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HANDBOOK 
 
 OF 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
HANDBOOK 
 
 OF 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BY HENRY CALDERWOOD, LL.D. 
 
 PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. 
 
 ( L I B R A R 
 
 SEVENTH EDITION 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF 
 
 : 
 
 MACMILLAN & CO. 
 1881. 
 

 
PREFACE TO THE FOURTH 
 
 EDITION. 
 
 THE issue of a fourth edition affords an opportunity 
 for making some additions which may be of service 
 to the student. 
 
 In the opening part of the Appendix will be found 
 a brief defence of the position that Conscience, re- 
 garded as an Intuitive Faculty, must be held to be 
 above education. 
 
 The second and more extended portion of the 
 Appendix contains an outline of works bearing upon 
 the study of Ethics, which have appeared in our 
 country since the first publication of this Handbook. 
 
 H. C. 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, 
 October 1875. 
 
PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. 
 
 THE present work has been prepared mainly with the view 
 of meeting the wants of University Students. 
 
 Two works of similar character were available, The Outlines 
 of Moral Philosophy, by Dugald Stewart, whose name shed 
 lustre over this University, published in its final form in 1808 ; 
 and A Manual of Moral Philosophy by Professor Fleming of 
 Glasgow, published in 1860. Both of these are text-books of 
 high value. As, however, a want has been felt, and pressed 
 upon my attention, for a book dealing with the subject in view 
 of more recent discussions, I have here attempted to meet the 
 demand. 
 
 My aims have been to present the chief problems of 
 Ethical Science ; to give an outline of discussion under each, 
 allowing fundamental questions greatest prominence ; and to 
 afford a guide for private study by references to the Literature 
 of the Science. 
 
 In order to secure space for discussion of the more im- 
 portant problems, details have been omitted such as may be 
 found in the histories of philosophy more commonly in the 
 possession of students. 
 
viii PREFACE TO FIRST EDITION. 
 
 ~' \ 
 
 In some parts, the work wears a controversial character. 
 In the present state of Ethical inquiry, this was unavoidable. 
 The Development Theory (Sensational and Utilitarian) is well 
 represented, both critically and constructively, in the works of 
 Mr. John Stuart Mill, and of Professor Bain. The present 
 Handbook offers an exposition and defence of the Intuitional 
 Theory of Morals, with the criticism of Utilitarianism. The 
 uniform object, however, has been to give a careful repre- 
 sentation of the conflicting theories, supplying the reader with 
 materials for independent judgment. 
 
 While the interests of University students have been con- 
 stantly considered, I have endeavoured to provide a book- 
 suited for those who wish, apart from academic arrangements, 
 to prosecute the study of Ethical questions. 
 
 H. C. 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, 
 October 1872. 
 
 THIRD EDITION. 
 
 In addition to the verbal corrections introduced into the 
 Second Edition, this involves only slight explanatory variations 
 in the Chapter on First Principles of Morals. 
 
 H. C. 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, 
 November 1873. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Nature of Moral Philosophy, Method of Investigation, Con- 
 sciousness, Introspection, Nerve and Brain, Personality, 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 + 
 
 PRELIMINARY. 
 Relation of Psychology to Ethical Science, Tests of Accuracy, . 15 
 
 PART I. 
 
 MAN'S MORAL NATURE AS COGNITIVE. 
 DIVISION L INTUITIONAL THEORY. 
 
 CHAP. I. Knowledge of Moral Distinctions, . 17 
 
 CHAP. ii. Moral Judgments, .23 
 
 CHAP. in. First Principles of Morals, .... 30 
 
 Sketch of the History of Philosophic Thought as to 
 
 the Source of our Knowledge of Moral Distinctions, 43 
 
 CHAP. IV. Conscience, 77 
 
 CHAP. V. Duty or Obligation, ... SS 
 
 CHAP. vi. Moral Rights, ....... . Q- 1 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 DIVISION II. DEVELOPMENT THEORY. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAP. I. Origin of Knowledge, ... 98 
 
 CHAP. II. Knowledge of Moral Distinctions, . . . 123 
 
 CHAP. in. Conscience, 139 
 
 CHAP. iv. Duty or Obligation, . . . . 145 
 
 PART II. 
 
 IMPULSES AND RESTRAINTS BELONGING TO THE 
 
 NATURE OF MAN. 
 
 CHAP. i. Impulses to Action, .... 153 
 
 CHAP. ii. Ethical Classification of Natural Impulses, . 158 
 
 CHAP. in. Restraints upon Actioa, ... . 161 
 
 PART III. 
 
 THE WILL. 
 
 CHAP. L Its Nature and Relations to our other Powers, . . 165 
 
 CHAP. ii. Its Exercise, ........ 169 
 
 CHAP. in. The Freedom of the Will, 173 
 
 CHAP. iv. Necessitarianism 194 
 
 PART IV. 
 MORAL SENTIMENTS, ... .... 203 
 
 PART V. 
 DISORDER OF OUR MORAL NATURE, . . . 209 
 
CONTENTS. x j 
 
 METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PRELIMINARY, 219 
 
 CHAP. i. The Existence of God, 223 
 
 CHAP. II. The Materialistic (Atheistic) Theory of the Universe, 233 
 
 CHAP. in. The Pantheistic theory, 237 
 
 CHAP. iv. Knowledge of the Divine Nature, .... 247 
 
 CHAP. v. Relations of the Absolute Being to the Problems of 
 
 Moral Life, . . . . . . . 251 
 
 I. The Foundation of Virtue, . . . . 25 1 
 
 II. Relation of Divine Sovereignty to Free Will, . 253 
 
 III. Origin of Evil, 256 
 
 iv. The Future State. (Immortality of the Soul), . 259 
 
 APPLIED ETHICS. 
 
 I. Laws which regulate the Formation of Character, . , 262 
 
 II. The Number and Relations of the Virtues, . . 264 
 
 in. Guidance of Social Life, . . . . 265 
 
 IV. Moral Conditions of Political Government, . 267 
 
 v. Morality in its Relations to Religion, ..... 268 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 A. Can Conscience be Educated ? . . .271 
 
 B. Recent Literature, . . . . . . . . 274 
 

 LIB R A K V \ 
 
 U N 1 V K II s IT Y O F 
 
 CALIFOKNIA. 
 
 - 
 
 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 SPHERE AND METHOD OF ENQUIRY. 
 
 ^. 
 
 1. Moral Philosophy is the rational explanation of our 
 moral actions, moral nature, and moral relations. It is a science 
 of the knowledge of moral distinctions, of the practice of 
 morality, and of the existing moral system, or order in the 
 universe. It is a theory of- knowing and of being, but only 
 of such knowing as is concerned with moral distinctions, and 
 only of being which is capable of possessing and applying 
 such knowledge. 
 
 The designations ' Moral Philosophy ' and ' Ethics ' are 
 commonly and properly used as synonymous. Etymologically, 
 the Greek designation, Ethics ('H0i/x from rjOos, custom, habit, 
 disposition), refers to a more limited department of enquiry 
 than that belonging to Moral Philosophy. Strictly taken, it 
 applies only to individual conduct or manners. The same 
 limitation, however, exists in the Latin designation, Moral, 
 since mores concerns primarily manners or customs. The 
 Greek term, as having more distinct reference to the source 
 of action within the mind, has even the advantage over the 
 Latin term. According to the best usage, however, the names 
 
2 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Moral Philosophy and Ethics are equivalent ; Moralis Philo- 
 sophia, 'H$iKa ; German, Ethik or Sittenlehre. 
 
 2. In its beginning, Moral Philosophy takes rank as a 
 Science of Observation. In its higher development, when 
 dealing with relations which transcend the facts of experience, 
 such as our relations to the Absolute Being, it wears the form 
 of a Speculative Science. The denial of a speculative branch 
 of the science must rest on the denial either of the need for a 
 philosophy of the fact of man's existence, or of the possibility 
 of such a philosophy. Moral Philosophy is further described 
 as a Practical Science, because it embraces knowledge re- 
 quisite for the guidance of human conduct. As a philosophy 
 or science, it is a system of truth, scientifically discovered and 
 arranged. 
 
 The term ' observation ' has by some been unwarrantably 
 applied to the recognition of external facts only. ' Observation' 
 refers to the mental exercise, not to its objects. The mental 
 sciences, as truly as the physical, are sciences of observation, 
 though in their higher departments the mental sciences are 
 speculative. 
 
 3. As a Science of Observation, Moral Philosophy is sub- 
 ject, -first, to the laws of evidence, which require that facts be 
 carefully ascertained, distinguished, and classified; and second, 
 to the rules of logic, which require that generalization be 
 reached by legitimate induction from ascertained facts. As a 
 Speculative Science, it is dependent for its start, and also for 
 the final test of all its results, upon the accuracy and com- 
 pleteness of the underlying Science of Observation. 
 
 The inductive method determines the foundations of the 
 science ; the deductive method finds application in the specu- 
 lative department. In the inductive method, the critical 
 
INTR OD UC TION. 
 
 method of Kant is included, by which he distinguishes between 
 the a posteriori and the a priori in knowledge ; but the dialectic 
 method is excluded, such as that of Spinoza (Ethics), which 
 elaborates a theory from a series of definitions, or such as that 
 of Hegel ( Wissenchaft der Logik), which starts from the highest 
 abstraction, viz., Pure. Being; (v. Secret of Hegel, by J. H. 
 Stirling, LL.D., London, 1865.) 
 
 4. The Order of Investigation must, as in all sciences, be 
 from the simple to the complex. Moral Philosophy must, 
 therefore, begin with individual experience ; and must pass 
 thence to social life, and thereafter to the wider testimony of 
 History. From these fields of observation it rises to grapple 
 with problems which transcend observation, while they rise 
 out of it. 
 
 Comte pleads for commencing our study in society, be- 
 cause the laws of human conduct are best inferred from the 
 actions of men in the mass ; Cours de Philosophic Positive, 
 i. 31; 2d ed. The following passage from Mr. Mill maybe 
 taken in reply : ' Human beings in society have no pro- 
 perties but those which are derived from, and may be resolved 
 into, the laws of nature of individual man ; ' System of Logic, 
 2d ed., n. 543. But, for the reason indicated by Hume, 
 (Intro, to Treat, on Hum. Nat.), observation of the actions of 
 men is essential for completing our investigations. 
 
 5. CONSCIOUSNESS (Conscientia, Bewusstseyn) is the uni- 
 form condition of individual experience. To consciousness, 
 therefore, must be our primary and ultimate appeal concerning 
 the facts of personal experience. As here understood, 'in- 
 dividual experience,' and ( the facts of consciousness/ are 
 identical. Physical impressions are facts of experience only 
 as they are recognised in consciousness. A distinction must, 
 
4 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 however, be kept between facts of experience and conditions 
 of life. The play of vital organs, such as the heart or brain, 
 is largely beyond the range of consciousness, though the 
 action of both may be closely connected with our mental 
 activity, and may thus have an important bearing on the in- 
 terpretation of what is experienced. 
 
 Consciousness, though associated with physical energy, is 
 not so closely connected with it as to make the latter the 
 measure of the former. Accordingly, physical prostration, 
 popularly named 'unconsciousness,' is not to be reckoned 
 equivalent to a cessation of personal experience. On the 
 contrary, it often happens that those said to be unconscious 
 are aware of what is transpiring around them. 
 
 For a full investigation of the nature, evidence, and 
 authority of Consciousness, Hamilton's Metaphysics, Lects. 
 xi.-xvi., and Note H. in Reid's Works. Hamilton says, ' It is 
 the recognition by the thinking subject of its own acts or 
 affections;' Metaph. i. 201. Rather, it is the recognition by 
 the thinking subject ot itself and its own acts and affections, 
 ' What consciousness directly reveals, together with what can 
 be legitimately inferred from its revelations, composes, by 
 universal admission, all that we know of the mind ;' Mr. J. 
 S. Mill's Exam, of Sir W. Hamilton's Philos., p. 132, 3d ed. 
 For the grounds on which Mr. Mill holds that 'we cannot 
 study the original elements of mind in the facts of our present 
 consciousness;' Ib. p. 173. 
 
 6. THE INTROSPECTIVE OR REFLECTIVE MODE OF ENQUIRY 
 is an essential requisite for the construction of a science of 
 mind. This mode of enquiry is named Introspective, because 
 the individual must look within himself in order to discover 
 the facts of his experience ; Reflective, because he must turn 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 back upon the facts as having had a place in experience. The 
 necessity for the introspective line of enquiry arises from the 
 application of an obvious law of evidence. A man must 
 attend to the facts of experience in order to interpret them. 
 And it is only as the facts of our inner experience are sub- 
 jected to observation and analysis that it is possible to 
 attempt the construction of a philosophy of them. 
 
 Comte has declared Introspection impossible. His argu- 
 ment is this, ' In order to observe, your intellect must pause 
 from activity ; yet it is this very activity which you want to 
 observe. If you cannot effect the pause, you cannot observe , 
 if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe.' (Miss Mar- 
 tineau's Translation, I. p. n.) The argument involves neglect 
 of the following facts : that intellectual activity implies con- 
 sciousness ; that attention to its own states is a possibility of 
 mind; that repetition in consciousness of the same act leads to 
 increased familiarity with it ; 'that memory admits of the recall 
 of what has previously passed through consciousness. There 
 is, therefore, no necessity for a pause in order to attain know- 
 ledge of personal activity. Dr. Maudsley not only accepts 
 the argument of Comte, but supplements it thus : ' (a) There 
 are but few individuals who are capable of attending to the 
 succession of phenomena in their own minds ; (b) there is no 
 agreement between those who have acquired the power of in- 
 trospection, (c) As long as you cannot effect the pause 
 necessary for self-contemplation there can be no observation 
 of the current of activity ; if the pause is effected, then there 
 is nothing to observe.' The Physiology and Pathology of Mind, 
 p. 10, 2d ed. These statements may be summarised thus : 
 (i.) Few can use the introspective method ; (2.) those who can 
 are not agreed as to the results thereby secured ; (3.) nobody 
 
6 HAND-BOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 can use it at all. Comte himself did not maintain his con- 
 sistency. Take the following example : ' Philosophers tell 
 us of the fundamental difficulty of knowing ourselves ; but 
 this is a remark which could not have been made till human 
 reason had achieved a considerable advance. The mind must 
 have attained to a refined state of meditation before it could 
 be astonished at its own acts, reflecting upon itself a speculative 
 activity, which must be at first incited by the external world.' 
 -Cours de Philos. Positive, vi. 6, Miss Martineau's translation, 
 ii. p. 159. If it be possible by any process of refinement to 
 attain reflection on our own mental activity, the objection to 
 introspection is admitted to be untenable. On this subject see 
 Sir H. Holland's chapter on Mental Consciousness, Mental 
 Physiology. By Mr. Mill a ' Psychological mode of ascertain- 
 ing the original elements of mind ' is placed over against the. 
 Introspective. Exam, of Hamilton's fhilos., p. 170, and p. 
 173; with which compare 'the Natural History' mode in 
 Prof. Bain's Senses^ and Litellcct, with Append. A., and chap- 
 ter on ' Consciousness ;' Emotions and Will, p. 555; also 
 Spencer's Principles of Psychology, ' On Consciousness in 
 general,' p. 322, c. 25. Mr. Mill, 'for want of a better word,' 
 calls his mode 'Psychological;' but the Introspective is 
 Psychological, and his Psychological is Introspective. For an 
 admirable statement on Introspection, see Mill's Exam, of 
 Hamilton's Philos., p. 169. 
 
 7. The testimony of Consciousness cannot be denied with- 
 out self-contradiction. He who doubts it relies on Conscious- 
 ness for the affirmation of his doubt. 
 
 This is the key of the Cartesian position, and the basis of 
 modern philosophy ; Des Cartes's Method, I. n. in. Method 
 and Meditations, translated by Professor Veitch. Leibnitz, 
 
INTR OD UCTION. 
 
 Nonveaux ssais, n. 27. Maudsley points to the madman's 
 delusion as throwing discredit on consciousness, PhysioL 
 and Pathol. of Mind, p. n. So far from such an objec- 
 tion having any force, the pathology of brain depends for its 
 scientific validity on the reliableness of the madman's con- 
 sciousness. If a man says that he constantly sees spectres 
 which have no existence, or that a person resides in his 
 stomach, it is because, knowing his statements to be erroneous, 
 you nevertheless trust his consciousness, and do not regard 
 him as a wilful deceiver, that you pronounce him insane. 
 Consciousness thus discovers with certainty those forms of 
 experience which give evidence of a morbid organism. 
 
 8. The Interpretation of Consciousness is the business of 
 philosophy. This implies the discrimination and classification 
 of facts, the determination of their origin or source, and the 
 discovery of the legitimate inferences from these facts. In 
 this way we may construct a rational explanation of our 
 experience. The distinction between the testimony of con- 
 sciousness to internal facts, and its testimony ' to something 
 beyond itself/ is well put by Mr. Mill ; Exam., p. 166. 
 
 9. Every state of consciousness involves three elements. 
 The shortest expression of such a state is, I am conscious 
 of a perception. An act 01 perception thus standing as the 
 illustration, there are in the single state, the conscious knower, 
 the consciousness, and the present experience, viz., a per- 
 ception. Consciousness is the uniform characteristic of our 
 experience ; in consciousness, the recognition of self is in- 
 variable ; the special exercise recognised is variable. While, 
 therefore, Consciousness is knowledge of a present state, it is 
 always knowledge 01 Sell as Intelligence, Self-consciousness, 
 Selbstbewusstseyn. 
 
8 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This is the meaning of Des Cartes's Cogito, ergo sum, 
 I think, therefore I am. This celebrated utterance is not an 
 argument, but a simple statement of the fact, that each thinker 
 is as certain of his own existence as of his own thought. 
 Hamilton, though giving the threefold analysis of a state of 
 consciousness, reduces the component elements to two, by 
 identifying consciousness itself with the fact recognised, 
 thereby making the present fact a modification of conscious- 
 ness. He says, ' Consciousness is not to be viewed as any 
 thing different from these modifications themselves ; ' Metaph. 
 i. 193; and Reid's Works, 932. On the lower physiological 
 theory, Mind is known only by physical manifestation, and 
 thought is a function of brain ; Rapport du Physique et du 
 Moral de VHomme, P. J. G. Cabanis. At the other extreme 
 of transcendental metaphysic, developed by Kant, Mind is a 
 transcendental conception, separated from the smallest trace 
 of experience. For the history of philosophic thought on this 
 subject, Pt. i. Div. ii. c. i. 
 
 10. Among states of consciousness, there are some which 
 discover that we are not pure intelligences ; but that we are 
 also sentient beings. We are conscious of sensation, through 
 an organism so truly a part of our being, that its affections are 
 our own. Touch, taste, smell, hearing, and vision, afford dis- 
 tinct illustrations. The physical organism, through which 
 sensations are received, provides for a wider area of knowledge. 
 The organism itself is not known in consciousness, but only 
 the experience resulting from its affections. For example, the 
 organs of vision and hearing are not known in consciousness, 
 but the sensations and perceptions obtained by means of them 
 are thus known. If then Consciousness be always Self-know- 
 ledge, and physical organism is not recognised by conscious- 
 
INTR OD UC TION. 
 
 ness, that organism is more properly described as belonging to 
 Self, than as essential to its very nature. 
 
 11. The organism which is not known in consciousness 
 must have its functions determined by scientific enquiry dis- 
 tinct from that prosecuted by the analysis and interpretation 
 of consciousness. While the knowledge of the internal Self is 
 by internal observation, the knowledge of the organism must 
 be by external observation. There are thus two departments 
 of science concerned with our existence, the Psychological 
 (^X 7 ?) psyche the soul, and logos ^ science), and the Physio- 
 logical (<V<TIS, physis, nature, and logos]. These are quite 
 distinct from each other, yet closely related, and capable of 
 rendering mutual aid. 
 
 For a most important contribution from the Physiological 
 side, see Preliminary Observations, and the first part of Chap. 
 in. in The Principles of Medical Psychology, by Baron Ernst von 
 Feuchtersleben, M.D., published by the Sydenham Society 
 (1845). Feuchtersleben's little book, The Dietetics of the Soul, 
 London (Churchill) 1852, is well deserving study. The Ger- 
 man work is in its thirty-third edition. The union of mind and 
 body involves what Professor Laycock has happily designated 
 ' the correlations of consciousness and organization ; ' Mind 
 and Brain, see specially the Preliminary Dissertation on 
 Method, chap. v. See also Psychological Inquiries, ist and 
 2d series, by Sir Benj. Brodie; Chapters on Mental Physiology, 
 by Sir H. Holland ; Maudsley's Physiology and Pathology of 
 Mind; and Paine's Physiology of the Soul and Instinct : New 
 York, 1872. 
 
 12. To .speak of the Introspective line of enquiry and of 
 the Physiological, as if they were two distinct, and even con- 
 flicting, methods of philosophizing, is an abuse of language. 
 
io HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 They deal with two distinct departments of investigation, in 
 which the same method, namely, observation, is employed 
 on two sets of facts altogether different. While the method 
 of philosophizing is in both cases the same, the spheres are so 
 distinct that Introspective enquiry cannot reach organism, and 
 External observation cannot reach consciousness. No exami- 
 nation of the organ of vision leads to the discovery of per- 
 ception ; and no contemplation of a perception discovers the 
 organ of vision. Prof. Bain (Senses and Intellect ', p. 91) speaks 
 of ' the influence spread over the conscious centres when mus- 
 cular contraction takes place/ But there is no physiological 
 or anatomical evidence warranting us to fix upon certain 
 spots in the brain as ' conscious centres.' Jouffroy has well 
 said, 'The senses cannot penetrate into the sphere of con- 
 sciousness, nor the consciousness into the sphere of the 
 senses;' Introd. to Edition of Stewart's Outlines Jouffroy's 
 Philosophical Essays (Clark, Edinburgh), p. 9. J, G. Fichte 
 has said, ' We are conscious of the seeing, hearing, or feeling ; 
 but can by no means, on the other hand, see, feel, or hear 
 our consciousness ;' Anweisung zum selige?i Leben, 1806, The 
 Way of the blessed Life, translated by Dr. William Smith, 
 Edinburgh, p. 43. 
 
 The fields of enquiry belonging to Physiology and Psycho- 
 logy are, however, so related, that neither science can ade- 
 quately interpret its own facts without reference to the. other. 
 Those phenomena of consciousness known as sensation and 
 perception expressly require Physiological aid for their ex- 
 planation. And the Physiology of nerve and brain needs no 
 less the testimony of consciousness in order to interpret ascer- 
 tained facts. In one respect the Pathology of nerve and brain 
 comes even more closely into contact with Psychology, as all 
 
INTR OD UC TION. 1 1 
 
 diseased or disordered action of physical organism throws in 
 upon consciousness forms of experience otherwise unknown. 
 This holds true in the widest and most important sense of the 
 Brain, which is distinctively the organ of Mind or Self. All 
 the facts connected with a disordered brain are thus fitted to 
 cast important light on the action of mind as related to the 
 action of brain. Hence the peculiar value to mental philo- 
 sophy of all scientific investigation as to the experience of the 
 insane. 
 
 Nerve and Brain are the physical conditions of sensation 
 and external perception on the one hand, and of locomotion 
 on the other. To what extent they afford conditions for other 
 forms of mental exercise is not yet made out. The nerves ot 
 sensation in minute ramifications come from the surface of 
 the body, join in ganglia, and stretch up to the great nerve 
 centre, in the brain. From the brain, on the other hand, go 
 the whole sets of motor nerves, or nerves of movement, by 
 which control is maintained over the muscles. The brain 
 itself is in the form of two lobes or hemispheres, adapted for 
 communication with the two sides of the body, and specially 
 with double organs of sense. The matter of the brain is of two 
 kinds, the outer or grey matter, which is vesicular, having as 
 its function, to supply nerve energy ; and the inner or white 
 matter, which is fibrous in nature, embracing the termini of 
 the nerve ramifications. Such is the organism which affords 
 the physical media of sensation and external perception, and 
 of control of the bodily movements. This organism every 
 human being employs, while ignorant of the laws and appli- 
 ances which determine its use. For the nature and functions 
 of Brain and Nerve, v. Quain's Anatomy, 7th ed. vol. n. 501 ; 
 with Carpenter's Principles of Human Physiology, 7th ed. 
 
1 2 HANDB OK OF MORAL PHIL O SO PHY. 
 
 chap. xiii. p. 503. There is a valuable statement on the 
 relation between Physiology and Psychology in Jouffroy's 
 Introd. to Stewart's Outlines t Philosophical Essays, Edin. 1839, 
 p. 37, onwards. 
 
 Sensitive organism is the physical condition, and Con- 
 sciousness the psychological condition, of sensations. On the 
 other hand, excepting only a limited circle of spontaneous 
 movements, conscious volition is the psychological condition, 
 and nerve energy the physical condition, of motion. In sen- 
 sation the impression is made on the organism, and is trans- 
 mitted from the extremity of the nerves to the nerve centre ; 
 and though the transmission is not matter of experience, the re- 
 sultant sensation is known in consciousness. In movement of 
 the limbs, the volition to move the foot or fingers is known in 
 consciousness, and thereupon there is a transmission of nerve 
 energy from the brain along the appropriated nerve lines 
 providing for movement, but of this transmission there is no 
 record in personal experience. 
 
 13. Consciousness discovers SELF-DETERMINATION IN OUR 
 ACTIVITY. With thinking, there is conscious self-determination 
 of the order of thought ; with observation, self-determination 
 of the objects to be observed ; with use of an organ, such as 
 the hand, there is self-direction of its use, even though con- 
 sciousness gives no information as to how this is accomplished. 
 
 14. Consciousness of Self-determination is consciousness 
 of power exercised by me over my mental activity, and over 
 physical organs which belong to me. Self is thus known, not 
 merely as Intelligence, but also as Power. I am a self-conscious, 
 intelligent, self-determining Power. I am a Person, not a 
 mere living Organism, and not a mere Thing. Personality 
 thus involves self-conscious being, self-reg?:lated intelligence, 
 
INTR OD UCTION. i 3 
 
 and self-determined activity. But there is no warrant to say, 
 with the elder Fichte, that the Ego (I) posits itself, or with 
 Hegel, that the Ego comes to itself, or, with both, that the 
 Ego is Universal Reason manifesting itself. Neither by direct 
 evidence, nor by inference, can these positions be sustained. 
 
 Personality is here taken as involved in the consciousness 
 of mature life. Whether this knowledge or Personality is 
 capable of development from Sensation, as the lowest form 
 of experience, is a question held in reserve. For answer, 
 see Part i. Div. ii. c. i. 
 
 15. Besides the 'characteristics of experience already in- 
 dicated, there are conditions of existence known as external to 
 Self. These are conditions of our physical existence, as part 
 of the material world ; and conditions of intelligence, in so far 
 as it is concerned with the facts of an outer world. 
 
 16. Moral Philosophy concentrates attention on what 
 applies to Self as the determiner of personal activity. It is 
 because Self-knowledge implies knowledge of myself as direct- 
 ing my own actions, in accordance with knowledge, that a 
 Moral Philosophy is possible. 
 
 The characteristics of our physical nature, and those of the 
 purely intellectual nature, belong to two distinct departments 
 of science, the one physical, the other mental ; but, Moral 
 Philosophy, as distinct from both, makes reference to the 
 results of the Physiological and Intellectual sciences, only in 
 so far as its territory borders upon theirs. 
 
 17. In view of the sphere of action open to me as r 
 Personality, I recognise my relation to other living beings, 
 some of which, by speech and action, discover themselves to 
 be possessed of the same personality as that which belongs to 
 me. Of these living beings, there are others which do not 
 
14 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 discover their possession of personality. Within the sphere of 
 personal activity, there is thus established the general dis- 
 tinction between Persons and Things, or more specifically, 
 the threefold distinction between Persons, Living Organisms, 
 and Things. 
 
 18. The Philosophy of Morals must be as applicable to the 
 persons by whom I am surrounded as to myself, and must be 
 capable of verification by them. But it need not be applicable 
 to other living beings around me, or capable of verification in 
 their experience. 
 
 19. Personality is the first requisite for philosophising. 
 Where there is not self-consciousness, or knowledge of Self, as 
 possessing power for self-direction, under conditions of intelli- 
 gence, there cannot be a philosophy either of our own nature, 
 or of any other form of being. 
 
 20. Personality is the basis of Morality. Where there is 
 not knowledge of Self, as the intelligent source of action, there 
 is no discrimination of motive, act, and end ; and where such 
 discrimination does not exist, there is no morality. The 
 knowledge of moral distinctions, and the practice of morality, 
 are in such a case equally impossible ; Shaftesbury, Inquiry 
 concerning Virtue, i. n., 3. ' The idea of person involves 
 determination to individual morality;' Trendelenburg, Natur- 
 recht, 86, p. 158, Leipzig, 1860. 'Personality, as the uni- 
 versal characteristic of man, advances to the phenomenal in 
 the form of individuality ;' Martensen, Die Christliche Ethik, 
 Gotha, 1871. 
 
 21. Actions as contemplated in Moral Philosophy are the 
 outcome of intelligence and will, and are properly named Per- 
 sonal Actions. Other forms of activity, popularly denominated 
 ' Actions/ do not come within the sphere of Moral Philosophy. 
 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ETHICS. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF MAN'S MORAL NATURE. 
 
 PRELIMINARY 
 
 1. IN seeking the rational explanation of our Moral Nature, 
 it is better, in point of order, to begin with our knowledge of 
 moral distinctions, and only after that to extend observation to 
 the springs of activity, namely, desires, affections, judgments, 
 and volitions. 
 
 This order has been very frequently reversed in works on 
 Moral Philosophy. 
 
 The Scotch Philosophy, swayed by the old classification of 
 the powers of the Mind into the Understanding and the Will, 
 has commonly begun the treatment of Moral Philosophy with 
 an enquiry as to the Impulses of our nature, denominated Ac- 
 tive Powers. Hutcheson's Passions and Moral Sense; Reid's 
 Active Powers ; Beattie's Moral Science; Stewart's Philosophy 
 of the Active and Moral Powers. The German Philosophy has 
 commonly taken the other course, seeking first to ascertain 
 what is the Ethical idea or conception. 
 
 2. In the Intellectual department of Mental Science, 
 
16 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Psychology deals with the facts of our experience belonging to 
 morals, as with all the facts of consciousness, but simply to 
 determine their nature as mental facts. In the Ethical depart- 
 ment of Mental Science, Psychology ascertains the nature of 
 Mental facts only as a preliminary step for determining their 
 Moral significance. 
 
 3. The Psychology of Ethics is completed only by con- 
 structing a philosophy of all that belongs to our personality as 
 Moral beings. Each characteristic must be looked at, not 
 only apart, but also in relation to other features of our Moral 
 Nature. ' The value of every ethical system must ultimately 
 be tested on psychological grounds/ Mansel's Prolegomena, 
 Pref. (Oxford, 1860). 
 
 4. In a system of Philosophy, every affirmation is liable to 
 have its truth determined by a variety of tests. In no case 
 are we shut up to a single avenue of enquiry. In Moral 
 Philosophy there is uniformly a double test, the true in 
 theory must be the consistent in practice. 
 
PART I. 
 MAN'S MORAL NATURE AS COGNITIVE. 
 
 DIVISION I. INTUITIONAL THEORY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 
 
 1. THERE is in consciousness a knowledge of Moral dis- 
 tinctions among personal actions. This is apparent in the 
 discrimination of actions into right and wrong; Honestum 
 (rectuni), malum ; KaXov, KO.KOI/; Recht, Unrecht. 
 
 The same distinction is otherwise expressed by the phrases 
 * morally good/ and ' morally bad.' In these phrases, the 
 term ' morally ' is used to indicate the specific nature of good- 
 ness or badness alleged to exist, namely, such goodness or 
 badness as can belong to personal actions, and to the agents, 
 in contrast with other forms of goodness or badness, such as 
 may belong to things. ' The right' thus comes under a wider 
 generalization, namely, ' the good/ Happiness is a good 
 within a man ; property, on the other hand, is an external 
 good ; but the morally good is distinct from both, as good 
 connected with what a man is and does, in contrast with what 
 a man experiences and has. The greatness of contrast 
 between actions and things makes it exceedingly undesirable 
 to lay the foundations of Moral Science on such a generality 
 as the Good. 
 
 The whole Ethical Philosophy of ancient times was seriously 
 
 B 
 
am 
 Da 
 
 t 
 
 i8 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 encumbered by discussing the question of Morals under the 
 general conception of The Good, as a character of things, 
 rather than under the conception of The Right, as a quality of 
 actions. It commonly led to an estimate of moral good by its 
 utility, as in the part taken by Socrates in the Protagoras ; or 
 to the use of good and evil in a double sense, as when Socrates 
 makes the doing of injustice a greater evil, and the enduring 
 of it a less. Plato's Gorgias, 509. As a compensation we 
 receive from the Ancient Philosophy most valuable discussions 
 in support of the unapproachable superiority of Moral good, 
 among all forms of good attainable by man. Ultimately, as 
 with Plato, The Good comes to be identified with God him- 
 self. Repub. vii. 517; Jowett, ii. p. 351. The disposition 
 to make The Good the basis of Morality has recently re- 
 appeared in some adherents of the d priori school, as well as 
 among Utilitarians. For example, Schleiermacher, Die Sitten- 
 lehre, Werke, Philos. vol. v. ; the younger Fichte, System der 
 Ethik, ii. i, p. 27; Rothe, Die Theologische Ethik, vol. iii.; 
 and in one of the most recent works, translated from the 
 Danish into German, Bishop Martensen's Die Christliche 
 Ethik. 
 
 In modern times the universally acknowledged distinction 
 between actions right and wrong, has commonly been accepted 
 as the primary fact, giving occasion for a Moral Philosophy. 
 ' Thoap who have denied the reality of Moral distinctions may 
 be' ranked among the disingenuous disputants; nor is it con- 
 ceivable that any human creature could ever seriously believe 
 that all characters and actions were alike entitled to the affec- 
 tiorrWid regard of every one.' Hume's ' Inquiry concerning 
 the. Principles of Morals,' Essays, vol. ii. p. 223. 
 
 It is of essential moment to distinguish between \hz founda- 
 tion of moral distinctions and the knowledge of them. Hume 
 
 vJ 
 
 has confounded these at the outset. He treats of the problem 
 * concerning the general foundation of Morals ; whether they 
 be derived from reason or from sentiment, whether we attain 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 19 
 
 the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, 
 or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense/ Ib. 
 These are two perfectly distinct questions. Mackintosh's 
 Dissertation, sect. i. As to the foundation of moral dis- 
 tinctions, I wish to insist that that is independent of human 
 personality ; while as to the knowledge of moral distinctions, 
 that is derived from Reason, not from feeling. 
 
 2. Of the duality of moral distinctions, these may be taken 
 as examples : persevering use of personal powers, courageous 
 endurance of privation, truthfulness in utterance, kindness of 
 disposition, and efforts to mitigate the sufferings of others, are 
 right actions; while vanity on account of possessions, envy of 
 others in prosperity, secret satisfaction at their trials, dishonest 
 dealings, and wilful infliction of injury, are wrong actions. 
 
 3. The actions possessed of moral quality are the actions 
 of intelligent agents. If the term ' action ' be employed in a 
 wider sense, such application goes beyond the moral sphere, 
 as when we speak of the * action ; of water on the rock ; 
 organic action, as the action of the heart ; and the action of 
 an animal in walking or eating. When deliberate reflection 
 on the nature of the act is impossible, moral quality does not 
 belong to the action. The terms ' right ' and ' wrong ' are 
 misapplied, when used in relation to any actions other than 
 personal actions. 
 
 4. All moral actions, being the actions of persons, presup- 
 pose intelligent observation, and are carried out by personal 
 determination for a definite end. Every moral action, there- 
 fore, is capable of being regarded in three relations, according 
 to its origin, progress, and result. With all these, intelligent 
 self-determination is concerned. A moral action, therefore, 
 includes motive, act, and end. As these may be distinguished 
 from each other, they may differ in moral quality. The 
 motive may be right, though the act is wrong. And still fur- 
 ther, the Tightness of the end does not determine the character 
 either of the motive or of the means. 
 
20 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 5. All personal actions are not known as moral actions. 
 The varieties of activity possible to man are according to the 
 powers which belong to his nature. That nature may be 
 contemplated as physical, intellectual, and moral. Action 
 which is merely physical, or purely intellectual, does not 
 necessarily come within the moral sphere. For example, 
 walking, leaping, and lifting ; efforts of attention, reasoning, 
 and memory, are not in themselves moral actions. 
 
 6. Actions not in themselves recognised as moral actions 
 may acquire moral character by being involved with the action 
 of our moral nature. The complex nature, physical, intel- 
 lectual, and moral, may in all its parts be concerned with a 
 definite line of action, in which case the whole extent of 
 activity wears a moral character. Every power belonging to 
 us as moral beings is thus capable of being turned to a moral 
 or an immoral use. Physical exercise is a merely physical 
 good ; but physical strength can be employed for the attain- 
 ment of moral good or the doing of moral evil. Intellectual 
 exercise is an intellectual good, but it also can be employed 
 in moral relations, for good or evil. 
 
 7. Actions which are not in themselves Moral actions, 
 cannot with philosophical warrant be denominated actions 
 1 morally indifferent.' The reason for this statement is con- 
 tained in the previous paragraph, from which it appears that 
 the distribution of our actions into * good, bad, and indifferent, 1 
 is inadmissible. 
 
 The designation ' indifferent ' comes to us from the Stoic 
 Philosophy, dSid^opa, things neither good nor bad. See 
 Zeller's Stoics, etc., p. 218. The distinction was accepted 
 by Cicero, who translated aSta<o/3ov by indifferens : 'Quod 
 illi aSia^o/Doy dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit, ut indifferens dicerem.' 
 De Finibus, iii. 16. Cicero also described things indifferent 
 by the designation res mediae, things lying in the middle, 
 between right and wrong. This phrase is as unsuitable as 
 the other, for things morally right are not separated from 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 21 
 
 things morally wrong by an intermediate territory. Moral 
 distinctions belong to a single sphere, which is the inner and 
 more sacred sphere of human life. All beyond that sphere, 
 moral characteristics cease to apply. The contrast is interest- 
 ing between this classification of things (possessions rather 
 than actions), without moral quality as res mediae, and Aris- 
 totle's mean, jueo-or^s, as determining the nature of virtue. The 
 Stoics aimed at a classification of different kinds of good, and 
 placed such external good as health of body, honours, and 
 wealth, as res mediae. Aristotle, looking at activity, makes the 
 mean to be the test of virtuous action in all cases. 
 
 In the Scotch Philosophy, Reid accepted the classification 
 of actions into ' good, bad, and indifferent.' Active Powers, 
 Essay v. c. iv. (Hamilton's Ed. p. 646.) 
 
 8. Whether moral distinctions are recognised by men 
 generally, may be ascertained by reference to the testimony 
 coming (i) from individual conduct, and (2) from social life. 
 What has been reached irrespectively may thus be tested by 
 external observation. First, Testimony from personal con- 
 duct. Every man is seen to experience self- approbation and 
 self-condemnation on account of his actions. Shame because 
 of wrong-doing may be taken as an illustration, with the ad- 
 mission that there is a distinction between the shame felt on 
 account of awkwardness, and that on account of wickedness. 
 Second, Testimony from social life. Men are agreed in ap- 
 proving certain actions as right, and all nations inflict punish- 
 ment on evil-doing. 
 
 The sufficiency of the evidence from these sources is not 
 affected by the question whether that evidence is applicable to 
 all forms of moral distinctions. For the present purpose, it is 
 of no moment whether the actions punished by society do or 
 do not embrace the whole range of actions morally wrong. 
 The fact of the punishment of some actions is sufficient. Even 
 on Professor Bain's theory, which makes punishment and 
 moral distinction co-extensive {Emotions and Will, p. 257), 
 there arises no difference at the present point. 
 
22 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 9. While all men agree in accounting certain actions right 
 and others wrong, they may not agree as to the actions so 
 regarded. The explanation of such disagreement is connected 
 with the later enquiry regarding the ground or criterion of 
 moral distinctions, but such disagreement does not affect the 
 evidence for the fact, that men do recognise moral differences 
 among actions. 
 
 10. PROBLEMS. (i.) Indicate the grounds on which THE 
 GOOD is not to be taken as affording a commencement for 
 Ethical Enquiry. (2.) Does the identification of pleasure with 
 the good, in the Protagoras, rest on sufficient grounds? (3.) 
 Animals may be trained to obedience ; a dog will rush into 
 the water to save a drowning child ; animals undomesticated 
 and untamed will die for the protection of their young : do 
 such facts as these indicate a knowledge of moral distinctions'? 
 Darwin's Descent of Man, i. c. iii. 'The Moral Sense.' Or. 
 the opposite side, Wallace's Contributions to the Jlieory oj 
 Natural 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 MORAL JUDGMENTS. 
 
 (INTUITIONAL THEORY.) 
 
 1. A Philosophy of personal experience, to be adequate, 
 must account for the origin and nature of each fact in ex- 
 perience. 
 
 2. As the knowledge here to be explained is my know- 
 ledge, it involves the relation between me and mine, and its 
 explanation must in part at least be in myself. Personality 
 contains the primary explanation of personal experience. 
 
 3. As the knowledge here to be explained is the know- 
 ledge of moral quality in the actions of myself and others, it 
 involves a further relation between me and others, and its 
 explanation may be in part beyond myself, in so far as it may 
 be concerned with what is neither me nor mine. The explan- 
 ation of some personal experience may in part be found in 
 what is beyond my personality. In so far as my experience 
 implies the recognition of moral distinctions by others, it may 
 find part of its explanation in other personalities. 
 
 4. As the fact now to be explained is KNOWLEDGE, not 
 Feeling, it can be accounted for only by the existence of a 
 cognitive power belonging to our personality. Whether this 
 power be an original power of mind, or the result of develop- 
 ment from simpler elements, is a question belonging to a later 
 stage of enquiry. However attained, this knowing power 
 belongs to our personality, and its exercise from time to time 
 depends upon our personality. 
 
24 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 5. The only philosophic warrant for acknowledging dis- 
 tinct powers in mind, is the discovery in consciousness of facts 
 essentially different in nature. Facts which differ must have 
 different explanations. If different facts have a common 
 source, it is because diverse powers exist in the same source 
 of activity. By distinct powers of mind, therefore, is meant 
 nothing more than the mind's power to produce facts essen- 
 tially different. 
 
 6. Knowledge of the moral qualities of actions is know- 
 ledge of matters of fact. Of such knowledge there are three 
 distinct forms. These are : Sensation, knowledge of impres- 
 sions made on our physical nature ; Perception, knowledge of 
 objects by self-directed observation ; Judgment, a more ad- 
 vanced knowledge of objects, either by simple comparison, 
 or by inference. 
 
 These generally admitted distinctions are here simply ac- 
 cepted as the product of Psychology in the purely intellectual 
 department of mental science. 
 
 As Affections and Sentiments presuppose knowledge, and 
 as the Laws of Association merely provide for the combination 
 of the facts of knowledge, these cannot afford any theory of the 
 origin of our knowledge of moral distinctions. Sentimental 
 and Associational theories are thus excluded on exactly the 
 same ground. 
 
 JONATHAN EDWARDS (1703-1758) made Benevolence the 
 standard of rectitude. * Virtue is the beauty of those qualities 
 and acts of the mind, that are of a moral nature, i.e. such as 
 are attended with desert or worthiness of praise or blame* 
 ' Virtue is the beauty of the qualities and exercises of the 
 heart, or those actions which proceed from them.' * True 
 virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to being in 
 general.' 'The first object of a virtuous benevolence is being, 
 simply considered : and if being, simply considered, be its 
 object, then being /// general is its object; and what it has 
 an ultimate propensity to, is the highest good of being in 
 
MORAL JUDGMENTS. 25 
 
 general.' A Dissertation concerning the Nature of true Virtue. 
 Chap. i. 
 
 DAVID HUME (1711-1776) referred to 'the original fabric 
 and formation of the human mind ' for the explanation of 
 moral distinctions. He held * that Reason and Sentiment 
 concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions,' 
 but ' the final sentence, it is probable, depends on some in- 
 ternal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in 
 the whole species.' Essay s, n. 222 Principles of Morals, 
 sect. i. The nature of this sense or feeling is thus indicated : 
 ' Every quality, which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or 
 others, is, in common life, allowed to be a part of personal 
 merit : ' the censure of the disagreeable and the approval 
 of the agreeable are thus * the universal sentiments of censure 
 v5r approbation which arise from humanity/ 
 
 The theory of ADAM SMITH (1723-1790) is founded on 
 Sympathy. Moral Sentiments, Part iii. (1759): 'We either 
 approve or disapprove of our own conduct, according as we 
 feel that, when we place ourselves in the situation of another 
 man, and view it, as it were, with his eyes, and from his 
 station, we either can or cannot entirely enter into and sym- 
 pathize with the sentiments and motives which influence it.' 
 Part iii. c. i. For his argument that 'general rules of 
 morality' are formed 'by finding from experience that all 
 actions of a certain kind are approved or disapproved of,' v. 
 Part iii. c. 4. 
 
 DR. THOMAS BROWN (1778-1820) agrees with Adam 
 Smith in so far as he grants that emotions are the basis of 
 moral distinctions, Philos. of the Human Mind, Lect. 59. He 
 says : l The action excites in us a certain feeling of vivid 
 approval. It is this irresistible approvableness . . . which 
 constitutes to us who consider the action, the virtue of the 
 action itself,' Lect. 73. ' On the undue place often given to 
 the Emotions," Chalmers's Sketches of Ment. and Mor. Philos. 
 
26 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 chap. vi. Of Associational Theories see detailed examination 
 in Div. IT. 
 
 7. Knowledge of moral quality in an action is not of the 
 nature of Sensation. Sensation is neither an act, nor the 
 knowledge of an act, but an involuntary experience conse- 
 quent on personal relation to a sensitive organism, and to 
 objects capable of making impressions on that organism. 
 Take, for example, the sensations of heat, cold, weariness, 
 and pain. 
 
 Those who originally described the moral faculty as a 
 ' Moral Sense,' meant by that either a power of perception, 
 or of judgment, with attendant emotions, not a mere capacity 
 of feeling or of sensation. Thus Shaftesbury (1671-1713), 
 ' In a creature capable of forming general notions of things, 
 not only the outward beings which offer themselves to the 
 sense, are the objects of the affection, but the very actions 
 themselves, and the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and 
 their contraries, being brought into the mind by reflection, 
 become objects, So that by means of this reflected sense, 
 there arises another kind of affection towards those very affec- 
 tions themselves which have been already felt, and are now 
 become the subject of a new liking or dislike.' Behaviour and 
 actions are said to be ' presented to our understanding,' and 
 the faculty is said to be 'a sentiment of judgment.' Inquiry 
 concerning Virtue, I. 2, sect 3 ; Characteristics, vol. ii. 29. So 
 Hutcheson, Syst. of Mor. Phil.; and Passions and Moral Sense. 
 
 8. Knowledge of moral quality in an action is not of the 
 nature of Perception. Perception being a simple recognition 
 of fact, can include oniv such facts as are capable of being 
 known by simple observation, that is, without comparison and 
 inference. For example, Perception gives knowledge of an 
 extended surface, but not of its measure ; knowledge of a 
 signal, but not of its meaning; knowledge of an action, but 
 not of its moral character. Knowledge of an extended sur- 
 face, of the presence of a signal, or of the performance of 
 
MORAL JUDGMENTS. 27 
 
 an action, is possible by simple Perception. But knowledge 
 of the measure of the surface, of the meaning of the signal, 
 and of the character of the action, are three examples of 
 knowledge requiring the application of a standard, that is, the 
 cognition of one thing by means of another, and this is 
 knowledge of a higher and more complex order than simple 
 Perception. 
 
 A theory of the knowledge of moral distinctions by means 
 of a moral sense, as an organ or power of perception, is thus 
 shown to be impossible. 
 
 9. Knowledge of moral quality is of the nature of Judg- 
 ment. The knowledge of an action as fact is me thing, the 
 knowledge of that action as right or wrong is another thing. 
 The former involves simple perception, the latter is attained 
 only by comparison. For example, the infliction of pain by 
 one upon another, as a simple act, may be seen in a variety of 
 circumstances. In one case we may regard it as morally 
 right, in another as morally wrong. In any case we must first 
 know the relation of the persons concerned, the motive of the 
 agent, and the contemplated end. If the relations of persons 
 be that of parent and child ; if the motive of the parent be 
 desire of the child's improvement ; and the warrant, a parent's 
 right to restrain disobedience in a child, we pronounce one 
 verdict. On the other hand, if the persons concerned are 
 related as neighbours, and if the suffering is inflicted in malice, 
 we give an opposite verdict. In either case we form a judg- 
 ment. Again, restricting attention to our own consciousness, 
 take for example the experience of an envious disposition. 
 The knowledge of the presence of envy in the mind, is simple 
 perception ; the knowledge of its character as morally wrong 
 is knowledge of a higher order, implying a prior knowledge, 
 however obtained, as to Tightness and wrongness, and the 
 application of that prior knowledge to the particular fact per- 
 ceived. It thus appears that the knowledge of moral quality 
 is not obtained without comparison 
 
28 JHA NDB OK OF MORAL PHIL OSOP21 Y. 
 
 10. Moral Judgment does not result from the comparison 
 of individual objects, but from the comparison of a particular 
 act with a general truth. The comparison of an envious dis- 
 position present in consciousness, with a former experience of 
 the same kind, only warrants the affirmation that these are 
 two examples of the same disposition. Their similarity of 
 nature being recognised, and the accuracy of a judgment of 
 condemnation upon the earlier experience being assumed, 
 there is a legitimate inference to the wrongness of the present 
 disposition ; but it is thereby proved that the judgment is not 
 attained by simple comparison of particular cases. The first 
 judgment, and by consequence, every dependent judgment, 
 must be accounted for by reference to a general truth appli- 
 cable to all examples of the same form of experience. Moral 
 Judgments, therefore, take rank as judgments which apply a 
 definite standard in particular cases. 
 
 11. Moral Judgments are not distinguished by moral 
 quality, as right or wrong, but by intellectual quality, as true 
 or false, correct or incorrect ; and they are as liable to error 
 as other judgments. Hutcheson's Syst. of Mor. Philos. i. 4, 9. 
 
 12. Every accurate moral judgment affirms a particular 
 application of a general moral truth. It contains a prin- 
 ciple valid as a law of activity, not only in the particular case, 
 but in all similar cases ; not only at this time, but at all times 
 (Id quod semper aequum et bonum est); a principle whose 
 validity is in its own nature. There are other judgments 
 which apply a standard altogether adventitious, the result of 
 agreement, or of common association. Judgments of morality 
 differ in this respect from judgments of measurement. The 
 judgment that an honest or benevolent act is right, contains 
 an element of self-evident truth. The judgment that an ex- 
 tended body is seven yards long, contains an element of truth 
 dependent on common consent. In morality, the standard of 
 judgment is invariable, because independent of personal or 
 national choice. In measurement, the standard of judgment 
 
MORAL JUDGMENTS, 29 
 
 is variable, because dependent upon national sanction. There 
 may be various standards of measurement, but only one 
 standard of morality. Truthfulness, and nothing else, must 
 be the standard of morality in utterance. Honesty, and 
 nothing more nor less, must be the standard of morality 
 affecting property. It is therefore an essential feature of a 
 valid moral judgment that it carry in it a general truth. 
 
 13. PROBLEMS. (i.) Distinguish between the Tightness 
 of an action, and the approbation of the action. (2.) In dis- 
 cussing the manner in which moral qualities are recognised, is 
 the question as to * that which renders morality an active 
 principle' (Hume, followed by Mackintosh) legitimately intro- 
 duced 1 ? (3.) Distinguish between the rightness of an action, 
 and the merit of an agent. (4.) How is the moral quality ol 
 an action distinguished from obligation to do or not tc 
 vio it 'i 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 
 
 (INTUITIONAL THEORY.) 
 
 1. As Moral Judgments involve the application of a general 
 truth to a particular action, they pre-suppose knowledge of 
 First Principles as a requisite for the discovery of moral dis- 
 tinctions among actions. For example, approval of a man 
 who speaks the truth, is implicitly approval of truthfulness 
 itself. The ultimate intellectual basis of the approval may be 
 very dimly perceptible to the person pronouncing the judg- 
 ment ; but when such a judgment is scientifically tested, its 
 philosophical warrant is found in the general principle that 
 Truthfulness itself is right, that is, that Truthfulness is of the 
 very nature of rectitude. Mr. Martineau denies that Morality 
 is a system of truths. Essays, second series, p. 6. 
 
 The term Principle {princrpium^ a^x 7 ?) signifies literally a 
 beginning, and may refer to any commencement. Within the 
 mind, it applies either to first principles of knowledge or to 
 sources of activity, such as the passions. It is here employed 
 in the former sense exclusively. See Reid, Intell. Powers, 
 Essay vi. c. 4, and Hamilton's Notes, p. 761 ; very particu- 
 larly Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Transcend. Dialectic, 
 Intro, ii., Meiklejohn's transl. p. 212. In the latter sense it 
 is employed by Hume, Adam Smith, and others who assign 
 superiority to sentiment. 
 
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS, 31 
 
 2. The general truths involved in moral judgments are 
 such in their nature that a reasoned contradiction of them 
 cannot be maintained. Their opposites are incapable of 
 vindication by any test, either from the forms of knowledge, 
 or from the facts of experience. That Falsehood is right, that 
 Malevolence is right, that Cowardice is right, are positions 
 which cannot be reasoned out as applicable to human conduct. 
 Hume's Essays (Prin. of Morals, sect, i.) ; Reid's Inteli. 
 Powers, vi. 6 (Hamilton's Ed., p. 454). 
 
 3. The general truths involved in moral judgments are not 
 generalized truths dependent for their validity on an induction 
 of particulars; but self-evident truths, known independently 
 of induction. They are as clearly recognised when a single 
 testing case is presented for adjudication, as when a thousand 
 such cases have been decided. In this relation, the Inductive 
 Method guides merely to the fact that such truths are dis- 
 covered in consciousness. But Induction as little explains the 
 intellectual and ethical authority of these truths, as it settles 
 the nature of the facts pertaining to physical science. The 
 Tightness of Honesty is not proved by an induction of par- 
 ticulars. But the conclusion that ' Honesty is the best policy,' 
 is essentially a generalization from experience. 
 
 For elucidation of the former statement, it is needful to dis- 
 tinguish between the Action, the Judgment, as to its moral 
 character, the Warrant for that judgment, and the Abstrac- 
 tion which represents the particular form of moral quality 
 present, namely, Honesty. Exchange of property by mutual 
 consent may stand for the example. The judgment is that the 
 acquisition of property in such a manner is morally right. What 
 then is the warrant for this judgment? The purchaser pays his 
 money and receives the property. Purchase depends on pos- 
 session of the purchase-money. Honesty consists in paying 
 the price. In pronouncing upon an exchange of property, 
 therefore, we lean on a principle which determines what is right 
 in acquiring property. How did the purchaser obtain his 
 
32 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 money? In reply, we are led back to personal effort, where 
 we come upon the natural law of production the ultimate law 
 on which Political Economy rests man possesses wealth by 
 producing it. The source of property is in the man himself. 
 So it is with the source of truthfulness, temperance, bene- 
 ficence. The moralist is thus led into the inner circle of human 
 life. He deals with the activity which has its source within 
 and only its ultimate results in the outer world. Moral quality 
 does not belong to property, but only to personal activity ; 
 consequently, moral considerations are not concerned with 
 variety in the kinds of property, but only with the lines of 
 action taken for securing it. Rightness or wrongness applies 
 to personal action in acquiring property. And the question of 
 morality in acquisition, must depend upon what is right in 
 producing property. This result is reached by simple analysis 
 of the facts, discovering their relation to each other. By the 
 use of his understanding in the direction of his energies, man 
 becomes a producer. This is, in point of fact, the origin of 
 property. 
 
 This analysis brings us to Personality as the centre and 
 source of the activity to which alone moral distinctions are 
 applicable. The question as to property thus becomes ultim- 
 ately a question as to the use or non-use of our powers. By 
 the use of our powers property is produced ; without such 
 activity, production is impossible. The enquiry is thus con- 
 cerned with what is right in the use of our powers. Here there 
 are two preliminary facts essential to the case. These are, 
 the existence of powers to be used, and ability for self-direc- 
 tion in their use. The latter is obviously itself a power, which 
 might be included in the first statement, but it is here dis- 
 tinguished as different from the producing powers, and con- 
 cerned in their control. There are then powers, physical and 
 mental, by the use of which man becomes a producer, and he 
 has power of self-direction, by means of which he can deter- 
 mine, with due regard to external circumstances, what he shall 
 
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 33 
 
 being the facts, the principle which decides 
 righti^ss of acquisition is, that it is right in a man to use his 
 powers >" their natural ends. This principle comes from the 
 depth of our nature ; it is the outcome of Personality ; and the 
 knowledge of it is a necessary condition of an intelligent, self- 
 directed life. This is Intuition. It is the immediate recog- 
 nition of the moral law, which appoints man to be a producer. 
 By a power inherent in our Reason, the principle is recognised 
 as self-evident. Thus, in the recognition of moral principle, 
 the mind is the source of simple ideas, as Price maintained. 
 By our Will, the principle may either be voluntarily accepted as 
 the guide of conduct, or voluntarily rejected. But, to prove 
 that the natural use of our powers is right, and the neglect of 
 their use wrong, is as needless, as the attempt would be vain. 
 That it is right to use our natural powers, is a proposition 
 quite distinct from these two ; that it is agreeable to exercise 
 our powers, and that it is useful to employ them. The first 
 expresses a principle, or rule of conduct ; the second and third 
 merely affirm distinct facts. Thejfor/ is a preliminary rule of 
 action, presupposed as a requisite for the guidance of personal 
 conduct ; the second applies simply to an accompaniment of 
 action, and is discovered only in acting ; while the third applies 
 to the external results of effort, which can be ascertained 
 only by experience. Self-direction presupposes the know- 
 ledge of the distinction between right and wrong in conduct, 
 originating in self-knowledge ; the agreeable and the useful 
 both presuppose action itself as the condition of their discovery. 
 Now, in distinguishing between right and v/rong, the right- 
 ness of using our natural powers for their natural ends may 
 be accounted the earliest and most general form in which the 
 distinction is recognised. It may even be regarded as the 
 foundation principle of morality. If unity is attainable in 
 morals, it is here. (For discussion of the question whether 
 virtue is one, v. Plato's Protagoras.} Viewing this principle 
 as affording guidance in the acquisition of property, every step 
 
 c 
 
34 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 may be taken by means of its application, until we reach the 
 lightness of exchange. When we say, Industry is right, we 
 only give an interpretation of the principle. By use of our 
 powers, we originate property, and the Tightness of such 
 acquisition is implied in the principle. The use of our powers 
 for their natural ends, clearly covers the attainment of these 
 ends. And once more, the Tightness of acquiring other pro- 
 perty through means of that which has been self-originated, is 
 only a more extended application of the same principle. 
 
 In this principle, that which is wrong becomes equally 
 apparent. The right implies the wrong. Self-direction means, 
 doing the right, and avoiding the wrong. If the natural use 
 of our powers is righl, the non-use of our powers is wrong, 
 and so also is their unnatural use. An inactive life is wrong. 
 Put abstractly, Idleness is wrong. Viewed in relation to 
 property, an unproductive life is wrong ; and so of necessity, 
 the waste of property is wrong. 
 
 This principle, springing from the very nature of Personality, 
 must apply equally to all persons. Rightness in the use of 
 natural powers, and consequently Tightness in acquiring pro- 
 perty, must hold in the case of all men. The cheat, the thief, 
 and the robber are doubly condemned : first in respect of the 
 violation of the law of their own personality, by the unnatural 
 use of their powers ; &&& secondly, in respect of the violation of 
 the personality of another, by obstructing the use of his powers 
 for natural ends. The idler, being distinguished only by 
 the non-use of his powers, and not coming into view by 
 direct action as a deliberate injurer of others, may less rouse 
 our indignation, but he no less comes under the double con- 
 demnation. He violates the law of his own personality, and 
 at the same time interposes to check the legitimate applica- 
 tion of the law of personality in the case of others, by drawing 
 upon their powers of production for the supply of his own 
 \vants. By another course, he occasions the same results to 
 others, as are occasioned by the cheat. 
 
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 35 
 
 Having thus seen how the Tightness of personal activity, in 
 harmony with our nature, involves the Tightness of acquiring 
 property, we have reached the point where the transition is 
 made from right action, to personal Rights connected with 
 property. From the origin of property, the Rights of property 
 arise, namely, the right to hold and the right to use. These 
 rights do not constitute Morality, they are its consequents. 
 Rightness comes with the person. Rights come with the 
 property. Personal Rights there are besides, no doubt, but 
 they also are consequent upon what belongs to the person, 
 and presuppose a law of conduct superior to social arrange- 
 ments. These Rights cannot be constituted by Law; they 
 afford to Law an original basis, so that the law is unjust 
 which disregards them. Rights of Property come to be 
 amrmed only in connexion with Risks of Property, and so 
 point to social relations in which possession may be disputed 
 or endangered, and not to the fundamental question of right- 
 ness in acquiring property. That there is an advantage to 
 the community from guarding the rights of private property, 
 is a consideration still further removed from the fundamental 
 question of morality, and is to be settled by induction of 
 particulars. When thus settled, as it very easily can be, and 
 uniformly has been settled in every civilized nation, the 
 advantage reaped from the protection of property becomes a 
 sanction of morality, which, however, presupposes morality itself. 
 
 Recognising, as we are thus led to do, a manifold applica- 
 tion of the moral law regulating acquisition of property, we 
 are on the way for generalizing as to the form of moral excel- 
 lence which appears in all these cases. We trace the common 
 feature equally in the small and in the great. Thus we form 
 a generalization as to the use of our powers, and designate it 
 by the name of INDUSTRY ; and another generalization as to 
 the acquisition and exchange of property, and designate it by 
 the name of Honesty, Fairness, or Equity The ]ust,justitia; 
 The Equal, TO "crov. These abstractions belong to the intel- 
 
36 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 lectual furnishing of every man. As generalizations they are 
 more or less clear and full, according to the reflection of the 
 individual. But the law of morality bearing on acquisition of 
 property is prior in knowledge and fundamentally requisite 
 for the formation of the abstract conceptions of Industry and 
 Honesty. 
 
 When we speak of an Intuitional Theory of Moral Dis- 
 tinctions, we mean that the Law which decides what is right 
 is so connected with the nature of the Person, that the 
 recognition of it is involved in intelligent self- direction. The 
 knowledge is immediate, and its source is found within the 
 mind itself. When we say of moral truth that it is self- 
 evidencing, we mean that the Law carries in itself the evi- 
 dence of its own truth. Taking Mr. Herbert Spencer's form, 
 we may say, it ; s 'indisputable.' Indisputability, however, 
 may apply in two directions to facts and to principles. The 
 Moral Law affords an example of- the latter. As to the 
 Validity of the principle, the evidence of that lies in its own 
 nature as a proposition or formulated truth. When we say 
 that moral truth is its own warrant, we mean that it is by its 
 nature an authoritative principle of conduct. Its credentials 
 belong to its nature. Such laws of human conduct are ' the 
 unwritten IPWS,' which Socrates says cannot be violated with- 
 out punishment. Mem. iv. 4, 13. 
 
 After the same manner as that adopted above, we must 
 vindicate the essential Tightness of the natural use of our 
 powers of intelligible communication with others, the law of 
 truthfulness ; of our powers of benefiting others, the law of 
 benevolence, and so with courage, temperance, etc. Such truths 
 as those now described as self-evident principles of action, are 
 also designated ' necessary truths.' This expression is very 
 suitable in many ways, but the risk of ambiguity is consider- 
 able. Professor Bain explains the distinction thus : ' The 
 necessary, or what must be true, is opposed to the contingent* 
 which may or may not be true.' Mental and Moral 
 
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 37 
 
 B. ii. c. 6. This cannot be accepted. ' Necessary' and ' con 
 tingent' are adjectives which qualify truth. The contrast is 
 between ' necessary truth ' and ' contingent truth,' not be- 
 tween what must be true and what may be false. The dis- 
 tinction is between the true in principle and the true in fact. 
 The one is truth recognised by the Reason, which is superior 
 to all occurrences. The other is the truth of facts, things 
 done, occurrences, and is recognised by Observation. 
 
 Besides this, there has been another source of ambiguity. 
 'Necessary truth' has sometimes been made to mean truth 
 which we are necessitated to think. Consequent upon this 
 use of the phrase, with which usage the Scotch Philosophy 
 unfortunately is peculiarly chargeable, and the German Philo- 
 sophy has its own share of blame, it has been made to appear 
 as if these truths, instead of being by their own nature irrever- 
 sible, drew their authority only from the necessities of our 
 Intellect, a doctrine which I do not think has any evidence in 
 its support. That our intellectual constitution is such as to 
 fit us for the recognition of the principles of action seems 
 plain in point of fact, whatever difficulty there may be in ex- 
 plaining the process of recognition. But truths recognised as 
 self-evident, have their authority in their own nature, so as to 
 be essentially irreversible. Their contraries cannot be made to 
 wear even the semblance of truth. Such principles as these, 
 that truthfulness, justice, and benevolence are right in them- 
 selves, are authoritative as rules of conduct, and capable of 
 enduring the test of application to the minutest details of life. 
 So difficult is it to keep to an opposite view, that we could 
 not wish the position better taken than has been done by 
 Hobbes : * The Laws of nature are immutable and eternal ; for 
 injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acceptance of 
 persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can 
 never be that war shall preserve life, and peace destroy it' 
 Leviathan, Pt. i. 15, Molesworth's ed., vol. iii. p. 145. This 
 feature of essential validity is what Kant has expressed by say- 
 
38 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ing that moral principles have ' unlimited, universal validity/ 
 unbeschrankte allgemeine Gultigkeit. That these truths 
 are seen by us to be self-evident, is a fact which adds nothing 
 to their authority, but involves only the recognition of an 
 authority which is inherent. As self-evident, the truth in the 
 proposition is instantly recognised, a fact well expressed by 
 Cicero's word promptu, and also by our derivative prompt. As 
 to the Psychological question concerning the mode or manner 
 in which instantaneous recognition is secured, that seems 
 inexplicable. These self-evident truths are brought from 
 within in some manner not discovered in consciousness, and 
 are instantaneously accepted. Quae ita sunt in promptu, ut 
 res disputatione non egeat. De Offitiis, i. 2. 
 
 Here the dividing point in the history of philosophic 
 thought is reached. For an outline of the course taken by 
 the two distinct currents of thought, see close of present 
 chapter. 
 
 4. The general principle which gives validity to an accurate 
 moral judgment, is present in that judgment only by impli- 
 cation, not by formal expression. Its formal recognition is 
 not matter of common observation, but is dependent upon 
 a philosophic process. The ordinary moral judgment deals 
 with the concrete, not with the general or the abstract. Men 
 do not enunciate general truths, when they decide on the 
 Tightness or wrongness of an action. Philosophy is not 
 needed for any such decision. Kant's Metaph. of Ethics, p. 
 164 (3d ed.) ; Cousin, Philos. of Kant, Henderson's transl. p. 
 167. But Moral Philosophy must determine how a prompt 
 decision in morals may be given without formal recognition o! 
 a principle, which by implication is nevertheless accepted. 
 
 5. Viewed simply as an exercise of mind, simultaneous 
 with rational exercise, the recognition of general truths or 
 principles is perception or intuition of a higher order, as the 
 recognition of simple fact is perception or intuition of a lower 
 order. Knowledge of the former kind implies direct insight 
 
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 
 
 into necessary truth. The possibility of such insight is the 
 highest characteristic of our intelligent nature. 
 
 6. The power to recognise such self-evident truth has 
 been named Reason, in contrast with Reasoning or Under- 
 standing. (Novs in contrast with Atavoia; Vernunft in contrast 
 with Verstand). Kant formally enunciated this distinction. 
 Kritik der Reinen Vermmft, Die Transc. Dialectik n. A., 
 Werke, ed. Rosencranz, n. 242 ; Meiklejohn's transl. Critique 
 of Pure Reason, p. 212; Coleridge's Aids to Reflection, 8th ed. 
 p. 167 ; Hamilton's Reid, Note A, sect. 5 ; M'Cosh's Intuitions, 
 Pt. in. B. i. ch. ii. sect. 6. Knowledge of fact is knowledge 
 by onlook ; knowledge inferred is knowledge of one thing 
 through means of another; knowledge of first principles is 
 knowledge by insight into truth higher than fact. 
 
 7. Viewed simply as a form of knowledge, knowledge of 
 first principles is distinguished by intellectual quality, not by 
 ethical. It is knowledge of truth, but it is not in any proper 
 sense right action. Insight into absolute moral truth, arising 
 from the unfolding of intelligence itself, is a necessary function 
 of mind, and therefore not capable of being reckoned among 
 moral actions, which must be self-determined, as matters ot 
 choice. 
 
 8. The first principles of morals, being concerned with 
 personal activity, are essentially laws of conduct, while they 
 are principles of truth. That principle which determines 
 what is right, determines what is law for me. As by our con- 
 stitution we are appointed to a life of activity, so from the 
 same source comes the discovery of the law for the guidance 
 of our conduct. As the first principles of morals are of the 
 nature of absolute truth, so are they absolute law, involving a 
 ' categorical imperative,' to use the renowned expression of 
 Kant. Metaph. of Ethics, p. 27, 3d ed.; Price, Principal 
 Qiiestions of Morals, c. vi.; Hutcheson, System of Mor. Phil. 
 ii. ii. 3, Glasg. 1755. 
 
 It cannot be held with Kant in his Intellectual Theory, 
 
40 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 that the a priori elements of our knowledge are merely regu- 
 lative, not assertive. See Cousin, Philos. of Kant, p. 174. 
 The position, which seems to me untenable even in reference 
 to Pure Reason (the purely Intellectual), is manifestly so in 
 reference to Practical Reason (the Moral). For whereas in 
 the former case, the a priori elements of knowledge may be 
 said to be merely regulative of thought, in the latter they are 
 regulative of conduct, thereby making our actions, with depend- 
 ent experience, a continual test of their validity. A moral 
 principle is first a truth discovered as an element of knowledge ; 
 and next a law, recognised as a determinator of action. It is 
 first a revelation (Offenbarung) of truth, in order that it may 
 next be a law of life for an intelligent being. 
 
 9. While the principles of morality belong in their nature 
 to the sphere of the absolute, they belong in their applica- 
 tion to the sphere of the phenomenal or transitory : this 
 is involved in parag. 4. Kant holds that ' Right cannot 
 appear as a phenomenon/ Critique of Pure Reason, Doct. of 
 Elements, Pt. i. sect. 9. In ordinary experience, when a moral 
 principle is recognised by us, it appears in its application to 
 some line of conduct. To formulate and interpret the principle 
 implies a philosophic process, but it also requires a definite 
 example from which to begin. Only on the acknowledgment, 
 that absolute truth can be manifested in transitory forms, can 
 there be a common rule of conduct for humanity. Only by 
 the harmony of fleeting actions with absolute truth, which is 
 at the same time absolute law, can there be consistency of 
 human life. Without these, uniformity of law and consistency 
 of action are lost in the specialities of Individualism. In such 
 a case, each man is a law to himself, not by personal submis- 
 sion to recognised common law, but by express denial of it, 
 and assertion of self-will. 
 
 It is impossible with philosophic warrant to maintain, as 
 Kant has done, that man as intelligence exists in a cogitable 
 world entirely separated from the phenomenal world. Metaph. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF 
 
 > 
 
 of Ethics ^d ed.), pp. 52, 63, 71, 147. Rather, it is cleaf^iat 
 the spheres of a priori truth, and of experience, are so esstn-i 
 
 1 I '~^ 
 
 tially related, that they cannot be separated, or contemplated'/" 
 as contradictory. 
 
 10. First principles of morals do not contradict each 
 other, either in their nature as truths, or in their application 
 as laws. 
 
 It has been a common objection against the Intuitional 
 theory, that in attaining a variety of sovereign moral laws, 
 it fails to provide for adjudication between them. The 
 objection is thus stated by Mr. Mill : ' In other systems, the 
 moral laws all claiming independent authority, there is no 
 common umpire entitled to interfere between them.' Utili- 
 tarianism, p. 37. This objection is connected with the appli- 
 cation of the principles, not with their nature. But, in order 
 to conflict in practice, they must contradict each other in 
 nature, which does not happen. The principle of truthfulness 
 does not conflict with that of justice, nor the latter with that 
 of benevolence. Each principle of morals applies to a line 
 of activity all its own, and always its own. * The same 
 general principles are common to all men, nor does one such 
 principle contradict another.' Epictetus, i. 23. Further it is 
 to be observed, that moral principles, as applying to perfectly 
 distinct lines of activity, do not, on the ground of inherent 
 authority, make a claim for extending that authority over 
 spheres of activity which other principles regulate. In prac- 
 tical application, therefore, they do not contradict each other. 
 Further, if perplexity arise as to the time when a principle of 
 morality should have application, while other principles are 
 left in abeyance, this perplexity affects neither the validity, 
 nor the authority, of the principles ; but is a question of 
 present duty, which is quite distinct, and will afterwards have 
 attention under the head of Moral Obligation. 
 
 11. There are first principles of intellectual truth, as there 
 are of moral truth. The former are laws of intelligence, as 
 
42 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the latter are laws of conduct. Of the former, the laws of 
 non- contradiction and of causality are examples. Regarded 
 as facts in consciousness, both are distinguished by the same 
 character of self-evidence. In so far as they may be referred 
 to a distinct power of mind, the power is one. The name 
 commonly given to this Power Reason, as distinguished 
 from the Understanding or Reasoning power is merely a 
 name for Intelligence as competent to the function of recog- 
 nising self-evident truths. This is its highest function, the 
 power for which is a fundamental condition of intelligent 
 activity. 
 
 12. As of self-evident truths, some are applicable in purely 
 intellectual relations, others in exclusively moral relations, this 
 difference of application gives such warrant as high scientific 
 convenience can afford, for distinguishing Intellectual or Specu- 
 lative Reason from Moral or Practical Reason. Other war- 
 rant there is none. There is no such difference in the nature 
 of the power exercised in the two cases, as to provide a philoso- 
 phic basis for the distinction in classification and terminology. 
 
 As however the two spheres of application are concerned 
 with two separate departments of science, the distinction is 
 inevitable, for the sake of scientific accuracy. The more 
 effectually to secure such accuracy, it is of consequence to 
 make the popular term, CONSCIENCE, apply to Reason in its 
 moral applications, as contrasted with Reason in its specu- 
 lative bearings. Kant's distinction between Pure Reason and 
 Practical Reason, however suitable in some respects, is not a 
 distinction philosophically valid. If the recognition of a priori 
 truth be the function of Pure Reason, then the Practical 
 Reason is also Pure Reason. Mctaph. of Ethics (3d ed.) 
 p. 64. Speculative Reason and Practical Reason might mark 
 the difference. 
 
 13. PROBLEMS. (i.) If a priori principles are confessedly 
 conditions necessary for the attainment of human experience, 
 are these principles more than conditions, and entitled to rank 
 
FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORALS. 43 
 
 as Truths 1 The problem is, To find the philosophic inter- 
 pretation of ' condition ' in this case. (2.) If apriori truths are 
 not always present to all minds (and the hypothesis which 
 Locke controverted, is confessedly ridiculous), how is the re- 
 cognition of them possible ? The problem is, To attain the 
 Psychological law under which apriori truth may at any time 
 be presented in consciousness. For Kant's Spontaneity of 
 Reason, Met. of Eth. 71-75. (3.) Granting that there are a priori 
 truths of Intelligence and of Practice, and that both are laws 
 of mind, in what respect do they, as Laws, differ from each 
 other 1 ? The problem is To interpret legality in the two cases. 
 (4.) If Moral Principles are at once Truths, and Laws, can we 
 draw rigidly the distinction between these two aspects of the 
 same Principle? (5.) If the mind is itself the source of primary 
 truth, how far is mind dependent upon experience for the use 
 of what it possesses 1 (6.) Can Truth be at once absolute and 
 phenomenal ? Can these two characteristics be found in com- 
 bination 1 ? (7.) Can Truthfulness as a law of Personal Con- 
 duct, come into conflict with Justice as a law regulating the 
 relations of Persons 1 (8.) Can a priori moral truth be re- 
 presented as expressing nothing ' except general legality/ or 
 'the form of law in general'] Kant's Met. of Ethics ', p. 13, 
 3d ed. 
 
 SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT 
 AS TO THE SOURCE OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL 
 TRUTH. 
 
 THE standard of moral decisions is the test of every system 
 of Ethics. With this is closely connected the source from 
 which the knowledge of the standard is drawn. The briefest 
 outline of the history of thought on this subject is all that can 
 be attempted. 
 
44 HA NDB O OK OF MORAL PHIL O SOT II 1 '. 
 
 In contemplating the Ancient Philosophy, it is needful to 
 keep in view that the questions as to the ultimate standard of 
 morals, and the source of our knowledge of that standard, 
 were not so definitely raised as in modern times. The utmost 
 care is required in order to guard against judging the termino- 
 logy of ancient times by modern distinctions. 
 
 SOCRATES, born about 470 B.C., made it his chief business 
 to reach a proper understanding of such general conceptions 
 as piety, justice, bravery, temperance, and virtue. In this, as 
 Aristotle affirms, Metaph. xii. 4, he simply carried out a pro- 
 cess of generalization, in order to form a general or abstract 
 conception, which might be afterwards applied to any variety 
 of examples. These general conceptions he constantly sub- 
 jected to the test of experience. He insisted that knowledge 
 is essential to virtue, or, even more broadly, that knowledge is 
 virtue. This last declaration, which is commonly represented 
 as the central position of the Socratic philosophy, involves a 
 theory of practice, rather than of knowledge, resting on the 
 allegation that no man is knowingly vicious. While con- 
 cerning himself with the significance of ethical conceptions, 
 he did not raise the question as to the ground on which 
 general conceptions are held to afford a standard of moral 
 distinctions. If, however, we may regard the Platonic Socrates 
 in the Thecztetus as the historic Socrates, he argued strenuously 
 against the doctrine of Protagoras, which reduces everything 
 to the phenomenal. Our best authorities as to the theory of 
 Socrates are Xenophon's Memorabilia, and Plato's Apologia. 
 After these in importance come the Platonic Dialogues, and 
 references in Aristotle's Metaph. and Ethics. See Stanley's 
 Lives of the Philos. ; Ritter's Anc. Philos. vol. ii. ; Schwegler's 
 Hist, of Philos., Dr. Hutchison Stirling; Zeller's Socrates and 
 Socratic Schools, Reichel j Ueberweg's Hist, of Philos., G. S. 
 Morris, Michigan, TheoL and Philos. Lib. ; Lewes's Hist, cf 
 Philos. ; Sir A. Grant's Aristotle, Essay ii. 
 
 PLATO, born about 427 B.C., rises into a higher region of 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 45 
 
 enquiry. He gives to the general conceptions of Socrates the 
 character of Ideas, which constitute the fundamental ideas of 
 Reason, the perfect essences of things the eternal laws of 
 being, and belong to a super-sensible state, ' a world or sphere 
 of ideas.' Intelligence is confused with the shadows of the 
 sensible state, and is ever striving to rise into this ' upper 
 world ' of higher knowledge. Here the Good, which he ulti- 
 mately identifies with God, is supreme. See specially the 
 Republic, B. vii., Jowett's transl. ii. 348; Aristotle's Metaph. 
 i. 6. The power to know these primary ideas ' is already in 
 the soul/ Rep. vii. ; and their presence may be explained by 
 a theory of reminiscence, possible on account of our having de- 
 scended from a higher sphere : Meno, Jowett's Transl. i. For 
 the student of Moral Philosophy, the most important of the 
 Platonic Dialogues are Protagoras, Meno, Gorgias, Phsedo, 
 Philebus, and Republic, i.-iv., and specially B. vii. On Plato's 
 Philos., see Ritter's History, and the admirable representation 
 of it in Archer Butler's Ancient Philos. vol. ii. From an 
 opposite point of view, Grote's Plato. 
 
 ARISTOTLE, born 384 B.C., formally separates Ethics from 
 other sciences. He commences the Nicom. Ethics with a 
 discussion of the chief good, summum bonum, apia-rov, or 
 the perfect good, TO reActov dya#ov, which he declares to be 
 Happiness. He is thus led into the doctrine of the Mean, 
 fjLt<roTr)<s, or avoidance of extremes, previously touched upon 
 by Socrates, Mem. ii. i. n. The leading part of the Ethics 
 assumes the Utilitarian or the Eudaemonistic form. A different 
 phase of theory appears in Books v., vi., vii., on account of 
 which it has been disputed whether these books were written 
 by Aristotle himself, or by Eudemus as an amplification of 
 the sayings of his master. In Book vi. the rule of practical 
 life is, to act according to right reason, Kara rov 6p6ov Aoyoi'. 
 Reason is distinguished into Scientific, eTrtcm^oi/iKov, which 
 contemplates necessary matter, and the Reasoning or Dis- 
 cursive Faculty, AoyicrriKoV, which deals with contingent 
 
46 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 matter. Even here, however, it is left uncertain what is the 
 standard by which to determine the mean, and there are 
 admissions which seem to imply that there is no certain in- 
 variable standard. If the genuineness of Books v., vi. and 
 vii., be allowed, and the internal criticism against them is not 
 conclusive, it is difficult to harmonize them with the forms of 
 life enumerated in B. i. c. 5. In any case, the theory is bur- 
 dened with the admission, i. 4, that while happiness is the 
 summum bonum, men are not agreed as to happiness, or what 
 is most desirable. Grote maintains that 'by referring the 
 principles to Intellect (Nous), Aristotle does not intend to 
 indicate their generating source, but their evidential value and 
 dignity.' * To say that they originate from Sense through In- 
 duction, and nevertheless to refer them to Intellect (Nous) as 
 their subjective correlate, are not positions inconsistent with 
 each other, in the view of Aristotle.' Grote's Aristotle, vol. 
 ii. App. ii. p. 293. That both positions were taken b> 
 Aristotle seems plain ; that he raised the question of their 
 consistency is not clear. That they did not seem to Aristotle 
 inconsistent, can be maintained on no better ground than that 
 he accepted both. But this is rather lofty as a canon of in- 
 ternal criticism, That an author is never inconsistent. On 
 Aristotle's Ethical system, see Ritter, Schwegler, Ueberweg, 
 Sir A. Grant's Aristotle's Ethics, Essays and Notes ; Whewell's 
 Systematic Morality, p. 140. From the Utilitarian stand- 
 point, Lewes's Aristotle, and Grote's Aristotle. 
 
 Here it should be remarked that the prominent defects of 
 ancient systems are such as to render them, on the practical 
 side, incompatible with a theory of necessary or universal 
 moral law. They are systems constructed for the State, not 
 for Humanity ; for friends, but not for foes. Human in their 
 origin and development, they became more or less sectarian 
 in their application. The inconsistency is glaring even in the 
 midst of the grandeur of Plato's Ideal system. Zeller dwells 
 on some of these defects in the ist chap, of Stoics, etc. 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 47 
 
 The two conflicting elements of Aristotle's theory part 
 company, and form two distinct and conflicting philosophies in 
 the later movements. The two antagonistic theories are re- 
 presented by the Stoics and the Epicureans, and thenceforth 
 these two divisions continue down the line of history. The 
 separation of the conflicting elements was attended on each 
 side by a disparagement of that which was rejected, and a con- 
 sequent undue exaltation of that preferred. The Stoics selected 
 the Rational nature as the true guide to an ethical system, 
 but they gave to it supremacy so rigid as to threaten the ex- 
 tinction of the subject affections. The Epicureans, laying hold 
 of the doctrine that happiness is the chief good, gave such 
 ascendency to the desirable as to threaten the mob-rule 
 against which Plato had protested. 
 
 The STOIC Philosophy was essentially a moral philosophy 
 in which right action was rational action, and in this light 
 the Stoic maxim is to be interpreted, to live according to 
 nature, o^uoXoyov/xevcos rrj <fjv(ret QV. For while this implies 
 harmony with the universe, it is by Reason that such harmony 
 is recognised ; and this is made so vital, as practically to lean 
 on the Socratic doctrine, that knowledge is virtue. But with 
 the Stoics, as with Socrates, there is indecision as to the 
 standard, though it is commonly said that the knowledge of 
 right is given by nature. For the Stoic Philosophy, see JDiog. 
 Laertius, B. vii., specially lives of Zeno (about 350 B.C.), 
 Cleanthes, Chrysippus. See also Plutarch ; Cicero, De Fini- 
 bus and De Offiriis ; with Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus 
 Aurelius. Histories, as above, very particularly Zeller's Stoics, 
 etc., Reichel. 
 
 The system of EPICURUS, B.C. 342, made Happiness the 
 chief good, and declared the end of Philosophy to be the 
 guidance of man in the attainment of it. The pleasure of the 
 soul is placed above that of the body ; but there is no stand- 
 ard higher or more authoritative than the agreeable. Diogenes 
 Laertius, B. x. ; Plutarch, Cicero, and references as above. 
 
48 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 CICERO, 106 B.C., gave moral philosophy the precedence. 
 In all his thought, he was swayed by the Greek Philosophy, and 
 though vacillating and undecided in many points, was avow- 
 edly (De Off. i. 2) an adherent of the Stoics. Though far 
 from being consistent as to the criterion of truth, he held to 
 * innate notions,' notiones innatce, and the common consent of 
 the nations, consensus gentium. He maintains, that a man can- 
 not say that he is ignorant of duty, Acad. Pr. 34 ; and that the 
 conviction of the wisest men has been, that Law was neither 
 invented by the genius of men, nor an institution of the 
 popular will, but something eternal, De Leg. ii. 4. 
 
 It is necessary here to pass, as transcending needful limits, 
 the Neo-Platonic Philosophy of Plotinus, A.D. 204-269, Aurelius, 
 and Porphyry ; the Patristic period, when Christianity did so 
 much to quicken and expand philosophic thought ; and the 
 age of the Schoolmen, with the controversy between the 
 Nominalists and Realists. For the history of thought during 
 these periods, see specially Ueberweg's History of Philos^ 
 Cudworth's Immutable Morality, and Sir W. Hamilton's Dis- 
 sertation A., supplementary to Reid's Works. 
 
 DES CARTES (1596-1650), the father of modern philosophy, 
 made innate ideas a distinctive feature of his system. He 
 held that these ideas are given by the light of nature, lumen 
 natures. He divides ideas into innate, adventitious, and 
 factitious, Medit. Hi., where see his definition of Nature. His 
 theory is more fully unfolded in the Principles of Philosophy. 
 In a letter to the French Translator of the Principles^ he gives 
 an important explanation of his views as to these innate ideas 
 or principles of Knowledge. ( They must be so clear and 
 evident that the human mind, when it attentively considers 
 them, cannot doubt of their truth ; in the second place, the 
 knowledge of other things must be so dependent on them as 
 that though the principles themselves may indeed be known 
 apart from what depends on them, the latter cannot be known 
 apart from the former.' Prof. Veitch's Translation, p. 94, 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 49 
 
 and note, 207, Des Cartes did not enter formally on Ethical 
 Philosophy, 
 
 SPINOZA (1632-1677), a disciple and expounder of Des 
 Cartes, developed a system very different from the Cartesian, 
 His thinking was directed chiefly to the grandeur of the Divine 
 nature, and our dependence upon God. His theory, developed 
 in The Ethics, is dialectic in form, depending almost wholly on 
 definitions of terms, not upon observed facts, and is Pantheistic 
 in substance. It holds the conception of the Deity to involve 
 such all-pervading existence, and all-efficient agency, as to 
 make The Ethics really an exposition of the impossibility 
 of Ethics, Still, Spinoza is to be interpreted not from the 
 standpoint of Scepticism, but from that of Faith. His defini- 
 tion of Substance is the basis of his whole system. ' By 
 substance I understand that which is self-existent, and is 
 conceived only through itself; that is to say, Substance is 
 that the conception of which requires the conception of 
 nothing else from which it must be derived.' The Ethics, Pt, 
 I. Def. 3. This is the beginning and end of all that Spinoza 
 maintains. From this it follows that ' no substance can exist, 
 or be conceived to exist, except God.' All existence is a 
 manifestation of Deity, and can be in no sense distinct from 
 the Deity. * All things are determined by the necessity of the 
 Divine nature.' ' Things could not have been produced by 
 God in any other way than they have been.' From these 
 positions in Part I., there necessarily follows, in Part n., a view 
 of the human mind directly contrary to Personality or self- 
 originated activity. The human mind is 'constituted by 
 certain modes of the Divine attributes.' The False is ' merely 
 want of knowledge.' * Men deceive themselves when they 
 fancy themselves to be free.' Belief in freedom is possible only 
 because we are ' ignorant of the causes which determine our 
 actions.' On this Psychology rests the Ethical system of Part 
 in. * Affections or Emotions ' are states of body and their 
 ideas, Def. 3. Things awaken in us pleasure or pain, Prop. 
 
 D 
 
50 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 xv.; they are accordingly liked or disliked, loved or hated, 
 Prop, xvi.; we strive to do whatever men regard with plea- 
 sure, and to avoid the contrary, Prop, xxix.; as different men 
 are differently affected, they love and hate different things. 
 Morality is thus the play of love and hate, based on likes 
 and dislikes. The mind is grieved by contemplating its own 
 inability to act; grief occasioned by our own weakness is 
 humility, joy occasioned by our own power is self-satisfac- 
 tion, humility is intensified when we imagine ourselves to be 
 blamed by others, Prop. LV. Spinoza's Definitions of the 
 Affections of the mind are found at the close of Part in. 
 The system is a theory of human conceptions, in which the 
 highest transcendental conception rules, and logical deduction 
 carries the theory of human practice down to the lowest type 
 of sensationalism. In the Ethics of Spinoza the extremes 
 meet. Benedict! de Spinoza Opera Philosophica Omnia, vol. i. 
 ed. Bruder, Leipzig, 1843-1846 ; Benedict de Spinoza: his Life, 
 Correspondence, and Ethics, translated by Willis, London, 
 1870. 
 
 MALEBRANCHE (1638-1715) held the Cartesian doctrine, 
 affirming that there are necessary truths, which are truths of 
 the Universal Reason. Recherche de la Verite, I. 4; Search 
 after Truth, translated by Taylor. On this basis he founds 
 morality. Traite de Morale. 
 
 LEIBNITZ (1646-1716) accepted the same account of the 
 source of our knowledge of fundamental truth. Nouveauoc 
 Essais, B. I., ed. Erdmann, p. 204. 
 
 HOBBES (1588-1679) devoted himself to Moral Philosophy. 
 Contemporary with Des Cartes, he founded his theory on an 
 opposite view. ' Concerning the thoughts of a man, . . . the 
 original of them all, is that which we call Sense, for there 
 is no conception in a man's mind which hath not at first, 
 totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of sense.' 
 Leviathan, I. i. At the same time, he held 'Eternal laws of 
 Nature,' i. 15, a chapter of great interest, though difficult to 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 51 
 
 harmonize with the preceding theory. For the statement of 
 the fundamental feature of his ethical system, see below, 
 Div. ii. ch. 2. 
 
 CUDWORTH (1617-88) maintained, in reply to Hobbes, 
 that there is ' a natural, immutable, and eternal justice ' 
 (Immutable Morality, i. i) ; and that * there are some ideas . . . 
 which must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of 
 the mind itself.' Ib. iv. 2. An able discussion, but depend- 
 ing too much on argumentation as to the essences of things. 
 
 LOCKE (1632-1704) made it a primary aim to oppose the 
 theory of ' innate ideas.' He insisted that there are neither, 
 speculative nor practical principles belonging to the mind by 
 its original constitution. ' Children and idiots have not the 
 least apprehension or thought of them.' Essay i. ii. sec. 5. 
 Recognition of them by children seems to him the only con- 
 ceivable view of ' innate truths/ although it is altogether dif- 
 ferent from Des Cartes's theory, or any other that had been 
 maintained. According to Locke, all our knowledge is obtained 
 through Sensation and Reflection. In support of moral law, 
 the Christian refers to ' Happiness and misery in another life;' 
 the Hobbist, to the power of the state ; the old heathen 
 philosophers to the dignity of man and the highest perfection 
 of human nature. * Hence naturally flows the great variety of 
 opinions concerning the moral rules, according to the different 
 sorts of happiness they have a prospect of, or purpose to them- 
 selves.' i. iii. 5, 6. 
 
 WOLLASTON (1629-1724) denied ' innate maxims/ and also 
 rejected the happiness theory. He held that the reasoning- 
 power, or rational faculty, is the judge of actions and the 
 governing principle of life. He thus made ' right ' identical 
 with ' truth.' Religion of Nature Delineated. 
 
 SAMUEL CLARKE (1675-1724) insisted that there are 
 ' eternal and necessary differences of things/ and a consequent 
 * fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or 
 different relations one to another.' \ This fitness determines 
 
52 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Tightness. ' Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion/ 
 published in same volume with The Attributes. 
 
 JOSEPH BUTLER (1692-1752) held that 'there is a principle 
 of reflection in men, by which they distinguish between, ap- 
 prove, and disapprove their own actions. We are plainly con- 
 stituted such sort of creatures as to reflect upon our own 
 nature.' Sermon i. 'There is a superior principle of reflec- 
 tion or conscience in every man which distinguishes between 
 the internal principles of his heart, as well as his external 
 actions ; which passes judgment upon himself, and thus . . . 
 magisterially exerts itself . . . and goes on to anticipate a 
 higher and more effectual sentence/ It is, 'considered as a 
 faculty, in kind and in nature, supreme over all others, and 
 which bears its own authority of being so/ Sermon n. ' You 
 cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without 
 taking in judgment, direction, superintendency.' Ib. ' Had it 
 strength, as it has right ; had it power, as it has manifest 
 authority, it would absolutely govern the world.' Ib. Beyond 
 this Butler does not push the inquiry. 
 
 PRICE (1723-1791) held that the understanding is the 
 source of simple ideas, that ' our ideas of right and wrong are 
 simple ideas, and must therefore be ascribed to some power of 
 immediate perception.' Principal Questions of Morals. 
 
 HUME (1711-1776) propounded a Sceptical Philosophy 
 which reduced existences to a series of appearances, and 
 mind to a bundle of perceptions. Treatise on Human Nature, 
 i. i. i.; and i. iv. 6. He advocates the Utilitarian theory of 
 morals, but not with complete consistency. He says, ' Those 
 who have denied the reality of moral distinctions may be 
 ranked among the disingenuous disputants.' Essays, n. 223, 
 Principles of Morals. In the Appendix on Moral Sentiment, 
 he adds, p. "348, ' Virtue is an end, and is desirable on its own 
 account, without fee or reward, merely for the immediate 
 satisfaction which it conveys.' The inconsistency of such a 
 sentence is a curiosity of the Sceptical philosophy. To Hume's 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 53 
 
 Scepticism, Intuitionalism has been peculiarly indebted for a 
 powerful impulse experienced in Scotland, Germany, and 
 France. On the relation of the Scotch and German Philo- 
 sophies, see Cousin on Kant, Henderson's Translation, 
 p. ii. 
 
 REID (1710-1796), in reply to Hume, maintained that the 
 mind has a knowledge of truth superior to that gathered by 
 experience. ' There are propositions which are no sooner 
 understood than they are believed . . . there is no searching 
 for evidence, no weighing of arguments ; the proposition is not 
 deduced or inferred from another ; it has the light of truth in 
 itself, and has no occasion to borrow it from another.' These 
 truths are called 'first principles, principles of common sense, 
 common notions, self-evident truths.' Of these, some are 
 'first principles in morals.' I?itell. Powers (1785), Essay vi. 
 chaps, 4 and 6. ' I call these first principles, because they 
 appear to me to have in themselves an intuitive evidence 
 which I cannot resist.' Active Powers (1788), v. i. The 
 closing words here are objectionable, because they make it 
 appear as if it were by some constraint that we acknowledged 
 the truth of the propositions. 
 
 DUGALD STEWART (1753-1828) was the resolute upholder 
 of the same theory. Elements of the Philos. of the Hum. Mind 
 (1813), vol. n. i ; Works, in. 23. First Truths, Stewart 
 designates 'the fundamental laws of human belief, or the 
 primary elements of human reason.' 
 
 KANT (1724-1804) is the leading champion of an a priori 
 philosophy, whose singular ability, with adaptation of the 
 national mind, has given Germany the first place in prosecut- 
 ing the investigations of mental philosophy. It was by Hume's 
 Sceptical philosophy that Karit was roused * from his dogmatic 
 slumber, 5 Introd. to the Prolegomena, Werke, Rosencranz, in. 
 9, a rousing of more than common significance to the philo- 
 sophic world. For Kant's view of Hume, see Kritik der 
 Rein. Vern.; Critique of Pitre Reason, Meiklejohn's Transl. 
 
54 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pp. 453 and 464, and Introd. to Prolegomena. Cf. Cousin's 
 Philos. of Kant, Henderson's Transl., p. 145. 
 
 Kant set to work critically, to ascertain how much in con- 
 sciousness is to be assigned to experience, and how much is 
 a priori, or original to mind. The result led him to maintain 
 an a priori element in the exercise of the Senses, Sinne, of the 
 Understanding, Verstand, and of the Reason, Vernunft. Exer- 
 cise of the senses is possible, only under the a priori forms of 
 space and time ; of the understanding, under the primitive pure 
 notions, denominated Categories. The exercise of the Reason 
 gives Ideas, out of which principles originate. The three 
 grand Ideas of Reason are the Soul, God, and the Universe. 
 Still, we know only phenomena, or passing appearances. Of 
 things-in-themselves, noumena, we can know nothing. Even 
 the ideas of Reason themselves, involve us in hopeless con- 
 fusion. At this point, Kant does not part company with 
 Hume. Yet they completely differ in this respect, that Kant 
 maintains the reality of things-in-themselves. With him, the 
 Mind is a noumenon, existing in a supersensible or cogitable 
 world, superior to the laws of causality. With certain marked 
 differences, the theory of Kant here becomes analogous to 
 that of Plato. With the ancient philosopher, the supersensible 
 world is one from which we have descended, and -to which we 
 may climb again by philosophy ; with the modern, we are 
 now both in the supersensible world, and out of it, being 
 within it as pure mind, but without, in so far as we are con- 
 cerned with the sensible and phenomenal. According to 
 Kant, the a priori forms, notions, and ideas, which are not 
 criteria of truth, are conditions of our intelligence which we 
 impose on phenomenal experience. This is akin to that 
 formula of Reid which represents first principles of intelligence 
 and morality, as convictions which we cannot resist ; but quite 
 inferior to Reid, who maintains that a priori principles have 
 ' the light of truth in themselves.' With Kant, the ideas of 
 pure reason, though involving us speculatively in contradictions, 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 55 
 
 are nevertheless regulative of intellectual life. Kant's intel- 
 lectual theory, with all its speculative insight, and grandeur of 
 conception, is negative and sceptical in its conclusion, from 
 which its cognitive or supersensible world cannot be accredited 
 as a philosophic deliverance. Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, 
 Werke, Rosencranz, n. ; Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's 
 Translation ; MahafTy's Kant for English Readers ; Schwegler's 
 History, translated by Dr. J. Hutchison Ttirling ; Ueberweg's 
 History, translated by G. S. Morris ; Cousin's La Philosophic 
 de Kant, translated with admirable Introduction by A. G. Hen- 
 derson, London, 1854; Inquisitio Philosophic^ by M. P. W. 
 Bolton, London, 1866 ; Time and Space, by Dr. Shadworth 
 Hodgson, London, 1865 ; Kant, article in Encyclo. Britann., 
 8th ed., by Rev. Professor John Cairns, D.D. For the ter- 
 minology of Kant, see Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's 
 Transl. p. 224; Encyclo. W'orterbuch der Kritischen Philosophic, 
 by G. Mellin, eleven vols. Leipzig, 1797 ; Krug's Handwb'rter- 
 bitch, Leipzig, 1832, 2d ed. 
 
 Kant's Ethical Theory, in accordance with the Intellectual, 
 is a priori m its structure. It is in the region of practice that 
 we tianscend the phenomenal, and attain the real. 'The 
 Practical Reason ' discovers truth ; the ' Autonomy of the Will ' 
 carries us beyond the phenomenal into the cogitable or super- 
 sensible world. Here the Categorical Imperative or Moral 
 Law, our own Personality, Freedom of Will, and the Being of 
 God, are all certainly discovered. In accordance with the 
 nature of the categorical imperative, the formula of all morality 
 
 IS, ACT FROM A MAXIM AT ALL TIMES FIT FOR LAW UNI- 
 VERSAL. Grundlegung zur Mtlaph. der Sitten, 1785; and 
 Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, 1788, both in vol. vm. of 
 Werke, Rosencranz The Mctaphysic of Ethics, translated by 
 Semple, which I have edited, with Introduction, 3d ed., Edin- 
 burgh M. 
 
 JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762-1814), adopting a pure 
 Idealism, discarded the Speculative Reason of Kant, and 
 
56 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 regarded Reason as practical. In Ethics, he first developed 
 the Science of -Rights. Grundlage des Naturrechts, 1796, 
 Werke by J. H. Fichte, in., translated by Kroeger, Science 
 of Rights, Philadelphia, 1869; and afterwards the Science of 
 Morals, System der Sittenlehre, 1798, Werke, Th. iv. With 
 Fichte, Self-consciousness is the test of rationality, and the 
 Rational Being necessarily posits itself as a free-will agent. To 
 such a rational agent, Morality is action according to the 
 ideas of Reason, in order to attain perfect or absolute 
 freedom. 
 
 GEORG W. F. HEGEL (1770-1831) made the Idea the source 
 of all reality. His system is developed as a Dialectic, pro- 
 ceeding from Pure Being as its starting-point. It is more a 
 Philosophy of Logical Possibilities than a Philosophy of Mind 
 or known existence, though of necessity it is wrought out with 
 the materials which experience affords. Wissenschaft der 
 Logik, 1833-34, Werke, ni.-v. His Ethical Theory is in 
 accordance with his general scheme. It is divided into three 
 parts, Abstract Right, Morality in the individual life, and 
 Moral Principles applied to social life. Grundlinien der 
 Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin, 1821, Werke, vm. Hegel's 
 line of progress is as follows, starting from a conception such 
 as Being, to pass over to its opposite, Not-Being, and then by 
 the combination of both to reach a higher unity, or stage in 
 advance, Becoming. The notion is thus the first moment, 
 reaching the antithesis, is the second moment, and the com- 
 bination, is the third moment. This tripartite movement, 
 Hegel regards as involved in every stage of philosophic pro- 
 gress. In accordance with its character, Universality and 
 Necessity are the prominent features of the scheme. 'The 
 philosophical science of morals possesses the Idea of Right, 
 the Conception of Right, and its realization in objects/ 
 sec. i, p. 3. In harmony with Fichte, he says, * The ground 
 of the Right is the mental, and its primary position and start- 
 ing-point, the Will, so that freedom constitutes its substance 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 57 
 
 and distinction, and the system of Right is the realm of real- 
 ized freedom, the world of mind brought out from itself, as a 
 second nature,' sec. 4, p. 14. Then comes the development, 
 according to the Hegelian system, of the pure or indeter- 
 minate Ego (I), into the determinate, by a metaphysical pro- 
 cess. After this, the immediate or natural Will, encountering 
 Impulses, Desires, and Inclinations, realizes itself in action, 
 by an ethical process. In this, Personality is reached, sec. 31, 
 p. 41. The Mind has objects and aims, and so is a Person. 
 4 Personality involves capability of Right.' ' The Law of 
 Right is therefore, BE A PERSON AND RESPECT OTHERS AS 
 PERSONS,' sec. 36, p. 42. In application of this the Right of 
 the moral Will involves three sides, (i.)the abstract or formal 
 right of the action, (2.) the speciality of the action, as having 
 a determinate aim, in harmony with abstract right, this is the 
 Well (Wohl), and (3.) the realization of this in act, which is 
 the Good, and its antithesis, the Bad, where appears the ap- 
 plication of Conscience, sec. 114, p. in. 
 
 In judging of Hegel, it is needful to distinguish between 
 his method and the substance of his system, keeping at the 
 same time in view, that this philosopher of abstractions held 
 that 'everything true is concrete' (alles Wahre ist concret), 
 sec. 7, p. 19. The substance of the theory has for the most 
 part been previously and otherwise obtained. Without Kant 
 there could have been no Hegel. The critical method pre- 
 ceded this dialectic, supplied the materials, gave the key and 
 the later philosophy has come after, with a splendid dialectic 
 exercise, working up these materials into a new form, afford- 
 ing ample proof of the validity and consistency of the funda- 
 mental conceptions of Reason. But as a separate and 
 independent system of philosophy, I cannot think it capable 
 of enduring. The basis of all real philosophy lies where 
 Kant uncovered the distinction between the a posteriori and 
 a priori, knowledge by experience, and knowledge original 
 to mind ; and the beginning of all philosophizing is where Des 
 
5S HANDBOOK: OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Cartes began, I think, therefore I am. If both philosophers 
 seriously failed in rearing the superstructure, this is only in 
 keeping with the analogy of discovery ; but certainly both 
 achieved, as Hegel also has done, a very grand part in the 
 work which belongs to ages. 
 
 FRIEDRICH E. D. SCHLEIERMACHER (1768-1834) discussed 
 the whole system of Ethics from the point of view afforded 
 by the highest good. He maintained that ' the activity of 
 Reason upon the nature, expresses the beginning and ending 
 of the science of morals.' Sittenlehre (1835), sec. 91 ; Werke 
 Philos. v. p. 52. 'As Moral Philosophy is completely un- 
 folded as a doctrine of Good, or of the Highest Good, so is 
 it the full expression of the whole unity of Reason and Nature.' 
 But the highest good is not to be taken as a single good, but 
 as a totality, ' the organic connexion of all good,' a doctrine 
 which comes closely upon the Utilitarian Theory, though it is 
 not so iegarded by Schleiermacher himself. 
 
 The FRENCH philosophers belonging to the latter half of 
 the eighteenth century, carried out the sensationalism of 
 Condillac, by developing a utilitarian system of morals. Thus 
 HELVETIUS (1715-1771) argues from sensation as the origin 
 of all knowledge, to the pleasurable as the ground of moral 
 distinctions. De r Esprit, Paris, 1758; J)e V Hovime, Lon- 
 don, 1772; and Les Progres de la Raison dans la Recherche 
 du Vraij London, 1775. D'HOLBACH (1723-1789), making 
 actions the necessary product of our organism, develops a 
 moral system similar to that of Helvetius. Systeme de la 
 Nature; ou Des Lois du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral^ 
 1770. 
 
 The French School of the nineteenth century, drawing its 
 inspiration mainly from the Scotch School, partly from the 
 German, finds the basis of morality in necessary principles of 
 rectitude. Following Laromiguiere, Maine de Biran, and 
 Royer-Collard, Victor COUSIN (1792-1867) is a conspicuous 
 example. The critic at once of Locke and of Kant, he was 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 59 
 
 the vindicator of Reid, and the upholder of universal and 
 necessary principles as the basis equally of speculative and of 
 practical science. The True, the Beautiful, and the Good, 
 translated by O. W. Wright, Edinburgh, 1854. See specially 
 Lects. i.-in. xi. and xiv. 
 
 THEODORE JOUFFROY (1796-1842) was the distinguished 
 disciple and colleague of Cousin. Travelling along a course 
 of independent investigation, he reached the same conclusions 
 in morals. The main steps are these : There are ' primitive 
 tendencies ' in our nature, and * faculties ' for attaining the 
 ends sought by these tendencies, 'pleasure' results from the 
 use of these faculties. Reason finds these tendencies and 
 faculties developed, enters into the meaning of all things 
 connected with our nature and circumstances, and acquires 
 an idea of the true end of our being. Thus man attains to 
 morality in self-guidance, for he is moral only by the attain- 
 ment of universal absolute ideas. From a survey of the 
 relations of distinct personalities, there comes the conception 
 of Universal Order. The idea of Order awakens the reverence 
 of Reason, and is accepted as ' the natural and eternal law.' 
 'All duty, right, obligation, and rules of morality spring from 
 this one source, the idea of good in itself, the idea of Order. 
 Cours de Droit naturel, Paris, 1834; Introduction to Ethics ^ 
 translated by W. H. Channing, Boston, 1840, 2 vols. Jouffrovs 
 own theory is given in vol. i. 1-82. 
 
 AUGUSTE COMTE (1798-1857) has, more recently in the 
 history of France, become leader of a reaction. In his 
 desire to attain certainty, he seeks, under the name of 
 Positivism, to restrict philosophy to the recognition of facts 
 and laws, to the exclusion of causes. He proposes to abandon 
 * metaphysical idealities ' for observed realities, as if external 
 observation discovered the only realities, or as if metaphysical 
 investigation involved rejection or disparagement of external 
 facts. 
 
 For the student of Moral Philosophy, the most important 
 
60 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 parts of the Cours de Philosophic Positive, are the Introductory 
 discussion on the nature of Philosophy, and Book vi., Social 
 Physics, chaps, v. and vi. ; the one entitled Social Statics, or 
 theory of the spontaneous order of human society ; the other 
 entitled Social Dynamics, or theory of the natural progress of 
 human society. 
 
 Comte is profuse in his charges of ' imbecility ' all round, 
 and of 'transcendental idiocy' in a special direction, while 
 he assures his readers that the Positive Philosophy ' reorganizes 
 everything that it touches,' and that 'Social Science has no- 
 where yet risen to the positive except in this book.' In spite 
 of such blemishes, the parts of his work mentioned above well 
 deserve careful study. 
 
 I have already indicated, Introd. sect. 4, that Comte rejects 
 Psychology, on account of the alleged impossibility of follow- 
 ing the introspective line of inquiry, instead of which he offers 
 a Biology, or theory of life. I have also explained, Introd. 
 sect. 6, that he further insists that the laws of human conduct 
 must be studied in society, not in the nature and experience 
 of the individual. The moral system which he proposes is 
 thus a Sociology, with no law of personal life save that which 
 may be deduced from the data recognised in social organiza- 
 tion and progress. I will now give the main points of Comte's 
 system, in so far as it is concerned with human conduct. In 
 doing so, I shall quote from the translation given by Miss 
 Harriet Martineau, The Positive Philosophy of AugusU Comte, 
 2 vols., London, 1853. 
 
 Comte denies that society originates in utilitarian consider- 
 ations, and holds that there is ' a spontaneous sociability of 
 human nature/ ii. 127. There is in our nature a 'preponder- 
 ance oi the affective over the intellectual faculties/ 128. 
 There is 'a certain degree of spontaneous activity as the 
 chief cerebral attribute of humanity/ 136. 'The intellectual 
 faculties are naturally the least energetic, and their activity, if 
 ever so little protracted beyond a certain degree, occasion in 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 6r 
 
 most men a fatigue which soon becomes utterly unsupportable. 
 Nevertheless, it is on the persevering use of these high faculties 
 that the modifications of human life, general and individual^ 
 depend/ To produce and sustain intellectual effort, some 
 impulse is needed from 'lower but stronger propensities.' 
 ' The individual nature of man becomes lofty in proportion as 
 incitement proceeds from propensities which are of a higher 
 order/ 129. 'Our affective faculties must preponderate/ in 
 order to give ' a permanent aim and direction ' to the activity 
 of our reason. ' Our social organism is, then, what it ought 
 to be, except as to degree ; and we must observe and remem- 
 ber that it is in our power, within certain narrow limits, to 
 rectify this degree of difference/ ' The lowest and most per- 
 sonal propensities have, in regard to social relations, an un- 
 questionable preponderance over the nobler/ ' our social 
 affections are inferior in strength and steadiness to the per- 
 sonal/ 'this condition is necessary/ in order to stimulate 
 exertion, and ' it is only its degree we have to deplore/ 'All 
 notions of public good must be based on those of private 
 advantage, because the former can be nothing else than that 
 which is common to all -cases of the latter/ 130. By Comte 
 our moral nature seems to have been regarded as consisting 
 of our affective faculties our social and personal propensities 
 though this is not expressly affirmed. ' Our moral nature 
 would be destroyed and not improved, if it were possible to 
 repress our personal instincts/ 131. 'The statical analysis 
 of our social organism' shows that the development of the 
 race rests on ' a certain system of fundamental opinions/ or 
 common beliefs, 156 j and what Positive Philosophy aims at is, 
 to ascertain ' how those habits and views are to be rationalized, 
 so as solidly to establish the universal obligations of civilized 
 man/ and thus to generate 'universal moral convictions/ 475. 
 ' When the morality of an advanced society bids us love our 
 neighbours as ourselves, it embodies, in the best way, the 
 deepest truth, with only such exaggeration as is required ID 
 
62 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the formation of a type, which is always fallen short of in 
 practice/ 131. ' The sympathetic instinct, and the intellectual 
 activity,' 'those two chief moderators of human life/ 132 
 * are especially destined to compensate mutually for common 
 social insufficiency/ 131 ; and 'the first function of universal 
 morals, in regard to the individual, consists in increasing this 
 double influence/ 132. 'So much for the first Statical divi- 
 sion the Individual.' 
 
 From this fundamental part of the theory concerning 
 human nature, I pass to the Dynamical, or theory of human 
 progress. ' If we regard the course of human development 
 from the highest scientific point of view, we shall perceive 
 that it consists in educing more and more the characteristic 
 faculties of humanity, in comparison with those of animality.' 
 'While the radical dispositions of our nature are necessarily 
 invariable, the highest of them are in a continuous state of 
 relative development/ 149. The order of evolution is thus 
 determined : ' Though the elements of our social evolution are 
 connected, and always acting on each other, one must be prepon- 
 derant, in order to give an impulse to the rest, though they may 
 in their turn so act upon it as to cause its further expansion.' 
 ' We must find out this superior element, and ... we cannot 
 err in taking that which can be best conceived of apart 
 from the rest, while the consideration of it would enter into 
 the study of others. This double characteristic points out the 
 intellectual evolution as the preponderating/ 156. One conse- 
 quence is that ' we must choose for consideration in this 
 intellectual history, the most general and abstract conceptions, 
 which require the exercise of our highest faculties. Thus, it is 
 the study of the fundamental system of human opinions with 
 regard to the whole of phenomena . . . which must regulate 
 our historical analysis.' ' The scientific principle of the theory ' 
 (of human progression) ' appears to me to consist in the great 
 philosophical law of the succession of the three states : the 
 primitive theological state, the transient metaphysical, and the 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 63 
 
 final positive state, through which the human, mind has to 
 pass in every kind of speculation,' 157. The Theological 
 period or state is explained thus, ' The necessity of the 
 intellectual evolution, I assert, lies in the primary tendency of 
 man to transfer the sense of his own nature into the radical 
 explanation of all phenomena whatever/ ' The only way in 
 which he can explain any phenomena is by likening them, as 
 much as possible, to his own acts/ 159. This theological 
 period is necessarily the first stage, * for the facts which must 
 form the basis of a positive theory could not be collected to 
 any purpose without some preliminary theory which should 
 guide their collection. Our understanding cannot act without 
 some doctrine, false or true, vague or precise, which may con- 
 centrate and stimulate its efforts, and . . . those who expect 
 that the theory will be suggested by the facts, do not under- 
 stand what is the course necessarily pursued by the human 
 mind, which has achieved all real results by the only effectual 
 method, of anticipating scientific observations by some con- 
 ception (hypothetical in the first instance) of the corresponding 
 phenomena/ 161. 'The only alternative from total inactivity 
 was, in those days, in the pursuit of the inaccessible subjects 
 which are represented by the theological philosophy.' 
 
 1 The metaphysical philosophy takes possession of the 
 speculative field after the theological has relinquished it, and 
 before the positive is ready for it.' * The method of modifi- 
 cation consists in substituting gradually the entity for a deity 
 when religious conceptions become so generalized as to 
 diminish perpetually the number of supernatural agents/ 171. 
 4 The increasing subtlety of metaphysical speculation is for 
 ever reducing their characteristic entities to mere abstract 
 denominations of the corresponding phenomena, so as to 
 render their own impotence ridiculous when they attempt 
 explanations/ 172. 
 
 The metaphysical period is only a transitional stage to the 
 Positive, for ' men are unable to emancipate themselves ' from 
 
64 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the theological system, ' except by abandoning altogether 
 these inaccessible researches and restricting themselves to the 
 study of the laws of phenomena, apart from their causes/ 160. 
 ' Under this system of general education, morality will be 
 immoveably based upon positive philosophy as a whole, and 
 Human nature being one of the branches of positive know- 
 ledge, it will be understood how childhood is to be trained in 
 good habits, by means of the best possessions ; and how those 
 habits and views are afterwards to be rationalized, so as 
 solidly to establish the universal obligations of civilized man, 
 duties personal, domestic, and social, with the modifications 
 that will be required by changes in civilisation/ 474. The 
 positive spirit is the only one which can ' generate universal 
 moral convictions/ and develop ' the social sentiment as a 
 part of morals.' The metaphysical system ' bases morality 
 on self-interest/ but * positive morality, which teaches the habi- 
 tual practice of goodness, without any other certain recom- 
 pense than internal satisfaction, must be much more favour- 
 able to the growth of the benevolent affections than any 
 doctrine which attaches devotedness itself to personal con- 
 siderations/ 475. V. Huxley's Lay Sermons^ vin. p. 162. 
 
 I proceed to consider briefly the value of this system, 
 regarded as an Ethical Theory. Its first distinctive feature is, 
 that it is a Sociology, or theory of society regarded as a unity, 
 not a theory of personal conduct according to which each 
 individual is a separate factor. A man is not regarded as a 
 representative of the race, in whose nature the characteristics 
 of the race may be fairly studied, but merely as an atom in a 
 great totality apart from which the individual is deserving of 
 no scientific consideration. It is said, 'As every system 
 must be composed of elements of the same nature with itself, 
 the scientific spirit forbids us to regard society as composed 
 of individuals. The true social unit is certainly the family/ 
 ii. 132. This is obviously correct as to society, in contrast 
 with mere association of individuals, but in making this 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 65 
 
 essential also to the theory, it is shown to be a Sociology, not 
 a Moral Philosophy. That social phenomena are governed by 
 laws as rigorous as those of the physical universe is admitted. 
 But, as a matter of fact, actions originate with individuals, and 
 therefore, as a matter of scientific demand, there must be a law 
 of personal action determining right conduct for an individual, 
 in absence of which Positivism has no claim to be regarded 
 as a Moral Philosophy. 
 
 The next distinctive feature of Positivism is its rejection of 
 Psychology, on the radical ground of a denial of the possibility 
 of introspective observation. Mr. Mill has with great effect 
 pointed out the incompleteness of Positivism as a philosophic 
 system, on account of the exclusion of Psychology from the 
 circle of the sciences. Auguste Comte and Positivism, by J. S. 
 Mill, 62-67. I am specially concerned with the bearing of 
 this omission on an ethical theory. Comte has a biological 
 theory of human nature, in contrast with a psychological, 
 a theory of life instead of a theory of mind. That any theory 
 of human life must include mind, is admitted. But, can a 
 theory of life include mind without introspective observation? 
 Comte meets this with the statement that introspection is 
 impossible. But, let the reader look back on the summary of 
 Comte's Statical theory given above, and he will find a whole 
 series of statements, most admirable in their nature, as to 
 passions, higher affections, and intellectual faculties. All 
 these are based on introspective observation, they are parts 
 of a psychology, but they are nothing more than parts, 
 because thoroughness of investigation in this department 
 Comte did not attempt. The consequence is that, while 
 there is a true morality running all through Comte's discus- 
 sion, there is no moral philosophy. He has not even come 
 in sight of the difficulties to be encountered in attempting to 
 construct a doctrine of moral obligation. But the morality 
 which he proclaims is clearly reached by a use of the psycho 
 logical method, in contradiction of his o\vn assertion of the 
 
 t 
 
66 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 impossibility of its use. The defenders of Comte have taken 
 up defensible ground in alleging that the founder of the system 
 did observe mental processes by the same method as that 
 which Mr. Mill supports. But the correctness of the defence 
 is admitted only at the cost of surrendering the absurd allega- 
 tion that Psychology is impossible. Dr. Bridges pleads quite 
 reasonably, and with strict accuracy, that ' if by Psychology 
 be meant the study, by every means that are available, of the 
 moral and intellectual functions of man, it is very certain that 
 Comte was a psychologist, though he naturally avoided a word 
 which connected him with a contemporary school of meta- 
 physicians. . . . The study of the intellectual and moral functions 
 was prosecuted by Comte throughout his life, and that on 
 methods, not, I imagine, materially different from those which 
 you would adopt. ' The Unity of Comte 's Life and Doctrine; 
 a Reply to Strictures on Comte" s later Writings, addressed to J. S. 
 Mill, Esq., M.P., by J. H. Bridges, M.D., London, 1866. 
 Mr. G. H. Lewes accepts this defence, quoting with approval 
 the passage from which the above extracts are taken. Hist, 
 of Philosophy, H. 627. Undoubtedly Comte used introspec- 
 tion, while he declared it impossible ; and thus he was a 
 psychologist, in a hesitating imperfect way. That he ' natur- 
 ally avoided a word which connected him with a contempor- 
 ary school of metaphysicians' may be admitted, when we 
 remember how he charged metaphysicians with imbecility and 
 idiocy, how he condemned the metaphysical stage of evolu- 
 tion, and proclaimed t^at Positivism is not only superior but 
 perfect. Comte was a Psychologist, a Metaphysician. How 
 could he help it 1 } In restricting philosophy to what we can know, 
 was he not bound to inquire into our powers of knowledge, 
 as well as into the facts known ? If he were to treat of moral 
 problems, how could he do otherwise than enquire into our 
 mental constitution, so as to distinguish between passions and 
 intellect 1 ? Mr. Lewes, speaking of Religion, has well said, 
 that ' to regulate the Feelings, it must furnish an explanation 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 67 
 
 of man, such as enables us to understand, and by understand- 
 ing adapt ourselves to the Internal Order, which constitutes 
 the moral life.' Hist, of Philos. n. 639. And so, to give any 
 theory of the Internal Order which constitutes moral life, 
 Philosophy must be introspective and analytic. 
 
 The last distinctive feature of Positivism in this connexion 
 is the Dynamical theory, based on the law of the three stages 
 of social evolution. In this part, the system is not properly a 
 Sociology, but a theory of the intellectual conditions under 
 which men have attempted explanations of the phenomena of 
 the external world. That these explanations have exercised a 
 mighty influence on the intellectual development, and on the 
 social, moral, and religious condition of the race, Comte has 
 shown with great ability, and with a success which will command 
 general admiration. But this is not Sociology, and, though 
 often concerned with morals, it does not contribute anything 
 towards the formation of a Moral Philosophy. He has given 
 a history of speculations, not a philosophy of human nature, 
 nor a theory of moral life. An ethical theory cannot take the 
 form of speculation as to the most probable explanation of 
 the occurrences in the physical world. Even if the law of the 
 three stages were accepted as affording a key to intellectual 
 progress, it cannot provide a theory of right practice. Even as 
 a theory of intellectual development, it does not explain much. 
 It merely says that the human race began its efforts with in- 
 cipient philosophy, that it gradually attained a developed 
 philosophy, and that it is now recommended to abandon philo- 
 sophy, and content itself with the classification of facts. The 
 two first declarations will be admitted ; the closing advice is 
 not likely to be taken. Was it the folly and not the glory of 
 the first stirrings of thought, that they prompted men to 
 attempt to scale the inaccessible? Is it the glory, and not 
 the folly of philosophy to teach man to aim low 1 Are men 
 to escape their troubles, and perform life's duties only by * re- 
 stricting themselves to the study of the laws of phenomena. 
 
68 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 w 
 
 apart from their causes'? If the 'habits and views' of men 
 are to be ' rationalized, so as solidly to establish the universal 
 obligations,' and this is what all moralists admit must be 
 done, if a science of morals is to be constructed, Comte has 
 not given us any help in explaining the rationalizing process. 
 It may be true, as he suggests, that there is ' something aston- 
 ishing in man's expectation of understanding matters which 
 are inaccessible to reason.' But if man has a natural craving 
 for knowledge of causes, it is needless to denounce that craving ; 
 while it is plain that what is accessible to reason can be deter- 
 mined only by examining reason itself. 
 
 Professing to be a philosophy of the universe, Positivism 
 has not provided a philosophy of human nature. It may be 
 true that men from early times have concerned themselves 
 with explanations of the phenomena of the outer world ; but 
 the first necessity was to guide their own life. If they were 
 intellectually interested in physical events, they were practi- 
 cally concerned in human actions. If they gave some thought 
 to the rising and setting of the sun, the flowing of the waters, 
 and the growth of trees, they must have given more thought 
 to the direction of their own energies. How did they recog- 
 nise a rule of personal conduct 1 Positivism gives no answer 
 And while constructing a Sociology, with professed denial of 
 the possibility of knowing causes, it fails to account for that 
 most conspicuous fact in the procedure of Society, that it has 
 always regarded men as the causes of their own actions, and 
 has punished them for their evil deeds. 
 
 Returning again to Germany for a rapid glance at what 
 has been done more recently, I refer first to JOHANN FRIED. 
 HERBART (1776-1841). He may be regarded as a philosopher 
 who, about the time of the elder Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, 
 was lifting his voice in favour of Psychology, though he was 
 still an adherent of the transcendental philosophy. His 
 Ethical system was first published in 1808, under the title 
 of Allgcmcinc Fractische Philosophic, which, with his othei 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 69 
 
 ethical writings, is to be found in vol. viii. of the Collected 
 Works. 
 
 He begins by asking 'what is the Good? Who is the 
 Good ? the Better ? the Worse V (vol. viii. p. 4) and insists 
 that the approval and condemnation implied in these words, 
 both in ordinary conversation and in the exercise of Con- 
 science, makes it necessary to raise these questions, ' Is such 
 a judgment admissible 1 And, if this may be affirmed, Which 
 judgments are correct V The verification or rectification of 
 such a judgment, * may be expected from practical philosophy 
 as its sole vocation, if it has a vocation, and if it is any- 
 thing,' p. 4. He treats of morals under the three conceptions, 
 the Good, Virtue, and Duty, showing that all three are con- 
 cerned with the Will, ' Good stands as the boundary for 
 man's Will ; Virtue is the strength of his Will ; and Duty is 
 the rule of his Will,' p. 10. In view of the judgments pro- 
 nounced as to the condition of the Will, he holds two main 
 positions, '(i.) The judgment pronounced upon a volition 
 never marks it out as a single volition, but always as the 
 member of a relation ; (2.) The judgment has originally no 
 logical quantity, but the sphere of its authority comes to it 
 from the . universality of the conceptions through which the 
 members of the relation were thought,' p. n. He assigns the 
 knowledge of moral distinctions to Taste, saying that it should 
 be obtained from a universal ^Esthetic. His system is seri- 
 ously hampered by the need for explaining and vindicating 
 this ^Esthetical doctrine, which places Ethics along with 
 Poetry, Sculpture, and Music, p. 12. At this stage, the 
 theory has some analogy with that of Jonathan Edwards, who 
 begins his theory by saying that Virtue is a species of beauty. 
 This, however, is only an incidental resemblance. After 
 defending the position that the recognition of moral quality is 
 by a moral sense or taste, Herbart proceeds to enquire, 
 1 How far a practical philosophy can attain to universality.' 
 As morality is a matter of proportion or harmony, he says it 
 
70 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 
 
 is founded on the ' harmony between conceptions and real 
 things/ p. 29. ' Universal conceptions, being abstracted 
 from reality, lose a great deal of its determinateness/ On 
 this account, they do not afford a measure of degree of moral 
 excellence. That is found only when we contemplate the 
 real, and compare it with the universal conception. ' Har- 
 monious or inharmonious proportions ' between volitions and 
 conceptions, afford the ultimate test of moral actions, p. 30. 
 On this basis, he builds up a theory of ideas, of which the 
 following are the fundamental, (i.) The idea of internal free- 
 dom; (2.) the idea of perfection ; (3.) the idea of good volition ; 
 (4.) the idea of right. 
 
 HEINRICH M.CHALYBAUS (1792-1862) published at Leipzig, 
 in 1850, his System der Sfieculativen Ethik, in 2 vols. a work of 
 very great ability. The system is divided into three parts, 
 
 I. The primary principle or fundamental doctrine of Ethic ; 
 
 II. Phenomenology of morals ; III. System of Ethic that is, 
 applied Ethics. A brief statement will indicate the author's 
 fundamental position. He begins by considering Ethic in its 
 relation to knowledge in general. ' Science is in so far a 
 formal conception, as there is included under it the manifold 
 and particular contents of the whole empirical knowledges ; 
 but in a more restricted sense, Science is pure, highest, philo- 
 sophical (rmj/?). As among the sciences, Ethic does not 
 take the place of the most fundamental, pure, and original, 
 but belongs to the mixed or applied sciences, so must we give 
 to it that which is fundamental and pure. . . . It raises, there- 
 fore, in the foreground the demand (i.) to indicate this relation 
 of Ethic to pure philosophy, (2.) particularly to show the basis 
 of the Ethical principle in the absolute Idea, and its develop- 
 ment from the same ; and lastly (3.) to determine the special 
 principle of Ethic itself as to content and application,' p. 3. 
 'It behoves us to make a path* to 'Pure or Fundamental 
 Philosophy.' * If such a general ground-science were not yet 
 attained, the moralist himself must strive to unfold it, that 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 71 
 
 thereby he may be able to give his principle the necessary 
 foundation/ p. 4. From these opening statements the 
 author's standpoint is clearly seen, his conclusion being that 
 the Reason discovers necessary moral law, and that morality 
 consists in the harmony of volition with reason. 
 
 IMMANUEL HERMANN FICHTE, son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 
 born 1797, published his System der Ethik, in 3 vols., Leipzig, 
 1850-51-53, a work of great merit. The volume in which 
 his own system is developed is vol. ii. part i., Leipzig, 1851, 
 sold separately. He says that ' Ethic is for us the science of 
 the nature of the human Will.' It may also be treated as 'a 
 system of practical ideas/ for the very conception of Will 
 involves possession of such ideas, p. i. ' Ethical ideas are 
 the ideal notions of perfection of Will.' ' The idea of the 
 Good ' is the proper object of Moral Philosophy. The science 
 shows how 'the abstract idea becomes a distinct and mani- 
 foldly articulate conception in the system of Ethical ideas and 
 how thence there arises for Moral Philosophy the threefold 
 point of view of a Science of Virtue, of Duty, and of Good/ 
 p. 28. The conception of the Will, ' resting on the depth 
 and background of human consciousness/ recognises the will 
 of the individual as * a law for itself, as command or pro- 
 hibition/ p. i. ' The source and internal basis of the Shall 
 and Shall-Not is the simple internal nature of man, and specially 
 of that which is fundamental to his Will/ p. 29. 
 
 One of the most notable of quite recent books is that of 
 BISHOP MARTENSEN, published at Copenhagen, the German 
 translation at Gotha, 1871, entitled Die Christliche Ethik. 
 1 Only in the domain of freedom is morality possible/ p. 3 
 ' The Moral itself is an idea, which has not its source in 
 conduct and experience, but rather itself exists as the un- 
 conditioned law of such experience/ p. 4. ' All research . . . 
 points to the idea of an absolute aim and last end for the 
 human will and voluntary action. This all-embracing end for 
 the will of man is THE GOOD. .The Good is what secures its 
 
72 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 end or object.' 'The Idea becomes also the Ideal when it 
 presents itself as the pattern which, in the exercise of freedom, 
 shall be reduced to a specific form,' p. 5. Moral Philosophy 
 may be treated from three different standpoints, The OUGHT, 
 Duty, a demand on man's will ; VIRTUE, the ability to do good, 
 the law admitted into the will ; and the GOOD, the realization 
 of the sum-total of all good, p. 9. ' The Ideal of self-govern- 
 ment is essentially the good, or the idea of Ethics. And if we 
 inquire as to the content of this ideal, it can only be described 
 as man himself, human personality, conceived in its purity and 
 perfection.' ' The universal human,' Allgemeine Menschliche, 
 thus becomes with Martensen the test of all natural Ethics. 
 
 Recent British and American developments may be more 
 briefly traced, as the books themselves are more readily ac- 
 cessible. See Professor Masson's vigorous and vivid sketch 
 Recent British Philos., 2d ed., London, 1867. Dr. Thomas 
 Brown's theory I have already given, p. 25. The most import- 
 ant works in support of the Utilitarian basis of Morals will be 
 found in the following Division, where the theory is examined. 
 Dr. CHALMERS in his Sketches of Mental and Moral Philo- 
 sophy did not enter upon a systematic development of the 
 Science. The most valuable portions of the book are, chap. i. 
 -On the distinction between mental and moral philosophy ; 
 and chap. vi. On the undue place which is often given to 
 the Emotions, and the delusive estimate of human virtue to 
 which it leads. 
 
 Dr. WILLIAM WHEWELL published the Elements of Morality 
 in 1845, 2 vols. ; and Lectures on Systematic Morality in 1846. 
 In the earlier and larger work, after treating of Reason and 
 the Springs of Action, he proceeds to maintain that ' moral 
 rules exist necessarily/ i. 32. The gratification of natural 
 desires 'must be a part of the order of Society. There 
 must be Rules which direct the course and limits of such 
 gratification. Such Rules are necessary for the peace of 
 Society.' * Reason directs us to Rules,' i. 33. * As there is a 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 universal human reason, common to all men, ... so 
 
 a universal moral sympathy, common to all men, so far ai,ij. - 
 
 is unfolded; a conscience of mankind to which each man's %- 
 conscience must conform,' 35. ' Moral rules must be nece 
 sary truths, flowing from the moral nature of man,' 50. ' An 
 internal moral standard is one part of Conscience, and Self- 
 knowledge or Consciousness is another part/ 235. But ' each 
 man's conscience may err, and lead him to a false moral 
 standard/ 238. * Conscience is the Reason employed about 
 questions of right and wrong, and accompanied with the 
 sentiments of approbation and condemnation, which, by the 
 nature of man, cling inextricably to his apprehension of right 
 and wrong.' Systemat. Mor. p. 144. 
 
 Dr. M'CosH, formerly of Queen's College, Belfast, now 
 President of Princeton College, United States of America, 
 published in 1850 his work on TJie Method of the Divine 
 Government, Physical and Moral, which is now in its eighth 
 edition. Book in. contains an able treatment of the main 
 ethical questions. President M'Cosh strenuously supports 
 the inductive method as ruling in Moral Philosophy ; begins 
 by considering the nature of the Will, maintaining its freedom ; 
 and distinguishes the following questions concerning morals, 
 the mental process by which the distinction between virtue 
 and vice is observed ; the common quality or qualities in all 
 virtuous actions, the rule by which to determine whether an 
 action is virtuous ; and the consequences which follow from 
 virtue and vice. He supports the doctrine of first principles 
 in morals, which are distinguished by ' self-evidence, necessity. 
 universality.' He says Conscience may be viewed in three 
 aspects: (i.) 'as proceeding upon and revealing a law with 
 authoritative obligations/ (2.) 'as pronouncing an authoritative 
 judgment upon actions presented to it/ (3.) 'as possessing a 
 class of emotions, or as a sentiment. 7 Dr. M'Cosh has also a 
 criticism of Utilitarianism in his Exam, of Mr. Mill's Philcs., 
 chap. xx. 
 
74 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In America, Dr. FRANCIS WAYLAND published as a text- 
 book his Elements of Moral Science. Its ninth edition, from 
 which I quote, was published in Boston in 1839. 'As soon 
 as a human being comprehends the relation in w r hich two 
 human beings stand to each other, there arises in his mind a 
 consciousness of moral obligation,' p. 44. This is a 'peculiar 
 and instinctive impulse ; arising at once by the principles of 
 our constitution, as soon as the relations are perceived in 
 which we stand to the beings, created and uncreated, with 
 whom we are connected/ 46. Further than this he does not 
 press the inquiry. According to him, Conscience is imperfect. 
 ' There are many obligations under which man is created, both 
 to his fellow-creatures and to God, which his unassisted con- 
 science does not discover,' p. 113. 
 
 FRANCIS BOWEN, in his Lowell Lectures on The Application 
 of Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the Evidences of Religion, 
 Boston, 1849, has a Lecture on Conscience, in which he main- 
 tains 'the absolute certainty of its decisions,' p. 274, and 
 declares that ' the sense of obligation, the recognition of an act 
 as something which ought to be done, or to be left undone, is 
 the capital fact in our moral being : it is the foundation and 
 superstructure of our moral nature,' p. 277. 
 
 Dr. LAURENS P. HICKOK, well known for his ability as a 
 mental philosopher, has a treatise entitled System of Moral 
 Science, published in London, 1853. 'We do not apprehend 
 pure truth, except we have some ground in which the truth is, 
 inasmuch as truth always particularizes, and can give no 
 criterion of itself in general. This is the same in moral truth, 
 as in mathematical and philosophical. Hence the necessity 
 of finding some ground on which the truth of the ultimate 
 Rule of the right shall be made immediately manifest. This 
 can be done only by a clear apprehension of the Highest 
 Good, since that must be the ground on which the ultimate 
 rule shall reveal itself,' p. 41. 'No sensible appearance nor 
 mental conception can be scarcely ever given to the mind as 
 
HISTORICAL SKETCH. 
 
 75 
 
 a mere dry intellect.' All our feelings will range under two 
 distinct classes : (i.) ' Feelings which cannot rest in mere con- 
 templation' (Desires); (2.) 'Feelings which rest in the object 
 itself . . . for its own sake' (Sentiments), 42, 3. Those of 
 the second class ' are called forth only in the presence of some 
 pure ideal excellency, which the mind holds up to its own 
 view, or some copy which it may compare with the pure ideal/ 
 43. There are thus two kinds of Good, the one utility, the 
 other dignity. Spiritual life is the dignity given to humanity. 
 This is proved, (i.) by Taste, through which the pure forms of 
 art are put upon every object which ministers to the gratifica- 
 tion of the appetite ;' (2.) by Science, since * Philosophy is 
 cherished for its own sake, and the universal truths are attained 
 by which both man and nature are interpreted ;' (3.) by ' the 
 Imperative of the spirit's own excellence/ There is to each 
 spirit, 'an inner world of conscious prerogative . . . from 
 which comes forth perpetually the imperative that every action 
 be restrained by that which is due to its own dignity/ 47. 
 ' The Highest Good, the SUMMUM BONUM, is worthiness 
 of spiritual approbation.' ' That this is ultimate, intuitively 
 appears in many ways/ p. 49. See also Hickok's Empirical 
 Psychology, New York, 1859, Divisions second and third. 
 
 Another work deserving attention is that of Dr. JOSEPH 
 HAVEN, Mental Philosophy, Boston, 1857. 'Among the con- 
 ceptions which constitute the furniture of the mind, there is 
 one which, in many respects, is unlike all others, . . . that is, 
 the notion or idea of right; p. 303. * The ideas in question 
 (the right and wrong) are intuitive; suggestions or perceptions 
 of reason? * Regarded subjectively, as conceptions of the 
 human mind, right and wrong . . . are simple ideas, incap- 
 able of analysis or definition ; intuitions of reason. Regarded 
 as objective, right and wrong are realities, qualities absolute 
 and inherent in the nature of things, . . . not relative merely 
 to the human mind, but independent, essential, universal, abso- 
 lute. . . . Judgment decides that such and such actions do 
 
76 HANDBOOK OF MORAL .PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 possess the one or the other of these qualities, . . . there 
 follows the sense of obligation, . . . and the consciousness of 
 merit and demerit, . . . and certain emotions which we are 
 constituted to feel,' 312-13. But ' Conscience is not always a 
 safe guide/ 324. 
 
 Of quite recent books, the following are worthy of attention : 
 GROTE'S Utilitarianism, a posthumous publication, and at 
 times more diffuse than it might have been under the author's 
 revision ; but a candid, careful, and very powerful criticism. 
 With this, take the able critique in Lecky's Hist, of Europ. 
 Morals, chap. i. The Theory of Practice, 2 vols., Lond. 1870, by 
 Dr. SHADWORTH HODGSON, an exceedingly able and elaborate 
 work, in which the author seeks to reach moral law by a path 
 in harmony with a theory of evolution, though distinct from 
 that taken by the Utilitarian school. PROFESSOR BLACKIE has 
 given us a valuable addition to Ethical literature in his Four 
 Phases of Morals, full of important -exposition and criticism. 
 The Conscience, by the late Prof. F. D. MAURICE, a book more 
 of popular than of scientific structure. It opens with an ad- 
 mirable chapter on the Ego or I, and then proceeds to treat 
 of Conscience, saying that * Conscience is that in me which 
 says I ought or I ought not.' This Avord l ought ' is insepar- 
 able from Self. Ethics of Theism, by Dr. LEITCH, the second 
 part of which contains a discussion of the leading ethical 
 questions ; and in dealing with the criterion of morals shows 
 that neither the will of God, nor utility, nor sentiment can 
 afford the criterion. TJie Philosophy of Ethics, by Mr. SIMON 
 S. LAURIE, taken with Notes, Expository and Critical, on certain 
 British Theories of Morals, by the same author, in which the 
 leading points of each theory are brought out with marked 
 felicity. The student is further referred to the exceedingly 
 valuable article in the Encyclopedia Britannica on Moral- 
 Philosophy, by the Rev. Dr. LINDSAY ALEXANDER, Edinburgh ; 
 MACKINTOSH'S Dissertation; and WHEWELL'S Lectures on the 
 Hist, of Mor. Philosophy. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 CONSCIENCE. 
 
 (INTUITIONAL THEORY.) 
 
 1. CONSCIENCE (conscientia, o-weafycris, Gewissen) is that 
 power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each in- 
 dividual for the guidance of his conduct. It is the Reason as 
 that discovers to us absolute moral truth having the authority 
 of sovereign moral law. It is an essential requisite for the 
 direction of an intelligent free-will agent, and affords the basis 
 for moral obligation and responsibility in human life. 
 
 2. Conscience, in discovering to us truth, having the 
 authority of moral law, is seen to be a cognitive or intellectual 
 power. Either it does not discover truth ; or, if it does, it is 
 not a form of feeling, or combination of feelings, or affections, 
 or emotions, or desires. Feeling may exist as fact, and thus 
 have reality ; but it is not in itself of the nature of regulative 
 uuth, and it cannot by its action produce such truth. Truth 
 is that which we can see, and implies seeing power. Moral 
 law is that which we can know, and implies knowing power. 
 Hume, while allowing the action of intellect, assigns to feeling 
 'the final award.' Essays, App. i. Mackintosh makes con- 
 science a combination of our moral sentiments or feelings, 
 ' which have no other object but the mental dispositions lead- 
 ing to voluntary action.' Dissert, Encyc. Brit., Whe well's edit. 
 pp. 152, 215, 323. 
 
78 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The popular name for the Moral Faculty applies to a cog- 
 nitive power : Con-science (con-scientia, o-uv-ei'S^cris). Con- 
 science and Consciousness are similarly compounded, and are in 
 fact originally the same word conscientia. Consciousness is 
 now employed as the more general term to include the know- 
 ledge of every mental state. By analogy, conscience is im- 
 mediate knowledge sf moral law, as clear and indubitable 
 as a simple fact of consciousness. Conscience is, however, 
 popularly applied to the whole moral nature of man. Thus 
 Remorse is popularly an exercise of Conscience, while moral 
 law is discovered by the same faculty. This free use of the 
 name makes it often synonymous with consciousness, or the 
 knowlege of the harmony of personal conduct with moral law. 
 The prefix, con, with, has very frequently been held to 
 mean knowledge of moral law along with the Moral Governor. 
 So Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theo. 2. 79, 13 ; Martensen, 
 Die Chrislliche Ethik, sec. 117, p. 498, in course of translation 
 for Clark, Edinburgh ; Trench's Study of Words. 
 
 3. Conscience, in discovering to us moral law for the 
 guidance of our actions, has authority over all other springs of 
 activity within us. We may with clear philosophic warrant 
 attribute to the power discovering to us all moral law the 
 authority which belongs to each of the laws thereby made 
 known. 'The authority of Conscience' is an abbreviated 
 form for expressing the authority which is common to all the 
 laws of morality. In affirming that Conscience has authority 
 over the other powers of mind, we merely indicate that moral 
 law, being concerned with the guidance of our actions, is 
 authoritative for the regulation of all the other motive forces, 
 and restraining forces, which operate within human nature. 
 
 Every spring of activity within us operates according to a 
 law of its own nature. Thus every affection and desire comes 
 into play under a definite law determining its exercise. But 
 neither affections nor desires are competent for their own 
 guidance. All these forces of our nature are dependent upon 
 
CONSCIENCE. 79 
 
 intelligence for direction, while, for performance of its special 
 function, Intelligence is dependent on its possession of Moral 
 Law. All other powers are thus subordinated to moral law. 
 The power which discovers such law is necessarily excluded 
 from this subordination. And it thus appears that the re- 
 cognition of moral law is not a moral action, but a condition 
 essential for the performance of moral action. On the ground 
 thus stated, we must regard as insufficient the theory that 
 Conscience is either the acquiescence or the antagonism of 
 the whole nature on occasion of the play of some appetite or 
 desire. This theory, hinted at by Plato, when he described 
 Injustice as * a rising up of a part of the soul against the whole 
 soul ' (Repub. iv.), has been advocated by Trendelenburg in 
 a passage of great eloquence and power. Naturrecht, sec. 39, 
 p. 56. The leading parts of the paragraph are translated by 
 Professor Lorimer, Institutes of Law, p. 152. The fact of 
 such antagonism or acquiescence of our nature in the exercise 
 of our propensities, is admitted. That the resentment or con- 
 sent is with varying degree in different persons, and in the 
 same person at different times, is also granted. The ground 
 is solid, but not sufficient. In two respects the insufficiency 
 appears. ' The whole man ; does not always resent the action of 
 the * self-seeking part ; ' den selbsiichtigen Theil, and what 
 then? But, more especially, we want an explanation of an- 
 tagonism or acquiescence. And if we may progress in our 
 feeling of resentment or approval, we need knowledge in order 
 to determine the line in which progress shall be esteemed true 
 moral culture. 
 
 4. Conscience in discovering truth absolutely authoritative 
 as moral law is vested with sovereign practical authority in 
 mind. This appears from its nature, and is confirmed by 
 comparison of the functions of the moral faculty, with those 
 of all other powers and capacities in mind. 
 
 That which discovers moral law has the teaching authority 
 
 <J J 
 
 which belongs to the law itself. This law, as absolute truth. 
 
8o HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 admits of no contradiction. Every other power of mind in- 
 ferior in teaching function is subordinate to this. Other truths, 
 recognised as in their nature absolute, such as the first princi- 
 ples of understanding, called laws of thought, have their com- 
 plete application in another sphere, and do not in nature or 
 authority come into competition with the laws of morality. 
 1 The supremacy of conscience ' is an abbreviated expression 
 for the sovereignty of moral laws over the forms of activity to 
 which their authority applies. In its reference to motives, 
 acts, and ends, moral law has unquestionable and unchange- 
 able authority. 
 
 The high honour of establishing the supremacy of con- 
 science belongs to Butler. Sermons i. n. in. and Dissert, on 
 t/ie Nature of Virtue. Conscience is the ' moral approving 
 and disapproving faculty,'- -'a principle of reflection or con- 
 science.' 'That principle by which we survey, and either 
 approve or disapprove our own heart, temper, and actions, is 
 not only to be considered as what is in its turn to have some 
 influence ; which may be said of every passion, of the lowest 
 appetites ; but likewise as being superior ; as from its very 
 nature claiming superiority over all others ; in so much that 
 you cannot form a notion of this faculty, Conscience, without 
 taking in judgment, direction, superintendency.' Ser. n. 
 Butler has not gone with much care into the question as to 
 the nature of conscience, but he has placed the fact of 
 ' superintendency ' or supremacy on such a basis that it has 
 been admitted with wonderful unanimity by upholders of most 
 conflicting theories as to the nature of conscience. 
 
 5. The authority of conscience is not found in any pre- 
 dominating force belonging to it as a faculty, but altogether 
 in the character of the truth which it discovers. The authority 
 is not found in the nature of the faculty itself. The faculty is 
 a power of sight, such as makes a perception of self-evident 
 truth possible to man, and contributes nothing to the truth 
 which is perceived. To the truth itself belongs inherent 
 
CONSCIENCE. 8 1 
 
 authority, by which is meant, absolute right of command, not 
 force to constrain. Professor Bain mistakes in saying that a 
 purely mental origin 'is held to confer a higher authority' on 
 certain ideas, if he intends this as a representation of Intui- 
 tionalism. Mental and Moral Science, n. 6, sec. 2. 
 
 6. Conscience is a faculty which, from its very nature, 
 cannot be educated. Education, either in the sense of instruc- 
 tion or of training, is impossible. As well propose to teach the 
 eye, how and what to see : and the ear, how and what to hear: 
 as to teach Reason how to perceive the self-evident, and what 
 truths are of this nature. All these have been provided for in 
 the human constitution. 
 
 The opposite view has been commonly advocated, even by 
 intuitionalists. For example, Reid's Active Powers, in. iii. 8, 
 H- p. 595- Stewart is more guarded, Outlines of Mor. PhiL, 
 sec. 174. Whewell puts it as broadly as possible, 'We must 
 labour to enlighten and instruct our Conscience/ and by con- 
 sequence ' He who acts against his conscience is always 
 wrong/ 'but to say that he who acts according to his con- 
 science is always right ' * would lead to great inconsistencies in 
 our Morality.' Elements of Morality, i. p. 236, sec. 364-366. 
 Very differently Kant, ' An erring conscience is a chimera.' 
 Metaph. of Ethics, 3d ed., p. 217. So Rothe, Theol. Ethik, 
 ii. 29. Whewell confounds opinion with conscience, as will 
 appear from the following : ' Whatever subordinate law we 
 have in our minds is to be looked on only as a step to the 
 Supreme Law, the Law of complete Benevolence, Justice, 
 Truth, Purity, and Order.' Ib. sec. 366. 
 
 Moral training is something different from education of 
 Conscience. Two things need here to be distinguished : (a.) 
 Personal experience in the application of conscience. Since 
 all knowledge begins in experience, though it does not all 
 arise from experience (v. Introduction to Kant's Critique of 
 Pure Reason}, the application of moral law becomes known in 
 personal experience, according as the forms of activity admit 
 
82 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of it. But application of law presupposes the knowledge of 
 it, and knowledge of moral law is not gathered from experi- 
 ence. (Div. i. c. iii. sec. 3.) (b.) Personal attainment in the 
 practical subordination of other powers to the authority of 
 conscience. This is of the very essence of moral training, 
 which is dependent upon the sovereign authority of Con- 
 science. 
 
 7. Conscience, in subjecting our other powers to its autho- 
 rity, reveals the moral harmony of our natural powers, and 
 provides what is essential for moral training of our whole 
 being. All subject powers are powers naturally under regula- 
 tion for their exercise, and all regulated powers are capable of 
 training. In this way our dispositions, affections, and desires 
 are placed under guidance, in accordance with the demands 
 of moral law. 
 
 Dispositions, affections, and desires which are out of har- 
 mony with Conscience are out of harmony with our nature, 
 that is, are unnatural, and can have no place in healthy moral 
 development. 
 
 8. Conscience, in revealing a law which absolutely con- 
 demns certain dispositions, desires, and passions known in 
 human experience, authoritatively requires the suppression of 
 moral evil within us, and thereby contributes still further to 
 the necessities of moral training. 
 
 There are springs of action of which we are conscious, 
 which moral law entirely condemns. Of these, pride, selfish- 
 ness, jealousy, and envy may be taken as examples. What in 
 teaching it condemns, conscience requires shall in practice be 
 suppressed, since moral truth is by its nature moral law. 
 Conscience thus contributes not only constructively, but de- 
 structively to the necessities of moral training. 
 
 9. Conscience, in discovering to us first principles for the 
 guidance of conduct and formation of moral character, con- 
 stitutes a leading distinction of human nature. The basis of 
 personal life is thereby laid in self-evident, absolute truth. 
 
o 
 
 CONSCIENCE. 83 
 
 The application of that truth is left to us in the guidance of 
 personal procedure ; and this is an exercise unspeakably 
 higher than guidance by detailed rules. The possibilities of 
 such a life involve the possibility of likeness to the Deity 
 Himself. 
 
 10. The name of Conscience has always been, and will 
 always continue to be, popularly used in a much wider sense 
 than that in which the designation can be employed under 
 strict philosophic warrant. It is thus commonly made to 
 embrace all that is connected with our moral decisions, within 
 the sphere of personal consciousness. Thus our moral judg- 
 ments are attributed directly to conscience itself, and that 
 even when they are discredited as erroneous. So in like 
 manner all experience of moral sentiment is referred directly 
 to Conscience. 
 
 11. With this wide popular use of the term Conscience, a 
 variety of phrases descriptive of the condition of the faculty 
 has found currency in popular discourse. Of these, the 
 following may be taken as examples : An unenlightened 
 Conscience, a scrupulous Conscience, a tender Conscience, a 
 hardened Conscience, an upbraiding Conscience. 
 
 The philosophic interpretation of such phrases may be 
 secured by discriminating between these three things the Con- 
 science properly so called, the moral judgments, and the moral 
 sentiments, all of which are popularly referred to one power. 
 In some of the phrases a mixed reference may be found ; but 
 they commonly apply either to the moral judgments or to the 
 action of the moral sentiments. 
 
 12. THE DIVERSITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS AMONG MEN IS 
 
 the main difficulty in vindicating an intuitional theory of Con- 
 science, and is the great leading objection of its opponents. 
 
 In treating of this difficulty, the following points need 
 attention : 
 
 JFt'rsf, The extent to which diversity prevails. All nations 
 admit a distinction between right and wrong in human conduct 
 
84 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 There is very general agreement as to the forms of rectitude, 
 such as truthfulness, justice, benevolence. There is no nation 
 which is known so to transpose moral distinctions as to place 
 these forms of moral excellence in the list of qualities morally 
 wrong. Diversity of opinion on moral subjects is much more 
 concerned with the determination of what is wrong, than 
 with deciding what is right. Men excuse deceit, who do not 
 condemn integrity; they approve advantage taken of another, 
 but they do not condemn honesty; they applaud cruel 
 vengeance, but they still admire benevolence. There is thus 
 a want of consistency in the case of many of the judgments 
 pronounced. Compare the law of theft in ancient Sparta ; in 
 Caffre-land, famous for cattle-lifting ; and in the nations of 
 modern civilization. 
 
 Secondly, The philosophical explanation of diversity among 
 the moral judgments of men. Men differ not as to the 
 principles, but as to their application in given circumstances. 
 Epictetus explains it thus, ' The same general principles are 
 common to all men. . . . Where, then, arises the dispute ? 
 In adapting these principles to particular cases,' i. 23. Con- 
 tradictory moral judgments imply error somewhere ; that error 
 is capable of being detected and exposed ; its detection and 
 exposure imply possession of a common, unvarying standard 
 of morals. An adequate explanation of diversity of moral 
 judgments is therefore possible. The key to diversities in 
 personal judgments, will afford the key to national diversities. 
 The question is this If the first principles of morals are self- 
 evident truths, of which a reasoned contradiction cannot be 
 given, how can the rational nature of man accept and act 
 upon a tacit contradiction of them ? The answer is twofold, 
 partly Ethical, partly Psychological. 
 
 (i.) ETHICAL EXPLANATIONS. (a.) There are dispositions 
 belonging to our nature, and impelling to action, which are 
 out of harmony with conscience, and the exercise of which is 
 a practical violation of the authority of conscience. Selfish- 
 
CONSCIENCE. 85 
 
 ness and Malice may be taken as the root forms of these. 
 This fact affords, primarily, an explanation of wrong acting, 
 but it is at the same time a step towards the explanation of 
 erroneous thinking. Hence it happens that the diversity of 
 opinion on Morals is much more concerned with what is 
 wrong, by way of excusing it, than with what is right, by way 
 of condemning it. 
 
 (b.) There is often great difficulty in deciding what is 
 present duty, when there is none as to what is morally right. 
 Hence it happens that there is much more diversity of opinion 
 as to the dutiful in special circumstances, than as to what is 
 right in all circumstances. It is the relation of the agent to 
 circumstances, which originates questions of casuistry, and not 
 the decision as to what courses of conduct are right in them- 
 selves. All such diversity of opinion concerns the application 
 of the standard, not the nature of the standard, and is there- 
 fore to be laid aside as irrelevant when the discussion is 
 concerned with the standard of moral distinctions. Men may 
 agree that Benevolence is morally right, and yet may altogether 
 differ as to the duty of helping a beggar. Diversity of opinion 
 on this latter point, though it is connected with morals, is not 
 concerned with the standard of morality. 
 
 (2.) PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION. The following laws 
 of mind come into view as bearing on the question : 
 
 (a.) Dispositions swaying the conduct have power to bias 
 the judgments. What a man inclines to do, that he is ready ; 
 to think right. Liability to error being at any rate character- 
 istic of the reasoning power, the risk of contentment with 
 fallacious reasoning is greatly heightened, when cherished 
 dispositions favour the accepted conclusions. In this way, 
 the rational nature is often content to place false generaliza- 
 tions in the room of self-evident truths. 
 
 (b.} Prevailing opinions may be accepted without inde- 
 pendent investigation. It is not merely in the ethical sphere, 
 but in every department of thought, that illustration may be 
 
86 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 found of this tendency in the rational nature. In the deve- 
 lopment of mind, prevailing opinions are first accepted on 
 authority, and then retained without personal investigation. 
 Besides, if the practice sanctioned is in harmony with an evil 
 disposition common to our nature, there is double inducement 
 to adopt it. Authority and Inclination combine their forces. 
 Where social custom establishes a practice, unreasoning 
 acquiescence is easy. 
 
 (f.) The moral sentiments cluster around a false judgment, 
 as readily as around a true. There is not, indeed, the same 
 security in both cases for the continuance of these sentiments. 
 But if a man, whether correctly or incorrectly, only approve 
 an action, he will experience self-approbation in doing it. If, 
 whether accurately or not, he only disapprove of an action, he 
 will experience a sense of shame, or even of remorse, in doing it. 
 Of all the recognised laws of mind, this is the one to which most 
 prominence is to be given, in accounting for the astonishing 
 diversity of opinion, founded upon appeals to conscience. If 
 a South Sea Islander approve of vengeance, he may have a 
 sense of well-doing while he tortures an enemy. If an Indian 
 believes that the Deity requires him to wash in the Ganges, 
 he may have a sense of remorse in neglecting what he regards 
 as duty. Moral sanctions may thus gather around even gross 
 immorality. When this law of union between judgment and 
 sentiment is recognised, it is clear that sentiments afford 
 neither the basis of moral distinctions, nor any certain guid- 
 ance as to such distinctions. Moral responsibility hangs upon 
 the possession of rational nature. 
 
 Man, as a rational being, has intrusted to him the applica- 
 tion of the principles of morality (v. sec. 9 of this chap.) In 
 deciding questions of morals, he may either seek a clear view 
 of moral law, or he may accept a current rule of conduct 
 without inquiring as to its rational validity. In the former 
 case, he accepts self-evident truth, capable of vindication 
 by every test. In the latter, he proceeds upon a rule the 
 
CONSCIENCE. 87 
 
 rational insufficiency of which may be proved at every step. If 
 individual and national history give evidence that men often 
 prefer the latter course to the former, there is ample explana- 
 tion, ethical, intellectual, and sentimental, and that explana- 
 tion does not affect the reality of self-evident moral principles, 
 or impinge upon their authority as moral laws. 
 
 13. PROBLEMS. (i.) Can personal feeling possess the 
 authority of moral law 1 ? (2.) Critically examine the follow- 
 ing, 'As each man's Reason may err, and thus lead him 
 to false opinions, so each man's Conscience may err, and 
 lead him to a false moral standard.' Whewefl's Elements of 
 Morality, sec. 368, i. 238. Distinguish between what is here 
 pointed to as fact, and what is presented by way of inter- 
 pretation and explanation of the fact. (3.) If Conscience be 
 represented as * a power of reflection,' can its supremacy be 
 competently maintained 1 ? (4.) Does the philosophical doc- 
 trine of an unerring Conscience imply infallibility of judgment 
 in morals on the part of its possessor ? ' The universal Con- 
 science and Reason, of which Dr. Whewell speaks as infallible, 
 must reside in some men endued with Conscience and Reason. 
 We ask, who are these infallible men, or this infallible Coun- 
 cil?' Prof. Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 267. (5.) When 
 sovereignty is attributed to conscience, what is the nature and 
 measure of power involved in this sovereignty 1 (6.) Are the 
 functions usually assigned to conscience compatible with the 
 hypothesis that this faculty finds exercise only in consequence 
 of an action having been done \ 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 DUTY OR OBLIGATION. 
 
 (INTUITIONAL THEORY.) 
 
 1. BESIDES the knowledge we have of Tightness and wrong- 
 ness as qualities of actions, we have the knowledge of duty, 
 obligation, or oughtness, as a condition of personal activity. 
 The general conception of obligation is subjection of person- 
 ality to moral law. The measure of this obligation is therefore 
 found in the full application of the whole law to the whole 
 life. 
 
 Duty is officium, in contrast with honestum: KaOrJKov in 
 contrast with KaXov ; Die Pflicht, in contrast with Das Recht ; 
 devoir, in contrast with droit. The offirium of Cicero, like the 
 KO.OTJKOV of Zeno, is used in a wider sense than moral obliga- 
 tion, properly so called, applying to rational selection of desir- 
 able objects. ' Quod ratione actum sit, id officium appellamus.' 
 -Cicero, De Fin. in. 17. According to Diogenes Laertius, 
 Lib. vii., Zeno was the first to use Ka9fJKov in the strictly 
 Ethical sense. See also Cicero, De OJficiis, i. 3. 
 
 2. Personal obligation is recognised in consciousness by 
 means of a judgment affirming present personal subjection to 
 clearly recognised moral law. Such a judgment invariably 
 affirms a definite measure and direction of obligation as rest- 
 ing upon me at the time. 
 
 I 3. The judgment of oughtness is so distinct from the judg- 
 
DUTY OR OBLIGATION. 89 
 
 ment of Tightness, that the former applies to the agent, the 
 latter to the action. 
 
 4. The judgment of oughtness is so related to the judg- 
 ment of Tightness, that each implies the other, and both draw 
 their warrant from the same moral law. The first principles 
 of rectitude are the basis of all morality : in relation to intelli- 
 gent beings, these principles wear the aspect of moral laws ; 
 each moral being is thus by a necessity of his existence placed 
 in subjection to moral law; subjection to law, or liability to 
 obedience, is in each case commensurate with the application 
 of moral law to the life of the moral being ; and Tightness is 
 that quality in action which is recognised by its conformity 
 with moral law. 
 
 5. The judgment of oughtness is such as to imply com- 
 plete and uniform subjection to all the laws of morality. I 
 am under constant and complete obligation to moral law, 
 because it is known to me as moral law. Partial or incom- \ 
 plete obligation to moral law is impossible. 
 
 A distinction has been drawn in Morals and Jurisprudence 
 between obligations ' perfect and imperfect,' otherwise named 
 ' determinate and indeterminate.' The distinction has more 
 commonly been maintained from the standpoint of Positive 
 Law, by reference to what civil authority can enforce in view 
 of human relations. From this standpoint, the distinction is 
 concerned with the due limits of civil power in the enforce- 
 ment of personal rights, and not with the real nature of moral 
 obligation. The distinction has also been maintained from 
 the standpoint of Philosophy by Hutcheson and Reid, and 
 conspicuously by Kant and many of his followers. 
 
 6. A condensed account of the history of this distinction 
 may be best presented by a classification of three examples of 
 the use of the distinction between perfect and imperfect obli- 
 gation. 
 
 FIRST, AN ETHICAL USE, That some duties are always 
 binding, others only in certain circumstances. The former 
 
90 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are perfect duties, the latter imperfect ; Karo/oflco/za, qfficium 
 t>erfectum, and KaOrJKov pecrov, qfficium medium. 
 
 This is the view given by the Stoics, and accepted by Cicero 
 as their avowed follower. It does not properly indicate two 
 kinds of obligation. It is a classification of duties, not a 
 philosophy of the fact of obligation. It points to the obvious 
 truth that moral law not only imposes common obligation upon 
 all, but has speciality of application according to the circum- 
 stances of each. The Stoics seem really to have used KO,TO/>- 
 Oufjia to signify an action done in acknowledgment of duty 
 (recte fachtm, rather than qfficium perfectuni), rather an action 
 done in a perfect manner, than a perfect obligation requiring 
 its performance. Cicero has complicated technical phrase- 
 ology by the use of rectum qualifying officium as equivalent to 
 perfectum. Diogenes Laertius, B. vii., Life of Zeno ; Cicero, 
 De Officiis i. 3 ; Ueberweg's Hist, of Philos. i. 197 ; Zeller's 
 Stoics, etc., p. 269 ; Grant's Aristotle i. 262 ; Reid's Active 
 Powers, Essay in. iii. 5, Hamilton's ed., p. 588, and two 
 notes, p. 588, and p. 649. 
 
 SECOND, A JURIDICAL USE, That in the dispensation of 
 justice there are only some duties which can be enforced 
 under sanction of positive law, whereas others must be left to 
 individual choice for their performance. The former are per- 
 fect obligations, with equivalent perfect rights ; the latter are 
 imperfect obligations, with imperfect rights. 
 
 This is looking at the distinction from a point of view 
 altogether different. Instead of considering what is common 
 and what special in personal obligation, it is concerned with 
 the question, how much of common obligation can be enforced 
 by civil authority. It grants common obligation resting on 
 Ethical warrant ; acknowledges such obligation as the basis of 
 natural law, but admits that social authority is not competent 
 to enforce all obligations. This restriction is so far a thing of 
 nature, as the limitation arises from the fact that there are 
 obligations which belong to the internal sphere which social 
 
DUTY OR OBLIGATION, 91 
 
 authority cannot enforce. But it is also in considerable 
 measure a matter of general agreement, according to times and 
 circumstances. 
 
 This view of perfect and imperfect obligation has been 
 supported very generally by Jurists, and amongst moralists by 
 Hutcheson, System of Mor. Phil. u. iii. -3; and Reid, Active 
 Powers, Ess. in. pt. iii. c. 5. 
 
 THIRD, A TRANSCENDENTAL USE, That inasmuch as 
 Moral law discovers only a maxim of conduct, and does 
 not prescribe definite actions, all moral obligation is indeter- 
 minate, and only obligations enforced by positive law could 
 be described as examples of determinate obligation. 
 
 This shifts the whole ground. It is not maintained that 
 only some of our obligations are determinate, but that none 
 are. It is the product of the transcendental philosophy oi 
 Kant which makes the essence of the law consist in its form, 
 and so separates it from positive enactment. It is no doubt 
 true that moral laws are general principles of action, which an 
 intelligent being must apply for himself in the guidance of 
 conduct, but the obligation which encircles the whole life, and 
 has sway over all its activity, is certainly obligation deter- 
 minate and perfect. The opposite view led Kant to regard 
 the subjective principles only as ' not unfit to be elevated to 
 the rank of law in a system of universal moral legislation.' 
 But this gave them * only a negative character.' His translator, 
 Mr. Semple, goes a step further, and ventures the assertion 
 that * Duty is a negative conception only.' Kant's Metaphysic 
 of Ethics, 3d ed., p. 204. 
 
 There is a very valuable discussion of this subject in Pro- 
 fessor Larimer's Institutes of Law, c. xi., Edin. 1872. 
 
 6. The subjection to moral law, which is recognised in a 
 judgment of obligation, may be described as ' moral necessity/ 
 It is moral necessity as determining the lines of activity which 
 alone are in harmony with the laws of moral being. 
 
 For man, there are three forms of necessity, differing essen- 
 
92 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tially in their nature. These are physical, intellectual, and 
 moral. Physical necessity is concerned with our physical 
 nature, and is not dependent on our will, as that we breathe, 
 eat, and sleep, in order to support bodily life. Intellectual 
 necessity concerns the exercise of our rational powers, deter- 
 mining the conditions on which they may be used for the 
 discovery of truth, as in application of the laws of identity, 
 non-contradiction, and causality. This form of necessity the 
 will cannot alter, but may often disregard without loss of 
 rational power. Moral necessity is that which imposes as a 
 law of life implicit obedience to moral law. The will cannot 
 alter this law, but may transgress it, yet only on penalty of 
 destroying the harmony of the whole nature, and leading a 
 life antagonistic to the moral government of the universe. 
 
 7. Common obligation is fixed for all by the necessities 
 of moral law, but the recognition of it by each one for himself 
 is dependent upon personal application of moral law to per- 
 sonal activity in the relations in which he is placed. Personal 
 obligation in present time is determined between moral law 
 and present personal situation. 
 
 8. Every judgment as to personal obligation has a three- 
 fold reference, viz., to moral law, as affording the rule oi 
 action ; to personal power, as regulating the possibilities of 
 action ; and to present opportunity, as indicating the line ol 
 action open at the time. The decision may involve either 
 obligation to act, or obligation to refrain from acting. Beyond 
 this sphere of judgment, because apart from the application 
 of moral law, there is liberty of action according to personal 
 preferences. 
 
 9. From personal obligation, there follows by necessary 
 consequence, moral responsibility, or answerableness to God 
 for the degree in which obligation has been fulfilled. The 
 rational explanation of the universe is found in the existence 
 of the self-sufficient One (v. Metaphysic of Ethics) : to Him as 
 sovereign belongs the moral government of the universe : and 
 
DUTY OR OBLIGATION. 93 
 
 to Him who imposes duty must answer be made as to its 
 performance. 
 
 10. The relations of moral law, life, and action, may be 
 thus represented : Rightness is absolute moral excellence 
 discovered in all moral law; Oughtness is subjection of per- 
 sonal life to the authority of moral law ; Goodness is Tightness 
 manifested in disposition and conduct under submission to 
 moral law. The first is above all personality ; the second is 
 an essential accompaniment of personality ; and the third is 
 voluntarily wrought out in personal history. 
 
 11. PROBLEMS. (i.) In what sense is obligation common 
 to all moral creatures, and in what sense is it different to each? 
 (2.) Distinguish between the knowledge of the fact of obliga- 
 tion, and the scientific explanation of the knowledge. (3.) 
 From what sources may uncertainty arise as to present duty] 
 (4.) How far is a performance of duty compatible with uncer- 
 tainty as to which of two lines of action is the preferable] 
 The problem is, to find moral certainty along with some 
 degree of uncertainty as to the manner of its performance. 
 
CHAPTER VL 
 
 MORAL RIGHTS. 
 (INTUITIONAL THEORY.) 
 
 1. As moral obligation signifies an imposed necessity of 
 acting in accordance with moral law, it implies the right of 
 the moral being, without restraint from others, to engage in 
 the forms of activity thus required. This is the natural 
 and inalienable right of personality, To act according to 
 Conscience. God has in the constitution of our nature 
 provided for it j and our fellow-men can have no warrant to 
 restrict it. 
 
 Right here is jus in contrast with honestum or rectum. 
 Hence jurisprudence, the Science of Law, is properly the 
 Science of human Rights, for, as Hutcheson says, * Jus 
 ensues upon rectum! Jurisprudence is therefore based . upon 
 Ethics. For the distinction between Tightness, The Right, 
 as a quality of action, and a right, as a claim or title of a 
 moral agent, v. Hutcheson, Syst. of Mor. Phil. n. iii. i, vol. 
 i. p. 252; Reid, Active Powers, v. iii. H. p. 643; WhewelTs 
 Elements of Mor. i. iv. vol. i. p. 36. 
 
 2. As moral obligation requires from me right actions 
 towards others, it implies rights on their part equivalent to 
 those belonging to myself. Here also the measure of obliga- 
 tion is the measure of rights. The latter cannot be more 
 restricted than the former. The right to fair judgment, the 
 right to generous feeling, and the right to payment of 
 
 64 
 
MORAL RIGHTS. 95 
 
 money due, have all exactly the same ethical validity. The 
 fact that the real acknowledgment of the right is more easily 
 tested in the last-named example than in the other two cases, 
 constitutes no difference in respect of the moral warrant for 
 the claim. 
 
 3. Common obligations which determine the forms of 
 right action towards others, mark out the common rights of 
 those who are associated in the same sphere of action. 
 
 4. Special obligations resting upon some on account of 
 speciality of relation to others, give to these others special 
 rights in that relation. This discovers the ethical basis of 
 the rights of parents and children, husband and wife, master 
 and servant, for these rights are the exact equivalent of 
 the relative duties. The child has a right to be educated, 
 as the parent is under obligation to provide education for 
 his child. 
 
 5. Moral rights are not self-exacted, nor can they be 
 voluntarily surrendered. They are the necessary accompani- 
 ment of obligation under reign of moral law. They are as 
 unchangeable as the nature of moral law itself, and the obliga- 
 tion which it imposes. 
 
 6. Duties and Rights are moral equivalents resting equally 
 upon the unchangeable warrant of moral law as the universal 
 rule of human action. The ground on which any man can 
 claim a right entitled to acknowledgment by others is exactly 
 the ground on which by necessity he must own moral 
 obligation. 
 
 7. All moral rights are perfect rights, irrespective of their 
 being claimed by the person or enforced by society. A moral 
 right rests wholly upon moral law, and must be uniform as that 
 law. (See above, c. v. 5.) Positive law may not attempt to 
 enforce all rights alike, because all rights do not admit of 
 being enforced ; but this does not affect the ethical validity 
 of any of the rights of a moral being. 
 
 Hutcheson, while holding that ' the observing and fulfilling 
 
96 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 every proper right of others is matter of conscience, necessary 
 to obtain the approbation of God and our own hearts,' never- 
 theless assents to the classification of rights into perfect and 
 imperfect. He says, ' Rights according as they are more or 
 less necessary to be obtained and observed in society, are 
 divided into perfect and imperfect.' Syst. of Mor. Phil. n. 
 iii. 3. In the former sentence he speaks as a moralist; in 
 the latter as a jurist. 
 
 Dr. Thomas Brown was more accurate, when he said, 
 'There is as little an imperfect right, in a moral sense, as 
 there is in logic an imperfect truth or falsehood/ Philos. of 
 Mind, Lect. 91. 
 
 8. Besides natural moral rights, there are Acquired Moral 
 Rights. These spring up as the direct result of natural rights. 
 Of Acquired Rights, the distinctive rights of each person ac- 
 cording to the nature of his property, and the rights acquired 
 by contract, afford examples. The Rights of Property 
 follow directly from the natural right to the use of personal 
 power, and to the fruit of its exercise. The Rights of Con- 
 tract arise from the natural right to dispose of personal power 
 and property, according to personal choice, restricted only by 
 the moral obligations which are the necessary attendants upon 
 acquired as well as natural rights. 
 
 9. Acquired Moral Rights, depending upon natural moral 
 rights, rest ultimately for their authority upon absolute moral 
 law. The measure of any man's rights may depend upon the 
 forms of contract into which he has entered ; but the right of 
 contract itself is determined by moral law, and is not de- 
 pendent on voluntary agreement. 
 
 10. PROBLEMS. (i.) Critically examine the statement, 
 ' Where no covenant hath proceeded, every man has a right 
 to every thing.'- -Hobbes, Leviath. i. 14, also in ch. 13. 
 Molesworth, iii. p. 130, and p. 117. (2.) Does a state of 
 war destroy the natural rights of the combatants'? Hobbes 
 says, 'Force and fraud are in war the two cardinal virtues.' 
 
MORAL RIGHTS. 97 
 
 Leviath. I. 13; Molesworth, in. 115. (3.) How far is it 
 in harmony with moral law to surrender a measure of per- 
 sonal right, in organizing society ? (4.) Is there any natural 
 limit to the surrender of personal rights under the require- 
 ments of civil government? The problem is, To find the 
 Ethical grounds for such limitation. 
 
DIVISION II. DEVELOPMENT THEORY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 1. * NOTHING is to be held innate that can be shown to 
 arise from experience and education. 5 Prof. Bain, Ment. and 
 Moral Science, B. n. c. 6. This is. common ground. A de- 
 velopment theory of Moral Philosophy is sufficient if it can 
 prove its competence to explain our recognition of moral dis- 
 tinctions, personal obligation, and personal rights. 
 
 2. The fundamental position of the development theory is, 
 that all our most complex states of consciousness are merely 
 developments, under natural law, from our simplest state. 
 The mind, as known in present consciousness, is the general 
 resultant of all previous experience. * We have it not in our 
 power to ascertain by any direct process, what consciousness 
 told us at the time when its revelations were in their pristine 
 purity. It only offers itself to our inspection as it exists now, 
 when those original revelations are overlaid and buried under 
 a mountainous heap of acquired notions and perceptions.' 
 Mill's Exam, p. 171. The development theory is, therefore, 
 
 i first a theory of mind, in order to become a theory of morals. 
 Its ethical theory depends on the proved accuracy and suffi- 
 ciency of its theory of mind. The preliminary stages of the 
 theory are of consequence here only as bearing on a theory of 
 morals. 
 
 98 
 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 99 
 
 The history of the theory may be traced through the fol- 
 lowing works : LOCKE'S Essay (1690), giving the germ, in 
 making sensation the origin of all knowledge, while attribut- 
 ing to mind a power of reflection. CONDILLAC, Essai sur 
 Forigine dcs Connaissances Humaines (1746), following Locke ; 
 but later, Traite des Sensations (1754), he derives reflection 
 from sensation. HARTLEY'S Observations on Man (1749), 
 tracing development by association. PRIESTLEY, Disquisitions 
 relating to Matter and Spirit (1777). ERASMUS DARWIN, Zoo- 
 nomia, or Laws of Organic Life (1793-96); criticised by Dr. 
 THOMAS BROWN, Observations on Darwin's Zoonomia (1798). 
 Mr. JAMES MILL, Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human 
 Mind (1829), and a Fragment on Mackintosh (anonymously) 
 1835. Of the former, a new edition, edited by his son, Mr. 
 John S. Mill, with notes by Prof. Bain, Mr. Findlater, and 
 Mr. Grote, London, 1869, a valuable compendium. Mr. 
 JOHN S. MILL, Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy ', 3d ed. 
 1867, Chaps, ix. xi. xii. PROF. BAIN'S Works, Senses and 
 Intellect, Emotions and Will, Mental and Moral Science. 
 HERBERT SPENCER, Principles oj Psychology, 2nd ed. ALFRED 
 BARRATT, Physical Ethics, London, 1869, a very able work, 
 unfolding a theory hopelessly entangled ' between the irrita- 
 bility and contractility of animal tissue.' CHARLES DARWIN, 
 Descent of Man, opening chapters, in contrast with which, see 
 ALFRED RUSSELL WALLACE, Theory of Natural Selection, Chaps. 
 on Mind and Morals. 
 
 3. The development theory objects to the affirmation of 
 original faculties of mind as explaining the states of conscious- 
 ness. The old ground of original faculties is accounted a 
 reproach to Philosophy. That a child is born with limbs, 
 and organs of sense, is matter of observation ; but that the 
 child is born with power of observation, reasoning power, 
 memory, and will, is pure assumption. Indeed, that there is 
 in human nature such a thing as mind, or spiritual existence, 
 in addition to physical organism, is not self-evident, but needs 
 
ioo HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 proof. It may, indeed, be questioned whether Mind is any- 
 thing more than ' the sum of Subject-experiences/ so that 
 
 * operations and experiences constitute mind,' or even whether 
 mind is not merely * a function of brain.' 
 
 4. Since it is impossible to go back to the dawn of expe- 
 rience, the theory begins with Sensation, as the simplest fact 
 in consciousness. Hence the development theory is called 
 the Sensational theory. 
 
 5. The first test of the theory turns upon the account it 
 gives of Sensation, as a fact admitted by all. What is Sensa- 
 tion ? How does it arise 1 Where does it exist? How is it 
 known 1 An answer to these four questions is essential to a 
 philosophy of Sensation. Take smell as the example one 
 of the Sensations furthest removed from intellectual power, or, 
 as Prof. Bain puts it, one of ' the least intellectual Sensations.' 
 Mr. James Mill says, * In the smell three things are commonly 
 distinguished. There is the organ, there is the Sensation, 
 and there is the antecedent of the Sensation, the external 
 object.' Analysis, i. 4 ; 2d ed. I. 8. Sensation, then, is so 
 connected with bodily organism that it implies an impression 
 made upon some part of the nervous system by an external 
 object. The Sensation is the fact requiring attention. 
 
 (i.) What is this Sensation ? Mr. James Mill replies, it is 
 
 * a particular feeling, a particular consciousness,' ' a point of 
 consciousness, a thing which we can describe no otherwise 
 than by calling it a feeling.' Analysis, i. 7 ; 2d ed. i. 12. 
 
 (2.) How does the Sensation arise? 'Odorous particles 
 which proceed from the object' reach the organ of smell, and, 
 in some way to us unknown, make an impression on the nerve, 
 of which impression, the sensation in some way unknown is 
 the consequent. Or, as Hume says (Treat, on Hum. Nat. 
 i. i, 2), 'Sensations arise in the soul originally from unknown 
 causes.' That the impression is transmitted to the nerve- 
 centre in the brain is acknowledged. Beyond this, Physiology 
 makes no averment. Every one is able to tell from his own 
 
ORIGIN OF KNO WLEDGE. 10 r 
 
 consciousness, when he has a sensation of smell. And, as 
 Mr. Mill says, * we, can distinguish this feeling, this conscious- 
 ness, the sensation of smell, from every other sensation.' 
 Ib. i. 7, or i. 12. 
 
 (3.) Where does the sensation exist? Mr. Mill does not 
 hold with Hume, ' that an object may exist, and yet be nowhere ' 
 (Hum. Nat. i. iv. 5), but replies, * What is in me is the sensa- 
 tion, the feeling, the point of consciousness.' Ib. p. 9, or 13. 
 The sensation is in Me ; not in my nose any more than in 
 the violet. That Mr. Mill means to distinguish between the 
 organ of smell, where the impression is, and the Me, where 
 the sensation is, admits of no doubt. For he says the sensa- 
 tion is ' a part of that series, that succession, that flow of 
 something, on account of which we call ourselves living or 
 sensitive creatures.' He could not have meant that the 
 nostrils belong to the * flow.' In confirmation we have the 
 following : ' We can conceive ourselves as endowed with 
 smelling, and not enjoying any other faculty. In that case, we 
 should have no idea of objects, as seeable, as hearable, as 
 touchable, or tasteable. We should have a train of smells. . . . 
 Our life would be a train of smells, and nothing more.' 
 Ib. p. 8, or 13. To which account of life this must be added, 
 our sensitive organism would be Nose and Brain, and nothing 
 more. 
 
 (4.) How is the Sensation known? Much of the informa- 
 tion now possessed as to Sensation is the result of Physiologi- 
 cal Inquiry, and is not known by experience. But Sensation 
 itself is always a form of experience. Our acquaintance with 
 the facts, that odorous particles come from an object, that 
 there are within the nostrils olfactory nerves, sensitive to the 
 influence of such particles, and that these olfactory nerves 
 are connected with the nerve-centre in the brain, is not 
 obtained by us in experiencing the Sensation of smell. Such 
 knowledge is obtained by external observation. But Sensation 
 is known to me as a fact in my own experience. Sensation 
 
102 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 does not know itself, but is known by me. This knowledge is 
 consciousness, which is characteristic of all internal experience. 
 Sensation, then, is known to us ' as a part of that ... on 
 account of which we call ourselves living or sensitive creatures.' 
 The simplest expression of the fact is this I am conscious of 
 a sensation of smell. This is our primary fact, out of which 
 by development a Philosophy of Mind and of Morals is to be 
 constructed. Here we start with absolute certainty, for, as 
 Mr. J. S. Mill says, * Consciousness of the mind's own feelings 
 and operations cannot be disbelieved.' Exam. p. 166. Here 
 also we start with the greatest attainable simplicity in human 
 experience. However great be the * mountainous heap of 
 acquired notions and perceptions,' this consciousness of a 
 sensation of smell is the simplest fact in experience. Here, 
 on the testimony of all the authorities of a sensational philo- 
 sophy, we are underneath the mountain, and have come upon 
 the primordial element of the whole -formation. 
 
 As to this simple experience of sensation, four questions 
 have been raised. In gathering the answers, facts have 
 accumulated. We have objects sensitive organism impres- 
 sions made upon it by the objects and sensations known in 
 consciousness. All these belong to the interpretation of the 
 simplest element in human experience. Of these, three, the 
 object, the sensitive organism, and the impressions made upon 
 it, are acknowledged as realities affording an external ex- 
 planation of the rise of the Sensation. 
 
 But the Sensation itself, as a fact of internal experience, is 
 that which we need to have explained. I am conscious of 
 the sensation as a fact ' in me/ This Consciousness is not 
 identical with the Sensation. The latter is a sensation of 
 smell, the former is consciousness of the sensation as mine. 
 Sensation is ' a particular feeling ;' consciousness is a general 
 characteristic of all experience. With the capacity for sensa- 
 tion, I receive the particular feeling into myself; but with the 
 consciousness as a characteristic of myself, the rise of the 
 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 103 
 
 sensation is known as a present reality within. Consciousness 
 of a sensation is therefore consciousness of Personality or 
 Self, and of a particular experience as mine. Sensation of 
 smell is feeling, to be classed among ' the feelings of Recep- 
 tivity or Passivity, which arise in connexion with the Sentient 
 or Incarrying nerves ' (Prof. Bain). Consciousness is know- 
 ledge, a double knowledge, knowledge of self and know- 
 ledge of the present experience. 
 
 In opposition to this view, James Mill maintains the 
 identity of Sensation and Consciousness, making the terms 
 synonymous, and identifying both with feeling. Mr. John 
 S. Mill and Professor Bain take the same position, but more 
 guardedly. The views of all three are brought together in the 
 new edition of James Mill's Analysis, chap, v., with Notes, 
 74, 75 ; vol. i. p. 226. 
 
 James Mill's identification of sensation and consciousness 
 is inconsistent both in respect .of expression and of the facts 
 stated. As to expression, the following may be taken : 
 4 Though I have these various modes of naming my sensation, 
 by saying, I feel the prick of a pin, I feel the pain of a prick, 
 I have the sensation of a prick, I have the feeling of a prick, I 
 am conscious of the feeling ; the thing named in all these 
 various ways is the same.' Analy. i. 71, or I. 224. In this 
 sentence there are plainly two distinct facts the one express- 
 ing simple fact, the other possession or property in that fact : 
 the one saying, I feel, the other, I have the feeling. The same 
 thing is named in all the forms, but a second thing is named 
 with it in the third and fourth. The fifth form is certainly 
 different, but according to Mill it is tautological, therefore 
 to be discarded as 'an impropriety of speech.' If it be 
 an accurate statement, as is here maintained, it indicates a 
 complex state, composed of three elements. (See above, Intro, 
 sec. 8.) 
 
 As to the facts themselves, Mr. Mill admits such diversity 
 as implies a distinction between Sensation and Consciousness. 
 
T04 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Sensations are ' feelings which we have through the external 
 senses.' ' What is in me is the sensation/ It is not alleged 
 that the object, making an impression on the organ, produces 
 Me. On the contrary, I receive the sensation ; its existence 
 is accounted for by a power of Receptivity which belongs to 
 Me. But, in receiving the sensation, I know the thing 
 received, and I know myself as the receiver. I have the 
 sensation, and I have the knowledge of it. Both belong to 
 me as possessions at the same moment in the same state. 
 Sensation is not Self-sensation, but Smell-sensation, or some 
 other 'particular feeling.' Consciousness is the expression of 
 Self-activity ; Sensation is the expression of Receptivity in 
 Self. Whether in lower forms of life there may be feelings or 
 sensibility apart from consciousness, and by mere irritability 
 and contractility of animal tissue, I do not undertake to say. 
 But this is not what is involved in sensation as the simplest 
 element in human experience, and Mr. Mill has not alleged 
 that it is. The simplest fact in our experience involves know- 
 ledge of Self, Personality, or Mind, before you begin a theory 
 of development. We are still on the old ground, and have 
 gone back as far as Des Cartes. * I feel,' is an affirmation 
 which I myself make ; and, in making which, I affirm my own 
 existence, and my knowledge of a present state as mine. The 
 existence of feeling is thus personal experience of feeling. 
 
 Mr. John Stuart Mill also holds the identity of Sensation 
 and Consciousness, but he makes the avowal in a much more 
 cautious manner, admitting that 'a slight correction seems 
 requisite to the doctrine.' Analy. 2d ed. I. 230. He says, 
 Many philosophers think ' we cannot have a feeling without 
 having the knowledge awakened in us at the same moment, of 
 a Self who feels it. But of this as a primordial fact of our 
 nature, it is impossible to have direct evidence ; and a sup- 
 position may be made which renders its truth at least question- 
 able. Suppose a being, gifted with sensation, but devoid of 
 memory, whose sensations follow one after another, but leave 
 
ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 no trace of their existence when they cease. 
 
 being have any knowledge or notion of a Self? WouldxheO, ''/ 
 ever say to himself, / feel; this sensation is mine? I thim^, 
 not. The notion of a Self is, I apprehend, a consequence of 
 memory. There is no meaning in the word Ego or I, unless 
 the I of to-day is also the I of yesterday.' Analy. 2d ed. 
 i. 229. It is matter of much interest that Mr. Mill, after his 
 mature study of the question, should take his position so 
 cautiously as to say, that it is ' at least questionable,' whether 
 sensation involves a knowledge of self, and still more that he 
 should ground this statement on a supposition. The supposi- 
 tion is a fair one, but it seems to me to fail in its purpose. 
 Suppose a being capable of sensation but incapable of recol- 
 lection. Suppose this being experiencing a sensation. ' Would 
 he say to himself, this sensation is mine?' If he should say 
 anything to Himself, he would say this ; he could not possibly 
 say anything eLe. Either he must experience a sensation 
 without knowing it, or he must know it as his sensation. 
 The argument to the contrary is based on the necessity of 
 memory for the attainment of ' any knowledge or notion of 
 a " Self." But a knowledge and a notion are two distinct 
 things. A knowledge may be obtained in a single state ; 
 a notion is a general conception obtained by gathering 
 up into one representation the various qualities recognised 
 through successive forms of experience. Without Memory, 
 a conception is impossible. But, on the supposition made, 
 we deal with a being who has only a single sensation and 
 no memory. A conception of a Self is to him impossible. 
 Hamilton's Reid, p. 360, and Note B, p. 804; Mansel's 
 Prolegomena Logica, p. 9. But a knowledge of Self is not 
 thereby excluded. On the contraiy, if a conception of self 
 can be obtained by the aid of Memory, a knowledge of self 
 must be involved in each state, without the play of memory. 
 Present Knowledge is the condition of memory. To say that 
 memory recalls what was never present, is a contradiction in 
 
io6 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 terms. A conception which contains what has not been 
 gathered by direct knowledge, is a fabrication, and nothing 
 more. A philosophic doctrine of Personality resting on such 
 a basis, exposes its own insufficiency. The saying, that ' there 
 is no meaning in the word Ego or I, unless the I of to-day is 
 also the I of yesterday/ appears to carry the refutation of the 
 theory. There must have been an I of yesterday, in order to 
 say that the I of to-day is the same ; and the I of yesterday 
 must have had a meaning, if the I of to-day has any. A 
 doctrine of Personality is, therefore, a prerequisite for a 
 doctrine of Personal Identity. To identify these is to invent 
 confusion. The conjunction has been attempted from the 
 extreme of a transcendental philosophy, as well as from the 
 other extreme of a sensational philosophy. 
 
 On the grounds thus indicated, it seems evident that the 
 slight correction which Mr. Mill proposes, must be still further 
 extended. The correction suggested is this : ' There is a 
 mental process, over and above the mere having a feeling, to 
 which the word consciousness is sometimes, and it can hardly 
 be said improperly, applied, viz., the reference of the feeling to 
 our self. But this process, though separable in thought from 
 the actual feeling, and in all probability not accompanying it 
 in the beginning, is, from a very early period, inseparably 
 attendant on it.' This is a large admission ; too large to rest 
 in. A 'reference' to Self, however, implies a l process] just as 
 in the transcendental philosophy of Germany, the Ego or Self 
 is said to affirm itself, so as to be an object to itself. There 
 is thus the inconsistency of saying that Self refers its own state 
 to itself, or that Self affirms itself to itself. For such state- 
 ments there is no philosophic warrant. To know an experience 
 as mine, I must obtain the knowledge in the act of experience 
 itself. Later than this, is too late. If I do not know the 
 sensation as mine, I cannot refer it to Self; if I do know it as 
 mine, I have a knowledge which is superior to that obtained 
 by any process or reference. 
 
ORIGIN OF KNO IVLED GE. 1 07 
 
 Professor Bain takes practically the same position. The 
 modifications he proposes on the doctrine of Mr. James Mill 
 are no less striking than those just considered. He says, 
 ' We may be in a state of pleasure with little or nothing of 
 thought accompanying ; we are still properly said to be con- 
 scious, or under consciousness. But we may add to the mere 
 fact of pleasure, the cognition of the state, as a state of pleasure, 
 and a state belonging to us at the time. This is not the same 
 thing as before ; it is something new superposed upon the 
 previous consciousness. When we take note of the fact that 
 we are pleased, we proceed beyond the bare experience of the 
 present pleasure, to an intellectual act of comparison, assimi- 
 lation, or classification with past pleasures ; WQ probably intro- 
 duce the machinery of language to express ourselves as pleased : 
 all this is so much extra consciousness. These operations are 
 not involved in mere feeling ; we may feel without them.' 
 Analysis, Note 74, i. 227. There is much in this paragraph 
 which will be readily accepted bearing on the possibility of 
 attention, or reflection, as a more complex exercise, than 
 simple consciousness. It is agreed that we can make any 
 mental state matter of attention, and can proceed to compari- 
 son of it with other states, and to appropriate classification of 
 it. It is certainly accurate to say that * These knowing opera- 
 tions are not involved in mere feeling ; we may feel without 
 them.' The real point in dispute, however, appears, when 
 Professor Bain says, * We may be in a state of pleasure with 
 little or nothing of thought accompanying/ If ' thought ' here 
 mean ' consciousness,' whether are we to hold to ' little ' or to 
 'nothing'] Leaving the 'little or nothing' indeterminate, 
 Dr. Bain says, ' But we may add to the mere fact of pleasure 
 the cognition of the state as a state of pleasure, and as a state 
 belonging to us at the time.' Where is the evidence in sup- 
 port o this ' addition,' or the psychological provision for it ? 
 Does ' the mere fact of pleasure,' as a matter of experience, 
 not imply that it is I who have the pleasure, or that the fact 
 
loS HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is one of personal experience? If not, I must, in order to 
 'add' the cognition of it as mine, have first a cognition of 
 myself purely as a person, and then attribute the fact to myself 
 as its subject; a process which, according to all the accredited 
 results of Psychology, involves two impossibilities, knowledge 
 of pure self, and attributing to pure self of that which is not 
 known as simple fact. 
 
 Hume says, ' I never can catch myself 'at any time without 
 a perception.' Hum. Nat. I. iv. 6. It is enough at any time 
 to catch yourself with one. Kant, in opening up his grand 
 scheme of transcendental philosophy, sought to reach what 
 Hume here points to as requisite, Mind as a Thing-in-itself. 
 By that single effort, with its later developments down to 
 Hegel, philosophic literature has been enriched to a wonder- 
 ful degree. But we are still without the Thing-in-itself. We 
 know Mind as Personality in every present state ; the recogni- 
 tion of Personal Identity is another thing; and the concep- 
 tion of the Mind as possessed of a variety of powers is still 
 another. 
 
 The extreme caution, almost hesitation, of the language 
 which Professor Bain next employs, seems to indicate a sense 
 of the greatness of the difficulty. He says, ' It is thus cor- 
 rect to draw a line between feeling, and knowing that we feel ; 
 although there is a great delicacy in the operation. It may be 
 said, in one sense, that we cannot feel without knowing that 
 we feel ; but the assertion is verging on error, for feeling may 
 be accompanied with a minimum of cognitive energy, or as 
 good as none at all.' Ib. It must be kept in view, that ' to 
 draw a line between feeling, and knowing that we feel,' involves 
 an analytic or philosophic process, and the possibility of such 
 a process depends upon the co-existence of the feeling and the 
 knowing in a single mental state. If there be even 'a mini- 
 mum of cognitive energy' accompanying each experience of 
 feeling, the first and last hope of a development theory of 
 mind dies out, and the true beginning of a mental philosophy 
 
ORIGIN OF KNO WLED GE. 1 09 
 
 is where Des Cartes began. For history of opinion on this 
 subject, see end of this Chapter. 
 
 6. The next test of the development theory is found in the 
 explanation it offers of the 'series, succession, or flow 7 of our 
 experiences. That there is a series, involving unity in con- 
 tinuity, is admitted. A sufficient explanation must account 
 for two things : (i.) The fact of a connected series of experi- 
 ences, 'a bundle or collection of different perceptions' 
 (Hume); 'a thread of consciousness' (J. S. Mill) : and (2.) 
 The diversity of nature belonging to successive parts of the 
 series, bundle, or thread. Sensation being the primary fact, 
 how is a connected series of sensations possible? and how 
 does the series come to embrace more than sensations 1 
 
 The first problem is this, Given a sensation, how are we 
 to account for the development of a series, conscious of its 
 own unity 1 So far as the external conditions of sensation are 
 concerned, it is clear that that which awakens one sensation 
 may again awaken another. If there be Organism, with i sen- 
 tient or incarrying nerves,' and Objects fitted to make impres- 
 sions on that organism, the external conditions are fulfilled. 
 Permanence of externality, partly Mine, and partly Not-Me, 
 make provision outwardly for sensation. Whether such ex- 
 ternality is adequately explained by a sensational theory, the 
 nature of the present problem does not lead me to inquire. 
 
 The essential question is this : Granting the possibility of 
 sensations, how can a series of such sensations recognise itself 
 as a series, or attain to a conception of Personal Identity ? 
 The theory most rigidly adhering to the conditions of Sensa- 
 tionalism is that presented by Mr. J. S. Mill, from whom we 
 have ample acknowledgment of the perplexity. * If we speak 
 of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete 
 the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware 
 of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alter- 
 native of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different 
 irom any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of ac- 
 
i io HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but 
 a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.' Exam. 
 3d ed. p. 242. Which alternative is commonly accepted, 
 there can be no doubt. But if it be admitted that ' the Mind 
 or Ego is something different from any series of feelings/ how 
 can the acknowledgment be described as a 'belief? In 
 postulating a belief, we are guilty of the inconsistency of sup- 
 posing ourselves outside the series, forming a belief as to some- 
 thing different, that is, our own identity as distinct from the 
 series of feelings. We escape the inconsistency if there be 
 knowledge of Self in every state, and if our conception of 
 Personal Identity rests upon such knowledge. 
 
 In order to proceed we must assume the possession of 
 MEMORY. We must have not merely a present experience, 
 but recollections of past experiences. But how can a succes- 
 sion of feelings remember 1 By common consent the sensa- 
 tion ceases when the object no longer continues to make an 
 impression on the nerves of sensibility. The recollection of 
 the sensation, or the ' idea ' of it, as Mr. James Mill and 
 others name it, is quite different from the sensation. Under 
 this admission^ it becomes needful to call in the aid of Memory 
 as an original power. An impression upon our sensitive 
 organism may produce a sensation, but cannot continue or 
 recall it. Sensation is ' Receptivity or Passivity.' Recollec- 
 tion is activity. In this we come upon a form of experience 
 entirely different from sensation, and which sensation could 
 not produce. If sensation ceases when the impression on 
 the sensitive nerves is discontinued, development of a sensa- 
 tion is impossible. Professor Bain says that sensations possess 
 the power of ' continuing as Ideas after the actual object of 
 sense is withdrawn.' Emotions, p. 17. But the Idea cannot 
 at the same time be different from the Sensation, and yet a 
 continuation of the Sensation itself. An ideal representation 
 or recollection must be ' reproduced by mental causes alone,' 
 and in saying so we postulate Memory as a property of Mind. 
 
ORIGIN OF KNO WLEDGE. 1 1 1 
 
 There is, however, still another demand towards the con- 
 struction of a theory. We have a regard to the Future, as 
 well as to the Past. On this account, Mr. John S. Mill postulates 
 the following psychological truth, 'that the human mind is 
 capable of Expectation, in other words, that, after having had 
 Actual Sensations we are capable of forming the conception of 
 Possible Sensations.' Exam. p. 219. This makes provision 
 for another form of experience quite distinct from Sensation. 
 
 But what is the effect of the introduction of these two 
 postulates, Memory and Expectation ? If these two powers are 
 attributed to the series of Sensations, the theory is involved in 
 self-contradiction, by assigning to sensations attributes quite 
 different from those which can belong to them, according to 
 the explanation given of their origin and essential character. 
 If these powers are postulated as belonging to ' the human 
 mind,' or as powers * which we are capable ' of using, a de- 
 velopment theory is abandoned, and we are on the old ground 
 of faculties. 
 
 Granting now as postulates, that ' the human mind ' is 
 capable of Memory, and also of Expectation, how can we 
 account for the diversity of nature belonging to the forms of 
 experience remembered and expected 1 Life is not made up 
 of a series of Sensations merely. There are affections and 
 emotions welling up from within ; there are comparisons of 
 things without and within, and reasonings leading to definite 
 conclusions ; there are regrets as to the past, and purposes as to 
 the future. May we, in sight of all this diversity, now escape 
 the necessity of adding to the number of our own postulates ? 
 In postulating Memory, have we not postulated a good deal 
 more 1 Does not Memory imply attention and comparison, 
 and do not these involve intellectuality, in complete contrast 
 with mere receptivity] From this manifest and serious per- 
 plexity I see no satisfactory outlet. ' Every one of himself 
 will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and think- 
 ing.' Hume, Treat, on Hum. Nature, B. i. Pt. 2. 
 
112 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 One of the most interesting attempts to complete the 
 theory is that of Professor Bain, wrought out with great ability. 
 He assigns Emotional, Volitional, and Intellectual characters 
 to Feeling. Emotions and Will, c. i. The substratum of 
 life is thus regarded as Feeling, while Emotional, Volitional, 
 and Intellectual activity are only modifications of Feeling. 
 The first position is, that Emotion may be derived from Sen- 
 sation. To establish this, it is urged that every Feeling has a 
 physical side and a mental side, and that gradually the physi- 
 cal side may abate and the mental side increase, in which 
 case an emotion exists. Hume felt a need for other materials. 
 He said, * The idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon 
 the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, 
 hope and fear, which may properly be called impressions of 
 reflection, because derived from it.' Hum. Nat. B. i. Pt. i. 
 sec. 2. Next, * Volitional characters ' are assigned to Feel- 
 ing on the following ground ' Although the operations of the 
 Will are conceived by us as something distinct from, or super- 
 added to, the operation of Feeling proper, yet in every voli- 
 tion, rightly so named, the stimulus, or antecedent, is some 
 feeling.' Finally, ' intellectual characters ' are assigned to 
 Feeling thus, Since Sensations possess the power of continu- 
 ing themselves as Ideas, * this property of ^Persistence and 
 also of recurrence in Idea, belonging more or less to sensa- 
 tional states, is their intellectual property.' Such an ingenious 
 scheme of development cannot fail to gain admiration, but it 
 assumes too much. Sensation has a physical ' stimulus or 
 antecedent/ but the Sensation itself is ' in me.' Admitting 
 next, that Feeling is the * stimulus or antecedent ' of a Voli- 
 tion, Feeling is then used in a sense different from Sensation. 
 An assumption is thus made, to help the argument. And 
 even then the Feeling supposed does not account for the 
 possibility of Volition, which is * something distinct from, or 
 superadded to, the operation of Feeling proper,' and implies 
 some power different in nature as its source. Finally, as 
 
ORIGIN OF KNO WLED GE. 113 
 
 ' recurrence in idea ' is not persistence of a sensation, the 
 recurrence needs some power other than Sensation to account 
 for it. Besides, intellectual action is much more than mere 
 reproduction of what has gone before. It gathers what Sensa- 
 tion cannot give, and thus originates conceptions which are far 
 removed from all that sensitive organism transmits by the 
 incarrying nerves. Nay more : when Sensation and Intellec- 
 tual action are compared, with a view to decide their relations 
 to each other, so far is Intellectual-Action from being a de- 
 velopment from Sensation, that Intellect is required for the 
 use of the Senses. So obvious is this last statement, that Pro- 
 fessor Bain distributes the Senses on the basis of their relation 
 to Intellect. He says, ' Some of the senses are evidently in- 
 tellectual in a high degree, as sight and hearing, others are 
 intellectual in a much smaller degree, as Smell and Taste/ 
 Note in Mr. Mill's Analysis, 2d ed. i. 7. Taking, then, even 
 the lowest of the senses, Intellect is involved in their use, and 
 development up to Intellect is forestalled. 
 
 7. The final resort of a development theory is found in 
 the Laws of Association. On this account, the theory is often 
 named the Associational theory. 
 
 Mr. James Mill, following in the line taken by Locke and 
 Hume, traces the relation between Sensation and Association 
 in the following manner : The simplest element in experience 
 is Sensation ; the representation, copy, or recollection of the 
 sensation is an Idea : and the connecting or combining of 
 Ideas in the mind is association. This last is ASSOCIATION OF 
 IDEAS, not of objects, nor of sensations. The name points to 
 combinations by the exercise of recollection. The Laws of 
 Association are Laws of Memory. So Mr. J. Mill says, ' Our 
 ideas spring up, or exist, in the order in which the Sensations 
 existed of which they are the copies.' Analy. i. 56 ; or i. 78. 
 
 The Laws of Association as given by Mr. John S. Mill are 
 the following : ' ist, Similar phenomena tend to be thought of 
 together. 2d, Phenomena which have either been experienced 
 
 H 
 
U4 HANDBOOK: OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or conceived in close contiguity to one another, tend to be 
 thought of together. 3d, Associations produced by contiguity 
 become more certain and rapid by repetition. When two 
 phenomena have been very often experienced in conjunction, 
 and have not in any single instance occurred separately either 
 in experience or in thought, there is produced between them 
 what has been called Inseparable, or, less correctly, Indis- 
 soluble Association, by which is not meant that the Association 
 must inevitably last to the end of life that no subsequent 
 experience or process of thought can possibly avail to dissolve 
 it ; but only, that as long as no such experience or process of 
 thought has taken place, the Association is irresistible. 4th, 
 When an association has acquired this character of insepar- 
 ability, not only does the idea called up by association 
 become, in our consciousness, inseparable from the idea which 
 suggested it, but the facts or phenomena answering to these 
 ideas come at last to seem inseparable in existence.' Exam. 
 219. 
 
 In this statement of the Laws of Association, the substitu- 
 tion of the term ' Phenomena ' for ' Ideas ' is an improve- 
 ment, as embracing the remembrance of all mental facts. But 
 this comprehensiveness is gained at the risk of embracing 
 more than the facts of mind. The laws as given will be 
 generally accepted, with this modification, that the third really 
 embraces two distinct laws, and the fourth is not a law of As- 
 sociation in the same sense as the others. 
 
 The four laws of Association may be named, the Laws of 
 Similarity, of Contiguity, of Repetition, and of Tenacity or 
 Persistence. Hume named them, ' Resemblance, Contiguity 
 in time or place, and Cause and Effect.' See also Hamilton's 
 Reid, p. 199, and Dissert. D * *. 
 
 Mr. Mill's fourth law transcends the limits of Association 
 of the facts of internal experience. That external facts are 
 often considered to be necessarily connected merely on the 
 ground of mental association, is certain. But this tendency 
 
ORIGIN OF KNO WLED GE. 115 
 
 of mind is not an application of any law of association, but 
 a tendency towards false inference, which needs to be con- 
 stantly guarded against, as a source of error. It is a 
 disposition to make our thoughts the measure of external 
 existence. 
 
 The value of the Laws of Association as instruments for 
 the development of mind now requires consideration. Is 
 Memory sufficient to account for the origin of Intellect; or 
 does the action of Memory presuppose Intellect ? 
 
 The Laws of Association provide only for connecting 
 together facts which pass through consciousness, and for con- 
 stituting one of these facts a help for recalling the other. 
 Nothing can ' recur ' in consciousness which has not already 
 passed through it. If there be in consciousness only Feelings, 
 and provision for their association, the result can be nothing 
 more than combinations of Feeling. If Memory spin its 
 thread out of the stores of material treasured in the past ; 
 and if these stores contain nothing but feeling ; the thread 
 must be all of one fibre. Sensations as forms of passivity 
 are not capable of activity. Feelings may afford materials 
 for thought, but cannot themselves produce thought. Here 
 also we are brought to a stand-still. For the sake of progress, 
 we must pass over to the old ground of faculties, postulating 
 Intelligence as an original possession. 
 
 The facts next requiring attention are those pointed at in 
 Mr. Mill's fourth law. These facts being admitted as belong- 
 ing to consciousness, and yet distinct from the normal action 
 of the Laws of Association, have an important bearing on the 
 origin and certainty of human knowledge. While Sensations 
 and their Associations are concerned exclusively with our own 
 experience, Observations and Inferences are concerned with 
 external -objects, as well as with facts belonging to experience. 
 By observation, we recognise combinations and associations 
 of external objects, and from such observation we draw certain 
 inferences of our own. These inferences we hold to be true 
 
n6 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the objects. We have thus a twofold aspect of association, 
 associations of mental phenomena, and of external facts. 
 The difference between these two is very marked. Internal 
 Associations, we originate in accordance with the Laws enumer- 
 ated; External Associations we only recognise, and do not 
 originate, except in the case of actions which are manifesta- 
 tions of our own personality. Taking, then, Associations of 
 our own experience, and associations of external objects ob- 
 served by us, the spheres are so distinct, that the combinations 
 must be formed under different laws. The question now is, 
 How far can Internal Associations afford a criterion of external 
 reality ? This question is raised for the purpose of deciding, 
 how far conceivability, or its opposite, is a test of external 
 existence. On this subject, see Des Cartes' Method, Pt. iv., 
 ' that all things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive, 
 are true ; ' Leibnitz, Meditationes de Cognitione Veritate et Ideis 
 (1684), ed. Erdmann, p. 79; Reid's Intellectual Powers, 
 Essay iv. c. 3, with special reference to Hamilton's note, 
 p. 377 ; Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, I. 54 ; 
 Reply to foregoing, Mill's Logic, B. n. c. 5 ; Criticism of 
 Mr. Mill, by Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology, c. u. ; 
 Mansel's Prolegomena Logica. 
 
 The essential points in a reply are condensed into the fol- 
 lowing paragraphs : 
 
 Truth is recognised either by Intuition, lower or higher, or 
 by Logical Inference ; that is, either directly or indirectly. 
 (Whether there are higher, as well as lower intuitions, is a 
 question not essential to the discussion.) Observation is cer- 
 tainty. This is equivalent to affirming the certainty of known 
 facts. Logical Inference from observed facts has validity. 
 Observation is equally certain as to the relations of objects, as 
 to their separate existence. An association, whether matter of 
 experience or of external observation, is matter of fact. The 
 recurrence of such associations in observation, is an additional 
 fact known by the aid of Memory. 
 
ORIGIN OF KNO WLED GE. 117 
 
 What, then, is the relation between Internal and External 
 "Reality 1 ? Perception is observation of an external object, the 
 fact perceived being as certain as the fact of perception. Sen- 
 sation, being an internal fact dependent upon an impression 
 made on the sensitive organism, warrants an inference to the 
 existence in the object of a property capable of making the 
 impression. Associations, whether internal or external, being 
 known as facts, warrant an inference to laws, or powers (if 
 not both), competent to explain their origin. As observation 
 of objects affords the materials for our conceptions of them, 
 the external association of qualities in an object may have an 
 exact counterpart in the conception of these qualities associated 
 in the mind. If our observation of trees has uniformly in- 
 volved the recognition of trunk, branches, and green leaves, 
 these three characteristics will be associated in our conception 
 of a tree. We could not on this ground, however, warrantably 
 maintain the physical impossibility of any variation. The sight 
 of a black beech gives external diversity, and introduces a new 
 association. True, then, as it is in the history of mind, that 
 external facts or phenomena answering to ideas constantly 
 associated within, come at last to be regarded by us as in 
 reality inseparable, such an inference from internal association 
 to external reality is logically incompetent. The possibilities 
 of existence are not restricted by the range of our conceptions. 
 Conceivableness is not the test of truth ; nor is inconceivable- 
 ness the test of the false. As a test of possible existence, 
 conceivability is the least reliable that can be used. The 
 conceivable may be only what we have known ; the inconceiv- 
 able, nothing more than what we have never known. The 
 tendency to employ inconceivableness as a test of truth has 
 involved philosophical inquiry in confusion, and has led to the 
 egregious assumption that our thoughts are the measure of 
 reality. 
 
 Passing from facts to principles, we come upon another 
 example of confusion. The mind's insight into self-evident 
 
i iS HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 truth has been confounded with conceivableness as a test of 
 truth. Insight into self-evident truth does not make mind 
 the measure of truth, but indicates only the mind's power to 
 recognise truths which are higher than facts. So insight into 
 the self- contradictory does not erect the limits of mental power 
 into limits of possible truth, but only illustrates the fact that 
 there is in mind a power to detect the inherently false. The 
 false is not identified with the inconceivable. It is by under- 
 standing the terms of a proposition, that we recognise it to be 
 self-contradictory, carrying in itself the evidence of its own 
 falseness. The test lies in the proposition itself, not in the 
 power of conception belonging to this or that mind. Few 
 things are more likely to mislead, than to represent the Incon- 
 ceivable as the furthest removed from Truth. For this reason, 
 the formula is open to serious objection, as a statement of the 
 criterion of a priori principles of knowledge, ' A necessary 
 truth is a proposition the negative of which is not only false 
 but inconceivable' 
 
 The history of philosophic thought as to the knowledge of 
 Self may be traced in the following line. DES CARTES makes 
 the knowledge of self an essential element in all knowledge. 
 Method (1637); Pt. iv., Veitch's ed. p. 74 ; Meditations (1647), 
 IL, Veitch's ed. p. 24. He says, ' I think, therefore I am ; if 
 I doubt, still I affirm my own existence ; if I am deceived, still 
 I exist.' LOCKE, tracing all knowledge to sensation and re- 
 flection, admitted the existence of mind, defining Person as 
 * a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, 
 and can consider itself as itself.' Essay (1690; n. 27, sec. 9. 
 While holding that ' there is nothing in the Intellect which 
 was not previously in Sense/ he did not expose himself to the 
 point of the clever addition of Leibnitz, * except the Intellect 
 itself,' for he granted mental existence. HUME denied ' that 
 we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our 
 Self, and maintained that we are only ' a bundle of percep- 
 tions.' Treatise on Human Nature (1739), I. iv. 6. The 
 
ORIGIN OF KNO WLED GE. 119 
 
 Scotch School followed, attacking the Sceptical Philosophy, 
 and seeking to reconstruct the science of Mind on some 
 better basis than that of Locke. But REID spoke hesitat- 
 ingly of the knowledge of mind. He said, * The attributes of 
 mind, and particularly its operations, we know clearly, but of 
 the thing itself we have only an obscure notion.' Intellectual 
 Powers (1785), Essay v. c. 2. STEWART followed more de- 
 cidedly on the negative side, saying of mind, that ' we are not 
 immediately conscious of its existence.' Elements of the Philo- 
 sophy of the Human Mind, vol. I. (1792), Intro. Part i. In 
 these statements, both authors were hampered by discussions 
 as to the Essence of Mind. The French School, which 
 sprung almost wholly from the Scotch School, became 
 much more clear on the immediate consciousness of mind. 
 ROYER-COLLARD led the van, in the Lectures delivered in 
 Paris in 1811, published by Jouffroy in his edition of Reid's 
 Works, vols. iv. and v. MAINE DE BIRAN, an independent 
 thinker, made it his chief concern to maintain our conscious- 
 ness of mind as a cause or active force. Examin des Lemons 
 de Philosophic de M. Laromiguiere (1809), CEuvres Philo- 
 sophiques, edited by Cousin, 1841. After him, COUSIN him- 
 self followed on the same side, Cours de Philosophic, Legons 
 v. vi., Wight's translation j History of Modern Philosophy, 
 Edinburgh, 1852, vol. i. p. 88 and p. 109 ; and also Lecons 
 sur la Philosophic de Kant, Legon vin., Henderson's transla- 
 tion, The Philosophy of Kant, London, 1854, p. 193. THEO- 
 DORE JOUFFROY, Prof, of Mor. Phil, at Paris, took the same 
 ground, in his Introduction to Stewart's Outlines. This intro- 
 duction is translated by George Ripley of Boston, U.S., and is 
 the first of the Philosophical Essays by M. Theo. Jouffroy, 
 Edinburgh, 1839 (Clark's series), see p. n and p. 56. The 
 French movement is ably traced in Morell's History of Modern 
 Philosophy. The German School, in its reaction against 
 Hume, took a different course under guidance of the master 
 spirit, KANT. In the development of a transcendental philo- 
 
120 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sophy, Kant held that the Ego or Self is known in every con- 
 scious state ; but such knowledge he considered a knowledge 
 of mind only as phenomenon, giving nothing permanent. He 
 even goes so far as to say that the Ego or Self as thus known 
 ' is but the consciousness of my thought/ But the mind itself, 
 the thing in itself (Ding-an-sich), as a permanent thing, is 
 reached only by transcendental conception. This is the Mind 
 as Noumenon, separated from every element of experience. 
 The cogito, ergo sum, I think, therefore I am, of Des Cartes, 
 gives only an empirical psychology, whereas beyond that we 
 must seek a rational psychology. ' I think is, therefore, the 
 only text of rational psychology, from which it must develop 
 its whole system.' This double view of Self as phenomenon 
 and as noumenon is so important that I subjoin detailed 
 references : Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (1781), Vorrede zur 
 zweiten Auflage, note, Werke, Rosencranz, Th. n. Supple- 
 ment ii. p. 685. A very important passage withdrawn from the 
 latest editions, given by Rosencranz as Supplement xi., Th. n. 
 716. Another withdrawn passage, given by Rosencranz as 
 Supplement xiv., Th. n. 730, and Supplement xxi., Th. n. 774. 
 And Des Zweiten Buchs der Transcendentalen Dialektik, Erstes 
 Haupstiick. Mr. Meiklejohn in his translation has wisely em- 
 braced all the passages in the text, admitting of the references 
 being given to the pages, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. xl. 
 Introd., pp. 41, 81, 86, 95, 168, and 237. The progression of 
 thought was by a transition to higher abstraction, with excep- 
 tion of a decided protest from JACOB: (1743-1819), 'The 
 Faith- Philosopher/ as Ueberweg calls him, Geschichte, Th. in. 
 206. The theory of Jacobi is best gathered from his work, 
 David Hume, uber den Glauben, oder Ideal is mus und Realismus, 
 1787. The elder FICHTE (J. G.) followed Kant with an 
 Idealism, which made the Ego or I everything ; but with him 
 the Ego or I is not the individual, but universal reason. Thus 
 the problem of Personality was abandoned for higher specula- 
 tive efforts separated from the facts of consciousness. Fichte's 
 
ORIGIN OF KNO WLED GE. 121 
 
 Wissenschaftslehre, 1794; in the following year, SCHELLING 
 took the same line, in his work entitled Vom Ich als Princip 
 der Philosophic, oder ilber das Unbedingte im Menschlichen 
 Wissen, 1795. With both of these philosophers the End was 
 not Kant's noumenon, or Pure Self, but The Absolute or The 
 Unconditioned, Das Unbedingte. HEGEL went to the oppo- 
 site extreme, to seek a beginning in the universal, and thus we 
 have the last use of Being and Determinate Being, Seyn and 
 Da-seyn, Wissenschaft der Logik, 1812. With Hegel, Philo- 
 sophy takes its rise at the utmost remove from facts ; at the 
 extreme opposite from Kant's commencement in the Kritik 
 d. R. V., ' all our knowledge begins with experience.' From 
 that extreme, however, Hegel comes, through evolution of 
 thought, to self-consciousness. Later German thinking has 
 returned upon Psychology. J. F. HERBART (1776-1841) 
 insists that Philosophy must begin with the tacts of con- 
 sciousness. He gives primary importance to the Ich, I, ' with 
 which word the proper self-consciousness of every one is indi- 
 cated to himself;' and this Ich, I, ' exists, that is, is present, 
 not merely in Itself, but also with the Not- 1, Nicht-Ich.' 
 Lehrbuch zur Einleitimg in die Philosophic, 1813, sec. 124, 
 Werke, by Hartenstein, i. 198. F. E. BENEKE (1798-1854) 
 followed in the same line, insisting upon self-knowledge 
 in self-consciousness, Erkentnisslehre, 1820. See also, the 
 younger FICHTE (Immanuel Hermann), who regards each 
 Personality as an eternal entity, Das Erkennen als Selbster- 
 kennm, 1833, and Zur Seelenfrage, eine philosophische Confes- 
 sion, Of the Problem of the Soul, A Philosophical Confession, 
 -1859, translated by Morell under the title, Contribiitions to 
 Mental Philosophy, London, 1860 ; and ADOLF TRENDELEN- 
 BURG, Logische Untersuchungen, 1840. For the earlier stages 
 of German thought, see Schweglefs History of Philosophy, 
 translated by Dr. James Hutchison Stirling, with notes of the 
 translator ; for the later stages, see Ueberweg's History of 
 Philosophy, Theological and Philosophical Library, New 
 
122 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 York and London, edited by Professors Henry B. Smith and 
 SchafT. 
 
 The philosophy which acknowledges immediate conscious- 
 ness of Self, has been ably vindicated by Hamilton, Metaph. 
 L; very admirably by Ferrier, Institutes of Metaphysic, in 
 which prominence is given to this as fundamental ; by MANSEL, 
 Prolegomena Logica, p. 137 ; and Metaphysics, p. 180; and in 
 President M'Cosn's Exam, of Mill's Philosophy, p. 80. Dr. 
 SHADWORTH HODGSON, Time and Space, London, 1865, raises 
 ' the question how consciousness is related to, or distinguished 
 from, Self-consciousness,' and affirms that self-consciousness is 
 a later attainment, by reflection. P. 168. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 
 (UTILITARIAN THEORY.) 
 
 1. THE Development theory, which seeks first to rise from 
 Sensation to Intelligence, endeavours next, with the aid of 
 Intelligence, to reach a knowledge of moral distinctions. The 
 power to observe and reason about our Sensations being 
 granted, the development theory undertakes to distinguish 
 between right and wrong in action. 
 
 2. As the foundation of the intellectual theory is laid in 
 Sensation, the foundation of the moral theory is laid in the 
 pleasurable and painful experience characteristic of our Feelings. 
 The Ethical Theory may be summarized thus : ' Actions are 
 right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
 as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. '--Mill's 
 Utilitarianism^ p. 9. In view of this, the theory is named 
 ' The Happiness Theory,' Eudsemonism (from euSou/Aoi/ta, 
 happiness), Hedonism (^oovi?, pleasure). Of the two designa- 
 tions, the former indicates a view of happiness higher than the 
 latter. Bentham thinks that ' the word happiness is not 
 always appropriate/ because 'it represents pleasure in too 
 elevated a shape.' Deontology, i. 78. 
 
 In accordance with the Sensational basis, we must look 
 first at pleasure and pain as opposites, then at different kinds 
 of pleasure and pain, then at the reasons for seeking pleasure 
 
 133 
 
124 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and shunning pain, next at the reasons for preferring one 
 pleasure to another, and finally, we must consider whether 
 the tendency or fitness of an action to produce happiness or 
 misery, determines the Tightness or wrongness of that action. 
 
 3. That pleasurable and painful feelings are experienced 
 by us is matter of agreement. The range of facts with which 
 we have to deal is also well defined. * By happiness is in- 
 tended pleasure and the absence of pain ; by unhappiness, 
 Dain and the privation of pleasure.' Mill's Util. p. 10. Plea- 
 sures and pains of all kinds are here included, whether con- 
 nected with Sensations, Feelings, or Intellectual Activity. 
 
 4. The rise of pleasure, as connected with the functions 
 of our life, admits of a twofold explanation. It is the natural 
 accompaniment of our Sensations, or of the exercise of our 
 energies. In the one case it attends upon our ' Passivity or 
 Receptivity,' as in the warmth of the body, or the cooling in- 
 fluence of the breeze. In the other case, it attends upon our 
 Activity, or Voluntary use of powers, as in the exercise of 
 our muscles, or of our reasoning power. The former belongs 
 to sentient existence ; the latter to active existence, whether 
 physical or intellectual, or both combined. 
 
 Besides these forms of pleasure, there is another, which 
 does not here call for special note, namely, pleasure in the 
 possession of objects of value. 
 
 Pain comes either through injury inflicted upon the Sen- 
 tient organism, or through unnatural restraint upon the energies 
 when brought into exercise. Pain is not merely a negation, or 
 want of pleasure, but a positive experience, opposite in kind. 
 
 5. Pleasure being a form of experience naturally attendant 
 upon the use of our sensibilities or energies, is not the end of 
 their use. This is the obvious exposition of the previous para- 
 graph. Pain being attendant upon the injury or restraint of 
 our powers is not the product of their natural use. Pleasure 
 and pain are the index of the natural and the unnatural in the 
 use of powers ; of conformity with the law of their exercise, or 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 125 
 
 violation of that law. As Feuchtersleben has said, ' Beauty is 
 in some degree the reflection of health,' so pleasure is the 
 symbol of natural exercise. Pleasure and pain are respectively 
 as the smooth play or the irksome fretting of machinery, but 
 neither is the end for which it is kept moving. Consciousness 
 of simple pleasure and nothing more is unknown. A capacity 
 or faculty whose function it is to produce pleasure and nothing 
 more is unknown. Pleasure may thus be generalized as the 
 common accompaniment of all natural exercise. 
 
 6. Pleasures differ in kind according to the capacities or 
 faculties on whose exercise they attend, and they vary in quality 
 according to the quality of mental exercise, of which they are 
 the natural accompaniment. 
 
 In accordance with the first statement, we speak of the 
 pleasure of the senses, of the affections, of the intellect, of the 
 imagination. In accordance with the second, we speak of 
 the pleasures of the senses as lower than those of the intellect, 
 and sensualism is a term of reproach applied to the indulgence 
 of the appetites, in neglect of the restraints^ understanding and 
 conscience. As the active transcends the passive, so does the 
 happiness of activity surpass in value all the pleasures which 
 spring from mere sensibility. And, as among the active powers, 
 some transcend others, the attendant pleasures are graduated 
 accordingly. 
 
 Mr. John S. Mill has insisted, with peculiar felicity, on the 
 diversity of quality among pleasures. It is one of his highest 
 distinctions as an expounder of Utilitarianism and a leader of 
 thought, that he has given prominence to the superior quality 
 of some pleasures in comparison with others. Thus he has 
 dwelt upon the important fact, that 'a being of higher faculties] 
 requires more to make him happy . . . than one of an inferior 
 type.' So also he points to the fact that those equally capable 
 of appreciating and enjoying all pleasures, * give a most marked 
 preference to the manner of existence which employs their 
 higher faculties.' Util. p. 12. This is admirable, both as 
 
126 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 indicating the relations of pleasures to the faculties employed, 
 and the superior quality of the pleasure, according to the 
 quality of the faculty in exercise. 
 
 7. Pleasure, as agreeable to our nature, is a common object 
 of desire. Pain, as disagreeable to our nature, is a common 
 object of dislike. 
 
 The natural desire of pleasure stimulates to the use of our 
 powers, gives zest to their continued employment, and contri- 
 butes largely to mental development, and to continuance in a 
 life of activity. 
 
 The natural aversion to suffering acts as a check upon un- 
 natural use of power, and warns of the danger which attends 
 upon an unhealthy state or undue action of any power. 
 
 That pleasure is agreeable, and as such desirable, is simple 
 matter of fact, and needs no proof. ' What proof is it possible 
 to give that pleasure is good 1 ?' Util. p. 6. 
 
 8. Passing now from pleasure and pain as forms of ex- 
 perience, to the capacities or faculties upon whose exercise 
 they attend, it is evident that the experience of pleasure or 
 pain is largely dependent on use of our own faculties, that is, 
 upon our own actions. That the experience of either is alto- 
 gether dependent on our own actions cannot be affirmed, for 
 there are both pleasures and pains experienced which are not 
 determined by our own acts. For example, the pleasure of a 
 bracing atmosphere on a clear morning, and the depressing 
 influence of a thick, damp atmosphere, on a dull morning. 
 But, that our pleasure or pain is dependent mainly on the use 
 of our faculties, is admitted. 
 
 9. Actions may be classified according as pleasure or pain 
 attends upon them. They may be described as pleasurable 
 or painful actions. That pleasurable actions are agreeable to 
 the agent, and painful actions disagreeable, is only another 
 mode of saying that pleasure is agreeable, pain the reverse. 
 That pleasure may be described as good, and suffering as evil, 
 
 \ is equally obvious, but no additional meaning is thereby con- 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 127 
 
 veyed. Good and evil cannot here be taken in a moral sense, 
 for we have no evidence of the presence of anything more 
 than the agreeable or disagreeable ; and moral quality belongs 
 to actions, whereas neither pleasure nor pain is a personal 
 action. 
 
 10. In actions classified as pleasurable, the action is not 
 identified with the pleasure, but the pleasure as a passive expe- 
 rience, attendant on the action, and dependent upon it, is 
 often described as the consequence of the action. It is the 
 consequent, not the subsequent. It is dependent upon the 
 action for its existence, but does not follow after the action 
 when it is past. On account of this relation between action 
 and pleasure or pain, the theory of moral distinctions based 
 upon it is named the Theory of Consequences. 
 
 11. Passing from actions which have an exclusively per- 
 sonal reference, to actions which affect the experience of 
 others, these actions also may be classified according as they 
 produce happiness or unhappiness to others. Such happiness 
 or unhappiness on the part of others may be either the inci- 
 dental and undesigned accompaniment of our action, or it may 
 be the direct and designed result of our conduct. In the 
 former case, the experience of others is an attendant result of 
 our action. In the latter, the experience of others is the con- 
 templated end of our action. If that end be the happiness of 
 another, the motive is benevolent, the act is beneficent, the 
 result is a definite amount of happiness to the person con- 
 cerned. If the end contemplated be the unhappiness of an- 
 other, the motive is malevolent, the act is injurious, the 
 result is a definite amount of misery to the person concerned. 
 
 In this description of these actions, we simply extend the 
 application of agreeable and disagreeable to the experience 
 of another, which we take to be an experience analogous 
 with our own ; and in accordance with this application, we 
 describe our motive and act, as wishing good or doing good, 
 wishing evil or doing evil, understanding that the terms good 
 
128 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and evil here mean nothing more than agreeable and disagree- 
 able. 
 
 12. Contemplating these characteristics of actions as pro- 
 ducing happiness or unhappiness to ourselves or others, it 
 is maintained by the upholders of the Utilitarian Theory of 
 Morals, that actions are morally right as they tend to produce 
 happiness, morally wrong as they tend to produce unhappiness. 
 It is thus the usefulness of actions in securing happiness that 
 determines their moral character. On this account the Theory 
 is named Utilitarian. For the different senses in which the 
 term Utilitarianism has been used, see Prof. Crete's Exam, of 
 the Utilitarian Philos., Cambridge, 1867. 
 
 This theory, which was formally promulgated among the 
 ancients by Epicurus, has appeared in a variety of forms in 
 modern times. These are given in successive paragraphs, as 
 a guide not only to the history of the theory, but also to its 
 criticism. 
 
 13. Hobbes (1588-1679), in making happiness the standard, 
 applies the term to personal happiness. ' Whatsoever is the 
 object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for 
 his part calleth good ; and the object of his hate and aversion, 
 evil ; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these 
 words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with 
 relation to the person that useth them ; there being nothing 
 simply and absolutely so ; nor any common rule of good and 
 evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves ; 
 but from the person of the man, where there is no common- 
 wealth ; or, in a commonwealth, from the person of him that 
 representeth it, or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men dis- 
 agreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the 
 rule thereof. ... Of good there be three kinds : good in 
 the promise, that is, piilchrum; good in effect, as the end 
 desired, which is caJledjucundum, delightful; and good as the 
 means, which is called ntile, profitable ; and as many of evil ; 
 for evil in promise is that they call tnrjte, evil in effect and end, 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 129 
 
 is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome ; and evil in means, inutile^ 
 unprofitable, hurtful.' Leviathan (1651), Parti, c. 6, Moles- 
 worth's ed., vol. iii. p. 41. With Hobbes, personal appetite is 
 a sufficient guide ; anything is good as it happens to be desired. 
 ' There is no such finus ultimus, utmost aim, nor summum 
 bonum, greatest good, as is spoken of in the books of the old 
 moral philosophers.' Ib. c. XL iii. 85. In studying the system 
 of Hobbes, it is important to turn to chapters 14 and 15, on 
 * Laws of Nature,' said to be ( found out by reason/ 
 
 14. Paley (1743-1805) gives a higher form to the same 
 theory, introducing the benevolent element, and reference to 
 the Deity. ' Virtue is the doing good to mankind, in obedi- 
 ence to the Will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happi- 
 ness. According to which definition, " the good of jnankiadj' 
 is the subject, "the will of God" the rule, and "everlasting 
 happiness " the motive, of human virtue.' Moral and Political 
 Philosophy, c. vn. (1785.) 
 
 15. Jeremy Bentham (1747-1842) propounded the theory 
 of ' The Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number ' as the 
 end determining the rightness_ of actions. The phrase was 
 first used by Priestley. * Nature has placed Mankind under 
 the government of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. 
 It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do.' 
 Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), 
 i. i, Works, ed. by Bowring, i. i. < By the principle of 
 utility is meant, that principle which approves or disapproves 
 of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it 
 appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the 
 party whose interest is in question.' Ib. i. 2. When an 
 action ... is supposed by a man to be conformable to the 
 principle of utility, it may be convenient, for the purposes of 
 discourse, to imagine a kind of law or dictate.' Ib. i. 8. ' Of 
 an action that is conformable to the principle of utility, one 
 may always say, either that it is one that ought to be done, or 
 at least that it is not one that ought not to be done. One 
 
 i 
 
130 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 may say also, that it is right it should be done, at least that it 
 is not wrong it should be done. . . . When thus interpreted, 
 the words ought and right . . . have a meaning ; when other- 
 wise, they have none/ Ib. I. 10. The theory is presented 
 less guardedly, almost recklessly, in the posthumous work 
 (1834) Deontology, vol. I. pp. 17, 24, edited by Sir John 
 Bowring. 
 
 16. Mr. John S. Mill accepts Utilitarianism under the form 
 of universal benevolence. He has still further refined and 
 elevated the theory by introducing the quality of pleasures as 
 an element in determining what is right, and by laying down 
 the rule that a higher is always to be preferred to a lower. 
 This is now the accredited type of Utilitarianism. 'The 
 theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded is, 
 that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things 
 desirable as ends.' Util. p. 10. 'Some kinds of pleasure are 
 more desirable and more valuable than others,' p. n. 'Of 
 two pleasures, if there be one to which all, or almost all who 
 have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective 
 of any feeling of moral obligation, that is the more desirable 
 pleasure,' p. 12. 'From this verdict of the only competent 
 judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal/ p. 15. ' If they 
 differ, that of the majority among them must be admitted as 
 final/ p. 15. Such judges ' do give a most marked preference 
 to the manner of existence which employs their higher facul- 
 ties/ p. 12. 'The ultimate end, with reference to and for the 
 sake of which all things are desirable (whether we are con- 
 sidering our own good, or that of other people), is an existence 
 exempt, as far as possible, from pain, and as rich as possible 
 in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality/ p. 17. 
 
 ' This being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of 
 human action, is necessarily also the standard of Morality/ 
 
 P- 17- 
 
 17. The criticism of Utilitarianism implies two things, 
 
 first, criticism of its theory of life, and secondly, of its theory 
 
KNO WLED GE OF MORA L DISTINCTIONS. 1 3 1 
 
 of morals. Any adequate refutation of it must show that the 
 theory which makes happiness the sole end of life is not a 
 theory of human life, and thereafter that the tendency of an 
 action to promote happiness does not determine the moral 
 quality of that action. 
 
 The following recent criticisms of Utilitarianism are par- 
 ticularly worthy of attention, Grote's Exam, of Utilit. Philos. ; 
 Lecky's European Morals, chap. i. ; M 'Cosh's Exam, of Mr. 
 J. S. Miffs Philos. ch. 20 ; Professor Blackie's Four Phases of 
 Morals ; and ' The Law of Nature/ in Professor Lorimer's Insti- 
 tutes of Law (Edinburgh, 1872). 
 
 18. The end or final object of any being is determined |by 
 the nature of the being itself. That end must be according to 
 the capacities and faculties possessed. A being of lower power 
 must have a lower end of life, a being with higher faculties 
 must have a nobler end of life. Even if happiness were the 
 end of all life, still would it be a distinct happiness in each 
 case, according to the different possibilities of each form of life. 
 In acknowledgment of this, Mr. J. S. Mill has successfully, and 
 with keenness of feeling not unreasonable, repelled the current 
 allegation that Utilitarianism lowers men to the level of the 
 swine. * The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts 
 is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not 
 satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human 
 beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites.' 
 Util. p. ii. 
 
 19. In a complex form of existence each power has its 
 own end to serve according to its own nature. The ramifica- 
 tion of nerves provides for sensitiveness over the surface of the 
 body ; heart, arteries, and veins provide for the circulation of 
 the blood. The eye is for seeing, the ear for hearing, and the 
 intellect for acquiring knowledge. 
 
 20. Sensitive organism has for its end varied forms of 
 sensibility or sensation, and the pleasurableness of the sensa- 
 tion, though not the end itself, is connected with the end. 
 
132 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Thus what we describe as the pleasures of the senses may be 
 said to be component parts of the end which the senses serve. 
 Such pleasurable sensation may belong to the lower forms of 
 animal iife in which sensation follows sensation, while a ' con- 
 ception of happiness' is impossible. 
 
 21. Of the ' faculties more elevated' which belong to man, 
 each must serve a higher end, according to its own nature. 
 The end of intelligence is knowledge ; of memory, recollection ; 
 of will, self-direction ; of affection, such as love or sympathy, 
 the good of another. If the end of each power is in harmony 
 with its own nature, Intelligence, Memory, Will, and Affection 
 being entirely different in nature from Sensibility, cannot all 
 have the same end. To say, for example, that sensibility 
 and intellect have the same end, is to contradict the only rule 
 by which the natural end of a power can be decided. It is to 
 say that Passivity has the same end as Activity, which is 
 practically to enunciate the contradiction that Passivity and 
 Activity are the same. 
 
 22. While each power has its own end determined by its 
 own nature, it is possible for an intelligent being to use any 
 one of his powers, merely for the sake of the pleasure attending 
 on its use, and not for its natural end. The possibility of this 
 is restricted to an intelligent being capable of forming a con- 
 ception of happiness, and contemplating the voluntary use of 
 means for a selected end. The lower animals experience 
 pleasure in accordance with laws of their nature, which operate 
 irrespective of any control from the animals themselves. So 
 it is with the laws of our sentient nature. But an entire revolu- 
 tion of being occurs where intelligent self-direction is possible. 
 In a being thus endowed, powers are capable of being used 
 according to the conceptions and purposes of the being himself. 
 It thus becomes possible to use a power, not only for its natural 
 end, but for other and subordinate ends, and even, in some 
 measure, for ends contrary to its nature. Thus forming a con- 
 ception of pleasure as an end, we may seek this end in the use 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 133 
 
 of any one of our powers. Each one of them has a distinct 
 form of pleasure associated with its exercise ; ascertaining this, 
 and being able to determine the use of our powers, we can 
 bring them into exercise for the sake of the pleasure attending 
 upon their use. But when such a thing happens it is not 
 under the law determining the natural use of the power, but by 
 special determination of our own. We cannot change the 
 nature of the power, or alter the end which it naturally serves, 
 but we often voluntarily employ a power for the sake of the 
 attendant pleasure, and not for its own natural end. This is 
 done when we employ the intellect, not for the discovery of 
 truth, but for the pleasure which attends on the search for 
 truth; or, when we cherish sympathy, not for the sake of 
 relieving the sufferer, but for the luxury of feeling which we 
 experience. 
 
 23. If a general conception can be formed of the end or 
 final object of our being, it must be by reference to the higher 
 or governing powers of our nature, and as these are intellectual 
 or rational, the end of our being is not pleasure, but the full 
 and harmonious use of all our powers for the accomplishment 
 of their own natural ends. These natural ends admit of a 
 threefold classification. As concerned with our own being, it 
 is the end of life to secure the development and forthputting 
 of all its energies ; with other beings, their development and 
 performance of their life-work ; and finally and transcendently, 
 with the Absolute Being himself, devotion to Him as the 
 source of our being and the ruler of our destiny. 
 
 24. If the theory which makes happiness the sole end of 
 human life be proved erroneous, the theory of moral distinc- 
 tions built upon it loses its foundation. The insufficiency of 
 the Ethical theory may, however, be still further shown when 
 tested by the special facts which it professes to explain. Cer- 
 tain actions are commonly distinguished as right actions, and 
 others as wrong. Certain other actions are as commonly 
 regarded as actions which do not fall under this twofold classi- 
 
134 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 
 fication. This broad distinction of actions requires explana- 
 tion under a professed ethical theory. 
 
 25. All actions producing happiness are not regarded as 
 moral actions. Dinner- eating is not as much a moral action 
 as truth- speaking. Hearing music, studying a fine picture, 
 and encouraging a fellow- man in trouble, are not all alike 
 spoken of under the designations of actions morally right, 
 though they are confessedly pleasurable. All morally right 
 actions are agreeable actions, but all agreeable actions are not 
 moral actions. Happiness is thus wider than morality. By 
 selecting too general a characteristic, the moral quality of 
 actions has been missed. So also with utility, if that be pre- 
 ferred, as the mode of expressing the principle. ' Some limit 
 must be assigned to the principle, for it is obvious that we 
 do not make everything a moral rule that we consider useful.' 
 Bain's Emotions a?id Will, p. 273. Professor Bain explains 
 the limitation by making morality a matter of authority. Mora- 
 lity is ' utility made compulsory/ This is a change from a 
 stronger position to a weaker, and, only exposing the difficulty, 
 does not solve it. If only some utility constitutes morality, 
 utility itself is not the test. If Authority determines that some 
 utility is right, we still want the ground on which the decision 
 is given. 
 
 26. All actions producing pain are not morally wrong 
 actions. To scratch your fingers on a thorn-bush, to submit 
 to the humiliation of confessing that you have done wrong, 
 and to refuse help to a friend in suffering, are all painful 
 actions ; but they are not on that account wrong actions. In 
 all these cases, the end of the action is something else than 
 the pain experienced. The pain is only the attendant upon 
 the action, as in opposite cases pleasure is an attendant. 
 
 Though men seek pleasure for its own sake, they cannot 
 seek pain for its own sake. The law of our nature which 
 makes pleasure-seeking possible, makes pain-seeking impos- 
 sible. There are no actions which have pain as their end. 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 135 
 
 f 
 
 If, therefore, pleasure be the end of life, it is impossible to go 
 against it, and the classification of certain actions as morally 
 wrong altogether disappears. 
 
 Pain may be endured as a means to an end, even as a 
 means for securing happiness. The pain of a surgical opera- 
 tion for the sake of health, the pain of self-denial for the sake 
 of moral training, are examples. This fact makes a further 
 inroad upon the theory. Moral evil cannot be used as a 
 means of moral good. In making the production of happiness 
 the test of right actions, and the production of pain the test of 
 wrong actions, moral distinctions are hopelessly confused, and 
 even immoral men may gain a reputation for goodness. See 
 Plato's Gorgias, 499. That the painful may lead to the 
 pleasurable, is proof that pleasure and pain are not by their 
 own nature ends in themselves, but simply attendants on per- 
 sonal action. Of contraries, the one cannot produce the 
 other. 
 
 27. A general rule of moral conduct cannot be founded 
 on the distinction of quality amongst pleasures. As each 
 power of our nature has its own natural end and its own 
 attendant pleasure, it is impossible to determine the appro- 
 priate exercise for each power on the rule that a higher 
 pleasure is always to be preferred to a lower. The lower 
 powers, having their own natural ends, must have their appro- 
 priate exercise. 
 
 28. A general rule of moral conduct cannot rest upon a 
 conception of the aggregate of pleasures available for man as 
 an individual. Such a calculation of consequences is too per- 
 plexing to admit of certainty in our decisions, or application to 
 the details of individual life. * The good or evil effect of an 
 action dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of conse- 
 quences, of which very seldom any man is able to see the 
 end.' Hobbes's Leviathan^ Pt. I. c. 6. Kant urges this 
 difficulty, Metaphysic of Ethics^ p. 10. 
 
 A wider generality still belongs to Utilitarianism when it 
 
136 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 makes the Tightness of actions depend upon their tendency to 
 promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The 
 definition which might suffice to describe the end of true bene- 
 volence is impracticable as a statement of the universal rule of 
 conduct. This generality must, however, be held as restricted 
 to the happiness of the greatest number, which, on reasonable 
 calculation, may be influenced by individual action. Any- 
 thing wider is not essential to the system, for, as Mr. J. S. 
 Mill says, ' It is a misapprehension of the utilitarian mode of 
 thought to conceive it as implying that people should fix their 
 minds upon so wide a generality as the world or society at 
 large.' Util. p. 27. 
 
 Apart, however, from the perplexity of attempting to use 
 the rule, the method here taken for reaching a rule of life is 
 unsuitable. Moral life, in harmony with all analogy, is a unity 
 having consistency in all its parts. It therefore implies the 
 exercise of a variety of powers, each one of which must have a 
 law for its own guidance, rendering it impossible to reduce the 
 laws of conduct to the simplicity of a single maxim. If unity 
 be attainable, it is only in the general affirmation of the right- 
 ness of using our natural powers. The aggregate of pleasures 
 can no more afford a definite rule of conduct than the aggre- 
 gate of powers could decide a single line of action. As well 
 attribute respiration, circulation, and nerve- energy to a single 
 bodily organ. 
 
 29. A theory of benevolence is logically unattainable 
 under a utilitarian system. Since Bentham's time, Utilitarian- 
 ism has given prominence to benevolence, making ' The 
 greatest happiness of the greatest number' its standard of 
 rectitude. But in this it has amended its ethical form only by 
 the sacrifice of logical consistency. If happiness is the sole 
 end of life, it must be the happiness of that life to which it is 
 the end. To make the happiness of others the end of indi- 
 vidual life, is to leave the utilitarian basis, by deserting the 
 theory of life on which it rests. Utilitarianism is in the very 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS. 137 
 
 singular position of professing itself a theory of universal 
 benevolence, and yet laying its foundations on the ground 
 that personal happiness is the sole end of life. As long as it 
 maintains that * pleasure and freedom from pain are the only 
 things desirable as ends,' the maxim must mean that these are 
 the only things desirable as ends for each individual, and here its 
 Moral Philosophy must end. To do good to others for the 
 sake of our own happiness, is, however, compatible with the 
 theory ; but this is not benevolence, and whatever honour 
 belongs to the propounder of such a theory may be fairly 
 claimed for Hobbes. 
 
 30. To appeal to Civil or Social authority for the ground 
 of moral distinctions is to confess the failure of Utilitarianism 
 as a philosophy of morals. ' Morality is an Institution of 
 Society, maintained by the authority and Punishments of 
 Society.' Bain's Emotions and Will, p. 257. If actions pro- 
 ducing happiness or unhappiness, include more than actions 
 regarded as right and wrong; actions punished by Society 
 include less. This form of the theory puts 'positive good 
 deeds and self-sacrifice ' beyond ' the region of morality 
 proper.' Ib. p. 292. Utilitarianism is thus reduced to a mere 
 fragment of an ethical theory. Besides, in this form Utili- 
 tarianism loses a philosophical basis for the fragment of a 
 theory which is retained. It rests only on authority, without 
 a reason for ' moral enactments/ which are made to rest only 
 on the votes of the majority. If it attempt a reason for its 
 enactments, it falls back upon utility, which it nevertheless 
 confesses to be too wide for its purpose. If it seek to explain 
 why all utility is not enforced, it introduces the claims of 
 ' individual liberty/ and thus points to rights superior to its 
 own account of morality. And by trusting to the majority as 
 the source of ' moral enactments/ it is reduced to the necessity 
 of maintaining, either that no law is unjust, or that an unjust 
 law is a constituent part of morality. 
 
 31. PROBLEMS. (i.) How far can the agreeable in expen- 
 
138 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ence be shown to coincide with the right in action, and in 
 what respects are they separated 1 (2.) Distinguish the desir- 
 able from the right. (3.) Take collectively the pleasures of 
 scientific research, of truthfulness, of making money, and of 
 paying debts, and ascertain how far the moral character of the 
 actions is determined by the quantity and quality of pleasure 
 experienced. (4.) How do the pleasure of self- approval, and 
 the pain of self-condemnation, stand related to the ground of 
 moral distinctions given by Utilitarianism? (5.) Distinguish 
 between the functions of self-government and of civil govern- 
 ment. (6.) Test the following: 'The common dislike to 
 utility, as the standard, resolves itself into a sentimental pre- 
 ference, amounting to the abnegation of reason in human life.' 
 Bain's Emotions and Will, p. 275. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 CONSCIENCE. 
 
 (UTILITARIAN THEORY.) 
 
 1. THE Utilitarian Theory, in making the criterion of 
 right consist in a tendency to promote happiness, does not 
 admit the need for a Moral faculty, as a power by which 
 moral distinctions are recognised. The element of knowledge 
 being allowed to fall out, the aim has been to account for the 
 authority usually attributed to Conscience. It is admitted 
 that a peculiar sacredness is commonly attached to moral 
 distinctions, and a theory of the development of Conscience is 
 constructed with the view of explaining this fact. Generally, 
 under this theory, Conscience is represented as a form of 
 Feeling, involving reverence for moral distinctions, and im- 
 pelling to their observance. Sometimes Conscience has been 
 regarded rather as a restraining force, involving ' a pain more 
 or less intense, attendant on violation of duty/ 
 
 On account of the view thus taken of the functions of this 
 power, it is commonly named by Utilitarians, ' The Moral 
 Sense.' This name has thus an entirely different meaning 
 from that intended by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, with whom 
 Moral Sense was a power of Perception. 
 
 2. A theory of Conscience, in harmony with a develop- 
 ment theory of Mind, has been propounded by Hartley, 
 Observations ) I. iv. 6.; and by Mr. James Mill, Fragment 011 
 
I 4 o HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Mackintosh (anonymous, 1835), p. 259; but most fully and 
 definitely by Professor Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 283, and 
 Mental and Moral Science, ETHICS, chap. ill. The theory in 
 its latest form is most deserving of attention. 
 
 3. Professor Bain's Theory of Conscience is the following : 
 ' Conscience is an imitation within ourselves of the govern- 
 ment without us/ The proof of this is found, ' in observing 
 "he growth of Conscience from childhood upwards/ and * its 
 character and working generally.' ' The first lesson that a 
 child learns as a moral agent is obedience. . . . The child's 
 susceptibility to pleasure and pain is made use of to bring 
 about this obedience, and a mental association is rapidly 
 formed between disobedience and apprehended pain, more or 
 less magnified by fear. The feeling of encountering certain 
 pain ' (both physical and moral) ' is the first motive power of 
 an ethical kind that can be traced, in the mental system of 
 childhood.' ... * A sentiment of love or respect towards the 
 person of the superior infuses a different species of dread,' 
 which is ' sometimes a more powerful deterring impulse than 
 the other.' . . . ' When the young mind is able to take notice 
 of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed upon it, 
 and to approve of the end intended by them, a new motive is 
 added, and the Conscience is then a triple compound, and 
 begirds the actions in question with a threefold fear.' Emo- 
 tions and Will, pp. 283-6. 
 
 4. The philosophic thought of Germany has for the most 
 part been separated from the Sensational or Development 
 Theory. Some few of the more recent writers, however, have 
 embraced it. Of these, Schopenhauer may be taken as an 
 example. He was born in Danzig, and was Professor of 
 Philosophy (Privatdocent) in Berlin, and afterwards in Frank- 
 furt- on-the-Maine, where he died in 1860. After saying that 
 many would be surprised if they knew of what their Conscience 
 is composed, he suggests that the elements may be computed 
 thus * one fifth, fear of man j one fifth, superstition ; one fifth, 
 
CONSCIENCE. 141 
 
 prejudice ; one fifth, vanity ; one fifth, custom.' Die beiden 
 Grundprobleme der Ethik, ist ed., Frankfurt am Main, 1841, 
 p. 196, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1860. 
 
 5. Such descriptions as those of the two preceding para- 
 graphs may be allowed to contain a considerable measure of 
 truth, the first bearing on associations commonly attendant on 
 the moral training of early life, and the second on the hetero- 
 geneous combination of motives which often sway men, when 
 they profess to have the approval of Conscience for their con- 
 duct. But both fail to provide a theory of Conscience, as a 
 power authoritative for self-guidance, and even supreme in 
 authority, as Conscience is generally allowed to be. Either 
 there must be a power discovering a sovereign law of conduct ; 
 or, the reality of Conscience must be denied. 
 
 6. Schopenhauer gives only a gathering of unreasonable 
 and unworthy motives which may operate within the mind of 
 jone who fancies himself doing right. That such a combina- 
 tion may exist, under shelter of an appeal to Conscience, and 
 with some degree of support from the moral sentiments, will 
 be generally admitted. But when Schopenhauer grants that 
 men thus swayed would be surprised were the true analysis of 
 their motives presented to them, he practically admits that no 
 one could imagine such a state of mind entitled to be regarded 
 as a genuine exercise of Conscience. 
 
 7- Professor Bain's treatment of the question is altogether 
 more interesting, as more obviously facing the difficulties con- 
 nected with development of a power such as Conscience. The 
 solution proposed has, moreover, the advantage of logical con- 
 sistency with the phase of Utilitarianism adopted, according to 
 which utility enforced by punishment is the test of morality. 
 On the other hand, it suffers from being manifestly out of 
 harmony with the broader and more attractive basis, according 
 to which the tendency to produce happiness is the ground of 
 moral excellence in human conduct. Professor Bain gains the 
 element of authority, but only by the surrender of a large part 
 
M2 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the territory of morals. Still more to its disadvantage is 
 the consideration, that an internal authority which is only an 
 imitation of external government, has not the evidence of 
 its truth in its own nature, but depends upon the suffi- 
 ciency of the warrant for the external authority to which it 
 appeals. 
 
 8. As a history of early experience, the theory in its first 
 part accounts only for training in obedience, as an enforced 
 necessity. It points only to the use which parents can make 
 of certain ' primitive impulses of the mind/ such as fear, love, 
 and prudence, in order to secure obedience. But it ignores 
 the fact, that at a very early stage children distinguish as to 
 lightness and wrongness in the commands issued. There are 
 some commands which children resent as unjust, and which 
 they are forced to obey only at the cost of injury to their 
 nature. If this discrimination be possible on the part of 
 children, it is clear that something more is required for their 
 training than force and fear. 
 
 9. The full strain falls upon the third stage in the alleged 
 development of Conscience, ' when the young mind is able to 
 take notice of the use and meaning of the prohibitions imposed 
 upon it, and to approve of the end intended by them/ What 
 Professor Bain has said in reference to an a priori theory, holds 
 with equal force here, l There can be no such thing as a stan- 
 dard overriding the judgment of every separate intelligence.' 
 Emotions, p. 262. Human thought cannot be kept in con- 
 tinual subjection to authority. To accept as right what we 
 have been always commanded, or accustomed to do, is con- 
 tinued childhood. Every separate intelligence must find suffi- 
 cient reason for accounting certain actions right, and others 
 wrong. This cannot be found either in the authority of 
 parents or in past practice. It must be recognised by personal 
 intelligence, on evidence either of fact or principle. It is 
 certainly true, as Dr. Bain says, that, ' wherever an agreement 
 is come to by a large or ascendant party, there is a natural 
 
CONSCIENCE. 143 
 
 tendency to compel the rest to fall in with that.' But so 
 much the more obvious is it, that every man must seek a stan- 
 dard satisfying to his own Reason, and act upon that. This 
 Dr. Bain practically admits in the quotation last given, and 
 Mr. Mill has powerfully argued for such unrestrained freedom 
 ot thought, in his work on * Liberty? Such a standard, if 
 found, may lead to a doctrine of righteous disobedience to 
 external authority, and a reversal of earlier practice. 
 
 10. The theory must fall back on utility as the basis of 
 personal assent to moral distinctions, and in doing so it owns 
 the failure of its attempt to develop Conscience by means of 
 authority. Either * every separate intelligence' must find for 
 itself a law of nature, marking off some actions as right, others 
 as wrong, or it must continue under the trammels of authority. 
 If the former, the failure *is admitted ; if the latter, the escape 
 is not effected. Professor Bain admits that 'the grand difficulty' 
 is to account for ' the self-formed or independent conscience/ 
 ' where the individual is a law to himself.' * But/ he adds, 
 ' there is nothing very formidable in this apparent contradic- 
 tion/ 'when the young mind is sufficiently advanced to be 
 able to appreciate the motives, the utilities, or the sentiment 
 that led to their imposition the character of the conscience is 
 entirely transformed ; the motive power issues from a different 
 quarter of the mental framework. Regard is now had to the 
 intent and meaning of the law, and not to the mere fact of its 
 being prescribed by some power.' Emotions, p. 288. The 
 difficulty here seems much more formidable than Professor Bain 
 allows. The situation of the theory is briefly this, Utility is 
 the basis of moral distinctions; but some limit must be assigned 
 to the principle, for we do not make everything a moral rule 
 that we consider useful. Utility made compulsory is the stan- 
 dard of morality ; Morality is thus an institution of society ; 
 Conscience is an imitation of the Government of society; Con- 
 science is first fear of authority, and then respect for it ; but, 
 ' even in the most unanimous notions of mankind, there can be 
 
144 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 no such thing as a standard overriding the judgment of every 
 separate intelligence;' the individual must therefore emancipate 
 himself from authority, in order to be 'a law to himself;' to 
 this end he must recognise the intent and meaning of the law ; 
 for this purpose he must fall back on Utility. It is not, how- 
 ever, all Utility, but only Utility made compulsory, which affords 
 the basis of morals, and it is Society which determines what 
 shall be made compulsory. How can every separate intelli- 
 gence emancipate itself? How can it find to its own satisfaction 
 a rule of life so essentially superior to the authority of Society, 
 as to warrant independent action in opposition to the teaching 
 of Society 3 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 DUTY OR OBLIGATION. 
 (UTILITARIAN THEORY.) 
 
 1. ON a Utilitarian Theory, the problem concerning moral 
 obligation wears this form : If tendency to produce happiness 
 determine the lightness of an action, how can we rise above 
 the agreeable and desirable to find philosophic warrant for a 
 doctrine of personal obligation ? Utilitarianism meets its last 
 and severest test in the attempt to distinguish between the 
 desirable, which is the optional ; and the dutiful, which is the 
 imperative. 
 
 2. That happiness is by our nature desirable, is a fact 
 which neither constitutes a law of personal obligation, nor 
 obviates the necessity for having one. It cannot constitute a 
 law of action, for the desirable has power only to attract, not 
 to command. Besides, the desirable may often be the unattain- 
 able. The dutiful is not only the possible, but the binding. 
 Neither can the desirability of happiness obviate the necessity 
 for a law of obligation in the guidance of life. All pleasures 
 are desirable, but all cannot be enjoyed at once ; of pleasures, 
 some are higher in quality, some lower, but the higher cannot 
 always be preferred to the lower, therefore the quality of 
 pleasure does not of itself afford a sufficient rule for selection. 
 If man must sometimes surrender a higher enjoyment for a 
 lower, and yet rigidly restrict lower pleasures for the sake of 
 
 K 
 
146 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 higher attainment and action, we need to discover the ground 
 of these necessities. Analysis discovers a physical necessity, 
 since man must eat, as well as think ; rest, as well as work ; 
 and an intellectual necessity, since man must concentrate his 
 attention in order successfully to guide his efforts, and must 
 therefore do some things, and leave others unattempted ; but, 
 within the possibilities of human effort, there is still another 
 necessity, since of the things which a man can do, he recognises 
 some as binding upon him in a sense in which others are not, 
 and this is moral necessity. If, to perform the high functions of 
 his life, he must deny himself some pleasures ; and if, as a 
 member of society, he must surrender his own pleasure for trie 
 good of others, there is a law of Self-denial and there is a 
 law of Benevolence. Utilitarianism must, therefore, supply 
 a basis of obligation in order to make good its claims as a 
 Philosophy of Morals. 
 
 3. The extreme difficulty of discovering a basis for moral 
 obligation under this theory has led to great diversity of opinion 
 among its upholders. Bentham makes the cleanest cut through 
 the difficulty by simply denying that there is such a thing as 
 duty. ' It is, in fact, very idle to talk about duties ; the word 
 itself has in it something disagreeable and repulsive.' Deon- 
 tology, i. 10. 'The talisman of arrogance, indolence, and 
 ignorance, is to be found in a single word, an authoritative 
 imposture. ... It is the word " ought," " ought or ought not," 
 as circumstances may be. ... If the use of the word be ad- 
 missible at all, it " ought " to be banished from the vocabulary 
 of morals.' Ib. pp. 31,32. And yet, he has not advanced thirty 
 pages, before we find the following, 'Every pleasure \sprima 
 fade good, and ought to be pursued. Every pain is a prima 
 facie evil, and ought to be avoided.' Ib. p. 59. This post- 
 humous work Deontology is so unguarded as to warrant the 
 opinion that Bentham's memory would have been more 
 honoured by withholding it from publication. 
 
 4. Mr. Charles Darwin attempts to surmount the difficulty 
 
DUTY OR OBLIGATION-. 147 
 
 by reducing its dimensions. ' The imperious word ought seems 
 merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a per- 
 sistent instinct, either innate or partly acquired, serving him 
 (man) as a guide, though liable to be disobeyed. We hardly 
 use the word ought in a metaphorical sense when we say 
 hounds ought to hunt, pointers to point, and retrievers to 
 retrieve their game. If they fail thus to act, they fail in their 
 duty, and act wrongly/ The Descent of Man, ' Moral Sense/ 
 I. p. 92. The quotation is preceded by these words, ' Thus 
 at last man comes to feel, through acquired and perhaps 
 inherited habit, that it is best for him to obey his more per- 
 sistent instincts.' And this quotation is preceded, two pages 
 earlier, by these words, ' The wish for another man's property 
 is, perhaps, as persistent a desire as any that can be named,' 
 i. p. 90. Neither a good morality nor a doctrine of personal 
 obligation can rest on this basis. 
 
 5. Professor Bain meets the difficulty by making external 
 authority the source of personal obligation, and restricting 
 obligation to ' the class of actions enforced by the sanction of 
 punishment.' Emotions, p. 254. This, at one sweep, cuts off 
 from the area of personal obligation the whole class of right 
 actions. ' When a man does his duty, he escapes punishment ; 
 to assert anything more is to obliterate the radical distinction 
 between duty and merit.' Emotions, p. 292. On the con- 
 trary, to assert the duty of right actions is to preserve this 
 distinction, for duty binds to the performance of an action, 
 merit belongs to the person on account of having fulfilled his 
 duty. But to restrict moral obligation to the avoidance of 
 wrong actions, to say that it involves only restraint upon 
 mean and cruel deeds, but does not make noble and bene- 
 ficent deeds binding upon men, is to give up the grandest 
 part of morality, and to confess failure at a vital point in the 
 theory. For a Utilitarian theory there is the further disad- 
 vantage of a surrender of its claims as a theory of benevolence, 
 in this form it ceases to be a theory inculcating ' the greatest 
 
MS HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 happiness of the greatest number.' But even within the re- 
 stricted area the theory fails to establish a doctrine of moral 
 obligation. It only points out how evil deeds are restrained 
 by society, not why a man ought to refrain from such actions. 
 If to escape this difficulty we fall back upon utility, everything 
 in the form of obligation is lost, since that which is to be 
 explained is the selection of some utilities as those which are 
 to be enforced. 
 
 6. The fullest appreciation of the difficulty is to be found 
 in Mr. John S. Mill's Utilitarianism. He keeps strictly to the 
 view which recognises the foundation of morals in the tendency 
 of actions to promote happiness, holds to the benevolent inter- 
 pretation of the theory, and finds no limitation of it, except 
 that afforded by the quantity and quality of pleasures. He 
 therefore shuns the reference to external authority as the 
 source of obligations. His nearest approach to it, is the 
 acknowledgment that the question as to the comparative excel- 
 lence of pleasures is to be decided by the votes of competent 
 judges, from whose decision there can be no appeal, p. 15. 
 But he does not elevate such judges into the position of autho- 
 rities determining personal obligation. They are only compe- 
 tent witnesses recording the results of their experience. 
 
 7. Mr. Mill complicates the question of Obligation by his 
 mode of stating it. He says, ' The question is often asked, 
 and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard, 
 What is its sanction ? What are the motives to obey it, or, 
 more specifically, what is the source of its obligation ^ Whence 
 does it derive its binding force ? It is a necessary part of 
 moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question.' 
 Chap. iii. p. 39. The more specific statement is exact, but 
 the two earlier forms of the question apply to topics quite dis- 
 tinct. Sanction and Motive are both essentially different from 
 Obligation. Sanction is a confirmation of the moral character 
 of an action, which follows it in experience. Motive is that 
 which induces or impels a man to do an action, whether that 
 
DUTY OR OBLIGA TION. 149 
 
 action be right or wrong. Both of these belong to moral 
 philosophy, but not to that part of it now engaging attention. 
 Obligation is the binding of a moral agent to do that which is 
 right, whether he incline or riot ; and to refrain from doing a 
 wrong action, however much he incline to do it. The ques- 
 tion is, Can a standard of Happiness have the binding force of 
 moral law ? Happiness is agreeable j to secure it is desirable ; 
 but how is it dutiful or binding on me to seek it for myself, or 
 to promote the happiness of others even at the sacrifice of my 
 own 1 ? 
 
 8. Mr. Mill finds ' the source of obligation ' in personal 
 feeling. The following are the most definite statements : ' The 
 ultimate sanction of all morality is a subjective feeling in our 
 mind,' p. 42 ; ' The internal sanction of duty, whatever our 
 standard of duty may be, is one and the same, a feeling in our 
 own mind, a pain, more or less intense, attendant on a viola- 
 tion of duty/ p. 41 ; ' This feeling, when disinterested and 
 connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some 
 particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory cir- 
 cumstances, is the essence of Conscience,' pp. 41-2. It is 
 unfortunate that the term Sanction is the one employed in 
 these passages. That such a pain as that described is a sanc- 
 tion of morality is uniformly admitted. But it is not admitted 
 that ' the source of obligation ' can be found in anything per- 
 sonal, far less that it can be identified with this sanction. 
 
 Looking at the merits of the theory, it is worthy of notice 
 that in seeking an internal source of Obligation, Mr. Mill 
 selects Pain; as in seeking an external source, Dr. Bain 
 selects Punishment. Both point to restraint on wrong actions. 
 
 The statement that ' the internal sanction ... is a pain 
 attendant on violation of duty/ presupposes a doctrne of duty, 
 but does not supply it. The knowledge of duty cannot 
 originate out of a pain which is consequent on violating our 
 duty. Still less can duty itself originate from such a source. 
 The knowledge of duty, and painful feeling because of neglect 
 
150 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of duty, are so different, that the one is knowledge of binding 
 force as to what is to be done ; the other is experience of dis- 
 turbing force consequent upon what has been done. The 
 question, therefore, remains, what is ' the pure idea of duty ' 
 connected with this feeling 1 l Binding force ' over a person 
 must come from a source superior to the person. If so, it 
 cannot come from his own feeling, nor even from his own 
 knowledge. The knowledge of obligation must be knowledge 
 of ' binding force,' applying to him, as one subject to moral 
 law. Obligation must be a condition of the life of a moral 
 being, even though unacknowledged by the man himself. 
 
 9. Identification of Obligation with ' the conscientious 
 feelings of mankind,' involves the serious difficulty of admitting 
 that those who have no such feelings thereby escape obliga- 
 tion. This difficulty is met by Mr. Mill in the following 
 manner : * Undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy 
 in those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to ; but 
 neither will these persons be more obedient to any other moral 
 principle than to the utilitarian one,' pp. 42, 43. This de- 
 fence of Utilitarianism is unavailing, because of the essential 
 difference between obligation and obedience. The transition 
 from binding authority to binding efficacy, shifts attention to a 
 new subject, and leaves the difficulty standing. Obligation is 
 requirement of obedience ; Obedience is acknowledgment of 
 obligation. The real difficulty is in answering this question, - 
 If a man do not acknowledge or feel his obligation, is he or 
 that account free from obligation 1 To answer in the affirma- 
 tive is to admit that Utilitarianism is incapable of attaining 
 a doctrine of moral obligation. A man who has no con- 
 scientious feelings to restrain him from telling falsehoods, i* 
 not thereby released from obligation to the law of truthful- 
 ness. 
 
 10. The theory which makes 'the greatest happiness o) 
 the greatest number ' the test of moral action, loses all its 
 value, if it be without a scientific basis for moral obligation. 
 
DUTY OR OBLIGATION. 151 
 
 If there be one thing which specially commends the theory to 
 our admiration, it is the aspect of universal benevolence which 
 it wears. But, in order to be accepted as a sound theory of 
 Benevolence, it must establish on a philosophic basis a doc- 
 trine of unvarying obligation to act benevolently. Mr. Mill 
 puts the question thus,' Why am I bound to promote the 
 general happiness 1 If my own happiness lies in something else, 
 why may I not give that the preference ? ' Mr. Mill answers, 
 * If the view adopted by the utilitarian philosophy of the 
 nature of the moral sense be correct, this difficulty will always 
 present itself, until the influences which form moral character 
 have taken the same hold of the principle which they have 
 taken of some of the consequences until, by the improvement 
 of education, the feeling of unity with our fellow-creatures 
 shall be (what it cannot be doubted that Christ intended it to 
 be) as deeply rooted in our character, and to our conscious- 
 ness as completely a part of our nature, as the horror of crime 
 is in an ordinarily well-brought-up young person,' p. 40. This 
 is an admirable passage. But it fails to meet the scientific 
 demands upon an Ethical Theory. It concerns obedience, 
 not obligation ; and vividly portrays the need for renovation 
 of nature before the law of benevolence can become the 
 general rule of life among us. But the difficulty of attaining 
 uniform consistent benevolence in practice is not the sub- 
 ject engaging attention. The philosophic difficulty of con- 
 structing a theory of morals is one thing ; the practical diffi- 
 culty of rendering uniform obedience to the requirements of 
 morality is quite another thing. Doubtless, it is beyond 
 the power of Moral Philosophy to make men obey the law ; 
 but it is the part of Moral Philosophy to show that there 
 is a moral law to be obeyed. Mr. Mill's answer is in- 
 sufficient because of the wide separation between theory 
 and practice. That the practical difficulty of personal con- 
 formity with the law of benevolence ' will always be felt 
 until the influences which form moral character have taken 
 
152 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 hold of the principle ' is certain. But the question is, what 
 obligation rests on the person who would form his character 
 aright, to accept this principle of benevolence as the rule of 
 conduct? It is certain that Christ intended the feeling of 
 unity with our fellow-creatures to be deeply rooted in our 
 character ; but it is no less certain that in order to secure the 
 fulfilment of his intention, Christ proclaimed the principle of 
 benevolence as a law for Humanity. And, in order to estab- 
 lish a philosophy of benevolence, Moral Philosophy must show 
 that the principle of benevolence is a law of natural obligation. 
 If we are to escape the admission that Selfishness is dutiful, 
 we must pass Mr. Darwin's view, that persistent desire is the 
 ground of obligation. If we are to maintain that morality 
 requires a man to keep his promise, even though he is not 
 forced to do so, we must pass Professor Bain's view, that 
 external authority is the source of duty. And now, if we are 
 to avoid the position, that a man is freed from obligation by 
 simply disowning it, we must pass Mr. Mill's view, that per- 
 sonal feeling is the source of obligation. Has, then, Utilitari- 
 anism no answer to the question, What is the source of 
 Obligation ? ' Why am I bound to promote the general 
 happiness V Must Philosophy, before attempting an answer, 
 wait until the improvement of education has rooted in the 
 character of all men a feeling of unity with their fellow- 
 creatures? If so, on what ground must education proceed 1 ? 
 On Prudence, which means only Self-interest 1 or on Natural 
 Law? The Intuitional Theory gives its answer thus,- -The 
 standard of morals has in itself the authority of law, binding 
 on every intelligence capable of understanding and applying it. 
 A man cannot live and escape obligation, however much he 
 violate it. But, the standard of Happiness cannot be the 
 standard of morals, because the agreeable, or desirable, does 
 not in itself possess ' binding force ; to determine the action of 
 moral beings. 
 
I B R A U \ 
 
 ' 
 
 U N I V E K S I T Y O F 
 
 
 CALIFORNIA. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 IMPULSES AND RESTRAINTS BELONGING 
 TO THE NATURE OF MAN. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 IMPULSES TO ACTION. 
 
 1. THERE are certain forces belonging to human nature 
 which so operate as to impel us to act. By means of these 
 Impulses, activity is made a law of our nature. 
 
 2. These Impulses have been denominated ' principles of 
 action/ ' motives,' ' active powers,' and ' springs of action.' 
 ' Principle,' signifying a commencement, may apply to the 
 origin of activity, as well as of knowledge ; but it is better 
 that it be kept for the latter application, and it is so reserved 
 here. * Motive ' is ambiguous, being applied to external ob- 
 jects which attract, as well as to internal forces which impel. 
 1 Active Powers,' the favourite title of Reid and Stewart, does 
 not adequately discriminate these forces from the intellectual 
 powers. 
 
 3. Some Impulses belong to our physical nature, and are 
 experienced by us in common with the lower animals. They 
 are not acquired, but are essential conditions of animal exist- 
 ence, concerned with the support of the physical frame and 
 the continuance of the race. They are hunger, thirst, and sex. 
 In these, appears man's affinity of nature with the brutes. 
 These Impulses are commonly named Appetites. In a rational 
 
154 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nature, they are warrantably gratified only in accordance with 
 an intelligent regard to their appointed ends. Deflection from 
 this is surrender of rational self-government, and assimilation 
 to brute life. 
 
 4. The larger number of Impulses are of a superior order, 
 as is shown by their dependence upon intelligence for their 
 rise in consciousness. 
 
 5. Various forms of classification have been proposed. 
 Dr. Reid gives a threefold division, mechanical, animal, and 
 rational. Active Power s, in. i. i. This is a mixed division, 
 as mechanical impulses are animal. It has been objected to 
 by Stewart (Philos. of Act. and Mor. Powers, Intro.), who 
 classifies thus : Appetites, Desires, Affections, Self-love, the 
 Moral Faculty. Dr. Thomas Brown arranges by reference to 
 their relation to time, Immediate, Retrospective, and Prospec- 
 tive. Lect. 52. For Professor Bain's classification, v. Emotions 
 and Will, chap. n. 
 
 6. Difference of psychological nature among the Im- 
 pulses affords a philosophic ground of classification. On this 
 basis Impulses may be divided into three classes, Desires, 
 Affections, and Judgments; craving powers, giving powers, and 
 persuading powers. These indicate respectively, the empti- 
 ness of our nature, the fulness of our nature, and power of dis- 
 crimination in our nature for self-guidance. All these forms of 
 impulse may be blended in a single mental state, but they can- 
 not be merged in each other, or lose their distinctive features. 
 
 7. DESIRE is craving, a force impelling us to draw into 
 our possession what is fitted to give satisfaction. It primarily 
 affords evidence that our nature is not self-sufficient. Every 
 desire involves three things, (i.) consciousness of want; (2.) 
 consequent restlessness of nature ; and (3.) longing for satis- 
 faction. These three particulars indicate the origin, attendant 
 sensibility, and essential characteristic of the impulse so de- 
 nominated. Appetites are a class of desires, belonging to 
 physical existence. They are distinguished from other desires, 
 
IMPULSES TO ACTION. 155 
 
 as being periodical, and becoming quiescent by means of satis- 
 faction. Mental Desires are continuous in exercise, seek con- 
 tinuity of gratification, and are dependent upon some degree 
 of intelligence for their exercise. Stewart distinguishes the 
 following mental desires, Desire of knowledge, of society, of 
 esteem, of power. (Outlines of Mor. Phil.) Though the De- 
 sires seek self-satisfaction in contrast with the satisfaction of 
 others, they are not selfish, that is, do not seek their end by 
 the injury of others. Where selfishness appears there is un- 
 natural desire, associated with the natural or normal. Our 
 Desires are the forces which specially expose us to the risk of 
 selfishness. On this account, every exercise of desire calls for 
 rigid application of self-government. 
 
 8. AFFECTION is inclination towards others, disposing us 
 to give from our own resources what may influence them either 
 for good or ill. In practical tendency, the Affections are the 
 reverse of the Desires. Desires absorb ; Affections give out. 
 Affections presuppose a recognition of certain qualities in per- 
 sons, and, in a modified degree, in lower sentient beings, 
 but not in things, for the exercise of affection presupposes in 
 the object of it the possibility either of harmony or antagonism 
 of feeling. Affections take the form of Love or Hate (Anti- 
 pathy), according as the objects of them are esteemed, in any 
 sense, good or bad; and the form of Reverence or Pity, 
 according as the object is esteemed either superior or inferior 
 in nature and experience. Desires invariably seek what is 
 accounted a personal gain. But affections are of two classes, 
 seeking either the benefit or the restraint of others. In the 
 latter class, affections have an element of self-protection, which 
 is of great moral significance. 
 
 9. JUDGMENTS of two distinct classes take rank as im- 
 pulses, namely, Judgments of Prudence, concerned with self- 
 interest or expediency; and Judgments of Rectitude, con- 
 cerned with rightness in actions and dispositions, leading to 
 judgments of obligation and responsibility. 
 
156 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 For the difference between these two classes of judgments, 
 as impulses to actions, see Reid's Act. Powers, in. 3. That 
 Conscience performs the function of what the Scotch School 
 have called ' Active Powers,' is commonly held ; but, on any 
 theory, this is possible only by means of a judgment bearing 
 on present circumstances. 
 
 Judgments do not simply and of themselves perform the 
 function of impulse, but these two classes of judgments have 
 associated with them certain dispositions whose impelling force 
 operates with the judgments. These dispositions are, desire 
 of personal advantage (often called, self-love) with expectation 
 or hope ; and reverence for moral law, with devotion to the 
 Deity as Moral Governor. Without the judgments, the atten- 
 dant dispositions are not experienced. The judgments, there- 
 fore, are properly regarded as the origin of impelling force. 
 On the other hand, without the attendant disposition, the 
 judgments would fail to perform the part of an impulse. The 
 presence of these dispositions depends not upon the circum- 
 stances in which a man is placed, but upon the degree of 
 intellectual energy bestowed upon the question how far duty 
 or interest is involved. This, therefore, establishes the intel- 
 lectual origin of the impulse. Kant's Metaph. of Ethics, 
 p. 60, and p. 1 20. It is at this point that there lies the ex- 
 planation of what appears the singular utterance of Mr. Mill, 
 in objecting to the saying 'that my conscience prevails over 
 my desires,' when he adds, ' as if conscience were not itself a 
 desire the desire to do right.' Exam. p. 567. 
 
 10. All these impelling forces are original powers of our 
 nature, not to be accounted for by any process of development. 
 Desires and Affections, as inferior to Judgments, may be said 
 to lie in the line between sensation and intelligence. Yet, so 
 far are they from being stages of development towards intelli- 
 gence or intermediate forces by means of which intellect may 
 be evolved, that physical desires are dependent on our organ- 
 ism, while mental desires presuppose intelligence as the con- 
 
IMPULSES TO ACTION. 157 
 
 dition of their experience. Neither continuance of a particular 
 feeling, nor growing intensity of it, nor combination of various 
 feelings, can account for Desires or Affections. 
 
 11. PROBLEMS. (i.) Granting that Judgments are formal 
 expressions of Truth, can they be at the same time Impulses 
 to action? (2.) If a Moral judgment awaken reverence for 
 moral law, is the judgment in that case the spring of action, 
 or the reverence, or both together ? (3.) Granting that some 
 judgments are impulses to action, should judgments of obliga- 
 tion, when viewed in this relation, be held to constitute a class 
 distinct from judgments of rightness? 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 ETHICAL CLASSIFICATION OF NATURAL IMPULSES. 
 
 1. As Moral Philosophy is concerned with moral action, it 
 must afford an explanation of the origin of our actions, as well 
 as of our knowledge of their moral quality. It must determine 
 the Ethical value and relations of the Natural Impulses. 
 
 2. Impulses to action must themselves be active. In so 
 far as they come under control of the Will (v. infra, Part IIL), 
 their exercise may possess moral quality, that is, may come 
 under regulation of Conscience. 
 
 3. As Desires and Affections may spring into exercise 
 irrespective of control of the Will (v. Part in.), they may be, in 
 their rise, mere natural forces, possessed of no moral quality. 
 Desires, craving self-satisfaction, are not in themselves selfish ; 
 affections, inclining towards the good of others, are not in 
 themselves benevolent ; affections, inclining towards resistance 
 of others, are not in themselves malevolent. 
 
 4. A Desire or Affection which is merely natural, and not 
 moral, in its rise, thereafter takes rank as a moral action, since 
 its continuance depends on the Will, and is liable to the appli- 
 cation of moral principle. Desire which is not in itself selfish, 
 may become so in its indulgence; affection not in itself benevo- 
 lent, may wear this moral character in its exercise ; such affec- 
 tion as hate, which is not in itself malevolent, may become so 
 in the manner of its operation. 
 
 158 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF NATURAL IMPULSES. 159 
 
 5. A Judgment of expediency, regarded merely as a pro- 
 position, has no moral quality ; but, when accepted as an 
 impulse to action, stimulating the desire of personal advantage, 
 it immediately comes under the dominion of moral law. Thus 
 a judgment of expediency may assume the form of an im- 
 pulse to neglect or to transgress moral law, in which case it 
 is itself wrong, and the consequent action must wear a similar 
 character. 
 
 6. A moral judgment, regarded merely as a proposition 
 affirming the application of moral law, has in itself no moral 
 quality ; but, regarded as an impulse capable of awakening 
 reverence for the law, and devotion to the Lawgiver, it is not 
 only morally right, but is the only Impulse which, from its very 
 nature, is necessarily right, requiring reference to nothing be- 
 yond itself for its warrant. In order, however, that a judgment 
 may legitimately be credited with this warrant, it must be 
 recognised as involving an application of pure moral law. 
 See p. 28, sec. 12. 
 
 7. By reason of the sovereignty of Moral Law, and the 
 distinctive character of the Moral Judgment as an impulse to 
 action, all other impulses are morally subordinate to the Moral 
 Judgment, which alone among the impulses has uniform, un- 
 questionable title to sway the conduct. 
 
 8. The Natural Desires and Affections, as Natural Impulses, 
 are dependent upon a moral judgment for the determination of 
 the moral quality of their exercise, in respect of the circum- 
 stances and degree in which they influence our conduct. 
 
 9. Amongst the subordinate Natural Impulses, Affections 
 occupy a position superior to desires, when both are regarded 
 from a moral point of view. This Ethical superiority rests 
 primarily on a natural superiority, but ultimately on the fact 
 that moral principle demands self-denial in submission to its 
 authority, which imposes more restraint upon desires than upon 
 affections. In practice, Self-denial is only the negative result 
 attending on the acknowledgment of the supremacy of moral 
 
160 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 law. It is restraint in one direction, consequent upon activity 
 demanded in another. 
 
 10. PROBLEMS. (i.) Is Hate not by its nature malevo- 
 lent? (2.) If Hate is not in itself malevolent, by what addition 
 is it turned into a malicious force 1 (3.) Granting that Desire 
 is inferior to affection, if a desire be a natural attendant on an 
 affection, does the former in that case take equal ethical rank 
 with the latter I 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 RESTRAINTS UPON ACTION. 
 
 1. DIVERSITY of character among our natural impulses, in 
 itself implies restraint upon some of the number, in order 
 to action of others. The most obvious examples are found 
 in the contrary affections Love and Hate, Reverence and 
 Pity. A further restraint is involved in the subordination of 
 impulses to moral law. 
 
 2. Besides the restraint upon activity, arising (i.) from the 
 natural laws of exercise, and (2.) from the application of 
 moral law, there are certain natural forces whose primary, 
 though not exclusive, function it is to restrain from action. 
 These are Emotions, of which the chief are Wonder, Grief, 
 and Fear. 
 
 3. Emotion is agitation of feeling, attended by more or 
 less physical disturbance, and always implies a sense of weak- 
 ness. The Emotions, in common with the Impulses, imply 
 movement of our inner nature ; but Desires and Affections 
 are movements towards their objects. Emotions are move- 
 ments from their objects. 
 
 4. Their restraining power is experienced with great 
 diversity of degree, and at their height they attain an over- 
 whelming force, paralysing the other energies. 
 
 5. Emotions, like desires, are concerned with Self, and 
 
f6s HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 are marks of the weakness of our nature. But they differ 
 completely in function, the Desires craving satisfaction, the 
 Emotions shunning iniurv. 
 
 ^j * 
 
 6. The Emotions are in close relation with Intelligence. 
 Fear, the lowest of them all, may be experienced in some form 
 by every sentient creature, but in its higher forms it is depen- 
 dent on the exercise of intelligence. If the lower animals are 
 often subjects of fear from which man is delivered by his 
 intelligence, it is no less true that the animals escape many 
 forms of fear to which men are liable. 
 
 7. Emotions in their rise are naturally independent of the 
 Will, and in their exercise may reach a paroxysm, ungovernable 
 by the Will. In all their ordinary exercise, however, they are 
 subject to the laws of self-government. In harmony with the 
 common laws of activity, the measure of control possible under 
 excitement may be increased. 
 
 8. Wonder, in filling the mind, throws an arrest for a time 
 upon the voluntary direction of activity ; Grief dulls the mind, 
 abating proportionately its interest in things around ; Fear is 
 capable of putting a restraint upon powers, both of intelligence 
 and of action. 
 
 9. Besides their inherently restraining power, Emotions are 
 naturally fitted for amalgamation with the Impulses. When 
 acting in combination with an Impulse, the Emotion which 
 restrains in one direction, lends its force to intensify the power 
 of impulse urging in another direction. This law of combina- 
 tion holds good, however, only when the Emotion is experi- 
 enced in moderate degree. As it rises towards full energy 
 it absorbs consciousness, and the possibility of amalgamation 
 with an Impulse ceases. Fear, when moderate in degree, 
 will give force to the desire of safety ; Wonder will quicken 
 curiosity ; Grief will stimulate reflectiveness. But as Emotion 
 rises in intensity, the stimulating force gradually abates. At 
 the maximum of force, Fear paralyses, Wonder stupifies, Grief 
 deepens into the listlessness of despair. 
 
RESTRAINTS UPON ACTION. 163 
 
 10. PROBLEMS. (i.) Is Wonder greatest in mind when 
 it is the child of ignorance or of knowledge? (2.) Can the 
 Emotions be proved to afford evidence of the greatness of 
 our nature, while they are at the same time essentially con 
 nected with its weakness 1 ? (3.) How does the emotion of Fear 
 stand related to the affection of Reverence? (4.) Is Grief 
 capable of proving in any way an elevating power, though its 
 immediate effect is depressing 1 
 
PART III. 
 THE WILL, 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 
 
 ITS NATURE AND RELATIONS TO OUR OTHER POWERS. 
 
 1. WILL is a power of control over the other faculties and 
 capacities of our nature, by means of which we are enabled to 
 determine personal activity. 
 
 It is to be carefully observed that Will is control of our 
 own powers, not of external things.^ Edwards has quite over- 
 looked this, in his definition, 'will is that which chooses 
 anything.' Freedom of Will, I. i. And again, he extends its 
 application to ' things present and absent/ Locke had said, 
 Essay n. 21, sec. 15, with more accuracy, * Volition is an act 
 of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself 
 to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or with- 
 holding it from, any particular action. And what is the Will, 
 but the faculty to do this 1 ?' So Reid makes Will ' a power to 
 determine in things which he conceives to depend upon his 
 determinations.' Active Powers, n. i. From the time of 
 Kant, the doctrine of the Will has generally had the leading 
 place in the Ethical systems of Germany. Next in importance 
 in the treatment of the Will, is the literature of America, which 
 has distinct Treatises on this subject by Edwards, Upham, 
 Tappan, Whedon, Hazard, Bledsoe, and Day. 
 
1 66 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 2. Will is a power distinct from all the other powers 
 already named. Intellect is knowing power, Will is controlling 
 power. Affection is inclination towards another person, Will 
 is guidance of our own activity. Desire is craving of what we 
 have not, Will is use of what belongs to us as part of our own 
 nature. Emotion is excitement of feeling in contemplation of 
 an object, Will is energy from within, directing us in our 
 relations to external objects. Affection, Desire, and Emotion, 
 are all concerned with external objects, Will is concerned with 
 the management of affections, desires, and emotions. Intel- 
 lect, besides being occupied with the objects and occasions 
 which awaken affections, desires, and emotions, is capable of 
 making these exercises of feeling themselves the matter of 
 observation, but it is the function of Will, under fixed laws, to 
 determine in the case of all these, including Intellect, the 
 time, manner, and measure of exercise. 
 
 Most important of these distinctions is that between desire 
 and will. These have often been identified. Their distinction 
 is thorough-going, as indicated above. This has been insisted 
 upon by Locke, Essay n. 21 ; by Reid, Act. Powers, n. i, 
 Works, 531 ; by Stewart, Act. and Mor. Powers, App. p. 471, 
 Works, vi. p. 345 ; by Upham, on the Will, c. v. p. 84. Des 
 Cartes identified Desire and Will, Principles of Philos. xxxn. 
 So also did Priestley, Philosophical Necessity, p. 35. Edwards 
 said, ' Will seems to be a word of more general signification, 
 extending to things present and absent. Desire respects 
 something absent ... I cannot think they are so entirely 
 distinct, that they can ever be properly said to run counter.' 
 Freed, of Will, I. i. Dr. Thomas Brown said, ' These 
 brief feelings, which the body immediately obeys, . . . are 
 commonly termed Volitions ; while the more lasting wishes, 
 which have no such direct termination, are simply denominated 
 Desires. '--Cause and Effect, i. 3, 3d ed. p. 51. 
 
 3. Will is an essential and prominent feature of Person- 
 ality. A person is a Self-conscious Intelligence, capable of 
 
THE WILL: ITS NATURE AND RELATIONS. 167 
 
 self-determination. If Intelligence is needful to make know- 
 ledge of Moral Law possible, Will, or power of self-determina- 
 tion, is needful to make obedience to that law possible. 
 Power of self-determination is thus essential to the nature of 
 a moral being. Kant says of man that ' his will ' is his ' proper 
 self,' Metaph. of Ethics, $& ed. 71. It is power of control 
 over our whole nature. ' The immediate object of every act 
 of will is to move some portion of the body, or to influence 
 mental activity.' Freedom of Mind in Willing, p. 13, by Row- 
 land G. Hazard, New York, 1864, The author, however, 
 gives a definition too wide, when he says, ' Will is the power 
 or faculty of the mind for effort,' p. 24. 
 
 4. Will holds a double relation to Intelligence, (i.) a 
 relation of superiority in respect of control; and (2.) a relation 
 oft. dependence in respect of need for guidance in the govern- 
 ment of the subordinate powers. The former is the common 
 relation of Will to all other powers of personal activity. The 
 latter is a special relation subsisting between Will and Intel- 
 lect, by reason of which self-control in human experience is a 
 Rational Self-control. 
 
 Reason is the 'legislator and governor of Will.'- -Kant, 
 Metaph, of Ethics, p. 18. The term ' governor ' must, however, 
 be interpreted in harmony with legislation or discovery of law, 
 which is the proper function of intelligence. 
 
 Intellect has superiority of teaching power, without con- 
 trolling power, Will has superiority of controlling power, with 
 out teaching power. The grand distinction of man as an 
 active being is recognised when the harmony of these two is 
 such as to secure unity of force, and unity of result. 
 
 5. To all the powers lower than Intelligence, Will holds 
 only the single relation of superiority in respect of control, 
 without any dependence in respect of authoritative guidance. 
 These lower powers afford occasion for the exercise of Will, 
 but Will is not dependent on them for a rule of action. This 
 singleness of relationship is consequent upon the natural 
 
168 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 inferiority of the affections, desires, and motives to Intelligence, 
 and their dependence upon it for exercise. These impulses 
 are in their nature insufficient to afford a rule of conduct ; 
 Will, or power of self-direction, therefore, needs a rule of guid- 
 ance. On the subjects of this and the preceding paragraph, 
 see Upham on the Will, Part I. chaps, ii. and iii. ; Tappan, 
 The Doctrine of the Will, chaps, iv. v. ; Hazard, Freedom oj 
 Mind in Willing, Book I. c. iii. 
 
 6. Consequent upon the superior relation subsisting 
 between Will and Intellect, in comparison with that subsisting 
 between the Will and affections, desires and emotions, the Will 
 may be represented as standing between the higher power and 
 the lower powers, to maintain proper action, that the higher may 
 guide the lower, and the lower not override the higher. In 
 this view, Intellect may give law to the Will, the lower powers 
 never can. 
 
 Kant has represented this relation by saying that the Will 
 stands between the sensory and the reason. 
 
 7. Intellect, in affording the law of conduct, is constantly 
 and closely connected with the sensibilities, thereby providing 
 for completeness of control on the part of the Will, when 
 executing moral law. 
 
 8. The lower powers, such as the affections and the 
 desires, may operate without check from the Will ; for, the 
 relation between Will and Impulse is not such that Will must 
 control, but only such that it may control. 
 
 PROBLEMS. (i.) Distinguish between willing, choosing, 
 and preferring. Edwards on the Will, 1. 1, criticised by Tappan, 
 Doctrine of the Will, p. 73 ; Hazard on Willing, p. 177. (2.) 
 What forms of choice lie within the sphere of Will, and what 
 beyond 1 ? (3.) Interpret the term Desire, when a form of 
 action is said to be its object, e.g., I desire to write, I wish 
 to speak with you. (4.) Can a rigid line of separation be 
 drawn between a sphere of thought and a sphere of action ? 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 THE WILL : ITS EXERCISE. 
 
 1. AN act of Will, directing present activity, is named a 
 Volition, from the Latin volo, I will. 4 Voluntas est, quse quid 
 cum ratione desiderat.' Cicero, Tusc. Disput. iv. 6. 
 
 2. Volitions are distinguished from each other according 
 to the nature of the power over which control is exercised. 
 Thus the volition may involve personal determination in the 
 direction of affection or desire, of observation or reflection. 
 
 3. An exercise of pure will is unknown in consciousness.! 
 We may will to think, or to sympathize with one in suffering,! 
 or to restrain our fears, but we cannot will to will. This is a 
 simple interpretation of the nature of Will, as indicated in the 
 previous chapter, sec. i. ' A mere Will without any motive 
 is chimerical and contradictory.' Leibnitz, Fourth Paper, , 
 Letters of Leibnitz and Clarke, p. 93. Reid states it thus, 
 
 ' Every act of will must have an object. He that wills must 
 will something.' Active Powers, Essay n. i. ; Hamilton, 531. 
 '' Volitions never exist independently of motives.' Upham, 
 The Will, sec. 136, p. 213. 
 
 4. Volitions may have different degrees of volitional force, 
 according to the measure of control exercised on an existing 
 impulse. There may be simple consent of the Will, that is, 
 Volition in simple accordance with an existing Impulse. And 
 
 169 
 
170 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 there may be deliberate determination of the Will, that is, Voli- 
 tion in accordance with a distinct decision of the Intellect as 
 to what is right or wrong in action, or, beyond the moral 
 sphere, as to what is prudent or advantageous. Deliberate 
 determination may lead either to exercise of an existing im- 
 pulse, or to resistance of the impulse so as to provide for its 
 expulsion from the mind. Consent of Will may be without 
 deliberation ; Resistance by the Will never can. Diversity of 
 degree in volitional force depends on the degree in which 
 Intellect has regulative power in guiding our actions. ' Rational 
 actions require preliminary effort to design the plan, or the 
 series of efforts by which the end maybe reached.'- -Causation 
 and Freedom in Willing, by Rowland G. Hazard, p. 13, 
 London, 1869 two letters of great ability, addressed to Mr. 
 John S. Mill, worthy of the earlier work from the same pen. 
 
 5- Volition is not uniformly the spring of our actions. 
 There is a spontaneous, as well 'as a volitional, origin of 
 activity. There are forms of activity provided for by the 
 constitution of our nature, independently of our choice ; as 
 there are others which can be originated only by means of 
 personal choice. That ' internal principles and motives 
 operate in a uniform manner, ' as Hume maintains, Liberty 
 and Necessity, Essays, n. 103, is beyond doubt. 
 
 6. Volition is the origin of activity only in so far as actions 
 are regulated by our intellectual powers. It is only the intel- 
 ligent being which can contemplate, devise, and execute a 
 form of activity purely subjective in its source. What we 
 originate is achieved, in respect of plan, by means of thought ; 
 in respect of force, by means of will. Only such action as 
 owes its form to intellectual as well as volitional power is 
 properly named Self-originated. See Causation and Freedom 
 in Willing, by Rowland G. Hazard. 
 
 7. Volition fulfils its function in other cases by the con- 
 trol of activity which it does not originate. The origin of 
 activity is then spontaneous; only its continuance is under 
 
THE WILL: ITS EXERCISE. 171 
 
 sway of the Will. Thus the current impressions received 
 through the senses, are not voluntary in origin, but only in 
 continuance. So it is with the desires, affections, and emo- 
 tions, in so far as they are dependent on the sensory. What I 
 see in walking, is seen because I have an organ of vision, and also 
 intellectual power capable of acting spontaneously in harmony 
 with this organ. What I feel in consequence of what I see, is 
 just as plainly spontaneous. But concentration of attention 
 upon any one object is voluntary, as implied in the previous 
 paragraph. In so far as a man does not originate his own I 
 activity, he is the creature of circumstances ; in so far as he 
 originates his actions, he is the master of circumstances. 
 
 8. Volition is concerned with the continuity of every 
 action, whether Will be or be not competent to originate the 
 action or actually involved in its origin. Or, to indicate thei 
 position as regarded from the opposite extreme, the Will is! 
 capable of terminating all normal forms of personal activity. 
 Otherwise, action ceases to be personal, and becomes abnormal. 
 Sensibility, contrasting with activity, follows a different law. 
 Continued agitation of feeling, despite efforts of Will, involves 
 nothing abnormal. As Cicero has said, ' Quae Grseci -n-dOrj 
 vocant, nobis perturbationes appellari magis placet, quam 
 morbos? Tusc. Disput. iv. 5. Continuance of excitement, 
 even when we long to escape from it, is in accordance with 
 our nature, is agitation, not disease. 
 
 9. In so far as the Will cannot originate all actions, and 
 cannot altogether prevent the rise of impulses, it has only a 
 restricted control. Within these natural limits, however, the 
 control exercised by the Will is rational self-control, inasmuch 
 as the exercise of intellectual power is constantly under com- 
 mand of the Will, for the guidance of our activity. 
 
 10. A Rational Self-control is adequate self-control of all 
 personal activity. It is adequate in range, inasmuch as it 
 applies to continuance of activity on the part of all our powers. 
 It is adequate in guiding power, inasmuch as it has been 
 
172 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 shown that Reason is competent to supply a moral law, or 
 law of guidance sufficient for the direction of all forms of 
 activity, and Will is capable of operating in harmony with 
 Intellect See above, Part I. chap. iii. Truth superior to 
 personality is the one requisite for harmonious self-direction 
 of the life. Such truth, Reason is competent to recognise ; 
 and the exercise of Reason, Will is competent to command. 
 Any disturbance of this relation between Reason and Will is a 
 breach of the normal condition of human nature. 
 
 11. The question as to the Freedom of the Will is ob- 
 viously concerned with the laws which regulate the exercise of 
 the faculty. But this question is so universally regarded as 
 the chief matter of dispute affecting the Will, that it is desir- 
 able to assign to it a special chapter. Its extreme difficulty is 
 a further reason for distinct treatment, since it is, as Hume 
 avers, * the most contentious question of metaphysics, the 
 most contentious science/ Human Understanding^ sec. 8, 
 Essays, n. no. 
 
 12. PROBLEMS. (i.) Trace the effects to Ethical Science 
 arising from the identification of Reason and Will. (2.) Dis- 
 tinguish between knowledge voluntarily acquired, and that 
 acquired involuntarily. (3.) Can Will originate an exercise of 
 Affection? (4.) Are there any circumstances in which love 
 or pity may be matter of command ? (5.) How can there be 
 various degrees of force belonging to volitions? Give ex- 
 amples and interpret them, so as to discover the law or laws 
 which determine volitional force. (6.) Does strength of Will 
 vary among the individuals of the race? Hughes, The Human 
 
 Will, ch. x., London, 1867. (7.) Is Will a faculty capable of 
 development ? 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
 
 1. THE question as to the freedom of the Will, being 
 essentially concerned with the laws regulating the exercise of 
 this power, is exclusively a question of Psychology, to be 
 determined by analysing the facts of consciousness. This 
 statement settles the method to be followed, and thereby shuts 
 off for the present the Metaphysical questions necessarily and 
 closely connected with this subject. The area of discussion 
 is thus narrowed to the fundamental problem. The correlative 
 metaphysical problems are not thereby abandoned, but merely 
 separated and delayed. 
 
 The philosophic nature of the problem is vital to the whole 
 discussion. If it be accurately represented as a question con- 
 cerned exclusively with the operations of mind, the form of 
 the discussion at least is fixed. Hume, as a defender of 
 Necessitarianism, with a * reconciling project' on hand, held 
 ' that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning 
 liberty and necessity, when they enter upon it by examining 
 the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding, 
 and the operations of the will.' Human Understanding, sec. 8, 
 Essays, n. 108. He would have us begin with * the operations 
 of body and of brute unintelligent matter/ Kant, in his 
 renowned defence of Freedom of Will, denounces in the 
 
 173 
 
174 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 severest terms those who * regard it as a mere psychological 
 quality. ' -See Kant's Metaphysic of Ethics, 3d ed. p. 135, 
 where will be found some of Kant's strongest language. But 
 it is to be observed that in deciding it to be a psychological 
 question, or question concerning the laws of mind, nothing 
 further is decided. More especially it is not thereby affirmed 
 that the essential nature of the Will's freedom can be fully 
 explained, and this is the point at which Kant pours out his 
 fury. The first demand is a careful elucidation of the facts 
 involved, without which there can be no thorough discussion 
 of the subject. What explanations of the facts may be pos- 
 sible, is an after question. 
 
 2. The problem as to the freedom of the Will is further 
 seen to be a Psychological one, by reference to the powers 
 with the regulation of which the Will is concerned. As 
 already shown, an exercise of pure will is impossible, pre- 
 ceding chapter, sec. 3. If then it is the function of Will to 
 control the Intellect, and the Impulses and Restraints natural 
 to us, the question as to its freedom in doing so, is purely a 
 question as to the power belonging to Mind. It is a problem 
 which inevitably raises collateral questions as to the laws which 
 regulate Intelligence and the lower powers of mind. Without 
 answering these, no solution can be reached. 
 
 The nature of the question is misunderstood, and even per- 
 verted, if it be made a question as to ' liberty of indifference.' 
 ' In things absolutely indifferent there is no foundation for 
 choice, and consequently rvo election nor will.' Leibnitz, 
 Fourth Paper, Letters of Leibnitz and Clarke, p. 93, and again 
 p. 167. 
 
 3. The problem as to the freedom of the W T ill is, from one 
 point of view, only a special aspect of the wider problem as 
 to the measure of control which the will exercises over the 
 other faculties and capacities of our nature. This wider pro- 
 blem having in part engaged our attention, the facts already 
 ascertained must be taken into account as essential to the 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 175 
 
 settlement of this final question. What is the power of Will, 
 depends for its answer in great measure upon what is the rela- 
 tive power of Intelligence on the one hand, and of Impulses, 
 such as desires and affections, on the other hand. Has the 
 Will controlling power over the other faculties, or have the 
 other faculties controlling power over the Will 1 This is not 
 the whole problem ; it is only one aspect of it ; yet, it is that 
 aspect which has been most prominent throughout the dis- 
 cussion, even to the overshadowing of the question concerning 
 the nature of Will itself. 
 
 4. The problem may be viewed apart from these relations, 
 and then it wears the form of a question concerning the 
 essential nature of the Will itself. Thus considered, the ques- 
 tion comes to be this, Is the nature of the power of will such 
 as to make freedom an essential characteristic of its exercise ? 
 In other words, Is Will a self-determining power 1 ? And ulti- 
 mately, Has the Mind power of self-determination 1 
 
 5. These three phrases, The Will is free, the Soul is free, | 
 and the Person is free, with their correlative negations, are, on 
 either side, only three forms of expressing the same thing. 
 The following authors consider it of importance that liberty 
 should be attributed to the person or agent, not to the faculty : 
 Locke, Essay, n. 21 ; Edwards, Freedom of the Will, i. 5 ; 
 Reid, Act. and Mor. Powers, iv. iv. 5, Works, 611 ; Stewart, 
 Dissert., Note DDD, and Act. Powers, App. I. Hazard 
 defines Will thus, ' The power or faculty of the mind for 
 effort.' Freedom of Mind in Willing, p. 24. 
 
 6. On account of the relative form of the problem 
 having mainly engaged attention, the discussion has turned 
 upon the comparative determining force of thoughts, voli- 
 tions, and dispositions, as all three have a bearing on 
 activity. The question has thus become very largely one as 
 to the determining force of MOTIVES. For if it can be shown 
 that Motives determine or cause Volitions, the question ot 
 freedom of Will is settled in the negative, by a direct applica- 
 
176 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion of the law of Causality. On this ground, it has been 
 tacitly assumed that it holds true conversely, that if the Will is 
 free, in the sense of being superior to motives, it must be so 
 by superiority to the law of Causality also, although such a 
 view really violates the nature of the problem, and that to the 
 extent of making it irrational. Cicero, De Fato, XL For 
 whatever be the nature of the problem, it certainly does not 
 stand thus. Is a Volition an uncaused event? Are there 
 facts in consciousness which cannot be attributed to any 
 cause ? Hume identifies the idea of necessity and of causality, 
 Hum. Understanding, Libert, and Necess., sec. 8, Essays, n. 96. 
 And yet, so far is there common ground, that he says, ' It is 
 universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its 
 existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere 
 negative word, and not any real power which has anywhere a 
 being in nature.' Ib. n. p. no. 
 
 7. Dealing with the relative aspect of the problem, we 
 have to compare the determinative force of motives ana 
 volitions ; not merely their power over our activity, but 
 their influence over each other, so as to decide, whether 
 motives determine volitions, or volitions determine motives, or 
 whether both statements may be in some sense true. If the 
 last possibility were established, it would then become needful 
 to distinguish the different senses in which the word l deter- 
 mining ' had been employed, and what bearing this diversity 
 of usage had on the chief question as to the freedom of Will. 
 
 8. The first requisite here is a satisfactory explanation of 
 the nature of Motives, by which they may be sharply and 
 unmistakeably distinguished from Volitions. Edwards gives 
 the definition thus, ' By motive I mean the whole of that which 
 moves, excites, or invites ihe mind to volition, whether that 
 be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly.' Freedom of 
 the Will, Pt. i. sec. ii. This is objectionable on many ac- 
 counts. We are dealing with the comparative force of mental 
 powers^ but this applies as well to things or external objects. 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 177 
 
 And since it is admitted that external objects awaken in us 
 such impulses as desire and affection, there is no need for the 
 wide popular use of the term, which would reckon money and 
 place as motives to action. More serious, however, is the 
 objection that the definition begs the question in dispute. If 
 the law of mental activity be that motives excite to volition, 
 further philosophic investigation is useless. The matter is 
 settled on the necessitarian side. The will is not free. The 
 object awakens the motive, the motive excites the volition, and 
 the action is the result. The object, together with sensibility 
 of nature, which makes me liable to its influence, is the cause 
 of my action. Such a theory might have some fair claim to 
 acceptance if it applied to an irrational nature, but is quite 
 inadequate where motives must be classified as rational and 
 irrational. Motives so different in nature must be regulated in 
 their exercise by different laws. 
 
 It must at least, then, require a scientific process to prove 
 that the single law of mental exercise is, that motives excite to 
 volition. We need first to know exactly what motives are, 
 before we proceed to ascertain what effects they produce. 
 Take the three terms, ' that which moves, excites, or invites 
 the mind/ The last may be thrown out, as it points to the 
 influence of the object, which is really represented in the 
 mental movement with which we are to deal. The other two 
 terms will serve the end, or Belsham's expression ' moves or in- 
 fluences the mind in its choice' (Elements of Philos. 228), if we 
 take motive to mean, an internal force which moves or excites 
 the mind towards a single definite line of action. Hunger, 
 love of fame, sympathy with a sufferer, may suffice as examples. 
 Motive is an internal force ; Hamilton says, * a mental ten- 
 dency' (Reid's Works, 608), which impels to action, either in- 
 ternal or external. The action may be confined to the mind 
 itself, or it may pass over into the external sphere, this makes 
 no difference. As several such impulses may unite their force, 
 it is legitimate to speak of the whole as the motive force in the 
 
 M 
 
178 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 case. Reid used motive in the sense of ' a thing that is con- 
 ceived' ens rationis, and so was led to hold that motives ' may 
 influence to action, but they do not act.' Act. Powers, iv. iv. i, 
 Works, 608. This is untenable ; see above, Part n. chap. ii. 
 sec. 2. Motives are likened to weights by Leibnitz, Letters 
 between L. and Clarke, Fifth Paper, 157. defended 165,- 
 defended after the death of Leibnitz, by Thummig, quoted 
 by Hamilton, Reid's Works, 6 1 1 . 
 
 In contrast, 'The faculty of the WiU'vs* that power or principle 
 of mind by which it is capable of choosing/ Edwards, Freedom 
 of the Will, i. i. To this must be added, 'Choosing forms of 
 activity or actions,' not things. Motive is impulse to act ; 
 Will is power of determining whether to act or not to act ; and, 
 in the event of acting, whether to act in this way or in that. 
 The whole dispute concentrates on these two points : What is 
 motive, and what is will ? 
 
 9. A classification of motives, or natural impulses which 
 urge to action, is the next requisite for an adequate treatment 
 of the problem. This classification has already been given, 
 Part ii. c. i., under which they have been presented in three 
 groups, Desires, Affections, and Judgments. Between the two 
 first and the last a clear line of separation runs, warranting their 
 classification as Dispositions and Judgments. The distinction 
 of these two is broadly marked. The one class includes forces 
 which impel, only by their own inherent strength as feelings ; 
 and are non-rational. The other class includes only forces 
 which are rational as well as impelling, and which impel by 
 reason of their rational character, thereby constituting a 
 specific kind of motive. The difference between these two is 
 so great that the impelling power of the latter can be expe- 
 rienced only in a rational nature, whereas impulses of the 
 former class may belong to natures of a lower type, and may be 
 experienced by them in a large degree, though not always to 
 the full measure of human nature. The one is recognition of 
 a rule of life, as a rational motive ; the other is experience of 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 179 
 
 disposition as motive-force. Upham, in a very interesting 
 passage, proposes a classification of motives into personal and 
 moral. Treatise on the Will, n. sec. 133, p. 207. The dis- 
 tinction is important, but the designations are unfortunate, as 
 moral motives are pre-eminently personal. 
 
 10. These two classes of motives have common relations 
 to the Will, but they have at the same time relations so dif- 
 ferent as to set them in opposition to each other, disposition 
 influencing Will in one way, the understanding in another. 
 This has been indicated so far in Part in. c. i. sec. 4. sec. 5, 
 and it is a consideration of vital importance. Both have some 
 influence in determining the exercise of the Will ; both are 
 under some control of the Will as to their own exercise, but 
 only rational motives provide a rule to the Will for its guid- 
 ance, in addition to fulfilling the function of impulse. 
 
 11. Both rational motives, and lower motives, including ^ 
 desires and affections, have some influence in determining the 
 exercise of Will. Both Intelligence and Disposition are 
 capable of spontaneous action, and in accordance with this 
 law of their activity, both afford occasion for the exercise of 
 Will. As already stated (Part in. c. ii. sec. 3), an exercise of 
 pure Will is impossible. The Will is thus dependent upon 
 the other energies of our nature for the primary condition of 
 its exercise. Motives do so far determine the Will, as tol 
 fix the direction and form of the volitions. This, however, 
 establishes nothing as to power or force to control the Will ; 
 though it does discover a measure of exercise on their part 
 independently of Will. 
 
 12. The rational motives and the lower motives, being 
 quite distinct in nature, are capable of restricting each other 
 in action. AVhile spontaneous action both of Intelligence and 
 of Disposition is recognised as fact, unrestricted exercise of 
 each motive power, until it exhausts its energy in fulfilment of 
 its end, is not similarly recognised. That dispositions may 
 rise to a force equivalent to ascendency in consciousness, is a 
 
i So HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 well-known fact, afterwards to be considered, but such ascend- 
 ency is not recognised as a uniform law of their exercise. 
 For example, desire of honour may arise simultaneously in the 
 minds of a number of associated persons, when a question of 
 precedence is to be settled. But the law of activity applying 
 to this disposition is not such as to make it impossible for one 
 to give way to another, and inevitable that all be swayed to the 
 last by the desire of pre-eminence. Men are not forces which, 
 being set in motion, must move on with a velocity proportioned 
 to the single motive power, until they dash against each other. 
 Sir W. Hamilton, criticising Reid, says, ' If motives " influence 
 to action," they must co-operate in producing a certain effect 
 on the agent ; and the determination to act, and to act in 
 a certain manner, is that effect.' Reid's Works, 608. To 
 1 influence ' and to ' determine ' are not synonymous ; and so 
 far are they from being necessarily consequent, that it is 
 granted, in case of conflicting motives, that determination is, 
 at least in some cases, contrary to influence. * Human choice 
 is affected by such stimuli, not determined by them.'- -Kant, 
 Metaph. of Ethics, 3d ed. 16 1. There is, then, in human 
 nature some moderating power, distinct from an impulse such 
 as desire, which may interfere with the law of exercise belong- 
 ing to desire itself, so as to put restraint upon it. On the 
 other hand, if each man exercise his own judgment in esti- 
 mating carefully the qualifications of each of his associates, 
 and in comparing them with his own, the law of intellectual 
 action is not such that judgment must sway, so as to make 
 it impossible that men should be influenced by a desire of pre- 
 cedence. There is thus a moderating force, distinct from 
 intelligence, which may interfere with its exercise, so as to 
 put a restraint upon its action. The higher and lower 
 motive forces of our nature are so different as to fit them for 
 performing the part of counter-checks upon each other. A law 
 of their exercise is this, That the action of motives of the 
 one class involves a check upon motives of the other class. 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 181 
 
 This counter-check, however, being consequent upon their 
 own nature as contrary to each other, discovers nothing as to 
 the action of Will. 
 
 13. The higher and the lower motives, by reason of their 
 diversity of nature, and antagonism in action, are placed in 
 different relations to the Will. The higher motives, as rational, 
 that is, capable of discovering reasons for conduct, may be of 
 the nature of rules or moral laws. They may therefore be 
 both sufficient and authoritative as guides for the conduct, 
 even to the restraint of the lower motives. The lower 
 motives, on the other hand, are only forces seeking distinct 
 ends, without being able to afford a reason for doing so, much 
 less to take the place of moral law. While sufficient to urge 
 on towards the attainment of their own ends, they are neither 
 sufficient nor authoritative as laws for the guidance of personal 
 action. This is only an exposition of that fundamental law of 
 moral life, that the Reason rule the passions. From this it 
 might be argued, as Kant has done, that the law which re- 
 quires personal control, implies the power of personal control, 
 for Moral Law cannot itself be an expression of injustice, by 
 demanding the impossible. The argument is irresistible, I 
 think; for, as it seems to me, the alternatives are, moral 
 government of free agents by law intrusted to themselves for 
 application, or, government ab extra, through means of human 
 sensibilities, to the sacrifice of human personality, similar 
 to the government of the horse by corn and whip-cord a 
 government modified only by the reason and kindliness of the 
 master. But I do not use the argument from moral law to 
 human freedom, for in prosecuting a psychological investiga- 
 tion, we are at present concerned with evidence, not with 
 argument in support of our position. 
 
 14. There is, in personal experience, control over both 
 the higher and lower motives additional to that which they 
 exercise over each other, and that is personal control, imply- 
 ing freedom of self-government. We have seen that these 
 
1 82 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 T _ _ . . _ r ii _ . 
 
 two classes of motives, as they come into play, naturally act 
 as counter-checks upon each other. But this does not exhaust 
 the measure of control exercised over our thoughts and dis- 
 positions. It only indicates a very small part of it. Granting 
 now spontaneous action of both thought and disposition, and 
 natural restriction of the one by the other, there is besides, 
 government of both so as to determine the manner and 
 measure of their exercise. Take the case already supposed, 
 desire of pre-eminence, with its possible restraint, anci even 
 mastery. By the exercise of intellect, facts are observed, 
 compared, and classified, and subsequently a course of reason- 
 ing is prosecuted in order to determine present duty. This 
 process is not explained either by the influence of the desire, 
 or by spontaneity of the intellect. The explanation is not 
 found in the desire of honour, for that is a motive to seek 
 only its own end, and, according to the law established above, 
 sec. 1 2, it can act only as a check urjon such exercise of intel- 
 lect as would tend to its own restraint. The explanation is 
 not found in spontaneous action of the intellect, for while 
 there may be a spontaneous recognition of facts, there can be 
 no spontaneous prosecution of arguments. The laws of intel- 
 lectual activity, as known to us in consciousness, directly con- 
 tradict the supposition. Attention, the first essential act in 
 the process, is a distinct exercise of personal power ; and 
 thereafter, arguments do not follow by fixed law, but by per- 
 sonal effort, so that if the reasoning be fallacious, we have the 
 blame, if it be correct, we have the praise of it. The occa- 
 sion of the desire has not been of our own arranging, the 
 desire of honour has arisen spontaneously and naturally ; but 
 we are conscious of personal volition in putting our intellect 
 to use, and keeping it in exercise while we prosecute the 
 investigation. Mr. Mill says, ' To be conscious of free-will 
 Inust mean to be conscious, before I have decided, that I am 
 able to decide either way.' Exam. 564. No. That would 
 not be consciousness of free-will, but only conviction of pos- 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 183 
 
 sessing such a power. To be conscious of free-will must 
 mean to be conscious in deciding that I am deciding. 
 M'Cosh, Intuitions, 2d ed. 266 ; Mansel, Metaph. 363 ; Battle 
 of the Two Philosophies, 35 ; Hazard on Causation, 132 ; Alex- 
 ander, Moral Causation, 12. 
 
 Turn now to the desire itself. That receives a check, 
 consequent upon the voluntary exercise of the intellect. The 
 concentration of attention on the question of duty withdraws 
 so much from the strength of the desire, which for the time is 
 held in subjection. And, as the exercise of attention is the 
 result of personal effort, so by consequence is this temporary 
 subjection of the desire. In this sense it is correct, in describ- 
 ing freedom, to say, as Mr. Mill has done, that the will, as 
 free, is 'capable of acting against motives/ Exam. 576 ; but 
 this does not mean that the will is capable of acting with- 
 out motives ; and still less that a man ' can do different 
 things while the motives remain the same.' Hartley on Man, 
 i. 507. 
 
 Suppose now that the decision of duty in the case is, for 
 the suppression of the desire of honour in the circumstances, 
 how is submission possible ? How can a natural desire be 
 suppressed, while the opportunity for gratification continues 1 
 The view of the opportunity is sufficient to awaken the desire ; 
 the desire itself is natural, we may say, in the circumstances, 
 inevitable. Is, then, its continuance equally inevitable ? Cer- 
 tainly not. Its suppression by personal determination is in 
 accordance with familiar laws of mind. To transfer the atten- 
 tion from the prospect of honour to the question ot duty is to 
 put the desire under restraint ; to concentrate the attention 
 upon duty, awakening thereby the reverence for moral law, is 
 to remove the conditions requisite for the continuance of the 
 desire. In reversal of the law of its rise, we have the law oi 
 its departure. In this manner, man throws off a strong ambi- 
 tion, and maintains the dignity of a moral being. In this way 
 it is that he becomes master of circumstances by being master 
 
184 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of himself. By the opposite course, though still through the 
 exercise of intelligence, man may concentrate attention on the 
 object or opportunity for gratification. Such concentration 
 throws open the mind to the full influence of the object, 
 voluntarily placing the whole nature under its sway. In such 
 a case the motive develops according to the single law of its 
 own exercise. Its influence will be according to the sensi- 
 bility of the nature. And if, when at its maximum, the motive 
 determine action, vqlition first gave to motive its force. 
 
 It is in our consciousness of self-control for the determina- 
 tion of activity, that we obtain our only knowledge of causality. 
 Each one knows himself as the cause of his own actions. In 
 the external world we continue ignorant of causes, and are 
 able only to trace uniform sequence, as Hume and Comte 
 have insisted. But in consciousness we distinguish between 
 sequence and causality. We are conscious of our own 
 causal energy, by knowing the origin of our activity in self- 
 determination. This was illustrated, though inconsistently, 
 by Locke, Essay n. xxi. sec. 5. It was held by Maine de 
 Biran, Nouvelles Considerations, p. 363 ; and Cousin, Cours de 
 r Histoire de la Philosophic, second course, L. xix.; transl. Hist. 
 of Modern Philosophy, n. p. 206 ; and Mansel, Prolegomena 
 Logica, 139 ; and is generally held by those who adopt the 
 libertarian side. It is, however, rejected by Sir W. Hamilton, 
 Metaph. n. 390 ; Reid's Works, 866 ; Discussions, 612 ; and in 
 this he finds a supporter in Mr. Mill, Exam. 357. Regarding 
 the question from the point of view afforded by the movement 
 of the limbs, on which Maine de Biran had dwelt, Hamilton 
 argues thus : ' Between the overt act of corporeal movement 
 of which we are cognisant, and the internal act of mental deter- 
 mination of which we are also cognisant, there intervenes a 
 numerous series of intermediate agencies of which we have no 
 knowledge ; and consequently we can have no consciousness 
 of any causal connexion between the extreme links of this 
 chain.' Metaph. n. 391. That the management of brain, nerve, 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE 
 
 y 
 
 > off 
 
 /" J ,-/ 
 
 -* : -y-i 
 
 
 r/- -*pr /O 
 
 and muscle is not matter of consciousness, is^adrmtfed : anq/. 
 
 ^r ^ "^^ 
 
 consequently that we have no consciousness of causaKjpon- 
 nexion between volitions and the movements of these organs. 
 But we are conscious of the sensation of movement, and ^ 
 are conscious of observing the movements. How, then, does 
 the case stand ? I will to move my arm, and both by sensa- 
 tion and observation I recognise the consequent movement. 
 This is not direct consciousness of the causal nexus, but it is 
 consciousness of the origmaimgiQiCQ of the whole, the efficiency 
 of which is tested by direct experiment, and confirmed by 
 results within our own consciousness. According to Hamil- 
 ton's theory, it is origin of existence we need to recognise 
 in order to reach causality ; and here we have consciousness 
 of the origin of our activity. But the question is really to be 
 settled elsewhere. Obscurity hangs over the intermediate 
 stages in the case of bodily movements. But in the use of 
 our mental powers in the government of understanding and 
 desire, for example, it is otherwise. Everything is within 
 consciousness. By exercise of Will, we bring the intellect into 
 use, and by continuance of volitional energy we prosecute a 
 course of reasoning. We are conscious of the fact of control, 
 and in immediate connexion and dependence, we are conscious 
 of the controlled exercise of mind. It is in this control of 
 mental power that we have direct knowledge of the exercise of 
 causal energy. * Intelligence endowed with will is causality.' 
 Kant, Metaph. of Ethics, 3d ed. p. 64-70. In the manage- 
 ment of bodily organs the area of knowledge is widened, but 
 our knowledge is immediate only so far as volition is con- 
 cerned, and is only mediate so far as the next act is concerned. 
 On this subject see Chalmers's Sketches of Mental aud Moral 
 Philos. c. iv. sec. 27, ed. 1854, p. 161 ; Hazard on Causation 
 and Freedom in Willing, p. 7 ; and a valuable passage in 
 Cairns's Treatise on Moral Freedom, p. 222. 
 
 15. Freedom of Will, as known in consciousness, is control 
 over the whole nature by means of the control we have over 
 
1 86 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the understanding. The intellect is continually at command 
 for guidance and impulse, our best dispositions are all in har- 
 mony with it, and our evil dispositions, which are out of 
 harmony with it, can be grappled with in earnest moral con- 
 flict. So far from freedom of will being out of harmony with 
 reason, and in violation of its fundamental principles, it is 
 possible only in the possession and use of reason, and is 
 preserved in its natural force only by the continuous govern- 
 ment of reason in the sphere of personal activity. The 
 understanding must be able to compare motives with some 
 standard of judgment or rule of conduct, must be able to 
 go forward in thought, and forecast the form and tendencies 
 of different actions, in order that there may be any real choice 
 or self-determination in action. Intelligence is essential to 
 the exercise of Will. ' A false relish may frequently be cor- 
 rected by argument and reflection/ Hume, Essays, n. 227 ; 
 Prin. of Morals. In this close union of intellect and will for 
 the control of all the powers of our nature, lies the explana- 
 tion of Kant's tendency to identify the Will with the Practical 
 Reason. The two powers are certainly distinct, but their 
 united action is essential. Their union in our nature provides 
 for the possibility of personal freedom ; their union in self- 
 government secures freedom in practice. 
 
 16. The negative aspect of freedom of Will, presenting 
 the lower alternative open to man, is government by the 
 passions in disregard of the reason, with use of the under- 
 standing only as servant to the lower propensities. This is 
 the possibility of a two-sided nature, in which Will stands 
 between, with the power of giving to either the ascendency. 
 For freedom of Will is not merely power to act or to refrain, 
 but power to accept impulse in action, from the lower as well 
 as from the higher side of our nature. Where this lower alter- 
 native is the one more commonly preferred, there is subjection 
 of the kingdom of mind to Mob-Rule, v. Plato's Republic. 
 Such a life leads down into the abyss of wilful baseness, where 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 187 
 
 the grand elements of human personality are at length broken 
 up by what is nothing less than moral suicide. 
 
 17. As freedom of action is attainable through rational 
 control of the whole nature, the key to the exercise of such 
 freedom is found in the power of ATTENTION. This is the key 
 to possible superiority over circumstances and dispositions, 
 and also to the possibility of uniform guidance by the reason. 
 The ruling type of human freedom, as recognised in conscious- 
 ness, is discovered in the control exercised over attention. 
 Intellect exerts its governing power only as we put it to 
 use for this end, and that means attention. Objects, when 
 contemplated by us, touch our sensibility, and awaken dis- 
 positions which have the force of motives. This being the 
 law of our experience, we weaken or strengthen these lower 
 motives according as we direct our attention. Our experience 
 under contemplation of objects is the product of natural con- 
 stitution, and is not subject of volition ; but the continuance 
 and increase of such sensibility, with attendant dispositions, 
 are elements of experience constantly under our own control, 
 according as attention is bestowed upon the object, or with- 
 drawn from the object, and concentrated upon another. 
 
 18. As the possibility of personal freedom is provided for 
 in the full command we have over our intellect, and as freedom 
 is practically realized when intellect is used as the power 
 guiding our conduct, moral freedom becomes an established 
 attainment by means of successful conflict with the clamant 
 dispositions. ' It is Conscience which preserves the might of 
 the Will.' Trendelenburg, Naturrecht^ p. 56. 
 
 19. In proportion as the government of Intelligence over 
 the life is voluntarily established, definite lines of moral action 
 are preferred with uniformity, as occasion arises. The laws of 
 moral conduct being definite, and applicable to the several 
 powers which we possess, the lines of action which they mark 
 out are no less certain. As perfect moral freedom is realized, 
 consistency of moral action is attained, with such diversity, in 
 
1 88 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the form of actions, as circumstances may require. The law 
 being one, the Will is in full harmony with it. According to 
 the accuracy of the estimate we have formed of a man's moral 
 character, will be the accuracy of our anticipations as to the 
 manner in which he will act in given circumstances. The 
 possibility of forecasting probable lines of moral action is not 
 an argument against freedom of will, but a proof that such 
 freedom is in accordance with moral law, that is, in harmony 
 with Reason. See Upham on the Will, chapters in. and vi. 
 
 20. Behind and beneath these inquiries as to control of 
 intellect and dispositions, and as to the manner in which such 
 control is carried through to its practical result in forming the 
 external actions, there is a deeper and far more perplexing 
 question, How does the Will regulate itself? If it can use 
 intelligence to restrain disposition, or if it can stimulate dis- 
 position, so as to hold the understanding in check, such use of 
 other powers implies an inherent and superior power in itself. 
 How is this power brought into exercise? How can Will 
 regulate the forth-putting of its own energy 1 It is when we 
 thus withdraw from the relations in which Will acts, to consider 
 Will in itself, that we encounter the most serious difficulty. At 
 this point we pass beyond the facts of consciousness, as Kant 
 maintained Meiaph. of Ethics, 3d ed. p. 71, and enter the 
 region of hypothesis and inference, where philosophy may be 
 constrained to own its weakness. 
 
 21. Proper treatment of the question requires careful 
 appreciation of the source of its difficulty. The question itself 
 is concerned with the power of pure will, but, as already 
 recognised, ch. n. sec. 3 of the present Part, an exercise of 
 pure will is unknown in consciousness, consequently the source 
 of the difficulty is that we control our other powers without 
 being conscious how power of control lies always at com- 
 mand, or how it is brought into use as occasion requires. 
 The real state of the case is this, We use our power, knowing 
 well to what end we exert it, but without knowing how we 1 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 189 
 
 bring it into use. The power itself is unique, but such ignor- 
 ance of the manner in which we use a power has many analogies 
 in the history of mind. 
 
 22. Of legitimate hypotheses there are three available 
 forms, (i.) constrained action, under dominion of some con- 
 trolling power, distinct from the Will itself; (2.) spontaneous 
 action, according to an inherent and invariable law of energy 
 operating within the Will itself; or (3.) free action, admitting 
 of variation within a sphere where alternative courses are 
 equally possible. 
 
 23. The hypothesis of constrained action of Will is invali- 
 dated on the ground of inconsistency with the recognised 
 facts of consciousness. Of these facts, the following are the 
 most important, that Intelligence and Disposition are con- 
 trolled, that we are conscious of personal control over these 
 powers, so that their exercise is in the direction of our voli- 
 tions, and that we praise or blame ourselves as the authors 
 of the consequent actions. To prove that these are only 
 suppositions and not facts, has been found too hard a task for 
 the supporters of the hypothesis of constrained action. If we 
 cannot plead the testimony of consciousness as to the manner 
 in which Will is brought into exercise, we have its clear testi- 
 mony as to the fact of the Will's control over the other powers 
 of mind. Whatever be the law of its own exercise, Will is free 
 from the dominion of intellect and disposition. It is not con- 
 trolled by them, but controls both. The strongest motive does 
 not determine the Will ; but the Will determines what motives 
 shall be allowed to gain strength. As to 'the strongest 
 motive,' see Reid, Act. Powers, Essay iv. 4, Works, 610; 
 Stewart, Philos. of Act. and Mor. Powers, n. App. i, Works, 
 vi. 351 ; Upham on the Will, sec. 138; Tappan, Review of 
 Edwards, 21 ; Hazard, Freedom of Mind, Book n. c. x. 
 
 24. The hypothesis of spontaneous action, according to an 
 invariable law operating within the Will itself, is invalidated 
 by the facts of consciousness. The facts indicated in the 
 
tgo HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 previous paragraph are inexplicable on this supposition. 
 While the fact of control over intellect and disposition is 
 obvious, it is equally clear that the control is not so uniform 
 as to favour belief in a law of spontaneity as characteristic of 
 Will. So far from every disposition being uniformly gratified 
 or checked as it arises, there are great variations in the mea- 
 sure of control maintained. Inasmuch as intellect is brought 
 
 o 
 
 into use, sometimes as guide and encourager of dispositions, 
 sometimes as their restrainer, there is no such uniformity in 
 the manner of control, as to harmonize with a law of spon- 
 taneity in Will, similar to that which applies to the dispositions 
 themselves when uncontrolled. 
 
 25. The hypothesis of free action as the law of exercise 
 for the Will itself, is the only one which harmonizes with the 
 facts of consciousness. Relative freedom in the sense of free- 
 dom from control of intellect and disposition on the part of 
 the Will, being established by simple analysis of the facts of 
 consciousness ; controlling power on the part of the Will over 
 both intellect and disposition being recognised in exercise 
 within consciousness ; a theory of the Will is completed only 
 by maintaining that this power is distinct in nature from any 
 other known to us, and that fieedom of action in adopting 
 available alternatives, is the law of its exercise. 
 
 26. That we should exercise a power without being con- 
 scious of the manner of its exercise ; and that, on account of 
 the absence of such consciousness, we should be unable to 
 complete a philosophy of its action, are not singular facts, but 
 facts which are sustained by numerous analogies in the history 
 of mind. A whole series of examples is afforded by the con- 
 trol which the mind has over the body in executing the deter- 
 minations of the Will. We determine to walk, and we execute 
 our intention, without knowing how the feat is accomplished, 
 or being able to complete a philosophy of it, either physiologi- 
 cal or mental, any more than we can complete our philosophy 
 of volition. So it is with our use of the various senses. So 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
 
 it is also, coming into the department of mind, with the 
 marvels of memory. We recall the experience of the past, so 
 that we have no doubt of the accuracy of our recollections, 
 and we have the laws of association to guide us in some 
 degree as to the manner in which facts are classified in order 
 to be readily remembered ; but how we put in operation and 
 employ the power of memory so as to recall past events, is 
 what no philosophy has been able to explain, because con- 
 sciousness yields no testimony. So is it, in like manner, with 
 our recognition of first principles of truth and rectitude. The 
 control of our bodily organs is a mystery of our life, which 
 Physiology has only made more mysterious. The wonders of 
 memory are altogether perplexing. But when we penetrate as 
 far as Will, discerning the internal power, which has sway 
 over all other powers, making self-determination possible, a 
 scheme of self-government rational, and formation of moral 
 character a reality in personal progress ; we reach the inner 
 mystery of human life. The results of the exercise of Will we 
 know; we are besides familiar with the work of self-control 
 itself; but we cannot explain how the Will comes into action 
 in accordance with the peculiar law of its own exercise. As 
 pure volition is unknown, a philosophy of Pure Will is impos- 
 sible. Beyond the psychological analysis which discovers the 
 subordination of the understanding and dispositions to the 
 Will, the utmost that can be attained is that Will is the ultimate 
 power of mind, in harmony with Intelligence, to provide for 
 government of all the special and subordinate forces of human 
 nature. In accordance with this view, Kant describes the 
 Will as the man's ' proper self,' and indicates the closeness of 
 its union with intelligence by describing its laws as ' the laws 
 of his intellectual will.' Metaph. of Ethics, 3d ed. p. 71. 
 
 27. Kant passes beyond the acknowledgment of our 
 ignorance of the manner in which Will operates, to maintain 
 that man exists in two states, a sensible and a cogitable ; in 
 the former of which he is subject to physical law, in the latter 
 
192 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of which he is superior to it. The distinction is drawn with 
 great clearness and power in the Grundlegung, Metaph. 0} 
 Ethics^ pp. 70-73. The theory is a bold one, having much 
 to commend it as a speculative suggestion, but it is altogether 
 untenable if it mean anything more than man's superiority to 
 physical laws, and his inability to give a complete explanation 
 of this superiority by means of the operations of his own Will. 
 This theory of the cogitable world, as distinguished from the 
 sensible world the world of human causality, in which man 
 acts as a thing-in-itself, and the world of experience, in which 
 man is a mere phenomenon, does not make 'the smallest 
 pretence to know anything of the laws obtaining' in the cogi- 
 table world, ' excepting only the formal condition of them/ 
 namely, 'their autonomy, which alone can consist with freedom,' 
 p. 72. But, in so far as it makes experience only phenome- 
 nal, it reduces the sensory too far, and separates it from true 
 union with the higher nature of man. The doctrine of free- 
 dom of will claims no such severance from the sphere of 
 experience, and makes no such affirmation of the merely 
 phenomenal nature of that sphere. In so far as the theory 
 makes the cogitable world ( a mere idea, negative of the 
 sensible world/ and represents reason as 'cogitating herself 
 into a supersensible state ;' and declares that 'the notion of 
 a cogitable system is a mere station which reason needs for a 
 fulcrum to lift itself out of the mass of appearances, and cogi- 
 tate itself as sui-active/ it attempts the impossible, and offers 
 the form of an explanation, where the reality is unattainable. 
 
 28. Equally untenable are the representations of the later 
 Transcendentalism, which makes human reason a manifestation 
 of Universal Reason, and speaks of Will as containing 'the 
 element of pure indeterminateness, or the pure reflection of 
 the Ego (I) to itself/ and as ' passing over from indistinguish- 
 able indenniteness to Determinateness.'- -Hegel, Philosophic 
 des RccJits, sec." 5, sec. 6, pp. 16, 17. As Dr. J. Hutchison 
 Stirling puts it, ' Undevelopedness #ives free will.' . . . ' Will 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 193 
 
 is the undeveloped universal.' Lects. on the Philos. of Law, in. 
 As already seen, the knowledge of pure will is impossible ; f 
 consciousness of its exercise there is none, and consequently 
 knowledge of transition from indeterminateness to determinate- 
 ness is impossible. The theory, not only transcending an 
 empirical Psychology, but breaking connexion with it, is with- 
 out a solid foundation, and thereby fails to establish its claim 
 to be regarded as a philosophy of Will. Accordingly, as 
 the younger Fichte has remarked, Hegel has no place for a 
 doctrine of freedom of will in the individual. Im. Hermann 
 Fichte, System der Ethik, vol. n. Part i. sec. 19, p. 81. As 
 a dialectic scheme of universal existence, Hegel's system is 
 certainly the grandest production embraced in the history of 
 philosophy. And yet, as a pure Dialectic, Spinoza's system, 
 based on the radical conception of one great Substance, source, 
 and explanation of all existence, maintains a closer harmony 
 with the conditions of thought, if not with the characteristics 
 of finite Personality. 
 
 PROBLEMS. (i.) Analyse and interpret current phrases 
 which make actions the objects of Desire, such as, * I desire to 
 write ; ; or, ' I wish to speak with you.' (2.) Critically exa- 
 mine the doctrine that freedom of Will must imply will to will. 
 ' The soul determines all the free acts of the will in the exer- 
 cise of a power of willing and choosing. Edwards, Freedom of 
 the Will, n. i. (3.) State the law of causality, and distin- 
 guish between its application to external facts, and to the facts 
 of mind. (4.) Does freedom of Will require us to 'define a 
 cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, 
 necessary connexion with its effect' ? Hume, Essays, n. in. 
 (5.) Critically examine the following, ' I ask my consciousness 
 what I do feel, and I find, indeed, that I feel (or am convinced) 
 that I could, and even should, have chosen the other course if 
 I had preferred it, that is, if I had liked it better ; but not that 
 I could have chosen one course while I preferred the other.'- 
 Mr. Mill's Exam, of Hamilton's Philos. y\ ed. p. 566. 
 
 N 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 NECESSITARIANISM. 
 
 1. THE Necessitarian doctrine, in denying freedom of 
 will, does not altogether refuse a place to freedom. But the 
 only liberty which it acknowledges is liberty of acting as we 
 will, denominated freedom from constraint or coaction. ' I say 
 that a thing is free which exists and acts by the sole necessity of 
 its nature.' Spinoza, Letter 62, Life, Corresp. and Ethics, by 
 R. Willis, M.D., p. 393. ' By liberty we can only mean a power 
 of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the 
 Will.' Hume, Essays, n. no. By freedom or liberty in an 
 agent is meant, ' being free from hindrance or impediment 
 in the way of doing or conducting, in any respect, as he wills. 
 Edwards, TJie Will, Part i. sec. 5. 
 
 2. Such liberty being attributed to man, the upholders of 
 the scheme have a double objection to the name Necessi- 
 tarianism, as descriptive of their theory, first, because it seems 
 to convey that they have no place for liberty, and, secondly, 
 because it seems to imply that they really hold that men are 
 constrained in their actions ; both of which they deny. Thus 
 Mr. Mill, as an upholder of the theory, speaks of it as ' the 
 (alsely-called Doctrine of Necessity,'- -preferring 'the fairer 
 name of Determinism/ and says, that the word Necessity ' in 
 this application, signifies only invariability.' Exam. p. 552. 
 
 191 
 
NECESSITARIANISM. 195 
 
 Determinism is an unsuitable word, because on both sides a 
 doctrine of determination of will is held, the dispute being be- 
 tween self-determination, and motive-determination. And still 
 more to complicate matters, there is a sense in which liberta- 
 rians may say, that volitions are determined by motives ; see 
 preceding chapter, sec. 10. The doctrine itself Mr. Mill states 
 thus, ' A volition is a moral effect, which follows the corre- 
 sponding moral causes as certainly and invariably as physical 
 effects follow their physical causes. Whether it must do so, I 
 acknowledge myself to be entirely ignorant, be the phenomena 
 moral or physical ; and I condemn accordingly the word Ne- 
 cessity as applied to either case. All I know is that it always 
 does. 1 Ib. p. 562. These modifications, then, being obviously 
 accurate in themselves, are to be carefully regarded in criticis- 
 ing the theory. 
 
 3. The distinctive features of Necessitarianism or Deter- 
 minism are, negatively^ the denial of freedom in willing to act ; j 
 &&& positively ) the presentation of a theory of Will, professedly 
 adequate to account for all the facts of consciousness which 
 bear upon the direction of human conduct. 
 
 4. The Necessitarian theory, on its negative or critical 
 side, rests upon an application of the law of causality. It 
 urges that every event follows a cause : that this holds true in 
 the sphere of mind as well as of matter ; and so applies to 
 volitions as well as sensations. At this point there is no 
 divergence of opinion. Indeed, most libertarians go further 
 than necessitarians here, and do not halt, like Mr. Mill, at the 
 statement that the effect ' certainly and invariably ' does follow 
 its cause, but advance to the position that it must do so. 
 Liberty of indifference and liberty of caprice are repudiated, 
 and are not to be set to the account of libertarian ism, any 
 more than a doctrine of constraint is to be charged against 
 necessitarianism. These are the extremes, taken in the heat 
 of conflict, to be abandoned in calmer mood. That every 
 volition must have a cause, is a necessity freely admitted. 
 
196 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 To Hume it is granted, according to his demand, that a cause 
 has a i necessary connexion with its effect.' Essays n. in. 
 This does not, however, touch the question in dispute. 
 
 Spinoza was a necessitarian in logical consistency, as the 
 author of a dialectic which rests on the existence of only one 
 substance. In his view, ' men deceive themselves when they 
 suppose they are free/ and this because, though conscious of 
 their own acts, they are ignorant of the causes by which these 
 acts are determined. Ethics, Part n. prop. 35. 
 
 5, The Necessitarian theory not only insists upon the 
 application of the law of causality within the region of mind, 
 as to which all are agreed, but further insists upon an interpreta- 
 tion of the law in accordance with the analogy of the physical 
 world. Looking from the effect backwards to the cause, it 
 maintains that the law of causality warrants the affirmation, 
 not only that an adequate cause has acted, but also how it 
 has acted. Looking from the cause forward to the effect, it 
 maintains, on warrant of the law of causality, not only that 
 the cause has produced the effect, but that it was necessitated 
 to produce that effect. But this is something more than an 
 application of the law of causality. With the law, it carries 
 an interpretation founded on knowledge gathered in a par- 
 ticular sphere. It is an argument from matter to mind, and 
 as such needs to be vindicated on the basis of facts, not 
 merely proclaimed on the authority of a general law. 
 
 No mere statement of the law is sufficient to establish the 
 theory, and obviate the need for an appeal to the facts of 
 consciousness. To say that the same cause acting in the 
 same circumstances will produce the same effect, is a most 
 accurate statement, but is of no value in the attempt to 
 prove that matter and mind, in so far as they do act, must 
 act in a manner exactly analogous. The statement concerns 
 only the amount of force or power in the cause, and not 
 the mode in which the cause operates. It is merely that the 
 same produces the same, which ultimately is nothing more 
 
NECESSITARIANISM. . 197 
 
 than this, that the same is the same. To say of two forces that 
 they will cause the same velocity or produce the same amount 
 of heat, is only equivalent to saying that the two forces are the 
 same. This is shown to be the case, equally when the measure- 
 ment is applied to the cause, and to the effect. The same 
 sympathy will lead to the same help ; the same selfishness will 
 lead to the same neglect. No doubt. The same is the same, 
 whether you measure from the one end or from the other. 
 But the whole matter in dispute lies beyond this. The theory 
 must, therefore, be tested by an examination of the facts of 
 consciousness, with the view of ascertaining the laws of exer- 
 cise applying to mental causes or forces. And when we thus 
 pass from the physical to the mental, we at once recognise a 
 complete difference in the laws of exercise governing the 
 forces of the two spheres. There is so much which is com- 
 mon to both. Effects ' certainly and invariably' follow their 
 causes in both spheres. In both, causes are as invariable in 
 their nature, and as certain in their results. But there is an 
 essential difference between the mental and the physical. 
 Circumstances do not so * certainly and invariably ' determine 
 causes in the mental, as in the physical sphere. Or, to put it 
 in another and more positive form, there is in the mental 
 world an adjustment of forces, which is not found in the 
 material world, except when man interposes to make the 
 adjustment. This difference is so broadly marked, that there 
 is in the sphere of mind at once less certainty, and more cer- 
 tainty as to results. There is less certainty, so far as circum- 
 stances contribute to the result ; and more certainty, so far as 
 the nature of the operating force is concerned. Physical 
 action (so called) depends mainly upon attendant conditions : 
 mental action depends mainly on internal nature. As to 
 circumstances or attendant conditions, it is more certain that 
 friction will produce fire, than that provocation will produce 
 anger. On the other hand, considering the nature of the 
 efficient cause, it is less certain that steam will produce loco- 
 
IQS HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 motion, than that volition will produce action. Thus, in the 
 mental world, if you take such forces as love, pity, and rever- 
 ence, a single distinct and uniform effect ' certainly and invari- 
 ably' follows from the action of each of the three ; but their 
 exercise depends upon something more than the circumstances 
 fitted to call them forth, and still more obvious is it that such 
 circumstances afford no exact criterion of the measure in 
 which these forces operate in mind. These are facts which 
 go to show that causality in mind is not exactly analogous 
 with causality in matter. 
 
 6. Passing now the controversial use of the law of 
 Causality made by necessitarianism, we come to its construc- 
 tive use, in forming a theory alleged to afford an adequate 
 explanation of the facts of consciousness, so far as these are 
 concerned with personal action. In this part, the theory deals 
 specially with the laws regulating the exercise of natural and 
 acquired motives, as carrying a complete explanation of voli- 
 tions. Necessitarians ' affirm as a truth of experience, that 
 volitions do, in point of fact, follow determinate moral ante- 
 cedents with the same uniformity, and (when we have suffi- 
 cient knowledge of the circumstances) with the same certainty, 
 as physical effects follow their physical causes. These moral 
 antecedents are desires, aversions, habits, and dispositions, 
 combined with outward circumstances suited to call those 
 internal incentives into action. All these again are effects of 
 causes, those of them which are mental being consequences 
 of education, and of other moral and physical influences.' 
 Mr. Mill, Exam. p. 561. In following through this theory of 
 volitions, there is no need for raising the question as to the 
 possibility of the development of our natural powers, already 
 discussed in Part I. Div. ii. 
 
 7. The Necessitarian theory accounts for the rise of distinct 
 motives in consciousness, by affirming that there are ' outward 
 circumstances suited to call those internal incentives into 
 action.' This is ground common to both theories. It has 
 
NECESSITARIANISM. 199 
 
 been always admitted that personal experience is thus far 
 determined for us. But these * internal incentives ' are awak- 
 ened not by any physical energy which objects exert over us, 
 but by natural sensibility, connected with observation. It is 
 granted, then, that we have an example of necessity, not even 
 of volition (certainly not of free-will) in the rise of motives. 
 Whether it be possible by voluntary determination to provide 
 for the awakening of natural or acquired dispositions, need 
 not at present detain us. 
 
 8. The Necessitarian theory explains the continuance and 
 influence of motives in consciousness by the constitution and 
 acquired tendencies of the mind within which they arise. Mr. 
 Mill refers to ' education and other moral and physical influ- 
 ences.' Edwards points to * the particular temper which the 
 rnind has by nature, or that has been introduced and estab- 
 lished by education, example, custom, or some other means/ 
 Pt. i. sec. ii. Here too is matter of agreement, but here 
 also the point of divergence is reached. It is granted that 
 what a man is by nature, he is by necessity, that is, without 
 personal choice. And as men differ somewhat in constitution, 
 it is granted that, independently of personal choice, there may 
 be some diversity in the natural force of dispositions, as they 
 come into play. Thus far it is held on both sides, that there 
 is determination without choice. Beyond this, the controversy 
 begins. Libertarians distinguish between a man's nature and 
 his character, maintaining that the one is made for him, and 
 the other he makes for himself. This, however, may be 
 passed, while we consider the point of more immediate im- 
 portance here, viz., the laws which determine the progressive 
 strength of motives. Libertarians admit the accuracy of the 
 Necessitarian theory, in so far as it points to a man's nature and 
 acquired tendencies as contributing towards an explanation of 
 the strength of a motive. But they affirm that, after making 
 full allowance for the outward circumstances, for the nature of 
 the man, and for his acquired tendencies, the answer is incom- 
 
200 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 plete. They urge, that the influence of observation or atten- 
 tion, so essential to our experience, is omitted ; and that 
 the solution of the question as to the strength of any motive, 
 whether great or small, depends largely on the account given 
 of personal observation. In absence of any philosophy of 
 this, Libertarians affirm that the solution of the problem as 
 to the laws which determine the development of motive 
 force, stands unfinished in the scheme of Necessitarianism. 
 Edwards arranged admirably the points of consideration, 
 when he indicated these three, 'the nature and circumstances 
 of the thing viewed; the nature and circumstances of the mind 
 that views ; and the degree and manner of its view! But the 
 last named is very imperfectly examined; see Freedom of Will, 
 i. ii. 2. The incompleteness of its treatment is apparent in 
 these statements of the general result, 'The Will always is 
 as the greatest apparent good is,' and ' the Will always follows 
 the last dictate of the understanding.' Still more perplexing 
 is the statement of Hobbes, c Will is the last appetite in 
 deliberating.' Leviath. i. vi., Works, vol. in. p. 49. The 
 term ' Deliberation' is, however, used in a very wide sense ; 
 see p. 48. A psychological investigation of the part which 
 the understanding performs in connexion with the increase of 
 motive force in the mind, is, in the view of Libertarians, an 
 obvious want in the opposite scheme. 
 
 9. Necessitarianism encounters difficulties, arising from its 
 own nature, in attempting to construct a harmonious theory of 
 moral government, and to interpret the moral sentiments 
 common to men. With a statement of each of these difficul- 
 ties, I conclude the subject of the Will. 
 
 10. Necessitarianism has difficulty in accounting for the 
 consciousness of Moral Responsibility, and for the justice of 
 personal liability to punishment. The following is an outline 
 of Mr. Mill's view of the subject : ' Responsibility means 
 Punishment. When we are said to have the feeling of being 
 morally responsible for our actions, the idea of being punished 
 
NECESSITARIANISM. 201 
 
 for them is uppermost in the speaker's mind.' This may mean 
 expectation of punishment, or 'knowing that we shall deserve' 
 it. The former, as expectation of responsibility, is not con- 
 sciousness of it. That which may be deemed to require the 
 free-will hypothesis is ' the belief that we ought to be 5 account- 
 able ; ' that we are justly accountable ; that guilt deserves 
 punishment. It is here that issue is joined between the two 
 opinions,' JZxam.p. 571. 'On the theory of Necessity (we 
 are told), a man cannot help acting as he does, and it 
 cannot be just that he should be punished for what he cannot 
 help. Not if the expectation of punishment enables him to 
 help it, and is the only means by which he can be enabled to 
 help it?' Exam. 575. 'There are two ends which, Qn the 
 Necessitarian theory, are sufficient to justify punishment : the 
 benefit of the offender himself, and the protection of others.' 
 Ib. 576. 
 
 11. A philosophy of the moral sentiments, including self- 
 approbation and self-condemnation, shame and remorse, is 
 peculiarly difficult under the necessitarian hypothesis. Remorse 
 may be taken as the example. Priestley treats of it thus, ' A 
 man, when he reproaches himself for any particular action in 
 his past conduct, may fancy that if he was in the same situa- 
 tion again, he would have acted differently. But this is a 
 mere deception, and if he examines himself strictly, and takes 
 in all the circumstances, he may be satisfied that, with the same 
 inward disposition of mind, and with precisely the same views 
 of things as he had then, and exclusive of all others which he 
 has acquired by reflection since, he could not have acted 
 otherwise than he did.' Illust. of Phil. Necessity r , p. 99 ; see 
 also Belsham's Elements, p. 406. It is at least an awkward 
 escape from a theoretic difficulty to maintain that the whole 
 human race is deceived. The philosophic question is this,- 
 What power belongs to us as intellectual beings 1 Have we 
 such power, that a man can attain to accurate views of the 
 moral quality of an action before he perform it, as well as 
 
202 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 after the action is done ? The negative cannot be maintained 
 on a Utilitarian theory of morals, any more than on an In- 
 tuitional theory. 
 
 12. PROBLEMS. (i.) On the theory that knowledge of 
 causality is only knowledge of sequence, can an appeal be 
 consistently made to the law of causality itself, as sufficient 
 warrant for a theory as to the origin of a new form of exist- 
 ence 1 (2.) Granting moral distinctions as common to Intui- 
 tionalism and Utilitarianism, can these afford any rule of 
 conduct in harmony with a Necessitarian theory of volition ? 
 (3.) Are Rewards and Punishments means of government, 
 employed to determine the strongest motive ; or are they the 
 consequences which naturally and justly follow voluntary con- 
 formity to moral law, or violation of it ? (4.) On the basis of the 
 necessitarian theory, work out an explanation of the common 
 opinion, as expressed by Mr. Mill, ' That whoever cultivates a 
 disposition to wrong, places his mind out of sympathy with 
 the rest of his fellow-creatures.' Exam. 572. (5.) If men 
 are governed by contrivances for awakening the strongest 
 motive, how has it come to pass that rewards are less employed 
 for this end than punishments ? The Battle of tJie Two 
 Philosophies , p. 49. (6.) In view of the need for protecting 
 common rights, what is the difference between these two 
 cases : ' It is just to punish so far as is necessary for this 
 purpose, as it is just to put a wild beast to death (without 
 unnecessary suffering} for the same object'? Exam. 578. 
 
PART IV. 
 
 MORAL SENTIMENTS. 
 
 1. BESIDES the Affections and Emotions already described 
 in PART II., there are other dispositions of mind, which have 
 as their objects, moral actions considered in themselves, or 
 persons regarded as agents acting within the moral sphere. 
 These are properly named * Moral Sentiments,' and are ex- 
 perienced only through means of the exercise of our moral 
 nature, distinguishing between right and wrong. 
 
 2. These Sentiments afford illustrations of the common 
 law of mind, that all exercise of the intelligent nature is 
 accompanied by an experience of sensibility. Intelligence 
 directed on moral distinctions, is thus attended by a particular 
 order of sensibility. 
 
 3. The moral sentiments differ in their psychological 
 character, according as the judgment on which they attend, 
 applies merely to an action in itself considered, or to the 
 agent whose action is observed, or to self as the agent. These 
 sentiments may thus wear the character of mere feeling, or of 
 affection, or of emotion. The name ' moral sentiments/ there- 
 fore, is not to be regarded as indicating exact similarity of 
 psychological character in the dispositions grouped under it, 
 though they agree in these two characteristics, that they are 
 of the nature of sentiment or feeling in contrast with intelli- 
 gence; and that they attend upon moral judgments. They 
 
 SOS 
 
204 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 harmonize with these judgments, as sentiment can harmonize 
 with thought, and they support the judgments as attendant 
 sanctions. 
 
 4. In accordance with their functions, the natural ground 
 of classification is obtained by reference to the distinct moral 
 judgments which they accompany, as these judgments refer to 
 the actions or to the agent, and, in the latter case, to another 
 person or to self. 
 
 5. In harmony with the twofold division of moral quality, 
 as right or wrong, moral sentiments appear in double form, as 
 pleasurable or painful, each sentiment of a pleasurable kind, 
 because of approval, having its contrary, in case of a judgment 
 of condemnation. 
 
 6. Viewing a moral action simply in the light of the judg- 
 ment pronounced upon it, we experience a sentiment of beauty 
 or deformity, as the judgment is favourable or unfavourable. 
 There is a moral beauty, varying in degree, according to har- 
 mony with moral law, and the simplicity or complexity of the 
 action. There is in like manner a moral deformity, awaken- 
 ing, more or less powerfully, a sense of aversion or dislike. 
 
 7. Consequent upon a judgment approving an action, and 
 the attendant sentiment of the beautiful, there is admiration 
 of the agent. With the opposite judgment, and its attendant 
 feeling, there is disrespect to the agent. These dispositions 
 are of the nature of affections, analogous to love and hate. 
 They accordingly have impelling power, as all affections have. 
 Admiration of an agent in successive cases, leads to a judg- 
 ment of general approval as to his character, attended by love 
 and trust. Disrespect to an agent, in like manner, in conse- 
 quence of its recurrence, conducts to dislike and distrust. 
 ' A generous and noble character affords a satisfaction even in 
 the survey ; and when presented to us, though only in a poem 
 or fable, never fails to charm and delight us.' Hume, Essays, 
 II. 195, Dissert. o?i the Passions, sec. 2. 
 
 8. Moral sentiment assumes a distinct type when the 
 
MORAL SENTIMENTS. 205 
 
 judgment on which it depends is concerned with our own con- 
 duct or character. Such sentiments, however, follow the 
 analogy of those already described. 
 
 As the sense of beauty or deformity is dependent upon a 
 judgment concerned with the action only, either sentiment is 
 as natural in contemplation of our own action as in contemplat- 
 ing the action of another person. To shun experience or 
 acknowledgment of either sentiment, simply because the action 
 happens to be our own, is suppression of natural sentiment, 
 possible only by shunning the approval or disapproval of con- 
 science. 
 
 9. As there is a judgment of approval on ourselves when 
 we have done a right action, there is a sentiment or pleasur- 
 able feeling of self-approbation attendant on the judgment. 
 This sentiment, being experienced in consequence of the 
 decision that there has been conformity with moral law, is in 
 natural harmony with the teaching of conscience. It is thus, 
 according to its essential relation with our moral judgments, 
 a sanction of these judgments, and a natural reward of right 
 action. Its experience is often described as ' the testimony of 
 a good conscience/ meaning an approving conscience. 
 
 10. The frequent recurrence of judgments of self-approval, 
 if sufficiently tested by strict moral law, warrants a favourable 
 judgment as to personal character, attended by a more endur- 
 ing sentiment of self-esteem. Such self-esteem is in full har- 
 mony with Conscience. It is in nature wholly distinct from 
 Pride, which is an immoral sentiment, the attendant of false- 
 hood and self-deception. Self-esteem because of continuous 
 observance of moral law, is in perfect harmony with a true 
 humility, springing from habitual recognition of the limits of 
 all our powers, for humility is not, as Hume makes it, ' a dis- 
 satisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirm- 
 ity.' The Passions, sec. 2; Essays, n. 191. Humility as a 
 virtue is at the opposite extreme from humiliation or mortifi- 
 cation, whether as the result of our own conduct or that of 
 
206 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 others. Self-esteem is an essential feature of a soundly work- 
 ing moral nature. The loss of it betokens moral disorder. 
 
 11. As there is a judgment of condemnation pronounced 
 by us upon ourselves when we have done a wrong action, 
 there is a sentiment of dissatisfaction with ourselves, which 
 involves us in the experience of great uneasiness. This is 
 often termed the accusation of an evil Conscience. In its 
 more active form it is designated Shame, which, as it becomes 
 intensified, is named Remorse. This sentiment, as a restraining 
 force, wears the character of Emotion. This restraint it exer- 
 cises in harmony with the authority of Conscience, so as to 
 prevent continuance in immorality. This emotion, in common 
 with others, is liable to gain ascendency, and overleap the 
 barriers of personal control. It may thus urge to recklessness 
 in complete surrender of self-government. 
 
 12. As continuance in immoral conduct leads to the loss 
 of self-esteem, and to an intolerable experience of self-reproach, 
 there is a struggle of the nature to escape its misery. And, if 
 this attempt be made while the cause of the suffering continues 
 in operation, it is carried through under shelter of false reason- 
 ing and excuses, which blunt the sense of shame, and prepare 
 the way for shamelessness, in wilful defiance of moral dis- 
 tinctions. 
 
 13. Moral sentiments which are in harmony with Con- 
 science, are by consequence in harmony with our whole moral 
 nature. Disregard of such sentiments, indicates some form of 
 moral disorder. 
 
 14. Moral sentiments being essentially dependent on the 
 moral judgments, rise spontaneously along with these judg- 
 ments, and in accordance with them. They are not dependent 
 on our Will, either to occasion or prevent their rise, except in 
 so far as the judgments themselves depend upon our Will. 
 
 15. This law of the rise of moral sentiments, by which 
 they depend upon preceding judgments, makes the mora! 
 sentiment of no value as a standard for deciding the moral 
 
MORAL SENTIMENTS. 207 
 
 character of actions. Everything here depends upon the 
 validity of the moral judgment with which they have taken 
 their rise. A sentiment of self-satisfaction will attend a judg- 
 ment of self-approbation, whether that judgment be correct or 
 not. The sole test of the moral value of sentimental experi- 
 ence is found in the test of the moral quality of personal 
 actions, clear recognition of moral law. 
 
 16. PROBLEMS. (i.) Explain how one man can boast of 
 an act, which another man regards with shame. (2.) In what 
 combinations of experience may Shame instigate to action sub- 
 versive of its own natural end 1 (3.) In Adam Smith's theory 
 of Moral Sentiments, what is the value of his reference to 
 a disinterested SDectator in atteniDting to secure a test of 
 
 * *^ 
 
 sympathy ? 
 
PART V, 
 DISORDER OF OUR MORAL NATURE. 
 
 1. THE preceding investigations have repeatedly brought 
 into view evidence that our moral nature is in a condition of 
 disorder. Stated generally, the result is, that our nature does 
 not work in full harmony with the dictates of the governing 
 power. 
 
 2. The evidence of moral disorder may be summarized 
 under three divisions : (i.) insubordination of lower motives, 
 as in the gratification of natural desires in opposition to the 
 guidance of Conscience ; (2.) the action of impulses which 
 are in their nature condemned by Conscience, such as envy, 
 selfishness, cruelty; (3.) the experience of moral sentiment of 
 a kind which can have exercise only in a nature disordered, 
 and as a check upon the increase of moral disorder, the 
 sentiment which according to its degree of strength is named 
 self-disapprobation, shame, remorse. 
 
 3. The disorder of our moral nature, of which the evidence 
 is so distinct and abundant, has been all but uniformly ac- 
 knowledged by philosophers. The explicit character of the 
 general acknowledgment may be inferred from the following 
 examples. The Socratic doctrine that Virtue is knowledge, 
 and that no one is voluntarily evil, Ka/cos CKWI/ ovSels, may 
 seem adverse to an admission of disorder, and so in form it 
 is, for it implies the presence of adequate motive power for 
 
 o 
 
210 HA NDB OK OF MORA L ' PHIL OSOPH Y. 
 
 well-doing. But in reality it involves a very full acknowledg- 
 ment of disorder, since it is supported on the ground that all 
 men seek their own good, and that they excuse their folly by 
 reference to some form of deception of which they have been 
 the victims. Plato says, * Virtue is the health and beauty and 
 well-being of the soul, and vice is the disease and weakness 
 and deformity of the soul.' Repub. iv., Jowett's Transl. n. 
 276. The disorder he explains in the following manner. 
 First distinguishing the parts of our nature as rational, con- 
 cupiscent, and irascible, he says, * Must not injustice be a 
 kind of quarrel between these three a meddlesomeness, and 
 interference, and rising up .of a part of the soul against the 
 whole soul, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made 
 by a rebellious subject against a true prince, of whom h : ^ 
 the natural vassal that is the sort of thing; the confusion 
 and error of these parts or elements is injustice and intemper- 
 ance, and cowardice and ignorance, and in general all vice?' 
 Ib., Jowett, iv. 275. See also the misery of a corrupt soul, 
 as described in the Gorgias. Aristotle says, 'We are more 
 naturally disposed' towards those things which are wrong, and 
 ' more easily carried away to excess, than to propriety of con- 
 duct.' Ethics in. i. The testimony from modern philosophy 
 is equally explicit. Des Cartes says, ' With respect to seem- 
 ingly natural impulses, I have observed, when the question 
 related to the choice of right or wrong in action, that they 
 frequently led me to take the worse part/ Medit. m., Prof. 
 Veitch's Transl. p. 39. I need not mention in detail Hume's 
 representations of human vanity in sec. n. of his Dissei't. on the 
 Passions. In illustration of the fact 'that an opposition of 
 passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits, and 
 produces more disorder than the concurrence of any two affec- 
 tions of equal force/ he says, ' Hence we naturally desire 
 what is forbid, and often take a pleasure in performing actions 
 merely because they are unlawful. The notion of duty, when 
 opposite to the passions, is not always able to overcome them ; 
 
DISORDER OF OUR MORAL NATURE. 211 
 
 and when it fails of that effect, is apt rather to increase and 
 irritate them, by producing an opposition in our motives and 
 principles.' Dissert on the Passions, sec. vi., Essays, n. 218. 
 Adam Smith's whole theory is a testimony to moral disorder, 
 in the acknowledgment of the continual need for going out of 
 self, in search of a disinterested spectator, in order to avoid 
 bias. Mackintosh, in remarking that ' many passions prevail 
 over ' the moral sentiments, says, * The prevalence itself . . . 
 is perceived to be a^ disorder, when seen in another man, and 
 felt to be so by the mind disordered, when the disorder sub- 
 sides.' Dissert, sec. vi., Remarks on Butler, Whewell's ed. 
 p. 153. Comte says, 'We must regret that even in the best 
 natures, the social affections are so overborne by the personal, 
 as rarely to command conduct in a direct way. Philos. 
 Positive, B. vi. c. 5 ; Sociology r , Miss Martineau's Tr. n. p. 131. 
 In accordance with this statement, Comte proceeds to speak 
 of ' the radical imperfection of the human character,' n. p. 133. 
 With these as representative witnesses to the fact of moral 
 disorder, testimony need not be extended in proof of its 
 general acknowledgment. 
 
 4. As the fact of moral disorder appears conspicuously 
 in the abnormal action of the desires and affections, and in 
 the existence of dispositions, having the influence of motive 
 forces, which are antagonistic to the authority of conscience 
 and to the harmony of our nature, the extent of the disorder 
 may be computed on these data. Having regard to the dif- 
 ference between Intelligence and Disposition, the question 
 may be considered from the two opposite points of view 
 afforded by these sides of our nature. For this purpose, it is 
 not needful here to reproduce the evidence in support of the 
 position that the conscience discovers to us moral law, and 
 has in this respect competent authority in the government of 
 our life. Part i. div. i. chaps, iii. and iv. Assuming this, our 
 investigation must take the form of an inquiry, how far the 
 conscience, and our intellectual powers generally, are affected 
 
212 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in nature or action by the moral disorder existing in the mind; 
 and, on the other hand, how far natural dispositions are influ- 
 enced by this disorder. 
 
 5. Our Intellectual Powers are not so influenced by moral 
 disorder as to render them uncertain guides in the recognition 
 and application of moral truth. 
 
 Taking first a general view, the contrast between Intellect 
 and Disposition is such that neither abnormal action of natural 
 dispositions, nor the action of unnatural dispositions, produces 
 an essential change upon intellect. Cognitive power, that is 
 power of sight or knowledge, is so different in nature from 
 the power of disposition, that each produces distinct results 
 according to its own nature ; in the one case, knowledge ; in 
 the other, movement or excitement of mind, exercising im- 
 pelling or restraining force. It is no part of the function of 
 cognitive power to produce sentiment, neither is it of senti- 
 ment to provide knowledge. This is a simple exposition of 
 the difference of the two classes of powers. 
 
 When, however, we consider the laws which regulate the 
 action of these two sides of our nature, we find that they do 
 not operate singly, but conjointly, and in such a manner as to 
 influence each other. What then is the nature and possible 
 extent of this influence ? It is such that they may mutually 
 stimulate or restrain each other, but not such that either can 
 change the nature of the other, or the laws of its exercise. 
 Affection in its ardour can greatly restrain the action of intel- 
 lect, a fact commonly known under the designation of ' the 
 blinding power of love/ Intellect in full exercise, takes the 
 government of affection, and thereby keeps it in check. 
 These are the laws which regulate the joint action of the two 
 sides of our nature, and their bearing on the question under 
 discussion is obvious. The intellect is by its nature the 
 governor of disposition, but disposition in its development 
 may break away from its control. Abnormal action of natural 
 disposition does involve a check on intellectual action, so 
 
DISORDER OF OUR MORAL NATURE. 213 
 
 long as such abnormal experience continues ; but when this 
 experience passes off, intellect has free play, and at all events 
 continues unchanged in nature and function. Unnatural 
 desires, however their presence in consciousness may be ac- 
 counted for, do in point of fact follow the same laws of exer- 
 cise as the natural in respect of conjoint action with intellect. 
 Envy as well as affection, cruelty as well as sympathy, can 
 restrain intellect or be restrained by it ; but in any case the 
 laws, of intellectual action continue undisturbed. 
 
 Looking now at the distinct forms of intellectual power 
 finding exercise in consciousness, observation, understanding, 
 and reason, the distinct law of intellectual action becomes 
 apparent in a variety of applications. 
 
 OBSERVATION. Disposition in any of its forms, normal, 
 abnormal, or unnatural, has not stopped observation, nor 
 perverted it, nor imposed upon it new laws of exercise. What- 
 ever be the disorders in our nature, it has not ceased to be 
 intelligent. Whatever be the medium or instrument of know- 
 ledge, all rests ultimately on consciousness, and that is by its 
 own nature indisputable. 
 
 REASONING. As the facts of observation supply the 
 materials for reasoning, the laws of thought, which supply 
 the tests of accuracy, are equally undeniable with the facts, 
 making rational power a guide to certainty. Whatever we 
 feel or desire, makes no difference as to the nature of a fallacy 
 or of a logical argument. 
 
 REASON. The recognition of self-evident universal truth, 
 that is, truth of principle as distinct from truth of fact, if it be 
 admitted on the testimony of consciousness as characteristic 
 of the mind, implies power of such a nature, that neither the 
 moral character of our dispositions, nor the degree of force 
 they may severally attain in particular cases, supplies an 
 element of experience whose interpretation carries in it, as a 
 consequence, the loss of this power. The nature of our dis- 
 positions may go far to determine how often the first principles 
 
2 1 4 HANDS OK OF MORAL PHIL SOPHY. 
 
 of morals are overlooked by us, or what measure of considera- 
 tion and application they have when recognised ; but in saying 
 so, it is admitted that the power of recognition remains. 
 
 These considerations are enough to show that the disorder 
 in our nature does not so influence our intellect as to pre- 
 vent the recognition and application of moral law. The 
 evil is in consciousness, and the knowledge of it as evil 
 is present also, but the conditions on which these two forms 
 of experience arise are quite distinct. This conclusion is 
 adverse to the Socratic doctrine, that knowledge is Virtue. 
 There is a knowledge of vice, and a practice of it, while its 
 true character is fully known. 
 
 If we distinguish between the power and the authority of 
 Conscience, as in the famous sentence of Butler, 'Had it 
 strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest autho- 
 rity, it would absolutely govern the world ;' Sermon n., it is 
 needful to bear in mind that its' impelling force is not one 
 which operates directly upon other motives, so as to measure 
 its strength with theirs. Its power is simply such as belongs 
 to the discovery of truth, which, in its own nature, has the 
 authority of law. But here, as in all intellectual action, there 
 is attendant sentiment, which is of such a nature as to exercise 
 direct impelling force. Recognised moral law awakens rever- 
 ence, which acts as motive force, and as a direct check upon dis- 
 positions which are immoral in character. When we speak of 
 want of power in Conscience, it is not want of teaching power, 
 which leaves the mind uncertain as to the fundamental dis- 
 tinctions between right and wrong, but want of reverence for 
 moral law, a want which is inevitable if the teaching of con- 
 science do not receive attention. Under this condition, with 
 co-operation of the law of custom as it influences thought, and 
 the law of habit as it influences practice, the mind may 
 become regardless of moral law. 
 
 6. As the disorder of our moral nature is not such as to 
 hinder the knowledge of moral distinctions, or to prevent their 
 
DISORDER OF OUR MORAL NATURE. 515 
 
 application in the guidance of life, it does not offer an obstacle 
 to the construction of a philosophy of man's moral nature, 
 and of moral distinctions themselves. On the contrary, the 
 disorder of our nature is such that the character and extent of 
 the disorder are clearly recognised by us. There is no man 
 who regards selfishness as equally deserving of admiration 
 when witnessed, and of self-approbation when practised, as 
 benevolence, however frequently he may be conscious of the 
 recurrence of both. Whatever difficulty there may be in 
 rendering submission to moral law, that difficulty is recognised 
 only by means of our knowledge of the law itself. This is the 
 interpretation of moral conflict under a conviction of present 
 duty, and also of the formation of moral character on the model 
 of clearly recognised virtues. 
 
 Dr. Wardlaw, in his Christian Ethics (4th ed. London, 
 1844), has taken up a position which involves the denial of 
 the possibility of Ethical Philosophy, because of the disorder 
 of our moral nature. He argues that, because of this, we are 
 unfitted for philosophizing on moral questions, and that our 
 nature does not afford the requisite materials for an ethical 
 philosophy. Man is 'both the investigator, and, in part at 
 least, the subject of investigation. In each of these views of 
 him there is a source of error ; ihejirst arising from the influ- 
 ence of his depravity on his character as an investigator ; and 
 the second from the disposition to make his own nature, with- 
 out adverting to its fallen state, his standard of moral prin- 
 ciples, and his study in endeavouring to ascertain them,' p. 37. 
 It must be conceded to Dr. Wardlaw that moralists have not 
 given that amount of consideration to the extent and influence 
 of moral disorder, which their admission of the fact clearly 
 required. But, on the other hand, Dr. Wardlaw has gone to 
 the opposite extreme of constructing a theory of this disorder 
 which the facts of consciousness do not sustain. Moral 
 Philosophers generally have not affirmed that our whole nature 
 is in itself the standard of moral excellence, so that thoughts 
 
216 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and impulses are all equally good in themselves, and authori- 
 tative as guides of conduct. The reverse of this is affirmed 
 in every system of Ethics until you descend as far as Mande- 
 ville. But, on the other hand, Dr. Wardlaw takes an un- 
 tenable position when he insists that man is incapable of 
 investigating moral questions ' from the bias which, on all 
 such subjects, the moral state of the heart unavoidably imparts 
 to the operations of the intellect ; a bias which attaches 
 uncertainty and inconclusiveness to all human inquiries and 
 decisions concerning them,' p. 38. He has no sooner penned 
 this declaration than he is constrained to modify it by saying 
 that our conclusions on moral subjects ' are not, without great 
 caution, to be depended upon/ But, if caution is sufficient 
 to make them reliable, the position is abandoned, and it is 
 granted that certainty and conclusiveness may attach to human 
 decisions concerning moral truth and personal obligation. 
 
 7. The power to direct attention, exercised by us in our 
 decisions on other subjects, is equally available for guid- 
 ance of thought and action where moral distinctions are con- 
 cerned. But this power is the condition which provides for 
 the exercise of Will. Part in. ch. iii. sec. 14. The moral 
 disorder existing in our nature is, therefore, not such as to 
 unfit for obedience to moral law. It certainly involves the 
 frequent experience of evil dispositions, when circumstances 
 favour their rise, and consequently such influence over our 
 thoughts of a disturbing or blinding nature as disposition can 
 exert. But in the possibility of self-directed attention, a clear 
 battle-ground is provided in consciousness, over which conflict 
 with unnatural propensities may be waged. To what extent 
 such conflict is undertaken, and to what extent successfully 
 waged, in personal history, depends upon the degree in which 
 regard is commonly given to moral law, and the reverence 
 habitually cherished for it. 
 
 8. How moral disorder originated in human nature, is a 
 problem which philosophy is incompetent to solve. To dis- 
 
DISORDER OF OUR MORAL MATURE. 217 
 
 tinguish between the normal and the abnormal is simple 
 enough by analysis of the facts of consciousness. But the 
 problem of the origin of abnormal experience and action, is a 
 historical not a psychological one. Philosophy can only bring 
 out and set in array the facts which prove the disturbance of 
 the balance originally established among the powers. But 
 the problem thereby started, being insoluble by philosophic 
 methods, can be answered only by direct Revelation. 
 
 9. The more urgent practical question is, How is moral 
 disorder to be escaped, and the original balance of our nature 
 restored ? This problem really involves two very distinct 
 questions, What are the laws of mind in accordance with 
 which successful conflict may be maintained with dispositions 
 recognised as wrong ? And, second, How shall such a moral 
 victory as this be raised into a uniform aim of the life, until 
 it is completely realized 1 To the first question, Philosophy 
 offers a reply by pointing to moral law as the rule of life, to 
 the law of attention, as providing for the control of disposi- 
 tions by the Will, and to the law of habit, as establishing 
 ascendency so far as attained. These are the laws of moral 
 progress ; and, in their reversal, appear the laws of moral 
 deterioration. But, in so far as we need an answer to the 
 question, How is a reigning motive power to be secured under 
 sway of which the moral agent shall not weary of his irksome 
 task, and abandon it in despair? Philosophy is again con- 
 strained to bear testimony to its insufficiency for solving the 
 problem which it has itself raised. How to battle with dispo- 
 sitions adverse to the harmony of our nature, may be readily 
 determined ; but how to restore motive power which has been 
 lost, is a question which transcends philosophy. On this sub- 
 ject, see the very able Essay of Principal Shairp, ' The 
 Moral Dynamic :' Studies in Poetry and Philosophy, p. 348. 
 
 10. PROBLEMS. (i.) How far does the disorder of the 
 moral nature contribute to the explanation of the diversity of 
 moral decisions 1 (2.) Is there any sense in which an exercise 
 
2i8 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of natural disposition could be represented as abnormal, 
 without being by consequence immoral 1 (3.) Under what 
 conditions may an evil influence be said to become ungovern- 
 able 1 ? (4.) Are there, in human nature as known to us, any 
 latent mental forces morally evil in character, which are so 
 related to the controlling power in mind, as to give them in- 
 evitably the ascendency, when they arise in consciousness ? 
 
METAPHYSIC OF ETHICS. 
 
 PRELIMINARY. 
 
 1. BESIDES the questions which concern the moral nature 
 of man, there is a still higher range of inquiry belonging to 
 Moral Philosophy. It is concerned with the origin of our 
 existence, specially considering our nature as moral beings, 
 the relation in which we now stand to the source of our exist- 
 ence, the interpretation which such relation may afford of 
 the system or order of things in which we find ourselves exist- 
 ing, and the destiny which awaits us. 
 
 This is a region of inquiry properly denominated Meta- 
 physical, because the character of the inquiry transcends the 
 sphere of investigation connected with the nature we possess, 
 that is to say, transcends the psychological. This, though a 
 common use of the term Metaphysic, is different from Kant's 
 use, according to which metaphysic is applied to a priori 
 knowledge, as contrasted with knowledge through experience. 
 But a priori knowledge is recognised in Consciousness, and is 
 discovered in accordance with definite laws of mind, as truly 
 as the knowledge gathered by experience. The one is tran- 
 scendental, the other empirical, yet these are two branches of 
 Psychology. But a psychology which discovers a priori laws 
 of life, cannot be the halting-place of Ethical inquiry. It 
 only gives deeper interest to that sphere in which we seek an 
 answer to the question as to the origin of our nature. 
 
 210 
 
220 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 2. Objection may be made to such inquiry, and this on 
 two quite distinct grounds. First, that the a priori forms of 
 knowledge, upon which we must greatly rely in attempting to 
 prosecute further inquiry, are only mental conditions, regula- 
 tive of our own thought, and not assertive, or capable of being 
 regarded as criteria of truth. This is Kant's position in the 
 Critiqtie of Pure Reason, from which he is led to maintain that 
 the idea of God, as of the soul and the universe, is merely 
 regulative. From this self-created difficulty, he seeks escape, 
 by maintaining in his Ethical system, that we, as free agents, 
 belong to a cogitable world, above consciousness. The objec- 
 tion has no force beyond the theory out of which it arises, and 
 has not sufficient force even within that theory. To those 
 who reject the regulative theory of the ideas of Reason, and 
 hold that Reason discovers self-evident truths, the objection 
 loses all force. But, even within the theory, if ours is a 
 phenomenal experience, regulated' in accordance with the 
 ideas of God, the soul, and the universe, the question is 
 still legitimate, How is the origin of such life as ours to be 
 explained 1 
 
 The second form of objection to the higher metaphysic 
 comes from the theory which denies the possibility of dis- 
 covering causes. Jt is urged that as in observation we recog- 
 nise nothing more than the succession of facts, and never attain 
 to a knowledge of causes, we cannot reach a knowledge of the 
 cause of our own existence, or of the existence of the universe. 
 To raise the question concerning the origin of our own exist- 
 ence, seems to Comte to attempt inaccessible heights, an 
 attempt which belongs only to the earliest stages of intellectual 
 evolution, not to the more advanced. But to shun a question 
 is not to lay it. At best, these heights are declared inacces- 
 sible, only because it is alleged that solid footing cannot be 
 discovered by which to reach their base. But if, as has been 
 maintained, each intelligence has a knowledge of self as the 
 cause of personal actions, we have a clear approach to the 
 
ME TA PHYSIC OF ETHICS. 221 
 
 base of the heights'; and besides, we have both impulse and 
 warrant for attempting to scale them. 
 
 3. As the problem concerns the explanation of personal 
 existence, it can take its rise only from the facts of that 
 existence, which must determine the line of speculative in- 
 quiry. Psychology must itself be the basis of a legitimate 
 Metaphysic. Speculation which begins with definitions, or 
 abstract conceptions, not with the facts of experience, separates 
 itself from the only ground of certainty. However ingenious, 
 and logically consistent, it is only conjecture, not metaphysics, 
 or legitimate philosophical speculation. 
 
 4. The problem concerning the origin of personal exist- 
 ence is only part of the one great problem as to the origin of 
 the universe. To isolate ourselves from the system to which 
 we belong, is impossible ; and so is it, to detach the problem 
 of personal life, from the wider question concerning finite 
 existence generally. The problem concerning the origin of 
 finite existence is one. All sciences culminate at length on a 
 common eminence, where, in one way or another, the scientific 
 mind concerns itself with the question as to the origin of Known 
 Being. The natural distinction between physical and mental 
 sciences, becomes of no account in view of the common intel- 
 lectual demand coming, not from the special facts, but from 
 the minds which have been classifying these facts. It is thus 
 true, as Sir W. Hamilton has insisted, Metaph. I. 30, that 
 intelligence raises the grand question as to the existence of 
 ' an Intelligent Creator and Moral Governor ; ' but the ac- 
 knowledgment is pushed too far when Sir William affirms 
 * that the class of phenomena which requires that kind of cause 
 we denominate a Deity is exclusively given in the phenomena 
 of mind.' Ib. 26. 
 
 5. As metaphysical inquiry seeks an explanation of the 
 origin of known existence, and of its continuance under 
 government of laws recognised in the several departments of 
 science, the ultimate test of all metaphysical speculation must 
 
222 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be found in the facts from which the inquiry takes its rise. 
 Merely to start from facts is not a sufficient security for the 
 accuracy of subsequent speculation. This security is found 
 only by careful return upon the facts out of which the meta- 
 physical problems arise. These, then, are the two funda- 
 mental canons of metaphysical speculation : To start from 
 facts in search of the solution of the problems to which they 
 give rise ; and to return to the facts for test of every solution 
 proposed. 
 
 6. A view of the breadth of existence to be explained 
 may be readily secured by separating existence into three 
 divisions, material, intellectual, and moral. The validity of 
 these divisions need not now be insisted upon. It is enough 
 for the present purpose that reference be made to the char- 
 acteristics of mind as traced in the Introduction. If any 
 prefer to divide existence into inorganic and organic, with the 
 addition, in case of the human race, of the peculiar mental or 
 spiritual features belonging to it, there is no reason why such 
 a classification should not be adopted. 
 
 7. The various theories propounded in explanation of the 
 order of things in which we exist are, The Theistic, or a Self- 
 sufficient First Cause ; the contrary of this, which in its nega- 
 tive form is Atheistic, in its positive form Materialistic, making 
 Self-existent Matter the source of all ; The Pantheistic, pre- 
 senting in a variety of forms the theory that God is All ; and, 
 lastly, The Polytheistic, that there are many Gods. The last 
 need not detain us, as i: b not vindicated on philosophic 
 grounds. 
 
CHAPTER I. 
 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 
 
 1 . THE solution of the problem of finite existence is found 
 first in a Self- sufficient Being, Infinite and Eternal, who is First 
 Cause, or source of all existence besides. 
 
 2. The problem concerning the origin of being is first 
 consciously raised in the search for satisfaction as to the 
 source of personal existence, and of all existence recognised 
 around. This problem is the expression of a purely intellec- 
 tual demand. Its solution is not directly required by the 
 practical necessities of life. There is, therefore, no reason to 
 conclude that men uniformly grapple with the question, Does 
 God exist? Acknowledgment of the Divine existence is, 
 indeed, closely allied with the requirements of personal life. 
 But deliberate testing of the grounds on. which this acknow- 
 ledgment is made, is a logical and metaphysical exercise on 
 which there is no evidence to conclude that men uniformly 
 enter. The raising of the question is evidence of the pre- 
 valence of philosophic thought. Confirmation of this appears 
 in the fact that the formal discussions of the subject occur in 
 treatises more or less philosophic in character. 
 
 3. The first and most conspicuous fact connected with all 
 forms of existence whose origin we seek to have explained is, 
 that all are finite and restricted. That limited and restricted 
 existence is not self-sufficient is evident. To say so is merely 
 to present an amplification of the first statement. For, to say 
 that a being is limited, either in the measure of existence, 
 
 223 
 
224 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 or in the range of its powers, is to say that it is not self- 
 sufficient. The intellect must raise the question, How has it 
 been so limited 1 or, Whence has it the laws of its existence 1 
 And these questions arise, because their solution is not seen 
 in the being itself. This is the root of the problem. When, 
 further, it is said of any being that it is restricted, it is meant 
 that there is other existence so related to this as to lend some 
 help to its action, as moisture and heat contribute to the 
 growth of a plant, or to impose a check upon its action, as 
 resistance of the atmosphere wearies the runner. It is to be 
 observed further, that it is in the highest order of finite being 
 that restriction is most apparent. The more numerous the 
 forms of effort the more the points of restraint. Whether, 
 therefore, we recognise change of form and condition actually 
 occurring, or merely limitation of being, we equally need an 
 explanation of existence. 
 
 4. The logical alternatives opeji to us in seeking a solu- 
 tion of limited and restricted existence are two : An infinite 
 regress of finite causes ; or, A self-sufficient, eternal first-cause. 
 The four theories which have been offered come under the 
 sweep of this duality of logical alternative. The Theistic 
 doctrine, as a deliberate acceptance of the one alternative, 
 stands in logical opposition to all the other three, which 
 either accept the opposite alternative, or fail to deal with the 
 essential features of the problem. 
 
 5. The regress of finite causes, each one of which shall be 
 adequate to account for the measure of existence previously 
 recognised, is logically the nearest solution, and meets the 
 first demands of a logical process, under the law of Causality. 
 To postulate a cause simply adequate to produce known 
 existence, satisfies the immediate claim of intelligence. Ac- 
 cordingly, the truth of the conclusion may be accepted, merely 
 as implying conformity with the laws of thought, though there 
 be no means at command for verifying the supposition as to 
 the existence of such a cause. The conclusion is thus of only 
 
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 225 
 
 a general nature, such as this, In the cause there must be at 
 least sufficient power to produce the effect. To this con- 
 clusion there can be no logical exception. Still, what is thus 
 accepted, logically, but only hypothetically, is not conclusive. 
 The intellectual requirement which raised the first question, 
 now raises another as to the existence of this hypothetical 
 cause, and so must continue as long as, in strict conformity 
 with logical rule, only limited existence is postulated. In this 
 line, therefore, there is no logical landing-place which can 
 be conclusive, and no logical warrant for stopping. Besides, 
 as the second stage in the process is only hypothetical, and 
 there is no discovery of actual existence, by the contemplation 
 of which we should have required to raise a fresh question, 
 there is nothing better than a logical ground for procedure. 
 As, then, it is impossible for us to continue the process to 
 infinity, so is it impossible to rest in the belief that the history 
 of existence has been progressively, what the order of thought 
 must be regressively. And for these reasons, First , Logical 
 consistency in reasoning cannot be identified with reality of 
 existence. Second, As individual thinkers differ in the measure 
 of their knowledge of the various forms of existence, and each 
 one logically postulates a cause adequate only to meet the 
 measure of his own knowledge, the logical result is distinct in 
 each case. The line of thought is essentially connected with 
 the individuality of the thinker, and has no further hold upon 
 reality than that obtained in the facts from which the intel- 
 lectual process takes its rise. Third, An infinite succession of 
 finite causes involves a hypothesis of infinity, without even 
 so much as a hypothetical basis on which to support it. At 
 each stage in the logical process, there is at least the hypo, 
 thetical basis of a definite amount of existence on which to 
 postulate a sufficient cause. When the intellectual process is 
 stopped, we have warrant for affirming merely our inability to 
 continue the process for ever, and similarly our inability to 
 affirm that at some stage we should reach a logical halting- 
 
 p 
 
226 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 place. If, to escape the discomfort arising from the want of 
 any solution of the problem, we suggest an infinite regression 
 of finite causes, the suggestion is not only gratuitous, but we 
 raise a new problem. On what ground are we to affirm infinity 
 of existence ? We have made an affirmation without trace of 
 logical warrant. Our difficulties in carrying through an in- 
 tellectual process bear witness to the limits of our thought, 
 but provide no foundation for a hypothesis as to existence. 
 
 6. In postulating a self-sufficient cause, infinite in power, 
 and eternal in duration, we postulate more than is logically 
 sufficient to -account for known existence. If, therefore, there 
 be any warrant for this affirmation, it cannot be obtained by 
 a logical process. It cannot be logically competent to reason 
 from finite existence to infinite, from restricted existence to 
 that which is self-sufficient. Hamilton's Discussions, p. 15. 
 If we rest somehow in the acknowledgment of a Self-sufficient 
 Being, it cannot be as the conclusion of a discursive process. 
 Attempts at demonstration, whether starting from the most 
 general conceptions, such as being, or extension (a priori in 
 form) ; or starting from the facts of experience (a posteriori in 
 form), are equally unsuccessful, however great the ability 
 which they discover. Either the whole question is assumed 
 in starting, or the Infinite is not reached in concluding. 
 Kant has clearly shown this, and has thus rendered special 
 service to the Theistic doctrine. Critique of Pure Reason, 
 Transc. Dialec. n. in., Meiklejohn's Transl. p. 359. To begin, 
 as Clarke did, with the proposition that ' something has 
 existed from eternity,' is virtually to propose an argument, 
 after having assumed what is to be proved. Demonstration of 
 the Being and Attributes of God, p. 8. Gillespie's form of the 
 a priori argument, starting with the proposition, ' Infinity of 
 Extension is necessarily existing,' is liable to the same objec- 
 tion, with the additional disadvantage of attributing a property 
 of matter to the Deity. The Necessary Existaice of the Deity. 
 The argument from Design is admirable as an inference from 
 
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 227 
 
 the character of the effect to the nature of the cause, but it 
 pre-supposes the truth that there is a first cause. The argu- 
 ment of Des Cartes, as of Anselm, from the clearness of the 
 idea of God, to the certainty of his existence, is incompetent, 
 because we cannot lay down the canon that our thoughts are 
 the criterion of reality, or that every clear idea must have its 
 counter-part in an existing object. Des Cartes, Meditation, m., 
 and Principles of Philos. Pt. i. xiv.; Anselm's Proslogium; for 
 substance of the argument, see Ueberweg's Hist. i. 383. As 
 Kant has said, we cannot allow reason ' to persuade itself into 
 a belief of the objective existence of a mere creation of its 
 own thought.' Pure Reason, Meiklejohn, 359. Some ideas 
 are creations of our own thought ; for example, the idea of a 
 centaur. Knowing this, we are aware that it is incompetent 
 to reason from the thought to the thing. But, can we dis- 
 tinguish between thoughts which are of our own creation, and 
 thoughts which are not ? If so, the relations of thoughts to 
 things may vary, and we may be aware of the difference. 
 Even if the clearness of our thought of God be no argument to 
 the reality of the Divine existence, still the idea remains as a 
 fact to be accounted for. I can explain, by simple combina- 
 tion of the attributes of different beings, how the idea of a 
 centaur has been formed. But how shall we account for the 
 idea of God within us 1 ? How has this conception been 
 formed ? Des Cartes has a strong position here. ' By the 
 name of God I understand a substance infinite, eternal, 
 immutable, independent, all-knowing, all-powerful, and by 
 which I myself, and every other thing that exists, if any such 
 there be, were created. But these properties are so great and 
 excellent, that the more attentively I consider them, the less, 
 as I feel persuaded, can the idea I have of them owe its 
 origin to myself alone.' Medit. in., Prof. Veitch's Transl. p. 
 45. See Plato's Republic, B. vi.; Jowett, n. p, 351 ; and the 
 elder Fichte's Way of the Blessed Life, translated by Dr. Smith, 
 p. 48. Still, it is not the idea or conception of God which 
 
228 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 proves the reality of the Divine existence, though the presence 
 of such a conception requires to be explained. Logical pro- 
 cesses are insufficient for reaching this high truth. Thus far 
 Comte is correct in speaking of inaccessible heights ; but the 
 mind is not restricted merely to observation and logic for the 
 discovery of truth. There is in the nature of reason itself, 
 provision for the recognition of higher truth. 
 
 7. The reality of the Divine existence is a truth so plain 
 that it needs no proof, as it is a truth so high that it admits of 
 none. It is not the clearness of the idea or conception of 
 God, which proves his existence, for it is not a conception so 
 clear to the mind of all men, as it was to Des Cartes, but 
 often a conception rather vague, because not analytically 
 examined. But there is certainty of belief in the Divine 
 existence, supported by reference to finite existence, thereby 
 explained. This is an intuitive belief, while that of infinite 
 regress of finite causes is a logical belief. This is a belief so 
 fundamental to human life, that men accept and apply it with- 
 out question. When, advancing beyond this, the problem of 
 finite existence is faced, the fact of the Divine existence is at 
 once regarded as the adequate solution. It is only when an 
 attempt is made to prove it, that doubt is felt to arise ; and 
 then, it is to be observed, the doubt attaches to the argument, 
 not to the fact. In no region of inquiry more than here is 
 there need for analysing doubt in order to decide upon its 
 source. For, doubts concerned merely with the validity of 
 accredited arguments, are to be discounted, when we seek a 
 correct measure of doubt as to the true solution of the problem 
 of finite existence. See Augustine, De Vera Religione, 72. 
 
 8. Intuitive belief in the Divine existence, contemplated 
 in its radical form, is belief in a Supreme Being. It is ac- 
 knowledgment of a Being who controls our destiny, and that 
 of all finite existence. The conception may be vague, and 
 indeed is certain to be indistinct until some analytic process is 
 voluntarily attempted. But that some reference to a Supreme 
 
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 229 
 
 Being is natural to man, is a conclusion established by the 
 testimony of history (see Cudworth's Intellectual System), and is 
 supported by the most recent inquiries regarding uncivilized 
 life. On the last-named subject see specially, Tylor's Primi- 
 tive Culture, 2 vols., 1870. An outline of the results I have 
 given in the Appendix to third Edition of The Philosophy of 
 the Infinite, 1872. To represent the religious beliefs of savage 
 tribes as the result of logical processes, is the least satisfac- 
 tory suggestion which can be made. On the admission that 
 the belief is natural to the human mind, it is possible to find a 
 general harmony of ascertained facts. The conception, being 
 vague, may gather around it additions suggested by the cir- 
 cumstances of the people. These additions may accordingly 
 be different in the history of different tribes, and may even 
 fail in self-consistency. But it is the common original idea of 
 a Great Ruler which is the explanation of the common features 
 of belief and religious practice throughout the world. In 
 harmony with this view, it is obvious that the idea of God 
 becomes more comprehensive and self-consistent in all its 
 features, as a people advances in intellectual activity. 
 
 9. The belief in the Divine existence, which is first ac- 
 cepted simply as a determining force in practical life, is after- 
 wards accepted as the only adequate solution of the problem 
 of finite existence. As already suggested, the raising of this 
 problem belongs to a period of philosophic thought. And in 
 seeking a solution of it, the existence of a self-sufficient First 
 Cause is accepted as adequate, and as the only adequate solu- 
 tion. The inquiry as to the origin of known existence thus 
 becomes the test of the harmony of our belief with recognised 
 facts. What is thereby accepted has new significance, being no 
 longer a vague belief, no longer personal experience of the 
 force of some natural impulse, but a clear discovery of the 
 fitness of this belief to meet all the demands of intellect in its 
 search for causes. It is thus that the natural belief comes to 
 have associated with it a fuller, clearer conception of the nature 
 
HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the Supreme Being. In this way, also, the conception 
 receives its true scientific place and application. From these 
 considerations, it appears that the legitimate use of a discursive 
 process, is not in an attempt to reach the fact of the Divine 
 existence as a logical conclusion, but in testing the harmony 
 between the belief and the facts of existence. This latter use 
 of the reasoning process is in accordance with the scientific 
 methods followed in all departments of investigation. When 
 the mind makes inquiry as to the existence of a Being, Self- 
 sufficient and Supreme, it is certainly more in accordance with 
 the limits of logical proof, that it should advance from belief 
 to confirmatory evidence, than that it should attempt to pass, 
 by its own strength, from restricted existence to the transcend- 
 ent grandeur of Infinite Being. Mahan's Nat. Theol., 1867. 
 
 10. Belief in the Divine existence is confirmed as the 
 range of discovery extends our knowledge of the universe. 
 With this belief given, the argument from design rises into a 
 conspicuous place as an argument confirmatory. And as the 
 harmony of the universe becomes more manifest in the correla- 
 tion of forces, and the relation of mind to action, the con- 
 firmatory argument gains in proportion. Here also it is that 
 the contradictions and insufficiency of conflicting theories be- 
 come most apparent. To account for the order of the universe 
 is the grand perplexity of every theory which attempts a philo- 
 sophy of finite existence from any lower point of view than 
 that recognised in the existence of an intelligent First Cause. 
 
 11. The whole of the earlier conclusions in Moral Philo- 
 sophy, as to personal obligation and responsibility, find an 
 ultimate resting-place in the recognition of the Deity as moral 
 ruler, source of moral good. 'There is no teaching more 
 mischievous than that which makes human belief in God the 
 first regenerating power in human society, and God himself 
 second.' Essays, TheoL and Lit., by R. H. Hutton, i. 5, 
 London, 1871. Any theory of existence lower than the 
 Theistic, leaves the essential features of our moral nature 
 
</ 
 
 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. ^ f r ' I - 231 
 
 7' ^ *"/ 
 
 unexplained. The tendency under such a theory is ^o^epre-'V 
 ciate the facts of moral life which give character to the'gpeat 
 problem of experience. Evidence of this appears in all the 
 development theories of moral nature. We have seen obliga-- 
 tion reduced to the strongest proclivity, and responsibility to 
 punishment. Such representations fail in their appreciation of 
 the facts to be explained. On the other hand, relying on the 
 basis of necessary truth, we have seen in the nature of moral 
 law, the source of personal obligation, and of individual 
 responsibility. These correlated doctrines of Ethical science 
 may be admitted to have logical consistency and coherence in 
 systematic form, and yet may be regarded as wanting in living 
 practical force. But when that which springs from necessary 
 laws of morality finds its resting-place in the government of a 
 Supreme Ruler, the vital relations of the whole order of moral 
 truth, law, and activity, become apparent on the grandest 
 scale. If oughtness spring from the application of law, it is 
 seen to be enforced by the Sovereign Ruler ; and if responsi- 
 bility for personal conduct flow directly from obligation to act, 
 we discover now the Judgment Seat before which the response 
 must be given. Even if Responsibility mean liability to 
 punishment, narrow as this view is, it finds coherence only 
 in the acknowledgment of a Judge, vested with authority and 
 power to inflict what is due. If we venture further to gaze 
 upon the complications and terrible mysteries of life, and 
 attempt to rise above the dead level where we speak only of 
 the imperfection which necessarily clings to finite existence ; 
 if, with the instincts of moral life, we venture to anticipate 
 that Justice shall triumph, and the loftiest characteristics of 
 man gain ascendency in his life, the rational warrant for such 
 expectation is found only in the recognition of the Supreme 
 One, ruling in absolute justice and purity over the hosts of 
 intelligent creatures. 
 
 12. Belief in the Divine existence harmonizes with the 
 religious instinct of our nature. That men reason themselves 
 
232 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 into religious feeling, is a proposition which could not claim 
 serious attention. But that men recognise religious feeling to 
 be reasonable, and that all the more clearly in proportion as 
 they reflect profoundly on the higher relations of life, is a 
 position more in harmony with the facts of experience. At 
 the same time it must be allowed that reasoning of this kind 
 is more the exercise of disciplined minds than of men gene- 
 rally, and partakes somewhat more of the character of philo- 
 sophic thought than of what might fitly be called religious 
 thought. Religious instinct seems, therefore, the term to 
 describe the source of that widespread religious life which 
 appears in our world under a multitude of forms. When sub- 
 jected to analytic investigation, it is distinctly marked by two 
 prominent features, first, the sense of dependence on higher 
 power which is the spontaneous experience of a nature sensible 
 of its inherent weakness, and subjection to governing forces in 
 the universe ; and, second^ reverence of feeling for the perfec- 
 tion belonging to the Absolute Being. These two are the 
 essential elements of the religious instinct, swayed by the 
 fundamental belief in the Divine existence. The harmony of 
 faith with such feeling is complete. Only in such faith can a 
 harmony be found. Without it there is the saddening, crush- 
 ing sense of hopeless subjection to inexorable forces which in 
 mystery sway the universe, regardless of intensest human 
 emotion. Without this faith, a capacity of reverence is a 
 fountain of disappointment, finding no higher object towards 
 which it may direct its force than is discovered among men of 
 wide experience and lofty disposition who die by our side. 
 But with faith in Deity, dependence rises to trust, attended by 
 peace the most profound which the human spirit can reach, 
 and by reverence which finds in an object of infinite excel- 
 lence an exhaustless source of satisfaction, attracting towards 
 the loftiest attainment. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE MATERIALISTIC (ATHEISTIC) THEORY. 
 
 HAVING indicated the nature and value of the first logical 
 alternative which lies open to us in seeking to account for the 
 origin of finite existence, I pass to the consideration of con- 
 flicting theories, taking first the opposite extreme, in the form 
 of a thoroughgoing contradiction of the Theistic doctrine. 
 The other two theories, the Pantheistic and Polytheistic, 
 as they do not involve a thoroughgoing contradiction, are 
 mixed theories, and as such are wanting in self-consistency. 
 
 1. A purely Atheistic theory, being merely negative, proves 
 nothing. Merely to utter a denial of the Divine existence is 
 always possible ; but such a denial is of no scientific value. 
 Nor is there any logical worth in a plea of ignorance as to 
 such a transcendent fact as the existence of an absolute but 
 invisible ruler. We have seen that to argue from thought to 
 existence is unwarrantable ; much more unwarrantable is it to 
 reason from ignorance to non-existence. Equally impossible 
 is it to argue legitimately against the existence of an object 
 merely on the ground that no such existence is visible. 
 Though one avenue of knowledge be closed against us, it 
 does not therefore follow that other means of information are 
 not open. A plea grounded on invisibility is only a specific 
 form of the illegitimate argument from ignorance to non- 
 existence. 
 
 233 
 
234 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 2, The negative worth of an Atheistic doctrine is to be 
 tested by its success in assailing the theistic position. Suc- 
 cess here can be attained only in one of two ways. Either 
 it must be shown, first, that the theistic doctrine is insufficient 
 to account for recognised facts ; or, second, that a charge of 
 self-contradiction can be established. These are the two 
 available lines of criticism. But a doctrine that an Absolute 
 First Cause is the source of all dependent existence is beyond 
 reach of a charge of insufficiency. To repel this charge, how- 
 ever, is not to advance any argument for theism. No theory 
 is established by simply rebutting a criticism. A charge of 
 self-contradiction is equally powerless against the theistic 
 doctrine, for, while the whole extent of being is embraced, the 
 line runs clear between dependent being on the one side, and 
 Absolute being on the other. All finite existence is regarded 
 as dependent ; and the Absolute Being, as the one source of 
 all finite existence. Whatever may be said of other theories, 
 Theism stands clear of the charge of self-contradiction. 
 
 3. No argument is logically competent against Theism on 
 the ground that it postulates a cause more than sufficient to 
 produce the effect. Such an argument, based on what has 
 been named the law of parsimony the Scholastic, ' entia non 
 sunt multiplicanda praster necessitatem' must be final against 
 a logical process which would infer infinity of being from the 
 fact of finite existence. Hence it is that by mere logical 
 methods, no other course is open than that of taking succes- 
 sive stages of logical progress, through a regress of finite 
 causes. But, in saying so, we merely indicate the law which 
 determines the order of legitimate thought, and do not 
 establish anything as to the facts of existence. If however 
 the fact of Divine existence is matter of natural belief, not 
 demonstrated by logical methods, objection is incompetent on 
 the ground that the cause of existence is more than sufficient 
 to produce the effect That the sum of being, or even of 
 power, is not discovered in the energy exercised at a given 
 
THE MATERIALISTS (ATHEISTIC] THEORY. 235 
 
 moment, is one of the most familiar truths even of ordinary 
 experience. 
 
 4. The theory which criticises the Theistic doctrine, and 
 meets it with direct contradiction, must in turn endure criti- 
 cism, by subjecting to scrutiny a theory of finite existence 
 which shall account for the facts on ground lower than 
 Theism. In order to take rank as a theory of the universe, 
 and thus rise above mere Scepticism, it must pass over from 
 the negative form into a positive. 
 
 5. In meeting this demand, the theory becomes Material- 
 istic. The explanation of the universe is alleged to be dis- 
 covered in its material substance, and this substance is eternal. 
 But such a theory is insufficient as an explanation of the most 
 commonly recognised facts. Without touching the multitude of 
 complex questions involved in any theory which would attempt 
 to explain the present condition of the universe, with un- 
 organized matter as its sole cause or source, there are two 
 considerations which are fatal to its logical claims. First, 
 unorganized matter is inadequate as the cause of the various 
 forms of organized existence. Second, we recognise in our own 
 consciousness a form of existence higher than the material. 
 Explanation of the higher by the lower is achieved only by 
 the reversal of Logic. See Huxley ' On the Physical Basis of 
 Life/ Lay Sermons, p. 132 As regards Protoplasm, by Dr. J. 
 Hutchison Stirling. 
 
 6. The perplexity of the problem under a Materialistic 
 theory is not lessened but increased, when duality of origin is 
 assigned, by introducing Force in addition to Material Sub- 
 stance. Duality of existence, with co-eternity of duration, in- 
 volves perplexity sufficient to bar logical procedure. This 
 duality of existence implies diversity of nature and mutual 
 restriction ; and these two, diversity and limitation, raise anew 
 the problem which they were meant to solve. The explana- 
 tion needs to be explained. Again, matter and force are 
 postulated primarily to account for motion, but in accounting 
 
236 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 for motion, they are proved insufficient to account for existence. 
 That which needs to have force exerted upon it in order to 
 be moved is not self-sufficient, and the same is true of the 
 force which needs matter on which to exert its energy. 
 
 7. Materialism not only fails to reach a primary source of 
 finite existence, but, at the opposite extreme, it fails to har- 
 monize the complex facts of known existence. Intelligence 
 may be taken as the highest of these facts, with which to 
 test the adequacy of the materialistic doctrine. Intellect starts 
 the problem, and the solution must at least carry an explana- 
 tion of such powers as belong to the investigator. Let us say 
 that matter and force conjointly produce intelligence, or that 
 one of the two is competent to originate this high type of 
 being. How can thought interpret and accept the possibility? 
 Either the cause need not be adequate to produce the effect, 
 and we are reduced to Hume's maxim, * Any thing may pro- 
 duce any thing/ which is a mere utterance of Scepticism, or 
 avowal of absolute ignorance, amounting to an abandonment 
 of the problem, in face of the natural demands of intelligence ; 
 or, there is that in the cause which is competent to produce 
 the effect, in which case force is more than material, it is 
 intelligent ; a Personal Intelligence is the fountain of depen- 
 dent personality, and the Materialistic position is abandoned. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 THE PANTHEISTIC THEORY. 
 
 1. THIS theory, That God is all, TO 7rai>, has appeared 
 in a variety of forms. The common intellectual aim of the 
 theory is to maintain, not only unity in the source of finite 
 existence, but absolute and eternal unity of all existence. 
 That there is a changeable, a fluctuating, even an evanescent 
 existence, is freely admitted ; but the imperfect and transitory 
 are only phenomenal, the mere varying manifestations of the 
 one abiding, unchangeable Being, the surface swell on the 
 unfathomable and untroubled ocean of existence. 
 
 2. The theory wears a materialistic or spiritualistic type, 
 according to the point of view from which the facts are 
 regarded. From the lowest point of view, matter itself is of 
 the very nature of the Deity. In this form, the theory is only 
 a higher phase of materialism. From the highest point of 
 view, the Deity is the spiritual substance pervading all things ; 
 and, in activity, Deity is the spiritual force operating through 
 all things. In this type of the theory, matter in all its forms, 
 and intellect as existing under the trammels of finite personality, 
 are the occasional broken discoveries of the grandeur of abso- 
 lute being, which must itself for ever continue undiscovered. 
 
 Akin to this in thought, but quite apart from any formulated 
 philosophic theory, is the poetic perception of life and intel- 
 ligence in all forms of existence. Exit quite distinct in thought, 
 
 237 
 
238 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 while often approximating in expression, is the theistic view, 
 that God discovers himself in all, and makes known the great- 
 ness of his nature to all his creatures who look with the eyes 
 of intelligence on the face of nature, on the relationships of 
 social life, and on the mysteries of the soul, which is constituted 
 observer of all that lies within its restricted ken. 
 
 3. The special difficulty of a Pantheistic theory is, to 
 connect the facts with the doctrine by any competent philoso- 
 sophic process. It first presupposes a conception of Deity, 
 such as belongs to the Theistic doctrine ; and secondly, a 
 theoretic affirmation that all known finite existence belongs, 
 either essentially or in a phenomenal sense, to the Divine 
 nature. Both of these are positions which need to be estab- 
 lished by a distinct philosophic process. Without this, Pan- 
 theism merely accepts the Theistic doctrine in the first stage 
 of its development, in order to violate it in the second, thus 
 becoming self-contradictory. To make good its claim to a 
 place among philosophic theories, it must show first, how it 
 reaches its theism, and next how it lifts up the 'all' into its 
 theism, for legitimate construction of a Pantheism. 
 
 4. The first test of Pantheism is in the account it gives of 
 its Theism. It does not profess to offer us any clearer or 
 surer road from finite existence to a modified theism. Given 
 the theistic point of vision, and it can descry the gleams of 
 transcendent grandeur sweeping across all the varieties of 
 finite form. But, how is the point of vision reached? Pan- 
 theism does not propose to resuscitate the argument from 
 finite to infinite, from dependent to absolute. In every case, 
 a theistic conception is regarded as natural to the mind, and 
 the reality of the Divine existence is admitted as matter of 
 natural belief. In so far, therefore, as the reality of theistic 
 existence is concerned, Pantheism does not, by the structure 
 of any new philosophic process, separate itself from the purely 
 theistic doctrine. 
 
 5. The second test of the Pantheistic theory is concerned 
 
THE PANTHEISTIC THEORY. 239 
 
 with the philosophic competency of its account of the relation 
 of finite existence to the Divine nature. By what logical pro- 
 cess can we identify the ' all/ with the Divine 1 The duality 
 of existence being admitted as fact, to establish a real unity is 
 the grand difficulty. If it be impossible in accordance with 
 logical consistency to argue from a finite result to an infinite 
 cause j the impossibility is still more manifest if we attempt to 
 assign finitude to the infinite, and thus seek to escape the 
 necessity for a transition. The lower a Pantheistic theory 
 descends, the greater the difficulty becomes. The higher the 
 type of theory, the more it separates itself from the facts of the 
 universe, and encounters difficulty of another sort. To say 
 that the Divine nature embraces material existence, is theoreti- 
 cally to reduce absolute being to a level where its essential 
 property is lost. The infinite becomes divisible. To say, 
 finite existence is of the Divine nature, is to lift restricted 
 existence to a level where its essential characteristics vanish. 
 The dependent becomes absolute. The facts of a restricted, 
 multiform universe are not solved ; but simply overlooked, 
 while men discourse in the language of transcendental faith. 
 Man himself is the great obstacle to the acceptance of this 
 philosophy; he is the living refutation of it. The Person- 
 ality which makes independent action possible ; the law which 
 applies to such personality ; the obligation which flows from 
 that law ; the action at one time in obedience to that law, at 
 another in violation of it ; all these are the indubitable facts 
 of a present existence which make it impossible for us legiti- 
 mately to embrace all being in unity. This is fatal to the 
 philosophic claims of Comte's conception of a Great Being ; 
 the sum of all humanity. The Philosophy which declines the 
 search for causes, is naturally at its weakest in seeking for a 
 Deity, and arranging forms of worship. Comte's Politique 
 Positive, and Catechisme ; Lewes's Hist, of Philos, n. 635 ; 
 M'Cosh's Method oj Div. Govt. yth ed. p. 240. From the 
 Pantheistic position, personal freedom and responsibility are 
 
240 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 not facts but delusions, as Spinoza considers them. How, 
 then, shall we discover the delusion 1 It is not discovered by 
 constructing a dialectic and then pointing out the inconsist- 
 ency of these alleged facts with the logical framework. This 
 cannot satisfy the scientific demand. We must face the fact 
 of absolute existence, since a theism of some sort is admitted. 
 We must next take the finite universe as known to us, and 
 propound its explanation. If no other course is satisfactory, 
 an attempt must be made to prove that consciousness is illu- 
 sory. The attempt is essential in order to claim philosophic 
 rank for Pantheism. But such a line of proof has nowhere 
 been offered. 
 
 6. The scientific insufficiency of the Pantheistic line of 
 thought becomes apparent by examination of the philosophic 
 systems which may fairly be claimed as contributing in some 
 degree towards a Pantheistic view of the universe. As Pan- 
 theism is not always openly avowed, it does not become any 
 part of the duty of one recording historical facts to assign to 
 every theory its exact place. No thinker is fairly chargeable 
 with more than the results of his own reasoning ; and if he do 
 not carry out his theory to its full results, that must be because 
 he has recognised reason sufficient to interpose some obstacle. 
 On Pantheistic theories, see Cudworth's Intellectual System; 
 Modern Pantheism, Essays on Religious Philos. by Emile 
 Saisset, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1863; Hansel's Bampton Lect. 
 5th ed. p. 38. 
 
 7. The whole philosophic system of Spinoza, as developed 
 in the Ethica, is avowedly Pantheistic, and is properly taken as 
 a test of the philosophic value of such a theory. Hume de- 
 scribed it as Atheism, and spoke of its author as ' that famous 
 atheist, '--Treat, of Hum. Nat. i. iv. 5, and so the system has 
 been described by others. Such representations are, however, 
 altogether inconsistent with the structure of the theory. It may 
 be logically competent to argue that Pantheism, consistently car- 
 ried out, becomes Atheism, that the theistic element is lost in 
 
THE PANTHEISTIC THEORY. 241 
 
 the All, and that materialism is the logical result. But it was 
 not so in the hands of Spinoza. Neither in theory, nor in 
 personal belief and practice, was Spinoza atheistic. His sys- 
 tem has theism in its very centre, though.it be a pantheism, and 
 his whole frame of mind was alien to atheistic belief and feeling. 
 See Spinoza's Life, Correspondence, and Ethics, by Willis, where 
 the whole evidence on the subject is well presented to the 
 English reader. With Spinoza, God is everything, and it is 
 the overwhelming grandeur of the one conception which makes 
 it impossible for him to admit a distinct existence for any 
 other being. Take away all finite forms, and what remains for 
 Spinoza is not Nothing, but God, the absolutely Infinite Being. 
 Take the Deity out of his scheme of thought, and the theory 
 becomes nothing. With him the existence of the Deity is a 
 necessary and eternal truth. Account for other existence as 
 you may, this is the fundamental certainty. The real strain 
 upon Spinoza's theory is where it accounts for finite forms of 
 existence, and attempts to gain Pantheism by maintaining 
 that these are modes of the attributes of God. The point is 
 reached at Prop. xv. Pars I., which, with its Demonstr. and 
 Schol., must be mastered by the student in order to reject or 
 accept Spinoza. Any one may, indeed, legitimately refuse to 
 pass the Definition of Substance. But, once entered on the 
 argument, Prop. xv. is the testing point. His theory may be 
 summarized thus, Substance is self-existent ; there is but one 
 substance, God; one substance cannot produce another, i. Prop. 
 vi. ; a cause or reason must be assigned for everything, why 
 it exists, as well as why it does not exist, Prop. xi. Demon, n. ; 
 'whatever is, is in God/ Prop. xv. ; ' all who have ever thought 
 of the Divine nature in any proper way, deny that God is 
 corporeal;' 'by body we understand a certain measure or 
 quantity, having length, breadth, and thickness, and bounded 
 by a definite outline;' but corporeal substance itself is not 
 divisible, since divisibility applies only to the mode of an 
 attribute, not to the attribute itself, much less to the substance; 
 
 Q 
 
a-12 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 divisibility applies only to modality, not to reality modaliter, 
 -non autem realiter ; for example, 'water, as water, is produced 
 and corruptible, but as substance it is neither produced nor 
 corruptible;' God himself therefore is not corruptible, but only 
 the modes of his attributes ; God himself is natura naturans, 
 'nature acting;' all that follows from the necessity of his 
 nature ' is natura naturata, nature acted upon/ prop. 29 ; 
 therefore ' things could not have been produced by God other- 
 wise than they have been/ prop. 33. The test of such a theory 
 is twofold, from the theistic side, and from the finite side. 
 First, it sacrifices the consistency of theism. The Absolute is 
 represented as necessitated to act ; God is a necessary cause, 
 and is said to be free only in the sense of acting by the 
 necessity of his own nature, a position which denies to Deity 
 any choice in action. To aggravate the difficulty, God is 
 necessitated to cause the changeable and corruptible ; ab- 
 solutely perfect attributes are necessitated to produce cor- 
 ruptible modes of existence, in other words, the modes of 
 existence are not in harmony with their causes. Second, It 
 fails to explain the facts of finite existence. Body is not mere 
 measurement, but the thing measured; not mere modality, 
 but reality, which every observer recognises as distinct from 
 self. The theory of the ' All/ is not a theory of the universe 
 as known to us. These are fatal objections to the logical 
 coherence of the scheme, and they cannot be modified with- 
 out destroying its essential features. The difficulties belong 
 to the illogical attempt to reduce contradictory elements to 
 unity of substance. 
 
 8. COUSIN says concerning his own treatment of this sub- 
 ject, 'In the perplexing question of the relations of God to the 
 world, we have constantly endeavoured to shun the double error 
 of supposing a God of whom there may be no visible trace in 
 the world, and a God so passed into the world that he may 
 not be different from it; the dead God of the schools, and 
 the grosser God of pantheism.' Hist of Mod. Philos. Note 3 
 
THE PANTHEISTIC THEORY. 243 
 
 to Lect. v. ; so Pascal, in the preface to the Penskes. It is not 
 clear that Cousin altogether succeeded in his intention, as, for 
 example, in his views of creation and of universal reason. 
 Speaking of the Deity as cause, he says, ' Being an absolute 
 cause it cannot avoid passing into action; it cannot avoid 
 developing itself.' Hist, of Mod. Philos. i. 72. So also he 
 has allowed himself to identify human reason with the Divine. 
 ' Reason is not, then, individual, hence it is not ours ; it does 
 not belong to us, is not Jiuman. . . . Ideas are conceptions of 
 this absolute and universal reason, which we do not constitute, 
 but which appear in us.' Ib. I. 76. It is on the ground of 
 such passages as these that Cousin has been regarded as the 
 exponent of a Pantheistic system. Much that might, at first 
 sight, appear to warrant such a conclusion, admits of a different 
 interpretation. If there are passages which seem more to 
 favour the charge of Pantheism, Cousin himself did not regard 
 them in that light. 
 
 9. The course which German thought took after the days 
 of Kant, was decidedly in a Pantheistic direction, though it 
 did not result in the construction of a pure Pantheism, such as 
 that of Spinoza. The identification of the Ego (I) with abso- 
 lute Reason by the elder Fichte j Schelling's absorption of the 
 Ego (I) into the Absolute, and the elaborate Dialectic of 
 Hegel which makes the idea the essence and source of things, 
 all point in the same direction. The system of Hegel is that 
 which in form most approaches the appearance of Pantheism. 
 Instead of the definitions of Spinoza, Hegel begins with pure 
 Being and pure Nothing, that is, bare existence without any 
 determinate quality, and its contradiction. With these there 
 begin moments, or, more properly, movements. The com- 
 bination of Being and Nothing, that is, the movement of the 
 one into the other, leads to Becoming. Wissensckaft der 
 Logik, Werke, in. 77, 78. In starting with Being, the possi- 
 bility of a beginning of the world is denied. Ib. p. 106. 
 ' There can nothing begin, whether so far as it is, or so far as 
 
244 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 it is not ; for, in so far as it is, it does not first begin ; but in 
 so far as it is not, neither does it then begin.' Ib. The 
 movements of Becoming involve passing-into-being and 
 passing- out -of-being Entstehen und Vergehen, p. 108, the 
 disappearance of Being in Nothing and of Nothing in Being, 
 and the result is determinate Being, or being existing in a 
 definite place or state, p. 112. The determinate existence, or 
 Being possessed of quality, is by its determinateness distin- 
 guished from some other. This is the interpretation of quality 
 or determinateness, ' It is something over against another, 
 it is changeable and finite,' verdnderlich und endlich. The 
 determinate Being is finite ; it is a something contrasted with 
 another something; each has another opposite to it, p. 122. 
 This introduces the distinction of existence in itself, An- 
 sichseyn; and existence-for-an other, Seyn-fur-Anderes, p. 124. 
 This existence-in-itself is the thing-in-itself, Ding-an-sich; but 
 an answer to the question, what requires that determinations 
 be assigned to being, is an impossibility, p. 127. 'The thing- 
 in-itself is the same as that Absolute of which one knows 
 nothing, but that in it all is one. We very well know what 
 these things-in-themselves are ; they are as such nothing else 
 than truthless, empty abstractions/ p. 127. But the finite, 
 with its relation of inner and outer, is the ending, perishing, 
 or passing away ; and if it merely pass away, it goes back to 
 abstract nothing, and we make no progress, p. 139. But in 
 passing away, it is affirmative of the Infinite, a union with 
 which is impossible. * The Finite stands perpetually over 
 against the Infinite,' p. 140. The limited is the bounded or 
 bound. In this appears the ought-to, the necessity to pass 
 over into something else. Something is raised above its 
 limitation, and yet this ought-to has its limit, p. 142. The finite 
 in passing away is not passed away, it has become another 
 finite, and that becomes another, and so on to infinity, p. 147. 
 This, as affirmative being, must have its other, or contrary, 
 that is the Infinite, which in this aspect is only the negative 
 
THE PANTHEISTIC THEORY. 245 
 
 of the finite, p. 148. But, as standing opposite each other, 
 the Infinite is restricted by the finite, is in reality only an- 
 other finite, p. 154. The finite passes over to the Infinite, 
 and the Infinite passes over again into the finite for its realiza- 
 tion. The finite and infinite thus relatively contain each 
 other, and it is in the absorption of both that we attain the 
 true Infinite, the unity of finite and Infinite, p. 157. 
 
 For Hegel's Philosophy, see Schwegler's Hist. ; Ueberweg's 
 Hist.; Translation of first part of Hegel's Logic, in Dr. 
 Hutchison Stirling's Secret of Hegel, beginning vol. I. 319, 
 and Lectures on Jurisprudence p , by same author. 
 
 This system may first be regarded as representative of a 
 course of abstraction. In this light, every one will allow, that 
 Being or Existence is the ultimate abstraction, and that from 
 this ultimatum we may synthetically return to the complex 
 order of things with which we are familiar. But that this can 
 produce a theory of existence is not evident. It is a develop- 
 ment of abstract thought, not a theory of existence ; and to 
 argue from thought to existence is incompetent. V. p. 116- 
 118. 
 
 Viewing the whole as a philosophic system, the following 
 considerations are adverse to its logical competency. Its first 
 requisite is moment or movement, which it assumes, but does 
 not account for. And as movement cannot come from inde- 
 terminate being, nor from nothing, its presence is an incon- 
 sistency, unless it be merely mental movement which is 
 intended, in which case the claim of the theory to be received 
 as a theory of existence is abandoned. The line of progress 
 from a negative to a positive is incompetent. At every stage 
 in advance there is a violation of logical rule, by the assump- 
 tion of more in the conclusion than is involved in the premisses. 
 It is admitted that the finite must have a beginning, and yet 
 no explanation of such beginning is afforded, since the ques- 
 tion of causality is ignored. Determinate being is placed 
 before the Infinite, and leads to it. If this mean only that the 
 
246 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mind seeks the explanation of the finite in the Infinite, 
 Hegelianism has made a wide detour, with weary zigzag, to 
 reach a position which may be taken at once. The whole 
 question of the origin of existence lies outside the Hegelian 
 Logic. Consciousness and thought are assumed and em- 
 ployed, yet not made account of : and all the while Hegel's 
 offer is this, Given the single contradictory Being and 
 Nothing, and T shall create, not the universe merelv. but 
 even the Infinite. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE NATURE. 
 
 1. BELIEF in the Divine existence implies knowledge of 
 the Divine nature. This follows from the place which faith 
 holds among our cognitive powers. To classify belief other- 
 wise would be an inconsistency. Sir W. Hamilton and Cousin 
 agree in this, though differing so widely as to knowledge of 
 the Infinite. Hamilton's Metaph. n. 15, and 350; Cousin's 
 Hist, of Mod. Philos. i. 79. That a knowledge of the Deity 
 belongs to man has been the general testimony of philo- 
 sophic thought, from Socrates and Plato down through the 
 Patristic period, even while it was held that none of the cate- 
 gories apply to God, as by Clement of Alexandria. Strom, v., 
 and Augustine, De Vera Religione, and De Trin. v. 2. And 
 this knowledge of God has been maintained along with those 
 acknowledgments of his incomprehensibility, of which Sir W. 
 Hamilton has given examples in his philosophical testimonies 
 to 'learned ignorance/ Discussions, p. 634, and Mansel 
 in his Bampton Led., Pref. to 5th ed. p. xx. The saying of 
 Clemens Alexandrinus may be taken as axiomatic : ' Neither 
 is there knowledge without faith, nor faith without knowledge.' 
 So Cousin : * To believe is to know and comprehend in some 
 degree.' Hist. I. 79. Hamilton, on the contrary, held that 
 the Infinite is 'an object of belief, but not of knowledge.' 
 
 247 
 
248 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Letter to me in reply to first ed. of Philos. of the Infinite, given 
 in the third ed. p. 497, and Metaph. n. 530. On this subject, 
 see Prof. Eraser's Essays in Philos. p. 201, and Rational 
 Psychology ; Young's Province of Reason; and Prof. Noah 
 Porter's Human Intellect, p. 645. 
 
 2. The knowledge of the Divine nature is not merely 
 negative knowledge. As the reality of the Divine existence 
 is not a conclusion reached by logical process, it is impossible 
 to interpret the acknowledgment of a Supreme or Infinite 
 Being, as if it were mere assent to an abstract proposition, 
 or submission to the conditions of thought. Indeed, ne:a- 
 
 O 7 O 
 
 tion of one thing is possible only by affirmation of another, 
 and consciousness bears witness to no such exercise as may 
 with propriety be named 'negative thinking/ resulting in 'a 
 negative notion.' Sir W. Hamilton's distinction between a 
 positive and negative notion is given in the Logic, i. 102, and 
 is defended in his Letter, Philos'. of Inf. p. 500, or Metaph. 
 ii. 534 ; and supported by Mansel, Prolegomena Logica, p. 48. 
 This doctrine I have criticised at length, Philos. of the Inf. 
 3d ed., beginning at p. 272. See Cousin, Hist, of Mod. Philos. 
 i. 86, and M'Cosh, Intuitions, 230. 
 
 3. Belief in an Infinite Being involves such knowledge of 
 his nature as enables us to distinguish his existence from 
 all existence besides. Belief is the assent of the mind to a 
 truth, while the reality so acknowledged is not matter of 
 observation. See MansePs Philos. of the Conditioned, p. 129, 
 and appendix to Philos. of Infin. 3d ed. p. 503. Thus, facts 
 which we accept on the testimony of others, propositions to 
 which we assent without being able to complete their verifica- 
 tion, and such a transcendent fact as the Divine existence, 
 are matters of faith. But faith is the exercise of an intelligent 
 nature, apart from which it is impossible. Assent cannot be 
 given except on condition of an apprehension of truth, 
 sufficient to distinguish it from all other known truth. Since, 
 then, a belief in the Divine existence belongs to us, this 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE NATURE. 249 
 
 implies some knowledge of the Divine nature. That in this 
 belief the mind meets the incomprehensible is beyond a doubt ; 
 but it meets a living being, an Intelligence, a Ruler, not an 
 Abstraction. That this Being is possessed of intelligence and 
 power is so far from being doubtful, that the admission is 
 essential to the presence of the belief. And besides, all thought 
 concerning this Being, in order to be logically competent in 
 terms of the belief from which it springs, must reject every 
 aspect of limitation which can apply either to this intelligence 
 or power, acknowledging that any limits which we recognise 
 are the measure of our thought, not of its object. Such denial 
 of the objective application of the limits recognised in con- 
 sciousness is not the result of any intellectual weakness, but 
 of distinct intelligence resting on belief, as, in another sphere, 
 the mind assents to the truth that the law of gravitation 
 must apply in undiscovered regions of the world. 
 
 4. Knowledge of God is advanced by means of extending 
 knowledge of nature, and especially of the conditions and 
 possible attainments of personal existence. Widening know- 
 ledge of the facts to be explained gives increased knowledge 
 of the nature and government of the Being whose action affords 
 the explanation. 
 
 5. Knowledge of God on the ground of analogy between 
 the Divine nature and human intelligence, presupposes a 
 distinct knowledge of the attributes of Deity, fitting us to 
 detect analogy, and to determine where it fails. Neglect of 
 this fundamental law of analogical reasoning is the glaring 
 defect in Bishop Browne's works on this subject, otherwise so 
 valuable. Proced. of the Hum. Understanding, 2d ed., London, 
 1729; and Things Divine and Supernatural, London, 1733. 
 The ability to recognise where analogy fails, saves us from 
 resting content in anthropomorphic representations of Deity, 
 which would vitiate the radical conception resting on the 
 fundamental belief. Buchanan's Analogy as a Guide to Truth. 
 
 6. Such knowledge as we have of the Divine nature, is 
 
250 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 knowledge of Infinite Being, not of Infinitude. Here the 
 position of Sir W. Hamilton and Mansel is strong even to self- 
 evidence. Human knowledge cannot compass the Infinite. 
 But, on the other hand, it seems no less certain that Sir W. 
 Hamilton was wrong, on psychological grounds, in maintaining 
 that 'existence can only be an object of thought, inasmuch 
 as it is an object thought,' Letter, Philos. of the Infin. p. 498, 
 and that partial knowledge of an object is knowledge of a 
 part. Ib. Mansel went still further wrong in making concep- 
 tion of an object equivalent to ' consciousness of Being,' or 
 knowledge of 'a thing in consciousness.' Bampt. Lect yth 
 ed. p. 51. See Young's Provmce of Reason, London, 1860. 
 
 7. The Infinitude of the Divine Nature involves eternal 
 incomprehensibility of the excellence of that nature, since no 
 manifestation of the Divine power can discover the fulness 
 of the Divine nature, and progress of human knowledge can 
 be nothing more than relative approximation towards a fuller 
 knowledge of the Divine. 
 
 8. Knowledge of the Divine nature being attainable only 
 through knowledge of finite existence, we can formulate our 
 knowledge only by regarding the Deity as possessed of such 
 Attributes as are adequate for the accomplishment of recognised 
 facts. While the facts of the universe guide us in postulating 
 the Divine attributes, our belief in the infinitude of the Divine 
 nature must regulate us in our affirmations and inferences. 
 It is in this way that the original belief in the Divine existence 
 delivers human thought from those contradictions set in array 
 by Mansel as a barrier to systematic theology. Limits of 
 Religious Thought^ Bami, Lcct* 
 
CHAPTER V, 
 
 RELATIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE BEING TO THE 
 PROBLEMS OF MORAL LIFE. 
 
 FROM the Psychology of Ethics there arise four metaphysical 
 problems which have their solution essentially connected with 
 the fact of Divine existence. These are, the foundation of 
 Virtue ; the relation of the human will to Divine sovereignty ; 
 the disorder of our moral nature ; and the question as to a 
 Future State of existence. 
 
 I. THE FOUNDATION OF VIRTUE. 
 
 1. The first metaphysical question peculiar to Ethical 
 science is this, What is the source of all morality, or, as it is 
 often put, What is the foundation of Virtue 1 Granting that 
 we, as moral beings, are capable of recognising moral law, and 
 of putting it into application, so as to realize virtue in our life, 
 what is the ultimate ground of that morality 'I 
 
 2. Here there are two alternatives: Either a theory of 
 the Impersonality of Reason, identifying it with Absolute Intel- 
 ligence, so that it is God in us who unfolds his own excellence 
 in moral life ; or a theory that Human Reason, while distinct 
 from Divine Intelligence, is a power for recognising absolute 
 truth, implanted by the Author of our being, and for the ex- 
 planation of which we are thrown back in thought upon that 
 which belongs to the Divine nature itself. 
 
 3. There are no data on which to warrant a metaphysical 
 
252 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 conclusion to the impersonality of Reason. Cousin asks the 
 question ' Is Reason, strictly speaking, purely human 1 or 
 rather, is it only so far human as it makes its appearance in 
 man 1 ' To which he replies, ' Reason is not individual, hence 
 it is not ours ; it does not belong to us, is not human.' Hist, 
 of Mod. Philos. i. p. 75 ; Cours de Mod. Phil. Legon v. This 
 statement rests on the basis, that we are not ourselves the 
 source of the knowledge we have, which is at once granted by 
 all who accept a priori truth. But is this basis sufficient to 
 bear the theory built upon it? We are not ourselves the 
 source of the knowledge we have of an outer world, but we 
 do not think of attributing impersonality to the organ of know- 
 ledge. Though the conditions of knowledge are very different 
 in the two cases, there is no warrant to regard Reason in 
 any other or higher light than as an organ of knowledge. All 
 that Cousin pleads for in the exercise of the faculty is granted, 
 without accepting his conclusion, and the reference to the Deity 
 is not ignored, but merely presented in a different form. 
 
 4. Knowledge of moral law belongs to the exercise of our 
 Reason, which discovers that law, without explaining how this 
 discovery has been provided for, or on what ultimate basis 
 the law rests. 
 
 5. Taking now the Divine Existence as the explanation of 
 all finite being, it is in conformity with the solution of the 
 earlier problem, that we regard the Divine nature itself as 
 the foundation of Virtue. We cannot satisfy the intellectual 
 demand in this case, by resting in the idea of mere Power, 
 and affirming of it infinity of degree. There must be that in 
 the Divine nature which explains the purpose and procedure 
 realizing themselves in a moral race. We thus reach the 
 metaphysical result, that the foundation of virtue is the moral 
 purity or perfection of the Divine nature. 
 
 6. The relation of the Divine Will to the Divine nature 
 must be such that the former is the sure exponent of the latter. 
 Moral obligation, and responsibility imply the exercise of 
 
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND *REE WILL. 253 
 
 Divine control subjecting us to moral law. We may, there- 
 fore, affirm that the source of all morality is in the Divine 
 Will, but this can rank only as a provisional and partial state- 
 ment, leaning upon the excellence of the Divine nature. 
 Human morality cannot have its ultimate source in mere com- 
 mand, or exercise of authority over dependent being. Such a 
 supposition would imply either that God might act capri- 
 ciously, that is, without regard to his own perfection ; or that 
 he might act in violation of his own perfection. In appeal- 
 ing to the Divine nature, we do not affirm that God was 
 necessitated to create, as if he were subjected to constraint 
 from a superior power ; or as if his power were not exercised 
 in accordance with Will. It is simply affirmed that the action 
 of the Deity must be in accordance with the perfection of his 
 own nature, never can fall beneath it. 
 
 In this appears the illogical character of Scholastic asser- 
 tions, reproduced in a variety of forms in later times, such as 
 that of William of Occam, ' Nullum actum malum esse nisi 
 quatenus a Deo prohibitum, et qui non possit fieri bonus si a 
 Deo prsecipiatur ;' there is no act which is wrong except as 
 it is forbidden by God, and which cannot be made right, if 
 commanded by God. Such a position can have no meta- 
 physical sanction, and results from the attempt to interpret 
 absolute nature by the negation of finite restrictions, in neglect 
 at once of the testimony of our own moral nature, and of the 
 application of our original belief in the Divine Being. 
 
 II. RELATION OF DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY TO FREE WILL. 
 
 1. If the Divine existence is the explanation of all finite 
 being, it follows that there is Divine sovereignty over all such 
 being. This is a simple interpretation of the relation between 
 the Absolute and the dependent. Dependence of origin, 
 with independence of subsequent existence, were a contra- 
 diction. The dependent cannot restrict the Absolute. Sove- 
 reignty in originating dependent being, at the cost of sur- 
 
254 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 render of sovereignty over the created existence, is impossible. 
 The Absolute Being cannot restrict his own nature. 
 
 2. As Divine Sovereignty must apply to all forms of origi- 
 nated being, no creature can be so highly endowed as to 
 be independent of Divine control. As independence could 
 not be achieved by the dependent, it could not be conferred 
 by the Absolute Being. Subjection to sovereign control must 
 therefore hold true of the rational as well as of the irrational, 
 and of activity as well as of sensitivity in creatures. 
 
 3. While Absolute Sovereignty of the Deity is a clear 
 metaphysical deduction from the primary belief in His exist- 
 ence, it does not carry metaphysical warrant for a further 
 inference as to the manner in which such absolute sovereignty 
 is exercised. Inference on this subject must come from the 
 facts of experience. 
 
 4. There are running all through the universe, lines of 
 evidence which illustrate sovereign control. Whilst holding 
 the highest place among the living agencies of the world, man 
 is conscious of subjection to forces which he cannot control, 
 and to which he must conform his efforts if these are to be 
 attended with success. His experience is a lesson of continual 
 subjection. The laws of existence he can discover; these 
 laws he can in some degree employ for the attainment of his 
 own ends ; but he cannot alter their nature or change their 
 applications. Physical laws, such as provide for supplies of 
 light and heat, and for the currents of the air and ocean, are 
 so beyond our power, that we are accustomed to describe them 
 as laws of nature. The laws of mind are equally definite and 
 uniform in their action ; they are laws of our nature, altogether 
 superior to personal choice. 
 
 5. In observing and classifying the facts which indicate 
 the action of a superior determining power in the universe, we 
 discover evidence of diversity in the manner of control over 
 the different forms of existence. These forms vary so greatly 
 that they may be classified as animate and inanimate, rational 
 
DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY AND FREE WILL. 255 
 
 and irrational, and the laws of their control may differ accord- 
 ingly. Taking our own control over other beings as guide, 
 we are able to reason by analogy towards sovereign control 
 over dependent being. Our control over the productions of 
 the soil, over animals, and over our fellow-men, varies so 
 greatly, as to enable us to conclude that there may be diversity 
 in the forms of sovereign control. We are not in possession 
 of facts, however, by which to reach exact conclusions as to 
 the manner in which Divine control is exercised over the 
 actions of men. As we have no immediate consciousness of 
 Divine control being exercised over us, the exact manner and 
 measure of that control transcends the range of a legitimate 
 philosophy. If this admission be made, it precludes an argu- 
 ment from Sovereignty to the denial of freedom of will, as we 
 are precluded from reasoning from freedom of will to a denial 
 of Divine Sovereignty. On exactly the same ground, our 
 ignorance of the manner of exercise, we cannot reason from 
 Divine foreknowledge to the denial of human freedom ; any 
 more than we are warranted to reason, as some have done, from 
 freedom to the denial of foreknowledge. See Ed. Williams, 
 Equity of Divine Govt., and Defence of Mod. Calvinism; and 
 Mozley on the Augustinian Doct. of Predestination. 
 
 6. While granting that the facts of intelligent self-control 
 are those which are most perplexing in view of our belief in 
 the absolute sovereignty of the Deity, it is to be observed that 
 Will itself bears witness to sovereignty. The analysis of con- 
 sciousness has shown that our freedom is not an absolute, but 
 a restricted freedom. A will capable of controlling our other 
 powers, only by means of intelligent appreciation of the laws 
 under which these powers operate, is not a faculty which can 
 claim to possess freedom of such a nature as to be contradic- 
 tory of our belief in Divine Sovereignty. On the other hand, 
 a freedom which implies moral obligation and responsibility 
 does, by its nature and exercise, carry a continual acknow- 
 ledgment of the sovereignty of a Divine Ruler. 
 
2s6 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 III. THE ORIGIN OF EVIL. 
 
 1. If the Deity be the source of all dependent being, 
 which exists only because he wills that it should, how does he 
 permit the outbreak and continuance of moral evil? This is 
 one of the darkest and most perplexing problems of moral 
 philosophy. 
 
 2. The imperfection which belongs to a finite nature, 
 occasions no perplexity, and affords no help towards a solu- 
 tion of our difficulty. To say that finite existence is imperfect, 
 is only an identical proposition ; it is to say, that finite exist- 
 ence is finite. The finitude of known existence raises the 
 problem of existence, and originates inquiry without giving 
 occasion for perplexity. Archbishop King puts it accurately 
 when he says, ' Either nothing at all must be created, or 
 something imperfect/ Origin of Evil, chap. v. sec. v. subsec. 
 i. 5th ed. p. 309. The question, then, is not, why does im- 
 perfect being exist, and why are all the natural evils belonging 
 to restricted existence found in the universe ; but why does 
 moral evil exist, that is, why in the realm of creation is there 
 any being out of harmony with the laws of its own nature, and 
 out of harmony with the nature and will of the Deity 1 
 
 3. The problem concerning the origin of moral evil has 
 two aspects, the possibility of such evil, and its permission, 
 (i.) How could moral evil be superinduced upon a nature 
 morally pure? (2.) How could moral evil be permitted by 
 the Supreme Being, who is at once absolutely pure and 
 absolutely powerful ? The first question is psychological, the 
 second metaphysical. While, however, the first is psycho- 
 logical, being concerned with the laws of mind, the circum- 
 stance that we are conscious of the operations of our nature 
 only in its disordered state, gives to the question in some 
 degree a speculative character. 
 
 4. That the Deity himself is not the source of moral evil 
 is involved in the acknowledgment of his existence as the 
 
THE ORIGIN OF EVIL. 257 
 
 Absolute Being. That which is inevitable on a Pantheistic 
 scheme is impossible on a Theistic, which maintains essential 
 duality of existence. Spinoza and Hegel did not hesitate to 
 acknowledge that as all finite modes belong to the Infinite, all 
 forms of evil must. The Theistic scheme, maintaining that 
 no finite modes can belong to the Infinite, maintains that no 
 evil can. The Pantheistic conclusion is merely an example of 
 logical consistency, springing out of a scheme of thought, and 
 nothing more ; the Theistic conclusion is logical and meta- 
 physical as well, consistency of thought springing out of a 
 scheme of being. This is the essential contrast between a 
 philosophy based on a natural belief as to reality of existence, 
 and a philosophy which rests only upon definitions or the 
 forms of thought. 
 
 The impossibility of the Deity himself being the source of 
 moral evil is apparent by reference to the moral perfection 
 of his nature. This is only an amplification, by way of ex- 
 position of the nature of an Absolute Being. We find in the 
 Divine nature the explanation of all that is noblest in us. 
 Moral law, and obligation, and responsibility which apply to us, 
 all rest upon absolute moral purity in him. In denial of this, 
 the solution of the problem of existence is broken down. 
 The fallacy, if there be any, must lie at an earlier stage ; it 
 cannot lie here. The present position can be turned only Dy 
 an argument that the source of finite existence is not found in 
 One Absolute Being. If the moral law in us is the expression 
 of the Divine Will concerning us, he is a God of perfect moral 
 purity. 
 
 5. In the laws of our moral nature as known in conscious- 
 ness, we find some clue to the possibility of the outbreak 
 of moral evil. Our nature, being complex, so that desires, 
 affections, emotions, intelligence, and will, have their several 
 parts to perform ; and having its perfection secured only in 
 the continued balance of all these ; the possibility of its dis- 
 order is found in the peculiar nature of the Desires, or craving 
 
 R 
 
258 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 powers. See before, Psychol. of Ethics, Pt. n. chap. i. sec. 7, 
 p. 154. It is only the possibility of the outbreak of moral dis- 
 order which here concerns us, not the actual outbreak itself, 
 which must be matter of history, not of philosophy. 
 
 The clue here obtained is nothing more, for there still re- 
 mains the difficulty of deciding how a nature perfectly balanced 
 could disturb its own harmony. So far as present experience 
 can guide, the explanation lies in the freedom of the will, that 
 is, the power to take or not to take the guidance of moral law. 
 Why such a power should have been left to any being, is not 
 a question at all, for without such power there could have 
 been no morality. Why God should have created moral 
 beings, is a question which is not concerned with the possi- 
 bility of the disorder of their nature when created. But the 
 possibility of disorder may be enough to account for the fact 
 of disorder, in the event of its taking place. 
 
 6. The permission of the outbreak and continuance of 
 moral disorder still remains the darkest mystery which the 
 universe occasions. If there be absolute sovereignty, why is 
 moral evil allowed 1 Archbishop King has well indicated the 
 alternatives to which our thoughts may turn. * There are 
 three ways whereby God may be conceived able to have pre- 
 vented bad elections : first, if he had created no free being at 
 all ; secondly, if his omnipotence interpose, and occasionally 
 restrain the will, which is naturally free, from any wrong elec- 
 tion ; thirdly, if he should change the present state of things, 
 and translate man into another, where the occasions to error 
 and incitements to evil being cut off, he should meet with 
 nothing that could tempt him to choose amiss.' Origi?i of Evil, 
 chap. v. sec. v. sub. 2, p. 312*. More shortly, No free beings ; 
 free agents always restrained when tempted to transgress; 
 or free agents whose freedom is never tried in such a way as 
 to test voluntary submission to moral law. Of these, the first 
 must be discarded as involving a claim for restriction upon 
 the absolute ; the second, as implying a breach on the nature 
 
THE FUTURE STA TF. 259 
 
 of the creature ; and the third, as inconsistent with the condi- 
 tions of moral life. 
 
 7. If then we can see no way in which moral beings could 
 certainly be guarded against an outbreak of moral evil, why 
 did the Sovereign Being not visit with the punishment of 
 destruction any moral agent who voluntarily destroyed the 
 harmony of the moral world? This is the final form of a 
 mystery, which is insoluble from the lower side of existence, 
 and whose solution can lie only in the heights of Absolute 
 Being. 
 
 IV. THE FUTURE STATE. (IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.) 
 
 1. With an Absolute Being as the Great First Cause, the 
 final problem of the Metaphysic of Ethics concerns the ques- 
 tion of future existence for ourselves as moral beings. Having 
 moral life from him, what is our destiny ? What are the 
 rational expectations which may be formed as to a life beyond 
 the present state ? The immediate occasion for the question 
 is the fact that there is a limit beyond which the present life 
 cannot be continued. In seeking its answer, we must con- 
 sider first the facts out of which the question arises, and after- 
 wards the relation of the Absolute Being to the problem. 
 
 2. The facts which point towards the termination of our 
 present state of existence are connected with our physical 
 nature, not with our mental. In physical life, there is a pro- 
 gression of bodily development until maturity is reached, after 
 which there is gradual decay. But in mind, there is the law 
 of progress, without evidence of the same law of decay. That 
 our nature is one, and that weakness of body can entail 
 restraint upon mental action, are admitted facts ; but the latter 
 places the source of restraint in the body, not in the mind. 
 Besides, the body may be dismembered and the mind con- 
 tinue active as before. The phenomena of consciousness 
 connected with amputation are of interest here. But chief 
 importance attaches to the contrast between the facts of physi- 
 
260 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 cal and mental life during the infirmities of age. At such 
 a time, when the recollection of the occurrences of the day is 
 difficult, recollections of events which happened threescore 
 years before, are vivid and exact. Such facts point towards 
 the possibility of continued existence of the spirit, apart from 
 the body. See Taylor's Physical Theory of Another Life. 
 
 3. Besides these, the facts of our moral life seem to 
 warrant a conclusion to the certainty of a future state. If 
 there be moral obligation and responsibility, their full signi- 
 ficance can be realized only in another state of being, where 
 account of moral actions can be rendered. On this line of 
 reflection, it is legitimate to conclude that the future state 
 must be one of rewards and punishments. But the argument 
 does not rest on what Comte has called ' the police considera- 
 tion of a Future State,' Philos. Positive, Martin eau's Transl. 
 ii. 165 ; a consideration which is the legitimate logical accom- 
 paniment of the utilitarian and necessitarian view of respon- 
 sibility, as expressed by Mr. Mill, 'Supposing a man to be 
 of a vicious disposition, he cannot help doing the criminal 
 act, if he is allowed to believe that he will be able to commit 
 it unpunished/ Exam. 575 ; a consideration all trace of which 
 is lost under a transcendental universalism, such as that of 
 Spinoza or Hegel. I am not, however, looking along the line of 
 a ' police consideration' of restraint, but along the line of higher 
 intellectual and ethical possibilities, where, in full harmony 
 with obligations held sacred here, the spiritual achievements of 
 the present life will remain as a personal possession, whose real 
 worth shall find acknowledgment from the Absolute Ruler. 
 The argument, resting on our conception of perfection of char- 
 acter yet to be attained, our progress towards it, our aspiration 
 after it, finds, in all these considerations, warrant for anticipat- 
 ing that the Future which obligation implies, must afford scope 
 for the realization of the possibilities after which we aspire. 
 See specially the very striking passages towards the close of 
 the Apologia of Socrates, preserved by Plato. 
 
THE FUTURE STATE. 261 
 
 4. While the most prominent facts of our life thus com- 
 bine to support the belief that there is for man a great Future, 
 there is nothing which logically warrants an inference to 
 Immortality of existence. Such a conclusion can be sustained 
 neither from the immateriality of the soul, the favourite logical 
 basis see Dr. S. Clarke's Answer to Dodwell, with Defences ; 
 nor from the ceaseless motion of the soul, as with Plato in 
 the Phadnis; nor from the ideas of abstract beauty, good- 
 ness, and magnitude, as in the Phtzdo ; nor from the nature 
 of the soul as a simple being, as argued by Moses Mendels- 
 sohn (1729-1786) in his Phddon. Mendelssohn's Phddon is 
 a Dialogue after the Platonic model, preceded by a sketch 
 of the character of Socrates, first published at Berlin, 1767, 
 which reached a fifth edition in 1814, and is criticised by 
 Kant, Kritik der Rein. Vernf., Meiklejohn's Transl. p. 245. 
 The finite, since it is not the self-sufficient, cannot afford an 
 argument towards immortality. The nature which is de- 
 pendent upon the Absolute Being for its origin, must be 
 dependent on his will for its continuance. While, therefore, 
 Futurity of Existence is clearly involved in the facts of the 
 present life, Eternity of existence must depend upon the 
 Divine Will, and can be known only as matter of distinct re- 
 velation, not as matter of metaphysical deduction. All that is 
 greatest in us points towards an immeasurable future. Thither 
 we must look for the solution of many of our dark problems, 
 and for that purity and grandeur of personal life unknown in 
 the present state. But Immortality, if it be ours, must be the 
 gift of God. Over the best intellect, if it be restricted to 
 pure speculation, must hang the great uncertainty which found 
 utterance in the closing words of the Apology of Socrates, 
 * The hour to depart has come, for me to die, for you to 
 live ; but which of us is going to a better state is unknown 
 to every one except to God,' aS^Aov iravrl irXrjv >; 
 
APPLIED ETHICS. 
 
 THE application of psychological and metaphysical con- 
 clusions to personal and social life is a task so much more 
 simple than that of discovering the fundamental positions of 
 the science, that the main points belonging to this division of 
 the subject may be presented in brief outline. 
 
 The great leading questions here requiring attention are, 
 the formation of moral character, the guidance of individual 
 life, and the regulation of social life. To touch upon the more 
 essential points involved in the disposal of these questions, is 
 all that can be attempted in such a Handbook as the present. 
 Connected especially with Sociology there is a vast range of 
 intricate inquiry which cannot be embraced here. 
 
 I. LAWS WHICH REGULATE THE FORMATION OF CHARACTER. 
 
 1. Character, as distinct from nature, is an established 
 order of disposition which by development gradually acquires 
 strength, in accordance with the rules of life most commonly 
 acted upon. Its measure is found in the prevailing disposi- 
 tions ; the standard of measurement, in the moral law. Char- 
 acter is, therefore, good or bad, according as the reigning dis- 
 positions are in harmony with Conscience, or antagonistic to 
 its authority. In accordance with the law of development, 
 
APPLIED ETHICS. 263 
 
 character may assume a selfish or benevolent, an upright or 
 a dishonest type. The goodness temporarily manifested in a 
 single action, may find an abiding representation in the dis- 
 position which prompts the moral agent readily to reproduce 
 such forms of action when opportunity offers. The morally 
 right disposition by development gains strength, and acquires 
 an aptness to exert its influence which places it more at the 
 command of the person. 
 
 2. Dispositions which incline the mind to duty are named 
 Virtues. There are, then, as many virtues in the perfect 
 human character as there are natural dispositions declared to 
 be morally right, and fitted for influencing conduct in fulfil- 
 ment of moral law. 
 
 3. The laws which regulate the formation of moral character 
 are concerned with two distinct spheres the one, intellectual 
 or guiding, the other, operative or executive; the one concerned 
 with deciding what is right, the other with doing it. The law 
 of Association rules in the one case, the law of Habit in the 
 other. 
 
 4. THE LAW OF ASSOCIATION, which provides generally 
 for facility in retaining and recalling knowledge, enables us 
 to classify actions and dispositions as right and wrong, that 
 we may act upon the classification, without needing to test its 
 accuracy on each occasion. In this we are naturally helped, 
 as Herbert Spencer and others have maintained, by the moral 
 convictions which have prevailed before our own time. The 
 results of the observation and experience of previous genera- 
 tions are necessarily transmitted. But on no basis of ethical 
 philosophy can it be warrantable that the moral judgments 
 prevalent in society, whether in our own time or in earlier ages, 
 should have unquestioning submission. 
 
 5. THE LAW OF HABIT, as concerned with our activity, 
 is most important in the formation of character. It provides 
 for greater facility in action by frequent repetition of the act. 
 It must not be confounded with the law of Custom. Under 
 
264 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the law of Habit, moral conflict in self-government is simplified; 
 subjection of all the motive forces to rational control becomes 
 more constant ; and dispositions which incline to the perform- 
 ance of duty gain practical ascendency in co-operation with 
 conscience. On this ground, Aristotle gave prominence to 
 Habit. Ethics, i. 8. Such Habit is not ' a mechanical neces- 
 sity,' as Kant represents it Metaph. of Ethics, 224, but an 
 aptness which is essentially dependent on personal direction, 
 as it implies previous faithfulness in the application of Con- 
 science. 
 
 II. THE NUMBER AND RELATIONS OF THE VIRTUES. 
 
 1. In conformity with Conscience, a classification of the 
 Virtues may be found in harmony of disposition with the 
 known relations of personal existence to the Absolute Being, 
 and to finite persons around. Three fundamental virtues are 
 thus obtained, Reverence, Modesty, and Sympathy ; Reverence 
 for the Absolute Being, above all finite being; Modesty, 
 which truthfully estimates personal dignity and efficiency; 
 and Sympathy, which respects and esteems others as persons 
 to whom belong the dignity and responsibility of human 
 nature. 
 
 2. From this wider and more general range of observa- 
 tion, embracing the foundations of character, we may pass to 
 the virtues which belong essentially to the guidance of in- 
 dividual life. As concerning determinations to act, there is 
 Faithfulness to known law, which, as a virtue of more general 
 application, is often distinguished by the name of Con- 
 scientiousness ; as concerning action itself, Courage in 
 the execution of known law ; as regards personal gratification, 
 Temperance, in harmony with a rational nature ; as concerning 
 dealings with others, Love of Justice, founded on respect 
 for the law of Justice. 
 
 3. The relations of the Virtues are such as to provide for 
 special combinations among them, and perfect harmony of the 
 
APPLIED ETHICS. 265 
 
 whole in a single character. There are cardinal virtues, as 
 ancient philosophy proclaimed, hinge or pivot virtues, on 
 which dependent virtues turn. Thus, Reverence carries 
 with it meekness and lowliness ; Modesty, humility and peni- 
 tence ; Courage, endurance and perseverance. As all virtues 
 are dispositions cultivated in subjection to moral law, the unity 
 of that law provides for the harmony of the virtues. 
 
 III. GUIDANCE OF SOCIAL LIFE. 
 
 1. The natural basis of society is biological. Society exists 
 as a necessity of our life, in accordance with the constitution 
 we have received, the laws of which are above our choice. 
 Society is founded, not in Individualism nor in Association- 
 alism, but in vital social organism. In this view, Comte's 
 observation is strictly accurate and profoundly important, see 
 p. 64, that the family is the primary unit in Society. Society 
 is, therefore, strong only as family life is preserved in its 
 integrity. It is this which is the natural condemnation of all 
 speculative communism, such as that presented by Plato in 
 the Republic. 
 
 2. The Ethical basis of Society is discovered in the identity 
 of nature belonging to the race, placed as that is under com- 
 mon moral law, from which spring common obligations and 
 common rights. 
 
 3. As Society is founded biologically, or as matter of life, 
 on the union of the sexes ; so is it founded ethically, or as 
 matter of rational combination, on the common application of 
 the same moral law to both sexes. The obligation to physical, 
 intellectual, and moral purity is exactly the same for both, and, 
 being placed under common law, each of the sexes is con- 
 stituted the guardian of purity in the other. 
 
 4. Diversity of nature given to the sexes, implies diverse 
 application of a common moral law for the attainment of a 
 moral unity in social life. To man is given robustness, to 
 
266 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 control and provide for the other ; to woman, such fineness of 
 nature as requires support, yet elevates by refining the stronger 
 nature with which it is associated. In these facts, biological 
 and ethical law are seen to combine in the regulation of both 
 sexes, for the consolidation and progress of Society. On the 
 other hand, the harmony of personal and social life is dis- 
 turbed, if in the one case robustness degenerate to coarseness, 
 or in the other fineness degenerate to weakness. The man 
 who uses his strength to defend the purity of woman, performs 
 the moral part assigned to him in life, and he only is manly 
 in the true ethical sense. The man who uses his power to 
 corrupt woman, is self- degraded, cruel, and cowardly. The 
 woman who, in receiving the protection which is her birth- 
 right, uses her influence to refine and elevate, performs her 
 moral part in life. She who uses her influence to corrupt 
 others, debases herself, and makes her life a moral anomaly, 
 specially glaring and offensive because of the refining influence 
 intrusted to her keeping. 
 
 5. The marriage bond is the only adequate acknowledg- 
 ment of the biological and ethical laws appointed to regulate 
 human society. In this alone is there realization of the truth, 
 that the family is the primary form of society. In accordance 
 with the common obligations imposed by moral law, inter- 
 preted and applied to the special relations of husband and 
 wife, marriage implies a mutual pledge to life -long, consistent 
 endeavour to reach in family history a high standard of attain- 
 ment in physical, intellectual, moral, and religious life. A 
 lower ideal is unworthy of rational government of the social 
 life. 
 
 6. In the family circle, with the relations of husband and 
 wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, moral law 
 provides for the series of relative duties incidental to the 
 natural relations of life. Maurice's Social Morality. 
 
 7. On a wider and less close relationship of individuals, 
 where the relation rests upon the general rights of contract, 
 
APPLIED ETHICS. 267 
 
 such as the union of employers and employed, it is still 
 universal moral law, the undeviating principle of Justice, 
 which determines relative obligations. In this way, Political 
 Economy rests ultimately on an ethical basis. 
 
 IV. MORAL CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 1. The basis of Political Organization must be found in 
 the biological and moral structure of Society. Men in arrang- 
 ing or organizing themselves for the guidance of the more 
 general relationships of the race, can find rational warrant for 
 procedure only in acknowledgment of the laws of human life, 
 physical and moral. 
 
 2. As the basis of Society is the unity of the race, and the 
 moral equality of all, Political Government can be legitimately 
 constructed only on condition of the acknowledgment of 
 natural obligations and rights as inviolable. Political or 
 Positive Law comes into existence only with the acknowledg- 
 ment that there is natural law superior to itself, for moral law 
 has universal and uniform sway. 
 
 3. As moral action is possible only by personal direction 
 of motive, the attainment of moral ends is beyond the reach 
 of Political Government. Political law may, nevertheless, 
 greatly favour or retard a pure moral life among the people 
 living under it. But the healthy relations of Political Govern- 
 ment to a sound morality can be secured only by providing 
 that Positive Laws, which transcend the moral sphere in 
 their applications, are in nature harmonious with moral law. 
 Such security is attained only where legislators and people 
 have reverence for moral law. All legal reform, other than 
 that which is merely formal, is an attempt to bring positive 
 law roore completely into harmony with the principle of 
 equity, as advancing experience may guide. 
 
 4. As the ultimate end of Political Organization is com- 
 munity of interest, it is implied in its existence, that the real, 
 
265! HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 abiding interests of all men are the same, and that when pre- 
 sent, temporary interests come into competition, these are to 
 be regulated on the principle of Justice, that is, the equality 
 of all, for in the eyes of the Law, all men are. equal. 
 
 5. As Political Government involves a modified limitation 
 of personal liberties for the purpose of securing the common 
 good, it is essential to its constitution and procedure, that it 
 be acknowledged that there are liberties which men cannot, 
 consistently with moral law, surrender, and with which political 
 government cannot interfere without stepping beyond its 
 natural boundaries. If only there be protection for the rights 
 of all, and provision for the common good, there must be 
 unfettered liberty of thought, utterance, and action. Politi- 
 cal Government becomes the bulwark of civil and religious 
 liberty only by rigid acknowledgment of the limits of its own 
 sphere. 
 
 6. Political Government, in seeking the common good, 
 must restrict by punishment wilful injury as infraction of 
 natural or acquired rights. In this, however, by its constitu- 
 tion and aim, it acts only as the guardian of common interests, 
 not as the judge of personal motives, that is, political cannot 
 pass over into moral government. 
 
 V. MORALITY IN ITS RELATIONS TO RELIGION. 
 
 1. As there is a Natural Theology springing out of mor- 
 ality, so is there a Natural Religion. It has been already 
 indicated, p. 231, on what ground it seems legitimate to con- 
 clude that religious sentiment is a natural instinct, acting as 
 an impulse, and checking the low materialism to which the 
 mind is in some ways prone. But on the ground of the meta- 
 physical conclusions as to the Divine existence and nature, it 
 becomes here matter of legitimate deduction, that religious 
 thought and feeling rest on a rational basis, and are capable 
 of being elevs-ted and purified by application of our original 
 
APPLIED ETHICS. 269 
 
 belief to the guidance of our life, in harmony with personal 
 obligation and responsibility. 
 
 2. Philosophy thus becomes the vindicator and upholder 
 of reverential and submissive acknowledgment of the Abso- 
 lute Being, affording in itself a rational basis of religious 
 homage. Such was recognised as the result of philosophic 
 thought by the best spirits which preceded the Christian era, 
 as in the case of Socrates, Apologia, and of Plato, Republic, 
 Book vi. And since the dawn of that era, the Christian 
 system has shed its grand light over the darkest mysteries of 
 philosophic thought, and opened for Philosophy itself new 
 courses of inquiry, culminating in a fuller devotion. So Hume, 
 whose thought at many points seems antagonistic to this ad- 
 mission, says, * There is only one occasion when philosophy 
 will think it necessary and even honourable to justify herself, 
 and that is, when religion may seem to be in the least offended ; 
 whose rights are as dear to her as her own, and are indeed the 
 same.' Treat, on Hiim. Nat. Book i. sec. 5, vol. i. p. 435. 
 
 3. As the existence of the Deity is the transcendent fact 
 of philosophy, the rational homage offered to Him is the 
 highest exercise of mind. In such exercise, intellect is occu- 
 pied with the highest conceptions which it can reach, and our 
 sensibility proves competent for companionship with thought, 
 as it goes forth on its most exalted range. The unity of both 
 sides of our nature in this exercise is the loftiest and surest 
 indication of the possibility of attainment far beyond every- 
 thing that has yet come within the limits of consciousness. 
 
 4. In accordance with the conclusion thus reached, 
 religion becomes the loftiest element of individual, family, and 
 social culture, as it is the obvious duty of every intelligence 
 contemplating God as the source of finite existence and of all 
 forms of good with which restricted being is blessed. See 
 Chapters on Worship, in Maurice's Social Morality. 
 
 5. In the application of Moral Law, there is provision 
 for the development of a life of purity; of consistent activity, 
 
270 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 seeking the attainment of those ends which our powers are 
 fitted to secure ; and of generous regard for others, making 
 us their helpers in well-doing. But our highest greatness 
 appears in the appreciation of Absolute Greatness, and dedi- 
 cation of all our energies to the fulfilment of the will of Him 
 who has bestowed upon us a moral nature. The religious life 
 and the moral are thus essentially related. For, we yield 
 a true and full homage to the Author of our being, not when 
 we observe forms of worship merely, but when we use our 
 whole nature aright, realizing Moral Law in action, because it 
 has been vitalized in personal character. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 A. CAN CONSCIENCE BE EDUCATED? 
 
 THERE is no part of this text-book which has more uniformly 
 met with adverse criticism from those who give a general 
 assent to its theory, than the position that Conscience cannot 
 be educated (p. 81). Adverse criticism was inevitable, for 
 the position here maintained is opposed to current popular 
 forms of teaching. Besides, the criticism must have some 
 plausibility, for there is undoubtedly a measure of truth under- 
 lying the popular declaration that Conscience needs to be 
 educated. But, if we consider what is really intended by 
 those who make the assertion, and understood by those who 
 assent to it, the criticism founded upon it loses greatly in 
 force. If it be meant that all need to be instructed in matters 
 of duty, there is no one who will dispute the position. But 
 this does not affect the assertion in the text. If more than 
 this be meant, the statement is open to question. 
 
 Without being minute, it is obvious that if ' we labour to 
 enlighten and instruct our Conscience,' we regard it as de- 
 ficient in guiding power and authority. If so, it is impos 
 sible to speak of the supremacy of our Conscience. Butler's 
 most important position is lost. This results from a tacit 
 
272 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 acceptance of popular and unscientific phraseology as a basis 
 for scientific deduction. The phraseology is equivocal, and 
 the deduction unwarranted. 
 
 The position that Conscience cannot be educated is so 
 far from being assumed from want of due consideration, that 
 it is essential to the theory here maintained. That Conscience 
 intuitively recognises moral law ; that it is supreme in its 
 authority; and that it cannot be educated, are three pro- 
 positions which hang or fall together. The philosophic 
 accuracy of all the three seems to me established on the 
 fullest evidence. No criticism of the proposition that Con- 
 science cannot be educated, which has come under my notice, 
 shews a full appreciation of the interdependence of these 
 three propositions. That of Professor Birks of Cambridge 
 may be taken as an illustration. He says : ' No doubt, if 
 we begin by confining the name of Conscience to the sound 
 and healthy conclusions of the mind on moral questions, to 
 its clear and distinct vision of spiritual truth, or its perfect 
 insight into the course of practical duty, then all need of 
 training is excluded by the definition. But the definition will 
 then degenerate into a barren truism. The mind needs no 
 training to judge rightly, wherever right judgment is already 
 attained. It needs no increase of light where it already sees 
 clearly. But this is neither the popular nor yet the scientific 
 meaning of the word. We certainly do not mean by con- 
 scientious convictions those which are infallibly right, but 
 simply those which are honestly entertained. A person follows 
 his conscience when he does what he sincerely thinks to be 
 his duty, though he may have mistaken his duty, and acted on 
 a wrong judgment.' First Principles of Moral Science, p. 253. 
 
 In order to understand the position that Conscience cannot 
 be educated, it is needful to distinguish between judgments 
 on moral questions and intuitive perceptions of moral law. 
 This distinction has been insisted upon above, pp. 23-43. 
 The criticism by Professor Birks overlooks this. Moral judg- 
 
CAN CONSCIENCE BE EDUCATED? 273 
 
 ments, conscientious convictions, and conscientious feelings, 
 are all exercises of mind quite distinct from intuitions. We 
 must get behind judgments, convictions, and feelings ; we 
 must get deeper into our nature, and discover a prior and 
 simpler exercise. Neither judgments, nor convictions, nor 
 feelings can properly be called intuitions. We must find a 
 power fulfilling a special function. We must shew that the 
 reason for marking off a certain number of our judgments, 
 convictions, and feelings as ' conscientious,' is their relation 
 to this higher power. This we must do if we are to reach 
 scientific exactness, and place Intuitionalism on a legiti- 
 mate basis, with a claim to self-consistency. If careful 
 analysis discover that we possess a knowledge of moral law, 
 simply and in itself, such as a law of truthfulness, or of 
 benevolence, or of justice, this is the underlying test of all 
 our thoughts and feelings on moral subjects. Whether there 
 is really such a power is a fair subject for discussion. But, if 
 an intuitive cognitive power be granted, it seems impossible to 
 deny that education is incompatible with its nature. In this 
 way the criticism just quoted misses its mark. ' Sound and 
 healthy conclusions ' of the mind on moral questions are not 
 to be referred to an intuitive power, any more than unsound 
 and unhealthy conclusions could be so assigned. Conclusions, 
 whether well or ill founded, are products of the reasoning 
 power. Their nature precludes us from referring them to an 
 intuitive faculty. Such a reference would be self-contradictory. 
 Had I attributed all correct conclusions to Conscience, and 
 all incorrect conclusions to some other power, it would cer- 
 tainly have been a ' barren truism ' to have said that Con- 
 science could not be educated. It would have been an 
 unseemly play upon words. But it is something quite different 
 from this which I have asserted, and much more in harmony 
 with an intuitional theory. In saying that Conscience cannot 
 be educated, I have only said that Intuition is and must be 
 independent of training. The unfortunate philosophic result? 
 
 s 
 
274 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of attributing to Conscience all our mistaken views of duty 
 are to my mind very obvious. For example this very state- 
 ment 'A person follows his conscience when he does what 
 he sincerely thinks to be his duty, though he may have mis- 
 taken his duty and acted on a wrong judgment.' I greatly 
 prefer to say, that the man sincerely thinks he is following 
 his conscience, when in reality he is not doing so, rather than 
 lay to the charge of conscience the mass of our erroneous 
 judgments. It is because a man's conscience is not charge- 
 able with his mistaken judgments, that the man himself is 
 responsible. The need for greater philosophic exactness has 
 a fresh illustration in Mr. Sidgwick's suggestion of a twofold 
 moral character for the same action : 'As all schools teach 
 that a person may mistake his duty, and do what is wrong, 
 sincerely believing it to be right, it results that an action may 
 be right in one sense and wrong in another/ Methods of 
 Ethics , 1 8 1. 
 
 B. RECENT LITERATURE. 
 
 AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF J. S. MILL, 1873. The parts of this 
 work of most interest to the student of Moral Philosophy may 
 be briefly enumerated : the moral influences under which 
 Mill grew up, 38 ; his father's aversion to religion, 40 ; his 
 father's teaching as to the origin of the world, 42 ; and as to 
 concealment of opinion, 43. J. S. Mill's own * ideal concep- 
 tion of a Perfect Being ;' ' the guide of conscience,' 46. Early 
 influence of Bentham on his mind, 64 ; of Hartley, 68 ; the 
 crisis in his mental history despondency and escape from it, 
 132. Happiness only to be attained by not making it the 
 direct end, 142 ; internal culture, a prime necessity of human 
 well-being, 143 ; the incubus of the doctrine of Philosophical 
 Necessity, 168; Determinism, 170; his examination of Hamil- 
 
RECENT LITER A TURE. 275 
 
 ton's Philosophy, 271 Relations of Intuitionalism and the 
 Philosophy derived from experience and association, 273. 
 
 THREE ESSAYS ON RELIGION, by J. S. Mill, 1874. I. 
 NATURE. This is 'the collective name for all facts,' 6. It 
 has two principal meanings (i) 'All powers of the outer and 
 inner world and their products,' or (2) ' what takes place with- 
 out the agency of man,' 8 ; is nature a test of right and wrong 1 ? 
 13 ; the sins of writers on Natural Theology, 36; either the 
 Creator wills misery, or he cannot do all that he wills, 37 ; 
 the only admissible ethical theory of creation, 38 ; the duty 
 of man is not to follow nature, but to amend it, 54; conform- 
 ity to nature has no connection with right and wrong, 62. 
 II. UTILITY OF RELIGION. Is religious belief an instrument 
 of social good? 77. The good coming with inculcation of 
 morality is not to be attributed to religion, but mainly to the 
 following things : influence of authority, 78 ; of education, 
 80 ; of public opinion, 84. There is evil in ascribing the 
 maxims of morality to a supernatural origin, 99 ; ' Religion of 
 Humanity/ 109 ; denial of absolute perfection as belonging 
 to the Author and Ruler of this world, 112 ; moral difficulties 
 and perversities involved in Revelation, 113; the Manichean 
 doctrine the only form of rational belief in the supernatural, 
 116 ; the one grand loss endured by the sceptic, the hope of 
 Futurity, 120. III. THEISM. Monotheism alone can present 
 a scientific claim to acceptance, 133 ; the question as to the 
 origin of things issues from a recognised want of the mind, ib.; 
 * A God governing the world by fixed laws ' is a conception 
 consistent with scientific investigation, 135 ; in Nature there 
 are a permanent element and a changeable, 142 ; Force, Mind, 
 Voluntary Action, if these require Mind as their source, the 
 source itself must need another Mind to account for it, 150 ; 
 argument from consent of mankind, 155 ; from Consciousness, 
 161 ; from Design, 167 ; the adaptations in nature afford a 
 large balance of probability in favour of creation by intelli- 
 gence, 174; Divine attributes, 176; immortality, 196; Revela- 
 
276 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tion, 212. Conclusion 'The rational attitude of a thinking 
 mind towards the supernatural, whether in natural or revealed 
 religion, is that of scepticism, as distinguished from belief on 
 the one hand, and atheism on the other,' 242. 
 
 OLD-FASHIONED ETHICS AND COMMON SENSE METAPHYSICS, 
 byW.T. Thornton, 1873 Anti-Utilitarian, but Non-Intuitional, 
 proceeding largely on the objective method, or method of 
 external observation, with abundance of illustration. Utilita- 
 rianism amplifies a moiety of Christianity, 12; no amount of 
 utility can of itself constitute virtue, 14; utilitarianism has two 
 equally authoritative rules, probable consequences, and usual 
 consequences, 27 ; allows a dangerous latitude of interpreta- 
 tion, ib. ; has not a fixed and definite notion of expediency, 
 32 ; obliterates all distinctions between different kinds of virtue, 
 33 ; offers no argument in support of the greatest happiness 
 principle, 48; intuitionism is, by its nature, unsusceptible of 
 decisive proof, 40. The author maintains ' natural rights,' but 
 does not say 'that they are intuitively perceived,' 41. ' As for 
 sense of justice, or of duty, or moral sense or faculty, what I 
 understand by that is not recognition of certain rights or duties 
 as such, but recognition of the obligation to respect whatever 
 rights, and to fulfil whatever duties are recognised/ 41. There 
 are such things as abstract right and wrong, resting not on 
 fancied intuition, but on a solidly rational basis, 82. The 
 second Essay is an argument against the possibility of a 
 Science of History, grounded on the freedom of the will. An- 
 other Essay deals with recent phases of scientific atheism. 
 
 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MORAL SCIENCE, by Professor Birks, 
 Cambridge, 1873. Intuitional in natural ethics, with a blend- 
 ing of Christian ethics. The volume consists of lectures on 
 the true place of moral science, the certainty of moral truth, 
 the divisions of moral science, the nature and office of con- 
 science, the doctrine of utility, and the relations of moral 
 science to physical science, political economy, and theology. 
 That on the relation of moral science to political economy 
 
RECENT LITER A TURE. 277 
 
 specially deserves consideration. Ethics is * the science of 
 Ideal Humanity,' 17 ; accordingly, the science is not derived 
 from experience, 18. The author holds the freedom of the 
 will, 78; maintains, in harmony with the Aristotelian dictum, 
 that the object of moral science is to make men good, 46 ; 
 that conscience can be educated, 253 ; and refers repeatedly 
 to the ' awakening of natural conscience,' without, however, 
 presenting any formal analytic explanation of the process. 
 
 SENSATION AND INTUITION, by James Sully, M.A., 1874. 
 Essays, of which two are ethical, both on the assumption 01 
 the Utilitarian theory. The first of these is on ' The Genesis 
 of the Free-will Doctrine.' Assuming the doctrine false, how 
 to account for its prevalence. As a ' definition of the curious 
 tenet,' the following is given : ' Our voluntary actions are the 
 unconditional products of perfectly spontaneous beings, and 
 must be conceived as falling into certain directions, rather 
 than into others . . . simply because of the fortuitous and un- 
 predictable selection of an undetermined mind or will,' 118. 
 Where such a doctrine has been upheld, the author does not 
 state. ' The impression likely to be made on the mind of a 
 primitive man by voluntary actions,' 1 20. He must have taken 
 a ' purely objective mode of distinguishing voluntary actions 
 from the natural movements,' 123 ; but ' there seems no ground 
 for assuming that men could ever have regarded their own 
 actions simply as objective facts, having no connection with 
 the conscious, prompting soul within/ The primitive man 
 would notice the want of a ' conspicuous cause' for voluntary 
 actions, 120 ; a 'high degree of variability' in the actions, 121 ; 
 a contrast between ' free and externally coerced human ac- 
 tions,' 123 ; then he would refer to the ' conscious and prompt- 
 ing soul within,' 123; next, would recognise the ' theological 
 interest,' 126; then adopt a special name, ' will,' 128; lastly, 
 make this power l inhere in the spiritual substance,' and then 
 ' the obscuration of the real nature of voluntary action was 
 completed,' 129. The second Essay, on ' Moral Self-culture,' 
 
278 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 is an inquiry as to * the essential features of religious self- 
 discipline/ Here the author says, ' The fundamental moral 
 idea of all of them seems to be, that worthy living is not a 
 matter of external action merely, but requires the preparatory 
 processes of ordered thought and regulated emotion,' 145. 
 
 THE METHODS OF ETHICS, by Henry Sidgwick, M.A., 
 Trinity College, Cambridge, 1874. A vindication of Utili- 
 tarianism. It is not a critique of the conflicting methods of 
 inquiry followed in an experiential and an intuitional philo- 
 sophy. It is a criticism of rival theories, tested by the 
 question of the moral standard adopted. A threefold classifi- 
 cation of Ethical theories is given : Egoistic Hedonism, which 
 makes self-love, or self-interest, the sole test of what is right ; 
 Intuitionalism, which makes absolute and self-evident law 
 the standard ; and Universal Utilitarianism, which takes as 
 its test the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The 
 author avows himself an IntuitionarUtilitarian. Throughout 
 the work Psychological analysis is little employed. The 
 objective method, or that of external observation, is generally 
 preferred. Great favour is shown for an Eclectic mode of deal- 
 ing with conflicting theories. In consequence, it is often diffi- 
 cult to say towards which side the discussion is tending, while 
 assertions are commonly guarded with 'it seems,' or 'upon the 
 whole,' or similar modifying phrase. A condensed statement 
 is not easily attempted. The author * seems ' to assume that 
 ' right,' ' ought/ and ' duty,' are the same, Introd. p. 80, passim, 
 yet he would embrace the 'right' under the 'good,' 93. It is 
 maintained that Moral Reason not only discovers moral law, 
 but decides its application, 24, 26, passim. It determines 
 'the true first principles of actions,' and judges of 'the 
 relations of means to ends.' The Free-Will question is set 
 aside as non-essential, and otherwise hopeless. 'The Freedom 
 of the Will presents itself to me as an unsolved problem,' 45 ; 
 -but our dispositions ' may be modified by voluntary effort,' 
 179; 'we seem to be led to the conclusion' that we cannot, 
 
RECENT LITER A TURE. 2 79 
 
 without the idea of Free-Will, ' make the common conception 
 of right conduct at once rational and definite/ 258 ; so with 
 'personal; merit/ 329. Egoism or Empirical Hedonism, 
 restricted to self-interest as the sole end of life, is set aside as 
 untenable, 107-174. The main portion of the book is devoted 
 to a negative criticism of the Intuitional theory, which is 
 represented as standing mid-way between the scheme of self- 
 interest and Utilitarianism a transition from the one to the 
 other. ' An intuitive operation of the practical reason seems 
 to be assumed in all moral systems,' 26, 364; Utilitarianism 
 rests on a principle which ' cannot be known by induction 
 from experience,' 84 ; Intuitionalism is identified with ' Com- 
 mon Sense Morality,' a phrase made to cover self-evident 
 principles, common opinion, and even any deviation of 
 thought on moral subjects which gains currency in a com- 
 munity, 136, 138, 185, 190. So reference is made to 'Con- 
 science, or common moral judgments and sentiments,' 177. 
 What is right for me is right for all, 183, repeated 358, 
 modified 450. Special space is given to the attempt to reduce 
 the claims of the principle of Justice to be regarded as objec- 
 tive truth intuitively known, 236, 267. Conclusion, 'Ideal 
 Justice is very difficult to delineate, even in outline,' 267. 
 Utilitarianism defended and expounded, 381-473. As to dis- 
 tribution of happiness, the Utilitarian principle needs to be 
 supplemented thus, ' It seems reasonable to treat any one 
 man in the same way as any other, if there be no reason 
 apparent for treating him differently' ! 387. How to meet the 
 difficulty of the Egoist, 391. 'Why all Utility is not included 
 within morality,' 397. ' Utilitarianism solves the difficulties 
 arising from want of precision in Intuitionalism,' 396. Under 
 Common Sense Morality there seems to be 'in most cases 
 a large vague margin, with respect to which consensus could 
 not be affirmed,' 407. Under Utilitarianism the same state 
 of things seems to exist, but from the altered point of view the 
 'vague margin' wears a different appearance. 'It is not 
 
280 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 necessary that a clear and precise theoretical line should be 
 drawn between right and wrong in this matter. Here, as in 
 other cases, it is sufficient for practical purposes if the main 
 central portion of the region of duty be strongly illuminated, 
 while the margin is left somewhat obscure,' 423. How is the 
 Utilitarian principle to be applied ? By the method of 
 Empirical Hedonism. 'We have in each case to compare all 
 the pleasures and pains that can be foreseen as probable 
 results of the different alternatives of conduct presented to us, 
 and to adopt the alternative which seems likely to lead to the 
 greatest happiness on the whole/ 428. 'That this method is 
 liable to the most serious errors, and this comparison must 
 generally be of the roughest and vaguest kind, we have 
 already seen ; and it is highly important to bear this in mind : 
 but yet we seem unable to find any substitute for it,' 440. 
 'The Utilitarian must repudiate as superstitious the awe of 
 established morality as an absolute or Divine code,' 439. 
 'At the same time, this sentiment is in no way incompatible 
 with Utilitarianism/ note, 439. How exceptions to moral 
 rules are to be allowed, 448. How the ' enlightened Utili- 
 tarian should proceed as an innovator on current morality/ 
 458. ' Though two different kinds of conduct cannot both be 
 right under the same circumstances, two contradictory opinions 
 as to the Tightness of conduct may possibly both be ex- 
 pedient/ 454. 'A Utilitarian may reasonably desire, , . 
 that the vulgar should keep aloof from his system as a whole, 
 in so far as the inevitable indefmiteness and complexity of its 
 calculations render it likely to lead to bad results in their 
 hands/ 453. 'Of course in an ideal community of en- 
 lightened Utilitarians this swarm of puzzles and paradoxes 
 would vanish.' 
 
 HUME'S TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE, AND ESSAYS, 
 Edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. 4 vols. 1874-5.- 
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION (Intuitional), by Mr. Green. Opens 
 with a criticism of Locke's Essay, by use of a stern test of con- 
 
RECENT LITERATURE. 281 
 
 sistency. The early portion applies exclusively to the side of 
 Intellectual Philosophy, but is interesting to the student of 
 Ethics as a criticism of the experiential theory of knowledge. 
 The relation of Locke's 'ideas got by sensation' and 'ideas 
 of reflection ' is minutely traced, vol. i., 8. The discussion 
 comes into the region of Ethical Science, when Locke's view 
 of the idea of God is examined, 116. Criticism of Locke's 
 'intuitive knowledge of our own existence/ 122. 'A real 
 existence of the mind, founded on the logical necessity of sub- 
 stantiation, rests on a shifting basis,' 124. We are thus 
 tempted 'to treat the inner synthesis as a figure of thought, . . 
 and to confine real existence to single feelings.' But 'the 
 final result will rather be the discovery that the single feeling 
 is nothing real, but that the synthesis of appearance, which 
 alone for us constitutes reality, is never final or complete ; that 
 thus absolute reality is never to be found by us, belonging as 
 it does only to divine self-consciousness, of which the presence 
 in us is the source and bond of the ever-growing synthesis 
 called knowledge/ 125. Criticism of Locke's demonstration 
 of the being of God, 125. Relation of Berkeley and Hume, 
 133. Berkeley, by making the philosophy of Locke consistent 
 with itself, 'empties it of three-parts of its suggestiveness/ 134. 
 Berkeley's theory criticised, 133-160. Hume's mission, 161. 
 Granted impressions of sensation and of reflection, to what 
 impressions can relations, such as cause and effect, be 
 reduced? 162. 'The vital nerve of his philosophy lies in his 
 statement of the "association of ideas/' as a sort of process 
 of spontaneous generation/ 162. Here Physiology is of no 
 avail. 'The quarrel of the physiologist with the meta- 
 physician is due to an ignorantia elenchi on the part of the 
 former.' ' The question is whether the conceptions which all 
 sciences presuppose shall have an account given of them or 
 not/ 164. 'Empirical Psychology' has to ascertain what con- 
 sciousness is to itself at the beginning,' 165. Assuming the 
 beginning in impressions, the question is, Can the theory 
 
282 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 explain thought, or " cognition by means of conceptions," as 
 something which happens in sequence upon previous psychical 
 events,' 166. Hume made a strenuous effort, but failed. A 
 natural history of self-consciousness is impossible. 'Such a 
 history must be of events, and self-consciousness is not 
 reducible to a series of events,' 166. Hume's position as to 
 self and God, 291. 
 
 INTRODUCTION TO THE MORAL PART OF THE TREATISE ON 
 HUMAN NATURE, by Mr. Green. Vol. II. In the Moral 
 Part, ' the originality of Hume lies in his systematic efforts to 
 account for those objects, apparently other than pleasure and 
 pain, which determine desire,' i. 'To understand that it is 
 the constitution of the desired object . . . which forms the 
 central question of Ethics, is the condition of all clear 
 thinking on the subject/ 3. Does the prior consideration 
 which determines desire 'consist merely in the return of an 
 image of past pleasure, or is it a conception, the thought of 
 an object under relations to self, or of self in relation to certain 
 objects, in a word, self-consciousness as distinct from simple 
 feeling ? ' 4. l " Happiness >; is a familiar cover for confusion/ 
 6. Locke's position, ' Every one knows what best pleases 
 him, and that he actually prefers.' Different meanings of 
 Happiness, 6. '"The desired good is really just as it appears," 
 this admission has always been the rock on which consistent 
 Hedonism has broken/ n. The relation of personal character 
 and circumstances to personal happiness, 11-12. Responsi- 
 bility and the choice of pleasures, 13. 'The voice of con- 
 science/ 16. 'Whether something is good for us on the whole 
 is to be determined, not by the imagination of pleasure, but by 
 the conception of self/ 16. Hume's characteristic lies in the 
 more consistent application of the principles and method of 
 Locke, 22. 'The work of reason in constituting the moral 
 judgment (" I ought "), as well as the moral motive (" I must, 
 because I ought "), could not find due recognition in an age 
 which took its notion of reason from Locke/ 28. Hume re- 
 
RECENT LITER A TURE. 283 
 
 jects rational or unselfish affections, ' this involves rejection 
 of reason as supplying either moral motive or moral standard/ 
 32. Hume's account of knowledge of self, 37. How Hume 
 attempts to account for the 'distinction between moral and 
 other good/ 54. Requirements for an answer, 55. Locke's 
 law of God disappears under Hume's theory, 55. Virtues and 
 vices are the usual likes and dislikes of society, 57. Moral 
 sense, 59. Omissions in course of Hume's argument, 59. 
 Insufficiency of his account of 'oughtness,' 65. Self-con- 
 demnation disappears, 69. 
 
 THE SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY, BIOGRAPHICAL, EXPOSITORY, 
 CRITICAL, FROM HUTCHESON TO HAMILTON, by Dr. M'Cosh, 
 President of Princeton College, New Jersey, United States, 
 1875. The first continuous history of the 'Scotch School,' 
 and written in full harmony with its position and spirit. It 
 opens with a sketch of the characteristics of the 'school,' as 
 proceeding on the method of observation ; employing self-con- 
 sciousness ; maintaining principles independent of experience, 
 2-6. State of Scotland during the i7th century, 11-22. In- 
 teresting biographical details are given, shewing much research. 
 The sketches include not only the well-known representa- 
 tives, but less-known adherents-. Dr. M'Cosh has here 
 gathered together a large amount of information not otherwise 
 accessible. Hutcheson naturally stands out as the first con- 
 spicuous figure. An extended account is given of the theories 
 of Hume, Reid, Stewart, and Hamilton. Criticism is very 
 freely exercised throughout, but is specially minute in dealing 
 with Hamilton's Philosophy. There is a brief general review 
 of the Philosophy of the i8th century, p. 267 ; and a closing 
 chapter on the Metaphysics of the future, p. 454. 
 
 For guidance in the study of Mind and Body, works adapted 
 to the requirements of those devoted to mental science are 
 accumulating. In German, the Mikrokosmus of Hermann 
 Lotze has been completed, a work eminently marked by 
 exhaustiveness of treatment. The question is discussed from 
 
284 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the psychological standpoint. The improved and extended 
 edition of Geschichte des Materialismus by Friedrich Albert 
 Lange, is now published in three volumes. Its discussions in- 
 clude all the most recent investigations on the physiological 
 side, including those of Ferrier in our own country. 
 
 MEDICAL REPORTS OF THE WEST RIDING LUNATIC ASYLUM, 
 vol. in., 1873. This volume contains Dr. Ferrier's account of 
 his experiments on the action of the brain in live animals, 
 while under the influence of chloroform. The experiments 
 were made chiefly on the cat, the dog, and the rabbit. The 
 cortical substance of the brain was exposed, and an electric 
 current applied to different parts ; the results were marked in 
 each case, and afterwards a comparison was instituted with 
 the view of noting the degree of uniformity attained. Whether 
 the results of operating on the cortical of the cerebrum while 
 the animal is in a stupefied condition are to be accepted as 
 trustworthy indications of the ordinary action of the organ, 
 may be open to question. But the results are sufficiently 
 uniform to call for consideration, and to warrant certain 
 simple conclusions. Dr. Ferrier has been able to localise 
 definite functions, connecting certain portions of the cerebrum 
 with the movements of separate bodily organs. Thus the 
 excitement of a special part of the brain has been uniformly 
 followed by the movement of the right ear, of another with 
 the opening of the jaws, of another with the movement of the 
 tail. These are results novel and interesting, and apparently- 
 definite, though they do not lead us far in our study of the 
 action of brain in the case of man. 
 
 BODY AND MIND, by Dr. Maudsley. Enlarged and revised 
 edition, 1873. The volume contains three lectures on the 
 connection and mutual influence of Body and Mind. The 
 first gives a clear and concise account of the main points of 
 contact between physiology and psychology. The other two 
 are occupied with disorders of nerve and brain. Next, there 
 is a lecture on Conscience and Organization, which is altogether 
 
RECENT LITER A TURE. 285 
 
 inadequate. The latter portion of the volume is occupied 
 with Essays, chiefly of interest as throwing light on the author's 
 theory of mind. The last, on ' the limits of philosophical in- 
 quiry,' merits attention. In this volume, the introspective 
 method is not disparaged as in Physiology and Pathology of 
 Mind, yet it is still all but ignored. The functions of the 
 nerves of sensation and of motion are described in exact 
 scientific manner, as well as all that pertains to reflex action ; 
 but the higher functions of mind reason, will, and conscience, 
 are far from receiving scientific treatment. The author com- 
 plains of the distinction between 'materialism and spiritual- 
 ism,' affirming that ' one need have no concern with them in 
 a scientific inquiry ' (viii), and straightway proceeds to inquire 
 * how much matter can do without spiritual help ' (ix). ' The 
 nature of mind is a question which science cannot touch/ 
 4, 38. Reflex action is described, 6-12, with doubtful use of 
 ' volition ; and 'voluntary.' 'Actions for a definite end may 
 be automatic,' 9. 'The Will gives the order which sets in 
 motion the organised machinery/ 12. Definitions of Ideas, 
 Emotion, Memory, Volition, and Reflection, 18. 'Memory is 
 f.ie organic registration ot the effects of impressions/ 20. 
 Volition is 'a reaction or desire of determination of energy 
 outwards/ when guided by intelligence, 22. 'In order to 
 execute consciously a voluntary act, we must have in the 
 mind a conception of the aim or purpose of the act/ 25. 
 ' The development of mind is a gradual process of organiza- 
 tion"' in the supreme nerve centres, 23. If we ask how this 
 organization proceeds, we are told that 'Ideas' 'are blended 
 and combined, and grouped in a complexity that defies analysis' 
 27. Can there then be science where there is no analysis? 
 Dependence of mental development on muscular action, 30. 
 Power of mind over bodily action, 38. Physical and mental 
 degeneracy results from profligacy, 44. ' Idiocy is a manu- 
 factured article/ 44. Dr. Maudsley holds to the theory that 
 ' the life of man is the definite result of fixed relations between 
 
286 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the individual and circumstances,' 153. Yet he is so far from 
 holding to it that he adds 'that the greatest is he who determines, 
 as much as possible, circumstances, and is as little as possible 
 determined by them,' 135. To the same effect is all that is 
 said concerning the formation of character. ' The moral ele- 
 ment is an essential part of a complete and sound character,' 
 67 and 134. What this 'moral element' is, has not been 
 made clear; and so with the term 'moral sense,' 121, 129, etc. 
 ' Is conscience a function of organization?' 125. The answer 
 is in the affirmative, on the ground that some are born with 
 criminal tendencies, in whom ' the foundations on which the 
 acquisitions of education must rest,' are ' too weak to bear a 
 good moral superstructure,' 127. These 'constitute' a class 
 of persons who are without the moral sense true moral im- 
 beciles, 128. This ' moral imbecility ' is marked by such things 
 as these ' no affection,' ' no real appreciation of the difference 
 between right and wrong no love for the one, nor remorse 
 for the other.' The subjects of it are ' inherently vicious ;' 
 'instinctive thieves and liars,' 130. Other arguments in 
 support of the same view 'might be drawn from the effect 
 of a severe attack of insanity on the moral feelings,' 137. 
 'The medical psychologist must, I think, maintain that the 
 best of the argument concerning the origin of the moral sense 
 is with those who uphold its acquired nature/ 139. ' That 
 the sentiments of common interest . . . should finally generate 
 a sentiment of right and wrong ... is in entire accordance with 
 what we know of the results of education and of hereditary 
 action,' 139. 
 
 MIND AND BODY : THEORIES OF THEIR RELATION, by Pro- 
 fessor Bain, Aberdeen University, 1873.- -The main purpose 
 of this work is to uphold the hypothesis that each acquisition 
 secures for itself a definite position in the substance of the 
 brain. Professor Bain, holding that every mental action has 
 its attendant brain-action as a condition of its possibility, 
 seeks here to construct hypothetically a ' physical basis of 
 
RECENT LITERATURE. 287 
 
 mind.' After touching upon the evidence that the body affects 
 the mind, and the mind the body, he treats of the connexion 
 of mind and body as ' concomitant variation.' ; While size 
 of brain increases in arithmetical proportion, intellectual range 
 increases in geometrical proportion,' 21. The difficulty aris- 
 ing from this fact is not discussed. Taking the ' Sense Organs,' 
 and ' the Moving Organs,' as supplying illustration, nerve 
 action is briefly explained, 22-35. Sensitiveness in an organ 
 is made to determine not only experience, but moral character. 
 
 * The circumstance of being acutely sensitive in one or two 
 leading senses may rule the entire character intellectual and 
 moral,' 35. The conditions on which character is formed are 
 not considered. By experiments as to * the time elapsing 
 between the sensation of a signal, and the answering by the 
 hand,' and as to the time between the utterance of a syllable 
 by one person, and repetition of it by another, it is considered 
 settled that ' our thinking can never transcend the physical 
 pace of the nerve-force,' 37-8. In outline the theory of mind 
 runs thus : Nerve and brain afford * the physical basis of 
 mind.' Feeling affords the mental basis, 44. ' Memory is the 
 basis of intellect,' 21 and 87. The Will, however, does not 
 receive prominence. Along this line, Feeling (Will), Memory, 
 Thought, it is to be shown ' that for every mental transition, 
 there must be a concomitant nervous shock.' Feeling, as ' the 
 most fundamental and general attribute of the mind,' has its 
 
 * physical counterpart ' determined by the ' Law of Relativity,' 
 which is stated thus : ' Change of impression is necessary to 
 our being conscious,' 45. Here intensity of feeling is con- 
 sidered, and next diffusion. Glancing at the question con- 
 nected with sleep, it is regarded as uncertain whether ' the 
 nervous mass as a whole is quiescent,' or ' currents are kept up, 
 but at an even, settled, unaltering pace,' 48-9. The author 
 indicates a preference for the latter. The phenomena of 
 sleep are of special importance here. Sensation and reflex 
 action are easily connected with their physical basis. The 
 
283 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Will, with all its difficulties, is disposed of within four pages, 
 under this explanation, ' The distinguishing peculiarity oi 
 our voluntary movements is that they take their rise in Feeling, 
 and are guided by Intellect ; hence, so far as Will is con- 
 cerned, the problem of physical and mental concomitance is 
 still a problem either of Feeling or of Intellect/ 76. If the 
 Will directs the Intellect, this plea fails. The discussion here 
 deals only with ' spontaneous energy,' and ' directed activity/ 
 in accordance with ' the great fundamental law of Pleasure 
 and Pain/ in which is discovered ' the deepest foundation of 
 the Will/ 78. ' The Will mainly consists in following the 
 lead of pleasure and drawing back from the touch of pain/ 82. 
 In a chapter which is described as ' not essential to the general 
 argument, while it is more purely hypothetical and specula- 
 tive than the foregoing/ the author seeks ' the physical basis ' 
 of Intellect, 80. The functions of Intellect are represented as 
 threefold, Discrimination, Similarity, Retentiveness. The 
 two first named are quickly passed, with references to the 
 organs of sense. Under the second, it is alleged that ' our 
 reason essentially consists in using an old fact in new cir- 
 cumstances, through the power of discerning the agreement/ 
 87. Most space is given to 'Retention, Acquisition, or 
 Memory.' The problem is, * the possibility of storing up in 
 three pounds' weight of a fatty and albuminous tissue, done 
 into fine threads and corpuscles, all these complicated group- 
 ings that make our natural and acquired aptitudes and all our 
 knowledge/ 89. Here it must be borne in mind how much of 
 the brain is needed as a battery to keep the sense organs and 
 motion organs in healthy play. Professor Bain's hypothesis is, 
 that ' for every act of memory ' there is a specific growth ' in 
 the cell junctions/ * definite growths at certain proper or 
 convenient cell-crossings/ 91. Next comes the question of 
 the proportion between the number of ' our acquisitions/ and 
 the ' number of the nervous elements of the brain/ 95. There 
 
RECENT LITERA TURE. 289 
 
 must be provision for our ' various instincts ' of organic life, 
 next for the higher instincts ' including Feelings, Voluntary 
 powers and Intelligence, with all their " acquired connexions," 
 including " those associations of Will called the ' Moral 
 Habits.'"' The ' shocks,' 'waves,' and 'growths' become 
 perplexingly numerous. To lessen this perplexity a 'Multi- 
 plication Table' for the Brain is provided, according to which 
 ' with a total of 200,000 Acquisitions,' ' there would be for 
 each nervous grouping, 5000 cells, and 25,000 fibres,' 107. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL PHYSIOLOGY, by Dr. Carpenter, 
 1874. The most important work from the English press, 
 professedly dealing with the difficult question of the 
 mind's relation to the brain. The introspective method is 
 freely acknowledged, while physiological investigation is 
 unhesitatingly prosecuted. The nervous system is traced from 
 its appearance in the simplest type of animal life (32) up 
 through all the grades (61) until the complex organism of 
 man is brought under observation, 95. Thence the author 
 passes at once to 'attention' as characteristic of man, 'the 
 capacity of the Ego, alike for the systematic acquirement of 
 knowledge, for the control of the passions and emotions, and 
 for the regulation of the conduct/ 130. After this he treats 
 of Sensation, Perception, ' Ideation,' Emotion, Habit, and 
 Will, as each stands connected with nerve action. Under the 
 head of ' Special Physiology/ besides memory, common sense, 
 and imagination, there are extended and very interesting dis- 
 cussions on 'unconscious cerebration/- -the author's favourite 
 theme, and on abnormal conditions, such as the somnam- 
 bulistic and mesmeric, and pathological phenomena, including 
 those of intoxication, delirium, and insanity. 
 
 AN INTRODUCTION TO HUMAN ANATOMY, by Professor 
 Turner, University of Edinburgh, Part i., 1875. Chapter V. 
 contains a minute account of the nervous system, in a manner 
 easily appreciated by non-professional students, with a pro- 
 
 T 
 
290 HANDBOOK OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fusion of illustration of great value in aiding a correct under- 
 standing. The structure of the Medulla Oblongata, the Pons, 
 the Cerebellum, and the Cerebrum, is embraced within this 
 chapter. The student of mental philosophy will here find in 
 easily accessible form, the information requisite to guide him 
 in studying the relation of physiology and psychology. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ABSTRACTION as concerned with moral 
 qualities, 35. 
 
 Acquisition of Property, 31. 
 
 Actions, moral, how distinguished, 14, 
 19 ; all personal actions not moral, 20. 
 
 maybe classified according to attend- 
 ant pleasures or pains, 126. 
 
 Alexander, Free- Will and Consciousness, 
 183. 
 
 Dr. Lindsay, on Moral Philos. , 76. 
 
 Anselm, Divine existence, 227. 
 
 Applied Ethics, 262. 
 
 Aquinas on Conscience, 78. 
 
 Aristotle, the ' mean ' contrasted with the 
 Stoical doctrine of indifferent actions, 
 21 ; his Ethical theory, 45 ; on moral 
 disorder, 210 ; on habit, 264. 
 
 Atheistic Theory of the Universe, 233-236. 
 
 Augustine, Divine existence, 228 ; know- 
 ledge of God, 247. 
 
 BAIN, Prof., his doctrine of Conscious 
 centres in the brain, 10 ; on necessary 
 and contingent truth, 36 ; the author- 
 ity supposed to attach to the mental 
 origin of knowledge, 81 ; test of the 
 reality of innate knowledge, 98 ; sen- 
 sation and consciousness, 107 ; transi- 
 tion from feeling to intelligence and 
 will, 112 ; morality is matter of 
 social authority, 134, 137 ; theory of 
 Conscience, 140 ; criticism of, 141 ; 
 theory of obligation, 147. 
 
 Battle of the Two Philosophies, free-will, 
 183. 
 
 Belief, nature of, and relation to Know- 
 ledge, 248. 
 
 Belsham on Motives, 177 ; remorse, 201. 
 
 Benevolence, a theory of, unattainable on 
 a Utilitarian basis, 136. 
 
 Bentham, Happiness, 123 ; ethical theory, 
 129; the word 'ought,' 146. 
 
 Blackie, Prof., Phases of Morals, 76; on 
 Utilitarianism, 131. 
 
 Bowen on Conscience, 74. 
 
 Brain, its nature and functions, n. 
 
 Bridges, Dr., on Comte's rejection of Psy- 
 chology, 66. 
 
 Brodie, Sir B., on Psychology, 9. 
 
 Brown, Dr. Thos., theory of morals, 25 ; 
 moral rights, 96 ; volitions and desires, 
 166. 
 
 Browne, Bishop, Knowledge of God by 
 analogy, 249. 
 
 Butlers ethical theory, 52 ; on supremacy 
 of Conscience, 80 ; strength and au- 
 thority of Conscience, 214. 
 
 CABANIS, his philosophy of thought, 8. 
 
 Cairns on Causality, 185. 
 
 Prof. John, on Kant, 55. 
 
 Categorical Imperative of Kant, 39. 
 
 Causality, knowledge of in consciousness, 
 185. 
 
 Chalmers, Dr., on the Emotions, 25 ; ethi- 
 cal theory, 72 ; causality, 185. 
 
 Character, Moral, laws which regulate 
 formation of, 262. 
 
 Chalybiius, H. M., ethical theory, 70. 
 
 Cicero, his application of j>romj>tu, to 
 
292 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 knowledge of first truths, 38 ; his 
 ethical theory, 48 ; use of officium, 
 88; nature of Will, 169 ; perturbation, 
 171; problem of freedom, 176. 
 
 Clarke, Sam., Ethical theory, 51 ; argu- 
 ment for Divine existence, 226; im- 
 mortality, ?6i. 
 
 Clement of Alexandria, on knowledge and 
 faith, 247 ; knowledge of God, ib. 
 
 Comte (Auguste), his view of Ethics as 
 Sociology, 3 ; his doctrine that Intro- 
 spection is impossible, 5; his Sociology, 
 60; Statical theory, 61 ; Dynamical 
 theory, 62; Criticism of, 64-68 ; moral 
 disorder, 211 ; objection to Meta- 
 physic, 220 ; Deity and religion, 239 ; 
 future state, 260. 
 
 Conceivability not a test of reality, 116- 
 118. 
 
 Conscience, its function, 77 ; its nature. 
 77 ; meaning of the name, 78 ; its 
 authority, 78 ; supremacy, 80 ; cannot 
 be educated, 81 ; discovers the moral 
 harmony of our nature, 82 ; requires 
 suppression of moral evil, 82 ; popular 
 use of the term, 83 ; Utilitarian theory 
 
 of, I39-M4- 
 Consciousness, its nature, 3 ; its authority, 
 
 6 ; its interpretation, 7 ; its component 
 
 elements, 7 ; its testimony as to our 
 
 nature, 8, 12. 
 Consequences of actions, impossibility of 
 
 foreseeing, 135. 
 
 Contingent, as applied to truth, 36. 
 Cousin, necessary truth, 58 ; knowledge of 
 
 Self, 119; causality, 184; his alleged 
 
 pantheism, 242 ; knowledge and faith, 
 
 247. 
 Cudworth, Ethical theory, 51 ; belief in 
 
 Divine existence, 229 ; on Pantheism, 
 
 240. 
 
 DARWIN, Ch., on Duty, 146. 
 
 Deity, existence of, 223 ; conception of, 
 227 ; universal belief in, 229. 
 
 DCS Cartes bis view of Consciousness, 6 ; 
 his primary truth, 8 ; his theory of 
 innate ideas, 48 ; knowledge of Self, 
 118; desire and will, 166; moral 
 disorder, 210; Divine existence, 227. 
 
 Design, argument from, to the Divine 
 existence, 227, 230. 
 
 Development Theory, 98 ; its history, 99 ; 
 starts from sensation, 100 ; its account 
 of sensation, 100 ; identifies it with 
 consciousness, 103-108 ; its account of 
 personal identity, 109-113; its use of 
 Association, 113-115 ; its account of 
 moral distinctions, 123-137 ; account 
 of Conscience, 139-144 ; account of 
 obligation, 145-152. 
 
 Disorder of the moral nature, 209-218. 
 
 Diversity of moral judgments among men 
 accounted for, 83-87. 
 
 Duty, nature of, 88 ; how recognised, 88 ; 
 implies moral necessity, 91 ; the com- 
 mon ground of, 92 ; the special appli- 
 cations of, 92 ; its relation to Tightness 
 and to goodness, 93 ; under a Utili- 
 tarian system, 145-152. 
 
 EDWARDS (Jonathan), theory of morals, 
 24 ; definition of will, 165, 178 ; desire 
 and will, 166 ; motives, 176 ; freedom 
 in an agent, 194 ; power of motives, 
 199. 
 
 Epictetus, on harmony of moral laws, 41 
 
 Epicurus, his ethical theory, 47. 
 
 Eudffimomsm, 123. 
 
 Exchange of property, 34. 
 
 FERRIER, knowledge of Self, 122. 
 
 Feuchtersleben on the relation of mind 
 and body, 9. 
 
 Fichte, Joh. Gottlieb, the relation of the 
 senses and consciousness, 10 ; ethical 
 theory, 55-6; knowledge of Self, 120; 
 idea of God, 227. 
 
 Im. H. r ethical system, 71; know- 
 ledge of Self, 121 ; freedom of will in 
 Hegel's philos., 193. 
 
 First Principles of Morals, 30; proof of 
 their recognition, 31-35 ; only im- 
 plicitly in judgments, 38 ; recognised 
 by immediate perception, 38 ; on laws 
 of conduct, 39 ; not merely regulation 
 of thought, 40 ; not contradictory of 
 each other. AI. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 293 
 
 First Principles of intellectual truth, how 
 related to moral principles, 41-2. 
 
 Foundation of Virtue, 251. 
 
 Fraser, Prof., Essays in Philos. and 
 Rational Psychology, 248. 
 
 Freedom of Will, 173-193 J relation to 
 Consciousness, 181 ; in what sense, 
 power to go against motives, 183. 
 
 Future State of existence, 259. 
 
 GILLESPIE, Argument for Divine exist- 
 ence, 226. 
 
 God, existence of, 223-232. 
 
 Good, The, does not afford a satisfactory 
 basis for Ethics, 17 ; influence of this 
 conception on ancient Ethics, 18 ; 
 modern intuitionalists who found upon 
 it, 18. 
 
 Grant, Sir Alex., Aristotle, 44, 46. 
 
 Grote's, G., Aristotle, 46. 
 
 Prof., Utilitarianisn^ 76, 131 ; uses 
 
 of the name, 128. 
 
 HAMILTON, Sir \V., his analysis of Con- 
 sciousness, 4 ; identification of con- 
 sciousness with its modifications, 8 ; 
 self-consciousness, 122 ; motive, 177 ; 
 influence of motives, 180 ; knowledge 
 of causality, 184 ; existence of Deity, 
 221 ; on knowledge and faith, 247 ; 
 knowledge of the Infinite, ib. ; tes- 
 timonies to learned ignorance, ib. ; 
 negative thinking, 248. 
 
 Happiness, Greatest, moral theory, 129. 
 
 Hartley's theory of Conscience, 139 ; free- 
 will and motives, 183. 
 
 Haven's theory of morals, 75. 
 
 Hazard, nature of the Will, 167, 175 ; re- 
 lation of Will to lower Impulses, 168 ; 
 intelligence and will, 170 ; free-will 
 and consciousness, 183 ; causality, 
 185 ; strongest motive, 189. 
 
 Hedonism, 123. 
 
 Hegel, his method, 3 ; his ethical theory, 
 56-58 ; his theory of Will, 192 ; his 
 philosophy regarded as a theory of 
 being, 243. 
 
 Helvetius, origin of knowledge, 58. 
 
 Herbart, Jo. Fr., ethical theory, 68-70 ; 
 knowledge of Self, 121. 
 
 Hickok's Ethical theory, 74. 
 
 Hobbes, on Laws of Nature, 37 ; ethical 
 theory, 50 ; personal appetite, th' 
 basis, 128 ; difficulty of foreseeing con- 
 sequences, 135 ; will and appetite, 
 
 200. 
 
 Hodgson, Dr. Shadworth. Theory of Prac- 
 tice, 76 ; self-consciousness, 122. 
 
 Holland on consciousness, 6. 
 
 Honesty, 35. 
 
 Hume, David, defends reality of moral 
 distinctions, 18 ; confounds the gene- 
 ral foundation of morals with the 
 knowledge of them, 18 ; theory of 
 morals, 25, 52 ; use of the term 'prin- 
 ciple,' 30; knowledge of Self, 108, 118; 
 motives operate uniformly, 170 ; free- 
 dom of will, the most contentious 
 question, 172 ; where its discussion 
 should begin, 173 ; necessity and 
 causality, 176 ; power of intelligence 
 over disposition, 186; liberty in an 
 agent, 194; moral beauty, 204;. hu- 
 mility, 205 ; moral disorder, 210 ; mis- 
 take as to Spinoza, 240 ; philosophy 
 and religion, 269. 
 
 Hutcheson, on the moral sense, 26 ; moral 
 judgments liable to error, 28 ; author- 
 ity of moral principles, 39 ; perfect 
 and imperfect obligation, 91 ; moral 
 rights, 94. 
 
 Hutton, R. H., on Divine existence, 230. 
 
 Huxley, Physical Basis of Life, 235. 
 
 IMMORTALITY of the Soul, 261. 
 
 Impulses to Action, their psychological 
 nature, 153-157 ; ethical character, 
 158-160. 
 
 'Indifferent 1 ,' how applied to actions Ly 
 the Stoics, 20 ; Cicero, ib. ; why un- 
 warrantable, ib. 
 
 Industry, 35. 
 
 Introspection, its possibility, 4 ; not a 
 method of philosophizing, 9. 
 
 Intuitional Theory, meaning of,,Jj?. 5 
 
 JACOBI, Knowledge of Self, 120. 
 Jouffroj', the relation of the senses to Con- 
 sciousness, 10 ; relation of Physiology 
 
294 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 to Psychology, 12 ; ethical theory, 59 ; 
 Knowledge of Self, 119. 
 
 Jowett's, Prof., Plato, 45, 210, 227. 
 
 Judgment, all knowledge of moral quality 
 wears this form, 27 ; moral judgments 
 are marked by intellectual quality 
 only, 28 ; apply general truths, 28 ; 
 pre-suppose knowledge of first princi- 
 ples, 30. 
 
 KANT, on essential validity of moral princi- 
 ples, 37 ; distinction of Reason from 
 Reasoning, 39 ; his Categorical Im- 
 perative, 39 ; a priori truth only regu- 
 lative, 40 ; his cogitable world, 40 ; 
 Right not phenomenal, 40 ; distinction 
 of Pure and Practical Reason, 42 ; 
 ethical theory, 53-55; on an erring 
 conscience, 81 ; knowledge of Self, 
 120 ; difficulty in foreseeing conse- 
 quences, 135 ; will is a man's proper 
 self, 167, 191 ; relation of reason to 
 will, 167 ; moral freedom not a psy- 
 chological question, 174 ; influence of 
 motives, 180 ; knowledge of causality, 
 184; cogitable world, 192; use of 
 metaphysic, 220 ; value of arguments 
 for Divine existence, .226 ; immortality 
 of the soul, 261 ; on Habit, 264. 
 
 King, Arch., on the origin of Evil, 256, 
 258. 
 
 Knowledge of moral distinctions, not at- 
 tained by Sentiment or Association, 
 24 ; not by sensation, 26 ; nor by per- 
 ception, 26 ; but by judgment, 27 ; 
 which rests on general principles, 28 ; 
 neither judgments nor intuitions pos- 
 sess moral quality, 28, 39. 
 
 Knowledge of the Divine Nature, 247. 
 
 LAUIUE, Simon S., The PJiilos. of Ethics, 
 
 and Notes Expos, and Crit., 79. 
 Laws of Nature, as described by Hobbes, 
 
 37- 
 
 Laycock, Prof., on mind and brain, 9. 
 Lecky's European Morals, 131. 
 Leibnitz, necessary truth, 50 ; motive and 
 
 will, 169 ; liberty of indifference, 
 
 174 ; motives, 178. 
 
 Leitch's, Dr., Ethics of Theism, 76. 
 
 Lewes, G. H., on Comte's rejection of 
 Psychology, 65 ; on the need for an 
 explanation of the internal order of 
 our nature, 66. 
 
 Locke, on innate ideas, 51 ; knowledge of 
 Self, 118; definition of will, 165; dis- 
 tinction between desire and will, 166 ; 
 freedom applies to Person, not to 
 Will, 175 ; causality, 184. 
 
 Lorimer, Prof., on Trendelenburg's ethical 
 theory, 79 ; perfect and imperfect 
 obligation, 91 ; on Utilitarianism, 131. 
 
 MACKINTOSH, Dissertation, 76 ; theory 
 of conscience, 77 ; moral disorder, 
 211. 
 
 M'Cosh, President, distinction between 
 Reason and Reasoning, 39 ; his ethical 
 theory, 72 ; knowledge of Self, 122 ; 
 on Utilitarianism, 131 ; free-will and 
 consciousness, 183 ; on Comte's repre- 
 "sentation of Deity, 239 ; negative 
 thinking, 248. 
 
 Maine De Biran, knowledge of Self, 119; 
 causality, 184. 
 
 Malebranche, necessary truth, 50. 
 
 Mansel, the relation of psychology to 
 Ethics, 16; knowledge of Self, 122; 
 causality, 184 ; on Pantheism, 240 ; 
 testimony as to ignorance of God, 
 247 ; negative thinking, 248. 
 
 Marriage, its natural and ethical signifi- 
 cance, 266. 
 
 Martcnsen on personality, 14; ethical 
 theory, 71 ; on the name, Conscience 
 78. 
 
 Martineau, morality not a system of truths, 
 
 So- 
 Materialistic Theory of the Universe, 235, 
 236. 
 
 Masson, Prof., Recent Brit. Philos., 71. 
 
 Maudsley, his arguments against Intro- 
 spection, 5 ; his interpretation of the 
 m.idinan's consciousness, 7. 
 
 Maurice, F. D., on Conscience, 76. 
 
 Mendelssohn, Moses, Immortality of the 
 Soul, 261. 
 
 Metaphysic of Ethics, 219; Objections 
 to a speculative part of the Mor. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 295 
 
 Phil., 220; canons of metaphysical 
 speculation, 222. 
 
 Mill, James, theory of the development of 
 mind from sensation, 100-108 ; identi- 
 fies consciousness with sensation, 103 ; 
 theory of Conscience, 139. 
 
 Mill, J. S., on Consciousness, 4; his ' Psy- 
 chological' mode of inquiry, 6; on 
 contradictoriness of moral laws, 41 ; 
 origin of our knowledge, 98 ; sensation 
 and consciousness, 104 ; laws of asso- 
 ciation, 113 ; basis of morals, 123 ; 
 happiness, 124 ; quality of pleasure, 
 125; Utilitarian theory, 130; differ- 
 ence between human and animal 
 pleasure, 131 ; greatest happiness, 
 not the world's happiness, 136 ; theory 
 of obligation, 148 ; difference between 
 foundation and knowledge of, 149; 
 that Conscience is desire, 156; free-will 
 and Consciousness, 182, 193 ; free-will 
 and motives, 183 ; Necessitarianism, 
 194 ; volitions follow their antecedents 
 invariably, 198 ; power of motives, 
 199; responsibility, 200; power of 
 punishment, r>6o. 
 
 Moral distinctions, knowledge of, 17 ; is 
 of the nature of judgment, 27. 
 
 Moral Judgments, 23 ; involve general 
 truth, 30; not generalized truths, 
 
 3i- 
 
 Moral Philosophy its nature, i ; its place 
 among sciences, 2 ; primarily induc- 
 tive, partly deductive, 2 ; the order of 
 its investigations, 3. 
 
 Moral Rights, in what founded, 94 ; com- 
 mon and special, 95 ; natural rights 
 cannot be surrendered, 95 ; Duties 
 and Rights are equivalents, 95 ; moral 
 right, perfect, 95; natural and ac- 
 quired, 96. 
 
 Moral Sentiments, their nature and laws 
 of exercise, 203-207. 
 
 Motives, their nature and influence, 176- 
 185. 
 
 Mozley on the Augustinian Doctrine of 
 Predestination, 255. 
 
 NECESSARY' truth, 36; use of, in Scotch 
 Philos., 37. 
 
 Necessitarianism, 194-202. 
 Negative and positive notions, 248. 
 Nerve and Brain, their relations to Mind, 
 ii ; two orders of nerves, n. 
 
 OBLIGATION. See Duty. 
 
 Obligations, ' perfect and imperfect,' 89 ; 
 history of the distinction, 89-91. 
 
 Origin of finite existence, problem con- 
 cerning, 221. 
 
 Origin of knowledge under a development 
 theory, 98 ; history of opinion on *his 
 side, 99. 
 
 Origin of Moral Evil, 256. 
 
 PAIN, the laws of its experience, 124 ; the 
 
 test of obligation with Mr. J. S. M>!1, 
 
 149. 
 
 Paley, ethical theory, 129. 
 Pantheistic theory of the universe, 237. 
 Perception, knowledge of moral quality 
 
 not obtained by this power, 26. 
 Personality discovered in consciousness, 
 
 12 ; what it involves, 12 ; that it is the 
 
 basis of morality, 14. 
 Physical organism, its relation to mind, 
 
 8-12. 
 
 Physiology in its relation to Mind, 9-11. 
 Plato, is virtue one? 33; his Ethical theory, 
 
 44 ; his idea of God, 45, 227 ; theory of 
 
 reminiscence, 45 ; goodness not proved 
 
 by happiness, 135 ; mastery of the 
 
 passions, 186 ; moral disorder, 210; 
 
 immortality, 261 ; communism, 265 ; 
 
 religion, 269. 
 Pleasure, the laws of its experience, 124: 
 
 different in kind, 125 ; diversity of 
 
 quality, 125. 
 Political Government, moral conditions of, 
 
 267. 
 Positive Law, relation of to moral law, 
 
 267. 
 Positivism, described, 59-64; criticised, 
 
 64-68. 
 Price on authority of moral principles, 39 ; 
 
 ethical theory, 52. 
 Priestley, identified desire and will, 166; 
 
 remorse, 201. 
 Principle, meaning of the term. ao. 
 
2 6 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Property, acquisition of, 31-34 ; exchange 
 
 f 34 : rights of, 35. 
 Psychology, meaning of the term, 9 ; its 
 
 importance in Ethics, 15-16. 
 Punishment the test of obligation, with 
 
 Professor Bain. 147. 
 
 REASON, distinguished from reasoning, 
 
 39- 
 
 Reid, classification of moral actions, 21 ; 
 general truths in morals, 31 ; ethical 
 theory, 53 ; education of Conscience, 
 81 ; perfect and imperfect obligation, 
 91 ; moral rights, 94 ; knowledge of 
 Self, 119 ; classification of Impulses, 
 154 ; definition of Will, 165 ; distinc- 
 tion between desire and will, 166 ; 
 object of volition. 169; attributes free- 
 dom to the Person rather than to the 
 Will, 175 ; motive, 178 ; strongest 
 motive, 189. 
 
 Relations of Absolute Being to the pro- 
 blems of Moral life, 251. 
 
 Religion, Natural, as springing out of 
 Morality, 268. 
 
 Restraints upon action, their nature, 161 ; 
 the laws of their action, 161, 162. 
 
 Rothe, the Good, 18 ; an erring conscience, 
 81. 
 
 Royer-Collard, knowledge of Self, uq. 
 
 SAISSET on Pantheism, 240. 
 
 Sanction, meaning of, in morals, 148. 
 
 Schelling, knowledge of Self, 121. 
 
 Schleiermacher, ethical theory, 18, 58. 
 
 Schopenhauer, account of Conscience, 
 140. 
 
 Self, as known in consciousness, 12, 102- 
 108 ; history of opinion concerning, 
 1 18-122. 
 
 Self-determination as discovered in con- 
 sciousness, 12. 
 
 Self-evidencing, as applied to moral truth, 
 36; Cicero upon, 38. 
 
 Sensation, knowledge of moral quality not 
 obtained by this power, 26 ; its nature 
 and relation to a theory of knowledge, 
 100. 
 
 Sexes, relation of, 265 ; ethical relations 
 of, 265-6. 
 
 Shaftesbury, ' moral sense,' and theory of 
 morals, 26. 
 
 Shairp, Prin., on the Moral Dynamic, 
 217. 
 
 Smith, Adam, theory of morals, 25 ; moral 
 disorder, 211. 
 
 Social life, guidance of, 265. 
 
 Society, natural basis of, 265 ; ethical 
 basis of, ib. 
 
 Socrates, tendency to estimate good by 
 utility, 1 8 ; on unwritten laws, 36 ; his 
 Ethical Theory, 44 ; none willingly 
 evil, 209 ; future state, 260-1. 
 
 Sovereignty, Divine, Relation of to Free 
 Will, 253. 
 
 Spencer, Herb., use of 'indisputable,' 36. 
 
 Spinoza, his method, 3 ; his ethical theory, 
 49 ; freedom, 194 ; necessitarian, 196 ; 
 pantheism, 240. 
 
 Stewart, Dugald, Ethical theory, 53 ; 
 knowledge of Self, 119; classification 
 of Impulses, 154; distinction between 
 desire and will, 166 ; attributes free- 
 dom to the Person, 175 ; strongest 
 motive, 189. 
 
 Stirling, Dr. J. H., Secret of Hegel, 3 ; 
 on will in Hegel's theory, 193 ; Proto- 
 plasm, 235 ; on Hegel's theory of 
 being, 245. 
 Stoics, ethical system, 47 ; use 
 
 88 ; of Kar6p9<afj.a, go. 
 Supremacy of Conscience, 80. 
 
 TAPPAN, relation of Will to lower Im- 
 pulses. 168 ; strongest motive, 189. 
 j Trench, Archbishop, on the word ' Con- 
 science,' 78. 
 
 Trendelenburg on personality, 14; ethical 
 theory, 79 ; quoted in Prof. Lorimer's 
 Institutes of Law, 79; conscience 
 and will, 187. 
 
 Tylor, on belief in Divine existence, 229. 
 
 UrHAM, distinction between desire and 
 will, 166 ; relation of will to lower 
 impulses, 168 ; motive and will, :69; 
 classification of motives, 179; freedoir- 
 and uniformity of action, 188 ; strongest 
 motive. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 297 
 
 Utilitarianism, different uses of the name, 
 128 ; criticism of, 130-137 ; its account 
 of Conscience, 139-144 ; of Duty, 145- 
 152. 
 
 VIRTUE, Foundation of, 251. 
 Virtues, number and relations of, 264. 
 
 WARDI.AW, l)r., on the Disorder of our 
 
 Moral Nature, 215. 
 Way-land's Ethical theory, 74. 
 Whewell's Ethical theory, 72 ; Hist, of 
 
 Mor. Phil., 76; an erring Conscience, 
 
 %i ; moral rights, 94, 
 
 Will, its nature, 165 ; its relation to other 
 powers, 167 ; the laws of its exercise, 
 169-172; freedom of will, 173-193; its 
 relation to Divine Sovereignty, 253. 
 
 Williams, Ed., on Divine Sovereignty, 
 
 255- 
 
 Willis, Life, Corrcsp., and Ethics of 
 Spinoza, 241. 
 
 YOUNG, Province of Reason, 2.18, 250. 
 
 ZELLER'S Socrates and the Socratic 
 Schools, 44 ; Stoics, Epicureans, and 
 Sceptics, 47, 
 
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