study of it, seems to have 
 borrowed it. This reasoning possesses some beauty but is neverthe- 
 less imperfect. The argument amounts to this : Whatever may be 
 demonstrated from the notion of a thing, that can be attributed to 
 the thing. Now from the notion of most perfect or greatest being, 
 existence can be demonstrated. Therefore existence can be attrib- 
 uted to the most perfect being (God), or God exists. The assump- 
 tion is proved : Most perfect or greatest being includes all perfec- 
 tions, therefore existence also, which undoubtedly is of the number 
 of perfections, since to exist is more or greater than not to exist. 
 Thus far the argument. But if perfection or magnitude had been 
 omitted, the argument might have been constructed even more 
 strictly and more closely in this way. Necessary being exists (or 
 being to whose essence existence belongs, or being of itseK exists), 
 as is evident from the terms. Now God is such a being (from the 
 definition of God) ; therefore God exists. These arguments are 
 valid, provided it be admitted that most perfect or necessary being 
 impossible, and does not imply contradiction, or, what is the same 
 thing, that the essence from which existence follows is possible. 
 But as long as this has not been demonstrated, it certainly ought 
 not to be thought that the existence of God has been perfectly 
 demonstrated by such an argument. And, generally, it ought to 
 be known (as I formerly urged), that from a definition nothing can 
 be safely inferred concerning the thing defined, so long as it is nof 
 established that the definition expresses something possible. For 
 if, perchance, it implies some hidden contradiction, it might happen 
 that something absurd would be deduced from it. Meanwhile from 
 this argument we become acquainted with this wonderful privilege 
 of the divine nature that provided it be possible it exists of itself , 
 which is not sufficient for proving existence in other things. There 
 
51 
 
 only remains for the geometrical demonstration of tlie divine ex- 
 istence that the possibility of God be demonstrated with accurate 
 severity in geometrical rigor. Meanwhile the existence of that 
 which only lacks possibility receives great faith : as for the rest, 
 that there is some necessary thing is evident from the fact that 
 contingent things exist. 
 
 On Article 18. We have an idea of a most perfect being, and 
 therefore the cause of this idea (that is, the most perfect being) exists. 
 This which is Descartes' second argument, is even more doubtful 
 than the possibility of God. It is denied also by many of those 
 'who with great zeal acknowledge that God is not only possible 
 but that he exists. IS'or is it true, what I remember Descartes 
 somewhere says, that when we speak of something, understanding 
 what we say, we have the idea of the thing. For it often happens 
 that we combine incompatibles, as when we think of quickest 
 motion^ which is admitted to be impossible and therefore lacks 
 idea ; and nevertheless we admit that we speak of this with under- 
 standing. Indeed it has been explained by me elsewhere that we 
 often only confusedly think that of which we speak, and are not 
 conscious of an idea existing in our mind unless we understand the 
 thing and resolve it as far as is sufficient. 
 
 On Article 20. The third argument is burdened with this 
 same vice, as well as others, since it assumes that the idea of the 
 highest perfection of God is in us, and hence it concludes that God 
 exists, since we who have this idea exist. 
 
 On Article 21. From the fact that we now are, it follows that 
 we shall still hereafter be, unless a reason of change exists. So 
 unless it were established elsew^iere that we could not even exist 
 unless by favor of God, nothing would be proved for the existence 
 of God from our duration ; as if indeed one part of this duration 
 could. be wholly independent of the other; which is not to be ad- 
 mitted. 
 
 On Article 26. Although we are Unite, we may nevertheless 
 know many things concerning the infinite, as concerning asympto- 
 tic lines or those which produced ad infinitum, always approach but 
 never meet; concerning infinite spaces not greater than a finite 
 length as respects area ; concerning the last members of series which 
 are infinite. Otherwise we should know nothing certain concern- 
 ing God either. Moreover it is one thing to know something of a 
 
52 
 
 tiling, another to comprehend the thing, that is, to have in our 
 power whatever lies hidden in the thing. 
 
 On Article 28. As to what pertains to the ends which God 
 proposed to himself, I clearly think both that those ends of God 
 are to be known and to be investigated with great profit and that 
 contempt of this inquiry is not free from peril or suspicion. And, 
 in general, as often as we see that something has remarkable uses, 
 we may safely assert that among others this end also, namely, that he 
 might furnish these uses, was proposed to God when producing this 
 thing, since he both knew and procured this use of the thing. Else- 
 where I have noted and shown by examples that certain hidden physi- 
 cal truths of great moment, which cannot be so easily known through 
 efficient causes, might be disclosed by the consideration of final 
 cause. 
 
 On Article 30. Even if we admit a perfect substance, which 
 is undoubtedly not the cause of imperfections, the true or fictitious 
 grounds for doubting which Descartes introduced are not thus re- 
 moved, as I have already noticed. Art. 13. 
 
 On Articles 31, 35. That errors depend more upon the will 
 than upon the intellect, I do not admit. To believe that true which 
 is false or that false which is true when this may be known by 
 investigating, this is to err. So also through consciousness or 
 memory certain perceptions or reasons arise, and therefore do not 
 depend on the will except in so far as in some indirect way, and 
 sometimes even unknown to us, it may happen that we seem to 
 .ourselves to see those things which we will. Of. Art. 6. We 
 judge therefore not because we will but because it appears 
 And as for the saying that the will is wider than the intellect, 
 this is more sounding than true ; in a word, I may say it is 
 but trappings for the people. We will nothing except it appear 
 to the intellect. The origin of all errors is the same, that 
 which is observed as the reason of errors of reckoning among 
 arithmeticians. For it often happens from a defect of attention or 
 memory that we do what we ought not to do, or leave undone what 
 we ought to do, or think that we have done what we have not done 
 or that we have not done what we have done. So it happens that 
 in reckonings (to which reasoning corresponds in the mind) the 
 right figures are not set down, wrong ones are put down, something 
 is passed over among the things which ought to be taken into ac- 
 count, the method is disturbed. Our mind, indeed, wearied or 
 
53 
 
 distracted, does not, for its present operations, sufficiently attend to 
 the matter ; or, by an error of memory, it assumes as if formerly 
 proved that which only adheres to us deeply because it has been 
 often inculcated or iixedJy re2;arded or eagerly desired. The 
 remedy also for our errors is the same as that for the errors of 
 reckoning, namely, that we attend to the matter and to the form, 
 that we proceed slowly, that we repeat and vary the operation, that 
 we institute examinations or proofs, that we divide longer reason- 
 ings into parts, by which the mind may breathe, and that we con- 
 iirm each part, as may be, by particular proofs. And since we 
 must in action sometimes be hurried, the great thing is to have ac- 
 quired presence of mind for one's self by force of habit, just as those 
 have done who in the midst of tumult and even without writing 
 or calculations are none the less able to compute large numbers, so 
 that the mind is not easily distracted either by the external senses 
 or by its own imaginations or emotions, but always rises above 
 what it is doing and retains the power of regarding, or, as we com- 
 monly say, of turning itself back upon itself, so that presently, in 
 place of an external admonisher it may say, "See what you are 
 doing, say why you are here, the hour passes." The Germans 
 admirably call this sich hegreiffeii ; the French not less happily, 
 s'aviser^ as if it were to- warn one's self, to suggest to one's self, as 
 the nomenclators suggested to Roman candidates the names and 
 merits of citizens worthy to be taken, as the prompter suggests to 
 the comedian the initial w^ords of the rest of the piece, as a certain 
 youth suggested to Philip, king of Macedon, " Remember you are 
 mortal." But tliis turning of the mind, s^aviser, is not in our 
 power nor in the election of our will ; on the contrary it must first 
 occur to the intellect, and it depends on the present degree of our 
 perfection. It belongs to the will in advance to strive zealously 
 that the mind be well prepared, which is advantageously done both 
 by the consideration of the experiences and losses or dangers of 
 others, and also by the use of our own, but (as is allowable) this is 
 at the risk of the loss of time or at least of a light or ludicrous 
 injury ; but at the same time there is the accustoming of the mind to 
 a certain order and method of thinking so that afterwards it may 
 occur, when it is needed, as if voluntarily. There nevertheless are 
 errors which without guilt escape or are not avoided. Where we 
 are in trouble not by defect of judgment but by want of memory 
 
54 
 
 or ability we are not so inucli in error as we are ignorant, for we 
 cannot bring it about that we may either know or remember what 
 we will. That kind of directing the mind suffices by which we 
 fight against lack of attention, and as often as memory repeats to 
 us past proofs which perchance were in reality none, we have a 
 confused recollection which is suspicious ; and either we repeat the 
 inquiry if it may be done and the matter is important, or v(g do 
 not rely on past care unless it is sufficiently tested. 
 
 On Article 37. The highest perfection of man is not more 
 that he acts freely than that he acts with reason ; or rather, both 
 are the same, since the freer one is the less is the use of reason dis- 
 turbed by the violence of the emotions. 
 
 On Article 39. To ask whether there is liberty in our will is 
 the same as to ask whether choice is in our will. Free and volun- 
 tary mean the same thing. For free is the same as spontaneous 
 with reason ; and to will is to be carried to action by a reason per- 
 ceived by the intellect ; moreover the more unconditional the reason 
 is and the less the impulse has of ba^e and confused perception 
 mixed with it, the freer the action is. To abstain from judgments 
 does not belong to our will but to the intellect suggesting some at- 
 tention to itself, as has been already said on Art. 35. 
 
 On Article 40. If anyone thinking that God has preordained 
 all things and nevertheless that he himself is free, and his argu- 
 ments exhibiting conflict among themselves, makes this one reply, as 
 Descartes orders ; namely : that his mind is finite and cannot com- 
 prehend such things, he seems to me to reply to the conclusion, 
 not to the argument, and to cut, not to untie, the knot. The ques- 
 tion is not whether you comprehend the thing itself, but rather 
 whether you do not comprehend your absurdity on my showing 
 it. There must certainly be a contradiction also in the mysteries of 
 faith not less than in the mysteries of nature. Therefore if you 
 wish to excel as a philosopher, it behooves that you take up the 
 argument, which one of your opponents infers with some appear- 
 ance of truth from your assertions, and point out the defect in it, 
 which assuredly can always be done, unless you have erred. 
 
 On Articles 43, 45, 46. I have elsewhere called attention to 
 the fact that there is no great use in this rule which is laid down, 
 of approving only what is dear and distinct^ unless better marks 
 of clear and distinct are brought forward than those which 
 
55 
 
 Descartes gave. The rules of Aristotle and the geometers are 
 better, namely : That we should admit nothing, principles (i. e. 
 first truths and hypotheses) of course excepted, unless proved by 
 legitimate argument ; legitimate, I say, that is, burdened neither 
 with defect of form nor of matter. But it is a defect of matter 
 if anything except principles or again things proved from prin- 
 ciples by legitimate argument, be assumed. But I understand the 
 right form to be not only the common syllogistic form, but also any 
 other predemonstrated which concludes by force of its own dis- 
 position ; which also the forms of the operations of the arithme- 
 ticians and algebraists, the forms of the book-keepers, indeed also, 
 in some degree, the forms of judiciary process, do : for occasionally 
 we are content to proceed with a certain degree of resemblance. 
 Nevertheless the part of logic, especially useful in life for estimat- 
 ing degrees of probability, remains still to be discussed, concerning 
 which not a few things have been noted down by me. On form, 
 compare further what is gaid on Art. 75. 
 
 On Articles 47, 48. Some one, I know not who (I think it was 
 Comenius), formerly rightly criticized Descartes for promising. Art. 
 47, summarily to enumerate all simple notions, and yet directly in 
 the following Article 48, he deserts us, and, some being named, he 
 adds : and the like ; besides which the larger part of those which 
 he does name are not simple. This is an inquiry of greater 
 moment than is thought. 
 
 On Article 50. Truths entirely simple but which nevertheless 
 are not admitted on account of the prejudged opinion of men, we 
 must take especial pains to demonstrate by those more simple. 
 
 On Article 51. I do not know whether the definition of sub- 
 stance as that which needs the concurrence of God alone to exist is 
 appropriate for any created substance known to us, unless inter- 
 preted in some less common meaning. For not only do we need 
 other substances, but we need also much more accidents. Since 
 therefore substance and accident mutually need each other, there is 
 need of otlier marks for discriminating substance from accident ; 
 among which may be this, that although the substance may need 
 some accident it often nevertheless does not need a determinate 
 one but when this one is taken away is content with the substitu- 
 tion of another ; the accident, however, not only needs some sub- 
 stance in general but also that one of its own in which it is once 
 
56 
 
 present, so that it may not change it. Nevertheless there remain 
 other things to be said elsewhere concerning the nature of sub- 
 stance, of greater moment and of more profound discussion. 
 
 On Article 52. I confess that there is one principle of sub- 
 stance and one attribute of it, expressing its essence ; but I do not 
 know whether it can be explained in words, and those few, so that 
 if jou understand individual substance, other kinds of sub- 
 stances may be explained by definitions. But that extension con- 
 stitutes the common nature of corporeal substance I see asserted by 
 many with great confidence, never proved. Certainly neither mo- 
 tion nor action nor resistance nor passion is thence derived ; nor do 
 the laws of nature which are observed in the motion and conjunc- 
 tion of bodies come from the mere notion of extension, as I have 
 elsewhere shown. And indeed the notion of extension is not prim- 
 itive but resolvable. For it is required in extension that there be a 
 whole eontinuum, in which many things exist at once. And, to 
 speak farther, to extension indeed, the notion of which is relative, 
 something is required which is extended or continued, as in milk 
 whiteness, in body that itself which makes its essence : the repeti- 
 tion of this (whatever it may be) is extension. And I certainly 
 agree with Huygens (whose opinion in natural philosophy and math- 
 ematics is of great weight with me) that the conception of a vacant 
 space and of mere extension is the same ; nor in my opinion can 
 mobility itself or duziToma be understood of mere extension but of 
 the subject of extension, by which place is not only constituted but 
 also filled. 
 
 On Article 54. I do not remember that as yet it has been per- 
 fectly demonstrated either by our author or by his partisans that 
 thinking substance is devoid of extension or extended substance of 
 thought, so that thence it is evident that the one attribute is not re- 
 quired for the other in the same subject nor indeed can consist 
 with it. Nor is this surprising ; for the author of the book. Search 
 After Truth (in which some excellent things are said), correctly re- 
 marks that no distinct notion of thought is offered by the Carte- 
 sians, and thus it is not strange if what is involved in it is not clear 
 to them. 
 
 On Articles 60, 61. To deny a real distinction between modes 
 is not a necessary change of the received use of words. For hitherto 
 it has been held that modes exist between things, and they have 
 
6Y 
 
 been seen to really differ, as a spherical wax figure from a square 
 one ; certainly there is a true change from one figure to the other, 
 and thus it has a real foundation. 
 
 On Article 63. To conceive thought and extension as the 
 thinking substance itself or the extended substance itself seems to 
 me neither right nor possible. This device is suspicious and like 
 that by which doubtful things were commanded to be considered 
 false. Minds are prepared by these distortions of things for perti- 
 nacity and for false reasonings. 
 
 On Articles 65 to 68. Descartes performed a useful service 
 after the ancients in eradicating that prejudice by which we regard 
 heat, color and other phenomena as something outside of us ; when 
 it is evident that what seemed very hot is soon felt by the same 
 hand to be tepid ; and he who observes a green color in a pulver- 
 ized mixture, his eye being presently assisted, no longer perceives a 
 green color but a mixture of yellow and blue, and, with a better 
 equipment or other experiences or reasons, the causes of these two 
 may be perceived ; from which it appears that no such thing exists 
 outside of us, the phantasm of which hovers before our imaginatioiL 
 We are ordinarily like boys who are. persuaded that a golden pot is 
 to be found at the very end of the rainbow where it touches the 
 earth, which in vain they try to find by running. 
 
 On Articles 71 to 74. On the causes of errors we have said 
 something above, on Arlts. 31 and 35. From these also the reason 
 for the present ones may be given. For the prejudices of infancy 
 have to do with unproved assertions. Fatigue, moreover, lessens 
 attention ; and ambiguity of words belongs to the abuse of signs 
 and makes an error in form ; and thus it is as if (as the German 
 proverb says) X were put in place of Y in a calculation, or as if a 
 quack doctor in a prescribed formula should select sandarach instead 
 of dragon's blood. 
 
 On Article 75. It seems to me fair that we should give 
 to the ancients each one his due, nor by a silence, malignant and 
 injurious to ourselves, conceal their merits. Those things which 
 Aristotle prescribed in his Logic^ although not sufiicient for discov- 
 ery, are nevertheless almost sufficient for judging ; at least where 
 he treats of necessary consequences ; and it is important that the 
 conclusions of the human mind be established as if by certain 
 mathematical rules. And it has been noted by me that those who 
 
 •-T^Ti tri!'l>CTT"V 
 
58 
 
 admit false reasonings in serious things oftener sin in logical form 
 than is commonly believed. Thus in order to avoid all errors there 
 is need of nothing else than to use the most common rules of logic 
 with great constancy and severity. But since the complication of 
 things often does not admit of this pedantry, we hence furnish, in 
 the sciences and in things to be done, certain special logical forms, 
 which ought to be demonstrated beforehand by those general rules ; 
 the nature of each subject being taken into account ; just as Euclid 
 had a certain logic of his own concerning conversions, compositions, 
 divisions of reasons, estabhshed iirst in tlie special book on ele- 
 ments, and afterwards ruling in the whole geometry. And thus 
 brevity and certainty are at once regarded ; and the more there are 
 of these, the more there is of science and of w^hatever there is that 
 is refined. Those things are to be added which we have noted on 
 Articles 43 et seq., concerning reasonings Avhich are said to be 
 made in form and which extend farther than is commonly believed. 
 
 On Part II. 
 
 On Article 1. The argument by which Descartes seeks to 
 demonstrate that material things exist is weak ; it were better 
 therefore not to try. The gist of the argument is this : The reason 
 why we believe in material things is external to us, and hence 
 either from God or from another or from things themselves ; not 
 from God, if no things exist, for he would be a deceiver ; not from 
 another, this he has forgotten to prove ; therefore from themselves, 
 therefore they themselves exist. It might be replied, that a sensa- 
 tion may be from an other than God, who as he permits all other 
 evils for certain weighty reasons so may permit this deceiving of us 
 without having the character of a deceiver, especially as it is joined 
 with no injury, since it would rather be unpleasant to lis not to be 
 deceived. Besides the deception therein, w^hich the argument con- 
 ceals, is that it may be that the perceptions are from God or from 
 another but that the judgment (concerning the cause of the sen- 
 sation, whether it be from a real object outside of us), and hence the 
 deception, comes from ourselves. Just as hapj^ens also when colors 
 and other things of this sort are considered as real objects. Besides 
 souls might have merited by previous sins that they lead this life 
 full of deception where they snatch at shadows for things ; to which 
 the Platonists do not seem to be averse, to whom this life seemed as 
 
59 
 
 a sleep in the cave of Morpheus, the mind being demented by 
 Lethean draughts before it came thither. 
 
 On Article 4. That body consists in extension alone Descartes 
 tries to demonstrate by an enumeration of the other attributes which 
 he removes, but it ought to have been shown that the enumeration 
 is sufficient ; then not all are well removed, certainly those who 
 admit atoms, that is bodies of greatest hardness, denied that hard- 
 ness consists in this, namely, that the body does not yield to the 
 motion of the hands, but rather in this, that it preserves its form. 
 And those who place the essence of body in dvuzuma, or impene- 
 trability, do not derive its notion from our hands or senses but from 
 the fact that it does not give place to another homogeneous body 
 unless it itself can go elsewhere. Just as if we imagine that against 
 a cube there run six other cubes precisely similar to and resembling 
 the first, so that each one of them mth one of its sides accurately 
 coincides with one side of the intercepting cube ; on this supposi- 
 tion it would be impossible for either the intercepting cube itself 
 or a part of it to be moved, whether it be understood as flexible or 
 as rigid. But if that middle cube be held to be penetrable exten- 
 sion or empty space then the six concurring cubes will oppose their 
 angles to each other mutually ; if however they are flexible, noth- 
 ing will prevent the middle parts of these from breaking into the 
 intercepting cubical space. Whence also we understand what is 
 the difference between hardness, which belongs to certain bodies, 
 and impenetrability, which belongs to all ; which latter Descartes 
 ought to have remembered not less than hardness. 
 
 On Articles 5, 6, 7. Descartes has excellently explained that 
 rarefaction and condensation such as w^e perceive by the senses may 
 take place although neither interspersed vacuum nor a change of 
 dimensions of the same part of matter be admitted. 
 
 On Articles 8 to 19. IS^ot a few of those who defend a vacuum 
 consider space as a substance, nor can they be refuted by the Car- 
 tesian arguments ; other principles are needed to end this dispute. 
 They will admit that quantity and number do not exist outside of 
 the things to which they are attributed, but they will deny that 
 space or place is quantity of body, and they will rather believe that 
 it has quantity or capacity and that body is equal to it in content. 
 Descartes had to show that internal space or place does not differ 
 from the substance of body. Those who are contrary minded will 
 
60 
 
 defend themselves by the common notion of mortals avIio think 
 that body succeeding body passes over the same space and the same 
 place which has been deserted by a previous body ; but this cannot 
 be said if space coincides with the substance itself of body. Al- 
 though to have a certain situation or to be in a given place 
 is an accident of body they will nevertheless no more admit 
 that place itself is an accident of body than that as contact is 
 an accident, so also what is touched is an accident. And indeed 
 Descartes seems to me not so much to bring forward good reasons for 
 his own opinion as to reply to opposing arguments ; which in this 
 place he does not un skillfully. And he often employs this artifice 
 in place of demonstration. But we expected something more and if 
 I am not mistaken we were commanded to expect more. To nothing, 
 it must be confessed, there is no extension, and this may be rightly 
 hurled against those who make space an imaginary something. 
 But those to whom space is a substance are not afiiected by this ar- 
 gument; they would indeed be affected if Descartes had shown 
 above, what he here assumes, that every extended substance is body. 
 
 On Article 20. The author does not seem satisfactorily to 
 oppose atoms. Their defenders concede that they may be divided as 
 well in thought as by divine power. But whether bodies which 
 have a firmness inseparable to the forces of nature (which is the 
 true notion of atom among them) can exist naturally, is a question 
 whicli Descartes (what I wonder at) does not even touch upon in 
 this place, and nevertheless he here declares that atoms have been 
 overthrown by him, and he assumes it in the whole course of his 
 Avork. We shall have more to say on atoms on Article 54. 
 
 On Articles 21, 22, 23. That the world has no limits of exten- 
 sion and thus can only be one, then that all matter everywhere is 
 homogeneous and is not distinguished except by motions and figures, 
 are opinions which are here built upon the proposition, which is 
 neither admitted by all nor demonstrated by the author, that exten- 
 sion and body are the same thing. 
 
 On Art. 25. If motion is nothing but change of contact or 
 immediate vicinity, it follows that it can never be determined 
 which thing is moved. For as in astronomy the same phenomena 
 are presented in different hypotheses, so it is always permissible to 
 ascribe real motion to either one or other of those bodies whicli 
 change among themselves vicinity or situation ; so that one of 
 
61 
 
 these bodies being arbitrarily cliosen as if at rest or, for a given 
 reason moving in a given line, it may be geometrically determined 
 what motion or rest must be ascribed to the others so that the 
 given phenomena may appear. Hence if there is nothing in 
 motion but this respective change, it follows that no reason is 
 given in nature why motion must be ascribed to one thing rather 
 than to others. The consequence of this will be that there is no 
 real motion. Therefore in order that a thing can be said to be 
 moved, we require not only that it change its situation in respect 
 to others, but also that the cause of change, tlie force or action, be 
 in it itself. 
 
 [The remarks on the rest of the book, excepting those on Articles 45 and 64, 
 are omitted here as being of little philosophical interest. They treat princi- 
 pally of Descartes' opinions as to the laws of motion,] 
 
 On Article 45. Before I undertake to examine the special 
 laws of motion laid down by our author, I will give a general crite- 
 rion, or Lydian stone as it w^ere, by which they may be examined, 
 which I am accustomed to call the law of continuity. I have 
 recently explained it elsewhere, but it must be repeated here and 
 amplified. Certainly when two hypotheses or two different data 
 continually by turns approach until at length one of them ends in 
 the other, it must be also that the qtiCBsita aut eventa of both by 
 turns continually approach one another, and finally, that one van- 
 ishes in the other, and vice "versa. Thus it is with ellipses one 
 focus of which remains unmoved, if the other focus recedes 
 from it more and more, then the new ellipses which are thus 
 produced will continually approach a parabola and finally wholly 
 vanish in it, since indeed the distance of the receding focus will 
 have become immeasurable. Whence both the properties of such 
 ellipses will approach more and more to the properties of a para- 
 bola so far even that they finally vanish in them, and also a 
 parabola may be considered as an ellipse one focus of which is in- 
 finitely distant, and hence all the properties of ellipses may be also 
 verified of a parabola as if of such an ellipse. And indeed geome- 
 try is full of examples of this kind ; but nature, the most wise 
 Author of which employes the most perfect geometry, observes the 
 same, otherwise no ordered progress would be preserved in it. 
 Thus motion gradually decreasing finally vanishes into rest, and in- 
 equality continually diminished ends in true equality, so that rest 
 
62 
 
 may be regarded as infinitely slight motion or as infinite slowness, 
 and equality as infinitely slight inequality ; and for this reason 
 whatever may be demonstrated either of motion in general or of 
 inequality in general must also according to this interpretation be 
 verified of rest or of equality, so that the law of rest or of equality may 
 in a certain way be conceived as a special case of the law of motion 
 or of inequality. But if this does not follow, it must be considered 
 as certain that the rules are awkward and badly conceived. 
 
 On Article 64. The author closes the Second and General 
 Part concerning the principles of material things with a certain 
 admonition which seems to me to need restriction. He says truly 
 that in order to explain the phenomena of nature there is no need 
 of other principles than those found in abstract mathematics or in 
 the theory of magnitude, figure and motion. 'Nor does he recog- 
 nize any other matter than that which is the subject of geometry. 
 I indeed fully assent that all the special phenomena of nature can 
 be explained mechanically if they are sufiiciently examined by us, 
 nor can the causes of material things be understood in any other 
 way. But I think also that this ought to be repeatedly considered, 
 that the very mechanical principles and hence the general laws 
 of nature are derived from higher principles, nor can they be ex- 
 plained by the mere consideration of quantity and of that which 
 is geometrical, but that there is rather in them something metaphys- 
 ical, independent of the notions which the imagination presents 
 and which must be referred to a substance destitute of extension. 
 For in addition to extension and its variations there is in matter 
 force itself or power of acting which forms a transition from meta- 
 physics to nature, from material things to immaterial. This force 
 has its own laws derived from principles not of mere absolute and, 
 so to speak, brute necessity as in mathematics but of perfect reason. 
 But these being embraced together in a general discussion, after- 
 wards when a reason is given for the phenomena of nature, all can 
 be explained mechanically, and as vainly as fundamental {archcei) 
 perceptions and desires, and operating ideas, and forms of sul)- 
 stances, and souls also are then employed, so vainly would we call 
 in the universal cause of all, as a Deus ex maehina, to explain 
 each natural thing by his simple will, which I remember the author 
 of Philosophia Mosaica does, the words of Sacred Scripture being 
 badly understood. He who will consider this properly will hold a 
 
68 
 
 middle position in philosophy and will satisfy theology no less than 
 physics, and. he will understand that it was not so much a sin of 
 the schoolmen to hold the doctrine of intelligihle /(xrms as to 
 apply it as they did, at the time when the inquiry was rather of 
 the modifications and instruments of substance and its manner of 
 acting, that is, its mechanism. Nature has as it were an empire 
 within an empire, and so to say^ double kingdom, of reason and of 
 necessity, or of forms and of particles of matter; for just as all 
 things are full of spirits, so also they are full of organized bodies. 
 These realms without confusion between them are governed each 
 by its own law, nor is the reason of perception and of desire in the 
 modifications of extension, any more than the reason of nutrition 
 and of other organic functions are to be found in forms or spirits. 
 But this highest substance, which is the universal cause of all, brings 
 it about by his infinite wisdom and power that these two very differ- 
 ent series are referred to the same corporeal substance and perfectly 
 harmonize between themselves just as if one was controlled by the 
 influence of the other ; and if you observe the necessity of matter 
 and the order of efficient powers, you observe that nothing happens 
 without a cause satisfying the imagination and except on account of 
 the mathematical laws of mechanism ; or if you regard the circle of 
 ends as a golden chain and of forms as an intelligible world, the 
 apexes of ethics and of metaphysics being joined in one on account 
 of the perfection of the supreme author, you notice that nothing 
 can be done without the highest reason. For God and eminent 
 form and first efficient are the same, and he is the end or final reason 
 of things. Moreover it is our part to reverence his footprints in 
 things, and not only to admire his instruments in operating and the 
 mechanical cause of material things, but also the higher uses of 
 admirable ingenuity, and as we recognize God as the architect of 
 bodies so also to recognize him especially as the king of minds and 
 his intelligence as ruling all things for the best, which constitutes 
 the most perfect Republic of the Universe under the most power- 
 ful and :wisest of Monarchs. Thus in the particular phenomena of 
 nature and in the connection of each consideration, we shall consult 
 equally utility of life and perfection of mind, and wisdom no less 
 than piety. 
 
yiii. 
 
 Leibnitz's Reply to the Extract from the Letter of M. 
 FoucHER, Canon of Dijon, published in the '^Journal" of 
 March 16. 1693. 
 
 [From the Trench.] 
 
 One ought to be very glad, sir, that you give a reasonable mean- 
 ing to the doubt of the Academicians. It is the best apology that 
 you could make for them. I shall be charmed to see sometime 
 their views digested and made clear by your pains. But you will 
 be obliged from time to time to lend them some ray of your light, 
 as you have begun to do. 
 
 It is true that I wrote two little discourses, twenty years ago, 
 one 071 the theory of abstract motion^ wherein I considered it as 
 outside of the system, as if it were a thing purely mathematical ; 
 the other on the hypothesis of concrete and systematic motion^ such 
 as really is met with in nature. There may be some good in them 
 since you with others judge so. However there are many points 
 on which I believe that I am better instructed at present, and 
 among others I explain to-day indivisibles in an entirely different 
 way. That was the attempt of a young man who had not yet 
 fathomed mathematics. The laws of abstract motion which I gave 
 at that time would really hold good if there was nothing else in 
 body but what is conceived there according to Descartes and even 
 according to Gassendi. But as I have found that nature treats 
 body quite differently as regards motion it is one of my arguments 
 against the received notion of the nature of body, as I have indi- 
 cated in the Journal des Savans of June 2, 1692. 
 
 As regards indivisibles, when by that word is understood simple 
 extremities of time or of line, new extremities could not be 
 conceived in them, nor actual nor pretended parts. Thus points 
 are neither large nor small, and there needs no leap to pass them. 
 However, although there are such indivisibles everywhere, contin- 
 uity is not composed of them, as the objections of the sceptics 
 appear to suppose. In my opinion these objections have nothing 
 insurmountable about them, as will be found by reducing them to 
 form. Gregory of St. Vincent has well shown by the calculations 
 
65 
 
 even of divisibility ad injmitum, the place where Achilles ought 
 to overtake the tortoise which precedes him, according to the pro- 
 portion of velocities. Thus geometry serves to dissipate these 
 apparent difficulties. 
 
 I am so macli in favor of the actual infinite that instead of 
 admitting that nature abhors it, as is commonly said, I hold that it 
 affects it everywhere in order better to mark the perfections of its 
 author. So I believe that there is no part of matter which is not, 
 I do not say divisible, but actually divided ; and consequently the 
 least particle must be regarded as a world full of an infinity of 
 •different creatures. 
 
IX. 
 
 Extract from a Letter to the Abbe Kicaise on the Philos- 
 ophy OF Descartes. 1793. 
 [From the French.] 
 
 I HONOR exceedingly the Bishop d'Avranches, and I beg you, 
 sir, to give him my respects when occasion offers. One of my 
 friends in Bremen having sent me the book of Herr SweUing, pro- 
 fessor there, against the censure of that illustrious prelate, in order 
 to have my opinion of it, I replied that the best answer that the 
 Cartesians could make would be to profit by the advice of 
 d'Avranches ; to emancipate themselves from the spirit of sect, 
 always contrary to the advancement of the sciences ; to unite to 
 the reading of the excellent works of Descartes that of some other 
 great men, ancient and modern ; not to despise antiquity, whence 
 Descartes has taken a good part of his best thoughts ; to give 
 themselves to experiments and to demonstrations in place of those 
 general reasonings which serve but to support idleness and to cover 
 up ignorance ; to try to make some advance and not to content 
 themselves with being simple paraphrasers of their master, and not 
 to neglect or despise anatomy, history, the languages, criticism, for 
 want of knowing their importance and value ; not to imagine that 
 we know all +hat is necessary or all we may hope to ; finally, to be 
 modest and studious, in order not to draw upon themselves this apt 
 saying : Ignorantia inflat. I shall add that I do not know how or 
 by what star, the influence of which is the enemy of every sort of 
 secret, the Cartesians have done almost nothing that is new, and 
 that almost all the discoveries have been made by persons not of 
 the sect. I know but the little pipes of M. Rohault, which do not 
 deserve the name of a Cartesian discovery. It seems that those 
 who attach themselves to a single master abase themselves by this 
 kind of slavery and conceive almost nothing except in imitation of 
 him. 1 am sure that if Descartes had lived longer he would have 
 given us many important things. This shows us either that it was 
 rather his genius than his method, or else that he has not published 
 his method. In fact I remember having read in one of his letters 
 that he intended simply to write a discourse on his method, and to 
 
67 
 
 give some examples of it; but that he had no intention of publish- 
 ing it. Thus the Cartesians who think that they have the method 
 of their master deceive themselves very much. Nevertheless I 
 imagine that this method was not so perfect as we are made to 
 believe. I think so from his geometry. This is, without doubt, 
 his strong point ; nevertheless we know to-day that it is very far 
 from going as far as it ought to go and as he said it went. The 
 most important problems need a new sort of analysis entirely differ- 
 ent from his, examples of which I myself have given. It seems 
 to me that Descartes did not sufficiently penetrate the important 
 truths of Kepler on astronomy which the course of time has veri- 
 fied. His "Jf«^" is very different from the true man, as M. 
 Stenon and others have shown it to be. The knowledge he had of 
 salts and chemistry was very meagre ; this is the reason that what 
 he says thereon, as well as on minerals, is mediocre. The meta- 
 physics of this author, although it has some fine traits is 
 intermingled with great paralogisms, and has some very weak pas- 
 sages. I have discovered the eource of his errors as to the laws of 
 motion, and although I esteem very highly his physics it is not 
 because I regard it as true, except in some particular things, but 
 because I consider it as an admirable model and as an example of 
 what could and ought now to be produced on principles more solid 
 than experiments have thus far furnished us with. In a word, I 
 esteem Descartes very highly, but very often it is not permitted me 
 to follow him. I have in the past made remarks on the first and 
 eecond parts of his " Principles." The parts comprise, in epitome, 
 his general philosophy, in which I have most often been obliged to 
 separate myself from him. The following parts come to the 
 detail of nature, which is ^lot yet so easily explained. This is why 
 I have not yet touched it. But I do not know how I have been 
 insensibly led to entertain you so long on this subject. 
 
X. 
 
 On the Reform of Metaphysics and of the Notion of 
 
 Substance. 1694. 
 
 [From the Latin.] 
 
 I SEE that most of those who devote themselves with pleasure to 
 the study of mathematics entertain a dislike for that of meta- 
 physics because in the former they find clearness and in the latter 
 obscurity. I think that the principal reason of this is that general 
 notions, which are believed to be perfectly known by all, have 
 become ambiguous and obscure by the negligence of men and by 
 the inconsistency of their thoughts, and that what are ordinarily 
 given as definitions are not even nominal definitions, because they 
 explain absolutely nothing. And it is not to be wondered at that 
 this evil has spread into the other sciences, which are subordinate 
 to this first and architectonic science. Thus we have subtile dis- 
 tinctions in place of clear definitions, and in place of truly 
 universal axioms we have general rules which are more often bro- 
 ken by exceptions than supported by examj^les. And yet men by 
 a sort of necessity frequently make use of metaphysical terms, and 
 flatter themselves that they understand what they have learned to 
 say. And it is manifest that the true and fruitful meanings not 
 only of siibstance but also of caicse, of action^ of relation, of simi- 
 larity and most other general terms, lie for the most part hidden. 
 Whence it is not surprising that this queen of the sciences, which 
 is C2i)i\edi first philosophy and which Aristotle defined as the science 
 desired or to he sought for {$7^Too/jiiu7^), remains to-day in the num- 
 ber of the sciences sought. Plato, it is true, often in his Dialogues 
 inquires into the value of notions ; Aristotle does the same in his 
 books entitled Metaphysics ; nevertheless, without much apparent 
 profit. The later Platonists fall into monstrosities of language, and 
 Xhe disciples of Aristotle, especially the Scholastics, were more 
 desirous of raising questions than of answering them. In our day 
 some illustrious men have also devoted themselves to the first 
 philosophy, but up to the present time without much success. It 
 cannot be denied that Descartes brought to it many excellent 
 things ; that he has above all the merit of having renewed Platonic 
 
69 
 
 study by turning the mind away from the things of sense and of 
 having afterwards employed usefully academic scepticism ; but 
 soon, by a sort of inconsistency or of impatience to affirm, he was 
 led astray, no longer distinguishing the certain from the uncertain, 
 and hence making tlie nature of corporeal substance incorrectly 
 consist in extension and holding a false conception of the union of 
 the soul and the body, the cause of which was that the nature of 
 substance in general was not understood. For he had proceeded at 
 a bound, as it were, to the solution of the gravest questions, without 
 having explained the notions which they implied. Hence, nothing 
 shows more clearly how far his ^ metaphysical meditations are 
 removed from certainty than the writing in which, at the prayer of 
 Mersenne and others, he vainly tried to clothe them with a mathe- 
 matical garb. I see also that other men gifted with rare penetra- 
 tion have broached metaphysics and treated some parts of it with 
 profoundness, but enveloping them with so much obscurity that 
 they appear to surmise rMher than to .prove. But metaphysics, it 
 seems to me, has more need of clearness and certainty than even 
 the mathematics, because the latter carry with them their proofs 
 and corroborations which is the principal cause of their success ; 
 whereas in metaphysics we are deprived of this advantage. There- 
 fore a certain particular plan*^ necessary in exposition which, like 
 the thread in the Labyrinth, serves us, no less than the method of 
 Euclid, for resolving our problems after the manner of calculus, 
 preserving, nevertheless, always the clearness which even in com- 
 mon conversation should not be sacrificed. 
 
 How important these things are is apparent, especially from the 
 nation of substance which I give, because it is so fruitful that from 
 it first truths, even those which concern God and souls and the 
 nature of bodies, follow ; truths in part known but not sufficiently 
 proved ; in part unknown up to this time but which would be of 
 the greatest usefulness in the other sciences. To give a foretaste 
 of them, it is sufficient for me to say that the idea of energy or 
 virtue, called by the Germans liraft^ and by the French la force ^ and 
 for the explanation of which I have designed a special science of 
 dynamics^ adds much to the understanding of the notion of sub- 
 stance. For active force differs from the bare power familiar to the 
 schools, in that the active power or faculty of the scholas- 
 tics is nothing else than the possibility ready to act, which 
 
70 
 
 has nevertheless need, in order to pass into action, of an 
 external excitation, and as it were of a stimulus. But active 
 force includes a sort of act or iuTeU')[ecav, which is mid- 
 way between the faculty of acting and the action itself, and 
 involves an effort, and thus of itself passes into operation ; nor does 
 it need aid other than the removal of impediments. This may 
 be illustrated by the example of a heavy hanging body strainings 
 the rope which sustains it, or a tense bow\ For although gravity 
 or elastic force may and must be explained mechanically from the 
 motion of ether, nevertheless the final reason of motion in matter 
 is the force impressed upon it at the creation, a force inherent in 
 every body, but which is variously limited and confined in nature 
 by the very meeting of bodies. I say, then, that this property of 
 acting resides in every substance, that always some sort of action is 
 bom of it ; and that, consequently, corporeal substance, no less than 
 spiritual, never ceases to act; 'a truth which those who place its 
 essence in mere extension or even in impenetrability, and who have 
 imagined that they conceived of body absolutely at rest, seem not 
 to have sufficiently understood. It w^ll appear also from our medi- 
 tations that a created substance receives from another created sub- 
 stance, not the force itself of acting but only the limits and 
 determination of an already pre-existent tendency or virtue of 
 acting. I omit here other considerations useful for the solution of 
 the difficult problem concerning the mutual operation of substances. 
 
XI. 
 
 A New System of J^ature, and of the Interaction of Sub- 
 stances, AS WELL AS OF THE UnION WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN 
 
 THE Soul and the Body. 1695. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 1. I conceived this system many years ago and communicated it 
 to some learned men, and in particular to one of the greatest theo- 
 logians and philosophers of our time, who, having been informed 
 of some of my opinions by a very distinguished person, had found 
 them highly paradoxical. When, however, he had received my 
 explanations, he withdrew his condemnation in the most generous 
 and edifying manner ; and, having approved a part of my proposi- 
 tions, he ceased censuring the others with which he was not yet in 
 accord. Since that time I have continued my meditations as far as 
 opportunity has permitted, in order to give to the public only 
 thoroughly examined views, and I have also tried to answer the 
 objections made against my essays in dynamics, which are related 
 to the former. Finally, as a number of persons have desired to see 
 my opinions more clearly explained, I have ventured to pubHsh 
 these meditations although they are not at all popular nor fit to be 
 enjoyed by every sort of mind. I have been led to do this princi- 
 pally in order that I might profit by the judgments of those who 
 are learned in these matters, inasmuch as it would be too inconven- 
 ient to seek and challenge separately those who would be disposed 
 to give the instructions which I shall always be glad to receive, pro- 
 vided the love of truth appears in them rather than passion for 
 opinions already held. 
 
 2. Although I am one of those who have worked very hard at 
 mathematics I have not since my youth ceased to meditate on phi- 
 losophy, for it always seemed to me that there was a Way to 
 establish in it, by clear demonstrations,, something stable. I had 
 penetrated well into the territory of the scholastics when mathe- 
 matics and modern authors induced me while yet young to with- 
 draw from it. Their fine ways of explaining nature mechanically 
 charmed me ; and, with reason, I scorned the method of those who 
 employ only forms or faculties, by which nothing is learned. But 
 
72 
 
 afterwards, when I tried to search into the principles of mechanics 
 to find proof of the laws of nature which experience made known, 
 I perceived that the mere consideration of an extended mass did 
 not suffice and that it was necessary to employ in addition the 
 notion oiforce^ which is very easily understood although it belongs 
 to the province of metaphysics. It seemed to me also that the 
 opinion of those who transform or degrade animals into simple 
 machines, notwithstanding its seeming possibihty, is contrary to 
 appearances and even opposed to the order of things. 
 
 3. In the beginning, when I had freed myself from the yoke of 
 Aristotle, I occupied myself with the consideration of the void and 
 atoms, for this is what best fills the imagination ; but after many 
 meditations I perceived that it is impossible to fimi the principles 
 of true unity in mere matter, or in that which is only passive, 
 because there everything is but a collection or mass of parts ad 
 infinitum, I^ow, multiplicity cannot have its reality except from 
 real unities, which originate otherwise and are entirely different 
 things from the points of which it is certain the continuum could 
 not be composed. Therefore, in order to find these real unities I 
 was compelled to resort to a formal atom, since a material being 
 could not be at the same time material and perfectly indivisible, or 
 in other words, endowed with true unity. Jt became necessary, 
 therefore, to recall and, as it were, reinstate the substantial forms, 
 so decried now-a-days, but in a way to render them intelligible, and 
 distinguish the use which ought to be made of them from the 
 abuse vvliich had befallen them. I found then that their nature is 
 force and that from this something analagous to sensation and 
 desire results, and that therefore it was necessary to co'nceive them 
 similarly to the idea which we have of souls. But as the soul 
 ought not to be employed to explain the details of the economy of 
 the animal body, likewise I judged that it was not necessary to 
 employ these forms to explain particular problems in nature 
 although they are necessary in order to establish true general prin- 
 ciples. Aristotle calls them the first entelechies. I call them, 
 perhaps more intelligibly, primitive forces which contain in them- 
 selves not only the act or complement of possibility, but also an 
 original activity. 
 
 4. I saw that these forms and these souls ought to be indivisible, 
 just as much as our mind, as in truth I remembered was the 
 
Y8 
 
 opinion of St. Thomas in regard to tlie souls of brutes. But this 
 innovation renewed the great difficulties in respect to the origin and 
 duration of souls and of forms. For every simple substance which 
 has true unity cannot begin or end except by miracle ; it follows, 
 therefore, that it cannot begin except by creation, nor end except 
 by annihilation. Therefore, with the exception of the souls which 
 God might still be pleased to create expressly, I was obliged to rec- 
 ognize that the constitutive forms of substances must have been 
 created with the world, and that they must exist always. Certain 
 scholastics, like Albertus Magnus and John Bacon, had also foreseen 
 a part of the truth as to their origin. , And the matter ought not 
 to appear at all extraordinary for only the same duration which the 
 Gassendists accord their atoms is given to these forms. 
 
 5. I w^as of the opinion, nevertheless, that neither spirits nor the 
 rational soul, which belong to a superior order and have incom- 
 parably more perfection than these forms implanted in matter 
 which in my opinion are found everywhere — being in comparison 
 with them, like little gods made in the image of God and having 
 within them some rays of the light of divinity, ought to be mixed 
 up indifferently or confounded with other forms or souls. This is 
 why God governs spirits as a prince, governs his subjects, and even 
 as a father cares for his children ; while he disposes of the other sub- 
 stances as an engineer manipulates his machines. Thus spirits 
 bave peculiar laws which place them above the changes which 
 matter undergoes, and indeed it may be said that all other things 
 are made only for them, the changes even being adapted to the 
 felicity of the good and the pimishment of the bad. 
 
 0. However, to return to ordinary forms or to material souls [awes 
 l)rutes\ the duration which must be attributed to them in place of that 
 w^hicli had been attributed to atoms, might raise the question as to 
 whether they pass from body to body, which would be metempsy- 
 chosis — very like the belief of certain philosophers in the transmis- 
 sion of motion and of the species. But this fancy is very far 
 removed from the nature of things. There is no such passage ; 
 and here it is that the transformations of Swammerdam, Malpighi 
 and Leewenhoeck, who are the best observers of our time, have 
 come to my aid and have made me admit more easily that the 
 animal and every other organized substance does not at all begin 
 when we think it does, and that its apparent generation is only a 
 
74 
 
 development and a sort of augmentation. Also I liave noticed that 
 the author of the Search after Truth [i. e., Malebranche], Kigis, 
 Hartsoeker and other able men, have not been far removed from 
 this opinion. 
 
 7. But the most important question of all still remained : What 
 do these souls or these forms become after the death of the animal 
 or after the destruction of the individual of the organized sub- 
 stance? It is this question which is most embarrassing, all the 
 more so as it seems unreasonable that souls should remain uselessly 
 in a chaos of confused matter. This obliged me finally to believe 
 that there was only one reasonable opinion to hold, namely, that 
 not only the soul but also the animal itself and its organic machine 
 were preserved, although the destruction of its gross parts had ren- 
 dered it so small as to escape our senses now just as much as it did 
 before it was born. Also there is no person who can accurately 
 note the true time of death, which can be considered for a long 
 time solely as a suspension of visible actions, and indeed is never 
 anything else in mere animals ; witness the resuscitatioyi of 
 drowned flies after being buried under pulverized chalk, and other 
 similar examples, which make it sufficiently clear that there would 
 be many more resuscitations and of far more intricacy if men were 
 in condition to set the machine going again. And apparently it 
 was of something of this sort that the great Democritus, atomist as 
 he was, spoke, although Pliny makes sport of the idea. It is then 
 natural that the animal having, as people of great penetration 
 begin to recognize, been always living and organized, should so 
 remain always. And since, therefore, there is no first birth nor 
 entirely new generation of the animal, it follows that there will be 
 no final extinction nor complete death taken in its metaphysical 
 rigor, and that in consequence instead of the transmigration of 
 souls there is only a transformation of one and the same animal, 
 according as its organs are folded differently and more or less 
 developed. 
 
 8. Nevertheless, rational souls follow very much higher laws 
 and are exempt from all that could make them lose the quality of 
 being citizens in the society of spirits, God having planned for 
 them so well, that all the changes in matter cannot make them lose 
 the moral qualities of their personality. And it can be said that 
 everything tends to the perfection not only of the miiverse in gen- 
 
75 
 
 eral but also of those creatures in particular who are destined to 
 such a measure of happiness that the universe finds itself interested 
 therein, by virtue of the divine goodness which communicates 
 itself to each one, according as sovereign wisdom permits. 
 
 9. As regai'ds the ordinary body of animals and of other cor- 
 poreal substances, the complete extinction of which has up to thi.s 
 time been believed in, and the changes of w^hicli depend rather 
 upon mechanical rules than upon moral law^s, I remarked with 
 pleasure that the author of the book On Diet^ which is attributed 
 to Hippocrates, had foreseen something of the truth when he said 
 in express terms that anirnals are not born and do not die, and 
 that the things which are supposed to begin and to perish only 
 appear and disappear. This was also the opinion of Parmenides 
 and of Melissus, according to Aristotle, for these ancients were 
 more profound than is thought. 
 
 10. I am the best disposed in the world to do justice to the 
 moderns ; nevertheless I think they have carried reform too far, 
 for instance, in confounding natural things with artificial, for the 
 reason that they have not had sufficiently high ideas of the majesty 
 of nature. They conceive that the difference between its machines 
 and ours is only that of large to small. This caused a very able 
 man, author of Conversations on the Plurality of Wm'lds, to say 
 recently that in regarding nature close at hand it is found 
 less admirable than had been believed, being only like the work- 
 shop of an artisan. I believe that this does not give a w^orthy idea 
 of it and that only our system can finally make men realize the true 
 and, immense distance which there is between the most trifling 
 productions and mechanisms of the divine w^isdom and the greatest 
 masterpieces of the art of a finite mind, this difference consisting 
 not merely in degree but also in kind. It must then be known 
 that the machines of nature have a truly infinite number of organs 
 and that they are so well protected and so proof against all acci- 
 dents that it is not possible to destroy thern. A natural machine 
 remains a machine even to its least parts and, w^hat is more, it 
 remains always the same machine it has been, being only trans- 
 formed by the different folds it receives, and sometimes expanded, 
 sometimes compressed and, as it were, concentrated when believed 
 to be lost. 
 
 11. Farther, by means of the soul or of form there arises a true 
 unity which answers to what we call the 7 in us, that which could 
 
76 
 
 take place neither in the machines of art nor in the simple mass of 
 matter however well organized it might be, which can only be 
 considered as an army, or as a herd of cattle, or as a pond full of 
 tish, or as a watch composed of springs and wheels, i^evertheless, 
 if there were not real substantial unities there would be nothing 
 substantial or real in the mass. It was this which forced Cordemoi 
 to abandon Descartes, and to embrace Djpmocritus' doctrine of the 
 Atoms, in order to find a true unity. But atoms of matter are con- 
 trary to reason, leaving out of account the proof that they are made 
 up of parts, for the invincible attachment of one part to another 
 (if sucli a thing could be conceived or with reason supposed) would 
 not at all destroy their diversity. OiAy atoms of substance, i. e., 
 unities which are real and absolutely destitute of parts, are sources 
 of actions and the^ absolute first principles of the composition of 
 things, and, as it were, the last eleijients of the analysis of sub- 
 stances. They might be called metajphysical joints ', they possess 
 a certain vitality and a kind of jperception, and mathsmatical 
 points are t\\Q\v jpoints of view to express the universe. But when 
 corporeal substances are compressed all their organs together form 
 only ?i jphysical point to our sight. Thus physical points are only 
 indivisible in appearance ; mathematical points are so in reality but 
 they are merely modalities ; only metaphysical points or those of 
 substance (constituted by forms or souls) are exact and real, and 
 without them there would be nothing real, for without true unities 
 there could not be multiplicity. 
 
 12. After having established these propositions I thought myself 
 entering into port, but when I came to meditate on the union of 
 the soul with the body I was as if cast back into the open sea. 
 For I found no way of explaining how the body can cause anything 
 to pass into the soul, or vice versa / nor how one substance can 
 communicate with another created substance. Descartes gave up 
 the attempt on that point, as far as can be learned from his writ- 
 ings, but his disciples seeing that the common view was inconceiv- 
 able, were of the opinion that we perceive the qualities of bodies 
 l)ecause God causes thoughts to arise in the soul on the occasion of 
 movements of matter ; and when the soul wished to move the body 
 in its turn they judged that it was God who moved it for the soul. 
 And as the communication of motions again seemed to them incon- 
 ceivable, they beHeved that God gave motion to a body on the 
 
77 
 
 occasion of the motion of another body. This is what they call the 
 system of Occasional Causes which has been much in vogue on 
 account of the beautiful remarks of tlie author of the Search after 
 Truth. 
 
 13. It must be confessed that the difficulty has been well pene- 
 trated when the not-possible is stated, but it does not appear that it 
 is done away witli by explaining what actually takes place. It is 
 indeed true that there is no real influejice of one created substance 
 upon another, speaking in xnetaphysical strictness, and that all 
 things with all their realities are continually produced by the 
 power of God ; but in resolving problems it is not enough to 
 employ a general cause and to call in what is called the Deus ex 
 Machina. For when this is done and there is no other explana- 
 .tion which can be drawn from secondary causes, it is, properly, 
 having recourse to miracle. In philosophy it is necessary to try to 
 give reasons by making known in what way things are done by 
 divine wisdom, in conformity to the idea of the subject concerned. 
 
 14. Being then obliged to admit that it is not possible for the 
 soul or any true substance to receive any influence from without, if 
 it be not by the divine omnipotence I was led insensibly to an 
 opinion which surprised me but which appears inevitable and 
 which has in truth great advantages and many beauties. It is this : 
 it must then be said that God created the soul, or every other real 
 unity, in the first place in such a way that everything with it comes 
 into existence from its ow^n substance through perfect spontaneity 
 as regards itself and in perfect harmony with objects outside itself. 
 And "ibat thus our internal feelings (i. e., those within the soul 
 itself ana not in the brain or finer parts of the body), being only 
 phenomena consequent upon external objects, or true appearances, 
 and like well-ordered dreams, it is necessary that these internal per- 
 ceptions within the soul itself come to it by its own proper original 
 constitution, i. e., by the representative nature (capable of express- 
 ing beings outside itself by relation to its organs), which has been 
 given it at its creation and which constitutes its individual char- 
 acter. This brings it about that each of these substances in its 
 own way and according to a certain point of view, represents exactly 
 the entire universe, and perceptions or impressions of external 
 things reach the soul at the proper point in virtue oi its own laws^ 
 as if it were in a world apart, and as if there existed nothing 
 
78 
 
 but God and itself (to make use of the manner of speaking of a 
 certain person of great elevation of mind, whose piety is well 
 known) ; there is also perfect harmony among all these substances, 
 producing the same effects as if they communicated with each other 
 by a transmission of kinds or of qualities, as philosophers generally 
 suppose. 
 
 Farther, the organized mass, within which is the point of view 
 of the soul, being expressed more nearly by it, finds itself reciprocally 
 ready to act of itself^ following the laws of corporeal machines, at 
 the moment when the soul wills it, without either one troubling 
 the laws of the other, the nerves and the blood having just at that 
 time received the impulse which is necessary in order to make 
 them respond to the passions and perceptions of the soul ; it is this 
 mutual relationship, regulated beforehand in every substance of 
 the universe, which produces what we call their inter-co'tniminication 
 and alone constitutes the union letween the soul and hody. And we 
 may understand from this how the soul has its seat in the body by 
 an immediate presence which could not be greater, for it is there 
 as the unit is in the complex of units, which is the multitude. 
 
 15. This hypothesis is very possible. For why could not God give 
 to a substance in the beginning a nature or internal force which 
 could produce in it to order (as in a spirittoal or formal automaton^ 
 hut free here since it has reason to its share), all that which should 
 happen to it ; that is to say all the appearances or expressions it 
 should have, and that without the aid of any creature? All the 
 more as the nature of the substance necessarily demands and essen- 
 tially includes a progress or change, without which it would not 
 have power to act. And this nature of the soul, being representa- 
 tive, in a very exact (although more or less distinct) manner, of the 
 universe, the series of representations which the soul will produce 
 for itself will naturally correspond to the series of changes in the 
 universe itself ; as, in turn, the body has also been accommodated 
 to the soul, for the encounters where it is conceived as acting from 
 without. This is the more reasonable as bodies are only made for 
 those spirits which are capable of entering into communion with 
 God and of celebrating His glory. Thus from the moment the 
 possibility of this hypothesis of harmonies is perceived, we per- 
 ceive also that it is the most reasonable and that it gives a 
 marvellous idea of the harmony of the universe and of the perfec- 
 tion of the works of God. 
 
79 
 
 16. This great advantage is also found in it, that instead of say- 
 ing that we are free only in appearance and in a way practically 
 sufficient, as many persons of ability have believed, it must 
 rather be said that we are only enchained in appearance, and that 
 according to the strictness of metaphysical expressions we are in a 
 state of perfect independence as respects the influence of all other 
 creatures. This again places in a marvellous light the immortality 
 of the soul and the always uniform preservation of our individ- 
 uality, regulated perfectly by its own nature beyond the risk of all 
 accidents from without, whatever appearance there may be to the 
 contrary. J^ever has a system so clearly proved our high standing. 
 Every spirit, being like a separate world sufficient to itself, inde- 
 pendent of every other creature, enclosing the infinite, expressing 
 the universe, is as durable, as stable and as absolute as the universe 
 of creatures itself. Therefore we ought always to appear in it in 
 the way best fitted to contribute to the perfection of the society of 
 all spirits, which makes their moral union in the city of God. 
 Here is found also ^ wq^w proof of the existence of God, ^xliioh is 
 one of surprising clearness. For this perfect harmony of so many 
 substances which have no communication with each other, can only 
 come from a common cause. 
 
 > IT. Besides all these advantages which render this system com- 
 mendable, it can also be said that this is more than an hypothesis, 
 since it hardly seems possible to explain the facts in any other 
 intelligible manner, and since several great difficulties which have 
 exerci^ the mind up to this time, seem to disappear of them- 
 selves as soon as this system is well understood. The customary 
 ways of speaking can still be retained. For we can say that the 
 substance, the disposition of w^hich explains the changes in others 
 in an intelligible manner (in this respect, that it may be supposed 
 that the others have been in this point adapted to it since the 
 beginning, according to the order of the decrees of God), is the one 
 which must be conceived of as acting upon the others. Also the 
 action of one substance upon another is not the emission or trans- 
 fer of an CTitity as is commonly believed, and cannot be understood 
 reasonably except in the way which I have just mentioned. It is true 
 that we can easily conceive in matter both emissions and receptions 
 of parts, by means of which we are right in explaining mechani- 
 cally all the phenomena of physics ; but as the material mass is not 
 
80 
 
 a substance it is apparent that action as regards substance itself can 
 only be what I have just said. 
 
 18. These considerations, however metaphysical they may appear, 
 have yet a marvellous use in physics in establishing the laws of 
 motion, as our Dynamics can make clear. For it can be said that 
 in the collision of bodies, each one suffers only by reason of its own 
 elasticity, because of the motion which is already in it. And as to 
 absolute motion, it can in no way be determined mathematically, 
 since everything terminates in relations ; therefore there is always 
 a perfect equality of hypotheses, as in astronomy, so that whatever 
 number of bodies may be taken it is arbitrary to assign repose or a 
 certain degree of velocity to any one that may be chosen, without 
 being refuted by the phenomena of straight, circular and composite 
 motion, l^evertheless it is reasonable to attribute to bodies real 
 movements, according to the supposition which explains phe- 
 nomena in the most intelligible manner, since this description is in 
 conformity to the idea of action which I have just established. 
 
XII. 
 
 The Eeply* of M. Foucher to Leibnitz concerning his ]N"ew 
 
 System of the Interaction of Substances. 1695. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 Although your system is not new to me, sir, and althougli I 
 made known to you, in part, my opinion in replying to a letter 
 which you wrote me on this subject more than ten years ago, still I 
 will not fail to tell you again what I think of it, since you ask me 
 anew. 
 
 The first part aims only to make known in all substances the 
 unities which constitute their reality and distinguish them from 
 others, and form, to speak after the manner of the school, their 
 individuation ; this is what you remark first on the subject of 
 matter or extension. I agree with you that it is right to inquire 
 after the unities which form the composition and the reality of 
 extension, for without this, as you very justly remark, am, always 
 divisible extension is only a chimerical compound, the principles of 
 which do not exist since without unities no true multitude is possi- 
 ble. ^N^evertheless, I wonder that people are indifferent on this 
 subject, ybr the essential principles of extension cannot exist really. 
 In truth, points without parts cannot be in the universe, and two 
 points joined together form no extension ; it is impossible that any 
 length can subsist without breadth, or any surface without depth. 
 And it is of no use to bring forward physical points, for these 
 points are extended and involve all the difficulties which we should 
 like to avoid. But I will not longer delay on this subject on 
 which you and I have already had a discussion in the Journal 
 of the sixteenth of March, 1693, and of the third of August of the 
 same year. 
 
 You introduce on the other hand another kind of unities which, 
 strictly speaking, are unities of composition or of relation, and 
 which respect the perfection or completion of a whole which, being 
 organic, is destined for certain functions ; for example, a clock is 
 one, an animal is one ; and you believe that you can give the name 
 of substantial forms to the natural unities of animals and of plants, 
 so that these unities shall form their individuation in distinguish- 
 6 
 
82 
 
 ing them from every other compound. It seems to me that you 
 are right in giving animals a principle of individuation other than 
 that which is usually given them, which is only through relation to 
 external accidents. In reality this principle must be internal, as, 
 much on the part of their soul as of their body, but whatever dis- 
 position there may be in the organs of the animal, that does not 
 suffice to render it sensible. For finally all this concerns merely 
 the organic and mechanical composition, and I do not see that you 
 are thereby justified in constituting a sensitive jprinciple in hrutes 
 differmg substantially from that of men. And after all it is not 
 without reason that the Cartesians acknowledge that if we admit a 
 sensitive principle capable of distinguishing good from evil, it is 
 consequently necessary also to admit in them reason, discernment 
 and judgment. So, allow me to say to you, sir, that this does not 
 solve the difficulty, either. 
 
 We come to your concomitance which forms the principal and 
 second part of your system. We will admit that God, that great 
 artisan of the universe, can adjust all the organic parts of the body 
 of a man so well that they shall be capable of producing all the 
 movements which the soul joined to this body might wish to pro- 
 duce in the course of its life, without its having the power to 
 change these movements or to modify them in any way. And, 
 reciprocally, God can produce a contrivance in the soul (be it a 
 machine of a new kind or not), by means of which all the thoughts 
 and modifications w^hich correspond to these movements shall arise 
 successively at the same moment that the body shall perform its 
 functions. And I admit that this is not more impossible than to 
 make two clocks agree so well and go so uniformly that at the 
 moment when clock A shall strike twelve clock B also strikes, so 
 that one would imagine that the two clocks are regulated by the 
 same weight or the same spring. But after all, to what can this 
 great artifice in substances serve if not to make tnen believe that 
 the one acts upon the other ^ although this is not true f In reality, 
 it seems to me that this system is hardly more advantageous than 
 that of the Cartesians; and if we are right in rejecting theirs 
 because it uselessly supposes that God, considering the movements 
 which he himself produces in the body, produces also in the soul 
 thoughts which correspond to these movements, as if it were not 
 more worthy of him. to produce all at once the thoughts and modi- 
 
83 
 
 fications of the soul without needing hodies to serve as regulators 
 and, so to speak, inform liim what he ought to do — shall we not 
 have reason to inquire of yon why God does not content himself 
 with producing all the thoughts and modifications of the soul 
 (whether he do it immediately or by contrivance, as you will), 
 without there being useless bodies which the mind can neither 
 move nor know ? Even to such an extent that although no move- 
 ment should take place in the body, the soul would not cease to 
 think always that there was one ; just as those who are asleep think 
 that they are moving their members and are walking, when never- 
 theless those members are at rest and do not move at all. Thus, 
 during the waking state, souls would remain always persuaded that 
 their bodies would move according to their desires, although, 
 nevertheless, these vain and useless masses would be inactive and 
 would remain in a continuous lethargy. Truly, sir, do we not see 
 that these opinions are made expressly and that these ex post facto 
 systems have been invented only to save certain principles which 
 have been adopted ? In fact, the Cartesians, supposing that there 
 is nothing in common between spiritual and corporeal substances, 
 cannot explain how one acts on the other ; and consequently they 
 are compelled to say what they do. But you, sir, w^ho could free 
 yourself by other ways, I am surprised that you embarrass yourself 
 with their difficulties. For who does not see that when a balance 
 is in equilibrium and inactive, if a new weight is added to one of 
 the sides, forthwith movement appears and one of the counter- 
 weights makes the other rise in spite of the effort which the latter 
 makes to descend. You conceive that material heings are capable 
 of efforts and of movement ; and it follows "very naturally that the 
 strongest effort must surpass the weakest. On the other hand you 
 recognize also that spiritual heings may malce efforts ; and as there 
 is no effort which does not suppose some resistance, it is necessary 
 either that this resistance be stronger or weaker; if stronger, it 
 overcomes ; if weaker, it yields. Now it is not impossible that the 
 mind making an effort to move the body finds it endowed with a 
 contrary effort which resists — sometimes more, sometimes less, and 
 thil suffices to cause it to suffer thereby. It is thus St. Augustine, 
 in fiis books on music, explains of set purpose the action of spirits 
 on bodies. 
 
 I know that there are many other questions to be raised before 
 resolving from first principles all those which might be agitated ; 
 
84 
 
 so true is it tliat one ought to observe the laws of the academicians, 
 the second of which forbids the calling in question those things 
 which one easily sees cannot be decided, such as are almost all 
 those of which we have just spoken ; not that these questions are 
 absolutely insoluble but because they can only be solved in a 
 certain order, which requires that philosophers begin by agreeing 
 as to the infallible mark of truth, and confine themselves to dem- 
 onstrating from first principles ; and by waiting, one can always 
 separate that which is conceived clearly and sufficiently from other 
 points or subjects which embrace some obscurity. 
 
 This, sir, is what I can say at present of your system, without 
 speaking of the other fine subjects of which you there incidentally 
 treat, and which would merit particular discussion. 
 
XIII. 
 
 Explanation of the New System concerning the Communi- 
 cation BETWEEN Substances, to serve as a reply to the 
 Memoir of M. Foucher inserted in the ''''Journal des 
 Savans^'' of September 12, 1695. 1696. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 I remember, sir, that I believed I was fulfilling your wislies in 
 communicating to yon, many years ago, my philosophical hypothe- 
 sis, although I assured you at the same time that I had not yet 
 made up my mind to avow it. I asked for your opinion of it in 
 exchange, but I do not remember to have received any objections 
 from you ; otherwise, teachable as I am, I should not have given 
 you occasion to make the same objections to me twice. However, 
 after the publication, they still come apropos. For I am not one of 
 those in whom a prepossession takes the place of reason, as you 
 will experience when you are able to bring forward some precise 
 and weighty arguments against my opinions, a thing which appar- 
 ently has not been your design on this occasion. You have wished 
 to speak as a skillful academician and thus give opportunity for a 
 thorough examination of these subjects. 
 
 I have not wished to explain here the principles of extension, 
 but those of effective extension or of corporeal mass; and these 
 principles, in my opinion, are real unities ; that is, substances 
 endowed with true unity. The unity of a clock, of which you 
 make mention, is entirely different, with me, from that of an ani- 
 mal, which latter is capable of being a substance endowed with a true 
 unity, like what we call the ego in us ; whereas a clock is nothing 
 but an assemblage. It is not in the disposition of the organs that I 
 place the sensitive principle of animals, and I admit that it con- 
 cerns only the corporeal mass. So it seems that you do not make 
 me out to be wrong when I demand true unities and when for this 
 reason I rehabilitate substantial forms. But when you seem to 
 say that the soul of brutes must possess reason if feeling is ascribed 
 to it you make use of a conclusion, the force of which I do not see. 
 You admit, with praiseworthy sincerity, that my hypothesis of 
 harmony or of concomitance is possible. But you do not conceal a 
 
86 
 
 certain repugnance to it ; undoubtedly because you have believed it 
 purely arbitrary, not having been informed that it follows from my 
 view of unities, for therein everything is connected. You demand 
 then, sir, what purpose all this contrivance which I attribute to the 
 author of nature may serve ? As if one could attribute too much 
 of it to him, and as if this exact correspondence which substances 
 have among themselves by laws of their own which each one has 
 received in the beginning, was not a thing admirably beautiful in 
 itself and worthy of its author. You ask, too, what advantage I find 
 herein. I might refer to what I have already said of it ; neverthe- 
 less, I reply, in the first place, that when a thing cannot but be it 
 is not necessary that, in order to admit it, we should demand of 
 what use it is. Of what use is the incommensurability of the side 
 with the diagonal ? I reply, in the second j^lace, that this corres- 
 pondence serves to explain the communication of substances and 
 the union of the soul with the body by laws of nature established 
 beforehand, without having recourse either to a transmission of 
 species, which is inconceivable, or to fresh assistance from God, 
 which appears very unsuitable. For it must be understood that as 
 there are laws of nature in matter, so there are like laws in souls or 
 forms, and these laws effect what I have just stated. 
 
 I shall be asked, farther,, whence it comes that God does not con- 
 tent himself with producing all the thoughts and ^nodijications of 
 the soul without these useless bodies which the soul, they say, can 
 neither 7nove nor know f The reply is easy. It is that God has 
 willed that there should be more rather than fewer substances, and 
 that he has thought it good that these viodifications of the soul 
 should answer to something external. There is no useless sub- 
 stance ; they all cooperate in the design of God. I am unwilling, 
 also, to admit that the soul does not know the body at all, although 
 this knowledge is gained without the influence of one upon the 
 other. I should even have no difficulty in saying that the soul 
 moves the body ; and as a Copemican speaks truly of the rising of 
 the sun, a Platonist of the reality of matter, a Cartesian of the 
 reality of sensible qualities, provided that he is rightly understood, 
 so I believe that it is quite true to say that substances act, the one 
 on the other, provided that it be understood that one is the cause 
 of the changes in the other in consequence of the laws of harmony. 
 As to the objection concerning the lethargy of bodies, that they 
 
87 
 
 would be inactive while the soul would think them in movement, 
 this could not be, because of this same unfailing correspondence 
 which the divine wisdom has established. I know no vain, useless 
 and inactive masses of which you speak. There is action every- 
 where, and I establish that fact better than the received philosophy 
 does, because I believe that there is no body without movement, 
 nor substance without effort. 
 
 I do. not understand in what the objection consists contained in 
 the words, "In truth, sir, do not we see that these opinions are 
 made expressly, and that these ex post facto systems have been 
 invented only in order to save certain principles ?" All the hypoth- 
 eses are made expressly, and all the systems follow after, to save 
 phenomena or appearances ; but I do not see what the principles 
 are of which I am said to be prepossessed, and which I wish to 
 soAie. If this means that I am led to my hypothesis by a priori 
 reasons or by certain principles, as is in truth the fact, it is rather 
 praise for the hypothesis than an objection. It is usually sufficient 
 that a hypothesis prove itself a posteriori, because it satisfies the 
 phenomena ; but when there are also reasons elsewhere and. 
 a priori, it is so much the better. But perhaps this means that 
 having invented a new opinion I have been very glad to employ 
 it, in order to give myself the airs of an innovator, rather than 
 because I recognized any usefulness in it. I do not know, sir, 
 whether you have a poor enough opinion of me to attribute these 
 thoughts to me. For you know that I love the truth and that if I 
 affected novelties so much I should be in more haste to produce 
 them, especially those the solidity of which is recognized. But in 
 order that those who do not know me so well may not give your 
 words a meaning we would not like, it will be sufficient to say 
 that in my opinion it is impossible to explain otherwise contin- 
 ual action conformable to the laws of nature, and that I believe 
 that the usefulness of my hypothesis will be recognized by the 
 difficulty which the most sharp-sighted philosopliers of our time 
 have found in the communication between minds and bodies, and 
 even of corporeal substances among theraselves; and I do not 
 know if you have not found some there yoursetf. It is true that 
 there are, in my opinion, efforts in all substances, but these efforts 
 are properly only in the substance itself ; and what follows in the 
 others is only in virtue of a pre-established harmony (if I may be 
 
permitted to use tins word), and in no wise by a real influence or 
 by a transmission of some property or quality. As I have 
 explained what action and passion are, you may infer also the 
 meaning of effort and resistance. 
 
 You say you know, sir, that there are many other questions to 
 be asked before those which we have just agitated can be decided. 
 But perhaps you will find that I have already asked them, and I 
 do not know whether your academicians have employed with 
 greater rigor or with more effect than I what there is of good in 
 their method. 1 highly approve of seeking to demonstrate truths 
 from first principles ; it is more useful than is thought, and I have 
 put this precept into practice. So I approve of what you say on 
 that head, and I would .that your example would bring our philoso- 
 phers to think of it as they should. I will add another reflection 
 which seems to me important in making the reality and usefulness 
 of my system better understood. You know that Descartes 
 believed that the same quantity of motion is preserved in bodies. 
 It has been shown that he was mistaken on that point, but I have 
 made it apparent that it is always true that the same moving force, 
 for which he had substituted the quantity of movement, is pre- 
 served. However, the changes which take place in bodies in 
 consequence of the modifications of the. soul embarrassed him, 
 because they seemed to violate this law. He believed that he had 
 found an expedient, which in truth is ingenious, by saying that we 
 must distinguish between njovement and direction, and that 
 the soul cannot increase or diminish the moving force, but 
 that it changes the direction or determination of the course of the 
 animal spirits, and that it is in this way that voluntary movements 
 take place. It is true that he was unwilling to explain how the 
 soul acts to change the course of bodies, that which is as inconceiv- 
 able as to say that it gives them movement, unless recourse is had 
 with me to the pre-established harmony. But it should be known 
 that there is another law of nature, which I have discovered and 
 demonstrated, and which Descartes did not know. It is that not 
 only is the same quantity of moving force preserved, but also the 
 same quantity of direction tovjards whatever side i7i the world is 
 taJi'en, That is to say, drawing any straight line you please and 
 taking also such and as many bodies as you please, you will find in 
 considering all these bodies together, without omitting any of 
 
89 
 
 those which act upon any one of those you have taken, that there 
 will always be the same quantity of progress on the same side in 
 all the parallels to the right line which you have taken, taking care 
 to estimate the sum of the progress in . omitting that of the bodies 
 which move in the direction opposite to that of the bodies which 
 move in the direction taken. This law, being just as beautiful and 
 just as general as the other, no more deserves to be violated than the 
 other ; and this is avoided by my system, which preserves the force 
 and the direction, and in a word all the natural laws of bodies, in 
 spite of the changes which take place there, in consequence of 
 those of the soul. 
 
xiy. 
 
 Second Explanation of the System of the Communication 
 
 BETWEEN Substances. 1696. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 By jour reflections, sir, I see clearly that the thought which one 
 of my friends has published in the Journal de Paris has need of 
 explanation. 
 
 You do not understand, you say, how I could prove that which I 
 advanced concerning the communication or harmony of two sub- 
 stances so different as the soul and the body. It is true that I 
 believe that I have found the means of doing so, and this is how I 
 propose to satisfy you. Imagine two clocks or watches which 
 agree perfectly, ^ow, this may take place in three ways. The 
 first consists in a mutual influence ; the second is to have a skillful 
 workman attached to them who regulates them and keeps them 
 always in accord ; the third is to construct these two clocks with so 
 much art and accuracy as to assure tUeir future harmony. Put 
 now the soul and the body in place of these two clocks ; their 
 accordance may be brought about by one of these three ways. 
 The way of influence is that of common philosophy, but as we can- 
 not conceive of material particles which may pass from one of these 
 substances into the other, this view must be abandoned. The way 
 of the continual assistance of the creator is that of the system of 
 occasional causes; but I hold that this is to make a Deus ex 
 Machina intervene in a natural and ordinary matter, in which, 
 according to reason, he ought not to cooperate except in the way in 
 which he does in all other natural things. Thus there remains 
 only my hypothesis ; that is, the way of harmony. From the 
 beginning God has made each of these two substances of such a 
 nature that merely by following its own peculiar laws, received 
 with its being, it nevertheless accords with the other, just as if 
 there were a mutual influence or as if God always put his hand 
 thereto in addition to his general cooperation. After this I have 
 no need of proving anything, unless you wish to require me to 
 prove that God. is sufficiently skillful to make use of this prevenient 
 contrivance, examples of which we see even among men. Now, 
 
91 
 
 taking for granted that he can do it, you easily see that this is the 
 way most beautiful and most worthy of himf? You suspected that 
 my explanation would be opposed lo the very different idea which 
 we have of the mind and of the body ; but you will presently clearly 
 see that no one has better established their independence. For 
 wliile it has been necessary to explain their communication by a 
 kind of miracle, occasion has always been given to many people to 
 fear that the distinction between the body and the soul was not as 
 real as was believed, since in order to maintain it it was necessary 
 to go so far. I shall not be at all sorry to sound enlightened per- 
 sons concerning the thoughts which I have just explained to you. 
 
XY. 
 
 Third Explanation. Extract from a letter of Leibnitz on 
 HIS Philosophical Hypothesis and the curious Problem 
 
 PROPOSED BY his FRIENDS TO THE MATHEMATICIANS. 1696. 
 [From the French.] 
 
 Some wise and penetrating friends, having considered my novel 
 hypothesis concerning the great question of the union of soul and 
 body, and having found it of importance have besought me to give 
 some explanations of the" difficulties which have been raised and 
 which come from the fact that it has not been well understood. 
 
 I have thought that the matter might be rendered intelligible to 
 every sort of mind by the following comparison : 
 
 Imagine two clocks or two watches which agree perfectly. 
 Xow this may happen in three ways. The first consists in the 
 mutual influence of one clock on the other ; the second, in the care 
 of a man who attends thereto ; the third, in their own accuracy. 
 
 The first way^ Avhich is that of influence, has been experimented 
 on by the late M. Huygens, to his great astonishment. He had 
 two large pendulums attaclied to the same piece of wood *, the 
 continual vibrations of these pendulums communicated similar 
 vibrations to the particles of wood ; but these different vibra- 
 tions not being able to subsist very well in their order and without 
 hindering each other, unless the pendulums agreed, it happened 
 by a kind of marvel that even when their beats had been pur- 
 posely disturbed they soon came again to beat together, almost 
 like two chords which are in unison. 
 
 The second way of making two clocks, even although poor, 
 always accord, would be to have a skillful workman who should see 
 to it that they are kept in constant agreement. This is what I call 
 the way of assistance. 
 
 Finally, the third way would be to make in the first place these 
 two clocks with so much art and accuracy that we might be assured 
 of their future accordance. This is the way of the pre-established 
 agreement. 
 
 Put now the soul and the body in the place of these two clocks. 
 Their harmony or sympathy will take place by one of these three 
 
93 
 
 methods. Tlie way of influence is that of common philosophy ; 
 but as we cannot conceive of material particles or properties, or 
 immaterial qualities, which can pass from one of these substances 
 into the other, we are obliged to abandon this view. The way of 
 assistance is that of the system of occasional causes ; but I hold 
 that this is making a Deus ex Machina intervene in a natural and 
 ordinary matter, when, according to reason, he ought not to inter- 
 vene except in the manner in which he cooperates in all the other 
 affairs of nature. 
 
 Thus, there remains only my hypothesis ; that is, the way of a 
 harmony pre-established by a prevenient divine contrivance, which 
 from the beginning has formed each of these substances in a way 
 so perfect and regulated with so much accuracy that merely by fol- 
 lowing laws of its own, received with its being, it nevertheless 
 agrees with the other, just as if there were mutual influence, or as 
 if God in addition to his general cooperation constantly put his 
 hand thereto. 
 
 After this I do not think I need to prove anything, unless it be 
 that you wish me to prove that God has everything necessary to 
 making use of this prevenient contrivance, examples of which we 
 see even among men, according to their skill.. And supposing that 
 he can do it you see well that this is the most admirable way and 
 the one most worthy of him. 
 
 It is true that I have yet other proofs but they are more pro- 
 found, and it is not necessary to state them here. 
 
XYI. 
 
 Reflections on Locke's Essay on Huinan Understanding. 1696. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 I FIND 80 many marks of unusual penetration in what Mr. Locke 
 has given us on tlie Hwinan Understanding and on Education, and 
 I consider the matter so important, that I have thought that the time 
 would not be badly employed which I should give to such profit- 
 able reading; all the more as I have myself deeply meditated 
 concerning that which has to do with the foundations of our 
 knowledge. It is for this reason that I have jotted down on this 
 sheet some of the reflections which have occurred to me in reading 
 his Essay on the Understanding. Of all researches, there is none 
 more important, because it is the key to all others. 
 
 The first hooh considers mainly the principles said to be born 
 with us. Mr. Locke does not admit them any more than he does 
 innate ideas. He has undoubtedly had good reasons for putting 
 himself in opposition on this point to ordinary prejudices, for the 
 name of ideas and principles is extremely abused. Common phi- 
 losophers make themselves principles at their fancy ; and the 
 Cartesians, who profess more accuracy, do not fail to intrench 
 themselves behind so-called ideas of extension, of matter and of the 
 soul, wishing in this way to exempt themselves from the . necessity 
 of proving what they advance, on the pretext that those who will 
 meditate on these ideas will find in them the same thing that they 
 do ; that is to say, that those who will accustom themselves to their 
 manner of thinking .will have the same prepossessions, which is 
 very true. 
 
 My opinion is, then, that nothing ought to be taken as primitive 
 principles except experiences and the axiom of identity, or, what is 
 the same thing, contradiction, which is primitive, since otherwise 
 there would be no difference between truth and falsehood ; and 
 since all researches would cease at the start if to say yes or no were 
 indifferent. We cannot, therefore, prevent ourselves from sup- 
 posing this principle as soon as we wish to reason. All other 
 truths are capable of proof, and I highly esteem Euclid's method 
 which, without stopping at what would be thought to be suffi- 
 
95 
 
 ciently proved by the so-called ideas, has proved, for example, that 
 in a triangle one side is always less than the other two together. 
 Yet Euclid was right in taking some axioms for granted, not as if 
 they were truly primitive and undemonstrable, but because he 
 would have come to a standstill if he had wished to draw conclu-^ 
 sions only after an accurate discussion of principles. Thus he 
 judged it proper to content himself with having pushed the 
 proofs up to this small number of propositions, so that it can be 
 said that if they are true, all that he says is also tnie. He has left 
 to others the trouble of demonstrating these principles themselves 
 which, besides, are already justified by experience; but in these 
 matters this does not content us. This is why Appolonius, 
 Proclus and others have taken the trouble to demonstrate some 
 of Euclid's axioms. This manner of proceeding ought to be imitated 
 by philosophers in order to arrive finally at some established posi- 
 tions, even if they be but provisional, in the way of which I have 
 just spoken. 
 
 As for ideas, I have given some explanation of them in a short 
 essay entitled Meditationes de Cognitione^ Yeritate et Ideis, and I 
 could have wished that Mr. Locke had seen and examined it ; for I 
 am one of the most docile of men, and nothing is more fitted to 
 advance our thoughts than the considerations and remarks of per- 
 sons of merit, when they are made with care and sincerity. Here I 
 shall only say that true or real ideas are those of the possibility of 
 whose fulfilment we are assured; the others are doubtful, or (in 
 case of proof of impossibility), chimerical. JN'ow the possibility of 
 ideas is proved as much a priori by demonstrations, by making use 
 of the possibility of other simpler ideas, as a jposteriori by ex- 
 perience ; for what is, cannot fail to be possible. But primitive 
 ideas are those the possibility of which is undemonstrable, and 
 which indeed are nothing else than the attributes of God. 
 
 As regards the question, whether there are ideas and truths 
 created with us, I do not consider it absolutely necessary for the 
 beginning nor for the practice of the art of thinking, to decide it ; 
 whether they all come to us from without, or whether they come 
 from us, we will reason correctly if we observe what I have just 
 said on this subject and if we proceed with order and without 
 prejudice. The question concerning the origin of our ideas am,d of 
 our rao/xims is not preliminary in philosophy, and we must have made 
 
96 
 
 great progress to be able to answer it well. I think, however, that 
 I can say that our ideas, even those of sensible things, come from 
 within the soul \de notre proj)re fond\ of which jou may judge 
 by what I have published concerning the naUire and interaction of 
 siihstances and what is called the itnion of the soul with the hody. 
 For I have found that these things had not been well understood. 
 I am in no wise in favor of the Tabula rasa of Aristotle ; and 
 there is something sound in what Plato called reminiscence. There 
 is even something more, for we have not only a reminiscence of all 
 our past thoughts but also 2^ presentiment of all our future thoughts. 
 It is true that it is confusedly and without distinguishing them, very 
 much as when I hear the sound of the ocean I hear that of all the 
 waves in particular which make up the total sound, although it is 
 without discerning one wave from another. And it is true in a 
 certain sense, which 1 have explained, that not only our ideas but 
 also our feelings, spring from within our own soul, and that the 
 soul is more independent than is thought, although it is always 
 true that nothing takes place in it which is not determined and 
 that nothing is found in creatures which God does not continually 
 create. 
 
 In the second hook, which goes into the details of ideas, I confess 
 that Mr. Locke's reasons for proving that the soul is sometimes 
 without thought do not seem to me convincing, unless he gives the 
 name of thoughts to only those perceptions sufficiently noticeable 
 to be distinguished and retained. I hold that the soul and even 
 the body is never without action, and that the soul is never without 
 some perception. Even in dreamless sleep we have some confused 
 and dim feeling of the place where we are and of other things. But 
 even if experience should not confirm it, I believe that it may be 
 demonstrated. It is very much as when we cannot prove abso- 
 lutely by experience whether there is a vacuum in space, and 
 whether there is rest in matter. And yet questions of this kind 
 seem to me, as well as to Mr. Locke, to be decided demonstratively. 
 
 I assent to the difference which he makes with great reason 
 between matter and space. But as concerns the vacuum, many 
 learned people have believed in it. Mr. Locke is of this number. I 
 was almost persuaded of it myself, but I gave it up long ago. And 
 the incomparable Mr. Huygens, who was also for a vacuum and for 
 the atoms, began at last to reflect upon my reasons, as his letters 
 
97 
 
 can bear witness. The proof of a vacuum, taken from motion, of 
 which Mr. Locke makes use, supposes that body is originally Kard^ 
 and that it is composed of a certain number of inflexible parts. 
 For in this case it would be true, whatever finite number of atoms 
 might be taken, that motion could not take place without a 
 vacuum, but all the parts of matter are divisible and pliable. 
 
 There are some other things in this second book which arrest 
 me ; for example, when it is said, chapter XYII, that infinity is to 
 he attributed only to Sjpace^ Time and JSuinher. I believe with 
 Mr. Locke that, strictly speaking, it may be said that there is no 
 space, no time and no number which is infinite, but that it is only 
 true that however great may be a space, a time or a number, there 
 is always another larger than it, ad infinitum / and that thus the 
 true infinite is not found in a whole made up of parts. It is none 
 the less, however, found elsewhere ; namely, in the absolute, which 
 is without parts and which has influence upon compound things 
 because they result from the limitation of the absolute. Hence the 
 positive infinite being nothing else than the absolute, it may be 
 said that there is in this sense a positive idea of the infinite, and 
 that it is anterior to that of the finite. For the rest, by rejecting a 
 composite infinite, we do not deny what the geometricians, and 
 especially the excellent Mr. I^ewton, prove de Seriebus infimitis. 
 
 As for what is said, chapter XXX, de ideis adaequatis, it is per- 
 missible to give to the terms the signification one finds apropos. 
 Kevertheless, without finding fault with Locke's meaning, I put 
 degrees in ideas, according to which I call those adequate in which 
 there is nothing more to explain very much as in numbers. Now 
 all ideavS of sensible qualities, as of light, color, heat, not being of 
 this nature, I do not count them among the adequate ; also it is 
 not through themselves nor a priori, but by experience that we 
 know their reality or possibility. 
 
 There are again many good things in the third booh, where he 
 treats of words or terms. It is very true that everything cannot 
 be defined, and that sensible qualities have no Tiominal definition 
 and may be called primitive in this sense ; but they can none the 
 less receive a real defimition. I have shown the difference between 
 these two kinds of definition in the meditation quoted above. The 
 nominal defi/iiition explains the name by the marks of the thing ; 
 but the real defim^ition makes known a priori the possibility of the 
 
98 
 
 thing defined. For the rest, I heartily approve of Mr. Locke's doc- 
 trine concerning the demonstrahility of moral truths. 
 
 The fourth or last hooh, which treats of the linotoledge of truths 
 shows the use of what has just been said. I find in it, as well as in 
 the preceding books, numberless beautiful reflections. To make 
 fitting remarks upon them would be to make a book as large as the 
 work itself. It seems to me that the axioms in it are a little less 
 considered than they deserve to be. It is apparently because, with 
 the exception of those of the mathematicians, there are not ordina- 
 rily found any which are important and solid. • I have tried to 
 remedy this defect. I do not despise identical propositions, and I 
 have found that they are of great service even in analysis. It is 
 very true that we know our own existence by an immediate intui- 
 tion, and that of God, by demonstration ; and that a mass of 
 matter, the parts of which are without perception, cannot make a 
 whole which thinks. I do not despise the argument, invented some 
 centuries ago by Anselm, which proves that the perfect being must 
 exist ; although I find something lacking in this argument, because it 
 takes for granted that the perfect being is possible. For if this 
 one point were proved in addition the whole demonstration would 
 be complete. 
 
 As for the knowledge of other things, it is very well said that 
 experience alone does not sufiice for advancing sufficiently in 
 physics. A penetrating mind will draw more conclusions from 
 some very ordinary experiences than another could draw from the 
 most choice ; besides there is an art of experimenting and of inter- 
 rogating, so to speak, nature. Yet it is always true that progress 
 cannot be made in the details of physics except in proportion as 
 one has experience. 
 
 Mr. Locke is of the opinion, held by many able men, that the 
 forms of logic are of little use. I should be almost of the opi30site 
 opinion ; and I have often found that paralogisms, even in mathe- 
 matics, are faults of form. Mr. Huygens has made the same 
 observation. Much might be said on this point, and many excel- 
 lent things are despised because the use of which they are 
 capable is not made of them. We are prompted to despise what 
 we have learned in the schools. It is true that we there learn 
 many useless things, but it is good to exercise the function delta 
 Crusca^ that is, to separate the good from the bad. Mr. Locke can 
 
99 
 
 do it as well as anyone whatsoever ; and in addition he fijives us 
 important thoughts of his own. He is not only an assayer, but he 
 is also a transmuter, by the augmentation which he makes of good 
 metal. If he continued to make a present of it to the public we 
 should be greatly indebted to him. 
 
XYII. 
 
 On the Ultimate Origin of Things. 1697. 
 [From the Latin.] 
 
 In addition to the world or aggregate of finite things, there is 
 some unique Being who governs, not only like the soul in me, or 
 rather like the Ego itself in my body, but in a much higher rela- 
 tion. For one Being dominating the universe not only rules the 
 world but he creates and fashions it, is superior to the world, and, 
 so to speak, extra mundane, and by this very fact is the ultimate 
 reason of things. For the sufficient reason of existence can be 
 found neither in any particular thing nor in the whole aggregate 
 or series. Suppose a book on the elements of geometry to have 
 been eternal and that others had been successively copied after it, 
 it is evident that, although we might account for the present book 
 by the book which was its model, we could nevertheless never, by 
 assuming any number of books whatever, reach a perfect reason 
 for them ; for we may always wonder why such books have 
 existed from all time ; that is, why books are and why they are 
 thus written. What is true of books is also true of the different 
 states of the world, for in spite of certain laws of transformation a 
 succeeding state is in a certain way only a copy of the preceding, 
 and to whatever anterior state you may go back you will never 
 find there a perfect reason why, forsooth, there is any world at all, 
 and such a world as exists. For even if you imagine the world 
 eternal, nevertheless since you posit nothing but a succession of 
 states, and as you find a sufficient reason for them in none of them 
 whatsoever, and as any number of them whatever does not aid you 
 in giving a reason for them, it is evident that the reason must be 
 sought elsewhere. For in eternal things it must be understood that 
 even where there is no cause there is a reason which, in perduring 
 things, is necessity itself or essence, but in the series of changing 
 things, if it were supposed that they succeed each other eternally, 
 this reason would be, as will soon be seen, the prevalence of incli- 
 nations where the reasons are not necessitating (by an absolute or 
 metaphysical necessity the opposite of which would imply contra- 
 
101 
 
 diction), but inclining. From whiaii it follows that hy supposing 
 the eternity of the world, an ultimate extramundane reason of 
 things, or God, cannot be escaped. 
 
 The reasons of the world, therefore, lie hidden in something extra- 
 mundane different frorn the chain of states or series of things, the 
 aggregate of which constitutes the world. We must therefore pass 
 from physical or hypothetical necessity, which determines the 
 posterior states of the world by the prior, to something which is 
 absolute or metaphysical necessity, the reason for which cannot 
 be given. For the present world is necessary, physically or hypo- 
 thetically, but not absolutely or metaphysically. It being granted, 
 indeed, that the world is such as it is, it follows that things may 
 hereafter be such as they are. But as the ultimate origin must be in 
 something which is metaphysically necessary, and as the reason of 
 the_existing can. only be from the existing, there must exist some 
 one being metaphysically necessary, or whose essence is existence ; 
 and thus there exists something which differs from the plurality of 
 beings or from the world, which, as we have recognized and 
 shown, is not metaphysically necessary. 
 
 But in order to explain a little more clearly how, from eternal 
 or essential or metaphysical truths, temporary, contingent or phys- 
 ical truths arise, we ought first to recognize that from the very fact 
 that something exists rather than nothing, there is in possible 
 things, that is, in the very possibility or essence, a certain need of 
 existence, and, so to speak, some claim to existence ; in a word, 
 that essence tends itself towards existence. Whence it further fol- 
 lows that all possible things, whether expressing essence or possible 
 reality, tend by equal right toward existence, according to their 
 quantity of essence or reality, or according to the degree of perfec- 
 tion wliicli they contain, for perfection is nothing else than 
 quantity of essence. 
 
 Hence it is most clearly understood that among the infinite com- 
 binations of possibles and possible series, that one exists by which 
 the most of essence or of possibility is brought into existence. 
 And indeed there is always in things a principle of determination 
 which is to be taken from the greatest and the smallest, or in such 
 a way that the greatest effect is obtained with the least, so to 
 Speak, expenditure. And here the time, place, or as many say, the 
 receptivity or capacity of the world may be considered as the 
 
102 
 
 expenditure or the ground wUicli can be most easily built, iipon, 
 whereas the varieties of forms correspond to the cominodiousness of 
 the edifice and the multiplicity and elegance of its chambers. And 
 it is with it in this respect as with certain games where all the 
 spaces on a table are to be filled according to determined laws. 
 ]^ow, unless a certain skill be employed, you will be finally 
 excluded by unfavorable spaces and forced to leave many more 
 places empty than you can or wish. But there is a certain very easy 
 way of filling the most possible space. Just as, therefore, if it is 
 resolved to make a triangle, there being no other determining reason, 
 it commonly happens that an equilateral results ; and if it is resolved 
 to go from one point to another without any further determination 
 as to the way, the easiest and shortest path will be chosen ; so it 
 being once posited that being is better than not being, or that there 
 is a reason why something should be rather than nothing, or that 
 we must pass from the possibility to the act, it follows that even in 
 the absence of every other determination the quantity of existence 
 is as great as possible, regard being had to the capacity of the time 
 and of the place (or to the possible order of existence), exactly as 
 the squares are disposed in a given area in such a way that it shall 
 contain the greatest number of them possible. From this it is now 
 marvelously understood how in the very origin of things a sort of 
 divine mathematics or of metaphysical mechanism was employed, 
 and how the determination of the greatest quantity of existence 
 takes place. It is thus that from all angles the determined angle 
 in geometry is the right angle, and that liquids placed in hetero- 
 geneous positions take that form which has the most capacity, or 
 the spherical ; but especially it is thus that in ordinary mechanics 
 itself, when several heavy bodies strive together the motion which 
 results constitutes, on the whole, the greatest descent. For just as 
 all the possibles tend by equal right to exist by reason of reality, so 
 all weights tend by an equal right to descend by reason of their 
 gravity ; and as here a movement is produced which contains the 
 greatest possible descent of heavy bodies, so there a world is pro- 
 duced in which is found realized the greatest number of possibles. 
 And thus we now have physical necessity from metaphysical ; 
 for although the world be not metaphysically necessary, in the 
 sense that its contrary implies a contradiction or a logical absurdity, 
 it is nevertheless physically necessary, or determined in such a way 
 
103 
 
 that its contrary implies imperfection or moral absurdity. And as 
 possibility is tlie principle of essence, so perfection or the degree 
 of essence (through which the greatest possible number is at the 
 same time possible), is the principle of existence. Whence at the 
 same time it is evident that the author of the world is free, 
 although he makes all thiilgs determinately ; for he acts according 
 to a principle of wisdom or of perfection. Indeed indifference 
 arises from ignorance, and the wiser one is, the more determined one 
 is to the highest degree of perfection. 
 
 But, you will say, however ingenious this comparison of a cer- 
 tain determining metaphysical tfiechanism with the physical 
 mechanism of heavy bodies may appear, nevertheless it fails in 
 this, that heavy bodies truly exist, whereas possibilities and essences 
 prior to existence or outside of it are only fancies or fictions in 
 which the reason of existence cannot be sought. I answer, that 
 neither these essences nor these so-called eternal truths are fictions 
 but that they exist in a certain region of ideas, if I may thus speak, 
 that is in God himself, the source of all essences and of the exist- 
 ence of all else. And the existence of the actual series of things 
 shows sufficiently of itself that my assertion is not gratuitous. For 
 since the reason is not found in this series, as we have shown 
 above, but must be sought in metaphysical necessities or eternal 
 truths, and since that which exists can only come from that which 
 existed, as we have remarked above, eternal truths must have their 
 existence in a certain sifbject absolutely and metaphysically neces- 
 sary, that is in Grod, through whom those things which otherwise 
 would be imaginary, are, to speak barbarously but significantly, 
 realized. 
 
 And in truth we discover that everything is done in the world 
 according to the laws, not only geometrical but also metaphysical, 
 of eternal truths ; that is, not only according to material necessities, 
 but also according to formal necessities ; and this is true not only 
 generally in that which concerns the reason, which we have just 
 explained, of a world existing rather than non-existing, and existing 
 thus rather than otherwise (a reason which can only be found in 
 the tendency of the possible to existence) ; but if we descend to the 
 special we see the metaphysical laws of cause, of power, of action 
 holding good in admirable manner in all nature, and prevailing 
 over the purely geometrical laws themselves of matter, as I found 
 
104 
 
 in accounting for the laws of motion : a thing which struck me 
 with such astonishment that, as I liave explained more at length 
 elsewhere, I was forced to abandon the law of the geometrical com- 
 position of forces which I had defended in my youth when I was 
 more materialistic. 
 
 Thus, therefore, we have the ultimate reason of the reality, as 
 well of essences as of existences, in a Being who is necessarily much 
 superior and author to the world itself, since it is from him that 
 not only the existences which this world contains, but also the pos- 
 sibles themselves derive their reality. And this reason of things 
 can be sought only in a single source, because of the connection 
 which they all have with one another. But it is evident that it is 
 from this source that existing things continually emanate, that they 
 are and have been its products, for it does not appear why one state 
 of the world rather than another, the state of to-day rather than 
 that of to-morrow, should come from the world itself. We see, 
 also, with the same clearness, how God acts, not only physically but 
 freely ; how the efficient and final cause of things is Jn him, and 
 how he manifests not only his greatness and his power in the con- 
 struction of the machine of the world, but also his goodness and his 
 wisdom in the creation. And in order that no one should think 
 that we confound , here moral perfection or goodness with meta- 
 physical perfection or greatness, or that the former is denied while 
 the latter is granted, it must be known that it follows from what 
 has been said that the world is most perfect, not physically, or, if 
 you prefer, metaphysically, because that series of things is produced 
 in which there is the most reality in action, but also that it is most 
 perfect morally, because really moral perfection is physical perfec- 
 tion for souls themselves. Thus the world is not only the most 
 admirable machine, but in so far as it is composed of souls, it is also 
 the best republic, through which as much happiness or joy is 
 brought to souls as .is possible, in which their physical perfection 
 consists. 
 
 But, you will say, we experience the contrary in this world, for 
 often good people are very unhappy, and not only innocent brutes 
 but also innocent men are afflicted and even put to death with tor- 
 ture ; finally, the world, if you regard especially the government of 
 the human race, resembles a sort of confused chaos rather than the 
 well ordered work of a supreme wisdom. This may appear so at 
 the first glance, I confess, but if you examine the thing more 
 
105 
 
 closely, it evidently appears from the things which have been 
 alleged, that the contrary should be affirmed; that is, that all 
 things and consequently souls attain to the highest degree of per- 
 fection possible. And in truth it is not proper to judge before 
 having examined, as the jurisconsults say, the whole law. We 
 know only a very small part of the eternity w^hicli extends into 
 immen^tyj_for the memory of the few thousands of years which 
 history transmits to us are indeed a very little thing. And yet 
 from an experience so short we dare to judge of the immense and ^ 
 of the eternal, like men who, born and brought up in a prison, or, \ 
 if you prefer in the subterranean salt mines of the Sarmatae, think 
 that there is no other light in the world than the lamp whose feeble 
 gleam hardly suffices to direct their steps. Let us look at a very 
 beautiful picture, and let us cover it in such a way as to see only a 
 very small part of it, what else will appear in it however closely we 
 may examine it and however near we may approach to it, except a 
 certain confused mass of colors without choice and without art? 
 And yet when we remove the covering and regard it from the 
 proper point of view we will see that what appeared thrown on the 
 canvas at haphazard has been executed with the greatest art by the 
 author of the work. What the eyes discover in the picture, the 
 ears discover in music. The most illustrious composers often intro- 
 duce discords into their harmonies in order to excite and pique, so 
 to speak, the listener, w^ho, anxious as to the outcome, is all the 
 more pleased when soon all things are restored to order. Just as we 
 rejoice to have passed through slight dangers and experienced small 
 ills, whether because of a feeling of egotism, or because we find 
 pleasure in the frightful images which tight-rope dances or leap- 
 ings between swords {sauts jperilleux) present ; so we partly loose 
 laughing children, pretending to throw them far away from us, 
 like the ape which, having taken Christian, king of the Danes, 
 while still an infant wrapped in swaddling clothes, carried him to 
 the top of the roof, and when everybody was frightened brought 
 him back laughing, safe and sound to his cradle. According to the 
 same principle, it is insipid always to eat sweetmeats ; we must 
 mingle with them sharp, acid and even bitter things, which excite 
 the taste. He who has not tasted bitter things has not merited 
 sweet things and even will not appreciate them. It is the law even 
 of joy that pleasure be not uniform, for it engenders disgust, ren 
 ders us stupid and not joyous. 
 
106 
 
 As to what we said, that a part may be disturbed without preju- 
 dice to the general harmony, it must not be understood as mean- 
 ing that no account is made of the parts, or that it suffices that 
 the entire world be perfect in measure, although it might happen 
 that the human race should be unhappy, and that there should be 
 in the universe no regard for justice, no heed taken of our lot, as 
 some think who do not judge rightly enough of the whole of things. 
 For it must be known that as in a well-constituted republic as 
 much care as possible is taken of the good of the individual, so the 
 universe cannot be perfect if individual interests are not protected 
 as much as the universal harmony will permit. And here a better 
 law could not be established than the very law of justice which 
 wills that each one participate in the perfection of the universe and 
 in a happiness of his own proportioned to his own virtue and to the 
 good will he entertains toward the common good, by which that 
 which we call the charity and love of God is fulfilled, in which 
 alone, according to the judgment of the wisest theologians, the 
 force and power of the Christian religion itself consists. And it 
 ought not appear astonishing that so large a part should be given to 
 souls in the universe since they reflect the most faithful image of 
 the supreme Author, and hold to him not only the relation of 
 machine to artificer, but also, that of citizen to prince ; and they are 
 to continue as long as the universe itself ; and in a manner they 
 express and concentrate the whole in themselves so that it can be 
 said that souls are whole parts. 
 
 As regards especially the afflictions of good people, we must hold 
 for certain that there results for them a greater good, and this is 
 not only theologically but physically true. So grain cast into the 
 ground suffers before producing its fruit. And we may affirm, 
 generally, that afflictions, temporarily evil, are in effect good, since 
 they are short cuts to greater perfections. So in physics, liquors 
 which ferment slowly take more time also to improve ; whereas 
 those the agitation of which is greater, reject certain parts with 
 more force and are more promptly improved. 
 
 And we might say of this that it is retreating in order the better 
 to leap forward {qu'on recede^ pour mieux sauter). 
 
 We should therefore regard these considerations not merely as 
 agreeable and consoling, but also as most true. And, in general, I 
 feel that there is nothing truer than happiness, and nothing 
 happier nor sweeter than truth. 
 
XYIII. 
 
 Reply to Reflections, found in the ^''Journal des So/oomh^'' 
 
 OF THIS YEAR, RELATING TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN 
 PASSAGES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF DeSCARTES. 1697. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 I AM accused of wishing to establish my reputation on the ruins 
 of that of Descartes. I liave a right to complain of this. Yerj 
 far from wishing to ruin the reputation of this great man, I find 
 that his real merit is not sufficiently known, because what is most 
 excellent in him is not enough considered and imitated. IMen 
 fasten on the weakest passages because these are most easily under- 
 stood by those who are not willing to give themselves the trouble 
 of thinking profoundly and who yet would like to understand the 
 foundation of things. ) This is why, to my great regret, his par- 
 tisans add almost nothing to his discoveries, and this is the usual 
 effect of the sectarian spirit in philosophy. As all my views are 
 intent only upon the public good, I have said something from time 
 to time to arouse them, well knowing that their penetration would 
 lead them very far, if they did not believe that their master had 
 done enough. I have always declared that I esteem Descartes 
 exceedingly ; there are few who approach him in genius. I know 
 but Archimides, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Jung, Huygens, New- 
 ton, and a few others of such- force ; to whom Pythagoras, 
 Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Suisset, Cardan, Gilbert, Yerulam, 
 Campanella, Harvey, Pascal, and some others might be added. It 
 is nevertheless true that Descartes has made use of artifice in order 
 to profit by the discoveries of others, without wishing to appear 
 indebted to them. He treated some excellent men in an unjust 
 and unworthy way when they offended him, and he had an unbri- 
 dled ambition to set himself up as a party chief. But this does not 
 diminish the beauty of his thoughts. Far from approving those 
 who despise him and who repay merit with ingratitude, it is this 
 that I blame principally in Descartes, and still more in several of 
 his partisans, whose misunderstood attachment for a single author 
 nourishes prejudice and hinders them from profiting by the light 
 
108 
 
 of so many otliers. I am accustomed to say that the Cartesian 
 philosophy is as it toere tJie a/tite-Ghamher of the truth, and that it is 
 difficult to penetrate far beyond witliout having passed through this ; 
 but one deprives himself of the true knowledge of the heart of 
 things if he stops there. 
 
 As for the little of reputation which I am honored by having 
 accorded me, I have not acquired it in refuting Descartes ; I have 
 no need of that means ; law, history and letters contributed to it 
 before I had thought of mathematics. And if our new analysis, 
 the calculus of which I have propounded, surpasses that of Des- 
 cartes as much and more than his surpassed preceding methods, his 
 remains none the less very worthy of esteem, although it has been 
 necessary for the progress of science to disabuse those who think it 
 suffices for everything ; which cannot better be done than by pro- 
 posing to them problems, beautiful and attractive, and, for those 
 who know their method, even simple, but which not one of the 
 Cartesian analysts has been able to solve. 
 
 Let us come now to the heart of our dispute. I am not the first 
 who has blamed Descartes for having rejected the search for final 
 causes. Besides the Rev. Father Malebranche, the late Mr. Boyle 
 did so with much zeal and solidity ; not to speak of numerous 
 other grave, moderate and well-disposed authors, men who other- 
 wise make much of Descartes. The' reply is here made that he 
 banished final causes from physics, and that he was right in so 
 doing, but that he would have been wrong if he had banished them 
 from ethics : For the whole good and the whole evil of our free 
 actions depends upon their end. This reply is surprising. The 
 question is not concerning our free actions, but concerning God and 
 his wisdom, which appears among the things which Descartes 
 ought not to have neglected.' And the reply, far from excusing 
 him, would charge, if it were true, that according to him final 
 causes belong only to our free actions. But I suppose that this is 
 not the view of the author of the Reflections, nor that of Des- 
 cartes. Nevertheless, his silence might be prejudicial to his inten- 
 tion. He did not wish to avail himself of this means of proving 
 the existence of God ; he may be excused on this point, although 
 many have blamed him for it ; but he has not done well in other- 
 
109 
 
 wise everywhere passing by so important a point, which ought to 
 have been employed in some passages of his Principles of Philos- 
 ophy. If God is the author of things and if he is sovereignly 
 wise, one could not very well reason as to the structure of the uni- 
 verse without making considerations of his wisdom enter therein, 
 just as one could not well reason concerning a building without 
 entering into the designs of the architect. I have adduced else- 
 where an excellent passage from the Phaedo of Plato (which is the 
 dialogue on the death of Socrates), where the philosopher Anaxi- 
 mander, who had posited two principles, an intelligent mind and 
 matter, is blamed for not having employed this intelligence or this 
 wisdom in the progress of his work, having contented himself 
 with the figures and motions of matter ; and this is exactly the case 
 with our too materialistic modern philosophers. 
 
 But, it is said, in physics we do not ask why things are but how 
 they are. I reply that both questions are there asked. Often we 
 can better judge of the means by the end. Besides to explain a 
 machine we could not do better than to state its design and to 
 show how all its parts conduce thereto. This may even be useful 
 in finding the origin of the intention. I wish that this method 
 were employed also in medicine. The animal body is a machine, 
 at once hydraulic, pneumatic and pyrobolic, the design of which is 
 to maintain a certain motion ; and by showing what conduces to 
 this design and what is injurious to it, physiology as well as thera- 
 peutics, would be understood. Thus it is seen that final causes are 
 of service in physics, not only to make us admire the wisdom of 
 God, which is the principal reason, but also for knowing things and 
 for managing them. I have elsewhere shown that whereas we may 
 still dispute as to the efiicient cause of Hght, which Descartes, as 
 the most intelligent now acknowledge, has not sufficiently well 
 explained, yet the final cause suffices for divining the laws which it 
 follows, for provided we imagine that nature had as its design the 
 conducting of rays from a given point to another given point by 
 the easiest path, we find all these laws admirably, by simply 
 employing, as I have done in the Acta Eruditoruin of Leipsic, 
 
 some lines of analysis Molineux thanked me for this in his 
 
 Dioptrics, and he highly approved of the remark, which I made on 
 the occasion, on the important use of final causes, which lead us to 
 the consideration of Sovereign Wisdom, in showing us at the same 
 time the laws of nature which are its consequence. 
 
110 
 
 The author of the Reflections asks me to give the passage where 
 Descartes says that matter receives successively all the forms of 
 which it is capable. He has searched Articles 203 and 204 of the 
 fourth part of his Principles for it. But it is found in Article 47 
 of the third part. I shall quote it in the words of the original 
 Latin. The author remarks in the summary that the falsity of his 
 suppositions regarding the origin of the world could not be inju- 
 rious, and to prove it the better he adds : " Atque omnino parum 
 refert quid hoc pacto supponatur, quia postea juxta leges naturae 
 est mutandum. Et vix aliquid supponi potest, ex quo non idem 
 eifectus (quanquam fortasse operosius), per easdem naturae leges 
 deduci possit. Cum earum ope materia formas omnes, quarum est 
 capax, successive assumat, si formas istas ordine consideremus, tan- 
 dem ad illam quae est hujusmodi poterimus devenire." From this 
 it may be judged whether I have imposed upon this author, and 
 whether he does not say positively not only that matter can take, 
 but also that it does take effectively as well as successively, all the 
 forms of which it is susceptible, and that it is thus of little impor- 
 tance what suppositions are made. There is much to be said against 
 this reasoning. In order to sustain it, it would be necessary to 
 suppose that the same state of the universe returns always precisely 
 after a certain period ; since otherwise, a state of the world being 
 taken which is posterior in fact to another, this latter state could 
 never be deduced from the former, even if matter should receive 
 all the forms of which it is capable. But these periods involve 
 other difficulties, so much so that thus all the infinite possibilities 
 would have' to occur in this finite, periodic interval; and all 
 eternity could produce nothing new. To say, also, with Descartes, 
 that he is at liberty to suppose almost anything he wishes, it would 
 not suffice that each supposition or hypothesis should finally lead to 
 our world ; for it might be so distant and the passage from one to 
 the other miglit be so long and so difficult that it would be impos- 
 sible for the mind of man to follow it and to comprehend it. But 
 the only proposition here in question is the one I have adduced, 
 and the strange consequences of which I have noted : for if every- 
 thing possible, and everything imaginable, however unworthy it 
 be, some day comes to pass ; if every fable or fiction has been or 
 will' become true history, there is naught but necessity, and no 
 choice, no providence. And this consequence it is that the author 
 
Ill 
 
 of the Reflections does not disown, he having simply undertaken to 
 disprove the proposition itself, which he did not find in the Prirb- 
 ciples of its author. 
 
 Nevertheless I am unwilling to attack the religion and piety of 
 Descartes, as is unjustly imputed to me. I protested the contrary 
 in express terms, for a doctrine may be dangerous, without the one 
 circulating it, or the one following it, remarking the fact or approv- 
 ing its consequences. ^Nevertheless it is well to make them known, 
 to the end that we may be on our guard against them, forasmuch 
 as it clearly appears that Spinoza and some others have drawn 
 them. For there are minds disposed to seize upon the worst pas- 
 sages, and ingenious in deducing the most dangerous conclusions. I 
 would not have spoken of Spinoza if I had thought that what I 
 wrote would be published, from the fear that it would be believed 
 that I wished to cast odium upon the Cartesians, knowing well that 
 they have sometimes been wronged by mistaken zeal. "Neverthe- 
 less, since there is a desire to criticize my words it has been 
 necessary to show that I have advanced nothing groundlessly. As 
 one of the best uses of true philosophy, and particularly of physics, 
 is to nourish piety and to lead us to God, I am not ill -pleased 
 with those who have given me this occasion for explaining myself 
 in a way which may make good impressions on some one ; although 
 I could wish that it had been done without attributing to me a pas- 
 sion and partiality, from which, perhaps, few people are more 
 removed than I. To express in few words the feeling which I 
 have toward an author whose reputation I am wrongly accused of 
 wishing to ruin (an enterprise which would be as unjust as it is 
 impossible), I will say that he who does not acknowledge the emi- 
 nent merit of Descartes is not very penetrating ; but that he who 
 acknowledges and esteems none but him and those who follow him, 
 will never amount to much. 
 
XIX. 
 
 On JS'ature in Itself; or, On the Force residing in Created 
 
 Things, and their Actions. 1698. 
 
 [From the Latin.] 
 
 (1). I have recently received from the very illustrious John 
 Christopher Sturm, a man especially meritorious for his work in 
 mathematics and physics, the Apology which he published at 
 Altorf in defence of his Dissertation, De Idolo Natiirae^ which 
 GuTither Christopher Schelhammer, the eminent and beloved phy- 
 sician of Kiel, attacked in his book on nature. As I have formerly 
 examined the same question, and as I have had by letters some dis- 
 cussions on this subject with the eminent author of the Dissertation, 
 mention of which he made in a way very gratifying to me in 
 recalling publicly some details of our correspondence in the first 
 volume of his Select Physics (Yol. I, Sec. 1, Chap. 3, epilog. §v, 
 pp. 119, 120), I have been thereby but the more disposed to give 
 serious attention to such an important subject, judging it necessary 
 that my view and the whole question should be a little more 
 distinctly set forth from those principles which I have already 
 often indicated. This apologetic dissertation seemed to me to offer 
 an opportunity favorable to my design, because it was easy to see 
 that the author had there treated in a few words the essential 
 points of the question. For the rest I do not take sides between 
 these illustrious men. 
 
 (2). Two points especially, it seems to me, are in question : first, 
 in what consists the nature which we are accustomed to attribute 
 to things, the commonly received attributes of which, according to 
 the judgment of the celebrated Sturm, savor a little of paganism ; 
 next, whether there is in creatures any ipspysia, a thing which he 
 appears to deny. As for the first point, concerning nature in itself, 
 if we examine what it is and what it is not, I admit indeed that 
 there is no soul of the universe ; I even admit that these marvels, 
 which happen every day and of which we are wont to say with 
 reason that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence, are 
 not to be attributed to certain created intelligences endowed with a 
 wisdom and virtue proportioned to so great a matter; but that 
 
113 * 
 
 universal nature is, so to speak, the handiworh of God^ and one so 
 great that every natural machine (and this is the true but little 
 observed difference between nature and art) is composed of really 
 iniinite organs, and consequently requires in the author and 
 director iniinite wisdom and power. This is why I hold the omnis- 
 cient heat of Hippocrates and the soul-giving Cholco-goddess of 
 Avicenna and the very wise plastic virtue of Scaliger and others 
 and the hylarchic principle of Henry More, some of them impossi- 
 ble, others superfluous ; and it is enough for me that the mechanism 
 of things is constructed with so much wisdom that all these marvels 
 come to pass through its very development, organized beings being 
 evolved, I think, according to a preconceived plan. I am therefore 
 of the opinion of the illustrious author when he rejects the figment 
 of a certain created nature, whose wisdom forms and governs the 
 mechanisms of bodies ; but it does not hence follow, I believe, and 
 reason does not admit, that all created, indwelling, active force 
 must be rejected. 
 
 (3.) We have just*spoken of what it is not ; let us now examine 
 more closely w^hat this nature is w^hich Aristotle was not wrong in 
 calling the principle of motion and of rest, although this philoso- 
 pher seems to me to take the word in too broad a meaning, and 
 understand by it not only local motion or rest in a place, but in 
 general change and aTdac(: or persistence. Whence, also, as I may 
 say in passing, the definition which he gives of motion is truly 
 obscure ; it is, however, not so absurd as it seems to those who sup- 
 pose that he meant to define only local motion. But let us return 
 to the matter in hand. Robert Boyle, a man eminent and skilled 
 in the accurate observation of nature, has written on nature in 
 itself a little book, the thought of which, if I remember correctly, 
 is summed up in this, that we ought to regard nature as being the 
 very inechanism of bodies ; which indeed may be proved (l>c ^^ 
 TzMvee ; but if he had examined the thing with more dxpc^eia he 
 would have distinguished in the mechanism itself the principles 
 from their derivatives. So it does not suffice, in order to explain a 
 clock, to say that it is moved in a mechanical manner, without dis- 
 tinguishing whether it receives this impulse from a weight or from 
 a spring. I have already declared more than once (what I think 
 will be of profit in hindering the abusing of mechanical explana- 
 tions of material things, to the prejudice of piety, as if matter 
 8 
 
could exist of itself and as if the mechanism had no need of anj 
 intelligence or of any spiritual substance) that the origin of the 
 mechanism itself does not come merely from a material principle 
 alone nor from mathematical reasons but from a certain higher 
 principle, and, so to speak, metaphysical source. 
 
 (4.) One remarkable proof, among others, of this truth is that 
 the foundation of the laws of nature must be made to consist not 
 in this, that the same quantity of motion is preserved, as was com- 
 monly believed, but rather in this, that the same quantity of active 
 power ^ still more (and I have discovered that this happens for an 
 admirable reason), the same quantity of moving action must he 
 preserved^ the estimation of which must be very different from that 
 which the Cartesians conceive under quantity of motion. 
 
 I have conferred on this subject, partly by letters, in part 
 publicly, with two mathematicians of superior talent, and one of 
 them embraced my opinion altogether ; the other, after long and 
 thorough examination, ended by renouncing all his objections and 
 avowing frankly that he had not yet been abld to find an answer to 
 my demonstration. And I am all the more astonished to see that 
 the illustrious man, in the edited portion of his Select Physics, in 
 explaining the laws of motion, has admitted the common doctrine 
 as if it did not permit of doubt (he has, however, recognized that 
 it rests upon no demonstration but on a certain probability, and he 
 has repeated it in this last dissertation. Chap. 3, § 2) ; but perhaps 
 he wrote before my writings appeared and had not the time or the 
 thought for revising his own, especially as he was persuaded that 
 the laws of motion are arbitrary, which appears to me not at all 
 according to reason. For I think that it is because of reasons 
 determined by wisdom and order that God has been led to make the 
 laws which we observe in nature ; and hence it is evident, accord- 
 ing to the remark which I formerly made on the occasion of an 
 optical law and which the celebrated Molineux later highly 
 approved in his Dioptrics, that final cause is not only useful to vir- 
 tue and to piety in ethics and in natural theology, but that even in 
 physics it serves to find and to discover hidden truths. So when 
 the renowned Sturm, where he treats of final cause in his Select 
 Physics, presented my doctrine among the hypotheses, I could have 
 wished that he had sufficiently examined it in his criticism ; for he 
 would have found opportunity for saying in favor of the impor- 
 
115 
 
 tance and richness of the argument many excellent things aixd such 
 as are useful for piety. 
 
 (5.) But we must now examine what he says of the notion of 
 nature in his apologetic dissertation, and what seems to us insuffi- 
 cient in it. He grants, Chap. lY, §§ 2, 3, and often elsewhere, that 
 the movements which take place now are the result of the eternal 
 law once decreed by God, which law he calls soon after volition 
 and corrmia/nd I and that there is no need of a new command from 
 God, of a new volition, and still less of a new effort or of a sort of 
 laborious operation (§ 3) ; and he repels as an unjust imputation on 
 the part of his opponent the thought that God moves things as a 
 wood-cutter does his two-edged axe, or as a miller governs his mill 
 by retaining the waters or by turning them loose on the wheel. 
 But in truth, as indeed it seems to me, this explanation does not 
 suffice. For I ask if this volition or this command, or, if you pre- 
 fer, this divine law, decreed originally, attributed to things only an 
 extrinsic denomination; or if, in forming them, it created in them 
 some permanent impression, or as Schelhammer, remarkable as 
 well for his judgment as for his experience, well calls it, an 
 indwelling lata (although it is most often unknown to the creatures 
 in whom it resides), whence proceed all actions and all passions. 
 The first appears to be the doctrine of the authors of the system of 
 Occasional Causes, and especially of the very ingenious Male- 
 branche ; the latter is received (and as I believe rightly) as the 
 most true. 
 
 (6.) And in truth since this past order does not exist at present, 
 it can produce nothing now unless it then left after it some perdur- 
 ing effect, which now still continues and operates. And he 
 who thinks otherwise renounces, if I judge rightly, all distinct 
 explanation of things ; and it can be said that anything is, by an 
 equal title, the result of anything, if that which is absent in space 
 and time can without intermedium operate here and now. Thus 
 it is not sufficient to say that in creating things in the beginning 
 God willed that they should observe a certain law in their progress, 
 if his will is conceived to have been so inefficacious that things 
 were not affected by it and no lasting effect was produced in them. 
 And assuredly it is contrary to the notion of the divine power and 
 will, which is pure and absolute, that God should will and never- 
 theless in willing produce or change nothing; that he is always 
 
116 
 
 acting and never effecting ; that in a word he leaves no work or 
 dnoriXtafia. Without doubt, if nothing was impressed on creatures 
 by this divine word, " Let the earth bring forth, let the animals 
 multiply ;" if after it things were not affected otherwise than if no 
 command intervened, it follows (since there must be between the 
 cause and the effect a certain connection, either immediate or, 
 mediate), either that nothing takes place now conformably to this 
 mandate or that this mandate effecting so much in the present 
 must be always renewed in the future, a consequence which the 
 learned author, with reason, repels. But if, on the contrary, the 
 law decreed by God left some trace of itself impressed on things ; 
 if things were so formed by the mandate as to render them fit to 
 accomplish the will of the legislator, then it must be admitted that 
 a certain efficacy, form or force, such as we are accustomed to call 
 by the name of nature, is impressed on things, whence proceeds the 
 series of phenomena according to the prescription of the first 
 command. 
 
 (7.) But this indwelling force may indeed be conceived dis- 
 tinctly but not explained by images ; nor, certainly, ought it to be 
 so explained any more than the nature of the soul, for force is one 
 of those things which are not to be grasped by the imagination but 
 by the understanding. Thus, when the author of the apologetic 
 dissertation (Chap. 4, § 6) asks that the manner in which indwell- 
 ing law operates in bodies ignorant of this law be explained to him 
 by the imagination, I understand him to desire to have an 
 explanation of it through the understanding ; for otherwise, it 
 might be believed that he demanded that sounds be painted and 
 colors heard. Furthermore, if the difificulty of explaining things 
 is sufficient for rejecting them, he therefore merits the imputation 
 which he himself (Chap, i, § 2) repels as unjust, of preferring to 
 decide that everything is moved merely by a divine virtue rather 
 than to admit, under the name of nature, something the nature of 
 which is unknown to him. And certainly even Hobbes and others 
 could claim with equal right that all things are corporeal, because 
 they are persuaded that only bodies can be explained distinctly and 
 by the imagination. But they themselves are justly refuted by the 
 very fact that there is in things a power of acting which is not 
 derived from imageable things, but merely to trace this to a man- 
 date of God, which once given, in no wise affects things nor leaves 
 
117 
 
 any effect after it, so far from clearing up the difficulty, is rather 
 to renounce the role of the philosopher and to cut the Gordian 
 knot with the sword. For the rest, a more distinct and correct 
 explanation of active force than has up to this time been given, 
 may be drawn from our Dynamics, in which we give an interpre- 
 tation of the laws of nature and of motion, which is true and in 
 accordance with things. 
 
 (8.) But if some defender of the new philosophy which intro- 
 duces the inertia and torpor of things, goes so far as to take away 
 from the commands of God all durable effect and all efficacy for 
 the future, and has no scruples in requiring of God incessantly 
 renewed efforts (that which Sturm prudently declares he is averse 
 to), he himself may see how worthy he thinks this of God ; more- 
 over, he could not be excused unless he offered an explanation of 
 why things themselves can last some time but the attributes of 
 things which we understand under the name of nature cannot be 
 lasting ; why it may not be, furthermore, according to reason that 
 just as the word fiat left something after it, namely, the persisting 
 thing itself, so the not less admirable word of blessing has left also 
 after it in things a certain fecundity or virtue of producing their 
 acts and of operating, whence, if there is no obstacle, the operation 
 results. That which I have explained elsewhere might be added to 
 this if perchance it is not yet perfectly clear to all, that the very 
 substance of things consists in their power of acting and suffering, 
 whence it follows that not even durable things can be produced if 
 a force of some duration cannot be imprinted upon them by the 
 divine power. Thus it would follow that no created substance, no 
 soul, would remain numerically the same ; that nothing would be 
 preserved by God, and consequently that all things would be only 
 certain passing or evanescent modifications, and, so to speak, 
 phantasms, of one permanent divine substance ; and, what amounts 
 to the same thing, that nature itself or the substance of all things, 
 would be God; a pernicious doctrine, recently introduced into the 
 world or renewed by a subtle but profane author. In truth, if cor- 
 poreal things contained nothing but matter it would be quite true 
 to say that they are in a flux and have nothing substantial, as the 
 Platonists formerly very well recognized. 
 
 (9). Another question is whether we must say that creatures prop- 
 erly and truly act. This question is included in the first if we once 
 
118 
 
 understand that the indwelling nature does not differ from the 
 power of acting and suffering. For there cannot be action with- 
 out the power of acting, and on the other hand that potency is 
 worthless which can never be exercised. Since, however, action and 
 potency are none the less different things, the first successive, the 
 second lasting, let us consider the action. Here, I confess, I find 
 no little difficulty in explaining the thought of the learned Sturm. 
 For he denies that created things act properly and of themselves, 
 and, nevertheless, soon after, while admitting that they act, he does 
 not wish that the comparison of creatures to an ax moved by a 
 wood-cutter be attributed to him. I cannot draw from this any- 
 thing certain nor do I find explained with sufficient clearness to 
 what extent he recedes from the received opinions, or what distinct 
 notion he has conceived in his mind of action, which, as the de- 
 bates of the metaphysicians attest, is far from being obvious and 
 simple. As for me, as far as I seem to have grasped the notion of 
 action, the doctrine generally received in philosophy, that actions 
 helong to subjects^ follows from it and is established by it ; and I 
 think that this principle is so true that it may be inverted ; so that 
 not only is everything which acts a particular substance, but also 
 every particular substance acts without cessation, not even except- 
 ing body itself, in which no absolute rest is ever found. 
 
 (10). But let us now examine a little more attentively the opin- 
 ion of those who take away from created things true and individual 
 action ; a thing which Robert Fludd, author of the Philosophia 
 Mosaica, formerly did, and also now some Cartesians do who think 
 that it is not at all the things which act, but indeed God, on occa- 
 sion of things and according to the aptitude of things ; and thus 
 things are occasions not causes; they receive, but do not effect or 
 produce. After Cordemoi, de La Forge and other Cartesians had 
 proposed this doctrine, Malebranche, with his superior mind, lent 
 it the lustre of his style ; but no one, in my opinion, has presented 
 solid proofs. Certainly if this doctrine is pushed to the point of 
 suppressing even the imrrianent actions of substances (a view which 
 the illustrious Sturm in his Select Physics^ Bk. 1, ch. iv, Epilo., § 11, 
 p. 176, rightly rejects, and in this he gives proof of much circum- 
 spection), then nothing in the world appears to be more contrary 
 to reason. In truth, who will question that the mind thinks and 
 wills, and that many thoughts and volitions in us are elicited from 
 
119 
 
 ourselves, and that we are endowed with spontaneity ? This would 
 be not only to deny human liberty and to make God the cause of evil, 
 but also to contradict the testimony of our inmost experience and 
 of our conscience; through which we feel that those things are 
 ours, w^liich, without any kind of reason, our adversaries would 
 transfer to God. But if we attribute to our soul the indwelling 
 power of producing immanent actions, or, what is the same thing, 
 of acting immanently, then nothing hinders, on the contrary, it is 
 conformable to reason, that this same power should reside in other 
 animated beings or forms, or, if you prefer, in the nature of sub- 
 stances ; but if some one should think that in the nature of things 
 as known to us only our souls are active, or that all power of act- 
 ing immanently, and so to speak vitally^ is joined with intellect, 
 such assertions certainly rest on no ground, and can be defended only 
 in opposition to the truth. As to what is to be believed concern- 
 ing the transient actions of creatures^ that will be explained better 
 in another place, and has, in part, already been explained by us 
 elsewhere : that is to say, the communication of substances or of 
 monads has its source not in influx but in a concord proceeding 
 from divine preformation ; each substance, at the same time that it 
 follows the indwelling power and laws of its own nature, being ac- 
 commodated to the others ; and it is in this that the union of the 
 soul and body consists. 
 
 "~ (11). Moreover, that bodies are of themselves inert is true if it 
 is rightly understood, that is, that what is assumed to be in some 
 way at rest cannot set itself in motion or allow itself without resis- 
 tance to be set in motion by another body ; any more than it can 
 of itself change the rate of velocity or the direction which it once 
 has, or allow it easily and without resistance to be changed by 
 another body. And thus it must be confessed that extension, or 
 what is geometrical in body if taken simply, has nothing in it which 
 can give rise to action and to movement ; on the contrary, matter 
 rather resists motion by a certain natural inertia^ as Kepler has 
 wbII called it, so that it is not indifferent to motion and rest, as is 
 generally thought, but it needs in order to move an active force 
 proportionate to its size. Wherefore I make the very notion of 
 materia prima, or of mass, consist in this very passive force of 
 resistance (involving impenetrability and something more), which is 
 always the same in body and proportioned to its size ; and hence, I 
 
120 
 
 show that entirely different laws of motion follow than if there 
 were in body and in matter itself only impenetrability together 
 with extension ; and that, as there is in matter a natural inertia op- 
 posed to motion, so in body itself, and what is more, in every sub- 
 stance, there is a natural constancy opposed to change. But this 
 doctrine is not defended, but rather opposed, by those who deny 
 action to things ; for just as certain as it is that matter of itself does 
 not begin motion, so certain is it (as very fine experiments on the 
 motion communicated by a moving body show) that body retains of 
 itself the impetus which it has once acquired, and that it is stable 
 in its levity or makes an effort to persevere in that very series of 
 changes which it has entered on. As these activities, or entelechies, 
 cannot be modifications of primary matter or of mass, a thing 
 essentially passive, as was recognized by the very judicious Sturm 
 himself (as we shall see in the following paragraph), it may be in- 
 ferred that there must be found in corporeal substance a first en- 
 telechy or npajTOP dexrtxov for activity ; tliat is, a primitive motor 
 force which being joined to extension (or what is purely geometri- 
 cal) and to mass (or what is purely material) always indeed acts 
 but nevertheless, in consequence of the meeting of bodies, is vari- 
 ously modified through effort and impetus. And it is this same 
 substantial principle which is called soul in living beings, and suh- 
 stantialform in others ; and so far as by its union Avith matter it 
 constitutes a substance truly 07ie, or one per se, it forms what I call 
 a monad : since if these true and real unities are taken away only 
 beings by aggregation will remain ; nay, rather, it follows from 
 this, that there will be no real entities in bodies. For although 
 there are atoms of substance given, that is, our monads without 
 parts, there are no atoms of mass, i. e., of the smallest extension, 
 or ultimate elements, since the continuous cannot be formed of 
 points. In short, no being is given which is the greatest in mass 
 or infinite in extension, although there may always be some larger 
 than others : but a being is given which is the greatest by intension 
 of perfections or infinite in power. 
 
 (12). I see however that in this same aiDolegetic dissertation, 
 ch. lY, § 7 et seq., the celebrated Sturm has undertaken to attack 
 by certain arguments the motor force residing in bodies. ''I 
 shall abundantly here prove," he says, " that corporeal substance is 
 not even capable of any actively motor potency." But I do not 
 
121 
 
 understand what a power not actively motor can be. Moreover, lie 
 says that he will employ two arguments, one drawn from the nature 
 of matter and of body, the other from the nature of motion. The 
 first amounts to this, that matter, in its nature and essentially, is a 
 passive substance ; and that thus it is no more possible to give it 
 active force than it is for God to will that a stone, as long as it re- 
 mains a stone, shall be living and rational, that is, not a stone ; 
 further, whatever qualities are posited in bodies are but modifica- 
 tions of matter, moreover (what I acknowledge is well said), a modi- 
 fication of a thing essentially passive cannot render this thing 
 active. But it is easy to reply with the received and true philoso- 
 phy that matter is to be understood as secondary or as primary ; 
 the secondary is a certain complete but not purely passive substance ; 
 the primary is purely " passive but not complete, and consequently 
 there must be added to it a soul, or form analogous to the soul, a 
 primary ivrMyzta^ that is, a certain effort or primitive power of 
 acting, which is itself the indwelling law imprinted by divine de- 
 cree. I do not think that such a view is repugnant to the illus- 
 trious and ingenious man who lately maintained that body is com- 
 posed of matter and of spirit ; provided that sjpirit is taken not for 
 an intelligent thing (as in other cases is done) but for a soul or form 
 analogous to the soul ; not for a simple modification, but for some- 
 thing constituent, substantial and perduring, which I am accus- 
 tomed to call monad, and which possesses a sort of perception and 
 desire. Therefore this received doctrine, agreeing with the favor- 
 ably explained dogma of the schoolmen, must be first refuted, in 
 order that the argument of this illustrious man may have any 
 weight. Whence also it is evident that we cannot admit, what he 
 assumes, that whatever is in corporeal substance is but a modifica- 
 tion of matter. For it is well known that according to received 
 philosophy there are in the bodies of living beings souls which 
 assuredly are not modifications. For although the illustrious man 
 appears to maintain the contrary and to take away from the brutes 
 all feeling, in the true meaning of the word, and soul, properly 
 speaking, nevertheless, he cannot assume this opinion as the founda- 
 tion of his demonstration until it itself has been proved. And I 
 believe, on the contrary, that it is consistent neither with the order 
 nor the beauty nor the reason of things, that this vital or immanently 
 active principle should be only in a small part of matter, when 
 
122 
 
 greater perfection demands that it be in all. Nor does aught hin- 
 der souls, or at least forms analogous to souls, from being every- 
 where, although the dominant, and hence intelligent, souls, like the 
 human, cannot be everywhere. 
 
 (13). The second argument, which the illustrious Sturm draws 
 from the nature of motion, does not appear to me to be necessarily 
 conclusive. He says that motion is only the successive existence of 
 the thing in different places. Let us grant this provisionally, 
 although we are not at all satisfied with it, and although it expresses 
 rather the result of motion that its so-called formal reason ; never- 
 theless motor force is not thus excluded. For a body is not only at 
 the actual moment of its motion in the place assigned it, but it has 
 also a tendency or effort to change its place so that the succeeding 
 state follows of itself from the present by the force of nature; 
 otherwise at the actual moment, and hence at any moment, body A, 
 which is moved by body B, would in no wise differ from a body at 
 rest ; and from the opinion of the illustrious man, were it contrary 
 to ours on this point, it would follow that there would be no differ- 
 ence whatever in bodies, because in the fullness of a mass in itself 
 uniform no other difference can be assumed than that which 
 respects the motion. Finally, it would further follow that there 
 would be absolutely no variation in bodies, and that they would 
 remain always in the same state. For if any portion of matter 
 does not differ from another equal to and like it (which the illus- 
 trious Sturm must admit, since he does away with active forces, 
 impulses, and all other qualities and modifications, except ex- 
 istence in this place, which would be successively another and 
 another) ; if moreover the state at one instant does not differ from 
 the state at another instant except by the transposition of portions 
 of matter, equal and similar, and at qygyj point fitting to each 
 other, it evidently follows tliat, on account of the perpetual substi- 
 tution of indiscernible things, it will be absolutely impossible to 
 distinguish the states in the world of bodies at different moments. 
 In truth, it would only be an extrinsic denomination by which one 
 part of matter would be distinguished from another, that is, by the 
 future, namely, that it would be later in another and still another 
 place ; but for the present state, there is no difference ; and not 
 even from the future could a well founded difference be drawn, be- 
 cause we could even later never arrive at any true present differ- 
 
123 
 
 ence, since by no mark can one place be distinguished from another 
 place, nor (on the hypothesis of the perfect uniformity in matter 
 itself) matter from other matter of the same place. In vain also 
 would we after motion have resort to figure. In a mass perfectly 
 similar, indistinguishable and full, there arises no figure, nor limit 
 and distinction of various parts, except from the motion itself. If 
 then motion does not contain any mark of distinction it will impart 
 none to figure ; and as everything which is substituted for that 
 which was, is perfectly equivalent, no one, even were he omniscient, 
 could grasp the least indication of change, and consequently every- 
 thing will be just as if no change and no distinction occurred in 
 bodies : and we could never in this way account for the diverse ap- 
 pearances which we perceive. And it would be as if we should 
 imagine two perfect concentric spheres, perfectly similar in them- 
 selves and in all their parts, one of which should be enclosed in the 
 other so that not the least aperture should be left : then, if we sup- 
 pose that the inner sphere is either in motion or at rest, not even 
 an angel, to say nothing more, will be able to perceive any difference 
 between the states at different times, and will have no sign by 
 which to distinguish whether the inner sphere is at rest or in 
 motion and according to what law the motion is. Moreover, not 
 even the boundary of the spheres can be defined, because of the 
 want both of aperture and of difference ; just as in this case motion 
 cannot be noticed because of the one lack of difference. Whence 
 it must be considered as certain (although those who have not suffi- 
 ciently penetrated into these things have little noticed it) that such 
 things are foreign to the nature and order of things, and that (what 
 is among the number of my new and greater axioms) there' is no- 
 where any perfect similarity ; whence it follows also that we find 
 in nature neither corpuscles of an extreme hardness, nor a fluid of 
 an extreme tenuity, nor subtile matter universally diffused, nor ulti- 
 mate elements, called by some by the name of primary or secondary. 
 It is, I believe, because he had understood something of this, that 
 Aristotle, more profound in my opinion than many think, judged 
 that in addition to local change there was need of alteration, and 
 that matter would remain invariable. Moreover, this dissimilarity 
 or diversity of qualities, and hence this dlXoiwacz or alteration, 
 which Aristotle did not sufficiently explain, comes from the diverse 
 degrees and directions of efforts, and so from the modifications of 
 
124 
 
 indwelling monads. "We can understand by this that there must 
 necessarily be posited in bodies something besides a uniform mass 
 and its not untimely transportation. Certainly, those who hold to 
 atoms and a vacuum diversify matter at least in some degree by 
 making it here divisible, there indivisible, full in one place, porous 
 in another. But for a long time now I have understood (by laying 
 aside the prejudices of youth) that atoms together with vacuum 
 must be rejected. The celebrated author adds that the existence of 
 matter through diverse moments is to be attributed to the divine 
 will ; why not then, he says, attribute to the same its existence here 
 and now ? I reply, that this, like all other things in so far as they 
 involve some perfection, must undoubtedly be attributed to God ; 
 but just as this universal first cause which preserves all things 
 does not destroy, but rather produces, the natural permanence, 
 or once granted perseverance in existence, of the thing which 
 begins to exist; so it will not destroy but rather strengthen the 
 natural efficacy, or perseverance in action once communicated, of 
 the thing set in motion. 
 
 (14). Many other things are met with in this apologetic disserta- 
 tion which present difficulties, as what is said chapter lY, §11, con- 
 cerning motion transmitted from one ball to another through seve- 
 ral intermediaries, that the last ball is moved by the same force by 
 which the first is moved, whereas, it seems to me, it is moved by an 
 equivalent but not the same force ; for (what may appear surpris- 
 ing), each ball repelled by the next impinging it is set in motion by 
 its own force^ viz., its elasticity. (I do not here discuss at all the 
 cause of this elasticity, nor do I deny that it ought to be explained 
 mechanically by the movement of an indwelling and unstable 
 fluid). So also it Avill rightly seem surprising when he says, § 12, 
 that a thing which cannot set itself in motion cannot of • itself con- 
 tinue the motion. For it is evident rather that, as there is need of 
 force to communicate motion, so, when the impulse is once given, 
 so far from there being need of a new force to continue it there is 
 rather need of a new force to stop it. For the question here is 
 not of that preservation of motion by means of a universal cause 
 necessary to things, which, as we have remarked, could not destroy 
 the efficiency of things without taking away their existence. 
 • (15). By this it will be again perceived that the doctrine of occa- 
 sional causes defended by some (unless it be explained in such a 
 
125 
 
 way as to admit of modiiications which the illustrious Sturm has in 
 part admitted and in part seems disposed to admit), is subject to 
 dangerous consequences which are certainly not agreeable to its 
 very learned defenders. For so far is it from augmenting the glory 
 of God by doing away with the idola of nature, that on the con- 
 trary, by resolving all created things into simple modifications of a 
 single divine substance, it seems, with Spinoza, to make of God the 
 very nature of things ; since that which does not act, that which 
 lacks active force, tliat which is deprived of distinctive mark, and 
 finally, of all reason and ground of permanence, can in no wise be 
 a substance. I am thoroughly persuaded that the illustrious Sturm, 
 a man remarkable for his piety and learning, is very far removed 
 from these monstrosities. Thus there is no doubt but that he will 
 either have to show clearly that there remains in things some sub- 
 stance or even some variation, without prejudice to his doctrine, or 
 he will have to accept the truth. 
 
 (16). I have many reasons to suspect that I have not sufliciently 
 grasped his meaning, nor he mine. He has somewhere admitted 
 to me that a certain portion of divine power (that is, as I think, an 
 expression, imitation, nearest effect ; for the divine force itself can 
 certainly not be divided into parts) can and even in a way must be 
 regarded as possessed by and attributed to things. What he has 
 transmitted to me and what he has repeated in his Select Physics^ 
 may be seen in the passage which I quoted at the beginning of this 
 essay. If this be interpreted (as the terms seem to imply) in the 
 sense in which we speak of the soul as a portion of the divine 
 breath, then there is no longer any controversy between us. But 
 what prevents me from afiirming that such is his meaning, is that 
 nowhere else do I see him propounding anything like it, nor ad- 
 vancing any deductions from it. I notice on the contrary, that his gen- 
 eral views are little in harmony with this opinion, and that his apolo- 
 getic dissertation goes into everything else. When indeed my 
 views concerning indwelling force were first published in the month 
 of March, 1694, in the Acta ETuditor%i'in of Leipzig (views whicli 
 my Essay on Dynamics published in the same in April, 1695, farther 
 developed), he addressed to me by letter certain objections ; but 
 after having received my reply, he decided in a very friendly way 
 that the only difference between us was in the manner of expressing 
 ourselves. When I, remarking this, had brought some other things 
 
126 
 
 to his attention, he turning about declared there were many differ- 
 ences between us, which I recognized : and finally, these having 
 been removed, he wrote me anew that there was no difference be- 
 tween us except in terms, a thing very agreeable to me. I have, 
 therefore, wished, on the occasion of the recent apologetic disserta- 
 tion, to so explain the matter that finally the opinion of each one of 
 us and the truth of the same may the more easily be established. 
 For the illustrious author possesses, moreover, such rare penetra- 
 tion and clearness of exposition, that I hope that no little light will 
 be thrown by his zeal on this great subject. And consequently 
 this work of mine will not be useless because it furnishes him the 
 opportunity, with his wonted talent and force of judgment, to ex- 
 amine and to explain some things of importance in the present sub- 
 ject, which have up to this time been omitted by authors and by 
 me. But these things will be supplemented, if I am not mistaken, 
 by new, more profound, and more comprehensive principles, 
 whence perhaps may come, some day, a reconstructed and amended 
 system of philosophy midway between the formal and the material 
 (and properly uniting and preserving both). 
 
XX. 
 
 Ethical Definitions. 169Y-1698. 
 [From the French.] 
 
 As to charity or disinterested love, on which I see embarrassing 
 disputes have arisen, I think that one could not extricate one's self 
 better than by giving a true definition of love. I believe that 
 in the preface to the work S^Codex Dijplomaticus Juris Gentium] 
 which is known to you, sir, I have formerly so done in noting the 
 source of justice. For Justice is fundamentally nothing else than 
 charity conformed to wisdom. Charity is universal benevolence. 
 Benevolence is a disposition or inclination to love and it has the 
 same relation to love that habit has to act. And Love is this act or 
 active state of the soul which makes us find our pleasure in the 
 happiness or satisfaction of others. This definition, as I have since 
 noted, is capable of solving the enigma of disinterested love, and of 
 distinguishing it from the bonds of interest or debauchery. I re- 
 member that in a conversation, which I had several years ago with 
 
 the Count and other friends, in which human love alone was 
 
 spoken of, this difiiculty was agitated, and my solution was found 
 satisfactory. When one loves a person sincerely one does not seek 
 one's own advantage or a pleasure severed from that of the beloved 
 person, but one seeks one's pleasure in the contentment and in the 
 felicity of this person. And if this felicity did not please in itself, 
 but merely because of an advantage resulting therefrom to us, this 
 would no longer be pure and sincere love. It must be then that 
 pleasure is immediately found in this felicity, and that grief is 
 found in the unhappiness of the beloved person. For whatever 
 produces pleasure immediately through itself is also desired for 
 itself, as constituting (at least in part) the end of our wishes, and as 
 something which enters into our own felicity and gives us satis- 
 faction. 
 
 This serves to reconcile two truths which appear incompatible ; 
 for we do all for our ow^n good, and it is impossible for us to have 
 other feelings whatever we may say. IS'evertheless we do not yet 
 love altogether purely, when we seek the good of the beloved ob- 
 ject not for itself and because it itself pleases us, but because of an 
 
128 
 
 advantage which we foresee from it. But it is apparent from the 
 notion of love which we have just given that we seek at the same time 
 our good for ourselves and the good of the beloved object for it it- 
 self, when the good of this object is immediately, finally {ultimatd) 
 and through itself our end, our pleasure and our good ; as happens 
 in regard to all the things wished for because they are pleasing in 
 themselves, and are consequently good of themselves, even if one 
 should have no regard to consequences; these are ends and not 
 means. 
 
 J^ow divine love is infinitely above the loves of creatures, for 
 other objects worthy of being loved constitute in fact part of onr 
 contentment or our happiness, in so far as .their perfection touches 
 us, while on the other hand the felicity of God does not compose a 
 part of our happiness, but the whole. He is its source and not its 
 accessory, and since the pleasures of lovable earthly objects can 
 injure by their consequences, only the pleasure taken in the enjoy- 
 ment of the divine perfections is surely and absolutely good, with- 
 out danger or excess being possible. 
 
 These considerations show in what the true disinterestedness of 
 pure love consists which cannot be severed from our own content- 
 ment and felicity, as M. de la Trappe has well remarked, because 
 our true felicity embraces essentially the knowledge of the felicity 
 of God and of the divine perfections, that is to say, the love of 
 God. And consequently it is impossible to prefer one to the other 
 by a thought founded in distinct notions. And to wish to sever 
 one's self from one's self and from one's own good is to play with 
 words, or if you wish to go to the effects, it is to fall into an ex- 
 travagant quietism, it is to desire a stupid, or rather affected and 
 simulated inaction in which under pretext of resignation and of the 
 annihilation of the soul swallowed up in God, one may go to liber- 
 tinism in practice, or at least to a hidden speculative atheism, such 
 as that of Averroes and of others more ancient who taught that our 
 soul finally lost itself in the universal spirit, and that this is perfect 
 union with God. — Extract frora a letter to I^icaise, 1697. 
 
 The error concerning pure love appears to be a misunderstand- 
 ing, whicli as I have already said to you, sir, comes perhaps from 
 not paying sufficient attention to forming definitions of terms. 
 
129 
 
 To LOVE truly and disinterestedly is nothing else than to be led 
 to find pleasure in the perfections or in the felicity of the object, 
 and consequently to experience grief in what may be contrary to 
 these perfections. This love has properly for its object substances 
 susceptible of felicity ; but some resemblance of this is found as 
 regards objects which have perfections without being aware of it, 
 as for example, a beautiful picture. He who finds pleasure in con- 
 templating it and would find pain in seeing it ruined even if it 
 should belong to another, would love it, so to speak, with a disin- 
 terested love. This could not be said of another who should' 
 merely have in view gain in selling it or the winning of applause 
 by showing it, without for the rest caring whether or not it were 
 ruined when it should no longer belong to him. This shows that 
 pleasure and action cannot be taken away from love without de- 
 stroying it, and that M. des Preaux in the beautiful verses which 
 you sent me, was right both in recommending the importance of 
 the divine love and in opposing a love which is chimerical and 
 without effect. I have explained my definition in the preface of 
 my Codex Dvplomaticus Juris Gentium (published before these 
 new disputes arose), because I had need of it in order to give the 
 definition of Justice, which in my opinion is nothing but charity 
 regulated according to wisdom, ^ow Charity being a universal 
 benevolence, and Benevolence being a habit of loving, it was 
 necessary to define what it is to love. And since to love is to have 
 a feeling which makes us find pleasure in what conduces to the 
 happiness of the beloved object, and since wisdom (which makes 
 the rule of justice) is nothing but the science of happiness, I 
 showed by this analysis that happiness is the basis of justice, and 
 that those who would give the true elements of jurisprudence, 
 which I do not find laid down as they should be, ought to begin by 
 establishing the science of happiness, which does not yet appear 
 well determined^ although books on Ethics are full of discourses on 
 blessedness or the sovereign good. 
 
 As PLEASTJEE, which is nothing but the feeling of rare perfection, 
 is one of the principal points of happiness, which in turn consists 
 in a lasting condition of possession of what is necessary in order to 
 taste pleasure, it were to be desired that the science of pleasures 
 which the late M. Lautin meditated had been completed. — Extract 
 from a letter to Nicaisse^ 1698. 
 9 
 
130 
 
 [The following Ethical Definitions, translated from the Latin, are undated.] 
 
 Justice is the charity of the wise. 
 
 Charity is general benevolence. 
 
 Benevolence is the habit of love. 
 
 To love anyone is to delight in his happiness. 
 
 Wisdom is the science of happiness. 
 
 Happiness is durable joy. 
 
 Joy is a state of pleasure. 
 
 Pleasure or delight is a sense of perfection, that is, a sense of 
 something which helps or which sustains ai^y power. 
 
 He is perfected whose power is augmented or helped. 
 
 Demonstrate this Hypothesis elsewhere : 
 
 The world is governed by the wisest and most powerful of mon- 
 archs, whom we call God. 
 
 Propositions. 
 
 The end or aim of God is his own joy or love of himself. 
 
 God created creatures, and especially those endowed with mind, 
 for his own glory or from love of himself. 
 
 God created all things in accordance with the greatest harmony 
 or beauty possible. 
 
 God loves all. 
 
 God bestows on all as much as is possible. 
 
 Neither hatred, nor wrath, nor sadness, nor envy, belong to God. 
 
 God loves to be loved or those loving him. 
 
 God loves souls in proportion to the perfection which he has 
 given to each of them. 
 
 The perfection of the universe, or harmony of things, does not 
 allow all minds to be equally perfect. 
 
 The question why God has given to this mind more perfection 
 than to another, is among senseless questions, as if you should ask 
 whether the foot is too large or the shoe pinching the foot is too 
 small. And this is a mystery, ignorance of which has obscured the 
 whole doctrine of the predestination and justice of God. 
 
 He who does not obey God is not the friend of God. 
 
 He who obeys God from fear is not yet the friend of God. 
 
 He who loves God above all things is at length the friend of 
 God. 
 
 He who does not seek the common good does not obey God. 
 
 He who does not seek the glory of God does not obey God. 
 
. 131 
 
 He who at the same time seeks the glory of God and the 
 common good obeys God. 
 
 He who does not in his acts recognize God does not sufficiently 
 love God. 
 
 He who is displeased by some things in the acts of God does not 
 think God perfect. 
 
 He who thinks God does some things from absolute good 
 pleasure, having no reason, or from irrational or indifferent liberty, 
 does not think God perfect. 
 
 He who thinks God acts in the best possible way acknowledges 
 that God is perfect. 
 
 Whoever does not delight in the contemplation of the divine per- 
 fection does not love God. 
 
 All creatures serve the felicity or glory of God in the degree of 
 their perfection. 
 
 Whoever against his will serves the felicity of God does not love 
 God. 
 
 Whoever places his own felicity in relation with the divine 
 felicity, loves himself and loves finally God. 
 
 He who loves God endeavors to learn his will. 
 
 He who loves God obeys God's will. 
 
 He who loves God loves all. 
 
 Every wise man endeavors to do good to all. 
 
 Every wise man does good to many. 
 
 Every wise man is a friend of God. 
 
 The wiser one is the happier he is. 
 
 Every wise man is just. 
 
 Every just man is happy 
 
XXI. 
 
 On the Cartesian Demonstration of the Existence of God. 
 
 1700-1. 
 [From the French.] 
 
 In truth metapliysics is natural theology, and the same God who 
 is the source of all good is also the principle of all knowledge. 
 This is because the idea of God embraces that of absolute being, 
 that is to say, what is simple in our thoughts, from which all that 
 we think takes its origin. Descartes had not considered the matter 
 from this side ; he gives two ways of proving the existence of 
 God : the fit'st is, that there is in us an idea of God, since we 
 undoubtedly think of God and since we cannot think of anything 
 without having the idea of it. Now if we have an idea of God 
 and if it is a true one, that is, if it is of an infinite being and if it 
 represents it faithfully, it cannot be caused by anything less, and 
 consequently God himself must be its cause. He must therefore 
 exist. The other argument is still shorter. It is tliat God is a 
 being which possesses all perfections and consequently possesses 
 existence which is in the number of perfections ; hence he exists. 
 It must be confessed that these arguments are a little suspicious 
 because they advance too quickly and do violence to us without 
 enlightening us ; whereas true demonstrations are wont to fill the 
 mind with some solid nourishment. However it is difficult to find 
 the knot of the matter, and I see that a number of able men who 
 have made objection to Descartes have passed this by. 
 
 Some have believed that there is no idea of God because he is 
 not subject to the imagination, supposing that idea and image are 
 the same thing. I am not of their opinion, and I well know that 
 there is an idea of tJiought and of existence and of similar things 
 of which there is no image. For we think of something and when 
 we remark what made us recognize it, this, so far as it is in Qur 
 soul, is the idea of the thing. This is why there is also an idea of 
 what is not material or imaginable. 
 
 Others admit that there is an idea of God, and that this idea 
 embraces all perfections, but they cannot understand how existen<3e 
 follows from it : be it because they do not admit that existence is 
 
133 
 
 of the number of perfections, or because they do not see how a 
 simple idea or thought can imply existence outside of us. For 
 myself I well believe that he who has acknowledged this idea of God 
 and who fully sees that existence is a perfection, ought to avow 
 that this perfection belongs to God. In fact I do not doubt the idea 
 of God any more than his existence, on the contrary, I claim that I 
 have a demonstration of it ; but I would not that we flatter our- 
 selves and persuade ourselves that we could succeed in so great a 
 matter at so little cost. Paralogisms are dangerous in this matter ; 
 when they are not successful they rebound upon ourselves and 
 strengthen the opposite party. I say then that we must prove with 
 all imaginable accuracy that there is an idea of an all-perfect being, 
 that is to say of God. It is frue that the objections of those who 
 think that they can prove the contrary because there is no image of 
 God are as I have just shown worthless ; but it must also be con- 
 fessed that the proof which Descartes offers for establishing the 
 idea of God is imperfect. How, he will say, can we speak of God 
 without thinking of him. And could we think of God without 
 having the idea of him? Yes, undoubtedly, we sometimes think 
 of impossible things, and this has even been demonstrated; for 
 example, Descartes held that the quadrature of the circle is impos- 
 sible, and yet we do not cease to think of it and to draw conse- 
 quences as to what would happen if it were possible. Motion of 
 ultimate swiftness is impossible in any body whatever, for if it 
 were supposed in a. circle, for example, another concentric circle, 
 surrounding the first and attached firmly to it, would be moved 
 with a velocity still greater than the first, which consequently is 
 not of the ultimate degree, contrary to what we have supposed. 
 All this to the contrary notwithstanding, we think of this ultimate 
 swiftness which has no idea since it is impossible. So the greatest 
 of all eirdes is an impossible thing, and a number made up of all 
 possible units is no less so: there is proof of it. And nevertheless 
 we think of all this. This is why there is certainly room to doubt 
 whether the idea of the greatest of all stars is to be trusted and 
 whether it does not involve some contradiction ; for I well under- 
 stand, for example, the nature of motion and of swiftness, and 
 what greatest is. But for all that I do not understand whether all 
 this is compatible and whether there is a way of joining all this 
 and making therefrom an idea of the greatest swiftness of which 
 
134: 
 
 motion is capable. So although I know what star is, and what 
 largest and most perfect are, nevertheless, I do not yet know 
 whether there is not a hidden contradiction in joining all these 
 together, as there is in fact in the other examples mentioned. That 
 is to say, in a word, I do not know for all this whether such a star 
 is possible ; for if it were not there would be no idea of it. How- 
 ever, I confess, that God in this respect has a great advantage over 
 all other things. For it is sufficient to prove that he is possible to 
 prove that he exists, a thing not encountered anywhere else that I 
 know of. Furthermore I infer from this that there is a presump- 
 tion that God exists for there is always a presumption on the side 
 of possibility ; that is to say everything is held to be possible until 
 its impossibility is proved. There is therefore also a presumption 
 that God is possible, that is, that he exists, since in him existence is 
 a consequence of the possibility. This may suffice for practical 
 life but it is not sufficient for a demonstration. I have disputed 
 much on this point with several Cartesians, but, finally, I have 
 gotten some of the more able to frankly confess, after having 
 understood the force of my arguments, that this possibility was 
 still to be demonstrated. There are even some who after being 
 challenged by me have undertaken to demonstrate this but they 
 have not yet completed it. — Extract -from an undated letter to 
 {prohahly) the Grand Duchess Sophia. 
 
 I have not yet seen the work published at Basle in the year 1699, 
 entitled Judicium de argumento Cartesii pro existentia Dei petito 
 ab ejus idea; but having formerly casually examined the same ar- 
 gument in an essay On Knowledge, Truth and Ideas, inserted in 
 the Acta of Leipzig, in the year 1684, I am curious to read what 
 an able man says in the Histoire des Outrages des So/vans, May, 
 1700, in favor of the arguments of Descartes and against the Latin 
 work published at Basle. And I will say to you, sir, that I hold a 
 position midway between the work and the reply. The author of 
 the work believes that the argument is a sophism, the author of the 
 reply considers it a demonstration, and I myself believe that it is 
 an imperfect argument which tacitly takes for granted a proposition 
 the proof of which, if added, would complete the demonstration. 
 Thus the argument is not to be despised ; it is at least a good begin- 
 ning. Est aliquid prodire tenus, si non datur ultra. 
 
135 
 
 Geometricians, who are the true masters of the art of reasoning, 
 have seen that in order that demonstrations drawn from definitions 
 may be good, it is necessary to prove, or at least postulate, that the 
 notion embraced in the definition is possible. This is why Euclid 
 placed among his postulata, that the circle is something possible, in 
 asking that a circle, the center and radius of which are given, be 
 described. The same precaution holds good in every sort of rea- 
 soning, and particularly in the argument of Anselm, archbishop of 
 Canterbury (in Liher contra insipientem)^ quoted and examined by 
 St. Thomas and other scholastics, and renewed by Descartes, which 
 proves that God, being the greatest or most perfect being, embraces 
 that perfection called existence, and that consequently he exists. 
 To this it may be said that the reasoning is sound, supposing that 
 the being sovereignly perfect or which embraces all perfections, is 
 possible; and that it is the privilege of the divine nature {ens 
 a se) that its essence comprises existence, that is, that it exists pro- 
 vided it is possible. And even omitting all mention of perfection 
 it may be said that if necessary heing is possible it exists. This is 
 undoubtedly the most beautiful and the most important of modal 
 propositions, because it furnishes a passage from power to act, and 
 it is solely here that jposse ad esse valet consequentia. Also herein 
 is found the princijDle of existences. 
 
 The author of the work opposes an example to Descartes, in rea- 
 soning as he does and reaching a false conclusion, for he says that 
 existence is contained in the idea of a very perfect body (or one 
 which comprises all perfection), hence such a body exists. To this, 
 in my opinion, reply must be made that the idea of a very perfect 
 being in this sense is impossible, for a body being limited by its 
 essence cannot include all perfections. The work and the reply 
 give themselves up a little too much to the terms and distinctions of 
 real (or formal) and objective, essence and existence, whither I do 
 not think it necessary to follow them. It is sufiicient to remark 
 that the author of the work having proposed to himseK the reason- 
 ing of those who say that God must necessarily exist because it is 
 not impossible that God be, has touched the essential point and has 
 rej^lied by no means badly that it does not follow that a thing is 
 possible because we do not see its impossibility, our knowledge 
 being limited. But this might have led him to think that the 
 argument is not a sophism and that those who have proposed it 
 
136 
 
 have sinned only in concealing what they presuppose, instead of 
 following the example of the geometricians, who have penetration 
 and sincerity enough to see and expressly indicate the axioms and 
 postulates of which they have need and which they presuppose. 
 
 The author of the reply, as far as I can understand him, does 
 not enter sufficiently into this ; he has good reason, p. 211, for 
 rejecting this limitation : that wholly jperfect heing includes exist- 
 ence if it he supposed that there is a wholly perfect heing ^ that is to 
 say an actual. But if we understand it thus : if it he supposed 
 that there is a wholly perfect heing possible or among essences^ the 
 limitation is good. He is right in saying that it is not permissible 
 to doubt things which are known to us under the pretext that our 
 knowledge is limited. But this does not appear to be the meaning 
 of the author of the work. I have already remarked in my essay, 
 before mentioned, that the true mark of perfectly distinct knowl- 
 edge is that the possibility of the notion in question can be proved 
 a priori. Thus he is fundamentally wrong here in attributing to 
 himself a clear and distinct notion when he cannot verify it by the 
 mark which is essential to it. The example of the proposition that 
 two and two are four is not applicable here because it can be 
 demonstrated by definitions the possibility of which is recognized. 
 — Extract from a letter to , ITOO. 
 
 I have already elsewhere given my opinion concerning St. 
 Anselm's demonstration of the existence of God, renewed by 
 Descartes ; the substance of which is that that which embraces in 
 its idea all perfections, or the greatest of all possible beings, com- 
 prehends also in its essence existence, since existence is in the 
 number of perfections, and otherwise something could be added to 
 that which is perfect. I hold a medium between those who take 
 this reasoning for a sophism and the opinion of Eeverend Father 
 Lami, explained here, who considers it a complete demonstration. 
 I admit then that it is a demonstration, but imperfect, which 
 demands or supposes a truth which deserves to be further demon- 
 strated. For it is tacitly supposed that God, or the Perfect 
 Being, is possible. If this point were again demonstrated, as it 
 should be, it could be said that the existence of God was demon- 
 strated geometrically a priori. And this shows what I have 
 
137 
 
 already said, that we cannot reason perfectly on ideas except by 
 knowing their possibility ; to which geometricians have paid atten- 
 tion, but the Cartesians not sufficiently. However it can be said 
 that this demonstration is none the less of importance, and so to 
 speak, presumptive. For every being must be held possible until 
 its impossibility is proved. I doubt however whether Reverend 
 Father Lami was right in saying that it was adopted by the School. 
 For the author of the marginal note remarks here very justly that 
 St. Thomas had rejected it. 
 
 However this may be, a demonstration still more simple might 
 be formed, not mentioning the perfections at all, so as not to be 
 stopped by those who should venture to deny that all perfections 
 are compatible, and consequently that the idea in question is pos- 
 sible. For by simply saying that God is a being of itself or 
 primative, ens a se, that is, which exists by its essence it is easy to 
 conclude from this definition that such a being, if it is possible, 
 exists ; or rather, this conclusion is a corollary which is derived 
 immediately from the definition, and hardly differs from it. For 
 the essence of the thing being only that which makes its possibility 
 in particular, it is very clear that to exist by its essence, is to exist 
 by its possibility. And if the heing of itself were defined in terms 
 still nearer, by saying that it is the heing which must exist hecause 
 it is possible, it is manifest that all which could be said against the 
 existence of such a being, would be to deny its possibility. 
 
 On this subject we might again make a modal proposition, which 
 would be one of the best fruits of all logic: namely, that if 
 necessary heing is possihle, it exists. For necessary heing and 
 heing hy its essence are only one and the same thing. Thus the 
 reasoning taken with this bias appears to have solidity ; and those 
 who will have it that from mere notions, ideas, definitions or 
 possible essences, actual existence can never be inferred, in truth 
 fall into what I have just said, namely, they deny the possibility of 
 being of itself. But it is well to notice that this bias itself serves 
 to show that they are wrong, and fills up finally the gap in the 
 demonstration. For if heing of itself is impossible, all heing s hy 
 others are so also ; since they exist ultimately only through being 
 of itself ; thus nothing could exist. This reasoning leads us to 
 another important modal proposition, equal to the preceding, and 
 which joined with it, completes the demonstration. It might be 
 
138 
 
 expressed thus : If necessary heing is not^ there is no heing possible. 
 It seems that this demonstration has not been carried so far up to 
 this time. However I have also labored elsewhere to prove that 
 the perfect being is possible. 
 
 I designed, sir, merely to write you in few words some trifling 
 reflections on the memoirs which you sent me ; but the variety of 
 matters, the heat of meditation and the pleasure which 1 have 
 taken in the generous design of the Prince who is the protector 
 of this work, have carried me on. Pardon me for having been so 
 lengthy, and I am, etc. — Extract from a letter to the editor of the 
 Journal de Trevoiox. 1701. 
 
XXII. 
 Considerations on the Doctrine of a Universal Spirit. 1702. 
 
 Many ingenious persons have believed, and believe now, that 
 there is but one spirit, which is universal and which animates all 
 the universe and all its parts, each one in accordance with its 
 structure and organs, just as the same breath of wind makes the 
 various pipes of an organ give forth different sounds. And that 
 thus when an animal has its organs well placed, it produces there 
 the effect of an individual soul, but when the organs are spoiled, 
 this individual soul again becomes nothingness, or returns, so to 
 speak, into the ocean of the universal spirit. 
 
 Aristotle has seemed to many to hold a like opinion, which Aver- 
 roes, a celebrated Arabian philosopher, has renewed. He believed 
 that there was in us an intellectus agens or active understanding, 
 and also an intellectus jpatiens or passive understanding : that the 
 former, coming from without, was eternal and universal for all, but 
 that the passive understanding was peculiar to each, and took its 
 departure at the death of man. In the last two or three centuries, 
 this has been the doctrine of some Peripatetics, as of Pomponatius, 
 Contarenus and others ; and traces of it are to be recognized in the 
 late M. Naude, as his letters and the Naudseana, which have been 
 lately published, show. They taught this in secret to their most 
 intimate and best qualified disciples, while in public they had the 
 cleverness to say that this doctrine was in reality true according to 
 philosophy, by which they understood that of Aristotle jpar excel- 
 lence^ but that it was false according to faith. Hence have finally 
 arisen the disputes over double truth which the last Lateran Council 
 condemned. 
 
 I have been told that Queen Christina had a decided leaning 
 toward this opinion, and as M. Naude, who was her librarian, was 
 imbued with it, he probably communicated to her what he knew of 
 the secret views of the celebrated philosophers with whom he had 
 had intercourse in Italy. Spinoza, who admits only one substance, is 
 not far removed from the doctrine of a single, universal spirit, and 
 even the ]^ew Cartesians, who claim that G(>d alone acts, estab- 
 lish it likewise without noticing it. Apparently Molinos and several 
 
140 
 
 other New Quietists, among others, a certain Joannes Angelus 
 Silesius, who wrote before Molinos and some of whose works have 
 recently been reprinted, and even Weigelius before them, embraced 
 this opinion of the sabbath or rest of souls in God. This is why 
 they believed that the cessation of particular functions was the 
 highest state of perfection. 
 
 It is true that the Peripatetic philosophers did not make this 
 spirit quite universal, for besides the intelligences, which according 
 to them, animated the stars, they had an intelligence for this world 
 here below ; and this intelligence performed the part of the active 
 understanding in the souls of men. They were led to this doctrine 
 of an immortal soul common to all men, by false reasoning. For 
 they took for granted that actual infinite multiplicity is impossible 
 and that thus it was not possible that there should be a'n infinite 
 number of souls, but that there Tnust be nevertheless, if individual 
 souls existed. For the world being, according to them, eternal, and 
 the human race also, and new souls always being born, if these all 
 continued to exist, there would now be an actual infinity. This 
 reasoning passed among them for a proof. But it was full of false 
 suppositions. For neither the impossibility of actual infinitude, 
 nor that the human race has existed eternally, nor the generation of 
 new souls, would be admitted, since the Platonists teach the preex- 
 istence of souls, and the Pythagoreans teach metempsychosis, and 
 claim that a certain determined number of souls remains ever and 
 imdergoes changes. 
 
 The doctrine of a universal spirit is good in itself, for all those 
 who teach it admit in effect the existence of the divinity, whether 
 they believe that this universal spirit is supreme — for in this case 
 they hold that it is God himself — , or whether they believe with 
 the Cabalists that God created it. This latter was also the opinion 
 of Henry More, an Englishman, and of certain other modern philoso- 
 phers, and especially of certain chemists who believed in a uni- 
 versal Archseus or world-spirit ; and some have maintained that it 
 was this spirit of the Lord which, as the beginning of Genesis says, 
 " moved upon the waters." 
 
 But when they go so far as to say that this universal spirit is the 
 only spirit and that there are no souls or individual spirits, or at 
 least that these individual souls cease to exist, I believe that they 
 pass the limits of reason, and advance, without grounds, a doctrine 
 
141 
 
 of which they have not even a distinct notion. Let us examine a 
 Httle the apparent reasons upon which they rest this doctrine whicli 
 destroys the immortahty of souls and degrades the human race, or 
 rather, all living creatures, from that rank which belongs to them 
 and which has commonly been attributed to them. For it seems 
 to me that an opinion of so much importance ought to be proved, 
 and that it is not sufficient to have imagined a supposition of this 
 kind, which really is only founded on a very shocking comparison 
 with the wind which animates musical organs. 
 
 I have showed above that the pretended demonstration of the 
 Peripatetics who maintained that there was but one spirit, common 
 to all men, is of no force, and rests only on false suppositions. 
 Spinoza has pretended to prove that there is only one substance in 
 the world, but these proofs are contemptible or unintelligible. 
 And the New Cartesians, who believed that God alone is active, 
 gave no proof of it ; not to mention that Father Malebranche 
 seemed to admit at least the internal action of individual spirits. 
 One of the most apparent reasons which have been urged against 
 individual souls, is the embarrassment as to their origin. The 
 scholastic philosophers have disputed greatly over the origin of 
 forms, among which they include souls. Opinions differed greatly 
 as to whether there was an eduction of power from matter, as a 
 statue is extracted from marble ; or whether there was a traduction 
 of souls so that a new soul should be born of a preceding soul as 
 one fire is lighted from another ; or whether souls already existed 
 and only made themselves known after the generation of the ani- 
 mal ; or finally whether souls were created by God every time there 
 was a new generation. 
 
 Those who denied individual souls, believed that they were 
 thereby freeing themselves from all difficulties, but this is cutting 
 the knot instead of untying it, and there is no force in an argument 
 which would run thus : the explanations of a doctrine have been 
 various^ hence the whole doctrine is false. This is the manner in 
 which sceptics reason and if it were to be accepted, there would be 
 nothing which could not be rejected. The experiments of our time 
 lead us to believe that souls and even animals have always existed, 
 although in small volume, and that generation is only a kind of 
 growth ; and in this way all the difficulties concerning the genera- 
 tion of souls and of forms, disappear. However we do not refuse 
 
142 
 
 God the right to create new souls or to give a higher degree of 
 perfection to those which are already in nature, but we speak of 
 what is ordinary in nature without entering into the particular 
 economy of God in respect to human souls, which may have privi- 
 leges since they are infinitely above those of animals. 
 
 In my opinion what has greatly conti-ibuted to incline ingenious 
 persons toward the doctrine of a single universal spirit, is the fact 
 that common philosophers gave currency to a theory, treating of 
 separate souls and the functions of the soul independent of the 
 body and of the organs, which they could not sufficiently justify ; 
 they had good reason for wishing to maintain the immortality of 
 the soul as in accordance with divine perfections and true morality, 
 but seeing that, in death, the organs visible in animals became 
 disordered and finally spoiled, they believed themselves obliged 
 to have recourse to separate souls, that is to say, to believe that the 
 soul existed without any body, and did not even then cease to have 
 its thoughts and activities. And in order to better prove this they 
 tried to show that the soul, even in this life, has abstract thoughts, 
 independent of material ideas, ^ow those who rejected this 
 separate state and this independence, as contrary to experience and 
 reason, were all the more compelled to believe in the extinction of 
 the particular soul and the preservation of the single, universal 
 spirit. 
 
 I have examined this matter carefully and I have proved that 
 really there are in the soul some materials of thought or objects of 
 the understanding which the external senses do not furnish, namely, 
 the soul itself and its activities {nihil est in intellectu quod non 
 fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse intellect us) ; and those who believe in a 
 universal spirit will readily grant this, since they distinguish it 
 from matter. I find, nevertheless, that there is never an abstract 
 thought which is not accompanied by some images or material 
 traces, and I have established a perfect parallelism between what 
 takes place in the soul and what takes place in matter, having 
 shown that the soul with its activities is something distinct from 
 matter, but that nevertheless it is always accompanied by organs 
 which must correspond to it ; and that this is reciprocal and always 
 will be. 
 
 And as to the complete separation between soul and body, 
 although I can say nothing beyond what is said in the Holy Scrip- 
 
143 
 
 tur.es of the laws of grace and of what God has ordained in respect 
 to human souls in particular — since these are things which cannot 
 be known through the reason and which depend upon revelation 
 and upon God himself, nevertheless, I see no reason either in 
 religion or in philosophy, which obliges me to give up the doctrine 
 of the parallelism of the soul and the body, and to admit a perfect 
 separation. For why might not the soul always retain a subtile 
 body, organized in its fashion, and even resume some day, in the 
 resurrection, as much as is necessary of its visible body, since we 
 accord to the blessed a glorious body and since the ancient Fathers 
 accorded a subtile body to the angels ? 
 
 Moreover this doctrine is conformable to the order of nature, 
 established through experience ; for the observations of very skillful 
 observers make us believe that animals do not begin when the 
 ordinary person thinks they do, and that the seminal animals, or 
 animated seeds, have existed ever since the beginning of things. 
 Order and reason demand also that what has existed since the 
 beginning should not end ; and thus as generation is only the 
 growth of a transformed and developed animal, so death will only 
 be the diminution of a transformed and developed animal, while 
 the animal itself w^ill always remain, during the transformations, as 
 the silkworm and the butterfly are the same animal. And it is 
 well to remark here that nature has the skill and the goodness to 
 reveal its secrets to us in a few little samples, to make us judge of 
 the rest, since everything is correspondent and harmonious. It 
 shows this also in the transformation of caterpillars and of some 
 insects — for flies also come from worms — to make us divine that 
 there are transformations everywhere. Experiments with insects 
 have destroyed the common belief that these animals are engen- 
 dered through nourishment, without propagation. It is thus also 
 that nature has shown us in the birds a specimen of the generation 
 of all animals by means of eggs, a fact which new discoveries have 
 now established. Experiments also with the microscope have 
 shown that the butterfly is only a development of the caterpillar ; 
 but, above all, that the seeds contain the plant or animal already 
 formed, although afterward it needs transformation and nutrition 
 or growth in order to become an animal perceptible to our ordinary 
 senses. And as the smallest insects are also engendered by the 
 propagation of the species, we must judge the same to be true of 
 
these little seminal animals, namely, that they themselves come 
 from other seminal animals, even smaller, and so began to exist 
 when the world did. This is in harmony with the Sacred Scrip- 
 tures, which imply that seeds existed first of all. 
 
 Nature has given us an example in sleep and swoons, which 
 ought to make us believe that death is not a cessation of all the 
 functions, but only a suspension of certain of the more noticeable 
 functions. And I have explained elsewhere an important point, 
 which not having been sufficiently considered has the more easily 
 inclined men to the opinion of the mortality of souls : namely, that 
 a large number of minute perceptions, equal and interbalanced, 
 having no background and no distinguishing marks, are not noticed 
 and cannot be remembered. But to wish to conclude from this 
 that the soul is then altogether without functions is the same thing 
 as when the common people believe that there is a vacuum or 
 nothing wliere there is no visible matter, and that the earth is 
 without motion, because its motion is not noticeable, being uniform 
 and without shocks. We have innumerable minute perceptions 
 which we cannot distinguish ; a great deafening noise, as, for 
 example, the murmur of a whole assembled people, is composed of 
 all the little murmurs of particular persons which we would not 
 notice separately, but of which we have nevertheless a sensation, 
 otherwise we would not be sensible of the whole. So when an 
 animal is deprived of the organs capable of giving it sufficiently 
 distinct perceptions, it does not at all follow that there do not remain 
 to it smaller and more uniform perceptions, nor that it is deprived 
 of all organs and all perceptions. The organs are only folded up 
 and reduced to small volume, but the order of nature demands that 
 everything redevelop, and, some day, return to a visible state, and 
 that there be in these changes a certain well-regulated progress, 
 which serves to make things ripen and become perfect. It appears 
 that Democritus himself saw this resuscitation of animals, for 
 Plotinus says that he taught a resurrection. 
 
 All these considerations show how not only individual souls, but 
 also animals, exist, and that there is no reason to believe in an 
 utter extinction of souls nor a complete destruction of the animal, 
 and consequently that there is no need to have recourse to a single 
 universal spirit and to deprive nature of its particular and existing 
 perfections — which would be in reality also not to sufficiently con- 
 
145 
 
 sider its order and harmony. There are besides many things in 
 the doctrine of a single, universal spirit which cannot be main- 
 tained and involve difficulties much greater than those of the ^ 
 common doctrine. 
 
 Here are some of them : you see, in the first place, that the com- 
 parison with the wind which makes various pipes sound differently, 
 flatters the imagination, but explains nothing, or rather implies 
 exactly the contrary. For this universal breath of the pipes is only 
 a collection of a quantity of separate breaths ; moreover each pipe 
 is filled with its own air which can even pass from one pipe to 
 another, so that this comparison would establish rather individual 
 souls, and would even favor the transmigration of souls from one 
 body to another, as the air can change pipes. 
 
 And if we imagine that the universal spirit is like an ocean, com- 
 posed of innumerable drops, which are detached from it when they 
 animate some particular organic body, but reunite themselves to 
 the ocean after the destruction of the organs, you again form a 
 material and gross idea which does not suit the subject and becomes 
 entangled in the same difficulties as the breath. For as the ocean 
 is a collection of drops, God would likewise be an assembly of all 
 the souls, just as a swarm of bees is an assembly of these little ani- 
 mals ; but as this swarm is not itself a real substance, it is clear that 
 in this way the universal spirit would not be a true being itself, 
 and instead of saying that it is the only spirit, we should have to say 
 that it is nothing at all in itself, and that there are in nature only 
 individual souls, of which it would be the mass. Moreover these 
 drops, reunited to the ocean of the universal spirit after the destruc- ^ 
 tion of the organs, would be in reality souls which would exist sep- 
 arated from matter, and we should fall back again into what we 
 wished to avoid, especially if these drops retain something of their 
 preceding state, or have still some functions and could even acquire 
 more sublime ones in the ocean of the divinity or of the universal 
 spirit. For if you wish that these souls, reunited to God, be without 
 any function of their own, you fall into an opinion contrary to reason 
 and all sound philosophy, as if any existing being could ever reach 
 a state where it would be without any function or impression. For 
 one thing because it is joined to another does not therefore cease 
 to have its own particular functions, which joined with those of the 
 other, produce the functions of the whole. Otherwise the whole 
 10 
 
146 
 
 would have none, if the parts had none. Besides I have elsewhere 
 proved that every being retains perfectly all the impressions it has 
 received, although these impressions may not be perceptible singly, 
 because they are joined with so many others. So the soul reunited 
 to the ocean of souls, would always remain the particular soul it had 
 been while separated. 
 
 This shows that it is more reasonable and more in conformity with 
 the custom of nature to allow individual souls to exist in the ani- 
 mals themselves, and not outside in Grod, and so to preserve not 
 only the soul but also the animal, as I have explained above and 
 elsewhere ; and thus to allow individual souls to remain always in 
 activity, that is, in the particular functions which are peculiar to 
 them and which contribute to the beauty and order of the universe, 
 instead of reducing them to the sabbath in God of the Quietists, 
 that is to say, to a state of idleness and uselessness. For as far as 
 the beatific vision of blessed souls is concerned, it is compatible 
 with the functions of their glorified bodies, which will not cease to 
 be, in their way, organic. 
 
 But if some one wished to maintain that there are no individual 
 souls, not even when the function of feeling and of thought takes 
 place with the aid of the organs, he would be refuted by our experi- 
 ence which teaches us, as it seems to me, that we are a something 
 in particular, which thinks, which perceives, which wills ; and that 
 we are distinct from another something which thinks and which 
 wills other things. 
 
 Otherwise we fall into the opinion of Spinoza, or of some other 
 similar authors, who will have it that there is but one substance, 
 namely God, which thinks, believes and wills one thing in me, but 
 which thinks, believes and wills exactly the contrary in another ; 
 on opinion of which M. Bayle, in certain portions of his Dictionary, 
 has well shown the absurdity. 
 
 Or, if there is nothing in nature but the universal spirit and 
 matter, we would have to say that if it is not the universal spirit 
 itself which believes and wills opposite things in diiferent persons, 
 it is matter which is different and acts differently ; but if matter 
 acts, of what use is the universal spirit? If matter is nothing 
 but an original passive substance, or a passive substance only, how 
 can these actions be attributed to it ? It is therefore much more 
 reasonable to believe that besides God, who is the supreme activity, 
 
14:7 
 
 there are a number of individual active beings, since there are a 
 number of particular and opposite actions and passions, which could 
 not be attributed to the same subject ; and these active beings are 
 the individual souls. 
 
 We know also that there are degrees in all things. There is an 
 infinity of degrees between any movement and perfect repose, 
 between hardness and a perfect fluidity which is without any resist- 
 ance, between God and nothingness. There is likewise an infinity 
 of degrees between any active being whatsoever and a purely pass- 
 ive being. Consequently it is not reasonable to admit but one 
 active being, namely the universal spirit, with a single passive 
 being, namely matter. 
 
 It must also be considered that matter is not a thing opposed to 
 God, but that it is rather opposed to the limited active being, that 
 is, to the soul or to form. For God from whom matter as well as 
 form comes is the supreme being opposed to nothingness ; and the 
 purely passive is something more than nothingness, being capable 
 of something, while, nothing can be attributed to nothingness. 
 Thus with each particular portion of matter must be connected the 
 particular forms, — that is, souls and spirits, — which belong to it. 
 
 I do not wish here to recur to a demonstrative argument which I 
 have employed elsewhere, and which is drawn from the unities or 
 simple things, among which individual souls are included. For 
 this unavoidably obliges us not only to admit individual souls, but 
 also to avow that they are immortal by their nature, and as indestruc- 
 tible as the universe ; and, what is more, that each soul is in its way 
 a mirror of the universe, without any interruption, and that it con- 
 tains in its depths an order corresponding to that of the universe 
 itself. The souls diversify and represent the universe in an infinity 
 of ways, all different and all true, and multiply it, so to speak, as 
 many times as is possible, so that in this way they approach divinity 
 as much as is possible, according to their different degrees, and give 
 to the universe all the perfection of which it is capable. 
 
 After this, I do not see on what reason or probability the doctrine 
 of individual souls can be combated. Those who do so, admit that 
 what is in us is an effect of the universal spirit. But the effects of 
 God are subsistent, not to say that even the modifications and effects 
 of creatures are in a way durable, and that their impressions only 
 unite without being destroyed. Therefore, if in accordance with 
 
148 
 
 reason and experience, ae we have shown, the animal, with its more 
 or less distinct perceptions and with certain organs, always subsists, 
 and if consequently this effect of God subsists always in these 
 organs, why would it not be permissible to call it the soul, and to 
 say that this effect of God is a soul, immaterial and immortal, which 
 imitates in a way the universal spirit ? Since this doctrine, more- 
 over, does away with all difficulties, as appears by what I have just 
 said here and in other writings, which I have produced on these 
 subjects. 
 
XXIII. 
 
 On the Supersensible Element in Knowledge, and on the 
 Imma-terial in ISTature: A Letter to Queen Charlotte of 
 Prussia, 1702. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 Madame : 
 
 The letter written not long since from Paris to Osnabruck and 
 which I recently read, by your order, at Hanover, seemed to me 
 truly ingenious and beautiful. And as it treats of the two impor- 
 tant questions, Whether there is something in our thoughts which 
 does not come from the senses, and Whether there is something in 
 nature which is not material, concerning which I acknowledge that 
 I am not altogether of the opinion of the author of the letter, I 
 should like to be able to explain myself with the same grace as he, 
 in order to obey the commands and to satisfy the curiosity of your 
 Majesty. 
 
 We use the external senses as, to use the comparison of one of 
 the ancients, a blind man does a stick, and they make us know 
 their particular objects which are colors, sounds, odors, flavors, and 
 the qualities of touch, but they do not make us know what these 
 sensible qualities are nor in what they consist. For example, 
 whether red is the revolving of certain small globules which it is 
 claimed cause light, whether heat is the whirling of a very fine 
 dust, whether sound is made in the air as circles in the water when 
 a stone is thrown into it, as certain philosophers claim ; this is 
 what we do not see. And we could not even understand how this 
 revolving, these whirlings and these circles if they should be real 
 should cause exactly these perceptions which we have of red, of 
 heat, of noise. Thus it may be said that sensihle qualities are in 
 fact occult qualities, and that there must be others more manifest 
 which can render the former more explicable. And far from 
 understanding only sensible things, it is exactly these which we 
 understand the least. And although they are familiar to us we do 
 not understand them the better for that ; as a pilot understands no 
 better than another person the nature of the magnetic needle 
 which turns toward the north, although he has it always before his 
 
150 
 
 eyes in the compass, and although he does not admire it any the 
 more for that reason. 
 
 I do not deny that many discoveries have been made concerning 
 the nature of these occult qualities, as, for example, we know by 
 what kind of refraction blue and yellow are formed, and that these 
 two colors mixed form green ; but for all this we cannot yet under- 
 stand how the perception which we have of these three colors 
 results from these causes. Also we have not even nominal defini- 
 tions of such qualities by which to explain terms. The purpose of 
 nominal definitions is to give sufficient marks by which the thing 
 may be recognized ; for example, assayers have marks by which 
 they distinguish gold from every other metal, and even if a man 
 had never seen gold these signs might be taught him so that he 
 would infallibly recognize it if he should some day meet with it. 
 But it is not the same with these sensible qualities, and marks to 
 recognize blue, for example, could not be given if we had never 
 seen it. So that blue is its own mark, and in order that a man 
 may know what blue is it must necessarily be shown to him. 
 
 It is for this reason that we are accustomed to say that the 
 notions of these qualities are char, for they serve to recognize 
 them ; but that these same notions are not distinct, because we 
 cannot distinguish nor develope that which they include. It is I 
 hnow not what of which we are conscious, but for which we cannot 
 account. Whereas we can make another understand what a thing 
 is of which we have some description or nominal definition, even 
 although we should not have the thing itself at hand to show him. 
 However we must do the senses the justice to say that, in addition 
 to these occult qualities, they make us know other qualities which 
 are more manifest and which furnish more distinct notions. And 
 these are those which we ascribe to common sense, because there is 
 no external sense to which they are particularly attached and 
 belong. And here definitions of the terms or words employed may 
 be given. Such is the idea of numhers, which is found equally in 
 sounds, colors, and touches. It is thus that we perceive also 
 figures, which are common to colors and to touches, but which we 
 do not notice in sounds. Although it is true that in order to con- 
 ceive distinctly numbers and even figures, and to form sciences of 
 them, we must come to something which the senses cannot furnish, 
 and which the understanding adds to the senses. 
 
151 
 
 As therefore our soul compares (for example) the numbers and 
 figures which are in colors with the numbers and figures which are 
 found by the touch, there must be an internal sense^ in which the 
 perceptions of these different external senses are found united. 
 This is what is called the imagination^ which comprises at once the 
 notions of the jparticular^ which are dear but confused^ and the 
 notions of the common sense, which are clear and distinct. And 
 these cl^ar and distinct ideas which are subject to the imagination 
 are the objects of the mathematical sciences, namely of arithmetic 
 and geometry, which are pure mathematical sciences, and of the 
 application of these sciences to nature, forming mixed mathematics. 
 It is evident also that particular sensible qualities are susceptible 
 of explanations and of reasonings only in so far as they involve 
 what is common to the objects of several external senses, and 
 belong to the internal sense. For those who try to explain sensi- 
 ble qualities distinctly always have recourse to the ideas of mathe- 
 matics, and these ideas involve size or multitude of parts. It is 
 true that the mathematical sciences would not be demonstrative, 
 and would consist in a simple induction or observation, which 
 would never assure us of the perfect generality of the truths there 
 found, if something higher and which intelligence alone can fur- 
 nish did not come to the aid of the imagination and the senses. 
 
 There are, therefore, objects of still other nature, which are not 
 included at all m what is observed in the objects of the senses in 
 particular or in common, and which consequently are not objects of 
 the imagination either. Thus besides the sensible and imageable, 
 there is that which is purely intelligible, as being the object of the 
 understanding alone, and such is the object of my thought when I 
 think of myself 
 
 This thought of the Ego, which perceives sensible objects, and of 
 my own action resulting therefrom, adds something to the objects 
 of the senses. To think a color and to observe that one thinks 
 it, are two very different thoughts, as different as the coloms from 
 the Ego which thinks it. And as I conceive that other beings may 
 also have the right to say /, or that it could be said for them, it is 
 through this that I conceive what is called substance in general, 
 and it is also the consideration of the Ego itself which furnishes 
 other metaphysical notions, as cause, effect, action, similarity, etc., 
 and even those of logic and of ethics. Thus it can be said that 
 
152 
 
 there is nothing in the understanding which does not come from 
 the senses, except the understanding itself, or that which under- 
 stands. 
 
 There are then three grades of notions : the simply sensible,, 
 which are the objects appropriate to each sense in particular ; the 
 sensible mid at the same time intelligible, which pertain to the com- 
 mon sense ; and the simply intelligible, which belong to the under- 
 standing. The first and the second are both imageable, but the 
 third are above the imagination. The second and third are intelli- 
 gible and distinct ; but the first are confused, although they are 
 clear or recognizable. 
 
 Being itself and truth are not known wholly through the senses, 
 for it would not be impossible for a creature to have long and 
 orderly dreams, resembling our life, of such a sort that everything 
 which it thought it perceived through the senses would be but a 
 mere appearance. There must therefore be something beyond the 
 senses, which distinguishes the true from the apparent. But the 
 truth of the demonstrative sciences is exempt from these doubts, 
 and must even serve for judging of the truth of sensible things. 
 For as able philosophers, ancient and modern, have already well 
 remarked : — if all that I should think that I see should be but a 
 dream, it would always be true that I who think while dreaming, 
 would be something, and would actually think in many ways, for 
 which there must always be some reason. 
 
 Thus what the ancient Platonists have observed is very true, 
 and is very worthy of being considered, that the existence of sensi- 
 ble things and particularly of the Ego which thinks and which is 
 called spirit or soul, is incomparably more sure than the existence 
 of sensible things ; and that thus it would not be impossible, speak- 
 ing with metaphysical rigor, that there should be at bottom only 
 these intelligible substances, and that sensible things should be but 
 appearances. While on the other hand our lack of attention makes 
 us take sensible things for the only true things. It is well also to 
 observe that if I should discover any demonstrative truth, mathe- 
 matical or otherwise, while dreaming (as might in fact be), it would 
 be just as certain as if I had been awake. This shows us how 
 intelligible truth is independent of the truth or of the existence 
 outside of us of sensible and material things. 
 
 This conception of being and of truth is found therefore in the 
 
153 
 
 Ego and in the understanding, rather than in the external senses 
 and in the perception of exterior objects. 
 
 There we find also what it is to affirm, to deny, to doubt, to will, 
 to act. But above all we find there \h.Q force of the consequences 
 of reasoning, which are a part of what is called the natural light. 
 For example, from this premise, that no wise man is wicked^ we 
 may, by reversing the terms, draw this conclusion, that no wicked 
 man is wise. Whereas from this sentence, that every wise man is 
 praiseworthy., we cannot conclude by reversing it, that every one 
 'praiseworthy is wise but only that some praiseworthy ones are wise. 
 Although we may always reverse particular affirmative propositions, 
 for example, if some wise man is rich it must also be that some 
 rich men are wise, this cannot be done in particular negatives. For 
 example, we may say that there are charitable j^ersons who are not 
 just, which happens when charity is not sufficiently regulated ; but 
 we cannot infer from this that there are just persons who are not 
 charitable / for in justice are included at the same time charity and 
 the rule of reason. 
 
 It is also by this natural light that the axioms of mathematics 
 are recognized ; for example, that if from, two equal things the 
 same quantity be taken away the things which remain are equal j 
 likewise that if in a balance everything is equal on the one side 
 and on the other, neither will incline, a thing which we foresee 
 without ever having experienced it. It is upon such foundations 
 that we establish arithmetic, geometry, mechanics and the other 
 demonstrative sciences, in which, in truth, the senses are very nec- 
 essary, in order to have certain ideas of sensible things, and experi- 
 ences are necessary to establish certain facts, and even useful to 
 verify reasonings as by a kind of proof. But the force of the 
 demonstrations depends upon intelligible notions and truths, which 
 alone are capable of making us discern what is necessary, and 
 which, in the conjectural sciences, are even capable of determining 
 demonstratively the degree of probability, concerning certain given 
 suppositions, in order that we may choose rationally among oppo- 
 site appearances, the one which is greatest. JSTevertheless this part 
 of the art of reasoning has not yet been cultivated as much as it 
 ought to be. 
 
 But to return to necessary truths, it is universally true that we 
 know tliem only by this natural light, and not at all by the experi- 
 
154 
 
 ences of the senses. For the senses can very well make known in 
 some way what is, but they cannot make known what ought to he 
 or could not be otherwise. 
 
 For example, although we may have experienced numberless 
 times that every massive body tends toward the centre of the 
 earth and is not sustained in the air, we are not sure that this is 
 necessary as lon^ as we do not understand the reason of it. Thus 
 we could not be sure that the same thing would occur in air at a 
 higher altitude, at a hundred or more leagues above us, and there 
 are philosophers who imagine that the earth is a magnet, and as 
 the ordinary magnet does not attract the needle when a little re- 
 moved from it, they think that the attractive force of the earth 
 does not extend very far either. I do not say that they are right, 
 but I do say that one cannot go very certainly beyond the experi- 
 ences he has had, if he is not aided by reason. 
 
 This is why the geometricians have always considered that what 
 
 is only proved by induction or by examples in geometry or in 
 
 arithmetic, is never perfectly proved. For 
 
 3 3 3 3 example, experience teaches us that odd num- 
 ~ ^ ^ ^ bers continuously added together produce the 
 
 9 — 9 square numbers, that is to say, those which 
 
 I 25 ^^"^^ from multiplying a number by itseK. 
 
 I I Thus 1 and 3 make 4, that is to say 2 times 2, 
 
 ^ X X X ^^^ 1 ^^^ ^ ^^^ ^ make 9, that is to say 3 
 
 2 3 4 5 times 3. And 1 and 3 and 5 and 7 make 16, 
 
 4 9 16 25 tliat is 4 times 4. And 1 and 3 and 5 and 7 
 
 and 9 make 25, that is 5 times 5. And so on. 
 However, if one should experience it a hundred thousand times, 
 continuing the calculation very far, he may reasonably think that 
 this will always follow ; but we do not therefore have absolute 
 certainty of it, unless we learn the demonstrative reason which the 
 mathematicians found out long ago. And it is on this foundation 
 of the uncertainty of inductions, but carried a little too far, that an 
 Englishman has lately wished to maintain that we can avoid death. 
 For (said he) the consequence is not good, my father, my grand- 
 father, my great-grandfather are dead and all the others who have 
 lived before us ; therefore we shall also die. For their death has 
 no influence on us. The trouble is that we resemble them a little 
 too much in this respect that the causes of their death subsist also 
 
155 
 
 in us. For the resemblance would not suffice to draw sure conse- 
 quences without the consideration of the same reasons. 
 
 In truth there are experiments which succeed numberless times 
 and ordinarily, and yet it is found in some extraordinary cases that 
 there are instances where the experiment does not succeed. For 
 example, if we should have found a thousand times that iron put 
 all alone on the surface of water goes to the bottom, we are not 
 sure that this must always happen. And without recurring to the 
 miracle of the prophet Elisha who made the iron float, we know 
 that an iron pot may be made so hollow that it floats, and that it 
 can even carry besides a considerable weight, as do boats of copper 
 or of tin. And even the abstract sciences like geometry furnish 
 cases in which w^hat ordinarily occurs occurs no longer. For 
 example, we ordinarily find that two lines which continually 
 approach each other finally meet, and many people will almost 
 swear that this could never be otherwise. And nevertheless 
 geometry furnishes us with extraordinary lines, which are for this 
 reason called asymptotes^ which prolonged ad infinitum continu- 
 ally approach each other, and nevertheless never meet. 
 
 This consideration shows also that there is a light horn with us. 
 For since the senses and inductions could never teach us truths 
 which are thoroughly universal, nor that which is absolutely neces- 
 sary, but only that which is, and that which is found in particular 
 examples ; and since we nevertheless know necessary and universal 
 truths of the sciences, a privilege which we have above the brutes ; 
 it follows that we have derived these truths in part from what is 
 within us. Thus we may lead a child to these by simple interroga- 
 tions, after the manner of Socrates, without telling him anything, 
 and without making him experiment at all upon the truth of what 
 is asked him. And this could very easily be practised in numbers 
 and other similar matters. 
 
 I agree, nevertheless, that in the present state the external senses 
 are necessary to us for thinking, and that, if we had none, we 
 could not think. But that which is necessary for something does 
 not for all that constitute its essence. Air is necessary for life, but 
 life is something else than air. The senses furnish us the matter 
 for reasoning, and we never have thoughts so abstract that some- 
 thing from the senses is not mingled therewith ; but reasoning 
 requires something else in addition to what is from the senses. 
 
156 
 
 As to the second question^ whether there are immaterial siob- 
 stances, in order to solve it, it is first necessary to explain one's self. 
 Hitherto by matter has been understood that which includes only 
 notions purely passive and indifferent, namely, extension and im- 
 penetrability, which need to be determined by something else to 
 some form or action. Thus when it is said that there are imma- 
 terial substances, it is thereby meant that there are substances 
 which include other notions, namely, perception and the principle 
 of action or of change, which could not be explained either by 
 extension or by impenetrability. These beings, when they have 
 feeling, are called souls, and when they are capable of reason, they 
 are called spirits. Thus if one says that force and perception are 
 essential to matter he takes matter for corporeal substance which 
 is complete, which includes form and matter, or the soul with the 
 organs. It is as if it were said that there were souls everywhere. 
 This might be true, and would not be contrary to the doctrine of 
 immaterial substances. For it is not intended that these souls be 
 outside of matter, but simply that they are something more than 
 matter, and are not produced nor destroyed by the changes which 
 matter undergoes, nor subject to dissolution, since they are not 
 composed of parts. 
 
 ^Nevertheless it must be avowed also that there is substance 
 sejparated from matter. And to see this, one has only to consider 
 that there are numberless forms which matter might have received 
 in place of the series of variations which it has actually received. 
 For it is clear, for example, that the stars could move quite other- 
 wise, space and matter being indifferent to every kind of motion 
 and figure. 
 
 Hence the reason or universal determining cause whereby things 
 are, and are as they are rather than otherwise, must be outside of 
 matter. And even the existence of matter depends thereon, since 
 we do not find in its notion that it carries with it the reason of its 
 existence. 
 
 Now this ultimate reason of things, wliich is common to them 
 all and universal by reason of the connection existing between all 
 parts of nature, is what we call God, who must necessarily be an 
 infinite and absolutely perfect substance. I am inclined to think 
 that all immaterial finite substances (even the genii or angels ac- 
 cording to the opinion of the ancient Church Fathers) are united 
 
157 
 
 to organs, and accompany matter, and even that souls or active 
 forms are everywhere found in it. And matter, in order to con- 
 stitute a substance which is complete, cannot do without them, 
 since force and action are found everywhere jn it, and since the 
 laws of force depend on certain remarkable metaphysical reasons 
 or intelligible notions, without being explicable by notions merely 
 material or mathematical, or which belong to the sphere of the 
 imagination. 
 
 Perception also could not be explained by any mechanism whatso- 
 ever. We may therefore conclude that there is in addition some- 
 thing immaterial everywhere in these creatures, and particularly 
 in us, in whom this force is accompanied by a sufficiently distinct 
 perception, and even by that light, of which I have spoken above, 
 which makes us resemble in miniature the Divinity, as well by 
 knowledge of the order, as by the ordering which we ourselves 
 know how to give to the things which are within our reach, in 
 imitation of that which God gives to the universe. It is in this 
 also that our mrtue and perfection consist, as our felicity consists 
 in the pleasure which we take therein. 
 
 And since every time we penetrate into the depths of things, we 
 find there the most beautiful order we could wish, even surpassing 
 what we have therein imagined, as all those know who have 
 fathomed the sciences ; we may conclude that it is the same in all 
 the rest, and that not only immaterial substances subsist always, 
 but also that their lives, progress and changes are regulated for 
 advance toward a certain end, or rather to approach more and more 
 thereto, as do the asymptotes. And although we sometimes 
 recoil, like lines which retrograde, advancement none the less 
 finally prevails and wins. 
 
 The natural light of reason does not suffice for knowing the 
 detail thereof, and our experiences are still too limited to catch a 
 glimpse of the laws of this order. The revealed light guides us 
 meanwhile through faith, but there is room to believe that in the 
 course of time we shall know them even more by experience, and 
 that there are spirits which know them already more than we do. 
 
 Meanwhile the philosophers and the poets, for want of this, have 
 betaken themselves to the fictions of metempsychosis or of the 
 Elysian Fields, in order to give some ideas which might strike the 
 populace. But the consideration of the perfection of things or (what 
 
158 
 
 is the same thing) of the sovereign power, wisdom and goodness of 
 God, who does all for the best, that is to say, in the greatest order, 
 suffices to render content those who are reasonable, and to make us 
 believe that the contentment ought to be greater, according as we 
 are more disposed to follow order or reason. 
 
XXIY. 
 
 An Explanation of Certain Points in his Philosophy: An 
 
 Extract from a letter to Lady Mash am. 1704. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 As I am altogether in favor of the principle of uniformity, 
 which I think nature observes in the heart of things while it varies 
 in ways, degrees and perfections, my whole hypothesis amounts to 
 recognizing in substances which are removed from our view and 
 observation, something parallel to what appears in those which are 
 within our reach. Thus, taking now for granted that there is in 
 us a simple being endowed with action and perception, I think 
 that nature would be little connected, if this particle of matter 
 which forms human bodies were alone endowed with that which 
 would make it infinitely different from the rest (even in physics) 
 and altogether heterogeneous in relation to all other known bodies. 
 This makes me think that there are everywhere present such active 
 beings in matter, and that there is no difference between them 
 except in the manner of perception. And as our own perceptions 
 are sometimes accompanied by reflection and sometimes not, and as 
 from reflection come abstractions and universal and necessary 
 truths^ no traces of which are to be seen in brutes and still less in 
 the other bodies which surround us,' there is reason for believing 
 that this simple being which is in us and which is called soul is 
 distinguished by this from those of other known bodies. 
 
 Whether now these principles of action and of perception be 
 called Forms, Entelechies, Sofls, Spirits, or whether these terms 
 be distinguished according to the notions one would like to attribute 
 to them, the things will not thereby be changed. You will ask 
 what these simple beings or these souls which I place in brutes and 
 in the other creatures as far as they are organic, will become ; I 
 reply, that they must not be less inextinguishable than our 
 souls, and that they cannot be produced or destroyed by the forces 
 of nature. 
 
 But further, to preserve the analogy of \h.Q future or past as well 
 as of other bodies with what we experience at present in our 
 bodies, I hold that not only these souls or entelechies all have a 
 
160 
 
 sort of organic body witli tliem proportioned to their perceptions 
 but also that they will always have one, and have always had one, 
 as long as they have existed ; so that not only the soul but also the 
 animal itself (or that which is analogous to soul and animal, not to 
 dispute about names) remains. And that thus generation and 
 death can only be developments and envelopments, some examples 
 of which nature, according to its custom, shows us visibly to aid us 
 in divining that which is hidden. And consequently neither iron 
 nor fire nor any otlier violences of nature, whatever ravages they 
 may make in the body of an animal, can prevent the soul from 
 preserving a certain organic body, inasmuch as the Organism, 
 that is to say, order and artifice, is something essential to matter, 
 produced and arranged by sovereign wisdom, and the production 
 must always retain the traces of its author. This leads me to think 
 also that there are no spirits entirely separated from matter except 
 the first and sovereign being, and that the genii, however marvellous 
 they may be, are always accompanied by bodies worthy of them. 
 This must also be said of souls which nevertheless may be called 
 separate by relation to this gross body. You see therefore, 
 Madame, that all this is only to suppose that it is everywhere and 
 always just as with us and at present (the supernatural excepted), 
 except degrees of perfections which vary ; and I leave you to 
 judge if an hypothesis at least simpler and more intelligible can 
 be thought of. 
 
 This very maxim, not to suppose unnecessarily anything in 
 creatures except what corresponds to our experiences^ has led me to 
 my System of the Preestahlished Harmony. For we experience 
 that bodies act among themselves according to mechanical laws, 
 and that souls produce in themselves some internal actions. And 
 we see no way of conceiving the action of the soul upon matter, or 
 of matter upon the soul, or anything corresponding to it ; it not be- 
 ing, explicable by any machine whatever how material variations, that 
 is to say, mechanical laws, cause perception to arise ; nor how 
 perception can produce change of velocity or of direction in animal 
 spirits and other bodies, however subtile or gross they may be. 
 Thus the inconceivability of another hypothesis as much as the good 
 order of nature which is always uniform (without speaking here of 
 other considerations), have made- me believe that the soul and the 
 body follow perfectly their laws, each one its own separately, 
 
161 
 
 without the laws of the body being troubled by the actions of the 
 soul and without bodies finding windows through which to 
 influence souls. It will be asked then whence comes this accord 
 of the soul with the body. The defenders of occasional causes 
 teach that God accommodates at each moment the soul to the body 
 and the body to the soul. But it being impossible that this be 
 other than miraculous, it is unsuited to a philosophy which must 
 explain the ordinary course of nature, for it would be necessary 
 that God should continually disturb the natural laws of bodies. 
 This is why I believed that it was infinitely more worthy of the 
 economy of God and of the uniformity and harmony of his work, 
 to conclude that he has at the beginning created souls and bodies 
 such that each following its own laws accords with the other. It 
 cannot be denied that this is possible to him whose wisdom and 
 power are infinite. In this I still only attribute to souls and to 
 bodies for all time and everywhere what we experience in them 
 every time that the experience is distinct, that is to say, mechanical 
 laws in bodies and internal actions in the soul : the whole consisting 
 only in the present state joined with the tendency to changes, 
 which take place in the body according to the moving forces and 
 in the soul according to the perceptions of good and evil. 
 
 The only surprising thing which follows from this is that the 
 works of God are infinitely more beautiful and more harmonious 
 than had been believed. And it may be said that the subterfuge 
 of the Epicureans against the argument drawn from the beauty of 
 visible things (when they say that among numberless productions of 
 chance it is not to be marvelled at if some world like our own has 
 succeeded passably) is destroyed, in that the perpetual correspond- 
 ence of beings which have no influence one upon the other can 
 only come from a common cause of this harmony. M. Bayle (who 
 is profound), having meditated on the consequences of this hypoth- 
 esis, acknowledges that one never exalted more what we call the 
 divine perfections, and that the infinite wisdom of God, great as it 
 is, is not too great to produce such a pre-established harmon}^, the 
 possibility of which he seemed to doubt. But I made him consider 
 that even men produce automata which act as if they were rational 
 and that God (who is an infinitely greater artist or, rather, with 
 whom everything is art as much as is possible), in order to make 
 matter act as minds require, has traced out for it its path. So 
 11 
 
162 
 
 that after this we ought not to be more surprised at the fact 
 that it acts with so much reason, than at the course of certain ser- 
 pents in fireworks along an unseen cord, which shows that it is a 
 man who manages them. The designs of God can only be grasped 
 in proportion to the perfections found in them, and bodies being 
 subjected to souls in advance in order to be accommodated to their 
 voluntary actions, the soul in its turn is expressive of bodies in virtue 
 of its primordial nature, being obliged to represent them by its invol- 
 untary and confused perceptions. Thus each one is the original or 
 the copy of the other in proportion to the perfections or imperfec- 
 tions which"it involves. 
 
XXY. 
 
 Considerations on the Principles of Life, and on Plastic 
 I^ATUREs ; by the Autlior of the System of Preestablished 
 Harmony. 1705. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 As the dispute which has arisen on plastic natures and on the 
 principles of life has given celebrated persons who are interested 
 in it occasion to speak of my system, of which some explanation 
 seems to be demanded (see Bihlioth. Ohois., vol. 5, art. 6, p. 301, 
 and also VHistoire des Outrages des SamoAis^ of 1704, art. 7, p. 393), 
 I have thought it would be in place to add something to what I have 
 already published on the subject in various passages of the Journals 
 quoted by Bayle in his Dictionary, article Heparins. I really 
 admit principles of life diffused throughout all nature, and immortal 
 since they are indivisible substances or units, as bodies are multitudes 
 liable to perish by dissolution of their parts. These principles of 
 life or these souls have perception or desire. When I am asked if 
 there are substantial forms, I reply in making a distinction. For if 
 this term is taken as Descartes takes it Avhen he maintains against 
 Pegis that the rational soul is the substantial form of man, I will 
 answer, Yes. But I answer, No, if 'the term is taken as those take 
 it who imagine that there is a substantial form of a piece of stone, 
 or of any other non-organic body ; for the principles of life belong 
 only to organic body. It is true (according to my system) that 
 there is no portion of matter in which there are not numberless 
 organic and animated bodies ; under which I include not only 
 animals and plants, but perhaps also other kinds which are entirely 
 unknown to us. But for all this, it must not be said that each 
 portion of matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond 
 full of fishes is an animated body, although a fish is. 
 
 However, my opinion on the principles of life is in certain 
 points different from that hitherto taught. One of these points is 
 that all have believed that these principles of life change the course 
 of the motion of bodies, or at least give occasion to God to change 
 it, whereas, according to my system, this course is not changed at 
 all in the order of nature, God having pre-estab lished it as it 
 
164 
 
 ought to be. The Peripatetics believed that souls had an influ- 
 ence on bodies and that according to their will or desire they 
 gave some impression to bodies. And the celebrated authors who 
 have given occasion for the present dispute, by their principles of 
 life and their plastic natures, have held the same view, although 
 they are not Peripatetics. We cannot say as much of those who 
 have employed d-pyai^ or hylarchic principles, or other immaterial 
 principles under different names. Descartes having well recog- 
 nized that there is a law of nature, according to which the same 
 quantity of force is preserved (although he was deceived in its 
 application in confounding quantity of force with quantity of 
 motion), believed that we ought not to ascribe to the soul the power 
 of increasing or diminishing the force of bodies, but simply that of 
 changing their direction, by changing the course of the animal 
 spirits. And those Cartesians, who have introduced the doctrine 
 of Occasional Causes, believed that the soul not being able to 
 exert any influence on body, it was necessary that God should 
 change the course or direction of the animal spirits according to 
 the volitions of the soul. But if at the time of Descartes the 
 new law of nature, which I have demonstrated, had been known, 
 which affirms that not only the same quantity of total force of 
 bodies which are in communication, but also their total direction, is 
 preserved, he would probably have discovered my system of Pre- 
 established Harmony. For he would have recognized that it is as 
 reasonable to say that the soul does not change the quantity of the 
 direction of bodies, as it is reasonable to deny to the soul the power 
 of changing the quantity of their force, both being equally contrary 
 to the order of things and to the laws of nature, as both are equally 
 inexplicable. Thus, according to my system, souls or the principles 
 of life do not change anything in the ordinary course of bodies, 
 and do not even give to God occasion to do so. Souls follow their 
 laws which consist in a certain development of perceptions, accord- 
 ing to the goods and the evils ; and bodies also follow their laws, 
 which consist in the laws of motion ; and nevertheless these two 
 beings of entirely different kind are in perfect accord, and corres- 
 pond like two clocks perfectly regulated on the same basis, although 
 perhaps of an entirely different construction. This is what I call 
 Pre-established Harmony, which removes all notion of miracle 
 from purely natural actions, and makes things run their course. 
 
165 
 
 regulated in an intelligible manner ; whereas tlie common system 
 has recourse to absolutely inexplicable influences, and in that of 
 Occasional Causes, God, by a sort of general law and as if by 
 agreement, is obliged to change at each moment the na^ral course 
 of the thoughts of the soul to accommodate them to the impressions . 
 of the body, and to disturb the natural course of the motions of 
 bodies according to the volitions of the soul ; that which can only 
 be explained by a perpetual miracle, while I explain it quite intel- 
 ligibly by the natures which God has established in things. 
 
 My system of Pre-established Harmony furnishes a new proof, 
 hitherto unknown, of the existence of God, since it is quite manifest 
 that the agreement of so many substances, of which the one has no 
 influence upon the other, could only come from a general cause, 
 on which all of them depend, and that this must have infinite 
 power and wisdom to pre-establish all these harmonies. M. Bayle 
 himself has thought that there never has been an hypothesis which 
 so sets in relief the knowledge which we have of the divine wisdom. 
 The system has moreover the advantage of preserving in all its 
 rigor and generality the great principle of physics that a body 
 never receives change in its motion except by another body in 
 motion which impels it. Corpus non Tuoveri nisi impulsum a 
 eorpore contiguo et moto. This law has been violated hitherto by all 
 those who have admitted souls or other immaterial principles, all 
 Cartesians included. The followers of Democritus, Hobbes, and 
 some other thorough-going materialists, who have rejected all 
 immaterial substance, having alone up to this time preserved this 
 law have believed that they found therein ground for insulting 
 other philosophers, as if they thus maintained a very irrational 
 opinion. But the ground of their triumph has been but apparent 
 and ad hominem / and far from serving them, it serves to confound 
 them, and now, their illusion being discovered and their advantage 
 turned against them, it seems that it may be said that it is the first 
 time that the best philosophy shows itself also the most conformed 
 in all respects to reason, nothing remaining which can be opposed 
 to it. This general principle, although it excludes particular first 
 movers, by making us deny this quality to soul or to immaterial 
 created principles, leads us so much the more surely and clearly to 
 the universal first mover, from whom comes equally the succession 
 and harmony of perceptions. They are like two kingdoms, the one 
 
166 
 
 of efficient causes, the other of final ; each of which separately suf- 
 fices in detail for explaining all as if the other did not exist. But 
 the one does not suffice without the other in what is general of their 
 origin, for thej emanate from a source in which the power which 
 constitutes efficient causes and the wisdom which regulates final 
 causes are found united. This maxim also, that there is no motion 
 which has not its origin in another motion, according to laws of 
 mechanics, leads us again to the first mover, because matter being 
 indifferent in itseK to all motion or rest, and nevertheless always 
 possessing motion with all its force and direction, it could not have 
 been put in it except by the author himself of matter. 
 
 There is still another difference between the opinions of other au- 
 thors who favor the principles of life, and mine. It is that I believe 
 at the same time both that these principles of life are immortal and 
 that they are everywhere ; whereas according to the common 
 opinion the souls of brutes perish, and according to the Cartesians, 
 man only has really a soul and even perception and desire ; an 
 opinion which will never be approved, and which has only been 
 embraced because it was seen that it was necessary either to accord 
 to brutes immortal souls or to avow that the soul of man might be 
 mortal. But it ought rather to have been said that every simple 
 substance being imperishable and every soul being consequently 
 immortal, that which could not be reasonably refused to brutes, 
 cannot fail also to subsist always, although in a way very different 
 from our own, since brutes, as far as can be judged, are lacking in 
 that reflection which makes us think of ourselves. And we do not see 
 why men have been so loath to accord to the bodies of other organic 
 creatures immaterial, imperishable substances, since the defenders 
 of atoms have introduced material substances which do not perish, 
 and since the soul of the brute has no more reflection than an atom. 
 For there is a broad difference between feeling which is common to 
 these souls and the reflection which accompanies reason, since we 
 have a thousand feelings without reflecting upon them ; and I do 
 not think that the Cartesians have ever proved or can prove ■ that 
 every perception is accompanied by consciousness. It is reasonable 
 also that there may be substances capable of perception below us as 
 there are above ; and that our soul far from being the last of all is 
 in a middle position from which one may descend and ascend, 
 otherwise there would be a defect of order which certain philosophers 
 
167 
 
 r 
 
 f 
 
 call vacuum formarum. Thus reason and nature lead men to the 
 opinion I 'have just propounded; but prejudices have turned them 
 aside from it. 
 
 This view leads us to another where I am again obhged to 
 diverge from the received opinion. It will be asked of those who 
 are of my opinion what the souls of brutes will do after the death 
 of the animal, and they will impute to us the dogma of Pythagoras 
 who believed in the transmigration of souls, which not only the late 
 M. Yan Helmont, the younger, but also an ingenious author of 
 certain Metaphysical Meditations, published at Paris, have wished 
 to revive. But it must be known that I am far from this opinion, 
 because I believe that not only the soul but also the same animal 
 subsists. Persons very accurate in experiments have already in our 
 day perceived that it may be doubted whether an altogether new 
 animal is ever produced, and whether animals wholly alive as well 
 as plants are not already in miniature in germs before conception. 
 This doctrine being granted, it will be reasonable to think that what 
 does not begin to live also does not cease to live, and that death like 
 generation is only the transformation of the same animal which is 
 sometimes augmented and sometimes diminished. This again 
 reveals to us hitherto unthought-of marvels of divine contrivance. 
 This is, that the machines of nature being machines even to their 
 smallest parts are indestructible, by reason of the envelopment of 
 one little machine in a greater ad infinitum. Thus one finds one's 
 self obliged at the same time to maintain the pre-existence of the 
 soul as well as of the animal, and the substance of the animal as 
 well as of the soul. 
 
 I have gradually been led to explain my view of the formation of 
 plants and animals, since it appears from what I have just said that 
 they are never formed altogether anew. I am therefore of the 
 opinion of Cudworth (the greater part of whose excellent work 
 pleases me extremely) that the laws of mechanics alone could not 
 form an animal where there is nothing yet organized ; and I find 
 that with reason he is opposed to what some of the ancients have 
 imagined on this subject and even Descartes in his VITomme^ the 
 formation of which costs him so little, but which is also very far 
 from being a real man. And I reinforce this opinion of Cudworth 
 by presenting for consideration the fact that matter arranged by 
 divine wisdom must be essentially organized throughout, and that 
 
168 
 
 thus there is a machine in the parts of the natural machine ad infi- 
 niUirri^ and so many envelopes and organic bodies enfolded one 
 within another that an organic body never could be produced 
 altogether new and without any preformation ; nor could an "animal 
 already existing be entirely destroyed. Thus I have no need to 
 resort with Cudworth to certain immaterial jplastic natures^ although 
 I remember that Julius Scaliger and other Peripatetics and also 
 certain partisans of the Helmontian doctrine of Archsei have believed 
 that the soul manufactures its own body. I may say of it non mi 
 Msogna, e non mi hasta^ for the very reason of the preformation 
 and organism ad infinitum which furnishes me the material plastic 
 natures suited to the requirements of the case ; whereas the imma- 
 terial plastic principles are as little necessary as they are little 
 capable of satisfying the case. For since the animals are never 
 formed naturally of a non-organic mass, the mechanism incapable 
 of producing de novo these infinitely varied organs can very well 
 derive them through the development and through the transforma- 
 tion of a pre-existing organic body. Meanwhile those who employ 
 plastic natures whether material or immaterial in no wise weaken 
 the proof of the existence of God drawn from the marvels of nature, 
 which appear particularly in the structure of animals, provided 
 that these defenders of immaterial plastic natures, add a particular 
 direction from God, and provided that those who with me make use 
 of a material cause in assenting to plastic mechanism, maintain not 
 only a continual preformation, but also an original divine pre-estab- 
 lishment. Thus whatever way we take we cannot overlook the 
 divine existence in wishing to explain these marvels, which have 
 always been admired but which have never been more apparent 
 than in my system. 
 
 We see by this that not only the soul but also the animal must 
 subsist always in the ordinary course of things. But tlie laws of 
 nature are made and applied with so much order and so much wis- 
 dom that they serve more than one end, and God, who occupies 
 the position of inventor and architect as regards the mechanism of 
 nature, occupies the position of king and father to substances 
 possessing intelligence, and of these the soul is a spirit formed after 
 his image. And as regards spirits, his kingdom, of which they are 
 the citizens, is the most perfect monarchy which can be invented ; 
 in which there is no sin which does not bring upon itself some pun- 
 
169 
 
 ishment, and no good action without some recompense ; in which 
 everything tends finally to the glory of the monarch and the happi- 
 ness of the subjects, by the most beautiful combination of justice and 
 goodness which can be desired. Nevertheless I dare not assert any- 
 thing postively either as regards pre-existence or as regards the 
 details of the future condition of human souls, since God might 
 make use of extraordinary ways in the kingdom of grace ; neverthe- 
 less that which natural reason favors ought to be preferred, at least 
 if Kevelation does not teach us the contrary, a point which I do not 
 here undertake to decide. 
 
 Before ending, it will perhaps be well to note, among the other 
 advantages of my system, that of the universality of the laws 
 which I employ, which are always without exception in my general 
 philosophy : and it is just the opposite in other systems. For ex- 
 ample, I have already said that the laws of mechanics are never 
 violated in natural motions, that the same force is always preserved, 
 as also the same direction, and that everything takes place in souls 
 as if there were no body, and that everything takes place in bodies 
 as if there were no souls ; that there is no part of space which is 
 not full ; that there is no particle of matter which is not actually 
 divided, and which does not contain organic bodies ; that there are 
 also souls everywhere, as there are bodies everywhere ; that souls 
 and the same animals always subsist ; that organic bodies are never 
 without souls, and that souls are never separated from all organic 
 body ; although it is nevertheless true that there is no portion of 
 matter of which it can be said that it is always affected by the same 
 soul. I do not admit then that there are naturally souls entirely 
 separated, nor that there are created spirits entirely detached, from 
 all body, in which I am of the opinion of several ancient Church 
 Fathers. God only is above all matter, since he is its author ; but 
 creatures, free or freed from matter, would be at the same time de- 
 tached from- the universal concatenation, and like deserters from 
 the general order. This universality of laws is confirmed by its 
 great facility of explanation, since the uniformity, which I think is 
 observed in all nature, brings about that everywhere else, in all time 
 and in every place, it can be said that all is as it is here^ to the de- 
 grees of greatness and of near perfection ; and that thus those things 
 which are farthest removed and most concealed are perfectly ex- 
 plained by the analogy of what is visible and near to us. 
 
XXYI. 
 
 Letter to M. Coste on Necessity and Contingency. 1707. 
 [From the French]. 
 
 Hanover, Dec. 19, 1707. 
 To M. Coste, London : 
 
 I thank you very mncli for communicating to me tlie last addi- 
 tions and corrections of Locke, and I am pleased also to learn what 
 you tell me of his last dispute with Limborch. The liberty of in- 
 difference, about which the dispute turns and my opinion of which 
 you, sir, ask, consists in a certain subtilty which few people trouble 
 themselves to understand and of w^hich many people nevertheless 
 reason. This carries us back to the consideration of necessity and 
 of contingency. 
 
 \ A truth is necessary when the opposite involves contradiction, 
 and when it is not necessary it is called contingent. It is a neces- 
 sary truth that God exists, that all right angles are equal, etc., but 
 that I myself exist, and that there are bodies in nature which show 
 an angle actually right, are contingent truths. For the whole uni- 
 verse might be otherwise ; time, space, and matter being absolutely 
 indifferent to motions and forms. And God has chosen among an 
 iniinite number of possibles what he judged most lit. But 
 since he has chosen, it must be affirmed that everything is com- 
 prised in his choice and that nothing could be changed, since he 
 has once for all foreseen and regulated all ; he who could not regu- 
 late things piecemeal and by fits and starts. Therefore the sins 
 and evils which he has judged proper to permit for greater goods 
 are comprised in his choice. This is the necessity, which can now 
 be ascribed to things in the future, which is called hypothetical or 
 consequent necessity (that is to say, founded upon the consequence 
 of the hypothesis of the choice made), which does not destroy the 
 contingency of things, and does not produce that absolute necessity 
 which contingency does not allow. And nearly all theologians and 
 philosophers (for we must except the Socinians) acknowledge the 
 hypothetical necessity which I have just explained, and which can- 
 not be combated without overthrowing the attributes of God and 
 even the nature of things. 
 
171 
 
 [N^evertheless, although all the facte of the universe are now cer- 
 tain in relation to God, or (what amounts to the same thing) are 
 determined in themselves and even linked among themselves, it 
 does not follow that their connection is ^Iwajj^ truly necessary; 
 that is to say, that the truth, which pronounces that one fact follows 
 another, is necessary. And this must be applied particularly to 
 voluntary actions. When a choice is proposed, for example to go 
 out or not to go out, it is a question whether, with all the circum- 
 stances, internal and external, motives, perceptions, dispositions, 
 impressions, passions, inclinations taken together, I am still in a 
 contingent state, or whether I am necessitated to make choice, for 
 example, to go out ; that is to say, whether this proposition true and 
 determined in fact. In all these circuTRstanees tahen together I 
 shall choose to go out, is contingent or necessary. To this I- reply 
 that it is contingent, because neither I nor any other mind more 
 enlightened than I, could demonstrate that the opposite of this 
 truth implies contradiction. And supposing that by liberty of in- 
 difference is understood a liberty opposed to necessity (as I have 
 just explained it), I acknowledge this liberty for I am really of 
 opinion that our liberty, as well as that of God and of the blessed 
 spirits, is exempt not only from co-action but furthermore from 
 absolute necessity, although it can not be exempt from determina- 
 tion and from certainty. 
 
 But I find that there is need of great precaution here in order 
 not to fall into a chimera which shocks the principles of good sense, 
 and which would be what I call an absolute indifference or an in- 
 difference of equilibrium, which some conceive in liberty, and 
 which I believe chimerical. It must be observed then that tiiat 
 connection of which I just spoke is not necessary, speaking abso- 
 lutely, but that it is none the less certainly true, and tlmt in general 
 every time that in all the circumstances taken together the balance 
 of deliberation is heavier on the one side than on the other, it is 
 certain and infallible that that side will carry the day. God or the 
 perfect sage would always choose the best that is known, and if one 
 thing was no better than another, they would choose neither. In 
 other intelligent substances passions often take the place of reason, 
 and it can always be said in regard to the will in general that the 
 choice follows the greatest inclination, under which I understand 
 passions as well as reasons, true or apparent. 
 
172 
 
 Nevertheless I see that there are people who imagine that we are 
 determined sometimes for the side which is the less weighted^ th«t 
 God chooses sometimes the least good everything considered, and 
 that man chooses sometimes without object and against all his 
 reasons, dispositions, and passions, finally that one chooses some- 
 times without any reason which determines the choice. But this 1 
 hold to be false and absurd, since it is one of the greatest principles 
 of good sense that nothing ever occurs without cause or determin- 
 ing reason. Thus when God chooses it is by reason of the Best, 
 when man chooses it will be the side which shall have struck him 
 most. If moreover he chooses that which he sees to be less useful 
 and less agreeable, it will have become perhaps to him the most 
 agreeable through caprice, through a spirit of contradiction, and 
 through similar reasons of a depraved taste, which would none the 
 less be determining reasons, even if they should not be conclusive 
 reasons. And never can any example to the contrary be found. 
 
 Thus although we have a liberty of indifference which saves us 
 from necessity, w^e never have an indifference of equilibrium 
 which exempts us from determining reasons ; there is always some- 
 thing which inclines us and makes us choose, but without being able 
 to necessitate us. And just as God is always infallibly led to the 
 best although he is not led necessarily (other than by a moral neces- 
 sity), so we are always infallibly led to that which strikes us most, 
 but not necessarily. The contrary not implying any contradiction, it 
 was not necessary or essential that God should create nor that he 
 should create this world in particular, although his wisdom and 
 goodness has led him to it. 
 
 It is this that M. Bayle, very subtle as he has been, has not suf- 
 ficiently considered when he thought that a case similar to the ass 
 of Buridan was possible, and that a man placed in circumstances 
 of perfect equilibrium could none the less choose. For it must be 
 said that the case of a perfect equilibrium is chimerical and never 
 occurs, the universe not being able to be parted or cut into parts 
 equal and alike. The universe is not like an ellipse or other such 
 oval which the straight line drawn through its centre can cut in two 
 congruent parts. The universe has no centre and its parts are 
 infinitely varied, thus the case will never occur where all will be 
 perfectly equal and will strike equally from one side and from the 
 other, and although we are not always capable of perceiving all the 
 
173 
 
 little impressions wliicli contribute to determine us, there is always 
 something wbicli determines us between two contradictories, with- 
 out the case ever being perfectly equal on the one side and on the 
 other. 
 
 [N^evertheless, although our choice ex datis on all the internal and 
 external circumstances taken together is always determined, and 
 although for the present it does not depend upon us to change the 
 will, it is none the less true that we have great power over our 
 future wills by choosing certain objects of our attention and by 
 accustoming ourselves to certain ways of thinking, and by this 
 means we can accustom ourselves the better to resist impressions 
 and the better make the reason act, to the end that we can con- 
 tribute toward making ourselves will what we ought to. 
 
 For the rest I have elsewhere shown, that, regarding matters in 
 a certain metaphysical sense, we are always in a state of perfect 
 spontaneity, and that what is attributed to the impressions of ex- 
 ternal things comes only from confused perceptions in us which 
 correspond to them, and which cannot but be given us at the start 
 in virtue of the pre-established harmony which establishes the con- 
 nection of each substance with all othersj 
 
 If it were true, sir, that your Sevennese were prophets, that 
 event would not be contrary to my hypothesis of the Pre-established 
 Harmony and would even be in thorough agreement with it. I 
 have always said that the present is big with the future and that 
 there is a perfect connection between things however distant they 
 may be one from another, so that one of sufficient penetration 
 might read the one in the other. I should not even oppose one 
 who should maintain that there are globes in the universe where 
 prophecies are more common than on our own, as there will per- 
 haps be a world in which dogs will have sufficiently good noses to 
 scent their game at a thousand leagues, perhaps also there are globes 
 in which genii have more freedom than here below to mix in the 
 actions of rational animals. But when the question is to reason on 
 what is actually practised here, our presumptive judgment must be 
 founded on the custom of our globe, where prophetic views of this 
 sort are very rare. We cannot swear that there are none, but we 
 could wager that these in question are not such. One of the reasons 
 which would most lead me to judge favorably of them would be 
 the judgment of M. Fatio but it would be necessary to know his 
 
174 
 
 opinion witliout taking it from the newspaper. If you had wiW 
 all dne attention associated yourself with a gentleman with an 
 income of £2000 sterling who prophesies in Greek, in Latin, and in 
 French, although he only knows English well, there would be 
 nothing to be said. So I beg you, sir, to enlighten me more on a 
 matter so interesting and important. I am, etc. 
 
XXYII. 
 
 Refutation of Spinoza, c. 1708. 
 [From the Latin.] 
 
 The author [Wachter] passes on (ch. 4) to Spinoza, whom he 
 compares with the cabalists. Spinoza (Eth., pt. 2, prop. 10, schol.) 
 says : ''Every one must admit that nothing is or can be conceived 
 without God. For it is acknowledged by everyone that God is the 
 sole cause of all things, of their essence as well as of their exist- 
 ence ; that is, God is the cause of things, not only in respect to 
 their being made (secundum fieri), but also in respect to their being 
 {secundum esse)^ This, from Spinoza, the author [Wachter] 
 appears to approve. And it is true that we must speak of created 
 things only as permitted by the nature of God. But I do not 
 think that Spinoza has succeeded in this. Essences can in a 
 certain way be conceived of without God, but existences involve 
 God. And the very reality of essences by which they exert an 
 influence upon existences is from God. The essences of things are 
 co-eternal with God. And the very essence of God embraces all 
 other essences to such a degree that God cannot be perfectly con- 
 ceived without them. But existence cannot be conceived of with- 
 out God, who is the final reason of things. 
 
 This axiom, "To the essence of a thing belongs that without 
 which it can neither be nor be conceived," is to be apphed in 
 necessary things or in species, but not in individuals or contingent 
 things. For individuals cannot be distinctly conceived. Hence 
 they have no necessary connection with God, but are produced 
 freely. God has been inclined toward these by a determining 
 reason, but he has not been necessitated. 
 
 Spinoza (de Emend. Intel., p. 374) places among fictions the 
 dictum, " Something can be produced from nothing." But, in 
 truth, modes which are produced, are produced from nothing. 
 Since there is no matter of modes, assuredly neither the mode, nor 
 a part of it, has preexisted, but only another mode which has dis- 
 appeared and to which this present one has succeeded. 
 
 The cabalists seem to say tliat matter, on account of the vileness 
 of its essence, can neither be created nor can it exist ; hence, 
 
176 
 
 that there is absokitely no matter, or that spirit and matter, as 
 Henry More maintains in his cabalistic theses, are one and the 
 same thing. Spinoza, likewise, denies that God could have created 
 any corporeal and material mass to be the subject of this world, 
 *' because," he says, " those who differ do not know by what divine 
 power it could have been created." There is some truth in these 
 words, but I think it is not sufficiently understood. Matter does, 
 in reality, exist, but it is not a substance, since it is an aggregate or 
 resultant of substances : I speak of matter as far as it is secondary 
 or of extended mass, which is not at all a homogeneous body. But 
 that which we conceive of as homogeneous and call primary matter 
 is something incomplete, since it is merely potential. Substance, 
 on the contrary, is something full and active. 
 
 Spinoza believed that matter, as commonly understood, did not 
 exist. Hence he often warns us that matter is badly defined by 
 Descartes as extension (Ep. 73), and extension is poorly explained 
 as a very vile thing which must be divisible in place, " since (de 
 Emend. Intel., p. 385) matter ought to be explained as an attribute 
 expressing an eternal and infinite essence." I reply that extension, 
 or if you prefer, primary matter, is nothing but a certain indefinite 
 repetition of things as far as they are similar to each other or indis- 
 cernible. But just as number supposes numbered things, so exten- 
 sion supposes things which are repeated, and which have, in addi- 
 tion to common characteristics, others peculiar to themselves. 
 These accidents, peculiar to each one, render the limits of size and 
 shape, before only possibfe,actual. Merely passive matter is some- 
 thing very vile, that is, w^anting in all virtue, but such a thing 
 consists only in the incomplete or in abstraction. 
 
 Spinoza (Eth., pt. 1, prop. 13, corol. and prop. 15, schol.) says : 
 " Ko substance, not even corporeal substance, is divisible." This- 
 statement is not surprising according to his system, since he admits 
 but one substance ; but it is equally true in mine, although I admit 
 innumerable substances, for, in my system, all are indivisible or 
 7nonad8. 
 
 He says (Eth., pt. 3, prop. 2, schol.) that "the mind and the 
 body are the same thing, only expressed in two ways," and (Eth., 
 pt. 2, prop. 7, schol.) that " thinking substance and extended sub- 
 stance are one and the same, known now under the attribute of 
 thought, now under that of extension." He says in the same scho- 
 
177 
 
 lium, '^ This, certain Hebrews seem to have seen as through a cloud, 
 who indeed maintain that God, the intellect of God, and the things 
 known by it, are one and the same." This is not my opinion. 
 Mind and body are not the same any more than are the principle 
 of action and that of passion. Corporeal substance has a soul and 
 an organic body, that is, a mass made up of other substances. It 
 is true that the same substance thinks and has an extended mass 
 joined to it, but it does not consist of this mass, since all this can 
 be taken away from it, without altering the substance ; moreover, 
 every substance perceives, but not every substance thinks. Thought 
 indeed belongs to the monads, especially all perception, but exten- 
 sion belongs to compounds. It can no more be said that God and 
 the things known by God are one and the same thing than that the 
 mind and the things perceived by the mind are the same. The 
 author [Wachter] believes that Spinoza posited a common nature 
 in which the attributes thought and extension reside, and that this 
 nature. is spiritual; but there is no extension belonging to spirits 
 unless the word be taken in a broader sense for a certain subtile 
 animal such as angels were regarded by the ancients. The author 
 [Wachter] adds that mind and body are the modes of these attri- 
 butes. But how, I ask, can the mind be the mode of thought, when 
 it is the principle of thought ? Thus the mind should rather be the 
 attribute and thought the modification of this attribute. It is aston- 
 ishing also that Spinoza, as was seen above (de Emend. Intel., p. 
 385), seems to deny that extension is divisible into and composed 
 of parts ; which has no meaning, unless, perchance, like space, it is 
 not a divisible thing. But space and time are orders of things and 
 not things. 
 
 The author [Wachter] rightly says, that God found in himself 
 the origins of all things, as I remember Julius Scaliger once said 
 that " things are not produced by the passive power of matter but 
 by the active power of God." And I assert this of forms or of 
 activities or entelechies. 
 
 What Spinoza (Eth., pt. 1, prop. 34) says, that " God is, by the 
 same necessity, the cause of himself and the cause of all things," 
 and (Polit. Tract., p. 270, c. 2, no. 2) that " the power of things is 
 the power of God," I do not admit. God exists necessarily, but 
 he produces things freely, and the power of things is produced by 
 God but is different from the divine power, and things themselves 
 operate, although they have received their power to act. 
 12 • 
 
178 
 
 Spinoza (Ep. 21) says : " That everything is in God and moves 
 in God, I assert with Paul and perhaps with all other philosophers, 
 although in a different manner. I would even dare to say that this 
 was the opinion of all the ancient Hebrews, so far as it can be con- 
 jectured from certain traditions, although these are in many ways 
 corrupted.'^ I think that everything is in God, not as the part in 
 the whole, nor as an accident in a subject, but as place, yet a place 
 spiritual and enduring and not one measured or divided, is in that 
 which is placed, namely, just as God is immense or everywhere ; 
 the world is present to him. And it is thus that all things are in 
 him ; for he is where they are and where they are not, and he 
 remains when they pass away and he has already been there where 
 they come. 
 
 The author [Wachter] says that it is the concordant opinion of 
 the cabalists that God produced certain things mediately and others 
 immediately. Whence he next speaks of a certain created first 
 principle which God made to proceed immediately from himself 
 aiid by the mediation of which all other things have been produced 
 in series and in order, and this they are wont to salute by various 
 names : Adam Cadmon, Messiah, the Christ, XoyoQ, the word, the 
 first-born, the first man, the celestial man, the guide, the shepherd, 
 the mediator, etc. Elsewhere he gives a reason for this assertion. 
 The fact itself is recognized by Spinoza, so that nothing is wanting 
 except the name. ^' It follows," he says (Eth., pt. 1, prop. 28, 
 schol.), " in the second place, that God cannot properly be called 
 the remote cause of mdividual things, except to distinguish these 
 from those which God produces immediately or rather which follow 
 from his absolute nature." Moreover what those things are which 
 are said to follow from the absolute nature of God, he explained 
 (prop. 21) thus : "All things which follow from the absolute nature 
 of any attribute of God must exist always and be infinite or are 
 eternal and infinite through the same attribute." — These proposi- 
 tions of Spinoza, which the author cites, are wholly without founda- 
 tion. God produces no infinite creature, nor could it be shown or 
 pointed out by any argument in what respect such a creature would 
 differ from God. 
 
 The theory of Spinoza, namely, that from each attribute there 
 springs a particular infinite thing, from extension a certain some- 
 thing infinite in extension, from thought a certain infinite under- 
 
1Y9 
 
 standing, arises from his varied imagination of certain heterogeneous 
 divine attributes, like thought and extension, and perhaps innumer- 
 able others. For in reality extension is not an attribute of itself 
 since it is only the repetition of perceptions. An infinitely ex- 
 tended thing is only imaginary : an infinite thinking being is God 
 himself. The things which are necessary and which proceed from 
 the infinite nature of God, are the eternal truths. A particular 
 creature is produced by another, and this again by another. Thus, 
 therefore, by no conception, could we reach God even if we should 
 suppose a progress ad injlnitum, and, notwithstanding, the last no 
 less than the one which precedes is dependent upon God. 
 
 Tatian says, in his Oration to the Greeks, that there is a spirit 
 dwelling in the stars, the angels, the plants, the waters and men, 
 and that this spirit, although one and the same, contains differences 
 in itself. But this doctrine I do not approve. It is the error of 
 the world-soul universally diffused, and which, like the air in 
 pneumatic organs, makes different sounds in different organs. 
 Thus when a pipe is broken, the soul will desert it and will return 
 into the world-soul. But we must know that there are as many 
 incorporeal substances, or if you will, souls, as there are natural, 
 organic machines. 
 
 But what Spinoza (Eth., pt. 2, prop. 13, schol.) says : " All things, 
 although in different degrees, are animated," rests upon another 
 strange doctrine, " for," he says, " of everything there is necessarily 
 in God an idea, of which God is the cause, in the same way as there 
 is an idea of the human body." But there is plainly no reason for 
 saying that the soul is an idea. Ideas are something purely 
 abstract, like numbers and figures, and cannot act. Ideas are 
 abstract and numerical : the idea of each, animal is a possibility, 
 and it is an illusion to call souls immortal because ideas are eternal, 
 as if the soul of a globe should be called eternal because the idea of 
 a spherical body is eternal. The soul is not an idea, but the source 1 
 of innumerable ideas, for it has, besides the present idea, something \ 
 active, or the production of new ideas. But according to Spinoza, 
 at any moment the soul will be different because the body being 
 changed the idea of the body is different. Hence it is not strange 
 if he considers creatures as transitory modifications. — The soul, 
 therefore, is something vital or something containing active force. 
 . Spinoza (Eth., pt. 1, prop. 16) says : '' From the necessity of the 
 
180 
 
 divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite 
 modes, that is to say, all things which can fall under infinite intel- 
 lect." This is a most false opinion, and this error is the same as 
 that which Descartes insinuated, viz., that matter successively 
 assumes all forms. Spinoza begins where Descartes ended, in 
 Naturalism. He is wrong also in saying (Ep. 68) that " the world 
 is the effect of the divine nature," although he almost adds that it 
 was not made by chance. There is a mean between what is 
 necessary and what is fortuitous, namely, what is free. The world 
 is a voluntary effect of God, but on account of inclining or 
 prevailing reasons. And even if the world should be supposed 
 perpetual nevertheless it would not be necessary. God could either 
 not have created it or have created it otherwise, but he was not to 
 do it. Spinoza thinks (Ep. 49) that " God produces the world by 
 that necessity by which he knows himself." But it must be replied 
 that things are possible in many ways, whereas it was altogetlier 
 impossible that God should not know himself. — Spinoza says (Eth., 
 pt. 1, prop. 17, schol.) : "I know that there are many who beKeve 
 that they can prove that sovereign intelligence and free will belong 
 to the nature of God ; for they say they know nothing more perfect 
 to attribute to God than that which is the highest perfection in us. 
 .... Therefore, they prefer to assert that God is indifferent to 
 all things, and that he creates nothing except what he has decided, 
 by some absolute will, to create. But I think I have shown (Prop. 
 16) sufficiently clearly that all things follow from the sovereign 
 power of God by the same necessity ; in the same way as it follows 
 from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two 
 right angles." — From the first words it is evident that Spinoza does 
 not attribute to God intellect and will. He is right in denying 
 that God is indifferent and that he decrees anything by absolute 
 will : he decrees by a will which is based on reasons. That things 
 proceed from God as the properties of a triangle proceed from its 
 nature is proved by no argument, besides there is no analogy 
 between essences and existing things. 
 
 In the scholium of Proposition 17, Spinoza says that " the intel- 
 lect and the will of God agree with ours only in name, because 
 ours are posterior and God's are prior to things ; " but it does not 
 follow from this, that they agree only in name. Elsewhere, never- 
 theless, he says that ''thought is an attribute of God, and that 
 
181 
 
 particular modes of thought must be referred to it (Eth. pt. 2, prop. 
 1)." But the author [Wachter] thinks that he is speaking there of 
 the external word of God, because he says (Eth. pt. 5) " that our 
 mind is a part of the infinite intellect." 
 
 "The human mind," says Spinoza (Eth., pt. 5, prop. 23, proof), 
 " cannot be entirely destroyed with the body, but there remains 
 something of it which is eternal. But this has no relation to time, 
 for we attribute duration to the mind only during the duration of 
 the body." In the scholium following, he adds, " This idea which 
 expresses the essence of the body under the form of eternity [sub 
 specie ceternitatis'] is a certain mode of thought which belongs to 
 the essence of the mind and which is necessarily eternal, etc." 
 This is illusory. This idea is like the figure of the sphere, the 
 eternity of which does not prejudge its existence, since it is but the 
 possibility of an ideal sphere. Thus it is saying nothing to say 
 that " our mind is eternal in so far as it expresses the body under 
 the form of eternity," and it would be likewise eternal because it 
 understands eternal truths as to the triane:le. "Our soul has no 
 duration nor does time relate to anything beyond the actual exist- 
 ence of the body." Thus Spinoza, I. c, who thinks that the mind 
 perishes with the body because he believes that only a single body 
 remains always, although this can be transformed. 
 
 The author [Wachter] adds : " I do not see that Spinoza has 
 anywhere said positively that minds migrate from one body into 
 another, and into different dwellings and various regions of eternity. 
 Nevertheless it might be inferred from his thought." But he errs. 
 The same soul, to Spinoza, cannot be the idea of another body, as 
 the figure of a sphere is not the figure of a cylinder. The soul, to 
 Spinoza, is so fugitive, that it does not exist even in the present 
 moment, and the body too only exists in idea. Spinoza says 
 (Eth., pt. 5, prop. 2) that " memory and imagination disappear 
 with the body." But I for my part think that some imagination 
 and some memory always remain, and that, without them, there 
 would be no soul. It must not be believed that the mind exists 
 without feeling or without a soul. A reason without imagination 
 and memory is a conclusion without premises. Aristotle, also, 
 thought that i^oi)?, mind, or the acting intellect remains, and not 
 the soul. But the soul itself acts and the mind is passive. 
 
 Spinoza (de Emend. Intel., p. 384) says, " The ancients never, to 
 my knowledge, concgived, as we do here, a soul acting according to 
 
182 
 
 certain laws and like a spiritual automat'' (he meant to saj automaton). 
 The author [Wachter] interprets this passage of the soul alone and 
 not of the mind, and says that the soul acts according to the laws of 
 motion and according to external causes. Both are mistaken. I 
 say that the soul acts spontaneously and yet like a spiritual autom- 
 aton ; and that this is true also of the mind. The soul is not less 
 exempt than the mind from impulses from external things, and the 
 soul no more than the mind acts determinately ; as in bodies every- 
 thing is done by motions according to the laws of force, so in the 
 soul everything is done through effort or desire, according to the 
 laws of the Good. The two realms are in harmony. It is true, 
 nevertheless, that there are certain things in the soul which cannot 
 be explained in an adequate manner except by external things, and 
 so far the soul is subject to the external ; but this is not by a physi- 
 cal influx, but so to speak by a moral, in so far, namely, as God, in 
 creating the mind, had more regard to other things than to it itself. 
 For in the creation and preservation of each thing he has regard to 
 all other things. / 
 
 Spinoza is wrong in calling [Eth., pt. 3, 9, schoL] the will the effort 
 of each thing to persist in its being ; for the will tends toward more 
 particular ends and a more perfect mode of existence. He is 
 wrong also in saying [pt. 3, prop. 7] that the effort is identical 
 with the essence, whereas the essence is always the same and efforts 
 vary. I do not admit that affirmation is the effort of the mind to 
 persist in its being, that is, to preserve its ideas. We have this effort 
 even when we affirm nothing. Moreover, with Spinoza, the mind 
 is an idea, it does not have ideas. He is also wrong in thinking 
 that affirmation or negation is volition, since, moreover, volition 
 involves, in addition, the reason of the Good. 
 
 Spinoza (Ep. 2, ad Oldenb.) says that " the will differs from this 
 or that volition, just as whiteness from this or that white color : con- 
 sequently, will is not the cause of volition, as humanity is not the 
 cause of Peter and of Paul. Particular volitions liave therefore 
 need of another cause. The will is only an entity of reason. " So 
 Spinoza. But we take the will for the power of choosing, the 
 exercise of which is the volition. Therefore it is indeed by the 
 will that we will ; but it is true that there is need of other special 
 causes to determine the will, namely, in order that it produce a 
 certain volition. It must be modified in a certain manner. Tlie 
 
183 
 
 will does not therefore stand to volitions as the species or the 
 abstract of the species to individuals. Mistakes are not free nor 
 acts of will, although often we concur in our errors by free 
 actions. 
 
 Further, Spinoza says (Tract. Polit., c. 2, no. 6), "Men conceive 
 themselves in nature as an empire within an empire (Malcuth in 
 Malcuth, adds the author). For they think that the human mind is 
 not the product of natural causes, but that it is immediately created 
 by God so independent of other things that it has absolute power 
 of determining itself and of using rightly its reason. But experience 
 proves to us over-abundantly that it is no more in our power to have 
 a sound mind than to have a sound body." So Spinoza. In my 
 opinion, each siibstance is an empire within an empire ; but harmoniz- 
 ing exactly with all the rest it receives no influence from any being 
 except it be from God, but, nevertheless, through God, its author, it 
 depends upon all the others. It comes immediately from God and 
 yet it is created conformed to the other things. For the rest, not all 
 things are equally in our power. For we are inclined more to this 
 or to that. Malcuth, or the realm of God, does not suppress either 
 divine or human liberty, but only the indifference of equilibrium, as 
 they say who think there are no reasons for those actions which 
 they do not understand. 
 
 Spinoza thinks that the mind is greatly strengthened if it knows 
 that what happens happens necessarily : but by this compulsion he 
 does not render the heart of the sufferer content nor cause him to 
 feel his malady the less. He is, on the contrary, happy if he under- 
 stands that good results from evil and that those things which 
 happen are the best for us if we are wise. 
 
 From what precedes it is seen that what Spinoza says on the 
 intellectual love of God (Eth., pt. 4, prop. 28) is only trappings for 
 the people, since there is nothing loveable in a God who produces 
 without choice and by necessity, without discrimination of good 
 and evil. The true love of God is founded not in necessity but in 
 goodness. Spinoza (de Emend. Intel., p. 388), says that " there is no 
 science, but that we have only experience of particular things, that 
 is, of things such that their existence has no connection with their 
 essence, and which, consequently, are not eternal truths." — This 
 contradicts what he said elsewhere, viz : that all things are necessary, 
 that all things proceed necessarily from the divine essence. Like- 
 
184 
 
 wise he combats (Eth., pt. 2, prop. 10, schol.) those who pretend that 
 the nature of God belongs to the essence of created things, and yet 
 he had established before [Eth., pt. 1, prop. 15] that things do not 
 exist and cannot be conceived without God, and that they necessarily 
 arise from him. He maintains (Eth.,pt. 1, prop. 21), for this reason, 
 that finite and temporal things cannot be produced immediately by 
 an infinite cause, but that (Prop. 28) they are produced by other 
 causes, individual and finite. But how will they finally then spring 
 from God ? for they cannot come from him mediately in this case, 
 since we could never reach in this way things which are not simi- 
 larly produced by another finite thing. It cannot, therefore, be said 
 that God acts by mediating second causes, unless he produces second 
 causes. Therefore, it is rather to be said that God produces sub- 
 stances and not their actions, in which he only concurs. 
 
XXYIII. 
 
 Kemarks on the Opinion of Malebranohe that We See All 
 Things m God, with reference to Locke's Examination 
 OF IT. 1708. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 There is, in the posthumous works of Locke published at London 
 in 1706, 8vo., an examination of the opinion of Malebranche that 
 we see all things in God. It is acknowledged at the start that there 
 are many nice thoughts and judicious reflections in the book on 
 TTie Search after Truth, and that this made him hope to find 
 therein something satisfactory on the nature of our ideas. But he 
 has remarked at the beginning (§ 2) that this Father [Malebranche] 
 makes use of what Locke calls the argumentum ad ignorantiam, in 
 pretending to prove his opinion, because there is no other means of 
 explaining the thing : but according to Mr. Locke, this argument 
 loses its force when the feebleness of our understanding is con- 
 sidered. I am nevertheless of opinion that this argument is good 
 if one can perfectly enumerate the means and exclude all but one. 
 Even in Analysis, M. Frenicle employed this method of exclusion, 
 as he called it. Nevertheless Locke is right in saying that it is of 
 no use to say that this hypothesis is better than the other, if it is 
 found not to explain what one would like to understand and even 
 to involve things which cannot harmonize. 
 
 After having considered what is said in the first chapter of the 
 second part of book third, where Malebranche claims that what the 
 soul can perceive must be in immediate contact with it, Mr. Locke 
 asks (§ 3, 4.) what it is to be in immediate contact, this not appear- 
 ing to him intelligible except in bodies. Perhaps it might be 
 replied that one acts immediately on the other. And as Male- 
 branche, admitting that our bodies are united to our souls, adds 
 that it is not in such a way that the soul perceives it, he is asked 
 (§ 5.) to explain that act of union or at least in what it differs from 
 that which he does not admit ? Father Malebranche will perhaps 
 say that he does not know the union of the soul with the body 
 except by faith, and that the nature of Dody consisting in extension 
 alone, nothing can be deduced therefrom toward explaining the 
 
186 
 
 soul's action on the body. He grants an inexplicable union, but he 
 demands one which shall serve to explain the commerce of the soul 
 and body. He claims also to explain why material beings could 
 not be united with the soul as is demanded ; this is because these 
 beings being extended and the soul not being so, there is no relation 
 between them. But thereupon Locke asks very apropos (§7.) if 
 there is any more relation between God and the soul. It seems 
 indeed that the Keverend Father Malebranche ought to have urged 
 not the little relation, but the little connection, which appears 
 between the soul and the body, while between God and the crea- 
 tures there is a connection such that they could not exist without 
 him. 
 
 When the Father says (§ 6.) that there is no purely intelligible 
 substance except God, I declare that I do not sufficiently understand 
 him. There is something in the soul that we do not distinctly 
 understand ; and there are many things in God that we do not at 
 all understand. 
 
 Mr. Locke (§^8^ makes a remark on the end of the Father's chap- 
 ter which is tantamount to my views ; for in order to show that the 
 Father has not excluded all the means of explaining the matter, he 
 adds : " If I should say that it is possible that God has made our 
 souls such and has so united them to bodies that at certain motions 
 of the body the soul should have such and such perceptions but in 
 a manner inconceivable to us, I should have said something as 
 apparent and as instructive as that which he says." Mr. Locke in 
 saying this seems to have had in mind my system of Pre-established 
 Harmony, or something similar. 
 
 Mr. Locke objects (§ 20.) that the sun is useless if we see it in 
 God. As this argument applies also against my system, which 
 claims that we see the sun in us, I answer that the sun is not made 
 solely for us and that God wishes to show us the truth as to what is 
 without us. 
 
 He objects also (§ 22.) that he does not conceive how we could 
 see something confusedly in God, where there is no confusion. 
 One might answer that we see things confusedly when we see too 
 many of them at a time. 
 
 Father Malebranche having said that God is the place of spirits 
 as space is the place of bodies, Mr. Locke says (§25.) that he does 
 not understand a word of this. But he understands at least what 
 
187 
 
 space, place and body are. He understands also that the Father 
 draws an analogy between space ^ place, body and between God, 
 plojce, spirit, Thas a good part of what he here says is intelligible. 
 It may merely be objected that this analogy is not proven, although 
 some relations are easily perceived which might give occasion for 
 the comparison. I often observe that certain persons seek by this 
 affectation of ignorance to elude what is said to them as if they 
 understood nothing ; they do this not to reproach themselves, but 
 either to reproach those speaking, as if their jargon was unintelligi- 
 ble, or to exalt themselves above the matter and those who tell it, 
 as if it was not worthy of their attention. 
 
 Nevertheless Mr. Locke is right in saying that the opinion of 
 Father Malebranche is unintelligible in connection with his other 
 opinions, since with him space and body are the same thing. The 
 truth has escaped him here and he has conceived something com- 
 mon and immutable, to which bodies have an essential relation and 
 which indeed produces their relation to one another. This order 
 gives occasion for making a fiction and for conceiving space as an 
 immutable substance : but what there is real in this notion relates 
 to simple substances (under which spirits are included), and is 
 found in God, who unites them. 
 
 The Father saying that ideas are representative beings, Mr. Locke 
 asks (§ 26.) if these beings are substances, modes or relations ? I 
 believe that it may be said that they are nothing but relations 
 resulting from the attributes of God. 
 
 When Mr. Locke declares (§31.) that he does not understand 
 how the variety of ideas is compatible with the simplicity of God, 
 it appears to me that he ought not raise an objection on this score 
 against Father Malebranche, for there is no system which can make 
 such a thing comprehensible. "We cannot comprehend the incom- 
 mensurable and a thousand other things, the truth of which we 
 nevertheless know, and which we are right in employing to explain 
 others which are dependent on them. There is something approach- 
 ing to this in all simple substances ; where there is variety of 
 affections in unity of substance. 
 
 The Father maintains that the idea of the infinite is prior to that 
 of the finite. Mr. Locke objects (§ 34.) that a child has the idea 
 of a number or of a square sooner than that of the infinite. He is 
 right in taking the ideas for images; but in taking them as the 
 
188 
 
 foundations of notions, he will find that in the continuum the 
 notion of an extended, taken absolutely, is prior to the notion of an 
 extended where the modification is added. This must be further 
 applied to what is said in §§ 42. and 4-6. 
 
 The argument of the Father which Mr. Lqcke examines (§ 40.), 
 that God alone, being the end of spirits, is also their sole object, 
 is not to be despised. It is true that it needs something in order to 
 be called a demonstration. There is a more conclusive reason 
 which shows that God is the sole immediate external object of 
 spirits, and that is that there is naught but lie which can act on 
 them. 
 
 It is objected (§ 41.) that the Apostle begins with the knowledge 
 of the creatures in order to lead to God and that the Father does 
 the contrary. I believe that these methods harmonize. The one 
 proceeds a priori, the other a posteriori ; and the latter is the more 
 common. It is true that the best way to know things is through 
 their causes ; but this is not the easiest. It requires too much 
 attention to things of sense. 
 
 In replying to § 34. I have noticed the difference there is 
 •between image and idea. It seems that this difference is combated 
 (§ 38.) by finding difficulty in the difference which there is between 
 image [se7iti7nent'] and idea. But I think that the Father under- 
 stands by image [sentimenf] a perception of the imagination, 
 whereas there may be ideas of things which are not sensible nor 
 imageable. I affirm that we have as clear an idea of the color of 
 the violet as of its figure (as is objected here) but not as distinct 
 nor as intelligible. 
 
 Mr. Locke asks if an indivisible and unextended substance can 
 have at the same time different modifications relating to .inconsist- 
 ent objects. I reply. Yes. That which is inconsistent in the same 
 object is not inconsistent in the representation of different objects, 
 conceived at the same time. It is not therefore necessary that 
 there be different parts in the soul as it is not necessary that there 
 be different parts in a point although different angles come together 
 there. 
 
 It is asked with reason (§ 43.) how we know the creature if we 
 do not see immediately aught but God ? Because the objects, the 
 representation of which God causes us to have, have something 
 which resembles the idea we have of substance, and it is this which 
 makes us judge that there are other substances. 
 
189 
 
 It is supposed (§ 46.) that God has the idea of an angle which is 
 the nearest to the right angle, but that he does not show it to any- 
 one, however one may desire to have it. I reply that such an 
 angle is a fiction, like the fraction nearest to unity, or the number 
 nearest to zero, or the least of all numbers. The nature of con- 
 tinuity does not permit any such thing. 
 
 The Father had said that we know our soul by an inner feeling 
 of consciousness, and that for this reason the knowledge of our soul 
 is more imperfect than that of things, which we know in God. 
 Mr. Locke then remarks very apropos (§ 47.) that the idea of our 
 soul being in God as well as that of other things, we should see it 
 also in God. The truth is that we see all things in ourselves and 
 in our souls, and that the knowledge which we have of the soul is 
 very true and just provided that we attend to it ; that it is by the 
 knowledge which we have of the soul that we know being, sub- 
 stance, God himself, and that it is by reflection on our thoughts 
 that we know extension and bodies ; that it is nevertheless true 
 that God gives us all there is that is positive in this, and all perfec- 
 tion therein involved, by an immediate and continual emanation, by 
 virtue of the dependence on him which all creatures have, and it is 
 thus that a good meaning may be given to the phrase that God is 
 the object of our souls and that we see all things in him. 
 
 Perhaps the design of the Father in the saying which is examined 
 (§ 53.), that we see the essences of things in the perfections of God 
 and that it is the universal reason which enlightens us, tends to 
 show that{_the attributes of God are the bases of the simple notions 
 which we have of things, — being, power, knowledge, diffusion, du- 
 ration, taken absolutely, being in him and not being in creatures 
 save in a limited way. ^ 
 
XXIX. 
 
 Letter to Wagner on the Active Force of Body, on the 
 
 Soul and on the Soul of Brutes. 1710. 
 
 [From the Latin.] 
 
 1. I WILLINGLY reply to the inquiries you make as to the nature 
 of the soul, for I see from the doubt which you present that my 
 view is not sufficiently clear to you, and that this is due to some 
 prejudgment drawn from my essay, inserted in the Acta Erudito- 
 rum, wherein I treated, in opposition to the illustrious Sturm, of 
 the active force of body. You say that I have not there sufficiently 
 vindicated active force for matter, and while I attribute resistance 
 to matter I have also attributed reaction to the same, and conse- 
 quently action ; since therefore there is everywhere in matter an 
 active principle, this principle seems to suffice for- the actions of 
 brutes, nor is there need in them of an incorruptible soul. 
 
 2. I reply, in the first place, that the active principle is not 
 attributed by me to bare or primary matter, which is merely pas- 
 sive, and consists only in antitypia and extension ; but to body or 
 to clothed or secondary matter which in addition contains a primi- 
 tive entelechy or active principle. I r^ply, secondly, that the resist- 
 ance of bare matter is not action, but mere passion, inasmuch as it 
 has antitypia or impenetrability, by which indeed it resists what- 
 ever would penetrate it but does not react, unless there be added 
 an elastic force, which must be derived from motion, and therefore 
 the active force of matter must be superadded. I reply, thirdly, 
 that this active principle, this first entelechy, is, in fact, a vital 
 principle, endowed also with the faculty of perception, and incor- 
 ruptible, for reasons recently stated by me. And this is the very 
 thing which in brutes I hold for their soul. While, therefore, I 
 admit active principles superadded everywhere in matter, I also 
 posit, everywhere disseminated through it, vital or percipient prin- 
 ciples, and thus monads, and, so to speak, metaphysical atoms 
 wanting parts and incapable of being produced or destroyed natu- 
 rally. 
 
 3./ You next ask my definition of soul. I reply that soul may be 
 employed in a broad and in a strict sense. Broadly speaking, soul 
 
191 
 
 will be the same as life or vital principle, that is, the principle of 
 internal action existing in the simple thing or monad, to which ex- 
 ternal action corresponds. And this correspondence of internal 
 and external, or representation of the external in the internal, of 
 the composite in the simple, of multiplicity in unity, constitutes in 
 reality perception. But in this sense, soul is attributed not only to 
 animals but also to all other percipient beings/ /_Jii the strict sense, 
 soul is employed as a nobler species of life, or sentient life, where 
 there is not only the faculty of perceiving, but in addition that of 
 feeling, inasmuch, indeed, as attention and memory are joined to 
 perception. Just as, in turn, mind is a nobler species of soul, that 
 is, mind is rational soul, where reason or ratiocination from univer- 
 sality of truths is added to feeling. As therefore mind is rational 
 soul, so soul is sentient life, and life is perceptive principle. I 
 have shown, moreover, by examples and arguments, that not all 
 perception is feeling, but that there is also insensible perception. 
 For example, I could not perceive green unless I perceived blue 
 and yellow, from which it results. At the same time, I do not 
 feel blue and yellow unless perchance a microscope is employed. 
 
 4. You will remember, moreover, that according to my opinion, 
 not only are all lives, all souls, all minds, all primitive entelechies, 
 everlasting, but also that to each primitive entelechy or each vital 
 principle there is perpetually united a certain natural machine, 
 which comes to us under the name of organic body : which machine, 
 moreover, even although it preserves its form in general, remains in 
 flux, and is, like the ship of Theseus, perpetually repaired. Nor 
 therefore can we be certain that the smallest particle of matter 
 received by us at birth, remains in our body, even although the 
 same machine is by degrees completely transformed, augmented, 
 diminished, involved or evolved. Hence, not only is the soul ever- 
 lasting, but also some animal always remains, although no partic- 
 ular animal ought to be called everlasting, since the animal species 
 does nbt remain ; just as the caterpillar, and the butterfly are not 
 the same animal, although the same soul is in both. Every natural 
 machine, therefore, has this quality, that it is never completely 
 destructible, since, however thick a covering may be dissolved, 
 there always remains a little machine not yet destroyed, like the 
 costume of Harlequin, in the comedy, to whom, after the removal 
 of many tunics, there always remained a fresh one. And we 
 
192 
 
 ought to be the less astonished at this for this reason, that nature is 
 everywhere organic and ordered by a most wise author for certain 
 ends, and that nothing in nature ought to be criticized as unpolished, 
 although it may sometimes appear to our senses as but a rude 
 mass. Thus therefore we escape all the difficulties which arise 
 from the nature of a soul absolutely separated from all matter ; so 
 that, in truth, a soul or an animal before birth or after death does 
 not differ from a soul or an animal living the present life except in 
 condition of things and degrees of perfections, but not by entire 
 genus of being. And likewise I think that Genii are minds 
 endowed with bodies very penetrating and suitable for action, 
 which perhaps they are able to change at will, whence they do not 
 deserve to be called even animals. Thus all things in nature are 
 analogous, and the subtile may be understood from the coarse, since 
 both are constituted in the same way. God alone is substance 
 really separated from matter, since he is actus jpurus, endowed 
 with no passive power, whjch, wherever it is, constitutes matter. 
 And, indeed, all created substances have antitypia, by which it hap- 
 pens naturally that one is outside the other, and so penetration is 
 excluded. 
 
 5. But although my principles are very general and hold not less 
 in man than in brutes, yet man stands out marvellously above 
 brutes and approaches the Genii, because from the use of reason he 
 is capable of society with God, and thus of reward and of punish- 
 ment in the divine government. And therefore he preserves not 
 only life and soul like the brutes, but also self-consciousness and 
 memory of a former state, and, in a word, personality. He is im- 
 mortal, not only physically but also morally, whence in the strict 
 sense immortality is attributed only to the human soul. For if a 
 man did not know that in the other life rewards or punishments 
 would be awarded him for this life, there would really be no 
 punishment, no reward, and as regards morals, it would be just as 
 if I were extinguished and another, happier or unhappier, should 
 succeed me. And thus I hold that souls, latent doubtless in semi- 
 nal animalcules from the beginning of things, are not rational until, 
 by conception, they are destined for human life ; but when they are 
 once made rational and rendered capable of consciousness and of 
 society with God, I think that they never lay aside the char- 
 acter of citizens in the Republic of God ; and since it is most 
 
193 " 
 
 justly and beautifully governed, it is a consequence that by 
 the very laws of nature, on account of the parallelism of the king- 
 dom of grace and of nature, souls by the force of their own actions 
 are rendered more fit for rewards and punishments. And in this 
 sense it may be said that virtue brings its own reward and sin its 
 own punishment, since by a certain natural consequence, before the 
 last state of the soul, according as it departs atoned for or unatoned 
 for, there arises a certain natural divergence, preordained by God 
 in nature and with divine promises and threats, and consistent with 
 grace and justice ; the intervention also being added of Genii, good 
 or bad according as we have associated with either, whose operations 
 are certainly natural although their nature is sublimer than ours. 
 We see, indeed, that a man awaking from a profound sleep, or even 
 recovering from apoplexy, is wont to recover the memory of his 
 former state. The same must be said of death, which can render 
 our perceptions turbid and confused but cannot entirely blot them 
 from memory, the use of which returning, rewards and punishments 
 take place. Thus the Saviour compared death to sleep. Moreover 
 the preservation of personality and of moral immortality cannot be 
 attributed to brutes incapable of the divine society and law. 
 
 6. 'No one, therefore, need fear dangerous consequences from 
 this doctrine, since rather a true natural theology, not only not at 
 variance with revealed truth but even wonderfully favorable to it, 
 may be demonstrated by most beautiful reasoning from my princi- 
 ples. Those indeed who deny souls to brutes and all perception 
 and organism to other parts of matter, do not sufiiciently recognize 
 the Divine Majesty, and introduce something unworthy of God, un- 
 polished, that is, a void of perfections or forms, which you may 
 call a metaphysical void, which is no less to be rejected than a 
 material or physical void. But those who grant true soul and per- 
 ception to brutes and yet affirm that their souls can perish naturally, 
 take away thus from us the demonstration which shows that our 
 minds cannot perish naturally, and fall into the dogma of the Socin- 
 ians, who think that souls are preserved only miraculously or by 
 grace, but believe that by nature they ought to perish ; which is to 
 rob natural theology of its largest part. Besides, the contrary can 
 be completely demonstrated, since a substance wanting parts cannot 
 naturally be destroyed. 
 
 Wolfenbiittel, June 4, 1710. 
 13 
 
XXX. 
 
 The Theodicy. 
 
 Abridgment of the Argument reduced to syllogistic form. 
 
 1710. 
 
 [From the French.] ^ 
 
 Some intelligent persons liave desired that this supplement should 
 be made [to the Theodicy], and I have the more readily yielded to 
 their wishes as in this way I have an opportunity to again remove 
 certain difficulties and to make some observations which were not 
 sufficiently emphasized in the work itself. 
 
 I. Objection. Whoever .does not choose the^l^esl. is lacking in 
 power, or in knowledge, or in goodness. 
 . God did not choosp the best in creating this world. 
 
 Therefore God has been lacking in power, or in knowledge, or in 
 goodness. 
 
 Answer. I deny the minor, that is, the second premise of this 
 syllogism ; and our opponent proves it by this 
 
 Prosyllogism. Whoever makes things in which there is evil, 
 which could have been made without any evil, or the making of 
 which could have been omitted, does not choose the best. 
 
 God has made a world in which there is evil ; a world, I say, 
 which could have been made without any evil, or the making of 
 which could have been omitted altogether. 
 
 Therefore God has not chosen the best. 
 
 Answer. I grant the minor of this prosyllogism ; for it must be 
 confessed that there is evil in the world which God has made, and 
 that it was possible to make a world witliout evil, or even not to 
 create a world at all, for its creation depended on the free will of 
 God ; but I deny the major, that is, the first of the two premises of 
 the prosyllogism, and I might content myself with simply demand- 
 ing its proof ; but in order to make the matter clearer, I have 
 wished to justify this denial by showing that the best plan is not 
 always that which seeks to avoid evil, since it may happen that t?te 
 evil he accompanied hy a greater good. For example, a general of 
 an army will prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a con- 
 
195 
 
 dition witliout wound and witlioiit victory. / We have proved this 
 more fully in the large work by making it clear, by instances taken 
 from mathematics and elsewhere, that ,an imperfectio_n.in_the part 
 inayba-required for a greater perfection ItTthe^' whole.) In this I 
 have followed tlie opinion of St^^-^jlgustine, who has said a hun- 
 dred times,, that God permitted evil in order^to bring about good, 
 that i^^ greater good ; and that of Tl^omas Aquina»^ (in libr. II. 
 sent. dist. 32, qu. I, art. 1), that the peruiitting of evil tends to the 
 good ^^ .tLie.-iixiiverse. I -have shown that the ancients called 
 ' AdHm^^^toR-feUx culpa, a hagpj sin, because it had been retrieved 
 with, immense advantage Bythe incarnation of the Son of God, 
 who has given to the universe something nobler than anything that 
 ever would have been among creatures except for this. And in 
 order to a clearer understanding, I have added, following many 
 good authors, that it was in accordance with order and the general 
 good that God gave t6 certain creatiires the opportunity of exercis- 
 ing their liberty, even when he foresaw that they would turn to 
 evil, but wdiich he could so well rectify ; because it was not right 
 that, in order to hinder sin, God should always act in an extraordi- 
 nary manner. 
 
 To overthrow this objection, therefore, it is sufficient to show 
 that a world with evil might be better than a world without evil ; 
 but I have gone even farther in the w^ork, and have even proved 
 that this universe must be in reality better thaTi every other possi- 
 ble universe. 
 
 II. Objection. If there ^ is more evil than good in intelligent 
 creatures, then there is more evil than good in the whole w^ort of 
 God. ~ 
 ' Now, there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures. 
 
 Therefore there is more evil than good in the whole work of 
 God. 
 
 Answer. I deny the major ^and the minor of this conditional 
 syllogism. As to the major, I do not admit it at all, because this pre- 
 tended deduction from a part to the whole, from intelligent crea- 
 tures to all creatures, supposes tacitly and without proof that 
 creatures destitute of reason cannot enter into comparison nor into 
 account with those which possess it. But why may it not be that 
 the surplus of good in the non-intelligent creatures which fill the 
 world, compensates "fof^ and even incomparably surpasses, the sur- 
 
196 
 
 plus of evil in tlie rational creatures ? It is true that the value of 
 the latter is greater ; but, in compensation, the other are beyond 
 comparison the more numerous, and it may be that the proportion 
 of number and of quantity surpasses that of value and of quality. 
 
 As to the minor, that is no more to be admitted ; that is, it is not 
 at all to be admitted that there is more evil than good in the intelli- 
 gent creatures. There is no need even of granting that there is 
 more evil than good in the human race, because it is possible, and 
 in fact very probable, that the glory and the perfection of the 
 blessed are incomparably greater than the misery and the imperfec- 
 tion of the damned, and that here the excellence of the total good 
 in the smaller number exceeds the total evil in the greater number. 
 The blessed approach the Divinity, by means of the Divine Media- 
 tor, as near as may suit these creatures, and make such progress in 
 good as is impossible for the damned to make in evil, approach as 
 nearly as they may to the nature of demons. God is infinite, and 
 the devil is limited; good may and does advance <^(^ infinihim, 
 while evil has its bounds. It is therefore possible, and is credible, 
 that in the comparison of the blessed and the damned, the contrary 
 of that which I have said might happen in the comparison of in- 
 telhgent and non-intelligent creatures, takes place ; namely, it is 
 possible that in the comparison of the happy and the unhappy, the 
 proportion of degree exceeds that of number, and that in the com- 
 parison of intelligent and non-intelligent creatures, the proportion 
 of number is greater than that of value. I have the right to sup- 
 pose that a thing is possible so long as its impossibility is not 
 proved ; and indeed that which I have here advanced is more than 
 a supposition. 
 
 But in the second place, if I should admit that there is more evil 
 than good in the human race, I have still good grounds for not ad- 
 mitting that there is more evil than good in all intelligent creatures. 
 For there is an inconceivable number of genii, and perhaps of 
 other rational creatures. And an opponent could not prove that in 
 all the City of God, composed as well of genii as of rational ani- 
 mals without number and of an infinity of kinds, evil exceeds good. 
 And although in order to answer an objection, there is no need of 
 proving that a thing is, when its mere possibility suffices ; yet, in 
 this work, I have not omitted to show that \it is a consequence of 
 the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of the universe, that the 
 
197 
 
 kingdom of God be the most perfect of all possible states or gov- 
 ermnents, and that consequently the little evil there is, is required 
 for the consummation of the immense good which is there found. ) 
 
 III. Objection. If it is alwuj^impossible not to sin, it is always 
 unjust to punish. ~" 
 
 ISTow, it is always impossible not to sin ; or, in other words, every 
 sin is necessary. 
 
 Therefore, it is always unjust to punish. 
 
 The minor of this is proved thus : 
 
 1. Prosyllogism. All that is predetermined is necessary. Every 
 event (and consequently sin also) is necessary. 
 
 Again this second minor is proved thus : 
 
 2. Prosyllogism. That which is future, that which is foreseen, 
 that which is involved in the causes, is predetermined. 
 
 Every event is such. 
 
 Therefore, every event is predetermined. 
 
 Answer. I admit in a certain sense the conclusion of the 
 second prosyllogism, which is the minor of the first ; but I shall 
 deny the major of the first prosyllogism, namely, that every thing 
 predetermined is necessary ; understanding by the necessity of 
 sinning, for example, or by the impossibility of not sinning, or of 
 not performing any action, the necessity with which we are 
 here concerned, that is, that which is essential and absolute, and 
 which destroys the morality of an action and the justice of punish- 
 ments. For if anyone understood another necessity or impossibility, 
 namely, a necessity which should be only moral, or which was only 
 hypothetical (as will be explained shortly) ; it is clear that I should 
 deny the major of the objection itself. I might content myself 
 with this answer and demand the proof of the proposition denied ; 
 but I have again desired to explain my procedure in this work, in 
 order to better elucidate the matter and to throw more light on the 
 whole subject, by explaining the necessity which ought to be re- 
 jected and the determination which must take place. That neces- 
 sity which is contrary to morality and which ought to be rejected, 
 and which would render punishment unjust, is an insurmountable 
 necessity which would make all opposition useless, even if we 
 should wish with all our heart 'to avoid the necessary action, and 
 should make all possible efforts to that end. Now, it is manifest 
 that this is not applicable to voluntary actions, because we would 
 
198 
 
 not perform them if we did not choose to. Also their prevision 
 and predetermination is not absohite, jbnt it supposes the will : if it 
 is certain that we shall perform them, it is not less certain that we 
 shall choose to perform them. These voluntary actions and their 
 consequences will not take place no matter what we do or whether 
 we wish them or not ; but, through that which we shall do and 
 through that which we shall wish to do, which leads to them. And 
 this is involved in prevision and in predetermination, and even 
 constitutes their ground. And the necessity of such an event is 
 called conditional or hypothetical, or the necessity of consequence, 
 because it supposes the will, and the other requisites / whereas the 
 necessity which destroys morality and renders punishment unjust 
 and reward useless, exists in things which will be whatever we 
 may do or whatever we may wish to do, and, in a word, is in that 
 which is essential ; and this is what is called an absolute necessity. 
 Thus it is to no purpose, as regards what is absolutely necessary, to 
 make prohibitions or commands, to propose penalties or prizes, to 
 praise or to blame ; it will be none the less. On the other hand, in 
 voluntary actions and in that which depends upon them, precepts 
 armed with power to punish and to recompense are very often of 
 use and are included in the order of causes which make an action 
 exist. And it is for this reason that not. only cares and labors 
 but also prayers are useful ; God having had these prayers in view 
 before he regulated things and having had that consideration for 
 them which was proper. This is why the precept which says ora 
 et labora (pray and work), holds altogether good ; and not only 
 those who (under the vain pretext of the necessity of events) 
 pretend that the care which business demands may be neglected, 
 but also those who reason against prayer, fall into what the ancients 
 even then called the lazy sophism. Thus the predetermination of 
 events by causes is just what contributes to morality instead of 
 destroying it, , and causes incline the will, without compelling it. 
 This is why the determination in question is not a necessitation — it 
 is certain (to him who knows all) that the effect will follow this 
 inclination ; but this effect does not follow by a necessary conse- 
 quence, that is, one the contrary of which implies contradiction. 
 It is also by an internal inclination such as this that the will is 
 determined, without there being any necessity. Suppose that one 
 has the greatest passion in the world (a great thirst, for example), 
 
199 
 
 you will admit to me that the soul can find some reason for 
 resisting it, if it were only that of showing its power. Thus, 
 although one may never be in a perfect indifference of equilibrium 
 and there may be always a preponderance of inclination for the 
 side taken, it, nevertheless, never renders the resolution taken 
 absolutely necessary. 
 
 ly. Objection. Whoever can prevent the sin of another and does 
 not do so, but rather contributes to it although he is well informed 
 of it, is accessory to it. 
 
 God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures ; bu^ he does not 
 do so, and rather contributes to it by his concurrence and by the 
 opportunities which he brings about, although he has a perfect 
 knowledge of it. 
 
 Hence, etc. 
 
 Answer, I deny the major of this syllogism. For it is possible 
 that one could prevent sin, but ought not, because he could not do 
 it without himself committing a sin, or (when God is in question) 
 without performing an unreasonable action. Examples have been 
 given and the application to God himself has been made. It is 
 possible also that we contribute to evil and that sometimes we even 
 open the road to it, in doing things which we are obliged to do ; 
 and, when we do our duty or (in speaking of God) when, after 
 thorough .consideration, we do that which reason demands, we are 
 not responsible for the results, even when we foresee them. We 
 do not desire these evilfi4_i>ut we 3ra_J<villing to permit them for 
 the sake of a greater good which we cannot reasonably help pre- 
 ferring to other considerations, and it is a consequent will, which 
 results from antecedent wills, by which we will the good. I know 
 that some persons, in speaking of the antecedent and consequent 
 will of God, have understood by the antecedent that which wills 
 that all men should be saved ; and by the consequent^ that which 
 wills, in consequence of persistent sin, that they should be damned. 
 But these are merely illustrations of a more general idea, and it 
 may be said for the same reason that God, by his antecedent will, 
 wills that men should not sin ; and by his consequent or final and 
 decreeing will (that which is always followed by its effect), he 
 wills to permit them to sin, this permission being the result of 
 superior reasons. And we have the right to say in general that 
 the antecedent will of God tends to the production of good and the 
 
200 
 
 prevention of evil, each taken in itself and as if alone {partictdariter 
 et secundicm quid, Tliom. I, qu. 19, art. 6), according to the 
 measure of the degree of each good and of each evil ; bnt that the 
 divine consequent or final or total will tends toward the production 
 of as many goods as may be put together, the combination of 
 which becomes in this way determined, and includes also the 
 permission of some evils and the exclusion of some goods, as the 
 best possible plan for the universe demands. Arminius, in his 
 Anti-jperkinsus, has very well explained that the will of God may 
 be called consequent, not only in relation to the action of the 
 creatures considered beforehand in the divine understanding, but 
 also in relation to other anterior acts of will. But this considera- 
 tion of the passage cited from Thomas Aquinas, and that from 
 Scotus (I. dist. 46, qu. XI), is enough to show that they make this 
 distinction as 1 have done here. Nevertheless, if anyone objects to 
 this use of terms let him substitute deliberating will, in place of 
 antecedent, and final or decreeing will, in place of consequent. 
 For I do not wish to dispute over words. 
 
 Y. Objection. Whatever produces all that is real in a thing, is 
 its cause. 
 
 God produces all that is real in sin. Hence, God is the cause of 
 sin. 
 
 Answer. I might content myself with denying the major or the 
 minor, since the term real admits of interpretations which would 
 render these premises false. But in order to explain more clearly, 
 I will make a distinction. Ileal signifies either that which is posi- 
 tive only, or, it includes also privative beings : in the first case, I 
 deny the major and admit the minor ; in the second case, I do the 
 contrary. I might have limited myself to this, but I have chosen 
 to proceed still farther and give the reason for this distinction. I 
 have been very glad therefore to draw attention to the fact that 
 every reality purely positive or absolute is a perfection ; and that 
 imperfection comes from limitation, that is, from the privative : for 
 to limit is to refuse progress, or the greatest possible progress. 
 Now God is the cause of all perfections and consequently of all 
 realities considered as purely positive. But limitations or priva- 
 tions result from the imperfection of creatures, limiting their 
 receptivity. And it is with them as with a loaded vessel which the 
 river causes to move more or less slowly according to the weight 
 
201 
 
 which it carries : thus its speed depends upon the river, out the 
 retardation which hmits this speed comes from the load. Thus in 
 the Theodicy^ we have shown how the creature, in causing sin, is 
 a defective cause; how errors and^evil inclinations are born of pri- 
 vation ; and how privation is accidentally efficient ; and I have 
 justified the opinion of St. Augustine (lib. I. ad Simpl. qu. 2) 
 who explains, for example, how God makes the soul obdurate, not 
 by giving it something evil, but because the effect of his good im- 
 pression is limited by the soul's resistance and by the circumstances 
 which contribute to this resistance, so that he does not give it all 
 the good which would overcome its evil. Nec^ inqioit^ ah illo 
 erogatiir aliquid quo homo fit deterior^ sed tantum quo fit melior 
 non erogatur. But if God had wished to do more, he would have 
 had to make either other natures for creatures or other miracles to 
 change their natures, things which the best plan could not admit. 
 It is as if the current of the river must be more rapid than its fall 
 admitted or that the boats should be loaded more lightly, if it were 
 necessary to make them move more quickly. And the original lim- 
 itation or imperfection of creatures requires that even the best plan 
 of the universe could not be exempt from certain evils, but only 
 those moreover, which are to result in a greater good. There are 
 certain disorders in the parts which marvellously enhance the 
 beauty of the whole ; just as certain dissonances, when properly 
 used, render the harmony more beautiful. But this depends on 
 what has already been said in answer to the first objection. 
 
 YI. Ohjection. He who punishes those who have done as well 
 as it was in their power to do, is unjust. 
 
 God does so. 
 
 Hence, etc. 
 
 Answer. I deny the minor of this argument and I believe that 
 God always gives sufficient aid and grace to those who have a good 
 will, that is, to those who do not reject this grace by new sin. 
 Thus I do not admit the damnation of infants who have died with-" 
 out baptism or outside of the church ; nor the damnation of adults 
 who have acted according to the light which God has given them. 
 And I believe that if any one has followed the light which has heen 
 given him, he will undoubtedly receive greater light when he has 
 need of it, as the late M. Hulseman, a profound and celebrated 
 theologian at Leipsic, has somewhere remarked ; and if such a man 
 
202 
 
 has failed to receive it during his life time he will at least receive 
 it when at the point of death. 
 
 YII. Ohjection. He who gives only to some, and not to all, the 
 means which produce in them effectively a good will and salutary 
 final faitli, has not sufficient goodness. 
 
 God does this. 
 
 Hence, etc. 
 
 Answer. I deny the major of this. It is true that God could 
 overcome the greatest resistance of the human heart ; and does it, 
 too, sometimes, be it by internal grace, be it by external circum- 
 stances which have a great effect on souls ; but he does not always 
 do this. Whence comes this distinction ? it may be a^ed, and why 
 does his goodness seem limited ? It is because, as I have already 
 said in answering the first objection, it would not have been in order 
 always to act in an extraordinary manner, and to reverse the con- 
 nection of things. The reasons of this connection, by means of 
 which one is placed in more favorable circumstances than another, 
 are hidden in the depths of the wisdom of God; they depend 
 upon the universal harmony. The best plan of the universe, which 
 Gt)d could not fail to choose, made it so. We judge from the event 
 itself, since God has made it, that it was not possible to do better. 
 Far from being true that this conduct is contrary to goodness, it is 
 supreme goodness which led him to it. This objection with its solu- 
 tion might have been drawn from what was said in regard to the 
 first objection ; but it seemed useful to touch upon it separately. 
 
 YIII. Ohjection. He \vho cannot fail to choose the best, is not 
 free. 
 
 God cannot fail to choose the best. 
 
 Hence, God is not free. 
 
 Answer. I deny the major of this argument ; it is rather true 
 liberty and the most perfect, to be able to use one's free will for 
 the best, and to always exercise this power without ever being 
 turned from it either by external force or by internal passions, the 
 first of which causes slavery of the body, the second, slavery of 
 the soul. There is nothing less servile than to be always led 
 toward the good, and always by one's own inclination, without any 
 constraint and without any displeasure. And to object therefore 
 that God had need of external things, is only a sophism. He 
 created them freely ; but having proposed to himself an end, which 
 
^ 
 
 203 
 
 is to exercise his goodness, wisdom determined liim to choose those 
 means best fitted to attain this end. To call this a need is to take 
 that term in an unusual sense which frees it from all imperfection^ 
 just as when we speak of the wrath of God. 
 
 Seneca has somewhere said that God commanded but once but 
 that he obeys always, because he obeys laws which'-lfe willed to pre- 
 scribe to himself ; semel jussit, semper paret. But 'he had better 
 have said that God always commands and that he is always obeyed ; 
 for in willing, he always follows the inclination of his own nature, 
 and all other things always follow his will. And as this will is 
 always the same, it cannot be said that he obeys only that will 
 which he formerly had. \lSrevertheless, although his will is always 
 infallible and always tends toward the best, the evil, or the lesser 
 good, which he rejects, does not cease to be possible in itself ; other- j^ 
 wise the necessity of the good would be geometrical (so to speak), or 
 metaphysical and altogether absolute ; the contingency of things 
 would be destroyed, and there would be no choice.^ But this sort 
 of necessity, which does not destroy the possibility of the contrary, 
 has this name only by analogy ; it becomes effective, not by the 
 pure essence of things, but by that which is outside of them, above 
 them, — namely, by the will of God. This necessity is called moral, 
 because, to the sage, necessity and what ought to he are equivalent 
 things ; and when it always has its effect, as it really has iii the per- 
 fect sage, that is, in God, it may be said that it is a happy necessity. 
 The nearer creatures approach to it, the nearer they approach to 
 perfect happiness. Also this kind of necessity is not that which 
 we try to avoid and which destroys morality, rewards and praise. 
 For that which it brings, does not happen whatever we may do or 
 will, but because we will it well. And a will to which it is natural to 
 choose well, merits praise so much the more ; also it carries its reward 
 with it, which is sovereign happiness. And as this constitution of 
 the divine nature gives entire satisfaction to him who possesses it, 
 it is also the best and the most desirable for the creatures who 
 are all dependent on God. If the will of God did not have for a 
 rule the principle of the best, it would either tend toward evil, 
 which would be the worst ; or it would be in some way indifferent 
 to good and to evil, and would be guided by chance : but a will 
 which would allow itself always to act by chance, would not be 
 worth more for the government of the universe than the fortuitous 
 
204 
 
 concourse of atoms, without there being any divinity therein. And 
 even if God should abandon himself to chance only in some cases 
 and in a certain way (as he would do, if he did not always work 
 towards the best and if he were capable of preferring a lesser good 
 to a greater, that is, an evil to a good, since that which prevents a 
 greater good is an evil), he would be imperfect, as w^ell as the object 
 of his choice ; he would not merit entire confidence ; he would act 
 without reason in such a case, and the government of the universe 
 would be like certain games, equally divided between reason and 
 chance. All this proves that this objection which is made against 
 the choice of the best, perverts the notions of the free and of the 
 necessary, and represents to us even the best as evil ; to do which 
 is either malicious or ridiculous. 
 
XXXI. 
 
 On Wisdom — The Art of Reasoning Well, the Art of Dis- 
 covery, THE Art of Remembering. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 Wisdom is a perfect knowledge of the principles of all the 
 sciences and of the art of applying them. I call p7'inciples all the 
 fundamental truths which suffice for drawing thence all conclusions 
 in case of need, after some exercise and with some little application. 
 In a word, that which serves to lead the mind to regulate the 
 manners, to subsist honestly, and everywhere, even if one were 
 amid barbarians, to preserve the health, to perfect one's self in every 
 kind of thing of which one may have need, and to provide, finally, 
 the conveniences of life. The art of applying these principles to 
 exigencies, embraces the art of judging well or reasoning, the art 
 of discovering unknown truths, and finally, of remembering what 
 one knows, in the nick of time and when one has need of it. 
 
 The Art of Reasoning Well consists in the following maxims : 
 
 1. ]S"othing is ever to be recognized as true but what is so mani- 
 fest that no ground for doubt can be found. This is why it will be 
 well, in beginning one's investigations, to imagine one's self interested 
 in sustaining the contrary, in order to see if this incitement could 
 not arouse one to find that the matter has something solid to be said 
 in its favor. For prejudices must be avoided and nothing be 
 ascribed to things but what they include. But also one must never 
 be opinionated. 
 
 2. When there appears to be no means of attaining this assur- 
 ance, we must, in waiting for greater light, content ourselves with 
 probability. But we must distinguish the degrees of probability 
 and we must remember that all that we infer from a principle 
 which is but probable must bear the marks of the imperfection of 
 its source, especially when several probabilities must be supposed 
 in order to reach this conclusion, for it thereby becomes still less 
 certain than was each probability which serves it as basis. 
 
 3. To infer one truth from another, a certain connection, which 
 shall be without interruption, must be observed. For as one may 
 
206 
 
 feel sure that a chain will hold when he is assured that each 
 separate link is of good material and that it clasps the two neigh- 
 boring links, viz : the one preceding and the one following it, so 
 we may be sure of the accuracy of the reasoning when the matter 
 is good, that is to say, when nothing doubtful enters into it, and 
 when the form consists in a perpetual concatenation of truths which 
 allows of no gap. For example, A is B and B is C and C is D, 
 hence A is D. This concatenation will always teach us never to 
 put in the conclusion more than there was in the premises. 
 The Art of Discovery consists in the following maxims : 
 
 1. In order to know a thing we must consider all the requisites 
 of that thing, that is to say, all tliat which suffices to distinguish it 
 from every other thing. This is what is called definition, nature, 
 reciprocal property. 
 
 2. Having once found a means of distinguishing it from every 
 other thing, this same first rule must be applied to the consideration 
 of each condition or requisite which enters into this means, and all 
 the requisites of each requisite must be considered. And this is 
 what I call true analysis or distribution of the difficulty into 
 several parts. 
 
 3. When we have pushed the analysis to the end, that is to say, 
 when we have considered the requisites which enter into the con- 
 sideration of the thing proposed and even the requisites of the 
 requisites, and when we have finally come to the consideration of 
 some natures which are understood only through themselves, which 
 are without requisites and which need nothing outside of them- 
 selves in order to be conceived, we have reached a perfect knowl- 
 edge of the thing proposed. 
 
 4. When the thing deserves it, we must try to have this perfect 
 knowledge present in the mind all at once, and this is done by 
 repeating the analysis several times until it seems to us that we see 
 the whole of it at a single glance of the mind. And for this 
 result a certain gradation in repetition must be obse^ed. 
 
 5. The mark of perfect knowledge is when nothing presents 
 itself in the thing in question for which we cannot account and 
 when there is no conjuncture the outcome of which we cannot 
 predict beforehand. It is very difficult to carry through an 
 analysis of things, but it is not so difficult to complete the analysis 
 of truths of which we have need. Because the analysis of a truth 
 
207 
 
 is completed when its demonstration has been found, and it is not 
 always necessary to complete the analysis of the subject or predicate 
 in order to find the demonstration of a proposition. Most often 
 the beginning of the analysis of a thing suffices for the analysis or 
 perfect knowledge of the truth which we know of the thing. 
 
 6. We must always begin our investigations with the easiest 
 thing, such as the most general and the simplest, likewise those on 
 which it is easy to make experiments and to find their reason, such 
 as numbers, lines, motions. 
 
 7. We must proceed in order, and from easy things to those which 
 are difficult, and we must try to discover some progression in the 
 order of our meditations, so that we may have nature itself as our 
 guide and voucher. 
 
 8. We must try to omit nothing in all our distributions or enu- 
 merations. For this, dichotomies by opposite members are very 
 useful. 
 
 9. The first of several analyses of different particular matters 
 will be the catalogue of simple thoughts, or those which are not far 
 removed from simple. 
 
 10. Having the catalogue of simple thoughts we shall be in 
 position to recommence a priori and to explain the origin 'of things, 
 beginning at their source, in a perfect order and in a combination 
 or synthesis absolutely complete. And this is all that our mind 
 can do in the state in which it is at present. 
 
 The Aet of Remembering in the nick of time and when it is 
 needed what one knows, consists in the following observations : 
 
 1. We must accustom ourselves to be present-minded, that is to 
 say, to be able to meditate just as well in a tumult, on occasion, 
 and in danger, as in our cabinet. This is why we must test our- 
 selves on occasions and even seek them ; with this precaution, 
 however, that we do not expose ourselves without good reason to 
 irreparable evil. In the meanwhile it is good to exercise ourselves 
 on occasions when the danger is imaginary or small, as in our sport, 
 conversations, conferences, exercises, and comedies. 
 
 2. We must accustom ourselves to eimmerations. This is why it 
 is well to exercise ourselves in collecting all possible cases of the 
 matter in question, all the species of a genus, all the conveniences 
 or inconveniences of a means, all possible ways of aiming at some 
 end. 
 
208 
 
 3. We must accustom ourselves to distinctions ; namely, two or 
 more very similar things being given, to find on the spot all their 
 differences. 
 
 4. We must accustom ourselves to analogies; namely, two or 
 more very different things being given to find their resemblances. 
 
 5. We must be able to adduce on the spot things which closely 
 resemble the given thing or which are very different from it. For 
 example, when one denies some general maxim, it is well if I can 
 adduce on the spot some examples. And when another quotes 
 some maxim against me, it is well if I can forthwith oppose an 
 instance to him. When one tells me a story, it is well if I can 
 adduce then and there a similar one. 
 
 6. When there are truths or knowledges in which the natural 
 connection of the subject with its predicate is not known to us, as 
 happens in matters of fact and in truths of experience, in order to 
 retain them we must make use of certain artifices, as for example, 
 for the specific properties of simple, natural, civil and ecclesiastical 
 history, geography, customs, laws, canons, languages. I see nothing 
 so fitted to make us retain these things as burlesque verses and 
 sometimes certain figures ; also hypotheses invented to explain them 
 in imitation of natural things (as an appropriate etymology, true or 
 false, for languages — Regula mundi, in imagining certain orders of 
 providence for history). 
 
 7. Finally, it is well to make an inventory in writing of the 
 knowledges which are the most useful, with a register or alpha- 
 betical table. And finally a portable manual must be drawn 
 therefrom of what is most necessary and most ordinary. 
 
•:.0 
 
 XXXII. 
 
 The Principles of I^ature and of Grace. 1714. 
 [From the French.] 
 
 i;' Suhstance is bering, capable of action. It is simple or com- 
 pound. Simple suhstance is that which has no parts. Compound 
 substance is a collection of simple substances or monads. Monas is 
 a Greek word which signifies unity, or that w^hich is one. 
 
 Compounds, or bodies, are multitudes ; and simple substances, 
 lives, souls, spirits are unities. And there must be simple sub- 
 stances everjwliere, because without simple substances there would 
 be^o compounds ; and consequently all nature is full of life. 
 
 (2/ Monads, having no parts, cannot be formed or decomposed. 
 They cannot begin or end naturally ; and consequently last as long 
 as the universe, which will indeed be changed but will not be 
 destroyed. They cannot have shapes ; otherwise they would have 
 parts. And consequently a monad, in itself and at a given moment, 
 could not be distinguished from another except by its internal qual- 
 ities and actions, wdiich can be nothing else than its perceptions 
 (that is, representations of the compound, or of what is external, in 
 the simple), and its appetitions (that is, its tendencies from one per- 
 ception to another), which are the principles of change. For the 
 simplicity of substance does not prevent multiplicity of modifica- 
 tions, which must be found together in this same simple substance, 
 and must consist in the variety of relatif^ to things which are ex- 
 ternal. Just as in a centre or point, altogether simple as it is, there 
 is found an infinity of angles formed by lines which there meet. 
 
 3. Everything in nature is full. There are everywhere simple 
 substances, separated in reality from each other by activities of 
 their own which continually change their relations ; and each sim- 
 ple substance, or monad, which forms the centre of a compound 
 substance (as, for example, of an animal) and the principle of its 
 unity, is surrounded by a mass composed of an infinity of other 
 monads, which constitute the body proper of this central monad ; 
 and in accordance with the affections of this it represents, as a 
 centre^ the things which are outside of itself. And this hody is or- 
 
210 
 
 game, when it forms a sort of automaton or natural machine ; 
 which is a machine not only in its entirety, but also in its smallest 
 perceptible parts. And as, because of the plenitude of the world, 
 everything is connected and each body acts upon every other body, 
 more or less according to the distance, and by reaction is itself 
 affected thereby ; it follows that each monad is a mirror, living or 
 endowed with internal activity, representative according to its 
 point of view of ther universe, and as regulated as the universe itself. 
 And perceptions in the monad spring one from the other, by the law 
 of appetites or by the Jinal causes of good and evil, which consist 
 in visible, regulated or unregulated perceptions ; just as the changes 
 of bodies and external phenomena spring one from another, by the 
 laws of efficient causes, that is, of movements. Thus there is per- 
 fect harmony between the perceptions of the monad and the move- 
 ments of bodies, established at the beginning between the system of 
 efficient causes and that of final causes. And in this consists the 
 accord and physical union of the soul and body, although neither 
 one can change the laws of the other. 
 
 * 4. Each monad, with a particular body, makes a living substance. 
 Thus there is not only life everywhere, provided with members or 
 organs, but also there is an infinity of degrees in monads, some 
 dominating more or less over the others. But when the monad has 
 organs so adjusted that by means of them there is clearness and 
 distinctness in the impressions which it receives and consequently 
 in the perceptions which represent them (as, for example, when by 
 means of the shape of the humors of the eyes, the rays of light are 
 concentrated and act wi^i^ more force) ; ihis can extend even to 
 feeling [sentimenf], that^, even to a^^rception accompanied by 
 Tuemory, that is, one a certain^echo-m which remains a long time to 
 make itself heard upon occasion ; and such a living being is called 
 an animal, as its monad is called a soul. And when this soul is 
 elevated to reason it is something more sublime and is reckoned 
 among spirits, as will soon be explained. 
 
 It is true that animals are sometimes in the condition of simple 
 living beings, and their souls in the condition of simple monads, 
 namely, when their perceptions are not sufficiently distinct to be 
 remembered, as happens in a profound, dreamless sleep, or in a 
 swoon. But perceptions which have become entirely confused must 
 be re-developed in animals, for reasons which I shall shortly (§ 12) 
 
211 
 
 enumerate. Therefore it is well to make a distinction between the 
 perception, which is the internal condition of the monad represent- 
 ing external things, and apperception, which is consciousness or the 
 reflective knowledge of this internal state ; the latter not being 
 given to all souls, nor at all times to the same soul. And it is for 
 want of this distinction that the Cartesians have failed, taking 
 no account of the perceptions of which we are not conscious as 
 people take no account of imperceptible bodies. It is this also 
 which made the same Cartesians believe that only spirits are monads, 
 that there is no soul of brutes, and still less other pririciples of life. 
 
 And as they shocked too much the common opinion of men by re- 
 fusing feeling to brutes, they have, on the other hand, accommo- 
 dated themselves too much to the prejudices of the multitude, by con- 
 founding a long swoon, caused by a great confusion of perceptions, 
 with death st/rictly speahing, where all perception would cease. 
 This confirmed the ill-founded belief in the destruction of some 
 souls, and the bad opinion of some so-called strong minds, who 
 have contended against the immortality of our soul. 
 
 5. There is a continuity in the perceptions of animals which 
 bears some resemblance to reason; but it is only founded in the 
 memory oi facts, and not at all in the knowledge of causes. Thus ^ 
 a dog shuns the stick with which it has been beaten, because mem- 
 ory represents to it the pain which the stick has caused it. And 
 men in so far as they are empirics, that is to say, in three-fourths 
 of their actions, act simply as brutes. For example, we expect that 
 there will be daylight to-morrow, because we have always had the 
 experience ; only an astronomer foresees it by reason, and even this 
 prediction will finally fail when the cause of day, which is not 
 eternal, shall cease. But true reasoning depends upon necessary or i 
 eternal truths, such as those of logic, numbers, geometry, which es- 
 tablish an indubitable connection of ideas and unfailing consequen- 
 ces. The animals in which these consequences are not noticed, are 
 called hrutes ; but those which know these necessary truths are 
 properly those which are called rational animals, and their souls 
 are called spirits. These souls are capable of performing acts of 
 reflection, and of considering that which is called the ego, substance, 
 monad, soul, spirit, in a word, immaterial things and truths. It is 
 this which renders us capable of the sciences and of demonstrative 
 knowledge. 
 
212 
 
 6. Modern researches have taught us, and reason approves of it, 
 that living beings whose organs are known to us, that is to say, 
 plants and animals, do not come from putrefaction or from chaos, 
 as the ancients believed, but from ^re-formed seeds, and conse- 
 quently by the transformation of pre-existing living beings. There 
 are animalcules in the seeds of large animals, which by means of 
 conception assume a new dress which they make their own and by 
 means of which they can nourish themselves and increase their size, 
 in order to pass to a larger theatre and to acconiplish the propaga- 
 tion of the large animal. It is true that the souls of spermatic hu- 
 man animals are not rational and do not become so until conception 
 determines these animals to the human nature. And as generally 
 animals are not born altogether in conception or generation^ neither 
 do they perish altogether in what we call death / for it is reason- 
 able that what does not begin naturally, should not end either in 
 the order of nature. Therefore, quitting their mask or their rags, 
 they merely return to a more subtile theatre where they can, never- 
 theless, be just as sensitive and just as well regulated as in the 
 larger. And what we have just said of large animals, takes place 
 also in the generation and death of smaller spermatic animals, in 
 comparison with which the former may pass for large ; for every- 
 thing extends ad infinitum, in nature. 
 
 Thus not only souls, but also animals, are ingenerable and imper- 
 ishable : they are only developed, unfolded, reclothed, unclothed, 
 transformed : souls never quit their entire body and do not pass 
 from one body4ntou~another which is entirely new to them. 
 
 There is therefore no metempsychosis, but there is metamor- 
 phosis ; animals change, take and leave only parts : the same thing 
 which happens little by little and by small invisible particles but 
 continually in nutrition, and suddenly, visibly but rarely in concep- 
 tion or death, which cause a gain or loss of everything at one time. 
 
 7. Up to this time we have spoken as simple physicists : now we 
 must advance to metaphysics by making use of the great principle, 
 little employed in general, which teaches that nothing happens 
 without a sufficient reason '^ that is to say, that nothing happens 
 without its being possible for him who should sufficiently under- 
 stand things, to give a reason sufficient to determine why it is so 
 and not otherwise. This principle laid down, the first question 
 
213 
 
 which should rightly be asked, would be, Why is there something 
 rather than nothing? For nothing is simpler and easier than 
 something. Further, suppose that things must exist, we must be 
 able to give a reason why they must exist so and not otherwise. 
 
 8i Now this sufficient reason for the existence of the universe 
 could not be found in the series of contingent things^ that is, of 
 bodies and of their representations in souls ; for matter being in- 
 different in itself to motion and to rest and to this or another 
 motion, we could not find the reason of motion in it, and still less 
 of a certain motion. And although the present motion which is 
 in matter, comes from the preceding motion, and that from still 
 another preceding, yet in this way we should never make any pro- 
 gress, go as far as we might ; for the same question would always 
 remain. 
 
 Therefore it must be that the sufficient reason which has no need! 
 of another reason, be outside this series of contingent things and'| 
 be found in a substance which is its cause, or which is a necessary \ 
 being, carrying the reason of its existence within itself ; otherwise \ 
 we should still not have a sufficient reason in which we could rest. ( 
 And this final reason of things is called God, 
 
 i 9. This simple primitive substance must contain in itself emi- 
 nently the perfections contained in the derivative substances which . 
 are its effects ; thus it will have perfect power, knowledge and will : \ 
 that is, it will have omnipotence and sovereign goodness. And as 
 justice,^ taken generally, is only goodness conformed to wisdom, 
 there must too be sovereign justice in God. The reason which has 
 caused things to exist by him, makes them still dependent upon 
 him in existing and in working : and they are continually receiving 
 from him that which gives them some perfection ; but the imper- 
 fection which remains in them, comes from the essential and origi- 
 nal limitation of the creature. 
 
 10. It follows from the supreme perfection of God, that in creat- 
 ing the universe he has chosen the best possible plan, in which 
 there is the greatest variety together with the greatest order ; the 
 best arranged ground, place, time ; the most results produced in 
 the most simple ways ; the most of power, knowledge, happiness 
 and goodness in the creatures that the universe could permit. For 
 since all the possibles in the understanding of God laid claim to 
 existence in proportion to their perfections, the actual world, as the 
 
214 
 
 resultant of all these claims, must be the most perfect possible. 
 And without this it would not be possible to give a reason why 
 things have turned out so rather than otherwise. 
 
 11. The supreme wisdom of God compelled him to choose the 
 laws of movement best adjusted and most suited to abstract or 
 metaphysical reasons. He preserves there the same quantity of total 
 and absolute force, or of actions ; the same quantity of respective 
 force or of reaction ; lastly the same quantity of directive force. 
 Farther, action is always equal to reaction, and the whole effect 
 is always equivalent to the full cause. And it is not surprising 
 that we could not by the mere consideration of the efficient caioses 
 or of matter, account for those laws of movement which have been 
 discovered in our time, and a part of which have been discovered 
 by myself. For I have found that it was necessary to have re- 
 course to filial caiises, and that these laws do not depend upon the 
 principle of necessity, like logical, arithmetical and geometrical 
 truths, but upon the principle of fitness, that is, upon the choice of 
 wisdom. And this is one of the most efficacious and evident proofs 
 of the existence of God, to those who can examine these matters 
 thoroughly. 
 
 12. It follows, farther, from the perfection of the supreme 
 author, that not only is the order of the entire universe the most 
 perfect possible, but also that each living mirror representing the 
 imiverse in accordance wdtli its point of view, that is to say, that 
 each monad, each siihstantial centre, must have its perceptions and 
 its desires as^^^ll regulated as is compatible w^ith all the rest. 
 Whence it follows, still farther, that souls, that is, the most domi- 
 nating monads, or rather, animals, cannot fail to awaken from the 
 state of stupor in which death or some other accident may put 
 them. 
 
 13. For everything in things is regulated once for all wath as 
 much order and harmony as is possible, supreme wisdom and good- 
 ness not being able to act except with perfect harmony. The pres- 
 ent is big wdth the future, the future could be read in the past, the 
 distant is expressed in the near. One could become acquainted 
 with the beauty of the universe in each soul, if one could unfold 
 all its fdlds, which only develop visibly in time. But as each dis- 
 tinct perception of the soul includes innumerable confused percep- 
 tions which comprise the w^hole universe, the soul itself knows the 
 
215 
 
 things of which it has perception only so far as it has distinct and 
 clear perceptions of them. 
 
 Each soul knows the infinite, knows all, but confusedly. As in 
 walking on the sea-shore and hearing the great noise which it makes, 
 I hear the individual sounds of each wave, of which the total sound 
 is composed, but without distinguishing them ; so our confused per- 
 ceptions are the result of the impressions which the whole universe 
 makes upon us. It is the same with each monad. God alone has 
 a distinct consciousness of everything, for he is the source of all. 
 It has been well said that he is as centre everywhere, but that his 
 circumference is nowhere, since w^ithout any withdrawal from this 
 centre, everything is immediately present to him. 
 
 14. As regards the rational soul, or spirit^ there is something in 
 it more than in the monads, or even in simple souls. It is not only 
 a mirror of the universe of creatures, but also an image of the 
 Divinity. The spirit has not only a perception of the works of 
 God, but it is 6ven capable of producing something which resem- 
 bles them, although in miniature. For, to say nothing of the mar- 
 vels of dreams where we invent without trouble, and even involun-, 
 tarily, things which when awake we should have to think a long 
 time in order to hit upon, our soul is architectonic in its voluntary 
 actions also, and, discovering the sciences according to which God 
 has regulated things {pondei'e^ mensura^ nwniero^ etc.), it imitates, 
 in its department and in the little world where it is permitted to 
 exercise itself, what God does in the large world. 
 
 15. This is why all spirits, whether of men or of genii, entering 
 by virtue of reason and of the eternal truths into a sort of society 
 with God, are members of the City of God, that is to say, of the 
 most perfect state, formed and governed by the greatest and best 
 of monarchs ; where there is no crime without punishment, no 
 good actions without proportionate recompense; and finally as 
 much virtue and happiness as is possible ; and this is not by a de- 
 rangement of nature, as if what God prepares for souls disturbed 
 the laws of bodies, but by the very order of natural things, in virtue 
 of the harmony pre-established for all time between the realms of 
 nature and of grace^ between God as Architect and God as Mon- 
 arch ; so that nature leads to grace and grace^ while making use of 
 nature, perfects it. 
 
216 
 
 16. Thus although reason cannot teach us the details, reserved to 
 Kevelatipn, of the great future, we can be assured by this same 
 reason that things are made in a manner surpassing our desires. 
 God also being the most perfect and most happy, and consequently, 
 the most lovable of substances, and truly pure love consisting in 
 the state which finds pleasure in the perfections and happiness of 
 the loved object, this love ought to give us the greatest pleasure of 
 which w^e are capable, when God is its object. 
 
 17. And it is easy to love him as we ought, if we know him as 
 I have just described. For although God is not visible to our 
 external senses, he does not cease to be very lovable and to give 
 very great pleasure. We see how much pleasure honors give men, 
 althougli they do not at all consist in the qualities of the external 
 senses. 
 
 Martyrs and fanatics (although the affection of the latter is ill- 
 regulated), show what pleasure of the spirit can accom]3lish ; and 
 what is more, even sensuous pleasures are reduced to confusedly 
 known intellectual pleasures. * 
 
 Music charms us, although its beauty only consists in the harmony 
 of numbers and in the reckoning of the beats or vibrations of 
 sounding bodies, which meet at certain intervals, of which we are 
 not conscious and which the soul does not cease to make. The 
 pleasures which sight finds in proportions are of the same nature ; 
 and those caused by the other senses amount to almost the same 
 thing, althougli we cannot explain it so clearly. 
 
 18. It may be said that even from the present time on, the love 
 of God makes us enjoy a foretaste of future felicity. And although 
 it is disinterested, it itself constitutes our greatest good and interest 
 even if we should not seek it therein and should consider only the 
 pleasure which it gives, without regard to the utility it produces ; 
 for it gives us perfect confidence in the goodness of our author and 
 master, producing a true tranquillity of mind ; not like the Stoics 
 who force themselves to patience, but by a present content which 
 assures us of future happiness. And besides the present pleasure, 
 nothing can be more useful for the future ; for the love of God 
 fulfills our hopes, too, and leads us in the road of supreme happiness, 
 because by virtue of the perfect order established in the universe, 
 everything is done in the best possible way, as much for the general 
 good as for the greatest individual good of those who are convinced 
 
217 
 
 of this and are content with the divine government ; this conviction 
 cannot be wanting to those who know how to love the source of all 
 good. It is true that supreme felicity, by whatever beatific vision 
 or knowledge of G-od it be accompanied, can never be full ; 
 because, since God is infinite, he cannot be wholly known. There- 
 fore our happiness will never, and ought not, consist in full joy, 
 where there would be nothing farther to desire, rendering our mind 
 stupid ; but in a perpetual progress to new pleasures and to new 
 perfections. 
 
XXXIII. 
 
 The Monadology. 1Y14. 
 [From the French.] 
 
 1. The monad of which we shall here speak is merely a simple 
 substance, which enters into compounds; simple, that is to say,- 
 without* parts.* 
 
 2. And there must be simple substances, since there are com- 
 pound substances, for the compound is only a collection or aggrega- 
 tum of simple substances. 
 
 3. Now where there are no parte, neither extension, figure nor 
 divisibility is possible. And these monads are the true atoms of 
 nature, and, in a word, the elements oi things. 
 
 4. Dissolution also is not at all to be feared, and there is no con- 
 ceivable way in which a simple substance can perish naturally. f 
 
 5. For the same reason there is no way in which a simple sub- 
 stance can begin naturally, since it cannot be formed by compo- 
 sition. 
 
 6. Thus it may be said that the monads can only begin or end 
 all at once, that is to say, they can only begin by creation and end 
 by annihilation ; whereas that which is compound begins or ends by 
 parts. 
 
 7. There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be 
 altered or changed internally by any other creature, for nothing can 
 be transposed within it, nor can there be conceived in it any inter- 
 nal movement which can be excited, directed, augmented or 
 diminished within it as can be done in compounds, where there is 
 change among the parts. The monads have no windows through 
 which anything can enter or depart. The accidents cannot detach 
 themselves or go forth from the substances, as did form^ly the 
 sensible species of the Schoolmen. Likewise neither substance nor 
 accident can enter a monad from without. 
 
 8. Nevertheless, the monads must have some qualities, otherwise 
 they would not even be entities. And if simple substances did not 
 differ at all in their qualities there would be no w^ay of perceiving 
 any changes in things, since what is in the compound can only 
 
 *Theodicee, §10. t§89. 
 
219 
 
 come from the simple ingredients, and if the monads were without 
 qualities thej could not be distinguished the one from the other, 
 since also they do not differ in quantity. Consequently, a plenum 
 being supposed, each place in any movement could receive only the 
 equivalent of what it had had before, and one state of things would 
 not be distinguishable from another. 
 
 9. Moreover it is necessary, that each-,mopad should differ from 
 every other. For never in nature are two beings exactly alike and 
 such that it is not possible to find an internal difference or one 
 founded upon an intrinsic connotation. 
 
 10. I take it also for granted that every created being, and conse- 
 quently the created monad also, is subject to change, and even that 
 t his ch ange is continual in each. "" 
 
 11. It follows from what has just been said, that the natui*al 
 changes of the monads proceed from an internal princijple^ since 
 an external cause could not influence their interior." 
 
 12. But besides the principle of change, there must be a detail 
 of that which changes^ which forms, so to speak, the specificatio n 
 and var iety ofj hejimple„.ailb.stances>-. 
 
 ' 13. This detail must involve multitude in the unity or in the sim-, 
 pie. For since every natural change is made by degrees, some- 
 thing changes and something remains ; consequently, there must be 
 in the simple substance a plurality of affections and of relations, 
 although not of parts. 
 
 14. The transient state, which involves and represents multitude 
 in unity or in the simple substance, is only what we call jpercejption^ 
 which must be distinguished from apperception or from conscious- 
 ness, as will appear in what follows. Here it is that the Cartesians 
 especially failed, having made no account of the perceptions of 
 which we are not conscious. It is this also which made them 
 suppose that spirits only are monads and that there are no souls of 
 brutes or of other entelechies. They, with the vulgar, have also 
 confounded a long state of unconsciousness [etoiordissement'] with 
 death strictly speaking, and have therefore agreed with the old scho- 
 lastic prejudice of entirely separate souls, and have even confirmed 
 weaker minds in their belief in the mortality of the soul. 
 
 15. The action of the internal principle which causes the change 
 or the passage from one perception to another, may be called appeti- 
 
 * §§ 396 and 400. 
 

 220 
 
 Hon ; it is true that the desire cannot .always completely attain to 
 the whole perception toward which it tends, but it always attains to 
 something of it and arrives at new perceptions. ^ 
 
 16. We experience in ourselves multitude in a simple substance, 
 when we find that the most trifling thought of which we are con- 
 
 cious involves variety in the object. Thus all those who admit 
 that the soul is a simple substance must also admit this multitude 
 in the monad, and M. Bayle ought not to find in it the difiiculties 
 which he mentions in his Dictionary, article Rorarius. 
 
 17. We must confess, moreover, \\vdX percejption and that which 
 depends on it are inexplicable hy meGhanical causes^ that is, by 
 figures and motions. And, supposing that there were a machine so 
 constructed as to cause thought, feeling and perception, we could 
 conceive of it as enlarged and yet preserving the same proportions, 
 so that we might enter it like a mill. And this granted, we should 
 only find on visiting it, pieces which push one against another, but 
 never any thing by which to explain a perception. It must be sought 
 for, therefore, in the simple substance and not in the compound or 
 machine. IS'othing but this, also, can be found in the simple sub- 
 stance ; and it is in this alone that all the internal actions of simple 
 substances consist.* 
 
 18. The name of entelechies might be given to all simple sub- 
 stances or created monads, for they have within tliemselves a certain 
 perfection [iy^oom zb ivreXi^) ; there is a certain sufiiciency {aurdpxeia) 
 which renders them the sources of their internal actions, and so to 
 speak, incorporeal automata. f . 
 
 I 19. If we choose to give the name soul to everything that has^^^- ' 
 ^ cejptions and desires in the general sense which I have just explained, 
 all simple substances or created monads may be called souls, but as 
 feeling is something more than a simple perception, 1 consent that 
 the general name of monads or entelechies shall sufiice for those 
 simple substances which have only perception, and that only those 
 substances shall be called souls whose perception is more distinct j 
 Vnd is accompanied by memory. 
 ■'*' 20. For we experience in ourselves a state in which we remember 
 nothing and hav^e no distinguishable perceptions, as, for instance, 
 when we fall in unconsciousness or when we are overpowered by a 
 profound and dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not differ 
 * Preface, p. 37. t § 87. 
 
221 
 
 sensibly from a simple monad ; but as this state is not continuous 
 and as the soul frees itself from it, it is something more than a mere 
 monad. ■'^ 
 
 21. And it does not at all follow that therefore the simple sub- 
 stance is without any perception. This is indeed impossible, for the 
 reasons mentioned above ; for it cannot perish, nor can it subsist 
 without some affection, which is nothing else than perception ; but 
 when there is a great number of minute perceptions, where nothing 
 is distinct, we are stunned, as when we turn continually in the same 
 direction many times in succession, whence arises a dizziness which 
 may make us lose consciousness, and which does not allow us to 
 see anything distinctly. So death may for a time produce this 
 condition in animals. 
 
 22. And as every present state of a simple substance is naturally 
 the consequence of its preceding state, so its present is big with its ' 
 future.f 
 
 23. Therefore, since on being awakened from a stupor, we are 
 aware of our perceptions, we must have had them immediately 
 before although we were entirely unconscious of them ; for one per- 
 ception can only come naturally from another perception as one 
 motion can only come naturally from another motion.;}: 
 
 24. From this we see that if there w^ere nothing distinct, nothing, 
 80 to speak, in relief and of a higher flavor, in our perceptions, we 
 skould always be in a dazed state. This is the condition of the 
 naked monad. 
 
 25. So also we see that nature has given to animals higher percep- 
 tions, by the pains she has taken to furnish them with organs which 
 collect many rays of light or many undulations of air, in order to 
 render them more efficacious by their union. There is soiiething 
 of the same kind in odor, in taste, in touch and perhaps in a mul- 
 titude of other senses which are unknown to us. I shall presently 
 explain how that which takes place in the soul represents that which 
 occurs in the organs. 
 
 26. Memory furnishes souls with a sort of coiisecutiveriess which 
 imitates reason, but which ought to be distinguished from it. We 
 observe that animals, having the perception of something which 
 strikes them and of which they have had a similar perception 
 before, expect, through the representations of their memory, that 
 
 * 8 64. t § 360. X %% 401 to 403. 
 
222 
 
 which was associated with it in the preceding perception, and experi- 
 ence feelings similar to those which they had had at that time. 
 For instance, if we show dogs a stick, they remember the pain it 
 has caused them and whine and run.* 
 
 27. And the powerful imagination which strikes and moves 
 them, arises either from the magnitude or the multitude of preced- 
 ing perceptions. For often a strong impression produces all at 
 once the effect of a long continued hahit^ or of many times re- 
 peated moderate perceptions. 
 
 28. Men act like the brutes in so far as that the consecutiveness 
 of their perceptions only results from the principle of memory, 
 resembling the empirical physicians who practice without theory, 
 and we are simple empirics in three-fourths of our actions. For 
 example, when we expect that there will be daylight to-morrow, we 
 are acting as empirics, because that has up to this time always 
 taken place. It is only the astronomer who judges of this by 
 reason. 
 
 29. But the knowledge of necessary and eternal truths is what 
 distinguishes us from mere animals and furnishes us with reason 
 and the sciences, by raising us to a knowledge of ourselves and of 
 God. This is what we call the reasonable soul or spirit within us. 
 
 30. It is also by the knowledge of necessary truths, and by their 
 abstractions, that we rise to acts of reflection^ which make us think 
 of that which calls itself " /," and consider that this or that is with- 
 in us ; and it is thus that, in thinking of ourselves, we think of 
 being, of substance, simple or compound, of the immaterial and of 
 God himself, conceiving that what with us is limited is with him 
 without limit. These reflective acts furnish the principal objects 
 of our reasonings/f 
 
 31. Our reasonmgs are founded on two great jprinciples^ that of 
 Gontradietion, by virtue of which we judge that to be false which 
 involves it, and that true^ which is opposed or contradictory to the 
 false.:}: 
 
 32. And that of the sufficient reason, by virtue of which we con- 
 sider that no fact can be real or existent, no statement true, unless 
 there be a sufficient reason why it is so and not otherwise, although 
 most often these reasons cannot be known to us.|| 
 
 * Prelim., §65. fPref., p. 27. t§§44, 169. || §§44, 196. 
 
 N 
 
223 
 
 33. There are also two kinds of truths, those of reasoning and 
 those of fact. Truths of reasoning are necessary and their oppo- 
 site is impossible, and those of fact are contingent and their oppo- 
 site is possible. When a truth is necessary its reason can be found 
 by analysis, resolving it into more simple ideas and truths until we 
 reach those which are primitive.* 
 
 34. It is thus that mathematicians by analysis reduce speculative 
 theorems and practical canons to definitions, axioms and postulates. 
 
 35. Finally there are simple ideas, definitions of which cannot 
 be given ; there are also axioms and postulates, in a word, jprima/ry 
 principles, which cannot be proved and indeed need no proof, and 
 these are identical propositions, the opposite of which contains an 
 express contradiction. 
 
 36. But there must also be a sufficient reason for contingemi 
 truths, or those of fact, — that is, for the series of things diffused 
 through the universe of created objects — where the resolution into 
 particular reasons might run into a detail without limits, on account 
 of the immense variety of objects and the division of bodies ad 
 infinitum. There is an infinity of figures and of movements, pres- 
 ent and past, which enter into the efficient cause of my present 
 writing, and there is an infinity of trifiing inclinations and dispo- 
 sitions, past and present, of my soul, which enter into the final 
 cause, t 
 
 37. And as all this detail only involves other contingents, ante- 
 rior or more detailed, each one of which needs a like analysis for 
 its explanation, we make no advance, and the sufficient or final 
 reason must be outside of the sequence or series of this detail of 
 contingencies, however infinite it may be. 
 
 38. And thus it is that the final reason of things must be found 
 in a necessary sub stance, in wh ich the detail of changes exists only 
 
 emi nently, as in their source, and this it is which we call GoD.ij: 
 
 39. ^ow this substance being the sufficient reason of all this de- 
 tail, which also is linked together throughout, there is hut one God, 
 and this Ood suffices. 
 
 40. We may judge also that this supreme substance, which is 
 unique, universal and necessary, having nothing outside of itself 
 which is independent of it, and being the simple series of possible 
 
 * §§ 170, 174, 189, 280-282, 367, Abridgment, Objection 3. 
 
 t §§36, 37, 44, 45, 49, 52, 131, 122, 337, 340, 344. t §'7. 
 
224 
 
 being, must be incapable of limitations and must contain as much 
 of reality as is possible. 
 
 41. Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect, perfection 
 being only the magnitude of positive reality taken in its strictest 
 meaning, setting aside the limits or bounds in that which is limited. 
 And there where there are no limits, that is, in God, perfection is 
 absolutely infinite.* 
 
 42. It follows also that creatures have their perfections from the 
 influence of God, but that their imperfections arise from their own 
 nature incapable of existing without limits. For it is by this that 
 they are distinguished from God.f - 
 
 43. It is also true that in God is the source not only of existences 
 but also of * essences, so far as they are real, or of that which is real 
 in the possible. This is because the understanding of God is the 
 region of eternal truths, or of the ideas on which they depend, and 
 because, without him, there would be nothing real in the possibili- 
 ties, and not only nothing existing but also nothing possible. J 
 
 44. Nevertheless, if_there_is_aj; eality in the e s sences o r possibili- 
 tipsjvr jTi thp, e ternal truths,_this_reality must be founded in some- 
 thing: existing and actual : ^consequently in the existence of the 
 necessary being in whom essence involves existence or with whom 
 it is suflRcient to be possible in order to be actual. || 
 
 45. Hence God (or the necessary being) alone has this privilege 
 that he must exist if it is possible. And since nothing can hinder 
 the, possibility of that which possesses no limitations, no negation, 
 and, consequently, no contradiction, this alone is sufiicient to estab- 
 lish the existence of G^o^ d pi'iori. We have also proved it by the 
 Ideality of the eternal truths. But we have ]us.t proved it also 
 a posteriori^ since contingent beings ^Bxist which can only have 
 their final or sufficient reasbn in a necessary being who has the 
 reason of his existence in himself. 
 
 40. But it must not be imagined, as is sometimes done, that the 
 eternal truths, being dependent upon God, are arbitrary and depend 
 upon his will, as Descartes seems to have conceived, and afterwards 
 M. Poiret. This is true only of contingent truths, the principle of 
 
 * § 22 ; Preface, p. 27. 
 
 t §§20, 27-31, 153, 167, 3^7 seqq. [In the copy revised by Leibnitz the 
 following is added : " This original imperfection of creatures is notice- 
 able in the natural inertia of bodies. §§ 30, 380 ; Abridgment, Objection 5. "J 
 
 + ^20. I §§ 184, 189, 335. 
 
226 
 
 which \^ fitness or the choice of the hest, whereas necessary truths 
 depend solely on his understanding and are its internal object.* 
 
 47. Thus God alone is the primitive unity or the original simple 
 substance ; of which all monads, created or derived, are the pro- 
 ducts, and are born, so to speak, from moment to moment by con- 
 tinual fulgurations of the Divinity, limited by the receptivity of 
 the creature, to which limitation is essential.f 
 
 48. In God is Power, which is the source of all ; then Knowledge, 
 which contains the detail of ideas ; and finally Will, which effects 
 changes or products according to the principle of the best. It is 
 this which corresponds to what in created monads forms the sub- 
 ject or basis, the perceptive and the appetitive faculty. But in 
 God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect, and in the 
 created monads or in the entelechies (or jperfectihahies, as Harmo- 
 laus Barbarus translated the word), they are only imitations pro- 
 portioned to their perfection. :j: 
 
 49. The creature is said to act externally in so far as it is perfect, 
 and to suffer from another in so far as it is imperfect. Thus action 
 is attributed to the monad in so far as it has distinct perceptions, 
 and passion in so far as it has confused perceptions. || 
 
 50. And one creature is more perfect than another in that there 
 is found in it that which serves to account a priori for what takes 
 place in another, and it is in this way that it is said to act upon 
 another. ' 
 
 51. But in simple substances the influence of one monad upon 
 another is purely ideal, since it can take effect only through the 
 introduction of God, inasmuch as in the ideas of God a monad 
 may demand with reason that God in regulating the others from 
 the commencement of things, have regard to it. For since a created 
 monad can have no physical influence upon the interior of another, 
 it is only in this way that one can be dependent upon another. T[ 
 
 52. And hence it is that the actions and passions of creatures are 
 mutual. For God, in comparing two simple substances, finds in 
 each one reasons which compel him to adjust the other to it, and 
 consequently that which in certain respects is active, is according 
 to another point of view, passive ; active in so far as that what is 
 
 * §§180, 184, 185, 335, 351, 380. t §§ 382-391, 398, 395, 
 
 X §§ 7, 149, 150, 87. II §§ 23, 66, 386. 
 
 If §§^9, 54, 65, 66, 201 : Abridgment. Objection 3. 
 
226 
 
 known distinctly in it, serves to account for that which takes place 
 in another ; and passive in so far as the cause of what takes place in 
 it, is found in that which is distinctly known in another."^ 
 
 53. Now, as there is an infinity of possible universes in the idea 
 of God, and as only one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient 
 reason for the choice of God, which determines him for one rather 
 than for another, f 
 
 54. And this reason can only be found in the fitness, in the 
 degrees of perfection, which these worlds contain, each possible 
 world having a right to claim existence according to the measure of 
 perfection which it possesses.:}: ' 
 
 55. And this is the cause of the existence of the Best, which 
 wisdom makes known to God, which his goodness chooses and 
 which his power produces.! 
 
 56. ]^ow this connection, or this adaptation of all created things 
 to each and of each to all, brings it about that each simple sub- 
 stance has relations which express all the others, and that conse- 
 quently it is a living, perpetual mirror of the universe. T[ 
 
 57. And as the same city regarded from different sides appears 
 entirely different and in perspective is as if multiplied, so also it 
 happens that, because of the infinite multiplicity of simple sub- 
 8t«,nces, there are as it were so many different universes, which are 
 nevertheless only the perspectives of a single one, from the 
 different j:><9m^5 of view of each monad. "^'^ 
 
 68. And this is the way to obtain as great a variety as possible, 
 but with the greatest possible order ; that is, it is the way to obtain 
 as much perfection as possible. ff 
 
 59. Thus this hypothesis (which I dare to assert is demonstrated) 
 is the only one which brings into relief the grandeur of God. M. 
 Eayle recognized this, when in his Dictionary (Art. Rorarius) he 
 objected to it ; where indeed he was tempted to believe that I 
 accorded to God more than was possible. But he can state no 
 reason why this universal harmony which brings it about that each 
 
 * § 66. t §§ 10, 44, 173, 196 seqq., 225, 414-416. 
 
 %%% 74, 167, 350, 201, 130, 352, 345 seqq., 354. [In the first copy revised by 
 Leibnitz the following is found added here: "Thus there is nothing abso- 
 lutely arbitrary."] 
 
 I §§8, 78, 80, 119, 204, 206, 208 ; Abridgment, Objections 1 and 8. 
 
 ^ §§ 130, 360. *^ § 147. 
 
 ft §§120, 124, 241 seqq., 214, 243, 275. 
 
22T 
 
 substance expresses exactly all others by the relations which it sus- 
 tains to them, is impossible. 
 
 60. Besides, we can see in what I have just said a priori reasons 
 why things could not be otherwise, because God, in regulating* all, 
 has regard to each part, and particularly to each monad, since, its 
 nature being representative, nothing can limit it* to representing 
 only a part of things ; although it may be true that this representa- 
 tion is but confused as regards the detail of the whole universe, and 
 can be distinct only in the case of a small part of things, that is to 
 say, in the case of those which are nearest or largest in relation to 
 each of the monads — otherwise each monad would be a divinity. 
 
 It is not in the object but only in the modification of the knowledge / 
 of the object, that monads are limited. They all tend confusedly 
 toward the infinite, toward the whole, but they are limited, and 
 distinguished by their degrees of distinct perceptions. 
 
 61. And in this respect compound substances symbolize with 
 simple substances. For since the world is a plenum, making all 
 matter connected, and since in a plenum every movement has some 
 effect on distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each 
 body is affected not only by those which touch it and feels in some 
 way all that happens to them but also by their means is affected 
 by those which touch the first with which it is in immediate 
 contact, it follows that this communication extends to any distance 
 whatever. Consequently, each body feels all that passes in the uni- 
 verse, so that he who sees all, could read in each that which passes 
 everywhere else, and even that which has been or shall be, perceiv- 
 ing in the present that which is removed in time as well as in space ; 
 oufxnvoca nduza, said Hippocrates. But a soul can read in itself 
 only that which is distinctly represented in it. It cannot develop 
 its laws all at once, for they reach into the infinite. 
 
 62. Thus, although each created monad represents the entire uni- 
 verse, it represents most distinctly the body which is particularly 
 appropriated to it and of which it forms the entelechy ; and as this 
 body represents the whole universe by the connection of all matter 
 in a plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe by repre- 
 senting that body which especially belongs to it.* 
 
 63. The body belonging to a monad, which is its entelechy or 
 soul, constitutes, with the entelechy, what may be called a lining 
 
 *§400. 
 
228 
 
 being, and with the soul, what may be called an animal. Now this 
 body of a living being or of an animal is always organic, for since 
 every monad is in its way a mirror of the universe, and since the 
 universe is arranged in perfect order, there must also be order in 
 the representative, that is, in the perceptions of the soul, and hence 
 in the body, according to which the universe is represented in it.^ 
 
 64. Thus each organic body of a living being is a kind of divine 
 machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artifi- 
 cial automata, because a macliine which is made by man's art is not 
 a machine in each one of its parts ; for example, the tooth of a 
 brass wheel has parts or fragments which to us are no longer artifi- 
 cial and have nothing in themselves to show the use to which the 
 wheel was destined in the machine. But nature's machines, that is, 
 living bodies, are machines even in their smallest parts ad infini- 
 tum. Herein lies the difference between nature and art, that is, 
 between the divine art and ours. 
 
 65. And the author of nature has been able to contrive these 
 divine and infinitely marvellous works of art, because each portion 
 of matter is not only divisible ad infinitum, as the ancients per- 
 ceived, but also each part is actually endlessly subdivided into parts 
 of which each has its own motion : otherwise it would be impossi- 
 ble for each portion of matter to express the universe. f 
 
 I6Q. Hence we see that there is a world of creatures, of living 
 beings, of animals, of entelechies, of souls, in the smallest particle 
 of matter. 
 
 67. Each portion of matter may be conceived of as a garden full 
 of plants, and as a pond full of fishes. But each branch of the 
 plant, each member of the animal, each drop of its humors is also 
 such a garden or such a pond. 
 
 68. And although the earth or air embraced between the plants 
 of the garden, or the water between the fish of the pond, is "neither 
 plant nor fish, they yet contain more of them, but for the most part 
 so tiny as to be to us imperceptible. 
 
 69. Therefore there is nothing uncultivated, nothing sterile, 
 nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion except in 
 appearance. Just as a pond would appear from a distance in which 
 we might see the confused movement and swarming, so to speak, 
 of the fishes in the pond, without perceiving the fish themselves. if 
 
 * § 403. t Prelim. , § 70 ; Theod. , § 195. t Preface, pp. 40, 41. 
 
229 
 
 TO. We see thus that each living body has a ruling entelechy 
 which is the soul in the animal, but the members of this living body- 
 are full of other living beings — plants, animals — each of which has 
 also its entelechy or governing soul. 
 
 71. But it must not be imagined, as has been done* by some peo- 
 ple who have misunderstood my thought, that each soul has a mass 
 or portion of matter appropriated to it or united to it forever, and 
 that hence it possesses other inferior living beings destined to its 
 service forever. For all bodies are, like rivers, in a perpetual flux, 
 and parts are entering into them and departing from them continu- 
 ally. 
 
 72. Thus the soul changes its body only gradually and by 
 degrees, so that it is never deprived of all its organs at once. 
 There is often a metamorphosis in animals, but never metempsy- 
 <3hosis nor transmigration of souls. There are also no entirely sej^a- 
 rate souls, nor genii without bodies. Grod alone is wholly without 
 body.* 
 
 73. For which reason also, it happens that there is, strictly speak- 
 ing, neither complete generation nor entire death, where the soul 
 is separated from the body. What we call generation is develop- 
 
 lent or increase, as also what we call death is envelopment and 
 liminution. 
 
 74. Philosophers have been greatly puzzled over the origin of 
 forms, entelechies, or souls ; but to-day, when we know by exact 
 investigations of plants, insects and animals, that organic bodies in 
 nature are never produced from chaos or from putrefaction, but 
 always from seeds, in which there was undoubtedly ^ovclq p7'e-forma- 
 tion, it has been thought that not only the organic body was already 
 there before conception, but also a soul in this body, and, in a word, 
 the animal itself ; and that by means of conception this animal has 
 merely been disposed to a greater transformation, in order to be- 
 come an animal of another kind. Something similar is seen out- 
 side of generation, as when worms become flies, and caterpillars, 
 butterflies, t 
 
 75. The animals, some of which are raised by conception to the 
 grade of larger animals, may be called spermatics ; but those 
 among them, which remain in their class, that is, the most part, are 
 
 *Theod., §90, 124. 
 
 t §§ 86, 89, 90, 187, 188, 403, 397 ; Preface, p. 40, seq. 
 
230 
 
 born, multiply, and are destroyed like the larger animals, and there 
 is only a small number of chosen ones, which pass to a larger 
 theatre. 
 
 T6. But this were only half the truth *, I have therefore thought 
 \! that if the animal never has a natural beginning, it cannot end 
 ^ naturally ; and that not only will there be no generation, but also 
 no utter destruction or death strictly speaking. And these reason- 
 ings, made a posteriori and drawn from experience, harmonize per- 
 fectly with principles deduced a priori, as above.* 
 
 77. Thus it may be said that not only the soul (mirror of an 
 indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal itself, 
 although its machine often perishes in part and takes on or puts off 
 organic spoils. 
 
 78. Tliese principles have given me the means of explaining nat- 
 urally the union or rather the conformity of the soul and the or- 
 ganic body. The soul follows its own peculiar laws and the body 
 also follows its own laws, and they meet by virtue of the pre-estab- 
 lished harmony between all substances, since they are all represen- 
 tations of one and the same universe.f 
 
 79. Souls act according to the laws of final causes, by appetitions, , 
 ends and means. Bodies act in accordance with the laws of effi- " 
 cient causes or of motion. And the two realms, that of efficient 
 causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with each other. 
 
 80. Descartes recognized that souls cannot give any force to 
 bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in matter ; 
 nevertheless he believed that the soul could change the direction of 
 bodies. But it was because, in his day, the law of nature which 
 enforces the conservation of the total direction in matter, was not 
 known. If he had known this, he would have lighted upon my sys- 
 tem of the pre-established harmony.:]: 
 
 81. By this system it comes about that bodies act as if (what is 
 impossible) there were no souls, and that souls act as if there were 
 no bodies, and that both act as if each influenced the other. 
 
 82. As to spirits or rational souls, although I find that the same 
 thing which I have stated — namely, that animals and souls begin 
 only with the world and end only with the world — holds good at 
 bottom with regard to all animals and living things, yet there is this 
 
 * §90. t Preface, p 36 ; Theod., §§ 340, 352, 353, 358. 
 
 X Pref ., p. 44 ; Theod., §§ 22, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 345, 346 seqq., 354, 355. 
 
231 
 
 peculiarity in rational animals, that their spermatic animalcules, as 
 such, have only ordinary or sensitive souls, but as soon as those 
 which are, so to speak, elected, attain by actual conce ption to hu-^ 
 man nature, their sensitive souls are elevated to the rank of reason, 
 an d to theprerPgativejof spirHsT^^ 
 
 83. Among other differences which exist between ordinary souls 
 and spirits, a part of which I have already mentioned, there is fur- 
 thermore, this, that souls in general are the living mirrors or images, 
 of the universe of creatures, but spirits are in addition images of the 
 Divinity itself, or of the author of nature, able to know the system 
 of the universe and to imitate something of it by architectonic 
 samplings, since every spirit is as a little divinity in its own depart- 
 ment, f 
 
 84. Hence it comes about that spirits are capable of entering 
 into a sort of society with God, and that he is, in relation to them, 
 not only what an inventor is to his machines (as God is in relation 
 to the other creatures), but also what a prince is to his subjects and 
 even a father to his children. 
 
 85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the assembly of all spirits 
 must compose the City of God, that is, the most perfect state which 
 is possible, under the most perfect of monarchs.ij: 
 
 86. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral 
 world within the natural world, and the highest and most divine of 
 the works of God ; it is in this that the glory of God truly consists, 
 for he would have none if his greatness and goodness were not 
 known and admired by spirits. It is, too, only in relation to the 
 divine city that he possesses, properly, goodness ; while his wisdom, 
 and power are everywhere manifest. 
 
 87. As we have above established perfect harmony between two- 
 natural kingdoms, the one of efficient, the other of final causes, we 
 should also notice here another harmony between the physical 
 kingdom of nature and"' the moral kingdom of grace ; that is, be- 
 tween God considered as the architect of the mechanism of the uni- 
 verse, and God, considered as monarch of the divine city of spirits. | 
 
 88. This harmony makes all things progress toward grace by 
 natural methods. This globe, for example, must be destroyed and 
 repaired by natural means, at such times as the government of 
 
 * §§ 91, 397. f § 147. t § 146 ; Abridgment, Objection 2. 
 
 II §§ 62, 72, 118, 248, 112, 130, 247. 
 
232 
 
 spirits may demand it, for the punishment of some and the reward 
 of others.* 
 
 89. It may be said, farther, that God as architect satisfies in every 
 respect God as legislator, and that therefore sins, by the decree of 
 nature and by virtue even of the mechanical structure of things, 
 must carry their punishment with them ; and that in the same way, 
 good actions will obtain their rewards by mechanical ways through 
 their relation to bodies, although this may not and ought not always 
 happen immediately. 
 
 90. Finally, under this perfect government, there will be no good 
 action without reward, no bad action without punishment, and 
 everything must result for the well-being of the good, that is, of 
 those who are not discontented in this great State, who, after having 
 done their duty, trust in providence, and who love and imitate as 
 they ought the author of all good, pleasing themselves wath the 
 contemplation of his perfections, — according to the nature of truly 
 jpure love, which takes pleasure in the happiness of the loved one. 
 This is what causes wise and virtuous persons to work at all which 
 seems conformable to the divine will, presumptive or antecedent, 
 and yet to content themselves with that which God in reality sends 
 by his secret, consequent and decisive will, recognizing that if we 
 could sufficiently comprehend the order of the universe we would 
 find that it surpassed all the wishes of the wisest, and that it is im- 
 possible to render it better that it is, not only for all in general, but 
 also for ourselves in particular, if we are attaclied, as we should be, 
 to the author of all, not only as the architect and efficient cause of 
 our being, but also as our master and final cause, who ought to be 
 the sole aim of our volition, and who can alone secure our happi- 
 ness.f 
 
 *§§18 seqq., 110, 244, 245, 340. 
 
 •f §§ 134 fin., 278 ; Preface, pp. 27, 28. 
 
XXXIY. 
 
 On the Doctrine of Malebranche. A Letter to M. Remond 
 de Montmort, containing Remarks on the Book of Father Tertre 
 against Father Malebranche. 1715. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 
 Sir, I have just received your package, and I thank you for the 
 interesting articles which you have sent me. I say nothing on the 
 continuation of Homer ; but as, after the sacred books, he is the 
 most ancient of all the authors whose works remain to us, I wish 
 that some one would undertake to clear up the historical and geo- 
 _graphical difficulties which remote antiquity has produced in these 
 works, and principally in the Odyssey, relating to ancient geog- 
 raphy ; for, however fabulous the travels of Ulysses may be, it is 
 nevertheless certain that Homer carried him into countries then 
 spoken of but which it is difficult now to recognize. 
 
 I pass to the philosophical articles which relate to the Reverend 
 Father Malebranche (whose Joss I greatly regret), and which tend 
 to elucidate the natural theology of the Chinese. The Refutation 
 of the system of this Father, divided into three small volumes, is 
 without doubt from a man of ability, for it is clear and ingenious. 
 I even approve of a part of it, but part of it is too extreme. Too 
 much divergence is here shown from the views of Descartes and of 
 Father Malebranche, even when they receive a good meaning. It 
 should be time to give up these enmities, which the Cartesians 
 have perhaps drawn upon themselves by showing too much con- 
 tempt for the ancients and for the schoolmen, in whom there is 
 nevertheless solidity meriting our attention. Tlius justice ought to, 
 be shown on the one side and on the other, and we are to profit by 
 the discoveries of both, as it is right to reject that which each 
 advances without foHindation. 
 
 1. It is right to refute the Cartesians when they say that the 
 soul is nothing but thought ; as also when they say that matter is 
 nothing but extension. For the soul is a subject or concretum 
 which thinks, and matter is an extended subject or subject endowed 
 with extension. This is why I hold that space must not be con- 
 
234 
 
 founded with matter, althoue^li I agree that naturally there is no 
 void space ; the scholastics are right in distinguishing the concretes 
 and the abstracts^ when it is a matter of exactness. 
 
 2. I concede to the Cartesians that the soul actually always 
 thinks, but I do not grant that it is conscious of all these thoughts. 
 For our great perceptions and our great appetites of which we are 
 conscious, are composed of innumerable little perceptions and little 
 inclinations of which we cannot be conscious. And it is in the 
 insensible perceptions that the reason is found of what passes in 
 us ; as the reason of what takes place in sensible bodies consists in 
 insensible movements. 
 
 3. There is good reason also for refuting Eeverend Father Male- 
 branche especially when he maintains that the soul is purely 
 passive. I think I have demonstrated that every substance is 
 active, and especially the soul. This is also the idea which the 
 ancients and the moderns have had of it; and the entelechy of 
 Aristotle, which has made so much noise, is nothing else but force 
 or activity ; that is, a state from which action naturally flows if 
 nothing hinders it. But matter^ primary and pure, taken without 
 the souls or lives which are united to it, is purely passive ; prop- 
 erly speaking also it is not a substance, but something incomplete. 
 And secondary matter, as for example, body, is not a substance, 
 but for another reason ; which is, that it is a collection of several 
 substances, like a pond full of fish, or a flock of sheep ; and conse- 
 quently it is what is called unum per accidens, in a word, a 
 phenomenon. A true substance, such as an animal, is composed of 
 an immaterial soul, and an organized body ; and it is the com- 
 pound of these two which is called nmcm p^r se. 
 
 4. As to the efficiency of second causes, it is again right to main- 
 tain it against the opinion of this Father. I have demonstrated 
 that each simple substance, or monad (such as souls), follows its 
 own laws in producing its actions, without being capable of being 
 troubled therein by the influence of another created simple sub- 
 stance ; and that thus bodies do not change the ethico-logical laws 
 of souls, any more than souls change the physico-mechanical laws 
 of bodies. This is why second causes really act, but without any 
 influence of one created simple substance upon another ; and souls 
 harmonize with bodies and among themselves, in virtue of the 
 preestablished harmony, and not at all by a mutual physical influ- 
 
235 
 
 ence ; except in the case of the metaphysical union of the soul and 
 its body which makes them compose unum jper se, an animal, a 
 living being. It has been right, therefore, to refute the opinion of 
 those who deny the action of second causes ; but it must be done 
 without renewing false influences, such as the species of the school. 
 
 5. Father Malebranche made use of this argument : That exten- 
 sion not being a mode of being of matter, must be its substance. 
 The author of the Refutation (Vol. I, p. 91), distinguishes between 
 the positive modes of being ; and he claims that extension is one of 
 the modes of being of the second sort, which he thinks can be con- 
 ceived by themselves. But these are not positive modes of being ; 
 they all consist in the variety of limitations, and all cannot be con- 
 ceived save by the being of which they are the modes and ways. 
 And as to extension it may be said that it is not a mode of being of 
 matter, and nevertheless is not a substance either. What is it, 
 then % you will ask, sir. I reply that it is an attribute of substances, 
 and there is a clear difference between attributes and modes of 
 being. 
 
 6. It appears to me, also, that the author of the Refutation does 
 not well combat the opinion of the Cartesians on the infinite, 
 which they with reason consider as prior to the finite, and of which 
 the finite is but a limitation. He says (p. 303 of Yol. I), that if 
 the mind had a clear and direct view of the infinite, Father Male- 
 branche would not have had need of so much reasoning to make us 
 think of it. But by the same argument he would reject the very 
 simple and very natural knowledge we have of the Divinity. 
 These kinds of objections amount to nothing, for there is need of 
 labor and application in order to give to men the attention neces- 
 sary for the simplest notions, and this end will only be reached by 
 recalling them from their dissipation to themselves. It is also for 
 this reason that the theologians who have composed works on 
 eternity, have much need of discourse, of comparisons and of 
 examples to make it well understood ; although there is nothing 
 more simple than the notion of eternity. But it is because, in such 
 matters, all depends on attention. The author adds (Yol. I, p. 307), 
 that in the pretended knowledge of the infinite, the mind sees 
 merely that lengths may be put end to end and repeated as many 
 times as is wished. Yery good ; but this author should consider 
 that to know that this repetition can always be made, is already to 
 know the infinite. 
 
236 
 
 7. The same author examines in his second volume the natural 
 theology of Father Malebranche ; but his performance appears to 
 me overdone, although he declares that he merely presents the 
 doubts of others. The Father saying that God is being in general, 
 this is taken for a vague and notional being, as is the genus in 
 logic ; and little more is needed to accuse Malebranche of atheism. 
 But I think that the Father understood not a vague and indeter- 
 minate being, but absolute being, which differs from particular 
 limited beings as absolute and boundless space differs from a circle 
 or square. 
 
 8. There is more likelihood of combating the opinion of Male- 
 branche on ideas. For there is no necessity (seemingly) ior taking 
 them for something external to us. It is sufficient to regard ideas 
 as notions, that is to say, as modifications of our soul. It is thus 
 that the schoolmen, Descartes, and Arnauld, regard them. But as 
 God is the source of possibilities and consequently of ideas, the 
 Father may be excused and even praised for having changed the 
 terms and given to ideas a more exalted signification, in distin- 
 guishing them from notions and in taking them for perfections in 
 God which we participate in by our knowledge. This mystical 
 language of the Father was not then necessary ; but I find it useful, 
 for it better brings before the mind our dependence on God. It 
 even seems that Plato, speaking of ideas, and St. Augustine, speak- 
 ing of truth, had kindred thoughts, which I find very remarkable ; 
 and this is the part of Malebranche' s system which I should like to 
 have retained, with the phrases and formulas which depend on it, 
 as I am very glad that the most solid part of the theology of the 
 mystics is preserved. And far from saying with the author of the 
 Refutation (Vol. 2, p. 304), that the system of St. Augustine is 
 d little infected with the language and opinimis of the Platonists / 
 I would say that it is thereby enriched and set in relief. 
 
 9. I say almost as much of the opinion of Father Malebranche 
 when he affirms that we see all things in God. I say that it is an 
 expression which may be excused and even praised, provided it be 
 rightly taken ; for it is easier to fall into mistake in this than in the 
 preceding article on ideas. It is, therefore, well to observe that not 
 only in Malebranche's system but also in mine, God alone is the 
 immediate external object of souls, exercising upon them a real 
 influence. And although the current school seems to admit other 
 
237 
 
 influences, by means of certain species, which it beheves that 
 objects convey into the soul, it does not fail to recognize that all 
 our perfections are a continual gift of God, and a limited participa- 
 tion in his iniinite perfection. This suffices to show that what 
 there is true and good in our knowledge is still an emanation from 
 the light of God, and that it is in this sense that it may be said, 
 that we see all things in God. 
 
 10. The third volume refutes the system of revealed theology of 
 Father Malebranche, in reference especially to grace and predestin- 
 ation. But as I have not sufficiently studied the particular theo- 
 logical opinions of the author, and as I think I have sufficiently 
 elucidated the matter in my essay La Theodicee, I excuse myself 
 from entering upon it at present. 
 
 It would now remain to speak to you, sir, of the natural theology 
 of the Lettres Chinois^ according to what the Jesuit Father Longo- 
 bardi and Father Antoine de St. Marie, of the Minorite order, 
 report to us thereon in the treatises which you have sent me, in 
 order to have my opinion of them ; as well as of the mode which 
 Reverend Father Malebranche has employed to give to a cultivated 
 Chinaman some insight into our theology. But this requires a sep- 
 arate letter ; this which I have just written being already sufficiently 
 long. Referring for the rest to my preceding letter, I am zealously, 
 sir, your very humble and very obedient servant, 
 
 Leibnitz. 
 Hanover, Nov. 4, 1715. 
 
XXXY. 
 
 Letters to Sam. Clarke. 
 
 Mr. Leibnitz's First Paper : Being an Extract of a Letter written 
 in November, 1715. 
 
 1. Natural religion itself seems to decay \in Englam.d^ very 
 much. Many will have Imman souls to be material : others make 
 God himself a corporeal Being. 
 
 2. Mr. Locke^ and his followers, are uncertain at least, whether 
 the soul be not material^ and naturally perishable. 
 
 3. Sir Isaac Newton says, that sj)ace is an organ, which God 
 makes use of to perceive things by. But if God stands in need of 
 any organ to perceive things by, it will follow, that they do not 
 depend altogether upon him, nor were produced by him. 
 
 4. Sir Isaac Newton, and his followers, have also a very odd 
 opinion concerning the work of God. According to their doctrine, 
 God Almighty wants to wind up his watch from time to time : 
 otherwise it would cease to move. He had not, it seems, sufficient 
 foresight to make it a perpetual motion. Nay, the machine of 
 God's making, is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen ; that 
 he is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary con- 
 course, and even to mend it, as a clockmaker mends his work ; who 
 must consequently be so much the more unskillful a workman, as 
 he is oftener obliged to mend his work and to set it right. Accord- 
 ing to my opinion, the same force and vigor remains always in 
 the world, and only passes from one part of matter to another, 
 agreeably to the laws of nature, and the beautiful jpre-estahlished 
 order. And 1 hold, that when God works miracles, he does not do 
 it in order to supply the wants of nature, but those of grace. Who- 
 ever thinks otherwise, must needs have a very mean notion of the 
 wisdom and power of God. 
 
239 
 
 Mr. Leibnitz's Second Paper : Being an Answer to Dr. Clarke's 
 
 First Eeply. 
 
 1. It is rightly observed in the paper delivered to the Princess 
 of Wales, which her Royal Highness has been pleased to com- 
 municate to me, that, next to corruption of manners, the princvples 
 of the materialists do very much contribute to keep up impiety. 
 But I believe the author had no reason to add, that the mathemati- 
 cal jprincijples ofj)hilosoj)hy are opposite to those of the materialists. 
 On the contrary, they are the same ; only with this difference, that 
 the materialists, in imitation of Democritus, Epicurus, and Hohhes, 
 confine themselves altogether to mathematical principles, and admit 
 only bodies;' whereas the Christian mathematicians admit also im- 
 material substances. Wherefore, not mathematical principles (ac- 
 cording to the usual sense of that word) but metaphysical princi- 
 ples ought to be opposed to those of the materialists. Pythagoras, 
 Plato, and Aristotle in some measure, had a knowledge of these 
 principles ; but I pretend to have established them demonstratively 
 in my Theodicma, though I have done it in a popular manner. 
 The great foundation of mathematics, is the principle of contradic- 
 tion or identity, that is, that a proposition cannot be true and false 
 at the same time ; and that therefore A is A, and cannot be not A. 
 This single principle is sufficient to demonstrate every part of 
 arithmetic and geometry, that is, all mathematical principles. But 
 in order to proceed from mathematics to natural philosophy, 
 another principle is requisite, as I have observed in my Theo- 
 dicoea : I mean, the principle of a sufficient reason, viz : that 
 nothing happens without a reason why it should be so, rather than 
 otherwise. And therefore Archimedes being desirous to proceed 
 from mathematics to natural 'philosophy, in his book De ^qtoilihrio^ 
 was obliged to make use of a particular case of the great principle 
 of a sufficient reason. He takes it for granted, that if there be a 
 halance, in which every thing is alike on both sides, and if equal 
 weights are hung on the two ends of that balance, the whole will 
 be at rest. 'Tis because no reason can be given, why one side- 
 should weigh down, rather than the other. Now, by that single 
 principle, viz : that the7'e ought to he a sicfficient reason why things 
 should he so, and not otherwise, one may demonstrate the being of 
 a God, and all the other parts of metaphysics or natural theology ; 
 and even, in some measure, those principles of natural philosophy^ 
 
240 
 
 that are independent upon mathematics : I mean, the dynamic 
 principles, or the jprinciples of force. 
 
 2. The author proceeds and sajs, that according to the mMJie- 
 matical jprincijples^ that is, according to Sir Isaac NewtorCs philos- 
 ophy (for 7rhathematical principles determine nothing in the pres- 
 ent case,) matter is the most inconsiderable part of the universe^ 
 The reason is, because he admits empty space, besides matter / and 
 because, according to his notions, matter fills up only a Yerj small 
 part of space. But Democritus and Epicurus maintained the 
 same thing : they differed from Sir Isaac Newton, only as to the 
 quantity of 'matter ; and perhaps they believed there was more 
 matter in the world, than Sir Isaac Newton will allow : wherein I 
 think their opinion ought to be preferred ; for, the more matter 
 there is, the more God has occasion to exercise his wisdom and 
 power. Which is one reason, among others, why I maintain that 
 there is no vacuum at all. 
 
 3. I find, in express words, in the Appendix to Sir Isaac New- 
 tovus Optics, that space is the sensorium of God. But the word 
 sensorium, hath always signified the organ of sensation. He, and 
 his friends, may now, if they think tit, explain themselves quite 
 otherwise : I shall not be against it. 
 
 4. The author supposes that ih.Q presence of the soul is sufficient 
 to make it perceive what passes in the brain. But this is the very 
 thing which Father Malehranche, and all the Cartesians deny ; 
 and they rightly deny it. More is requisite besides hare presence,. 
 to enable one thing to perceive what passes in another. Some 
 communication, that may be explained ; some sort of influence, is 
 requisite for this purpose. Space, according to Sir Isaac Newton, 
 is intimately present to the body contained in it, and commensu- 
 rate with it. Does it follow from thence, that space perceives what 
 passes in a body ; and remembers it, when that body is gone away ? 
 Besides, the soul being indivisible, it's immediate presence, which 
 may be imagined in the body, would only be in one point. How 
 then could it perceive what happens out of that point ? I pretend- 
 to be the first, who has shown how the soul perceives what passes 
 in the body. 
 
 5. The reason why God perceives every thing, is not his bare 
 presence, but also his operation. 'Tis because he preserves things 
 by an action, which continually produces whatever is good and 
 
241 
 
 perfect in them. But the soul having no immediate influence 
 over~the hody^ nor the hody over the soul, their mutual corres- 
 pondence cannot be explained by their being jpresent to each other. 
 
 6. The true and principal reason why we commend a machine, 
 is rather grounded upon the effects of the machine, than upon its 
 cause. We don't enquire so much about the jpower of the artist, 
 as we do about his shill in his workmanship. And therefore the 
 reason alleged by the author for extolling the machine of God's 
 making, grounded upon his having made it entirely, without want- 
 ing any materials to make it of ; that reason, I say, is not sufficient. 
 'Tis a mere shift the author has been forced to have recourse to : 
 and the reason why God exceeds any other artist, is not only 
 because he makes the whole, whereas all other artists must have 
 matter to work upon. This excellency in God, would be only on 
 the account of power. But God's excellency arises also from 
 another cause, viz : wisdom, whereby his machine lasts longer, and 
 moves more regularly, than those of any other artist whatsoever. 
 He who buys a watch, does not mind whether the workman made 
 every part of it himself, or whether he got the several parts made 
 by others, and did only put them together ; provided the watch 
 goes right. And if the workman had received from God even the 
 gift of creating the matter of the wheels ; yet the buyer of the 
 watch would not be satisfied, unless the workman had also received 
 the gift of putting them well together. In like manner, he who 
 will be pleased with God'^s workmanship, cannot be so, without 
 some other reason than that which the author has here alleged. 
 
 T. Thus the sMll of God must not be inferior to that of a work- 
 man ; nay, it must go infinitely beyond it. The bare production 
 of every thing, would indeed show the power of God ; but it 
 would not sufficiently show his wisdom. They who maintain the 
 contrary, will fall exactly into the error of the materialists, and of 
 Spinoza, from w^hom they profess to differ. They would, in such 
 case, acknowledge power, but not sufficient wisdom, in the princi- 
 ple or cause of all things. 
 
 8. I do not say, the material world is a machine, or watch, that 
 goes without God's interposition ; and I have sufficiently insisted, 
 that the creation wants to be continually influenced by its Creator, 
 But I maintain it to be a watch, that goes without wanting to be 
 mended by him : otherwise we must say, that God hethinhs himself 
 16 * 
 
242 
 
 again. No ; God has foreseen everything ; he has provided a 
 remedy for everything he/ore-hand ; there is in his works a har- 
 mony, a beauty, dlvQdi&y pre-established. 
 
 9. This opinion does not exclude God's Providence^ or his 
 government of the world : on the contrary, it makes it perfect. A 
 true Providence of God, requires a perfect foresight But then it 
 requires moreover, not only that he should have foreseen every- 
 thing ; but also that he should horve pi^ovided for everything before- 
 hand, with proper remedies : otherwise, he must want either wis- 
 dom to foresee things, or potver to provide against them. He will 
 be like the God of the Socinians, who lives only from day to day, 
 as Mr. Jurieu says. Indeed God, according to the Socinians, does 
 not so much as foresee inconveniences ; whereas, the gentlemen I 
 am arguing with, who put him upon mending his work, say only, 
 that he does not provide against them. But this seems to me to 
 be still a very great imperfection. According to this doctrine, 
 God must want either power, or good loill. 
 
 10. I don't think I can be rightly blamed, for saying that God 
 is intelligentia supramundana. Will they say, that he is intelli- 
 gentia mundana ; that is, the soul of the world f I hope not. 
 However, they will do well to take care not to fall into that notion 
 unawares. 
 
 11. The comparison of a king, under whose reign everything 
 should go on without his interposition, is . by no means to the 
 present purpose ; since God preserves everything continually, and 
 nothing can subsist without him. His kingdom therefore is not a 
 nominal one. 'Tis just as if one should say, that a king, who 
 ;should originally have taken care to have his subjects so well 
 educated, and should, by his care in providing for their subsistence, 
 preserve them so well in their fitness for their several stations, and 
 in their good affection towards him, as that he should have no 
 occasion ever to be amending anything amongst them ; would be 
 only a nominal king. 
 
 12. To conclude. If God is obliged to mend tlie course of 
 nature from time to time, it must be done either sicpernaturally 
 or naturally. If it be done supernaturally, we must have recourse 
 to miracles, in order to explain natural things : which is reducing 
 an hypothesis ad absurdum: for, everything may easily be 
 accounted for by miracles. But if it be done naturally, then God 
 
243 
 
 will not be hitelligentia siipramtrndam^a : he will be compre- 
 hended under the nature of things ; that is, he will be the soul of 
 the world. 
 
 Me. Leibnitz's Third Paper : Being an Answer to Dr. Clarke's 
 
 Second Reply. 
 
 1. According to the usual way of speaking, mathematical 
 principles concern only mere mathematics, viz : numbers, figures, 
 arithmetic, geometry. But metaphysical principles concern more 
 genei'al notions, such as are cause and effect. 
 
 2. The author grants me this important principle • that nothing 
 happens without a sufficient reason, why it should he so, rather 
 than otherwise. But he grants it only in words, and in reality 
 denies it. Which shows that he does not fully perceive the 
 strength of it. And therefore he makes use of an influence, which 
 exactly falls in with one of my demonstrations against real absolute 
 space, which is an idol of some modern Englishinen. I call it an 
 idol, not in a theological sense, but in a philosophical one ; as 
 Chancellor Bacon says, that there are idola trihus, idola specus. 
 
 3. These gentlemen maintain therefore, that space is a real 
 absolute being. But this involves them in great difficulties ; for 
 such a being must needs be eternal and infi/nite. Hence some have 
 believed it to be God himself, or, one of his attributes, his im- 
 mensity. But since space consists of jjarts, it is not a thing which 
 can belong to God. 
 
 4. As for my own opinion, I have said more than once, that I 
 hold space to be something merely relative, as time is ; that I hold 
 it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions. 
 For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things which 
 exist at the same time, considered as existing together • without 
 inquiring into their particular manner of existing. And when 
 many things are seen together, one perceives that order of things 
 among themselves. 
 
 5. I have many demonstrations, to confute the fancy of those 
 who take space to be a substance, or at least an absolute being. 
 But I shall only use, at the present, one demoiistrgiioiijjvhich the^ 
 author here gives me occasion to insist upon.^-MT say then, that if 
 space was an absolute being, there would something happen, for 
 which it would be impossible there should be a sufficient reason. 
 
244 
 
 "Which is against mj Axiom. And I prove it thus. Space is 
 something absolutely uniform ; and, without the things placed in 
 it, one point of space does, not absolutely differ in any respect 
 whatsoever from another point of space. Now from hence it fol- 
 lows, (supposing space to be something in itself, besides the order 
 of bodies among themselves,) that 'tis impossible there should be a 
 \ I reason, why God, preserving the same situations of bodies among 
 C I themselves, should have placed them in space after one certain par- 
 ticular unanner, 8ind not otherwise ; why everything was hot placed 
 the quite contrary way, for instance, by changing east into west. 
 But if space is nothing else, but that order or relation / and is 
 nothing at all without bodies, but the possibility of placing them ; 
 then those two states, the o?ie such as it now is, the other supposed 
 to be the quite contrary way, would not at all differ from one 
 another. Their difference therefore is only to be found in our 
 chimerical supposition of the reality of space in itself. But in 
 truth the one would exactly be the same thing as the other, they 
 being absolutely indiscernible ; and consequently there is no room 
 to enquire after a reason of the preference of the one to the other. 
 ^6. The case is the same wdth respect to time. Supposing any 
 one should ask, why God did not create everything a year sooner / 
 and the same person should infer from thence, that God has done 
 something, concerning which 'tis not possible there should be a^ 
 reason, why he did it so, and not otherwise : the answ^er is, that his 
 inference would be right, if time was any thing distinct from things 
 existing in time. For it would be impossible there should be any 
 reason, why things should be applied to such particular instants, 
 rather than to others, their succession continuing the same. But 
 then the same argument proves, tliat instants, considered without 
 the things, are nothing at all • and that they consist only in the 
 successive order of things : which order remaining the same, one of 
 ^he two states, viz. that of a supposed anticipation, would not at all 
 . !(differ, nor could be discerned from, the other which now is. 
 
 7. It appears from what I have said, that my axiom has not been 
 well understood ; and that the author denies it, tho' he seems to 
 grant it. ''Tistrue, says he, that there is nothing without a suf- 
 ficient reason why it is, and why it is thus, rather than otherwise : 
 but he adds, that this sufficient reason, is often the simple or mere 
 will of God : as, when it is asked why matter w^as not placed other- 
 
245 
 
 wise in space ; the same situations of bodies among themselves being 
 preserved. But this is plainly maintaining, that God wills some- 
 thing, without any sujficient reason for his will : against the axiom, 
 or the general rule of whatever happens. This is falling back into 
 the loose indifference^ which I have confuted at large, and showed 
 to be absolutely chimerical even in creatures, and contrary to the 
 wisdom of God, as if he could operate without acting by reason. 
 
 8. The author objects against me, that if we don't admit this 
 simple and mere will^ we take away from God the power of choosing, 
 and bring in a fatality. But the quite contrary is true. I maintain 
 that God has the power of clioosing, since I ground that power 
 upon the reason of a choice agreeable to his wisdom. And 'tis 
 not thisfatalfity^ (which is only the wisest order of Providence) but 
 a blind fatality br necessity^ void of all wisdom and choice, which 
 we ought to avoid. 
 
 9. I had observed, that by lessening the quantity of matter, ih^ 
 quantity of objects, upon which God may exercise his goodness, 
 will be lessen'd. The author answers, that instead of matter, there 
 are other things in the void space, on which God may exercise 
 his goodness. Be it so : tho' I don't grant it ; for I hold that every 
 created substance is attended with matter. However, let it be so : 
 I answer, that m.07'e matter was consistent with those same things ; 
 and consequently the said objects will be still lessened. The in- 
 stance of a greater number of men, or animals, is not to the pur- 
 pose ; for they would ^ZZ ujp place, in exclusion of other things. 
 
 10. It will be difficult to make me believe, that sensorium does 
 not, in its usual meaning, signify an organ of sensation. See the 
 words of Rudoljph'iis Goclenius^ in his Dictionarium Philosojph- 
 icum ; v. sensiterium. Barharum Scholasticorum, says he, qui 
 interdum sunt Simim Gra^corum. Hi dicunt ^Kid^rripLov. Ex 
 quo illifecerunt sensiterium pro sensorio, id est, organo sensationis, 
 
 11. The rrwrej^resence of a substance, even an animated one, is 
 not sufficient for perception. A blind man, and even a man whose 
 thoughts are w^andering, does not see. The author must explain, 
 how the soul perceives what is '?^^A^(_itself. 
 
 12. God is not present to things by situation, but \)^ essence: 
 his presence is manifested by his immediate operation. The pres- 
 ence of the soul is quite of another nature. To say that it is dif- 
 fused all over the body, is to make it extended and divisible. To 
 
246 
 
 say it is, the whole of it, in every part of the body, is to make it 
 divided from itself. To tix it to a pointy to diffuse it all over many 
 points, are only abusive expressions, idola tribus. 
 
 13. If active force should diminish in the universe, by the nat- 
 ural laws which God has established ; so that there should be need 
 for him to give a new impression in order to restore that force, like 
 an artist's mending the imperfections of his machine ; the disorder 
 would not only be with respect to us, but also with respect to God 
 himself. He might have prevented it, and taken better measures 
 to avoid sucli an inconvenience : and therefore, indeed, he has 
 actually done it. 
 
 14. When I said that God has provided remedies beforehand 
 against such disorders, I did not say that God suffers disorders to 
 happen, and then finds remedies for them ; but that he has found a 
 way beforehand to prevent any disorders happening. 
 
 15. The author strives in vain to criticize my expression, that 
 God is intelligentia supramiindana. To say that God is above the 
 world, is not denying that he is in the world. 
 
 16. I never gave any occasion to doubt, but that- God's conser- 
 vation is an actual preservation and continuation of the beings, 
 powers, orders, dispositions, and motions of all things : and I think 
 I have perhaps explained it better than many others. But, says 
 the author, §bis is all that I coiktendedfor. To this I answer; yoitr 
 humble servant for that, sir. Our dispute consists in many other 
 things. The question is, whether God does not act in the most 
 regular and ^no^i perfect manner? whether his machine is liable to 
 disorder, which he is obliged to mend by extraordinary means? 
 whether the will of God can act without reason f whether space is 
 an absolute being? also concerning the nature of miracles i and 
 many such things, which make a wide difference between us. 
 
 17. Divines will not grant the author's position against me, viz. 
 that there is no difference, with respect to God, between natural 
 and supernatural : and it will be still less approved by m.o^t philos- 
 ophers. There is a vast difference between these two things ; but it 
 plainly appears, it has not been duly consider'd. That which is 
 supernatural exceeds all the powers of creatures. I shall give an 
 instance, which I have often made use of with good success. If 
 God would cause a body to move free in the cether round about a 
 certain fixed center, without any other creature acting upon it : I 
 
24Y 
 
 say, it could not be done without a miracle / since it cannot be 
 explained by the nature of bodies. For, a free body does naturally 
 recede from a curve in the tangent. And therefore I maintain, 
 that the attraction of bodies, properly so called, is a miraculous 
 thing, since it cannot be explained by the nature of bodies. 
 
 Mr. Leibnitz's Fourth Paper ; Being an Answer to Dr. Clarke's 
 
 Third Keply. 
 
 1. In things ahsolutely indifferent^ there is no [foundation for] 
 choice ; and consequently no election, nor will ; since choice must 
 be founded on some 'reason^ or principle. 
 
 2. A mere will without any motive, is a fiction, not only con- 
 trary to God's perfection, but also chimerical and contradictory ; 
 inconsistent with the definition of the will^ and sufficiently con- 
 futed in my Theodiccea. 
 
 3. 'Tis a tiling indifferent^ to place three bodies, equal and per- 
 fectly alike, in any order whatsoever ; and consequently they will 
 never he placed in any order, by him who does nothing without 
 wisdom. But then, he being the author of things, no such things 
 will be produced hy him at all; and consequently there are no 
 such things in nature. 
 
 4. There is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible from 
 each other. An ingenious gentleman of my acquaintance, discours- 
 ing with me, in the presence of her Electoral Highness the Princess 
 Sophia, in the garden of Herrenhausen, thought he could find 
 two leaves perfectly alike. The princess defied him to do it, and 
 he ran all over the garden a long time to look for some ; but it 
 was to no purpose. Two drops of water, or milk, viewed with a 
 microscope, will appear distinguishable from each other. This is" 
 an argument against atoms ; which are confuted, as well as a 
 vacuum, by the principles of true metaphysics. 
 
 5. Those great principles of a sufficient reason, and of the iden- 
 tity of indiscernihles, change the state of metaphysics. That 
 science becomes real and demonstrative by means of these princi- 
 ples ; Avhereas before, it did generally consist in empty words. 
 
 6. To suppose two things indiscernihle, is to suppose the same 
 thing under two names. And therefore to suppose that the uni 
 verse could have had at first another position of time and place. 
 
 \ 
 
248 
 
 than that which it actually had ; and yet that all the parts of the 
 universe should have had the same situation among themselves, as 
 that which they actually had ; such a suppositioTi, I say, is an i'm- 
 ^ossihle fiction. 
 
 7. The same reason, which shows that extramundane space is 
 imaginary, proves that all empty space is an imaginary thing ; for 
 they differ only as greater and less. 
 
 8. If space is a property or attribute, it must be the property of 
 some substance. But what substance will that bounded empty 
 space be an affection or property of, which the persons I am argu- 
 ing with, suppose to be between two bodies ? 
 
 9. If infinite space is immensity, finite space will be the opposite 
 to immensity, that is, 'twill be mensur ability, or limited extension. 
 !Now extension must be the affection of some thing extended. But 
 if that space be empty, it will be an attribute ivithout a subject, an 
 extension without any thing extended. Wherefore by making 
 space a property, the author falls in with my opinion, which makes 
 it an order of things, and not any thing absolute. 
 
 10. If space is an absolute reality; far from being a property or 
 an accident opposed to substance, it will have a greater reality than 
 substances themselves. God cannot destroy it, nor even change it 
 in any respect. It will be not only immense in the whole, but also 
 immutable and eternal in every part. There will be an infinite 
 number of eternal things besides God. 
 
 11. To say that infinite space has no parts, is to say that it does 
 not consist of finite spaces ; and that infinite space might subsist, 
 though all finite space should be reduced to nothing. It would be, 
 as if one should say, in the Cartesian supposition of a material 
 extended unlimited world, that such a world might subsist, though 
 all the bodies of which it consists, should be reduced to nothing. 
 
 12. The author ascribes parts to space, p. 19 of the 3d edition of 
 his Defense of the Argument against Mr. Dodwell j and makes 
 them inseparable one from another. But, p. 30 of his Second 
 Defense, he says they are pa/rts improperly so-called : which may 
 be understood in a good sense. 
 
 13. To say that God can cause the whole universe to move for- 
 ward in a right line, or in any other line, without making other- 
 wise any alteration in it, is another chimerical supposition. For, 
 two states indiscernible from each other, are the same state ; and 
 
249 
 
 consequently, 'tis a change without any change. Besides, there is 
 neither rhyme nor reason in it. But God does nothing without 
 reason 'j and 'tis impossible there should be any here. Besides, it 
 would be agendo nihil agere, as I have just now said, because of 
 the indiscernibility. 
 
 14. These are idola tribus, mere chimeras, and superficial im- 
 aginations. All this is only grounded upon the supposition, that 
 imaginary space is real. 
 
 15. It is a like fiction, (that is) an impossible one, to suppose that 
 God might have created the world some millions of years sooner. 
 They who run into such kind of fictions, can give no answer to one 
 that should argue for the eternity of the world. For since God 
 does nothing without reason, and no reason can be given why he 
 did not create the world sooner ; it will follow, either that he has 
 created nothing at all, or that he created the world before any 
 assignable time, that is, that the world is eternal. But when once 
 it has been shown, that the beginning, whenever it was, is always 
 the same thing i the question, why it was not otherwise ordered, 
 becomes needless and insignificant. 
 
 16. If space and time were anything absolute, that is, if they 
 were anything else, besides certain orders of things ; then indeed 
 my assertion would be a contradiction. But since it is not so, the 
 hypothesis [that space and time are anything absolute\ is contra- \ 
 dictory, that is, 'tis an impossible fiction. -^ 
 
 17. And the case is the same as in geometry i where by the very 
 supposition that a figure is greater than it really is, we sometimes 
 prove that it is not greater. This indeed is a contradiction ; but it 
 lies in the hypothesis, which appears to be false for that very 
 reason. 
 
 18. Space being uniform, there can be neither any external nor 
 internal reason, by which to distinguish its parts, and to make any 
 choice among them. For, any external reason to discern between 
 them, can only be grounded upon some internal one. Otherwise 
 we should discern what is indiscernible, or choose without discern- 
 ing. A will without reason, would be the chance of the Epicu- 
 reans. A God, who sliould act by such a will, would be a God only 
 in name. The cause of these errors proceeds from want of care to 
 avoid what derogates from the divine perfections. 
 
250 
 
 19. When two things which cannot both be together, are equally 
 good ; and neither in themselves, nor by their combination with 
 other things, has the one any advantage over the other ; God will 
 produce neither of them. 
 
 20. God is never determined by external things, but always by 
 what is in himself; that is, by his knowledge of things, before any 
 thing exists without himself. 
 
 21. There is no possible reason, that can lirrdt the quantity of 
 matter ; and therefore such limitation can have no place. 
 
 22. And supposing an arbitrary limitation of the quantity of 
 matter, something might always be added to it without derogating 
 from the perfection of those things which do already exist ; and 
 consequently something must always be added, in order to act 
 according to the principle of the perfection of the divine opera- 
 tions. 
 
 23. And therefore it cannot be said, that the present quantity of 
 matter is the fittest for the present constitution of things. And 
 supposing it were, it would follow that this present constitution of 
 things would not be the fittest absolutely, if it hinders God from 
 using more matter. It were therefore better to choose another con- 
 stitution of things, capable of something more. 
 
 24. I should be glad to see a passage of any philosopher, who 
 takes sensor iumj in any other sense than Godenius does. 
 
 25. If Scapula says that sensoriitm is the place in which the 
 understanding resides, he means by it the organ of internal sensa- 
 tion. And therefore he does not differ from Godenius. 
 
 26. Sensorium has always signified the organ of sensation. The 
 glandula penealis would be, according to Ca/rtesius, the sensorium^ 
 in the above-mentioned sense of Scapula. 
 
 27. There is hardly any expression less proper upon this subject, 
 than that which makes God to have a sensorium. It seems to make 
 God the sold of the world. And it will be a hard matter to put a 
 justifiable sense upon this word, according to the use Sir Isaac 
 JSewton makes of it. 
 
 28. Though the question be about the sense put upon that word 
 by Sir Isaac Newton^ and not by Godenius; yet I am not to blame 
 for quoting the philosophical dictionary of that author, because the 
 design of dictionaries is to show the use of words. 
 
251 
 
 29. God perceives things in himself. Space is the place of 
 things, and not the place of God's ideas: unless we look upon 
 space as something that makes an union between God and things, 
 in imitation of the imagined union between the soul and the body ; 
 which would still make God the soul of the world. 
 
 30. And indeed the author is much in the wrong, when he com- 
 pares God^s knowledge and operation, with the knowledge and 
 operation of souls. The soul knows things, because God has put 
 into it a prineiple representative of things without. But God 
 knows things, because he produces them continually. 
 
 31. The soul does not act upon things, according to my opinion, 
 any otherwise than because the body adapts itself to the desires of 
 the soul, by virtue of the harmony, which God has pre-established 
 between them. 
 
 32. But they who fancy that the soul can give a new force to the 
 body ; and that God does the same in the world, in order to mend 
 the imperfections of his machine ; make God too much like the 
 soul, by ascribing too much to the soul, and too little to God. 
 
 33. For, none but God can give a new force to nature ; and he ^ 
 does it only supernaturally. If there was need for him to do it in 
 the natural course of things ; he would have made a very imper- 
 fect work. At that rate, he would be with respect to the world, 
 what the soul, in the vulgar notion, is with respect to the body. 
 
 34. Those who undertake to defend the vulgar opinion concern- 
 ing the soul's influence over the body, by instancing in God's op- 
 erating on things external ; make God still too much like a soul of 
 the world. To which I add, that the author's affecting to find fault 
 with the words, intelligentia supramundana, seems also to incline 
 that way. 
 
 35. The images, w4th which the soul is immediately affected, are 
 within itself; but they correspond to those of the body. The 
 presence of the soul is imperfect, and can only be explained by that 
 correspondence. But the presence of God is perfect, and mani- 
 fested by his operation. 
 
 36. The author wrongly supposes against me, that the presence 
 of the soul is connected with its influence over the body ; for he 
 knows, I reject that influence. 
 
 37. The soul's being diffused through the hrain, is no less inex- 
 plicable, than its bei^ diffused through the whole body. The 
 difference is only in ram^e and less. 
 
252 
 
 38. They who fancy that active force lessens of itself in the 
 world, do not well understand the principal laws of nature, and the 
 l)eauty of the works of God. 
 
 39. How will they be able to prove, that this defect is a conse- 
 quence of the dependence of things ? 
 
 40. The imperfection of our macliines, which is the reason why 
 they want to be mended, proceeds from this very thing, that they 
 do not sufficiently depend upon the workman. And therefore the 
 dependence of nature upon God, far from being the cause of such 
 an imperfection, is rather the reason why there is no such imper- 
 fection in nature, because it depends so much upon an artist, who 
 is too perfect to make a work that wants to be mended. 'Tis true 
 that every particular machine of nature, is, in some measure, liable 
 to be disordered ; but not the whole unive^'se^ which cannot 
 diminish in perfection. 
 
 41. The author contends, that space does not depend upon the 
 situation of hodies. I answer : 'Tis true, it does not depend upon 
 such or such a situation of bodies ; but it is that order, which 
 renders bodies capable of being situated, and by which they have a 
 situation among themselves when they exist together ^ as ti7ae is 
 khat order, with respect to their successive position. But if there 
 Were no creatures, space and time would be only in the ideas of 
 God. 
 
 42. The author seems to acknowledge here, that his notion of a 
 miracle is not the same with that which divines and philosophers 
 usually have. It is therefore sufficient for my purpose, that my 
 adversaries are obliged to have recourse to what is conunonly called 
 a miracle. 
 
 43. I am afraid the author, by altering the sense commonly put 
 upon the word miracle, w411 fall into an inconvenient opinion. The 
 nature of a miracle does not at all consist in usefulness or tmuseful- 
 ness ; for then m^onsters would be miracles. 
 
 44. There are miracles of an inferior sort, which an angel can 
 work. He can, for instance, make a man walk upon the water 
 without sinking. But there are miracles, which none but God can 
 work ; they exceeding all natural powers. Of which kind, are 
 creating and annihilating. 
 
 45. 'Tis also a supernatural thing, that bodies should attract one 
 another at a distance, without any intermediate means ; and that a 
 
253 
 
 body should move around, without receding in the tangent, though 
 nothing hinder it from so receding. For these effects cannot be ex- 
 plained by the nature of things. 
 
 46. Why should it be impossible to explain the motion of animals 
 by natural forces ? Though indeed, the heginning of animals is no 
 less inexplicable by natural forces, than the beginning of the world. 
 
 P. S. — All those who maintain a vactium^ are more influenced by i 
 imagination than by reason. When I was a young man, /also i 
 gave in to the notion of o.. vacuum and atoms ; but reason brought 
 me into the right way. It was a pleasing imagination. Men carry 
 their inquiries no farther than those two things : they (as it were) 
 nail down their thoughts to them : they fancy, they have found out 
 the first elements of things, a non plus ultra. We would have na- 
 ture to go no farther ; and to be finite, as our minds are : but this is 
 being ignorant of the greatness and majesty of the author of things. 
 The least corpuscle is actually subdivided m infinitum^ and contains 
 a world of other creatures, which would be wanting in the universe, 
 if that corpuscle was an atom, that is, a body of one entire piece, 
 without subdivision. In like manner, to admit a vacuum in nature,'! 
 is ascribing to God a very imperfect work : 'tis violating the grand \ 
 principle of the necessity of a sufficient reason ; which many have \ 
 talked of, without understanding its true meaning ; as I have lately 
 shown, in proving, by that principle, that space is only an order of 
 things, as time also is, and not at all an absolute being. To omit 
 many other arguments against a vacuum and atoms, I shall 
 here mention those which I ground upon GocVs perfection, and 
 upon the necessity of a sufficient reason. I lay it down as a principle, 
 that every perfection, which God could impart to things without 
 derogating from their other perfections, has actually been imparted 
 to them. Now, let us fancy a space wholly empty. God couldT) 
 have placed some matter in it, without derogating in any respect \ 
 from all other things : therefore he hath actually placed some matter 
 in that space : therefore, there is no space wholly empty : there- 
 fore all is full. The same argument proves that there is no cor- 
 puscle, but what is subdivided. I shall add another argument, 
 grounded upon the necessity 'of a sufficient reasmi. 'Tis impossible 
 there should be any principle to determine what proportion of 
 matter there ought to be, out of all the possible degrees from a 
 plenum to a vacuum, or from a vacuum to a plenum,. Perhaps it 
 
254 
 
 will be said, that the one should be equal to the other : but, because 
 matter is more perfect than a vacuuwj, reason requires that a 
 geometrical proportion should be observed, and that there should 
 be as much more matter than vacutim^ as the former deserves to 
 have tlie preference before the latter. But then there must be no 
 vacuum at all ; for the perfection of matter is to that of a vacuum, 
 as something to nothing. And the case is the same with atoms: 
 What reason can any one assign for confining nature in the pro- 
 gression of subdivision \ These are fictions merely arbitrary, and 
 unworthy of true philosophy. The reasons alleged for a vacimm, 
 are mere sophisms. 
 
 Mr. Leibnitz's Fifth Paper : Being an answer to Dr. Clarke's 
 
 Fourth Reply. 
 
 To § 1 and 2, of the foregoing paper [Clarke's Fourth Reply.] 
 
 1. I shall at this time make a larger answer ; to clear the difficul- 
 ties ; and to try whether the author be willing to hearken to reason, 
 and to show that he is a lover of truth ; or whether he will only 
 cavil, without clearing anything. 
 
 2. He often endeavors to impute to me necessity and fatality ; 
 though perhaps no one has better and more fully explained, than I 
 have done in my Theodiccea, the true difference between liberty, 
 contingency, spontaneity, on the one side ; and absolute necessity, 
 chance, coaction, on lilie other. I know not yet, whether the author 
 does this, because he will do it, whatever I may say ; or whether he 
 does it, (supposing him sincere in those imputations,) because he has 
 not yet duly considered my opinions. I shall soon find what I am 
 to think of it, and I shall take my measures accordingly. 
 
 3. It is true, that reason in the mi^id of a wise being, and motives 
 in any mind whatsoever, do that which answers to the effect pro- 
 duced by weights in a balance. The author objects, that this 
 notion leads to necessity and fatality. But he says so, without 
 proving it, and without taking notice of the explications I have 
 formerly given, in order to remove the difficulties that may be raised 
 upon that head. 
 
 4. He seems also to play with equivocal terms. There are neces- 
 sities, which ought to be admitted. For we must distinguish be- 
 tween an absolute and an hypothetical necessity. We must also dis- 
 
tinguish between a necessit/y^ which takes place because the opposite^ 
 implies a contradiction ; (which necessity is called logical^ rnetd- 
 physical^ or mathematical;^ and a necessity which is moral, 
 whereby a wise being chooses the best, and every mind follows the 
 strongest inclination. 
 
 5. Hypothetical necessity is that, which the supposition or 
 hypothesis of God's foresight and pre-ordination lays upon future 
 contingents. And this must needs be admitted, unless we deny, as 
 the Socinians do, God's foreknowledge of future contingents^ and 
 }i\Q providence which regulates and governs every particular thing. 
 
 ^. But neither that foreknowledge, nor that pre-ordination, 
 derogate from liberty. For God, being moved by his supreme 
 reason to choose, among many series of things or worlds possible, 
 that, ij i which f r ee creatures shou l d take such or such resolutions, 
 though not without his concourse ; has thereby rendered every 
 event certain and determined once for all; without derogating 
 thereby from the liberty of those creatures : that simple decree of 
 choice, not at all changing, but only actualizing their free natures, 
 which he saw in his ideas. 
 
 7. As for moral necessity, this also does not derogate from Uherty. 
 For when a wise being, and especially God, who has supreme 
 wisdom, chooses what is best, he is not the less free upon that ac- 
 count : on the contrary, it is the most perfect liberty, not to be 
 hindered from acting: in the best manner. And when any other 
 chooses according to the most apparent and the most strongly in- 
 clining good, he imitates therein the liberty of a truly wise being, 
 in proportion to his disposition. Without this, the choice would be 
 a blind chance. 
 
 8. But good, either true or apparent; in a word, the motive, 
 inclines without necessitating ; that is, without imposing an ahsohcte 
 necessity. For when God (fo r instance,) chooses the best ; what he 
 does not chooSe, and is liTTenor in perfection, is nevertheless possi- 
 ble. /(QBut if what he chooses, was absolutely necessary ; any other 
 wa/Vould be impossible : which is against the hypothesis. For 
 God chooses among possibles, that is, among many ways, none of 
 which implies a contradiction. • 
 
 9. But to say, that God can only choose what is hest ; and to 
 infer from thence, that what he does not choose, is impossible ; 
 this, I say, is confounding of terms : 'tis blending power and will, 
 
256 
 
 metaphysical necessity and moral necessity^ essences and existences. 
 For what is necessa/ry, is so by its essence, since the opposite implies 
 a contradiction ; but a contingent which exists, owes its existence to 
 the jprinciple of what is hest, which is a sufficient reason for the 
 existence of things. And therefore I say, that motives incline 
 without necessitating ; and that there is a certainty and infallibility, 
 but not an absolute necessity in contingent things. Add to this, 
 what will be said hereafter, Nos. Y3 and 76. 
 A 10. And I have sufficiently shown in my TheodiccBa, that this 
 '/ moral necessity is a good thing, agreeable to the divine perfection ; 
 agreeable to the great principle or ground of existences^ which is 
 that of the want of a sufficient reason: whereas ahsolute and 
 metaphysical necessity^ depends upon the other great principle of 
 our reasonings, viz. that of essences / that is, the principle of iden-^ 
 tity or contradiction : for what is absolutely necessary, is the only 
 possible way, and its contrary implies a contradiction. 
 
 11. I have also shown, that our will does not always exactly 
 follow the practical understanding ; because it may have or find 
 reasons to suspend its resolution till a further examination. 
 
 12. To impute to me after this, the notion of an absolute necessity^ 
 without having anything to say against the reasons which I have 
 just now alleged, and which go to the bottom of things, perhaps 
 beyond what is to be seen elsewhere ; this, I say, will be an unrea- 
 sonable obstinacy. 
 
 13. As to the notion of fatality^ which the author lays also to 
 my charge ; this is another ambiguity. There is a fatiim. Mahom- 
 etanum, dofatuin stoicum^ and ?ifatwn Christianum. The Turkish 
 
 ^ fate will have an effect to happen, even though its cause should be 
 avoided ; as if there was an absolute necessity. The Stoical fate 
 will have a man to be quiet, because he must have patience wliether 
 he will or not, since 'tis impossible to resist the course of things. 
 But 'tis agreed, that there is fatmn Christianum^ a certain destiny 
 of every thing, regulated by the foreknowledge and providence of 
 God. Fatum is derived from fari ; that is to pronounce^ to decree; 
 and in its right sense, it signifies the decree of providence. And 
 those who submit to it through a knowledge of the divine perfec- 
 tions, whereof the love of God is a consequence ; have not only 
 patience, like the heathen philosophers, but (are also contented with 
 what is ordained by God, knowing lie does every thing for the best : 
 
257 
 
 and not only for the greatest good in general, but also for the 
 greatest particular good of those who love him. 
 
 14. I have been obliged to enlarge, in order to remove ill- 
 grounded imputations once for all ; as I hope I shall be able to do 
 by these explications, so as to satisfy equitable persons. I shall 
 now come to an objeatMiHOu- raised here, against my comparing the 
 weights of a halance with the motives of the will. 'Tis objected, 
 i^oidi^ 'balance is merely passive^ and moved by-ihe, :^eights ; 
 whereas agents intelligent, and endowed with will, are active. To 
 this I answer, that i^e principle of the want of a sufficient reason 
 is common both to agents and patients: they want a sufficient 
 reason of their action^ as well as of their passion. A halance does 
 not only not act, when it is equally pulled on both sides ;. but the 
 equal weights likewise do not act when they are in an equilibrium^ 
 so that one of them cannot go down without the other's rising up as 
 much. 
 
 15. It must also be considered, that, properly speaking, motives 
 do not act upon the mind, as weights do upon a balance ; but 'tis 
 rather the mind that acts by virtue of the motives, which are its 
 dispositions to act. And therefore to pretend, as the author does 
 here, that the mind prefers sometimes weak motives to strong ones, 
 and even that it prefers that which is indifferent before motives : 
 this, I say, is to divide the mind from the motives, as if they were 
 without the mind., as the weight is distinct from the balance ; and 
 as if the mind had, besides rnotives, other dispositions to act, by 
 virtue of which it could reject or • accept the motives. Whereas, in 
 truth, the motives comprehend all tite dispositions, which the mind 
 can have to act voluntarily ; for they inchide not only the reasons, 
 but also the inclinations arising from passions, or other preceding 
 impressions. AVherefore, if the mind should prefer a weak inclin- 
 ation to a strong one, it would act against itself, and otherwise than 
 it is disposed to act. Which shows that the author's notions, con- 
 trary to mine, are superficial, and appear to have no solidity in 
 them, when they are well considered. 
 
 16. To assert also, that the mind may have good reasons to act, 
 when it has no motives, and when things are absolutely iiidiffei'ent, 
 as the author explains liimself here ; this, I say, is a manifest con- 
 tradiction. For if the mind has good reasons for taking the pa/rt 
 it takes, then the things are not indifferent to the mind. 
 
 17 • 
 
258 
 
 17. And to affirm that the mind will act, when it has reasons to 
 act, even though the ways of acting were ahsohctely indifferent : 
 this, I say, is to speak again very superficially, and in a manner 
 that cannot be defended. For a man never has a sufficient reason 
 to act^ when he has not also a sufficient reason to act in a certain 
 particular manrier ; every action being individual, and not general, 
 nor abstract from its circumstances, but always needing some par- 
 ticular w^ay of being put in execution. Wherefore, when there is 
 a sufficient reason to do any particular thing, there is also a sufficient 
 reason to do it in a certain particular manner ; and consequently, 
 several manners of doing it are not indifferent. As often as a man 
 has sufficient reasons for a single action, he has also sufficient reasons 
 for all its requisites. See also what I shall say below, No. ^^. 
 
 18. These arguments are very obvious : and 'tis very strange to 
 charge me with advancing my principle of the want of a sufficient 
 reason^ without any proof drawn either from the nature of things, 
 or from the divine perfections. For the nature of things requires, 
 that every event should have beforehand its proper conditions, 
 requisites, and dispositions, the existence whereof makes the suffi- 
 cient reason of such event. 
 
 19. And GoWs perfection requires, that all his actions should be 
 agreeable to his wisdom ; and that it may not be said of him, that 
 he has ^cted without reason ; or even that he has preferred a weaker 
 reason before a stronger. 
 
 20. But I shall speak more largely at the conclusion of this paper, 
 concerning the solidity and importance of this great principle, of 
 the %oant of a sufficient reason in order to every event ; the over- 
 throwing of which principle, would overthrow the best part of all 
 philosophy. 'Tis therefore very strange that the author should say, 
 I am herein guilty of a petitio principii ; and it plainly appears 
 lie is desirous to maintain indefensible opinions, since he is reduced 
 to deny that great principle, which is one of the most essential 
 principles of reason. 
 
 To § 3 and 4. 
 ^1. It must be confessed, that tliough this great principle has 
 "been acknowledged, yet it has not been sufficiently made use of. 
 Which is, in great measure, the reason why the priiyia philosophia 
 lias not been hitherto so fruitful and demonstrative, as it should 
 have been. I infer from that principle, among other consequences, 
 
259 
 
 that there are not in nature two real, absolute beings, indiscernihle^x'Xi.'^ 
 
 from each other ; because if there were, God and nature would act " 
 
 without reason, in ordering the one otherwise than the other ; and 
 that therefore God does not produce two pieces of matter perfectly 
 equal and alike. The author answers this conclusion, without con- 
 futing the reason of it ; and he answers with a very weak objec- 
 tion. That argument^ says he, if it was good, would prove that it 
 would he imposs'Me for God to create any matter at all. For, the^ 
 perfectly solid parts of matter, if we tahe them of equal figure and\ 
 dimensions, (which is always possible in supposition), would he 
 exactly alike. But 'tis a manifest petitio principii to suppose that 
 perfect likeness, which, according to me, cannot be admitted. This 
 supposition of \^no indiscernihles, such as two pieces of matter per- 
 fectly alike, seems indeed to be possible in abstract terms ; but it 
 is not consistent with the order of things, nor with the divine wis- 
 dom, by which nothing is admitted without reason. The vulgar 
 fancy such things, because they content themselves with incomplete 
 notions. And this is one of the faults of the atomists. 
 
 22. Besides ; I don't admit in matter, parts perfectly solid, or 
 that are the same throughout, without any variety or particular 
 WjOtion in their parts, as the pretended atoms are imagined to be. 
 To suppose such bodies, is another popular opinion ill-grounded. 
 According to my demonstrations, every part of matter is actually 
 subdivided into parts-differently moved, and no one of them is per- 
 fectly like another. 
 
 23. I said, that in sensible things, two, that are indiscernible 
 from each other, can never be found ; that (for instance) two leaves 
 in a garden, or two drops of water, perfectly alike, are not to be 
 found. The author acknowledges it as to lea/oes, 2.rA perhaps 
 as to drops of water. But he might have admitted it, without any 
 hesitation, without a perhaps, (an Italian would say, senzd forse^ 
 as to drops of water likewise. 
 
 24. I believe that these general observations in things sensible 
 hold also in proportion in things insensible, and that one may say 
 in this respect, what harlequin says in the Emperor of the Moon ; 
 His there, just as His here. And 'tis a great objection against indis- 
 cernihles, that no instance of them is to be found. But the author 
 opposes this consequence, because (says he) sensible bodies are com- 
 pounded ; whereas he maintains there are insensible bodies which 
 
260 
 
 / ; are simple. I answer again that I don't admit simple bodies. 
 
 ' I There is nothing simple^ in my opinion, but true monads., which 
 ^""^X have neither parts nor extension. Simple bodies, and even perfectly 
 similar ones, are a consequence of the false hypothesis of a vacttum 
 and of atoms, or of lazy philosophy, which does not sufficiently 
 carry on the analysis of things, and fancies it can attain to the first 
 material elements of nature, because our imagination would be 
 therewith satisfied. 
 
 25. "WTien I deny that there are two drops of water perfectly 
 alike, or any two other bodies indiscernihle from each other ; I 
 don't say, 'tis absolutely impossible to suppose them ; but that 'tis 
 
 > ' a thing contrary to the divine wisdom, and which consequently 
 does not exist. 
 
 To § 5 and 6. 
 
 26. I own, that if two things perfectly indiscernihle from each 
 other did exist, they would be two ; but that supposition is false, 
 and contrary to the grand principle of reason. The vulgar phi- 
 losophers were mistaken, when they believed that there are things 
 different solo mimero, or only because they are two; and from 
 this error have arisen their perplexities about what they called 
 the prinGiple of individuation. Metaphysics have generally been 
 handled like a science of mere words, like a philosophical diction- 
 ary, without entering into the discussion of things. Superficial 
 philosophy, such as is that of the atomists and "vacuists, forges 
 things, which superior reasons do not admit. I hope my demon- 
 strations will change the face of philosophy, notwithstanding such 
 weak objections as the author raises here against me. 
 
 ^ 2Y. The parts of tivie or place, considered in themselves, are 
 ''- ideal things ; and therefore they perfectly resemble one another, 
 "^ like to abstract units. But it is not so with two concrete ones, or 
 ( with two real times, or two spaces filled up, that is, truly actical. 
 28. I don't say that two points of space are one and the same 
 point, nor that two instants of time are one and the same in- 
 stant, as the author seems to charge me with saying. But a man 
 may fancy, for want of knowledge, that there are two different 
 instants, where there is but one : in like manner as I observed in 
 the 17th paragraph of the foregoing answer, that frequently in 
 geometry we suppose two, in order to represent the error of a gain- 
 sayer, when there is really but one. If any man should suppose 
 
261 
 
 that a right line cuts another in two points ; it will be found after 
 all, that those two pretended points must coincide, and n:ake but 
 one point. __ 
 
 29. I have demonstrated, that space is nothing else but an order 
 of the existence of things, observed as existing together ; and there- 
 fore the fiction of a material finite universe, moving forward in an 
 infinite empty space, cannot be admitted. It is altogether unrea- 
 sonable and impracticable. For, besides that there is no real space 
 out of the material universe ; such an action would be without any ^ 
 design in it : it would be working without doing anything, agendo 
 nihil agere. There would happen no change, which could be ob- 
 served by any person whatsoever. These are imaginations of 
 philosophers who have incomplete notions, who make space an abso- 
 lute reality. Mere mathematicians, who are only taken up with the 
 conceits of imagination, are apt to forge such notions ; but they are 
 destroyed by superior reasons. 
 
 30. Absolutely speaking, it appears that God can make the ma- 
 terial universe Jmite in extension ; but the contrary appears more 
 agreeable to his wisdom. 
 
 31. I don't grant, that every finite is movable. According to 
 the hypothesis of my adversaries themselves, a part of space, 
 though finite, is not movable. What is movable, must be capable 
 of changing its situation with respect to something else, and to be 
 in a new state disceriiible from the first : otherwise the change is \ 
 but a fiction. A movable finite, must therefore make part of | 
 another finite, that any change may hap23en which can be observed. 
 
 32. Cartesins maintains, that matter is unlimited ; and I dorCt 
 think he has been sufiiciently confuted. And though this be 
 granted him, yet it does not follow that matter would be necessary, 
 nor that it would have existed from all eternity / since that un- 
 limited diffusion of matter, would only be an effect of God's choice 
 judging that to be the better. 
 
 To §7. 
 
 33. Since space in itself is an ideal thing, like time • space out 
 of the world must needs be imaginary, as the schoolmen themselves 
 have acknowledged. The case is the same with empty space within \ 
 the world ; which I take also to be imaginary, for the reasons before j 
 alleged. ^ 
 
. 262 
 
 34. The author objects against me the vacuum discovered bj Mr. 
 Guevike of Magdeburg^ which is made by pumping the air out of 
 a receiver ; and he pretends that there is truly a perfect vacuum^ or 
 a space without matter (at least in part), in that receiver. The 
 Aristotelicms and Cartesians, who do not admit a true vacuum 
 have said in answer to that experiment of Mr. GtieriJce, as well as 
 to that of Torricellius of Florence (who emptied the air out of a 
 glass-tube by the help of quicksilver), that there is no vacuum at 
 all in the tube or in the receiver : since glass has small pores, which 
 the beams of light, the effluvia of the loadstone, and other very 
 thin fluids may go through. I am of their opinion : and I think 
 the receiver may be compared to a box* full of holes in the water, 
 having fish or other gross bodies shut up in it ; which being taken 
 out, their place would nevertheless be filled up with water. There 
 is only this difference ; that though water be fluid and more yield- 
 ing than those gross bodies, yet it is as heavy and massive, if not 
 more, than they ; whereas the matter which gets into the receiver 
 in the room of the air, is much more subtile. The new sticklers for 
 a vacuum allege in answer to this instance, that it is not the gross- 
 ness of matter, but its mere guantity, that makes resistance ; and 
 consequently that there is of necessity more vacuum,, where there 
 is less resistance. They add, that the subtileness of matters has 
 nothing to do here ; and that the ]3articles of guicJcsilver are as 
 subtile and fine as those of water ; and yet that quicksilver resists 
 above ten times more. To this I reply, that it is not so much the 
 quantity of matter, as its difficulty of giving place, that makes 
 resistance. For instance ; floating timber contains less of heavy 
 matter, than an equal bulk of water does ; and yet it makes 7nore 
 resistance to a boat, than the water does. 
 
 35. And as for quicksilver ; 'tis true, it contains about fourteen 
 times more of heavy matter, than an equal bulk of water does ; 
 but it does not follow, that it contains fourteen times more matter 
 absolutely. On the contrary, i^a^^r contains as much matter ; if we 
 include both its own matter, which is heavy ; and the extraneous 
 matter void of heaviness, which passes through its pores. For, both 
 quicksilver and water, are masses of heavy matter, full of pores, 
 through which there passes a great deal of matter void of heaviness 
 [and which does not sensibly resist] ; such as is probably that of 
 the rays of light, and other insensible fluids ; and especially that 
 
263 
 
 which is itself the cause of the gravity of gross bodies, by receding 
 from the center towards which it drives those bodies. For, it is a 
 strange imagination to make all matter gravitate, and that towards 
 all other matter, as if each body did equally attract every other body 
 according to their masses and distances ; and this by an attraction 
 properly so called, which is not derived from an occult impulse of 
 bodies : whereas the gravity of sensible bodies towards the center of 
 the earth, ought to be produced by the motion of some fluid. And 
 the case must be the same with other gravities, such as is that of the 
 planets towards the sun or towards each other. [A body is never 
 moved naturally except by another body which impels it by touch- 
 ing it ; and afterwards it advances until it is stopped by another 
 body which touches it. Every other operation on bodies is either 
 miraculous or imaginary.] 
 
 To S 8 and 9. _ 
 
 36. I objected, that space, taken for something real and absolute / 
 without bodies, would be a thing eternal, impassible, and indepen- / 
 dent upon God. The author endeavors to elude this difficulty, by 
 saying that space is a property of God. In answer to this, I have 
 said, in my foregoing paper, that the property of God is immensity / 
 but that space (which is often commensurate with bodies), and God's; 
 immensity, are not the same thing. ^ 
 
 37. I objected further, that if space be a property, and infinite \ 
 space be the immensity of God ; finite space will be the extension 
 or mensnrability of something finite. And therefore the space 
 taken up by a hody^ will be the extension of that hody. Which ift 
 an absurdity ; since a body can change space^ but cannot leave its 
 exterision. 
 
 38. I asked also : if space is a property, what thing will an y 
 empty limited space, (such as th^ which my adversary imagines in 
 
 an exhausted receiver), be the property of ? It does not appear rea- 
 sonable to say, that this empty space either round or square, is a 
 property of God. Will it be then perhaps the property of some 
 immaterial, extended, imaginary substances, which the author seems 
 to fancy in the imaginary spaces ? 
 
 39. If space is the property or affection of the substance, which 
 is in space ; the same space will be sometimes the affection of one 
 
264 
 
 "^ody^ sometimes of another hody^ sometimes of an immaterial sub- 
 jstance, and sometimes perliaps of God himself, when it is void of 
 all other substance material or immaterial. But this is a strange 
 property or affection, which passes from one suhject to another. 
 (Thus subjects will leave oif their accidents, like clothes ; that other 
 subjects may put them on. At this rate, how shall we distinguish 
 accidents and substances ? 
 
 40. And if limited spaces are the affections of limited substances^ 
 which are in them ; and infinite space be a property of God ; a 
 property of God must (which is very strange), be made up of the 
 affections of creatures ; for all finite spaces taken together make up 
 infinite space. 
 
 41. But if the author denies, that limited space is an affection 
 of limited things / it will not be reasonable neither, that infi/nite 
 space should be the affection or property of an infinite thing. I 
 have suggested all these difficulties in my foregoing paper ; but it 
 does not appear that the author has endeavored to answer them. 
 
 C ^ 42. I have still other reasons against this strange imagination, 
 that space is a property of God. If it be so, space belongs to the 
 
 ^ essence of God. But space has parts : therefore there would be 
 pa7'ts in the essence of God. Spectatum admissi. 
 ^ 43. Moreover, spaces are sometimes empty, and sometimes filled 
 up. Therefore there will be in the essence of God, parts some- 
 times empty and sometimes full, and consequently liable to a per- 
 petual change. Bodies, filling up space, would fill up part of God's 
 essence, and would be commensurate with it ; and in the supposi- 
 tion of a vacuum, part of God's essence will be within the receiver. 
 Such a God having parts, will very much resemble the Stoic^s 
 God, which wag the whole universe considered as a divine animal. 
 
 44. If infinite space is God's immensity, infinite time will be 
 God's eternity ; and therefore we must say, that what is in space, 
 
 / is in God's immensity, and consequently in his essence ; and that 
 
 \ what is in time, is also in the essence of God. Strange expressions ; 
 
 \^ which plainly show, that the author makes a wrong use of terms. 
 
 45. I shall give another instance of this. God's immensity makes 
 liim actually present in all spaces. But now if God is in space, 
 
 / how can it be said that space is in God, or that it is a property of 
 > God ? We have often heard, that a property is in its subject ; but 
 
265:? 
 
 we never heard, that a subject is in its property. In like manner, ) 
 Ood exists in all time. How then can time be in God ; and how ) 
 can it be a property of God ? These are perpetual aZZ^^Zo^^.^^^. _j 
 
 46. It appears that the author confounds immensity, or the exten- I 
 mon of things^ with the space according to which that extension is \ 
 taken. Infinite space is not the immensity of God ; finite space is\ 
 not the extension of bodies : as time is not their duration. Things y 
 keep their extension, but they do not always keep their space. ^ 
 Everything has its own extension, its own duration ; but it has not 
 
 its own time, and does not keep its own space. -^"^ 
 
 47. I will here show, how men come to form to themselves the I 
 notion of space. They consider that many things exist at once, j 
 and they observe in them a certain order of co-existence, according -M 
 to which the relation of one thing to another is more or less simple. 
 This order is their situation or distance. When it happens that 
 one of those co-existent things changes its relation to a multitude 
 of others, which do not change their relation among themselves ; 
 and that another thing, newly come, acquires the same relation to 
 the others, as the former had ; we then say it is come into the place 
 of the former ; and this change, we call a motion in that body, 
 wherein is the immediate cause of the change. And though many, 
 or even all the co-existent things, should change according to cer- 
 tain known rules of direction and swiftness ; yet one may always 
 determine the relation of situation, which every co-existent acquires 
 with respect to every other co-existent ; and even that relation, 
 which any other co-existent would have to this, or which this would 
 have to any other, if it liad not changed, or if it had changed any 
 otherwise. And supposing, or feigning, that among those co-exis- 
 tents, there is a sufficient number of them, which have undergone 
 no change ; then we may say, that those which have such a relation 
 to those fixed existents, as others had to them before, have now the 
 same place which those others had. And that which comprehends 
 all those places^ is called space. Which shows, that in order to 
 have an idea of place, and consequently of space, it is sufficient to 
 consider these relations, and the rules of their changes, without 
 needing to fancy any absolute reality out of the things whose situa- 
 tion we consider, and, to give a kind of definition : place is that, 
 which we .say is the same to A, and to B, when the relation of the 
 co-existence of B, with C, E, F, G, c&c, agrees perfectly Avitli the 
 
266 
 
 relation of the co-existence, which A had with the same C, E^ Fy 
 G^ c&c, supposing there has been no cause of change in C, E^ F, 
 G, (&G. It might be said also, without entering into any further 
 particularity, that place is that, which is the same in different mo- 
 ments to different existent things, when their relations of co-existence 
 with certain other existents, which are supposed to continue fixed 
 from one of those moments to . the other, agree entirely together. 
 And fixed existents are those, in which there has been no cause of 
 any change of the order of their co-existence with others ; or 
 (which is the same thing), in which there has been no motion. 
 Lastly, space is that which results from places tahen together. 
 And here it may not be amiss to consider the difference between 
 place^ and the relation of situation, which is in the body that fills 
 up the place. For, the place of A and B, is the samie ; whereas 
 the relation of A to fixed bodies, is not precisely and individually 
 the sarne, as the relation which B (that comes into its place) will 
 have to the same fixed bodies ; but these relations agree only. For 
 two different subjects, as A and B, cannot have precisely the same 
 individual affection ; it being impossible, that the same individual 
 accident should be in two subjects, or pass from one subject to an- 
 other. But the mind not contented with an agreement, looks for 
 an identity, for something that should be truly the same ; and con- 
 ceives it as being extrinsic to the subject : and this is what we here 
 call place and space. But this can only be an ideal thing ; contain- 
 ing a certain order, wherein the mind conceives the application of 
 relations.! In like manner, as the mind can fancy to itself an order 
 made'up of genealogical lines, whose bigness would consist only in 
 he number of generations, wherein every person would have his 
 place : and if to this one should add the fiction of a metempsychosis , 
 and bring in the same human souls again ; the persons in those 
 lines might change place ; he who was a father, or a grand-father, 
 might become a son, or a grand-son, &c. And yet those genealog- 
 ical places, lines, and spaces, though they should express real truths, 
 would only be ideal things. I shall allege another example,* to 
 show how the mind uses, upon occasion of accidents which are in 
 subjects, to fancy to itself something answerable to those accidents, 
 •^ *'"' out of the subjects. The ratio or proportion between two lines 
 • *^'^'^* L and M, may be conceived three several ways ; as a ratio of 
 ''"^^^i the greater L to the lesser M ; as a ratio of the lesser M to 
 
 S^ 
 
26Y 
 
 the greater Z/ and lastly, as something abstracted from both, that 
 is, as the ratio between L and J/, without considering which is 
 the antecedent, or which the consequent ; which the subject, and 
 which the object. And thus it is, that proportions are considered 
 in music. In the first way of considering them, L the greater; 
 in the second, M the lesser, is the subject of that accident, which 
 philosophers call relation. But, which of them will be the sub- 
 ject, in the third way of considering them % It^ cannot be said 
 that both of them, L and M together, are the subject of such an 
 accident ; for if so, we shoulcL have an accident in _t^w^^^^ 
 wit h one leg in one, and the other in the other ; which is contrary 
 to jhe notion of accidents. Therefore we must say that this rela- 
 tion, in this third way of considering it, is indeed out of the 
 subjects ; but being neither a substance, nor an accident, it must be 
 a mere ideal thing, the consideration of which is nevertheless use- 
 ful. To conclude : I have here done much like Euclid^ who not 
 being able to make his readers well understand what ratio is abso- 
 lutely in the sense of geometricians ; defines what are the samie 
 ratios. Thus, in like manner, in order to explain what jplace is, I 
 have been content to define what is the same place. Lastly ; I ob- 
 serve, that the traces of movable bodies, which they leave some- 
 times upon the immovable ones on which they are moved ; have 
 given men occasion to form in their imagination such an idea, as 
 if some trace did still remain, even when there is nothing unmoved. 
 But this is a mere ideal thing, and imports only, that if there was 
 am^y unmoved thing there, the trace might he marked out upon it. 
 And 'tis this analogy, which makes men fancy places, traces and 
 spaces ; though those things consist only in the truth of relations, 
 and not at all in any absolute reality. 
 
 48. To conclude. If the space (which the author fancies) void 
 of all bodies, is not altogether empty ; what is it then full of ? Is 
 it full of extended spirits perhaps, or immaterial substances, capa- 
 ble of extending and contracting themselves ; which move therein, 
 and penetrate each other without any inconveniency, as the shadows 
 of two bodies penetrate one another upon the surface of a wall ? 
 M ^thinks I see the revival of the odd imaginations of Dr. Henry 
 J/t 7*6 (otherwise a learned and well-meaning man), and of some 
 othe^, who fancied that those spirits can make themselves impen- 
 etrab. > whenever they please. Nay, some have fancied, that man 
 
268 
 
 in the state of innocencj, had also the ^ift of penetration ; and 
 that he became solid, opaque, and impenetrable by his fall. Is it not 
 overthrowing our notions of things, to make God have parts, to 
 make spirits have extension ? The principle of the wcmt of a suffi- 
 cient reason does alone drive away all these spectres of imagina- 
 tion. Men easily run into fictions, for want of making a right use 
 of that great principle. 
 
 To § 10. 
 
 49. It cannot be said, that [a certain] duration is eternal ; but 
 that things, which continue always, are eternal, [by gaining always 
 new duration.] Whatever exists of time and of duration, [being 
 successive] perishes continually : and how can a thing exist eter- 
 nally, which, (to speak exactly,) does never exist at all ? For, how 
 can a thing exist, whereof no part does ever exist ? Nothing of 
 time does ever exist, but instants ; and an instant is not even itself 
 
 ■ ;^^a part of time. Whoever considers these observations, will easily 
 'apprehend that time can only be an ideal thing. And the analogy 
 between time and space, will easily make it appear, that the one is 
 
 / as merely ideal as the other. [However, if by saying that the dura- 
 tion of a thing is eternal, is merely understood that it lasts eternally, 
 I have no objection.] 
 
 50. If the reality of space and time, is necessary to the immen- 
 sity and eternity of God ; if God must be in space ; if being in 
 space, is a property of God ; he will, in some measure, depend upon 
 time and space, and stand in need of them. For I have already 
 prevented that subterfuge, that space and time are [in God and as 
 it were] properties of God. [Could the opinion which should affirm 
 that bodies move about in the parts of the divine essence be main- 
 tained ?] 
 
 To § 11 and 12. 
 
 51. I objected that space cannot be in God, because it has parts. 
 Hereupon the author seeks another subterfuge, by departing from 
 the received sense of words ; maintaining that space has no parts, 
 because its parts are not separable, and cannot be removed from 
 one another by discerption. But 'tis sufficient that space has par^s, 
 
 ^ whether those parts be separable or not ; and they may be assigned 
 J in space, either by the bodies that are in it, or by lines and sur-^'aces 
 
269 
 
 To § 13. 
 
 52. In order to prove that space, without bodies, is an absohite 
 reality ; the author objected, that a finite material universe might 
 m>ove forward in space. 1 answered, it does not appear reasonaUe 
 that the material universe should be finite ; and, though we should 
 suppose it to be finite ; yet 'tis unreasonahle it should have motion 
 any otherwise, than as its parts change their situation among them- 
 selves ; because such a motion would produce no change that could 
 be observed, and would be without design. 'Tis another thing, 
 when its parts change their situation among themselves ; for then 
 there is a motion in space ; but it consists in the order of relations^ 
 which are changed. The author replies now, that the reality of 
 motion does not depend upon being observed / and that a ship may 
 go forward, and yet a man, who is in the ship, may not perceive it. 
 
 I answer, motion does not indeed depend upon being observed ; but J . y 
 it does depend upon being possible to he observed. There is no/ 
 motion, when there is no change that can he observed. And when^ 
 there is no change that can he observed, there is no change at all. 
 The contrary opinion is grounded upon the supposition of a real 
 absolute space, which I have demonstratively confuted by the prin- 
 ciple of the want of a sujflcient reason of things. 
 
 53. I find nothing in the eighth defim,ition of the Mathematicali 
 Principles of Nature, nor in the scholiuin belonging to it, that' 
 proves, or can prove, the reality of space in itself. However, I 
 grant there is a difference between an absolute true motion of a 
 body, and a mere relative change of its situation with respect to an- 
 other body. For when the immediate cause of the change is in the' • 
 body, that body is truly in motion ; and then the situation of other 
 bodies, with respect to it, will be changed consequently, though the 
 cause of that change be not in them. 'Tis true that, exactly speak- 
 ing, there is not any one body, that is perfectly and entirely at rest ; 
 but we frame an abstract notion of rest, by considering the thing 
 mathematically. Thus have I left nothing unanswered, of what 
 has been alleged for the absolute reality of space. And I have 
 demonstrated the falsehood of that reality, by a fundamental princi- 
 ple, one of the most certain both in reason and experience ; against 
 which, no exception or instance can be alleged. Upon the whole, 
 one may judge from what has been said, that I ought not to admit 
 
 a movable universe / nor any place out of the material universe. 
 
270 
 
 To § 14. 
 
 54. I am not sensible of any objection, but what I think I have 
 sufficiently answered. As for the objection that space and time are 
 quantities, or rather things endowed with quantity / and that situa- 
 tion and order are not so : I answer, that order also has its quantity ; 
 there is in it, that which goes before, and that which follows; 
 there is distance or interval. Relative things have their quantity, 
 as well as absolute ones. For instance, ratios or proportions in 
 
 ** mathematics, have their quantity, and are measured by logarithms / 
 \ and yet they are relations. And therefore though time and space 
 ; consist in relations, yet they have their quantity. 
 
 To § 15. 
 
 55. As to the question, whether God could have created the 
 world sooner ; 'tis necessary here to understand each other rightly. 
 Since I have demonstrated, that time, without things, is nothing 
 else but a mere ideal possibility ; 'tis manifest, if any one should 
 say that this same world, which has been actually created, might 
 
 . have been created sooner, without any other change ; he would say 
 nothing that is intelligible. For there is no mark or difference, 
 whereby it would be possible to know, that this world was created 
 sooner. And therefore, (as I have already said), to suppose that 
 God created the same world sooner, is supposing a chimerical thing. 
 \ 'Tis making time a thing absolute, independent upon God ; whereas 
 time must co-exist w^th creatures, and is only conceived by the 
 order and quantity of their changes. 
 
 Ri iS 56. But yet absolutely speaking, one may 
 
 j \ conceive that an universe began sooner, than 
 
 i \ it actually did. Let us suppose our universe, 
 
 \or any other, to be represented by the figure 
 A F ; and that the ordinate A B represents 
 its first state ; and the ordinates G D, E F, 
 its following states : I say, one may conceive 
 that such a world began sooner, by conceiving 
 the figure prolonged backwards, and by add- 
 ing to it xS ^ ^ ^ /(SI For thus, things being 
 F increased, time will be also increased. But 
 
 whether such an augmentation be reasonable and agreeable to 
 God's wisdom, is another question, to which we answer in the 
 
2n 
 
 negative ; otherwise God would have made such an augmentation. 
 It would be like as 
 
 Humano capiti cervicem pictor equinam 
 Jungere si velit. 
 
 The case is the same with respect to the destruction [duration — Ger.] 
 of the universe. As one might conceiA^e something added to the 
 beginning, so one might also conceive something taken off towards 
 the end. But such a retrenching from it, would be also unreason- 
 able. 
 
 57. Thus it appears how we are to understand, that God created 
 things at what time he pleased ; for this depends upon the things^ 
 which he resolved to create. But things being once resolved upon, 
 together with their relations ', there remains no longer any choice 
 about the time and the place^ which of themselves have nothing in 
 them real, nothing that can distinguish them, nothing that is at all 
 discernible. 
 
 58. One cannot therefore say, as the author does here, that the 
 wisdom of God may have good reasons to create this world at such 
 or such a particula/r time : that particular time, considered with- 
 out the things^ being an impossible fiction ; and good reasons for a 
 choice, being not to be found, where everything is indiscernible. 
 
 59. When I speak of this worlds I mean the whole universe of 
 material and immaterial creatures taken together, from the begin- 
 ning of things. But if any one mean only the beginning of the 
 material world, and suppose immaterial creatures before it ; he 
 would have somewhat more reason for his supposition. For time 
 then being marhed by things that existed already, it would be no 
 longer indifferent ; and there might be room for choice. And yet 
 indeed, this w^ould be only putting off the difficulty. For, suppos- 
 ing the whole universe of immaterial and material creatures to- 
 gether, to have a beginning ; there is no longer any choice about 
 the tivfte^ in which God would place that beginning. 
 
 60. And therefore one must not say, as the author does here, that 
 God created things in what particular space, and at what particular 
 time he pleased. For, all time and all spaces being in themselves 
 perfectly uniform and indiscernible from each other, one of them 
 cannot please more than another. 
 
/ 
 
 272 
 
 61. I shall not enlarge here upon my opinion explained elsewhere, 
 that there are no created substances wholly destitute of matter. 
 For I hold with the ancients, and according to reason, that angel& 
 or intelligences, and souls separated from a gross body, have always 
 subtile bodies, though they themselves be incorporeal. The vulgar 
 philosophy easily admits all sorts of fictions : mine is more strict. 
 
 62. I don't say that matter and space are the same thing. I 
 only say, there is no space, where there is no matter ; and that space 
 in itself is not an absolute reality. Space and matter differ, as time 
 and motion. However, these things, though different, are insep- 
 arable. 
 
 63. But yet it does not at all follow, that matter is eternal and 
 necessary ; unless we suppose sj[>ace to be eternal and necessary ; 
 a supposition ill-grounded in all respects. 
 
 To § 16 and IT. 
 
 64. I think I have answered everything ; and I have particularly 
 replied to that objection, that sjpace and tiiYie have quam^tity, and 
 
 1 that order has none. See above, Nuniber 64. 
 
 / 65. I have clearly shown that the contradiction lies in the 
 hypothesis of the opposite opinion, which looks for a difference 
 where there is none. And it would be a manifest iniquity to infer 
 from thence, that I have acknowledged a contradiction in my own 
 opinion. 
 
 To § 18. 
 ^^. Here I find again an argument, which I have overthrown 
 above. Number 17. The author says, God may have good reasons 
 to make two cubes perfectly equal and alike : and then (says he) 
 God must needs assign them their places, though every other 
 respect be perfectly equal. But things ought not to bQ. separated 
 from their circumstances. This argument consists in incomplete 
 notions. God's resolutions are never abstract and imperfect : as if 
 God decreed, first, to create the two cubes ; and then, made another 
 decree where to place them. Men, being such limited creatures as 
 they are, may act in this manner. They may resolve upon a thing, 
 and then find themselves perplexed about means, ways, places, and 
 circumstances. But God never takes a resolution about the ends, 
 without resolving at the same time about the means, and all the 
 circumstances. Nay, I have shown in my Theodiccea, that properly 
 
273 
 
 speaking, there is but one decree for the whole universe, whereby 
 God resolved to bring it out of possibility into existence. And there- 
 fore God will not choose a cube, without choosing its place at the 
 same time ; and he will never choose among indisceriiihles. 
 
 67. The parts of space are not determined and distinguishedT" ' 
 but by the things which are in it : and the diversity of things in \ 
 space, determines God to act differently upon different parts of \ 
 space. But space without things, has nothing whereby it may be \ 
 distinguished ; and indeed not anything actual. 
 
 68. If God is resolved to place a certain cube of matter at all, 
 he is also resolved in which particular place to put it. But 'tis 
 with respect to other parts of matter ; and not with respect to bare 
 space itself, in which there is nothing to distinguish it. 
 
 69. But wisdom does not allow God to place at the same time 
 two cubes perfectly equal and alike y because there is no way to 
 find any reason for assigning them different places. At this rate, 
 there would be a will 2Joitliout a motive. 
 
 70. A will without inotive (such as superficial reasoners suppose 
 to be in God), I compared to Epicui'iis* s chance. The author an- 
 swers ; Epicurus' s chance is a blind necessity, and not a choice of 
 will. I reply, that Epicurus^ s chance is not a necessity, but some- 
 thing indifferent. Epicurus brought it in on purpose to avoid 
 necessity. 'Tis true, chance is blind ; but a will without motive 
 would be no less blind, and no less owing to mere chance. 
 
 To § 19. 
 
 71. The author repeats here, what has been already confuted 
 above, Number 21 ; that matter cannot be created, without God's 
 choosing among indiscernibles. He would be in- the right, if mat- 
 ter consisted of atoms, similar particles, or other the like fictions of 
 superficial philosophy. But that great principle, which proves 
 there is no choice among indiscernibles, destroys also these ill-con- 
 trived fictions. 
 
 To § 20. 
 
 72. The author objected against me in his third paper. {Nunnbers 
 7 and 8); that God would not have in himself a principle of act- 
 ing, if he was determined by things external. I answered, that the 
 ideas of external things are in him : and that therefore he is deter- 
 mined by internal reasons, that is, by his wisdom. But the author 
 here will not understanii, to what end I said it. 
 
 18 
 
274 
 
 To § 21. 
 
 73. He frequently confounds, in his objections against me, what 
 God will not do, with what he cannot do. See above, JS umber ^ 
 \and helow Wumber 76]. For example ; God can do everything 
 that is possible, but he will do only what is best. And therefore 
 I don't say, as the author here will have it, that God cannot limit 
 the extension of matter ; but 'tis likely he will not do it, and that 
 he has thought it better to set no bounds to matter. 
 
 74. From extension to duration, non valet consequentia. Though 
 the extension of matter were unlimited, yet it would not follow 
 that its duration would be also unlimited ; nay even a parte ante, 
 it would not follow, that it had no beginning. If it is the nature 
 of things in the whole, to grow uniformly in perfection ; the uni- 
 verse of creatures must have had a beginning. And therefore, 
 there will be reasons to limit the duration of things, even though 
 there were none to limit their extension. Besides, the world's hav- 
 ing a beginning, does not derogate from the infinity of its duration 
 a parte post ; but bounds of the universe would derogate from 
 the infinity of its extension. And therefore it is more reasonable 
 to admit a beginning of the w^orld, than to admit any bounds of it ; 
 that the character of its infinite author, may be in both respects 
 preserved. 
 
 75. However, those who have admitted the eternity of the world, 
 or, at least, (as some famous divines have done), the possihility of 
 its eternity ; did not, for all that, deny its dependence upon God ; 
 as the author here lays to their charge, without any ground. 
 
 To § 22, 23. 
 
 76. He here further objects, without any reason, that, according 
 to my opinion, whatever God can do, he must needs have done. 
 As if he was ignorant, that I have solidly confuted this notion in 
 my Theodiccea ; and that I have overthrown the opinion of those, 
 who maintain that there is nothing possible but what really hap- 
 pens ; as some ancient philosophers did, and among others Diodorus 
 in Cicero. The author confounds inoral necessity, which proceeds 
 from the choice of what is hest with absolute necessity : he con- 
 founds the will of God, with his power. God can produce every- 
 thing that is possible, or whatever does not imply a contradiction ; 
 but he wills only to produce what is the best among tilings possible. 
 See what has been said above, Number 9 {a/ad Number 74.] 
 
275 
 
 77. God is not therefore a necessary agent in producing creatures, 
 since lie acfs with choice. However, what the author adds here, is 
 ill-grounded, viz. that a necessary agent would not be an agent at 
 all. He frequently affirms things boldly, and without any ground ; 
 advancing [against me] notions which cannot be proved. 
 
 To § 24-28. 
 
 78. The author alleges, it was not affirmed that space is God's 
 sensorntw,, but only as it were his sensorium. The latter seems to 
 be as improper, and as little intelligible, as the former. 
 
 To § 29. 
 
 79. Space.m^ot the place of all things ; for it is not the place of , 
 God.^^ihQVwi^Q i^ere would be a thing co-eternal with God, and \ 
 independent upon him ; nay, he himself would depend upon it, if/ 
 he has need of place. 
 
 80r^ or do I see, how it can be said, that space is the place of 
 ideas ; for ideas are in the understanding. 
 
 81. 'Tis also very strange to say, that the soul of man is the soul 
 of the images it perceives. The images, which are in the under- 
 standing, are in the mind : but if the mind was the soul of the 
 images^ they would then be extrinsic to it. And if the author 
 means corporeal images, how then will he have a human tnind to 
 be the soul of those images, they being only transient impressions 
 in a body belonging to that soul ? 
 
 82. If 'tis by means of a sensorium, that God perceives what/ 
 passes in the world ; it seems that things act upon him ; and that 
 therefore he is what we mean by a soul of the world. The author 
 charges me with repeating objections, without taking notice of the 
 answers ; but I don't see that he has answered this difficulty. They 
 had better wholly lay aside this pretended sensorium. 
 
 To § 30. 
 
 83. The author speaks, as if he did not understand, how, accord- 
 ing to my opinion, the soul is a 7'epresentative principle. Which 
 is, as if he had never heard of my pre-established harmony. 
 
 84. I don't assent to the vulgar notions, that the images of things 
 are conveyed by* the organs [of sense] to the soul. For, it is not 
 conceivable by what passage, or by what means of conveyance, 
 these images can be carried from the organ to t he souL This 
 
276 
 
 j vulgar notion in philosophy is not intelligible, as the new Cartesians 
 \ have sufficiently shown. It cannot be explained, how immaterial 
 I substance is affected by matter : and to maintain an unintelligible 
 ■ ^ I. i motion thereupon, is having recourse to the scholastic chimerical 
 1«_— -^^^ftotion of I know not what inexplicable species intentionales^ pass- 
 ing from the organs to the soul. Those Cartesians saw the diffi- 
 culty ; but they could not explain it. They had recourse to a 
 [certain wholly special] concourse of God, which would really be 
 miraculous. But, I think, / have given the true solution of that 
 enigma. 
 
 t 86. To say that God perceives what passes in the world, because 
 /he is present to the things, and not by [the dependence which the 
 f continuation of their existence has upon him and which may be 
 said to involve] a continual production of them ; is saying some- 
 thing unintelligible. A mere presence or proximity of co-exist- 
 ence, is not sufficient to make us understand, how that which 
 passes in one being, should answer to what passes in another. 
 
 86. Besides ; this is exactly falling into that opinion, which makes 
 God to be the soul of the world ; seeing it supposes God to perceive 
 things, not by their dependence uj)on him, that is, by a continual 
 production of what is good and perfect in them ; but by a kind of 
 perception, such as that by which men fancy our soul perceives 
 what passes in the body. This is a degrading of God's knowledge 
 very much. 
 
 87. In truth and reality, this way of perception is wholly chimer- 
 ical, and has no place even in human souls. They perceive what 
 passes without them, by what passes within them, answering to the 
 things without ; in virtue of the harmony^ which God has pre- 
 established by the most beautiful and the most admirable of all his 
 productions ; whereby every simple suhstance is by its nature (if 
 one may so say), a concentration^ and a living 7mrror of the whole 
 universe, according to its point of view. Which is likewise one of 
 the most beautiful and most undeniable proofs of the existence of 
 God ; since none but God, viz. the universal cause, can produce 
 such a harmony of things. But God himself cannot perceive 
 things by the same means whereby he makes other beings perceive 
 them. He perceives them, because he is able to produce that 
 means. And other beings would not be caused to perceive them, if 
 he himself did not produce them all harmonious, and had not 
 
277 
 
 therefore in himself a representation of them ; not as if that rep- 
 resentation came from the things, but because the things proceed 
 from him, and because he is the efficient and exemplary cause of 
 them. He perceives them, because they proceed from him ; if one ) 
 may be allowed to say, that he jpei^ceives them : which ought not to } 
 be said, unless we divest that word of its imperfection ; for else it 
 seems to signify, that things act upon him. They exist, and are 
 known to him, because he understands and wills them ; and because 
 what he wills, is the same, as what exists. Which appears so much 
 the more, because he makes them to be perceived by one another ; 
 and makes them perceive one another in consequence of the natures 
 which he has given them once for all, and which he keeps up only 
 according to the laws of qnqvj one of them severally; which, 
 though different one from another, yet terminate in an exact corres- 
 pondence of the results of the whole. This surpasses all the ideas, 
 which men have generally framed concerning the divine perfec- 
 tions, and the works of God ; and raises {our notion of~\ them, to 
 the highest degree ; as Mr. Bayle has acknowledged, though he be- 
 lieved, without any ground, that it exceeded possibility. 
 
 88. To infer from that passage of Holy Scripture, wherein God 
 is said to have rested from his works, that there is no longer a con- 
 tinual production of them ; would be to make a very ill use of » 
 that text. 'Tis true, there is no production of new simple sub-[ 
 stances : but it would be wrong to infer from thence, that God is j 
 now in the w^orld, only as the soul is conceived to be in the body, 
 governing it merely by his presence, wdthout any concourse being 
 necessary to continue its existence. 
 
 To § 31. 
 
 89. The harmony, or correspondence between the soul and the 
 hody, is not a perpetual miracle ; but the effect or consequence of 
 an original miracle worked at the creation of things ; as all natural 
 things are. Though indeed it is a perpetual wonder, as many 
 natural things are. 
 
 90. The word, pre-established harmony, is a term of art, I con- 
 fess ; but 'tis not a term that explains nothing, since it is made out 
 very inteUigibly ; and the author alleges nothing, that shows there 
 is any difficulty in it. 
 
2Y8 
 
 91. The nature of e'oery simple substance^ sotd, or true monad^ 
 being such, that its following state is a consequence of the preced- 
 ing one ; here now is the cause of the harmony found out. For 
 God needs only to make a simple substance become once and from 
 the beginning, a representation of the universe^ according to its 
 point of mew / since from thence alone it follows, that it will be so 
 perpetually ', and that all simple substances will always have a 
 harmony among themselves, because they always represent the same 
 universe. 
 
 To § 32. 
 . 92. 'Tis true, that, according to me, the soul does not disturb the 
 laws of the body^ nor the body those of the soul / and that the soid 
 and body do only agree together ; the one acting freely, according 
 to the rules of final causes ; and the other acting mechanically, 
 according to the laws of efficient causes. But this does not derogate 
 from the liberty of our souls, as the author here will have it. For, 
 every agent which acts [with choice — Ger.'\ according to final 
 causes, is free, though it happens to agree with an agent acting only 
 by efficient causes without knowledge, or m^echanically ; because 
 God, foreseeing what the free cause would do, did from the begin- 
 ning regulate the machine in such manner, that it cannot fail to 
 agree with that free cause. Mr. Jaquelot has very well resolved 
 this difficulty, in one of his books against Mr. Bayle ; and I have 
 cited the passage, in my Theodicma, Part I, § 63. I shall speak 
 ■ of it again below, Numher 124. 
 
 To § 33. 
 f93. I don't admit, that every action gives a new force to the 
 patient. It frequently happens in the concourse of bodies, that 
 each of them preserves its force / as when two equal hard bodies 
 i$eet directly. Then the direction only is changed, without any 
 change in the force ; each of the bodies receiving the direction of 
 the other, and going back with the same swiftness it came. 
 
 94. However, I. am far from saying that it is supernatural to 
 give a new force to a body ; for I acknowledge that one body does 
 frequently receive a new force from another, which loses as much 
 of its own. But I say only, ^t\^ supernatural that the whole 
 "universe of bodies should receive a new^force^: stud consequently 
 that one body should acquire any new force, without the loss of as 
 
2Y9 
 
 mucli in others. And therefore I say likewise, 'tis an indefensible 
 opinioiila-sttppose the soul gives force to the hody / for then the 
 whole universe of bodies would receive a new force. 
 
 95. The author's dilemma here, is ill-grounded; viz. that accord- 
 ing to me, either a man must act supernaturally, or be a mere ma- 
 chine, like a watch. For, man does not act supernaturally : and his 
 body is truly a machine, acting only mechanically ; and yet his 
 soul is a free cause. 
 
 ^^~ — -^ To § 34 and 35. 
 
 96. I here refer to what has been or shall be said in this paper, 
 Wiomher 82, 86, [88] and 111 : concerning the comparison between 
 God and a soul of the world ; and how the opinion contrary to 
 mine, brings the one of these too near to the other. 
 
 5. 
 
 To § 36. 
 
 97. I here also refer to what I have before said, concerning the^^^^ 
 harmony between the soul and the hody, Number 89, &c. ^j^J^^^"*^^ ' 
 
 To § 37. 
 
 98. The author tells us, that the soul is not in the brain, but in 
 the sensorium ; without saying what that sensorium is. But sup- 
 posing that sensorium to be extended, as I believe the author un- 
 derstands it ; the same difficulty still remains, and the question 
 returns, whether the soul be diffused through that whole extension, 
 be it great or small. For, more or less in bigness, is nothing to the 
 purpose here. 
 
 To § 38. 
 
 99. I don't undertake here to establish my Dynamics, or my 
 doctrine of forces : this w^ould not be a proper place for it. How- 
 ever, I can very well answer the objection here brought against me. 
 
 I have affirmed that active forces are preserved in the world {with- . 
 out dirninution\ The author objects, that two soft or unelastic \ Lai 
 bodies meeting together, lose some of their force. I answer, no. ] 
 'Tis true, their wholes lose it with respect to their total motion ; but 
 their pa/rts receive it, being shaken [internally] by the force of the \ 
 concourse. And therefore that loss oi force, is only in appearance. \ / 
 The forces are not destroyed, but scattered among the small parts. 
 The bodies do not lose their forces ; but the case here is the same, \ 
 as when men change great money into small. However, I agree that 
 
280 
 
 the quantity of motion does not remain the same *, and herein I 
 approve what Sir Isaac Newton says, jpa^ge 341 of his Opties^ 
 which the author here quotes. But I have shown elsewhere, that 
 there is a difference between the quantity of motion^ and the quan- 
 tity of force. 
 
 To § 39. 
 
 100. The author maintained against me, that force does naturally 
 lessen in the material universe ; and that this arises from the depen- 
 dence of things, {Third Reply ^ § 13 and 14). In my third an- 
 swer^ I desired him to prove that this imperfection is a consequence 
 of the dependence of things. He avoids answering my demand ; 
 by falling upon an incident, and denying this to be an imperfec- 
 tion. But whether it be an imperfection or not, he should have 
 proved that 'tis a consequence of the dependence of things. 
 
 101. However; that which would make the machine of the 
 world as imperfect, as that of an unskillful watchmaker; surely 
 must needs be an imperfection. 
 
 102. The author says now, that it is a consequence of the inertia 
 of matter. But this also, he will not prove. That inertia^ alleged 
 here by Aim, mentioned by Kepler^ repeated by Cartesius [in his 
 letters], and made use of by me in my Theodiccea^ in order to give 
 a notion [and at the same time an example] of the natural imper- 
 fection of creatures ; has no other effect, than to make the veloci- 
 ties diminish, when the quantities of matter are increased : but 
 this is without any diminution of the forces. 
 
 To § 40. 
 
 103. I maintained, that the dependence of the machine of the 
 world upon its divine author, is rather a reason why there can be 
 no such imperfection in it ; and that the work of God does not 
 want to be set right again ; that it is not liable to be disordered ; 
 and lastly, that it cannot lessen in perfection. Let any one guess 
 now, how the author can hence infer against me, as he does, that, 
 if this be the case, then the material world must be infinite and 
 eternal^ without any beginning ; and that God must always have 
 created as many men and other kinds of creatures, as can possibly 
 be created. 
 
 To § 41. 
 
 104. I don't say, that space is an order or situation, which makes 
 things capable of being situated : this would be nonsense. Any 
 
281 
 
 one needs only consider my own words, and add them to what I 
 said above, {Number 47) in order to show how the mind comes to 
 form to itself an idea of space^ and yet that there needs not be any 
 real and absolute being answering to that idea, distinct from the 
 mind, and from all relations. I don't say therefore, that space is an (n 
 order or situation^ but an order of situations; or [an order] accord- "jCi 
 ing to which, situations are disposed ; and that abstract space is 
 that order of situations, when they are conceived as being possible. 
 SpacejITtheref ore something [pierely] ideal. But, it seems, the 
 author will not understand me. I have already, in this paper, 
 {'Number 54) answered the objection, that order is not capable of 
 quantity. 
 
 105. The author objects here, that time cannot be an order of^'^ -^ 
 suGcessi^i^tAingSyheGSLUse the quantity of time may become greater [ 
 
 or less, and yet the order of successions continue the same. I 
 answer : this is not so. For if the time is greater, there will bel 
 more successive and like states interposed ; and if it be less, there 
 wilt'Be fewer / seeing there is no vacuum, nor condensation, noif 
 penetration (if I may so speak), in times, any more than in places\ 
 
 106. 'Tis true, [I maintain that] the immensity and eternity of^ 
 God would subsist, though there were no creatures ; but those attri- ( 
 butes would have no dependence either on tiynes or places. If there 
 were no creatures, there would be neither tim^e nor place, and con- 
 sequently no actual space. The immensity of God is independent 
 upon space, Si^ hi^ eternity is independent upon time. These attri- 
 butes signify only [in respect ~^fo these two orders of things], that 
 God would be present and co-existent with all the things that 
 should exist. And therefore I don't admit what's here alleged, I y^ 
 that if God existed alone, there would be time and space SiS, there is iW 
 now ; whereas then, in my opinion, they would be only in the ideas- (:a^ 
 of God as mere possibilities. The immensity and eternity of God M^ 
 are things more transcendent, than the duration and extension of crea- 
 tures ; not only with respect to the greatness, but also to the nature 
 
 of the things. Those divine attributes do not imply the supposi- 
 tion of things extrinsic to God, such as are actual places and times. 
 These truths have been sufficiently acknowledged b y divin es and 
 philosophers. 
 
 ^ To § 42. 
 
 107. I maintained, that an operation of God, by which he should 
 mend the machine of fhe material world, tending in its nature (as 
 
282 
 
 this antlior pretends) to lose all its motion, would be a wdracle. 
 His answer was ; that it would not be a miraculous operation, be- 
 cause it would be usual ^ and must frequently happen. I replied ; 
 that 'tis not usualness or unusualness, that makes a miracle prop- 
 erly so called, or a miracle of the highest sort ; but its surpassing 
 the powers of creatures / and that this is the [general] opinion of 
 divines and philosophers : and that therefore the author acknowl- 
 edges at least, that the tiling he introduces, and I disallow, is, ac- 
 cording to the received notion, a miracle of the highest sort, that is, 
 one which surpasses all created powers : and that this is the very 
 thing which all men endeavor to avoid in philosophy. He answers 
 now, that this is appealing from reason to vulgar opinion. But I 
 reply again, that this vulgar opinion, according to which we ought 
 in philosophy to avoid, as much as possible, what surpasses the 
 i natures of creatures ; is a very reasonable opinion. Otherwise 
 'nothing will be easier than to account for anything by bringing in 
 ;the Deity, Demn ex 7nachina, without minding the natures of 
 things. 
 
 108. Besides ; the common opinion of divines, ought not to be 
 looked upon merely as vulgar opinion. A man should have 
 weighty reasons, before he ventures to contradict it ; and I see no 
 such reasons here. 
 
 109. The author seems to depart from his own notion, according 
 to which a miracle ought to be unusual ; when, in § 31, he objects 
 to me (though without any ground), that the pre-established har- 
 mony w^ould be a perpetual miracle. Here, I say, he seems to 
 depart from his own notion ; unless he had a mind to argue against 
 me ad hominem. 
 
 To § 43. 
 
 110. If a miracle differs from what is natural, only in appearance 
 and with respect to us ; so that we call that only a miracle, which 
 we seldom see ; there will be no internal real difference, between 
 a miracle and what is natural ; and at the bottom, every thing will 
 be either equally natural, or equally miraculous. Will divines 
 like the former, or philosophers the latter ? 
 
 111. Will not this doctrine, moreover, tend to make God the 
 soul of the world ; if all his operations are natural, like those of 
 our souls upon our bodies % And so God will be a part of nature. 
 
283 
 
 112. In good philosophy, and sound theology, we ought to dis- 
 tinguish between what is explicable by the natures and jpowers of ) 
 creatures^ and what is explicable only by the powers of the infinite \ 
 substance. We ought to make an infinite difference between the 
 ojperation of God^ which goes beyond the extent of natural 
 powers ; and the operations of things that follow the law which 
 
 God has given them, and which he has enabled them to follow hy 
 their natural powers^ though not without his assistance. 
 
 113. This overthrows attractions^ properly so called, and other 
 operations inexplicable by the natural powers of creatures ; which 
 kinds of operations, the assertors of them must suppose to be 
 effected by miracle / or else have recourse to absurdities, that is, to 
 the occult qualities of the schools ; which some men begin to revive 
 under the specious name of forces / but they bring us back again 
 into the kingdom of darkness. This is, inventa fruge, glandihus 
 vesci. 
 
 114. In the time of Mr. Boyle, and other excellent men, who 
 flourished in England under Charles the lid, nobody would have 
 ventured to publish such chimerical notions. I hope that happy 
 time will return under so good a government as the present [and 
 that minds a little too much carried away by the misfortune of the 
 times will betake themselves to the better cultivation of sound 
 learning]. Mr. Boyle made it his chief business to inculcate, that 
 
 . everything was done mechanically in natural philosophy. But it 
 is men's misfortune to grow, at last, out of conceit with reason 
 itself, and to be weary of light. Chimeras begin to appear again, 
 and they are pleasing because they have something in them that is 
 wonderful. What has happened in poetry, happens also in thef^y^ft^^J- 
 
 philosophical world. People are grown weary of rational romances, \ ^^ 
 such as »were the French Clelia, or the Germa/n Aramene / and 
 they are become fond again of the tales of fairies. 
 
 115. As for the motions of the celestial bodies, and even the for-\ 
 mation of plants and animals ; there is nothing in them that looks i 
 like a, miracle, except their beginning. . The organism of animals 
 is a mechanism, which supposes a divine preformation. What 
 follows upon it, is purely natural, and entirely mechanical. 
 
 116. Whatever is performed in the body of man, and of every 
 cmimal, is no less mechanical, than what is performed in a loatch. 
 The difference is only such, as ought to be between a machine of 
 
284 
 
 divine invention, and tlie workmanship of such a limited artist as 
 man is. 
 
 To § 44. 
 
 117. There is no difficulty among divines, about the miracles of 
 angels. The question is only about the use of that word. It may 
 be said that a/ngels work miracles / but less properly so called, or 
 of an inferior order. To dispute about this, would be a mere 
 question about a word. It may be said that the angel, who carried 
 Ilahahhitlc through the air, and he who troubled the water of the 
 pool of Bethesda, worked a miracle. But it was not a miracle of 
 the highest order ; for it may be explained by the natural powers 
 of angels, which surpass those of man. 
 
 To § 45. 
 
 118. I objected, that an attraction, properly so called, or in the 
 scholastic sense, would be an operation at a distance, without any 
 means intervening. The author answers here, that an attraction 
 without any means intervening, would be indeed a contradiction. 
 Y ery well ! But then what does he mean, when he wiU have the 
 sun to attract the globe of the earth through an empty space ? Is 
 it God himself that performs it % But this would be a miracle, if 
 ever there was any. This would surely exceed the powers of crea- 
 tures. 
 
 119. Or, are perhaps some immaterial substances, or some spirit- 
 ual rays, or some accident without a substance, or some kind of 
 species intentionalis, or some other 1 know not what, the means by 
 which this is pretended to be performed 1 Of which sort of things, 
 the author seems to have still a good stock in his head, without ex- 
 plaining himself sufficiently. 
 
 120. That means of communication (says he) is invisible, intangi- 
 ble, not mechanical. He might as well have added, inexplicable, 
 unintelligible, precarious, groundless, and unexampled. 
 
 121. But it is regular, (says the author), it is constant, and con- 
 sequently natural. I answer ; it cannot be regular, without being 
 reasonable ; nor natural, unless it can be explained by the natures 
 of creatures. 
 
 \ 122. If the means, which causes an attraction properly so called, 
 be constant, and at the same time inexplicable by the powers of 
 creatures, and yet be true ; it must be a perpetual miracle : and if 
 
286 
 
 it is not miraculous, it is false. 'Tis a chimerical thing, a scholastic i 
 occult quality. 
 
 123. The case would be the same, as in a body going round 
 without receding in the tangent, though nothing that can be ex- 
 plained, hindered it from receding. Which is an instance I have 
 already alleged ; and the author has not thought fit to answer it, 
 because it shows too clearly the difference between what is truly 
 natural on the one side, and a chimerical occult quality of the 
 schools on the other. 
 
 To § 46. 
 
 124. All the natural forces of bodies, are subject to mechanical 
 laws ; and all the natural powers of spirits, are subject to moral 
 laws. The former follow the order of efficient causes ; and the 
 latter follow the order of final causes. The former operate without 
 liberty, like a watch ; the latter operate with liberty, though they 
 exactly agree with that machine, which another cause, free and 
 superior, has adapted to them beforehand. I have already spoken 
 of this, above, JSfo. 92. 
 
 125. I shall conclude with what the author objected against me ^ 
 at the beginning of this fourth reply : to which I have already 
 given an answer above {Numiber 18, 19, 20). But I deferred -" 
 speaking more fully upon that head, to the conclusion of this paper. 
 He pretended, that I have been guilty of a petitio principii. But, 
 
 of what principle, I beseech you ? Would to God, less clear prin- 
 ciples had never been laid down. The principle in question, is the 
 principle of the want of a sufficient reason / in order to any thing's 
 existing, in order to any event's happening, in order to any truth's 
 taking place. Is this a principle, that wants to be proved ? The 
 author granted it, or pretended to grant it. Number 2, of his third 
 paper 'j possibly, because the denial of it would have appeared too 
 unreasonable. But either he has done it only in words, or he con- 
 tradicts himself, or retracts his concession. 
 
 126. I dare say, that without this great principle, one cannot 
 prove the existence of God, nor account for many other important 
 truths. -^ 
 
 127. Has not everybody made use of this principle, upon a thou- 
 sand occasions ? 'Tis true, it has been neglected, out of careless- 
 ness, on many occasions : but that neglect has been the true cause 
 of chimeras ; such as are (for instance), an absolute real time or 
 
286 
 
 space^ a vacuum, atoms, attraction in the scholastic sense, a physical 
 j injkoence of the soul over the hody, and a thousand other fictions, 
 either derived from erroneous opinions of the ancients, or lately 
 invented bj modem philosophers. 
 
 128. Was it not upon account of Epicurus' s violating this great 
 principle, that the ancients derided his groundless declination of 
 atoms ? And I dare say, the scholastic attraction, revived in our 
 days, and no less derided about thirty years ago, is not at all more 
 reasonable. 
 
 129. I have often defied peoj)le to allege an instance against that 
 great principle, to bring any one uncontested example wherein it 
 fails. But they have never done it, nor ever will. 'Tis certain, 
 there is an infinite number of instances, wherein it succeeds, [or 
 rather it succeeds] in all the known cases in which it has been made 
 use of. From whence one may reasonably judge, that it will suc- 
 ceed also in unknown cases, or in such cases as can only by its 
 means become known : according to the method of experimental 
 philosophy, which proceeds a jjosteriori ; though the principle 
 were not perhaps otherwise justified by bare reason, or a priori. 
 
 130. To deny this great principle, is likewise to do as Epicurus 
 did ; who was reduced to deny that other great principle, viz. the 
 
 principle of contradiction ; which is, that every intelligible enun- 
 ciation must be either true, or false. Chrysippus undertook to 
 prove that principle against Epicurus ; but I think I need not 
 imitate him. I have already said, what is sufficient to justify mine : 
 and I might say something more upon it ; but perhaps it would be 
 too abstruse for this present dispute. And, I believe, reasonable 
 and impartial men will grant me, that having forced an adversary 
 to deny that principle, is reducing him ad ahsurdum. 
 
XXXYI. 
 
 Extracts from the Kew Essays on the Understanding. 1704. 
 
 [From the French.] 
 Preface. 
 
 The Essay on the Understanding^ by an illustrious Englishman, 
 being one of the most beautiful and esteemed works of the time, I 
 have resolved to make Remarks on it, because, having sufficiently 
 meditated for a long time on the same subject and upon most of the 
 matters which are therein touched upon, I have thought that it would 
 be a good opportunity to put forth something under the title of Neio 
 Essajys on the Understanding^ and to obtain a favorable reception 
 for my thoughts by putting them in such good company. I have 
 thought also that I should be able to profit by the work of another, 
 not only to lessen my own (since in fact it is less difficult to follow 
 the thread of a good author than to labor entirely de novo\ but 
 also to add something to what he has given us, which is always 
 easier than to begin ; for I think I have cleared up some difficulties 
 which he had left in their entirety. Thus his reputation is advan- 
 tageous to me ; besides being inclined to do justice, and far from 
 wishing to lessen the esteem in which that work is held, I would 
 increase it, if my approval was of any weight. It is true that I 
 often differ from him, but far from denying the merit of celebrated 
 writers, we bear witness to it, by making known in what and why 
 we separate ourselves from their ojDinion, when we think it neces- 
 sary to prevent their authority from prevailing over reason on cer- 
 tain points of. importance; besides by satisfying such excellent 
 men, we make truth more acceptable, and it must be supposed that 
 it is principally for truth that they labor. 
 
 In fact, although the author of the Essay says a thousand fine 
 things of which I approve, our systems differ very much. His has 
 more relation to Aristotle, and mine to Plato, although we both di- 
 verge in many things from the doctrines of these two ancients. He 
 is more popular, and I am forced at times to be a little more acro- 
 matic and more abstract, which is not an advantage to me, especially 
 when I write in a living language. I think nevertheless that by 
 
288 
 
 making two persons speak, one of whom expounds the views taken 
 from the Essay of the author and the other joins thereto my ob- 
 servations, the parallel will be more to the liking of the reader than 
 wholly dry remarks the reading of which would be constantly in- 
 terrupted by the necessity of referring to his book to understand 
 mine. It will nevertheless be well to compare now and then our 
 writings and not to judge of his views except by his own work, 
 although I have ordinarily preserved its expression. It is true that 
 the subjection which the discourse of another, the thread of which 
 must be followed, gives in making Kemarks, has prevented me 
 from thinking to secure the embellishments of which the dialogue 
 is susceptible : but I hope that the matter will make up for the de- 
 fect of style. 
 
 Our differences are on subjects of some importance. The ques- 
 tion is to know whether the soul in itself is entirely void like the 
 tablet on which nothing has yet been written {tabula rasa) accord- 
 ing to Aristotle and the author of the Essay, and whether all that 
 is traced thereon comes solely from the senses and from experience, 
 or whether the soul contains originally the principles of several 
 notions and doctrines which external objects merely awaken on 
 occasions, as I believe with Plato and even with the schoolmen and 
 with all those who take with this meaning the passage of St. Paul 
 (Komans, 2, 15) where he remarks that the law of God is written 
 in the heart. The Stoics called these principles prolepses, that is 
 to say, fundamental assumptions, or what is taken for granted in 
 advance. The mathematicians call them common notions (xocuac 
 ivvotac). Modern philosophers give them other beautiful names, 
 and Julius Scaliger in particular named them semina mternitatis, also 
 zopyra, as meaning living fires, luminous rays, concealed within 
 us, but which the encounter of the senses makes appear like the 
 sparks which the blow makes spring from the steel. And it is not 
 without reason that these glitterings are believed to indicate some- 
 thing divine and eternal which appears especially in necessary 
 truths. Whence there arises another question, whether all truths 
 depend on experience, that is to say, on induction and examples, 
 or whether there are some which have still another basis. For if 
 some events can be foreseen before any proof which may have been 
 \ made of them, it is manifest that we contribute something on our 
 part thereto. The senses although necessary for aU our actual 
 
289 
 
 knowledge are not sufficient to give it all to ns, since the senses 
 never give anything except examples, that is to say, particular or 
 individual truths. Kow all the examples of whatever number they 
 be, which confirm a general truth, do not suffice to establish the 
 universal necessity of this same truth, for it does not follow that 
 what has happened will happen just so. For example, the Greeks 
 and Romans and all other peoples of the earth known to the 
 ancients, have always noticed that before the exj^iration of twenty- 
 four hours day changes into night and the night into day. But 
 we would be deceived if we believed that the same law holds good 
 everywhere else, for since then the contrary has been experienced 
 in the region of JS'ova Zembla. And he would still deceive himself 
 who believed that in our climates at least it is a necessary and eter- 
 nal truth which will last always, since we must think that the earth 
 and the sun themselves do not exist necessarily, and that there will 
 perhaps be a time when that beautiful star will no longer be, at 
 least in its present form, nor all its system. Whence it would seem 
 that necessary truths such as are found in the pure mathematics 
 and especially in arithmetic and in geometry, ought to have princi- 
 ples the proof of which does not depend on examples, nor, conse- 
 quently, on the testimony of the senses, although without the senses 
 we would never take it into our heads to think of them. This 
 ought to be well recognized, and this is what Euclid has so well un- 
 derstood that he often demonstrates by the reason that which is 
 sufficiently seen through experience and by sensible images. Logic 
 also, together with metaphysics and ethics, one of which forms 
 theology and the other jurisprudence, both natural, are full of such 
 truths, and consequently their proof can only come from internal 
 principles which are called innate. It is true that we must not 
 ihiagine that these eternal laws of the reason can be read in the 
 soul as in an open book, as the edict of the pretor is read upon his 
 album without difficulty and without search ; but it is enough that 
 they can be discovered in us by force of attention, for which occa- 
 sions are furnished by the senses, and the success of experiences 
 serves also as confirmation to the reason, very much as proofs serve 
 in arithmetic for better avoiding error of reckoning when the rea- 
 soning is long. It is also in this that the knowledge of men and 
 that of the brutes differ : the brutes are purely empirics and only 
 guide themselves by examples, for they never, as far as we can judge, 
 19 • 
 
290 
 
 come to form necessary propositions ; whereas men are capable of 
 demonstrative sciences. It is also for this reason that the faculty 
 which brutes have of making consecutions is something inferior to 
 the reason which is in man. The consecutions of the brutes are 
 merely like those of simple empirics, who claim that what has hap- 
 pened sometimes will happen also in a case where that which strikes 
 them is similar, without being able to judge whether the same rea- 
 sons hold good. This is why it is so easy for men to entrap brutes 
 and so easy for simple empirics to make mistakes. This is why 
 persons who have become skilled by age or by experience are not 
 exempt from error when they rely too much upon their past ex- 
 perience, as has happened to many in civil and military affairs ; 
 because they do not sufficiently consider that the world changes 
 and that men become more skilled by finding a thousand new dex- 
 terities, whereas deers and hares of the present day do not become 
 more cunning than those of past time. The consecutions of the 
 brutes are only a shadow of reasoning, that is to say, they are but 
 connections of the imagination and passages from one image to 
 another, because in a new juncture which appears similar to the 
 preceding they expect anew w^hat they found conjoined with it 
 before, as if things were linked together in fact because their 
 images are in the memory. It is true that even reason counsels us 
 to expect ordinarily to see that happen in the future which is con- 
 formed to a long past experience, but this is not for this reason a 
 necessary and infallible truth, and success may cease when we ex- 
 pect it least, if the reasons which have sustained it change. This 
 is why the wisest do not rely upon it so much that they do not try 
 to discover something of the reason (if it is possible) of this fact, 
 in order to judge when it will be necessary to make exceptions. 
 For reason is alone capable of establishing sure rules, and of supply- 
 ing what is lacking to those which were not sure by inserting their 
 exceptions ; and of finding, finally, certain connections in the force 
 of necessary consequences, which often gives the means of fore- 
 seeing the event without having need of experiencing the sensible 
 connections of images, to which the brutes are reduced ; so that that 
 which justifies the internal principles of necessary truths, distin- 
 guishes also man from the brutes. 
 
 Perhaps our able author will not differ entirely from my opinion. 
 For after having employed the whole of his first book in rejecting 
 
291 
 
 innate lights, taken in a certain sense, he nevertheless avows at the 
 beginning of the second and in what follows, that the ideas which 
 •do not originate in sensation come from reflection. Now reflection 
 is nothing else than attention to what is in ns, and the senses do 
 not give us that which we already carry with us. This being so, 
 can it be denied that there is much that is innate in our mind, 
 since we are innate, so to say, in ourselves? and that there is in 
 us ourselves, being, unity, substance, duration, change, action, 
 perception, pleasure, and a thousand other objects of our intel- 
 lectual ideas ? And these objects being immediate to our under- 
 standing and always present (although they cannot be always 
 perceived on account of our distractions and wants), why be aston- 
 ished that we say that these ideas, with all which depends on them, 
 are innate in us ? I have made use also of the comparison of a 
 block of marble which has veins, rather than of a block of 
 marble wholly even, or of blank tablets, that is to say, of 
 what is called among philosophers tabula rasa. For if the soul 
 resembled these blank tablets, truths would be in us as the figure 
 of Hercules is in marble when the marble is entirely indifferent 
 toward receiving this figure or some other. But if there were veins 
 in the block which should mark out the figure of Hercules rather 
 than other figures, the block would be more determined thereto, 
 and Hercules would be in it as in some sort innate, although it 
 would be necessary to labor in order to discover these veins and to 
 cleanse them by polishing and by cutting away that which prevents 
 them from appearing. It is thus that ideas and truths are innate 
 in us, as inclinations, dispositions, habits, or natural capacities, and 
 not as actions ; although these capacities are always accompanied 
 by some actions, often insensible, which correspond to them. 
 
 It seems that our able author claims that there is nothing virtual 
 in us and nothing even of which we are not always actually con- 
 scious, but he cannot take this strictly, otherwise his opinion would 
 be too paradoxical ; since, moreover, acquired habits and the stores 
 of our memory are not always consciously perceived and do 
 not even come always to our aid at need, although we often easily 
 bring them back to the mind on some slight occasion which makes 
 us remember them, just as we need but the beginning of a song to 
 remember it. He modifies also his assertion in other places, by 
 saying that there is nothing in us of which we have not been at 
 
292 
 
 least formerly conscious. But in addition to the fact that no one 
 can be sure by reason alone how far our past apperceptions which 
 we may have forgotten may have gone, especially according to the 
 reminiscence of the Platonists, which, fabulous as it is, has nothing 
 in it incompatible at least in part with the bare reason ; in addition 
 to this, I say, why is it necessary that all be acquired by us through 
 the perceptions of external things, and that nothing can be un- 
 earthed in ourselves ? Is our soul then such a blank that, besides 
 the images imprinted from without, it is nothing 2 This is not 
 an opinion (I am sure) which our judicious author can approve. 
 And where are there found tablets which are not something varied 
 in themselves ? For we never see a plain perfectly even and uni- 
 form. Why then could we not furnish also to ourselves something 
 of thought from our own depths, if we should dig therein ? Thus 
 I am led to believe that at bottom his opinion on this point is not 
 different from mine or rather from the common opinion, inasmuch 
 as he recognized two sources of our knowledge, the Senses and 
 Reflection. ' ~ 
 
 I do not know whether it will be as easy to bring him in accord 
 with us and with the Cartesians, when he maintains that the mind 
 /does not always think and particularly that it is without perception 
 when we sleep without dreaming. And he objects that, since 
 bodies may be without movement, souls may also well be without 
 thought. But here I reply a little differently than is wont to be 
 done, for I maintain that naturally a substance cannot be without 
 action, and even that there is never a body without movement. 
 Experience already favors me, and one has only to consult the book 
 of the illustrious Mr. Boyle against absolute repose, to be persuaded 
 of it ; but I believe that reason also favors it and it is one of the 
 proofs which I have for destroying atoms. 
 
 Furthermore there are a thousand indications which lead us to 
 think that there are constantly numberless perceptions in us, but 
 without apperception and without reflection ; that is to say, 
 changes in the soul itself of which we are not conscious because the 
 impressions are either too slight or in too great a number or too 
 even, so that they have nothing sufiicient to distinguish them one 
 from the other, but joined to others, they do not fail to produce 
 their effect and to make themselves felt at least confusedly in the 
 mass. Thus it is that custom causes us not to take notice of 
 
293 
 
 the motion of a mill or of a waterfall when we have lived near it 
 for some time. It is not that the motion does not always strike 
 our organs, and that something does not enter the soul which 
 answers thereto, on account of the harmonv of the soul and the 
 body ; but these impressions which are in the soul and in body, 
 being destitute of the charms of novelty, are not strong enough to 
 attract our attention and our memory, attached as they are to 
 objects more engrossing. For ail attention requires memory, and 
 often when we are not admonished, so to speak, and advised to 
 attend to some of our own present perceptions, we let them pass 
 without reflection and even without being noticed ; but if some one 
 calls our attention to them immediately afterwards and makes us 
 notice, for example, some noise which was just heard, we remember 
 it and are conscious of having had at the time some feeling of it. 
 Thus it was with the perceptions of which we were not immedi- 
 ately conscious, the consciousness only coming in this case from the 
 warning after some interval small though it may be. And to 
 judge still better of the minute perceptions which we are unable to 
 distinguish in the crowd, I am accustomed to make use of the 
 example of the roar or noise of the sea which strikes one when on 
 the shore. To understand this noise as it is made it would be nec- 
 essary to hear the parts which compose the whole, that is to say, 
 the noise of each wave, although each of these little noises only 
 makes itself known in the confused collection of all the others 
 together, that is to say, in the roar itself, and would not be 
 noticed if the wave which makes it was alone. For it must be that 
 we are affected a little by the motion of this wave and that we 
 have some perception of each of these noises however small ; other- 
 wise we would not have that of a hundred thousand waves, since a 
 hundred thousand nothings cannot make something. One never 
 sleeps so profoundly but that he has some feeble and confused feel- 
 ing, and he would never be awakened by the greatest noise in the 
 world if he did not have some perception of its small beginning, 
 just as one would never break a rope by the greatest effort in the 
 world if it was not stretched and lengthened a little by smaller 
 efforts, although the little extension which they produce does not 
 appear. 
 
 These minute perceptions are then of greater efficacy by their 
 consequences than is thought. It is they which form I know not 
 
294 
 
 what, these tastes, these images of the sensible qualities, clear in^ 
 the mass but confused in the parts, these impressions which sur- 
 rounding bodies make upon us, which embrace the infinite, this 
 connection which each being has with all the rest of the universe. 
 It may even be said that in consequence of these minute per- 
 ceptions the present is big with the future and loaded with the 
 past, that all things conspire (aofinvoca navza, as Hippocrates said) ; 
 and that in the least of substances eyes as piercing as those of 
 God could read the whole course of the things in the universe. 
 Quae sint, quae fuerint, quae max futura trahantur. These in- 
 sensible perceptions indicate also and constitute the same indi- 
 vidual, who is characterized by the traces or expressions which 
 they preserve of the preceding states of this individual, in making 
 the connection with his present state ; and these can be known by a 
 superior mind, even if this individual himself should not be aware 
 of them, that is to say, when the express recollection of them ' will 
 no longer be in him. But they (these perceptions, I say) furnish 
 the means of finding again this recollection at need by the periodic 
 developments which may happen some day. It is for this reason 
 that death can be but a sleep, and cannot indeed continue, the 
 perceptions merely ceasing to be sufficiently distinguished and 
 being, in animals, reduced to a state of confusion which suspends 
 consciousness, but which could not last always ; not to speak here of 
 man who must have in this respect great privileges in order to pre- 
 serve his personality. 
 
 It is also through the insensible perceptions that the admirable 
 pre-established harmony of the soul and the body, and indeed of 
 all monads or simple substances, is to be explained ; which supplies 
 the place of the unmaintainable influence of the one upon the 
 others, and which in the judgment of the author of the finest of 
 Dictionaries exalts the greatness of the divine perfections above 
 what has ever been conceived. After this I would add little if I 
 should say that it is these minute percej)tions which determine us 
 in many a juncture without it being thought of, and which deceive 
 the vulgar by the appearance of an indifference of equilihri^cm, as 
 if we were entirely indifferent to turning (for example) to the right 
 or to the left. It is not necessary also that I notice here, as I have 
 done in the book itself, that they cause that uneasiness wliich I 
 show consists in something which does not differ from pain except. 
 
295 
 
 as the small from the great, and which nevertheless often consti- 
 tutes our desire and even our pleasure, in giving to it a salt which 
 stimulates. It is also the inconceivable parts of our sensible per- 
 ceptions which produce a relation between the perceptions of colors^ 
 of heat and of other sensible qualities and between the motions in 
 bodies which correspond to them, whereas the Cartesians with our 
 author, thoroughly penetrating as he is, conceive the perceptions 
 which we have of these qualities as arbitrary, that is to say, as if 
 God had given them to the soul according to his good pleasure 
 without having regard to any essential relation between these per- 
 ceptions and their objects: an opinion which surprises me and 
 which appears to me little worthy of the Author of things who 
 does nothing without harmony and without reason. 
 
 In a word, these insensible perceptions are of as great use in pneu- 
 matics as the insensible corpuscles are in physics, and it is equally 
 as unreasonable to reject the one as the other under the pretext 
 that they are beyond the reacfi of our senses. ISTothing is done all 
 at once, and it is one of my great maxims, and one of the most 
 verified, that nature never makes leaps : this is what I called the 
 Law of continuity , when I spoke of it in the first Nouvelles de la 
 Republique des Lettres, and the use of this law is very considerable 
 in physics. It teaches that we pass always from the small to the 
 great, and vice versa, through the medium, in degrees as in parts^ 
 and that motion never arises immediately from repose nor is re- 
 duced to it except by a smaller motion, just as one never completes 
 running any line or length before having completed a shorter line ; 
 although hitherto those who have laid down the laws of motion 
 have not observed this law, believing that a body can receive in an 
 instant a motion contrary to the preceding. And all this leads us 
 to conclude rightly that the noticeable perceptions also come by de- 
 grees from these which are too minute to be noticed. To think 
 otherwise is to little understand the immense subtilty of things 
 which always and everywhere embraces an actual infinite. 
 
 I have also noticed that in virtue of insensible variations, two 
 individual things cannot be perfectly alike, and that they must 
 always differ more than nnmero ; which destroys the blank tablets 
 of the soul, a soul without thought, a substance without action, a 
 void in space, atoms and even particles not actually divided in mat- 
 ter, absolute rest, entire uniformity in one part of time, of space or 
 
of matter, perfect globes of the second element, born of perfect 
 and original cubes, and a thousand other fictions of the philosophers 
 which come from their incomplete notions, and which the nature of 
 things does not pennit, and which our ignorance and the little 
 attention we give to the insensible, let pass, but which can not be 
 tolerated, unless they are limited to abstractions of the mind which 
 protests that it does not deny what it puts aside and what it thinks 
 ought not enter into any present consideration. Otherwise if it is 
 rightly understood, namely, that things of which we are not con- 
 scious, are not in the soul nor in the body, we should be lacking in 
 philosophy as in politics, in neglecting r^ /axpop, insensible progress ; 
 whereas an abstraction is not an error, provided that we know what 
 it is that we feign in it. Just as mathematicians employ it when 
 they speak of perfect lines which they propose to us, of uniform 
 motions and of other regulated effects, although matter (that is to 
 say, the medley of the effects of the surrounding infinite) makes 
 always some exception. It is in order to distinguish the considera- 
 tions and to reduce, as far as is possible, the effects to reasons and 
 to foresee some of their consequences, that we proceed thus : for 
 the more attentive we are to neglect no consideration which we are 
 able to regulate, the more practice corresponds to theory. But it 
 pertains only to the Supreme Reason, which nothing escapes, to 
 comprehend distinctly all the infinite and to see all the reasons and 
 all the consequences. All that we can do as regards infinites is to 
 know them confusedly and to know at least distinctly that they are 
 thus ; otherwise we judge very wrongly of the beauty and grandeur 
 ■of the universe ; so also we could not have a sound physics which 
 should explain the nature of bodies in general, and still less a sound 
 pneumatics which should comprise the knowledge of God, of souls 
 and of simple substances in general. 
 
 This knowledge of insensible perceptions serves also to explain 
 why and how two souls, human or otherwise, of the same kind, 
 never come from the hands of the Creator perfectly alike, and each 
 always has its original relation to the points of view which it will 
 have in the universe. But this it is which already follows from 
 what I have remarked of two individuals, namely, that their differ- 
 ence is always more than numerical. There is still another point 
 of importance, on which I am obliged to differ not only from the 
 opinions of our author but also from those of the greater part of 
 
297 
 
 modern philosophers; this is, that I believe with most of the 
 ancients that all genii, all souls, all simple created substances are 
 always joined to a body and that there never are souls entirely 
 separated. I have a priori reasons for this ; but this advantage is 
 also found in the doctrine, that it resolves all the philosophical diffi- 
 culties as to the condition of souls, as to their perpetual conserva- 
 tion, as to their immortality and as to their action. The difference 
 of one of tlieir states from another never being and never having 
 been anything but that of more sensible to less sensible, of more 
 perfect to less perfect, or vice versa, it renders their past or future 
 state as explicable as that of the present. One feels sufficiently, 
 however little reflection one makes, that this is rational, and that a 
 leap from one state to another infinitely different could not be 
 natural. I am astonished that by quitting the natural without 
 reason, the schoolmen have been willing to plunge themselves pur- 
 posely into very great difficulties and to furnish matter for apparent 
 triumphs of the strong-minded, all of whose reasons fall at a single 
 blow by this explanation of things, where there is no more diffi- 
 culty in conceiving the conservation of souls (or rather according 
 to me of the animal) than there is in conceiving the change of the 
 caterpillar into the butterfly, and the conservation of thought in 
 sleep, to which Jesus Christ has divinely well compared death. 
 Also I have already said that a sleep could not last always, and it 
 will last least or almost not at all to rational souls who are always 
 destined to preserve the personality which has been given them in 
 the City of God, and consequently remembrance : and this in order 
 to be more susceptible to chastisements and recompenses. And I 
 add also that in general no derangement of the visible organs is 
 able to throw things into entire confusion in the animal or to destroy 
 all the organs and to deprive the soul of all its organic body and 
 the ineffaceable remains of all preceding traces. But the ease with 
 which the ancient doctrine has been abandoned of subtile bodies 
 united to the angels (which was confounded with the corporality of 
 the angels themselves), and the introduction of pretended separate 
 intelligences in creatures (to which those who make the heavens of 
 Aristotle revolve have contributed much), and finally the poorly 
 understood opinion into which we have fallen that the souls of 
 brutes could not be preserved without falling into metempsychosis 
 and without conducting them from body to body, and the embar- 
 
298 
 
 rassmen^ in which men have been placed by not knowing what to 
 do with them, have caused us, in my opinion, to neglect the natural 
 way of explaining the conservation of the soul. This has done 
 great injury to natural religion and has made many believe that our 
 immortality was only a miraculous grace of God, of which also our 
 celebrated author speaks with some doubt, as I shall presently re- 
 mark. But it were desirable that all who are of this opinion had 
 spoken as wisely and with as good faith as he, for it is to be feared 
 that many who speak of immortality through grace do it but to 
 save appearances, and approximate at heart those Averroists and 
 some bad Quietists who picture to themselves an absorption and the 
 reunion of the soul with the ocean of divinity ; a notion the impossi- 
 bility of which perhaps my system alone makes evident. 
 
 It seems also that we differ further as regards matter, in that the 
 author thinks a vacuum is here necessary for motion because he 
 thinks that the minute parts of matter are rigid. And I acknowl- 
 edge that if matter were composed of such parts motion in a plenum 
 would be impossible, just as if a room were full of a quantity of 
 small pebbles without there being the least vacant space. But this 
 supposition, for which there appears also no reason, is not admissi- 
 ble, although this able author goes to the point of believing that 
 rigidity or cohesion of minute parts constitutes the essence of body. 
 It is necessary rather to conceive space as full of an originally fluid 
 matter, susceptible of all the divisions and even actually subject to 
 divisions and subdivisions ad infinitum, but nevertheless with this 
 difference that it is divisible and divided unequally in different 
 places on account of the motions which already more or less concur 
 there. This it is which causes it to have everywhere a degree of 
 rigidity as well as of fluidity, and which causes no body to be hard 
 or fluid to the highest degree, that is to say, no atom to be found of 
 an insurmountable hardness nor any mass entirely indifferent to 
 division. The order also of nature and particularly the law of con- 
 tinuity destroy both equally. 
 
 I have shown also that cohesion, which could not itself be the 
 effect of impulse or of motion, would cause a traction taken 
 strictly. For if there were a body originally inflexible, for example, 
 an Epicurean atom which should have a part projecting in the form 
 of a hook (since we can conceive atoms of all sorts of figure), this 
 hook pushed would carry with it the rest of the atom, that is to say, 
 
299 
 
 the part which is not pushed and which does not fall in the line of 
 impulsion. Nevertheless our able author is himself opposed to 
 these philosophical tractions, such as were attributed formerly to 
 the abhorrence of a vacuum, and he is reduced to iiri'pulse^ main- 
 taining with the moderns that one part of matter operates imme- 
 diately upon another only by pushing it by contact. In which I 
 think they are right, since otherwise there is nothing intelligible in 
 the operation. 
 
 It is however necessary not to conceal the fact that I have 
 noticed a sort of retraction by our excellent author on this subject ; 
 whose modest sincerity in this respect I cannot refrain from prais- 
 ing as much as I have admired his penetrating genius on other 
 occasions. It is in the reply to the second letter of the late Bishop 
 of Worcester, printed in 1699, p. 408, where to justify the opinion 
 which he had maintained in opposition to that learned prelate, 
 namely, that matter might think, he says among other things : I 
 admit that I hoA^e said (book 2 of the Essay on the Understand- 
 ing^ chap. 8, §11) that hody acts hy impulse and not otherwise. 
 This also was my opinion when I wrote it^ and still at present I 
 cannot conceive in it another manner of acting. But since then 
 I have heen convinced hy the incomparable hooh of the jtcdicious 
 Mr. Newton, that there is too w^uch presumption in wishing to 
 limit the power of God hy our limited conceptions. The gravita- 
 tion of inatter towards matter, hy ways which are inconceivable to 
 me, is not only a demonstration that God can, when it seems good 
 to him, put in bodies ^powers and ways of acting which transcend 
 that which cam, be derived from our idea of body or explained by 
 what we know of matter i hut it is further an incontestable 
 instance that he has really done so. T shall therefore tahe care 
 that in the next edition of my hooh this passage he corrected. I 
 find that in the French version of this book made undoubtedly 
 according to the latest editions it has been put thus in this § 11 : 
 Tt is evident, at least so far as we are able to conceive it, that it is 
 by impulse and not otherwise that bodies act on each other, for it 
 is impossible for us to understand that hody can act lopon what it 
 does not touch, which is as much as to imagine that it can act 
 where it is not. 
 
 I cannot but praise that modest piety of our celebrated author, 
 which recognizes that God may do above what we are able to com- 
 
300 
 
 prehend, and that thus there may be inconceivable mysteries in the 
 articles of faith ; but I should not like to be obliged to resort to 
 miracle in the ordinary course of nature, and to admit powers and 
 operations absolutely inexplicable. Otherwise too much license 
 will be given to poor philosophers, under cover of what God can 
 do, and by admitting these centripetal virtues or these immediate 
 attractions from afar, without its being possible to render them 
 intelligible, I see nothing to hinder our scholastics from saying that 
 everything is done simply by their faculties and from maintaining 
 their intentional species which go from' objects to us and find 
 means of entering even into our souls. If this is so, omnia jam 
 Jient, fieri quae posse negaham. So that it seems to me that our 
 author, quite judicious as he is, goes here a little too much from 
 one extremity to the other. He is squeamish concerning the opera- 
 tions of souls, when the question merely is to admit that which is 
 not sensihle, and now, behold, he gives to hodies that which is not 
 even intelligible, granting them powers and actions which surpass 
 all that in my opinion a created spirit could do and understand, for 
 he grants them attraction, and that even at great distances, without 
 limiting himself to any sphere of activity, and this to maintain an 
 opinion which does not appear less inexplicable ; namely, the possi- 
 bility of the thought of matter in the natural order. 
 
 The question which he, with the celebrated prelate who attacked 
 him, agitates, is whether matter can thinh / and as this is an import- 
 ant point, even for the present work, I cannot exempt myself from 
 entering upon it a little and from taking notice of their contro- 
 versy. I will present the substance of it on this subject and will take 
 the liberty of saying what I think of it. The late Bishop of Wor- 
 cester, apprehending (but in my opinion without good reason) that 
 our author's doctrine of ideas was liable to certain abuses prejudicial 
 to the Christian faith, undertook to examine some passages of it in 
 his Yindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity / and having done 
 justice to this excellent writer by recognizing that he regards the 
 existence of spirit as certain as that of body, although one of these 
 substances is as little known as the other, he asks (p. 241 seqq.) how 
 reflection can assure us of the existence of spirit, if God can give to 
 matter the faculty of thinking, according to the opinion of our au- 
 thor, bk. 4, chap. 3, since thus the way of ideas which must serve to 
 discern that which is suitable to the soul or the body would become 
 
301 
 
 useless ; whereas he had said, bk. 2 of the Essorj on the Under- 
 standi7ig, ch. 23, §§ 15, 27, 28, that the operations of the soul furnish 
 us the idea of mind, and the understanding with the will renders 
 this idea as intelligible to us as the nature of body is rendered by 
 solidity and impulse. This is how our author replies to it in the 
 first letter (p. 65 seqq.) : Ihelieve that I have proved that there is a 
 spiritual substance in us^ for we experience in ourselves thought; 
 now this action or this mode coidd not he the object of the idea of 
 a thing subsisting of itself^ and consequently this mode needs a 
 support or siibject of inhesion^ and the idea of this support forms 
 what we call substance. . . For since the general idea of substance 
 is everywhere the same, it follows that the modification, which is 
 called thought or power of thinhing, being joined to it, there results 
 a mind without there being need of considering what other modi- 
 fication it has in addition / that is whether it has solidity or not. 
 And on the other hand, the substance which has the modification 
 called solidity will be matter, whether thought be joined to it or not. 
 But if by a spiritual substance you understand an immaterial 
 substance, I confess that I have not proved that there is one in us, 
 and that it cannot be proved demonstratively on m.y principles. 
 Although what I have said on the s^f stems of matter (bk. 4, ch. 10, 
 § 16), in demonstrating that God is immaterial, renders it extremely 
 
 probable that the substance which thinks in ics is immaterial 
 
 Howev&r I have shown (adds the author, p. 68) that the great ends 
 of religion and of morals are assured by the immortality of the 
 soul, without its being necessary to suppose its immateriality. 
 
 The learned Bishop in his reply to this letter, in order to show 
 that our author was of another opinion when he wrote his second 
 book of the Essay, quotes, p. 51, the passage (taken from the same 
 book, ch. 23, § 15) where it is said, that by the simple ideas which 
 we hoA^e deduced from the operations of our mind, we can form 
 the complex idea of a mind. And that putting together the ideas 
 of thought, of perception, of liberty and of power of moving our 
 body, we ha/ve as clear a notion of immaterial substances as of 
 material. He quotes still other passages to show that the author 
 opposed mind to body. And he says (p. 54) that the ends of relig- 
 ion and of morals are the better assured by proving that the soul is 
 immortal by its nature, that is, immaterial. He quotes again 
 (p. 70) this passage, that all the ideas which we have of pai^ticular 
 
302 
 
 a/ad distmct kinds of substances are nothing hut different comhina- 
 tions of simple ideas / and that thus the author believed that the 
 idea of thinking and of willing gives another substance different 
 from that which the idea of solidity and of impulse gives, and that 
 (§ 17) he observes that these ideas constitute the body as opposed 
 to mind. 
 
 The Bishop of Worcester might add that from the fact that the 
 general idea of substance is in the body and in the mind, it does 
 not follow that their differences are ^modifications of one and the 
 same thing, as our author has just said in the passage which I have 
 adduced from his first letter. It is necessary to distinguish care- 
 fully between modifications and attributes. The faculties of hav- 
 ing perception and of acting, extension, solidity, are attributes or 
 perpetual and principal predicates ; but thought, impetuosity, figures, 
 movements are modifications of these attributes. Furthermore, we 
 must distinguish between physical (or rather real) genus, and logical 
 or ideal genus. The things which are of the same physical genus, 
 or which are homogeneous, are of the same matter^ so to speak, 
 and may often be changed the one into the other by the change 
 of the modification, as circles and squares. But two heterogeneous 
 things may have a common logical genus, and then their differences 
 are not simply accidental modifications of the same subject or of 
 the same metaphysical or physical matter. Thus time and space 
 are very heterogeneous things, and we should do wrong to imagine 
 I know not what real common subject which had but the contained 
 quantity in general and the modifications of which should make 
 time or space appear. 
 
 Perhaps some one will mock at these distinctions of philosophers 
 of two genera, the one merely logical, the other real ; and of two 
 matters, the one physical which is that of bodies, the other only 
 metaphysical or general ; as if some one said that two parts of space 
 are of the same matter or that two hours are also of the same mat- 
 ter among themselves. Nevertheless these distinctions are not 
 merely of terms, but of things themselves, and seem to come in 
 here very appropriately, "where their confusion has given rise to a 
 false consequence. These two genera have a common notion, and 
 that of the real genus is common to the two matters, so that their 
 genealogy will be as follows : 
 
303 
 
 ^ Logical merely, varied by simple differences. 
 
 Metaphysical only, 
 
 Genus: 
 
 Real, the differences of which 
 are modifications, that is to 
 say, matter. 
 
 where there is ho- 
 mogeneity. 
 Physical, Avhere 
 there is a solid ho- 
 mogeneous mass. 
 
 I have not seen the second letter from the author to the Bishop, 
 hut the reply which this prelate makes to it hardly touches on the 
 point regarding the thinking of matter. But the reply of our 
 author to this second answer, returns to it. God (he says very 
 nearly in these words, p. 397), adds to the essence of matter the 
 qualities and perfections which he pleases, simple movenfient in 
 some parts, hut in plants, vegetation, and in animals, feeling. 
 Those who agree up to this point. Cry out as soon as one more step 
 is taken, saying that God can give to matter thought, reason, will, 
 as if this destroyed the essence of matter. But to prove it, they 
 allege that thought or reason is not included in the essence of mat- 
 ter, a point of no consequence, since movement and life are not 
 included in it either. They assert also that we cannot conceive 
 that matter thinks ; hut our conception is not the measure of the 
 power of God. After this he cites the example of the attraction of 
 matter, p. 99, but especially p. 408, where he speaks of the gravita- 
 tion of matter toward matter attributed to Mr. E"ewton (in the 
 terms which I have quoted above), confessing that we could never 
 conceive the manner of it. This is in reality to return to the occult 
 or, what is more, inexplicable qualities. He adds, p. 401, that 
 nothing is more fit to favor the sceptics than to deny what we do 
 not understand ; and, p. 402, that we do not conceive even how the 
 soul thinks. He will have it, p. 403, that the two substances, 
 material and immaterial, capable of being conceived in their bare 
 essence without any activity, it depends on God to give to each the 
 power of thinking. And he wishes to take advantage of the 
 avowal of his opponent who had granted feeling to brutes, but who 
 would not grant them any immaterial substance. It is claimed 
 that liberty and consciousness (p. 408), and the power of making 
 abstractions (p. 409), can be given to matter, not as matter but as 
 enriched by a divine power. Finally he adduces the remark 
 
304 
 
 (p. 434) of a traveller as important and as judicious as M. de la 
 Loubere, that the peasants of the east know the immortality of the 
 sonl without being able to comprehend its immateriality. 
 
 On all this I will remark, before coming to the explanation of 
 my opinion, that it is certain that matter is as little capable of 
 mechanically producing feeling as of producing reason, as our 
 author agrees ; that in truth I acknowledge that it is not right to 
 deny what we do not understand, but I add that we are right in 
 denying (at least in the natural order) what is absolutely neither 
 intelligible nor explicable. I maintain also that substances (mate- 
 rial or immaterial) cannot be conceived in their bare essence 
 without any activity ; that activity belongs to the essence of sub- 
 stance in general ; that, finally, the conception of creatures is not 
 the measure of the power of God, but that their conceptivity or 
 force of conceiving is the measure of the power of nature ; every- 
 thing which is conformed to the natural order being capable of 
 being conceived or comprehended by some creature. 
 
 Those who would conceive my system will think that I could 
 not conform myself in everything to one or the other of these two 
 excellent authors, whose controversy, however, is highly instructive. 
 But to explain myself distinctly, before all .else it is necessary to 
 consider that the modifications which may belong naturally or 
 without miracle to a subject, must come into it from the limitations 
 or variations of a real genus or of a constant and absolute original 
 nature. For it is thus that philosophers distinguish the modes of 
 an absolute being from that being itself ; as it is known that size, 
 figure and movement are manifestly limitations and variations of 
 corporeal nature. For it is clear in what way a limited extension 
 gives figures, and that the change which is made in it is nothing 
 but motion. And every time that we find some quality in a sub- 
 ject, we must believe that if we understood the nature of this 
 subject and of this quality, we should conceive how this quality 
 can result therefrom. Thus, in the order of nature (miracles set 
 aside), it is not optional with God to give to substances indiffer- 
 ently such or such qualities, and he will never give them any but 
 those which shall be natural to them ; that is, which can be 
 derived from their nature as explicable modifications. Thus it 
 may be asserted that matter will not naturally have the above men- 
 tioned attraction, and will not move of itself in a curved line* 
 
305 
 
 because it is not possible to conceive how this takes place there ; 
 that is, to explain it mechanically ; whereas that which is natural, 
 must be able to become distinctly conceivable if we were admitted 
 into the secrets of things. This distinction between what is 
 natural and explicable and what is inexplicable and miraculous, 
 removes all the difficulties ; and by rejecting it, we should main- 
 tain something worse than the occult qualities ; and in this we 
 would renounce philosophy and reason, by opening retreats for 
 ignorance and idleness, through a dead system which admits not 
 only that there are qualities which we do not understand, of which 
 there are only too many, but also that there are some which the 
 greatest mind, if God gave him all the opening possible, could not 
 comprehend ; that is, which would be either miraculous or without 
 rhyme and reason ; and also that God should make miracles ordi- 
 narily, would be without rhyme and reason, so that this useless 
 hypothesis would destroy equally our philosophy which seeks rea- 
 sons, and divine wisdom which furnishes them. 
 
 Now as to thought, it is certain, and the author recognizes it 
 more than once, that it could not be an intelligible modification 
 of matter or one which could be comprehended and explained; 
 that is to say, that the feehng or thinking being is not a mechan- 
 ical thing like a clock or a mill, such that we might conceive 
 sizes, figures and movements, the mechanical conjunction of which 
 might produce something thinking and even feeling in a mass 
 in which there was nothing such, which should cease also in the 
 same way by the irregularity of this mechanism. It is hence 
 not natural to matter to feel and to think ; and this can only 
 take place within it in two ways, one of which will be that God 
 should join to it a substance, to which it is natural to think, and the 
 other that God should put thought in it by miracle. In this, then, I 
 am entirely of the opinion of the Cartesians, except that I extend it 
 even to brutes and that I believe that they have feeling and imma- 
 terial souls (properly speaking) and are as imperishable as the atoms 
 of Democritus or Gassendi ; whereas the Cartesians, groundlessly 
 embarassed by the souls of brutes and not knowing what they are 
 to do with them if they are preserved (for want of having be- 
 thought themselves of the preservation of the same animal reduced 
 to miniature), have been forced, contrary to all appearances and 
 to the judgment of the J^uman race, to deny even feeling to brutes, 
 20 
 
306 
 
 Eut if some one should say that God at least may add the fac- 
 ulty of thinking to the prepared mechanism, I would reply that if 
 this were done and if God added this faculty to matter without 
 depositing in it at the same time a substance which was the subject 
 of inhesion of this same faculty (as I conceive it), that is to say, 
 without adding to it an immaterial soul, it would be necessary that 
 matter should be miraculously exalted in order to receive a power 
 of which it is not naturally capable ; as some scholastics claim that 
 God exalts fire even to the point of giving it the force to burn 
 immediately spirits separated from matter, a thing which would be 
 a miracle, pure and simple. And it is enough that it cannot be 
 maintained that matter thinks without putting thereto an imperish- 
 able soul or a miracle, and that thus the immortality of our souls 
 follows from that which is natural, since their extinction could be 
 effected only by a miracle, whether by exalting matter or by 
 annihilating the soul. For we well know that the power of God 
 could render our souls mortal, however immaterial (or immortal 
 by nature alone) they may be, for he can annihilate them. 
 
 Now this truth of the immateriality of the soul is undoubtedly 
 of importance. For it is infinitely more advantageous to religion 
 and to morals, especially in the times in which we live (when 
 many people hardly respect revelation alone and miracles), to show 
 that souls are immortal naturally, and that it would be a miracle if 
 they were not, than to maintain that our souls ought naturally to 
 die, but that it is by virtue of a miraculous grace, founded in the 
 promise of God alone, that they do not die. Also for a long time 
 it has been known that those who have wished to destroy natural 
 religion and reduce all to revealed religion, as if reason tauglit us 
 nothing concerning it, have been regarded with suspicion, and not 
 always without reason. But our author is not of this number ; he 
 maintains the demonstration of the existence of God, and he attrib- 
 utes to the immateriality of the soul a probability in the highest 
 degree, which could pass consequently for a moral certainty, so 
 that I imagine that, having as much sincerity as penetration, he 
 could accommodate himself easily to the doctrine which I have just 
 stated and which is fundamental in every rational philosophy ; for 
 otherwise I do not see how one can prevent himself from falling 
 back into the fanatical philosophy, such as the Philosophia Mo- 
 saica of Fludd which saves all phenomena by attributing them to 
 
307 
 
 Ood immediately and by miracle, or into the harbaric philosophy, 
 like that of certain philosophers and physicians of the past, which 
 still bore the marks of the barbarity of their century and which is 
 to-day with reason despised, who saved appearances by forging ex- 
 pressly occult qualities or faculties which they imagined to be like 
 little demons or goblins capable of producing unceremoniously that 
 which is demanded, just as if watches marked the hours by a cer- 
 tain horodeictic faculty without having need of wheels, or as if 
 mills crushed grains by a fractive faculty without needing any- 
 thing resembling mill-stones. As to the difficulty which many 
 people have had in conceiving an immaterial substance, it will 
 easily cease (at least in good part) when they do not demand sub- 
 stances separated from matter ; as indeed I do not believe there 
 ever are any naturally among creatures. 
 
 Book I. — Of Innate Ideas. 
 
 CHAPTER I. [ll IN LOCKE.] 
 
 Are there Innate Principles in the Mind of Man f 
 
 It is necessary that I tell you anew that I am no longer a Carte- 
 sian, and that nevertheless I am farther removed than ever from 
 your Gassendi, whose knowledge and merit I elsewhere recognize. 
 I have been impressed by a new system, of which I have read 
 something in the philosophical journals of Paris, of Leipsic, and of 
 Holland, and in the marvellous Dictionary of M. Bayle, article 
 Morarius ; and since then I believe I see a new aspect of the inte- 
 rior of things. This system appears to unite Plato with Democritus, 
 Aristotle with Descartes, the scholastics with the moderns, theology 
 and ethics with reason. It seems to take the best from every side 
 and then afterwards to go farther than any one has yet gone. I 
 find in it an intelligible explanation of the union of the soul and 
 body, a thing of which I had before despaired. I find the true 
 principles of things in the Unities of Substance which this system 
 introduces, and in their harmony preestablished by the primitive 
 substance. I find in it a surprising simplicity and uniformity, so 
 that it may be said that it is everywhere and always the same thing, 
 nearly in the degrees of perfection. I see now what Plato meant 
 
308 
 
 when he took matter for an imperfect and transitory entity, what 
 Aristotle meant by his entelechy ; what the promise which Democ- 
 ritns himself made of another life is, with Pliny ; just liow far the 
 Sceptics were right in inveighing against the senses ; how the ani- 
 mals are in reality automata according to Descartes, and how they 
 have, nevertheless, souls and feeling according to the opinion of the 
 human race ; how it is necessary to explain rationally those who 
 have lodged life and perception in all things, like Cardan, Cam- 
 panella, and better than they, the late Countess of Connaway, a 
 Platonist, and our friend, the late M. Francois Mercure van 
 Helmont (although elsewhere bristling with unintelligible para- 
 doxes), with his friend, the late Mr. Henry More. How the laws 
 of nature (a large part of which were unknown before this system) 
 have their origin in principles superior to matter, and how, never- 
 theless, everything takes place mechanically in matter ; in which 
 respect the spiritualistic authors whom I have just mentioned, had 
 failed with their Archaei and even the Cartesians, in believing that 
 immaterial substances changed if not the force, at least the direction 
 or determination of the motions of bodies, whereas the soul and 
 body perfectly retain their laws, each its own, according to the new 
 system, and yet one obeys the other as far as is necessary. Finally, 
 it is since I have meditated on this system that I have found out 
 how the souls of brutes and their sensations are not at all prejudicial 
 to the immortality of human souls, or, rather, how nothing is more 
 adapted to establish our natural immortality than to conceive that 
 all souls are imperishable {morte carent animae)^ without, however, 
 there being metempsychoses to be feared, since not only souls but 
 also animals remain and will remain living, feeling, acting ; it is 
 everywhere as here, and always and everywhere as with us, accord- 
 ing to what I have already said to you. Unless it be that the states 
 of animals are more or less perfect and developed, without there 
 ever being need of souls altogether separate, while nevertheless, we 
 always have minds as pure as possible, notwithstanding our organs, 
 which cannot disturb by any influence, the laws of our spontaneity. 
 I find the vacuum and atoms excluded very differently than by the 
 sophism of the Cartesians, founded on the pretended coincidence 
 between the idea of body and of extension. I see all things regu- 
 lated and adorned beyond anything conceived of up to this time, 
 matter everywhere organic, no sterile, neglected vacuum, nothing 
 
309 
 
 too uniform, everything varied but with order ; and what sur- 
 passes the imagination, the whole universe in epitome, but with a 
 different aspect in eacli of its parts and even in each of its unities 
 of substance. In addition to this new analysis of things, I have 
 better understood that of notions or ideas and of truths. I under- 
 stand what is a true, clear, distinct, adequate idea, if I dare adopt 
 this word. I understand what are primitive truths, and true 
 axioms, the distinction between necessary truths and those of fact, 
 between the reasoning of men and the consecutions of brutes which 
 are a shadow of it. Finally, you will be surprised, sir, to hear all 
 that I have to say to you, and especially to understand how knowl- 
 edge of the greatness and perfection of God is thereby exalted. 
 For I cannot conceal from you, from whom I have had nothing 
 secret, how much I am imbued now with admiration and (if we may 
 venture to make use of this term) with love for this sovereign 
 source of things and of beauties, having found that those which 
 this system reveals, surpass everything hitherto conceived. You 
 know that I had gone a little too far formerly, and that I began 
 to incline to the side of the Spinozists, who leave only infinite power 
 to God, without recognizing either perfection or wisdom as respects 
 him, and, scorning the search after final causes, derive everything 
 from brute necessity. But these new lights have cured me of this. 
 § 1. I have always favored, as I do still, the innate idea of 
 God which M. Descartes maintained, and consequently other innate 
 ideas which cannot come to us from the senses. Now I go still 
 farther in conformity with the new system, and I even believe 
 that all the thoughts and actions of our soul come from its own 
 depths and cannot be given to it by the senses, as you shall see in 
 the sequel. But at present I shall set aside this investigation, and 
 accommodating myself to the received expressions, since in truth 
 they are good and maintainable and since in a sense it may be said 
 that the external senses are in part causes of our thoughts, I shall 
 examine how in my opinion it must be said, even in the common 
 system (speaking of the action of bodies on the soul, as the Coper- 
 nicans speak with other men of the motion of the sun, and with 
 reason), that there are ideas and principles which do not come to us ' 
 from the senses, and wliich we find in us without forming them, 
 although the senses give us occasion to become conscious of them. 
 I imagine that your able^author has remarked that under the name 
 
310 
 
 of innate principles one often maintains his prejudices, and wishes 
 to exempt himself from the trouble of discussions, and that this 
 abuse has animated his zeal against this supposition. He has wished 
 to combat the indolence and the superficial manner of thinking of 
 those who, under the specious pretext of innate ideas and truths 
 engraved naturally on the mind, to which we easily give assent, 
 do not concern themselves with seeking and examining the sources, 
 connections and certainty of this knowledge. In this I am alto- 
 gether of his opinion, and I even see farther. I would that our 
 analysis should not be limited, that definitions of all terms capable 
 thereof should be given, and that all the axioms which are not 
 primitive, should be demonstrated or the means of demonstrating 
 them be given ; without distinguishing the opinion which men have 
 thereof, and without caring whether they give their consent thereto 
 or not. This would be more useful than is thought. But it seems 
 that the author has been carried too far on the other side by his 
 zeal, otherwise highly praiseworthy. He has not sufficiently distin- 
 guished, in my opinion^ the origin of necessary truths whose source 
 I is in the understanding, from that of the truths of fact, drawn from 
 the experiences of the senses, and even fi'om the confused percep- 
 tions which are in us. You see therefore, sir, that I do not admit 
 what you lay down as fact, that we can acquire all our knowledge 
 without having need of innate impressions. And the sequel will 
 show which of us is right. 
 
 I § § 2. 3. 4. I do not base the certainty of innate principles on 
 luni/versal consent, for I have already told you that my opinion is 
 } that we ought to labor to be able to prove all the axioms which are 
 I not primitive. I grant also that a consent very general, but which 
 is not universal, may come from a tradition diffused throughout the 
 human race, as the practice of smoking tobacco has been received 
 by almost all nations in less than a century, although some islanders 
 have been found who, not knowing even fire, were unable to smoke. 
 Thus some able people, even among theologians, but of the party of 
 Arminius, have believed that the knowledge of the Divinity came 
 from a very ancient and general tradition; and I believe indeed, 
 that instruction has confirmed and rectified this knowledge. It 
 appears, however, that nature has aided in reaching it without in- 
 struction ; the marvels of the universe have made us think of a 
 superior power. A child born deaf and dumb has been seen to 
 
311 
 
 show veneration for the full inoon, and nations have been found 
 who seemed not to have learned anything else of other people, fear- 
 ing invisible powers. I grant that this is not yet the idea of God, 
 such as we have it and as we demand ; but this idea itself does not 
 cease to be in the depths of our souls, without being placed there^ 
 as we shall see, and the eternal laws of God are in part engraved 
 thereon in a way still more legible, and by a sort of instinct. But 
 they are practical principles of which we shall also have occasion to 
 speak. It must be admitted, however, that the inclination which 
 we have to recognize the idea of God, lies in human nature. And 
 even if the first instruction therein should be attributed to Revela- 
 tion, the readiness which men have always shown to receive this 
 doctrine comes from tlie nature of their souls. I conclude that a 
 sufficiently general consent among men is an indication and not a 
 demonstration of an innate principle ; but that the exact and deci- 
 sive proof of these principles consists in showing that their certainty 
 comes only from what is in us. To reply again to what you say 
 against the general approbation given to the two great speculative 
 principles, which are nevertheless the best established, I may say to 
 you that even if they were not known, they would none the less be 
 innate, because they are recognized as soon as heard ; but I will add 
 further, that at bottom everyone knows them and makes use at 
 every moment of the principle of contradiction (for example) with- 
 out examining it distinctly, and there is no barbarian, who, in a 
 matter which he considers serious, would not be shocked at the 
 conduct of a liar who contradicts himself. Thus these maxims are 
 employed without being expressly considered. And it is very 
 much so that we have virtually in the mind the propositions sup- 
 pressed in enthymemes, which are set aside not only externally, but 
 also in our thought. 
 
 § 5. \^]^ot on the mind naturally impvinted^ hecause not hnown 
 to children, idiots, c&c.'] If you are so prejudiced as to say that 
 there are truths imprinted on the soul which it does not perceive, I 
 «iim not surprised that you reject innate knowledge. But I am 
 astonished that it has not occurred to you that we have an infinity 
 of knowledge of which we are not always conscious, not even when 
 we have need of it. It is for memory to retain it and for reminis- 
 cence to represent it to us, as it often does, but not always when 
 needed. This is very well called remembrance {suhvenire), for 
 
312 
 
 reminiecence requires some help. And it must be that in this mul- 
 tiplicity of our knowledge we are determined by something to 
 renew one rather than another, since it is impossible to think dis- 
 tinctly and at once of all that we hnow. In a sense it must be said 
 that all arithmetic and all geometry are innate and are in us virtu- 
 ally, so that they may be found there if we consider attentively and 
 arrange what is already in the mind, without making use of any 
 truth learned by experience or by the tradition of others, as Plato 
 has shown in a dialogue, where he introduces Socrates leading a 
 child to abstract truths by mere questions, without telling him any- 
 thing. We may therefore invent these sciences in our libraries 
 and even with closed eyes, without learning by sight or even by 
 touch, the truths which we need ; although it is true that we would 
 not consider the ideas in question if we had never seen or touched 
 anything. 
 
 Since an acquired knowledge may be concealed in the soul by the 
 memory, as you admit, why could not nature have also hidden there 
 some original knowledge ? Must everything which is natural to a 
 substance which knows itself, be known there actually in the begin- 
 ning ? Can not and must not this substance (such as our soul), have 
 many properties and modifications, all of which it is impossible to 
 consider at first and altogether? It was the opinion of the Platon- 
 ists that all our knowledge was reminiscence and that thus the 
 truths which the soul has brought along at the birth of the man 
 and which are called innate, must be the remains of an express 
 anterior knowledge. But this opinion has no foundation. And it 
 is easy to judge that the soul must already have innate knowledge 
 in the preceding state (if preexistence were a fact), however distant 
 it might be, just as here ; it therefore would have to come also from 
 another preceding state, or it would be finally innate or at least 
 concreate, or it would be necessary to resort to the infinite and make 
 souls eternal, in which case this knowledge would be innate in 
 truth, from the fact that it would never have a beginning in the 
 soul ; and if someone claimed that each anterior state has had some- 
 thing from another more anterior which it has not left to the 
 succeeding, the reply will be made, that it is manifest that certain 
 evident truths must have been in all these states. And in what- 
 ever way it may be taken, it is always clear in all the states of the 
 soul that necessary truths are innate and are proved by what is 
 
313 
 
 internal, it not being possible to establish them by experiences as 
 we establish truths of fact. Why should it be necessary also that 
 we could possess nothing in the soul of which we had never made 
 use ? And is to have a thing without making use of it the same 
 thing as to have merely the faculty of acquiring it? If it were so, 
 we should never possess anything except the 'things which we enjoy; 
 whereas we know that in addition to the faculty and the object, 
 there must often be some disposition in the faculty or in the object 
 or in both, in order that the faculty be exercised upon the object. 
 
 If the mind had only the simple capacity of receiving knowledge 
 or passive power for that, as indeterminate as that which the wax 
 has for receiving figures, and a blank tablet for receiving letters, it 
 would not be„the scuii!C.a. of nece^^ just shown it 
 
 to be ; for it is incontestable that the senses do not suffice to show 
 their necessity, and that thus the mind has a disposition (as much 
 active as passive) to draw them itself from its depths ; although the 
 senses are necessary in order to give it the occasion and attention 
 for this, and to carry it to some rather than to others. You see, 
 therefore, sir, that these people, otherwise very able, who are of a 
 different opinion, seem not to have sufficiently meditated on the 
 consequences of the difference which there is between necessary or 
 eternal truths and the truths of experience, as I have already 
 remarked, and as all our discussion shows. The original proof of \ 
 the necessary truths comes from the understanding alone, and the \ 
 other truths come from experiences or from the observations of the 
 senses. Our mind is capable of knowing both, but it is the source 
 of the former ; and whatever number of particular experiences we 
 may have of a universal truth, we could not be assured of it forever 
 by induction, without knowing its necessity through the reason. 
 
 § 11. It is the particular relation of the human mind to these 
 truths which renders the exercise of the faculty easy and natural as 
 respects them, and which causes them to be called innate. It is 
 therefore, not a naked faculty which consists in the mere possibility 
 of understanding them ; it is a disposition, an aptitude, a preforma- 
 tion, which determines our soul and which brings it about that they 
 may be derived from it. Just as there is a difference between the 
 figures which are given to the stone or marble indifferently, and 
 those which its veins already mark out or are disposed to mark out 
 if the workman profits by them. 
 
11 
 
 314 
 
 The intellectual ideas, which are the source of necessary truths, 
 do not come from the senses ; and you recognize that there are ideas 
 which are due to the reflection of the mind when it reflects upon 
 itself. For the rest, it is true that the express knowledge of truths 
 is posterior {femjpore vet natura) to the express knowledge of ideas ; 
 as the nature of truths depends on the nature of ideas, before we 
 expressly form one or the other, and the truths into which the ideas 
 which come from the senses enter, depend on the senses, at least in 
 part. But the ideas which come from the senses are confused, and 
 the truths which depend upon them are confused also, at least in 
 part ; whereas the intellectual ideas and the truths which depend on 
 them, are distinct, and neither the one class nor the other has its 
 origin in the senses, although it may be true that we would never^ 
 think of them without the senses. 
 
 § 18. \_If such an assent he a marJc of innate^ then^ that one and 
 two are equal to three, that sweetness is not bitterness, and a thou- 
 sand the nice, must he innate.'] I do not see how this : what is the 
 sarnie thing is not different, can be the origin of the principle of 
 contradiction, and easier ; for it seems to me that you give yourself 
 more liberty by advancing that A is not B, than by saying that A 
 is not non-A. And the reason which prevents A from being B, is 
 that B includes non-A. For the rest, the proposition : the sweet is 
 not the hitter, is not innate, according to the meaning which we 
 have given to the term innate truth. For the feelings of sweet 
 and of bitter come from the external senses. Thus it is a mixed 
 conclusion [hyhrida conclusio), where the axiom is applied to a sen- 
 sible truth. But as for this proposition : the square is not a circUy 
 it may be said to be innate, for in considering it, you make a sub- 
 sumption or application of the principle of contradiction to what 
 the understanding itself furnishes as soon as you are conscious of 
 innate thoughts. 
 
 § 19. \_SuGh less general jpropositions hnown hefore these %ini/Der- 
 sal maxims.'] We build on these general maxims, as we build on 
 majors which are suppressed when we reason by enthymemes ; 
 for although very often we do not think distinctly of what we do 
 in reasoning, any more than of what we do in walking and jump- 
 ing, it is always true that the force of the conclusion consists partly 
 in what is suppressed and could not come from elsewhere, as will 
 be found if you should wish to prove it. 
 
315 
 
 § 20. [One cmd one equal to two^ cfec, not general nor useful, 
 answered.'] It is true that we begin sooner to perceive particular 
 truths, when we begin by more composite and gross ideas ; but this 
 does not prevent the order of nature from beginning with the most 
 simple, and the reason of more particular truths from depending on 
 the more general, of which they are only examples. And when 
 we wish to consider what is in us virtually, and before all apper- 
 ception, we are right in beginning with the most simple. For the 
 general principles enter into our thoughts, of which they form the 
 soul and the connection. They are as necessary to it as the mus- 
 cles and sinews are for walking, although we do not think of it. 
 The mind leans upon these principles at all times, but it does not 
 so easily come to distinguish them and to represent them to itself 
 distinctly and separately, because that requires great attention 
 to what it does, and most people, little accustomed to meditate, 
 have hardly any. Have not the Chinese, like ourselves, articulate_^ 
 sounds ? and yet being attached to another way of writing, they ^ 
 have not yet thought of making an alphabet of these sounds. It i&^v 
 thus that one possesses many things without knowing it. — ^ 
 
 § 21. [These maxims not heing known sometimes till proposed, 
 proves them not innate.] The nature of things and the nature of 
 the_mind agree. And since you oppose the consideration of the 
 thing to the apperception of that which is 'engraved on the mind, 
 this objection itself shows, sir, that those whose side you take, 
 understand by innate truths only those which would be approved | 
 naturally as by instinct, and even without knowing it, unless con- \ 
 fusedly. There are some of this nature, and we shall have occasion 
 to speak of them. But that which is called natural light supposes a 
 distinct knowledge, and very often the consideration of the nature 
 of things is nothing else than the knowledge of the nature of our i 
 mind and of these innate ideas which we do not need to seek out- | 
 side. Thus I call innate, those truths which need only this consid- ' 
 eration in order to be verified. I have already replied § 5, to the 
 objection § 22, which claimed that when it is said that innate 
 ideas are implicitly in the mind, this must mean simply, that it has 
 the faculty of knowing them ; for I have shown that in addition to 
 this, it hg^the ^f acuity of finding; them in itself, and the d isp^f^ifion -^ 
 to approve them when it thinks of them as it shoula. 
 
 § 23. [The argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a 
 false supposition of no precedent teaching.] I would name aa 
 
316 
 
 propositions whose ideas are innate, the propositions of arithmetic 
 and geometry, which are all of this nature, and as regards necessary 
 truths, no others could be found. 
 
 § 25. [These maxims not the first known.'] The apperception 
 of that which is in us, depends upon attention and order. ISTow, it 
 is not only possible, but it is also proper, that children pay more 
 attention to the ideas of the senses, because the attention is regu- 
 lated by the need. The result, however, shows in the sequel, that 
 nature has not uselessly given herself the trouble of impressing 
 upon us innate knowledge, since without it there would be no 
 means of arriving at actual knowledge of the truths necessary in 
 the demonstrative sciences, and at the reasons of facts ; and we 
 should possess nothing above the brutes. 
 
 § 26. [And so not innate?^ IS^ot at all, for thoughts are actions ; 
 and knowledge or truths, in so far as they are in us, even when we 
 do not think of them, are habits or dispositions ; and we know very 
 many things of which we hardly think. 
 
 \It is very difficult to eoiiceive that a truth he in the inind^ if the 
 m,ind has never thought of this truth.] 
 
 It is as if someone said that it is difficult to conceive that there 
 are veins in marble before they are discovered. This objection 
 alsef seems to approach a little too much the jpetitio 'jprincijpii. All 
 those who admit innate truths without basing them upon the Pla- 
 tonic reminiscence, admit those of which they have not yet thought. 
 Moreover, this reasoning proves too much ; for if truths are 
 thoughts, we should be deprived not only of the truths of which we 
 have never thought, but also of those of which we have thought 
 and of which we no longer actually think ; and if truths are not 
 thoughts but habits, and aptitudes, natural or acquired, nothing pre- 
 vents there being some in us of which we have never thought, nor 
 will ever think. 
 
 § 27. {Not innate^ because they appea/r least where what is 
 innate shows itself clearest.] I believe that we must reason here 
 very differently. Innate maxims, appear only through the atten- 
 tion which is given them ; but these persons [children, idiots, sav- 
 ages], have very little of it, or have it for entirely different things. 
 They think of hardly anything except the needs of the body ; and 
 it is reasonable tliat pure and detached thoughts should be the prize 
 of nobler pains. It is true that children and savages have the mind 
 
317 
 
 less altered by customs, but they also have it exalted by the teach- 
 ing which gives attention. It would not be very just that the 
 brightest lights should burn better in minds which deserve them 
 less, and which are enveloped in thicker clouds: I would not like 
 one to give too much honor to ignorance and barbarity, when one 
 is as learned and as clever as you are ; that would be to depreciate 
 the gifts of God. Some one will say, that the more ignorant one 
 is, the nearer he will approach to the advantage of a block of mar- 
 ble or of a piece of wood, which are infallible and sinless. But 
 unfortunately, it is not in this way that one approaches thereto ; and 
 as far as we are capable of knowledge, we sin in neglecting to 
 acquire it, and we shall fail so much the more easily as we are less 
 instructed. 
 
 Book II. — Of Ideas. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of Ideas in general^ and whether the soul always thinks. 
 
 % 1. [Idea is the object of thinking. '] I admit it, provided that 
 you add that it is an immediate internal object, and that this object 
 is an expression of the nature or of the qualities of things. If the 
 idea were iheform of thought, it would come into existence, and 
 would cease with the actual thoughts which correspond to it ; but in 
 being its object it might be anterior and posterior to thoughts. 
 The external sensible objects are but mediate^ because they cannot 
 act immediately upon the soul. God alone is the vmmediate exter- 
 nal object. It might be said that the soul itself is its own immedi- 
 ate internal object ; but it is so in so far as it contains ideas or 
 what corresponds to things ; for the soul is a microcosm in which 
 distinct ideas are a representation of God, and in which confused 
 ideas are a representation of the universe. 
 
 § 2. \All ideas come from sensation or reflection^ The tahula 
 rasa, of which so much is said, is, in my opinion, a fiction which 
 nature does not admit of, and which has its foundation in the incom- 
 plete notions of philosophers, like the vacuum, atoms, and rest, 
 absolute or relative, of two parts of a whole, or like the materia 
 jprima which is conceived as without form. Uniform things and 
 those which contain no variety, are never anything but abstractions, 
 like time, space, and the other entities of pure mathematics. There 
 
318 
 
 is no body, the parts of which are at rest, and there is no substance 
 which has nothing by which to distinguish it from every other. 
 Human souls differ not only from other souls, but also among them- 
 selves, although the difference is not of the nature which is called 
 specific. And according to the demonstrations, which I think I 
 have, everything substantial, whether soul or body, has its relation, 
 which is peculiar to itself, to each of the others, and the one must 
 always differ from the other by intrinsic charaGteristics i not to 
 mention that those who speak so much of this tabula rasa^ after 
 having taken away from it ideas are not able to say what is left to 
 it, like the scholastic philosophers who leave nothing to their 
 materia jprima. It may, perhaps, be answered that this tabula rasa- 
 of the philosophers means that the soul has naturally and originally 
 only bare faculties. But faculties without some act, in a word, the 
 pure powers of the school, are also but fictions unknown to nature, 
 and which are obtained only by abstraction. For where in the 
 world will there ever be found a faculty which confines itself to the 
 mere power, without exercising any act % There is always a particu- 
 lar disposition to action, and to one action rather than to another. 
 And besides the disposition, there is a tendency to action, of which 
 tendencies there is always an infinity at once in each subject ; and 
 these tendencies are never without some effect. Experience is, I 
 admit, necessary in order that the soul be determined to such or 
 such thoughts, and in order that it take notice of the ideas which 
 are in us ; but by what means can experience and the senses give 
 ideas ? Has the soul windows ? does it resemble tablets ? is it like 
 wax ? It is evident that all who think of the soul thus, make it at 
 bottom corporeal. This axiom received among the philosophers, 
 will be opposed to me, that there is nothing in the soul which does 
 not come from the senses. But the soul itself and its affections 
 must be excepted. Nihil est in intellectu^ quod non fuerit in sensu^ 
 excipe : nisi ipse intellectus. Now the soul comprises being, sub- 
 stance, unity, identity,- cause, perception, reason, and many other 
 notions which the senses cannot give. 
 
 In order to avoid a discussion upon what has delayed us too long, 
 I declare to you in advance, sir, that when you say that ideas come 
 to us from one or the other of these causes [sensation or reflection], 
 I understand it of their actual perception, for I think that I have 
 shown that they are in us before they are perceived, so far as they 
 have anything distinct about them. 
 
319 
 
 §§ 9 and 10. {The soul begins to have ideas when it begins to per- 
 ceive. The soul thinks not always.'] Action is no more connected 
 with the soul than with body ; a state without thought in the soul 
 and an absolute repose in body, appear to me equally contrary 
 to nature and without example in the world. A substance once in 
 action will be so always, for all the impressions remain and are 
 merely mixed with other new ones. By striking a body we excite 
 or rather determine an infinity of vortices, as in a liquid, for at bot- 
 tom every solid has a degree of liquidity, and every liquid a degree 
 of solidity, and there is no means of ever arresting entirely these 
 internal vortices. l^Tow we may believe that if body is never in 
 repose, the soul, which corresponds to it, will never be without per- 
 ception either. 
 
 It is certain that we slumber and sleep, and that God is exempt 
 from this. But it does not follow that while sleeping we are with- 
 out perception. Bather just the opposite is found to be the case, 
 if it is well considered. 
 
 Beal powers are never simple possibilities. There is always ten- 
 dency and action. 
 
 I do not say that it is self-evident that the soul always thinks. A 
 little attention and reasoning is needed to discover it. The common 
 people perceive it as little as the pressure of the air or the round- 
 ness of the earth. 
 
 It is decided as it is proved that there are imperceptible bodies 
 and invisible movements, although certain persons ridicule them. 
 There are likewise, numberless perceptions which are not sufficient- 
 ly distinguished for them to be perceived or remembered, but they 
 are made known by certain consequences. 
 
 I have not read the book which contains this objection [that it is 
 an inference from Locke's position, that a thing is not, because we 
 are not sensible of it in our sleep], but it would not have been 
 wrong to object to you, that it does not follow because the thought 
 is not perceived that it ceases for that reason ; for otherwise it could 
 be said for the same reason, that there is no soul during the time 
 when it is not perceived. And in order to refute this objection it 
 is necessary to point out in particular of the thought that it is essen- 
 tial to it that it be perceived. 
 
 § 11. \_It is not alwa/ys conscious of it.] There [that it is not 
 easy to conceive that a thing can think and not be conscious that it 
 
320 
 
 thinks] is, undoubtedly, the knot of the affair and the difficulty 
 which has embarrassed able men. But here is the means of getting 
 out of it. We must consider that we think of many things at once, 
 but we attend only to the thoughts which are most important ; and 
 it could not be otherwise, for if we attend to all it would be necessary 
 to think attentively of an infinity of things at the same time, all of 
 which we feel and which make an impression upon our senses. I 
 say even more : there remains something of all our past thoughts 
 and none can ever be entirely effaced. E'ow when we sleep with- 
 out dreaming and when we are stunned by some blow, fall, symp- 
 tom or other accident, there is formed within us an infinite number 
 of minute confused sensations, and death itself can produce no other 
 effect upon the souls of animals who without doubt ought, sooner 
 or later, to acquire important perceptions, for all goes in an orderly 
 manner in nature. I acknowledge, however, that in this state of 
 confusion, the soul would be without pleasure and without pain, for 
 these are noticeable perceptions. 
 
 § 12. \If a sleeping mem thinks vnthout knowing it, the sleejp- 
 ing and waking man m^e two persons.] I, in turn, will make you 
 another supposition, which appears more natural. Is it not true 
 that it must be admitted that after some interval or some great 
 change, one may fall into a condition of general forgetf ulness ? 
 Sleidan, it is said, before his death, forgot all that he knew ; and 
 there are numbers of other examples of this sad occurrence. Let 
 us suppose that such a man became young again and learned all de 
 novo. Would he be another man for all that ? It is not then 
 memory which properly makes the same man. JSTevertheless, the 
 fiction of a soul which animates different bodies by turns without 
 what happens to it in one of these bodies interesting it in the 
 other, is one of those fictions contrary to the nature of things, 
 which come from the incomplete notions of the philosophers, like 
 space without body, and body without motion, and which disappear 
 when one penetrates a little farther ; for it must be known that each 
 soul preserves all its preceding impressions and cannot divide itself_ 
 equally in the way just menfioned. The future in each substance 
 has a perfect connection with the past. It is this Avhich constitutes 
 the identity of the individual. Moreover, memory is not necessary 
 nor even always possible, on account of the multitude of present 
 and past impressions which cooperate toward our present thoughts ; 
 
321 
 
 for I do not believe tbere are in man thoughts of which there is 
 not some effect at least confused, or some remnant mixed with sub- 
 sequent thoughts. Many things can be forgotten, but they could 
 also be remembered long afterward if they were recalled as they 
 should be. 
 
 § 13. [Impossible to Gonvince those that sleep without dreaming, 
 that they thinh.'] One is not without some feeble feeling while 
 asleep, even when the sleep is dreamless. Waking itself shows it, 
 and the easier it is to awaken one, the more feeling one has of what 
 is going on without him, although this feeling is not always suffi- 
 ciently strong to cause the awakening. 
 
 § 15. [ Upon this hypothesis, the thoughts of a sleeping man 
 ought to he the most rational.'] All impressions have their effect, 
 but all the effects are not always noticeable. When I turn to one 
 side rather than to another, it is very often through a series of mi- 
 nute impressions of which I am not conscious, and which render one 
 movement a little more uncomfortable than the other. All our 
 unpremeditated actions are the results of a cooperation of minute 
 perce})tion8, and even our customs and passions, which have such 
 influence in our deliberations, come therefrom ; for these habits 
 grow little by little, and consequently without the minute percep- 
 tions, we should not arrive at these noticeable dispositions. I have 
 already remarked that he who would deny these effects in morals, 
 would imitate the poorly instructed persons who deny insensible 
 corpuscles in physics ; and yet I see that there are among those 
 who speak of liberty those who, taking no notice of these insensible 
 impressions, capable of inclining the balance, imagine an entire in- 
 difference in moral actions, like that of the ass of Buridan divided 
 equally between two meadows. And of this we shall speak more 
 fully in what follows. I acknowledge, however, that these impres- 
 sions incline without necessitating. 
 
 § 23. [ When does a man hegin to have ideas f~\ I am of the same 
 opinion [namely, that it is when he has some sensation] ; but it is by^ 
 a principle a little peculiar, for I believe that we are never without 
 thoughts and also never without sensation. I distinguish only be- 
 tween ideas and thoughts ; for we have always all pure or distinct 
 ideas independently of the senses ; but thoughts always correspond 
 to some sensation. 
 
 21 
 
322 
 
 § 25. [In the perception of simple ideas the soul is for the most 
 part passive^] How can it be that it is merely passive with regard 
 to the perception of all simple ideas, since, according to your own 
 avowal, there are simple ideas the perception of which comes from 
 reflection, and since the mind gives itself thoughts from reflection, 
 for it is itself which reflects? Whether it can refuse them is 
 another question, and it cannot do it undoubtedly without some 
 reason which turns it aside from them, when there is some occasion 
 for it. 
 
 • CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of solidity. 
 
 § 1. [ We receive this idea from, touch.'] And at bottom solid- 
 ity, in so far as the notion is distinct, is conceived by the pure 
 reason, although the senses furnish to the reason that by which to 
 prove that it is in nature. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of simple ideas of divers senses. 
 
 These ideas which are said to come from more than one sense, as 
 those of space, flgure, motion, rest, are given us rather by the com- 
 mon sense, that is to say, the mind itself, for these are ideas of the 
 pure understanding, but which have relation to that which is exte- 
 rior and which the senses make us perceive ; also they are capable 
 of definitions and demonstrations. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Of ideas which come from sensation and from reflection. 
 
 § 1. {Pleasure and pain, power, existence, etc.] It seems to me 
 that the senses could not convince us of the existence of sensible 
 things without the aid of the reason. Thus 1 believe the consid- 
 eration of existence comes from reflection. Those of power and of 
 unity come also from the same source and are of an entirely differ- 
 ent nature from the perceptions of pleasure and of pain. 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Other considerations concerniny simple ideas. 
 
 § 2. {Privative qualities.] I had not believed that the privative 
 nature of repose could be doubted. It suffices for it that motion in 
 
323 
 
 iDody be denied ; but it does not suffice for motion that repose be 
 denied, and something more must be added in order to determine 
 the degree of motion, since it receives essentially more or less, 
 while all repose is equal. It is another thing when we speak of 
 the cause of repose, which must be positive in secondary matter or 
 mass. I should further believe that the very idea of repose is pri- 
 vative, that is, that it consists only in negation. It is true .that the 
 act of denying is a positive thing. 
 
 § 10. [Secondary qualities.'] I believe that it can be said that 
 jpoiver^ when it is intelligible and can be distinctly explained, ought 
 to be counted among primary qualities / but when it is only sensi- 
 ble and gives but a confused idea, it ought to be put among second- 
 4xry qualities. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Of perception. 
 
 § 1. {Perception the first simple idea of refi^ction.] It might, 
 perhaps, be added that brutes have perception and that it is not 
 necessary that they have thought, that is to say, that they have 
 reflection or what may be its object. Also we ourselves have 
 minute perceptions of which we are not conscious in our present 
 state. It is true that we could very well perceive them and reflect 
 on them if we were not turned aside by their multitude which dis- 
 tracts our minds, or if they were not effaced or rather obscured by 
 the .greater ones. 
 
 § 4. I should prefer to distinguish between perception and con- 
 sciousness {s^ apercevoir). The perception of light or of color, for 
 example, of which we are conscious is composed of many minute 
 perceptions of which we are not conscious ; and a noise of which 
 we have a perception but to which we do not attend, becomes apper- 
 ceptible by a little addition or augmentation. For if what pre- 
 cedes made no impression on the soul, this small addition would 
 also make none and the whole would make no more. 
 
 § 8. [" The problem of Molineux.^^~\ I think that supposing 
 that the blind man knows that these two figures which he sees are 
 those of the cube and of the globe, he would be able to discern 
 them and to say without touching them, this is the globe, this is 
 the cube. 
 
 Perhaps Molineux and the author of the Essay are not so far 
 from my opinion as at» first appears, and that the reasons of their 
 
324 
 
 opinion, contained apparently in the letter of the former who has 
 employed it with success in order to convince people of their folly, 
 have been suppressed purposely by the latter in order to give more 
 exercise to the mind of his readers. If you will weigh my answer 
 you will find that I have put a condition in it which can be consid- 
 ered as comprised in the question ; it is, that the only thing in question 
 is that of distinguishing, and that the blind man knows that the two 
 figured bodies which he must distinguish are there, and that thus 
 each of the appearances which he sees is that of the cube or that of 
 the globe. In this case, it seems to me beyond doubt that the blind 
 man who ceases to be blind, can distinguish them by the principles 
 of the reason joined to what touch has provided him with before- 
 hand of sensible knowfedge. For I do not speak of what he will 
 do perhaps in fact and immediately, being stunned and confounded 
 by the novelty and otherwise little accustomed to drawing conse- 
 quences. The foundation of my opinion is that in the globe there 
 are no points distinguishable on the side of the globe itself, all 
 being there level and without angles, whereas in the cube there 
 are eight points distinguished from all the others. If there were 
 not this means of distinguishing the figures a blind man could not 
 learn the rudiments of geometry by touch. JSTevertheless, we see 
 that those born blind are capable of learning geometry and have 
 even always some rudiments of natural geometry, and that most 
 often geometry is learned by the sight alone, without employing 
 touch, as a paralytic, or other person to whom touch has been 
 almost interdicted, might and even must do. And it must be that 
 these two geometries, that of the blind man and that of the para- 
 lytic, meet and coincide and even return to the same ideas although 
 there are no common images. This again shows how necessary it is 
 to distinguish images from exact ideas which consist in definitions. 
 It would certainly be very interesting and even instructive to exam- 
 ine well the ideas of one born blind to hear his descriptions of fig- 
 ures. For he might come to this and he might even understand 
 the doctrine of optics in so far as it depends upon distinct and 
 mathematical ideas, although he would not be able to reach a con- 
 ception of what is clear-confused, that is to say, the image of light 
 and of colors. — It would also be very important to examine the 
 ideas that a deaf and dumb man might have of non-figured things. 
 — Men are very negligent in not getting an exact knowledge of the 
 ways of thinking of such persons. 
 
325 
 
 § 11. {Perception puts the difference hetween animals a/nd in- 
 J^erior heingsJ] I am inclined to believe that there is also among 
 plants some perception and desire, because of the great analogy 
 there is between plants and animals ; and if there is a vegetable 
 soul, as is the common opinion, it must have perception. However, 
 I do not cease to ascribe to mechanism all that takes place in the 
 body of the plants and animals, except their first formation. Thus 
 I agree that the movement of the plant called sensitive comes from 
 the mechanism, and I do not approve of having recourse to the soul 
 when the detail of the phenomena of plants and animals is to be 
 explained. 
 
 § 13. Yery good ; and I think almost as much could be said of 
 plants. But as to man, his perceptions are accompanied by the 
 power of reflection which passes to the act when there is occasion. 
 But when he is reduced to a state in which he is like one in a leth- 
 argy and almost without feeling, reflection and consciousness cease 
 and universal truths are not thought of. IN^evertheless, the innate 
 and acquired faculties and dispositions and even the impressions 
 which are received in this state of confusion do not cease for that 
 reason and are not effaced althougli they are forgotten; they will 
 even have their turn in order to contribute some day toward some 
 noticeable effect ; for nothing is useless in nature ; all confusion 
 ought to develop itseK, animals even, having passed through a con- 
 dition of stupidity, ought to return some day to more exalted per- 
 ceptions ; and since simple substances last-forever, it will not do to 
 judge of eternity by some years. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 Of the faculty of discerning ideas. 
 
 § 10. [Brutes abstract not.] 1 am of the same opinion. They 
 know apparently whiteness and notice it in chalk as in snow ; but 
 this is not yet abstraction, for it requires a consideration of what is 
 common, separated from what is particular, and consequently there 
 enters therein the knowledge of universal truths, which is not given 
 to brutes. It is well observed also that the brutes that speak do not 
 make use of words to express general ideas, and that men deprived 
 of the use of speech and of words do not fail to invent other gen- 
 eral signs. • 
 
326 
 
 § 11. The brutes pass from one imagination to another by the 
 connection which they have felt here before ; for example, when 
 the master takes a stick the dog is apprehensive of being struck. 
 And on many occasions children, as likewise other men, have no 
 other procedure in passages from thought to thought. This might 
 be called consecution and reasoning in a very broad sense. But I 
 prefer to conform to the received usage in confining these words to 
 man and in restricting them to the knowledge of some reason of 
 the connection of perceptions which sensations alone could not give ; 
 their effect being but to cause us naturally to expect another time 
 the same connection which has been noticed before, although the 
 reasons are no longer the same ; a fact which often deceives those 
 who govern themselves merely by the senses. 
 
 § IT. {Darh room.] [Cf. opening remarks of the next chapter.] 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 Of complex ideas. 
 
 In order to render the resemblance greater it would be necessary 
 to suppose that there was in the dark room to receive the species a 
 cloth, which was not smooth but diversified by folds representing 
 innate knowledge ; that, furthermore, this cloth or canvas being 
 stretched had a sort of elasticity or power of acting, and even an action 
 or reaction accommodated as much to past folds as to newly arrived 
 impressions of the species. And this action would consist in certain 
 vibrations or oscillations, such as are seen in a stretched cord when 
 it is touched, of such a kind that it gives forth a sort of musical 
 sound. For not only do we receive images or traces in the brain 
 but we also form them anew when we consider complex ideas. 
 Thus the cloth, which represents our brain, must be active and 
 elastic. This comparison would explain tolerably well what takes 
 place in the brain ; but as to the soul, which is a simple substance 
 or monad, it represents without extension these same varieties of 
 extended masses and has perception of them. 
 
 § 3. \_Gomplex ideas are either modes., substances, or relations.] 
 This division of the objects of our thoughts into substances, modes 
 and relations is satisfactory to me. I believe that the qualities are 
 but modifications of substances, and that the understanding adds 
 thereto the relations. This is of more consequence than is thought. 
 
327 
 
 § 5. \Simjple and mixed modes.'] Perhaps a dozen or score are 
 but relations and are constituted by relation to the understanding. 
 Units are separate and the understanding puts them together how- 
 ever dispersed they may be. l^evertheless, although relations are 
 from the understanding they are not without foundation and reality. 
 For the first Understanding is the origin of things ; and even the 
 reality of all things, except simple substances, consists only in the 
 foundation of the perceptions of the phenomena of simple sub- 
 stances. It is often the same thing as regards mixed modes, that 
 is to say, that it would be necessary to refer them back to other re- 
 lations. 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 Of simple modes, and first of those of space. 
 
 § 17. [ Whether space is substance or accident, not known.'] I 
 have reason to fear that I shall be accused of vanity in wishing to 
 determine what you, sir, acknowledge not to know. But there is 
 room for believing that you know more on this point than you say 
 or believe you do. Some have believed that God is the place of 
 things. Lessius and Guerike, if I am not mistaken, were of this 
 opinion ; but then place contains something more than we attribute 
 to space which we strip of all action ; and in this way it is no more 
 a substance than time, and if it has parts it could not be God. It is 
 a relation, an order, not only among existing things but also among 
 possible things as if they existed. But its truth and reality is 
 founded in God, like all the eternal truths. 
 
 It is best then to say that space is an order, but that God is its 
 source. 
 
 § 19. [Substance and accident of little use in philosophy.] I 
 acknowledge that I am of another opinion, and that I believe that 
 the consideration of substance is a point of philosophy of the great- 
 est importance and of the greatest fruitfulness. 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 Of duration am^d its simple modes. 
 
 § 16. \_Tt is not motion but the constant train of ideas in our 
 minds while awake that furnishes us with the idea of duration^ 
 A train of perceptions awakens in us the idea of duration but it does 
 not make it. Our perceptions never have a train sufiiciently con- 
 
328 
 
 stant and regular to correspond to that of time, which is a uniform 
 and simple continuum^ like a straight line. The change of percep- 
 tions gives us occasion to think of time, and it is measured by uni- 
 form changes ; but if there should be nothing uniform in nature, 
 time would not cease to be determined, just as place would not 
 cease to be determined also if there should be no fixed or immova- 
 ble body. 
 
 § 24. The void which can be conceived in time indicates, like 
 that in space, that time and space apply as well to possible as to ex- 
 isting things. 
 
 § 26. Time and space are of the nature of eternal truths which 
 concern equally the possible and the existing. 
 
 § 27. {Eternity ?\ But in order to derive the notion of eternity 
 it is necessary to conceive more, viz., that the same reason subsists 
 always for going farther. It is this consideration of the reasons 
 which completes the notion of the infinite or of the indefinite in 
 progresses. Thus the senses alone could not sufiice to make us 
 form these notions. And at bottom it may be said that the idea of 
 the Ahsohite is anterior in the nature of things to that of the limits 
 which are added. But we do not notice the first save in beginning 
 with what is limited and which strikes our senses. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 Of infinity. 
 
 § 1. \_Infinity^ in its original intention, attrihuted to space, 
 duration and number.'] The true infinite, strictly speaking, is only 
 in the Absolute, which is anterior to all composition and is not 
 formed by the addition of parts. 
 
 § 3. {Hence we come by the idea of infinity?^ Take a straight 
 line and prolong it in such a way that it is double the first. I^ow 
 it is clear that the second, being perfectly similar to the first, can 
 be doubled in the same way in order to give a third which is also 
 similar to the preceding ; and the same reason subsisting always it 
 will never be possible to stop ; thus the line can be prolonged ad 
 infinitum, j in such a way that the consideration of the infinite 
 comes from that of the similarity or of the same reason, and its 
 origin is the same as that of universal and necessary truths. This 
 shows how what gives completion to the conception of this idea is 
 found in us and could not come from the experiences of the senses ; 
 
329 
 
 just as necessary truths could not be proved by induction nor by 
 the senses. The idea of the Absolute is in us internally, like that 
 of being. These absolutes are nothing but the attributes of Grod 
 and it can be said that they are no less the source of the ideas than 
 God is himself the principle of beings. The idea of the absolute in 
 relation to space is no other than that of the immensity of God, and 
 80 of the otliers. But we deceive ourselves in imagining an abso- 
 lute space, which would be an infinite whole, composed of parts. 
 There is no such thing. It is a notion which involves a contradic- 
 tion, and these infinite wholes and their opposites, the infinitely 
 minutes, are only admissible in the calculations of geometers just 
 like the imaginary roots of algebra. 
 
 § 16. [ We have no ijositive idea of infinity nor of infinite dura- 
 tion^ I believe that we have a positive idea of both, and this idea 
 will be true provided it is not conceived as an infinite whole but as 
 an absolute or attribute without limits, which is the case as regards 
 the eternity in the necessity of the existence of God, without de- 
 pending on parts and without forming the notion by an addition of 
 times. From this is also seen, as I have already said, that the origin 
 of the notion of the infinite comes from the same source as that of 
 necessary truths. 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 Of the modes of thinking. 
 §1. [^Sensation, reTnemhrance^ contemplation, duo.'] It is well 
 to clear up these notions and I shall try to aid in it. I will say 
 then that it is sensation when we perceive an external object ; that 
 remembrance is its repetition without the object returning ; but 
 when we know that we have had it, it is memory. Contempla- 
 tion is commonly employed in a sense different from yours, namely, 
 for a condition where we free ourselves from business in order to 
 apply ourselves to some meditation. But since there is no word 
 that I know of which fits your notion, sir, the one you employ may 
 be applied to it. We give attention to the objects which we dis- 
 tinguish and prefer to others. When attention continues in the 
 mind, whether the external object continues or 'Hot, and even 
 whether it is present or not, this is consideration / which when it 
 concerns knowledge without reference to action will be contempla- 
 tion. Attention, the aim of which is to learn (that is to say, to 
 
330 
 
 acquire knowledge in order to preserve it), is study. To consider 
 in order to form some plan is to meditate ; but revery appears to be 
 nothing but the pursuing of certain thoughts through the pleasure 
 taken in them without having other end ; this is why revery may 
 lead to insanity: one forgets self, forgets the die cur hic^ ap- 
 proaches dreams and chimeras, builds castles in Spain. We cannot 
 distinguish dreams from sensations except because they are not con- 
 nected with them ; they are, as it were, a world apart. Sleep is a 
 cessation of sensations, and so tram^ce is a very profound sleep from 
 which one can be aroused with difficulty, which comes from a tran- 
 sient internal cause which distinguishes it from the profound sleep 
 which comes from a narcotic or from some lasting injury to the 
 functions, as in lethargy. Trances are sometimes accompanied by 
 visions / but there are some without trance ; and vision, it seems, is 
 nothing but a dream which passes for a sensation, as if it taught us 
 the truth of the objects. And when these visions are divine there 
 is in fact truth ; which may be known, for example, when they con- 
 tain particularized prophecies which the event justifies. 
 
 §4. [Hence it is prohahle that thinking is the action, not the 
 essence of the soul.] Undoubtedly thought is an action and could 
 not be the essence ; but it is an essential action, and all substances 
 have such. I have shown above, that we have always an infinity 
 of minute perceptions without our being conscious of them. We 
 are never without perceptions but it is necessary that we be often 
 without apperceptions, namely, when there are no distinct percep- 
 tions. It is for want of having considered this important point that 
 a philosophy loose and as little noble as solid has prevailed among 
 so many men of good minds, and because we have hitherto almost 
 ignored what there is most beautiful in souls. This has also 
 caused men to find so much plausibility in the error which teaches 
 that souls are of a perishable nature. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 Of modes of pleasure and pain. 
 § 1. [Pleasure and pain, simple ideas.] I believe that there are 
 no perceptions which are entirely indifferent to us, but it is enough 
 that their effect be not noticeable in order that they may be called 
 so, for pleasure and pain appear to consist in an aid or in a notice- 
 able impediment. I assert that this definition is not nominal and 
 that one cannot be given. 
 
331 
 
 §2. [Good and evil^ what.'] I am also of this opinion. The 
 good is divided into the praiseworthy, agreeable, and useful ; but at 
 bottom I believe that it must be either itself agreeable or contribut- 
 ing to something else which can give us an agreeable feeling ; that 
 is to say, the good is agreeable or useful and the praiseworthy itself 
 consists in a pleasure of the mind. 
 
 §§ 4, 5. [Love. Hatred.'] I gave very nearly this same defini- 
 tion oi.love when I explained the principles of justice in the pre- 
 face to my Oodex Juris Gentium Diplomaticics^ namely, that to 
 love is to be led to take pleasure in the perfection, well-being or 
 happiness of the beloved object. And for this reason we do not 
 consider nor demand any other pleasure for self than just that 
 which is found in the well-being or pleasure of the one loved ; but 
 in this sense we do not properly love what is incapable of pleasure 
 or of happiness, and we enjoy things of this nature without, for that 
 reason, loving them, if this is not by a prosopopoeia, and as if we 
 imagine that they themselves enjoy their perfection. It is not then 
 properly love when we say that we love a beautiful picture because 
 of the pleasure we take in thinking of its perfections. But it is 
 permissible to extend the meaning of the terms, and usage varies 
 here. Philosophers and theologians even distinguish two kinds of 
 love, namely, the love which they call love of conquest, which is 
 nothing else than the desire or feeling we have for what gives 
 us pleasure without our interesting ourselves as to whether it re- 
 ceives pleasure ; and the love of henevolence, which is the feeling 
 we have for him who, by his pleasure or happiness, gives the same 
 to us. The first causes us to have in view our pleasure and the 
 second that of others, but as making or rather constituting ours, for 
 if it should not react upon us in some sort we could not interest our- 
 selves in it, since it is impossible, whatever may be said, to be indif- 
 ferent to one's own good. And this is how disinterested or non- 
 mercenary love must be understood, in order to conceive well its 
 nobleness and yet not to fall into the chimerical. 
 
 § 6. [Desire]. This consideration of uneasiness is a capital point 
 in which the author has particularly shown his penetrating and 
 profound spirit. This is why I have given it some attention, and 
 after having considered the matter well, it appears to me that the 
 French word inquietude {restlessness), if it does not sufiiciently 
 express the meaning of •the author, fits nevertheless, in my opinion^ 
 
332 
 
 the nature of the thing ; and the English word uneasiness, if it 
 stands for a displeasure, fretful ness {chagrin)^ inconvenience, and 
 in a word some effective pain, would be inappropriate. I should 
 prefer to say that in desire in itself there is rather a disposition and 
 preparation toward pain than pain itself. It is true that this per- 
 ception sometimes does not differ from that which is in pain than 
 as less does from more, but this is because the degree is the essence 
 of pain, for it is a noticeable perception. This is also seen by the 
 difference which there is between appetite and hunger ; for when 
 / the irritation of the stomach becomes too strong it incommodes ; so 
 / that it is necessary also to apply here our doctrine of perceptions 
 I too minute to be p,pperceptible ; for if what takes place in us when 
 1 we have an appetite and desire were sufficiently magnified it would 
 j cause us pain. This is why the infinitely wise author of our being 
 jx has acted for our good, when he ordained that we should be often 
 *Vin ignorance and in confused perceptions. This is in order to act 
 more promptly by instinct and not to be incommoded by the too 
 distinct sensations of many objects, which do not altogether come 
 back to us, and which nature has not been able to do without in 
 order to obtain its ends. How many insects do we not swallow 
 without our being conscious of it ? how many persons do we see 
 who having too fine a sense of smell are thereby incommoded % and 
 hew many disgusting objects should we see if our vision were sufl&- 
 ciently piercing ? It is also by this skill that nature has given us 
 the incitements of desire, like the rudiments or elements of pain or, 
 so to speak, semi-pains, or (if you wish to speak so as to express 
 yourself more forcibly) minute inapperceptible pains, to the end 
 that we may enjoy the adA^cmtage of evil without being incom- 
 moded thereby. For otherwise if this perception were too distinct 
 we would always be miserable in waiting for the, good, whereas this 
 continual victory over these semi-pains which are felt in following 
 one's desire and satisfying in some sort this appetite or this 
 longing, gives us many semi-pleasures, the continuation and collec- 
 tion of which (as in the continuation of the impulse of a heavy 
 body which descends and acquires force) becomes in the end an 
 entire and real pleasure. And at bottom without these semi-pains 
 there would be no pleasure, and there would be no means of perceiv- 
 ing that something, by being an obstacle which prevents us from 
 putting ourselves at our ease, assists us and aids us. It is also in 
 
333 
 
 this that the affinity of pain and of pleasure is recognized, which 
 Socrates notices in the Phaedo of Plato when the feet long to be 
 in action. This consideration of the minute aids or small deliver- 
 ances and imperceptible disengagements of the arrested tendency 
 from which noticeable pleasure finally results, serves also to give 
 some more distinct knowledge of the confused idea which we have 
 and ought to have of pleasure and of pain / just as the feeling of 
 heat or of light results from many minute movements which 
 express those of the objects, as I have said above (ch. 9, § 13), and 
 do not differ therefrom save in appearance and because we are not 
 conscious of this analysis ; whereas many to-day believe that our 
 ideas of sensible qualities differ toto genere from motions and from 
 what takes place in the objects, and are something primitive and 
 inexplicable, and even arbitrary, as if God made the soul feel what 
 seems good to him in place of what takes place in the body ; an 
 opinion very far removed from the true analysis of our ideas. But 
 to return to uneasiness, that is to say, to the minute imperceptible 
 solicitations which keep us always in breath, these are confused 
 determinations such that we often do not know what we lack, 
 whereas in inclinations and passions, we at least know what we 
 need, although the confused perceptions enter also into their man- 
 ner of acting, and the same passions also cause this uneasiness or 
 longing. These impulses are like so many small springs which try 
 to unbend and which cause our machine to act. And I have 
 already remarked thereon, that it is through this that we are never 
 indift'erenty when we appear to be most so, for example, to turning to 
 the right rather than to the left at the end of a path. For the side 
 which we take comes from these insensible determinations mingled 
 with the actions of the objects and of the interior of the body, 
 which cause us to find ourselves more at our ease in one than in 
 the other way of moving ourselves. The pendulum of a clock is 
 called in German JJnriohe, that is to say, tmeasiness. It can be 
 said that it is the same in our body which can never be perfectly 
 at its ease ; because if it should be so, a new impression of the 
 objects, a shght change in the organs, in the vessels, and in the 
 viscera would change at once the balance and would cause them to 
 make some slight effort in order to regain the best state which they 
 can be in ; which produces a continual strife, which causes, so to 
 speak, the uneasiness of our clock ; so that this term is satisfactory 
 to me. 
 
334 
 
 §7. [J^oyl. There are no words in the languages sufficiently 
 appropriate to distinguish kindred notions. Perhaps the Latin ^au- 
 dium approaches nearer this definition of joy than laetitia^ which 
 is also translated by the word joy; but then it seems to me to signify 
 a state in which pleasure predominates in us, for during the pro- 
 foundest sorrow and amidst the most piercing griefs one can take 
 some pleasure, as in drinking or in listening to music, but the pain 
 predominates ; and likewise amid the sharpest pains, the mind can 
 'be in joy, as happened to the martyrs. 
 
 § 8. [Sorrow.] Not only the actual presence but also the fear 
 of an evil to come can make sad, so that I believe the definitions of 
 joy and of sorrow, which I have just given, come nearest to usage. 
 As to uneasiness, there is in pain, and consequently in sorrow, 
 something more; and uneasiness is even in joy, for it makes men 
 wide awake, active, full of hope for going farther. Joy has been 
 able to cause death by excess of emotion, and then there was in it t- 
 even more than uneasiness. '^*a^^(J 
 
 §§ 9, 10. [Hope and J^ear.] If uneasiness signifies a pain, I ^j;^ 
 acknowledge that it always accompanies fear ; but taking it for this 
 insensible incitement which urges us on, it can also be applied to 
 hope. The Stoics took the passions for opinions ; thus their hope 
 was the opinion of a future good, and fear, the opinion of a future 
 evil. But I prefer to say that the passions are neither contentments 
 or pains, nor opinions, but tendencies or rather modifications of the 
 tendency, which come from opinion or from feeling, and which are 
 accompanied by pleasure or displeasure. 
 
 § 11. [Despair.'] Despair taken for the passion will be a sort 
 of strong tendency which finds itself wholly arrested, causing a vio- 
 lent struggle and much pain. But when the despair is accompanied 
 by repose and indolence, it will be an opinion rather than a passion. 
 
 § 12. [Anger.] Anger seems to be something more simple and 
 more general since brutes, to whom no injury has been done, are 
 susceptible of it. There is in anger a violent effort which strives to 
 free itself from evil. The desire of vengeance can remain when 
 one is cool and when one experiences hatred rather than anger. 
 
 § 13. [Mivy.] According to this [Locke's] notion, envy would 
 be always a praiseworthy passion and always founded upon justice, 
 at least in my opinion. But I do not know but that envy is often 
 entertained toward recognized merit which one would not hesitate 
 
y- 
 
 335 
 
 to misuse if one were master. Envy is even entertained of people 
 who have a good which one would not care to have one's self. One 
 would be content to see them deprived of it without thinking to 
 profit by their spoils, and even without being able to hope it. For 
 some goods are like pictures painted in fresco which can be de- 
 ^ ^ stroyed, but which cannot be taken away. 
 
 § 11. [Shame.'] If men took more pains to observe the exterior 
 movements which accompany the passions, it would be difficult to 
 conceal them. As to shame, it is worthy of consideration that 
 modest persons, when they are simply witnesses of an improper 
 action, sometimes feel movements resembling those of shame. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 Of power and of liberty. 
 
 § 1. \The idea of power ^ how got.] li power corresponds to the 
 Latin potentia it is opposed to act^ and the passage from power to 
 act is change. This is what Aristotle understands by the word 
 motion when he says that it is the act or perhaps the actuation of 
 what is in power. We can say then that power in general is the 
 possibility of change. Now change or the act of this possibility, 
 being action in one subject and passion in another, there will be 
 also two powers, one passive the other active. The active could be 
 called faculty and perhaps the passive could be called capacity or 
 receptivity. It is true that active power is sometimes taken in a 
 more perfect sense when in addition to the simple faculty there is a 
 tendency; and it is thus that I employ it in my dynamical considera- 
 tions. The word force might be appropriated to it in particular ; 
 2^ndi force would be either entelechy or effort; for entelechy (although 
 Aristotle employs it so generally that it comprises also all action and 
 all effort) appears to me more appropriate to- pi'imitive acting 
 forces, and that of effort to derivative forces. There is even also a 
 species of passive power more particular and more endowed with 
 reality ; it is this which is in matter when there is not only mobility, 
 which is the capacity or receptivity for motion, but also resistance, 
 which embraces impenetrahility and itiertia. Entelechies, that is 
 to say, primitive or substantial tendencies, when they are accom- 
 panied by perception, are souls. 
 
 % 4. \The clearest idea of active power had from spirit.] I am 
 thoroughly in accord with you, that the clearest idea of active power 
 
336 
 
 comes to us from spirit. It is also only in things which have an 
 analogy with spirit, that is to say, in entelechies, for matter properly 
 only indicates passive power. 
 
 § 8. [Liberty?^ The term liberty is very ambiguous. • There is 
 liberty of right and of fact. According to that of right a slave is 
 not free, a subject is not entirely free, but a poor man is as free as 
 a rich man. Liberty of fact consists either in the power to will as 
 one ought, or in the power to do what one wills. It is of the liberty 
 of doing of which you speak, and it has its degrees and varieties. 
 Generally he who has most means is most free to do what he 
 wishes : but, in particular, liberty is understood of the use of things 
 which are wont to be in our power and especially of the free use of 
 our body. Thus the prison or sicknesses which prevent us from giv- 
 ing to our body and to our limbs the motion which we wish and 
 which we are ordinarily able to give, lessens our liberty. It is thus 
 that a prisoner is not free, and that a paralytic has not the free use 
 of his limbs. Liberty to will is also taken in tw^o different senses. 
 One is when it is opposed to the imperfection or to the slavery of 
 the spirit, which is a coaction or constraint, but internal like that 
 which comes from the passions. The other sense appears when 
 liberty is opposed to necessity. In the first sense the Stoics said 
 that the wise man only is free ; and in fact the spirit is not free 
 when it is occupied with a great passion, for one cannot then will 
 as he ought to, that is to say, with the deliberation which is requisite. 
 It is thus that God alone is perfectly free, and that created spirits 
 are so only in so far as they are superior to the passions. And this 
 liberty concerns properly our understanding. But the liberty of 
 the spirit opposed to necessity concerns the naked will and in so far 
 as it is distinguished from the understanding. This it is which is 
 called free-will, and it consists in this, that one wishes that the 
 strongest reasons or impressions which the understanding presents 
 to the will do not prevent the act of the will from being contingent, 
 and do not give an absolute or so to say metaphysical necessity. 
 And it is in this sense that I am accustomed to say that the under- 
 standing can determine the will in accordance with the prevalence 
 of perceptions and reasons, in such a way that even when it is cer- 
 tain and infallible it inclines without necessitating. 
 y § 13. {Necessity, whaf] It seems to me that, properly speak- 
 ing, although volitions are contingent, necessity ought not to be 
 
33Y 
 
 opposed to volition but to contingency^ and that necessity ought not 
 to be confounded with determination, for there is not less of con- 
 nection or of determination in thoughts than in motions (to be 
 determined being quite different from being pushed or forced with 
 constraint). And if we do not always notice the reason wliich 
 determines us, or rather by which we determine ourselves, it is 
 because we are as little capable of being conscious of the whole 
 extent of our spirit and of its thoughts, most often imperceptible 
 and confused, as we are of disentangling all the mechanisms which 
 nature makes play in the body. Thus, if by necessity is understood 
 the certain determination of man, which a perfect knowledge of all 
 the circumstances of what takes place within and without the man 
 could enable a perfect mind to foresee, it is certain that thoughts 
 being just as determined as the motions which they represent, every 
 free act would be necessary. But the necessary must be distin- 
 guished from the contingent though determined ; and not only con- 
 tingent truths are not necessary, but even their connections are not 
 always, of an absolute necessity, for it must be acknowledged that 
 there is a difference in the manner of determination between the 
 consequences which exist in necessary matter and those which exist 
 in contingent matter. Geometrical and metaphysical consequences 
 necessitate, but physical and moral incline without* necessitating ; 
 the physical even having something moral and voluntary in relation 
 to God, since the laws of motion have no other necessity than that 
 of [the principle of] the best. Now God chooses freely although 
 he is determined to choose the best ; and as bodies themselves do 
 not choose (God having chosen for them), usage has settled that 
 they be called necessary agents; to which I am not opposed, provided 
 the necessary and the determined be not confounded, and that it be 
 not imagined that free beings act in an indetermined manner ; an 
 error which has prevailed in certain minds and which destroys the 
 most important truths, even this fundamental axiom, that nothing 
 occurs without reason^ without which neither the existence of God 
 nor other great truths could be well demonstrated. As to constraint^ 
 it is well to distinguish two species of it. The one physical, as 
 when a man is taken to prison in spite of himself, or is thrown over 
 a precipice ; the other moral, as, for example, the constraint of a 
 greater evil, and this action, although in some manner forced, is 
 nevertheless voluntary. One can also be forced by the consideration 
 22 * 
 
338 
 
 of a greater good, as when a man is tempted by having proposed to 
 him a too great advantage, although this is not customarily called 
 constraint. 
 / § 21. [^Liberty belongs to the agent^ or man.'] When we reason 
 
 about the liberty of the will, or about the free will^ we do not ask 
 if the man can do what he wishes, but if there is enough independ- 
 ence in his will itself. We do not ask if he has his limbs free or 
 elbow-room, but if he has his spirit free and in what this consists. 
 In this respect one intelligence could be more free than another, 
 and the supreme intelligence will enjoy perfect liberty of which the 
 creatures are not capable. 
 
 §§ 41, 42. \_AU desire happiness. Happ%ness., what.] I do not 
 know whether the greatest pleasure is possible. I believe rather 
 that it can grow ad injhiitum; for we do not know how far our 
 knowledge and our organs can be extended in all the eternity which 
 awaits us. I believe then that happiness is a lasting pleasure; 
 which could not be so without there being a continual progress to 
 new pleasures. Therefore, of two persons, one of whom will go in- 
 comparably quicker and through greater pleasures than the other, 
 each will be happy in himself and apart hy himself ^ although their 
 happiness will be \qyj unequal. Happiness is then, so to speak, a 
 road through 'pleasures; and pleasure is merely a step and an ad- 
 vancement towards happiness, the shortest which can be made accord- 
 ing to the present impressions, but not always the best. The right 
 road may be missed in the desire to follow the shortest, as the stone 
 which goes straight may encounter obstacles too soon, which pre- 
 vent it from advancing quite to the center of the earth. This 
 shows that it is the reason and the will which transport us toward 
 happiness, but that feeling and desire merely lead us to pleasure. 
 Now, although pleasure can not receive a nominal definition, any 
 more than light or color, it can however receive, like them, a causa} 
 definition ; and I believe that at bottom pleasure is a feeling of per- 
 fection di^dipaiii a feeling of imperfection, provided it is noticeable 
 enough to cause us to be conscious of it. 
 
 § 47. [^The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire 
 mahes way for consideration^ and in this freedom of will consists.] 
 The execution of our desire is suspended or arrested when this 
 desire is not strong enough to move us, and to overcome the trouble 
 and inconvenience of satisfying it. But when the desire is strong 
 
339 
 
 enough in itself to move its, if nothing prevents, it can be arrested 
 by contrary incHnations, be it tliat they consist in a simple leaning 
 which is like the element or the beginning of desire, be it that they 
 extend to desire itself. IS^evertheless as these inclinations, these 
 leanings, and these contrary desires must be found already in the 
 soul, it does not have them in its power, and consequently it cannot 
 resist in a free and voluntary way where the reason can take part, 
 if it had not also another means which is that of turning the mind 
 elsewhere. But how can we think of doing it when there is need ? 
 for this is the point, especially if we are possessed by a strong pas- 
 sion. There is need, therefore, that the mind be prepared before- 
 hand, and find itself already ready to go from thought to thought 
 in order not to stop too long in a slippery and dangerous place. 
 For this, it is well to accustom one's self generally not to think 
 except in passing of certain things, in order the better to preserve 
 the freedom of the mind. But the best way is to accustom one's 
 self to proceed methodically, and to attach one's self to a train of 
 thoughts the connection of which reason and not chance (that is to 
 say, insensible and casual impressions) establishes. And in order to do 
 this, it is well to accustom one's self to collect one's self from time to 
 time, and to raise one's self above the present tumult of impressions, 
 to go forth, so to say, from the place where one is, to say to one's self 
 '^dio GUT hie? respice Jmem, or where are we? or are we coming to 
 the point ? " Men would often have need of some one, established 
 with an official title (as Philip, the father of Alexander the Great, 
 had), to interrupt them and to recall them to their duty. But, for 
 lack of such an officer, it is well for us ourselves to be accustomed 
 to perform for ourselves this office. ]^ow being once in a condition 
 to arrest the effect of our desires and of our passions, that is to say, 
 to suspend action, we can find the means of combating them, be it 
 by the contrary desires or inclinations, be it by diversion, that is to 
 say, by occupations of another nature. It is by these methods and 
 these artifices that we become, as it were, masters of ourselves, and 
 that we can make ourselves think and do in time what we would will 
 to and what reason commands, l^evertheless, it is always by deter- 
 mined ways and never without ground or by the imaginary princi- 
 ple of a perfect indifference or equilibrium, in which some would 
 make the essence of liberty to consist, as if one could determine 
 himself groundlessly and even against all ground, and go directly 
 counter to the prevalent of the impressions and the inclinations. 
 
340 
 
 § 51. {The necessity of jpursuing true happiness the foundation 
 of liherty.'] True happiness ought always to be the object of our 
 desires, but there is ground for doubting whether it is. For often 
 we hardly think of it, and I have remarked here more than once 
 that the less desire is guided by reason the more it tends to present 
 pleasure and not to happiness, that is to say, to lasting pleasure, 
 although it tends to make it last. Cf. §§ 36, 41. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 Of our complex ideas of substances. 
 
 § 1. {Ideas of substances, how made.'] On the contrary it is 
 rather the concretuni as odorous, as warm, as glittering, which comes 
 into our minds, rather than the abstractions or qualities (for it is they 
 which are in the substantial object and not the ideas) as, namely, 
 heat, light, etc., which are much more difficult to comprehend. It 
 may even be doubted whether these accidents are real entities, as in 
 fact they are very often only relations. It is known also that it is the 
 abstractions which occasion most difficulty when it is desired to 
 examine them minutely, as those know who are acquainted with 
 the subtilties of the scholastics, whose most intricate speculations 
 fall at one blow if we will banish abstract entities and resolve not 
 to speak ordinarily except by concretes, and not to admit any other 
 terms in the demonstrations of the sciences, but those which repre- 
 sent substantial subjects. Thus it is nodum queer ere in scirpo, if 
 1 dare say it, and to invert things, if we take the qualities or other 
 abstract terms for what is easiest and the concrete ones for some- 
 thing very difficult. 
 
 § 2. {Our idea of substance in general.] In distinguishing two 
 things in substance, attributes or predicates and the common subject 
 of these predicates, it is not strange that nothing in particular can 
 be conceived in this subject. It must necessarily be so, since we 
 have already separated all the attributes in which some detail could 
 be conceived. Therefore to demand something more in this pure 
 sid>ject in general than what is necessary in order to conceive that 
 it is the same thing (e. g., which understands and wills, which 
 imagines and reasons), this is to demand the impossible and to run 
 counter to one's own supposition, made in abstracting and in con. 
 ceiving separately the subject and its qualities or accidents. The 
 same pretended difficulty could be aj)plied to the notion of being 
 
341 
 
 and to all that is most clear and most primitive ; for we could ask 
 philosophers what they conceive in conceiving pure heing in gen. 
 eral; for all detail, being thereby excluded, there would be as little 
 to say as when it is asked what pure substance in general is. I 
 think, therefore, that the philosophers do not deserve to be ridi- 
 culed, as is done here in comparing them to the Indian philosopher 
 who when asked what the earth rested on, replied that it was a large 
 elephant, and when asked what the elephant rested on, said that it 
 was a great tortoise, and, finally, when pressed to tell what the tor- 
 toise rested on, was reduced to saying that it was something^ I 
 know not what. However, the consideration of substance, very 
 inconsiderable as it seems to be, is not so void and sterile as is 
 thought. Certain consequences come from it which are most 
 important to philosophy, and which are capable of giving it a new 
 aspect. [Cf. ch. 13, § 19.] 
 
 § 4. \_No dear idea of substance in general.'] For my part, I 
 believe that this opinion of our ignorance comes from our demand- 
 ing a kind of knowledge which the object does not permit of. The 
 true mark of a clear and distinct notion of an object is the means 
 we have of knowing many truths of it by a priori proofs, as I have 
 pointed out in an essay on truths and ideas inserted in the Acta of 
 Leipsic of the year 1684. [Cf. Aet. III.] 
 
 § 15. {Ideas of spiritual substances, as clear as of bodily sub- 
 stances.] It is well said, and it is very true, that the existence of 
 the mind is more certain than that of sensible objects. 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 Of relation. 
 
 % 1. {Relation, wfiat.] Eolations and orders are like entities of 
 reason, although they have their foundation in things ; for it may 
 be said that their reality, like that of eternal truths and possibilities, 
 comes from the supreme reason. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 Of identity and diversity. 
 
 § 1. [ Whe)'ei7i identity consists.] There must always be, in 
 addition to the difference of time and of place, an internal principle 
 of distinction; and altl^ough there are many things of the same 
 species, it is nevertlieless true there are never any perfectly similar : 
 
342 
 
 thus although time and placer (that is, the relation to the external) 
 serve us in distinguishing things which we do not well distinguish 
 through themselves, things are none the less distinguishable in 
 themselves. The characteristic of identity and of diversity does 
 not consist, therefore, in time and in place. 
 
 § 3. [^Prineipium individuationis.'] The jprinciple of indi- 
 viduation corresponds in individuals to the principle of distinction 
 of which I have just spoken. If two individuals were perfectly 
 similar and equal, and (in a word) indistinguishable in themselves, 
 there would be no principle of individuation ; and I even venture to 
 say that there would be no individual distinction, or different indi- 
 viduals, on this condition. 
 
 § 9. {^Personal identity ?\ I am also of the opinion that con- 
 sciousness, or the feeling of the ego^ proves a moral or personal 
 identity. And it is in this that I distinguish the unceasingness of 
 the soul of a brute from the immortality of the soul of man : both 
 retain physical and real identity; but as for man, it is conformed 
 to the rules of divine providence that the soul preserve in addition 
 moral identity which belongs to us in order to constitute the same 
 person, capable consequently of feeling punishments and recom- 
 penses. It appears that you, sir, hold that this apparent identity 
 might be preserved, even if there should be no real identity. I 
 should believe that this might perhaps be possible by the absolute 
 power of God ; but according to the order of things the identity 
 apparent to the person himself, who feels himself the same, sup- 
 poses the real identity at each following stage, accompanied by 
 reflection or by the feeling of the ego, an intimate and immediate 
 perception not being able to deceive naturally. If man could be 
 only a machine and have in addition consciousness, it would be nec- 
 essary to be of your opinion, sir ; but I hold that this case is not 
 possible, at least naturally. I do not mean to say either that per- 
 sonal identity and even the ego do not remain in us, and that I am 
 not that ego which was in the cradle, under the pretext that I no 
 longer remember anything which I then did. It is sufiicient in 
 order to find moral identity by itself that there be a common hond 
 of co?isciousness from a neighboring state, or even one a little 
 removed, to another, even if some leap or forgotten interval should 
 be mingled with it. Thus, if an illness had caused an interruption 
 of the continuity of the connection of consciousness so that I should 
 
343 
 
 not know how I had come into the present state, although I might 
 remember more distant things, the testimony of others might fill 
 the gap of my remembrance. I might even be punished on this tes- 
 timony if I had done some evil of deliberate forethought in an 
 interval which I had forgotten a little while afterwards through this 
 illness. And if I came to forget all past things, so that I should be 
 obliged to let myself be taught anew, even to my name and to read- 
 ing and writing, I could always learn from others my past life in 
 my preceding state, as I have preserved my rights without its being 
 necessary to divide myself into two persons, and to make myself 
 my own heir. All this suffices for maintaining the moral identity 
 which makes the same person. It is true that if others conspired to 
 deceive me (as I might even be deceived by myself, by some vision, 
 dream or illness, believing that what I dreamed had happened to 
 me), the appearance would be false ; but there are cases in which 
 we may be morally certain of the truth upon the report of others ; 
 and in relation to God whose bond of union with us makes the prin- 
 cipal point of morality, error cannot enter. As regards the ego^ it 
 will be well to distinguish it from the appearance of the ego and 
 from consciousness. The ego forms the real and physical identity, 
 and the appearance of the ego, accompanied by truth, joins to it 
 personal identity. Thus not wishing to say that personal identity 
 does not extend farther than memory, I would say still less that the 
 ego or physical identity depends on it. The real and personal 
 identity is proved as certainly as is possible in matter of fact, 
 by present and 4mmediate reflection ; it is proved sufficiently for 
 common use by our remembrance of the interval, or by the corrobo- 
 rating testimony of others. But if God changed extraordinarily 
 real identity, personal identity would remain, provided that man 
 should preserve the appearances of identity, as well the internal 
 (that is of consciousness) as the external, like those appearances 
 which consist in what is evident to others. Thus consciousness 
 is not the only means of establishing personal identity, and the 
 report of others or even other marks may take its place. But there 
 is difficulty if contradiction is found between these different evi- 
 dences. Consciousness may be silent as in f orgetf ulness ; but if it 
 said very distinctly things which were contrary to the other evi- 
 dences, we should be embarrassed in the decision and sometimes as 
 if suspended between two possibilities : that of the error of our 
 memory and that of some deception in the external evidences. 
 
344 
 
 § 14. An immaterial being or a spirit cannot le despoiled of all 
 perception of its past existence. There remain to it impressions of 
 everything which has formerly happened to it and it has even pre- 
 sentiments of everything which will happen to it ; but these feel- 
 ings are most often too slight to be distinguishable and for us to be 
 conscious of them, although they may be developed some day. 
 This continuation and connection oi perceptions forms the same in- 
 dividual really ; but apperceptions (that is, when we are conscious 
 of past feelings) prove, farther, a moral identity and make the real 
 
 identity appear The late M. Yan Helmont, the younger, 
 
 believed, with certain rabbis, in the passing of tlie soul of Adam 
 into the Messiah as into the new Adam. And I do not know 
 whether he did not believe that he himself had been one of the 
 ancients, very able man as he was otherwise. Now, if this passing 
 of souls was true, at least in the possible way which I have ex- 
 plained above (but which does not appear probable), that is, that 
 souls, retaining subtile bodies,should pass suddenly into other gross 
 bodies, the same individual would subsist always, in Nestor, in 
 Socrates, and in some modern, and he might even make known his 
 identity to that one who should sufficiently penetrate into his nature, 
 by reason of the impressions or characters which would there 
 remain of all that Nestor or Socrates has done, and which some 
 sufficiently penetrating genius miglit read there. However, if the 
 modem man had no internal or external means of knowing what he 
 has been, it would be, so far as ethics is concerned, as if he had not 
 been at all. But the probability is that notliing is neglected in 
 the world, even in relation to morals, because God is its monarch, 
 and his government is perfect. — Thus if souls passed into a new 
 body gross or sensitive, they would always retain the expression of 
 all of which. they have had perception in the old, and it would 
 even be necessary that the new body should feel it all so that the 
 individual continuation will always leave its real marks. 
 
 §18. [Object of reward and punishment.] I confess that if 
 God caused consciousnesses to be transferred to other souls, it would 
 be necessary to treat them, according to ethical ideas, as if they were 
 the same ; but this would be to disturb the order of things ground- 
 lessly, and to make a divorce between the apperceptible and truth, 
 which is preserved by insensible perceptions. This would not be 
 rational because perceptions, at present insensible, may be developed 
 
34:5 
 
 some day, for there is nothing useless, and eternity presents a large 
 field for changes. 
 
 § 29. [Continued existence makes identity.'] I have pointed out 
 to you the source of true physical identity ; I have shown you that 
 morals do not contradict it, any more than memory ; that they could 
 not always mark out physical identity to the person himself in ques- 
 tion, nor to those who are in communication with him ; but that 
 nevertheless they never contradict physical identity, and never are 
 divorced from it ; that there are always created spirits which know 
 or may know what is the truth respecting it ; but that there is reason 
 for thinking that what is indifferent as regards persons themselves 
 can be so only for a time. 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 Of other relations. 
 
 § 5. [^Moral good and evil.'] I should prefer, for myself, to take 
 as the measure of moral good and of virtue the invariable rule of 
 reason that God has charged himself to maintain. Also we may be 
 assured that by his means every moral good becomes physical, or, 
 as the ancients said, all that is praiseworthy is useful ; whereas, in 
 order to express the idea of the author, it would be necessary to say 
 that moral good or evil is a good or ei^il of imposition or institutive, 
 which he who has the power in his hand tries to bring about or to 
 prevent by pains or recompenses. Good is that which by the gen- 
 eral institution of God is conformed to nature or to reason. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 Of dear and obscure^ distinct and confused ideas. 
 
 § 2. In a short essay on ideas, true or false, clear or obscure, dis- 
 tinct or confused, inserted in the Acta of Leipsic in the year 1684, 
 I have given a definition of clear ideas which is common to simples 
 and compounds, and which accounts for what is said thereon here. 
 
 § 13. [^Complex ideas may he distinct in one j^art and confused 
 in another.] This example [a chiliagon] shows that idea is here con- 
 founded with image. If someone proposes to me a regular polygon, 
 sight and imagination could not make me understand the thousand 
 sides which are in it ; I have only a confused idea both of the figure 
 and of its number, until I distingxdsh the number by counting. But 
 
346 
 
 having found it, I know very well the nature and the properties of 
 the proposed polygon, in so far as they are those of a chiliagon, and 
 consequently I have the idea of it ; but I could not have the image 
 of a chiliagon, and it would be necessary to have the senses and the 
 imagination more delicate and better exercised in order to thereby 
 distinguish it from a polygon w^hicli should have one side less. But 
 knowledge of figures does not depend upon the imagination any 
 more than that of numbers, although it is of use thereto ; and a 
 mathematician may know exactly the nature of an enneagon or of a 
 decagon because he has the means of making and examining them, 
 although he cannot distinguish them by sight. It is true then that 
 a workman or an engineer, who should not perhaps know the nature 
 of the figures sufficiently, might have this advantage over a great 
 geometrician, that he could distinguish them by merely seeing them 
 without measuring them ; as there are porters who will tell the 
 weight of what they are to carry without the mistake of a pound, 
 in which they will surpass the most skillful statistician in the world. 
 This empirical knowledge, acquired by long practice, may have great 
 advantages for acting promptly, as an engineer very often needs to 
 do by reason of the danger to which he exposes himself by hesitat- 
 ing. However this clear image^ or this feeling which we may have 
 of a regular decagon or of a weight of ninety-nine pounds, consists 
 only in a confused idea, since it is of no use in discovering the na- 
 ture and the properties of this weight or of the regular decagon, 
 which requires a distinct idea. And this example serves to show 
 better the difference between ideas, or rather that between idea and 
 image. 
 
 § 15. [Instance in eternity.'] This example does not seem to 
 me to fit your purpose any better ; but it is very appropriate to 
 mine, which is to disabuse you of your notions on this point. For 
 there reigns here the same confusion between image and idea. We 
 have a complete and proper idea of eternity, since we have a defini- 
 tion of it, although we have no image of it ; but the idea of infinites 
 is not formed by the composition of parts, and the errors which are 
 committed in reasoning concerning the infinite do not come from 
 the lack of image. 
 
347 
 
 Book TV. Of Knowledge. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Of knowledge in general. 
 
 §§ 1 and 2. [1. Our knowledge conversant about oitr ideas. 2. 
 Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of 
 two ideas.~\ Knowledge is employed still more generally, in such a 
 way that it is found also in ideas or terms, before we come to prop- 
 ositions or truths. And it may be said that he who shall have seen 
 attentively more pictures of plants and of animals, more figures of 
 machines, more descriptions or representations of houses or of fort- 
 resses, who shall have read more ingenious romances, heard more 
 curious narratives, he, I say, will have more knowledge than an- 
 other, even if there should not be a word of truth in all which has 
 been portrayed or related to him ; for the practice which he has in 
 representing to himself mentally many express and actual concep- 
 tions or ideas, renders him more fit to conceive what is proposed to 
 him ; and it is certain that he will be better instructed and more 
 capable than another, who has neither seen nor read nor heard any- 
 thing, provided that in these stories and representations he does not 
 take for true that which is not true, and that these impressions do not 
 hinder him otherwise from distinguishing the real from the imagni- 
 ary, or the existing from the possible .... But taking knowledge 
 in a narrower meaning, that is, for knowledge of truth, as you do 
 here, sir, I say that it is very true that truth is always founded in 
 the agreement or disagreement of ideas, but it is not true generally 
 that our knowledge of truth is a perception of this agreement or 
 disagreement. For when we know truth only empirically, from 
 having experienced it, without knowing the connection of things 
 and the reason which there is in what we have experienced, we 
 have no perception of this agreement or disagreement, unless it be 
 meant that we feel it confusedly without being conscious of it. 
 But your examples, it seems, show that you always require a knowl- 
 edge in which one is conscious of connection or of opposition, and 
 this is what cannot be conceded to you. 
 
 §§3-7. [3. This agreement fourfold. 4. Firsts Of identity or 
 diversity. 6. Secondly^ Relative. 6. Thirdly., Of co-existence. 
 
348 
 
 7. Fourthly^ Of real existence?^ I believe that it may be said that 
 connection is nothing else than accordance or relation^ taken 
 generally. And I have remarked on this point that every rela- 
 tion is either of comparison or of concurrence. That of cora- 
 pa/rison gives diversity and identity, either in all or in something ; 
 that which makes the same or the diverse, the like or nnlike. Con- 
 ciirrence contains what you call co-existence, that is, connection of 
 existence. But when it is said that a thing exists or that it has real 
 existence, this existence itself is the predicate ; that is, it has an 
 idea joined with the idea in question, and there is connection be- 
 tween these two notions. One may conceive also the existence of 
 the object of an idea, as the concurrence of this object with me. So 
 I believe that it may be said that there is only comparison or con- 
 currence ; but that comparison, which marks identity or diversity, 
 and the concurrence of the thing with me, are relations which de- 
 serve to be distinguished among others. More exact and more pro- 
 found researches might perhaps be made ; but I content myself 
 here with making remarks. 
 
 CHAPTEK II. 
 
 Of the degrees of our hiowledge. 
 
 § 1. [Intuitive.'] Primitive truths, which are known by intui- 
 tion are of two kinds, like the derivative. They are either truths 
 of reason^ or truths of fact. Truths of reason are necessary and 
 those of fact are contingent. Primitive truths of reason are those 
 which I call by the general name of identical, because it seems 
 that they do nothing but repeat the same thing without giving us 
 any information. They are affirmative or negative .... 
 
 As respects pri^nitive truths of fact ^ they are the immediate inter- 
 nal experiences of an immediateness of feeling. And here it is that 
 the first truth of the Cartesians or of St. Augustine : I thinh, hence 
 I am^ that is, / ani a thing which thinks^ holds good. But it should 
 be known that just as tlie identicals are general or particular, and 
 that the one class is as clear as the other (since it is just as clear to 
 say that A is A, as to say that a thing is what it is), so it is also 
 with first truths ot* fact. For not only is it cleW to me immediately 
 i\mi I thinlc ; but it is just as clear to me th^t / have different 
 thoughts ; that sometimes I think of A, and thai. sometimes 1 think 
 
349 
 
 of B, etc. Thus the Cartesian principle is good, but it is not the 
 only one of its kind. You see therefore that all primitive truths of 
 reason or of fact have this in common, that they cannot be proved 
 by anything more certain. 
 
 § 14. \_Se7isitive knowledge of particular existence.'] But let us 
 come to this controversy which the sceptics carry on with the dog- 
 matists over the existence of things outside of us. We have al- 
 ready touched upon it, but it is necessary to return to it here. I 
 have formerly discussed it thoroughly both verbally and in writing, 
 with the ]ate Abbe Foucher, Canon of Dijon, a learned and subtle 
 man. — I^ow I made him admit that the truth of sensible things con- 
 sisted only in the connection of phenomena, which must have its 
 reason, and that it is this which distinguishes them from dreams ; 
 but that the truth of our existence and of the cause of phenomena 
 is of another kind, because it establishes substances ; and that the 
 sceptics spoiled whatever they say that is good, by carrying it too 
 far, and by wishing even to extend their doubts to immediate expe- 
 riences and to geometrical truths (a thing which M. Foucher, how- 
 ever did not do), and to the other truths of reason, which he did a 
 little too much. But to return to ourselves, sir ; you are right in 
 saying that there is ordinarily a difference between feelings and 
 imaginations ; but the sceptics will say that more or less does not 
 change the kind. Besides, although feelings are wont to be more 
 vivid than imaginations, it is a fact nevertheless that there are 
 cases where an imaginative person is impressed by his imaginations 
 as much or perhaps more than another is by the truth of things ; so 
 that I believe that the true critei'ion as regards the objects of the 
 senses is the connection of phenomena, that is, the connection of 
 that which takes place in different places and times, and in the ex- 
 perience of different men, who are themselves, each to the others, 
 very important phenomena on this score. And the connection of 
 phenomena, which guarantees truths of fact in respect to sensible 
 things outside of us, is verified by means of truths of i^eason ', as 
 the appearances of optics are explained by geometry. However it 
 must be confessed that all this certainty is not of the highest degree, 
 as you have well recognized. For it is not impossible, speaking 
 metaphysically, that there may be a dream, continuous and lasting, 
 like the life of a man ; but it is a thing as contrary to reason as 
 would be the fiction of a book which should be formed at haphazard 
 
350 
 
 by throwing the type together pell mell. For the rest, it is also 
 true that, provided the phenomena be connected, it does not matter 
 whether they are called dreams or not, since experience shows that 
 we are not deceived in the measures taken concerning phenomena 
 when they are understood according to the truths of reason. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Of the extent of human Icnowledge. 
 
 § 6. [" Whether any mere material heing thinhs or 7ic>."] In 
 the first place, I declare to you, sir, that when one has only con- 
 fused ideas of thought and of matter, as one ordinarily has, it is not 
 to be wondered at if one does not see the means of solving such 
 questions. It is as I have remarked before that a person who has 
 not ideas of the angles of a triangle except in the way in which one 
 has them generally, will never think of finding out that they are 
 always equal to two right angles. It must be considered that mat- 
 ter, taken for a complete being (that is, secondary matter opposed to 
 primary, which is something simply passive^ and consequently in- 
 complete), is only a mass, or that which results therefrom, and that 
 every real mans supposes simple substances or real unities ; and 
 when we consider farther what belongs to the nature of tliese real 
 unities, that is, perception and its consequences, we are transported, 
 so to speak, into another world, that is to say. into the intelligible 
 world of substances, whereas before we have been only among the 
 phenomena of the senses. And this knowledge of the interior of 
 matter shows sufficiently of what it is naturally capable, and that 
 every time that God shall give organs fitted to express reasoning, 
 the immaterial substance which reasons will not fail to be also given 
 to it, by virtue of this harmony, which is again a natural result of 
 substances. Matter could not subsist without immaterial substances, 
 that is, without unities ; after which it ought no longer to be asked 
 whether God is at liberty to give them to it or not. And if these 
 substances did not have in themselves the correspondence or har- 
 mony, of which I have just spoken, God would not act according to 
 the natural order. To speak very simply of giving or of according 
 powers is to return to the nahed faculties of the schoolmen and to 
 imagine minute subsisting beings, which can enter and depart like 
 the pigeons of a pigeon-house. It is making substances of them 
 
351 
 
 without thinking of it. The primitive powers constitute substances 
 themselves ; and the derivative powers, or, if you like, the faculties, 
 are only modes of being which must be derived from substances, and 
 they are not derived from matter as a machine merely, that is, in so 
 far as we consider it abstractly only as the incomplete being of pri- 
 mary matter, or the simply passive. Here I think that you will agree 
 with me, sir, that it is not in the power of a mere mechanism to 
 cause perception, sensation, reason, to arise. They must therefore 
 spring from some other substantial thing. To think that God acts 
 differently and gives to things accidents which are not modes of 
 being or modifications derived from substances, is to resort to mira- 
 cles and to what the schoolmen called the obediential power ^ by a 
 sort of supernatural exaltation, as when certain theologians claim 
 that the fire of hell burns separated souls ; in which case it might 
 be even doubted if it were the fire which acted, and if God did not 
 
 himself produce the effect, by acting in place of the fire 
 
 The difficulty which remains is only in respect to those who wish 
 to imagine what is only intelligible, as if they wanted to see sounds, 
 or hear colors. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Of the reality of human knowledge. 
 
 §§ 1-5. S^Knowledge placed in ideas may be all bare vision. 
 Answer.'] Our certainty would be slight or rather none, if it had 
 no other foundation for simple ideas than that which comes from 
 the senses.- Have you forgotten, sir, how I showed that ideas are 
 originally in our mind and that even our thoughts come to us from 
 our own depths, without its being possible for other creatures to 
 have an immediate influence upon the soul. Moreover the ground 
 of our certainty in regard to the universal and eternal truths lies in 
 the ideas themselves independently of the senses ; as also pure and 
 intelligible ideas do not depend upon the senses, for example, that 
 of being, of one, of the same, etc. But the ideas of sensible qual- 
 - ities, as of color, of flavor, etc. (which in reality are only appear- 
 ances), come to us from the senses, that is, from our confused 
 perceptions. And the ground .of the truth of contingent and 
 particular things is in the succession, whereby the phenomena 
 of the senses are connected just as the intelligible truths require. 
 This is the difference which should be made between them : whereas 
 
352 
 
 that which you make here between simple and compound ideas, and 
 compound ideas belonging to substances and to accidents, does not 
 seem to me well founded, since all intelligible ideas have their arche- 
 types in the eternal possibility of things. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Of truth in general. 
 
 §§ 1 and 2. [1. What truth is. 2. A right joining or separat- 
 ing of signs ; i. e., ideas or words.'] But what I find least to my 
 taste in your definition of truth, is that truth is there sought in 
 words. Thus the same meaning, being expressed in Latin, German, 
 English, French, will not be the same truth, and it will be necessary 
 to say with Hobbes, that truth depends on the good pleasure of men ; 
 which is speaking in a very strange way. Truth is even attributed 
 to Grod, who you will admit (I think) has no need of signs. Finally, 
 I have been already more than once surprised at the humor of your 
 friends, who take pleasure in making essences and species, nominal 
 truths. 
 
 We shall have therefore, farther, literal truths, which may be dis- 
 tinguished into truths of paper or of parchment, of the black of 
 ordinary ink, or of printer's ink, if truths must be distinguished by 
 signs. It is better, therefore, to place truths in the relation between 
 the objects of ideas, which causes one to be included or not to be in- 
 cluded in the other. This does not depend on languages and is 
 common to us with God and the angels ; and when God manifests 
 a truth to us we acquire that one which is in his understanding, 
 for although there is an infinite difference between his ideas and 
 ours as respects perfection and extension, it is always true that there 
 is agreement in the same relation. It is therefore in this relation 
 that truth must be placed, and we may distinguish between truths^ 
 which are independent of our good pleasure, and expressions, which 
 we invent as seems good to us. 
 
 §11. {Moral and metaphyseal truth]. Jl/brr^Z truth is called 
 veracity by some, and metaphysical truth is taken commonly by 
 metaphysicians for an attribute of being, but it is a very useless 
 attribute and one almost void of meaning. Let us content our- 
 selves with seeking truth in the correspondence of jDrop'ositions 
 which are in the mind with the things in question. It is true that 
 I have also attributed truth to ideas in saying that ideas are true or 
 
353 
 
 false ; but in that case I understand it in fact of the propositions 
 which affirm the possibility of the object of the idea. And in this 
 same sense it may be said farther that a being is true^ that is to say, 
 the proposition which affirms its actual or at least possible existence. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Of maxims. 
 
 §1. {They are self-evident]. This investigation is very useful 
 and even important. But you must not imagine, sir, that it has 
 been entirely neglected. You will find in a hundred places that the 
 scholastic philosophers have said that these propositions are evident 
 ex terminis, as soon as their terms are understood ; so that they 
 were persuaded that the force of conviction was founded on the 
 apprehension of the terms, that is, in the connection of the ideas. 
 But the geometricians have done much more : for they have under- 
 taken very often to demonstrate them As regards maxinns., 
 
 they are sometimes taken for established propositions, whether 
 they are evident or not. This might be well for beginners, whom 
 scrupulousness arrests ; but when the establishing of science is in 
 question, it is another matter. They are also often taken thus in 
 ethics and even by the logicians in their Topics., in which there is 
 an abundance of them, but a part of this contains some which are 
 sufficiently vague and obscure. For the rest, I said publicly and 
 privately a long while ago that it would be important to demon- 
 strate all the secondary axioms of which we ordinarily make use, 
 by reducing them to primitive or immediate and undemonstrable 
 axioms, which are those which I called lately and elsewhere, 
 identical ones. 
 
 § 7. It may always be said that this proposition, I exist^ 
 is most evident, being a proposition which cannot be proved 
 by any other, or an im7nediate truth. And to say, / think 
 therefore I am, is not properly to prove existence by thought, 
 since to think and to be thinking are the same thing ; and to say 
 / am thinking is the same as to say, / a7n. IS^evertheless you 
 may exclude this proposition from the number of axioms with some 
 justice, for it is a proposition of fact, founded upon an immediate 
 experience, and it is not a necessary proposition, whose necessity is 
 seen in the immediate agreement of ideas. On the contrary, there 
 
354 
 
 is no one but God who sees how these two terms 1 and existence 
 are connected, that is, why I exist. Bnt if the axiom is taken 
 more generally for an immediate or non-provable truth, it may be 
 said that the proposition 1 am is an axiom, and in any case we may 
 be assured that it is a primitive truth or unum ex primis cognitis 
 inter ternmios coinjplexos^ that is, that it is one of the first known 
 statements, that which is understood in the natural order of our 
 knowledge ; for it is possible that a man may never have thought of 
 forming expressly this proposition, which is yet innate in him. 
 
 §§ 8, 9. I had further added that in the natural order to say 
 that a thing is what it is, is prior to saying that it is not another ; 
 for here it is not a question of the history of our discoveries, 
 which is different in different men, but of the connection and 
 natural order of truths, which is always the same. But your re- 
 mark, namely, that what the child sees is only a fact, deserves still 
 more reflection ; for the experiences of the senses do not give abso- 
 lutely certain truths (as you yourself observed, sir, not long ago), 
 nor such as are free from all danger of illusion. For if it is per- 
 mitted to make metaphysically possible fictions, sugar might be 
 changed imperceptibly into a rod to punish a child if it has been 
 naughty, just as water is changed into wine with us on Christmas 
 Eve, if it has been well rectified \moTigene\. But the pain (you 
 will say) which the rod inflicts will never be the pleasure which the 
 sugar gives. I reply that the child will think of making an express 
 proposition concerning it as little as of remarking the axiom that it 
 cannot be said truly that what is, at the same time is not, although 
 it may very well perceive the difference between pleasure and pain, 
 as well as the difference between perceiving and not perceiving. 
 
 § 10. Thus you must not here oppose the axiom and the examj)le 
 as different truths in this respect, but regard the axiom as incor- 
 porated in the example and rendering the example true. It is 
 quite another thing when the evidence is not remarked in the ex- 
 ample itself and when the affirmation of the example is a conse- 
 quence and not merely a subsumption of the universal proposition, 
 as may happen also in respect to axioms. 
 
365 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Of our hiowledge of existence. 
 
 §§ 2 and 3. [2. A threefold knov)ledge of existence. 3. Our 
 'knowledge of our oion existence is intuitive.'] I am fully in accord 
 with all this. And I add that the immediate apperception of our 
 existence and of our thoughts furnishes us the first truths a poste- 
 riori or of fact, that is, the first experiences / as identical propo- 
 sitions contain tlie first truths a priori or of reason, that is, the 
 fi7'st lights. Both are incapable of being proved and may be called 
 immediate ; the former, because there is immediation between the 
 understanding and its object, the latter, because there is immedia- 
 tion between the subject and predicate. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Of our hiowledge of the existence of a God. 
 
 § 1. I do not wish to repeat what has been discussed between us 
 concerning innate ideas and truths, among which I reckon the idea 
 of God and the truth of his existence. 
 
 §§ 2-6. [2. Man hiows that he himself is. 3. He hnows also 
 that nothing cannot produce a heing^ therefore something is eternal. 
 4. That eternal being must he most powerful. 5. And most know- 
 ing 6. And therefore (rod P^ I assure you, sir, with perfect sin- 
 cerity, that I am extremely sorry to be obliged to say anything 
 against this demonstration : but I do it in order to give you an 
 opportunity to fill up the gap in it. It is principally in the passage 
 where you conclude (§ 3) that something has existed from all 
 eternity. I find ambiguity in it. If it means that there has never 
 heen a time when nothing existed^ I agree to this ; and it follows 
 truly from the preceding propositions by a wholly mathematical 
 sequence. For if there never had been anything, there would 
 always have been nothing, nothing not being able to produce 
 being ; hence we ourselves would not be, which is contrary to the 
 first truth of experience. But what follows shows first that in 
 saying that something has existed from all eternity, you mean an 
 eternal thing. Nevertheless it does not follow, in virtue of what 
 you have advanced up to this time, that if there has always been 
 something, it has always been a certain thing, that is, that there is 
 an eternal being. For s(»ne opponents will say that I myself have 
 
356 
 
 been produced by other things and these things again bj others. 
 Farther, if some admit eternal beings (as tlie Epicureans their atoms) 
 they will not believe themselves thereby obliged to grant an eternal 
 being which should be alone the source of all others. For even if 
 they should admit that that wliich gives existence gives also the 
 other qualities and powers of a thing, they will deny that a single 
 thing gives existence to the others and they will even say that for 
 each thing several others must concur. Thus we will not arrive in 
 this way alone at one source of all powers. However it is very 
 reasonable to conclude that there is one, and even that the universe 
 is governed with Vvdsdom. But if one believes matter susceptible 
 of feeling, one may be disposed to believe that it is not impossible 
 that it may produce it. At least it will be difficult to bring forward 
 a proof of it which should not show at the same time that matter 
 is altogether incapable of it; and supposing that our thought comes 
 from a thinking being, can it be taken for granted without having 
 a bias for the demonstration, that this must be God ? 
 
 § 7. [ Out idea of a most perfect heing, not the sole proof of 
 a God']. Although I hold to innate ideas and particularly to that 
 of God, I do not believe that the demonstrations of the Cartesians 
 
 drawn from the idea of God, are perfect This [ontological 
 
 argument] is not a paralogism, but it is an imperfect demonstra- 
 tion which supposes something which has still to be proved in order 
 to render it mathematically evident. This is, that it is tacitly 
 supposed that this idea of the all-great or all-perfect being is possi- 
 ble and implies no contradiction The other argument of M. 
 
 Descartes which undertakes to prove the existence of God because 
 his idea is in our soul and it must have come from the original, is 
 still less conclusive. For, in the first place, this argument has 
 this defect in common with the preceding, that it supposes that 
 there is in us such an idea, that is, that God is possible. . . . . And, 
 secondly, this same argument does not sufficiently prove that the 
 idea of God, if we have it, must come from the original. But I do 
 not wish to delay here at present. You will say to me, sir, that 
 recognizing in us the innate idea of God I ought not to say that 
 we may question whether there is one. But I permit this doubt 
 only in relation to a strict demonstration, founded upon the idea 
 alone. For one is sufficiently assured otherwise of the idea and 
 of the existence of God. And you will remember that I have 
 
357 
 
 shown how ideas are in iis, not always in such a way that we are 
 conscious of them, but always so that we may draw them from our 
 own depths and render them perceptible. And this is also w^hat I be- 
 lieve of the idea of God, whose possibility and existence I hold to be 
 demonstrated in more than one way. And the Preestahlished Har- 
 7nony itself furnishes a new and incontestable means of doing so. 
 I believe besides that almost all the means which have been em- 
 ployed to prove the existence of God are good, and might serve, if 
 they were perfected ; and I am not at all of the opinion that the 
 one which is drawn from the order of things is to be neglected. ■ 
 
 §§ 9, 10. [9. Two sorts of heings, cogitative and incogitative. 
 10. Incogitative heing cannot produce a cogitative']. I think the 
 present reasoning the strongest in the world, and not only exact but 
 also profound and worthy of its author. I am entirely of his 
 opinion that there is no combination and modification of parts of 
 matter, however small they may be, which can produce perception ; 
 all the more that the gross parts could not give it (as is clearly 
 evident), and that everything in the small parts is proportional to 
 what may take place in the large ones. It is another important 
 remark upon matter, which the author here makes, that it must not 
 be taken for a thing single in number, or (as I am accustomed to 
 say) for a true and perfect monad or unity, since it is but a mass of 
 an infinite number of beings. Here this excellent author needed 
 but one more step to reach my system. For in fact I give percep- 
 tion to all these infinite beings, each one of which is as an animal, 
 endow^ed with a soul (or with some analogous active principle, which 
 forms its true unity) together with what is necessary to this being 
 in order to be passive, and endowed with an organic body. Now 
 these beings have received their nature, active and passive (that is, 
 what they possess of immaterial and material), from a general and 
 supreme cause, because otherwise, as the author well remarks, being 
 independent each of the others, they could never produce that 
 order, that Karmony, that heaicty, which we observe in nature. But 
 this argument, which appears to be only of moral certainty, is 
 brought to a necessity altogether metaphysical by the neio hind of 
 harmony which I have introduced, which is \hQ preestahlished har- 
 mony. For each one of these souls expressing in its manner that 
 which takes place outside and not being able to have any influence 
 on other particular beings, or rather, being obliged to draw this ex- 
 
358 
 
 pression from the depths of its own nature, each one must neces- 
 sarily have received this nature (or tliis internal reason of the 
 expressions of what is external) from a universal cause on which all 
 these beings depend, and which causes one to be perfectly in accord 
 and correspondent with another; a thing which is not possible 
 without an infinite knowledge and power, and by an artifice great 
 in respect especially to the spontaneous agreement of the mechanism 
 with the actions of the rational soul. In regard to this, the illustri- 
 ous author who made objections against it in his wonderful Diction- 
 ary, doubted whether it did not surpass all possible wisdom ; saying 
 that the wisdom of God did not ^appear to him too great for such 
 an effect, and he at least recognized that never had the feeble con- 
 ceptions whicli we are able to have of the divine perfection, been so 
 set in relief. 
 
 CHAPTEK XI. 
 
 Of OUT knowledge of the existence of other things. 
 
 §§ 1-10. \_It is to he had only ly sensation^ etc.'] I have already 
 remarked in our preceding conversations that the truth of sensible 
 things is proved by their connection^ w^hicli depends on the intel- 
 lectual truths founded in reason, and on the constant observations 
 in sensible things themselves, even when the reasons do not appear. 
 And as these reasons and observations give us the means of judging 
 of the future by relation to our interests, and as success answers to 
 our rational judgment, we could not ask nor even have a greater 
 certainty concerning these objects. We can account also even for 
 dreams and for their lack of connection with other phenomena. IS^ev- 
 ertheless I believe that the appellation of knowledge and of cer- 
 tainty might be extended beyond actual sensations, since clearness 
 and manifestness extend beyond, which I consider as a kind of cer- 
 tainty : and it would undoubtedly be folly to seriously doubt 
 whether there are men in the world when we do not see any. To 
 doiobt seriously is to doubt in relation to practice, and certainty 
 might be taken for a knowledge of truth of which one cannot 
 doubt in relation to practice without madness ; and sometimes it is 
 taken still more generally and applied to cases where we cannot 
 doubt without deserving to be greatly blamed. But manifest- 
 ness would be a luminous certainty, that is to say, where we 
 do not doubt on account of the connection which we see between 
 
359 . 
 
 ideas. According to this definition of certainty, we are certain 
 that Constantinople is in the world, that Constantine and Alexander 
 the Great and Julius Caesar have lived. It is true that some 
 peasant of Ardennes might with reason doubt of these for want of 
 information ; but a man of letters and of the world could not do so 
 without a great derangement of mind. 
 
 § 11. \Past existence linown hy memory.'] It has already been 
 remarked that our memory sometimes deceives us. And we 
 believe it or not according as it is more or less vivid and more or 
 less connected with the things which we know. And even when 
 we are assured of the principal fact we may often question the 
 circumstances. 
 
 §§ 13, 14. [13. PaHicular propositions concerning existence 
 are hiowable. 14. And general propositions concerning abstract 
 ideas.] Your division appears to amount to mine, oi propositions 
 of fact and propositions of reason. Propositions of fact also may 
 become general in a way, but it is by induction or observation ; so 
 that it is only a multitude of similar facts, as when it is observed 
 that all quicksilver is evaporated by the force of fire ; and this is 
 not a perfect generalization because we do not see its necessity. 
 General propositions of reason are necessary, although the reason 
 also furnishes some which are not absolutely general and are only 
 probable, as, for example, when we presume that an idea is possible 
 until the contrary is discovered by a more exact research. There 
 are, finally, mixed propositions which are drawn from premises, 
 some of which come from facts and observations, and others are 
 necessary propositions : and such are a number of geographical and 
 astronomical conclusions concerning the globe of the earth and the 
 course of the stars, which spring from the combination of the obser- 
 vations of travelers and astronomers with the theorems of geometry 
 and arithmetic. But as, according to the usage of logicians, the con- 
 clusion follows the weahest of the premises and cannot have more 
 certainty than they, these mixed propositions have only the certainty 
 and universality which belong to the observations. As regards 
 eternal truths., it must be observed that at bottom they are all con- 
 ditional and say in effect, such a thing posited, such another thing 
 is. For example, in saying, every figure which has three sides will 
 also haA)e three angles^ I do nothing but suppose that if there is a 
 figure with three sides, tl^is same figure will have three angles. . . . 
 
360 
 
 The scholastics have disputed hotlj de constantia svhject% as they 
 called it, that is, how the proposition made upon a subject can have 
 a real truth if this subject does not exist. It is that the truth is 
 only conditional and says that in case the subject ever exists, it will 
 be found such. But it will be asked further, in what is this con- 
 nection founded, since there is in it reality which does not deceive ? 
 The reply will be that it is in the connection of ideas. But in 
 answer it will be asked, where would these ideas be if no mind 
 existed and then what would become of the real foundation of this 
 certainty of the eternal truths ? This leads us finally to the ulti- 
 mate ground of truths, namely, to that Sitprenie and Unwersal 
 Mind, which cannot fail to exist, whose understanding, to speak 
 truly, is the region of eternal truths, as St. Augustine has recog- 
 nized and expresses in a sufficiently vivid way. And in order that 
 it be not thought that it is unnecessary to resort to this, we must con- 
 sider that these necessary truths contain the determining reason and 
 the regulative principle of even existences, and, in a word, the laws 
 of the universe. Thus these necessary truths, being anterior to the 
 existences of contingent beings, it must be that they are founded in 
 the existence of a necessary substance. Here it is that I find the 
 original of the ideas and truths which are engraved in our souls, 
 not in the form of propositions, but as the sources from which 
 applications and occasions will cause actual enunciations to arise. 
 
 CHAPTEK XII. 
 
 Of the improvement of our Icnoioledge. 
 
 §§ 4-6. [Dangerotis to huild upon precarious principles. But 
 to compare clear complete ideas under steady names.] I am sur- 
 prised, sir, that you turn against maxims, that is, against evident 
 principles, that which can and must be said against the principles 
 supposed gratis. When one demands praecognita in the sciences, 
 or anterior knowledges, which serve to ground science, he demands 
 known principles and not arbitrary positions, the truth of which is 
 not known ; and even Aristotle understands that the inferior and 
 subaltern sciences borrow their principles from other higher sciences 
 where they have been demonstrated, except the first of the 
 sciences, vrhich we call metaphysics, which, according to him, asks 
 nothing from the others and furnishes them the principles of which 
 
361 
 
 tliey have need ; and when he says Bel irLareveiv top iiavOdvovra^ 
 the apprentice must believe his master, his opinion is that he must 
 do it only while waiting, while he is not yet instructed in the higher 
 sciences, so that it is only provisionally. Thus one is very far from 
 receiving gratuitous principles. To this must be added, that even 
 principles whose certainty is not complete may have their use if 
 we build upon them only by demonstration ; for although all the 
 conclusions in this case are only conditional and are valid solely on 
 the supposition that this principle is true, nevertheless, this connec- 
 tion itself and these conditional enunciations would at least be 
 demonstrated ; so that it were much to be desired that we had many 
 books written in this way, where there would be no danger of error, 
 the reader or disciple being warned of the condition. And prac- 
 tice will not be regulated by these conclusions except as the suppo- 
 sition shall be found verified otherwise. This method also serves 
 very often itself to verify suppositions or hypotheses, when many 
 conclusions arise from them, the truth of which is known otherwise, 
 and sometimes this giA^es a perfect proof sufficient to demonstrate 
 the truth of the hypothesis. 
 
 § 13. l^The true use of hypotheses. ^^ The art of discovering the 
 causes of phenomena, or true hypotheses, is like the art of decipher- 
 ing, where an ingenious conjecture often shortens the road very 
 much. Lord Bacon began to put the art of experimenting into 
 precepts, and Sir Eobert Boyle had a great talent for practising 
 it. But if the art of employing experiences and of drawing conse- 
 quences therefrom is not joined to it, we shall never with the 
 utmost cost attain to what a man of great penetration might dis- 
 cover in the first place. Descartes, who was assuredly such, 
 has made a similar remark, in one of his letters, in regard 
 to the method of the Chancellor of England ; and Spinoza (whom 
 I do not hesitate to quote when he says something good), in 
 one of his letters to the late M. Olden bourg. Secretary of the Royal 
 Society of England, printed among the posthumous works of this 
 subtle Jew, makes a like reflection concerning a work by Mr. Boyle, 
 who, to speak the truth, stops a little too much to draw from a 
 number of fine experiences no other conclusion than this which he 
 might take for a principle, namely, that everything takes place in 
 nature mechanically ; a principle which can be rendered certain by 
 reason alone and never by experiences however numerous they 
 may be. 
 
CONTENTS OF NOTES. 
 
 1. Life of Leibnitz, ...... 
 
 2. Leibnitz's Writings, ...... 
 
 3. Expositions and Criticisms of Leibnitz's Philosophy, 
 
 Article I. 
 
 4. Leibnitz and Descartes, ..... 
 
 5. Literature on Descartes and his Philosophy, 
 
 6. The Search for Final Causes (p. 1), . 
 
 7. Philipp (p. 2), 
 
 8. The Epicurus of Laertius (p. 8), ... 
 
 Article II. 
 
 9. Relation of Leibnitz to Spinoza, 
 
 10. Literature on the Philosophy of Spinoza, . 
 
 11. The Conception of Contingent (p. 22), . 
 
 12. Natura naturans and natura naturata (p. 23), . 
 
 Article III. 
 
 13. The Quality of Terms (p. 26), .... 
 
 14. Descartes' Argument for proving the Existence of God (p. 
 
 15. True and False Ideas (p. 30), .... 
 
 16. " Whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived is true" (p. 
 
 17. Antoine Arnauld's On the Art of Thinking Well (p. 32), 
 
 18. " Whether we see all things in God" (p. 32), 
 
 19. Malebranche and The Search after Truth (p. 33), 
 
 Article IV. 
 
 20. The Law of Continuity, .... 
 
 Article V. 
 
 21. Statement of Personal Views on Metaphysics and Physics, 
 
 Article VI. 
 
 22. Does the Essence of Body consist in Extension ? 
 
 23. The System of Occasional Causes (p. 44), . 
 
 Article VII. 
 
 24. Descartes' Principles of Philosophy, . 
 
 25. Truths of Fact and Truths of Reason (p. 48), 
 
 26. The Source and Nature of Error (p. 49), 
 
 27. The Author of the Philofophia Mosaica (p. 62), . 
 
 Page. 
 
 29), 
 31), 
 
364 
 
 28. 
 
 Article VIII. 
 Two Essays on Motion (p. 64), . 
 
 29. Descartes' Man (p. 67), 
 
 Article IX. 
 Article X. 
 
 30. The Notion of Substance, ...... 
 
 31. Mersenne (p. 69), ....... 
 
 Article XI. 
 
 32. "One of the greatest theologians and philosophers of our time" 
 
 (p.Tl), 
 
 33. " To find real units" (p. 72), . ..... 
 
 34. Swammerdam, Malpighi, Leewenhoeck, Rigis, Hartsoeker (pp. 73-74), 
 
 35. The System of Preestablished Harmony (pp. 77-78), 
 
 Article XII. 
 
 36. Objections to the Doctrine of Preestablished Harmony, 
 
 Article XIII. 
 
 37. Answers to Objections to the Doctrine of Preestablished Harmony, 
 
 Articles XIV and XV. 
 
 38. The Illustration of the Clocks, .... 
 
 Article XVI. 
 
 39. Leibnitz and Locke, 
 
 40. Literature on Locke, ...... 
 
 41. The Function della crusca (p. 98), 
 
 Article XVII. 
 
 42. The Law of Sufficient Reason, .... 
 
 Article XVIII. 
 
 43. On the Consequences of Certain Passages in Descartes, 
 
 Article XIX. 
 
 44. On Nature in Itself, etc., 
 
 45. Aristotle's Definition of Motion (p. 113), . 
 
 46. Imaging and Intellectual Conception (p. 116), 
 
 47. The Principle of the " Identity of Indiscernibles " (pp. 122-3), . 
 
 ' Article XX. 
 
 48. Leibnitz's Preface to the Codex Diplomaticus Juris Gentium (p. 127), 
 
 Article XXI. 
 
 49. The Ontological Argument for the Being of God, 
 
 Article XXII. 
 
 50. The Doctrine of a Universal Spirit, ..... 
 
 51. Molinos, Angelus Silesius, and Weigel (p. 140), . 
 
 376 
 
 376 
 
 376 
 376 
 
 376 
 376 
 376 
 377 
 
 377 
 
 377 
 
 377 
 
 377 
 
 378 
 378 
 
 378 
 
 379 
 
 379 
 879 
 379 
 379 
 
 379 
 
365 
 
 Article XXIII. Page. 
 
 52. Leibnitz on the Non-Sensuous Element in Knowledge (p. 149), . 383 
 
 Article XXIV. * 
 
 53. Lady Mashara, ........ 384 
 
 Article XXV. 
 
 54. Proof of the Existence of God from the Doctrine of Preestablished 
 
 Harmony (p. 165), . 384 
 
 Article XXVL 
 
 55. Cpntingency and Necessity, ..... 384 
 
 56. The Sevennese Prophets (p. 173), . . . . . 384 
 
 • Article XXVII. 
 
 57. " The Eefutation of Spinoza by Leibnitz," . . . .384 
 
 58. Malcuth in Malcuth (p. 183), 384 
 
 Article XXVIII. 
 
 59. Remarks on Locke's Examination of Malebranche, . . 385 
 
 Article XXIX. 
 
 60. Leibnitz on the Nature of the Soul, . . . . . 385 
 
 61. The different Classes of Monads (p. 191), .... 385 
 63. Genii (p. 192), 386 
 
 Article XXX.. 
 
 63. Leibnitz's Theodicee, . . . . . . .386 
 
 64. Leibnitz's Optimism, ...... 387 
 
 Article XXXI. 
 
 65. Leibnitz's Rules for the Conduct of the Mind and the Increase of 
 
 Knowledge, 387 
 
 Article XXXII. 
 
 66. The Principles of Nature and of Grace, .... 387 
 
 Article XXXIII. 
 
 67. The Monadology, 387 
 
 68. Analysis of the Monadology, ..... 388 
 
 Article XXXIV. 
 
 69. Remond de Montmort, ....... 389 
 
 Article XXXV. 
 
 70. Leibnitz's Correspondence with Clarke, .... 389 
 
 Article XXXVI. 
 
 71. The Nouveaux Essais, ....... 389 
 
 72. Analysis of the Second Chapter of Bk. 1, of the Nouveaux Essais^ 390 
 
NOTES 
 
 1. Life of Leibnitz. 
 
 No more interesting personage appears in the history of modern philosophy 
 than Leibnitz. Frederick the Great said of him, ' ' He represents in himself 
 a whole academy ;" and by almost universal consent he is admitted to have 
 possessed the most comprehensive mind since Aristotle. He was on familiar 
 terms with almost every prominent character, political, ecclesiastical, philo- 
 sophical, scientific and literary, of his day, and he himself played a promi- 
 nent part in each of these spheres. From him as a statesman we have a 
 scheme for the unification of Germany, prepared for the Imperial Diet at 
 Ratisbon ; and a far-sighted plan for a French conquest of Egypt, by which 
 the conquering armies of Louis XIV were to have been turned aside from 
 Germany, and the Turks from Austria and Hungary; besides numerous 
 schemes for reforming the currency and the laws of the German states and 
 improving the condition of the people. As a theologian he has given us an 
 essay Against Atheism, a Defense of the Trinity, numerous discussions on 
 the arguments for the being of God, a great project for the reunion of the 
 Protestant and Latin churches, an irenical Systema Theologicum (translated 
 by Russell, 1858) written in the interests of this reunion project, and above 
 all his great work La Theodicee. As a mathematician he contests with Sir 
 Isaac Newton the honor of discovering the Calculus. As a historian he pro- 
 duced an elaborate work on the Annals of the House of Brunswick. To t lie 
 science of Logic, among other contributions, he has given us the important 
 doctrine of the Quality of Terms. As a physicist he was the first to give the 
 correct formula for moving force, and in his Protagda he became a pioneer 
 in geological investigations. His New Essays on the Human Understanding 
 place him along side of his great contemporary Locke as a psychologist. 
 And as a speculative philosopher, or metaphysician, he was the first man of 
 his age on the continent of Europe and the founder of modern German 
 philosophy. 
 
 The standard biography of Leibnitz is : Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr von 
 Leibnitz. Fine Biographie von Dr. O. E. Guhrauer. Zwei Bdnde, Breslau, 
 1842. Guhrauer's two volume work was the basis of the Life of Godfrey 
 William von Liebnitz, by John M. Mackie, 12mo., Boston, 1845. In his pre- 
 face Mackie writes: -'I have added little, or nothing, to the German work; 
 and have taken away from it nothing that could be appropriately introduced 
 into a popular biography, or that might be considered as possessing any his- 
 torical interest for readers without the confines of Germany." Excellent 
 accounts of the life of Leibnitz are also found in Kuno Fischer's Leibniz 
 {Geschichte d. neuern Philosophie. Zweiter Band, dritte neubearbeitete Auf- 
 lage, 1888), pp. 1-324, Leibnizens Leben u. Schriften; and in the little work 
 by Merz, Leibniz, in Blackwood's Philosophical Classics, 1884. Cf., also, E. 
 Fleiderer, Leibniz als Patriot, Staatsmann u. Bildungstrdger, Leipsic, 1870 ; 
 and T. Kirchner's Leibniz : sein Leben u. Denken, Cothen, 1877. 
 
36T 
 
 2. Leibnitz's Writings. 
 
 There is no complete edition of the writings of Leibnitz. For an account 
 of the different issues of his works, consult Kuno Fischer's Leibniz (Ge- 
 schichte d. n. Philosophie, Zweiter Band, Munich, 1888), pp. 307-19, and the 
 preface to Merz's Leibniz. 
 
 The best edition of his philosophical writings is that of C. J. Gerhardt, Die 
 philosophisehen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, 7 vols., Berlin, 1875-90. This, 
 however, needs to be supplemented by Erdmann's God. Guil. Leibnitii Opera 
 Philosophica quae extant Latina, Gallica, Germanica Omnia, Berlin, 1840, 
 and by the theological writings and the correspondence with Wolff. 
 
 The best edition of his mathematical works is that of C. J. Gerhardt, form- 
 ing the third series in the edition of Pertz, Leibnizen's mathematische Schrif- 
 ten, herausgegeben von C. J. Gerhardt, 7 vols., London and Berlin, 1850; 
 Halle, 1855-63. 
 
 The best issue of his historical and political writings is that by Onno Klopp, 
 Die WerJce von Leibniz, u. s. w., first series, 10 vols., Hanover, 1864-77. 
 With this should be compared Foucher de Careil's Oeuvres de Leibniz, Paris, 
 1859-75, vols, in to VI. 
 
 The best edition of his theological works is that of Foucher de Careil, vols. 
 I and II of his Oeuvres de Leibniz. 
 
 To the above should be added Guhrauer's Leibniz's Deutsche Schriften, 2 
 vols., Berlin, 1838-40; Foucher de Careil's Lettres et Opuscules inedits de 
 Leibniz, Paris, 1854-57; and Gerhardt's Briefwechsel zwischen Leibniz und 
 Wolff, Halle, 1860. 
 
 3. Expositions and Criticisms of Leibnitz' Philosophy. 
 
 Among the most important discussions of the Philosophy of Leibnitz, are 
 the following : 
 In German: — Ldw. Feuerbach's Darstellg., Entw. u. Krit. d. L.'schen Phi- 
 losophie, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1844. 
 A. Trendelenburg's essays on L. in his Historische Beitrdge, vols, ii 
 
 and iii, Berlin, 1855, 1867. 
 Hartenstein's Ueber Lockers u. L.'s Lehre von d. Mensch. Ver stand, etc. 
 
 (Several essays in his Hist.-phil. Abhandlungen), Leipsic, 1870. 
 T. Kirchner's Leibniz's Psychologic, Cothen, 1876. 
 J. H. V. Kirchmann's Erlduterungen zu L.^s kleineren philosophisch 
 
 wichtigern Schriften, Leipsic, 1879. Also Erltrgn. zu Leibniz's Theo- 
 
 dicee by Kirchmann, and Erlduterungen zu L.'s Neue Abhandlungen^ 
 
 by Prof. Schaarschmidt. The same. 
 Kuno Fischer's Leibniz (Geschte. d. n. Philosophie. Zweiter Band, 
 
 dritte neubearbeitete Auflage), Munich, 1888. 
 In French: — Condillac's Exposition et Refutation (in his Traite des Sys- 
 
 temes.) 
 Maine de Biran's Exposition de la Phil, de Leibniz. An English 
 
 translation of this will be found in the American Whig Review, vol. 
 
 IX, p. 575 ff. 
 Nourisson's La Philosophie de Leibniz, Paris, 1860. 
 
368 
 
 Secretan's La Philosophie de Leibniz, Paris, 1840. 
 
 Nolan's Eclaircissements (in his valuable edition of the Monadology), 
 ' Paris, 1887. Also his earlier work. La Critique de Kant et la Meta- 
 physique de L.. Paris, 1875. 
 In English: — Samuel Clarke's Letters to Leibnitz (in his Collection of 
 Papers which Passed between L. and Dr. S. Clarke), London, 1717. 
 J. T. Merz's Leibriiz (in Blackwood's Phil. Series), Edinburgh, 1884. 
 J. Dewey's Leibniz's New Essays concerning the Human Understand- 
 ing: a Critical Exposition (in Griggs's Philosoph. Classics), Chi- 
 cago, 1888. 
 To these should be added the exposition by the eminent Swedish thinker, 
 Bostrom, contained in the recent collected edition of his writings ; and 
 Cesca's La Metafisica e la Teoria delta Conoscenza del Leibniz. 
 
 The student may profitably consult for further literature the last edition 
 of Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, ed. by Prof. M. Heinze ; and the Archiv 
 fur Geschichte d. Philosophie, edited by Prof. L. Stein, Bd. I ff., Berlin, 1887 f. 
 Among the many magazine articles on Leibnitz, which will be found by con- 
 sulting an index to periodical literature, are those by Prof. Fraser, on the 
 Life and Philosophy of Leibnitz in the No. Brit. Review, vol. 5, (also pub- 
 lished in F.'s Essays in Philosophy); Aubertin's La Phil, de L. et la Science 
 Contemporaine in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 92; and Brennecke's Z/.'s 
 Beiveise fur das Dasein Goites in the Phil. Monatshefte, 5. 
 
 The histories of philosophy containing the best accounts of Leibnitz's phi- 
 losophy are those of Ueberweg, Erdmann, Bowen, and Zeller [Deutsche Phil, 
 seit Leibniz, 1873). 
 
 ARTICLE I. 
 
 4. Leibnitz and Descartes. 
 Leibnitz while a mere boy at Leipsic began the study of Descartes' writ- 
 ings and they more than those of any other one philosopher determined his 
 thinking. He had access when at Paris to the manuscripts left by Descartes 
 and continued the study of his writings, especially those on mathematics. 
 His own discovery of the Integral Calculus on Oct. 29, 1675, and of the 
 Differential Calculus soon after, carried him far beyond the Cartesian math- 
 ematics, considered by the followers of Descartes as their master's most im- 
 portant work. This acliievement not improbably led Leibnitz to free him- 
 self more and more from the influence of Descartes in metaphysics. After 
 his removal to Hanover he took a more openly hostile attitude toward Des- 
 cartes. His writings against Descartes and Cartesianism will be found in 
 Gerhardt's edition, vol. iv, pp. 274-406. The most important of them are 
 translated here in Articles I, VII, IX, XVIII, and XXI ; cf. also Articles III, 
 IV, VI, X, XI, XXIX and passim. His general attitude toward Cartesianism 
 is well indicated by his remark that ' ' Cartesianism is to be regarded as the 
 ante-chamber of the truth," and by the remarks found in the third of the 
 extracts forming Article I. 
 
 5. Literature on the Philosophy of DESCARTilfe. 
 For the study of the philosophy of Descartes the following additional 
 works will be found of service : 
 
369 
 
 Spinoza's Renati Descartes Principiorum Philosophice pars I et II more 
 geometrico demonstratce. 
 
 Maine de Biran's Commentaire sur les Meditations de Descartes (found in 
 Bertrand's Science et Psychologic, oeuvres inedits de De Biran, pp. 73-125), 
 Paris, 1887. 
 
 Cousin's Fragments Philosophiques, vol. ii, Paris, 1838, and Fragments de 
 Phil. Cartesienne, Paris, 1845. 
 
 Bouillier's Histoire de la Philosophic Cartesienne, Paris, 1854. 
 
 Bordas-Demoulin's Le Cartesiayiisme, 2d ed., Paris, 1874. 
 
 Louis Liard's Descartes, Alcan, Paris, 1882. 
 
 V. Brochard's editions, with notes, of Les Principes de Phil. , pt. 1, and of 
 the Discours de la Methode. The same. 
 
 Henri Joly's editions of the same pieces, Delalan Freres, Paris. 
 
 Fonsegive's Les Pretendues Contradictions de Descartes (in the Revue Phil- 
 osophique, 1883, pp. 511-532, and 642-656). 
 
 Schaarschmidt's Descartes u. Spinoza, urkundl. Darstellg. d. Philos. Beider, 
 Bonn, 1850. 
 
 Lowe's Das Spec. Syst. des Rene Descartes, seine Vorzilge u. Mangel, 
 Vienna, 1855. 
 
 Kuno Fischer's Descartes u. seine Schule, 3 auf. (the first part, treating of 
 Descartes and Malebranche, has been translated into English by Prof. Gordy 
 and published by the Scribners of New York), Munich, 1878. 
 
 Thilo's Die Religionsphilosophie des Descartes (in Ztschr. f. ex. Phil. , III, 
 121-182), 1862. 
 
 Heinze's Die Sittenlehre des Descartes, Leipsic, 1872. a 
 
 Glogau's Darlg. u. Krit. d. Grundgedanhens d. Cartesianisch. MetaphysiJc 
 (in Z. f. Phil. u. phil. Kr.), 1878. 
 
 Koch's Die Psychologic Descartes", Munich, 1882. 
 
 Natorp's Descartes' Erkemitnisstheorie, Marburg, 1882. 
 
 Cunningham's Descartes and English Speculation, London, 1875. 
 
 Mahaffy's Descartes (in Blackwood's Series), Edinburgh, 1880. 
 
 H. Sedgwick's The Fundamental Doctrines of Descartes (in Mind, vol. 7, 
 pp. 435 f.). 
 
 Rhodes' A New View of the Phil, of Descartes (in the Jour, of Spec. Phil. , 
 vol. 17, pp. 225 f.). 
 
 Consult also the histories of philosophy, especially those of Hegel, Ueber- 
 weg, Bo wen, and Erdmann. 
 
 The best and only complete edition of Descartes' own writings is that by 
 Cousin, 11 vols., Paris, 1824-26. Of the most important philosophical works, 
 there is a French edition in one volume edited by Jules Simon ; a German 
 translation in one volume by von Kirchmann ; and an English translation, 
 also in one volume, by Prof. Veitch (7 ed., Blackwood, Edinburgh). 
 
 6. The Search for Final Causes (Page 1). 
 
 It may be well to compare the views of Leibnitz on this important subject 
 
 with those of fiis philosophical predecessors. Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza. 
 
 For Bacon's views consult his Novum Organum, I, 48, 65 ; II, 2 ; Advan. of 
 
 Learning, bk. 2 ; De Augmentis Sci., bk. 3, chs. 4 and 5 ; compare also Prof. 
 
 24 • 
 
370 
 
 Fowler's note on the subject in his edition of the Novum Organum, and 
 Kuno Fischer's remarks in his Franz Baco, pp. 148-146. For Descartes' 
 views consult his Meditations, IV, and Principles of Philosophy, 1, 28 ; also 
 Kuno Fischer's remarks in his Descartes ( Hist, of Mod. Phil. , Eng. trans. , 
 vol. I, pp. 364 f.). For Spinoza's views consult his Ethics, pt. I, props. 32-34 
 and the appendix. P^or Leibnitz's own views, see Article I, IV, VII, § 28, 
 IX, XVIII, XIX, XXVII. On the whole subject, see Janet's Final Causes. 
 
 7. Philipp (Page 2). 
 A native of Saxony, not improbably also of Leipsic, Avho was a councillor 
 and representative of the Saxon government at Hamburg from 1675-1682. 
 In 1682 he became librarian of the electoral library at Dresden and died 
 shortly afterward. He was much interested in the sciences. 
 
 8. The Epicurus of Laertius (Page 8). 
 This refers to the article on Epicurus by Diogenes Laertius in his Lives of 
 the Philosophers, in ten books. It contains some original letters of Epicu- 
 rus and comprises a pretty satisfactory epitome of the Epicurean doctrines. 
 
 ARTICLE II. 
 9. Relation of Leibnitz to Spinoza. 
 The relation of Leibnitz philosophically to Spinoza has long been a subject 
 of dispute. Was Leibnitz ever a Spinozist ? How much has he been in- 
 fluenced by Spinoza? These and other like questions have given rise to 
 numerous essays. The weight of evidence seems to show that he never was 
 a real follower of Spinoza but that nevertheless he at first had strong lean- 
 ings toward the philosophy of the great Jew (cf. p. 309). Those who wish to 
 pursue the subject will find, in addition to the earlier discussions of the ques- 
 tion by Trendelenburg, Erdmann, Guhrauer and De Careil, the whole subject 
 discussed anew by Prof. Stein in his Leibniz in seinem Verhdltniss zu Spinoza 
 auf Grundlage unedirten Materials entivicklungsgeschichtlich dargestellt (in 
 the Sitzungsberichte der Konigl. preuss. Akademie XXV, 1888, p. 615 fif.). 
 Two recently, discovered letters of Leibnitz concerning Spinoza, which bear 
 upon the question, will be found in the Archiv fiXr Geschichte d. Philosophic, 
 Band 3, Heft 1, 1889. 
 
 Between the years 1676 and 1680 Leibnitz carefully studied the writings of 
 Spinoza. He received a copy of the Opera posthuma , containing the Ethics, 
 almost immediately after it appeared in January, 1678, and several manu- 
 scripts are extant in which he has given an extended judgment on this the 
 masterpiece of Spinoza. One of these, together with two minor pieces bear- 
 ing on Spinoza, Gerhardt has given to the public in his first volume. This is 
 here translated and should be read in connection with Art. XXVII (on which 
 see note 57). 
 
 10. Literature on Spinoza's Philosophy. 
 The following references may be of use in the study of Spinoza : 
 (1.) Collected editions of Spinoza's works. The best and now standard 
 edition is that of Van Vloten and Land, The Hague, 1882 f. This has sup- 
 planted Bruder's ed., 3 vole., Leipsic, 1843-6. A cheap edition is that of Gins- 
 berg, 4 vols., Heidelberg, 1875 f. 
 
371 
 
 (2.) Translations. There are two in German : Spinoza^ s Sdmmtliche 
 Werke uhers. von B. Auerbach, last ed. in 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1872; and 
 Spinoza's Sdmmtliche Werke uhers. von Von Kirchmann u. Schaarschmidt, 2 
 vols., Berlin. The standard translation in French is the Oeuvres de Spinoza, 
 trad, par E. Saisset, last ed. 3 vols., Charpentier, Paris, 1872. Until recently 
 none of the works of Sj)inoza was accessible in English. Now we have the 
 following : the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, translated by Elwes, 
 1887 ; the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, translated anonymously in 1689, by 
 Willis in 1862, by Elwes in 1887 ; the Tractatus Politicus, translated by 
 Maccall in 1854, by Elwes in 1887 ; the Epistolae (in part) by Willis in 1870, 
 by Elwes in 1887 ; the Ethica, translated by Willis, London, 1870 ; by D. D. 
 S., New York, 1876; by Prof. H. Smith, Cincinnati, 1886; by White, London, 
 1887 ; by Elwes, London, 1887. The translations of White and Elwes are 
 the best. 
 (3.) Expositions and Criticisms of Spinoza : 
 
 In German : Trendelenburg's Ueber Spinoza's Grundgedanken (in his Hist. 
 Beitrdge). 
 Erdmann's Die Grundhegriffe des Sjnnozismus (in his Verm. Aufs.). 
 Schaarschmidt's Descartes u. Spinoza, urkundl. Darstellg. d. Philos. 
 
 Beider, Bonn, 1850. 
 Busolt's Die Grundzuge d. Erkenntnisstheorie u. Metaphysik Spinozas, 
 
 Berlin, 1875. 
 Camerer's Die Lehre Spinozas, Stuttgart, 1877. 
 Von Kirchmann's Erlduterungen zu Spinoza's Werke (in his Philosoph- 
 
 ische Bibliothek). 
 Kuno Fischer's Spinoza {Gesch. d. n. Phil., Erster Bd., Zweiter Theil, 
 dritte Auf.), Munich, 1880. 
 In addition to these, Jacobi's Ueber die Lehre Spinoza's, Herder's Gott, 
 einige Gesprdche ilber Spinoza's System, and Auerbach's Spinoza, a novel, 
 may be noticed. 
 
 In French : — Fenelon's Refutation de Spinoza (in his Traite de V Existence 
 de Dieu, pt. 2, ch. Ill ; the Eng. trans, contains also criticisms by the Jesuit 
 Father Toumemine). 
 
 Cousin's Rapports du Cartesianisme et du Spinozisme (in his Frag- 
 ments de Phil. Cartesienne). 
 De Careil's Leibniz, Descartes, et Spinoza, Paris, 1862. 
 E. Saisset's Introduction (to his translation of the Oeuvres de Spinoza, 
 Charpentier, Paris), also his Modern Pantheism (Eng. trans.), pp. 92- 
 157. 
 Janet's Spinoza et le Spinozisme (in the Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. 70) 
 and his French Thought and Spinoza (in the Contemp. Review, May, 
 1877). 
 In English .-—Pollock's Spinoza : his Life and Philosophy, London, 1880. 
 Martineau's Spinoza : a Study, London, 1882, and his Types of Ethical 
 
 Theory, vol. i, pp. 246-393. 
 John Caird's Spinoza (in Blackwood's Series), Edinburgh, 1888. 
 Prof. Knight's Spinoza : Four Essays (by Fischer, Land, Van Vloten, 
 
 Eenan), London, 1882. 
 Flint's Anti-Theistic theories, pp. 358-375 and 547-552. 
 
372 
 
 In addition to these and to the early English notices of Spinoza mentioned 
 by Pollock (p. xxxiii), the following may be added : Howe's Living Temple, 
 pt. II, ch. 1; Fronde's Spinoza (in his Short Studies on Great Subjects, vol. i) ; 
 Lewes' Spinoza and his Philosophy (in Westminster Review, No. 77) ; M. Ar- 
 nold's Spinoza (in his Essays in Criticism) ; Prof. G. S. Morris' Life and 
 Teachings of Spinoza (in the Jonr. of Spec. Phil., vol. 11); Dewey's The 
 Pantheism of Spinoza (in the same, vol. 16): and the sections on Spinoza in 
 the histories of philosophy by Ueberweg, Erdmann, and Bowen. Consult 
 also for very recent literature the Archiv fiXr Geschichte der Philosophic. 
 
 11.— The Conception of Contingent (Page 22, prop. 29). 
 
 Cf. Articles XXVI, XXXV (p. 254f.) and XXXVI (p. 337), for fuller state- 
 ments of Leibnitz's view of contingency and necessity. 
 
 12.— Natura naturans and Natura Naturata (Page 23, prop. 31). 
 
 " In the most general meaning of the words, Natura Naturans and Natura 
 Naturata may be described as related to each other thus : Natura Naturata 
 is the actual condition of a given object or quality, or of the aggregate of all 
 objects and qualities, the Universe, at any given time ; Natura Naturans is 
 the immanent cause of this condition, or aggregate of conditions, and is re- 
 garded as producing it by a continuous process. Thus when we say ' How 
 wonderfully Nature works,' we are speaking of ' Natura Naturans'; when we 
 say ' How beautiful is Nature,' we are speaking of Natura Naturata. Hence, 
 Natura Naturans is related to Natura Naturata as cause to effect. Or, again, 
 we may say that Natura Naturans is the active or dynamical, Natura Natur- 
 ata the passive or statical aspect of nature." — Fowler's Bacon's Novum Or- 
 ganum, II, 1, note 4. 
 
 ARTICLE III. 
 13.— The Quality of Terms (Page 26). 
 
 Cf . Discours de Metaphysique, § 24 ; Nouv. Essais, II, c. 29f . ; Art. XXII, 
 p. 150. The distinctions here made by Leibnitz constitute what is known as 
 the logical doctrine of the quality of terms and will be found explained in all 
 the ordinary. text-books on logic. The question is, What constitutes clear, 
 distinct and perfect knowledge ? The views of Leibnitz's predecessors should 
 be noticed. See Descartes' Discourse on Method, pt. 4, and Principles of 
 Philosophy, I, 45, 46 ; Spinoza's Ethics, I, axiom 6 and note to prop. 29, and 
 II, deff 2, 3, and props. 33-43, and De Emend. Intel, (pp. 23 f. in Elwes' 
 trans.); Arnauld's Port Royal Logic, pp. 61, 62, in Baynes' trans. Consult 
 also Locke's views (published subsequently to this essay) in his Essay, bk. 11. 
 ch. 29, §§ 2, 4, and ch. 31, § 1. For the doctrine as presented by modern logi- 
 cians and its value, see Bowen's Logic, Davis' Theory of Thought, Ueberweg's 
 Logik (latest ed. , by J. Bona Mayer). 
 
 Leibnitz's other statements of the doctrine should be compared with those 
 in this essay. 
 
 A brief statement of the doctrine is as follows : 
 
373 
 Knowledge is 
 
 Clear. Obscure. 
 
 Distinct. Indistinct (Confused). 
 
 Adequate. Inadequate. 
 
 Intuitive = Perfect. Symbolical. 
 
 The whole process consists in the grasping of ^more and more attributes. 
 
 Clear knowledge is only of the constituted whole. I have clear knowledge 
 of a thing when I can distinguish it as a whole from other things. The 
 knowledge which common people have of Value, Price, Final Cause, is not 
 clear but obscure. The knowledge which a patient has of his ailment, which 
 an artist has of a defect in a picture, which a witness has of a prisoner, is 
 usually clear but not distinct. 
 
 Distinct knowledge is of the constituent parts. My knowledge of a thing 
 is distinct when I not only clearly distinguish it from other things but dis- 
 tinguish its different attributes or characteristics. When I define an ele- 
 phant as an animal that drinks through its nostrils, my knowledge is dis- 
 tinct although quite inadequate. Our knowledge of simple ideas is at 'once 
 distinct and adequate. 
 
 Adequate knowledge is of the essential attributes. Knowledge may be said 
 to be adequate when there is exhaustive knowledge of the attributes. Such 
 knowledge is possible to God alone. Again, it may be said to be adequate 
 when it suffices for the object in view. In this sense a housewife's knowl- 
 edge of fish when she goes to the fish-market may be called adequate. This 
 is practical adequacy and is scientifically worthless. Logical adequacy is 
 knowledge of the essential attributes, that is, those which (a) contain the 
 common and persistent basis for a multitude of others, and on which (6) the 
 subsistence of the object, its worth and its meaning depend. 
 
 Intuitive knowledge is possessed when we grasp in one act of consciousness 
 all the qualities or the essential qualities. Such knowledge, which is at once 
 also clear, distinct and adequate is Perfect Knowledge. Very little of our 
 knowledge is such ; most of it may be adequate without being intuitive, and 
 hence is but symbolical. 
 
 14. Argument of Descartes for Proving the Existence of God 
 (Page 29). Cf . note 49. 
 
 15. True and False Ideas (Page 30). 
 Cf. Spinoza's De Emend. Intel.; Ethics, I, axiom 6, and II, props. 33-43 ; 
 Leibnitz's Notes on Spinoza's Ethics ; Locke's Essay, bk. II, ch. 32 ; Ar- 
 nauld's Port Royal Logic. 
 
 16. ''Whatsoever is clearly and distinctly conceived is True" 
 
 (Page 31). 
 This is Descartes' famous criterion of truth. Cf . his Discourse on Method, 
 pt. IV ; Meditations, III ; M^inciples, I, 60 ; and cf . Art. VII, p. 54. 
 
374 
 
 17. Antoine Arnauld's "On the Art of Thinking Well" (Page 32). 
 This is the celebrated Port Royal Logic, the best specimen of the logic of 
 
 the Cartesian school, written by Arnauld assisted by Nicole. It has twice 
 been translated into English. The last translation, a most admirable one, 
 is that by Prof. Baynes, who has added in an appendix an excellent transla- 
 tion of this essay by Leibnitz. Arnauld's masterpiece is his work on True 
 and False Ideas, 1683, in which he attacks, and in many points anticipates 
 Reid's objections to, the theory of representative ideas. He became an inti- 
 mate friend of Leibnitz and carried on with him a long correspondence on 
 theological and philosophical topics. For this, see Janet's and Gerhardt's 
 editions of Leibnitz's works. 
 
 18. The Question "Whether we See all things in God" (Page 32). 
 This refers to the famous doctrine of Malebranche. See next note. 
 
 19. Malebranche and "The Search after Truth" (Page 33). 
 Malebranche has been called by Cousin the French Plato. Next to Des- 
 cartes he was the most eminent French metaphysician of the seventeenth 
 century. His greatest work is his De la Recherche de la Verite, 1672. Of 
 this there are two English translations, the second by Taylor, London, 1712. 
 The famous doctrine that we see all things in God is expounded in the third 
 book in a brief chapter but in a clear manner. There is a convenient edition 
 in four small volumes of the most important works of Malebranche, edited, 
 with an introduction, by Jules Simon. Leibnitz's correspondence with 
 Malebranche will be found in Gerhardt, vol. I. On his philosophy, see the 
 first volume of Kuno Fischer's Hist, of Mod. Phil.; OUe-Laprune's La Philo- 
 sophic de Malebranche ; Locke's Examination of the Doctrine of Malebranche; 
 Leibnitz's criticisms in Arts. XXVIII and XXXIV, and in his Examen de» 
 Principes du Malebranche, in Erdmann, LXXXV. 
 
 ARTICLE IV. 
 20. The Law op Continuity. 
 This law of continuity is one of the cardinal points in the system of Leib- 
 nitz. For other statements of it and remarks on it by him, see Arts. V, 
 VII (p. 61), XXXVI (p. 295); the Theodicee, III, § 348 ; and Nouv. Ess. Ill, c. 6, 
 § 12 ; IV, c. 16, § 12. 
 
 ARTICLE V. 
 
 21. Statement of Personal Views on Metaphysics and Physics. 
 This letter to Arnauld is of especial interest as it gives an epitome of Leib- 
 nitz's system and mentions the monad doctrine in its essential characteristics. 
 Yet the letter of Foucher (Art. XII) shows that Leibnitz, as early as 1685, 
 had reached in some of its main features his later published system ; and the 
 Discours de Metaphysique (the table of contents of which Leibnitz sent to 
 Arnauld, in his letter to Prince Ernest of Hesse; of February 11. 1686), pub- 
 lished first by Grotefond and now again by Gerhardt, vol. 4, verifies this. 
 Cf. §§ 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 24, 27, 33, 34 of it. 
 
375 
 
 ARTICLE VI. 
 22. Does the Essence of Body consist in Extension (Page 41). 
 This is the doctrine of Descartes and of Malebranche. Cf. Descartes, 
 Princip. of Phil., II, 4, " that the nature of body consists not in weight, 
 hardness, color, and the like, but in extension alone ;" and Leibnitz's note on 
 it, p. 59. After being led by his mathematical and physical studies to reject 
 Descartes' Laws of Motion, Leibnitz was led on to a thorough investigation 
 of the nature of body, and on this he separates himself from Descartes. 
 Doubtless his youthful studies on the Principle of Individuation, as well as 
 his later studies in dynamics, contributed much to convince him that " some 
 higher or metaphysical notion, to wit : that of action, power, force is 
 needed." These pieces in Art. VI— two letters to the editor of the Journ. des 
 Sav., June, 1691, and Jan., 1693— are important in that they throw light on 
 the process by which Leibnitz came to reach the corner-stone of his system 
 — the notion of Substance. Cf . also Art. X and Art. XI, pp. 71-72. 
 
 23. The System of Occasional Causes (Page 44). 
 This is the system propounded by Geulincx and advocated by Male- 
 branche, to explain the relation between the body and soul. See Leibnitz's 
 opinion of the doctrine. Art. XIX, p. 125, and cf. Kuno Fischer's Geschichte 
 d. n. Phil., vol. I. 
 
 ARTICLE VII. 
 
 24. Descartes' Principles of Philosophy. 
 This work was written by Descartes in 1644, for the Princess Elisabeth, the 
 sister of Leibnitz's friend, the Grand Duchess Sophia, and the aunt of Queen 
 Sophia Charlotte for whom Leibnitz wrote the Theodicee. Prof. Veitch has 
 translated the First Part of the Principles along with selections from the 
 Second, Third and Fourth Parts. Parts I and II are entitled respectively Of 
 the Principles of Human Knowledge and Of the Principles of Material 
 Things, and give an epitome of Descartes' philosophy. Cf . Spinoza's Renati 
 Descartes Pi'incipiorum Philosophiae pars I et II more geometrico demons- 
 tratae; Kirchmann's Erlduterungen zu Spinoza'' s Descartes' Principien; 
 also Joly's and Brochard's editions, with notes, of Descartes' Les Principes 
 de Philosophic. 
 
 25. Truths of Fact and Truths of Reason (Page 48). 
 Cf . Articles XXXIII, §§ 33 and 30-38 ; XXXVI (p. 348 and p. 355). 
 
 26. The Source and Nature of Error (Page 52). 
 Cf. Descartes, Meditations, IV, Principles of Phil., I, §§29, 30, 33, 35, 42, 
 43 ; Bacon, Novum Organum, I, 38-68 (and Fowler's notes ; also Kuno Fisch- 
 er's Franz Baco u. seine Nachfolger, last ed., pp. 159-173). For Leibnitz's 
 views see in this Art. VII his notes on articles 5, 6, 13 and especially on 31 and 
 35, and Nouv. Ess., IV c. 20. 
 
 27. The author of the Philosophia Mosaica (Page 62). 
 Robert Fludd (1574-1637), an English physician and mystical philosopher. 
 His Phil. Mosaica appeareain 1638 at Gouda. 
 
376 
 
 ARTICLE VIII. 
 
 28. Two Essays on Motion (Page 64). 
 These were written while Leibnitz was at Mayence and dedicated, the one 
 to the Royal Society of London, and the other to the Royal Academy at Paris. 
 The subject of this Art., Indivisihilia, was one which engaged the thought of 
 Leibnitz a great deal. 
 
 ARTICLE IX. 
 
 29. Descartes' Man (Page 67). 
 
 I. e.. his work entitled L' Homme, published after his death, Paris, 1664. 
 
 ARTICLE X. 
 
 30. The Notion of Substance. 
 
 If there is one conception which may be called central in the philosophy 
 of Leibnitz it is the notion of substance. If, therefore, his system is to be 
 rightly understood, great attention must be given to his answer to the 
 question, " What is substance ?" Cf . Articles XI, §§ 2, 3, XIX, XXV, XXXII, 
 XXXIII, and Nouv. Ess., II, c. 13, §19, and c. 23, §2. See also Fischer's 
 Leibniz, pp. 325 f . 
 
 31. Mersenne (Page 69). 
 
 An intimate friend of Descartes and former fellow-student of his at La 
 Fleche. He superintended the publication of some of Descartes writings. 
 The writing of Descartes alluded to in this sentence is probably the Answers 
 to Objections to his Meditations, especially the answer to the Second Objec- 
 tion. 
 
 ARTICLE XL 
 
 32. "One of the greatest theologians and philosophers of our time" 
 
 (Page 71). 
 He alludes to Arnauld (cf . note 17). 
 
 33. "To FIND REAL UNITS" (Page 72). 
 Gerhardt's text here reads : " Therefore, in order to find these real unities, 
 I was compelled to have recourse to a real or animated point, so to speak, or 
 to a substantial atom, which must embrace something formal or active in 
 order to constitute a complete being." 
 
 34. SwAMMERDAM, Malpighi, Leewenhoeck, Rigis, Hartsoeker (Pages 
 
 73-74). 
 Swammerdam (1637-1680), a Dutch anatomist, especially celebrated for 
 his investigations in entomology ; his General History of Insects (Utrecht,, 
 1669), and other kindred works contributing to the founding of the science 
 Malpighi (1628-1694), of Bologna, founder of microscopic anatomy. 
 Leeivenhoeck (1632-1723), an eminent Dutch microscopist, discoverer of the 
 
 capillary circulation of the blood. 
 Rigis or Regius (1632-1701), a celebrated Cartesian philosopher who in- 
 terpreted Descartes in the manner of an empiricist. 
 Hartsoeker (1632-1925), a Dutch mathematician and physicist. 
 
3Y7 
 
 35. The system of Pre-established Harmony (Pages 77-78). 
 A-fter the publication of this New System Leibnitz was fond of calling him- 
 self "Author of the System of Pre-established Harmony," and it is as such 
 that he is popularly known. For other statements of it by him, see Articles 
 Xni, XIV, XV, XXIV, XXXII, XXXIII., etc. 
 
 ARTICLE XII. 
 
 36. Objections to the Doctrine of Pre-established Harmony. 
 The objections urged by Foucher in this Article are unimportant com- 
 pared with those presented by others of Leibnitz's contemporaries. See 
 especially the objections of Bayle in his Dictionary, Art. Rorarius ; Lami 
 in his Connaissance de soi-meme, Paris, 1699 ; and Clarke in his Answer to 
 Leibnitz's 3th Letter. 
 
 ARTICLE XIII. 
 
 37. Answers to Objections to the Pre-established Harmony. 
 
 For Leibnitz's answers to the more serious objections of Bayle, Lami, and 
 Clarke, see Gerhardt's ed., vol. 4, pp. 517-596, and Erdmann's ed., pp. 746-788. 
 
 ARTICLES XIV AND XV. 
 38. The Illustration of the Clocks. 
 This illustration is not original with Leibnitz. 
 
 ARTICLE XVI. 
 39. Leibnitz and Locke. 
 Leibnitz's attention was first called to Locke by the epitome of his Essay 
 published by LeClerc in the Bibliotheque Universelle, 1688. On the appear- 
 ance in 1690 of the Essay itself he wrote these observations (Art. XVI) which 
 were sent through Burnett to Locke. Locke gives his opinion of them in a 
 letter to Molyneux, April 10, 1697 : "I must confess to you, that Mr. Leib- 
 nitz's great name had raised in me an expectation which the sight of his 
 paper did not answer, nor that discourse of his in the Acta Eruditorum, 
 which he quotes, and I have since read, and had just the same thoughts of 
 it, when I read it, as I find you have. From whence I only draw this infer- 
 ence, that even great parts will not master any subject without great think- 
 ing, and even the largest minds have but narrow swallows." When Leibnitz 
 heard that Locke did not understand him, he wrote two pieces, Echantillon 
 de Reflexions sur le L Livre de V Essay de VEntendement de V Homme and 
 Echantillon de Reflexions sur le 11. Livre, which were also sent through Bur- 
 nett to Locke, but these failed to call forth any direct acknowledgment from 
 the latter. When Coste's French translation of the Essay appeared in 1700, 
 Leibnitz wrote a notice of it for the Monatlicher Auszug, and entered on an 
 extended critique of it — The New Essays co7icerning Human Understanding 
 — which was completed in 1704, but, on account of Locke's death, not 
 published. 
 
3Y8 
 
 40. Literature on Locke. 
 
 Locke's Essay, next to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, has been the 
 most influential single work in modern philosophy. It has called forth a 
 literature which would itself make a good-sized library. The following are 
 among the most imjjortant works on it : 
 
 Henry Lee's Anti-Scepticism ; or Notes upon each Chapter of Locke's Essay 
 concerning Human Understanding. London, 1702. 
 
 Leibnitz's Nouveaux Essais sur VEntendement Humain. (Vol. 4, in Ger- 
 hardt's ed.) 
 
 Cousin's La Philosophic de Locke, 1829. English translations by Henry 
 and by Wight. 
 
 Webb's Intellectualism of Locke. London, 1858. 
 
 Hartenstein's Lockers Lehre v. d. menschl. Erkenntness in Vergleichung init 
 Leibniz's Kritik derselben, Leipsic, 1865. 
 
 Marion's Locke, sa Vie, son Oeuvre. (Alcan), Paris, 1878. 
 
 Thos. Fowler's Locke. London, 1880. 
 
 Green's Introduction to the Phil. Works of Hume. London, 1874. 
 
 McCosh's Locke's Theory of Knowledge, with a notice of Berkeley. New 
 York, 1884. 
 
 Kirch mann's Erlduterungen zu Locke's Versuch uber den menschlichen 
 Verstand (cf . , also Schaarschmidt's Erlduterungen zu Leibnitz's Neue Ab- 
 handlungen.) 
 
 Eraser's Locke (in Blackwood's series). Edinburgh, 1890. 
 
 41. The function della Crusca (Page 98). 
 
 La Crusca, a celebrated academy of Florence, founded in 1582, for the 
 purpose of maintaining the purity of the Italian language, that is to say, of 
 separating the bran {crusca) from the flour : hence the name. 
 
 ARTICLE XVII. 
 
 42. The Law of Sufficient Reason. 
 
 This Article XVII was written by Leibnitz on Nov. 23, 1697, and was first 
 published by Erdmann in 1841. It deals with the cosmological argument for 
 the being of God and the problem of the Theodicee. The third sentence gives 
 the key-note to the whole : "The sufficient reason of existence can be found 
 neither in any particular thing nor in the whole aggregate or series." The 
 principle of sufficient reason is fundamental in the philosophy of Leibnitz. 
 His system, from one end to the other, is inspired by an unshaken and 
 immovable faith in the authority of this prmciple. At the very end of his 
 life he writes : " Plut a Dieu qu'on n'eut jamais suppose des principes moms 
 claires ! Ce principe est celui du besoin dhme raison suffisante, pour qu'une 
 chose existe, qu'un evenement arrive, qu'une verite ait lieu" {5th Let. to 
 Clarke, § 125). For other statements of the principle, cf. Monadology, §§ 32 f., 
 Theodicee, §§ 44, 196. Cf. Nolan's La Monadologie de Leibnitz, p. 39 f.; 
 Ueberweg's Logik, p. 270. 
 
'679 
 
 ARTICLE XVIII. 
 43. On the Consequences of Certain Passages in Descartes. 
 The occasion of the piece, to which this is a reply, was a passage in a letter 
 to Nicaise, in which Leibnitz speaks of the evil consequences of Descartes* 
 denial of final cause and of his view that matter takes successively all forms 
 of which it is capable ; and in which he also remarks : " Aussi peut-on dire, 
 que Spinoza n'a fait que cultiver certaines semences de la Philosophie de 
 Descartes, de sorte que je crois qu'il importe effectivement pour la Religion, 
 et pour la piete, que cette philosophie soit chatiee par le retranchment des 
 erreurs qui sont melees avec la verite." 
 
 ARTICLE XIX. 
 44. On Nature in Itself. 
 The two questions handled in this essay are stated in § 2, What is nature 
 in itself 9 and 7s there any energy or force residing in things 9 The first he 
 answers (§§ 2-8) by saying that Nature is the handiwork of an all- wise 
 creator — the expression of the truths and ends of Absolute Reason. The 
 second question, he answers (§§ 9 f.) by his doctrine that to be is to act. 
 
 45. Aristotle's Definition of Motion (Page 113). 
 Found in his Physics, bk. V. 
 
 46. Imaging and Intellectual Conception (Page 116). 
 Th6 important distinction between imaging and intellectual conception, 
 where imaging is impossible, was emphasized by Descartes {Prin. Phil., I, 73, 
 and Med. VI), Spinoza {Emend. Intel.), and Leibnitz (p. 188 and Nouv. Essais, 
 II, c. 9, § 8, and c. 29). What absurdities one may be led into by a failure to 
 keep this distinction in mind, may be seen by consulting Spencer's First 
 Principles. 
 
 47. The Principle of the "Identity of Indiscernibles " (Pages 122-3). 
 This, as Leibnitz here remarks, is among his "new and most important 
 axioms." He says in writing to Clarke (4, § 5.) : " Ces grands principes de la 
 Raison suffisante et de VIdentite des indiscer nobles, changent I'etat de la 
 metaphysique, qui devient reelle et demonstrative par leur moyen : au lieu 
 qu'autrefois elle ne consistait presque qu'en termes vuides." Cf . also § 4 ff, ; 
 Letter V, §§21 f.; Nouv. Ess., II, c. 27. 
 
 ARTICLE XX. 
 
 48. Leibnitz's Preface to his Codex Diplomaticus Juris Gentium (Page 127). 
 This Preface is so important for an understanding of Leibnitz's ethical 
 views (cf. also his letter to Coste of July 4, 1706) that a translation of it is 
 given here : 
 
 On the Notions of Right and Justice. 1693. 
 
 [From the Latin.] 
 
 I do not know whether, even after so many eminent writers have discussed 
 
 them, the notions of right and of justice have been sufficiently cleared up. 
 
 Right is a certain moral po\f er, and obligation a moral necessity. Moreover^ 
 
380 
 
 I understand by moral that which among good men is equivalent to natural : 
 for, as a celebrated Roman jurisconsult says, things which are contrary to 
 good morals must be regarded as things which cannot be done. A good 
 man moreover is one who loves all as much as reason allows. Justice, 
 therefore, which virtue is the mistress of this affection, which the Greeks 
 call <i)i?iav6po)TTiaj we will define most properly, unless I am mistaken, as 
 the charity of the wise man [caritatem sapientis], that is, charity accord- 
 ing to the dictates of wisdom. Therefore, what Carneades is reported to 
 have said, namely, that justice is the highest folly, because it commands 
 us, neglecting our own interests, to care for the interests of others, comes 
 from ignorance of the definition. Charity is universal benevolence, and 
 benevolence is the habit of loving. Moreover to love is to take delight in the 
 happiness of another, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is to account 
 another's happiness one's own. Whence the difficult knot, which is also of 
 great moment in theology, is untied, how there can be a disinterested love, 
 which is free from hope and from fear, and from regard for personal advan- 
 tage ; it is evident that the joy of those whose joy enters into our own 
 delights us, for those things which delight are sought after for their own 
 sake. And just as the contemplation of beautiful objects is itself agreeable, 
 and a painting by Raphael affects him who understands it, even if it brings 
 no riches, in such a way that it is kept before the eyes and regarded with 
 delight, as a symbol of love ; so when the beautiful object is at the same time 
 also capable of happiness, the affection passes over into true love. But the 
 divine love surpasses other loves because God can be loved with the greatest 
 success, since nothing is at once happier than God, and nothing more beauti- 
 ful and more worthy of happiness can be known than he. And since he also 
 possesses the highest power and wisdom, his happiness does not so much 
 enter into ours (if we are wise, that is love him) but it also makes it. Since, 
 moreover, wisdom ought to direct charity, there will be need of defining it 
 also. I think, however, that the notions of men are best satisfied if we say 
 that wisdom is nothing else than the science itself of happiness. Thus we 
 are brought back again to the notion of happiness, to explain which this is 
 not the place. 
 
 From this source flows natural right, of which there are three grades ; 
 strict right in commutative justice, equity (or charity in the narrow sense of 
 the word) in distributive justice, finally piety (or probity) in universal justice : 
 whence spring the rules, to injure no one, to concede to each his own, to live 
 honorably (or rather piously), as well as the most general and commonly 
 recognized precepts of right, just as I formerly outlined it in mj'- youthful 
 essay, De Methodo Juris. 
 
 The law of pure or strict right is. No one is to be injured, so that in the 
 state no cause for action be given him, out of the state no right of war ; 
 whence comes the justice which philosophers call commutative and the right 
 which Grotius calls power. The higher grade I call equity, or, if you prefer, 
 charity (namely, in the narrower sense) which I extend beyond the rigor of 
 bare right to those obligations also to the performance of which we may not 
 be forced ; such as gratitude, almsgiving, to which we have, according to 
 Grotius, an aptitude, not a power. And just as it belonged to the lowest 
 
381 
 
 grade to injure no one, so to the middle grade it belongs, To do good to all ; 
 but so far only as is fitting to each or so far as each deserves, so that it is not 
 allowable to favor all equally. Thus this is the sphere of distributive justice, 
 and the law of right here is that which commands to give to each his due 
 [suu7}i cuique tribui]. And thus far the political laws in the commonwealth 
 extend which secure the happiness of the subjects, and along with this bring 
 it about that those who had only aptitude acquire power, that is, that they 
 are able to demand what it is fair that the others perform. And while in 
 the lowest grade of right the differences among men were not regarded, ex- 
 cept those which arise from the affair itself, but all men are held as equals, 
 now, however, in this higher grade, deserts are weighed ; whence privileges, 
 rewards, punishments have their place. This difference in the grade of 
 right Xenophon has excellently sketched, with the boy Cyrus as example, 
 who, chosen as judge between two boys, the stronger of whom had ex- 
 changed coats with the other by force, because he had found the coat of the 
 other more fitting to his figure, and his own coat to the figure of the other, 
 had pronounced in favor of the robber : but it was pointed out by his teacher 
 that the question here was not as to which the coat might fit, but to which 
 it belonged, and that this form of giving judgment could only then be 
 employed rightly, when he himself had coats to be distributed. For 
 equity itself commends to us strict right in affairs, that is, equality among 
 men, except when a weighty reason of greater good commands us to recede 
 from it. Moreover, what is called regard of persons has its place not in ex- 
 changing the goods of others, but in distributing our own or the public 
 goods. 
 
 The highest degree of right I have called by the name of probity or rather 
 piety. For what has been hitherto said can be so understood as to be con- 
 fined within the consideration of mortal life. And, moreover, pure or strict 
 right springs from the principle of the preserving of peace ; equity or charity 
 extends to something more ; so that while each one benefits the other as 
 much as he can, he increases his own happiness in that of another ; and, in 
 a word, strict right avoids misery, the highest right tends to happiness, but 
 happiness such as belongs to this mortality. But that we ought to place life 
 itself and whatever makes this life desirable, after another's great good ; that, 
 moreover, the greatest griefs ought to be endured for the sake of others ; this 
 is more beautifully taught by philosophers than solidly demonstrated. For 
 the honor and glory and joyous feeling in the virtue of one's own soul, to 
 which, under the name of honor, they appeal, are goods of thought or of the 
 mind, and, moreover, have great superiority, but not with all and for all bit- 
 terness of evils, since not all are equally affected by the imagination ; espe- 
 cially those whom neither a liberal education nor a free-born mode of living 
 or the discipline of life or of rank to the estimation of honor has surely ac- 
 customed to discerning the goods of the soul. But that it may be settled by 
 a general demonstration that all that is worthy is useful, and all that is base 
 is injurious, the immortality of the soul, and the director of ail, God, must 
 be assumed. Thus it is that we know that we all live in the most perfect 
 state under a monarch who on account of his wisdom cannot be deceived 
 and on account of his power cannot be eluded ; and he too is so lovable that 
 
382 
 
 to serve such a master is happiness. Therefore, he who applies his soul to 
 this, Christ teaching him, wins it. By his power and providence it comes to 
 pass that all right passes over into fact, that no one is injured except by him- 
 self, that nothing done rightly is without its reward, no sin without punish- 
 ment. Since, as Christ has divinely taught, all our hairs are numbered, and 
 even a cup of water is not given m vain to one thirsting, so nothing is 
 neglected in the Commonwealth of the Universe. It is from this considera- 
 tion that it is called universal justice and includes all other virtues ; for that 
 also which otherwise does not concern the interest of another, namely, that 
 we do not misuse our body or our means, this is also forbidden outside of 
 human laws, by natural right, i. e., by the eternal laws of the divine mon- 
 archy, since we are indebted to God for ourselves and for what we have. 
 For as it is to the interest of the State so it is much more to that of the Uni- 
 verse that no one use badly his own. Here, therefore, that highest law of 
 right receives its force, which commands us to live honorably (i. e., piously). 
 And in this sense it is rightly put among the things to be demanded of learned 
 men, that the natural right and the right of nations be taught according to 
 the doctrine of Christians, that is (from the example of Christ) ra avurepa, the 
 sublime, the divine of the wise. Thus we seem to ourselves to have explained 
 most fitly the three laws of right, or three degrees of justice, and to have 
 pointed out the sources of natural right. 
 
 ARTICLE XXI. 
 49. The Ontological Argument for the Being of God. 
 
 On this celebrated argument consult Anselm's Proslogion and Liber contra 
 Insipientem, i. e.. Liber Apologeticus (a translation of the Proslogion will 
 be found in the Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. vni., pp. 534-553 ; see also the French 
 translation, with notes, by Bouchitte, Le Rationalisme Chretien, Paris, 1843); 
 Gaunilo's Liber pro Insipiente ; Thomas Aquina's Sum. Theologia; Descartes' 
 Meditations, V ; Replies to Objections, especially those to objections 1 and 2 ; 
 Principles of Philosophy, I, §§ 14 f . 
 
 The Anselmic form of the argument may be stated thus : We have as a 
 fact the idea of the greatest possible or perfect being ; an actually existing 
 being {in re esse) has more perfection than an ideally existing one (in intel- 
 lectu esse) ; therefore God exists. In other words, the most perfect conceiva- 
 ble being must be actual : otherwise a property— that of actuality, or ob- 
 jective being— is wanting. 
 
 Descartes' additions to this argument consist in showing that the idea of 
 God is a necessary idea of the reason : that it is an idea of a real infinite 
 and could not have originated in us or from any finite source ; that when we 
 think of God, we must think of him not merely as existing, which we do 
 with everything while we are thinking of it, but as necessarily existing. 
 Descartes' argument may therefore be stated thus : We have among the 
 necessary ideas of the reason the idea of Absolute or All-perfect Being ; this 
 idea contains as one of its elements necessary existence; therefore, God 
 exists. 
 
383 
 
 Spinoza (letter to DeVries) has stated the basis of the ontological argument 
 thus : " The more reahty a being or thing has, the more attributes must be 
 assigned to it and the more attributes I assign to a thing, the more I am 
 forced to conceive it as existing.'" 
 
 For remarks by Leibnitz bearing on the argument, see Articles III, p. 29 ; 
 yil, p. 50 ; Xxi, XXXVI, p. 356 ; and the Letters to Jacquelot (Gerhardt, 
 vol. 3, pp. 442f.). 
 
 He claims : (1) That the idea of God is peculiar in this, that if it is of a 
 being possible in fact, then that being must actually exist. But is the idea 
 of God the idea of a being possible in fact ? 
 
 (2) That merely because we have the idea of God it does not therefore fol- 
 low that he actually exists. We have ideas of things which cannot actually 
 exist. It must therefore be shown that the idea of God is a true idea, that 
 is, the idea of a possible being. Descartes failed to do this. [That Leibnitz 
 is in error here may be seen by examining Descartes' Reply to the Second 
 Objection, where Descartes allows that it must first of all be proved that the 
 conception of an infinite being is possible, and does not contain a contradic- 
 tion ; but shows that such a proof need occasion no difficulties.] 
 
 (3) Everything is to be held possible until its impossibility is proved. 
 Hence there is a presumption in favor of the actual existence of God. 
 
 (4) This presumption is more than a presumption : it is a fact that God is 
 possible. This is shown, pp. 137-138. 
 
 For Locke's examination of Descartes' argument, see Lord King's Life of 
 Locke, Vol. II, pp. 134 seq. On the worth of the argument itself, cf. Kant's 
 Critique, Flint's Theism, Dorner's System of Christian Doctrine, and the 
 essays by Huber, Elvenich, Jahnke, and the works named in note 5. For 
 somewhat elaborate studies on the theism ^of Descartes and on the theism of 
 Leibnitz, consult Saisset's Modern Pantheism. 
 
 ARTICLE XXII. 
 
 50. The Doctrine of a Universal Spirit. 
 
 This essay was written at Charlottenburg, near Berlin, for the instruction 
 of Queen Sophia Charlotte. This accounts for its popular tone. 
 
 51. MoLiNOS, Angelus Silesius and Weigel (p. 140). 
 
 Molinos (c. 1627-1696), celebrated Quietist, born in Spain, lived and died at 
 Rome. Author of the celebrated Guida Spirituale. Cf. Bigelow's Molinos 
 the Quietist, New York, 1882, and Shorthouse's novel, John Inglesant. 
 
 Angelus Silesius, John Angelus of Silesia, to whom Leibnitz refers several 
 times, author of a number of devotional pieces. 
 
 Weigel (1531-1588), a theologian and author of several theological works. 
 
 ARTICLE XXIII. 
 
 53. The Non-Sensuous Element in Knowledge (p. 149). 
 
 This interesting letter to Queen Charlotte, now for the first time published 
 by Gerhardt, shows in a popular way the impossibility of pure empiricism 
 
384 
 
 and presents in brief Leibnitz's views on this most important subject. It is 
 interesting to notice in how many respects Leibnitz anticipates Kant. His 
 views are more fully given in the Nouveaux Essais. See also Kirchner's 
 Leibniz's Psychologie, Cothen, 1876. 
 
 ARTICLE XXIV. 
 
 53. Lady Masham. 
 
 Lady Masham was the daughter of Cudworth and the friend of Locke. In 
 
 her house, at Oates^ Locke spent his last years. She was the author of one 
 
 or two religious books. The letters which passed between her and Leibnitz 
 
 are given in full by Gerhardt. 
 
 ARTICLE XXV. 
 
 54. Proof of the Existence of God from the Doctrine of Pre- 
 established Harmony (p. 165). 
 
 Leibnitz often urges this " new argument for the existence of God." " The 
 agreement of so many substances, one of which has no influence upon 
 another, could only come from a general cause, on which all of them 
 depend, and this Cause must have infinite power and wisdom to pre-establish 
 all these harmonies." 
 
 ARTICLE XXVI. 
 
 55. Contingency and Necessity. 
 On this important subject see further remarks in the Letters to Clarke and 
 
 in the Nouveaux Essais, II, c. 21. Cf. note 11. 
 
 56. Sevennese Prophets (p. 173). 
 
 This last paragraph is an allusion to a passage in the letter of Coste to 
 Leibnitz (Gerhardt, vol. 3, p. 393), in which he tells of certain Sevennese 
 mystics who were then creating a sensation in London by their pretended 
 prophecies ; one of them being a gentleman of good character and possessed 
 of an income of £3000. Fatio was a cultivated Swiss gentleman residing in 
 London. 
 
 ARTICLE XXVIL 
 57. "The Refutation of Spinoza by Leibnitz." 
 Among the manuscripts of Leibnitz in the royal library at Hanover is one 
 entitled Animadversiones ad Joh. Georg. Wachteri librum de recondita 
 Hehrceorum philosophia. This, accompanied by a French translation and 
 an introduction, was published at Paris in 1854 by Foucher de Careil under 
 the title Refutation Inedite de Spinoza par Leibniz. The editor's preface 
 and the introduction treat of the relation of Leibnitz to Spinoza. The por- 
 tion of the work (about two-thirds of the whole) which treats of Spinoza, and 
 which led the editor to give to the whole such a pretentious title, is here 
 translated. 
 
 58. Malcuth in Malcuth (p. 183). 
 
 Cf . Theodicee, III, § 372. 
 
385 
 
 ARTICLE XXVIIT. 
 
 59. Remarks on Locke's Examination of Malehranche. 
 
 The work by Locke which is here examined was published in 1706, after his 
 death, and will be found in the second volume of Bolin's edition of Locke's 
 works. Locke and Malehranche stood at the opposite poles of thought and 
 Leibnitz would naturally be interested in a criticism of the latter by the 
 former. This Article XXVIII seems to consist of first-hand jottings made 
 while reading Locke's work. The date at which they were made is uncer- 
 tain, but it must have been after 1706, and was not improbably 1708. 
 
 ARTICLE XXIX. 
 
 60. Leibnitz on the Nature of the Soul. 
 
 This Article is one of very great importance for the understanding of the 
 Leibnitzian doctrine. He explains here his conception of the soul and the 
 nature of perception. 
 
 61. The Different Classes of Monads (p. 191). 
 
 This Article assists us in distinguishing the various classes of monads, or 
 different degrees of monad development, which are recognized by Leibnitz : 
 
 I. All monads are alike : 
 
 (1) In being simple, ultimate, veritable unities ; ingenerable and indestruc- 
 tible realities. 
 
 (2) In that each is essentially energizing power, force, active principle. 
 
 (3) In that each possesses the power of perception and reflects (mirrors) in 
 its way the whole universe. "The representation of the external in the 
 internal, of the composite in the simple, of multiplicity in unity, constitutes 
 in realit J perception (§ 3)." 
 
 II. According as they are or are not monades reines ou dominantes, have 
 or have not organizing power over others, they are divided thus : 
 
 i Simple (1). 
 Monads •< ( Entelechies or monades vivantes (2). 
 
 ( Dominating or ruling -J q_„]^ j Animal souls (3). 
 ( ^^^^^ I Rational souls (4). 
 
 III. According as they possess or do not possess sentiency, they are divided 
 thus : 
 
 i Non-sentient \ ^i^^Pl® monads (1-). 
 Tvr^r^o^o. J f Entelechies or monades vivantes (3). 
 
 Sentient U"r^\'°"V?]:. 
 ^ } Rational souls (4). 
 
 IV. According as they do or do not possess self -consciousness, they are 
 divided : 
 
 i Lacking memory < Simple Monads (1). 
 ( Merely perceptive •< ( Entelechies (2). 
 
 Monads •< ( Possessing memory -j Animal souls (3). 
 
 ( Self-conscious^ Rational souls (4). 
 
 V. Results. There are four kinds of monads : 
 
 1. Simple monads, lacking self -consciousness, memory and organic 
 capacity. • 
 
 25 
 
386 
 
 2. Dominating or organizing monads {monades reines ou dmes vivantes), 
 lacking memory and self -consciousness. These and the simple monads are 
 the sleeping monads ; they perceive unconsciously and without feeling. 
 
 3. Animal souls. These organize and possess memory, but lack self-con- 
 sciousness. They are dreaming monads. 
 
 4. Rational souls. These have organizing capacity, memory, and, in addi- 
 tion, self-consciousness and the power of recognizing necessary truth ; in a 
 word, they are personalities. They are waked up monads. 
 
 Does a monad of the lower class ever pass into the higher classes ? One of Leibnitz's 
 correspondents, Remond, writes to him on Jan. 9, 1715, and asks, among others, the fol" 
 lowing questions : " Comment (physiquement parlant et sans emploier des termes ab- 
 straits ni metaphoriques), par quels moiens, par quels degrez une monade centrale et do- 
 minante qui constitue dans un certain tems un animal, peut venir dans un autre d faire 
 ou plustot d estre un Monsieur de Leibniz?" To this Leibnitz replies as follows : " Puis- 
 qu'on peut concevoir que par le developpement et changement de la matiere, la machine 
 qui fait le corps d'un animal spermatique, peut devenir une machine telle qu'il faut pour 
 former le corps organique d'un homme : 11 faut qu'en meme temps I'arae de sensitive 
 seulement soit devenue raisonnable, d cause de I'harmonie parfaite entre Fame et la ma- 
 chine. Mais comme cette harmonic est preetablie, Tetat futur etoit deja dans le present, 
 et une parfaite intelligence reconnoissait il y a long temps dans Panimal present I'homme 
 futur, tant dans son ame d part, que dans son corps d part. Ainsi jamais un pur animal 
 ne deviendra homme, et les animaux spei-matiques humains, qui ne viennent pas d la 
 grande transformation par la conception, sont de purs animaux." 
 
 62. Genii (Fage 192). 
 By genii Leibnitz means angels and arch-angels. 
 
 AETICLE XXX. 
 63. Leibnitz's Theodieee. 
 
 This work, as is well known, was written by Leibnitz in memory of Queen 
 Sophia Charlotte of Prussia, and grew out of conversations and discussions 
 with her on the problems of liberty and of evil, occasioned by the objections 
 she found in Bayle's Dictionary. It is the only large work by Leibnitz pub- 
 lished in his life-time. Although written in a popular style and diffuse, 
 it is unquestionably the most celebrated work on the subject. The work 
 itself consists of (1) a Preface ; (2) an Introductory Discourse on the Confor- 
 mity of Faith with Reason ; (3) the body of the work, in three parts, the first 
 on the nature of evil in general, the second on moral evil, the third on physi- 
 cal evil ; (4) an Index ; (5) the Abridgment, here translated ; (6) an Examina- 
 tion of Hobbes' work Questions concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance ; 
 (7) Remarks on a work by King on The Origin of Evil ; (8) a more extended 
 abridgment of the work in Latin. 
 
 An excellent abridgment of the body of the work, with critical and ex- 
 planatory notes, has been issued by Th. Desdouits : Essais de Theodieee de 
 Leibniz. Extraits relies entre eux par de courtes analyses, precedes d'une in- 
 troduction et d'une analyse generate, et accompagnes d' appreciations critiques, 
 Paris, 1878. 
 
 Two excellent articles on Leibnitz's Theodicy will be found in the Andover 
 Review, vol. 4. 
 
387 
 
 64. Leibnitz's Optimism. 
 
 The last word of the Leibnitzian philosophy is that, all things considered, 
 the actual is the best possible world. The doctrine as it bears upon the prob- 
 lem of human existence is well set forth in the apologue of the Theodicee 
 (§§ 405-417) in the story of Sextus. Consult on this subject in general, be- 
 sides the TheoiXicee, the Monadology (§53seq.), The Principles of Nature and 
 of Or ace, the Letters to Clarke, Nolan's La Monadologie, onzieme eclaircisse- 
 ment, Fischer's Leibniz, pp. 576-598, and Erdmann, Nourisson, and Feuer- 
 bach, _ 
 
 AETICLE XXXI. 
 
 65. Leibnitz's Rules for the Conduct of the Mind and the Increase 
 
 OF Knowledge. 
 
 Compare with this article Erdmann's edition of Leibnitz's phil. works, Ar- 
 ticles XXVI, De vero methodo philosophice et theologice ; LIII, Preceptes pour 
 avancer les Sciences ; and LIV, Discours touchant la Methode de la Certitude 
 et VArt d'lnventer, pour finir les Disputes et pour faire en peu de Terns de 
 grands Progres ; and the Nouveaux Essais, IV, chap. 12, Des Moyens d'Aug- 
 Tnenter nos Connaissances. 
 
 Leibnitz's thoughts on this subject may be compared with Descartes' {Dis- 
 cours de la Methode ; Regies pour la Direction de V Esprit) ; Spinoza's (De 
 Emendatione Intellectus) ; and Locke's {Conduct of the Understanding, and 
 the Essay, bk. 4, c. 12, Of the Improvement of Our Knowledge). 
 
 ARTICLE XXXII. 
 
 66. The Principles of Nature and op Grace. 
 
 During Leibnitz's residence in Vienna (1712-1714) he was asked by Prince 
 Eugene of Savoy to give in a short compendium his philosophical system as 
 an aid to the understanding of the Theodicee. With this object in view he 
 composed The Principles of Nature and of Grace, founded on Reason. A 
 copy of the essay, which was prepared with the utmost care, he sent to 
 Nic. Remond, at Paris, with a letter (Vienna, Aug. 26, 1714), in which he 
 writes : " J'ay espere que ce petit papier contribuerait a mieux faire entendre 
 mes meditations, en y joignant ce que j'ay mis dans les Journaux de Leip- 
 zig, de Paris, et de Hollande. Dans ceux de Leipzig je m'accommode 
 davantage au style des Cartesiens, et dans cette derniere piece je tache de 
 m'exprimer d'une maniere qui puisse etre entendue de ceux qui ne sont pas 
 encore trop accoutumes au style des uns et des autres." 
 
 ARTICLE XXXIIL 
 
 67. The Monadology. 
 
 This epitome of Leibnitz's philosophy was written very shortly after the 
 Principles of Nature and of Grace, and has, until recently, been confounded 
 with it as the work written for Prince Eugene. It is the most complete 
 statement of Leibnitz's syst|m and merits the most careful study. Erdmann 
 
388 
 
 calls it Ubrum Leibnicii omnium gravissimum. There are a number of anno- 
 tate! separate editions of it, especially in French. The best of these are 
 Nolan's La Monadologie de Leibniz, avec des eclaircissements et des notes his- 
 toriques et philosophiques, Alcan, Paris, 1887 ; and Boutroux's La Monad- 
 ologie de Leibniz, etc., Delagrave, Paris, 1881. Zimmerman's German trans- 
 lation, with notes, may also be profitably consulted. It should be said that 
 the original manuscript is without a title and that the title, The Monadology^ 
 was given it by Erdmann, who published for the first time the original French 
 text in his Leibnitii Opera Philosophica, Berlin, 1840 ; before that time it had 
 been known only in a German translation. 
 
 68. Analysis of The Monadology. 
 
 The following analysis may assist in understanding the Monadology. It 
 should, however, be remembered that the thought is so condensed that no 
 very satisfactory analysis of it can be given. 
 
 Part I. 
 Substance {or Monad), §§ 1-30. 
 
 1. Existence and Simplicity, 1-3. 
 
 2. Indestructibility, 4-6. 
 
 3. Inner Principle of their Activity, 7-13. 
 
 4. Perceptions of the Monads, 14-18. 
 
 (1) Perception, what ; distinguished from apperception, 14-16. 
 
 (2) Inexplicable mechanically, 17. 
 
 (3) Therefore, monads are actualized perfections or entelechies, 18. 
 
 5. Kinds of Monads, 19-30. 
 
 (1) Sleeping monads, 19-24. 
 
 (2) Dreaming monads, 25-27. 
 
 (3) Waked up or rational monads, 28-30. 
 
 Part II. 
 Principles of Reason and their source in Absolute Reason, God, §§ 31-48. 
 
 6. Principles of Reason and their source, 31-37. -L ^<UA-^-^*>»AJA^^ fyfi^oAA-^ 
 
 7. God, the Principle of Principles, on whom all contingent things and 
 even necessary truths depend, 37-48. 
 
 Part III. 
 The Preestablished Harmony and the Best Possible Universe, §§ 49-90. 
 
 8. Preestablished Harmony, what ; it accounts for the apparent interaction 
 of the monads, 49-52 and 56. 
 
 9. Why there is a preestablished harmony ; the actual world the best pos- 
 sible, 53-55. 
 
 10. It accounts for variety and unity ; each monad mirrors the universe, 
 56-62. • 
 
 11. Every particle of matter is a fullness of vital monads ; there is life 
 everywhere, 63-70. 
 
389 
 
 12. Souls are not composite ; they always have bodies, which change grad- 
 ually. Souls and bodies are alike ingenerable ; generation is but a develop- 
 ment and death an envelopment, 71-77. 
 
 13. Hierarchy of the monads : kingdoms of efficient cause, of final cause, 
 and of grace ; harmony of the three, 78-90. 
 
 (1) Preestablished harmony between the kingdoms of efiicient causes 
 and of final causes, 78-82. 
 
 (2) The kingdom of grace — society of free personalities — and the abso- 
 lute harmony and perfect system, or "City of God," 83-90. 
 
 ARTICLE XXXIV. 
 69. Remond de Montmort. 
 Nicolas Remond, de Montmort, was Chef des Conseils de M. le Due d' Or- 
 leans. He was a great admirer of the Platonic philosophy and on reading 
 Leibnitz's Theodicee became a great admirer of him also, and carried on a cor- 
 respondence with him on philosophical subjects. For this, see Gerhardt's 
 third volume. This letter (Art. XXXIV) is of especial importance, as in it 
 Leibnitz takes occasion to explain the points of contact and of divergence 
 between his own system and those of Malebranche on the one hand and of 
 Descartes on the other. 
 
 ARTICLE XXXV. 
 70. Leibnitz's Correspondence with Clarke. 
 
 The occasion of this correspondence Leibnitz describes in a letter (Dec. 23, 
 1715) to Wolff, thus : "The Princess of Wales [Wilhelmina Charlotte of Ans- 
 bach], who had read with pleasure my Theodicee, fell into a controversy over 
 it, as she herself informed me, with a prelate who frequented the Court. He 
 afterward handed the Princess a paper written in English in which he de- 
 fended the Newtonian system and attacked mine. I answered him briefly 
 and sent the answer to the Princess." The correspondence extends to five 
 letters on each side and was terminated by the death of Leibnitz. It was 
 published in 1717 by Clarke, who gave an English translation (here reprinted) 
 side by side with Leibnitz's French. The words in [ ] in the Fifth Letter 
 (except the words of sense, § 84, our notion of, § 87, without diminution 
 § 99, an order and merely, § 104, general, g 107, which were added by Clarke) 
 are additions or changes made by Leibnitz himself in a second copy. They 
 are here inserted in Clarke's translation. 
 
 These letters belong to the most important documents on Leibnitz's philos- 
 ophy, as in Clarke he found an antagonist worthy of him, who pointed out 
 the weak points in his system. For lack of space the letters of Clarke, which 
 are accessible to the student in Clarke's own works, are omitted here. 
 
 ARTICLE XXXVI. 
 71. The Nouveaux Essais. 
 For the occasion of Leibnitz's writing the Nouveaux Essais and for the lit- 
 erature bearing on it, see notes 39, 40, 3. The work itself is a dialogue 
 between Philalethe, representing Locke, and Theophile, representing Leib- 
 
390 
 
 nitz. Locke's Essay is followed chapter by chapter and almost paragraph by 
 paragraph. The French style of the work is so poor as to render a readable 
 translation almost impossible. The extracts translated are from the remarks 
 of Theophile alone, and it is hoped that they will convey some general idea 
 of the nature and value of the work and do something toward awakening a 
 demand for an English rendering of the whole. An excellent translation by 
 Mr. A. Langley was begun in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, in 1885, 
 and it is greatly to be hoped that it will be completed and published in book 
 form. 
 
 In Gerhardt's text, §§ 5-18 of the first chapter are placed between § 26 and 
 § 27. In the translation, the order adopted by Erdmann and Janet has been 
 followed as it accords with the order of Locke's Essay. The headings in [ ] 
 of the §§ are inserted from Locke's Essay ; they are not in Leibnitz's text. 
 
 72. Analysis of the Second Chapter of Bk. I. of the Nouveaux Essais. 
 
 ''The controversy between Locke and Leibnitz in the first book of the 
 Nouveaux Essais sur VEntendement Humain relates to the famous question 
 of the origin of ideas. Locke represents the empirical school, Leibnitz 
 the rationalistic school. The first maintains the hypothesis of the tabula 
 rasa, the second the hypothesis of innate ideas. It can be said that they 
 have each exhausted the question and that they have said all that could be 
 said at their time, at least in the terms in which the question was then 
 stated : for since then it has been presented under different forms. In order 
 to leave to the arguments of the two authors all their force we shall repro- 
 duce them as far as possible under their form and in their order, afterwards 
 we shall give a resume, in condensing the whole discussion : 
 
 Locke's 1st Objection. — If innate principles existed all men ought to agree 
 on them ; now this universal consent does not exist even for the principles of 
 identity and of contradiction ; for there is a large part of the human race to 
 whom these principles are unknown. And, further, did this consent exist it 
 would prove nothing, could another way be shown than that of innateness 
 by which men might have arrived at this uniformity of opinion. 
 
 Leibnitz's Reply.— I do not base the certainty of innate principles upon 
 universal consent, which, moreover, might in fact arise in another way. This 
 consent is an intimation and not a demonstration of the innate principle ; 
 but the exact and decisive proof of these principles consists in showing that 
 their certainty comes only from what is in us. Even should they not be 
 known, they would not cease to be innate, because they would be recognized 
 as soon as they have been understood. But fundamentally everybody knows 
 them and they are at each moment employed without being expressly re- 
 cognized ; it is very much the same as when one has virtually in the mind 
 the propositions suppressed in enthymemes. 
 
 M Obj. —To say that there are truths imprinted on the soul which it does 
 not perceive is a real contradiction. 
 
 Reply.— 1 think that we have a multitude of knowledges of which we are 
 not always aware even when we have need of them. 
 
I. 
 
 391 
 
 3d Obj. — It could then be said that all reasonable propositions are innate. 
 
 Reply. — I acknowledge this as regards pure ideas. In this sense it can be 
 said that the whole of arithmetic and of geometry is innate, although it is 
 true to say that one would not be aware of the ideas under consideration 
 unless one saw or touched something. . . . for we could not have abstract 
 thoughts which do not have need of something sensible. This does not pre- 
 vent the mind from deriving necessary truths only from itself. Only there 
 are degrees in the difficulty of perceiving what is in us. 
 
 4th 06;'.— Latent perceptions suppose at least memory : undoubtedly there 
 may be in the soul what is not perceived there ; but it must always be that 
 this has been learned and been formerly known. 
 
 Reply. — Why could it not have still another cause ? For, since acquired 
 knowledge can be concealed there by the memory, may not nature also have 
 concealed there some original knowledge ? This would be natural habits, 
 active and passive dispositions and aptitudes, rather than a tabula rasa. 
 
 5th 0£>;*.— But innateness does not differ from the simple capacity of know- 
 ing. 
 
 Reply. — The mind is not only capable of knowing them but also of finding 
 them in itself, and if it had but the simple capacity, or passive power, it would 
 not be the source of necessary truths. The mind has a disposition to take 
 them itself from its own depths. 
 
 1st Instance.— But do the words to he in the understanding signify anything else than 
 to be perceived hy the understanding ? 
 
 BepZy.— They mean something entirely different. It is enough that what is in the under- 
 standing can be found there and that the sources or original proofs of these truths are 
 in the understanding alone. 
 
 2d Instance.— But the consent which the mind gives without effort to these truths de- 
 pends on the faculty of the human mind. 
 
 Reply.— Yerj true ; but it is the particular relation of the human mind to these truths 
 which renders the exercise of the faculty easy and natural in regard to them, and which 
 causes them to be called innate. 
 
 6th Obj. — Truths are posterior to ideas : now the ideas comp from the 
 senses. 
 
 Reply.— The intellectual ideas which are the source of necessary truths do 
 not come from the senses. 
 
 Ith Obj. — Particular propositions are more evident than general proposi- 
 tions ; and nevertheless they come from the senses ; for example, to say that 
 to be yellow is not to be sweet, is as evident, if not more so, as to say, that 
 it is impossible for a thing to be and not to beat the same time. Shall we 
 say then that all our sensations are innate ? 
 
 Reply. — The one is the principle (namely, the general maxim) ; and the 
 other is but the application. As for the rest, this proposition, sweet is not 
 bitter, is not innate ; for the sensations of sweet and of bitter come from the 
 external senses ; but it is a mixed conclusion (hybrida conclusio) where the 
 axiom is applied to a sensible truth. As for the general maxim, it is there- 
 with understood, just as the major which is suppressed in enthymemes. 
 We do not always think distinctly of that which we do. 
 
 Instance.— But it seems that g^eral and abstract ideas are more foreign to our minds 
 than particular notions and truths. 
 
392 
 
 Reply.— It is true that we begin sooner to perceive particular truths ; but this does not 
 prevent the order of nature from beginning with tlie most simple, and the reason of the 
 more particular truths from depending on the more general 
 
 8th Obj. — Does not immediate acquiescence in certain truths come from the 
 very nature of the things themselves, rather than from the propositions being 
 graven naturally in the mind ? 
 
 Reply. — Both are true. The nature of things and the nature of the mind 
 agree here ; and very often the consideration of the nature of things is noth- 
 ing else than knowledge of the nature of our mind. 
 
 9th Ohj. — It seems that if there are innate truths it is not necessary to learn 
 them since they are known in advance. But it is necessary at least to learn 
 the names and the words by which the truths are expressed. 
 
 Reply. — I agree to this ; but I could not admit the proposition that all that 
 is learned is not innate. The truth of numbers is in us, and yet we do ndl 
 omit learning them. 
 
 10th Obj. — But how does it happen that children have no knowledge of 
 ' these truths which are supposed to be innate and to make part of their 
 minds? If this were so, nature would have taken the trouble for nothing. 
 
 Reply. — The perception of what is in us depends on attention and order. 
 Now, not only is it possible, but it is even befitting, that children pay more 
 attention to the notions of the senses, because attention is regulated by need. 
 
 Same nhjection, § 27.— "If general maxims were innate they ought to appear with more 
 clearness in the minds of certain people. I speak of infants, idiots and savages ; for of 
 all men they have the mind least altered and corrupted by custom." 
 
 Reply.— I believe we must reason otherwise. Innate maxims appear only -through the 
 attention which is given to them ; but these persons exert none or exert it for very differ- 
 ent objects : they think of almost nothing save of the needs of the body, and It is reason- 
 able that pure and detached thoughts should be the prize of more noble pains. I should 
 not like so much honor to be paid to barbarism and ignoi-ance. 
 
 ilth Obj. — If there are innate truths, must there not be innate thoughts 9 
 Reply. — Not at all, for thoughts are actions ; and truths are habits or dis- 
 positions ; and we know many things of which we scarcely think. To say 
 that a truth cannot be in the «iind without it having thought of it, is to say 
 that there cannot be veins in marble. before they are discovered there. 
 
 Leibnitz had already employed this comparison of the marble in a pas- 
 sage with which we close tins analysis of the chapter ; for it is the best 
 resume of his whole doctrine {Preface to the Nouveaux Essais, p. 291) : "If 
 the soul resembled these blank tablets {tabula rasa), truths would be in us as 
 the figure of Hercules is in a block of marble when the marble is wholly indif- 
 ferent to receiving this figure or some other. But if there were veins in the 
 stone which indicated the figure of Hercules in preference to other figures, 
 this stone would be more determined to it, and Hercules would be there as 
 innate in some sort, although it would be necessary to labor to discover the " 
 veins and to cleanse and polish them, by cutting away that which prevents 
 them from appearing. It is thus that ideas and truths are innate in us, as 
 inclinations, dispositions, habits or natural capacities and not as actions^ 
 —Prof. Paul Janet, Nouveaux Essais, livre I, Paris, 1886. 
 
ADDENDUM. 
 
 Add to Note 38 : The illustration is found in a note to Geulincx's Tvadi 
 aeavrbvy sive Ethica, first published at Amsterdam in 1665. Of. Erdmann's 
 Gesc/i. d. PM.,§367, 8. 
 
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