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 THE LIBRARY 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES 
 
 SCHOOL OF LAW
 
 iiate District
 
 A 
 TREATISE ON THE LAW 
 
 OF 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 
 
 INCLUDING 
 
 THE RULES REGULATING THE PROPER PRESENTATION 
 
 OF EVIDENCE AND ITS RELEVANCY; THE 
 
 MODE OF PROOF IN PARTICULAR 
 
 CLASSES OF CRIMES 
 
 COMPETENCY AND EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES 
 
 WITH FULL REFERENCES TO THE DECISIONS 
 
 SECOND EDITION 
 
 BY 
 
 H. C. UNDERHILL, LL. B 
 
 OF THE NEW YORK BAR 
 
 INDIANAPOLIS 
 
 THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY 
 1910
 
 T 
 1916 
 
 Copyright 1898 
 THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY 
 
 Copyright 1910 
 
 BY 
 
 H. C. UNDERHILL 
 
 THE HOLLENBECK PRESS 
 INDIANAPOLIS
 
 PREFACE 
 
 The general conditions involved in a consideration of the law 
 of criminal evidence are substantially the same as twelve years 
 ago when the First Edition of this work was published. The 
 author therefore trusts that he may be pardoned for quoting at 
 length from the Preface of the First Edition. 
 
 "The existing law of criminal evidence is almost wholly the 
 product of the judiciary of England and America during the last 
 hundred years. The disadvantages by which the accused was op- 
 pressed during the earlier periods of English criminal jurispru- 
 dence inaugurated a process of judicial legislation which evolved 
 a series of extremely technical rules. These rules mitigated, in a 
 large degree, the severity of the law, and frequently enabled an 
 accused person to establish his innocence. The advance of educa- 
 tion and of humane ideas which has, during the present century, 
 etYected so radical a reform in our criminal law to the advantage 
 of the accused, has obviated the necessity for these rules. 
 
 ''The rules of modern criminal procedure have been conceived 
 in a liberal spirit, and such safeguards are still thrown around the 
 accused as enable him to defend himself with much greater ad- 
 vantage than he could possess if he were defending a civil action. 
 But the state, as well as the prisoner, has rights in criminal pro- 
 ceedings, and it has been my aim to define these rights as far as 
 possible. 
 
 "I have endeavored to present : 
 
 ''First. A concise, but comprehensive and systematic treat- 
 ment of those fundamental doctrines of the law of evidence 
 which are exclusively invoked in the trial of crimes. 
 
 "Second. Those rules and principles of the law of evidence, 
 which, while not confined in their application to criminal trials, are 
 very frequently under consideration during such proceedings. 
 
 "The relevancy of particular classes of facts and the mode of 
 proving them are considered. 
 
 iii 
 
 <.U^ IiQ -2.
 
 IV PREFACE. 
 
 *'In the preparation of this work I have confined myself to 
 a presentation of the rules and principles of the law as I have 
 found them stated in the cases which have been decided by the 
 courts of last resort. 
 
 "The general rules of proof constituting the body of the law of 
 evidence are, so well settled as to obviate their discussion in detail 
 in this work. The main difficulty in judicial proceedings is to de- 
 termine when and to what extent general principles are applicable 
 to the facts and circumstances of particular cases. The solution 
 of this difficulty is to be found, first in ascertaining what the facts 
 and circumstances are, and next in determining how the general 
 principle claimed to be applicable has been applied in analogous 
 cases." 
 
 In this Second Edition the author has endeavored to cite all im- 
 portant cases which have been decided since the publication of the 
 First Edition and thus bring the work down to the date of going 
 to press. In the preparation of the First Edition nearly nine 
 thousand cases were analyzed, examined and cited, and several 
 thousand have been added to this number in the present edition. 
 The sections of the original text have been rewritten and enlarged 
 and many new sections have been added as developments in the 
 law have made such changes necessary. The total addition to the 
 text is considerably over two hundred pages. 
 
 In order to make the book more useful to the practitioner, cita- 
 tions are given not only to the official State Reports, but also to 
 the L. R. A., the American Decisions, the American Reports, the 
 American State Reports and to the Reporter System. 
 
 1367 Broadway, Brooklyn, N. Y. H. C. Underhill. 
 
 September 10, 1 910.
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 1. Neccssit)^ for rules of evidence in judicial proceedings 1-2 
 
 2. Elements of probability and improbability as affecting the proof of 
 
 facts and circumstances 2-3 
 
 3. The character and mental capacity of a witness as relating to the 
 
 credibility of his testimony 3-5 
 
 4. The motive of the witness to misrepresent 5-6 
 
 5. Concurrent or corroborative testimony 6-7 
 
 6. Circumstantial evidence — To sustain conviction must exclude every 
 
 rational hypothesis except that of guilt 7-i- 
 
 7. Circumstantial evidence to prove corpus delicti in trial for homicide. 12-14 
 
 8. Distinction between civil and criminal proceedings as regards rele- 
 
 vancy and manner of proof 14-16 
 
 9. The weight of evidence — Rules in civil and criminal cases distin- 
 
 guished — Reasonable doubt 16 
 
 10. Difificulty of defining reasonable doubt 16-17 
 
 11. Demonstration and belief beyond a reasonable doubt distinguished. 17-18 
 
 12. Attempted definitions of reasonable doubt 1&-21 
 
 13. Precaution to be employed in defining reasonable doubt 22-24 
 
 14. Doctrine of reasonable doubt applicable to misdemeanors as well 
 
 as to felonies 24-25 
 
 15. Reasonable doubt in the mind of one juror 25-26 
 
 16. Statutory changes in rules of evidence and modes of procedure 26-27 
 
 i6a. Number of witnesses required and positive and negative evidence.. 27-30 
 
 CHAPTER H. 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 17. The presumption of innocence — General rule 31-33 
 
 18. The presumption of innocence accompanies the accused until a ver- 
 
 dict is rendered 33-34
 
 VI TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 19. Presumption of chastity of female, of continuance of life, etc., con- 
 
 flicting with the presumption of innocence 34-35 
 
 20. Presumptions from infancy 35-36 
 
 21. Certain facts which the courts are presumed to know 36-39 
 
 22. Burden of proof and presumption of innocence distinguished 39-40 
 
 23. Burden of proof — General rule casting it upon prosecution 40-43 
 
 24. Burden of proving a negative — Facts peculiarly within knowledge of 
 
 party alleging them 43-44 
 
 24a. Constitutionality of statutes regulating the burden of proof 45 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY. 
 
 25. Ex parte character of evidence before the grand jury 46-47 
 
 26. Legal and proper evidence only receivable — Effect of basing in- 
 
 dictment on incompetent evidence 47-51 
 
 27. The accused as a witness before the grand jury 51-52 
 
 28. Sufficiency of evidence before the grand jury 52 
 
 29. Contempt of witnesses before the grand jury 52-53 
 
 30. The indictment is not evidence 53 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 VARIANCE AND PROOF OF THE VENUE. 
 
 31. Proving the substance of the offense — What variances are material. 54-55 
 
 S2. Proof of essential particulars of persons, time and place 55-56 
 
 T,^. Variance in names — Idem sonans 56-57 
 
 34. Variance in proving species or genus of animals 57-58 
 
 35. Proving the venue — Judicial notice of general geographical facts. . . 58-59 
 ;^6. The venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence — Proof be- 
 yond a reasonable doubt not required 59-6i 
 
 ;^7. Proof of venue in forgery and crimes committed in retirement 61-62 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 38. Definition of primary evidence 63-64 
 
 39. Primariness of witnesses — Proof of handwriting 64-66
 
 TABLE OF COXTENTS. vii 
 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 40. Evidence which is required to be in writing 66 
 
 41. Statutor}' requirements as regards evidence of certain facts 66-67 
 
 4ra. The necessity for showing loss or destruction of the writing 67-69 
 
 42. Notice to produce 69-70 
 
 43. Writings whose existence and contents are in issue — Impeachment 
 
 by contradictory writings 70-7 1 
 
 44. Primary evidence of collateral facts 7i-74 
 
 45. Exception in the case of proving general results 74-/6 
 
 46. Proof of records and official appointments 76-77 
 
 47. Physical condition of personal property 77-7? 
 
 48. Incriminating articles — Weapons, clothing, etc 78-81 
 
 49. Inscriptions on bulky articles 81-82 
 
 50. Photographs as primary evidence — Personal identity 82-85 
 
 51. Accuracy and relevancy of photographs 85-P6 
 
 52. Paintings and drawings 87 
 
 53. Real evidence — Inspection by jurors 88-90 
 
 54. Compelling accused to submit to inspection or to stand for identi- 
 
 fication 90-9- 
 
 55. Mode and effect of identifying evidence 9^-95 
 
 56. Identification of the voice 95-96 
 
 CHAPTER yi. 
 
 THE ACCUSED AS A "WITNESS. 
 
 57. Statutory competency of the accused 97-9? 
 
 58. The accused is not compellable to testify against himself — His 
 
 credibility 99-101 
 
 58a. Evidence obtained by searches legal and illegal 101-104 
 
 59. Mode of examining the accused 104-105 
 
 60. Cross-examination — Incriminating and disgracing questions 105-107 
 
 61. Examination as to prior imprisonment, etc 107-11T 
 
 62. Statutory limitation of cross-examination to relevant matters. .. . 111-112 
 
 63. Mode of cross-examination 112 
 
 64. Privileged communications on the cross-examination 113 
 
 65. Conclusiveness of answers — Impeachment by other witnesses.... 113-114 
 
 66. The bad character of the accused — When admissible to impeach 
 
 him 114-1T5 
 
 67. Commenting on the failure of the accused to testify 115-11/ 
 
 68. Exclusion or withdrawal of comments on failure to testify — Fail- 
 
 ure to call other witnesses, or to testify to incriminating facts. . 117-119 
 
 69. Accomplices defined — Province of court and jury ■ 119-122 
 
 70. Accomplices when jointly indicted — Witnesses for each other 122-124 
 
 71. Accomplices as witnesses for the state 124-126
 
 Vlll TABLE OF COXTEXTS. 
 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 Immunity of accomplice when testifying for the state 126-127 
 
 73. Credibility and corroboration of accomplices 127-129 
 
 74. Extent of corroboration required — It must be of material facts.. 129-132 
 The nature of the crime as a test of corroboration — Sufificiency 
 
 of corroboration 132-134 
 
 /- 
 
 /o 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. 
 
 76. Character defined — The accused may show good character I35-I37 
 
 "J"/. Specific traits only relevant — Character of associates 137-139 
 
 78. Bad character — When admissible 139-141 
 
 79. Effect and operation of evidence of good character 141-142 
 
 80. Good character, though never conclusive, may acquit if it creates 
 
 a reasonable doubt 143-145 
 
 81. jMode of proof — Irrelevancy of personal opinions — Derogatory 
 
 rumors in rebuttal 146-147 
 
 %2. Specific evil acts — Relevancy of 148-149 
 
 83. Remoteness — Character subsequent to the date of the crime 149-150 
 
 84. The grade and moral nature of the crime 151 
 
 85. Disposition is irrelevant 151-152 
 
 "^6. Number of witnesses to character 152 
 
 86a. Instructions as to the character of the accused 152-153 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. 
 
 9^7. General rule regarding evidence of crimes other than that 
 
 charged in the indictment 154-156 
 
 88. Connected or intermingled crimes forming parts of one whole... 157-161 
 
 89. Evidence of other offenses to show specific intention or guilty 
 
 knowledge 161-163 
 
 90. Relevant evidence not inadmissible because indirectly proving or 
 
 tending to prove another crime — Dissimilar crimes united in 
 motives 163-167 
 
 91. Identity of means employed in several crimes — Identity of ac- 
 
 cused 168-169 
 
 92. Sexual crimes 169
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. ix 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE A PART OF THE RES GEST^. 
 SECTION. PACES. 
 
 93. Scope and limit of facts and declarations forming a part of the 
 
 res gestce 170 -174 
 
 94. Necessity for approximation of unity in time, place and motive 
 
 prompting the declarations 174-175 
 
 95. Declarations must explain and illustrate the main transaction... 175-176 
 
 96. Contemporaneous character of the declarations 176-177 
 
 97. Interval for consideration or taking advice 178-180 
 
 98. Mental and physical conditions as influencing the declarations. . . 180-182 
 
 99. Admissibility for the accused — Relevancy 182-183 
 
 TOO. Declarations uttered prior to the crime 183-18-! 
 
 lor. Declarations by bystanders and third persons 184-186 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 102. Definition — Religious element 187-189 
 
 103. Consciousness of nearness of death as shown by the declarant's 
 
 language 189-193 
 
 104. Sending for legal or spiritual advisers, nature of wounds or 
 
 other circumstances showing a consciousness of approaching 
 
 death I93-I95 
 
 105. Period intervening between the statement and the death 195-197 
 
 106. Dying declarations not admissible to prove all crimes I97-I99 
 
 107. Dying declarations distinguished from those which are a part of 
 
 res gestce 199-200 
 
 108. Opinions contained in dying declarations are not admissible.... 200-202 
 
 109. Must refer to the res gestce of the homicide 202-203 
 
 no. Mode of proof, credibility, relevancy and weight , 203-206 
 
 111. Declaration is admissible in its entirety — Contradictory or un- 
 
 truthful character 206-208 
 
 1 12. The form of the declaration 208-21 1 
 
 113. Declarations by signs — I\Iental condition of the declarant 211-212 
 
 114. Dying declarations made by children 212
 
 ^ TABLE OF CONTEXTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. 
 SECTION'. PAGES. 
 
 115. Facts showing a consciousness of suilt 213-214 
 
 116. Falsehoods by accused or suspected persons 214-216 
 
 117. Demeanor subsequent to crime 216-218 
 
 1 18. The flight or attempted escape of the accused 218-222 
 
 iig. Explanation by accused of his flight or attempted escape 222-225 
 
 iiga. Declarations which are self-serving are rejected 225-226 
 
 120. Resistance to arrest 226-227 
 
 I2T. Fabricating or suppressing evidence 227-229 
 
 122. Silence under accusations of guilt 230-232 
 
 123. Attendant circumstances explaining motives and reasons of si- 
 
 lence 232-234 
 
 124. The accusatory assertion or question 234-237 
 
 CHAPTER XH. 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 125. Definition and classification 238-241 
 
 126. Voluntary character of confessions 242-245 
 
 127. Burden of proof to show voluntary character 245-247 
 
 128. Circumstances under which confession becomes involuntary.... 247-249 
 
 129. Confessions made while under arrest 249-251 
 
 130. Effect of cautioning the accused 251-254 
 
 T31. Confessions under oath 254-256 
 
 132. Confessions taken at the preliminary examination 256-258 
 
 133. Mode of proving confessions made at the preliminary examina- 
 
 tion 259-261 
 
 134. Confessions of persons associated in a conspiracy 261 
 
 135. Artifice or deception used 261-263 
 
 136. Confessions by intoxicated persons 263-265 
 
 137. Admissions receivable though involuntary 265 
 
 138. When facts discovered admit parts of an involuntary confes- 
 
 sion 266-267 
 
 139. Confessions procured by persons in authority 267-269 
 
 140. Confession need not be spontaneous 269-271 
 
 141. Confessions made by signs or gestures 271-272 
 
 142. Confessions of treason -7^ 
 
 143. Confessions made by young children 272-273 
 
 144. Judicial confessions — Plea of guilty 273-276
 
 TABLE OF COXTEXTS. xi 
 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 145. Confessions of persons not indicted 276-277 
 
 146. The value of confessions as evidence 277-279 
 
 147. Mode of proof — When corroboration is required 279-281 
 
 147a. Credibility of confession and use of in favor of the accused. . . . 281-283 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 ALIBI. 
 
 148. Definition and character of alibi — Burden of proof 284-286 
 
 149. Distance and period of absence 286-288 
 
 150. Relevancy of evidence 288 
 
 151. Impeaching the alibi — Defendant's declarations 288-289 
 
 152. , Reasonable doubt 289-290 
 
 153. Cautioning the jury 291-295 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF INSANITY AND INTOXIC.\TION. 
 
 154. Mental capacity to know right and wrong as a test of insanity. . 296-297 
 
 155. Uncontrollable impulse and insane delusions 298-299 
 
 156. Presumption of continuance of insanity 299-300 
 
 157. Burden of proof to show sanity and insanity 300-302 
 
 158. Proof of insanity beyond a resonable doubt not required 303-304 
 
 159. The character and range of evidence to show insanity 305-306 
 
 160. Evidence showing the appearance, conduct and language of the 
 
 accused after the crime — Evidence of insanity in family of ac- 
 cused 306-308 
 
 161. Non-expert evidence 308-310 
 
 162. Non-expert must relate in evidence facts on which his impres- 
 
 sion is based — Degree of knowledge required 310-312 
 
 163. Expert evidence — What constitutes an expert — Physical exami- 
 
 nation of accused to ascertain sanity 312-316 
 
 164. Evidence of voluntary intoxication — When irrelevant 316-317 
 
 165. Insensibility or insanity from indulgence in intoxicants may be 
 
 shown 317-318 
 
 166. Evidence of intoxication as bearing on a specific intent, or on 
 
 premeditation 318-320 
 
 167. Mode of proving or disproving intoxication 320-321 
 
 168. Morphine habit 32i
 
 Xll TABLE OF CONTEXTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 i6g. Foundation of the doctrine and classification of communications 322-324 
 
 170. Executive communications and transactions 324-325 
 
 171. Communications to police officials 325-326 
 
 172. Communications to attorneys at law 326-327 
 
 173. Communications made by or to the agent of the attorney 328-330 
 
 174. Character and date of the communications 330-332 
 
 175. Communications made in contemplation of crime 332-33S 
 
 176. Permanency of the privilege — Waiver 335-337 
 
 177. Writings, when privileged 337-33^ 
 
 178. Communications to spiritual adviser 338-340 
 
 179. Communications passing between medical practitioners and their 
 
 patients 340-343 
 
 180. Death of the patient — Purpose of the communication — Contem- 
 
 plated crime 343-344 
 
 181. Communications made during an examination to detect or ascer- 
 
 tain sanity 344 
 
 182. Secrecy of telegrams 344-345 
 
 183. Indecency of the facts to be proved 345-346 
 
 184. Privileged communications between husband and wife 346-347 
 
 185. Husband and wife as witnesses in criminal proceedings 347-349 
 
 186. Statutory competency of husband and wife 349-350 
 
 187. Confidential communications between husband and wife 350-353 
 
 188. Husband or wife of co-defendant as a witness for or against 
 
 his associate in crime — Testimony of husband or wife on trial 
 
 of a third person tending to criminate 353-354 
 
 189. Valid marriage is necessary 355 
 
 190. Privilege as relating to the evidence of judicial officers 355-357 
 
 191. Privilege as relating to grand jurors 357-359 
 
 192. Statutory regulations of the competency of grand jurors 3S9-36o 
 
 193. Evidence of traverse jurors 360-361 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF FORMER JEOPARDY. 
 
 194. Plea of former conviction or acquittal 362 
 
 195. Record of former trial in evidence 362-364 
 
 196. Essential facts to be shown 364-365 
 
 197. Identity of crime and person 365-366 
 
 198. Criminal judgments as admissions 367
 
 TABLE OF CONTEXTS. xiii 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 199. Definition and formal requirements of the oath 368-369 
 
 200. When witness may afifirm 369-370 
 
 201. Religious belief of the witness 370-372 
 
 202. Insanity — When disqualifying a witness Zl^-ZIT) 
 
 203. Mode of proving insanity of witness ZTh-Z7A 
 
 204. Deaf mutes as witnesses 374-375 
 
 205. Children on the witness stand 1 375-378 
 
 206. Incompetency of witnesses caused by conviction of infamous 
 
 crime 378-379 
 
 207. The pardon of the convict — When restoring competency 379-380 
 
 208. Mode of proving pardon — Parol evidence 380-381 
 
 209. Statutory regulations removing the incompetency of persons 
 
 convicted of crime 381-383 
 
 210. Statutes construed 383 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 21 1. Direct examination — Leading questions 384-386 
 
 212. When leading questions may be asked on the direct examina- 
 
 tion 386-388 
 
 213. Forgetful witness may be asked leading questions 388-390 
 
 214. Questions put to the witness by the court 390-392 
 
 215. Judicial remarks upon the demeanor or credibility of a witness 
 
 during his examination 393 
 
 216. Answers must be responsive 394 
 
 217. Refreshing the memory of a forgetful witness by memorandum. 394-397 
 
 218. Character of the memorandum employed to refresh the memory. 397-398 
 
 219. Purpose and importance of cross-examination 398-399 
 
 220. When right to cross-examine is lost — Cross-examination con- 
 
 fined to matters brought out on direct 399-402 
 
 221. Cross-examination to test credibility 402-405 
 
 222. When answers to questions involving collateral matters asked 
 
 in cross-examination may be contradicted — Hostility or friend- 
 ship towards the accused 405-407 
 
 223. Re-direct examination 407-410 
 
 224. Recalling witnesses 410-41 1 
 
 225. Exclusion and separation of witnesses 411-414
 
 XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 226. Refusal to testify 414-415 
 
 22~. Interpreting the language of the witness 415-416 
 
 228. Improper reception of evidence by the jurors 416-418 
 
 229. View by the jurors — Discretionary power of the court 418-419 
 
 230. Purpose of the view is to afford evidence 419 
 
 231. The right of the accused to be present during the taking of riie 
 
 view 419-420 
 
 232. Presence of the accused while taking testimony 421-422 
 
 233. Experiments in and out of court 422-424 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 THE IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 234. Impeachment of witnesses — General rule 425-426 
 
 235. The impeachment of necessary witnesses and those unexpectedly 
 
 hostile 426-429 
 
 236. Impeachment of adverse witnesses by showing bad reputation 
 
 for veracity — Belief under oath z^9-43i 
 
 2.Z7. Impeachment by showing the general bad character of the wit- 
 ness aside from truthfulness 431-433 
 
 238. Impeachment of the adverse witness by showing contradictory 
 
 statements — Necessity for foundation 433-436 
 
 239. Impeachment by contradictory affidavits, depositions and otI~er 
 
 writings 436-437 
 
 240. Contradictory writings must be shown to the witness who is to 
 
 be impeached 438 
 
 241. Contradiction of irrelevant matters not permissible — Proof of 
 
 confirmatory statements 438-439 
 
 242. Previous silence as impeachment 439-440 
 
 243. Relevancy of evidence to show the general reputation for truth- 
 
 fulness of a witness who has been impeached 440-441 
 
 244. Limitations upon the right to ask questions which disgrace the 
 
 witness 442-443 
 
 245. Impeachment by showing social connections, occupation and 
 
 manner of living 443-446 
 
 246. When and how previous imprisonment or conviction of crime 
 
 may be shown 446-447 
 
 247. Incriminating questions • 447-452 
 
 248. Interest and bias of the witness as impeachment 452-456
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XV 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 249. The subpoena — Witness fees 457-458 
 
 250. Constitutional right of the accused to compulsory process to 
 
 procure the attendance of witnesses 458-460 
 
 251. Subpoena duces tecum 460-461 
 
 252. Validity of reasons for not producing writings 461-462 
 
 253. Service of the subpoena and time allowed to witnesses 462 
 
 254. Recognizance to secure the attendance of witnesses where the 
 
 hearing is postponed 462-463 
 
 255- Obstructing the attendance of witnesses 463-465 
 
 256. Change of venue for the convenience of witnesses 465 
 
 257. The intentional absence of witnesses — When it constitutes a con- 
 
 tempt of court 465-466 
 
 258. Privilege of witnesses from civil arrest and from service of 
 
 civil process 466-468 
 
 259. Attendance of witnesses in custody 468 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 ABSENT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. 
 
 260. Grounds for admitting the testimony of missing witnesses 469-470 
 
 261. Deceased or insane witnesses — How death of witness may be 
 
 proved 4/0 
 
 262. Witnesses sick or out of the jurisdiction — Distinction between 
 
 civil and criminal cases 47^ 
 
 263. Mode of proving absence of witness 471-472 
 
 264. Absence of witness procured by connivance — Relevancy and use 
 
 of evidence of such witness 472-473 
 
 265. Cross-examining and confronting witnesses 473-474 
 
 266. Mode of proving the evidence of the absent witness — Substance 
 
 only need be stated 474-475 
 
 267. Stenographer's notes, judge's minutes and bill of exceptions 
 
 when used to prove the evidence of the absent witness 475-477 
 
 268. Continuance when granted because of absence of witness — Dis- 
 
 cretionary power of the court 477-479 
 
 269. Due diligence in summoning witness must be proved — 'I lie com- 
 
 petency and materiality of his testimony must appear 479-482 
 
 270. What facts the affidavit for the continuance must contain 482-483 
 
 271. Admissions to avoid continuance — Constitutional right of the 
 
 accusefl to enjoy the benefit of oral testimony 4^3-4^5 
 
 272. Admission of facts as true to avoid continuance 485-486
 
 XVI TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 THE PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 
 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 273. The power and right of the jury to determine the law — Criminal 
 
 libel 487-488 
 
 274. Character and analysis of a general verdict 489-490 
 
 275. Charging the jury on the law — Physical power of the jury to 
 
 disregard the judge's charge 490-492 
 
 276. Charging on the evidence 493-494 
 
 z'/'j. Assumption of facts in charge 495 
 
 278. Necessity for evidence to sustain instructions 495-496 
 
 279. Directing a verdict 496-498 
 
 280. Order and manner of introducing the proof. . . .• 498 
 
 280a. The credibility of detectives and experts 499-500 
 
 CHAPTER XXni. 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. 
 
 281. Embezzlement — Essential facts constituting the crime 501-502 
 
 282. Embezzlement — The intention to convert 502-505 
 
 283. Proving other acts of embezzlement 505-506 
 
 284. Evidence of demand and refusal 506-507 
 
 285. The existence of the fiduciary relation 507-508 
 
 286. The ownership of the property 508-509 
 
 287. Evidence of efforts to conceal or dispose of property or money. 509-5TO 
 2S8. Circumstantial evidence to prove the venue 510 
 
 289. Value of the property 510-51 1 
 
 290. Admissions by the defendant 511 
 
 291. Documentary evidence 511-513 
 
 291a. Definition of larceny 5i3-5i4 
 
 292. Larceny — The felonious intention 514-516 
 
 293. The carrying away 516-517 
 
 294. Ownership — Character and proof of 517-518 
 
 295. Competency of owner of stolen goods as witness — Proof of his 
 
 non-consent 518-519 
 
 296. Identifying the staleh property 519-522 
 
 297. Recorded brands of cattle 522-523 
 
 298. Evidence of venue and of the value of money or property 523-525 
 
 299. Inference from possession of the property stolen 525 
 
 300. Recent and exclusive character of possession 526-527 
 
 301. Burden of explaining possession — Character of explanatory evi- 
 
 dence 528-530
 
 TABLE OF CONTEXTS. 
 
 SECTION. 
 302 
 
 304 
 305 
 306 
 
 307 
 30S 
 309 
 
 Explanatory declarations 530-531 
 
 Evidence of footprints S3I-532 
 
 Financial standing and expenditures of the defendant 532 
 
 Evidence of other crimes S32-534 
 
 Stolen goods found through inadmissible confession 534 
 
 Malicious mischief 535 
 
 ^lalicious intent 535-536 
 
 Ownership and value of property — Evidence that the accused 
 
 acted in good faith 537-538 
 
 310. Maliciously injuring animals 538-539 
 
 311. Injuries to grain, trees, crops, etc 539-540 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 312. Facts forming the corpus delicti — Evidence to prove the cause 
 
 and manner of death 541-546 
 
 313. The result of the autopsy as evidence 546-547 
 
 314. Variance in proof of means or weapon producing death 54^-55 1 
 
 315. Weapons as evidence 551-552 
 
 316. Identity of the deceased 552 
 
 317. The identification of the body of the deceased 552 
 
 318. Expert testimony and the employment of a chemical analysis 
 
 in caSes of homicide b}^ poisoning 553-555 
 
 319. Relevancy of evidence to show poisoning 555-556 
 
 319a. The declarations of the deceased 556-558 
 
 320. Presumption and proof of malice 558-560 
 
 321. Connected crimes 560-562 
 
 322. Conduct of the accused subsequent to the crime 562-563 
 
 2,22,. Facts showing possible motive 563-568 
 
 324. Competency of evidence showing the habits, character and dis- 
 
 position of the deceased 568-570 
 
 325. Nature of the proof required to show the character of the de- 
 
 ceased 570-572 
 
 326. Evidence of threats by the deceased 572-575 
 
 227. Evidence to prove the peaceable character of the accused 575-576 
 
 328. Threats by the accused — General nature of these threats 576-578 
 
 329. Form, character and mode of proving threats 578-580 
 
 330. Declarations forming a part of the res gesfce 580-582 
 
 330a. Declarations of the accused after the crime 582-583 
 
 331. Declarations of third persons and cries and exclamations of by- 
 
 standers 583-584 
 
 332. Threats against deceased by third persons. . . ; 584-585
 
 XX T-UiLE OF COXTi:XTS. 
 
 SECTION-. PAGES. 
 
 384. Lascivious cohabitation or living in unlawful cohabitation 662-663 
 
 385. Seduction defined 663 
 
 386. The sexual intercourse — Relevanc}^ of evidence 663-664 
 
 387. Evidence to prove the promises 664-665 
 
 388. Relevancy of the previous conduct of the parties 665-667 
 
 389. The examination, credibility and corroboration of the prosecu- 
 
 trix 667 
 
 390. Character of corroborative evidence required 668-669 
 
 391. The marriage of the accused to the seduced female 669-670 
 
 392. The chastity of the female — What constitutes chastity and houf 
 
 it may be proved 670-673 
 
 393. The presumption of chastity 673 
 
 394. Defilement of female ward or servant 674 
 
 395. Incest defined 674 675 
 
 396. Evidence to show the sexual intercourse 675-676 
 
 397. The kinship existing between the parties — Evidence of accom- 
 
 plices 676 
 
 398. Bigamy — The intent — Invalidity or annulment of first marriage. 677 
 
 399. Presumption and proof of death of spouse ■ 677-678 
 
 400. Competency of wife of accused 678 
 
 401. Absence of lawful spouse 679 
 
 402. Proof of marriage bj- eye-witness or certificate 679-680 
 
 403. Proof of marriage by reputation, cohabitation and conduct 680-681 
 
 404. The admissions of the accused as evidence to prove the mar- 
 
 riage — Primary evidence of the ceremony — When required... 681-682 
 
 405. Marriage certificates and transcripts of records as evidence — 
 
 Presumption of validity — Venue 682-683 
 
 406. Bigamous cohabitation 683 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 407. Rape defined — The nonconsent of the prosecutrix — Presump- 
 
 tion of incapacity to consent 684-686 
 
 408. Rape by infants 686-687 
 
 409. Relevancy of the victim's complaints — Proving the details of 
 
 what she said 687-68S 
 
 410. Proving the details to impeach or corroborate 688-689 
 
 411. Delay in making complaint — Reasons for delay 689-691 
 
 412. Medical testimony 692 
 
 413. Relevancy of the physical condition of the prosecutrix 692-694 
 
 414. The prosecutrix as a witness — Her competency and credibility — 
 
 Infancy of the prosecutrix when rendering her incompetent 
 
 as a witness 694-696
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXi 
 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 415. The prior relations of the parties 6g7 
 
 416. Proof of carnal knowledge requisite 698 
 
 417. The force or fraud employed — Threats and mortal fear — Failure 
 
 to make outcry 699-701 
 
 418. Reputation of the prosecutrix for chastity — Proof of specific un- 
 
 chaste acts 701-704 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 FORGERY. COUNTERFEITING AND FALSE PRETENSES. 
 
 419. Forgery — Definition and classification 705-706 
 
 420. Competency of witnesses 707 
 
 421. Variance in proving the writing 707-709 
 
 422. Fraudulent intent and guilty knowledge — Circumstantial evi- 
 
 dence to show 709-710 
 
 423. Evidence of similar crimes to show the intent— Effect of acquit- 
 
 tal — Relevancy of possession of forged papers on charge of 
 forgery 7'^'i--7^2, 
 
 424. Proof of uttering forged paper 714 
 
 425. The writing alleged to have been forged as evidence — Primary 
 
 evidence 714-716 
 
 426. Proving the venue 716 
 
 427. Fictitious names — Evidence to prove existence or non-existence 
 
 of person 716-717 
 
 428. Proving the corporate existence of the bank upon which the 
 
 forged check is drawn 717-718 
 
 429. Proving the handwriting — Expert evidence — Standards of com- 
 
 parison 718-720 
 
 430. Evidence to show that the forged writing could not accomplish 
 
 the purpose intended 721-722 
 
 431. Sufficiency of evidence — Pecuniary condition of the accused 722-723 
 
 432. Counterfeiting — Elements of the crime — Intent and guilty 
 
 knowledge — Evidence of similar offenses 724-725 
 
 433. Evidence to show that counterfeit money or implements for its 
 
 manufacture were found in the possession of the accused 725-726 
 
 434. Resemblance to the genuine 726-727 
 
 435. False pretenses 7-7-7-9 
 
 436. Evidence to show the intention of the owner 729 
 
 437. The intent to defraud 729-/31 
 
 438. Evidence of other similar crimes not inadmissible when relevant 
 
 to show the intent to defraud 7?i'^-7^2 
 
 439. The pretenses made and evidence to sliow their falsity 7?>--7M 
 
 440. The pretenses must have been calculated to deceive 734-735
 
 XXll TABLE OF CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION'. PAGES. 
 
 441. The value of the property obtained 735-736 
 
 442. Belief in the false representations 736 
 
 443. Evidence of the pecuniary condition of the accused at the date 
 
 of making the representations 72)7-72^ 
 
 444. The false pretenses not necessarily verbal 738-739 
 
 445. Proving the venue 739 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 446. Obstructing justice and resisting arrest — Proof of official char- 
 
 acter of officer resisted — Validity of his appointment 740-742 
 
 447. Intention to obstruct justice — Evidence of threats or to show 
 
 validity of warrant 742-743 
 
 448. Preventing attendance of witnesses 743 
 
 449. False swearing 743-744 
 
 450. Embracer}' — Evidence required 744-745 
 
 451. Bribery defined — Evidence of circumstances to prove corrupt 
 
 intention 745 746 
 
 452. Judicial notice of official character and acts - 746-747 
 
 453. Necessity for reliance on evidence of accomplices in the bribery 
 
 — Compulsory examination of accomplice 747-748 
 
 454. Proving other acts of bribery 748-749 
 
 455. Bribery of voters — Judicial notice of elections 749-75° 
 
 456. Extortion — Intent and guilty knowledge — Evidence to prove ig- 
 
 norance or mistake of law or fact 750-751 
 
 457. Value of the thing extorted — Burden of proving exception to 
 
 statute 751 
 
 458. Compounding offenses — The intent to screen the offender — 
 
 Mode of proving that a crime was committed 751-75^ 
 
 459. Contempt defined — Inherent judicial power to punish 753 
 
 460. Direct and constructive contempt distinguished — Court may take 
 
 notice of without evidence 753-754 
 
 461. Procedure in receiving evidence of constructive contempt 755-758 
 
 462. Escape — Distinction from prison breach 758 
 
 463. Intention of permitting escape — Negligence of officer 758-759 
 
 464. Aiding prisoner to escape 759-76o 
 
 465. Illegality of arrest, when relevant 760-761 
 
 466. Perjury — The intent to swear to what is false 761-762 
 
 467. Materiality of the testimony 763-764 
 
 468. Number of witnesses required and corroboration of single wit- 
 
 ness to prove falsity 764-766 
 
 469. Falsity of the testimony 766-767 
 
 470. Proof of the testimony alleged to be false 767-769
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. xxiii 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, PUBLIC PEACE AND PUBLIC 
 
 HEALTH. 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 471. Lotteries and gaming or gambling — What constitutes 770-771 
 
 472. Evidence to prove manner of playing 771 
 
 473. The bet or wager — Playing in public 71^-llZ 
 
 474. Accomplice evidence 774 
 
 475. Keeping gambling houses IIA-Il^ 
 
 476. Presumptions and burden of proof 776 
 
 477. Gambling instruments as evidence 111^117 
 
 478. Mailing obscene literature, etc 777-77'& 
 
 479. Evidence obtained by decoy letters 77^779 
 
 480. Adulteration of food, drugs, etc 779-78o 
 
 481. Evidence furnished by analysis 780-782 
 
 482. Keeping disorderly house 782-784 
 
 483. Dueling — Sending a challenge to fight a duel 784-785 
 
 484. Carrying concealed weapons — How concealment may be proved 
 
 —intent 785-788 
 
 485. Apprehension of danger 788-789 
 
 486. Character of the defendant as an officer or traveler 789-791 
 
 487. Forcible entry and detainer 79i 
 
 488. Affray 792 
 
 489. Riot 793-794 
 
 490. Conspiracy 794-795 
 
 491. Circumstantial evidence 795-797 
 
 492. Admissibility of acts and declarations of fellow-conspirators... 797-799 
 
 493. Must be made during existence of and in furtherance of the 
 
 conspiracy 799-801 
 
 494. Order of proving conspiracy to let in declarations 801-802 
 
 CHAPTER XXXn. 
 
 EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE EXTRADITION. 
 
 495. International extradition — Treaties and statutory regulation 803-804 
 
 496. Burden of proof and amount of evidence required in interna- 
 
 tional and interstate extradition to show criminality and other 
 essential facts 804-806 
 
 497. Fugitive character of the person claimed for extradition 806-808 
 
 498. Evidential rules governing interstate extradition 808-809 
 
 499. Character, form and authentication of indictments, etc., in in- 
 
 terstate extradition 809-81 1
 
 XXIV TABLE OF COXTENTS. 
 
 SECTION. PAGES. 
 
 500. Constitutional and statutory regulation of the mode of proving 
 
 and effect of records of other states 811-812 
 
 501. General rules regulating the taking of evidence in foreign extra- 
 
 dition 812-814 
 
 502. Authentication by consular certificate of warrants and "other 
 
 papers used as evidence in international extradition 814-815 
 
 503. The competency of certified copies as evidence of criminality... 815-816 
 
 504. Proof of foreign laws and treaties in international extradition.. 816-817 
 
 505. Proof of laws in interstate extradition 817-818 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS CRIME TO INCREASE PENALTY. 
 
 506. Statutes enhancing the punishment of habitual criminals 819-820 
 
 507. Constitutionality of legislation punishing habitual criminals 820-821 
 
 508. Conviction of the former crime must have been prior to the 
 
 commission of the crime now being tried 822 
 
 509. Effect of pardon of former crime in excluding proof of prior 
 
 conviction S2j^ 
 
 510. Setting out the former conviction in the indictment — Variance.. 823-824 
 
 511. Effect of plea of not guilty 824 
 
 512. Order of trying the issue of former conviction 824-826 
 
 513. Necessity of proving discharge from prison 826 
 
 514. Proof of the prior conviction — How made 826-827 
 
 515. Proof of the identity of the accused with the person previously 
 
 convicted 827-829 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
 
 516. General considerations 830-831 
 
 517. Diligent efforts to find and to procure the evidence in season 
 
 must be shown 831-833 
 
 518. Burden of proof — The new evidence must be set out in the affi- 
 
 davits 833 
 
 519. Credibility of ,the new evidence 834-835 
 
 520. Materiality and relevancy of the newly-discovered evidence 835 
 
 521. New evidence impeaching merely 836 
 
 522. The new evidence must not be cumulative merely 836-837
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XXV 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 EVIDENCE IN BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. 
 StXTION. PAGES. 
 
 523. Bastardy proceedings — Whether criminal or civil in their char- 
 
 acter 838-840 
 
 524. Degree of proof required — Doctrine of reasonable doubt not ap- 
 
 plicable 840-841 
 
 525. Evidence for the jury from the inspection of the child 841-843 
 
 526. Presumption of legitimacy 843-845 
 
 527. Evidence rebutting the presumption of legitimacy 845-846 
 
 528. The relations of the parties 846-848 
 
 529. Competency and credibility of the prosecutrix 848 
 
 530. Variance in proving the date of the conception 848-849 
 
 531. The reputation of the prosecutrix 849 
 
 532. Sexual intercourse with other men during the period of gesta- 
 
 tion 849-851 
 
 533. Admissibility of the admissions and declarations of the parties.. 851-853 
 
 534. Evidence of the preliminary examination 853 
 
 535. Evidence of compromise and settlement 854
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 Aaron v. United States, 155 Fed. 
 
 833 174 
 
 Abbott V. People, 86 N. Y. 460 325 
 Abernethy v. Commonwealth, loi 
 
 Pa. St. 322 328 
 
 Abies V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 292 476 
 Abrigo V. State, 29 Tex. App. 143 36 
 Achterberg v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 
 463 36 
 
 Ackerson v. People, 124 111. 563 
 
 123, 148, 152 
 
 Ackley v. People, 9 Barb (N. Y.) 
 
 6og 76 
 
 Adams, Ex parte, 25 Miss. 883 459 
 
 Adams v. Board of Trustees, S7 
 
 Fla. 266 218 
 
 V. New York, 192 U. S. 585 58a 
 
 V. People, 9 Hun (N. Y.) 89 
 
 66, 121 
 V. People, 47 111. 376 no 
 
 V. State, 52 Ala. 379 301 
 
 V. State, 78 Ark. 16 395 
 
 V. State, 28 Fla. 511 
 
 50, 153, 220, 232 
 V. State, 34 Fla. 185 235 
 
 V. State, 55 Fla. i 522 
 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 11 320 
 
 V. State, 129 Ga. 248 132 
 
 V. State, 29 Ohio St. 412 275 
 
 V. State (Tex. App., 1892), 19 
 
 S. W. 907 112 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 285 130 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 35 309 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 452 48 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 586 409 
 
 Adellberger v. State (Tex. Cr., 
 
 1897), 39 S. W. 103 468 
 
 Adkins V. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 
 539 271 
 
 Adkisson v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 
 
 296 403 
 
 Adreveno v. Mutual &c. Life 
 
 Assn., 34 Fed. 870 179 
 
 Adutt, In re, 55 Fed. 376 496 
 
 .-Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Deming, 
 
 123 Ind. 384 179 
 
 .\gan V. Hey, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 591 189 
 
 Agee V. State, 113 Ala. 52 421, 422 
 Ager V. State, 2 Ga. App. 158 437 
 
 Aguierre v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 519 449 
 Ahearn v. United States, 158 Fed. 
 
 606 72, 
 
 Aholtz V. People, 121 111. 560 517 
 
 Aiken v. State (Tex.), 64 S. W. 
 
 57 140 
 
 Alanis v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 
 81 S. W. 709 130 
 
 Albany City Bank v. Schermer- 
 
 horn, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 372 461 
 
 Alberty v. United States, 162 U. 
 
 S. 499 118 
 
 Albin V. State, 63 Ind. 598 153 
 
 Albright v. Lapp, 26 Pa. St. 99 226 
 Albritton v. State, 94 Ala. 76 I49-I53 
 Alderman v. People, 4 Mich. 414 
 
 72, 172, 176 
 
 Alexander v. State, 99 Ind. 450 473 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 406 305 
 
 V. State. 31 Tex. Cr. 359 377 
 
 V. United States, 138 U. S. 353 332 
 
 Alford V. State, 25 Fla. 852 196 
 
 V. State, 47 Fla. i 236, 238, 374 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 621 
 
 87, 331 
 
 Alfred v. State, 37 Miss. 296 126 
 
 Allams V. State, 123 Ga. 500 156, 157
 
 XXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 \Rcfcrcnccs ar 
 Allen V. Commonwealth ( Ky. ) , 
 82 S. W. 589 314 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 10 Ky. 58 225 
 V. Commonwealth, 26 Ky. L. 
 
 807 121 
 
 V. People, 82 111. 610 356 
 
 V. State, 40 Ala. 334 371 
 
 V. State, 60 Ala. 19 14 
 
 V. State, III Ala. 80 328, 331 
 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 61 118. 119 
 
 V. State, 148 Ala. 588 320 
 
 V. State, 70 Ark. 22 197 
 
 V. State, 74 Ga. 769 69 
 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 458 147 
 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 237 447 
 
 V. State (Miss., 1908), 45 So. 
 
 833 414 
 
 V. State, 61 Miss. 627 225 
 
 V. State, 10 Ohio St. 287 71, 72. 72, 
 V. State, 12 Tex .A.pp. 190 129 
 
 V. State, 16 Tex. App. 150 439 
 
 V. United States, 164 U. S. 492 
 
 15, 121. 118, 320 
 
 Allgood V. State, 87 Ga. 668 431 
 
 Allison V. State, 14 Tex. App. 402 71 
 Allred v. State, 126 Ga. 537 125 
 
 Alminowicz v. People, 117 111. 
 
 App. 415 524 
 
 Alpine v. State, 117 Ala. 93 ., 384 
 Alsobrook v. State, 126 Ga. 100 90 
 Alston V. State, 109 Ala. 51 352 
 
 Altman v. State (Ga. App.), 63 S. 
 
 E. 928 74 
 
 Altschuler v. Algaza, 16 Neb. 631 
 
 525, 529 
 
 Amos V. State, 83 Ala. i 127 
 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 120 494 
 
 Anderson v. Bank, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 
 
 644 ^77, 179 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 117 
 
 S. W. 364 89 
 
 V. Dunn, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 204 
 
 459 
 V. Imhofif, 34 Neb. 335 218 
 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 5 112 
 
 V. State, 104 Ala. 83 211, 387 
 
 V. State, 20 Fla. 381 7 
 
 V. State, 72 Ga. 98 126 
 
 V. State, 122 Ga. 175 275 
 
 e to Sections.^ 
 
 Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467 
 
 18, 58, 118, 417, 418 
 V. State, 82 Miss. 784, 409 
 
 V. State (Tex. 1897), 39 S. W. 
 
 109 471 
 
 V. State, 14 Tex. App. 49 206 
 
 V. State, 20 Tex. App. 312 69 
 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 341 336 
 
 V. State, 41 Wis. 430 407 
 
 V. State, 133 Wis. 601 126, 131, 484 
 Andre v. State, 5 Iowa 389 
 
 341, 390, 392, 393 
 Andrew v. State, 152 Ala. 16 41a 
 Andrews v. Andrews, 2 John Cas. 
 (N. Y.) 109 257 
 
 V. People, T,2> Colo. 193 130 
 
 V. State (Ala.), 48 So. 858 211 
 V. State, 21 Fla. 598 Z7 
 
 V. State, 116 Ga. 83 6 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.), 100 S. W. 
 
 922 269 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 83 
 
 S. W. 188 55. ITS 
 
 .'Kneals v. People, 134 111. 401 77, 238 
 Angelo V. People, 96 111. 209 21, 68 
 Angley v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 427 148 
 
 Anglin v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 475 296 
 Angling v. State, 137 Ala. 17 
 
 61, 132, 133 
 Angus V. State, 29 Tex. App. 52 326 
 Ankeny v. Rawhouser (Neb. 
 
 T901), 95 N. W. 1053 532 
 
 Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. 
 
 Tr. 1 139 175 
 
 Anshicks v. State, 6 Tex. App. 
 
 524 228 
 
 Anson v. People, 148 111. 494 
 
 89, 420, 423 
 .\nthony-v. State, Meigs (Tenn.) 
 
 265 III 
 
 App V. State, 90 Ind. 73, 211 
 
 Appleton V. State, 61 Ark. 590 
 
 loi, 330 
 Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 
 
 U. S. 222 498 
 
 Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426 72,, 49i 
 Archibald v. State, 122 Ind. 122 
 
 103, 1 1 1 
 Arcia v. State, 28 Tex. App. 198 2,2
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXIX 
 
 [References at 
 Arenz v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 
 
 737 482 
 
 Areola v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 51 297 
 Armitage v. State, 13 Ind. 441 434 
 Armor v. State, 63 Ala. 173 80, 167 
 Armstrong v. People, 30 Fla. 170 158 
 V. State, 30 Fla. 170 
 
 154, 156, 157, 161, 162 
 V. State, 14 Ind. App. 566 214 
 
 Arnold v. Chesebrough, 41 Fed. 
 
 74 
 
 174 
 402 
 
 77^ 93 
 
 12 
 
 119 
 
 214 
 
 V. State, 53 Ga. 574 
 V. State, 131 Ga. 494 
 V. State, 23 Ind. 170 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 435 
 V. State, 81 Wis. 278 
 Arnwine v. State (Tex. Cr.), 114 
 S. W. 796 330 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 477 324 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 213 265, 314 
 Ascher v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. 
 
 L. 134 103 
 
 Ashford v. State, 36 Neb. 38 371, 2)77 
 Ashwood V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 
 
 550 225 
 
 Ashworth v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 
 
 419 358 
 
 Askew V. State, 3 Ga. App. 79 225 
 Askren v. State, 51 Ind. 592 524 
 Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347 
 
 17, 18. 104, 166 
 Atkins V. State (Tenn.), 105 S. 
 
 W. 353 161 
 
 Attaway v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 403 147 
 
 Attorney-General v. Briant, 15 M. 
 
 & W. 169 171 
 
 Atwood V. State, 84 Ark. 623 310 
 V. Welton, 7 Conn. 66 201 
 
 Ausmus V. People (Colo., 1910), 
 
 107 Pac. 204 312, 330, 338, 429 
 
 Austin V. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. 
 
 L- 474 m 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 55 
 
 133, 267 
 
 V. People, 102 111. 261 67 
 
 V. State, 14 Ark. 555 220 
 
 Aiistine v. People, no 111. 248 270 
 
 Avery v. State, 10 Tex. App. 199 
 
 492, 494 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Ayers v. State, 88 Ind. 275 73 
 
 V. Watson, 137 U. S. 584 49 
 
 B 
 
 Babcock v. People, 13 Colo. 515 242 
 V. People, 15 Hun (N. Y.) 347 
 
 180, 200, 351, 439 
 Baccio V. People, 41 N. Y. 265 
 
 409, 411 
 Bachellor v. State, 10 Tex. 258 473 
 Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N. Y. 394 173 
 V. Harrington, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 63 533 
 
 V. State, 22 Fla. 51 70, 73 
 
 Badger v. State (Ga. App. 1909.), 
 
 63 S. E. 532 357 
 
 Bagley v. State, 3 Tex. App. 163 298 
 Bailey v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush 
 (Ky.) 688 485 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky. 1908), 
 113 S. W. 140 281 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 107 
 
 411, 416 
 V. State, 26 Ga. 579 195 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 49 So. 227 521 
 V. State, 36 Neb. 808 382 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 30 S. W. 669 388 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 706 133 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 540 
 
 386, 390, 391 
 
 Bain v. State, 61 Ala. 75 342 
 
 V. State, 74 Ala. 38 12 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 96 117 
 
 Bainbridge v. State, 30 Ohio St. 
 
 264 197 
 
 Bake v. State, 21 Md. 422 523 
 
 Baker v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 17 S. W. 625 228 
 
 V. Kuhn, 38 Iowa 392 176 
 
 V. London &c. R. Co., L. R. 3 
 
 Q. B. 91 ^79 
 
 V. People, 105 111. 452 346 
 
 V. State, 49 Ala. 350 485 
 
 V. State, 122 Ala. i 67 
 
 V. State, 85 Ark. 300 96, 108 
 
 V. State, 87 Ark. 564 469 
 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 452. 362. 364 
 
 V. State, 53 N. J. L. 45 80
 
 XXX 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Baker v. State, 25 Tex. App. i 130 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 392 loi 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.), 118 S. W. 
 
 542 405 
 
 V. State, 47 Wis iii 532 
 
 V. State, 56 Wis. 568 523 
 
 V. State, 69 Wis. 2^ 528 
 
 V. State, 80 Wis. 416 301 
 
 V. State, 120 Wis. 135 12, 184 
 
 Balbo V. People, 80 N. Y. 484 129 
 Raldez v. State, 2>7 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 413 6 
 
 Baldwin v. State, 46 Fla. 115 492, 493 
 
 V. State, 126 Ind. 24 257 
 
 V. State, I Sneed (Tenn.) 411 296 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 28 
 
 S. W. 951 130 
 
 Balkum v. State 115 Ala. 117 76 
 Ball V. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. L. 
 
 600 61 
 V. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 
 
 601 323 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 107 326 
 
 V. State 31 Tex. Cr. 214 241 
 
 Ballard v. State, 31 Fla. 266 70, 268 
 
 Ballinger v. Elliott, 72 N. Car. 
 
 596 258 
 Ballowe v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 44 S. W. 646 196 
 Banbury Peerage Case, i Sim. 
 
 & Stu. I53_ 526 
 Bank of Utica v. ^lersereau, ^ 
 
 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 528 ^ 175 
 
 Banks v. State, 84 Ala. 430 138 
 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 78, 380, 383 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. 644 296 
 
 Barber v. People, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 366 443 
 
 V. People, 203 111. 543 398 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 598 235 
 
 Barden v. State, 145 Ala. i 61 
 
 Bardin v. State, 143 Ala. 74 262 
 
 Bargagliotti, Ex parte, 6 Cal. App. 
 
 333 21 
 
 Barefield v. State, 14 Ala. 603 451 
 
 Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127 422 
 
 Barker v. State, i Ga. App. 286 213 
 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 276 473 
 
 Barlow v. State, 120 Ind. 56 309 
 
 Barnaby v. State, 106 Ind. 539 476 
 
 e to Sections.'\ 
 
 Barnard v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 App. Ill 67 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.), 76 S. W. 
 
 475 390 
 
 Barnards v. State, 88 Tenn. 183 6 
 
 Barnes v. Commonwealth, lOi Ky. 
 
 556 423 
 
 V. Harris, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 576 173 
 
 V. People, 18 111. 52 23 
 
 V. State, 88 Ala. 204 
 
 225, 409, 415, 416, 418 
 V. State, 134 Ala. 36 35 
 
 V. State, 89 Ga. 316 484 
 
 V. State, 2fi Tex. 356 127 
 
 V. State, 2)7 Tex. Cr. 320 
 
 211. 386, 387, 392 
 Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40 
 
 409, 410, 412, 414 
 V. State (Ala., 1909), 51 So. 
 
 299 119, 327, 333 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 280 363 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 538 379 
 
 Barney v. People, 22 111. 160 417 
 
 Barr v. People, 30 Colo. 522 71 
 
 Barrett v. State, 24 Ala. 74 249 
 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 182 395 
 
 Barron v. Annistotj (Ala. 1908), 
 
 48 So. 58 184 
 
 Barry v. Coville, 129 N. Y. 302 174 
 Barthelemy v. People, 2 Hill 
 
 (N. Y.) 248 365 
 
 Bartholomew v. People, 104 111 
 
 601 210 
 
 Bartley v. People, 156 111. 234 143, 147 
 Barton v. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 105 _ 484 
 
 Bartow v. People, 78 N. Y. 377 385 
 Bashinski v. State, 122 Ga. 164 475 
 Bass V. State, i Ga. App. 728 21 
 
 Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261 
 
 77, 82, 174 312 
 Bates V. Holladay, 31 Mo. App. 
 162 61 
 
 V. United States, 10 Fed. 92 479 
 Bateson v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 34 97. no, 328 
 
 Bathrick v. Detroit &c. Co., 50 
 
 Mich. 629 350 
 
 Batten v. State, 80 Ind. 394 
 
 119, 222, 312, 322
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 SXXl 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Battishill v. Humphreys, 64 ^lich. 
 
 514 218 
 
 Baum V. Reay, 96 Cal. 462 217 
 
 Baiimer v. State, 49 Ind. 544 395 
 Baxter v. Gormley, 186 ]\Iass. 168 533 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. App. 516 185 
 Bayntun v. Cattle, i Alood. & R. 
 
 265 455 
 
 Bays V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 548 
 
 70 
 276 
 
 247 
 
 221 
 
 69 
 
 Baysinger v. People, 115 111. 419 
 Beach v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 240 
 
 V. United States, 46 Fed. 754 
 Beal V. State, 138 Ala. 94 
 
 V. State, 72 Ga. 200 
 Bean v. People, 124 111. 576 
 
 416, 417, 517 
 Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275 482 
 
 Bearden v. State, 44 Ark. 331 232 
 Beasley v. State, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 
 
 705 486 
 
 Beason v. State (Miss. 1909), 50 
 
 So. 488 • 408 
 
 Beaty v. State, 82 Ind. 228 282 
 
 Beavers v. State, 103 Ala. 36, 15 
 So. 616 55, 108, 149, 152 
 
 V. State, 58 Ind. 530 36, 37, 50 
 Beck V. State, 44 Tex. 430 300 
 
 Beckwith v. Galice Mines Co., 50 
 
 Ore. 543 435 
 
 Bedgood v. State, 115 Ind. 275 72, 418 
 Bebees, Ex parte, 2 Wall. Jr. C. 
 
 C. 127 461 
 
 Beech's Case, i Leach Cr. L. 
 
 158 31 
 
 Beene v. State, 79 Ark. 460 312 
 
 Beers v. Jackman, 103 ]\Iass. 192 528 
 Behler v. State, 112 Ind. 140 239 
 Belcher v. State, 125 Ind. 419 
 Belden v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 565 
 Bell V. State (Ala.), 47 So. 242 
 
 44, 262 
 
 V. State, 115 Ala. 25 
 
 V. State, 73 Ga. 572 
 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 15 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 557 
 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 701 
 
 V. State, 57 Md. 108 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 38 So. 795 40 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 20 S. W. 362 517 
 
 493 
 430 
 
 118 
 
 75 
 276 
 
 123, 125 
 468 
 423 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Bell V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 276 6r 
 
 Bellamy v. State (Fla. 1908), 47 
 
 So. 868 224 
 
 Bellinger v. People, 8 Wend. (X. 
 
 Y.) 595 247 
 
 Belote V. State, 36 ]^Iiss. 96 138, 307 
 Belt V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 82 87 
 Ben V. State, 37 Ala. 103 324 
 
 Bench v. State, 63 Ark. 488 421 
 
 Benedict v. State, 44 Ohio St. 679 
 
 172. 173 
 V. State, 14 Wis. 423 328 
 
 Benes v. People, 121 111. App. 103 525 
 Benge v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 
 
 I 270 
 
 Benham v. State, 91 Ind. 82 532 
 
 Benjamin v. State, 148 Ala. 671 lor 
 
 V. State, 105 Ga. 830 298 
 
 V. State, 41 So. 739 322 
 
 Bennefield v. State, 62 Ark. 36s 
 
 224, 310 
 V. L'nited States (Okla.), 100 
 
 Pac. 34. 48 
 
 Bennett v. Kroth, 37 Kan. 235 250 
 
 V. State, 62 Ark. 516 
 
 33, 430. 492, 493 
 V. State, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 118 82 
 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 73 210 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 539 248 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 341 148, 153 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 75 
 
 S. W. 314 III 
 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 52 
 
 88, 112, 118 
 V. State, 57 Wis. 69 154 
 
 Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 
 457 496 
 
 V. Shotwell, T03 Cal. 163 262 
 
 V. State, 119 Ind. 488 321 
 
 V. State (Tex.). 103 S. W. 911 269 
 V. United States, 146 U. S. 325 
 
 70, 71 
 Benstine v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 
 
 169 418 
 
 Bentley v. Cooke, 3 Doug. 422 185 
 
 V. State, 32 Ala. 596 473 
 
 Benton v. Starr, 58 Conn. 285 528, 333 
 
 V. State, 30 .^rk. 328 229, 230
 
 XXXll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Benton v. State, 78 Ark. 284 61, 493 
 V. State, 59 N. J. L. 551 364 
 
 Bergen v. People, 17 111. 426 147, 262 
 Bergin v. State, 31 Ohio St. iii 
 
 22,, 157 
 Bcrnekcr v. State, 40 Neb. 810 85 
 
 Bernhardt v. State, 82 Wis. 2t, 
 
 166, 228 
 Berry v. Commonwealth, 10 Busli 
 (Ky.) 15 147a, 356 
 
 V. State, 92 Ga. 47 35 
 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 202 442 
 
 V. State, 122 Ga. 429 493 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 34 S. W. 6t8 70 
 V. State (Tex., 1897), 38 S. 
 
 W. 1038 108 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. App. 483 363 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 423 
 Bess V. Commonwealth, 116 Ky. 
 927 
 V. Commonwealth, 118 Kv. 858 
 
 221, 429 
 Bessette v. State, loi Ind. 85 221 
 
 Betts V. State, 93 Ind. 375 
 Beyer v. People, 86 X. Y. 369 
 Beyerline v. State, 147 Ind. 125 
 Bice V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 }^i 97, 
 
 Bickham v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 150 
 Bicklev v. Commonwealth, 2 J. J. 
 
 M. (Ky.) 572 
 Biddle v. United States, 156 Fed. 
 
 759 
 Biddy v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 412 
 Bielschofsky v. People, 3 Hun 
 
 (N. Y.) 40 88, 438 
 
 Bigler v. Reyher, 43 Ind. IT2 176 
 
 Bill V. State, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 155 
 Billings V. State, 52 Ark. 303 
 Billingsley v. Clelland, 41 W. Va. 
 
 234 
 Bilton V. Territory (Okla., 1909). 
 
 99 Pac. 163 103, T TO 
 
 Bines v. State, t"i8 Ga. 320 147 
 
 Binfield v. State, 15 Neb. 484 113 
 
 Bingham v. Walk, 128 Ind. 164 
 
 174, 177 
 
 354 
 
 3; 
 
 482 
 
 339 
 197 
 
 238 
 
 197 
 
 254 
 
 439 
 
 45 
 
 6 
 
 238 
 
 535 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Binkley v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 54 21, 129, 130 
 
 Binns v. State, 46 Ind. 311 152 
 
 V. State, 57 Ind. 46 23 
 
 Bird V. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 800 405 
 
 V. State, 50 Ga. 585 26 
 
 V. State. 128 Ga. 253 no 
 
 V. State, T04 Ind. 384 342 
 
 V. State, T07 Ind. 154 58 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. App. 635 384 
 
 Birdsall v. Edgerton, 25 Wend. 
 
 (N. Y.) 619 523 
 
 Birkenfeld v. State, 104 Md. 253 
 
 140, 143 
 Birmingham v. McPoland, 96 
 
 Ala. 363 218 
 
 Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Pul- 
 
 ver, 126 111. 329 369 
 
 Birney v. State, 8 Ohio 230 456 
 
 Biscoe V. State, 67 Md. 6 128 
 
 Bishoff V. Commonwealth, 123 
 
 Ky. 340 • 161 
 
 Bishop V. State, 55 Md. 138 89, 423 
 V. State, 62 Miss. 289 23 
 
 Bissman v. State, 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. 
 
 714 480 
 
 Black V. State, 119 Ga. 746 418 
 
 V. State, I Tex. App. 368 14 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 590 130 
 
 Blackburn v. Commonwealth, 12 
 
 Bush (Ky.) 181 235 
 
 .V. Crawford, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 
 
 175 U6 
 
 V. State, 23 Ohio St. 146 147a 
 
 V. State, 50 Ohio St. 428 507 
 
 Blackman v. State, 23 Ohio St. 
 
 146 312 
 
 Blackstone v. State, 15 Ala. 415 309 
 Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76 53 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 416 32 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 476 486 
 
 Blake v. Rourke, 74 Iowa 519 162 
 
 Blaker v. State, 130 Ind. 203 
 
 273, 299, 300, 30 T 
 Blanc V. Rodgers, 49 Cal. 15 207 
 
 Bland v. People, 4 111. 364 36 
 
 Blanks v. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 
 
 41 269 
 
 Bledsoe v. State, 64 Ark. 474 467
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXlll 
 
 [References ai 
 
 Blige V. State, 20 Fla. 742 269 
 
 Blois V. State, 92 Ga. 584 74 
 
 Bloom V. State, 68 Ark. 3^6 36 
 
 Bloomer v. State, 75 Ark. 297 
 
 121, 324 
 V. State, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 66 26 
 Blount V. State, 49 Ala. 381 357 
 
 Blue V. State (Neb., 1910), 125 X. 
 
 W. 136 382 
 
 Bluett V. State, 151 Ala. 41 
 
 12, 326, 328, 333 
 Bluff V. State, 10 Ohio St. 547 433 
 Bluman v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 43 188, 369 
 
 Blj-ew V. Commonwealth, 91 K}-. 
 
 200 196 
 
 Boatmeyer v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 
 
 473 225 
 
 Boddie v. State, 52 Ala. 395 414, 418 
 Bode V. State, 80 Neb. 74 45, 290 
 
 Bodiford v. State, 86 Ala. 67 381 
 
 Bodine v. State, 129 Ala. 106 86a 
 
 Boggs V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 
 25 S. W. 770 36 
 
 Boland v. People, 19 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 80 305 
 
 Boles V. State, 86 Ga. 255 484 
 
 Bollen V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 70 117 
 
 Boiling V. State, 54 Ark. 588 
 
 157, 161, 314 
 Bolln V. State, 51 Neb. 581 289 
 
 Bolton V. State, 146 Ala. 691 118 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr., 1897), 39 
 
 S. W. 672 357 
 
 Bond V. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 
 
 581 368, 522 
 
 V. State, 21 Fla. 738 2x5 
 
 Bone V. State, 86 Ga. 108 215 
 
 Bones v. State, 117 Ala. 138 6 
 
 Bonnard v. State, 25 Tex. App. 
 
 173 222 
 
 Bonner v. State, 107 Ala. 97 276, 323 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 237 320 
 
 Bonners v. State (Tex. Cr., 
 
 1896), 35 S. W. 650 305 
 
 Bonnet v. Gladfelt, 24 111. App. 
 
 533 218, 224 
 
 Bookhout V. State, 66 Wis. 415 
 
 523, 531 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 Bookser v. State, 26 Tex. App. 
 
 593 122 
 
 Boone v. People, 148 111. 440 27 
 
 Booth V. Hart, 43 Conn. 480 524 
 
 Boothe V. State, 4 Tex. App. 202 332 
 Borck V. State (Ala., 1905), 39 
 
 So. 580 507 
 
 Boren v. State, 23 Tex. App. 28 
 
 33> 49 
 
 Borer v. Lange, 44 Minn, 281 49 
 
 Bork V. People, 16 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 476 291 
 
 V. People, 91 N. Y. 5 31 
 
 Borrego v. Territory, 8 N. Mex. 
 
 446 148 
 
 Borroun v. State (Miss., 1897), 
 
 22 So. 62 269 
 
 Boscowitz, Ex parte, 84 Ala. 463 
 
 244, 247 
 Bossean v. State (Tex., 1890), 15 
 
 S. W. 118 484 
 
 Bostic V. State, 94 Ala. 45 211, 278 
 Bostock V. State, 61 Ga. 635 229 
 
 Boston &c. R. Co. v. Dana, i 
 
 Gray (Mass.) 83 45 
 
 Boswell V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 47 384 
 Boswell's Case, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 
 
 860 157, 166 
 
 Bothwell V. State, 71 Neb. 747 161 
 
 Bottomley v. United States, i 
 
 Story 135 88, 89, 433 
 
 Botts V. United States, 155 Fed. 
 
 50 482 
 
 Boulden v. State, 102 Ala. 78 105, 245 
 Bouldin v. State, 8 Tex. App. 332 
 
 337, 374 
 Bow V. People, 160 111. 438 
 
 61, 95, 225, 358 
 
 Bowden v. Achor, 95 Ga. 243 214 
 
 V. Bailes, loi N. Car. 612 214 
 
 Bowen v. Reed, 103 IMass. 46 532 
 
 Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542 
 
 173, 387, 388 
 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 542 359 
 
 V. State, 122 Wis. 163 312 
 
 V. Wood, 143 Mass. 182 529, 533 
 
 Bowler v. State, 41 Miss. 570 437, 439 
 
 Bowles V. Commonwealth, 103 
 
 Va. 8r6 97, 103, 325, 330 
 
 Bowlus V. State, 130 Ind. 227 357
 
 :xxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Bowman v. State, 54 Fla. 16 441 
 
 V. State (Tex., 1893), 21 S. 
 
 W. 48 324 
 
 Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644 
 
 390, 392 
 Boyd V. State, 153 Ala. 41 358 
 
 V. State, 33 Fla. 316 15 
 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 58 147, 313 
 V. State, 84 Aliss. 414 319a 
 
 V. State (Ohio, 1910), 90 N. 
 
 E. 355 418 
 
 V. State, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 16 
 
 233, 3'i2 
 V. State, 94 Tenn. 505 246 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 138 48 
 V. United States, 116 U. S. 616 182 
 V. United States, 142 U. S. 450 207 
 Boykin v. Boykin, 70 X. Car. 262 527 
 V. State, 148 Ala. 608 35 
 
 V. State, 34 Ark. 443 299 
 
 V. State, 89 Miss. 19 118 
 
 Boyle V. State, 97 Ind. 322 330 
 
 V. State, 105 Ind. 469 
 
 60, 108, 237, 320 
 V. State, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 163 362 
 V. State, 61 Wis. 440 312 
 
 Bracken v. State, iii Ala. 68 
 
 223, 388, 392 
 
 Bradburn v. State, 162 Ind. 689 416 
 
 Bradford v. People, 22 Colo. 157 247 
 
 V. People, 20 Hun (N. Y.) 309 347 
 
 V. State, 147 Ala. 95 118, 293, 473 
 
 Bradley v. State, 103 Ala. 29 358 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. 622 69 
 
 V. State (Tex.), in S. W. 733 
 
 96, 328 
 Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 10 
 Bush (Ky.) 576 loi, 331 
 
 V. People, 153 111. 156 341 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 165 414 
 
 Brady v. Commonwealth, i Bibb. 
 (Ky.) 517 195 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 26 S. W. 621 308 
 Braham v. State, 143 Ala. 28 
 
 127, 158, 159, i6t, 162, 163, 322 
 Bramlette v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 
 611 185 
 
 Branch v. State, 41 Tex. 622 310 
 
 Brandon v. People, 42 N. Y. 265 61 
 
 ■e to Sections.] 
 Brandt v. Klein, 17 Jones (N. Y.) 
 
 335 176 
 
 Branson v. Commonwealth, 92 
 
 Ky- 330 300 
 
 Brard v. Ackerman, 5 Esp. 119 176 
 Brashears v. State, 58 Md. 563 568 
 Brasier's Case, i Leach Cr. L. 
 
 237 205 
 
 Brassell v. State, 91 Ala. 45 211 
 
 Brauer v. State, 25 Wis. 413 413, 416 
 Braxton v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 632 296 
 Brazil v. State, 117 Ga. 32 79 
 
 Breen, In re, 73 Fed. 458 496, 502 
 
 Brennan v. People, 37 Colo. 256 
 
 103, no 
 V. People, 7 Hun (N. Y.) 171 418 
 Bressler v. People, 117 111. 422 
 
 222, 238 
 
 Brevaldo v. State, 21 Fla. 789 381 
 
 Brewer v. State, 72 Ark. 145 147a 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 74 427 
 
 Briceland v. Commonwealth, 74 
 
 Pa. St. 463 149, 152 
 
 Bricker v. Commonwealth, 31 Ky. 
 
 L. 596 105 
 
 Briffitt V. State, 58 Wis. 39 21 
 
 Briggs V. Briggs, 20 Mich. 34 179 
 
 V. Coleman, 51 Ala. 561 249 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554 237 
 
 Brighton v. Miles, 151 Ala. 479 46 
 
 Brill V. State, i Tex. App. 152 196 
 
 Brinkley v. State, 58 Ga. 296 160 
 
 Briscoe v. State, 95 Ga. 496 520 
 
 Brister v. State, 26 Ala. 107 122, 126 
 
 Britt V. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 30 442 
 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 215 243, 292 
 
 Britton v. State, 115 Ind. 55 220 
 
 Broad v. Pitt, 3 C. & P. 518 177 
 
 Brock V. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 
 
 183 no 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), no 
 
 S. W. 878 312 
 
 V. State, 123 Ala. 24 68 
 
 Brog\' V. Commonwealth, lO 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 722 262, 263, 414 
 
 Brom V. People, 216 111. 148 S7, 103 
 Brooke v. People, 23 Colo. 374 
 
 36, 49, 280, 297
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXV 
 
 [References ar 
 Brooke v. State (Ala.), 46 So. 
 
 491 353, 357 
 
 Brooks V. Commonwealth, 100 
 Ky. 194 328 
 
 V. State, 85 Ark. 376 324, 326 
 
 V. State (Ark. 1909), 121 S. 
 
 W. 740 467, 468 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 458 268 
 
 V. State, 96 Ga. 353 331, 378 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 27 S. W. 141 292 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 582 468 
 
 Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 
 
 159 108, 157, 158 
 
 Browder v. State, 102 Ala. 164 245 
 
 Brown, Ex parte, 72 Mo. 83 182, 251 
 
 Brown v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 17 S. W. 220 323 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 61 
 
 S. W. 4 S08 
 
 V. Commonwealth, (Ky.), 117 
 
 S. W. 281 358 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 26 Ky. L. 
 
 1269 103 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 73 Pa. St. 
 
 321 106, 265 266 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. St. 
 
 319 88, 321 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 9 Leigh. 
 
 (Va.) 633 147a 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 653 
 
 408, 417 
 V. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 935 122 
 V. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 215 367 
 V. Jewett, 120 Mass. 215 174 
 
 V. Mooers, 6 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 451 243 
 
 V. Payson, 6 N. H. 443 174 
 
 V. People, 20 Colo. 161 281 
 
 V. People, 86 111. 239 430 
 
 V. People, 16 Hun (N. Y.) 535 437 
 V. State, 46 Ala. 175 83 
 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 61 242 
 
 V. State, T05 Ala. 117 196 
 
 V. State, 108 Ala. 18 384 
 
 V. State, 120 Ala. 342 145, 358 
 
 V. State, 141 Ala. 80 484 
 
 V. State, 142 Ala. 287 238, 356 
 
 V. State, 150 Ala. 25 103, no, 119 
 V. State, 28 Ark. 126 358 
 
 V. State, 55 Ark. 593 312, 326 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Brown v. State, 29 Fla. 543 232 
 
 V. State, 40 Fla. 459 157 
 
 V. State, 46 Fla. 159 220, 238 
 
 V. State, 47 Fla. 16 467 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 479 129 
 
 V. State, 59 Ga. 456 300 
 
 V. State, 76 Ga. 623 238, 407 
 
 V. State, 119 Ga. 572 222 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 145 268 
 
 V. State, 71 Ind. 470 126 
 
 V. State, 105 Ind. 385 328 
 
 V. State, 72 Md. 477 220, 224, 356 
 V. State, 72 Miss. 95 195, 197 
 
 V. State, 72 Miss. 997 
 
 277, 373, 418 
 V. State, 88 Miss. 166 119 
 
 V. State, 18 Ohio St. 496 71, 283 
 V. State, 26 Ohio St. 176 
 
 90, 308, 309, 310 
 V. State, 85 Tenn. 439 268 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 20 S. W. 924 247 
 V. State (Tex.), 48 S. W. 176 482 
 V. State (Tex.), 114 S. W. 
 
 820 23s 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1909), 
 
 124 S. W. loi 118 
 
 V. State, 3 Tex. App. 294 225 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 119 269 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 150 301 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 104 443, 444 
 V. State, 127 Wis. 193 
 
 94, 407, 414, 417 
 V. United States, 142 Fed. i 305 
 V. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 247 
 
 Browne v. United States, 76 C. 
 C. A. 31 80 
 
 Brownell v. People, 38 Mich. 732 
 
 82, 324 
 
 Browning v. State, 30 Miss. 656 492 
 V. State, 33 Miss. 47 272 
 
 Brownlee v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 
 213 485, 486 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 408 325 
 
 Broyles v. State, 47 Ind. 251 123 
 
 Bruce v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 590 238 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 26 6r 
 
 Brumley v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 
 222 94, TOO 
 
 Brummett V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 108 S. W. 861 491
 
 XXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Brunaugh v. State (Ind., 1910), 
 90 N. E. 1019 442 
 
 Bruner v. United States, 4 Ind. 
 Ter. 580 128 
 
 Brungger v. Smith, 49 Fed. 124 173 
 
 Bryan v. State, 74 Ga. 393 303, 374 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 201 475 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 114 
 
 S. W. 811 185 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 196 294, 305 
 
 Bryant, In re, 80 Fed. 282 496 
 
 Bryant v. State, 116 Ala. 445 
 
 6, 296, 299, 302 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 851 300 
 
 V. State, 80 Ga. 272 36 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 394 105 
 V. United States, 167 U. S. 104 496 
 
 Bubster v. State, 33 Neb. 663 295 
 
 Buchanan v. State, 55 Ala. 154 383 
 V. State, 109 Ala. 7 296 
 
 Buck V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 319 305 
 
 Bueno v. People, i Colo. App. 232 411 
 
 Bull V. Loveland, 10 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 9 252 
 
 Bulloch V. State, 10 Ga. 47 283 
 
 V. Knox, 96 Ala. 195 526 
 
 Bundrick v. State, 125 Ga. 753 
 
 331, 483 
 
 Burchfield v. State, 82 Ind. 580 272 
 
 Burd V. Moring, i C. & P. 372 174 
 
 Burden v. State, 120 Ala. 388 430 
 
 Burdge v. State, 53 Ohio St. 512 423 
 Burge V. United States, 26 App. 
 
 D. C 524 88 
 
 Burger v. State, 34 Neb. 397 23, 366 
 
 Burgess v. State, 148 Ala. 654 137 
 
 Burk V. State, 81 Ind. 128 197 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 185 147 
 
 Burke v. State, 47 Ind. 528 461 
 
 V. State, 34 Ohio St. 79 286 
 Burkett v. State, 154 Ala. 19 
 
 58, 312, 320 
 
 Burks V. State, 78 Ark. 271 242 
 
 V. State, 92 Ga. 461 374 
 
 Burley v. State, 130 Ga. 343 320. 323 
 
 V. State (Ga. App. 1909), 65 
 
 S. E. 816 ^ 367 
 
 Burnett v. State, 30 Ala. 19 473 
 
 V. State, 76 Ark. 295 195, 390 
 
 V. State, 87 Ga. 622 132, 267 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Burnett v. State (Neb. 1910), 124 
 
 N. W. 927 125 
 
 V. State, 60 N. J. L. 255 284 
 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 515 222, 248 
 
 Burney v. State, 100 Ga. 65 12 
 
 Burnham v. State, 37 Fla. 327 365 
 
 Burns v. Donoghue, 185 Mass. 71 533 
 
 V. People, 45 111. App. 70 280a 
 
 V. State, 49 Ala. 370 119a 
 
 V. State, 89 Ga. 527 69 
 
 V. State, 75 Ohio St. 407 78 
 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 641 83 
 
 Burrell v. Bull, 3 Sandf. Ch. (N. 
 
 Y.) 15 I8S 
 
 V. State, 18 Tex. 713 iii 
 
 Burress v. Commonwealth, 27 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 934. 421 
 
 Burris v. Court, 34 Neb. 187 532 
 
 V. State, 38 Ark. 221 116, 118 
 
 Burrow v. State, 147 Ala. 114 373 
 
 Burst V. State, 89 Ind. 133 484, 486 
 Burt V. State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 397 163 
 
 Burton v. Commonwealth, 108 
 
 Va. 892 18, 323 
 
 V. State, 107 Ala. 108 52, 116, 126, 
 
 135. 140, 314, 315, 322 
 
 V. State, IIS Ala. i 
 
 52, 238, 314, 328 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. App. 138 144 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 196 
 
 161, 40s 
 V. United States, 142 Fed. 57 478 
 Busby V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 83 246 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 289 
 
 282, 28s, 286 
 
 Bush V. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 
 
 244 201, 266 
 
 V. State, 18 Ala. 415 296 
 
 Buskett, Ex parte, 106 Mo. 602 247 
 
 Busse V. State, 129 Wis. 171 524 
 
 Butler V. State, 22 Ala. 43 425 
 
 V. State, 91 Ala. 87 77, 290 
 
 V. State (Ala. 1909), 50 So. 
 
 400 364 
 
 V. State, 83 Ark. 272 265, 267 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 397 277 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 623 473 
 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 161 214 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 232 330
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 XXXVll 
 
 [References ai 
 
 Butler V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 444 467 
 Butt V. State, 81 Ark. 173 
 
 491, 492, 494 
 Buzard v. McAnulty, 77 Tex. 438 50 
 Byers v. State, 105 Ala. 31 323 
 
 V. Territory, i Okla. Cr. 677 516 
 Bynum v. State, 46 Fla. 142 269, 342 
 Byrd v. State, 76 Ark. 286 161 
 
 Cabrera v. State (Tex.), 118 S. 
 
 W. 1054 492 
 
 Caddell v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 380 366 
 Caddis v. State, 91 Ga. 148 517 
 
 Cady V. Commonwealth, 10 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 776 428 
 
 V. Walker, 62 Mich. 157 173, 174 
 Caffey v. State (Miss.), 24 So. 
 
 315 158 
 
 Cahn V. State, no Ala. 56 482 
 
 Cain V. State, 18 Tex. 387 128 
 
 Caldwell V. State, 146 Ala. 141 
 
 186, 404 
 V. State, 50 Fla. 4 73 
 
 Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio St. 366 
 
 68, 286, 287 
 Callaghan v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 
 
 536 482 
 
 Callison v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 211 92, 213 
 
 Calloway v. State, 103 Ala. 27 130 
 
 V. State, so Tex. Cr. App. 72 373 
 Cameron v. State, 14 Ala. 546 19, 399 
 Campau v. North, 39 Mich. 606 179 
 Campbell v. Chace, 12 R. I. 333 187 
 V. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. St. 
 
 187 69 
 
 V. Dalhousie, L. R. i H. L. So. 
 
 App. 462 252 
 
 V. People, 16 Til. 17 326 
 
 V. State, 23 Ala. 44 
 
 47, 119, 322, 337 
 V. State, 150 Ala. 70 127 
 
 V. State. 38 Ark. 498 325 
 
 V. State, II Ga. 353 in 
 
 V. State, 123 Ga. 533 6, 40 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 645 215 
 
 Campos V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 289 56, 88, 238 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 Cancemi v. People, 16 N. Y. 501 
 
 76, 
 Cannon v. People, 141 111. 270 
 
 211, 
 V. State, 60 Ark. 564 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 172 
 Cantee v. State (Tex., 1889), 10 
 
 S. W. 757 
 Canter v. State, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 
 
 349 435, 
 
 Caples V. State (Okla. Cr. App., 
 
 1909), 104 Pac. 493 
 Card V. Foot, 56 Conn. 369 
 V. State, 109 Ind. 415 
 
 423, 492, 493, 
 Garden v. State, 84 Ala. 417 
 Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 20 
 
 Ky. L. 496 
 Cargill V. Commonwealth, 93 Ky. 
 
 578 
 Carle v. People, 200 111. 494 i 
 
 Carlisle v. State, 76 Ala. 75 
 Carlton v. Commonwealth, 13 Ky. 
 L. 946 
 
 V. People, 150 111. 181 12, 
 
 Carman v. Kelly, 5 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 283 
 Carmichael v. State, 11 Tex. App. 
 
 27 
 Carnell v. State, 85 Md. i 438, 
 Carnes v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 437 
 Carney v. State, 79 Ala. 14 
 Carothers v. State, 75 Ark. 574 
 
 6t, 
 Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 29 
 Ky. L. 107 
 V. People, 3 Gilm. (111.) 147 
 V. People, 31 Colo. 284 
 V. People. 8 Barb. (N. Y.) 603 
 V. State, 62 Ark. 286 12, 
 
 Carper v. State, 27 Ohio St. 572 
 Carr v. State, 34 Ark. 448 
 
 484, 485, 
 V. State, 43 Ark. 99 
 V. State, 8r Ark. 580 61, 
 
 V. State, 45 Fla. 11 
 V. State, 96 Ga. 284 
 V. State, 23 Neb. 749 
 V. State (Tex.), 116 S. W. 591 
 
 84 
 
 213 
 269 
 
 439 
 
 245 
 217 
 
 494 
 119 
 
 328 
 
 228 
 19a 
 
 437 
 
 225 
 
 148 
 
 263 
 
 486 
 439 
 
 387 
 
 221 
 
 129 
 250 
 359 
 393 
 238 
 144 
 
 486 
 100 
 129 
 118 
 
 193 
 328 
 
 358
 
 xxxvm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Carr v. State, 24 Tex. App. 562 342 
 Carreker v. State, 92 Ga. 471 302 
 
 Carrington v. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 
 
 208 179 
 
 Carroll v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 
 
 St. 107 73 
 
 V. People, 136 111. 456 12, 295 
 
 V. State, 5 Neb. 31 71 
 
 V. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 315 96 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 431 245 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 155 373 
 
 Carson v. State, 50 Ala. 134 79, 80 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 157 276 
 
 Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. 
 
 Cas. 169 78 
 
 V. State, 68 Ala. 96 372 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 477 291a 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 254 no, 214 
 
 V. State (Ga. App. 1909), 65 
 
 S. E. 1072 489 
 
 V. State, 106 Ga. 372 492 
 
 V. State, 2 Ind. 617 350 
 
 V. State (Miss., 1898), 24 So. 
 
 307 269 
 
 V. State, 2,6 Neb. 481 78, 241 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 345 
 
 22, 52 
 Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 560 
 
 81, 270, 312 
 Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230 
 
 459, 461 
 Carver v. People, 39 Mich. 786 423 
 V. United States, 164 U. S. 694 
 
 104, III 
 
 Carwile v. State, 35 Ala. 392 488 
 
 V. State, 148 Ala. 576 223, Z'^^i 
 
 Casat V. State, 40 Fla. 511 157 
 
 Case V. Blood, 71 Iowa 632 267 
 
 Casey v. People, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 158 158 
 
 V. State, 27 Ark. 67 172, 494 
 
 V. State, 20 Neb. 138 522 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 392 
 
 loi, 240, 246 
 Cassem v. Galvin, 158 111. 30 213 
 
 Castillo V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 145 
 
 409, 410 
 Castle V. State, 75 Ind. 146 
 
 15, 17, 180 
 Caswell V. State (Ga. App.), 63 
 S. E. 566 212, 214 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Caswell V. State, 5 Ga. App. 483 280 
 Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 37 
 
 Pa. St. 108 86, 116 
 
 Cavender v. State, 126 Ind. 47 6, 80 
 Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395 90 
 
 Celender v. State (Ark.), 109 S. 
 
 W. 1024 74 
 
 Central Nat. Bank v. Arthur, 2 
 
 Sweeney (N. Y.) 194 252 
 
 Chadwick v. United States, 141 
 
 Fed. 225 492 
 
 Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. 
 
 (Mass.) 260 258 
 
 Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 20 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 733 424 
 
 Chalk V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 116 97, 323 
 
 Chamberlain, Ex parte, 4 Cow. 
 
 (N. Y.) 49 250 
 
 V. People, 23 N. Y. 85 527 
 
 Chamberlin v. State, 80 Neb. 812 89 
 Chambers v. People, 4 Scam. 
 
 (111.) 351 211 
 
 V. People, 105 111. 409 58, 61 
 
 V. State, 62 Miss. 108 301 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 44 S. W. 495 74 
 Chambless v. State (Tex.), 24 S. 
 
 W. 899 246 
 
 Chandler v. Thompson, 30 Fed. 
 
 38 516 
 
 Chant V. Browne, 12 Eng. L. & E. 
 
 299 174 
 
 Chapline v. State (Ark.), 95 S. 
 
 W. 477 493 
 
 V. State, 77 Ark. 444 491 
 
 Chapman v. Gates, 54 N. Y. 132 41 
 
 V. James, 96 Iowa 233 224 
 
 V. Peebles, 84 Ala. 283 174 
 
 V. State, 78 Ala. 463 353 
 
 V. State, 30 S. W. 225 269 
 
 Chappel V. State, 7 Coldw. 
 
 (Tenn.) 92 148 
 
 Chappell V. State, 71 Ala. 322 201 
 
 Charba v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 316 6r 
 
 Charlton's Case, 2 Myl. & Cr. 316 255 
 
 Charnock's Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 
 
 1377 73 
 
 Chase v. People. 40 111. 352 I57 
 
 V. State, 46 Miss. 683 324
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XXXIX 
 
 [References are to Scctions-I 
 
 Chase v. United States, 7 App. D. 
 
 C. 149 187 
 
 Chastang v. State, 83 Ala. 29 484 
 
 Cheatham, Ex parte, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 SI 499 
 
 Cheek v. State, 171 Ind. 98 517 
 
 Cheesum v. State, 8 Blackf. 
 
 (Ind.) 332 474 
 
 Chenowith v. CommonweaUh 
 
 (Ky.), 12 S. W. 585 507 
 
 Cherry v. State, 68 Ala. 29 342 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 20 So! 837 320 
 Chestnut Hill &c. Co. v. Piper 
 
 &c. Co., 15 W. N. 15 50 
 
 Chew V. State, 23 Tex. App. 230 383 
 Chicago V. Bowman Dairy Co., 
 
 234 111. 294 480 
 
 Chicago &c. Coal Co. v. People, 
 
 214 111. 421 492, 493 
 
 Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Hazels, 26 
 
 Neb. 364 224 
 
 V. Shenk, 131 111. 283 227 
 
 V. Woodward, 47 Kan. 191 216 
 
 Childress v. State, 86 Ala. 77 69 
 
 Childs V. State, 15 Ark. 204 488 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr., 1893), 22 S. 
 
 W. 1039 269 
 
 Chism V. State, 70 Miss. 742 234 
 
 Chitister v. State, S3 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 635 6 
 
 Choice V. State, 31 Ga. 424 160, 162 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 285 493 
 
 Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283 
 
 166, 338 
 Christensen v. People, 114 111. 
 
 App. 40 461, 492 
 
 Christian v. State, 37 Tex. 475 485 
 V. Williams, 12 Fed. 590 258 
 
 Chute V. State, 19 Minn. 271 229 
 
 Cicero v. State, 54 Ga. 156 40 
 
 Clapp V. State, 94 Tenn. 186 S7 
 
 Clark, Ex parte, 208 Mo. T2I 459, 460 
 Clark V. Bradstreet, 80 Me. 454 525 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 92 
 
 S. W. 573 ^ 418 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. L. 
 
 540 ^ 118 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 29 I\y. L. 
 
 154 342 
 
 V. People, 224 111. 554 345 
 
 Clark V. State (Ga.), 62 S. E. 663 87 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 605 521 
 
 V. State, 84 Ga. 577 353 
 
 V. State, 14 Ind. 26 296 
 
 V. State, 50 Ind. 514 s8a 
 
 V. State, 79 Neb. 473 90 
 
 V. State, 58 N. J. L. 383 144 
 
 V. State, 12 Ohio 483 161, 162 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 437 294 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 402 
 
 300, 301 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 30 519 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 519 48 
 
 Clarke v. People, 16 Colo. 511 349 
 V. People, 224 111. 554 348 
 
 V. State, 78 Ala. 474 328 
 
 V. State, 8 Crim. L. Mag. Cr. 
 
 450 118 
 
 Claxon V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 30 S. W. 998 268 
 
 Clay V. State, 122 Ga. 136 358 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 22 So. 62 447 
 
 V. State, 15 Wyo. 42 126, 129 
 
 V. Williams, 2 Munf. (Va.) 
 
 105 177 
 
 Clayton v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 
 489 138, 245 
 
 Cleaveland v. State, 34 Ala. 254 456 
 
 Clem V. State, 33 Ind. 418 243 
 
 Clemens v. State (Miss., 1908), 
 45 So. 834 323 
 
 Clements v. State, 51 Fla. 6 268, 269 
 V. State, 80 Neb. 313 522 
 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 258 33 
 
 Clemons v. State, 48 Fla. 9 312 
 
 Cleveland v. Commonwealth, 31 
 Ky. L. ITS 104' 108 
 
 V. State, 86 Ala. i 23. 164, 166 
 
 Cleveland &c. R. Co. v. Mon- 
 aghan, 140 111. 474 sr 
 
 Clifton V. State, 26 Fla. 523 377 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex Cr. 18 397 
 
 Clawson v. State, 129 Wis. 650 
 
 435. 441 
 
 Cline V. State. 51 Ark. 140 236 
 
 V. State, 43 Ohio St. 332 164, 166 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 320 265 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. 494 435 
 
 Clinton V. State (Fla., 1908), 47 
 So. 389 368
 
 xl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ai 
 
 Clinton v. State (Fla. 1909), 50 
 So. 580 369 
 
 V. State, S3 Fla. 98 60, 205, 268 
 Clore V. State, 26 Tex. App. 624 166 
 Close V. Samm, 27 Iowa 503 230 
 
 Clough V. State, 7 Neb. 320 132 
 
 Clow V. Smith (Neb., 1909), 124 
 
 N. W. 140 53: 
 
 Cluck V. State, 40 Incl. 263 76, 78, 166 
 Cluverius v. Commonwealth, 81 
 
 Va. 787 100 
 
 Coates V. Birch, 2 Q. B. 252 174 
 
 V. State, 50 Ark. 330 408 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 257 371 
 
 Coble V. State, 31 Ohio St. 100 
 
 87, 210 
 Coburn v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 257 397 
 Cochran v. United States, 14 
 
 Okla. 108 224 
 
 Cockerham v. State (Miss., 1895), 
 
 19 So. 195 446 
 
 Coffee V. State, 25 Fla. 501 130, 146 
 
 V. State, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 245 485 
 
 V. State, I Tex. App. 548 77 
 
 Coffman v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 478 55 
 
 Cohen, Ex parte, 5 Cal. 494 459 
 
 V. State, 50 Ala. 108 12 
 
 V. State, 17 Tex. 142 473 
 
 V. United States, 157 Fed. 651 494 
 
 Cohn V. State (Tenn.), 109 S. W. 
 
 I 149 280a 
 
 Cohoe V. State (Neb.), 118 N. W. 
 
 1088 305 
 
 Coker V. State, 144 Ala. 28 238, 331 
 
 Colbert v. State, 91 Ga. 705 S73 
 
 Cole V. State, 105 Ala. 76 103 
 
 V. State, 59 Ark. 50 81. 236, 240 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 4 So. 577 79 
 
 V. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 239 381 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 225 
 
 119. 330a 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 439 
 
 121, 186, 187 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 89 325 
 
 Colee V. State, 75 Ind. 511 
 
 162, 164, 214 
 Coleman v. Commonwealth, 25 
 Gratt. (Va.) 865 202 
 
 V. People, 26 Fla. 6r 6 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 
 Coleman v. People, 55 N. Y. 81 87, 89 
 V. State (Tenn., 1908), 113 S. 
 
 W. 1045 461 
 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 520 32 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 404 144 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 202 475 
 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 578 244 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 173 485 
 
 Collier v. State, 55 Ala. 125 456 
 
 V. State, 20 Ark. 36 70, 112, 228 
 V. State, 55 Fla. 5 378 
 
 Collins V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 15 Ky. L. 835 125 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 12 Bush 
 
 (Ky.) 271 121, 262, 263 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 15 Ky. L. 
 
 691 138, 374 
 
 V. Mack, 31 Ark. 684 179 
 
 V. People, 39 111. 2S3 296 
 
 V. People, 98 111. 584 73 
 
 V. People, 115 111. App. 280 362 
 V. State, 137 Ala. 50 330a 
 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 57 314, 491, 492 
 V. State, 46 Neb. 37 103, 223 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 118 S. W. 
 
 1038 298 
 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 141 126 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 441 60 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 550 384 
 
 Colquit V. State, 107 Tenn. 381 119a 
 
 Colquitt V. State, 34 Tex. 550 357 
 
 Colson V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 138 486 
 
 Colter V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 284 201 
 
 Colton V. State, 7 Tex. App. 50 270 
 Colwell V. State (Tex.), 34 S. W. 
 
 615 293 
 
 Combs V. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 
 24 236 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 116 S. W. 595 
 
 352, 354 
 Comer v. State (Tex. Cr.), 20 S. 
 
 W. 547 _ 408 
 
 Commissioners v. Ballinger, 20 
 
 Kan. 590 249 
 
 Commonwealth v. Abbott, 13 
 
 Met. (Mass.) 120 275 
 
 V. Abbott, 130 Mass. 472 332 
 
 V. Ackland, 107 Mass. 211 21, 36 
 
 V. Adams, 114 Mass. 323 354
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 x\i 
 
 [References are 
 
 Commonwealth v. Adams, 127 
 
 Mass. 15 349 
 
 V. Adams, 160 Mass. 310 472 
 
 V. Allen, 135 Pa. St. 483 413 
 
 V. Antaya, 184 Mass. 326 126 
 
 V, Anthes, 5 Gray (Mass.) 185 
 
 273. 275 
 V. Austin, 97 Mass. 595 195, 197 
 V. Ayer, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 150 423 
 V. Bacon, 135 Mass. 521 174 
 
 V. Bagley, 7 Pick. (Mass.) 279 456 
 V. Bailey (Ky.), 87 S. W. 299 448 
 V. Baker, 155 Mass. 287 69, 474 
 V. Bangs, 9 Mass. 387 399 
 
 V. Barker, 133 Mass. 399 465 
 
 V. Barker, 185 Mass. 324 185 
 
 V. Barry, 124 Mass. 325 435 
 
 V. Barry, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 216 61 
 
 V. Battis, I Mass. 95 144 
 
 V. Beaman, 8 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 497 296 
 
 V. Bell, 145 Pa. St. 374 247, 453 
 V. Bell, 166 Pa. St. 405 92 
 
 V. Bezek, 168 Pa. St. 603 118 
 
 V. Bigelow, 8 Mete. (Mass.) 
 
 235 432, 433 
 
 V. Bishop, 165 Mass. 148 103 
 
 V. Blair, 126 Mass. 40 349 
 
 V. Blanding, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 304 _ 364 
 
 V. Blankinship, 165 ]\Iass. 40 475 
 
 V. Blood, II Gray (Mass.) 74 49 
 
 V. Blood, 141 Mass. 571 438 
 
 V. Bonner, 9 Met. (]\Iass.) 410 364 
 
 V. Bonner, 97 Mass. 587 6r 
 
 V. Booker, 25 Ky. L. 1025 325 
 V. Boott, Thatcher Cr. Cas. 
 
 (Mass.) 390 483 
 V. Bos worth, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 72> 72, 7A: 
 
 V. Bosworth, 113 Mass. 200 196 
 
 V. Boutwell, 129 Mass. 124 419 
 
 V. Bowers, 121 Mass. 45 92 
 
 V. Boyer, 7 Allen (Mass.) 306 398 
 
 V. Boynton, 116 Mass. 343 345 
 
 V. Bradford, 126 Mass. 42 89, 369 
 
 V. Brailey, 134 Mass. 527 122, 123 
 
 V. Branham, 8 Bush (Ky.) 387 356 
 
 V. Brennor, 194 Mass. 17 jt, 
 
 V. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577 103, no 
 
 to Sections.^ 
 
 Commonwealth v. Briggs, 7 
 Pick. (Mass.) 177 515 
 
 V. Brigham, 147 Mass. 414 118 
 
 V. Brooks, 9 Gray (Mass.) 299 74 
 V. Brown, 14 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 419 48, 345, 350, 492 
 
 V. Brown, 121 Mass. 69 
 
 122, 124, 349, 350 
 V. Brown, 130 Mass. 279 71 
 
 V. Brown, 147 Mass. 585 422 
 
 V. Brown, 149 Mass. 35 147a 
 
 V. Brown, 150 Mass. 330 125, 144 
 V. Brown, 22, Pa. Super. Ct. 
 
 470 121 
 
 V. Buccieri, 153 Pa. St. 535 
 
 160, 163 
 V. Buckingham, Thach. Cr. 
 
 Cas. (Mass.) 29 363 
 
 V. Burton, 183 Mass. 461 435, 438 
 V. Bush, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 264 207 
 V. Butland, 119 Mass. 317 468 
 
 V. Byard (Mass.), 86 N. E. 
 
 285 307 
 
 V. Byron, 14 Gray (Mass.) 31 222 
 V. Call, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 515 
 
 88, 90, 125, 435 
 V. Campbell, 131 Iowa 645 51 
 
 V. Campbell, 155 Mass. 537 54 
 
 V. Caponi, 155 Mass. 534 399 
 
 V. Carbin, 143 Mass. 124 58a 
 
 V. Cardoze, 119 Mass. 210 482 
 
 V. Carey, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 246 III 
 
 V. Care}^, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 47 
 
 429, 434 
 V. Carter, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 277 257 
 
 V. Casey, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 417 107, 113 
 
 V. Castles, 9 Gray (Mass.) 121 100 
 V. Gate, 220 Pa. 138 80 
 
 V. Caufield, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 
 
 279 47 
 
 V. Chaney, 148 Mass. 6 211 
 
 V. Chilson, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 15 197 
 
 V. Choate, 105 Mass. 451 91, 152 
 
 V. Clancy, 154 Mass. 128 217, 475 
 
 V. Clark, 130 Pa. St. 641 132 
 
 V. Cleary, 152 Mass. 491 187 
 
 V. Cleary, 135 Pa. St. 64 164
 
 xlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Coleman v. deary, 148 Pa. St. 26 
 
 265, 327 
 V. Clemmer, 190 Pa. St. 202 
 
 209, 22^ 
 V. Clifford, 96 Ky. 4 282 
 
 V. Cloonen, 151 Pa. St. 605 167 
 V. Coe, 115 Mass. 481 423, 437, 438 
 V. Coleman, 157 Mass. 460 481 
 
 V. Connolly, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 414 422 
 V. Conroy, 207 Pa. 212 12 
 
 V. Cony, 2 Mass. 523 457 
 
 V. Cook, 12 Met. (Mass.) 93 343 
 V. Cooley, 6 Gray (Mass.) 350 446 
 V. Cooper, 5 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 495 105, 348 
 
 V. Corkin, 136 Mass. 429 345 
 
 V. Cosseboom, 155 Mass. 298, 
 
 119a, 279 
 V. Costello, 119 Mass. 214 121, 427 
 V. Costello, 120 Mass. 358 427 
 
 V. Costley, 118 Mass. i 6, 36 
 
 V. Cox, 7 Allen (Mass.) 577 309 
 V. Coy, 157 Mass. 200 133, 314 
 
 V. Crans, 3 Pa. L. J. 442 29 
 
 V. Cressinger, 193 Pa. St. 2^6 135 
 V. Crocker, 108 Mass. 464 130 
 
 V. Crowe, 165 Mass. 139 368 
 
 V. Cullen, III Mass. 435 130 
 
 V. Culver, 126 Mass. 464 126, 127 
 V. Curtis, Thach. Cr. Cas. 
 
 (Mass.) 202 196 
 
 V. Daley, 4 Gray (Mass.) 209 197 
 V. Dame, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 384 210 
 V. Damon, 136 Mass. 441 364 
 
 V. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408 461 
 V. Daniel, 4 Pa. L. J. 49 258 
 
 V. Danz, 211 Pa. 507 319 
 
 V. Dascom, 11 r Mass. 404 195 
 
 V. Davis, I W. N. C. (Pa.) 
 
 18 461 
 
 V. De Cost, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 
 
 88 468 
 
 V. Dedham, 16 Mass. 14 286 
 
 V. Deitrick, 221 Pa. 7 338 
 
 V. Delero, 218 Pa. 487 268 
 
 V. Demain, 6 Pa. L. J. 29 344 
 
 V. Dennie (Mass.), Thach. Cr. 
 
 Cas. 165 456 
 
 V. Densmore, 12 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 .535 145 
 
 c to Sections.^ 
 Coleman v. Desmond, 103 Mass. 
 445 21 
 
 v. Devlin, 141 Mass. 423 437 
 
 V. Dewhirst, 190 Mass. 293 122 
 
 V. Dewritt, 10 Mass. 154 298 
 
 V. Dill, 156 Mass. 226 44, 223 
 
 V. Dillane, 11 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 67 198 
 
 V. Donovan, 13 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 571 2>Z 
 
 V. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412 166, 334 
 V. Dovirer, 4 Allen (Mass.) 297 133 
 V. Downing, 4 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 29 69 
 
 V. Drake, 15 Mass. 161 177 
 
 V. Drass, 146 Pa. St. 55 309 
 
 V. Drew, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 179 
 
 435, 444 
 V. Drew, 153 Mass. 588 
 
 436, 442, 443 
 V. Drum, 58 Pa. St. 9 12, 320 
 
 V. Easland, i Mass. 15 188 
 
 V. Eastman, i Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 189 70, 89, 283, 429, 438 
 
 V. Eddy, 7 Gray (Mass.) 583 
 
 22, 157 
 V. Edgerly, 10 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 184 423, 432 
 
 V. Edgerton, 200 Mass. 318 44 
 
 V. Eisenhower, 181 Pa. St. 470 63 
 V. Ellis (Ky.), 118 S. W. 973 493 
 V. Emery, 2 Gray (Mass.) 276 41 
 V. Emmons, 98 Mass. 6 342 
 
 V. Ervine, 8 Dana (Ky.) 30 125 
 V. Evans, loi Mass. 25 195 
 
 v. Evans, 132 Mass. 11 480 
 
 V. Pagan, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 613 27 
 V. Falvey, 108 Mass. 304 310 
 
 V. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. St. 386 
 
 90, 323, 324 
 V. Fielding. 184 Mass. 484 369 
 
 V. Fields, 4 Leigh (Va.) 648 417 
 V. Fisher, 221 Pa. 538 186 
 
 V. Fitzpatrick, 140 Mass. 455 241 
 V. Flynn, 165 Mass. 153 221, 358 
 V. Follansbee, 155 Mass. 274 
 
 225, 345, 349 
 V. Foran, iro Mass. 179 280a 
 
 V. Ford, 146 Mass. 131 210, 246 
 V. Foster, 114 Mass. 311 422
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xliii 
 
 [References ai 
 Coleman v. Fox, 7 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 58s 320 
 
 V. Furman, 211 Pa. 549 205 
 V. Gadard, 14 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 402 266 
 V. Galavan, 9 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 271 124 
 V. Gaming Implements, 119 
 
 Mass. z^2 477 
 
 V. Gauvin, 143 Mass. 134 370 
 
 V. Gentry, s Pa. Dist. 703 164 
 V. Gerade, 145 Pa. St. 289 
 
 154. 157, T58, 163 
 V. Getchell, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 452 507 
 
 V. Gibson, 211 Pa. 546 320 
 
 V. Gilbert, 165 Mass. 45 216 
 
 V. Glover, iii ]\Iass. 395 69, 371 
 V. Goddard, 14 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 402 267 
 
 V. Goddard. 13 ^lass. 455 195 
 
 V. Goding, 3 Met. (Mass.) 130 471 
 
 V. Goldstein, 114 Mass. 273 369 
 
 V. Goodall, i6s Mass. 588 482 
 V. Goodwin, 14 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 55 6 
 
 V. Goodwin, 186 Fa. St. 218 140 
 V. Gordon, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 569 188 
 
 V. Gorham, 99 Mass. 420 246 
 
 V. Grady, 13 Bush (Ky.) 285 440 
 
 V. Graves, 112 Mass. 282 32 
 
 V. Graves, 155 Mass. 163 507, 508 
 
 V. Gray, 17 Ky. L. 354 330 
 
 V. Gray, 129 Mass. 474 382 
 
 V. Green, 17 Mass. 515 209 
 
 V. Green, 126 Pa. St. 531 191 
 
 V. Griffin, no ]\Iass. 181 187 
 
 V. Grose, 99 Mass. 423 304 
 V. Hackett, 2 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 136 97 
 V. Hagarman, 10 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 401 144 
 
 V. Hagenlock, 140 Mass. 125 166 
 V. Haley, 13 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 587 217 
 V. Hall, 4 Allen (Mass.) 305 
 
 210, 423 
 
 V. Haney, 127 Mass. 455 105, 112 
 
 V. Haiiley, 140 Mass. 457 67 
 
 c to Sections.'] 
 Coleman v. Hardy, 2 Mass. 303 
 
 81, 77, 78 
 v. Hargis, 124 Ky. 356 97, 103 
 
 v. Harlow, no Mass. 411 
 
 58, 67, 68 
 v. Harman, 4 Pa. St. 269 130 
 
 v. Harmon, 2 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 289 364 
 
 V. Harrington, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 26 32 
 
 V. Harrington, 152 Mass. 488 242 
 V. Harris, 131 Mass. 336 418 
 
 V. Harvey, i Gray (Mass.) 
 
 487 122 
 
 V. Haughey, 3 Met. (Ky.) 223 440 
 V. Hayden, 163 Mass. 453 26, 399 
 V. Hayden, 150 IVIass. 332 367 
 
 V. Hayes, 145 Mass. 286 187 
 
 V. Heidler, 191 Pa. St. 375 157, 158 
 V. Hersey, 2 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 173 119, 225 
 
 V. Hill, II Cush. (Mass.) 137 191 
 V. Hill, 14 Mass. 207 204 
 
 V. Hilliard, 2 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 294 324 
 
 V. Hills, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 530 
 
 49, 201 
 V. Hinds, lOi Mass. 209 423, 430 
 V. Hoffman, 121 Mass. 369 197 
 
 V. Hollis, 170 Mass. 433 342 
 
 V. Holmes, 127 Mass. 424 7^, 74, 75 
 V. Holt, 121 Mass. 61 383 
 
 V. Homer, 153 Mass. 343 348 
 
 V. Hooper, Thatcher C. C 
 
 (Mass.) 400 483 
 
 V. Hoskins (Ky.) 35 S. W. 
 
 284 325 
 
 V. Hourigan, 89 Ky. 305 222 
 
 V. Howard (Mass. 1910), 91 
 
 X. E. 397 312, 323 
 
 V. Howe, 9 Gray (Mass.) no 136 
 V. Howe, 132 IMass. 250 
 
 130, 437, 438 
 V. Howe, 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 554 80 
 V. Hoxey, 16 Mass. 385 455 
 
 V. Hul)cr, 126 Ky. 456 47" 
 
 V. Hudson, 97 Mass. 565 369 
 
 V. Hudson, 185 Mass. 402 126 
 
 V. Hughes, 133 Mass. 496 507, 514 
 V. Hunton, 168 Mass. 130 492
 
 xliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, lO 
 j\Iass. 225 205 
 
 V. Ingraham, 7 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 46 243 
 
 V. Israel, 4 Leigh (Va.) 675 446 
 V. Jackson, 11 Bush (Ky.) 679 404 
 V. Jackson, 132 IMass. 16 
 
 87, 438, 439 
 V. James, 99 Mass. 438 138 
 
 V. Jeffries, 7 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 548 437, 438, 443 
 
 V. Johnson, 188 Mass. 382 160, 163 
 V. Johnson, 199 Mass. 55 
 
 41a, 50, 55, 88, 376 
 V. Johnson, 162 Pa. St. 63 116 
 
 V. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432 52 
 
 V. Johnson, 217 Pa. 77 130 
 
 V. Jones, 155 Mass. 170 241 
 
 V. Kaas, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 422 371 
 V. Kane, 108 ]\Iass. 423 46 
 
 V. Karamarkovic, 218 Pa. 405 6 
 V. Karpouski, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 280 445 
 
 V. Keck, 148 Pa. St. 639 265 
 
 V. Keller, 191 Pa. St. 122 50 
 
 V. Kendall, 113 Mass. 210 418 
 
 V. Kennedy, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 
 
 531 471 
 
 V. Kennedy, 131 Mass. 584 144 
 V. Kennedy, 170 ]\Iass. 18 
 
 224, 318, 319 
 V. Kenney, 12 Met. (Mass.) 
 
 235 122, 123 
 
 V, Keyes, 11 Gray (Mass.) 323 
 
 147a 
 
 V. Killion, 194 Mass. 153 147 
 
 V. Kirb3^ 2 Cush. (Mass.) 577 446 
 V. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 496 
 
 26, 138, 140, 229, 230 
 V. Knapp, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 477 130, 273 
 
 V. Krueger, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 181 185 
 
 V. Ladd, 15 Alass. 526 422, 430 
 
 V. Lahey, 14 Gray (Mass.) 91 381 
 
 V. Lane, 113 Mass. 458 395 
 V. Lannam, 13 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 563 60, 125 
 
 V. Lannan, 155 Mass. 168 61 
 
 V. Latampa, 226 Pa. 23 105, 328 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Commonwealth v. Lawler, 12 Al- 
 len (Mass.) 585 237 
 V. Leach, i ]\Iass. 59 307 
 V. Leach, 156 Mass. 99 
 
 348, 349, 350 
 
 V. Leach, 160 Mass. 542 17 
 
 V. Lee, 143 Mass. 100 237 
 
 V. Lenousky, 206 Pa. 277 265 
 V. Leonard, 140 ]\Iass. 473 
 
 12, 79, 80 
 V. Levinson, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 
 
 286 90 
 V. Lindsey, 2 Ches. Co. (Pa.) 
 
 268 250 
 
 V. Liquors, 155 ]\Iass. 142 14 
 V. Littlejohn, 15 ]\Iass. 163 
 
 383, 404 
 
 V. Locke, 114 Mass. 288 24a 
 
 V. Lockhardt, 144 ]\Iass. 132 481 
 
 V. Loewe, 162 Mass. 518 i6a 
 
 V. Logue, 160 ^lass. 551 285 
 
 V. Lowrey, 158 Mass. 18 279 
 
 V. Luckis, 99 Mass. 431 293 
 
 V. Luscomb, 130 Mass. 42 480 
 
 V. Lyden, 113 Mass. 452 221 
 
 V. Lynes, 142 ]Mass. 577 205 
 
 V. ^McCarthy, 119 Mass. 354 89 
 
 V. McComb, 157 Pa. St. 611 191 
 
 V. ]\IcConnell, 162 ^lass. 499 68 
 V. McCue, 16 Gray (Alass.) 
 
 226 46, 446 
 
 V. McDermott, 123 Mass. 44a 123 
 V. McDermott, 37 Pa. Super. 
 
 Ct. I 89 
 V. McDonald, no ]\Iass. 405. 
 
 245, 417 
 
 V. McGorty, 114 ]Mass. 299 301 
 
 V. ^klcGrath, 140 INIass. 296 399 
 V. McKenney, 9 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 114 298 
 
 V. INIcKie, I Gray (Mass.) 61 23 
 
 V. ^McLaughlin, 105 ]\Iass. 460 310 
 V. AIc^NIahon, 145 Pa. St. 413 
 
 153. 277 
 V. Mc^Ianiman, 27 Pa. Super. 
 
 Ct. 304 118, 120 
 V. Mc^Manus, 143 Pa. St. 64 
 
 273, 275, 323 
 
 V. Maclin, 3 Leigh (Va.) 809 310
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xtv 
 
 [References a 
 
 Commonwealth v. Mahon, 145 
 Pa. St. 413 118 
 
 V. Manson, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 31 
 
 188, 189 
 V. Marchand, 155 Mass. 8 507 
 
 V. Marsh, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 57 70 
 V. Mason, 105 Mass. 163 437 
 
 V. Mead, 10 Allen (Mass.) 396 20 
 V. Mead, 12 Gray (Mass.) 167 192 
 V. Meehan, 170 Mass. 362 
 
 46, 429 
 V. Mehan, 11 Gray (Mass.) 321 ^3 
 V. Merriam, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 518 381 
 
 V. Merrill, 14 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 415 279 
 
 V. Meserve, 154 Mass. 64 427 
 
 V. Messinger, i Binn. (Pa.) 
 
 273 296 
 
 V. Mika, 171 Pa. St. 273 103 
 
 V. Millard, i Mass. 6 378 
 
 V. Miller, 8 Gray (Mass.) 484, 514 
 V. Miller, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 309 79 
 V. Minor, 89 Ky. 555 209, 24a 
 
 v. Moinehan, 140 Mass. 463 47 
 V. Montgomery, ii Mete. 
 
 (Mass.) 534 296, 299, 300, 304 
 V. Moore, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 194 532 
 
 V. Moore, 166 Mass. 513 282, 287 
 V. Moore, 99 Pa. St. 570 439, 440 
 V. Morey, i Gray (Mass.) 461 
 
 126, 138 
 V. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199 
 
 60, 246, 362, s(i3 
 V. Morgan, 159 Mass. 375 51 
 
 V. Morihan, 4 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 585 465 
 
 V. Morningstar, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 34 33 
 
 V. Morrell, 99 Mass. 542 49 
 V. Morrill, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 571 439 
 V. Morris, i Cush. (Mass.) 391 
 
 381, 383 
 V. Morrow, 9 Phila. (Pa.) 
 
 583 512 
 
 V. Mosier, 135 Pa. St. 221 238 
 
 V. Mosier, 4 Pa. St. 264 130 
 
 V. Moulton, 9 Mass. 29 295 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Commonwealth v. M'Pike, 3 
 Cush. (Mass.) i8r 95, 97 
 
 V. Mudgett, 174 Pa. St. 211 189 
 V. Mullen, 97 IMass. 545 68, 247 
 V. Murphy, 96 Ky. 28 444 
 
 V. Murphy, 4 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 491 185 
 
 V. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66 408 
 
 V. ]\Iurphy, 166 Mass. 171 485 
 
 V. Murray, 135 Mass. 530 451 
 
 V. Murtagh, i Ashm. (Pa.) 
 
 272 404 
 V. Myers, 160 Mass. 530 137, 138 
 V. Nagle, 157 Mass. 554 77, 84 
 
 V. Nichols, ID Allen (Mass.) 
 
 199 481 
 
 V. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285 
 
 60, 92, 247, 381 
 V. Norcross, 9 Mass. 492 383, 404 
 V. O'Brien, 12 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 183 74, 78, 81, 82 
 
 V. O'Brien, 134 ]\Iass. 198 342 
 
 V. O'Brien, 170 Pa. St. 555 492 
 V. O'Neil, 169 ]\Iass. 394 323 
 
 V. Palmer, 222 Pa. 299 338 
 
 V. Parker, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 212 " 468 
 
 V. Parker, 9 Met. (Mass.) 263 
 
 344, 399 
 V. Parsons, 195 Mass. 560 88, 163 
 V. Pease, 16 Mass. 91 458 
 
 V. Peters, 12 Met. (Mass.) 387 196 
 V. Phillips (Ky.), 82 S. W. 
 
 286 138 
 
 V. Phillips, 12 K}'. L. 410 367 
 
 V. Phillips, 26 Ky. L. 543 130 
 
 V. Phillips, II Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 28 507, S14 
 
 V. Pioso, 18 Lane. L. Rev. 
 
 (Pa.) 18s T6a 
 
 V. Piper, 120 Mass. 185 126, 233 
 V. Place, 153 Pa. St. 314 365 
 
 V. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 143 
 
 157, 161 
 V. Pope, 103 Mass. 440 47, 374 
 
 V. Powers, 116 Mass. 337 49 
 
 V. Pratt, 126 Mass. 462 247 
 
 V. Pratt, 137 Mass. 98 
 
 39, 58, 291
 
 xivi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References a 
 
 Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 
 ]\Iass. 276 41, 126, 143, 366 
 
 V. Price, ID Gray (Mass.) 472 
 
 72, 423, 433 
 V. Proctor, 165 Mass. 38 480 
 
 V. Purdy, 146 Mass. 138 32 
 
 V. Quinn, 150 Mass. 401 368 
 
 V. Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 36 354 
 
 V. Reynolds, 14 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 87 255, 448 
 
 V. Reynolds, 122 Mass. 454 131 
 
 V. Richards, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 434 265, 266 
 
 V. Ricker, 131 Mass. 581 151 
 
 V. Riggs, 14 Gray (Mass.) 376 
 
 298, 305 
 V. Riley, Thach. Cr. Gas. 
 
 (Mass.) 67 432 
 
 V. Roark, 8 Gush. (Mass.) 210 41 
 V. Robbins, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 63 121 
 
 V. Roberts, 108 Mass. 296 105 
 
 V. Robinson, i Gray (Mass.) 
 
 555 188 
 
 V. Robinson, 146 Mass. 571 
 
 88, 321 
 V. Robinson, 165 Mass. 426 205 
 V. Rogers, 7 Met. (Mass.) 
 
 500 158, 163 
 
 V. Rogers, 136 Mass. 158 81 
 
 V. Roosnell, 143 Mass. 32 408 
 
 V. Rowell, 146 Mass. 128 31, 480 
 V. Ruddle, 142 Pa. St. 144 279 
 V. Rudy, 5 Pa. Dist. Ct. 270 365 
 V. Ruisseau, 140 Mass. 363 516 
 
 V. Runnels, 10 Mass. 518 489 
 
 V. Russell, 156 Mass. 196 423 
 
 V. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523 282 
 
 V. Sacket, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 394 
 
 83, 24s 
 V. Samuel, 2 Pick. (]\Iass.) 
 
 103 24a 
 
 V. Saulsbury, 152 Pa. St. 554 
 
 452, 456 
 V. Savory, 10 Gush. (]\Iass.) 
 
 535 74 
 
 V. Sawtelle, 141 Mass. 140 290 
 
 V. Schwartz, 92 Ky. 510 
 
 436, 437, 447 
 
 456 
 6 
 
 283 
 
 527 
 126 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Gommonwealth v. Schweiters, 29 
 Ky. L. 417 470 
 
 V. Scott, 123 Mass. 222 56 
 
 V. Scowden, 92 Ky. 120 
 
 . 191, 192, 449 
 V. Searle, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 332 
 
 422, 424 
 V. Shaffer, 32 Pa. Super. Gt. 
 
 375 308, 309 
 
 V. Shaffer, 178 Pa. St. 409 146 
 
 V. Shaw, 4 Gush. (Mass.) 593 
 
 221, 245 
 V. Shed, I Mass. 227 
 V. Sheffer, 218 Pa. 437 
 V. Shepard, i Allen (Mass.) 
 
 575 
 V. Shepherd, 6 Binnev (Pa.) 
 
 283 
 V. Shew, 190 Pa. St. 23 
 V. Simmons, 6 J. J. Marsh 
 
 (Ky.) 614 488 
 
 V. Sinclair, 195 Alass. 100 
 
 42, 106, 350 
 V. Sliney, 126 Mass. 49 124 
 
 V. Smith, II Allen (Mass.) 
 
 243 466 
 
 V. Smith, 2 Gray (Mass.) 516 201 
 V. Smith. 119 Mass. 305 129, 143 
 V. Smith, 162 Mass. 508 121 
 
 V. Smith, 163 Mass. 411 238 
 
 V. Smith, 166 Mass. 370 
 
 16, 24a, 58a, 477 
 V. Smith, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 568 
 
 420 428, 429 
 V. Snee, 145 Mass. 351 239 
 
 V. Snell, 3 Mass. 82 425 
 
 V. Snell, 189 Mass. 12 312 
 
 V. Snelling, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 337^ 364, 365 
 
 V. Snelling, Thach. Gr. Gas. 
 
 (Mass.) 318 365 
 
 V. Snow, III Mass. 411 241, 360 
 V. Snowden, i Brew. (Pa.) 
 
 218 461 
 
 V. Spahr, 211 Pa. 542 iii, 112 
 
 V. Sparks, 7 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 534 188, 3^^ 
 
 V. Spear, 143 ]\Iass. 172 481 
 
 V. Starr, 4 Allen (Mass.) 301 239
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlvii 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Commonwealth v. Stearns, 2 
 Met. (Mass.) 343 281 
 
 V. Stearns, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 
 
 256 432 
 
 V. Stebbins, 8 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 492 i6a, 292, 298, 304 
 
 V. Stevenson, 127 Mass. zt46 
 
 439, 442 
 V. Stevenson, 142 Mass. 466 342 
 V. Stone, 4 Met. (Mass.) 43 423 
 V. Straesser, 153 Pa. St. 451 324 
 V. Sturgeon (Ky.), 37 S. W. 
 
 680 484 
 
 V. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122 
 
 55, 88, 167, 312, 321 
 V. Sugland, 4 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 7 408 
 
 V. Sullivan, 150 Mass. 315 246 
 
 V. Sullivan, 13 Phil. 410 233 
 
 V. Surles, 165 Mass. 59 344 
 
 V. Switzer, 134 Pa. 383 5I 
 
 V. Taylor, 5 Gush. (Mass.) 
 
 605 126, 434 
 
 V. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261 313 
 
 V. Thomas (Ky.), 104 S. W. 
 
 326 86, 277, 326 
 
 V. Thomas, 31 Ky. L. 899 59 
 
 V. Thomas, i Va. Gas. 307 360 
 
 V. Thompson, 159 Mass. 56 
 
 103, 225, 3^2, 348, 350 
 V. Thurlow, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 374 24, 24a, 32 
 
 V. Thyng, 134 Mass. 191 235 
 
 V. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519 58a, 349 
 V. Tiroinski, 189 Mass. 257 324 
 
 V. Tivnon, 8 Gray (Mass.) 375 375 
 V. Tolliver, 119 Mass. 312 116 
 
 V. Tracy, 5 Met. (Mass.) 536 447 
 V. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180 
 
 116, 348 
 v. Trider, 143 Mass. 180 247 
 
 v. Trimmer, i Mass. 476 294 
 
 V. Tuckerman, 10 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 173 89, 139, 146, 283 
 
 V. Turner, 3 Met. (Mass.) 19 423 
 V. Twitchcll, I Brew. (Pa.) 
 
 551 116, 233 
 
 v. Tuttlc, 120 Gush. (Mass.) 
 
 502 2 
 
 v. Uhrig, 167 Mass. 420 366 
 
 ■ to Sections.] 
 
 Gommonwealth v. Van Tuyl, i 
 Mete. (Ky.) I 275, 445 
 
 V. Varney, 10 Gush. (Mass.) 
 
 362, 402 
 V. Vermouth, 174 Mass. 74 197 
 
 V. Vieth, 155 Mass. 422 480 
 
 V. Waite, 11 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 264 481, 490 
 
 V. Waite, 5 Mass. 261 420 
 
 V. Walden, 3 Gush. (Mass.) 
 
 558 308, 309 
 
 V. Walker, 13 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 570 123 
 
 V. Walker, 163 Mass. 226 45 
 
 V. Wallace, 114 Pa. St. 405 442 
 V. Walsh, 196 Mass. 369 246 
 
 V. Ward, 157 Mass. 482 214, 215 
 V. Warren, 6 Mass. 72 435 
 
 V. Warren, 143 Mass. 568 33 
 
 V. Weber, 167 Pa. St. 153 25, 68 • 
 V. Webster, 5 Gush. (Mass.) 
 
 29s 77, 79, 82, 84, 152, 153- 
 229, 247, 314, 317 
 V. Welch, 142 Mass. 473 47 
 
 V. Wellington, 7 Allen (Mass.) 
 
 299 367 
 
 V. Wells, no Pa. St. 463 471 
 
 V. Welsh, 2 Va. Gas. 57 508 
 
 V. Wentz, I Ash. (Pa.) 209 527 
 V. Werntz, 161 Pa. St. 591 279, 330 
 V. Wesley, 166 Mass. 248 368 
 
 V. Wheeler. 162 Mass. 429 21 
 
 V. Wheeler (Mass., 1910), 91 
 
 N. E. 415 480 
 
 V. White, 145 Mass. 392 423 
 
 V. White, 147 Mass. 76 193 
 
 V. Whitman, 121 Mass. 361 55, 294 
 V. Whittaker, 131 Mass. 224 
 
 393, 341 
 V. Willard, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 476 69 
 
 V. Williams, 2 Gush. (Mass.) 
 
 582 377 
 
 V. Williams, 13 Mass. 501 250 
 
 V. Williams, 171 Mass. 461 129, 323 
 V. Wilson, I Gray (Mass.) 
 
 337 163 
 
 V. Wilson, 2 Gray (Mass.) 70 421 
 V. Wilson, 30 Pa. Super. Gt. 26 456 
 V. Wilson, 186 Pa. St. i 140
 
 xlviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References a 
 
 Commonwealth v. Wireback, 190 
 Pa. St. 138 157, 161 
 
 V. Woelfel, 121 Ky. 48 163 
 
 V. Wood, II Gray (Mass.) 85 
 
 344, 345, 349 
 V. Woodcroft, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 554 26 
 
 V. Woods, 10 Gray (]\Iass.) 477 26 
 V. Worcester, 141 ]\Iass. 58 68 
 
 V. Wotton, 201 Mass. 81 452 
 
 V. Wright (Ky.), 27 S. W. 
 
 815 391 
 
 V. York, 9 Met. (Mass.) 93 320 
 
 V. Zeh, 138 Pa. St. 615 23, 24, 24a 
 
 Compton V. State, no Ala. 24 320 
 
 V. Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130 258 
 
 Comstock V. State, 14 Neb. 205 
 
 68, 123, 416 
 Conant v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 610 74, 468 
 
 Conkwright v. People, 35 111. 204 299 
 
 Conley v. Meeker, 85 N. Y. 618 236 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.). 116 S. W. 
 
 806 225 
 
 Conly V. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 
 
 125 164 
 
 Conn V. People, 116 111. 458 354 
 
 Connell v. State, 80 Neb. 296 46 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 142 324 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 259 
 
 106, 108 
 Conner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 378 
 
 44, 263 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. 659 147a 
 
 Conners v. State, 47 Wis. 523 407 
 
 Connor v. People, 18 Colo. 373 241 
 
 Connors v. People, 50 N. Y. 240 
 
 60, 66 
 Conrad v. State, 132 Ind. 254 
 
 12, 153, 236 
 V. State, 144 Ind. 290 229, 230 
 
 Consaul v. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247 222 
 Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482 
 
 71, 124, 154, 121, 122, 235, 318 
 
 Conyers v. State, 50 Ga. 103 24, 476 
 
 Cook, In re, 49 Fed. 833 495, 497 
 
 Cook V. Johnston, 5« ^lich. 437 369 
 
 V. State, 152 Ala. 66 222 
 
 V. State, 75 Ark. 540 74 
 
 V. State, 80 Ark. 495 69, 376 
 
 - to Sections.] 
 
 Cook V. State, 46 Fla. 20 78, 82 
 
 V. State, II Ga. 53 380 
 
 V. State, 124 Ga. 653 242 
 
 V. State, 169 Ind. 430 494 
 
 V. State, 71 Neb. 243 439 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 607 225 
 
 Cooksey v. State, 84 Ark. 485 446 
 
 Cooley V. Foltz, 85 ]Mich. 47 179 
 
 Coolman v. State, 163 Ind. 503 338 
 
 Coon V. People, 99 111. 368 211, 213 
 
 Coons V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 256 
 
 381, 403 
 
 Cooper V. State, 63 Ala. 80 302 
 
 V. State, 86 Ala. 610 57 
 
 V. State, 88 Ala. 107 374 
 
 V. State, 90 Ala. 641 240, 390 
 
 V. State, 86 Ark. 30 392 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 730 36 
 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 362 520 
 
 V. State, 1 01 Ga. 783 285 
 
 V. State, 106 Ga. 119 37 
 
 V. State, 47 Ind. 61 197 
 
 V. Territory, 19 Okla. 496 74 
 
 Cope V. Cope, i Moody & R. 269 527 
 
 Copeland v. Boston Dairy Co., 189 
 
 Mass. 342 481 
 
 V. State (Fla., 1909), 50 So. 
 
 621 323 
 
 V. State (Tex., 1897), 40 S. W. 
 
 589 525 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 575 280a, 475 
 Corbett v. Gibson, 16 Blatchf. 334 252 
 Corcoran v. Higgins, 194 Mass. 
 
 291 523 
 
 Cordes v. State (Tex. Cr. App., 
 
 1908), 112 S. W. 943 163 
 
 Cordova v. State, 6 Tex. App. 207 123 
 
 Cornelius v. Commonwealth, 15 
 
 B. Mon. (Ky.) 539 222 
 
 V. State, 145 Ala. 65 364 
 
 Cornell v. Green, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 14 266 
 
 Cornwell v. State, Mart. & Yerg. 
 
 (Tenn.) 147 96 
 
 Corson v. Corson, 44 N. H. 587 527 
 Cortez V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 10 90, 321 
 
 Cossart v. State, 14 Ark. 538 459 
 
 Costello V. State (Tex.), 21 S. W. 
 300 373
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 xlix 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Cotton V. State, 87 Ala. 103 
 
 68, 135, 238 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 17 So. 372 87 
 
 Cottrell, Ex parte, 13 Neb. 193 523 
 
 Couch V. State, 28 Ga. 367 422, 424 
 
 Counselman v. Hitchock, 142 U. 
 
 S. 547 57, 453 
 
 Counts V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 329 384 
 Course v. Stead, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 
 
 22 505 
 
 Courtney v. State, 5 Ind. App.' 
 
 356 475 
 
 Coveney v. Tannahill i Hill (N. 
 
 Y.) 33 175. 176 
 
 Cover V. Commonwealth, 6 Cent. 
 
 585 121 
 
 Covington v. O'Meara (Ky., 1909) 
 119 S. W. 1S7 202 
 
 V. People. 36 Colo. 183 312 
 
 Cowen V. People, 14 111. 348 442 
 
 Cowles V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 498 411 
 Cowley V. People, 83 N. Y. 464 
 
 50, 163 
 
 V. State, 10 Lea (Tenn.) 282 354 
 
 Cox V. Commonwealth, 125 Pa. St 
 
 94 73 
 
 V. Hill, 3 Ohio 411 174 
 
 V. People, 80 N. Y. 500 
 
 129, 135, 140 
 V. State (Fla., 1909), 50 So. 
 
 875 352, 364 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 609 44 
 
 V. State, 64 Ga. 374 100 
 
 V. State, 95 Ga. 502 475 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 36 S. W. 435 261 
 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 254 330, 492 
 
 Coxwell V. State, 66 Ga. 309 333 
 
 Coyle V. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 
 L. 340 no 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 100 Pa. St. 
 
 573 158 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 72 S. W. 847 488 
 Craddick v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 
 385 211 
 
 Craft V. State (Tex. Cr. App., 
 
 1909), 122 S. W. 547 108 
 
 Craig V. State (Ind.), 86 N. E. 
 397 55. 358 
 
 V. State, 78 Xeh. 466 223 
 
 iv — Underhill Cbim. Ev. 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Craighead v. State (Tex.), 117 
 
 S. W. 128 309 
 
 Crandall v. People, 2 Lans. (N. 
 
 Y.) 309 68 
 
 Crane v. State, in Ala. 45 278 
 
 v. State, 94 Tenn. 86 402, 404 
 
 Crass V. State, 30 Tex. App. 480 32 
 
 v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 312 90 
 
 Cravens v. State (Tex.), 103 S. 
 
 W. 921 267, 269 
 
 Crawford v. State, 112 Ala. i 
 
 80, 116, 241, 315 
 V. State, 113 Ala. 661 301 
 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 701 358 
 
 V. State, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 
 
 190 147a 
 
 V. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 41 532 
 V. State, 2 Yerg. (Tenn.) 60 193 
 V. State (Tex.), 34 S. W. 927 74 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 454 354 
 
 V. United States, 30 App. D. 
 
 C. I 59, 119, 280 
 
 V. United States, 212 U. S. 183 121 
 Crayton v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 88 430 
 Creed v. People, 81 111. 565 149 
 
 Creek v. State, 24 Ind. 151 26 
 
 Creighton v. Commonwealth, 83 
 
 Ky. 142 446 
 
 Crenshow v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 77 73 
 
 Creswell v. State, 14 Tex. App. i 314 
 Crews v. People, 120 111. 317 270 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 533 88, 321 
 Cribb V. State, 118 Ga. 316 164 
 
 Criner v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 174 73 
 
 Gripe v. State, 4 Ga. App. 832 21 
 
 Crittenden v. Commonwealth, 82 
 
 Ky. 164 222 
 
 Crockett v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 276 103 
 
 Croghan v. State, 22 Wis. 444 395 
 Cromack v. Heathcote, 4 Moore 
 
 357 175 
 
 Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510 
 
 95> 332 
 
 Groom v. State, 90 Ga. 430 32S 
 
 Crosby v. People, 137 111. 325 493 
 
 Cross v. Cross, 43 Miss. 392 526 
 
 v. Cross, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139 527
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 Cross V. People, 47 III. 152 68, 421 
 V. State, 78 Ala. 430 381 
 
 V. State, 132 Ind. 65 12 
 
 Crossland v. State, yy Ark. 537 
 
 238, 301, 423 
 Crow V. Jordon, 49 Ohio St. 655 525 
 V. State, 6 Tex. 334 144 
 
 Crowell V. State, 79 Neb. 784 121 
 
 Croy V. State, 4 Ga. App. 456 58a, 488 
 V. State, 32 Ind. 384 310 
 
 Crozier v. State, i Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 453 392 
 
 Crumbley v. State, 61 Ga. 582 353 
 
 Crumley v. State, 5 Ga. App. 231 329 
 Crump V. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. 
 
 L. 450 103, 237 
 
 Crumpton v. State, 52 Ark. 273 
 
 222, 248 
 V. United States, 138 U. S. 361 269 
 Crutchfield v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 65 69, 70 
 
 Cryer v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 621 310 
 Cubbison v. McCreary, 2 W. & S. 
 
 (Pa.) 262 201 
 
 Culver V. Marks, 122 Ind. 554 45 
 
 V. Scott &c. Lumber Co., 53 
 
 Minn. 360 218 
 
 Cummings v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 1907), 106 S. W. 363 298 
 
 Cummins v. People, 42 Mich. 142 118 
 
 Cunningham v. People, 210 111. 
 
 410 409 
 
 V. State. 97 Ga. 214 225 
 
 V. State, 56 Neb. 691 6 
 
 V. State, 61 N. J. L. 666 439 
 
 Curby v. Territory, 4 Ariz. 371 414 
 
 Curlee v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 395 485 
 
 Curran v. People, 35 111. App. 275 532 
 
 Curry v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 158 130, 342 
 
 Curtis V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 606 87 
 
 Custer V. State (Tex.), y6 S. W. 
 
 476 74 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 144 87 
 
 Cuthbert v. State, 3 Ga. App. 600 378 
 
 Cutsinger v. Commonwealth, 7 
 
 Bush) (Ky.) 392 48s 
 
 Cutter V. State, 36 N. J. L. 125 456 
 
 D 
 
 Dacey v. People, 116 111. 555 155, 320 
 
 Daggett V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 5 sy^ 
 
 Dahlberg v. People, 225 111. 485 359 
 
 Daily v. New York &c. R. Co., 32 
 
 Conn. 356 106 
 
 V. State, 51 Ohio St. 348 311 
 
 Dale V. State, 88 Ga. 552 153, 522 
 
 V. State, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 550 154 
 
 Dallas V. State, 129 Ga. 602 268, 270 
 
 Daly V. Multnomah Co., 14 Ore. 
 
 20 249 
 
 Dan forth v. State, 75 Ga. 614 275 
 
 Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. St. 191 174 
 
 Daniels v. People, 6 Mich. 381 395 
 
 V. State, 148 Ala. 6*63 293 
 
 V. State (Fla.),48 So. 747 125, 130 
 
 V. State, 78 Ga. 98 138, 197, sys 
 
 V. State, 2 Penn. (Del.) 586 79 
 
 Dantz V. State, 87 Ind. 398 144 
 
 Darby v. State, 92 Ala. 9 112 
 
 Darter v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 40 
 
 325, 330a 
 Daughdrill v. State, 113 Ala. 7 105 
 Daughtry v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 
 
 394 483 
 
 Dave V. State, 22 Ala. 23 81 
 
 Davenport v. Commonwealth, I 
 
 Leigh (Va.) 588 275 
 
 V. State, 85 Ala. 336 82 
 
 v. State, 112 Ala. 49 484 
 
 Davidson v. People, 90 111. 221 221 
 
 V. State, 104 Ga. 761 378 
 
 V. State, 99 Ind. 366 197 
 
 V, State, 135 Ind. 254 324 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 372 466 
 
 Davis V. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. 
 
 L. 1426 98 
 
 v. Commonwealth, 95 Ky. 19 236 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. St. 
 
 421 310 
 
 V. People, 114 111. 86 14 
 
 v. People, I Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 447 378 
 
 V. State (Ala. 1909), 48 So. 
 
 694 358 
 
 V. State, 17 Ala. 354 261, 266 
 
 V. State, 141 Ala. 62 147
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ore to Sectioiis.] 
 
 Davis V. State, 152 Ala. 25 58 
 
 V. State, 152 Ala. 82 368, 370 
 
 V. State, 45 Ark. 359 486 
 
 V. State, 63 Ark. 470 54, 417 
 
 V. State, 46 Fla. 137 374a 
 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 318 58a 
 
 V. State, 10 Ga. loi 79 
 
 V. State, 76 Ga. 16 378 
 
 V. State, 100 Ga. 69 293 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 843 104 
 
 V. State, 122 Ga. 564 70 
 
 V. State, 138 Ind. 11 67 
 
 V. State, 50 Miss. 86 300 
 
 V. State, 31 Neb. 247 205, 408 
 
 V. State, 51 Neb. 301 
 
 IS, 55, 147, 248, 280 
 V. State, 25 Ohio St. 369 166 
 
 V. State (Tex., 1908), 114 S. 
 
 W. 366 122 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 102 S. W. 
 
 1150 269 
 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 519 306 
 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 594 56 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 45 359 
 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 210 34, 296 
 V. State, 32 Tex. (3r. App. 377 88 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 117 427 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 218 421 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 166 378 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 149 517, 520 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 332 272 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 629 61 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 236 318, 323 
 V. State, 134 Wis. 632 36 
 
 V. United States, 160 U. S. 469 157 
 V. United States, 165 U. S. 373 163 
 
 Davison v. Cruse, 47 Neb. 829 
 
 525, 531, 532 
 
 V. People, 90 111. 221 320 
 Dawson v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 25 Ky. L. 5 358 
 
 V. State, 16 Ind. 428 166 
 
 V. State, 62 Miss. 241 153 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. App. 535 
 
 88, 376, 378 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 9 37 
 
 Day V. Commonwealth (Ky.), no 
 
 S. W. 417 435, 439 
 
 V. State, 63 Ga. 667 374 
 
 V State, 91 Miss. 239 517 
 
 Day V. State, 21 Tex. App. 213 23 
 V. State, 27 Tex. App. 143 71 
 
 Deal V. State (Miss., 1909), 50 
 
 So. 495 424 
 
 Dean v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 78 
 S. W. 1112 269 
 
 v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. 
 
 1876 238 
 
 v. Commonwealth, 32 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 912 315 
 
 v. State, 89 Ala. 46 354 
 
 V. State, 98 Ala. 71 484 
 
 v. State, 105 Ala. 21 336 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 184 518 
 
 V. State, 29 Ind. 483 526, 527 
 
 V. State, 130 Ind. 237 276 
 
 V. State, 147 Ind. 215 284 
 
 V. State, 85 Miss. 40 323 
 
 Deathridge v. State, i Sneed 
 
 (Tenn.) 75 138 
 
 Debardelaben v. State, 99 Tenn. 
 
 649 471 
 
 Degg V. State, 150 Ala. 3 41a 
 
 DeGroat v. People, 39 Mich. 124 395 
 DeHaven v. State, 2 Ind. App. 
 
 376 475 
 
 Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 
 
 Va. 867 159, 163 
 
 Delahoyde v. People, 212 111. 554 120 
 De La Motte's Case, 21 How. St. 
 
 Tr. 564 429 
 
 Delaney v. State, 148 Ala. 586 
 
 103, 119 
 
 V. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 28 440 
 
 Delany v. People, 10 Mich. 241 395 
 
 DeLeon v. State (Tex.), 114 S. 
 
 W. 828 19s 
 
 v. Territor}^ 9 Ariz. 161 
 
 42, 281, 290 
 Delk v. State, 100 Ga. 61 268 
 
 Delmont v. State, 15 Wyo. 271 371 
 Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 691 144 
 
 v. Stewart, 86 Ga. 729 43 
 
 Demaree v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 91 S. W. T131 160 
 
 Demolli v. United States, 144 Fed. 
 
 363 478 
 
 Dempsey v. State, 83 .Ark. 81 12 
 
 Dcnham v. State (Ga. App.), 63 
 S. E. 62 S7
 
 lii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References a) 
 6 Maine 
 
 Dennett v. Kneeland, 
 
 460 
 Dennis v. People, i Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 469 
 
 State, 
 
 State 
 
 926 
 
 V. State. 
 
 139 Ala. 109 
 (Ark.), 114 
 
 S. W. 
 
 533 
 
 428 
 473 
 
 276 
 519 
 
 103 Ind. 142 
 Dennison v. Christian, 196 U. S. 
 
 637 497 
 
 V. Page, 29 Pa. St. 420 526, 527 
 
 Densmore v. State, 67 Ind. 306 
 
 Denson v. State (Tex. Cr. 1896), 
 
 35 S. W. 150 
 Dentler v. State, 112 Ala. 70 
 Denton v. State, 77 Md. 527 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 193 
 DePriest v. State, 68 Ind. 569 
 De Silva v. State, 91 Miss. 776 
 Devere v. State, 5 Ohio Cr. Ct. 
 
 509 423, 425 
 
 Devine, Ex parte, 74 Miss. 715 499 
 Devoto V. Commonwealth, 3 Mete. 
 
 (Ky.) 417 89 
 
 Devoy v. State, 122 Wis. 148 
 Devries v. Phillips, 63 N. Car. 53 
 Dibble v. State, 48 Ind. 470 
 Dick, Ex parte, 14 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 120 
 
 330 
 35 
 290 
 418 
 524 
 357 
 
 417 
 247 
 524 
 
 Dickerson v. State, 48 Wis. 288 
 
 510 
 
 Dickey v. State, 68 Ala. 508 
 V. State, 86 Miss. 525 118, 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 430 
 
 Dickinson v. State (Okla. 
 App., 1909), 104 Pac. 923 
 
 Dickson v. State, 39 Ohio St. 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. i 
 V. Territory, 6 Ariz. 199 
 V. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507 
 
 Diffey v. State, 86 Ala. 66 
 
 Digby V. People, 113 111. 123 
 
 Dill V. State, i Tex. App. 278 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 113 
 
 Dillard v. State, 152 Ala. 86 
 V. State, 58 Miss. 368 
 V. United States, 72 C. C 
 
 451 
 V. United States, 141 Fed. 
 Dillin V. People, 8 Mich. 357 
 
 131, 132 
 473 
 
 121, 409 
 416 
 Cr. 
 352 
 
 73 326 
 363 
 297 
 202 
 
 484 
 104, 105 
 
 188 
 
 358 
 87 
 224, 334 
 A. 
 
 241 
 303 423 
 
 337 
 
 439 
 485 
 270 
 
 385 
 386 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St. 
 280 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 32 S. W. 771 
 Dingman v. State, 48 Wis. 485 
 Dinkey v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa. 
 
 St. 126 
 Disharoon v. State, 95 Ga. 351 
 District of Columbia v. Armes, 
 
 107 U. S. 519 202 
 
 Dixon V. People, 18 Mich. 84 185, 189 
 
 V. State, 13 Fla. 636 328 
 
 V. State, 86 Ga. 754 234 
 
 V. State, 116 Ga. 186 130 
 
 Dobbs V. State (Tex.), 113 S. W. 
 
 923 48 
 
 Dobson V. Cothran, 34 S. Car. 518 39 
 
 V. State, 46 Neb. 250 299 
 
 Dock's Case, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 
 
 909 324 
 
 Dodds V. State (Miss. 1908), 45 
 
 So. 863 246 
 
 Dodson V. State, 86 Ala. 60 147a 
 
 Doe V. Harvey, 8 Bing. 239 44 
 
 V. Riley, 28 Ala. 164 452 
 
 Dolan V. State, 40 Ark. 454 262, 263 
 
 V. United States, 123 Fed. 52 492 
 Doles V. State, 97 Ind. 555 no 
 
 Dominick v. State, 81 Ga. 715 521 
 
 Done V. People, 5 Park Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 364 138 
 
 Don Moraii v. People, 25 Mich. 
 
 3S6 417 
 
 Donnellan v. Commonwealth, 7 
 
 Bush (Ky.) 676 320 
 
 Donnelly v. County, 7 Iowa 419 
 
 249, 250 
 Donner v. State, 69 Neb. 56 41a, 45 
 Donoghoe v. People, 6 Park Cr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 120 76 
 
 Donohue v. State, 59 Ark. 375 442 
 Donovan v. State, 140 Wis. 570 414 
 Dooley v. State, 89 Ala. 90 485 
 
 Doolittle V. State, 93 Ind. 272 312 
 
 Doo Woon, In re, 18 Fed. 898 496 
 Dorgan v. State, 72 Ala. 173 523 
 
 Dorman v. State, 48 Fla. 18 263 
 
 V. State, 56 Ind. 454 21 
 
 Dorsey v. State, no Ala. 38 48, 304 
 
 v. State, III Ala. 40 437 
 
 v. State, no Ga. 331 17
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 liii 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Doss V. State, SO Tex. Cr. 48 374 
 
 Dougherty v. People, i Colo. 514 349 
 Doughterty v. People, 118 111. 160 
 
 2,7, 21 
 
 Douglass V. State (Ark., 1909), 
 
 121 S. W. 923 36, 301 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 2,3 S. W. 228 237 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 98 S. W. 840 236 
 
 V. State (Tex.). 114 S. W. 808 ico 
 
 Dove V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 
 348 
 Dow V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 278 
 Dowd V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 563 
 Downey v. State, no Ala. 99 
 Doyle V. Kirby, 184 Mass. 409 
 V. People, 147 111. 394 
 V. State, 39 Fla. 155 
 V. State, 77 Ga. 513 
 Drake v. State, no Ala. 9 
 V. State, 75 Ga. 413 
 V. State, 53 N. J. L. 23 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 203 
 Drane v. State (Miss.), 45 So. 
 
 149 
 Draught! v. State, 76 Miss. 574 
 Drew V. State, 124 Ind. 9 66, 78, ^2 
 Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68 Conn. 441 497 
 Driscoll V. People, 47 Mich. 413 
 
 95, 97, 246 
 Driver v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 20 87 
 
 Drowne v. Stimpson, 2 JNIass. 441 533 
 Druin v. Commonwealth (Ky., 
 
 1910), 124 S. W. 856 413, 414 
 
 Drumright v. State, 29 Ga. 430 124 
 
 DuBose V. State, 120 Ala. 300 103, no 
 
 V. State, 148 Ala. 560 2,37 
 
 Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 
 
 How. St. Tr. 573 179 
 
 Duck V. State, 17 Ind. 210 532 
 
 Duckworth v. State, 83 Ark. 6 
 
 192, 196 
 Dudley v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 31 
 
 269, 321 
 Dudney v. State, 22 Ark. 251 475 
 
 Duffin V. People, T07 111. 113 51, 425 
 Duffy V. People, 26 N. Y. 588 
 
 138, 275, 279 
 Dugan, In re, 2 Lowell C. C. 367 501 
 
 157 
 269 
 267 
 473 
 
 455 
 279 
 
 277 
 
 358 
 
 328, 329 
 
 58a 
 
 364 
 112 
 
 226 
 126 
 
 ■e to Sections. "] 
 
 Dugan V. Mahoney, 11 Allen 
 
 (Mass.) 572 
 Duke V. Asljee, n Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 112 
 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 14 
 Dukehart v. Coughman, 36 Neb. 
 
 412 
 
 Dukes V. State, n Ind. 557 100, 
 Dulin V. Dillard, 91 Va. 718 
 Dumas v. State, 62 Ga. 58 2'^, 
 
 V. State, 63 Ga. 600 
 
 V. State, 94 Ga. 590 
 Dunbar v. Armstrong, 115 111. 
 App. 549 
 
 V. United States, 156 U. S. 185 
 Duncan v. State, 29 Fla. 430 
 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 180 
 
 V. State, 49 Miss. 331 
 
 V. State, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 148 
 Dungan v. State, 135 Wis. 151 61 
 Dunk V. State, 84 Miss. 452 
 Dunlap V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 504 
 Dunlop V. United States, 165 U. 
 S. 486 19, 
 
 Dunmore v. State, 86 Miss. 788 
 Dunn V. People, 109 111. 635 
 
 V. People, 158 111. 586 
 
 V. People, 29 N. Y. 523 
 
 V. State, 143 Ala. 67 
 
 V. State, 2 Ark. 229 
 
 V. State, 70 Ind. 47 
 Dunwoody v. State, n8 Ga. 308 
 Dupree v. State, 23 Ala. 380 265, 
 
 V. State, 148 Ala. 620 35, 371, 
 Durham's Case, 2 Leach C. L. 538 
 Durham v. State, 2 Ga. App. 401 
 Durland v. United States, 161 U. 
 S. 306 195, 
 
 Duttenhofer v. State, 34 Ohio St. 
 91 64, 
 
 Duvall v. State, 62 Ala. 12 
 Dwight v. Cutting, 91 Hun 38 
 Dwyer v. Rippetoe, 72 Tex. 520 
 Dye v. State, 130 Ind. 87 
 Dyer v. State, 74 Ind. 594 
 
 v. State (Tex. Cr. 1903), 77 S. 
 W. 456 
 
 217 
 
 455 
 364 
 
 524 
 
 325 
 196 
 104 
 65 
 125 
 
 59 
 
 44 
 
 37 
 
 227 
 
 308 
 
 446 
 
 , 77 
 235 
 359 
 
 478 
 129 
 
 12 
 337 
 345 
 326 
 
 90 
 198 
 
 374 
 325 
 373 
 73 
 214 
 
 197 
 
 176 
 298 
 218 
 267 
 124 
 35 
 
 245
 
 liv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Eacock V. State, 169 Ind. 488 
 
 79, 121, 220, 
 Eads V. State (Wyo.), loi Pac. 
 946 172, 
 
 Eaker v. State, 4 Ga. App. 649 
 Earles v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 140 
 Earll V. People, TZ HI- 329 
 
 V. People, 99 111. 123 
 Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 
 
 921 135, 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 382 
 
 268, 269, 
 Earp V. State, 104 Md. 253 
 Easdale v. Reynolds, 143 Mass. 
 
 126 
 Easley v. Commonwealth (Pa., 
 
 1887), II Atl. 220 
 Easlick v. United States, 7 Ind. 
 
 Ter. 707 
 Easterwood v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 
 
 400 
 Eastman v. Crosby, 8 Allen 
 
 (Mass.) 206 
 Eastwood V. People, 3 Park. Cr. 
 
 Rep. 25 
 Eatman v. State, 139 Ala. (i^ 
 
 V. State, 48 Fla. 21 282, 
 
 Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 598 
 
 V. State, 134 Ind. 651 
 Echols V. State, 147 Ala. 700 
 
 298, 301, 302, 
 V. State, 81 Ga. 696 
 Eckels V. State, 20 Ohio St. 508 
 Edgington v. United States, 164 
 
 U. S. 361 
 Edington v. vEtna Life Ins. Co., 
 TJ N. Y. 564 
 
 V. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N. 
 Y. i8s 
 Edmonds v. State, 70 Ala. 89 
 
 V. State, 34 Ark. 720 312, 
 
 Edmondson v. State, 43 Tex. 230 
 Edmonson v. State, ']2 Ark. 585 
 Edwards v. Commonwealth, 78 
 Va. 39 
 V. State, IIS Ala. 52 
 V. State (Ga.), 51 S. E. 505 
 V. State, 126 Ga. 89 
 
 492 
 
 293 
 57 
 
 324 
 1Z 
 
 349 
 
 138 
 
 143 
 
 532 
 527 
 
 323 
 
 50s 
 
 [References are to Sections."] 
 
 Edwards v. State, 69 Neb. 386 18 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 452 294 
 
 V. Territory, i Wash. 195 69 
 
 Egbert v. Greenwalt, 44 Mich. 
 
 245 527 
 
 Eggler V. People, 56 N. Y. 642 
 
 312, 32s 
 Ehrhart v. Rork, 114 111. App. 509 282 
 Ehrisman v. Scott, 5 Ind. App. 
 
 596 218 
 
 Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322 325, 326 
 Eldridge v. State, 27 Fla. 162 
 
 248, 364 
 Eley V. State (Tex. 1890), 13 S. 
 
 W. 998 376 
 
 Elias V. Ramirez, 215 U. S. 398 
 
 496, SOI 
 
 Ellerbe, In re, 13 Fed. Rep. S30 226 
 
 Elliott V. State, i Ga. App. 113 40 
 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 31 383 
 
 V. State, 34 Neb. 48 62 
 
 Ellis V. State, 120 Ala. S2>3 Z2Z 
 
 V. State, 25 Fla. 702 409, 414 
 
 V. State, 124 Ga. 91 487 
 
 V. State, 65 Miss. 44 126 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 601 24 
 
 V. State, 2,Z Tex. Cr. App. 86 
 
 230 
 205 
 286 
 127 
 
 417 
 
 30S 
 6 
 
 293 
 
 79 
 
 179 
 
 179 
 293 
 330 
 250 
 128 
 
 509 
 308 
 
 484 
 
 6, 161 
 Elliston V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 575 296 
 Elmore v. State, 98 Ala. 12 118, 119 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 184 185 
 
 Elsey V. State, 47 Ark. 572 422 
 
 Eisner v. State, 22 Tex. App. 687 297 
 Elsworth V. State, S2 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. I 54 
 
 Elting V. United States, 27 Ct. CI. 
 
 158 251 
 
 Emerson v. State, 43 Ark. 372 
 
 197, 198 
 Emery v. State, 92 Wis. 146 131, 132 
 Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 57 
 
 Emmons v. Barton, 109 Cal. 663 187 
 Employers' Teaming Co. v. Team- 
 sters' Joint Council, 141 Fed. 
 679 461 
 
 Endaily v. State, 39 Ark. 278 30S 
 
 England v. State, 89 Ala. 76 
 
 245, 372, 374 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 49 S. W. 379 364 
 
 English V. State, 31 Fla. 340 228
 
 TABLE 0'^ CASES. 
 
 Iv 
 
 [References a) 
 
 Ennis v. State, 3 Greer (Iowa 
 
 67 282 
 
 Enquirer Co. v. Johnston, 72 Fed. 
 
 443 363 
 
 Epps V. State, 19 Ga. 102 80, 214, 228 
 V. State, 102 Ind. 539 
 
 6, 40, 280a, 312, 318 
 Errington's Case, 2 Lewin's C. C. 
 
 148 103 
 
 Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 320 
 
 V. State, 10 Tex. App. 700 165 
 
 Esch V. Graue, 72 Neb. 719 525 
 
 Eskridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30 136 
 
 Espalla V. State, 108 Ala. 38 424 
 
 Etress v. State, 88 Ala. 191 484 
 Ettinger v. Commonwealth, 98 
 
 Pa. St. 338 122, 123, 124, S22i 
 Euqua v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 
 
 5/8 112 
 
 Evans v. State, 109 Ala. il 233 
 
 V. State, 58 Ark. 47 97, no 
 
 V. State, 17 Fla. 192 21, 37 
 
 V. State, 67 Ind. 68 521 
 
 V. State, 150 Ind. 651 510 
 
 V. State, 165 Ind. 369 529 
 
 V. State, 61 ]\Iiss. 157 71 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 76 S. W. 467 119 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 485 209 
 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 649 517 
 
 Everage v. State, 113 Ala. 102 493 
 
 Everett v. State, 33 Fla. 661 185 
 
 V. State, 62 Ga. 65 312, 329 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 682 175 
 
 Evers v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 318 324 
 
 Ewert V. State, 48 Fla. 36 268 
 
 Ewing V. Bailey, 36 III. App. 191 201 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), in 
 
 S. W. 352 320 
 
 Ezell V. State, 103 Ala. 8 315 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 71 S. W. 283 121 
 
 Eager v. State, 22 Neb. 332 414 
 
 Falkner v. State, 151 Ala. 77 238 
 
 Fallin v. State, 83 Ala. 5 241 
 
 Fallwell V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 35 473 
 
 Falmouth v. Moss,' 11 Price 455 179 
 
 Fannin v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 41 358 
 
 e to Sectioiis.] 
 
 Fanton v. State, 50 Neb. 351 12, 271 
 Farez, In re, 7 Blatchf. C. C. 345 
 
 496, 501 
 
 Farley v. State, 57 Ind. 331 195 
 
 V. State, 127 Ind. 419 17, 18, 373 
 
 Farmer v. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. 
 
 L. 1168 61, 103 
 
 V. Salisbury, 77 Vi. 161 21 
 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 423 310 
 
 Farrall v. State, 32 Ala. 557 24 
 
 Farrell, In re, 36 Mont. 254 430 
 
 Farrell v. People, 103 111. 17 116 
 
 v. State, 54 N. J. L. 416 408 
 
 Farris v. People, 129 111. 521 90 
 
 Fassinow v. State, 89 Ind. 235 61 
 
 Faulk v. State, 52 Ala. 415 197 
 
 Faulkner v. State, S3 Tex. Cr. 258 388 
 
 V. Territory, 6 N. Mex. 464 270 
 
 Faust V. United States, 163 U. S. 
 
 452 33, 224, 282 
 
 Faustre v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 
 
 34 _ _ _ 402 
 
 Fawcet v. Linthecum, 7 Ohio Cir. 
 
 Ct. 141 254 
 
 Fay V. Commonwealth, 28 Gratt. 
 (Va.,) 912 305, 442 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 185 312, 315 
 Fears v. State, 125 Ga. 740 21 
 
 Feeney v. Long Island R. Co., 116 
 N. Y. 375 179 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App., 
 
 1910), 124 S. W. 944 422 
 Feilds V. State, 46 Fla. 84 54 
 
 Fein v. Covenant &c. Assn., 60 
 
 III. App. 274 239 
 
 Felder v. State, 23 Tex. App. 477 
 
 54, no, 331 
 Felker v. State, 54 Ark. 489 279 
 
 Felsenthal v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 67s 77, 78 
 
 Fenlon v. Dempsey, 21 Abb. N. C. 
 
 291 252 
 
 Ferguson v. McBean, 91 Cal. 63 174 
 
 V. State, 141 Ala. 20 97, 336 
 
 v. State, 71 Miss. 805 390, 393 
 
 V. State, 72 Neb. 350 58, 220, 222 
 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 504 356 
 
 V. State, 3T Tex. Cr. App. 93 137 
 
 Ferrel v. Commonwealth, 15 Ky. 
 
 L. 321 325
 
 ivi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References at 
 
 Ferrell v. Opelika, 144 Ala. 135 473 
 Ferriman v. People, 128 111. App. 
 
 230 460 
 
 Fertig v. State, 100 Wis. 301 119a, 267 
 
 Field V. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 
 
 690 517, 520, 521 
 
 V. State, 126 Ga. 571 372 
 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 422 378 
 
 Fielder v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 184 138 
 
 Fields V. State, 47 Ala. 603 79, 324 
 
 V. State, 121 Ala. 16 66 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App., 1903), 
 
 74 S. W. 309 Z72 
 V. United States, 27 App. D. C. 
 
 433 281, 286 
 
 Files V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 206 295 
 
 Filkins v. People, 69 N. Y. loi 59 
 Finch V. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 
 L. 187 122 
 
 V. State, 81 Ala. 41 136, 314, Z32 
 Findlev v. State, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 
 576 6 
 
 Fine v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 290 388 
 Finklea v. State (Miss.), 48 So. 
 
 I 184 
 
 Finley, Ex parte. 66 Cal. 262 430 
 
 Finley, In re, i Cal. App. 198 507 
 Finn v. Commonwealth, 5 Rand. 
 
 (Va.) 701 262 
 Finnegan v. Dugan, 14 Allen 
 
 (Mass.) 197 525 
 Fischl V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 55 
 
 419, 422 
 
 Fisher v. State, 2 Ind. App. 365 475 
 
 Fisher v. State, 30 Tex. App. 502 158 
 
 Fitts V. State, 102 Tenn. 141 121 
 
 Fitzgerald v. State, 12 Ga. 213 484 
 
 V. State, II Neb. 577 104 
 
 V. State, 78 Neb. i 414 
 
 V. State, 50 N. J. L. 475 287 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 265 484 
 
 Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth, 81 
 
 Ky. 357 85 
 
 V. Daily States Pub. Co., 48 
 
 La. Ann. 11 16 364 
 
 V. State, ^7 Tex. Cr. 20 212 
 
 Fizell V. State, 25 Wis. 364 408 
 
 Flagg V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 602 292 
 
 Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467 154 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 
 Flanagin v. State, 25 Ark. 92 123, 189 
 Flanegan v. State, 64 Ga. 52 loi 
 
 Flanigan v. People, 86 N. Y. 554 164 
 Flannery v. People, 225 111. 62 461 
 Fleener v. State, 58 Ark. 98 
 
 281. 286, 287 
 
 Fleming v. State, 150 Ala. 19 97, 326 
 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 17 476 
 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 149 153 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 114 S. W. 
 
 383 100 
 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 339 520 
 
 Fletcher v. People, 117 111. 184 
 
 521, 522 
 V. State, 12 Ark. 169 144 
 
 V. State, 85 Ga. 666 153 
 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 468 12 
 
 V. State, 49 Ind. 124 58a, 66 
 
 V. State, 169 Ind. yy 405 
 
 Flint V. Kennedy, 33 Fed. 820 218 
 Flohr V. Territory, 14 Okla. 477 
 
 267, 281 
 Flood V. Mitchell, 68 N. Y. 507 217 
 Flores v. State (Tex.) 79 S. W. 
 
 808 97 
 
 Florez v. State, 11 Tex. App. 102 452 
 Flower v. United States, 116 Fed. 
 
 241 147 
 
 Floyd V. State, 79 Ala. 39 446 
 
 V. State, 82 Ala. 16 240 
 
 Fluty V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 :o5 S. W. 138 464 
 
 Flynn v. People, 123 111. App. 
 
 591 475 
 
 V. State, 43 Ark. 289 lOl 
 
 Fogg V. State, 81 Ark. 417 103 
 
 Folden v. State, 13 Neb. 328 424 
 
 Foley V. State, 11 Wyo. 464 109, 112 
 Follis V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 186 129, 312 
 
 Fonseca v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 28 129 
 
 Foote V. People, 17 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 218 444 
 
 Forbes v. Willard, 37 How. Pr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 193 247 
 
 Ford V. Painter, 3 Okla. 80 214 
 
 V. State, 71 Ala. 385 158 
 
 V. State, 34 Ark. 649 122 
 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 162 517
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ivii 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 Ford V. State, 7 Ind. App. 567 196 
 V. State, 112 Ind. 373 
 
 241, 327, 368, 494 
 
 V. State, 73 Miss. 734 157 
 
 V. State, 75 Miss. 101 126, 132, 143 
 
 V. State, 86 Miss. 123 475 
 
 V. State, loi Tenn. 454 273 
 
 Fore V. State, 75 Miss. 727 50 
 
 Forehand v. State, 51 Ark. 553 228 
 
 Forehead v. State, 53 Ark. 46 21 
 
 Fort V. State, 52 Ark. r8o 372 
 
 Fortenberry v. State, 56 Miss. 286 285 
 
 Fortson v. State, 125 Ga. 16 149 
 
 Foster v. Dickerson, 64 Vt. 233 235 
 
 V. Neilson, 2 Peters (U. S.) 
 
 253 504 
 
 V. People, 18 Mich. 265 176 
 
 V. State, 39 Ala. 229 197 
 
 V. State, 70 Miss. 755 230 
 
 V. State, 79 Neb. 259 271 
 
 V. State, I Ohio. Cir. Ct. 467 360 
 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 248 100 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 39 466, 467 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 137 268 
 
 Fountain v. Young, 6 Esp. 113 173 
 
 Fouse V. State (Neb.), 119 N. W. 
 
 478 126, 323 
 
 V. State, 83 Neb. 258 225 
 
 Fowler, In re, 4 Fed. 303 502. 503 
 
 V. State (Ala.) 45 So. 913 312, 323 
 
 V. State, 100 Ala. 96 277 
 
 Fox V. People, 95 111. 71 
 
 118, 119, 422, 423 
 Fox V. State, 3 Tex. App. 329 383 
 Foxcroft's Case, i Rolle Abr. 359 526 
 Francis v. Rosa, 151 Mass. 532 
 
 528, 530 
 
 Francis v. State, 7 Tex. App. 501 423 
 
 Franco v. State. 42 Tex. 276 377 
 
 Frank v. State, 39 Miss. 705 373, 375 
 
 V. State, 94 Wis. 211 60 
 
 Franklin v. Commonwealth, 20 
 
 Ky. L. 1 137 314 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 612 323 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 105 Ky. 237 
 
 124, 314 
 V. State, 29 Ala. 14 324 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 342 301 
 
 493 
 114 
 
 147a 
 35, 412 
 9i> 376 
 482 
 
 Franklin v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 312 301 
 Fraser v. State, 55 Ga. 325 323 
 
 Frazier v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 76 S. W. 28 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.) 
 
 S. W. 268 
 
 V. State, 56 Ark. 242 
 
 V. State, 135 Ind. 38 i 
 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 24 
 
 Freeman v. State, il Tex. App 
 
 92 397 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 545 97 
 
 French v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 
 
 97 S. W. 427 461 
 
 V. State, 12 Ind. 670 152 
 
 V. Ware, 65 Vt. 338 187 
 
 Fribly v. State, 42 Ohio St. 205 458 
 
 Friday v. State (Tex. Cr.), 79 
 
 S. W. 815 328 
 
 Friedman v. Railroad Co., 7 Phila. 
 
 (Pa.) 203 106 
 
 Friery v. People, 54 Barb. (N. 
 
 Y.) 319 166 
 
 Frink v. State (Fla. 1908), 47 So. 
 
 514 282 
 
 Frisby v. State, 26 Tex. App. 180 363 
 Frizzell v. State, 30 Tex. App. 42 
 
 48, 329 
 
 Frosh V. State, 11 Tex. App. 280 144 
 
 Fry V. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 33^ 418 
 
 V. State, 96 Tenn. 467 83 
 
 Fulcher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 465 
 
 103, IDS, 122, 123, 130 
 Fuller V. State, 147 Ala. 35 
 
 245, 246, 315 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 47 137 
 
 V. State, 12 Ohio St. 433 14 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 559 238 
 V. Territory (Okla.), 99 Pac. 
 
 1098 21, 36 
 
 Fulmer v. Comm.onwealth, 97 Pa. 
 
 St. 503 304 
 
 Fulton V. State, 13 Ark. 168 305 
 
 Fults V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 502 157, 161 
 
 Funderburg v. State (Tex.), 34 S. 
 
 W. 613 .300 
 
 Funderburk v. State, 75 Miss. 20 308 
 
 V. State, 69 Ga. 36 150, 122 | Fuqua v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 88 S. W. 357 97 578 267
 
 Iviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Furst V. State, 31 Neb. 403 147a 
 
 Fussell V. State, 93 Ga. 450 56 
 
 Futch V. State, 90 Ga. 472 35 
 
 403 
 58a 
 
 334 
 271 
 20s 
 24a 
 62, 220 
 167 
 
 21 
 268 
 
 54 
 
 493 
 
 Gahagan v. People, i Park. Cr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 378 
 Gainer v. State, 2 Ga. App. 126 
 Gaines v. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. 
 St. 319 
 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 16 
 
 V. State, 99 Ga. 703 
 Gains V. State., 149 Ala. 29 
 Gale V. People, 26 Mich. 157 
 Gallagher v. People, 120 111. 179 
 
 V. State, 10 Tex. App. 469 
 
 V. State, 78 Ark. 299 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 247 
 Gallegos v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 58 23)3 
 Gamble v. State, 113 Ga. 701 488 
 
 iGambrell v. Commonwealth (Ky. 
 1908), 113 S. W. 476 
 
 V. State (Miss. 1908), 46 So. 
 
 138 102, no 
 
 Gamel v. State, 21 Tex. App. 357 482 
 Gandolfo v. State, 11 Ohio 114 77, 81 
 Gandy v. State, 23 Neb. 436 255, 469 
 
 V. State, 77 Neb. 782 448 
 
 Gannon v. People, 127 111. 507 6 
 
 Gantier v. State (Tex. 1893), 21 
 
 S. W. 255 94 
 
 Gantling v. State, 40 Fla. 237 
 
 147a, 334 
 V. State, 41 Fla. 587 147 
 
 Garber v. State, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 
 
 161 94, 95 
 
 Garcia v. State, 26 Tex. 209 295, 301 
 Garden v. Cresswell, 2 M. & W. 
 
 319 257 
 
 Gardiner v. People, 6 Park Cr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 155 48, 119 
 
 Gardner v. People, 106 111. 76 144 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 12 423 
 
 V. State, 80 Ark. 264 21, 46, 467 
 V. State, 55 Fla. 25 
 
 103, 108, no, 112 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 310 324 
 
 V. State, 55 N, J. L. 17 17 
 
 e to Sections.'] 
 
 Gardner v. State (Tex.), 34 S. 
 
 W. 945 123 
 V. State (Tex.), 117 S. W. 140 87 
 V. United States, 5 Ind. Ten 
 
 150 268 
 
 Garfield v. State, 74 Ind. 60 275 
 Garland, Ex parte, 4 Wall. (U. 
 
 S.) 22>3 207 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 643 382 
 
 Garman v. State, 66 Miss. 196 232 
 
 Garmire v. State, 104 Ind. 444 421 
 Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113 
 
 166, 215, 164, 326 
 
 V. State, 6 Ga. App. 788 119a, 336 
 
 Garrett v. State, 97 Ala. 18 325 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 255 328 
 
 Garrison v. People, 87 111. 96 87 
 
 V. People, 6 Neb. 274 417 
 
 Garrity v. People, 107 111. 162 152 
 
 Gartman v. State, 16 Tex. App. 
 
 215 468 
 Gartside v. Outram, 26 L. J. Ch. 
 
 113 173, 175 
 
 Garvin v. State, 52 Miss. 207 53 
 
 Gary son v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 35 S. W. 1035 22^ 
 
 Garza v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 358 
 
 269, 222 
 Gaskin v. State, 105 Ga. 631 417 
 
 Gassenheimer v. United States, 26 
 
 App. Dec. 432 87, 89, 121 
 
 Gather v. State (Tex.), 81 S. W. 
 
 717 378 
 
 Gatlin v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 116 69 
 
 Gaunt V. State, 50 N. J. L. 490, 
 
 495 53, 525 
 
 Gaut V. Satte, 49 Tex. Cr. 493 429 
 Gavin v. State, 42 Fla. 332 14 
 
 Gawn V. State, 7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 
 
 19 370 
 
 Gay V. Eugene (Ore.), 100 Pac. 
 
 306 21 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 242 81 
 
 Geiger v. State, 25 Ohio C. C. 742 124 
 
 Gemmill v. State, 16 Ind. App. 154 
 
 220, 240, 528 
 
 Genz V. State, 58 N. J. L. 482 158 
 
 V. State, 59 N. J. L. 488 154, 161 
 
 George v. State, 145 Ala. 41 108, 328
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 lix 
 
 [References ar 
 
 George v. State, i6 Neb. 318 65, 118 
 V. United States (Okla.), 97 
 
 Pac. 1052 294 
 
 Gerard v. State, 10 Tex. App. 690 289 
 Gerstenkorn v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 
 
 621 268, 269 
 
 Getzlaff V. Seliger, 43 Wis. 297 177 
 Gholston V. State, 33 Tex. 342 310 
 Gibbs V. State (Ala.), 47 So. 65 
 
 325- 330 
 V. United States, 7 Ind. Ter. 
 
 182 520 
 
 Gibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121 338 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 29 447 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 16 So. 298 330 
 
 V. State, 38 Miss. 313 401 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 77 S. W. 216 362 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 218 235 
 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 489 129 
 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 349 50 
 
 Gififord V. People, 148 111. 173 412 
 
 Gilcrease v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 619 
 
 269, 336 
 Giles V. State, 6 Ga. 276 11, 12, 362 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 561 132 
 Gilford V. State (Tex. Cr. 1903), 
 
 78 S. W. 692 302 
 
 Gilhooley v. State, 58 Ind. 182 178 
 Gilleland v. State, 24 Tex. App. 
 
 524 119 
 
 Gillespie v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 
 
 530 395 
 
 Gilliam v. State, i Head. (Tenn.) 
 
 39 237 
 
 Gillum V. State, 62 J\Iiss. 547 323 
 Gilman v. People, 178 111. 19 122 
 
 Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 N. H. 108 525 
 Gilmore v. State, 99 Ala. 154 6, 371 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. 1895), 33 
 
 S. W. 120 301 
 
 Gilyard v. State, 98 Ala. 59 239 
 
 Gindrat v. People, 138 111. 103 47 
 Ginn v. Commonwealth, 5 Litt. 
 
 (Ky.) 300 531 
 
 Girous V. State, 29 Ind. 93 316 
 
 Gise V. Commonwealth, 81 Pa. St. 
 
 428 406 
 
 Givens v. Commonwealth, 29 
 Gratt. (Va.) 830 408, 414, 416 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 563 56 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Glass V. State, 147 Ala. 50 
 
 117, 236, 314, 330 
 Glazier v. Hebron, 62 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 137 51 
 
 Glenn v. State (Ala. 1908), 47 
 So. 1034 328 
 
 V. State, 46 Ind. 368 523, 534 
 
 Glidewell v. State, 15 Lea 
 
 (Tenn.) 133 519 
 
 Glover v. State, 146 Ala. 690 298 
 V. State, 129 Ga. 717 161 
 
 V. State, 109 Ind. 391 451 
 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 690 294 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App., 1909) , 
 
 122 S. W. 396 119a 
 
 V. Thomas, 75 Tex. 506 43 
 
 V. United States, 147 Fed. 426 
 
 152, 214 
 
 Gluck V. State, 40 Ind. 263 36 
 
 Goddard v. State 78 Ark. 226 268 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 154 
 
 439, 440, 442 
 Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. 323 20, 408 
 Goetz V. State, 41 Ind. 162 476 
 
 Goforth V. State, 8 Humph. 
 
 (Tenn.) 37 308, 309 
 
 Golatt V. State, 130 Ga. 18 328 
 
 Golden v. State, 25 Ga. 527 119 
 
 Goldman v. State, 75 Md. 621 273 
 Goldsby v. United States, 160 
 
 U. S. 70 48, 250 
 
 Goldsmith v. State, 99 Ga. 253 485 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 112 200, 378 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 556 366 
 Goldstein v. People, 82 N. Y. 231 300 
 Goley V. State, 85 Ala. 333 276 
 
 Gomprecht v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 
 
 434 473 
 
 Gonzales v. State (Tex.), 50 S. 
 
 W. 1018 373 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 657 132 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 611 413 
 
 Goersen v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 
 
 St. 388 88, 89, 90 
 
 Goodall V. State, i Ore. 333 102 
 
 Goode V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 505 241 
 
 V. United States, 159 U. S. 663 479 
 
 Gooding V. State, 39 Ind. App. 
 
 42 523
 
 Ix 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 Grant v. State, 141 Ala. 96 364 
 
 419, 430 
 
 V. State, Meigs (Tenn.) 195 271 
 
 Goodwin V. State, 102 Ala. 87 82 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 770 466 
 
 V. State, 96 Ind. 550 
 
 154, 156, 164, 165, 318, 328, 329 
 Goodwine v. State, 5 Ind. App. 63 
 
 528, 532 
 
 Gordon v. Commonwealth, 92 Pa. 
 
 St. 216 192 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 29 245, 246, 333 
 
 V. State, 147 Ala. 42 205 
 
 V. State, 3 Iowa 410 77, 82 
 
 V. State, 48 N. J. L. 611 467 
 
 Gordon's Case, 2 Leach C. Law 
 
 (1789) 581 46 
 
 Gore V. People, 162 111. 259 125 
 
 Gorman v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 24 331 
 Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U. S. 623 505 
 Goslin V. Commonwealth, 121 Ky. 
 
 $98 469, 473 
 
 Gossett V. State, 123 Ga. 431 327 
 
 Gould V. State, 71 Neb. 651 41a 
 
 IGow v. Bingham, 57 Misc. (N. 
 
 Y.) 66 18 
 
 Grabill v. State (Tex.), 97 S. W. 
 
 1046 41a, 206 
 
 Grady v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 3 468 
 
 Graflf V. People, 108 111. App. 168 188 
 
 V. People, 134 111. 380 279 
 
 V. People, 208 111. 312 44, 492 
 
 Graham v. Commonwealth, 16 B. 
 
 Mon. (Ky.) 587 157, 158 
 
 V. Larimer, 83 Cal. 173 220 
 
 V. People, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 468 172 
 
 V. State, 153 Ala. 38 243 
 
 V. State, 50 Ark. 161 250, 268, 271 
 V. State, lib Ga. 807 122, 146 
 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 48 328, 329, 330a 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 123 
 
 S. W. 691 314 
 
 Granado v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 426 6 
 
 Cranberry v. State, 61 Miss. 440 384 
 
 Granger v. State (Tex.), 31 S. 
 
 W. 671 315 
 
 V. State, so Tex. Cr. 488 485 
 
 Grant v. State, 97 Ala. 35 276 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Grant v. State, 141 Ala. 96 364 
 
 V. State, 89 Ga. 393 225 
 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 789 519, 520 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 804 103 
 
 V. State, 122 Ga. 740 215 
 
 V. State, 124 Ga. 757 loi 
 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 259 358 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 527 473 
 
 V. United States, 28 App. D. C. 
 
 169 330 
 
 Grate v. State, 23 Tex. App. 458 521 
 Grattan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. 
 
 Co., 80 N. Y. 281 179 
 
 Gravely v. Commonwealth, 86 
 
 Va. 396 299, 378 
 
 V. State, 38 Neb. 871 23, 338 
 
 Graves v. State, 45 N. J. L. 347 158 
 
 V. State, 12 Wis. 591 300 
 
 v. United States, 150 U. S. 
 
 118 68 
 
 Gray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 
 
 23 170 
 
 v. State, 55 Ala. 86 439 
 
 V. State, 42 Fla. 174 67 
 
 V. State (Tex.) 86 S. W. 764 88 
 
 Grayson v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 573 143 
 
 Greathouse v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 218 69 
 
 Green v. Bedell, 48 N. H. 546 198 
 V. Commonwealth, 12 Allen 
 
 (Mass.) 155 144, 155 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 33 
 
 S. W. 100 321 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 83 
 
 S. W. 638 147 
 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 59 6 
 
 V. State, 143 Ala. 2 325 
 
 V. State, 151 Ala. 14 359 
 
 V. State, 51 Ark. 189 6, 69 
 
 V. State, 64 Ark. 523 154 
 
 V. State (Fla.), 24 So. 537 125 
 V. State, 17 Fla. 669 250, 257 
 
 V. State, 40 Fla. 191 129 
 
 V. State, 88 Ga. 510 138 
 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 742 246, 323 
 
 V. State, 109 Ind. 175 475 
 
 V. State, 88 Tenn. 614 158 
 
 V. State, 97 Tenn. 50 123 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 33 S. W. 120 292
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixi 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Green v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 109 422 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 645 225 
 
 Greenfield v. People, 85 N. Y. 75 
 
 117, 123, 14s, 334 
 Greenlaw v. King, i Beav. 137 
 
 177, 179 
 Greenough, In re, 31 Vt. 279 499 
 
 V. Gaskell, i M. & K. 98 175 
 
 Greenwell v. Commonwealth, 125 
 
 Ky. 192 88 
 
 Greer v. State (Ala.), 47 So. 300 103 
 V. State, 87 Ga. 559 522 
 
 V. State, (Tex.) 106 S. W. 
 
 359 354 
 
 Gregg V. State, 106 Ala. 44 138 
 
 Gregory v. State, 140 Ala. 16 
 
 III, 236, 314 
 
 V. State, 148 Ala. 566 103, 312 
 
 Grentzinger v. State, 31 Neb. 460 301 
 
 Griffin V. People (Colo.), 99 Pac. 
 
 321 482 
 
 V. State, 76 Ala. 29 409, 410 
 
 V. State, 90 Ala. 596 328 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 534 6, 473 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 476 435 
 
 V. State, 86 Ga. 257 305 
 
 V. State, 14 Ohio St. 55 y6, 77, 78 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 20 S. W. 552 269 
 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 157 243 
 
 Griffith V. State, 90 Ala. 583 83, 100 
 
 Griffiths V. State, 163 Ind. 555 147 
 
 Griggs V. United States, 85 C. C. 
 
 A. 596 88 
 
 Grigsby v. State, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 19 124 
 
 Grimm v. People, 14 Mich. 300 188 
 Grimsinger v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 561 132, 133 
 
 Grissom v. State (Ark.), 113 S. 
 
 W. ion 467 
 
 Griswold v. State, 24 Wis. 144 147a 
 Grogan v. State, 6;^ Miss. 147 490, 493 
 Groom v. State, 23 Tex. App. 82 32 
 Groves v. State, 123 Ga. 570 475 
 
 Gnihb V. State, 117 Ind. 277 155 
 
 Guenther v. State (Wis.) 118 
 
 N. W. 640 282 
 
 Guerrero v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 
 
 445 374 
 
 Guetig V. State, 66 Ind. 94 157, 163 
 
 e to Sections.'\ 
 
 Guin V. State (Tex.) 50 S. W. 
 
 350 130 
 
 Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161 160 
 
 Gunn, In re, 50 Kan. 155 257 
 
 Gunter v. State, 83 Ala. 96 240 
 
 V. State, III Ala. 23 ^2ii 
 
 V. State, 79 Ark. 432 2)77 
 
 Guptill V. Verback, 58 Iowa 98 175 
 Guthrie v. State (Neb.), 96 N. W. 
 
 243 532 
 
 V. State, 16 Neb. 667 454 
 
 Gutierrez, Ex parte, 45 Cal. 429 507 
 
 Guy V. State, 2,7 Ind. App. 691 357 
 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 161 133 
 
 Guynes v. State, 25 Tex. App. 584 371 
 
 Guzinski v. People, 77 111. App. 
 
 275 80 
 
 H 
 
 Haase v. State, 53 N. J. L. 34 362 
 Habersham v. State, 56 Ga. 61 275 
 Hackett v. People, 54 Barb. (N. 
 
 Y.) 370 log 
 
 Haddix v. State, 76 Neb. 369 224 
 
 Hadnett v. State, 117 Ga. 705 296 
 
 Hagan v. State, 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 615 160 
 
 Hagar v. State, 71 Ga. 164 425 
 
 Haile v. State, 11 Humph. 
 
 (Tenn.) 153 166 
 
 Haines v. People, 138 111. App. 49 lOi 
 
 V. Territory, 3 Wyo. 167 225 
 
 Hainey v. State, 147 Ala. 146 484 
 
 Hair v. State, 16 Neb. 601 
 
 261, 266, 267 
 Halbrook v. State, 34 Ark. 511 
 
 398, 402, 404 
 
 Hale V. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 247 
 
 V. Richards, 80 Iowa 164 284 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 183 421 
 
 Haley v. State, 62 Ala. 83 81, 2^Z, 364 
 
 Hall V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 31 
 
 Ky. L. 64 492 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. L. 
 
 485 332 
 
 V. County Com'rs, 82 Md. 618 249 
 V. People, 47 Mich. 62,6 415, 418 
 V. People, 6 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 671 88
 
 liii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Hall V. Somerset County, 82 Md. 
 618 254 
 
 V. State, 40 Ala. 698 80, 2^3 
 
 V. State, 130 Ala. 45 248 
 
 V. State, 134 Ala. 90 277 
 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 176 494 
 
 V. State, 34 Ga. 208 301 
 
 V. State, 48 Ga. 607 96 
 
 V. State (Ga. App., 1909), 66 
 
 S. E. 390 90, 373 
 
 V. State 132 Ind. 317 76, 77, 
 
 94, 96, 108, 124, 312, 327, 330 
 
 V. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 522 262 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 34 S. W. 122 473 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 22 S. W. 141 68 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 250 74 
 
 V. United States, 155 Fed. 52 482 
 
 Halleck v. State, 65 Wis. 147 370 
 
 Halloran v. State, 80 Ind. 586 196 
 
 Ham V. State (Ala.), 47 So. 126 247 
 
 Hamblin v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 
 
 135 330 
 
 V. State, 81 Neb. 148 522 
 
 Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173 
 
 ID, 176, 273, 275 
 V. People, 29 Mich, 195 72, 494 
 V. People, 46 Mich. 186 530 
 
 V. State, 147 Ala. no 129 
 
 V. State, 62 Ark. 543 58, 116 
 
 V. State, 96 Ga. 301 6 
 
 V. State, 75 Ind. 586 473, 475 
 
 V. United States, 26 App. Cas 
 
 D. C 382 163 
 
 Hamilton Provident &c. Soc. v. 
 
 Northwood, 86 Mich. 315 45 
 
 Hamma v. People, 42 Colo. 401 460 
 Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577 103, 104 
 Hammock v. State, i Ga. App. 
 
 126 58a 
 
 Hammond v. State, 147 Ala. 79 
 
 224, 321, 326 
 V. State, 74 ^Mass. 214 26, 80 
 
 V. State, 39 Neb. 252 414 
 
 Hampton v. State, 10 Lea 
 
 (Tenn.) 639 310 
 
 Ham's Case, 11 Me. 391 383 
 
 Hanawalt v. State, 64 Wis. 84 
 
 386, 525 
 Handline v. State, 6 Tex. App. 
 347 117 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. i 505 
 Hanna v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 5 122 
 
 Hannel v. State, 4 Ind. App. 485 309 
 Hanners v. McClelland, 74 Iowa 
 
 318 210 
 
 V. State, 147 Ala. 27 492 
 
 Hanney v. Commonwealth, 116 
 
 Pa. St. 322 79 
 
 Hannon v. State, 70 Wis. 448 409, 413 
 Hannum v. State, 90 Tenn. 647 275 
 Hanofif V. State, 37 Ohio St. 178 
 
 59, 60, 61 
 
 Hanrahan v. People, 91 111. 142 147a 
 Hans V. State, 50 Neb. 150 32 
 
 Hanscom v. State, 93 Wis. 273 467 
 Hansford v. State (]\Iiss.) 11 So. 
 106 23, 320 
 
 Hanson v. United States, 157 Fed. 
 
 749 478 
 
 Harden v. State, 109 Ala. 50 147 
 
 Hardesty v. Commonwealth, 88 
 
 Ky. 537 268 
 
 V. United States, 164 Fed. 420 58a 
 
 Hardgraves v. State (Ark.), 114 
 
 S. W. 216 325 
 
 Hardin v. State, 63 Ala. 38 485 
 
 V. State, 66 Ark. 52 128 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 208 44 
 
 V. State, 57 Tex. Cr. 559 312 
 
 Harding v. State, 54 Ind. 359 423 
 
 Hardtke v. State, 67 Wis. 552 
 
 125, 412, 415, 416 
 Hardy v. Commonwealth (Va., 
 1910), 67 S. E. 522 314, 323, 328 
 V. Merrill, 56 N. H. 227 161 
 
 V. State, 7 Mo. 607 275 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 44 S. W. 173 32 
 V. United States, 3 App. D. C. 
 
 35 130, 13s, 140 
 
 Hargis v. Commonwealth (Ky., 
 
 1909), 123 S. W. 239 326 
 
 Hargrove v. State, 147 Ala. 97 
 
 374. 374a 
 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 270 74 
 
 Harlan v. People, 32 Colo. 397 407 
 
 V. State, 134 Ind. 339 35, 3^ 
 
 Harley v. lona Circuit Judge, 140 
 
 Mich. 642 523
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixiii 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 Harman v. State (Tex.), 22 S. 
 
 W. 1038 475 
 
 Harmanson v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 1897), 42 S. W. 995 269 
 
 Harmon v. State, 120 Ga. 197 473 
 
 Harn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80 315, 332 
 
 Harper v. State, 129 Ga. 770 103, 314 
 
 V. State, 131 Ga. 771 517 
 
 V. State, 71 Miss. 202 299 
 
 V. United States, 7 Ind. Ter. 
 
 437 77 
 
 Harrington v. State, 36 Ala. 236 69 
 V. State, 19 Ohio St. 264 79, 80, 84 
 
 Harris, Ex parte, 73 N. Car. 65 259 
 
 Harris, Ex parte, 4 Utah 5 226 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. 
 
 297 330 
 
 V. People, 64 N. Y. 148 31, 468 
 V. State, 31 Ala. 362 471 
 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 24 330 
 
 V. State, 73 Ga. 41 308 
 
 V. State, 84 Ga. 269 374 
 
 V. State, 30 Ind. 131 243 
 
 V. State, 24 Neb. 803 228 
 
 V. State, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 124 68 
 V. State, 5 Tex. 11 476 
 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 97 133 
 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 411 301 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 441 ' 132 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 338 243 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 564 377 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 118 269 
 
 Harrison v. People, 50 N. Y. 518 293 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 29 328 
 
 V. State, 144 Ala. 20 58 
 
 V. State, 83 Ga. 129 148, 152 
 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 42 14 
 
 V. Sutter R. Co., 116 Cal. 156 181 
 
 Harrold v. Territory, 18 Okla. 
 395 220, 221 
 
 Harrolson v. State, 54 Te.x. Cr. 
 452 521 
 
 Harsdorf v. State (Tex. App.), 
 18 S. W. 415 298 
 
 Hart V. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 77 326 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 183 390 
 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 202 48, 115 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 163 320 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 563 301 
 
 Harter v. People, 204 111. 158 269 
 
 Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461 
 
 58, 239, 362 
 Hartley v. Cataract &c. Co., 64 
 
 Hun 634 217 
 
 Hartman v. Aveline, 63 Ind. 344 497 
 Hartranft, Appeal of, 85 Pa. St. 
 
 433 170 
 
 Hartung v. People, 4 Park. Cr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 319 313, 318 
 
 Harty v. JNIalloy, 67 Conn. 339 
 
 528, 533 
 Harvey v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 545 119, 211 
 V. Territory, 11 Okla. 156 36 
 
 Harwood v. State, 63 Ark. 130 263 
 Haskew v. State, 7 Tex. App. 107 484 
 Haslip V. State, 10 Neb. 590 421 
 
 Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357 347 
 Hathaway v. Commonwealth 
 
 (Ky.), 82 S. W. 400 129 
 
 Hathcock v. State, 88 Ga. 91 
 
 80, 442, 443 
 Hathcote v. State, 55 Ark. 181 486 
 Hauger v. United States, 173 Fed. 
 
 54 123 
 
 Hauk V. State, 148 Ind. 238 
 
 126, 147a, 179, 180, 370 
 Haun V. State, 13 Tex. App. 383 425 
 Hauser v. People, 210 111. 253 152 
 
 Haverstick v. State, 6 Ind. App. 
 
 595 270 
 
 Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37 18, 173, 218 
 
 Hawkins v. State, 29 Fla. 554 215 
 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 630 277, 417 
 
 V. State, 98 Md. 355 104, 348 
 
 V. State, 60 Neb. 380 36 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. App. 273 205 
 
 Haworth v. Gill, 30 Ohio St. 627 527 
 
 Hawthorne v. State, 61 ]\Iiss. 749 
 
 325, 326 
 Hayden v. State, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 
 546 359 
 Hayes v. Palmer, 21 App. D. C. 
 
 450 499 
 
 V. People, 25 N. Y. 390 403 
 
 V. State, 126 Ga. 95 323 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 146 224 
 
 Haygood v. State, 98 Ala. 61 343 
 
 Haynes v. Commonwealth, 104 
 
 Va. 854 451
 
 Ixiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 163 
 426 
 2,66 
 
 References ar 
 
 Haynes v. State, 15 Ohio St. 455 419 
 
 Hays V. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. 
 
 L. 611 112 
 
 V. State, no Ala. 23 yj 
 
 V. State, 40 Md. 633 116, 348, 349 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 20 S. W. 361 211 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 472 378 
 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 149 245 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. in 272>, 3/8 
 
 Hayward v. Knapp, 22 Minn. 5 230 
 
 Head v. Thompson, yj Iowa 263 187 
 
 Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392 
 
 Heard v. State, 121 Ga. 138 
 
 V. State, 116 Tenn. 713 
 Hearne v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 431 186, 403 
 
 Heath v. Commonwealth, I Rob. 
 (Va.) 735 88, 321 
 
 V. State, 36 Ala. 273 446 
 
 V. State (Ind., 1909), 90 N. E. 
 
 310 408 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 464 225 
 Hedley, Ex parte, 31 Cal. 108 281 
 
 Heflin v. State, 88 Ga. 151 
 
 466, 468, 470 
 Heidelbaugh v. State, 79 Neb. 499 
 
 370, 374 
 Heilman v. Commonwealth, 84 
 
 Ky. 457 408 
 
 Heine v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 
 
 St. 145 79, 493 
 
 Heldt V. State, 20 Neb. 492 
 
 68, 135, 140, 
 Helfrich v. Commonwealtth, 23 
 
 Pa. St. 68 
 Hellems v. State, 92 Ark. 207 
 Heller v. People, 22 Colo. 11 
 Hellyer v. People, 186 111. 550 
 Helm V. State, 6y Miss. 562 
 
 195, 210, 246 
 Helper v. State, 58 Wis. 46 45 
 
 Helvenston v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 
 
 636 
 Hemenway v. Smith, 28 Vt. 701 
 Hemingway v. State, 68 Miss. 371 
 Hemminger v. Western Assur. 
 
 Co., 95 Mich. 355 
 Hemphill v. State. 71 Miss. 877 
 Henderson v. People, 124 111. 607 
 
 341- 343 
 
 248 
 
 380 
 225 
 193 
 277 
 
 328 
 
 176 
 
 17 
 
 220 
 
 469 
 
 c to Scctions.'\ 
 
 Henderson v. State, 70 Ala. 23 302 
 V. State, 14 Tex. 503 422, 425, 431 
 V. State, 22 Tex. 593 270 
 
 V. State, 2)7 Tex. Cr. App. 79 
 
 22, 227 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 511, 161 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 620 272 
 
 Hendrick's Case, 5 Leigh (Va.) 
 
 707 432 
 
 Hendrickson v. People, 10 N. Y. 
 
 13 132 
 
 Heningburg v. State, 153 Ala. 13 
 
 104, 112, 167, 221, 356 
 Hennessy v. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 
 340 421, 423 
 
 Henning v. People, 40 Mich. 722 I44 
 Henrich, In re, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 
 
 414 496, 501, 502 
 
 Henry, In re (Idaho), 99 Pac. 
 
 1054 197 
 
 Henry v. State, 51 Neb. 149 149 
 
 V. State, 35 Ohio St. 128 430 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 30 S. W. 802 332 
 Henson v. State, 112 Ala. 41 326, 338 
 V. State, 120 Ala. 316 238, 241 
 
 V. State, 62 Md. 230 482 
 
 Herd v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 600 93 
 
 V. United States, 13 Okla. 512 298 
 Hernandez v. State, 18 Tex. App. 
 134 172, 174 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 271 314 
 
 Herndon v. Commonwealth, 105 
 Ky. 197 507 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 552 
 
 68, 87, 371, 378 
 Herr v. Commonwealth (Ky.),9i 
 
 S. W. 666 476 
 
 Herrick, Ex parte, 78 Ky. 23 249 
 
 Herring v. Goodson, 43 Miss. 392 
 
 526, 527 
 
 Herrington v. State, 121 Ga. 141 484 
 
 V. State, 130 Ga. 307 96 
 
 Herzinger v. State, 70 Md. 278 482 
 
 Hess V. Grimes (Kan.), 48 Pac. 
 
 596 497 
 
 V. State, 5 Ohio 5 420, 421, 423 
 
 Hester v. State, 103 Ala. 83 238 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 
 
 139 207
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 Ixv 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Heuston v. Simpson, 115 Ind. 62 179 
 Hewitt V. Prime, 21 Wend. (X. 
 
 Y.) 79 179, 180 
 
 Hey V. Commonwealth, ^2 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 946 225 
 
 Heyward, In re, i Sandf. (N. Y. 
 
 Super.) 701 499 
 
 Hibbs, Ex parte, 26 Fed. 421 427 
 
 Hickam v. People, 137 111. 75 
 
 88, 271, 321 
 Hickerson v. Benson, 8 Mo. 8 471 
 Hickey v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 230 315 
 Hickman v. State, 38 Tex. 190 161 
 Hickory v. United States, 160 U. 
 
 S. 408 S8, 118 
 
 Hicks V. State, 99 Ala. 169 61, 116 
 
 V. State, loi Ga. 581 293 
 
 Hiegins v. People, 58 N. Y. Z77 41 1 
 
 High V. State (Tex.), 98 S. W. 
 
 849 269 
 
 Hightower v. State, 58 Miss. 636 133 
 Higler v. People, 44 IMich. 299 
 
 440, 442 
 
 Hildreth v. People, 32 111. 36 296 
 
 Hiler v. People, 156 111. 511 399 
 
 Hill V. Atlanta, 125 Ga. 697 21 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 12 Ky. L. 
 
 914 277 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 2 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 594 104, 320 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 633 278 
 V. State, 156 Ala. 3 119a, 314 
 
 V. State, 43 Ala. 335 310 
 
 V. State, 137 Ala. 66 381, 384 
 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 51 221, 312 
 
 V. State, 41 Ga. 484 102, 189 
 
 V. State, 6s Ga. 578 21 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 16 So. 901 
 
 325, Z26 
 V. State, 64 ]\Tiss. 431 102 
 
 V. State, 91 Tenn. 521 216, 241 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.), 77 S. W. 
 
 808 414 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. Cr. 279 352, 354 
 
 V. State, 2>7 Tex. Cr. 415 119 
 
 Hill's Case, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 594 107 
 
 Hills V. State, 6r Neb. 589 178 
 
 Hines v. State, 26 Ga. 614 511, 515 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 187 24a 
 
 V — Underbill Crim. Ev 
 
 e to Sections.'] 
 Hinshaw v. State, 147 Ind. 334 
 
 192, 334 
 Hinson v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 38 87 
 
 Hintz V. State, 125 Wis. 405 126 
 
 Hirsch, In re, 74 Fed. 928 252 
 
 Hirschman v. People, loi 111. 568 
 
 81, 82, 85 
 Hisler v. State, 52 Fla. 30 52, 233 
 Hitchins v. People, 39 N. Y. 454 473 
 Hite V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 20 
 
 S. W. 217 162 
 
 Hix V. People, 157 111. 382 299 
 
 Hixon V. State, 130 Ga. 479 328 
 
 Hizer v. State, 12 Ind. 330 452 
 
 Hobbs V. State, ^6 Ark. 360 328 
 
 V. State, 133 Ind. 404 241 
 
 V. State, S3 Tex. Cr. 71 262, 267 
 Hobson V. State, 44 Ala. 380 308, 310 
 Hockenberger v. State, 49 Neb. 
 
 706 291 
 
 Hocker v. Commonwealth, 33 Ky. 
 
 L. 944 118, 336 
 
 Hodge V. State, 97 Ala. 37 12 
 
 V. State, 26 Fla. 11 205, 213, 214 
 
 V. Territory, 12 Okla. 108 14 
 
 Hodges V. State, 94 Ga. 593 360 
 
 Hodgman v. People, 4 Denio (N. 
 
 Y.) 235 24 
 
 Hodgson V. Xickell, 69 Wis. 308 523 
 
 Hoff V. Fisher, 26 Ohio St. 7 534 
 
 V. State, 83 Miss. 488 67 
 
 Hoffman v. Commonwealth (Ky., 
 
 1909), 121 S. W. 690 338 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 406 z^ 
 
 Hoge V. People, 117 111. 35 
 
 152, 236, 238 
 Holcomb V. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 
 177 203 
 
 V. People, 79 111. 409 530, 532 
 
 Holcombe v. State, 5 Ga. App. 
 47 161 
 
 V. State, 28 Ga. 66 44 
 
 Holden v. State, 18 Tex. App. 91 493 
 Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473 87 
 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 51 309 
 
 Holland v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 82 S. W. 596 147 
 
 V. State, jz Ark. 425 486
 
 Ixvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 
 
 178 
 126, 
 79 
 
 V. State, 131 Ind. 548 
 
 V. State, 60 Miss. 939 
 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 27 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 345 
 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 623 
 
 V. Hall, 58 Hun fN. Y.) 604 
 Hollej^ V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 306 
 Holliday v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 133 
 Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 77 
 
 V. State, 79 Ga. 605 
 
 V. State, III Ind. 289 45, 284, 
 Holloway v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 303 
 Holls V. State, 27 Fla. 387 
 Holman v. Kimball, 22 Vt. 555 
 Holmes, Ex parte, 21 Neb. 324 
 Holmes v. State, 88 Ala. 26 221, 
 
 V. State, 100 Ala. 81 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 352 
 Holsey v. State, 89 Ga. 433 
 Hoist V. State, 23 Tex. App. i 
 
 205, 
 Holt V. State, 2 Ga. App. 383 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 282 
 Holtz V. State, 76 Wis. 99 245, 
 Hoober v. State, 81 Ala. 51 
 Hood V. State, 56 Ind. 263 
 Hooker v. State, 98 Md. 145 
 
 V. State, 4 Ohio 348 34, 
 
 Hooten v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 6 
 Hoover v. State, 48 Neb. 184 
 Hope V. People, 83 N. Y. 418 
 Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 3 
 Bush (Ky.) 480 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 3 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 460 
 
 V. State, 122 Ga. 583 
 Hopper V. State, 54 Ga. 389 
 Hopperwood v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 
 
 15 
 Hopps V. People, 31 111. 385 
 
 77, 81, 
 Hopt V. People, 104 U. S. 631 
 
 164, 
 
 V. People, no U. S. 574 
 
 54, 126, 128, 
 
 V. Utah, no U. S. 574 
 
 147 
 , 80 
 464 
 328 
 270 
 373 
 258 
 269 
 277 
 
 461 
 224 
 291 
 
 82 
 407 
 173 
 516 
 237 
 
 23 
 242 
 
 303 
 
 409 
 214 
 492 
 248 
 138 
 380 
 
 369 
 296 
 296 
 161 
 26 
 
 485 
 
 507 
 473 
 386 
 
 214 
 
 158 
 166 
 
 130 
 16 
 
 Hopt V. Utah, 120 U. S. 430 312 
 
 Horan v. State, 7 Tex. App. 183 
 
 446, 447 
 
 Horn V. State, 98 Ala. 23 88, 227, 277 
 V. State, 102 Ala. 144 120 
 
 V. State, 12 Wyo. 80 136 
 
 Hornbeck v. State, 35 Ohio St. 
 277 409, 411 
 
 Hornish v. People, 142 111. 620 154 
 
 Hornsby v. State, 94 Ala. 55 48 
 
 Horton v. State, 53 Ala. 488 267 
 
 V. State, 66 Ga. 690 492, 494 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 307 211 
 
 House V. State, 139 Ala. 132 269 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 48 So. 3 108 
 
 Houser v. State, 58 Ga. 78 14, 17 
 
 V. State, 93 Ind. 228 525, 533 
 
 Housh V. People, 24 Colo. 262 
 
 295, 305 
 
 V. People, 75 111. 487 465 
 
 Howard v. Commonwealth (KJ^) 
 
 80 S. W. 817 268 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 118 K}'. i 187 
 
 V. State, 108 Ala. 571 6 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 659 36 
 
 V. State, so Ind. 190 149, 154 
 
 Howe V. State, no Ala. 54 484 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 174 • 
 
 382, 387, 388 
 Howell V. Blackwell, 7 Ga. 443 250 
 V. Commonwealth, 31 Ky. L. 
 
 983 468, 469 
 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 612 520 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. 591 430 
 
 Howerton v. Commonwealth, 129 
 
 Ky. 482 272 
 
 Howson V. State, 73 Ark. 140 133 
 
 Hoy V. Morris, 13 Gray (]\Iass.) 
 
 519 '^73 
 
 Hoyt V. Hoyt, 112 N. Y. 493 179 
 
 V. People, 140 111. 588 271 
 
 Hronek v. People, 134 111. 139 
 
 201, 280a 
 Hubbard v. State, 107 Ala. 33 302 
 
 Huber v. State. 57 Ind. 341 358 
 
 V. State, 126 Ind. 185 241, 417 
 
 Hubert v. State, 74 Neb. 220 407 
 
 Hudelson v. State, 94 Ind. 426 12 
 
 Hudson V. Roos, 76 Mich. 173 264 
 
 V. State, 137 Ala. 60 45, 223
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Lxvii 
 
 [References ai 
 Hudson V. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 407 307 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 323 238 
 
 Hudspeth v. State, 50 Ark. 534 236 
 V. State, 55 Ark. 323 521 
 
 Huey V. State (Ga. App., 1910), 
 
 66 S. E. 1023 409 
 
 Huff V. Commonwealth, 18 Ky. 
 
 L. 752 339, 343 
 
 V. State, 104 Ga. 521 40, 248 
 
 V. State, 106 Ga. 432 418 
 
 Huffaker v. Commonwealth, 124 
 
 Ky. 115 272 
 
 Huffman v. State, 29 Ala. 40 473 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 174 61, 116 
 Huggins V. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 364 17 
 
 Hughbanks, In re, 44 Kan. 105 253 
 Hughes V. Boone, 102 N. Car. 137 174 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 80 
 
 S. W. 197 269 
 
 V. People, 223 111. 417 435 
 
 V. Pflanz, 138 Fed. 980 498 
 
 V. State, 152 Ala. 5 81 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 29 58a 
 
 V. State, 103 Ind. 344 308, 309 
 
 V. State. 29 Ohio C. C. 237 212 
 V. Ward, 38 Kan. 452 221 
 
 Hull V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 607 269 
 
 Humbard v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 
 200 365 
 
 Humber v. Commonwealth, 31 
 
 Ky. L. 606 324 
 
 Humphrey V. State, 74 Ark. 554 314 
 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 329 95 
 
 V. State, 78 Wis. 569 224, 520, 531 
 
 Hunnicutt v. State, 18 Tex. App. 
 
 498 69, 207, 208 
 
 Hunt V. State, 55 Ala. 138 32 
 
 V. State, 135 Ala. i 140 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 149 67, 68 
 
 Hunter v. State, 112 Ala. 77 
 
 491, 492, 493 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 761 i6a, 484 
 V. State, 43 Ga. 483 323 
 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 43 ' 489 
 
 V. State, 74 Miss. 515 126 
 
 V. State, 40 N. J. L. 495 96, 10 1 
 V. State (Tex.), 114 S. W. 124 103 
 Hurley v. State, 29 Ark. 17 228 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Hurley v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 
 282 209 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 73 305 
 
 Hurst V. State, 79 Ala. 55 464 
 
 Hurst's Case, 4 Dall. 387 258 
 
 Hussey v. State, 87 Ala. 12 81, 185 
 Huston V. People, 53 111. App. 501 21 
 V. People, 121 111. 497 417 
 
 Hutcherson v. State (Tex.), 35 
 S. W. 375 438 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 67 469 
 
 Hutchins v. State, 13 Ohio 198 433 
 Hutchinson v. State (Ga. App.), 
 63 S. E. 597 137 
 
 V. State, 19 Neb. 262 525 
 
 Hutsch V. Mclllgargey, 69 ]\Iich. 
 
 377 221 
 
 Huttman, In re, 70 Fed. 699 170 
 
 Hyatt V. New York, 188 U. S. 691 497 
 Hj'den v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 401 242 
 Hynes v. McDermott, 82 N. Y. 
 41 429 
 
 Imboden v. People, 40 Colo. 142 58a 
 Impson V. State (Tex.), 19 S. W. 
 
 677 486 
 
 Ince V. State, 77 Ark. 426 163 
 
 Ingalls V. State, 48 Wis. 647 
 
 73, 165, 166, 299, 507 
 
 Ingraham v. State, 82 Neb. 553 300 
 
 Ingram v. State, 39 Ala. 247 283 
 
 V. State, 67 Ala. 67 82 
 
 V. State, 24 Neb. 33 525 
 
 Inman v. State, 35 Tex. Cr, App. 
 
 39 197 
 
 Innis V. State, 42 Ga. 473 414 
 
 Irby V. State, 32 Ga. 496 21 
 
 V. State, 91 Miss. 542 21 
 
 Irvin V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 52 484 
 
 Irvine, Ex parte, 74 Fed. 954 72, 247 
 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 51 486 
 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 51 486 
 
 Irving V. State (Miss.), 47 So. 
 
 518 122 
 
 Isaac V. United States, 7 Ind. T. 
 
 196 221 
 
 Isaacs V. United States, 159 U. S. 
 487 316
 
 U'viii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Isham V. State (Tex. Cr.). 49 S. 
 
 W. 581 268, 269, 301 
 
 Ivey V. State, 4 Ga. App. 828 129 
 
 V. State, 23 Ga. 576 483 
 
 Jack V. Washington Territory, 2 
 
 Wash. Ter. loi 228 
 
 Jackson, Ex parte, 96 U. S. 727 479 
 Jackson v. Archibald, 12 Ohio 
 Cir. Ct. 155 499 
 
 V. CommonweaUh, 100 Ky. 239 
 
 129, 334 
 V. Commonwealth, 19 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 656 103, 232 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 107 59 
 V. Crilly, 16 Colo. 103 265 
 
 V. Denison, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 558 176 
 
 V. Seager, 2 D. & L. 13 257 
 
 V. State, 156 Ala. 93 161 
 
 V. State, 78 Ala. 471 236 
 
 V. State, 8r Ala. 33 320 
 
 V. State, 83 Ala. 76 127 
 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 155 473 
 
 V. State, 147 Ala. 699 81, 325 
 
 V. State, 29 Ark. 62 523 
 
 V. State, 54 Ark. 243 268 
 
 V. State, 76 Ga. 551 
 
 283, 286, 287, 289 
 V. State, 14 Ind. 327 225 
 
 V. State, 116 Ind. 464 384 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 47 So. 502 
 
 108, no 
 V. State, 39 Ohio St. 37 130 
 
 V. State, 41 So. 178 325 
 
 V. State (Tex., 1894), 25 S. 
 
 W. 773 473 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 363 295 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 143 378, 379 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 260 451 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 215 269 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 302 128 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 220 382 
 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 79 225 
 
 V. State, 81 Wis. 127 79, 266, 267 
 V. State, 91 Wis. 253 15, 411 
 
 Jacobs V. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 
 St. 586 160 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Jacobs V. Hesler, 113 Mass. 157 187 
 V. State, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 196 195 
 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. 
 
 S. II 21 
 
 Jacques v. People, 66 111. 84 416 
 
 Jahnke v. State, 68 Neb. 154 73, 323 
 Jais V. Territory (N. Mex.), 94 
 
 Pac. 947 152 
 
 James v. State, 45 Miss. 572 12 
 
 V. United States, 7 Ind. T. 
 
 250 246 
 
 Jamison v. People, 145 111. 357 
 
 118, 120, 154 
 Janes's Estate, 30 W. N. Cases 
 
 (Pa.) 166 526 
 
 Janes v. State, 45 Miss. 572 6 
 
 Janzen v. People, 159 111. 440 415 
 
 Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 17 
 
 50, 103, 112, 328 
 Jasper v. Porter, 2 McLean C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 579 505 
 
 Jay V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 567 333 
 
 Jaynes, Ex parte, 70 Cal. 638 182, 251 
 
 V. People, 44 Colo. 535 280a 
 
 Jefferds v. State, 5 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 522 136, 329 
 
 Jefferson v. State, 89 Ark. 129 292 
 
 Jeffries v. State, 61 Ark. 308 277 
 
 Jeffries v. State, 89 Miss. 643 409 
 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 598 166 
 
 V. United States, 7 Ind. Ter. 
 
 47 89 
 
 Jemley v. State, 121 Ga. 346 489 
 
 Jenkins v. State (Fla., 1909), 50 
 
 So. 582 119, 377 
 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 196 217, 250 
 
 V. State, 35 Fla. 737 132, 192, 493 
 
 V. State, 53 Ga. 33 367 
 
 V. State, 119 Ga. 431 127 
 
 V. State, 78 Ind. 133 197 
 
 V. State, 80 Md. 72 324, 325 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 201 245 
 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 224 486 
 
 V. State, 62 Wis. 49 6 
 
 Jennings v. People. 8 Mich. 81 432 
 
 Jesse V. State, 28 Miss. 100 367 
 
 Jessup V. State, 14 Ind. App. 230 475 
 
 Jeter v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 212 392 
 
 Jim V. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 289 228
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixix 
 
 [References ai 
 
 Joe V. State, 6 Fla. 591 318 
 
 Johns V. State, 46 Fla. 153 328 
 
 Johnson V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 93 
 
 S. W. 581 
 
 
 
 314 
 
 V. 
 
 Commonwealth ( Ky. ) , 
 
 107 
 
 
 
 S. W. 768 
 
 
 108, 
 
 268 
 
 V. 
 
 Commonwealth, 12 
 873 
 
 K} 
 
 . L. 
 
 379 
 
 V. 
 
 Commonwealth, 32 
 1117 
 
 K> 
 
 . L. 
 
 108 
 
 V. 
 
 Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 
 
 325 
 
 7 
 
 V. 
 
 Commonwealth, 87 Ky. 
 
 189 
 
 373 
 
 V. 
 
 Commonwealth, 90 
 
 Ky. 
 
 53 
 
 455 
 
 V. 
 
 Commonwealth, 102 
 
 Va 
 
 927 
 50, 
 
 429 
 
 V. 
 
 Daverne, 19 Johns. 
 134 
 
 (N. 
 
 Y.) 
 
 174 
 
 V. 
 
 People, 140 111. 350 
 
 
 
 533 
 
 V. 
 
 People, 55 N. Y. 512 
 
 507, 
 
 514 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 17 Ala. 618 
 
 
 
 108 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 35 Ala. 363 
 
 
 354, 
 
 358 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 47 Ala. 9 
 
 
 no. 
 
 188 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 59 Ala. 37 
 
 
 
 147 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 61 Ala. 9 
 
 
 
 308 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 94 Ala. 35 
 
 [19, 
 
 215, 
 
 323 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 102 Ala. i 
 
 
 
 105 
 
 V. 
 
 State, III Ala. 66 
 
 
 
 333 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 60 Ark. 308 
 
 
 
 402 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 27 Fla. 245 
 
 
 
 228 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 51 Fla. 44 
 
 
 
 446 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 54 Fla. 45 
 
 
 
 196 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 55 Fla. 46 
 
 
 224, 
 
 374 
 
 V. 
 
 State (Ga.), 12 S. E 
 
 • 47 
 
 I 
 
 147a 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 59 Ga. 142 
 
 
 
 149 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 62 Ga. 299 
 
 
 
 37 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 83 Ga. 552 
 
 
 
 521 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 85 Ga. 561 
 
 
 
 519 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 88 Ga. 203 
 
 
 
 33^ 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 89 Ga. 107 
 
 
 
 368 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 119 Ga. 257 
 
 
 
 307 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 120 Ga. 135 
 
 
 
 118 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 122 Ga. 172 
 
 
 
 465 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 124 Ga. 656 
 
 
 
 489 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 125 Ga. 243 
 
 
 
 217 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 128 Ga. 71 
 
 
 
 323 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 13 Ind. App. 
 
 299 
 
 
 32 
 
 V. 
 
 State (Miss.), 40 S 
 
 324 
 
 8r 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 63 ]\riss. 313 
 
 
 
 68 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 89 Miss. 773 
 
 
 
 126 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 90 Miss. 317 
 
 
 
 124 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 
 Johnson v. State, 27 Neb. 687 411 
 
 V. State, 17 Ohio 593 410 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 102 S. W. 
 
 I 133 429 
 
 V. State, I Te.x. App. 333 265 
 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 249 425 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 385 301 
 
 V. State, 17 Tex. App. 565 78 
 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 368 152 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 206 330 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. App. 135 
 
 185, 187 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 150 318, 323 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 569 365 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 271 427 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 65 439 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 423 
 
 127, 323 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 314 126 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 648 484 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 201 
 
 268, 377, 378 
 V. State, 129 Wis. 146 98 
 
 V. State, 133 Wis. 453 212 
 
 V. United States (Okla.), 99 
 
 Pac. 1022 292, 301 
 
 V. Walker, 86 ^liss. 757 525 
 
 Johnson Steel &c. Co. v. North 
 
 Branch &c. Co., 48 Fed. 191 251 
 
 Johnston v. Miller, 72 Mich. 265 244 
 
 V. Todd, 5 Beav. 597 239 
 
 Joiner v. State, 119 Ga. 315 122 
 
 Joliff V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 61 49 
 
 Jones V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 46 S. W. 217 109 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L. 
 
 355 108, 331 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 592 358 
 V. Hays, 4 McLean C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 521 505 
 
 V. Jones, 45 Md. 144 525 
 
 V. Knauss, 31 N. J. Eq. 211 258 
 V. Leonard, 50 Iowa 106 497 
 
 V. People, 12 111. 259 301 
 
 V. State, 26 Ala. 155 471 
 
 V. State, 67 Ala. 84 401 
 
 V. State, 100 Ala. 88 ir 
 
 V. State, 107 Ala. 93 122, 124
 
 Ixx 
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 Jones V. State, 120 Ala. 303 
 
 12, 60, 82, 125 
 
 V. State, 137 Ala. 12 314, 3:^6 
 
 V. State, 141 Ala. 55 238 
 
 V. State, 145 Ala. 51 238 
 
 V. State, 155 Ala. i 312 
 
 V. State, 156 Ala. 175 53, 122, 126 
 
 V. State, 88 Ark. 579 106 
 
 V. State, 58 Ark. 390 35 
 
 V. State, 59 Ark. 417 276 
 
 V. State (Ga.), 62 S. E. 482 s8a 
 
 V. State, I Ga. 610 71 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 433 
 
 122, 123, 147 
 
 V. State, 65 Ga. 147 124 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 547 435 
 
 V. State, 105 Ga. 649 6 
 
 V. State, 128 Ga. 23 267 
 
 V. State, 130 Ga. 274 104, ill, 125 
 
 V. State, 132 Ga. 340 119 
 
 V. State, II Ind. 357 432 
 
 V. State, 71 Ind. 66 
 
 95. 96, 97, 112, 330 
 
 V. State, 70 ]\Id. 326 349 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 48 So. 407 358 
 
 V. State, 30 Miss. 653 300, 301 
 
 V. State, 65 Miss. 179 238 
 
 V. State, 70 Miss. 401 no 
 
 V. State, 51 Ohio St. 331 23 
 
 V. State, 70 Ohio St. ^^ 366 
 
 V. State, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 346 428 
 
 V. State, 13 Tex. 168 135 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 38 S. W. 992 103 
 
 V. State, 3 Tex. App. 150 225 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 177 269 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 490 6 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 364 362 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 363 358, 377 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 329 138 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 26 324 
 
 V. Turpin, 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 
 181 192 
 
 V. United States, 137 U. S. 202 452 
 Jordan v. Circuit Court, 69 Iowa 
 177 461 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 943 54, 358 
 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 9 248, 328 
 
 V. State, 50 Fla. 95 55 
 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 278 45 
 
 Jordan v. State, 142 Ind. 422 
 
 
 185 
 
 V. State, 32 Miss. 382 
 
 
 138 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 595 
 
 
 67 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 646 
 
 
 295 
 
 Joseph V. Commonwealth, 99 
 
 S. 
 
 
 W. 311 
 
 
 225 
 
 Joyner v. State, 78 Ala. 448 
 
 
 26 
 
 Judson, Ex parte, 3 Blatchf. 
 
 C. 
 
 
 C. 89 
 
 
 226 
 
 Judson, In re, 3 Blatchf. (U. 
 
 S.) 
 
 
 148, 
 
 
 461 
 
 Jupitz V. People, 34 111. 516 
 
 
 79 
 
 Juretich v. People, 223 111. 484 
 
 73, 
 
 423 
 
 Justice V. Commonwealth, 20 
 
 Kv. 
 
 
 L. 386 
 
 60, 
 
 241 
 
 V. State, 99 Ala. 180 
 
 
 no 
 
 K 
 
 Kahlenbeck v. State, 119 Ind. 118 76 
 Kahn v. State (Tex.), 38 S. W. 
 
 989 384 
 
 Kaine, Ex parte, 3 Blatchf. (U. 
 
 S.) I 496, 603 
 
 Kane v. Commonwealth, 109 Pa. 
 
 St. 541 514, 515 
 
 Kastner v. State, 58 Neb. 767 14 
 
 Kaufman v. State, 49 Ind. 248 14, 152 
 Kean v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush 
 
 (Ky.) 190 267 
 
 Kearney v. State, loi Ga. 803 44 
 
 Kearse'v. State (Tex.), 88 S. W. 
 
 363 41 1 
 
 Keating v. People, 160 111. 480 
 
 14, 271, 296, 434 
 Kee V. State, 28 Ark. 155 77 
 
 Keefe v. State, 19 Ark. 190 354 
 
 Keeler v. State, 73 Neb. 441 36, 371 
 Keenan v. Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 
 
 St. 55 166 
 
 Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194 
 
 78, 81, 82, 325 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 388 157 
 
 Keerl v. State, 213 U. S. 135 196 
 
 Keeton v. Commonwealth, 32 Kj-. 
 
 L. 1 164 17, 
 
 Keffer v. State, 12 Wyo. 49 268 
 
 Kehoe v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 
 
 St. 127 IDS, no
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 Ixxi 
 
 324 
 439 
 
 491 
 468 
 
 269 
 225 
 50/ 
 193 
 
 166 
 
 [References a) 
 
 Keipp V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 417 298 
 Keith V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 63 
 Keller v. State, 51 Ind. in 
 Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 565 
 
 122, 123, 124, 
 
 V. State, SI Tex. Cr. 507 
 
 V. United States, 7 Ind. Ter. 
 241 
 Kelly V. People, 17 Colo. 130 
 
 V. People, IIS 111. 583 
 
 V. State, 39 Fla. 122 
 
 V. State, 3 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 
 518 
 
 Kendall v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. 
 L. IS 331 
 
 V. May, 10 Allen (Mass.) S9 202 
 
 V. State, 6s Ala. 492 147a 
 
 Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 2 
 Met. (Ky.) 36 432 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. L. 
 
 1063 97, 105 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 447 
 
 21, 119 
 
 V. People, 39 N. Y. 245 
 
 V. State, 147 Ala. 687 
 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 428 
 
 V. State, Id Ga. S59 
 
 V. State, 71 Xeb. 765 
 Kennon v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App 
 
 359 126, 299 
 
 Kent V. State, 64 Ark. 247 
 
 V. State, 84 Ga. 438 
 
 V. State, 6 Cr. L. Mag. 520 
 
 V. State, 42 Ohio St. 426 
 Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203 
 Kenzie v. State, 24 Ark. 636 
 Kernan v. State, 11 Ind. 471 
 Kerr v. State, 150 Ala. 6ss 
 
 V. United States, 7 Ind. Ter. 
 
 486 19, 341, 392, 393 
 
 Ketchingman v. State, 6 Wis. 417 245 
 Keys V. State, 122 Ind. 527 60 
 
 Kidd V. State, loi Ga. 528 223, 269 
 Kilbourn v. State, 9 Conn. 560 515 
 Killct V. State, 32 Ga. 292 484 
 
 Killins V. State, 28 Fla. 313 88, 321 
 Kimberly v. State, 4 Ga. App. 852 267 
 Kinard v. State, i Ga. App. 146 42, 46 
 Kinchelow v. State, 5 Humph. 
 
 (Tenn.) 9 75, 12s 
 
 ■c to Sections.] 
 
 King V. King, 42 Mo. App. 454 
 V. Dean of St. Asaph, 3 T. R. 
 
 428 
 V. State, 40 Ala. 314 126, 
 
 V. State, 89 Ala. 43 
 V. State, S5 Ark. 604 
 V. State, 99 Ga. 686 
 V. State, 44 Ind. 285 
 V. State, 74 Miss. 576 
 
 3^2, 323 
 
 320 
 
 6 
 
 269 
 
 118, 377 
 
 293 
 373 
 222 
 238 
 392 
 70 
 
 447 
 41a 
 
 V. btate, 74 Miss. S76 158, 
 
 V. State, 91 Tenn. 617 23, 112, 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 463 
 V. State, 43 Tex 351 
 Kingory v. United States, 44 Fed. 
 669 
 
 669 
 Kingsbury's Case, 106 Mass. 223 
 Kinnan v. State (Neb., 1910), 125 
 
 N. W. S94 
 
 Kinnan v. State (] 
 
 N. W. S94 
 Kinnemer v. State, 66 Ark. 206 
 Kinnej^ v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 500 
 
 ivmnemer v. otate, 00 i\ 
 Kinnej^ v. State, 45 Tex. v^i. y 
 Kinsman v. State, 77 Ind. 132 
 Kintner v. State, 45 Ind. 175 
 Kipley v. People, 215 111. 358 
 Kipper v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 377 
 Kirby v. People, 123 111. 436 
 
 V. State, 151 Ala. 66 112, 324, 
 V. State, 57 N. J. L. 320 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 13 130, 
 Kirk V. State (Tex.), 37 S. W. 
 
 440 
 Kirkham v. People, 170 III. 9 s8, 
 Kirkland v. State, 141 Ala. 45 262, 
 Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400 79, 80 
 Kitchen v. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 
 45 
 
 Klawiter v. State, 76 Neb. 49 
 
 Klein v. People, 113 111. 596 149, 
 V. State, 9 Ind. App. 365 
 
 Klink V. People, 16 Colo. 467 
 
 Klug V. State, 77 Ga. 734 
 
 Knickerbocker v. People, 43 
 Y. 177 
 
 Knight V. State, 147 Ala. 93 
 V. State, 152 Ala. 56 
 V. State, 58 Neb. 225 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 243 
 
 Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408 
 V. Scribner, 57 Me. 495 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 383 
 
 Knudson v. State (Tex. Cr. App., 
 1909), 120 S. W. 878 
 
 187 
 
 364 
 135 
 447 
 326 
 378 
 33 
 338 
 522 
 470 
 197 
 
 217 
 499 
 
 374 
 149 
 
 507 
 310 
 532 
 324 
 221 
 246 
 326 
 456 
 131 
 
 204 
 103 
 263 
 
 N. 
 
 157, 
 
 414 
 152 
 353 
 517 
 238 
 
 375 
 387 
 282 
 
 369 
 117 
 
 185 
 524 
 269 
 
 308
 
 Ixxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Koch V. State, 115 Ala. 99 424 
 
 V. State, 126 Wis. 470 246 
 
 Koerner v. State, 98 Ind. 7 277, 333 
 Koller V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 496 330 
 Komp V. State, 129 Wis. 20 214 
 
 Konda v. United States, 166 Fed. 
 
 91 276 
 
 Kopcyznski v. State, 137 Wis. 358 366 
 Kopke V. People, 43 Mich. 41 405 
 
 Korell V. State, 139 Ala. i 161 
 
 Kossakowski v. People, 177 111. 
 
 563 
 
 13 
 
 283 
 356 
 
 337, 374 
 Bush 
 
 23 
 
 Kouns V. State, 3 Tex. App, 
 Krens v. State, 75 Neb. 294 
 Kriel v. Commonwealth, 5 
 
 (Ky.) 362 
 Kroell V. State, 139 Ala. i 
 
 157, 223, 268, 269 
 Krolage v. People, 224 111. 456 144 
 Kunde v. State, 22 Tex. App. 65 492 
 
 LaBeaii v. People, 34 N. Y. 223 
 
 245, 328, 329 
 Lackey v. State, 67 Ark. 416 14 
 
 Ladeaux v. State, 74 Neb. 19 292 
 
 Lafferty v. State (Tex.), 35 S. 
 
 W. 374 224 
 
 Lahue v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 159 61, 220 
 
 Lake v. Calhoun Co., 52 Ala. 115 51 
 V. Commonwealth, 31 Ky. L. 
 
 1232 418 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 31 Ky. L. 
 
 1232 77 
 
 Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265 320, 492 
 
 LaMatt v. State, 128 Ind. 123 526, 528 
 
 345 
 
 67 
 
 97 
 
 447 
 
 133 
 
 Lamb v. State, 66 Md. 285 
 
 V. State, 69 Neb. 212 
 Lambert v. People, 29 Mich. 71 
 Lamberton v. State, 11 Ohio 282 
 Lambe's Case, 2 Leach C. C. 625 
 Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 322 
 
 102, no 
 
 Lambright v. State, 34 Fla. 564 330 
 
 Lamson v. Boyden, 160 111. 613 247 
 
 Lanasa v. State (Md.), 71 Atl. 
 
 1058 74 
 
 ' to Sections.] 
 
 Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602 
 Lancaster v. State, 91 Tenn. 267 
 
 7, 18, 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 393 
 Land v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 330 
 Lane v. Cole, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 680 
 V. State (Tex. Cr., 1894), 28 
 
 S. W. 202 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 335 
 Laney v. State, 109 Ala. 34 
 Lang V. Merwin, 99 Me. 486 
 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 41 283, 
 
 Langdale v. People, 100 111. 263 
 Langdon, Ex parte, 25 Vt. 680 
 V. People, 133 111. 382 
 
 6, 156, 157, 429, 
 Langford v. State, 33 Fla. 233 89, 
 Landis v. State, 70 Ga. 651 152, 
 Landthrift v. State, 140 Ala. 114 
 Lanergan v. People, 39 N. Y. 39 
 La Plant v. People, 60 111. App. 
 
 340 
 Larkin v. People, 61 Barb. (N. 
 
 Y.) 226 
 Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 
 St. 200 138, 
 
 La Rosae v. State, 132 Ind. 219 
 Lasater v. State, 77 Ark. 468 390, 
 Lascelles v. State, 90 Ga. 347 
 Lasher v. State, 30 Tex. App. 387 
 Lasister v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 532 
 Lasserot v. Gamble (Cal., 1896), 
 
 46 Pac. 917 
 Lassiter v. State, 67 Ga. 739 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 540 
 Latimer v. State, 55 Neb. 609 79, 
 Laughlin V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 37 S. W. 590 
 V. State, 18 Ohio 99 
 Lawhead v. State, 46 Neb. 607 12 
 Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 30 
 Gratt. (Va.) 845 
 V. State, 59 Ala. 61 
 V. State, 103 Md. 17 
 
 58, 95, 439, 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 173 
 Lawson v. State, 155 Ala. zt4 
 V. State, 20 Ala. 65 92, 
 
 V. State, 30 Ala. 14 
 
 238 
 
 37 
 296 
 269 
 
 298 
 S7 
 533 
 471 
 291 
 421 
 461 
 
 522 
 423 
 153 
 205 
 124 
 
 527 
 
 35 
 
 307 
 390 
 391 
 427 
 
 2T 
 427 
 
 487 
 225 
 421 
 358 
 
 147 
 409 
 
 ■ 73 
 
 342 
 33 
 
 492 
 519 
 324 
 122 
 352
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxiii 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Lawson v. State, 171 Ind. 431 
 
 162, 323, 338 
 V. State (Tex.), 31 S. W. 645 486 
 Laydon v. State, 52 Ind. 459 27 
 
 Layman's Will, In re, 40 Minn. 
 
 471 176 
 
 Lea V. State, 64 ]\Iiss. 294 248 
 
 V. State, 94 Tenn. 495 83 
 
 Leach v. Commonwealth, t,2> Kj'. 
 
 1 01 6 244, 248 
 
 V. State, 99 Tenn. 584 136 
 
 Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279 
 
 154, 155, 156 
 Leak v. State, 61 Ark. 599 467 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.), 97 S. W. 
 
 476 213 
 
 Leaptrot v. State, 51 Fla. 57 161, 470 
 Leather v. Salvor Wrecking &c. 
 
 Co., 2 Woods (U. S.) 680 50 
 
 Ledbetter v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 
 
 195 294 
 
 Lee, In re, 46 Fed. 59 486 
 
 Lee, In re, 41 Kan. 318 523 
 
 Lee V. State, 136 Ala. 31 473 
 
 V. State, 56 Ark. 4 68 
 
 V. State, 116 Ga. 563 154 
 
 V. State, 2 Tex. App. 338 79 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 94 447 
 
 V. State, 74 Wis. 45 409 
 
 Leedom v. State, 81 Neb. 585 415, 418 
 
 Leeper v. State, 29 Tex. App. 63 54 
 
 V. Texas,' 139 U. S. 462 507 
 
 Lefevre v. State, 50 Ohio St. 584 127 
 
 Lefferts v. State, 49 N. J. L. 26 39 
 
 Lefforge v. State, 129 Ind. 551 92, 396 
 
 Leftridge v. United States, 6 Ind. 
 
 Ter. 30s 40 
 
 Legere v. State, in Tenn. 368 152 
 Leggett V. State, 97 Ga. 426 40 
 
 Le Grand v. State (Ark., 1908), 
 
 113 S. W. 1028 404 
 
 Leiber v. Commonwealth, 9 Bush 
 
 (Ky.) II 109 
 
 Leindpcker v. Waldron, 52 111. 283 174 
 Lemons v. State, 97 Tenn. 560 
 
 312, 315, 324 
 
 V. State, 4 W. Va. 755 81 
 
 Leonard v. State, 115 Ala. 80 304 
 
 V. State, 150 Ala. 89 120, 374 
 
 V. State, 29 Ohio St. 408 422 
 
 c to Sections.^ 
 
 Leonard v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 417 281, 
 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 187 
 Lesslie v. State, 35 Fla. 184 
 Lester v. State, t,~ Ark. •/2y 
 V. State, 2,7 Fla. 382 
 
 103, 104, 105, 
 V. State, 106 Ga. 371 
 
 Lettz V. State (Tex.), 21 S. W. 
 
 371 
 Leverich v. State, 105 Ind. 277 
 Levering V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 117 S. W. 253 2"^^, 
 
 Levison v. State, 54 Ala. 520 
 Levy V. State, 79 Ala. 259 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 203 48, 
 Lewallen v. State, 22 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 412 
 Lewer v. Commonwealth, 15 S. & 
 
 R. (Pa.) 93 
 Lewis V. Bruton, 74 Ala. 317 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 732 
 
 V. People, 82 111. 104 523, 
 
 V. People, 37 Mich. 518 
 
 V. State (Ala., 1909), 51 So. 
 308 
 
 V. State, 30 Ala. 54 
 
 V. State, 120 Ala. 339 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 126 
 
 V. State, 55 Fla. 54 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 659 
 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 95 
 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 168 
 
 V. State, 129 Ga. 731 2^, 
 
 V. State TMiss.), 47 So. 467 
 
 V. State, 85 Miss. 35 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 24 S. W. 903 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 201 95, 
 Lienpo v. State, 28 Tex. App. 179 
 Lightfoot V. State (Tex. Cr. 
 App.), 78 S. W. 1075 
 
 V. State, 20 Tex. App. yy, 100 
 Liles V. State, 30 Ala. 24 99, 
 
 Lillie V. State, y2 Neb. 228 
 
 222, 322, 
 Limouze v. People, 58 111. App. 
 
 3f4 
 Lindsay v. People, 62 N. Y. 143 
 
 7, 7h 72, "7, 148, 
 
 282 
 77 
 35 
 
 136 
 
 326 
 378 
 
 475 
 326 
 
 318 
 130 
 232 
 238 
 
 119 
 
 435 
 455 
 326 
 524 
 391 
 
 298 
 
 417 
 
 338 
 
 473 
 
 220 
 
 488 
 
 214 
 
 238 
 
 268 
 
 76 
 
 70 
 
 35 
 
 301 
 
 136 
 
 69 
 
 7 
 
 117 
 
 326 
 
 439 
 334
 
 Ixxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 Lindsey v. State, 38 Ohio St. 507 
 
 ?9- 423 
 Linehan v. State, 113 Ala. 70 328, 338 
 Lingerfelt v. State, 125 Ga. 4 119 
 
 Lingafelter v. State, 28 Ohio Cir. 
 
 Ct. 800 423, 430 
 
 Links V. State, 13 Lea (Tenn. ) 
 
 701 305 
 
 Linnehan v. State, 120 Ala. 293 
 
 61, 119a, 220 
 Lipes V. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 
 
 125 _ 53 
 Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559 
 
 103, 261 
 V. State, 76 ]\Iiss. 22^ 108, 195 
 
 Lipsey v. People, 277 111. 364 i6a, 141 
 Lismore v. State (Ark., 1910), 
 
 126 S. W. 853 482 
 Little V. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 921 94, 191 
 
 V. People, 157 111. 153 12, 15 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 441 36 
 
 V. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 491 326 
 
 V. Todd, 3 Rich. (S. Car.) 91 250 
 
 Livar v. State, 26 Tex. App. 115 227 
 
 Livinghouse v. State, 76 Neb. 491 414 
 
 Livingston v. Commonwealth, 14 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 592 330 
 
 V. Kierstead, 10 Johns. (X. 
 
 Y.) 362 203 
 
 Llewellyn's Case, 13 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 126 226 
 
 Loar V. State, 76 Neb. 14S 414 
 
 Lockhart v. State, 3 Ga. App. 480 373 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 589 
 
 96, 106, 108, 330 
 Lockwood V. State, i Ind. 161 29 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.), 26 S. W. 
 
 200 297 
 
 Loder v. Whelpley, 11 1 N. Y. 239 176 
 Loehr v. People, 132 111. 504 71, 248 
 Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 598 
 
 157. 158 
 Logan V. Commonwealth, 16 Ky. 
 L. 508 116 
 
 V. State, 149 Ala. 11 103, 333 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. i 294 
 
 V. United States, 123 Fed. 291 427 
 V. United States, 144 U. S. 263 
 
 57, 209, 493 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 Loggins V. State, 8 Tex. App. 434 
 
 174, I 
 
 122, 123 
 472 
 302 
 270 
 270 
 74a 
 
 61 
 292 
 
 17 
 358 
 522 
 
 68 
 
 80 
 508 
 
 44 
 
 Lohman v. State, 81 Ind. 15 
 Lohrey v. State, 91 Miss. 853 
 Long V. People, 34 111. App. 48 
 
 V. People, 135 111. 435 
 
 V. State, 86 Ala. 36 7 
 
 V. State, 72 Ark. 427 
 
 V. State, II Fla. 295 
 
 V. State, 42 Fla. 509 
 
 V. State, 12 Ga. 293 
 
 V. State, 54 Ga. 564 
 
 V. State, 56 Ind. 182 
 
 V. State, 23 Neb. 33 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. 6 
 
 V. State, 10 Tex. App. 186 
 
 V. State, 13 Tex. App. 211 
 
 122, 124, 492 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 461 268 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 175 
 
 103, 112, 315 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 55 492 
 
 Longenbook v. People, 130 111. 
 
 App. 320 461 
 
 Loose V. State, 120 Wis. 115 342 
 
 Lord Audley's Case, 3 How. St. 
 
 Tr. 401 185 
 
 Lord ]\Iorley's Case, 6 St. Trials 
 
 770 264 
 
 Lorenz v. United States, 24 App. 
 
 (D. C.) 337 498 
 
 Lessen v. State, 62 Ind. 437 308, 309 
 Lothrop V. Roberts, 16 Colo. 250 247 
 Lott V. State, 122 Ind. 393 486 
 
 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Com- 
 monwealth, 117 Ky. 345 87 
 Louisville &c. R. Co. v. Falvey, 
 
 104 Ind. 409 342 
 
 Lounder v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 121 242 
 
 Love V. People, 160 111. 501 71, 373 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 27 121 
 
 Lovelace v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 261 378 
 
 Lovell v. State, 12 Ind. 18 92 
 
 Lovett V. State, 60 Cal. 125 65, 116 
 
 V. State, 30 Fla. 142 120 
 
 V. State, 80 Ga. 255 97 
 
 Low's Case, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 439 191 
 
 Low V. Mitchell, 18 Me. 372 525 
 
 Lowder v. State, 63 Ala. 143 373
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxv 
 
 [References ai 
 
 Lowe V. State (Ga.), 63 S. E. 
 1 1 14 105 
 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 792 241, 409 
 
 V. State, 118 Wis. 641 161, 163 
 
 Lowrance v. State, 4 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 145 294 
 
 Lowry v. Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152 477 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 562 119a 
 
 Lucas V. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. 
 S.) 436 184 
 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 51 265 
 
 V. State, 2S Conn. 18 184, 185 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. App. 322 228 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 219 48 
 
 Luck V. State, 96 Ind. 16 35 
 
 Luco V. United States, 23 How. 
 
 (U. S.) 515 50 
 
 Lucre v. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 148 70 
 
 Ludlow V. State, 156 Ala. 58 97 
 
 Ludwig V. State, 170 Ind. 648 520 
 
 Lue V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 15 
 
 S. W. 664 296, 297 
 
 Luera v. State (Tex., 1895), 32 S. 
 
 W. 898 133 
 
 Luke V. Calhoun Co., 52 Ala. 115 50 
 V. State, 49 Ala. 30 369 
 
 Luker v. Commonwealth, 9 Ky. 
 
 L. 38s 103 
 
 Lumpkin v. State, 125 Ga. 24 122 
 
 Lung's Case, i Conn. 428 25 
 
 Luqua v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 
 
 5/8 221 
 
 Luttrell V. State, 85 Tenn. 232 421 
 Lyle V. State, 21 Tex. App. 153 
 
 222, 248, 486 
 Lyles V. State, 130 Ga. 294 100, 211 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 119 
 
 93, 103, 106, 113, 120 
 V. United States, 20 App. Cas. 
 
 D. C. 559 276 
 
 Lynch v. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. 
 
 309 463 
 
 V. People, 137 111. App. 444 59 
 
 V. State, 84 Ga. 726 517 
 
 Lynes v. State, 36 Miss. 617 130 
 
 Lynn v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 13 S. W. 74 414 
 
 Lynne v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 386 378 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Lynns v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 375 305 
 Lyon V. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 
 L. 1020 122 
 
 Lyons v. People, 137 111. 602 121 
 
 V. State. 52 Ind. 426 341 
 
 Lytle V. State, 31 Ohio St. 196 166 
 
 M 
 
 McAdams v. State, 25 Ark. 405 320 
 McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154 
 
 115, 130, 139 
 
 McAfee v. State, 85 Ga. 438 44 
 
 McAlIer v. State, 46 Neb. 116 285 
 
 McAllister v. State, 156 Ala. 122 44 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 654 147 
 McAlpine v. State, 117 Ala. 93 
 
 81, 126, 235 
 McArthur v. State, 59 Ark. 431 
 
 17, 19, 236, 365 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. Cr. 635 362, 365 
 
 McBean v. State, 83 Wis. 206 193 
 McBrayer v. State (Tex.), 34 S. 
 
 W. 114 315 
 McBride v. Commonwealth, 95 
 
 Va. 818 330 
 V. People, 5 Colo. App. 91 
 
 106, 108, 113, ir8, 333 
 
 McBryde v. State, 156 Ala. 44 338 
 
 McCabe, Ex parte, 46 Fed. 363 495 
 McCalman v. State, 121 Ga. 491 
 
 526, 534 
 
 McCann v. People, 226 111. 562 213 
 V. People, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 272 333 
 V. State, 13 S. & M. (Miss.) 
 
 471 116, 118, 147a, 322 
 McCartney v. State, 3 Ind. 353 
 
 423, 432 
 
 McCarty v. People, 51 111. 231 82, 327 
 McClackey v. State, 5 Tex. App. 
 
 320 161, 162 
 McClain v. Commonwealth, no 
 
 Pa. St. 263 140, 211, 247 
 
 McClellan v. State, 53 .Ma. 640 488 
 
 V. State, 32 Ark. 609 421 
 
 V. State, 66 Wis. 335 529 
 
 McClerkin v. State, 20 Fla. 879 
 
 466, 468
 
 Ixxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 8i 
 
 358 
 
 St. 
 
 583 
 
 [References at 
 
 McCloskey v. People, 5 Park. Cr 
 
 (N. Y.) 299 
 McClure v. Commonwealth 
 
 Ky. 448 
 V. Com.monwealth, 86 Pa 
 
 353 
 McClurg V. State, 2 Ga. App. 624 
 McCollum V. State, 29 Tex. App, 
 
 162 
 
 McCombs V. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 418 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 490 398 
 
 McConnell v. State, 2 Ga. App. 
 445 482 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 18 S. W. 645 
 McCook V. State, 91 Ga. 740 
 McCorkle v. State, i Cold. 
 
 (Tenn.) 2,Z2> 
 McCormick, Ln re, 117 N. Y. S. 
 
 70 
 McCorquodale v. State (Tex.), 
 98 S. W. 879 III. 112, 
 
 McCourt V. People, 64 X. Y. 
 McCoy V. People, 65 111. 439 
 V. State, 46 Ark. 141 
 V. State, 78 Ga. 490 
 V. State, 91 ]\Iiss. 257 
 V. State (Tex.), 81 S. W. 46 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App., 1909), 
 
 120 S. W. 858 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 30 
 McCracken v. People, 209 111. 215 
 McCrary v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 502 
 McCrory v. State, loi Ga. 779 
 McCue V. Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 
 
 St. 185 
 McCullar'v. State, z^ Tex. Cr. 
 
 213 
 McCully's Case, 2 Lew C. C. 272 
 McCune v. State, 42 Fla. 192 
 McDaniel v. State, 97 Ala. 14 
 V. State, 100 Ga. 67 
 V. State, 8 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 
 
 401 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. 475 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 560 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 342 
 McDermott v. State, 89 Ind. 187 
 
 269, 320 
 
 422 
 308 
 
 263 
 
 164 
 
 440 
 
 461 
 
 322 
 
 Z72, 
 
 532 
 
 119a 
 
 228 
 
 93, 325 
 
 67 
 
 299 
 
 375 
 
 58 
 
 28s 
 74 
 
 323 
 
 390 
 34 
 37 
 61 
 
 328 
 
 227 
 21 
 
 130 
 74 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 McDonald v. Commonwealth, 86 
 Ky. 10 77, 78 ^ 
 
 V. ^Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 
 
 311 S07 
 
 V. State (Ala., 1910), 51 So. 
 
 629 145 
 
 V. State, 55 Fla. 134 21 
 
 V. State (Fla.), 47 So. 485 
 
 296, 301 
 V. vState, 2 Ga. App. 633 298 
 
 V. State, 80 Wis. 407 21 
 
 McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320 48 
 
 McDonnell v. State, 58 Ark. 242 421 
 ^McDongal v. State, 88 Ind. 24 157 
 
 McDowell V. Commonwealth (Ky., 
 1909), 123 S. W. 313 439, 440 
 
 V. State, 68 ]\Iiss. 348 294 
 
 V. State, 74 Miss. 373 298 
 
 iNIcEwen v. State, 152 Ala. 38 105 
 
 McFadden v. Re3'nolds (Pa.), 11 
 Atl. 638 ' 247 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 241 68 
 
 ]\IcFarland v. State, 83 Ark. 98 268 
 jNIcGarr v. State, 75 Ga. 155 425 . 
 
 INIcGary v. People, 45 N. Y. 153 33 
 McGee v. State, 29 Tex. App. 596 207 
 AIcGinnis v. State, 24 Ind. 500 
 
 42, 296 
 V. State, 16 Wyo. 72 358 
 
 McGlasson v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 620 89, 420 
 
 McGowan v. Commonwealth 
 
 (Ky.), 117 S. W. 387 96, 324 
 
 V. McDonald, iii Cal. 57 218 
 
 V. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 184 275 
 
 McGrath v. State, 25 Neb. 780 373 
 
 McGraw v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 20 S. W. 279 494 
 
 McGrew v. State, 13 Tex. App. 
 
 340 261 
 
 ^IcGufif V. State, 88 Ala. 147 
 
 205, 225, 412 
 
 McGuire v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 
 
 156 Mass. 324 220 
 
 V. People, 44 ]\Iich. 286 12, 205 
 
 V. State, 76 Miss. 504 21 
 
 McGullock V. State, 48 Ind. 109 7 
 
 McHenry v. State. 91 Mass. 562 461 
 
 ]\IcHugh V. Territory, 17 Okla. i 325
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxvii 
 
 [References at 
 
 IMcIlvain v. State, 80 Ind. 69 528 
 
 Mclnerney v. United States, 143 
 
 Fed. 729 55 
 
 IMcIntyre v. State, 170 Ind. 163 486 
 V. State (Tex.), 33 S. W. 347 118 
 McKee v. People, 36 N. Y. 113 
 
 99, 119a 
 
 V. State, III Ind. 378 440, 491, 492 
 
 McKenna, In re, 47 Kan. 738 57 
 
 McKenzie v. State, 24 Ark. 636 70 
 
 V. State, 26 Ark. 334 157 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 568 492 
 
 McKeone v. People, 6 Colo. 346 
 
 60, 65 
 ]\IcKevitt V. People, 208 111. -460 
 
 T20, 144, 246 
 ]\IcKinney v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 372 97, 130 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 591 
 
 93, 3T4 
 IMcKinny v. State, 29 Fla. 565 408 
 IMcKissick v. State, 26 Tex. App. 
 
 673 228 
 
 McKleroy v. State, 77 Ala. 93 13 
 
 McKnight v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 252 214 
 
 V. United States, 122 Fed. 926 285 
 IMcLain v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 
 St. 86 i6a, 84, 262 
 
 V. State, 18 Neb. 154 137, 152 
 
 McLaren v. State, 4 Ga. App. 643 
 
 466, 468, 470 
 
 McLaughlin v. Joy, 100 Me. 517 534 
 
 McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672 103, 225 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 660 419, 430 
 
 McLellan v. Richardson, 13 ]Me. 
 
 82 191 
 
 McLeod V. State, 35 Ala. 395 92 
 
 V. State, 128 Ga. 17 320 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 331 
 
 157, 162 
 McMahan v. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 348 310 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 244 292 
 
 McMahon v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 
 
 450 328 
 
 McManus v. Freeman, 2 Pa. Dist. 
 
 144 173 
 
 McMath V. State, 55 Ga. 303 
 
 408, 409, 414, 418 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 McMeans v. State (Tex.), 114 S. 
 W. 264 131 
 
 McMeen v. Commonwealth, 114 
 
 Pa. St. 300 333 
 
 Mc^Millan v. State, 128 Ga. 25 108 
 
 jMcMurrin v. Rigby, 80 Iowa 322 413 
 McXaghten's Case, i C. & K. 
 
 130 154 
 
 McXair v. State, 53 Ala. 453 417 
 
 McXamara v. People, 24 Colo. 61 358 
 IMcXealy v. State, 17 Fla. 198 269 
 
 McXeil V. State, 29 Tex. App. 48 196 
 McXish V. State, 47 Fla. 69 21, 129 
 ]\IcPherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478 no 
 ]\IcPhun, In re, 30 Fed. 57 503 
 
 McQueen v. Commonwealth (Kj'.), 
 
 88 S. W. 1047 269 
 
 V. State, 94 Ala. 50 103, no 
 
 V. State, 103 Ala. 12 104 
 
 V. State, 108 Ala. 54 305 
 
 V. State, 82 Ind. 72 76, 80 
 
 McQuirk v. State, 84 Ala. 435 418 
 jMcReynolds v. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 
 327 I 6a 
 
 jMcSwean v. State, 113 Ala. 66r 
 
 79, 80, 87 
 ]\IcTyler v. State, gi Ga. 254 193, 237 
 i\IcVey V. State, 23 Tex. App. 659 517 
 IMcWharter v. State, 118 Ga. 55 512 
 ^laas V. Territory, 10 Okla. 714 154 
 MacDonnell, In re, 11 Blatchf. 
 
 (U. S.) 170 496 
 
 Mace V. State, 58 Ark. 79 471 
 
 MacFadden v. United States, 165 
 
 Fed. 51 478 
 
 Machen v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 115 475 
 
 Mack V. State, 54 Fla. 55 56 
 
 V. State, 48 Wis. 271 100 
 
 ]\I?ckey V. Commonwealth, 80 
 
 Ky. 345 269 
 
 Mackin v. People, 115 111. 312 27 
 
 V. State, 59 N. J. L. 495 154 
 
 Macklin v. Commonwealth, 93 
 
 Ky. 294 330 
 
 Mackquire v. State, 91 Miss. 151 421 
 
 Madden v. State, 148 Ind. 183 300 
 
 V. State, T Kan. 340 3^9 
 
 Maddox v. State, 159 Ala. 53 
 
 100, 117, 147a
 
 Ixxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 Madison v. State, i6 Tex. App. 
 
 435 293 
 
 Magee v. People, 139 111. 138 243, 378 
 V. State (Miss.), 45 So. 360 268 
 Magennis v. Parkhurst, 4 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 433 461 
 
 Magnay v. Burt, 5 Q. B. 381 255 
 
 Maguire v. State, 47 J\Id. 485 
 
 507, 510, 512, 514 
 [Nlahaffey v. Territory, 11 Okla. 
 
 213 14 
 
 Mahan v. State, i Ga. App. 534 42 
 Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 23 
 
 Mahon v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 234 470 
 Mahoney v. State, 2>2> Ind. App. 
 
 655 460, 461 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 98 S. W. 854 56 
 Maillet v. People, 42 Mich. 262 
 
 411, 414, 416 
 Mainard v. Reider, 2 Ind. App. 
 
 115 187 
 
 Maine v. People, 9 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 13 348 
 
 Maines v. State, 26 Tex. App. 14 468 
 Majors v. People, 38 Colo. 437 87 
 
 Malachi v. State, 89 Ala. 134 72,, 312 
 Mallory v. State, 27 Tex. Cr. 
 
 482 429 
 
 ]\Ialone v. State, 49 Ga. 210 12, 166 
 V. State, 169 Ind. 72 292 
 
 Maloney v. State (Ark. 1909), 
 
 121 S. W. 728 122, 261, 427 
 
 Maloy V. State, 52 Fla. loi 60, 66, 2>22, 
 Manaway v. State, 44 Ala. 375 
 
 42s, 429 
 Manchester, In re, 5 Cal. 237 497, 499 
 Mangrum v. Commonwealth 
 
 (Ky.), 39 S. W. 703 154 
 
 Mangum v. State (Ga.), 62, S. E. 
 543 6 
 
 V. State, 15 Tex. App. 362 484 
 Mann v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. 
 L. 1964 74 
 
 V. State, 23 Fla. 610 213, 216 
 
 V. State, 34 Ga. i 392 
 
 V. State, 44 Tex. 642 189 
 
 ^Manning v. State, 27 Tex. Cr. 180 
 
 364, 365 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 326 470 
 
 V. State, 79 Wis. 178 118 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 Mapes V. State (Tex.), 85 S. W. 
 
 797 473 
 
 Maples V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 
 408 130 
 
 ]Marable v. State, 89 Ga. 425 323, 521 
 Alarcy v. Barnes, 16 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 161 SO 
 
 ]\Iarion v. State, 16 Neb. 349 66, 246 
 V. State, 20 Neb. 233 27 
 
 ^Nlarkey v. State, 47 Fla. 38 470 
 
 Marks v. State, loi Ind. 353 532 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 274 331 
 
 Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55 
 
 71, 74, 261, 323, 332 
 V. State, 68 Ala. 580 323 
 
 Marnoch v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 269 22,3 
 
 Maroney v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 524 
 
 467, 468 
 
 Marrash v. United States, 168 
 Fed. 225 492 
 
 Marshall v. Chicago &c. R. Co., 
 48 111. 475 106 
 
 V. State, 49 Ala. 21 342 
 
 V. State, 84 Ark. 88 147 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 22 S. W. 878 376 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. 273 137 
 
 Martin v. Anderson, 21 Ga. 301 174 
 V. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. 
 
 1923 III, 245 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 93 Ky. 189 222 
 V. Commonwealth, 2 Leigh 
 
 (Va.) 745 423, 432, 434 
 
 V. State, 39 Ala. 523 122 
 
 V. State, 89 Ala. 1x5 46 
 
 V. State, 90 Ala. 602 143 
 
 V. State, 104 Ala. 71 300, 304 
 
 V. State, 125 Ala. 64 6 
 
 V. State, 144 Ala. 8 326 
 
 V. State, 32 Ark. 124 463. 465 
 
 V. State, 5 Ind. App. 453 326, 357 
 V. State (Miss.), 47 So. 426, 484 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. i 207, 208 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 125 
 
 89, 438 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 29 
 
 69. 97 
 V. State. 79 Wis. 165 67 
 
 V. Territory, 14 Okla. 593 209
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 [References ar 
 Martinez v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 33 67 
 
 Marts V. State, 26 Ohio St. 162 325 
 Marx V. People, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 618 65 
 
 iMascolo V. Montesanto, 61 Conn. 
 
 SO 360 
 
 Mask V. State, 32 Miss. 405 188 
 
 Mason v. Hinds, 19 N. Y. S. 996 221 
 
 V. People, 26 N. Y. 200 373 
 
 V. State, 42 Ala. 532 87, 88, 90 
 
 V. State, 153 Ala. 46 371 
 
 V. State, 171 Ind. 78 99, 302 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 98 S. W. 854 373 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 24 342 
 
 IMassey v. Colville, 45 N. J. L. 119 258 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 159 279 
 
 Masterson v. State, 144 Ind. 240 
 
 228, 467 
 Maston v. State. 83 Miss. 647 327 
 
 ^lastronada v. State, 60 Miss. 86 144 
 [Nlatherly v. Commonwealth, 14 
 
 Ky. L. 182 104, 108 
 
 Alathews v. State, 19 Neb. 330 414 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 98 6 
 
 Mathis V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 13 S. W. 360 395 
 
 V. Commonwealth, il Ky. L. 
 
 882 130 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 39 328 
 
 Mathley v. Commonwealth, 120 
 
 Ky. 389 323 
 
 Matteson v. People, 122 III. App. 
 
 66 529 
 
 IMatthews v. Hoagland, 48 N. J. 
 
 Eq. 455 175 
 
 V. People, 6 Colo. App. 456 67 
 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 62 262, 267 
 
 Mattox V. United States, 146 U. 
 
 S. 140 no, III, 193 
 
 Maxey v. State, 76 Ark. 276 121, 464 
 
 Maxwell v. Hardy, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 
 
 560 533 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 40 So. 615 128 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 78 
 
 S. W. 516 78 
 
 May V. People, 8 Colo. 210 324 
 
 V. Shnmway, 16 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 86 258 
 
 V. State, 14 Ohio 461 429 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. App. 74 6r 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Mayberry v. State, 107 Ala. 64 484 
 Mayer v. People, 80 N. Y. 364 438 
 Mayes v. State, 64 Miss. 329 96, 330 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 33 236 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. 340 309 
 
 Mayfield v. State, no Ind. 591 326 
 
 V. State, loi Tenn. 673 96, 272 
 Maynard v. People, 135 111. 416 123 
 Mayo V. State, 7 Tex. App. 342 408 
 Mayor &c. v. Caldwell, 81 Ga. 76 202 
 Mays V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 76 
 S. W. 162 268 
 
 V. State, 72 Neb. 723 149 
 
 Mead v. State, 53 N. J. L. 601 425 
 Means v. State, 10 Tex. App. 16 254 
 Medis V. State, 27 Tex. App. 194 360 
 Medley v. State (Ala.), 47 So. 
 
 218 6 
 
 Medrano v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 214 401 
 Meehan v. State, 46 N. J. L. 355 463 
 Meek v. State, 117 Ala. 116 
 
 437, 438, 439, 440, 442 
 Aleeks v. State, 80 Ark. 579 461 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 420 468 
 
 Mehan v. State, 7 Wis. 670 24a 
 
 Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99 
 
 89, 369 
 Melbourne v. State, 51 Fla. 69 269 
 Mellen, In re, 63 Hun (N. Y.) 
 632 174 
 
 Menefee v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 249 93, 323 
 
 Mercer v. State, 17 Tex. App. 452 
 
 68, 146 
 Merrill v. State, 58 Miss. 65 109, 112 
 Merritt v. Campbell, 79 N. Y. 
 
 62s 429 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 5 So. 386 446 
 Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 
 
 118 Ky. 870 124 
 
 Merriwether v. State, 81 Ala. 74 185 
 V. State (Tex.), 115 S. W. 44 30i 
 Mershon v. State, 51 Ind. 14 236 
 
 Mesa V. State, 17 Tex. App. 395 391 
 Messer v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 635 451 
 Methard v. State, 19 Ohio St. 363, 378 
 Mettler v. People, 36 111. App. 324 311 
 Mctz V. State, 46 Neb. 547 67, 378 
 Metzger, In re, 5 How. (U. S.) 
 176 495
 
 Ixxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 Meurer v. State, 129 Ind. 587 517, 521 
 JNleyer v. Standard &c. Ins. Co., 
 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 74 179 
 
 V. State, 59 N. J. L. 310 87 
 
 Meyers, E.v parte, 33 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 204 103 
 
 Meyers v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. 
 St. 131 157 
 
 V. State, 14 Tex. App. 35 314 
 
 IMeyncke v. State, 68 Ind. 401 
 
 532, 533 
 ]\Hchaels v. People, 208 111. 603 125 
 Micheauz v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 660 292 
 
 IMiddangh v. State, 103 Ind. 78 473 
 ]\IiddIebrook v. State, 43 Conn. 
 
 257 459, 460 
 
 Mieller v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 609 94 
 
 Miera v. Territory, 13 N. Mex. 
 
 192 312 
 
 Miers v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 161 324 
 
 ]\Iilan V. State, 24 Ark. 346 172, 174 
 
 Miles V. State, 93 Ga. 117 152 
 
 V. State, 129 Ga. 589 7 
 
 V. United States, 103 U. S. 304 
 
 12, 400, 404 
 
 Mill V. State, i Ga. App. 134 36 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 414 137 
 
 Miller v. Anderson, 43 Ohio St. 
 
 473 526 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 113 
 
 S. W. 518 40 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 15 435 
 V. Commonwealth, 117 Ky. 80 472 
 V. Illinois &c. R. Co., 89 Iowa 
 
 567 223 
 
 V. People, 39 111. 457 149, 153 
 
 V. People, 216 111. 309 131, 133, 267 
 V. People, 229 111. 376 300, 301 
 
 V. State, 48 Ala. 122 471 
 
 V. State, 107 Ala. 40 276 
 
 V. State, no Ala. 69 
 
 119, 312, 524, 525, 528, 529, 533 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 686 328 
 
 V. State, IS Fla. 577 58, 215 
 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 186 374 
 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 653 242 
 
 V. State, 9 Ind. 340 272 
 
 V. State, 51 Ind. 405 422, 423 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 
 jMiller v. State, 73 Ind. 88 440 
 
 V. State, 68 .Miss. 221 124 
 
 V. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 449 486 
 V. State (Tex.), 50 S. W. 704 375 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 232 117 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 445 377 
 
 V. State (Wis.), 119 X. W. 850 
 
 12, 272, 492, 493 
 V. Territory, 15 Okla. 422 
 
 214, 221, 222, 248 
 V. United States, 6 App. D. C. 
 
 6 471 
 
 Millett V. Baker, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 215 523 
 
 ^lills V. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 
 
 ^15 390, 392, 393 
 
 V. State, 20 Ala. 86 473 
 V. United States, 164 U. S. 
 
 644 407 
 Milne's Case, 2 East C. L. 602 296 
 Mimms v. State, 16 Ohio St. 221 330 
 Miner v. People, 58 111. 59 380, 404 
 Ming V. Foote, 9 Mont. 201 51 
 Minich v. People, 8 Colo. 440 12 
 Mink V. State, 60 Wis. 583 527 
 ^Minneapolis TMill Co. v. Minneap- 
 olis &c. R. Co., 51 i\Iinn. 304 262 
 Elinor V. State, 55 Fla. 77 121, 296 
 ]\Iinters v. People, 139 111. 363 247 
 Misseldine v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 
 335 296 
 
 ]\Iitchell, In re, i Cal. App. 396 307 
 Mitchell V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 14 S. W. 489 106 
 V. Commonwealth, 78 K}^ 204 
 
 344, 399 
 V. State, 58 Ala. 417 318 
 
 V. State, 94 Ala. 68 
 
 47, 60, 236, 237, 248 
 V. State, S2 Ark. 324 94, 112 
 
 V. State, 43 Fla. 188 79 
 
 V. State, 71 Ga. 128 103, 113 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 24 So. 312 126 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 278 193 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 71 80 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 37 
 
 120, 514 
 
 Mixon V. State, 55 Miss. 525 12, 331 
 V. State (Tex.), 31 S. W. 408 88 
 
 Mizell V. State, 38 Fla. 20 293, 296
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxi 
 
 [References ai 
 
 IMockabee v. Commonwealth, 78 
 
 Ky. 380 103, 105, 113 
 
 Moeck V. People, 100 111. 242 108 
 
 Moett V. People, 85 X. Y. 373 154 
 ]\Ioffit V. State, 2 Humph. 
 
 (Temi), 99 t88 
 
 ■Nlonahan v. State, 135 Ind. 316 144 
 ]\Ioncrief v. Elj^ 19 Wend. (N. 
 
 Y.) 405 523 
 
 Mondragon v. State, 33 Tex. 480 301 
 Monroe, In re, 20 N. Y. 82 173 
 
 INIonroe v. State, 5 Ga. 8s 100 
 
 ]\Iontag V. People, 141 111. 75 157 
 
 ]\Iontee v. Commonwealth, 3 J. 
 
 J. :\Iarsh (Ky.) 132 275 
 
 Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 
 
 17 Ky. L. 94 78 
 
 V. Knox, 23 Fla. 595 238 
 
 V. State, 80 Ind. 338 106, 108 
 
 V. State, II Ohio 424 266 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 323 422 
 
 Moody V. People, 20 111. 316 269 
 
 V. Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490 
 
 212, 223 
 
 V. State, I Ga. App. 772 102, no 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 868 95 
 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 821 307 
 
 I\Ioon V. State, 68 Ga. 687 51 
 
 ]Mooney v. State, 33 Ala. 419 166 
 
 INIoore v. Commonwealth (Kv.), 
 
 81 S. W. 669 ' 268 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 2 Leigh 
 
 (Va.) 701 130, 296 
 
 V. Green, 73 N. Car. 394 258 
 
 V. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673 507 
 
 V. People, 108 111. 484 222 
 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 687 103 
 
 V. State, 79 Ga. 498 205 
 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 759 474 
 
 V. State, 126 Ga. 414 21 
 
 V. State, 130 Ga. 322 36, 42 
 
 V. State, 55 Miss. 432 36 
 
 V. State, 86 Miss. 160 325 
 
 V. State, 53 Neb. 831 144, 281 
 
 V. State, 17 Ohio St. 521 408 
 
 V. State, 96 Tenn. 209 
 
 105, 122, 124, 233, 519 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 37 S. W. 747 377 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 552 349 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 54 324 
 
 vi — Underhill CkiM. Evidence. 
 
 e to Secfious.] 
 Moore v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 
 449 205 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 468 370, 374 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 336 323 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 364 377 
 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 559 482 
 
 V. United States, 91 U. S. 270 429 
 V. United States, 150 U. S. 57 90 
 Morales v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 234 
 
 130 
 
 97 
 238 
 
 321 
 
 267 
 278 
 
 94 
 III 
 496 
 441 
 
 Moran v. People (111.), 45 N. E. 
 230 
 V. People, 163 111. 372 
 V. Territory, 14 Okla. 544 
 Morawitz v. State. 49 Tex. Cr. 
 
 366 
 Morearty v. State, 46 Xeb. 652 
 Morehcad v. State, 34 Ohio St. 212 17 
 r^Torehouse v. State, 35 X'^eb. 643 291 
 ^lorello V. People, 226 111. 388 
 ]Morelock v. State, 90 Tenn. 528 
 Morgan, Ex parte, 20 Fed. 298 
 Morgan v. State, 42 Ark. 131 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 599 366, 368 
 
 V. State, 51 X'^eb. 672 6 
 
 V. State, 48 Ohio St. 371 
 
 276, 277, 279 
 
 V. State, 25 Tex. App. 513 378 
 
 V. Territory, 16 Okla. 530 314 
 
 Morgan's Case, i Mood. & R. 134 429 
 
 Moriarity v. State, 62 Miss. 654 
 
 325, 326 
 Morphew v. State, 84 Ark. 487 
 IMorris v. Davies, 5 C. & F. 163 
 V. Morris, 119 Ind. 341 
 V. Xew York &c. R. Co., 148 
 
 N. Y. 88 
 V. State, 84 Ala. 446 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 66 61, 93, 
 
 126, 262, 323, 328, 330, 491, 492 
 V. State. 54 Fla. 80 435, 439 
 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 36 291a 
 
 V. State, loi Ind. 560 533 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 95 
 
 88, 321, 322, 323 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 515 328 
 
 V. Territory (Okla.), 99 Pac. 
 
 760 50, 164 
 
 V. Territory, i Okla. Cr. 617 332 
 
 269 
 526 
 176 
 
 179 
 294
 
 Ixxsii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ai 
 
 Morrison v. Commonwealth 
 
 (Ky.), 74 S. W. 2/7 323 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. 
 
 2493 324 
 
 V. Lennard, 3 C. & P. 127 204 
 
 Morrow v. State, 48 Ind. 432 
 
 100, 119a 
 Morse v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 Ill S. W. 714 55, 87, 91 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 33 Ky. L. 
 
 831 88, 89, 90 
 
 Morse v. Odell, 49 Ore. iiS 220 
 
 Morton v. State, 91 Tenn. 437 loi 
 Mose V. State, 35 Ala. 421 108, 109 
 Moseley v. State, 89 Miss. 802 324 
 Moss V. State, 152 Ala. 30 
 
 47, 48, 268, 314, 374 
 V. State, 17 Ark. 327 70 
 
 V. State, 40 So. 346 298 
 
 Mott V. Consumers' Ice Co., 52 
 
 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 244 252 
 
 Mount V. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 
 
 (Ky.) 93 509 
 
 Mounts V. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 
 
 274 144 
 
 Mow V. People, 31 Colo. 351 51 
 
 Moye V. State, 65 Ga. 754 21, 298 
 Mulford V. People, 139 111. 586 
 
 282, 285 
 Mullen V. State, 45 Ala. 43 353 
 
 Mullins V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 79 S. W. 258 269 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. 
 
 2044 245 
 
 Munkers v. State, 87 Ala. 94 388, 390 
 Munyon v. State, 62 N. J. L. i 188 
 Murdock v. State, 68 Ala. 567 117 
 
 Murdock's Case, 2 Bland. (Md.) 
 
 461 461 
 
 Murphey v. State, 43 Neb. 34 225 
 Murphree v. State (Tex.), 115 S. 
 
 W. 1 189 36, 115 
 
 Murphy v. Commonwealth, 23 
 Gratt. (Va.) 960 187 
 
 V. People, 9 Colo. 435 84, 320 
 
 V. People, 63 N. Y. 590 
 
 129, 137, 140, 323, 337 
 V. Spence, 9 Gray (Mass.) 399 533 
 V. State, 63 Ala. i 138 
 
 V. State, 108 Ala. 10 14, 79, 82, 246 
 
 ■e to Sections.] 
 
 Murphy v. State, 31 Fla. 166 153 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 780 6, 419 
 
 V. State, 122 Ga. 149 404 
 
 V. State, 120 Ind. 115 408 
 
 V. State, 36 Ohio St. 628 123 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 24 332 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 488 427 
 
 V. State, 124 Wis. 635 279 
 
 Murray v. Great Western Ins. Co., 
 
 72 Hun 282 221 
 
 V. Louisiana, 163 U. S. loi 251 
 
 V. State, 25 Fla. 528 130 
 
 V. State, I Tex. App. 417 270 
 
 Muscoe V. Commonwealth, 87 Va. 
 460 330 
 
 Musfelt V. State, 64 Neb. 445 122 
 
 Musgrave v. State, 133 Ind. 297 444 
 
 Mussel Slough Case, 5 Fed. 680 491 
 
 Musser v. Stewart, 21 Ohio St. 
 353 _ 523 
 
 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Selby, 
 72 Fed. 980 174 
 
 Myer v. State, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. 
 226 480 
 
 Myers v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 
 70s 23 
 
 V. Stafford, 114 N. Car. 689 523 
 V. State, 84 Ala. 11 412, 413 
 
 V. State, 51 Neb. 517 418 
 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 76 248, 280a, 374 
 V. State, 92 Ind. 390 195 
 
 V. State, 3 Sneed (Tenn.) 98 471 
 
 Mynatt v. Hudson, 66 Tex. 66 236 
 
 N 
 
 Nagel V. People, 229 111. 598 196, 197 
 Nail V. State, 125 Ga. 234 338 
 
 Nance v. State, 126 Ga. 95 468 
 
 Narnard v. State, 119 Ga. 436 120 
 
 Nathan v. State, 130 Ga. 48 235 
 
 National Bank v. National Bank, 
 
 7 W. Va. 544 182 
 
 National Trust Co. v. Gleason, 77 
 
 N. Y. 400 209 
 
 Navarro v. State, 24 Tex. App. 
 
 378 185, 213 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 326 486 
 
 Neal V. Patten, 47 Ga. 73 176
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 Ixxxiii 
 
 [References a) 
 
 Neal's Case, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 917 471 
 Xeary v. People, 115 111. App. 157 387 
 Xeathery v. People, 227 111. no 326 
 Xeel V. State, 9 Ark. 259 461 
 
 Xeely v. State, 2i^ Tex. Cr. 370 363 
 Xehr V. State, 35 Xeb. 638 310 
 
 X'eiderluck v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 
 320 129 
 
 Xeill V. State, 79 Ga. 779 519, 522 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 219 412 
 
 Xeilson v. State, 146 Ala. 683 18, 2;^ 
 
 V. State, 40 So. 221 6 
 
 Xelms V. State, 84 Ga. 466 406 
 
 V. State, 58 Miss. 362 269 
 
 X'elson V. State, 151 Ala. 2 55, 405 
 
 V. State, 2,2 Fla. 244 82, 236 
 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 223 320 
 
 V. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 22,7 225 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 20 S. W. 766 355 
 
 V. State, I Tex. App. 41 314 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 205 298 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 274 493 
 
 V. United States, 28 App. D. C. 
 
 . 32 475 
 
 V. United States, 201 U. S. 92 
 
 247, 461 
 X'eubrandt v. State, 53 Wis. 89 378 
 X'ewberry v. Robinson, 36 Fed. 
 ^?4i 505 
 
 X'ewcomb v. State, 2i7 -Miss. 383 
 
 222, 330 
 Xewell V. State, 109 Ala. 5 484 
 
 X'^ew England Monument Co. v. 
 
 Johnson (Pa.) 22 Atl. 974 39 
 
 X'ewman v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 88 S. W. 1089 60 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 28 Ky. L. 
 
 81 61, 123 
 
 V. People, 23 Colo. 300 451, 453 
 V. People, 63 Barb. (X. Y.) 
 
 630 61 
 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 27^ ^73 
 
 X'^cwphew V. State, 5 Ga. App. 
 
 84 395 
 
 Xewport V. State. 95 Ga. 299 58 
 
 Newson v. State, 107 Ala. 133 80 
 
 X^ewton V. Commonwealth, 31 Ky. 
 
 L. 327 326 
 
 V. State, 92 Ala. ^^ 328 
 
 V. State, 21 Fla. 53 312 
 
 c to Scctions.l 
 
 Xewton V. State, 51 Fla. 82 103 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 12 So. 560 277 
 V. State (Tex.), 48 S. W. 507 301 
 
 X^icholas v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 
 
 741 314, 2>i2> 
 
 Xichols V. Commonwealth, 11 
 Bush (Ky.) 575 272, 328 
 
 V. People, 23 Hun (X. Y.) 
 
 165 325 
 
 X'icholson v. Commonwealth, 91 
 
 Pa. St. 390 386 
 
 V. State, 72 Ala. 176 528 
 
 V. State, 38 Md. 140 126, 127 
 
 Xick V. State, 128 Ga. 573 270 
 
 Xickles V. State, 48 Fla. 46 314 
 
 Xickols V. State, in Ala. 58 473 
 
 Xicks V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 I 129, 147a 
 
 Niezorawski v. State, 131 Wis. 
 
 166 248 
 
 Xight V. State, 147 Ala. 93 392 
 
 Xightengale v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 3 2,77 
 
 X^ioum V. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 
 
 685 227, 520 
 
 Xixon V. Perry, 77 Ga. 530 523 
 
 V. State, S2> Tex. Cr. 325 261 
 
 X^obles V. State, 98 Ga. 72, 146 
 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 212 381 
 
 X^ofsinger v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 301 117, 322 
 
 X^olan V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 436 
 
 387, 392 
 X^^olen V. State, 8 Tex. App. 585 126 
 V. State, 14 Tex. App. 474 
 
 122, 129, 141 
 Xonemaker v. State, 34 Ala. 211 279 
 Nordan v. State, 143 Ala. 13 
 
 312, 318, 319a, 323 
 X'ordgren v. People, 211 111. 425 
 
 102, no, III, 319a 
 X^orfleet v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. 
 
 L. 1137 95 
 
 Norris v. Beach, 2 Johns. (N. 
 
 Y.) 294 258 
 
 V. State, 25 Ohio St. 217 445 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 166 244 
 
 North V. People, 139 HI. 81 
 
 46, 102, 109, 112, 270
 
 Ixxsiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 North Carolina v. Vandcrford, 
 
 35 Fed. 282 308 
 
 Norton v. State, 72 JMiss. 128 393 
 
 V. State, 129 Wis. 659 422, 430 
 
 Norwood V. State, 45 Md. 68 524 
 
 Noyes v. State, 41 N. J. L. 418 71 
 Nuckolls V. Commonwealth, 32 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 884 472 
 
 Nugent V. State, 18 Ala. 521 413 
 
 Nurnberger v. United States, 156 
 
 Fed. 721 466 
 
 Nusbamer v. State, 54 Fla. 87 21 
 
 Nuzum V. State, 88 Ind. 599 264 
 
 O 
 
 Oakley v. State, 135 Ala. 29 6 
 
 Oates V. State, 156 Ala. 99 326 
 
 O'Berry v. State, 47 Fla. 75 230 
 
 O'Blenis v. State, 47 N. J. L. 279 418 
 O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 6 Bush 
 
 (Ky.) 563 261, 265 
 
 O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 
 354 272 
 
 V. People, 36 N. Y. 276 161 
 
 V. People, 48 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 • 274 157 
 
 V. State, 125 Ind. 38 54 
 
 V. State, 69 Neb. 691 491, 492, 494 
 
 . V. State (Tex.), 35 S. W. 666 144 
 
 V. United States, 27 App. D. 
 
 C. 263 42, 217, 282 
 
 Ochsner v. Commonwealth, 2>2i 
 
 Ky. L. 119 69 
 
 O'Connell v. People, 87 N. Y. 377 
 
 23, 157 
 V. State (Ga. App.), 62 S. E. 
 
 1007 21 
 
 Oder V. State, 26 Fla. 520 473 
 
 O'Donnell v. People, no III. App. 
 
 250 246 
 
 V. People, 224 111. 218 246 
 
 Ogletree v. State, 28 Ala. 693 
 
 154, 157 
 O'Grady v. State, 36 Neb. 320 166 
 
 O'Hearn v. State, 79 Neb. 513 
 
 122 123 
 
 Ohio V. Foy, Tappan (Ohio) 71 488 
 
 e to Sections."] 
 Oldham v. State, 5 Gill (Md.) 
 
 90 5-^3 
 
 Oleson V. State, 11 Neb. 276 409, 410 
 Oliver V. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 
 
 228 5M 
 V. Commonwealth, loi Pa. St. 
 
 215 19- 393 
 
 V. State, 17 Ark. 508 446, 447 
 
 V. State, 94 Ga. 83 40 
 
 Oliver v. State, 129 Ga. 777 103 
 
 V. State, II Neb. i 73 
 
 Olson V. Peterson, 32, Neb. 358 
 
 525, 529, 532 
 O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 
 
 St. 424 ^ 334 
 Omer v. Commonwealth, 95 K}-. 
 
 353 _ 77 
 
 Omichund v. Barker, Willes, 547 199 
 O'Neal V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 42 
 
 484, 485. 486 
 Oneale v. Commonwealth, 17 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 582 404 
 
 Oneil V. State, 48 Ga. 66 12 
 
 O'Neill V. State, 85 Ga. 383 392 
 O'Rear v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 78 S. W. 407 ' 269 
 
 Orman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604 175 
 
 Ormond v. Ball, 120 Ga. 916 446 
 
 Ormsby v. People, 53 N. Y. 472 76 
 
 Ornelas v. Ruiz, i6r U. S. 502 497 
 
 Orr V. State, 107 Ala. 35 299 
 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 76 517 
 
 Orser v. Orser, 24 N. Y. 51 235 
 Osborn v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 20 S. W. 223 135 
 v. People, 2 Park Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 583 91 
 
 V. State, 125 Ala. 106 248 
 
 v. State, 52 Ind. 526 343 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 46 371 
 
 Osgood V. State, 64 Wis. 472 416, 417 
 
 Oteiza, In re. 136 U. S. 330 496 
 
 Ouock Ting v. United States, 140 
 
 U. S. 417 i6a 
 
 Overlook v. Hall. 8t Maine 348 S^S 
 
 Oviatt V .State, 19 Ohio St. 573 310 
 Owen V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 1910), 125 s. w. 405 356 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 65 
 
 312, 323, 328
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Isxxv 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Owens V. State, 94 Ala. 97 381, 2^z 
 
 V. State, 119 Ga. 304 147 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 296 125 
 
 V. Stale, 67 Md. 307 217 
 
 V. State, 63 ]\Iiss. 450 58 
 
 V. State, 80 Miss. 499 248 
 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. i 482 
 
 Owensby v. State, 82 Ala. 63 
 
 118, 143 
 
 Owings V. Hull, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 
 
 607 505 
 
 Owsley V. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 
 
 384 143 
 Ozark V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 106 48, 262, 312 
 
 Ozburn v. State, 87 Ga. 173 82 
 
 Pace V. Alabama, 106 U. S. 583 507 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 2>7 S. 
 
 W. 948 332 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 20 S. W. 762 145 
 V. State (Tex.), 31 S. W. 173 299 
 
 Padfield v. People, 146 111. 660 12 
 
 Padgett V. State, 40 Fla. 451 23 
 
 Page V. Commonwealth, 27 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 954 197 
 
 V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 198 484 
 
 Painter v. People, 147 111. 444 
 
 12, 87, 90 
 
 Palmer v. People, 138 III. 356 330^ 
 V. State (Ala. 1909), 51 So. 
 
 358 381, 382 
 
 V. State, 45 Ind. 388 309 
 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 393 126, 127 
 
 Panton v. People, 114 111. 505 58 
 
 Parham v. State, 147 Ala. 57 148 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 468 468 
 
 Park V. State, 126 Ga. 575 
 
 no, 112, 119a 
 
 Parker v. Commonwealth, 96 Ky. 
 212 324 
 
 V. People, 97 111. z^ 422 
 
 V. State, 39 Ala. 365 34, 296 
 
 V. State, III Ala. 72 298 
 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. ^2,^ 517 
 
 V. State, 135 Ind. 534 61 
 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 284 12, 96, 153 
 
 c to Sections.^ 
 
 Parker v. State, 67 Md. 329 
 
 225, 409, 410 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr.'App. 461 
 
 130, 374, 374a 
 
 Parks V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 100 223 
 Parmelle v. People, 8 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 623 437 
 Parnell v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 419 115 
 
 Parris v. People, 76 111. 274 311 
 Parrish v. Commonwealth (Ky. 
 
 1909), 123 S. W. 339 90 
 V. State, 139 Ala. 16 
 
 129, 157, 160, 161, 162, 163 
 
 V. State, 14 Neb. 60 275 
 Parrott v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 47 S. W. 452 67 
 Parshell v. New York &c. R. Co., 
 
 66 Hun (N. Y.) 62,2, 51 
 Parson v. Commonwealth, 2>2) Ky. 
 
 L. I 05 I 208 
 
 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577 154, 155 
 
 Partain v. State, 22 Tex. App. 100 470 
 
 Partee v. State, 67 Ga. 570 75 
 
 Paschal v. State, 89 Ga. 303 213 
 
 Pate V. State (Ala.), 48 So. 388 262 
 V. State, 150 Ala. 10 
 
 48, 61, 93, 103, 119 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 93 S. W. 556 395 
 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 462 326 
 Patterson, Ex parte, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 271 147 
 
 Patterson v. State (Ala.), 47 So. 
 
 52 324, 333 
 
 V. State, 86 Ga. 70 161, 214 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 613 103 
 
 Patton V. State (Ala.), 46 So. 862 314 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. in 310 
 
 V. State, 6 Ohio St. 467 493 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 80 S. W. 86 312 
 
 Patrick v. State, 17 Wyo. 260 144 
 
 Paul V. Paul, 27 N. J. Eq. 23 237 
 
 V. State, 65 Ga. 152 147 
 
 Pauli V. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 
 
 St. 432 78 
 
 Paulk V. State. 52 Ala. 427 523, 526 
 Paulson V. State, 118 Wis. 89 
 
 48, 55, 119a 
 Payne v. Commonwealth, i Met. 
 
 (Ky.) 370 325
 
 Isxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Payne v. State, 60 Ala. 80 238, 326 
 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 184 378 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 564 103 
 
 Peaden v. State, 46 Fla. 124 236 
 
 Peak V. State, 5 Ga. App. 56 
 
 1 6a, 276 
 V. State, 50 N. J. L. 179 103, 105 
 Pearce v. State, 40 Ala. 720 89 
 
 Pearsall v. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 
 L. 222 126, 129 
 
 Pearson v. State, 55 Ga. 659 431 
 
 Pease v. State, 91 Ga. 18 521 
 
 Peat's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 288 189 
 
 Peck V. Parchen, 52 Iowa 46 43 
 
 V. State, 86 Tenn. 259 66 
 
 Peckham v. People, 32 Colo. 140 408 
 Peek V. Boone, 90 Ga. 767 I73 
 
 Peete v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 
 
 513 427 
 
 Pefferling v. State, 40 Tex. 486 409 
 Peice V. State, 107 Ala. loi 100 
 
 Pence v. State, no Ind. 95 292 
 
 Pendleton's Case, 4 Leigh (Va.) 
 
 694 42s 
 
 Pendrell v. Pendrell, 2 Stra. 925 526 
 
 Pennsylvania v. Bell, Add. (Pa.) 
 
 156 273 
 
 V. M'Fail, Add. (Pa.) 255 273 
 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 
 
 129 Ind. 401 221 
 
 Penrice v. State (Tex.), 105 S. 
 
 W. 797 88, 305 
 
 Penrod v. People, 89 111. 150 316 
 
 Pentecost v. State, 107 Ala. 81 236 
 People v. Abbott, 97 Mich. 484 
 
 237, 415, 418 
 V. Abbot, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 192 417. 418 
 
 V. Acritelli, 57 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 574 74 
 
 V. Adams, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 
 
 190 445 
 
 V. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351 58a, 477 
 V. Ah Choy, i Idaho 317 119 
 
 V. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61 243 
 
 V. Ah Fook, 62 Cal. 493 451 
 
 V. Ah Lean, 7 Cal. App. 626 413 
 V. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85 96, 97 
 
 V. Ah Lee Doon, 97 Cal. 171 85 
 V. Ah Sam, 41 Cal. 645 428 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Ah Sing, 51 Cal. 372 120 
 
 V. Ah Sing, 59 Cal. 400 378 
 
 V. Ah Teung, 92 Cal. 421 465 
 
 V. Ah Woo, 28 Cal. 205 424 
 
 V. Ah Ying, 42 Cal. 18 163 
 
 V. Ah Yute, 54 Cal. 89 124 
 
 V. Aiken, 66 Mich. 460 6, 348, 350 
 
 V. Albers, 137 Mich. 678 Si 
 
 V. Altmau, 147 N. Y. 473 423 
 
 V. Alviso, 55 Cal. 230 7, 189 
 
 V. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531 248 
 
 V. Ammon, 179 N. Y. 540 74 
 
 v. Anderson, 26 Cal. 129 189 
 
 V. Anderson, 39 Cal. 703 324, 325 
 
 V. Anderson, 53 Mich. 60 269 
 
 V. Arensberg, 105 N. Y. 123 481 
 V. Argentos (Cal. 1909), 106 
 
 Pac. 65 87, 323 
 
 V. Argo, 237 111. 173 247 
 
 V. Arlington, 131 Cal. 231 17 
 
 V. Armstrong, 114 Cal. 570 33 
 
 V. Arnold, 116 Cal. 682 61 
 
 V. Arnold, 43 Mich. 303 116 
 
 V. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268 493 
 V. Ashe, 44 Cal. 288 76, 79, 80 
 
 V. Ashmead, 118 Cal. 508 118 
 
 V. Atkinson, 40 Cal. 284 173 
 V. Babcock, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 
 201 435 
 V. Badgley, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 53 74 
 
 V. Bailey, 120 N. Y. S. 618 481 
 
 V. Baird, 104 Cal. 462 87 
 
 V. Baker, 100 Cal. 188 421 
 V. Baker, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 42 250 
 V. Baker, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 567 . 28 
 V. Baker, 96 N. Y. 340 437, 442 
 V. Baldwin, 117 Cal. 244 413, 414 
 
 V. Balkwell, 143 Cal. 259 74 
 
 V. Barker, 114 Cal. 617 74 
 
 V. Barker, 144 Cal. 705 263 
 V. Barker, 60 Mich. 277 
 
 126, 140, 173 
 
 V. Barker, 153 N. Y. in 120 
 
 V. Barney, 114 Cal. 554 409 
 
 V. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342 69 
 
 V. Barry, 94 Cal. 481 373 
 
 V. Barry, 196 N. Y. 507 74
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxvii 
 
 [References at 
 
 People V. Barthleman, 120 Cal. 7 
 
 158, 160, 227 
 V. Bawden, 90 Cal. 195 158 
 
 V. Beach. 87 N. Y. 508 11 1 
 
 V. Beckwith, 108 N. Y. 67 7 
 
 V. Beevers, 99 Cal. 286 398 
 
 V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544 166 
 
 V. Bell, 49 Cal. 485 80, 334 
 
 V. Bemmerly, 87 Cal. 117 104, 112 
 V. Benjamin, 2 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 201 195 
 
 V. Benjamin, 9 How. Pr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 419 176 
 
 V. Bennett, 39 Mich. 208 383 
 
 V. Bennett, 27 N. Y. 117 146 
 
 Y. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137 279 
 
 V. Benoit, 97 Cal. 249 396 
 
 V. Benson, 6 Cal. 221 418 
 
 V. Berini, 94 Cal. 573 281 
 
 V. Bernor, 115 ]\Iich. 692 
 
 212, 342, 409, 416 
 V. Berobuto, 196 N. Y. 293 2-3 
 
 V. Besold, 154 Cal. 363 279 
 
 V. Beverly, 108 Mich. 509 107, 112 
 V. Bezy, 67 Cal. 223 76, 328 
 
 V. Bibby, 91 Cal. 470 423 
 
 V. Bidleman, 104 Cal. 608 
 
 88. 89, 283, 285 
 V. Bill, 10 Johns. (X. Y.) 95 70 
 V. Bishop, 81 Cal. 113 ^2 
 
 V. Bissert, 172 N. Y. 643 69. 124 
 V. Blackwell, 27 Cal. 65 . 222 
 V. Blake, 65 Cal. 275 164, 165 
 
 V. Blakeley, 4 Park Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 176 17s 
 
 V. Blanchard, 90 N. Y. 314 439 
 
 V. Blatt, 121 N. Y. S. 507 80 
 
 V. Block, 15 N. Y. S. 229 299, 372 
 V. Bodine, i Denio (N. Y.) 
 
 281 76 
 
 V. Boggs, 20 Cal. 432 228 
 
 V. Bolanger, 71 Cal. 17 49, 69 
 
 V. Bonier, 189 N. Y. 108 323 
 
 V. Bonifacio, 190 N. Y. 150 120 
 V. Bonney, 19 Cal. 426 229, 230 
 V. Boo Doo Hong, 122 Cal. 
 
 606 23 
 
 V. Boren, 139 Cal. 210 308 
 
 V. Borgetto, 99 Mich. 336 146 
 
 V. Bosquet, 116 Cal. 75 238 
 
 e to Sections.'\ 
 
 People V. Bosworth, 64 Hun (X. 
 Y.) 72 507 
 
 V. Botkin, 9 Cal. App. 244 247, 323 
 V. Bowen, 43 Cal. 439 207 
 
 V. Bowen, 49 Cal. 65 87, 415 
 
 V. Boyd, 151 :Mich. 577 268 
 
 V. Boyle, 116 Cal. 658 360 
 
 V. Bradbury (Cal. 1909), 103 
 
 Pac. 215 467 
 
 V. Bradford (Cal.), 81 Pac. 
 
 712 20s 
 
 V. Bradner, 107 X". Y. i 516 
 
 V. Brandt, 14 N. Y. St. 419 339 
 V. Bransby, 32 X. Y. 525 417 
 
 V. Brasch, 193 X. Y. 46 
 
 86a, 126, 147 
 V. Brecht, 105 X. Y. S. 436 103 
 
 V. Breese, 7 Cow. (X. Y.) 429 35 
 V. Brent (Cal. App. 1909), 106 
 
 Pac. no i5g 
 
 V. Brewer, 27 Alich. 134 
 
 341, 392, 393 
 V. Brickner, 8 X. Y. Cr. 217 26 
 V. Briggs, 60 How. Pr. (X. 
 
 Y.) 17 26, 191 
 
 V. Brigham, 2 Mich. 550 424 
 
 V. Britton, 118 X. Y. S. 989 282 
 V. Brooks, loi Mich. 98 21 
 
 V. Brooks, 131 X. Y. 321 222, 248 
 V. Broughton, 49 Mich. 339 383 
 V. Brow, 90 Hun (X. Y.) 509 
 
 211, 276 
 V. Brower, 7 X. Y. Cr. 292 180 
 
 V. Brown, 46 Cal. 102 270 
 
 V. Brown, 53 Cal. 66 67 
 
 V. Brown, 54 Cal. 243 272 
 
 V. Brown, 53 Mich. 531 411 
 
 V. Brown, 6 Cow. (X. Y.) 41 461 
 V. Brown, 46 Hun (X. Y.) 
 
 320 257 
 
 V. Brown, 71 Hun (X. Y.) 601 
 
 339, 341 
 V. Brown, 72 X. Y. 571 59, 61, 427 
 V. Brown, no App. Div. (X. 
 
 Y.) 490 369 
 
 V. Browne, 118 App. Div. (X. 
 
 Y.) 793 427 
 
 V. Browne, 189 X. Y. 528 269 
 
 V. Bruzzo, 24 Cal. 41 71 
 
 V. Bryon, 103 Cal. 675 458
 
 Ixxxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Payne v. State, 60 Ala. 80 238, 326 
 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 184 378 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 564 103 
 
 Peaden v. State, 46 Fla. 124 236 
 
 Peak V. State, 5 Ga. App. 56 
 
 i6a, 276 
 V. State, 50 N. J. L. 179 103, 105 
 Pearce v. State, 40 Ala. 720 89 
 
 Pearsall v. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 
 L. 222 126, 129 
 
 Pearson v. State, 55 Ga. 659 431 
 
 Pease v. State, 91 Ga. 18 521 
 
 Peat's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 288 189 
 
 Peck V. Parchen, 52 Iowa 46 
 
 V. State, 86 Tenn. 259 
 Peckham v. People, 32 Colo. 140 
 Peek V. Boone, 90 Ga. 767 
 Peete v. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 
 
 513 
 Pefferling v. State, 40 Tex. 486 
 Peice V. State, 107 Ala. loi 
 Pence v. State, no Ind. 95 
 Pendleton's Case, 4 Leigh (Va.) 
 
 694 
 Pendrell v. Pendrell, 2 Stra. 925 
 Pennsylvania v. Bell, Add. (Pa.) 
 156 
 
 V. M'Fail, Add. (Pa.) 25s 
 Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 
 
 129 Ind. 401 221 
 
 Penrice v. State (Tex.), 105 S. 
 
 W. 797 8 
 
 Penrod v. People, 89 111. 150 
 Pentecost v. State, 107 Ala. 81 
 People V. Abbott, 97 Mich. 484 
 
 237, 41S, 418 
 V. Abbot, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 192 417, 418 
 
 V. Acritelli, 57 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 574 74 
 
 V. Adams, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 
 
 43 
 
 66 
 
 408 
 
 173 
 
 427 
 409 
 100 
 292 
 
 425 
 526 
 
 273 
 273 
 
 305 
 316 
 236 
 
 190 
 
 445 
 58a, 477 
 119 
 243 
 
 451 
 
 V. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351 
 
 V. Ah Choy, i Idaho 317 
 
 V. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61 
 
 V. Ah Fook, 62 Cal. 493 
 
 V. Ah Lean, 7 Cal. App. 626 413 
 
 V. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85 96, 97 
 
 V. Ah Lee Doon, 97 Cal. 171 83 
 
 V. Ah Sam, 41 Cal. 645 428 
 
 e to Seetious.] 
 
 People V. Ah Sing, 51 Cal. 372 120 
 V. Ah Sing, 59 Cal. 400 378 
 
 V. Ah Teung, 92 Cal. 421 465 
 
 V. Ah Woo, 28 Cal. 205 424 
 
 V. Ah Ying, 42 Cal. 18 163 
 
 V. Ah Yute, 54 Cal. 89 124 
 
 V. Aiken, 66 Mich. 460 6, 348, 350 
 V. Albers, 137 IMich. 678 81 
 
 V. Altmaa, 147 N. Y. 473 423 
 
 V. Alviso, 55 Cal. 230 7, 1S9 
 
 V. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531 248 
 
 V. Ammon, 179 N. Y. 540 74 
 
 v. Anderson, 26 Cal. 129 189 
 
 V. Anderson, 39 Cal. 703 324, 325 
 V. Anderson, 53 Mich. 60 269 
 
 V. Arensberg, 105 N. Y. 123 481 
 V. Argentos (Cal. 1909), 106 
 
 Pac. 65 87, 323 
 
 V. Argo, 237 111. 173 247 
 
 V. Arlington, 131 Cal. 231 17 
 
 V. Armstrong, 114 Cal. 570 33 
 V. Arnold, 116 Cal. 682 61 
 
 V. Arnold, 43 Mich. 303 116 
 
 V. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268 493 
 
 V. Ashe, 44 Cal. 288 76, 79, 80 
 
 V. Ashmead, 118 Cal. 508 118 
 
 V. Atkinson, 40 Cal. 284 173 
 
 V. Babcock, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 
 201 435 
 
 V. Badgley, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 53 74 
 
 V. Bailey, 120 N. Y. S. 618 481 
 V. Baird, 104 Cal. 462 87 
 
 V. Baker, 100 Cal. 188 421 
 
 V. Baker, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 42 250 
 
 V. Baker, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 567 . 28 
 
 V. Baker, 96 N. Y. 340 437, 442 
 V. Baldwin, 117 Cal. 244 413, 414 
 V. Balkwell, 143 Cal. 259 74 
 V. Barker, 114 Cal. 617 74 
 V. Barker, 144 Cal. 705 263 
 V. Barker, 60 Mich. 277 
 
 126, 140, 173 
 V. Barker, 153 N. Y. in 120 
 V. Barney, 114 Cal. 554 409 
 V. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342 69 
 V. Barry, 94 Cal. 481 373 
 V. Barry, 196 N. Y. 507 74
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Lsxxvii 
 
 [References ar 
 
 People V. Barthleman, 120 Cal. 7 
 
 158, 160, 327 
 V. Bawden, 90 Cal. 195 158 
 
 V. Beach, 87 N. Y. 508 in 
 
 V. Beckwith, 108 N. Y. 67 7 
 
 V. Beevers, 99 Cal. 286 398 
 
 V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544 166 
 
 V. Bell, 49 Cal. 485 ^ 80, 334 
 
 V. Bemmerly, 87 Cal. 117 104, 112 
 V. Benjamin, 2 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 201 195 
 
 V. Benjamin, 9 How. Pr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 419 176 
 
 V. Bennett, 39 Mich. 208 383 
 
 V. Bennett, 37 N. Y. 117 146 
 
 V. Bennett, 49 N. Y. 137 279 
 
 V. Benoit, 97 Cal. 249 396 
 
 V. Benson, 6 Cal. 221 41S 
 
 V. Berini, 94 Cal. 573 281 
 
 V. Bernor, 115 Mich. 692 
 
 212, 342, 409, 416 
 V. Berobnto, 196 N. Y. 293 323 
 
 V. Besold, 154 Cal. 363 279 
 
 V. Beverly, 108 Mich. 509 107. 112 
 V. Bezy, 67 Cal. 223 76, 328 
 
 V. Bibby, 91 Cal. 470 423 
 
 V. Bidleman, 104 Cal. 608 
 
 88, 89, 283, 285 
 V. Bill, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 95 70 
 V. Bishop, 8r Cal. 113 S2 
 
 V. Bissert, 172 N. Y. 643 69, 124 
 V. Blackwell, 27 Cal. 65 . 222 
 V. Blake, 65 Cal. 275 164, 165 
 
 V. Blakeley, 4 Park Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 176 175 
 
 V. Blanchard, 90 N. Y. 314 439 
 
 V. Blatt, 121 N. Y. S. 507 80 
 
 V. Block, 15 N. Y. S. 229 299, 372 
 V. Bodine, i Denio (N. Y.) 
 
 281 76 
 
 V. Boggs, 20 Cal. 432 228 
 
 V. Bolanger, 71 Cal. 17 49, 69 
 
 V. Bonier, 189 N. Y. 108 323 
 
 V. Bonifacio, 190 N. Y. 150 120 
 V. Bonney, 19 Cal. 426 229, 230 
 V. Boo Doo Hong, 122 Cal. 
 
 606 23 
 
 V. Boren, 139 Cal. 210 308 
 
 V. Borgetto, 99 IMich. 336 146 
 
 V. Bosquet, 116 Cal. 75 238 
 
 ■e to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Bosworth, 64 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 72 507 
 
 V. Botkin, 9 Cal. App. 244 247, 323 
 V. Bowen, 43 Cal. 439 207 
 
 V. Bowen, 49 Cal. 65 87, 415 
 
 V. Boyd, 151 Mich. 577 268 
 
 V. Boyle, 116 Cal. 658 360 
 
 V. Bradbury (Cal. 1909), 103 
 
 Pac. 215 467 
 
 V. Bradford (Cal.), 81 Pac. 
 
 712 205 
 
 V. Bradner, 107 N. Y. i 516 
 
 V. Brandt, 14 N. Y. St. 419 339 
 V. Bransby, 32 N. Y. 525 417 
 
 V. Brasch, 193 N. Y. 46 
 
 86a, 126, 147 
 V. Brecht, 105 N. Y. S. 436 103 
 
 V. Breese, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 429 35 
 V. Brent (Cal. App. 1909), 106 
 
 Pac. no 159 
 
 V. Brewer, 27 Mich. 134 
 
 341, 392, 393 
 V. Brickner, 8 N. Y. Cr. 217 26 
 V. Briggs, 60 How. Pr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 17 26, 191 
 
 V. Brigham, 2 ]Mich. 550 424 
 
 V. Britton, 118 N. Y. S. 989 282 
 V. Brooks, loi "Mich. 98 21 
 
 V. Brooks, 131 N. Y. 321 222, 248 
 V. Broughton, 49 ]Mich. 339 383 
 V. Brow, 90 Hun (N. Y.) 509 
 
 211, 276 
 V. Brower, 7 N. Y. Cr. 292 180 
 V. Brown, 46 Cal. 102 270 
 
 V. Brown, 53 Cal. 66 67 
 
 V. Brown, 54 Cal. 243 272 
 
 V. Brown, 53 Mich. 531 411 
 
 V. Brown, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 41 461 
 V. Brown, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 320 257 
 
 V. Brown, 71 Hun (N. Y.) 601 
 
 339. 341 
 V. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571 59, 61, 427 
 V. Brown, no App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 490 369 
 
 V. Browne, n8 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 793 427 
 
 V. Browne, 189 N. Y. 528 269 
 
 V. Bruzzo, 24 Cal. 41 71 
 
 V. Bryon, 103 Cal. 675 458
 
 Ixxxviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [Rcfci-ciiccs ar 
 People V. Buchanan, 145 X. Y. i 
 
 173, 223, 318, 333 
 V. Buckely, 143 Cal. 375 267 
 
 V. Buckland, 13 Wend. (N. 
 
 Y.) 592 45S 
 
 V. Buckley, 91 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 586 464 
 
 V. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 47 50 
 V. Buettner, 233 111. 272 104 
 
 V. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197 
 
 74, 453, 454, 494 
 V. Burke, 11 Wend. (N. Y. 129 298 
 V. Burnham, 119 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 302 291, 292, 293 
 
 V. Burns, 121 Cal. 529 6 
 
 V. Burns, 67 Mich. 537 225 
 
 V. Burridge, 99 Mich. 343 370 
 
 V. Burt, 51 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 
 106 132 
 
 Burt, 170 N. Y. 560 55 
 
 Bush, 68 Cal. 623 230 
 
 Bush, 71 Cal. 602 230, 231 
 
 Bushton, 80 Cal. 160 235 
 
 Butler, 55 Mich. 408 238 
 
 Butler, III Mich. 483 132 
 
 Butler, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 347 5o8 
 Cahill (Cal. App. 1909), 
 
 106 Pac. 115 88 
 
 Cahill, 103 N. Y. 232 470 
 
 Cain, 7 Cal. App. 163 305 
 
 Caldwell, 107 Mich. 374 
 
 212, 276 
 Callaghan, 4 Utah 49 103, 112 
 Calvert, 22 N. Y. S. 220 
 
 371, 377 
 Campbell, 16 Det. Leg. N. 
 
 1082 422 
 
 Carey, 125 Mich. 535 55 
 
 Carlin, 194 N. Y. 448 160 
 
 Carlson, 17 Det. Leg. N. 
 
 120, 125 N. W. 361 352 
 
 Carlton, 57 Cal. 559 511 
 
 Carney, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 47 525 
 Carolan, 71 Cal. 195 210, 246 
 Carpenter, 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 580 185 
 
 Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238 
 
 154- 302 
 Carr, 64 ]\Iich. 702 245 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 People V. Carrier, 46 Mich. 442 
 
 339, 341, 343 
 V. Carroll, 54 Mich. 334 378 
 
 V. Carson, 155 Cal. 164 494 
 
 V. Carvelto, 123 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 822 484 
 
 V. Caryl, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 547 428, 429 
 
 V. Cascone, 185 N. Y. 317 61, 246 
 V. Casey, 65 Cal. 260 277 
 
 V. Casey, 72 N. Y. 393 61, 245 
 
 V. Cassidy, 133 N. Y. 612 
 
 126, 147a, 369 
 V. Caton, 25 Mich. 388 422 
 
 V. Cease, 80 Mich. 576 396 
 
 V. Cesena, 90 Cal. 381 517, 522 
 V. Chadwick, 4 Cal. App. 63 467 
 V. Chadwick, 2 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 163 428 
 
 V. Chadwick, 7 Utah 134 69 
 
 V. Chapleau, 121 N. Y. 266 242 
 V. Chase, 27 Hun (N. Y.) 256 
 
 398, 405 
 V. Chase, 79 Hun (N. Y.) 296 
 
 104, 105 
 V. Childs, 90 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 58 86a 
 
 V. Chegaray, 18 Wend. (N. 
 
 Y.) 637 185 
 
 V. Ching, 74 Cal. 389 240 
 
 V. Chin Hane, 108 Cal. 597 
 
 121, 238 
 V. Chin Mook Sow, 51 Cal. 
 
 597 102, no 
 
 V. Christensen, 85 Cal. 568 237 
 
 V. Chrones, 141 Cal. xviii 439 
 
 V. Chung, 54 Cal. 398 14 
 
 V. Chung Ah Chue, 57 Cal. 567 267 
 V. Church, 116 Cal. 300 358 
 
 V. Cipperly, loi N. Y. 634 481 
 
 V. Clark, 151 Cal. 200 161 
 
 V. Clark, 33 Mich. 112 
 
 387, 388, 389, 392, 393, 412 
 V. Clark. 14 N. Y. S. 642 453 
 
 Clark. 102 N. Y. 735 61 
 
 Clarkson, 56 Mich. 164 432 
 
 Claudius, 8 Cal. App. 597 343 
 Clements, 5 N. Y. Cr. 282 453 
 Cleveland, 107 Alich. 367 
 
 118, 119
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Ixxxix 
 
 [References ai 
 
 People V. Cline, 74 Cal. 575 378 
 
 V. Clough, 73 Cal. 348 74 
 
 V. Cobler, 108 Cal. 538 281, 285 
 V. Cochran, 61 Cal. 548 228 
 
 V. Coffman, 59 ]Mich. i 40 
 
 V. Cokahnour, 120 Cal. 253 132 
 
 V. Colbath, 141 Mich. 189 342 
 
 V. Cole, 54 Mich. 238 298 
 
 V. Cole, 113 Mich. 83 523, 533 
 
 V. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508 203, 220 
 
 V. Collins, 9 Cal. App. 622 419 
 
 V. Collins, 64 Cal. 293 492 
 
 V. Collison, 85 Alich. 105 279 
 
 V. Collun^, 122 Cal. 186 68 
 
 V. Colmey, 188 N. Y. 573 118 
 
 V. Compton, 123 Cal. 403 69, 74 
 V. Compton, i Duer (N. Y. 
 
 Super.) 512 461 
 
 V. Conkling, iii Cal. 616 228 
 
 V. Conley, 106 Mich. 424 354 
 
 V. Conlin, 13 ^lisc. (N. Y.) 
 
 303 499 
 
 V. Connelly (Cal.), 38 Pac. 42 283 
 V. Connor, 142 N. Y. 130 196 
 
 V. Conroy. 97 N. Y. 62 116, 161 
 V. Considine, 105 Mich. 149 268 
 V. Constantino, 153 N. Y. 24 227 
 V. Cook, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 67 
 
 440, 441, 443 
 V. Cook. 45 Hun (N. Y.) 34 515 
 V. Coombs, 158 N. Y. 532 58a 
 
 V. Copsey, 71 Cal. 548 201 
 
 V. Corbin, 56 N. Y. 363 87, 423 
 V. Corrigan, 129 App. Div. 
 
 (N. Y.) 75 422 
 
 V. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. i 467 
 
 V. Costello, I Denio (N. Y.) 
 
 83 73 
 
 V. Coughlin, 65 ]\Iich. 704 
 
 17. 23, 338 
 V. Courier, 79 Mich. 366 416 
 
 V. Cowgill, 93 Cal. 596 77, 276 
 
 V. Coyne, 116 Cal. 295 309 
 
 V. Craig, in Cal. 460 205, 321, 328 
 V. Craig, 195 N. Y. 190 507, 510 
 V. Cramer, 5 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 171 197 
 
 V. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288 60 
 
 V. Crawford, 133 N. Y. 535 
 
 402, 404 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 People V. Creegan, 121 Cal. 554 
 
 75, 429 
 V. Cronin, 34 Cal. 191 6, 58 
 
 V. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427 
 
 407, 408, 417 
 V. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. (N. 
 
 Y.) 337 273, 361 
 
 V. Crowley, 102 N. Y. 234 58, 416 
 V. Cuff, 122 Cal. 580 116, 319 
 
 V. Cummins, 47 Mich. 334 166 
 
 V. Cunningham, 6 Park 
 
 (N. Y.) 398 
 V. Curley, 99 Mich. 238 
 V. Curtis, 97 ]\Iich. 489 
 V. Curtiss, 118 App. Div. 
 
 Y.) 259 
 
 V. Cutler, 28 Hun (N. Y.) 465 473 
 V. Dailey, 143 N. Y. 638 
 V. Daniels (Cal.), 34 Pac. 233 
 V. Daniels, 105 Cal. 262 
 V. D'Argencour, 18 N, 
 
 Wkly. Dig. 532 
 V. Darr, 3 Cal. App. 50 
 V. Davis, 61 Cal. 536 
 V. Davis, 52 Mich. 569 
 V. Davis, 21 Wend. (N. 
 
 309 
 V. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95 
 V. Deacons, 109 N. Y. 374 
 
 126, 147, 334 
 V. Dean, 58 Hun (N. Y.) 610 295 
 V. De Camp, 146 Mich. 533 61 
 
 V. DeFore, 64 ]Mich. 693 
 
 17, 385, 387 
 V. DeGarmo, 179 N. Y. 130 65 
 
 V. DeLay. 80 Cal. 52 282 
 
 V. Deluce, 237 111. 541 300 
 
 V. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470 
 
 50, 95, 97, 103, no, 314 
 V. Demasters, 109 Cal. 607 
 
 359, 516, 522 
 V. Demousset, 71 Cal. 611 339, 341 
 V. Diaz, 6 Cal. 248, 271, 272 
 
 V. Dice, 120 Cal. 189 329, 330a 
 
 V. Dietz, 86 Mich. 419, 357 
 
 V. Dimick, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 616 
 V. Dinser, 49 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 82 
 V. DiRyana, 8 Cal. App. 333 
 
 Cr. 
 
 18 
 21, 35 
 23 
 (N. 
 
 no 
 
 6 
 
 279 
 
 Y. 
 
 428 
 
 222, 223 
 
 468 
 
 171 
 
 Y.) 
 
 428, 432 
 31, 106 
 
 440 
 
 333 
 
 430
 
 xc 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 1 89, 
 
 42, 
 421, 
 
 (N. 
 
 People V. Dixon, 94 Cal. 255 
 V. Dohring, 59 N. Y. 374 
 V. Dolan, 96 Cal. 315 
 V. Dolan, 186 N. Y. 4 
 V. Dole, 122 Cal. 486 
 V. Donaldson, 70 Cal. 116 
 V. Donnelly, 2 Park Cr. 
 
 Y.) 182 
 V. Donnolly, 143 Cal. 394 
 V. Donohue, 84 N. Y. 438 
 V. Dorthy, 156 N. Y. 347 
 V. Dowdigan, 67 Mich. 95 
 V. Dowling, 84 N. Y. 478 
 
 87, 301, 
 V. Downs, 123 N. Y. 558 154, 
 V. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85 
 V. Doyle (Fla.), 22 So. 272 
 V. Doyle, 58 Hun (N. Y.) 535 
 
 67, 
 V. Driscoll, 107 N. Y. 414 
 V. Droste (Mich. 1910), 125 N. 
 
 W. 87 
 V. Drum, 127 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 241 
 V. Druse, 103 N. Y. 655 129, 
 V. Dudenhausen, 115 N. Y. S. 
 
 374 
 V. Dumar, 106 N. Y. 502 
 V. Duncan, 104 Mich. 460 
 V. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179 
 
 50, 213, 
 V. Dye, 75 Cal. 108 
 V. Dyle, 21 N. Y. 578 
 V. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562 
 V. Eaton, 59 Mich. 559 
 V. Eaton, 122 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 706 
 V. Eckert, 2 N. Y. Cr. 470 
 V. Eckman, 72 Cal. 582 
 V. Eckman, 63 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 209 
 V. Eddy, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 615 
 V. Edwards (Cal.), 73 Pac. 
 
 416 
 V. Edwards, 41 Cal. 640 
 V. Edwards, 59 Cal. 359 
 V. Egnor, 175 N. Y. 419 
 V. Eldridge, 3 Cal. App. 648 
 V. Ellenbogen, 186 N. Y. 603 
 38, 74, 80, 
 
 121 
 
 417 
 34-^ 
 
 423 
 429 
 
 444 
 
 70 
 494 
 499 
 
 61 
 227 
 
 305 
 338 
 241 
 414 
 
 292 
 314 
 
 323 
 
 482 
 
 325 
 
 90 
 
 305 
 i6a 
 
 73 
 167 
 368 
 
 74 
 61 
 83 
 
 482 
 481 
 
 220 
 324 
 373 
 158 
 147 
 
 470 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Elliot, 80 Cal. 296 23 
 
 V. Elliot, 106 N. Y. 288 73 
 
 V. Elliot, 163 N. Y. II 79 
 
 V. Elmer, 109 Mich. 493 279 
 
 V. Elpliis, 139 Cal. xix 422 
 
 V. Emerson, 7 N. Y. Cr. 97 32 
 V. Emmons, 7 Cal. App. 685 
 
 4S4> 494 
 V. Eppinger, 114 Cal. 350 519 
 
 V. Estrado, 49 Cal. 171 119a 
 
 V. Etting, 99 Cal. 577 21, 35 
 
 V. Evans (Cal.), 41 Pac. 444 
 
 116, 328 
 V. Evans, 72 Mich. 367 414 
 
 V. Everett, 242 111. 628 378 
 
 V. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 591 
 
 75, 89, 200, 423 
 V. Fair, 43 Cal. 137 77, 78 
 
 V. Fairchild, 48 Mich. 31 366 
 
 V. Eallon, 149 Cal. 287 147 
 
 V. Fancher, 2 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 226 29, 226 
 
 V. Fanning, 131 N. Y. 659 147, 276 
 V. Farina, 118 N. Y. S. 817 414 
 V. Farmer, 77 Cal. i iii 
 
 V. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 251 154 
 
 V. Farrell, 30 Cal. 316 433 
 
 V. Farrell, 31 Cal. 576 59 
 
 V. Farrington, 140 Cal. 656 
 
 136, 301 
 V. Feilen, 58 Cal. 218 19 
 
 V. Feinberg, 237 111. 348 73, 238 
 V. Ferguson, 119 Mich. 373 308 
 V. Few, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 290 461 
 V. Fice, 97 Cal. 459 
 V. Fine, 77 Cal. 147 
 V. Finley, 38 Mich. 483 
 V. Finnegan, i Park. Cr. 147 
 V. Fiori, 123 App. Div. (N 
 
 Y.) 174 
 V. Fish, 125 N. Y. 136 
 V. Fishman, 119 N. Y. S. 89 
 V. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253 
 
 86, 282, 369 
 V. Fitzpatrick, 5 Park Cr. 26 185 
 V. Flaherty, 79 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 48 
 V. Fleming, 60 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 576 294 
 
 V. Flock, 100 Mich. 512 291 
 
 518 
 119 
 
 12 
 275 
 
 127 
 312 
 196 
 
 418
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 ZCl 
 
 [References ar 
 
 People V. Flynn, 73 Cal. 511 277 
 
 V. Foley, 64 Mich. 148 66, 88, 321 
 V. Pong Ah Sing, 64 Cal. 253 
 
 109, 152 
 V. Pong Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8 
 
 106, III, 2TI 
 
 V. Pong Ching, 78 Cal. 169 17, 83 
 V. Pong Chung, 5 Cal. App. 587 
 
 271, 411, 413 
 V. Poo, 112 Cal. 17 
 V. Poote, 93 Mich. 38 
 V. Pournier (Cal.), 47 
 
 1014 
 V. Formosa, 61 Hnn 272 
 V. Fowler, 104 Mich. 449 
 V. Pox, 121 N. Y. 449 
 V. Francis, 38 Cal. 183 
 V. Frank, 28 Cal. 507 
 V. Prankenberg, 236 111. 408 
 V. Freeman, 92 Cal. 3S9 
 V. Prindel, 58 Hun '(N. Y.) 
 
 482 205, 
 
 V. Frost (N. Y. 1910), 91 N. 
 
 E. 376 
 V. Pultz, 109 Cal. 258 
 V. Gage, 62 Mich. 271 
 V. Gaimari, 176 N. Y. 84 325, 328 
 V. Gallagher, 75 Mich. 512 
 
 64, 132, 176 
 V. Galland, 55 ]\lich. 628 2S2 
 
 V. Galloway, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 54c 430, 44 T 
 
 V. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9 
 
 76, 160, 164, 324 
 V. Garcia, 63 Cal. 19 104 
 
 V. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119 
 
 53, 54, 5?a 
 V. Garnett, 9 Cal. App. 194 267 
 V. Garrahan, 19 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 347 
 V. Gartland, 30 App. Div. (X. 
 
 Y.) 534 
 V. Gates, 46 Cal. 52 
 V. Gates, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 3ir 
 V. Gault, 104 Mich. 575 
 V. Gelabert, 39 Cal. 663 
 V. German, no Mirh. 244 
 V. Gctchell, 6 Mich. 496 
 V. Giancoli, 74 Cal. 642 
 
 60 
 61 
 Pac. 
 
 369 
 228 
 
 87 
 
 126, 127 
 
 156 
 
 423 
 
 292 
 
 517 
 
 357 
 
 391 
 185, 415 
 409, 411 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Gibbons, 43 Cal. 557 132 
 
 V. Gibbs, 98 Cal. 66r 437, 442 
 V. Gibbs, 70 Mich. 42=; 
 
 385, 388, 389 
 
 V. Gibbs, 93 N. Y. 470 87 
 
 V. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196 245 
 
 V. Gibson, 106 CaJ. 458 312 
 
 V. Gibson, 58 Mich. 368 151 
 V. Gilhooley, 187 N. Y. 551 
 
 262, 468 
 
 145, 212 
 222 
 
 438 
 384 
 
 178 
 
 197 
 
 147a 
 
 466 
 
 437 
 117, iiR 
 
 V. Gillespie, in Mich. 241 
 
 V. Gillis, 97 Cal. 542 
 
 V. Girdler, 65 Mich. 68 381 
 
 V. Giro (N. Y. 1910), 90 N. E. 
 
 432 133 
 
 V. Glassman, 12 Utah 238 364 
 
 V. Gleason, 122 Cal. 370 86a 
 
 V. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32 in, 112 
 
 V. Glover. 141 Cal. 233 103 
 
 V. Glover, 71 Mich. 303 
 
 409, 411, 413, 418 
 v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328 
 
 25, 54, 222 
 v. Gonzalez, 6 Cal. App. 255 411 
 v. Gonzalez, 35 N. Y. 49 334 
 
 v. Gordon, 100 Mich. 518 185 
 
 v. Gosch, 82 Mich. 22 247 
 
 v. Gould, 70 Mich. 240 391 
 
 V. Goulette, 82 Mich. 36 408 
 
 v. Governale, 193 N. Y. 581 87, 90 
 V. Grabutt, 17 Mich. 9 83 
 
 V. Graney, 91 Mich. 646 17 
 
 v. Grauer, 12 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 464 418 
 
 V. Gray, 66 Cal. 271 283 
 
 v. Green, 99 Cal. 564 200 
 
 V. Green, i Denio (N. Y.) 
 
 614 185 
 
 V. Greenwall, 108 N. Y. 296 
 
 241, 376 
 V. Gregory, 120 Cal. 16 489, 492 
 V. Gress, 107 Cal. 461 330 
 
 V. Griffin, 77 Mich. 585 377 
 
 V. Griffin, 38 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 475 298 
 
 V. Grill, 151 Cal. 592 50, 51, 268 
 V. Gnidici, 100 N. Y. 503 120 
 
 V. Gumaer, 4 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 412 387
 
 XCll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 People V. Gutierrez, 74 Cal. Si 511 
 V. Hagan, 14 N. Y. S. 233 zil 
 V. Hagenow, 236 111. 514 
 
 89, 90, 312, 345. 349, 330 
 V. Haines, i N. Y. S. 55 27 
 
 V. Hall, 94 Cal. 595 106 
 
 V. Hall, 48 Mich. 482 246, 280 
 
 V. Hallam, 6 Cal. App. 331 358 
 
 V. Hamberg, 84 Cal. 468 196 
 
 V. Hammond, 132 IMich. 422 451 
 V. Hancock, 7 Utah 170 3 
 
 V. Handley, 100 Cal. 370 366 
 
 V. Handley, 93 Mich. 46 367 
 
 V. Harben, 5 Cal. App. 29 423 
 
 V. Hare, 57 Mich. 505 150, I53 
 
 V. Harriden, i Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 344 395 
 
 V. Harris, 29 Cal. 678 166 
 
 V. Harris, 114 Cal. 575 147 
 
 V. Harris, 95 Mich. 87 324 
 
 V. Harris, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 
 
 150 256 
 
 V. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423. 429 
 
 5, 6, 90, 180 
 V. Harrison, 93 IMich. 594 237 
 
 V. Hartman, 103 Cal. 242 418 
 
 V. Harty, 49 Mich. 490 523 
 
 V. Haver, 4 N. Y. Cr. 171 88 
 
 V. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648 276, 330 
 V. Hawkins, 106 IMich. 479 283 
 V. Hawks, 107 Mich. 249 527 
 
 V. Hawley, 11 1 Cal. 7B 229 
 
 V. Haxer, 144 Mich. 575 120, 314 
 V. Haves, 9 Cal. App. 301 330 
 
 V. Hayes, 70 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 I I I 468 
 
 V. Haynes, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 546 442 
 
 V. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451 ZIZ 
 
 V. Hemple, 4 Cal. App. 120 281 
 V. Hendrickson, 53 Mich. 525 381 
 V. Hendrickson. 18 App. Div. 
 
 (N. Y.) 404 292 
 
 V. Hennsler, 48 Mich. 49 
 
 89, 438, 440 
 V. Henrv, 127 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 489 5T9 
 
 V. Herrick, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 87 437, 442 
 
 V. Hess, 85 Jvlich. 128 687 
 
 [Rcfcraiccs are to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Hess, 8 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 143 174 
 
 V. Hickey, 109 Cal. 275 360 
 
 V. Hickman, 113 Cal. 80 125, 137 
 V. Hicks, 98 Mich. 86 357 
 
 V. Hill, 116 Cal. 562 312 
 
 V. Hill, 198 N. Y. 64 321 
 
 V. Hill (X. Y.), 87 N. E. 813 163 
 V. Hillhouse, 80 IMich. 580 
 
 123, 222 
 V. Hiltel, 131 Cal. 577 6 
 
 V. Hitchcock, 104 Cal. 482 58 
 
 V. Hodgdon, 55 Cal. 72 102, 103 
 V. Hodge, 141 Mich. 312 345 
 
 V. Hodnett, 68 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 341 481 
 
 V. Hogan, 117 La. 863 136 
 
 V. Hoin, 62 Cal. 120 154 
 
 V. Holbrook, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 
 90 
 
 296 
 
 V. Holden, 127 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 758 69 
 
 v. Holfelder, 5 N. Y. Cr. 179 124 
 V. Holmes, in Mich. 364 157 
 
 V. Hong Quin Moon, 92 Cal. 
 
 41 522 
 
 V. Hooghkerk, 96 N. Y. 149 61 
 V. Hope, 62 Cal. 291 233, 375, 379 
 V. Hopson, I Denio (N. Y.) 
 
 574 446 
 
 V. Horr, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 9 
 
 309, 311 
 V. Horton, 7 Cal. App. 34 300 
 
 V. Hosier, 196 N. Y. 506 87 
 
 V. Hossler, 135 IMich. 384 122 
 
 V. Houghton, 24 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 501 185 
 
 V. Hovev, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 382 185 
 
 V. Hovev. 30 Hun (N. Y.) 354 5^6 
 v. Howell, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 
 296 420 
 
 V. Howes, 81 IMich. 396 126 
 
 V. Hoy Yen, 34 Cal. 176 138 
 
 V. Huggins, no App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 613 439 
 
 V. Hughes, 41 Cal. 234 33 
 
 V. Hughes, 91 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 354 305 
 
 V. Hughes, 137 N. Y. 29 72
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XClll 
 
 [References ai 
 
 People V. Hughes, ii Utah lOO 3S^ 
 V. Hulbut, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 133 
 
 26, 191 
 V. Hull, 86 Mich. 449 215, 230 
 
 V. Humphrey, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 
 3i4_ 404 
 
 V. Huntington, 8 Cal. App. 612 99 
 V. Hurley, 60 Cal. 74 
 
 3od, 301, 302 
 V. Hurst, 62 Mich. 276 282 
 
 V. Husband, 36 INIich. 306 292 
 
 V. Hutchings (Cal.), 97 Pac. 
 
 325 297 
 
 V. Hutchings, 8 Cal. App. 550 136 
 V. Hutchings, 137 Mich. 527 429 
 V. Hyler, 2 Park. Cr. 570 228 
 
 V. lines, no Mich. 250 383 
 
 V. Irwin, 77 Cal. 494 492 
 
 V. Isham, 109 Mich. 72 383 
 
 V. Ivey, 49 Cal. 56 275 
 
 V. Jackman, 96 Mich. 269 365 
 
 V. Jackson, 6 N. Y. Cr. 393 418 
 V. Jackson, 47 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 60 451 
 
 V. Jackson, in N. Y. 362 32, 51 
 V. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66 116 
 
 V. Jacobs, 29 Cal. 579 353 
 
 V. Jacobs, 49 Cal. 384 235 
 
 V. James, 5 Cal. App. 427 163 
 
 V. James, no Cal. 155 33 
 
 V. Jan John, 144 Cal. 284 137 
 
 V. Jeina, 125 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 
 697 90 
 
 V. Jenness, 5 IMich. 305 
 
 92, 381, 395 
 V. Jim Ti, 32 Cal. 60 130 
 
 V. Johnson (Cal. App.), 98 
 
 Pac. 682 i8s 
 
 V. Johnson, 57 Cal. 571 61 
 
 V. Johnson, 91 Cal. 265 282 
 
 V. Johnson, 106 Cal. 289 418 
 
 V. Johnson, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 
 292 435 
 
 V. Johnson, T40 N. Y. 350 12. 52 
 V. Johnson, 185 X. Y. 219 329 
 
 V. Jones (Cal.), 8 Pac. 611 517 
 V. Jones, 123 Cal. 65 7, 147, 369 
 V. Jones, 195 N. Y. 547 482 
 
 V. Jones, 106 N. Y. 523 45, 427 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 
 
 People V. Jones, 129 App. Div. 
 
 
 (N. Y.) 772 
 
 482 
 
 V. -Jones, 115 N. Y. S. 800 
 
 516 
 
 V. Jordan, 66 Cal. 10 
 
 435 
 
 V. Jordan, 125 App. Div. (N. 
 
 
 Y.) 522 
 
 512 
 
 V. Josephs, 7 Cal. 129 
 
 77 
 
 V. Josselyn, 39 Cal. 393 
 
 346 
 
 V. Judson, II Daly (N. Y.) i 
 
 489 
 
 V. Kamaunu, no Cal. 609 
 
 36 
 
 V. Kaminskv, 73 Mich. 637 
 
 532 
 
 V. Kane, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 
 15 
 
 387 
 
 V. Kane, 142 N. Y. 366 
 
 309 
 
 v. Keefer, 103 Mich. 83 
 
 532 
 
 V. Kehoe, 19 N. Y. 763 
 
 298 
 
 V. Keith, 141 Cal. 686 411, 
 
 414 
 
 V. Kelley, 47 Cal. 125 65, 131 
 
 V. Kelly, II App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 
 495 369 
 
 V. Kellv, 24 N. Y. 74 29, 226, 247 
 V. Kelly, 35 Hun (X. Y.) 295 
 
 149, 153 
 V. Kemmler, 119 N. Y. 580 181 
 V. Kendall, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 399 21, 437 
 
 V. Kent, 41 Misc. (N. Y.) 191 
 
 131, 136 
 V. Kerr, 6 X. Y. S. 67 80 
 
 V. Kibler, 106 X. Y. 321 479 
 
 V. King, 4 Cal. App. 213 378 
 
 V. King, 28 Cal. 265 27 
 
 V. Kirk, 151 Mich. 253 357 
 
 V. Kirwan, 22 X. Y. 160 417 
 
 V. Knapp, 71 Cal. i 48 
 
 V. Knight (Cal.), 43 Pac. 6 
 
 221, 411, 414, 418 
 V. Koehler, 146 111. App. 541 514 
 V. Koerner, 154 X. Y. 355 
 
 124, 160, 224 
 V. Koerner, 191 X. Y. 528 159, 163 
 V. Kohler, 5 Cal. 72 232 
 
 V. Koller, 142 Cal. 621 395 
 
 V. K9ster, 121 App. Div. (X. 
 
 Y.) 852 481 
 
 V. Kraft, 91 Hun (X. Y.) 474 
 
 103, 104 
 V. Kraft, 148 X. Y. 631 102. no 
 V. Krummer, 4 Park. Cr. (X. 
 
 Y.) 217 422, 427
 
 XCIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Krusick, 93 Cal. 74 391 
 V. Kunz, 76 Hun (N. Y.) 610 414 
 V. Kurtz, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 335 126 
 
 V. Lagrille, i Wheel. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 412 _ 432 
 
 V. Lagroppo, 90 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 219 
 Laird, 102 Mich. 135 
 Lake, 12 N. Y. 358 
 Lake, no N. Y. 61 
 Lamb, 2 Keyes (N 
 
 360 
 Lambert, 120 Cal. 170 
 Lampson, 70 Cal. 204 
 La Munion, 64 Mich. 709 
 
 151, 152 
 Landiero, 192 N. Y. 304 
 
 517, S18 
 Lane, 100 Cal. 379 
 Lane, loi Cal. 513 
 Lane, 49 Mich. 340 
 Lane, i N. Y. Cr. 548 
 Lane, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 13 
 
 516, 522 
 Lang, 104 Cal. 363 
 Lang, 142 Cal. 482 
 Lange, 90 Mich. 454 
 Langtree, 64 Cal. 256 
 Lapique, 120 Cal. 25 
 Lattimer, 86 Cal. 403 
 Laverty, 9 Cal. App. 756 366 
 Lawrence, 21 Cal. 368 in 
 
 Leavens (Cal. App. 1909), 
 
 106 Pac. 1 103 437, 439 
 
 315 
 171 
 163 
 397 
 
 Y.) 
 
 324 
 
 409, 411 
 270 
 
 166 
 179, 180 
 
 147 
 519, 520 
 
 277 
 
 377 
 
 211 
 
 72, 188 
 
 282 
 
 153, 369 
 
 Ledwon, 153 N. Y. 10 
 
 Lee, I Cal. App. 169 
 
 Lee, 49 Cal. 37 
 
 Lee Ah Chuck, 66 Cal. 662 222 
 
 Lee Chuck, 74 Cal. 30 326 
 
 Lee Duck Lung, 129 Cal 
 
 491 
 Lee Gam, 69 Cal. 552 
 Lee Sare Bo, 72 Cal. 623 
 
 105, 152 
 Leighton, i N. Y. Crim. 468 522 
 Lem You, 97 Cal. 224 267 
 
 Lennox, 67 Cal. 113 144 
 
 Lennox, 106 Mich. 625 437 
 
 Lenon, 79 Cal. 625 415 
 
 279 
 330 
 254 
 
 82 
 153 
 
 People V. Leonardin, 143 N. Y 
 
 
 36c 
 
 ) 
 
 164 
 
 V. 
 
 Lepper, 51 Mich. 196 
 
 144 
 
 V. 
 
 Levin, 119 App. Div. (N 
 
 
 
 Y.) 233 
 
 438 
 
 V. 
 
 Levine, 85 Cal. 39 
 
 233 
 
 V. 
 
 Levy, 71 Cal. 618 
 
 161 
 
 V. 
 
 Lewandowski, 143 Cal. 574 
 
 263 
 
 V. 
 
 Lewis, 64 Cal. 401 507 
 
 5," 
 
 V. 
 
 Lewis, 51 Mich. 172 
 
 144 
 
 V. 
 
 Lewis, 16 N. Y. S. 881 
 
 124 
 
 V. 
 
 Lewis, 136 N. Y. 633 
 
 187 
 
 V. 
 
 Leyba, 74 Cal. 407 
 
 356 
 
 V. 
 
 Leyshon, 108 Cal. 440 
 
 271 
 
 V. 
 
 Lilley, 43 Mich. 521 
 
 353 
 
 V. 
 
 Linares, 142 Cal. 17 
 
 17 
 
 V. 
 
 Liphardt, 105 ]\Iich. 80 
 
 453 
 
 V. 
 
 Long, 7 Cal. App. 27 122, 
 
 124 
 
 V. 
 
 Loris, 115 N. Y. S. 236 
 
 280a 
 
 V. 
 
 Loui Tung, 90 Cal. 377 
 
 521 
 
 V. 
 
 Lowrey, 70 Cal. 193 
 
 230 
 
 V. 
 
 Lowrie, 4 Cal. App. 137 371 
 
 375 
 
 V. 
 
 Luby, 99 Mich. 89 
 
 144 
 
 V. 
 
 Lynch, loi Cal. 229 
 
 326 
 
 V. 
 
 Lyons, 51 Mich. 215 
 
 248 
 
 V. 
 
 McArdle, 5 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 
 
 Y.) 180 
 
 392 
 
 V. 
 
 Mc.Arron, 121 Mich, i 
 
 79 
 
 V. 
 
 McBride, 120 Mich. 166 96, 
 
 290 
 
 V. 
 
 McCallam, 103 N. Y. 587 
 
 137 
 
 V. 
 
 McCamm, 16 N. Y. 58 
 
 
 
 12, 157, 
 
 158 
 
 V. 
 
 McCarthy, 115 Cal. 255 
 
 157 
 
 V. 
 
 McCarthy, 45 How. Pr. (N. 
 
 
 
 Y.) 97 
 
 507 
 
 V. 
 
 McConnell, 146 111. 532 
 
 267 
 
 V. 
 
 McCord, 76 Mich. 200 
 
 373 
 
 V. 
 
 McCormick, 135 N. Y. 663 
 
 61 
 
 V. 
 
 McCraney, 6 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 
 
 Y.) 49 
 
 189 
 
 V. 
 
 McCrea, 32 Cal. 98 122, 
 
 124 
 
 V. 
 
 McCrory, 41 Cal. 458 144, 
 
 270 
 
 V. 
 
 McCue, 87 App. Div. (N. 
 
 
 
 Y.) 72 
 
 122 
 
 V. 
 
 McCurdy, 68 Cal. 576 337, 
 
 517 
 
 V. 
 
 McDonald (Cal.), 45 Pac. 
 
 
 
 1005 
 
 358 
 
 V. 
 
 McDonald, 9 Mich. 150 
 
 408 
 
 V. 
 
 McDonnell, 80 Cal. 285 
 
 432 
 
 V. 
 
 McDowell, 71 Cal. 194 
 
 363
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XCV 
 
 [References ar 
 
 People V. McDowell, 63 ]Mich. 
 229 344 
 
 V. McElroy, 14 N. Y. S. 203 358 
 V. McElvaine, 125 N. Y. 596 
 
 158, 163 
 V. McGarry, 136 Mich. 316 
 
 225, 451, 454 
 V. McGintv, 24 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 62 358 
 
 V. McGlade, 139 Cal. 66 430 
 
 V. McGloin, 91 N. Y. 241 
 
 131, 132, 13s, 140 
 V. McGonegal, 42 N. Y. St. 
 
 307 346 
 
 V. AIcGonegal, 136 N. Y. 62 350 
 V. McGregar, 88 Cal. 140 36, 37 
 V. McGuire, 135 N. Y. 639 
 V. McGungill, 41 Cal. 429 
 V. McKane, 143 N. Y. 455 
 
 77, 78, 492 
 V. McKenzie, 6 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 199 
 V. McKeon, 19 N. Y. S. 486 
 V. McLane, 60 Cal. 412 
 V. McLaughlin, 44 Cal. 435 
 V. McLaughlin, 2 App. Div 
 
 (N. Y.) 419 
 V. McLean, 71 Mich. 309 
 V. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 384 
 
 126, 131, 132, 135, 138 
 V. McNair, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 608 232 
 
 V. McNamara, 94 Cal. 509 18, 223 
 V. McXutt, 64 Cal. 116 376 
 
 V. ]McQuade, ito N. Y. 284 492 
 V. McQuaid, 85 Mich. 123 403 
 
 V. McSweeny (Cal.), 38 Pac. 
 
 743 83 
 
 V. iMcWhortcr, 93 Mich. 641 23 
 V. McWhorter, 4 Barb. (N. 
 
 Y.) 438 68 
 
 V. Macard, 73 ]\Iich. 15 18 
 
 V. Macard, 109 Mich. 623 
 
 467, 469, 470 
 V. Machen, loi Mich. 400 225 
 
 V. MacKinder, 80 -Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 40 1.30, 358 
 
 V. Mahaney, 41 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 26 480 
 
 V. Mahon, i Utah 205 175 
 
 62 
 
 353 
 118 
 
 245 
 145 
 
 456 
 418 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 
 
 
 People V. Mahoney, yy Cal. 529 
 
 228 
 
 V. 
 
 Main, 114 Cal. 632 
 
 
 33 
 
 V. 
 
 Majoine, 144 Cal. 303 
 
 
 223 
 
 V. 
 
 Malaspina, 57 Cal. 628 
 
 
 153 
 
 V. 
 
 jMallon, 116 App. Div. 425 
 
 
 
 
 238, 
 
 248 
 
 V. 
 
 Manahan, 32 Cal. 68 
 
 
 415 
 
 V. 
 
 Manasse, 153 Cal. 10 
 
 
 
 
 61, 62, 
 
 123, 
 
 222 
 
 V. 
 
 Manning, 48 Cal. 335 
 
 
 36 
 
 V. 
 
 Manoogian, 141 Cal. 59 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 159. 
 
 161 
 
 V. 
 
 Mar Gin Suie (Cal. 
 
 App. 
 
 
 
 1909), 103 Pac. 951 
 
 
 315 
 
 V. 
 
 Marion, 29 Mich. 31 
 
 121, 
 
 421 
 
 V. 
 
 ]\Iarkham, 64 Cal. 157 
 
 236, 
 
 451 
 
 V. 
 
 Marks, 90 Mich. 555 
 
 78, 
 
 86a 
 
 V. 
 
 Marseiler, 70 Cal. 98 
 
 
 
 
 166, 
 
 250, 
 
 354 
 
 V. 
 
 Marshall, 59 Cal. 386 
 
 339, 
 
 343 
 
 V. 
 
 Martin, 102 Cal. 558 
 
 
 435 
 
 V. 
 
 Martin, 175 N. Y. 315 
 
 
 466 
 
 V. 
 
 Martinez, 66 Cal. 278 
 
 
 131 
 
 V. 
 
 Mather, 4 Wend. (N. 
 
 Y.) 
 
 
 
 229 
 
 
 244 
 
 V. 
 
 INLatthai, 135 Cal. 442 
 
 
 277 
 
 V. 
 
 Maughs, 149 Cal. 253 
 
 
 50 
 
 V. 
 
 Mayes, 66 Cal. 597 
 
 
 409 
 
 V. 
 
 Mayes, 113 Cal. 618 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 , 60, 
 
 280 
 
 V. 
 
 Mayhew, 19 Misc. (N. 
 
 Y.) 
 
 
 
 313 
 
 
 519 
 
 V. 
 
 Mavhew, iso N. Y. 346 
 
 
 74 
 
 V. 
 
 Maxwell, 83 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 
 
 
 
 157 
 
 
 24 
 
 V. 
 
 Mead, 50 Mich. 228 
 
 
 
 
 54, 79. 
 
 374, 
 
 376 
 
 V. 
 
 Melandrez, 4 Cal. App. 
 
 396 
 
 269 
 
 V. 
 
 Mendenhall, 119 Mich. 
 
 404 
 
 403 
 
 V. 
 
 Messer, 148 Mich. 168 
 
 
 291 
 
 V. 
 
 Meyer, 73 Cal. 548 
 
 512, 
 
 514 
 
 V. 
 
 Miles, I9i N. Y. 541 
 
 
 
 
 45. 
 
 491, 
 
 494 
 
 V. 
 
 Millard. S3 Mich. 63 
 
 23, 
 
 280 
 
 V. 
 
 Miller. 66 Cal. 468 
 
 
 69 
 
 V. 
 
 Miller 114 Cal. 10 
 
 
 164 
 
 V. 
 
 Miller, 122 Cal. 84 
 
 
 125 
 
 V. 
 
 ;\liller, 91 Mich. 639 
 
 
 354 
 
 V. 
 
 Miller, 96 Mich. 119 
 
 
 408
 
 XCVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 People V. Miller, 2 Park. Cr. (X. 
 Y.) 197 189 
 
 V. j\Iills, 94 Alich. 630 222, 237 
 
 V. Mills, 98 N. Y. 176 166 
 
 V. Millspaugh, 11 Mich. 278 392 
 V. Minnaugh, 131 N. Y. 563 276 
 V. Minney, 455 Mich. 534 279 
 
 V. Mitchell, 94 Cal. 550 
 
 132, 149, 23s, 315 
 V. ]\Iix, 149 ]\Iich. 260 369 
 
 V. M'Kay, 122 Cal. 628 314, 333 
 V. I\Iol, 137 Mich. 692 451 
 
 V. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264 131 
 V. Mondon, 103 N. Y. 211 131 
 
 V. Monk, 8 Utah 35 456 
 
 V. Monreal, 7 Cal. App. 37 236 
 V. IMonroe, 138 Cal. 97 36 
 
 V. Monteith, 73 Cal. 7 167 
 
 V. Montgomery, 53 Cal. 576 119 
 V. ^Montgomery, 176 N. Y. 219 323 
 V. ]Moore, 3 Wheeler Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 82 48S 
 
 V. Morales, 143 Cal. 550 315 
 
 V. Moran, 144 Cal. 48 
 
 82, 116, 137, 491 
 V. ]\Iorehouse, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 638 353 
 
 V. ^lorphy, lOO Cal. 84 439 
 
 V. Morris, 3 Cal. App. i 415 
 
 V. Morrison, i Park Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 625 417 
 
 V. ]Morse, 196 N. Y. 306 
 
 48, 90, 102 
 V. Morton, 139 Cal. 719 62 
 
 V. Morton, 4 Utah 407 377 
 
 V. Mnhly (Cal. App. 1909), 104 
 
 Pac. 466 47 
 
 V. Muldoon, 2 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 13 465 
 
 V. Mullen, 7 Cal. App. 547 33 
 
 V. ]\Iunroe (Cal.), 33 Pac. 776 421 
 V. Munroe, 100 Cal. 664 218 
 
 V. Murphy, 45 Cal. 137 262, 266 
 V. Murphy, 146 Cal. 502 78, 81 
 
 V. Murphy, loi N. Y. 126 
 
 179, 180, 351 
 V. Murphy, 135 N. Y. 450 369 
 
 V. ]\Iurphy, 145 IMich. 524 417 
 
 V. Murray, 10 Cal. 309 324 
 
 V. ^Murray, 52 Mich. 288 11 1 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 People V. ^Myers, 20 Cal. 518 
 
 
 
 157, 
 
 158 
 
 V. 
 
 Mylin, 139 111. App. 50c 
 
 
 271 
 
 V. 
 
 Nagle, 137 ^lich. 88 
 
 
 605 
 
 V. 
 
 Nail, 242 111. 284 
 
 
 41a 
 
 V. 
 
 Naughton, 7 Abb. N 
 
 S. 
 
 
 
 (N. Y.) 421 
 
 
 26 
 
 V. 
 
 Neff, 191 N. Y. 210 
 
 
 89 
 
 V. 
 
 Nelson, 85 Cal. 421 
 
 
 263 
 
 V. 
 
 Nelson, 153 N. Y. 90 
 
 
 392 
 
 V. 
 
 Neumann, 85 i\Iich. 98 
 
 
 279 
 
 V. 
 
 Newman, 5 Hill (N. 
 
 Y.) 
 
 
 
 295 
 
 262, 
 
 265 
 
 V. 
 
 News-Times Pub. Co. 
 
 , 35 
 
 
 
 Colo. 253 
 
 
 461 
 
 V. 
 
 New York Hospital, 3 
 
 Abb. 
 
 
 
 N. Cas. (N. Y.) 229 
 
 
 203 
 
 V. 
 
 Neyce, 86 Cal. 393 
 
 
 283 
 
 V. 
 
 Nichols (}klich. 1909), 
 
 124 
 
 
 
 N. W. 25 
 
 
 418 
 
 V. 
 
 Nino, 149 N. Y. 317 
 
 
 
 
 158, 
 
 163, 
 
 215 
 
 V. 
 
 Noblett, 184 N. Y. 612 
 
 223, 
 
 438 
 
 V. 
 
 Noelke, 94 N. Y. 137 
 
 
 61 
 
 V. 
 
 Nolan, 22 ^lich. 229 
 
 
 273 
 
 V. 
 
 Nohe, 19 Misc. (X. 
 
 Y.) 
 
 
 
 674 
 
 
 470 
 
 V. 
 
 Noonan, 14 N. Y. S. 5 
 
 19 
 
 
 
 
 519, 
 
 522 
 
 V. 
 
 Northey, 77 Cal. 618 
 
 
 215 
 
 V. 
 
 Nunley, 142 Cal. 441 
 
 
 225 
 
 V. 
 
 Nyce, 34 Hun (N. Y.) 298 
 
 24 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171 
 
 
 236 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Brien. 130 Cal. i 
 
 
 17 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Brien, 60 Mich. 8 
 
 
 73 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Brien, 68 Mich. 468 
 
 
 124 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Brien, 92 ]\Iich. 17 
 
 
 96 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Brien, 176 N. Y. 253 
 
 
 247 
 
 V. 
 
 Odell, I Dak. 197 
 
 
 166 
 
 V. 
 
 Ogden, 8 App. Div. 
 
 (N. 
 
 
 
 Y.) 464 
 
 
 523 
 
 V. 
 
 Ogle, 104 N. Y. 511 
 
 
 
 
 6r, 74, 
 
 118. 
 
 119 
 
 V. 
 
 Oldham, 11 1 Cal. 648 
 
 358, 
 
 493 
 
 V. 
 
 Oliver (Cal.), 95 Pac. ] 
 
 72 
 
 61 
 
 V. 
 
 01mstead,'36 Mich. 431 
 
 108, 
 
 349 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251 
 
 75, 
 
 210 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Neill, 107 Mich. 556 
 
 
 235 
 
 V. 
 
 O'Neill, 112 N. Y. 355 
 
 
 117 
 
 V. 
 
 Orr, 92 Hun (N. Y.) 199 
 
 390
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XCVll 
 
 [References ai 
 People V. Ortega, 7 Cal. App. 
 480 74 
 
 V. Osborn (Cal. App. 1910), 
 
 106 Pac. 891 442 
 
 V. Oscar, 105 Mich. 704 437 
 
 V. Osmer, 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 242 434 
 
 V. Ostrander, iio]NHch. 60 18 
 
 V. O' Sullivan, 104 N. Y. 481 
 
 411, 415 
 V. Owen, IS Det. Leg. N. 881 60 
 V. Owen, 154 Mich. 571 328 
 
 V. Oyer & Terminer, 83 N. Y. 
 
 436 440 
 
 V. Page, 116 Cal. 386 282, 284, 285 
 V. Pallister, 138 N. Y. 601 
 
 12, 17, 88, 321 
 V. Palmer, 105 jNIich. 568 326 
 
 V. Palmer, 109 N. Y. no 7, 230 
 V. Parker, 67 Mich. 222 429, 431 
 V. Parmelee, 112 Mich. 291 323 
 
 V. Parton, 49 Cal. 632 137, 224 
 
 V. Patrick, 182 N. Y. 131 74, 117 
 V. Patterson, 102 Cal. 230 92 
 
 V. Peabody, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 472 428, 432 
 
 V. Peacock, 5 Utah 240 522 
 
 V. Pearsall, 50 Mich. 233 152, 153 
 V. Pease, 3 John. Cas. (N. Y.) 
 
 333 207 
 
 V. Peck, 139 Mich. 680 291, 423 
 V. Pekarz, 185 N. Y. 470 318 
 
 V. Pembroke, 6 Cal. App. 588 
 
 I5i> 236 
 V. Penhallow, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 103 265 
 
 V. Perriman, 72 Mich. 182 402 
 
 V. Petmecky, 2 N. Y. Cr. 450 118 
 V. Phalen, 49 Mich. 492 523, 524 
 V. Phillips, 70 Cal. 61 277 
 
 V. Pichette, 11 1 Mich. 461 148, 152 
 V. Pico, 62 Cal. 50 160, 296 
 
 V. Pinckney, 67 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 428 439 
 
 V. Pine, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 566 275 
 V. Pincr (Cal. App. 1909), 105 
 
 Pac. 780 140, 371 
 
 V. Pinkerton, yy N. Y. 245 499 
 
 V. Plath, 100 N. Y. 590 23, 339 
 
 V. Plyler, 121 Cal. 160 268 
 
 vii — Underhill Crim. Evidence. 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Poemer, 114 Cal. 51 60 
 
 V. Poindexter, 243 111. 68 435 
 
 V. Porter, 104 Cal. 415 469 
 
 V. Potter, 5 I\lich. i 99, 154 
 
 V. Potter, 89 Mich. 353 17, 18 
 
 V. Powell, 87 Cal. 348 324, 325 
 
 V. Price, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 185 
 
 282, 509 
 V. Price, 119 N. Y. 650 510 
 
 V. Probst, 237 111. 390 14, 522 
 
 V. Pustolka, 149 N. Y.' 570 50 
 V. Putman, 129 Cal. 258 245 
 
 V. Putnam, 90 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 125 88 
 
 V. Pyckett, 99 Mich. 613 115 
 
 V. Quick, 51 Mich. 547 59 
 
 V. Quimby, 134 Mich. 625 318, 322 
 V. Rae, 66 Cal. 423 435 
 
 V. Raina, 45 Cal. 292 80 
 
 V. Ramirez, 56 Cal. 533 136, 227 
 V. Randazzio, 194 N. Y. 147 
 
 129, 147a 
 V. Rando, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 335 89 
 
 V. Randolph, 2 Park. Cr. Rep. 
 
 (N. Y.) 174 21, 408 
 
 V. Ranier, 127 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 47 371 
 
 V. Ranney, 153 Mich. 293 147 
 
 V. Rathbun, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 509 119, 424 
 
 V. Ratz, 115 Cal. 132 408 
 
 V. Raymond, 96 N. Y. 38 507 
 
 V. Reagle, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 527 185 
 
 V. Reardon, 109 N. Y. S. 504 57 
 V. Rector, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 569 . 312 
 
 V. Reinhart, 39 Cal. 449 60 
 
 V. Resh, 107 Mich. 251 17, 58, 152 
 V. Restenblatt. i Abb. Pr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 268 26 
 
 V. Rice, 57 Hun (N. Y.) 62 226 
 V. Richards, 44 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 278 197 
 
 V. Rickcr, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 643 69 
 
 V. Riordan, 7 N. Y. Cr. 7 338 
 V. Riordan, 117 N. Y. 71 23, 154
 
 XCVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ai 
 
 People V. Ritchie, 12 Utah 180 
 
 361, 362, 363 
 V. Rivers, 147 Mich. 643 416 
 
 V. Roberts, 114 Cal. 67 279 
 
 V. Robertson, 6 Cal. App. 514 283 
 V. Robertson, 88 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 198 413 
 
 V. Robinson, 19 Cal. 40 135 
 
 V. Robinson, 2 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 235 318 
 
 V. Robles, 34 Cal. 591 305 
 
 V. Rodawald, 177 N. Y. 408 
 
 324, 325 
 V. Roderigas, 49 Cal. 9 341, 392 
 V. Rodley, 131 Cal. 240 119a 
 
 V. Rodrigo, 69 Cal. 601 
 
 12, 23, 81, 246 
 V. Rogers, 71 Cal. 565 314, 321 
 V. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9 129, 164, 166 
 V. Rogers, 22 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 147 293 
 
 V. Rogers, 192 N. Y. 331 90, 126 
 V. Rolfe, 61 Cal. 540 55 
 
 V. Romero (Cal. App. 1910;?, 
 
 107 Pac. 709 297 
 
 V. Ross, 103 Cal. 425 466 
 
 V. Ross, 115 Cal. 233 12 
 
 V. Row, 135 Mich. 505 238 
 
 V. Rowland (Cal. App.). 1909), 
 
 106 Pac. 428 283 
 
 V. Rowland, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 449 263 
 
 Royal, 53 Cal. 62 412 
 
 Royce, 106 Cal. 173 284 
 
 Russell, no Mich. 46 482 
 
 Ryan. 152 Cal. 364 223 
 
 Ryan, 55 Hun (N. Y.) 214 236 
 Ryder, 151 ]\Iich. 187 77, 236 
 Ryno, 148 Mich. 137 418 
 
 Salas, 2 Cal. App. 537 227 
 
 Salisbury, 2 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 39 481 
 
 Salisbury, 134 Mich. 537 451 
 Samario, 84 Cal. 484 103 
 
 Sam Lung, 70 Cal. 515 
 
 225, 472, 477 
 Samonset, 97 Cal. 448 391 
 
 Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17 102, 103, 319 
 Sanders, 144 Cal. 216 
 
 89, 423, 429 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Sanders, 139 Mich. 442 285 
 V. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29 102, 167 
 
 V. Sattlekau, 104 N. Y. S. 805 442 
 V. Scalamiero, 143 Cal. 343 
 
 120, 137, 409 
 V. Scattura, 238 111. 313 409 
 
 V. Schiavi, 96 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 479 106 
 
 V. Schildwachter, 5 App. Div. 
 
 (N. Y.) 346 532 
 
 V. Schilling, no 'SUch. 412 528 
 
 V. Schooley, 89 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 391 89 
 
 V. Schooley, 149 N. Y. 99 429 
 V. Schuyler, 7 N. Y. Cr. 262 181 
 V. Schuyler, 43 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 88 163 
 
 163 
 98 74 
 144 
 100 
 
 89 345 
 26, 185 
 
 V. Schuyler, 106 N. Y. 298 
 
 V. Sciaroni, 4 Cal. App. t 
 
 V. Scott, 59 (ial. 341 
 
 V. Scott, 153 N. Y. 40 
 
 V. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348 
 
 V. Sebring, 66 Mich. 705 
 
 V. Sebring, 14 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 31 259 
 
 V. Seeley, 139 Cal. 118 364, 365 
 V. Seeley, 37 Hun (N. Y.) 190, 339 
 V. Sekeson, in App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 490 305 
 
 V. Sellick, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 
 
 329 26 
 
 V. Sessions, 58 Mich. 594 312, 349 
 V. Sevine (Cal.) 22 Pac. 969 369 
 V. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495 212, 213 
 V. Shall, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 778 430 
 V. Sharp, 53 Mich. 523 420, 427 
 V. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427 
 
 87, 88, 121, 454 
 V. Shattuck, 109 Cal. 673 
 
 163, 248,331 
 V. Shaw, ni Cal. 171 238 
 
 V. Shaw, 63 N. Y. 36 108, 113 
 
 V. Shea, 16 Misc. (N. Y.) in 519 
 V. Sheffield, 9 Cal. App. 130 416 
 V. Shelters, 99 Mich. 333 437 
 
 V. Sheriff, 29 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 622 177 
 
 V. Sherman, 133 N. Y. 349 213 
 V. Shoemaker, 131 Mich. 107 280a
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 XCIX 
 
 [References ar 
 
 People V. Shuler, 28 Cal. 490 6 
 
 V. Shulman, 8 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 514 523 
 
 V. Shulman, 80 N. Y. 373 88 
 
 V. Sickles, 156 N. Y. 541 510, 512 
 V. Siemsen, 153 Cal 387 126, 140 
 V. Silvers, 6 Cal. App. 69 126, 133 
 V. Simmons, 125 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 234 491 
 
 V. Simonsen, 107 Cal. 345 147 
 
 V. Simpson, 48 Mich. 474 112, 130 
 V. Singer, 5 N. Y. Cr. i 27 
 
 V. Singer, 18 Abb. N. Cas. (N. 
 
 Y.) 96 453 
 
 V. Skutt, 96 Mich. 449 92 
 
 V. Slack, 90 Mich. 448 167 
 
 V. Sligh, 48 Mich. 54 267 
 
 V. Sliney, 137 N. Y. 570 179, 181 
 V. Smalling, 94 Cal. 112 146 
 
 V. Smiler, 125 N. Y. 717 163 
 
 V. Smith (Cal. App.), 99 Pac. 
 
 Ill 88, 325, 327 
 
 V. Smith, 103 Cal. 563 421 
 
 V. Smith, 106 Cal. 73 
 
 3-23, 334, 354 
 V. Smith, 121 Cal. 355 36 
 
 V. Smith, 106 Mich. 431 216 
 
 V. Smith, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 258 
 
 307. 310 
 V. Smith, 104 N. Y. 491 106, no 
 V. Smith, 114 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 513 68, 239 
 
 V. Smith, 121 N. Y. 578 50, 52 
 
 V. Smith, 172 N. Y. 210 124 
 
 V. Snyder, no App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 699 436 
 
 V. Soeder, 150 Cal. 12 61 
 
 V. Solani, 6 Cal. App. 103 233 
 V. Soto, 49 Cal. 67 126, 127 
 
 V. Soto, 53 Cal. 415 371 
 
 V. Special Sessions, 10 Hun 
 
 (N. Y.) 224 342 
 
 V. Spencer, 66 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 149 453 
 
 V. Spencer, 179 N. Y. 408 161 
 
 V. Spier, 120 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 786 346 
 
 V. Spoor, 235 111. 230 398, 405 
 
 V. Spriggs, 119 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 236 343 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Squires, 49 Mich. 487 393 
 V. Stackhouse, 49 Mich. 76 241 
 V. Stacy, 192 N. Y. 577 104, 105 
 V. Stanford, 64 Cal. 27 520 
 
 V. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113 
 
 115, 118, 492, S07 
 V. Stanley. loi Mich. 93 55 
 
 V. Stark, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 51 364 
 V. St. Clair (Cal.), 44 Pac. 234 299 
 V. Stearns, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 409 422, 430 
 
 V. Sternberg, in Cal. 3 
 V. Stevens, 109 N. Y. 159 
 V. Stewart, 85 Cal. 174 
 V. Stewart, 97 Cal. 238 
 V. Stison, 140 Mich. 216 
 V. Stocking, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 573 
 V. Stokes, 5 Cal. App. 205 
 
 137, 492, 494 
 V. Stokes, 71 Cal. 263 383 
 
 V. Stokes, 24 N. Y. S. 727 365 
 V. Stone, 32 Hun (N. Y.) 41 
 
 466, 468 
 V. Stout, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 670 179 
 
 V. Stout, 4 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 227 
 
 309 
 418 
 409 
 106 
 
 32 
 
 71 
 
 88, 90 
 205 
 161 
 
 (N. 
 
 V. Stouter, 142 Cal. 146 
 V. Strait, 148 N. Y. 566 
 V. Strauss, 94 App. Div, 
 
 Y.) 453 74 
 
 V. Strong, 31 Cal. 151 125 
 
 V. Strollo, 191 N. Y. 42 
 
 56, 132, 133 
 V. Stuart, 4 Cal. 218 26 
 
 V. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329 10 
 
 V. Suesser, 142 Cal. 354 157 
 
 V. Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 502 
 
 123, 124 
 V. Sullivan, 144 Cal. 471 358 
 
 V. Summers, 40 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 384 456 
 
 V. Suppiger, 103 111. 434 21 
 
 V. Sutherland, 154 N. Y. 345 336 
 V. Sutton, 73 Cal. 243 516 
 
 V. Swaile (Cal. App. 1909), 
 
 107 Pac. 134 122 
 
 V. Sweeney, 55 Mich. 449 235, 239
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 People V. Sweeney, 133 N. Y. 
 609 80 
 
 V. S wetland, 77 Mich. 53 127 
 
 V. Taggart, 43 Cal. 81 371 
 
 V. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 57 147, 412 
 V. Tarm Poi, 86 Cal. 225 23, 338 
 V. Tatum, 60 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 311 466 
 
 V. Taylor, 4 Cal. App. 31 119a 
 
 V. Taylor, 59 Cal. 640 104, 108 
 V. Taylor, 93 ^lich. 638 126, 147a 
 V. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398 154, i57 
 V. Terwilliger, 124 N. Y. 629 411 
 V. Thatcher, 108 Mich. 652 87, 318 
 V. Thiede, 11 Utah 241 227 
 
 V. Thomas, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 169 437 
 V. Thompson, 84 Cal. 598 138 
 
 V. Thompson, 92 Cal. 506 222 
 
 V. Thorns, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 
 256 147a, 423, 433 
 
 V. Thomson, 92 Cal. 506 221, 333 
 V. Thornton, 74 Cal. 482 228 
 
 V. Thurston, 2 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 49 160 
 
 V. Tibbs. 143 Cal. 100 39° 
 
 V. Tice, IIS Mich. 219 153. 238 
 
 V. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651 60, 247 
 
 V. Tierney, 57 Cal. 54 409 
 
 V. Tiley, 84 Cal. 651 222 
 
 V. Titherington, 59 Cal. 598 378 
 V. Tomlinson, 35 Cal. 503 430 
 
 V. Tomlinson, 66 Cal. 344 284 
 
 V. Townsey, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 
 
 112 24 
 
 V. Travers, 88 Cal. 233 I57 
 
 V. Travis, 56 Cal. 251 326 
 
 V. Trezza, 128 N. Y. 529 516 
 
 V. Tripicersky, 38 N. Y. S. 
 
 696 52s 
 
 V. Tubbs, 147 Mich, i 115, 223, 246 
 V. Tucker, 104 Cal. 440 305 
 
 V. Turcott, 65 Cal. 126 215 
 
 V. Turner, i Cal. App. 420 
 
 122, 241 
 V. Turner, i Cal. 152 460 
 
 V. Turpin, 233 111. 452 298 
 
 V. UnDong, 106 Cal. 83 60 
 
 V. Urquidas, 96 Cal. 239 516, 522 
 V. Van Alstine, 57 Mich. 69 175 
 V. Van Dam, 107 Mich. 425 79, 379 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 People V. Van de Carr, 87 App. 
 Div. 386 451 
 
 V. Vane, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 78 77 
 V. Van Ewan, iii Cal. 144 
 
 220, 283, 290 
 V. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N. Y. 408 79 
 V. Van Gaasbeck, 118 App. 
 
 Div. (N. Y.) 511 83, 327 
 
 V. Van Houter, 38 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 168 18 
 
 V. Van Tassel, 26 App. Div. 
 
 445 222, 466 
 
 V. Van Tassel, 64 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 444 257 
 
 V. Vedder, 98 N. Y. 630 349 
 
 V. Velarde, 59 Cal. 457 I37 
 
 V. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 
 369 70, 268, 269, 272 
 
 V. Vaughan, 42 N. Y. S. 959 28 
 V. Vidal, 121 Cal. 221 118, 301 
 
 V. Vincent, 95 Cal. 425 166 
 
 V. Wade, 118 Cal. 672 390, 392 
 
 V. Wadsworth, 63 Mich. 500 282 
 V. Wahle, 124 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 762 4S1 
 
 V. Wah Lee Mon, 59 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 626 339 
 
 V. Wakely, 62 Mich. 297 435 
 
 V. Walker, 140 Cal. 153 129 
 
 V. Walker, 38 Mich. 156 166 
 
 V. Wallace, 89 Cal. 158 331 
 
 V. Wallace, 109 Cal. 611 387, 393 
 V. Waller, 70 JMich. 237 35 
 
 V. Ward, 105 Cal. 335 6 
 
 V. Ward, 3 N. Y. Cr. 483 56 
 
 V. Ward, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 231 126 
 
 V. Warden of City Prison, 83 
 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 456 498 
 V. Ware, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 473 65 
 v. Warner, 104 Mich. 337 427 
 
 V. Warner, 51 Hun 53 226 
 
 V. Wasson, 65 Cal. 538 108 
 
 V. Way, 119 App. Div. 344 33, 211 
 V. Way, 191 N. Y. 533 48 
 
 V. Wayman, 128 N. Y. 585 12, 275 
 V. Weaver, 108 Mich. 649 105 
 
 V. Weaver, 116 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 594 481 
 
 V. Weaver, 177 N. Y. 434 87
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CI 
 
 Peopl 
 
 [References ar 
 
 e V. Webb. 5 N. Y. 855 182 
 
 Weber, 149 Cal. 325 61, 
 
 82, 117, 137, 211, 233, 313, 323 
 Webster, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 398 161, 280a 
 
 Webster, 139 N. Y. 73 237 
 
 Weil, 244 111. 176 435> 442 
 
 Weithoff, 51 Mich. 203 471 
 
 Welsh, 63 Cal. 167 115 
 
 Wentz, 37 N. Y. 303 140 
 
 Wenzel, 189 N. Y. 275 223 
 
 West, 106 Cal. 89 172, 180 
 
 West, 106 N. Y. 293 480 
 
 Weston, 236 111. 104 
 Whalen, 154 Cal. 472 
 Whaley, 6 Cow. (N 
 
 661 
 Wheeler, 60 111. App. 351 
 Wheeler, 142 Mich. 212 
 Whipple, 9 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 
 707 
 White, 34 Cal. 183 
 White, 142 Cal. 292 
 White, 53 ]\Iich, 537 
 White, 153 Mich. 617 
 White, 3 N. Y. Cr. 366 
 White, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 Ill 82, 213 
 
 White, 62 Hun (N. Y.) 114 74 
 White, 176 N. Y. 331 
 
 126, 127, 135 
 Whiteman, 114 Cal. 338 423 
 Wieger, 100 Cal. 352 437 
 
 Willard, 92 Cal. 482 215 
 
 Willard, 150 Cal. 543 
 
 60, 157, 158, 159, 163 
 Willctt, 92 N. Y. 29 
 
 56, 122, 123, 267 
 Wilkinson, 60 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 582 296 
 
 Williams, 43 Cal. 344 166 
 
 Williams, 17 Cal. 142 214 
 
 Williams, 18 Cal. 187 222 
 
 Williams, 64 Cal. 87 38 
 
 Williams, 3 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 84 100, 318 
 
 Williams, 19 Wend. (N. 
 
 Y.) 377 70 
 
 Williams, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 520 55 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 People V. Williamson, 6 Cal. App. 
 
 204, 409 
 438 
 
 Y.) 
 
 456 
 
 535 
 482 
 
 71 
 433 
 210 
 
 533 
 373 
 376 
 
 336 
 
 312, 
 
 333 
 
 V. Willson, 109 N. Y. 345 
 
 
 313 
 
 V. Wilson, 64 111. 195 
 
 
 461 
 
 V. Wilson, 133 Mich. 57 
 
 
 378 
 
 V. Wilson, 136 Mich. 298 
 
 
 531 
 
 V. Wilson, 7 App. Div. 
 
 (N. 
 
 
 Y.) 326 
 
 300, 
 
 375 
 
 V. Wilson, 151 N. Y. 403 
 
 
 300 
 
 V. Wilson, 3 Park. Cr. 
 
 (N. 
 
 
 Y.) 199 
 
 55, 
 
 272 
 
 V. Wiman, 148 N. Y. 29 
 
 
 422 
 
 V. Winant, 24 Misc. (N. 
 
 Y.) 
 
 
 361 
 
 
 69 
 
 V. Winslow, 39 Mich. 505 
 
 
 437 
 
 V. Winters, 29 Cal. 658 
 
 
 375 
 
 V. Wirth, 108 ]\Iich. 307 
 
 
 242 
 
 V. Wolcott, 51 Mich. 612 
 
 236, 
 
 374 
 
 V. Wolf, 95 Mich. 625 
 
 
 323 
 
 V. Wong Chong Suey, no 
 
 Cal. 
 
 
 117 
 
 
 299 
 
 V. Wood, 99 Mich. 620 
 
 
 378 
 
 V. Wood, 126 N. Y. 249 
 
 
 
 159, 163, 185, 
 
 215, 
 
 322 
 
 V. Wood, 131 N. Y. 617, 
 
 
 21 
 
 V. Woods, 147 Cal. 265 
 
 321, 
 
 491 
 
 V. Worden, 113 Cal. 569 
 
 149, 
 
 275 
 
 V. Wright, 144 Cal. 161 
 
 
 323 
 
 V. Wright, 89 Mich. 70 
 
 
 48 
 
 V. Wright, 19 Misc. (N. 
 
 Y.) 
 
 
 135 
 
 
 480 
 
 V. Wyman, 102 Cal. 552 
 
 
 287 
 
 V. Yee Fog, 4 Cal. App. 730 
 
 238 
 
 V. Young, 31 Cal. 563 
 
 
 192 
 
 V. Young, 102 Cal. 411 
 
 
 166 
 
 V. Young, 108 Cal. 8 
 
 122 
 
 124 
 
 V. Yslas, 27 Cal. 630 
 
 353 
 
 354 
 
 V. Yut Ling, 74 Cal. 569 
 
 
 230 
 
 V. Zapicek, 233 111. 198 
 
 
 319 
 
 V. Zimmermin, 3 Cal. App. 84 
 
 
 
 90, 
 
 151 
 
 Perdue v. State, 126 Ga. 112 
 
 
 lOI 
 
 Perkins v. Commonwealth 
 
 (Ky. 
 
 
 1909), 124 S. W. 794 
 
 
 408 
 
 V. State, 50 Ala. 154 
 
 
 279 
 
 Perovich v. United States, 205 U. 
 
 
 S. 86 
 
 
 129 
 
 Perrin v. State. 81 Wis. 135 
 
 
 304 
 
 V. Wells, 155 Pa. St. 299 
 
 
 262 
 
 Perrow v. State, 67 Miss. 365 
 
 255 
 
 488
 
 Cll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References a) 
 Perry v. Commonwealth, 27 Ky. 
 D."5i2 358 
 
 V. People, 38 Colo. 23 294, 299 
 
 V. State, 155 Ala. 93 299 
 
 V. State, 94 Ala. 25 324 
 
 V. State, 149 Ala. 40 309 
 
 V. State, 102 Ga. 365 112 
 
 V. State, no Ga. 234 6 
 
 V. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 540 130 
 Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124 258 
 
 V. State, 90 Tenn. 291 19 
 
 Persons v. State, 90 Tenn. 291 
 
 280a, 19 
 Peters v. United States, 2 Okla. 116 467 
 Petrie, In re, i Kan. App. 184 254 
 V. Columbia &c. R. Co., 29 S. 
 
 Car. 303 264 
 
 Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192 498 
 V. United States, 148 U. S. 
 
 197 446 
 
 Pettis V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 66 
 
 324, 33,3 
 
 Pettit V. State, 135 Ind. 393 269 
 
 V. Walshe, 194 U. S. 205 501 
 
 Petty V. State, 83 Miss. 260 55 
 
 Pflueger v. State, 46 Neb. 493 
 
 161, 162 
 Pfomer v. People, 4 Park Cr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 558 324 
 
 Phelps V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 32 S. W. 470 161 
 
 V. People, 55 111. 334 292 
 
 V. People, 72 N. Y. 365 422 
 
 Phillips V. People, 57 Barb. (N. 
 Y.) 353 88 
 
 V. State, 62 Ark. 119 328 
 
 V. State, I Ga. App. 687 i6a 
 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 597 470 
 
 V. State, 108 Ind. 406 387 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 34 S. W. 539 
 
 228, 299 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 481 112 
 
 Pickard v. Br3^ant, 92 Mich. 430 217 
 
 Pickerel v. Commonwealth (Ky.) 
 
 30 S. W. 617 35 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. L. 
 
 120 358 
 
 Pierce, Ex parte, 155 Fed. 663 499 
 Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536 
 
 273, 275 
 
 532 
 309 
 
 466 
 
 373 
 
 '■c to Sections.'] 
 Pierce v. United States, 160 U. 
 
 S. 355 129 
 
 Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 424 
 
 90, 179, 180, 323, 351 
 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 14 103 
 
 Pigg V. State, 145 Ind. 560 224 
 
 Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555 166 
 
 Pike V. People, 34 111. App. 112 
 
 V. State, 35 Ala. 419 
 Pilger V. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. 
 
 St. 220 
 Pilgrim v. State (Okla. Cr. App. 
 1909), 104 Pac. 383 192, 
 
 Pinson v. State (Ark. 1909), 121 
 
 S. W. 751 
 
 Piper V. State (Tex. Cr.), 51 S. 
 
 W. 1 1 18 488 
 
 Pippen V. State, 77 Ala. 81 308 
 
 Pisar V. State, 56 Neb. 455 277 
 
 Pitman, Ex parte, i Curtis (U. 
 
 S.) 186 461 
 
 V. State, 22 Ark. 354 326 
 
 Pitner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 366 209 
 
 V. State, 2,7 Tex. Cr. App. 268 8S 
 
 Pittman v. State, 51 Fla. 94 429 
 
 Pitts V. State, 140 Ala. 70 
 
 12, 57, 103, 238, 312 
 V. State, 43 ^liss. 472 7, 147 
 
 Pittsford V. Chittenden, 58 Vt. 49 527 
 Plake V. State, 121 Ind. 433 154, 157 
 Plant V. State, 140 Ala. 52 94 
 
 Pleasant v. State, 13 Ark. 360 275, 417 
 V. State, 15 Ark. 624 225, 410, 418 
 Pledger v. State, 77 Ga. 242 
 
 226, 239, 364 
 Plowes V. Bossev, 31 L. J. Ch. 
 
 681 ' 526 
 
 Plumbly V. Commonwealth, 2 
 
 Mete. (Mass.) 413 507, 510 
 
 Plummer v. State, in Ga. 839 248 
 V. State, 135 Ind. 308 484 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 202 469 
 
 Plunkett V. State, 72 Ark. 409 418 
 Poe V. State, 155 Ala. 31 314, 2,33 
 
 Pointer v. State, 148 Ala. 676 87 
 
 Polin V. State, 14 Neb. 540, 
 
 12, 233, 269, 3x5 
 
 Polinsky v. People, 72 N. Y. 65 480 
 
 Polk V. State, 36 Ark. 117 69. 318 
 
 V. State, 19 Ind. 170 157, 158
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 cm 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Pollard V. State, 2 Iowa 567 407 
 
 V. State, 53 Miss. 410 149 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1910), 
 
 125 S. W. 390 22,2, 
 
 Pollock V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 29 488 
 Poison V. State, 137 Ind. 519 
 
 172, 215, 409, 411, 413 
 
 Pomeroy v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. 
 
 Cas. 342 296 
 
 V. State, 94 Ind. 96 417 
 
 Pontier v. State, 107 i\Id. 384 404 
 
 Pontius V. People, 82 N. Y 339 355 
 
 Pool V State, 51 Tex. Cr. 596 299 
 
 Poole V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 348 327 
 
 Porath V. State, 90 Wis. 527 395 
 
 Porch V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 335 68, 222, 374 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 7 248 
 
 Porter v. People, 31 Colo. 508 492 
 
 V. State, 55 Ala. 95 130 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 87 157, 160, 161 
 
 V. State, 51 Ga. 300 473 
 
 V. State, 76 Ga. 658 74 
 
 V. United States, 7 Ind. Ter. 
 
 616 187, 189 
 
 Porterfield v. Commonwealth, 91 
 
 Va. 801 378 
 
 Posey V. State, 143 Ala. 54 409 
 
 V. United States, 26 App. D. 
 
 C. 302 87 
 
 Poss V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 486 401 
 Post V. United States, 135 Fed. i 276 
 Poston V. State, 83 Neb. 240 220 
 
 Potter V. State, 92 Ala. 27 374 
 
 Pound V. State, 43 Ga. 88 324 
 
 Powe V. State, 48 N. J. L. 34 349 
 
 Powell, Ex parte, 20 Fla. 806 499 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 9 S. 
 
 W. 245 421 
 
 V. State, 58 Ala. 362 188 
 
 V. State, 88 Ga. 32 298 
 
 V. State (]\Iiss.), 20 So. 4 387, 392 
 V. State, 61 Miss. 319 228 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 44 S. W. 504 382 
 V. State, II Tex. App. 401 301 
 V. State, 13 Tex. App. 244 225 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 277 467 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 592 J2 
 Powers V. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 L. 277 328 
 
 358 
 
 93 
 461 
 272 
 103 
 79, 108 
 83 
 368 
 
 21 
 418 
 159 
 
 2,72, 
 268 
 482 
 no 
 140 
 
 e to Sections. "[ 
 
 Powers V. People, 42 111. App. 
 427 
 
 V. People, 114 111. App. 323 
 
 V. State, 80 Ind. 77 
 
 V. State, 87 Ind. 144 
 
 V. State, 74 Miss. 777 
 
 V. State, 117 Tenn. 2'^2 
 Prater v. State, 107 Ala. 26 
 Prather v. United States, 9 App. 
 
 D. C. 82 
 Pratt V. State, 19 Ohio St. 277 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 227 
 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 281 265, 222 
 Preatis v. Bates, 88 Mich. 567 213 
 Pressler v. State, 19 Tex. App. 52 484 
 Pressley v. State, 132 Ga. 64 320 
 
 Price V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 112 S. W. 855 
 
 V. People, 131 111. 223 
 
 V. State, 96 Ala. i 
 
 V. State, 72 Ga. 441 
 
 V. State, 114 Ga. 815 
 
 V. State, I Okla. Cr. 
 
 98, 100, 329, 492 
 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 102 486 
 
 V. United States, 165 U. S. 
 
 311 479 
 
 Priest V. State, 10 Neb. 393 146, 492 
 Prince v. Gmidaway, 157 iMass. 
 
 417 533 
 
 V. State, 100 Ala. 144 117, 153 
 
 Prine v. State, 72 Miss. 838 276, 326 
 Prior V. State, 99 Ala. 196 61, 248 
 Pritchett v. State, 22 Ala. 39 324 
 
 Proctor V. Commonwealth, 
 Ky. L. 248 
 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 254 
 V. Territory, 18 Okla. 378 
 Proper v. State, 85 Wis. 615 
 
 92, 213, 4( 
 Pruett V. State, 141 Ala. 69 
 Pruitt V. State, 92 Ala. 41 
 Primer v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 
 
 115 
 Pryor v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 643 
 Pryse v. State (Tex.), 113 S. W. 
 
 93S 
 Pullen V. State, 11 Tex. App. 89 
 Pulpus V. State, 84 Miss. 49 
 
 14 
 410 
 
 494 
 473 
 
 410, 412 
 
 188 
 
 262, 267 
 
 384 
 130 
 
 96 
 269 
 336
 
 CIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Purvis V. State, 71 ]\Iiss. 706 6 
 
 Puryear v. Reese, 6 Coldw. 
 (Tenn.) 21 163 
 
 V. State, 63 Ga. 692 266 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 454 78 
 Putman v. State, 49 Ark. 449 446 
 V. United States, 162 U. S. 687 
 
 218, 235 
 Putnal V. State (Fla.), 47 So. 864 
 
 260, 265 
 Pyle V. State, 4 Ga. App. 811 
 
 102, 103, III 
 
 Q 
 
 Queenan v. Territorj^ 190 U. S. 
 
 548 162 
 
 Queen's Case. 2 Br. & Bing. 284 248 
 Quillen v. Commonwealth, 105 
 
 Va. 874 207 
 
 Quinn v. People, 123 111. 333 6y, 68 
 Quintana v. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 
 401 137 
 
 Quong Yu V. Territory (Ariz. 
 
 1909), 100 Pac. 462 378 
 
 R 
 
 Radford v. State (Ga. App. 
 
 1910), 67 S. E. 707 381 
 
 Rafferty v. State, 91 Tenn. 655 438 
 Ragland v. State, 2 Ga. App. 492 367 
 Railing v. Commonwealth, no 
 
 Pa. St. 100 106, 348 
 
 Rainbolt v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 153 473 
 Rains v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 29 Ky. L. 66 122, 124 
 
 V. State, 88 Ala. 91 247 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 588 295 
 
 Raker v. State, 50 Neb. 202 361 
 
 Rambo v State, 134 Ala. 71 248 
 
 Ramey v. State, 127 Ind. 243 528 
 
 Ramsey v. State, 89 Ga. 198 521 
 
 Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 738 507 
 
 Randall v. State, 132 Ind. 539 58, 236 
 V. State, 53 N. J. L. 488 462 
 
 Randall's Case, 5 City Hall Rec. 
 
 (N. Y.) 141 185 
 
 '■c to Sections.] 
 
 Randolph v. State, 100 Ala. 139 35 
 V. State (Tex.), 49 S. W. 591 299 
 Raney v. Commonwealth, 2 Kv 
 
 L. 62 ' 28 
 
 Ransbottom v. State, 144 Ind. 250 413 
 
 Ransom v. State, 26 Fla. 364 473 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 826 152, 153 
 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 826 137 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 70 S. W. 960 130 
 
 Rapp V. Commonwealtht, 14 B. 
 
 i\Ion. (Ky.) 614 . 324 
 
 Rash V. State, 61 Ala. 89 312 
 
 Rath V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 142 452 
 
 Rau V. People, 63 N. Y. 277 21 
 
 Rauck V. State, no Ind. 384 357 
 
 Rawls V. State, 97 Ga. 186 276 
 
 Ray V. Coffin, 123 Mass. 365 533 
 
 V. State, 50 Ala. 104 12 
 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 67 90, 295 
 
 V. State, I Greene (Iowa) 316 71 
 
 Rayburn v. State, 69 Ark. 177 23 
 
 Raymond v. Burlington &c. R. 
 
 Co., 65 Iowa 152 179 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 123 Kv. 
 
 368 87, 89 
 
 492 
 122, 123 
 217 
 485 
 
 V. People, 226 III. 433 
 V. State, 154 Ala. i 
 
 Raynor v. Norton, 31 Mich. 210 
 
 Reach v. State, 94 Ala. 113 
 
 Read v. Commonwealth, 22 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 924 521 
 
 v. State, 2 Ind. 438 357 
 
 Reason v. State (Miss. 1909), 48 
 
 So. 820 130 
 
 Rector v. Commonwealtth, 4 Ky. 
 L. 323 138 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 468 514 
 
 Redd V. State, 68 Ala. 492 329 
 
 V. State, 69 Ala. 255 126 
 
 v. State, 54 Ark. 621 305 
 
 V. State, 63 Ark. 457 68 
 
 V. State, 65 Ark. 475 429 
 
 V. State, 99 Ga. 210 80 
 
 v. State (Tex.), 29 S. W. 1085 197 
 
 Reddick v. State, 72 Miss. 1008 68 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 463 54 
 
 Redditt v. State, 17 Tex. 610 473 
 
 Reddy v. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 
 784 197 
 
 Redman v. State, 33 Ala. 428 471
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cv 
 
 [References ai 
 
 Reed v. Haskins, ii6 Mass. 198 533 
 V. State, 54 Ark. 621 18 
 
 V. State, 75 Neb. 509 158 
 
 V. State, 15 Ohio 217 423, 428, 432 
 V. State (Okla. Cr. App. 1909), 
 
 103 Pac. 1042 326 
 
 V. Territory (Okla.), 98 Pac. 
 
 583 21, 35, 47 
 
 Reese v. State, 7 Ga. 373 88 
 
 Reeves v. State, 95 Ala. 31 291 
 
 V. State, 29 Fla. 527 18 
 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 340 129 
 
 Reg. V. Armitage, 27 L. T. 41 529 
 V. Arnold, 8 C. & P. 621 130 
 
 V. Attwood, 5 Cox Cr. Cas. 
 
 322 130 
 
 V. Birkett, 8 C. & P. 732 74 
 
 V. Bleasdale. 2 Carr & K. 765 88 
 V. Baillie, 8 Cox C. C. 238 339 
 V. Barratt, 12 Cox C. C. 498 408 
 V. Beale, 10 Cox C. C. 157 408 
 V. Bedingfield, 14 Cox C. C 
 
 341 330 
 
 V. Bennett, 14 Cox C. C. 45 401 
 V. Bonlton, i Den. C. C. 508 437 
 V. Braithwaite, 8 Cox C. C. 
 
 254 468 
 
 V. Browning, 3 Cox C. C. 437 449 
 V. Burke, 8 Cox. C. C. 44 245 
 
 V. Camplin, I C. & K. 746 417 
 
 V. Chapman, i Den. C. C. 432 449 
 V. Chappie, 9 C. &. P. 355 255 
 
 V. Child, 5 Cox C. C. 197 267 
 
 V. Clark, 6 Cox C. C. 210 510 
 
 V. Clark, 20 Eng. L. & E. 583 514 
 V. Cockburn, 3 Cox C. C. 543 414 
 V. Cockroft, II Cox C. C. 410 418 
 V. Cooke, 8 C. & P. 582 422, 423 
 V. Cotton, 12 Cox C. C. 400 88, 89 
 V. Cox, L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. 153 
 
 175, 176 
 V. Crickmer, 16 Cox C. C. 701 90 
 V. Crofts, 9 C. & P. 219 515 
 
 V. Doherty, 13 Cox C. C. 23 130 
 V. Eyre, 2 F. & F. 579 409 
 
 V. Farley, 2 C. & K. 313 174, 177 
 V. Ford, I C. & Marsh iii 70 
 
 V. Forster, 6 Cox C. C. 521 433 
 V. Fox, 10 Cox C. C. 502 512 
 
 V. Frances, 4 Cox C. C. 57 225 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Reg. V. Fretwell, 9 Cox C. C. 471 354 
 
 V. Gadbury, 8 C. & P. 676 78 
 
 V. Gazard, 8 C. & P. 595 189 
 V. Geach, 9 C. & P. 499 422, 424 
 
 V. Gibbons, 12 Cox C. C. 237 401 
 V. Gould, 9 C. & P. 364 138, 307 
 
 V. Hankins, 2 C. & K. 823 172 
 
 V. Harvey, 8 Cox C. C. 99 189 
 
 V. Hay, 2 F. & F. 4 177 
 V. Hayward, 2 C. & K. 234 
 
 174, 175, 176, 177 
 V. Hill, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 547 
 
 202, 203, 204 
 
 V. Hilton, 8 Cox C. C. 87 512 
 
 V. Hind, 8 Cox C. C. 300 106 
 
 V. Hodges, 8 C. & P. 195 25 
 
 V. Holmes, i C. & K. 248 130 
 
 V. Holmes, 12 Cox C. C. 137 418 
 
 V. Horton, 11 Cox C. C. 670 401 
 
 V. Howarth, 11 Cox C. C. 588 442 
 
 V. Howell, I Den. C. C. i 104 
 
 V. Hunt, I Cox C. C. 177 488 
 
 V. James, i Cox C. C 78 353 
 V. Jenkins, L. R. i C. C. 187 
 
 103, 105 
 
 V. Jones, I Den. C. C. 166 177 
 
 V. Jordon, 9 C. & P. 118 408 
 
 V. Langford, i C. & M. 602 309 
 
 V. Leng, I F. & F. 77 515 
 
 V. Levy, 8 Cox C. C. 73 515 
 
 V. Lewis, 6 C. & P. 16 90 
 
 V. Lines, i C. & K. 393 416 
 
 V. Lumley, L. R. i C. C. 196 399 
 
 V. J\Larsh, 6 Ad. & E. 236 191 
 
 v. Martin, L. R. i C. C. 502 512 
 
 v. Mathews, 14 Cox C. L. 5 309 
 
 V. Megson, 9 C. & P. 420 410 
 
 V. Miller, 18 Cox C. C. 54 116 
 
 v. Mills, 7 Cox C. C. 263 442 
 
 v. Moore, 3 C. & K. 319 166 
 
 v. Mullins, 3 Cox C. C. 526 74 
 
 V. Murphy, 8 C. & P. 297 493 
 
 V. Murrey, i Salk. 122 526 
 
 V. Naylor, 10 Cox C. C. 149 437 
 V. Nicholas, 2 C. & K. 246 
 
 205, 414 
 
 V. O'Brien, 4 Cr. L. Mag. 42 365 
 
 V. Oldham, 2 Den. C. C. 472 375 
 
 V. Owen, 9 C. & P. 83 71 
 
 V. Parker, i C, & M. 639 468
 
 CVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 Partndge, 6 Cox C. C. 
 
 444 
 458 
 114 
 408 
 179 
 130 
 
 Reg. 
 182 
 
 V. Pascoe, i Den. C. C. 456 
 V. Perkins, 9 C. & P. 396 
 V. Philips, 8 C. & P. 736 
 V. Powell, I C. & P. 97 
 V. Priest, 2 Cox C. C. 378 
 V. Radcliffe, 12 Cox C. C. 474 444 
 V. Richardson, 3 F. & F. 693 
 
 171, 283 
 V. Rovvton, ID Cox C. C. 25 81 
 
 V. Russell, I C. & M. 247 191 
 
 V. Scaife, 5 Cox C. C. 243 262, 264 
 V. Sell, 9 C. & P. 346 144 
 
 V. Shaw, 10 Cox C. C. 66 468 
 
 V. Soley, II Modern 115 488 
 
 V. Sparks, I F. & F. 388 
 V. Stanton, i C. & K. 415 
 V. Steele, 12 Cox C. C. 168 
 V. Thomas, 9 Cox C. C. 376 
 V. Tivey, i Den. C. C. 63 
 V. Turner, 9 Cox C. C. 670 
 V. Tylney, I Den. C. C. 319 
 
 17s, 176 
 V. Unkles, Ir. R. 8 C. L. 50 147 
 V. Vaughan, 8 C. & P. 276 
 V. Virrier, 12 A. & E. 317 
 V. Walker, 2 Moo. & R. 212 
 V. Warman, 2 C. & K. 195 
 V. Whitehead, L. R. i C. C. R, 
 
 33 
 V. Wiggins, 10 Cox C. C. 562 
 V. Wilson, 2 C. & K. 527 
 V. Wood, 5 Jur. 295 
 V. Woodfield, 16 Cox C. C. 
 
 314 
 V. Young, 10 Cox C. C. 371 
 Regan v. State, 46 Wis. 256 
 Reggel, Ex parte, 114 U. S. 642 
 Reid V. State, 20 Ga. 681 
 V. State, 81 Ga. 760 
 Reilley v. State, 14 Ind. 217 
 Reinhold v. State, 130 Ind. 467 
 
 215, 
 
 Reitz V. State, 33 Ind. 187 386, 525 
 Rembert v. State, 53 Ala. 467 
 
 419. 430 
 Remsen v. People, 43 N. Y. 6 79, 80 
 Renfroe v. State, 84 Ark. 10 
 
 88, 342, 418 
 
 71 
 417 
 105 
 116 
 308 
 401 
 
 422 
 468 
 409 
 314 
 
 203 
 
 131 
 
 421 
 82 
 
 512 
 75 
 356 
 497 
 121 
 521 
 124 
 
 491 
 
 Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 573 179 
 Respublica v. Teischer, i Dall. 
 
 (Pa.) 335 307 
 V. Shaffer, i Dall. (U. S.) 236 25 
 Rex V. Addis, 6 C. & P. (Mass.) 
 
 299 74 
 
 V. Ady, 7 C. & P. 140 439 
 
 V. Akers, 6 Esp. I25n 171 
 V. All Saints, 6 [Nlaule & Selw. 
 
 194 188 
 
 V. Atwood, 2 Leach C. D. 521 73 
 
 V. Baker, 2 Mood. & Rob. 53 106 
 
 V. Barker, 3 C. & P. 589 418 
 
 V. Barnard, 7 C. & P. 784 444 
 
 V. Beare, i Ld. Rd. 414 362 
 
 V. Bolland, i Leach C. C. 97 427 
 
 V. Book, I Wils. 340 527 
 
 V. Bowman, 6 C. & P. loi 195 
 
 V. Burdett, 4 B. & Aid. 95 6, 7 
 
 V. Chappie, R. & R. C C. 77 310 
 
 V. Clarke, 2 Starkie 214 418 
 V. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221 
 
 90, 133, 147a. 317, 493 
 
 V. Codrington, i C. & P. 661 439 
 
 V. Coe, 6 Car. & P. 403 349 
 
 V. Cook, I Leach Cr. L. 123 32 
 
 V. Crockett, 4 C. & P. 544 103 
 
 V. Dawson, i Stra. 19 419 
 
 V. Dean of Asaph, 3 T. R. 428 273 
 
 V. Derrington, 2 C. & P. 418 135 
 V. Dixon, 3 Burr. 1687 
 
 172, 175, 252 
 
 V. Dunn, i Moody C. C. 146 89 
 
 V. Edwards, 4 T. R. 449 206 
 
 V. Ellis, 6 B. & Cr. 145 88 
 
 V. Ely, 12 Viner's Abr. 118 102 
 
 V. Ford, 2 Salk. 690 207 
 
 V. Frederick, 2 Stran. 1095 188 
 
 V. Fursey, 6 Car. & Paj-ne 81 91 
 
 V. Gilham, i Moody C. C. 186 177 
 
 V. Gray, 68 J. P. 327 414 
 
 V. Griffin, 6 Cox Cr. Cas. 219 177 
 
 V. Groombridge, 7 C. & P. 582 408 
 
 V. Halloway, i C. & P. 127 296 
 
 V. Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 199 171 
 
 V. Hargrave, 5 Car. & P. 170 346 
 
 V. Haworth, 4 Car. & P. 254 425 
 
 V. Hay, 2 C. & P. 458 295 
 
 V. Haydn, 2 F. & S. 379 175 
 
 V. Holy Trinity, 7 B. & C. 611 44
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 evil 
 
 [References a> 
 Rex V. Hutchinson, 2 B. & C. 608 106 
 V. Jackson, 3 Campb. 370 444 
 
 V. Jagger, i East P. C. 455 185 
 V. Jarvis, 2 iMoo. & R. 40 75 
 
 V. Jolliffe, 4 T. R. 285 266 
 
 V. Jones, 2 C. & P. 629 147a 
 
 V. Kinloch, 18 How. St. Tr. 
 
 395 203 
 
 V. Lara, 6 T. R. 565 435 
 
 V. Lawley, 2 Str. 904 255 
 
 V. Lloyd, 4 C. & P. 233 106, 140 
 V. Locker, 5 Esp. 107 188 
 
 V. Luffe, 8 East 193 527 
 
 V. Maidstone, 12 East 550 527 
 
 V. Marsh, 6 Ad. & El. 236 26 
 
 V. Martin, 6 C. & P. 562 418 
 
 V. Mead, 2 B. & C. 605 106 
 
 V. Merthyr Tidvil, i B. & Ad. 
 
 29 44 
 
 Moffatt, 2 Leach C. C. 483 430 
 Mosly, I Mood C. C. 98 105 
 Mott, I Leach C. C. 85 310 
 
 Moyle, 2 East P. C. 1076 310 
 Osmer, 5 East 304 446 
 
 Partridge, 7 Car. & P. 551 300 
 Phillips, 3 Camp. 73 349 
 
 Pike, 3 C. & P. 598 114 
 
 Plumber, 2 K. B. 339 144 
 
 Plympton, 2 Ld. Raym. 
 
 1377 451 
 
 Priddle, 2 Leach C. L. 496 206 
 Reason, i Str. 499 112 
 
 Rooney, 7 C. & P. 517 88, 91 
 Rudd, Cowp. 331 72 
 
 Sergeant, I Ry. & Mood 352 185 
 Shukard, Russ. & Ry. 200 424 
 Simons, 6 C. & P. 540 135 
 
 Smith, I Mood. C. C. 289 188 
 Smith, Russ. & Ry. 417 371 
 
 Sourton, 5 Ad. & E. 180 527 
 
 Sparkes, Peake N. P. 78 177 
 Spilsbury, 7 C. & P. 187 136 
 
 Stannard, 7 C. & P. 763 76, 79 
 Sutton, 3 Adol. & E. 597 21 
 
 Swallow, 31 How. St. Tr. 
 
 971 73 
 V. Thompson, i Mood. C. C. 
 
 78 293 
 
 V. Thornton, i Mood. C. C. 27 143 
 
 V. Tippet, R. & R. 509 147 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 Rex V. Turner, 5 IMaule & Selw. 
 
 206 24a 
 
 V. Turner, 6 How. St. Tr. 565 79 
 V. Vaughan, 2 Doug. 516 461 
 
 V. Wade, i Mood. C. C. 86 
 
 203, 205 
 V. Walter, 7 C. & P. 267 133 
 
 V. Walters, 7 Car. & P. 250 314 
 V. Watson, 32 How. St. Tr. i 171 
 V. Watson. 2 Stark. 104 8, 54 
 
 V. Warickshall, r Leach Cr. L. 
 
 298 137 
 
 V. Wedge, 5 Car. & P. 298 342 
 
 V. Westbeer, i Leach C. L. 14 71 
 V. Wheeler, i W. Bl. 311 461 
 
 V. White, 2 Leach Cr. L. 482 
 
 201, 203, 205 
 V. Whitney, I INIood. C. C. 3 310 
 V. Wilkes," 7 C. & P. 272 74 
 
 V. Williams, 7 C. & P. 320 
 
 205, 414 
 V. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2661 273, 364 
 V. Wyatt, 73 L. J. K. B. 15 88 
 
 Reyes v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 422 323 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 346 234 
 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 422 520 
 
 Reynolds v. State, 68 Ala. 502 107 
 
 V. State, 115 Ind. 421 524 
 
 V. State, 147 Ind. 3 187, 241, 358 
 
 407 
 
 (N. 
 
 417 
 264 
 
 145 
 87 
 70 
 
 V. State, 27 Neb. 90 
 
 V. People, 41 How. Pr 
 
 Y.) 179 
 V. United States, 98 U. S. 145 
 260, 
 Rhea v. State, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 
 257 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 138 
 Rhodes v. State, 141 Ala. 66 
 
 V. State, 128 Ind. 189 15, 235, 348 
 Rhyne v. Hofifman, 6 Jones Eq. 
 
 (N. Car.) 335 ^ 526 
 
 Rice V. Commonwealth, 31 Ky. L. 
 1354 398, 403 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. St. 
 
 408 68 
 
 V. Rice, 47 N. J. Eq. 559 53. 252 
 V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 215 138 
 V. State (Tex.), 112 S. W. 
 
 299 161 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 38 418
 
 cvm 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References a) 
 Rice V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 
 569 103 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 648 
 
 73, 242 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 255 
 
 103, 105, 121 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 149 
 
 318, 319a 
 Rich V. United States, i Okla. 
 
 354 467 
 
 Richards v. Commonwealth, 107 
 
 Va. 881 106, 238, 314 
 
 V. State, 91 Tenn. 723 59, 2^2 
 
 V. State, S3 Tex. Cr. 400 492 
 
 V. State, 82 Wis. 172 iii, 124 
 
 Richardson v. Commonwealth, 80 
 
 Va. 124 S7 
 
 V. People, 31 111. 170 524 
 
 V. State, 145 Ala. 46 127, 314, 374a 
 
 V. State, 47 Ark. 562 519 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 42 S. W. 996 378 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 486 334 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. 346 381, 384 
 
 Richburger v. State, 90 Miss. 806 137 
 
 Richels v. State, i Sneed (Tenn.) 
 
 606 354 
 
 Richie v. State, 85 Ark. 413 269 
 
 Richmond v. State, 19 Wis. 307 533 
 Rickerstricker v. State, 31 Ark. 
 
 207 189 
 
 Ridenour v. State, 65 Ind. 411 484 
 
 V. State, 38 Ohio St. 272 359 
 
 Ridgell V. State, 156 Ala. 10 238 
 
 Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371 477 
 
 Riggs V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 33 S. W. 413 356 
 
 V. State, 104 Ind. 261 358 
 
 V. State, 30 Miss. 635 320, 328 
 
 Riley v. State, 88 Ala. 193 224 
 
 V. State, 132 Ala. 13 364 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 18 So. 117 342 
 
 V. State, I Ga. App. 651 6 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 44 S. W. 498 429 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. 763 286 
 
 Riley's Case, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 172 507 
 
 Rinker v. United States, 151 Fed. 
 
 755 429 
 
 Ripley v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 126 
 
 ■491, 494 
 Risk V. State, 19 Ind. 152 386, 525 
 
 ■e to Sections.] 
 
 Risner v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 80 S. W. 457 271 
 
 Ritchey v. People, 47 Pac. 272 204 
 
 Ritter v. State, 33 Tex. 608 309 
 
 Rivers v. State, 97 Ala. 72 248 
 
 V. State, 20 Tex. App. 177 207 
 
 Rixford V. Miller, 49 Vt. 319 263 
 
 Rizzolo V. Commonwealth, 126 
 Pa. St. 54 130 
 
 Robbins v. Budd, 2 Ohio 16 195 
 
 V. People, 95 111. 175 475 
 
 V. Smith, 47 Conn. 182 533 
 
 V. Springfield &c. R. Co., 165 
 
 Mass. 30 224 
 
 V. State, 8 Ohio St. 131 iir 
 
 Robb's Petition, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 442 226 
 
 Roberts v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. 
 L. 219 245 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 449 225 
 V. People, 19 Mich. 401 166 
 
 V. Reilly, 116 U. S. 90 497, 499 
 V. State, 122 Ala. 47 67 
 
 V. State, 55 Ga. 220 69 
 
 V. State, 72 Ga. 673 259 
 
 V. State, 123 Ga. 146 312, 315, 323 
 V. State, 5 Tex. App. 141 no 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 378 103 
 V. State, 84 Wis. 361 529 
 
 Robertson v. Commonwealth 
 (Va.), 22 S. E. 359 23 
 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 206 296 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 441 74 
 
 Robinson v. People, 159 111. 115 130 
 V. State (Ala. 1908), 45 So. 
 
 916 338 
 
 V. State (Ga. App. 1909), 65 
 
 S. E. 792 398, 401 
 
 V. State, 82 Ga. 535 214, 446, 462 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 198 330 
 
 V. State, 128 Ga. 254 263 
 
 V. State, 130 Ga. 361 
 
 103, 104, I TO, 166 
 V. State, 87 Ind. 292 40, 133 
 
 V. State, 113 Ind. 510 292, 293 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 48 S. W. 176 
 
 269, 305 
 V. State, 24 Tex. 152 476 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. 170 353 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 104 209
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CIX 
 
 [References ai 
 
 Robnett v. People, i6 111. App. 
 
 299 221 
 
 Robson V. State, ?>2> Ga. 166 
 
 36, 282, 288 
 
 V. Thomas, 55 Mo. 581 23 
 
 Rocco V. State, 2>7 Miss. 357 195, 197 
 
 Roch V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 48 325 
 
 Rodgers v. State, 50 Ala. 102 21, 314 
 
 V. State, 144 Ala. 32 325 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 510 414 
 
 Rodifer v. State, 74 Ind. 21 476 
 
 Rodriguiz v. State, 20 Tex. App. 
 
 542 408 
 
 Rodriquez v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 259 48, 315, 336 
 
 Roelker, In re, Sprague Dec. 276 226 
 Roesel v. State, 62 N. J. L. 216 
 
 127, 130 
 
 Rogers v. Bullock, 3 N. J. L. 109 258 
 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 192 17 
 
 V. State, 60 Ark. 76 189 
 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 691 57 
 
 V. State, 129 Ga. 589 517, 522 
 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 404 119a 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 221 469 
 
 V. State, 77 Vt. 454 159 
 
 Rohr V. State, 60 N. J. L. 576 422 
 
 Rollings V. State (Ala.), 49 So. 
 
 329 24s, 314, 322 
 
 Rollins V. State (Tex.), 20 S. W. 
 358 269 
 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 148 425 
 
 Rolls V. State, 52 Miss. 391 232 
 
 Romanes, Ex parte, i Utah 23 499 
 Ronan v. Dugan, 126 Mass. 176 532 
 Roode V. State, 5 Neb. 174 430 
 
 Roody V. People, 43 Mich. 34 144 
 
 Rooney v. State, 51 Neb. 576 298 
 
 Roper V. State, 58 N. J. L. 420 174 
 Rociuemore v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 542 122 
 
 Rosales v. State, 22 Tex. App. 673 441 
 Rosaman v. Okolona, 85 Miss. 
 
 583 486 
 
 Rose V. State, 143 Ala. 114 105 
 
 V. State, 13 Ohio C. C. 342 54, 124 
 
 Rosemond v. State, 86 Ark. 160 320 
 
 Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 
 
 29 478 
 
 Ross' Case, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 165 507 
 
 c to Sections.'] 
 Ross, Ex parte, 2 Bond. (Ohio) 
 
 252 503 
 
 Ross V. People, 34 111. App. 21 530 
 V. State, 74 Ala. 532 120 
 
 V. State, 139 Ala. 144 60, 81, 245 
 V. State, 169 Ind. 388 224 
 
 V. State, 116 Ind. 495 59 
 
 V. State, 67 Md. 286 126 
 
 Rosson V. State, 2;^ Tex. App. 
 
 287 207 
 
 Roszczyniala v. State, 125 Wis. 
 
 414 58a 
 
 Roten V. State, 31 Fla. 514 324 
 
 Rothschild v. State, 13 Lea 
 
 (Tenn.) 294 442 
 
 Rouch V. Great West R. R. Co., 
 
 I Q. B. 51 96 
 
 Rounds V. State, 57 Wis. 45 267 
 
 Rountree v. State, 88 Ga. 457 72 
 
 Rouse V. State, 2 Ga. App. 184 214 
 Roush V. State, 34 Neb. 325 421 
 
 Roussell V. Commonwealth, 28 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 930 270 
 
 Routt V. State, 61 Ark. 594 358 
 
 Rowell V. Fuller. 59 Vt. 688 50 
 
 Rowland v. State, 45 Ark. 132 493 
 Rowsey v. Commonwealth, 116 
 
 Ky. 617 103 
 
 Royce v. Territory, 5 Okla. 61 26 
 
 Ruby V. State, 9 Tex. App. 353 192 
 Ruch V. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 693 266 
 Rucker v. State, 2 Ga. App. 140 147 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 222 304 
 
 Rudy V. Commonwealth, 128 Pa. 
 
 St. 500 14, 119a, 154 
 
 Rufer V. State, 25 Ohio St. 464 127 
 Ruffin V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 565 69, 451, 46s 
 
 Ruloff V. People, 18 N. Y. 179 7 
 
 V. People, 45 N. Y. 213 50, 67 
 
 Runnels v. State, 28 Ark. 121 71 
 
 Runles v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 555 125 
 
 Rush V. Smith, T Cr. M. & R. 94 220 
 V. State (Tex.), 76 S. W. 927 
 
 270, 227, 329 
 Rusher v. State, 94 Ga. 363 138 
 
 Russell V. Jackson, 9 Hare 387 
 
 17s, 177, 179
 
 ex 
 
 TAELE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ay 
 Russell V. State (Ala.), 38 So. 
 291 51, 296, 372, 375 
 
 V. State, 66 Ark. 185 398 
 
 V. State, 51 Fla. 124 430 
 
 V. State, 77 Neb. 519 
 
 68, 387, 390, 392 
 
 V. State, S7 Tex. Cr. App. 314 120 
 
 Ruston V. State, 4 Tex. App. 432 54 
 
 Ruston's Case, i Leach Cr. L. 455 204 
 
 Ruth V. State (Wis. 1909), 122 
 
 N. W. 733 45 
 
 Rutherford v. Commonwealth, 78 
 
 Ky. 639 230 
 
 Ryan v. City of Chicago, 124 111. 
 App. 188 447 
 
 V. People, 79 N. Y. 593 
 
 61, 118, 119, 120, 245 
 
 V. State, 45 Ga. 128 
 
 V. State, 104 Ga. 78 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 35 S. W. 288 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 699 
 
 V. State, 83 Wis. 486 118. 215, 
 
 V. Territory (Ariz.), 100 Pac. 
 
 770 59, 354 
 
 V. United States, 26 App. D. 
 
 C. 74 
 Ryder v. State, 100 Ga. 528 
 
 439 
 435 
 325 
 35 
 378 
 
 268 
 
 Sabins v. Jones, 119 Mass. 167 532 
 Saffer v. United States, 87 Fed. 
 
 329 220, 222 
 
 Sage V. State, 91 Ind. 141 i6r, 162 
 V. State, 127 Ind. 15 40, 248, 261 
 Sahlinger v. People, 102 111. 241 
 
 299, 378 
 Sailsberry v. Commonwealth, 32 
 
 Ky. L. 1085 no, 112 
 
 Saint V. State, 68 Ind. 128 528 
 
 Sale V. Crutchfield, 8 Bush (Ky.) 
 
 636 533 
 
 Sample v. Frost, 10 Iowa 266 173 
 
 Samuel v. People, 164 111. 379 247 
 
 Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y. 147 
 
 160, 163 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. App. 14 480 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 179 127 
 
 Sanders v, Bagwell, 37 S. Car. 
 
 145 214 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Sanders v. Commonwealth, 13 
 Ky. L. 820 
 V. People, 124 111. 218 
 V. State, 148 Ala. 603 
 V. State, 113 Ga. 267 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 329 
 V. State, 85 Ind. 318 
 V. State, 94 Ind. 147 157, 164, 
 V. State, 73 Miss. 444 
 Sanderson v. State, 169 Ind. 301 
 
 90, 333, 491, 492, 
 Sands v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 800 
 Sanford v. State, 143 Ala. 78 
 
 108, 267, 
 Sang V. Beers, 20 Neb. 365 
 Santo V. State, 2 Iowa 165 
 Sapp V. King, 66 Tex. 570 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 77 S. W. 456 
 235, 
 Sarah v. State, 28 Ga. 576 
 Sargent v. Cavis, 36 Cal. 552 
 Sarles, In re, 4 City H. R. (N. 
 
 Y.) 107 
 Sartorious v. State, 24 Miss. 602 
 
 223, 
 Sasse V. State, 68 Wis. 530 
 Sasser v. State, 129 Ga. 541 
 
 151, 222, 
 V. State, 13 Ohio 453 428, 
 
 Sater v. State, 56 Ind. 37S 
 Satterwhite v. State, 28 Ala. 65 
 Sattler v. People, 59 111. 68 
 Saucier v. State (Miss.), 48 So. 
 
 840 
 Saunders v. State, 10 Tex. App. 
 
 336 
 Saunderson v. State, 151 Ind. 550 
 Saussy v. South Florida R. Co., 
 
 22 Fla. 327 
 Sawyer v. People, 91 N. Y. 667 
 
 81, 85, 
 Sawyers v. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 
 
 694 
 
 Saxon V. State, 96 Ga. 739 40, 
 Saye v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 569 
 Savior V. Commonwealth, 122 
 ky. 776 
 
 331 
 86a 
 117 
 140 
 147 
 144 
 318 
 
 493 
 
 422 
 
 332 
 532 
 24a 
 253 
 
 297 
 130 
 249 
 
 434 
 
 225 
 230 
 
 323 
 432 
 153 
 524 
 309 
 
 467 
 
 144 
 461 
 
 243 
 338 
 
 153 
 246 
 
 77 
 462
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Sayres v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. 
 
 St. 291 2,33 
 
 Schanzenbach v. Brough, 58 111. 
 
 App. 526 237 
 
 Scharf V. People, 34 111. App. 400 532 
 Schaser v. State, 2,(> Wis. 429 222, 
 Schissler v. State, 122 Wis. 365 163 
 Schlemmer v. State, 51 N. J. L. 
 
 23 94, 100 
 
 Schlencker v. State, 9 Neb. 241 
 
 161, 166 
 Schmidt v. United States, 133 
 
 Fed. 257 468 
 
 Schnicker v. People, 88 N. Y. 
 
 192 100 
 
 Schnier v. People, 23 111. ir 227 
 
 Schnitz V. People, 178 111. 320 17, 283 
 Schoenfeldt v. State, 39 Tex. 
 
 App. 69s 74, 75, 395 
 
 Schoolcraft v. People, 117 111. 271 
 
 328, 329 
 Schoudel v. State, 57 N. J. L. 
 
 209 384 
 
 Schroeder v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 I I I 484 
 
 Schubkagel v. Dierstein, 131 Pa. 
 
 St. 46 173 
 
 Schults V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 351 414 
 Schultz V. State, 133 Wis. 215 
 
 492, 494 
 V. Territorjs 5 Ariz. 239 152, 158 
 Schuster v. State, 80 Wis. 107 
 
 150, 212, 213, 23s 
 Schutz V. State, 125 Wis. 452 494 
 
 Schwantes v. State, 127 Wis. 160 6, 7 
 Schwartz v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 App.), 114 S. W. 809 75 
 
 Schwen v. State, 27 Tex. Cr. 2>^2> 492 
 Sconyers v. State, 85 Ga. 672 517 
 
 Scott V. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378 
 
 525, 533 
 V. People, 141 111. 195 
 
 276, 277, 345, 348, 349 
 V. People, 62 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 62 440 
 
 V. State, 94 Ala. 80 484 
 
 V. State, 113 Ala. 64 248 
 
 V. State, 141 Ala. i 318 
 
 V. State, 42 Ark. 7:^ 35, 298 
 
 V. State, 63 Ark. 310 74 
 
 io Sections.\ 
 
 Scott V. State, 3 Ga. App. 479 
 V. State, 119 Ga. 425 
 V. State, 122 Ga. 138 373, 
 
 V. State, 64 Ind. 400 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 31 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 164 
 
 Scoville V. State (Tex.), 81 S. 
 W. 117 
 
 Scruggs V. State, 90 Tenn. 81 
 
 340, 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 622 
 Seaborn v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 80 S. W. 223 
 Searcy v. State, 28 Tex. App. 513 
 Searls v. People, 13 111. 597 381, 
 Seifert v. State, 160 Ind. 464 
 Seitz V. Seitz, 170 Pa. St. 71 
 Selby V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 25 Ky. L. 2209 97, 
 
 Selden v. State, 74 Wis. 271 
 Self V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 455 
 Sellers v. People, 6 111. 183 
 Semon v. People, 42 Mich. 141 
 
 523, 
 Sentell v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 260 
 Settle V. Alison, 8 Ga. 201 
 Sewall V. Robbins, 139 Mass. 164 
 Sexton V. State (Ark., 1909), 121 
 S. W. 1075 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 497 
 
 Seymour, Ex parte, 14 Pick. 
 
 (Mass.) 40 507, 
 
 Shackelford v. State, 32, Ark. 539 
 
 262, 
 
 Shaffer v. State, ^2 Ind. 221 
 
 V. State, 100 Ind. 365 
 
 V. United States, 24 App. D. 
 
 C. 417 SO, 
 
 Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 
 
 Pa. St. 60 
 Shailer v. Bullock, 78 Conn. 65 
 Shannahan v. Commonwealth, 8 
 Bush (Ky.) 463 164, 
 
 Shannon v. Swanson, 208 111. 52 
 Sharkey v. State, ^2, Miss. 353 
 Sharp V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 30 S. W. 414 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky. 1909), 
 
 124 S. W. 316 
 V. People, 29 111. 464 
 
 414 
 300 
 378 
 222 
 166 
 238 
 
 273 
 
 341 
 
 522 
 
 48 
 138 
 384 
 180 
 187 
 
 145 
 176 
 330 
 144 
 
 524 
 241 
 500 
 221 
 
 410 
 61 
 
 510 
 
 267 
 440 
 440 
 
 211 
 
 525 
 
 166 
 205 
 471 
 
 232 
 
 508 
 357
 
 exn 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ai 
 
 Sharp V. State, 51 Ark. 147 
 
 215 
 
 V. State, 17 Ga. 290 
 
 24 
 
 V. State, S2, N. J. L. 511 
 
 437 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 211 
 
 
 293, 
 
 294 
 
 Shattuck V. State, 51 Miss. 575 
 
 463 
 
 Shaw, Ex parte, 61 Cal. s8 
 
 254 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.), 105 S. W. 
 
 
 500 
 
 268 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 236 
 
 364 
 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. App. 155 
 
 133 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 379 
 
 384 
 
 Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51 87, 
 
 247 
 
 Sheehan v. People, 131 111. 22 152, 
 
 220 
 
 Sheehy v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 269 
 
 96 
 
 Shelby v. Commonwealth, 91 Ky. 
 
 
 S63 
 
 493 
 
 Sheldon, Ex parte, 34 Ohio St. 
 
 
 319 
 
 499 
 
 Shelly V. State, 95 Tenn. 152 
 
 395 
 
 Shelton v. State, 143 Ala. 98 
 
 430 
 
 V. State, 132 Ga. 413 
 
 521 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. 431 
 
 488 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 627 
 
 269 
 
 Shepard, In re, 3 Fed. 12 
 
 251 
 
 V. United States, 160 Fed. 584 
 
 479 
 
 Shepherd v. People, 72 111. 480 
 
 316 
 
 V. People, 25 N. Y. 406 
 
 195 
 
 V. State, 31 Neb. 389 
 
 215 
 
 Shepherd's Case, 2 Leach C. C. 
 
 
 609 
 
 310 
 
 Shepler v. State, 114 Ind. 194 
 
 196 
 
 Shepperd v. State, 94 Ala. 102 
 
 
 12, 
 
 299 
 
 Sheridan's Case, 31 How. St Tr. 
 
 
 543 
 
 49 
 
 Sherman v. People, 13 Hnn (N. 
 
 
 Y.) 575 
 
 404 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 148 
 
 58a 
 
 Sherrill v. State, 138 Ala. 3 
 
 
 6, 118, 
 
 233 
 
 Sherrod v. State, 90 Miss. 856 
 
 238 
 
 Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35 
 
 484 
 
 V. State, 2i2 Tex. Cr. 498 
 
 418 
 
 Shiflett V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 530 
 
 493 
 
 Shilling V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 
 326 
 
 74 
 
 Shinn v. Commonwealth, 32 
 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 899 282, 
 
 293 
 
 'c to Sections.^ 
 Shipp V. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 
 
 643 
 Shires v. State (Okla.), 99 Pac. 
 
 1 100 276, 
 
 Shirley v. State, 144 Ala. 35 262, 
 V. State (Tex.), 22 S. W. 42 
 308, 
 Shirwin v. People, 69 111. 55 
 
 270, 414, 415, 
 Shivers v. State, 53 Ga. 149 
 Shley V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 190 
 Shoemaker v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 App., 1910), 126 S. W. 887 
 Shorey v. Hussey, :i2 Me. 579 
 Short V. Commonwealth, 9 Ky. 
 
 L- 255 
 Shorter v. State, 62, Ala. 129 
 Showalter v. State, 84 Ind. 562 67 
 Shreveport v. Bowen, 116 La. 522 
 Shriedley v. State, 23 Ohio St. 
 
 130 
 Shrivers v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 450 
 Shubrick v. State, 2 S. Car. 21 
 Shular v. State, 105 Ind. 289 
 Shuler v. State, 126 Ga. 630 
 Shultz V. State, 5 Tex. App. 390 
 Shumate v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 
 
 266 
 Shumway v. State, 82 Neb. 152 
 
 118, 
 Shurley v. State, 144 Ala. 35 
 Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677 
 
 12, 48, 82, 233, 315, 
 Sidelinger v. Bucklin, 64 Me. 371 
 
 52s, 531, 
 
 Siebert v. People, 143 111. 571 
 
 Sigerella v. State (Del., 1909), 74 
 
 Atl. 1081 408. 
 
 Simmons V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 18 S. W. 534 
 
 V. State (Ala.), 48 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 289 
 V. State, T45 Ala. 61 94, 
 
 V. State, 32 Fla. 387 
 V. State, 88 Ga. 169 
 V. State, IT5 Ga. 574 
 V. State, 61 Miss. 243 126, 
 
 323 
 
 280 
 22,2 
 
 310 
 
 418 
 291 
 
 46 
 
 418 
 
 235 
 
 329 
 
 485 
 68 
 
 471 
 
 99 
 310 
 230 
 489 
 213 
 
 2^2 
 
 lOI 
 
 323 
 
 533 
 58a 
 
 413 
 320 
 
 119 
 223 
 240 
 464 
 124 
 127
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 exiii 
 
 [References at 
 
 Simmons v. State, 7 Ohio ii6 420 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 527 123 
 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 619 387, 392 
 
 Simon v. State, 108 Ala. 2y 312 
 
 V. State, 36 Miss. 636 130 
 
 V. State, 37 Miss. 288 130 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 186 396, 397 
 
 Simons v. People, 150 111. 66 103 
 
 Simpson v. Commonwealth, 126 
 
 Ky. 441 70, 74 
 
 V. State, III Ala. 6 374a 
 
 V. State, 78 Ga. 91 248 
 
 V. State, 31 Ind. 99 232 
 
 V. State, 56 Miss. 297 232 
 
 V. State, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 356 488 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 320 342 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 77 470 
 
 V. Yeend, L. R. 4 Q. B. 626 455 
 
 Sims V. Sims, 75 N. Y. 466 209 
 
 V. State, 15s Ala. 96 425 
 
 V. State, 43 Ala. 33 279 
 
 V. State, 139 x-Vla. 74 
 
 105, no, 112, 325 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 109 121, 223 
 
 V. State, I Ga. App. 776 21, 473 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 649 197 
 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 358 373 
 
 V. State, 88 Tex. Cr. 637 221, 327 
 Sindram v. People, 88 N. Y. 190 
 
 85, 324 
 Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297 207 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1909), 
 
 124 S. W. 92 328 
 
 Sisk V. State (Tex.), 42 S. W. 
 98s 268 
 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 432 218 
 
 Sizemorev. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 108 S. W. 254 269 
 
 Skaggs V. State (Ark.), 113 S. 
 W. 346 409, 413 
 
 V. State, 108 Ind. 53 204, 227 
 
 Skains v. State, 21 Ala. 218 488 
 
 Skates v. State, 64 Miss. 644 270 
 
 Skeen v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 308 485 
 Skidmore v. State (Tex. Cr. App., 
 1909), 123 S. W. 1 129 4Ta 
 
 V. State, 43 Tex. 93 356 
 
 Skiff V. People, 2 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 Y-) 139 439. 442 
 
 Skinner v. State, 108 Ga. 747 i6a 
 
 viii — Underhill Crim. Evidence. 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Skipworth v. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 
 135 270 
 
 Slade V. State, 29 Tex. App. 381 23 
 Slater v. United States, i Okla. 
 
 Cr. 275 519 
 
 Slattery v. People, 76 111. 217 
 
 122, 123, 344 
 Sledge V. State, 99 Ga. 684 358 
 
 Slingerland v. Slingerland, 46 
 
 Minn. 100 267 
 
 Sloan V. People, 47 111. 76 300 
 
 V. State, 71 Miss. 459 470 
 
 V. Torry, 78 Mo. 623 505 
 
 Slocum V. People, 90 111. 274 
 
 19. 339, 392, 393 
 
 Slone V. Commonwealth, 33 Ky. 
 
 L. 266 332 
 
 Small V. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 
 
 St. 304 105 
 
 Smalls V. State, loi Ga. 570 83 
 
 V. State, 102 Ga. 31 222 
 
 Smallwood v. Commonwealth, 17 
 
 Ky. L. 1134 356 
 
 Smartt v. State, 112 Tenn. 539 
 
 t88, 346 
 Smith, Ex parte, 3 McLean C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 121 479, 499 
 
 Smith, In re, 61 Hun (N. Y.) loi 177 
 Smith V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 92 S. W. 610 314 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 9 Ky. L. 
 
 215 329 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 437 
 
 364, 365 
 V. Commonwealth, 10 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 734 138 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 809 7 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 924 414 
 V. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 759 188 
 V. Jerome, 47 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 22 58a 
 
 V. Jones, 76 Me. 138 258 
 
 V. Lint, 37 Me. 546 523 
 
 V. People, 38 Colo. 509 118, 493 
 V. People, 103 111. 82 299 
 
 V. People, 53 N. Y. ill 435 
 
 V. State, 9 Ala. 990 145 
 
 V. State, 55 Ala. i 167 
 
 V. State, 79 Ala. 21 61
 
 CXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 
 [Ref 
 
 crcnccs ai 
 
 litl 
 
 1 V. State, 96 Ala. 66 
 
 
 484 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 103 Ala. 40 
 
 
 302 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 107 Ala. 139 
 
 
 387 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 108 Ala. i 
 
 
 
 
 32, 58, 391, 
 
 392, 
 
 397 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 142 Ala. 14 
 
 
 
 
 77, -^27, 
 
 325, 
 
 326 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 145 Ala. 17 
 
 
 103 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 147 Ala. 692 
 
 
 122 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 59 Ark. 132 
 
 
 193 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 74 Ark. 397 
 
 
 127 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 29 Fla. 408 36, 
 
 116, 
 
 423 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 48 Fla. 307 
 
 
 103 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 5 Ga. App. 833 
 
 
 74 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 2 Ga. App. 413 
 
 
 36 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 77 Ga. 705 
 
 
 414 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 88 Ga. 627 
 
 
 126 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 106 Ga. 673 
 
 
 118 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 118 Ga. 61 
 
 
 no 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 125 Ga. 296 
 
 
 147 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 126 Ga. 803 
 
 
 280 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 127 Ga. 56 
 
 
 280a 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 69 Ind. 140 
 
 
 484 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 143 Ind. 685 248, 
 
 S17, 
 
 522 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 165 Ind. 180 
 
 
 314 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 22, ^le. 48 
 
 
 344 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 39 Aliss. 521 
 
 353, 
 
 354 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 55 Miss. 513 
 
 
 442 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 67 i\Iiss. 116 
 
 
 196 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 75 Miss. 542 
 
 
 325 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 61 Neb. 296 
 
 
 119a 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 42 Tex. ^/[\ 
 
 229, 
 
 230 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 43 Tex. 433 
 
 
 309 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 43 Tex. 643 
 
 
 312 
 
 V. 
 
 State (Tex.), 20 S. W. 
 
 554 
 
 238 
 
 V. 
 
 State (Tex.), 32 S. W. 
 
 696 
 
 422 
 
 V. 
 
 State (Tex.), 38 S. W. 
 
 200 
 
 74 
 
 V. 
 
 State (Tex.), 78 S. W. 
 
 516 
 
 152 
 
 V. 
 
 State (Tex.). 99 S. W. 
 
 100 
 
 216 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 19 Tex. App. 95 
 
 
 158 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 21 Tex. App. 277 
 
 97 
 
 223 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 31 Tex. Cr. 14 
 
 
 158 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 34 Tex. Cr. 265 
 
 
 290 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 35 Tex. Cr. 6r8 
 
 
 6 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 27 Tex. Cr. 488 
 
 68, 69 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 45 Tex. Cr. 405 
 
 
 374 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 46 Tex. Cr. 267 
 
 233 
 
 491 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 47 Tex. Cr. 267 
 
 
 218 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 48 Tex. Cr. 65 
 
 
 265 
 
 V. 
 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. 27 
 
 
 238 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 Smith V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 80 
 
 225, 369, 413 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 344 
 
 122, 223 
 
 V. State. 53 Tex. Cr. App. 643 138 
 V. United States, 161 U. S. 85 
 
 237, 324 
 V. Young, I Campb. N. P. 439 44 
 Smith's Case, i Leach C. L. 223 73 
 Smith's Case, 2 City Hall Rec. 
 
 (X. Y.) 77 177 
 
 Smurr v. State, 88 Ind. 504 23 
 
 V. State, 105 Ind. 125 195 
 
 Snap V. People, 19 111. 80 310 
 
 Snapp V. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 
 
 173 304 
 
 Sneed v. Territory, 16 Okla. 641 325 
 
 Snell V. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 347 422 
 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 171 486 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 236 105 
 
 Snelling v. State (Tex. Cr. App., 
 
 1909), 123 S. W. 610 492 
 
 Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 89 
 
 Va. 679 224 
 
 Snow V. Gould, 74 Me. 540 174 
 
 Snyder, In re, 17 Kan. 542 439, 442 
 V. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 
 
 519 82, 87 
 
 V. State, 145 .A.la. 23 238 
 
 V. State, 151 Ind. 553 461 
 
 Sokel V. People. 212 111. 238 405 
 
 Solander v. People, 2 Colo. 48 68, 348 
 Solomon v. State, 2 Ga. App. 92 102 
 Somers v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 475 263 
 Sonnenberg v. State, 124 Wis. 
 
 124 524 
 
 Soquet V. State, 72 Wis. 659 318 
 
 Sorenson v. United States, 143 
 
 Fed. 820 134 
 
 Sort V. State, 4 Harr. (Del.) 568 532 
 Sosat V. State, 2 Ind. App. 586 310 
 Soto V. Territory (.Ariz.), 94 Pac. 
 
 I 104 98 
 
 South V. People, 98 111. 261 
 
 136, 147, 404 
 V. State, 86 Ala. 617 70, 71 
 
 Southern Railway News Co. v. 
 Russell, 91 Ga. 808 247
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXV 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Southwick V. Sonthwick, 2 Sweeny 
 
 (N. Y. Super.) 234 186 
 
 Southworth v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 
 
 532 60, 235 
 
 Sowder v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush 
 
 (Ky.) 432 14 
 
 Sparf V. United States, 156 U. S. 
 
 51 275 
 
 Sparks v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 
 
 644 71 
 
 Sparrenberger v. State, 53 Ala. 
 
 481 26, 191 
 
 Spearman v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 
 
 279 138 
 
 Spears v. People, 220 111. 72 422 
 
 V. State, 92 Miss. 613 2i^7, 374a 
 Speer v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 273 444 
 Speight V. State, 80 Ga. 51 37 
 
 Spence v. Thompson, 11 Ala. 746 457 
 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. 
 
 L. 880 _ 333 
 
 V. Commonwealth, Leigh (Va.) 
 
 751 37 
 
 Spenrath v. State (Tex.), 48 S. 
 
 W. 192 387, 390 
 
 Spicer V. Commonwealth, 21 Ky. 
 
 L. 528 125 
 
 Spies V. People, 122 111. i 
 
 12, 60, 236, 335, 490, 492 
 Spigner v. State, 103 Ala. 30 277 
 
 Spires v. State, 50 Fla. 121 233 
 
 Spittorff V. State, 108 Ind. 171 
 
 119a, 296 
 Spraggins v. State, 139 Ala. 93 14 
 
 V. State, 150 Ala. 214 14 
 
 Sprague v. State (Tex.), 44 S. 
 
 W. 837 482 
 
 Spratt V. State, 8 Mo. 247 192 
 
 Springer v. State, 102 Ga. 447 69 
 
 V. State, 121 Ga. 155 36, s8a, 484 
 Springfield v. Dalby, 139 111. 34 223 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 81 80, 164 
 
 Sprinkle v. United States, 141 
 
 Fed. 811 93, 94 
 
 Sprouse V. Commonwealth (Ky., 
 
 1909), 116 S. W. 344 312, 328 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 374 63 
 
 Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459 399 
 
 Stacy V. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 
 L. 1242 330a 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Stafford v. State, 50 Fla. 134 328 
 
 V. State, 55 Ga. 591 89, 135 
 
 Stage's Case, 5 City Hall Rec. 
 (N. Y.) 177 143 
 
 Stalcup V. State, 129 Ind. 519 522 
 
 V. State, 146 Ind. 270 60, 325 
 
 Stalker v. State, 4 Conn. 341 433 
 
 Stallings v. State, 47 Ga. 572 126 
 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 220 282, 287 
 
 Stallworth v. State, 146 Ala. 8 333 
 
 Stamper V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 100 S. W. 286 468 
 
 Stanfield v. State, i Ga. App. 
 532 489 
 
 Stanglein v. State, 17 Ohio St. 
 
 453 404, 40s 
 
 Stanley v. Montgomery, 102 Ind. 
 
 102 187 
 
 V. State, 88 Ala. 154 283 
 
 V. State, 82 Miss. 498 318 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 74 S. W. 318 470 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 482 96 
 
 Staples V. State, 89 Tenn. 231 67, 68 
 
 Stapletonv. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 3 S. W. 793 269 
 
 V. Crofts, 83 Eng. C. L. 367 184 
 
 Starck v. State, 63 Ind. 285 293 
 
 Starke v. State, 97 Ga. 193 381 
 
 Starkey v. People, 17 111. 17 102 
 
 Starks v. State, 137 Ala. 9 103, 330 
 
 Starling v. State, 89 Miss. 328 245 
 
 Starr v. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 
 
 193 109 
 
 V. State, 160 Ind. 661 328 
 
 V. United States, 164 U. S. 627 118 
 
 Starror, In re, 63 Fed. 364 251 
 
 State V. Abbatto, 64 N. J. L. 658 133 
 
 V. Abbev, 29 Vt. 60 402, 404 
 
 V. Abbott (W. Va.), 62 S. E. 
 
 693 6, 12 
 
 V. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741 
 
 ICO, 325, 326 
 V. Able, 65 Mo. 357 261, 266, 267 
 V. Abram, 10 Ala. 928 359 
 
 V. Abrams, 131 Iowa 479 
 
 125, 147, 486 
 V. Ackcrman, 64 X. J. L. 99 197 
 V. Adair, 160 Mo. 391 248 
 
 V. Adams (Del.), 65 All. 510 
 
 12, no, 119, 146
 
 CXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 [References ar 
 State V. Adams, 20 Kan. 311 
 
 229, 230, 271 
 V, Adams, 58 Kan. 365 358 
 
 V. Adams, 40 La. Ann. 213 188 
 
 V. Adams, 108 Mo. 208 282, 290 
 V. Adams, 138 N. Car. 688 88 
 
 V. Adamson, 114 Ind. 216 284 
 
 V. Adamson, 43 Minn. 196 246 
 
 V. Addison, 2 S. Car. 356 28 
 
 V. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79 53, 58a 
 V. Ah Lee, 8 Ore. 2x4 102, 230 
 V. Aker (Wash., 1909), 103 
 
 Pac. 420 392, 397 
 
 Aldrich, 50 Kan. 666 103 
 
 Aleck, 41 La. Ann. 83 354 
 
 Alexander, 66 Mo. 148 80 
 
 Alexander, 119 Mo. 447 437 
 
 Alexander, 30 S. Car. 74 154 
 Alexis, 45 La. Ann. 973 246 
 
 Allemand, 25 La. Ann. 525 257 
 Allen, 57 Iowa 431 72, 
 
 Allen, 48 La. Ann. 1387 338 
 
 Allen, III La. 154 328 
 
 Allen, 116 Mo. 548 427 
 
 Allen, 34 Mont. 403 292 
 
 Allen, I Hawks (N. Car.) 
 
 6 434 
 
 Allen, 107 N. Car. 805 247 
 
 Allen, 21 S. Dak. 121 282 
 
 Allisbach, 69 Ind. 50 311 
 
 Allison (S. Dak., 1909), 124 
 
 N. W. 747 415 
 
 Aired, 115 Mo. 471 270 
 
 Altoffer, 3 Ohio Dec. 288 24a 
 Alton, 105 Minn. 410 97, 334 
 Ames, 64 Me. 386 255 
 
 Ames, 90 Minn. 183 451, 454 
 Ames, 91 Minn. 365 451 
 
 Anderson (Conn., 1909), 75 
 
 Atl. 81 482 
 
 Anderson, 140 Iowa 445 380 
 
 Anderson, 47 Iowa 142 435 
 
 Anderson, 51 La. Ann. 1181 2^ 
 Anderson, 120 La. 331 87, 238 
 Anderson, 89 Mo. 312 68 
 
 Anderson, 92 N. Car. 732 
 
 491, 493, 494 
 Anderson, 5 Wash. 350 
 
 24a, 277 
 Andette, 81 Vt. 400 380 
 
 e to Sections. \ 
 
 State V. Andrews, 95 Iowa 451 382 
 V. Andrews, 43 Mo. 470 473 
 
 V. Andrews, 72 S. Car. 257 
 
 40, 222, 325 
 V. Anthony, i McCord (S. 
 
 Car.) 28s 188, 189 
 
 V. Antonio, 3 Brev. (S. Car.) 
 
 562 433 
 
 V. Archer, 54 N. H. 465 250 
 
 V. Ariel, 38 S. Car. 221 320 
 
 V. Armistead, 106 N. Car. 639 
 
 446, 46s 
 V. Armstrong, 48 La. Ann. 314 520 
 V. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335 
 
 402, 404 
 V. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395 
 
 272,, 2<^2, 
 V. Armstrong, 203 ]\Io. 554 
 
 127, 129 
 V. Arnold, 12 Iowa 479 82, 163 
 V. Arnold (Kan., 1909), 100 
 
 Pac. 64 154 
 
 V. Arnold, 206 Mo. 589 280 
 
 V. Arnold, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 184 24, 342, 525 
 
 V. Arnold, 146 N. Car. 602 236 
 V. Arthur, 135 Iowa 48 
 
 371, 374, 492 
 V. Asbell, 57 Kan. 398 6, 312 
 
 V. Ashworth, 50 La. Ann. 94 
 
 no, 112 
 V. Athey. 133 Iowa 382 382 
 
 V. Atkinson, 40 S. Car. 363 6, 58a 
 V. Atkinson, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 677 197 
 
 V. Atterbury, 59 Kan. 237 387, 392 
 V. Aughtry, 49 S. Car. 285 276, 277 
 V. Austin, 113 Mo. 538 507 
 
 V. Austin, 183 Mo. 478 493 
 
 V. Avery, 31 La. Ann. 181 147a 
 
 V. Avery, 113 Mo. 475 6, 61, 221 
 V. Ayers, 8 S. Dak. 517 390 
 
 V. Ayles, 120 La. 661 163 
 
 V. Baans (N. J.), 71 Atl. in 482 
 V. Babb, 76 Mo. 501 296 
 
 V. Babcock, 25 R. I. 224 61 
 
 V. Baber, 74 Mo. 292 163 
 
 V. Bacon, 13 Ore. 143 61 
 
 V. Badger, 69 Vt. 216 loi 
 
 V. Bailey, 79 Conn. 589 48
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CX\11 
 
 State V. Bailey, 
 
 [References are 
 190 Mo. 257 90, 328 
 
 Bailey, 63 W. Va. 558 
 Bain, 43 Kan. 638 
 Baird, 13 Idalio 29 118, 
 
 Baker (Iowa, 1910), 125 X. 
 
 W. 659 
 Baker, 20 Mo. 338 
 Baker, 136 Mo. 74 
 Baker, 209 Mo. ^ ^^ 
 Baker, 58 S. Car. in 
 Baker, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 326 
 271, 
 Baker, 33 W. Va. 319 
 Balch, 136 Mo. 103 
 Baldoser, 88 Iowa 55 
 Baldwin, 79 Iowa 714 
 Baldwin, 36 Kan. i 
 
 292 
 
 119 
 
 381 
 
 26. 191 
 
 240, 411 
 
 66 
 
 130 
 
 272 
 58a 
 358 
 67 
 no 
 
 117, 
 
 106, 
 IIS, 
 
 217, 222, 238, 267, 312, 319 
 Baldwin, 214 Mo. 290 340 
 
 Baldwin, 80 N. Car. 390 465 
 Baldwin, 15 Wash. 15 11 r 
 
 Ballard, 104 Mo. 634 296 
 
 Bailer, 26 W. Va. 90 255 
 
 Ballou, 20 R. I. 607 338 
 
 Bancroft, 22 Kan. 170 284 
 
 Bancroft, 10 X. H. 105 371 
 
 Banister, 35 S. Car. 290 
 
 103, 105, no 
 Banks, 40 La. Ann. 736 74 
 
 Banks, 78 Me. 490 67 
 
 Banner, 149 N. Car. 519 
 
 161, 223, 324 
 Banusik (X. J.), 64 Atl. 
 
 994 129, 140, 147 
 
 Baptiste, 26 La. Ann. 134 
 
 207, 208 
 Barber, 13 Idaho 65 59, 248, 326 
 Barber, 2 Kan. App. 679 248 
 Barfield, 8 Ired. (X. Car.) 
 
 344 324 
 
 Barham, 82 ^To. 67 iig 
 
 Barker, 2:6 Mo. 532 154, 158 
 
 Barksdale, 122 La. 788 326 
 Barnes, 48 La. Ann. 460 214 
 
 Barnes, 32 Me. 530 362 
 
 Barnes, 47 Ore. 592 7 
 
 Barnett, 203 Mo. 640 61 
 
 Barnett, 34 W. Va. 74 485 
 
 Barr, 11 Wash. 481 83 
 
 Barrett, jj7 La. 1086 61, 245 
 
 to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Barrett, 121 La. 1058 419 
 
 V. Barrett, 40 Minn. 65 236, 238 
 V. Barrett (X. Car., 1909), 65 
 
 S. E. 894 368 
 
 V. Barrick, 60 W. Va. 576 418 
 
 V. Barringer, 114 N. Car. 840 488 
 V. Barrington, 198 Mo. 23 
 
 7, 40, 41, 137, 140, 246 
 V. Barrows, 76 Me. 401 71 
 
 V. Bartlett, 127 Iowa 689 414 
 
 V. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 57, 247 
 
 V. Bartlett, 43 X. H. 224 157 
 
 V. Bartlett, n Vt. 650 298 
 
 V. Bartley, 48 Kan. 421 271 
 
 V. Barron, 37 Vt. 57 121 
 
 V. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283 122 
 
 V. Bassett, 34 La. Ann. 1108 
 
 34, 296 
 V. Batchelder, 5 X. H. 549 307 
 
 V. Bateman, 198 Mo. 212 211 
 
 V. Bateman, 3 Ired. (X. Car.) 
 
 474 420 
 
 V. Bates, 23 Iowa 96 446, 447 
 
 V. Bates, 46 La. Ann. 849 87 
 
 V. Bates, 182 Mo. 70 91, 305 
 
 V. Baudoin, 115 La. 837 333 
 
 V. Bauerkemper, 95 Iowa 562 
 
 213. 390, 391, 393 
 V. Bauman, 52 Iowa 68 427 
 
 V. Beach (Ind.), 43 X^. E. 949 
 
 16, 24a 
 V. Beal, 68 Ind. 345 66, 236 
 
 V. Bean, 77 Vt. 38 233, 315 
 
 V. Beasom, 40 X. H. 367 446 
 
 V. Beaucleigh, 92 Mo. 490 69 
 
 V. Beaudet, 53 Conn. 536 
 
 loi, 145, 332 
 V. Bebb, 125 Iowa 494 97, 409, 411 
 V. Becht, 23 Minn. 411 461 
 
 V. Beckner, 194 Mo. 281 78, 323 
 V. Bedard, 65 Vt. 278 150, 409 
 
 V. Beebe, 13 Kan. 589 465 
 
 V. Beebe, 17 Minn. 241 79, 192 
 
 V. Beeman, 51 Wash. 557 371, 378- 
 V. Behan, 113 La. 701 472, 475 
 
 V. Behnnan, 114 X. Car. 797 383 
 V. Belcher, 13 S. Car. 459 185 
 
 V. Bell, 49 Iowa 440 392 
 
 V. Bell, 212 Mo. ni 88, 161, 163 
 V. Bell, 63 X. Car. ggn 33
 
 CXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 State 
 
 [References are 
 V. Belton, 24 S. Car. 185 328 
 Benjamin (R. I.), 71 Atl. 65 
 
 61, 329 
 Benge, 61 Iowa 658 270 
 
 Benham, 7 Conn. 414 195 
 
 Benner, 64 Me. 267 116, 192, 212 
 Bennett, 31 Iowa 24 185 
 
 Bennett, 52 Iowa 724 269 
 
 Bennett, 137 Iowa 427 
 
 41a, 387, 388, 392 
 Bennett, 40 S. Car. 308 
 
 193, 280a 
 Bennett, 21 S. Dak. 396 67 
 
 Benson, 22 Kan. 471 36 
 
 Benson, 28 Minn. 424 507 
 
 Benson, no Mo. 18 436 
 
 Berberick, 38 Mont. 423 
 
 126, 129, 147a, 161 
 Berger, 121 Iowa 581 87 
 
 Berkley, 92 Mo. 41 250, 271 
 
 Berlin, 42 Mo. 572 383 
 
 Bernard, 45 Iowa 234 185 
 
 Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309 
 
 126, 129, 136, 140 
 Bertin, 24 La. Ann. 46 229, 230 
 Bessa, 115 La. 259 77 
 
 Best, III N. Car. 638 193 
 
 Beuerman, 59 Kan. 586 161 
 
 Biango (N. J.), 68 Atl. 125 103 
 Bias, 37 La. Ann. 259 484 
 
 Bibb, 68 Mo. 286 421 
 
 Bibby, 91 Cal. 470 429 
 
 Bickle, 53 W. Va. 597 119 
 
 Bige, 112 Iowa 433 277 
 
 Bigelow, loi Iowa 430 95 
 
 Biggerstaft, 17 Mont. 510 
 
 loi, 331 
 Biggs (Wash., 1910), 107 
 
 Pac. 374 416 
 
 Bingham, 51 Wash. 616 
 
 435, 436, 442 
 Birdwell, 36 La. Ann. 850 328 
 
 86a 
 96, 326 
 
 473 
 
 Birdey, 122 Iowa 102 
 Birks, 199 IMo. 263 
 Bishel, 39 Iowa 42 
 Bishop, 73 X. Car. 44 
 Bishop, 98 N. Car. 773 
 Black, 89 Iowa 737 
 Black, 42 La. Ann. 861 
 
 103, 104, 108, 215 
 
 14s 
 116 
 
 524 
 
 to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Black, 143 Mo. 166 70, 74 
 V. Blackburn, 61 Ark. 407 523 
 
 V. Blackburn (Del. O. & T., 
 
 1892), 75 Atl. 536 124, 320 
 V. Blackburn (Iowa), no N. 
 
 W. 275 414, 418 
 
 V. Blackburn, 136 Iowa 743 237 
 V. Blackburn, 80 N. Car. 474 
 
 103, IDS, III 
 V. Blackley, 138 N. Car. 620 284 
 V. Blackwell, 9 Ala. 79 353 
 
 V. Blaisdell, 33 N. H. 388 207 
 
 V. Blalock, Phil. (N. Car.) 242 208 
 V. Blanchard, 74 Iowa 628 421 
 
 V. Blee, 133 Iowa 725 
 
 221, 326, 331 
 V. Blize, III Mo. 464 468 
 
 V. Blodgett, 50 Ore. 329 
 
 126, 129, 140, 147a 
 V. Bloedow, 45 Wis. 279 359 
 
 V. Bloom. 68 Ind. 54 77 
 
 V. Blue, 136 ]\Io. 41 12, 378 
 
 V. Blunt, 59 Iowa 468 153 
 
 V. Blydenburg, 135 Iowa 264 
 
 ■- 14, 319, 319a, 323 
 V. Bobbitt, 215 Mo. 10 323 
 
 V. Bobbst, 131 Mo. 328 341, 343 
 V. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 335 480 
 V. Bodekee, 34 Iowa 520 
 V. Bogardus, 36 Wash. 297 
 V. Boggan, 133 X. Car. 761 
 V. Bohan, 15 Kan. 407 
 V. Bohanon, 142 N. Car. 695 
 
 103, 126 
 V. Boies, 68 Kan. 167 
 V. Bokien, 14 Wash. 403 
 V. Bollero, 112 La. 850 
 V. Bonar, 71 Kan. 800 
 V. Bond, 12 Idaho 424 
 V. Bonine, 85 Mo. App. 462 363 
 V. Borchert, 68 Kan. 360 415 
 
 V. Bos well, 2 Dev. (X. Car.) 
 
 209 236, 237 
 
 V. Bourne, 21 Ore. 218 249 
 
 V. Bouvy, 124 La. 1054 326 
 
 V. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475 21 
 
 V. Bowles, 70 Kan. 821 451 
 
 V. Bowman, 78 X. Car. 509 318 
 V. Boyd, 178 Mo. 2 81, 245 
 
 V. Boyd, 34 Xeb. 435 452 
 
 12 
 
 281 
 103 
 106 
 
 308 
 
 438 
 
 261, 263 
 
 112 
 
 74, 247
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXIX 
 
 [References ar 
 State V. Boyd, 2 Hill (S. Car.) 
 288 26, 185 
 
 Boyer, 79 Iowa 330 473 
 
 Boyland, 24 Kan. 186 87 
 
 Boyles, 80 S. Car. 352 6r 
 
 Brabham, 108 N. Car. 793 
 
 47, 314, 322 
 
 Bradley, 45 Ark. 31 197 
 
 Bradley, 90 Mo. 160 270 
 
 V. Bradley, 34 S. Car. 136 312 
 
 V. Bradley, 64 Vt. 466 
 
 116, 117, 22>Z, 334 
 V. Brady, 121 Iowa 561 378 
 
 V. Brady, 44 Kan. 435 364 
 
 V. Brady, 124 La. 951 103 
 
 V. Brady, 71 N. J. L. 360 76, 77 
 V. Brame, 6r Minn. loi 282 
 
 V. Brand (N. J. L.), 72 Atl. 
 
 131 369 
 
 V. Brandenburg, 118 Mo. 181 
 
 81, 391 
 V. Brandon, 8 Jones (N. Car.) 
 
 463 154, 157 
 
 V. Branham, 13 S. Car. 389 40, 133 
 V. Brannan, 206 Mo. 636 48, 417 
 V. Branner, 149 N. Car. 559 144 
 V. Brant, 14 Iowa 180 309 
 
 V. Branton, 49 Ore. 86 429 
 
 V. Braskamp, ^7 Iowa 588 21 
 
 V. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 151 388, 390 
 V. Brecht, 41 Minn. 50 
 
 381, 382, 383 
 V. Breckenridge, 67 Iowa 204 
 
 43, 423, 425 
 V. Breckenridge, Z3 La. Ann. 
 
 310 248 
 
 V. Bresland, 59 Minn. 281 482 
 
 V. Brett, 16 Mont. 360 419 
 
 V. Brewer, 33 Ark. 176 488 
 
 V. Brewer, 38 S. Car. 263 523 
 
 V. Brick, 2 Harr. (Del.) 530 307 
 V. Bricker, 135 Iowa 343 408 
 
 V. Bridges, 29 Kan. 138 12 
 
 V. Bridgewater, 171 Ind. i 477 
 
 V. Bridgham, 51 Wash. 18, 109 522 
 V. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202 
 
 88, 92, 188, 381 
 V. Bricn, 32 N. J. L. 414 71 
 
 V. Briggs, 68 Iowa 410 125, 381 
 V. Briggs, 9 R. I. 361 188 
 
 c to Sections."] 
 State V. Brigman, 94 N. Car. 888 
 
 308, 310 
 V. Brin, 30 Minn. 522 294 
 
 V. Bringgold, 40 Wash. 12 40, 448 
 V. Brink, 68 Vt. 659 381, 383 
 
 V. Brinkaus, 34 Minn. 285 387 
 
 V. Brinkley (Ore. 1909), 105 
 
 Pac. 708 125 
 
 V. Brinte, 4 Penn. (Del.) 551 
 
 12, 36, 133, 140, 147a 
 V. Briscoe (Del.), 67 Atl. 154 
 
 12, 435, 437, 441, 444 
 V. Brisk, 199 Mo. 263 2>32> 
 
 V. Britt, 78 N. Car. 439 
 
 525, 526, 532 
 V. Brittain, 117 N. Car. 783 187 
 V. Broadbent, 19 Mont. 467 354 
 V. Brodnax, 91 N. Car. 543 484 
 V. Bronkol, s N. Dak. 507 197 
 
 V. Bronstine, 147 Mo. 520 161 
 
 V. Brooks, 85 Iowa 366 
 
 284, 285, 290 
 V. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542 
 
 118, 119, 135 
 V. Brooks, 4 Hill (S. Car.) 
 
 361 489 
 
 V. Brooks, 79 S. Car. 144 3ZZ 
 
 V. Brookshire, 2 Ala. 303 225 
 
 V. Broughton, 7 Ired. (N. 
 
 Car.) 96 116, 131, 191, 192 
 V. Brow, 64 N. H. 577 343 
 
 V. Brown, 2 Marv. (Del.) 380 
 
 171, 202 
 V. Brown (Iowa 1909), 121 
 
 N. W. 513 381 
 
 V. Brown (Iowa 1910), 124 
 
 N. W. 899 382 
 
 V. Brown, 95 Iowa 381 178 
 
 V. Brown, 100 Iowa 50 241, 246 
 V. Brown, 128 Iowa 24 467 
 
 V. Brown, 54 Kan. 71 4^7 
 
 V. Brown, 55 Kan. 766 418 
 
 V. Brown, 28 La. Ann. 279 189 
 V. Brown, no La. 591 466 
 
 V. Brown, in La. 696 
 
 IDS, 221, 224 
 V. Brown, in La. 170 467, 470 
 V. Brown. 121 La. 599 516 
 
 V. Brown, 63 Mo. 439 325 
 
 V. Brown, 7^ Mo. 631 130
 
 cxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 State V. Brown, i8i Mo. 192 80 
 
 163, 164 
 V. Brown, 188 Mo. 451 
 
 103, 108, 328 
 V. Brown, 38 Mont. 309 294, 298 
 V. Brown, 68 N. H. 200 470 
 
 V. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571 61 
 
 V. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102 
 
 395, 396, 397 
 V. Brown, 28 Ore. 147 95, 248 
 
 V. Brown, 4 R. I. 528 433 
 
 V. Brown, 34 S. Car. 41 79, 80 
 
 V. Brown, 62 W. Va. 546 269 
 
 V. Brownfield, 15 Mo. App. 593 68 
 V. Brownlee, 84 Iowa 473 69 
 
 V. Broxton, 118 La. 126 300 
 
 V. Bruce, 106 N. Car. 792 304 
 
 V. Brunson, 38 S. Car. 263 523 
 
 V. Bryan, 40 Iowa 379 284 
 
 V. Bryan, 34 Kan. 63 391 
 
 V. Bryan, 74 N. Car. 351 135 
 
 V. Bryant, 134 Mo. 246 58 
 
 V. Buckles, 26 Kan. 237 32, 296 
 V. Buckley, 40 Conn. 246 12 
 
 V. Buffington, 20 Kan. 599 186 
 
 V. Bulla, 89 Mo. 595 61 
 
 V. Bullinger, 54 Mo. 142 397 
 
 V. Bundy, 24 S. Car. 439 164 
 
 V. Bunker, 7 S. Dak. 639 523, 525 
 V. Burgdorf, 53 Mo. 65 417 
 
 V. Burgess, 74 N. Car. 272 294 
 
 V. Burk, 88 Iowa 661 87 
 
 V. Burnett, 119 Ind. 392 440 
 
 V. Burnett, 142 N. Car. 577 340 
 V. Burns, 124 Iowa 207 269 
 
 V. Burns, 48 Mo. 438 21, 35, 36 
 V. Burns, 54 Mo. 274 270 
 
 V. Burns, 148 Mo. 167 238, 268 
 V. Burns, 19 Wash. 52 269, 299 
 V. Burwell, 34 Kan. 312 270 
 
 V. Bush, 122 Ind. 42 365 
 
 V. Busse (Iowa), 100 N. W. 
 
 536 147a 
 
 V. Buster, 23 Nev. 346 147a 
 
 V. Butler (Iowa 1910), 125 N. 
 
 W. 196 23^ 
 
 V. Butler, 67 Mo. 59 250 
 
 V. Butler, 178 Mo. 272 451 
 
 V. Butler, 47 S. Car. 25 247 
 
 V. Butman, 15 La. Ann. 166 365 
 
 '€ to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Byers, 16 Mont. 565 261, 492 
 V. Bj^ers, 100 N. Car. 512 248 
 
 V. Byrd, 121 N. Car. 684 326, 338 
 V. Byrne, 47 Conn. 465 
 
 409, 410, 411 
 V. Bj'^song, 112 Iowa 419 82 
 
 V. Cadotte, 17 Mont. 315 48, 205 
 V. Cagle, 114 N. Car. 835 523 
 
 V. Cain, I Hawks (N. Car.) 
 
 352 26 
 
 V. Cain, 9 W. Va. 559 39 
 
 V. Calder, 23 ]\Iont. 504 6 
 
 V. Caldwell, 115 N. Car. 794 105 
 V. Calkins, 73 Iowa 128 248, 429 
 V. Call, 48 N. H. 126 443 
 
 V. Callahan, 100 Minn. 63 238 
 
 V. Callegari, 41 La. Ann. 578 240 
 V. Cambron, 20 S. Dak. 282 482 
 V. Camden, 48 N. J. L. 89 24a 
 
 V. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555 68 
 
 V, Camley, 67 Vt. 322 470 
 
 V. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688 
 
 125, 131, 137, 191, 192, 451 
 V. Campbell, 115 Mo. 391 518 
 
 V. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202 21, 415 
 V. Campbell, 20 Nev. 122 409, 418 
 V. Campbell, i Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 124 265 
 
 V. Campbell, 35 S. Car. 28 329 
 
 V. Cannon, 72 N. J. L. 46 381 
 
 V. Cannon, 49 S. Car. 550 276 
 
 V. Cardelli, 19 Xev. 319 49 
 
 V. Cardoza, 1 1 S. Car. 195 223, 494 
 V. Carey, 76 Conn. 342 73, 346 
 V. Carey, 56 Kan. 84 96 
 
 V. Carey, 23 Ind. App. 378 248 
 
 V. Carkin, 90 Me. 142 282 
 
 V. Carlson (Iowa, 1909), 123 
 
 N. W. 765 421 
 
 V. Carlton, 48 Vt. 636 96, 330 
 
 V. Carmody, 50 Ore. i 21 
 
 V. Caron, it8 La. 349 214, 215, 221 
 V. Carpenter, 124 Iowa 5 
 
 409, 410, 417 
 V. Carpenter, 74 N. Car. 230 32 
 V. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 9 255 
 
 V. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 551 446 
 
 V. Carpenter, 32 Wash. 254 
 
 129, 132 
 V. Carr, 28 Ore. 389 74
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXl 
 
 [References at 
 
 State V. Carr, 2>7 Vt. 191 130 
 
 Carr, 20 W. Va. 679 . 228 
 
 Carroll, 85 Iowa i 132 
 
 Carroll, 14 Mo. 392 358 
 
 Carroll, 30 S. Car. 85 122 
 
 Carron, 18 Iowa 372 393 
 Carson, 36 S. Car. 524 
 
 126, 138, 492 
 
 Carter, 106 La. 407 
 Carter, 49 S. Car. 265 
 Carver, 89 Me. 74 
 Casados, i N. & McC. (S 
 
 Car.) 91 
 Case, 96 Iowa 264 
 Case, 93 N. Car. 545 
 Cassida, 67 Kan. 171 
 Cassid}^, 85 Iowa 145 
 Castello, 62 Iowa 404 
 Castle, 133 N. Car. 769 
 
 123 
 2,^7 
 
 354 
 
 220, 
 
 295 
 224 
 121 
 
 383, 384 
 
 411, 418 
 
 236 
 
 82, 338 
 
 Casto, 119 Mo. App. 265 485 
 Castor, 93 Mo. 242 300, 301 
 
 Cater, 100 Iowa 501 239, 312 
 Cather, 121 Iowa 106 167 
 
 Cavin, 199 Mo. 154 88, 93 
 
 Caywood, 96 Iowa 367 467 
 
 Cecil Co., 54 Md. 426 265 
 
 Center, 35 Vt. 378 106, 187 
 
 Cephus (Del.), 67 Atl. 150 
 
 6, 320, 338 
 Chamberlain, 89 iMo. 129 
 
 :i6, 62, 220 
 Chambers, 39 Iowa 179 130 
 
 Chambers, 43 La. Ann. 1108 521 
 Chambers, 45 La. Ann. 36 126 
 Champoux, 33 Wash. 339 425 
 Chandler, 96 Ind. 591 380, 384 
 Chandler, 132 Mo. 155 384 
 
 Chanev, 9 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 438 " 36 
 
 Charity, 2 Dev. (X. Car.) 
 
 543 -^73 
 
 Chase, 68 Vt. 405 118, 227, 
 
 Chavis, 80 X. Car. 353 320 
 
 Chee Gong, 16 Ore. 534 
 
 148, 153 
 Child, 40 Kan. 482 152 
 
 Chiles, 44 S. Car. 338 312 
 
 Chinanlt, 55 Kan. 326 197 
 
 Chippcy, 9 Houst. (Del.) 
 
 583 48s 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Chisenhall, 106 N. Car. 
 676 126, 340 
 
 V. Chisnell, 36 W. Va. 659 67, 68 
 V. Chitman, 117 La. 950 268 
 
 V. Christian, 44 La. Ann. 950 236 
 V. Christmas, lOi N. Car. 749 377 
 V. Christopher, 134 Mo. App. 
 
 6 243 
 
 V. Church, 199 Mo. 605 
 
 129, 130, 160, 163, 220 
 V. Church, 63 N. Car. 15 353, 354 
 V. Churchill, 52 Wash. 210 
 
 48, 324, 333 
 V. Chj-o Chiagek, 92 Mo. 395 
 
 71, 200 
 V. Clark, 69 Iowa 294 409, 410 
 
 V. Clark, 46 Kan. 65 435 
 
 V. Clark, 117 La. 920 61 
 
 V. Clark, 119 La. 733 333 
 
 V. Clark (Nev. 1909), 104 Pac. 
 
 593 465 
 
 V. Clark, 54 N. H. 456 380, 383, 402 
 V. Clark (S. Car. 1910), 67 
 
 S. E. 300 375 
 
 V. Clark, 15 S. Car. 403 312 
 
 V. Clark, 27 Utah 55 296 
 
 V. Clark, 34 Wash. 485 157 
 
 V. Clark, 64 W. Va. 625 
 
 103, no, 112 
 V. Claude, 35 La. Ann. 71 324 
 
 V. Clawson, 30 Mo. App. 139 237 
 V. Clemenson, 123 Iowa 524 382 
 V. Clements, 15 Ore. 237 347 
 
 V. Clifford, 86 Iowa 550 132 
 
 V. Cline, 146 N. Car. 640 467 
 
 V. Clinton, 67 Mo. 380 429 
 
 V. Cloninger, 149 N. Car. 567 
 
 78, 157 
 V. Clough, 72 N. H. 178 497 
 
 V. Clyburn, 16 S. Car. 375 224 
 
 V. Clyne, 53 Kan. 8 364 
 
 V. Coatney, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 
 210 532 
 
 V. Coats, 174 Mo. 396 147 
 
 V. Cobbs, 40 W. Va. 718 193 
 
 V. Cochran, 147 Mo. 504 
 
 268, 269, 328 
 V. Coella, 3 Wash. 99 326 
 
 V. Coffee, 56 Conn. 399 131 ' 
 
 V. Coffey, 44 Mo. App. 455 237
 
 cxxn 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 State V. Cohen, io8 Iowa 208 6 
 
 V. Cohn, 9 Nev. 179 60, 63, 66, 369 
 V. Colby, 51 Vt. 291 382 
 
 V. Cole, 90 Ind. 112 309 
 
 V. Cole, 132 N. Car. 1069 320 
 
 V. Cole, 2 McCord (S. Car.) 
 
 117 489 
 
 V. Cole, 19 Wis. 129 432 
 
 V. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691 157 
 V. Coleman, 11 1 La. 303 333 
 
 V. Coleman, 117 La. 973 448 
 
 V. Coleman, 119 La. 669 326 
 
 V. Coleman, 199 Mo. 112 264 
 
 V. Coleman, 20 S. Car. 441 
 
 157, 158 
 V. Coleman, 17 S. Dak. 594 321 
 V. Coley, 114 N. Car. 879 81 
 
 V. Collins, 20 Iowa 85 185 
 
 V. Collins, 32 Iowa 36 324 
 
 V. Collins, 72 N. Car. 144 296 
 
 V. Collins, 115 N. Car. 716 421 
 V. Collins, 28 R. I. 439 217, 276 
 V. Colombo (Del. O. & T. 
 
 1909). 75 Atl. 616 409, 413 
 V. Colwell, 3 R. I. 132 217 
 
 V. Comeau, 48 La. Ann. 249 191 
 V. Compagnet, 48 La. Ann. 
 
 1470 328 
 
 V. Conable, 81 Iowa 60 364, 365 
 V. Cone, I Jones (N. Car.) 18 417 
 V. Conerly, 48 La. Ann. 1561 241 
 V. Congdon, 14 R. I. 267 230 
 
 V. Conlan, 3 Penn. (Del.) 218 yy 
 V. Conlin, 45 Wash. 478 414, 418 
 V. Connelly, 57 Minn. 482 414 
 
 V. Conners, 95 Iowa 485 373 
 
 V. Connolly, 3 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 337 489 
 
 V. Constantine, 48 Wash. 218 
 
 42, 121, 161, 238 
 V. Conway, 56 Kan. 682 
 
 23, 148, 37S 
 V. Cook, 13 Idaho 45 248 
 
 V. Cook, 65 Iowa 560 418 
 
 V. Cook, 17 Kan. 392 318 
 
 V. Cook, 132 Mo. App. 167 62 
 
 V. Cooper, 102 Iowa 146 285 
 
 V. Cooper, 32 La. Ann. 1084 333 
 V. Cooper, 103 Mo. 266 403, 404 
 V. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52 344 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 State V. Cooper (Tenn. 1908), 113 
 
 S. W. 1048 456 
 
 V. Copp, 15 N. H. 212 
 
 446, 447, 459 
 V. Cornelius, 118 La. 146 61 
 
 V. Costner, 127 N. Car. 566 68 
 
 V. Covington, 94 N. Car. 913 427 
 V. Court (Mo. 1910), 125 S. 
 
 W. 451 291a, 515 
 
 V. Cowan, 7 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 239 144, 147 
 
 V. Cowan, 74 Iowa 53 287 
 
 V. Cox, 67 Mo. 392 78 
 
 V. Crabtree, iii Mo. 136 105, 328 
 V. Craemer, 12 Wash. 217 314, 336 
 V. C'-aft, 118 La. 117 48 
 
 V. Crafton, 89 Iowa 109 333 
 
 V. Craig, 190 Mo. 332 104 
 
 V. Craig, 52 Wash. 66 157 
 
 V. Craine, 120 N. Car. 601 105, iii 
 V. Crane, 202 Mo. 54 269 
 
 V. Crank, 2 Bailey (S. Car.) 
 
 66 138 
 
 V. Crawford, 34 Iowa 40 . 390 
 
 V. Crawford, 99 Mo. 74 
 
 368, 370, 517 
 V. Crawford, 2 Dev. (N. Car.) 
 
 425 359 
 
 V. Crawford, 39 S. Car. 343 87, 89 
 V. Crea, 10 Idaho 88 338 
 
 V. Cremeans, 62 W. Va. 134 332 
 V. Creson, 38 Mo. 372 78 
 
 V. Crofford, 121 Iowa 395 345, 494 
 V. Crogan, 8 Iowa 523 475 
 
 V. Crone, 209 Mo. 316 no 
 
 V. Cronin, 64 Conn. 293 103, 116 
 V. Crooke, 129 Mo. App. 490 302 
 V. Cross, 12 Iowa 66 417 
 
 V. Cross, 68 Iowa 180 327 
 
 V. Cross, 95 Iowa 629 301 
 
 V. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 273 
 
 V. Crouch, 130 Iowa 478 414, 415 
 V. Crow, 53 Kan. 662 24a 
 
 V. Crow, 107 Mo. 341 48, 240, 297 
 V. Crowell, 149 Mo. 391 153 
 
 V. Crowell, 116 N. Car. 1052 387 
 V. Crowley, 13 Ala. 172 382 
 
 V. Cruse, 74 N. Car. 491 129, 140 
 V. Cummings, 189 Mo. 626 
 
 174, 268, 323
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXlll 
 
 State 
 
 [References ar 
 V. Cummins, 76 Iowa 133 
 
 213, 234 
 Cunningham, 100 Mo. 382 408 
 Curdy (Del. Gen. Sess. 
 
 1910), 75 Atl. 868 448 
 
 Curran, 51 Iowa 112 388 
 
 Currie, 13 N. Dak. 655 67 
 
 Cushenberry, 157 Mo. 168 55 
 Cushing, 14 Wash. 527 315, 326 
 Dalcourt, 112 La. 420 221 
 
 Dale, 141 Mo. 284 296, 378 
 
 Daley, 53 Vt. 442 100, 292 
 
 Dalton, 106 Mo. 463 416 
 
 Dalton, 134 Mo. App. 517 490 
 Dalton, 2 Murph. (N. Car.) 
 
 379 430 
 
 Dalton, 20 R. I. 114 103, 209 
 Dalton, 43 Wash. 278 211 
 
 Daly, 210 Mo. 664 126, 313 
 
 Dana, 59 Vt. 614 397 
 
 Dancy, 83 N. Car. 608 408 
 
 Danforth, 48 Iowa 43 
 
 386, 413, 52s 
 Danforth, y:^ N. H. 215 413 
 
 Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91 103, 105 
 Daniel, 114 N. Car. 823 439 
 
 Daniels, 49 La. Ann. 954 271 
 Daniels, 122 La. 261 373 
 
 Daniels, 115 La. 59 103, 104, 105 
 Daniels, 134 N. Car. 641 374 
 
 Dankwardt, 107 Iowa 704 450 
 Darling, 202 Mo. 150 238, 248 
 Darnell, i Houst. (Del.) 
 
 321 140 
 
 Daugherty, 17 Nev. 376 96 
 
 Davenport, 38 S. Car. 348 6 
 
 David, 131 Mo. 380 
 
 6, 12, 132, 429 
 David, 14 S. Car. 428 232 
 
 Davidson, 44 Mo. App. 513 12 
 Davidson, yy N. Car. 522 185 
 Davidson, 30 Vt. 2i7y 7 
 
 Davis, 9 Houst. (Del.) 407 320 
 Davis, 6 Idaho 159 
 
 118, 129, 152, 321, 328 
 191 
 225 
 326 
 127 
 450 
 
 c to Sections.'] 
 State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439 23, 465 
 v. Davis, I Ired. (N. Car.) 125 
 
 353, 354' 
 V. Davis, 2 Ired. (N. Car.) 153 310 
 V. Davis, 65 N. Car. 298 488 
 
 V. Davis, 69 N. Car. 313 425 
 
 V. Davis, yy N. Car. 483 loi, 332 
 V. Davis, 109 N. Car. 780 157 
 
 V. Davis, 134 N. Car. 633 no, 113 
 V. Davison (N. H. 1906), 64 
 
 Atl. 761 290 
 
 V. Dawkins, 32 S. Car. 17 373 
 
 V. Dawson, go Mo. 149 172 
 
 V. Day (Minn. 1909), 121 N. 
 
 W. 611 470 
 
 V. Day, 188 Mo. 359 81, 414, 418 
 V. Dayton, 23 N. J. L. 49 26 
 
 V. Deal, 64 N. Car. 270 358 
 
 V. Deal (Ore.), 98 Pac. 165 61 
 
 V. Dean, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 63 493 
 
 V. Dean, 72 S. Car. 74 218, 325 
 V. Dean, yi Wis. 678 i6a 
 
 V. Deatherage, 35 Wash. 326 118 
 V. DeBerry, 92 N. Car. 800 117 
 v. DeBoy, 117 N. Car. 702 471 
 
 V. Decklotts, 19 Iowa 447 320 
 
 V. DeGraff, 113 N. Car. 638 130 
 V. DeHart, 38 Mont. 211 
 
 233, 248, 280 
 V. DeHart, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 222 440 
 
 V. Deitrick, 51 Iowa 467 386 
 
 V. Delaneuville, 48 La. Ann. 
 
 502 238 
 
 v. Delaney, 92 Iowa 467 150 
 
 V. Deliso (N. J. 1908), 69 Atl. 
 
 218 88 
 
 De Maio, 69 N. J. L. 590 
 Demareste, 41 La. Ann. 617 
 
 Davis, 41 Iowa 311 
 Davis, 48 Kan. i 
 Davis, 123 La. 133 
 Davis, 34 La. Ann. 351 
 Davis, 112 Mo. App. 346 
 
 i«9 
 133 
 
 V 
 V 
 
 V. Demming, 79 Kan. 526 328, 329 
 V. Dennis, 2 Marv. (Del.) 433 447 
 V. Denny (N. D. 1908), 117 N. 
 
 W. 869 247 
 
 V. Depoister, 21 Nev. 107 
 
 176, 179, 416 
 V. Desforges, 48 La. Ann. y^, 451 
 v. Desmond, 109 Iowa y2 119 
 
 V. Dcsroches, 48 La. Ann. 428 
 
 30, 88, 147a
 
 CXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are 
 State V. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426 268 
 V. Detwiler, 60 W. Va. 583 418 
 V. Deuel, 63 Kan. 811 79 
 
 V. Dewitt, 2 Hill (S. Car.) 
 
 282 
 De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93 
 
 267 
 
 45, 
 
 204, 411 
 
 77 
 300 
 
 493 
 
 354 
 
 374a 
 248 
 
 435 
 106, 344 
 
 7 
 285 
 392 
 
 Dexter, 115 Iowa 678 
 Deyoe, 97 Iowa 744 
 Dickerhoff, 127 Iowa 404 
 Dickerson, 98 N. Car. 708 
 Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34 
 36, 82, 90, 327 
 Dickey, 48 W. Va. 325 
 Dickinson, 21 Mont. 595 
 Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299 
 Dickson, 78 Mo. 438 
 Dierberger, 90 Mo. 369 
 Dietrick, 51 Iowa 467 
 DiGuglielmo, 4 Penn. (Del.) 
 
 336 12, 21, 320, 352 
 
 Dill, 48 S. Car. 249 82, 324 
 
 Dillard, 59 W. Va. 197 338 
 
 Dilley, 15 Ore. 70 ?24 
 
 Dilley, 44 Wash. 207 133, 492 
 Dillon, 48 La. Ann. 1365 301 
 Dineen, 10 Minn. 407 7, 12 
 
 Dineen, 203 Mo. 628 467 
 
 Diskin, 34 La. Ann. 919 123 
 
 Dix, :i2> Wash. 405 492 
 
 Dixon, 47 La. Ann. i 269 
 
 V. Dockstader, 42 Iowa 436 7(^ 
 
 V. Dodson, 4 Ore. 64 326 
 
 V. Dodson, 16 S. Car. 453 207, 493 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 Doe, 79 Ind. 9 310 
 
 Dolan, 132 Iowa 196 390 
 
 Dole. 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 294 47S 
 Donahoe, 78 Iowa 486 338 
 
 Donelon, 45 La. Ann. 923 
 
 27, 82 
 Donnelly, 130 Mo. 642 6, 7Z, 323 
 Donohoo, 22 W. Va. 761 76 
 
 Donovan, 61 Iowa 369 
 
 166, 380, 381 
 Dooris, 40 Conn. 145 405 
 
 Doris, 51 Ore. 136 
 
 82, 109, no, 112, 326 
 Dorr. 82 Me. 212 32 
 
 Douglas, 26 Nev. 196 69 
 
 Douglass, 48 Mo. App. 39 34^ 
 
 to Sections.l 
 
 
 State 
 
 V. Douglass, 20 W. Va. 770 
 
 172 
 
 V. 
 
 Douglass, 28 W. Va. 297 
 
 320 
 
 V. 
 
 Dowden, 137 Iowa 573 
 
 507 
 
 V. 
 
 Downer, 8 Vt. 424 
 
 446 
 
 V. 
 
 Downs, 91 Mo. 19 324, 
 
 326 
 
 V. 
 
 Drake, 82 N. Car. 592 
 
 130 
 
 V. 
 
 Drake, 113 N. Car. 624 
 
 130 
 
 V. 
 
 Draper, 65 Mo. 335 
 
 109 
 
 V. 
 
 Draughon (N. Car. 1909), 
 
 
 
 65 S. E. 913 
 
 101 
 
 V. 
 
 Drew, 179 Mo. 315 
 
 299 
 
 V. 
 
 Dudenhefer, 122 La. 288 
 
 281 
 
 V. 
 
 Dudley, 7 Wis. 664 187, 
 
 188 
 
 V. 
 
 Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44 323, 
 
 330 
 
 V. 
 
 Dufif (Iowa 1909)," 122 N. 
 
 
 
 W. 829 
 
 69 
 
 V. 
 
 Duffy, 57 Conn. 525 
 
 
 
 189, 211, 
 
 221 
 
 V. 
 
 Duffy, 124 Iowa 705 
 
 358 
 
 V. 
 
 Duffy, 124 Mo. I 413, 
 
 493 
 
 V. 
 
 Duhammel, 2 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 
 
 532 
 
 458 
 
 V. 
 
 Dulaney, 87 Ark. 17 87, 90 
 
 V. 
 
 Dull, 67 Kan. 793 
 
 323 
 
 V. 
 
 Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438 
 
 2,2^ 
 
 V. 
 
 Duncan, 116 Mo. 288 
 
 
 
 lor, 118, 145, 
 
 220 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunlap, 24 Me. 77 
 
 442 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunlap, 149 N. Car. 550 
 
 324 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunlop, 65 N. Car. 288 
 
 70 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunn, 53 Iowa 526 
 
 392 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunn, 179 i\Io. 95 
 
 163 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunn, 138 N. Car. 672 
 
 282 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunn (Ore. 1909), 99 Pac. 
 
 
 
 278 
 
 241 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunn (Ore.), 100 Pac. 258 
 
 
 
 222 
 
 241 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunn (Wis.), 102 N. W. 
 
 
 
 935 80, 
 
 276 
 
 V. 
 
 Dunwell, 3 R. I. 127 
 
 21 
 
 V. 
 
 Dupont, 2 McCord (S. Car.) 
 
 
 334 
 
 483 
 
 V. 
 
 Durnain, 7^ Minn. 150 
 
 454 
 
 V. 
 
 Dusenberry, 112 ^.lo. 277 
 
 
 
 193, 270, 414, 
 
 417 
 
 V. 
 
 Dustin, 5 Ore. 375 
 
 455 
 
 V. 
 
 Dyer, 59 Me. 303 185, 
 
 188 
 
 V. 
 
 Dyer, 139 Mo. 199 
 
 65 
 
 V. 
 
 Eades. 68 Mo. 150 
 
 422 
 
 V. 
 
 Ean, 90 Iowa 534 68, 
 
 381
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXV 
 
 [References ar 
 State V. Earl, 41 Ind. 464 461 
 
 V. Earnest, 56 Kan. 31 320 
 
 V. Eaton, 3 Harr. (Del.) 554 133 
 V. Eberline, 47 Kan. 155 408, 418 
 V. Eckler, 106 Mo. 585 389 
 
 V. Eddon, 8 Wash. 292 109 
 
 V. Eddy, 46 Wash. 494 297 
 
 V. Edwards, 203 Mo. 528 326 
 
 V. Edwards, 13 S. Car. 30 79 
 
 V. Egbert, 125 Iowa 443 409 
 
 V. Eggleston, 45 Ore. 346 
 
 381, 382 
 V. Eisenhour, 132 Mo. 140 390 
 
 V. Elden, 41 Me. 165 195 
 
 V. Elkins, loi Mo. 344 103, 108 
 V. Elliott, 45 Iowa 486 102 
 
 Ellis, 74 Mo. 385 395 
 
 Ellis, 33 N. J. L. 102 451 
 
 Ellis. loi N. Car. 765 330 
 
 Elsham, 70 Iowa 531 6 
 
 Emery, 59 Vt. 84 7^, 84, 85, 368 
 Emory, 5 Penn. (Del.) 126 
 
 6, 16 
 England, 78 N. Car. 552 369 
 Enright, 90 Iowa 520 408 
 
 Enslow, ID Iowa 115 308 
 
 Epstein, 25 R. I. 131 97, 123 
 Espinozei, 20 Nev. 209 78 
 
 Estoup, 39 La. Ann. go6 123 
 Eubank, 2?, Wash. 293 300 
 
 Evans, i Marv. (Del.) 477 6 
 Evans, 65 Mo. 574 320 
 
 Evans, 124 Mo. 397 104, 105 
 Evans, 138 Mo. 116 
 
 118, 185, 412 
 Evans, i Hayw. (N. Car.) 
 
 231 359 
 Exum, 138 N. Car. 599 
 
 129, 325, 328, 2Z?, 
 
 Ezekiel, 33 S. Car. 115 429 
 
 Faile, 41 S. Car. 551 103 
 
 Faile, 43 S. Car. 52 326 
 
 Fain, T06 N. Car. 760 287 
 
 Falconer, 70 Iowa 416 269 
 
 Falk, 66 Cnnn. 250 47T 
 Farley, 87 Iowa 22 21, 35, 2t6 
 
 Farmer, 84 Me. 436 61 
 
 Farr (R. I. 1908), 69 Atl. 
 
 5 117 
 
 Farrell, 82 Iowa 553 248 
 
 e to Sections.^ 
 
 State v. Farrier, 114 La. 579 44 
 V. Farrier, i Hawks (N. Car.) 
 
 487 483 
 V. Farrington, 90 Iowa 673 
 
 220, 420, 429 
 V. Fasset, 16 Conn. 458 
 
 26, 28, 191, 192 
 V. Faulk (S. Dak. 1908), 116 
 
 N. W. 72 29s, 298 
 V. Faulkner, 175 Mo. 546 
 
 466, 467, 468 
 
 V. Favre, 51 La. Ann. 434 63 
 
 V. Fay, 65 Mo. 490 421 
 
 v. Feeley, 194 Mo. 300 324, 328 
 
 v. Fellows, 56 Ind. 65 380 
 
 V. Felter, ^2 Iowa 49 155, 158 
 
 V. Feltes, 51 Iowa 495 136 
 v. Fenlason, 78 Me. 495 
 
 149, 152, 368 
 
 v. Fenn, 112 Mo. App. 531 362 
 
 v. Ferguson, 107 N. Car. 841 44 
 v. Fetterly, 22, Wash. 599 
 
 27, 267, 414, 415 
 
 V. Fidment, 35 Iowa 541 127 
 
 V. Field, 14 Me. 244 324 
 
 V. Fielding, 135 Iowa 255 328 
 
 V. Fields, 118 Ind. 491 437 
 
 V. Fillpot, SI Wash. 223 429 
 
 V. Finch, 70 Iowa 316 298 
 
 V. Finch, 71 Kan. 793 131 
 
 V. Findley, loi Mo. 217 285, 291 
 
 V. Finley, 118. N. Car. 1161 112 
 
 V. Finn, 199 Mo. 597 358 
 
 V. Firmatura, 121 La. 676 72 
 V. First Nat. Bank, 3 S. Dak. 
 
 52 35 
 
 V. Fishel, 140 Iowa 460 21, 276 
 
 V. Fisher, 51 N. Car. 478 130 
 
 V. Fisher, 149 N. Car. 557 324 
 
 V. Fisk, 170 Ind. 166 424 
 
 V. Fiske, 63 Conn. 388 166 
 V. Fitzgerald, 49 Iowa 260 
 
 344, 345 
 V. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa 268 
 
 118, 119, 265, 387, 389. 390 
 V. Fitzgerald, 20 Mo. App. 
 
 408 363 
 
 V. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 407 312, 314 
 
 V. Fitzgerald, 68 Vt. 125 68, 174
 
 CX5V1 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References a; 
 State V. Fitzpatrick, 9 Houst. 
 (Del.) 38s 292 
 
 V. Fitzsimmons, 30 Mo. 236 225 
 V. Fitzsimon, 18 R. I. 236 
 
 376, 409, 418 
 V. Flanders, 118 Mo. 227 425 
 
 V. Fleetwood (Mo. 1909), 122 
 
 S. W. 696 343 
 
 V. Fleshman, 40 W. Va. 726 421 
 V. Fletcher (N. J. L.), 72 Atl. 
 
 33 349 
 
 V. Fletcher, 24 Ore. 295 145, 233 
 V. Flint, 60 Vt. 304 149, 232, 241 
 V. Flowers, 58 Kan. 702 159 
 
 V. Floyd, 169 Ind. 136 419 
 
 V. Floyd, 5 Strob. (S. Car.) 
 
 59 419 
 
 V. Flye, 26 Me. 312 154, 419 
 
 V. Flynn, 28 Iowa 26 308, 309 
 
 V. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 58a 
 
 V. Fogg, 206 Mo. 696 392 
 
 V. Foley, 81 Iowa 36 284 
 
 V. Foley, 113 La. 52 93, 97 
 
 V. Foley, 15 Nev. 64 207 
 
 V. Folwell, 14 Kan. 105 88 
 
 V. Fontenot, 48 La. Ann. 305 
 
 90, 119, 321, 323, 326 
 V. Fooks, 65 Iowa 196 
 
 132, 442, 443 
 V. Foot You, 24 Ore. 61 108 
 
 V. Force, 69 Neb. 162 128 
 
 V. Ford, 2 Root (Conn.) 93 425 
 V. Ford, 37 La. Ann. 443 325, 492 
 V. Ford, 82 Minn. 452 364, 365 
 
 V. Ford, 3 Strob. (S. Car.) 
 
 517 79 
 
 V. Forshee, 199 Mo. 142 416 
 
 V. Forshner, 43 N. H. 89 418 
 
 V. Forsythe, 78 Iowa 595 349 
 
 V. Forsythe, 99 Iowa i 238, 408 
 V. Forsythe, 89 Mo. 66 355 
 
 V. Fortner, 43 Iowa 494 139, 140 
 V. Foster, i Penn. (Del.) 289 
 
 281, 282, 289 
 V. Foster, 79 Iowa 726 520 
 
 V. Foster, 91 Iowa 164 78 
 
 V. Foster, 136 Mo. 653 
 
 118, 126, 130, 325 
 V. Foster, 23 N. H. 348 24a 
 
 V. Fournier, 68 Vt. 262 312 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Fowler, 13 Idaho 317 409 
 V. Fowler, 52 Iowa 103 26 
 
 V. Fox, 80 Iowa 312 377 
 
 V. Frahm, 73 Iowa 355 378 
 
 V. Francis, 199 Mo. 671 6 
 
 V. Franklin, 69 Kan. 798 90 
 
 V. Franklin, 80 S. Car. 332 no 
 
 V. Franks, 51 S. Car. 259 70 
 
 V. Frazier, i Houst. (Del.) 176 
 
 97, 330 
 V. Frederic, 69 Me. 400 119, 267 
 V. Fredericks, 85 Mo. 145 128, 135 
 V. Frederickson, 81 Kan. 854 327 
 V. Freemam, 8 Iowa 428 447 
 
 V. Freeman, 100 N. Car. 429 410 
 V. Freeman, 127 N. Car. 544 488 
 V. Freeman, 146 N. Car. 615 
 
 374, 374a 
 V. Freeman, 43 S. Car. 105 238 
 V. Freeman, 27 Vt. 523 514, 515 
 V. Freidrich, 4 Wash. 204 267 
 
 V. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442 429 
 V. Fritz, 133 N. Car. 725 488 
 
 V. Frizell, in N. Car. 722 27 
 
 V. Froelick, 70 Iowa 213 237 
 
 V. Froiseth, 16 Minn. 296 26 
 
 V. Fruge, 44 Tex. 64 228, 243 
 
 V. Fry, 67 Iowa 475 152 
 
 V. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12 374 
 
 V. Fuller, 52 Oreg. 42 
 
 103, no, III, 348 
 V. Furney, 41 Kan. 115 no 
 
 V. Gabriel, 88 Mo. 631 94, 96, loi 
 V. Gadsden, 70 S. Car. 430 152 
 
 V. Gainor, 84 Iowa 209 88, 321, 326 
 V. Gallehugh, 89 Minn. 212 loi 
 V. Gallman, 79 S. Car. 229 
 
 48, no, 315, 331 
 V. Gardner, i Root (Conn.) 
 
 485 188, 383 
 
 V. Gardner, 54 Ohio St. 24 452 
 V. Garick, 35 La. Ann. 970 79 
 
 V. Garner, 8 Port (Ala.), 447 309 
 V. Garrett, 80 Iowa 589 447 
 
 V. Garrett, 71 N. Car. 85 54 
 
 V. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548 
 
 103, III, n8 
 V. Gartrell, 171 Mo. 489 S6a 
 
 V. Garvey, 28 La. Ann. 925 
 
 138, 307
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXVll 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Garvey, ii Minn. 154 
 V. Garvin, 48 S. Car. 258 
 V. Gaston, 96 Iowa 505 
 V. Gates, 27 Minn. 52 
 V. Gavigan, ^6 Kan. 322 
 V. Gay, 18 Mont. 51 
 V. Gay, 94 N. Car. 814 
 V. Gebey, 196 Mo. 104 
 V. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 
 
 Gee, 92 N. Car. 756 
 Geer, 48 Kan. 752 
 Genz, 57 N. J. L. 459 
 George, 15 La. Ann. 145 
 George, 214 Mo. 262 
 George, 5 Jones (N 
 
 233 
 Gereke, 74 Kan. 196 
 Gesell, 124 Mo. 531 
 Geyer, 3 Ohio N. P. 242 
 Gianfala, 113 La. 463 
 Gibbs, 39 Iowa 318 
 Gibbs, 10 Mont. 213 
 Gibson, 132 Iowa 53 
 Gibson, 108 Mo. 575 
 Gibson, iii Mo. 92 
 Gideon, 119 Mo. 94 
 Gilbert, 21 Ind. 474 
 Gilbert, 87 N. Car. 527 
 Gilbert, 68 Vt. 188 
 Giles, 103 N. Car. 391 
 Gillespie, 62 Kan. 469 
 Gillespie, 63 W. Va. 152 
 Gilliam, 66 S. Car. 419 242, 329 
 Gillick, 7 Iowa 287 103 
 
 Gillick, ID Iowa 98 228 
 
 Gillis, 73 S. Car. 318 7 
 
 Gilluly, so Wash. I 36 
 
 Gilman, 51 Me. 206 65, 125 
 
 Ginger, 80 Iowa 574 312, 529 
 Girking, I Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 121 359 
 
 Giroux, 26 La. Ann. 582 in 
 Glass, 5 Ore. 73 347 
 
 Glass, 50 Wis. 218 132 
 
 Glave, 51 Kan. 330 68 
 
 Gleason, 68 Iowa 618 
 Gleim, 17 Mont. 17 
 Glenn, 130 Mo. App. 145 
 Gliddcn, 55 Conn. 46 
 
 166 
 33, 301 
 415 
 393 
 422 
 103 
 429 
 
 293 
 6 
 
 345, 348 
 145 
 470 
 144 
 138 
 
 211, 244 
 Car.) 
 
 129 
 418 
 
 225, 236 
 
 451 
 98, 103 
 
 192 
 468, 470 
 438, 441 
 
 343 
 341, 343 
 
 250 
 
 447 
 484 
 293 
 532 
 119a 
 90 
 
 522 
 
 12, 62 
 
 487 
 
 492 
 
 State V. Glynn, 51 Vt. 577 238 
 
 V. Godard, 4 Idaho 750 250 
 
 V. Godet, 7 Ired. (N. Car.) 210 
 
 32, 34, 296 
 V. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300 353, 356 
 V. Goetz, 34 Mo. 85 305 
 
 V. Goforth, 136 Mo. in 188, 248 
 V. Goin, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 175 20, 408 
 
 V. Goldstein, 72 N. J. L. 336 429 
 V. Gonce, 79 Mo. 600 18, 404 
 
 V. Good, 132 Mo. 114 119, 122 
 
 V. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275 411, 414 
 V. Goodbier, 48 La. Ann. 770 238 
 V. Goodson, 116 La. 388 323 
 
 V. Gordon, 56 Kan. 64 33 
 
 V. Gordon, 196 Mo. 185 469 
 
 V. Goss, 66 Minn. 291 499 
 
 V. Gossett, 9 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 428 36 
 
 V. Goulden, 134 N. Car. 743 
 
 401, 404 
 V. Goyette, ii R. I. 592 21 
 
 V. Grace, 18 Minn. 398 254 
 
 V. Grady, 84 Mo. 220 26, 192 
 
 V. Graeme, 130 Mo. App. 138 311 
 V. Graham, 116 La. 779 314 
 
 V. Graham, 41 N. J. L. 15 71, 72 
 V. Graham, 74 N. Car. 646 374 
 
 V. Gramelspacher, 126 Ind. 398 452 
 V. Granger, 87 Iowa 355 532 
 
 V. Grant, 86 Iowa 216 492, 494 
 
 V. Grant, 22 Me. 171 146 
 
 V. Grant, 76 Mo. 236 494 
 
 V. Grant, 79 Mo. 113 120, 32S 
 
 V. Grate, 58 Mo. 22 81 
 
 V. Graves, 95 Mo. 510 68 
 
 V. Graves, 13 Wash. 485 250 
 
 V. Grayson, 38 La. Ann. 788 40 
 V. Grear, 28 Minn. 426 136 
 
 V. Grebe, 17 Kan. 458 68, 304 
 
 V. Green, 35 Conn. 203 323 
 
 V. Green, i Houst. Cr. (Del.) 
 
 217 328 
 
 V. Green, 115 La. 1041 314 
 
 V. Green, 117 N. Car. 695 279 
 
 V. Green, 40 S. Car. 328 374, 492 
 V. Green, 48 S. Car. 136 147a, 206 
 V. Green, 52 S. Car. 520 21 
 
 V. Green, 61 S. Car. 12 • 119a
 
 CXXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 State V. Green, 7 Wis. 571 439 
 
 V. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800 232 
 
 V. Gregory, 178 Mo. 48 323 
 
 V. Gregory, 50 N. Car. 315 130 
 
 V. Griffie, 118 Mo. 188 33 
 
 V. Griffin, 87 Mo. 608 119 
 
 V. Griffin, 43 Wash. 591 
 
 222, 409, 411 
 Griggsby, 117 La. 1046 77, 245 
 Grimes, 50 Minn. 123 366 
 
 Grimes, loi Mo. 188 310 
 
 Grinden, gi Iowa 505 81 
 
 Grinstead, 10 Kan. App. 90 365 
 Griswold, 67 Conn. 290 58a 
 
 Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512 44 
 
 Groning, 33 Kan. 18 373, 379 
 Grossheim, 79 Iowa 75 408 
 
 Grove, 61 W. Va. 697 
 Groves, 15 R. I. 208 
 Grub, 55 Kan. 678 
 Grubb, 201 Mo. 585 
 Gruso, 28 La. Ann. 952 
 Gryder, 44 La. Ann. 962 
 Guild, 149 Mo. 370 
 Guild, 10 N. J. L. 163 
 Gullette, 121 Mo. 447 
 Gunagy, 84 Iowa 177 
 Gurnee, 14 Kan. 11 1 
 Gustafson, 50 Iowa 194 
 V. Gut, 13 Minn. 341 
 V. Guy, 69 Mo. 430 
 V. Haas, 163 Fed. 908 
 V. Habib. 18 R. I. 558 
 V. Hack. 118 Mo. 92 
 V. Hagan, 22 Kan. 490 
 V. Hahn, 38 La. Ann. 169 
 
 422, 427, 430 
 V. Hailey, 2 Strob. ( S. Car.) 
 
 73 
 V. Haines, 23 S. Car. 170 
 V. Haines, 36 S. Car. 504 
 V. Hair, 37 Minn. 351 
 V. Hale, 156 Mo. 102 
 V. Halford, 6 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 58 463 
 
 V. Hall, 79 Iowa 674 53, 54 
 
 V. Hall, 97 Iowa 400 517 
 
 V. Hall, 93 N. Car. 571 367 
 
 V. Hall, 132 N. Car. 1094 276 
 
 V. Ham,- 98 Iowa 60 378 
 
 237 
 481 
 416 
 301 
 360 
 421 
 
 71 
 
 130, 143 
 
 430 
 
 517 
 
 38, 42 
 
 79 
 166 
 326 
 452 
 
 89 
 245 
 269 
 
 447 
 439 
 232 
 
 359 
 123 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 State V. Hambleton, 22 Mo. 452 310 
 V. Hamilton (Del.), 67 Atl. 
 
 836 121 
 
 V. Hamilton, 57 Iowa 596 15, 152 
 V. Hamilton, 42 La. Ann. 1204 227 
 V. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95 25, 191 
 V. Hancock, 28 Nev. 300 i8g 
 
 V. Hand, 71 N. J. L. 137 130 
 
 V. Handy, 4 Harr. (Del.) 566 408 
 V. Handy 20 Me. 81 421 
 
 v. Haney, 32 Kan. 428 309 
 
 v. Hanks, 39 La. Ann. 234 
 
 517, 522 
 V. Hanlon, 38 Mont. 557 326 
 
 v. Hannibal, 37 La. Ann. 619 275 
 V. Hanna, 99 Me. 224 456 
 
 V. Hanscom, 28 Ore. 427 41a 
 
 V. Hansford, 91 Kan. 300 9j 
 
 V. Hanson, 69 N. J. L. 42 458 
 
 v. Hardin, 46 Iowa 623 152 
 
 v. Hargrave, 65 N. Car. 466 416 
 V. Hargraves, 188 Mo. 337 36 
 
 V. Harkins, 100 Mo. 666 73 
 
 V. Harlan, 130 Mo. 381 328 
 
 V. Harmann, 135 Iowa 167 382 
 V. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 580 
 
 12, 320 
 V. Harmon, 70 Kan. 476 477 
 
 V. Harness, 10 Idaho 18 413, 431 
 V. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 78 106, 34S 
 V. Harrell, 107 N. Car. 944 48S 
 V. Harrigan (Del.), 55 Atl. 5 
 
 352, 357 
 V. Harriman, 75 Me. 562 310 
 
 V. Harris, 5 Penn. (Del.), 145 185 
 V. Harris, 97 Iowa 407 358 
 
 V. Harris, 48 La. Ann. 1189 118 
 V. Harris, 112 La. 937 106, 109 
 
 V. Harris, 209 Mo. 423 
 V. Harris, 63 N. Car. i 
 V. Harris (R. I. 1908), 69 Atl. 
 
 506 
 V. Harrison (N. Car.), 58 S. 
 
 E. 754 52 
 
 V. Harrison, 93 N. Car. 605 485 
 V. Harrison, 115 N. Car. 706 135 
 V. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729 
 
 154, 270 
 V. Hart, 67 Iowa 142 237 
 
 V. Hart, 94 Iowa 749 6 
 
 221 
 312, 330 
 
 97
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXIX 
 
 State 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 [References are 
 V. Hart, 66 Mo. 208 30 
 
 Hart, 89 Mo. 590 414 
 
 Hartman, 46 Wis. 248 228 
 
 Hartnett (Del. 1909), 74 
 
 Atl. 82 435, 437 
 
 Harvey, 130 Iowa 394 
 
 221, 369, 370 
 Harvey, 131 Mo. 339 
 
 23, 60, 62, 148, 366 
 Hascall, 6 N. H. 352 468 
 
 Hash, 12 La. Ann. 895 130 
 
 Hasty, 121 Iowa 507 
 
 50, 122, 269, 380 
 Hatch. 57 Kan. 420 338 
 
 Hatcher, 29 Ore. 309 133 
 
 Hatfield, 75 Iowa 592 414 
 
 Hauser, 112 La. 313 73, 430 
 
 Havely, 21 Mo. 498 33 
 
 Hawkins, 23 Wash. 289 63, i6a 
 Hawks, 56 Minn. 129 27 
 
 Hawley, 63 Conn. 47 332 
 
 Haworth;, 24 Utah 398 133 
 
 Hayden, 45 Iowa 11 
 
 12, 14, 192, 270 
 Hayden, 131 Iowa i 320 
 
 Hayden, 15 N. H. 355 432 
 
 Hayden, 51 Vt. 296 161, 163 
 
 Hayes, 78 Mo. 307 239 
 
 Hayes, 105 Mo. 76 373 
 
 Hayes, 214 Mo. 230 293 
 
 Hayes, 138 N. Car. 660 44 
 
 Hayes, 14 Utah 118 321 
 
 Haynes, 71 N. Car. 79 145, 332 
 Haynes, 35 Vt. 570 514, 515 
 
 Hayward, 62 Minn. 474 
 
 87, 214, 221 
 Hazleton, 15 La. Ann. 72 
 
 172, 176 
 Heacock, 106 Iowa 191 364 
 
 Head, 38 S. Car. 258 133 
 
 Heath, 41 Tex. 426 309 
 
 Heatherton, 60 Iowa 175 387 
 Hedgepeth, 125 Mo. 14 174 
 
 Heed, 57 Mo. 252 468 
 
 Heeman, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 502 526 
 
 Heffcrnan, 28 R. T. 20 60 
 
 Heffernan (S. Dak.), 118 
 
 N. W. 1027 267 
 
 to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Heflin, 8 Humph. 
 
 (Tenn.) 84 488 
 V. Heidelberg, 120 La. 300 220, 330 
 
 V. Heidenrich, 29 Ore. 381 125 
 
 V. Height, 117 Iowa 650 138 
 
 V. Heinze, 2 Mo. App. 1314 18 
 
 V. Helm, 92 Iowa 540 326 
 
 V. Helm, 97 Iowa 378 61 
 
 ix — Underhill Crim. Evidence. 
 
 V. Hemm, 82 Iowa 609 387, 293 
 
 V. Henderson, 84 Iowa 161 
 V. Henderson, 74 S. Car. 477 
 V. Henderson, 29 W. Va. 147 
 V. Hendrix, 45 La. Ann. 500 
 V. Henn, 39 Minn. 476 
 V. Henry, 5 Jones (N. Car.) 
 
 65 
 V. Herlihy, 102 Me. 310 
 V. Herzog, 55 W. Va. 74 
 V. Hesterly, 182 Mo. 16 
 V. Hetland, 141 Iowa 524 
 V. Heusack, 189 Mo. 295 
 V. Hice, 117 N. Car. 782 
 V. Hickam, 95 Mo. 322 
 V. Hickerson, 72 N. Car. 421 
 V. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431 
 V. Hicks, 125 N. Car. 636 
 V. Hicks, 20 S. Car. 341 
 V. Higdon, 32 Iowa 262 
 
 341, 389, 393 
 V. Higgins, 13 R. I. 330 24a 
 
 V. High, 116 La. 79 221, 272 
 
 381 
 129 
 420 
 
 522 
 357 
 
 79 
 
 265, 267 
 
 166 
 
 268 
 
 414 
 
 61, 210 
 
 76 
 
 23 
 
 524 
 
 100 
 
 14 
 223 
 
 V. High, 122 La. 521 
 
 V. Hight, 153 N. C. 817 
 
 V. Hill, 46 La. Ann. 27 
 
 V. Hill, 72 Me. 238 
 
 V. Hill, 65 Mo. 84 
 
 V. Hill, 91 Mo. 423 
 
 V. Hill, 134 Mo. 663 
 
 V. Hill, 47 Neb. 456 
 
 V. Hill, 65 N. J. L. 626 
 
 V. Hill, 45 Wash. 694 
 
 225 
 
 87 
 24a 
 
 437, 442 
 
 296 
 
 388, 390, 394 
 
 115, 117 
 
 285 
 
 127 
 
 61 
 
 V. Hillstock, 45 La. Ann. 298 257 
 
 V. Hilsabeck, 132 Mo. 348 245, 248 
 
 V. Hilton, 26 Mo. 199 446 
 
 V. Hilton, 3 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 434 404 
 
 V. Hines, 68 Me. 202 514 
 
 V. HinkJe, 6 Iowa 380 318 
 
 V. Hinson, 103 N. Car. 374 
 
 lOi, 365
 
 cxxx 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ai 
 State V. Hirsch, 45 ]\Io. 429 2;^, 24 
 V. Hobbs, 37 W. Va. 812 35 
 
 V. Hobgood, 46 La. Ann. 855 245 
 V. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442 
 
 154, 163, 280a, 320 
 V. Hodge, 50 N. H. 510 299 
 
 V. Hodgkins, 42 N. H. 474 ig6 
 
 V. Hodgskins, 19 Me. 155 
 
 383, 402, 404 
 
 Hodgson, 66 Vt. 134 
 Hoel, yy Kan. 334 
 Hoffman, 134 Iowa 587n 
 Hoffman, 53 Kan. 700 
 Hoffman, 120 La. 949 
 Hogan, 117 La. 863 
 
 115, 136, 164 
 Hogan, 123 Mo. App. 319 349 
 Hogard, 12 Minn. 293 
 Holcomb, 86 Mo. 371 
 Hollenbeck, 36 Iowa 112 
 Hollenbeck, 67 Vt. 34 
 Hollenscheit, 61 Mo. 302 
 Hollier, 49 La. Ann. 371 
 Hollingsworth, 132 Iowa 
 
 471 
 Hoi Ion, 22 Kan. 580 
 Holloway, 117 N. Car. 730 
 Hollyway, 41 Iowa 200 
 Holmes, 65 Minn. 230 67, 6i 
 Holmes (Mich. 1896), 68 N. 
 
 W. II 
 Holt, 84 Me. 509 
 Honey (Del.), 65 Atl. 764 
 
 12, 320 
 Honore, 121 La. 573 
 Hood, 63 W. Va. 182 
 Hooker, 17 Vt. 658 
 
 507 
 467 
 
 77 
 299 
 
 45 
 
 301 
 330 
 345 
 418 
 147a 
 519 
 
 439 
 
 465 
 
 58 
 
 358 
 
 I 79 
 
 283 
 
 255, 448 
 
 90 
 102 
 261, 266 
 
 Hooper, 2 Bailey (S. Car.) 
 
 37 
 
 420, 429 
 54 
 277 
 35 
 225, 429 
 282, 294 
 
 Hoover, 134 Iowa 17 
 Hope, 102 Mo. 410 
 Hopkins, 94 Iowa 86 
 Hopkins, 50 Vt. 316 
 Hopkins, 56 Vt. 250 
 Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278 
 
 135, 136, 140 
 Hopper, 71 Mo. 425 228, 257 
 Horan, 32 Minn. 394 95, 97 
 
 Horin, 70 Kan. 256 470 
 
 Horn, 204 Mo. 528 109 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 State V. Horn, 209 I\Io. 452 269, 270 
 V. Home, 9 Kan. 119 63, 324, 330 
 V. Horned, 178 Mo. 59 373 
 
 V. Horner, i ]\Iarv. (Del.) 504 
 
 73, 255 
 V. Horner, 48 Mo. 520 424 
 
 V. Hornsby, 8 Rob. (La.) 554 250 
 V. Horseman (Ore. 1908), 98 
 
 Pac. 135 493 
 
 V. Hortman, 122 Iowa 104 144 
 
 V. Horton, 63 N. Car. 595 191 
 
 V. Horton, 100 N. Car. 443 
 
 386, 525 
 V. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643 248 
 
 V. Hough, 138 N. Car. 663 337 
 
 V. Houghton. 45 Ore. no 190,242 
 V. House, 55 Iowa 466 445 
 
 V. Houseworth, 91 Iowa 740 174 
 V. Houston, 3 Harr. (Del.) 15 174 
 V. Houston, I Bailey (S. Car.) 
 
 300 423 
 
 V. Houx, 109 ]\Io. 654 342 
 
 V. Howard, 120 La. 311 
 
 96, 104, 270 
 122 
 204 
 470 
 61, 358 
 130 
 
 V. Howard, 102 ^lo. 142 
 
 V. Howard, 118 Mo. 127 
 
 V. Howard, 137 Mo. 289 
 
 V. Howard, 30 Mont. 518 
 
 V. Howard, 17 X. H. 171 
 
 V. Howard, 35 S. Car. 197 127, 220 
 
 V. Howard, 32 Vt. 380 399 
 
 V. Howell, 80 Conn. 668 459, 461 
 
 V. Howell, 100 AIo. 628 152 
 
 V. Howell, 117 Mo. 307 118 
 
 V. Howell, 9 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 485 320 
 
 V. Hoxsie, 15 R. I. i 280a 
 
 V. Hoy, 83 Minn. 286 58 
 
 V. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330 328, 329 
 
 V. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518 16, 160, 328 
 V. Hubbard, 20X Mo. 639 245 
 
 V. Hudkins, 35 W. Va. 247 
 
 195, 197 
 
 V. Huff, 76 Iowa 200 224 
 
 V. Hughes, 58 Iowa 165 399 
 
 V. Hughes, 8 Kan. App. 631 220 
 
 V. Hughes, 35 Kan. 626 404 
 
 V. Hughes, 82 Mo. 86 32 
 
 V. Hull, 83 Iowa 112 369 
 
 V. Hull, 33 Ore. 56 295
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXl 
 
 [References arc to S 
 State 
 
 378 
 
 33 
 
 .392 
 
 238 
 
 70 
 
 State V. Hullen, 133 X. Car. 656 
 V. Humble, 34 ]\Io. App. 343 
 V. Hummer, 128 Iowa 505 
 V. Hunsaker, 16 Ore. 497 
 V. Hunt, 91 ]Mo. 491 
 V. Hunter, 50 Kan. 302 6 
 
 Hunter, 181 Mo. 316 468, 469 
 Hunter, 94 N. Car. 829 463 
 
 Hunter, 143 N. Car. 607 374a 
 Hunter, 79 S. Car. 84 267 
 
 Hunter, 18 Wash. 670 229 
 
 Huntley, 91 N. Car. 617 356 
 Huntly, 3 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 418 484, 488 
 
 Hurd, loi Iowa 39^ 395, 397 
 
 Hussey, 7 Iowa 409 413, 533 
 Hutchings, 30 Utah 310 6, 138 
 Hutchinson, 95 Iowa, 566 
 
 54, 410 
 Hutchinson, 11 1 ]Mo. 257 :^y^ 
 Hutchinson, 55 Ohio St. 
 
 573 480 
 
 Hutto, 66 S. Car. 449 
 Hyatt, 179 Mo. 344 
 Hyer, 39 N. J. L. 598 
 Hymer, 15 Nev. 49 
 Icenbice, 126 Iowa 16 
 Ihrig, 106 Mo. 267 
 Ireland, 89 ]\Iiss. 763 
 Isaacson, 8 S. Dak. 69 
 Jack, 69 Kan. 387 
 Jackman, 29 Nev. 403 
 Jackson, 12 La. Ann. 679 
 Jackson, 44 La. Ann. 160 
 Jackson, 30 ]\Ie. 29 
 Jackson, 73 Me. 91 
 Jackson, 17 Mo. 544 
 V. Jackson, 95 Mo. 623 
 V. Jackson, 106 Mo. 174 
 V. Jackson, 112 I\Io. 585 
 V. Jackson, 21 S. Dak. 494 
 V. Jacobs (Mo. App. 1908), 
 
 113 S. W. 244 
 V. Jacobs, 5 Jones (N. Car.), 
 
 259 
 V. Jacobs, 106 N. Car. 695 
 
 115. 215 
 V. Jacobs, 21 R. I. 259 147 
 
 V. Jacobs, 28 S. Car. 29 224 
 
 V. Jager, 19 Wis. 235 523 
 
 271 
 
 55 
 
 75 
 
 328 
 
 127, 129 
 
 58 
 
 40 
 
 233 
 
 247 
 
 226 
 
 324 
 
 237 
 
 32, 296 
 
 455 
 
 324 
 
 118 
 
 71, 74 
 438 
 438 
 
 99 
 
 53 
 
 cctions.] 
 V. Jaggers (N. J. 1904), 58 
 
 Atl. 1014 
 James, 37 Conn. 355 
 James, 194 Mo. 268 55, 
 
 James, 13 S. E. 325 64, 
 
 James, 34 S. Car. 49 64, 
 
 James, 34 S. Car. 579 64, 
 Jamison, 38 ]\Iinn. 21 339, 
 Jarrell, 141 N. Car. 722 
 Jarvis, 18 Ore. 360 
 Jarvis, 20 Ore. 437 395, 
 Jaynes, 78 N. Car. 504 149, 
 Jeandell, 5 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 475 
 Jefferson, 6 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 305 
 Jefifries, 210 ^lo. 302 
 
 58a, 314, 
 Jeffries, 117 N. Car. 727 
 Jenkins, 139 Mo. 535 
 Jenkins, 6 Jones (N. Car.), 
 
 19 
 Jenkins, 14 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 215 
 Jennett, 88 N. Car. 665 299, 
 Jennings, 79 Iowa 513 
 Jennings, 81 Mo. 185 
 
 152, 271, 
 Jennings, 48 Ore. 483 
 
 116, 235, 
 Jerome, 82 Iowa 749 
 Jesse, 3 Dev. & Bat. (N. 
 
 Car.) 98 
 Jeter, 47 S. Car. 2 
 Jimmerson, 118 N. Car. 
 
 1 173 
 Johnagen, 53 Iowa 250 
 Johns (Del.), 65 Atl. 763 
 
 17, 
 Johnson, 17 Ala. 618 
 Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 157, 
 Johnson, 8 Iowa 525 
 Johnson, 19 Iowa 230 
 Johnson, 72 Iowa 393 63, 
 Johnson, 89 Iowa i 
 Johnson, 133 Iowa 38 
 Johnson, 136 Iowa 601 
 Johnson, 29 La. Ann. 717 
 Johnson, 30 La. Ann. 88r 
 Johnson, 31 La. Ann. 368 
 
 117 
 10 
 
 378 
 176 
 492 
 176 
 343 
 95 
 397 
 397 
 
 275 
 418 
 
 374 
 
 87 
 
 404 
 
 32 
 
 300 
 378 
 
 301 
 
 239 
 409 
 
 423 
 366 
 
 320 
 248 
 
 320 
 log 
 166 
 320 
 6 
 522 
 224 
 415 
 268 
 211 
 127 
 332
 
 CXXXll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 State 
 
 [References ar 
 V. Johnson, 35 La. Ann. 968 94 
 Johnson, 41 La. Ann. 574 
 
 236, 250, 257 
 Johnson, 47 La. Ann. 1225 268 
 Johnson, 48 La. Ann. 437 222 
 Johnson, iii La. 935 88 
 
 Johnson, 12 ]\Iinn. 476 402, 403 
 Johnson, 91 Mo. 430 22,, 153 
 Johnson, 115 j\Io. 480 
 
 191, 339, 341, 342, 343 
 Johnson, 12 Nev. 121 261, 265 
 Johnson, y^, N. J. L. 412 
 
 122, 124 
 Johnson, i Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 352 320 
 
 Johnson, 67 N. Car. 55 54 
 
 Johnson, 16 S. Car. 187 484 
 Johnson, 26 S. Car. 152 103, 109 
 Johnson, 28 Vt. 512 418 
 
 Johnson, 36 Wash. 294 296 
 
 Johnston, 118 La. 276 157 
 
 Jolly, 3 Dev. & B. (N. Car.) 
 
 no 187 
 
 Jones (Iowa 1909), 123 N. 
 
 W. 960 408 
 
 Jones, 52 Iowa 150 79 
 
 Jones, 64 Iowa 349 160 
 
 Jones, 70 Iowa 505 359 
 
 Jones, 115 Iowa 113 68 
 
 Jones, 41 Kan. 309 233 
 
 Jones, 39 La. Ann. 935 408 
 Jones, 44 La. Ann. 960 238 
 
 Jones, 44 La. Ann. 1120 276 
 
 Jones, 47 La. Ann. 1524 
 
 103, 129, 224 
 Jones, 118 La. 369 117 
 
 Jones, 51 Me. 125 70 
 
 Jones, 55 Minn. 329 33 
 
 Jones, 71 Miss. 872 456 
 
 Jones, 54 Mo. 478 126, 130 
 
 Jones, 86 Mo. 622, 276 
 
 Jones, 134 Mo. 254 325 
 
 Jones, 153 Mo. 457 54 
 
 Jones, 32 Mont. 442 414 
 
 Jones, 50 N. H. 369 155 
 
 Jones, 70 N. Car. 75 440 
 
 Jones, 78 N. Car. 420 465 
 
 Jones, 145 N. Car. 466 129 
 
 Jones. I McMullen (S. 
 
 Car.) 236 421 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Jones, 29 S. Car. 201 243 
 
 V. Jones, 77 S. Car. 385 lOi 
 
 V. Jones, 33 Vt. 443 • 311 
 
 V. Jones, 20 W. Va. 764 338 
 
 V. Jones, 53 W. Va. 613 270 
 
 V. Judd, 132 Iowa 296 223 
 
 V. Judge, 42 La. Ann. 414 195 
 
 V. Judiesch, 96 Iowa 249 220 
 V. Justesen (Utah), 99 Pac. 
 
 456 470 
 V. Justice, 2 Dev. (N. Car.) 
 
 199 435 
 
 V. Justus. II Ore. 178 233 
 V. Kabrich, 39 Iowa, 277 76, 78 
 V. Kane (N. J.), 72 Atl. 39 
 
 93, 99, 100 
 
 V. Kane, i !McCord (S. Car.) i6a 
 
 V. Kapelino, 20 S. Dak. 591 loi 
 
 V. Karver, 65 Iowa 53 532 
 V. Kavanaugh, 4 Penn. (Del.) 
 
 131 23 
 
 V. Kearley, 26 Kan. 77 12 
 V. Keaveny, 49 La. Ann. 667 
 
 517, 520 
 
 V. Keefe, 54 Kan. 197 80, 325 
 V. Keeland (Mont. 1909), 104 
 
 Pac. 513 125 
 
 V. Keeler, 28 Iowa 551 7, 66, 147 
 
 365 
 24a 
 
 314 
 
 339 
 
 207, 208 
 
 V. Keenan, in Iowa 286 
 
 V. Keggon. 55 N. H. 19 
 
 V. Kehr, 133 Iowa 35 
 
 V. Keith. 47 Minn. 559 
 
 V. Keith, 63 N. Car. 140 
 
 V. Kellar, 8 N. Dak. 563 69 
 
 V. Kelleher (I\Io. 1909), 123 
 
 S. W. 551 109 
 V. Kelleher, 201 Mo. 614 
 
 96, 103, 104, 123, 326 
 
 V. Kelley, 45 S. Car. 659 248 
 
 V. Kelley, 46 S. Car. 55 50 
 
 V. Kelley, 65 Vt. 531 87 
 
 V. Kelliher, 49 Ore. 77 73 
 
 V. Kelly, 77 Conn. 266 319a 
 
 V. Kellv, 123 Mo. App. 680 37 
 
 V. Kelly, 76 N. J. L. 576 482 
 
 V. Kelly, 28 Ore. 225 126 
 V. Kelsoe, 11 Mo. App. 91 195, I97 
 
 V. Kemp. 87 N. Car. 538 92 
 
 V. Kemp, 120 La. 378 269 
 V. Kendall, 143 N. Car. 659 211
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXlll 
 
 [References are 
 State V. Kendig, 133 Iowa 164 267 
 V. Keneston, 59 N. H. 36 422 
 
 V. Kennade, 121 Mo. 405 324 
 
 V. Kennard, 74 N. H. 76 492 
 
 V. Kenny, 77 S. Car. 236 268, 492 
 V. Kennedy, 177 AIo. 98 77, 493 
 V. Kennedy (S. Car. 1910), 67 
 
 S. E. 152 492 
 
 V. Kenyon, 18 R. I. 217 324, 325 
 V. Kepper, 65 Iowa, 745 56 
 
 V. Keyes, 196 Mo. 136 435, 439 
 V. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57 255, 448 
 
 V. Khowry, 149 N. Car. 545 124 
 V. Kibler, 79 S. Car. 170 338 
 
 V. Kibling, 63 Vt. 636 276 
 
 V. Ki dwell, 62 W. Va. 466 6 
 
 V. Kilcrease, 6 S. Car. 444 26 
 
 V. Kimble, 34 La. Ann. 392 301 
 V. Kimbrell (N. Car. 1909) 
 
 66 S. E. 208 357 
 
 V. Kinder, 96 j\Io. 548 126, 127 
 V. Kindred, 148 ]\Io. 270 
 
 269, 270, 320 
 V. King, 81 Iowa 587 43, 287, 291 
 V. King, 122 Iowa, i 79 
 
 King, 71 Kan. 287 465 
 
 King, 47 La. Ann. 28 325, 326 
 King, 78 Mo. 555 77, 119 
 
 King, III Mo. 576 37 
 
 King, 203 Mo. 560 328 
 
 King, 67 N. H. 219 439 
 
 King, 86 N. Car. 603 
 
 59, 261, 262, 263, 264, 354 
 King, 9 S. Dak. 628 225 
 
 Kingsbury, 58 Me. 238 370 
 
 Kinley, 43 Iowa 294 76. 81, 83 
 Kinney, 44 Conn. 153 409, 410 
 Kinney, 21 S. Dak. 390 277 
 
 Kirkpatrick, 63 Iowa 554 
 
 66, 2;i6, 237 
 Kline, 54 Iowa 183 355 
 
 Kline, 50 Ore. 420 37 
 
 Klitzke, 46 Minn. 343 528 
 
 V. Klugherz, 91 Minn. 406 424 
 
 V. Knapf, 50 Wash. 229 447 
 
 V. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148 
 
 411, 412, 415, 418 
 V. Knapp, 70 Ohio St. 380 147 
 
 V. Knight, 43 Me. 11 320, 334 
 
 to Scctiojis.] 
 
 State V. Knoll, 69 Kan. 767 102, 103 
 V. Knost, 207 Mo. 18 211, 343 
 
 V. Knowles, 185 Mo. 141 
 
 147, 284, 286 
 V. Knutson, 91 Iowa 549 387 
 
 V. Knutson, 18 S. Dak. 444 524 
 V. Koontz, 31 W. Va. 127 517 
 
 V. Kortgaard, 62 Minn. 7 282, 283 
 V. Kriechbaum, Si Iowa 6^3 24a 
 V. Krug, 12 Wash. 288 17, 18 
 
 V. Kyle, 14 Wash. 702 16, 24a 
 
 V. Labuzan, 37 La. Ann. 489 326 
 V. Lacey, 11 1 Mo. 513 408 
 
 V. Lackland, 136 ]\Io. 26 300 
 
 V. Lagoni, 30 ]\Iont. 472 160 
 
 V. Laird, 79 Kan. 181 267 
 
 V. Laliyer, 4 Minn. 368 147 
 
 V. Lally, 2 Marv. (Del.) 424 12 
 V. Lamb, 141 Mo. 298 358 
 
 V. Lambert, 104 Me. 394 
 
 81, 116, 118, 120 
 V. LaMont (S. Dak. 1909), 
 
 120 N. W. 1 104 418 
 
 V. Lamothe, 37 La. Ann. 43 522 
 V. Lance, 149 N. Car. 551 330 
 
 V. Landers, 21 S. Dak. 606 48, 126 
 V. Landrum, 127 Mo. App. 653 209 
 V. Landry, 29 Mont. 218 230 
 
 V. Lane, 80 N. Car. 407 421, 423 
 V. Lang, 63 Me. 215 195 
 
 V. Lang (N. Dak. 1910), 125 
 
 N. W. 558 523 
 
 V. Lange, 59 Mo. 418 269, 300 
 
 V. Langford, 45 La. Ann. 1177 
 
 409, 410 
 V. Langford, 74 S. Car. 460 374 
 V. Lantz, 23 Kan. 728 228 
 
 V. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245 78, 87, 438 
 V. Laque, 41 La. Ann. 1070 261 
 V. Larkin, 49 N. H. 39 492, 493 
 V. Larkins, 5 Idaho 200 158, 328 
 V. La Rose (Ore. 1909), 104 
 
 Pac. 299 321 
 
 V. Lashus, 79 Me. 504 SM. S^S 
 
 V. Laster, 71 N. J. L. 586 95 
 
 V. Latham, 13 I red. (N. Car.) 
 
 33 310 
 
 V. Lattin, 29 Conn. 389 4^4 
 
 V. Lattin, 19 Wash. 57 33°
 
 CXXXIV 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are 
 State V. Lauderbeck, g6 Iowa 258 390 
 V. Lautenschlager, 22 iVlinn. 
 
 514 314 
 
 V. Lavin, 80 Iowa 555 526, 527 
 V. Lawler, 130 Mo. 366 358 
 
 V. Lawrence, $7 Me. 574 154, 157 
 V. Lawrence, 74 Ohio St. 38 418 
 V. Lax, 71 N. J. L. 386 299, 301 
 V. Laxton, 76 N. Car. 216 82 
 
 V. Laycock, 136 Mo. 93 518 
 
 V. Laycock, 141 Mo. 274 224 
 
 V. Leabo, 84 Mo. 168 18 
 
 V. Leabo, 89 Mo. 247 6 
 
 V. Leach, 7 Conn. 452 465 
 
 V. Leaden, 35 Conn. 515 371 
 
 V. Learnard, 41 Vt. 585 20, 21 
 
 V. Leary, iii La. 301 270 
 
 V. Leary, 136 N. Car. 578 487 
 
 V. Leasia, 45 Ore. 410 41a, 187 
 
 V. Le Blanc, 116 La. 822 82 
 
 V. Ledford, 133 N. Car. 714 368 
 V. Lee, 69 Conn. 186 347 
 
 V. Lee, 95 Iowa 427 273 
 
 V. Lee, 22 Minn. 407 yy, 81, 85 
 V. Lee, 80 N. Car. 483 214 
 
 V. Lee Doon, 7 Wash. 308 225, 230 
 V. Leeper, 70 Iowa 748 240 
 
 V. Legg, 59 W. Va. 315 
 
 217, 218, 247, 323 
 V. Lehman, 175 ]\Io. 619 467 
 
 V. Lehman, 182 Mo. 424 451 
 V. Lehre, 2 Brev. (S. Car.) 
 
 446 365 
 
 V. Leicham, 41 Wis. 565 291 
 
 V. Lejeune, 116 La. 193 324 
 
 V. Lem Woon (Ore., 1910), 
 
 107 Pac. 974 315 
 
 V. Lentz, 45 Minn. 177 312, 323 
 V. Lentz, 184 Mo. 223 282 
 
 V. Leonard, 135 Iowa 371 378 
 
 V. Leppere, 66 Wis. 355 79, 80 
 V. Leuhrsman, 123 Iowa 476 119a 
 V. Leuth, 5 Ohio C. C. 94 
 
 132, 133, 160 
 V. Levidi, 128 Iowa 3,72 305 
 
 V. Levine, 79 Conn. 714 292, 293 
 V. Levy, 9 Idaho 483 6, 67 
 
 V. Levy, 119 Mo. 434 144 
 
 V. Lewis, 139 Iowa 405 48, 97 
 
 V. Lewis, 45 Iowa 20 439 
 
 72>, 
 
 to Sectxons.'\ 
 
 State V. Lewis, 96 Iowa 286 29, 
 V. Lewis, 19 Kan. 260 
 V. Lewis, 26 Kan. 123 
 V. Lewis, 56 Kan. 374 
 V. Lewis, 38 La. Ann. 680 
 V. Lewis, 39 La. Ann. mo 
 V. Lewis, 44 La. Ann. 958 
 V. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 321 
 V. Lewis, 136 Mo. 84 
 V. Lewis, 181 Mo. 235 
 V. Lewis, 20 Nev. ^2>2> 
 V. Lewis, 51 Ore. 467 491, 
 v. Libby, 44 Me. 469 
 V. Libby, 84 Me. 461 
 V. Lichliter, 95 Mo. 402 
 V. Lightsey, 43 S. Car. I14 
 V. Liles, 134 N. Car. 735 
 V. Lincoln, 17 Wis. 597 
 V. Lindley, 51 Iowa 343 
 V. Lindsay, 122 La. 375 
 V. Lingle. 128 Mo. 528 
 V. Linhofif, 121 Iowa 632 
 V. Litchfield, 58 Me. 267 
 V. Littooy, 52 Wash. 87 
 V. Littschke, 27 Ore. 189 
 V. Livesay, 30 Mo. App. 6^3 
 
 484, 
 V. Lockhart, 188 ^lo. 427 
 V. Lockwood (Del., 1909), 74 
 
 Atl. 2 
 V. Lockwood, 58 Vt. 378 
 V. Lodge, 9 Houst. (Del.) 542 
 
 III, 
 V. Loe. 98 ]Mo. 609 
 V. Logan, i Nev. 509 
 V. Lomack, 130 Iowa 79 364, 
 V. Loney, 82 'Mo. 82 
 V. Long, 103 Ind. 481 438, 439, 
 V. Long, 201 ]\Io. 664 I 
 
 V. Long, 209 Mo. 366 
 V. Loos (Iowa, 1909), 123 N. 
 
 W. 962 
 V. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407 
 V. Lotono, 62 W. Va. 310 
 V. Lowe, 6 Kan. App. iia 
 V. Lowe, 93 ]\Io. 547 156, 
 
 V. Lowell, 123 Iowa 427 
 V. Lowry. 42 W. Va. 205 
 
 23, 148, 228, 422, 
 Lowhorne, 66 N. Car. 638 
 
 492 
 
 465 
 441 
 277 
 
 28 
 1 3-' 
 238 
 250 
 220 
 
 90 
 154 
 494 
 383 
 
 32 
 517 
 353 
 523 
 316 
 
 80 
 
 326 
 
 i8s, 386 
 
 17 
 182 
 276 
 196 
 
 485 
 238 
 
 368 
 296 
 
 227 
 271 
 
 26 
 365 
 
 70 
 443 
 19a 
 
 48 
 
 466 
 230 
 419 
 89 
 164 
 533 
 
 425 
 130
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXV 
 
 State V. Lucas, 57 Iowa 501 69 
 
 V. Lucas, 24 Ore. 168 215, 237 
 
 V. Lucey, 24 Mont. 295 119 
 
 V. Lucker, 40 S. Car. 549 232, 268 
 V. Luff (Del., 1909), 74 Atl. 
 
 1079 437 
 
 V. Lull, 48 Vt. 581 324 
 
 V. Lund, 49 Kan. 580 271 
 
 V. Luper (Ore., 1908), 95 Pac. 
 
 811 466 
 
 V. Lurles, 117 N. Car. 720 47 
 V. Lu Sing, 34 Mont. 31 147a, 20a 
 V. Lyniens, 138 Iowa 113 223 
 
 V. Lyon, 45 N. J. L. 272 282 
 
 V. Lyon, 81 N. Car. 600 71, 72 
 
 V. Lyon, 89 N. Car. 568 365 
 
 V. Lytle, 117 N. Car. 799 
 
 55, 368, 369 
 V. Lyts, 25 Wash. 347 132 
 
 V. ]\IcAllister, 24 ]\Ie. 139 -j^i, 423 
 V. :McAllister, 65 W. Va. 97 358 
 V. McBeth, 49 Kan. 584 309 
 
 V. IMcCaffrey, 69 Vt. 85 23, 24a 
 V. [NlcCahill, 72 Iowa iii 328, 335 
 V. ]\IcCanon, 51 Mo. 160 no 
 
 V. ISIcCants, i Speers (S. 
 
 Car.) 384 166 
 
 V. ^McCarthy, 43 La. Ann. 541 257 
 V. ^McCarthy, 36 Mont. 226 74, 292 
 V. McCaskey, 104 Mo. 644 390, 393 
 V. McCaulej-, 17 Wash. 88 42 
 
 V. AlcClain, 130 Iowa "^Z 299, 302 
 V. ]McClain, 137 ^lo. 307 129, 394 
 V. McClellan (Kan.), 98 Pac. 
 
 209 81 
 
 V. IMcClintic, "JZ Iowa 663 
 
 237, 386, 388, 393 
 V. ]\IcComb, 18 Iowa 43 271 
 
 V. JNIcCoomer, 79 S. Car. 63 
 
 103, 104, 106 
 V. ^IcCoy, 14 N. H. 364 294 
 
 V. McCoy, 15 Utah 136 50, 347 
 
 V. ^IcCoy, 63 W. Va. 69 358 
 
 V. McCracken, 66 Iowa 569 
 
 iSi> 152 
 V. McCrum, 38 Minn. 154 343 
 
 V. McDaniel, 84 N. Car. 803 19 
 V. ^McDaniel, 115 N. Car. 807 164 
 V. McDaniel, 68 S. Car. 304 
 
 242, 312 
 
 {References arc to Sections.] 
 
 State V. INIcDavid, 15 La. Ann. 
 403 400, 406 
 
 V. IMcDermet, 138 Iowa 86 298 
 V. McDermott, 36 Iowa 107 308 
 V. McDevitt, 69 Iowa 549 119 
 
 V. jMcDonald, 106 Ind. 233 452 
 V. McDonald, 57 Kan. 537 82 
 
 V. McDonald, 67 Mo. 13 356 
 
 V. ^IcDonald, 133 N. Car. 680 282 
 V. ^McDowell, loi N. Car. 734 526 
 V. McDuffie, 34 N. H. 523 3io 
 
 V. McDuffie, 107 N. Car. 885 383 
 V. ]\IcFarlain, 41 La. Ann. 686 
 
 222, 248 
 V. INIcFarlain, 42 La. Ann. 803 
 
 40, 44 
 V. McGahey, 3 N. Dak. 293 223 
 V. McGee, 81 Iowa 17 
 
 82, 492, 493, 494 
 V. }^IcGee, 188 Mo. 401 293 
 
 V. ]\IcGee, 212 Mo. 95 293 
 
 V. ]\IcGinnis, 74 Mo. 245 35, 36 
 V. McGlothlen, 56 Iowa 544 529 
 V. jNIcGlynn, 34 N. H. 422 24a 
 
 V. McGowan, 66 Conn. 392 221 
 
 V. iNIcGowan, 36 Alont. 422 
 
 I59> 238 
 V. INIcGraw, 87 Mo. 161 493 
 
 V. McGreevey (Idaho, 1909), 
 
 IDS Pac. 1047 328 
 
 V. McGuire, 193 Mo. 215 373 
 
 V. iMcGuire, 15 R. I. 23 61, 66, 246 
 V. iMcIntosh, 64 N. Car. 607 523 
 V. iSIcIntyre, 53 Wash 178 198 
 
 V. ]McKay, 150 N. Car. 813 6 
 
 V. McKay, 122 Iowa 658 184 
 
 V. McKean, 36 Iowa 343 69 
 
 V. McKee, 109 Ind. 497 309, 310 
 V. McKee, 17 Utah 270 293 
 
 V. McKellar (S. Car., 1910), 
 
 67 S. E. 314 328 
 
 V. McKenzie, 42 Me. 392 434 
 
 V. McKinney, 76 Kan. 419 196, 301 
 V. ?*IcKinney, III N. Car. 683 241 
 V. ]\IcKinnon, 99 Me. 166 44 
 
 V. IMcKnight, 1 19 Iowa 79 277 
 
 V. McKnight, in N. Car. 690 37^ 
 V. McLain. 43 Wash. 267 370 
 
 V. McLaughlin, 44 Iowa 82 
 
 238, 414
 
 CXXXVl 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 State 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 62 
 263 
 349 
 
 [References ar 
 V. McLaughlin, 27 Mo. in 518 
 McLaughlin, 76 Mo. 320 
 McLellan, 79 Kan. 11 
 McLeod, 136 Mo. 109 
 M'Leod, I Hawks (N. 
 
 Car.) 344 26, 193 
 
 McMahon, 17 Nev. 365 370 
 
 McManus, 89 N. Car. 555 484 
 McNally, 87 Mo. 6z^ 79 
 
 McNamara, 212 Mo. 150 323 
 McNeil, 33 La. Ann. 1332 
 
 261, 265 
 McO'Blenis, 24 Mo. 402 
 
 261, 265 
 McQuire, 15 R. L 23 66 
 
 Mace, 118 N. Car. 1244 108 
 
 MacQueen, 69 N. J. L. 522 152 
 Madeira, 125 Mo. App. 508 42 
 Madigan, 57 Minn. 425 90 
 
 MaFoo, no IMo. 7 n9 
 
 Magone, 32 Ore. 206 71 
 
 Magoon, 68 Vt. 289 121, 122 
 
 Maguire, n3 Mo. 670 58 
 
 Mahan, 132 Mo. n2 285 
 
 Maher, 74 Iowa 77 148, 149 
 
 Maher, 24 Nev. 465 14 
 
 Mahon, 32 Vt. 241 n9a 
 
 Mahoney, 122 Iowa 168 120 
 
 Maier, 36 W. Va. 757 161 
 
 Main, 69 Conn. 123 275 
 
 IMaitremme, 14 La. Ann. 830 145 
 Major, 70 S. Car. 387 122 
 
 Mallon, 75 Mo. 355 ng 
 
 Malloy, 34 N. J. L. 410 311 
 
 JNIaloney, 12 R. I. 251 446 
 
 Manceaux, 42 La. Ann. 
 
 I I 64 270 
 
 Manicke, 139 Mo. 545 509, 512 
 Mann, 39 Wash. 144 185, 369 
 Marcks, 140 Mo. 656 417 
 
 ]\Iarkins, 95 Ind. 464 92 
 
 Marks, 70 S. Car. 448 118, 120 
 Markuson, 7 N. Dak. 155 510 
 Marselle, 43 Wash. 273 147 
 
 Marsh, 70 Vt. 288 
 
 42, 123, 312, 319a, 323 
 Marshall, ns Mo. 383 n9 
 
 Marsteller, 84 N. Car. 726 353 
 Martin, 31 La. Ann. 849 485 
 Martin, 124 Mo. 514 246 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 State V. Martin (N. J. 1909), 73 
 
 Atl. 548 482 
 
 V. Martin, 147 N. Car. 832 307 
 
 V. Martin, 59 Ohio St. 212 509 
 
 V. Martin, 47 Ore. 282 323, 334 
 V. Martin, 30 Wis. 216 353 
 
 V. Martin, 47 S. Car. 67 55 
 
 V. Marvels, 2 Harr. (Del.) 527 419 
 V. Marvin, 35 N. H. 22 
 
 92, 187, 188, 381, 383 
 V. Mason, 26 Ore. 273 363 
 
 v. Massey, 104 N. Car. 877 
 
 249, 250 
 V. Mathes, 90 Mo. 571 102, 103, 112 
 V. Matheson, 130 Iowa 440 50 
 
 V. Matheson, 142 Iowa 414 312 
 
 V. Mathews, 98 Mo. 125 67, 71, 214 . 
 V. Mathews, 202 Mo. 143 121 
 
 V. Mathias, 206 Mo. 604 471, 475 
 V. Matlock, 5 Penn. (Del.) 401 470 
 V. Matlock, 70 Iowa 229 402 
 
 V. Matthews, 119 La. 665 151 
 
 V. Matthews, 88 Mo. 121 43 
 
 V. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450 
 
 459, 460, 461 
 V. Matthews, 66 N. Car. 106 132 
 V. Matthews, 78 N. Car. 523 324 
 V. Maxwell, 47 Iowa 454 4^9 
 
 V. Maxwell, 51 Iowa 314 198 
 
 V. May, 20 Iowa, 305 302 
 
 V. May, 62 W. Va. 129 132 
 
 V. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540 
 
 103, no, in 
 V. Mayberry. 48 Me. 218 296 
 
 V. Meche, 42 La. Ann. 273 377 
 
 V. Medbury, 8 R. I. 543 383 
 
 V. Medicott, 9 Kan. 257 103 
 
 V. Megorden, 49 Ore. 259 213, 312 
 V. Mehojovich, 118 La. 1013 408 
 V. Melick, 65 Iowa 614 374 
 
 V. Melrose, 98 Mo. 594 492 
 
 V. Melton, 37 La. Ann. 77 119 
 
 V. Melton, 120 N. Car. 591 
 
 132, 404, 40s 
 V. Melvern, 32 Wash. 7 58, 233 
 V. Merchant (N. H.), 18 Atl. 
 
 654 174 
 
 v. Merkel, 189 Mo. 315 282 
 
 V. Merriman, 34 S. Car. 16 
 
 82, 246, 313
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 CXXXVll 
 
 [References ar 
 
 State 
 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 
 V. Merriman, 34 S. Car. 576 
 Alerritt, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 
 
 67 
 Meshek, 61 Iowa 316 
 Messner, 43 Wash. 206 
 jMetcalf, 2 Mo. App. 1269 
 INIetcalf, 17 Mont. 417 
 :Meyer, 135 Iowa 507 36, 
 Meyers, 120 La. 127 
 Meyers, 99 Mo. 107 
 Meyers, 46 Neb. 152 
 Michael, 37 W. Va. 565 
 Michel, III La. 434 
 Michel, 20 Wash. 162 
 Middleton, 69 S. Car. 72 
 Miles, 89 Me. 142 
 Miles, 124 Mo. App. 283 
 
 484, 
 Miles, 15 Wash. 534 
 Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564 
 6, 320, 
 IMiller, 53 Iowa 84 
 Miller, 65 Iowa 60 
 Miller, 71 Kan. 200 39, 342, 
 Miller, 42 La. Ann. 1186 
 
 127, 
 ]\Iiller, 45 Minn. 521 300, 
 [Miller, 44 ^lo. App. 159 
 
 449- 
 [Nliller, 93 Mo. 263 
 ]\Iiller, 100 Mo. 606 
 IMiller, 182 Mo. 370 
 Miller, 97 N. Car. 484 73, 
 Miller, 43 Ore. 325 
 Miller, 3 Wash. St. 131 
 Miller, 42 W. Va. 215 
 Milling, 35 S. Car. 16 
 Millmeier, 102 Iowa 692 
 Mills (Del. 1908), 69 Atl. 
 
 841 
 Mills, 17 ]Me. 211 
 Mills, 91 N. Car. 581 
 Mills, 116 N. Car. 1051 
 Mills, 79 S. Car. 187 61, in. 
 Mills, 33 W. Va. 455 
 Mims, 26 Minn. 183 285, 
 Mims, 39 S. Car. 557 
 Minard, 96 Iowa 267 
 Minnick, 15 Iowa 123 
 Minor, 117 Mo. 302 61, 71, 
 
 221, 
 6, 245, 
 
 238 
 
 456 
 277, 
 490 
 475 
 58 
 205 
 238 
 
 125 
 410 
 205 
 73 
 36 
 138 
 451 
 
 236 
 
 334 
 275 
 397 
 413 
 
 408 
 301 
 
 468 
 237 
 246 
 450 
 74 
 50 
 519 
 384 
 214 
 
 354 
 439 
 103 
 
 364 
 269 
 
 35 
 290 
 382 
 118 
 
 455 
 246 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 State V. Minton, 116 Mo. 605 423, 427 
 V. Mispagel, 207 Mo. 557 282, 289 
 V. [Mitchell, 139 Iowa 455 
 
 6, 352, 354 
 V. [Mitchell, 68 Iowa 116 409, 410 
 V. Mitchell, Phil. (N. Car.) L. 
 
 447 135 
 
 V. [Mitchell, 32 Wash. 64 67 
 V. [Mitton, 36 Mont. 376 
 
 419, 421, 422, 423 
 
 V. [Mize, 117 N. Car. 780 523 
 
 V. ^lizis, 48 Ore. 165 488 
 
 V. IMoberly, 121 Mo. 604 87 
 
 V. [Mobley, 44 Wash. 549 415 
 V. Moelchen, 53 Iowa 310 
 
 6, 58, 86, 330 
 
 V. [Moncla, 39 La. Ann. 868 119 
 
 V. Monfre, 122 La. 251 124 
 V. [Montgomery, 65 Iowa 483 
 
 59, 355 
 V. [Montgomery, 121 La. 1005 161 
 V. [Montgomery, 17 S. Dak. 
 
 500 298 
 
 V. [Mook, 40 Ohio St. 588 289 
 
 V. [Moon, 41 Wis. 684 295 
 
 V. Moore (Del., 1909), 74 Atl. 
 
 1 112 320 
 
 V. Moore, 25 Iowa 128 320 
 
 V. Moore, 78 Iowa 494 386 
 
 V. [Moore, 38 La. Ann. 66 loi 
 
 V. Moore, loi Mo. 316 
 
 118, 120, 301, 302, 305 
 V. Moore, 106 [Mo. 480 358 
 
 V. Moore, 117 Mo. 395 
 
 97, 120, 372, 373, 378 
 V. Moore, in N. Car. 667 439 
 V. Moore (Utah, 1909), 105 
 
 Pac. 293 383 
 
 V. Moran, 131 Iowa, 645 51, 90, 138 
 V. [Moran, 46 Kan. 318 232 
 
 V. [Moran, 216 Mo. 550 245, 467 
 V. Moran, 15 Ore. 262 192, 230 
 
 V. [Mordecai, 68 N. Car. 207 48 
 
 V. [Morey, 2 Wis. 494 295 
 
 V. [Morgan, 196 Mo. 177 178 
 
 V. [Morgan, 2 Dev. & B. (N. 
 
 Car.) 348 423 
 
 V. Morgan, 3 Ircd. (N. Car.) 
 
 186 354 
 
 V. Morgan, 28 Ore. 578 286
 
 CXXXVlll 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 67 
 13S 
 
 State V. Morgan, 27 Utah 103 
 
 268, 269, 270 
 V. Morney, 196 ]\Io. 43 6 
 
 V. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 459 
 
 V. Morris, 47 Conn. 179 371 
 
 V. Morris, 109 N. Car. 820 
 
 22, 241 
 V. Morrison, 46 Kan. 679 447 
 
 V. Morrow, 40 S. Car. 221 345 
 
 V. Morse, 12 Idaho 492 293 
 
 V. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312 
 
 313, 323, 330 
 V. Mortimer, 20 Kan. 93 138 
 
 V. Morton, 27 Vt. 310 491 
 
 V. Morton, 8 Wis. 167 432 
 
 V. Mosby, S3 Mo. App. 571 475 
 V. Moses, 139 Mo. 2x7 517, 518 
 V. Mosley, 31 Kan. 355 
 V. Moss, -]-] S. Car. 391 
 V. Motley, 7 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 327 
 
 V. Moultrie, 2>2> La. Ann. 1146 270 
 V. Mount, ^z N. J. L. 582 61 
 
 V. Mowry, Zl Kan. 369 164, 166 
 V. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374 
 
 6, 18, 48, ()T, 312 
 V. INIulch, 17 S. Dak. 321 221 
 
 V. Mulkern, 85 Me. 106 411 
 
 V. JNIullins, loi Mo. 514 
 
 65, 122, 123, 132, 133 
 V. Mulloy, III Mo. App. 679 42 
 V. ]\Iungeon, 20 S. Dak. 612 247 
 V. ]\Iurdy, 81 Iowa 603 112 
 
 V. Murphy (Del., 1907), (£ 
 
 Atl. 335 446 
 
 V. ]\Turphy, 45 La. Ann. 958 61 
 V. INIurphy, 118 Mo. 7 
 
 ^7, 79, 164, 413 
 
 V. Murphy, 84 N. Car. 742 87 
 
 V. Murphy, 17 N. D. 48 423 
 
 V. Murphy, 17 R. I. 698 428 
 
 V. Murphy, 15 Wash. 98 296 
 
 V. Murray, 6 Cr. L. Mag. 255 154 
 V. Murray, 15 Me. 100 465 
 
 V. Murray, 39 Mo. App. 127 484 
 V. Murray, 126 Mo. 611 123, 124 
 V. Mushied, 12 Wis. 561 523 
 
 V. Mushrush, 97 Iowa 444 494 
 
 V. Musick, loi Mo. 260 517 
 
 V. Myers, 82 Mo. 558 423, 438 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Myers, 198 Mo. 225 
 
 322, 323, 493 
 V. Myrberg (Wash. 1909), 105 
 
 Pac. 622 409 
 
 V. Nadal, 69 Iowa 478 400, 404 
 
 V. Nagel, 136 Mo. 45 5 18 
 
 V. Nagle, 25 R. I. 105 233 
 
 V. Nance, 25 S. Car. 168 103 
 
 V. Napier, 65 Mo. 462 119a 
 
 V. Napper, 141 Mo. 401 58, 211 
 
 V. Napper, 6 Nev. 113 353 
 
 V. Nash, 7 Iowa 347 m* Ii7, 3^2 
 V. Nash, 45 La. Ann. 974 324 
 
 V. Neagle, 65 Me. 468 89, SM 
 
 V. Neasby, 188 Mo. 467 342 
 
 V. Nease, 46 Ore. 433 47^ 
 
 V. Neil, 13 Idaho 539 409, 417 
 V. Neill, 6 Ala. 685 185 
 
 V. Neimeier, 66 Iowa 634 442 
 
 V. Nelson, 58 Iowa 208 81 
 
 V. Nelson, 68 Kan. 566 262 
 
 V. Nelson, 98 Mo. 414 60 
 
 V. Nelson, loi Mo. 46 104, 106, no 
 V. Nelson, 39 Wash. 221 187 
 
 V. Nettlebush, 20 Iowa 257 108 
 
 V. Neubauer (Iowa, 1909) 124 
 
 N. W. 312 92 
 
 V. New, 22 Minn. 76 284, 288 
 
 V. Newhouse, 39 La. Ann. 862 103 
 V. Newman. 57 Kan. 705 159 
 
 V. Newman, 34 Mont. 434 423 
 
 V. Newman, 74 N. H. 10 281, 282 
 V. Newman, 73 N. J. L. 202 
 
 331, 438 
 V. Newsum, 129 Mo. 154 268 
 
 V. Newton, 44 Iowa 45 342 
 
 V. Newton, 16 N. Dak. 151 461 
 V. Nichols, 29 Minn. 357 524 
 
 V. Nickels, 65 S. Car. 169 277 
 
 V. Nieuhaus, 217 Mo. 332 
 
 221, 222, 312 
 V. Niles, 47 Vt. 82 411 
 
 V. Nippert, 74 Kan. 371 21 
 
 V. Nix, III La. 812 326 
 
 V. Nixon, 32 Kan. 205 154 
 
 V. Nocton, 121 Mo. 537 326 
 
 V. Noeninger, 108 Mo. 166 330, 357 
 V. Nolan, 48 Kan. 723 367 
 
 V. Noland, in Mo. 473 282, 291 
 V. Nordall, 38 Mont. 327 3i2> 3^6
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 C5XX1X 
 
 State 
 
 [References ar 
 V. Norman, 135 Iowa 483 
 
 197, 236, 374 
 Norris, 127 Iowa 683 414 
 
 Norton, 89 i\Ie. 290 364 
 
 Norton, 76 Mo. 180 437 
 
 Nowells, 135 Iowa, 53 
 
 103, 113, 233 
 Nugent, 134 Iowa 237 386 
 
 Nugent, 116 La. 99 220 
 
 Nulty, 2 Eastern 347 279 
 
 Nussenholtz, 76 Conn. 92 78 
 
 Oakes, 202 Mo. 86 394 
 
 Ober, 52 N. H. 459 60, 68, 247 
 O'Brien, 81 Iowa 88 
 
 108, 246, 265, 266, 2)72> 
 O'Brien, 18 Mont, i 
 
 132, 238, 239, 240, 250 
 O'Brien, 35 Mont. 482 69 
 
 O'Connell (Iowa, 1909), 123 
 
 N. W. 201 88 
 
 O'Connor, 38 Minn. 243 499 
 
 Odell, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 156 196 
 O'Keefe, 141 Mo. 271 391 
 
 Oldham, 200 Mo. 538 475 
 
 Olds, 217 Mo. 305 429, 482 
 
 Oliver, 55 Kan. 711 131 
 
 Oliver, 43 La. Ann. 1003 
 
 262, 329 
 O'Neal, 7 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 251 76, 78 
 
 O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651 154. 164, 333 
 Oppenheimer, 41 Wash. 630 437 
 O'Reilly, 126 Mo. 597 50 
 
 Ormiston, 66 Iowa 143 79 
 
 Orr, 64 Mo. 339 I95 
 
 O'Rourke (Neb., 1909), 124 
 
 N. W. 138 531 
 
 Orsborn, i Roott (Conn.) 
 
 152 434 
 
 Orth, 79 Ohio St. 130 185 
 
 Osborne, 28 Iowa 9 295 
 
 Osborne, 96 Iowa, 281 221 
 
 Oscar, 7 Jones (N. Car.) 
 
 305 ^^2^, 
 
 Ostwalt, 118 N. Car. 1208 523 
 Oswald, 59 Kan. 508 475 
 
 Otey, 7 Kan. 69 413 
 
 Otis, 135 Ind. 267 391 
 
 Overstreet, 43 Kan. 299 339, 343 
 Owsley, III Mo. 450 378 
 
 e to Sections.'] 
 
 State V. Oxford, 30 Tex. 428 191 
 
 V. Ozias, 136 Iowa 175 74 
 
 V. Pabst. 139 Wis. 561 179 
 
 V. Padillia, 42 Cal. 535 12 
 
 V. Page, 212 Mo. 224 323 
 
 V. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300 
 
 154, 157, 163, 250 
 V. Pain, 48 La. Ann. 311 
 
 82, i8s, 328 
 V. Painter, 50 Iowa 317 390 
 
 V. Painter, 67 Mo. 84 356 
 
 V. Paisley, 36 Mont. 237 118 
 
 V. Palmberg, 199 Mo. 233 
 
 217, 413, 415 
 V. Palmer, 50 Kan. 318 442 
 
 V. Palmer, 88 Mo. 568 59 
 
 V. Palmer, 65 N. H. 216 118 
 
 V. Pancoast (N. Dak., 1896), 
 
 67 N. W. 1052 90, 247 
 
 V. Parham, 48 La. Ann. 1309 112 
 V. Parish, 104 N. Car. 679 415 
 
 V. Park, 57 Kan. 431 467 
 
 V. Parker, 134 N. Car. 209 410 
 
 V. Parrish, 22 Iowa 284 280 
 
 V. Parrott, 79 N. Car. 615 185 
 
 V. Parsons, 44 Wash. 299 358 
 
 V. Partlow, 90 Mo. 608 328 
 
 V. Patillo, 4 Hawks (N. Car.') 
 
 348 435 
 
 V. Patrick, 107 ]\Io. 147 
 
 355, 409, 410, 41S, 418 
 V. Patterson, 72> ^lo- 695 
 
 126, 127, 129 
 V. Patterson,' 88 Mo. 88 62 
 
 V. Patterson, 2 N. J. L. J. 2t8 364 
 V. Patterson, 2 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 L. 346 185, 189, 400, 406 
 
 V. Patterson, 63 N. Car. 520 119a 
 V. Patterson, 18 S. Dak. 251 
 
 523, 525 
 V. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 
 
 III, 112, 320 
 V. Peace, 121 La. 107 326 
 
 V. Peach, 70 Vt. 283 378, 379 
 
 V. Pease, 74 Ind. 263 421 
 
 V. Peebles, 178 Mo. 475 374a 
 
 V. Peffers, 80 Iowa 580 
 
 100, 324, 32s 
 V. Pell, 140 Iowa 655 
 
 516, 517, 521
 
 cxl 
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 127 
 
 411 
 
 301 
 
 [References ar 
 State V. Pellerin, 118 La. 547 282 
 
 V. Pendleton, 67 Kan. 180 403 
 
 V. Penna, 35 Mont. 535 160, 161 
 V. Penney, 113 Iowa 691 140 
 
 V. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388 
 
 21, 185, 32,2, 
 V. Penny, 70 Iowa 190 41, 439 
 
 V. Pennyman, 68 Iowa 216 161, 299 
 V. Ped, 9 Houst. (Del.) 488 320 
 V. People, 85 N. Y. 390 82 
 
 V. Perkins, 3 Hawks (N. Car.) 
 
 Z77 124 
 
 V. Perkins, 66 N. Car. 126 236, 237 
 V. Perkins, 117 N. Car. 698 532 
 V. Perry, 4 Idaho 224 I73 
 
 V. Perry, 124 La. 931 370, 377 
 
 V. Perry, 136 Mo. 126 88, 321 
 
 V. Perry, 5 Jones (N. Car.) 9 488 
 V. Peter, 14 La. Ann. 521 
 V. Peter, 8 Jones (N. Car.) 
 
 19 
 Peters, 107 N. Car. 876 
 Peterson, 67 Iowa 564 
 Peterson, 149 N. Car. 533 
 
 320, 324, 338 
 
 Petsch, 43 S. Car. 132 m, 2,33 
 Pettaway, 3 Hawks (N. 
 
 Car.) 623 526, 527 
 
 Pettit, 119 Mo. 410 324 
 
 Petty, 119 Mo. 425 439 
 Peyton (Ark. 1910), 125 S. 
 
 W. 416 408 
 Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90 
 
 60, 210, 246 
 
 Phair, 48 Vt. 366 429 
 
 Phelps, 2 Root (Conn.) 87 434 
 
 Phelps, II Vt. 116 420 
 
 Phelps, 41 Wash. 470 439 
 
 Phifer, 65 N. Car. 321 439 
 
 Phillips, 5 Ind. App. 122 532 
 
 Phillips, 24 Mo. 475 "9 
 V. Phillips, 104 N. Car. 786 
 
 196, 356 
 
 V. Phillips, 73 S. Car. 236 493 
 V. Philpot, 97 Iowa 365 
 
 215, 216, 221, 245 
 
 V. Phipps, 95 Iowa 491 310 
 
 V. Phipps, 76 N. Car. 203 71 
 
 V. Picker, 2 Mb. App. 1074 279 
 
 V. Pickett, II I^ev. 255 407 
 
 e to Sections.^ 
 
 State V. Pickett, 174 Mo. 663 442 
 
 V. Pickett, 118 N. Car. 1231 446 
 V. Pienick, 46 Wash. 523 367 
 
 V. Pierce, 7 Ala. 728 310 
 
 V. Pierce, 65 Iowa 85 12, 167 
 
 V. Pierce, 77 Iowa 245 287 
 
 V. Pierson, 12 Ala. 149 275 
 
 V. Pigford, 117 N. Car. 748 484 
 V. Pigg, 78 Kan. 618 46 
 
 V. Pike, 65 Me. in 333 
 
 V. Pippin, 88 N. Car. 646 92 
 
 V. Pirkey (S. Dak.), 118 N. 
 
 W. 1042 
 V. Place, 5 Wash. 773 
 V. Plant, 67 Vt. 454 
 V. Plomondon, 75 Kan. 853 
 
 276 
 
 355 
 
 482 
 
 61 
 
 193, 276 
 
 V. Plum, 49 Kan. 679 
 
 V. Plunkett, 64 Me. 534 
 
 V. Poindexter, 23 W. Va. 805 37 
 
 V. Pollok, 4 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 305 487 
 
 V. Pomeroy, 25 Kan. 349 96 
 
 V. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489 477 
 
 V. Poole, 42 Wash. 192 126, 438 
 
 V. Pope, 109 N. Car. 849 383 
 
 V. Pope, 78 S. Car. 264 250, 269 
 
 V. Porter, 34 Iowa 131 338 
 
 V. Porter, 57 Iowa 691 415 
 
 V. Porter, 97 Iowa 450 373 
 
 V. Porter, 213 Mo. 43 I59, 329 
 
 V. Porter, 26 Mo. 20 284, 295 
 
 V. Porter, 32 Ore. 135 125 
 
 V. Potter, 18 Conn. 166 130 
 
 V. Potter, 13 Kan. 414 324 
 
 V. Potter, 108 Mo. 424 119, 521 
 
 V. Potter, 42 Vt. 495 73 
 
 V. Potter, 52 Vt. 33 381 
 
 V. Potts, 83 Iowa 317 521, 522 
 
 V. Potts, 9 N. J. L. 26 42s, 434 
 
 V. Poimdstone (Mo. App. 
 
 1909), 124 S. W. 79 41a 
 
 V. Powell, 5 Penn. (Del.) 24 
 
 245, 320, 326 
 
 V. Powell, 5T Wash. 372 516 
 
 V. Powers, 130 Mo. 157 55, I49 
 V. Powers, 51 N. J. L. 432 201 
 
 V. Poyner (Wash., 1910), 107 
 
 Pac. 181 384 
 
 V. Pratt, 20 Iowa 267 122
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxli 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 State 
 
 V. Pratt, 98 Mo. 482 
 71, 28. 
 Pratt, 121 Mo. 566 
 Pratt, 21 S. Dak. 305 
 Pray, 14 N. H. 464 
 Pressler, 16 Wyo. 214 
 Price, 6 La. Ann. 691 
 Price, 12 Gill & J. (Md.) 
 
 260 
 Price, 115 Mo. App. 656 
 Priddy, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 429 
 Pritchard, 107 X. Car. 921 
 
 451, 
 Pritchett, 106 N. Car. 667 
 Privitt, 175 Mo. 207 
 Prolow, 98 Minn. 459 
 Pruett, 49 La. Ann. 283 
 Pryor, 30 Ind. 350 
 Psycher, 179 Mo. 140 
 Pucca, 4 Penn. (Del.) 71 
 Pugh, 7 Jones (N. Car.) 61 
 Punshon, 124 Mo. 448 
 Punshon, 133 Mo. 44 
 Purdy, s6 Wis. 213 
 Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 
 Queen, 91 N. Car. 659 
 Quick, 150 N. Car. 820 
 Quigley, 26 R. L 263 
 Quinn (Wash., 1909). 
 
 Pac. 818 
 Quirk, loi Minn. 334 
 Rabens, 79 S. Car. 542 
 Rainsbarger, 71 Iowa 746 
 Ralston, 139 Iowa 44 
 Ramsey, 48 La. Ann. 1407 
 Rand, 33 N. H. 216 
 Ransell, 41 Conn. 433 
 Raphael, 123 Iowa 452 
 Rash, 12 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 382 90, 328, 
 
 Rathbun, 74 Conn. 524 
 Raven, 115 Mo. 419 
 Ravenscraft, 62 Mo. App. 
 
 109 
 Ray, S3 Mo. 345 
 Raymond, 46 Conn. 345 
 
 299. 
 Raymond, 53 X. J. L. 260 
 
 215. 
 
 289, 291 
 246 
 
 468, 470 
 295 
 
 157, 338 
 III 
 
 473 
 482 
 
 488 
 
 456 
 
 61 
 
 163 
 
 320 
 
 280 
 
 442 
 
 6 
 
 79 
 
 408 
 
 330 
 
 97, 312 
 
 455 
 
 72 
 
 144 
 
 338 
 
 160 
 
 157, 
 105 
 326, 
 
 329 
 122 
 269 
 188 
 118 
 
 33^ 
 
 118 
 
 89 
 
 377 
 
 333 
 
 280a 
 
 96 
 
 292 
 
 518 
 
 378 
 228 
 
 State V. Raynor, 145 N. Car. 
 
 472 
 387, 
 528, 
 
 390 
 V. Read, 45 Iowa 469 528, 532 
 
 V. Reader, 60 Iowa 527 21 
 
 V. Reasby, 100 Iowa 231 53, 54 
 
 V. Record (X. Car., 1909), 65 
 
 S. E. loio 299 
 
 V. Red, 53 Iowa 69 125, 137 
 
 V. Reddick, 7 Kan. 143 156, 163 
 
 V. Reddington, 7 S. Dak. 368 205 
 V. Redemeier, 71 Mo. 173 158 
 
 V. Redstrake, 39 X. J. L. 365 
 
 422, 424 
 V. Reed, 26 Conn. 202 195 
 
 V. Reed, 3 Idaho 754 230 
 
 V. Reed, 62 Iowa 40 152 
 
 V. Reed, 53 Kan. 767 105 
 
 V. Reed, 49 La. Ann. 704 134 
 
 V. Reed, 62 Me. 129 10, 12 
 
 V. Reed, 89 Mo. 168 223, 303 
 
 V. Reed, 137 Mo. 125 112, 326 
 
 V. Reed, 52 Ore. 377 275 
 
 V. Reeves, 97 Mo. 668 390 
 
 V. Register, 133 X. Car. 746 73, 89 
 V. Reick, 43 Kan. 635 222 
 
 V. Reid, 20 Iowa 413 373, 378 
 
 V. Reid, 39 Minn. 277 411, 417 
 
 V. Reidel, 9 Houst. (Del.) 470 163 
 V. Reilly, 4 Mo. App. 392 282 
 
 V. Reitz, 83 X. Car. 634 152, 374 
 V. Remington, 50 Ore. 99 280, 354 
 V. Renaud, 50 La. Ann. 662 135 
 V. Renfrow, iii Mo. 589 58 
 
 V. Renton, 15 X. H. 169 489 
 
 V. Revells, 34 La. Ann. 381 
 
 129, 138 
 V. Reynolds, 5 Kan. App. 515 87 
 V. Reynolds, 48 S. Car. 384 185 
 V. Rice (S. Car., 1897), 37 S. 
 
 E. 452 243 
 
 V. Richards, 33 Iowa 420 409 
 
 V. Richardson, 18 Ala. 109 207 
 
 V. Richardson, 194 Mo. 326 
 
 78, 122, 184, 327 
 V. Richmond, 138 Iowa 494 125 
 V. Ricksicker, 73 Kan. 495 21 
 
 V. Riddle, 20 Kan. 711 324, 325 
 V. Riddle, 179 Mo. 287 263 
 
 V. Ridcau, ti6 La. 245 326, 328 
 
 V. Riggs, 39 Conn. 498 364
 
 cxlii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 State V. Rights, 82 N. Car. 675 378 
 V. Riley, 42 La. Ann. 995 loi, 263 
 V. Riley, 113 N. Car. 648 279 
 
 V. Riney, 137 Mo. 102 70 
 
 V. Ring, 29 Minn. 78 285, 289, 291 
 V. Ring, 142 N. Car. 596 387 
 
 V. Ripley, 32 Wash. 182 
 
 95, 268, 358 
 V. Rivers (Conn. 1909), 74 Atl. 
 
 757 418 
 
 V. Rivers, 58 Iowa 102 437 
 
 V. Rivers, 68 Iowa 611 152, 378 
 
 Roach, 2 Mo. App. 11 14 s^ 
 
 Robbins, 124 Ind. 308 477 
 
 Roberson, 150 N. Car. 837 320 
 Roberts, 39 Mo. App. 47 484 
 Roberts, 201 Mo. 702 
 
 89, 492, 494 
 Roberts, 28 Nev. 350 
 
 50, 87, 103, 104, 112 
 Roberts, 15 Ore. 187 68, 370 
 Roberts, 63 Vt. 139 48 
 
 Robertson, 30 La. Ann. 340 326 
 Robertson, iii La. 35 129 
 
 Robinson, 35 La. Ann. 964 294 
 Robinson, 39 Me. 150 514 
 
 Robinson, 117 Mo. 649 6 
 
 Robinson, 16 N. J. L. 507 423 
 Robinson, 116 N. Car. 1046 197 
 Robinson, 32 Ore. 43 224, 415 
 Robinson, 35 S. Car. 340 
 
 278, 376 
 Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713 
 
 166, 228 
 
 194 320 
 
 318, 319 
 
 189 
 
 514 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 State v. Rogers, 112 N. Car. 874 
 
 129, 130 
 
 Rochester, 72 S. Car. 
 Rocker, 138 Iowa 653 
 Rocker, 130 Iowa 239 
 Rockett, 87 Mo. 666 
 Roderick, 77 Ohio St. 301 
 
 324, 325 
 Rodgers (Mont., 1909), 106 
 
 Pac. 3 118 
 
 Rodman, 62 Iowa 456 79, 118 
 Rodriguez, 115 La. 1004 
 
 220, 221, 329 
 Roger, 56 Kan. 362 15 
 
 Rogers, 108 ]\Io. 202 236, 394 
 Rogers, 135 Mo. App. 695 349 
 Rogers, 31 Mont, i 245 
 
 Rogers, 79 N. Car. 609 524 
 
 v. Rogers, 119 N. Car. 793 
 v. Rogoway, 45 Ore. 601 
 V. Rohn, 140 Iowa 640 
 v. Rohrer, 34 Kan. 427 
 V. Rollins, 113 N. Car. 722 
 
 23, 324, 330 
 V. Romaine, 58 Iowa 46 525, 526 
 V. Romero, 117 La. 1003 245, 342 
 V. Ronk, 91 ]\Iinn. 419 233, 324 
 
 V. Rorbacher, 19 Iowa 154 
 V. Rosa, 71 X. J. L. 316 
 V. Rose, 47 Minn. 47 
 V. Rosier, 55 Iowa 517 
 V. Ross, 77 Kan. 341 
 V. Ross (Ore., 1909), 104 Pac. 
 
 596 
 V. Roswell, 6 Conn. 446 
 V. Roten, 86 N. Car. 701 
 V. Rounds, 76 Me. 123 
 V. Rover, 13 Nev. 17 
 V. Row, 81 Iowa 138 
 V. Rowell, 75 S. Car. 494 
 V. Rowland, 94 Ala. 76 
 V. Rowland, 72 Iowa 327 
 V. Royce, 38 Wash, in 
 V. Rozeboom (Iowa, 1910) 
 
 124 N. W. 783 
 V. Ruby, 61 Iowa 86 
 V. Ruck, 194 Mo. 416 
 V. Rucker, 93 Mo. 88 
 V. Rugan, 5 Mo. App. 592 
 V. Rugero, 117 La. 1040 
 V. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447 
 V. Rush, 95 ]\Io. 199 
 V. Russell, 90 Iowa 569 
 V. Russell, 33 La. Ann. 135 
 V. Russell, 13 Mont. 164 
 V. Russell, 45 N. H. 83 489 
 
 V. Ruth, 14 Mo. App. 140 37 
 
 V. Ruthven, 58 Iowa 121 458 
 
 V. Rutledge, 135 Iowa 581 
 
 221, 330a 
 v. Rutledge, 37 Wash. 523 54, 468 
 V. Ryder, 80 Vt. 422 
 
 6, 41a, 93, 94, 95 
 v. Ryno, 68 Kan. 348 427, 429 
 
 V. Sales, 2 Nev. 268 450 
 
 V. Salge, 2 Nev. 321 196 
 
 523 
 147 
 204 
 
 522 
 
 121 
 248 
 276 
 
 68 
 
 221 
 
 284 
 
 403, 404 
 
 484 
 
 12 
 
 133 
 46 
 61 
 
 153 
 
 152 
 58a 
 
 293 
 118 
 
 54, 138, 314 
 426 
 236 
 129 
 
 343 
 140 
 
 383 
 
 73 
 
 103, 104
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxliii 
 
 State 
 
 [Refercttccs a) 
 
 V. Sammuels (Del.), 67 Atl. 
 
 164 6, 18, 23 
 
 Samuel, 2 Dev. & Bat. (X. 
 
 Car.) 177 189 
 
 Sanders, 30 Iowa 582 404 
 
 Sanders, 68 AIo. 202 228, 230 
 Sanders, 76 Mo. 35 120 
 
 Sanders, 106 JNIo. 188 
 
 36, 58, 152, 355 
 Sanders, 14 X. Dak. 203 358 
 Sanders, 75 S. Car. 409 337, 374 
 Sanford, 124 ;Mo. 484 413 
 
 Sargood, 77 Vt. 80 188 
 
 Sargood, 80 Vt. 412 
 
 90, 467, 517 
 Sarlls, 135 Ind. 195 284 
 
 Sarvis, 45 S. Car. 668 366 
 
 Sassaman, 214 ^lo. 695 
 
 237, 276, 321 
 Sauer, 38 Minn. 438 12 
 
 Sauer, 42 ]\Iinn. 258 246 
 
 Saunders, 68 Iowa 370 89, 425 
 Saunders, 14 Ore. 300 61 
 
 Savant, 115 La. 226 343 
 
 Sawtelle, 66 X. H. 488 182, 205 
 Scaduto, 74 X". J. L. 289 326 
 
 Schaefer, 116 Mo. 96 157 
 
 Schaffer, 70 Iowa 371 119a, 301 
 Schaffer, 74 Iowa 704 482 
 
 Scheve, 65 Xeb. 853 17 
 
 Schingen, 20 Wis. 74 281 
 
 Schleagel, 50 Kan. 325 76 
 
 Schlemn, 4 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 577 499 
 
 Schmidt, 73 Iowa 469 103 
 
 Schmidt, 61 Kan. 862 58a 
 
 Schmidt, 136 AIo. 644 133 
 
 Schnettler, 181 Mo. 173 454 
 
 Schoenwald, 31 Mo. 147 14 
 Schuerman, 70 ]\Io. App. 518 32 
 
 Schuyler, 75 X. J. L. 487 329 
 
 Schweitzer, 57 Conn. 532 23 
 
 Scott, I Kan. App. 748 195 
 
 Scott, 49 La. Ann. 253 157, 158 
 
 Scott, 45 Mo. 302 429 
 
 Scott, 28 Ore. 331 382 
 
 Scripture, 42 X. H. 485 373 
 
 Scroggs, 123 Iowa 649 342 
 Seagler, i Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 30 293 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Sears, 86 Mo. 169 354 
 
 V. Sears, Phil. (X. Car.) 146 309 
 V. Sebastian, 215 Mo. 58 237, 521 
 V. Sechrist (Mo., 1910), 126 
 
 S. W. 400 418 
 
 V. Sederstrom, 99 ^linn. 234 235 
 V. Seeley, 51 Ore. 131 489 
 
 V. Seene}^ 5 Penn. (Del.) 142 282 
 
 447 
 263 
 438 
 473 
 309 
 
 193, 374 
 227 
 
 97, 374 
 
 V. Seery, 95 Iowa 652 
 V. Sejours, 113 La. 676 
 V. Seligman, 127 Iowa 415 
 V. Sellner, 17 Mo. i\pp. 39 
 V. Semotan, 85 Iowa 57 
 V. Senn, 32 S. Car. 392 
 
 132 
 V. Severson, 78 Iowa 653 
 V. Sexton, 147 Mo. 89 
 V. Seymour, 94 Iowa 699 
 
 90, 312, 333 
 V. Seymour, 36 Me. 225 371 
 
 V. Shaeffer, 89 Mo. 271 441, 445 
 V. Shafer, 22 ]\Iont. 17 324, 330 
 V. Shafifner, 2 Penn. (Del.) 
 
 171 361, 364 
 
 V. Shannehan, 22 Iowa 435 271 
 
 V. Shapiro (Mo.), 115 S. W. 
 
 1022 69 
 
 V. Sharkey, 73 N. J. L. 491 404 
 V. Sharp, 132 Mo. 165 387, 392 
 
 V. Sharp, 183 Mo. 715 
 V. Sharpless, 212 Mo. 176 
 6, 
 V. Shean, 32 Iowa 88 
 V. Shelters, 51 Vt. 102 
 V. Shelton (Mo., 1909), 122 S. 
 
 W. 732 
 V. Shelton, 2 Jones (X. Car.) 
 
 360 106, 109 
 
 V. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54 417 
 
 V. Sherburne, 59 N. H. 69 446 
 
 V. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164 58a 
 
 V. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512 126 
 
 V. Sherouk, 78 Conn. 718 
 
 47, 48, 3^5 
 V. Sherwood, 90 Iowa 550 424 
 
 V. Shettleworth, 18 Minn. 208 409 
 V. Shields, 45 Conn. 256 407, 416 
 V. Shinborn, 46 X. PI. 497 429 
 
 V. Shines, T25 N. Car. 730 14 
 
 V. Shipley, 174 Mo. 512 68, iig 
 
 242 
 
 S8a, 428 
 
 19, 393 
 
 422 
 
 71
 
 cxliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 l6l, 
 
 [References ar 
 
 State V. Shockley, 29 Utah 25 87, 88 
 V. Shoemaker, 62 Iowa 343 
 
 523, 526 
 V. Short (Del. Gen. 
 1909), 75 Atl. 787 
 V. Shoiir, 196 Mo. 202 
 V. Shouse, 188 Mo. 473 
 V. Shreve, 137 Mo. i 
 V. Shuff, 9 Idaho 115 
 V. Shu ford, 69 N. Car. 486 
 V. Shiiman, loi Me. 158 
 V. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519 388, 
 
 V. Sienkiewiez, 4 Penn. (Del.), 
 
 59 
 V. Silva, 130 Mo. 440 
 V. Simes, 12 Idaho 310 
 V. Simmons, 3 Ala. 497 
 V. Simmons, 78 Kan. 852 
 V. Simmons, 143 N. Car. 613 
 V. Simmons, 52 Wash. 132 
 V. Simon, 71 N. J. L. 142 
 V. Simons, 17 N. H. ?-t, 
 V. Simpson, 2 Hawks (N. 
 
 Car.) 460 
 V. Skidmore, 87 N. Car. 509 
 V. Skillman, 76 N. J. L. 464 
 V. Skinner (Nev., 1909), 104 
 
 Pac. 223 
 V. Skinner, 29 Qre. 599 
 V. Slagle, 82 N. Car. 653 
 V. Slagle, 83 N. Car. 630 
 V. Slamon, y^ Vt. 212 
 V. Slingerland, 19 Nev. 135 
 V. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217 
 
 15, 185, 400, 406 
 V. Small, 26 Kan. 209 36, 213, 288 
 V. Small. 49 Ore. 595 461 
 
 V. Smalley, 50 Vt. 736 89 
 
 V. Smalls, 72, S. Car. 516 82, 314 
 V. Smith, 5 Day (Conn.) 175 432 
 V. Smith, 49 Conn. 376 
 
 i6a, 167, 22,2, 
 V. Smith, 65 Conn. 283 17 
 
 V. Smith, 5 Penn. (Del.) i 184, 188 
 V. Smith, 9 Houst. (Del.) 588 
 
 80, 133 
 V. Smith, 54 Iowa 104 525 
 
 V. Smith, 99 Iowa 26 180, 345 
 
 V. Smith, 106 Iowa 701 221 
 
 V. Smith, 129 Iowa 709 512, 515 
 
 Sess., 
 
 378 
 
 41a, 298 
 
 81 
 
 26 
 
 276 
 
 87 
 281 
 
 394 
 
 282 
 28s 
 202, 213 
 
 359 
 60, 261 
 
 484 
 429 
 
 73, 
 24a 
 
 307 
 338 
 429 
 
 338 
 295 
 344 
 318 
 58 
 6, 58 
 
 e to Sections.'] 
 State V. Smith, 30 La. Ann. 457 
 
 122, 123 
 
 46 
 103 
 314 
 157 
 528 
 421 
 119 
 360 
 358 
 
 129 
 
 188 
 469 
 
 V. Smith, 38 La. Ann. 301 
 
 V. Smith, 48 La. Ann. 533 
 
 V. Smith, 32 Me. 369 
 
 V. Smith, 53 Me. 267 
 
 V. Smith, 47 Minn. 475 
 
 V. Smith, 31 Mo. 120 
 
 V. Smith, 114 Mo. 406 
 
 V. Smith, 137 Mo. 25 
 
 V. Smith, 174 Mo. 586 
 
 V. Smith (N. Car.), 50 S. E. 
 
 859 
 V. Smith, 2 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 402 
 V. Smith, 119 N. Car. 856 
 V. Smith, 138 N. Car. 700 174, 175 
 V. Smith (Ore., 1909), 106 
 
 Pac. 797 493 
 
 V. Smith, II Ore. 205 446 
 
 V. Smith, 6 R. I. 22 228, 275 
 
 V. Smith, 8 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 460 269 
 
 V. Smith, 12 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 430 325 
 
 V. Smith, 18 S. Dak. 341 413, 418 
 V. Smith, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 150 430 
 V. Sneed, 88 Mo. 138 loi, 331 
 
 V. Snell, 46 Wash. 2^7 156 
 
 V. Snure, 29 Minn. 132 525 
 
 V. Snyder, 137 Iowa 600 17, 115 
 V. Snyder, 67 Kan. 801 
 V. Snyder, 44 Mo. App. 429 
 V. Somerville, 21 Me. 14 
 V. Sommers, 60 Minn. 90 
 V. Soper, 16 Me. 293 
 
 117, 137, 160, 163, 
 V. Soper, 148 Mo. 217 \i 
 
 V. Sopher, 70 Iowa 494 
 V. Sortor, 52 Kan. 531 
 V. Sortviet, lOO ]\Iinn. 12 387, 390 
 V. Southern, 48 La. Ann. 628 215 
 V. Sowell (S. Car. 1910), 67 
 
 S. E. 316 
 V. Squires, i Tyler (Vt.) 147 
 V. Spalding, 19 Conn. 233 
 V. Sparks, 78 Ind. 166 
 V. Sparks, 79 Neb. 504 
 V. Spary, 174 Mo. 569 
 
 220 
 
 294 
 196 
 
 171 
 
 133 
 129 
 
 235 
 
 Z72 
 176 
 432 
 463 
 438 
 2S^ 
 
 V. Spaugh, 199 Mo. 147 312, 356
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlv 
 
 [References ar 
 
 State V. Spaugh, 200 ^lo. 571 
 
 90, 120, 138 
 V. Spaulding, 61 Vt. 505 514 
 
 V. Spell, 38 La. Ann. 20 326 
 
 V. Speller, 86 N. Car. 697 48S 
 
 V. Spencer, 73 Minn. loi 533 
 
 V. Spencer, 21 X. J. L. 196 154, 159 
 V. Spencer, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 431 196 
 
 V. Spencer, 15 Utah 149 74 
 
 V. Speyer, 194 Mo. 459 119a 
 
 V. Speyer, 207 Mo. 540 157, 160 
 V. Spillman, 43 La. Ann. looi 269 
 V. Spivey (N. Car., 1909), 65 
 
 S. E. 995 374a 
 
 V. Spotted Hawk, 22 jMont. 33 69 
 V. Sprague, 149 Mo. 409 73, 299 
 V. Sprague, 64 N. J. L. 419 83 
 
 V. Stackhouse, 24 Kan. 445 333 
 V. Stafford (Iowa, 1909), 123 
 
 N. W. 167 173 
 
 V. Stair, 87 Mo. 268 429 
 
 V. Staley, 14 Minn. 105 I35 
 
 V. Stallings, 142 Ala. 112 127 
 
 V. Stanley, 64 Me. 157 439 
 
 V. Stanly, 4 Jones (N. Car.) 
 
 290 488 
 
 V. Staples, 47 N. H. 113 262 
 
 V. Stark, 202 Mo. 210 423 
 
 V. Stark, i Strobh. (S. Car.) 
 
 479 160 
 
 V. Starling, 6 Jones (N. Car.) 
 
 366 157 
 
 V. Starnes, 97 X. Car. 423 522 
 
 V. Staton, 114 X. Car. 813 77 
 
 V. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463 
 
 55, 72, 228 
 V. Steen, 125 Iowa 307 482 
 
 V. Steeves, 29 Ore. 85 240 
 
 V. Steidley, 135 Iowa 512 160 
 
 V. Steifel, 106 Mo. 129 71 
 
 V. Stentz, 33 Wash. 444 1 18 
 
 V. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535 144 
 
 V. Sterrett, 68 Iowa 76 85 
 
 V. Stevens, 56 Kan. 720 415 
 
 V. Stevenson, 91 Me. 107 281 
 
 V. Stevenson, 68 Vt. 529 347 
 
 V. Stewart (Del.), 67 Atl. 786 
 
 73, 80, 81, 277 
 v. Stewart, 52 Iowa 284 115, 349 
 X — Underbill Crim. Evidence. 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 State v. Stewart, 34 La. Ann. 
 
 1037 263 
 
 V. Stewart, 47 La. Ann. 410 324 
 
 V. Stibbens, 188 I\Io. 387 126, 129 
 
 V. Stickley, 41 Iowa 232 157 
 
 V. Stickney, 53 Kan. 308 522 
 
 V. Still, 68 S. Car. 37 3^3 
 
 V. Stines, 138 N. Car. 686 409 
 V. Stock ford, 77 Conn. 227 
 
 490, 492 
 
 V. Stolley, 121 Iowa 11 1 387 
 
 V. Stone, 40 Iowa 457 285 
 
 v. Stone, 74 Kan. 189 413 
 
 V. Stone, 106 Mo. i 339 
 
 V. Storkey, 63 X. Car. 7 408 
 
 v. Storms, 113 Iowa 385 127 
 
 V. Storts, 138 Mo. 127 295 
 
 V. Stotts, 26 Mo. 307 70 
 
 V. Stout, 71 Iowa 343 382 
 
 V. Stout, 49 Ohio St. 270 885 
 
 V. Stoyell, 54 Me. 24 343 
 
 V. Strait, 94 IMinn. 384 58a 
 V. Stratford, 149 X. Car. 483 
 
 323, 328 
 
 V. Strattman, 100 Mo. 540 394 
 
 V. Streeter, 20 X^ev. 403 397 
 V. Stroll, I Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 244 433 
 
 V. Strong, 85 Ark. 536 320 
 
 V. Strong, 153 Mo. 548 119 
 
 V. Strother (S. Car., 1909), 66 
 
 S. E. 877 338 
 
 V. Struble, 71 Iowa 11 54 
 
 V. Stubbs, 108 X^. Car. 774 381 
 
 V. Stukes. 73 S. Car. 386 61, 221 
 V. Sudduth, 52 S. Car. 488 
 
 409, 413, 417 
 V. Sudduth, 74 S. Car. 498 124 
 
 V. Suggs, 89 X. Car. 527 122, 133 
 V. Sullivan, 51 Iowa 142 112, 320 
 V. Sullivan, no Mo. App. 75 451 
 V. Sullivan, 43 S. Car. 205 312, 326 
 V. Sullivan, 68 Vt. 540 408 
 
 V. Summers, 141 X^. C. 841 282 
 
 V. Sumner, 2 Ind. 377 310 
 
 V. Sumner, 5 Strobh. (S. Car.) 
 
 53 488 
 
 v. Sutherland, 30 Iowa 570 
 
 392, 393 
 V. Sutton, 147 Ind. 158 467
 
 cxlvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 State V. Swafford, 98 Iowa 362 467 
 V. Swaim, 97 N. Car. 462 468 
 
 V. Swain, 68 Mo. 605 80 
 
 V. Sweizewski. y^ Kan. 723 6 
 
 V. Swift, 57 Conn. 496 119a, 154 
 V. Swift, 69 Ind. 505 455 
 
 V. Symens, 138 Iowa 113 409, 412 
 V. Sysinger (S. Dak., 1910), 
 
 125 N. W. 879 415 
 
 V. Talbert, 41 S. Car. 526 41, 330 
 V. Talbott, 73 Mo. 347 222 
 
 V. Tall, 43 Minn. 273 
 
 64, 212, 23s, 245, 247, 519 
 V. Talley, 77 S. Car. 99 89 
 
 V. Talmadge, 107 Mo. 543 12, 124 
 V. Tarlton (S. Dak.), 118 N. 
 
 W. 706 307, 308 
 
 Tarter, 26 Ore. 38 58 
 
 Tatman, 59 Iowa 471 68 
 
 Tatro, so Vt. 483 140 
 
 Taylor, 140 Iowa 470 358 
 
 Taylor, 20 Kan. 643 353 
 
 Taylor, 36 Kan. 329 131 
 
 Taylor (Miss., 1898), 23 So. 
 
 34 195 
 
 Taylor, 117 Mo. 181 245 
 
 Taylor, 118 Mo. 153 120 
 
 Taylor, 134 Mo. 109 
 
 IS, s8, 68, 119, 152 
 Taylor, 136 Mo. 66 238, 293, 377 
 Taylor, 202 Mo. i 468 
 
 Taylor, s8 N. H. 331 380 
 
 Taylor (N. Car.), 508 261 
 
 Taylor, 3 Brev. (S. Car.) 
 
 243 483 
 
 Taylor, 70 Vt. I 118, 122 
 
 Taylor, 57 W. Va. 228 
 
 67, 27s, 277 
 Teachey, 134 N. Car. 6s6 241 
 Teachey, 138 N. Car. 587 
 
 106, 270, 338 
 Teasdale, 120 Mo. App. 692 60 
 Teeter, 69 Iowa 717 371 
 
 Tennison, 42 Kan. 330 67 
 
 Terrell, 12 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 321 106, III, 318 
 
 Terrio, 98 Me. 17 6 
 
 Terry, 106 Mo. 209 394 
 
 Tessier, 32 La, Ann. 1227 442 
 Testerman, 68 Mo. 408 88, 321 
 
 49 
 
 324 
 493 
 395 
 125, 152 
 36 
 326 
 
 242 
 419 
 
 268 
 
 21 
 
 228 
 
 318 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Thaden, 43 Minn. 32s 71, 247 
 V. Thatcher, 3s N. J. L. 445 
 
 437, 442 
 V. Thawley, 4 Harr. (Del.) 
 
 562 
 V. Thibeau, 30 Vt. 100 
 V. Thomas, 53 Iowa 214 
 V. Thomas, 135 Iowa 717 
 V. Thomas, 58 Kan. 805 
 V. Thomas, in La. 804 
 V. Thomason, i Jones (N. 
 
 Car.) 274 
 V. Thompson, 19 Iowa 299 
 V. Thompson, 127 Iowa 440 
 
 78, 237, 328 
 V. Thompson, 134 Iowa 25 381 
 
 V. Thompson, 47 La. Ann. IS97 73 
 V. Thompson, 121 La. 1051 
 V. Thompson, 8s Me. 189 
 V. Thompson, 83 Mo. 2S7 
 V. Thompson, 132 Mo. 301 
 V. Thompson, 141 Mo. 408 
 
 269, 319 
 V. Thompson, 49 Ore. 46 104, 324 
 V. Thompson, 68 S. Car. 133 224 
 V. Thompson, 14 Wash. 285 41S 
 V. Thornton, 49 La. Ann. 1007 250 
 V. Thrailkill, 71 S. Car. 136 276 
 V. Thrailkill, 73 S. Car. 314 
 
 323, 336 
 V. Thurtell, 29 Neb. 148 78 
 
 V. Tice, 90 Mo. 112 21 
 
 V. Tice, 30 Ore. 4S7 493 
 
 V. Tieman, 32 Wash. 294 523 
 
 V. Tilghman (Del.), 63 Atl. 
 
 772 6, 147a, 320 
 
 V. Tilghman, ll Ired. (N. 
 
 Car.) 5 13 104, 105 
 
 V. Tilly, 3 Ired. (N. Car.) 424 324 
 V. Tilman, 30 La. Ann. 1249 4o8 
 V. Timberlake, 50 La. Ann. 308 
 
 262, 268, 269 
 V. Timmens, 4 Minn. 32s 390, 392 
 V. Tindal, 5 Harr. (Del.) 488 432 
 V. Tippet, 94 Iowa 646 315 
 
 V. Tipton, I Blackf. (Ind.) 166 461 
 V. Tipton, 15 Mont. 74 S33 
 
 V. Tompkins, 32 La. Ann. 620 
 
 284. 287 
 V. Tompkins, 71 Mo. 613 228, 429
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlvii 
 
 State 
 
 [References ar 
 V. Toohey, 203 Mo. 674 299, 378 
 Tosney, 26 Minn. 262 35, 248 
 Tough, 12 N. Dak. 425 59 
 
 Townsend, 66 Iowa 741 
 
 280a, 320 
 Trail, 59 W. Va. 175 6 
 
 Trolson, 21 Nev. 419 282 
 
 Trounce, 5 Wash. St. 804 257 
 Trove, i Ind. App. 553 279 
 
 Trumbull, 4 N. J. L. 139 
 
 257, 461 
 Trust}% I Penn. (Del.) 319 
 
 96, no, 129, 312 
 Trusty, 122 Iowa 82 342, 415 
 Tucker, 20 Iowa 508 
 Tucker, 72 Kan. 481 
 Tull, 119 Mo. 421 
 Tully, 31 Mont. 365 
 Turlej% 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 323 
 Turlington, 102 Mo. 642 
 
 103, 105, 248, 269 
 Turner, i Hous. (Del.) 76 418 
 Turner, 122 La. 371 140, 522 
 Turner, 106 Mo. 272 371 
 
 Turner, no Mo. 196 62 
 
 Turner, 119 N. Car. 841 74, 286 
 Turner, 31 S. Car. 534 81 
 
 Turner, 36 S. Car. 534 
 
 214, 236, 238, 242 
 Turpin, yy N. Car. 473 325, 326 
 Tweedy, 11 Iowa 350 112 
 
 Twitty, 2 Hawks (N. Car.) 
 
 26 
 
 269, 343 
 
 420 
 
 21 
 
 32 
 
 423 
 6, 12 
 
 2,72, 
 
 522 
 
 404 
 
 68 
 
 69, 70 
 
 Tyre (Del.), 67 Atl. 199 
 Tyrrell, 98 Mo. 354 
 Tyson, 56 Kan. 686 
 Ullruch, no Mo. 350 
 Ulsemer, 24 Wash. 657 
 Umble, 115 Mo. 452 
 Underwood, 44 La. Ann. 852 62 
 Underwood, 76 Mo. 630 270 
 
 Upham, 38 Me. 261 y6, 78 
 
 Urie, loi Iowa 411 417 
 
 Usher, 136 Iowa 606 56, 312 
 
 Vaigneur, 5 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 391 132, 138 
 
 Valentina, 71 N. J. L. 552 276 
 Vallery, 47 La. Ann. 182 330 
 Valwell, 66 Vt. 558 88, 89 
 
 e to Sections.^ 
 State V. Van Auken, 
 
 Iowa 674 
 
 419. 430 
 
 Vandemark, yy Conn. 201 470 
 
 Vandiver, 149 Mo. 502 61 
 
 Vandimark, 35 Ark. 396 439 
 Vanella (Mont., 1909), ro6 
 
 Pac. 364 2,22, 
 
 Van Kuran, 25 Utah 8 80 
 
 Vansant, 80 Mo. 67 12, 102, in 
 
 Van Tassel, 103 Iowa 6 58a 
 
 Van Vliet, 92 Iowa 476 237 
 
 Van Winkle, 80 Iowa 15 247 
 
 Vari, 35 S. Car. 175 225 
 
 Vatter, 71 Iowa 557 369 
 
 V. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 117 471 
 
 V. Vaughan, 136 Mo. App. 635 185 
 
 V. Vaughan, 199 Mo. 108 358 
 
 V. Vaughan, 200 Mo. i 321, 492 
 
 V. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 285 103, 326 
 V. Vaughan, i Bay (S. Car.) 
 
 282 436 
 
 V. Vedder, 98 N. Y. 630 345 
 V. Veillon (La., 1897), 21 So. 
 
 856 269 
 
 V. Velarde, 59 Cal. 457 299 
 
 V. Venable, \\y Mo. App. 501 485 
 
 V. Vickers, 47 La. Ann. 1574 242 
 
 V. Vickers, 209 Mo. 12 223 
 V. Vierck (S. Dak., 1909), 120 
 
 N. W. 1098 378 
 
 V. Vincent, 24 Iowa 570 100, 330 
 
 V. Vineyard, 16 Mont. 138 427 
 
 V. Vinson, 63 N. Car. 335 305 
 V. Vinton (Mo., 1909), 119 S. 
 
 W. 370 301 
 
 V. Vollander, 57 Minn. 225 383 
 V. VonKutzleben, 126 Iowa 89 
 
 126, 162, 268 
 
 V. Voorhies, 115 La. 200 312 
 
 V. Wacker, 16 Mo. App. 417 35 
 
 V. Wagner, 61 Me. 178 21 
 
 V. Wait, 44 Kan. 310 365 
 
 V. Walke, 69 Kan. 183 413 
 
 V. Walker, 124 Iowa 414 491, 493 
 
 V. Walker, 133 Iowa 489 212 
 V. Walker, yy Me. 488 
 
 94, 95, 97, 100 
 
 V. Walker, 69 Mo. 274 270 
 V. Walker, 78 Mo. 380 
 
 94, loi, 122
 
 cxlviii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References a. 
 State V. Walker, 98 Mo. 95 68, 70, 71 
 V. Walker, 129 Mo. App. 371 42 
 V. Walker, 145 N. Car. 567 
 
 Z23, 338 
 V. Walker, 149 N. Car. 527 2y6 
 V. Wallace, 9 N. H. 515 92 
 
 V. Waller, 88 Mo. 402 314 
 
 V. Wallick, 87 Iowa 369 285 
 
 V. Walls, 4 Penn. (Del.) 408 12 
 V. Walsh, 44 La. Ann. 1122 61 
 
 V. Walsh (S. Dak., 1910), 125 
 
 N. W. 295 382 
 
 V. Walters, 6 Jones (N. Car.) 
 
 276 310 
 
 V. Walton, 92 Iowa 455 112 
 
 V. Walton, 114 N. Car. 783 
 
 90, 437, 438 
 V. Walton, 53 Ore. 557 265 
 
 V. Ward. 72, Iowa 532 81, 4x7, 418 
 V. Ward, 19 Nev. 297 276, 494 
 
 V. Ward, 103 N. Car. 419 
 
 119a, 371 
 V. Ward, 61 Vt. 153 117, 121, 
 
 148, 152, 153, 225, 368 
 V. Warford, 106 Mo. 55 273 
 
 V. Warner, 74 Mo. 83 279 
 
 V. Warren (Idaho, 1910), 107 
 
 Pac. 993 121 
 
 V. Warren, 57 Mo. App. 502 488 
 V. Warren, 109 Mo. 430 430 
 
 V. Washelesky (Conn.), 70 
 
 Atl. 62 i6a 
 
 V. Washing, 36 Wash. 485 127 
 
 V. Washington, 36 La. Ann. 
 
 341 517 
 
 V. Washington, 40 La. Ann. 
 
 669 130 
 
 V. Waterbury, 133 Iowa 135 431 
 V. Waterman, 87 Iowa 255 
 
 197, 198 
 V. Waterman, 75 Kan. 253 
 
 388, 390, 39 T 
 V. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47 90 
 
 V. Watson, 81 Iowa 380 412 
 
 V. Watson, 30 Kan. 281 347 
 
 V. Watson, 2^ La. Ann. 148 225 
 V. Watson, 47 Ore. 543 366, 370 
 V. Watts, 48 Ark. 56 307 
 
 V. Way, 5 Neb. 283 381 
 
 V. Way, 76 S. Car. 91 95 
 
 re to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Weasel, 30 La. Ann. 919 492 
 
 V. Weatherby, 43 Me. 258 383 
 
 V. Weaver, 57 Iowa 730 123 
 
 V. Weaver, 165 Mo. i 67 
 V. Weaver, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 491 419 
 
 V. Webb, 18 Utah 441 163, 429 
 
 v. Weems, 96 Iowa 426 221 
 
 v. Welch, 26 Me. 30 188, 383 
 
 v. Welch, 79 Me. 99 200 
 
 V. Welch, 21 Minn. 22 166 
 
 V. Welch, 32 Ore. 33 55 
 
 V. Welch, 36 W. Va. 690 334 
 
 V. Welch, 27 Wis. 196 447 
 
 V. Weldon, 39 S. Car. 318 204, 376 
 V. Wells, 48 Iowa 671 392 
 
 V. Wells, III Mo. 533 12, 58 
 
 V. Wells, I N. J. L. 424 133 
 
 V. Wells (Utah, 1909), 100 
 
 Pac. 681 347 
 
 V. Welsh, 29 S. Car. 4 23 
 
 V. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234 60, 247 
 V. Wentworth, 37 N. H. 196 140 
 V. Wenz, 41 Minn. 196 386. 393 
 V. Werner, 16 N. Dak. 83 410 
 
 V. Wesie (N. Dak.), 118 N. 
 
 W. 20 382 
 
 V. West, I Houst. Cr. (Del.) 
 
 371 154 
 
 V. West, 43 La. Ann. 1006 82 
 
 V. West, 120 La. 747 323 
 
 V. West. 69 Mo. 401 6, 26 
 
 V. Westcott, 130 Iowa i 
 
 7, 126, 129, 135 
 V. Westfall, 49 Iowa 328 106 
 
 V. Whalen, 98 Mo. 222 465 
 
 V. Wheat, in La. 860 261, 262 
 V. Wheaton, 79 Kan. 521 37 
 
 V. Whedbee (N. Car., 1910), 
 
 67 S. E. 60 435 
 
 V. Wheeler, 19 Minn. 98 430 
 
 V. Wheeler, 94 Mo. 252 392 
 
 V. Wheeler, 108 Mo. 658 39^ 
 
 V. Whimpey, 140 Iowa 199 407 
 
 V. Whisenhurst, 2 Hawks (X. 
 
 Car.) 458 200 
 
 V. Whitbeck (Iowa, 1909), 123 
 
 N. W. 982 48. 320. 222 
 
 V. White, 7 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 180 365
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cxlix 
 
 State 
 
 [References ai 
 V. White, 89 N. Car. 462 305 
 
 White,' 48 Ore. 416 70, 492 
 
 White, 8 Wash. 230 196 
 
 White, 10 Wash. 6ri 58 
 
 White, 40 Wash. 560 499 
 
 Whitesell, 142 Mo. 467 418 
 
 Whitfield, 109 N. Car. 876 129 
 Whitley, 141 N. Car. 823 
 
 387, 388, 392 
 
 Whitmer, yj Iowa 557 522 
 
 Whitne}', 38 La. Ann. 579 41 
 Whitson, III N. Car. 695 
 
 112, 119, 320 
 
 Whittier, 21 Me. 341 205 
 
 Whitworth. 126 Mo. 573 225 
 Wideman, 68 S. Car. 119 
 
 117, 
 
 374 
 
 53 
 
 73 
 
 439 
 
 414 
 
 Wieners, 66 Mo. 13 
 Wigger, 196 Mo. 90 
 Wilbourne, 87 N. Car. 529 
 Wilcox, III Mo. 569 
 Wilcox, 132 X. Car. 1120 
 
 66, 119, 276, 312, 323 
 Wilcox, 21 S. Dak. 532 
 
 250, 272 
 Wilcox, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 
 278 310 
 
 Wilhite, 132 Iowa 226 21 
 
 Wilkes, 82 S. Car. 163 377 
 
 Wilkins, 66 Vt. i 119, 150, 411 
 Wilkinson, 121 Mo. 485 343 
 
 Wilks, 58 Rio. App. 159 300 
 
 Williams, 103 Ind. 235 442 
 
 Williams, 20 Iowa 98 402 
 
 Williams, 66 Iowa 573 116, 422 
 Williams, 122 Iowa 115 338 
 
 Williams, 74 Kan. 180 362 
 
 Williams, 11 1 La. 179 
 
 87, 201, 220, 223 
 Williams, 120 La. 175 374 
 
 Williams, 76 Me. 480 88, 92 
 
 Williams, 72 Miss. 992 486 
 
 Williams, 95 Mo. 247 292 
 
 Williams, 136 Mo. 293 450 
 
 Williams, 28 Nev. 395 112 
 
 Williams, 30 N. J. L. 102 482 
 Williams (N. Car., 1909), 
 
 65 S. E. 908 195 
 
 Williams, 7 Jones (X. Car.) 
 
 446 7 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 State V. Williams, 67 X^. Car. 12 108 
 V. Williams, 46 Ore. 287 312 
 
 V. Williams, 2 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 418 423 
 
 V. Williams, 76 S. Car. 135 272 
 V. Williams, 27 Vt. 724 116 
 
 V. Williamson, 42 Conn. 261 75 
 V. Williamson, 106 Mo. 162 
 
 88, 147a, 161, 321 
 V. Willi ford, ill Mo. App. 668 450 
 V. Willingham, 23 La. Ann. 
 
 537 220 
 
 V. Willis. 71 Conn. 293 130, 138 
 V. Willis, 79 Iowa 326 250 
 
 V. Willis, 63 X^. Car. 26 320 
 
 V. Wills (Minn., 1897), 73 N. 
 
 W. 177 419 
 
 V. Wills, 106 Mo. App. 196 118 
 
 V. Wilner, 40 Wis. 304 156 
 
 V. Wilson, 22 Iowa 364 380 
 
 V. Wilson, 95 Iowa 341 299, 301 
 V. Wilson, 124 Iowa 264 482 
 
 V. Wilson, 24 Kan. 186 104, 112 
 V. Wilson, 62 Kan. 621 279 
 
 V. Wilson, 23 La. Ann. 558 106 
 
 V. Wilson, 40 La. Ann. 751 228 
 V. Wilson, 39 Mo. App. 114 
 
 24, 115 
 V. Wilson CMo., 1909), 122 S. 
 
 W. 671 48 
 
 V. Wilson, 121 Mo. 434 103 
 
 V. Wilson, 130 Mo. App. 151 17 
 V. Wilson, 137 Mo. 592 378 
 
 V. Wilson, 31 X. J. L. 77 188 
 
 V. Wilson, 5 R. I. 291 49 
 
 V. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249 458 
 
 V. Wilson, 9 Wash. 218 24a 
 
 V. Wimbnsh, 9 S. Car. 309 447 
 V. Winchester, 113 X. Car. 641 279 
 V. Windahl, 95 Iowa 470 312, 330 
 V. Wingfield, 34 La. Ann. 1200 119 
 V. Wingo, 89 Ind. 204 293 
 
 V. Wingo, 66 Mo. 181 23, 154, 338 
 V. Winner, 17 Kan. 298 494 
 
 V. Winston, 116 X. Car. 990 138 
 V. Winter, 83 S. Car. 153 301 
 
 V. Wintzingerode, 9 Ore. 153 130 
 V. Wisdom. 84 Mo. 177 276. 486 
 V. Wisnewski, 13 X. Dak. 649 67 
 V. Wister, 62 Mo. 592 197
 
 fil 
 
 TAELE OF CASES. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 State V. Witt, 34 Kan. 488 12, 15, 316 
 V. Witham, 72 Me. 531 55, 60, 381 
 V. Wolcott, 21 Conn. 272 25, 26 
 V. Wolf (Del.), 66 Atl. 739 
 
 17, 291a, 293 
 V. Wolfley, 75 Kan. 406 297 
 
 V. Wood (La., 1909), 48 So. 
 
 438 130 
 
 V. Wood, 124 Mo. 412 193 
 
 V. Wood, S3 N. H. 484 192, 350 
 V. Wood, 53 Vt. 560 107, 109 
 
 V. Woodard, 132 Iowa 675 319 
 
 V. Woodfin, 5 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 199 460 
 
 V. Woodfin, 87 N. Car. 526 485 
 V. Woodrow, 56 Kan. 217 421 
 
 V. Woodruff, 67 N. Car. 89 
 
 53, 52s 
 V. Woods, 49 Kan. 237 39 
 
 V. Woodward, 34 Me. 293 24 
 
 V. Woodward, 95 Mo. 129 522 
 
 V. Woodward, 131 Mo. 369 358 
 V. Woodward, 182 Mo. 391 
 
 269. 450 
 V. Woody, 2 Jones (N. Car.) 
 
 335 488 
 
 V. Woolard, iii Mo. 248 152 
 
 V. Wooley (Mo.), 115 S. W. 
 
 417 6 
 
 V. Wooley, 215 Mo. 620 184 
 
 V. Woolridge, 45 Ore. 389 470 
 
 V. Workman, 15 S. Car. 540 
 
 130, 185 
 V. Workman, 39 S. Car. 151 522 
 V. Workman, 35 W. Va. 367 485 
 V. Worthen, 124 Iowa 408 122, 129 
 V. Worthingham, 23 Minn. 528 526 
 V. Worthington, 64 N. Car. 
 
 594 147a 
 
 V. Wray, 109 Mo. 594 408 
 
 V. Wren, 121 La. 55 221 
 
 V. Wright (Del., 1907), 66 Atl, 
 
 364 377 
 
 V. Wright, 70 Iowa 152 261 
 
 V. Wright, 41 La. Ann. 600 
 
 185, 188 
 V. Wright, 48 La. Ann. 1525 117 
 V. Wright, 53 Me. 328 275 
 
 V. Wright, 134 Mo. 404 
 
 23, 157, 163 
 
 State V. Wright, 141 Mo. 333 327 
 
 V. Wright, 25 Neb. 38 408 
 
 V. Wright, 81 Vt. 281 464 
 
 V. Wyatt, 124 Mo. 537 358 
 
 V. Wyse, 33 S. Car. 582 
 
 246, 268, 326 
 V. Yancey, 74 N. Car. 244 353 
 
 V. Yates, 132 Iowa 475 338 
 
 V. Yates, 52 Kan. 566 144 
 
 V. Yerger, 86 Mo. 33 426 
 
 V. Yetzer, 97 Iowa 423 250 
 
 V. Yocum, 117 Mo. 622 412 
 
 V. York, 37 N. H. 175 138 
 
 V. York, 74 N. H. 125 21 
 
 V. Young, 96 Iowa 262 482 
 
 V. Young, 52 La. Ann. 478 129 
 
 Young, 99 Mo. 284 394 
 
 Young, 105 Mo. 634 214 
 
 Young, 153 Mo. 44S 71 
 
 Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. 619 
 
 60, 6r 
 Zeibart, 40 Iowa 169 320, 446 
 Zeilman, 75 N. J, L. 357 220 
 V. Zellers, 2 Halst. (N. J.) 
 
 220 324 
 
 V. Zichfield, 23 Nev. 304 401 
 
 V. Zimmerman, 3 Kan. App. 
 
 172 220, 222 
 
 V. Zinn, 26 Mo. App. 17 309 
 
 V. Zinn, 61 Mo. App. 476 277 
 
 V. Zorn, 202 Mo. 12 104, no, 324 
 V. Zorn, 22 Ore. 591 166 
 
 Statham v. State, 86 Ga. 331 517, 521 
 Stavinow v. Home Ins. Co., 43 
 
 Mo. App. 513 218 
 
 Stayton v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 33 245 
 
 Stazey v. State, 58 Ind. 514 35 
 
 Steadman v. State, 81 Ga. 736 377 
 
 Steele v. People, 45 111. 152 269, 432 
 
 V. State, 83 Ala. 20 82 
 
 V. State, 33 Fla. 348 326 
 
 V. State, 76 Miss. 387 60, 132 
 
 Steen v. State, 20 Ohio St. 333 
 
 184, 185 
 Stegar v. State (Tex. Cr.), 105 
 
 S. W. 789 269 
 
 Steiner v. State, 78 Neb. 147 21 
 
 Stephen v. State, 11 Ga. 225 147, 409 
 
 Stephens v. People, 4 Park. Cr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 396 80, 318
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 Cli 
 
 [References are to Sections.'] 
 
 Stephens v. People, 19 N. Y. 549 257 
 
 V. State, 56 Ga. 604 422 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 489 282 
 
 Stephenson v. Rannister, 3 Bibb. 
 
 (Ky.), 369 500 
 
 V. State, 28 Ind. 272 342 
 
 V. State, no Ind. 358 94, 96 
 
 Stepp V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 349 56 
 
 Stern v. State, 53 Ga. 229 476 
 
 Sternaman v. Peck, 80 Fed. 883 496 
 
 Stevens v. People, 158 111. in 409 
 
 V. People, 215 111. 593 350 
 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 71 95, 129, 268 
 
 V. State, 50 Kan. 712 247 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 38 S. W. 167 133 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 95 S. W. 505 379 
 
 Stevenson v. Gunning, 64 Vt. 601 243 
 
 V. State, 69 Ga. 68 330 
 
 Steward v. People, 224 111. 434 358 
 
 Stewart v. Reid, 118 La. 827 461 
 
 V. State, 78 Ala. 436 Z2>3 
 
 V. State, 24 Ind. 142 26 
 
 V. State, 44 Ind. 2^7 143 
 
 V. State, 113 Ind. 505 421 
 
 V. State, 62 Md. 412 296 
 
 V. State, 22 Ohio St. 477 79 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 273 220 
 
 Stice, Ex parte, 70 Cal. 51 226 
 
 Sticht V. State, 25 Tex. App. 420 363 
 
 Stiewell V. State (Ark.), 12 S. W. 
 
 1014 486 
 
 Stitt V. State, 91 Ala. 10 23 
 
 Stitz V. State, 104 Ind. 359 15, 82, 369 
 
 St. Louis V. Bippen, 201 Mo. 528 481 
 
 V. Sullivan, 8 Mo. App. 455 473 
 St. Louis &c. R. Co. V. Weaver, 
 
 35 Kan. 412 505 
 
 Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225 484 
 Stockton V. Commonwealth, 125 
 
 Ky. 268 358 
 Stoddard v. State, 132 Wis. 520 
 
 127, 292 
 Stokes V. People, 54 N. Y. 164 
 
 16, r8, 23, 320, 326 
 
 V, State, 84 Ga. 258 ^77 
 V. State, 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 619 
 
 337, 374 
 
 Stone V. State, 105 Ala. 60 140 
 
 V. State, 50 Fla. 4 77, 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 705 73, 90 
 
 Stone v. State, 20 N. J. L. 401 428 
 V. State, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 27 87 
 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 575 482 
 
 v. White, 55 Fla. 510 220 
 
 Stoner v. Devilbiss, 70 Md. 144 223 
 
 Stoppert V. Nierle, 45 Neb. 105 
 
 533. 534 
 Storms v. State, 81 Ark. 25 289 
 
 Storor, In re, 6z Fed. 564 182 
 
 Story V. State, 99 Ind. 413 48 
 
 Stout v. People, 4 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 71 323 
 
 V. State, 90 Ind. i 12, 228 
 
 Stovall v. State, 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 597 524 
 
 v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 30 95, 312 
 Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 315 
 
 68, 79, 80, 247 
 
 Strait V. State, 43 Tex. 486 306 
 
 Strang v. People, 24 Mich, i 418 
 
 V. State, 2^ Tex. Cr. 219 423 
 
 Stratton v. State (Tex.), 44 S. 
 
 W. 506 482 
 
 Strauss, In re, 126 Fed. 327 497 
 
 v. State, 58 Miss. 53 269 
 
 Strawhern v. State, 27 Miss. 422 70 
 
 Streety v. State (Ala., 1909), 51 
 
 So. 415 322, 323 
 
 Strickler v. Grass, 32 Neb. 811 528 
 Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss. 157 147 
 Stringfield v. State, 4 Ga. App. 
 
 842 36 
 
 Strobhar v. State, 55 Fla. 167 12 
 
 Strong v. State, 86 Ind. 208 438 
 
 V. State, 105 Ind. i 487 
 
 V. State, 61 Neb. 35 248 
 
 V. State, 105 S. W. 785 475 
 
 Strother v. Barr, 5 Bing. 136 44 
 
 v. State, 74 Miss. 447 485 
 
 Stuart v. Binsse, 10 Bosw. (N. Y. 
 
 Super.) 436 51 
 
 V. People, 4 111. 395 460 
 
 V. People, 42 Mich. 255 149, 378 
 
 Studdy V. Sanders, 2 Dowl. & R. 
 
 347 ^73, U4 
 
 Sturgeon V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 37 S. W. 679 484 
 
 v. Commonwealth, 31 Ky. L. 
 
 536 325
 
 clii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References a 
 Sturtevant v. Commonwealth, 158 
 
 Mass. 598 507 
 
 Suddeth v. State, 112 Ga. 407 277 
 
 Sudduth V. State, 70 Miss. 250 485 
 Sue V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 122 
 
 48, 221, 326 
 
 Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 93 
 Pa. St. 2S4 233 
 
 V. Jefferson &c. Co.. 133 ]\Io. i 239 
 V. Hurley, 147 Mass. 387 528 
 
 V. People, 6 Colo. App. 458 33 
 
 V. People, 108 111. App. 328 42 
 
 V. People, 144 111. 24 
 
 35, 36, 58, 247 
 V. State, loi Ga. 800 119a 
 
 V. State, 52 Ind. 309 12 
 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 319 
 
 261, 263, 265, 267 
 V. State, 75 Wis. 650 
 V. State, 100 Wis. 283 
 
 Summerlin v. State, 130 Ga. 791 
 
 482 
 
 323 
 41a 
 
 Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. 325 263 
 Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71 122 
 
 Surles V. State, 89 Ga. 167 243 
 
 Sutfin V. People, 43 Mich. 37 523 
 
 Sutherland v. State, 121 Ga. 190 103 
 Sutherlin v. State, 108 Ind. 389 
 
 521, 522 
 
 Sutton V. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 
 
 308 421 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 128 68 
 
 V. State, 12 Fla. 135 484 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 659 357 
 
 V. State, 124 Ga. 815 382 
 
 V. State, 16 Tex. App. 490 172, 176 
 
 Swaim v. Humphreys, 42 111. App. 
 
 370 174 
 
 Swalley v. People, 116 111. 247 198 
 
 Swan V. State (Tex.), 76 S. W. 
 
 464 268 
 
 Swang V. State, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 
 
 212 144 
 
 Swartz V. State, 7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 
 
 43 402 
 
 Swearingen v. United States, 161 
 
 u. s. 446 478 
 
 Sweat V. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 L. 1067 468 
 
 V. State, 4 Tex. App. 617 32 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Sweatt V. State (Ala.), 47 So. 194 
 
 66, 237 
 
 V. State, 153 Ala. 70 89 
 
 Sweet V. Sherman, 21 Vt. 23 528 
 
 V. State, 75 Neb. 263 6, 80, 213 
 
 Swinger v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 397 310 
 
 Swift V. State, 126 Ga. 590 442 
 
 Swint V. State, 154 Ala. 46 245 
 
 Swisher v. Commonwealth, 26 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 963 105, no 
 
 V. Malone, 31 W. Va. 442 531 
 
 Sykes v. People, 132 111. 32 33 
 
 V. State, 151 Ala. 80 58 
 
 V. State, IT2 Tenn. 572 418 
 
 Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17 
 
 54, 118, 232 
 V. State, 46 Fla. 166 
 
 221, 222, 235, 333 
 
 T 
 
 Tabor v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 387 358 
 Tace}^ V. Noyes, 143 Mass. 449 533 
 Taggart v. Commonwealth, 104 
 
 Ky. 301 330a 
 
 Talbert v. State, 121 Ala. 33 12, 292 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 96 
 Tall V. Commonwealth, 33 K3\ L. 
 
 541 
 
 157 
 
 514 
 225 
 
 61 
 
 Talley v. State, 2 Ga. App. 395 
 Tally V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 474 
 Tanner v. State (Tex. Cr., 1898), 
 
 44 S. W. 489 269 
 
 Tarbox v. State, 3S Ohio St. 584 494 
 
 Tarkio v. Loyd, 179 Mo. 600 21 
 
 Tarver v. State, 43 Ala. 354 352, 353 
 
 V. State, 137 Ala. 29 no 
 
 Tatum V. State, 156 Ala. 144 473 
 
 V. State, 63 Ala. i 167 
 
 V. State, 82 Ala. 5 44 
 
 V. State, I Ga. App. 778 6 
 
 Taulman v. State, 37 Ind. 353 
 
 184, 185 
 Taylor, In re, 8 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 159 29 
 V. Commonwealth, 3 Bush 
 
 (Ky.) 508 82 
 V. Commonwealth, 13 Yiy. L. 
 
 860 63
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 cliii 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 Ta3-lor v. Commonwealth, 17 Ky. 
 L. 1214 68 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 19 Kv. L. 
 
 836 " 138 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 28 Kv. L. 
 
 1348 ' 88 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 281 445 
 V. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 109 
 
 68, 193 
 V. Evans (Tex., 1894), 29 S. 
 
 W. 172 175 
 
 V. People, 12 Hun (X. Y.) 212 71 
 V. State, 22 Ala. 15 488 
 
 V. State, 82 Ark. 540 211 
 
 V. State, 83 Ga. 647 247 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 857 94 
 
 V. State, 121 Ga. 348 326 
 
 V. State, 126 Ga. 557 262 
 
 V. State, 131 Ga. 765 225 
 
 V. State, 132 Ga. 235 517, 520 
 
 State, III Ind. 279 416 
 
 State, 130 Ind. 66 225 
 
 State, 52 Miss. 84 228 
 
 State, Z7 Neb. 788 125 
 
 State, 62 S. E. 1048 6, 58a, 236 
 State, 15 Tex. App. 356 302 
 
 State, 22 Tex. App. 529 415 
 
 State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 381 172 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. 190 t,j-j 
 
 V. Territory (Okla.), 99 Pac. 
 
 628 279 
 
 V. United States, 3 How. (U. 
 
 S.) 197 49 
 
 V. United States, 7 App. Cas. 
 
 D. C. 27 160, 161 
 
 V. United States, 81 C. C. A. 
 
 197 247 
 
 V. United States, 152 Fed. i 247 
 
 Teachout v. People, 41 N. Y. 7 132 
 
 Teague v. State, 120 Ala. 309 118, 324 
 
 V. State, 144 Ala. 42 80 
 
 Tedford v. People, 219 111. 23 448 
 
 V. United States, 7 Ind. Ter. 
 
 254 390, 393 
 
 Telfair v. State, 56 Fla. 104 421 
 
 Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 
 
 892 247 
 
 Templeton v. People. 27 ^lich. 501 90 
 Tenney's Case, 23 X. H. 162 459 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 v. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 V. 
 V. 
 
 Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278 
 Territory v. Baker, 4 Gild. (X. 
 Mex.) 236 
 
 v. Big Knot on Head, 6 ^Mont. 
 
 242 
 v. Clayton, 8 Mont, i 
 V. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50 
 V. Crozier, 6 Dak. 8 
 V. De Gutman, 8 X. Mex. 92 
 V. Dooley, 3 Ariz. 60 
 V. Egan, 3 Dak. 119 
 V. Emilio (X. Mex.) 89 Pac. 
 
 239 52, 
 
 V. Godfrey, 6 Dak. 46 
 V. Guthrie, 2 Idaho 398 
 V. Harding, 6 ]^Iont. 2>^^ 
 V. Livingston, 13 X. Mex 
 
 164 
 
 124 
 242 
 395 
 308 
 205 
 270 
 312 
 
 318 
 
 299, 
 V. Mahaffey, 3 ]\Iont. 112 
 V. r^Ieredith (X. Mex.), 91 
 Pac. 731 212, 
 
 V. Perkins, 2 ^lont. 467 
 V. Price (X. Mex.), 91 Pac. 
 
 72,3 
 V. Smith, 12 X. Mex. 229 
 V. West (X. Mex. 1909), 99 
 Pac. 343 197. 
 
 Terry v. State, 90 Ala. 635 
 V. State, 118 Ala. 79 
 
 82, 312, 2^^, 
 V. State, 120 Ala. 286 272, 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 264 
 Tetterton v. Commonwealth 
 
 (Ky.), 89 S. W. 8 
 Thalheim v. State, 38 Fla. 169 
 Tharp v. State, 15 Ala. 749 
 Thayer v. Davis, 38 Vt. 163 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 39 
 V. Thayer, loi ]Mass. 11 1 
 Theisen v. Dayton, 82 Iowa 74 
 Therasson v. People, 20 Hun (X. 
 
 Y.) 55 
 Thockmorton v. Commonwealth 
 
 (Ky.), 29 S. W. 16 
 Thomas v. Commonwealth (Kj-.), 
 20 S. W. 226 6, 
 
 v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 92 
 v. Commonwealth, 106 Va. 855 
 
 409 
 271 
 271 
 
 305 
 360 
 
 297 
 271 
 
 52 
 297 
 
 279 
 484 
 
 374 
 312 
 
 2,23 
 
 Z26 
 
 285 
 266 
 528 
 6 
 173 
 174 
 
 442 
 
 298 
 
 314 
 455 
 414
 
 cliv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 Thomas v. People, 113 111. 531 44° 
 V. People, 67 N. Y. 218 
 
 81, 86, 320, 325, 327, 334 
 V. State, 107 Ala. 13 370 
 
 V. State, 109 Ala. 25 119 
 
 V. State, 139 Ala. 80 322 
 
 V. State, 156 Ala. 166 349, 350 
 
 V. State, 47 Fla. 99 119, 280 
 
 V. State, 27 Ga. 287 100 
 
 V. State, 67 Ga. 460 315 
 
 V. State, 84 Ga. 613 126 
 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 437 439 
 
 V. State, 95 Ga. 484 276 
 
 V. State, 99 Ga. 38 353 
 
 V. State, 129 Ga. 419 516 
 
 V. State, 103 Ind. 419 
 
 60, 88, 89, 421, 423, 429, 478 
 V. State, 61 Miss. 60 270 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 26 S. W. 724 383 
 V. State (Tex.), 116 S. W. 600 
 
 154, 157 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 178 132 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. 27 367 
 
 V. State, 56 Tex. Cr. App. iii 48 
 
 Thomason v. Territory, 4 N. Mex. 
 
 150 227 
 
 Thomasson v. State, 80 Ark. 364 218 
 Thompkins v. Commonwealth, 
 
 117 Ky. 138 187 
 
 Thompson v. Commonwealth, 20 
 Gratt. (Va.) 724 130 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 88 Va. 45 268 
 V. German Valley R. Co., 22 
 
 N. J. Eq. Ill 170, 257 
 
 V. State, 30 Ala. 28 425 
 
 V. State, 49 Ala. 16 427 
 
 V. State, 70 Ala. 26 488 
 
 V. State, 99 Ala. 173 473 
 
 V. State, 100 Ala. 70 82 
 
 V. State, 120 Ga. 132 470 
 
 V. State (Fla., 1909), 50 So. 
 
 507 378 
 
 V. State, 38 Ind. 39 242, 409, 410 
 V. State, 5 Kan. 159 271 
 
 V. State, 51 Miss. 353 55, 308 
 
 V. State, 83 Miss. 287 17, 18 
 
 V. State, 84 Miss. 758 333 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 113 S. W. 536 93 
 V. State, 26 Tex. App. 466 297 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 472 411, 414 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Thompson v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 
 397 374 
 
 V. United States, 30 App. D. 
 
 C. 352 61, 246, 346 
 
 V. United States, 75 C. C A. 
 
 172 61, 90 
 
 Thompson's Case, 122 ]\Iass. 428 258 
 Thornell v. People, 11 Colo. 305 
 
 35, 3^ 
 
 Thornley v. State (Tex.), 35 S. 
 
 W. 981 89 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 118 425 
 
 Thornton v. State, 113 Ala. 43 314 
 
 Threadgill v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 
 
 451 378 
 
 Thurman v. State, 109 Ind. 240 127 
 
 Thurmond v. State, 25 Tex. App. 
 
 366 424 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 422 294 
 
 Tidwell V. State, 70 Ala. 33 166, 333 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 38 
 
 140, 466 
 Tiffany v. Commonwealth, 121 
 
 Pa. St. 165 154, 324 
 
 Till V. State, 132 Wis. 242 381 
 
 Tilly V. State, 21 Fla. 242 301 
 
 Timmons v. State, 80 Ga. 216 422 
 
 Timon v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 363 196 
 
 Tinckler's Case, i East Pleas 
 
 Crown 354 105 
 
 Tines v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. 
 
 L. 1233 67, 137 
 
 Tinney v. State, in Ala. 74 36 
 
 Tinsley v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 91 96 
 
 Tioga County v. South Creek 
 
 Township, 75 Pa. St. 433 527 
 
 Tipton V. State. 140 Ala. 39 328 
 
 V. State. 53 Fla. 69 285 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 530 243 
 
 Tison V. State, 125 Ga. 7 383, 403 
 Tittle V. State, 30 Tex. App. 597 297 
 Titus V. State. 117 Ala. 16 103, 246 
 Tla-Koo-Yet-Lee v. United States, 
 
 167 U. S. 274 245 
 
 Todd V. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 L. 473 292 
 
 V. State, 31 Ind. 514 
 
 437, 438, 439, 443
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clv 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 Tolbirt V. State, 124 Ga. 767 320 
 
 Toliver v. State, 94 Ala. iii 119 
 
 V. State, 142 Ala. 3 492 
 
 Toll V. State, 40 Fla. i6g 90 
 
 Tolleson v. State, 97 Ga. 352 520 
 
 Tolliver v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 329 315 
 Tolston V. State (Tex.), 42 S. W. 
 
 988 36 
 
 Tompkins v. Commonwealth, 117 
 Ky. 138 187 
 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 639 21 
 
 V. State, 17 Ga. 356 357 
 
 Tones v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. ;i63 358 
 Took V. State, 4 Ga. App. 495 57, 58a 
 Toops V. State, 92 Ind. 13 12, 68 
 
 Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244 87 
 Totman v. Forsaith, 55 Me. 360 533 
 Totten V. United States, 92 U. S. 
 
 105 170 
 
 Towns V. State, 11 1 Ala. i 152 
 
 V. State, 167 Ind. 315 292 
 
 Townsend v. State, 137 Ala. 9 279 
 
 V. State, 2 Blackf. (Ind.) 151 273 
 Tracy, In re, 10 CI. & F. 154, 191 4 
 Tracy v. Commonwealth, 87 Ky. 
 578 362 
 
 V. People, 97 111. Id 102, 113, 221 
 Trafton v. State, 5 Tex. App. 480 
 
 294. 29s 
 Trask v. People, 151 111. 523 269, 421 
 Travers v. United States, 6 App. 
 D. C. 450 325 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 423 127 
 Traverse v. State, 61 Wis. 144 z^z 
 Trevenio v. State (Tex.), 42 S. 
 
 W._ 594 zjy 
 
 Trevinio v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 350 470 
 Tribble v. State, 145 Ala. 23 324 
 Trinkle v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 42 331 
 Triplett v. Commonwealth, 122 
 
 Ky. 35 41, 358 
 
 Tripp V. State, 95 Ga. 502 522 
 
 Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 31 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 862 438 
 
 Trnjillo v. Territory, 6 N. M. 589 225 
 Truslow V. State, 95 Tenn. 189 292 
 Tucker v. People, 117 111. 88 404, 405 
 
 V. People, 122 111. 583 398, 404 
 
 V. Shaw, 158 111. 326 202 
 
 V. State, 57 Ga. 503 279 
 
 Tudor V. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. 
 
 L. 1039 
 Tullis V. State, 39 Ohio St. 200 
 Tune V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 445 
 Turley v. State, 3 Humph. 
 
 (Tenn.) 323 
 Turman v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 7 53 
 
 Turnbull v. Richardson, 69 Mich. 
 
 400 
 Turner v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 
 St. 54 
 
 V. People, 23 Mich. 363 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 57 
 V. State, 89 Ga. 424 
 V. State, 102 Ind. 425 
 V. State, 60 Miss. 351 
 V. State, 89 Tenn. 547 
 V. State (Tex.), 32 S. W. 700 
 V. State (Tex.), 46 S. W. 830 
 V. State, 22 Tex. Cr. 103 
 Turpin v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. 
 L. 90 
 
 V. State, 55 Md. 462 184, 
 
 Tuttle V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 22 S. W. 823 
 Tweedy v. State, 5 Iowa 433 
 
 17, 154, 
 Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 10 
 Tyrrell v. State (Tex.), 38 S. W. 
 ion 
 
 U 
 
 18, 87, 
 48, 96, 
 
 67 
 
 312 
 29a 
 
 ■ 55 
 221 
 
 153 
 417 
 314 
 
 i«5 
 112 
 225 
 268 
 323 
 
 61 
 
 328 
 
 338 
 173 
 418 
 
 87 
 
 Udderzook v. Commonwealth, y6 
 
 Pa. St. 340 50, 51, 317 
 
 Ullman v. State, 124 Wis. 602 354 
 
 Ulrich V. People, 39 Mich. 245 139 
 
 Underwood v. Commonwealth 
 
 (Ky.), 84 S. W. 310 47 
 
 V. State, 72 Ala. 220 23, 294, 299 
 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 193 
 
 71, 209 
 Union v. State (Ga. App. 1909), 
 
 66 S. E. 24 48, 248 
 
 United States v. Adams, 2 Dak. 
 305 ' 284 
 
 V. Addatte, 6 Blatchf. (U. S.) 
 
 76 189
 
 clvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References at 
 United States v. Angell, ii Fed. 
 34 95, 262 
 
 V. Angney, 15 Wash. L. 560 519 
 V. Arredondo, 6 Peters (U. 
 
 S.) 691 504 
 
 V. Babcock, 3 Dill (U. S.) 566 
 
 182, 251, 491, 492 
 V. Bachelder, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 
 
 15 447 
 
 V. Ball, 163 U. S. 662 
 
 221, 222, 315 
 V. Barber, 21 D. C. 456 196 
 
 V. 18 Barrels, 8 Blatchf. (U. 
 
 S.) 475 223 
 
 V. Bassett, 5 Utah 131 185 
 
 V. Battiste, 2 Sum. (U. S.) 
 
 240 273, 27s, 279 
 
 V. Bayaud, 23 Fed. 721 144 
 
 V. Beboiit, 28 Fed. 522 478 
 
 V. Beebe, 2 Dak. 292 21 
 
 V. Blodgett, 35 Ga. 336 25 
 
 V. Bott, II Blatchf. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 346 478 
 
 V. Boyd, 45 Fed. 851 91 
 
 V. Boese, 46 Fed. 917 147 
 
 V. Bredemeyer, 6 Utah 143 382 
 V. Breese, 131 Fed. 915 6, 79, 283 
 V. Britton, 2 Mason (U. S.) 
 
 464 31, 37 
 
 V. Brown, I Sawy. (U. S.) 
 
 531 _ 27 
 
 V. Brown, 40 Fed. 457 61 
 
 V. Burns, 5 McLean (U. S.) 
 
 23 423, 433 
 
 V. Burr, 25 Fed. Gas. I4692d 250 
 V. Candler, 65 Fed. 308 i6a 
 
 V. Carroll, 147 Fed. 947 460, 461 
 V. Caton, I Cranch C. C. 15 226 
 V. Chapman, 25 Fed. Gas. 
 
 14783 130 
 
 V. Charles, 2 Cranch G. G. 76 191 
 V. Chisholm, 153 Fed. 808 
 
 154, 157, 162 
 V. Clark, 27 Fed. 106 178 
 
 V. Cole, 153 Fed. 801 6, 490, 491 
 V. Coolidge, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 
 
 364 26 
 
 V. Cooper, 4 Dall. 341 257 
 
 V. Craig, 4 Wash. C. G. (U. 
 
 S.) 729 423, 433 
 
 c to Sections.] 
 
 United States v. Grandell, 4 
 Cranch C. G. 683 362 
 
 V. Cross, 20 D. C. 365 221 
 
 V. Crow, I Bond (U. S.) 51 119 
 V. Crow Doc, 3 Dak. 106 185 
 
 V. Curtis, 107 U. S. 671 470 
 
 V. Davis, 2 Sumner G. G. (U. 
 
 S.) 482 495 
 
 V. Davis, 38 Fed. 326 478 
 
 V. Densmore, 12 N. Mex. 99 325 
 V. De Amador, 6 N. Mex. 173 468 
 V. Deaver, 14 Fed. 595 456 
 
 V. Dexter, 154 Fed. 890 12 
 
 V. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 676 452 
 
 V. Dodge, 2 Gall (U. S.) 313 461 
 V. Doebler, i Bald. G. G. (U. 
 
 s.) 519 • 423, 432 
 
 V. Durling, 4 Biss. 509 249 
 
 V. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 25, 26 
 V. Edme, 9 S. & R. (Pa.) 147 258 
 V. Eldredge, S Utah 161 522 
 
 v, Evans. 28 App. D. C. 264 358 
 r. Falkenheimer, 21 Fed. 624 305 
 v. Farrington, 5 Fed. 343 26 
 
 V. Francis, 144 Fed. 520 492 
 
 v. Ford, 33 Fed. 861 242, 248 
 
 V. Ford, 99 U. S. 594 71, 72 
 
 V. Gibert, 2 Sum. (U. S.) 19 
 
 7, 227, 520 
 
 V. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Gas. 1=5205 282 
 V. Graff, 14 Blatchf. C. G. (U. 
 
 S.) 381 491 
 
 V. Greene, 75 Mo. 355 119 
 
 V. Greene, 146 Fed. 784 
 
 38, 118, 119, 267 
 V. Guiteau, 10 Fed. 160 159 
 
 V. Gunther, 5 Dak. 234 359 
 
 V. Hall, 44 Fed. 864 468 
 
 V. Hall, 53 Fed. 352 207, 208 
 
 V. Hand, 2 Wash. G. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 435 352 
 
 V. Hanway, 2 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 
 
 139 70, 188 
 
 V. Harned, 43 Fed. 376 456 
 
 V. Harper, 33 Fed. 471 10 
 
 V. Hartwell, 3 Cliff. (U. S.) 
 
 221 493 
 
 V. Hawthorn, i Dill. (U. S.) 
 
 422 57
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clvii 
 
 IReferences ar 
 United States v. Health, 19 
 Wash. Law R. 818 12 
 
 V. Heath, 20 D. C. (9 Mackey) 
 
 272 17, 103 
 
 V. Heinze, 161 Fed. 425 21 
 
 V. Henry, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 428 70, 71 
 
 V. Hinman, i Bald. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 292 423 
 
 V. Hinz, 35 Fed. 272 71, 72, 75 
 V. Holmes, i Clif. (U. S.) 98 
 
 23, 154 
 V. Houghton, 14 Fed. 544 422 
 
 V. Howell, 56 Fed. 21 73 
 
 V. Hudson, 7 Cranch. (U. S.) 
 
 32 459 
 
 V. Hunter, i Cranch. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 446 70 
 
 V. Hunter, 15 Fed. 712 182, 251 
 V. Jackson, 29 Fed. 503 294 
 
 V. Jones, 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 
 
 (N. Y.) 451 207 
 
 V. Jones, 3 Wash. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 209 358 
 
 V. Jones, 32 Fed. 569 184 
 
 V. Kee, 39 Fed. 603 255 
 
 V. Keen, i McLean (U. S.) 429 
 
 429, 434 
 V. Kenneally, 26 Fed. Cas. 
 
 15522 250, 433 
 
 V. Kenney, 90 Fed. 257 17, 58, 466 
 V. Kessler, Bald. (U. S.) 15 75 
 V. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765 26, 27 
 V. Kindred, 4 Hughes (U. S.) 
 
 493 255 
 
 V. King-, 5 McLean (U. S.) 
 
 208 433 
 
 V. Kirkwood, 5 Utah 123 130, 132 
 V. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 896 74, 75 
 V. Lantry, 30 Fed. 232 373 
 
 V. Lawrence, 4 Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 574 25 
 
 V. Lee, 4 Mackev (D. C.) 489 160 
 V. McGlue, I Curt. (U. S.) i 157 
 V. Macomb, 5 McLean C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 286 26r 
 
 V. Mathews, 68 Fed. 880 32 
 
 V. Matthews, 26 Fed. Cas. 
 
 15741b 140 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 United States v. Mitchell, i Bald. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 366 422, 424, 433 
 V. Moore, 2 Low. (U. S.) 232 469 
 V. Morris, i Curt. (U. S.) 23 273 
 V. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 726 171, 422 
 
 V. Mullaney, 32 Fed. 370 63 
 
 V. Nardello, 4 Mackey (D. C.) 
 
 503 129 
 
 V. Newtown, 52 Fed. 275 120 
 
 V. Noble, 5 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 371 432, 433 
 
 V. Noelke, 17 Blatchf. (U. S.) 
 
 554 95. 479 
 
 V. Ortega, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 531 353 
 
 V. Palmer, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) II 24, 25 
 
 V. Phelps, 4 Day (Conn.) 469 446 
 V. Piaza, 133 Fed. 998 502 
 
 V. Pirates, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 
 
 184 44 
 
 V. Porter, 2 Cranch C. C. 60 191 
 V. Porter, 3 Day (Conn.) 283 31 
 V. Post, 128 Fed. 950 222 
 
 V. Provenzano, 171 Fed. 675 
 
 432, 433 
 V. Randall, Deady (U. S.) 524 116 
 V. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407 495 
 
 V. Reder, 69 Fed. 965 6 
 
 V. Reed, 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 
 
 435 28, 192 
 
 V. Reid, 21 How. (U. S.) 361 
 
 70, 250 
 V. Reyburn, i Pet. (U. S.) 352 41 
 V. Richard, 2 Cranch C. C. 439 138 
 V. Richards, i Alaska 613 461 
 
 V. Richards, 149 Fed. 443 
 
 17, 37, 73 
 V. Rose, 12 Fed. 576 457 
 
 V. Roudenbush, i Bald. (U. 
 
 S.) 514 79 
 
 V. Sacia, 2 Fed. 754 73, 491 
 
 V. Shinn, 8 Saw. (U. S.) 671 469 
 V. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563 461 
 
 V. Simon, 146 Fed. 89 247 
 
 V. Sims, 161 Fed. roo8 206 
 
 V. Slenkcr, 32 Fed. 691 478 
 
 V. Smallwood, 5 Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U. S.) 35 185
 
 clviii 
 
 TABLE OP CASES. 
 
 [References a 
 United States v. Smith, i Sawyer 
 (U. S.) 277 520 
 
 V. Smith, 4 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 
 S.) 659 
 
 
 475 
 
 V. 
 
 Smith, 47 Fed. 501 
 
 
 247 
 
 V. 
 
 Stevens, 52 Fed. 120 
 
 433, 
 
 434 
 
 V. 
 
 Taintor, 11 Blatch. C 
 
 . C. 
 
 
 
 374 
 
 
 282 
 
 V. 
 
 Taranto, 74 Fed. 219 
 
 
 433 
 
 V. 
 
 Taylor, 3 McCrary 500 
 
 
 279 
 
 V. 
 
 Taylor, 11 Fed. 470 
 
 275, 
 
 279 
 
 T. 
 
 Taylor, 35 Fed. 484 
 
 
 239 
 
 V. 
 
 Tenney, 2 Ariz. 127 
 
 403, 
 
 404 
 
 V. 
 
 Thomas, 47 Fed. 807 
 
 
 277 
 
 V. 
 
 Tilden, 10 Ben. 566 
 
 
 251 
 
 V. 
 
 Turner, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 
 
 132 
 
 430 
 
 V. 
 
 Vietch, I Cranch C. C. 
 
 (U. 
 
 
 
 S.)_Ti5 
 
 
 108 
 
 V. 
 
 Watkins, 3 Cranch C 
 
 c. 
 
 
 
 441 
 
 
 234 
 
 V. 
 
 Wayne, Wall. C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 
 
 134 
 
 
 461 
 
 V. 
 
 Weikel, 8 Mont. 124 
 
 
 431 
 
 V. 
 
 Whitaker, 6 McLean 
 
 (U. 
 
 
 
 S.) 342 
 
 
 79 
 
 V. 
 
 White, 2 Wash. C. C. 
 
 (U. 
 
 
 
 S.) 29 
 
 
 25 
 
 V. 
 
 Whittier, 5 Dill. C. C. 
 
 (U. 
 
 
 
 S.) 35 
 
 
 478 
 
 V. 
 
 Wightman, 29 Fed. 636 
 
 
 478 
 
 V. 
 
 Williams, I Cliff. (U. 
 
 s.) 
 
 
 
 5 
 
 7, 
 
 516 
 
 V. 
 
 Williams, 14 Fed. 550 
 
 
 430 
 
 V. 
 
 Williams, 103 Fed. 938 
 
 
 133 
 
 V. 
 
 Wilson, I Baldw. 78 
 
 
 275 
 
 V. 
 
 Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 
 
 150 
 
 
 
 
 207, 
 
 208 
 
 V. Wilson, 69 Fed. 584 
 
 V. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 440 
 V. Wood, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 430 
 V. Woods, 4 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 
 S.) 484 
 V. Ybanez, 53 Fed. 536 
 V. Zes Cloya, 35 Fed. 493 
 Untreinor v. State, 146 Ala, 
 
 228 
 
 266 
 
 103 
 
 73 
 
 343 
 
 26 
 6r, 91 
 Upstone V. People, 109 III. 169 167 
 Upton V. State, 48 Tex. App. 280 
 
 119, 224 
 
 re to Sections.] 
 
 Urmston v. State, 73 Ind. 175 455 
 
 Usher v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 93 42^ 
 
 Utley V. Donaldson, 94 U. S. 29 44 
 
 V 
 
 Vale V. People. 161 111. 309 77 
 
 Valensin v. Valensin, 73 Cal. 106 179 
 Vallereal v. State (Tex. 1892), 20 
 
 S. W. 557 372 
 
 Vanata v. State, S2 Ark. 203 269 
 
 Van Buren v. People, 7 Colo. App. 
 
 136 442 
 
 V. State, 63 Neb. 453 248 
 
 Vance v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 115 S. W. 774 377 
 
 V. State, 56 Ark. 402 225 
 
 Vandegrift v. State, 151 Ala. 105 298 
 
 V. State, 43 So. 852 298 
 
 Vanderwerker v. People, 5 Wend. 
 
 (N. Y.) 530 21 
 
 Vandeventer v. State, 38 Neb. 592 14 
 Vandiveer, In re, 4 Cal. App. 650 392 
 Van Dolsen v. State, i Ind. App. 
 
 108 384 
 
 Van Gesner v. United States, 153 
 
 Fed. 46 90 
 
 Vanhouser v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 572 18 
 
 Van Immons v. State, 29 Ohio Cir. 
 
 Ct. 681 366 
 
 Van Meter v. People, 60 111. 168 272 
 Vann v. State, 140 Ala. 122 224, 248 
 V. State, 83 Ga. 44 215 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 434 95 
 Van Sickel v. People, 29 Mich. 61 429 
 Van Straaten v. People, 26 Colo. 
 
 184 300 
 
 Van Syoc v. State, 69 Neb. 520 
 
 295. 304 
 
 Van Tassel v. State, 59 Wis. 351 524 
 Van Walker v. State, 2i3 Tex. Cr. 
 
 359 373 
 Van Wyk v. People (Colo.), 99 
 
 Pac. 1009 116, 323, 492, 493 
 
 Varnadoe v. State, 67 Ga. 768 269 
 
 Varner v. State, 72 Ga. 745 295 
 Vass V. Commonwealth, 3 Leigh 
 
 (Va.) 786 112
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clix 
 
 [References a 
 
 Vasser v. State, 75 Ark. 373 89 
 
 Vaughan v. State, 57 Ark. i 6 
 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 563 464 
 
 Vaughn V. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. 
 431 103 
 
 V. State, 78 Neb. 317 411 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 180 130 
 Veal V. State, 8 Tex. App. 474 357 
 Vernon v. United States, 146 Fed. 
 121 6, 36 
 
 V. Vernon, 6 La. Ann. 242 526 
 
 Vess V. State, 93 Ind. 211 487 
 
 Vetten v. Wallace, 39 111. App. 390 
 
 523, 526 
 Viberg v. State, 138 Ala. 100 
 
 61, 245, 292 
 Vickers v. United States, i Okla. 
 
 Cr. 452 87, 416 
 
 Vickery v. State, 50 Fla. 144 96 
 
 Vicksburg &c. R. Co. v. O'Brien, 
 
 119 U. S. 99 97 
 Vincent v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 
 120 298 
 Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287 429 
 Voght V. State, 124 Ind. 358 475 
 
 V. State, 145 Ind. 12 85 
 Vogt V. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 
 
 68 270 
 
 Von Pollnitz v. State, 92 Ga. 16 330 
 Von Vetsera, Ex parte, 7 Cal. 
 
 App. 136 40 
 
 Voorhees, In re, 32 N. J. L. 141 499 
 Vowells V. Commonwealth, 83 
 
 Ky. 193 197 
 
 W 
 
 Wachstetter v. State, 99 Ind. 290 
 
 221, 237 
 
 266 
 
 Wade V. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 80 zuu 
 
 Wadge, In re, 16 Fed. 864 501, 503 
 Waggoner v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 App.), 98 S. W. 25s 56, S8a 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 269 473 
 
 Wagner v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. 
 L. ii8s 108 
 
 V. State, 107 Ind. 71 80 
 
 V. State, 116 Ind. 181 
 
 156, 164, 238, 280a 
 
 re to Sections.l 
 
 Wagoner v. State, 90 Ind. 504 440 
 Waidley v. State, 34 Neb. 250 292 
 
 Wakefield v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 124 109, 330a 
 
 Walker v. Commonwealth, i Leigh 
 (Va.) 90 90 
 
 V. Kennedy. 133 Iowa 284 461 
 
 V. People, 88 N. Y. 81 
 
 23, 81, 157, 158 
 V. State, 89 Ala. 74 309 
 
 V. State, 91 Ala. 76 31, 81, 268 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 85 202, 379 
 
 V. State, 104 Ala. 56 380 
 
 V. State, 107 Ala. 5 469 
 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 42 282, 285, 291 
 V. State, 120 Ala. 293 119a 
 
 V. State, 139 Ala. 56 
 
 II, 47, 56, 119, 332 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 45 97, 473 
 
 V. State, 147 Ala. 699 103, 312 
 
 V. State, 153 Ala. 31 36, 334 
 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 430 376, 378 
 V. State, 28 Ga. 254 302 
 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 757 73 
 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 48 431 
 
 V. State, 6 Blackf. (Ind.) i 532 
 V. State, 92 Ind. 474 528 
 
 V. State, 102 Ind. 502 160, 327 
 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 663 126, 268 
 
 V. State, 165 Ind. 94 532 
 
 V. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 287 473 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 37 S. 
 
 W. 423 69 
 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 245 130, 374 
 V. State, 13 Tex. App. 618 119, 269 
 V. State, 14 Tex. App. 609 7 
 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 176 173, 176 
 Wall V. State, 5 Ga. App. 305 7 
 
 Wallace v. State, 90 Ga. 117 105 
 
 V. State, 147 Ind. 621 339 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. 758 310 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 341 492 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 318 493 
 
 V. United States, 162 U. S. 466 326 
 Waller v. People, 209 111. 284 
 
 35, 58, 238, 312 
 
 V. State, 40 Ala. 325 . 416, 417 
 
 V. State, 38 Ark. 656 21 
 
 Walling V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 254 358
 
 clx 
 
 TAELE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 
 Wallis V. State, 54 Ark. 611 
 
 36, 284, 288 
 
 Walls V. State, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 
 572 485 
 
 V. State, 125 Ind. 400 77 
 
 Walrath v. State, 8 Neb. 80 138 
 
 Walsh V. People, 65 111. 58 45 1 
 
 V. People. 88 N. Y. 458 160, 3M 
 
 V. United States, 174 Fed. 615 89 
 
 Walston V. Commonwealth, 16 B. 
 
 Mon. (Ky.) 15 103, no, in 
 
 Walter v. People, 32 N. Y. 147 157 
 V. State, 105 Ind. 589 195, 198 
 
 Walters v. People, 6 Park. Cr. 
 (N. Y.) 15 88 
 
 V. State, 39 Ohio St. 215 148, 152 
 V. State, 17 Tex. App. 226 119 
 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 388 356 
 
 Walton V. Commonwealth, 32 
 Gratt. (Va.) 85.^ 270 
 
 V. State, 71 Ark. 398 387, 391, 393 
 V. State, 88 Ind. 9 236, 492 
 
 Wampler v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 
 352 6 
 
 Wantland v. State. 145 Ind. 38 6 
 
 Ward V. Commonwealth, 29 Ky. 
 L. 62 329 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Kv. 1909), 
 
 n6 S. W. 786 483 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 26 Ky. L. 
 
 1256 121 
 
 V. People, 3 Hill (X. Y.) 395 129 
 V. State, 85 Ark. 179 104, 212 
 
 V. State, 2 Mo. 120 29 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. 611 302 
 
 Ware v. State, 67 Ga. 349 149 
 
 V. State, 96 Ga. 349 276 
 
 V. State, 59 Ark. 379 148. 152 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 597 
 
 87, 236 
 Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 107 
 
 36. 89 
 Warickshall's Case, i Leach C. C. 
 
 298 306 
 
 Waring v. United States, 7 Ct. CI. 
 
 CU. S.) 501 207 
 
 Warlick v. White. 76 X. Car. 175 525 
 Warner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. 
 
 Cas. 95 404 
 
 Warrace v. State, 27 Fla. 362 36 
 
 e to Sectiofis.] 
 
 Warren v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 
 370 245 
 
 V. State, 94 Ala. 79 484 
 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 619 108 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 573 327 
 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 443 
 
 415, 417, 429 
 Warrick v. State, 125 Ga. 133 
 
 325, 330 
 Wasden v. State, 18 Ga. 264 14 
 
 Wash V. Commonwealth, 16 Gratt. 
 
 (Va.) 530 423 
 
 Washington v. State, 23 Tex. 
 App. 336 467, 470 
 
 V. State, 72 Ala. 272 33, 286 
 
 V. State, 143 Ala. 62 420, 429 
 
 V. State, 36 Ga. 242 484 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. 1907), 105 
 
 S. W. 789 520 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 154 517 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 184 214, 328 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 542 269 
 
 Wassells v. State, 26 Ind. 30 272 
 
 Waterman v. People, 67 111. 91 430 
 
 Waters v. People, 104 111. 544 301 
 
 V. State, n7 Ala. 108 17 
 
 V. State, 53 Ga. 567 371 
 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 284 468 
 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 322 333 
 
 Watkins v. Carlton, 10 Leigh 
 
 (Va.) 560 ^ 526 
 
 V. Commonwealth. 123 Ky. 817 17 
 
 V. State, 89 Ala. 82 48, 312 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1910), 
 
 124 S. W. 959 397 
 
 Watson V. Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 
 St. 418 148, 152 
 
 V. Miller. 82 Tex. 279 218 
 
 V. People, 87 X. Y. 561 440 
 
 V. State, 3 Ind. 123 471 
 
 V. State, 36 Miss. 593 301 
 
 V. State, 9 Tex. App. 237 69, 346 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 80 464 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 85 
 
 137, 315, 333 
 Watt V. People, 126 111. 9 67, 122 
 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 72 458 
 
 Watters v. State (Tex. Cr.), 94 S. 
 
 W. 1038 217, 305 
 
 Watts V. Ownes, 62 Wis. 512 527
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxi 
 
 [References ar 
 Watts V. State, 99 ]Mcl. 30 
 
 126, 160, 161, 162 
 V. State, 90 Miss. 757 269 
 
 Wax V. State, 43 Xeb. 18 442 
 
 Way V. State (Ala.), 46 So. 273 
 
 12, 55, 56, 76, 336 
 Weatherby v. State (Aliss. 1909), 
 
 48 So. 724 520 
 
 Weatherford v. State, 78 Ark. 36 261 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 530 193 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 430 89 
 Weaver v. State, 77 Ala. 26 123 
 
 V. State, 142 Ala. 33 388, 393 
 
 V. State, 83 Ark. 119 
 
 239, 324, 325 
 
 V. State, 24 Ohio St. 584 23 
 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 607 374 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 11 269 
 
 Weaver's Estate, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 516 175 
 
 Webb V. State, 100 Ala. 47 225 
 
 V. State, 106 Ala. 52 ■ 80 
 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 53 314 
 
 V. State (Miss. 1897), 21 So. 
 
 133 388 
 
 V. State, 73 llhs. 456 6, 323 
 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 310 281 
 
 V. State, 17 Tex. App. 205 475 
 
 Webber v. Commonwealth, 119 
 
 Pa. St. 223 163 
 
 Webster v. People, 92 X. Y. 422 439 
 Wedgwood's Case, 8 ^le. 75 383 
 
 Weed V. People, 3 T. & C. (X. Y.) 
 
 50 349 
 
 Weeks v. State, 79 Ga. 36 518 
 
 Weideman v. State, 4 Ind. App. 
 
 397 482 
 
 Weightnovel v. State, 46 Fla. i 
 
 116, 348 
 Weinberg v. People, 208 III. 15 35 
 V. State, 25 Wis. 370 405 
 
 Weinecke v. State, 34 Xeb. 14 36 
 
 Weinert v. State, 35 Fla. 229 32 
 
 Weisenbach v. State, 138 Wis. 152 492 
 Weitzel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 
 523 33 
 
 Welch V. Clark. 50 Vt. 386 533 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 33 Ky. L. 57 
 
 60, 61, 90 
 V. State, 124 Ala. 41 6 
 
 xi — Underhill Crim. Evidence. 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Welch V. State, 156 Ala. 112 373 
 V. State, 126 Ga. 495 291a 
 
 V. State, 104 Ind. 347 119, 241 
 
 Wellar v. People, 30 Mich. 16 333 
 
 Wells, Ex parte, 18 How. (U. S.) 
 
 307 207 
 
 Wells V. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. 
 
 L. 504 245 
 
 v. Fletcher, 5 C. & P. 12 189 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 499 162 
 
 v. Territory, i Okla. Cr. 469 431 
 
 V. Territory, 14 Okla. 436 80 
 
 Welsh V. State, 96 Ala. 92 12, 145 
 
 V. State, 97 Ala. i 119 
 
 Welty V. United States, 14 Okla. 
 
 7 269 
 
 Wesley v. State, 65 Ga. 731 416 
 
 V. State, 37 Miss. 327 79, 324 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1905), 
 
 85 S. W. 802 87 
 
 Wesoky v. United States, 175 
 
 Fed. 333 185 
 
 West V. State, 76 Ala. 98 loi, 145 
 
 V. State, 53 Fla. 77 ■ 52, 119a 
 
 V. State, 6 Ga. App. 105 367 
 
 V. State, 48 Ind. 483 149 
 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 640 325 
 
 V. State, I Wis. 209 250, 393 
 V. United States, 20 App. D. 
 
 C. 347 128 
 Westbrook v. People, 126 111. 81 328 
 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 401 421 
 Westbrooks v. State, 76 Miss. 710 77 
 
 Weston V. Brown, 30 Xeb. 609 217 
 Westover v. ^tna Life Ins. Co., 
 
 99 N. Y. 56 179 
 
 Weyrich v. People, 89 111. 90 330 
 Whalen v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 
 
 544 298 
 
 Whaley v. State, 11 Ga. 123 118 
 
 v. State, no Ala. 68 263 
 
 V. State, 6 Mo. 455 24a 
 
 Wheatley v. Williams, i M. & W. 
 
 533 ^74 
 
 Wheeler, In re, 34 Kan. 96 523 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 120 Ky. 697 328 
 
 V. Hill, 16 Me. 329 174 
 
 V. Le Marchant, L. R. 17 Ch. 
 
 D. 675 T78 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 325 245
 
 clxii 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References at 
 Wheeler v. State, 79 Neb. 491 023 
 Wherl V. State, 79 Neb. 491 248 
 
 Whipp V. State, 34 Ohio St. 87 185 
 Whitaker v. State, 79 Ga. 87 103, no 
 White, In re, 55 Fed. 54 497 
 
 White V. Bailey, 10 Mich. 155 163 
 V. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. 2>72 55 
 V. Commonwealth, 20 Ky. L. 
 
 1942 507 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 480 S2, 
 V. Commonwealth, 96 Ky. 180 408 
 V. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 699 325 
 V. Morgan & Co., 119 Ind. 338 226 
 V. State, 49 Ala. 344 147 
 
 V. State, 72 Ala. 195 378 
 
 V. State, 74 Ala. 31 380 
 
 V. State, ^6 Ala. 69 174 
 
 V. State, 103 Ala. 72 451 
 
 V. State, III Ala. 92 
 
 82, 103, 104, III 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 273 475 
 
 V. State, 53 Ind. 595 59 
 
 V. State (Miss.), 45 So. 611 268 
 V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 
 338 307 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 38 S. W. 169 130 
 V. State (Tex.), 50 S. W. 1015 i6a 
 V. State (Tex. 1905), 85 S. W. 
 
 I 140 122 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 98 S. W. 264 269 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 652 
 
 69, III, 112, 333 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. App. 625 
 
 6, 136 
 V. United States, 164 U. S. 
 
 100 80 
 
 Whitehead v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 
 
 89 2^3 
 
 Whitehurst v. Commonwealth, 79 
 
 Va. 556 265, 521 
 
 Whitley v. State. 38 Ga. 50 108 
 
 V. State, 66 Ga. 656 488 
 
 Whitlo V. State (Tex.), 18 S. W. 
 
 865 75 
 
 Whitlock, In re, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 351 174 
 
 Whitlock V. State, 4 Ind. App. 
 
 432 482 
 
 Whitman v. State, 34 Ind. 360 532 
 
 e to Sections.} 
 
 Whitney v. Commonwealth, 24 
 
 Ky. L. 2524 138 
 
 Whittake4- v. Commonwealth, 13 
 
 Ky. L. 504 328 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 95 Ky. 632 397 
 
 V. State, so Wis. 518 407, 417 
 
 Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196 461 
 
 Whizenant v. State, 71 Ala. 383 296 
 
 Whorton v. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. 
 
 L. 826 507 
 
 Wiborg V. United States, 136 U. 
 
 S. 632 277 
 
 Wiggins V. People, 4 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 540 427 
 
 V. State, Id Ga. 501 270 
 
 V. Utah, 93 U. S. 465 326 
 
 Wilber v. Scherer, 13 Ind. App. 
 
 428 218 
 
 Wilcox V. Nolze, 34 Ohio St. 520 497 
 V. State, 94 Tenn. 106 166, 280a 
 V. Wilcox, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 32 49 
 
 Wilde V. Commonwealth, 2 Mete. 
 
 (Mass.) 408 SIC 
 
 Wiley V. State (Ark. 1909), 124 
 S. W. 249 300, 493, 494 
 
 V. State, 74 Ga. 840 z^^ 296 
 
 V. State, 52 Ind. 516 486 
 
 V. State, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 
 
 362 296 
 
 Wilhite V. State, 84 Ark. 67 
 
 19, 390, 393 
 
 Wilke V. People, 53 N. Y. 525 185 
 
 Wilkerson v. Commonwealth, 25 
 
 Ky. L. 780 17 
 
 V. State, Tex. Cr. App. 86 88 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 86 321, 323 
 
 Wilkins v. Metcalf, 71 Vt. 103 533 
 
 V. State, 98 Ala. i 58 
 
 V. State. 35 Tex. Cr. 525 3:^,2 
 
 Wilkinson v. People, 226 111. 135 467 
 
 V. State, 59 Ind. 416 197 
 
 Willard v. State, 27 Tex. i\.pp. 
 
 386 147 
 
 V. Superior Court, 82 Cal. 456 250 
 
 Willet V. Commonwealth, 13 Bush 
 
 (Ky.) 230 21 
 
 Williams v. Commonwealth, 13 
 Ky. L. 753 522
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 clxiii 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 Williams v. Commonwealth 
 Ky. L. 663 
 V. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 
 
 102 
 V. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 
 
 493 
 V. Commonwealth (Va. i^ 
 
 22 S. E. 859 
 Commonwealth, 85 Va. 
 Dickenson, 28 Fla. 90 
 People, 54 111. 422 
 People, 121 111. 84 
 People, 166 111. 132 
 People, 196 111. 173 
 State, 44 Ala. 24 
 
 184, 
 State, 52 Ala. 411 
 State, 81 Ala. i 
 State, 98 Ala. 52 
 State, 103 Ala. 33 
 State, 109 Ala. 64 
 State, 113 Ala. 58 
 State, 144 Ala. 14 
 State, 147 Ala. 10 93, 
 State, 149 Ala. 4 
 State (Ark. 1891), 16 S. 
 
 816 
 State, 42 Ark. 35 122, 
 State, 66 Ark. 264 
 State, 32 Fla. 251 
 State, 40 Fla. 480 
 State, 48 Fla. 65 
 State, 53 Fla. 89 
 State, 4 Ga. App. 853 
 State, 19 Ga. 402 
 State, 67 Ga. 260 
 State, 99 Ga. 203 
 State, 119 Ga. 564 
 State, 125 Ga. 741 
 State, 47 Ind. 568 
 State, 168 Ind. 87 
 State, 64 Md. 384 
 State (Miss. 1908), 45 
 
 146 
 State, 47 Miss. 609 
 State, 46 Xeb. 704 
 State, 69 Neb. 402 
 State, 14 Ohio 222 
 State, 77 Ohio St. 468 
 State, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 
 
 , 18 
 , St. 
 
 , St. 
 466, 
 ?95), 
 
 607 
 14, 
 
 484 
 
 131 
 
 400, 
 119, 
 166, 
 
 528, 
 210, 
 ,96, 
 
 W. 
 117, 
 123, 
 60, 
 
 300, 
 
 147, 
 
 3^2, 
 
 So. 
 
 160 
 
 360 
 120 
 209 
 326 
 23 
 88 
 509 
 
 406 
 
 145 
 492 
 
 247 
 
 128 
 205 
 532 
 246 
 328 
 44 
 
 322 
 124 
 
 96 
 221 
 301 
 129 
 269 
 517 
 264 
 
 21 
 353 
 
 48 
 367 
 492 
 
 36 
 3^3 
 
 391 
 408 
 276 
 118 
 408 
 439 
 457 
 
 Cr. 1895), 32 
 1896), 34 S. 
 
 420 
 
 473 
 127 
 
 35 
 121 
 118 
 
 Williams v. State (Tex. App. 
 1890), 13 S. W. 609 373 
 
 V. State (Tex. 1892), 19 S. W. 
 
 897 350 
 
 V. State (Tex. 
 S. W. 532 
 V. State (Tex, 
 
 W. 271 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 276 
 V. State, 21 Tex. App. 256 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 497 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 17 
 V. State, 25 Tex. App. 76 
 
 235, 241 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 301 61 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. App. 128 69 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 523 296 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. 355 225 
 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 606 17 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 147 129 
 V. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 128 133 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 218 269 
 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 352 269 
 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 396 69, 149 
 V. United States, 3 App. D. C. 
 
 335 205, 331 
 
 V. United States, 137 U. S. 113 520 
 
 V. Wager, 64 Vt. 326 217 
 
 Williamson v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 330 18 
 
 V. United States, 207 U. S. 425 466 
 
 Willi ford v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 414 122, 238 
 
 Willingham v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 98 90 
 
 Willis V. People, 32 N. Y. 715 154 
 V. State, 12 Ga. 444 247 
 
 V. State, 93 Ga. 208 129 
 
 V. State, 43 Neb. 102 127 
 
 V. United States, 6 Ind. Ter. 
 
 424 133 
 
 Willoughby v. Territory, 16 Okla. 
 
 577 110 
 
 Wills V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 
 141 21 
 
 Wilson V. Boerem, 15 Johns. (N. 
 Y.) 286 106 
 
 V. People, 94 111. 299 223, 330 
 
 V. Rastall, 4 T. R. 753 
 
 173, 177, 179
 
 clxiv 
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 [References ar 
 Wilson V. State, 31 Ala. 371 473 
 
 V. State, 61 Ala. 151 464 
 
 V. State, 68 Ala. 41 486 
 
 V. State, 72 Ala. 527 
 
 19, 390, 392, 393 
 V. State, no Ala. i 132, 328 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 43 
 
 17, 103, 261, 326 
 V. State, 62 Ark. 497 2)^ 
 
 V. State (Ga. App. 1910), 67 
 
 S. E. 705 430 
 
 V. State (Ga.), 64 S. E. 112 
 
 35, 36, 147 
 
 V. State, 58 Ga. 328 385 
 
 V. State, 69 Ga. 224 58 
 
 V. State, 57 Ind. 71 257 
 
 V. State, 70 Miss. 595 421 
 
 V. State, 2 Ohio St. 319 399 
 
 V. State, 41 Tex. 320 313 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. 76 295 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.), 74 S. W. 
 
 315 352 
 
 V. State, 12 Tex. App. 481 295 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. Cr. 64 241 
 
 V. State, 27 Tex. Cr. 156 356 
 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 159 282 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 496 69 
 . V. United States, 5 Ind. Ten 
 
 610 238 
 
 V. United States, 149 U. S. 60 67 
 V. United States, 162 U. S. 613 
 
 50, 116, 126, 132, 312, 334 
 
 V. Woodside, 57 Me. 489 533 
 Wimberly v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 
 
 II 482 
 
 Wingo V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 16 268 
 Winn V. Patterson, 9 Pet. (U. S.) 
 
 663 38 
 
 Winsett v. State, 57 Ind. 26 521 
 
 Winslow V. State, y6 Ala. 42 2'^7 
 
 V. State, 97 Ala. 68 440 
 
 Winston v. State, 145 Ala. 91 473 
 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 
 
 U. S. 26s 209 
 Wisdom V. People, 11 Colo. 170 
 
 71, 72, 149 
 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 215 390 
 
 Wise V. State, 100 Ga. 68 312 
 
 V. State, 2 Kan. 419 324 
 
 T to Sections.'] 
 
 Withaup V. United States, 127 
 
 Fed. 530 90 
 
 Witt V. State, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 5 314 
 Wixson V. People, 5 Park. Cr. 
 
 (N. Y.) 119 70, y2 
 
 Wohlford V. People, 148 111. 296 59 
 Wolf V. State, 4 Tex. App. 332 297 
 Womble v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 24 160 
 
 Wong Hane, hi re, 108 Cal. 680 
 
 16, 24a 
 Wolverton v. State, 16 Ohio 173 404 
 Wood V. People, 53 N. Y. 511 
 
 443, 510, 513 
 V. State, 34 Ark. 341 166 
 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 221 12 
 
 V. State, 48 Ga. 102 383, 392 
 
 V. State, 92 Ind. 269 100, 220, 326 
 V. State, 58 Miss. 741 161 
 
 V. State, 46 Neb. 58 408, 410 
 
 Woodward v. State, 5 Ga. App. 
 
 447 392, 393 
 
 Woodbury v. State, 69 Ala. 243 
 
 440, 442 
 Woodcock's Case, 2 Leach C. L. 
 
 563 102, 104, 105 
 
 Woodin V. People, i Park. Cr. 
 
 (X. Y.) 464 412 
 
 Woodley v. State, 103 Ala. 23 71 
 
 Woodruff V. State, 61 Ark. 157 
 
 45, 217, 439 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 320 12 
 
 V. State, 72 Xeb. 815 118 
 
 V. State (Tex. 1891), 20 S. W. 
 
 573 379 
 
 Woods V. Miller Co., 55 Iowa 168 182 
 V. People, 55 N. Y. 515 418 
 
 V. State. 76 Ala. 35 188 
 
 V. State, 63 Ind. 353 65 
 
 V. State, 90 Miss. 245 324 
 
 Woodsides v. State, 2 How. 
 
 (Miss.) 65s III 
 
 Woodward v. Blue, 107 N. Car. 
 
 407 526 
 
 V. Leavitt, 107 Mass. 453 193 
 
 V. Shaw, 18 Me. 304 533 
 
 • V. State, 84 Ark. 119 89, 188 
 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 447 387 
 
 V. State, 54 Ga. 106 277
 
 TABLE OF CASES. 
 
 ClXV 
 
 [References ai 
 Woodward v. State, (Tex. Cr. 
 App. 1910), 126 S. W. 271 447 
 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 554 308 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 294 329 
 
 Woodworth, Ex parte, 29 W. L. 
 
 Bull. 315 226 
 
 Woodworth v. State, 26 Ohio St. 
 
 196 447 
 
 Wooldridge v. State, 49 Fla. 137 
 
 44, 423, 429 
 
 Wool folk V. State. 85 Ga. 69 
 
 135, 268, 328 
 
 Woollen V. Wire, no Ind. 251 267 
 
 Woolley V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 214 390 
 
 Woolsey v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 346 367 
 
 Wooten V. State, 119 Ga. 745 35 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 428 
 
 156, 157 
 
 V. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223 106 
 
 Work V. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 
 
 64 499 
 
 Workman v. State, 4 Sneed 
 
 (Tenn.) 425 188 
 
 Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 
 
 3T0 204 
 
 Wray v. People, 78 111. 212 269 
 
 V. State, 154 Ala. 36 265 
 
 Wren v. State. 70 Ala. i 475 
 
 Wright, Ex parte, 65 Ind. 504 460 
 
 Wright V. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 
 
 183 377, 378 
 
 V. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155 526 
 
 V. Mayer, 6 Ves. Jr. 280 176 
 
 V. People, 61 111. 382 284 
 
 V. People, 4 Neb. 407 157 
 
 V. State, 108 Ala. 60 384 
 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 69 423 
 
 V. State, 148 Ala. 596 58, 354 
 
 V. State, 149 Ala. 28 221 
 
 V. State, 30 Ga. 325 310 
 
 V. State, 88 Md. 705 97 
 
 V. State, SO Miss. 332 40, 133 
 
 V. State, 21 Neb. 496 6 
 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 358 293 
 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 670 474 
 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 354 390, 39i 
 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 447 493 
 
 Wroe V. State, 20 Ohio St. 460 61, 108 
 
 e to Sections.] 
 
 Wrye v. State, 95 Ga. 466 58, 189 
 
 Wyatt V. People, 17 Colo. 252 257 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 114 S. W. 
 
 812 89, 358 
 
 Wylie V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 182 ^6 
 
 \V>nn V. Commonwealth (Ky. 
 1909), 122 S. W. 516 358 
 
 Yancey v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 366 314 
 
 Yanke v. State, 51 Wis. 464 
 
 60, 61, 245 
 
 Yarborough v. State, 41 Ala. 405 89 
 
 Yarbrough v. State, 105 Ala. 43 55 
 V. State, 115 Ala. 92 301 
 
 Yates V. People, 38 111. 527 228 
 
 V. People, 32 N. Y. 509 446 
 
 V. State, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 549 35 
 
 Yeoman v. State, 21 Neb. 171 395 
 
 Young, In re, 137 N. Car. 552 448 
 
 Young V. People, 221 111. 51 42, 44 
 V. State, 68 Ala. 569 129 
 
 V. State, 95 Ala. 4 320 
 
 V. State, 149 Ala. 16 23 
 
 V. State, 155 Ala. 145 439 
 
 V. State, 65 Ga. 525 i73 
 
 V. State, 122 Ga. 725 205 
 
 V. State, 131 Ga. 498 522 
 
 V. State, 90 Md. 579 140 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 44 
 
 S. W. 835 69 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1907), 
 
 102 S. W. 1 144 162 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1908), 
 
 113 S. W. 276 88 
 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 207 
 
 48, 50 
 V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 417 323 
 
 Young Ah Gow, Ex parte, 73 
 Cal. 438 511 
 
 Younger v. State, 80 Neb. 201 58a, 81 
 
 Zabriskie v. State, 43 N. L. L. 640 
 
 19, 390, 392, 393 
 Zackery v. State, 6 Ga. App. 104 383
 
 clxvi 
 
 TABLE OF CASES, 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 Zeehandelear, Ex parte, 71 Cal. 
 
 238 226 
 
 Zeigler v. State, 2 Ga. App. 632 192 
 Zimmerman v. People, 117 111. 
 
 App. 54 532 
 
 Zink V. People, 77 N. Y. 114 435 
 
 Zipperian v. People, 2;^ Colo. 134 
 
 106, no, 223 
 
 Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580 
 
 7, 89, 225, 318 
 Zollicoffer v. State, 16 Tex. App. 
 
 312 69 
 
 Zucker v. Karpeles, 88 Mich. 413 221 
 Zuckerman v. People, 213 111. 114 
 
 126, 147a, 282
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. 
 
 1. Necessity for rules of evidence 
 
 in judicial proceedings. 
 
 2. Elements of probability and im- 
 
 probability as affecting the 
 proof of facts and circum- 
 stances. 
 
 3. The character and mental capac- 
 
 ity of a witness as relating to 
 the credibility of his testimony. 
 
 4. The motive of the witness to 
 
 misrepresent. 
 
 5. Concurrent or corroborative tes- 
 
 timony. 
 
 6. Circumstantial evidence — To sus- 
 
 tain conviction must exclude 
 every rational hypothesis ex- 
 cept that of guilt. 
 
 7. Circumstantial evidence to prove 
 
 corpus delicti in trial for 
 homicide. 
 
 8. Distinction between civil and 
 
 criminal proceedings as re- 
 gards relevancy and manner 
 of proof. 
 
 9. The weight of evidence — Rules 
 in civil and criminal cases dis- 
 tinguished — Reasonable doubt. 
 
 10. Difficulty of defining reasonable 
 
 doubt. 
 
 11. Demonstration and belief be- 
 
 yond a reasonable doubt dis- 
 tinguished. 
 
 12. Attempted definitions of reason- 
 
 able doubt. 
 
 13. Precaution to be employed in de- 
 
 fining reasonable doubt. 
 
 14. Doctrine of reasonable doubt ap- 
 
 plicable to misdemeanors as 
 well as to felonies. 
 
 15. Reasonable doubt in the mind of 
 
 one juror. 
 
 16. Statutory changes in rules of 
 
 evidence and modes of pro- 
 cedure. 
 i6a. Number of witnesses required 
 and positive and negative evi- 
 dence. 
 
 § 1. Necessity for rules of evidence in judicial proceedings. — That 
 the major part of the knowledge which is possessed l)y any indi- 
 vidual is derived wholly from information imparted to him by 
 others is a truism. In other words the facts which constitute the 
 starting point in the search for truth in any sphere of investigation 
 are usually furnished to the mind through other channels than 
 
 (I)
 
 g 2 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 2 
 
 observation or experience. This is particularly the case in the 
 judicial investigation of crime, by means of trial by jury, for the 
 fact that any person has a knowledge of the facts of the crime is 
 sufficient to disqualify him as a juror. So, too, the jurors are 
 sworn to render a verdict upon the evidence alone, and if any one 
 of them knows anything of his own knowledge he must be sworn 
 as a witness. 
 
 We must recognize the fact that the disposition to believe, that 
 is, to rely upon what others tell us, is inherent, and persists until 
 we become incredulous, and learn to distrust the statements of our 
 fellows because we may have been so frequently deceived by 
 them. For at a very early period in life we learn, because of the 
 falsehoods uttered to us, or to others in our hearing, that an 
 urgent necessity exists for the discovery of principles, and the 
 creation and use of rules, by which the truth of what is said may 
 be separated from the false. Hence, the necessity and importance 
 of rules of evidence which will facilitate the ascertainment of 
 truth. 
 
 Besides the technical rules which regulate the science of judi- 
 cial evidence and the production and employment of testimony in 
 court, other well-known principles of general application in every- 
 day life exist which are commonly employed in ascertaining the 
 truth. These we must now consider. 
 
 § 2. Elements of probability and improbability as affecting the 
 proof of facts and circumstances. — The truth of any statement of 
 fact may be considered from the standpoint of the probability or 
 improbability of the fact per se. Its probability or improbability 
 is to be measured by the degree with which the fact stated accords 
 with the general experience of mankind. If the new fact is in 
 accord with other facts which are a part of the sum total of our 
 knowledge, we say it is probable, and less evidence, or evidence 
 of a less satisfactory character, is required to convince us of its 
 truth than when the new fact is wholly unlike anything in our 
 experience. Thus, we may readily believe that a man is dead if 
 it be proved that he has had a knife thrust through his heart, 
 from our knowledge of the physiological functions of that organ 
 and the mortal character of such a wound. 
 
 The confirmation of the truth of a statement of fact by means
 
 3 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. § 3 
 
 of knowledge already possessed will vary according to the na- 
 ture of the new fact and the situation of the individual. So a 
 statement involving a scientific discovery or invention, as, for 
 example, that oral communication can be had by telephone be- 
 tween persons w'ho are hundreds of miles apart, will be regarded 
 as extremely probable or as utterly absurd, according as it is 
 made to a well-educated man or to an illiterate savage. If the 
 new fact is utterly irreconcilable, not only with the experience 
 and knowledge already possessed by us, but with the known laws 
 that govern the operation of the physical universe, we say that 
 it is impossible, that it cannot be true. The dividing line between 
 the possible and the probable is difficult of ascertainment. It 
 wavers according to the general comprehension of the rules which 
 regulate the physical universe and the mutations of human affairs. 
 So that new facts which now seem utterly impossible^ may, in the 
 light of a fuller investigation and knowledge of natural law^s, be 
 regarded merely as improbable. 
 
 So if it should be asserted as a fact that an idiot or an imbecile, 
 wdiile absolutely devoid of mental capacity, had successfully 
 demonstrated an abstruse scientific problem, the impossibility that 
 such a statement was true would cause its immediate rejection. 
 If, however, it were asserted that an idiot had, after a surgical 
 operation, manifested a limited degree of mental power, we would 
 not, in view of the wonderful modern development of surgical 
 science, regard such an assertion as impossible, though it may be 
 highly improbable. A statement affirming a fact which is im- 
 possible is absolutely incredible, and no testimony can make us 
 believe it. But the mere possibility of an event does not render a 
 statement credible except so far as its probability appears upon a 
 comparison w^ith our experience. So it is possible for a very 
 strong man to lift a barrel of merchandise w^eighing several hun- 
 dred pounds. But the statement that a person of ordinary strength 
 had stolen a barrel containing four hundred pounds of lead, and 
 had, without any means of conveyance, carried the same half a 
 mile, is so improbable that no sane man would believe it.^ 
 
 § 3. The character and mental capacity of a witness as relating to 
 the credibility of his testimony. — Our knowledge that a witness 
 
 a See Elliott Ev., § 2708, et seq.
 
 g 3 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 4 
 
 habitually tells the truth is a most important element in forming 
 our estimate of the credibility of his evidence. For this reason it 
 is always permissible to show that a witness is reputed to be un- 
 truthful or immoral among those who know him best, and by such 
 an attack upon his character for veracity, morality the credibility 
 of his evidence may be impeached. And the same principle is at 
 the basis of impeachment by proving contradictory statements. 
 
 An habitual respect for truth, while very important, is but one 
 element in credibility. It is necessary that the witness should pos- 
 sess adecjuate mental capacity to comprehend the facts to which 
 he is testifying. He should also have had a reasonably good op- 
 portunity for observation and should have directed his attention 
 to the facts in question. Because of the absence of fully developed 
 mental powers, the evidence of infants and weak-minded or in- 
 sane persons, while no longer incompetent, is only credible so far 
 as their mental capacity is commensurate with the facts seen and 
 testified to by them.^ 
 
 The memory of a witness must also be considered. Some per- 
 sons have a good memory for abstract principles, while finding 
 it extremely difficult, and often impossible, to recollect facts, 
 figures or faces. Others have a good verbal memory, which re- 
 tains accurately and fully the language of others. With the great 
 majority of persons, however, the memory is chiefly concerned 
 with and exercised upon the common events and incidents of their 
 own experience ; or of the experience of others with whom they 
 have maintained social or business relations. Hence, it follows 
 that facts which most affect the personal interests of the witness 
 will make the deepest impression on his memory, and his mind 
 will be most active and retentive of that knowledge the recollec- 
 tion of which will be of the greatest advantage to him. 
 
 In this connection it may be noted that the vividness of the 
 recollection of an event is in proportion to its proximity in point 
 of time as well as its personal importance in relation to the wit- 
 ness. So where the trial takes place many years after the commis- 
 sion of a crime, the facts that the chief prosecuting witness was a 
 
 ^Post, § 202; Elliott Ev., § 272T. 802; necessity of instructions as to 
 For comprehensive note on circum- law of circumstantial evidence, see 
 stantial evidences, see 97 Am. St. 771- 69 L. R. A. I93-2I7-
 
 5 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. § 4 
 
 young child at the date of the crime and that the other witnesses 
 for the state are now very old are to be considered by the jury." 
 
 § 4. The motive of the witness to misrepresent. — Though we may 
 have been repeatedly deceived by the misrepresentations of others, 
 we find, by experience, that men, as a rule, tell the truth. Where 
 neither prejudice nor passion exists, and where the individual has 
 no private or personal interests to advance by distorting the truth, 
 we may rely upon the credibility of his testimony, if it is probable 
 and if we know him to be an intelligent man, possessing adequate 
 powers and opportunities for acquiring knowledge. The entire 
 absence of all motive to give false testimony justifies an assump- 
 tion that his testimony is true, for sane men do not usually act 
 without motive, and will not ordinarily violate the principles of 
 truth without some object in doing so, particularly if they are 
 questioned under oath, with the fear of punishment for perjury 
 before their eyes. Accordingly, in the case of persons, such as 
 police and private detectives and others engaged in the detection 
 of crime, or expert witnesses who testify under pay,^ wdio, from 
 their professional occupation, character, or position, are inclined 
 to take prejudiced or distorted view^s of human nature, it will re- 
 quire a high degree of credibility in the evidence to satisfy the 
 mind of an impartial hearer. 
 
 On the other hand, where no motive can be imagined strong 
 enough to prompt the witness to make a false statement, and 
 where all motives that exist in his bosom prompt him to tell the 
 truth, we have every reason to accept his evidence as credible, 
 irrespective of the poor opinion we may have of his veracity under 
 circumstances where he would have a motive to misrepresent the 
 truth. 
 
 Again, our belief in the truthfulness of a witness is confirmed 
 when we find him narrating incidents which we have ourselves 
 observed, when placed in similar circumstances. On the other 
 hand, he may relate minor incidents which, being credible and 
 probable, as well as consistent with the main facts, are so startling 
 
 " People V. Hancock, 7 Utah 170, 25 cause in which they are embarked 
 
 Pac. 1093. that hardly any weight should be 
 
 ^"Skilled witnesses come with such given to their evidence." Tracy, hire, 
 
 a bias on their minds to support the 10 CI. & F. 154, 191.
 
 8 5 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. O 
 
 and original that, considering- his mental capacity, they could not 
 have been invented by him. 
 
 § 5. Concurrent or corroborative testimony. — The confidence we 
 place in the testimony of a witness may be increased or diminished 
 by the concurrence of his testimony with that of others. If the 
 testimony of other witnesses to the same facts, or to facts calcu- 
 lated to produce as evidence the same results, is credible in itself, 
 consistent with the testimony first offered, and the character of 
 the witnesses is not impeached, the corroboration, in the absence 
 of collusion, is almost conclusive. The same result is effected 
 where the evidence of one witness is confirmed by that of another 
 witness to the same facts, and it also appears that the witnesses 
 are hostile to each other and hence actuated by different motives. 
 Here the relations of both witnesses to the issue are so diametri- 
 cally opposed that collusion is absolutely impossible. 
 
 No witness can fairly be expected to remember all the details 
 of any transaction, and if he claims to do so suspicion is quickly 
 aroused. But where he unintentionally omits details which are 
 supplied by other witnesses, or where he apparently contradicts 
 other witnesses on minor points and the contradiction is fully 
 reconcilable by any one who possesses a full knowledge of the 
 whole subject or transaction, his hearers may well feel justified 
 in believing that his narrative is trustworth}^ because wholly un- 
 premeditated and unfabricated by him. 
 
 Another element affecting the credibility of evidence is found 
 in the frequent occurrence of undesigned coincidences, which, 
 though sometimes startling and unexpected, are unaccountable 
 except upon the hypothesis that the narrative, of which they form 
 a part, is true. No event stands alone. It is the result of others 
 which precede it. It may in its turn be the fruitful cause of many 
 others which follow or relate to it. So every fact or circumstance 
 is connected with others of a collateral nature, rendering it well 
 nigh impossible for any one to concoct a narrative which, upon 
 comparison with other and related circumstances, will stand the 
 test. Even by comparing the various parts of the story, a mind 
 trained in the habit of investigation may quickly ascertain the 
 truth or falsity of the narrative ; for, in such a case, the fabrica- 
 tion, however skillfully constructed, will crumble to pieces by 
 reason of its inherent lack of verity.
 
 7 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. § 
 
 Again, the well-recognized connection often observed between 
 collateral or subordinate facts which are proved or admitted and 
 the main fact in issue frequently furnishes most cogent and satis- 
 factory proof of the existence of the latter. This is only applying 
 to the law of evidence the principles of inductive reasoning, which 
 are used, often unconsciously, by all men in the conduct of their 
 most trivial as well as of their most important affairs. Such a 
 process furnishes a basis for the division of evidence into direct 
 and circumstantial. Direct evidence of the crime is the evidence 
 of an eye-witness that it was committed. This includes in crim- 
 inal law, the confessions and admissions of the accused and dying 
 declarations. Circumstantial evidence consists of facts proved 
 from which the jury may infer by a process of reasoning or in- 
 ference that the accused committed the crime. The application of 
 the principles of reasoning allows the jury to draw inferences or 
 presumptions, of fact from other facts which are proved to their 
 complete satisfaction. On the other hand, the rules of circum- 
 stantial evidence have opened the door for presumptions of law, 
 which are only presumptions of fact that have, from frequent re- 
 currence, become rules of law.* 
 
 § 6. Circumstantial evidence — To sustain conviction must exclude 
 every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. — The necessity of fre- 
 quent resort to circumstantial evidence to prove guilt in criminal 
 
 *"A1I evidence is, in a strict sense, credibility of witnesses. The mind 
 
 more or less circumstantial ; whether may be reluctant to conclude upon the 
 
 consisting of facts which permit the issue of guilt in criminal cases upon 
 
 inference of guilt, or whether given evidence which is not direct, and yet, 
 
 by eye-witnesses; for the testimony if the facts brought out, taken to- 
 
 of eye-witnesses is based upon cir- gether, all point in the one direction 
 
 cumstances more or less distinctly of guilt, and to the exclusion of any 
 
 and directly observed. But, of course, other hypothesis there is no substan- 
 
 there is a difference between evidence tial reason for reluctance. Purely cir- 
 
 consisting in facts of a peculiar na- cumstantial evidence may be often 
 
 ture, and hence giving rise_ to pre- more satisfactory and a safer form 
 
 sumptions, and evidence which is di- of evidence, for it must rest upon 
 
 rect as consisting in the positive facts which must tend collectively to 
 
 testimony of witnesses, and the dif- establish the guilt of the accused." 
 
 ference is material according to the Gray, J., in People v. Harris, 136 N. 
 
 degree of exactness and relevancy, the Y. 423, 428, 33 N. E. 65. 
 weight of the circumstances and the
 
 § 6 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 8 
 
 proceedings is apparent in the very nature of things. Whenever 
 it is possible the criminal will endeavor to perform his nefarious 
 deeds in secrecy, and where no eye-witnesses are present to behold 
 him. So he will choose the time and occasion which are most 
 favorable to concealment, and sedulously scheme to render detec- 
 tion impossible. Circumstantial evidence alone is enough to sup- 
 port a verdict of guilty of the most heinous crime, provided the 
 jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty 
 upon the evidence.^ No greater degree of certainty in proof is re- 
 quired where the evidence is all circumstantial than where it is di- 
 rect, for in either case the jury must be convinced of the prisoner's 
 guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.^ They are bound by their oath 
 to render a verdict upon all the evidence, and the law makes no 
 distinction between direct evidence of a fact and evidence of cir- 
 cumstances from which the existence of the fact may be inferred.'^ 
 
 ° Carlton v. People, 150 111. 181, 187, 
 'i'j N. E. 244, 41 Am. St. 346; State 
 V. Atkinson, 40 S. Car. 363, 18 S. 
 E. 1021, 42 Am. St. 877; People v. 
 Cronin, 34 Cal. 191, 202; People v. 
 Daniels (Cal.), 34 Pac. 233; State v. 
 Hunter, 50 Kan. 302, 304, 32 Pac. 2)7 \ 
 State V. Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 495, 21 
 S. W. 193; State V. Slingerland, 19 
 Nev. 135, 141, 7 Pac. 280; State v. 
 Elsham, 70 Iowa 531, 31 N. W. 66; 
 State V. Moelchen, 53 Iowa 310, 5 N. 
 W. 186; Epps V. State, 102 Ind. 539, 
 554, I N. E. 491 ; Griffin v. State, 2 
 Ga. App. 534, 58 S. E. 781; Murphy 
 V. State, 118 Ga. 780, 45 S. E. 609; 
 Commonwealth v. Sheffer, 218 Pa. 
 437, d'j Atl. 761 ; Vernon v. United 
 States, 146 Fed. 121, 76 C. C. A. 547; 
 Oakley v. State, 135 Ala. 29, 2>2, So. 
 693; Martin v. State, 125 Ala. 64, 28 
 So. 92; People V. Hiltel, 131 Cal. 577, 
 63 Pac. 919; State v. Evans, i Marv. 
 (Del.) 477, 41 Atl. 136; Andrews v. 
 State, 116 Ga. 83, 42 S. E. 476; State 
 V. Hunter, 50 Kan. 302, 32 Pac. Z7', 
 Thomas v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 20 
 S. W. 226, 14 Ky. L. 288; Cunning- 
 
 ham V. State, 56 Neb. 691, "/y X. W. 
 60; State V. Atkinson, 40 S. Car. 363, 
 18 S. E. 1021, 42 Am. St. 877; Bill v. 
 State, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 155. Direct 
 and circumstantial evidence differ 
 merely in their logical relation to the 
 fact in issue. Evidence as to the ex- 
 istence of the fact is direct. Circum- 
 stantial evidence is composed of facts 
 which raise a logical inference as to 
 the existence of the fact in issue. A 
 conviction may well be had upon cir- 
 cumstantial evidence, but to warrant 
 such conviction the proven facts must 
 not only be consistent with the hy- 
 pothesis of guilt, but must clearly and- 
 satisfactorily exclude every other rea- 
 sonable hypothesis save that of guilt. 
 United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 803. 
 
 * Though circumstantial evidence is 
 often the most satisfactory and con- 
 vincing that can be produced, the 
 convincing effect that follows from 
 positive evidence is not necessarily 
 expected. State v. Levy, 9 Idaho 483, 
 75 Pac. 227. 
 
 ^ Spraggins v. State, 139 Ala. 93, 35 
 So. 1000. "A fact has the sense of
 
 9 CIRCUMSTAXTIAL EVIDENCE AXD REASONABLE DOUBT. § 6 
 
 Hence a prejudice against circumstantial evidence may be suffi- 
 cient to disqualify a person who entertains it from serving as a 
 member of the jury.^ But to sustain a verdict founded on circum- 
 stances not directly proving a crime, the circumstances themselves 
 must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury. The danger that 
 the jurors, unused to logical mental processes, may assume as 
 proved circumstances in support of which the evidence is wholly 
 or partially inadequate, is always present. It has been often said 
 that witnesses may lie, but that circumstances never do. It should 
 not be forgotten, however, that the circumstances from which 
 guilt may be inferred must be proved by the direct evidence of 
 witnesses who saw them, and that such witnesses may misrepre- 
 sent or forget, or be mistaken as to the circumstances they tes- 
 tify to. 
 
 The first duty of the jury is to determine carefully upon all the 
 testimony as stated by the witnesses whether the incriminating 
 circumstances, from which they may infer guilt, are proved, be- 
 yond a reasonable doubt.'' No general rule can or should be laid 
 down as to what constitutes proof of circumstances in any par- 
 ticular case. Each case is a rule unto itself, and is to be deter- 
 mined upon its peculiar circumstances. But all the circumstances 
 as proved must be consistent with each other, and, taken together, 
 they must point surely and unerringly in the direction of guilt. 
 
 and is equivalent to a truth or that 65; State v. McKay (N. Car.), 63 S*. 
 
 which is real. It is in the ingenious E. 1059. Circumstantial evidence is 
 
 combination of facts that they may admissible, though there are ej^e-wit- 
 
 be made to deceive or to express nesses to the crime. Commonwealth 
 
 what is not the truth. In the evidence v. Karamarkovic, 218 Pa. 405, 67 Atl. 
 
 of eye-witnesses to prove the facts of 650; State v. Ryder, 80 Vt. 422, 68 
 
 an occurrence, we are not guaran- Atl. 652; State v. Tyre (Del.), 67 
 
 teed against mistake and falsehood, Atl. 199; State v. Cephus (Del.), 67 
 
 or the distortion of truth by exagger- Atl. 150; Tatum v. State, i Ga. 
 
 ation or prejudice, but when we are App. 778, 57 S. E. 956; Riley v. 
 
 dealing with a number of established State, i Ga. App. 651, 57 S. E. 1031; 
 
 facts, if, upon arranging, examining State v. Samuels (Del.), 67 Atl. 164. 
 and weighing them in our mind, we * State v. Leabo, 89 Mo. 247, 252, I 
 
 reach only the conclusion of guilt, S. W. 288; Cluverius v. Common- 
 
 the judgment rests upon pillars as wealth, 81 Va. 787, 794, 795 ; State v. 
 
 substantial and as sound as though West, 69 Mo. 401, 33 Am. 506. 
 resting upon the testimony of eye- "Jenkins v. State, 62 Wis. 49, 21 
 
 witnesses." Gray, J., in People v. N. W. 232. 
 Harris, 136 N. Y. 423, 429, 33 N. E.
 
 § 6 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 lO 
 
 All the facts and circumstances taken together as proved must 
 not only be consistent with the inference that the accused is guilty, 
 but they must at the same time be inconsistent with the hypothesis 
 that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis." 
 
 AVhere the only incriminating evidence for the prosecution is 
 circumstantial, it is the duty of the court to instruct upon the 
 
 "State V. Johnson, 19 Iowa 230; 
 State V. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 
 571, 32 Atl. 137; Echols V. State, 81 
 Ga. 696, 699, 8 S. E. 443; Green v. 
 State, 51 Ark. 189, 10 S. W. 266; 
 Findley v. State, S Blackf. (Ind.) 
 576, 579, 36 Am. Dec. 557; James v. 
 State, 45 Miss. 572, 575 ; State v. As- 
 bell, 57 Kan. 398, 46 Pac. 770; People 
 V. Ward, 105 Gal. 335, 38 Pac. 945; 
 State V. David, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 
 28; Jones V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. App. 
 490, 30 S. W. 1059; State V. Avery, 
 113 Mo. 475, 495, 21 S. W. 193; State 
 V. Miller, 100 Mo. 606, 626, 13 S. W. 
 832, 1051 ; Gommonwealth v. Good- 
 win, 14 Gray (Mass.) 55; Chitister 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. App. 635, 638, 28 
 S. W. 683; State V. Hunter, 50 Kan. 
 302, 306, 32 Fac. 37; Kennedy v. 
 State, 31 Fla. 428, 12 So. 858; State 
 V. Davenport, 38 S. Car. 348, 352, 17 
 S. E. 37; Carlton v. People, 150 111. 
 181, 37 X. E. 244, 41 Am. St. 346; 
 Gannon v. People, 127 111. 507, 521, 
 21 N. E. 525, II Am. St. 147; Com- 
 monwealth V. Costley, 118 Mass. i; 
 Coleman v. People, 26 Fla. 61, 71, 7 
 So. 367; Lancaster v. State, 91 Tenn. 
 267, 18 S. W. 777; State V. Keeler, 
 28 Iowa 551, 553 ; People v. Foley, 64 
 Mich. 148, 31 N. W. 94; Wright v. 
 State, 21 Neb. 496, 32 N. W. 576; 
 People V. Aiken, 66 ]\Iich. 460, 33 N. 
 W. 821, II Am. St. 512; Cavender v. 
 State, 126 Ind. 47, 48, 35 N. E. 875; 
 United States v. Reder, 69 Fed. 965; 
 Hamilton v. State, 96 Ga. 301, 22 S. 
 
 E. 528; Smith V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 618, 33 S. W. 339, 34 S. W. 960; 
 Howard v. State, 108 Ala. 571, 18 So. 
 813; Wantland v. State, 14S Ind. 38, 
 43 N. E. 931 ; State v. Hart, 94 
 Iowa 749, 64 N. W. 278; Webb v. 
 State, 73 Miss. 456, 19 So. 238; Bal- 
 dez V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 413, 35 
 S. W. 664; State V. Moxley, 102 Mo. 
 374, 14 S. W. 969; People V. Shuler, 
 28 Cal. 490, 496; Morgan v. State, 51 
 Neb. 672, 71 N. W. 788; Sherrill v. 
 State, 138 Ala. 3, 35 So. 129; Neilson 
 V. State, 40 So. 221, 146 Ala. 683 (not 
 reported in full) ; Duckworth v. 
 State, 83 Ark. 192, 103 S. W. 601; 
 State V. Tilghman (Del.), 63 Atl. 772; 
 State V. Emorj-, 5 Penn. (Del.) 126, 
 58 Atl. 1036; Mangum v. State, — 
 Ga. App. — , 63 S. E. 543; Long v. 
 State, — Ga. App. — ,62 S. E. 711; 
 Campbell v. State, 123 Ga. 533, 51 
 S. E. 644; State v. Sweizewski, 73 
 Kan. 733, 85 Pac. 800; State v. Ter- 
 rio, 98 Me. 17, 56 Atl. 217; State v. 
 Psycher, 179 Mo. 140, 77 S, W. 836; 
 State V. Francis, 199 Mo. 671, 98 S. 
 W. 11; State V. Morney, 196 Mo. 43, 
 93 S. W. 1 1 17; Shumway v. State, 
 — Neb. — , 117 N. W. 407; Sweet v. 
 State, 75 Neb. 263, 106 N, W. 31; 
 State V. Hutchings, 30 Utah 319, 84 
 Pac. 893 ; Schwantes v. State, 127 
 Wis. 160, 106 N. W. 237; State v. 
 Abbott, — W. Va. — , 62 S. E. 693 ; 
 State V. Trail, 59 W. Va. 175, 53 S. 
 E. 17; United States v. Cole, 153 Fed. 
 801 ; United States v. Breese, 131 Fed.
 
 I I CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. § 6 
 
 nature of circumstantial evidence and upon the rules of law regu- 
 lating it.^^ 
 
 If, however, there is some direct evidence in the case for the 
 state which would be sufficient, if believed by the jury, to show 
 the prisoner's guilt, an instruction on circumstantial evidence need 
 not be given, though there be circumstantial evidence in the case/^ 
 
 For example, if the confession of the accused is direct evidence 
 of his guilt an instruction on circumstantial evidence is not re- 
 quired. ^^ 
 
 An instruction that circumstantial evidence must be clear, con- 
 vincing and conclusive, excluding all rational doubt as to the 
 prisoner's guilt, and that from the material and necessary circum- 
 
 915; Bryant v. State, 116 Ala. 445, 23 
 So. 40; Medley v. State, — Ala. — , 
 47 So. 218; Thayer v. State, 138 Ala, 
 39, 35 So. 406; Bones v. State, 117 
 Ala. 138, 23 So. 138. The rule of the 
 text is applied to the facts which are 
 found by the jury after they have 
 heard the evidence for and against 
 the accused and determined what is 
 true and what is untrue. It should 
 be applied not to the items of evi- 
 dence themselves, as these are given 
 by the witness. State v. Kidwell, 62 
 W. Va. 466, 59 S. E. 494. The state 
 is not restricted to direct proof of the 
 date of the offense. Taylor v. State, 
 62 S. E. 1048; Elliott Ev., § 2709. 
 
 " Gilmore v. State, 99 Ala. 154, 13 
 So. 536; Jones v. State, 105 Ga. 649, 
 31 S. E. 574; State v. Cohen, 108 
 Iowa 208, 78 N. W. 857, 75 Am. St. 
 213. 
 
 ^- Welch V. State, 124 Ala. 41, 27 
 So. 307; Vaughan v. State, 57 Ark. 
 I, 20 S. W. 588; People V. Burns, 121 
 Cal. 529, 53 Pac. 1096; Langdon v. 
 People, T33 111. 382, 408, 24 N. E. 874 ; 
 State V. Mitchell (Iowa), 116 N. W. 
 808; State V. Robinson, 117 Mo. 649, 
 663, 23 S. W. 1066 ; State v. Donnelly, 
 130 Mo. 642, 32 S. W. 1124; Purvis 
 V. State, 71 Miss. 706, 14 So. 268; 
 
 State V. Wooley, — Mo. — , 115 S. 
 W. 417; State V. Calder, 2^ Mont. 
 504, 59 Pac. 903 ; Barnards v. State, 
 88 Tenn. 183, 12 S. W. 431 ; Granado 
 v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 426, 35 S. 
 W. 1069; Ellis V. State, Z3 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 86, 87, 24 S. W. 894; White v. 
 State, 2>2 Tex. Cr. App. 625, 25 S. W. 
 784; Wampler v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 352, 353, 13 S. W. 144- 
 
 " Green v. State, 97 Ala. 59, 12 So. 
 416, IS So. 242; Perry v. State, no 
 Ga. 234, 36 S. E. 781 ; State v. Robin- 
 son, 117 Mo. 649, 2Z S. W. 1066; 
 Mathews v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. App. 
 98, 51 S. W. 915. "Despite the fact 
 that inferences drawn from circum- 
 stances may be and often are errone- 
 ous, circumstantial evidence may be, 
 and in many cases is, as conclusive 
 and convincing as the direct and posi- 
 tive testimony of eye-witnesses. 
 Where it is strong and satisfactory to 
 the jurors it is their duty to act on it. 
 They should give it its just and fair 
 weight, and if upon a candid, careful 
 and guarded judgment of all the cir- 
 cumstances proved they are convinced 
 of the guilt of the accused it is their 
 duty to convict him. Tliey may not 
 go outside of the facts and circum- 
 stances proved to fancy others which
 
 § 7 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 12 
 
 Stances his guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, 
 is correct/* 
 
 An instruction that before the accused can be convicted upon 
 circumstantial evidence alone the facts must form a complete 
 chain and point to his guilt and must be irreconcilable with any 
 reasonable theory of his innocence, and that the facts must be 
 such as to exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but that 
 of his guilt, is a sufficient charge on the law of circumstantial 
 evidence/^ 
 
 § 7. Circumstantial evidence to prove corpus delicti in trial for 
 homicide. — The rule seems at one time to have prevailed that- a 
 conviction could not be sustained, so far as a charge of homicide 
 was concerned, unless the corpus delicti was proved by direct evi- 
 dence, which in such case necessitated the finding of the victim's 
 body.^'' As an objection of considerable force it has been urged 
 that this rule offers a premium on homicide by proclaiming to 
 assassins that they will be safe from punishment if they shall suc- 
 ceed in utterly destroying the corpses of their victims by fire or 
 chemicals, or by sinking them to a great depth in the ocean, so 
 that they cannot be identified by direct evidence.^'^ 
 
 may point to his innocence, but are 274. The expression corpus delicti 
 
 to base the verdict upon the reason- has been somewhat loosely employed 
 
 able inferences drawn from the cir- to mean two separate and distinct 
 
 cumstances proven that reasonable things. In its original and primary 
 
 men would entertain. If all infer- sense, it means the fact that a 
 
 ences thus made are consistent with crime has been committed and is 
 
 the guilt of the prisoner and incon- thus defined by Webster's Dictionary 
 
 sistent with his innocence, then they and in Starkey on Evidence, § 575. 
 
 must convict him." State v. Elsham, The fact that a crime has been com- 
 
 70 Iowa 531, 31 N. W. 66. mitted is usually not so much a fact 
 
 ^* State V. Wilcox, 132 N. Car. 1 120, as an inference from other facts 
 
 44 S. E. 625. which are divided into two classes, 
 
 ^® State v. Sharpless, 212 ]\Io. 176, the first of which is the facts ccnsti- 
 
 III S. W. 69. tuting the circumstances or event 
 
 ^^2 Hale P. C. 290; Rex v. Burdett, aside from any personal agency in it, 
 
 4 B. & Aid. 95. and second, the existence of a crimi- 
 
 " United States v. Gibert, 2 Sum. nal and personal agency or element. 
 
 (U. S.) 19, 27, 25 Fed. Cas. 15204; People v. Jones, 123 Cal. 65, 55 Pac. 
 
 State V. Williams, 7 Jones (N. Car.) 698; Pitts v. State, 43 Miss. 472; Ru- 
 
 446, 454, 78 Am. Dec. 248n; State v. lofif v. People, 18 N. Y. 179. Beside 
 
 Westcott, 130 Iowa i, 104 N. W. 341 ; this and particularly in relation to 
 
 Miles V. State, 129 Ga. 589, 59 S. E. the crime of homicide, the words
 
 13 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. § 7 
 
 There are many cases, however, which do not require such 
 direct and strict proof of corpus delicti, but allow it to be proved 
 by circumstantial evidence if sufficiently clear and cogent to con- 
 vince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt in connection with the 
 oth^r evidence/^ 
 
 This would be the case where it is proved by direct evidence 
 that the body of the person murdered had been thrown overboard 
 and never subsequently recovered ;^^ or where the body has been 
 wholly or partly consumed by fire."** 
 
 Such cases may, however, be regarded as exceptions to the 
 general rule which is applicable and usually, if direct evidence 
 exists of the death of the victim of the homicide, it will be re- 
 quired."^ 
 
 A broader, more accurate and more inclusive statement of the 
 general rule would be that the corpus delicti of homicide must be 
 proved either by showing that the party alleged to have been 
 killed is actually dead by proof of the finding and identifying his 
 corpse, or by showing that the murder was accomplished or ac- 
 companied by the employment of violence in such a manner as to 
 sufficiently account for the disappearance of the body and render 
 
 have required a secondary meaning: S.) S7in; Schwantes v. State, 127 
 
 Then they mean the dead body or Wis. 160, 106 N. W. 237. A statute 
 
 remains of the victim of the homi- which requires direct proof of the 
 
 cide. It is in the secondary sense death of a person alleged to have 
 
 that the word is used in the text and been killed does not exclude evidence 
 
 in the cases which are cited to sup- of circumstances indicating identity, 
 
 port it. See Burrill Law Dictionary; People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. no, 16 
 
 Wharton's Crim. Evid., § 325, and N. E. 529, 4 Am. St. 423, or evidence 
 
 Burrill on Circumstantial Evidence of resemblance of features between 
 
 119. a mutilated body which was found 
 
 ^^ Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580, and the person alleged to have been 
 
 52 N. W. 778; Rex v. Burdett, 4 B. killed. People v. Beckwith, 108 N. 
 
 & Aid. 95 ; Lightf oot v. State, 20 Tex. Y. 67, 15 N. E. 53. 
 
 App. 77-100; Johnson v. Common- ^"United States v. Williams, i Cliff, 
 
 wealth, 81 Ky. 325; State v. Dineen, (U. S.) 5, 28 Fed. Cas. 16707. 
 
 ID Minn. 407 : State v. Keeler, 28 -° State v. Barnes, 47 Ore. 592, 85 
 
 Iowa 551, 553; Anderson v. State, 20 Pac. 998, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) i8in. 
 
 Fla. 381; State v. Davidson, 30 Vt. ^People v. Alviso, 55 Cal. 230; 
 
 377, 73 Am. Dec. 312; State v. Wil- State v. Williams, 7 Jones (N. Car.) 
 
 Hams, 7 Jones (N. Car.) 446, 453, 78 446, 453, 78 Am. Dec. 248n; McCuI- 
 
 Am. Dec. 248n : State v. Gillis, 7^ S. loch v. State, 48 Ind. 109. 
 Car. 318, 53 S. E. 487, 5 L. R. A. (N.
 
 § 8 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. I4 
 
 direct evidence of its whereabouts or appearance impossible to be 
 obtained. So it has been held in a case of homicide where the 
 body of the victim was destroyed that it was not necessary to 
 prove, beyond a doubt, the precise means by which his death was 
 produced."" 
 
 The evidence of an accomplice is always admissible to prove 
 the corpus delicti of homicide and if it is corroborated, even by 
 the confession of the accused, it may be sufficient.-^ 
 
 But in every case of homicide, if a body is found or if any re- 
 mains are found, they must be identified as those of the victim. 
 The disappearance of the person supposed to have been killed 
 vv'ith circumstantial evidence of the guilt of the accused, will not 
 sustain a conviction if the body is not identified."'* 
 
 § 8. Distinction between civil and criminal proceedings as regards 
 relevancy and manner of proof. — It has been remarked, both by the 
 writers of text-books and in the adjudications, that "there is no 
 difference in the rules of evidence between civil and criminal 
 cases ; what may be received in the one may be received in the 
 other ; what is rejected in the one will be rejected in the other.""^ 
 And such a rule would seem to be not only just and logical, but 
 necessary when we consider that the sole object of evidence is the 
 ascertainment of truth ; in other words, that every species of evi- 
 dence is merely a means towards an end, and that end the estab- 
 lishment or discovery of facts unknown or disputed. However 
 universal such a principle of uniformity may have been in the 
 
 " Smith V. Commonwealth, 21 Gratt. 609. Evidence of scars,' moles, con- 
 
 (Va.) 809, 820; Pitts V. State, 43 genital marks or those artificially 
 
 Miss. 472, 481 ; State v. Keeler, 28 made, as by tattooing, the color of 
 
 Iowa 551, 553; Lancaster v. State, 91 the hair and beard, the condition, 
 
 Tenn. 267, 18 S. W. 777', Ruloff v. number of and marks on the teeth. 
 
 People, 18 N. Y. 179; State v. Win- the measurement, weight and stature 
 
 ner, 17 Kan. 298; State v. Dickson, 78 of a person are always admissible to 
 
 Mo. 438; State v. Davidson, 30 Vt. identify a dead body. Lindsay v. 
 
 377, 386. 73 Am. Dec. 312; State v. People, 63 N. Y. 143. The body must 
 
 Barrington, 198 Mo. 23, 95 S. W. 235 ; be identified as that of the person 
 
 Schwantes v. State, 127 Wis. 160, 106 whose death is the subject of inquiry. 
 
 N. W. 237. See, also, post, § 338a. Wall v. State, — Ga. App. — , 6;^ S. 
 
 -'Follis V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. E. 27. 
 186, loi S. W. 242. ^ Rex V. Watson, 2 Stark. 104, 155. 
 
 *• Walker v. State, 14 Tex. App.
 
 15 CIRCUMSTAXTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT, § 8 
 
 early and formative period of the common law, it has long since 
 ceased to be so. The present tendency is to widen the margin or 
 borderland which lies between the domains of civil and criminal 
 jurisprudence so that criminal evidence differs from civil evidence, 
 not merely in the issues to which it is to be applied, but in the 
 manner in which it may be employed and the facts which may be 
 introduced. 
 
 In general the rules which regulate most of the various sub- 
 divisions into which the subject of evidence is divided, with the 
 exception of the weight of evidence, and the presumption of the 
 innocence of the accused, are substantially identical in both civil 
 and criminal proceedings. But there are exceptions to these rules 
 which must be considered. No general rule has ever been discov- 
 ered by which it is possible to determine in every case whether any 
 given fact is relevant or not. Usually one fact is relevant to prove 
 another when, by itself or in combination with other relevant 
 facts, it proves or renders probable the existence of the other. 
 The rules as to the relevancy of facts and as to the proof of rele- 
 vant facts are generally the same in criminal as in civil proceed- 
 ings. If it is essential to prove that A is dead the fact may be 
 proved in the same way in a criminal trial for his homicide as 
 in an action to recover for an insurance on his life. So a witness 
 who saw his dead body and knew it to be the body of A may tes- 
 tify orally to these facts. But some facts are relevant in criminal 
 proceedings which would not be received in a civil trial where the 
 same fact was in issue. For example, the fact that the accused is 
 reputed among his neighbors to be honest may be proved in a 
 criminal trial for theft, not only to reinforce the presumption of 
 innocence, but as affirmative evidence to prove that he did not 
 steal, while the state may prove his bad character for dishonesty 
 to show that it is extremely probable that he is a thief. 
 
 It need hardly be said that if the fact of larceny by the defend- 
 ant is in issue in a civil proceeding, his character as an honest 
 man or the reverse is not admissible. So, too, there are several 
 rules of evidence which are applicable exclusively to criminal pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 The first and most important of these exclusively criminal rules 
 is that under which every person who is charged with crime is 
 presumed to be innocent until his guilt is determined by the ver-
 
 § 9 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. l6 
 
 diet of a jury. Growing out of it, and always connected with it, 
 is the rule fixing the amount of evidence necessary in criminal 
 trials, and requiring that all the jurors shall be convinced of the 
 guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Other rules, pe- 
 culiar to criminal cases, admit confessions and dying declarations, 
 contrary to the general principle under which, in modern times, 
 hearsay evidence is uniformly rejected. 
 
 § 9. The weight of evidence — Rules in civil and criminal cases dis- 
 tinguished—Reasonable doubt. — In cases where civil rights alone 
 are involved extreme strictness of proof, as regards the weight 
 of the evidence, is never required. The jury may decide for either 
 party according to the probability and the weight of the evidence, 
 its cogency and the degree of credibility they may attach to it. 
 The verdict will be sustained, it matters not how contradictory the 
 evidence may be, so long as it is in favor of that litigant upon 
 whose side the facts proved preponderate. 
 
 In criminal cases the jury are not permitted to render a verdict 
 of guilty upon a mere preponderance of proof, but are required, 
 particularly where the evidence is circumstantial, or contradictory, 
 to be satisfied or convinced upon all the evidence beyond a reason- 
 able doubt that the accused is guilty. ^^ The rule that a preponder- 
 ance of evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict in a civil suit is 
 due partly to the fact that before any evidence is offered in behalf 
 of either litigant, no presumption is indulged in favor of either, 
 but mainly to the fact that the proof wall only result in a judg- 
 ment for pecuniary damages, or establish a civil right. 
 
 In a criminal trial the accused starts with a legal presumption 
 that he is innocent of the crime charged, which some authorities 
 regard as evidence in his favor and which must be overcome, in 
 addition to any evidence which he shall introduce in his own be- 
 half. So the reputation, the future livelihood, and career, and, 
 perhaps, even the life of the accused are involved, while in civil 
 cases any loss the party may sustain, however great, may usually 
 be retrieved by his future efforts. 
 
 § 10. Difficulty of defining reasonable doubt. — The meaning of 
 the term "reasonable doubt" has been the subject of a vast amount 
 
 ■*See §§ 11-15; Elliott Ev., § 2713.
 
 1/ CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOLTBT. ^11 
 
 of discussion, and innumerable attempts have been made to define 
 it. What a reasonable doubt is, does not seem easy of explanation. 
 The most learned jurists, who possessed unusual facility in the 
 use of language, have found it difficult to formulate or con- 
 vey to their own satisfaction the idea expressed by these words. 
 For the difficulty is not so much in understanding the meaning 
 of the words as in conveying their meaning to others.^' Many of 
 the cases point out the terseness and seeming simplicity of the 
 phrase and the inutility of attempting a definition which must 
 necessarily consist in a restatement of the proposition in a differ- 
 ent form of words, which are not any more easily understood,^^ 
 but which render the original expression more obscure and tend 
 to create doubts and confusion rather than to remove them. 
 
 § 11. Demonstration and belief beyond a reasonable doubt distin- 
 guished. — In the whole domain of knowledge, mathematical facts 
 alone are capable of that precise and logical demonstration which 
 absolutely convinces the mind and leaves no room for any doubt 
 whatever. So when one has solved a given problem in geometry 
 and has demonstrated the correctness of his solution by applying 
 to it the rules of that science, and the knowledge which he already 
 possesses, the certainty of the facts involved has been demon- 
 strated by a chain of facts and argument which must completely 
 convince the mind of every sane man. Such a demonstration not 
 only convinces the mind of the truth of a proposition or hypothe- 
 sis, but absolutely excludes the possibility that a contradictory or 
 inconsistent proposition is true. 
 
 But with inductive or inferential facts a very different prin- 
 
 " State V. Reed, 62 Me. 129, 142; from defect of knowledge, or of evi- 
 
 Elliott Ev., §§ 2706, 2707. For com- dence, and that a doubt of the guilt 
 
 prehensive note on reasonable doubt, of the accused, honestly entertained, 
 
 see 4 Am. St. 567; also 96 Am. St. is a reasonable doubt." People v. 
 
 210. Stubenvoll, 62 Mich. 329, 334, 28 N. 
 
 ^ "Language that is within the com- W. 883, and see also, Hamilton v. 
 
 prehension of persons of ordinary in- People, 29 Mich. 173, 194, 195; State 
 
 telligence can seldom be made plainer v. Reed, 62 Me. 129, 142, 145 ; Miles 
 
 by further definition or refining. All v. United States, 103 U. S. 304, 26 L. 
 
 persons who possess the qualifications ed. 481 ; State v. James, Z7 Conn. 355, 
 
 of jurors know that a doubt is a flue- 360; United States v. Harper, 2Z Fed. 
 
 tuation or uncertainty of mind arising 471, 483. 
 
 2 — UXDERHILL CrIM. Ev.
 
 8 12 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 15 
 
 ciple obtains. It is absolutely impossible as regards our knowl- 
 edge of human affairs derived from the testimony of witnesses to 
 have this sort of demonstrative certainty. Such facts cannot be 
 scientifically demonstrated to be true. We can be convinced only 
 beyond a reasonable doubt, or, in other words, we can have only 
 a moral certainty,^^ varying in degree and never absolute. 
 Whether we shall have any certainty at all as the result of our 
 consideration of the evidence depends upon various and compli- 
 cated circumstances.^''^ 
 
 Thus if the facts attested are in themselves probable, if the 
 witnesses called to prove them are of good repute and apparently 
 credible, their opportunities and capacity for observation good 
 and their evidence consistent or uncontradicted, we would have 
 a very high degree of certainty and any doubt would be unreason- 
 able and not justified by the circumstances. As the above elements 
 of belief diminish and disappear or become inoperative and the 
 evidence becomes contradictory or incredible, the presence of 
 doubts becomes manifest. If one is reasonably certain, and, a 
 fortiori, if .he is absolutely certain of the existence of a fact, he 
 cannot be reasonably doubtful, that is, he cannot have a reason- 
 able doubt. Where the evidence in support of a fact is equally 
 balanced by other evidence there can be no certainty. We say then 
 that there is a reasonable doubt of the existence of the fact, and if 
 the fact is the guilt of an accused person he is entitled to the bene- 
 fit of the doubt. 
 
 § 12. Attempted definitions of reasonable doubt. — The doubt of 
 the guilt of the prisoner to be a reasonable doubt must have some- 
 thing to rest upon. In other w'ords, it must be a substantial 
 doubt. It must arise from the evidence or from the lack of evi- 
 dence and it cannot be a reasonable doubt where it is based solely 
 on the arguments of counsel.^'' 
 
 Hence, an instruction that if a doubt is raised in the minds of 
 the jury by the evidence or by the ingenuity of counsel, that 
 doubt is decisive in favor of the prisoner may be refused. ^^ 
 
 ^ Jones V. State, lOO Ala. 88, 14 So. So. loii; State v. Lally, 2 Marv. 
 
 772. (Del.) 424, 43 Atl. 258. 
 
 ^a See remarks of the court in ^^ Strobhar v. State, 55 Fla. 167, 47 
 
 Giles V. State, 6 Ga. 276, 285. So. 4 ; United States v. Dexter, 154 
 
 ^"Walker v. State, 139 Ala. 56, 35 Fed. 890.
 
 19 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. § 12 
 
 The doubt to be reasonable must be such a one as an honest, 
 sensible and fair-minded man might, with reason, entertain con- 
 sistent with a conscientious desire to ascertain the truth.^^ A 
 vague conjecture or an inference of the possibility of the inno- 
 cence of the accused is not a reasonable doubt. A reasonable 
 doubt is one which arises from a consideration of all the evi- 
 dence in a fair and reasonable way. There must be a candid con- 
 sideration of all the evidence and if, after this candid considera- 
 tion is had by the jurors, there remains in their minds a convic- 
 tion of the guilt of the accused, then there is no room for a rea- 
 sonable doubt.^^ 
 
 A doubt is not reasonable that, in the face of overwhelming or 
 even strong evidence assumes that the accused may possibly be 
 innocent.^* 
 
 There must be sincerity and common sense as the basis for the 
 doubt and in this connection it may be said that the mental opera- 
 tions of all sane men are governed by the same rules, whether 
 they are in the jury box or out of it. The jurors ought to be con- 
 vinced as jurors by the same proof that would convince them as 
 men and upon which they would act in the management of their 
 own most important affairs and concerns. ^^ 
 
 On the other hand, the jurors should doubt as jurors what they 
 would doubt as men.®^ 
 
 If they have an abiding and conscientious conviction of the 
 prisoner's guilt after a candid consideration of all the facts which 
 
 '■State V. Stewart (Del.), 67 Atl. Ga. 276, 285; Arnold v. State, 23 Ind. 
 
 786. 170; State V. Dineen, 10 Minn. 407, 
 
 ^Dempsey v. State, 83 Ark. 81, 102 417; State v. Pierce, 65 Iowa 85, 89, 
 
 S. W. 704; State V. DiGuglielmo, 4 21 N. W. 195; McGuire v. People, 44 
 
 Penn. (Del.) 336, 55 Atl. 350. Mich. 286, 6 N. W. 669, 38 Am. 265; 
 
 ^ State V. Brinte, 4 Penn, (Del.) State v. Bridges, 29 Kan. 138; State 
 
 551, 58 Atl. 258. V. Kearley, 26 Kan. 77, 87; Stout v. 
 
 ''State V. Honey (Del.), 65 Atl, State, 90 Ind. i, 12; Toops v. State, 
 
 764; State V. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 41 92 Ind. 13, 16; Commonwealth v. 
 
 Pac. 998, 52 Am. St. 655, 31 L. R. A. Conroy, 207 Pa. 212, 56 Atl. 427. 
 
 294 ; Lawhead v. State, 46 Neb. 607, '" United States v. Heath, 19 Wash. 
 
 65 N. W. 779; People v. Hughes, 137 Law R. 818; Spies v. People, 122 111. 
 
 N. Y. 29, 32 N. E. 1 105; People v, i, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898, 3 Am. 
 
 Wayman, 128 N. Y. 585, 27 N. E. St. 32on ; State v. Rounds, 76 Me. 
 
 T070; Miles V. United States, 103 U. 123; Fanton v. State, 50 Neb. 351, 69 
 
 S. 304, 26 L, ed, 481 ; Giles v. State, 6 N. W. 953, 36 L. R. A, 158.
 
 § 12 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 20 
 
 are, in their opinion proved, then they are convinced beyond a 
 reasonable doubt. But the law does not require that each particu- 
 lar incriminating fact which may aid the jury in determining that 
 the accused is guilty shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 The doubt which will justify an acquittal is not a doubt of any 
 particular fact constituting the sum of the prisoner's guilt, but 
 a doubt upon all the evidence that he is guilty.^^ 
 
 A reasonable doubt has also been defined as "a doubt for which 
 a reason can be given, "^® as a doubt which must satisfy a reason- 
 able mind, after a full comparison and consideration of the evi- 
 dence,^^ as a doubt that has something to rest upon such as a 
 sensible and honest man would reasonably entertain,^** as a doubt 
 growing out of the evidence and the circumstances of the case,*^ 
 having a foundation in reason,*^ a substantial doubt arising 
 from insufficiency of evidence not a mere possibility,*" or prob- 
 ability of innocence,^* and as an honest, substantial misgiving 
 generated by an insufficiency of proof.^^ But negative definitions 
 
 ^' Pitts V. State, 140 Ala. 70, zi So. 
 loi ; Kossakowski v. People, 177 111. 
 563, 53 N." E. 115; Delahoyde v. Peo- 
 ple, 212 111. 554, 72 N. E. 732. The 
 words "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
 and "to a moral certainty," explana- 
 tory of the quantum of proof re- 
 quired to convict in a criminal prose- 
 cution, are synonymous. People v. 
 Bonifacio, 190 N. Y. 150, 82 N, E. 
 1098, affirming 21 N. Y. Crim. 122, 
 104 N. Y. Supp. 181. 
 
 ^ Jones V. State, 120 Ala. 303, 25 
 So. 204; Hodge V. State, 97 Ala. 37, 
 41, 12 So. 164, 38 Am. St. 145; Cohen 
 V. State, so Ala. 108, 112; People v. 
 Guidici, 100 N. Y. 503, 3 N. E. 493. 
 But it has also been said that the ju- 
 rors need not be able to give a rea- 
 son for their doubt. See People v. 
 McCann, 16 N. Y. 58, 69 Am. Dec. 
 642n; Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 
 688, 33 N. E. 681 ; People v. Ah Sing, 
 51 Cal. 372; Densmore v. State, 67 
 Ind. 306, 33 Am. 96 ; Leonard v. State, 
 150 Ala. 89, 43 So. 214. 
 
 ^Wood V. State, 31 Fla. 221, 240, 
 12 So. 539; People V. Guidici, 100 N. 
 Y. 503, 3 N. E. 493; Miller v. State 
 (Wis. 1908), 119 N. W. 850. 
 
 " Fletcher v. State, 90 Ga. 468, 17 S. 
 E. 100; State V. Emory, 5 Penn. 
 (Del.) 126, 58 Atl. 1036; State v. 
 Walls, 4 Penn. (Del.) 408, 56 Atl. 
 III. 
 
 *^Malone v. State, 49 Ga. 210, 218; 
 State v. Davidson, 44 Mo. App. 513. 
 
 ^ Conrad v. State, 132 Ind. 254, 258, 
 31 N. E. 805; People v. Barker, 153 
 N. Y. Ill, 47 N. E. 31; Barnard v. 
 State, 119 Ga. 436, 46 S. E. 644. 
 
 *' State V. Wells, in Mo. 533, 20 S. 
 W. 232; State V. Briscoe (Del.), 67 
 Atl. 154; State V. Mahoney, 122 lovi^a 
 168, 97 N. W. 1089; Way v. State 
 (Ala.), 46 So. 273. 
 
 " Bain v. State, 74 Ala. 38 ; State v. 
 David, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. W. 28. 
 
 *^ United States v. Newton, 52 Fed. 
 27s, 290; Densmore v. State, 67 Ind. 
 306. 33 Am. 96: Siberry v. State, 133 
 Ind. 677, 688, 33 N. E. 681 ; Lovett v.
 
 21 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. § 12 
 
 are more frequent and perhaps safer and more helpful. Hence, a 
 mere whim, or a groundless surmise,**' a vague conjecture,*^ a 
 whimsical or vague doubt,** a capricious and speculative doubt,*" 
 a desire for more evidence of guilt, ^"^ a captious doubt or misgiv- 
 ing, suggested by an ingenious counsel, or arising from a merci- 
 ful disposition, or kindly feeling towards the prisoner, or from 
 sympathy for him or for his family, is not a reasonable doubt. ^^ 
 
 State, 30 Fla. 142, 162, 11 So. 550, 17 
 L. R. A. 70511; Lyons v. People, 137 
 111. 602, 618, 27 N. E. 677 ; Carroll v. 
 People, 136 111. 456, 27 N. E. 18; 
 Woodruff V, State, 31 Fla. 320, 12 So. 
 653; People V. Pallister, 138 N. Y. 
 601, ZZ N. E. 741 ; Carpenter v. State, 
 62 Ark. 286, 36 S. W. 900; Little v. 
 People, 157 111. 153, 42 N. E. 389; 
 State V. David, 131 Mo. 380, ZZ S. 
 W. 28; People V. Ross, 115 Cal. 233, 
 46 Pac. 1059; State v. Blue, 136 Mo. 
 41, 2i7 S. W. 796; Burney v. State, 
 100 Ga. 65, 25 S. E. 911; Baker v. 
 State, 120 Wis. 135, 97 N. W. 566; 
 State V. Harmon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 580, 
 60 Atl. z^- 
 
 ''Welsh V. State, 96 Ala. 92, 11 So. 
 450. 
 
 *'' Fletcher v. State, 90 Ga. 468, 470, 
 17 S. E. 100; Bluett V. State, 151 Ala. 
 41, 44 So. 84; State V. Adams (Del), 
 65 Atl. 510. 
 
 *^ Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 
 St. 9 ; State v. Bodekee, 34 Iowa 520 ; 
 State V. Tyre (Del.), 67 Atl. 199; 
 State V. Abbott (W. Va.), 62 S. E. 
 693- 
 
 "Talbert v. State, 121 Ala. 2,3, 25 
 So. 690. 
 
 ^^ Shepperd v. State, 94 Ala. 102, 10 
 So. 663. 
 
 " United States v. Newton, 52 Fed, 
 275, 290. In State v. Talmadge, 107 
 AIo. 543, 551, 17 S. W. 990, the court 
 said in charging the jury: "If you 
 have a reasonable doubt of the de- 
 fendant's guilt you must acquit him, 
 
 but a doubt, to authorize an acquit- 
 tal, must be a substantial doubt, aris- 
 ing from the insufificiency of evi- 
 dence and not a mere possibility of 
 innocence," and "a reasonable doubt 
 is that state of the case, which, after 
 the entire comparison and considera- 
 tion of all the evidence, leaves the 
 minds of the jurors in that condition 
 that they cannot say that they feel 
 an abiding conviction to a moral cer- 
 tainty of the truth of the charge." 
 So in Cross v. State, 132 Ind. 65, 31 
 N. E. 473, the subject is thus dis- 
 cussed : "A doubt produced by un- 
 due sensibility in the mind of the 
 juror, in view of the consequences of 
 his verdict, is not a reasonable doubt ; 
 and a juror is not allowed to create 
 sources or material for doubt by re- 
 sorting to trivial or fanciful supposi- 
 tions and remote conjectures as to a 
 possible state of facts, dififering from 
 that established by the evidence. 
 Your oath imposes on you no obliga- 
 tion to doubt where no doubt would 
 exist if no oath had been adminis- 
 tered. When a circumstance is of 
 doubtful character in its bearings, you 
 are to give the accused the benefit of 
 the doubt. If, however, all the facts 
 established necessarily lead the mind 
 to the conclusion that the defendant 
 is guilty, though there be a bare pos- 
 sibility, merely, not supported by 
 some good reason therefor, that he is 
 innocent, you should find him guilty. 
 A juror's duty to the state, to so-
 
 13 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE, 
 
 § 13. Precaution to be employed in defining^ reasonable doubt. — 
 
 The danger of confusing the minds of the jurors in attempting to 
 
 ciety, and to himself is equallj^ sacred 
 to hold for conviction if he has an 
 abiding satisfaction of defendant's 
 guilt; and if, after deliberation, no 
 juror is possessed of any good reason 
 to doubt the defendant's guilt, it is 
 the duty of the jury to convict." 
 
 "The court instructs the jury as 
 matter of law that in considering the 
 case the jury are not to go beyond 
 the evidence to hunt up doubts nor 
 must they entertain such doubts as 
 are merely chimerical or conjectural. 
 A doubt, to justify an acquittal, must 
 be reasonable, and arise from a can- 
 did and impartial investigation of all 
 the evidence in the case, and tmless it 
 is such that were the same kind of 
 doubt interposed in the graver trans- 
 actions of life, it would cause a rea- 
 sonable and prudent man to hesitate 
 and pause, it is insufficient to au- 
 thorize a verdict of "not guiltj-." If, 
 after considering all the evidence, 
 you can say you have an abiding con- 
 viction of the truth of the charge, 
 you are satisfied beyond a reasonable 
 doubt." Spies v. People, 122 111. I, 8, 
 12 N. E. 86s, 17 N. E. 898, 3 Am. St. 
 320n. See also, Painter v. People, 147 
 111. 444, 35 N. E. 64; Carlton v. Peo- 
 ple, ISO 111. 181, Z7 N. E. 244, 41 Am. 
 St. 346. 
 
 In State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129, on p. 
 143, the court says : "There is no ex- 
 act mathematical test by which we 
 may certainly know whether a doubt, 
 entertained in any case, is reasonable 
 or otherwise. What would be reason- 
 able to one person might be far 
 otherwise to another. Therefore, no 
 certain line, as upon a plan, can be 
 drawn, that shall be recognized by 
 
 every one as the dividing line between 
 the mere skeptical doubt and that 
 which has the sanction of reason. 
 Hence, whatever explanation may be 
 given of the phrase, its meaning prac- 
 tically must depend very largely upon 
 the character of the mind of the per- 
 son acting. Lexicographers tell us 
 that reasonable is that which is 
 'agreeable or conformable to reason.' 
 The doubt, therefore, which conforms 
 to the reason of the person examin- 
 ing, is to him a reasonable doubt. If 
 it does not so conform, to him it is 
 unreasonable, and will not be enter- 
 tained. We must assume that the 
 jurors are reasonable men, and as 
 such they must be addressed. When 
 told that, in order to convict, the 
 proof must remove every reasonable 
 doubt of guilt from their minds, 
 whatever the form of words used, if 
 any heed is given to the instruction, 
 the result must be that each individ- 
 ual juror will understand it and act 
 according to the dictates of his own 
 reason; and if, tried by that test, the 
 doubt is reasonable, conviction must 
 fall. Otherwise it would follow." 
 
 "A reasonable doubt is not such a 
 doubt as any man may start by ques- 
 tioning for the sake of a doubt, nor a 
 doubt surmised without foundation in 
 the facts or testimony. It is such a 
 doubt only as a fair, reasonable effort 
 to reach a conclusion upon the evi- 
 dence, using the mind in the same 
 manner as in other matters of impor- 
 tance, prevents the jury from coming 
 to a conclusion in which their minds 
 rest satisfied. If so using the mind, 
 and considering all the evidence pro- 
 duced, it leads to a conclusion which
 
 23 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDEXCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT, § 1 3 
 
 define words seemingh' so plain as "reasonable doubt," has 
 prompted some judges to refuse to attempt any definition.^- Any 
 explanation which may be given is apt to be couched in language 
 more intricate and harder to be understood than the original 
 phrase, and to be little more than a judicial paraphrase of the 
 original expression. By such subtle and scholastic definitions as 
 have been given in many of the cases the minds of the jurors, 
 
 satisfies the judgment and leaves 
 upon the mind a settled conviction of 
 the truth of the fact, it is the duty of 
 the jury so to declare the fact by 
 their verdict. It is possible always to 
 question any conclusion derived from 
 testimony. Such questioning is not a 
 reasonable doubt, but the circum- 
 stances, if the case is one of circum- 
 stantial evidence, must so concur that 
 no well-established fact or circum- 
 stance which is capable of controlling 
 the case should go counter to the con- 
 clusions sought to be reached or 
 which are to be reached. If all the 
 circumstances concur in one result, 
 it is for the jury to say whether those 
 circumstances are sufficient to estab- 
 lish that result, or whether there is a 
 failure to cover probabilities of the 
 case so as to make it reasonably cer- 
 tain that the fact has been made out." 
 Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass. 
 I, 16. 
 
 For other cases in which reason- 
 able doubt has been defined, see : 
 State v. Kearley, 26 Kan. TJ, 87; 
 State v. Witt, 34 Kan. 488, 490, 8 
 Pac. 769; State v. Buckley, 40 Conn. 
 246; Commonwealth v. Leonard, 140 
 Mass. 473, 480, 4 N. E. 96, 54 Am. 
 485; Parker v. State, 136 Ind. 284, 
 35 X- E. 1 105; Oneil v. State, 48 Ga. 
 (£\ jMcKleroy v. State, 'j'] Ala. 95; 
 People V. Johnson, 140 N. Y. 350, 35 
 X. E. 604 ; Commonwealth v. Tuttle, 
 12 Cush. (Mass.) 502, 505; Padfield 
 
 ,v. People, 146 111. 660, 35 X. E. 469; 
 State V. Dineen, 10 Minn. 407, 417; 
 Hudelson v. State, 94 Ind. 426, 430, 
 48 Am. 171 ; Sullivan v. State, 52 
 Ind. 309, 311; People v. Rodrigo, 69 
 Cal. 601, II Pac. 481 ; State v. Pa- 
 dillia, 42 Cal. 535; State v. Vansant, 
 80 Mo. (iT, Dunn v. People, 109 111. 
 635 ; State v. Pierce, 65 Iowa 85, 89, 
 21 N'. W. 195; State v, Hayden, 45 
 Iowa II, 17; Minich v. People, 8 
 Colo. 440, 454, 9 Pac. 4; James v. 
 State, 45 Miss, 572, 575; Polin v. 
 State, 14 Xeb. 540, 547, 16 N. W. 898 ; 
 State v. Oscar, 7 Jones (X. Car.) 
 305, 307; Ray V. State, 50 Ala. 104; 
 State V. Rounds, 76 Me. 123, 125; 
 McGuire v. People, 44 Mich. 286, 289, 
 6 N. W. 669, 38 Am. 265; People v. 
 Finley, 38 Mich. 482, 485, 6 X. W. 
 669; Mixon V. State, 55 Miss. 525, 
 527. 
 
 ""The term reasonable doubt is 
 almost incapable of any definition 
 which will add much to what the 
 words themselves imply. In fact it is 
 easier to state what it is not, than to 
 state what it is; and it may be 
 doubted whether any attempt to de- 
 fine it will not be more likely to con- 
 fuse than to enlighten a juror. A 
 man is the best judge of his own 
 feelings, and he knows for himself 
 whether he doubts better than any 
 one can tell him." State v. Saucr, 38 
 Minn. 438, 439, 38 X. W. 355-
 
 § 14 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 24 
 
 unused to threading such devious intellectual mazes, have been 
 confused and bewildered. They receive the erroneous impression 
 that after entering the jury box their intellectual processes are no 
 longer to be regulated by the ordinary rules employed by them 
 in their every-day affairs, but by some new system whose prin- 
 ciples they must receive from the lips of the court. In other words 
 they receive the impression that "the verdict is not to be the result 
 of the natural impression which the evidence has made upon their 
 minds, but of the operation of some artificial and altogether new 
 rules, which the law has created for them to apply in reach- 
 ing it."'^ 
 
 § 14. Doctrine of reasonable doubt applicable to misdemeanors as 
 well as to felonies. — The rule now under consideration is applicable 
 in all criminal cases, i. c, in misdemeanors as well as felonies.^* 
 But it should be noted that the rule does not mean that the jury 
 must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of every 
 proposition of fact alleged in the case against the accused. The 
 rule does not permit one or more facts, however material in con- 
 stituting the crime, to be selected out of the mass of facts in evi- 
 dence and require the jury to be convinced of them beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt. If, therefore, the court has instructed the jury 
 accurately as to the true rule of reasonable doubt, it cannot be 
 required to subdivide its instruction and charge separately as to 
 each of the elements composing the crime.^^ 
 
 It has been held according to the majority of the decisions that 
 to warrant a conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone each 
 fact relied upon and necessary to the proof of the guilt of the 
 accused need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. No par- 
 ticular fact or class of facts should be considered alone, but all 
 the facts and circumstances must be considered together; and if 
 those which are proved, in the opinion of the jury, taken together 
 are sufficient to satisfy the minds of the jurors beyond a reason- 
 
 ** Thompson on Trials, § 2463. v. Liquors, 115 Mass. 142, 145, 105 
 
 "Vandeventer v. State, 38 Neb. Mass. 595; Fuller v. State, 12 Ohio 
 
 592, 57 N. W. 397; Stewart v. State, St. 433, 436; i Bishop Cr. Proc. 1093; 
 
 44 Ind. 237; Sowder v. Common- State v. Hicks, 125 N. Car. 636, 34 
 
 wealth, 8 Bush (Ky.) 432; Wasden S. E. 247. 
 
 V. State, 18 Ga. 264; Commonwealth '''Walker v. People, 88 N. Y. 81.
 
 25 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. § 1 5 
 
 able doubt that the accused is guilty, they should not acquit be- 
 cause they believe that some particular fact, taken alone and not 
 in connection with all the circumstances, is not proved beyond a 
 reasonable doubt.^*' 
 
 According to other authorities it has been held that where the 
 proof of certain facts is necessary to the guilt of the accused he 
 should be acquitted if the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to 
 the proof of any of these facts. ^^ 
 
 § 15. Reasonable doubt in the mind of one juror. — The proposi- 
 tion that the jury must be convinced of the guilt of the prisoner 
 beyond a reasonable doubt does not require an instruction that a 
 reasonable doubt must be entertained by or arise in the mind of 
 every juror,^* and that an acquittal is not warranted unless a rea- 
 sonable doubt is entertained by all of them.^® On the other hand, 
 every one of the jurors must be convinced of the prisoner's guilt 
 in order that his conviction should be sustained. The law contem- 
 plates, and, indeed, demands, the concurrence of twelve minds 
 in the conclusion that the accused is guilty, as indicted, before he 
 can be convicted.*'" Each individual mind has to arrive at this 
 conclusion separately, and each juror, having in view the oath he 
 has taken, and his duty and responsibility thereunder, should have 
 
 ''^Spraggins v. State, 139 Ala. 93, wealth, 128 Pa. St. 500, 508, 18 Atl. 
 
 35 So. 1000; Spraggins v. State, 150 344. 
 
 Ala. 89, 43 So. 214; Murphy V. State, "People v. Ah Chung, 54 Cal. 
 
 108 Ala. ID, 18 So. 557; Allen v. 398; State v. Blydenburgh, 135 Iowa 
 
 State, 60 Ala. 19; Lackey v. State, 264, 112 N. W. 634; Gavin v. State, 
 
 67 Ark. 416, 55 S. W. 213; Houser 42 Fla. 332, 29 So. 405; State v. 
 
 V. State, 58 Ga. 78; People v. Probst, Maher, 25 Nev. 465, 62 Fac. 236; 
 
 237 111. 390, 86 N. E. 588; Williams Hodge v. Territory, 12 Okla. 108, 69 
 
 V. People, 166 111. 132, 46 N. E. 749; Pac. 1077; Mahaffey v. Territory, 11 
 
 Davis V. People, 114 111. 86, 29 N. E. Okla. 213, 66 Pac. 342; Harrison v. 
 
 192; Keating v. People, 160 111. 480, State, 6 Tex. App. 42; Black v. State, 
 
 43 N. E. 724;, State v. Hayden, 45 i Tex. App. 368. 
 
 Iowa II, 17; State v. Schoenwald, 31 °^ State v. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217, 220, 
 
 Mo. 147, iss; Morgan v. State, 51 7 N. W. 516. 
 
 Neb. 672, 71 N. W. 788 ; State v. '" Stitz v. State, 104 Ind. 359, 362, 4 
 
 Shines, 125 N. Car. 730, 34 S. E. 552 ; N. E. 145. 
 
 Kastner v. State, 58 Neb. 767, 79 N. ""Jackson v. State, 91 Wis. 253, 64 
 
 W. 713. Contra, Kaufman v. State, N. W. 838. 
 49 Ind. 248, 251 ; Rudy v. Common-
 
 § 1 6 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 26 
 
 his own mind convinced beyond a reasonable doubt upon all the 
 evidence before he can conscientiously consent to a verdict of 
 guilty.®^ But the fact that one, or even a majority, of the jurors, 
 are not convinced of the prisoner's guilt beyond a reasonable 
 doubt, does not necessarily call for the acquittal of the prisoner, 
 and the jury should be so instructed.^^ 
 
 Under such circumstances the jury should report that an agree- 
 ment is impossible. Each juror must act on his own judgment of 
 the evidence, and while he may be aided by conferring with his 
 fellow jurors in reaching the truth, he is not required to surrender 
 his conviction of the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, or his 
 reasonable doubt of guilt, remaining after a consideration of the 
 evidence and consultation with his associates, merely to prevent 
 a disagreement^^ 
 
 § 16. Statutory changes in rules of evidence and in modes of pro- 
 cedure. — Many very numerous and important changes in the rules 
 of evidence established at the common law have been made by 
 statute, in the United States and England. The changes and 
 modifications have, as a rule, been intended to afford the accused 
 a better opportunity to clear himself of the charge against him. 
 Thus, for example, he has been made a competent witness in his 
 own behalf contrary to the rules of the common law. 
 
 ^ Castle V. State, 75 Ind. 146 ; State evidence, and after having consulted 
 
 V. Witt, 34 Kan. 488, 496, 8 Pac. 769; with his fellow jurymen, entertains 
 
 State V. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217, 220, 7 such reasonable doubt, the jury can- 
 
 N. W. 516; State v. Stewart, 52 Iowa not in such case find the defendant 
 
 284, 3 N. W. 99; Rhodes v. State, 128 guilty, is correct. See Clem v. State, 
 
 Ind. 189, 194, 27 N. E. 866, 25 Am. 42 Ind. 420, 13 Am. 369. * * * 
 
 St. 429; Little V. People, 157 111. 153, Each juror should feel the responsi- 
 
 42 N. E. 389. bility resting on him as a member of 
 
 ®^ Boyd V. State, 33 Fla. 316, 14 So. the body, and should realize that his 
 
 836; Davis V. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 own mind must be convinced beyond 
 
 N. W. 984. a reasonable doubt before he can con- 
 
 ^ State V. Hamilton, 57 Iowa 596, sent to a verdict of guilty." See also, 
 
 598, II N. W. 5 ; State v. Witt, 34 State v. Rogers, 56 Kan. 362, 43 Pac. 
 
 Kan. 488, 496, 8 Pac. 769. In Castle 256; State v. Taylor, 134 Mo. 109, 35 
 
 V. State, 75 Ind. 146, the court said: S. W. 92; Allen v. United States, 
 
 "The proposition embodied in the 164 U. S. 492, 41 L. ed. 528, 17 Sup. 
 
 charge asked, that if any one of the Ct. 154. 
 jury, after having considered all the
 
 27 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AXD REASONABLE DOUBT. § 1 6a 
 
 Laws which prescribe the evidential force of proof of certain 
 facts by enacting that upon proof of such facts a given presump- 
 tion shall arise, or which determine what facts shall constitute a 
 prima facie case against the accused, casting the burden of proof 
 upon him of disproving or rebutting the presumption, are not 
 generally regarded as unconstitutional, even though they may 
 destroy the presumption of innocence. An accused person has no 
 vested right in this or any other presumption, or law of evidence, 
 or procedure, that the law-making power cannot, within constitu- 
 tional limits, deprive him of.*** The existing rules of evidence may 
 be changed at any time by legislative enactment. But the legisla- 
 tive power must be exercised within constitutional limitations so 
 that no constitutional right or privilege of the accused is de- 
 stroyed. He cannot be deprived of a fair and impartial trial by a 
 jury of his peers and according to the law of the land. But the 
 constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws is not applicable, 
 to statutes which merely alter the method and details of the pro- 
 cedure of a criminal trial, even though the statute was passed after 
 the crime was committed.^" Thus, a statute which simply enlarges 
 the class of persons who may be competent to testify against the 
 accused is not an ex post facto law as regards crimes previously 
 committed."*^ 
 
 § 16a. Number of witnesses required and positive and negative 
 evidence. — In the common law in all cases of a criminal character, 
 the testimony of one witness to facts constituting a crime and 
 convicting the accused if uncontradicted is sufficient for a con- 
 viction, if it is credible and the jury believe it.**' 
 
 " State V. Kyle, 14 Wash. 702, 45 and Cf. State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 
 
 Pac. 147; Commonwealth v. Smith, 532, 2>^ Am. Sgn. 
 
 166 Mass. 370, 44 N. E. 503; State "3 Bl. Comm. 370; Foster Crown 
 
 V. Beach (Ind.), 43 N. E. 949; In re L. 233; 2 Hawkins P. C, c. 25, § 131, 
 
 Wong Hane, 108 Cal. 680, 41 Pac. c. 46, § 2; Starkie Ev. 857; Lipsey v. 
 
 693, 49 Am. St. 138. People, 227 111. 364, 81 N. E. 348; 
 
 '^ Stokes V. People, 53 N. Y. 164, Commonwealth v. Stebbins, 8 Gray 
 
 174, 13 Am. 492. , (Mass.) 492; McLain v. Common- 
 
 ''Hopt V. Utah, no U. S. 574, 589- wealth, 99 Pa. St. 86; Commonwealth 
 
 590, 28 L. ed. 262, 4 Sup. Ct. 202. V. Pioso, 18 Lane. L. Rev. (Pa.) 185; 
 
 See, also, 25 Am. Law Reg. 680-695, State v. Kane, i McCord (S. Car.) 
 
 482.
 
 S iT^a CRIMIXAL EVIHRXCE. 28 
 
 In England, by statute, certain exceptions to the rule were cre- 
 ated. These exceptions depended upon the nature of the crime 
 and the principal reason for creating them was either that the 
 crime was of such a character that of necessity two witnesses were 
 required to prove it, as in the case of perjury, or for the pro- 
 tection of the accused against his political enemies as in the case 
 of treason. 
 
 A statute that provides that no person shall be convicted of 
 any crime punishable by death, w'ithout the testimony of two wit- 
 nesses or its equivalent, does not require the testimony of two 
 living witnesses. 
 
 It is enough that the testimony in the minds of the jury is 
 equivalent to that of two witnesses. It is not necessary that two 
 witnesses shall testify to every important fact, but it is sufficient 
 for two or more witnesses each to testify to different parts of the 
 same transaction or to different circumstances surrounding the 
 case, because such evidence tends directly to show the guilt of the 
 accused. In other words, the evidence is sufficient if the proof 
 being given by two or more witnesses taken as a whole convinces 
 the jury of the guilt of the prisoner beyond a reasonable doubt.'^** 
 
 So it may be said, that the jury in a criminal as in a civil case, 
 are not bound to believe that side of the case which produces the 
 larger number of witnesses. Thus, where a witness for the prose- 
 cution testifies positively and substantially to the facts constitut- 
 ing the crime, it is not error for the jury to believe him and to 
 convict, though all his evidence was directly contradicted by two 
 witnesses.^'' 
 
 For it is a general rule, that as between witnesses whom the 
 jury may determine are of equal credibility, a witness who testi- 
 fies to the affirmative of a proposition is entitled to be believed 
 rather than a witness who testifies to the negative of a proposi- 
 tion. For illustration, it is more likely that a witness who, being 
 present when an assault and battery take place, testifies that he 
 saw a blow struck is speaking the truth tlian one who, being 
 present at the same time, testifies that he did not see the blow 
 
 '''State V. Smith, 49 Conn, zi^^; ""White v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 State V. Washelesky (Conn.), 70 Atl. 50 S. W. 1015. 
 62.
 
 29 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND REASONABLE DOUBT. § 1 6a 
 
 Struck, assuming, of course, that both the witnesses are disinter- 
 ested persons and have no motive to deceive. 
 
 This, however, is not a rule of law, and an instruction which 
 directs the jury to believe affirmative evidence rather than nega- 
 tive evidence, regardless of the character, or of the motive of 
 the witnesses, or of the surrounding circumstances, is erroneous."'^ 
 
 The rule is wholly for the guidance of the jury according to 
 the particular facts, and they must take into consideration with 
 it, all the circumstances of the case and the character, motives 
 and demeanor of the witnesses. Its basis is simply the well-recog- 
 nized fact that a witness who testifies negatively may have for- 
 gotten what actually occurred in his presence, or his observation 
 may have been so imperfect, or his mind so inattentive that he 
 did not see what took place. On the other hand, the witness who 
 testifies affirmatively that something did happen and that he saw 
 it, if he be otherwise credible, should be believed, because it is 
 impossible to remember what never happened.'^ 
 
 The rule does not apply where two witnesses with equal oppor- 
 tunity for knowledge contradict each other as to the existence or 
 non-existence of a fact.'^^ 
 
 Again, evidence is not necessarily to be accepted as true by 
 the jury because it is not directly contradicted or expressly im- 
 peached by an attack on the character of the witness, or by his 
 cross-examination.'' 
 
 The jury have the same right to employ their common sense 
 and judgment in weighing the testimony of an uncontradicted 
 witneis as they have in determining the credibility of uncontra- 
 dicted statements made to them in their ordinary evcry-day affairs. 
 
 If the testimony of the witness is inherently improbable so that 
 a fair-minded and reasonable man would disbelieve it, the jury 
 may disregard it, though the witness is not directly contradicted. 
 His credit may be impeachcfl by the facts he relates as completely 
 as by adverse testimony. His credibility may be destroyed by the 
 imprgbability of his own testimony, and the jury have a right to 
 
 "•State V. Dean, 71 Wis. 678, 38 N. Starkic I'.v. 867; Wills Circ. Ev. 224. 
 
 W. 341 : Hunter v. State, 4 Ga. App. "a Phillips v. State, i Ga. App. 687. 
 
 761. 62 S. E. ifA 57 S. E. 1070. 
 
 " MrRtynriMs V. State, 4 Tex. App. "Comiiioinvcaiili v. Lofwc, \(\2 
 
 .127; State V. Hawkins. 2.1 Wavh. 28r), Mass. 518, y) X. E.. 102; People v. 
 
 (^■^ Pac. 258; L5est Prin. Ev. 280; Duncan, 104 Mitli. .j^V). 62 N. W. i^^^.
 
 1 6a 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 30 
 
 believe that a witness lies and reject all his testimony from the 
 omissions of relevant facts which occur in his story and from the 
 improbable things he testifies to.'^^ 
 
 In Georgia, it has been held reversible error to instruct on the 
 comparative weight of positive or negative evidence where there 
 is no negative evidence.'* And in that state the court has ruled 
 that such an instruction should not be given where there are two 
 witnesses who having equal facilities for seeing and hearing a 
 thing about which they testify directly contradict each other.'^ 
 
 " Quock Ting v. United States, 140 
 U. S. 417, 35 L. ed. 501, II S. Ct. 733, 
 851 ; United States v. Candler, 65 
 Fed. 308. 
 
 "" Peak V. State (Ga. App.), 62 S. E. 
 665. 
 
 " Hunter v. State, 4 Ga. App. 761, 
 62 S. E. 466; Skinner v. State, 108 
 Ga. 747, 32 S. E. 844. In England, 
 by several statutes and resolutions, a 
 difference has been mad£ between 
 civil and criminal evidence. Thus, by 
 statutes, I Edward VI, c. 12, and 5 & 
 
 6 Edward VI, c. 11, two witnesses 
 were required to convict in high 
 treason and petty treason unless the 
 accused confessed. The same rule 
 was applied to counterfeiting by stat- 
 ute P. & M., c. ID. This was fol- 
 lowed and enforced in subsequent 
 statutes. Under these statutes a con- 
 fession of the person taken out of 
 court before a magistrate or other 
 person having competent authority to 
 take it and proved b}' two witnesses 
 was sufficient to convict. By statute 
 
 7 William III, it was also declared 
 that both witnesses must testify to the 
 same overt act of treason and no evi- 
 dence was admitted to prove any 
 overt act not laid in the indictment. 
 Blackstone says that in almost every 
 other accusation one positive witness 
 is sufficient. In case of indictment 
 for perjury, at the common law, the 
 
 testimony of one witness was not 
 sufficient to convict because here is 
 only one oath against another. This 
 last observation may also be the basis 
 of the requirement of two witnesses 
 in treason, for the oath of allegiance 
 by the accused might in theory be re- 
 garded as the testimony of a witness. 
 The principal reason, however, was to 
 secure the subject and to protect him 
 in his life and liberty against his po- 
 litical enemies who might endeavor 
 to compass his destruction bj' secur- 
 ing his indictment for treason. And 
 Blackstone further adds that all pre- 
 sumptive, 7. e., circumstantial evi- 
 dence of felony should be admitted 
 cautiously, for the law holds that it 
 is better that ten guilty persons 
 escape, than that one innocent man 
 shall sufifer. Sir Matthew Hale, in 
 2 Hale P. C. 2go, lays down two 
 rules, the first of which is never to 
 convict a man for stealing the goods 
 of a person unknown merely because 
 he will give no account of how he 
 came by them imless an actual felony 
 be proven in such case; and second, 
 never to convict any person of mur- 
 der or manslaughter until at least the 
 body be found dead. The former 
 rule is still recognized to be good 
 law, but the latter rule, stated in its 
 ancient strictness, has been and is re- 
 peatedly departed from.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 § 17. The presumption of innocence 
 — General rule. 
 
 18. The presumption of innocence 
 
 accompanies the accused until 
 a verdict is rendered. 
 
 19. Presumption of chastity of fe- 
 
 male, of continuance of life, 
 etc., conflicting with the pre- 
 sumption of innocence. 
 
 20. Presumptions from infancy. 
 
 21. Certain facts which the courts 
 
 are presumed to know. 
 
 22. Burden of proof and presump- 
 
 tion of innocence distin- 
 guished. 
 
 23. Burden of proof — General rule 
 
 casting it upon prosecution. 
 
 24. Burden of proving a negative 
 
 — F acts peculiarly within 
 knowledge of party alleging 
 them. 
 24a. Constitutionality of statutes 
 regulating the burden of 
 proof. 
 
 § 17. The presumption of innocence — General rule. — It is a car- 
 dinal and important rule of the law of evidence that the defend- 
 ant in a criminal trial, however degraded or debased he may be, 
 and no matter what may be the enormity of the crime charged 
 against him, must always be presumed innocent of the crime for 
 which he is indicted until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable 
 doubt.' 
 
 ^ People V. Graney, 91 Mich. 646, 52 
 N. W. 66; United States v. Heath, 
 20 D. C. 272; People v. Pallister, 138 
 N. Y. 601, 60s, 33 N. E. 741 ; Gard- 
 ner v. State, 55 N. J. L. 17, 652, 26 
 Atl. 30 ; Peoplo v. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 
 704, 32 N. W. 905 ; Castle v. State, 75 
 Ind. 146, 147; Farley v. State, 127 
 Ind. 419, 421, 26 N. E. 898; People v. 
 Resh, 107 Mich. 251, 65 N. W. 99; 
 Williams v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 
 606, 34 S. W. 943; State V. Krug, 12 
 Wash. 288, 41 Pac. 126; Rogers v. 
 State, 117 Ala. 192, 23 So. 82; Waters 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 108, 22 So. 490; 
 
 (3 
 
 Wilson V. State, 140 Ala, 43, 37 So. 
 93; McArthur v. State, 59 Ark. 431, 
 
 27 S. W. 628; People V. Arlington, 
 131 Cal. 231, 63 Pac. 347; People v. 
 O'Brien, 130 Cal. i, 62 Pac. 297; Peo- 
 ple V. Linares, 142 Cal. 17, 75 Pac. 
 308; State V. Smith, 65 Conn. 283, 31 
 Atl. 206; State V. Johns (Del.), 65 
 Atl. 763; Long V. State, 42 Fla. 509, 
 
 28 So. 775; Dorsey v. State, no Ga. 
 33f, 35 S. E. 651 ; State v. Wolf 
 (Del.), 66 Atl. 739; State v. Snyder, 
 137 Iowa 600, 115 N. W.225; Tweedy 
 V. State, 5 Iowa 433; State v. Lin- 
 hoff, 121 Iowa 632, 97 N. W. 77; 
 

 
 17 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 32 
 
 Nothing need be proved nor is any evidence necessary as a 
 basis for this presumption. The imputation of the innocence of 
 the accused is rather a legal assumption of a fact than a presump- 
 tion. The doctrine is based upon the well-recognized fact which 
 the courts judicially notice that men generally obey the rules of 
 the criminal law, and upon the impossibility of obtaining, and the 
 consequent injustice of requiring, affirmative proof from the ac- 
 cused that he has done so in this particular case. This presump- 
 tion is merely stating concisely the rule that any party, whether 
 the state or a natural person desirous of redress for an injury, who 
 seeks the aid of a court of justice, has the burden of proving the 
 existence or non-existence of the facts he affirms or denies. 
 
 The presumption of innocence is always rebuttable.^^ As is 
 elsewhere explained, the evidence which will conclusively rebut 
 this presumption must be sufficient to convince the jury upon all 
 
 Schintz V. People, 178 111. 320, 52 N. 
 E. 903; Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 
 347, 24 N. E. 123, 8 L. R. A. 3311; 
 Keeton v. Commonwealth, 32 Ky. L. 
 1164, 108 S. W. 315; Watkins v. 
 Commonwealth, 123 Kj-. 817, 97 S. W. 
 740, 29 Ky. L. 1273; Wilkerson v. 
 Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. 780, 76 S. 
 W. 359; People V. Potter, 89 :Mich. 
 353. 50 N. W. 994; People v. DeFore, 
 
 64 Mich. 693, 31 N. W. 585, 8 Am. 
 St. 863n; State v. Wilson, 130 Mo. 
 App. 151, 108 S. W. 1086; Heming- 
 way V. State, 68 Miss. 371, 8 So. 
 317; Thompson v. State, 83 Miss. 
 287, 35 So. 689; State V. Scheve, 
 
 65 Neb. 853, 93 N. W. 169, 59 L. 
 R. A. 927; Morehead v. State, 34 
 Ohio St. 212; Huggins v. State, 42 
 Tex. Cr. App. 364, 60 S. W. 52; 
 United States v. Richards, 149 Fed. 
 443. Note on presumption of inno- 
 cence in habeas corpus proceeding, 22 
 L. R. A. 678; note on presmtiption 
 that party intended natural conse- 
 quences of acts, II L. R. A. 810; note 
 on presumption and burden of proof 
 as to violations of liquor law, 41 L. 
 
 R. A. 6y2; note on presumption as to 
 burglary from possession of stolen 
 property, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 200; 
 note on presumption of malice from 
 killing in prosecution for homicide, 
 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 934; note on pre- 
 sumption as to voluntariness of sub- 
 sequent confession, 18 L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) 857; note on presumption as to 
 character of confession, 18 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 783; note on presumption of 
 intent to defraud in false pretenses, 
 25 Am. St. Rep. 380; note on effect 
 on presumption of probable cause for 
 prosecution of fact that conviction 
 was procured by fraud, perjury or 
 other undue means, 15 L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) II43- 
 
 ^aThe presumption of innocence is 
 evidence in favor of the defendant 
 in a criminal case and stands as his 
 sufficient protection imless it has been 
 overcome and removed by the evi- 
 dence in the case, taken as a whole, 
 proving his guilt beyond a reason- 
 able doubt. United States v. Ken- 
 ney, 90 Fed. 257.
 
 33 PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF P"ROOF. § l8 
 
 tlie facts beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of 
 the crime charged against him.- 
 
 The state need not, however, prove that it is impossible for the 
 crime to have been perpetrated by any other person than the ac- 
 cused,^ that no one else had an opportunity to commit it or that it 
 might not possibly have been the act of some one else.* 
 
 § 18. The presumption of innocence accompanies the accused until 
 a. verdict is rendered. — The presumption of innocence does not 
 cease when the jury retires. It accompanies the accused through 
 the trial down to and until the jury reach a verdict of guilty,^ and 
 it is their duty if possible to reconcile the facts proven with this 
 presumption.*^ 
 
 It is reversible error for the court to refuse so to charge,'^ or to 
 refuse a request for a separate instruction upon the presumption 
 of innocence, though it does instruct fully and correctly upon the 
 necessity for proof of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable 
 doubt.' ' 
 
 If the court instructs the jury correctly upon the presumption 
 of innocence, and the doctrine of reasonable doubt, a further in- 
 struction that the state must show facts which are not only con- 
 sistent with the guilt of the accused, but inconsistent with any 
 other rational hypothesis, may, according to some of the cases, be 
 properly refused. ** 
 
 =§§9-16. V. State, 127 Tnd. 419, 421, 26 N. E. 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Leach, 160 898 ; Vanhouser v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 
 
 Mass. 542, 36 N. E. 471, 472. App. 572, 108 S. W. 386; Thompson 
 
 *Houser v. State, 58 Ga. 78, 81. v. State, 83 Miss. 287, 35 So. 689; 
 
 ^ People V. Macard, "jz Mich. 15, Burton v. Commonwealth, 108 Va. 
 
 26, 40 N. W. 784; State v. Krug, 12 892, 62 S. E. 376. 
 
 Wash. 288, 41 Pac. 126; People v. ''State v. Gonce, 79 Mo. 600, 602; 
 
 McNamara, 94 Cal. 509, 515, 29 Pac. People v. Potter, 89 Mich. 353, 354, 
 
 953; Edwards v. State, 69 Neb. 386, 50 N. W. 994; Reeves v. State, 29 
 
 95 N. W. 1038; Neilson v. State, 146 Fla. 527, 10 So. 901, 905. 
 
 Ala. 683, 40 So. 221 ; State v. Sam- ^ People v. Van Houter, 38 Hun 
 
 uels (Del.), 67 Atl. 164; Gow v. (N. Y.) 168, 173; Stokes v. People, 
 
 Bingham, 57 Misc. (N. Y.) 66, 107 53 N. Y. 164, 183, 13 Am. 492. 
 
 N. Y. S. lOll. Contra, People v. Osstrander, no 
 
 "Castle V. State, 75 Ind. 146, 147; Mich. 60, 67 N. W. 1079; State v. 
 
 Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 361, Heinze, 2 Mo. App. 13T4. 
 
 24 N. E. 123, 8 L. R. A. 33n; Farley ^Reed v. State, 54 Ark. 621, 16 S. 
 
 3 — Underhill Crim. Ev.
 
 § 19 ' CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 34 
 
 It was at one time held that the law presumes that the relations 
 existing between husband and wife are amicable, and that such 
 friendly relations continue during the existence of the marital 
 connection, unless the contrary is shown affirmatively. In a prose- 
 cution for wife murder, where the incriminatory evidence is 
 wholly circumstantial, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of 
 this presumption as well as to the advantage accruing- from the 
 presumption of innocence, and the prosecution must rebut both.^" 
 This appears to be no longer the law." 
 
 § 19. Presumption of chastity of female, of continuance of life, etc., 
 conflicting with the presumption of innocence. — It often happens 
 from the nature of the crime that the presumption that the ac- 
 cused is innocent encounters or is opposed by a presumption of 
 innocence invoked, or existing, in behalf of some other person. 
 So, in prosecutions for seduction, or for slander in imputing un- 
 chastity to a female, the rebuttable presumption that all women 
 are chaste has sometimes, but rarely, been permitted to overcome 
 the presumption of innocence. In other words, the state has been 
 absolved from proving as a part of its case the female's chastity.^- 
 
 But it should be particularly noted that the presumption of in- 
 nocence, though popularly attributed to every person, so that it 
 is said, "that every person is presumed innocent until proved 
 guilty," is restricted in its legal sense and application to the de- 
 fendant in a criminal trial. It is to be used as a weapon of defense 
 by the prisoner, not as a means of assault upon him to procure his 
 conviction, when proof of some fact necessary to show his guilt 
 is lacking. 
 
 W. 819, 820, 821; Williamson v. 392, 14 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556; 
 
 State, 30 Tex. App. 330, 17 S. W. State v. Leabo, 84 Mo. 168, 54 Am. 
 
 722. Cf. contra, Lancaster v. State, 91. 
 
 91 Tenn. 267, 18 S. W. 777; State "State v. Soper, 148 Mo. 217, 49 
 
 V. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 388, 14 S. W. S. W. 1007; Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 
 
 969, 15 S. W. 556; People V. Cun- 37, 7 So. 302. 
 
 ningham, 6 Park. Cr. Rep. (N. Y.) ^ See Slocum v. People. 90 111. 274, 
 
 398; Turner v. State, 102 Ind. 425, 280; Kerr v. United States. 7 Ind. 
 
 427, I N. E. 869; Anderson v. State, Terr. 486, 104 S. W. 809; Wilhite v. 
 
 104 Ind. 467, 473, 4 N. E. 63, 5 N. E. State, 84 Ark. 67, 104 S. W. 531. 
 
 71 T. Contra, State v. McDaniel, 84 N. Car. 
 
 ^* State V. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 803, 806.
 
 35 PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF. § 20 
 
 So, though the decisions are not harmonious, the better and 
 more reasonable view is that the law will not countenance any 
 presumption, which by overcoming the presumption of innocence 
 will cast the burden of proving his innocence upon the defendant. 
 Hence, where presumptions apparently conflict the law will recog- 
 nize the presumption of innocence alone and will impose no re- 
 striction on its operation, but will apply it to the whole scope of 
 the charge against the accused and to every fact essential to the 
 crime/^ 
 
 A man is presumed to be alive until his death is shown,^* or 
 until a counter presumption of his death arises from evidence that 
 he has been absent and has not been heard from for a consider- 
 able period, by those who would naturally have heard from him 
 if he were alive. But the presumption of the continuance of life 
 must give way before that of innocence.^^ 
 
 § 20. Presumptions from infancy.— An infant under the age of 
 seven years is conclusively presumed to be doli incapax. Between 
 that age and the age of fourteen the absence of criminal intent 
 or guilty knowledge will be presumed ; though in this case the pre- 
 sumption is rebuttable by proving circumstances from which, 
 despite his youth, intent may be inferred. Hence, if the jury are 
 convinced on all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt that 
 the infant between the ages of seven and fourteen understood the 
 nature and consequences of his act, and that it was done with de- 
 liberation and legal intent, they may convict him of a capital 
 crime or other felony.*^ 
 
 " State V. McDaniel, 84 N. Car. cide, when the body of a man is 
 
 803, 806; McArthur v. State, 59 Ark. found whose death by violence is not 
 
 431, 27 S. W. 628; Persons v. State, questioned, as against the presump- 
 
 90 Tenn. 291, 295, 16 S. W. 726; tion of innocence. Persons v. State, 
 
 Zabriskie v. State, 43 N. J. L. 640, 90 Tenn. 291, 295, 16 S. W. 726. 
 
 39 Am. 610; Oliver v. Common- "Underbill on Evid., § 233. 
 
 wealth, loi Pa. St. 215, 218, 47 Am. ^° Cameron v. State, 14 Ala. 546, 
 
 704. Cf. contra, Dunlop v. United 48 Am. Dec. inn; People v. Feilen, 
 
 States, 165 U. S. 486, 41 L. ed. 799, 58 Cal. 218, 41 Am. 258; Reg. v. Will- 
 
 T7 Sup. Ct. 375; State v. Shean, 32 shire, L. R. 6 Q. B. D. 366. 
 
 Iowa 88; Slocum v. People, 90 111. ^® Commonwealth v. Mead, to Allen 
 
 274, 280; Wilson V. State, 7^ Ala. (Mass.) 396, 398; State v. Learnard, 
 
 527, 534, and post, § 393. There is 41 Vt. 585, 589; Godfrey v. State, 31 
 
 no presumption against death by sui- Ala. 323, 70 Am. Dec. 49411; State v.
 
 21 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 36 
 
 The evidence to rebut the presumption of criminal incapacity 
 in the case of a child between the ages of seven and fourteen years 
 must be strong and clear, and prove his capacity to commit crime 
 beyond all reasonable doubt ;" though direct proof of malice is 
 not necessary/^ The state must not only show the history and 
 character of accused and the degree of his intelligence but facts 
 showing that he knew that the offense charged was criminal and 
 would subject him to punishment.^" All presumptions in favor of 
 infancy cease when the child is older than fourteen, for above that 
 age he will be presumed to be capable, mentally and physically, of 
 committing any crime."" 
 
 § 21. Certain facts which the courts are presumed to know. — The 
 general rules regulating and indicating those facts which the 
 courts will judicially notice are equally applicable to the processes 
 of proving facts in civil and criminal cases. These rules have been 
 very frequently formulated in statutes which should be consulted 
 in order to ascertain their precise effect and operation. Elsewhere 
 in this work the subject of judicial notice will be found referred 
 to in connection with the facts of which no proof is required.'^ 
 
 Goin, 9 Humph. CTenn.) 175, 176, 
 'iTj; Willet v. Commonwealth, 13 
 Bush (Ky.) 230, 232; People v. Ran- 
 dolph, 2 Park. Cr. Rep. (N. Y.) 174. 
 
 "4 Bl. Com. 24; State v. Tice, 90 
 Mo. 112, 2 S. W. 269; State v. Learn- 
 ard, 41 Vt. 585; Angelo v. People, 
 96 111. 209, 212, 36 Am. 132. 
 
 ^' What evidence will be required 
 depends wholly upon the circum- 
 stances of each case, as the education 
 and intelligence of the child, his mo- 
 ral character and training and the 
 nature of the crime, its attendant cir- 
 cumstances and the motives which 
 prompted it. 
 
 "Binkley v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 54, TOO S. W. 780. 
 
 -" I Hale P. C. 20; Irby v. State, 32 
 Ga. 496, 498; State v. Di Guglielmo 
 (Del.), 55 Atl. 350; State v. Goin. 9 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 175, 176; McDaniel 
 
 v. State, 5 Tex. App. 475; People v. 
 Kendall, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) 399; Rex 
 V. Sutton, 3 Adol. & E. 597; Hill v. 
 State, 63 Ga. 578, 582, 36 Am. 120. 
 See § 403, post. 
 
 ^The subject of judicial notice is 
 treated in cxtcnso in Chapter XVHI 
 Underbill on Evidence. A few in- 
 stances of facts which have been ju- 
 dicially noticed in criminal cases are 
 here given. The names of the 
 judges, Kennedy v. Commonwealth, 
 78 Ky. 447, 454; the names of the 
 court officers, State v. Campbell, 210 
 Mo. 202, 109 S. W. 706; and the 
 terms of the courts. Kennedy v. 
 Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 447, 454; 
 Dorman v. State, 56 Ind. 454, 456; 
 Rodgers v. State, 50 Ala. 102, 103; 
 State V. Green, 52 S. Car. 520, 30 S. 
 E. 683. The records of the court. 
 State V. Bowen, 16 Kan. 475, 477.
 
 Z7 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 Where the number of grand jurors depends upon the popu- 
 lation of the county, the grand jurors and the court will take ju- 
 
 Judicial notice may be taken that the 
 sheriff is the legal keeper of the jail 
 of the county of which he is sheriff, 
 and in that capacity is the custodian 
 of all prisoners confined therein. Ex 
 parte Bargagliotti, 6 Cal. App. ^iZZ, 92 
 Pac. 96. The power of municipal 
 corporations to elect officials. Gal- 
 lagher V. State, 10 Tex. App. 469, 
 471. That certain well-known liquors, 
 as lager beer, wine and whiskey, are 
 intoxicating, and that there is malt 
 in beer. Brififitt v. State, 58 Wis. 39, 
 41-45, 16 N. W. 39, 46 Am. 621 ; 
 State V. Goyette, 11 R. I. 592; Rau v. 
 People, 63 N. Y. 2T7; Waller v. 
 State, 38 Ark. 656, 660; Cripe v. 
 State, 4 Ga. App. 832, 62 S. E. 567; 
 (lager beer) Tompkins v. State, 2 
 Ga. App. 639, 58 S. E. II 11; Fears 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 740, 54 S. E. 661 ; 
 State V. Carmody, 50 Ore. i, 91 Pac. 
 446, io8r, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 828; 
 Nussbaumer v. State, 54 Fla. 87, 44 
 So. 712; that whiskey is a spirituous 
 or distilled liquor. State v. York, 74 
 N. H. 125, 65 Atl. 685; O'Connell v. 
 State (Ga. App.), 62 S. E. 1007. 
 Great public and historical events. 
 Williams v. State, ()^ Ga. 260, 262. 
 Facts of geography, particularly of 
 territorial subdivisions established by 
 law. Moore v. State, 126 Ga. 414, 
 55 S. E. 327; State v. Thompson, 85 
 Me. 189, 194, 27 Atl. 97; State v. 
 Wagner, 6r Me. 178; People v. 
 Brooks, TOi Mich. 98, lOi, 59 N. W. 
 444; Forehand v. State, 53 Ark. 46, 
 T3 S. W. 728; People v. Wood, 131 
 N. Y. 617, 30 N. E. 243; State v. 
 Dunwell, 3 R. I. 127; United States 
 V. Beebe, 2 Dak. 292, 293, 11 N. W. 
 
 505; State V. Reader, 60 Iowa 527, 15 
 N. W, 423; People v. Suppiger, 103 
 111. 434. The court will take judicial 
 notice of the boundaries of the state 
 and of the county, that a designated 
 county is in the state, and a desig- 
 nated town in the county. Reed v. 
 Territory (Okla. App.), 98 Pac 
 583; State V. Burns, 48 Mo. 438; 
 State V. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 
 391, 27 S, W. 1106; Commonwealth 
 V. Desmond, 103 Mass. 445 ; State v. 
 Fishel (Iowa), 118 N. W. 763; 
 Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 162 Mass. 
 429, 431, 38 N. E. 1115; State v. Dun- 
 well, 3 R. I. 127 ; Vanderwerker v. 
 People, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 530; Moye 
 V. State, 65 Ga. 754; Huston v. Peo- 
 ple, 53 111. App. 501, 502; People V. 
 Etting, 99 Cal. 577, 579, 34 Pac. 2ZT, 
 State V. Farley, 87 Iowa 22, 53 N. W. 
 T089; People V. Curley, 99 Mich. 238, 
 58 N. W. 68. Also of the boundaries 
 of counties. Fuller v. Territory 
 (Okla App.), 99 Pac. 1098. Crimes 
 committed within a military post or 
 fort are beyond the jurisdiction of 
 state courts. Lasher v. State, 30 Tex. 
 App. 387, 17 S. W. 1064, 1065, 28 Am. 
 St. 922; Wills V. State, 3 Heisk. 
 (Tenn.) 141, 148. 
 
 In a prosecution for an unlawful 
 sale of liquor, the court will take ju- 
 dicial notice that the county where 
 the sale was charged to have been 
 made was a prohibition county. Irby 
 V. State, 91 Miss. 542, 44 So. 801. 
 The courts will take notice of gen- 
 eral state elections, but not of special 
 elections. Gay v. Eugene (Ore.), 100 
 Pac. 306.
 
 21 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 38 
 
 dicial notice of the census in determining whether the grand jury- 
 is properly constituted."' 
 
 Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that a city is by statute 
 a city of the second class where it has been made such by a procla- 
 mation of the state executive."^ 
 
 The courts wnll take judicial notice of the contents of the jour- 
 nals of the legislature far enough to determine whether an act 
 published was actually passed and is constitutional.^^ 
 
 "State V. Braskamp, 87 Iowa 588, 
 590, 591, 54 N. W. 532. 
 
 "* State V. Ricksicker, y^ Kan. 495, 
 85 Pac. 547. As regards public streets 
 and squares, it may be said that though 
 a court may take judicial notice that 
 the public place is located in a city 
 or town in the county, it is not com- 
 pelled to do. The safer plan is to 
 prove the location of the street or 
 square in the city in which the venue 
 is laid. Dougherty v. People, 118 
 111. 160, 8 N. E. 673; Evans v. State, 
 17 Fla. 192; Commonwealth v. Ack- 
 land, 107 Mass. 211. 
 
 ^* McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 
 411, so N. W. 185; People v. Mayes, 
 113 Cal. 618, 45 Pac. 860. 
 
 The facts which the courts will 
 notice judicially, and which therefore 
 need neither be alleged in the indict- 
 ment, nor proved at the trial, may be 
 thus concisely summarized: 
 
 The truesignificatio'n.of all English 
 words and phrases and abbreviations 
 in common use (McDonald v. State, 
 55 Fla. 134, 46 So. 176) and of all 
 legal expressions. United States v. 
 Heinze, 161 Fed. 425; State v. Nip- 
 pert, 74 Kan. 371, 86 Pac. 478; Sims 
 V. State, I Ga. App. yy6, 57 S. E. 
 1029 (meaning of the words "craps" 
 as a game with dice and that "quar- 
 ter" means twenty-five cents). 
 
 The statutory and common law and 
 generally whatever is established by 
 law. Courts are bound to take no- 
 
 tice of every public statute, and the 
 facts they recite or state, including 
 the time at which they take effect, 
 though that time depends on the re- 
 sult of a popular vote, to be declared 
 by proclamation issued by the secre- 
 tarjf of State. Farmer v. Salisburj^ 
 77 Vt. 161, 59 Atl. 201. 
 
 Public and private official acts of 
 the legislative, executive and judicial 
 departments of the state and of the 
 United States. State v. Tull}', 31 
 Mont. 365, 78 Pac. 760; Prather v. 
 United States, 9 App. D. C. 82. 
 
 The seals of all the courts of the 
 state and of the United States. 
 
 The accession to office and the offi- 
 cial signatures and seals of the prin- 
 cipal officers of government in the 
 legislative, executive and judicial de- 
 partments of the state and of the 
 United States. 
 
 The existence, title, national flag, 
 and seal of every state or sovereign 
 recognized by the executive power of 
 the United States. 
 
 The seals of courts of admiralty 
 and maritime jurisdiction and of no- 
 taries public. 
 
 The laws of nature, the measure of 
 time, the value and nature of the cir- 
 culating medium, and the geograph- 
 ical divisions and the facts of politi- 
 cal histor3^ That the sale of liquors 
 is prohibited by law in a particular 
 county. Bass v. State, i Ga. App. 
 728, 790, 57 S. E. 1054.
 
 39 PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF. § 22 
 
 So also, the appellate courts will judicially notice the fact of 
 a prior reversal, and indeed all prior proceedings in the record 
 such as the verdict on a demurrer to the plea of former jeopardy.^^ 
 
 The appellate courts, however, will not take notice in deciding 
 one case of the record of another case. The latter record must be 
 made part of the case on appeal.-*^ 
 
 Generally, the higher courts, such as the supreme court and the 
 courts of appellate jurisdiction, will not take notice of the exist- 
 ence of municipal ordinances."' 
 
 But the municipal courts will usually take judicial notice of 
 city ordinances.-'^ 
 
 Thus, where an appeal is from a conviction of violating a mu- 
 nicipal ordinance a court having appellate jurisdiction, will, on a 
 trial dc novo, notice judicially all facts which would have been 
 noticed by the lower court.-^ The court will take judicial notice 
 of the meaning of scientific and medical terms, such as "anatomy," 
 etc. Nevertheless, standard medical works and other publications 
 defining such words may be consulted by the court.®** 
 
 § 22. Burden of proof and presumption of innocence distinguished. 
 
 — The principle that the accused is innocent until the jury has 
 pronounced him guilty upon all the evidence, and the rule that 
 regulates the burden of proof must be clearly distinguished. The 
 former is a rule of substantive law, existing before any evidence 
 is offered and accompanying the accused throughout the trial 
 down to the moment of his conviction. But the burden of proof, 
 designed mainly as a rule of procedure, confers only a temporary 
 
 "^ McXish V. State, 47 Fla. 69, 36 prosecution for practicing medicines 
 
 So. 176; McGuire v. State, 76 Miss, without a license. State v. Wilhite, 
 
 504, 25 So. 495. 132 Iowa 226, 109 N. W. 730. Ju- 
 
 "'^ McNish V. State, 47 Fla. 69, 36 dicial notice will be taken that vac- 
 
 So. 176. cination is commonly believed to be 
 
 " Gardner v. State, 80 Ark. 264, 97 a safe and valuable means of pre- 
 
 S. W. 48; Tarkio v. Loyd, 179 Mo. venting the spread of smallpox, and 
 
 600, 78 S. W. 797; Hill V. Atlanta, that this belief is supported by high 
 
 125 Ga. 697, 54 S. E. 354. medical authority. Jacobson v. Mas- 
 
 "^ Steiner v. State, 78 Neb. 147, no sachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 49 L. ed. 
 
 N. W. 723. 643, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, aff'g Common- 
 
 ^° Steiner v. State, 78 Neb. 147, no wealth v. Pear, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N. 
 
 N. W. 723. E. 719, 67 L. R. A. 935. 
 
 ^This rule was applied in the
 
 § 23 CRIAIINAL EVIDENCE. ' 4O 
 
 benefit upon him. Under the burden of proof the prosecution is 
 compelled in the first instance to make out a prima facie case prov- 
 ing the essential facts embraced in the criminal transaction al- 
 leged, including the intent. If this is done, and the accused offers 
 no evidence, the case as made out by the state must go to the jury. 
 They are to consider it, but only in connection with the presump- 
 tion of innocence to which the accused is always entitled, though 
 he may have introduced no evidence whatever. In thus comply- 
 ing with the requirement that it shall sustain the burden of proof, 
 the state must produce such evidence as will overcome the pre- 
 sumption of innocence and convince the jury of the guilt of the 
 accused beyond a reasonable doubt. After the state has introduced 
 all the proof which it regards as sufficient to convict the prisoner, 
 he may meet the case thus made out against him in three different 
 ways : First. He may plead not guilty generally. By this plea he 
 puts in issue all the allegations of the indictment. He denies the 
 truth of all the evidence which may be offered against him. Sec- 
 ond. He may deny the truth of some particular ingredient in the 
 criminal transaction, as shown by the state, as when he pleads 
 an alibi, or, admitting the doing of the act charged, denies the 
 presence of a malicious intent, or alleges that he was no)i compos 
 mentis at the date of the alleged crime and is, therefore, not re- 
 sponsible for what he did. Third. He may put in a defense not 
 traversing the allegations of the indictment, but involving some 
 matters or facts which are entirely separate, distinct from, and 
 independent of the original transaction set forth therein. Thus, 
 for example, he may plead that the court has no jurisdiction of the 
 charge, or he may plead that he had a statutory license to do what 
 he did, or he may claim that he has been already tried and ac- 
 quitted or convicted of the same crime. We will first consider a 
 case where the accused pleads not guilty merely and traverses tlie 
 allegations of the indictment. 
 
 § 23. Burden of proof — General rule casting it upon prosecution. — 
 The general rule stated broadly, as laid down by the cases, is 
 that the burden of proof and the obligation to convince the jury 
 of the prisoner's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to all facts 
 and circumstances essential to the guilt of the accused, including 
 the criminal intent, are upon the prosecution throughout the
 
 41 
 
 PRESUMPTIONS AXD BURDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 ^3 
 
 trial.^"* There is no shifting of the burden of proof during the 
 trial.'^ 
 
 The making out of a prima facie case does not shift the burden 
 of proof to the defendant but it remains with the prosecution until 
 the verdict is reached. 
 
 This rule is clearly applicable in every case where the defend- 
 ant by pleading "not guilty" alone, and without qualification, 
 stands upon a negative allegation, and does not rely upon any 
 facts which are separate and distinct from, or independent of, the 
 original transaction set forth in the indictment. By such a plea 
 the prisoner restricts himself to denying and disproving the facts 
 
 ^°a Note on burden of proof as to 
 insanity, ^6 Am. St. Rep. 92, 97; note 
 on burden of proof in prosecution for 
 false pretenses, 25 Am. St. Rep. 385; 
 note on freedom from fault by de- 
 fendant in homicide, who began con- 
 flict, 45 L. R. A. 706; note on burden 
 of proof as to alibi, 41 L. R. A. 530, 
 541 ; note on burden and measure of 
 proof of alibi, 41 L. R. A. 530; note 
 on burden of proof that confession 
 was voluntary, 6 Am. St. Rep. 244, 
 245. See Elliott Ev., § 2706. 
 
 ^^ State V. Conway, 56 Kan. 682, 44 
 Pac. 627; State v. Harvey, 131 Mo. 
 339, 32 S. W. mo; State v. Lowry, 
 42 W. Va. 20s, 24 S. E. 561 ; People 
 V. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 704, 705, 32 N. 
 
 W. 90s; Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 
 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 ; Walker v. 
 
 People, 88 N. Y. 81, 88; O'Connell 
 
 V. People, 87 N. Y. 377, 380, 41 Am. 
 
 379; Gravely v. State, 38 Neb. 871, 
 
 873, 57 N. W. 751 ; Holmes v. State, 
 
 100 Ala. 80, 84, 14 So. 864; Jones v. 
 
 State, 51 Ohio St. 331, 38 N. E. 79; 
 
 State V. Hirsch, 45 Mo. 429, 431 ; 
 
 People V. Plath, 100 N. Y. 590, 592, 
 
 3 N. E. 790, 53 Am. 236; People v. 
 
 Curtis, 97 Mich. 489, 490, 56 N. W. 
 
 925 ; People v. IMcWhorter, 93 IMich. 
 
 641, 643, 644, 53 N. W. 780; Burger 
 
 v. State, 34 Xeb. 397, 400, 51 X. W. 
 1027; Bishop V. State. 62 Miss. 289; 
 Hansford v. State (Miss.), 11 So. 
 106; Slade V. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 381, 392, 393, 16 S. W. 253: People 
 V. Elliott, 80 Cal. 296, 22 Pac. 207; 
 Xeilson v. State, 146 Ala. 683, 40 So. 
 221; State V. Samuels (Del.), 67 Atl. 
 164. "In every criminal case the burden 
 is throughout upon the prosecution. 
 Whatever course the defense deems 
 it prudent to take, in order to ex- 
 plain suspicious circumstances or re- 
 move doubts, it is incumbent on the 
 prosecution to show, under all the 
 circumstances, as a part of their case, 
 unless admitted or shown by the de- 
 fense, that there is no innocent the- 
 ory possible, which will, without vio- 
 lation of reason, accord with the 
 facts. So, in a case of alleged poi- 
 soning, where the symptoms and ap- 
 pearances during the last illness be- 
 come controlling in determining 
 whether death was from poison or 
 disease, the charge is not made out 
 unless the state negative everything 
 but poison as the cause of death. 
 This it can do only by showing that 
 the combined symptoms and the ab- 
 solutely certain facts with which they 
 are associated are inconsistent with
 
 § 23 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 42 
 
 involved in the original transaction upon which the^ charge is 
 based, including, of course, all the accompanying circumstances. ^- 
 The defendant is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of 
 innocence before he introduces any evidence. Hence, though he 
 offers no evidence, the court has no legal power to direct a ver- 
 dict, but the prima facie case against him must be submitted to the 
 jury. They must take into consideration the presumption of in- 
 nocence, and should not convict unless the state has sustained the 
 burden of proof. But when the defendant pleads any substantive, 
 distinct and independent matter as a defense, either as justifica- 
 tion or excuse or as an exemption from criminal liability, which 
 upon its face does not necessarily constitute an element of the 
 transaction wath w'hich he is charged, and wdiich is wholly dis- 
 connected from the offense, it has been said that the burden of 
 proving such defense devolves upon him.^^ The accused must 
 prove the independent exculpatory facts upon which he relies, and 
 
 any other disease." People v. Mil- 
 lard, S3 Mich. 63, 18 X. W. 562. See, 
 also, Underhill on Evid., § 247. 
 
 ^" For a full discussion of the ques- 
 tion, see Commonwealth v. ]\IcKie, i 
 Gray (Mass.) 6t, 61 Am. Dec. 410. 
 But the rule does not require an in- 
 struction that the burden of proof 
 in every criminal case is on the state 
 to prove all the allegations in the 
 indictment. Young v. State, 149 Ala. 
 16, 43 So. 100. 
 
 "State V. Rollins, 113 X. Car. 722, 
 729, 734, 18 S. E. 394; State v. Welsh, 
 29 S. Car. 4, 7, 6 S. E. 894; Robert- 
 son V. Commonwealth (Va.), 22 S. 
 E. 359, 362; Myers v. Commonwealth, 
 90 Va. 705, 706, 19 S. E. 881 ; Cleve- 
 land V. State, 86 Ala. i, 10, 5 So. 
 426; Commonwealth v. Eddy, 7 Gray 
 (Mass.) 583, 584: United States v. 
 Holmes, I CHfif. (U. S.) 98, 117, 26 
 Fed. Cas. 15382; Stitt v. State, 91 
 Ala. 10, 8 So. 669, 24 Am. St. 853; 
 Day V. State, 21 Tex. App. 2x3, 17 S. 
 W. 262; Stokes V. People, 53 X. Y. 
 164, 13 Am. 492; State v. Wingo, 66 
 
 Mo. i8r, 183, 186, 27 Am. 329; State 
 V. Johnson, 91 Mo. 439, 443, 3 S. W. 
 868; Weaver v. State, 24 Ohio St. 
 584, 588, 589; People V. Rodrigo, 69 
 Cal. 601, II Pac. 481; People v. Tarm 
 Poi, 86 Cal. 225, 24 Pac. 998; Kriel 
 v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush (K}\) 
 2,62; Bergin v. State, 31 Ohio St. iii, 
 115; Rayburn v. State, 69 Ark. 177, 
 63 S. W. 356; People V. Boo Doo 
 Hong, 122 Cal. 606, 55 Pac. 402; 
 State V. Schweitzer, 57 Conn. 532, 18 
 Atl. 787, 6 L. R. A. 125; State v. 
 Kavanaugh, 4 Pen. (Del.) 131, 53 
 Atl. 335; Padgett v. State, 40 Fla. 
 451, 24 So. 145; Williams v. People, 
 121 111. 84, II N. E. 881; State v. 
 Wright, 134 Mo. 404, 35 S. W. 1145; 
 State V. Hickam, 95 Mo. 322, 8 S. W. 
 252, 6 Am. St. 54; State v. Davis, 14 
 Xev. 439, ZZ Am. 563; People v. 
 Riordan, 117 X. Y. 71, 22 X. E. 455; 
 Commonwealth v. Zelt, 138 Pa. St. 
 615, 21 Atl. 7, II L. R. A. 602; King 
 V. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 20 S. W. 169; 
 State V. :McCaffrey, 69 Vt. 85, 27 
 Atl. 234.
 
 43 PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF. g 24 
 
 in this respect and to this extent, it is correct to say the burden 
 Hes on him. Notwithstanding this, if, after all the evidence is in, 
 it is found that upon the whole case the prosecution has not sus- 
 tained the burden of proof in convincing the jury of the prisoner's 
 guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he should be acquitted. 
 
 It may happen that the facts which sustain, or tend to sustain 
 a defense of justification or excuse, shall came out during the 
 examination of the witness for the prosecution. The defendant is 
 entitled to the benefit of this for the rule that the burden of proof 
 of an affirmative and independent defense is on the accused does 
 not necessarily mean that he must prove it wholly by his testi- 
 mony or that of his own witnesses. And no matter what the evi- 
 dence may be showing justification or excuse, and whether it be 
 strong or whether it be weak, or whether it shall proceed from 
 the state's witnesses or from the witnesses for the accused, the 
 accused is entitled, where there is any evidence sustaining an af- 
 firmative defense, to have it considered by the jury, with all the 
 evidence in the case; and he is entitled to an instruction that 
 though the burden is on him to prove an affirmative defense, yet 
 upon all the evidence, the state must establish his guilt beyond a 
 reasonable doubt. 
 
 § 24. Burden of proving a negative — Facts peculiarly within 
 knowledge of party alleging them. — The general rule is that the bur- 
 den of proof is upon him who maintains the affirmative, for the 
 reason that the affirmative is the most susceptible of direct proof. 
 Hence the prosecution has the burden of proof as the indictment 
 is composed of allegations of an affirmative character. 
 
 The difficulty lies mainly in applying the rule. That it is a real 
 difficulty no one will hesitate to believe who has struggled through 
 the bewildering jungle of contradictory and irreconcilable deci- 
 sions endeavoring to find some common principle upon which they 
 could be harmonized or at least rendered more intelligible. The 
 main source of the confusion which has arisen has been the forget- 
 fulness of the fact that there is no conceivable proposition of fact 
 affirmative in its form which does not blend a negative with it. 
 or in other words which does not imply the negation or denial of 
 its opposite. Thus, for example, in a prosecution for rape the al- 
 legation that the defendant violated the prosecutrix by force or
 
 § 24 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 44 
 
 fraud involves the negative allegation that she did not consent to 
 the intercourse. 
 
 So a charge of larceny necessitates proof that the owner of the 
 property stolen did not consent to the taking. The allegation that 
 personal property was stolen is inseparable from the allegation 
 that it w^as taken from the owner without his consent, and for the 
 state to prove one necessarily requires that it shall prove the other. 
 Hence the rule that the burden of proof is upon the prosecution 
 because it has made affirmative allegations is not afifected by the 
 existence of the implied negatives in the original transaction. The 
 prosecution is permitted and required to prove these negatives as 
 a part of its case, and cannot shift the burden of proving their 
 affirmative opposites upon the accused. And in criminal cases the 
 presumption of innocence which attaches to the accused casts the 
 burden of proving the guilt of the accused upon the state through- 
 out. Hence if the non-existence of some fact, or the non-perform- 
 ance of some duty, is a constituent and essential element in the 
 crime with which the accused is charged, the burden of proving 
 this negative allegation of non-existence or non-performance is 
 upon the state. Thus, under an indictment for selling goods not 
 produced in the United States, the burden is on the state to show 
 that the goods were foreign. But if a fact is peculiarly within the 
 knowledge of the accused, as, for example, his own age when he 
 pleads non-age as a defense,^* or the fact that he has a license to 
 carry on a prohibited business or to do a forbidden act, the bur- 
 den of proof is on him as he has much better means of proving 
 the negative fact alleged than the prosecution has of proving the 
 contrary. The matter is peculiarly within his knowledge, and to 
 require the state to prove the lack of a license is to require proof 
 of a negative allegation. ^^ 
 
 ^ Ellis V. State, 30 Tex. App. 6or, 686 ; Commonwealth v. Thurlow, 24 
 
 18 S. W. 139; State V. Arnold, 13 Pick. (Mass.) 374, 381; State v. 
 
 Ired. (N. Car.) 184, 187. Hirsch, 45 Mo. 429; Commonwealth 
 
 ^' Sharp V. State, 17 Ga. 290; Gen- v. Zelt, 138 Pa. St. 615, 628, 21 Atl. 
 
 ing V. State, i McCord (S. Car.) 7, 11 L. R. A. 602; State v. Wood- 
 
 573, 574; People V. Townsey, 5 Denio ward, 34 Me. 293, 295: Farrall v. 
 
 (N. Y.) 70; People v. Safford, 5 State, ^2 Ala. 557; State v. Wilson, 
 
 Denio (N. Y.) 112; Hodgman v. 39 I\Io. .'\pp. 114, 115; People v. X^xe, 
 
 People, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 235; Con- 34 Hun (N. Y.) 298. 300: People v. 
 
 yers v. State, 50 Ga. 103, 106, 15 Am. ]\Iaxwell, 83 Hun (N. Y.) 157, 31 N.
 
 45 
 
 PRESUMPTIOXS AND BURDEN OF PROOF. 
 
 § 24a 
 
 § 24a. Constitutionality of statutes regulating the burden of proof. 
 
 — In some states statutes have been passed which cast upon the 
 accused the burden of proving certain particular and specific facts 
 which may arise under the indictment. These statutes generally 
 provide that a certain act of the accused when proved, shall be 
 presumed to have been done with a criminal or illegal intent. 
 Thus it has been provided that one accused of burglary, must 
 prove the innocent character of his entrance on the premises.^" 
 And again, there are statutes which provide that the evidence of 
 the sale or keeping of liquors shall be prima facie evidence 
 that the sale or keeping was illegal. ^^ These statutes by which 
 the jury are bound to infer that some act which would otherwise 
 be an innocent act is proof of guilt until the accused shall con- 
 vince them his act was not criminal are constitutional.^* 
 
 Y. S. 564 ; State v. McGlynn, 34 N. H. 
 422; State V. Simons, 17 N. H. 83; 
 State V. Foster, 23 N. H. 348, 55 Am. 
 Dec. 191 ; State v. Keggon, 55 N. H. 
 19, 20; Wheat V. State, 6 Mo. 455. 
 456; State V. Crow, 53 Kan. 662,, 663, 
 37 Pac. 170; State v. Camden, 48 N. 
 J. L. 89, 90. Contra by statute, Com- 
 monwealth V. Thnrlow, 24 Pick. 
 (]\Iass.) 374; Commonwealth v. 
 Locke, 114 Mass. 288, 294; Mehan v. 
 State, 7 Wis. 670. The same prin- 
 ciple is applicable where several ex- 
 ceptions or qualifications exist by 
 statute, and the accused alleges he is 
 under one of them. Rex v. Turner, 
 5 Maule & Selw. 206, 2ii„2i3; Hines 
 V. State, 93 G*i. 187, 189, 18 S. E. 
 558; Commonwealth v. Zelt, 138 Pa. 
 St. 615, 21 Atl. 7, II L. R. A. 602; 
 State V. Kriechbaum, 81 Iowa 633, 47 
 X. W. 872 ; State v. Hill, 46 La. Ann. 
 27, 49 Am. St. 316; Commonwealth 
 V. Samuel, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 103. 
 Thus, for example, a parent who is 
 prosecuted for failing to send his 
 child to school for the period pre- 
 scribed in a truancy statute, has the 
 
 burden of showing he is within the 
 exception of the statute. State v. 
 McCaffrey,. 69 Vt. 85, 37 Atl. 234. 
 See as to a statute forbidding one 
 not an employe in the discharge of 
 his duty, riding, on a train without the 
 permission of conductor or engineer. 
 Gains v. State, 149 Ala. 29, 43 So. 
 137, where it was held incumbent on 
 the accused to prove he was an em- 
 ploye. 
 
 ^^ State V. Wilson,. 9 Wash. 218, 37 
 Pac. 424; State v. Anderson, 5 Wash. 
 350, 31 Pac. 969. 
 
 ^^ State V. Higgins, 13 R. I. 330, 43 
 Am. St. 26. 
 
 ^ State V. Beach (Tnd.), 43 N. E. 
 949; Santo V. State, 2 Iowa 165, 63 
 Am. Dec. 487 ; Commonwealth v. Mi- 
 nor, 88 Ky. 422, II S. W. 472, 10 Ky. 
 L. 1008; Commonwealth v. Smith, 
 166 Mass. 370, 44 N. E. 503 ; State v. 
 Altoffer, 3 Ohio Dec. 288, 2 Ohio N. 
 P. 97; State v. Kyle, 14 Wash. 550, 
 45 Pac. 147. Contra, Wong Hane, In 
 re, 108 Cal. 680, 41 Pac. 693, 49 Am. 
 St. 138.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY, 
 
 § 25. Ex parte character of evidence 
 before the grand jury. 
 26. Legal and proper evidence only 
 receivable — Effect of basing 
 indictment on incompetent 
 evidence. 
 
 27. The accused as a witness before 
 
 the grand jury. 
 
 28. Sufficiency of evidence before 
 
 the grand jury. 
 
 29. Contempt by witnesses before 
 
 the grand jury. 
 
 30. The indictment is not evidence. 
 
 § 25. Ex parte character of evidence before the grand jury. — The 
 
 common law regarded the proceedings of grand jurors as abso- 
 lutely ex parte in their character. This, it will be seen, must of 
 necessity be the case, and for this reason the accused is not en- 
 titled, as of course, to appear before them either in person or by 
 counsel/ It is, however, discretionary with the court, but never 
 matter of right, to call the accused before the grand jur}^ and, 
 perhaps, under peculiar circumstances, to permit him to cross- 
 examine the witnesses against him. The accused party has no 
 right to submit any evidence. He cannot produce witnesses before 
 the grand jury nor submit evidence in his own behalf, even with 
 the permission of the state's attorney.^ The office of the grand 
 jury is to examine the foundation on which the change is made by 
 
 ^The grand jury are, in the absence 
 of statute, to hear evidence in sup- 
 port of the charge only. Lung's Case, 
 
 1 Conn. 428; United States v. Palmer, 
 
 2 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 11, 27 Fed. 
 Cas. 15989. They can not inquire in- 
 to the insanity of the accused. That 
 is matter of defense to be proved in 
 his trial. Reg. v. Hodges, 8 C. & P. 
 195- 
 
 " State V. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95, 105, 
 36 Am. 54 ; United States v. Blodgett, 
 
 35 Ga. 336, 342, Fed. Case 18312; 
 United States v. White, 2 Wash. C. 
 C. (U. S.) 29, 30, 28 Fed Cas. 16685; 
 United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 
 374; Respublica v. Shaffer, i Dall. 
 (U. S.) 236, I L. ed. 116; United 
 States v. Palmer, 2 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 S.) II, 27 Fed. Cas. 15989; United 
 States V. Lawrence, 4 Cranch C. C. 
 (U. S.) 574, 26 Fed. Cas. 15576; 
 People V. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, 19 
 Pac. 161. 
 
 (46)
 
 47 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY. § 26 
 
 the State and not that on which it is denied. This rule, though 
 a]jparently working an injustice to an accused person, is actually- 
 calculated to inure to his benefit. For, if he were allowed to in- 
 troduce witnesses and evidence in his own behalf and the ei'and 
 jury were then to indict him on all the evidence and after argu- 
 ment of counsel, an indictment would partake of the nature of a 
 verdict of guilty. It would, perhaps, raise such bias and presump- 
 tion of guilt that all hope and expectation of impartiality in the 
 traverse jurors would be at an end. 
 
 The seeming harshness of a rule that permits a presumably in- 
 nocent and honorable man to be branded with an indictment on ex 
 parte testimony which may, perhaps, prompted by malice or man- 
 ufactured for the occasion, or which may be the result of a popu- 
 lar outburst of indignation against him and which he may be per- 
 fectly able to disprove without any opportunity of meeting the 
 charge in its inception, has caused the rule to be modified in some 
 jurisdictions. It is provided by statute in some states that the 
 grand jury, though not always bound to hear exculpatory evi- 
 dence, ought, as a matter of duty, to weigh all evidence submitted 
 to them, and when they have reason to believe that they can pro- 
 cure other evidence which will explain away the charge, they 
 should order it to be produced. 
 
 From the rules above set forth it follows that the fact that the 
 accused during the inquiry by the grand jury, which resulted in 
 his being indicted, was confined in the state's prison, had no no- 
 tice of the proceedings against him, and, consequently had no op- 
 portunity to be present does not thereby invalidate the indictment.^ 
 
 So the fact that the court permits the accused, before he is in- 
 dicted to be brought handcufifed into the court-room in the pres- 
 ence of the grand jury, is not sufficient to invalidate the indict- 
 ment since it may be presumed that this would have no influence 
 on them as they may know that he is in jail and handcuffed even 
 though they did not see him,* and the knowledge of this fact is 
 in any case not material. 
 
 § 26. Legal and proper evidence only receivable — Effect of basing 
 indictment on incompetent evidence. — The grand jury is bound to 
 
 " State V. Wolcott, 21 Conn. 272. * Commonwealth v. Weber, 167 Pa. 
 
 St. 153, 31 Atl. 481.
 
 § 26 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 48 
 
 require the production of the most satisfactory and convincing 
 evidence which the case permits.*^ The witnesses should be 
 sworn^ and the prosecuting attorney should never, in justice and 
 fairness, introduce evidence which he knows, or has good reason 
 to believe, will be ruled out as incompetent at the trial.*' Many 
 statutes exist expressly providing that grand juries shall receive 
 legal evidence only. Sometimes it is enacted that the best evidence 
 must be produced.^ 
 
 For investigations before grand juries must be made in accord- 
 ance with the well-established rules of evidence, and they must 
 hear the best legal proofs of which the case admits. No evidence 
 should be received by a grand jury which would not be admissible 
 in a court upon the trial of the cause. And hearsay evidence upon 
 questions before a grand jury is no more admissible than before 
 the court,^ 
 
 Though usually the witnesses should be produced and sworn 
 before the grand jury, depositions, containing the evidence taken 
 at the preliminary examination, may be received where the ac- 
 cused has had at the preliminary examination an opportunity to 
 cross-examine though he may not have done so.^ As the accused 
 has no right to cross-examine witnesses before the grand jury, 
 it is not grounds for quashing an indictment that it was based 
 solely on depositions." It should be remembered, however, that 
 
 *a Note on incompetency of evi- grand jury, Bird v. State, 50 Ga. 585. 
 
 dence before the grand jury, 28 L. ^ People v. Sellick, 4 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 
 
 R. A. 318; note on documentary evi- 329, 334; State v. Logan, i Nev. 509, 
 
 dence before the grand jury, 28 L. R. 516. 
 
 A. 320; note on use of depositions ^Ky. Cr. Code, § 107; Comp. L. 
 
 and afifidavits before the grand jury, Nev., 1873, § 183 1 ; Cal. Penal Code, 
 
 28 L. R. A. 319; note on competency §919; Minn. St. at Large, 1873, § 108, 
 
 of evidence before the grand jury, page 1036; N. Y. Code Cr. Pro., 
 
 confessions, admissions and refusal § 256 ; People v. Brickner, 8 N. Y. 
 
 to testify, 28 L. R. A. 318; note on Cr. Rep. 217, 221. 
 
 evidence of criminals before grand ^ United States v. Reed, 2 Blatchf. 
 
 jury, 28 L? R. A. 319. (U. S.) 435, 27 Fed. Cas. 16134; 
 
 ^ State V. Kilcrease, 6 S. Car. 444; United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 
 
 United States v. Coolidge, 2 Gall. (U. 765. 
 
 S.) 364, 25 Fed. Cas. T4858. The oath 'N. Y. Code Cr. Pro., §255; 
 
 must be administered by a legally ap- Thompson and Merriam on Juries, 
 
 pointed official, Joyner v. State, 78 § 64T. 
 
 Ala. 448, or by the foreman of the " People v. Stuart, 4 Cal. 218, 225.
 
 49 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY. § 26 
 
 the testimony goes before the grand jury in the absence of the 
 judge, and very often while the prosecuting officer is not in the 
 grand jury room. Hence, to confine grand juries to the technical 
 rules of evidence may be intolerable in practice/^ As a general 
 rule the fact that some incompetent evidence was received by the 
 grand jury in connection with competent evidence, or an incom- 
 petent witness^" examined, is not ground for quashing an indict- 
 ment, if there is enough competent evidence, since these errors 
 may be corrected on the trial. ^" 
 
 So an indictment is not void because it was found by the grand 
 jury after hearing testimony from one of the grand jurors, since 
 a grand jury may properly act upon the personal knowledge of 
 any of its members.^* 
 
 ]\Iany of the trial courts absolutely refuse to inquire into the 
 question of the character, the insufficiency, or the incompetency 
 of the evidence on which the indictment is based, regarding the 
 finding of the indictment and its indorsement as conclusive of 
 the legality, propriety and sufficiency of the evidence/^ 
 
 But an indictment which plainly appears to the trial court to 
 have no evidence to support it, except that which is wholly in- 
 
 " State V. Wolcott, 21 Conn. 272, 338; Hope v. People, 83 N. Y. 418, 
 
 280; State V. Boyd, 2 Hill (S. Car.) 423, 38 Am. 460. 
 
 288, 289. "Commonwealth v. Hayden, 163 
 
 " "Whether witnesses are compe- ]\rass. 453, 40 N. E. 846, 47 Am. St. 
 
 tent is often a very difficult question 468, 28 L. R. A. 318. 
 
 of law. To hold that if a grand jury "Creek v. State, 24 Ind. 151, 156; 
 
 happen to examine a single incompe- Hammond v. State, 74 Miss. 214, 21 
 
 tent witness their finding will be vi- So. 149; State v. Shreve, 137 Mo. i, 
 
 tiated, is taking extreme ground." 38 S. W. 548; People v. Sebring, 66 
 
 Dillon, J., in State v. Tucker, 20 Iowa ]\Hch. 705, 707, 33 N. W. 808; United 
 
 508, 510. States V. Reed, 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 
 
 ^^Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 435, 466, 27 Fed. Cas. 16134; Low's 
 
 (Mass.) 496, 20 Am. Dec. 491; State Case, 4 Greenl. (]Me.) 439, 446, 16 
 
 V. Dayton, 23 N. J. L. 49, 53 Am. Am. Dec. 27in; Stewart v. State, 24 
 
 Dec. 270; State v. Fasset, 16 Conn. Ind. 142, 145; People v. Hulbut, 4 
 
 458, 471 ; Bloomer v. State, 3 Sneed Denio (N. Y.) 133, 135, 47 Am. Dec. 
 
 (Tenn.) 66, 70; Rex v. Marsh, 6 Ad. 244; Hope v. People, 83 N. Y. 418, 
 
 & El. 236 ; State v. M'Leod, i Hawks 38 Am. 460 ; State v. Fowler, 52 Iowa 
 
 (X. Car.) 344; State v. Logan, i 103, 104, 2 N. W. 983; People v. 
 
 Nev. 509, 516; State v. Baker, 20 Mo. Naughton, 7 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 
 
 421. 
 
 4 — Underhill Crim. Ev.
 
 26 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 50 
 
 competent, must be set aside. ^° Thus, an indictment which is 
 based wholly on the evidence of the accused, who, in violation of 
 his constitutional rights and privileges was compelled to testify 
 against himself before the grand jury,^^ or on the knowledge of 
 a grand juror who was not sworn as a witness,^* or partly on 
 evidence given by the wife of the accused, ^° which is incompetent 
 because confidential or privileged, or upon the evidence of a 
 physician of communications by his patient to him w^iich came 
 under the rule of statutory privilege,"*' i's invalid."^ 
 
 An indictment cannot stand unless it is based on evidence 
 which, at some time or another, has been considered by the grand 
 jury which finds the indictment. The grand jury may,^ without 
 re-examining witnesses, find one indictment as a substitute for an- 
 other previously found."" But an indictment which has been 
 quashed, or on which a nol. pros, has been entered, is not alone 
 evidence enough to support a new indictment."^ 
 
 As a general rule, a grand jury should hear no other evidence 
 than that adduced by the prosecution, but they are sworn "to in- 
 
 ^' Sparrenberger v. State, 53 Ala. 
 481, 486, 25 Am. 643; People v. Rest- 
 enblatt, i Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 268, 272; 
 United States v. Farrington, 5 Fed. 
 343; State V. Logan, i Nev. 509, 516; 
 United States v. Coolidge, 2 Gall. (U. 
 S.) 364, 25 Fed. Cas. 14858; Com- 
 monwealth V. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 
 496, 498, 20 Am. Dec. 491 ; People v. 
 Briggs, 60 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 17, 30; 
 Royce v. Territory, 5 Okla. 61, 47 
 Pac. 1083; State v. Grady, 84 Mo. 
 220, aff'g 12 Mo. App. 361. 
 
 " State V. Froiseth, 16 Minn. 296, 
 298; United States v. Edgerton, 80 
 Fed. 374; post, § 27. 
 
 ^^ State V. Cain, i Hawks. (N. Car.) 
 352, 353. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hay- 
 den, 163 Mass. 453, 455, 40 N. E. 846, 
 47 Am. St. 468, 28 L. R. A. 3i8n. 
 
 " People V. Briggs, 60 How. Pr. 
 (N. Y.) 17; Commonwealth v. Wood- 
 croft, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 554. 
 
 =" People V. Sellick, 4 N. Y. Cr. 
 Rep. 329. 
 
 ^ In United States v. Coolidge, 2 Gall. 
 (U. S.) 364, 25 Fed. Cas. 14858, the 
 court said, setting aside an indictment 
 based upon the evidence of a witness 
 not sworn: "The grand jury is the 
 great inquest between the government 
 and the citizen. It is of the highest 
 importance that this institution be 
 preserved in its purity and no citizen 
 tried until he has been regularly ac- 
 cused. Every indictment is subject to 
 the control of the court, and this in- 
 dictment having been found irregu- 
 larly, and upon the mere unsworn 
 statement of a witness, which was 
 not evidence, a cassetur must be en- 
 tered." 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Woods, 10 
 Gray (Mass.) 477, 483; Creek v. 
 State, 24 Ind. 151, 156. 
 
 "^ Sparrenberger v. State, 53 Ala. 
 481, 486, 25 Am. 643.
 
 51 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY. § 27 
 
 quire and true presentment make ;" and if, in course of their 
 inquiries, they have reason to beheve that there is other evidence 
 not presented and within reach, which would quaHfy or explain 
 away the charge under investigation, it would be their duty to 
 order such evidence to be produced.^* 
 
 § 27. The accused as a witness before the grand jury. — Under the 
 universal constitutional provisions that no one shall be compelled 
 in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself, an indict- 
 ment should be quashed when the defendant was compelled by 
 subpoena to testify before the grand jury, and the indictment is 
 founded on his testimony alone.^^ The fact that the accused vol- 
 untarily testifies before the grand jury affords no ground for set- 
 ting aside the indictment. It must be shown, however, not only 
 that his appearance was voluntary, but that he confessed his 
 wrong-doing voluntarily and not inadvertently, or under the com- 
 pulsion or constraint of his situation, or under the obligation of 
 an oath.-° 
 
 The question arises, ought an indictment to be quashed on mo- 
 tion merely because the accused, being at that time not charged 
 with any crime, happened to be one of several witnesses sum- 
 moned and examined by the grand jury in investigating a crime ? 
 
 If any person summoned fails to claim his privilege against 
 answering incriminating or implicating questions, the mere fact 
 that he has testified is not enough to invalidate an indictment 
 against him, though based solely upon his testimony,-^ Nor will 
 the fact that a suspected person has been required to give evidence 
 in another matter be sufficient to set aside an indictment on the 
 ground that he was compelled to testify against himself, unless 
 
 '* United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 96; State v. 
 
 Fed. 765. Donelon, 45 La. Ann. 744, 12 So. 922, 
 
 " State V. Froiseth, 16 Minn. 296, 923. 
 
 298 ; Boone v. People, 148 111. 440, "" People v. King, 28 Cal. 265, 272 ; 
 
 449, 36 N. E. 99; People v. Haines, i United States v. Brown, i Sawy. (U. 
 
 N. Y. S. 55; United States v. Edger- S.) 531, 537, 24 Fed. Cas. 14671. 
 
 ton, 80 Fed. 374. This rule is appli- "United States v. Brown, i Sawy. 
 
 cable, though the accused was cau- (U. S.) 531, 24 Fed. Cas. 14671;, 
 
 tioned that he was under no obliga- Boone v. People, 148 111. 440, 36 N. 
 
 tion to answer and was not sworn. E. 99. 
 People V. Singer, 5 N. Y. Cr. 1-4, 18
 
 § 28 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 52 
 
 it affirmatively appears that he was indicted wholly or in part on 
 his own admissions. ^^ 
 
 § 28. Sufficiency of evidence before the grand jury. — The early 
 judges, prompted, doubtless, by a too great subserviency to the 
 Crown, and by a disgraceful zeal for securing the punishment of 
 those who were obnoxious to the royal power, did not require that 
 the evidence presented to the grand jurors on which an indict- 
 ment was based should be either copious or convincing. "If there 
 be probable evidence, they ought to find the bill," says Hale,^*^ "be- 
 cause it is but an accusation, and the trial follows." The better 
 and more modern rule, as stated by Blackstone, is that "a grand 
 jury ought to be thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an indict- 
 ment, so far as their evidence goes, and not to rest satisfied with 
 remote probabilities."^^ In other words, the grand jury ought not 
 to indict unless they are convinced that the accused is guilty and 
 that the evidence before them is sufficient, if unexplained and un- 
 contradicted, to convict him.^^ 
 
 § 29. Contempt by witnesses before the grand jury. — ^The grand 
 jury is a part of the court. Its session is a session of the court, 
 and witnesses when summoned before it are amenable to punish- 
 ment for contempt if they refuse to appear or on appearing refuse 
 to testify.^- The grand jurors may direct their own officer to take 
 
 ^'Mackin v. People, 115 III. 312, 3 S. Car. 356; State v. Fasset, 16 Conn. 
 N. E. 222, 56 Am. 167; State v. 458, 473; In re Grand Jury, 62 Fed. 
 Hawks, 56 Minn. 129, 139, 57 N. W. 840. And this is the statutory rule in 
 455- Where co-defendants jointly in- many states, but the ancient rule that 
 dieted were examined by the grand the court will not revise the judg- 
 jury prior to the indictment, no pre- ment of the grand jury for the pur- 
 sumption exists that either was ex- pose of determining whether or not 
 amined against himself. State v. the finding was on sufficient evidence 
 Frizell, iii N. Car. 722, 723, 16 S. E. was upheld in United States v. Reed, 
 409. 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 435, 27 Fed. Cas. 
 ^2 Hale P. C. 157. 16134; Raney v. Commonwealth, 2 
 '"' 4 Bl. Com. 303. Ky Law 62 ; State v. Lewis, 38 
 ^^ In re Grand Jury, 2 Sawy. (U. S.) La. Ann. 680. Note on sufficiency of 
 667; I Chitty Cr. Law 318; People v. evidence before grand jury to sustain 
 Hyler, 2 Park Cr. 570, 575 ; People indictment, 28 L. R. A. 324. 
 V. Price, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 185, 6 N. ^"Taylor, In re, 8 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 Y. S. 833; People v. Baker, 10 How. 159, 28 N. Y. S. 500, 509; Common- 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 567; People v. Vaughan, wealth v. Crans, 3 Pa. L. J. 442, 453. 
 42 N. Y. S. 959; State v. Addison, 2
 
 53 EVIDENCE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY. § 30 
 
 the witness before the judge in order that he may be punished 
 if he remains contumacious, and the judicial sentence on the con- 
 tempt, whether fine or imprisonment, is final and conclusive.^^ 
 
 § 30. The indictment is not evidence. — The indictment is read in 
 the statement of the case of the prosecution. It does not when 
 thus read have the weight and significance which attach to it if 
 read in evidence. Its true and sole use is to charge the crime, and 
 to inform the accused of the offense alleged against him. The in- 
 dictment is not evidence and should not be read to or by the jurors 
 either in the court-room or elsewhere. If the court shall permit 
 this, and the indictment is thus placed in evidence without any 
 limitation or any explanation of the purpose of its introduction, 
 the jury may take it as an intimation from the court that the mere 
 fact of the accused having been indicted is evidence, and that the 
 indictment must be considered in determining his guilt.^* 
 
 '^ Taylor, //! rf, 8 Misc. (N. Y.) 159, self-incriminating questions before 
 
 28 N. Y. S. 500, 504; Lockwood v. the grand jury. State v. Lewis, 96 
 
 State, I Ind. 161 ; Ward v. State, 2 Iowa 286, 65 N. W. 295. 
 
 Mo. 120, 22 Am. Dec. 449; People v. "State v. Hart, (^ Mo. 208, 215; 
 
 Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74 ; People v. Fancher, State v. Desroches, 48 La. Ann. 428, 
 
 2 Hun (N. Y.) 226. A witness is not 19 So. 250. 
 in contempt who refuses to answer
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 VARIANCE AND PROOF OF THE VENUE. 
 
 § 31. Proving the substance of the of- 35. Proving the venue — Judicial 
 
 fense — What variances are notice of general geographical 
 
 material. facts. 
 
 32. Proof of essential particulars of 36. The venue may be proved by 
 
 persons, time and place. circumstantial evidence — 
 
 3S. Variance in names — Idem so- Proof beyond a reasonable 
 
 nans. doubt not required. 
 
 34. Variance in proving species or 37. Proof of venue in forgery and 
 
 genus of animals. crimes committed in retire- 
 ment. 
 
 § 31. Proving the substance of the offense — What variances are 
 material. — The strict technical rules formerly governing this sub- 
 ject have been greatly relaxed, if not altogether abrogated, by 
 statutory enactment or by the liberal spirit of the modern courts 
 of criminal jurisdiction. In determining whether a variance is 
 material, the question to be decided is, does the indictment so far 
 fully and correctly inform the defendant of the criminal act with 
 which he is charged that, taking into consideration the proof 
 which is introduced against him, he is not misled in making his 
 defense, or placed in danger of being twice put in jeopardy for 
 the same offense?^ If this be not so, then the variance is material, 
 and the state, having failed to prove the crime, in substance as it 
 is alleged, the acquittal of the accused should be directed. 
 
 Whether a greater strictness of proof is required in criminal 
 than is necessary in civil proceedings in favor of life and liberty 
 is a question upon which the cases differ.^ But though the general 
 rule is that the crime which is laid in the indictment must be 
 
 ^ Harris v. People, 64 N. Y. 148, 153, United States v. Porter, 3 Day 
 
 154. Variance in proof of substance (Conn.) 283, 286. Contra, 2 Russ. 
 
 of charge, Elliott Ev., § 2714; vari- on Cr., § 588; Rose. Cr. Ev. 73; 
 
 ance in prosecution for gambling, El- United States v. Britton, 2 Mason 
 
 liott Ev., § 3007. (U. S.) 464, 468. 24 Fed. Cas. 14650: 
 
 "Beech's Case, i Leach Cr. L. 158; Walker v. State, 91 Ala. 76, 9 So. 87. 
 
 (54)
 
 55 VARIANCE AND PROOF OF VENUE. § 32 
 
 proved substantially as alleged, no variance will be material if the 
 allegations of the indictment are separable and the substance of 
 the crime is proven, though some immaterial averments remain 
 unproved.^ 
 
 And as a general rule any allegation which is not descriptive 
 of the identity of the offense itself, that is, which does not mark 
 it out as a crime and distinguish it from other crimes, or from 
 actions which are not criminal, and which therefore may be 
 omitted without affecting the criminality of the charge and with- 
 out detriment to the indictment, is mere surplusage and need not 
 be proved.* 
 
 § 32. Proof of essential particulars of persons, time or place. — 
 "The general rule is that all averments necessary to constitute the 
 substantive offense must be proved. If there is any exception, it 
 is from necessity, or great difficulty amounting to such necessity, 
 as where one could not show the negative and where the other 
 with perfect ease can show the affirmative."^ All circumstances 
 of person, place or thing, which are described in the indictment 
 with extreme or unnecessary particularity, must be proven strictly, 
 if, by reason of such a mode of pleading, the details are essential 
 to enable the jury to perceive the identity of the thing or person 
 proved with that alleged.*' Thus where one is indicted for stealing 
 an animal which is described either by color, age or brand, these 
 details become material, and a variance is fatal. '^ The time and 
 
 ^In Bork v. People, gi N. Y. 5, 13, ® Sweat v. State, 4 Tex. App. 617, 
 
 the court says : "Where an offense 621. 
 
 may be committed by doing one of ^ Coleman v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 
 several things, the indictment may, in 520, 528, 2 S. W. 859; State v. Jack- 
 
 a single count, group them together, son, 30 Me. 29, 30; Wiley v. State, 74 
 
 and charge the defendant with having Ga. 840; Groom v. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 
 committed them all, and a conviction 82, 86, 87, 3 S. W. 668. When by a 
 
 may be had on proof of the commis- statute animals are distinguished ac- 
 
 sion of any one of those things with- cording to species, proof of one spe- 
 
 nut proof of the commission of the cies is a variance, if another is al- 
 
 others." See, also, People v. Davis, leged. State v. Buckles, 26 Kan. 237; 
 
 56 N. Y. 95, loi. Rex V. Cook, i Leach Cr. L. 123; 
 * Commonwealth v. Rowell, 146 State v. Godet, 7 Ired. (N. Car.) 210, 
 
 Mass. 128, 130, IS N. E. 154. 211; State v. Turley, 3 Humph. 
 
 ^Shaw, J., in Commonwealth v. (Tenn.) 323, 325. An allegation of 
 
 Thurlow, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 374, 381. stealing an animal is not sustained
 
 33 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 56 
 
 place of the crime should be stated with certainty in the indict- 
 ment, though it is not necessary to prove them precisely as stated, 
 unless they are necessary ingredients in the crime.^ But it must 
 always be alleged and proved that the crime was committed prior 
 to the date^ of the indictment, within the period of limitation,^" 
 and within the jurisdiction of the court." When, however, time 
 and place are material, as in a prosecution for selling liquor be- 
 tween specified dates, or on forbidden days,^" or for transporting 
 licpior between given places, ^^ the details of time and place must 
 be proved precisely as alleged. 
 
 § 33. Variance in names — Idem sonans. — A variance between the 
 name of a person as alleged and as it is proved, whether it be the 
 name of a person assaulted or killed, or of the person who owned 
 the property which was the subject of the crime, has often been 
 held fatal.^* A mere error in spelling, or the use of a nickname, 
 is no variance. If the names be idcui sonans, or, if sufficient evi- 
 
 by proof of the theft of a carcass. 
 Hunt V. State, 55 Ala. 138; State v. 
 Jenkins, 6 Jones (N. Car.) 19, 20. 
 
 *Arch. Cr. PI. 40, 41; Crass v. 
 State, 30 Tex. App. 480, 17 S. W. 
 1096 ; Blackwell v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 416, 418, 17 S. W. 1061 ; People v. 
 Emerson, 7 N. Y. Cr. 97, 105, 6 N. Y. 
 S. 274; Commonwealth v. Harring- 
 ton, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 26; People v. 
 Stocking, 50 Barb. (N. Y.) 573, 586; 
 People V. Jackson, 11 1 N. Y. 362, 19 
 N. E. 54, 6 N. Y. Cr. 393, 399 (vari- 
 ance in time) ; United States v. Ma- 
 thews, 68 Fed. 880; Smith v. State, 
 108 Ala. I, 19 So. 306, 54 Am. St. 
 140; Johnson v. State, 13 Ind. App. 
 299; Hans V. State, 50 Neb. 150, 69 
 N. W. 838. 
 
 'Turner v. State, 89 Ga. 424, 15 S. 
 E. 488; Commonwealth v. Graves, 112 
 Mass. 282; State v. Hughes, 82 Mo. 
 86; Hardy v. State (Tex.), 44 S. W. 
 
 173- 
 
 ^"Weinert v. State, 35 Fla. 229, 17 
 So. 570; State V. Anderson, 51 La. 
 
 Ann. 1 181, 25 So. 990; State v. 
 Schuerman, 70 Mo. App. 518; State v. 
 Carpenter, 74 N. Car. 230. 
 
 "Arcia v. State, 28 Tex. App. 198, 
 12 S. W. 599; State v. Dorr, 82 Me. 
 212, 214, 19 Atl. 171 ; State v. Bain, 
 43 Kan. 638, 640, 23 Pac. 1070. 
 
 ^" Commonwealth v. Purdy, 146 
 Mass. 138, 139, IS N. E. 364. 
 
 "State V. Libby, 84 Me. 461, 464, 
 24 Atl. 940. 
 
 "Washington v. State, 72 Ala. 272, 
 276; Johnson v. State, iii Ala. 66, 20 
 So. 590; Sullivan v. People, 6 Colo. 
 App. 458, 41 Pac. 840; People v. 
 Armstrong, 114 Cal. 570, 46 Pac. 611 ; 
 People V. Main, 114 Cal. 632, 46 Pac. 
 612; Commonwealth v. Morningstar, 
 12 Pa. Co. Ct. 34; Clements v. State, 
 21 Tex. App. 258, 17 S. W. 156; Mc- 
 Gary v. People, 45 N. Y. 153, 157; 
 Sykes V. People, 132 111. 32, 45, 23 N. 
 E. 391 ; King v. State, 44 Ind. 285, 
 286; People V. Hughes, 41 Cal. 234, 
 237 ; Underwood v. State, 72 Ala. 220, 
 222 ; State v. Bell, 63 N. Car. 99n.
 
 57 
 
 VARIANCE AND PROOF OF VENUE, 
 
 § 34 
 
 dence is introduced to identify the person intended, the variance 
 of name is immaterial and will be disregarded/^ 
 
 Whether names are idem sonans is never a question of spell- 
 ing, but of pronunciation determined largely by usage. If the 
 names, though spelled differently, sound alike, the court may de- 
 termine that they are idem sonans and instruct the jury to dis- 
 regard the variance in spelling/*' But if they are not necessarily 
 pronounced alike, the question, whether, being spelled differently, 
 they are idem sonans, is for the jury." 
 
 § 34. Variance in proving species or genus of animals. — An in- 
 dictment for stealing a cow,^^ chickens,^^ a sheep, -** a horse,-^ or 
 a hog,^^ will be sustained by proof of the larceny of any variety 
 or sex of those animals. The generic name ought and in common 
 
 " Williams v. United States, 3 App. 
 D- C. 335; Barnes v. People, 18 111. 
 52, 53, 65 Am. Dec. 699; State v. 
 Humble, 34 Mo. App. 343, 345-348; 
 Weitzel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 523, 13 
 S. W. 864, 19 Am. St. 855; Smurr v. 
 State, 88 Ind. 504, 506; State v. Gor- 
 don, 56 Kan. 64, 42 Pac. 346; People 
 V. Mullen, 7 Cal. App. 547, 94 Pac. 
 867. Evidence of the name by which 
 a person is known is not the best evi- 
 dence as to his true name set forth in 
 an indictment ; but it is not hearsay, 
 within the rule excluding hearsay evi- 
 dence. People V. Way, 119 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 344, 104 N. Y. S. 277, af- 
 firmed in 191 N. Y. 533, 84 N. E. 
 1 1 17. See, as to the admissibility of 
 such evidence, Carter v. State, 39 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 345, 46 S. W. 236, 48 S. W. 
 508. 
 
 " State V. Havely, 21 Mo. 498. 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Donovan, 13 
 Allen (Arass.) 571, 572; Common- 
 wealth V. Mehan, 11 Gray (Mass.) 
 321, 323; Lawrence v. State, 59 Ala. 
 61 ; Underwood v. State, 72 Ala. 220, 
 222; Commonwealth v. Warren, 143 
 Alass. 568, 10 X. E. 178. For illustra- 
 
 tions, see Faust v. United States, 163 
 U. S. 452, 41 L. ed. 224, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 1112; People v. James, no Cal. 155, 
 42 Pac. 479 ; Bennett v. State, 62 Ark. 
 516, 36 S. W. 947; State V. Garvin, 48 
 S. Car. 258, 26 S. E. 570; Henderson 
 V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 79, 38 S. 
 W. 617. "It matters not how the 
 names are spelled, what their orthog- 
 raphy. They are idem sonans within 
 the meaning of the books, if the at- 
 tentive ear finds difficulty in distin- 
 guishing them when pronounced, or 
 common and long established usage 
 has by corruption or abbreviation 
 made them identical in pronunciation." 
 Robson V. Thomas, 55 Mo. 581 ; app'd 
 in State v. Jones, 55 Minn. 329, 332, 
 S6 N. W. 1068; State v. Griffie, 118 
 ]\Io. 188, 197, 23 S. W. 878. 
 
 ^® Parker v. State, 39 Ala. 365, 366. 
 
 ^^ State v. Bassett, 34 La. Ann. 1108, 
 mo. 
 
 =0 M'CulIy's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 272. 
 
 "^ Davis V. State, 23 Tex. App. 210, 
 
 4 S. W. 590. 
 
 "State V. Godet, 7 Ired. (X. Car.) 
 210, 211.
 
 § 35 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 58 
 
 speech does include every variety of the animal, whether produced 
 naturally, as by age and sex, or artificially by cultivation, or oc- 
 cupation. Hence, the above rule would seem based on reason and 
 common sense. It is repudiated by the English courts,-^ and by 
 those criminal tribunals of this country whose conservatism has 
 deterred them from cutting loose from technical rules, or inquir- 
 ing into the reasonableness, or propriety of such rules."* 
 
 § 35. Proving the venue — Judicial notice of general geographical 
 facts. — The indictment is not good unless it shows upon its face 
 the venue of the crime, and that it was committed within the 
 jurisdiction of the court. The venue is a jurisdictional fact and 
 must always be proved by the state as a part of its case. That is 
 to say, the state must prove that the crime alleged in the indict- 
 ment was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
 court.^^- And usually the precise venue must be proved affirma- 
 tively and substantially, and a failure to do so is ground for a 
 new trial.-® 
 
 If, however, the crime is shown to have been committed in, or 
 
 -^2 East P. C. 617. 51 Miss. 353; Williams v. State, 21 
 
 ^ Hooker V. State, 4 Ohio 348, 351 ; Tex. App. 256, 257, 17 S. W. 624; 
 
 Turley v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) Ryan v. State, 22 Tex. App. 699, 703, 
 
 323, 325. 3 S. W. 547; Larkin v. People, 61 
 
 "State V. McGinniss, 74 Mo. 245, Barb. (N. Y.) 226; Yates v. State, 10 
 
 247; State V. Wacker, 16 Mo. App. Yerg. (Temi.) 549; Boykin v.' State, 
 
 417, 421 ; Barnes v. State, 134 Ala. 36, 148 Ala. 608, 42 So. 999 ; Wilson v. 
 
 32 So. 670; Dentler V. State, 112 Ala. State (Ga. App.), 64 S. E. 112; 
 
 70, 20 So. 592; Dyer v. State, 74 Ind. State v. First Nat. Bank, 3 S. Dak. 
 
 594. 595; Harlan v. State, 134 Ind. 52, 51 N. W. 780; Weinberg v. Peo- 
 
 339, 341, 33 N. E. 1102; Stazey v. pie, 208 111. 15, 69 N. E. 936; Wooten 
 
 State, 58 Ind. 514; State v. Mills, 33 v. State, 119 Ga. 745, 47 S. E. 193. 
 W. Va. 455, 457, ID S. E. 808; State "^The objection that the venue is 
 
 V. Hobbs, 37 W. Va. 812, 814, 17 S. E. not proved must be taken at the trial. 
 
 380; Randolph v. State, 100 Ala. 139, State v. Hopkins, 94 Iowa 86, 62 N. 
 
 141, 14 So. 792; Jones v. State, W. 656; but will be presumed to be 
 
 58 Ark. 390, 396, 24 S. W. 1073; included in an exception to the ver- 
 
 Frazier v. State, 56 Ark. 242, diet that it is against the law and 
 
 244, 19 S. W. 838; Berry v. State, without sufficient evidence to support 
 
 92 Ga. 47, 48, 17 S. E. 1006; Thor- it. Berry v. State, 92 Ga. 47, 48, 17 
 
 nell V. People, 11 Colo. 305, 17 Pac. S. E. 1006; Futch v. State, 90 Ga. 
 
 904 ; State v. Tosney, 26 Minn. 262, 472, 16 S. E. 102. 
 3 N. W. 345; Thompson v. State,
 
 59 
 
 VARIANCE AXD PROOF OF VEXUE, 
 
 36 
 
 very near, a certain town, village, or other minor territorial sub- 
 division, it is not necessary to prove that this minor division is 
 in the county. And if it is proved to have been committed any- 
 where in a county, the latter need not be proved to be in the state. 
 The jury, as a part of the court, are bound to take notice of gen- 
 eral geographical facts."^ 
 
 § 36. The venue may be proved by circumstantial evidence — Proof 
 beyond a reasonable doubt not required. — The venue need not be 
 proved by direct and positive evidence. It is sufficient if it may 
 be reasonably inferred from the facts and circumstances which 
 are proven and are involved in the criminal transaction. It is 
 enough if it may be inferred from the circumstances by the jury 
 that the crime was committed in the county alleged in the in- 
 dictment."* 
 
 *' Luck V. State, 96 Ind. 16, 20 ; Les- 
 lie V. State, 35 Fla. 184, 17 So. 559; 
 People V. Breese, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 429; 
 Pickerel v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 30 
 S. W. 617, 17 Ky. L. 120; People v. 
 Etting, 99 Cal. 577, 34 Pac. 237 ; Lew- 
 is V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 24 S. W. 
 903; People V. Curley, 99 Mich. 238, 
 58 N. W. 68 ; State v. Farley, 87 Iowa 
 22, 53 X. W. 1089; Sullivan v. Peo- 
 ple, 114 111. 24, 28 N. E. 381; State v. 
 Burns, 48 Mo. 438; People v. Waller, 
 70 Mich. 237, 239, 38 N. W. 261; 
 Waller v. People, 209 111. 284, 70 N. 
 E. 681 ; Boykin v. State, 148 Ala. 608, 
 42 So. 999; Dupree v. State, 148 Ala. 
 620, 42 So. 1004; Reed v. Territory 
 (Okla.), 98 Pac. 583. A failure by 
 the state to prove the venue may be 
 cured by evidence introduced by the 
 defendant from which it may be in- 
 ferred. Scott v. State, 42 Ark. 73. 
 
 ^*Tinney v. State, iii Ala. 74, 20 
 So. 597; People V. Kamaunu, no Cal. 
 609, 42 Pac. 1090; State v. Roach, 2 
 Mo. App. 1 1 14; Thornell v. People, 
 II Colo. 305, 17 Pac. 904; Common- 
 wealth V. Costley, 118 Mass. i, 9, 26; 
 
 People V. INIanning, 48 Cal. 335 ; Bland 
 V. People, 4 111. 364; State v. Snj-der, 
 44 Mo. App. 429, 430; State v. Burns, 
 48 Mo. 438, 440; State v. McGinniss, 
 74 Mo. 245, 246; Beavers v. State, 58 
 Ind. 530, 537; Hoffman v. State, 12 
 Tex. App. 406, 407; Dumas v. State, 
 62 Ga. 58, 65; Weinecke v. State, 34 
 Neb. 14, 51 N. W. 307; Wallis v. 
 State, 54 Ark. 611, 620, 16 S. W. 821; 
 Robson v. State, 83 Ga. 166, 9 S. E. 
 610, 611 ; State v. Small, 26 Kan. 209; 
 State V. West, 69 Mo. 401, 33 Am. 
 506; Brooke v. People, 23 Colo. 375, 
 48 Pac. 502; Edwards v. State (Ga.), 
 51 S. E. 505; Smith V. State, 2 Ga. 
 App. 413, 58 S. E. 549 ; Little v. State, 
 3 Ga. App. 441, 60 S. E. 113; Mill v. 
 State, I Ga. App. 134, 57 S. E. 969; 
 Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 107, 96 
 Pac. 556; State v. Brinte, 4 Penn. 
 (Del.) 551, 58 Atl. 258; State v. Gil- 
 luly, SO Wash, i, 96 Pac. 512; State 
 V. Meyer, 135 Iowa 507, 113 N. W. 
 322, 124 Am. St. 29in; State v. Har- 
 graves, 188 Mo. 337, 87 S. W. 491; 
 Murphree v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 115 S. W. 1189, 1191; Fuller v.
 
 36 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 60 
 
 The venue need not be proved beyond a reasonable doiibt.'^ 
 If the only rational conclusion from the facts in evidence is that 
 the crime was committed in the county alleged, the proof is suf- 
 ficient. ^° 
 
 The venue may be proved by circuinstantial evidence. It is not 
 necessary that a witness expressly testifies that the crime was 
 committed in the county as charged in the indictment. Such di- 
 rect and positive testimony may be dispensed with.^^ 
 
 Territory (Okla.), 99 Pac. 1098; 
 Walker v. State, 153 Ala. 31, 45 So. 
 640. 
 
 ^Keeler v. State, Tz Neb. 441, 103 
 N. W. 64; Wylie v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 182, 109 S. W. 186; State v. 
 Burns, 48 Mo. 438, 440; Boggs v. 
 State (Tex. Cr. App.), 25 S. W. 
 770 ; State v. Benson, 22 Kan, 471 ; 
 Warrace v. State, 27 Fla. 362, 8 So. 
 748; Hoffman v. State, 12 Tex. App. 
 406, 407; Achterberg v. State, 8 Tex. 
 App. 463; Wilson V. State, 62 Ark. 
 497, 36 S. W. 842, 54 Am. St. 303. 
 
 ""State V. Sanders, 106 Mo. 188, 
 190, 17 S. W. 22z; Weinecke v. State, 
 34 Neb. 14, 24, 51 N. W. 307; Abrigo 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 143, 15 S. W. 
 408; Andrews v. State, 21 Fla. 598, 
 611; Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 
 Mass. 1, 27; People v. Smith, 121 Cal. 
 355> 53 Pac. 802. "The jury has a 
 right to infer from the testimony be- 
 fore them whether it was done in the 
 county. They know all the facts and 
 the maxim vicini vicinorum pm- 
 sumunter scire applies." Bryant v. 
 State, 80 Ga. 272, 275, 4 S. E. 853; 
 Wilson V. State, 62 Ark. 497, 36 S. W. 
 842, 54 Am. St. 303; Lewis v. State, 
 129 Ga. 731, 59 S. E. 782; Wilson v. 
 State (Ga. App.), 64 S. E. 112; 
 Howard v. State, 3 Ga. App. 659, 60 
 S. E. 328; Cooper v. State, 2 Ga. App. 
 730, 59 S. E. 20; State v. Dickerson, 
 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N. E. 969, 122 Am. 
 
 St. 479; Davis V. State, 134 Wis. 632, 
 115 N. W. 150; People v. Monroe, 138 
 Cal. 97, 70 Pac. 1072 ; Tolston v. State 
 (Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S. W. 988; 
 Vernon v. United States, 146 Fed. 
 121, 76 C. C. A. 547 ; Moore v. State, 
 130 Ga. 322, 60 S. E. 544; Smith v. 
 State, 29 Fla. 408, 10 So. 89 ; Williams 
 V. State, 168 Ind. 87, 79 N. E. 1079; 
 Springer v. State, 121 Ga. 155, 48 S. 
 E. 907; Stringfield v. State, 4 Ga. 
 App. 842, 62 S. E. 569. 
 
 '^ Bloom V. State, 68 Ark. 336, 58 
 S. W. 41; Wallis V. State, 54 Ark. 
 611, 16 S. W. 821; Brooke v. People, 
 23 Colo. 375, 48 Pac. 502; Robson v. 
 State, 83 Ga. 166, 9 S. E. 610 ; Wilson 
 V. State (Ga. App.), 64 S. E. 112; 
 Dumas v. State, 62 Ga. 58; Har- 
 lan V. State, 134 Ind. 339, 33 N. E. 
 1 102; State V. Thomas, 58 Kan. 805, 
 51 Pac. 228; Moore v. State, 55 Miss. 
 432; State V. Sanders, 106 Mo. 188, 
 17 S. W. 223; State V. Chamberlain, 
 89 Mo. 129, I S. W. 145 ; Hawkins v. 
 State, 60 Neb. 380, 83 N. W. 198; 
 Weinecke v. State, 34 Neb. 14, 51 N. 
 W. 307; Harvey v. Territory, 11 Okla. 
 156, 65 Pac. 837; State v. Chaney, 9 
 Rich. (S. Car.) 438; State v. Gossett, 
 9 Rich. (S. Car.) 428; Tolston v. 
 State (Tex. Cr. App.), 42 S. W. 988; 
 Abrigo v. State, 29 Tex. App. 143, 
 IS S. W. 408; State v. Michel, 20 
 Wash. 162, 54 Pac. 995 ; Douglas v. 
 State (Ark., 1909), 121 S. W. 923.
 
 6l VARIANCE AND PROOF OF VENUE. § 37 
 
 For it has been repeatedly held where there is no direct testi- 
 mony showing the venue that if there are references in the evi- 
 dence to streets, public buildings or other landmarks at or near 
 the scene of the crime, which are either known to the members 
 of the jury or which may probably be familiar to them, the jury 
 may safely presume that the venue has been proved. For as a 
 general rule, the court will take judicial notice of streets, public 
 buildings or public places which are known or which may prob- 
 ably be known to the residents of a certain locality and will also 
 take notice that these streets or public buildings and places are 
 within the county.^^ So, if there is direct evidence that a crime 
 was committed in a certain city, village or town, the judicial no- 
 tice which the court will take of geographical facts will usually 
 be sufficient and stand in place of actual proof that the place men- 
 tioned was in the county charged in the indictment.^" 
 
 § 37. Proof of venue in forgery and crimes done in retirement. — 
 
 That the venue shall be proved by circumstantial evidence is nec- 
 essarily the case in respect to forgery and similar crimes, which 
 are secretly planned and committed, out of sight of all but the 
 accomplices of the criminal. Hence the venue of the crime of 
 forging bank-notes or of uttering forged instruments may be cor- 
 rectly inferred by the jury from evidence that forged and coun- 
 
 ^' People V. McGregar, 88 Cal. 140, Richardson v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 
 
 26 Pac. 97; Sullivan v. People, 114 111. 124; Cooper v. State, 106 Ga. 119, 32 
 
 24, 28 N. E. 381; Cluck V. State, 40 S. E. 23; State v. King, in Mo. 576, 
 
 Ind. 263 ; Commonwealth v. Ackland, 20 S. W. 299 ; United States v. Rich- 
 
 107 Mass. 211. ards, 149 Fed. 443. The evidence of 
 
 ^ Duncan v. State, 29 Fla. 439, 451, one uncontradicted and credible wit- 
 
 10 So. 815; Andrews v. State, 21 ness to the venue is sufficient. 
 
 Fla. 598, 611; McCune v. State, Speight v. State, 80 Ga. 512, 5 S. E. 
 
 42 Fla. 192, 27 So. 867, 89 Am. 506; Laydon v. State, 52 Ind. 459. 
 
 St. 225; State V. Ruth, 14 Mo. App. Some cases hold, however, that the 
 
 226; People V. McGregar, 88 Cal. jury can not assume that the street 
 
 140, T43, 145, 26 Pac. 97 ; Cluck or public place in which the evidence 
 
 V. State, 40 Ind. 263, 273 ; Com- shows the crime was committed is 
 
 monwealth v. Ackland, 107 Mass. within a town, city or county within 
 
 211; State V. Fetterly, 33 Wash. 599, the jurisdiction, but that this fact 
 
 74 Pac. 810; State v. Kelly, 123 Mo. must appear from the proof. Evans 
 
 App. 680, loi S. W. 155; State v. v. State, 17 Fla. 192; Dougherty v. 
 
 Kline, 50 Ore. 426, 93 Pac. 237; State People, 118 III. 160, 8 N. E. 673. 
 V. Wheat on (Kan.), 99 Pac. 1132-
 
 38 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 62 
 
 terfeit notes and implements for their manufacture were found 
 in the possession of the accused in the county as alleged,^'* or that 
 he had always resided in the county and confessed the forgery 
 there.^^ 
 
 Though proof of the finding of a dead body in the county al- 
 leged is not, taken alone, sufficient proof of the venue, it is a cir- 
 cumstance to go to the jury to be considered by them with other 
 evidence.^'' If a corpse is found in a river with the marks of mor- 
 tal injuries on it in such a situation that from the evidence it is 
 clear that it was not borne there by the current, but that it was 
 thrown in the stream by the hand of man, the jury may infer the 
 homicide was committed in the county where the corpse is found. ^^ 
 
 '■* Spencer v. Commonwealth, 2 
 Leigh (Va.) 751, 756, 757; State v. 
 Poindexter, 23 W. Va. 805. Contra, 
 Commonwealth v. Fagan, 12 Pa. Co. 
 Ct. 613. 
 
 ^^ Johnson v. State, 62 Ga. 299, 301 ; 
 Murphree v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 115 S. W. 1189, 1191. The court 
 by Story, J., in United States v. Brit- 
 ton, 2 Mason (U. S.) 464, 470, 24 
 Fed. Cas. 14650, said : "If its exist- 
 ence in a forged state is not proved 
 in any other place, it must, from the 
 necessity of the case, be presumed to 
 have been forged where its existence 
 in such state is first made known. 
 
 * * * If the law were otherwise 
 it would be almost impossible to con- 
 vict any person of a forgery, for such 
 acts are done in retirement and con- 
 cealment, far from the sight of all 
 persons but confederates in guilt." 
 As to the venue in conspiracy, see 
 Dawson v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 9, 
 40 S. W. 731. 
 
 ^^ Beavers v. State, 58 Ind. 530, 537 ; 
 Marion v. State, 20 Neb. 233, 245, 57 
 Am. 825 ; Lancaster v. State, 91 Tenn. 
 267, 18 S. W. 777- 
 
 ^^Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 
 Mass. I, 2, 6.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 38. Definition of primary evidence. 
 
 39. Primariness of witnesses — Proof 
 
 of handwriting. 
 
 40. Evidence which is required to 
 
 be in writing. 
 
 41. Statutory requirements as re- 
 
 gards evidence of certain 
 facts. 
 41a. The necessity for showing loss 
 or destruction of the writing. 
 
 42. Notice to produce. 
 
 43. Writings whose existence and 
 
 contents are ' in issue — Im- 
 peachment by contradictory 
 writings. 
 
 44. Primary evidence of collateral 
 
 facts. 
 
 45. Exception in case of proving 
 
 general results. 
 
 46. Proof of records and official ap- 
 pointments. 
 
 Physical condition of personal 
 property. 
 
 Incriminating articles — Weap- 
 ons, clothing, etc. 
 
 Inscriptions on bulky articles. 
 
 Photographs as primary evi- 
 dence — Personal identity. 
 
 Accuracy and relevancy of 
 photographs. 
 
 Paintings and drawings. 
 
 53. Real evidence — Inspection by 
 
 jurors. 
 
 54. Compelling accused to submit to 
 
 inspection or to stand for 
 identification. 
 
 55. Mode and effect of identifying 
 
 evidence. 
 s6. Identification of the voice. 
 
 47. 
 
 § 38. Definition of primary evidence. — Primary evidence may be 
 defined as the highest or best evidence which, from the abstract 
 nature of the facts to be proved, is procurable, and which, under 
 circumstances of the particular case, affords the greatest cer- 
 tainty of the fact, that is, renders the probability of its existence 
 most evident to the understanding. It is that evidence which does 
 not indicate the existence of other evidence nearer the facts to be 
 proved.^ 
 
 The rule requiring primary evidence of a fact refers most fre- 
 quently to offers of oral evidence, to prove the contents of a writ- 
 ing, where the writing itself ought to be produced. Hence, usu- 
 ally, unless it is shown that the party claiming under the writing 
 is unable to produce it after a diligent search, oral, or in fact any 
 
 ^Anderson's Law Dictionary. 
 
 (63)
 
 § 39 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 64 
 
 Other evidence of its contents, will be rejected," So where a let- 
 ter, if produced, would be primary evidence of a relevant fact, 
 a press copy, even though an exact chirographical reproduction, 
 is inadmissible, except as secondary evidence and after the loss 
 or the destruction of the original is shown." 
 
 If a writing has been executed by all parties in several parts, 
 or copies, each is primary evidence of the contents of the writing.* 
 
 A letter press copy of a letter found in the possession of and 
 proved to be in the handwriting of a defendant may be received 
 as original evidence to show the writer's state of mind without 
 proof that the original was sent to the person to whom it was ad- 
 dressed.^ 
 
 If a writing was executed in counterpart — that is, in duplicate, 
 either part, though substantially the same as the other, but signed 
 by one party only, is primary evidence only when offered against 
 the party who signed it. Each of a number of copies made by 
 printing, lithography, photography, or by any process which will 
 secure exact uniformity, is primary evidence to prove the contents 
 of any or of all the others. Though all are from a common orig- 
 inal, none is primary evidence of that original.*' And where the 
 loss of the original and of a press copy of a letter is proved, a 
 copy of the press copy is admissible, where its correctness as a 
 reproduction of the original letter is vouched for upon the oath 
 of a witness having competent knowledge.'^ 
 
 § 39, Primariness of witnesses — Proof of handwriting. — As the 
 
 production of witnesses who will give the strongest, most credit- 
 
 - Underbill on Evid., §§ 30, 31. tion of a person to take an oath as 
 
 "Whether evidence is primary or sec- deputy was admitted to prove his au- 
 
 ondary has reference to the nature of thority where the original was lost in 
 
 the case in the abstract, and not to a prosecution for taking a false 
 
 the circumstances under which the oath. People v. Ellenbogen, 186 N. Y. 
 
 party, in the particular cause on trial, 603, 79 N. E. 11 12, affirming 114 App. 
 
 may be placed. It is a distinction of Div. (N. Y.) 182, 99 N. Y. S. 897. 
 
 law and not of fact; referring only to * State v. Gurnee, 14 Kan. in, 120. 
 
 the quality and not to the strength of ^ United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 
 
 the proof. Evidence which carries on 784. 
 
 its face no indication that better re- " People v. Williams, 64 Gal. 87, 27 
 
 mains behind is not secondary but Pac. 939. 
 
 primary." i Greenl. on Evid.. §84. ^Winn v. Patterson, 9 Pet. (U. 
 
 ^A letter-press copy of a designa- S.) 663, 9 L. ed. 266.
 
 65 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 39 
 
 able and convincing testimony is not required, no principle of law- 
 is violated by the introduction of faint or weak evidence, and the 
 withholding of that which is more strong, cogent and convincing, 
 if both are equally original. But it is a very natural inference, 
 partaking somewhat of the character of a legal presumption, at 
 least in the absence of explanatory circumstances, that a party 
 Avho is withholding the best evidence of any fact in issue is 
 prompted by a wrong motive which would be defeated by its pro- 
 duction. When, therefore, evidence is produced that presupposes 
 or suggests the existence of other evidence of the same facts of 
 a more original character, that is to say, which is more immediate, 
 and which lies closer to the material facts, the evidence intro- 
 duced will be regarded as substitutionary, and, as such, will be 
 rejected. 
 
 The rule recjuiring the production of primary evidence does 
 not compel a choice between or among several witnesses, nor does 
 it necessitate the calling of any particular witness among several 
 who have knowledge of a given fact.^ 
 
 So the testimony of a witness, claiming to be a minor, to his 
 own age is primary evidence, even if his parents are living.^ while 
 the oral evidence of a parent to the age of his child is also pri- 
 mary, the entry in a family Bible not being of necessity the best 
 evidence." 
 
 An exception is recognized in the case of subscribing witnesses 
 as regards the proof of instruments which are by statute invalid 
 unless witnessed. If a subscription by witnesses is not required 
 by statute, the execution of the instrument may be shown by the 
 evidence of any person who saw it signed, or who is familiar with 
 the handwriting of a person who signed it, or otherwise, though 
 it is in fact subscribed by witnesses. Hence, generally, in proving 
 handwriting, the testimony of a witness acquainted with it is not 
 secondary to that of the writer himself," nor should the testimony 
 
 MVhart. Cr. Ev., § 360; Common- "State v. Woods, 49 Kan. 237, 30 
 
 wealth V. Pratt, 137 Mass. 98, 107; Pac. 520, 521; Dobson v. Cothran, 34 
 
 New England Monument Co. v. S. Car. 518, 13 S. E. 679; Whart. 
 
 Johnson CPa."), 22 Atl. 974, 29 W. Ev., § T7. 
 
 X. C. (Pa.) T17. "Commonwealth v. Pratt, 137 
 
 'State V. Cain, 9 W. Va. 559, 570; Mass. 98, 107. In Leffcrts v. State, 
 
 State V. Miller, 71 Kan. 200, 80 Pac. 49 N- J- L- 26, 27, 6 Atl. 521, the 
 
 5T. court said: "The testimony of the 
 
 5 — Underhill Crim. Ev'.
 
 § 40 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 66 
 
 of the former be excluded when offered because the testimony of 
 the latter can be obtained. 
 
 § 40. Evidence which is required to be in writing. — Oral evidence 
 is inadmissible if the law required primary evidence in writing, 
 or if the party to substantiate his claims must produce a writing. 
 Judicial records, other public records, deeds of conveyance and 
 contracts not to be performed wathin a year are required by stat- 
 ute to be in writing. Hence the fact of another indictment pend- 
 ing,^- a prior verdict of acquittal or conviction,^^ the proceedings 
 and the testimony taken at a coroner's inquest, or at the prelimi- 
 nary examination,^* or before the grand jury, or a justice of the 
 peace,^^ or any body keeping a record of its actions, must be 
 shown by the record or by a properly authenticated copy.^'^ 
 
 § 41. Statutory requirement as regards evidence of certain facts. — 
 Where by statute any fact or transaction must be evidenced in 
 
 man who signed the documents * * * 
 was not of a higher grade of evi- 
 dence than the testimony of a man 
 who had seen him make such signa- 
 ture, or who was acquainted with his 
 writing and deposed to his opinion." 
 See, also, Underhill on Evid., §§ 132, 
 139-141- 
 
 ^" Saxon V. State, 96 Ga. 739, 23 S. 
 E. 116; State V. McFarlain, 42 La. 
 Ann. 803, 806, 8 So. 600; State v. 
 Grayson, 38 La. Ann. 788; Hufif v. 
 State, 104 Ga. 521, 30 S. E. 808; El- 
 liott V. State, I Ga. App. 113, 57 S. 
 E. 972; Leftridge v. United States, 6 
 Ind. Ten 305, 97 S. W. 1018. On a 
 trial for murder, to prove that de- 
 ceased had been tried for homicide, 
 record must be introduced as evi- 
 dence. State V. Andrews, y^) S. Car. 
 257, 53 S. E. 423. 
 
 " Miller v. Commonwealth, — Ky, 
 — , 113 S. W. 518; Von Vetsera, Ex 
 parte, 7 Cal. App. 136, 93 Pac. 1036. 
 See § 195. 
 
 '*Bell V. State (Miss.), 38 So. 795; 
 State V. Bringgold, 40 Wash. 12, 82 
 Pac. 132; Robinson v. State, 87 Ind. 
 292, 293 ; Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 
 546, I N. E. 491 ; Sage v. State, 127 
 Ind. 15, 26, 26 N. E. 667; Leggett 
 V. State, 97 Ga. 426, 24 S. E. 165 ; 
 State V. Branham, 13 S. Car. 389; 
 Wright V. State, 50 Miss. 332, 335; 
 Cicero v. State, 54 Ga. 156; Oliver v. 
 State, 94 Ga. 83, 84, 85, 21 S. E. 125 ; 
 State V. Barrington, 198 Mo. 23, 95 
 S. W. 235; Campbell v. State, 123 Ga. 
 533, SI S. E. 644. The fact that a 
 preliminary examination was had 
 may be shown orally. People v. 
 Coffman, 59 Mich, i, 26 N. W. 207. 
 As to proof of Judicial records, see 
 Underhill on Evid., §§ 146-149. 
 
 " State v. Ireland, 89 Miss. 76^^, 42 
 So. 797- 
 
 ^° For mode of proving naturaliza- 
 tion, see Underhill on Evid., § 31.
 
 6/ PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 41a 
 
 writing, it is usually necessary to consult the statute to understand 
 its scope and effect, or to ascertain the correct mode of proof and 
 when secondary evidence will be received. Generally, where the 
 statute requires that written proof shall be made, oral evidence 
 is secondary and inadmissible if the writing is procurable. 
 
 But where either the state or the prisoner can show to the 
 satisfaction of the court that the writing was executed and has 
 been destroyed, or cannot be found after a reasonable search, its 
 contents may be proved by secondary evidence." Thus the con- 
 tents of the warrant, on which the accused was arrested,^^ or of 
 the indictment against him,^^ may be shown by parol where the 
 loss of the writing is proved. "° 
 
 In many states statutes exist which allow an instrument, duly 
 acknowledged and recorded or registered, to be proved by a certi- 
 fied copy of the record, if the original instrument is not obtain- 
 able."^ Such a provision is of great benefit to one who, not being 
 a party or privy to the writing, may never have had it in his pos- 
 session, and hence may not be able. to account for its absence by 
 showing its loss or destruction. But the instrument itself is not 
 made secondary evidence by a statute requiring record and allow- 
 ing proof by a certified copy,^' nor can a party be excused from 
 producing it when he can do so. For, unless the statute makes 
 the copy equal in evidentiary value to the original, the copy is 
 secondary evidence, and the absence of the original must be ac- 
 counted for before the copy will be received."^ 
 
 § 41a. The necessity for showing loss or destruction of the writing. 
 
 — The general rule that, before secondary evidence of the contents 
 
 "United States v. Reyburn, 6 Pet. Mo. 23, 95 S. W. 235; Campbell v. 
 
 (U. S.) 352, 365, 8 L. ed. 424. State, 123 Ga. 533, 51 S. E. 644- 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Roark, 8 Cush. '^ Commonwealth v. Emery, 2 Gray 
 
 (Mass.) 210. (Mass.) 80; Commonwealth v. 
 
 ^' State V. Whitney, 38 La. Ann. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 278, 5 N. E. 
 
 579. See Underbill on Evid. 343, 494; Underbill on Evid., §§ 134, 142c. 
 
 ante, § 30. " Chapman v. Gates, 54 N. Y. 132, 
 
 ^"A witness may not testify orally 145; Triplett v. Commonwealth, 122 
 
 as to an offense charged in a warrant Ky. 35, 91 S. W. 281, 28 Ky. L. 974; 
 
 which he had himself issued. The Lorenz v. United States, 24 App. (D. 
 
 warrant itself is the best evidence. C.) 337. 
 
 State V. Talbcrt, 41 S. Car. 526, 529, "'' State v. Penny, 70 Iowa 190, 30 
 
 19 S. E. 852; State v. Harrington, 198 N. W. 561.
 
 § 413 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 68 
 
 of a writing shall be received, its loss or destruction must be 
 shown is applicable to criminal cases.** A failure to observe this 
 rule is error.-'^ Proof of loss or destruction may be taken in the 
 absence of the jury.-" The question usually is whether the loss 
 or destruction of the writing has been sufficiently proved. Proof 
 beyond all reasonable doubt is not necessary to render secondary 
 evidence competent. There must be proof of a diligent search 
 made in places the writing is likely to be found."^ An attorney 
 or other person may testify that papers or books in his possession 
 have been lost if he had made a search. ^^ Generally the proof of 
 a failure to find the paper should be given by some one who has 
 actually made the search. A letter from a clerk of a foreign court 
 stating that he had made a search and had failed to find any rec- 
 ord of a certain judgment, is not a sufficient foundation to admit 
 secondary evidence of it.-^ 
 
 The fact that the instrument whose existence is in question and 
 whose contents it is sought to prove by secondary evidence was 
 last seen in the possession of the accused, together with evidence 
 of a search for it by the witness is sufficient to admit secondary 
 evidence. ^*^ Proof that a writing missing at the trial was used in 
 evidence on a former trial, that it went out with the jury and it 
 had not been seen since by any person, though a thorough search 
 of the jur_v room and of the papers on file had been made is a 
 sufficient predicate for secondary evidence. ^^ In all cases, the clerk 
 or other official in whose custody the papers was last seen, may, 
 and in fact ought to be produced and testimony of the search by 
 him and of his inability to find the writing is usually sufficient.^^ 
 AVhere the evidence is that the deceased person destroyed certain 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Johnson, 199 " State v. Bennett, 137 Iowa 427, 
 
 Mass. 55, 85 N. E. 188; Gould v. no N. W. 150. 
 
 State, 71 Neb. 651, 99 N. W. 541; "* State v. Shour, 196 Mo. 202, 95 
 
 Donner v. State, 69 Neb. 56, 95 N. S. W. 405. 
 
 W. 40; People V. Nail, 242 111. 284, 89 '"Grabill v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 
 N. E. 1012; State v. Poundstone (Mo. 97 S. W. 1046. 
 
 App., 1909), 124 S. W. 79; Skidmore ^" State v. Leasia, 45 Ore. 410, 78 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 123 S. W. Pac. 328. 
 
 1129. ^Andrews v. State, 152 Ala. 16, 44 
 
 ^'Kerr v. State, 105 Ga. 655, 31 S. So. 696. 
 
 E. 739. '■ Summerlin v. State, 130 Ga. 791, 
 
 "^Degg V. State, 150 Ala. 3, 43 So, 61 S. E. 849. 
 484.
 
 69 
 
 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. 
 
 42 
 
 letters, the reason she gave for destroying them may be proved 
 and secondary evidence may then be received. ^^ 
 
 § 42. Notice to produce. — In a civil case if a writing is known to 
 be in the possession of the opposite party, or if its whereabouts 
 are absolutely unknown, he should have notice to produce it, be- 
 fore secondary evidence of its contents can be received. This rule 
 is applicable to criminal prosecutions with the qualification that, 
 as the state has no power to compel the production of a writing 
 in the rightful possession of the defendant, the notice to him is 
 nugatory and may, perhaps, under some circumstances, be dis- 
 pensed with.^* 
 
 This is the case when the indictment, as in forgery, or larceny 
 of a writing, alleges the existence of a writing, and by implication 
 that it is in the possession of the accused.^^ 
 
 Some effort should be shown on the part of the state to procure 
 the papers which are in the possession of the accused.^^ This need 
 not amount to a notice to produce at the trial. 
 
 Before secondary evidence of writings in the hands of the ac- 
 cused can be admitted, it must be shown by the prosecution or 
 admitted by the accused that the papers are in his possession. 
 Where the accused is possessed of relevant documentary evidence 
 and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, secondary evidence 
 is admitted.^^ The same rule applies if he denies having the docu- 
 
 "^ State V. Ryder, 80 Vt. 422, 68 
 Atl. 652. 
 
 ^ State V. Hanscom, 28 Ore. 427, 
 43 Pac. 167; State v. Gurnee, 14 Kan. 
 Ill, 121; McGinnis v. State, 24 Ind. 
 500; Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 195 
 Mass. 100, 80 N. E. 799; State v. 
 Mulloy, III Mo. App. 679, 86 S. W. 
 569; Sullivan v. People, 108 111. App. 
 328; State V. Walker, 129 Mo. App. 
 371, 108 S. W. 615; State V. Madeira, 
 125 Mo. App. 508, 102 S. W. 1046; 
 Young V. People, 221 111. 51, ']'] N. E. 
 536; People V. Dolan, 186 N. Y. 4, 78 
 N. E. 569, 116 Am. St. 521; Moore 
 V. State, 130 Ga. 322, 60 S. E. 544. 
 
 "State V. McCauley, 17 Wash. 88, 
 
 49 Pac. 221, 55 Pac. 382; State v. 
 Constantine, 48 Wash. 218, 93 Pac. 
 317. In criminal cases, parol evidence 
 of the contents of a written instru- 
 ment in the possession of the accused 
 is admissible without notice to the 
 defendant to produce such instrument. 
 O'Brien v. United States, 27 App. D. 
 C. 263. 
 
 ^* State V. Lentz, 184 Mo. 223, 83 S. 
 W. 970. 
 
 ^^Kinard v. State, I Ga. App. 146, 
 58 S. E. 263; Mahan v. State, i Ga. 
 App. 534, 58 S. E. 265; Common- 
 wealth V. Sinclair, 195 Mass. 100, 80 
 N. E. 799-
 
 § 43 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 70 
 
 ments. This rule is of general application to all writings in the 
 possession of one or more accused persons indicted and tried 
 jointly. Thus, where documentary evidence of an incriminating 
 character was, at the request of one defendant delivered to the 
 other, the defendants tried jointly are not prejudiced by the ad- 
 mission of proof of the contents of the document by secondary 
 evidence.^^ So, the contents of a letter which was written from 
 jail by the accused to his wife may be proved by secondary evi- 
 dence for the reason that the law does not permit the prosecution 
 to compel the wife to produce it in court. A jailor or other cus- 
 todian of the prison, who, under the rules of the jail or with the 
 knowledge of the accused, opened and read the letter may testify 
 to its contents.^^ Documentary evidence which is proved to have 
 been in the possession of the prosecution, before the trial, should 
 be produced or its absence accounted for before the court should 
 admit secondary evidence of its contents. ■*" 
 
 § 43. Writing's whose existence and contents are in issue — Im- 
 peachment by contradictory writings. — \\'here the existence or the 
 contents of a writing which is material to the issue, or has an im- 
 portant bearing upon the credibility of a witness, are disputed, 
 they cannot be shown orally, or by a copy, until the absence of the 
 original is accounted for. So, where in a criminal prosecution 
 based on a violation of a statute, or city ordinance, it is necessary 
 to prove the existence, or contents, of the statute, or by-law, it 
 cannot be done by oral evidence.*^ It has been found, as matter 
 of observation, that the memory is extremely unreliable. Aside 
 from any temptation to commit perjury, to avoid which this rule 
 has been adopted, but which would always be present if the lan- 
 guage of disputed instruments were allowed to be shown by oral 
 evidence, the court has a right to see the whole document, in its 
 entirety. 
 
 Where a witness is cross-examined on the contents of a letter, 
 which he is alleged to have written, for the purpose of impeaching 
 
 ^ State V. Marsh, 70 Vt. 288, 40 Atl. ■" See Tiedeman on Municipal 
 
 836. Corp., p. 264, note 5 ; Underbill on 
 
 '^DeLeon v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 161, Evid., §§ 32, 143a, for mode of prov- 
 
 80 Pac. 348. ing ordinances and statutes. 
 
 ^^ Young V. People, 221 111. 51, 'J^ 
 N. E. 536.
 
 yi PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 44 
 
 him, by proving prior contradictory statements therein, the letter 
 itself must first be read to him, and he must be asked if he has 
 written it/- It is not proper to read a portion of it, or to incorpo- 
 rate a part, or all of it in a question, and to ask him if he wrote a 
 letter to that effect. So, where a witness is examined under a 
 commission, and, in reply to an interrogatory, gives the contents 
 of a letter without producing it, the answer will be stricken out, 
 if there is no method of obtaining the letter.*^ 
 
 An allegation of forgery suggests by implication the existence 
 of a forged paper which must be produced, as the best evidence 
 of the fact of forgery, or accounted for, even where the forgery 
 is collateral and is relevant solely for the purpose of showing a 
 criminal intent.^* Unless the accused has been connected the er- 
 roneous admission of parol evidence of the contents of a missing 
 writing is cured by its subsequent production,*^ by the party 
 claiming under it, or by his adversary.*** A copy of a writing may 
 be received to prove the original upon condition that its correct- 
 ness shall subsequently be made to appear, and the impropriety, 
 if any, of receiving such a copy is cured by showing that it is a 
 true and correct copy. 
 
 § 44. Primary evidence of collateral facts. — Wherever the facts 
 in issue are not the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties 
 under a writing, but some fact collateral to its contents, its pro- 
 duction is not required as primary evidence of that collateral fact, 
 The fact may be proved by parol, for, if oral evidence is as near 
 the fact to be proved as the writing, both are primary evidence.*'^ 
 
 *^Underhill on Evid., § 350. duce a writing by which his title 
 
 ^ Peck V. Parchen, 52 Iowa 46, 2 vested, but may testify orally to the 
 
 N. W. 597; State v. Matthews, 88 fact of ownership where that fact is 
 
 Mo. 121, 125, 126. collateral. That a certain person was 
 
 ** State V. Breckenridge, drj Iowa a tenant may be proved orally by 
 
 204, 206, 25 N. W. 130. See post, showing he paid rent, though a writ- 
 
 §§ 423, 427. ten lease exists. Rex v. Holy Trin- 
 
 ^ State V. King, 81 Iowa 587, 47 N. ity, 7 B. & C. 611, 614, i Man. & Ry. 
 
 W. 775, 776. 444; but the contents of the lease, 
 
 " Glover v. Thomas, 75 Tex. 506, the names of the parties and the 
 
 12 S. W. 684; DeLoach v. Stewart, terms of the tenancy can be proved 
 
 86 Ga. 729, 12 S. E. 1067. only by the lease itself. Strother v. 
 
 " The owner of real or personal Rarr, 5 Ring. 136, 139, 145, 152, 2 M. 
 
 property will not be required to pro- & P. 207; Doe v. Harvey, 8 Bing.
 
 44 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 ^2. 
 
 Accordingly the oral evidence of prison or jail officials is ad- 
 missible to prove that prisoners, whom the accused had visited 
 in jail, were imprisoned for crimes similar to that with which he 
 is charged. The fact of their being in prison being collateral to 
 the issue of the guilt of the accused may be proved orally.*'' The 
 arrest of the accused on a charge other than that for which he is 
 on trial may be proved by parol.*" The testimony of an officer 
 who made the arrest is primary evidence of that fact, though the 
 loss of a book in which it was recorded is not shown. 
 
 Generally when the contents of a letter or telegram are essen- 
 tial to determine the rights of the parties, it must be produced.^" 
 But if the sole fact to be proved is that a letter or telegram was 
 sent or received, the writing need not be produced. ^^ 
 
 So payment may be shown by oral evidence of a tender and 
 acceptance, though a receipt in writing has been given, while an 
 oral demand may be proved though a written demand may have 
 
 239; Rex V. Merthyr Tidvil, i B. & 
 Ad. 29, 31 ; Wooldridge v. State, 49 
 Fla. 137, 38 So. 3; Kearney v. State, 
 loi Ga. 803, 29 S. E. 127, 65 Am. St. 
 344- 
 
 **Long V. State, 10 Tex. App. 186, 
 198; State V. McKinnon, 99 Me. 166, 
 58 Atl. 1028. 
 
 ** State V. McFarlain, 42 La. Ann. 
 803, 806, 8 So. 600. An oral state- 
 ment by a witness that he had been 
 divorced from the accused is compe- 
 tent where the divorce was merely 
 collateral to the guilt of the accused. 
 Williams v. State, 149 Ala. 4, 43 So. 
 720. 
 
 °°The oral testimony of a jailer to 
 the contents of letters sent or re- 
 ceived by a prisoner while in jail is 
 inadmissible until their non-produc- 
 tion is accounted for. McAfee v. 
 State, 85 Ga. 438, ii S. E. 810: Bell 
 V. State (Ala.), 47 So. 242. 
 
 ^^ Conner v. State, 22, Tex. App. 
 .378, 38s, 5 S. W. 189; Holcombe v. 
 State, 28 Ga. 66, 67. The fact that 
 the prosecutrix in a trial for seduc- 
 
 tion made an assignation by a letter 
 may be proved oralh- though the let- 
 ter is not forthcoming. State v. Fer- 
 guson, 107 N. Car. 841, 846, 847, 12 
 S. E. 574. The presence of a docu- 
 ment during an interview may be 
 shown orally without accounting for 
 its absence. Tatum v. State, 82 Ala. 
 5, 8, 2 So. 531. The fact that the 
 deceased was an officer is provable 
 b}' parol on a trial for homicide of 
 an officer. Hardin v. State, 40 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 208, 49 S. \V. 607. The 
 existence of a corporation either for- 
 eign or domestic has been proved in 
 a criminal case by parol. Graff v. 
 People, 208 111. 312, 70 X. E. 299, aff'g 
 108 111. App. 168. As to necessity 
 for the production of a doctor's 
 diploma where its existence is ma- 
 terial, see McAllister v. State (Ala.), 
 47 So. i6r. As for example when 
 the accused is on trial for practicing 
 medicine without a license. The fact' 
 that a person is a physician when 
 only collaterally involved may also 
 be proved orally.
 
 y^i PRIMARY EVIDEXCE. § 44 
 
 been made.°- ^^'here the receiver of a telegraphic dispatch is the 
 employer of the company, the writing delivered to the company's 
 operator by the sender is the original/^ But where the company 
 is the agent, not of the receiver but of the sender of the dispatch, 
 the written message which is delivered to the addressee is the 
 original/* 
 
 The tally sheets showing the count of the ballots cast at an 
 election are primary evidence of the count of the ballots where the 
 accused, an officer of elections, is charged with making a false 
 count. The ballots themselves are evidence of the number of bal- 
 lots cast but they are not the only evidence of that fact.°^ 
 
 A certificate, parish register, transcript of a public record or 
 other public writing is not necessarily primary evidence of the 
 existence of the marriage relation, even when it has been de- 
 clared by law to be presumptive evidence.^*' As a general rule, 
 and though a certificate which is known to exist is not produced, 
 the fact of a marriage having been solemnized may be proved by 
 other evidence, even in criminal trials. The performance of a 
 marriage ceremony may be shown by the evidence of witnesses 
 who were present, and sometimes by the declarations or admis- 
 sions of the accused. The evidence of such witnesses is not sec- 
 ondary to that furnished by the writing. But usually greater 
 cogency of evidence to prove marriage is required in a criminal 
 trial where marriage is directly in issue as in bigamy than will be 
 demanded in a civil proceeding.^^ 
 
 " Smith V. Young, I Campb. X. P. or that he acted thereupon if the 
 
 439. telegram had been received by the 
 
 " State V. Gritzner, 134 Mo. 512, addressee. Young v. People, 221 111. 
 
 36 S. W. 39; Utley V. Donaldson, 94 51, "/"j N. E. 536. 
 
 U. S. 29, 24 L. ed. 54. See cases, °^ Commonwealth v. Edgerton, 200 
 
 Underbill on Ev., § 34. A type- Mass. 318, 86 N. E. 768. Parol proof 
 
 written copy of a telegram is admis- may be made of the election of the 
 
 sible if the accused has admitted he officers of a corporation and any 
 
 sent the telegram without accounting one present at the election may state 
 
 for the absence of th© original mes- who was elected. State v. Farrier, 
 
 sage. Dunbar v. United States, 156 114 La. 579, 38 So. 460. 
 
 U. S. 185, 195, 39 L. ed. 390, 15 Sup. '^Commonwealth v. Dill. 156 Mass. 
 
 Ct. 325. 226, 228, 30 X. E. iot6. 
 
 "It is necessary, in order to bind "See Underbill on Evid.. §§ 114, 
 
 the alleged sender of a telegram, to 144, and post, §§ 383, 403-405. 
 show either that he signed or sent it
 
 § 45 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 74 
 
 Where a writing has no direct bearing upon a material point 
 in issue, or relevancy to it, but is only evidence of a collateral 
 fact, or so far as it is evidence of a collateral fact, no objection 
 exists to oral evidence to prove a fact contained in it.'"'^ 
 
 So, a written report of an incident made by a witness as a part 
 of his duty need not be produced or accounted for to render his 
 oral testimony admissible. Thus, a jailer may state orally that 
 a prisoner admitted he was married, though this fact was also 
 entered on the prison books, ^° as it should have been, 
 
 § 45. Exceptions in the case of proving general results. — To pre- 
 vent the time of the court from being unduly occupied in the ex- 
 amination of numerous and bulky books of account and other 
 writings to prove a single fact, the production of the writings 
 may be dispensed with and a witness, who has examined the 
 documents, may state orally the result of the examination which 
 he has made out of court. This rule is applicable only where the 
 books are multifarious and voluminous, and the jury would find 
 it difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain anything material from 
 their inspection. If the general result is stated in writing, it must 
 be verified by the party who abstracted it, and the adverse party 
 must be given a fair opportunity to examine the originals.*^*' 
 
 In such cases, it should be remarked, the witness is not re- 
 quired to prove the contents of the writing. He is merely asked 
 
 ^*For example, a writing is not in- him in conversing with others, could 
 
 dispensable to prove the nationality not be proved orally, when the slips 
 
 of a ship, where that fact is collateral used were missing and unaccounted 
 
 merely. United States v. Pirates, 5 for. 
 
 Wheat. (U. S.) 184, 5 L. ed. 64; ^Boston, etc., R. Co. v. Dana, i 
 
 State v. Haj^es, 138 N. Car. 660, 50 Gray (Mass.) 83, 104; Bode v. State, 
 
 S. E. 623; Cox v. State, 3 Ga. App. 80 Neb. 74, 113 N. W. 996; People 
 
 609, 60 S. E. 283. V. Miles, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 862, 
 
 '^ Commonwealth v. Walker, 163 108 X. Y. S. 510. It has been held 
 
 I\Iass. 226, 39 N. E. T0T4. If the that a witness will not be permitted 
 
 writing is one that it is customarily to state the result of his examina- 
 
 destroj-ed as soon as used, it would tion of books unless the books were 
 
 not seem logical, or fair, to require kept by him, and the entries made 
 
 its production if its contents could by him, or in his presence. Donner 
 
 be proved orally. But it was held in v. State, 69 Xeb. 56, 95 N'. W. 40. 
 
 State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93, 20 Am. This, however, is not the general 
 
 Dec. 90. that the admissions of a rule. Ruth v. State, 140 Wis. 373, 122 
 
 deaf mute, written on slips used by N. W. 733.
 
 75 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 45 
 
 to give primary evidence of a fact within his personal knowledge, 
 which he has acquired through the employment of his own powers 
 of observation. So, in a prosecution for embezzlement, an expert 
 who has examined the books of account kept by the prisoner may 
 testify that a certain balance is due from the accused. °^ 
 
 If the issue of insolvency is involved the general result of an 
 examination of the debtor's accounts and securities may be stated 
 without producing them.*'" So one whose duty it is to keep a 
 record of the names of a certain class of persons may state that 
 he has examined the record and that the name of a particular 
 person was not on the list."^ 
 
 So it has been held that a person may testify to the amount of 
 money which has been stolen from his person or from his cash 
 drawer, where his information as to the amount has been ascer- 
 tained in a general way from his examination of his books."* 
 
 A witness will not be allowed to testify to a single fact which 
 is not in the nature of the general result of an examination by 
 him if he has learned it solely from inspecting books, if they are 
 not produced.''^ 
 
 The oral testimony of one who has examined public records 
 that he did not find a certain fact or name, which was by statute 
 required to be recorded, is proof only that a search was made and 
 that it was unsuccessful. It may go to the jury as primary evi- 
 dence, that the name or fact was in fact not recorded.^^ 
 
 The jury are entitled, particularly in a prosecution for crime, 
 
 ^ See post, § 290. found against the defendant. Wood- 
 
 *" Culver V. Marks, 122 Ind. 554, rufif v. State, 61 Ark. 157, 32 S. W. 
 
 566, 567, 23 N. E. 1086, 17 Am. St. 102. 
 
 377, 7 L. R. A. 489n. That the rules "' People v. Jones, 106 N. Y. 523, 
 
 of the text are applicable to criminal 526, 13 N. E. 93. Contra, Hepler v. 
 
 prosecutions, see Hollingsworth v. State, 58 Wis. 46, S3, SS, 16 N. W. 
 
 State, III Ind. 289, 297, 12 N. E. 490. 42; Biddy v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 •"Jordan v. State, 127 Ga. 278, 56 412, 107 S. W. 814. But as regards 
 
 S. E. 422. the weight of such evidence, a copy 
 
 ** Hudson V. State, 137 Ala. 60, 34 of a public record must prevail over 
 
 So. 854. the oral testimony of a person who, 
 
 "^ Hamilton Provident, etc., Soc. v. after examining the record, testifies 
 
 Northwood, 86 Mich. 315, 49 N. W. 'that he cannot find the part certified. 
 
 37. Officials who have examined Boyce v. Auditor-General, 90 Mich. 
 
 books and accounts kept by the ac- 314, 321, 51 N. W. 457. 
 
 cused may testify to the balance .
 
 § 46 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 76 
 
 to have all the Hght possible that can be thrown upon documentary 
 evidence. From its nature and often from its great length, such 
 evidence is hard to be comprehended by persons of the highest 
 intelligence and trained in the investigation of the facts. Jurors 
 are likely, in the hurry and confusion which so frequently attend 
 criminal trials, to overlook the most important portions of the 
 books of account, certified copies of legal proceedings, deeds, let- 
 ters and other written proof which are placed before them. The 
 report of one who has examined the written evidence either as 
 to a single fact which he has or has not found or as to a general 
 result, derived from his investigation, is of great evidential value 
 and is properly received where the written evidence which is or 
 has been inspected by the witness is before the jury.*^' 
 
 So where an officer in a bank was being prosecuted for the 
 crime of receiving deposits after he knew the bank was insolvent, 
 it was competent to place expert accountants on the witness stand 
 to explain to the jury the entries in the books of the bank which 
 already were in evidence. *^^ 
 
 § 46. Proof of records and official appointments. — Public records, 
 because of their official character and the general inconvenience 
 which would always ensue if their removal from the proper cus- 
 tody was permitted, may usually be proved by a duly authen- 
 ticated copy or transcript, without accounting for the absence of 
 the original records.*'^ 
 
 The later cases, under the influence of statutory legislation, 
 have somewhat extended the rule. It is often applied to the books 
 of private corporations when it is very inconvenient to produce 
 them, but only after a reasonable effort to obtain possession of the 
 original has been proved.'^" 
 
 \Miere a statutory mode of proving a record by a certified copy 
 is provided, the copy is the best evidence of the record, and the 
 latter cannot be proved by parol. But where the records are 
 shown to be lost, so that a certified copy is unobtainable, the loss 
 
 ^ People V. Miles, 192 N. Y. 541, 84 Kinard v. State, i Ga. App. 146. 58 S. 
 
 N. E. 1 1 17, aff'g 123 App. Div. (N. E. 263. 
 
 Y.) 862, 108 N. Y. S. 510. '"Commonwealth v. Meehan, 170 
 
 ** State V. Hoffman, 120 La. 949, 45 ^lass. 362, 49 N. E. 648; Brighton v. 
 
 So. 95T. Miles, 151 Ala. 479, 44 So. 394- 
 
 '' State V. Pigg (Kan.), 97 Pac. 859;
 
 'JJ PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 4/ 
 
 and the contents of the records may be shown by the testimony 
 of any person having actual knowledge. 
 
 Another exception to the rule requiring the production of a 
 writing as the best evidence occurs where a party is called upon 
 to prove the validity of the appointment of some public official 
 and the official appointment is not directly in issue. The written 
 appointment of the officer need not generally be produced. From 
 proof that the public official has acted openly as such it will 
 be presumed, that is, in collateral proceedings not involving his 
 title to the office, that he was legally and properly appointed. 
 Thus in a criminal prosecution for assaulting or resisting a police 
 officer, written evidence of his appointment or of his authority 
 to act is never necessary, nor need its absence be accounted for.'^ 
 
 § 47. Physical condition of personal property. — The testimony of 
 a witness who has personal knowledge of the physical condition 
 or attributes of an article of personal property obtained by the 
 empIo5'ment of any of his senses is primary evidence of its char- 
 acter and condition. The article itself need not be produced. Thus 
 a witness may state that he saw blood stains upon a person's cloth- 
 ing/- or holes in clothing,'^ or that a certain liquor which he saw 
 was intoxicating,'^* without producing the clothing or the liquor. 
 
 A witness may testify that oleomargarine which is alleged to 
 have been illegally sold resembled butter without producing the 
 article sold or explaining its non-production.^^ 
 
 But an article of personal property, the relevancy of which 
 has been shown by its identification with the subject-matter of 
 the crime, may be exhibited to the jury in the court room, either 
 
 " Gordon's Case, 2 Leach C. Law " Commonwealth v. Pope, 103 
 
 (1789) 581, 585; Martin v. State, 89 Mass. 440; Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 
 
 Ala. 115, 118, 119, 8 So. 23, 18 Am. 44, 69, 72; Walker v. State, 139 Ala. 
 
 St. 91; North V. People, 139 111. 81, 56, 35 So. loii. 
 
 28 N. E. 966, 971 ; Commonwealth v. " Underwood v. Commonwealth 
 McCue, 16 Gray (Mass.) 226; State (Ky.), 84 S. W. 310, 27 Ky. L. 8. 
 V. Row, 81 Iowa 138, 46 N. W. 872; "Commonwealth v. Welch, 142 
 State V. Smith, 38 La. Ann. 301; Mass. 473. 8 N. E. 342; Common- 
 Commonwealth V. Kane, 108 Mass. wealth v. Moinehan, 140 Mass. 463, 
 423, II Am. 373; State v. Surles, 117 5 N. E. 259. 
 
 N. Car. 720, 23 S. E. 324; Shely v. "Commonwealth v. Caulficld, 27 
 
 State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 190, 32 S. W. Pa. Super. Ct. 279. 
 90T. See post, § 446.
 
 § 48 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 78 
 
 as direct evidence of a relevant fact, or to enable them to under- 
 stand the evidence or to realize more completely its cogency and 
 force."" 
 
 The jury may inspect and smell the contents of a bottle prop- 
 erly identified and admitted in evidence.'^ 
 
 Comparison of materials may also be made by the jury, aided 
 by the evidence of expert witnesses. So in case the quality of an 
 article, or its adaptability to a specific use or purpose, is in issue, 
 a sample may be shown to the jury, together with a specimen of 
 a like material which is shown to be of good quality or adapted 
 to the required purpose, and the jury may then make a com- 
 parison to ascertain possible points of difference.'^- 
 
 As a general rule, it seems essential that articles shown to the 
 jury should be connected, at least prima facie, with the crime 
 in issue.''' Indeed, the propriety and justice of permitting articles 
 and implements, such as deadly weapons, lanterns, masks, coun- 
 terfeiters' tools, gambling apparatus and the like, used by crim- 
 inals, but which are not shown to be connected with the accused, 
 to be exhibited to the jury may well be doubted. Such a practice, 
 under the pretext of illustrating or explaining the evidence, is 
 well calculated to prejudice the jury against the accused. 
 
 § 48. Incriminating articles — ^Weapons, clothing, etc. — A district 
 attorney has been permitted to show the jury an instrument with 
 
 "^ The witness-, it seems, need not had examined, the prosecution was 
 
 identif}' the article positively. He allowed to put other imitation rings 
 
 may testify to his belief in its iden- in evidence which had been found in 
 
 tity, based on the same principles a room occupied by the accused by 
 
 that aid him in determining whether an officer who had broken into the 
 
 a knife or a hat is his own. Mitchell room and searched it without any 
 
 V. State, 94 Ala. 68, 10 So. 518, 520. warrant. Moss v. State, 152 Ala. 30, 
 
 So one witness may testify to the 44 So. 598. 
 
 fact that another identified an article "Reed v. Territory (Okla.), 98 Pac. 
 
 on a prior occasion. State v. Brab- 583- 
 
 ham, 108 N. Car. 793, 13 S. E. 217. "People v. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 
 
 In Gindrat v. People, 138 111. 103, 487, 9 N- E. 44, 57 Am. 766. 
 
 108-110, 27 N. E. 1085, which was ^' But see Underbill on Evid., § 39; 
 
 an indictment for the larceny of a State v. Sherouk, 61 Atl. 897, 78 
 
 diamond ring by substituting an imi- Conn. 718, not reported in full. Peo- 
 
 tation ring in the place of one con- pie v. Muhly (Cal. App., 1909), i04 
 
 tained in a tray which the prisoner Pac. 466.
 
 79 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 4S 
 
 which an abortion had been procured/'^ or a pistol, or any weapon, 
 article, or instrument with which a homicide, assault, or other 
 crime has been committed. A witness will, also, be allowed to 
 show how it could have been used.^^ The clothing of the victim 
 of a homicide, if properly identified, may be exhibited, on the 
 principle that it is a part of the res gestco, to illustrate to the jury 
 the character and nature of the wounds, ^^ the motive of the crime, 
 the manner and means of death, ^^ or to show how near the ac- 
 cused w^as to him, when he was slain.** 
 
 *° Commonwealth v. Brown, 14 App. 452, 93 S. W. 116; State v. 
 
 Gray (Alass.) 419. Churchill (Wash.), 100 Pac. 309. 
 
 " State V. Gallman, 79 S. Car. 229, Clothing traced to accused may be 
 
 60 S. E. 682; Paulson v. State, 118 received in evidence if they were 
 
 Wis. 89, 94 N. W. 771 ; Young v. shown to have been stolen. Williams 
 
 State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 207, 92 S. W. v. State, 119 Ga. 564, 46 S. E. 837. 
 
 841. See generally, State v. Rob- Clothing of the victim proved to have 
 
 erts, 63 Vt. 139, 142, 21 Atl. 424; been worn by him when he was 
 
 Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, Z3 ^- killed will not be rejected because it 
 
 E. 68r ; Rodriquez v. State, 32 Tex. has been washed. Pate v. State, 150 
 
 Cr. App. 259, 22 S. W. 978; Hornsby Ala. 10, 43 So. 343. 
 v. State, 94 Ala. 55, 64, 10 So. 522; *' Story v. State, 99 Ind. 413, 414; 
 
 State V. Crow, 107 Mo. 341, 17 S. W. McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320; State 
 
 745, 747; State v. Mordecai, 68 N. v. Craft, 118 La. 117, 42 So. 718; 
 
 Car. 207; Gardiner v. People, 6 Park State v. Cadotte, 17 ]\Iont. 315, 42 
 
 Cr. (N. Y.) 155, 157. A watch charm Pac. 857; Hart v. State, 15 Tex. App. 
 
 taken from the person of a man who 202, 229, 230, 49 Am. i88n ; Clark v. 
 
 had been killed by the defendant State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 519, 102 S. 
 
 while perpetrating a robbery was re- W. 1136; Sue v. State, S2 Tex. Cr. 
 
 ceived in evidence in Goldsby v. App. 122, 105 S. W. 804; State v. 
 
 United States, 160 U. S. 70, 40 L. ed. Landers, 21 S. Dak. 606, 114 N. W. 
 
 343, 16 Sup. Ct. 216; State v. Wilson 717. 
 
 (Mo. App., 1909), 122 S. W. 671 ; Peo- ** Lucas v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. .A-pp. 
 
 pie V. Morse, 196 N. Y. 306, 89 N. E. 219, 95 S. W. 1055; Dobbs v. State 
 
 816: Union V. State (Ga. App., 1909), (Tex. Cr. App.), 113 S. W. 923; 
 
 66 S. E. 24. State v. Brannan, 206 ]\Io. 636, 105 
 
 ''Dorsey v. State, no Ala. 38, 20 S. W. 602; People v. Wright, 89 
 
 So. 450; People V. Knapp, 71 Cal. Mich. 70, 50 N. W. 792; Watkins v. 
 
 r, 3, II Pac. 793; Seaborn v. Com- State, 89 Ala. 82, 8 So. 134; Frizzell 
 
 mon wealth (Ky.), 80 S. W. 223, v. State, 30 Tex. App. 42, 16 S. W. 
 
 25 Ky. L. 2203; Bennefield v. United 751; Levy v. State, 28 Tex. .•Xpp. 
 
 States (Okla.), 100 Pac. 34; 203, 12 S. W. 596, 19 Am. St. 826. 
 
 State V. Long. 209 Mo. .366, 108 The use of a dressmaker's frame in 
 
 S. W. 35; Boyd v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. court for convenipncc in exhibiting 
 
 App. 138, 94 S. W. 1053; Ozark v. to the jury the clothing of the dc- 
 
 State, SI Tex. Cr. App. 106, 100 S. ceased is permissible. So, where cer- 
 
 W. 927; Adams v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. tain tools which were claimed by the
 
 48 CRnriXAL EVIDENCE. 80 
 
 In a homicide trial, the skull, jawbone/^ or vertebra of the 
 deceased, if properly identified,^*' may be submitted to the inspec- 
 tion of the jury, to show the character and location of the wounds 
 inflicted.''' Such a course is not prejudicial to the accused upon 
 the grounds that it is calculated to excite feelings of horror in 
 the minds of the jurors.*"^ 
 
 But it is usually wholly within the discretion of the court to 
 order decedent's skull to be exhumed for the purpose of putting 
 it in evidence. ^^ If there are physicians accessible as witnesses who 
 have dissected the skull and know as much of its condition as 
 can be learned from an examination of it by the jurors it is not 
 error to refuse to order the person having custody of decedent's 
 skull to produce it.®^ 
 
 The introduction in evidence of clothing belonging to the de- 
 fendant or belonging to a witness or worn by deceased at the 
 time of his death is a common occurrence in a homicide trial. 
 The clothing of the accused may be exhibited to the jury to show 
 that spots found thereon are blood-stains. The proper method is 
 to prove first that the clothing offered belonged to the accused and 
 that it had been worn by him at the date of the tragedy. This 
 is usually done by exhibiting the clothing to the witness and 
 having him identify it as the clothing belonging to or which was 
 worn by the accused. The weight and sufficiency of the identified 
 evidence are questions for the jury. It has been held that it need 
 not be actually proved that the accused wore the clothing on the 
 day of the homicide, if there is some evidence that the clothing 
 belonged to him and was worn by him about that time. After 
 
 defendant to fit in marks on a door N. E. 11 17, 119 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 
 were introduced in evidence by him, 344, 104 N. Y. S. 277. 
 
 the state was allowed to introduce *" State v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 
 
 the door to prove that the tools did 388, 14 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556; 
 
 not fit. People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. State v. Bailey, 79 Conn. 589, 65 Atl. 
 
 179, 48 Pac. 75. It was not reversible 95i- 
 
 error to admit a partly burned block "State v. Lewis (Iowa), 116 N. W. 
 
 of wood taken from the pile of char- 606. 
 
 coal on which the body of deceased *"a Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 547, 
 
 was found. Paulson v. State, 118 564. 565, I5 S. W. 838. 
 
 Wis. 89, 94 N. W. 771. '^Moss v. State, 152 Ala. 30, 44 So. 
 
 *^ People V. Way, 191 N. Y. 533, 84 598. 
 
 ^ Moss V. State, 152 Ala. 30, 44 So. 
 598. The jawbone of the victim of
 
 8l PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 49 
 
 being connected with accused, the clothing may itself be offered 
 with the testimony that the spots on it are blood-stains.^'' 
 
 The witness may point out the spots. So the clothing of the 
 witness was properly admitted where the witness testified to con- 
 tradict the statement made by the accused that no one was pres- 
 ent when the deceased was shot, that she was there and that she 
 held the deceased and that blood from his wounds flowed on her 
 clothing. Having testified to these facts, she may show her cloth- 
 ing to the jury to corroborate and illustrate her evidence.^^ 
 
 § 49. Inscriptions on bulky articles. — From the inconvenience 
 which would ensue if their actual production in court were re- 
 quired, the rule has long been recognized that monuments, natural 
 or artificial, used to mark the boundaries of land, sign-boards,®^ 
 mural tablets, gravestones, packages of merchandise and similar 
 bulky articles, need not be produced for the purpose of proving 
 inscriptions on them. The inscriptions may be proved by the evi- 
 dence of a witness who has read them. So the oral testimony of 
 a surveyor is admissible to describe the monuments which con- 
 stitute and mark out a boundary line,''^ and, from necessity, to 
 prove the marks which were blazed upon the trees near the 
 same.®* An invoice is competent to prove the marks upon cases 
 of merchandise described in it.®^ 
 
 Upon the same grounds and because of the general notoriety 
 of the facts involved, oral evidence of the contents of resolutions 
 passed at public meetings, and of inscriptions on flags or banners 
 
 an assault who died is competent to ^'' State v. Sherouk, 61 Atl. 897, 78 
 
 corroborate proof that a bullet was Conn. 718, not reported in full ; State 
 
 fired at his chin. People v. Way, 191 v. Whitbeck (Iowa, 1909), 123 N. \V. 
 
 N. Y. 533, 84 N. E. 1 1 17, aff'g 119 982. 
 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 344, 104 N. Y. "' Thomas v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 
 
 S. 277. The skull of deceased in App. in, 74 S. W. 36. 
 
 homicide was received to sustain the "" State v. Wilson, 5 R. I. 291. 
 
 theory of the prosecution that he was °® Borer v. Lange, 44 Minn. 281, 
 
 struck by the accused with a pick 286, 46 N. W. 358. 
 
 in the head while leaning forward ®*Ayers v. Watson, 137 U. S. 584, 
 
 with his head down, against the 600, 34 L. ed. 803, ti Sup. Ct. 201. 
 
 claim of the accused that the killing °^ Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 
 
 was in self-defense. State v. Lewis (U. S.) 197,208, n L. ed. 559. 
 (Iowa), 116 N. W. 606. 
 
 6 — Underbill Crim. Ev.
 
 § 50 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 82 
 
 carried in public parades, has always been admitted in criminal 
 trials.'*' 
 
 As regards unrecorded brands and marks upon cattle, one who 
 has seen them may testify to their existence,*^" and may explain 
 their character and meaning.''^ And in a prosecution for the un- 
 lawful sale of liquors, the names of the liquors marked on the 
 bottles and other vessels may be proved withoijt producing the 
 vessels or labels.^' 
 
 The contents of a waiting may be proved orally wdiere the 
 identity of an article to which it was attached is relevant. Thus, 
 a witness may state orally what was on a tag,^''*' or a label,"^ 
 w'hich w-as affixed to a bag, or a package, without producing the 
 writing.^"' 
 
 Secondary evidence may be given of writing that cannot be 
 produced in court, such as mural monuments, documents shown to 
 be in a foreign country, books of a concern the removal of which 
 would be very inconvenient and others, such as a license required 
 by the federal statute which cannot be removed from the place 
 of business of accused, and produced in court without violating 
 the federal statute. ^°^ 
 
 § 50. Photographs as primary evidence — Personal identity. — 
 
 Photographs, whether originals or copies, ^°* are admissible as 
 primary evidence upon the same grounds and for the same pur- 
 poses as are diagrams, maps"^ and drawings of objects or places. 
 Photographs have been received for the purpose of describing 
 
 ** Sheridan's Case, 31 How. St. Tr. ""A witness may testify to certain 
 
 543, ^^2. marks which he saw upon the cloth- 
 
 " State V. Cardelli, 19 Nev. 319, 10 ing worn by the accused. Common- 
 
 Pac. 433; People v. Bolanger, 71 Cal. wealth v. Hills, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 17, II Pac. 799; Brooke v. People, 530, 533. 
 
 23 Colo. 375, 48 Pac. 502. ''^Wilcox v. Wilcox, 46 Hun (N. 
 
 °*Boren v. State, 23 Tex. App. 28, Y.) 32. 
 
 ZZ, 4 S. W. 463. '^Joliff V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 '^ Commonwealth v. Blood, 11 Gray 61, 109 S. W. 176. 
 
 (Mass.) 74. "^ Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 511, 10 
 
 ^°" Commonwealth v. IMorrell, 99 So. 106 ; State v. Roberts, 28 Nev. 
 
 Mass. 542. 350, 82 Pac. 100; Jarvis v. State, 138 
 
 ^•"Commonwealth v. Powers, 116 Ala. 17, 34 So. 1025. 
 Mass. zn, 338.
 
 83 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 50 
 
 and identifying premises which were the scene of a crime/"" and 
 they need not show all the premises if they show the material 
 part.'*" 
 
 Photographs of the scene, taken several months after the crime 
 was committed, were properly admitted where it appeared that the 
 condition of the premises had not materially changed in the mean- 
 time.' °' 
 
 It is not allowable, however, for the prosecution to arrange a 
 scene assumed to represent the res gestae of the crime and then 
 to photograph the scene represented. In a recent case, the chief 
 witness for the prosecution very carefully reproduced by means 
 of persons employed for the purpose, the situation of the parties 
 to the homicide, and a reproduction of the occurrences which took 
 place at the time of the killing. This reproduction was photo- 
 graphed but the court rejected the photograph."'®^ So in a homi- 
 cide case, a photograph of a man lying on a porch in the position 
 in which the body of the victim of the homicide was found, was 
 rejected. '°^ 
 
 Photographs are always admissible as primary evidence of the 
 identity of persons alive or dead/'" and to present delineations of 
 
 ^"^ People V. Pustolka, 149 N. Y. Buddensieck, 103 N. Y. 487, 500, 9 N. 
 
 570, 43 N. E. 548 ; State v. Kelley, 46 E. 44, 57 Am. 766. 
 
 S. Car. 55, 24 S. E. 60; State v. ^"^ Gibson v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 
 
 O'Reilly, 126 Mo. 597, 29 S. W. 577; App. 349, no S. W. 41. 
 
 People V. Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. "'a Fore v. State, 75 Miss. 727, 23 
 
 515; People V. Del Vermo, 192 N. So. 710. 
 
 Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690. '"" People v. Maughs, 149 Cal. 253, 
 
 '"^Chestnut Hill, etc., Co. v. Piper, 86 Pac. 187. 
 etc., Co., 15 Weekly Notes 55. "It "" Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. 
 (the photograph) exhibited the sur- D. C. 417; Commonwealth v. John- 
 face, condition and state of the wall, son, 199 Mass. 55, 85 N. E. 188; 
 and it no doubt carried to the minds Young v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 
 of the jurors a better image of the 207, 92 S. W. 841 ; State v. Hasty, 
 subject-matter concerning which neg- 121 Towa 507, 96 N. W. 1115; People 
 ligence was charged, than any oral v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 Pac. 75; 
 description by an eye-witness could Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 
 have done. In such a case it must be 613, 40 L. ed. 1090, 16 Sup. Ct. 895 I 
 deemed established that photographic People v. Smith, 121 N. Y. 578, 582, 
 scenes are admissible in evidence as 24 N. E. 852 ; Udderzook v. Common- 
 appropriate aids to a jury in applying wealth, 76 Pa. St. 340, 352, 353; Ru- 
 the evidence, whether it relates to loff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213, 224; 
 persons, things or places." People v. Beavers v. State, 58 Ind. 530; Marion
 
 § 50 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 84 
 
 wounds or other physical injuries/^^ as, for example, to show 
 that a child had been insufficiently fed or ill-treated. "- 
 
 So photographs of the bodies of drowned persons have been 
 received for purposes of identification even when the bodies had 
 remained in the water for a very long time, and the likeness, be- 
 cause of this and of the disadvantageous circumstances under 
 which it was made, was bad.^^" 
 
 Photographs are sometimes received to supply accurate fac- 
 similes of public records wdiich cannot be conveniently brought 
 into court,^" and enlarged photographs of disputed writings em- 
 phasizing, illustrating and making prominent peculiarities of 
 handwriting have been employed by experts as standards of com- 
 parison. ^^^ 
 
 X-ray photographs have been received in evidence and are of 
 value to show the location of the bullet in the body of a deceased 
 person. The same rules and principles which apply to ordinary 
 photographs are applicable to them. It must first be shown that 
 they were prepared by one who understood their preparation. 
 An objection that there was no evidence before the jury that the 
 object represented in the radiograph was a bullet and that the 
 object was in the same position when the radiograph was taken 
 
 V. State, 20 Neb. 233, 240, 29 X. W. 224. A witness who found a muti- 
 
 911, 57 Am. 825; Luke v. Calhoun lated body of a man whom he had 
 
 Co., 52 Ala. 115, T18, T19; State v. never seen alive, which had been 
 
 McCoy, 15 Utah 136, 49 Pac. 420; buried several days, was allowed to 
 
 Morris v. Territory (Okla.). 99 testify that the face, though swollen 
 
 Pac. 760; Commonwealth v. Keller, and discolored, resembled a photo- 
 
 191 Pa. St. 122, 43 Atl. 198 (of de- graph shown him. Udderzook v. 
 
 ceased standing beside a witness to Commonwealth, 76 Pa. St. 340. 
 
 show the size of deceased by com- "* Leathers v. Salvor Wrecking, 
 
 parison). etc., Co., 2 Woods (U. S.) 680, 682, 
 
 ^" State V. ^Miller, 43 Ore. 325, 74 15 Fed. Cas. 8164; Luco v. United 
 
 Pac. 658; State v. Hasty, 121 Iowa States, 23 How. (U. S.) 515, 541, 16 
 
 507, 96 Mo. 1 1 15 (in adultery to iden- L. ed. 545. 
 
 tify the defendant's paramour) ; "° Rowell v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 688, 10 
 
 Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 36. 42, 47 Atl. 853; Buzard v. McAnulty, 77 
 
 Am. 748. Tex. 438, 14 S. W. 138; Marcy v. 
 
 "-Cowley V. People, 83 N. Y. 464, Barnes, 16 Gray (Mass.) 161; John- 
 
 476-478, 38 Am. 464; State v. IMathe- son v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 927, 
 
 son, 130 Iowa 440, 103 N. W. 137. 46 S. E. 789. 
 
 "'Ruloff V. People, 45 N. Y. 213,
 
 85 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. §51 
 
 as it was at the time of the shooting is not an ohjection to the 
 competency of the photograph but goes to its credibihty.^^'^ 
 
 § 51. Accuracy and relevancy of photographs. — If the correctness 
 of the photograph as a hkeness is shown pviina facie, either by 
 tlie testimony of the person who made it or by other competent 
 witnesses, to the effect that it faith f idly represents the object por- 
 trayed, it should go to the jury subject to impeachment as to its 
 accuracy.^" Whether the photograph is an accurate likeness is 
 then a question for the jury.^^** 
 
 A conflict of evidence regarding the correctness of a photo- 
 graph does not exclude it, if it is relevant. It should go to the 
 jury, and the other side may be allowed to introduce one they 
 deem to be correct.^^^ It may not always be necessary to show 
 the correctness of the portrait by positive evidence. In the absence 
 of any attack upon the correctness of the likeness, the court may 
 assume it to be correct from the universal employment of the art, 
 the general assent to the correctness of its delineations and the 
 scientific principles on which they are based.^'° 
 
 The photograph or picture must be relevant as well as correct. 
 Its relevancy will depend on the relevancy of the scene or object 
 it represents. If a photograph purports to represent a relevant 
 scene or object, but portrays it in a grossly inaccurate manner, 
 so that it practically represents something else, and the scene or 
 object would scarcely be recognized thereby, the non-reliability 
 of the photograph as a correct likeness may almost be considered 
 as producing irrelevancy. But usually the question of relevancy 
 is distinct from that of correctness, and is for the judge exclu- 
 sively. It is to be determined upon the considerations which gov- 
 ern when the relevancy of any sort of evidence is concerned. ^"^ 
 
 If a photograph of 'the accused introduced to prove his identity 
 contains writings or marks which have no bearing upon the ques- 
 
 "' State V. I\fatheson, 130 Iowa 440, may be put to the witness. Stuart v. 
 
 103 N. W. 137, 114 Am. St. 42711. Rinsse. 10 Bosw. (N. Y. Super.) 436. 
 
 "'Mow V. People, 31 Colo. 351, 72 "'Morris v. Territory (Okla.), 99 
 
 Pac. 1069; People v. Durrant, 116 Pac. 760. 
 
 Cal. 179, 48 Pac. 75; Commonwealth ""Moon v. State, 68 Ga. 687, 695. 
 
 V. Switzer, 134 Pa. St. 383, 19 Atl. '"" Udderzook v. Commonwealth, 76 
 
 681 ; Ming v. Foote, 9 Mont. 20T, 23 Pa. St. .340, 352, 353 ; Lake v. Cal- 
 
 Pac. 515. The questfon, "Is this houn Co., 52 Ala. T15, ttq. 
 
 photograph correct?" though leading, ^"^ The photograph of the accused
 
 ^51 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 86 
 
 tion of his identity, but which by their nature or meaning may 
 injure the accused in the estimation of the jury, it should be re- 
 jected. Thus a witness may testify that he was acquainted with 
 the accused, and he may identify him as having seen him in 
 prison or in jail, and he may then state that in his opinion, a 
 photograph exhibited to him is that of the accused. But where a 
 witness by oral testimony has testified that he had seen the ac- 
 cused in prison it was error for the court to receive in evidence 
 a photograph of the prisoner clothed in prison stripes and having 
 a prison number upon his breast, though the witness swears that 
 that is a picture of the prisoner as he saw him in jail.^^" 
 
 Stationing men about the scene to be depicted to show the po- 
 sitions occupied by persons present when the crime was com- 
 mitted, and to aid the recollection of a witness,^^^ or the fact that 
 a change had been made in the edifice which was photographed, 
 will not render the photograph irrelevant if the change is not too 
 material.^"* If, however, the photograph w^as taken so long after 
 the commission of the crime that material changes may have 
 taken place it should be rejected, unless it is affirmatively shown 
 that no material change had occurred. ^"^ 
 
 The photograph to be received need not, as a rule, have been 
 taken by a professional photographer,^-'' But in one instance a 
 photograph by an amateur was rejected, partly for the reason 
 that he was utterly unfamiliar with the locality.^^^ 
 
 is especially valuable and relevant to ^^ People v. Jackson, iii N. Y. 362, 
 
 identify him when it was taken im- 370, 19 N. E. 54. 
 
 mediately prior to or shortly after ^Glazier v. Hebron, 62 Hun (N. 
 
 his arrest, if the other evidence of Y.) 137, 16 N., Y. S. 503; Parshell 
 
 his personal appearance at that time v. New York, etc., R. Co., (£ Hun 
 
 is contradictory or unconvincing, or (N. Y.) 633, 21 X. Y. S. 354; People 
 
 if he had intentionally changed his v. Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. 515. 
 
 facial appearance, between his arrest ^^ Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Mon- 
 
 and his trial, by growing or remov- aghan, 140 III. 474, 483, 30 N. E. 869. 
 
 ing a beard or moustache. State v. ^^ Duffin v. People, 107 111, 113, 
 
 Ellwood, 17 R. I. ^(iz, IT^, 24 Atl. 47 Am. 431 ; Mow v. People, 31 Colo. 
 
 782; Commonwealth v. Morgan, 159 351, "72 Pac. 1069; Russell v. State 
 
 Mass. 375, 34 N. E. 458; Common- (Ala.), 38 So. 291. 
 
 wealth V. Campbell, 155 IMass. 537, '"Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Mon- 
 
 30 X. E. '/2. aghan, 140 111. 474, 483, 30 N. E. 869. 
 
 ^" State v. Moran, 131 Iowa 645, 
 109 N. W. 187.
 
 87 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 52 
 
 § 52. Paintings and drawings. — Pencil and pen-and-ink draw- 
 ings have been received to identify or explain localities. Though 
 they are received as primary evidence appealing to the eyes of the 
 jury under the rule admitting phbtographs, they differ from the 
 latter in that their accuracy as portraits or likenesses must be af- 
 firmatively shown by the testimony of the artist or other compe- 
 tent witness. There is no presumption of correctness founded on 
 general use and employment, or on their being mechanical repro- 
 ductions by a process which the court will judicially notice, as 
 exists in the case of photographs. The witness called to prove 
 their correctness must testify of his own knowledge that they 
 faithfully represent the object depicted, and their accuracy, if 
 disputed, is a question for the jury, turning upon the credibility 
 of the witnesses.!^"® 
 
 The map of the locus in quo of the homicide or a plan of a 
 house which was the scene of homicide or other crime, may be 
 received in evidence. The main use of these is not as evidence but 
 to enable the jury to better understand the oral testimony.^-^ The 
 draftsman of the map must testify as to its accuracy, but any 
 other witnesses may refer to it while testifying.^^° It is not ma- 
 terial by whom the map was prepared providing that he can tes- 
 tify that the map or diagram is accurate and is based upon knowl- 
 edge derived from his own investigation. Thus a map prepared 
 by the prosecuting attorney from his own observation intended 
 to represent the route that the accused took in going to and re- 
 turning from the place of the crime has been received. ^^^ 
 
 ^^ State V. Harrison (N. Car.), 58 the persons portrayed were criminals, 
 
 S. E. 754; Hisler v. State, 52 Fla. 30, was raised, but not decided in Peo- 
 
 42 So. 692; Carter v. State, 39 Tex. pie v. Smith, 121 N. Y. 578, 582, 24 
 
 Cr. App. 345, 46 S. W. 236, 48 S. W. N. E. 852. It would seem that the 
 
 508; Territory v. Emilio (N. Mex.), accusatory and derogatory indorse- 
 
 89 Pac. 239; Territory v. Price ments, while not keeping out the 
 
 (N. Mex.), 91 Pac. 72>Z', Common- photographs, ought to be excluded 
 
 wealth V. Johnson, 213 Pa. St. 432, from the jury as hearsay, and as cal- 
 
 62 Atl. 1064; People V. Johnson, 140 culated to prejudice the prisoner. 
 
 N. Y. 350, 35 N. E. 604; Burton v. '=^West v. State, 53 Fla. 77, 43 So. 
 
 State, 107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 284. The 445. 
 
 question, what effect on the compe- ""Burton v. State, 115 Ala. i, 22 
 
 tency of photographs taken from a So. 585. 
 
 "rogue's gallery," and offered solely '"Burton v. State, iiS Ala. i, 22 
 
 for the purpose of identifying the So. 585. 
 accused, certain indorsements stating
 
 § 53 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 88 
 
 § 53. "Keal evidence" — Inspection by jurors. — Real evidence 
 means evidence which is obtained through the sight by the actual 
 inspection of a person or thing by the judge or jury in open 
 court.^^" The subject of the production in court of articles to 
 furnish visual proof of their condition is considered elsewhere in 
 this volume."^ It remains to consider only cases where a cjues- 
 tion of personal identity, resemblance or physical condition is 
 concerned. The question is, when may the accused be compelled 
 to submit to an examination by the jurors? Inspection and com- 
 parison of persons by the jury have been frecjuently allowed 
 where race or color was in issue. This is wholly unobjectionable 
 if the accused shall consent thereto, or if he desires to introduce 
 the evidence in his own behalf.^^* Whether the accused can be 
 compelled to exhibit a portion of his body to the jury, or be re- 
 quired to submit to a general physical examination by them, is a 
 question upon which a diversity of opinion exists. 
 
 Under existing constitutional provisions, an accused person 
 cannot be compelled to testify as a witness against himself. Hence 
 it has been held that the accused, not being a witness, could not 
 be compelled to stand up before a jury in order that they might 
 ascertain from inspection to what race he belonged. ^"^ Whether 
 compulsory inspection of the accused can be considered to in- 
 fringe the constitutional prohibition that he shall not be com- 
 pelled to testify against himself depends somewhat on circum- 
 stances. He waives it by going on the stand in his own behalf. 
 If he does this, he must then submit to a cross-examination and 
 
 "° Gaunt V. State, 50 N. J. L. 490- head for the purpose of identifica- 
 
 495, 14 Atl. 600, citing cases. tion by prosecutrix. Turman v. 
 
 ^^ § 47, ante. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 7, 95 S. W. 
 
 ^^ It is error to refuse to permit the 533. 
 accused to place his physical appear- ^^^ State v. Jacobs, 5 Jones (N. 
 ance in evidence if the physical char- Car.) 259. In a prosecution against 
 acteristics are such as cannot be a negro for living in adultery with 
 manufactured for the occasion, as, an alleged white woman, it was per- 
 for example, blindness, lack of mem- missible for the state to make pro- 
 bers, or his color, size and height, fert of the woman to the jury, in 
 Lipes V. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 125, order that they might determine 
 127, 54 Am. 402. On a prosecution whether or not she was a white 
 for assault with intent to rape, it was woman. Jones v. State (Ala.), 47 So. 
 not permissible for the state to re- 100. 
 quire accused to place a cap on his
 
 89 PRIMARY EVIDEXCE. 
 
 DD 
 
 may be compelled to exhibit a part of his person for the inspection 
 of the jurors. 
 
 Even if he does not go upon the witness stand the majority of 
 the cases hold that jurors can use their eyes as well as their ears, 
 and, recognizing the difficulty of drawing any line of demarka- 
 tion, maintain the rule that the accused may be required to sub- 
 mit his person or any part of it to the jury for examination/"'^ 
 
 \\'here the accused, on refusing to obey an order to arise in 
 order to be identified, is forcibly compelled to stand up, it has 
 been held that his constitutional rights were not violated nor 
 was he compelled to give evidence against himself,^"' upon the 
 theory that there was nothing in the mere act of arising or in 
 his personal appearance which necessarily furnished evidence 
 against him or connected him with the crime. The right of the 
 accused to be present with the jury in court creates a reciprocal 
 duty that he shall remain in their presence. The orderly conduct 
 of a criminal trial requires that the court shall have full power to 
 say what place the prisoner shall occupy, when he shall sit or 
 stand, and that he shall remain within sight of the court and the 
 witnesses. So it is universally admitted that if the prisoner shall 
 appear in a mask, or veiled, or with his head covered, the court 
 may order him to uncover his features, for without this exposure 
 it would not be certain who the person really was who assumed 
 to be the prisoner.^^^ 
 
 The information obtainable by inspection is of considerable 
 value when the issue turns upon a question of race or color be- 
 cause of the marked racial characteristics which enable anyone 
 of ordinary intelligence to distinguish between persons of differ- 
 ent races. But evidence of identity, race or age thus obtained 
 does not possess much probative force because of the unreliability 
 of the untrained faculties of human observation. This objection 
 
 ^^' State V. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, tion, unless he is also a witness. Gar- 
 
 89, 33 Am. 53on ; State v. Woodruff, vin v. State, 52 Miss. 207, 209. 
 
 67 N. Car. 89, 91; State v. Hall, 79 "'People v. Gardner, 144 i^'- Y. 
 
 Iowa 674, 44 N. W. 914; Garvin v. 119, 127-129, 38 N. E. 1003, 43 Am. 
 
 State, 52 Miss. 207, 209; State v. St. 741, 28 L. R. A. 699n ; State v. 
 
 Wieners, 66 Mo. 13. Contra, Black- Reasby, 100 Iowa 231, 69 N. W. 451. 
 
 well V. State, 67 Ga. 76, 78, 79, 44 "*Rice v. Rice, 47 ^'. J- Eq. 559, 
 
 Am. 717. But he cannot be ques- 21 .Atl. 286, li L. R. A. 59m. 
 tioned while under visual examina-
 
 § 54 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 90 
 
 cannot be urged to its admissibility, if it is relevant, though 
 doubtless affecting its credibility/^" 
 
 § 54. Compelling the accused to submit to inspection by the jury or 
 to stand up for identification. — The accused cannot object if he be 
 identified in open court without being required to stand, A direc- 
 tion to a witness to look about the court and point out a person 
 in court whom he thinks committed the crime is always proper.^*" 
 The court or the prosecuting attorney may even point out the ac- 
 cused and ask a witness if that is the person who committed the 
 crime."^ 
 
 If the accused shall voluntarily stand up and so thus be identi- 
 fied by a witness pointing him out, he should not be granted a 
 new trial upon the ground that he has been compelled to testify 
 against himself. ^"'^ And it has been held that merely directing 
 the accused to stand up for identification is not compelling him 
 to be a witness against himself.^*^ The accused may immediately 
 on his arrest, if legally arrested, be subjected to a compulsory 
 
 "* The question arises can the de- 
 meanor and conduct of the prisoner, 
 his manifestation of emotion or the 
 absence of it during the trial, but not 
 while he is on the witness stand, and 
 if he is not expressly under the in- 
 spection of the jurors, be considered 
 by them as a legitimate source of evi- 
 dence? The rule that the conduct of 
 a witness may be regarded in esti- 
 mating his credibility has no applica- 
 tion here, for the credibility of the 
 accused is not material if he is not 
 a witness, and his demeanor then is 
 only relevant, so far as it bears di- 
 rectly upon the crime, by showing 
 that he is conscious of his guilt or 
 the reverse. Practically it is impos- 
 sible to prevent jurors from observ- 
 ing the appearance and behavior of 
 the accused very closely while he is 
 in court during the trial. They will 
 naturally draw inferences therefrom 
 either favorable or unfavorable to 
 
 him. The information thus obtained 
 is evidence, and, doubtless, many a 
 verdict has been determined thereby. 
 While we countenance the modern 
 jury system and insist upon the right 
 of the prisoner to remain in court 
 and to confront his accusers, we can- 
 not close the eyes of the jurors. See 
 article in 15 Cr. Law Mag., p. 339. 
 
 ""State V. Johnson, 67 N. Car. 55. 
 
 '"^ State V. Hall, 79 Iowa 674, 44 
 N. W. 914; State v. Ruck, 194 Mo. 
 416, 92 S. W. 706. 
 
 "-Gallaher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 247, 12 S. W. 1087, Rex V. Watson, 
 2 Stark. 104, 116, 128; People v. 
 Goldenson, ^(y Cal. 328, 347, 19 Pac. 
 161. 
 
 ""^ People V. Goldenson, ^6 Cal. 328. 
 19 Pac. 161 ; State v. Reasby, 100 
 Iowa 231, 69 N. W. 451; People v. 
 Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 
 1003, 43 Am. St. 741, 28 L. R. A. 699n.
 
 91 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 54 
 
 physical examination to ascertain his identity/'** His clothing 
 may be removed so far as is necessary to procure evidence of 
 identity and this may be done by a reasonable amount of force 
 if he resists/'*^ 
 
 A witness may always testify to the physical condition of the 
 prisoner when his condition is relevant. He may state what 
 marks he saw on the prisoner's body, whether he was physically 
 deformed in any way, and may describe his general personal ap- 
 pearance so far as he observed it. And this is the rule even where 
 the clothing of the prisoner is forcibly removed without his con- 
 sent by the police officers who arrested him, or who have him in 
 charge, and his nude body is examined for purposes of identifica- 
 tion. The witness may testify to what the prisoner wore and to 
 what articles were found concealed upon him when he was 
 searched. Permitting witnesses to testify to what they saw does 
 not compel the accused to testify against himself, and such a case 
 must clearly be distinguished from that in which the accused is 
 placed upon the witness stand and compelled to answer ques- 
 tions."*^ Where the condition of the prisoner's hand at the date 
 of the crime is relevant, it has been held that he may be compelled 
 to exhibit it, devoid of covering ; and a witness who saw it thus 
 exhibited at the coroner's inquest may testify to its condition, 
 though the exhibition was obtained by intimidation."' 
 
 When a witness has forgotten the appearance of the accused, 
 he has been allowed to testify that on a former trial he had iden- 
 tified the person then accused, and such evidence, if coupled with 
 independent testimony that the present accused is the same person 
 who previously had been identified, is sufficient evidence of 
 identity to sustain a conviction."* 
 
 "* O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 ^" State v. Garrett, 71 N. Car. 85, 
 
 N. E. 137, 9 L. R. A. 323n; State v. 87, 17 Am. i. 
 
 Struble, 71 Iowa 11, 32 N. W. i. '"Ruston v. State, 4 Tex. App. 432, 
 
 "° O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 25 434. Evidence of defendant's per- 
 
 N. E. 137, 9 L. R. A. 323n. sonal appearance two years before 
 
 "* O'Brien v. State, 125 Ind. 38, 45, trial and one year subsequent to the 
 
 25 N. E. T37, 9 L. R. A. 323n; crime is relevant. Commonwealth v. 
 
 Leeper v. State, 29 Tex. App. 63, 14 Campbell, 155 Mass. 537, 30 N. E. 
 
 S. W. 398; State V. Jones, 153 Mo. 72. A police officer ought not to be 
 
 457, 55 S. W. 80; Fields v. State 46 permitted to testify as an expert that 
 
 Fla. 84, 35 So. 185. he identified certain persons on some
 
 § 55 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 92 
 
 The language constituting an idcntitication by a third person 
 not produced in court is hearsay, if coming from a person to 
 whom it was related. '■*" unless the extra-judicial identification is a 
 part of the res gcstcc of some relevant fact,^'"' or unless it is con- 
 tained in a dying declaration which is admissible as such. The 
 objection that it is hearsay cannot then be urged against it.^^^ 
 
 Under this rule a witness will not be allowed to state that a 
 bystander pointed out a person to him and declared that he com- 
 mitted the crime. '■''- 
 
 § 55. Mode and eifect of identifying evidence. — The identity of 
 the accused with the person who committed the crime is an im- 
 portant element. Its proof is always essential and in some cases 
 difficult. The relevancy of evidence of identification depends upon 
 the circumstances of the case. Generally speaking, any fact which 
 would convince or tend to convince a person of ordinary judg- 
 ment in carrying on his every-day affairs, as to the identity of a 
 person will be received. The evidence will be permitted to take 
 a wide range.^^^ Usually evidence of identity comes from those 
 present when the crime was committed and who state that they 
 saw the accused commit it. This is direct evidence of identifica- 
 tion, but circumstantial evidence may be received. ^^* In an ex- 
 treme case of this sort, the crime having been committed on a 
 Thursday, the state was permitted to prove that the accused had 
 a superstitious belief that Thursday was a lucky day for him, 
 
 prior occasions as robbers from a de- People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 
 
 scription of such persons given him 128, 38 N. E. 1003, 43 Am. St. 741, 
 
 by the person alleged to have been 28 L. R. A. 699n. 
 
 robbed. State v. Rutledge, 37 Wash. "'Felder v. State. 23 Tex. App. 
 
 523, 79 Pac. 1 123. 477, 485-488, 5 S. W. 145. 59 Am. 
 
 "'Hopt V. People, no U. S. 574, 777n; Reddick v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 
 
 581, 582, 28 L. ed. 262, 4 Sup. Ct. 202; App. 463, 34 S. W. 274, 60 Am. St. 
 
 People V. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 N. 56; State v. Hutchinson, 95 Iowa 
 
 W. 95; Rose V. State, 13 Ohio C. C. 566, 64 N. W. 610: Davis v. State, 
 
 342, 7 Ohio Dec. 226; Elsworth v. 63 Ark. 470, 39 S. \V. 356. 
 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. t, 104 S. W. "' State v. Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463, 
 
 903; State V. Hoover, 134 Iowa 17, 79 Am. Dec. 223: State v. Witham, 
 
 III N. W. 323. 72 Me. 531; State v. Martin, 47 S. 
 
 ""Jordan v. Commonwealth, 25 Car. 67, 25 S. E. 113. 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 943, 945- '''Craig v. State, — Ind. — . 86 N. 
 
 "* Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 17, 26; E. 397.
 
 93 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. 8 55 
 
 and that he would be successful in anything he attempted on that 
 ^l^y 15 5 gQ j|. j^-|^y |-jg pi'oved that the accused had been previ- 
 ously indicted under the assumed name alleged in the indict- 
 rnent/^*^ A witness may testify that he identified the accused 
 after his arrest as the person he saw commit the crime/" And a 
 witness may testify that a photograph of the accused taken at the 
 time of his arrest and exhibited to the witness on the stand re- 
 sembled the person he saw commit the crime/^® A witness testi- 
 fying to identity may describe a person whom he saw in the vicin- 
 ity of the crime at the date of its occurrence and he may testify 
 to the actual color, height, weight and other appearances of this 
 person and his description may be compared with that of the 
 accused by the jury.^"^ One who is present when the accused was 
 brought before the complaining witness for identification cannot 
 testify that the complainant identified the accused, as that is a 
 conclusion of fact, but the witness may testify to whatever the 
 complainant said to the accused in his presence or he may testify 
 that the complainant was silent when he was asked if the accused 
 was his assailant/"*^ 
 
 The identity of the name of the accused as given by him in 
 court with the name of the person mentioned in the indictment, 
 raises some presumption of identity of person."^ The names by 
 which the defendant has been known may be proved to show his 
 identity and also to prove that he had given a fictitious name, 
 which under certain circumstances is suspicious/'^" It is proper 
 in order that the jury may determine the extent of the knowledge 
 of a witness testifying to the identity of the accused to permit him 
 to be asked how long he has known the accused and how long 
 and how often he had visited him/®^ And where the evidence of 
 identity is circumstantial, it may be permitted to take a wide 
 
 "^ Davis V. State, 51 Neb. 30T, 70 ^™ Andrews v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 N. W. 984- App.), 83 S. W. 188. 
 
 ^°* Morse v. Commonwealth (Ky.), ^""Turman v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 Ill S. W. 714, 33 Ky. L. 831, 894. App. 7, 95 S. W. 533- 
 
 '"Yarbrough v. State, 105 Ala. 43, ^^ Nelson v. State, 151 Ala. 2, 43 
 
 16 So. 758; Beavers v. State, 103 Ala. So. 966. 
 
 36, 15 So. 616. ^""Commonwealth v. Johnson, 199 
 
 "* People V. Carey, 125 Midi. 535, Mass. 55, 85 N. E. 188. 
 
 84 N. W. 1087. Sec photographs, . "'Way v. State (Ala.), 46 So. 273. 
 supra, §§ 50, 51.
 
 § 55 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 94 
 
 range. Any facts, which on their face, appear to relate to the 
 accused and which are of a descriptive character which corre- 
 spond in their details with a description of the accused, shown 
 by other evidence, are admitted. Thus, a description of the ac- 
 cused, giving his name, age, nationality, place of birth and port 
 of arrival contained in a report made by an officer of a vessel to 
 the officers having charge of immigration matters was received, 
 where, from the evidence it appears that the accused had been an 
 immigrant and the descriptive statement tallied in its details with 
 other facts brought out in the evidence.^*'* If identity is the sole 
 fact at issue and it is proved that a crime had been committed by 
 some one, the jury should be expressly instructed to accjuit unless 
 they believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused has been 
 identified as the party who committed the crime,^®^ 
 
 Whether a witness in identifying the accused as a person who 
 committed the crime is expressing an opinion or stating a fact 
 within his own knowledge is a question upon which a diversity 
 of opinion exists. Some of the authorities regard identity as a 
 fact and require the witness to identify the prisoner solely as a 
 matter of his own knowledge and on personal recollection. 
 
 So the witness may be asked, "Do you know A. ?" and, if he 
 does, he may then state whether the accused is the individual men- 
 tioned. He cannot be permitted to state that he "thinks" the ac- 
 cused is A., or give his impression that a man wdiom he saw near 
 the scene of the crime is identical with the accused. He should 
 state facts, leaving the inference of identity with the jury."" 
 
 According to another view a witness, in identifying the accused 
 is expressing an opinion or impression, founded on his observa- 
 tion of numerous details, as his physical appearance, dress or 
 other personal and peculiar incidents. He is accordingly permitted 
 to frame his answer to a question touching the identity of the 
 prisoner, in the form of an expression of opinion or belief or 
 state it as his impression mainly because the facts constituting 
 similarity, or the reverse, in personal appearance are so numerous 
 and peculiar that they cannot be specifically narrated so as to 
 
 ^"Mclnerney v. United States, 143 ^'^ People v. Williams, 29 Hun (N. 
 
 Fed. 729, 74 C. C. A. 655. Y.) 520, 523, 524; People v. Wilson, 
 
 ^" Petty V. State, 83 Miss. 260, 35 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 199, 206; State 
 
 So. 213. V. Hyatt, 179 Mo. 344, 78 S. W. 601.
 
 95 PRIMARY EVIDENCE. § 56 
 
 bring out clearly their proper force and significance before the 
 jury.^''" Hence a witness, after describing a person seen by him, 
 may state that, in his opinion, it was the prisoner, or thai he re- 
 sembled the prisoner, under the rule permitting a non-expert wit- 
 ness to give his opinion where the jury would be unable, other- 
 wise, to form an intelligent conception of identity/^® 
 
 The testimony of a witness that he believed he recognized the 
 accused as the one he saw taking away stolen property, and that 
 he saw and recognized other men who were with him, has been 
 admitted/''^ 
 
 Indeed, even if it be conceded that identity is a fact, the answer 
 should hardly be rejected because the witness is not positive of 
 the identity of the accused beyond all doubt ; or, because, through 
 excessive caution, he qualifies his answers by such expressions as 
 "I think," or "I believe." Witnesses cannot be required to state 
 all facts with equal positiveness.^^'' 
 
 Pointing out a person by a witness to the jury without naming 
 him is a sufficient identification if his name is shown by inde- 
 pendent evidence, ^'^^ nor will all the testimony of a witness be ex- 
 punged merely because he failed to identify the accused when the 
 latter would not arise for identification. 
 
 § 56. Identification of the voice. — Evidence of identity consist- 
 ing of the recognition of the voice of the accused by a witness 
 who is familiar with it has been received. The witness may state 
 that the accused was present on a certain occasion, and made a 
 statement, and may then add that he knows it was the accused 
 because he recognized his voice. ^^^ 
 
 '" See Underbill on Evid., § 186. 61 Cal. 540; People v. Stanley, loi 
 
 "* White V. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. Mich. 93, 59 N. W. 498; People v. 
 
 L. 373; Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, Burt, 170 N. Y. 560, 62 N. E. 1099; 
 
 117 Mass. 122. 10 Am. 40in; State v. Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N. 
 
 Powers, 130 Mo. 475, 32 S. W. 984; W. 771. 
 
 State V. Cushenberry, 157 Mo. 168, 56 ^"^ State v. Welch, 33 Ore. 33. 54 
 
 S. W. 737; State V. Lytle, 117 N. Pac. 213. 
 
 Car. 799, 23 S. E. 476; Jordan v. ^"'' People v. Rolf e, 61 Cal. 540, 543; 
 
 State, 50 Fla. 94, 39 So. 155; Coff- Underbill on Evid., § t86. 
 
 man v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 478, "^Commonwealth v. Whitman. 121 
 
 103 S. W. IT28; State V. James, 194 Mass. 361, 362. 
 
 Mo. 268, 92 S. W. 679 (as to identi- "'People v. Willctt, 92 N. Y. 29, 
 
 fication of things) ; People v. Rolfe, 32, 33; State v. Kepper, 65 Iowa 745,
 
 § 57 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 96 
 
 So the witness may describe the tone of voice used, whether 
 angry or otherwise, in a conversation overheard by him between 
 the accused and the victim of a homicide.^" 
 
 This rule is particularly applicable in the case of nocturnal 
 crimes, where it is physically imj)0ssible for the witness to have 
 seen the accused, though he may have been in close proximity to 
 him. The same rule would doubtless apply in the case of a blind 
 witness.'"* The accused will not, unless he shall go upon the wit- 
 ness stand, be allowed to put his own voice in evidence in order 
 to show his natural voice by speaking aloud in court. If per- 
 mitted to speak, not being under oath at the time, he may simu- 
 late. The jury will not hear his natural and ordinary voice, but 
 one which is manufactured for the occasion. 
 
 It has also been held that it is not material that the witness who 
 had a conversation over the telephone with the accused, did not 
 know at the time of the conversation who was talking. The con- 
 versation over the telephone may be proved if on subsequent ac- 
 quaintance with the accused, the witness can identify the voice 
 which he heard over the telephone as that of the accused.'"^ 
 
 The accused may prove to contradict a witness who states he 
 recognized the voice of the accused on the occasion of the crime, 
 that another person present had a similar voice and that this per- 
 son's voice had on other occasions been mistaken for that of the 
 accused.''*' 
 
 749, 23 X. W. 304; Givens v. State, nications sent and received by tele- 
 
 35 Tex. Cr. App. 563, 34 S. W. 626; phone. Underbill on Ev., § 85, and 
 
 Davis V. State, 15 Tex. App. 594, People v. Ward, 3 N. Y. Cr. 483, 511, 
 
 598 ; Stepp V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. where a witness was permitted to 
 
 349, 20 S. W. 753; Fussell V. State, state a conversation with the pris- 
 
 93 Ga. 450, 21 S. E. 97; Waggoner oner bad over a telephone. The wit- 
 
 v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 98 S. W. ness testified he had talked with him 
 
 255 ; Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55, 44 So. hvmdreds of times before over it, knew 
 
 706, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 373n. A bis voice well and recognized it on 
 
 witness may be allowed to state that this occasion. State v. Usher, 136 
 
 he heard a person say something and Iowa 606, 11 1 N. W. 811. 
 
 that it was bis opinion it was the ™ People v. Strollo, 191 N. Y. 42, 
 
 voice of the accused. Way v. State 83 N. E. 573; Commomvealth v. 
 
 (Ala.), 46 So. 273. Scott, 123 Mass. 222, 234, 25 Am. 81. 
 
 '■'Campos V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. "^ Mahoney v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 289, 97 S. W. 100. App.), 98 S. W. 854. 
 
 ^~* See also admissions and commu-
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. 
 
 57. Statutory competency of the ac- § 67. 
 
 cused. 
 
 58. The accused is not compellable 68. 
 
 to testify against himself — 
 His credibility. 
 58a. Evidence obtained by searches 
 legal and illegal. 
 
 59. ]\Iode of examining the accused. 69. 
 
 60. Cross-examination — Incrimina- 70. 
 
 ting and disgracing questions. 
 
 61. Examination as to prior im- 
 
 prisonment, etc. 71' 
 
 62. Statutory limitation of cross- 
 
 examination to relevant mat- 72. 
 ters. 
 
 63. ]\Iode of cross-examination. TZ- 
 
 64. Privileged communications on 
 
 the cross-examination. 74. 
 
 65. Conclusiveness of answers — Im- 
 
 peachment by other witnesses. 
 
 66. The bad character of the ac- 75. 
 
 cused — When admissible to 
 impeach him. 
 
 Commenting on the failure of 
 the accused to testify. 
 
 Exclusion or withdrawal of 
 comments on failure to testi- 
 fy — Failure to call other wit- 
 nesses, or to testify to incrim- 
 inating facts. 
 
 Definition of accomplice. 
 
 Accomplices when jointly in- 
 dicted — Witnesses for each 
 other. 
 
 Accomplices as witnesses for 
 the state. 
 
 Immunity of accomplice when 
 testifying for the state. 
 
 Credibility and corroboration 
 of accomplices. 
 
 Extent of corroboration re- 
 quired — It must be of material 
 facts. 
 
 The nature of the crime as a 
 test of corroboration — Suffi- 
 ciency of corroboration. 
 
 § 57. Statutory competency of the accused. — Because of the com- 
 mon-law rule rendering- parties to the record incompetent as wit- 
 nesses, the defendant, in a criminal trial, was incapable at common 
 law of testifying in his own behalf. It was considered certain that 
 his fear of punishment, whether he were conscious of guilt, or of 
 innocence, would cause him to testify untruthfully; and, to avoid 
 this, his testimony was wholly excluded. 
 
 At the present time, in most states, the accused may, as a matter 
 of statutory right, if he so elect, testify for himself. These statutes 
 do not, of course, violate a constitutional provision that a prisoner 
 shall not be compelled to testify against himself.^ But as they are 
 
 * State V. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200, 217. 
 
 7 — UXDERHILL CrIM. Ev. (Q/)
 
 ^^ 57 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 98 
 
 derogatory of the common law, they should receive a strict con- 
 struction, though not such a construction as will nullify the legis- 
 lative intention, and deprive the accused of his right to speak. 
 
 These enactments leave the exercise of the right to testify 
 wholly optional with the accused, and many of them in terms 
 provide that his failure or his neglect to exercise it, cannot be used 
 as an argument against him." 
 
 In the federal courts the competency of witnesses is regulated 
 by a statute which provides that the laws of the state within whose 
 limits the federal court is located shall be its rules of decision as 
 to competency in trials at common law, in ecjuity and admiralty. 
 As the criminal jurisdiction of the federal courts is purely statu- 
 tory, the competency of witnesses in criminal trials in those courts 
 is not regulated by the statute of the state in which the court is 
 located, but by the common law of the state, modified by the fed- 
 eral statutes defining crimes and regulating criminal proceedings 
 and the competency of witnesses.^ 
 
 ^ See post, § 58. Note on compelling 
 accused to cover or uncover his face 
 or head, 94 Am. St. 339; note on com- 
 pelling accused to try on a shoe, 94 
 Am. St. 344; note on compellingi ac- 
 cused to exhibit marks on his per- 
 son, 94 Am. St. 340; note on com- 
 pelling accused to make footprints, 
 94 Am. St. 343 ; note on compelling 
 accused to give specimen of his hand- 
 writing, 94 Am. St. 344, 345 ; note on 
 compelling accused to utter certain 
 words or sounds to show his voice, 
 94 Am. St. 341 ; note on right of 
 party to testify as to his intent or 
 motive, 21 Am. St. 314; note on 
 cross-examination of defendant in 
 criminal prosecution, 38 Am. St. 895- 
 897. 
 
 ^United States v. Hawthorn, i Dill. 
 (U. S.) 422, 26 Fed. Cas. 15332; Lo- 
 gan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 
 36 L. ed. 429, 12 Sup. Ct. 617. This 
 matter is now regulated by the act of 
 March 16, 1878, to be found in 20 U. 
 S. Stat. L. 30, p. 312, ch. 27- The 
 
 statutory provisions of the various 
 states dififer in detail, but their cen- 
 tral idea is to give the accused the 
 fullest opportunity to testify, while 
 permitting no inference of his guilt 
 to arise from his total silence. The 
 statute of Michigan which reads: 
 "No person shall be disqualified as a 
 witness in any criminal case, or pro- 
 ceeding, by reason of his interest in 
 the event of the same being a party, 
 or otherwise, or by reason of his 
 having been convicted of any crime ; 
 but such interest or conviction may 
 be shown for the purpose of affect- 
 ing his credibility; provided, how- 
 ever, that the defendant in any crimi- 
 nal case shall only at his own request 
 be deemed a competent witness, and 
 his neglect to testify shall not create 
 any presumption against him, nor 
 shall the court permit any reference 
 or comment to be made upon such 
 neglect," may be taken as an exam- 
 ple.
 
 99 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. § 58 
 
 § 58. The accused is not compellable to testify against himself — 
 His credibility. — Though the accused is now a competent witness 
 for himself, he cannot, under existing constitutional provisions, 
 federal and state, ''be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit- 
 ness against himself."* These provisions should be applied in a 
 broad and liberal spirit, in order to secure to the citizen that im- 
 munity from every species of self-accusation implied in the lan- 
 guage in which they are expressed.^ They are meant to protect 
 the accused not only from being compelled to answer questions 
 calling for an express confession of guilt, but from those calling 
 for collateral circumstances also.*' 
 
 Most of the statutes conferring competency upon the accused 
 expressly provide that he can be called as a witness at his own re- 
 quest only. The purpose of these statutes is to confer a privilege 
 upon him, not to impose an obligation upon the state to call him 
 as its witness. Hence, such a statute does not entitled him to de- 
 mand that he shall be called as a witness for the prosecution, even 
 to prove his own handwriting.'^ 
 
 If the accused goes on the witness stand in his own behalf the 
 credibility of his evidence is for the jury alone.® 
 
 *U. S. Const, Fifth Amend. These State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl. 
 
 provisions have been held applicable 1097, 87 Am. St. 711. 
 
 to accused persons and witnesses ^ Commonwealth v. Pratt, 137 Mass. 
 
 summoned to appear before the in- 98, 107. 
 
 terstate commerce commission, Coun- * Miller v. State, 15 Fla. 577; State 
 
 selman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, v. Napper, 141 Mo. 401, 42 S. W. 957; 
 
 562, 35 L. ed. 1 1 10, 12 Sup. Ct. 19s, to Kirkham v. People, 170 111. 9, 48 N. 
 
 legislative investigations, Emery's E. 465 ; Wilson v. State, 69 Ga. 224. 
 
 Case, 107 Mass. 172, 179, 9 Am. 22, The court may instruct the jury 
 
 and to proceedings to punish for con- that they are not to accept the evi- 
 
 tempt, In re McKenna, 47 Kan. 738, dence of the accused blindly, or any 
 
 28 Pac. 1078. further than it is corroborated by 
 
 "People V. Rcardon, 109 N. Y. S. other evidence,' but may consider 
 
 504. whether it is true, and is given in 
 
 ° Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172, 179, good faith, or merely to prevent a 
 9 Am. 22 ; Rogers v. State, 4 Ga. App. conviction. State v. Mecum, 95 Iowa 
 691, 62 S. E. 96; Pitts v. State, 140 433, 64 N. W. 286. But a charge re- 
 Ala. 70, 37 So. loi ; Eaker v. State, 4 minding the jury that the accused is 
 Ga. App. 649, 62 S. E. 99 ; Tooke v. the only surviving witness of a homi- 
 State, 4 Ga. App. 495, 61 S. E. 917; cide, for which he is on trial, while at 
 Cooper V. State, 86 Ala. 610, 6 So. the same time emphasizing his inter- 
 ne, II Am. St. 84, 4 L. R. A. 766; est in the outcome of the trial and
 
 58 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 lOO 
 
 But the court must (without, however, giving too much prom- 
 inence to this fact) instruct them that they should," or that they 
 may,^" consider the facts that he is interested in the outcome of 
 the trial, and is testifying in his own behalf, in determining his 
 credibility. 
 
 The jury should regard, among other things, the inherent prob- 
 ability or improbability of his statements, his intelligence or want 
 of intelligence, his opportunities for knowledge or business meth- 
 ods, and to what extent he has been corroborated by other evi- 
 dence." 
 
 Speaking generally the jury must determine the credibility of 
 
 pointing out the force and cogency of 
 the incriminating circumstances, is 
 very objectionable. Hickory v. United 
 States, i6o U. S. 408, 40 L. ed. 474, 16 
 Sup. Ct. 327. A charge that while the 
 law says defendant is a competent 
 witness and may testify in his own 
 behalf, and the jury should not ca- 
 priciously disregard it, this does not 
 mean that they should believe it, but 
 onh^ that they should consider it, and 
 ascertain to the best of their judg- 
 ment whether it is true, and, if true, 
 they should act on it as on truth from 
 any other source, and, if they should 
 not believe it, they should reject it, 
 they being the sole judges of the 
 truth of the evidence, is not errone- 
 ous. Harrison v. State, 144 Ala. 20, 
 40 So. 568. 
 
 ® State V. Renfrow, in Mo. 589, 
 598, 20 S. W". 299; People V. Cronin, 
 34 Cal. 191, 203; People v. Hitch- 
 cock, 104 Cal. 482, 38 Pac. 198; Peo- 
 ple v. Crowley, 102 N. Y. 234, 238, 6 
 N. E. 384 ; Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 
 467, 472, 4 N. E. 63, 5 N. E. 711; 
 Wilkins v. State, 98 Ala. i, 13 So. 
 312; Commonwealth v. Harlow, no 
 Mass. 411; State v. Moelchen, 53 
 Iowa 310, 316, 317, 5 N. W. 186; 
 State V. Slingerland, 19 Xev. 135, 
 141, 7 Pac. 280; State v. Melvern, 
 
 32 Wash. 7. 72 Pac. 489; Burkett v. 
 State, 154 Ala. 19, 45 So. 682 ; Wright 
 v. State, 148 Ala. 596, 42 So. 745; 
 Sykes v. State, 151 Ala. 80, 44 So. 398; 
 Thomas v. State (Ala.), 47 So. 
 257; Davis V. State, 152 Ala. 25, 44 
 So. 561; Greer v. State (Ala.), 47 So. 
 300. 
 
 "State V. Maguire, 113 Mo. 670, 21 
 S. W. 212; State V. Bryant, 134 Mo. 
 246, 35 S. W. 597 ; State v. Ihrig, 106 
 Mo. 267, 270, 17 S. W. 300 ; Panton v. 
 People, 114 111. 505, 507, 2 N. E. 411; 
 Chambers v. People, 105 111. 409, 413, 
 414; Bird V. State, 107 Ind. 154, 156, 
 8 N. E. 14 ; Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 
 461, 469, 49 Am. 18s; Smith v. State, 
 108 Ala. I, 19 So. 306, 54 Am. St. 140; 
 People v. Resh, 107 Mich. 251, 65 N. 
 W. 99; State V. Metcalf, 17 Mont. 
 417, 43 Pac. 182; State v. Holloway, 
 117 N. Car. 730, 23 S. E. 168; New- 
 port V. State, 140 Ind. 299, 39 N. E. 
 926 ; Wrye v. State, 95 Ga. 466, 22 S. 
 E. 273 ; State v. Tarter, 26 Ore. 38, 
 S7 Pac. 53 : Hamilton v. State, 62 Ark. 
 543, 36 S. W. 1054. The cases are not 
 harmonious upon the proper language 
 of the instruction. Its form is usu- 
 ally prescribed by statute. 
 
 "United States v. Kenney, 90 Fed. 
 257-
 
 lOI THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. § 58a 
 
 the testimony of the accused under the same rules and principles 
 as with any witness/" 
 
 So an instruction that the credibility and weight of defendant's 
 testimony were for the jury, and that they might consider his 
 manner of testifying, the reasonableness of his account of the 
 transaction, and his interest in the case, and should consider his 
 testimony and determine whether it was true or not, was not open 
 to the objection of telling the jury that they were not bound to 
 treat defendant's testimony the same as that of other witnesses.^^ 
 
 The jury should not permit the fact that the accused, while tes- 
 tifying, is burdened with an imputation of crime to influence them 
 to such an extent that they will disregard his evidence, if they 
 believe it is true. They should remember that, though accused, 
 he is presumed to be innocent, until they are convinced he is 
 guilty, and their verdict must be based upon the whole evidence, 
 including his own.^* Hence, the jury may not, at pleasure and 
 without regard to the elements of credibility which the evidence 
 of the accused may possess, reject it because of his interest, or 
 because they are not satisfied that it has been corroborated. ^*'' 
 They must always fairly consider his evidence together with all 
 the evidence in the case. 
 
 § 58a. Evidence obtained by searches legal and illegal. — By the 
 constitution of the United States and the constitutions of the sev- 
 
 ^ Ferguson v. State, 72 Xeb. 350, Sullivan v. People, 114 111. 24, 27, 28 
 
 100 X. \V. 800. X. E. 381 ; State v. Sanders, 106 IMo. 
 
 "Waller v. People, 209 111. 284, 70 188, 17 S. W. 223. See Underbill on 
 
 X. E. 68r. In a prosecution for em- Evid., § 234. 
 
 bezzlement, a charge specifically point- "^ Owens v. State, 63 Miss. 450, 452 ; 
 
 ing out accused, and calling attention State v. Melvern, 32 Wash. 7, 72 Pac. 
 
 to his testimony, and stating that, if 489. It is error to instruct the jury 
 
 he had willfully and corruptly testi- that they must regard the evidence 
 
 fied falsely to any fact material to the of the accused with great caution be- 
 
 issue, the jury had the right to en- cause of his interest, State v. Hollo- 
 
 tirely disregard his testimony, was not way, 117 X^. Car. 730, 23 S. E. 168; 
 
 error. IMcCracken v. People, 209 111. State v. White, 10 Wash. 611, 39 Pac. 
 
 215, 70 X. E. 749. 160, 41 Pac. 442; or that the jurors 
 
 "Bird V. State, 107 Tnd. 154, 156, 8 should bear in mind the tendency on 
 
 N. E. 14; Randall v. State, 132 Ind. the part of the guilty accused person 
 
 539. 32 X. E. 305 ; State v. Taylor, to fabricate a story which may bring 
 
 134 Mo. 109, 35 S. W. 92; State v. about their acquittal. State v. Hoy, 
 
 Wells, III Mo. 533, 20 S. W. 232; 83 Minn. 286, 86 X. W. 98.
 
 § 58a CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 102 
 
 eral states, It has been provided that no one shall be compelled on 
 a criminal trial, to give evidence against himself and that the 
 rights of the people against unreasonable searches, shall not be 
 violated. The mere fact that papers are produced by the execution 
 of a search-warrant is no objection to their admission in evidence. 
 In the supreme court of the United States, it has been held that 
 the accused was not compelled to incriminate himself, where his 
 private papers in the possession of the prosecution were intro- 
 duced against him. This is the rule particularly where the wit- 
 ness who testifies says nothing concerning the papers produced. ^^ 
 
 And it has been often held in the state courts that the above 
 constitutional provisions are not violated merely by the reception 
 in evidence of papers or articles of personal property taken from 
 the person or premises of the accused while he is under arrest, 
 and it does not appear in these cases, that it is material whether 
 the search is made by virtue of a legal search w^arrant or not.^'' 
 
 On the other hand, it has been held that the articles obtained by 
 search of the house of the accused under an illegal search warrant 
 is not admissible under constitutional provisions.^' A distinction 
 is made between articles or documents procured by a search of 
 the person of the accused after he has been arrested and the same 
 sort of evidence procured by an illegal search of the premises oc- 
 cupied by the accused. 
 
 In Georgia it has been repeatedly held that evidence either di- 
 rect or indirect which has been secured by the prosecution by an 
 unlawful search, either of the house or of the person of the ac- 
 cused, as, for example, where the accused has been illegally ar- 
 rested and searched by police officers should be excluded."^ 
 
 ^^Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 158 N. Y. 532, 53 N. E. 527, afif'g z^ 
 
 585' 48 L. ed. 575, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, App. Div. (N. Y.) 284, 55 N. Y. S. 
 
 aff'g People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 276; Drake v. State, 75 Ga. 413, 415; 
 
 68 N. E. 62,6, 98 Am. St. 675n, 62, L. State v. Ah Chuey, 14 Nev. 79, 83, 33 
 
 R. A. 406. • Am. 530n; Roszczyniala v. State, 125 
 
 ^* Lawrence V. State, 103 Md. 17,63 Wis. 414, 104 N. W. 113; State v. 
 
 Atl. 96; Commonwealth v. Carbin, 143 Baker, Z3 W. Va. 319, 10 S. E. 639. 
 
 Mass. 124, 8 N. E. 896; State v. "State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa 164, 
 
 Sharpless, 212 Mo. 176, iii S. W. 96 N. W. 730. 
 
 69 ; State v. Strait, 94 Minn. 384, 102 ^''a Croy v. State, 4 Ga. App. 456, 61 
 
 N. W. 913; State v. Jeffries, 210 Mo. S. E. 84S; Hughes v. State, 2 Ga. 
 
 302, 109 S, W. 614; People V. Coombs, App. 29, 58 S. E. 390; Gainer v. State,
 
 I03 
 
 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. 
 
 58a 
 
 Elsewhere it has been held to be the general rule that the courts 
 will not inquire at all into the mode by which the evidence is ob- 
 tained if it is relevant and otherwise admissible and that the il- 
 legal seizure of papers does not in itself constitute any obstacle to 
 their admissibility if they are relevant/^ 
 
 So a pistol found on the person of the accused/^^ or documents 
 taken from him at the time of his arrest/^ or articles of personal 
 property which are relevant taken from the premises of the ac- 
 cused"" have been received in evidence. 
 
 The production in court of vouchers taken from the possession 
 of the accused by a witness who produces them under subpoena, 
 does not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be ex- 
 empt from giving evidence which would incriminate him.^°^ So 
 documents consisting of the letters of a private character which 
 were taken from among the personal papers of the accused by 
 his employes or other persons without his knowledge or consent 
 and by them voluntarily turned over to the district attorney are 
 receivable in evidence if relevant."^ And in New York, it has 
 been expressly held that the police may search the person of one 
 
 2 Ga. App. 126, 58 S. E. 295; Ham- 
 mock V. State, I Ga. App. 126, 58 S. 
 E. 66; Sherman v. State, 2 Ga. App. 
 148, 58 S. E. 393; Davis v. State, 4 
 Ga. App. 318, 61 S. E. 404; Sherman 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 686, 58 S. E. 
 1122. (Concealed weapons.) 
 
 '' State V. Flynn. 36 N. H. 64 ; Com- 
 monwealth V. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519, 
 32 N. E. 910 ; State v. Griswold, 67 
 Conn. 290, 34 Atl. 1046, 2^2) L. R. A. 
 227 ; Siebert v. People, 143 111. 571, 
 582, 32 N. E. 431 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Smith, 166 Mass. 370, 44 N. E. 503. 
 Cf. People V. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 
 119, 128, 38 X. E. 1003, 43 Am. St. 
 741, 28 L. R. A. 699n; Younger v. 
 State, 80 Xeb. 201, 114 N. W. 170; 
 People V. Strollo, 191 N. Y. 42, 83 N. 
 E. 573; Imboden v. People, 40 Colo. 
 142, 90 Pac. 608; Hardesty v. United 
 States, 164 Fed. 420; People v. Ad- 
 ams, 85 App. Div. ex. Y.) 390. %T, X. 
 Y. S. 481 ; Rogers v. State, 4 Ga. App, 
 
 691, 62 S. E. 96; Tooke v. State, 4 Ga. 
 App. 495, 61 S. E. 917 ; Tajdor v. State 
 (Ga. App. 1908), 62 S. E. 1048; Jones 
 V. State (Ga. App.), 62 S. E. 482; 
 Eaker v. State, 4 Ga. App. 649, 62 
 S. E. 99. 
 
 "a Springer v. State, 121 Ga. 155, 
 48 S. E. 907. 
 
 ''State V. Royce, 38 Wash, in, 80 
 Pac. 268; Waggoner v. State (Tex. 
 Cr. App.), 98 S. W. 255. 
 
 '"State V. Schmidt, 71 Kan. 862, 80 
 Pac. 948 (bottles of liquor found in 
 defendant's possession). 
 
 ^^ People V. Coombs, 158 X. Y. 532, 
 53 X. E. 527. 
 
 ^ State V. Griswold, 67 Conn. 290, 
 34 Atl. 1046, 33 L. R. A. 227 ; State v. 
 Van Tassel, 103 Iowa 6, 72 X. W. 
 497; State V. Atkinson, 40 S. Car. 
 363, t8 S. E. 1021, 42 Am. St. 877; 
 Imboden v. People, 40 Colo. 142, 90 
 Pac. 608.
 
 § 59 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. IO4 
 
 who is lawfully under arrest. They may also search the room in 
 which he was arrested and any other place to which they can se- 
 cure lawful access. Writings or articles which are procured by 
 this search are not incompetent,-- because of the manner in which 
 they w^ere obtained. 
 
 § 59. Mode of examining the accused. — As the accused is a com- 
 petent witness, he has a constitutional right to demand that he 
 shall, when testifying, be questioned by his own counsel in the 
 same manner as other witnesses.-" The court cannot, therefore, 
 silence his counsel and compel the accused to give a general 
 account of the whole transaction, nor is his counsel precluded 
 from objecting to irrelevant questions put to him on his cross- 
 examination."* He must be permitted on his direct examination 
 to explain his conduct and declarations as he has testified to them, 
 or as they have been described by other witnesses. He must be 
 permitted fully to unfold and explain his actions, and to state the 
 motives which he claims prompted them. It is, within certain 
 limits, relevant for him to state what intention was present in 
 his mind when he participated in a transaction which is in issue.-'"* 
 
 And the jury are the sole judges to determine whether the de- 
 fendant's statement is false. They should not ignore his state- 
 
 ^^ Smith V. Jerome, 47 Misc. (N. ing, by what thej^ may have said in 
 
 Y.) 22, 93 N. Y. S. 202. regard to any material fact. If par- 
 
 " Clark V. State, 50 Ind. 514, 515; ties are to be kept in harness and not 
 
 Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. 124, 132, 19 allowed to explain their actions and 
 
 Am. 67Z- words when they admit of explana- 
 
 " People V. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, tion and when it is needed, but half 
 
 573, 28 Am. 183 ; Hanoff v. State, 37 the evil which was felt under the old 
 
 Ohio St. 178, 180, 41 Am. 496. rule has been removed." People v. 
 
 ''In People v. Quick, 51 Mich. 547, Farrell, 31 Cal. 576, 584. Cf. Ross v. 
 18 N. W. 375, it was held error to ex- State, 116 Ind. 495, 497, 19 N. E. 451. 
 elude the question "Why did you do "When an act forbidden by law is in- 
 that?" State v. Montgomery, 65 tentionally done, the intent to do the 
 Iowa 483, 22 N. W. 639. "The object act is the criminal intent, which im- 
 of the recent changes was not merely parts to it the character of an of- 
 to enable parties to disclose facts fense, and no one who violates the 
 wholly within their knowledge, but to law, which he is conclusively pre- 
 do what had heretofore been impos- sumed to know, can be heard to say 
 sible, to explain the motives with that he had no criminal intent in do- 
 which they were performed, and to Jng the forbidden act. A party can- 
 explain, if need be, what they meant, not excuse himself for an act inten- 
 or intended to be understood as mean- tionally done, and which is a violation
 
 I05 THE ACCUSED AS A WITXESS. § 6o 
 
 ment of intention, unless they believe it wholly false; and an in- 
 struction which requires the jury to do so is error. They must 
 consider it in connection with all the evidence. The inference 
 which they draw from it may be strong enough to overcome any 
 conclusion of guilty intention which they may draw from his 
 other acts or declarations.-^ 
 
 ' One of several defendants jointly tried who becomes a witness 
 for himself is a witness for all purposes ; and his testimony while 
 a witness in his own behalf is in no way incompetent merely be- 
 cause it may be injurious or beneficial to a co-defendant. The 
 fact that, as usually happens, he tries to exonerate himself by 
 casting the guilt upon his associates, while it may bear upon his 
 credibility, is otherwise immaterial."^ 
 
 § 60. Cross-examination — Incriminating and disgracing questions. 
 
 — The accused, when testifying in his own behalf, waives many 
 of the peculiar constitutional privileges which belong to him as 
 one accused of crime. It is usually provided by statute that he 
 may be examined and cross-examined "as any other witness," and 
 where such is the case, he will not be permitted to claim any 
 privilege while he is a witness that is not enjoyed by other wit- 
 nesses.-'^ In other words, the rule then is that he cannot claim as 
 a witness the privileges which belong to him solely as the ac- 
 
 of the law, by saying he did not so 88 Pac. 418; State v. Palmer, 88 Mo. 
 intend. But where acts are equivocal 568; Dunbar v. Armstrong, 115 111. 
 and become criminal only by reason App. 549; Filkins v. People, 69 X. Y. 
 of the intent with which they are done, loi, 25 Am. 143; State v. Tough, 12 
 both must unite to constitute the of- N. Dak. 425, 96 X. W. 1025; White 
 fense, and both facts must be proved, v. State, 53 Ind. 595 ; Lynch v. Peo- 
 In such cases, unless the intent is pie, 137 111. App. 444; Ryan v. Terri- 
 proved, the offense is not proved. As tory (Ariz.), 100 Pac. 770; People v. 
 the criminal intent may be and usu- Quick, 51 ]\Iich. 547, 18 N. W. 375. 
 ally is inferred from the declarations "^Commonwealth v. Thomas (Ky.), 
 and conduct of the accused, he is per- 104 S. W. 326, 31 Kj-. L. 899. 
 mitted to disavow the imputed pur- "' Richards v. State, 91 Tcnn. 723, 
 pose and repel the presumption." 725, 20 S. W. 533, 30 Am. St. 907. 
 Smith, C. J., in State v. King, 86 N. "* Since a witness can not be re- 
 Car. 603 ; Jackson v. Commonwealth, quired to give evidence against him- 
 96 Va. 107, 30 S. E. 452; Wohlford self, or to testify to facts showing his 
 V. People, 148 111. 296, 36 N. E. 107; commission of a public offense, ac- 
 Crawford v. United States, 30 App. cuscd can not be required to disclose 
 D. C. I ; State v. Barber, 13 Idaho 65, the commission of public offenses
 
 8 6o 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 1 06 
 
 cused.-" He cannot complain if considerable latitude is allowed 
 on his cross-examination, and, generally, he may be asked on his 
 cross-examination the same questions as any witness. 
 
 In states where the cross-examination of the accused is not by 
 statute expressly limited to matters brought out on his direct ex- 
 amination, he may be cross-examined, not only upon matters 
 strictly relevant to the issue, but upon those which are collateral 
 and apparently irrelevant, and which are calculated only to test 
 the credibility and weight of his testimony.^'' 
 
 other than that for which he is on 
 trial. Welch v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 108 S. W. 863, 33 Ky. L. 57- 
 Note on right to cross-examine ac- 
 cused who has taken witness stand as 
 to confession which is not admissible 
 in evidence, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 604. 
 
 ^ State V. Simmons (Kan.), 98 
 Pac. 277; People v. Owen (Mich.), 
 118 N. W. 590, 15 Det. Leg. N. 881. 
 
 '"Maloy V. State, 52 Fla. loi, 41 So. 
 791 ; Stalcup V. State, 146 Ind. 270, 45 
 N. E. 334; People v. Foo, 112 Cal. 
 17, 44 Pac. 453; State v. Harvey, 131 
 Mo. 339, 32 S. W. 1 1 10; People v. 
 Un Dong, 106 Cal. 83, 39 Pac. 12; 
 People V. Roemer, 114 Cal. 51, 45 Pac. 
 1003; Frank v. State, 94 Wis. 211, 68 
 N. W. 657; Commonwealth v. Nich- 
 ols, 114 Mass. 285, 287, 19 Am. 346n; 
 State V. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90, 96, 12 
 Pac. 406; Newman v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 88 S. W. 1089, 28 Ky. L. 81; 
 Commonwealth v. Lannan, 13 Allen 
 (Mass.) 563; Thomas v. State, 103 
 Ind. 419, 438, 2 N. E. 808; People v. 
 Reinhart, 39 Cal. 449, 450; Hanoflf v. 
 State, 37 Ohio St. 178, 180, i8r, 41 
 Am. 496; Okey, J., dissenting, pp. 
 184-187; People V. Tice, 131 N. Y. 
 651, 657, 30 N. E. 494, IS L. R. A. 
 669n ; Connors v. People, 50 N. Y. 
 240, 242 ; Commonwealth v. Morgan, 
 107 Mass. 199, 204; State v. Witham, 
 72 Me. 531 ; State v. Ober, 52 N. H. 
 
 459, 462, 13 Am. 88; State v. Cohn, 
 9 Nev. 179, 189; Keyes v. State, 122 
 Ind. 527, 531, 23 N. E. 1097; Spies 
 V. People, 122 111. I, 12 N. E. 865, 17 
 N. E. 898; State v. Wentworth, 65 
 Me. 234, 240, 20 Am. 688; Boyle v. 
 State, 105 Ind. 469, 474, 5 N. E. 203, 
 55 Am. 218: Mitchell v. State, 94 Ala. 
 68, 73, 10 So. 518; McKeone v. Peo- 
 ple, 6 Colo. 346, 348; State v. Nelson, 
 98 Mo. 414, II S. W. 997; Yanke v. 
 State, SI Wis. 464, 468, 8 N. W. 276; 
 People V. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 45 Pac. 
 860; People V. Conroy, 153 N. Y. ^74, 
 47 N. E. 258. Commenting on this 
 rule the court says, in People v. 
 Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288, 290, 32 Am. 302. 
 "He goes upon the stand under a 
 cloud. He stands charged with a 
 crime, and is under the strongest pos- 
 sible temptation to give evidence fa- 
 vorable to himself. His evidence is 
 therefore looked upon with suspicion 
 and distrust, and if, in addition, he 
 may be submitted to cross-examina- 
 tion upon every incident of his life, 
 and every charge of vice or crime 
 which may have been made against 
 him, and which has no bearing upon 
 the charge for which he is being tried, 
 he may be so prejudiced in the minds 
 of the jury as frequently to induce 
 them to convict on insufficient evi- 
 dence." See, also. State v. Teasdale, 
 120 Mo. App. 692, 97 S. W. 995 ; Ross
 
 107 
 
 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. 
 
 6l 
 
 And the accused who testifies vohmtarily in his own behalf is 
 presumed to have done so with knowledge that he accepts the 
 usual responsibilities of every witness and that anything he may 
 say of an incriminating character may be subsequently used 
 against him.^^ 
 
 The testimony of the accused voluntarily given at a coroner's 
 inquest may be subsequently employed against him to contradict 
 his testimony at the trial/ ^^ 
 
 So where the accused having been committed as an insane per- 
 son immediately after the crime voluntarily testified in his own 
 behalf on a hearing to secure his discharge as a sane person the 
 reception in evidence on his subsequent trial of his testimony 
 thus given is proper, though under the constitution he is protected 
 from criminating himself.^" 
 
 § 61. Examination as to prior imprisonment, etc. — He may be 
 questioned as to specific facts calculated to discredit him. Thus 
 his previous arrest,^^ or indictment,^* or his conviction of a felony 
 maybe shown. ^^ 
 
 V. State, 139 Ala. 144, 36 So. 718; 
 State V. Heffernan, 28 R. I. 20, 65 Atl. 
 284; State V. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. 
 619, 55 Atl. 743; Clinton v. State, 53 
 Fla. 98, 43 So. 312; Justice v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 46 S. W. 499, 
 20 K3\ L. 386; Williams v. State, 66 
 Ark. 264, 50 S. W. 517; Southworth 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 532, 109 S. 
 W. 133. 
 
 "" Collins V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 
 441, 46 S. W. 933- 
 
 **» Jones V. State, 120 Ala. 303, 25 
 So. 204 ; Steele v. State, 76 Miss. 387, 
 24 So. 910. (Testimony before ex- 
 amining magistrate.) 
 
 ^^ People V. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 
 Pac. 124. 
 
 ^ State V. Murphy, 45 La. Ann. 958, 
 13 So. 229; People V. Foote, 93 Mich. 
 38, 40, 52 N. W. 1036; Hanoff v. 
 State, 37 Ohio St. 178, t8o, 41 Am. 
 496; State V. Bacon, 13 Ore. 143, 147, 
 9 Pac. 393, 57 Am. 8n; People v. 
 Ogle, 104 N. Y. 511, 514, II N. E. 53; 
 
 Brandon v. People, 42 N. Y. 265. 
 Some cases hold that the question, 
 "Have you ever been, or how many 
 times have you been, arrested?" can 
 not be asked, as an arrest, involving 
 only an unproved charge of crime, of 
 which innocence is presumed, throws 
 no light upon his veracity. People v. 
 Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, 573, 28 Am. 
 183; People v. Crapo, 76 N. Y. 288, 
 293, 32 Am. 302; Ryan v. People, 79 
 N. Y. 593, 601 ; State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 
 17, 26-28; People V. Hamblin, 68 Cal. 
 loi, 102, 8 Pac. 687; People v. Buck- 
 ley, 143 Cal. 375, 77 Pac. 169. 
 
 ^ People V. Clark, 102 N. Y. 735, 8 
 N. E. 38; Wroe v. State, 20 Ohio St. 
 460; People V. Gale, 50 Mich. 237, 15 
 N. W. 99; Bruce v. State, 39 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 26, 44 S. W. 852; Sexton v. 
 State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 497, 88 S. W. 
 348. Contra, People v. Cascone, 185 
 N. Y. 317, 78 N. E. 287; Smith v. 
 State, 79 Ala. 21. 
 
 ■^N. Y. Code Civ. Pro., § 832; Peo-
 
 g 6i 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 1 08 
 
 A statute which provides that where the accused pleads not 
 guilty and admits a prior conviction such connection must not be 
 referred to on the trial does not prevent the accused from being 
 accused on cross-examination if he has been convicted of a 
 felony.^*' 
 
 The accused may be asked on cross-examination if he had not 
 heard that one of his witnesses and associates was an ex-convict.^^ 
 So, a previous imprisonment in a penitentiary,^'* or house of cor- 
 rection,^^ his prior contradictory statements,*^ disorderlv ac- 
 
 plc V. Johnson, 57 Cal. 571, 574; State 
 V. Minor, 117 Mo. 302, 306, 22 S. W. 
 1085; State V. McGuire, 15 R. I. 23, 
 22 Atl. iri8; State v. Farmer, 84 Me. 
 436, 440, 24 Atl. 985; Prior V. State, 
 99 Ala. 196, 13 So. 681 ; People v. Ar- 
 nold, 116 Cal. 682, 48 Pac. 803; Farm- 
 er V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 91 
 S. W. 682, 28 Ky. L. 1 168; State v. 
 Heusack, 189 Mo. 295, 88 S. W. 21; 
 State V. Plomondon, 75 Kan. 853, 90 
 Pac. 254; People v. Cascone, 185 N. 
 Y. 317, 78 N. E. 287 (holding that 
 mere indictment is irrelevant) ; State 
 V. Clark, 117 La. 920, 42 So. 425. 
 (Need not be a conviction of similar 
 crime.) A prior conviction of an in- 
 famous crime does not deprive the 
 accused of the absolute and arbitrary 
 statutory right to testify in his own 
 behalf. Williams v. State, 28 Tex. 
 App. 301, 303, 12 S. W. 1 103; New- 
 man V. People, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 630. 
 It is error to permit a question to ac- 
 cused calling for an admission that 
 he has been convicted in another 
 prosecution of a similar crime where 
 it appears he had been granted a new 
 trial and the incriminating evidence 
 is weak. Thompson v. United States, 
 30 App. D. C. 352; People v. DeCamp, 
 146 Mich. 533, 109 N. W. 1047, 13 
 Det. Leg. N, 862; People v. Soeder, 
 
 150 Cal. 12, 87 Pac. 1016: State v. 
 Babcock, 25 R. L 224, 55 Atl. 685; 
 State v. Benjamin (R. L), 71 Atl. 65. 
 
 '° People V. Oliver (Cal.), 95 Pac. 
 172. 
 
 ^^ Long v. State, 72 Ark. 427, 81 S. 
 W. 387. 
 
 ^' Turpin v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 74 S. W. 734, 25 Ky. L. 90; Davis 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 629, 108 S. 
 W. d^T, People v. Courtney, 31 Hun 
 (N. Y.) 199. The testimony of the 
 jailer and of persons who saw him in 
 jail and the commitment are usually 
 competent and sufficient proof of his 
 identity with the man who was in 
 prison. State v. Howard, 30 Mont. 
 518, T7 Pac. SO. 
 
 ^"Commonwealth v. Bonner, 97 
 Mass. 587, 589. 
 
 "State V. Boylcs, 80 S. Car. 352, 
 60 S. E. 233 ; State v. Hill, 45 Wash. 
 694, 89 Pac. 160; State v. Helm, 97 
 Iowa 378, 66 N. W. 751; Hicks v. 
 State, 99 Ala. 169, 13 So. 375 : Com- 
 monwealth V. Tolliver, 119 iNIass. 312, 
 315; May V. State, ZZ Tex. Cr. App. 
 74, 24 S. W. 910: State V. Avery, 113 
 Mo. 475, 21 S. W. 193; Huffman v. 
 State, 28 Tex. App. 174, 178, 12 S. W. 
 588 ; Chambers v. People, 103 111. 409 ; 
 Angling v. State, 137 Ala. 17, 34 So. 
 846.
 
 109 
 
 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. 
 
 6i 
 
 tioiis," or the commission of offenses similar to that charged,*' as 
 for example, where they are contemporaneous and a part of the res 
 gcsfcv/^ attempts to bribe witnesses,** or simulation of insanity,*^ 
 may all be brought out by questions put to him on his cross-ex- 
 amination, to show what credit his evidence should receive.*" 
 
 The accused may also properly be asked upon his cross-exami- 
 nation questions relating to and intending to show his intoxica- 
 
 *" People V. McCormick, 135 N. Y. 
 663, 664, 32 N. E. 26; Bow V. People, 
 160 111. 438, 43 N. E. 593; Common- 
 wealth V. Barry, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 216; 
 Lahue v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 159, 
 loi S. W. 1008. 
 
 *^- State V. Vandiver, 149 Mo. 502, 
 SO S. W. 892; State v. Barrett, 117 La. 
 1086, 42 So. 513; People V. Casey, 72 
 N. Y. 393, 399; People v. Noelke, 94 
 N. Y. 137, 144; 46 Am. 128; People 
 V. Hooghkerk, 96 N. Y. 149, 164; Fas- 
 sinow V. State, 89 Ind. 235, 237. Con- 
 tra, Welch v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 108 S. W. 863, 33 Ky. L. 51; Ball 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 99 S. W. 
 326, 30 Ky. L. 600. 
 
 ■"Pate V. State, 150 Ala. 10, 43 So. 
 
 343- 
 
 "^ Bates V. Holladay, 31 Mo. App. 
 162, 169; State V. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 
 3 S. W. 219; Carothers v. State, 75 
 Ark. 574, 88 S. W. 585 ; State v. Deal, 
 — Ore. — , 98 Pac. 165. 
 
 ^^ State V. Pritchett, 106 N. Car. 
 667, IT S. E. 357. 
 
 *° Newman v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 88 S. W. 1089, 28 Ky. L. 81; Ben- 
 ton V. State, 78 Ark. 284, 94 S. W. 
 688 ; Tally v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 
 474, 88 S. W. 339; Charba v. State, 
 48 Tex. Cr. App. 316, 87 S. W. 829; 
 People V. Manasse, 153 Cal. to, 94 
 Pac. 92; State v. Mills, 79 S. Car. 
 187, 60 S. E. 664. See also, Bell v. 
 State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 276, 277, 20 
 
 S. W. 549 ; McDaniel v. State, 97 Ala. 
 T4, 12 So. 24T ; State v. Farmer, 84 
 Me. 436, 440, 24 Atl. 985; State v. 
 Walsh, 44 La. Ann. IT22, 11 So. 811; 
 Parker v. State, T35 Ind. 534, 35 N. 
 E. T79, 2z L. R. A. 859; United States 
 V. Brown, 40 Fed. 457; Common- 
 wealth V. Lannan, 155 Mass. 168, 29 
 N. E. 467; State v. Bulla, 89 Mo. 
 595, I S. W. 764; People V. Eckert, 2 
 N. Y. Cr. 470, 48T, and other cases 
 cited; Underhill on Evid., § 346a. 
 "While occupying the witness stand 
 he was entitled to the same rights 
 and privileges, and was subject to the 
 same rules of evidence, as any other 
 witness. The fact that he was also 
 a party accused of a crime clothed 
 him with no greater rights or privi- 
 leges as a witness, nor subjected him 
 to any different rule of cross-exam- 
 ination. The same latitude and the 
 same limitations apply to his cross- 
 examination as if he had not been a 
 party." Hanoff v. State, 2,7 Ohio St. 
 T78, 180, 41 Am. 496; People v. Oliver 
 (Cal.), 95 Pac. T72. The accused 
 may be asked on cross-examination 
 if he had not tried to evade arrest, 
 Ryan v. People, 79 N. Y. 593; and if 
 he had not deserted his home and 
 family and become a tramp. Yankc 
 V. State, 51 Wis. 464, 8 N. W. 276. 
 Compare State v. Barnett, 203 Mo. 
 640, T02 S. W. 506, as to bad reputa- 
 tion.
 
 § 6l CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. IIO 
 
 tion before he committed the crime charged against him,*^ or 
 whether he had or had not at one time been criminally intimate 
 with a woman, whose name is stated ; and whether he had not 
 threatened to kill any one who visited her.*^ He may be ques- 
 tioned on cross-examination exhaustively and in detail as to his 
 conduct prior to the crime'*" as to his residence and business occu- 
 pation before or at the date of the crime,^° and in particular as to 
 his movements or whereabouts after the commission of the crime 
 for the purpose of showing that he had fled or attempted to flee to 
 escape arrest/'''^ Questions on cross-examination directed to bring 
 out his immoral conduct in his past life,°' his lack of good faith, ^^ 
 and his movements or particular acts if impeaching are generally 
 competent.^* So the prosecution may cross-examine the accused, 
 who was an attorney, with the object of proving that he has been 
 disbarred, to impeach his credit as a witness, but the prosecution 
 will not be permitted to bring out the details of the professional 
 or other misconduct of the accused which resulted in his disbar- 
 ment.^^ The accused may generally be cross-examined for the 
 purpose of showing that he made statements out of court which 
 contradict what he testifies to on his direct examination.^^ And 
 where the testimony of the accused on his direct examination, dif- 
 fers materially from prior statements made by him to the prose- 
 cuting attorney, or to other persons, it is proper to permit him to 
 be asked whether he has not altered his testimony for the purpose 
 of making it correspond with or corroborate the testimony of his 
 own witnesses. ^^ If the accused, on the direct examination volun- 
 tarily testifies as to his conduct, he may, on cross-examination, be 
 
 *'' State V. Rowell, 75 S. Car. 494, 56 ^^ State v. Stukes, 73 S. Car. 386, 53 
 
 S. E. 23. S. E. 643. 
 
 *®Carr v. State, 81 Ark. 589, 99 S. "Thompson v. United States, 75 C. 
 
 W. 831. C. A. 172, 144 Fed. 14; Linnehan v. 
 
 ** Barden v. State, 145 Ala. i, 40 State, 120 Ala. 293, 25 So. 6. 
 
 So. 948. °' People V. Dorthy, 156 N. Y. 237, 
 
 "" Viberg v. State, 138 Ala. 100, 35 50 N. E. 800. 
 
 So. 53, 100 Am. St. 22. '^Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 
 
 ^ State V. Cornelius, 118 La. 146, 42 So. 274. 
 
 So. 754 ; Untreinor v. State, 146 Ala. " People v. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 86 
 
 26, 41 So. 285. Pac. 671. 
 
 ^"Dungan v. State, 135 Wis. 151, 
 115 N. W. 350.
 
 Ill THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. § 62 
 
 questioned as to the details of tliis conduct and the evidence on 
 these details will be permitted to take a wide range. ^'- The rule 
 that the conviction of the accused may be shown on his cross-ex- 
 amination as impeachment does not permit the prosecution to 
 bring out on cross-examination, the evidence or details of the 
 criminal offense of which he was convicted. The admission of this 
 evidence is error justifying a reversal.^^ 
 
 § 62. Statutory limitation of cross-examination to relevant matters. 
 
 — If, however, the cjuestion calls for an answer, which, though 
 ostensibly invoked solely to aid the jury in estimating the credi- 
 bility of the accused, may, by showing him guilty of other similar 
 crimes, indirectly lead them to infer that he is guilty of the crime 
 charged, the court may interfere in its discretion. To compel the 
 accused to answer indiscriminately all questions respecting past 
 criminal transactions, which, though similar, are separate and dis- 
 tinct from that for which he is on trial, would not only be treating 
 him more harshly than other witnesses, but would be a serious in- 
 fringement of his constitutional privileges. Hence, even in those 
 states where no statute exists confining the cross-examination 
 within the limits of the direct, it is generally held that any dis- 
 gracing question which is put to the accused upon his cross-ex- 
 amination must be one that will affect his credibility as a witness 
 alone, either directly or by its tendency to show a bad moral 
 character.®'' 
 
 In some states it is expressly provided by statute that the prose- 
 cution shall be allowed to cross-examine the accused only upon 
 matters to which he has already testified, or which are legitimately 
 connected therewith, or which were inquired of or referred to on 
 the direct examination.*'^ These statutes should be strictly con- 
 
 °* State V. Zdanowicz, 69 N. J. L. Mo. 339, 32 S. W. 11 10; State v. 
 
 619, 55 Atl. 743. Chamberlain, 89 Mo. 129, 133, i S. W. 
 
 ■^ State V. Mount, 'jj) N. J. L. 582, 145 ; State v. Gleim, 17 Mont. 17, 41 
 
 64 Atl. 124, aff'g 72 N. J. L. 365, 6r Pac. 998, 52 Am. St. 655. 31 L- R- A. 
 
 Atl. 259. 294; State V. Underwood, 44 La. Ann. 
 
 ""People V. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, 852, 854, tt So. 277; Gale v. People, 
 
 573, 28 Am. 183. 26 Mich. T57, 160, t6i ; Elliott v. 
 
 "State V. Saunders, 14 Ore. 300, State, 34 Neb. 48, 50. 5t N. W. 3^5; 
 
 309, 12 Pac. 441 ; State v. Harvey, 131 State v. Turner, no Mo. 196, 2or, 19
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 112 
 
 strued with the view of protecting the rights of the accused and 
 giving him a fair and impartial trial. Hence, in those states it is 
 reversible error for the court to permit the cross-examination to 
 extend beyond the limits of the direct, both as regards questions 
 directly relevant and questions affecting the credibility of the ac- 
 cused only. And this is the rule where the court has the discretion 
 to compel other witnesses to answer disgracing questions on their 
 cross-examination. "- 
 
 § 63. Mode of cross-examination. — The cross-examination of the 
 accused ought to be carried on in a regular and orderly manner. 
 He cannot be interrogated by the prosecution until he is properly 
 turned over for cross-examination at the close of his direct ex- 
 amination. But where the defendant, on taking his seat after the 
 direct examination, declares to the jury that he is a peaceable, 
 law abiding citizen, and that he never had any idea of committing 
 a crime, it is not reversible error to permit the district attorney to 
 ask him it he had had trouble with many other persons.*'^ It has 
 been held that the court may permit the accused to be recalled for 
 further cross-examination after his cross-examination has been 
 completed.*'* 
 
 S. W. 645; State V. Cook, 132 Mo. 
 App. 167, 112 S. W. 710; People v. 
 Morton, 139 Cal. 719, 73 Pac. 609. 
 
 ""People V. iManasse, 153 Cal. 10, 
 94 Pac. 92 ; State v. Saunders, 14 Ore. 
 300, 316, 12 Pac. 441; State v. Mc- 
 Laughlin, 76 Mo. 320, 321 ; People v. 
 McGungill, 41 Cal. 429, 436; State v. 
 Patterson, 88 Mo. 88, 91, 57 Am. 374. 
 "The humane provision of the law 
 that a party shall not be compelled to 
 be a witness against himself remains 
 in full force, and is as effectually vio- 
 lated when the cross-examination of 
 the accused is extended beyond the 
 facts to which he has testified as it 
 would be if he were to be called and 
 made to testify at the instance of the 
 state." State v. Lurch, 12 Ore. 99, 
 103, 6 Pac. 408. 
 
 °^ Taylor v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 18 S. W. 852, 13 Ky. L. 860. 
 
 ^ State V. Home, 9 Kan. 119, 128; 
 State V. Johnson, 72 Iowa 393, 396, 
 397, 34 N. W. 177; State v. Cohn, 9 
 Nev. 179; Commonwealth v. Eisen- 
 hower, 181 Pa. St. 470, 2)7 Atl. 521,. 
 59 Am. St. 670; State v. Favre, 51 
 La. Ann. 434, 25 So. 93. Where the 
 accused has denied on the direct ex- 
 amination that he wrote an instru- 
 ment, he may be compelled on cross- 
 examination to write the words on 
 paper. United States v. Mullaney, 32 
 Fed. 370, 371. The accused is not 
 compelled to furnish evidence against 
 himself if he does this voluntarily. 
 Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 
 374-
 
 113 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. §§ 64, 65 
 
 § 64. Privileged communications on the cross-examination. — The 
 
 accused does not, merely by going upon the witness stand, waive 
 the protection which the statute affords his confidential statements 
 made to an attorney, physician or priest. He cannot, therefore, 
 be made to divulge communications made by him to his counsel, 
 or advice received during the existence of the relation of attorney 
 and client. '^^ The privilege is for the protection of the client and 
 may be waived by him,*^" but the waiver must be express and un- 
 equivocal. *''^ 
 
 It cannot be waived by third persons because they are in privity 
 with him.'^* The fact that the accused denies upon the witness 
 stand that he made a certain statement to his attorney will not 
 authorize proof of it by the latter's testimony.*'^ 
 
 § 65. Conclusiveness of answers — Impeachment by other witnesses. 
 
 — The rule forbidding the contradiction of the answers to irrele- 
 vant questions on cross-examination applies to the answers of the 
 accused.'" So where on cross-examination the accused testifies 
 to the commission of other crimes by way of impeachment the 
 state cannot contradict it.^^ This rule, however, does not preclude 
 the contradiction of answers to relevant questions put on the cross- 
 examination, merely because contradiction tends indirectly to im- 
 peach the credibility of the witness. The accused may be asked 
 if he did not, at a particular time and place, give a contradictory 
 account of relevant facts. If he denies he has done so, he may be 
 contradicted by the evidence of some one who heard him, though 
 
 *^ Duttenhofer v. State, 34 Ohio St. 12 S. E. 657. "The true view seems 
 
 91. 95, 32 Am. St. 362. to be that communications which the 
 
 ^ The privilege is waived if the wit- lawyer is precluded from disclosing 
 
 ness voluntarily discloses, during the the client can not be compelled to dis- 
 
 direct examination, the facts in the cover." State v. White, 19 Kan. 445, 
 
 communication. State v. Tall, 43 447, 27 Am. I37n. 
 
 Minn. 273, 276, 45 X. W. 449; People '"Marx v. People, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 
 v. Gallagher, 75 Mich. 512, 515, 42 X. 618, 619; People v. Ware, 29 Hun (X. 
 
 W. 1063. Y.) 473, 475, 92 X. Y. 653; George 
 
 " State v. James, 34 S. Car. 49, 58, v. State, 16 Xeb. 318, 320, 321, 20 X. 
 
 12 S. E. 657; Wharton on Cr. Ev., W. 311; McKeone v. People, 6 Colo. 
 
 500. See also, §§ 175, 176, 178. 346, 348. 
 
 "* State v. James, 13 S. E. 325, 34 S. " People v. Dc Garmo, 179 X. Y. 
 
 Car. 579, not reported in full. 130, 71 X. E. 736, rev'g 73 App. Div. 
 
 "* State v. James, 34 S. Car. 49, 58, (X. Y.) 46, 76 X. Y. S. 477- 
 8 — Underbill Cki.m. Ev.
 
 § 66 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. II4 
 
 the probable result of this is not so much to prove relevant facts 
 as to show the accused has contradicted himself. So the state may 
 prove contradictory statements voluntarily made by the accused 
 before tlie coroner/- or on the preliminary examination, or upon 
 a former trial for the same offense." 
 
 § 66. The bad character of the accused — ^When admissible to im- 
 peach him. — Whether the accused may be impeached by proving 
 bad character to the same extent as other witnesses depends 
 largely upon the statutes rendering him competent as a witness. 
 Where he may be impeached as any other witness his bad char- 
 acter or general reputation for veracity alone may always be 
 shown to impeach him.''* 
 
 But here a difficult cjuestion suggests itself. Can the general 
 bad character of the accused be shown solely for the purpose of 
 impeaching him as a witness, in case he has not, as the accused, 
 first offered evidence of good character?" Where the statute ex- 
 pressly provides that the accused, when testifying as a witness, 
 subjects himself to the same rules of examination as any witness, 
 the weight of the cases maintains the affirmative, at least in those 
 states where the general bad character of a witness may be 
 shown.'^" If, however, the statute does not expressly provide that 
 
 ^ Woods V. State, 63 Ind. 353, 358; ing that when so testifying he may be 
 
 Lovett V. State, 60 Ga. 257, 260; Peo- examined or impeached the same as 
 
 pie V. Kelley, 47 Cal. 125 ; State v. other witnesses, his general character 
 
 Mullins, loi Mo. 514, 519, 14 S. W. is protected from attack, unless he 
 
 625; State V. Oilman, 51 Me. 206, 218- puts it in issue by himself introducing 
 
 226. evidence relating to it. People v. 
 
 "Dumas v. State, 63 Ga. 600, 601, Hinksman, 192 N. Y. 421, 85 N. E. 
 
 604; State V. Dyer, 139 Mo. 199, 40 676. 
 
 S. W. 768. " See § 76 ct scq. 
 
 '* Adams v. People, 9 Kun (N. Y.) '''State v. Kirkpatrick, 63 Iowa 554, 
 
 89, 97; Fletcher v. State, 49 Ind. 124, 559, IQ N. W. 660; Drew v. State, 124 
 
 130, 131, 19 Am. 673; State v. Beal, Ind. 9, 13, 23 N. E. 1098; Peck v. 
 
 68 Ind. 345, 346, 34 Am. 263 ; State v. State, 86 Tenn. 259, 266, 6 S. W. 389 ; 
 
 Baker, 209 Mo. 444, 108 S. W. 6; Ma- State v. Cohn, 9 Nev. 179; Connors 
 
 loy V. State, 52 Fla. loi, 41 So. 791. v. People, 50 N. Y. 240; State v. Mc- 
 
 Code Cr. Proc, § 393, providing that Guire, 15 R. I. 23, 22 Atl. 11 18; Fields 
 
 defendant may testify as a witness in v. State, 121 Ala. 16, 25 So. 726; 
 
 his own behalf, not expressly provid- Sweatt v. State (Ala.), 47 So. 194.
 
 115 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. § 67 
 
 the accused may be examined or impeached as other witnesses, his 
 general character is protected from attack. 
 
 Logically a defendant, who elects to testify, occupies the double 
 position of accused and witness. He combines in his person the 
 rights and privileges of each ; for it is inconceivable that the stat- 
 ute, which made him a witness, was intended to deprive him of 
 any of the constitutional or other privileges which he enjoyed as 
 the accused before its passage.^ ^ 
 
 Hence, even where the general character of a witness can be at- 
 tacked, his character, when he has not first put it in issue, cannot 
 be impeached merely because he testifies.^^ Sometimes it is pro- 
 vided that his prior conviction of felony may be proved,^^ when 
 he testifies, but not his plea of guilty without sentence.^" 
 
 § 67. Commenting on the failure of the accused to testify. — It is 
 usually provided by statute that the failure of the accused to tes- 
 tify in his own behalf must not be considered by the jury as a 
 circumstance against him, nor can it be alluded to, or commented 
 on, by counsel. Under such a statute, the court should promptly 
 interrupt a prosecuting counsel who shall, in his argument, at- 
 tempt to make use of the fact that the prisoner has not taken the 
 Avitness stand ; and should charge that the prisoner's silence cre- 
 ates no presumption of his guilt,*^ and that it is the duty of the 
 jury to exclude his silence entirely from their consideration. 
 
 "State V, Beal, 68 Ind. 345, 346, 34 25 So. 238; Showalter v. State, 84 
 
 Am. 263. Ind. 562, 566; Staples v. State, 89 
 
 '^ Fletcher V. State, 49 Ind. 124, 131- Tenn. 231, 14 S. W. 603; People v. 
 
 ^33, 19 Am. 673; State v. Kirkpatrick, Brown, 53 Cal. 66; People v. Doyle, 
 
 63 Iowa 554, 559, i9 N. W. 660. 58 Hun (N. Y.) 535, 536, 12 N. Y. S. 
 
 ™ State V. McGuire, 15 R. I. 23, 22 836; State v. Mosley, 31 Kan. 355, 
 
 Atl. 1 1 18. 357, 2 Pac. 782; Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 
 
 ^Marion v. State, 16 Neb. 349, 361, 174, 28 So. 53; State v. IMathews, 98 
 
 20 N. W. 289. Mo. 125, 131, 10 S. W. 144, II S. W. 
 
 *^ State V. Mitchell, 32 Wash. 64, 72 1135; State v. Tennison, 42 Kan. 330, 
 
 Pac. 707; McCoy v. State (Tex. Cr. 332, 22 Pac. 429; Quinn v. People, 123 
 
 App.), 81 S. W. 46; State v. Weaver, 111. 333, 347, 15 N. E. 46; Parrott v. 
 
 165 Mo. I, 65 S. W. 308, 88 Am. St. Commonwealth CKy.), 47 S. W. 452, 
 
 406; Staples V. State, 89 Tenn. 231, 14 20 Ky. L. 761 ; State v. Banks, 78 Me. 
 
 S. W. 603; Wilson V. United States, 490, 7 Atl. 269. In Riiloff v. People, 
 
 149 U. S. 60, 37 L. ed. 650, 13 Sup. 45 N. Y. 213, 222. and Commonwealth 
 
 Ct. 765 ; Roberts v. State, 122 Ala. 47, v. Hanley, 140 Mass. 457, 5 N. E. 468,
 
 § 67 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 ii6 
 
 But. in order that a verdict of guilty should be set aside, be- 
 cause comment has been permitted upon the failure of the accused 
 to testify, an objection must be promptly made, the attention of 
 the court obtained, and a ruling had thereon.'*" 
 
 Strict compliance with the statute is usually required.^^ 
 
 The prosecuting attorney must not be allowed to evade it by in- 
 direct and covert allusions, as by calling the jury's attention to the 
 fact that none of the neighbors of a person on trial for the murder 
 of his wife were informed by him how she came to her death,*** 
 or by stating to the jury that, if the accused shall fail to testify, 
 the law precludes the state from commenting upon his failure.^^ 
 
 But not every reference to the law is prohibited. The true test 
 is, was the reference calculated or intended to direct the attention 
 of the jury to the defendant's neglect to avail himself of his 
 right? ^° 
 
 it was held that any allusion by the 
 court in its charge to the fact that the 
 defendant has not testified was error. 
 
 *- Matthews v. People, 6 Colo. App. 
 456, 41 Pac. 839; Metz v. State, 46 
 Neb. 547, 65 N. W. 190; Martin v. 
 State, 79 Wis. 165, 175, 48 N. W. 119, 
 122. 
 
 *^ Austin V. People, 102 111. 261; 
 Baker v. State, 122 Ala. i, 26 So. 194; 
 Lamb v. State, 69 Neb. 212, 95 N. W. 
 1050; State V. Wisnewski, 13 N. Dak. 
 649, 102 N. W. 883 ; ]\Iartinez v. State, 
 48 Tex. Cr. App. 33, 85 S. W. 1066; 
 Davis V. State, 138 Ind. 11, 37 N. E. 
 797; State V. Baldoser, 88 Iowa 55, 
 55 N. W. 97; Tudor v. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.), 43 S. W. 187, 19 Ky. 
 L. 1039. 
 
 " State V. Moxley, T02 Mo. 374, 393, 
 14 S. W. 969, 15 s. W. 556. 
 
 ^ Jordan v. State, 29 Tex. App. 595, 
 16 S. W. 543. A remark by a prose- 
 cuting attorney in discussing the 
 question of night session that "the de- 
 fendant had not testified" is error. 
 State V. Bennett. 2T S. Dak. 396, TT3 
 N. W. 78. Permitting the prosecuting 
 
 attorney to say, in response to the 
 quotation by the defendant "that rape 
 is a crime easily charged, hard to be 
 proved and difficult to be defended," 
 that, "since the legislature passed a 
 statute giving the defendant the right 
 to testify in his own behalf, it can 
 no longer be said as a maxim of law 
 that 'rape is a crime hard to be de- 
 fended' " is reversible error. Austin 
 V. People, 102 111. 261, 263. So it was 
 error for the district attorney to say 
 to counsel for defendant, "You know 
 the laws of this state permit the de- 
 fendant to remain silent, and it would 
 be improper and cowardly for me to 
 comment upon it, and it is not my in- 
 tention to evade the spirit or letter of 
 the law." State v. Holmes, 65 Minn. 
 230, 68 N. W. II. It is error for the 
 prosecuting attorney to say in closing 
 to the jury that "nobody on earth 
 denies" that defendant had written a 
 certain letter, and that "no living soul 
 has denied that defendant seduced 
 this little girl." Hoff v. State. 83 Miss. 
 488, 35 So. 950. 
 **Watt V. People, 126 111. 9, 32, 18
 
 117 '^HE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. § 68 
 
 Where such comment is made and the court, though rebuking 
 the speaker, refuses, or even omits to charge that it should be 
 disregarded, a new trial must be had.^" 
 
 The accused is entitled by the statutes to have the prosecuting 
 attorney remain absolutely silent during all the trial as to the fail- 
 ure of the accused to testify, and not only is he entitled to have 
 this, but he is also entitled to have the court remain silent as well 
 and the mere charge to the jury that they should not comment on 
 the failure of the accused to testify nor should they draw any 
 presumption of guilt from it. though intended to favor the ac- 
 cused, has been held reversible error. ®^ 
 
 § 68. Exclusion or withdrawal of comments on failure to testify — 
 Failure to call other witnesses, or to testify to incriminating facts. — 
 Upon the question whether a new trial should be granted for a 
 comment upon the failure of the accused to testify when the dis- 
 trict attorney withdraws his remarks, or the court excludes them 
 and also instructs the jur}' that the silence of the accused is not a 
 circumstance against him, the authorities are divided. Many 
 cases hold that under these circumstances the error is cured,®* 
 though others hold that a new trial should be had though the 
 prosecuting attorney is rebuked and the jurors are positively in- 
 structed to dismiss the comments from their minds.^'^ 
 
 N. E. 340, I L. R. A. 403; State v. ^ Tines v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 77 
 
 Mosley, 31 Kan. 355, 357, 2 Pac. 782. S. W. 363, 25 Ky. L. 1233. 
 
 *' State V. Banks, 78 Me. 490, 492, 7 ^ People v. Hess, 85 Mich. 128, 48 
 
 Atl. 269 ; People v. Brown, 53 Cal. N. W. 181 ; State v. Chisnell, 36 W. 
 
 66, 67; State v. Chisnell, 36 W. Va. Va. 659, 667, 671, 15 S. E. 412, 414, 
 
 659, 667, 15 S. E. 412; Common- 416; Crandall v. People, 2 Lans. (N. 
 
 wealth V. Harlow, no Mass. 411, 412; Y.) 309; Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio 
 
 Hunt V. State, 28 Tex. App. 149, 12 St. 366, 373; Commonwealth v. 
 
 S. W. 727, 19 Am. St. 815; State v. Worcester, 141 Mass. 58, 61, 6 N. E. 
 
 Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 393, 14 S. W. 700; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 555, 
 
 969, 15 S. W. 556; People V. Rose, 52 565; Ruloff v. People, 45 X. Y. 213, 
 
 Hun (N. Y.) 33, 36, 4 N. Y. S. 787; 222; Staples v. State, 89 Tenn. 231, 
 
 State V. Currie, 13 N. Dak. 655, 102 14 S. W. 603 ; Commonwealth v. Har- 
 
 N. W. 875, 112 Am. St. 687, 69 L. R. low, no Mass. 411, 412; Herndon v. 
 
 A. 405 ; State v. Taylor, 57 W. Va. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 552. 99 S. W. 
 
 228, 50 S. E. 247; Barnard v. State, 558; Clinton v. State (Fla.), 47 So. 
 
 48 Tex. Cr. App. in, 86 S. W. 760, 389. 
 
 122 .^m. St. 736; State v. Levy, 9 ""State v. Holmes, 65 Minn. 230, 68 
 
 Idaho 483, 75 Pac. 227. X. VV. n; Sanders v. State, 73 Miss.
 
 § 68 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. Il8 
 
 The latter view would seem most consistent with reason and 
 common sense. jMere silence under an accusation of crime, where 
 an opportunity for denial is afforded, is sure to create an infer- 
 ence of guilt in the mind of any one, though no oral comment is 
 made thereon. It is absurd therefore to suppose that any judicial 
 declaration will remove the effect of language which has found a 
 lodgment in the minds of the jurors, spent its force and subserved 
 its purpose of creating a prejudice against the accused.^^ 
 
 The exemption from unfavorable comment is applicable only 
 when the accused wholly refrains from testifying. If he volun- 
 tarily goes upon the stand he waives this exemption, and the 
 state may comment upon his testimony as fully as on that of any 
 other witness, and may call attention to his silence and demeanor 
 while there, or at the preliminary examination,^" to his refusal 
 to answer incriminating questions; or to deny prominent and 
 damaging facts of which he must have some personal knowledge.^^ 
 
 The prosecution may always freely comment on the failure of 
 the accused to call particular witnesses, or witnesses for a par- 
 ticular purpose, as, for example, to account for his whereabouts 
 
 444, i8 So. 541 ; Reddick v. State, 72 Pac. 8 ; Lee v. State, 56 Ark. 4, 19 S. 
 
 Miss. 1008, 16 So. 490; Angelo v. W. 16; State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95,9 S. 
 
 People, 96 111. 209, 36 Am. 132; Quinn W. 646, 11 S. W. 1133; State v. An- 
 
 V. People, 123 111. 333, 346, 15 X. E. derson, 89 Mo. 312, i S. W. 135; 
 
 46; Long V. State, 56 Ind. 182, 26 Am. State v. Tatman, 59 Iowa 471, 475, 13 
 
 19; Showalter v. State, 84 Ind. 562, N. W. 632; State v. Ober, 52 N. H. 
 
 566 ; Hunt V. State, 28 Tex, App. 149, 459, 463, 13 Am. 88 ; Brashears v. 
 
 150, 12 S. W. 737; State V. Brown- State, 58 Md. 563, 568 ; Toops v. State, 
 
 field, 15 Mo. App. 593. 92 Ind. 13, 16; Stover v. People, 56 
 
 *^ "As well try to brush out with the N. Y. 315, 320, 321; Commonwealth 
 
 hand a stain of ink on white linen." v. Mullen, 97 Mass. 545; Common- 
 
 Quinn v. People, 123 111. 333, 347, 15 wealth v. McConnell, 162 Mass. 499, 
 
 N. E. 46; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt. 39 N. E. 107; McFadden v. State, 28 
 
 555, 565. Tex. App. 241, 245, 14 S. W. 128; 
 
 ^^ Taylor v. Commonwealth (Ky.), Heldt v. State, 20 Xeb. 492, 30 N. W. 
 
 34 S. W. 227, 17 Ky. L. 1214. 626, 57 Am. 835n; State v. Ulsemer, 
 
 ** Russell V. State, 77 N^eb. 519, no 24 Wash. 657, 64 Pac. 800. Contra, 
 N. W. 380; Comstock v. State, 14 where it is expressly provided by 
 Neb. 205, 209, IS N. W. 355; Solander statute that the cross-examination of 
 V. People, 2 Colo. 48; State v. Ander- the accused must be limited to mat- 
 son, 89 ]\Io. 312, 320, I S. W. 135; ters brought out on the direct. State 
 Cotton V. State, 87 Ala. 103, 107, 6 So. v. Graves, 95 jMo. 510, 516, 8 S. W. 
 372; State v. Clave, 51 Kan. 330, 33 739.
 
 119 
 
 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. 
 
 § 69 
 
 on the day of the crime.^^ Hence, if the wife of the accused is 
 competent, the state may comment upon the failure of the ac- 
 cused to call her.^^ 
 
 § 69. Definition of accomplice. — An accomplice, as the word is 
 used in this and in the following paragraphs, is a person who is in 
 some way concerned in the commission of a crime for which the 
 accused is on trial. This includes principals and accessories 
 whether before or after the fact. A person against whom there is 
 sufficient evidence to indict for the crime upon which the accused 
 is standing trial is his accomplice.^' Mere knowledge or belief 
 that a crime is to be committed or has been committed and the 
 
 ®^ Sutton V. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 
 128, 135, 7 S. E. 323 ; State v. Costner, 
 127 N. Car. 566, zi S. E. 326, 80 Am. 
 St. 809. Cf. Commonwealth v. Har- 
 low, no Mass. 411, 412; State v. Ship- 
 ley, 174 Mo. 512, 74 S. W. 612; Porch 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 335, 99 S. 
 W. 102. 
 
 ^ State V. Millmeier, 102 Iowa 692, 
 72 N. W. 275, 63 Am. St. 479; Hall 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 22 S. W. 
 141 ; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 
 109, 17 S. E. 812, 816; Mercer v. 
 State, 17 Tex. App. 452, 457; Com- 
 monwealth V. Weber, 167 Pa. St. 153, 
 31 Atl. 481. But if she is not compe- 
 tent, the state should not be allowed 
 to comment on her absence. State v. 
 Hatcher, 29 Ore. 309, 44 Pac. 584; 
 State V. Taylor, 134 Mo. 109, 35 S. 
 W. 92; Johnson v. State, 63 Miss. 
 313; Graves v. United States, 150 U. 
 S. 118, 37 L. ed. 1021, 14 Sup. Ct. 40. 
 Where evidence is equally acces- 
 sible and material to the state and to 
 the accused, its non-production by the 
 accused, even though it may affirma- 
 tively appear that he made no attempt 
 to procure it, creates no presumption 
 against him. The omission cannot 
 be considered by the jury. State v. 
 
 Rosier, 55 Iowa 517, 8 N. W. 345; 
 Brock V. State, 123 Ala. 24, 26 So. 
 329; State V. Fitzgerald, 68 Vt. 125, 
 34 Atl. 429. But where evidence 
 which, if produced, would controvert 
 or explain some incriminating facts 
 proved against him, and which is also 
 clearly within his knowledge and his 
 power to obtain, is not produced by 
 the accused, the jury may consider the 
 fact in determining the credibility of 
 the evidence against him. State v. 
 Grebe, 17 Kan. 458; People v. Mc- 
 Whorter, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 438, 440; 
 Rice V. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. St. 
 408; People V. Smith, 114 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) S13, 100 N. Y. S. 259. 
 
 ^^Redd V. State, dz Ark. 457, 40 S. 
 W. 374; People V. Collum, 122 Cal. 
 186, 54 Pac. 589; Cross v. People, 47 
 111. 152, 95 Am. Dec. 474; State v. 
 Ean, 90 Iowa 534, 58 N. W. 898; 
 State V. Jones, 115 Iowa 113, 88 N. 
 W. 196; Territory v. Baker, 4 Gild. 
 (N. Mex.) 236, 13 Pac. 30; People 
 V. McGuire, 32 N. E. 146, 135 N. Y. 
 639 (not reported in full) ; State v. 
 Roberts, 15 Ore. 187, I3 Pac- 896; 
 Harris v. State, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 124; 
 Smith V. State, Z7 Tex. Cr. App. 488, 
 36 S. W. 586; State V. DufI (Iowa, 
 1909), 122 X. W. 829.
 
 69 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 1 20 
 
 concealment of such knowledge does not render a witness an ac- 
 complice unless he aided or participated in the commission of the 
 crime.^^ 
 
 Under the rule that participation in the crime is required to 
 constitute an accomplice, the mere concealment of knowledge that 
 a crime has been committed does not make the person concealing 
 his knowledge an accomplice. This is the general rule and is 
 sustained by the majority of the cases.^'' However this may be 
 in the case of an accessory after the fact, it is well settled that 
 all accessories before the fact if they actually participate at all 
 in the preparation for the crime are accomplices within the rule, 
 but if their participation is limited to the knowledge that a crime 
 is to be committed, they are not accomplices/"'' 
 
 A person who, as a detective, associates with criminals or com- 
 municates with or aids them solely for the purpose of discovering 
 commission of crime and procuring the punishment of the crimi- 
 nals is not an accomplice."^ 
 
 " Green v. State, 51 Ark. 189. 10 S. 
 W. 266; Allen V. State, 74 Ga. 769; 
 Bradley v. State, 2 Ga. App. 622, 58 
 S. E. 1064; Springer v. State, 102 Ga. 
 447, 30 S. E. 971 ; Ochsner v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 109 S. W. 326, 23 
 Ky. L. 119; People v. Ricker, 51 Hun 
 (N. Y.) 643, 4 N. Y. S. 70, 7 N. Y. 
 Cr. 19; Greathouse v. State. 53 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 218, 109 S. W. 165; Martin 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 29, 83 S. 
 W. 390; Wilson V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 496, 93 S. W. 547- 
 
 ^'Polk V. State, 36 Ark. 117; Gat- 
 lin V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 116, 49 
 S. W. 87 ; Hunnicutt v. State, 18 Tex. 
 App. 498, 51 Am. 330, but there are 
 other cases which hold to the con- 
 trary. State V. Umble, 115 Mo. 452, 
 22 S. W. 378; People V. Chadwick, 
 7 Utah 134, 25 Pac. 737. 
 
 '""Watson V. State, 9 Tex. App. 
 237 ; Edwards v. Territory, i Wash. 
 
 195- 
 
 "' Harrington v. State, 36 .A.la. 236 ; 
 People V. Bolanger, 71 Cal. 17, 11 
 
 Pac. 799; State v. Brownlee, 84 Iowa 
 473, 51 N. W. 25; State v. McKean, 
 36 Iowa 343, 14 Am. 530; Common- 
 wealth V. Baker, 155 Mass. 287, 29 
 N. E. 512; State v. Beaucleigh, 92 
 Mo. 490, 4 S. W. 666; State v. Doug- 
 las, 26 Nev. 196, 65 Pac. 802, 99 Am. 
 St. 688; People v. Noelke, 94 N. Y. 
 137, 46 Am. 128; Campbell v. Com- 
 monwealth, 84 Pa. St. 187; Common- 
 wealth V. Downing, 4 Gray (Mass.) 
 29; Commonwealth v. Willard, 22 
 Pick. (Mass.) 476. When the ac- 
 cused was decoyed into crime by a 
 police detective, Cooley, J., in permit- 
 ting the accused to make a full ex- 
 planation, said : "The officer was ap- 
 parently assisting or conniving in the 
 crime charged, and though he may 
 have done this, as he says, not by way 
 of enticement, but only by allowing 
 him the opportunity he sought and 
 requested, yet it placed him in an 
 equivocal position, and the jury ought 
 to have all the light the former deal- 
 ings of the parties would throw upon
 
 121 
 
 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. 
 
 § 69 
 
 A voluntary participation in the commission of the crime is re- 
 quired to constitute an accompHce. One who either by threats 
 or coercion inciting in him a fear that he is in clanger of losing 
 his life or liberty under and by reason of such coercion and fear 
 participates in a crime is not an accomplice/"^ 
 
 So one who is given money by the prosecuting attorney to make 
 a purchase of intoxicating liquors in order to obtain evidence of a 
 violation of the law is not an accomplice/"'^ 
 
 Whether a person is an accomplice depends upon the facts in 
 each particular case considered in connection with the nature of 
 the crime. This is usually determined by the court as a question 
 of law. Parties to be accomplices must participate in the com- 
 mission of the same crime. Thus a person who receives stolen 
 goods, knowing them to be stolen, is not an accomplice of the 
 thief where the receiver did not participate in the commission of 
 the larceny. The receiving and the larceny are distinct crimes.^"'' 
 
 In perjury, all persons who with knowledge of the falsity of the 
 statement aid in the commission of the crime have been held as 
 accomplices/"* A person who gives or tenders a bribe to an of- 
 
 the transactions." An accessory after 
 the fact is not an accomplice. State 
 V. Umble, 115 Mo. 452, 22 S. W. 378, 
 380. 
 
 "- Cook V. State, 80 Ark. 495, 97 S. 
 W. 683; Green v. State, 51 Ark. 189, 
 10 S. W. 266; People V. Miller, 66 
 Cal. 468, 6 Pac. 99; Burns v. State, 
 89 Ga. 527, IS S. E. 748; Beal v. 
 State, 72 Ga. 200. The word "accom- 
 plice," in Code Cr. Proc, art. 781, re- 
 quiring a corroboration of the testi- 
 mony of an accomplice in order to 
 convict, means a person who, either 
 as a principal, accomplice, or acces- 
 sory, is connected with a crime by un- 
 lawful act or omission transpiring 
 either before, at the time, or after the 
 commission of the offense, whether 
 he was present anrl participated in the 
 crime or not ; and while, in misde- 
 meanor cases, all jjartics are princi- 
 
 pals, a witness in a misdemeanor case 
 may be an accomplice. Williams v. 
 State, S3 Tex. Cr. App. 396, no S. 
 W. 63. 
 
 "'a State V. O'Brien, 35 Mont. 482, 
 90 Pac. 514. 
 
 "'State V. Shapiro (Mo.), 115 S. 
 W. 1022; People V. Barric, 49 Cal. 
 342; Roberts v. State, S5 Ga. 220; 
 People V. Holden, 127 App. Div. (N. 
 Y.) 758, III N. Y. S. 1019; Springer 
 V. State, 102 Ga. 447, 30 S. E. 971 : 
 Young V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 44 
 S. W. 83s; Walker v. State (Tex. 
 Cr. App.), z^ S. W. 423: Crutchfield 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 65. 
 
 '•^ Smith V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 
 488, ■^(y S. W. s86 : Anderson v. State, 
 20 Tex. App. 3T2. An officer before 
 whom one makes a false affidavit is 
 not an accomplice merely because lie 
 knows the affidavit is false, and docs
 
 ^ 70 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 122 
 
 ficer is an accomplice if the l)ril)e is accepted by the officer. ^'^^ 
 And this is the rule in some states where the statute makes the 
 giving or offering of a bribe a distinct offense from the taking 
 of one.^"" 
 
 The jury is not called on to determine the guilt of a witness 
 who, it is alleged, is an accomplice. The rule that the evidence of 
 an accomplice must be corroborated does not require that his guilt 
 as a participant shall first l)e established as an independent con- 
 clusion and beyond a reasonable doubt. If a criminal connection 
 with the crime is admitted by the witness, the court may charge 
 that the witness is an accomplice. If the evidence is conflicting on 
 this point, /. c, the participation of the witness in the commission 
 of the crime, the matter should be left to the jury under proper 
 instructions as to intent and participation."" 
 
 i< 70. Accomplices when jointly indicted — Witnesses for each other. 
 
 — Accomplices were always, even in the absence of statute, com- 
 petent witnesses for each other if separately indicted."^ Where 
 accomplices are jointly indicted, a different rule is recognized. 
 
 not refuse to administer the oath. 
 Wilson V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 
 496, 93 S. W. 547. 
 
 '°^ People V. Bissert, 72 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 620, 76 N. Y. S. 1022, aff'd 
 in 172 X. Y. 643, 65 N. E. 1120; 
 Ruffin V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 565, 
 38 S. W. 169. 
 
 ""People V. Winant, 24 IMisc. (N. 
 Y.) 361, 53 N. Y. S. 695. 
 
 "' People V. Compton, 123 Cal. 403, 
 S6 Pac. 44 ; People v. Bolanger, 71 
 Cal. 17, 20, II Pac. 799; Williams v. 
 State, 33 Tex. Cr. App. 128, 25 S. W. 
 629, 28 S. W. 958, 47 Am. St. 21 ; Zol- 
 licoffer v. State, 16 Tex. App. 312, 
 317 ; White v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 652, 657, 18 S. W. 462; Childress v. 
 State, 86 Ala. 77, 5 So. 775; State v. 
 Lucas. 57 Iowa 501, 10 N. W. 868; 
 Territory v. West (N. Mex.), 99 
 Pac. 343; Lightfoot v. State (Tex. 
 Cr. App.), 78 S. W. 1075; Common- 
 
 wealth V. Glover, iii Mass. 395; 
 State V. Spotted Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 
 55 Pac. 1026; State v. Kellar, 8'N. 
 Dak. 563, 80 N. W. 476, 73 Am. St. 
 775- 
 
 '"* United States v. Henry, 4 Wash. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 428, 429, 26 Fed. Cas. 
 15351 ; United States v. Hunter, i 
 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 446, 26 Fed. 
 Cas. 15425; United States v. Hanway, 
 2 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 139- 26 Fed. Cas. 
 15299; State V. Umble, 115 Mo. 452, 
 22 S. W. 378 ; State v. Riney, 137 Mo. 
 102, 38 S. W. 718; Lucre v. State, 7 
 Baxt. (Tenn.) 148, 150; People v. 
 Donnelly, 2 Park Cr. (N. Y.) 182; 
 State V. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 102, 9 S. 
 W. 646, II S. W. 1133; Rhodes v. 
 State, 141 Ala. 66, 37 So. 365 ; State v. 
 Black, 143 Mo. 166, 44 S. W. 340 ; Mc- 
 Kenzie v. State, 24 Ark. 636, 638. 
 Contra, by statute, Crutchfield v. State, 
 7 Tex. App. 65, 67.
 
 12?, 
 
 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. 
 
 70 
 
 The fact that they are tried separately does not, in the absence of 
 a permissive statute, render one competent as a witness for the 
 others, though, if jointly indicted, any one of them may testify 
 against the others/"^ 
 
 An accomplice cannot testify in favor of one jointly indicted 
 while the indictment is pending over him. The criminal charge 
 against him must be finally disposed of before he can testify for a 
 co-defendant.^" 
 
 If the state, on the trial of a joint indictment, closes its case 
 without producing evidence of the guilt of any defendant suffi- 
 cient to go to the jury, the court must direct his acquittal. He is 
 then a competent witness for a co-defendant."^ Where the evi- 
 dence against a defendant is slight, the court may, in its discretion, 
 submit it to the jury separately, and on his acquittal he is compe- 
 tent as a witness for a co-defendant.^^" 
 
 But a defendant has no absolute right to insist that the court 
 shall submit the case of any co-defendant jointly tried to the jury, 
 with the view of using him as a witness if acquitted."^ 
 
 ^•^ State V. Jones, 51 Me. 125, 126; 
 Commonwealth v. Marsh, 10 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 57; Lewis v. State, 85 Miss. 
 35. 37 So. 497; State v. Franks, 51 S. 
 Car. 259, 28 S. E. 908 ; Davis v. State, 
 122 Ga. 564, 50 S. E. 376. "A dis- 
 tinction is made between the compe- 
 tency of a co-defendant, jointly in- 
 dicted, as a witness for the state and 
 for his fellow-prisoners. The exclu- 
 sion of his evidence when he is called 
 for a co-defendant is based largely on 
 consideration of public policy, for 
 each would try to swear the other 
 innocent." Benson v. United States, 
 146 U. S. 325, 335, 36 L. ed. 991, 13 
 Sup. Ct. 60. 
 
 "" Collier V. State, 20 Ark. 36 ; State 
 V. Dunlop, 65 N. Car. 288; Ballard v. 
 State, 31 Fla. 266, 12 So. 865, 870; 
 Moss V. State, 17 Ark. 327, 330, 65 
 Am. Dec. 433; United States v. Reid, 
 12 How. (U. S.) 361, 13 L. ed. 1023; 
 Wixson V. People, 5 Park Cr. (N. 
 
 Y.) 119; Commonwealth v. Marsh, 10 
 Pick. (Mass.) 57; People v. Williams, 
 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 377, 378; State 
 V. Jones, 51 Me. 125, 126. In People 
 V. Bill, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 95, the 
 court says : "It appears to be a well- 
 settled though technical rule that a 
 party to the same indictment cannot 
 be a witness for his co-defendant un- 
 til he has been first acquitted, or at 
 least convicted. Whether they be 
 tried jointly or separately does not 
 vary the rule." 
 
 "'State V. Jones, 51 Me. 125, 126; 
 People V. Bill, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) 95; 
 Bacon v. State, 22 Fla. 51, 85; Mc- 
 Kenzie v. State, 24 Ark. 636, 638. 
 
 ""People V. Vermilyca, 7 Cow. (N. 
 Y.) 369, 382. 
 
 "'State V. Hunt, 91 Mo. 491, 3 S. 
 W. 868; Ferry v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 App.), 34 S. W. 618; Commonwealth 
 V. Eastman, i Cush. (Mass.) 189, 218, 
 48 Am. Dec. 59<5, 31 Ky. L. 769;
 
 ^ 71 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 124 
 
 An accomplice wlio pleads guilty, or who is convicted, becomes, 
 either before or after sentence, a competent witness for a co- 
 defendant jointly indicted."'* 
 
 § 71. Accomplices as witnesses for the state. — The general com- 
 mon-law rule is that accomplices are competent witnesses against 
 their criminal associates. This rule is always applicable where ac- 
 complices are separately indicted and receive separate trials."^ 
 
 Persons jointly indicted are competent witnesses for the prose- 
 cution against their associates, though jointly indicted, if they 
 are granted separate trials. It is enough that the trial of the ac- 
 complice has been postponed, for he may testify for the state, 
 though the charge against him has not been disposed of.^^*^ Where 
 
 State V. White, 48 Ore. 416, 87 P"c. 
 137; State V. Jones, 51 Me. 125, 126; 
 Reg. V. Ford, i C. & Marsh, iii. 
 
 "* Simpson v. Commonwealth, 126 
 Ky. 441, 103 S. W. 332; State v. 
 Jones, 51 Me. 125, 126, 48 Am. Dec. 
 596, 31 Ky. L. 769; South v. State, 
 86 Ala. 617, 6 So. 52; Strawhern v. 
 State, Zl Miss. 422; State v. Loney, 
 82 AIo. 82; Commonwealth v. Marsh, 
 10 Pick. (Mass.) 57, 58; State v. 
 Stotts, 26 Mo. 307; Wixson v. State, 
 5 Park Cr. (N. Y.) 119. In Wixson 
 V. People, 5 Park Cr. (N. Y.) 119, 
 on p. 126, the court, by Knox, J., thus 
 summarizes the law : "When the per- 
 sons indicted are all put on trial to- 
 gether, neither can be a witness for 
 or against the other, but when they 
 are tried separately, though jointly in- 
 dicted, the people may call those not 
 on trial, though not convicted or ac- 
 quitted or otherwise discharged, with 
 the permission of the court, but they 
 cannot be called as witness for each 
 other, though separately tried, while 
 the indictment is pending against 
 them. If acquitted they may be ex- 
 amined, and even if convicted, unless 
 it be for a crime which disqualifies, 
 and then sentence must have followed 
 
 the conviction. When all are tried 
 together, if the people desire to swear 
 an accomplice, he must in some way 
 be first discharged from the record." 
 
 "^Allison v. State, 14 Tex. App. 
 402; Benson v. United States, 146 U. 
 S. Z2^, 327, 36 L. ed. 991, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 60; United States v. Henry, 4 Wash. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 428, 26 Fed. Cas. 15351. 
 
 "* State V. Barrows, 76 Me. 401, 
 407, 49 Am. 629: Marler v. State, 67 
 Ala. 55, 42 Am. 95 ; Benson v. United 
 States, 146 U. S. 325, 333, 337, 36 L. 
 ed. 991, 13 Sup. Ct. 60; Wixson v. 
 People, 5 Park Cr. (X. Y.) 119; Car- 
 roll v. State, 5 Neb. 31, 35; Barr v. 
 People, 30 Colo. 522, 71 Pac. 392; 
 Jones V. State, i Ga. 610, 617; State 
 V. Brien, 32 N. J. L. 414, 416, 417; 
 Noyes v. State, 41 N. J. L. 418, 429; 
 Sparks v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 644, 
 20 S. W. 167 ; Allen v. State, to Ohio 
 St. 287; Brown v. State, 18 Ohio St. 
 496, 509; State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 
 325, 327, 45 N. W. 614; Conway v. 
 State, 118 Ind. 482, 485. 21 N. E. 285; 
 Commonwealth v. Brown, 130 Mass. 
 279; Evans v. State, 61 Miss. 157; 
 Noyes v. State, 41 N. J. L. 418; 
 State v. Shelton (Mo., 1909), 122 S. 
 W. 732.
 
 125 ^^^ ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. § /I 
 
 the disability of convicts to testify has been removed by statute, 
 no vahd reason exists for excluding the evidence of an accomplice 
 who has been convicted, or who has pleaded guilty, against one 
 jointly indicted, but tried separately/" 
 
 Accomplices jointly indicted and also jointly tried are not com- 
 petent witnesses against each other. But the court may always 
 order a nolle prosequi upon the application of the district attor- 
 ney, ^^^ or accept a plea of guilty with the express or implied prom- 
 ise of immunity."^ 
 
 The admission of the testimony of an accomplice who is still 
 under indictment against one who is jointly indicted is largely 
 in the judicial discretion.^-" The court exercising this discretion 
 should bear in mind that the evidence is receivable mainly because 
 of necessity and public policy and in furtherance of justice. The 
 question to be considered is not only whether it is possible to con- 
 vict without the testimony of the accomplice, but whether it is 
 possible to convict if he does testify. If sufficient evidence has 
 been received to sustain a conviction without that of the accom- 
 plice, or if, on the other hand, the evidence already in is so weak, 
 
 Contra, State V. Alathews, 98 Mo. 125, W. 646, 11 S. W. 1133; Reg. v. 
 
 10 S. W. 144, II S. W. 1 135; Day v. Owen, 9 Carr. & P. 83; State v. 
 
 State, 27 Tex. App. 143, 11 S. W. 36; Phipps, 76 N. Car. 203; Lindsay v. 
 
 State V. Chyo Chiagk, 92 Mo. 395, 4 People, 63 N. Y. 143, 154; State v. 
 
 S. W. 704. and cf. 2 Hawk. P. C, ch. Graham, 41 N. J. L. 15, 19, 32 Am. 
 
 46; I Hale P. C. 305; Rose Cr. Ev. 174; Underwood v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 
 
 130, 140: 2 Russ. Cr. 957; Whart. Cr. App. 193, 41 S. W. 618; People v. 
 
 Ev., § 439. Bruzzo, 24 Cal. 41 ; Love v. People, 
 
 "'People V. Whipple, 9 Cow. (N. 160 111. 501, 43 N. E. 710, 32 L. R. A. 
 
 Y.) 707, 709; South V. State, 86 Ala. 139; State v. Steifel, 106 Mo. 129, 17 
 
 617, 620, 6 So. 52; Woodley v. State, S. W. 227. 
 
 103 Ala. 23, 15 So. 820; Taylor v. ""State v. Lyon, 81 N. Car. 600. 31 
 
 People, 12 Hun (N. Y.) 212; Loehr Am. 5i8n; United States v. Ford, 99 
 
 V. People, 132 111. 504, 24 N. E. 68; U. S. 594, 25 L. ed. 399; State v. 
 
 State v. Jackson, 106 Mo. 174, 17 S. Jackson, 106 Mo. 174. 177, 17 S. W. 
 
 W. 301; State V. Minor, 117 Mo. 302, 30T. 
 
 305, 22 S. W. 1085 ; State V. Young, "" Lindsay v. People, 63 N. Y. 143, 
 
 153 Mo. 445, 55 S. W. 82; Rex v. 153; Commonwealth v. Brown. 130 
 
 Westbeer, i Leach C. L. 14; Wisdom Mass. 279. The judicial consent, if 
 
 V. People, II Colo. 170, 17 Pac. 519; given, need not be embodied in an 
 
 State v. Magone, 32 Ore. 206, 51 Pac. order, or indeed in any particular 
 
 452. form. Lindsay v. People, 63 N. Y. 
 
 "' State v. Walker, 98 Mo. 95, 9 S. 143, 153.
 
 § 72 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 126 
 
 conflicting and lacking in corroborative force that, even with his 
 testimony, no reasonable probability arises that a conviction will 
 result, the court should reject his evidence/^^ 
 
 § 72. Immunity of accomplice when testifying for the state. — An 
 
 accomplice who, confessing his own guilt, offers to testify against 
 an associate has no legal right, in the absence of statute, to de- 
 mand exemption from a prosecution for the crime he has con- 
 fessed/-- But an accomplice whose evidence, while placing him 
 where he could be easily convicted, has contributed to the convic- 
 tion of another, certainly has a strong moral and equitable claim 
 to clemency, and if he be subsequently convicted of that crime, 
 his moral claim should be recognized by the pardoning power. 
 
 If his testimony was procured by an express promise of im- 
 munity, or during interviews with the prosecuting attorney, prin- 
 ciples of justice would demand, and the prevalent practice would 
 sanction, the judicial recommendation of his case to the executive 
 that his pardon may be obtained.^-^ 
 
 '"^ State V. Pratt, 98 Mo. 482, 11 S. 
 W. 977; Ray V. State, i Greene 
 (Iowa) 316, 48 Am. Dec. 379; Reg. 
 V. Sparks, i Fost. & Fin. 388. 
 
 "- Runnels v. State, 28 Ark. 121, 
 123; United States v. Ford, 99 U. S. 
 594, 605, 25 L. ed. 399; United States 
 V. Hinz, 35 Fed. 272, 279, 280; State 
 V. Guild, 149 Mo. 370, 50 S. W. 909, 
 'JZ Am. St. 395. 
 
 "^Long V. State, 86 Ala. z^, 44, 5 
 So. 443; State V. Graham, 41 N. J. 
 L. 15, 16, 20, 32 Am. 174; State v. 
 Lyon, 81 N. Car. 600, 602, 31 Am. 
 5i8n. "Accomplices, not convicted of 
 an infamous crime, when separately 
 tried are competent witnesses for or 
 against each other. The universal 
 usage is that such a party, if called 
 and examined by the state on the 
 trial of his associate in guilt, will not 
 be prosecuted for the same offense, 
 provided it appears that he acted in 
 good faith and that he testified fully 
 
 and fairly. But it is equally clear 
 that he cannot plead such fact in bar 
 of an indictment against him, nor 
 avail himself of it upon his trial; for 
 it is merely an equitable title to the 
 mercy of the executive, subject to the 
 conditions stated, and can only come 
 before the court by way of applica- 
 tion to put off the trial in order to 
 give the prisoner time to apply to the 
 executive for that purpose." United 
 States V. Ford, 99 U. S. 594, 25 L. ed. 
 399, and Irvine, Ex parte, 74 Fed. 
 954. The defense may show that an 
 accomplice testifying for the state 
 does so with the expectation of gain 
 or immunity, and it is immaterial 
 whether there has been any actual 
 agreement to that effect with the pub- 
 lic prosecuting officer or not. Allen 
 V. State, ID Ohio St. 287; People v. 
 Langtree, 64 Cal. 256, 30 Pac. 813; 
 Tullis V. State, 39 Ohio St. 200.
 
 127 
 
 THE ACCUSED AS A ■ WITNESS. 
 
 S -TO 
 
 The accomplice may be asked, in order to test and bring out his 
 motives and feehngs towards the accused, whether he has not 
 confessed his guilt, and has said he would not be punished 
 alone/^* 
 
 An accomplice, who, with a full knowledge of his privilege 
 from answering incriminating questions, voluntarily answers such 
 Cjuestions, cannot withhold further evidence as to the same matters 
 under a claim of privilege/"^ So he may be compelled to answer 
 incriminating questions even though he shall claim the privilege, 
 if, by statute, the use against the witness of testimony given 
 under such circumstances is prohibited/^® And the voluntary con- 
 fession of an accomplice made in expectation of testifying against 
 an associate may always be used against the accomplice, on his 
 trial for the crime confessed, if he has refused to testify/"" 
 
 § 73. Credibility and corroboration of accomplices. — Xo presump- 
 tion of law exists against the credibility of the evidence of an ac- 
 complice, so that at common law, i. c, in the absence of statute, 
 a conviction may be had on his evidence alone.^"® 
 
 ^^ Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 195, 
 197. 
 
 "^Alderman v. State, 4 Mich. 414, 
 422, 423, 69 Am. Dec. 321 ; Common- 
 wealth V. Price, 10 Gray (Mass.) 
 472, 476, 71 Am. Dec. 668n. 
 
 ^"° State V. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 ; 
 Bedgoocl V. State, 115 Ind. 275, 17 
 N. E. 621, 623. 
 
 ^"United States v. Hinz, 35 Fed. 
 272, 277. 
 
 ^-^ I Hale P. C. 303, 304 ; Char- 
 nock's Case, 12 How. St. Tr. 1377, 
 1454; Rex V. Rudd, Cowp. 331; Rex 
 V. Atwood, 2 Leach C. L. 521 ; Dur- 
 ham's Case, 2 Leach C. L. 538; State 
 V. Thompson, 47 La. Ann. 1597, 18 
 So. 621 ; State v. Donnelly, 130 Mo. 
 642, 32 S. W. 1 124; Lawhead v. State, 
 46 Xeb. 607, 65 N. W. 779; Bacon 
 V. State, 22 Fla. 51, 79; State v. Har- 
 kins, 100 Mo. 666, 13 S. W. 830; 
 People V. Dyle, 21 N. Y. 578, 579; 
 
 Wisdom V. People, 11 Colo. 170, 174, 
 17 Pac. 519; Rountree v. State, 88 
 Ga. 457, 458; Wixson v. People, 5 
 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 119, 128; People 
 V. O'Brien, 60 :Mich. 8, 14, 26 N. W. 
 795 ; Lindsay v. People, 63 N. Y. 143, 
 154; State V. iMiller, 97 X. Car. 484, 
 487, 2 S. E. 363 ; Olive v. State, 1 1 
 X^eb. I, 30, 7 X^. W. 444; Common- 
 wealth V. Holmes, 127 IMass. 424, 429, 
 435, 34 Am. 39in; People v. Costello, 
 I Denio (X. Y.) 83; Commonwealth 
 V. Bosworth, 22 Pick. (IMass.) 397; 
 Ayers v. State, 88 Ind. 275; Collins 
 V. People, 98 111. 584, 38 Am. 105; 
 State V. Russell, 33 La. Ann. 135; 
 Juretich v. People, 223 111. 484, 79 N. 
 E. 181 ; State v. Kelliher, 49 Ore. 77, 
 88 Pac. 867; State v. Firmatura, 121 
 La. 676, 46 So. 691 ; Powell v. State, 
 50 Tex. Cr. App. 592, 99 S. W. 1005 ; 
 Criner v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 
 174, 109 S. W. 128; State V. Horner,
 
 7Z 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 128 
 
 And his testimony is to be weighed by considering his connec- 
 tion with the crime and with the accused, his interest in the case, 
 his appearance on the stand, the reasonableness of his testimony 
 and its consistency with other facts proved in the case. 
 
 But the jury is usually warned by the court against hasty cre- 
 dence of the testimony of an accomplice, and instructed that great 
 caution must be employed in the reception and consideration of 
 accomplice evidence, and that it should be submitted to the strict- 
 est scrutiny.^-" So, too, juries are generally advised that they 
 may acquit the accused if the evidence of the accomplice is not 
 corroborated, though a failure or refusal to instruct to acquit, 
 if his guilt is sustained solely by the uncorroborated evidence, is 
 not error. ^"^ 
 
 The credibility of witnesses, whether accomplices or not, is for 
 the jurv exclusivelv.^^^ 
 
 I i\Iarv. (Del.) 504, 2 Hardesty 178, 
 26 Atl. -/Z^ 41 Atl. 139; Ahearn v. 
 United States, 158 Fed. 606, 85 C. C. 
 A. 428; Caldwell v. State, 50 Fla. 4, 
 39 So. 188; Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 
 705, 45 S. E. 630, 98 Am. St. I45n; 
 Crenshaw v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 
 77, 85 S. W. 1 147; State V. Wigger, 
 196 Mo. 90, 93 S. W. 390; State v. 
 Simon, 71 X. J. L. 142, 58 Atl. 107; 
 State V. Carey, 76 Conn. 342, 56 Atl. 
 632 : People V. Feinberg, 237 111. 348, 
 86 N. E. 584; State v. Stewart (Del.), 
 d"] Atl. 786; Commonwealth v. Bren- 
 nor, 194 Mass. 17, 79 X. E. 799; State 
 V. Hauser, 112 La. 313, 36 So. 396. 
 
 ^"° The earliest case where corrobo- 
 ration was hinted at as necessary was 
 Smith's Case, i Leach C. L. 323, 
 where, the prosecution being imable 
 to identify the criminal, the court 
 thought it dangerous to let the case 
 go to the jury on accomplice evidence 
 alone. See also. Wisdom v. People, 
 II Colo. 170, 174, 17 Pac. 519; State v. 
 Stebbins, 29 Conn. 463, 79 Am. Dec. 
 223; Earll V. People, "/Z 111. 329; 
 United States v. Sacia, 2 Fed. 754, 
 
 758; United States v. Ybanez, 53 Fed. 
 536, 540; State V. Sprague, 149 Mo. 
 409, 50 S. W. 901 ; United States v. 
 Richards, 149 Fed. 443 ; State v. Stew- 
 art (Del.), 67 Atl. 786; Walker v. 
 State, 118 Ga. 757, 45 S. E. 608; 
 Stone V. State, 118 Ga. 705, 45 S. E. 
 630, 98 Am. St. I45n ; Jahnke v. State 
 (Xeb.), 104 X. W. 154- 
 
 ^^° Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 426, 
 434, 7 X. E. 225 ; State v. Michel, 1 1 1 
 La. 434, 35 So. 629; State v. Potter, 
 42 Vt. 495, 506; State V. Litchfield, 
 58 Me. 267, 270; Ingalls v. State, 48 
 Wis. 647, 653, 4 N. W. 785 ; State v. 
 Miller, 97 X. Car. 484, 2 S. E. 363; 
 Carroll v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. St. 
 107, 121; Wisdom V. People, 11 Colo. 
 170, 174, 17 Pac. 519; Allen v. State, 
 10 Ohio St. 287, 306; Rice v. State, 
 SO Tex. Cr. App. 648, 100 S. W. 771. 
 
 "' While the degree of credit to be 
 given to the testimony of an accom- 
 plice in a criminal case is a matter 
 within the exclusive province of the 
 jury, who may as matter of law con- 
 vict on such testimony alone, yet to 
 warrant a conviction such testimony
 
 129 "^HE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. § 74 
 
 The subject of the credibihty of the testimony of an accompHce 
 and the necessity for corroboration in order to sustain a conviction 
 are involved in some confusion. The propositions that an accused 
 person may be convicted on the evidence of an accompHce alone, 
 and that the testimony of an accomplice must be corroborated, are 
 both sound, though they involve a seeming inconsistency. The 
 prposition that an accomplice must be corroborated does not 
 mean that there must be cumulative or independent testimony to 
 the same facts to which he has testified. So, evidence in a murder 
 case that a coat, belonging to deceased, was found in defendant's 
 possession is proper corroboration, though the accomplice testi- 
 fied only to the killing and not to the taking of the coat.^^" 
 
 'Tf the testimony of the accomplice, his manner of testifying, 
 his appearance upon the witness stand, impress the jury with the 
 truth of his statement, there is no inflexible rule of law which 
 prevents a conviction."-"^ 
 
 § 74. Extent of corroboration required — It must be of material 
 facts. — From early times it has been the rule^^* that the corrobora- 
 tion need not include every material fact testified to by the ac- 
 complice, for, if he is confirmed in some material particulars, the 
 jury may believe him in others. ^^^ 
 
 should usually be corroborated in charge that it was dangerous to act 
 
 some material part, although the cor- exclusively on the testimony of an 
 
 roboration need not extend to all accomplice, and that the jury should 
 
 matters testified to by the accomplice, require confirmatory testimonj^ or to 
 
 and the jury should also consider charge that the unsupported testi- 
 
 whether he has been successfully con- mony of an accomplice must produce 
 
 tradicted with respect to any material entire belief; when the court did 
 
 portion of his testimony. United charge on reasonable doubt, telling 
 
 States V. Giuliani, 147 Fed. 594. the jury that, while they might con- 
 
 "■ Malachi v. State, 89 Ala. 134, 8 vict on the testimony of the accom- 
 
 So. 104. plice, they should be cautious in so 
 
 "'Cox V. Commonwealth, 125 Pa. doing. State v. Register, 133 N. Car. 
 
 St. 94, 103, 17 Atl. 227; Collins V. 746, 46 S. E. 21. 
 
 People, 98 111. 584, 38 Am. 105; ^^ Rex v. Swallow, 31 How. St. Tr. 
 
 L'nited States v. Ybanez, 53 Fed. 536, 97 1- 
 
 540. An instruction that the jury ^"^ State v. Allen, 57 Iowa 431, lO N. 
 
 must carefully consider the testimony W. 805 ; United States v. Howell, 56 
 
 of a certain witness as he stood be- Fed. 21 ; United States v. Ybanez, 53 
 
 fore the jury as an accomplice is Fed. 536, 538, 541 ; People v. Elliott, 
 
 proper. It is not error to refuse to 106 N. Y. 288, 12 N. E. 602; Com- 
 9 — Underhill Crim. Ev.
 
 § 74 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. I3O 
 
 The jury are not limited to believing the evidence of the ac- 
 complice only upon those facts which are actually proved by 
 other evidence. Such an absurd construction of the rule requiring- 
 corroboration w^ould be, in effect, to receive the evidence and let 
 it go to the jury, while practically forbidding them to believe it. 
 If independent corroboration is required from other witnesses, it 
 must refer to that portion of the testimony which is material to 
 the prisoner's guilt. It is not necessary that the corroboration 
 should be sufficient to prove the crime or to connect the defendant 
 with it.^^*' Nor need the corroboration be wholly inconsistent with 
 the theory of the defense.^^^ 
 
 But the corroborative evidence, whether consisting of acts or 
 admissions, in itself and without that of the accomplice, must at 
 least tend to prove the guilt of the accused by connecting him with 
 the crime ; for it is a matter of no importance to corroborate the 
 accomplice on irrelevant or immaterial details, or to show that 
 he has not perjured himself in stating matters not pertinent to 
 the issue, and upon which he had no interest to testify falsely/^'^ 
 
 The corroborative evidence is sufficient, though it may not bear 
 directly upon any particular fact which has been stated in the evi- 
 dence of the accomplice.^^^ 
 
 monwealth v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 424, Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197, 84 Pac. 364, 
 
 431, 34 Am. 39in; Rex v. Addis, 6 C. 370; Commonwealth v. Holmes, 127 
 
 & P. 388; Commonwealth v. Brooks, Mass. 424, 439, 34 Am. 39in. 
 
 9 Gray (Mass.) 299; People v. Balk- ^^"Commonwealth v. Holmes, 127 
 
 well, 143 Cal. 259, '/6 Pac. 1017; ]\Iass. 424, 441, 34 Am. 39in; Scott v. 
 
 Cook V. State, 75 Ark. 540, 87 S. W. State, 63 Ark. 310, 38 S. W. 339; 
 
 1176; State V. Black, 143 Mo. 166, 44 Mann v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 79 S. 
 
 S. W. 340; McCrory v. State, loi Ga." W. 230, 25 Ky. L. 1964; United States 
 
 779, 28 S. E. 921 ; Hargrove v. State, v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 896, 922, 10 L. 
 
 125 Ga. 270, 54 S. E. 164 ; Lanasa v. R. A. 333 ; Commonwealth v. Savory, 
 
 State (Md.), 71 Atl. 1058. 10 Cush. (Mass.) 535; Rex v. Wilkes, 
 
 "'" People V. Badgley, 16 Wend. (N. 7 C. & P. 272; Reg. v. Birkett, 8 C. 
 
 Y.) 53; Celender v. State (Ark.), 109 & P. 72,2; Reg. v. Mullins, 3 Cox Cr. 
 
 S. W. 1024. Cas. 526, 531. Defendant's failing to 
 
 "^People V. Ogle, 104 N. Y. 511, call a material witness was held suf- 
 
 515, II N. E. 53; Porter v. State, y6 ficient corroboration in Common- 
 
 Ga. 658. wealth v. Brooks, 9 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 ^"'Altman v. State (Ga. App.), 6^ 299. So, too, a declaration by the de- 
 
 S. E. 928; Chambers v. State (Tex. fendant on his arrest that the accom- 
 
 Cr. App.), 44 S. W. 495; People v. plice had nothing to do with the crime.
 
 131 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. § 74 
 
 The corroborative evidence is not necessarily required to show 
 a commission of the crime, either is it necessary that the whole 
 case should be proved outside of an accomplice, and an instruction 
 that the corroborative must be wholly inconsistent with the in- 
 nocence of the accused is not proper if the corroboration intends 
 to connect the accused with the commission of the crime. It comes 
 from an independent source and bears upon material facts tending 
 to show not only that a crime was committed, but that defendant 
 was concerned in it, it is sufficient."^^ The corroboration or intent 
 to prove the connection of the accused with the crime for evidence 
 that merely excites suspicion or that intimates that accused may 
 be guilty of the crime because he had an opportunity to commit 
 it is not corroboration.^*** 
 
 But the corroboration must bear directly or indirectly, not upon 
 the general character of the accomplice for truthfulness, but upon 
 the question whether, in this particular case and upon the facts 
 involved, his testimony is reliable and worthy of credit by the jury 
 in determining the guilt of the accused.^*^ The rule of the com- 
 mon law requiring the testimony of an accomplice to be corrobo- 
 rated has been confirmed by statutes in some states. In New York 
 "a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, 
 unless he is corroborated by such other evidence as tends to con- 
 nect defendant with the commission of the crime."^'*- 
 
 indicating that defendant knew all 761 ; People v. Patrick, 182 N. Y. 
 
 about it. Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 131, 74 N. E. 843; State v. Jackson, 
 
 12 Allen (Mass.) 183. 106 Mo. 174, 17 S. W. 301; Crawford 
 
 '"'a People V. Acritelli, 57 Misc.- v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 34 S. W. 
 
 Rep. 574, no N. Y. Sup. 430. 927; Marler v. State, ^J Ala. 55, 42 
 
 "" People V. Sciaroni, 4 Cal. App. Am. 95 ; Commonwealth v. Bosworth, 
 
 698, 89 Pac. 133; Smith v. State (Ga. 22 Pick. (Mass.) 397; Commonwealth 
 
 App.), 63 S. E. 917. V. O'Brien, 12 Allen (Mass.) 183; 
 
 ^"Celender v. State (Ark.), 109 State v. Allen, 57 Iowa 431, 10 N. W. 
 
 S. W. 1024; People V. Barker, 114 805 ; United States v. Ybanez, 53 Fed. 
 
 Cal. 617, 46 Pac. 601; People v. May- 536; People v. Clough, "jz Cal. 348, 
 
 hew, 150 N. Y. 346, 44 N. E. 971 ; 352, 15 Pac. S ; State v. Banks, 40 
 
 State V. Turner, 119 X. Car. 841, 25 La. Ann. 736, 5 So. 18; State v. 
 
 S. E. 810; Blois V. State, 92 Ga. 584, Miller, 97 N. Car. 484, 488, 2 S. E. 
 
 20 S. E. 12; Schoenfeldt v. State, 30 363; Smith v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 
 Tex, App. 695, 18 S. W. 640; Simp- 38 S. W. 200. And see other cases 
 
 son V. Commonwealth, 126 Ky. 441, fully cited in Underhill on Evidence, 
 
 103 S. W. ZTy^, 31 Ky. L. 769; State p. 464. 
 V. Ozias, 136 Iowa 175, 113 N. W. ^""People v. Ellenbogen, 114 App.
 
 § 75 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 1 32 
 
 Such a statute, it seems, prohibits a conviction on the uncor- 
 roborated evidence of an accomphce, even though the jury beheve 
 it and are convinced by it of the guilt of the accused beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt/''" 
 
 The evidence which the statutes rec[uire in corroboration and 
 which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the 
 crime, must be such evidence as will independently of the evidence 
 of the accomplice tend to connect the accused with the offense."^^ 
 And it is not usually necessary or proper to direct a jury to dis- 
 regard all the evidence of the accomplice which has not been cor- 
 roborated according to the statute. If, upon all the facts, the con- 
 nection of the accused with the crime is proven without the aid of 
 the evidence of the accomplice it may be sufficient, though all the 
 independent evidence does not strictly corroborate with what the 
 accomplice has testified to.^*'* 
 
 The admission by the accused that he was connected with the 
 commission of the crime is usually sufficient corroboration under 
 the statute.'*^ 
 
 § 75. The nature of the crime as a test of corroboration — Suffi- 
 ciency of corroboration. — The character and degree of corrobora- 
 tion which are required may, to a certain extent, be measured by 
 the enormity of the crime, the moral perversity involved in its 
 commission and the punishment. Hence conviction of a misde- 
 meanor might be sustained without the introduction of much in- 
 
 Div. (N. Y.) 182, 99 N. Y. S. 897, 7^ S. W. 476; Hall v. State, 52 Tex. 
 
 I N. Y. St. — ; Robertson v. State, 46 Cr. App. 250, 106 S. W. 379 ; Shilling 
 
 Tex. Cr. App. 441, 80 S. W. 1000; v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 326, 106 
 
 People V. Strauss, 94 App. Div. (N. S. W. 357; State v. McCarthy, 2>^ 
 
 Y.) 453, 88 N. Y. S. 40; People v. Mont. 226, 92 Pac. 521; State v. 
 
 Ortega, 7 Cal. App. 480, 94 Pac. 869; Bond, 12 Idaho 424, 86 Pac. 43; 
 
 People V. Ogle, 104 N. Y. 511, 515, 11 Cooper v. Territory, 19 Okla. 496, 
 
 N. E. 53; People v. Elliott, 106 N. Y. 91 Pac. 1032; State v. Carr, 28 Ore. 
 
 288, 292, 12 N. E. 602; People v. 389, 42 Pac. 215; State v. Spencer, 
 
 White, 62 Hun (N. Y.) 114; People 15 Utah 149,49 Pac. 302. 
 
 V. Mayhew, 150 N. Y. 346, 44 N. E. "^a People v. Compton, 123 Cal. 
 
 971 ; People v. Barry, 196 N. Y. 507, 89 403, 56 Pac. 44. 
 
 N. E. 1 107. ^** People v. Ammon, 179 N. Y. 540, 
 
 ^^'Conant v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 71 N. E. 1135, judgment, 92 App. Div. 
 
 610, 103 S. W. 897; McDaniel v. (N. Y.) 205. 87 N. Y. S. 358. 
 
 State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 342, 87 S. \\\ "' People v. Eaton, 122 App. Div. 
 
 1044; Custer V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), (N. Y.) 706, 107 N. Y. S. 849.
 
 133 THE ACCUSED AS A WITNESS. § 75 
 
 dependent and corroborative evidence where such evidence would 
 be required in the case of a felony/*^ 
 
 It would be illogical to place accomplices in every character of 
 crime upon the same footing. Evidently the nature of the crime 
 in which the accomplice is involved must vary the weight that a 
 jury will accord to his testimony ; while the reasonableness of his 
 story and his manner of testifying, are considerations affecting his 
 credibility and tending to shape the advice of the judge. If the 
 crime be free from moral turpitude, the story which he tells rea- 
 sonable, and the manner of its relation evincive of truthfulness, 
 the jury might, even under the influence of the strongest caution, 
 feel bound to believe and convict. To deny a conviction legal sup- 
 port under such circumstances would be to take from the jury 
 their right of judgment upon the weight of the testimony, and 
 to compel them to find against their conviction of truth. ^*^ The 
 evidence of the accomplice may be corroborated by the confession 
 of the accused;^** but not by the accomplice testifying that the 
 accused had stated to him that he intended to commit other dis- 
 tinct crimes/*'' 
 
 Whether the evidence of the accomplice shall go to the jury is 
 a question for the judge, and, before submitting it to them, he 
 should be satisfied that there is some corroboration. If corrobora- 
 tive circumstances are proved from which, with the evidence of 
 the accomplice, reasonable men may infer the existence of the 
 guilt of the accused, the court may submit the evidence of the 
 accomplice to the jury. But whether the testimony of the accom- 
 plice is corroborated so that the prisoner's guilt is shown beyond 
 a reasonable doubt is a question for them to determine.^'''* Cor- 
 roboration by independent evidence is not dispensed with where 
 
 '^'Bell V. State, 73 Ga. 572, 574; 896, 921, 10 L. R. A. 333 ; Schoenfeldt 
 
 Rex V. Jarvis, 2 Moo. & R. 40; Reg. v. State, 30 Tex. App. 695, 18 S. W. 
 
 V. Young, TO Cox Cr. Cas. 371 ; 640. 
 
 United States v. Kessler, Bald. (U. "'' Kinchelow v. State, 5 Humph. 
 
 S.) 15, 22, 26 Fed. Cas. 15528; Under- (Tenn.) 9, 12. 
 hill on Evidence, p. 463, note 4. ""Commonwealth v. Holmes, 127 
 
 "* State V. Hyer, 39 N. J. L. 598, Mass. 424, 437, 34 Am. 39in ; People 
 
 602. V. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 591, SO4, n 
 
 "'Partee v. State, 67 Ga. 570, 572; N. E. 62. 
 United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed.
 
 § 75 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 134 
 
 several accomplices testify against the accused. The accomplices 
 are not deemed to corroborate each other.^^^ 
 
 ^"Whitlow V. State (Tex. App.), 
 18 S. W. 86s; United States v. Hinz, 
 35 Fed. -^2', People v. O'Neil, 109 
 N. Y. 251, 16 N. E. 68; State v. W^il- 
 liamson, 42 Conn. 261. A failure to 
 so charge is error. McConnell v. 
 State (Tex. App.), 18 S. W. 645; 
 Schwartz v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 
 114 S. W. 809; People V. Creegan, 
 121 Cal. 554, S3 Pac. 1082. Whether 
 the corroborating witness was an ac- 
 complice is for the jury. It may be 
 assumed from a verdict of guilty 
 that the jury believed him not to be 
 an accomplice. People v. Creigan, 
 121 Cal. 554, 53 Pac. 1082,
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. 
 
 § ^d. Character defined — The accused 
 may show good character. 
 
 77. Specific traits only relevant — 
 
 Character of associates. 
 
 78. Bad character — When admissi- 
 
 ble. 
 
 79. Effect and operation of evidence 
 
 of good character. 
 
 80. Good character, though never 
 
 conclusive, may acqtiit if it 
 creates a reasonable doubt. 
 
 81. 
 
 82. 
 83. 
 
 84. 
 
 Mode of proof — Irrelevancy of 
 personal opinions — Deroga- 
 tory rumors in rebuttal. 
 
 Specific evil acts — Relevancy of. 
 
 Remoteness — Character subse- 
 quent to the date of the crime. 
 
 The grade and moral nature of 
 the crime. 
 
 Disposition is irrelevant. 
 
 Number of witnesses to charac- 
 ter. 
 
 \. Instructions as to the character 
 of the accused. 
 
 § 76. Character defined — The accused may show good character. — 
 
 The character of the accused means his reputation, /. e., the gen- 
 eral consensus of opinion regarding him and his conduct based on 
 his deportment and conduct, which is held by his neighbors, 
 friends and acquaintances. The accused may always prove his 
 
 good character.^ 
 
 HVay V. State (Ala.), 46 So. 273; 
 Lewis v. State (Miss.), 47 So. 467; 
 Hall v. State, 132 Ind. 317, 323, 
 31 N. E. 536; State v. Donohoo, 22 
 W. Va. 761, 764; State v. Schleagel, 
 50 Kan. 325, 328, 31 Pac. 1105; Peo- 
 ple v. Ashe, 44 Cal. '?88, 291 ; Grifiin 
 V. State, 14 Ohio St. 55, 63; State v. 
 Kinley, 43 Iowa 294, 296. The repu- 
 tation which is relevant is reputation 
 generally among all classes in the 
 community where the accused re- 
 sides, and not his reputation among 
 a particular class, as "among his fel- 
 low workmen." State v. Brady, 71 N. 
 J. L. 360, 59 Atl. 6. 
 
 (I 
 
 In General. 
 Note on right of defendant in crim- 
 inal cases to prove character, 20 L. R. 
 A. 613; note on proof of character of 
 person accused of crime, 20 L. R. A. 
 609, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 735, 103 Am. 
 St. 889, Elliott on Ev., § 3038 ; note on 
 good character of accused restricted to 
 traits involved in offense, 103 Am. St. 
 892 ; note on evidence of good charac- 
 ter of accused where the incrimina- 
 ting evidence is positive, 103 Am. St. 
 908, 909 ; note on what constitutes rep- 
 utation, 103 Am. St. 895 ; note on gen- 
 eral rule as to admissil)ility of evi- 
 dence of good character of accused, 
 
 35)
 
 76 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 136 
 
 If, however, he offers no evidence of good character, the law 
 presumes he has a fair and respectable, if not, indeed, an excellent 
 character, and does not permit any presumption of guilt to arise 
 from his silence as to his character or from his failure to offer 
 evidence on this point. That his character is bad can never be 
 ])resumed with proof, nor should the prosecution be permitted to 
 comment unfavorably upon his omission to offer evidence of 
 character.- 
 
 103 Am. St. 891 ; note on competency 
 of witness to testify as to character of 
 accused, 103 Am. St. 894; note on ad- 
 missibility of evidence of good char- 
 acter of accused to create doubt, 103 
 Am. St. 891 ; note on evidence as to 
 good character of accused where the 
 evidence against him is circumstantial, 
 103 Am. St. 907; note on evidence to 
 rebut evidence of good character of 
 accused, 103 Am. St. 893, 894, 895, 20 
 L. R. A. 616; note on evidence to 
 strengthen the presumption of inno- 
 cence, 103 Am. St. 892; note on evi- 
 dence of good character of accused to 
 rebut presumption from possession of 
 stolen goods, 20 L. R. A. 614; note 
 on negative evidence of good charac- 
 ter of accused, 103 Am. St. 895; note 
 on cross-examination as to character 
 of accused ; note on right to question 
 as to good character of accused sub- 
 mitted to the jury, 103 Am. St. 889; 
 note on evidence as to good character 
 of accused where the intent must be 
 shown, 103 Am. St. 906. 
 
 Specific Offenses. 
 
 Note on evidence of good charac- 
 ter, in prosecution for arson, 103 Am. 
 St. 902; in prosecution for counter- 
 feiting, 103 Am. St. 903; in prosecu- 
 tion for obtaining money by false pre- 
 tenses, 103 Am. St. 902 ; in prosecution 
 for homicide, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 352, 
 103 Am. St. 897, 899; Elliott Ev., § 
 
 3039; in prosecution for criminal libel, 
 103 Am. St. 900; in prosecution for 
 violating election or liquor laws, 103 
 Am. St. 903 ; in prosecution for per- 
 jury, 103 Am. St. 902: in prosecution 
 for larceny or robbery, 103 Am. St. 
 901 ; in prosecution for rape, 103 Am. 
 St. 899; in prosecution for imlawfully 
 carrying firearms, 103 Am. St. 904. 
 
 " State v. Dockstader, 42 Iowa 436 ; 
 Ackley v. People (burglary), 9 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 609, 611; McQueen v. State, 
 82 Ind. 72, 73; Ormsby v. People, 53 
 N. Y. 472, 475 ; Donoghoe v. People, 
 6 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 120. 124: State v. 
 Upham (counterfeiting), 38 Me. 261, 
 263; State v. O'Neal, 7 Ired. (N. 
 Car.) 251, 252; People v. Bodine, i 
 Denio (N. Y.) 281. Contra, State v. 
 McAllister, 24 Me. 139 ; State v. Kab- 
 rich, 39 Iowa 277. Counsel for the 
 accused may comment on the pre- 
 sumption of good character, but may 
 not discuss the good character of the 
 accused unless some evidence of it 
 has been offered. Cluck v. State, 40 
 Ind. 263, 270, 271. The fact that the 
 accused does not testify as a witness 
 does not prevent him from proving 
 his good character. State v. Hice, 
 T17 N. Car. 782, 23 S. E. 357. It was 
 error for the prosecuting attorney to 
 remark in his argument to the jury 
 that defendant had a right under the 
 law to offer evidence of good char- 
 acter, and the fact that he did not do
 
 137 
 
 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. 
 
 77 
 
 The accused starts out with the presumption of innocence. His 
 good character, if it be proved, will strengthen this. Its relevancy 
 depends solely upon the inference that any reasonable man ought 
 to draw that the accused is not guilty, because experience teaches 
 that it is improbable that a man of good character would commit 
 any crime or the crime with which he is charged.^ 
 
 § 77. Specific traits only relevant — Character of associates. — In a 
 criminal prosecution, evidence of accused's general good character 
 is admissible only when limited to the particular trait involved in 
 the nature of the charge. The traits of character which may be 
 proved must depend upon the nature of the crime alleged and the 
 moral wrong which is involved in its commission.* 
 
 so was sufficient evidence of bad 
 character, and tliat the attorney had 
 a right to comment thereon. State v. 
 Williams, 122 Iowa 115, 97 N. W. 
 992. 
 
 ^ "The object of laying evidence of 
 character before the jury is to induce 
 them to believe, from the improba- 
 bility that a person of good character 
 would commit crime, that there is a 
 mistake or misrepresentation on the 
 part of the prosecution." Rex v. 
 Stannard, 7 C. & P. (^TZ- "This pre- 
 sumption a'gainst the commission of 
 crime arises from the general im- 
 probability proved by common obser- 
 vation and experience, that a person 
 who has uniformly pursued an honest 
 and upright course of conduct will 
 depart from jt. * * * Such a person 
 may be overcome by temptation and 
 fall into crime, and cases of that 
 kind often occur, but they are excep- 
 tions ; the general rule is otherwise. 
 * * * The influence of the pre- 
 sumption may be slight when the ac- 
 cusation of crime is supported by the 
 direct and positive testimony of cred- 
 ible witnesses. It will seldom avail 
 to control the mind where the testi- 
 
 mony, though circumstantial, is reli- 
 able, strong and clear. If the evi- 
 dence is nearly balanced, but slightly 
 preponderant against the defendant, 
 the presumption from proof of good 
 character is entitled to great weight 
 and will often be sufficient to turn 
 the scale and produce an acquittal." 
 Cancemi v. People, 16 N. Y. 50T, 506. 
 ^Balkum v. State, 115 Ala. 117, 22 
 So. 532, (i"] Am. St. 19; People v. 
 Bezy, 67 Cal. 223, 7 Pac. 643; State 
 V. Emery, 59 Vt. 84, 90, 7 Atl. 129; 
 People V. Garbutt, \- Alich. 9, 97 Am. 
 Dec. i62n ; Kahlenbeck v. State, 119 
 Ind. 118, 121, 21 N. E. 460; Gordon 
 V. State, 3 Iowa 410, 415; State v. 
 Dexter, 115 Iowa 678, 87 N. W. 417; 
 Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261, (>Z N. W. 
 811; People V. Josephs (rape), 7 Cal. 
 129, 130; People V. Fair (homicide), 
 43 Cal. 137, 148-15 1 ; Commonwealth 
 V. Nagle, 157 Mass. 554, 32 N. E. 
 861; Gandolfo v. State (homicide), 
 II Ohio St. 114, 117; Coffee v. State, 
 I Tex. App. 548, 550; Kee v. State, 
 28 Ark. 15s, 164 ; Westbrooks v. State, 
 "](> Miss. 710, 25 So. 49T ; Griffin v. 
 State, 14 Ohio St. 55, 63; State v. 
 King, 78 Mo. 555, 556; State v. Ken-
 
 77 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 138 
 
 Thus evidence that the accused was generally reputed to be a 
 quiet, peaceable and inoffensive man is always relevant in cases 
 of homicide, and particularly so under a plea of self-defense. 
 And, illogical as it may seem, this evidence has been admitted in 
 a case of homicide by poisoning upon the theory that such traits 
 of character, being inconsistent with a disposition to take life by 
 one method, would be equally inconsistent with homicide by 
 another.'^ 
 
 In a prosecution for theft a witness may testify to the general 
 reputation as to honesty and integrity, but may not state that he 
 never heard of accused failing to return any money which came 
 into his hands.*' 
 
 Evidence of general good character has been rejected in a 
 prosecution for rape, though upon this point the cases are not 
 wholly in harmony/ 
 
 ned3% 177 ]\Io. 98, 75 S. W. 979 ; Lake 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 104 S. W. 
 1003, 31 Ky. L. 1232; State v. Bessa, 
 115 La. 259, 38 So. 985; Saye v. State, 
 50 Tex. Cr. App. 569, 99 S. W. 551; 
 Harper v. United States, 7 Ind. Terr. 
 437, 104 S. W. 673; Dungan v. State, 
 135 Wis. 151, 115 N. W. 350; Arnold 
 V. State, 131 Ga. 494, 62 S. E. 806; 
 State V, Griggsby, 117 La. 1046, 42 
 So. 497; Smith V. State, 142 Ala. 14, 
 39 So. 329; I Taylor Evid., § 326; i 
 Greenl. Evid., § 54. Some authorities 
 hold that evidence of good character 
 need not be confined to the trait in- 
 volved, particularly in capital cases. 
 Hopps V. People, 31 HI- 385, 388, 83 
 Am. Dec. 231 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Hardy, 2 Mass. 303, 317; People v. 
 Vane, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 78; Com- 
 monwealth V. Webster, 5 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 295, 32s, 52 Am. Dec. 71 in, 
 but see as sustaining the text. 
 
 Xote that evidence of defendant's 
 character be applicable to trait in- 
 volved, 20 L. R. A. 612; note on ad- 
 mfssibility of particular acts and spe- 
 cific traits of defendant generally, 20 
 
 L. R. A. 614; evidence of specific in- 
 stances to prove character in prose- 
 cution for homicide, 14 L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) 708; note on impeachment of de- 
 fendant's character for credibility, 20 
 L. R. A. 616. 
 
 Character of Others. 
 
 Note on character of accomplices, 
 20 L. R. A. 614; character of inmates 
 or visitors in prosecution for keeping 
 disorderly house, 20 L. R. A. 612, El- 
 liott Ev., § 2722; character of victims 
 of crime, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 352, 17 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 708, 722- 
 
 ^Hall V. State, 132 Ind. 317, 324, 
 31 N. E. 536. But evidence that the 
 character of the accused for honesty 
 was bad is not relevant in homicide 
 to prove the killing or to show malice. 
 People V. Cowgill, 93 Cal. 596, 597, 29 
 Pac. 228. 
 
 " Leonard v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 
 187, 109 S. W. 149. 
 
 ' People V. Josephs, 7 Cal. 129, 130. 
 Contra, State v. Lee, 22 Minn. 407- 
 409, 21 Am. 769.
 
 139 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. § 78 
 
 Thus, in rape a question as to the reputation of the accused in 
 the community may properly be disallowed. Reputation is too 
 broad. The proper question would be as to his reputation for 
 chastity and morality, using the latter term in its restricted sense 
 of the absence of impurity in sexual relations.^ 
 
 So in a prosecution for embezzlement, the general reputation 
 of the accused for honesty may be proved, but his reputation for 
 telling the truth is not admissible.^ 
 
 So, too, in a prosecution for larceny, evidence of character must 
 bear directly on the honesty and financial integrity of the ac- 
 cused. ^° 
 
 Though the accused may prove his own character, he will not 
 be permitted to prove that others conspiring with him and jointly 
 indicted/^ or who are suspected of complicity in the crime,^^ are 
 men of good character. This evidence is not in the least relevant 
 to show his innocence, as the fact that the friends or acquaintances 
 of the accused are men of unimpeachable character, in no way 
 proves that he is a person of good character. 
 
 On the other hand, it seems that the admission of evidence 
 showing the bad character of a co-defendant, if separately tried, is 
 not error. ^' 
 
 § 78. Bad character — ^Wheii admissible. — Except so far as the 
 character of the accused for veracity may be attacked when he is a 
 witness, the state cannot show his bad character in the first in- 
 stance, i. e., before he offers to prove his good character/* When- 
 
 * State V. Brady, 71 N. J. L. 360, 59 ^^Aneals v. People, 134 III. 401, 415, 
 
 Atl. 6. 25 N. E. 1022, 1026. The defendant 
 
 ' State V. Hoffman, 134 Iowa 587, cannot be questioned as to the bad 
 
 112 N. W. 103. character of his relatives, who are in 
 
 " State V. Bloom, 68 Ind. 54-57, 34 no way connected with the crime. 
 Am. 247; Butler v. State, 91 Ala. 87, Vale v. People, 161 III. 309, 43 N. E. 
 9 So. 191; Hays v. State, no Ala. 23, 1091. The failure of the court to 
 20 So. 322; People V. Ryder, 151 charge on the evidence of good char- 
 Mich. 187, 114 N. W. 1021; State v. acter offered by the accused is not, 
 Conlan, 3 Penn. (Del.) 218, 50 Atl. 95. in the absence of a request by him, 
 
 "Walls V. State, 125 Ind. 400, 403, erroneous. State v. IMurphy, 118 Mo. 
 
 25 N. E. 457 ; Omer v. Common- 7, 25 S. W. 95, 96, 98. 
 
 wealth (homicide), 95 Ky. 353, 362, "Felsenthal v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 25 S. W. 594, 596, 15 Ky. L. 694. 67s, ^T7> t8 S. W. 644, 645 : Peo- 
 
 " State V. Staton, 114 N. Car. 813, pie v. McXane, 143 N. Y. 455, 473, 38 
 
 818, 19 S. E. 96. N. E. 950; McDonald v. Common-
 
 § 7^ 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 140 
 
 ever the accused shall introduce evidence of good character, re- 
 butting evidence to show his bad character, but only as regards 
 the trait involved in the crime charged against him, is always ad- 
 missible.^° 
 
 And this is the rule even though the evidence of good character 
 was elicited upon the cross-examination of the witnesses for the 
 state." 
 
 To admit evidence of bad character against the accused, it is 
 necessary that he shall have already put his character clearly and 
 expressly in issue. ^'^ 
 
 wealth, 86 Ky. 10, 13, 4 S. W. 687, 
 9 Ky, L. 230; Commonwealth v. 
 Hardy, 2 Mass. 303, 318; Montgom- 
 ery V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 30 S. 
 W. 602, 17 Ky. L. 94; State v. Thur- 
 tell (larceny), 29 Kan. 148; Carter 
 V. State, 2,^ Neb. 481, 54 N. W. 853; 
 State V. Kabrich, 39 Iowa 277, 278; 
 PauH V. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. St. 
 432, 435 ; State v. Ellwood, 17 R. I. 
 763, 766, 24 Atl. 782 ; State v. Lapage, 
 57 N. H. 245, 24 Am. 693; State v. 
 Creson, 38 Mo. 372; State v. O'Neal, 
 7 Ired. (N. Car.) 251, 253; Griffin 
 V. State, 14 Ohio St. 55, 62, ; Carter 
 V. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 169; 
 Cluck V. State, 40 Ind. 263, 270, 271 ; 
 State V. Upham, 38 Me. 261, 263. 
 Where the defendant introduces evi- 
 dence to show good character in one 
 community where he has lived the 
 state may show his bad character in 
 another. State v. Foster, 91 Iowa 
 164, 59 N. W. 8. Cf. State v. Espin- 
 ozei, 20 Nev. 209, 19 Pac. 677. See 
 also, sustaining text. State v. Nussen- 
 holtz, 76 Conn. 92, 55 Atl. 589; State 
 V. Thompson, 127 Iowa 440, 103 N. 
 W. 377; People v. Murphy, T46 Cal. 
 502, 80 Pac. 709; Puryear v. State, 
 50 Tex. Cr. App. 454, 98 S. W. 258; 
 State v. Richardson, T94 Mo. 326, 92 
 S. W. 649: Newman v. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.), 88 S. W. 1089, 28 Ky. 
 
 L. 81 ; People v. Hinksman, 192 N. Y. 
 421, 85 N. E. 676. 
 
 Note on evidence of bad character 
 of accused, 103 Am. St. 893; at- 
 tacking defendant's character, 20 L. 
 R. A. 69, 20 L. R. A. 610 (disorderly 
 house) ; note on admissibility of evi- 
 dence of bad character of deceased in 
 prosecution for homicide, 2 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 102. 
 
 ^° Johnson v. State, 17 Tex. App. 
 565, 572; Maxwell v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 App.), 78 S. W. 516; Cook v. State, 
 46 Fla. 20, 35 So. 665. 
 
 " Reg. v. Gadbury!^ 8 C. & P. 676. 
 Evidence of bad character is gov- 
 erned by the same rules whether 
 elicited from independent witnesses 
 or on the cross-examination of the 
 accused. Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 
 221, 63 Am. Dec. 269; Commonwealth 
 V. O'Brien, 119 Mass. 342, 345, 20 Am. 
 325. The state may show the actual 
 reputation of the defendant, though 
 doing so may entail an inquiry into 
 his political or religious belief. Peo- 
 ple V. McKane, 143 N. Y. 455, 473, 38 
 N. E. 950. 
 
 ** People V. Fair, 43 Cal. 137; State 
 V. Beckner, T94 Mo. 281, 91 S. W. 
 892, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 535n; Bays 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. .^pp. 548, 99 S. 
 W. 561: Sweatt V. State (.A.la.), 47 
 So. 194.
 
 141 
 
 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. 
 
 § 79 
 
 The fact that it is incidentally and indirectly referred to, as 
 when a continuance is asked for because witnesses to good char- 
 acter are absent, does not let in evidence of bad character.^^ 
 
 But the rule protecting the character of the accused from at- 
 tack in the first instance is subject to a seeming exception if he 
 goes upon the stand as a witness. If it is expressly provided, by 
 statute or otherwise, that he may be examined or impeached as 
 any other witness, the state may prove his bad character for 
 veracity for the purpose of impeaching him as a witness (but for 
 no other purpose), before he offers any evidence of good char- 
 acter, -° 
 
 § 79. Effect and operation of evidence of good character. — Good 
 character should be permitted to operate as a positive, appropriate 
 and substantial defense. No distinction should be made, in appli- 
 cation and effect, between evidence to prove exculpatory facts and 
 evidence to prove the character of the accused.-^ 
 
 "Felsenthal v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 675, 677, 18 S. W. 644 ; State v. Clon- 
 inger, 149 N. Car. 567, 63 S. E. 154. 
 
 '° McDonald v. Commonwealth, 86 
 K}-. 10, 13, 14, 4 S. W. 687, 9 Ky. L. 
 230; State V. Cloninger, 149 N. Car. 
 567, 63 S. E. 154; Drew v. State, 124 
 Ind. 9, 23 X. E. 1098; Burns v. State, 
 75 Ohio St. 407, 79 N. E. 929; State 
 V. Cox, 67 Mo. 392. Where the state 
 neglects to rebut the defendant's 
 evidence of good character, it is error 
 for the court to charge "that the law 
 does not permit the state to attack 
 his character while allowing him to 
 prove good character." The bene- 
 ficial effect of the defendant's evi- 
 dence may be nullified by the infer- 
 ence which may be drawn that the 
 prosecution is akvays precluded from 
 attacking good character. People v. 
 Marks, 90 Mich. 555, 51 N. W. 638. 
 
 "'State V. Murphy, 118 Mo. 7, 25 
 S. W. 95, 97; State V. McNally, 87 
 Mo. 644, 658, 659; Lee v. State, 2 
 
 Tex. App. 338, 341 ; Rex. v. Stannard, 
 7 C. & P. 673; State V. Pucca, 4 
 Penn. (Del.) 71, 55 Atl. 831; Cannon 
 V. Territory (Okla. 1909), 99 Pac. 
 622; State V. King, 122 Iowa i, 96 X. 
 W. 712. 
 
 X'ote on consideration of good 
 character of accused, 103 Am. St. 
 904; note on effect of evidence 
 of defendant's good character to re- 
 but presumption from possession of 
 stolen goods, 20 L. R. A. 614; note 
 on effect of evidence of good char- 
 acter to create a doubt of guilt, 20 L. 
 R. A. 617; note on weight and effect 
 of evidence as to character, 20 L. R. 
 A. 618, 103 Am. St. 905; note on 
 consideration of evidence of good 
 character in determining degree of 
 guilt or crime, 20 L. R. A. 619; note 
 on instruction as to effect of evi- 
 dence of good character, T03 Am. St. 
 893 ; note on instruction limiting con- 
 sideration of good character to doubt- 
 ful cases, 20 L. R. A. 618.
 
 § 79 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 142 
 
 Both rest on the same basis. A man's good character is a fact 
 making strongly for the inference that he is innocent, and not a 
 mere make-weight to be thrown in the scale if his guilt is trem- 
 bling in the balance. 
 
 Though good character is of especial importance w^hen the in- 
 criminating evidence is wdiolly circumstantial,"" it is not to be 
 rejected, or even disregarded, wdien the evidence against the ac- 
 cused is direct.-^ And, except in a few early cases,-* its admissi- 
 bility has never been limited to doubtful cases, or to those in 
 which the other evidence was contradictory or unconvincing.-^ 
 
 The correct rule is that in all cases a good character, if proved, 
 the satisfaction of the jury must be considered.-*^ 
 
 " Jackson v. State, 81 Wis. 127, 138, 
 51 N. W. 89. 
 
 -^ State V. Rodman, 62 Iowa 456, 17 
 N. W. 663; Stover v. People, 56 N. 
 Y. 31S, 319. 
 
 =*Rex V. Turner, 6 How. St. Tr. 
 565, 613; Commonwealth v. Webster, 
 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 
 7iin; United States v. Roudenbush, 
 I Bald. (U. S.) 514, 27 Fed. Cas. 
 16198. See State v. Edwards, 13 S. 
 Car. 30, 33. 
 
 ■^ "It has been usual to treat the 
 good character of the accused as evi- 
 dence to be taken into consideration 
 only in doubtful cases. Juries have 
 generally been told that where the 
 facts proved are such as to satisfy 
 their minds of the guilt of the party, 
 character, however excellent, is no 
 subject for their consideration, but 
 when they entertain any doubt as to 
 the guilt of the party, they may prop- 
 erly turn their attention to his good 
 character. It is, however, submitted 
 with deference, that the good char- 
 acter of the party accused, when sat- 
 isfactorily established, is an ingredi- 
 ent which ought always to be sub- 
 mitted to the jury, together with the 
 other facts and circumstances of the 
 
 case. The nature of the charge and 
 the evidence by which it is supported 
 will often render such ingredient of 
 little or no value, but the more cor- 
 rect course seems to be, not, in any 
 case, to withdraw it from considera- 
 tion, but to leave the jury to form 
 their own conclusion upon the evi- 
 dence whether an individual, whose 
 character was previously unblem- 
 ished, has, or has not, committed the 
 particular crime for which he is 
 called upon to answer." 2 Russ. Cr. 
 
 785. 
 
 -* People V. Van Dam, 107 Mich. 
 425, 65 N. W. 277 ; Murphy v. State, 
 108 Ala. 10, 18 So. 557; Edgington 
 V. United States, 164 U. S. 361, 41 L. 
 ed. 467, 17 Sup. Ct. 72; McSwean v. 
 State, 113 Ala. 661, 21 So. 211; Wes- 
 ley V. State, Z7 Miss. 327, 75 Am. 
 Dec. 62; People v. Ashe, 44 Cal. 288, 
 293; United States v. Whitaker, 6 
 ]McLean (U. S.) 342, 344, 28 Fed. 
 Cas. 16672; Cole v. State (Miss.), 
 4 So. 577; State V. Holmes, 65 Minn. 
 230, 68 N. W. 1 1 ; Latimer v. State, 
 55 Neb. 609, 76 N. W. 207, 70 Am. St. 
 403; Harrington .v. State, 19 Ohio 
 St. 264, 269; Stewart v. State, 22 
 Ohio St. 477, 485; State v. Henry, 5
 
 143 
 
 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. 
 
 § 80 
 
 § 80. Good character, though never conclusive, may acquit if it 
 creates a reasonable doubt.— Though evidence of good character 
 should always receive due consideration, the fact that the defend- 
 ant has estabhshed a high character for peace or honesty furnishes 
 no reason why the jury must beHeve the evidence offered in his 
 behalf, if it is weak or contradictory."^ 
 
 The rule is that evidence of good character must always be con- 
 sidered not alone but in connection with all the evidence bearing 
 upon the question of the guilt or the innocence of accused. The 
 jury have no right to separate it from the mass of the testimony, 
 and to say that they believe the accused has a good character and 
 that therefor they will disregard all the evidence of guilt."- 
 
 An instruction in a prosecution for robbery that if the jury are 
 satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt, after a 
 consideration of all the evidence, including that showing his char- 
 
 Jones (N. Car.) 65, 66; State v. 
 Ormiston, 66 Iowa 143, 23 N. W. 370 ; 
 State V. Gustafson, 50 Iowa 194, 197; 
 Fields V. State, 47 Ala. 603, 609, 11 
 Am. 771 ; Carson v. State, 50 Ala. 
 134, 138; People V. Elliott, 163 N. Y. 
 11; 57 N. E. 103; Cancemi v. People, 
 16 N. Y. SOI, 505-507; Stover v. Peo- 
 ple, 56 N. Y. 315, 317; State v. Lep- 
 pere, 66 Wis. 355, 28 N. W. 376 ; State 
 V. Jones, 52 Iowa 150, 2 N. W. 1060; 
 State V. Ford, 3 Strobh. (S. Car.) 
 517; Heine v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 
 St. 145, 148; Holland v. State, 131 
 Ind. 568, 571, 31 N. E. 359; Lee v. 
 State, 2 Tex. App. 338, .341 ; Kistler 
 V. State, 54 Ind. 400, 405; Davis v. 
 State, 10 Ga. loi, 105 ; Jupitz v. Peo- 
 ple, 34 111. 516, 521 ; Remsen v. Peo- 
 ple, 43 N. Y. 6, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 324; People V. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 
 15 N. W. 95; Commonwealth v. 
 Leonard, 140 Mass. 473; 4 N. 
 E. 96, 54 Am. 485; Hanney v. 
 Commonwealth, 116 Pa. St. 322, 9 
 Atl. 339; Powers v. State, 74 Miss. 
 777, 21 So. 657; United States v. 
 Breese, 131 Fed. 915; Daniels v. 
 
 State, 2 Penn. (Del.) 586, 48 Atl. 
 196, 54 L. R. A. 286; Bilton v. Ter- 
 ritory, — Okla. — , 99 Pac. 163 ; Peo- 
 ple V. VanGaasbeck, 189 N. Y. 408, 
 82 N. E. 718; Eacock v. State, 169 
 Ind. 488, 82 N. E. 1039; Common- 
 wealth V. Miller, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 
 309; Mitchell V. State, 43 Fla. 188, 
 30 So. 803; Brazil v. State, 117 Ga. 
 32, 43 S. E. 460; State v. Deuel, 63 
 Kan. 811, 66 Pac. 1037; State v. 
 Garick, 35 La. Ann. 970; People v. 
 McArron, 121 Mich, i, 79 N. W. 944; 
 State V. Beebe, 17 Minn. 241. 
 
 Note on instruction limiting con- 
 sideration of good character to doubt- 
 ful cases, 20 L. R. A. 618; note on 
 instruction as to effect of evidence of 
 good character of accused, 103 Am. 
 St. 893. 
 
 '■ State V. Brown, 34 S. Car. 41, 48, 
 12 S. E. 662; State V. Stewart (Del.), 
 67 Atl. 786; Wells V. Territory, 14 
 Okla. 436, 78 Pac. 124; State v. 
 Brown, 181 Mo. 192, 79 S. W. iiii. 
 
 ''Sweet V. State, 75 Neb. 263, 106 
 N. W. 31 ; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 
 42, 40 So. 312.
 
 § So CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. I44 
 
 acter tor lionesty. then, tliougli they might believe he had a good 
 character for honesty before the crime, it will not entitle him to 
 an acquittal, and they may disregard it. is correct."" But while 
 proof of unblemished character alone may not be sufficient as 
 against proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,^" evidence of 
 good character should go to the jury without language of dis- 
 paragement by the court, to be considered with all the evidence 
 and not independently of it.^^ 
 
 In a criminal case the circumstances may be such that an estab- 
 lished reputation for honesty and integrity would create a reason- 
 able doubt of guilt, and require an acquittal, though, aside from 
 such reputation, the evidence might be convincing, and justify a 
 verdict of guilty. 
 
 Unless the evidence of guilt is so convincing that it precludes 
 a reasonable doubt, an acquittal will be justified if the evidence 
 
 "^ McQueen v. State, 82 Ind. 72, 74; 66 Mo. 148; Stover v. People, 56 X. 
 
 Wagiier v. State, 107 Ind. 71, 74, 7 Y. 315, 319; State v. Leppere, 66 Wis. 
 
 N. E. 896, 57 Am. 79; Cavender v. 355, 360, 28 X. W. 376; Aneals v. 
 
 State, 126 Ind. 47, 49. 25 N. E. 875; People, 134 HI. 401, 415, 25 N. E. 
 
 Holland v. State, 131 Ind. 568, 31 N. 1022; Kistler v. State, 54 Ind. 400, 
 
 E. 359; State V. Smith, 9 Houst. 405; State v. Dunn (Wis.), 102 X. 
 
 (Del.) 588. 33 Atl. 44 T. W. 935; Teague v. State, 144 Ala. 
 
 ** Harrington v. State, 19 Ohio St. 42, 40 So. 312. See remarks of the 
 264: People V. Sweeney, 133 X. Y. court in Commonwealth v. Leonard, 
 609. 610, 30 X. E. 1005 ; Hathcock v. 140 Mass. 473, 479, 4 N. E. 96, 54 
 State, 88 Ga. 91, 13 S. E. 959; Epps Am. 485. Its weight and effect are 
 V. State, 19 Ga. 102, 120: Springfield for the jury alone. Hence it is im- 
 V. State, 96 Ala. 81, 11 So. 250, 252, proper to charge that, in a doubtful 
 38 Am. St. 85 ; Webb v. State, 106 case, evidence of character should 
 Ala. 52, 18 So. 491. Thus good char- have great weight with them. State 
 acter for honesty is not enough, v. Brown, 34 S. Car. 41, 48, 12 S. E. 
 alone, to rebut the presumption which 662, and White v. United States, 164 
 arises from the unexplained posses- U. S. 100, 41 L. ed. 365, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 sion of stolen property. Wagner v. 38. In estimating and weighing char- 
 State. 107 Ind. "T. 73, 7 X. E. 896, acter evidence the jury may take into 
 57 Am. 79. consideration the testimony of the ac- 
 
 " Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, cused and the impression which they 
 
 II So. 250. 2^2, 38 .-Xm. St. 85; Heine may derive from his conduct and 
 
 v. Commonwealth. 91 Pa. St. 145, manner on the stand. People v. El- 
 
 148: People V. Raina, 45 Cal. 292, lenbogen, 186 N. Y. 603, 79 X. E. 
 
 293: People v. .Ashe. 44 Cal. 288, 292, 1112, aff'g 114 App. Div. (N. Y.) 182, 
 
 293: Holland v. State, 131 Ind. 568, 99 X. Y. S. 897; People v. Blatt, 121 
 
 31 X. E. 359; State v. Alexander, X. Y. S. 507.
 
 145 
 
 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. 
 
 § 80 
 
 of good character, considered in connection with all the other 
 evidence, raises a reasonable doubt.^- 
 
 Evidence that the accused is a man of good character consid- 
 ered in connection with the other evidence may be sufficient to 
 create a reasonable doubt of guilt, where such a doubt w^ould not 
 otherwise exist. The verdict of the jury, however, is to be based 
 upon the whole evidence, and if, after considering carefully the 
 evidence of good character, the jury still believe the accused is 
 guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, they are justified in rejecting 
 the evidence of good character.'^^ 
 
 A witness is competent to prove good character where he 
 knows the character or reputation of the man, though he ad- 
 mitted he had never heard his character discussed.^* 
 
 ~ Commonwealth v. Cate, 220 Pa. St. 
 138. 69 Atl. 322, 123 Am. St. 683 ; Ste- 
 phens V. People, 4 Park Cr. (X. Y.) 
 396; Xewsom v. State, 107 Ala. 133, 18 
 So. 206 ; State v. Leppere, 66 Wis. 355, 
 361, 362, 28 N. W. 376; People v. 
 S\vccne\% 133 X. Y. 609, 611, 30 X. 
 E. 1005; People V. Bell, 49 Cal. 
 485; Redd V. State, 99 Ga. 210, 
 25 S. E. 268; McSwean V. State, 113 
 .•\la. 661, 21 So. 211; Crawford v. 
 State, 112 Ala. i, 21 So. 214; Ham- 
 mond V. State, 74 Miss. 214, 21 So. 
 149: McQueen v. State, 82 Ind. 72, 74; 
 Hall V. State, 40 Ala. 698, 707; Armor 
 V. State, 63 Ala. 173; State v. Swain, 
 68 Mo. 605; State V. Lindley, 51 Iowa 
 343, I X. W. 484, 33 Am. 139; State 
 V. Kcefc, 54 Kan. 197, 38 Pac. 302; 
 Carson v. State, 50 .-Ma. 134, 138; Long 
 V. State, 23 Xcb. 33, 36 X. W. 310; 
 I'.akcr V. State, 53 .\. J. L. 45, 20 Atl. 
 858: Guzinski v. People, 77 111. App. 
 -75 ; People v. Kerr, 6 X. Y. S. 674, 6 
 N'. Y. Cr. 406; State v. Van Kuran, 25 
 L'tal) 8, (xj Pac. 60. "There is no case 
 in whicii the jury may not, in the cxcr- 
 ( isc of a sr)uii<I discretion, give a pris- 
 <ncr th«; hcnrfit f>f a previous good 
 
 10 — U.NDKRHILL CkI.«. Ev. 
 
 character. X^o matter how conclusive 
 the other testimony may appear, the 
 character of the accused may be such 
 as to create a doubt in the minds of 
 the jurors, and may lead them to be- 
 lieve, in view of the improbabilities 
 that a person of such character would 
 be guilty of the offense charged, that 
 the other evidence in the case is false 
 or the witnesses mistaken. An indi- 
 vidual accused of crime is entitled to 
 have it left to the jury to form their 
 conclusions upon all the evidence, 
 whether he, if his character was pre- 
 viously unl)lcmishcd, has or has not 
 committed the particular crime al- 
 leged against him." Remsen v. Peo- 
 ple, 43 X. Y. 6, 8, 9. Evidence of 
 good character is substantive evidence 
 and not a mere makeweight intro- 
 duced into a doubtful case. Such evi- 
 dence may have the effect to create 
 a reasonai)le doubt, and thereby pro- 
 duce an acquittal. Commonwcaltli v. 
 Howe, 35 I'a. Super. Ct. 554. 
 
 •* Browne v. United States, 76 C. C. 
 A. 31, 145 Fe<l. I. 
 
 "Mitchell V. State. 51 Te.\. Cr. 
 A|)p. 71, too S. W. 930.
 
 ^ 8i 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 146 
 
 § 81. Mode of proof — Irrelevancy of personal opinions — Deroga- 
 tory rumors in rebuttal. — Character, /. c, the general reputation 
 which the accused possesses and enjoys among his acquaintances, 
 may be shown by the testimony of such persons only. The wit- 
 ness is not competent unless it is first shown that he knows such 
 leputation,^^ which must be that which is current in the neigh- 
 borhood where both he and the accused reside.^^ 
 
 The witness cannot give an opinion which is merely the result 
 of observing the disposition and conduct of the defendant. What 
 is required of him is his knowledge of the existing general repu- 
 tation which he has obtained by hearing the comments of others 
 on the accused while he lived among those who knew him.'^ 
 
 The witness must be acquainted with the character of the ac- 
 
 ^^ State V. Lambert, — Me. — , 71 
 Atl. 1092; State V. Coley, 114 N. Car. 
 879, 883, 19 S. E. 705; Gay v. State, 
 40 Tex. Cr. App. 242, 49 S. W. 612. A 
 question as to the knowledge the wit- 
 ness has of the character of the ac- 
 cused in the neighborhood where he 
 lives must not be leading or suggest- 
 ive of the answer desired. Thus a 
 witness called to prove bad character 
 ought not to be permitted to answer 
 the question whether he knew the ac- 
 cused to be a turbulent, violent or 
 boisterous man. Ross v. State, 139 
 Ala. 144, 36 So. 718. 
 
 Note on credibilitj' of character 
 witnesses in criminal cases, 14 L. R. 
 A. (N. S.) 739-745- 
 
 ^^ People v. Rodrigo, 69 Cal. 601, 
 603, 1 1 Pac. 481 ; People v. Murphy, 
 146 Cal. 502, 80 Pac. 709. 
 
 Note on admissibility of evidence 
 to prove good character, 103 Am. St. 
 890; how and by whom defendant's 
 character proved, note in 20 L. R. A. 
 614 ; note on kind of evidence admis- 
 sible to prove good character of ac- 
 cused, 103 Am. St. 894 ; when particu- 
 lar facts admissible bearing on good 
 character, of accused, note in 103 Am. 
 
 St. 893 ; proof of disorderly house by 
 evidence of general reputation, 20 L. 
 R. A. 611. 
 
 ^' Reg. V. Rowton, 10 Cox Cr. Cas. 
 25, 30; Commonwealth v. Rogers, 136 
 ;Mass. 158, 159; State v. Grinden, 91 
 Iowa 505, 60 N. \V. 37; Sawyer v. 
 People, 91 N. Y. 667; Hirschm.an v. 
 People, Id 111. 568, 574; Berneker v. 
 State (larceny), 40 Neb. 810, 814, 816, 
 59 N. W. 372 ; State v. Ward, 7:^ Iowa 
 532, 35 N. W. 617; Hughes v. State, 
 152 Ala. 5, 44 So. 694; State v. Day, 
 188 Mo. 359. 87 S. W. 465 ; People v. 
 Albers, 137 Mich. 678, 100 N. W. 908; 
 State V. Shouse. 188 Mo. 473, 87 S. 
 W. 480; Younger v. State, 80 Neb. 
 201, 114 N. W. 170; State v. Boyd, 178 
 AIo. 2, 76 S. W. 979; Jackson v. State, 
 147 Ala. 699, 41 So. 178. The witness 
 need not be pereonally acquainted 
 with the accused if he knows his rep- 
 utation. State V. Turner, 36 S. Car. 
 534, 539, 15 S. E. 602. Nor need the 
 witness reside in the same community. 
 State V. Lambert, — Me. — , 71 Atl. 
 T092. State V. Stewart (Del.), 67 Atl. 
 786: McAlpine v. State, 117 Ala. 93, 
 23 So. 130.
 
 147 
 
 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED, 
 
 § 8l 
 
 cused before he can testify. An acquaintance extending over sev- 
 eral years is certainly sufficient to qualify a witness to testify as to 
 the good character of the accused. If having known the accused 
 for several years he further testifies that he is of good character 
 and that he never heard his character questioned and that the 
 question of his character never was discussed outside of his own 
 family, his evidence should be received.^^ 
 
 Evidence of the good actions of the accused is inadmissible to 
 prove his good reputation.^** Vague rumors are not reputation, 
 and a witness is not competent to prove reputation whose sole 
 basis of knowledge is rumor, idle reports and fugitive gossip not 
 traceable to any known and responsible source.^" 
 
 Affirmative testimony of express oral comments of the neigh- 
 bors, friends and acquaintances of the accused, upon the reputa- 
 tion of the accused is not always required. Evidence that the char- 
 acter of the accused had never been denied or doubted, or even dis- 
 cussed or spoken of among his acquaintances, though negative 
 in form, is always admissible and often of the highest value.*^ 
 
 ^ State V. McClellan — Kan. — , 98 
 Pac. 2og. 
 
 ^ Carthaus v. State, 78 Miss. 560, 47 
 N. W. 629; Thomas v. People, 67 N. 
 Y. 218, 223; Hopps V. People, 31 111. 
 385, 388, 83 Am. Dec. 231 ; Walker v. 
 State, 91 Ala. 76, 9 So. 87, 88; Kistler 
 V. State, 54 Ind. 400, 405 ; State v. 
 Kinley, 43 Iowa 294, 296; Common- 
 wealth V. Hardy, 2 Mass. 303, 317; 
 Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 119 Mass. 
 342, 345, 20 Am. 325 ; Keener v. State, 
 18 Ga. 194, 221 ; State v. Stewart 
 (Del.), 67 Atl. 786. 
 
 ^^ Haley v. State, 63 Ala. 83, 86. 
 Hence the results of a stranger's in- 
 quiries in the neighborhood where the 
 accused resides are not admissible. 
 Dave V. State, 22 Ala. 23, 39. 
 
 " State V. Brandenburg, 118 Mo. 
 181, 185, 23 S. W. 1080, 40 Am. St. 
 362; State V. Grate, 68 Mo. 22, 27; 
 Cole V. State, 59 Ark. 50; 26 S. W. 
 3771 Lemons v. State, 4 W. Va. 755, 
 
 761, 6 Am. 293; Hussey v. State, 87 
 Ala. 121, 6 So. 420; State v. Nelson, 
 58 Iowa 208, 12 N. W. 253; State v. 
 Lee, 22 Minn. 407. "A very sensible 
 and commendable relaxation of the 
 old and strict rule is the reception of 
 negative evidence of good character 
 as the testimony of a witness that he 
 has been acquainted with the defend- 
 ant for a considerable time, under 
 such circumstances that he would be 
 more or less likely to hear what was 
 said about him, and that he has never 
 heard any remark about his character 
 — the fact that a person's character is 
 not talked about at all being, on 
 grounds of common experience, ex- 
 cellent evidence that he gives no oc- 
 casion for censure." State v. Lee, 22 
 Minn. 407, 409, 21 Am. 769; Johnson 
 V. State (Miss.), 40 So. 324; Gan- 
 dolfo V. State, 11 Ohio St. 114; Reg. 
 V. Rowton, 10 Cox Cr. Cas. 25.
 
 § 82 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 148 
 
 § 82. Specific evil acts — ^Relevancy of. — Evidence of specific acts 
 of bad conduct is not admissible to show bad character. The ac- 
 cused may always be prepared to meet an attack on his general 
 character, but cannot fairly be required, without notice, to con- 
 trovert particular facts. ■*- 
 
 It is error to permit a character witness to be cross-examined as to 
 his own knowledge of particular acts of bad conduct by accused.*"^ 
 
 But a witness to good character may be asked on cross-exami- 
 nation to list his credibility whether he has heard rumors of 
 particular and specific charges of the commission of acts incon- 
 sistent with the character which he was called to prove,*" and 
 
 *- Underbill on Evidence, p. 26, 506 ; 
 Davenport v. State, 85 Ala. 336, 5 So. 
 152; Nelson v. State, 32 Fla. 244, 13 
 So. 361, 362; People V. Lee Duck 
 Lung, 129 Cal. 491, 62 Pac. 71 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Bishop, 81 Cal. 113, 22 Pac. 
 477; Steele v. State, 83 Ala. 20, 3 So. 
 547; McCarty v. People, 51 111. 231, 
 232; State V. Donelon, 45 La. Ann. 
 744, 754, 12 So. 922; Hirschnian v. 
 People, loi 111. 568, 574; Common- 
 wealth V. O'Brien, 119 Mass. 342, 345, 
 20 Am. 325 ; Gordon v. State, 3 Iowa 
 410, 415; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 3 
 Bush (Ky.) 508, 511; Reg. v. Rowton, 
 ID Cox Cr. Cas. 25 ; Drew v. State, 
 124 Ind. 9, 17, 23 N. E. 1098; Stitz v. 
 State, 104 Ind. 359, 4 N. E. 145 ; Ben- 
 nett v. State, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 118; 
 State V. Laxton, 76 N. Car. 216; 
 Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 221, 63 
 Am. Dec. 269; State v. Bysong, 112 
 Iowa 419, 84 N. W. 505; Common- 
 wealth V. Webster, 5 Cush (Mass.) 
 295, 324, 52 Am. Dec. 71 in; People v. 
 White, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) in, 114; 
 Snyder v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 
 519, 522; Brownell v. People, 38 Mich. 
 732, 736; State V. Donelon, 45 La. 
 Ann. 744, 12 So. 922 ; Basye v. State, 
 45 Neb. 261, 63 N. W. 811. A deputy 
 sheriff can not be permitted to testify 
 that he nearly always had a warrant 
 for the defendant's arrest. Murphy 
 
 V. State, 108 Ala. 10, 18 So. 557; State 
 V. Castle, 133 N. Car. 769, 46 S. E. i. 
 
 Note on proof of other crimes to 
 rebut defendant's good character, 62 
 L. R. A. 300. 
 
 *^aCook V. State, 46 Fla. 20, 35 So. 
 665. 
 
 ^' White V. State, ixi Ala. 92, 21 
 So. 330; People V. Moran, 144 Cal. 
 48, 77 Pac. 777; State v. McDonald, 
 57 Kan. 537, 46 Pac. 966; Goodwin v. 
 State (homicide), 102 Ala. 87, 15 So. 
 571 ; Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 
 684, 33 N. E. 681; Reg. v. Wood, 5 
 Jur. 295 ; Ingram v. State, 67 Ala. 67 ; 
 State v. Pain, 48 La. Ann. 311, 19 
 So. 138; State v. Merriman, 34 S. 
 Car. 16, 35, 12 S. E. 619; Ozburn v. 
 State, 87 Ga. 173, 13 S. E. 247, 249; 
 State V. Arnold, 12 Iowa 479, 487; 
 State V. Dill, 48 S. Car. 249, 26 S. E. 
 567; Holloway v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 303, 77 S. W. 14; Cook V. State, 
 46 Fla. 20, 35 So. 665 (homicide) ; 
 Terry v. State, 118 Ala. 79, 23 So. 
 776; People V. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 
 86 Pac. 671 ; State v. Smalls, 73 S. 
 Car. 516, 53 S. E. 976; State v. Dick- 
 erson (Ohio), 82 N. E. 969; Cook v. 
 State, 46 Fla. 20, 35 So. 665. 
 
 Note on admissibility of particular 
 acts and specific traits of defendant 
 on cross-examination, 20 L. R. A. 615.
 
 149 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. § 83 
 
 generally as to the grounds of his evidence, not so much to estab- 
 lish the truth of such facts or charges, as to test his credibility, 
 and to determine the weight of his evidence.** He may be asked 
 if he has not heard some general report which contradicts the 
 good reputation which he has been called upon to prove.*" 
 
 A witness to the good character of the accused may properly 
 be cross-examined as to particular facts which are within his 
 knowledge to test the soundness of his belief that the character 
 of the accused is good, and the facts on which it is founded.*** 
 Thus, he may be asked on cross-examination whether he had not 
 heard of a difficulty during which the accused had assaulted a 
 person with a knife.*'^ 
 
 If he admits having heard derogatory reports of the accused, 
 the latter may show their nature and subject-matter to prove that 
 they did not relate to and do not affect the particular trait of 
 character in issue.*^ 
 
 Where it appears from the cross-examination of a character 
 witness that he had heard that the accused had trouble with his 
 neighbors the accused may bring out all the facts in order to show 
 what the trouble was about and that he was not at fault,*^ 
 
 § 83. Remoteness — Character subsequent to the date of the crime. 
 
 ' — Evidence of character, either good or bad, is irrelevant if too 
 remote in time or place.^° 
 
 Though a man's character may have been bad at one period of 
 his life, he may subsequently have reformed and become a law- 
 abiding person at the date of the crime. Nor does it follow be- 
 
 ** Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 119 '^'' State v. Taylor, 45 La. Ann. 605, 
 
 Mass. 342, 356, 20 Am. 325; State v. 608, 12 So. 927. Remote evidence of 
 
 McGee, 81 Iowa 17, 46 N. W. 764, good character is not objectionable 
 
 765. wliere the only evidence against the 
 
 *° State V. West, 43 La. Ann. too6, defendant is circumstantial. Fry v. 
 
 10 So. 364; Thompson v. State (lar- State, 96 Tenn. 467, 35 S. W. 883. 
 
 ccny), 100 Ala. 70, 14 So. 878. Evidence of defendant's character 
 
 *" State V. Le Blanc, 116 La. 822, restricted as to time, note in 20 L. R. 
 
 41 So. 105. A. 612; period to which evidence must 
 
 *^ Jones V. State, 120 Ala. 303, 25 relate, note in 103 Am. St. 890; rcp- 
 
 So. 204. utation since the charge was made, 
 
 " Stape V. People, 85 N. Y. 390, 393. note in 103 Am. St. 896, 897. 
 
 "State V. Doris (Ore.), 94 Pac. 44.
 
 § 83 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. I5O 
 
 cause the accused enjoyed a reputation for peacefulness and hon- 
 esty when a boy that he retained it after maturity or down to the 
 date of the crime.'^^ 
 
 But even when the evidence is not excluded for remoteness the 
 remoteness of the time and place may be considered in estimating 
 the weight of character evidence. It was so held where it was 
 proved that the accused was of a peaceable and quiet reputation 
 in a place where he lived many years before committing the 
 crime. ^^ 
 
 Again, evidence of bad character must refer to a period prior 
 to the discovery of the crime. °^ It is onl}- just that this evidence 
 should be free from any imputation or suggestion of wrong-doing 
 which may have arisen from a public discussion of the crime 
 or of the arrest of the accused. To permit the inquiry to extend 
 down to the arrest or trial would be to embarrass, if not to de- 
 stroy, the probability of innocence arising from good character 
 by evidence of a single wicked transaction with which the ac- 
 cused may not have been connected at all. This is not only con- 
 trary to all recognized rules of evidence, but extremely unfair to 
 the accused.^* 
 
 Thus, for example, the state is not entitled to bring out on 
 cross-examination of a witness called to prove the good character 
 of the accused that, after the commission of the crime, he had 
 heard that the accused had been guilty of actions and conduct 
 that would indicate that the witness was mistaken in his estimate 
 of his character.^^ 
 
 " State V. Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 39 Ga. 570, 28 S. E. 981, 40 L. R. A. 369; 
 
 Pac. 1080, 48 Am. St. 890, 29 L. R. Lea v. State, 94 Tenn. 495, 496, 29 S. 
 
 A. 15411. The reputation of the ac- W. 900; Brown v. State, 46 Ala. 175, 
 
 cused as a soldier in the army is not 184; Griffith v. State, 90 Ala. 583, 539, 
 
 relevant to show character, good or 8 So. 812; People v. McSweeny 
 
 bad. People v. Eckman, 72 Gal. 582, (Gal.), 38 Pac. 743; People v. Fong 
 
 14 Pac. 359; People v. Garbutt, 17 Ghing, 78 Gal. 169, 20 Fac. 396; State 
 
 Mich. 9, 97 Am. Dec. i62n; Burns v. v. Sprague, 64 N. J. L. 419, 45 Atl. 788; 
 
 State, 23 Tex. App. 641, 5 S. W. 140. but compare Gommonwealth v. Sack- 
 
 '" People V. Van Gaasbeck, T18 App. et, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 394, 399. 
 
 Div. (N. Y.) 511, 913, 103 N. Y. S. "White v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 
 
 249- 480, 4 Ky. L. 373. 
 
 ^* White V. Gommonwealth, 80 Ky. ^'^ Powers v. State, 117 Tenn. 363, 
 
 480, 485, 4 Ky. Law 373; State v. Kin- 97 S. W. 815. 
 ley, 43 Iowa 294; Smalls v. State, lOi
 
 151 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. §§ 84. 85 
 
 § 84. The grade and moral nature of the crime. — The admissi- 
 bility and force of evidence of character do not depend upon the 
 degree of immorality involved in the crime,^*' but rather upon 
 the cogency and force of the evidence tending to prove its com- 
 mission and upon the motives which prompted the crime. In the 
 case of a great crime, which apparently was planned and exe- 
 cuted with great deliberation, no reason exists why character 
 should not be considered, as it is extremely probable that a person 
 of blameless and pure habits would not engage therein. Of 
 course, unusual and atrocious crimes involving great moral tur- 
 pitude are so obviously beyond the ordinary bounds of human 
 conduct that it is clear that the perpetrator must have been 
 prompted by extraordinary motives, far different from those 
 guiding his every-day actions, upon which estimates of his char- 
 acter are based. Hence, perhaps, evidence does not possess the 
 same cogency in connection with a crime of extraordinary ma- 
 lignity apparently committed with little, if any, forethought, and 
 under the influence of some sudden and powerful emotion, as it 
 would in the case of an inferior offense.^'^ 
 
 § 85. Disposition is irrelevant. — It is important to distinguish 
 Ijetween evidence of reputation to show character and direct evi- 
 dence of the good or bad moral disposition of the accused. Evi- 
 dence of a good disposition is not admissible for him, to mitigate 
 or excuse his act,^* or of a bad or malicious disposition to show 
 the probability of his guilt.^^ 
 
 '"Cancemi v. People, 16 N. Y. 501, 435, 448, 13 Pac. 528; Hirschman v. 
 
 506, 507 ; Harrington v. State, 19 Ohio People, loi 111. 568 ; People v. Ah Lee 
 
 St. 264, 268. Doon, 97 Cal. 171, 31 Pac. 933; Sin- 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 dram v. People, 88 N, Y. 196, 200 ; 
 
 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 324, 52 Am. Dec. Fitzpatrick v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 
 
 71 in. Cf. McLain v. Commonwealth, 357, 360; Sawyer v. People, 91 
 
 99 Pa. St. 86. Evidence of good char- N. Y. 667, 668 ; Voght v. State, 145 
 
 acter has been sometimes confined in Ind. 12, 43 N. E. 1049; Berneker v. 
 
 its operation to those crimes the com- State, 40 Neb. 810; 59 N. W. 372; 
 
 mission of which involves some moral State v. Emery, 59 Vt. 84, 7 Atl. 129. 
 
 turpitude. It is then not relevant in And see i Crim. Law Mag. 33^-335- 
 
 mere statutory offenses not malmn in Contra, State v. Lee, 22 Minn. 407, 
 
 sc. Commonwealth v. Nagle, 157 410, 21 Am. 769; State v. Sterrett, 68 
 
 Mass. 554, 32 N. E. 861. Iowa 76, 78, 25 N. W. 936. 
 
 " State V. Emery, 59 Vt. 84. 90, 7 °'' Reg. v. Rowton, 10 Cox Cr. Cas. 
 
 Atl. 129; Murphy v. People, 9 Colo. 25,29.
 
 §§ 86, 86a CRIMINAL evidence. 152 
 
 Accordingly the opinion of a witness that a prisoner accused 
 of murder was a kind-hearted man,*"* or as to what his disposition 
 was when crossed or misused, "^^ or that his behavior was rude, 
 arbitrary and unreasonable,"^ is inadmissible. But the state has 
 been permitted to show^ that the accused charged with homicide 
 had been in active military service, and w^as thus probably dis- 
 posed to acts of bloodshed and to place a low- estimate on human 
 life.''' 
 
 § 86. Number of witnesses to character. — It is sometimes pro- 
 vided by statute that, under circumstances specifically described, 
 that the witnesses to reputation called by the accused in a crim- 
 inal trial shall not exceed a given number unless the party call- 
 ing them shall provide for the payment of the fees for the wit- 
 nesses in excess."* 
 
 Such statutes, it has been held, do not violate a constitutional 
 provision that the accused shall be entitled to compulsory process 
 to procure the attendance of his wntnesses."''^ 
 
 § 86a. Instructions as to the character of the accused. — The ac- 
 cused, it is said, is not entitled to an instruction that his character 
 is presumed to be good, unless he introduces evidence of char- 
 acter or unless the prosecution attacks it.*"'" While an express re- 
 fusal of a request by the accused that the court shall charge that 
 he is presumed to have a good character, unless the contrary is 
 shown, would not be error, it is customary for the court to charge 
 
 *" Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 2>7 Pa. ute, compel the attendance of ten wit- 
 
 St. 108. nesses to his character at public ex- 
 
 " Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218, pense. If he desires more he must 
 
 22^. pay their expenses. The limitation is 
 
 •^ People V. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. a reasonable one, and in no way de- 
 
 253, 50 N. E. 846, rev'g 20 App. Div. prives the accused of any constitu- 
 
 (N. Y.) 139, 46 N. Y. S. 1020. tional right. Commonwealth v. 
 
 *^ State V. Moelchen, 53 Iowa 310, 5 Thomas (Ky.), 104 S. W. 326, 31 Ky. 
 
 N. W. 186. L. 899- 
 
 "For an example of such a statute, ** Bodine v. State, 129 Ala. 106, 29 
 
 see 2 Bates Rev. Stat. (Ohio), § 7287. So. 926; Sanders v. People, 124 111. 
 
 ** State V. Stout, 49 Ohio St. 270, 30 218, 16 N. E. 81 ; People v. Brasch, 
 
 N. E. 437, 438. Their purpose is to 193 N. Y. 46, 85 N. E. 809; State v. 
 
 prevent the waste of time and money. Gartrell, 171 Mo. 489, 71 S. W. 1045. 
 The accused may, under such a stat-
 
 153 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED. § 86a 
 
 on the presumption of good character as a part of the law of the 
 case. In any event, it would be error for the court to single out 
 the failure of the accused to offer evidence of good character and 
 call attention to it as a part of its instruction.*^" 
 
 Any charge which directly or indirectly tells the jury that the 
 prosecution cannot in the first instance attack the character of the 
 accused would be error as from such a charge, the jury might 
 reasonably infer that the prosecution is compelled by the law to 
 keep silence as to evidence which it has in its possession which, 
 if permitted to be received, would prove the accused to be a 
 man of bad character.*'^ It is error to refuse to charge that the 
 character of the accused may be such as to lead the jury to be- 
 lieve that the evidence against him was false."'' Any instruction 
 which confines the effect of character evidence to a doubtful case, 
 is erroneous for the reason that the good character of the accused 
 must be considered without reference to the apparently conclusive 
 or inconclusive character of the other evidence.'^'' 
 
 *^ People V. Bodine, i Denio (N. "' People v. Childs, 90 App. Div. (N. 
 
 Y.) 281 ; State v. Sanders, 84 N. Car. Y.) 58, 85 N. Y. S. 627. 
 
 728. ''" State V. Birkey, 122 Iowa 102, 97 
 
 ^* People V. Marks, 90 Mich. 555, 51 N. W. 980. 
 X. W. 638; People V. Gleason, 122 
 Cal. 370, 55 Pac. 123.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. 
 
 § 87. General rule regarding evidence § 90. Relevant evidence not inadmis- 
 
 of crimes other than that sible because indirectly prov- 
 
 chargod in the indictment. ing or tending to prove an- 
 
 88. Connected or intermingled other crime — Dissimilar 
 
 crimes forming parts of one crimes united in motives, 
 
 whole. 91. Identity of means employed in 
 
 89. Evidence of other offenses to several crimes — Identity of 
 
 show specific intention or accused, 
 
 guilty knowledge. 92. Sexual crimes. 
 
 § 87. General rule regarding evidence of crimes other than that 
 charged in the indictment. — The rule which requires that ah evi- 
 dence which is introduced shall be relevant to the guilt or the in- 
 nocence of the accused is applied with considerable strictness in 
 criminal proceedings. The wisdom and justness of this, at least 
 from the defendant's stand-point, are self-evident. He can with 
 fairness be expected to come into court prepared to meet the ac- 
 cusations contained in the indictment only, and, on this account, 
 all the evidence offered by the prosecution should consist wholly 
 of facts which are within the range and scope of its allegations. 
 The large majority of persons of average intelligence are un- 
 trained in logical methods of thinking, and are therefore prone 
 to draw illogical and incorrect inferences, and conclusions with- 
 out adequate foundation. From such persons jurors are selected. 
 They will very naturally believe that a person is guilty of the 
 crime with which he is charged if it is proved to their satisfac- 
 tion that he has committed a similar offense, or any offense of 
 an equally heinous character. And it cannot be said with truth 
 that this tendency is wholly without reason or justification, as 
 every person can bear testimony from his or her experience, that 
 a man who will commit one crime is very likely subsequently to 
 commit another of the same description. 
 
 To guard against this evil, and at the same time to avoid the 
 
 (154)
 
 155 
 
 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. 
 
 8/ 
 
 delay which would be incident to an indefinite multiplication of 
 issues, the general rule (to which, however, some very important 
 exceptions may be noted) forbids the introduction of evidence 
 which will show, or tend to show, that the accused has committed 
 any crime wholly independent of that offense for which he is on 
 trial/ 
 
 ' People V. Corbin, 56 N. Y. 363, 15 
 Am. 427; People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 
 427, 14 N. E. 319, I Am. St. 851 ; Cole- 
 man V. People, 55 N. Y. 81 ; State v. 
 Shuford, 69 N. Car. 486, 493; State v. 
 Jeflfries, 117 X. Car. 727, 23 S. E. 163; 
 People V. Gibbs, 93 N. Y. 470; State 
 V. Murphy, 84 N. Car. 742; Snyder v. 
 Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 519, 521 ; 
 Mason v. State, 42 Ala. 532, 537 ; Co- 
 ble V. State, 31 Ohio St. 100, 102; 
 State V. Boyland, 24 Kan. 186, 187; 
 Clapp V. State, 94 Tenn. 186, 202, 203, 
 30 S. W. 214; People V. Fowler, 104 
 Mich. 449, 62 N. W. 572; People v. 
 Baird, 104 Cal. 462, 464, 38 Pac. 310; 
 People V. Bowen, 49 Cal. 654 ; State v. 
 Moberly, 121 Mo. 604, 610, 26 S. W. 
 364; Painter v. People, 147 111. 444, 
 447, 463, 35 N. E. 64 ; Garrison v. Peo- 
 ple, 87 111. 96; State V. Burk, 88 Iowa 
 661, 667, 56 X. W. 180; State V. Craw- 
 ford, 39 S. Car. 343, 17 S. E. 799; 
 Cotton V. State (Miss.), 17 So. 372; 
 State V. Bates, 46 La. Ann. 849, 851, 
 15 So. 204; Commonwealth v. Jack- 
 son, 132 Mass. 16-21, citing many 
 cases; Holder v. State, 58 Ark. 473, 
 25 S. W. 279; State V. Lapagc, 57 X. 
 H. 245, 24 Am. 69; Stone v. State, 4 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 27; People v. Stout, 
 4 Park. Crim. (X. Y.) 71, 127; People 
 V. Dowling, 84 X. Y. 478; State v. 
 Kelley, 65 Vt. 531, 27 Atl. 203, 36 Am. 
 St. 884 ; 'I'urner v. State, 102 Ind. 425, 
 427, I X. E. 869; People v. Thacker, 
 108 Mich. 652, 66 X. W. 562; Meyer 
 V. State, 59 X. J. L. 310, 36 .'\tl. 483; 
 State V. Reynolds, 5 Kan. App. 515, 47 
 
 Pac. 573; Ware v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 597, 38 S. W. 198; Tyrrell v. 
 State (Tex., 1897), 38 S. W. ion; 
 Rhea v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 138, 
 38 S. W. 1012; Shears v. State, 147 
 Ind. 51, 46 X"^. E. 331. Admissions 
 made b}^ accused before a crime, as to 
 the commission of other independent 
 crimes, to induce a third person to 
 take part in the crime are receivable. 
 State V. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 
 X. W. 63; McSwean v. State, 21 So. 
 211, 113 Ala. 661, not reported in full. 
 
 General rule as to evidence of 
 other crimes in criminal cases, note 62 
 L. R. A. 193 ; reason for general rule 
 excluding, 105 Am. St. 977. See also 
 Elliott Ev., § 2720. 
 
 See, also, sustaining the text : Gas- 
 senheimer v. United States, 26 App. 
 Dec. 432; State v. Right (X. Car.), 
 63 S. E. 1043 ; Vickers v. United 
 States (Okla.), 98 Pac. 467; Denham 
 v. State (Ga. App.), 63 S. E. 62; 
 Campbell v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 116 S. W. 581; Belt V. State, 47 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 82, 78 S. W. 933; Gard- 
 ner V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 117 S. 
 W. 140; State V. Williams, in La. 
 179, 35 So. 505 ; People v. Governale, 
 193 N. Y. 581, 86 X. E. 554; Clark v. 
 State (Ga. App.), 62 S. E. 663; Hin- 
 son v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 102, 
 100 S. W. 939; Majors v. People, 38 
 Colo. 437, 88 Pac. 636; Morse v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), in S. W. 
 714, 33 Ky. L. 831, 894; State v. 
 Shncklcy, 29 Utah 25, 80 Pac. 865; 
 Alford v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 621,
 
 87 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 156 
 
 To this general rule there are several distinct exceptions which 
 have been permitted from absolute necessity, to aid in the detec- 
 tion and punishment of crime. These exceptions ought to be 
 carefully limited and guarded by the courts and their number 
 should not be increased. But it must be admitted that the modern 
 tendency on the part of the courts is to be liberal in the admission 
 of evidence of collateral crimes. The exceptions to the general 
 rule arise either from the necessity of the case, as, for example, 
 where two or more crimes constituent parts of one transaction so 
 that to prove either necessitates proof of the other, or when the 
 intent is to be proved from circumstances or in the third place 
 where the identity of the accused is expressly in issue, that is to 
 say, where the evidence conclusively shows a crime was com- 
 mitted by some one but there is a sharp conflict as to the person 
 who committed it.^* 
 
 108 S. W. 364; Driver v. State, 48 
 Tex. Cr. App. 20, 85 S. W. 1056; 
 Lane v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 335, 
 92 S. W. 839 ; Curtis v. State, 52 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 606, 108 S. W. 380; Wesley 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1905), 85 S. 
 W. 802; Custer v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 144, 86 S. W. 757; Herndon v. 
 State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 552, 99 S. W. 
 558; State V. Roberts, 28 Xev. 350, 82 
 Pac. 100; People v. Weaver, 177 N. 
 Y. 434, 69 N. E. 1094; State v. An- 
 derson, 120 La. 331, 45 So. 267; Ray- 
 mond V. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 368, 
 96 S. W. 515, 29 Ky. L. 785; State 
 V. Berger, 121 Iowa 581, 96 N. W. 
 1094; Brom V. People, 216 III. 148, 74 
 N. E. 790; Posey v. United States, 
 26 App. D. C. 302; State v. Dulaney 
 (Ark. 1908), 112 S. W. 158; Pointer 
 V. State, 41 So. 929, 148 Ala. 676, not 
 reported in full; Dillard v. State, 152 
 Ala. 86, 44 So. 537; Louisville & N. 
 R. Co. V. Commonwealth, 117 Kj*. 
 345, 78 S. W. 167, 25 Ky. L. 1442; 
 Topolewski v. State, 130 Wis. 244, 
 T09 N. W. 1037, 118 Am. St. 1019, 7 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 756n; People v. 
 Hosier, 196 N. Y. 506, 89 X. E. 1107; 
 
 People v. Argentos (Cal. App. 1909), 
 106 Pac. 65. 
 
 'a To rebut special defenses: Proof 
 of other crimes to rebut special de- 
 fenses — note, 62 L. R. A. 299, 300. 
 
 Corroboration and relation of par- 
 ties: Proof of other offenses to cor- 
 roborate other testimony — note, 105 
 Am. St. 993 ; proof of other offenses 
 to show relation of the parties — note, 
 105 Am. St. 993. 
 
 As constituting pari of res gestcc: 
 Proof of other crimes as constitut- 
 ing part of res cjcstcr — note, 105 Am. 
 St. 984, 62 L. R. A. 308, 319; in 
 prosecution for arson, 62 L. R. A. 
 319; in prosecution of assault, 62 L. 
 R. A. 314; in prosecution for assault 
 with intent to murder, 62 L. R. A. 
 313; in prosecution for burglary, 62 
 L. R. A. 317; in prosecution for 
 forgery, 62 L. R. A. 319; in prosecu- 
 tion for larceny, 62 L. R. A. 315; in 
 prosecution for murder, 62 L. R. A. 
 308; in prosecution for rape, 62 L. 
 R. A. 314; in prosecution for receiv- 
 ing stolen property, 62 L. R. A. 317: 
 in prosecution for robbery, 62 L. R. 
 A. 318. 
 
 Miscellaneous instances of creep-
 
 157 
 
 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. 
 
 § 88. Connected or intermingled crimes forming parts of one whole. 
 
 — If several crimes are intermixed, or blended with one another, 
 or connected so that they form an indivisible criminal transaction, 
 and full proof by testimony, whether direct or circumstantial, of 
 any one of them cannot be given without showing the others, 
 evidence of any or all of them is admissible against a defendant 
 en trial for any offense which is itself a detail of the whole crim- 
 inal scheme." 
 
 tion to rule: When evidence as to other 
 crimes not prejudicial — note, 62 L. R. 
 A. 347; evidence of to prove defend- 
 ant's connection with act charged, 62 L. 
 R, A. 278, 105 Am. St. 978; to show 
 common scheme or system connecting 
 defendant with act charged, 62 L. R. 
 A. 291 ; to show the criminal charac- 
 ter of accused, 105 Am. St. 981, 988, 
 992 ; to show identity of accused, 105 
 Am. St. 984; to show that crime was 
 committed to conceal another, 105 
 Am. St. 990; evidence of other 
 crimes to characterize act, 105 Am. 
 St. 993; to affect credibility of wit- 
 nesses, 105 Am. St. 1005 ; remoteness 
 of time as affecting admissibility, 105 
 Am. St. 1005 ; insinuation by prose- 
 cution of other crimes — statement, 62 
 L. R. A. 348; cross-examination of 
 defendant concerning, 62 L. R. A. 
 345 ; instructing jury concerning, 62 
 L. R. A. 350-355- 
 
 1)1 prosecution for particular of- 
 fenses: Notes on evidence of other 
 crimes in prosecution for adultery, 105 
 Am. St. 1004; in prosecution for arson, 
 105 Am. St. 996, looi ; in prosecution 
 for counterfeiting, 105 Am. St. 995, 
 996; in prosecution for embezzlement, 
 105 Am. St. 996, lOOi ; in prosecution 
 for false pretenses, 25 Am. St. 387, 
 105 Am. St. 996, lOOi, 1003; in prose- 
 cution for fraud, 105 Am. St. 997, 
 looi ; in prosecution for gambling, El- 
 liott Ev., § 3004 ; in prosecution for 
 
 larceny, 62 L. R. A. 231, 281, 315, 322; 
 in prosecution for violation of liquor 
 law, 62 L. R. A. 230, 290, 325; in 
 prosecution for subornation of per- 
 jury, 105 Am. St. 983; in prosecution 
 for rape, 62 L. R. A. 314, 322, 105 
 Am. St. 1004; in prosecution for re- 
 ceiving stolen goods, 105 Am. St. 
 995 ; of crimes committed in resisting 
 arrest or in attempting to escape after 
 commission of crime charged, 62 L. 
 R. A. 368, 105 Am. St. 991 ; in prose- 
 cution for robbery, 62 L. R. A. 288, 
 318, 324; in prosecution for sexual 
 offenses, 62 L. R. A. 329, 338, 105 
 Am. St. 989, 993, 994, 1003; in prose- 
 cution for uttering forged checks, 105 
 Am. St. 995, 996. 
 
 " Rex v. Ellis, 6 B. & Cr. 145 ; Com- 
 monwealth V. Call, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 
 515, 522; Commonwealth v. Sturti- 
 vant, 117 Mass. 122, 132, 19 Am. 
 40in; State v. Valwell, 66 Vt. 558, 
 562, 29 Atl. 1018; People V. Bidleman, 
 104 Cal. 608, 38 Pac. 502; People v. 
 Dailey, 143 N. Y. 638, 37 N. E. 823, 
 aff'g 73 Hun (N. Y.) 16, 25 N. Y. S. 
 1050; Mixon V. State (Tex., 1895), 
 31 S. W. 408; Dawson v. State, 32 
 Tex. Cr. App. 535, 25 S. W. 21, 40 
 Am. 791 ; Wilkerson v. State, 31 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 86, 90, 19 S. W. 903; Davis 
 V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. App. 377, 23 S. 
 W. 794; Turner v. State, 102 Ind. 
 425, 427, I N. E. 869; Frazier v. 
 State, 135 Ind. 38, 41, 34 N. E. 817;
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 158 
 
 Accordingly, where two or more persons are assaulted at or 
 about the same time and place, it will be permitted to prove all 
 the assaults on the trial of one indicted for any one of them for 
 the reason that all the assaults are merely parts of one transac- 
 tion, and to prove one necessitates proof of all.^ So where the 
 accused was being tried for the forgery of money orders purport- 
 ing to be issued by an express company, it was held competent 
 to permit the state to prove that, a few days before the forged 
 orders were uttered by the accused, the office from which they 
 appeared to have been issued was robbed.* Under this exception 
 to the rule it is not material that the crimes are dissimilar if they 
 are all parts of one indivisible whole. 
 
 But no separate and isolated crime can be given in evidence 
 under this exception to the rule. In order that a collateral crime 
 may be relevant as evidence it must be connected with the crime 
 under investigation as part of a general and composite trans- 
 action.^ 
 
 Bottomley v. United States, i Story 
 (N. S.) 135, 3 Fed. Cas. 1688; State 
 V. Fohvell, 14 Kan. 105 ; Walters v. 
 People, 6 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 15, 22; 
 Reese v. State, 7 Ga. 373 ; Reg. v. 
 Bleasdale, 2 Carr. & K. 765; People 
 V. Haver, 4 N. Y. Cr. 171 ; Phillips 
 V. People, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 353, aff'd, 
 42 N. Y. 200; State v. Desroches, 48 
 La. Ann. 428, 19 So. 250; State v. 
 Williamson, 106 Mo. 162, 170, 17 S. 
 W. 172; People V. Pallister, 138 X. 
 Y. 601, 60s, 33 N. E. 741; Hickam v. 
 People, 137 111. 75, 27 N. E. 88, 89; 
 State V. Testerman, 68 Mo. 408, 415 ; 
 Killins V. State, 28 Fla. 313, 334, 9 
 So. 711 ; State v. Gainor, 84 Iowa 209, 
 50 N. W. 947; Pitner v. State, 37 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 268, 39 S. W. 662; People 
 V. Foley, 64 Mich. 148, 157, 31 N. W. 
 94; Heath v. Commonwealth, i Rob. 
 (Va.) 735, 743; Crews v. State, 34 
 Tex. Cr. 533, 3i S. W. 373; Brown 
 V. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. St. 319, 337; 
 Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 
 Mass. 571, 578, 16 N. E. 452; Morris 
 V. State, 30 Tex. App. 95. 16 S. W. 
 
 757; State V. Perry, 136 Mo. 126, 37 
 S. W. 804; State V. Deliso (X. J. 
 1908), 69 Atl. 218; People V. Smith 
 (Cal. App.), 99 Pac. iiii; Bennett v. 
 State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 52, 81 S. W. 
 30; Taylor v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 92 S. W. 292, 2C Ky. L. 1348; Gray 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1905), 86 S. 
 W. 764; State V. Shockley, 29 Utah 
 25, 80 Pac. 865; Ryan v. United 
 States, 26 App. D. C. 74; State v. 
 O'Connell (Iowa, 1909), 123 N. W. 
 201. 
 
 ^ Greenwell v. Commonwealth, 125 
 Ky. 192, 100 S. W. 852, 30 Ky. L. 
 1282. 
 
 * State V. Bell, 212 Mo. in, in S. 
 W. 24. 
 
 ° The theory upon which this evi- 
 dence is relevant is that the motive 
 prompting the commission of the sev- 
 eral crimes is the same, or that the 
 objects aimed at are identical. Thus, 
 for example, where it was alleged 
 that the accused had poisoned his 
 wife for the purpose of securing her 
 property, the state was permitted to
 
 159 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. § 88 
 
 To illustrate the exception, that the crime must be connected 
 either by identity of motive or by being a constituent part of the 
 res gcstcc we may cite a case where the bod}' of the deceased, a 
 woman, was found some distance from her residence. When the 
 person who discovered it came to the residence, he found her two 
 children mortally wounded, and discovered foot prints from the 
 house leading to the spot where the body of the woman had been 
 found. '^ On the other hand, if from remoteness in point of time, 
 or from distance in point of place, or by reason of intervening 
 circumstances of whatever nature, the court can see that there is 
 no necessary connection between the two crimes, evidence of the 
 independent and disconnected crime should be rejected. So, while 
 it may be allowed on a trial for burglary to prove that crimes were 
 committed by the accused on the night of the burglary, it will not 
 be allowed to prove burglaries or attempted burglaries within a 
 year prior thereto.' 
 
 The movements of the accused within a reasonable period prior 
 to the instant of the crime are always relevant to show that he was 
 making preparations to commit it. Hence, on a trial for homi- 
 cide, it is when necessary permissible to prove that the accused 
 killed another person during the time he was preparing for or 
 was in the act of committing the homicide for which he is on 
 trial.* And, generally, when several similar crim.es occur near 
 each other, either in time or in locality, as. for example, several 
 burglaries or incendiary fires upon the same night, or on different 
 nights but in the same building, it is relevant to show that the 
 accused, being present at one of them, was present at the others 
 if the crimes seem to be connected.^ 
 
 prove that a few days before he had *Horn v. State, 98 Ala. 23. 13 So. 
 
 administered poison to her mother 329 ; Renf roe v. State, 84 Ark. 16. 104 
 
 with the same end in view. Goersen S. W. 542; Morse v. Commonwealth 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. St. 388. (Ky.), in S. W. 714, 33 Ky. L. 831. 
 
 See also, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 894; Young v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 199 Mass. 55, 85 N. E. 188: Griggs v. T908, 113 S. W. 276; State v. Cavin. 
 
 United States, 85 C. C. A. 596, 158 199 Mo. 154, 97 S. W. 573; Campos 
 
 Fed. 572. V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 289, 97 S. 
 
 'State V. Adams, 138 N. Car. 688, W. too. See cases cited. §§ 321. 376. 
 
 50 S. E. 765. " "Where several felonies are con- 
 
 ' Commonwealth v. Parsons, 195 nected as parts of one scheme or plot. 
 
 Mass. 560, 81 N. E. 291. like the acts of a drama, and .-ill tend
 
 § 88 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. l6o 
 
 Evidence that a person charged with a crime was seen in the 
 vicinity where the crime was committed shortly after or before 
 the event is admissible, and if when seen he was engaged in the 
 commission of another crime, the evidence, otherwise admissible, 
 is not therefore to be disregarded.^'' 
 
 Usually some connection between the crimes must be shown to 
 have existed in fact and in the mind of the accused, uniting them 
 for the accomplishment of a purpose common to both, before 
 such evidence can be received. ^^ 
 
 Thus on a trial of the accused for a homicide it may be shown 
 that the accused shot and killed the owner of the premises he was 
 breaking into, though such proof shows or tends to show the ac- 
 cused W'as guilty of the crime of burglar}^ 
 
 The connection must appear from the evidence. Whether any 
 connection exists is a judicial question. If the court does not 
 clearly perceive it, the accused should be given the benefit of the 
 doubt and the evidence should be rejected. The minds of the 
 jurors must not be poisoned and prejudiced against the prisoner 
 by receiving evidence of this description unless the case clearly 
 comes under the exception.^ - 
 
 to a common end, then they maj- be and dangerous. The people might 
 
 given in evidence to show the process have shown the condition of things 
 
 of motive and design in the final where the property was found, but 
 
 crime. The several crimes are parts they could not prove another felony, 
 
 of a chain of cause and consequence, unless it was so strongly connected 
 
 so linked together as to be necessarily with the felony charged as to prove, 
 
 provable as several parts of the same or strongly tend to prove, that the 
 
 act or crime." The court in People v. man who committed the one was 
 
 Stout, 4 Park. _Cr. (N. Y.) 71, 127; guilty of the other." But when two 
 
 Mason v. State, 42 Ala. 532, 535, 539. persons in a stage coach were robbed 
 
 See Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, at the same time, it was held that on 
 
 432, 2 N. E. 808; People v. Cahill the trial of the accused for robbing 
 
 (Cal. App., 1909), 106 Pac. 115. one of them, it might be shown that 
 
 "State v. Johnson, iii La. 935, Z^ property belonging to the other was 
 
 So. 30. found on him. Rex v. Rooney, 7 C. 
 
 " In Hall v. People, 6 Park. Cr. (N. & P. 517. 
 Y.) 671, the defendant was charged "See remarks of Agnew, J., in 
 
 with stealing certain articles. It was Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. 
 
 held error to permit proof that other St. 60, 13 Am. 649, and Cf. People 
 
 articles stolen from another party v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 14 N. E. 319, 
 
 were found in his possession. The i Am. St. 851 ; Burge v. United States, 
 
 court said: "This testimony is loose 26 App. D. C. 524 (homicide).
 
 i6i 
 
 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. 
 
 89 
 
 It is immaterial (at least where the evidence of another crime 
 is pffered to show guilty intent or knowledge) that the other 
 crime was committed before or after the crime for which the 
 accused is on trial/^ 
 
 § 89. Evidence of other offenses to show specific intention or guilty 
 knowledge. — Another exception to the rule occurs when the inten- 
 tion present in an act is material. Thus, suppose the question is, 
 was a given act, either by the accused, or by some other person, 
 intentional or accidental? Here it is relevant to prove that the 
 person whose intention is in question had performed acts of a 
 precisely similar nature either before or after the act the in- 
 tention of which is in question. And if it be found that he has 
 performed many such acts, we have the best of grounds for draw- 
 ing the conclusion that the act, in the present instance, is inten- 
 tional and not accidental." So where the commission of an act 
 
 ^' People V. Shulman, 80 N. Y. 373 ; 
 State V. Williams, 76 Me. 480; Reg. 
 V. Cotton, 12 Cox Cr. Cas. 400; Biel- 
 schofsky v. People, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 
 40; State V. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202, 
 210, 24 Am. 124: Williams v. People, 
 166 111. 132, 46 X. E. 749; Penrice v. 
 State (Tex. Cr. App.), 105 S. W. 
 797; People V. Putnam, 90 App. Div. 
 (X. Y.) 125, 85 X. Y. S. 1056; State 
 V. Johnson, in La. 935, 36 So. 30; 
 Rex V. Wyatt, 73 L. J. K. B. 15, 52 
 Wkly. Rep. 285, 68 J. P. 31, 20 Cox 
 Cr. Cas. 462, 20 Times Law Rep. 68. 
 
 " People V. Seaman, 107 Mich. 348, 
 65 X^. W. 203, 61 Am. St. 326; Morse 
 V. Commonwealth (Kj-.), in S. W. 
 714, 33 Ky. L. 831, 894. Where upon 
 the trial of one for a homicide by 
 poisoning, the defendant admits the 
 death by poisoning, but alleges that 
 llie poison was accidentally taken or 
 administered, it is relevant to show 
 that other persons, as, for example, 
 relatives and friends with whom the 
 accused came in contact, had died, 
 II — Underhill Cki.m. Ev. 
 
 previous to the present crime by the 
 same poison. Reg. v. Cotton, 12 Cox 
 Cr. Cas. 400, I Green's Cr. Law 102, 
 104; Goersen v. Commonwealth, 99 
 Pa. St. 388; Zoldoske v. State, 82 
 Wis. 580, 597, 52 X. W. 778. 
 
 To shoiv intent: Proof of other 
 offenses admissible where it tends to 
 show intent, — notes, 105 Am. St. 
 978, 981, 991, 992, 994, looi, 62 L. R. 
 T. 214-274; to show fraudulent in- 
 tent, 105 Am. St. 983; to show felo- 
 nious intent, 105 Am. St. 991 ; to 
 show innocence of intent, 105 Am. 
 St. 995; to show guilty intent, 105 
 Am. St. 991, 996; to rebut inference 
 of innocent intent, 105 Am. St. 091, 
 997 : where the act is criminal regard- 
 less of intent, 105 Am. St. 998; where 
 defendant admits criminal intent, 105 
 Am. St. 998; to show intent where it 
 may be otherwise shown, 105 Am. St. 
 999 ; to show common scheme, plan or 
 system indicating intent, 105 Am. St. 
 TOGO, 62 L. R. A. 2t8: to show intent 
 where there is other evidence or pre-
 
 § 89 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 162 
 
 alleged to be a crime is admitted by the accused but he denies 
 that he intended to commit it or alleges that he did it without 
 guilty knowledge his doing similar acts, wholly independent and 
 unconnected with that under investigation is relevant to show 
 intention. 
 
 Evidence of similar and independent crimes (but never of those 
 which are dissimilar) is often relevant to show the presence of 
 some specific intent. Thus, evidence of forgeries by the accused 
 has been received to prove the intent to defraud, which is essen- 
 tial in forgery ;^^ and of arson or of attempts at arson to prove 
 that a burning was not the result of accident. 
 
 sumption of intent, 62 L. R. A. 215; 
 to show intent where intent is imma- 
 terial, 62 L. R. A. 218; in prosecution 
 for fraud or false pretenses, 62 L. R. 
 A. 222; in prosecution for counter- 
 feiting, 62 L. R. A. 229; in prosecu- 
 tion for embezzlement, 62 L. R. A. 
 226; in prosecution for forgery, 62 L. 
 R. A. 224. 
 
 " Langford v. State, 33 Fla. 233, 14 
 So. 815; People V. Sanders, 114 Cal. 
 216, 46 Pac. 153; Anson v. People, 148 
 111. 494, 506, 135 N. E. 145 ; People v. 
 Bidleman, 104 Cal. 608, 615, 38 Pac. 
 502; State V. Valwell, 66 Vt. 558, 562, 
 29 Atl. 1018; State V. Smalley, 50 Vt. 
 736, 750 ; Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 
 119 Mass. 354, 355; Commonwealth 
 V. Bradford, 126 Mass. 42, 45; Cole- 
 man V. People, 55 X. Y. 81, 91 ; Staf- 
 ford V. State, 55 Ga. 591, 592; Pearce 
 V. State, 40 Ala. 720 : State v. Xeagle, 
 65 Me. 468, 469; State v. Ransell, 41 
 Conn. 433, 441; State v. Plunkett, 64 
 Me. 534, 538; People v. Everhardt, 
 104 N. Y. 591, II N. E. 62; Bishop v. 
 State, 55 Md. 138: State v. Saunders, 
 68 Iowa 370, 27 X. W. 455: Lindsey 
 V. State, 38 Ohio St. 507; IVIeister v. 
 People, 31 Mich. 99; People v. Hens- 
 sler, 48 Mich. 49, 1 1 X. W. 804 ; State 
 V. Habib, 18 R. I. 558, 30 Atl. 462; 
 
 State V. Crawford, 39 S. Car. 343. 17 
 S. E. 799; Devoto V. Commonwealth, 
 3 Mete. (Ky.) 417, 419; People v. 
 Rando, 3 Park Cr. (X. Y.) 335, 336; 
 Shriedley v. State, 23 Ohio St. 130, 
 142; Yarborough v. State, 41 Ala. 
 405, 2 Russell on Cr. 251 ; Rex v. 
 Dunn, I Moody C. C. 146; McGlas- 
 son V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 620, 
 40 S. W. 503, 66 Am. St. 842. "In all 
 cases where the guilt of the party 
 depends upon the intent, purpose, or 
 design with which the act is done, or 
 upon his guilty knowledge, I under- 
 stand it to be the general rule that 
 collateral facts may be examined into 
 for the purpose of establishing such 
 guilty intent, design, purpose, or 
 knowledge." Bottomley v. United 
 States, I Story (X. S.) 135, 143, 3 
 Fed. Cas. 1688. See, also, as sustaining 
 text : State v. Register, 133 X. Car. 
 746, 46 S. E. 21 ; State v. Talley, 
 77 S. Car. 99, 57 S. E. 618; 122 
 Am. St. 559; Wyatt v. State (Tex. 
 Cr. App."), 114 S. W. 812; Ander- 
 son V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 117 
 S. W. 364; Jeffries v. United States, 
 7 Tnd. Ter. 47, 103 S. W. 761 ; State 
 V. Lowe, 6 Kan. App. no, 50 Pac. 
 912: Chamberlin v. State, 80 Xeb. 812, 
 115 X. W. 555 ; Sweatt v. State, 153
 
 1 63 
 
 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. 
 
 90 
 
 So, when it is material to show that a given act was done with 
 a fraudulent intention, as, for example, in a prosecution for oh- 
 taining goods by false pretenses. Other disconnected false pre- 
 tenses in which the presence of fraud is recognized may be proved 
 solely to show the intent/*' To illustrate where the accused 
 had used a fraudulent abstract of title to induce one to sell him 
 goods in exchange for real estate it may be shown that the accused 
 had on the same day employed the same means to induce another 
 person to sell him goods/^ 
 
 § 90. Relevant evidence not inadmissible because indirectly prov- 
 ing or tending to prove another crime — Dissimilar crimes united in 
 motives. — .\11 evidence is relevant which throws, or tends to throw, 
 any light upon the guilt or the innocence of the prisoner. And 
 relevant evidence which is introduced to prove any material fact 
 ought not to be rejected merely because it proves, or tends to 
 prove, that at some other time or at the same time the accused 
 has been guilty of some other separate, independent and dis- 
 similar crime. The general rule is well settled that all evidence 
 
 Ala. 70, 45 So. 588; Mitchell v. State, 
 140 Ala. 118, Z7 So. y^, 103 Am. St. 
 i7n; Ryan v. United States, 26 App. 
 D. C. 74 ; Warford v. People, 43 Colo. 
 107, 96 Pac. 556; Raymond v. Com- 
 monwealth, 123 Ky. 368, 96 S. W. 
 515, 29 Ky. L. 785; Carnes v. State, 
 51 Tex. Cr. App. 437, 103 S. W. 403 ; 
 Weather ford v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 430, 103 S. W. 62,2,', Common- 
 wealth V. McDermott, 27 Pa- Super. 
 Ct. I ; People V. Neff, 191 N. Y. 210, 
 83 X. E. 970; Woodward v. State, 84 
 Ark. 119, 104 S. W. 1 109. 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 10 
 Gray (Mass.) 173; Commonwealth v. 
 Eastman, i Cush. (Mass.) 189, 217, 
 48 Am. Dec. 596; Thomas v. State, 
 103 Tnd. 419, 432, 2 N. E. 808 : People 
 V. Schooley, 89 Hun (N. Y.) 391, 35 
 X. Y. S. 429. See, also, §§89, 423, 
 4,18. "A man may have one forged 
 or counterfeit note in his possession 
 
 and yet, with reason, be assumed to 
 be ignorant of its true character. But 
 if he has been proved to have had 
 many such false instruments in his 
 hands at various times ; and particu- 
 larly, if it appears that he knew that 
 they were suspected of being forged, 
 he can not complain if the inference 
 is drawn that he was aware of their 
 character." It is reversible error for 
 the court to fail to instruct the jury 
 that evidence of other crimes should 
 only be considered upon the question 
 of the intent. Martin v. State, 36 
 Tex. Cr. App. 125, 35 S. W. 976; 
 Thornlcy v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 35 S. W. 981. See, also. People 
 V. Hagenow, 236 Til. 514, 86 N. E. 
 370: Vasser v. State, 75 .Ark. 27?)^ ^7 
 S. W. 635 ; Gasscnheimcr v. United 
 States, 26 App. D. C. 432. 
 
 "State V. Roberts, 201 Mo. 702, 
 100 S. W. 484; Walsh v. United 
 States, 174 Fed. 615.
 
 90 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 164 
 
 must lie relevant. If evidence is relevant upon the general issue 
 of guilt, or innocence, no valid reason exists for its rejection 
 merely because it may prove, or may tend to prove, that the ac- 
 cused committed some other crime, or may establish some col- 
 lateral and unrelated fact.^'* 
 
 Thus, the fact that the evidence introduced to prove the motive 
 of the crime for which the accused is on trial points him out as 
 
 '^ Moore v. United States, 150 U. S. 
 57, 37 L. ed. 996, 14 Sup. Ct. 26; Com- 
 monwealth V. Call, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 
 515, 522; Commonwealth v. Choate, 
 105 Mass. 451, 458; State v. Fonte- 
 not, 48 La. Ann. 305, 19 So. 1 1 1 ; 
 Mason v. State, 42 Ala. 532, 537, 539 ; 
 Reg. V. Lewis, 6 C. & P. i6r, 163; 
 Reg. V. Crickmer, 16 Cox Cr. Cas. 
 701 ; People v. Stout, 4 Park. Cr. ( N. 
 Y.) 71, 114; Painter v. People, 147 
 111. 444, 447, 463, 35 N. E. 64; State 
 V. Walton, 114 N. Car. 783, 18 S. E. 
 945; Ray V. State, 4 Ga. App. 67, 60 
 S. E. 816; Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 
 70s, 45 S. E. 630, 98 Am. St. i4Sn; 
 State V. Dulaney (Ark., 1908), 112 S. 
 W. 158; People V. Hagenow, 236 111. 
 514, 86 N. E. 370; Commonwealth v. 
 Levinson, 34 Pa. Super. Ct. 286; 
 State V. Spaugh, 200 Mo. 571, 98 S. 
 W. 55; People V. Dudenhausen, App. 
 Div. (N. Y.), 115 N. Y. S. 374; 
 Thompson v. United States, 75 C. C. 
 A. 172, T44 Fed. 14; State v. Frank- 
 lin, 69 Kan. 798, ^^ Pac. 588; State 
 V. Bailey, 190 Mo. 257, 88 S. W. ^zy, 
 People V. Zimmerman, 3 Cal. App. 84, 
 84 Pac. 446. In the case of Walker v. 
 Commonwealth, i Leigh (Va.), on p. 
 574, the court says : It frequently 
 happens that as the evidence of cir- 
 cumstances must be resorted to, for 
 the purpose of proving the commis- 
 sion of the particular offense charged, 
 the proof of these circumstances in- 
 volves the proof of other acts, which 
 may be criminal, or may be apparently 
 
 innocent. In such cases it is proper 
 that the chain of events should be 
 luibroken. If one or more links of 
 this chain consist of circumstances, 
 which tend to prove the prisoner has 
 been guilty of other crimes than that 
 charged, this is no reason why the 
 court should exclude these circum- 
 stances. They are so entirely con- 
 nected and blended with the main 
 fact that they can not be departed 
 from with propriety, and there is 
 no reason why the criminality of 
 such intimate and connected circum- 
 stances should exclude them more 
 than other facts apparently innocent." 
 Relevancy and materiality of evi- 
 dence of other crimes — notes, 62 L. R. 
 A. 320, 325, 326, 105 Am. St. 980, 
 981 ; admissibility merely to prove de- 
 fendant's propensity to commit crime, 
 IDS Am. St. 981, 988, 992; reasons for 
 admitting evidence of other crimes, 
 
 105 Am. St. 979, 980; test of admissi- 
 bility, 105 Am. St. 980; purpose for 
 which admissible, 105 Am. St. 579; 
 exceptions to rule excluding, 105 Am. 
 St. 973; admissibility of evidence of 
 similar offenses, 105 Am. St. 979; ev- 
 idence of other offenses where they 
 constitute a scries of crimes, 105 Am. 
 St. 983 : evidence where the other 
 offenses are an essential ingredient 
 of the crime charged, 105 Am. St. 
 982; State v. Hansford, 81 Kan. 300, 
 
 106 Pac. 738; Hall V. State (Ga. App., 
 1909), 66 S. E. 390; Parrish v. Com- 
 onwealth (Ky., 1909), 123 S. W. 339.
 
 165 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. § 90 
 
 guilty of an independent and totally dissimilar offense is not 
 enough to bring about its rejection, if it is otherwise competent/'* 
 
 Thus, to illustrate where it was necessary for the prosecution 
 
 ' to show the absence of the accused from the state to avoid the 
 
 statute of limitation it was admissible to prove that the accused 
 
 has spent several years in a penitentiary in another state, though 
 
 this evidence tends to show accused had committed a felony.-" 
 
 Under this exception to the general rule, where facts and cir- 
 cumstances amount to proof of another crime than that which is 
 charged, and it appears probable that the crime charged grew out 
 of the other crime, or was in some way caused by it. the facts and 
 circumstances of the other crime may be proved to show the mo- 
 tive of the accused."^ 
 
 This exception is of value in a homicide where the accused has 
 taken the life of two or more persons at or about the same time 
 aaid place and he is indicted and on trial for the killing of only 
 one of them. So that accused had killed three persons at one 
 time and place in an attempt to commit a burglary may, of neces- 
 sity, be proved on his trial for the murder of any one of them.^^ 
 So evidence of facts leading up to the homicide participated in by 
 the accused is always relevant to show his intent, though the 
 evidence may reveal another crime committed by him.-" It may 
 be shown that in the affray in which the deceased was killed the 
 accused shot him once before he inflicted the death wound. -^* 
 So, in most cases where the intent is in question, prior crimes of 
 the same nature, if not too remote in time, are receivable in evi- 
 dence, though the court can see that there is no connection be- 
 tween them.-'' 
 
 " Brown v. State, 26 Ohio St. 176, ■" State v. !Moran, 131 Iowa 645, log 
 
 181 ; People v. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423, X. W. 187. 
 
 ^3 X. E. 65 ; Farris v. People, 129 "* Commonwealth v. Ferrigan, 44 
 
 111. 521, 21 X. E. 821, 16 Am. St. 283, Pa. St. 386, 387. 
 
 4 L. R. A. 582; State v. Madigan, 57 "People v. Rogers, 192 X. Y. 331, 
 
 Minn. 425, 59 X. W. 490, 492; State 85 X. E. 135: holding also that this 
 
 V. Sargood, 80 Vt. 412, 68 Atl. 51 ; evidence might be received to corrob- 
 
 State V. Gillispie, 63 W. Va. 152, 59 orate a confession by the accused. 
 
 S. E. 957; Sanderson v. State, 169 "'^ Clark v. State, 79 Xeb. 473, 113 
 
 Tnd. 301, 82 X. E. 525; State v. Dick- X. W. 221. 
 
 crson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 X. E. 869, "''■1 People v. Jeina, 125 .\pp. Div. 
 
 122 Am. St. 479: Cortez v. State, 47 fX. Y.) 697, no X. Y. S. H3. 
 
 Tex. Cr. App. 10, 83 S. W. 812. "' VVithaup v. United States, 127
 
 90 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 
 
 1 66 
 
 Thus, it may be shown that the victim of a homicide, for which 
 the defendant is on trial, was a pohce officer, or other person 
 who. when he was killed, was engaged in investigating the circum- 
 stances of another prior and independent crime of which the 
 accused was suspected. -^ 
 
 Thus, where the accused kills an officer who attempts to arrest 
 him witliout a warrant, proof that the accused had committed a 
 felony is competent, as that is necessary to justify an arrest with- 
 out a warrant.-*' 
 
 And, generally, if one crime may have been perpetrated for 
 the purpose of aiding in the commission or concealment of an- 
 
 Fed. 530, 62 C. C. A. 328; Toll v. 
 State, 40 Fla. 169, 23 So. 942. 
 
 To shoiv motive: Proof of other 
 crimes to show motive — notes, 62 L. 
 R. A. 199, 208, 105 Am. St. 984, 986, 
 987; to show single motive for sev- 
 eral crimes, 105 Am. St. 990; to show 
 motive — common plan or system, 62 
 L. R. A. 199; in prosecution for mur- 
 der, 62 L. R. A. 200 ; in prosecution 
 for assault with intent to murder, 62 
 L. R. A. 207; in prosecution for ar- 
 son, 62 L. R. A. 208; in concealment, 
 resisting arrest or escape, 62 L. R. A. 
 211. 
 
 To show malice: Evidence of other 
 crimes to show malice, 62 L. R. A. 
 277, IDS Am. St. 989. 
 
 -^ Moore v. United States, 150 U. S. 
 57, 61, Z7 L- ed. 996, 14 Sup. Ct. 26; 
 Dunn V. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. 
 Dec. 54: State v. Honore, 121 La. 
 573, 46 So. 655 (killing of police offi- 
 cer) ; Cortez v. State. 47 Tex. Cr. 
 App. ID, 83 S. W. 812; People v. 
 Morse, 196 N. Y. 306, 89 N. E. 816. 
 
 ^ In such a condition of affairs, the 
 court properly charged that the proof 
 of the commission of a felony was 
 necessary to justify such arrest, that 
 the testimony was inadmissible, of it- 
 self, and its only purpose was to show 
 
 the cause of the attempted arrest. 
 State v. Honore, 121 La. 573, 46 So. 
 655. In a recent case in the state of 
 New York, where the accused, having 
 shot a man during a quarrel and fled, 
 was subsequently found by two offi- 
 cers in a building about five hundred 
 feet awa3% where he shot the two 
 officers who were not in uniform and 
 killed one of them, the court made a 
 distinction between receiving evidence 
 of the prior shooting for the purpose 
 of showing the occasion for the flight 
 of the accused and the purpose of the 
 officers pursuing him ; and receiving 
 the same evidence as direct proof 
 that the accused shot the officers or 
 that the killing of the officer was a 
 part of the commission of a felony. 
 The evidence of the prior crime was 
 received because it might show the 
 lawful character and purpose of the 
 pursuit by the officers as the right of 
 the accused, whose plea was self-de- 
 fense, to defend himself would not 
 applj' if he were being lawfully pur- 
 sued by policemen after committing 
 a felony. The court ruled out this 
 evidence for every other purpose, 
 holding that the first shooting was an 
 independent crime. People v. Gov- 
 ernale, 193 X. Y. 581, 86 N. E. 554.
 
 167 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. § 9O 
 
 Other, or to aid the escape of the accused,-' the incidental crime 
 may be shown as furnishing a motive for the commission of the 
 crime for which the accused has been indicted."^ Hence, adultery 
 committed by the accused with a woman may be proved upon his 
 trial for the killing of the woman's husband. For it is obvious 
 that an illicit intercourse, of which the adultery was a part, proved 
 to exist between the prisoner and the wife of his victim, would 
 be a strong circumstance for the jury to consider in determining 
 the existence of a motive prompting the accused to desire the 
 removal of the husband in order that he might obtain possession 
 of the woman.-" 
 
 The two crimes, though dissimilar, are so far unified in motive 
 that they are really parts of a single transaction. They were both 
 designed to bring about a single result. The adultery which may 
 be called the subsidiary crime is not relevant, because any infer- 
 ence that the defendant killed the husband can be drawn justly 
 or universally from the fact that he debauched the wife. It is 
 received solely to show that the defendant, having committed 
 adultery with the wife, was thereafter possessed of a motive, 
 which iiiigJif. under the circumstances, prompt him to the greater 
 crime, that he might remove the person who stood in the way of 
 the complete enjoyment of his illicit passion.'"' 
 
 "'If the circumstances tend to show Cr. App. 312, 315, 20 S. W. 579; Peo- 
 that accused has committed an inde- pie v. Stout, 4 Park. Cr. 71, 115; Rex 
 pendent, dissimilar crime to enable v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221 ; Alsobrook 
 him to commit or conceal the offense v. State, 126 Ga. 100, 54 S. E. 805 ; 
 charged, evidence of the independent State v. Lewis, 181 Mo. 235, 79 S. W. 
 crime is admissible, when the intent 671 ; Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395, 
 to commit or conceal the independent 46 S. E. 897; Welch v. Common- 
 offense was the motive of the offense wealth (Ky.), 108 S. W. 863, 33 Ky. 
 charged. Morse v. Commonwealth L. 51. 
 
 (Ky.). Ill S. W. 714, 33 Ky. L. 831, -'People v. Stout, 4 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 894. Y.) 71, 115. T32: State V. Rash, 12 
 
 "* Willi ngham v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. Tred. (N. Car.) 382. 384; Pierson v. 
 
 App. 98. 25 S. W. 424 ; Dunn v. People, 79 N. Y. 424, 435. 436. 35 .Vm. 
 
 State. 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dec. 54; 524; Templeton v. People, 27 Mich. 
 
 State V. Pancoast (N. Dak., 1896), 67 501; Commonwealth v. Ferrigan, 44 
 
 N. W. 1052; State v. Seymour, 94 Pa. St. 386, 387; State v. Watkins. 9 
 
 Towa 699, 63 N. W. 661 ; Painter v. Conn. 47, 53 ; Van Gesncr v. United 
 
 People, 147 111. 444, 447, 463, 35 X. E. States, 153 Fed. 46, 82 C. C. .\. t8o. 
 
 64; People V. Harris, 136 N. Y. 423, '"In Gocrsen v. Commonwealth, 99 
 
 33 N- E. 65; Crass v. State, 31 Tex. Pa. St. 388, the court said: "Under
 
 § 91 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. l68 
 
 i^ 91. Identity of means employed in several crimes — Identity of 
 accused. — Where a crime has been committed by some peculiar, 
 extraordinary and novel means or implement or apparatus or in 
 a peculiar or extraordinary manner, evidence of a similar crime 
 committed by the accused, by the same means, or in the same 
 manner, has been received to prove the identity of the accused as 
 an inference from the similarity of method."^ Thus, where the 
 accused is charged with arson in setting fire to a building by 
 means of a box or other apparatus contrived solely for incendiary 
 purposes, it may be shown that* he had employed a similar device 
 elsewhere, with the same object in view."' 
 
 Often it may be permitted to prove a collateral offense or crime 
 as part of the evidence which is introduced to identify the ac- 
 cused.^" Take, for example, the case of one who is on trial for 
 a crime which is alleged to have been committed by him under an 
 assumed name ; and he claims that the crime was committed by 
 another person. Under such circumstances, it is proper to permit 
 the state to prove any fact which will tend to identify the accused, 
 one of which would be, that he has committed similar offenses 
 under the same assumed name. So on an indictment under an 
 assumed name for embezzlement it may properly be shown that 
 the accused embezzled other sums of money under the same name. 
 The jury should be instructed, however, that evidence of other 
 crimes offered to identify the accused should be considered by 
 the jury only for the purpose of establishing the identity of the 
 accused.'* 
 
 some circumstances evidence of an- '^ I\Iorse v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 other offense may be given. It may iii S. W. 714, 33 Ky. L. 831, 894. 
 
 be done to establish identity, to show ^' Commonwealth v. Choate, 105 
 
 the act charged was intentional and Mass. 451, 457; Rex v. Fursey, 6 Car. 
 
 willful, not accidental; to show guilty & Payne 81. 
 
 knowledge and purpose and to rebut ^" Rose. Cr. Ev. 90 : Rex v. Rooney, 
 any inference of mistake; in death by 7 C. & P. 517, 518; United States v. 
 poison to show defendant knew the Boyd, 45 Fed. 851 ; Osborne v. Peo- 
 substance administered to be poison; pie, 2 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 583; Un- 
 to show him to be one of an organi- treinor v. State, 146 Ala. 133, 41 So. 
 zation banded together to commit 170; State v. Bates, 182 Mo. 70, 81 S. 
 similar crimes and to connect the W. 408. 
 
 other offense with the one charged as ^^ Morse v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 part of the same transaction." in S. W. 714, 33 Ky. L. 831, 894.
 
 169 PROOF OF OTHER CRIMES. § 92 
 
 So where the accused is on trial for arson, it may be shown 
 that goods, which were stored in the burned building, were found 
 in his possession, though this evidence tends to prove him guilty 
 of the larceny of the goods. And evidence that tracks found in 
 the vicinity of each of two houses, which had been broken into, 
 corresponded with the foot-wear of the accused is admissible as 
 tending to prove his whereabouts on the night in cjuestion."'' 
 
 § 92. Sexual crimes. — Crimes involving illicit sexual intercourse 
 either in incest, adultery or rape constitute another exception to 
 the general rule. Thus, under an indictment for adultery or incest 
 evidence of the commission of similar crimes by the same parties 
 prior, but not subsequent, to the offense alleged is received for the 
 purpose of showing inclination.^® 
 
 In all such cases the mutual relations and the disposition of 
 the parties towards one another are relevant upon the question, 
 did they have illicit intercourse? And, it is a very fair inference 
 that the accused was guilty of the crime alleged, if it affirmatively 
 appears that he had committed acts of adultery or incest with 
 the same person on prior occasions.^^ 
 
 Trazier v. State, 135 Ind. 38, 41, pie v. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305, 319; Mc- 
 
 34 N. E. 817. Leod v. State, 35 Ala. 395, 398; Law- 
 Proof of other crimes to show son v. State, 20 Ala. 65, 56 Am. Dec. 
 
 identity of accused, 105 Am. St. 984. 182; Proper v. State, 85 Wis. 615, 55 
 
 "* Callison v. State, zi Tex. Cr. App. N. W. 1035 ; State v. Markins, 95 Ind. 
 
 211, 39 S. W. 300; Commonwealth v. 464, 48 Am. '/2>'i', Lefforge v. State, 
 
 Bell, 166 Pa. St. 405, 411, 31 Atl. 123; 129 Ind. 551, 29 N. E. 34; Lovell v. 
 
 People V. Patterson, 102 Cal. 239, 244, State, 12 Ind. 18. Evidence of illicit 
 
 36 Pac. 436; State v. Bridgman, 49 intercourse indulged in by the same 
 
 Vt. 202, 24 Am. 124; State v. Marvin, parties subsequently to the date upon 
 
 35 N. H. 22, 28, 29; State v. Wallace, which the adultery is laid was admit- 
 9 N. H. 515, 517, 518; Common- ted in State v. Williams, 76 Me. 480. 
 wealth V. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285, 288, But the weight of the cases would 
 19 Am. 346n ; Commonwealth v. seem to exclude subsequent adulter- 
 Bowers, 121 Mass. 45, 46; State v. ous acts. State v. Xeubauer (Iowa, 
 Williams, 76 Me. 480; State v. Pippin, 1909). 124 X. W. 312. 
 
 88 N. Car. 646, 647; State v. Kemp, "See § 381. 
 
 87 N. Car. 538, 540; People v. Skutt, Proof of other offenses in prosecu- 
 96 Mich. 449, 450, 56 N. W. II ; Peo- tions for sexual crimes, 62 L. R. A. 
 
 329, 338.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE A PART OF THE RES GESTAE. 
 
 § 93. Scope and limit of facts and § 97. Interval for consideration or 
 
 declarations forming a part taking advice, 
 
 of the res gcstce. 98. Mental and physical condi- 
 
 94. Necessity for approximation of tions as influencing the dec- 
 
 unity in time, place and mo- larations. 
 
 tive prompting the declara- 99. Admissibility for the accused. 
 
 tions. 100. Declarations uttered prior to 
 
 95. Declarations must explain and the crime. 
 
 illustrate the main transac- loi. Declarations by bystanders and 
 tion. other third persons. 
 
 96. Contemporaneous character of 
 
 the declarations. 
 
 § 93. The scope and limit of facts and declarations forming the res 
 gestae. — T!ie expression, res gcstcv, as applied to a crime, means 
 the complete criminal transaction from its beginning or starting- 
 point in the act of the accused until the end is reached. What in 
 any case constitutes the res gestcc of a crime depends wholly on 
 th.e character of the crime and the circumstances of the case.^ 
 The rule of the res gestcc under which it is said that all facts 
 ■which are a part of the res gestcc are admissible, is a rule de- 
 termining the relevancy and not the character or probative force 
 of the evidence. If the court determines that the fact offered is 
 a part of the res gestcc, it will be accepted because as it is said 
 that fact is then relevant. Relevancy is always a judicial question 
 to be determined according to the issue which is to be tried. 
 Taking the main facts which are embraced in the commission of 
 any crime and which are essential to be proved, it will be found, 
 in most instances, that they are connected with others which are 
 not essential to be proved, but which tend more or less to prove 
 those facts which are to be proved. Every occurrence which is 
 the result of human agency is more or less implicated and involved 
 
 'State V. Foley, 113 La. 52, 36 So. 885. 104 Am. St. 493. 
 
 (170)
 
 I/I DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE PART OF THE RES GEST-'E. § 93 
 
 with Other occurrences. One event is the cause or the result of 
 another or two or more events or incidents may be collaterally 
 connected or related. Circumstances constituting a criminal trans- 
 action which is being investigated by the jury, and which are so 
 interwoven with others, and with the principal facts which are 
 at issue that they cannot be very well separated from the principal 
 facts at issue without depriving the jury of proof which is neces- 
 sary for them to have in order to reach a direct conclusion on the 
 evidence, may be regarded as res gestcu.~ 
 
 And it is a rule that evidence of connected, precedent, or sur- 
 rounding circumstances is proper to show the probability that the 
 principal fact has happened in all cases where it may naturally be 
 assumed that a connection exists between the main fact and the 
 subordinate fact." 
 
 Some crimes like homicide and rape consist of a single and 
 complete and continuous transaction circumscribed in its incidents 
 both as to time and place. For example, in homicide, the circum- 
 stances and details of what occurred at the very instant of the 
 homicide are usually the res gestcu of the homicide.^ Thus as a 
 
 - Sprinkle v. United States, 14T Fed. So. 992 ; State v. Cavin, 199 Mo. 154, 
 
 811, 73 C. C. A. 285. 97 S. W. 573; Menefee v. State, 50 
 
 ^Powers V. People, 42 111. App. 427, Tex. Cr. App. 249, 97 S. W. 486; 
 
 431; State V. Ryder, 80 Vt. 422. 68 Lyles v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 119, 
 
 Atl. 652. Res gestcB includes those 86 S. W. 762,. 
 
 circumstances which are the under- In particular offenses: Proof of res 
 
 signed incidents of a particular liti- gestce in particular offenses : In 
 
 gated act. They may be separated by prosecution for homicide, Elliott Ev., 
 
 the act from a lapse of time more or § 3029; in prosecution for rape — 
 
 less appreciable, and may consist of note, 19 L. R. A. 744; Elliott Ev., 
 
 speeches of any one concerned, wheth- § 3098 ; in prosecution for robbery, 
 
 er participant or bystander. They Elliott Ev., § 3134; in prosecution for 
 
 may comprise things left undone as seduction, Elliott Ev., § 3149; in 
 
 well as things done; their sole dis- prosecution for treason, Elliott Ev., 
 
 tinguishing feature being that they § 3160. 
 
 should be necessary incidents of the Other offenses part of res gestce: 
 
 litigated act in the sense that they are When other crime is part of res ges- 
 
 part of the immediate preparations tee — note, 62 L. R. A. 308, 319, 105 
 
 for or emanations of such act, and Am. St. 984; in prosecution for ar- 
 
 are not produced by the calculated son, 62 L. R. A. 319; in prosecution 
 
 policy of the actors. State v. Kane for assault, 62 L. R. A. 314; in prose- 
 
 (^- J.), 72 Atl. 39. cution for assault with intent to mur- 
 
 ' Williams v. State, 147 Ala. 10, 41 der, 62 L. R. A. 313; in prosecution
 
 § 93 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 1 72 
 
 part of the res gcstcc of the homicide, it is usually competent to 
 show that the accused, in killing the person for whose death he 
 is on trial, in the same transaction killed another person. But the 
 tendency is to extend the scope of the criminal transaction to 
 incidents occurring immediately before and after it. Accordingly, 
 it is permitted to show what the accused did immediately after 
 committing the crime.^ And also in homicide what took place 
 immediately before the shooting to show the intent.'' So, for 
 example, it may be shown that the accused had prepared to com- 
 mit the homicide or that he had threatened to kill the deceased, 
 or that he was seen in the company of the deceased before the 
 homicide. It has been held proper to admit, as part of the res 
 gestcc of the homicide, proof that prior to the homicide, the de- 
 fendant had quarreled with another person than the accused and 
 had attempted to kill him.^ 
 
 An event which is the cause of or furnishes a motive for the 
 homicide is always admissible as of the res gestar, though pre- 
 ceding it considerably in point of time.** So, where two men are 
 jointly indicted for a homicide committed by both in concert and 
 at the same time, the acts of either of them are admissible as part 
 of the res gestcv on the trial of the other.^ So where the accused 
 assaulted two persons at the same time and place, evidence show- 
 ing the assault on either person or the effects of the assault on 
 either, is admissible against the accused on his trial for either 
 of the two assaults. The crimes are separate in their character 
 and punishment, but connected into one indivisible transaction. 
 
 The principles at the foundation of the rule permitting the 
 proof of all incidents constituting a part of the res gcstce are also 
 
 for burglary, 62 L. R. A. 317; in 343; Arnold v. State, 131 Ga. 494, 62 
 
 prosecution for forgery, 62 L. R. A. S. E. S06. 
 
 319; in prosecution for assault with * ]\Iorris v. State. 146 Ala. 66, 41 
 
 intent to murder, 62 L. R. A. 313; in So. 274; Herd v. State. 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 prosecution for larceny, 62 L. R. A. App. 600, 99 S. W. 11 19. 
 
 315 ; in prosecution for murder, 62 " jMcKinney v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 
 
 L. R. A. 308; in prosecution for re- App. 591, 96 S. W. 48. 
 
 ceiving stolen property, 62 L. R. A. ® Thompson v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 317; in prosecution for rape, 62 L. R. App., 1908), 113 S. W. 536. 
 
 A. 314; in prosecution for robbery, ' ^IcCoy v. State, 91 Miss. 257, 44 
 
 62 L. R. A. 318. So. 814. 
 *Pate V. State, 150 Ala. 10, 43 So.
 
 173 DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE PART OF THE RES GEST^. § 93 
 
 the basis for the admission of circumstantial evidence. The facts 
 which are a part of the res gcstcu must tend to prove the principal 
 facts. So, circumstantial evidence is only relevant where it clearly 
 has a tendency to prove the necessary facts. 
 
 This is well illustrated by the use and application of circum- 
 stantial evidence. Thus, suppose the question is, did A. kill B. by 
 shooting him ? Evidence would be admissible to prove as part 
 of the res gestce or main transaction, and as a natural result of it, 
 that A. was seen a few minutes after the killing in the neighbor- 
 hood of the crime with a recently discharged and smoking pistol 
 in his hand. But obviously such a fact witnessed a week after the 
 crime would be wholly irrelevant, as it could not be a natural 
 result of the transaction for which A. is on trial, or in any way 
 connected with it. 
 
 The principles just enumerated regulate the admission of rele- 
 vant facts. Upon similar principles the declarations of partici- 
 pants referring to relevant facts and illustrating them are also re- 
 ceived without producing the declarant as an exception to the rule 
 rejecting hearsay evidence. 
 
 For example, let us suppose that A., when discovered with the 
 smoking pistol, impulsively declared that the deceased had at- 
 tacked him : and that he had shot to defend himself, or a party 
 who has been assaulted immediately thereafter states some fact 
 relevant to the assault or to the purpose or intention of the as- 
 sailant. Usually statements made by third persons not produced 
 as witnesses are objectionable as hearsay. But, it has been re- 
 marked, here the events speak for themselves, giving out their 
 fullest meaning through the unprompted language of the partici- 
 pants. The spontaneous character of the language is assumed to 
 preclude the probability of its premeditation or fabrication. Its 
 utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded, with a good deal 
 of reason, as a guarantee of its truth. These instinctive utterances 
 are as much original evidence as are the events whence they em- 
 anate or of which they form an inseparable part. Their value as 
 evidence does not depend in the slightest degree upon our con- 
 fidence in the credibility of the declarant, or upon our knowledge 
 of him as a man who habitually tells the truth. He is regarded 
 merely as the channel through which the events describe them- 
 selves contemporaneously, or nearly so, with their occurrence.
 
 § 94 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. I74 
 
 These declarations must possess three characteristics : First, 
 they must have been uttered contemporaneously with and grow 
 out of the act upon which they have a bearing so as to be spon- 
 taneous and not narrative; second, they must. qualify, illustrate, 
 explain or unfold its character or significance, so as, third, to 
 be connected with it in such a manner that the declaration and 
 the act form a single and indivisible transaction. 
 
 § 94. Necessity for approximation of unity in time, place and mo- 
 tive prompting: the declarations. — If the declaration springs out of 
 or accompanies the event, it is reasonable to suppose that the 
 motive prompting each is identical. This identity or unity of 
 motive may have reference to the motive of the crime itself, or to 
 the motive of persons who are charged with it, or of the person or 
 persons who were the passive participants in it and whose declara- 
 tions are offered. So the elements of time and place are very im- 
 portant, for the subsequent presence of persons at the locus in quo 
 who were not there when the event occurred may suggest the in- 
 tervention of new motives prompting the declaration. If a new 
 motive has prompted the declarations, it is no longer admissible 
 as a part of the original transaction. Hence an immediate and 
 sudden accusation of crime, a confronting with the corpus delicti, 
 the flight, pursuit or arrest of an accused person, the placing of 
 the accused in jail, or the doing of something by accused or 
 by the person whose declaration is offered which has no necessary 
 connection with the crime, entailing a change of scene and the 
 intervention of new persons, both unexpected and sudden, may 
 rob any explanatory declaration of its character as a part of a 
 relevant transaction.^" 
 
 Thus, declarations passing between parties are admissible when 
 the nature of the relations between them is in question, as, for 
 
 "State V. Walker, 78 Mo. 380, 386, 652; Simmons v. State, 145 Ala. 6r, 
 
 387; State V. Johnson, 35 La. Ann. 40 So. 660; Morello v. People, 226 111. 
 
 968; Little V. Commonwealth, 25 388, 80 N. E. 903; Mitchell v. State, 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 921, 924, 926; Stephen- 82 Ark. 324, loi S. W. 763. 
 
 son V. State, no Ind. 358, 372, 11 N. How near main transaction must be 
 
 E. 360, 59 Am. 216; Hall v. State, 132 to declaration made in order to con- 
 
 Ind. 317, 321, 31 N. E. 536; Brown v. stitute part of res gestce — note, 19 L. 
 
 State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N. W. 536: R. A. 7Z7- 
 State V. Ryder, 80 Vt. 422, 68 Atl.
 
 1/5 DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE PART OF THE RES GEST.E. 
 
 § 95 
 
 example, when it cannot otherwise be ascertained what feeHngs 
 they entertained towards each other at a particular time.^^ 
 
 This rule applies when the cjuestion of malice or premeditation 
 is raised on the trial of a homicide. The statements of the ac- 
 cused, uttered at the commission of the crime, being often the 
 only evidence procurable to show his mental state, are then re- 
 ceived for or against him to show that the killing was deliberate 
 or under the sudden impulse of anger or fear/- 
 
 § 95. Declarations must illustrate and explain main transaction. — 
 The range of events included by the term res gestcc varies accord- 
 ing to the crime which is charged and the particular facts consti- 
 tuting the criminal transaction. This fact must be kept in view, 
 for it is largely the explanatory and illustrative character of the 
 declarations as applied to the principal transaction that admits 
 them as evidence.^^ 
 
 " Garber v. State, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 
 161, 170; Brumley v. State, 21 Tex. 
 App. 222, 239, 17 S. W. 140, 57 Am. 
 612; State V. Gabriel, 88 Mo. 631; 
 Sprinkle v. United States, 141 Fed. 
 81 r, 72 C. C. A. 285. Under the stat- 
 ute of Georgia the declarations to be 
 received as res gestce must be con- 
 nected in point of time, so as to be 
 free from all suspicion of delibera- 
 tion. Taylor v. State, 120 Ga. 857, 
 48 S. E. 361. 
 
 " State V. Walker, 77 Me. 488, 491, 
 I Atl. 357; Gantier v. State (Tex. 
 1893), 21 S. W. 255; Miller v. State, 
 3T Tex. Cr. App. 609, 21 S. W. 925, 
 37 Am. St. 836; Schlemmcr v. State, 
 51 N. J. L. 23, 27, 29, 15 Atl. 836; 
 Plant V. State, 140 Ala. 52, 37 So. 
 T59- 
 
 " State V. Brown, 28 Ore. 147, 41 
 Pac. 1042; Bow V. People, t6o III. 
 438, 43 N. E. 593: Norfleet v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky. 1896), 33 S. W. 938, 
 17 Ky. L. 1T37; State v. Bigelow, tot 
 Iowa 430, 70 \. W. 600; Jones v. 
 
 State, 71 Ind. 66, 81, 82; Crookham 
 V. State, 5 W. Va. 510, 513; State 
 V. Walker, 77 Me. 488, 491, i Atl. 
 357; United States v, Noelke, 17 
 Blatchf. (U. S.) 554, 570; Garber v. 
 State, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.), 161, 169; 
 Schlemmer v. State, 51 N. J. L. 23, 
 29, 15 Atl. 836; United States v. An- 
 gell, II Fed. 34, 41 ; Lewis v. State, 
 29 Tex. App. 201, T5 S. W. 642; 
 Commonwealth v. M'Pike, 3 Gush. 
 (Mass.) 181, 184; State v. Horan, 
 32 J\linn. 394, 396, 20 N. W. 905; 
 Driscoll V. People, 47 Mich. 413, 415, 
 416, II N. W. 221; State v. Ryder, 80 
 Vt. 422, 68 Atl. 652; Vann v. State, 
 45 Tex. Cr. App. 434, 77 S. W. 8T3, 
 T07 Am. St. 997; State v. Jarrell, T4T 
 N. Car. 722, 53 S. E. 127: State 
 V. Taster, 71 N. J. L. 586, 60 Atl. 
 361 ; Moody v. State. 120 Ga. 868, 48 
 S. E. 340; Humphrey v. State (Tex. 
 Cr. App. T909), T16 S. W. 570; Peo- 
 ple V. Del Vcrmo, T92 N. Y. 470. 85 
 X. E. 600 : Lawrence v. State, T03 
 Aid. T7, 63 Atl.- 96; Stevens v. State,
 
 § 96 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. I76 
 
 No general rule can be enunciated as to what declarations do 
 or do not constitute a part of the res gcsfcc. The main question 
 is : are they relevant to, and do they explain and illustrate the 
 facts of the transaction in issue? In other words, can we learn 
 from them something of the motives or intention present in a rele- 
 vant act? For declarations forming a part of the res gestce are 
 only admissible when the act with which they are connected is 
 equivocal, or its nature or purpose, its motive and meaning are 
 doubtful, and the words of the person are invoked to render his 
 actions clear and intelligible. 
 
 § 96. Contemporaneous character of the declarations. — Whether 
 the declaration must be precisely contemporaneous with the trans- 
 action which it is presumed to illustrate and unfold, has been 
 much discussed. It is useless to look for harmony in the cases. ^* 
 The early rule was very strict that the declaration must be strictly 
 contemporaneous with the main transaction charged as an offense. 
 So, for example, the exclamation, "I am stabbed !" uttered by 
 the deceased at the instant of the fatal blow, would be received, 
 while his exclamation, "A. stabbed me," made a few seconds 
 afterwards, while pursuing his assailant, would be rejected. ^^ 
 
 It is absolutely impossible to lay down any rule which, will l^e 
 applicable in criminal cases generally to determine whether a 
 declaration is or is not a part of iho. res gestce. Some crimes, such 
 as murder and rape, often consist of a single isolated act on the 
 part of the active participant, occupying but a very small portion 
 of time from its inception to its consummation ; while other 
 crimes, as a conspiracy to defraud or to obtain money by false 
 
 138 Ala. 71, 35 So. 122; State v. tions admissible as part of the res 
 
 Ripley, z^ Wash. 182, 72 Pac. 1036, gestce, they must be substantially con- 
 
 and Underbill on Ev., p. 75. temporaneous with the crime, and be 
 
 ""Declarations, to be admissible, the instinctive utterances of the mind 
 
 must be contemporaneous with the under the active influence of the 
 
 main fact or transaction, but it is im- transaction. State v. Way, 76 S. Car. 
 
 practicable to fix, by any general rule, 91, 56 S. E. 653; Stovall v. State, 53 
 
 any exact instant of time, so as to Tex. Cr. App. 30, 108 S. W. 699. 
 
 preclude debate or conflict of opin- "Reg. v. Bedingfield. 14 Cox Cr. 
 
 ion in regard to this particular point." Cas. 341, 342 ; People v. O'Brien, 92 
 
 Lund V. Inhabitants, 9 Cush. (I\Iass.) Mich. 17, 19, 52 N. W. 84; Sheehy v. 
 
 2,6, 43. In order to render declara- Territory, 9 Ariz. 269, 80 Pac. 356.
 
 1/7 DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE PART OF THE RES GEST^. § 96 
 
 pretenses, consist of a series of connected facts and incidents 
 spread over a considerable portion of time, some of which may- 
 be innocent in themselves, but all of which lead up to, and termi- 
 nate in, the criminal transaction which is the principal fact. 
 
 Again, it is now the universal practice to permit certain ac- 
 tions of the accused after the commission of the crime to be 
 ])roved as relevant to show that he committed it. Thus it may be 
 shown that he attempted to escape, or fled from justice or that he 
 destroyed evidence or endeavored to fabricate evidence. Such 
 facts may, with correctness, be assumed to form a part of the res 
 gcstcu, though not contemporaneous with the principal transac- 
 tion. If this is so, there can be no impropriety in receiving the 
 declarations accompanying them.^*' 
 
 Nor is the period intervening between the criminal transaction 
 and the subsidiary act material if they are connected. An interval 
 of a day will not exclude the subsidiary act with its accompanying 
 declaration." 
 
 But it has been also determined that statements of the deceased 
 uttered four or five minutes after the mortal wound has been in- 
 flicted are not receivable as a part of the res gcstcc where it is 
 not proved what, if anything, happened between the wounding 
 and the statement from which it might be reasonably inferred 
 that the intervening circumstances were a part of the crime. ^"^ 
 
 On the whole, the res gestcu cannot be arbitrarily confined with- 
 in any limits of time. The element of time is not always material. 
 If the declarations are narrative and descriptive in their form and 
 character, if they are not the impromptu outpourings of the mind, 
 they should be rejected, though uttered only a few minutes after 
 the main transaction.^'' 
 
 "The ;r^ firr^/ff of larceny is not re- Mart. & Yerg. (Tenn.) 147: Mc- 
 
 tricted to the limited time when the Gowan v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 117 
 
 hand reaches out and grasps the S. W. 387. 
 
 stolen property. The intention, and ^' Vickcry v. State, 50 Fla. 144, 38 
 
 all conduct by which it may be shown, So. 907. 
 
 form, also, a part thereof, and decla- " People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85, 91 ; 
 
 rations accompanying acts preceding State v. Raven, 115 Mo. 419, 422, 22 
 
 the taking may be proven. State v. S. W. 376; State v. Daugherty, 17 
 
 Gabriel, 88 Mo. 631, 639. Nev. ^76, 379, 30 Pac. 1074; Jones 
 
 "Carroll v. State, 3 Humph, v. State, 71 Ind. 66, 81; Hall v. State, 
 
 (Tenn.) 315; Cornwell v. State, 132 Ind. 317, 321, 322, 31 N. E. 536; 
 12 — Undekhill Ckim. Ev.
 
 § 97 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 178 
 
 § 97. Interval for consideration or taking advice. — The spon- 
 taneous, unpremeditated character of the declarations and the fact 
 that they seem to be the natural and necessary concomitants of 
 some relevant transaction in which their author was a partici- 
 pant, constitute the basis for their admission as evidence."^ So 
 it has been held that spontaneous exclamations of persons who 
 were not actually present at a homicide, are properly admitted as 
 a part of the res gestcc where they were uttered on hearing the 
 report of a revolver which was employed in committing the 
 homicide."^ 
 
 If a sufficient period has intervened between the act and the 
 statement for consideration, preparation or taking advice, the 
 statement may be rejected. The mere likelihood or probability 
 that the statement was the result of advice, preparation or con- 
 sideration may exclude it. Actual preparation need not be shown. 
 
 Stephenson v. State, no Ind. 358, 11 
 N. E. 360, 59 Am. 216; Parker v. 
 State, 136 Ind. 284, 290, 35 X. E. 
 1 105; State V. Carey, 56 Kan. 84, 42 
 Pac. 371 ; Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 
 547, 559, IS S. W. 838; Hall v. State, 
 48 Ga. 607, 608; State v. Howard, 
 120 La. 311, 45 So. 260; Tinsley v. 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 91, 106 S. W. 
 347; Bradley V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 
 1908), III S. W. 72>3\ Lockhart v. 
 State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 589, in S. 
 W. 1024; Herrington v. State, 130 
 Ga. 307, 60 S. E. 572; State v. Carl- 
 ton, 48 Vt. 636, 643 (two minutes 
 after main act) ; State v. Pomeroy, 
 25 Kan. 349 (three to five minutes 
 afterwards) ; Mayfield v. State, lOi 
 Tenn. 67 2, 49 S. W. 742 (thirty min- 
 utes) ; Pryse v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 
 1908), 113 S. W. 938 (thirty minutes 
 after the shooting) ; State v. Trusty, 
 I Penn. (Del.) 319, 40 Atl. 766 (by 
 deceased five minutes after receiving 
 the mortal wound) ; State v. Kel- 
 leher, 201 ]\Io. 614, 100 S. W. 470 
 (two or three minutes) ; Stanley v. 
 
 State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 482, 46 S. W. 
 645 ; People v. ]\IcBride, 120 Mich. 
 166, 78 X. W. 1076; State v. Birks, 
 199 IVIo. 263, 97 S. W. 578 (fifteen 
 minutes later) ; Williams v. State, 66 
 Ark. 264, 50 S. W. 517; Williams v. 
 State, 147 Ala. 10, 41 So. 992. 
 
 -°]\Iayes v. State, 64 Miss. 329, 333, 
 I So. y2i2, 60 Am. 58. "The principle 
 of admission is, that the declarations 
 are pars rci gcstce, and therefore it 
 has been contended that they must be 
 contemporaneous with it ; but this has 
 been decided not to be necessary, on 
 good grounds ; for the nature and 
 strength of the connection are the 
 material things to be looked to, and, 
 although concurrence of time can not 
 but be always material evidence to 
 show the connection, yet it is by no 
 means essential." Rouch v. Great 
 West. R. R. Co., I Q. B. 51, 60, cited 
 and approved in Hunter v. State, 40 
 X^. J. L. 495, 539; Baker v. State, 85 
 Ark. 300, 107 S. W. 983. 
 
 " State v. Sexton, 147 Mo. 89, 48 
 S. W. 452.
 
 1/9 DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE PART OF THE RES GESTAE. § 97 
 
 Declarations made immediately after the principal transaction 
 liave been received in homicide cases.^^ 
 
 So, too, declarations uttered immediately before the crime, have 
 been received. Most of the cases are cases of homicide. Indeed, 
 the rule of the res gestcu is most frequently invoked in that crime. 
 So. an exclamation by the victim of the homicide to a police of- 
 ficer on his being shot that the accused "shot me without cause 
 or provocation" was received.^^ And exclamations uttered by by- 
 slanders before or during the commission of the homicide are 
 admissible.-* Any conversation taking place immediately before 
 the homicide between the accused and his victim is res gestco.^^ 
 And in a case of robbery, a declaration by the person robbed to 
 those who had come to aid him to the effect that the accused 
 was the person w^ho robbed him has been received."'^ 
 
 A man who has assaulted may state on the witness stand that 
 immediately after the assault he was asked by persons who came 
 to his assistance what had happened and he stated to them "he 
 got knocked out," and described to them the weapon with which he 
 was struck and the name of the person who struck him and told 
 them whence he had fled."^ So, generally in all cases of homicide 
 and assault, the statement by the person injured as to the mode 
 
 "Lambert v. People, 29 ]\Iich. 71; "^Kennedy v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 DriscoU V. People, 47 Mich. 413, 415, 100 S. W. 242, 30 Ky. L. 1063. 
 
 II N. W. 221; Bateson v. State, 46 ""Fleming v. State, 150 Ala. 19, 43 
 
 Tex. Cr.-App. 34, 80 S. W. 88; Flores So. 219. 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 79 S. W. "'State v. Epstein, 25 R. I. 131, 55 
 
 808; Franklin v. State (Tex. Cr. Atl. 204. In a recent New York case 
 
 App.), 88 S. W. 357; State v. Foley, it was laid down as a rule regulating 
 
 113 La. 52, 36 So. 885, 104 Am. St. the admissions of declarations that 
 
 493; Selby V. Commonwealth (Ky.), they should be of an explanatory 
 
 80 S. W. 221, 25 Ky. L. 2209; Walker character and describe the circum- 
 
 V. State, 146 Ala. 45, 41 So. 878; stances of the injury where they were 
 
 Commonwealth v. Hargis, 124 Ky. uttered by the injured person. The 
 
 356, 99 S. W. 348, 30 Ky. L. 510. In point was also dwelt upon that they 
 
 Commonwealth v. M'Pike, 3 Cush. must be spontaneous and made witli- 
 
 (Mass.) 181, 184, 50 .\m. Dec. 727, in such period after the injury as 
 
 a declaration by the victim of a homi- precludes fabrication. People v. Del 
 
 ride made after she had left the Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. F. 690. 
 
 room where she was assaulted, and "^ State v. Harris (R. I. 1908), 69 
 
 had gone upstairs, was received. .Atl. 506. 
 
 "''State V. Foley, 113 La. 52, 36 So. 
 885, 104 Am. St. 493.
 
 § 98 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 1 80 
 
 by which the assault had l)een perpetrated made immediately after 
 the assault to a person who comes to the assistance of the j^erson 
 assaulted, is competent as a part of the 7'cs gcstcu; the fact that 
 the statement was illicited by a question does not exclude it.-'* 
 
 And the American cases, as a rule, do not sustain the strict 
 English doctrine that the declarations, to be admissible, must be 
 strictly contemporaneous with the main transaction, if the declara- 
 tions are illustrative and spontaneous and not mere narratives of 
 what has passed.-" 
 
 § 98. Mental and physical conditions as influencing declarations. — 
 Many crimes involve scenes and actions which, by their exciting 
 character, engross the mind and stir it deeply. The period within 
 which a declaration may be uttered and yet be admissible can, to 
 some extent, be measured by the character of the passions and 
 emotions which exist in the breast of the speaker. Thus, in order 
 that statements should be res gestce on a trial for murder, the 
 speaker must have been prompted to speak solely from the ex- 
 citement of the event of which it is claimed the statement formed 
 
 ^ State V. Lewis (Iowa 1908), 116 
 N. W. 606. 
 
 -'State V. Punshon, 133 Mo. 44, 34 
 S. W. 25 ; Chalk v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 116, 32 S. W. 534; Moran v. 
 People (III. 1896), 45 N. E. 230; 
 State V. Horan, 32 Minn. 394, 395, 20 
 N. W. 905, 50 Am. 583 (a few min- 
 utes) ; Smith v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 277, 305, 17 S. W. 471 (fifteen min- 
 utes after) ; Commonwealth v. 
 Hacket, 2 Allen (Mass.) 136; Lovett 
 V. State, 80 Ga. 255, 4 S. E. 912; 
 United States v. Noelke, 17 Blatchf. 
 554, 570; United States v. Angell, 11 
 Fed. 34, 41 ; Evans v. State, 58 Ark. 
 47, 22 S. W. 1026; State V. Frazier, 
 I Houst. (Del.) 176; Jones v. State, 
 71 Ind. 66, 81; State v. Walker, 77 
 Me. 488, 491, I Atl. 357. See, also, 
 the remarks of the court in Vicks- 
 burg &c. R. Co. V. O'Brien, T19 U. 
 S. 99, 105, 106, 30 L. ed. 299, 7 Sup. 
 
 Ct. 118; Ferguson v. State, 141 Ala. 
 20, 2)7 So. 448; Bowles v. Common- 
 wealth, 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 527; 
 People V. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 
 85 N. E. 690; State v. Bebb, 125 
 Iowa 494, loi N. W. 189; Ludlow v. 
 State (Ala. 1908), 47 So. 321; State 
 V. Alton, 105 Minn. 410, 117 N. W. 
 617; Martin v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 174, 82 S. W. 657; Wright v. 
 State, 88 Md. 705, 41 Atl. 1060; Bice 
 V. State, SI Tex. Cr. App. 133, 100 
 S. W. 949; McKinney v. State, 40 
 Tex. Cr. App. 372, 50 S. W. 708; 
 Freeman v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 
 545, 46 S. W. 641, 51 S. W. 230. A 
 witness may state that he gave an 
 alarm after a burglary, and what he 
 said in connection with and while 
 giving it is clearly a part of the res 
 gcstce. State v. Moore, 117 Mo. 395. 
 40 T, 22 S. W. 1086. Contra, People 
 V. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85, 87, 9i-
 
 l8l DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE PART OF THE RES GEST.E. § 98 
 
 a part, and before he could sufficiently regain his self-possession 
 to be suspected of having made the statement from design.^" 
 
 If the declarant is implicated, either as agent or patient, in a 
 murderous assault, the fear, hatred, rage or other passion which 
 customarily accompanies a homicide, or attempted homicide, and 
 engrosses the minds of all participants, may, with reason, be 
 considered to prolong the period during which language may be 
 presumed to be spontaneous. The presence of these passions is 
 not conducive to the mental calmness and deliberation necessary 
 to concoct an untrue narrative declaration. On the other hand 
 the mental distraction which is the result of a mortal wound, the 
 physical shock or nervous excitement which is the result of serious 
 bodily injury,^^ the pain and physical anguish of the sufferer, the 
 danger of death and the urgent need for procuring speedy relief 
 or aid would be very likely to prevent the language of the victim 
 from assuming a narrative or retrospective character. 
 
 The imperative present needs of the body, filling the mind with 
 apprehension and fear, certainly preclude under these circum- 
 stances much mental consideration of past events, or mental 
 preparation or intention to narrate them ; and tend to make all 
 language used the reflection of the existing mental condition.^- 
 
 The mind, even when thus aroused and stirred, is still open to 
 the reception of new thoughts and impressions which may supply 
 opportunity for fabricating declarations and deprive them of 
 their character as part of the res gcsfcr. If some time elapses, 
 whether long or short and incidents intervene which change the 
 declarant's mental condition and fill his mind with new thoughts 
 
 '"State V. Gianfala, 113 La. 463, 37 panying declarations not otherwise 
 
 So. 30. admissible. Statements, from what- 
 
 ^' Soto V. Territory (Ariz. 1908), ever source, to be thus competent, 
 
 94 Pac. 1 104. must be contemporaneous with the 
 
 ""In general, subject to some ap- act they would illustrate. Perhaps a 
 
 parent or real qualifications, what few of the cases require them to be 
 
 one said in its nature explanatory, so in the strict sense. But it is at 
 
 while performing an admissible act, least better doctrine that they are 
 
 whether he is a party or a third per- competent, whenever near enough the 
 
 son, may be shown in evidence when- act, either before or after, to be 
 
 ever the act is shown. In this way prompted by the same motive, and 
 
 a defendant may even be entitled to apparently to constitute a part of it." 
 
 introduce in his own behalf accom- i Bishop Cr. Pro., § 1086.
 
 § 99 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 102 
 
 and ideas, it may be presumed that the door is thereby opened 
 for tlie introduction of new motives which may suggest or in- 
 fluence the declarations made. 
 
 The occurrences which may bring this about, depend largely 
 upon the circumstances of each case. The actions of the accused 
 in telephoning for a physician to aid the deceased, or in calling 
 in other persons to his aid, in going to his own room or home 
 and changing his clothing, and particularly where, after doing 
 this, he goes to the sheriff's office or to a police station and sur- 
 renders himself, deprive any statements which he may make after 
 these events have occurred of their character as res gestcc. And 
 it is immaterial that the transactions which intervene cover but 
 a few moments of time.^" 
 
 The same principles would apply to declarations by one who 
 is the victim of the crime. His statement made after the inter- 
 vention of incidents calculated to prompt him with new motives 
 would be rejected. The fact that bystanders had spoken to the 
 deceased and that, having found him lying badly wounded, had 
 l)laced him in a more comfortable position, and the further fact 
 that the accused had fled from the scene of the crime will not ex- 
 clude declarations of the deceased if they are properly of the res 
 gesfce.^* 
 
 §^99. Admissibility for the accused. — Declarations which are 
 commonly called self-serving cannot be given in evidence in 
 favor of the accused unless they are part of the res gestce.^^ If, 
 however, the accused makes a statement or utters an exclama- 
 tion which is spontaneous and which is connected with the inci- 
 dents of the criminal transaction, and explanatory of it, it may 
 be received, though it is in his favor. If the statement is rea- 
 sonable and consistent with innocence, it should receive due con- 
 sideration by the jury and may have considerable weight as evi- 
 dence. The value of his statements as evidence is diminished as 
 the time elapses after the transaction to which they relate.^'' And 
 
 ^Johnson v. State, 129 Wis. 146, ^'^ People v. Huntington (Cal. App. 
 
 108 N. W. 55, 5 L. R. A. (X. S.) 1908), 97 Pac. 760; Mason v. State 
 
 8o9n; Davis v. Commonwealth (Ky.), (Ind. 1908), 85 N. E. 776. 
 
 77 S. W. HOT, 25 Ky. L. 1426. ^° State v. Jacobs (Mo. App. T908). 
 
 ^ Price V. State (Okla. 1908), 98 T13 S. W. 244; State v. Kane (N. J. 
 
 Pac. 447. L. 1909), 72 Atl. 39.
 
 183 DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE PART OF THE RES GEST.E. § lOO 
 
 it should not be forgotten that the rule of the res gesfcc is based 
 upon the principle that if a part of a transaction is shown by one 
 party another party to the same transaction may introduce in 
 evidence all or any part of a remainder. 
 
 Hence, the \Yhole declaration or conversation must be stated 
 and admitted,^" If the declaration was made by the accused in 
 answer to assertions, questions or taunting remarks by the vic- 
 tim of a homicide, the latter are competent to explain the declara- 
 tion or modify its force and meaning by showing the true mo- 
 tives which prompted it. And it is a general rule that whenever 
 the prosecution shall introduce any declarations of the accused, 
 under the rule of the res gestce, he may offer other declarations 
 forming a part of the same conversation if they are explanatory 
 thereof, though they might not have been competent coming from 
 h.im in the first instance.^® 
 
 § 100. Declarations uttered prior to the crime. — If the declaration 
 meets the requirements of the rule now under consideration, that 
 is, if it explains or illustrates a relevant fact, it is not incompetent, 
 merely because its utterance precedes the actual commission of 
 the crime. Evidence is always relevant which shows that the ac- 
 cused made preparations to commit a crime, and from such pre- 
 parative actions a criminal intention may, with justice, be in- 
 ferred. 
 
 Declarations accompanying these acts of preparation are re- 
 ceived to explain and unfold their significance, and, indirectly, 
 to illuminate the subsequent language, conduct and state of mind 
 of the accused.^'' 
 
 Thus, where one of two travelers killed the other while e7i route 
 the court admitted the statements of the deceased, showing 
 
 "M'Kee v. People, 36 N. Y. 113; Ga. 374, 410, 37 Am. 7611; Schnicker 
 
 People V. Potter, 5 Mich, i, 5, 71 Am. v. People, 88 N. Y. 192, 195 ; Carr v. 
 
 Dec. 763; Liles v. State, 30 Ala. 24, State, 43 Ark. 99, 104; Common- 
 
 26, 68 Am. Dec. 108. wealth v. Castles, 9 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 ^ Shrivers v. State, 7 Tex. App. 121, 69 Am. Dec. 278; Cluverius v. 
 
 450, 455- See supra, § 119a. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 787; Wood v. 
 
 ''Price V. State, 107 Ala. 161, t8 State, 92 Tnd. 269, 272; People v. 
 
 So. 130; State V. Peffers, 80 Towa Scott, 153 N. Y. 40, 46 N. E. 1028. 
 580, 46 N. W. 662; Cox V. State, 64
 
 § lOI CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 184 
 
 whence they came and whither they were going, as a part of the 
 res gestae leading up to the crime.*" 
 
 The declarations, if of the res gestcc, may be offered by the ac- 
 cused in his own behalf to illustrate or to show his motives, or to 
 rebut an inference of a criminal intention ;*^ and before any part 
 of the declaration is offered against him, if the action to be ex- 
 plained is clearly relevant and is already in evidence. 
 
 The subsidiary or preparative act to be explained must be rele- 
 vant to the guilt of the accused. Otherwise, no mere suggestion 
 or probability that the declaration will throw light upon the crime, 
 will avail to let it in, if the accompanying action is not relevant.*" 
 
 If the relevant act is in evidence, the accused need not wait to 
 prove a declaration in his own favor, until another declaration is 
 introduced against him. He may prove the declaration at once.*'' 
 
 § 101. Declarations by bystanders and third persons. — The oral or 
 written declarations of persons other than the accused or the 
 passive participant in the crime, if they possess the character of 
 declarations forming a part of the res gestcc, are receivable. If 
 the act of a third party is relevant and is in evidence, his state- 
 ment accompanying and explanatory of it. which is the natural 
 concomitant of the act, and is prompted by the identical motive, 
 should be admitted.** 
 
 *" State V. Vincent, 24 Iowa 570, and cases in note'i. p. 124; Morrow 
 
 573, 574, 95 Am. Dec. 753. v. State, 48 Ind. 432, 435; Mack v. 
 
 " State V. Walker, 77 Me. 488, 490, State, 48 Wis. 271, 278, 280, 4 N. W. 
 
 I Atl. 357; Dukes V. State, 11 Ind. 449; Schlemmer v. State, 51 N. J. L. 
 
 557, 564, 71 Am. Dec. 370; State v. 23, 29-31, 15 Atl. 836. Contra, State 
 
 Daley, 53 Vt. 442, 445, 38 Am. 694; v. Hicks, 92 Mo. 431, 437, 4 S. W. 
 
 Monroe v. State, 5 Ga. 85; Foster v. 742; Fleming v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 State, 8 Tex. App. 248; Maddox v. App.), 114 S. W. 383; Douglass v. 
 
 State (Ala. 1909), 48 So. 689; State State (Tex. Cr. App.), 114 S. W. 
 
 V. Kane (N. J. L.) 72 Atl. 39; Price 808; Lj^les v. State, 130 Ga. 294, 60 
 
 V. State (Okla.), 98 Pac. 447. S. E. 578. 
 
 ** People V. Williams, 3 Park. Cr. ** Hunter v. State, 40 N. J. L. 495, 
 
 (N. Y.) 84; Griffith V. State, 90 Ala. 535-540; State v. Gabriel, 88 Mo. 631, 
 
 583, 589, 8 So. 812: Brumley v. State, 639; Haines v. People, 138 111. App. 
 
 21 Tex. App. 222, 239, 17 S. W. 140, 49. 
 
 57 Am. 612. Admissibility of declarations of 
 
 *' Foster v. State, 8 Tex. App. 248; conspirators as part of res gcstcs — 
 
 Thomas v. State, 27 Ga. 287, 297; note, 19 L. R. A. 745. 
 State V. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741, 754,
 
 185 DECLARATIONS WHICH ARE PART OF THE RES GEST^. § lOI 
 
 But if the declarations of a third person are merely narrative 
 and unconnected with a relevant act, so that by no proper exten- 
 sion of the rule can they be included among the res gestce, they 
 will, with some few exceptions, be rejected as hearsay,*^ though 
 the declaration is in form a confession that the declarant com- 
 mitted the crime/" 
 
 The exclamations of persons who were present at a fracas in 
 Avhich a homicide occurred, showing the means and mode of kill- 
 ing, are admissible for*' or against the accused,'** because of their 
 unpremeditated character and their connection with the event by 
 which the attention of the speaker was engrossed. Presence alone 
 is not enough. The declarant, whose language is offered as evi- 
 dence, must have been more than a mere observer or bystander at 
 the occurrence he describes. It must not only appear that he was 
 present, but that he was an active participant, either by word or 
 act, in the event.*'' 
 
 *° State V. Beaudet, 53 Conn. 536, 4 
 Atl. 237, 55 Am. 155; State v. Davis, 
 77 N. Car. 483; State v. Badger, 69 
 Vt. 216, S7 Atl. 293. Nor can the 
 state prove threats to Ij-nch defend- 
 ant, made by a crowd to show the 
 community believe him guilty. State 
 V. Sneed, 88 Mo. 138, 141, 147; State 
 V. Kapelino, 20 S. Dak. 591, 108 N. 
 W. 335; Casey v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 392, 97 S. W. 496; Perdue v. 
 State, 126 Ga. 112, 54 S. E. 820. 
 
 '"West V. State, 76 Ala. 98, 99; 
 State V. Gallehugh, 89 Minn. 212, 94 
 N. W. 72;^. But narrative statements 
 by third persons, assented to or ac- 
 quiesced in by the accused on his 
 hearing them are generally received 
 as his own admissions or confessions, 
 being made so by his adoption. See 
 post, §§ 122-124, 3n<J Underbill on 
 Ev., Chap. TV. 
 
 "Flanegan v. State, 64 Ga. 52; 
 State v. Jones, 77 S. Car. 385, 58 S. 
 E. 8; Haines v. People, 138 III. App. 
 49. Where a homicide occurred in 
 
 the dark, a declaration made by a by- 
 stander during the affra}- that he had 
 cut the accused in the back is rele- 
 vant for the latter where it appears 
 that he was not cut in the back, but 
 that the deceased had received sev- 
 eral apparently mortal wounds in his 
 back. Flanegan v. State, 64 Ga. S-< 
 56. 
 
 '^.Appleton V. State, 61 Ark. 590, S3 
 S. W. 1066; State V. Biggerstaff, 17 
 Mont. 510, 43 Pac. 709; State v. Dun- 
 can, 116 Mo. 288, 22 S. W. 699; State 
 V. Hinson (X. Car. 1909), 64 S. E. 
 T24; Shirley v. State, 144 Ala. 35, 40 
 So. 269; Grant v. State, 124 Ga. 757, 
 53 S. E. 334. The exclamation, "Don't 
 strike him, for you have shot him," 
 by a participant, addressed to the ac- 
 cused, was received against him in 
 State V. Walker, 78 Mo. 380, .386, 387. 
 
 ■■'Whart. Cr. Ev., § 262; Roscoe's 
 Cr. Ev., § 23: T Bish. Cr. Pro., 
 § 1087; Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 
 10 Bush. (Ky.) 576. 578: State v. 
 Moore, 38 La. Ann. 66; State v. Riley,
 
 lOI 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 1 86 
 
 42 La. Ann. 995, 997, 8 So. 469; 
 Flynn v. State, 43 Ark. 289, 292, 293 ; 
 Benjamin v. State, 41 So. 739, 148 
 Ala. 671, not reported in full ; Baker 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 392, 'j^ S. 
 W. 618. Thus, where the defendant 
 had given evidence that he had been 
 assaulted by a mob led by deceased, 
 he was permitted to show that some 
 
 unknown person in the crowd ex- 
 claimed "Kill him! Kill him!" mean- 
 ing the defendant. Morton v. State, 
 91 Tenn. 437, 19 S. W. 225. The fact 
 that the declarant was a participant 
 must be shown by independent evi- 
 dence. It cannot be proved by the 
 declaration itself. Flynn v. State, 43 
 Ark. 289, 293; State v. Draughon (N. 
 Car., 1909), 65 S. E. 913.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 § 102. Definition — Religious element. io8. Opinions contained in dying 
 
 103. Consciousness of nearness of declarations are not admis- 
 
 death as shown by the de- sible. 
 
 clarant's language. 109. Must refer to the res gcstw of 
 
 104. Sending for legal or spiritual the homicide. 
 
 advisers, nature of wounds no. Mode of proof, credibility, rele- 
 or other circumstances show- vancy and weight. 
 
 ing a consciousness of ap- in. Declaration is admissible in its 
 proaching death. entirety — Contradictory or un- 
 
 105. Period intervening between the truthful character. 
 
 statement and the death. 112. The form of the declaration. 
 
 106. Dying declarations not adniis- 113. Declarations by signs — Mental 
 
 sible to prove all crimes. condition of the declarant. 
 
 107. Dying declarations distin- 114. Dying declarations made by 
 
 guished from those which children, 
 
 are a part of the res gestce. 
 
 § 102. Definition — Religious element. — Dying declarations con- 
 stitute an exception to the rule rejecting hearsay evidence. Such 
 declarations are those made by the victim of a homicide, refer- 
 ring to the material facts which concern the cause and circum- 
 stances of the killing, and which are uttered under a fixed belief 
 that death is impending and is certain to follow immediately, or 
 in a very short time, without an opportunity for retraction and 
 in the absence of all hopes of recovery.^ 
 
 And dying declarations constitute direct evidence of the facts 
 they are relevant to prove as distinguished from circumstantial 
 evidence of such facts. ^ 
 
 ^Underbill on Evid., § lOO; I 96 Pac. 456. 
 
 Greenl. on Evid., § 136; Simons v. ^ State v. Sexton, 147 Mo. 8g, 48 S. 
 
 People, 150 111. 66, 7i, 2)(> N. E. 1019; W. 452; People v. Morse, 196 N. Y. 
 
 Starkey v. People, 17 111. 17; People 306, 89 N. E. 816. 
 
 V. Cipolla (Cal.), 100 Pac. 252. In Dcrinitif)n and admissibility of dy- 
 
 Oregoii the matter is governed by ing declaration — note, 86 Am. St. 638, 
 
 statute. State v. Fuller, 52 Ore. 42, 668. 
 
 (187)
 
 102 
 
 CRIMINAL EXIDEXCE. 
 
 1 88 
 
 The certainty of tlie declarant's belief that he is in extremis, 
 and that, in a very short time, those immortal and spiritual ele- 
 ments which inhabit the body will forsake it, to encounter the 
 dread possibilities of the unknown and supernatural world beyond 
 the grave, is deemed to furnish a sanction equivalent to that of a 
 solemn and positive oath administered in a court of justice. ""^ 
 
 To illustrate or to explain the mental condition of the deceased, 
 the accused should be permitted to show that the language of the 
 deceased was prompted by motives of revenge or malice ; and 
 that, when he uttered the accusatory statement, he entertained 
 vindictive feelings towards the accused and was in a reckless and 
 irreverent frame of mind. So it may be shown, that immediately 
 prior to or after the declaration, the deceased had used profane 
 language;* and such evidence furnishes good grounds for the pre- 
 sumption that the speaker does not believe that he is soon to die. 
 The fear of punishment for perjury in this world is wholly ab- 
 
 ^ "The general principle on which 
 this species of evidence is admitted is 
 that they are declarations made in 
 extremity, when the party is at the 
 point of death, when every hope of 
 this world is gone, when every motive 
 to falsehood is silenced ; and the mind 
 is induced by the most powerful con- 
 siderations to speak the truth. A sit- 
 uation so solemn and so awful is con- 
 sidered as creating an obligation equal 
 to that imposed by a positive oath ad- 
 ministered in a court of justice." 
 Eyre, J., in Woodcock's Case, 2 Leach 
 C. Law 563 (1789). The earliest case 
 is Rex v. Ely, in 1720, 12 Viner's Abr. 
 118; Starkey v. People, 17 Til. 17; 
 Hill V. State, 41 Ga. 484, 503. It 
 seems that an instruction that dying 
 declarations are to receive as much 
 credit as testimony given under oath 
 in open court is erroneous. State v. 
 Vansant, 80 Mo. 67 ; State v. Mathes, 
 90 Mo. 571, 2 S. W. 800; Lambeth v. 
 State, 23 Miss. 322, 359. The ab- 
 sence of an opportunity to cross- 
 examine the declarant or for the jury 
 
 to observe his demeanor upon the 
 witness stand, detracts from their 
 credibility as evidence, not from their 
 competency. People v. Kraft, 148 N. 
 Y. 631, 43 N. E. 80. Hence, if the 
 deceased was an infidel and had a 
 contempt for the church or totally ir- 
 religious, so that he had no appre- 
 hension of punishment for lying and 
 no belief in a state of future re- 
 wards and punishments, that fact, 
 while not rendering his declaration 
 inadmissible (People v. Sanford, 43 
 Cal. 29), because to permit this would 
 be to disqualify a witness because of 
 his religious belief or want of it, is 
 competent to go to the jury as affect- 
 ing the credit to be given to it. Gam- 
 brell V. State (Miss. 1908), 46 So. 
 138; Hill v. State, 64 Miss. 431, 432; 
 People V. Chin Mook Sow, 51 Cal. 
 597, 600; Goodall v. State, i Ore. 333, 
 334, 80 Am. Dec. 396; State v. El- 
 liott, 45 Iowa 486, 487; State v. Ah 
 Lee, 8 Ore. 2x4, 218; Pyle v. State, 
 4 Ga. App. 811, 62 S. E. 540. 
 ^ Tracy v. People, 97 111. loi, 106.
 
 189 DYIXG DECLARATIONS. § IO3 
 
 sent. Unless, therefore, the dying man possesses and is controlled 
 by a vivid and conscientious feeling of accountability to God, in 
 whose presence he expects soon to appear, it is very probable that 
 he may be materially influenced in his utterances by the passions 
 of anger and revenge. Hence, these declarations ought to be 
 received with the greatest caution as respects the primary facts 
 admitting them. All men are prone to excuse and justify their 
 own conduct and to endeavor to revenge themselves on those who 
 have injured them. These proclivities, however, in the case of 
 dying declarations, are supposed to have been overcome by the 
 apprehension of immediate death which will deprive the dying 
 man of all opportunity for repentance if he lies and subject him 
 to severe punishment beyond the grave.^ 
 
 The main ground for admitting dying declarations being that 
 the danger of immediate death and the belief of the declarant 
 that he is in extremis are regarded as equivalent to an oath, it 
 follows that every dying declaration w^ll be presumed, until the 
 contrary appears, to be made under a solemn and religious sense 
 of responsibility to a Deity who will punish perjury.® But ac- 
 cused may show on cross-examination that deceased, in making 
 the statements, w'as in a reckless, irreverent state of mind, and 
 entertained feelings of malice and hostility toward accused." 
 
 § 103. Consciousness of nearness of death, as shown by declarant's 
 language. — The deceased, at the time of the declaration, must have 
 been under a sense of approaching death without any hope of re- 
 
 ' People V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17, 24; "Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 322, 
 
 People V. Hodgdon, 55 Cal. 72, 76, 36 355 ; Solomon v. State, 2 Ga. App. 92, 
 
 Am. 30. But the fact that the de- 58 S. E. 381 ; Moody v. State, i Ga. 
 
 clarant believes, as a matter of re- App. 772, 58 S. E. 262; State v. 
 
 ligious opinion, that he may repent Knoll, 69 Kan. 767, 77 Pac. 580. In 
 
 of his sins, lying included, at any State v. Hood, 63 W. Va. 182, 59 S. 
 
 moment before death, does not alone E. 971, it was held that it was no 
 
 render his declaration inadmissible, ground for excluding a dying decla- 
 
 Xorth V. People, 139 III. 81, 28 N. E. ration that it did not appear in the 
 
 966. In a note to People v. Chin evidence that the declarant believed 
 
 Mock Sow, 51 Cal. 597, 601, will be in God and in rewards and punish- 
 
 found a summary of the religious be- ment after death, 
 
 lief of the Chinese as described by ^ Nordgren v. People, 211 111. 425, 
 
 one of them on the witness stand. 71 N. E. 1042.
 
 § I03 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 190 
 
 coyery. He must believe that there is no possibility of his re- 
 covery or his statement will not be competent.® 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Bishop, 165 
 Mass. 148, 42 N. E. 560; ColHns v. 
 State, 46 Neb. ZT, 64 N. W. 432; 
 People V. Kraft, 91 Hun (N. Y.) 
 474, 36 N. Y. S. 1034; Commonwealth 
 V. Brewer, 164 Mass. 577, 42 N. E. 
 92; Commonwealth v. Mika, 171 Pa. 
 St. 273, 33 Atl. 65; White v. State, 
 III Ala. 92, 21 So. 330; Jones v. 
 State (Tex. 1897), 38 S. W. 992; 
 United States v. Woods, 4 Cranch C. 
 C. (U. S.) 484, 28 Fed. Cas. 16760; 
 Archibald v. State, 122 Ind. 122, 123, 
 23 N. E. 758; State v. Faile, 41 S. 
 Car. 551, 19 S. E. 690; Ex parte 
 Meyers, 33 Tex. Cr. App. 204, 26 S. 
 W. 196; State V. Cronin, 64 Conn. 
 293, 305, 29 Atl. 536; State V. Wilson, 
 121 Mo. 434, 442, 26 S. W. 357; Wal- 
 ston V. Commonwealth, 16 B. Mon. 
 (Ky.) 15, 34; Powers v. State, 87 
 Ind. 144, 151 ; Whitaker v. State, 79 
 Ga. 87, 91, 3 S. E. 403; Mitchell v. 
 State, 71 Ga. 128, 141 ; State v. 
 Schmidt, "7^ Iowa 469, 35 N. W. 590; 
 State V. Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91, 95; 
 State V. Blackburn, 80 N. Car. 474, 
 478; State V. Mathes, 90 Mo. 571, 2 
 S. W. 800; Peak v. State, 50 N. J. L. 
 179, 182, 12 Atl. 701; Vaughan v. 
 Commonwealth, 86 Ky. 431, 435, 6 S. 
 W. 153, 9 Ky. L. 644; Hammil v. 
 State, 90 Ala. 577, 8 So. 380; State 
 V. Johnson, 26 S. Car. 152, 153, i S. 
 E. 510; State V. Banister, 35 S. Car. 
 290, 296, 14 S. E. 678; Cole V. State, 
 105 Ala. ^6, 16 So. 762; State v. 
 Clark (W. Va. 1908), 63 S. E. 402; 
 Sutherland v. State, i2t Ga. 190, 48 
 S. E. 915; State v. Daniels, 115 La. 
 59, 38 So. 894; Robinson v. State, 
 130 Ga. 361, 60 S. E. T005 ; Wilson 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 43, Zl So. 93 ; Com- 
 
 monwealth V. Hargis, 124 Ky. 356, 99 
 S. W. 348, 30 Ky. L. 510; Delaney v. 
 State, 148 Ala. 586, 42 So. 815; Kirk- 
 ham V. People, 170 111. 9, 48 N. E. 
 465 ; State v. Roberts, 28 Nev. 350, 82 
 Pac. 100; Brom v. People, 216 111. 
 148, 74 N. E. 790; Fogg V. State, 81 
 Ark. 417, 99 S. W. 537; People v. 
 Glover (Cal. 1903), 74 Pac. 745; 
 Grant v. State, 118 Ga. 804, 45 S. E. 
 603 ; Oliver v. State, 129 Ga. 'j-jT, 59 
 S. E. 900; Bricker v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 102 S. W. 117s, 31 Ky. L. 596; 
 State V. McCoomer, 79 S. Car. (iZ, 
 60 S. E. 237 ; Lj'les v. State, 48 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 119, 86 S. W. 763; Brown 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 83 S. W. 
 64s, 26 Ky. L. 1269; State v. Knoll, 
 69 Kan. 767, '/J Pac. 580; Brennan v. 
 People, 37 Colo. 256, 86 Pac. 79; 
 Hunter v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 114 
 S. W. 124; People v. Brecht, 105 N. 
 Y. S. 436; State v. Boggan, 133 N. 
 Car. 761, 46 S. E. in; Pyle v. State, 
 4 Ga. App. 811, 62 S. E. 540; People 
 V. Del Vermo, 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. 
 E. 690; Gardner v. State, 55 Fla. 25, 
 45 So. 1028; Smith V. State, 48 Fla. 
 307, yj So. 573 ; Sutherland v. State, 
 121 Ga. 190, 48 S. E. 915: Bilton v. 
 Territory (Okla. 1909), 99 Pac. 163, 
 and cases cited in Underbill on Ev., 
 p. 139. "An undoubted belief in the 
 mind of the declarant at the time the 
 declarations are made, that the finger 
 of death is upon him is indispen- 
 sable." People V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 
 17, 24. "If there is the least hope, 
 no matter how faint, the requisite 
 certainty of belief does not exist." 
 Peak V. State, 50 N. J. L. 179, 222, 12 
 Atl. 70T. 
 A declaration to be admissible as
 
 191 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 lO- 
 
 His mental condition in this respect must be shown before his 
 declaration is received, and if he entertained any hopes, however 
 slight, that his injury is not mortal, his statement should be re- 
 jected. If, however, it is shown that he was conscious of near 
 approaching death, it is immaterial that no one had told him that 
 he was about to die, though his silence and conduct, when told 
 he must die, is always relevant to show that he did or did not 
 believe what was told him.^ 
 
 The statement of the accused tending to show his knowledge 
 or belief that he is dying, and that he entertains no hope of re- 
 covery, though a part of the declaration, is always admissible.^" 
 
 It is perhaps the most satisfactory and convincing evidence of 
 a consciousness of approaching death in his mind but it is not the 
 only evidence, nor is any particular form of words required of 
 him." 
 
 a dying declaration must have been 
 made under a sense of impending death 
 (86 Am, St. 655, 658), and without 
 hope of recovery (86 Am. St. 660, 
 661), and with belief in its immi- 
 nence, 86 Am. St. 660. The declara- 
 tion need not state belief in the im- 
 minence of death, 86 Am. St. 658, 660. 
 Circumstances under which may be 
 made, 86 Am. St. 639, 640; dying 
 condition of person making, 86 Am. 
 St. 654, 663; ratification of declara- 
 tion previously made, 86 Am. St. 647. 
 
 'Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577, 578, 
 8 So. 380. 
 
 " State V. Cronin, 64 Conn. 293, 29 
 Atl. 536; State V. Vaughan, 22 Nev. 
 285, 39 Pac. 733; Commonwealth v. 
 Thompson, 159 Mass. 56, 59, 33 N. E. 
 iTii; Pate v. State, 150 Ala. 10, 43 
 So. 343; State V. Bohanon, 142 N. 
 Car. 69s, 55 S. E. 797; Moore v. 
 State, 40 So. 345, 146 Ala. 687, not 
 reported in full ; State v. Biango (N. 
 J-. 1907), 68 Atl. 125; State v. Nowells, 
 135 Iowa S3, 109 N. W. 1016; Jarvis 
 v. State, T38 Ala. 17, 34 So. 1025; 
 Lipscomb v. State, 75 Miss. 559, 23 
 
 So. 210, 230; People V. Brecht, 105 
 N. Y. S. 436; Rice v. State, 51 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 25s, 103 S. W. 1 1 56; Asher 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 91 S. W. 
 662, 28 Ky. L. 1342; Farmer v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 91 S. W. 682, 28 
 Ky. L. 1 168; Copeland v. State (Fla., 
 1909), 50 So. 621 ; State v. Brady, 124 
 La. 951, 50 So. 806. 
 
 " State V. Johnson, 26 S. Car. 152, 
 158, I S. E. 510; People v. Samario, 84 
 Cal. 484, 485; 24 Pac. 283; Lester v. 
 State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 232 ; Fulcher 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 465, 13 S. W. 
 750; McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672; 
 State V. Newhouse, 39 La. Ann. 862, 
 865, 2 So. 799; State V. Black, 42 La. 
 Ann. 861, 863, 8 So. 594; United 
 States V. Heath, 20 D. C. (9 Mackey) 
 272; State V. Gillick, 7 Iowa 287; 
 Mockabee v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 
 380, 382; State V. Mills. 91 N. Car. 
 581, 594; State V. Dalton, 20 R. I. 
 114, 37 Atl. 673; Long V. State, 48 
 Tex. Cr. App. 17S, 88 S. W. 203; 
 State V. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 87 S. 
 W. 519; Roberts V. State, 48 Tox. Cr. 
 App. 378, 88 S. W. 221 ; Bilton v. Ter- 
 ritory (Okla. 1909), 99 Pac. 163.
 
 I03 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 192 
 
 Thus, if the deceased states that it is useless to send for a doc- 
 tor/" that he is sure to die/" or obhged to die/* tliat he cannot 
 live and wants to make a dying declaration/''"' that he does not 
 think/'' or expect that he will recover from his wounds/' that 
 he has no hope of recovery/'' that he knows he is going to die/'"* 
 that he knows that he cannot live/-" that he is killed.-^ or uses 
 similar expressions, it is conclusively presumed that he has a full 
 and real sense of approaching death. 
 
 But if the declarant, w^hen making his statement, merely states 
 that he ''has no hope at present,"-- or says, "Who knows? per- 
 haps I may get well/'"^ or may recover,-* or expresses a hope 
 
 ^- State V. Jones, 47 La. Ann. 1524, 
 18 So. 515. 
 
 ^^ State V. Alclrich, 50 Kan. 666, 672, 
 Ti2 Pac. 408; State v. Turlington, 102 
 Mo. 642, 656, 15 S. W. 141 ; State v. 
 Smith, 48 La. Ann. 533, 19 So. 452; 
 Crump V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 20 
 S. W. 390, 14 Ky. L. 450; Logan v. 
 State, 149 Ala. 11, 43 So. 10; DuBose 
 V. State, 120 Ala. 300, 25 So. 185; 
 Gregory v. State, 148 Ala. 566, 42 So. 
 829; Harper v. State, 129 Ga. 770, 59 
 S. E. 792; State v. Gianfala, 113 La. 
 463, 37 So. 30; Newton v. State, SI 
 Fla. 82, 41 So. 19; State v. Kelleher, 
 201 Mo. 614, 100 S. W. 470; Titus 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 16, 23 So. 77; 
 Walker v. State, 41 So. 878, 147 Ala. 
 699, not reported in full ; Rowsey v. 
 Commonwealth, 116 Ky. 617, 76 S. W. 
 409. 25 Ky. L. 841. 
 
 " State V. Banister, 35 S. Car. 290, 
 295, 296, 14 S. E. 678; Rice V. State, 
 49 Tex. Cr. App. 569, 94 S. W. 1024. 
 
 " Pierson v. State, 2T Tex. App. 14, 
 17 S. W. 468: Starks v. State, 137 
 Ala. 9, 34 So. 687; Payne v. State, 
 45 Tex. Cr. App. 564. 78 S. W. 934- 
 
 '" IMcQueen v. State, 94 Ala. 50, 52, 
 10 So. 433, 434. 
 
 "State V. Gay, 18 Mont. 51. 44 Pac. 
 411; State V. Nance, 25 S. Car. 168, 
 
 172; Pate V. State, 150 Ala. 10, 43 So. 
 
 343- 
 
 '^ State V. Garrison, 147 Mo. 548, 
 49 S. W. 508. 
 
 " Heninburg v. State, 151 Ala. 26, 
 43 So. 959. 
 
 '" People V. Callaghan, 4 Utah 49, 
 6 Pac. 49; Hunter v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 App.), 114 S. W. 124; Pitts V. State, 
 140 Ala. 70, 37 So. loi ; State v. 
 Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85 Pac. 251. 
 
 ■^ Simons v. People, 150 111. 66, 74, 
 36 N. E. 1019; State v. Elkins, lor 
 Mo. 344, 350, 14 S. W. 116; State v. 
 Russell, 13 Mont. 164, 32 Pac. 854, 
 856; Luker v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 5 S. W. 354, 9 Ky. L. 385; Patterson 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 613, 95 S. 
 W. 129; Smith V. State, 145 Ala. 17, 
 40 So. 957; Greer v. State (Ala. 
 1908), 47 So. 300. See also, the case 
 of Brown v. State, 150 Ala. 25, 43 
 So. 194. 
 
 " Reg. V. Jenkins, L. R. i C. C. 
 187, T91, L. J. 38 M. C. 82; Crockett 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 276, 77 S. 
 W. 4- 
 
 "'Jackson v. Commonwealth, 19 
 Gratt. (Va.) 656. 
 
 "* Bowles V. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 
 8t6, 48 S. E. 527.
 
 193 DYING DECLARATIONS. § IO4 
 
 that, in case he dies, he may meet a person in heaven,-^ or hopes 
 that the attending surgeon will do what he can for the sake of his 
 family,-" or thinks he is in great danger^^ and may not recover,-^ 
 his declarations, not having been made in immediate apprehen- 
 sion of death, are inadmissible. The competency of dying declara- 
 tions is for the court, and, where the declarations are admitted 
 in evidence, they receive only such weight as the jury may deter- 
 mine.-^ 
 
 i< 104. Sending for legal or spiritual advisers, nature of wounds 
 or other circumstances showing a consciousness of approaching death. 
 — As in all cases where a person's mental condition is relevant, 
 this condition may, and from the very nature of things very often 
 must be shown by circumstances and not proved by the express 
 declarations of the deceased.^" The consciousness of approaching 
 death may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the 
 dying man.^^ He need not state expressly that he thinks or be- 
 lieves his end is near, or that he is at peace with his God,^^ while 
 making his statement, if the nature of his wounds, ^^ or his gen- 
 eral physical condition,^'* and his actions and language are such 
 that the court is reasonably satisfied that he realized that he was 
 about to die and had abandoned all hopes of recovery.^ ^ 
 
 -^ State V. Medlicott, 9 Kan. 257, ^- State v. Black, 42 La. Ann. 861, 
 
 282, 285. 864, 8 So. 594. 
 
 ■" Rex V. Crockett, 4 C. & P. 544. '' Hill v. Commonwealth, 2 Gratt. 
 
 "Errington's Case, 2 Lewin's C. C. (Va.) 594, 595, 605; Woodcock's 
 
 148. Case, 2 Leach C. Law 563, 567; Du- 
 
 -' People V. Hodgdon, 55 Cal. 72, mas v. State, 62 Ga. 58, 64 ; State v. 
 
 76, 36 Am. 30 ; State v. Knoll, 69 Kan. Roberts, 28 Nev. 350, 82 Pac. 100. 
 
 767, 77 Fac. 580. =* State v. Fuller (Ore. 1908), 96 
 
 "'■■State V. Fuller (Ore. 1908), 96 Pac. 456, where decedent's face was 
 
 Pac. 456. pallid or yellow, her breath short and 
 
 When hope of recovery entertained pulse weak and her eyes glassy, 
 
 by others is material, and when not State v. Roberts, 28 Nev. 350, 82 Pac. 
 
 — note, 86 Am. St. 661, 662, 663. 100. 
 
 '"State V. Fuller (Ore. 1908), 96 ''Fitzgerald v. State, 11 Neb. 577, 
 
 Pac. 456. 10 N. W. 495; People v. Bemmerly, 
 
 "State v. Evans, 124 Mo. 397, 407, 87 Cal. 117, 118, 25 Pac. 266; People 
 
 28 S. W. 8; People v. Chase, 79 Hun v. Kraft, 91 Hun (N. Y.) 474, 36 N. 
 
 (.V. Y.) 296, 299, 29 N. Y. S. 376; Y. S. 1034; People v. Taylor, 59 Cal. 
 
 Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 640, 646; Dumas v. State, 62 Ga. 58, 
 
 232; White V. State, in Ala. 92, 21 62; State v. Russell, 13 Mont. 164, 32 
 So. 330. 
 
 13 — UXDKRHII.L CrIM. Ev.
 
 104 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 194 
 
 A i^hysician may testify to declarant's physical condition."'^''' 
 
 Perhaps the most useful and important circumstance in de- 
 termining whether the consciousness of approaching dissolution 
 is present in the mind of the declarant is his sending for a spir- 
 itual adviser that he may receive religious consolation preparatory 
 to death.^^ If the dying person was a Roman Catholic, evidence 
 that he had sent for a priest to receive his confession and from 
 whom he wished to receive extreme unction and absolution would, 
 in the absence of other controlling circumstances, be conclusive 
 that he was in immediate apprehension of death."^ 
 
 But the silence or failure of the declarant to make a reply when 
 he is told by his attending physician that he cannot be cured with 
 his pleading to God for mercy is not conclusive that he has aban- 
 doned all hopes of recovery.^** 
 
 Other elements may be considered. So the actual character of 
 the wound itself, and its seriousness,^" where it is in a vital part 
 and thus calculated to justify an apprehension of mortal danger 
 in the mind of the wounded man ; the urgency expressed by him 
 that a surgeon should be called,*^ the use of religious expressions 
 
 Pac. 854, 856; State v. Wilson, 24 
 Kan. 186, 189, 197, 36 Am. 257 ; Haw- 
 kins V. State, 98 Md. 355, 57 Atl. 27. 
 Cf. Radbourne's Case, 2 Leach C. 
 Law 512, 520, 521. 
 
 ^* Heningburg V. State (Ala. 1907), 
 45 So. 246. 
 
 " Hammil v. State, 90 Ala. 577, 579, 
 581, 8 So. 380 ; State v. Kelleher, 201 
 Mo. 614, 100 S. W. 470. It is proper, 
 however, to exclude evidence on the 
 part of accused to show that the de- 
 clarant refused to send for a priest 
 about the time he uttered the state- 
 ment which is offered as his dying 
 declaration. State v. Zorn, 202 Mo. 
 12, 100 S. W. 591. 
 
 ^"' Carver v. United States, 164 U. 
 S. 694, 41 L. ed. 602, 17 Sup. Ct. 228; 
 Reg. V. Howell, i Den. C. C. i ; Peo- 
 ple V. Buettner, 233 111. 272, 84 N. E. 
 218; People V. Stacy, 119 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 743, 104 N. Y. S. 615. 
 
 ^^ State V. Daniels, 115 La. 59, 38 
 So. 894. Though deceased, when ad- 
 vised of a change for the worse, said 
 that he did not feel any worse, and 
 that he could not afford to die, his 
 statement thereupon made that he be- 
 lieved he was about to die, and that 
 he had been told by the doctors that 
 he was about to die, and made it as 
 his dying statement, was admissible ; 
 it appearing that he had confidence 
 in his physician, and the circum- 
 stances tending to show that his opin- 
 ions as to his recovery had under- 
 gone a change, and his death having 
 occurred within three hours after the 
 statement was made. State v. Craig, 
 190 ^lo. 332, 88 S. W. 641. 
 
 ^"Robinson v. State, 130 Ga. 361, 
 60 S. E. 1005 ; Jones v. State, 130 Ga. 
 274, 60 S. E. 840. 
 
 " The fact that the deceased sent
 
 195 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 10^ 
 
 by the dying declarant looking to a speedy entrance into another 
 world, his bidding farewell to his relatives and friends gathered 
 about his bedside/" his expressing a desire to execute a will and 
 sending an urgent call for the immediate attendance of a legal 
 adviser to frame it, and designating the minister to preach the 
 funeral sermon,*^ are facts from which, taken together or in con- 
 nection with other evidence, the existence of a consciousness of 
 near approaching death may be inferred. But the opinion of a wit- 
 ness that the deceased did or did not think he would die is never 
 admissible.^* 
 
 So the fact that the deceased having stated that he thinks he 
 has been fatally wounded when asked who shot him says he is 
 too weak to talk now but he will tell who shot him next morning 
 does not render his dying declaration inadmissible/^ 
 
 § 105. Period intervening between the statement and the death. — 
 
 Though a statement was made while the deceased was hopeful 
 of recovery, it is receivable if he subsequently ratifies it when 
 all hope is gone.*° On the other hand, the fact that he, after he 
 
 for a doctor may indicate an expecta- 
 tion of ultimate recovery. Mathedy 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), IQ S. W. 
 977, 14 Ky. L. 182. But in State v. 
 Evans, 124 Mo. 397, 408, 28 S. W. 8, 
 it is said : "The mere fact that the 
 victim, while writhing under the tor- 
 ments of a murderous blow, seeks re- 
 lief from anguish by sending for a 
 physician is not indicative of a hope 
 of life, but of a natural desire to be 
 relieved of pain." And see, on con- 
 senting to an operation, State v. 
 Thompson, 49 Ore. 46, 88 Pac. 583, 
 124 .^m. St. loisn; Reg. v. Howell, I 
 Den. C. C. I ; McQueen v. State, T03 
 Ala. T2, T5 So. 824. That a person 
 mortally wounded consents to be re- 
 moved to a sanitarium for the satis- 
 faction of his family is not incon- 
 sistent with his own abandonment of 
 the hope of recovery. State v. How- 
 ard, T20 La. 3TT, 45 So. 260. 
 "People V. Bemmerly, 87 Cal. 117, 
 
 118, 25 Pac. 266; Ward v. State, 85 
 Ark. 179, 107 S. W. 6-/T. 
 
 ^^ State V. Nelson, loi Mo. 464, 468, 
 14 S. W. 712; Digby v. People, 113 
 III. 123, 127, 55 Am. 402. 
 
 ** State V. Tilghman, 11 Ired. (N. 
 Car.) 513, 551. See Davis v. State, 
 120 Ga. 843, 48 S. E. 305. One wit- 
 ness may testify to the presence of 
 an expectation of death and the dec- 
 laration may be shown by another. 
 People v. Garcia, 63 Cal. 19, 20; 
 Austin v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 40 
 S. W. 905, 19 Ky. L. 474. And parol 
 evidence to show the feeling of death 
 being imminent is always proper. 
 Cleveland v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 lOT S. W. 931, 3T Ky. L. 115. 
 
 *' State v. McCoomer, 79 S. Car. ds, 
 60 S. E. 237. 
 
 '" Bryant v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 
 394, 33 S. W. 978, 36 S. W. 70; State 
 V. Evans, T24 Mo. 397, 409, 28 S. W. 
 8; Siicll v. State, 29 Tex. App. 236,
 
 I05 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 196 
 
 makes the statements, gets better so that he is encom*aged to be- 
 Heve and to express a hope that he will recover, will not exclude 
 his statement actually made in immediate expectation of death. ^^ 
 
 It is never necessary that the dying declaration should have 
 been made while the declarant was actually drawing his last 
 breath/^ 
 
 The fact that a considerable period has intervened between the 
 making of the declaration and the death of the declarant is im- 
 material, and furnishes no valid ground for rejecting the declara- 
 tion if it is shown that, when it was made, the speaker was in fact 
 fully impressed with the belief that he would die in a short time.^^ 
 Thus, declarations which were uttered forty-eight hours, ^" six 
 days,^^ ten days,''- eleven days,^^ fifteen days,^* seventeen days,^^ 
 
 15 S. W. 722, 25 Am. St. 723 
 V. Steele, 12 Cox Cr. Cas. 168 ; Mock- 
 abee v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 380; 
 Johnson v. State, 102 Ala. i, 16 So. 
 99, 103; Small V. Commonwealth, 91 
 Pa. St. 304; Sims v. State, 139 Ala. 
 74, 36 So. 138, loi Am. St. 17. 
 
 Ratification of declaration previ- 
 ously made — note, 86 Am. St. 647. 
 
 *' State V. Caldwell, 115 N. Car. 
 794, 804, 20 S. E. 523 ; State v. Tilgh- 
 man, 11 Ired. (N. Car.) 513, 552; 
 State V. Reed, 53 Kan. 767, ^^z, Z7 
 Pac. 174, 42 Am. St. 322; State v. 
 Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 657. 15 S. 
 W. 141 ; Swisher v. Commonwealth, 
 26 Gratt. (Va.) 963, 21 Am. 330; 
 People V. Stacy, 192 N. Y. 577, 85 N. 
 E. 1 1 14, aff'g 119 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 743, 104 N. Y. S. 615; Rose v. State, 
 143 Ala. 114, 42 So. 21; Lowe v. 
 State (Ga.), 63 S. E. 11 14. An ex- 
 press statement that the deceased has 
 surrended all hope of recovery is in- 
 dispensable where from the evidence 
 it appears that his mind was busy 
 with the idea of prosecuting those 
 who had shot him at the time he 
 made his statement. State v. Daniels, 
 115 La. 59, 38 So. 894- 
 
 ** Tohnson v. State, 102 Ala. i, 16 
 
 So. 99, 103 ; Commonwealth v. Ha- 
 ney, 127 Mass. 455, 457 ; Rice v. State, 
 51 Tex. Cr. App. 255, 103 S. W. 
 1 1 56; Bricker v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 102 S. W. II7S, 31 Ky. L. 
 596; Commonwealth v. Latampa, 226 
 Pa. 23, 74 Atl. 736. 
 
 Declaration need not be made im- 
 mediately before death, 86 Am. St. 
 662, 665. 
 
 ^* State v. Reed, 53 Kan, 767, 77Z, 
 2,7 Pac. 174, 42 Am. St. 322; Ken- 
 nedy V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 100 S. 
 W. 242, 30 Ky, L. 1063; State v. 
 Brown, iii La. 696, 35 So. 818. 
 
 Time when declaration should have 
 been made — note, 86 Am. St. 663, 665, 
 I L. R. A. (N. S.) 419- 
 
 "" Woodcock's Case, 2 Leach C. 
 Law 563. 
 
 " People V. Weaver, 108 Mich. 649, 
 66 N. W. 567; Moore v. State, 96 
 Tenn. 209, 2,Z S. W. 1046; Daughdrill 
 V. State, 113 Ala. 7, 21 So. 378. 
 
 ^"Tinckler's Case, I East Pleas 
 Crown 354. 
 
 =^Rex V. Mosly, i Mood. C. C. 98, 
 
 lOI. 
 
 "State V. Blackburn, 80 N. Car. 
 
 474, 478. 
 "Commonwealth v. Cooper, 5 Al-
 
 197 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 1 06 
 
 seven weeks^^ and five months,®^ before the death of the declarant 
 have been received. ^^ 
 
 The burden of proving the presence in the mind of the declarant 
 of the sense of approaching death is upon the prosecution.*^^ 
 
 § 106. Declarations not admissible to prove all crimes. — Declara- 
 tions made in extremis are never admissible as dying declara- 
 tions in civil cases, though they may be received upon other 
 grounds than their ante mortem character, as, for example, where 
 they are declarations reciting facts of pedigree, or where they 
 form a part of the res gestce.'^'^ 
 
 The declaration of a deceased person, which is offered in evi- 
 dence as a dying declaration, is only admissible as such in case his 
 death is the subject of an inquiry which is made because of an ac- 
 cusation of homicide, and the circumstances accompanying or 
 leading up to or the cause of that death are the subject-matter of 
 the declaration.'^^ 
 
 len (Mass.) 495, 8r Am. Dec. 762; 
 Commonwealth v. Roberts, 108 Mass. 
 296. 
 
 '"Fulcher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 465, 472, 13 S. W. 750. 
 
 " State V. Craine, 120 N. Car. 601, 
 27 S. E. 72. 
 
 °' State V. Crabtree, iii Mo. 136, 20 
 S. W. 7; Boulden v. State, 102 Ala. 
 78, 15 So. 341 ; State v. Banister, 35 
 S. Car. 290, 14 S. E. 678; State v. 
 Daniel, 31 La. Ann. 91 ; People v. 
 Chase, 79 Hun (N. Y.) 296, 297, 29 
 N. Y. S. 376; Commonwealth v. Ha- 
 ney, 127 Mass. 455, 457; Kehoe v. 
 Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 127; Mc- 
 Ewen V. State, 152 Ala. 38, 44 So. 
 619. 
 
 ""Peak V. State, 50 N. J. L. 179, 
 222, 223, 12 Atl. 701 ; Digby v. People, 
 113 Til. 123, 128, 55 Am. 402; Wallace 
 V. State, 90 Ga. 117, 15 S. E. 700; 
 Reg. V. Jenkins, L. R. i C. C. 187, 
 
 191 ; Lester v. State, 2i7 Fla. 382, 20 
 So. 232. A statement made two or 
 three minutes before death is admis- 
 sible as a dying declaration, though 
 the deceased did not say that he was 
 going to die until he had finished his 
 declaration. People v. Lee Sare Bo, 
 72 Cal. 622,, 625, 14 Pac. 310. 
 
 "o Daily v. New York &c. R. Co., 
 32 Conn. 356, 87 Am. Dec. 176; 
 Friedman v. Railroad Co., 7 Phila. 
 (Pa.) 203; Marshall v. Chicago &c. 
 R. Co., 48 111. 475, 479, 480, 95 Am. 
 Dec. 561 ; Wilson v. Boerem, 15 John. 
 (N. Y.) 286; Zipperian v. People, 23 
 Colo. 134, 79 Pac. 1018; State v. 
 Teachey, 138 N. Car. 587, 50 S. E. 
 232; Jones V. State (Ark. 1909), 115 
 S. W. 166. 
 
 "i Greenl. on Ev., § 156; Rex v. 
 Mead, 2 B. & C. 605 ; People v. Fong 
 Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8, 13, 11 Pac. 323;
 
 io6 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 198 
 
 The rule admitting chnng declarations does not apply in the case 
 of any crime, except homicide. xAtnd even where a crime, as for 
 example, abortion, is by statute declared to be murder, if the 
 woman, on whom it has been performed, dies, dying declarations 
 are inadmissible. The accused is not indicted for the murder but 
 for the abortion, and the victim's death is not a material and con- 
 stituent element of the abortion, but affects the punishment alone. ''- 
 
 An exception to this rule, more apparent that real, is sometimes 
 
 Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338, 347, 
 41 Am. 815; People v. Smith, 104 N. 
 Y. 491, 50s, 10 N. E. 873, 58 Am. 
 S37n; People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95, 
 96; State V. Baldwin, 79 Iowa 714, 
 45 N. W. 297, 299; McBride v. Peo- 
 ple, 5 Colo. App. 9T, Z7 Pac. 953, 955, 
 956; State V. Shelton, 2 Jones (N. 
 Car.) 360, 364, 64 Am. Dec. 587; 
 State V. Nelson, loi Mo. 464, 14 S. 
 W. 712; Mitchell v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 14 S. W. 489, 12 Ky. L. 458; 
 State V. McCoomer, 79 S. Car. 63, 60 
 S. E. 237 ; Connell v. State, 46 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 259, 81 S. W. 746; People 
 V Schiavi, 96 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 479, 89 N. Y. S. 564; Lockhart v. 
 State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 589, in S. 
 W. 1024; Richards v. Commonwealth, 
 107 Va. 881, 59 S. E. 1 104; State v. 
 Harris, 112 La. 937, 36 So. 810. The 
 d3nng declaration of an accomplice in 
 a burglary is inadmissible as a dying 
 declaration against another accom- 
 plice, as his death is not under in- 
 vestigation. People V. Hall, 94 Cal. 
 595, 30 Pac. 7. 
 
 *" Railing v. Commonwealth, no 
 Pa. St. TOO, 103, 108, I Atl. 314; Rex 
 v. Hutchison (1822), 2 B. & C. 608; 
 People V. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95, 103, 104; 
 Lyles V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 119, 
 86 S. W. "/dz'^ People v. Stison, 140 
 Mich. 216, 103 N. W. 542, 112 Am. 
 St. 397; State v. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 
 78, 80, 35 Am. 596; Reg. v. Hind, 8 
 
 Cox Cr. Cas. 300, 301 ; Wooten v. 
 Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223, 99 Am. Dec. 
 456; Rex v. Mead, 2 B. & C. 605, 607. 
 Contra, Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 
 338, 41 Am. 815; 3 Crim. Law Mag. 
 523; State V. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299; 
 Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 195 Mass. 
 100, 80 N. E. 799. The same prin- 
 ciple was held applicable where, upon 
 an indictment for robbery, the dying 
 statement of the person robbed was 
 ofifered to prove the accused guilty 
 of the robbery. Rex v. Lloyd, 4 C. 
 & P. 233. "The rule that dying decla- 
 rations should point distinctly to the 
 cause of death, and to the circum- 
 stances producing and attending it, is 
 one that should not be relaxed. Dec- 
 larations are uncertain evidence, lia- 
 ble to be misunderstood, imperfectly 
 remembered and incorrectly related. 
 As to dying declarations there can be 
 no cross-examination. The condition 
 of the declarant is often unfavorable 
 to clear recollection, and to the giv- 
 ing of a full and complete account of 
 all the particulars which it might be 
 important to know. Hence, all vague 
 and indefinite expressions, all lan- 
 guage that does not distinctl}' point 
 to the cause of death and its attend- 
 ant circumstances, but requires to be 
 aided by inference or supposition to 
 establish facts tending to criminate, 
 should be held inadmissible." State v. 
 Center, 35 Vt. 378, 386.
 
 199 DYIXG DECLARATIONS, § IO7 
 
 made in the case of the homicide of two persons by one who is on 
 trial for the murder of one of them only. If the circumstance of 
 the deaths are so closely connected that they may be regarded as 
 parts of a single transaction, the dying declaration of A. may be 
 admitted on a trial for the killing of B., in a case where A. and B. 
 were killed in the same transaction. The cases in which this ex- 
 ception has prevailed have been homicides by poisoning, where the 
 deaths were nearly simultaneous in time and place, and where they 
 were produced by the same means. *^^ 
 
 This exception has not, however, received universal recognition 
 and should not be pressed too far.^* And the mere circumstance 
 that a person's death occurred in a disturbance in which the person 
 for whose homicide the prisoner was indicted was killed, is insuffi- 
 cient to admit his declaration, when it is not shown that the decla- 
 rants' death was directly due to the defendant's act.''^ 
 
 § 107. Dying declarations distinguished from those which are a 
 part of the res gestae. — It may be of value to distinguish clearly and 
 somewhat in detail between declarations, whether of deceased, or 
 living persons, which are admissible as original evidence forming 
 a part of the res gestce of the crime; and those which are wholly 
 hearsay and which are received solely because they are dying dec- 
 larations/'*^ 
 
 In regard to the former class of declarations it need only be said 
 that they are generally admitted whatever the crime charged, on 
 account of their unprompted, natural, contemporaneous and ex- 
 planatory connection with the main transaction.''' On the other 
 hand dying declarations, not necessarily constituting any part of 
 the res gesfcu, but being usually subsequent in time and always nar- 
 rative of past events, both in their form and nature, are mainl)^ 
 
 ^ Rex V. Baker, 2 Mood. & Rob. 53 ; road three hundred j-ards from the 
 
 State V. Terrell, 12 Rich. (S. Car.) house. Brown v. Commonwealth, 7^ 
 
 321, 329; State V. Wilson, 23 La. Ann. Pa. St. 321, 329, 13 Am. 740. 
 558, 559- Where the declarant was "^ State v. Bohan, 15 Kan. 407. 
 found unconscious in a house which "' State v. Westfall, 49 Iowa 328. 
 had been robbed, her dying declara- *^ See Hill's Case, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 
 
 tions were rejected on a trial for the 594, 605. 
 
 homicide of the owner of the house. Dying declarations as part of res 
 
 who was her husband, and who was rjcsfee — note. 86 Am. St. 665. 
 found dead at the same time on a " See ante, § 94, et scq.
 
 § I08 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 200 
 
 admitted that homicide may not go unpunished, where the death of 
 the declarant is the subject-matter of a criminal trial.*'^ 
 
 In such a case, if no third person were present at the instant of 
 the homicide (and this, it is well known, is very frequently the 
 case), it would be impossible to procure direct evidence upon the 
 main fact in issue, as the mouth of the accused is closed by the pol- 
 icy of our law unless he shall see fit to testify for himself. But the 
 fact that the evidence is received from the necessity of the matter 
 furnishes no basis for its exclusion where other evidence of the 
 cause and the attendant circumstances of the death is to be had. 
 This is so even if the other proof is uncontradicted or conclusive."'* 
 And dying declarations are not admissible only in cases where the 
 evidence is wholly circumstantial, 
 
 § 108. Opinions contained in dying declarations are not admissible. 
 
 — The recitals in dying declarations, which are admissible in evi- 
 dence, include recitals of fact which might have been given by the 
 declarant if living and appearing as a witness at the trial, and may 
 include statements of facts occurring or existing coincident with 
 the commission of the homicide, and tending to establish every es- 
 sential element of the crime. The declarations should not contain 
 matter which would be excluded if the declarant were a witness.'" 
 Dying declarations are not admissible if stating opinions only. 
 He is beyond the reach of cross-examination to ascertain the 
 grounds upon which his opinion may be based, and other reasons 
 may exist which would exclude his opinion if he were a living 
 witness. 
 
 "'State V. Wood, 53 Vt. 560, 564; 30 Mich. 431; People v. Taylor, 59 
 
 Commonwealth v, Casey, 11 Cush, Cal. 640, 645; Gardner v. State, 55 
 
 (jMass.) 417, 421, 59 Am. Dec. 150. Fla. 25, 45 So. 1028; George v. State, 
 
 ™ Reynolds v. State, 68 Ala. 502; 145 Ala. 41, 40 So. 961, 117 Am. St. 
 
 People V. Beverb', 108 Mich. 509, 66 17; Connell v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 N. W. 379. And dying declarations 259, 81 S, W. 746, 
 are not admissible only in cases Dying declarations, as a general 
 
 where the evidence is wholly circum- rule, must consist of facts, and not 
 
 stantial. opinions, 86 Am. St. 649, 652, but 
 
 "" State V. Black, 42 La. Ann. 86r, there are circumstances under which 
 
 8 So. 594; Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. opinion may be shown by such a dec- 
 
 618; McBride v. People, 5 Colo. App. laration, 86 Am. St. 649, 652. 
 91, 37 Pac. 953; People v. Olmstead,
 
 201 DYING DECLARATIONS. § I08 
 
 Opinions in dying declarations are inadmissible. It is indispen- 
 sable that the dying declaration should consist solely of facts, and 
 not of conclusions, mental impressions or opinions.'^ 
 
 Hence it is proper to reject from evidence a statement of the de- 
 ceased to a witness that he (the witness) knew how the shooting 
 was done, that it was uncalled for and that the trouble was between 
 the deceased and the witness."- Thus, a dying statement that the 
 deceased thought or believed'^ the accused had shot him, or that 
 he expected the accused would try to kill him,'^* is inadmissible 
 where the deceased did not see his assailant, but based his declara- 
 tion wholly upon threats which had been made by the accused. 
 But opinions in dying declarations are admissible whenever they 
 would be received, if the declarant were himself a witness. '^ So a 
 declaration that as the accused arose he was reaching in his pocket 
 for his revolver is not a mere statement of a conclusion, but is de- 
 scriptive of the act of accused in getting his revolver from his 
 pocket, which he did."^ And if an expression of an opinion or of 
 a conclusion or of some belief not based on any fact within the 
 knowledge of declarant, which is embraced in the declaration, can 
 be separated from it, the court may do this and then strike out 
 
 '' United States v. Veitch, i Cranch "" Sanford v. State, 143 Ala. 78, 39 
 
 C. C. (U. S.) 115, 28 Fed. Cas. 16614; So. 370. 
 
 People V. Shaw, 63 N. Y. 2>^ ; State '^ Warren v. State, 9 Tex. App. 619, 
 
 V. Mace, 118 N. Car. 1244, 24 S. E. 35 Am. 745; Whitley v. State, 38 Ga. 
 
 798; Mose V. State, 35 Ala. 421; 50; People v. Wasson, 65 Cal. 53S, 
 
 State V. Williams, 67 N. Car. 12; 539, 4 Pac. 555. 
 
 State V. Elkins, loi Mo. 344, 351, 14 '^ People v. Shaw, 6z N. Y. 36, 38. 
 
 S. W. 116; State V. Black, 42 La. " Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 
 
 Ann. 861, 8 So. 594; Moeck v. Peo- 159, 165; Montgomery v. State, 80 
 
 pie, 100 III. 242, 24s, 39 Am. 38; Ind. 338, 346, 41 Am. 815; Boyle v. 
 
 Matherly v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 19 State, 105 Ind. 469, 472, 5 N. E. 203, 
 
 S. W. 977, 978, 14 Ky. L. 182; Berry 55 Am. 218; Hall v. State, 132 Ind. 
 
 V. State (Tex. 1897), 38 S. W. 1038; 317, 323, 31 N. E. 536; State v. Foot 
 
 Baker v. State, 85 Ark. 300, 107 S. You, 24 Ore. 61, 32 Pac. 1031, 23 
 
 W. 983 ; Johnson v. Commonwealth Pac. 537 ; Cleveland v. Common- 
 
 (Ky.), 107 S. W. 768, 32 Ky. L. 1117. wealth (Ky.), loi S. W. 931, 31 Ky. 
 
 An objection to the declaration be- L. 115. See also, Underbill on Evi- 
 
 cause containing opinions must be dence, § 186. 
 
 promptly made. State v. O'Brien, 81 "State v. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 87 
 
 Iowa 88, 46 N. W. 752. S. W. 519.
 
 § 109 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 202 
 
 what is inadmissible and receive what is admissible.'" And a 
 statement that the killing was intentional," or without reason or 
 provocation,'^, or for nothing,**" is not such an expression of an 
 opinion as will exclude a dying declaration. A dying declaration 
 in these words, "Oh, Lordy! Willie shot me for nothing, without 
 any cause," was not objectionable as a statement of a conclusion 
 rather than a fact.^^ 
 
 This is the general rule and has been sustained by the majority 
 of the cases. But in Kentucky it has been held that a declaration 
 which either expressly or by implication states that the accused 
 killed the deceased without cause is not competent. In that state 
 it has been held that the statement of the decedent that the trouble 
 "came up over" his daughters, and that there was some talk about 
 the daughters which displeased the decedent and that the accused 
 then shot the decedent without cause is not admissible.^" 
 
 § 109. Must refer to the res gestae of the homicide. — The declara- 
 tion is admissible only so far as it points directly to the facts con- 
 stituting the res gestcu of the homicide ; that is to say, to the act of 
 killing and to the circumstances immediately attendant thereon.**^ 
 
 A dying statement showing why the deceased went to the place 
 where the homicide was committed, or that, after the crime, he 
 
 "Lipscomb v. State, 76 Aliss. 223, ^"Jackson v. State (Miss. 1908), 47 
 
 25 So. 158. So. 502. 
 
 "^ State V. Nettlebush, 20 Iowa 257. " IMcMillan v. State, 128 Ga. 25, 57 
 
 " State V. Black, 42 La. Ann. 861, S. E. 309. 
 
 8 So. 594; Powers v. State, 74 Miss. *" Wagner v. Commonwealth (Kj'.), 
 
 •/"/J, 21 So. 657; Wroe v. State, 20 108 S. W. 318, 32 Ky. L. 1185. 
 
 Ohio St. 460; House v. State (Miss. *^ Starr v. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 
 
 1909), 48 So. 3; Lockhart v. State, 193,30 S. W. 397, 16 Ky. L. 843; State 
 
 S3 Tex. Cr. App. 589, 11 1 S. W. v. Johnson, 17 Ala. 618; State v. 
 
 1024. Contra, Jones v. Common- Johnson, 26 S. Car. 152, 153, i S. E. 
 
 wealth (Ky.), 46 S. W. 217, 20 Ky. 510; Wakefield v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 L. 355. A statement that accused App. 124, 94 S. W. 1046; State v. 
 
 shot him for nothing and because "of Harris, 112 La. 937, 36 So. 810; State 
 
 the crazy fool that was in him, or v. Doris (Ore. 1908), 94 Pac. 44. 
 
 because he was just a crazy fool," See comprehensive note in 86 Am. 
 
 were inadmissible. Johnson v. Com- St. 647, 649. The death of declarant 
 
 monwealth (Ky.), 107 S. W. 768, 32 and not of another should be under 
 
 Ky. L. 1117; Craft V. State (Tex. Civ. inquiry to render declaration admis- 
 
 App., 1909), 122 S. W. 547. sible, 86 Am. St. 665, 666; State v. 
 
 Kellcher (Mo., 1909), 123 S. W. 55:.
 
 203 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 IIO 
 
 stated to a bystander that he was unarmed,^* or stating actions of 
 the accused or of the deceased prior to the circumstances directly 
 involved in the homicide as the possible motive for it, is not ad- 
 missible.®^ Thus a statement that enmity always existed be- 
 tween the prisoner and the declarant,®*^ or that they had always 
 been friends,^" or describing previous altercations between them,®® 
 or detailing threats made by the accused against the deceased long 
 prior to the crime,®^ has been rejected. But a dying declaration de- 
 scribing threats is admissible if the threats are a part of the res 
 gesfcu of the homicide,''^ and generally the fact that a dying dec- 
 laration, whether written or oral, is partly inadmissible, because it 
 contains opinions or other irrelevant matter, does not exclude the 
 whole of it if the part which is inadmissible can be separated from 
 that which is not.^^ 
 
 § 110. Mode of proof — Credibility, relevancy and weight. — The 
 determination whether a statement should be received as a d3'ing 
 declaration is for the court upon all the facts.*^- A prima facie case 
 
 " State V. Eddon, 8 Wash. 292, 36 
 Pac. 139 ; State v. Horn, 204 Mo. 
 528, 103 S. W. 69. 
 
 *' People V. Fong Ah Sing, 64 Cal. 
 253, 28 Pac. 233; Leiber v. Common- 
 wealth, 9 Bush (Ky.) II. 
 
 ^ Mose V. State, 35 Ala. 421. 
 
 *' Starr v. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 
 193, 30 S. W. 397, 398, 16 Ky. L. 843 ; 
 State V. Doris (Ore. 1908), 94 Pac. 
 44- 
 
 ** State V. Shelton, 2 Jones (N. 
 Car.) 360, 64 Am. Dec. 587; Jones v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 46 S. W. 217, 
 20 Ky. L. 355; Foley v. State, 11 
 Wyo. 464, 72 Pac. 627. 
 
 ** North V. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. 
 E. 966; State V. Wood, 53 Vt. 560; 
 State V. Draper, 65 Mo. 335, 241, 27 
 Am. 287; Merrill v. State, 58 Miss. 
 65. 67; Hackett v. People, 54 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 370. 
 
 •° State V. Wood, 53 Vt. 560, 565. 
 
 "State V. Bridgham (Wash. 1908), 
 
 97 Pac. 1096. The court should 
 charge that the declaration is ad- 
 mitted only to prove the fact and 
 manner of the homicide and should 
 direct the jury to disregard parts of 
 it referring to other matters. 
 
 °" State V. Baldwin, 79 Iowa 714, 45 
 X. W. 297, 299; People V. Kraft, 148 
 N. Y. 631, 43 N. E. 80; Whitaker v. 
 State, 79 Ga. 87, 92, 3 S. E. 403 ; Ke- 
 hoe V. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 127; 
 Evans v. State, 58 Ark. 47, 22 S. W. 
 1026, 1027; People V. Del Vermo, 192 
 N. Y. 470, 8s N. E. 690; State v. 
 Doris (Ore., 1908), 94 Pac. 44; Bate- 
 son V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 34, 80 
 S. W. 88; Park v. State, 126 Ga. 575, 
 55 S. E. 489 ; State v. Crone, 209 Mo. 
 316, 108 S. W. 555; Sims V. State, 139 
 Ala. 74, 36 So. 138, loi Am. St. 17; 
 State V. Zorn, 202 Mo. 12, 100 S. W. 
 591 ; Sailsbcrry v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 107 S. W. 774, 32 Ky. L. T085 ; 
 Tarvcr v. State, 137 Ala. 29, 34 So.
 
 § no 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 204 
 
 is sufficient to authorize a submission of dying declarations to the 
 jyj.y 93 gy^ ^j^jg prima facie proof must be strong, and unless the 
 court is firmly convinced that the declaration was made in actual 
 expectation of immediate death it should not be received. To 
 avoid creating prejudice against the accused in the minds of the 
 jurors, it is advisable, as a matter of practice, to take the prelim- 
 inary proof out of their presence and hearing,®* though evidence 
 may be received in the presence of the jurors, they being instructed 
 that it must be dismissed from their consideration if the dying dec- 
 laration is rejected.®^ 
 
 627; Coyle V. Commonwealth (K5'.), 
 93 S. W. 584, 29 Ky. L. 340; Bilton 
 V. Territory (Okla., 1909), 99 Pac. 
 163; State V. Gallman, 79 S. Car. 229, 
 60 S. E. 682; State V. Franklin, 80 S. 
 Car. 332, 60 S. E. 953; Brennan v. 
 People, 27 Colo. 256, 86 Pac. 79. 
 
 ''State V. Fuller (Ore., 1908), 96 
 Pac. 456. 
 
 Grounds of admissibility of dying 
 declarations — note, 86 Am. St. 638, 
 639, 56 L. R. A. 353; character of 
 to be admissible, 86 Am. St. 647, 654; 
 religious belief of declarant imma- 
 terial, 86 Am. St. 641, 642; but such 
 fact may affect weight of testimony, 
 86 Am. St. 642; declarant must have 
 been sane, 86 Am. St. 640; whether 
 actual danger of death essential to 
 admissibility, 86 Am. St. 654, 655; 
 right of jury to determine existence 
 facts essential to admissibility, 16 L. 
 R. A. (N. S.) 660; whose declara- 
 tions admissible, 86 Am. St. 640; 
 competency of declarant as witness, 
 86 Am. St. 640, 642; intention or mo- 
 tive cannot generally be shown by, 
 86 Am. St. 652, 654; when intention 
 or motive may be shown by, 86 Am. 
 St. 652, 654; written dying declara- 
 tions admissible, 86 Am. St. 642, 644; 
 declarations of husband or wife, 
 when admissible against the other, 86 
 Am. St. 641. 
 
 What admissible as dying declara- 
 tions and in what cases, 86 Am. St. 
 637, 668; in prosecution for abortion, 
 86 Am. St. 666, 667; in prosecution 
 for burglary, 2 Am. St. 398 ; in prose- 
 cution for homicide, 86 Am. St. 665, 
 666, 63 L. R. A. 916; in prosecution 
 for seduction, 86 Am. St. 667, 668. 
 
 ** Doles V. State, 97 Ind. 555, 559; 
 State V. Furney, 41 Kan. 115, 13 Am. 
 St. 262; Swisher v. Commonwealth, 
 26 Gratt. (Va.) 963, 21 Am. 330; 
 State V. Crone, 209 Mo. 316, 108 S. 
 
 w. 555. 
 
 *' Price V. State, 72 Ga. 441, 555; 
 People; v. Smith, 104 N. Y. 491, 493, 
 498, 10 N. E. 873, 58 Am. 537n; 
 Johnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9; Doles 
 V. State, 97 Ind. 555, 559, 560. Dy- 
 ing declarations are admissible from 
 the necessities of the case, but they 
 should be received with caution, 
 for the reason that the declarant has 
 not been administered an oath, and 
 an opportunity for cross-examination 
 has not been afforded defendant, and 
 that the declarant might be influ- 
 enced against defendant; and for the 
 further reason that the physical con- 
 dition of the declarant might render 
 the statement more or less unreliable. 
 Circumstances surrounding the decla- 
 ration should be weighed the same as 
 those surrounding other evidence" —
 
 205 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS. 
 
 IIO 
 
 After the declaration is admitted, its credibility and weight are 
 wholly for the jury,'"' and these elements are to be determined by 
 the same rules that are employed in judging the evidence of a liv- 
 ing witness.^^ So an instruction that dying declarations are to be 
 received or considered with great caution may properly be re- 
 fused.^* 
 
 The dying declaration may be introduced not only as evidence 
 against the accused, but as evidence in his favor as well,®^ though 
 
 or one of similar import, should be 
 given. State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 
 85 Pac. 251. 
 
 ""Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 322, 
 329; State V. McCanon, 51 Mo. 160; 
 Walston V. Commonwealth, 16 B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 15, 35; Doles v. State, 97 
 Ind. 555, 562; McQueen v. State, 94 
 Ala. so, ID So. 433; Evans v. State, 
 58 Ark. 47, 55, 22 S. W. 1026; State 
 V. Zorn, 202 Mo. 12, 100 S. W. 591 ; 
 DuBose V. State, 120 Ala. 300, 25 So. 
 185; State V. Adams (Del., 1906), 65 
 Atl. 510; Willoughby v. Territory, 16 
 Okla. 577, 86 Pac. 56; Jackson v. 
 State (Miss., 1908), 47 So. 502; Car- 
 ter V. State, 2 Ga. App. 254, 58 S. E. 
 532; Gardner v. State, 55 Fla. 25, 45 
 So. 1028 ; State v. Davis, 134 N. Car. 
 633, 46 S. E. 722. 
 
 "'Justice v. State, 99 Ala. 180, 182, 
 13 So. 658; Jones v. State, 70 Miss. 
 401, 404, 12 So. 444; Nordgren v. 
 People, 211 111. 425, 71 N. E. 1042; 
 ]\Ioody V. State, i Ga. App. 772, 58 
 S. E. 262; Smith V. State, 118 Ga. 61, 
 44 S. E. 817; Gambrell v. State 
 (Miss., 1908), 46 So. 138; Zippcrian 
 v. People, 33 Colo. 134, 79 Pac. 1018; 
 State V. Davis, 134 N. Car. 633, 46 S. 
 E. 722; State V. Adams (Del., 1906), 
 65 Atl. 510; State V. Doris (Ore., 
 1908), 94 Pac. 44; DuBose v. State, 
 120 .Ma. 300, 25 So. 185. Indeed, it 
 lias been held that the jury may also 
 consider whether, as a matter of fact. 
 
 the deceased was in extremis, and had 
 lost all hopes of recovery. State v. 
 Banister, 35 S. Car. 290, 296, 14 S. 
 E. 678; Commonwealth v. Brewer, 
 164 Mass. 577, 42 N. E. 92. A prima 
 facie case that decedent was in the 
 article of death and conscious of his 
 condition is sufficient to carry a state- 
 ment offered as a dying declaration 
 to the jury, leaving to them the ulti- 
 mate determination as to whether de- 
 cedent was in the article of death 
 and realized his condition. Robinson 
 V. State, 130 Ga. 936, 60 S. E. 1005; 
 Bird V. State, 128 Ga. 253, 57 S. E. 
 320. 
 
 "* Brown v. State, 150 Ala. 25, 43 
 So. 194. 
 
 " In Brock v. Commonwealth, 92 
 Ky. 183, 186, 17 S. W. 337, 13 Ky. L. 
 450, where it appeared that deceased 
 was drawing a pistol when killed, his 
 dying statement that he had brought 
 on the quarrel and was wholly to 
 blame, was received in the defendant's 
 favor. See, also, Felder v. State, 23 
 Tex. App. 477, 5 S. W. 145, 59 Am. 
 777n ; State v. Ashworth, 50 La. .A.nn. 
 94, 23 So. 270. Dying declarations 
 are admissible on the ground that 
 they are made under a solemn, reli- 
 gious sense of impending death con- 
 cerning circumstances of which de- 
 ceased was not likely to have been 
 mistaken, but, since an accused is de- 
 prived of the power of cross-e-xam-
 
 § III CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 206 
 
 declarations of the deceased that he did not believe that the ac- 
 cused meant to kill him/"" and that he did not want him prosecuted 
 for the homicide have been rejected/ as being evidence of no fact 
 except that the declarant possessed a Christian spirit and was 
 ready to forgive his slayer. 
 
 In conclusion, it may be said that a witness, called to prove a 
 dying declaration, is not expected to repeat the exact language 
 used by the deceased, provided he can give the substance of what 
 he heard in a reasonably connected and complete form.- 
 
 § 111. Declaration admissible in its entirety — Contradictory or un- 
 truthful character. — A part of the declaration which is inadmissible 
 may be stricken out on motion,^ but generally, all the deceased has 
 said relevant to the guilt of the accused and bearing upon the facts 
 of the homicide should be admitted, and it is erroneous for the 
 court to reject any portion of it.'* 
 
 So, wdiatever was said by third parties to the deceased, if it 
 forms a part of the conversation containing the declaration, should 
 not be rejected. The accused has the right to prove whatever was 
 said, explaining, limiting or qualifying the declaration, or which 
 will rebut the inference of his guilt which may be drawn there- 
 from. But he can not be permitted to prove statements which, 
 while made during the conversation containing the declaration, are 
 
 ination, they should not be given great 489; State v. Clark (W. Va., 1908), 
 
 weight, where deceased had not a 63 S. E. 402. 
 
 deep sense of accountability to her ^ People v. Farmer, 77 Cal. i, 18 
 
 Maker, and an unenlightened con- Pac. 800. 
 
 science. State v. Trusty, i Penn. * State v. Terrell, 12 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 (Del.) 319, 40 Atl. 766. 321; Archibald v. State, 122 Ind. 122, 
 
 '~ McPherson v. State, 22 Ga. 478. 123, 23 N. E. 758; State v. Petsch, 43 
 
 ^ State V. Nelson, loi I\Io. 464, 468, S. Car. 132, 20 S. E. 993, 999 ; Ixlattox 
 
 14 S. W. 712; Adams v. People, 47 v. United States, 146 U. S. 140, 36 L. 
 
 111. 276; Slone V. Commonwealth ed. 917, 13 Sup. Ct. 50; People v. 
 
 (Ky.), no S. W. 235, 33 Ky. L. 266. Pong Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8, 13, n Pac. 
 
 - People V. Chin Mook Sow, 51 Cal. 323; Bennett v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 597; Roberts v. State, 5 Tex. App. App.), 75 S. W. 314; Commonwealth 
 
 141; Mattox V. United States, 146 U. v. Spahr, 211 Pa. 542, 60 Atl. 1084. 
 
 S. 140, 36 L. ed. 917, 13 Sup. Ct. 50; Admissibility of partial or distinct 
 
 Park V. State, 126 Ga. 575, 55 S. E. statements— note, 86 Am. St. 646.
 
 207 DYING DECLARATIONS. § III 
 
 not connected with the declaration, but are distinct and independ- 
 ent in their character.^ 
 
 The admission of dying declarations does not violate a constitu- 
 tional provision that the accused shall be confronted with the wit- 
 nesses against him, and shall have an opportunity to hear their 
 evidence.*^ The contradictory, fragmentary or incomplete charac- 
 ter,' or even the manifest untruthfulness of the dying declaration, 
 is no valid objection to its admissibility, however much these de- 
 tract from its credibility as evidence. The fact that the deceased 
 accuses a person who could not possibly have been present when 
 he was slain, does not exclude his statement as against others who 
 could have been present.® 
 
 Declarations made by the deceased contradicting his dying dec- 
 laration in respect to the party accused of the homicide and as to 
 the cause and circumstances of the crime are admissible to impeach 
 it, though they are not shown to have been made under a sense of 
 impending death,^ and (as it is generally impossible to do so), it is 
 never necessary that the attention of the deceased should have been 
 called to the occasion and circumstances of the contradictory 
 statements." A statute prescribing the mode of laying a founda- 
 
 ^ People V. Beach, 87 N. Y. 508; "Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 
 
 Xordgren v. People, 211 III. 425, 71 179, 51 N. W. 652; State v. Patter- 
 
 X. E. 1042. On the question of the son, 45 Vt. 308, 313, 12 Am. 20on; 
 
 disconnected and fragmentary char- State v. Giroux, 26 La. Ann. 582. 
 
 acter of the statement, see State v. * White v. State, 30 Tex. App. 652, 
 
 Garrison, 147 Mo. 548, 49 S. W. 508. 655, 18 S. W. 462. 
 
 "State V. Baldwin, 15 Wash. 15, 45 ^ State v. Lodge, 9 Houst. (Del.) 
 
 Pac. 650; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio 542, S3 Atl. 312; Carver v. United 
 
 St. 131; People V. IMurray, 52 Mich. States, 164 U. S. 694, 41 L. ed. 602, 17 
 
 288, 17 N. W. 843; State v. Price, 6 Sup. Ct. 228; Morelock v. State, 90 
 
 La. Ann. 691; Commonwealth v. Ca- Tenn. 528, 18 S. W. 258; Gregory v. 
 
 rey, 12 Cush. (Mass.) 246, 249; State State, 140 Ala. 16, 37 So. 259; Pyle 
 
 V. Nash, 7 Iowa 347; Woodsides v. v. State, 4 Ga. App. 811, 62 S. E. 540; 
 
 State, 2 How. (Miss.) 655; Walston State v. Mills, 79 S. Car. 187, 60 S. 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 16 B. Mon. (Ky.) E. 664; McCorquodale v. State (Tex. 
 
 15; State V. Van Sant, 80 Mo. 67; Cr. App.), 98 S. W. 879; State v. 
 
 Anthony V. State, Meigs (Tcnn.) 265, Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 85 Pac. 251; 
 
 277, 33 Am. Dec. 143; Campbell v. State v. Fuller (Ore., 1908), 96 Pac. 
 
 State, II Ga. 353; Jones v. State, 130 456. 
 
 Ga. 274, 60 S. E. 840; Burrell v. "People v. Lawrence, 2T Cal. 368; 
 
 State, 18 Tex. 713; People v. Glenn, Carver v. United States. 164 U. S. 
 
 10 Cal. 32. 694, 41 L. ed. 602, 17 Sup. Ct. 228.
 
 §112 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 208 
 
 tion for impeaching a witness by proof of contradictory statements 
 does not apply to dying declarations." On the other hand, evi- 
 dence has been received to show that the deceased declarant had 
 been convicted of the crime of grand larceny and that he had been 
 incarcerated in the penitentiary, for the purpose of impeaching 
 the credibility of the dying declaration.^" Declarations of the de- 
 ceased, not made in contemplation of death, have been received to 
 corroborate his dying declaration.^^ 
 
 § 112. The form of the declaration. — It is not necessary that the 
 deceased should have been formally examined or questioned as 
 though he were upon the witness stand. But, on the other hand, 
 dying declarations elicited by persistent questioning or persuasion, 
 or by the most urgent solicitation to tell the truth, are always re- 
 ceivable.^* 
 
 Dying declarations which consist simply in the decedent identi- 
 fying certain persons as those who killed him have been received. 
 So, where several men were brought to the accused and he was 
 asked if he could recognize his assailant among them, and he 
 picked out the accused from a number of persons who were stran- 
 gers to him. it was held that this was admissible.^^ 
 
 "State V. Fuller (Ore., 1908), 96 taken before his dying victim will 
 
 Pac. 456. not, it sccnis, exclude a dying decla- 
 
 " Alartin v. Commonwealth (Ky.), ration identifying him. People v. 
 
 78 S. W. 1 104, 25 Ky. L. 1928. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 128, 38 N. E. 
 
 ^ State V. Blackburn, 80 N. Car. 1003, 43 Am. St. 741, 28 L. R. A. 
 
 474, 478; State V. Craine, 120 N. Car. 699n. The fact that the dying declar- 
 
 601, 27 S. E. 72. ant was under oath while speaking 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Hanej', 127 does not exclude his statements. 
 
 ]\Iass. 455, 458; Anderson v. State, 79 State v. Talbert, 41 S. Car. 526, 529, 
 
 Ala. 5; Jones v. State, 71 Ind. 66; 19 S. E. 852; i Bicknell's Cr. Prac, 
 
 State V. Wilson, 24 Kan. 189, 36 Am. 161 ; State v. Bonar, 71 Kan. 800, 81 
 
 257; White V. State, 30 Tex. App. Pac. 484. 
 
 652, 18 S. W. 462; North V. People, Form of dying declaration usually 
 
 139 111. 81, 28 N. E. 966; Long V. immaterial — note, 86 Am. St. 642, 
 
 State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 175, 88 S. W. 647; character of declaration, 86 Am. 
 
 203; Phillips V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. St. 647, 654; declaration in form of 
 
 App. 481, 98 S. W. 868; AlcCorquo- questions and answers, 86 Am. St. 
 
 dale V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 98 S. 644, 646; declaration should be com- 
 
 W. 879; State V. Ashworth. 50 La. plete in itself, 86 Am. St. 646. 
 
 Ann. 94, 23 So. 270 ; Park v. State, " State v. Roberts, 28 Nev. 350, S2 
 
 126 Ga. 575, 55 S. E. 489. The Pac. 100. 
 fact that the accused was forcibly
 
 209 DYING DECLARATIONS. 8 112 
 
 If the declarant had sufficient mental consciousness to know 
 what he was saying, the fact that he was partially under the influ- 
 ence of a narcotic will not render his statement inadmissible/® But 
 the declaration must be complete in itself, and nothing should re- 
 main to be said by the declarant wdiich will materially qualify, en- 
 large or restrict its meaning/^ 
 
 A declaration which is complete in itself, is not incompetent be- 
 cause the deceased was interrupted while he was speaking or be- 
 cause he attended to other matters during the conversation/* The 
 fact also that included in the statement there are utterances which 
 are incompetent may be disregarded if the statement itself is 
 complete and contains the facts which are properly receivable/^ 
 Nor need the dying declaration relate every fact which constitutes 
 the res gestcu of the homicide, if the statement of the deceased re- 
 garding any particular detail is complete and apparently a full ex- 
 pression of what he meant to say regarding that detail."" 
 
 In case the declaration was committed to writing by a witness 
 who was present when it was made it is very proper to produce the 
 writing. But whether the writing is evidence at all depends on a 
 variety of circumstances. If it was signed by the deceased, or, he 
 being physically unable to sign it, was assented to and adopted by 
 him, it certainly is evidence to show the precise language used by 
 him, no matter when or by wdiom it was prepared."^ It is not 
 proper to limit the use of such a paper to refreshing the memory of 
 a witness who heard the declaration, nor should the writing be 
 excluded because not supplemented by the oath of a witness that it 
 is strictly correct," or because it does not precisely reproduce the 
 
 '^ People V. Beverly, io8 Mich. 509, -" State v. Patterson, 45 Vt, 308, 
 
 66 X. W. 379; State v. Reed, 137 Mo. 3x3, 12 Am. 20on. 
 
 125, 38 S. W. 574; Hays v. Common- -'Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. 
 
 wealth (K}'.), 14 S. W. 833, 12 Ky. E. 903; Heningburg v. State (Ala., 
 
 L. 611. 1907), 45 So. 246. 
 
 "Vass V. Commonwealth, 3 Leigh "Turner v. State, 89 Tenn. 547, 15 
 
 ( Va.) 786, 24 Am. Dec. 695 ; State v. S. W. 838. Cf. Commonwealth v. 
 
 Murdy, 81 Iowa 603,- 47 N. W. 867. Haney, 127 Mass. 455, 458; Bennett 
 
 " State V. Ashworth, 50 La. Ann. v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 52, 8r S. 
 
 04, 23 So. 270; Park v. State, 126 Ga. W. 30; Commonwealth v. Spahr, 211 
 
 575. 55 S. E. 489. Pa. 542, 60 Atl. T084; State v. Doris 
 
 "State V. P.nnar, 71 K.'in. 800, 81 (Ore., 1908), 94 Pac. 44. 
 Pac. 484. 
 
 14 — Underhh-l Crim. Ev.
 
 8 112 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 2IO 
 
 language of the oral declaration, if it was read to the deceased and 
 he then stated that it was all he wanted to say.-" But the circum- 
 stances of its preparation, and all cjuestions as to whether the de- 
 ceased understood the meaning and contents of the writing, are 
 wholly for the consideration of the jury, to be considered in deter- 
 mining what weight they should give to it."^ A statement added 
 to the writing by another after the accused had signed it, though 
 a part of the res gcstcc, must be regarded as an oral declaration, 
 and proved as such.-^ 
 
 Granting that the writing is evidence, and that its sole use is not 
 merely to refresh the memory, the question remains to be consid- 
 ered, is it the best or primary evidence of the oral declaration, so 
 that its absence must be accounted for before the declaration can be 
 proved by parol evidence? Upon this question the cases are di- 
 vided. The original statements were oral, and the mere fact that 
 they were written down as they were uttered gives the writing no 
 greater value as evidence than the oral statement. On these 
 grounds many authorities hold that the writing, even though 
 signed and sworn to by the deceased, is not the best evidence of the 
 declaration,^® and some even limit its use to refreshing the memory 
 of the witness. But this rule is not of universal recognition, and it 
 has several times been held that the writing is primary evidence, 
 so that its absence must be accounted for before its contents can 
 be proved by parol. '^ 
 
 "^People V. Bemmerly, 87 Cal. 117, State, 139 Ala. -74, 36 So. 138, loi Am. 
 
 25 Pac. 266; Foley v. State, 11 Wyo. St. 17; State v. Clark (W. Va., 1908), 
 
 464, 72 Pac. 627. 63 S. E. 402; Jarvis v. State, 138 Ala. 
 
 "* Perry v. State, 102 Ga. 365, 30 S. 17, 34 So. 1025. Where a dying dec- 
 
 E. 903. laration was made under oath to a 
 
 ^ State V. Doris (Ore., 1908), 94 justice of the peace which the justice 
 
 Pac. 44. reduced to writing as fully as he 
 
 ^ State V. Whitson, iii N. Car. 695, could, it was proper for him, in addi- 
 
 697, 698, 16 S. E. 332; Darby v. State, tion to reading his notes, to supply 
 
 92 Ala. 9, IS, 9 So. 429; State v. from his recollection the remainder 
 
 Mathes, 90 Mo. 571, 2 S. W. 800; of the declarant's statement. Mitchell 
 
 Commonwealth v. Haney, 127 Mass. v. State, 82 Ark. 324, loi S. W. 763. 
 455. 458; Anderson v. State, 79 Ala. "^King v. State, 91 Tenn. 617, 650, 
 
 5, 8; State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 20 S. W. 169; People v. Glenn, 10 
 
 314, 12 Am. 200n; State v. Sullivan, Cal. 32; State v. Parham, 48 La. Ann. 
 
 51 Iowa 142, 50 N. W. 572; Kirby v. 1309, 20 So. 727; People v. Callaghan, 
 
 State, 151 Ala. 66, 44 So. 38; Sims v. 4 Utah 49, 6 Pac. 49; Drake v. State,
 
 211 DYING DECLARATIOXS. § 113 
 
 If the dying declaration was committed to writing by an official 
 under some express statutory requirement, it partakes of the char- 
 acter of a public writing or record, and must be proved as such. 
 
 Where the written declaration is not read to or signed by the 
 deceased, it is certainly not primary evidence, unless it be a record, 
 as for example a statement taken by a coroner.*^ 
 
 Indeed, it may be doubtful if a writing which was taken down 
 from the lips of the deceased, but which was not signed by him, is 
 competent at all. It may unquestionably be used, however, to re- 
 fresh the memory of the witness who heard the declaration while 
 he testifies orally to what he heard. "^ Thus, for example, a justice 
 of the peace may testify to an oral dying declaration made to him 
 and taken down by him in writing. It is not improper to permit 
 him to read his notes to the jury, though they were never signed 
 by the deceased, if the justice will swear that he knows them to be 
 substantially correct.^^ 
 
 That some statements were committed to writing, while others 
 were not, does not exclude parol proof of those wholly oral when 
 the writing can not be produced or its absence accounted for.^^ 
 
 § 113. Declarations by signs — Mental condition of the declarant. — 
 
 The declaration is usually oral, though this is by no means indis- 
 pensable. It may be made by signs, where the dying person is 
 speechless, as by a nod, the pressure of the hand, or by pointing to 
 visible persons or objects in answer to leading questions.^" 
 
 Under these circumstances, and also where the declaration is 
 
 25 Tex. App. 293, 7 S. W. 868; Col- '« Mitchell v. State, 82 Ark. 324, lor 
 
 lier V. State, 20 Ark. 36; Jones v. S. W. 763. 
 
 State, 71 Ind. 66 ; State v. Tweedy, ^^ People v. Simpson, 48 Mich. 474, 
 
 II Iowa 350; Merrill v. State, 58 12 N. W. 662; Rex v. Reason, i Str. 
 
 Miss. 65, (iT, State v. Williams, 28 499, 500 ; State v. Walton, 92 Iowa 
 
 Xev. 395, 82 Pac. 353; State v. Clark 455, 61 N. W. 179, i8r ; State v. 
 
 (W. Va., 1908), 63 S. E. 402. Schmidt, 'jz Iowa 469, 35 N. W. 590; 
 
 ^ State V. Sullivan, 51 Iowa 142, 50 Underhill on Ev., p. 146. Otherwise 
 
 X. W. 572; Fuqua v. Commonwealth, if the writing is produced. Adams v. 
 
 118 Ky. 578, 81 S. W. 923, 26 Ky. L. State (Tex. App., 1892), 19 S. W. 
 
 420. 907. Cf. State V. Finley, 118 N. Car. 
 
 '■* .Anderson v. State, 79 Ala. 5; ii6t, 24 S. E. 495; State v. Doris 
 
 Sailsherry v. Commonwealth CKy.). (Ore., 1908"), 94 Pac. 44. 
 
 107 S. W. 774, 32 Ky. L. 1085; Card- ''""If the injured person had hut the 
 
 ncr V. State, 55 Fla. 25, 45 So. 1028. action of a single finger and with
 
 § 114 -CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 212 
 
 offered in writing.^" it must appear by independent evidence that 
 the declarant was mentally conscious,"''* realized his dying condi- 
 tion,^^ possessed memory, consciousness and intelligence sufficient 
 to know what he was doing and saying, and, where a declaration 
 in writing is oft'ered, that he understood clearly its contents. ^° 
 
 These are all questions for the jury, to be determined upon a 
 consideration of all the facts. And a non-professional witness 
 may not testify that, in his opinion, the declarant was delirious at 
 the time he made his dying statement unless he can state all the 
 facts upon which his conclusion is based. ^^ 
 
 § 114. Dying declarations made by children. — It is always neces- 
 sary, in order that a dying declaration should be admitted, to show 
 that the declarant, if living, would be a competent witness. If, 
 therefore, it appears from the facts of the case that the deceased 
 was a child of tender years, who was not possessed of sufficient 
 memory or intelligence to comprehend the nature and religious 
 sanction of an oath, or that he did not expect to be punished in a 
 future state if he told a lie, the declaration should be rejected.^'* 
 
 that pointed to the words yes or no in credibility of testimony of a medical 
 
 answer to questions in such a manner witness in relation to the condition of 
 
 as to render it probable that he un- deceased at the time of making dying 
 
 derstood, and was at the time con- declarations is a question for the 
 
 scious that he could not recover, it jury. State v. Davis, 134 N. Car. 633, 
 
 is admissible." Commonwealth v. 46 S. E. 722. 
 
 Casey, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 417, 422, 59 ^^ State v. Nowells, 135 Iowa 53, 
 
 Am. Dec. 150; Mockabee v. Common- 109 N. W. 1016. 
 
 wealth, 78 Ky. 380, 382 ; Walker v. ^ In Rex v. Pike, 3 C. & P. 598, the 
 
 State, 139 Ala. 56, 35 So. lOii. declaration of a four-year-old child 
 
 ^' Tracy v. People, 97 III. loi. was rejected because, while it was 
 
 ** Mitchell v. State, 71 Ga. 128. Ex- shown that she knew she would die, 
 
 pert testimony to show deceased was she did not have that idea of a fu- 
 
 rational when he made his statement ture state which is needed to make 
 
 has been rejected. Lyles v. State, 48 such a declaration admissible. But in 
 
 Tex. Cr. App. 119, 86 S. W. 763. Reg. v. Perkins, 9 C. & P. 396, the 
 
 ^ People v. Shaw, 63 N. Y. 36, 40. declaration of a child was admitted 
 
 ^ McBride v. People, 5 Colo. App. upon it being shown that he had a 
 
 91, 37 Pac. 953, 956; Binfield v. State, proper conception of a future exist- 
 
 15 Neb. 484, 19 N. W. 607. See Tra- ence beyond the grave. 
 
 cy V. People, 97 111. loi, 108-110. The
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. 
 
 § 115. Facts showing a consciousness § 120. Resistance to arrest. 
 
 of guilt. 121. Fabricating or suppressing evi- 
 
 116. Falsehoods by accused or sus- dence. 
 
 pected persons. 122. Silence under accusations of 
 
 117. Demeanor subsequent to crime. guilt. 
 
 118. The flight or attempted escape 123. Attendant circumstances ex- 
 
 of the accused. plaining motives and reasons 
 
 119. Explanation by accused of his of silence. 
 
 flight or attempted escape. 124. The accusing statement or 
 
 119a. Declarations which are self- question, 
 serving are rejected. 
 
 § 115. Facts showing a consciousness of guilt. — Any statement or 
 conduct of a person indicating a consciousness of guilt, where at 
 the time or thereafter he is charged with or suspected of the 
 crime, is admissible as a circumstance against him on his trial. 
 Evidence of circumstances, which are part of a person's behavior 
 subsequent to an event with which it is alleged or suspected he is 
 connected with or implicated in, are relevant if the circumstances 
 are such as would be natural and usual, assuming the connection 
 or implication to exist. This rule of circumstantial evidence may 
 be regarded as almost universally applicable. Aiid sometimes, 
 but not universally, evidence of actions and circumstances, in- 
 consistent with such an assumption, is relevant as a basis for an 
 inference that tlie person accused or suspected did not participate 
 in the event. Under these rules evidence will be received to prove 
 or di.sprove facts or circumstances which indicate a consciousness 
 of guilt on the part of the accused, existing after the crime with 
 which he is charged was committed. 
 
 His conduct and general demeanor, his language, oral or writ- 
 ten, and his mental anrl ])hysical condition, attitude and relations 
 towards the crime, or his actions in the presence of those who dis- 
 
 (213)
 
 ii6 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 
 
 214 
 
 covered the crime. ^ or ^vho are engaged in detecting its perpe- 
 trator, are relevant. - 
 
 The time which has elapsed, between the time of the crime and 
 the occurrence of the incriminating or accusatory actions relied 
 on to connect the accused with the crime, is sometimes an import- 
 ant element. The circumstances of the conduct of the accused 
 must not be so remote in time or extend over so long a period 
 as to create a strong probability that they are the outcome of other 
 motives than a consciousness of guilt.^ On the other hand the 
 reception of this evidence, whether consisting of statements or 
 events, never depends on its contemporaneous connection with the 
 crime that is charged, or on its being a part of the res gestcu^ 
 
 § 116. Falsehoods by accused or suspected persons. — Evidence that 
 the accused told falsehoods, or avoided, or attempted to avoid, 
 giving information of himself, his actions or his whereabouts, at 
 or about the time of the crime either in describing it or his rela- 
 tion to it,^ as when he has given false testimony at a coroner's in- 
 
 ^ People V. Pyckett, 99 ]\Iich. 613, 
 58 X. W. 621; State V. Jacobs, 106 
 N. Car. 695, 10 S. E. 1031 ; Hart v. 
 State, 15 Tex. App. 202, 49 Am. i88n. 
 See Elliott Ev., § 2723. 
 
 ^McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154; 
 People V. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 17 Am. 
 40T : People v. Welsh, 63 Cal. 167 ; 
 State V. Hill, 134 Uo. 663, 36 S. W. 
 223. 
 
 ^ State V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, 12, 12 
 Pac. 318; State v. Hogan, 117 La. 863, 
 42- So. 352; People V. Tubbs, 147 
 ]\Iich. I, no N. W. 132; Parnell v. 
 State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 419, 98 S. W. 
 269. 
 
 * People V. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 119, 
 17 Am. 401 ; People v. Welsh, 63 Cal". 
 167. 
 
 ^ State V. Williams, 66 Iowa 573, 
 574, 24 N. W. 52; Cathcart v. Com- 
 monwealth, 37 Pa. St. 108, 113; State 
 V. Williams, 27 Vt. 724, 726; State v. 
 Bradley, 64 Vt. 466, 469, 24 Atl. 1053 ; 
 
 Hicks V. State, 99 Ala. 169, 171, 13 
 So. 375; Huffman v. State, 28 Tex. 
 App. 174, 12 S. W. 588; State v. Cro- 
 nin, 64 Conn. 293, 305, 29 Atl. 536; 
 Commonwealth v. Tolliver, 119 Mass. 
 312; Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 
 157 Mass. 180, 31 N. E. 961, 24 L. R. 
 A. 23s; McCann v. State, 13 S. & 
 M. (Miss.) 471, 497 (denial of 
 name) ; Reg. v. Miller, 18 Cox Cr. 
 Cas. 54; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
 162 Pa. St. 63, 29 Atl. 280; Wilson 
 V. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 40 L. 
 ed. 1090, 16 Sup. Ct. 895 ; Hamilton 
 V. State, 62 Ark. 543, 36 S. W. 1054; 
 People V. Cuff, 122 Cal. 589, 55 Pac. 
 407; People V. Moran, 144 Cal. 48. 
 77 Pac. 777; State v. Jennings, 48 
 Ore. 483, 87 Pac. 524, 89 Pac. 421 ; 
 VanWyk v. People (Colo., 1909), 99 
 Pac. 1009; Logan v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 29 S. W. 632, 16 Ky. L. 508: 
 State V. Benner, 64 Me. 267; State v. 
 Lambert (Me., 1908), 71 Atl. 1092.
 
 215 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. § Il6 
 
 quest,® or before the grand jury," is always relevant to show a 
 consciousness of guilt.^ Such evidence would seem to have greater 
 relevancy, cogency and force if the falsehoods were uttered after 
 their author knew he was suspected or accused than before. Ex- 
 tra judicial statements by the accused may be proved and their 
 falsity may then be shown. It may be shown that when he was 
 arrested the accused made false statements of his prior where- 
 abouts to the ofiEicer who arrested him. It may be proved that the 
 accused gave false reasons for his presence in the town where the 
 crime was perpetrated.^ 
 
 Conscious innocence has nothing to fear from the fullest reve- 
 lation of the truth. The intentional fabrication of false, incon- 
 sistent or contradictory explanations of suspicious circumstances, 
 or the employment of evasion, equivocation or falsehood to divert 
 or stifle inquiry into the facts connected with the commission of 
 the crime or with the connection of the accused with it, is always 
 relevant and proper, for it may with reason be presumed that an 
 evil intention prompted the effort to hide the truth. ^'^ 
 
 The false statements of the accused may be proved by the state, 
 and their falsity may then be shown in various ways.^^ In the 
 first place the falsity of the statements may be shown in a very 
 satisfactory and convincing manner by direct proof that the re- 
 
 ' Hays V. State, 40 Md. 633 ; Lovett " People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62, 80; 
 
 V. State, 60 Ga. 257, 260. Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 37 Pa. 
 
 ^ State V. Brougliton, 7 Ired. (N. St. 108, 113; Commonwealth v. 
 
 Car.) 96, lor, 45 Am. Dec. 507. Twitchell, i Brew. (Pa.) 551, 608; 
 
 * State V. Lambert (Me.), 71 Atl. Crawford v. State, ri2 Ala. i, 21 So. 
 1092; State V. Jennings, 48 Ore. 483, 214; United States v. Randall, Deady 
 87 Pac. 524, 89 Pac. 421. So, too, it (N. S.) 524, 27 Fed. Cas. 16118; Reg. 
 may be shown that the accused has v. Thomas, 9 Cox Cr. Cas. 376, i L. 
 sworn to a falsehood in an affidavit & C. 313, 33 L. J. M. C. 22, 9 L. T. 
 made and used to procure a continu- (N. S.) 488, 12 W. R. 108; State v. 
 ancc. State v. Bishop, 98 N. Car. Lambert (Me., 1908), 71 Atl. 1092. 
 773. 4 S. E. 357. But it is only when " People v. Arnold, 43 Mich. 303, 
 the statement is relevant to the issue 5 N. W. 385, 38 Am. 182; Smith v. 
 that it can be proved. Its falsity can- State, 29 Fla. 408, 10 So. 894; Reg. v. 
 not be shown merely for the purpose Miller, 18 Cox Cr. Cas. 54; Burton 
 of showing he perjured himself. Far- v. State, T07 Ala. 108, 18 So. 284; 
 rell V. People, 103 Til. 17: P.urris v. People v. Evans (Cal., 1895), 41 Pac. 
 State, 38 Ark. 22 t. 444. 
 
 * People v. Cuff, 122 Cal. 589, 55 
 Pac. 407.
 
 § 117 CRIAIINAL EVIDENCE. 2l6 
 
 verse of the facts alleged in the statements is true. So, the falsity 
 of a statement or explanation may be brought out by showing that 
 the facts stated are absolutely inconsistent and irreconcilable with 
 other facts proved or admitted, or that the particular statement in 
 question is contradicted by other statements made by the prisoner, 
 and finally by the inherent improbability of the facts asserted in 
 the false statement.^' 
 
 Testimony that the accused has been guilty of falsehood must 
 always be somewhat intrinsically unreliable. As in the analogous 
 cases of admissions and incriminating conduct, its force depends 
 largely upon the temperament, education, experience and habits 
 of life and business of the prisoner. If the evidence of the alleged 
 falsehood is not satisfactory to the jury it is entitled to no weight. 
 That the accused has lied should be established beyond cavil, as 
 it is only circumstantial and collateral to the main issue.^' 
 
 If it shall be proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury 
 that statements made by the accused of material facts indicating 
 clearly his guilt th'e jury are justified in discrediting all his testi- 
 mony.^* 
 
 § 117. Demeanor subsequent to crime. — The movements, appear- 
 ance and bearing of the accused and his behavior when charged 
 with a crime or confronted with the consequences or with the 
 scene or the surroundings of the crime with which he is charged 
 are always relevant.^^ So the conduct of the prisoner wdien an at- 
 tempt was made to arrest him. shortly after the commission of the 
 offense, was properly allowed to be proved to show his criminal 
 
 " Burrill on Cir. Ev., pt. 2, ch. i, " State v. Williams, 27 Vt. 724, 726 ; 
 
 p. 491. "Truth is the reliance of in- Weightnovel v. State, 46 Fla. i, 35 
 
 nocence. Falsehood is the resort of So. 856. 
 
 crime. All true facts are consistent " People v. Jackson, 182 N. Y. 66; 
 
 with each other. If the prisoner is 74 N. E. 565. 
 
 innocent there is no reason for with- ^ Handline v. State, 6 Tex. App. 
 
 holding a true fact. Still less is there 347 ; State v. Hill, 134 Mo. 663, 36 S. 
 
 for uttering a falsehood. Falsehood W. 223; People v. Weber, 149 Cal. 
 
 is evidence of crime. Every falsehood 325, 86 Pac. 671 ; Knight v. State 
 
 uttered by way of exculpation be- CTex. Cr. App., 1909), 116 S. W. 56; 
 
 comes an article of circumstantial ev- Maddox v. State (Ala., 1909), 48 So. 
 
 idence of greater or less inculpatory 689. 
 force." State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267, 
 285.
 
 217 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. 
 
 117 
 
 intent.^" It may be shown that shortly after the crime he drank to 
 excess/^ or was very nervous, worried/* excited/^ mentally pre- 
 occupied,-*^ and manifested fear and turned pale on being arrested 
 for the crime f^ or, while in custody, that he attempted suicide, '- 
 or showed a lack of feeling as the result of a homicide with which 
 he is charged, when, from his near relation to the deceased, the 
 manifestation of great and sorrowful emotion would naturally be 
 expected. And it is not material whether the movements or con- 
 duct of the accused after the crime, which are proved to connect 
 him with it, are or are not of part of the res gestcc of the crime 
 itself.^' 
 
 It cannot be shown that the accused refused to allow his house 
 to be searched without a warrant as his insistence upon an un- 
 doubted constitutional right is a circumstance perfectly consistent 
 with innocence.^* 
 
 " State V. Jones, 118 La. 369, 42 So. 
 967. 
 
 "People V. O'Neill, 112 N. Y. 355, 
 363, 19 N. E. 796, aff'g 49 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 422,4 N. Y. S. 119. 
 
 ^' State V. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 194, 17 
 Atl. 483 ; State v. Bradley, 64 Vt. 466, 
 470, 24 Atl. 1053. 
 
 " Miller v. State, 18 Tex. App. 232 ; 
 Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144, 14 So. 
 409, 411, 46 Am. St. 28. 
 
 "° Xoftsinger v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 30T. 
 
 " State V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, 12, 
 12 Pac. 318; Williams v. State (Ark., 
 1891), 16 S. W. 816, 818; Lindsay v. 
 People, 63 N. Y. 143; State v. Nash, 
 7 Iowa 347; Bollen v. State, 48 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 70, 86 S. W. 1025. Under 
 certain circumstances it may be 
 proved that an accomplice of the ac- 
 cused on trial had attempted to com- 
 mit suicide. It must be shown that 
 the accused either advised or knew 
 of the suicidal intention of his ac- 
 complice. Proof that the accused 
 had expressly advised the suicide and 
 had supplied or attempted to supply 
 
 the means for the accomplishment of 
 this end when both were in jail is 
 conclusive of his connection with it 
 and furnishes a sufficient basis for its 
 admission as evidence. People v. Pat- 
 rick, 182 N. Y. 131, 74 N. E. 843. 
 
 "^ State v. Jaggers (N. J., 1904), 58 
 Atl. 1014. 
 
 "-^ Greenfield v. People, 85 N. Y. 75, 
 86, 39 Am. 636. Such evidence is not 
 admissible if it refers to a date sev- 
 eral months after the death. State v. 
 Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, 12 Pac. 318. 
 
 ^'''Murdock v. State, 68 Ala. 567. 
 "Such indications are by no means 
 conclusive and must depend upon the 
 mental characteristics of individuals. 
 Innocent persons, appalled by a 
 charge of crime, will sometimes ex- 
 hibit great weakness and terror. Per- 
 sons under a great weight of sorrow 
 will sometimes manifest the greatest 
 composure and serenity and shed no 
 tears." Greenfield v. People, 85 N. 
 Y. 75, 86, 39 Am. 636. Cf. People v. 
 Giancoli, 74 Cal. 642, 644, 16 Pac. 
 510; also, Liles v. State, 30 Ala. 24, 
 25, 68 Am. Dec. 108.
 
 § Il8 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 2l8 
 
 But it may be shown that the accused threw his hands behind 
 him and drew a pistol at the time of his arrest.''*^ So it may be 
 shown that the accused, when he was arrested, was pale and was 
 trembling greatly and appeared as though he w^ould fall to the 
 ground."'^ 
 
 It may be shown that the accused w'rote to the prosecutor offer- 
 ing to take a whipping if he w^ould let him off,"" or that he offered 
 to pay money to stifle the investigation or prosecution of the 
 crime of which he is suspected."' The rule excluding evidence of 
 compromises in civil suits does not apply to criminal proceed- 
 ings."^ 
 
 § 118. The flight or attempted escape of the accused. — The at- 
 tempts of the accused to escape while confined in jail may be 
 shown as circumstances proper to be considered, and to be given 
 such weight as they are fairly entitled to, with the other evidence, 
 in determining the guilt or innocence of accused. The prosecu- 
 tion may show by questions put to the accused on his cross-exami- 
 nation,-'' or by other witnesses, that he had attempted flight, or 
 that he had, by concealment or by other means, ^^ attempted to 
 
 "*a Glass V. State, 147 Ala. 50, 41 So. Neb. 402, 95 N. W. 1014 ; State v. 
 
 727 (homicide). Taylor, 70 Vt. i, 39 Atl. 447, 67 Am. 
 
 ■^ Bain v. State, 46 Tex. Crim. App. St. 648, 42 L. R. A. 67311 ; United 
 
 96, 79 S. W. 814. States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 803. See 
 
 When recent possession of stolen Eliott's Ev., § 2724. 
 
 goods admissible to show conscious- ^° Jamison v. People, 145 111. 357, 34 
 
 ness of guilt, Elliott's Ev., § 2725. N. E. 486; Fox v. People, 95 111. 71; 
 
 "° State V. De Berry, 92 N. Car. 800, State v. Moore, loi Mo. 316, 14 S. 
 
 801. W. 182; Clarke v. State, 8 Crim. L. 
 
 "' State V. Soper, 16 Me. 293, 295, 33 Mag. 19 ; People v. Petmecky, 2 N. 
 Am. Dec. 665 ; Sanders v. State, 148 Y. Cr. 450 ; McCann v. State, 13 S. 
 Ala. 603, 41 So. 466; State v. Wide- & M. (Miss.) 471, 475; Common- 
 man, 68 S. Car. 119, 46 S. E. 769; wealth v. Brigham, 147 Mass. 414, 18 
 State V. Farr (R. I., 1908), 69 N. E. 167; Burris v. State, 38 Ark. 
 Atl. 5. 221; State v. Lambert (Me. 1908), 71 
 
 "^ Cf. State V. Wright, 48 La. Ann. Atl. 1092 ; Shumway v. State ( Neb. 
 
 1525, 21 So. 160. 1908), 117 N. W. 407; Kennedy v. 
 
 -'Ryan v. People, 79 N. Y. 593; State, 71 Neb. 765, 99 N. W. 645; 
 
 Manning v. State, 79 Wis. 178, 48 N. State v. Baird, 13 Idaho 29, 88 Pac. 
 
 W. 209; Bell V. State, 115 Ala. 25, 22 233; Carr v. State, 45 Fla. 11, 34 So. 
 
 So. 526; State V. Davis, 6 Idaho 159, 892; State v. Rodgers (Mont., 1909), 
 
 53 Pac. 678; Williams v. State, 69 106 Pac. 3.
 
 219 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. 
 
 Il8 
 
 escape from arrest or custody;"^ that he had offered a bribe to 
 procure his escape,^- that he had requested a fellow prisoner or 
 some other person to bring him tools for that purpose,^^ or that 
 he was actually in possession of such tools, ^* and that the accused 
 have fled and subsequently been arrested out of the state then 
 denied his identity, s,ave an assumed name and refused to return 
 
 '' Allen V. United States, 164 U. S. 
 492, 41 L. ed. 528, 17 S. Ct. 154; State 
 V. Chase, 68 Vt. 405, 35 Atl. 336; 
 State V. Evans, 138 Mo. 116, 39 S. 
 W. 462, 60 Am. St. 549; McBride v. 
 People, 5 Colo. App. 91, 37 Pac. 953; 
 Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 467, 472, 
 4 N. E. 63, 5 N. E. 711; State v. 
 Howell, 117 ]\Io. 307, 23 S. W. 
 263 ; State v. Minard, 96 Iowa 267, 
 65 X. W. 147; Williams v. State, 
 24 Tex. App. 17, 32, 5 S. W. 655, 
 658; People V. Ogle, 104 N. Y. 
 511, II X. E. 53, 4 N. Y. Cr. 349; 
 Elmore v. State, 98 Ala. 12, 13 So. 
 427; State V. Harris, 48 La. Ann. 
 1 189, 20 So. 729; State V. Palmer, 
 65 X. H. 216, 20 Atl. 6; Ryan v. 
 State, 83 Wis. 486, 53 X. W. 836; 
 State V. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa 268, 19 
 X'. W. 202; Commonwealth v. Mc- 
 Mahon, 145 Pa. St. 413, 22 Atl. 971 ; 
 State V. Foster, 136 Mo. 653, 38 S. 
 W. 721 ; Ryan v. People, 79 X. Y. 
 593; People v. Ashmead, 118 Cal. 
 508, 50 Pac. 681 ; State v. Garrison, 
 147 Mo. 548, 49 S. W. 508; State v. 
 Lambert (Me. 1908), 71 Atl. 1092; 
 State V. Marks, 70 S. Car. 448, 50 S. 
 E. 14; State V. Wills, 106 Mo. App. 
 196, 80 S. W. 311; George v. State, 61 
 Xeb. 669, 85 X. W. 840; Woodruff 
 V. State, 72 X'^eb. 815, loi X. W. 
 II 14; State V. Ralston Clowa, 1908), 
 116 X. W. 1058; Andrews v. State 
 (Tex. Cr. App. 1904), 83 S. W. 188; 
 Commonwealth v. Bezck, 168 Pa. St. 
 603, 32 Atl. 109; Commonwealth v. 
 
 ]\IcManiman, 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 304; 
 Allen V. State, 146 Ala. 61, 41 So. 624; 
 Bolton V. State, 40 So. 409, 146 Ala. 
 691, without opinion; State v. Death- 
 erage, 35 Wash. 326, 77 Pac. 504; 
 Sherrill v. State, 138 Ala. 3, 35 So. 
 129; Dickey v. State, 86 Miss. 525, 38 
 So. 776; State V. Paisley, 36 Mont. 
 237, 92 Pac. 566; State v. Chase, 68 
 Vt. 405, 35 Atl. 336; Brown v. State 
 (Tex. Cr. App., 1909), 124 S. W. loi. 
 
 ^^Whaley v. State, 11 Ga. 123, 127. 
 A letter written by the accused in 
 which he states that the prosecution 
 means to send him to prison, but that 
 this could never be done, as he meant 
 to break jail, is competent. Brad- 
 ford V. State, 147 Ala. 95, 41 So. 462. 
 The state may always be permitted to 
 prove what was done by the sheriff 
 or other officer to ascertain the 
 whereabouts of the accused where it 
 appears he has taken flight. Bennett 
 V. State, 47 Tex. Crim. App. 52, 81 
 S. W. 30. But in the absence of 
 proof of flight on the part of the 
 accused it is improper to admit evi- 
 dence that a statutory reward for the 
 arrest of the accused was claimed and 
 paid. Boykin v. State, 89 Miss. 19, 
 42 So. 601. 
 
 ^^ State v. Jackson, 95 Mo. 623, 8 
 S. W. 749; People V. Petmecky, 2 X. 
 Y. Cr. 450. 
 
 •■"^ State V. Duncan, T16 Mo. 288, 22 
 S. W. 699; Clark v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky. 1896), 32 S. W. 131, 17 Ky. L. 
 540.
 
 § Il8 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 220 
 
 without a requisition.'"" The ilight of the accused after the crime 
 cannot be proved against another person who was not actually im- 
 plicated in aiding or procuring the flight.^® Nor can the flight of 
 a third person, whose connection with the crime does not appear, 
 be proved to show that the third person committed it.^' 
 
 An attempt by a prisoner in jail awaiting trial for two distinct 
 crimes to escape is not relevant to show that he is guilty of either. 
 It may be impossible to determine which charge he fled, or at- 
 tempted to flee, to avoid. ^- He may have fled because conscious 
 that he was guilty of the one for which he is not ofi trial. 
 
 It may usually be shown by proving the declarations or conduct 
 of the accused before the crime that he was preparing for leaving 
 town. The evidence of preparations for departure from the scene 
 of the subsequent crime must not be too remote in point of time. 
 Preparations on the day of the crime or on the day before are 
 competent, particularly when it is apparent from the other evi- 
 dence that the accused had the commission of the crime in con- 
 templation as where he has made threats that he will commit the 
 crime. ^^ 
 
 It cannot with correctness be said that the flight or the at- 
 tempted flight of the accused before his arrest, taken alone, raises 
 a legal presumption of guilt that an inference of guilt nuist be 
 drawn therefrom, *° or that his flight, ivithout regard to the mo- 
 
 ^ Johnson v. State, 120 Ga. 135, 47 ^' People v. ]\IcKeon. 19 X. Y. S. 
 
 S. E. 510. 486, 487. 
 
 ^' People V. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 118, ^^ Hocker v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 17 Am. 401; State v. Ruby, 61 Iowa in S. W. 676, 2ii Ky. L. 944; Teague 
 
 86, 15 N. W. 848. But on the trial v. State, 120 Ala. 309, 25 So. 209. 
 
 of the accessory evidence of the con- *" In Ryan v. People, 79 X. Y. 593, 
 
 cealment and flight of a principal not 19 Hun {X. Y.) 188, the court said: 
 
 yet convicted is admissible to estab- "The evidence that the defendant 
 
 lish the guilt of the principal. State made an effort to keep out of the 
 
 V. Rand, Z2i ^'- H. 216; Cummins v. way of the sheriff was very slight, 
 
 People, 42 Mich. 142, 143, 3 N. W. if any evidence of guilt. There are 
 
 305; IMcIntyre v. State (Tex. 1895), so many reasons for such conduct, 
 
 2,:^ S. W. 347; People v. Cleveland, consistent with innocence, that it 
 
 107 Mich. 367, 65 N. W. 216. See scarcely comes up to the standard of 
 
 contra. Smith v. People, 38 Colo. 509, evidence tending to establish guilt, 
 
 88 Pac. 453. but this and similar evidence has 
 
 '" Owensby v. State, 82 Ala. 63, 2 been allowed upon the theory that 
 
 So. 764. the jury will give it such weight as it
 
 221 COXSCIOUSXESS OF GUILT. § Il8 
 
 tiz'c idiich prompted it, is, in law, proof of guilt. At the most 
 it is only one of a series of circumstances to be considered by the 
 jury with the reasons that prompted it, tending to show guilt or 
 by which an inference of guilt may be raised,*^ and it has no 
 probative force unless it satisfactorily appears that the accused 
 fled to avoid arrest or imprisonment for the crime charged. 
 Even then, its force is slight, depending on the efforts made, the 
 means employed, and the motives and knowledge by which the 
 act was accompanied. The departure of the accused may have 
 been prompted by motives consistent with innocence. He may 
 have feared arrest for a crime totally distinct from that for which 
 he is indicted, or he ma}^ have apprehended violence at the hands 
 of the police. /\n officer who goes on the witness stand to prove 
 that the accused has left the state may state how long he has been 
 looking for the accused, may relate the steps he has taken to 
 ascertain his whereabouts and may testify to the answers to the 
 inquiries made by him. But all this evidence is only competent 
 where the officer is seeking to arrest him for the crime for which 
 the accused is actually being tried. If the pursuit of the officer 
 has for its object an arrest for another crime any evidence of the 
 officers as to the length or character of the pursuit or as to its in- 
 cidents and circumstances is inadmissible.*^ It is unnecessary in 
 proving incidents connected with the flight of the accused, to 
 produce the witness who actually met him away from home. It 
 
 deserves, depending upon the sur- Wash. 444, 74 Pac. 588; Smith v. 
 
 rounding circumstances." To the State, 106 Ga. 673, 32 S. E. 851, 71 
 
 same effect, see, Alberty v. United Am. St. 286; Svveatt v. State (Ala. 
 
 States, 162 U. S. 499, 40 L. ed. 1051, 1908), 47 So. 194. Flight, if shown, 
 
 16 Sup. Ct. 864; United States v. is not conclusive, nor does it raise a 
 Greene, 146 Fed. 803. legal presumption of guilt, but is to 
 
 " Hickory v. United States, 160 U. be given the weight to which the 
 
 S. 408, 40 L. ed. 474, 16 Sup. Ct. jury think it entitled, under the cir- 
 
 327; State V. Rodman, 62 Iowa 456, cumstances shown. In this conncc- 
 
 17 N. W. 663; State v. Brooks, 92 tion they may take into consideration 
 Mo. 542, 5 S. W. 257, 330; Starr v. the defendant's age, intelligence and 
 United States, 164 U. S. 627, 41 L. financial ability to make a defense, 
 ed. 577, 17 Sup. Ct. 223; People v. United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. 
 Giancoli, 74 Cal. 642, 644, 16 Pac. 803. 
 
 510; Sylvester v. Slate, 71 Ala. 17, ''People v. Vidal, T2i Cal. 221, 53 
 26, 72 .'Ma. 20T, 206; Fo.x v. People, Pac. 558; Bennett v. State, 47 Tc.x. 
 95 111. 71, 76; State v. Stentz, zz Cr. App. 52, 81 S. VV. 30.
 
 S 119 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 222 
 
 is permissible for one who has made a search for the accused to 
 testify that he inquired in various places and was told by persons 
 there that the accused was not there or that he was there and 
 was traveling- under an assumed name. Indeed, the one who 
 has done the searching may testify to what anybody told him 
 of the whereabouts of the accused over the objection that such 
 evidence is hearsay/^ 
 
 § 119. Explanation by accused of his flight or attempted escape. — 
 The escape or attempt of the accused to escape from actual incar- 
 ceration is never conclusive evidence of guilt. It depends upon his 
 motive. His actions may have arisen from a consciousness of 
 guilt, the fear of trial and the dread of punishment. But it is 
 equally probable that they may have been prompted by the fear 
 that, though innocent, his property will make it impossible for 
 him to defend himself,** or, being unable to give bail, and suffer- 
 ing from illness, he may seek liberty in order to avoid the dis- 
 comforts and privations of imprisonment/ ° 
 
 The evidence of flight or escape should go to the jury, who are 
 the sole judges of its weight and sufficiency,**' and of the motives 
 which prompted the flight.*^ It need not be shown that the ac- 
 cused actually anticipated an immediate arrest at the moment of 
 his escape.*^ But the mere fact that the accused left the county 
 is not relevant if it is not shown prima facie that he did so to 
 avoid arrest,*'* and the motives of his departure may be inferred 
 
 *^ People V. Colmey, 188 N. Y. 573, 25, 19 So. 403; Miller v. State, no 
 
 80 N. E. 1 1 15. Ala. 69, 20 So. 392; White v. State, 
 
 ** United States v. Greene, 146 Fed. iii Ala. 92, 21 So. 330; Ryan v. Peo- 
 
 803. pie, 79 N. Y. 593, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 *" State V. Mallon, 75 Mo. 355. The 188; Fox v. People, 95 111. 71, 77; 
 
 character of the offense ought to be State v. Baircl, 13 Idaho 29, 88 Pac. 
 
 considered in determining the motives 233; Evans v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 that prompted the flight. An inno- 1903), 76 S. W. 467; State v. Adams 
 
 cent man accused of a capital crime (Del.), 65 Atl. 510; United States v. 
 
 may flee or attempt to break jail, Greene, 146 Fed. 803. 
 
 while, if the charge involved a mis- " Elmore v. State, 98 Ala. 12, 13 So. 
 
 demeanor only, he may be willing, 427. 
 
 though innocent, to stand trial and *^ State v. Frederic, 69 Me. 400, 403. 
 
 be punished if convicted. *° State v. King, 78 Mo. 555 ; State 
 
 « Garden v. State, 84 Ala. 417, 4 v. Marshall, 115 Mo. 383, 22 S. W. 
 
 So. 823; Thomas v. State, 109 Ala. 452, 453.
 
 223 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. 
 
 119 
 
 from the circumstances of his flight/'''' The means used to 
 escape may be shown circumstantially,^^ and, where the absence 
 of the accused is shown, inquiries made for him at his abode or 
 usual places of resort at home or abroad, by police officers or 
 others, with the answers given, may be received as an excep- 
 tion to the hearsay rule.^" 
 
 The accused is not recjuired to explain his flight or conceal- 
 ment by evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt that his 
 motives were consistent with innocence.^^ The fact of his flight 
 is a circumstance whose meaning is for the jury alone to deter- 
 mine, and he may be permitted to show the rectitude of his mo- 
 tives in fleeing to enable them to determine its meaning.^'* He 
 should be allowed to prove that, before the date of the crime, he 
 had intended or had arranged to leave the state i^'^ that his flight 
 was caused by threats^'' or by actual mob violence, ^^ if he fled 
 so soon after the threats coming to his knowledge as to show 
 they caused it;^^ that great public excitement existed in the 
 neighborhood where he lived, creating apprehensions of vio- 
 
 '° Welch V. State, 104 Ind. 347, 353, 
 3 N. E. 850. 
 
 " State V. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa 268, 
 19 N. W. 202. 
 
 ^People V. Ogle, 104 N. Y. 511, 11 
 N. E. 53, 4 N. Y. Cr. 349; Garden v. 
 State, 84 Ala. 417, 4 So. 823; People 
 V. Fine, 77 Cal. 147, 19 Pac. 269; 
 State V. Shipley, 171 Mo. 544, 74 S. 
 W. 612; State V. Lucey, 24 Mont. 
 295, 61 Pac. 994. 
 
 "^'Fox V. People, 95 111. 71. 
 
 " It seems that where there is no 
 question as to who committed the 
 crime, and the only issue is the degree 
 of the ofifense, the accused should 
 not be allowed to explain the motives 
 of his flight. People v. Ah Choy, i 
 Idaho 317. See also, State v. Mel- 
 ton, ^7 La. Ann. 77. 
 
 " State V. Potter, 108 Mo. 424, 22 
 S. W. 89. When he left the county 
 
 immediately after the crime it may 
 be shown, to illustrate his motive in 
 leaving that, prior to the crime, he 
 had entered into a contract which 
 would require him to remain. Welsh 
 V. State, 97 Ala. i, 12 So. 275. 
 
 ^^ Lewallen v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 412, 26 S. W. 832; State v. Bar- 
 ham, 82 Mo. 67; Golden v. State, 25 
 Ga. 527; State v. Desmond, 109 Iowa 
 72, 80 N. W. 214. 
 
 "' State V. Griffin, 87 Mo. 608 ; State 
 V. Brooks, 92 Mo. 542, 5 S. W. 257, 
 330; Batten v. State, 80 Ind. 394; 
 State v. Ma Foo, no Mo. 7, 19 S. W. 
 222, 33 Am. St. 414; Arnold v. State, 
 9 Tex. App. 435. Cf. Kennedy v. 
 Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 447; Brown 
 v. State, 88 Miss. 166, 40 So. 737. 
 
 ''State v. McDevitt, 69 Iowa 549, 
 29 N. W. 459.
 
 g 119 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 224 
 
 lence on his part;'^" and that he was advised or warned by rela- 
 tives and friends to flee,*'" because his life was menaced. 
 
 But evidence to show that the accused had an opportunity to 
 escape, or to break jail, of wdiich he did not avail himself;"^ that 
 he surrendered or offered to surrender himself to the authori- 
 ties,*'" or telegraphed to the sheriff to come and arrest him,*'^ or 
 when arrested out of the jurisdiction voluntarily returned,*'* is 
 inadmissible unless perhaps to rebut any inference of guilt which 
 may have been created by evidence that the accused has fled.""' 
 Such actions may have been prompted by the fear of recapture, 
 or by his confidence that, though guilty, he would be acquitted 
 because of the ability of his counsel, the insufficiency of the evi- 
 dence against him, or through the employment of bribery, or 
 perjury or political or social influence.*'*' Where it is proved by 
 the prosecution that the accused ran aw^ay after he had committed 
 
 ^^ State V. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475; S. W. 452; People v. Cleveland, 107 
 
 Brown v. State, 88 INIiss. 166, 40 So. Mich. 367, 65 N. W. 216; Cole v. 
 
 737- State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 225, 75 S. W. 
 
 •^^ State V. Moncia, 39 La. Ann. 868, 527; Pate v. State, 150 Ala. 10, 43 
 
 2 So. 814; Walters v. State, 17 Tex. So. 343; Walker v. State, 139 Ala. 56, 
 
 App. 226, 50 Am. 128; Arnold v. 35 So. loii; Walker v. State, 13 Tex. 
 
 State, 9 Tex. App. 435. See Sim- App. 618; Upton v. State, 48 Tex. 
 
 mons V. State (Ala. 1909), 48 So. 606. Cr. App. 289, 88 S. W. 212; State 
 
 *" State V. Wilkins, 66 Vt. i, 28 v. Moncia, 39 La. Ann. 868, 2 So. 
 
 Atl. 323; People V. Rathbun, 21 814; State v. Taylor, 134 Mo. 109, 35 
 
 Wend. (X. Y.) 509, 518, 519; People S. W. 92; State v. Smith, 114 Mo. 
 
 V. Montgomery, 53 Cal. 576, 578; 406, 21 S. W. 827; Barnett v. State 
 
 Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 10 So. (Ala., 1909), 51 So. 299. 
 
 667; Delaney v. State, 148 Ala. 586, »' Walker v. State, 13 Tex. App. 618, 
 
 42 So. 815 ; Gardiner v. People, 6 643. 
 
 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 155; People v. ** State v. Taylor, 134 Mo. 109, 35 
 
 Curtiss, 118 App. Div. (N. Y.) 259, S. W. 92. Cf. State v. Good, 132 Mo. 
 
 103 N. Y. S. 395; Thomas v. State, fi4, 33 S. W. 790; United States v. 
 
 47 Fla. 99, 36 So. 161; Lingerfelt v. Crow, i Bond (U. S.) 51, 25 Fed. 
 
 State, 125 Ga. 4, 53 S. E. 803; State Cas. 14895. 
 
 V. Wilcox, 132 N. Car. 1120, 44 S. E. ^^ See Brown v. State, 150 Ala. 25, 
 
 625; Commonwealth v. Hersey, 2 Al- 43 So. 194. But see contra, Craw- 
 
 len (Mass.) 173; State v. Bickle, 53 ford v. United States, 30 App. D. C. i. 
 
 W. Va. 597, 45 S. E. 917 ; Harvey v. "''' Defendant cannot be permitted 
 
 State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 545, 34 S. W. to prove that his conduct in jail 
 
 623; Jones v. State (Ga. 1909), 63 S. since his arrest has been good. State 
 
 E. 1 1 14; Jenkins v. State (Fla., I909)» v. Fontcnot, 48 La. Ann. 305, 19 So. 
 
 50 So. 582. iii; Hill V. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 "State V. }ilarshall, 115 'Slo. 383, 22 415, 35 S. W. 660.
 
 225 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. § IIQa 
 
 a murderous assault it is proper to prove that the accused went 
 to the house of the witness to whom the accused then surrendered 
 himself and by whom he was then taken to the sheriff.*'^ Nor 
 can the accused be permitted, unless his flight is shown in the 
 first instance, to testify that he left the country because he was 
 too poor to make a proper defense.®'^ 
 
 It will be seen from the above illustrations that the defendant 
 cannot be permitted to manufacture evidence in his own favor. 
 Further illustrations may be found in the court refusing to permit 
 the defendant to show that he appeared surprised or astonished 
 when accused of having committed a cpime,''^ or that he behaved 
 himself in an orderly manner when in jail."^ And while evidence 
 that the accused offered to compromise the matter is always rele- 
 vant, he will not be allowed to show that he refused to compro- 
 mise."'^ So. evidence in a case of homicide that after the ac- 
 cused had inflicted the mortal wound, he endeavored to aid the 
 deceased or went to procure a physician for him, has been re- 
 jected.'^ 
 
 § 119a, Declarations which are self-serving are rejected. — The 
 
 statements or declarations of the accused in his own favor which 
 are independent of the res gestcc of the crime and which are 
 simply narrative in their character are not relevant as a part of 
 his defense.'" 
 
 "Allen V. State, 146 Ala. 61, 41 So. So. loii ; Linnehan v. State, 120 Ala. 
 
 624. 293, 25 So. 6; Hill V. State (Ala. 
 
 ^'aToliver v. State, 94 Ala. iii, 10 1908), 46 So. 864; ]\IcCoy v. State, 
 
 So. 428. The appeal bond of the ac- 46 Ark. 141 ; People v. Rodley, 131 
 
 cused and its forfeiture are admis- Cal. 240, 63 Pac. 351 ; People v. Tay- 
 
 sible to prove his flight. State v. lor, 4 Cal. App. 31, 87 Pac. 215; 
 
 Wingfield, 34 La. Ann. 1200; Gille- State v. Swift, 57 Conn. 496, 18 Atl. 
 
 land V. State, 24 Tex. App. 524, 7 S. 664 ; West v. State, 53 Fla. JJ, 43 So. 
 
 W. 24T. 445; Park V. State, 126 Ga. 575, 55 S. 
 
 ** Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 44. E. 489; Sullivan v. State, loi Ga. 
 
 * State V. Fontenot, 48 La. Ann. 800, 29 S. E. 16 ; Carle v. People, 200 
 
 305, 19 So. I IT. 111. 494, 66 N. E. 32, 93 Am. St. 208; 
 
 ™ Williams v. State, 52 Ala. 411. Spittorff v. State, 108 Tnd. 171, 8 N. 
 
 " State V. Whitson, III N. Car. 695, E. 911; State v. SchafFer, 70 Iowa 
 
 16 S. E. 332; State v. Strong, 153 Mo. 371, 30 N. W. 639; State v. Gillespie, 
 
 548, 55 S. W. 78. 62 Kan. 469, 63 Pac. 742, 84 Am. St. 
 
 ^"Walker v. State, 139 Ala. 56, 35 411; Commonwealth v. Cosseboom, 
 
 15 — U.VDERHILL CkIM. Ev.
 
 § I20 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 226 
 
 An exception, however, is made where the prosecution intro- 
 duces in evidence declarations of the accused which tend to in- 
 criminate him. The accused may then introduce that portion of 
 the conversation of which these declarations form a part which 
 relates or is connected with wdiat the accused said in the first in- 
 stance, though it may be partly or wholly in his favor.'" A part 
 of the conversation may be proved by one witness and a part by 
 another witness if the parts thus proved form a connected whole 
 and have a legitimate bearing on the statement of the accused, ''* 
 
 It has been held that the accused shall not be permitted to 
 prove that he requested or demanded to be taken before the de- 
 ceased for identification f^ that he had declared he had done noth- 
 ing wrong and w-anted to come to court and stand his trial, '^*' or 
 that, being charged with a homicide, he stated after the crime that 
 he had fired the first shot into a ditch on the banks of "which the 
 crime was committed."' But the accused may, however, prove that 
 he denied an accusation of crime made in his presence and 
 hearing. 
 
 § 120. Resistance to arrest. — An innocent person has nothing to 
 fear from an arrest, except perhaps the inconvenience of the 
 situation and the often unpleasant notoriety connected with it. 
 Even if he be ill-supplied with means to secure his acquittal when 
 tried, the evidence against him may be so intrinsically weak that 
 
 155 Mass. 298, 29 X. E. 463; State Morrow v. State, 48 Ind. 432; 
 
 V. Long, 201 Mo. 664, 100 S. W. 587; Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 
 
 State V. Speyer, 194 Mo. 459, 91 S. W. N. W. 771 ; State v. Napier, 65 
 
 1075 ; Smith v. State, 61 Neb. 296, 85 Mo. 462 ; State v. Patterson, 63 N. 
 
 N. W. 49; M'Kee v. People, 36 N. Y. Car. 520; Lowry v. State, 53 Tex. 
 
 113, 3 Abb. Pr. N. S. 216, 34 How. Cr. App. 562, no S. W. 911; Rogers 
 
 Pr. (N. Y.) 230; State v. Ward, 103 v. State, 26 Tex. App. 404, 9 S. W. 
 
 N. Car. 419, 8 S. E. 814 ; Rudy v. 762 ; State v. Mahon, 32 Vt. 241 ; 
 
 Commonwealth, 128 Pa. St. 500, 18 Fertig v. State, 100 Wis. 301, 75 N. 
 
 Atl. 344; State V. Green, 61 S. Car. W. 960. 
 
 12, 39 S. E. 185 ; Colquit v. State, 107 '* Fertig v. State, 100 Wis. 301, 75 
 
 Tenn. 381, 64 S. W. 713 ; State v. N. W. 960. 
 
 Leuhrsman, 123 Iowa 476, 99 N. W. '° Walker v. State, 139 Ala. 56, 35 
 
 T40; Glover V. State (Tex. Cr. App., So. toil 
 
 1909), 122 S. W. 396; Garner v. State, '" Linnehan v. State, 120 Ala. 293, 
 
 6 Ga. App. 788, 65 S. E. 842. 25 So. 6. 
 
 '^ Burns v. State, 49 Ala. 370; "People v. Taylor, 4 Cal. App. 31, 
 
 People V. Estrado, 49 Cal. 171 87 Pac. 215.
 
 227 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. 
 
 8 121 
 
 the grand jury will fail to indict. If indicted, at least in crimes 
 of little magnitude, he may, by securing bail, be able to reduce to 
 a minimum the annoyance and discomfort he suffers. Hence re- 
 sisting arrest, and particularly assaulting or attempting to kill 
 the officer who makes or attempts to make the arrest, is strong 
 evidence of a consciousness of guilt ;^'^ and the fact that the ar- 
 resting officer did not know the accused was charged with the 
 crime for which he is tried will not exclude evidence of his re- 
 sistance."^ 
 
 It ma}' be shown that the accused assaulted a bystander who 
 seized him on the occasion of the crime, ^^ and the threats of the 
 accused that he would kill any one who attempted to arrest him, 
 or that he would die before he would surrender, are also rele- 
 vant.^^ 
 
 § 121. Fabricating or suppressing evidence. — Evidence to show 
 that the accused has attempted to fabricate or procure false evi- 
 dence,^- to destroy evidence against himself,^^ to corrupt the wit- 
 nesses for the state,** or to procure their absence,*" by threats of 
 
 "State V. Taylor, ii8 Mo. 153, 2^ 
 S. W. 449, 451 ; State v. Moore, loi 
 Mo. 316, 14 S. W. 182; McKevitt v. 
 People, 208 111. 460, 70 N. E. 693; 
 Horn V. State, 102 Ala. 144, 15 So. 
 278; Commonwealth v. McManiman, 
 27 Pa. Super. Ct. 304; Jamison v. 
 People, 145 111. 357, 34 ^'■ E. 486; 
 People V. Scalamiero, 143 Cal. 343, y6 
 Pac. 1098; State v. Spaugh, 200 Mo. 
 571, 98 S. W. 55; State V. Taylor, 
 118 Mo. 153, 24 S. W. 449; State v. 
 Moore, 117 Mo. 395, 22 S. W. 1086; 
 Mitchell V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. .\pp. 
 37, 106 S. W. 124; Ryan v. People, 
 79 N. Y. 593; People v. Moore, 26 
 Misc. (N. Y.) r68, 56 N. Y. S. 802; 
 Williams v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 
 607, 8 S. E. 470; State v. Lambert 
 (Me. 1908), 71 Atl. 1092; People v. 
 Haxer CMich. 1906), ro8 N. W. 90. 
 
 "State V. Grant, 79 Mo. 113, 136, 
 49 Am. 218. Cf. Russell v. State, Z7 
 
 Tex. Cr. App. 314, 39 S. W. 674; 
 State V. Marks, 70 S. Car. 448, 50 S. 
 E. 14. 
 
 *" State V. Sanders, 76 Mo. 35; 
 Lyles V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 119, 
 86 S. W. 763. 
 
 "Horn V. State, 102 Ala. 144, 15 
 So. 278, 281 ; Ross V. State, 74 Ala. 
 532. 
 
 *" See Underhill on Evidence, § 229. 
 Dickey v. State, 86 I\Iiss. 525, 38 So. 
 776; Allen V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 82 S. W. 589, 26 Kj'. L. 807; State v. 
 Marren (Idaho, 1910), 107 Pac. 993. 
 
 ^ Cover V. Commonwealth, 6 Cent. 
 585 ; Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 Pa. 
 .Super. Ct. 470; State v. Constantine, 
 48 Wash. 218, 93 Pac. 317; Sims v. 
 State, 146 Ala. T09, 41 So. 413. 
 
 ^ People V. Marion, 29 Mich. 31 ; 
 Eacock V. State, 169 Tnd. 488. 82 N. 
 E. 1039; State V. Constantine, 48 
 Wash. 2t8, 93 Pac. 317. 
 
 "Collins V. Commonwealth, 12
 
 § 121 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 228 
 
 violence. ''''' or otherwise,"' is always admissible as showing a con- 
 sciousness of guilt, and is of particular value where the incrimi- 
 nating evidence is mainly circumstantial.*^ 
 
 Thus, the state may prove that the accused attempted to 
 compel a person who testifies against him to sign a paper pur- 
 porting to be his affidavit. It may then be shown that the paper 
 was not, in fact, an affidavit at all. The notary whose name is 
 signed to it is competent to show that the witness did not sign 
 the paper alleged to have been signed and did not swear to it, 
 but that the notary wrote and signed the affidavit in the absence 
 of the witness.^" Attempts by persons other than the accused to 
 bribe or to suppress testimony are admissible if the accused had 
 knowledge of or was in any way connected with the attempts.''^ 
 It is for the jury to determine whether or not the accused had 
 knowledge of, or was connected wnth. the attempts to bribe wit- 
 nesses.'*" And finally it may be shown as proving the guilt of 
 the accused, that on a prior trial he attempted to corrupt a mem- 
 ber of the jury.^^ 
 
 But the intentional destruction or removal of written evidence, 
 or of a witness from the jurisdiction, or the failure or neglect by 
 
 Bush (Ky.) 271 ; State v. Barron, Z7 ^^ Williams v. State, 22 Tex. App. 
 
 Vt. 57. Evidence that a third person 497, 505, 4 S. W. 64; State v. 
 
 paid to procure the absence of a wit- Mathews, 202 Mo. 143, 100 S. W. 
 
 ness is inadmissible if the accused is 420; Maxey v. State, 76 Ark. 276, 88 
 
 not priv}^ thereto. People v. Dixon, S. W. 1009; Love v. State, 35 Tex. 
 
 94 Cal. 255, 29 Pac. 504 ; Common- Cr. App. 27, 29 S. W. 790 ; Whart. Cr. 
 
 wealth V. Robbins, 3 Pick. (Mass.) Ev., § 750. It may be proved that 
 
 63; State V. Hamilton (Del.), 67 Atl. while the accused was in jail he 
 
 836; Crowell V. State, 79 Neb. 784, threatened to kill a person who was 
 
 113 N. W. 262; Reid v. State, 20 Ga. sent to identify him. People v. Chin 
 
 681; Ward V. Commonwealth (Ky.), Hane, 108 Cal. 597, 41 Pac. 697. 
 
 83 S. W. 649, 26 Ky. L. 1256; Ezell "".Minor v. State, 55 Fla. ^7, 46 So. 
 
 V. State (Tex.), 71 S. W. 283. 297. 
 
 '« Adams v. People, 9 Hun (X. Y.) "'Rice v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 89, 95; Commonwealth v. Smith, 162 255, 103 S. W. 1156. 
 
 Mass. 508, 39 N. E. iTi; State v. '" Eacock v. State, 169 Tnd. 488, 82 
 
 Mathews, 202 Mo. 143, 100 S. W. N. E. 1039. 
 
 420; Pitts V. State, T02 Tenn. 141. 50 *^ Gassenheimer v. United States, 26 
 
 S. W. 756; State V. Rorabacher, 19 App. D. C. 432; People v. Marion, 29 
 
 Iowa 154. Mich. 31 ; State v. Case, 93 N. Car. 
 
 *^ Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482, 545, 53 Am. 471. 
 490, 21 N. E. 285.
 
 229 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. § 121 
 
 the accused to produce evidence, creates no legal presumption of 
 his guilt or that the evidence, if produced, would be unfavorable 
 to him, in the absence of proof of an intention to suppress the 
 evidence.^* The intention is always very material and the ac- 
 cused must be permitted to testify to his intent in doing any act 
 which is suspicious or which prima facie appears to be a destruc- 
 tion or suppression of evidence. For example, he may be al- 
 lowed to testify to his intent in removing documents which the 
 prosecution states he has destroyed or concealed. ®° 
 
 Whether the state may show that a person implicated with the 
 accused, or a person who had a very full or a complete knowl- 
 edge of all the facts of the crime had fled from the reach of 
 process, in order to avoid testifying and refused to return, de- 
 pends on circumstances. It must be shown that the accused had 
 procured the absence of such person ; or, at least, that he had 
 some knowledge of his intention to leave, and that he made no 
 effort to secure his attendance.'"' 
 
 It has been held that a false theory of defense is some evi- 
 dence of guilt. It is not material that the accused did not him- 
 self invent it, but adopted a scheme put forward by others. The 
 court may, therefore, charge that the false theory of defense indi- 
 cating a consciousness of guilt may justify the jury in convicting 
 the prisoner, if the incriminating evidence, in connection with 
 the false defense, satisfies them beyond a reasonable doubt of his 
 guilt.''' 
 
 Evidence that the accused during his imprisonment was study- 
 ing the law of his case is not admissible for the purpose of prov- 
 ing an intention on his part to fabricate a defense."^ 
 
 "To use the fact that he had of- "^Crawford v. United States, 212 
 
 fered and used false evidence as a U. S. 183, 29 Sup. Ct. 260. 
 
 circumstance against him, the jury ®^ People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, 
 
 must be satisfied beyond all question 463, 14 N. E. 319, i Am. St. 851; 
 
 that he was guilty of fabricating it, Commonwealth v. Costello, 119 ^lass. 
 
 I. e., introducing it knowing it to be 214; Bloomer v. State, 75 Ark. 297, 87 
 
 false. State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, S. W. 438. 
 
 194. 17 Atl. 483; State V. Magoon, 68 *' Pilger v. Commonwealth, 112 Pa. 
 
 Vt. 289, 35 Atl. 310; Allen v. United St. 220, 230, 5 Atl. 309: Rloomcr v. 
 
 States, 164 U. S. 492, 41 L. ed. 528, State, 7S Ark. 297, 87 S. W. 438. 
 
 17 Sup. Ct. 154. "'Cole V. State, 48 Te.x. Cr. App. 
 
 439, 88 S. W. 341.
 
 § 122 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 23O 
 
 § 122, Silence under accusations of guilt. — The silence of the ac- 
 cused as regards statements in his hearing which impHcate him 
 directly or indirectly may be proved with the statements,"" and 
 from his acquiescence the jury may infer that the statements are 
 true and that they prove his guilt. Silence is assent as well as 
 consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime 
 is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-con- 
 fession. 
 
 An innocent person will at once naturally and emphatically 
 repel an accusation of crime, as a matter of self-preservation and 
 self-defense, and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A 
 person's silence, therefore, particularly wdien it is persistent, will 
 justify an inference that he is not innocent. The accused may 
 have been silent when he was interrogated or accused before a 
 magistrate, a coroner or police officers, which is termed judicial 
 interrogation, or he may have been silent extra-judicially, /. c, 
 when accused or questioned by private persons before or after 
 his arrest. 
 
 For silence to be equivalent to a confession, it must be shown 
 that the accused heard and understand the specific charge against 
 him,"° and that he heard it under circumstances not only per- 
 
 ^^ State V. Suggs, 89 N. Car. 527 ; Brailey, 134 Mass. 527 ; Bookser v. 
 
 Smith V. State, 147 Ala. 692, 40 So. State, 26 Tex. App. 593, 10 S. W. 
 
 959; Rains v. Commonwealth (K3'.), 219; Franklin v. State, 69 Ga. 36, 47 
 
 92 S. W. 276, 29 Ky. L. 66; Davis v. Am. 748; State v. Howard, 102 Mo. 
 
 State (Tex. 1908), 114 S. W. 366; 142, 14 S. W. 937; State v. Pratt, 20 
 
 State V. Worthen, 124 Iowa 408, 100 Iowa 267 ; Commonwealth v. Harvey, 
 
 N. W. 330; O'Hearn v. State, 79 Neb. i Gray (Mass.) 487; Long v. State, 
 
 513, 113 X. W. 130; Musfelt V. State, 13 Tex. App. 2x1; Martin v. State, 
 
 64 Xeb. 445, 90 X^. W. 237; Watt v. 39 Ala. 523; Roquemore v. State, 50 
 
 People, 126 111. 9, 18 X. E. 340, i L. R. Tex. Cr. App. 542, 99 S. W. 547 ; 
 
 A. 403; Gilman v. People, 178 111. 19, State v. Quirk, loi Minn. 334, 112 N. 
 
 52 X^. E. 967: Commonwealth v. De- W. 409; Irving v. State (Miss. 1908), 
 
 whirst, 190 Mass. 293, 76 X. E. 1052; 47 So. 518; State v. Major, 70 S. 
 
 Joiner v. State, 119 Ga. 315, 46 S. E. Car. 387, 50 S. E. 13; Jones v. State 
 
 412; State V. Johnson, 73 X\ J. L. (Ala. 1908), 47 So. 100; People v. 
 
 199, 63 Atl. 12; Lyon v. Common- Long, 7 Cal. App. 27, 93 Pac. 387; 
 
 wealth (Ky.), 96 S. W. 857, 29 Ky. People v. McCrea, 32 Cal. 98; White 
 
 L. 1020; People v. Swaile (Cal. App., v. State (Tex. 1905), 85 S. W. 1140; 
 
 1909), 107 Pac. 134. State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283, 91 
 
 ^"° Brown v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. Pac. 977 ; Finch v. Commonwealth 
 
 935, II S. E. 799; Commonwealth v. (Ky.) 92 S. W. 940, 29 Ky. L. 187.
 
 231 
 
 COXSCIOUSXESS OF GUILT, 
 
 122 
 
 mitting but calling on him for a denial/ taking into considera- 
 tion all the circumstances and the persons who were present.^ 
 
 ^ Ettinger v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 
 St. 338; Surber v. State, 99 Ind. 71, 
 'j2, ; Conwa\' v. State, 1 18 Ind. 482, 
 485, 21 X. E. 285 ; Jones v. State, 107 
 Ala. 93, 18 So. 237; State v. Good, 
 132 Vlo. 114, z}> S. \V. 790; Moore v. 
 State, 96 Tenn. 209, ZZ S. W. 
 1046; People V. Young, 108 Cal. 8, 
 41 Pac. 281 ; Williford v. State, 36 
 Tex. Cr. App. 414, 2,-j S. W. 761; 
 State V. :\Iagoon, 68 Vt. 289, 35 Atl. 
 310; Loggins V. State, 8 Tex. App. 
 434; Commonwealth v. Brown, 121 
 I\Iass. 69; Lawson v. State, 20 Ala. 
 65, 56 Am. Dec. 182 ; Brister v. State, 
 26 Ala. 107, 116; Slattery v. People, 
 76 111. 217; Watt V. People, 126 111. 
 9, 18 X. E. 340, I L. R. A. 403 ; Wil- 
 liams V. State, 42 Ark. 35 ; Ford v. 
 State, 34 Ark. 649; State v. Mullins, 
 loi IMo. 514, 14 S. W. 625; State v. 
 Smith, 30 La. Ann. 457 ; State v. Car- 
 roll, 30 S. Car. 85, 8 S. E. 433, 14 
 Am. St. 883; State v. Hasty, 121 
 Iowa 507, 96 X. W. 1 1 15; Raymond 
 V. State, 154 Ala. i, 45 So. 895; 
 O'Hearn v. State, 79 Xeb. 513, 113 
 X. W. 130; Graham v. State, 118 Ga. 
 807, 45 S. E. 616 ; State v. Richardson) 
 194 Mo. 326, 92 S. W. 649; State v. 
 Walker, 78 Mo. 380; People v. Mc- 
 Cue, 87 App. Div. CX. Y.) 72, 83 X. 
 Y. S. 1088; Lumpkin v. State, 125 
 Ga. 24, 53 S. E. 8to; Jones v. State, 
 2 Ga. App. 433, 58 S. E. 559; Smith 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. App. 344, 106 
 S. W. T161; People V. Hossler, 135 
 Mich. 384, 97 X. W. 754, 10 Det. 
 Leg. X. 798; State v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 
 r, 39 Atl. 447, ey Am. St. 648, 42 L. 
 R. A. 673n. If a confession is inad- 
 missible because the accused was not 
 cautioned, or because he was under 
 
 duress, his silence ought in like cir- 
 cumstances to be refused. Fulcher 
 V. State, 28 Tex. App. 465, 473, 13 S. 
 W. 750 ; Xolen v. State, 14 Tex. App. 
 474, 46 Am. 247n. 
 
 ■ Wharton thus broadly and liber- 
 ally states this rule in Cr. Ev., 8th 
 ed., § 679. "If A., when in B.'s pres- 
 ence and hearing, makes statements 
 which B. listens to in silence, inter- 
 posing no objection, A.'s statement 
 may be evidence against B., whenever 
 B.'s silence is of such a nature as to 
 lead to the inference of assent." In 
 Commonwealth v. Kenney, 12 Met. 
 (Mass.) 23s, 46 Am. Dec. 672, the 
 court says : "The admissibility of si- 
 lence depends on whether he hears 
 and understands the statement and 
 comprehends its meaning; whether 
 the truth of the facts embraced in 
 this statement is within his own 
 knowledge; whether he is in such 
 a situation that he is at liberty to 
 make a reply. * * * jf majg jn 
 the course of any judicial hearing, he 
 could not interfere and deny the 
 statement ; it would be to charge the 
 witness with perjury and inconsistent 
 with decorum and the rules of law 
 * * * or if he is restrained by 
 fear, or by doubts of his rights ; by a 
 belief that his security will be pro- 
 moted by his silence." See also, Kel- 
 ley V. People, 55 N. Y. 565, 574, 14 
 Am. 342. It is for the court to de- 
 termine whether the proceedings are 
 judicial. People v. Willett, 92 X. Y. 
 29, Z7)^ I X^ Y. Cr. 355. See also 
 State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283, 91 
 Pac. 977 ; Hanna v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 5, 79 S. W. 544; Maloney v. 
 State (Ark., 1909), 121 S. W. 728.
 
 >> 123 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 232 
 
 And if it be proved that the accused, when he heard the in- 
 criminating statement, positively denied it, the statement cannot 
 be proved.^ 
 
 g 123. Attendant circumstances explaining motives and reasons of 
 silence. — The silence of the accused may spring from such a va- 
 riety of motives, some of which may be consistent with inno- 
 cence, that silence alone is very slight evidence of guilt ; and, 
 aside from the inferences which may arise from the attendant 
 circumstances, should be received with caution as proof of guilt.* 
 
 The accused may always show the attending circumstances of 
 his silence, and, if he shall show, to the satisfaction of the jury, 
 that his silence was caused by reasons or prompted by motives 
 consistent with his innocence, the accusatory statements and his 
 silence should be disregarded. Thus, he may show his silence 
 was caused by threats f that the statements made did not impli- 
 cate him f that he had or that he supposed he had no right to 
 reply, '^ as when the accusations were made in a judicial or quasi- 
 judicial proceeding,® as a coroner's inquest.^ So he may prove 
 that he had promised to be silent under accusations made at a 
 family council ;^° and generally that, under the circumstances, he 
 may show that no oral reply would have been either natural, 
 proper or expedient." 
 
 ■''People V. Turner, i Cal. App. 420, The refusal by defendant to testify at 
 
 82 Pac. 397. a preliminary examination cannot be 
 
 * Underbill on Ev., p. 112; People proved against him. Broyles v. State, 
 
 V. Manasse, 153 Cal. 10, 94 Pac. 92. 47 Ind. 251, 253; State v. Smith, 30 
 
 ^ Flanagin v. State, 25 Ark. 92. La. Ann. 457 ; State v. Hale, 156 Mo. 
 
 " Loggins V. State, 8 Tex. App. 434. 102, 56 S. W. 881. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Kenney, 12 " State v. Mullins, loi Mo. 514, 14 
 
 Mete. (Mass.) 235, 46 Am. Dec. 672; S. W. 625; People v. Willett, 92 N. 
 
 Simmons v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. Y. 29, r N. Y. Cr. 355. 
 
 527, 97 S. W. 1052. '"Slattery v. People, 76 111. 217. 
 
 " Bell V. State, 93 Ga. 557, 19 S. E. " "Declarations made in the pres- 
 
 244; Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 565, ence of a party to which he makes 
 
 571, 14 Am. 342; Comstock v. State, no reply are sometimes competent, as 
 
 14 Neb. 205, 15 N. W. 355; Weaver equivalent to a tacit admission by 
 
 V. State, 77 Ala. 26; People v. Hill- him. This depends on whether he 
 
 house, 80 Mich. 580, 45 N. W. 484; heard and understood them, whether 
 
 State v. Mullins, loi Mo. 514. 14 S. he is at liberty to reply, whether he 
 
 W. 625; Burrill on Cir. Ev., p. 482. is in custody, or under restraint or
 
 233 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. §123 
 
 The mental condition of the person who made the accusing 
 statements which were not denied is very important. If the per- 
 son making the incriminating statements was so intoxicated as 
 not to reaHze what he was saying, they may be disregarded and 
 the silence of the accused is not competent. If, on the other hand, 
 the accused is intimidated by the conduct of the party making the 
 statements, who was drunk and violent in his conduct, silence is 
 not relevant.^- 
 
 Upon the question whether the silence of the accused under 
 accusations of crime made in his presence wdiile he is under arrest 
 or in custody, but which are not made in a judicial proceeding 
 or investigation, where it would have been improper for him to 
 speak, is admissible, the cases are inharmonious. Some cases 
 hold that the mere fact of the accused being in custody or under 
 arrest excludes any inference of acquiescence in others' state- 
 ments from his silence, though he had the right and the oppor- 
 tunity to speak. ^^ But it may be noted that it has never been 
 expressly held that the fact that the accused is under arrest ex- 
 cludes evidence of his acts and conduct other than mere silence.^* 
 On the other hand, where the accused was identified by the in- 
 jured person or by any other witness in jail,^^ or in a station- 
 house immediately after his arrest, ^'^ or on being brought before 
 
 duress, and whether the statements in which case statements of deceased 
 
 are made by such persons and under in homicide were made in the pres- 
 
 such circumstances as naturally call ence and hearing of the accused. See 
 
 for a reply." Commonwealth v. also State v. Weaver, 57 Iowa 730, 11 
 
 Brailey, 134 Mass. 527, 530; Newman N. W. 675; State v. Epstein, 25 R. I. 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 88 S. W. 131, 55 Atl. 204; Hanger v. United 
 
 1089, 28 Ky. L. 8r. States, 173 Fed. 54, 97 C. C. A. 372. 
 
 " Jones V. State, 2 Ga. App. 433, 58 " Fulcher v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 
 S. E. 559. 465, 472, 13 S. W. 750; Cordova v. 
 
 ^^ State V. Diskin, 34 La. Ann. 919, State, 6 Tex. App. 207; Greenfield v. 
 
 921, 44 Am. 448 ; State v. Carter, 106 People, 85 N. Y. 75, 39 Am. 636. 
 La. 407, 30 So. 895 ; State v. Estoup, ^'^ Ettinger v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. 
 
 39 La. Ann. 906, 3 So. 124 ; Common- St. 338. 
 
 wealth V. Kenncy, 12 Mete. (Mass.) '" Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 565, 
 
 235, 46 Am. 672; Commonwealth v. 573, 14 Am. 342; Ackerson v. Peo- 
 
 McDermott, 123 Mass. 440, 25 Am. pic, 124 111. 563, 16 N. E. 847; State 
 
 T2o; Commonwealth v. Walker, 13 v. ^Murray, 126 Mo. 611, 29 S. W. 
 
 Allen (Mass.) 570; Gardner v. State 700; Murphy v. State, 36 Ohio St. 
 
 (Tex. 1896), 34 S. W. 945 ; State v. 62S; Green v. State, 97 Tenn. 50, 36 
 
 Kelleher, 201 Mo. 614, 100 S. W. 470, S. W. 700.
 
 §123 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 234 
 
 a magistrate in his private office, after the prehminary examina- 
 tion, solely for identification/' it was held that, as it would have 
 been proper for him to deny the identification, his silence was 
 admissible. The statements identifying a person under such cir- 
 cumstances, though made to a police officer and not addressed 
 directly to the accused, so far concern the latter that they chal- 
 lenge him to assert his innocence, and his assertion of this fact 
 would be both natural and proper. ^*^ 
 
 But it has been held that a statement by the accused made by 
 him in reply to a question by a police officer if he had anything 
 to say to a confession of an accomplice, that he would make his 
 statement at the proper time, and, that he would stand trial and 
 tell his story then, is not such acquiescence as to render the con- 
 fession admissible against the accused.^" 
 
 The silence of the accused is not competent unless it shall 
 clearly appear that the witness called to prove the statement and 
 the silence would have heard a response had any been made.-" 
 The witness may be asked if he would have heard the defendant 
 speak, if he had said anything.-^ 
 
 The mental or physical condition of the parties to the conver- 
 sation is relevant to show whether the accused heard the state- 
 ments. Deafness or an unconscious condition on the part of the 
 accused when the statement is made may be shown. If the ques- 
 tion whether the accused heard what was said is in issue, the 
 jury may consider these facts in determining the value of the 
 evidence of silence.-- Proof that the accused did not understand 
 the language spoken by his accuser will exclude the statement 
 and the silence of the accused as evidence. Statements made by 
 the accuser of an incriminating character have been excluded 
 though uttered in the presence of the accused where they were 
 made through an interpreter."^ 
 
 ^' State V. Suggs, 89 X. Car. 527, "" Williams v. State, 42 Ark. 380. 
 
 530. ^ Maynard v. People, 135 111. 416, 
 
 ^^Kelley v. People, 55 X. Y. 565, 25 X. E. 740; Raymond v. State, 154 
 
 575, 14 Am. 342; People v. Sullivan, Ala. i, 45 So. 895. 
 
 3 Cal. App. 502, 86 Pac. 834 (accusa- "State v. IMarsh, 70 Vt. 288, 40 
 
 tions by deceased against one accused Atl. 836. 
 
 of homicide). "State v. Epstein, 25 R. I. 131, 55 
 
 "O'Hearn v. State, 79 Xeb. 513, 113 .A-tl. 204. 
 N. W. 130.
 
 235 COXSCIOUSXESS OF GUILT. § 1 24 
 
 § 124. The accusatory assertion or question. — The statement to 
 be proved should be directly or indirectly relevant to the guilt of 
 the accused. It must refer to matters upon which he is likely 
 to be informed,^* as for example a statement by deceased that the 
 accused had shot him while running and that "you will have to 
 die some day and give an account of this.""" 
 
 His silence will not be admissible against the accused if there 
 were nothing in the statement which required or demanded a de- 
 nial from him. So, vague comments on the crime, or rumors 
 about the circumstances of it, not particularly pointing to or con- 
 cerning the accused are not relevant against him, though he was 
 silent when he heard them."'' 
 
 Every sane man is in a position to deny or affirm statements 
 regarding his own acts. But it is both unfair and absurd to con- 
 strue his silence as respects other men's acts, of which, probably, 
 he had no knowledge, as an affirmance or approval of them, or 
 of any inference which may be drawn therefrom.-" 
 
 The accusing declaration or question is not evidence because 
 of the veracity, credibility or competency of its author. The 
 assent of the accused makes it admissible, the statement being 
 put in his mouth by the assent implied from his silence, and its 
 truth, as it were, guaranteed by the acquiescence of the accused, 
 
 ^* Accusations by the wife of a man, Pac. 281; Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 
 
 whom defendant is alleged to have 482, 21 N. E. 285 ; Commonwealth v. 
 
 killed, that he had killed her hus- Brown, 121 Mass. 69; People v. 
 
 band, that he had told her so, and O'Brien, 68 Mich. 468, z'^ ^- W. 225 ; 
 
 had told her he would kill her, too, if State v. Murray, 126 Mo. 611, 29 S. 
 
 she revealed the crime, made in de- W. 700; People v. Smith, 172 N. Y. 
 
 fendant's presence, to which he re- 210, 64 N. E. 814 ; People v. Koerner, 
 
 plied that he would answer to the 154 N. Y. 355, 48 N. E. 730; Ettinger 
 
 magistrates, may be proved by any v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. St. 338; 
 
 one who heard them. Such charges Moore v. State, 96 Tenn. 209, Z'i S. 
 
 clearly call for a prompt denial. Mil- W. T046. 
 
 ler v. State, 68 Miss. 22T, 8 So. 273; -' Grigsby v. State, 4 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 Rains V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 92 19; Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 565, 
 
 S. W. 276, 29 Ky. L. 66. 14 Am. 342. Hence, the admissions 
 
 " State V. Sudduth, 74 S. Car. 498, of the thief not made in the presence 
 
 54 S. E. 1013. of the defendant are not receivable 
 
 ^'Franklin v. Commonwealth, 105 against the latter on the trial of an 
 
 Ky. 237, 48 S. W. 986, 20 Ky. L. 1137; indictment for receiving stolen goods. 
 
 Jones v. State, 107 Ala. 93, 18 So. Dye v. State, T30 Ind. ^7, 29 N. E. 
 
 237; People v. Young, 108 Cal. 8, 41 77'^-', Reilley v. State, 14 Ind. 217.
 
 § 124 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 236 
 
 l)ecaiise it containsi facts which he was called upon, but failed, 
 to deny.-*^ 
 
 Thus, for example, statements made in the presence of the ac- 
 cused which lead directly to the crime or connected him directly 
 with it called for a denial by him and his failure to deny such 
 statements render the statements admissible."^ 
 
 The incompetency of the person who makes the accusation as 
 a witness against the accused will not keep out his statement.^" 
 Thus a statement .made by the four-year-old son of the accused, 
 in his presence and in the presence of a police officer, showing 
 the circumstances of the crime, may be proved by the police 
 officer with the fact of the silence of the accused. ^"^ But a state- 
 ment by an accomplice of the accused made in his presence while 
 in custody is not made admissible against the accused by his 
 silence.^^ A witness may testify that the declaration was made 
 in the presence of the accused. He will not be permitted, how- 
 ever, to state his opinion that the accused must have heard it, for 
 that is not for the witness to determine.^^ The person who made 
 the statement is not an indispensable witness, as the statement 
 and the silence of the accused may be proved by anybody who 
 was present and heard the conversation.^^ The cases are not har- 
 monious upon the mode of proving that the accused heard and 
 understood the declaration, or whether the judge or jury are to 
 determine these facts. 
 
 On the one hand it is affirmed that the facts that he heard and 
 understood may be inferred by the jury from evidence that the 
 
 ^ Drumwright v. State, 29 Ga. 430; ''"People v. McCrea, 32 Cal. 98; 
 
 State V. Talmage, 107 Mo. 543, 17 S. Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 51 N. 
 
 W. 990; Johnson v. State, 90 Miss. W. 652. 
 
 317, 43 So. 435 ; People v. Long, 7 ^"a Geiger v. State, 25 Ohio C. C. 
 
 Cal. App. 27, 93 Pac. 387. An im- 742. 
 
 plicating letter, written by a person '^ Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 
 
 not produced, is admissible against 118 Ky. 870, 82 S. W. 592, 26 Ky. 
 
 the accused, though neither the signa- L. 793. 
 
 ture of the writer nor the truth of ^" People v. Holfelder, 5 N. Y. Cr. 
 
 the accusation is proved, if defendant 179; State v. Khowrj', 149 N. Car. 
 
 refuses to deny or explain it. People 454, 62 S. E. 638. 
 
 V. Lewis, 16 N. Y. S. 88t, 62 Hun '' State v. Monfre, 122 La. 251, 47 
 
 (N. Y.) 622 (without opinion). So. 543. 
 
 ^ People V. Sullivan, 3 Cal. App. 
 502, 86 Pac. 834.
 
 ^Z7 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT. 
 
 124 
 
 Statement was made in his physical presence, or from his near- 
 ness and attitude as a Hstener.^'* On the other, it is held that this 
 is not enough, and that affirmative evidence is required to show 
 prima facie to the satisfaction of the court that the attention of 
 the accused was attracted, and that he did actually and distinctly 
 hear and understand, before the statement shall be permitted to 
 go to the jury as his admission/^ If it appears indubitably that 
 the accused was asleep,^'' or was unconscious from intoxication 
 or otherwise, or that the statement was in a language he did not 
 understand,"' so that he could not hear or understand, his silence 
 is not competent.^^ 
 
 ** State V. Perkins, 3 Hawks (N. 
 Car.) ^yj; Simmons v. State, 115 Ga. 
 574, 41 S. E. 983; Commonwealth v. 
 Galavan, 9 Allen (Mass.) 271; Hall v. 
 State, 132 Ind. 317, 321, 31 N. E. 536; 
 Commonwealth v. Brailey, 134 Mass. 
 527, 530; Commonwealth v. Sliney, 
 126 Mass. 49, 50; Richards v. State, 
 82 Wis. 172, 51 X. W. 652; State v. 
 Johnson, y^ N. J. L. 199, 62, Atl. 12; 
 Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 565, 14 
 Am. 342; People v. Bissert, 172 N. 
 Y. 643, 65 N. E. 1 120, aff'g 71 App. 
 Div. CN. Y.) 118, 75 N. Y. S. 630. 
 
 ^Hall V. State, 132 Ind. 317, 31 N. 
 E. 536, 537; Long V. State, 13 Tex. 
 App. 211; Williams v. State, 42 Ark. 
 
 380; Jones V. State, 65 Ga. 147, 150; 
 People V. Ah Yute, 54 Cal. 89; Rose 
 V. State, 13 Ohio C. C. 342, 7 Ohio 
 Cir. Dec. 226; State v. Blackburn 
 (Del. O. & T., 1892), 75 Atl. 536. 
 ^'Lanergan v. People, 39 N. Y. 39, 
 
 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.) 113, 6 
 Park Cr. (N. Y.) 209. 
 
 " Territory v. Big Knot on Head, 
 
 6 Mont. 242, II Pac. 670. 
 
 ^ It seems that if the accused, 
 though physically present, was intoxi- 
 cated, it is for the jury to decide if 
 he was qualified to hear and imder- 
 stand, and if he did, in fact, assent by 
 silence. State v. Perkins, 3 Hawks 
 (N. Car.) 277, 378; People v. Koer- 
 ner, 154 N. Y. 355, 48 N. E. 730.
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 § 125. Definition and classification. § 138. 
 
 126. Voluntary character of confes- 
 
 sions. 
 
 127. Burden of proof to show vol- 139. 
 
 untary character. 
 
 128. Circumstances under which 140. 
 
 confession becomes invol- 
 untary. 141. 
 
 129. Confessions made while under 
 
 arrest. 142. 
 
 130. Efifect of cautioning the ac- 143. 
 
 cused. 
 
 131. Confessions under oath. 144. 
 
 132. Confessions taken at the pre- 
 
 liminary examination. 145. 
 
 133. Mode of proving a confession 
 
 made at the preliminary ex- 146. 
 amination. 
 
 134. Confessions of persons asso- 147. 
 
 ciated in a conspiracy. 
 
 135. Artifice or deception used. 147a. 
 
 136. Confessions by intoxicated per- 
 
 sons. 
 
 137. Admissions receivable though 
 
 involuntary. 
 
 When facts discovered admit 
 parts of an involuntary con- 
 fession. 
 
 Confessions procured by per- 
 sons in authority. 
 
 Confession need not be spon- 
 taneous. 
 
 Confessions made by signs or 
 gestures. 
 
 Confessions of treason. 
 
 Confessions made by young 
 children. 
 
 Judicial confessions — Plea of 
 guilty. 
 
 Confessions of persons not in- 
 dicted. 
 
 The value of confessions as ev- 
 idence. 
 
 Corroborations of extra judi- 
 cial confessions. 
 
 , Credibilit}' of confession and 
 use of in favor of the ac- 
 cused. 
 
 § 125. Definition and classification. — A confession is a statement 
 made at any time by a person, admitting or suggesting the infer- 
 ence that he has committed, or participated in the commission of, 
 a crime. The statement must be made voluntarily and without any 
 fear by or promise to him before it will be admitted as evidence 
 against him on a criminal trial. ^ 
 
 'People V. Miller, 122 Cal. 84, 54 wealth (Ky.), 15 Ky. L. 835, 26 S. 
 Pac. 523; AUred v. State, 126 Ga. W. i; Taylor v. State, Z"/ Neb. 788, 
 537, 55 S. E. 178; Collins V. Common- 56 X. W. 623; State v. Porter, 32 
 
 (238)
 
 239 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 § 125 
 
 A confession is distinguished from an admission by the fact 
 that an admission is a statement of a fact not necessarily incrimi- 
 nating the accused person.- The necessity for drawing a Hue l^e- 
 tween the two classes of statements, confessions and admissions, 
 arises from the fact that admissions are always admissible as an 
 exception to the rule excluding hearsay irrespective of the motive 
 or inducement which prompted them, provided they are made 
 against the interest of the person making them, while confessions 
 must be shown to be entirely unprompted, either by the motives 
 of hope or fear. Thus a statement by the accused showing how 
 the crime was committed by other persons, he being present, but 
 denying that he took part in it,^ or a statement by the accused 
 which admits the commission of the act which is charged against 
 him, but which denies that it was done with a criminal intent,* 
 is an admission merely, and not a confession. An offer by the ac- 
 cused to compromise the charge against him by paying money 
 is not a confession, but is admissible as an admission.^ The 
 
 Ore. 135, 49 Pac. 964, 966; State v. 
 Heidenreich, 29 Ore. 381, 45 Pac. 
 755 ; Runnels v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 
 ■^■•PP- 555, 61 S. W. 479. "A confes- 
 sion in criminal law is the voluntary 
 declaration by a person who has com- 
 mitted a crime or misdemeanor, to 
 another, of the agency or participa- 
 tion he had in the crime. The word 
 confession is not the mere equivalent 
 of the words, statements or declara- 
 tions." People V. Strong, 30 Cal. 151. 
 A confession of guilt is an acknowl- 
 edgment of the criminal act or of the 
 facts that constitute the crime. State- 
 ments of facts and circumstances that 
 do not in effect or by inference ad- 
 mit the commission of a crime do 
 not in general constitute a confession 
 of guilt. Daniels v. State (Fla.), 48 
 So. 747. "A confession, in criminal 
 law, is a voluntary statement made by 
 a person charged with the commis- 
 sion of a crime or misdemeanor, com- 
 municated to another person, wherein 
 he acknowledges himself to be guilty 
 of the offense charged, and discloses 
 the circumstances of the act and the 
 
 share and participation he had in it." 
 Black's Law Dictionary, aff'd in 
 Owens V. State, 120 Ga. 296, 298, 48 
 S. E. 21 ; Spicer v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), SI S. W. 802, 21 Ky. L. 528; 
 State v. Brinkley (Ore., 1909), 105 
 Pac. 708. 
 
 ■ State v. Campbell, "]■>> Kan. 688, 
 85 Pac. 784, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) S33n. 
 
 ^ Jones v. State, 120 Ala. 303, 25 So. 
 204; Dumas v. State, dz Ga. 600; 
 Boston v. State, 94 Ga. 590, 20 S. E. 
 98; State V. Heidenreich, 29 Ore. 381, 
 45 Pac. 755 ; Bell v. State, 93 Ga. 557. 
 19 S. E. 244; People v. Elliott, 8 N. 
 Y. St. 223; State v. Oilman, 51 Me. 
 206, 225; Burnett v. State (Neb., 
 1910), 124 N. W. 927; State v. Knee- 
 land (Mont., 1909), 104 Pac. 513. 
 
 * State V. Abrams, 131 Iowa 479, 
 481, 108 N. W. 1041 ; State v. Thomas, 
 135 Iowa 717, 725, 109 N. W. 900; 
 Owens V. State, 120 Ga. 296, 48 S. 
 E. 21. 
 
 "Michaels v. People, 208 III. 603. 
 70 N. E. 747; State v. Richmond, 13S 
 Iowa 494, 116 N. W. 609.
 
 125 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 240 
 
 Statement of one accused of murder by poisoning, that he had 
 given too much of a certain (h'ug. at the same time protesting 
 that it was done by mistake and that the homicide was uninten- 
 tional is not a confession and should not be submitted to the jury 
 on that theory.*^ 
 
 A confession, to be receivable as such, must be an admission 
 by the accused that he is guilty of the precise crime with which 
 he is charged. The prisoner's declaration that he is guilty of 
 other similar crimes, while competent to show the existence of 
 a criminal intent, never amounts to a confession of the crime for 
 which he is indicted, nor do the rules and principles regulating 
 confessions apply to such declarations." 
 
 "^ State V. Thomas, 135 Iowa 717, 
 725, 109 N. W. 900. "The distinction 
 in all our cases is between the effect 
 of admissions of fact from which the 
 guilt of the accused may be inferred 
 and the admission of guilt itself. In- 
 criminating statements, to be the 
 equivalent of a confession of guilt, 
 must be so comprehensive as to in- 
 clude every fact necessary to be 
 proved by the prosecution in order 
 to establish the defendant's guilt. An 
 admission of the main fact, from 
 which the essential elements of the 
 criminal act may be inferred, amounts 
 to an admission of the crime itself. 
 If the main fact is admitted with a 
 qualifying exclusion of a necessary 
 ingredient of the crime charged, the 
 crime is not confessed. The qualifi- 
 cation is a part of the admission, and 
 both must be considered in interpret- 
 ing the meaning of the statement. 
 A crime consists in something more 
 than the commission of an act. There 
 must be a union of act and intention. 
 One may admit that he took a horse 
 from the stable of another and. at 
 the same time, explain that he pur- 
 chased the horse from a named per- 
 son claiming to own the horse, and 
 
 that there was no criminal intent on 
 his part. If the admission that he 
 took the horse was without explana- 
 tion, the intent to steal could be in- 
 ferred from the act of taking. But 
 where the taking is claimed to have 
 been in good faith and with no inten- 
 tion to commit a crime, and because 
 of a purchase from one whom, in 
 good faith, he believed to be the true 
 owner the admission made with such 
 qualification cannot mean that he was 
 intending to confess his guilt of the 
 crime of horse stealing. An admis- 
 sion of a fact not in itself involving 
 criminal intent is not a confession. 
 The term confession is restricted to 
 acknowledgment of guilt and is not a 
 mere equivalent of words or state- 
 ments." Owens V. State, 120 Ga. 296, 
 48 S. E. 21. 
 
 '^ Commonwealth v. Call, 21 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 515; Hardtke v. State, 67 
 Wis. 552, 558, 30 N. W. 723; People 
 V. Hickman, 113 Cal. 80, 45 Pac. 175. 
 Thus an offer to bribe the district at- 
 torney, coupled with an admission of 
 having committed an indecent assault, 
 cannot be construed as a confession 
 of the crime of rape. Hardtke v. 
 State, 67 Wis. 552, 558, 30 X. W. '/2Z.
 
 241 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 125 
 
 Confessions may be either judicial or extra-judicial; the 
 former are confessions that are made at a preliminary examina- 
 tion, at the coroner's inquest or on the trial of the accused. 
 Extra-judicial confessions are those made out of court to any 
 person. A plea of guilty on a prior trial ^ or on the preliminary 
 examination " is an extra-judicial confession and may be proved 
 as such on a subsequent trial. It is evidence merely and not con- 
 clusive on the court. This is the rule where the plea was ac- 
 cepted by the court and for some reason sentence was not im- 
 posed on the plea of guilty, or, being imposed, it was never exe- 
 cuted. But a plea of guilty which the court refused to receive is 
 not subsequently admissible in evidence as a confession.^" 
 
 Declarations by the accused of an in- 
 tention to commit separate offenses 
 from that charged are not confes- 
 sions. Kinchelow v. State, 5 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 9, 12. If the admission by 
 defendant of the commission of other 
 crimes than that charged is so insep- 
 arably connected with the confession 
 of the crime for which he is on trial 
 that it cannot be severed, it may be 
 received, the jury being warned that 
 it is in no sense evidence of the crime 
 charged. Gore v. People, 162 111. 259, 
 44 N. E. 500. An admission by the 
 accused that he killed deceased be- 
 cause of facts which even, if true do 
 not justify or excuse the killing is a 
 confession. Jones v. State, 130 Ga. 
 274, 60 S. E. 840. 
 
 * Commonwealth v. Ervine, 8 Dana 
 (Ky.) 30. 
 
 "Green v. State (Fla.), 24 So. 537; 
 State V. Briggs, 68 Iowa 416, 424, 27 
 X. W. 358; Commonwealth v. Brown, 
 T50 Mass. 330, 331, 23 N. E. 49. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Lannan, 13 Al- 
 len (Mass.) 563; State v. Meyers, 99 
 Mo. 107, 12 S. W. 516, 519. A 
 demurrer to the indictment can never 
 be construed as a confession. The 
 accused may always he allowed to 
 
 16 — Underhill Ckim. I'v. 
 
 show why he pleaded guilty and to 
 prove that he was not in fact guilty 
 wherever a prior plea of guilty is 
 used against him as a confession on 
 a subsequent trial. In State v. Por- 
 ter, 32 Ore. 135, 49 Pac. 964, the 
 court said after quoting almost all 
 the text writers. "From these au- 
 thorities we take it that the admis- 
 sion of a fact, or a bundle of facts, 
 from which quiet is directly deduci- 
 ble, or which within and of them- 
 selves impart guilt, may be denomi- 
 nated a confession, but not so with 
 the admission of a particular act or 
 acts or circumstances which may or 
 may not involve guilt, and which is 
 dependent for such result on other 
 facts or circumstances to be estab- 
 lished." .A^n admission by the ac- 
 cused that he is in possession of 
 property alleged to be stolen coupled 
 with exculpating declarations is not a 
 confession of the larceny. State v. 
 Heidenreich, 29 Ore. 381, 45 Pac. 755- 
 So in State v. Red, 53 Iowa 69, 4 N. 
 W. 831, the accused on trial for mur- 
 der admitted he had in his possession 
 jewelry of the victim, a woman. The 
 action of the court in calling this 
 admission a confession was held to be
 
 s 126 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 242 
 
 § 126. Voluntary character of confessions. — Before a confession, 
 either judicial or extra-judicial, can be received as such, it must 
 first be shown that it was in every respect freely and voluntarily 
 made." This means that the confession must not be obtained by 
 
 error. The test is, are the facts stated 
 by the accused, assuming them to be 
 true, consistent with his innocence? 
 If they are, his statement is an ad- 
 mission only and the rules of law 
 relating to confessions do not apply 
 to it. The admission may create a 
 presumption against the accused 
 which it will require evidence to re- 
 move. But unless the guilt of the 
 accused is the sole and necessary re- 
 sultant condition proceeding from or 
 growing out of the facts admitted, 
 the statement, however criminating, is 
 merely an admission and not a con- 
 fession. 
 
 Confessions in criminal cases, 6 
 Am. St. 242, 251 ; admissibihty in 
 evidence, 6 Am. St. 242, 251 ; ques- 
 tion of admissibility for court, 6 Am. 
 St. 249; whole confession must be 
 admitted, 6 Am. St. 251 ; confession 
 elicited by questions, 18 L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) 799-801 ; presumption as to vol- 
 untariness, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 857; 
 presumption as to character of, 18 L. 
 R. A. (N. S.) 783; determination of 
 character of confession, 18 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 777-794; confession without 
 proof of corpus delicti, 6 Am. St. 
 252; reason for exclusion of confes- 
 sion, 18 L. R. A. (X. S.) 772; col- 
 lateral inducement for confession, 6 
 Am. St. 249 ; statements made in sleep 
 as confession, 6 Am. St. 249; subse- 
 quent confessions, 18 L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) 857-859; effect of language as- 
 suming guilt addressed to accused, 18 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 802; confession in- 
 duced by hope or fear, 18 L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) 804-832; promise of accused to 
 turn state's evidence, 6 Am. St. 251; 
 
 extrinsic facts ascertained througli in- 
 admissible confession, 6 Am. St. 250, 
 251 ; confession in prosecution for 
 bribery, Elliott Ev., § 2907; in prose- 
 cution for counterfeiting, Elliott Ev., 
 § 2957; in prosecution for homicide, 
 Elliott Ev., § 3034; in prosecution 
 for perjury, Elliott Ev., § 3088; in 
 prosecution for rape, Elliott Ev., 
 § 3103. 
 
 "People v. Ward, 15 Wend. (X. 
 Y.) 231; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 5 
 Cush. (Mass.) 605, 610; Common- 
 wealth v. Morey, i Gray (Mass.) 
 461, 463 ; Commonwealth v. Preece, 
 140 Mass. 276, 277, 5 X. E. 494; Col- 
 lins V. State, 24 Tex. App. 141. 5 S. 
 W. 848 ; State v. Chambers, 45 La. 
 Ann. 36, 38, II So. 944; Ross v. State, 
 67 yid. 286, 289, 10 Atl. 218; Xichol- 
 son V. State, 38 Md. 140, 153; People 
 V. Taylor, 93 I\Iich. 638, 641, 53 X. W. 
 777; Smith V. State, 88 Ga. 627, 629, 
 15 S. E. 675 ; State v. Carson, 36 S. 
 Car. 524, 531, 532, 15 S. E. 588; State 
 V. Jones, 54 Mo. 478, 479; State v. 
 Kinder, 96 Mo. 548, 10 S. W. 77; 
 People V. Soto, 49 Cal. 67 ; People v. 
 Fox, 121 X^. Y. 449, 24 X. E. 923, aff'g 
 50 Hun (X^. Y.) 604, 3 X'. Y. S. 359; 
 People V. Deacons, 109 X'. Y. 374, 16 
 X^. E. 676; Fife V. Commonwealth, 29 
 Pa. 429, 436; Alfred v. State, 37 
 Miss. 296, 306; State v. Chisenhall, 
 106 X. Car. 676, 680, II S. E. 518; 
 Walker v. State, 136 Ind. 663, 668, 36 
 X. E. 356; State v. Poole, 42 Wash. 
 192, 84 Pac. 727; State v. Daly, 210 
 Mo. 664, 109 S. W. 53; McAlpine v. 
 State, 117 Ala. 93, 23 So. 130; People 
 V. Rogers, 192 X'. Y. 331, 85 X' E. 
 135 ; State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309,
 
 243 CONFESSIONS. § 1 26 
 
 any sort of threat or violence nor by any promise, either direct 
 or impHed, however slight the hope or fear produced thereby, 
 nor by the exertion of any influence. And while circumstances 
 are usually invoked to determine whether the confession is vol- 
 untary, yet as a safe general rule, it may be said that the state- 
 ment will be presumed to be voluntary, unless it appears that it 
 was inspired by a threat or a menace or procured by promises or 
 inducements or the expectation of some hope or benefit.^" A 
 basis must be laid for the admission of the confession by ascer- 
 taining whether the prisoner had been told that it would be 
 advantageous for him to confess, or whether any threat or prom- 
 ise had been made to him in connection with the crime, which 
 was sufficient to make the confession involuntary. If the con- 
 fession is the result of the pressure of a promise of some benefit, 
 or was procured by a threat, it will be excluded. In other words, 
 the fact that accused was influenced by hope or fear to make a 
 confession is regarded as creating so strong a presumption that 
 the confession is untrue, that the law rejects it as worthless. 
 
 The preliminary question, was the confession voluntary? bear- 
 ing directly upon its competency as evidence, must be, according 
 to the majority of the cases, decided by the court as a mixed 
 question of law and fact.^^ And the court may hear evidence 
 
 24 So. 329; Mitchell v. State (Miss. ^■Anderson v. State, 133 Wis. 6or, 
 
 1898), 24 So. 312; Pearsall v. Com- 114 N. W. 112. 
 
 monwealth (Ky. 1906), 92 S. W. 589, " Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 
 
 29 Ky. L. 222 ; Watts v. State, 99 Md. N. E. 127, 47 N. E. 465 ; Ford v. 
 
 30, 57 Atl. 542; People V. Silvers, 6 State, 75 Miss. loi, 21 So. 524; 
 
 Cal. App. 69, 92 Pac. 506; People v. Hunter v. State, 74 Miss. 515, 21 So. 
 
 Brasch, 193 X. Y. 46, 53, 85 N. E. 305; Palmer v. State, 136 Ind. 393, 
 
 809 ; Fouse V. State (Neb.) 119 N. W. 396, 36 N. E. 130; Brown v. State, 
 
 478; Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 71 Ind. 470, 473; State v. Patterson, 
 
 So. 274. See, also, Undcrhill on Ev., "/-^ j\Io. 695, 706; State v. Kinder, 96 
 
 § 89. "Voluntary is not always used Mo. 548, 550, 10 S. W. 77; Brister v. 
 
 in contradistinction to compulsory. In State, 26 Ala. 107, 129 ; Simmons v. 
 
 many cases voluntary means proceed- State, 61 Miss. 243, 257 ; Redd v. 
 
 ing from the spontaneous operation State, 69 Ala. 255, 259: People v. 
 
 of the party's own mind, free from Fox, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 604, 3 N. Y. 
 
 the influence of any extraneous dis- S. 359, 24 N. E. 923, afF'g 121 X. Y. 
 
 turbinp cause." People v. McMahon, 449; Thomas v. State, 84 Ga. (-i\% 618, 
 
 15 X. Y. 384. 3R6: State v. Bnhanon, to S. E. tot6: Ellis v. State. 65 Miss. 
 
 142 X. Car. 695, 55 S. E. 797. 44, 3 So. 188, 7 Am. St. 634; People
 
 § 126 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 244 
 
 from both sides to show the circumstances under which the con- 
 fession was made.''''' And as the question is one wholly for the 
 court to determine, the witness who testifies to what was said 
 and to the circumstances should not be permitted to state that 
 the confession was voluntary." The court must be allowed a 
 considerable measure of discretion in determining this question. 
 No particular threat or promise producing" a confession can safely 
 be said as matter of law to render the confession inadmissible, 
 for the effect of the threat or promise may be neutralized by 
 other facts and conditions. The admissibility of confessions so 
 largely depends upon the special circumstances of each case that 
 it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate any rule which will 
 embrace all the cases. And as the question is addressed in the 
 first instance to the judge, and since his discretion must be con- 
 trolled by all the attendant circumstances the courts have wisely 
 foreborne to mark with absolute precision the limits of admission 
 and exclusion.^'' But numerous authorities hold that in case a 
 conflict of evidence or room for doubt exists as to the voluntary 
 nature of the confession, the court ought to submit the confession 
 to the jury with an instruction that they may determine from 
 
 V. Howes, Si Mich. 396, 401, 45 N. this point, out of the hearing of the 
 
 W. 961; Burton v. State, 107 Ala. jurors. Anderson v. State, ^2 Ga. 
 
 108, 18 So. 284; People V. Siemsen, 98; State v. Kinder, 96 Mo. 548, 550, 
 
 153 Cal. 387, 95 Pac. 863: Draughn 10 S. \V. -j-] ; State v. KelW, 28 Ore. 
 
 V. State, 76 Miss. 574, 25 So. 153; 225, 42 Pac. 217, 52 Am. St. T]"]; 
 
 Commonwealth v. Antaya, 184 Mass. Holland v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 
 
 326, 68 X. E. 331 ; State v. Berberick 298. It has been held error not to 
 
 (IMont. 1909), 100 Pac. 209; State v. determine this before the confession 
 
 Blodgett, 50 Ore. 329, 92 Pac. 820; is submitted to the jury. Smith v. 
 
 State V. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512, 90 State, 88 Ga. 627, 629; Ellis v. State, 
 
 Pac. 981, 119 Am. St. 869; Hintz v. 65 Miss. 44, 47, 3 So. 188, 7 Am. St. 
 
 State, 125 Wis. 405, 104 N. W. no; 634; King v. State, 40 Ala. 314; 
 
 State V. Landers, 21 S. Dak. 606, 114 Brown v. State, 71 Ind. 470, 473; 
 
 N. W. 717; State v. Stibbens, 188 Nolen v. State, 8 Tex. App. 585; 
 
 Mo. 387, 87 S. W. 460. It is the duty Commonwealth v. Culver, 126 Mass. 
 
 of the court to hear all the prelimi- 464. 466. 
 
 nary evidence before deciding to ad- "a Zuckerman v. People, 213 111. 
 
 mit or reject the confession. People 114, 72 N. E. 741. 
 
 V. Rogers, 192 N. Y. 331, 85 N. E. "Jones v. State C'\la.\ 47 So. too. 
 
 13s, and Underbill on Ev., § 89. And '"^ Hopt v. People, no U. S. 574. 
 
 the court may and perhaps should, on 583, 28 L. ed. 262, 4 Sup. Ct. 202, 
 
 request, examine the witnesses on 207.
 
 245 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 127 
 
 the evidence whether it was or was not free and voluntary and 
 that if they beHeve from all the evidence that it was induced by 
 threats or promises, or was not free and voluntary, they must 
 reject it from their consideration, though they may believe it to be 
 true.'*' 
 
 § 127. Burden of proof to show voluntary character. — The cases 
 are not harmonious upon the question whether the prosecution 
 has the burden of proof to show the free and voluntary character 
 of the confession. Many of the cases sustain the affirmative of 
 this proposition, and require the state to show before the con- 
 fession is received in evidence by some evidence that it was freely 
 and voluntarily made." Other authorities sustain, at least in the 
 absence of evidence to the contrary, the very reasonable theory 
 that a confession, like most of the acts and utterances which are 
 the result of human agency, is presumed to have been voluntary 
 until the contrary is shown. ^'^ This view casts the burden of 
 
 ^^ Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 
 Mass. 2^6, 5 N. E. 494; Common- 
 wealth V. Piper, 120 Mass. 185, 188; 
 People V. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 298, 
 27 N. W. 539, I Am. St. SOin; Stal- 
 lings V. State, 47 Ga. 572; Thomas 
 V. State, 84 Ga. 613, 618, 10 S. E. 
 1016; People V. Kurtz, 42 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 335, 345, 3 N. Y. St. 715 ; People 
 V. Howes, 81 Mich. 396, 401, 45 N. 
 W. 961 ; Wilson v. United States, 162 
 U. S. 613, 40 L. ed. 1090, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 895; People V. Cassidy, 133 N. Y. 
 612, 30 N. E. 1003, 44 N. Y. St. 869; 
 Commonwealth v. Shew, 190 Pa. St. 
 23, 42 Atl. 377; Kennon v. State, 46 
 Tex. Cr. App. 359, 82 S. W. 518; 
 State V. Foster, 136 Iowa 527, 114 
 X. W. 36; People V. White, 176 N. 
 Y. 331, 68 N. E. 630; Johnson v. 
 State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 314, 94 S. 
 W. 224; State V. Stebhpns, 188 Mo. 
 .387, 87 S. W. 460; Commonwealth 
 V. Hudson, 185 Mass. 402, 70 N. E. 
 4.36; State V. Westcott, 130 Iowa T, 
 104 N. W. 341 ; Clay v. State, 15 
 
 Wyo. 42, 86 Pac. 17, 544; State v. 
 Von Kutzleben, 136 Iowa 89, 113 N. 
 W. 484; Johnson v. State, 89 Miss. 
 "J-JZ^ 42 So. 606. 
 
 " People V. Soto, 49 Cal. (>"] ; Peo- 
 ple V. Swetland, ^y Mich. 53, 60, 43 
 N. W. 779; Nicholson v. State, 38 
 Md. 140, 153; Barnes v. State, 36 
 Tex. 356, 363 ; State v. Johnson, 30 
 La. Ann. 881 ; Amos v. State, 83 Ala. 
 I, 3 So. 749, 3 Am. St. 682; Travers 
 V. United States, 6 App. D. C. 450; 
 Johnson v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 
 423, 88 S. W. 223; State v. Stallings, 
 142 Ala. 112, 38 So. 261; Jackson v. 
 State, 83 Ala. "jd, 3 So. 847; Smith 
 V. State, 74 Ark. 397, 85 S. W. 1123; 
 State V. Storms, 113 Iowa 385, 85 N. 
 W. 610, 86 Am. St. 380. Sec ex- 
 haustive note in 6 Am. St. 244, 245; 
 admission as affecting burden of 
 proof and right to open and close, 
 6r L. R. A. 562n. 
 
 '^Rufer V. State, 25 Ohio St. 464. 
 470; State V. Patterson, "jt^ Mo. 695, 
 705; People V. Cassidy, 133 N. Y.
 
 12/ 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 246 
 
 proving- that the confession was invokintary upon the accused. 
 In any case it is his right to show by prehminary evidence that 
 the confession was not voluntary, and it is the duty of the court, 
 in determining the competenc}^ of the confession, not only to con- 
 sider the evidence for the state, showing the confession was vol- 
 untary, but the evidence elicited by the accused to prove the con- 
 trary in his favor as well.^" 
 
 A refusal, before the confession is admitted, to allow counsel 
 for the prisoner to cross-examine the witness as to the voluntary 
 character of the confession;-" or to allow the accused to testify, 
 and to explain his mental condition when it was made;-^ or to 
 
 612, 613, 30 N. E. 1003, 44 N. Y. St. 
 869; State V. Howard, 35 S. Car. 
 197, 14 S. E. 481 ; Williams v. State, 
 19 Tex. App. 276; Commonwealth 
 V. Culver, 126 Mass. 464, 465; Eber- 
 hart V. State, 47 Ga. 598, 608; State 
 V. Davis, 34 La. Ami. 351, 353; Jen- 
 kins V. State, 119 Ga. 431, 46 S. E. 
 628; Sanchez v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 179, 78 S. W. 504; Thurman v. 
 State, 169 Ind. 240, 82 N. E. 64; 
 State V. Armstrong, 203 Mo. 554, 102 
 S. W. 503; State V. Washing, 36 
 Wash. 485, 78 Pac. 1019; State v. 
 Icenbice, 126 Iowa 16, loi N. W. 
 273; Richardson v. State, 145 Ala. 
 46, 41 So. 82; Campbell v. State, 150 
 Ala. 70, 43 So. 743; Stoddard v. 
 State, 132 Wis. 520, 112 N. W. 453; 
 Braham v. State, 143 Ala. 28, 38 So. 
 919; Smith V. State, 142 Ala. 14, 39 
 So. 329. 
 
 ** State V. Fidment, 35 Iowa 541 ; 
 Geiger v. State, 25 Ohio C. C. 742. 
 
 ^''Riifer V. State, 25 Ohio St. 464, 
 471 ; State v. Miller, 42 La. Ann. 
 1 186, it88, 8 So. 309, 21 Am. St. 
 418; People V. Fiori, 123 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 174, 185, 108 N. Y. S. 416; 
 Willis V. State, 43 Xeb. 102, 61 N. W. 
 254, 205; State V. Hill, 65 N. J. L. 
 626, 47 Atl. 814, 815; Roesel v. State. 
 62 N. J. L. 216, 41 Atl. 408; People 
 
 V. Fox, 121 N. Y. 449, 24 N. E. 923; 
 People V. White, 176 N. Y. 331, 350, 
 68 N. E. 630. 
 
 "^ Simmons v. State, 61 Miss. 243. 
 258; Jackson v. State, 83 Ala. 76, 78, 
 3 So. 847; Palmer v. State, 136 Ind. 
 393, 397, 2,^ N. E. 130; State v. Kin- 
 der, 96 Mo. 548, ID S. W. 77, 78; 
 Lefevre v. State, 50 Ohio St. 584. 
 588, 35 N. E. 52. When a confession 
 is offered by the state in a criminal 
 case, it is the right of the counsel 
 of the prisoner, before it is admitted, 
 to cross-examine the witness who 
 purposes to testify to it as to cir- 
 cumstances surrounding the making 
 of it, and the defense may also call, 
 at the same time, independent wit- 
 nesses and examine them, going thor- 
 oughly into the whole matter, as to 
 how the confession came to be made, 
 the parties present, the physical con- 
 dition and state of mind of the pris- 
 oner at the time it was made, and 
 then the court, with all these fact? 
 before it, is to pass upon its admis- 
 sion. State v. Hill, 65 N. J. L. 626. 
 47 Atl. 814, 815. In Willis v. State, 
 43 Xeb. 102, 61 X. W. 254, on page 
 255, it is said : "In the trial of a 
 criminal case, where the state calls 
 a witness for the purpose of proving 
 a confession made by the prisoner.
 
 247 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 § I2j 
 
 show by the evidence of others that it was improperly obtained, 
 is reversible error.-^ 
 
 § 128. Circumstances under which confession becomes involuntary. 
 
 • — It is very difficult, if not impossible, to lay down any general 
 rule by which the amount or degree of duress or improper influ- 
 ence which will destroy the voluntary character of a confession 
 can be regulated or measured."^ 
 
 The statement that a confession which has been extorted by 
 threats or procured by promises is not voluntary, and hence is 
 inadmissible as likely to be untrue, is not difficult to understand. 
 But it is very difficult to ascertain what language used to the 
 prisoner would, under the particular circumstances of each case, 
 constitute such a threat or promise. The sex, age, disposition, 
 education, experience, character, intelligence and previous train- 
 ing of the prisoner are elements to be considered in determining 
 whether the confession was or was not free and voluntary.-* For 
 it is well known that a determined, courageous and experienced 
 
 before the witness is allowed to de- 
 tail such information it is the privi- 
 lege of defendant's counsel, and the 
 better practice, to cross-examine the 
 witness as to the circumstances un- 
 der which the confession proposed to 
 be detailed was given. Counsel can- 
 not wait vmtil the witness has an- 
 swered and then move to strike the 
 statement from the record if the an- 
 swer is responsive to the inquiry." 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Culver, 126 
 Mass. 464, 466, 467. That the de- 
 fendant may himself testify to the 
 involuntary character of the confes- 
 sion, see State v. Kinder, 96 Mo. 548, 
 55^ 10 S. W. ^T, People v. Fiori, 123 
 App. Div. CN. Y.) 174, 185, T08 N. 
 Y. S. 416. A witness who testifies to 
 facts showing a confession was vol- 
 untary may be impeached by proof 
 that on a prior occasion he had stated 
 the contrary. State v. Peter, 14 La. 
 
 Ann. 521. When confession is vol- 
 untary, see note in 18 L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) 758, 768. 
 
 -^In Hopt v. People, no U. S. 574, 
 28 L. ed. 262, 4 Sup. Ct. 202, the 
 court says : "The admissibility of 
 such evidence so largely depends 
 upon the special circumstances con- 
 nected with the confession that it is 
 difficult, if not impossible, to formu- 
 late a rule that will comprehend all 
 cases, as the question is necessarily 
 addressed in the first instance to the 
 judge, and since his discretion must 
 be controlled by all attendant circum- 
 stances, the courts have wisely for- 
 borne to mark with absolute precision 
 the limits of admission and exclu- 
 sion. ' 
 
 -'Williams v. State, T03 Ala. 33, 15 
 So. 662; State V. Fredericks. 85 Mo. 
 145 ; Cain v. State, 18 Tex. 387.
 
 128 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 248 
 
 man is not so susceptible to threats, or to promises of immunity, 
 as a feeble woman, or a person of weak intellect or will power.-^ 
 
 Aside from the circumstances of the accused as determining 
 the voluntary nature of the confession, many things are held, as 
 matter of law, to render a confession involuntary. Thus, if there 
 is an express promise that a confession will benefit the accused, 
 or a threat, though somewhat vague and indefinite in character, 
 the confession will l^e involuntary. This was held in a case 
 where the chief of police told the accused that he would go to 
 the penitentiary and advised him that he had better confess, say- 
 ing that it would do the accused good if he would admit that he 
 was at the place of the crime. "*^ 
 
 So, also, confessions made while the accused is in bodily fear 
 of his life, are involuntary, though it may be difficult, under the 
 circumstances, to connect the fear with the confession: thus state- 
 ments made by the accused while he was in custody, with a howl- 
 ing mob around him, are not admissible as confessions.-' 
 
 A statement made by the accused while or after bystanders were 
 placing or had placed a rope around his neck and had threatened to 
 hang him or had whipped him or otherwise physically ill-treated 
 him, is involuntary, and inadmissible.-^ So, it has been held that 
 a confession made in reply to the charge by a police officer that 
 the accused had been lying to him and that he had better tell the 
 truth is inadmissible.-'' 
 
 So, where the father of the accused threatened the accused 
 with a shotgun and said to him "You are my prisoner, I have a 
 right to arrest you, you shall go and tell the sheriff, county at- 
 torney and coroner's jury all about the crime and you will get 
 clear. If you don't, you will get convicted," it was held that the 
 confession thus obtained was involuntary.^" And. though a wit- 
 ness in testifying to a confession swears that no promise or threat 
 had been employed, it may be shown by other e^■idence that 
 
 ^Biscoe V. State, 67 Md. 6, 7, 8 S2 S. W. 203; Jackson v. State, 50 
 
 Atl. 571. Tex. Cr. App. 302, 97 S. W. 312. 
 
 ^° Maxwell v. State (Miss. 1906), "'West v. United States. 20 .-Xpp. 
 
 40 So. 615. D. C. 347. 
 
 " Bruner v. United States, 4 Ind. ™ State v. Force, 69 Neb. 162, 95 
 
 Ter. 580, 76 S. W. 244- N- W. 42. 
 
 ** Edmonson v. State, 72 Ark. 585,
 
 249 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 § 129 
 
 threats or promises were used sufficient to keep out the confes- 
 sion.^^ 
 
 § 129. Confessions made while under arrest. — The mere fact that 
 the defendant was under arrest, or was in the charge of armed 
 pohce officers when he made his confession,^" or was handcuffed 
 and chained,^^ or tied,^* (if he is not tied in such a manner as 
 
 =' Hardin v. State, 66 Ark. 53, 48 
 S. W. 904, 907. 
 
 ^'Cox V. People, 80 N. Y. 500, 515; 
 Willis V. State, 93 Ga. 208, 19 S. E. 
 43; People V. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 
 T2 Am. Dec. 484 ; People v. Druse, 
 103 N. Y. 655. 656, 8 N. E. 7ZZ, i 
 Silv. Ct. App. 182, 5 N. Y. Cr. 10, 3 
 N. Y. St. 617: Allen v. State, 12 Tex. 
 App. 190; State V. Sopher, 70 Iowa 
 494, 497, 30 X. W. 917; Pierce v. 
 United States, 160 U. S. 355, 40 L. 
 ed. 454, 16 Sup. Ct. 321 ; State v. 
 Jones, 47 La. Ann. 1524, 18 So. 
 515; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 100 
 Ky. 239, 38 S. W. 422, 1091, 18 
 Ky. L. 795, 66 Am. St. 336: State 
 V. McClain, 137 Wo. 307, 38 S. 
 W. 906; Williams v. State, yj Tex. 
 Cr. App. 147, 38 S. W. 999; Carr v. 
 State, 81 Ark. 589, 99 S. W. 831; 
 State V. Worthen, 124 Iowa 408, 100 
 N. W. 330, 331 ; People v. Walker, 
 140 Cal. 153, yz Pac. 831, 833; State 
 V. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 24 So. 
 329; Commonwealth v. Williams, 171 
 Mass. 461, 50 N. E. 1035 : State v. 
 Trusty, i Penn. (Del.) 319, 40 .A.tl. 
 766; Carpenter v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 92 S. W. 552, 29 Ky. L. 107; 
 State V. Banusik (N. J. 1906), 64 
 Atl. 994; Hamilton v. State, 147 Ala. 
 no, 41 So. 940; State v. Henderson, 
 74 S. Car. 477, 55 S. E. 117; State 
 V. Exum, 138 N. Car. 599, 50 S. E. 
 283; Ivey V. State. 4 Ga. App. 828, 
 62 S. E. 565; State v. Jones, 145 N. 
 Car. 466, 59 .S. E. 353: Brown v. 
 State, 3 Ga. App. 479, 60 S. E. 216; 
 Gibson v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 489, 83 S. W. 1 1 19; Reeves v. State, 
 47 Tex. Cr. App. 340, 83 S. W. 803; 
 Follis V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 186, 
 Id S. W. 242; Fonseca v. State, 48 
 Tex. Cr. App. 28, 85 S. W. 1069; 
 State V. Church. 199 Mo. 605, 98 S. 
 W. 16; Pearsall v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 92 S. W. 589, 29 Ky. L. 222; 
 State V. Armstrong, 203 Mo. 554, 102 
 S. W. 503; State V. Robertson, iir 
 La- 35, 35 So. 375; McNish v. State, 
 47 Fla. 69, z^ So. 176: Williams v. 
 State, 48 Fla. 65, zi So. 521 ; State 
 V. Rugero, 117 La. 1040, 42 So. 495; 
 Parrish v. State, 139 Ala. 16. 36 So. 
 1012; Stevens v. State. 138 Ala. 71, 
 35 So. 122; State V. Davis. 6 Idaho 
 159. 53 Pac. 678; State v. Icenbice, 
 126 Iowa 16, loi X. W. 273 ; State 
 V. Westcott, 130 Iowa i. 104 X. W. 
 341; State V. Smith (X. Car.). 50 S. 
 E. 859; State V. Blodgett. 50 Ore. 
 329, 92 Pac. 820. Contra. Binkley v. 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 54, 100 S. W. 
 780. Confession by one illegally im- 
 prisoned, 6 Am. St. 244n, or by one 
 under "restraint, t8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 795-798n. 
 
 '' State V. Whitfield. 109 X. Car. 
 876, 877, 13 S. E. 726: Young V. 
 State, 68 Ala. 569; State v. George, 
 S.Jones (N. Car.) 233: Hathaway v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 82 S. W. 400, 
 26 Ky. L. 630; United States v. Xar- 
 dello, 4 Mackey (D. C.) .503; Dun- 
 more V. State, 86 Miss. 788. 39 So. 
 69. Contra. Xolcn v. State, 14 Tc.x. 
 App. 474, 480, 46 .'\m. 247n. 
 
 "State V. Rogers, 112 N. Car. 874.
 
 129 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 2;o 
 
 to produce pain or extort a confession), or in prison/""' will not 
 make a confession involuntary. But the confession of a prisoner, 
 a boy eighteen years of age. made while he was in the hands of a 
 large armed mob which had placed a rope about his neck, was 
 rejected as involuntary.^'' 
 
 The practice of taking the accused immediately after his arrest 
 before the prosecuting attorney and then and there obtaining a 
 confession from him is not to be commended. Any confession 
 made under such circumstances, however, is not inadmissible if 
 it is voluntary.^' 
 
 The prosecuting attorney is not a magistrate, and the hearing 
 
 ^76, 17 S. E. 297; State v. Patterson, 
 72, Mo. 693, 707. 
 
 ^^Commonwealth v. Smith, 119 
 Mass. 305, 311; People v. Rogers, 18 
 N. Y. 9, 14, 72 Am. Dec. 484; Mur- 
 phy V. People, 63 N. Y. 590, 597; 
 Ward V. People, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 395; 
 Cox V. People, 80 N. Y. 500, 515, 19 
 Hun (N. Y.) 430, 436. If by statute 
 a confession is inadmissible because 
 at the time the defendant is in jail, 
 it is immaterial that he is confined for 
 another crime than that then being 
 tried. Neiderluck v. State, 21 Tex. 
 App. 320, 328, 17 S. W. 467; Nicks 
 V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. i, 48 S. W. 
 186. The fact that the prisoner was 
 held without process, or otherwise in 
 illegal custody, does not exclude the 
 confession. Balbo v. People, 80 N. 
 Y. 484, 499, 19 Hun (N. Y.) 424; 
 State V. Carpenter, 32 Wash. 254, 
 73 Pac. 357; Green v. State, 40 Fla. 
 19T, 2^ So. 851. 
 
 ^° State V. Young, 52 La. Ann. 478, 
 27 So. 50; State V. Revells, 34 La. 
 Ann. 381, 384, 44 Am. 436. A deputy 
 marshal may testify to a voluntary 
 confession. Perovich v. LTnited 
 
 States, 205 U. S. 86, 51 L. ed. 722, 27 
 
 Sup. Ct. 456. The confession of the 
 accused made while he is in jail to 
 another prisoner who is also in the 
 same jail, and before whom the ac- 
 cused was brought that he might be 
 identified, was received in Clay v. 
 State, IS Wyo. 42, 86 Pac. 17. "The 
 fact that the prisoner was tied dur- 
 ing his preliminary examination 
 would not in itself constitute a valid 
 objection to the evidence, unless it 
 appeared that he was tied in such a 
 manner as to produce pain, or to tend 
 to induce or extort from him a con- 
 fession. State v. Cruse, 74 N. Car. 
 491. We do not commend the prac- 
 tice, however, if such there be, of 
 keeping the prisoner shackled or tied 
 while before the committing magis- 
 trate on the preliminary examination. 
 The law should be the same there 
 as upon the trial. The dictates of 
 humanity would require that, unless 
 there should be some strong reason 
 to the contrary, he should be freed 
 from such physical restraint." State 
 V. Rogers, 112 N. Car. 874, 17 S. E. 
 297. 
 
 =>■ State V. Stibbens, 188 Mo. 387, S7 
 S. W. 460.
 
 251 CONFESSIONS. 8 1 3© 
 
 before him is not a judicial hearing under a statute which entitles 
 the accused to counsel and a warning.^® The suspicious charac- 
 ter of a confession thus procured may be modified, if not wholly 
 removed, wdien the accused is advised, at the hearing before the 
 prosecuting attorney, of his right to counsel and to remain silent 
 and is warned that his statements may be used against him.^^ 
 The same rule applies to all statements made by the accused after 
 his arrest to persons having him in custody, for, however strong 
 the testimony of the police officials is that a confession was free 
 and voluntary, a suspicion and a doubt of its voluntary character 
 remain which persist until it shall be clearly shown that the ac- 
 cused was not threatened and that he was fully advised of his 
 rights. The evidence showing that he was advised of his rights 
 ought, under such circumstances, to be affirmative, for in spite 
 of the presumption that every one knows the law, it must be 
 shown that the accused was warned and that he was informed as 
 to his legal rights to remain silent while under arrest.^'' 
 
 § 130. Effect of cautioning the accused. — Aside from statute the 
 fact that a confession, which is otherwise admissible, is made 
 without the accused having been cautioned by the court or by 
 the person to whom the confession is made that what he says 
 may be used against him, does not render it incompetent.'*^ 
 
 The statute in Texas requires that the accused shall be cau- 
 tioned, and a confession made while the prisoner is in jail, in 
 custody, or under arrest, is inadmissible where it is not shown 
 that the accused was cautioned that what he said might be used 
 against him unless the fruits of the crime are discovered in pursu- 
 ance of and as a result of the confession. ■*- 
 
 '' People V. Randazzio, 194 N. Y. State, 46 Tex. Cr. App. 461, 80 S. W. 
 
 147, 87 N. E. 112. 1008; McDaniel v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 
 
 ""'State V. Berberick (Mont.), 100 App. 560, 81 S. W. 301; Vaughn v. 
 
 Pac. 209. State, 51 Tex- Cr. App. 180, loi S. W. 
 
 *" Daniels v. State (Fla.), 48 So. 747. 445. 
 
 " Reg. V. .Arnold, 8 C. & P. 621, 622; •*- Curry v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 Reg. V. Priest, 2 Cox Cr. Cas. 378; 158, 94 S. W. 1058; Vaughn v. State. 
 
 Simon v. State, 36 Miss. 636, 639; 51 Tex. Cr. App. 180, lOi S. W. 445; 
 
 State V. Hand, 71 N. J. L. 137, 58 Atl. McKinney v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 641: Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 372, 50 S. W. 708; Morales v. State. 
 
 St. 264; State V. Baker, 58 S. Car. in, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 234, 36 S. W. 43.=;, 
 
 36 S. E. 501; State v. Workman, 15 846; Alanis v. State (Tex. Cr. App.). 
 
 S. Car. 540, 545. See also Parker v. 81 S. W. 709; Black v. State, 46 Tex.
 
 .^ 130 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 252 
 
 The fact that the accused is cautioned that what he says will 
 be committed to writing and may or might be used on his trial 
 as evidence against him, does not render a voluntary confession 
 inadmissible." 
 
 Under the Texas statute not only must the accused be cau- 
 tioned, but it must appear from the evidence that the confession 
 was made within such a time after the caution was given that its 
 effect had not disappeared from the mind of the accused.** The 
 length of the period required depends upon the facts and circum- 
 stances of each case and is a question for the court. The effect 
 of the caution will be presumed to continue for a reasonable 
 period, and a confession made a day or two after the caution or 
 warning was given has been accepted. ^^ 
 
 As to the language to be used in cautioning the accused, it is 
 not necessary that the words of the statute shall be precisely fol- 
 lowed. The simplest and plainest language is advisable. Any 
 language conveying to his mind the' fact that the statement he 
 makes incriminating himself may or will be offered in evidence 
 against him at his trial is usually sufficient.*** 
 
 But a warning that anything he may say can be used either for 
 or against him does not comply with the statute, and renders the 
 confession inadmissible.*^ 
 
 Cr. App. 590, 81 S. W. 302; White v. Baker v. State, 25 Tex. App. i, 8 S. 
 
 State (Tex. Cr. App.), 38 S. W. 169. W. 23, 8 Am. St. 427. 
 
 "Reg. V. Holmes, i C. & K. 248, i '"State v. DeGraff, 113 X. Car. 638, 
 
 Cox Cr. Cas. 9; Reg. v. Attwood, 5 18 S. E. 507, 508; State v. Rogers, 112 
 
 Cox Cr. Cas. 322, 223; Calloway v. X. Car. 874, 17 S. E. 297, 298; Ran- 
 
 State, 103 Ala. 27, 15 So. 821; Maples som v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1902), 70 
 
 V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 408, 411, S. W. 960. 
 
 413; State V. Church, 199 Mo. 605, 98 "Perry v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 S. W. 16; Rizzolo V. Commonwealth, 540, 61 S. W. 400; Pryor v. State, 40 
 
 126 Pa. St. 54, 72, 17 Atl. 520; Com- Tex. Cr. App. 643. 51 S. W. 375; Guin 
 
 monwealth v. Johnson, 217 Pa. 77, v. State (Tex. 1899), 50 S. W. 350. 
 
 66 Atl. 233; United States v. Kirk- The silence of the accused after the 
 
 wood, 5 Utah 123, 13 Pac. 234; State caution has been given him cannot be 
 
 V. Carr, 37 Vt. 191. used against him as a confession. 
 
 "Binkley v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. Kirby v. State, 23 Tex. App. 13. 5 S. 
 
 54, 100 S. W. 780. W. 165. So generally liis cf^nduct in- 
 
 *^Maddox v. State, 41 Tex. 205; dicating guilt occurring after lie has 
 
 .Adams V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 285, been cautioned is not admissible. Eul- 
 
 33 S. W. 354, 356: Baldwin v. State cher v. State. 28 Tex. App. 465. 13 S. 
 
 (Tex. Cr. App.), 28 S. W. 951; W. 750. Generally, unless there is an
 
 253 
 
 COXFESSIOXS. 
 
 I.^O 
 
 If it plainly appear that a confession is voluntary, it is not nec- 
 essary, at least in the absence of suspicious circumstances, to 
 prove that from the moment of the prisoner's arrest to that of his 
 confession no improper inducement was offered.** A voluntary 
 confession will be received, though it may appear that immedi- 
 ately after his apprehension the accused had been threatened, but 
 without effect, in order to procure a confession.*^ It must be 
 shown that the promise or threat has been withdrawn. 
 
 Even though an original confession may have been obtained 
 by such means as will exclude it, a subsequent confession of the 
 same or of like facts may and should be admitted, if the court 
 shall believe from the length of time intervening, or from any 
 other facts in evidence, that the improper influence has been re- 
 moved. ^*' The influence of the threat or promise under which 
 the first confession has been made and because of which the con- 
 fession will be excluded will be presumed to continue to the time 
 of a subsequent confession unless it is affirmatively shown to have 
 been removed.'^ This presumption must be overcome before the 
 
 express statute requiring a caution, 
 mere admissions not constituting con- 
 fessions are received without the cau- 
 tion being given. People v. Simpson, 
 48 Mich. 474, 12 X. W. 662; Roessel 
 V. State, 62 X. J. L. 216, 41 Atl. 408. 
 
 *^Hopt V. People, no U. S. 574, 584, 
 28 L. ed. 262, 4 Sup. Ct. 202. 
 
 "McAdory v. State, 62 Ala. 154; 
 Sarah v. State, 28 Ga. 576; State v. 
 Chambers, 39 Iowa 179; Walker v. 
 State, 7 Tex. App. 245, 263, 32 Am. 
 595 ; State v. Jones, 54 Mo. 478, 480 ; 
 People V. Jim Ti, 32 Cal. 60, 63 ; State 
 v. Potter, 18 Conn. 166, 179; Common- 
 wealth V. Howe, 132 Mass. 250; Com- 
 monwealth V. Crocker, 108 Mass. 464; 
 Lynes v. State, 36 Miss. 617; People 
 V. MacKinder, 80 Hun fX.'Y.) 40, 29 
 N. Y. S. 842, 9 X. Y. Cr. 267 ; Moore 
 V. Commonwealth, 2 Leigh (Va.) 701 ; 
 State V. Gregory. 50 X. Car. 315. 
 
 =• State V. Guild, 10 X. J. L. 163, 
 18 Am. 404; Simon v. State, 36 Miss. 
 
 636, 639; Hardy v. United States, 3 
 App. D. C. 35; State v. Carr, Z7 Vt. 
 191, 195; United States v. Nardello, 
 4 Mackey D. C. 503; State v. Hash, 
 12 La. Ann. 895, 896; Levison v. 
 State, 54 Ala. 520; State v. Willis, 71 
 Conn. 293, 41 Atl. 820; State v. Fos- 
 ter, 136 Iowa 527, 114 X^. W. 36; 
 Dixon V. State, 116 Ga. 186, 42 S. E. 
 357; Andrews v. People, 23 Colo. 
 I93> 79 Pac. 1031; State v. Howard, 
 
 17 N. H. 171; State v. Fisher, 51 X. 
 Car. 478; Jackson v. State, 39 Ohio 
 St. :i7; Thompson v. Commonwealth 
 20 Gratt. (Va.) 724. 
 
 "State V. Guild, to X. J. L. 163, 
 
 18 Am. Dec. 404; Williams v. State, 
 69 Ark. 599, 65 S. W. 103, 105 ; State 
 V. Lowhorne, (^ X^. Car. 638; State 
 V. Hash, 12 La. Ann. 895. 986 ; State 
 V. Drake, 82 X. Car. 592; Murray 
 V. State, 25 Fla. 528, 6 So. 498 : State 
 V. Pirown, y;i Mo. 631 ; Rnhinson v. 
 People, 159 111. 115, 42 X. E. 375;
 
 § 131 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 254 
 
 later confession can be received as evidence. And evidence to 
 overcome or rebut it must be clear, strong and satisfactory.'"^^" 
 
 § 131, Confessions under oath. — The admissions or incriminating 
 statements of the accused are not to be rejected solely because 
 they were made under oath. A distinction is made between dec- 
 larations made under oath before the accused was arrested, or 
 before suspicion attached to him, and declarations made subse- 
 quently to his arrest. The former, though in fact confessions, 
 are not rejected. Thus the testimony of the accused, if it was 
 voluntarily given as a witness on a prior trial of himself;'" or 
 
 Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 477, 486, 20 Am. Dec. 534; 
 Thompson v. Commonwealth, 20 
 Gratt. (Va.) 724, 731; Common- 
 wealth V. Harman, 4 Fa. 269; Simon 
 V. State, Z7 Miss. 288, 295; Cofifee v. 
 State, 25 Fla. 501, 512, 6 So. 493, 2^ 
 Am. St. 525; Redd v. State, 69 Ala. 
 255, 260; State V. Jones, 54 Mo. 478, 
 480; State V. Chambers, 39 Iowa 179; 
 State V. Drake, 82 N. Car. 592; State 
 V. Wintzingerode, 9 Ore. 153 ; 
 Thompson v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 724; United States v. Chap- 
 man, 4 Am. Law J. (N. S.) 440, 25 
 Fed. Cas. 14783; Reason v. State 
 (Miss. 1909), 48 So. 820; State v. 
 Wood (La. 1909), 48 So. 438. 
 
 '"- Porter v. State, 55 Ala. 95 ; 
 Commonwealth v. Cullen, iii Mass. 
 435, 437; State v. Lowhorne, 66 N. 
 Car. 638; State v. Carr, 2>7 Vt. 191, 
 195," Commonwealth v. Phillips, 
 (Ky.), 82 S. W. 286, 26 Ky. L. 543; 
 !Mathis V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 13 
 S. W. 360, II Ky. L. 882; State v. 
 Washington, 40 La. Ann. 669, 4 So. 
 864; State V. Drake, 113 N. Car. 624, 
 628, 18 S. E. 166; Reg. V. Doherty, 
 13 Cox C. C. 23. It is a well-settled 
 rule that if promises or threats have 
 been used, it must be made to appear 
 that their influence has been entirely 
 
 done away with before subsequent 
 confessions can be deemed voluntary 
 and therefore admissible. State v. 
 Drake, 113 N. Car. 624, 628, 18 S. E. 
 166, and see Coffee v. State, 25 Fla. 
 SOI, 512, 6 So. 493, 23 Am. St. 525, for 
 a full citation of cases. It is sufficient 
 to exclude the latest confession if it 
 may have proceeded from prior ex- 
 isting motives. Commonwealth v. 
 Cullen, III Mass. 435, 437. 
 
 "People V. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 
 384, 392; Commonwealth v. Reyn- 
 olds, 122 Mass. 454, 458; Williams v. 
 Commonwealth, 29 Pa. St. 102, no; 
 People V. Kelley, 47 Cal. 125 ; Dick- 
 erson v. State, 48 Wis. 288, 293, 4 N. 
 W. 321; State V. Oliver, 55 Kan. 711, 
 41 Pac. 954; State v. Campbell, "^z 
 Kan. 688, 85 Pac. 784, 788, 9 L. R. 
 A. (N. S.) 533n; Miller v. People, 
 216 111. 309, 74 N. E. 743 ; State v. 
 Finch, 71 Kan. 793, 81 Pac. 494 (tes- 
 timony at coroner's inquest). See 
 notes in 41 Am. St. 522-524, 18 L. R. 
 A. (N. S.) 872. In State v. Brough- 
 ton, 7 Ired. (N. Car.) 96, 45 Am. 
 Dec. 507, which is quoted with ap- 
 proval in State v. Campbell, TZ Kan. 
 688, 85 Pac. 784, on p. 788, 9 L- R- A. 
 (N. S.) S33n, the court said, the ac- 
 cused having testified before the grand 
 jury that had indicted him, "The coun-
 
 255 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 § 131 
 
 another person^* for the crime \vith which he is now charged, 
 may be used against him. 
 
 A different rule is apphcable to sworn statements made after 
 the accused is under suspicion. Generahy the accused is not 
 sworn upon the preHminary examination. If his statement is 
 taken under oath it will be rejected if offered as a confession, 
 upon the ground that its free and voluntary character has been 
 destroyed by adding to the existing embarrassments of his posi- 
 tion, the apprehension of a possible punishment for perjury.^^ 
 
 The rule that a confession by the accused is competent, though 
 given under oath, is applicable to those very numerous cases in 
 which a person, being tried upon a charge of homicide, has tes- 
 tified as a witness at the coroner's inquest. The mere fact that at 
 the time of the inquest he was suspected of the homicide will 
 not exclude his incriminating statements voluntarily made if it 
 appears that he knew he could decline to answer if he wished to 
 do so and he was not under arrest at the time.^° They may be 
 
 sel for the prisoner took the further 
 ground here that it was incompetent 
 to prove the evidence of the pris- 
 oner, because it was in the nature 
 of a confession, which, compelled by 
 an oath, was not voluntary. It is 
 certainly no objection to the evidence, 
 merely, that the statement of the 
 prisoner was given by him, as a wit- 
 ness under oath. He might have re- 
 fused to answer questions, when he 
 could not do so without criminating 
 himself, and the very ground of that 
 rule of law is that his answers are 
 deemed voluntary and may be used 
 afterwards to criminate or charge 
 him in another proceeding, and such 
 is clearly the law." 
 
 '^ People V. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 
 384, 390; Burnett v. State, 87 Ga. 
 622, 13 S. E. 552; People v. Mitchell, 
 94 Cal. 550, 555, 29 Pac. no6; Peo- 
 ple v. Gallagher, 75 Mich. 512, 525, 
 12 X. W. 1063; Harris v. State, 27 
 Tex. Cr. App. 441, 36 S. W. 88; Peo- 
 ple v. Cokahnour, 120 Cal. 253, 52 Pac. 
 
 505; State v. Lewis, 39 La. Ann. 11 10, 
 3 So. 343 ; People v. Burt, 51 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 106, 64 N. Y. 417; State v. 
 Vaigneur, 5 Rich. (S. Car.) 391; 
 Dickerson v. State, 48 Wis. 288, 4 N. 
 W. 321. 
 
 °^ People V. Gibbons, 43 Cal. 557 ; 
 State V. Welch, 36 W. Va. 690, 15 S. 
 E. 4x9; Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. 
 ^23, 839, 841 ; United States v. Basca- 
 dore, 2 Cranch C. C. 30, 24 Fed. Cas. 
 14536; Angling v. State, 137 Ala. 17, 
 34 So. 846, and see Underbill on Evi- 
 dence, page 131 ; Steele v. State, 76 
 Miss. 387, 24 So. 910. But the confes- 
 sion of a person who voluntarily goes 
 before a magistrate and confesses will 
 be received. People v. McGloin, 91 N. 
 Y. 241, 246; Commonwealth v. Clark, 
 130 Pa. St. 641, 650, 18 Atl. 988. 
 
 =" State V. David, 131 Mo. 380, 33 S. 
 W. 28; Wilson V. State, iro .Ma. i, 
 20 So. 415. 55 Am. St. 77; Jenkins 
 V. State, 35 I'-Ia. 737, 18 So. 182, 48 
 Am. St. 267; People v. Strollo, 191 
 X. Y. 42, 83 N. E. 573; People v.
 
 CRIMIXAL EN'IDEXCE. 
 
 2;6 
 
 subse(inently used against him as a confession, and are to go to 
 the jury for what they are worth, though the accused was not 
 cautioned that they might be used against him. If, however, he 
 is under arrest, or if he has been indicted, or formally charged 
 with the crime, he stands in the position of a prisoner on trial. 
 He is then entitled to the same privilege of declining to testify 
 and warning, that what he says .may be used against him, so far 
 as his sworn statement is concerned, as a prisoner at the prelimi- 
 nary examination. He cannot, directly or indirectly, be com- 
 pelled to testify against himself.^' 
 
 § 132. Confessions taken at the preliminary examination. — The 
 preliminary examination of an accused person has for its main 
 objects the perpetuation of the testimony against him, the ascer- 
 tainment if he shall be held to await the action of the grand jury, 
 and if so, whether he shall be admitted to bail. When the ac- 
 cused is brought before the justice, the latter must, as soon as 
 
 Chapleau, 121 X. Y. 266, 24 N. E. 
 469; People V. Mondon, 103 N. Y. 
 211, 8 N. E. 496, 57 Am. 709; People 
 V. Kent, 41 Misc. (N. Y.) 191, 83 N. 
 Y. S. 948, 17 N. Y. Cr. 461; People 
 V. AIcGloin, 91 X. Y. 241 ; State v. 
 Finch, 71 Kan. 793, 81 Pac. 494; 
 State V. Taylor, 36 Kan. 329, 13 Pac. 
 550; Anderson v. State, 133 Wis. 601, 
 114 N. \V. 112; People v. Martinez, 
 66 Cal. 278; State v. Coffee, 56 Conn. 
 399, 16 Atl. 151 ; Kirby v. State, 23 
 Tex. App. 13, 5 S. W. 165; Emery 
 V. State, 92 Wis. 146, 65 X. W. 848; 
 Reg. V. Wiggins, 10 Cox Cr. Cas. 
 562; Mc^Ieans v. State (Tex.), L14 
 S. W. 837; People V. Molineux, 168 
 X. Y. 264, 61 X. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 
 I93n. 
 
 ^'.'Kdams v. State, 129 Ga. 248, 58 
 S. E. 822, 17 L. R. A. (X. S.) 468; 
 State V. Senn, 32 S. Car. 392, 402, ir 
 S. E. 292: State v. Carroll, 85 Iowa 
 I, 51 X. W. T159: Hendrickson v. 
 People, 10 X. Y. 13, 61 Am. Dec. 721, 
 9 How. Pr. (X. Y.) 155; Teachout 
 
 V. People, 41 X. Y. 7, 13; People v. 
 Mondon, 103 X. Y. 211, 214, 8 X. E. 
 496. 57 Am. 709, 2 X. Y. St. 713, 4 
 X. Y. Cr. 552; Clough V. State, 7 
 Xeb. 320, 340. Cf. People v. Mc- 
 Mahon, 15 X. Y. 384; State v. 
 O'Brien, 18 Mont, i, 43 Pac. 1091, 
 44 Pac. 399; State v. Matthews, 66 
 X^. Car. 106. But where he volun- 
 tarily appeared and was properly 
 cautioned, it was held otherwise in 
 State V. Leuth, 5 Ohio C. C. 94; 
 State V. Mullins, loi Mo. 514, 14 S. 
 W. 625 ; Emery v. State, 92 Wis. 146, 
 65 N. W. 848. See Underbill on Evi- 
 dence, § 93. And what the accused 
 voluntarily says on his preliminary 
 examination, as when he asks for the 
 aid of counsel or requests an ad- 
 journment, may, though not amount- 
 ing to a confession of guilt, be 
 proved against him if relevant on his 
 trial. State v. Fooks, 65 Iowa 196, 
 452, 21 X. W. 561, 773; Gonzales v. 
 State, 12 Tex. App. 657.
 
 257 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 132 
 
 possible, examine the witnesses for and against him under oath. 
 The accused must be present when this evidence is received, 
 though the examining magistrate may exclude all witnesses ex- 
 cept the one who is testifying. The accused may be sworn at 
 his own request, and examined as a witness in his own behalf, 
 under the restrictions which apply to the examination of defend- 
 ants in criminal trials. He should, in justice to himself, be in- 
 formed of his right to refrain from testifying. He should be 
 told that he need not answer any questions, and that his silence or 
 express refusal to answer incriminating questions cannot be used 
 against him on his trial. °® After thus having been warned, any- 
 thing he may say in the nature of a confession and which is not 
 under oath, may be used against him on his trial. ^'^ And w^here, 
 having been instructed as to his right to remain silent at the pre- 
 liminary examination, if he so desires, he voluntarily goes on the 
 witness stand and, under oath, testifies to his version of the facts 
 in the case, anything he may say of an incriminating nature un- 
 der such circumstances, though he is under oath, may be used 
 against him subsequently as his confession.*''' 
 
 ^' The failure of an examining 
 magistrate to inform the accused of 
 the statute, permit him to waive mak- 
 ing a statement and also that his 
 waiver cannot be used against him on 
 his trial excludes his statement as an 
 involuntary confession. State v. 
 Hatcher, 29 Ore. 309, 44 Pac. 584, 
 588; State V. O'Brien, 18 Mont, i, 43 
 Pac. 1091, 44 Pac. 399. "The result 
 of these several provisions is, that 
 now an accused person, with his con- 
 sent, may become a witness either for 
 or against himself at the preliminary 
 examination before the magistrate; 
 and if he voluntarily becomes a wit- 
 ness under such circumstances as to 
 render it clear that his testimony was 
 purely voluntary, and free from re- 
 straint or undue influence, there can 
 be no reason why it may not be 
 given in evidence against him on his 
 subsequent trial for the offense. If 
 17 — U.VDEKHii.L Crim. Ev. 
 
 his voluntary unsworn statement may 
 be proved against him as a confes- 
 sion, his voluntary testimony under 
 oath, given in a proceeding in which 
 he elects and is authorized to testify 
 ought to stand upon at least as fa- 
 vorable a footing." People v. Kel- 
 ley, 47 Cal. 125. 
 
 ■"^ State V. Bruce, 33 La. Ann. 186; 
 State V. Needham, 78 N. Car. 474; 
 State V. Hatcher, 29 Ore, 309, 44 Pac. 
 584, 585 ; Shaw v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 
 App. T5.=5. 22 S. W. 588, 590. 
 
 "" Green v. State, 46 Fla. 474, 24 
 So. 537; Daniels v. State (Fla. 1909), 
 48 So. 747; People V. Butler, in 
 Mich. 483, 485, 69 N. W. 734; Steele 
 V. State, 76 Miss. 387, 394, 24 So. 
 910; State V. Lewis. 73 Mo. App. 
 619, 621 ; State v. Xccdham, 78 X. 
 Car. 474; Commonwealth v. Clark. 
 T30 Pa. St. 641. 650. 18 Atl. 988: 
 Preston v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. App.
 
 § 132 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 '^:)< 
 
 This is the general rule in most states, but there are exceptions 
 either by statute or by judicial decision. Thus, in some of the 
 states, it is expressly required that the accused shall be cautioned 
 on his preliminary examination that anything he may say may 
 subsequently be used against him. Generally, it will have to be 
 shown that the accused has been properly advised of his right to 
 have counsel, of his right to decline to testify at all, or, if he sees 
 fit to testify, then as to his right to refuse to answer incriminat- 
 ing questions. If a statute requires that the accused shall be in- 
 formed of his right to waive making a statement, anything he 
 may say will be inadmissible against him if the record does not 
 show that he was warned."^ 
 
 Where a person against whom a charge is being investigated 
 by the grand jury, voluntarily appears and testifies, his confes- 
 sion thus obtained is subsequently admissible on his trial.*'- But 
 if the accused is compelled to go before the grand jury and is 
 compelled to answer over his objections, anything he may admit 
 is subsequently not admissible as his confession.''^ 
 
 300, 53 S. W. 127, 881 ; State v. Lyts, 
 25 Wash. 347, 65 Pac. 530; State v. 
 Glass, so Wis. 218, 221, 6 N. W. 500, 
 36 Am. 84s ; Wilson v. United States, 
 162 U. S. 613, 624, 40 L. ed. 1090, 16 
 Sup. Ct. 895. 
 
 " State V. Hatcher, 29 Ore. 309, 44 
 Pac. 584; People v. Butler, 11 1 Mich. 
 483, 69 N. W. 734; Ford V. State, 75 
 Miss. loi, 21 So. 524; State v. Mel- 
 ton, 120 N. Car. 591, 26 S. E. 933; 
 State V. Carpenter, 32 Wash. 254, 73 
 Pac. 357; State v. May, 62 W. Va. 
 129, 57 S. E. 366. The admissibility 
 of the statements of the accused 
 made upon his preliminary examina- 
 tion is a deduction from the modern 
 statutory legislation making the ac- 
 cused a competent witness in his own 
 behalf. If the accused were not per- 
 mitted to go on the stand of his own 
 free will and if not being a compe- 
 tent witness for himself he is sum- 
 moned as a witness by the prosecu- 
 
 tion on the trial of another person 
 it is only fair to exclude what he 
 may say of an incriminating char- 
 acter because he is, against his will, 
 compelled to tell the truth by his 
 oath, and this is a sort of compul- 
 sion. It is quite otherwise where the 
 accused voluntarily testifies to excul- 
 pate himself and iwstead of wholly 
 accomplishing this purpose only in- 
 volves himself in greater guilt. 
 State V. Glass, 50 Wis. 218, 221, 6 N. 
 W. 500, 36 Am. 845. 
 
 "' State V. Carroll, 85 Iowa i, 51 N. 
 W. 1 1 59; Grimsingcr v. State, 44 
 Tex. Cr. App. i, 69 S. W. 583; Giles 
 V. State, 43 Tex. Cr. App. 561, 67 S. 
 W. 411 ; Thomas v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 178, 32 S. W. 771 ; United 
 States V. Kirkwood, 5 Utah 123, 13 
 Pac. 234. 
 
 " State V. Clifford, 86 Iowa S50, 53 
 N. W. 299, 41 Am. St. 518. See 
 note in 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 533.
 
 259 CONFESSIONS. § 133 
 
 § 133. Mode of proving confessions made at the preliminary ex- 
 amination. — The signature of the accused to his statement wliich 
 has been committed to writing is not indispensable, unless it is 
 required by statute.*^* But, as it is useful as, a means of identi- 
 fication, it should be obtained whenever possible. If he signs the 
 writing voluntarily he waives all objections to its admission as evi- 
 dence (except, perhaps, the objection that he was sworn), and 
 this is so, though it is in a language not understood by him, if 
 its contents were translated to him.'^'^ 
 
 The writing which purports to contain the preliminary exami- 
 nation of the accused must be properly identified. If the accused 
 has not signed the writing at all, or if he has only affixed his 
 mark thereto, it must appear to the satisfaction of the court 
 (necessarily by parol evidence) that it was read to him and that 
 he assented to or acquiesced in it.''" The record of the examina- 
 tion, if otherwise admissible, should be produced as the best evi- 
 dence.'" and when produced, it is conclusive of the fact that 
 everything material that was said or done has been accurately 
 stated."- But when an informal examination only has been had, 
 or if the details of a regular and formal examination have not 
 
 " Lambe's Case, 2 Leach C. C. 625, letterheads of the accused and signed 
 
 629; State V. Haworth, 24 Utah 398, with his name, are admissible with- 
 
 68 Pac. 155. out proof of the handwriting. State 
 
 '''" Commonwealth v. Coy, 157 Mass. v. Soper, 148 Mo. 217, 49 S. W. 1007. 
 
 200, 212, 32 X. E. 4; State v. Dema- As to the admission of an unsigned 
 
 reste, 41 La. Ann. 617, 6 So. 136. letter which dropped in the room 
 
 In a case of a confession made of the accused, see State v. Dilley, 
 
 through an interpreter the prosecu- 44 Wash. 207, 87 Pac. 133. 
 tion should show, before the confes- "State v. Branham, 13 S. Car. 389; 
 
 sion is admitted, that the interpreta- Wright v. State, 50 Miss. 332, 335 ; 
 
 tion is true, correct and full. It is State v. Eaton, 3 Harr. (Del.) 554; 
 
 proper to require the interpreter so to Williams v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 testify. State v. Abbatto, 64 N. J. L. 128, 41 S. W. 645; Bailey v. State, 
 
 658, 47 Atl. ID. 26 Tex. App. 706, 9 S. W. 270. As 
 
 "Harris v. State, 6 Tex. App. 97; to a presumption that a confession 
 
 State V. Mullins, lox Mo. 514, 14 S. was committed to writing, see Wright 
 
 W. 625; State V. Schmidt, 136 Mo. v. State, 50 Miss. 332, 335; Under- 
 
 644, 38 S. W. 719; Angling v. State, hill on Ev., S§ 36, 146, 147, 232. 
 T37 Ala. 17, 34 So. 846. Letters con- "" Robinson v. State, 87 Ind. 292, 
 
 stituting a confession of homicide 293. 
 found near the bodies, written on the
 
 133 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 i6o 
 
 been committed to writing,"" or if the record is inadmissible be- 
 cause of a lack of jurisdiction/" or irregularities^^ apparent on 
 its face, or for any other material or substantial reason, parol 
 evidence of what the prisoner voluntarily said on the preliminary 
 examination will be received.'" So a coroner may testify orally 
 to what was said on a preliminary examination prior to the final 
 inquest.'^ So, too, parol evidence of an extra-judicial confession 
 is never incompetent merely because the judicial examination of 
 the prisoner was taken down in writing,'* or because the prisoner 
 himself has committed a prior confession to writing."^ A prose- 
 cuting attorney who heard a confession may testify orally to it. 
 His oral testimony is the best evidence, though the confession 
 was taken down by a stenographer in his presence. The writing 
 may be used, however, to refresh the memory of the witness. ^"^ 
 
 The practice is, in reading a written confession to the jury, to 
 omit the names of accomplices of the accused jointly indicted but 
 separately or jointly tried, but it is not error to read all the con- 
 
 "' State V. Suggs, 89 N. Car. 527, 
 530. 
 
 '" See Underhill on Ev., § 232, as 
 to presumptions of jurisdiction. State 
 V. Hatcher, 29 Ore. 309, 44 Pac. 584; 
 Luera v. State (Tex. 1895"), 32 S. W. 
 898. Incriminating interlineations 
 with pen and ink in a typewritten 
 transcript signed by the accused may 
 justly be regarded with suspicion, 
 and if unexplained as to time and 
 sources ought to exclude the confes- 
 sion. United States v. Williams, 103 
 Fed. 938. 
 
 "Wright V. State, 50 Miss. 332; 
 Guy V. State, 9 Tex. App. 161. 
 
 ""Wright V. State, 50 Miss. 332, 
 335 ; Guy V. State, 9 Tex. App. t6i ; 
 Stevens v. State (Tex. 1896), 38 S. 
 W. 167 ; Hightower v. State, 58 Miss. 
 636; Willis V. United States, 6 Ind. 
 Ter. 424, 98 S. W. 147; Austin v. 
 Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 55, 98 S. W. 
 295, 30 Ky. L. 295; Miller v. People, 
 216 111. 309, 74 N. E. 743. But such 
 evidence is inadmissible to show 
 
 what the prisoner said if the magis- 
 trate states that he refused to say 
 anything. The record cannot be con- 
 tradicted by parol. Rex v. Walter, 
 7 C. & P. 267. 
 
 ''People v. Strotto, 191 N. Y. 42, 
 83 N. E. 573- 
 
 '* State V. Smith, 9 Houst. (Del.) 
 588, 33 Atl. 441 ; State v. Rover, 13 
 Nev. 17; Commonwealth v. Dower, 
 4 Allen (Mass.) 297; State v. Wells, 
 I N. J. L. 424, I Am. Dec. 211 ; Grim- 
 singer V. State, 44 Tex. Cr. App. i, 
 69 S. W.- 583. 
 
 " State V. Head, 38 S. Car. 258, 16 
 S. E. 892; State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio 
 C. C. 94. The fact that the prisoner 
 desired to waive a preliminary ex- 
 amination will not, if he has been 
 properly cautioned, render any state- 
 ments he may make inadmissible. 
 Shaw V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. App. 155, 
 22 S. W. 588; People V. Giro (N. 
 Y., 1910), 90 N. E. 432. 
 
 ™ People V. Silvers, 6 Cal. App. 6g, 
 92 Pac. 506.
 
 26l CONFESSIONS. § 134 
 
 fession, including all names, if the court shall instruct the jury 
 that the confession is not evidence against any one except the 
 person making it/'^ 
 
 § 134. Confessions of persons associated in a conspiracy. — A con- 
 fession or incriminating statement uttered by a person engaged 
 with others in a conspiracy to commit a crime, made in the prose- 
 cution of the common enterprise, and during its existence, is ad- 
 missible against any or all of those associated together." When 
 the common undertaking is consummated or abandoned the com- 
 munity of interest ceases. A confession of any participant made 
 thereafter is receivable only against him. Usually the existence 
 of the conspiracy must be proved before the confession will be re- 
 ceived. But sometimes, though this is not the general rule, the 
 confession may be received as evidence on a promise by the pros- 
 ecution to establish the conspiracy subsequently.'^" 
 
 § 135. Artifice or deception used. — A free and voluntary confes- 
 sion is not inadmissible because it was subsequently retracted,*" or 
 because it was originally obtained by an artifice practiced on the 
 accused by officers having' him in charge, or by other persons, if 
 the means employed were not calculated to cause him to make an 
 untrue statement.**^ The question, how was the confession ob- 
 
 "Rex V. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221; 107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 284; State v. 
 
 Howson V. State, ■j'i Ark. 146, 83 S. Westcott, 130 Iowa i, 104 N. W. 341 ; 
 
 W. 933; State V. Brinte, 4 Penn. State v. Harrison, 115 N. Car. 706, 
 
 (Del.) 55T, 58 Atl. 258. 20 S. E. 175; State v. Hopkirk, 84 
 
 """StQ post,% d,g2, et seq. Mo. 278; People v. White, 176 N. 
 
 '"See cases cited in § 494, post. Y. 331, 68 N. E. 630; Commonwealth 
 
 State V. Reed, 49 La. Ann. 704, 21 So. v. Cressinger, 193 Pa. 326, 44 Atl. 
 
 732; Sorenson v. United States, 143 433. See exhaustive notes in t8 L. 
 
 Fed. 820, 74 C. C. A. 468. R. A. (X. S.) 840, 6 Am. St. 2-19. 
 
 ""Jones V. State, 13 Tex. 168, 62 A confession, otherwise admissible, 
 
 Am. Dec. 550. will not be rejected because it was 
 
 *' People V. McAIahon, 15 X. Y. made to a detective who was locked 
 
 384; Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. in a cell with the prisoner, or, who, in 
 
 921, 927, 928, II S. E. 795; Hardy v. the guise of a friend, obtained the 
 
 United States, 3 App. D. C. 35; Peo- confession from liim. State v. Brooks, 
 
 pie v. McGloin, 91 N. Y. 241; State 92 Mo. 542, 576, 5 S. W. 257, 330; 
 
 v. Staley, 14 Minn. 105, 113; State Heldt v. State, 20 Neb. 492, 495, 30 N. 
 
 v. Fredericks, 85 Mo. 145, 149; King W. 626, 57 Am. 835n ; Osborn v. Com- 
 
 V. State, 40 Ala. 314; Burton v. State, monweallh (Ky.), 20 S. W. 223, 14
 
 § 135 
 
 CRIMINAL FA'IDENCE. 
 
 262 
 
 tained? is of minor importance. The main point to be considered 
 is, was the confession probably true?''" The real cjuestion always 
 turns, not so much upon tlie means used in obtaining the confes- 
 sion, as upon the motives which prompted the prisoner to make 
 it.^^ The cases, however, are not harmonious, and in the most re- 
 cent cases it has been held that a confession procured by a person 
 who, by falsely representing- himself to be an attorney, obtained 
 the confidence of the prisoner, was inadmissible.^* A man who 
 
 Ky. L. 246. A confession procured 
 from a prisoner by telling him an ac- 
 complice has confessed, which state- 
 ment is untrue, is not inadmissible on 
 that account. State v. Jones, 54 Mo. 
 478, 481. So an appeal to the super- 
 stitious nature of an old and infirm 
 woman by promising her a charm 
 which would prevent detection, will 
 not exclude a confession elicited 
 thereby. State v. Harrison, 115 N. 
 Car. 706, 20 S. E. 175. 
 
 '''People V. McMahon, 15 N. Y. 
 384. 387, 390. 
 
 *^ So a confession contained in a 
 letter given to a jailer or other per- 
 son for mailing to a friend or a wit- 
 ness for the accused, but which was 
 retained by him and opened and 
 handed to the prosecuting officials, 
 should be received. Rex v. Derring- 
 ton, 2 C. & P. 418; State v. Renaud, 
 50 La. Ann. 662, 23 So. 894. "While 
 we do not sanction the deception 
 practiced by one of the officers in 
 charge of the defendant, the court 
 could not exclude the confessions 
 made to him on that account. De- 
 ception was used in order to induce 
 the defendant to tell the truth. No 
 inducement was held out to him to 
 confess guilt unless there was guilt. 
 The confession to the under-sheriff' 
 was made to him, not as a public 
 officer, but as a supposed friend. It 
 is not sufficient to exclude a confes- 
 
 sion by a prisoner, as we have held, 
 'that he was under arrest at the time, 
 or that it was made to the officer in 
 whose custody he was, or in answer 
 to questions put to him, or that it 
 was made under the hope or promise 
 of a benefit of a collateral nature.' 
 (Cox V. People, 80 N. Y. 500, 515.) 
 Confessions induced by the use of 
 decoy letters, by the false assertion 
 that some of the accomplices of the 
 prisoner were in custody or made 
 to a detective disguised as a confed- 
 erate or upon the promise that they 
 will not be disclosed, have been re- 
 ceived in evidence with the sanction 
 of courts of high authority. * * * 
 Cautious and hesitating as courts 
 have always been in regard to con- 
 fessions made by a person when un- 
 der arrest to those in authority over 
 him, they have not gone so far as to 
 exclude them, simply because they 
 were procured by deception, provided 
 they were voluntarily made. They are 
 careful, however, to leave the credi- 
 bility of the witness who practiced 
 the deception and the circumstances 
 under which the confessions were 
 made to the consideration of the 
 jury." By Vann, J., in People v. 
 White, 176 N. Y. 331, 349, 68 N. E. 
 630. 
 
 '* Cotton V. State, 87 Ala. 75, 6 So. 
 396; Tines v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 77 S. W. 363, 25 Ky. L. 1233.
 
 26^ CONFESSIONS. §136 
 
 \vill deliberately ingratiate himself into the confidence of another 
 for the purpose of betraying that confidence, and, with words of 
 friendship npon his lips, seek by every means in his power to 
 obtain an admission which can be tortured into a confession of 
 guilt which he may blaze to the world as a means of accomplish- 
 ing the downfall of one for whom he professes great friendship, 
 cannot be possessed of a very high sense of honor or moral 
 obligation." Hence, it is doubtful if anything is really gained in 
 the administration of justice from the admission of such evidence. 
 A person who may overhear the remarks of a prisoner made to 
 himself or to another person, as his wife, or an attorney, or spir- 
 itual adviser, who is incompetent as a witness to privileged com- 
 munications, may testify to what he has heard. ^"^ 
 
 A confession constituting a part of a prayer may be proved by 
 one who overheard it, though he may not be able to prove the 
 whole prayer.®" A confession made to another prisoner, under 
 the erroneous impression that one prisoner cannot testify against 
 the other, is not for that reason inadmissible. ®® 
 
 § 136. Confessions by intoxicated persons. — Confessions made 
 while the accused is intoxicated are not thereby rendered inadmis- 
 sible. This is the rule, even where the intoxication was produced 
 by liquor given to him by the officers having him in charge for the 
 sole purpose of procuring a confession.*^ Some of the recent cases, 
 
 *'Heldt V. State, 20 Neb. 492, 497, man. Stafford v. State, 55 Ga. 591, 
 
 498, 30 X. W. 626, 57 Am. 83511. 596. 
 
 **°Rex V. Simons, 6 C. & P. 540. '" Eskridge v. State, 25 Ala. 30; 
 
 But not to incriminating declarations Jefferds v. People, 5 Park. Cr. (X. 
 
 made during sleep, for the declarant Y.) 522, 561; Rex v. Spilsbury, 7 C. 
 
 is then unconscious of what he is & P. 187; South v. People, 98 111. 
 
 saying. People v. Robinson, 19 Cal. 261, 265 ; Lester v. State, 32 Ark. 
 
 40. 727, 730; People V. Ramirez, 56 Cal. 
 
 "Woolfolk V. State, 85 Ga. 69, 11 533, 38 Am. 73; State v. Grear, 28 
 
 S. E. 814. Minn. 426, 10 N. W. 472, 41 Am. 296 ; 
 
 ** State V. Mitchell, Phil. (X. State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 24 
 
 Car.) L. 447. A confession to a fel- So. 329; State v. Feltes, 5: Iowa 495, 
 
 low prisoner in jail, procured by the i N. W. 755 ; State v. Hopkirk, 84 
 
 latter's spiritual exhortation and Mo. 278; Leach v. State, 99 Tenn. 
 
 reading the Bible to the accused, is 584, 42 S. W. 195; State v. Hogan, 
 
 not to be rejected because the wit- 117 La. 863, 42 So. 352; Licnpo v. 
 
 ncss is himself a grossly irreligious State, 28 Tex. App. 179, 12 S. W.
 
 ^ 136 CKIMIXAL FA'IDEXCE. 264 
 
 however, reject confessions thus ol)tained because of tlie trick- 
 practiced. But the general rule has been sustained, even where the 
 accused was suffering from dcliriiiui trcuiciis,^" if he was mentally 
 and physically able to describe past events and to state his own 
 participation in the crime. ''^ The jury are not bound to believe the 
 prisoner's confession made when sober, nor to reject a contra- 
 dictory confession made when he was drunk, ^- for, if the court has 
 ruled that the confession was voluntary, the physical or mental 
 condition of the accused is merely one element for the jury in de- 
 termining what reliance, if any, is to be placed upon the confes- 
 sion.®^ 
 
 But the mental and physical condition of the accused when mak- 
 ing the confession is always relevant. Hence, the accused may 
 show his intoxication to determine the credit and weight of the 
 confession, by his own testimony, °* by cross-examining the wit- 
 ness who is called to prove the confession, or by other witnesses.''^ 
 
 The intoxication of the accused at the time of making a con- 
 fession may be considered by the jury in diminishing the value of 
 the confession as evidence. The old proverb in vino Veritas has 
 never been a rule of law. It is by no means of universal applica- 
 tion. Indeed, the contrary is often seen, for with men of a boastful 
 disposition, intoxication is apt to result in false and exaggerated 
 statements of their past achievements.'"^ 
 
 The accused may be permitted to show that what purports to 
 be his confession was simply boastful statements made with a 
 
 588; People V. Kent, 41 Misc. (N. (Mass.) no; People v. Kent, 41 
 
 Y.) 191, 83 X. Y. S. 948, I- X- Y. Misc. (X. Y.) 191, 83 X. Y. S. 948, 
 
 Cr. 461 (drugs). See note in 6 Am. 17 X'. Y. Cr. 461. 
 
 St. 249. "^Jefferds v. People, 5 Park Cr. 
 
 *" State V. Feltes, 51 Iowa 495, i X'. (X. Y.) 522, 547; State v. Berry, 50 
 
 W. 755. La. Ann. 1309, 24 So. 329; People v. 
 
 ''White V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. App. Kent, 41 i\Iisc. (N. Y.) 191, 83 X. Y. 
 
 625, 25 S. W. 784; Eskridge v. State, S. 948, 17 X. Y. Cr. 461. 
 
 25 Ala. 30, ss; People v. Farrington, '^ State v. Feltes, 51 Iowa 495, i X. 
 
 140 Cal. 656, 74 Pac. 288; State v. W. 755. 
 
 Hogan, 117 La. 863, 42 So. 352. '° State v. Berry, 50 La. Ann. 1309, 
 
 '"Finch V. State, 81 Ala. 41, 50, i 24 So. 329; State v. Grear, 28 Minn. 
 
 So. 56s ; People v. Hutchings, 8 Cal. 426, 10 X. W. 472, 41 Am. 296 ; State 
 
 App. 550, 97 Pac. 325 ; People v. Ho- v. Bryan, 74 X. Car. 351 ; White v. 
 
 gan, 117 La. 863. 42 So. 352. State, 32 Tex. Cr. .\pp. 625. 25 S. 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Howe, 9 Gray W. 784.
 
 265 
 
 CONFESSIOXS. 
 
 § 137 
 
 humorous intention, while he was intoxicated, and when he has 
 done this, the prosecution may prove by witnesses who overheard 
 him speaking that he appeared to be perfectly sincere while speak- 
 ing." 
 
 § 137. Admissions receivable though involuntary. — The rule that 
 a confession procured by a threat or a promise is inadmissible does 
 not apply to admissions®^ not involving the existence of a criminal 
 intent,®'' if the influence exerted did not amount to duress, or to 
 an illegal and undue degree of compulsion.^*'" Some cases hold that 
 it is not material that the involuntary admission, when connected 
 with other evidence, proves, or tends to prove, the guilt of the 
 defendant. So long as it does not, taken by itself, directly admit 
 or suggest his guilt, that it was voluntary in its character need not 
 be shown.^ But the cases are not harmonious, and it seems logical 
 that all the declarations of the defendant from which guilt may be 
 inferred should come under the rule.- 
 
 *' Horn V. State, 12 Wyom. 80, TZ 
 Pac. 705. 
 
 ** An admission as applied to a 
 criminal case is a statement of de- 
 fendant of facts pertinent to the is- 
 sues and tending in connection with 
 proof of other facts to prove his 
 guilt, but which of itself is insuf- 
 ficient to authorize conviction. Ran- 
 som V. State, 4 Ga. App. 826, 59 S. 
 E. lor. 
 
 *' People V. Hickman, 113 Cal. 80, 
 45 Pac. 175; McLain v. State, 18 
 Neb. 154, 161, 24 X. W. 720; Under- 
 bill on Ev., § 75 ; People v. Stokes, 5 
 Cal. App. 205, 89 Pac. 997; Fuller v. 
 State, 127 Ga. 47, 55 S. E. 1047; 
 Hutchinson v. State (Ga. App.), dz 
 S. E. 597; Watson v. State, 52 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 85, 105 S. W. 509; People 
 V. Jan John, 144 Cal. 284, "j^ Pac. 
 950; People V. Moran, 144 Cal. 48. ^7 
 Pac. ^T]; People v. Weber, 149 Cal. 
 325, 86 Pac. 671 ; People v. Scala- 
 miero, 143 Cal. 343, 76 Pac. 1098; 
 State V. Barrington, 198 Mo. 23, 95 
 
 S. W. 23s ; Burgess v. State, 148 Ala. 
 654, 42 So. 681. 
 
 ^"^^ The rule in civil cases that ad- 
 missions made to bring about a com- 
 promise are inadmissible does not 
 apply in criminal cases. State v. So- 
 per, 16 Me. 293, 295, 2,2> Am. Dec. 
 665 ; State v. Campbell, '/'>, Kan. 688, 
 85 Pac. 784, 9 L. R. A. (X. S.) S33n; 
 Richburger v. State, 90 Miss. 806, 44 
 So. 772. Contra, Mill v. State, 3 Ga. 
 App. 414, 60 S. E. 4. Admissibility 
 of confessions, see note in "j^i -^'ii- St. 
 942-946. 
 
 ^People V. Velarde, 59 Cal. 457; 
 State V. Red. 53 Iowa 69, 74, 4 N. W. 
 831; People V. Parton, 49 Cal. 632; 
 Ferguson v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 
 93, 19 S. W. 901 ; People v. McCal- 
 1am, 103 X. Y. 587, 596, 9 X. E. 502, 
 3 X. Y. Cr. 189. 5 X. Y. Cr. 143, 4 X. 
 Y. St. 29T, 25 Wkly. Dig. 2to. 
 
 " Marshall v. State, 5 Tex. App. 
 273, 293 ; Quintana v. State, 29 Tex. 
 App. 401, 407, 16 S. W. 258, 25 Km. 
 St. 730; Commonwealth v. Myers,
 
 1-^8 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 266 
 
 § 138. When facts discovered admit parts of an involuntary con- 
 fession. — The main reason for rejecting confessions uttered under 
 the influence of hope or fear is the great probabiHty that the pris- 
 oner has been influenced by his expectation of punishment, or of 
 immunity, to speak what is not true. If, however, the existence 
 of extraneous facts is discovered through the statements of the 
 accused, no reason exists for rejecting those parts of the confes- 
 sion which led to the discovery, and which, though not voluntarily 
 made or obtained by improper means or for any reason inadmis- 
 sible have been corroborated convincingly by the facts discovered. 
 The proper order of proof is for the facts discovered to be proved, 
 and then to receive as much of the confession as leads up to and 
 as relates strictly to such facts.^ 
 
 It is no objection to the proof of the facts which are discovered 
 that their discovery was brought about by means of a confession.* 
 
 160 ]\Iass. 530, 36 N. E. 481 ; Murphy 
 V. People, 63 X. Y. 590, 596. In Rex 
 V. Warickshall (1783), i Leach Cr. 
 L. 298, 300, which is a leading case, 
 the court said : '"This principle re- 
 specting confessions has no applica- 
 tion whatever as to the admission or 
 rejection of facts, whether the knowl- 
 edge of them be obtained in conse- 
 quence of an extorted confession, or 
 whether it arises from anj' other 
 source; for a fact, if it exist at all, 
 must exist invariably in the same 
 manner, whether the confession from 
 which it is derived be in other re- 
 spects true or false." This case also 
 holds, though the modern rule is 
 otherwise, that no part of the con- 
 fession can be received, but the facts 
 though obtained by a confession must 
 be satisfactorily proved without di- 
 vulging their source. Hence, it can- 
 rot be legalh' known whether the 
 fact had been confessed or not. 
 
 ^ Murphy v. State, 63 Ala. i ; Rice 
 V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 215, 223- 
 228; State V. Crank, 2 Bailey (S. 
 Car.) 66, 23 Am. Dec. iiyn; Daniels 
 
 V. State, 78 Ga. 98, 6 Am. St. 238n; 
 State V. Vaigneur, 5 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 391 ; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 
 Pick. (Mass.) 496, 511, 20 Am. Dec. 
 491; State V. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 
 91 N. W. 935, 94 Am. St. 323n, 59 
 L. R. A. 437; United States v. Rich- 
 ard, 2 Cranch C. C. 439, 27 Fed. Cas. 
 16154; Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 
 Pa. 200; People v. Hoy Yen, 34 Cal. 
 176; Done V. People, 5 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 364, 396; Gregg v. State, 106 Ala. 
 44, 17 So. 321 ; State v. Middleton, 69 
 S. Car. 72, 48 S. E. 35; Smith v. 
 State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 643, 11 1 S. 
 W. 939; Jones v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 329, 96 S. W. 930; State v. 
 Ruck, 194 Mo. 416, 92 S. W. 706; 
 State V. Hutchings, 30 Utah 319, 84 
 Pac. 893 ; Commonwealth v. Phillips 
 (Ky.), 82 S. W. 286, 26 Ky. L. 543; 
 Whitney v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 74 
 S. W. 257, 24 Ky. L. 2524. 
 
 * State V. Moran, 131 Iowa 645, 109 
 N. W. 187; Rusher v. State, 94 Ga. 
 363, 21 S. E. 593, 47 Am. St. 175; 
 Taylor v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 42 
 S. W. 1 125, 19 Ky. L. 836; State v.
 
 267 CONFESSIONS. § 1 39 
 
 Sometimes, however, the order of proof has been reversed, and 
 the court has allowed the language of the prisoner to be proved 
 before receiving evidence of the facts discovered.^ 
 
 Thus, for illustration, it may properly be proved in a prosecu- 
 tion for homicide that the victim's remains,*' or his clothing,'^ or 
 the weapon with which he was killed,^ were actually found at a 
 particular time and place as the result of a statement by the ac- 
 cused which was itself inadmissible, as a confession. So, in a lar- 
 ceny trial, it may be proved that the stolen property was discov- 
 ered as the result of an inadmissible confession ; and then as much 
 of the confession as disclosed the hiding place of the stolen prop- 
 erty and whatever the accused said in conducting persons there 
 or in pointing out or describing it, or which is in any way con- 
 nected with the discovery is admissible, though these statements 
 were the result of promises or threats.*^ 
 
 § 139. Confessions procured by persons in authority. — A distinc- 
 tion is made by many of the cases between those confessions which 
 are procured by threats made or promises offered by some person 
 who is so related to the accused as to be able to exercise authority 
 over him, and consequently had both the power and the oppor- 
 tunity to fulfill the threat or promise ; and confessions made in re- 
 sponse to promises by persons having no power whatever over the 
 
 George, 15 La. Ann. 145; Walrath v. "State v. Motley, 7 Rich. (S. Car.) 
 
 State, 8 Neb. 80; Duffy v. People, 26 327. 
 
 N. Y. 588, 590, 5 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 'State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 41 
 
 321. Atl. 820; Spearman v. State, 34 Tex. 
 
 ''Duffy V. People, 5 Park. Cr. (N. Cr. App. 279, 30 S. W. 229. 
 
 Y.) 321, 26 N. Y. 588, 590; Reg. V. * Commonwealth v. James, 99 Mass. 
 
 Gould, 9 C. & P. 364; Deathridgc v. 438. 
 
 State, I Sneed (Tenn.) 75, 80, 81; "State v. Mortimer, 20 Kan. 93; 
 
 Jordan v. State, '^,2 Miss. 382. But Rector v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. L. 
 
 in South Carolina the statements of 323; State v. Garvey, 28 La. Ann. 
 
 the accused made where, by reason 925, 26 Am. 123 ; Relote v. State, ^t^ 
 
 of threats, stolen property was recov- Miss. 96, 72 Am. Dec. 163 ; Fielder 
 
 ered, have been rejected, although it v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 184, 49 S. 
 
 was allowed to be proved that the W. 376; Ranks v. State, 84 Ala. 430, 
 
 stolen property had been found be- 4 So. 382 : State v. Winston, t 16 N. 
 
 cause the accused had pointed out Car. 990, 21 S. E. Zl- 
 its hiding place. State v. Middlcton, 
 69 S. Car. 72, 48 S. E. 35.
 
 § 139 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 268 
 
 prisoner, and, consequently, unable to perform what they promised 
 to do. In the former case it was conclusively presumed that the 
 confession was forced and involuntary.^** Hence, where the in- 
 ducement to confess proceeded from the prosecuting witness, or 
 liis wife, or from the district attorney, or some member of a 
 coroner's jury, or from a police officer or magistrate, the confes- 
 sion was rejected as presumably extorted by fear or prompted by 
 hope of immunity. 
 
 Upon the question whether any presumption was to be recog- 
 nized where a confession was made in response to a promise or 
 threat by one having no power whatever over the prisoner, and 
 who was, for that reason, unable to fulfill the threat or promise, 
 the authorities are divided. Some of the cases hold that a threat 
 or promise made by such a person creates a conclusive presump- 
 tion that the confession was not free and voluntary.^^ But other 
 authorities hold, and these perhaps are in the majority, that the 
 threat or promise must proceed from some one in authority, and 
 who has the power to carry it into execution, or it must be made 
 in the i)resence and with the implied approval of such a person, 
 to justify the court in drawing an inference that the confession 
 was involuntary.^^ 
 
 These distinctions, however, when tested by the actual circum- 
 stances of each case, prove of very little value. The question al- 
 ways is, was the will of the prisoner actually subjugated and 
 overcome, so that the confession is not the free product of his 
 own will but forced from his lips by the superior will of another? 
 This is a question of mixed law and fact, to be answered by the 
 
 " State V. Carson, 36 S. Car. 524, f essions, see 2 Am. St. 243-247, 18 
 
 532, 15 S. E. 588; Clayton v. State, L. R. A. (N. S.) 843-855- 
 
 31 Tex. Cr. App. 489, 21 S. W. 255; "State v. Revells, 34 La. Ann. 381, 
 
 Hoober v. State, 81 Ala. 51, l So. 44 Am. 436; Commonwealth v. 
 
 574; State V. Spaugh, 200 Mo. 571, 98 Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 496, 500, 20 
 
 S. W. 55 : People V. Thompson, 84 Am. Dec. 491, and see cases cited in 
 
 Cal. 598, 24 Pac. 384; Green v. State, Underbill on Evidence, p. T36, n. i. 
 
 88 Ga. 516, 15 S. E. 10, 30 Am. St. " Smith v. Commonwealth, ro 
 
 i67n; Collins v. Commonwealth Gratt. (Va.) 734; Early v. Common- 
 
 (Ky.), 25 S. W. 743, 15 Ky. L. 691; wealth, 86 Va. 921, 927, 928. 11 S. E. 
 
 Commonwealth v. Myers, 160 Mass. 795 ; Commonwealth v. Morey, i 
 
 530, 2>^ N. E. 481; State v. York, Z7 Gray (Mass.) 461, 463; Searcy v. 
 
 N. H. 175; People v. McMahon. 15 State, 28 Tex. App. 513, 13 S. W. 
 
 N. Y. 384. Exhaustive notes on con- 782, 19 Am. St. 851.
 
 269 CONFESSIONS. § I40 
 
 court or the jury according to the facts and circumstances of each 
 particular case. No presumption should be recognized based upon 
 the official position of the person who heard the confession, 
 though this may be taken into consideration with the other facts. 
 Doubtless the fact that the person who obtained a confession by 
 the use of a promise or a threat did not possess the power and 
 authority to carry either into effect, if known to the prisoner at 
 the time of making the confession, would nullify the effect in- 
 tended to be produced upon his mind, and the confession would 
 be regarded as his free act.^'"' 
 
 g 140. Confessions need not be spontaneous. — A confession, in 
 other respects admissible, is not inadmissible because it is not the 
 spontaneous utterance of the prisoner. The fact that the con- 
 fession was obtained by the employment of persistent question- 
 ing does not alone exclude it,^* but the practice of eliciting a con- 
 fession by putting question after question to the accused is clearly 
 not conducive to the procurement of truth, and the mode in which 
 the confession was elicited may always be considered by the jury 
 to determine whether they shall believe it. 
 
 This is well illustrated by the methods employed by police of- 
 ficers and other in practicing upon the accused after his arrest 
 what is known in police circles as the "third degree." This usu- 
 ally consists in subjecting the accused, after his arrest and while 
 in custody, to a continuous and rigid examination accompanied 
 with intimidation by threats and other means. The length of this 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Tuckcrman, 10 promise made by a person who inter- 
 Gray (Mass.) 173, 190; State v. Fort- feres without any authority of this 
 ner, 43 Iowa 494; McAdory v. State, kind is not to be presumed to have 
 62 Ala. 154, 161 ; Ulrich v. People, such an effect on the mind of the 
 39 Mich. 245, 250; Underbill on Evi- prisoner as to induce him to confess 
 dence, p. 136. In 3 Russell on that he is guilty of a crime of which 
 Crimes, p. 393, the author says : he is innocent." People v. Piner 
 "The result of the cases seems to be, (Cal. App., 1909), 105 Pac. 780. 
 that a confession is not inadmissible, "State v. Penney, 113 Iowa 691, 84 
 although made after an exhortation, N. W. 509; Young v. State, 90 Md. 
 or admonition, or other similar influ- 579, 45 Atl. 531 ; Cox v. People, 80 
 ence, proceeding at a prior time from N. Y. 500; Aiken v. State (Tex.), 
 some one who has nothing to do with 64 S. W. 57 ; Tidwcll v. State, 40 
 the apprehension, prosecution or ex- Tex. Cr. App. 38, 47 S. W. 466, 48 
 amination of the prisoner; for a S. W. 184; United States v. Mat-. 
 
 thews, 26 Fed. Cas. 15741b.
 
 S 140 CRIMIXAL EVIPEXCE. 27O 
 
 process and the manner of its application depend largelv upon 
 the character of the official who administers it and upon that of 
 the accused to whom it is administered, 
 
 \\'here, on the one hand, the police official is sufficiently hard- 
 ened and brutalized by his past experience and the accused is a 
 determined and courageous person, it is likely to continue for 
 some lengthy period without results, but where the accused is 
 weak and nervous or feeble in mind or body, the carrying out 
 of this method of modern torture will generally result in pro- 
 ducing statements in answer to leading questions which can 
 readily be twisted into a confession. 
 
 The worthlessness as evidence of such statements needs but to 
 be stated in order to be appreciated. Their probative force, or 
 rather lack of force, is well recognized by all who have had any 
 experience of human nature. They carry no weight, usually, in 
 the minds of the average juryman, but, in all probability, police 
 officials will continue to procure so-called confessions by this 
 method until the end of time. 
 
 As matter of law, the fact that confessions are obtained by 
 questions which assume the guilt of the accused, does not exclude 
 them if they are in all respects voluntary confessions and pro- 
 vided always that in putting the question which assumes that the 
 prisoner is guilty, no unfair advantage amounting to compulsion 
 or duress was exercised over him.^^ 
 
 A voluntary confession is not inadmissible because the person 
 to whom it was made promised under oath that he would not re- 
 veal it,^° or it was procured by the use of falsehood,^' as, for ex- 
 
 " Hardy v. United States, 3 App. State v. Brinte, 4 Pen. (Del.) 551, 58 
 
 D. C. 35 ; People v. Wentz, 37 N. Y. Atl. 258 ; State v. Barrington, 198 
 
 303; People V. McGloin, 91 N. Y. Mo. 23, 95 S. W. 235. 
 
 241, 246; State V. Turner, 122 La. "State v. Darnell, i Houst. (Del.) 
 
 371, 47 So. 685; State V. Berry, 50 321. 
 
 La. Ann. 1309, 24 So. 329; Birken- " State v. Darnell, i Houst. (Del.) 
 
 feld V. State, 104 Md. 253, 65 Atl. 321 : Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 
 
 i; State v. Banusik (N. J.), 64 Atl. Pick. (IMass.) 496, 20 Am. Dec. 491; 
 
 994; State V. Blodgett, 50 Ore. 329, Cox v. People. 80 X. Y. 500, 515. 
 
 92 Pac. 820; People v. Siemsen, 153 "Burton v. State, 107 Ala. 108, 18 
 
 Cal. 387, 95 Pac. 863: Cox v. People, So. 284: Sanders v. State. 113 Ga. 
 
 80 N. Y. 500 ; McClain v. Common- 267, 38 S. E. 841 : People v. Barker, 
 
 wealth, no Pa. 263, 269, i Atl. 45: 60 ]\Iich. 277, 27 N. W. 539. i Am. St. 
 
 Murphy v. People, 63 N. Y. 590, 597 ; 50in ; State v. Rush, 95 ]Mo. 199, 8
 
 271 CONFESSIONS. § I4I 
 
 ample, by telling the accused that his accomplice had made a con- 
 fession implicating the accused. 
 
 Nor should an admissible confession be rejected because it was 
 the result of some benefit having no connection with the crime 
 confessed.^^ Thus, a confession which has been induced by a 
 promise that the prisoner may see his wife, who was confined 
 in another cell,^° or have his shackles removed, and permit him 
 to associate with other prisoners, ^° or be permitted to take exer- 
 cise, or be released from a rigorous confinement, or to protect 
 him from others alleged to be implicated in the crime,"^ should 
 be received."" 
 
 § 141. Confessions made by signs or gestures. — Under this head 
 we may group direct admissions of guilt in the form of affirm- 
 ative gestures, nods or signs made in response to leading ques- 
 tions or to questions which assume the guilt of the person ad- 
 dressed. Can a witness who saw the incriminating gesture testify 
 that it was made, the question which called it out being also 
 proved, in a case where he would be precluded from testifying 
 to an express confession because the circumstances rendered it 
 involuntary ? 
 
 An affirmative nod in response to a direct accusation of crime 
 is no less a confession than an oral statement. If the accusation 
 is coupled with a threat or a promise, evidence of the nod or 
 gesture should be rejected as an attempt to accomplish by indi- 
 rection what cannot be done directly. Actions speak louder than 
 
 S. W. 221; Heldt V. State, 20 Neb. =^ Hunt v. State, 135 Ala. i, 33 So. 
 
 492, 30 N. W. 626, 57 Am. 83511; 329. 
 
 Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 186 Pa. "^"On the whole the authorities 
 
 218, 40 Atl. 412, 65 Am. St. 852; seem to be in favor of the proposi- 
 
 Commonwealth v. Wilson, 186 Pa. tion that the inducement must be of 
 
 St. I, 40 Atl. 283. a temporal nature. Whether or no 
 
 " Stone V. State, 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. it must have reference to the charge, 
 
 114; Price V. State, T14 Ga. 815, 40 has scarcely been fully discussed. It 
 
 S. E. lois; State v. Fortner, 43 Iowa is certainly possible to conceive cases 
 
 494; State v. Hopkirk, 84 Mo. 278; in which a much stronger inducement 
 
 State v. Wentworth, 37 N. H. 196; might be held out to a prisoner than 
 
 Cox V. People, 80 N. Y. 500. one having reference to an escape 
 
 "Rex. v. Lloyd, 6 C. & P. 393. from a charge not involving any very 
 
 "' State v. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483 ; State serious consequences." Roscoe Crim. 
 
 V. Cruse, 74 N. Car. 491. Ev., 46.
 
 §§ 142-143 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 2^2 
 
 words. Expressive gestures often manifest more clearly the emo- 
 tion of the mind than the most forcible and vehement language. 
 A direct confession by an act is therefore inadmissible whenever 
 the'spoken or written word would be excluded.-'' 
 
 § 142. Confessions of treason. — Because of the statutory require- 
 ment under which the testimony of two witnesses to an overt act 
 was necessary to convict one of the crime of treason, it was at 
 one time doubted whether an extra-judicial confession was ad- 
 missible against one on trial for the commission of that crime."* 
 It is now the law that while no one can be convicted of treason 
 upon his confession not made in open court, that is, by a plea of 
 guilty to the indictment, his extra-judicial confession may be re- 
 ceived against him. The making of the confession and the con- 
 fession itself must, to be admissible, be proved by two witnesses.-^ 
 
 g 143. Confessions made by young children. — Where a young 
 child possesses sufficient mental capacity, or is of such an age as 
 Avill render him responsible for the criminal consequences of his 
 actions, his confession is admissible, under the same circumstances 
 which will admit the confession of an adult or mature person.-" 
 
 It is enough to show that he is reasonably intelligent and old 
 enough to understand the character and effect of what he says 
 and to comprehend his situation generally."^ 
 
 And a child, under the age of fourteen years, may, if clearly 
 and fully shown to be able to distinguish between right and wrong 
 as respects the particular circumstances of the case under con- 
 
 ="Xolen V. State, 14 Tex. App. 474, "i East P. C, 131-133. i Burr's 
 
 483, 46 Am. 247n; Roscoe Cr. Ev., p. Trial 196. 
 
 5t; I Greenleaf on Evidence, § 282. ^"Commonwealth v. Smith, 119 
 
 The distinction between the admissi- Mass. 305, 311; Earp v. State, 55 Ga. 
 
 bility of evidence of facts discovered, 136; Stage's Case, 5 City Hall Rec. 
 
 through an involuntary confession (N. Y.) 177. 
 
 which is not admissible, and an act =^ Rirkenfeld v. State, 104 Md. 253. 
 
 not admissible because itself consti- 65 Atl. i; State v. Guild, 10 N. J. L. 
 
 tuting an involuntary confession, 163, 18 Am. Dec. 404; Grayson v. 
 
 should not be overlooked. Sec ante, State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 573, 51 S. W. 
 
 §§ r37, T38. 246; Rex v. Thornton, i Moody C 
 
 ■^ Underbill on Evidence, § 98. C. 2.T.
 
 273 coxFESsioxs. § 144 
 
 sideration. be convicted of murder or other felony upon his extra- 
 judicial confession, if the corpus delicti be otherwise proved."'' 
 
 But a confession by a stupid negro boy twelve years of age 
 made to white men by whom he was privately examined is inad- 
 missible where he was without friends or counsel to advise him.^^ 
 
 § 144. Judicial confessions: plea of guilty. — As will be subse- 
 quently pointed out. the jury may convict the accused upon his 
 extra-judicial confession, only in case they shall believe that it 
 is corroborated by independent proof of the corpus delicti. But 
 a judicial confession in the shape of a plea of guilty by the ac- 
 cused, he having sufficient capacity to understand the nature and 
 meaning of his act, made in the hearing of the court and the jury, 
 is equivalent to a conviction and is conclusive on the jury. The 
 court must pronounce judgment and sentence as in a case of a 
 verdict of guilty rendered by the jury.^^ 
 
 The accused has an absolute right to plead guilty and, in the 
 absence of a statute to the contrary, the court is bound to accept 
 the plea even in capital cases.^^ In some states, there are statutes 
 which provide that no plea of guilty shall be accepted in capital 
 cases and such a statute is constitutional. ^- 
 
 ^^'here no such statute prevails, the prisoner may, if sane, be 
 convicted at once and sentenced to death or imprisonment.^^ The 
 judge may in his discretion permit a plea of guilty to be with- 
 
 ^ Martin V. State, 90 Ala. 602, 8 So. 1092, 4 Bl. Comm. (Tucker) 329, i 
 
 858, 861, 24 Am. St. 844; Rex v. Chitty Cr. Law 429, 2 Hale Pleas. Cr. 
 
 Thornton, I Moody C. C. 27; Com- 225. The court may hear evidence to 
 
 momvealth v. Smith, 119 Mass. 305, determine the punishment. State v. 
 
 311; Bartley v. People, 156 111. 234, Branner, 149 N. Car. 559, 63 S. E. 
 
 40 X. E. 831 ; Commonwealth v. 169. 
 
 Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 5 N. E. 494. ^ State v. Branner, 149 X. Car. 559, 
 
 But cf. Ford v. State, 75 Miss. loi, 63 S. E. 169. 
 
 2T So. 524. ^^ State V. Genz, 57 X. J. L. 459, 31 
 
 ^ Owsley V. Commonwealth, 125 Atl. 1037. 
 
 Ky. 384, loi S. W. 366, 31 Ky. L. 5; "" Dantz v. State, Sj Tnd. 398. 399; 
 
 Ford V. State, 75 ^liss. lOi, 21 So. Commonwealth v. Brown, 150 Mass. 
 
 .S24. 330, 23 X. E. 49; Sellers v. People, 6 
 
 '^ State V. Branner, 149 N. Car. 559, 111. 183; State v. Cowan, 7 Ired. (N. 
 
 63 S. E. 169; Green v. Common- Car.) 239; State v. Branner, 149 N. 
 
 wealth, T2 .Mien (Mass.) 155: Peo- Car. 559,63 S. E. 169. 
 pie V. Luby, 99 Mich. 89, 57 X. W. 
 
 18 — UXDERHILL CrIM. Ev.
 
 $ 144 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 274 
 
 drawn at any time before judgment,^* and a plea of not guilty to 
 be substituted in its place.^^ 
 
 In order that the plea of guilty may be accepted, and a judg- 
 ment and sentence pronounced thereupon, the plea must be en- 
 tirely voluntary and given under circumstances which would per- 
 mit the introduction in evidence of a confession made out of 
 court. It must be shown to have been uninfluenced by fear or l^y 
 liope. It must not be the result of misrepresentation or over- 
 persuasion ; it must also be shown not to have been the outcome 
 of ignorance or of a misconception of the rights of the accused.^'' 
 
 The burden of proof is on the state to satisfy the court that the 
 plea of guilty was voluntary and that the accused understood the 
 nature of the plea. Ordinarily, this w^ill be presumed from the 
 absence of any circumstances showing compulsion, but the matter 
 i=; regulated by statutes in some states. In Michigan, it is pro- 
 vided where a defendant pleads guilty, that the court, before 
 pronouncing sentence, must investigate and satisfy itself that the 
 plea was made with a full knowledge of the consequences and 
 without undue influence.^^ 
 
 If the prisoner had, and acted under, proper legal advice, the 
 discretion of the court is not abused if the judge shall refuse to 
 allow a plea of guilty to be withdrawn after sentence.^^ 
 
 If, how^ever, the refusal to permit the plea of guilty to be with- 
 drawn results in gross and manifest injustice to the prisoner, as 
 would be the case where he, by mistake, pleads guilty to the wrong 
 indictment, ^^ or, being of foreign birth and training, he was 
 densely ignorant of the language and of the judicial institutions 
 
 '^Reg. V. Sell, 9 C. & P. 346; Kro- State, 2 Coklw. (Tenn.) 212, 88 Am. 
 
 lage V. People, 224 111. 456, 79 N. E. Dec. 593; O'Brien v. State (Tex.), 
 
 570 ; State v. Hortman, 122 Iowa 104, 35 S. W. 666. 
 
 97 N. W. 981 ; Rex v. Pkimmer, ^^ People v. Lepper, 51 Mich. 196, 
 
 (1902) 2 K. B. 339, 71 Law J. K. B. 16 N. W. '>)']T, People v. Lewis, 51 
 
 805, 86 Law T. 836, 51 Wkly. Rep. Mich. 172, 16 N. W. 326. 
 
 137, 66 J. P. 647. '' Clark v. State, 58 N. J. L. 383, 34 
 
 ^People V. McCrory, 41 Cal. 458. Atl. 3: People v. Lennox, 67 Cal. 113, 
 
 ^* Gardner v. People, 106 III. 'jf); 114, 7 Pac. 260; Commonwealth v. 
 
 Monahan v. State, 135 Ind. 216, 34 Hagarman, 10 Allen fMass.) 401; 
 
 N. E. 967; State v. Yates, 52 Kan. United States v. Bayand. 23 Fed. 721; 
 
 ,=i66, 35 Pac. 200; Green v. Common- Krolage v. People, 224 111. 456, 79 N. 
 
 wealth, T2 Allen (^Mass.) 155; State E. 570. 
 
 V. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535; Swang v. ^° Davis v. State, 20 Ga. 674, 676.
 
 275 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 § 144 
 
 of the jurisdiction/" or where his plea was caused by his erroneous 
 beHef, based upon a remark by the judge that the lowest sentence 
 would be imposed/^ or where there is any doubt of the sanity of 
 the prisoner,*^ or he pleads guilty under duress, and because of 
 the intimidation and threats of being lynched by a mob/^ the 
 conviction should be reversed. 
 
 But the mere fact that the punishment is greater than the ac- 
 cused anticipated that he would receive if he pleaded guilty,** or 
 that the district attorney or other prosecuting official was per- 
 mitted to offer evidence of facts and circumstances to aggravate 
 the guilt of the accused and to increase his punishment, is not 
 sufficient to justify permitting a voluntary plea of guilty to be 
 Vv'ithdrawn.*^ 
 
 A statute which requires the judge to satisfy himself that a 
 plea of guilty was freely made, uninfluenced by fear or the de- 
 lusive hope of pardon, with full knowledge of the charge and 
 without undue influence, must be strictly observed with a view 
 of protecting the accused against unscrupulous persons who might 
 extort a plea of guilty from him through his ignorance or by 
 false promises.**' 
 
 '" Gardner v. State, 106 111. 76. 
 
 " State V. Stephens, 71 Mo. 535, 
 537- 
 
 ^"Commonwealth v. Battis, i Mass. 
 95; Burton v. State, ss Tex. Ci. App. 
 138, 25 S. W. 782; People V. Scott, 59 
 Cal. 341 ; Deloach v. State, 77 Miss. 
 691, 27 So. 618. In moving to amend 
 the record after a conviction by strik- 
 ing out a plea entered by mistake, it 
 must be shovirn when the mistake was 
 first discovered. The accused must 
 be free from laches. The testimony 
 of the accused that a mistake has 
 been made is insufficient to justify 
 the amendment. McKevitt v. People, 
 208 111. 460, 70 N. E. 693. 
 
 *" Sanders v. State, 85 Tnd. 318, 
 320-334, 44 Am. 29. 
 
 " Mastronada v. State, 60 Miss. 86. 
 
 ■*■' Mounts V. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 
 274, 12 S. W. 311, II Ky. L. 474. 
 
 *^ People V. Lepper, 51 Mich. 196, 
 199, 16 N. W. 377 ; Coleman v. State, 
 35 Tex. Cr. App. 404, 33 S. W. 1083 ; 
 Frosh V. State, 11 Tex. App. 280. 
 When a statute prescribes certain ab- 
 solutely essential preliminaries are to 
 be observed before the plea of guilty 
 can be accepted, these prerequisites 
 must be made manifest by the record 
 and cannot be supplied by inference 
 or intendment. Saunders v. State, 10 
 Tex. App. 336, 339 ; Coleman v. State, 
 35 Tex. Cr. App. 404, 33 S. W. T083. 
 The court should question the friends 
 of the accused and his counsel. Hen- 
 ning v. People, 40 Mich. 733. This 
 may be done in open court and in 
 presence of the prosecuting attorney. 
 People V. Lewis, 51 Mich. 172, 16 N. 
 W. 326.
 
 § 145 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 276 
 
 A plea of guilty is only a confession of guilt in the manner and 
 form as charged in the indictment. It admits the facts charged 
 and no others. It does not admit that the facts stated in the in- 
 dictment constitute a crime. Hence a conviction on a plea of 
 guilty should he reversed where no legal crime is actually charged 
 in the indictment/' or where the crime to which the accused 
 pleads guilty is not the offense described in the indictment.''*' 
 
 But a plea of guilty waives formal defects in the indictment 
 upon which a plea in abatement might be based. ^" 
 
 § 145. Confessions of persons not indicted. — The incriminating 
 statements of a third person that he committed the crime for 
 which the accused is on trial are hearsay. Such persons must be 
 produced as witnesses.^" 
 
 Accordingly evidence on a trial for homicide that a person who 
 w^as present wdien the deceased w^as killed then stated that he 
 and not the accused had shot the deceased, is properly excluded 
 unless the person whose statement is offered shall be produced as 
 a witness. ^^ 
 
 The prisoner may, of course, disprove his guilt by proving the 
 guilt of some other person.^- But he cannot do that by introduc- 
 ing the extra-judicial confession or declaration of that person that 
 he intended to commit, or that he had committed, the crime. The 
 extra-judicial declaration is never conclusive upon the declarant. 
 He may, if he be subsequently indicted because of this so-called 
 confession, demonstrate its falsity and absolve himself. To re- 
 ceive such statements as exculpatory proof w^ould be to open wide 
 the door for the practice of fraud whereby the acquittal of the 
 real criminal w^ould be assured. ^^ 
 
 *'Cro\v V. State, 6 Tex. 334, 355; 257; Welsh v. State, 96 Ala. 92. 96, 
 
 Fletcher v. State, 12 Ark. 169; Fat- 11 So. 450; State v. Duncan, T16 Mo. 
 
 rick V. State (Wyo., 1908), 98 Pac. 288, 22 S. W. 699; State v. Fletcher, 
 
 588: Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 131 24 Ore. 295, 33 Pac. 575, 577; State 
 
 Tilass. 584 ; Boody v. People, 43 Mich. v. Haynes, 71 N. Car. 79, 84 ; State 
 
 34, 4 N. W. 349; State v. Levy, 119 v. Bishop, 73 N. Car. 44. 
 
 Mo. 434, 24 S. W. 1026; Moore v. ^^ Selby v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 State, 53 Neb. 831, 74 N. W. 319. 80 S. W. 221, 25 Ky. L. 2209. 
 
 ■^ State V. Queen, 91 N. Car. 659, " Brown v. State, 120 Ala. 342, 25 
 
 660. So. 182; McDonald v. State (Ala., 
 
 *' Carper v. State, 27 Ohio St. 572. 1910), 51 So. 629. 
 
 '"Rhea v. State, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) '= Greenfield v. People. 85 N. Y. 75, 
 
 90, 39 Am. 636; Daniel v. State, 65
 
 277 CONFESSIONS. § I46 
 
 But if it is alleged by the state that the third person was an 
 accessory, his confession that he was the principal is admissible 
 in favor of one who, being tried as the principal, claims he is not.^* 
 
 § 146. The value of confessions as evidence. — The evidential value 
 of confessions and their character, cogency and force as proof of 
 crime are subjects that have elicited much discussion. Some, 
 basing' their views upon the natural presumption that a man will 
 not voluntarily incriminate himself by uttering falsehoods, re- 
 gard confessions as of considerable, if not of paramount value, 
 in determining the guilt of the accused.^^ 
 
 Still it is usually very necessary that some degree of care 
 should be used in receiving the confession, and much caution em- 
 ployed by the jury in ascertaining its weight and sufficiency. Its 
 credibility is entirely for their determination, and though they 
 may believe it to have been wholly free and voluntary, they may, 
 and indeed must, scrutinize the confession closely, keeping in 
 view the peculiar circumstances in which it was made. For it 
 must be remembered that though it may have been voluntary the 
 accused was, at the time he made it, embarrassed by the present 
 rigors of his arrest and confinement in prison and menaced with 
 the fear of death or a term of imprisonment in the future. Such 
 
 Ga. 199; State v. Beaudet, 53 Conn, testimony of the injured person, in 
 536, 540, 4 Atl. 2Z7, 55 Am. 155; case he shall testify as a witness, un- 
 Smith V. State, 9 Ala. 990; West v. less they form a part of the res 
 State, "](> Ala. 98, 99; State v. Gee, 92 gcsta of some relevant act. Williams 
 N. Car. 756, 760; People v. Gillespie, v. State, 52 Ala. 411; State v. Mai- 
 iiT Mich. 241, 69 N. W. 490. Defend- tremme, 14 La. Ann. 830; Common- 
 ant will not be permitted to show wealth v. Densmore, 12 Allen 
 that a third person whose connection (Mass.) 535; People v. McLaughlin, 
 with the crime does not appear fled 44 Cal. 435. 
 
 on the night it was committed. Ow- " People v. Borgetto, 99 Mich. 336, 
 
 ensby v. State, 82 Ala. 6z, 64, 2 So. 58 N. W. 328. See, also, Common- 
 
 764. wealth V. Shaffer, 178 Pa. 409, 35 Atl. 
 
 ^ Pace V. State (Te.x-., 1893), 20 S. 924; People v. Bennett, 2>7 N. Y. 117, 
 
 W. 762. The admissions and decla- 93 Am. Dec. 551; Mercer v. State, 17 
 
 rations of a person who has been in- Ga. 146; Lipsey v. People, 227 III. 
 
 jured by the accused in the perpetra- 364, 81 N. E. 348. Admissibility of 
 
 tion of the crime, either in person confessions, see note. 6 .\\\\. St. 242, 
 
 or property, are not competent cvi- 243 ; against whom admissible, 6 Am. 
 
 dencc in favor of the accused, except St. 251. 
 for the purpose of impeaching the
 
 146 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 278 
 
 circumstances are not in general conducive to the calmness and 
 deliberation which are necessary to secure a truthful and accurate 
 narrative of past events of a stirring- nature in which the speaker 
 was the principal actor and participant.'^''' 
 
 From the moment of his arrest an accused person is surrounded 
 by shrewd and experienced police officials, whose daily business 
 it is to deal with hardened criminals, and whose interest it is, not 
 to secure the acquittal of the innocent, but to bring the guilty to 
 justice. The fact that a person under arrest is subsequently proved 
 to be innocent of the crime charged, is often regarded as showing 
 a lack of judgment or experience on the part of the officials caus- 
 ing or procuring his arrest. Hence it commonly happens that 
 detectives, policemen and others entrusted with the detection and 
 apprehension of criminals assume that every one who is placed 
 under arrest is guilty of the crime charged. Such a mental atti- 
 tude often leads to a wilful, and sometimes even to an unconscious 
 and involuntary suppression, of those facts which indicate that the 
 prisoner is innocent, and to an exaggeration of those which point 
 to guilt.^^ 
 
 ^Xobles V. State, 98 Ga. 73, 26 S. 
 E. 64. In Commonwealth v. Tucker- 
 man, 10 Gra}^ (Mass.) 173, 190, the 
 court said : "It is not because of any 
 breach of good faith in admitting 
 them, nor because they are extorted 
 illegally, but the reason is that in the 
 agitation of mind in which the party 
 charged is supposed to be, he is liable 
 to be influenced by the hope of ad- 
 vantage, or fear of injury, to state 
 things which are not true. The in- 
 fluence which is to exclude the par- 
 ty's confession must be external in- 
 fluence, and not the mere operation 
 of his own mind." Graham v. State, 
 118 Ga. 807, 45 S. E. 616; State v. 
 Adams (Del.), 65 Atl. 510. 
 
 " Priest V. State, 10 Xeb. 393, 400, 
 2 X. W. 468, I Green, on Ev., § 219. 
 "It is a rule of law that the con- 
 fessions of parties charged with 
 crime should be acted upon by courts 
 
 and juries with great caution. * * * 
 The wisdom of this rule cannot be 
 questioned, for the reason that not- 
 withstanding the confessions of per- 
 sons accused of crime have been held 
 to be evidence of the very highest 
 character, upon the theory that no 
 man would acknowledge that he had 
 committed a grave crime unless he 
 was actually guilty, but experience 
 teaches that this theory is a fallacy, 
 for it is a fact that numbers of per- 
 sons have confessed that the}^ were 
 guilt}- of the most heinous crimes, 
 for which they suffered the most hor- 
 rible punishments and yet they were 
 innocent. In the sixteenth and sev- 
 enteenth centuries, in enlightened 
 England, men and women confessed 
 that they were guilty of witchcraft — 
 communion with evil spirits and suf- 
 fered at the stake therefore, and at 
 this day men through fear of per-
 
 279 
 
 CONFESSIONS. 
 
 147 
 
 So, too, the accused may confess that he is guilty in order to 
 divert suspicion from another, or to enable some other person to 
 escape, and when he is himself placed on trial repudiate all he 
 has said, and conclusively prove his innocence by unimpeachable 
 evidence. A confession made to free another from suspicion or 
 arrest is not, for that reason, inadmissible, particularly where the 
 suspected person testifies that the accused substantially acknowl- 
 edged the facts confessed in his hearing.^^ Such cases are, how- 
 ever, admittedly rare, and can hardly, with justice, be invoked 
 to impeach confessions made under ordinary circumstances ren- 
 dering them admissible. 
 
 § 147. Corroboration of extra-judicial confessions. — A naked con- 
 fession is one which is not corroborated by independent proof of 
 the corpus delicti. Upon such a confession made in open court, 
 as, for example, by a plea of guilty, a conviction of any crime, 
 and sentence may be had. But in the case of all extra-judicial 
 confessions it is the rule that the corpus delicti must be proved 
 by additional evidence before a conviction upon the naked confes- 
 sion alone will be upheld. ^'^ 
 
 sonal punishment, or through hope of 
 averting such punishment, confess 
 that they are guilty of crime, without 
 the slightest foundation in truth for 
 such confession, and for these rea- 
 sons we say, that the theory that men 
 will not confess to the commission of 
 crimes of which they are innocent, is 
 a fallacy." Coffee v. State, 25 Fla. 
 501, 512, 6 So. 493, 23 Am. St. 525. 
 
 ^'People V. Smalling, 94 Cal. 112, 
 29 Pac. 421 ; State v. Grant, 22 ]\Ie. 
 
 171, 174- 
 
 '"Harden v. State, 109 Ala. 50, 19 
 So. 494; Bartley v. People, 156 111. 
 234, 40 X. E. 831 ; People v. Simonsen, 
 107 Cal. 345, 40 Pac. 440; Attaway 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 403, 34 S. 
 W. 112; People V. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 
 57. 46 Pac. 896; Laughlin v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 37 S. W. 590. 18 
 Ky. L. 640; Pitts V. State, 43 Miss. 
 
 472, 480; Bergen v. People, 17 111. 
 426, 65 Am. Dec. 672n ; South v. Peo- 
 ple, 98 111. 261 ; State v. Laliyer, 4 
 Minn. 368; Johnson v. State, 59 Ala. 
 37 ; State v. Keeler, 28 Iowa 551 ; 
 Stringfellow v. State, 26 Miss. 157, 
 165 ; Priest v. State, 10 Neb. 393, 399, 
 6 N. W. 468; People v. Deacons, 109 
 N. Y. 374, 16 N. E. 676, IS N. Y. St. 
 526, 28 Wkly. Dig. 545; Holland v. 
 State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298; Davis 
 V. State, 51 Neb. 30T, 70 N. W. 984; 
 Willard v. State, 27 Tex. App. 386, 
 II S. W. 453, II Am. St. 197; People 
 V. Lane, 49 Mich. 340, 13 N. W. 622; 
 People V. Ranney, 153 Mich. 293, 116 
 N. W. 999, 15 Det. Leg. N. 442; State 
 V. Abrams, 131 Iowa 479, T08 N. W. 
 1041 ; State v. Banusik (N. J.), 64 
 Atl. 994; Allen v. State, 4 Ga. App. 
 458, 6t S. E. 840: Jones v. State, 2 
 Ga. App. 433, 58 S. E. 559; Smith v.
 
 § 147 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 280 
 
 There have been, however, some apparent exceptions to this 
 general rule. They are early cases and most of them were decided 
 in England where the probative value of extra-judicial confes- 
 sions was particularly during the latter part of the eighteenth and 
 the early part of the nineteenth century regarded with very much 
 greater favor than it is at the present time, in either England or 
 America. So. also, the American cases sustaining the excep- 
 tions are all early cases and have been either expressly or by im- 
 plication overruled in the more recent decisions."** 
 
 The corroborative evidence must, independently of the con- 
 fession, prove or tend to prove that a crime has been committed 
 and that the accused committed it or was connected with it."^ The 
 corpus delicti need not be proved beyond all reasonable doubt 
 independently of the confession itself.**- 
 
 State, 125 Ga. 296, 54 S. E. 127; 
 Owen V. State, 119 Ga. 304, 46 S. E. 
 433; Bines v. State, 118 Ga. 320, 45 
 S. E. 27(>, 68 L. R. A. 33n; Marshall 
 V. State, 84 Ark. 88, 104 S. W. 934; 
 Ex parte Patterson, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 271, 95 S. W. 1061 ; People v. Brasch, 
 193 N. Y. 46, 85 N. E. 809; Wilson 
 V. State (Ga.), 64 S. E. 112; Boyd v. 
 State, 4 Ga. App. 58, 60 S. E. 8ot ; 
 Burk V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 185, 
 95 S. W. 1064; Rucker v. State, 2 
 Ga. App. 140, 58 S. E. 295 ; State v. 
 Rogoway, 45 Ore. 6or, 78 Pac. 987; 
 Williams v. State, 125 Ga. 741, 54 S. 
 E. 661 ; State v. Knowles, 185 Mo. 
 14T, 83 S. W. 1083 ; Green v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 83 S. W. 638, 26 
 Ky. L. 1221 ; Holland v. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.), 82 S. W. 596, 26 Ky. 
 L. 790; People V. Fallon, 149 Cal. 
 287, 86 Pac. 689: People v. Eldridge, 
 3 Cal. App. 648, 86 Pac. 832: State 
 V. Marselle, 43 Wash. 273, 86 Pac. 
 586; Griffiths V. State. 163 Ind. 555, 
 72 N. E. 563; McAllister v. State, 2 
 Ga. App. 654, 656, 58 S. E. IT to; 
 United States v. Boese, 46 Fed. 917, 
 
 919. Evidence of the finding of a 
 body showing marks of violence suf- 
 ficient to cause death, and of weap- 
 ons or articles stained with blood 
 near it, sufficiently proves that a mur- 
 der has been committed to sustain a 
 conviction based on an extra-judicial 
 confession. Paul v. State, 65 Ga. 
 TS2, 155; People v. Deacons, T09 N. 
 Y. 374, 378, 16 K. E. 676, 15 N. Y. St. 
 526, 28 Wkly. Dig. 545. 
 
 •^ White V. State, 49 Ala. 344; Ste- 
 phen V. State, II Ga. 225; State v. 
 Cowan, 7 Ired. (X. Car.) 239; Rex 
 V. Tippet, R. & R. 509; Reg. v. Un- 
 kles, Ir. R. 8 C. L. 50. 
 
 ** State V. Jacobs, 21 R. I. 259. 43 
 Atl. 31 ; People v. Ranney, 153 Mich. 
 293, 116 N. W. 999, 15 Detroit Leg. 
 N. 442; Commonwealth v. Killion, 
 194 Mass. 153, 80 N. E. 222. 
 
 "People V. Jones, 123 Cal. 65, 55 
 Pac. 698; People v. Harris, IT4 Cal. 
 575, 46 Pac. 602: Gantling v. State, 
 41 Fla. 587, 26 So. 737; Sanders v. 
 State, 118 Ga. 329, 45 S. E. 365; State 
 V. Coats. 174 Mo. 396, 74 S. W. 864; 
 People V. Fanning, 131 N. Y. 659, 30
 
 28 1 CONFESSIONS. § 147a 
 
 The meaning of this is that the evidence offered in corrobora- 
 tion need not be sufficient alone, aside from the confession to 
 convince the jury of the guilt of the accused beyond all reason- 
 able doubt, but if the evidence of the corpus delicti considered 
 with the confession of the accused, the jury believe beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt that the prisoner is guilty a conviction will be sus- 
 tained.*^^ 
 
 § 147a. Credibility of confession and use of in favor of the accused. 
 
 — The witness called to prove an oral confession need not repeat 
 the exact words of the accused.'''* But it is absolutely essential 
 that he should remember the substance of what was said in the 
 conversation*^^ and be able to state it accurately. And unless it 
 shall affirmatively appear that the witness thoroughly understood 
 the language in which the prisoner spoke. '^*' the confession should 
 be rejected. 
 
 The burden of proving that the language of the accused was 
 properly interpreted in the case of an alleged confession by one 
 who speaks no English is upon the prosecution. If the confes- 
 sion is taken down in the English language, reading it and re- 
 interpreting it back to the prisoner added to the oath of the in- 
 terpreter as to the correctness of his interpretation, are usually 
 sufficient."' 
 
 The interpreter need not be chosen by the accused. He may 
 be a person chosen by the prosecuting attorney and his evidence 
 is not hearsay but is competent, provided he will swear that he 
 correctly interpreted the questions and answers.*'- 
 
 The confession may be given in evidence for the accused as 
 
 N. E. 569, 8 N. Y. Cr. 363, 43 N. Y. '" Berry v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush 
 
 St. 771; State V. Jacobs, 21 R. I. 259, (Ky.) 15; Kendall v. State, 65 Ala. 
 
 43 Atl. 31. 492. 
 
 " Davis V. State, 141 Ala. 62, 37 "" State v. Buster, 23 Xev. 346. 47 
 
 So. 676; Flower v. United States, 116 Pac. 194; People v. Gelabert, 39 Cal. 
 
 Fed. 241. 53 C. C. A. 271 ; State v. 663, 665. Cf. People v. Thorns, 3 
 
 Knapp, 70 Ohio St. 380, 71 N. E. 705. Park. Cr. (\. Y.) 256. 
 
 "State V. Berberick (Mont.), 100 "State v. Banusik (K. J.), 64 .Atl. 
 
 Pac. 209; State v. Desroches, 48 La. 994. 
 
 Ann. 428, jg So. 250; State' v. Avery, '"People v. Randazzio, 194 N. Y. 
 
 31 La. Ann. 181. 147. 87 N. E. 112.
 
 ^ 147a 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 282 
 
 well as against him."" The whole of what was said should be put 
 in evidence by the prosecuting officer, and if he shall refuse or 
 neglect to do so. the accused has the right to prove the part 
 omitted which may be favorable to him,'^" and the confession may 
 be partly or wholly rejected by the jury if it is not believed by 
 them.'^ 
 
 The jury are bound to consider the confession in the light of 
 all the circumstances of the case. They should not separate it 
 from the other evidence and determine its credibility indepen- 
 dently of all the other evidence. They must consider it in con- 
 nection with all the facts of the case, and having done this, they 
 may believe such parts of it as they find sufficiently corroborated 
 
 '" Conner v. State, 34 Tex. 659, 662 ; 
 Rex V. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221, 223, 
 226. 
 
 ™ People V. Gelabert, 39 Cal. 663, 
 665; Conner v. State, 34 Tex. 659, 
 666; Griswold v. State, 24 Wis. 144, 
 148; Crawford v. State, 4 Coldw. 
 (Tenn.) 190, 192; State v. Worthing- 
 ton, 64 N. Car. 594, 596; State v. 
 Hollenscheit, 61 Mo. 302; Dodson v. 
 State, 86 Ala. 60, 63, 5 So. 485; Com- 
 monwealth V. Keyes, 11 Gray (Mass.) 
 323; State V. Green, 48 S. Car, 136, 
 26 S. E. 234; State v. Busse (Iowa), 
 100 N. W. 536; Frazier v. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.), 114 S. W. 268; Mad- 
 dox V. State (Ala.), 48 So. 689. 
 "There is no doubt that if a prose- 
 cutor uses the declaration of a pris- 
 oner he must take the whole of it to- 
 gether, and cannot select one part 
 and leave another; and if there be 
 either no other evidence in the case, 
 or no other evidence incompatible 
 with it. the declaration taken in evi- 
 dence must be admitted as true. But 
 if, after the whole of the statement 
 of the prisoner is given in evidence, 
 the prosecutor is in a position to con- 
 tradict any part of it, he is at liberty 
 
 to do so, and then the statement of 
 the prisoner and the whole of the 
 other evidence must be left to the 
 jury for their consideration, precisely 
 as in any other case where one part 
 of the evidence is contradictory of 
 another." The court, in Rex v. Jones, 
 2 C. & P. 629. 
 
 " Rex v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221, 225; 
 Furst v. State, 31 Neb. 403, 409, 47 
 N. W. "1116; People v. Taylor, 93 
 Mich. 638, 641, S3 N. W. 777; Gris- 
 wold V. State, 24 Wis. 144, 148 ; Han- 
 rahan v. People, 91 111. 142, 147; Long 
 V. State, 86 Ala. 36, 37, 5 So. 443; 
 Johnson v. State (Ga., 1890), 12 S. 
 E. 471 ; People v. Cassidy, 133 N. Y. 
 612, 30 N. E. 1003, 44 N. Y. St. 869; 
 Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St. 146; 
 Commonwealth v. Brown, 149 Mass. 
 35, 38, 20 N. E. 458; Hauk v. State, 
 148 Ind. 238, 46 N. E. 127, 47 N. E. 
 465; State V. Brinte, 4 Pen. (Del.) 
 551, 58 Atl. 258; State V. Blodgett. 50 
 Ore. 329, 92 Pac. 820; State v. LuSing, 
 34 Mont. 31, 85 Pac. 521 ; State v. 
 Tilghman (Del.), 63 Atl. 772; Brewer 
 V. State, 72 Ark. 145, 78 S. W. 77.3; 
 Nicks V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. App. i, 
 48 S. W. 186.
 
 283 CONFESSIONS. § 147a 
 
 and reject the rest; but, of course, they should not, in accepting 
 or rejecting the confession, act arbitrarily or without reasons- 
 All that the accused said constituting the confession, whether 
 favorable to him or not, ought to be received in its entirety. To 
 allow the introduction of fragments of a conversation, admitting 
 those indicative of the prisoner's criminality and suppressing 
 others which, by limiting or modifying the former, may establish 
 his innocence, is utterly inconsistent with all principles of justice 
 and humanity." 
 
 '■ Gantling v. State, 40 Fla. 237, 23 an answer is not inadmissible as an 
 
 So. 857; Zuckerman v. People, 213 opinion. State v. Williamson, 106 
 
 111. 114, ^2 N. E. 741. Mo. 162, 171, 17 S. W. 172. See, as 
 
 ^^A witness called to identify a sustaining text, People v. Gelabert, 39 
 written confession, on being asked if Cal. 663 ; McCann v. State, 13 Sm. & 
 the accused said anything further, M. (Miss.) 471; Brown v. Common- 
 may state that the writing contains wealth, 9 Leigh. (Va.) 633, ZZ Am. 
 the substance of what was said. Such Dec. 263.
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 ALIBI. 
 
 § 148. Definition and character of § 151. Impeaching the alibi — Defend- 
 alibi — Burden of proof. ant's declarations. 
 
 149. Distance and period of absence. 152. Reasonable doubt. 
 
 150. Relevancy of evidence. 153. Cautioning the jury as to evi- 
 
 dence of alibi. 
 
 § 148. Definition and character of alibi — Burden of proof. — The 
 plea of an alibi is a plea of not guilty, because at the instant of 
 the crime the accused was "elsewhere" than where it was com- 
 mitted. In theory this plea may be viewed from two standpoints. 
 First, it may be regarded as a traverse of the crime alleged rais- 
 ing a clear and direct issue of the defendant's guilt on the whole 
 case in the same manner as any defense involving the assertion 
 of an independent and distinct fact, as, for example, the plea 
 of insanity, or that the supposed victim of a homicide is alive. 
 Or, it may be regarded solely as traversing a single element in 
 the criminal charge against the accused, i. e., his presence at the 
 •place and time of the offense.^ 
 
 The majority of the cases, adopting the former view, maintain 
 that the burden of proving the alibi is upon the defendant, in ac- 
 cordance with the rule that the burden of proof is always upon 
 the party asserting an affirmative fact, or one peculiarly within 
 his own knowledge. Until the state offers rebutting evidence to 
 overcome the alibi, the only evidence before the jury to counter- 
 balance defendant's evidence is the incidental proof of time and 
 place contained in the prima facie case of the state. But suppose 
 all the evidence offered by the state showing the presence of the 
 accused, while insufficient to convince the jury of that fact beyond 
 a reasonable doubt, preponderates over the evidence of the de- 
 
 ' Under some' circumstances the on the question of his identity. For 
 proof that the accused was elsewhere evidence of identification, see supra, 
 than the place of the crime must turn §§ 53-56. 
 
 284
 
 285 
 
 ALIBI. 
 
 § 148 
 
 fendant on that point? Must he lose the benefit of this evidence 
 in disproving his guilt because on one particular point it is out- 
 weighed ? The jnry have no right to disregard any evidence un- 
 less after due consideration they totally disbelieve it. They may 
 and should consider defendant's evidence of an alibi in connection 
 with all the evidence in the case ; and the general rule still holds 
 good that the state is required to convince them of his guilty par- 
 ticipation in the crime, time and place being- essential ingredients 
 in this participation, beyond a reasonable doubt upon all the evi- 
 dence." 
 
 If the alibi be regarded solely as a denial of a single necessary 
 element in the charge, it seems as illogical in such case to place 
 the burden of proof on the accused as it would be to require him 
 to prove the absence of a criminal intent. Time and place are 
 essential elements of a crime. ^ The state must prove them prima 
 
 • State V. Conwaj', 56 Kan. 682, 44 
 Pac. 627; State v. Harvey, 131 Mo. 
 339, 2>^ S. W. 1 1 10; State V. Lowry, 
 42 W. Va. 205, 24 S. E. 561 ; People 
 V. Pichette, in AUch. 461, 69 N. W. 
 739; Borrego v. Territory, 8 N. Mex. 
 446, 46 Pac. 349 ; Carlton v. People, 
 150 111. 181, 2,7 ^^- E. 244, 41 Am. St. 
 346; Ackerson v. People, 124 111. 563, 
 571, 16 N. E. 847, 849; Watson v. 
 Commonwealth, 95 Pa. St. 418, 422; 
 Ware v. State, 59 Ark. 379, 392, 27 
 S. W. 485 ; Harrison v. State, 83 Ga. 
 129, 134, 9 S. E. 542; Walters v. 
 State, 39 Ohio St. 215, 217; Chappel 
 V. State, 7 Coldw. fTenn.) 92; State 
 V. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 192, 17 Atl. 483; 
 Beavers v. State, 103 Ala. 36, 15 So. 
 616; Parham v. State, 147 Ala. S7, 4~ 
 So. I ; Bennett v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 34T, 17 S. W. 545: State v. Chee 
 Gong, t6 Ore. 534, 538, 19 Pac. 607. 
 In Watson v. Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 
 St. 418, 422, the court says: ".An alibi 
 is as much a traverse of the crime 
 charged as any other defense, and 
 proof tending to establish it, though 
 not clear, may, with other facts of 
 
 the case, raise a reasonable doubt of 
 the guilt of the accused. When the 
 evidence is so imperfect as not to sat- 
 isfy the jury they will not find the 
 fact. Where the commonwealth rests 
 upon positive and undoubted proof of 
 the prisoner's guilt, it should not be 
 overcome by less than full, clear and 
 satisfactory evidence of the alleged 
 alibi. But the evidence tending to es- 
 tablish an alibi, though not of itself 
 sufficient to work an acquittal, shall 
 not be excluded from the case, for 
 the burden of proof never shifts, but 
 rests upon the commonwealth 
 throtighout, upon all the evidence 
 given in the cause, taken together, to 
 convince the jury, beyond a reason- 
 able doubt, of the prisoner's guilt." 
 Notes on proof and burden of proof 
 of alibi, 4T L. R. A. S30-541, 68 L. R. 
 A. 222. 
 
 ' The prosecution may always with 
 propriety prove that the accused was 
 near the scene of the crime about the 
 time it was committed though he does 
 not allege an alibi. State v. Mahcr, 
 74 Iowa 77, 2>7 ^- W. 2; Linsday v.
 
 § 149 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 286 
 
 facie, at least and may do so inferentially, that is by circumstan- 
 tial evidence, as it may prove the intent. If no alibi is alleged, 
 the burden of proof, under a plea of not guilty, to show the place 
 of the crime is on the state, but is sufficiently sustained by its 
 prima facie case. The issue of the defendant's guilt then turns 
 upon other essentials, and the necessity for evidence directly ap- 
 plicable to the issue of place does not arise. 
 
 § 149. Distance and period of absence. — The accused is not con- 
 fined in his evidence to proving that he was elsewhere at the 
 instant of the offense or during the whole of it, if it is a lengthy 
 transaction. The important and necessary facts to be considered 
 in alibi evidence and which the accused may prove are the distance 
 between the scene of the crime and the prisoner's whereabouts; 
 the time of the crime, as compared with that of the alibi, allowing 
 for differences in time-pieces, and in opinions respecting time; 
 and the available means and celerity of travel.* The farther away 
 the accused was the more doubtful is his guilt, until mere distance 
 becomes conclusive if it be so great as to render his participation 
 impossible. If he could have participated, though he were remote, 
 distance, though relatively great, is not conclusive, but time and 
 means of travel must also be considered.^ The evidence of the 
 alibi may fairly be required to cover the whole time of the criminal 
 transaction in question, and it has been held also but by a minority 
 of the cases that the accused may be required to show his where- 
 abouts during such a period as will, by its length, convince the 
 jury that it w^as absolutely impossible for him to have been on the 
 scene of the crime when it was committed.*' This seems almost 
 
 People, 63 N. Y. 143 ; Angley v. State, State, 94 Ala. 76, 10 So. 426 ; Wil- 
 
 35 Tex. Cr. App. 427, 34 S. W. 116. liams v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. App. 375, 
 
 * Klein v. People, 113 111. 596, 599- iii S. W. 729; Kinnemer v. State, 66 
 
 602. Note on time covered by proof, Ark. 206, 49 S. W. 815 ; Fortson v. 
 
 see 41 L. R. A. 541. State, 125 Ga. 16, 53 S. E. 767; How- 
 
 ° State V. Fenlason, 78 Ale. 495, 502, ard v. State, 50 Ind. 190. Where de- 
 
 7 Atl. 385. fendant was charged with burning 
 
 ^ Beavers v. State, 103 Ala. 36, 15 hay stacks which were some distance 
 
 So. 616; Wisdom v. People, 11 Colo, apart, the evidence should cover the 
 
 I70> 175. 17 Pac. 519; Briceland v. whole time, so as to render it very 
 
 Commonwealth, 74 Pa. St. 463, 469; improbable that the defendant could 
 
 Ware v. State, 67 Ga. 349; Miller v. have burned them. Creed v. People, 
 
 People, 39 111. 457, 464; Albritton v. 81 111. 565.
 
 287 
 
 ALIBI. 
 
 149 
 
 equivalent to requiring him to prove his innocence beyond a 
 reasonable doubt. Hence it is generally sufficient if the evidence, 
 though not absolutely covering the whole time of the transaction,' 
 shall tend fairly to show that he was elsewhere at the moment of 
 the crime, and that he remained there such a period of time as will 
 reasonably exclude the probability that he was in the place of the 
 crime when it was committed.® The length of the period is for 
 the jury to determine upon the facts, including the distance and 
 the time and the customary mode of travel.^ If the time necessary 
 to go from the place of the alibi to the place of the crime is in 
 issue, a witness, who has traveled from the one place to the other, 
 may state the time occupied and at what gait he walked." Dis- 
 similarity of conditions and modes of travel may affect the weight, 
 but they cannot the competency of such evidence.^^ If the precise 
 time a train left a certain place on a certain date is material on the 
 question of alibi the evidence of the railroad officials that the 
 
 ^ An instruction "that to render an 
 alibi satisfactory the evidence must 
 cover the whole of the time of the 
 transaction in question" was held 
 proper in Barr v. People, 30 Colo. 
 522, 71 Pac. 392. What the "trans- 
 action" is, of course, depends on the 
 facts of each case. Hence the period 
 to be covered by the alibi will be 
 more or less elastic, as the court ex- 
 pands or contracts the time limits of 
 the transaction. 
 
 * Where an alibi depends upon the 
 agreement of time-pieces, a disagree- 
 ment of a few minutes being vital, a 
 disagreement may be presumed, rath- 
 er than to assume that the witnesses 
 on either side testified falsely. Painter 
 v. People, 147 111. 444, 35 N. E. 64. 
 The accused, it has been held, must 
 show that he was present at some 
 other place before the time of the al- 
 leged crime for such a length of time 
 that it was impossible for him to have 
 been at the place where the crime was 
 committed, either before or after the 
 
 time he was at such other place. 
 Mays V. State, 72 Neb. 723, loi N. W. 
 979- 
 
 " People V. Worden, 113 Cal. 569, 45 
 Pac. 844; State v. Fenlason, 78 Me. 
 495, 502, 7 Atl. 38s ; lohnson v. State, 
 59 Ga. 142, 144; Pollard v. State, 53 
 Miss. 410, 24 Am. 703 ; Stuart v. Peo- 
 ple, 42 Mich. 255, 261, 3 N. W. 863; 
 State V. Maher, 74 Iowa "jy, 2i7 N. W. 
 2 ; West V. State, 48 Ind. 483, 485 ; Al- 
 britton v. State, 94 Ala. '/t, 79, 10 So. 
 426; State V. Powers, 130 Mo. 475, 32 
 S. W. 984. It is not absolutely essen- 
 tial that the evidence of the alibi 
 should cover the whole time of the 
 transaction, though it may be proper- 
 ly regarded with suspicion, if it does 
 not. State v. Jayncs, 78 N. Car. 504, 
 506; Henry v. State, 51 Neb. 149, 70 
 N. W. 924, (i6 Am. St. 450. 
 
 '"People v. Kelly, 35 Hun (N. Y.) 
 295. .305; State V. Flint, 60 Vt. 304, 14 
 Atl. T78. 
 
 " State V. Flint, 60 Vt. 304, 317, 14 
 Atl. 178.
 
 §150 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 288 
 
 company's rules do not permit trains to arrive before their sched- 
 ule time is inadmissible as hearsay.^- 
 
 § 150. Relevancy of evidence. — The accused may prove he con- 
 versed with persons who were at the place where he claims to have 
 been, and he may give a general outline of what was said. But he 
 cannot give all the details of what was said on a pretext that he 
 can thereby show how much time was occupied in the conversation 
 as measuring the period of the alibi. ^^ Evidence that residents of 
 the town, where the defendant is alleged to have been, asserted 
 from the time of his arrest that he was there at the date of the 
 crime is inadmissible as hearsay,^* nor can he show that he was 
 in the habit of frequenting the locality of the alibi. ^'^ A witness 
 called to prove an alibi may be asked when his attention was called 
 to the charge against the accused, and what was the date of the 
 crime. He cannot, however, be asked, to impeach him, what he 
 did to inform the prosecuting attorney of the whereabouts of the 
 accused. ^'^ Evidence that the accused could not have left the house 
 where he was sleeping on the night of the crime without arousing 
 the inmates with evidence that no one was aroused is competent 
 under a plea of alibi. ^' 
 
 § 151. Impeaching' the alibi — Defendant's declarations. — The ac- 
 cused may be asked whom or what he saw while in the place he 
 swears he was. and the state may then show, to impeach him, by 
 witnesses who were present, what persons or things were actually 
 to be seen there.^* The state may also show where the accused 
 
 '■ People V. Mitchell, 94 Cal. 550, " State v. Delaney, 92 Iowa 467, 61 
 
 554, 29 Pac. 1 106. N. W. 189. 
 
 "State V. Bedard, 65 Vt. 278, 284, "People v. Gibson, 58 Mich. 368, 
 
 26 Atl. 719, 721 ; People v. Hare, 57 371, 25 N. W. 316. If the description 
 
 ?klich. 505, 24 N. W. 843 ; Elliott Ev., of other witnesses agreed with de- 
 
 § 2726; note on measure of proof, 41 fendant's, it would certainly do him 
 
 L. R. A. 537. no harm; if it disagreed radically, it 
 
 " Schuster v. State, 80 Wis. 107, would be proper for the jury to con- 
 
 118, 49 N. W. 30. sider it as a circumstance bearing up- 
 
 ^' State V. Wilkins, 66 Vt. i, 28 Atl. on the question whether he saw it as 
 
 323. he had testified. See, also, People v. 
 
 '" Schuster v. State, 80 Wis. 107, La IMtmion,. 64 Mich. 709, 31 N. W. 
 
 ro8, 49 N. W. 30. 593. See, also. People v. Zimmerman, 
 
 3 Cal. App. 84, 84 Pac. 446.
 
 289 ALIBI. §§ 1 51-152 
 
 has testified that he was not in the city where the crime was 
 committed during a long period that certain witnesses had seen 
 him there at dates near the date of the crime/^ It may always be 
 shown that the accused was at or near the scene of the crime. This 
 evidence must come from some one who saw him there. Hearsay 
 evidence that on the day of the crime the accused had been seen 
 in the locality where it was committed is not admissible.^" Any 
 witness who testifies that he saw the accused in the neighborhood 
 of the crime within such a period thereafter as would indicate that 
 he participated in it should be permitted to testify to his conduct, 
 language or appearance as indicating that he did or did not par- 
 ticipate in the crime. A witness who immediately after a man was 
 shot saw the accused running toward the place of the crime should 
 be permitted to state that he seemed excited, was running or walk- 
 ing fast and that he panted for breath."^ Nor are self-serving 
 declarations of the accused not a part of the res gcstcc, received 
 to prove an alibi. The danger of permitting the accused thus to 
 fabricate evidence for himself is clear. Hence, his statements as 
 to his whereabouts made on returning to his home after an ab- 
 sence covering the date of the crime are inadmissible."' Nor can 
 the accused prove that about six hours before the crime he invited 
 another person to spend the night with him at his home about 
 three miles from the locus in quo.~^ 
 
 § 152. Reasonable doubt. — The cases generally hold that the ac- 
 cused need not. in order that his evidence of an alibi may be by the 
 jury considered sufficient to acquit him, establish it by a prepon- 
 derance of the evidence.-* But the alibi must be sustained by 
 
 " People V. Pembroke, 6 Cal. App. is offered to prove something ante- 
 
 588, 92 Pac. 668. cedent to the return in no manner 
 
 ^^ Commonweahh v. Ricker, 131 pertaining to the character, motive or 
 
 Mass. 581, 583. In this case a police object of it. 
 
 sergeant was permitted to testify that ^ Sasser v. State, 129 Ga. 541, 59 
 
 a police officer reported to him that S. E. 255. 
 
 he had seen defendant in a certain ''* State v. Rivers, 68 Iowa 611, 616, 
 
 place on a given date. Held error. 27 N. W. 781 ; State v. Rowland, 72 
 
 "State V. Matthews, 119 La. 665, Iowa ^27, 328, 33 N. W. 137; State 
 
 44 So. 336. V. Howell, 100 Mo. 628, 664, 14 S. W. 
 
 " State V. McCrackcn, 66 Iowa 569, 4 ; People v. Lee Sare Bo, 72 Cal. 623. 
 
 573. 24 X. W. 43. The declaration is 629, 14 Pac. 310: Walters v. State. .39 
 
 a mere narration of a past event. It Ohio St. 215, 217; Miles v. State, 93 
 19 — Unuerhill Cri.m. Ev.
 
 152 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 290 
 
 credible evidence which will reasonably satisfy the jury of the 
 truth of this defense."'^ What evidence will be reasonably satis- 
 factory depends wholly upon the circumstances of each case as 
 disclosed by all the evidence, the jury being the sole judges of its 
 weight and sufficiency. If it clearly and cogently appears from 
 the evidence offered by the prosecution that the accused was pres- 
 ent at the crime, proof of an alibi ought to be equally clear, cogent 
 and convincing.^" But the evidence of the alibi, even though not 
 clear, may, with other facts, raise enough doubt of guilt to acquit. 
 A reasonable doubt that the accused was present at the time and 
 place of the crime is a reasonable doubt of his guilt.-^ Hence, to 
 require the fact of his absence to be fully established and found 
 as a fact by the jury is to disregard all evidence falling short of 
 full proof and to require him to prove the alibi beyond a reason- 
 able doubt. This is certainly not the law.'*' If the accused suc- 
 ceeds by his evidence of an alibi in connection with all the evidence 
 in raising a reasonable doubt that he was present he should be 
 acquitted. ^^ 
 
 Ga. 117, 19 S. E. 805, 44 Am. St. 140; 
 State V. Child, 40 Kan. 482, 485, 20 
 Pac. 275. Contra, State v. Ward, 61 
 Vt. 153, 192, 17 Atl. 483; State v. 
 Fenlason, 78 Me. 495, 502, 7 Atl. 385 ; 
 State V. Hamilton, 57 Iowa 596, 598, 
 II N. W. 5; Glover v. United States, 
 147 Fed. 426, 77 C. C. A. 450. Ex- 
 haustive note on proof of reasonable 
 doubt, see 41 L. R. A. 530. 
 
 ■'Ackerson v. People, 124 111. 563, 
 16 N. E. 847; Watson v. Common- 
 wealth, 95 Pa. St. 418, 420, 422; Al- 
 britton v. State, 94 Ala. 76, 10 So. 
 426; Garrity v. People, 107 111. 162, 
 166; Ransom v. State, 2 Ga. App. 826, 
 59 S. E. loi ; State v. Davis, 6 Idaho 
 159, 53 P'ic. 678; Smith v. State (Tex. 
 Cr. App.), 78 S. W. 516. Contra, 
 Hoge V. People, 117 111. 35, 44, 6 N. 
 E. 796; State V. Hardin, 46 Iowa 623, 
 628, 26 Am. 174. 
 
 -"Klein v. People, 113 111. 596. 
 
 " See Harrison v. State, 83 Ga. 129, 
 
 135, 9 S. E. 542; People v. Fong Ah 
 Sing, 64 Cal. 253, 28 Pac. 233, 5 Cr. 
 L. Mag. 64. 
 
 "* People V. La Munion, 64 Mich. 
 709, 31 N. W. 593; Briceland v. Com- 
 monwealth, 74 Pa. St. 463; State v. 
 Jaynes, 78 N. Car. 504; Landis v. 
 State, 70 Ga. 651, 659, 660, 48 Am. 
 588; People V. Fong Ah Sing, 64 Cal. 
 253, 255, 28 Pac. 233, 5 Cr. L. Mag. 
 64; State V. Sanders, 106 Mo. 188, 
 195. 17 S. W. 223; State V. Woolard, 
 III Mo. 248, 256, 20 S. W. 27; State 
 V. Fenlason, 78 Me. 495, 502, 7 Atl. 
 385; State V. Howell, 100 Mo. 628, 14 
 S. W. 4; People V. Pearsall. 50 Mich. 
 233, 236, 15 N. W. 98; Miles V. State, 
 93 Ga. 117, 19 S. E. 805, 44 Am. St. 
 140; State V. Hardin, 46 Iowa 623, 
 628, 26 .A^m. 174; Hauser v. People, 
 2T0 Hi. 253, 71 N. E. 416; Jais v. Ter- 
 ritory (N. Mex., 1908) 94 Pac. 947. 
 
 -"Kaufman v. State, 49 Ind. 248; 
 Towns V. State, iii Ala. i, 20 So.
 
 291 
 
 ALIBI. 
 
 § 153 
 
 § 153. Cautioning the jury as to evidence of an alibi. — The de- 
 fense of an alibi, it cannot be denied is regarded with some sus- 
 
 598; People V. Resh, 107 Mich. 251, 65 
 N. W. 99; People v. Pichette, iii 
 Mich. 461, 69 N. W. 739; Ware v. 
 State, 59 Ark. 379, 392, 27 S. W. 485 ; 
 State V. Reed, 62 Iowa 40, 17 N. W. 
 150; State V. Fry, 67 Iowa 475, 478, 
 25 N. W. 738; Binns v. State, 46 Ind. 
 311, 312; Watson V. Commonwealth, 
 95 Pa. St. 418, 422; Klein v. People, 
 113 111. 596, 599, 602; Sheehan v. Peo- 
 ple, 131 111. 22, 22 N. E. 818; French 
 V. State, 12 Ind. 670, 674, 675, 74 Am. 
 Dec. 229; State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 
 192, 17 Atl. 483 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Choate, 105 Mass. 451 ; State v. Mc- 
 Cracken, 66 Iowa 569, 24 N. W. 43; 
 State V. Jennings, 81 Mo. 185, 51 Am. 
 236; Johnson v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 368, 381, 17 S. W. 252; State V. Reitz, 
 83 N. Car. 634, 635; People v. Pear- 
 sail, SO Mich. 233, 15 N. W. 98; Peo- 
 ple V. Fong Ah Sing, 64 Cal. 253, 255, 
 28 Pac. 233; Ware v. State, 67 Ga. 
 349; Garrity v. People, 107 111. 162, 
 167; Beavers v. State, 103 Ala. 36, 15 
 So. 616; Commonwealth v. Webster, 
 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 
 71 in; McLain v. State, 18 Neb. 154, 
 160, 24 X. W. 720; Ackerson v. Peo- 
 ple, 124 111. 563, 574, 16 N. E. 847. In 
 State V. Hamilton, 57 Iowa 596, 599, 
 II N^. W. 5, the court said, by Adams, 
 Ch. J., dissenting: "This court has 
 never undertaken to abrogate the rule 
 that a reasonable doubt of guilt justi- 
 fies an acquittal. It has, indeed, rec- 
 ognized this rule in the very cases re- 
 lied upon by the majority as holding 
 that when the defendant relies upon 
 proving an alibi he must prove it by 
 a preponderance of evidence. Both 
 rules cannot be correct, because they 
 arc inconsistent with each other. No 
 jury can follow both. Let us suppose 
 
 a case where the evidence of an alibi 
 does not preponderate, but does raise 
 a reasonable doubt of guilt. What 
 shall a jury do? If they follow the 
 instruction that the evidence of an 
 alibi must preponderate, they must 
 convict and disobey the instruction as 
 to reasonable doubt. On the other 
 hand, if they follow the instruction 
 as to reasonable doubt they must ac- 
 quit and disobey the instruction as to 
 the evidence of an alibi. I cannot re- 
 gard the rule adopted by the majority 
 as to evidence of an alibi as being 
 the established doctrine of this court, 
 so long as it is inconsistent with an- 
 other rule to which the court still ad- 
 heres. If the court adopts the rule in 
 question as to an alibi, then to be 
 consistent it should modify the rule 
 as to reasonable doubt. The rule as 
 modified would be as follows : A rea- 
 sonable doubt of guilt is sufficient to 
 justify an acquittal, unless it is raised 
 by evidence of an alibi, and if it is 
 then it is not sufficient." In State v. 
 Taylor, 134 Mo. 109, 35 S. W. 92, the 
 jury was correctly instructed that, al- 
 though the evidence of an alibi falls 
 short of the weight of moral certain- 
 ty, yet if it leaves in the minds of 
 the jury such a doubt or uncertainty 
 that, if taken by itself, they could not 
 find for or against an alibi, then the 
 jury must carry such doubt into the 
 case of the prosecution and array it 
 there as an element of reasonalile 
 doubt, beyond which the prosecution 
 must establish guilt, that the defend- 
 ant is entitled as much to the benefit 
 of such doubt as to any other doubt 
 raised by the evidence, and if its 
 weight alone, or with any other doubt, 
 be sufficient to raise a doubt of dc-
 
 § 153 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 2g2 
 
 picion by the courts. This suspicion is doubtless warranted by the 
 ease witli which evidence to support an ahbi can be manufactured. 
 In the case of a confirmed criminal who has had experience in 
 prior attempts to avoid the consecjuences of his criminal conduct : 
 and who possesses no appreciation of the sanctity of an oath, an 
 alibi offers a ready defense, particularly where the evidence 
 against him is wholly circumstantial so that he will be confronted 
 on his trial with no eye-witness- of his crime. If he has a reason- 
 able expectation that no one will testify that he was actually seen 
 to commit the crime, the temptation is almost irresistible to pro- 
 cure from persons of easy conscience testimony that at the time 
 the crime was committed, the accused was at some place at such 
 a distance from the place of the crime that he could not have com- 
 mitted it. 
 
 If the place chosen for the alibi is sufficiently removed from the 
 place of the crime; and if the prosecution has not been informed 
 as to the witnesses the accused will produce to prove his alibi, he 
 may reasonably expect that his testimony of an alibi will not be 
 directly controverted by the prosecution. It then remains for the 
 prosecution only to cross-examine the witnesses called to prove the 
 alibi and by this means to shake their testimony in the minds of 
 the jury. Nevertheless, these considerations are not sufficient as 
 matter of law to disparage the testimony of the defendant to his 
 alibi in the eyes of the jury. A charge which in substance dispar- 
 ages the testimony tending to support the alibi, or which casts any 
 suspicion upon an alibi, as a legitimate defense, is erroneous.^" 
 
 And it is an invasion of the province of the jury for the court 
 in its charge to instruct them that, as a rule of the criminal law, 
 the defense of alibi is open to great and manifest abuse, because 
 
 fendant's guilt, the jury must acquit, v. Pearsall, 50 Mich. 233, 15 N. W. 
 
 See, also, sustaining the text: Legere 98; State v. Crowell, 149 J\Io. 391. 50 
 
 V. State, iTi Tenn. 368, 77 S. W. 1059, S. W. 893, 73 Am. St. 402; People v. 
 
 102 Am. St. 781 ; State v. Thomas, Hare, 57 Mich. 505, 24 N. W. 843 ; 
 
 135 Iowa 717, 109 N. W. 900; Schultz People v. Kelly, 35 Hun (N. Y.) 295; 
 
 V. Territory, 5 Ariz. 239, 52 Pac. 352; People v. Lattimer, 86 Cal. 403, 405, 
 
 State V. MacQueen. 69 N. J. L. 522, 24 Pac. 1091 ; Albin v. State, 63 Ind. 
 
 55 Atl. 1006; State V. Gadsden, 70 598. 600: Sater v. State, 56 Ind. 378; 
 
 S. Car. 430, so S. E. 16. Albritton v. State, 94 Ala. 76, 79. 10 
 
 ^^ Prince v. State, 100 .A.la. 144, 14 So. 426 : State v. Chee Gong, 16 Ore. 
 
 So. 409, 410, 46 Am. St. 28; People 534, 538, 19 Pac. 607.
 
 293 ALIBI. ^ 153 
 
 of the comparative ease with which testimony in support of this 
 defense may be fabricated ; or that this defense is often resorted 
 to by those who are guilty; or that. perjury, mistake, contrivance 
 and deception are frequently employed and involved in support- 
 ing it.^^ 
 
 It is proper, however, to warn the jury in the charge or to in- 
 struct them that they should consider the evidence in support of an 
 alibi with great caution and care,^^ and that the evidence to prove 
 an alibi sho;.ild be subjected to a rigid scrutiny. This is true of all 
 evidence."^ But this caution or warning should always be accom- 
 panied by an instruction to the effect that if the accused should 
 raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt by reason of the evidence of 
 his alibi, the jury must acquit. So, too, it is not error for the court 
 to tell the jury that they must consider, in determining the cred- 
 ibility of the alibi, that witnesses may be honestly mistaken in or 
 forgetful of times and places, ^^ or that an alibi, like any other 
 defense, may be easily fabricated.^^ 
 
 The failure on the part of the accused to prove an alibi should 
 not have any more weight in the minds of the jury than his failure 
 to prove any other defense. The rule is that if it appears to the 
 jury that a witness has wilfully testified falsely to any material 
 fact, they may reject all his testimony. But this rule is not a rule 
 of law and simply permits a presumption of fact to arise in the 
 minds of the jurors. This presumption may arise against the 
 accused where the jurors detect him in deliberately giving false 
 testimony to an alibi. ^'^ However, aside from deliberate perjury 
 on the part of the accused or one of his witnesses, in endeavoring 
 to prove an alibi, an unsuccessful attempt to substantiate his de- 
 
 " State V. Chee Gong, 16 Ore. 534, wealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 .S.38, 19 Pac. 607; Murphy v. State, 31 295, 319, 52 .Am. Dec. yiin: People v. 
 
 Fla. 166, 12 So. 453; Dawson v. State, Tice, 115 Mich. 219, ^z ^'- ^- ^08. 69 
 
 62 Miss. 241. And see cases cited in Am. St. 560. 
 
 last note. "^ State v. Blunt, 59 Iowa 468, 13 N. 
 
 ■'"People V. Tice, 115 Mich. 219, ^z W. 427. 
 
 N. W. 108, 69 Am. St. 560; People ''People v. Wong Ah Foo, 69 Cal. 
 
 V. Lee Gam, 69 Cal. 552, 11 Pac. 183. 180, 183, 184, 10 Pac. 375, 707 ■ 
 
 "Albrifton v. State, 94 Ala. 76, 10 ^'' State v. Johnson, 91 Mo. 439, 444, 
 
 So. 426 : State v. Rowland, 72 Towa 445, 3 S. W. 868. 
 Z^l, 329, 33 N. W. 137; Common-
 
 § 153 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 294 
 
 fense of an alibi is not, as a matter of law, a circumstance of much 
 weight against the accused/'' 
 
 The deliberate fabrication of evidence is always a circumstance 
 pointing, though never conclusively, to the guilt of the prisoner,""'** 
 But the mere fact that the prisoner or one of his witnesses has 
 sworn falsely by no means warrants the presumption that the 
 evidence of the state is in all respects true."^ And generally a 
 failure by the accused to prove an alibi does not differ in its effect 
 from a failure on his part to prove any other material fact alleged 
 by him/** Where there is any evidence tending to prove the alibi, 
 it is sometimes, though not universally, held to be reversible error 
 for the court to refuse to charge specially thereon,'*^ or to refuse 
 to charge expressly that a reasonable doubt may arise therefrom.*^ 
 
 In view of the apparent irreconcilable conflict of opinion as to 
 the character of this plea and of the right of the court to comment 
 upon the evidence which is offered to sustain it, it is advisable for 
 the court, when cautioning the jury, to accompany its cautionary 
 admonitions with a statement that the alibi is sufficiently proved 
 by the accused if upon all the issues he has succeeded in raising a 
 reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that he w'as present 
 at the time and place of the crime. That fact is exclusively for 
 the jurors to determine.*" 
 
 ^'Parker v. State, 136 Ind. 284, 293, 136 Ind. 284, 35 N. E. 1105; Adams 
 
 35 N. E. 1 105; Miller v. People, 39 v. State, 28 Fla. 511, 10 So. 106; 
 
 111. 457; People V. Malaspina, 57 Cal. Landis v. State, 70 Ga. 651, 48 Am. 
 
 628, 629 ; Albritton v. State, 94 Ala. 588 ; Turner v. Commonwealth, 86 Pa. 
 
 76, 10 So. 426 ; Commonwealth v. Mc- St. 54, 27 Am. 683- People v. Mala- 
 
 Mahon, 145 Pa. St. 413, 416, 22 Atl. spina, 57 Cal. 628. 
 
 971 ; Ransom v. State, 2 Ga. App. 826, ^ Bennett v. State, 30 Tex. App. 
 
 59 S. E. loi; Landis v. State, 70 Ga. 341, 17 S. W. 545; Fletcher v. State, 
 
 651, 48 Am. 588; Prince v. State, 100 85 Ga. 666, 667, 11 S. E. 872. Contra, 
 
 Ala. 144, 14 So. 409, 46 Am. St. 28; State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 194, 17 
 
 Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 511, 10 So. Atl. 483; Conrad v. State, 132 Ind. 
 
 106. 254, 258, 31 N. E. 805. If the alibi 
 
 ^' State V. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17 Atl. turns on a question of disputed iden- 
 
 483. tity, a separate instruction on the 
 
 ^° Sawyers v. State, 15 Lea (Tenn.) former is unnecessary. Dale v. State, 
 
 694. 88 Ga. 552, 15 S. E. 287. 
 
 *° Miller v. People, 39 111. 457, 465 ; *' Fleming v. State, 136 Ind. 149. 
 
 Prince v. State, 100 Ala. 144, 14 So. 36 N. E. 154, 41 L. R. A. 539n. 
 
 409, 46 Am. St. 28; Parker v. State, ''In State v. Blunt, 59 Iowa 468, 13
 
 295 
 
 ALIBI. 
 
 153 
 
 N. W. 427, the court said: "It is 
 recognized in the law that the defense 
 of alibi is one easily manufactured, 
 and jurors are generally and properly 
 advised by the courts to scan the 
 proofs of an alibi with care and cau- 
 tion. * * * That this proposition 
 is correct there can be no doubt. It 
 accords with the observation of every 
 one of experience in criminal trials. 
 Besides, there can be no prejudice in 
 cautioning the jury to closely and 
 carefully scan the proof in every 
 case." There was no prejudice to the 
 defendant in such instructions. So, 
 in the case of Miller v. People, 39 111. 
 457 : "Failing to prove an alibi 
 
 should have no greater weight to 
 convince a jury of the guilt of the 
 prisoner attempting it than the failure 
 to prove any other important item of 
 defense. A prisoner is entitled to 
 rely on the facts in his favor, he may 
 suppose he is able to prove, and if he 
 is so unfortunate as to fail in his 
 proof, it should not, generally speak- 
 ing, operate to his prejudice. Proof 
 of an alibi is a defense as legitimate 
 as any other, and the court should not 
 say, lest it prejudice the minds of 
 the jury, that failing to establish it, 
 should have great weight against the 
 prisoner."
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF INSANITY AND INTOXICATION, 
 
 i 154. Mental capacity to know right 
 and wrong as a test of in- 
 sanity. 
 
 155. Uncontrollable impulse and in- 
 
 sane delusions. 
 
 156. Presumption of continuance of 
 
 insanity. 
 
 157. Burden of proof to show san- 
 
 ity and insanity. 
 
 158. Proof of insanity beyond a 
 
 reasonable doubt not re- 
 quired. 
 
 159. The character and range of 
 
 evidence to show insanity. 
 
 160. Evidence showing the appear- 
 
 ance, conduct and language 
 of the accused after the 
 crime — Evidence of insanity 
 in familj- of accused. 
 
 161. Non-expert evidence. 
 
 § 162. Xon-expert must relate in evi- 
 dence facts on which his im- 
 pression is based — Degree of 
 knowledge required. 
 
 163. Expert evidence — What con- 
 
 stitutes an expert — Physical 
 examination of accused to 
 ascertain sanitj'. 
 
 164. Evidence of voluntary intoxi- 
 
 cation — When irrelevant. 
 
 165. Insensibility or insanity from 
 
 indulgence in intoxicants 
 nia}^ be shown. 
 
 166. Evidence of into.xication as 
 
 bearing on a specific intent, 
 or on premeditation. 
 
 167. Mode of proving or disproving 
 
 intoxication. 
 
 168. Morphine habit. 
 
 § 154. Mental capacity to know right and wrong as a test of in- 
 sanity. — Every man is presumed by the law to be sane and re- 
 sponsible for his actions until the contrary appears. The author- 
 ities are by no means harmonious as regards the amount, quality 
 or degree of proof which will be required to overcome this pre- 
 sumption. But the tendency of the most recent cases is to give 
 the prisoner, who pleads insanity as a defense, every reasonable 
 opportunity to secure an acquittal by the employment of the 
 means which modern scientific investigation, into the domain of 
 mental disease, has placed within his reach. The accused must, 
 however, according to a large majority of the cases, prove that 
 "he was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of 
 the mind as not to know" (i. e., as not to have sufficient mental 
 capacity to know) "the nature and quality of the act he was do- 
 
 296
 
 297 
 
 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. 
 
 § 154 
 
 ing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing 
 wrong."^ This rule, which has been followed by a majority of the 
 cases in America, may be considered as a settled rule regulating 
 the degree of mental derangement which must be shown in a crim- 
 inal trial to overcome the presumption of sanity.^ 
 
 ^ This is the rule laid down in Mc- 
 Naghten's Case in 1843, 10 CI. & F. 
 200; I C. & K. 130; 8 Scott N. R. 
 595. In that case the court said : 
 "The jurors ought to be told in all 
 cases that every man is to be pre- 
 sumed to be sane, and to possess a 
 sufficient degree of reason to be re- 
 sponsible for his crimes, until the con- 
 trary be proved to their satisfaction; 
 and that to establish a defense on the 
 ground of insanity, it must be clearly 
 proved that, at the time of the com- 
 mitting of the act, the party accused 
 was labouring under such a defect of 
 reason, from disease of the mind, as 
 not to know the nature and quality of 
 the act he was doing, or, if he did 
 know it, that he did not know he was 
 doing what was wrong." Again, in 
 Moett V. People, 85 N. Y. 2>72>, 380, 
 the court, by Earl, J., said : "The 
 laws of God and the land are the 
 measure of every man's act and make 
 it right or wrong, and it is right or 
 wrong, as it corresponds with such 
 laws. When it is said that a prisoner 
 must, at the time of the alleged crim- 
 inal act, have sufficient capacity to 
 distinguish between right and wrong 
 with respect to such act, it is implied 
 that he must have sufficient capacity 
 to know whether such act is in viola- 
 tion of the law of God or of the land, 
 or of both. It is not the duty of the 
 trial judge to present the matter to 
 the jury in every possible phase and 
 in every form of language which the 
 ingenuity of counsel can devise." 
 * Mangrum v. Commonwcaltli 
 
 (Ky.), 39 S. W. 703, 19 Ky. L. 94; 
 Mackin v. State, 59 N. J. L. 495, 36 
 Atl. 1040; People v. Riordan, 117 N. 
 Y. 71, 75, 22 N. E. 455; People v. 
 Downs, 123 N. Y. 558, 565, 25 N. E. 
 988; Tiffany v. Commonwealth, 121 
 Pa. St. 165, 180, 15 Atl. 462, 6 Am. 
 St. 775 ; Rudy v. Commonwealth, 128 
 Pa. St. 500, 18 Atl. 344; Howard v. 
 State, 50 Ind. 190; State v. Wingo, 66 
 Mo. 181, 183, 186, 27 Am. 329; Ogle- 
 tree v. State, 28 Ala. 693; Tweedy v. 
 State, 5 Iowa 433; State v. Flye, 26 
 Me. 312; People v. Potter, 5 Mich, i, 
 7, 71 Am. Dec. 763; Dale v. State, 10 
 Yerg. (Tenn.) 550; Goodwin v. State, 
 96 Ind. 550, 560; Conway v. State, 118 
 Ind. 482, 490, 21 N. E. 285; Plake v. 
 State, 121 Ind. 433, 435, 23 N. E. 273, 
 16 Am. St. 408; Willis v. People, Z- 
 X. Y. 715, 719; People v. Taylor, 138 
 N. Y. 398, 406, 34 N. E. 27s ; State v. 
 Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 744, 755, 15 
 S. E. 982; Flanagan v. People, 52 N. 
 Y. 467, 469, 470, II Am. 731 ; People v. 
 Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 238, 250, 6 X. E. 
 584; State V. Alexander, 30 S. Car. 
 74, 84, 8 S. E. 440, 14 Am. St. 879; 
 United States v. Holmes, i Clif. (U. 
 S.) 98, 26 Fed. Cas. 15382; State v. 
 Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 314, 4 S. W. 931 ; 
 State V. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442, 30 N. 
 W. 742 ; Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 
 279, 308, 3 S. W. 539, 58 Am. 638; 
 State V. Xixon, 32 Kan. 205, 211, 212, 
 4 Pac. 159; State v. Brandon, 8 Jones 
 (N. Car) 463, 467, 468; People v. 
 IToin, 62 Cal. T20, 45 Am. 651; State 
 V. T.awrence, 57 Me. 574, 577. 581 ; 
 Commonwealth v. Gcradc, 145 Pa. St.
 
 § 155 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 298 
 
 § 155. Uncontrollable impulse and insane delusions. — Some re- 
 cent cases have departed from this rule. This repudiation of the 
 right and wrong test is, doubtless, due to the desire of the judges 
 to harmonize the legal rules which determine what facts must be 
 proved as a necessary basis for an inference of insanity with the 
 views of the medical profession. In almost every trial where san- 
 ity is an issue, medical witnesses are produced, who, viewing the 
 question of sanity from a medical standpoint, give evidence tend- 
 ing to set up some other test than that of a capacity to distinguish 
 and to choose between right and wrong. It is well recognized 
 that the moral sense is highly developed in many whose mental 
 powers are greatly impaired, and that some faint gleam of moral 
 judgment may be discovered, even in the most idiotic. The medi- 
 cal treatment of the insane in asylum proceeds largely upon the 
 theory that the majority of such persons possess the capacity to 
 distinguish between right and wrong, and the testimony of medi- 
 cal witnesses is very apt to be colored thereby and to lead the jury 
 to believe that other elements, than a capacity to judge of the 
 moral character of the act, are to be considered in determining if 
 the accused was insane. Thus, it is said, that though the accused 
 may have been capable of appreciating the moral character of his 
 act, and may have been able to choose the right and to avoid the 
 Avrong, yet he should be absolved from punishment for his act if, 
 knowing it was wrong, he was prompted to do it by some uncon- 
 trollable or irresistible influence, or was under some insane delu- 
 sion that made him choose the wrong in preference to the right. 
 
 289, 296, 22 Atl. 464, 27 Am. St. 689; 64; State v. O'Neil, 51 Kan. 651, 33 
 
 Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 205, Pac. 287, 24 L. R. A. 555; State v. 
 
 II So. 618, 17 L. R. A. 484n; Jamison Lewis, 20 Nev. 333, 23 Pac. 241; Feo- 
 
 V. People, 145 111. 357, 34 N. E. 486; pie v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 
 
 State V. Murray, 6 Cr. L. Mag. 255; 275; People v. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 251, 
 
 State V. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196, 206; 87 N. E. 457; Maas v. Territory, 10 
 
 Genz V. State, 59 N. J. 488, 37 Atl. 69, Okla. 714, 63 Pac. 960, 53 L. R. A. 
 
 59 Am. St. 619; Parsons v. State, 81 814; Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 
 
 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854, 60 Am. 193; Green N. W. 912, 46 Am. 26; United States 
 
 V. State, 64 Ark, 523, 43 S. W. 973; v. Chisholm, 153 Fed. 808; State v. 
 
 State V. Swift, 57 Conn. 496, 18 Atl. Craig (Wash), lOO Pac. 167; State 
 
 664; Lee V. State, 116 Ga. 563, 42 S. v. Barker, 216 Mo. 532, 115 S. W. 
 
 E. 759; Hornish v. People, 142 111. T102; Thomas v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 620, 32 N. E. 677, 18 L. R. A. 237: 1909), 116 S. W. 600. 
 State V. Arnold, (Kan. 1909) 100 Pac.
 
 299 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. § 1 56 
 
 After the jury have heard such a statement from a medical wit- 
 ness, they are extremely apt to be puzzled by a seemingly contra- 
 dictory instruction setting up the right and wrong test. Accord- 
 ingly many of the cases have held that though the evidence shows 
 the defendant had capacity to know the right from the wrong in 
 that particular case, yet, if from the facts it appears that he was 
 acting under an irresistible impulse preventing the choosing of 
 the right or compelling wrong-doing, he should be acquitted.^ 
 
 § 156. Presumption of continuance of insanity. — No presumption 
 of law is recognized that insanity proved to exist is always con- 
 tinuous down to the date of the crime. The presumption is one of 
 fact, and clearly the continuance of the insanity depends entirely 
 upon the nature of the mental malady. Insanity is undoubtedly 
 often chronic and permanent. This is the case in congenital men- 
 tal infirmity, as idiocy, or in senile dementia, and it may require 
 very clear proof to overcome the presumption that such insanity 
 is continuous.* If there is proof that the accused had been insane 
 since childhood, he is entitled to an instruction that if he were in- 
 sane at any time before the commission of the crime, his insanity 
 was presumed to continue, and that the burden is on the state to 
 show that he became sane and was so when he committed the 
 crime.^ But the reverse is true where insanity is the result of de- 
 lirium, ensuing from physical disease or indulgence in intoxi- 
 cants. The circumstances of each case should be considered, and 
 the matter is wholly for the jury to determine whether a mental 
 condition shown to exist continued down to any specific later pe- 
 riod.*' Where an insane person has lucid intervals, and no proof 
 
 " Parsons v. State, 8r Ala. 577, 2 So. 18 N. E. 833; State v. Snell, 46 Wash. 
 
 854, 60 Am. i93n (leading case) ; 327, 89 Pac. 931, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 State V. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. 1191, 35 L. R. A. 117 note. 
 
 242; Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. ^ Allams v. State, 123 Ga. 500, 51 
 
 •279, 3 S. W. 539, 58 Am. 638; Dacey S. E. 506; Wooten v. State, 51 Tex. 
 
 V. People, ir6 111. 555, 556, 6 N. E. Cr. App. 428, 102 S. W. 416. 
 
 165; State V. Felter, 32 Iowa 49; "Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 
 
 Plake V. State, 121 Ind. 433, 435, 23 N. 204, 11 So. 618, 17 L. R. A. 484n ; 
 
 E. 273; but cf. Grubb v. State, 117 Langdon v. People, 133 111. 382, 24 N. 
 
 Ind. 277, 280, 20 N. E. 257, 725. E. 874; State v. Wilncr, 40 Wis. 304; 
 
 * State V. Reddick, 7 Kan. 143, 151; State v. Reddick, 7 Kan. 143, 151; 
 
 Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550, 560; State v. Lowe, 93 Mo. 547, 5 S. W. 
 
 Wagner v. State, 116 Ind. 181, 187, 889; Whart. Cr. L., § 56. It is only
 
 157 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 300 
 
 of insanity existing at the instant of the offense is offered, it will 
 be presumed to have been committed during a lucid interval.' 
 
 § 157. Burden of proof to show sanity and insanity. — The cases 
 are inharmonious upon the question on whom does the burden of 
 proof rest when insanity is in issue in a criminal trial ? The pris- 
 oner's sanity is an essential and requisite ingredient in any crime 
 with which he may be charged, for, if his mental soundness is not 
 shown, there certainly cannot be a criminal intent present to 
 lender the act with which he is connected a crime. It is the gen- 
 eral rule that the state has the burden of proving all the necessary 
 ingredients of a crime, including the criminal intention, and this 
 rule logically casts the burden of proving the sanity of an accused 
 person upon the prosecution in the first instance.* We must dis- 
 tinguish clearly between the burden of proof, that is, the obliga- 
 
 where the insanity of the accused is 
 of an apparently permanent or con- 
 tinuing type, having the characteris- 
 tics of a confirmed disorder of the 
 mind as distinguished from spasmod- 
 ic mania or delirium, the product of 
 disease that any presumption of the 
 continuance of insanity is recognized. 
 People V. Francis, 38 Cal. 183; Arm- 
 strong V. State, 30 Fla. 170, 204, 11 
 So. 618, 17 L. R. A. 484n; Langdon v. 
 People, 133 111. 382, 24 N. E. 874. 
 
 ' Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 
 313, 3 S. W. 539, 58 Am. 638; I Rus- 
 sell on Crimes, p. 11. 
 
 * Ford V. State, 72> Miss. 734, 19 So. 
 665, 35 L. R. A. iT7n; O'Connell v. 
 People, 87 N. Y. 2,77, 4i Am. 379; 
 People V. Holmes, iii Mich. 364, 69 
 N. W. 501; People v. McCarthy, 115 
 Cal. 255, 46 Pac. 1073; Chase v. Peo- 
 ple, 40 111. 352, 358; Langdon v. Peo- 
 ple, 133 111- 382, 403, 24 N. E. 874; 
 People V. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58, 64, 67, 
 69 Am. Dec. 642n ; Walter v. People, 
 32 N. Y. 147; Walker v. People, 88 
 X. Y. 81, 88: State v. Davis, 109 N. 
 Car. 780, 14 S. E. 55; State v. West, 
 
 I Houst. Cr. (Del.) 371; State v. 
 Bartlett, 43 N. H. 224, 80 Am. Dec. 
 154; Ogletree v. State, 28 Ala. 693, 
 702; Polk V. State, 19 Ind. 170, 172, 
 8r Am. Dec. 382 ; Armstrong v. State, 
 30 Fla. 170, 204, II So. 618, 17 L. R. 
 A. 484n; State v. Schaefer, 116 Mo. 
 96, 22 S. W. 447; State V. Coleman, 
 20 S. Car. 441, 454; Wright v. People, 
 4 Neb. 407, 410; Commonwealth v. 
 Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 143, 148, 149, fol- 
 lovi^ed in Davis v. United States, 160 
 U. S. 469, 40 L. ed. 499, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 353; State v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; 
 Guetig V. State, 66 Ind. 94, 105-109; 
 State V. Speyer, 207 Mo. 540, 106 S. 
 W. 505; Fults V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 App. 502, 98 S. W. 1057; State v. 
 Fressler, 16 Wyo. 214, 92 Pac. 806; 
 State V. Quigley, 26 R. I. 263, 58 Atl. 
 905, 67 L. R. A. 222; People v. Casey, 
 231 111. 261, 83 N. E. 278; Knights v. 
 State, 58 Neb. 225, 78 N. W. 508, 7^^ 
 Am. St. 78n ; Allams v. State, 123 Ga. 
 SCO, 51 S. E. 506; Wooten v. State, 
 51 Tex. Cr. App. 428, 102 S. W. 416, 
 76 Am. St. 92, 97, note : Underbill on 
 Ev., § 249. Ante, §§ 2Z, 24.
 
 30I 
 
 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. 
 
 157 
 
 tion imposed upon a party who alleges a fact to establish it by 
 proof, and the mode and order of proof." 
 
 The state need not prove the prisoner's sanity by positive and 
 direct evidence. Presumptions often stand for proof until re- 
 butted. The presumption of law that every one is sane, which 
 holds good and is the full equivalent of express proof until it is 
 rebutted," will be sufficient to sustain the burden of proving the 
 prisoner's sanity where the evidence of the state suggests nothing 
 to the contrary. If the state shall prove, even prima facie, that 
 the accused committed an act which is criminal by law, and no 
 other evidence is given, his sanity will be presumed, and if the 
 prisoner, in the defense made by him, offers no evidence or offers 
 unconvincing or unsatisfactory evidence on this point, his sanity 
 may be regarded as proved. ^^ When the accused offers evidence 
 tending to show insanity, the state must produce evidence in re- 
 
 ' People V. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58, 
 66, 69 Am. Dec. 64211. 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Gerade, 145 Pa. 
 St. 289, 297, 22 Atl. 464, 27 Am. St. 
 689; Ford V. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 
 So. 665, 35 L. R. A. 11711; State v. 
 Cloninger, 149 X. Car. 567; 63 S. E. 
 154; Montag V. People, 141 111. 75; 30 
 N. E. 2)27 ; United States v. Cliisholm, 
 153 Fed. 808; Commonwealth v. Ed- 
 dy, 7 Gray (Mass.) 583. See cases 
 cited in next note. Under this rule, 
 it has been held proper to refuse to 
 charge that the burden is on the ac- 
 cused to prove by a preponderance of 
 the evidence that he was not of sound 
 mind at the time of the commission of 
 the crime. State v. Pressler, 16 Wyo. 
 214, 92 Pac. 806. 
 
 " Boiling V. State, 54 Ark. 588, 602, 
 16 S. W. 658; O'Brien v. People, 48 
 Barb. (N. Y.) 274, 280; Armstrong v. 
 State, 30 Fla. 170, 197, 11 So. 618, 17 
 L. R. A. 484n; O'Connell v. People, 
 87 N. Y. Z77, 384, 41 Am. 379; Com- 
 monwealth V. Gerade, 145 Pa. St. 289, 
 296, 297, 22 Atl. 464, 27 Am. St. 689; 
 Dove V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 348, 
 
 371 ; Walker v. People, 88 N. Y. 81 ; 
 Casat V. State, 40 Ark. 511, 513, 523; 
 Brown v. State, 40 Fla. 459, 25 So. 
 63 ; Commonwealth v. Wireback, 190 
 Pa. St. 138, 42 Atl. 542, 70 Am. St. 
 625 ; State v. Clark, 34 Wash. 485, 76 
 Pac. 98, loi Am. St. 1006; People v. 
 Suesser, 142 Cal. 354, 75 Pac. 1093. 
 "Insanity, when it is relied on as a 
 defense to a charge of crime, must be 
 proved to the satisfaction of the jury 
 to entitle the accused to be acquitted 
 on that ground, though such proof 
 may be furnished by evidence intro- 
 duced by the commonwealth to sus- 
 tain the charge, as well as by evi- 
 dence introduced by the accused to 
 sustain the defense. * * * The com- 
 monwealth having proved the corpus 
 delicti, and that the act was done by 
 the accused, has made out her case. 
 If he relies on the defense of insanity, 
 he must prove it to the satisfaction of 
 the jury. If, upon the whole evi- 
 dence, they believe he was insane, 
 when he committed the act, the}' will 
 acquit him on that ground." Boswell's 
 Case, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 860, 876.
 
 157 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 302 
 
 buttal, to revive and strengthen the presumption of sanity. Then 
 the duty of proving the sanity of the accused, his possession of 
 mental capacity and sense of moral responsibility, is deemed to 
 be upon the state. The presumption of sanity, having been over- 
 thrown by the evidence for the defense, is no longer to be consid- 
 ered, but the prosecution must prove the sanity of the accused 
 upon the whole evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.^" But 
 the prevailing rule seems to be that an allegation that the de- 
 fendant is insane is a statement of an independent fact, and is, 
 in its nature, a plea of confession and avoidance. Hence, if insan- 
 ity is pleaded as a defense, the burden of proof is on the defendant, 
 in conformity with the general rule that he who asserts any 
 affirmative fact has the burden of proof.^^ 
 
 ^" Where habitual insanity was 
 proved by the defendant, it was held 
 that the state must prove the exist- 
 ence of a lucid interval at the instant 
 of the crime by direct evidence. Ford 
 V. State, yz Miss. 734, 19 So. 665, 35 
 L. R. A. ii7n; Thomas v. State (Tex. 
 Cr. App. 1909), 116 S. W. 600; State 
 v. Craig (Wash), 100 Pac. 167. 
 
 "Boswell's Case, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 
 860, 875; State V. Starling, 6 Jones 
 (N. Car.) 366; People v. Myers, 20 
 Cal. 518; State v. Smith, 53 Mo. 267; 
 Montag v. People, 141 111. 75, 30 N. 
 E. ZZT, Walker v. People, 88 N. Y. 
 81 ; McKenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 334, 
 340; State V. Sticklej^, 41 Iowa 232, 
 237; Dove V. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 
 348, 371 ; Commonwealth v. Eddy, 7 
 Gray (Mass.) 583; Bergin v. State, 
 31 Ohio St. Ill; People v. Travers, 
 88 Cal. 233, 238, 26 Pac. 88; State v. 
 Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691, 692; Mey- 
 ers v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. St. 131 ; 
 Graham v. Commonwealth, 16 B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 587; People v. Ta}'lor, 
 138 N. Y. 398, 406, 34 N. E. 275 ; Mc- 
 Leod v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 331, 
 20 S. W. 749 ; State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 
 300, 315, 4 S. M. 931 ; Sanders v. 
 State, 94 Ind. 147, 148; McDougal v. 
 
 State, 88 Ind. 24, 26; Plake v. State, 
 121 Ind. 433, 435, 23 X. E. 2-jy, Keen- 
 er V. State, 97 Ga. 388, 24 S. E. 28; 
 State V. Wright, 134 Mo. 404, 35 S. 
 W. 1 145; Brotherton v. People, 75 
 X. Y. 159, 163; People v. McCann, 16 
 X. Y. 58, 59, 69 Am. Dec. 642n ; State 
 V. Scott, 49 La. Ann. 253, 21 So. 271, 
 36 L. R. A. 72in; People v. McCarthy, 
 115 Cal. 255, 46 Pac. 1073; Loeffner v. 
 State, 10 Ohio St. 598; United States 
 V. McGlue, I Curt. (U. S.) i, 26 Fed. 
 Cas. 15679; State v. Brandon, 8 Jones 
 (X^. Car.) 463; Commonwealth v. 
 Heidler, 191 Pa. St. 375, 43 Atl. 211; 
 People V. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 89 
 Pac. 124; Porter v. State, 140 Ala. 87, 
 2,7 So. 81; State v. Johnston, 118 La. 
 276, 42 So. 935; Talbert v. State, 140 
 Ala. 96, n So. 78; Kroell v. State, 
 139 Ala. I, 36 So. 1025; Parrish v. 
 State, 139 Ala. 16, 36 So. 1012; State 
 v. Cloninger, 149 X. Car. 567, 63 S. 
 E. 154. Ante, §§ 2Z, 24. 
 
 The question on whom is the bur- 
 den of proof when insanity is alleged 
 is one of some diff^cult3^ It lies in a 
 narrow compass. The difficulty is the 
 starting point. By some it is main- 
 tained that sanity is an essential of 
 the crime and a necessary part of its
 
 o^j 
 
 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. 
 
 § 158. Proof of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt not required. — 
 If it be granted that the defendant has the burden of proving his 
 insanity, it remains to be considered what amount or degree of 
 proof is sufficient. The safest rule, and one that is sustained by a 
 large majority of the cases, is that a reasonable preponderance of 
 evidence upon this particular point should acquit the defendant.^* 
 Though this is a general rule, the verbal forms in which it has 
 been expressed have resulted in throwing the matter into some 
 
 definition, and that it must be proved 
 to the jury in the same way as any 
 other part. But it must be remem- 
 bered that we start with the presump- 
 tion that all men are sane and re- 
 sponsible for their acts, in the same 
 waj' that we start with the proposition 
 that no man can legally do that which 
 is a crime. All the elements which 
 enter into the definition of any crime 
 assume a responsible agent to exist, 
 and sanity is assumed and treated as 
 an essential attribute of crime. The 
 indictment says nothing of his capac- 
 ity, and as it is only as regards the 
 facts therein alleged, that he is pre- 
 sumed innocent, they must be proved 
 and nothing more. By a plea of not 
 guilty alone he has the negative of the 
 issue. If he shall plead insanity, he 
 assumes the affirmative, for, though 
 such a plea is usually coupled with a 
 plea of not guilty, it is, strictly speak- 
 ing, a confession and avoidance. It 
 admits the allegations of the indict- 
 ment, but claims that the accused is 
 mentally irresponsible. It raises an 
 affirmative issue outside of the indict- 
 ment. Even so far as malice is con- 
 cerned, using that word in its legal 
 sense, it cannot be said that the plea 
 o* insanity denies its existence. It ad- 
 mits its presence, but claims the ac- 
 cused was mentally unsound. State 
 V. Lawrence, 57 Me. 574, 584. 
 "Gcnz V. State, 58 X. J. L. 482, 34 
 
 x\tl. 816; People V. Nino, 149 N. Y. 
 317, 43 N. E. 853; State v. Larkins, 
 5 Idaho 200, 47 Pac. 945 ; State v. 
 Scott, 49 La. Ann. 253, 21 So. 271, 
 36 L. R. A. 72in; King v. State, 
 74 Miss. 576, 21 So. 235; State v. 
 Redemeier, 71 Mo. 173, 176, 36 Am. 
 462; Graves v. State, 45 N. J. L. 
 347, 360, 46 Am. 778; Fisher v. 
 State, 30 Tex. App. 502, 18 S. W. 
 90; Ford v. State, 71 Ala. 385; State 
 v. Felter, 32 Iowa 49, 54; People v. 
 McCann, 16 N. Y. 58, 69 Am. Dec. 
 642n ; People v. McElvaine, 125 X. Y. 
 596, 26 X. E. 929; State v. Coleman, 
 20 S. Car. 441, 454; Polk v. State, 19 
 Ind. 170, 81 Am. Dec. 382 ; Loef¥ner v. 
 State, 10 Ohio St. 598, 616; Green v. 
 State, 88 Tenn. 614, 14 S. W. 43°; 
 Smith V. State, 19 Tex. App. 95, in; 
 Graham v. Commonwealth, 16 B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 587; People v. Myers, 20 
 Cal. 518; People v. Bawden, 90 Cal. 
 I95> 199, 27 Pac. 204; Commonwealth 
 V. Gerade, 145 Pa. St. 289, 296, 22 Atl. 
 464; Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Met. 
 (Mass.) 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458; Dove 
 v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 348, 373: 
 Hopps v. People, 31 111. 385, 83 Am. 
 Dec. 231; Langdon v. People, 133 111. 
 382, 403, 24 N. E. 874; People v. 
 Barthleman, 120 Cal. 7, 52 Pac. 112; 
 Schultz V. Territory, 5 Ariz. 239, 52 
 Pac. 352; Braham v. State, 143 Ala. 
 28, 38 So. 919.
 
 § 158 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 304 
 
 confusion . Thus it has been said that insanity must be estabHshed 
 to the entire or reasonable satisfaction of the jury, or by evidence 
 satisfactory to them, or which satisfies their minds or clearly pre- 
 ponderating. Such expressions are misleading and may be con- 
 strued to mean that insanity must be established by proof beyond 
 a reasonable doubt. This, however, is not required. Reasonably, 
 not extraordinarily, clear and substantial proof is required. Evi- 
 dence fairly preponderating is necessary, but never proof beyond 
 a reasonable doubt. ^^ To state this doctrine in another way by 
 which, perhaps, the lack of harmony and the confusion in the 
 authorities may be avoided, while the burden of proof to show 
 insanity is on the defendant, yet if he introduces evidence on that 
 point sufficiently preponderating to raise a reasonable doubt in 
 the minds of the jury it is their duty to acquit. ^^ 
 
 "Walker v. People, 88 N. Y. 81; 
 Smith V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 14, 19 
 S. W. 252; Commonwealth v. Gerade, 
 14s Pa. St. 289, 298, 22 Atl. 464, 27 
 Am. St. 689 ; Coyle v. Commonwealth, 
 100 Pa. St. 573, 45 Am. 397; People 
 V. Bawden, 90 Cal. 195, 199, 27 Pac. 
 204; People V. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 
 89 Pac. 124; Commonwealth v. Heid- 
 ler, 191 Pa. St. 375, 43 Atl. 211; Al- 
 lams V. State, 123 Ga. 500, 51 S. E. 
 506; State V. Barker, 216 Mo. 532, 115 
 S. W. 1 102; People V. Egnor, 175 N. 
 Y. 419, 67 N. E. 906; Reed v. State, 
 75 Neb. 509; 106 N. W. 649. 
 
 "Brotherton v. People, 75 N. Y. 
 I59» 163; Casey v. People, 31 Hun 
 (N. Y.) 158; Armstrong v. State, 30 
 Fla. 170, 196, II So. 618, 17 L. R. A. 
 484n. See also, 17 Am. Law Rev. 922, 
 TO Crim. Law Mag. 182. State v. 
 Shuff, 9 Idaho 115, 72 Pac. 664; Caf- 
 fey V. State (Miss. 1898), 24 So. 315; 
 State V. Barker, 216 Mo. 532, 115 S. 
 W. 1 102. In Brotherton v. People, 
 75 N. Y. 159, the court, by Church, C. 
 J., remarks as follows : "Crimes can 
 only be committed by human beings 
 
 who are in a condition to be respon- 
 sible for their acts, and upon this 
 general proposition the prosecutor 
 holds the affirmative, and the burden 
 of proof is upon him. Sanity being 
 the normal and usual condition of 
 mankind, the law presumes that every 
 individual is in that state. Hence a 
 prosecutor may rest upon that pre- 
 sumption without other proof. * * * 
 Whoever denies this or interposes a 
 defense based upon its untruth, must 
 prove it ; the burden, not of the gen- 
 eral issue of crime by a competent 
 person, but the burden of overthrow- 
 ing the presumption of sanity and qf 
 showing insanity, is upon the person 
 who alleges it, and if evidence is giv- 
 en tending to establish insanity, then 
 the general question is presented to 
 the court and jury whether the crime, 
 if committed, was committed by a 
 person responsible for his acts, and 
 upon this question the presumption of 
 sanity, and the evidence, are all to be 
 considered, and the prosecutor holds 
 the affirmative, and if a reasonable 
 doubt exists as to whether the pris-
 
 305 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. 8 159 
 
 § 159. The character and range of evidence to show insanity. — 
 Evidence to show insanity is not confined to evidence of the men- 
 tal condition of the accused at the instant of the act, though what- 
 ever facts are adduced must tend to show his mental state at that 
 moment. ]\Iind can only be known by outward acts. By these we 
 read the thoughts, the motives and the emotions, and as one's 
 acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind or contrast 
 therewith we form our judgment of sanity. Evidence is compe- 
 tent to prove conduct and language at various times and places 
 indicating an unhealthy mental condition, and the more extensive 
 the view, the safer is the determination reached. It is proper to 
 allow considerable latitude in the examination of the witness.^' 
 Every fact wdiich shows or tends to show that the mental or 
 physical condition of the accused was abnormal at the date of the 
 crime, is competent.^^ Thus, a witness may testify that on a cer- 
 tain occasion when the accused was in his presence, his actions 
 were unusual, peculiar or unnatural,^'' and that he talked discon- 
 nectedly and appeared absent minded.-" The evidence in point of 
 time may cover an extensive period ; the family history of the 
 accused, his relations with the deceased in the case of a homicide 
 and his actions towards the deceased are relevant. In the case of 
 a homicide, where the relations of the deceased with the wife of 
 the accused were of such a character that they might reasonably 
 affect the nervous or mental condition of the accused, those rela- 
 tions may be thoroughly inquired into."^ Under the above rule, 
 it has been repeatedly held that evidence of the mental condition 
 of the accused prior and subsequent to the crime,-" and of his 
 conduct at the time of the crime, and within a reasonable period 
 before and after it,-"* is competent. All the previous mental and 
 ])hysical history of the accused is relevant where insanity is the 
 defense as an inference of insanity must rest upon many facts."* 
 
 oner is sane, or not, he is entitled to " Braham v. State, 143 Ala. 28, 38 
 
 the benefit of the doubt, and to an So. 919. 
 
 acquittal." '"Braham v. State, 143 Ala. 28, ,38 
 
 " Dejarnctte v. Commonwealth, 75 So. 919. 
 
 Va. 867. ''State v. McGowan, 36 Mont. 422. 
 
 "State V. Porter, 213 Mo. 43, in 93 Pac. 552. 
 
 S. W. 529, 127 Am. St. 589; People "People v. Koerncr, 191 N. Y. 528, 
 
 V. Brent fCal. App., 1909), 106 Pac. 84 N. E. 11 17. 
 
 no. -■'People V. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, 
 
 89 Pac. T24. 
 
 -' Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161, 167. 
 2z — UxrinuiiiLL Ckim. I-.v.
 
 § l60 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 306 
 
 It may always be shown that he was insane prior to the crime.""' 
 and, though this fact is never conclusive of his insanitv at the 
 date of the crime, it may be received as tending to render the truth 
 of independent evidence of that fact more probable."" The evi- 
 dence of the insanity or mental weakness of the accused prior to 
 the crime ought to be rejected if too remote in point of time. So 
 where accused who has reached adult years pleads insanity evi- 
 dence tending to show that when he was a child he was mentally 
 weak ought to be rejected."' 
 
 § 160. Evidence showing- the appearance, conduct and language of 
 the accused after the crime — Evidence of insanity in family of ac- 
 cused. — The appearance and conduct of the accused while testify- 
 ing may be considered by the jury,"* aided by the opinions of ex- 
 perts thereon. The hideous, unnatural and barbarous character 
 of the crime, or the absence of adequate motive, though either 
 may be shown and be considered by the jury,-^ does not alone 
 justify an inference of insanity.^" The demeanor of a prisoner 
 after a homicide perpetrated by him, his coolness and lack of re- 
 gret for his act, his physical appearance and condition, his lan- 
 guage showing a motive or the lack of one, his attempt to conceal 
 his crime or to escape, or his open boast that he committed the 
 homicide and the reason for it, may be proved to show his mental 
 condition. None of these facts is conclusive however, and the 
 
 "^ People V. Wood, 126 N. Y. 249, tending school. Rogers v. State, 77 
 
 257, 27 N. E. 362, 365; United States Vt. 454, 61 Atl. 489. 
 
 V. Guiteau, 10 Fed. 160, 172; People v. ""State v. Spencer, 21 N. J. L. 196, 
 
 Manoogian, 141 Cal. 592, 75 Pac. 177 ; 203 ; State v. Newman, 57 Kan. 705, 
 
 Pratt V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 227, 47 Pac. 881. 
 
 96 S. W. 8; Braham v. State, 143 Ala. "People v. Carlin, 194 X. Y. 448, 
 
 28, 38 So. 919; People V. Willard, 150 87 X. E. 805. 
 
 Cal. 543, 89 Rep. 124; State v. Porter, ^Commonwealth v. Buccieri, 153 
 
 213 Mo. 43, III S. W. 529; 127 Am. Pa. St. 535, 26 Atl. 228; Elliott Ev., 
 
 St. 589; People V. Koerner, 191 X. Y. § 2728. 
 
 528, 84 X. E. 1 1 17. Evidence that the "Commonwealth v. Buccieri, 153 
 
 accused was or is weak minded or Pa. St. 535, 536, 544, 26 Atl. 228. 
 
 easily influenced should not be re- ^"United States v. Lee, 4 Mackey 
 
 ceived when insanity is not the de- (D. C.) 489; State v. Stark, i Strobh. 
 
 fense. State v. Flowers, 58 Kan. 702; (S. Car.) 479; Guiteau's Cas. 10 Fed. 
 
 50 Pac. 938. See, also, as to evidence 161, 168. 
 of the fantastic and ridiculous con- 
 duct of the accused while a girl at-
 
 307 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. § 160 
 
 jury may discredit them and find the accused guilty.^^ Indeed 
 isolated facts are of Httle weight to prove insanity if a person has 
 been generally considered sane, for it may be that the peculiar or 
 eccentric conduct was caused otherwise than by mental weakness. 
 Thus, if the insanity is claimed to have been the result of epilepsy, 
 and the accused states that he frequently fell to the ground in a 
 fit and lay for some time unconscious, the state may be permitted 
 to produce witnesses who knew him well and who had often seen 
 him in a drunken stupor.^" The conversations and the declarations 
 of the accused uttered within a reasonable period before or after 
 the crime are admissible to show his mental condition at the date 
 of the crime.^'^ The length of the period within which evidence to 
 show the sanity or insanity of the accused may be permitted de- 
 pends on the circumstances of each particular case. If it is alleged 
 by the accused that his insanity existed for a long period before the 
 crime and it is apparently of a permanent character, his sanity 
 may be shown by any relevant conduct or conversations within 
 the same period. In one case, the state was permitted to prove 
 conduct and conversations which impressed witnesses as being 
 entirely rational which occurred a year before the crime. ^'* 
 
 The jury may consider the cunning and sagacity displayed by 
 the accused in planning the crime, the promptitude and courage 
 shown in using a deadly weapon and the skill exhibited in effect- 
 ing an escape. Evidence that the accused was generally reputed, 
 prior to the commission of the alleged crime, to be of unsound 
 mind is not admissible, being hearsay merely. ^^ It may be shown 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Gerade, 145 Pa. testimony of the accused on former 
 
 St. 289, 297, 22 Atl. 464, 27 Am. St. trials was received to show his san- 
 
 689; State V. Jones, 64 Iowa 349, 354, ity. State v. Speyer, 207 Mo. 540, 106 
 
 I- X. W. 911, 20 X. W. 470; Sanchez S. W. 505, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 836. 
 
 V. People, 22 X. Y. 147; People v. ^* People v. Koerner, 154 X. Y. 355, 
 
 Thurston, 2 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 49; 48 X. E. 730. 
 
 Jacobs V. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. St. " Brinkley v. State, 58 Ga. 296; 
 
 586, 15 Atl. 465, 6 Am. St. 802; Peo- People v. Pico, 62 Cal. 50; Walker 
 
 pie V. Koerner, 191 X. Y. 528, 84 X^. v. State, 102 Tnd. 502, 507, I X. E. 
 
 E. 1117, aflf'g 117 App. Div. (X. Y.) 856; State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 36 
 
 40, 102 N^. Y. Sup. 93. See §§ 116-120. Am. 89n; Choice v. State. 31 Ga. 424. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Ruccieri, 153 Cf. State v. Leuth, 5 Ohio C. C. 94, 
 
 Pa. St. 535, 26 Atl. 228. 2 Grecnl. § 371 ; State v. Church, 199 
 
 "Taylor v. United States, 7 .App. Mo. 605, 98 S. W. t6; Womble v. 
 
 Cas. D. C. 27. Under this rule, the State, 39 Tex. Cr. App. 24, 44 S. W.
 
 § l6o CRI-MIXAL EVIDENCE. 308 
 
 that an ancestor or the progeny of the accused was insane if there 
 is independent evidence directly tending to show he is insane, "'"' 
 but evidence of the insanity of collateral relations is irrevelant,"^ 
 and evidence of insanity in an ancestor may be excluded, if it is 
 not also shown that the insanity was hereditary.^^ The cause of 
 such insanity is always relevant to prove it was not hereditary.^" 
 
 In proving hereditary insanity, the practice is to permit wit- 
 nesses who Avere accjuainted with the ancestor of the accused to 
 testify orally to his peculiar and irrational actions, and then to 
 testify that, in the opinion of the witness, based upon such peculiar 
 conduct, the ancestor in question was insane. In other words, a 
 non-expert witness may testify to the insanity of an ancestor of 
 the accused from his opinion based on the same class of facts and 
 in the same manner that he may testify to the insanity of the ac- 
 cused himself. It is not permissible, however, for a witness, 
 though she be the wife or other relation or a friend of the accused. 
 to testify orally that an ancestor of the accused had been adjudged 
 insane : this is not the best evidence. The record must be pro- 
 duced." Nor can the fact of the insanity of the accused be proven 
 as a matter of family pedigree by the testimony of a witness or 
 the declarations of the relatives of the accused to his insanity. 
 The kindred of the accused who are in a position to prove his 
 insanity must be produced as witnesses.*^ 
 
 § 161. Non-expert evidence. — By the weight of authority, a non- 
 expert witness who has had adequate means of becoming ac- 
 
 827; Demaree v. Commonwealth 9, 17, 97 Am. Dec. 16211; Common- 
 
 (Ky.) 91 S. W. 1 131; 28 Ky. L. R. wealth v. Johnson, 188 Mass. 382, 74 
 
 1374; Porter v. State, 140 Ala. 87, Z1 ^- E. 939; Watts v. State, 99 Md. 
 
 So. 81; People V. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 30, 57 Atl. 542. 
 
 355, 48 N. E. 730; Parrish v. State, '^ State v. Soper, 148 ]\Io. 217, 49 
 
 139 Ala. 16, 36 So. 1012; People v. S. W. 1007. 
 
 Barthleman, 120 Cal. 7, 52 Pac. 112; ^' Walsh v. People, 88 N. Y. 458; 
 
 State V. Lagoni, 30 Mont. 472, 76 State v. Quigley, 26 R. I. 263, 58 .\\\. 
 
 Pac. 1044; State v. Penna, 35 Mont. 905, 67 L. R. A. 322. 
 
 535, 90 Pac. 787; State v. Speyer, 194 '"State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 36 
 
 Islo. 459, 91 S. W. 1075. Am. 89n. 
 
 ""Shaeffer v. State, 6r Ark. 241, 32 '"State v. Steidley, 135 Iowa 512, 
 
 S. W. 679; Hagan v. State, 5 Baxt. 113 N. W. 333. 
 
 (Tenn.) 615, 618; Guiteau's Case, 10 "People v. Koerner, 154 X. Y. 355, 
 
 Fed. 161 ; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 48 X. E. 730.
 
 309 
 
 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. 
 
 quainted with the mental state of a person whose sanity is in issue 
 may give his opinion uj)on the question whether such person was 
 insane at the time of a specific occurrence which is also in evi- 
 dence.*" Thus, for illustration, an attorney who has acted in a 
 professional capacity for the accused may testify as to his conduct, 
 whether rational or irrational at a particular time.*^ So, an official 
 stenographer who was present and took down the testimony of 
 the accused at a trial in which the accused was a defendant may 
 state whether or not the answers of the accused impressed him as 
 rational or otherwise. And it is immaterial, under such circum- 
 stances, that the stenographer prior to the trial was not personally 
 acquainted with the accused, and that his opinion as to the rational 
 character of the answers of the accused was based solely upon the 
 
 *" State V. Williamson, io6 Mo. 162, 
 i/i, 17 S. W. 172; Phelps V. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.), 32 S. W. 470, 17 Ky. 
 L. 706; Pflueger v. State, 46 Neb. 
 493, 64 N. W. 1094; Genz v. State, 59 
 N. J. L. 488, 34 Atl. 816, 59 Am. St. 
 619; People V. Strait, 148 N. Y. 566, 
 42 N. E. 1045 ; Dove v. State, 3 Heisk. 
 (Tenn.) 348, 367; State v. Maier, 36 
 W. Va. 757; Schlencker v. State, 9 
 Xeb. 241, 251, I N. W. 857; Sage v. 
 State, 91 Ind. 141, 143; Armstrong v. 
 State, 30 Fla. 170, 201, 11 So. 618, 17 
 L. R. A. 484n; Boiling v. State, 54 
 Ark. 588, 16 S. W. 658 ; McClackey v. 
 State, 5 Tex. App. 320; Wood v. 
 State, 58 Miss. 741, 743; People v. 
 Levy, 71 Cal. 618, 623; State v. Hay- 
 den, 51 Vt. 296; Clark v. State, 12 
 Ohio 483, 487, 40 Am. Dec. 481 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62; Holconibe 
 v. State (Ga. App.), 62 S. E. 647; 
 State V. Banner, 149 N. Car. 519, 63 
 S. E. 84; Atkins v. State (Tenn.), 
 T05 S. W. 353; Taylor v. United 
 States, 7 App. Cas. D. C. 27 ; People 
 V. Manoogian, 141 Cal. 592, 75 Pac. 
 177; Leaptrot v. State, 51 Fla. 57, 40 
 So. 616; Watts V. State, 99 Md. 30, 
 57 Atl. 542; Lowe v. State, 118 Wis. 
 641, 96 X. W. 417; People V. Kocrn- 
 
 er, 191 N. Y. 528, 84 N. E. 11 17, aff'g 
 117 App. Div. (N. Y.) 40, 102 N. Y. S. 
 93 ; State v. Beuerman, 59 Kan. 586, 53 
 Pac. 874; State v. Montgomery, 121 
 La. 1005, 46 So. 997; Rice v. State 
 (Tex. Cr. App.), 112 S. W. 299; 
 State V. Bell, 212 Mo. iii, iii S. W. 
 24; State V. Bronstine, 147 Mo. 520, 
 49 S. W. 512; Byrd v. State, 76 Ark. 
 286, 88 S. W. 974; Burton v. State, 
 Sr Tex. Cr. App. 196, loi S. W. 226; 
 People V. Clark, 151 Cal. 200, 90 Pac. 
 549; State V. Penna, 35 Mont. 535, 90 
 Pac. 787; Commonwealth v. Wire- 
 back, 190 Pa. St. 319, 42 Atl. 542, 70 
 Am. St. 625; State v. Shuff, 9 Idaho 
 115, 72 Pac. 664; Parrish v. State, 139 
 Ala. 16, 36 So. 1012; Glover v. State, 
 129 Ga. 717, 59 S. E. 816; Porter v. 
 State, 140 Ala. 87, 37 So. 81 ; Kroell 
 V. State, 139 Ala. i, 36 So. 1025 ; Bra- 
 ham V. State, 143 Ala. 28, 38 So. 919; 
 State V. Berberick (Mont.), 100 Pac. 
 209. See, also, Hardy v. Merrill, 56 
 X. H. 227, 22 Am. 441, and Common- 
 wealth V. Pomeroy, 117 Mass. 143, 
 overruling earlier cases, contra. Pat- 
 terson V. State, 86 Ga. 70. 
 
 *■' Bishoff V. Commonwealtii, 123 
 K'y- 340, 9O S. VV. 538, 29 Ky. L. 770.
 
 § l62 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. ^JO 
 
 minutes of the testimony as made by him and without any recol- 
 lection of the manner of the accused in testifying.** The expert 
 may not state his present opinion as distinguished from the opin- 
 ion he had or the impression made upon his mind at the time of 
 the occurrence observed.'*^ He must state the facts first, and then 
 on this evidence he may express his opinion or impression formed 
 at the time as to the sanity of the accused.**^ Though, the opinion 
 of the non-expert witness is in its effect the opinion as to the 
 sanity of the accused at a particular time, he is not usually per- 
 mitted to state his opinion in that shape. All that he is permitted 
 to do, after he has described the facts upon which the opinion is 
 based, is to state whether in his opinion on the facts which he tes- 
 tified to the conduct of the accused was rational or irrational.*^ 
 
 § 162. Non-expert must relate in evidence facts on which his im- 
 pression is based — Degree of knowledge required. — The opinion of a 
 non-expert, on facts related to him, is never received. But where 
 he has seen the actions of the person, and conversed with him, 
 the law considers it easily within the mental ability of any ordi- 
 nary person to distinguish the mental condition of an insane per- 
 son. The influence and value of his opinion will depend largely on 
 the intelligence he shows on his examination, and upon his oppor- 
 tunities for acquiring the knowledge on which his opinion is based. 
 
 " People V. Koerner, 191 N. Y. 528, wealth v. Wireback, 190 Pa. St. 138, 
 
 84 N. E. 1117, aff'g 117 App. Div. (N. 42 Atl. 542, 70 Am. St. 625; State v. 
 
 Y.) 40, 102 N. Y. S. 93. Constantine, 48 Wash. 218, 93 Pac. 
 
 *^ O'Brien v. People, 36 N. Y. 276, 317; Fults v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 282; Hickman v. State, 38 Tex. 190. 502, 98 S. W. 1057; Bothwell v. State, 
 
 ^ Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170, 71 Neb. 747, 99 N. W. 669 ; People v. 
 
 201, II So. 618, 17 L. R. A. 484n; Koerner, 191 N. Y. 528, 84 N. E. 
 
 State V. Williamson, 106 Mo. 162, 171, 1117; Parrish v. State, 139 Ala. 16, 
 
 17 S. W. 172; State V. Pennyman, 68 36 So. 1012. Where a laj^ witness, 
 
 Iowa 216, 26 N. W. 82; Hoover v. after describing the symptoms he ob- 
 
 State, 48 Neb. 184, 66 N. W. 11 17; served, characterized a man's conduct 
 
 Com. V. Buccieri, 153 Pa. St. 535, 26 as irrational, expert testimony show- 
 
 Atl. 228; Ellis V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. ing that people may exaggerate such 
 
 App. 86, 24 S. W. 894; State v. Beuer- symptoms is inadmissible. People 
 
 man, 59 Kan. 586, 53 Pac. 874; Hen- v. Webster, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 398, 
 
 derson v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 511, 400, 13 N. Y. S. 414. 
 
 93 S. W. 550; State V. Bell, 212 Mo. ''People v. Spencer, 179 N. Y. 408, 
 
 III, III S. W. 24; Atkins v. State 72 N. E. 461. 
 (Tenn.), 105 S. W. 353; Common-
 
 311 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. § 162 
 
 And his previous personal acquaintance with the accused, its char- 
 acter and the length of time it existed, his freedom from bias or 
 interest, the absence of finely spun theories from his conception of 
 the whole matter, the fullness of the facts within his knowledge, 
 and the accuracy of his memory, are also to be regarded in esti- 
 mating the value of his evidence.*^ The mental unsoundness or de- 
 rangement of the accused may have been very marked. It may 
 have been so apparent, from his actions, that any person, though 
 possessing but weak and inadequate powers of observation, may 
 be as competent to express an opinion as the most skillful and 
 learned physician. Here it may be said that the insanity is matter 
 of fact rather than of opinion, and the testimony of the witness is 
 only an opinion in form. If, when stating it in a criminal trial, he 
 narrates with particularity the minor details from which it is de- 
 duced or inferred, and, it being made to appear that he was per- 
 sonally acquainted with the accused for a long time, he details the 
 furious acts and gestures, the foolish and incoherent talk, or the 
 absurd and unnatural conduct of the accused, there can be no ob- 
 jection to his adding an inference that any man would draw from 
 them, i. e., that the accused was insane. No rule can be laid down 
 as regards the amount of knowledge which the non-expert witness 
 must possess. The weight the opinion shall have is for the jury 
 alone. If he has full knowledge of the previous life, antecedents 
 and surroundings of the prisoner his opinion ought certainly to 
 have more value than that of a witness who has only meager 
 knowledge of these subjects.*^ 
 
 ** "It is true that a non-expert wit- cannot decide whether the opinion is 
 
 ness must always state the facts upon of much or little weight; its duty is 
 
 which he bases his opinion as to the merely to decide whether such knowl- 
 
 mental capacity of a defendant in a edge is shown and such facts stated 
 
 criminal prosecution, and it is also as entitle the witness to express any 
 
 true that it must appear that he has opinion at all." Colee v. State, 75 
 
 some knowledge of the acts and con- Ind. 511, 514; State v. Von Kutzle- 
 
 duct of the person upon whose mental ben, 136 Iowa 89, 113 N. W. 484; 
 
 condition he declares his opinion. The Underbill on Ev., § 197, p. 285. 
 extent of this knowledge has never ** McLeod v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 
 
 been defined, and we cannot frame App. 331, 20 S. W. 749; Armstrong v. 
 
 any general rule which will determine State, 30 Fla. 170, 205, it So. 6x8, 17 
 
 just how much or how little knowl- L. R. A. 484n: Clark v. State, 12 Ohio 
 
 edge will entitle the witness' opinion 483, 489, 40 Am. Dec. 481 ; Colee v. 
 
 to admission. * * * The court State, 75 Ind. 511, 514; Sage v. State,
 
 § l62 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 312 
 
 The question whether a witness who is a non-expert is compe- 
 tent to testify is for the court to determine. He must have had 
 some acquaintance with the accused prior to the crime and he 
 must have had some opportunity to observe his conduct upon 
 which is based his opinion whether it was rational or irrational. 
 If it shall appear prima facie that the witness did not have suffici- 
 ent time for observation, his evidence should be excluded.^'' Thus 
 the witness cannot give his opinion as to the rational conduct of 
 the accused where his only knowledge of the accused was such as 
 was derived from business relations subsequent to the crime. ^^ 
 On the other hand, it has been held that a police officer who talked 
 with the accused after his arrest might testify that he then talked 
 rationally where the defense was insanity.^- And under the rule 
 that the non-expert witness must have had sufficient opportunity 
 for observations, the prosecution may properly be refused permis- 
 sion to put witnesses on the stand from among bystanders to ex- 
 press their opinion as to the rational conduct of the accused, where 
 the only basis for such an opinion is observations made during 
 the trial." 
 
 g 163. Expert evidence — What constitutes an expert — Physical 
 examination of accused to ascertain sanity. — The rule governing the 
 admission of expert testimony is the same in criminal as in civil 
 cases.^'* When the insanity of the accused is in issue, the opinions 
 of competent physicians or of expert alienists are generally admis- 
 sible. The opinion given may be brought out by a hypothetical 
 question containing the facts proved, or assumed to be proved, on 
 one side or the other. ^^ The putting of a hypothetical question 
 
 91 Ind. 141; Choice v. State, 31 Ga. 98 S. W. 851; Young v. State (Tex. 
 
 424; McClackey v. State, 5 Tex. App. Cr. App. 1907), 102 S. W. 1144. 
 
 320; Pflueger v. State, 46 Neb. 493, °' Queenan v. Territory, 190 U. S. 
 
 64 N. W. 1094; Braham v. State, 143 548, 47 L. ed. 1175. 23 Sup. Ct. 762, 
 
 Ala. 28, 38 So. 919; Watts v. State, aff'g 11 Okla. 261, 71 Pac. 218. 
 
 99 Md. 30, 57 Atl. 542; United States ®^ Parrish v. State, 139 Ala. 16, 2^ 
 
 V. Chisholm, 153 Fed. 808; Lawson v. So. 1012. 
 
 State (Ind.), 84 N. E. 974. ""State v. Von Kutzleben, 136 Iowa 
 
 '"Hite V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 20 89, 113 N. W. 484- 
 
 S. W. 217, 14 Ky. L. 308: Blake v. "State v. Webb, 56 Pac. 159, 18 
 
 Rourke, 74 Iowa 519, 38 N. W. 392; Utah 441. 
 
 Wells V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 499, " Cowley v. People, 83 X. Y. 464.
 
 313 
 
 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION, 
 
 163 
 
 and the giving of an opinion on it is the better and customary 
 practice, but where the expert has heard all the testimony bearing 
 on the mental condition of the accused, and there is no conflict in 
 the evidence, it is not error to permit him to give his opinion based 
 solely upon the evidence as heard by him,^'' So, also, an expert 
 may give his opinion based on the evidence as stated in a hypo- 
 thetical question and also upon an examination of the accused 
 made by the expert as a physician.^' An expert may give his opin- 
 ion upon knowledge obtained and facts observed by the witness 
 in treating or examining the accused professionally.^* Generally 
 an expert witness will not be allowed to give an opinion on the 
 evidence, unless it is embodied in a hypothetical question. To al- 
 low this would be to usurp the exclusive province of the jury and 
 enable him to decide upon the credibilit}' of the testimony. But an 
 expert witness may, where the evidence is not conflicting, and if 
 he has heard all of it bearing on insanity, be permitted to give his 
 opinion as regards the mental condition of the accused, based 
 upon the facts in evidence, if true.^** And where a hypothetical 
 
 470, 38 Am. 464; Dejarnette v. Com- 
 monwealth, 75 Va. 867 ; State v. 
 Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 315, 4 S. W. 931 ; 
 Underbill on Ev., p. 287, n. 4. People 
 V. James, 5 Cal. App. 427, 90 Pac. 561 ; 
 State V. Bell, 212 Mo. iii, in S. W. 
 24; People V. Koerner, 117 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 40, 102 N. Y. 93; Parrish v. 
 State, 139 Ala. 16, 36 So. 1012; State 
 V. Dunn, 179 Mo. 95, "]■] S. W. 848; 
 Schissler v. State, 122 Wis. 365, 99 
 X- W. 593. 
 '^ State V. Privitt, 175 Mo. 207, 75 
 
 S. w. 457. 
 
 ■'• People V. Koerner, 191 N. Y. 528, 
 84 N. E. 1 1 17, aff'g 117 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 40, 102 N. Y. S. 93, 20 N. Y. 
 Cr. 515. 
 
 '^Commonwealth v. Johnson, 188 
 Mass. 382, 74 N. E. 939. 
 
 " Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y. 147, 
 154; People V. Lake, 12 N. Y. 358, 
 362; Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 
 Mctc. (Mass.) 500, 41 .\m. Dec. 458; 
 State V. Wright, 134 Mo. 40^, 35 S. 
 
 W. 114s; State V. Reidel, 9 Houst. 
 (Del.) 470, 14 Atl. 550; State v. Hay- 
 den, 51 Vt. 296; People V. Wood, 126 
 N. Y. 249, 27 N. E. 362, 366; State v. 
 Baber, 74 Mo. 292, 41 Am. 314; State 
 V. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442, 30 N. W. 
 742; Commonwealth v. Buccieri, 153 
 Pa. St. 535, 26 Atl. 228; People v. 
 Schuyler, 106 N. Y. 298, 305, 306, 12 
 N. E. 783 ; People v. Smiler, 125 N. Y. 
 T'^ly 719. 26 N. E. 312; Parrish v. 
 State, 139 Ala. 16, 36 So. 10x2; State 
 V. Soper, 148 Mo. 217, 49 S. W. 1007; 
 State V. Ayles, 120 La. 661, 45 So. 
 540. The expert may give an opinion 
 on an admitted state of facts, or may 
 state facts within his knowledge as a 
 witness and express an opinion on 
 them; or a state of facts supported 
 in some degree ])y the evidence might 
 be assumed on which he may give an 
 opinion; if tlic assumed facts are 
 proved the statement of the opinion 
 is evidence, otherwise it is not to be
 
 §163 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 3I4 
 
 question is put it is within the discretion of the court to permit 
 the expert to make an explanation.*"' But the expert who testifies 
 as to the insanity of the accused should not be permitted to testify- 
 that in his opinion, the accused was or was not capable of deter- 
 mining- between right and wrong."^ A witness to be regarded as 
 an exjiert must have made insanity a subiect of special study. He 
 should also have had such practical experience in the care and 
 treatment of the insane"" as will render him conversant with the 
 subject and able to recognize its peculiar subtle manifestations."^ 
 A medical student whose knowledge of mental diseases is wholly 
 derived from lectures he has heard cannot be accepted as an ex- 
 pert."* But a physician attached to a hospital or asylum may tes- 
 tify to the mode of treating insane persons and as to the methods 
 of his hospital though he is not an expert on insanity."'^ But it 
 has been held that if he has had experience in treating cases of 
 insanity, and if he has practiced as a physician and surgeon, he is 
 not incompetent because he has not made insanity a special 
 stud)^°" In the absence of a mandatory statute the appointment 
 by the court of a physician to examine an accused person, alleged 
 to be insane at the time of his arraignment, is wholly discretion- 
 ary, and usually the necessity for the examination must be made 
 to appear."^ The jury are never concluded by the report of exam- 
 considered. It is not necessary in °' Reese Med. Juris., p. 19; State v. 
 stating a hypothetical case to assume Bell, 212 Mo. iii, iii S. W. 24; Lowe 
 all the facts which the evidence tends v. State, 118 Wis. 641, 96 N. W. 417. 
 to prove, but all facts assumed must The physician had treated four insane 
 be supported by some evidence, persons during a practice of 18 
 Guetig V. State, 66 Ind. 94, 104-105, months. 
 
 32 Am. 99n ; and cf. Burt v. State, 38 '^^ Hamilton v. United States, 26 
 Tex. Cr. App. 397, 40 S. W. 1000, 43 App. Cas. D. C. 382. 
 S. W. 344, 39 L. R. A. 305n; Schissler "^People v. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355, 
 V. State, 122 Wis. 365, 99 N. W. 593. 48 N. E. 730. 
 
 °° Commonwealth v. Parsons, 195 ""State v. Reddick, 7 Kan. 143, 151; 
 Mass. 560, 81 N. E. 291. Lowe v. State, 118 Wis. 641, 96 N. 
 
 " State V, Brown, 181 Mo. 192, 79 W. 417. 
 S. W. nil. "'People v. McElvaine, 125 N. Y. 
 
 "" A physician in active practice who 596, 604, 608, 26 N. E. 929. See, also, 
 has made a study of insanity and has Wel)ber, v. Commonwealth, 119 Pa, 
 averaged 15 cases a year is an expert. St. 223, 13 Atl. 427, 4 Am. St. 634; 
 Hamilton v. United States, 26 App. State v. Arnold, 12 Iowa 479, 483; 
 Cas. D. C. 382. People v. Ah Ying, 42 Cal. 18.
 
 315 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. § 1 63 
 
 iners to the effect that the accused is insane. The evidence of such 
 examiners is merely that of experts and its credibihty is for the 
 jury. So, also, a judgment which declared the accused insane 
 based upon an examination following his commitment to the state 
 asylum for the insane is not conclusive on the question of his in- 
 sanity. And while the commitment of the accused to a state asy- 
 lum may be admissible as tending to prove his insanity, the writ- 
 ten reports of the examining physicians, and their certificates 
 upon which the commitment was based, are not competent evi- 
 dence of his insanity/® Where the expert has made a physical ex- 
 amination he may be required to describe the facts and symptoms 
 observed,*^^ as well as the conversation which he had with the de- 
 fendant,'*^ but he cannot be allowed to narrate what the attendants 
 said.'^ The expert for the state who is appointed, or who is re- 
 quested by the prosecuting attorney to examine the accused for 
 the purpose of ascertaining his sanity, should conduct himself in 
 a fair and impartial manner during the examination. He need 
 not tell the accused the purpose of the examination but the fact 
 that he does so, asking the accused to be open and free with him, 
 but that he need not tell him anything that would incriminate 
 him, does not exclude the evidence secured by the expert. Such 
 a statement is not a promise on the part of the physician that he 
 will not testify against the accused, and he may testify to any fact 
 ascertained by him or admitted to him, even though he has not 
 warned the accused that his statements made on the examination 
 may be used against him.'" A physician who has examined the 
 accused may, after giving an opinion based on the knowledge thus 
 
 °* People V. Willard, 150 Cal. 543, United States, 165 U. S. 373, 41 L. ed. 
 
 89 Pac. 124. 750, 17 Sup. Ct. 360. See post, § 181 ; 
 
 '"' Commonwealth v. Gerade, 145 Pa. Braham v. State, 143 Ala. 28, 38 So. 
 
 St. 289, 291, 296, 22 Atl. 464, 27 Am. 919; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 188 
 
 St. 689; White V. Bailey, 10 Mich. Mass. 382, 74 N. E. 939. But not 
 
 155 ; Puryear v. Reese, 6 Coldw. that the accused had told the examin- 
 
 (Tenn.) 21 ; Commonwealth v. John- ing physician that he believed himself 
 
 son, t88 Mass. 382, 74 N. E. 939; going crazy. State v. Dunn, 179 Mo. 
 
 Cordes v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1908), 95, 77 S. W. 848. 
 
 112 S. \V. 943. " Heald v. Thing, 45 Me. 392. 396. 
 
 '" People V. Nino, 149 X. Y. 317, 43 " People v. Hill (N. Y. 1909), 87 N. 
 
 N. E. 853; People v. Shattuck, 109 E. 813. 
 Cal. 673, 42 Pac. 315. Cf. Davis v.
 
 164 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 316 
 
 acquired, be asked a hypothetical question upon facts occurring- 
 prior to the examination,''' and the fact that the witness fears his 
 opinion in answer to such question may be influenced by the facts 
 observed by him will not exclude it."* The opinion which is ex- 
 pressed by the expert must be positive in form and character. If 
 he cannot or will not give such an opinion his doubts that the 
 accused was sane, or his conjectures that he was insane, must be 
 rejected.'^ 
 
 § 164, Evidence of voluntary intoxication — When irrelevant. — At 
 common law voluntary intoxication, as distinct from mania a 
 potii, furnishes no excuse, justification or extenuation for a crime 
 committed under its influence.'" Intoxication as a mental and 
 
 " People V. Lake, 12 N. Y. 358, 362 ; 
 State V. Church, 199 Mo. 605, 98 S. 
 W. 16; Commonwealth v. Woelfel, 
 121 Ky. 48, 88 S. W. 1061, 28 Ky. L. 
 16; Ince V. State, "jy Ark. 426, 93 S. 
 W. 65. 
 
 " People V. Schuyler, 43 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 88. 
 
 "' Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y. 147, 
 154. As a general rule, neither books 
 of established reputation, whether 
 written by physicians or lawyers, nor 
 statistics on the increase of insanity, 
 can be read to the jury. Common- 
 wealth V. Wilson, I Gray (Mass.) 
 
 2Z7, 339- 
 
 '" 4 Bl. Com. 25, 26, I Hale P. C. 32 ; 
 Bacon's Maxims, rule 5 ; Colee v. 
 State, 75 Ind. 511, 515; Hopt v. Peo- 
 ple, 104 U. S. 631, 633, 26 L. ed. 873; 
 Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550, 556; 
 State V. Murphy, 118 Mo. 7, 25 S. W. 
 95; McCook V. State, 91 Ga. 740, 17 S. 
 E. 1019; People V. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 
 9, 16-23, 72 Am. Dec. 484; People v. 
 Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 19, 97 Am. Dec. 
 i62n ; Sanders v. State, 94 Ind. 147, 
 148; Wagner v. State, 116 Ind. 181, 
 186, 18 N. E. 833; Conly v. Common- 
 wealth, 98 Ky. 125, 32 S. W. 285, 17 
 
 Ky. L. 678; People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 
 10, 45 Pac. 986; Commonwealth v. 
 Gentry, 5 Pa. Dist. 703; Cribb v. 
 State, 118 Ga. 316, 45 S. E. 396; State 
 V. Brown, 181 Mo. 192, 79 S. W. iiii ; 
 State V. Hogan, 117 La. 863, 42 So. 
 352; Morris v. Territory (Okla. Cr. 
 App. 1909), 99 Pac. 760. Elliott Ev., 
 § 2729. See, also, as sustaining the 
 text, Cleveland v. State, 86 Ala. i, 5 
 So. 426; People V. Blake, 65 Cal. 275, 
 4 Pac. I ; State v. ]\Iowr}-, 37 Kan. 
 369, 15 Pac. 282; State v. O'Neil, 51 
 Kan. 651, 23 Pac. 287; 24 L. R. A. 
 555; State v. Lowe, 93 Mo. 547, 5 S. 
 W. 889; State V. Murphy, 118 Mo. 
 7, 25 S. W. 95 ; Cline v. State, 43 Ohio 
 St. 332, I N. E. 22; State v. Bundy, 
 24 S. Car. 439, 58 Am. 262; Garner 
 V. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835, 29 
 Am. St. 232; Springfield v. State, 96 
 Ala. 81, II So. 250, 38 Am. St. 85; 
 McCook V. State, 91 Ga. 740, 17 S. E. 
 1019; Aszman v. State, 123 Ind. 347, 
 24 N. E. 123, 8 L. R. A. 33n: Shan- 
 nahan v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush. 
 (Ky.) 463, 8 Am. 465: Flanigan v. 
 People, 86 N. Y. 554, 40 Am. 556n; 
 People V. Leonardin, 143 N. Y. 360, 
 38 N. E. 272; State v. McDaniel, 115
 
 31/ INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. § 1 65 
 
 physical condition may be easily simulated. \\'hile if the accused 
 was really intoxicated when he committed the crime, if he has 
 cast aside the restraints of sobriety and voluntarily contracted 
 madness, his drunken condition is not relevant to excuse him. 
 This is true though he may have been in a frenzy from indulgence 
 in drink, for, if he has capacity remaining to appreciate and rec- 
 ognize the moral character of his acts, he is responsible. Hence 
 evidence of mere intoxication voluntarily acquired, and not 
 claimed to involve mental derangement, existing when the crime 
 was committed, is inadmissible where its sole purpose and ob- 
 ject are to furnish an excuse for or extenuation of the crime, 
 
 § 165. Insensibility or insanity from indulgence in intoxicants may 
 be shown. — Evidence of intoxication is sometimes relevant, not 
 strictly as a defense, but to show the condition, either mental or 
 physical, of the prisoner. Thus if the bodily powers of the accused 
 were so far subjugated by his indulgence in intoxicating drink, 
 or in stupefying drugs, that, at the time of the crime alleged, he 
 was physically unable to make the motions involved in its com- 
 mission, his drunkenness may be proved to show he was not and 
 could not have been implicated in the crime.'^' Evidence of intox- 
 ication at the time of the offense, or prior thereto, is admissible 
 under a plea of insanity caused by over-indulgence in intoxicating 
 liquors. But the fact of the prisoner's intoxication is mainly rele- 
 vant to show his mental condition. It is never conclusive. The 
 question of his insanity is for the jur}- to determine upon all the 
 circumstances. His prior dissipation and actual drunkenness at 
 the date of the crime are merely facts for them to consider in de- 
 termining whether he was, at the instant of the crime, suffering 
 from such a degree of mental unsoundness as to destroy his capac- 
 
 X. Car. S07, 20 S. E. 622; Common- time he was so incapable, as thoiif?h 
 
 wealth V. Cleary, 135 Pa. St. 64, 19 he had been so rendered incapable by 
 
 Atl. 1017; 26 W. N. C. 137, 8 L. R. paralysis of his limbs from some 
 
 A. 30in ; Terrill v. State, 74 Wis. 278, cause over which he had no control. 
 
 42 X. W. 243. The cause of the incapacity in such 
 
 '"'If a man by voluntary drunken- case is immaterial; the material ques- 
 
 ness renders himself incapal)le of tion is, was he in fact incapable of 
 
 walking for a limited time, it is just doing the acts charged?" Ingalls v. 
 
 as competent evidence tending to State, 48 Wis. 647, 651, 4 X. W. 785. 
 show that he did not walk during the
 
 § l66 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 318 
 
 ity to distinguish between right and wrong in that particular 
 case.'^ A witness cannot express an opinion as to whether the 
 accused can or cannot control his appetite for intoxicating drink."'* 
 
 § 166. Evidence of intoxication as bearing on a specific intent or on 
 premeditation. — Where the existence of a particular specific intent 
 is necessary to constitute a given act a crime, evidence that the ac- 
 cused was intoxicated when he committed the alleged criminal 
 act is relevant to show the accused could not have entertained the 
 intent.^" This does not mean that drunkenness is an excuse for the 
 commission of crime. If the mental condition of the accused at 
 the time of the alleged criminal act is such that he was incapable 
 of having any intent his act is not a crime at all. And it is always 
 competent to show his excessive intoxication by which the ac- 
 cused was wholly though temporarily deprived of his reason if 
 it was not indulged in to commit the crime and such evidence is 
 for the jury to consider in determining whether there was an in- 
 tent to commit a crime.®^ So, where one is indicted for assault 
 with intent to rob,^- to commit rape, or to do great bodily harm,^^ 
 evidence that he was very much intoxicated at the date of the 
 assault is relevant to show that he did not entertain the intent 
 
 "' People V. Blake, 65 Cal. 275, 4 v. State, 130 Ga. 361, 60 S. E. 1005, 
 
 Pac. I ; Erwin v. State, 10 Tex. App. 8 L. R. A. 33, note. 
 
 700. ^Williams v. State, 81 Ala. i, i So. 
 
 "Goodwin V. State, 96 Ind. 550, 179, 60 Am. 133; Cleveland v. State, 
 
 566. 86 Ala. I, 5 So. 426; People v. Wil- 
 
 *" State V. Zorn, 22 Ore. 591, 30 Pac. Hams, 43 Cal. 344; People v. Vincent, 
 
 371; Commonwealth v. Hagenlock, 95 Cal. 425; 30 Pac. 581; Chrisman v. 
 
 140 Mass. 125, 3 N. E. 36; Cline v. State, 54 Ark 283, 15 S. W. 889, 26 
 
 State, 43 Ohio St. 332, i N. E. 22; Am. St. 44; People v. Lane, 100 Cal. 
 
 Reg. V. Moore, 3 C. & K. 319, 16 Jur. 379, 34 Pac. 856 ; People v. Young, 
 
 750; People V. Rogers, 18 X. Y. 9, 102 Cal. 411, 36 Pac. 770; Schlencker 
 
 17, 72 Am. Dec. 484; Wood v. State, v. State, 9 Neb. 241, i X. \V. 857; 
 
 34 Ark. 341, 36 Am. 13; Garner v. O'Grady v. State, 36 Neb. 320, 54 N. 
 
 State, 28 Fla. 113, 155, 9 So. 835, 29 W. 556; Wilcox v. State, 94 Tenn. 
 
 Am. St. 232; Aszman v. State, 123 106, 28 S. W. 312; Clore v. State, 26 
 
 Ind. 347, 24 N. E. 123, 8 L. R. A. 33n; Tex. App. 624, 10 S. W. 242. 
 
 People V. Walker, 38 Mich. 156; Peo- "Scott v. State, 12 Tex. App. 31, 
 
 pie V. Odell, I Dak. 197, 46 N. W. 39; Keeton v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 
 
 601; Mooney v. State, 33 Ala. 419; 522, 18 S. W. 359, 13 Ky. L. 748. 
 
 Chrisman v. State, 54 Ark. 283, 288, *^ State v. Garvey, 11 ]\Iinn. 154. 
 
 15 S. W. 889, 26 Am. St. 44; Robinson Contra, Jeffries v. State, 9 Tex. App. 
 
 598, 605.
 
 319 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. § 1 66 
 
 charged.** If, from such evidence the jury are convinced the ac- 
 cused was so intoxicated as to be unable to form the specific in- 
 tent, a conviction of any crime other than simple assault must be 
 reversed. The specific intent to deprive the owner of his property, 
 as well as the taking away, are essential ingredients of larceny. 
 If it can be shown that the accused while carrying away the goods 
 was too drunk to entertain the intent of depriving the owner of 
 his property, he must be acquitted. ^^ So, the defendant's intoxi- 
 cation is relevant to disprove the felonious intention which must 
 be present in the act of breaking in and entering to constitute 
 burglary.*^ In all these cases the question of intent is for the jury 
 alone and the intoxication of the accused, however great, is never 
 conclusive but is merely a circumstance for the jury to consider 
 in determining the intent. Evidence of intoxication may be rele- 
 vant to show the absence of guilty knowledge. Thus, the existence 
 of knowledge of the falsity of the testimony given, when perjury 
 has been committed, or of the spurious character of the notes or 
 money forged in the crime of counterfeiting may both be rebutted 
 by evidence that the mind of the accused was so overcome by drink 
 that he did not possess the guilty knowledge necessary to these 
 crimes.** But where some act, innocent in itself, as for example, 
 voting more than once at an election, is made criminal by statutes 
 if voluntarily done,*** or where no specific intent is required by 
 law, evidence of intoxication is irrelevant.''" Sometimes by statute 
 the existence of a premeditated design to cause death on the part- 
 of the accused is essential to constitute a homicide murder in the 
 first degree. In such case drunkenness is relevant and may be 
 considered by the jury to determine the mental condition of the 
 
 " State V. Donovan, 61 Iowa 369, *^ See § 397. Breaking in and cn- 
 
 16 N. W. 206; State v. Fiske, 63 tering. 
 
 Conn. 388, 392, 28 Atl. 572; State v. '' Pigman v. State, 14 Ohio 555, 557, 
 
 Gut, 13 Minn. 341, 361; People v. 45 Am. Dec. 558 (counterfeiting); 
 
 Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683. Lytle v. State, 31 Ohio St. 196, 200 
 
 '^Ingalls V. State, 48 Wis. 647, 651, (perjury). 
 
 4 X. W. 785; Wood V. State, 34 Ark. *" State v. Welch, 21 jNIinn. 22, 26- 
 
 .341. 36 Am. 13; People v. Walker, 38 28. 
 
 Mich. 156. Contra, Dawson v. State, "" People v. Marseiler, 70 Cal. 98, 
 
 16 Ind. 428, 439, 79 Am. Dec. 439, 36 lOO. 
 Am. 13.
 
 § 1 66 CRnnxAL evidence. 320 
 
 accused, that is. to ascertain whether he liad mental capacity to 
 form a premechtated design, and from the fact of his drunkenness, 
 if excessive, they may infer that his intellect was so befogged that 
 the formation or execution of a deliberate intention or a premed- 
 itated design to kill was impossible.''^ In other words an allega- 
 tion that the accused acted with premeditation or deliberation lets 
 in evidence that he was intoxicated at the time. But proof of his 
 intoxication does not, as matter of law, rebut a presumption of 
 premeditation arising in the circumstances, nor is an instruction 
 to that effect warranted. It is only a circumstance for the jury, 
 and its effect in negativing premeditation is for them, as they 
 measure the degree of intoxication upon all the facts. ^- Evidence 
 of voluntary intoxication, not producing complete insensibility, 
 is sometimes relevant and may be considered by the jury in de- 
 termining the meaning of, and motive for, words uttered, as, for 
 example, to determine whether threatening language used by the 
 accused, or the victim of a homicide was the outcome of deliberate 
 h.atred, or the idle vaporings of a drunken man.''^ 
 
 ^^ 167. Mode of proving or disproving intoxication. — A non-expert 
 witness may testify that the accused or some other person was 
 intoxicated on a given date,'** and that he was habitually intem- 
 
 ^^ Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 155, pie v. Rogers, r8 N. Y. 9, 26, ^2 Am. 
 
 9 So. 835, 29 Am. St. 232 ; Shannahan Dec. 484 ; Keenan v. Commonwealth, 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 8 Bush (Ky.) 463, 44 Pa. St. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 414; State 
 
 8 Am. 465; Boswell's Case, 20 Gratt. v. McCants, i Speers (S. Car.) 384; 
 
 (Va.) 860; Hopt V. People, 104 U. S. State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 43 
 
 631, 26 L. ed. 873; State v. Donovan, Am. 799; State v. Hertzog, 55 W. Va. 
 
 61 Iowa 369, 16 N. W. 206; Scott V. 74, 46 S. E. 792. 
 
 State, \2 Tex. App. 31 ; People v. "■ People v. Mills, 98 N. Y. 176, 182. 
 
 Cummins, 47 JNIich. 334 ; Tidwell v. °" People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, 19, 
 
 State, 70 Ala. :i,2, ; Kelly v. State, 3 'j2 Am. Dec. 484 ; Friery v. People, 54 
 
 Sm. & Isl. (Miss.) 518; Common- Barb. (N. Y.) 319, 326; Hopt v. 
 
 wealth V. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412; People, 104 U. S. 631, 26 L. ed. 873; 
 
 Haile v. State, 11 Humph. (Tenn.) State v. Welch, 21 Minn. 22; Davis 
 
 153; People V. Belencia, 21 Cal. 544; v. State, 25 Ohio St. 369; State v. 
 
 State V. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136; Rob- Johnson, 40 Conn. 136. 
 
 erts V. People, 19 Mich. 401, 417; "'People v. Sanford, 43 Cal. 29, Z'^, 
 
 State V. Mewry, iy Kan. 369, yjT, 33; People v. Monteith, T^ Cal. 7, 14 
 
 Bernhardt v. State. 82 Wis. 22,, 51 Pac. ZTi'- People v. Eastwood, 14 X. 
 
 X. W. 1009: Malone v. State, 49 Ga. Y. 562; State v. Pierce, 65 Iowa 85, 
 
 210; Cluck v. State, 40 Ind. 263; Peo- 21 X. W. 195; Commonwealth v.
 
 321 INSANITY AND INTOXICATION. §§ 167-168 
 
 perate."" Evidence of the conduct of the accused on previous oc- 
 casions when he was intoxicated is competent as bearing on his 
 intoxication when he committed the crime charged, and as illus- 
 trating his usual manner of acting when drunk.^" The witness 
 will not be permitted to testify that the defendant's intoxication 
 was or was not sufficient to prevent the formation of intent or 
 premeditation, as that is a question for the jury alone.^' It is not 
 relevant for the defense to show that the prisoner had liquor in 
 his house which he might have drunk,**^ or that he was easily af- 
 fected by liquor and had drunk more than usual, ^^ or to prove 
 experiments made with liquor which is not positively identified 
 by independent evidence as the liquor drunk by the accused prior 
 to the crime/"*' 
 
 § 168. Morphine habit. — Though habitual indulgence in mor- 
 phine is by no means as common as indulgence in intoxicating 
 liquors, the use of morphine, cocaine and similar drugs is suffic- 
 iently common to justify an inquiry into what circumstances evi- 
 dence of their use is competent. The habitual use of morphine 
 may be shown, and, if proved, is a circumstance for the jury to 
 ■consider in determining the mental condition of the accused. If 
 on all the circumstances they shall determine that the faculty of 
 understanding the moral quality of the act has been destroyed by 
 the use of the deleterious drugs they should acquit. Many petty 
 crimes spring from the morphine habit. Those who use it habit- 
 ually will resort to any method, however criminal, to attain it, such 
 as forging a prescription for it, or stealing it from the office of a 
 physician. In all such cases, evidence of experts is competent to 
 show the peculiar symptoms which are inseparable from the con- 
 tinued use of the drug.^"^ 
 
 Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 19 Am. 175. Contra, Commonwealth v. 
 
 40in; Underbill on Ev., p. 269, n 8. Cloonen, 151 Pa. St. 605, 25 Atl. 145. 
 
 ■"^Gallagher v. People, 120 III. 179, "Armor v. State, 63 Ala. 173, 176. 
 
 182, II N. E. 335; Smith v. State, 55 "'Commonwealth v. Cloonen, 151 
 
 Ala. I, 10; Tatum v. State, 63 Ala. Pa. St. 605, 25 Atl. 145. 
 
 147, 150; Heningburg v. State, 153 ""State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376. 
 
 Ala. 13, 45 So. 246; State v. Cather, '"* People v. Slack, 90 Alich. 448, 51 
 
 121 Iowa 106, 96 N. W. 722. N. W. 533. 
 
 ** Upstone V. People, 109 Til. 169, "" System of Legal Medicine, vol. 
 
 2, p. 207. 
 
 21 — Underhill Crim. Ev.
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 § 169. Foundation of the doctrine and 
 classification of communica- 
 tions. 
 
 170. Executive communications and 
 
 transactions. 
 
 171. Communications to police offi- 
 
 cials. 
 
 172. Communications to attorneys- 
 
 at-law. 
 
 173. Communications made by or to 
 
 the agent of the attorney. 
 
 174. Character and date of the com- 
 
 munications. 
 
 175. Communications made in con- 
 
 templation of crime. 
 
 176. Permanency of the privilege — 
 
 Waiver. 
 
 177. Writings, when privileged. 
 
 178. Communications to spiritual 
 
 adviser. 
 
 179. Communications passing be- 
 
 tween medical practitioners 
 and their patients. 
 
 180. Death of the patient — Purpose 
 
 of the communication — Con- 
 templated crime. 
 
 § 181. 
 
 85. 
 
 87. 
 
 T89. 
 190. 
 
 191. 
 
 192. 
 
 193- 
 
 Communications made during 
 an examination to detect or 
 ascertain sanity. 
 
 Secrecy of telegrams. 
 
 Indecency of the facts to be 
 proved. 
 
 Privileged communications be- 
 tween husband and wife. 
 
 Husband and wife as witnesses 
 in criminal proceedings. 
 
 Statutory competency of hus- 
 band and wife. 
 
 Confidential communications 
 between husband and wife. 
 
 Husband or wife of co-defend- 
 ant as a witness for or 
 against his associate in crime 
 — Testimony of husband or 
 wife on trial of a third per- 
 son tending to criminate. 
 
 Valid marriage is necessary. 
 
 Privilege as relating to the evi- 
 dence to judicial officers. 
 
 Privilege as relating to grand 
 jurors. 
 
 Statutory regulations of the 
 competency of grand jurors. 
 
 Evidence of traverse jurors. 
 
 § 169. Foundation of the doctrine and classification of communica- 
 tions. — The welfare of society and the proper and orderly adminis- 
 tration of justice require that certain evidence, or, more correctly 
 speaking, the evidence of certain classes of witnesses, shall be ab- 
 solutely inadmissible, in criminal trials. The advantage which 
 would be gained in punishing any particular crime would be more 
 
 322
 
 ^2^ PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. § 1 69 
 
 than counterbalanced by the injury to society as a whole. Thus 
 it is recognized that, because of the complexity of modern juris- 
 prudence, both criminal and civil, any person who has to defend 
 himself against a criminal accusation, or to protect or enforce a 
 right, must secure and receive the assistance of counsel who, be- 
 cause of their skill and experience, are fitted to aid and advise 
 him. To enable members of the legal profession to render ef- 
 ficient aid, and to bring the matters entrusted to them to a suc- 
 cessful conclusion, it is usually an absolute necessity that the 
 client should make a full and complete disclosure of every fact 
 bearing on the criminal transaction. It is a maxim of the crimi- 
 nal law that no man can be compelled to testify against himself. 
 Hence, no fact or admission can with justice be used against the 
 accused which he was under the necessity of imparting confiden- 
 tially to his counsel. The law regards it as extremely wise to 
 encourage and sustain the high and unlimited confidence which 
 should exist between persons who bear the peculiar and intimate 
 relations towards one another of attorney and client. Upon simi- 
 lar considerations the knowledge acquired by a physician while 
 attending a patient, by a clergyman during the performance of 
 his spiritual duties, or the communications passing between hus- 
 band and wife, are also privileged. Writers upon the law of evi- 
 dence have divided privileged communications into four classes, 
 viz.. professional, judicial, political and social. In the first class 
 are included disclosures to attorneys, physicians and priests. 
 Communications privileged because of their judicial character 
 comprise the oral deliberations of grand and trial juries, the evi- 
 dence given before the grand jury, communications passing be- 
 tween judges, and all information in the hands of prosecuting 
 officials or others which leads to the detection or punishment of 
 crime. The third class, or political communications, is composed 
 of the transactions of the executive departments of the govern- 
 ment and all communications passing between the departmental 
 officials. By social communications are meant the communica- 
 tions passing between husl)and and wife in the intimacy and con- 
 fidence of tlie marriage relation. 
 
 These restrictions upon the capacity of certain classes of per- 
 sons as regards the evidence which they will be allowed to give, 
 are not founded on any peculiar respect which the law entertains
 
 § 170 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 324 
 
 for their calling or character. They have their origin in the de- 
 sire to procure a pure and unembarrassed administration of the 
 law, to subserve justice, and to protect the innocent, while secur- 
 ing the punishment of the guilty. 
 
 § 170. Executive communications and transactions. — The com- 
 mon law has always regarded as privileged all information in the 
 possession of executive officials as such ; and has uniformly de- 
 clined to compel them to divulge facts of which they have ob- 
 tained knowledge in any official capacity. This rule has been 
 most frequently invoked in civil cases. ^ In this country the various 
 executive departments of the government, both federal and state, 
 acting under the power conferred by the legislative branch to 
 formulate rules for the proper conduct of departmental affairs, 
 have forbidden their subordinate officials to disclose official in- 
 formation, unless permitted or required to do so by their official 
 superiors. The true rule, therefore, now is that the chief execu- 
 tive officer is the sole judge of the propriety of refusing to testify 
 or producing papers and of permitting his subordinates to do so.- 
 
 The privilege as regards executive communications is not ab- 
 solute in the sense that professional communications are abso- 
 lutely privileged and cannot be divulged. Thus the governor of 
 a state may or he may not with perfect propriety refuse to state 
 his reasons for signing a bill passed by the legislature or any 
 facts which were communicated to him in connection with his 
 
 ' Thompson v. German Valley R. court where obedience to the orders 
 
 Co., 22 N. J. Eq. Ill, 113; Totten v. of these courts would require such 
 
 United States, 92 U. S. 105, 107, 2^ L. officials to disobey the rules of the 
 
 ed. 605. (Action to recover for serv- general government. 
 
 ices as spy during rebellion dismissed.) "i Burr's Trial, 182; Gray v. Pent- 
 
 Huttman, In re, 70 Fed. 699, 705. land, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 22,, 31. In which 
 
 In this case the refusal to permit an it was held that parol evidence could 
 
 official of the United States internal not be given of a libellous deposition 
 
 revenue to testify in a state court for which had been sent to the governor 
 
 the trial of criminals to the contents of Pennsylvania containing charges 
 
 of the records of his office, was based against an officer he had appointed in 
 
 upon the regulations of the commis- an action for libel, though the court 
 
 sioner of internal revenue forbidding had refused a subpoena duces tecum, 
 
 the disclosure of these records. And and the governor could exercise his 
 
 the court held that internal revenue own discretion in producing the depo- 
 
 officials were not subject to the state sition.
 
 325 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 8 I?! 
 
 action in the premises. And no valid reason exists why he may 
 not testify when or by whom it was dehvered to him, for that is 
 a bare fact implying no action on his part. The propriety and 
 advisability of testifying to any fact which the executive official 
 may have acquired while acting in an official capacity are, how- 
 ever, always exclusively for his determination.^ 
 
 § 171. Communications to police officials. — The proper adminis- 
 tration of justice and the protection of society against criminals 
 imperatively require that persons should be encouraged in per- 
 forming the duty, incumbent upon all, of communicating to the 
 proper officials any information which they may possess regard- 
 ing the commission of a crime, or the identity or whereabouts of 
 the criminal. To this end the disclosure in court of the names of 
 persons who gave such information, either by a police official 
 who made the arrest,* by the informer himself, or by any other 
 person, will not be permitted. ° 
 
 Under the original rule not only was the name of the informer 
 and the name of the magistrate or other person to whom informa- 
 tion was given excluded, but every communication made, or act 
 done, leading up to the detection of a crime, or to the apprehen- 
 sion of the criminal, was excluded from evidence in a criminal 
 trial." This is doubtless a just rule in civil cases where the ques- 
 tion of guilt is involved collaterally, as in an action for slander 
 or libel contained in a communication to the police. But when 
 
 ^Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. St. 16 Me. 293, 295, 33 Am. Dec. 665. 
 
 433, 447, 27 Am. 66711. "The general rule is that persons en- 
 
 * United States v. Moses, 4 Wash, gaged in the detection of crime are 
 
 C. C. (N. S.) 726, 27 Fed. Cases not bound to disclose the sources of 
 
 15825. . the information which led to the ap- 
 
 ^ Attorney-General v. Briant, 15 M. prehension of the prisoner. The reason 
 & W. 169, IS L. J. Exch. 265; Rex v. for the rule is that such disclosure 
 Akers, 6 Esp. i25n ; Rex v. Hardy, 24 can be of no importance to the de- 
 How. St. Tr. 199; Rex v. Watson, 32 fense, and may be highly prejudicial 
 How. St. Tr. I, 105, 2 Stark. 104, 116, to the public in the administration of 
 136; State V. Brown, 2 Marv. (Del.) justice by deterring persons from 
 380, 36 Atl. 458. The owner of stolen making similar disclosures." People 
 property is not bound to disclose, on v. Laird, 102 Mich. 135, 60 N. W. 
 the witness stand, the names of per- 457. 
 
 sons who wrote to him in regard to " Rex v. Watson, 32 How. St. Tr. 
 
 his missing property. State v. Sopcr, i, 105, 2 Stark. 104, 116.
 
 §172 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 326 
 
 the question arises in a criminal trial, and the information is ma- 
 terial to determine the defendant's innocence, it would seem both 
 reasonable and just that the necessity and desirability of the dis- 
 closure and the question whether the public interests would be 
 benefited or would suffer, should be solely for the judicial discre- 
 tion upon the circumstances of the case.'' 
 
 § 172. Communications to attorn eys-at-law. — At common law an 
 attorney could not be compelled, nor would he be allowed, to dis- 
 close any communication made to him by a client, or the advice 
 given by him in the course of his professional employment.* In 
 very many, if not in a majority of the states, this rule has been 
 confirmed by statute. It is also often expressly provided that 
 the privileged character of the communication may be waived by 
 the client.** The modern tendency of the courts is to give the 
 rule its fullest possible application, and to apply it in both civil 
 and criminal proceedings, not only to oral or written communi- 
 cations passing between attorney and client, but to all information 
 which is acquired by the former because of the existence of the 
 professional relation. It matters not whether the information 
 has been derived from the client's words, actions or personal ap- 
 pearance. Thus, where the accused was on trial for stealing a 
 quantity of current silver coin, it was held error to compel his 
 
 ' People V. Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 573, practice sign the complaint and testify 
 
 18 N. W. 362; Reg. V. Richardson, 3 as a witness. 
 
 F. & F. 693; People v. Laird, 102 * Best on Ev., §§ 53, 581; Reg. v. 
 Mich. 135, 139, 60 N. W. 457; United Hankins, 2 C. & K. 823, 825 (a writ- 
 States V. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. ing in the hands of the attorney) ; 
 S.) 726, 27 Fed. Cases 15825. The Rex v. Dixon, 3 Burr. 1687; i Phill. 
 matter is now sometimes regulated by on Ev., 171 ; Casey v. State, Zl Ark. 
 statute, Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 1881 ; (y"], 83, 84. See civil cases Underhill 
 Colo., Acts 1883, p. 289; Minn. Stat., on Ev., § 169 ct scq. 
 § 5094. The disclosure of the name " See Tennessee Code, 1884, § 4748, 
 of the informer may be necessary in a p. 897 ; Georgia Code, 1882, p. 987, 
 case where the accused claims he is § 3797 ; Pennsylvania, 2 Pur. Dig. pp. 
 the victim of false accusations by an 1493, 1495 ; California Code Civ. Proc. 
 enemy, or where he claims he is the § 1881 ; Indiana Rev. St. 1881, §§ 497, 
 victim of a groundless arrest or per- 1796; Missouri Rev. St., 1879, P- 690, 
 secution by the police. And the rule § 4017; Wisconsin An. St. 1898, § 
 of silence is in modern times of very 4076; Texas Code Cr. Proc. 1906, § 
 little importance where a complainant jj^. 
 must imder local rules of statutory
 
 327 PRIV'ILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. § 1/2 
 
 attorney to testify to the fact that he had received silver coin as 
 a part of his retainer/" And in some states the statute expressly 
 provides that all information coming to the attorney and relating 
 to the matter upon which he has been consulted by the client is 
 privileged." The rules and statutes regulating privileged com- 
 munications are generally regarded, both by legislators and by 
 the courts, as applicable to the examination of witnesses in crimi- 
 nal trials, even where this is not expressly provided for in the 
 statute.^" An}^ communication which passes between the client 
 and the attorney or between the attorney and the witnesses for the 
 client* before the trial is usually privileged. It is not only the 
 right of the accused to have his witnesses interviewed by his 
 attorney before the trial, but it is the duty of the attorney to 
 confer with the witnesses for his client and ascertain what they 
 will testify. Anything passing between them, aside from the 
 privilege, is not material, but it is always material and proper to 
 show that the attorney attempted to corrupt or influence a wit- 
 ness to color his testimony in favor of the accused or to testify 
 falsely; and it is extremely doubtful whether the privilege could 
 be pleaded by the accused to protect him against evidence that his 
 attorney had with his consent attempted to bribe a witness to 
 testify falsely or to absent himself from the reach of process.^" 
 The fact that the client, being an accomplice, turns state's evi- 
 dence does not waive the privilege. Even such a course on his 
 part does not open his attorney's lips as regards professional 
 communications." 
 
 '" State V. Dawson, go Mo. 149, 154, 483. Cf. People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 
 
 I S. W. 827 ; State v. Douglass, 20 W. 39 Pac. 207. 
 
 Va. 770, 781. "Eads v. State (Wyo. 1909), loi 
 
 '^ Texas Code Cr. Proc, 1906, § Pac. 946. 
 
 773- " Sutton v. State, 16 Tex. App. 490. 
 
 '"Wharton Cr. Ev. § 496, ct scq.; Contra, Alderman v. People, 4 Mich. 
 Milan v. State, 24 Ark. 346, 355 ; Ben- 414, 69 Am. Dec. 321. A letter writ- 
 edict V. State, 44 Ohio St. 679, 688, 11 ten by an attorney for the defendant 
 X. E. 125; State v. Hazleton, 15 La. was inadmissible, since if it was auth- 
 Ann. 72; Hernandez v. State, 18 Tex. orized by the defendant it was priv- 
 App. 134, 152, 51 Am. 295; Poison v. ileged, and if not, it was merely the 
 State, 137 Ind. 519, 35 N. E. 907; Gra- act of a third party. Taylor v. State, 
 iiam V. People, 63 Barb. (N. Y.) 468, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 381, 97 S. W. 474.
 
 § 173 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 328 
 
 § 173. Communications made by or to the agent of the attorney. — 
 
 The communication need not have been made directly to a mem- 
 ber of the legal profession. But it must have been made to a per- 
 son who, whatever his character, was actually occupying the 
 position of legal adviser. If a communication was made to an 
 attorney whom the accused has requested to act for him, and who 
 has not at once expressly refused to do it will be privileged, 
 though he subsequently refuse to act.^^ The rule does not re- 
 quire that a retainer should have been paid,^'' or any particular 
 form of application made to the attorney, if he was consulted 
 with the intention of obtaining his professional services atid he 
 by implication or expressly has consented to act. A communica- 
 tion to or advice from the representative of an attorney is no less 
 privileged than a communication by or to the attorney. Thus, 
 a clerk, interpreter, or agent of the attorney, will not be allowed 
 to testify to any communication made to him in a professional 
 capacity by a client of his employer.^'^ One present during a 
 conversation between attorney and client, but who was not the 
 medium of conversation or who did not stand in a position of 
 peculiar confidence to the client may testify to what he saw and 
 heard. ^^ Thus a friend of the accused who took him to the office 
 of a lawyer may testify to what passed between the lawyer and 
 the accused at the interview.^^ So, also, a mere bystander who 
 took absolutely no part in the conversation between the attorney 
 and the client may testify to what he heard though all his knowl- 
 edge of what was said was acquired by reason of the carelessness 
 
 ^^Peek V. Eoone, 90 Ga. ■j6-], 17 S. Hoy v. Morris, 13 Gray (Mass.) 519, 
 
 E. 66, 67; Young v. State, 65 Ga. 525. 74 Am. Dec. 650; Holman v. Kimball, 
 
 " Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N. Y. 394, 22 Vt. 555. The presence of the 
 
 399, 36 Am. 627n ; Thayer v. Thayer, mother of a prosecutrix in a trial for 
 
 lOi Mass. Ill, 100 Am. Dec. iion. the crime of seduction at an interview 
 
 "Underbill on Evidence, § 169; betw^een her daughter and the daugh- 
 
 Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. zi, 68, 7 So. ter's attorney does not destroy the 
 
 302 ; I Green, on Evid., § 239 ; Studdy privilege as the daughter's youth, in- 
 
 V. Sanders, 2 Dowl. & R. 347. nocence and modesty would impera- 
 
 ^' People V. Buchanan, 145 N. Y. l, tively require the mother to be pres- 
 
 26, 39 N. E. 846, 64 N. Y. St. 427; ent at the interview. Bowers v. State, 
 
 State V. Perry, 4 Idaho 224, 38 Pac. 29 Ohio St. 542, 546. 
 
 655; Tyler v. Hall, 106 Mo. 313, 17 "People v. Buchanan, 145 N. Y. i, 
 
 S. W. 319, 27 Am. St. 327n; Walker 26, 39 N. E. 846. 
 V. State, 19 Tex. App. 176, 181, 182;
 
 329 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. § 1/3 
 
 and inadvertence of the parties to the conversation in overlooking 
 the fact that the witness was within hearing distance. "'' And, 
 generally, every person of whom legal advice is asked may be 
 compelled to testify regarding information divulged, if, at that 
 time and in reference to that matter, he did not occupy the posi- 
 tion of an attorney."^ 
 
 The authorities are not harmonious upon the question whether 
 communications are privileged which are made to a person who 
 is not in fact an attorney where they were made because the party 
 making them supposed the person to whom they were made was 
 an attorney. 
 
 It has been held in Massachusetts and in England that com- 
 munications though of a confidential character made to a person 
 whom the communicant supposed was an attorney are not privi- 
 leged where in fact that person was not an attorney.-" But the 
 contrary has been held in other jurisdictions. Thus it has been 
 held that confidential communications of facts constituting a con- 
 fession of crime made in reliance on the supposed relation of at- 
 torney and client should be excluded upon the plainest principles 
 of justice whether the person assuming to act as such is an at- 
 torney or not.-^ 
 
 So where a man though never actually admitted to the bar has 
 practiced for many years before justices of the peace, communi- 
 cations made to him by the accused not merely as a friend but 
 for the purpose of securing his professional advice and assistance 
 are privileged."'* It is very well settled that communications 
 between an employer and a confidential clerk or steward are 
 
 -" State V. Perry, 4 Idaho 224, 38 Walker v. State, 19 Tex. App. ,176, 
 
 Pac. 655. 181; In re Monroe, 20 N. Y. 82, 84; 
 
 ^ "It is equally well established law Schubkagel v. Dierstein, 131 Pa. St. 
 
 that an interpreter, intermediary, 46, 54, 18 Atl. 1059, 6 L. R. A. 48111 
 
 agent or clerk of an attorney, through (law student) ; Brungger v. Smith, 49 
 
 whom communications between at- Fed. 124. 
 
 torney and client are made, stands up- "Barnes v. Harris, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 
 
 on the same footing as his principal, 576, 578, 54 Am. Dec. 734; Fountain 
 
 and will not be allowed to divulge v. Young, 6 Esp. 113. 
 
 any fact coming to his knowledge ^ People v. Barker, 60 ]\Iich. 2yj, 
 
 as the conduit of information be- 27 X. W. 539, i Am. St. 50m. 
 
 tween them. But the rule extends -'' Benedict v. State, 44 Ohio St 679, 
 
 no further than this." In Hawcs v. 688, 11 N. E. 125. 
 State, 88 Ala. ^y, 68, 7 So. 302;
 
 § 174 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 330 
 
 never pri\-ileged."'^ And information disclosed in friendly con- 
 fidence to a non-professional person, even though under a pledge 
 of secrecy, is not privilege."" 
 
 If there is any doubt whether the communication is intended 
 to be privileged or not, the accused in a criminal trial should 
 have the benefit of the doubt."' 
 
 v< 174. Character and date of the communications. — The presence 
 of certain elements is indispensable to all classes of privileged 
 communications. In the first place the communication must have 
 been made, the advice given or the information divulged while 
 the confidential relation existed. Anything said afterwards is 
 not within the rule.""' The accused must show that the relation 
 of attorney and client existed in any case where he claims that 
 evidence is admissible because the witness who is called on to 
 disclose it was his attorney. He must show that the witness had 
 agreed to be his attorney and that he had agreed to have him as 
 such. So that where a lawyer and friend of the accused, without 
 express employment or promise or hope of compensation, was 
 asked by the accused while in the jail visiting another client to 
 
 -"State V. Charity, 2 Dev. (N. Car.) 
 543, 545, 549: Sample v. Frost, 10 
 Iowa 266, Gartside v. Outram, 26 L. 
 J. Ch. 113. 
 
 ■" McManus v. Freeman, 2 Pa. Dist. 
 144; Cady V. Walker, 62 Mich. 157, 
 158, 28 N. W. 805, 4 Am. 834 ; Wilson 
 V. Rastall, 4 T. R. 753. 
 
 " People V. Atkinson, 40 Cal. 284, 
 286. 
 
 =' People V. Hess, 8 App. Div, (X. 
 Y.) 143, 40 X. Y. S. 486, aff'g 6 
 Misc. (X. Y.) 246, 56 X. Y. St. 267, 
 26 X^. Y. S. 630 (construing Xew 
 York statute which requires the com- 
 munication to have been made in the 
 course of professional employment) ;. 
 Long V. State, 86 Ala. 36, 5 So. 443 ; 
 Reg. V. Hayward, 2 C. & K. 234, 236 ; 
 Reg. V. Farley, 2 C. & K. 313. 315; 
 Basye v. State, 45 Neb. 261. 63 N. W. 
 811; State V. Hedgepeth, 125 Mo. 14, 
 
 20, 21, 28 S. W. 160, 162; Hernandez 
 V. State, 18 Tex. App. 134, 51 Am. 
 295 ; State v. Cummings, 189 Mo. 
 626, 88 S. W. 706. Under a statute 
 exempting "confidential communica- 
 tion properly entrusted to him in his 
 professional capacity, and necessary 
 and proper to enable him to discharge 
 the functions of his office," it has been 
 held that the relation of attorney and 
 client need not exist, but that com- 
 munications made to the prosecuting 
 attorney by a witness for the state 
 are within the statute. State v. House- 
 worth, 91 Iowa 740, 60 X. W. 221, the 
 court saying that under the statute it 
 makes no difference from whom the 
 communication comes. State v. 
 Hedgepeth, 125 Mo. 14, 21, 28 S. W. 
 160. See, also, State v. Smith, 138 N. 
 Car. 700, 703, so S. E. 859; State v. 
 Stafford (Iowa, 1909), 123 N. W. 
 T67.
 
 331 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. § 1/4 
 
 convey a message to the chief of poHce to the effect that the ac- 
 cused would plead guilty if he were let off with light punishment, 
 the communication is not privileged and may be proved by the 
 attorney."" So the communications must have been made by or 
 to the attorney, physician or priest while he was acting profes- 
 sionallv. Information, such as belongs to ordinary intercourse, 
 is not privileged. The communication must relate to the attor- 
 ney's professional duty, though it is never necessary that it 
 should be expressly stated to him by the client that it is confiden- 
 tial,^" for this fact is always inferred and presumed until the con- 
 trary is shown whenever the relation of attorney and client is 
 proved to exist. 
 
 The attorney has been permitted in civil cases to identify his 
 client,'"'^ to disclose the name of a person who retained him.'"" to 
 prove his client's handwTiting,^" or address,^* the date when he 
 received a certain instrument,^^ the fact that he drew a deed for 
 his client,"^ or paid money to him,^' or to a third person on his 
 client's account. So an attorney may be compelled to answer a 
 question designed solely to ascertain whether he had ever been 
 consulted in his professional capacity by the accused, ^^ or whether 
 he had acted for him without authority."'' 
 
 And generally when an attorney, though acting as such, ob- 
 tains knowledge of any fact, not by means of his professional 
 character but by his powers of observation as a man, i. e., by the 
 
 ^ State V. Hedgepeth, 125 Mo. 14, Mass. 521, 524; State v. Houston, 3 
 
 21, 28 S. W. 160. Harr. (Del.), 15; Martin v. Ander- 
 
 ^ Wheeler v. Hill, 16 Me. 329. A son, 21 Ga. 301, 309. 
 
 letter written by an attorney to his ^^ Wheatley v. Williams, i M. & W. 
 
 client informing him of the terms of 533, 2 Gale 140, 5 L. J. E.x. 237. 
 
 an injunction is not a privileged com- ""Barry v. Coville, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 munication because it is in no sense 620, 7 N. Y. Supp. 36, afifirmed in 129 
 
 confidential. Aaron v. United States, N. Y. 302, 29 N. E. 307, 41 N. Y. St. 
 
 155 Fed. 833, 84 C. C. A. 67. 628. 
 
 ^' Studdy V. Sanders, 2 Dowl & Ry. " Chapman v. Peebles, 84 Ala. 283, 
 
 347- 284, 4 So. 273. 
 
 " Brown v. Payson, 6 X. H. 443, '' White v. State, 86 Ala. 69, 75, 5 
 
 448. So. 674 ; Leindecker v. Waldron, 52 
 
 ""Hurd V. Moring, i C. & P. 272\ 111. 283, 285. 
 
 Brown v. Jewett, 120 Mass. 215, 218. ^"Cox v. Hill, 3 Ohio 411, 424. 
 
 '* Commonwealth v. Bacon, 135
 
 §175 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 332 
 
 same means any one in a like situation would employ, the infor- 
 mation is not privileged/" 
 
 It is never essential to create the privilege that any proceed- 
 ings, criminal or civil, should be pending or even in contempla- 
 tion. That the relation of attorney and client exists is enough ; 
 for, whatever the transaction (unless some future infraction of 
 the criminal law is contemplated), and whether or not it is likely 
 to be subsequently litigated, the communication or advice is privi- 
 leged.'*^ In conclusion, it may be noted as not within the rule, 
 that an attorney may testify that a person alleged to be his client 
 had made no communication to him or received no advice ;■*" and 
 he may repeat a statement made to him (though made while he 
 was acting professionally) by a third person, to whom he was 
 referred by his client,*^ or communications by the client which 
 he meant should be imparted to others by the attorney,** or a 
 conversation between two persons which took place in his pres- 
 ence, though both were his clients.*^ 
 
 § 175. Communications made in contemplation of crime. — Com- 
 munications made by a client who contemplates the future com- 
 mission of a felony, or advice given by an attorney to enable his 
 client to escape the consequences of a future infraction of the 
 
 ^° State V. Fitzgerald, 68 Vt. 125, 543, 43 Am. 604; In re Whitlock, 51 
 
 34 Atl. 429; i\Iilan v. State, 24 Ark. Hun (N. Y.) 351, 353-355, 3 N. Y. S. 
 
 346, 355 ; Swaim v. Humphreys, 42 855, rev'g 2 N. Y. S. 683 ; Bingham v. 
 
 111. App. 370; State V. Merchant (N. Walk, 128 Ind. 164, 172, 27 N. E. 483; 
 
 H.), 18 Atl. 654; Theisen v. Dayton, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Selby, 72 Fed. 
 
 82 Iowa 74, 47 N. W. 891. So an at- 980, 19 C. C. A. 331. 
 
 torney may testify from his knowl- *' Daniel v. Daniel, 39 Pa. St. 191. 
 
 edge of his client's handwriting that ^^ Mellen, /;; re, 6;^ Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 an instrument was written by him if 632, 18 N. Y. S. 515. 
 
 his knowledge was gained by handling ■" White v. State, 86 Ala. 69, 5 So. 
 
 documents written by his client. John- 674 ; Roper v. State, 58 N. J. L. 420, 
 
 son V. Daverne, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) ^s Atl. 969; Ferguson v. McBean, 91 
 
 134; Coates V. Birch, 2 Q. B. 252, i Cal. 63, 27 Pac. 518, 14 L. R. A. 65; 
 
 G. & D. 647, II L. J. Q. B. I, 5 Jur. Hughes v. Boone, 102 N. Car. 137, 
 
 1009; Chant V. Browne, 12 Eng. L. & 159, 160, 9 S. E. 286; Cady v. Walker, 
 
 E. 299. See civil cases, Underbill on 62 Mich. 157, 158, 28 N. W. 805, 4 
 
 Ev., § 170. Am. St. 834. 
 
 " Arnold v. Chesebrough, 41 Fed. ''^ Weaver's Estate, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 
 74; Snow V. Gould, 74 Me. 540, 542, 516.
 
 333 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. _ §1/5 
 
 criminal law, are not privileged.**' An accused person may claim 
 privilege for any information communicated by him to an attorney 
 or physician after the date of the crime with which he is charged.'*' 
 He cannot claim to have the mouth of an attorney closed with 
 whom he consults to ascertain how he may commit a crime and 
 escape the detection and punishment. 
 
 It is no part of the duty of an attorney to counsel as to the 
 best methods of violating the law.*^ 
 
 The cases make a distinction between a confidential communica- 
 tion which states the intention to do a treasonable or felonious 
 act, which both client and attorney know to be such, with a re- 
 quest for advice to enable the client to execute the act in such a 
 way as to escape punishment ; and the communication of an in- 
 tention to commit an act which, under certain circumstances and 
 with a particular intention, may become criminal accompanied 
 by a request for advice as to how far the client may go without 
 exceeding the limits beyond which the act would become criminal. 
 In the first case, where the act is palpably and clearly criminal, 
 a communication which seeks to be advised in order that criminal 
 consequences may be avoided is not privileged. Thus, where a 
 victim of a homicide had advised with an attorney how he might 
 kill the accused and escape the consequences of his crime, it was 
 held that the communication was not privileged and might be 
 proved by the attorney.*® 
 
 So, also where two persons accused of crime had consulted an 
 attorney upon the best method by which they might fraudulently 
 conceal their property as against a judgment creditor and the 
 attorney had advised them against doing so, the attorney was 
 
 *^The lawfulness of the purpose of pregnant woman, which, under some 
 
 the communication will, in the ab- circumstances, might be lawful as 
 
 sence of contrary proof, be presumed, necessary to save the mother's life. 
 
 If the client's purpose be to commit a Guptill v. Verback, 58 Iowa 98, 100, 
 
 felony or to do any act which is 12 N. W. 125. See, State v. Smith, 
 
 vialuvi in se, the privilege is at once 138 X. Car. 700, 50 S. E. 859. 
 
 destroyed. Bank of Utica v. Merse- ■*' Covcney v. Tannahill, i Hill (N. 
 
 reau, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 528; Peo- Y.) 33, 36, Z7 Am. Dec. 287n. 
 
 pie v. Blakeley, 4 Park Cr. (N. Y.) "« Taylor v. Evans (Te.x. 1894), 29 
 
 176, 181. It is otherwise if the intent S. W. 172, 174. 
 
 is doubtful, and if the act contem- *• Everett v. State, 30 Tex. App. 682, 
 
 plated might be lawful, e. g., produc- 68s, 18 S. W. 674. 
 ing a miscarriage or abortion on a
 
 § 175 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 334 
 
 permitted to reveal on the witness stand what had been said to 
 him.'° 
 
 In another case it was held that an attorney who had been 
 consulted as to the possibility of forging a deed might testify on 
 the trial of his client for the forgery to what had been said to 
 him indicating an intention to forge/^ 
 
 There are man}^ other cases to the same effect, for the rule is 
 that the prostitution of the honorable relation of attorney and 
 client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and 
 every communication made to an attorney by a client for a crimi- 
 nal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is 
 not only law^ful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain 
 circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of 
 justice. ^^ 
 
 In accordance with this rule, where a forged will or other in- 
 strument has come into the possession of an attorney through 
 the instrumentality of the accused, with the hope or expectation 
 that the attorney would take some action in reference thereto, 
 and the attorney does act, in ignorance of the true character of 
 the instrument, there is no privilege, in as much as full confidence 
 has been withheld. The attorney is then compellable to produce 
 the forged writing against his client. ^^ 
 
 '° Reg. V. Cox, L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. '' Reg. v. Hayward, 2 C & K. 234 ; 
 
 153, 168, which is a very well consid- Reg. v. Tylney, i Den. C. C. 319, 3 
 
 ered case in which all the prior cases Cox C. C. 160, 18 L. J. J\I. C. 36, 37, 
 
 are cited and commented on. See al- 38. "If any man should confide to a 
 
 so, Cromack v. Heathcote, 4 Moore professional person that he had a 
 
 357, 2 Br. & B. 4 (1820), 22 R. R. treasonable or felonious intention and 
 
 638; Gartside v. Outram, 26 L. J. Ch. wished to know how he might execute 
 
 113; Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. it so as to escape punishment, it 
 
 St. Tr. 1139 (1743); Rex v. Dixon would be too much to say that such 
 
 (1765), 3 Burr. 1687. communication which might make the 
 
 °^ People V. Van Alstine, 57 Mich, man consulted guilty of misprision, 
 
 69, 79, 23 N. W. 594. was privileged, but if a man medi- 
 
 ^' Orman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, tates an act which, exceeding certain 
 
 617, 3 S. W. 468, 58 Am. 662; Green- limits, would become criminal, and 
 
 ough V. Gaskell, i M. & K. 98, 104; confined within certain bounds would 
 
 People V. Blakeley, 4 Park. Cr. (N. be perfectly justifiable, the person 
 
 Y.) 176, 181 ; Coveney v. Tannahill, i asking the advice nnist be considered 
 
 Hill. (N. Y.) S3, 36; People v. Ma- as seeking how he may avoid and not 
 
 hon, I Utah 205 ; Russell v. Jackson, how he may commit a crime, and it 
 
 9 Hare 387, 68 Eng. Ch. Rep. 558. is impossible that an attorney should
 
 335 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 176 
 
 The fact that the attorney is not cognizant of the criminal or 
 wrongful purpose, or, knowing it, attempts to dissuade his 
 client, °* is immaterial. The attorney's ignorance of his client's 
 intentions deprives the information of a professional character 
 as full confidence has been withheld. ^^ 
 
 § 176. Permanency of the privilege — "Waiver. — The termination 
 of the transaction pending when the communication was made, 
 or the termination of the relation of attorney and client by the 
 death of the client, or for any other cause, does not unseal the 
 lips of the attorney.^® The privilege is designed to protect the 
 interests of the client. He may waive it if he deems it to his 
 advantage to do so. His representative may, after his decease, 
 waive the privilege, but only when the application of the rule 
 would be disadvantageous to his estate." The privilege may be 
 waived by the client, either by implication arising from his silence 
 or failure to make prompt objection and, a fortiori, by an express 
 waiver.^® The doctrine of an implied waiver arising from cir- 
 
 be obliged to disclose such communi- 
 cation. * * * j(- cannot be said to 
 amount to the meditation of a crime, 
 if a man adopts a course by which he 
 seeks to avoid the commission of 
 one." Rex v. Haydn, 2 F. & S. 379. 
 
 " Orman v. State, 22 Tex. App. 604, 
 617, 3 S. W. 468, 58 Am. 662; Reg. v. 
 Hayward, 2 C. & K. 234. 
 
 '=Reg. V. Cox, L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. 
 153, 163, 165, 5 Am. Cr. 140; Mat- 
 thews V. Hoagland, 48 N. J. Eq. 455, 
 21 Atl. 1054. "In order that the rule 
 may apply there must be both profes- 
 sional confidence and professional 
 employment, but if a client has a 
 criminal object in view in his com- 
 munications with his solicitor, one of 
 these elements must necessarily be ab- 
 sent. The client must either con- 
 spire with his solicitor or deceive him. 
 If his criminal object is avowed, the 
 client does not consult his adviser 
 professionally, for it cannot be the 
 
 solicitor's business to further a crim- 
 inal object. If the client does not 
 avow his object he reposes no con- 
 fidence, for the state of facts, which 
 is the foundation of the supposed 
 confidence, does not exist." Reg. v. 
 Cox, L. R. 14 Q. B. Div. 153, 168. 
 
 '' Underbill on Ev., § 172. 
 
 " Layman's Will, /;; re, 40 Minn. 
 37^; 373, 42 N. W. 286; Morris v. 
 Morris, 119 Ind. 341, 343, 21 N. E. 
 918; Blackburn v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 
 fU. S.) 175, 18 L. ed. 186. Contra, 
 Loder v. Whelpley, in N. Y. 239, 
 245, 19 N. Y. St. 631, I Dem. Surr. 
 368; Underbill on Ev., § 172, note 5. 
 The privilege is wholly personal to 
 the client while be is living. It can- 
 not be waived by any person merely 
 because he stands in privity with him. 
 State V. James, 34 S. Car. 579, 13 S. 
 E. 325- 
 
 ™ Blackburn v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 
 (U. S.) 175, 194, 18 L. ed. 186: State
 
 § 176 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 336 
 
 cumstances is doubtless a safe rule iu civil litigation, though very 
 dangerous doctrine in a criminal trial. An express waiver is always 
 allowed in a criminal prosecution, particularly where the accused 
 is desirous of having his counsel testify in his behalf.^" But it is 
 doubtful if any waiver would be implied in a criminal trial."" 
 The privilege of the accused is certainly not waived because he 
 goes on the stand as a witness. In civil cases it has been held that 
 a party is privileged from disclosing what his attorney would be 
 prevented from divulging,''^ and the same rule w'ould doubtless 
 apply to the cross-examination of the accused.*^" But an accom- 
 plice who consents to be a w-itness for the prosecution cannot 
 claim the privilege for his statements to his attorney. He must, 
 under his arrangement with the state, tell all he knows, and if 
 he knowingly keeps back any relevant fact he loses his right to 
 the immunity promised. And the fact that he may be compelled 
 to state what he divulged to his attorney regarding his own 
 guilt may be the only means left to an innocent man accused of 
 crime, of meeting the perjury of the real criminal, posing as a 
 penitent accomplice on the witness stand. "^ The privilege be- 
 longs to the client and ought to be promptly claimed by him or 
 for him by his attorney or representative. But it seems that, 
 particularly in a criminal trial, the court may and perhaps should 
 interpose of its own motion for the protection of an accused 
 
 V. Depoister, 21 Nev. 107, 25 Pac. puts his attorney on the witness stand 
 1000, 1002, holding that a client who he may be compelled to relate rele- 
 requests his attorney to act as a sub- vant communications on his cross-ex- 
 scribing witness to his will waives his amination. 
 
 privilege by implication, and the at- " Hemenway v. Smith, 28 Vt. 701 ; 
 
 torney is compellable to testify to all Bigler v. Reyher, 43 Ind. 112, 114; 
 
 facts which may be proved by a sub- Baker v. Kuhn, 38 Iowa 392, 395. 
 
 scribing witness, though confidential "-Alderman v. People, 4 Mich. 414, 
 
 communications may be included. 422, 69 Am. Dec. 321. 
 
 '^'Whart. Cr. Ev., §§ 498, 500; "^Alderman v. People, 4 Mich. 414, 
 
 Walker v. State, 19 Tex. App. 176, 423, 69 Am. Dec. 321 ; Foster v. Peo- 
 
 182; Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich, pie, 18 Mich. 265; Hamilton v. Peo- 
 
 '^73, 179- pie, 29 Mich. 173, 184; Wharton on 
 
 *° Duttenhofer v. State, 34 Ohio St. Cr. Ev., § 502; People v. Gallagher, 
 
 91, 95, 32 Am. 362. The calling of the 75 Mich. 512, 516, 42 N. W. 1063; 
 
 attorney as a witness for the client Contra, Sutton v. State, 16 Tex. App. 
 
 is of course a waiver. Where accused 490, 495.
 
 337 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 8 1/7 
 
 person who may be entirely ignorant of his right to remain silent 
 when he is called upon to state what he said to his attorney.*'* 
 
 § 177. Writings when privileged. — A communication to or ad- 
 vice given by an attorney in writing is always privileged, nor 
 can an attorney be compelled to produce a client's papers de- 
 posited with him for safe-keeping or for the purpose of obtaining 
 his professional opinion. He may always be permitted to prove 
 that a paper is in existence, that he has searched for it, and that 
 it is or is not in his possession, to enable the other party to prove 
 it by parol. He cannot be compelled to produce the papers, or 
 to disclose their contents, if the papers are no longer in his cus- 
 tody.''^ Not only is the attorney prohibited from producing the 
 writing, but he is also forbidden to disclose all information, 
 whether names, dates, or other facts which he may have derived 
 therefrom. So, if a forgery is under investigation by the grand 
 jury,*"' or a person accused of that crime is on trial, an attorney, 
 who may have the alleged forged writing in his possession can- 
 not be compelled to produce it as evidence against the accused if 
 the attorney received it professionally,*'' and not as a part of the 
 preparation to commit the crime. The object of the privilege is 
 to promote justice and to protect the innocent. But the law 
 frowns upon all attempts to use it to defeat justice by shielding 
 guilty persons. Hence, writings are not privileged which are 
 
 "* "The communications between a v. Benjamin, g How. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 party, or his legal adviser, and wit- 419, 423; Selden v. State, 74 Wis. 271, 
 nesses, are also privileged. There is, 274, 275, 42 N. W. 218, 17 Am. St. 
 in those cases, the same necessity for 144; State v. Hazleton, 15 La. Ann. 
 protection; otherwise it would be im- 72; Neal v. Patten, 47 Ga. 73; Jack- 
 possible for a defendant to write a son v. Denison, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 letter for the purpose of obtaining 558, and cases cited in Underbill on 
 information on the subject of a suit, Ev., § 173. 
 without incurring the liability of hav- '"Anon., 8 Mass. 370, 371. 
 ing the materials of his defense dis- ""Rex v. Smith, i Phill. on Ev. (gth 
 closed to the adverse party." Hare on ed.) 171 ; Reg. v. Tylney, i Den. C. 
 Discovery of Evid., 151. C. 319, 3 Cox Cr. Cas. 160, 18 L. J. 
 
 "''Brandt v. Klein, 17 Johns. (N. (M. C) 36, 324; State v. Squires, r 
 
 Y.) 335; Brard v. Ackerman, 5 Esp. Tyler (Vt.), 147, 152; Reg. v. Hay- 
 
 119; Wright v. Mayer, 6 Ves. Jr. ward, 2 C. & K. 234, 2 Cox. Cr. Cas. 
 
 280; Covcney v. Tannahill, i Hill (X. 23; Reg. v. Cox, L. R. 14 Q. B. 153, 
 
 Y.) 33, 35. 37 Am. Dec. 287n ; People I74- 
 22 — Undf.rhii.l Crim. Ev.
 
 §178 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 33S 
 
 not given to the attorney in good faith and in liis professional 
 capacity. He may be compelled to produce forged writings 
 which he received without knowing their true character in the 
 execution of a proposed scheme to defraud,^* or writings which 
 were given to him for the purpose of suppressing evidence.®" 
 
 A communication to an attorney acting as a conveyancer is 
 privileged. '° though he act for both parties.'^ 
 
 § 178. Communications to spiritual adviser. — By the early com- 
 mon law, following the rule of the modern Roman and the 
 canon law, statements made to a priest in a confession were privi- 
 leged, except, perhaps, in case of high treason."- But the common 
 law. since the Reformation, has only protected the information 
 divulged by the penitent to his spiritual adviser to the extent that 
 the latter was under no legal compulsion to reveal the evidence 
 to a magistrate and to denounce the evil-doer.'" 
 
 The priest could be compelled, however, when placed upon the 
 witness stand, to divulge any confession of crime made to him, 
 though it was received in the course of religious discipline, and 
 though the law of his church sealed his lips under penalty of 
 suspension from or loss of office.''* In this respect a communica- 
 
 ^ Reg. V. Farley, 2 C. & K. 313, 319; Ev. 254; Rex v. Sparkes, cited in 
 
 Reg. V. Hayward, 2 C. & K. 234, 2 Peake N. P. 78. In Broad v. Pitt, 3 
 
 Cox Cr. Cas. 23. C. & P. 518, Best C. J., said: "I, for 
 
 * People V. Sheriff, 29 Barb. (N. one, will never compel a clergyman to 
 
 Y.) 622. disclose communications, made to him 
 
 "° Bingham v. Walk, 128 Ind. 164, by a prisoner, but if he chooses to dis- 
 
 27 N. E. 483; Getzlaff v. Seliger, 43 close them I shall receive them." See, 
 
 Wis. 297. Contra, In re Smith, 61 also, Greenleaf on Evidence, § 247. 
 
 Hun (N. Y.) loi; 15 N. Y. S. 425. '* Rex v. Gilham, i Moody C. C. 
 
 "Clay V. Williams, 2 Munf. (Va.) 186; Smith's Case, 2 City Hall Rec. 
 
 IDS, 122, 5 Am. Dec. 453. It is for (N. Y.) 77, 80; Commonwealth v. 
 
 the court to determine in what capac- Drake, 15 Mass. 161 (confession of a 
 
 ity and for what purpose documents church member was admitted) ; Reg. 
 
 were left with an attorney. Reg. v. v. Ha\', 2 F. & F. 4 (where a priest 
 
 Jones, I Den. C. C. 166, 2 Car. & K. refused to reveal from whom he re- 
 
 234. See cases cited Underbill on ceived a stolen watch and was com- 
 
 Ev., § 173. mitted for contempt). Contra. Rex v. 
 
 "2 Best on Ev., §§ 583, 584. See Griffin, 6 Cox Cr. Cas. 219. See, also, 
 
 note to Reg. v. Hay, 2 F. & F. 4. Greenlaw v. King, i Beav. 137, 145 ; 
 
 " Wilson V. Rastall, 4 T. R. 753, Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387, 391 ; 
 
 759; Anon., Skin. 404; MacXally's Anderson v. Bank, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 644,
 
 339 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 8 I/O 
 
 tion made to a priest is, in the absence of statute, on a par with 
 one made to a layman. 
 
 Many of the states have sought to remedy the unfairness of 
 this rule by statutory enactments by which priests and clergy- 
 men are absolutely prohibited from disclosing any fact becom- 
 ing known to them while acting in a professional capacity, or 
 in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules of the religious 
 body to which they belong. '^^ But a communication to a priest 
 made otherwise than in his ecclesiastical capacity is not pri^•i- 
 leged/*' 
 
 So, where the accused met the priest on a railroad train and, 
 with no intent of receiving his professional advice, assistance or 
 consolation, told his story, incriminating himself, it was held 
 that there was no privilege under the statute.'''^ And inasmuch 
 as the privilege is by the statute directly or indirectly limited to 
 confessions of sins made for the purpose of receiving spiritual 
 advice, or assistance, it was held in a prosecution for the crime 
 of bigamy that the statements of the accused made to a clergy- 
 man who was to communicate them to the first wife in order to 
 
 651, 45 L. J. Ch. 449, 35 L. T. (N. S.) an objection is plainly untenable, as 
 
 76, 24 Wkly. Rep. 624; Wheeler v. the statutes are universally applicable 
 
 Le Marchant, L. R. 17, Ch. D. 675, to communications made by the ad- 
 
 681. herents of any religion, and their pur- 
 
 '^ California (Code Civ. Proc.) § pose is plainly neither to protect the 
 
 1881 ; Colorado, Acts 1883, p. 290; priest, nor to promote any particular 
 
 Michigan, 2 Howell's An. Stat., § form of religion. Such statutes are 
 
 7515; Kansas Gen. Stat. 1901, § 4771; evidently intended to protect all per- 
 
 lowa Rev. Code, 1888, § 4893; Mis- sons in the exercise of their religious 
 
 souri Rev. St. 1879, P- 690, § 4017; belief according to the dictates of 
 
 Nebraska An. St. 1901, § 5902; Wis- their conscience. 
 
 consin An. Stat., 1898, § 4074. Sim- '"People v. Gates, 13 Wend. (X. 
 
 ilar statutes exist in Arizona, Arkan- Y.) 311, ^22; Gillooley v. State, 58 
 
 sas, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Ind. 182, 184; State v. Morgan, 196 
 
 Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Mo. 177, 95 S. W. 402. Under the 
 
 The question of the constitutionality principles of the text it is very doubt- 
 
 of such statutes has been raised, but, ful if communications to a priest re- 
 
 up to the present, never judicially lating to a marriage to be performed 
 
 determined. The only possible objec- by him would be privileged, 
 
 tion that can be raised on constitu- '"a State v. Brown, 95 Iowa 381, 64 
 
 tional grounds is that they tend to N. W. Rep. 277. 
 establish some form of religion. Such
 
 § 1/9 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 34O 
 
 influence her to abandon the prosecution for bigamy are not 
 privileged."^ 
 
 § 179. Communications passing between medical practitioners and 
 their patients. — At common law communications to medical men 
 were not privileged. Although a physician who voluntarily dis- 
 closes professional secrets would, from a medical and moral 
 standpoint, be guilty of a gross indiscretion, the law does not 
 treat them as privileged, and, in the absence of statute, he may 
 be compelled to testify upon the witness stand." Every con- 
 sideration that furnishes a basis for affixing a privilege to com- 
 munications or information passing between attorney and client 
 applies, with equal force, to the relation of physician and patient. 
 Aside from the benefit to the patient in encouraging him to make 
 a full disclosure, by means of which he may receive better treat- 
 ment, the danger that the truth will be perverted or concealed, 
 perhaps unconsciously, by the physician who is compelled to dis- 
 close medical secrets on the witness stand, in the struggle between 
 professional duty and legal duty, is removed. 
 
 It is now often provided by statute that no physician or sur- 
 geon shall be allowed or compelled to disclose any information 
 which he has acquired while attending a patient, or which was 
 necessary to enable him to act as such.'^ 
 
 "Gillooley v. State, 58 Ind. 182, sell v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387, 391; An- 
 
 184; Hills V. State, 61 Neb. 589, 85 derson v. Bank, L. R. 2 Ch. D. 644, 
 
 N. W. 836, 57 L. R. A. i55n. 650, 45 L. J. Ch. 449, 35 L. T. (N. S.) 
 
 •' Baker v. London &c. R. Co., L. R. 76, 24 Wkly. Rep. 624. 
 
 3 Q. B. 91 ; Duchess of Kingston's " "A person, duly authorized to 
 Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 573-580 (1776); practice physic or surgery, shall not 
 II Harg. St. Trials 243; People v. be allowed to disclose any infonna- 
 Stout, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 670, 673; tion which he acquired in attending 
 Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 424, 433, a patient, in a professional capacity, 
 35 Am. 524; People v. Lane, loi Cal. and which was necessary to enable 
 513, 36 Pac. 16; Wilson v. Rastall, him to act in that capacity." N. Y. 
 
 4 T. R. 753, 760, 2 R. R. 515; Fal- Code Civ. Proc, § 834; California 
 mouth V. Moss, 11 Price 455, 470, 25 Code, Civ. Proc. § 1881 ; Indiana Rev. 
 R. R. 753; Reg. V. Powell, i C. & P. St. 1881, § 497; Michigan, 2 Howell's 
 97 (where a surgeon who attended An. St. § 7516; Missouri R. S. 1879, 
 the accused who was indicted for the p. 690, § 4017; Ohio R. S. 1884, p. 
 murder of her child could not refuse 1096, § 5241 ; Wisconsin An. S. 1898, 
 to testify to her confession) ; Green- § 4075- Similar statutes exist in many 
 law V. King, i Beav. 137, 145; Rus- other states; 17 Am. St. 570, note.
 
 341 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. §179 
 
 These statutes are designed to protect the patient, not the 
 physician, and, being remedial in their nature, ought to receive 
 a Hberal construction which will fully effectuate their wise and 
 humane provisions. The principles of law applicable to privi- 
 leged communications in the case of attorney and client may be 
 invoked here. No regular contract of hiring or payment of a 
 fee by the patient need be proved. It is unnecessary to show that 
 the patient called him or procured his attendance. If the physi- 
 cian was summoned by a friend or a relative, or even by a 
 stranger standing by, or by an attending physician, it is sufficient, 
 provided he attended as a physician.®" If a physician attend a 
 person under circumstances calculated to produce the impression 
 that he does so professionally, and his visit is so regarded and 
 acted upon by the person, it is enough to establish the relation.*^ 
 
 These statutes expressly confer the privilege upon such in- 
 formation only as "it was necessary to communicate to enable 
 the physician or surgeon to act or prescribe." He will be com- 
 pelled to testify to all facts with which he became acquainted 
 which were not necessary to the exercise of his professional 
 skill.®" The mere existence of the professional relation of physi- 
 cian and patient is not enough. He must testify to all informa- 
 tion acquired while attending the patient, if the information was 
 not necessary to enable him to act or to prescribe.®^ 
 
 *°Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 573, view to medical treatment, though not 
 
 579, 9 N. E. 320, 4 N. Y. St. 261 ; 18 expressly so stated, and though no 
 
 Abb. N. Cas. loi, 25 Wkly. Dig. (N. medicine was given or prescribed. The 
 
 Y.) 172, 57 Am. 770; ^tna Life Ins. physicians were not permitted to tes- 
 
 Co. V. Deming, 123 Ind. 384, 395, 24 tify to the physical condition of the 
 
 N. E. 86, 375 ; Raymond v. Burling- accused. Compare Babcock v. People, 
 
 ton &c. R. Co., 65 Iowa 152, 154, 21 15 Hun (N. Y.) 347, 355. 
 
 N. W. 495. "■ Meyer v. Standard &c. Ins. Co., 
 
 *' People V. ^lurphy, lOi N. Y. 126, 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 74, 40 N. Y. S. 
 
 129, 4 N. E. 326, 54 Am. 661, 4 N. Y. 419; Campau v. North, 39 Mich. 606, 
 
 Cr. 95; People v. Stout, 3 Park. Cr. 609, 33 Am. 433n ; Briggs v. Briggs, 
 
 (N. Y.) 670, 675-680. In People v. 20 Mich. 34, 40; People v. Sliney, 137 
 
 Stout, a prisoner, while in jail and N. Y. 570, 580, 33 N. E. 150, 50 N. Y. 
 
 suffering bodily injuries, was exam- St. 391 ; Feeney v. Long Island R. Co., 
 
 ined by the jail physician, and after- 116 N. Y. 375, 22 N. E. 402, 5 L. R. 
 
 wards, with his consent, by two phy- A. 544; Collins v. Mack, 31 /\rk. 684, 
 
 sicians sent by the coroner. It ap- 693, 694. 
 
 peared that all parties understood that "'Hewitt v. Prime, 2T Wend. (N. 
 
 the examinations were made with a Y.) 79, 81; Babcock v. People, 15
 
 1/9 
 
 CRIAIINAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 342 
 
 He may testify that he attended a patient, the number of visits 
 he made;'''* the persons whom he found present and generally 
 what the patient said to him not strictly in reference to his physi- 
 cal or mental condition. 
 
 But where the statute expressly excludes all information com- 
 municated to or acquired by a medical man in the course of his 
 professional duties, or "while attending a patient professionally," 
 all knowledge of whatever description gained from the physician's 
 observation, or from the examination of the patient, or from 
 the latter's statements, is excluded.^^ 
 
 The privilege may, at least in civil cases, be waived by the pa- 
 tient or by his personal representative who is expressly author- 
 ized to do so.*'' So, in a prosecution for rape, the general rule 
 is that the physician who attended the woman may testify to any 
 facts within his knowledge. His calling as a witness for the 
 prosecution is an implied waiver of the privilege. Where the 
 statute requires that the patient shall consent that the physician 
 
 Hun (N. Y.) 347, 354; Hoyt v. Hoyt, 
 112 N. Y. 493, 515, 20 N. E. 402, 
 21 N. Y. St. 593; Westover v. ^tna 
 Life Ins. Co., 99 N. Y. 56, 60, i N. 
 E. 104, 52 Am. in. On the other hand 
 it has been said that as soon as the 
 relation of physician and patient is 
 shown to exist, it will be conclusively 
 presumed that all oral communica- 
 tions were made for the purpose of 
 enabling the physician to prescribe. 
 The necessit}- and purpose of the com- 
 munication need not be proved. Feen- 
 ey V. Long Island R. Co., 116 X. Y. 
 375. 380, 381, 22 N. E. 402, 5 L. R. A. 
 544; Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. 
 Co., 67 N. Y. 185, 194; Grattan v. 
 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 
 281, 297, 36 Am. 617. 
 
 **Cooley v. Foltz, 85 Mich. 47, 49, 
 48 N. W. 176. 
 
 '"'If the knowledge is acquired in 
 the chamber of the patient, and in the 
 discharge of professional duty, the 
 physician can make no disclosure. 
 This is true, whether the knowledge 
 
 is communicated by the words of the 
 patient, or is gained by observation, 
 or is the result of a professional ex- 
 amination." It is immaterial by what 
 method the physician acquires his 
 knowledge. Heuston v. Simpson, 115 
 Ind. 62, 63, 17 N. E. 261, 7 Am. St. 
 409; Renihan v. Dennin, 103 N. Y. 
 573, 578, 9 N. E. 320, 57 Am. 770; 
 Edington v. .Etna Life Ins. Co., 77 
 N. Y. 564 ; Grattan v. Metropolitan 
 Life Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 281, 36 Am. 
 617; People V. Stout, 3 Park. Cri. (N. 
 Y.) 670, 675; Morris v. New York 
 &c. R. Co., 148 N. Y. 88, 42 N. E. 410, 
 51 Am. St. 675. 
 
 ^^ Carrington v. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 
 208, 216, I S. W. 240, 58 Am. 108; 
 Valensin v. Valensin, 72 Cal. 106, 107, 
 14 Pac. 397 ; State v. Depoister, 21 
 Nev. 107, 25 Pac. 1000, 1003. A death 
 certificate made out by an attending 
 physician is not privileged. Adreveno 
 V. Mutual &c. Life Assn., 34 Fed. 870; 
 State V. Pabst (Wis. 1909), 121 N. W. 
 351.
 
 343 PRIVILEGED COMMUXICATIOXS. § l8o 
 
 testify, consent may be inferred in the case of a minor on whom 
 a rape had been committed, from the action of the minor's par- 
 ents, in prosecuting the criminal.*" 
 
 § 180. Death of the patient — Purpose of the communication — Con- 
 templated crime. — The statutes of privilege are usually applicable 
 both to civil and criminal trials. This is the rule even when the 
 statute is couched in the most general terms.^^* But in some of 
 the states the statutes are expressly limited to civil cases.*^ 
 Where the statutory privilege is applicable to criminal trials in 
 a homicide trial, it would seem that the testimony of the attend- 
 ant physician, proving the dying declaration of the victim, ought 
 to be excluded, for it is clear that his statement that he is dying 
 and his description of the manner of his wounding are necessary 
 to enable the physician to prescribe. The statute was never in- 
 tended as a defense for criminals. Its plain purpose is not to 
 protect murderers, but to shield the memory of the dead.^^ 
 Hence a physician who has been consulted, in advance, by the 
 accused, as to the best mode of procuring an abortion on a third 
 person may state what was said,'*'' as for example that he was 
 asked by the accused to procure an abortion and that he refused 
 to do so,^^ upon the theory that the relation of physician did not 
 exist between them and that no disgrace is cast upon the object 
 of the contemplated crime. 
 
 But a communication made by the accused that a woman, for 
 
 *' State V. Depoister, 21 Nev. 107, 25 may testify. The question is without 
 
 Pac. 1000, 1003; Hauk v. State, 148 any judicial adjudication so far as 
 
 Ind. 238, 46 X. E. 127, 47 N. E. 465. the author can ascertain. 
 
 "aPeopIe V. Murphy, loi N. Y. 126, "' Babcock v. People, 15 Hun (\. 
 
 129, 4 N. E. 326, 54 Am. 661. Y.) 347, 354; Hewitt v. Prime, 21 
 
 ^People V. Lane, loi Cal. 513, 516, Wend. (N. Y.) 79; Hauk v. State, 
 
 36 Pac. 16; People v. West, 106 Cal. 148 Ind. 238, 46 N. E. 127, 47 N. E. 
 
 89, 39 Pac. 207. 465. Cf. People v. West, 106 Cal. 89, 
 
 *° Pierson v. People, 79 N. Y. 424, 39 Pac. 207 ; State v. Smith, 99 Iowa 
 
 35 Am. 524. It is usually easy to 26, 68 N. W. 428, 61 Am. St. 219 
 
 prove dying declarations and all the (causing miscarriage), 
 
 attendant circumstances by the evi- "^ Seifert v. State, 160 Ind. 464, 67 
 
 dence of laymen. Where the state- N. E. 100, 98 Am. St. 340, which e.x- 
 
 ments to the physician are made in the pressly states that a "request to a 
 
 presence of a third party they are physician to commit a crime is never 
 
 not usually privileged, for the layman privileged."
 
 §§ 181-182 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 344 
 
 whom he engages the physician's professional services, was preg- 
 nant by him and that either she or he had attempted to produce 
 a miscarriage, in which he had assisted her, is privileged when 
 made to enable the physician to give the woman proper and legal 
 medical treatment.^^ So a physician who has attended profes- 
 sionally a person who died from poison, alleged to have been ad- 
 ministered by the accused, may in testifying for the prosecution 
 describe the patient's condition both from his own observation 
 and from what the patient told him."^ 
 
 A construction, which would operate to convert a statutory 
 provision, intended to protect a patient from a damaging or ob- 
 jectional disclosure, into a protection for a person accused of the 
 murder of the patient, cannot be admitted nor can we believe 
 that such w^as the legislative intent."* 
 
 § 181, Communications made during examination to detect or as- 
 certain sanity. — A physician who is sent by the court to examine 
 into the mental or physical condition of a person, c. g., of the ac- 
 cused, while in jail, merely to determine his sanity, may testify 
 to his mental or physical condition,"^ and even to what the ac- 
 cused said to him about the crime,"" but only if it is conclusively 
 shown that the relation of physician and patient did not and was 
 not supposed by the accused to exist."" 
 
 § 182. Secrecy of telegrams. — Telegraphic dispatches are not 
 privileged communications. But in many of the states statutes 
 
 ^° People V. Brower, 7 N. Y. Cr. 292, "' People v. Kemmler, 119 N. Y. 580, 
 
 294. 585, 24 N. E. 9; People v. Schuyler, 
 
 ®^ Pierson v. People, 79 N, Y. 424, 7 N. Y. Cr. 262, 267, 106 X. Y. 298, 
 
 432 (which, however, refuses to lay 12 N. E. 783, 8 X. Y. St. 860, 2y Wkly. 
 
 down any general rule), 35 Am. 524. Dig. (X. Y.) i. 
 
 "** People V. Harris, 136 X. Y. 423, '"' People v. Sliney, 137 X. Y. 570, 
 
 437, 448, 2Z N. E. 65, 49 X. Y. St. 580, 32, X. E. 150, 50 X. Y. St. 391- 
 
 751. In this case a physician testified ''^ In Harrison v. Sutter St. R. Co., 
 
 to the removal of a dead fostus from 116 Cal. 156, 47 Pac. 1019, it was held 
 
 a woman of whose homicide the pris- under a statute conferring the priv- 
 
 oner was accused, and that the de- ilege on "information * * * which 
 
 fendant at the time stated he had was necessary to enable him (the 
 
 twice procured an abortion on her, physician) to prescribe," that informa- 
 
 she being his wife. See, also, Hauk tion obtained by a physician, when 
 
 V. State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 X. E. 127, 47 conducting an autopsy, is not priv- 
 
 X. E. 465. ileged. See, also, ante, § 164.
 
 345 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIOXS. § 183 
 
 exist which forbid any clerk, messenger or other employe from 
 divulging to any person except the person addressed the contents 
 of a telegraphic message. These statutes do not apply to the pro- 
 duction of telegrams in court which may be secured by serv- 
 ing a subpoena duces tecum upon the officer or employe having 
 them in custody.^^ The rules of the telegraph company forbid- 
 ding disclosure of dispatches do not, of course, avail to prevent 
 the production of telegrams when needed in court.^^ 
 
 The subpoena must identify the particular papers required by 
 naming the parties sending or receiving them, the subject-matter 
 and the dates if known/"" But the particularity of the demand 
 and the sufficiency of the language are wholly discretionary with 
 the court. No definite rule can be laid down. But it may be 
 said that the subpoena cannot be used to obtain an indiscriminate 
 production of telegrams not material to the inquiry, and which 
 may, perhaps, be only effectual in disclosing private, social and 
 business matters which every man has a right to conceal. So a 
 grand jury has no power to compel the production of telegrams 
 passing between parties during a period of fifteen months past.^ 
 A telegraph official may be compelled to testify orally to the 
 contents of a dispatch where the writing is lost or its absence is 
 otherwise accounted for." 
 
 § 183. Indecency of the facts to be proved. — Evidence relevant to 
 the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and which is necessary for 
 
 ^ Croswell on Electricity, § 437 ; ^'^ Jaynes, Ex parte, 70 Cal. 638, 639, 
 
 State V. Sawtelle, 66 N. H. 488, 32 12 Pac. 117; Storror, In re, 63 Fed. 
 
 Atl. 831; Storror, In re, 63 Fed. 564, 564; United States -'. Hunter, 15 Fed. 
 
 distinguishing Boyd v. United States, 712, 715. 
 
 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. ^ Brown Ex parte, 72 Mo. 83, 94> 
 524; Brown, Ex parte, 72 Mo. 83, 88, 2i7 Am. 426, 7 Mo. App. 484. 
 37 Am. 426, 7 Mo. App. 484; State v. "State v. Litchfield, 58 Ivle. 267. If 
 Litchfield, 58 Me. 267 ; United States the federal government shall take con- 
 V. Babcock, 3 Dill. (U. S.) 566, 24 trol of the telegraph it is reasonable 
 Fed. Cas. 14484, 3 Cent. Law J. lOi ; to assume that the rule by which in- 
 National Bank v. National Bank, 7 formation in the hands of executive 
 W. Va. 544, 547; United States v. officials is privileged would apply. 
 Hunter, 15 Fed. 712, 715; Woods v. So, doubtless, Congress now has 
 Miller Co., 55 Iowa 168, 170, 7 N. W. power by virtue of its control of in- 
 484, 39 Am. 170; People v. Webb, 5 terstate commerce, of which the tele- 
 N. Y. 855. graph is a component part, to pass 
 
 •" State v. Litchfield, 58 Me. 267. such a statute.
 
 § 184 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 346 
 
 the purposes of criminal justice, will not be excluded or regarded 
 as privileged, merely because of its indecency. In the trial of 
 certain rare and abnormal crimes caused by a perversion of the 
 sexual instinct, the most shocking revelations of human depravity 
 are frequently met with ; while in the frequent criminal prosecu- 
 tions for abortion, rape, adultery, seduction and bastardy, the 
 evidence is utterly unfit for repetition before a miscellaneous 
 ofatherino^. Thoup'h relevant evidence cannot be excluded be- 
 cause of its indecency, it is always in the discretion of the court 
 to exclude from the court-room all persons not concerned in the 
 proceedings, either as jurors, witnesses, counsel, or court officers.^ 
 
 § 184. Privileged communications between husband and wife. — At 
 
 common law, neither a husband nor a wife was a competent wit- 
 ness for or against the other in any judicial proceedings, civil or 
 criminal, to- which the other was a party.* This incompetency, 
 so far as civil actions were concerned, was largely (though by 
 no means wholly) based upon the common law identity of inter- 
 est in property rights existing between the parties. The rule 
 that excluded a party as a witness because of interest logically 
 excluded another who was merely his or her alter ego. 
 
 And in criminal trials it was conceived that to permit husband 
 or wife to testify for the other would be to admit a witness who 
 would be sure to perjure himself or herself because of interest 
 in and bias and friendship for the accused.^ If either were recog- 
 nized as a competent witness against the other who was accused 
 of crime, besides the temptation to shield the accused, a very 
 
 ^ Greenleaf on Ev., § 253 ; i Elliott State v. Richardson, 194 Mo. 326, 92 
 
 Ev., § 647; 2 Elliott Ev., § 818. S. W. 649. 
 
 * Cases cited in Underbill on Ev., ' Greenl. on Ev., § 334; 2 Best on 
 § 166; State v. Smith, 5 Pen. (Del.) Ev., § 586. Under a statute permit- 
 I, 57 Atl. 368; Finklea v. State (Miss, ting husband or wife to testify in a 
 1909), 48 So. i; State v. Wooley, 215 prosecution for a crime committed by 
 Mo. 620, 115 S. W. 417; Baker v. one against the other the crime must 
 State, 120 Wis. 135; 97 N. W. 566. have been committed while the rela- 
 Where the wife is incompetent to tes- tion of husband and wife existed. A 
 tify against her husband, the testi- wife cannot testify against her hus- 
 mony of the third person as to her band on a prosecution for rape com- 
 declarations in the presence of her mitted by him on her prior to mar- 
 husband is not admissible against him. riage. State v. McKay, 122 Iowa 658, 
 
 98 X. W. 510.
 
 347 PRIV'ILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. § 185 
 
 serious injury would be done to the harmony and happiness of 
 husband and wife and the confidence which should exist between 
 them. In other words, the common law incompetency of the 
 husband and wife as witnesses in criminal trials arose mainly 
 from considerations of public policy having respect to the con- 
 fidential nature of the marital relation, and the interest which 
 the public have in the preservation of domestic peace and con- 
 fidence between married people/' Under tiie rules of the common 
 law a wife is not competent to testify for her husband in a prose- 
 cution for violating a municipal ordinance, since such a proceed- 
 ing is subject to the rules of evidence governing criminal pro- 
 ceedings.' 
 
 § 185. Husband and wife as witnesses in criminal proceedings. — 
 
 At the common law a wife is never a competent witness for her 
 husband in a criminal trial, though she may, in one or two ex- 
 ceptional cases, be a competent witness against him.^ The in- 
 competency of the husband or the wife to testify for the other, 
 where either is tried for a crime committed upon some third 
 person, is sometimes confirmed by statute.® 
 
 A husband or wife may, if willing to do, testify against each 
 other without the consent of the other though there is a statute 
 providing that neither shall be compelled to testify against the 
 other.'** 
 
 "Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462, 477; man, 15 S. Car. 540, 546; Merriwether 
 Stapleton v. Crofts, 83 End. C. L. 367, v. State, 81 Ala. 74, i So. 560 ; People 
 369; Lucas V. Brooks, 18 Wall. (U. v. Reagle, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 527, 547; 
 S.) 436. 453, 21 L. ed. 779; Steen v. Lucas v. State, 23 Conn. 18, 20; El- 
 State, 20 Ohio St. sss; Uriited States more v. State, 140 Ala. 184, 37 So. 
 V. Jones, 32 Fed. 569, 570; Williams 156; State v. Vaughan (Mo. App. 
 V. State, 44 Ala. 24; Lucas v. State, 1909), 118 S. W. 1186; Wesoky v. 
 23 Conn. 18, 20; Taulman v. State, 37 United States, 175 Fed. 333. 
 Ind. 353, 355. "United States v. Bassett, 5 Utah 
 
 ■'Barron v. Anniston (Ala. 1908), 48 131, 13 Pac. 237; State v. Parrott, 79 
 
 So. 58. N. Car. 615, 617; Johnson v. State, 27 
 
 *Turpin v. State, 55 Md. 462, 475; Tex. App. 135, 11 S. W. 34; People 
 
 Randall's Case, 5 City Hall Rec. (N. v. Gordon, 100 Mich. 518, 519, 59 N. 
 
 Y.) 141, 153; State V. Wright, 41 La. W. 322. The privilege of silence may 
 
 Ann. 600, 603, 6 So. 135 ; State v. be claimed by the accused as well as 
 
 Pain, 48 La. Ann. 311, 19 So. 138; by the witness. People v. Wood, 126 
 
 Hussey v. State, 87 Ala. 121, 135, 6 N. Y. 249, 264, 27 N. E. 362, 36 N. Y. 
 
 So. 420; Johnson v. State, 27 Tex. St. 952. 
 
 App- 135, II S. W. 34; State V. Work- "Commonwealth v. Barker, 185 
 
 Mass. 324, 70 N. E. 203.
 
 1 85 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 ■348 
 
 A statute declaring in general terms that a husband or a wife 
 is competent as a witness^^ in an action for or against the other, 
 or a statute which removes the common law incompetency of 
 interested persons as witnesses in civil proceedings ( and even 
 in criminal proceedings) will not be effective to make husband 
 and wdfe a competent witness against the other in a criminal 
 trial/- An exception is made on the trial of the husband for a 
 personal injury inflicted by him on his wife, and she is permitted 
 to testify against him. Such an exception is absolutely neces- 
 sary to promote justice and to protect the wife from violence at 
 the hands of her husband in circumstances where, from the rela- 
 tion and surroundings of the parties, no third person could be 
 present. ^^ 
 
 It is the policy of the law to extend the right of the wdfe to 
 testify against the husband in such cases/'* 
 
 ^ See People v. Reagle, 60 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 527, 547; Wilke v. People, 53 
 N. Y. 525, 526. 
 
 "State V. Evans, 138 Mo. 116, 39 
 S. W. 462, 60 Am. St. 549; Steen v. 
 State, 20 Ohio St. 333, 334; Turpin v. 
 State, 55 Md. 462, 477; United States 
 V. Crow Dog, 3 Dak. 106, 14 N. W. 
 437- Cf. Everett v. State, 33 Fla. 661, 
 673, 15 So. 543; State v. Orth, 79 
 Ohio St. 130, 86 N. E. 476; Bryan 
 v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 114 S. W. 
 811. The incompetency is based on 
 public policy, not on interest on the 
 action. Burrell v. Bull, 3 Sandf. Ch. 
 (N. Y.) 15; Knowles v. People, 15 
 ]\Iich. 408, 413 ; Dixon v. People, 18 
 Mich. 84, 92. Cf. People v. Fultz, 109 
 Cal. 258, 41 Pac. 1040; State v. Rey- 
 nolds, 48 S. Car. 384, 26 S. E. 679. 
 
 "i Bl. Com. (Brown) p. 655; i 
 East P. C. 455; Lord Audley's Case, 
 3 How. St. Tr. 401, 402; I Whart. Cr. 
 L., § 767; State V. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217, 
 220, 7 N. W. 516; State v. Bennett, 
 31 Iowa 24; United States v. Bassett, 
 5 Utah 131, 13 Pac. 237; Bramlette v. 
 State, 21 Tex. App. 6it, 718, 2 S. W. 
 765, 57 Am. 622; Baxter v. State, 34 
 
 Tex. Cr. App. 516, 31 S. W. 394, 53 
 Am. St. 720; Whipp v. State, 34 Ohio 
 St. 87, 89, 32 Am. 359; Navarro v. 
 State, 24 Tex. App. 378, 6 S. W. 542; 
 State V. Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 391, 
 27 S. W. 1 106; People V. Chegaray, 
 18 Wend. (N. Y.) 637, 642; Turner 
 V. State, 60 Miss. 351, 354, 45 Am. 
 412 ; United States v. Smallwood, 5 
 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 35, 27 Fed. Cas. 
 16316; I Russell on Crimes (9th Am. 
 Ed.) 948; People v. Carpenter, 9 Barb. 
 (N. Y.) 580-584; State v. Dyer, 59 
 Me. 303, 307 (abortion) ; Common- 
 wealth V. Kreuger, 17 Pa. Co. Cf. 181 ; 
 State V. Boyd, 2 Hill (S. Car.) 288, 
 27 Am. Dec. 376n; People v. Hough- 
 ton, 24 Hun (N. Y.) 501; People 
 V. Hovey, 29 Hun (N. Y.) 382, 389; 
 Rex v. Jagger, i East P. C. 455 (at- 
 tempt to poison wife). This excep- 
 tion is recognized, even if other wit- 
 nesses testify to material facts. Bent- 
 ley v. Cooke, 3 Doug. 422; Taulman 
 V. State, 37 Ind. 353. 355; State v. 
 Vaughan (Mo. App. 1909), nS S. W. 
 1 186. 
 
 "People V. Sebring, 66 Mich. 705, 
 707, 33 N. W. 808. In all cases where
 
 349 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. § l86 
 
 The dying declarations of a wife are always competent on a 
 trial of her husband accysed of her homicide, and may be used 
 for or against him/^ 
 
 Where a husband and wife are jointly indicted for the com- 
 mission of the same crime, the confession of the wife may be re- 
 ceived against the husband so far as it admits or suggests his 
 guilt. The statute excluding privileged communications between 
 husband and wife does not render this evidence inadmissible ; the 
 same rule would apply to the confession of a husband implicated 
 with his wife in a crime against a third person/® In all cases 
 where the statute permits a husband or wife to testify against 
 the other in a criminal trial, the credibility of the husband or wife 
 thus testifying is to be considered and determined by the same 
 rule which applies to other witnesses. The fact of the relation- 
 ship of the witness to the accused may be considered as bearing 
 upon his or her credibility, but this relationship should not cause 
 the evidence of the witness to be regarded with suspicion or 
 scrutinized with more than ordinary care.^' 
 
 § 186. Statutory competency of husband and wife. — The compe- 
 tency of a husband or wife as a witness for or against the other 
 is now, to a large extent, if not altogether, regulated by statute 
 in this country. The general effect of this legislation has been 
 to render the husband or wife competent in civil cases by remov- 
 
 a wife may testify against her hus- 5 Penn. (Del.) 145, 58 Atl. 1042; 
 
 band she may, with equal reason, tes- where he is the owner of property 
 
 tify for him. State v. Patterson, 2 for the arson of which the wife is on 
 
 Ired. (N. Car.) L. 346, 355, 38 Am. trial. Jordan v. State, 142 Ind. 422, 
 
 Dec. 699; State v. Neill, 6 Ala. 685, 41 N. E. 817; People v. Johnson (Cal. 
 
 686; People v. Fitzpatrick, 5 Park. App.), 98 Pac. 682. 
 
 Cr. 26, 28 ; Com. v. Murphy, 4 " i East P. C. 357 ; State v. Belcher, 
 
 Allen (Mass.) 491, 492; Rex v. Ser- 13 S. Car. 459, 462; People v. Green, 
 
 jeant, i Ry. & Mood. 352, 3 Russ. on i Denio (N. Y.) 614, 615; Whart. 
 
 Cr. (9th Am. Ed.) 633. The question Cr. Ev., § 393; Rose. Cr. Ev. (7th 
 
 usually arises where the wife is a ed.).i26. 
 
 witness. The exception is also recog- " State v. Mann, 39 Wash. 144, 81 
 
 nized where the husband is a witness Pac. 561. 
 
 for or against the wife. Whipp v. " State v. Collins, 20 Iowa 85, 92 ; 
 
 State, 34 Ohio St. 87, 89, 32 Am. 359; State v. Bernard, 45 Iowa 234; State 
 
 State V. Davidson, yj N. Car. 522, 523, v. Lingle, 128 Mo. 528, 31 S. W. 20, 
 
 as in the case of an assault by the 22. 
 
 wife on the husband. State v. Harris,
 
 187 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 35O 
 
 ing any disqualification either may have been under because of 
 the merger of the legal personality of the wife into that of the 
 husband. This principle applied in civil cases only, and in such 
 cases a husband or wife is now competent as a witness to the 
 same extent as any other person witl* this exception (which is 
 recognized in all the states which have legislated upon the sub- 
 ject), that neither can be permitted to disclose confidential com- 
 munications which passed between them during coverture/^ 
 
 The rule of the statute is applicable to confidential communi- 
 cations which are contained in letters or other writings as well 
 as to those which are of ail oral nature. Hence, it follows that 
 letters passing between husband and wife are inadmissible against 
 either of them on trial for a crime where by accident or design 
 they have been delivered by the person wdio received them to the 
 prosecuting official.^'' But it must appear, to bring the case under 
 the statute, that the letters or writings contained something of a 
 confidential nature. This fact is to be determined by the reading 
 of the writing itself, and is a preliminary question for the court. 
 If the communication in writing is not confidential per se, it can- 
 not be made so by the accused claiming that he wrote it in con- 
 fidence. The mere objection that the writing is confidential will 
 not exclude it if the court shall decide otherwise."" 
 
 It seems that a written communication from a husband to his 
 wife may lose its privileged character by her letting it go out of 
 her hands. The writing is no longer confidential if both husband 
 and wife have relinquished control over it."^ 
 
 § 187. Confidential communications between husband and wife. — 
 The statutory rule forbidding a husband or wife to disclose con- 
 fidential communications made during marriage is applicable to 
 criminal trials. Where the statute declares in express language 
 that "the husband or wife cannot be compelled to disclose con- 
 fidential communications," either may do so voluntarily if the 
 other consents thereto, ^^^ though the privilege is absolute and 
 
 '' See Underbill on Ev., § 167 ; Cole St. 538, 70 Atl. 865 ; Hearne v. State, 
 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. App. 439, 88 S. 50 Tex. Cr. App. 431 ; 97 S. W. 1050. 
 
 W. 341. Comprehensive notes on ""Caldwell v. State, 146 Ala. 141, 41 
 
 questions of competency of husband So. 473. 
 
 or wife to testify for or against each "^ State v. Buffington, 20 Kan. 599, 
 
 other in criminal proceedings, 24 Am. 614, 27 Am. 193. 
 
 St. 663, 106 Am. St. 763-770. ^a Emmons v. Barton, 109 Cal. 662, 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Fisher, 221 Pa. 42 Pac. 303 ; Southwick v. Southwick,
 
 351 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 187 
 
 caniiot be waived if the statute declares the communication to 
 be incompetent.^" Where a communication is not confidential 
 (and this will be presumed where it was made to a third person 
 by the husband or wife in the presence of the other-^), or where 
 a third person is present, or is concealed and overhears an inter- 
 view between husband and wife, it will not be privileged,"* and 
 the third party or the husband or wife may testify to what was 
 said. But sometimes it has been held that a communication need 
 not be expressly confidential to be privileged,"^ and this certainly 
 is the rule when the statute refers to all communications made 
 during marriage. ^° 
 
 Under such a statute by which all communications made during 
 the marriage relation are excluded ; either party may testify as 
 to the fact of marriage or as to any other fact which is not con- 
 tained in a communication passed between the parties."' 
 
 A conversation between husband and wife is no less confiden- 
 tial because children were present who took no part in it."^ The 
 cessation of the marital relation by annullment, divorce or death 
 will not let in a confidential communication made while it existed. 
 
 2 Sweeny (N. Y. Super.) 234. Thus, 
 a confession by a wife to her husband 
 that she has committed incest, extort- 
 ed by his threats to leave her, and its 
 repetition, under similar threats, to a 
 third person, in her husband's pres- 
 ence, are confidential communications 
 and incompetent. State v. Brittain, 
 117 N. Car. 783, 23 S. E. 433. Cf. 
 ante, §§ 173, 174. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Cleary, 152 
 Mass. 491, 25 N. E. 834; Head v. 
 Thompson, ~7 Iowa 263, 42 N. W. 
 188. The prosecutor in a trial for an 
 assault cannot be compelled to state 
 whether or not he told his wife that 
 the accused had acted in self-defense. 
 The law regards such a communica- 
 tion as confidential and will not com- 
 pel its disclosure. Murphy v. Com- 
 monwealth, 23 Graft. (Va.) 960, 965. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Griffin, no 
 Mass. 181 ; Mainard v. Reider, 2 Ind. 
 App. 115, 28 N. E. 196. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Griffin, no 
 Mass. 181 ; Reynolds v. State, 147 Ind. 
 3, 46 N. E. 31 ; State v. Center, 35 
 Vt. 378; People V. Lewis, 62 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 622, 16 N. Y. S. 881, afif'd in 136 
 N. Y. 633, 32 N. E. 1014, 49 N. Y. St. 
 913, and Underbill on Ev., § 168. 
 
 "^ Commonwealth v. Hayes, 145 
 Mass. 289, 293, 14 N. E. 151 ; Howard 
 V. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. i, 80 S. W. 
 21 r, 81 S. W. 704, 25 Ky. Law 2213, 
 where a wife was not permitted to 
 testify to the identity of a letter from 
 her husband. 
 
 "-" Campbell v. Chace, 12 R. I. 2Z2> ', 
 King V. King, 42 Mo. App. 454; Cole 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. xApp. 439, 88 S. 
 
 w. 341. 
 
 " Chase v. United States, 7 App. D. 
 C. 149- 
 
 ^Jacobs V. Hesler, 113 Mass. 157, 
 160. So business communications are 
 privileged. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 
 145 Mass. 289, 14 N. E. 151. A boast-
 
 § 187 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 352 
 
 A divorced husband or wife cannot testify to an adulterous act 
 by either, or any other fact occurring during coverture."^ 
 
 The termination of the marriage relation permits either party 
 thereto to testify thereafter against the other party as to any 
 incriminating fact occurring after the termination of the mar- 
 riage.^" This would be the effect of a decree of divorce but not 
 of a mere separation by decree or otherwise, for it is well settled 
 that separation and non-cohabitation, either by agreement or by 
 a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, do not remove the 
 restriction that a husband and wife shall not testify against each 
 other on a criminal trial, ^^ 
 
 An appeal from a decree of divorce does not prevent the decree 
 from putting an end to the marriage relations as of the date of 
 its entry. Though an appeal has been taken, either party may 
 testify on a criminal trial against the other as to all facts arising 
 after the decree.^" 
 
 It is not always necessary to produce the decree of divorce to 
 show that the witness has become competent. The question be- 
 ing a collateral question, the rule of the best evidence does not 
 apply and the witness may testify that she was divorced from the 
 accused and may also tesify to the date of the divorce. 
 
 The fact that she has been divorced may be implied as where, 
 for example, in a homicide case a witness testifies orally that 
 she is the widow of the victim of the homicide. Upon such a 
 statement by a woman in a Kentucky case, it was held that she 
 might, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be presumed to 
 
 ful and defiant declaration by a hus- the marriage on the trial of his wife 
 
 band to his wife of his misconduct, for adultery committed during the 
 
 and of his intention to openly persist coverture. State v. Dudley, 7 Wis. 
 
 in it, accompanied by insolent and 664. See, also, State v. Marvin, 35 
 
 brutal threats, is not a confidential N. H. 22, 26; Stanley v. Montgom- 
 
 communication. Seitz v. Seitz, 170 ery, 102 Ind. 102, 26 N. E. 213; French 
 
 Pa. St. 71, 2,2 Atl. 578. v. Ware, 65 Vt. 338, 26 Atl. 1096. Cf. 
 
 '^ State v. Jolly, 3 Dev. & B. (N. ante,% 176; State v. Nelson, 39 Wash. 
 
 Car.) no, 113. How far this case, 221, 81 Pac. 721. 
 
 which expressly assumes all marital ^"Tompkins v. Commonwealth, 117 
 
 transactions to be confidential, would Ky. 138, 77 S. W. 712, 25 Ky. L. 1254. 
 
 apply where the statute restricts the ^* Johnson v. State, 27 Tex. App. 
 
 privilege to confidential -communica- 135, 11 S. W. 34. 
 
 tions, is by no means certain. A di- "" State v. Leasia, 45 Ore. 410, 78 
 
 vorced husband is competent to prove Pac. 328.
 
 353 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 8 loo 
 
 ha\'e been divorced from her former husband before her mar- 
 riage to the deceased. ^^ 
 
 And either party to the marriage relation after the death of the 
 other may testify to facts which he or she learned from other 
 sources and not by reason of such relations. 
 
 In all cases where the question of the competency of the wife 
 of the accused to testify against him arises, the court should de- 
 cide against the competency of the witness if it has a reasonable 
 doubt on that point. ^* 
 
 § 188. Husband or wife of co-defendant as a witness for or against 
 Ids associate in crime — Testimony of husband or wife on trial of a 
 third person tending to criminate. — Whether a husband or wife is 
 competent to testify as a witness upon the trial of a third person 
 for a crime (where the spouse of the witness is not a party to 
 the record), if his or her testimony may incriminate the other 
 party to the marriage relation, is a question which was formerly 
 much discussed. It was at one time almost universally held that 
 such evidence, though it only tended to incriminate collaterally 
 and in connection with other circumstances, was inadmissible. 
 But the rule is now well settled that this evidence is to be re- 
 ceived, not only as to those facts which, though innocent in them- 
 selves, constitute links in a chain of proof which will implicate 
 the husband or wife of the witness, but also as to those facts 
 which are directly incriminating,^" always provided the spouse 
 of the witness is not a party to the record. 
 
 Where several persons, jointly indicted for the same crime, 
 are tried together, a different rule applies. Then the husband 
 or wife of no one of them is a competent witness for,^*^ or 
 
 ''Tompkins v. Commonwealth, 117 Maule & Selw. 194; State v. Welch, 
 
 Ky. 138, Tj S. W. 712, 25 Ky. Law 26 Me. 30, 45 Am. Dec. 94; Common- 
 
 1254. wealth V. Gordon, 2 Brewst. (Pa.) 
 
 ^ Porter v. United States, 7 Ind. 569 ; State v. Bridgmen, 49 Vt. 202, 
 
 Terr. 616, 104 S. W. 855. 209, 24 Am. 124. But compare State 
 
 ''^Commonwealth v. Sparks, 7 Allen v. Gardner, i Root (Conn.) 485; State 
 
 (Mass.) 534, 543; Pruett v. State, 141 v. Wilson, 31 N. J. L. 'JT. 
 Ala. 69, 2)7 So. 343; State v. Dudley, ''Rex v. Frederick, 2 Stran. 1095; 
 
 7 Wis. 664, 668; State v. Marvin, 35 Rex v. Locker, 5 Esp. 107; Common- 
 
 N. H. 22; State v. Briggs, 9 R. L wealth v. Easland, i Mass. 15; Com- 
 
 361, II Am. 270; Rex v. All Saints, 6 monwealth v. Robinson, i Gray 
 23 — Underhill Crim. Ev.
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 354 
 
 against,^" any co-defendant. Thus, for example, where two or 
 more are indicted for a conspiracy, the wife of none of them can 
 testif}^ against the others if the evidence connects her husband 
 with the common plan or scheme. ^^ But this rule of exclusion 
 should be thus qualified. The wife of a co-defendant is only 
 excluded in cases where the defendants are jointly tried, or 
 where, though separately tried, the nature of the crime charged 
 is such that the acquittal of one defendant would exonerate her 
 husband, as in riots and conspiracies, in which the participation 
 of two or more is necessary to constitute a crime.^^ 
 
 Hence, where several are indicted for a crime which could 
 have been committed by one person, as well as by several, the 
 husband or wife of either may testify for or against an accom- 
 phce, jointly indicted, but only when his or her spouse is not 
 a party to the record.'*'* And generally where a wife may testify 
 against an accomplice of her husband because, under the circum- 
 stances, her testimony will not injure the latter, she may testify 
 for him, when he is separately tried. "'^ 
 
 (Mass.) 555, 560; Moffit v. State, 2 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 99, loi, 36 Am. Dec. 
 301 ; Mask v. State, 32 Miss. 405, 410 ; 
 State V. Smith, 2 Ired. (N. Car.) 402, 
 405 : Woodward v. State, 84 Ark. 1 19, 
 104 S. W. 1 109; State V. Sargood, -^ 
 Vt. 80, 58 Atl. 971. 
 
 ^' Whart. Crim. Ev., § 391 ; Woods 
 V. State, 76 Ala. 35, 2>7, 38, 52 Am. 314 ; 
 Rex V. Smith, i Mood. C. C. 289 : Dill 
 V. State, I Tex. App. 278, 283. Contra, 
 State V. Adams, 40 La. Ann. 213, 3 
 So. 733. 
 
 ** Johnson v. State, 47 Ala. 9: Rex 
 V. Smith, I Mood. C. C. 289; United 
 States V. Hanway, 2 Wall. Jr. (U. S.) 
 139, 26 Fed. Cas. 15299, 4 Am. Law J. 
 (X. S.) 458. 
 
 '' Workman v. State, 4 Sneed. 
 (Tenn.) 425; Moffit v. State, 2 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 99, lOi, 36 Am. Dec. 
 301. The wife of one of several de- 
 fendants indicted jointly for a con- 
 spiracy is competent against the con- 
 spirators other than her husband 
 
 when he has pleaded guilty. Graff v. 
 People, 108 111. App. 168. 
 
 *" I Greenl. on Ev. 335 ; Common- 
 wealth V. Manson, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 31. 
 Against an accomplice, State v. Dyer, 
 59 Me. 303; State v. Anthony, i Mc- 
 Cord (S. Car.) 285: Smith v. Com- 
 monwealth, 90 Va. 759. 19 S. E. 843 ; 
 People V. Langtree, 64 Cal. 256, 30 
 Pac. 813; Moffit V. State, 2 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 99, loi. 36 Am. Dec. 301; 
 Grimm v. People. 14 ]\Iich. 300: BIu- 
 man v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. App. 43, 
 21 S. W. 1027. 26 S. W. 75 ; State v. 
 Goforth, 136 Mo. in, 37 S. W. 801; 
 State v. Rainsbarger, 71 Iowa 746, 31 
 N. W. 865: State v. Wright, 41 La. 
 Ann. 600, 603, 6 So. 135. Contra, 
 State V. Smith, 2 Ired. (X. Car.) 402, 
 405; Munyon v. State, 62 X. J. L. i, 
 42 Atl. 577; Smartt v. State. 112 Tenn. 
 539, 80 S. W. 586: State V. Smith, 5 
 Penn. (Del.) i. 57 Atl. 368. 
 
 " Powell V. State. 58 Ala. 362 ; Mof- 
 fitt V. State, 2 Humph. (Tenn.) 99, 36
 
 355 PRIVILEGED COMMUXICATIOXS. § 189 
 
 § 189. Valid marriage is necessary. — The burden of proving that 
 the marriage relation exists between the witness and the accused 
 rests upon the party opposing the competency of the witness. 
 Unless a marriage, valid or at least apparently valid in all re- 
 spects, is shown to exist at the time the witness is offered, his 
 or her testimony must be received. It is not enough that the 
 parties, supposing the marriage to be valid, had lived together 
 for years as man and wife, and had introduced each other to the 
 world as such. The marriage must be actually and in fact valid, 
 and must have existed in full force and vigor down to the date 
 of the crime alleged.*^ The validity of the marriage will be in- 
 Cjuired into on the voir dire examination of the witness, and, if 
 the relation of husband and wife is not found to exist, the wit- 
 ness is competent and must be permitted to testify.*" And the 
 fact that the parties have lived together in illicit relations, though 
 holding themselves out to the world as husband and wife, is com- 
 petent and admissible as an objection to the credibility of the 
 witness.** 
 
 § 190. Privilege as relating to the evidence of judicial officers. — 
 
 Because of the peculiar scope and nature of the duties of a judge 
 presiding at a criminal trial it is usually considered objectionable, 
 
 Am. Dec. 301 ; Commonwealth v. 616, 104 S. W. 855 ; State v. Rocker, 
 
 Manson, 2 Ashm. (Pa.) 31; State v. 130 Iowa 239, 106 N. W. 645. But in 
 
 Anthon3% i McCord (S. Car.) 285, Dixon v. People, 18 Mich. 84, 91, it 
 
 286; United States v. Addatte, 6 was said that evidence that an actual 
 
 Blatchf. (U. S.) 76, 24 Fed. Cas. marriage existed, though only prima 
 
 14422. Where a co-defendant is com- facie valid, and on which the prisoner 
 
 petent, his wife is also. Blackburn v. had, with reason, relied and acted as 
 
 Commonwealth, 12 Bujh (Ky.) 181. such, will preclude the prosecution 
 
 " State V. Samuel, 2 Dev. & Bat. (X. from attacking the validit\^ of the 
 
 Car.) 177-184; Flanagin v. State, 25 marriage collaterall}-. 
 
 Ark. 92; Rickerstricker v. State, 31 ^^ Peat's Case, 2 Lew. C. C. 288; 
 
 Ark. 207; State v. Patterson, 2 Ired. State v. Hancock, 28 Nev. 300, 82 Pac. 
 
 (N. Car.) 346, 355, 38 Am. Dec. 699; 95; People v. Anderson, 26 Cal. 129; 
 
 Wells v. Fletcher, 5 C. & P. 12 ; Wrye People v. Alviso, 55 Cal. 230. 
 
 V. State, 95 Ga. 466, 22 S. E. 273; "Mann v. State, 44 Tex. 642, 643, 
 
 People v. McCraney, 6 Park. Cr. (N. citing Ros. Cr. Ev., p. 148: t Phill. on 
 
 Y.) 49; Commonwealth v. iMudgett, Ev., pp. 69, 70; i Whart. Am. Cr. Law 
 
 174 Pa. St. 211, 34 Atl. 588; State v. (6th Ed.) § 772; Hill v. State, 41 Ga. 
 
 Hancock, 28 Nev. 300, 82 Pac. 95 ; 484, 503 ; State v. Brown, 28 La. Ann. 
 
 Porter v. United States, 7 Ind. Ter. 279, 280.
 
 § IQO CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 356 
 
 if not incieed erroneous, for him to take tlie witness stand on the 
 same trial. Aside from the general objection that judicial con- 
 duct should not be subject to cross-examination or comment, the 
 peculiar duties of the judge in administering oaths to the witnesses 
 in case the court has no clerk, and in deciding upon their com- 
 petency, with his power to commit for contempt, render it unfair 
 that he should assume the dual character of witness and judge 
 in a criminal trial. ^^ This rule, which is based rather upon the 
 official character of the witness than upon the nature of the testi- 
 mony \vhich he may give, is not absolute, and if the judge shall 
 testify, without objection from the accused, no error has been 
 committed. *° 
 
 And these considerations, while they are reasonable, do not 
 apply upon the trial of an indictment where the witness, though 
 a judge, is not presiding. Hence it is the rule that a judge may 
 testify under such circumstances to any matters which took place 
 before him in open court,*' as, for example, to prove the evidence 
 of an absent or deceased witness given at a previous trial. *^ 
 
 In some states there are statutes providing that a judge may 
 be called as a witness by either party. Under such a statute it 
 has been held that it is within the discretion of the judge who is 
 called to be a witness, either to suspend the trial or to direct that 
 
 *'Rapalje on Witnesses, § 45; Peo- tempt, and the session of the court 
 
 pie V. Miller, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 197; suspended? Either result must logic- 
 
 Underhill on Ev., § 313. ally ensue, and both are equally im- 
 
 ^^ People V. Dohring, 59 N. Y. 374, practicable. People v. Dohring, 59 
 
 17 Am. 349. Even to permit one of N. Y. 374, 17 Am. 349; Rogers v. 
 
 several judges to testify may result State, 60 Ark. 76, 87, 29 S. W. 894, 46 
 
 in embarrassment and judicial scan- Am. St. 164, 31 L. R. A. 465n; State 
 
 dal, and impede the course of justice, v. DeMaio, 69 N. J. L. 590, 55 Atl. 
 
 A judge upon the witness stand is 644. 
 
 subjected to all the duties of a wit- *' State v. Duffy, 57 Conn. 525, 18 
 
 ness, while at the same time possess- Atl. 791 ; People v. Dohring, 59 N. Y. 
 
 ing his rights and privileges. Who, 374, 17 Am. 349; Reg. v. Harvey, 8 
 
 then, shall decide what course shall Cox Cr. Cas. 99. 
 
 be taken if, for reasons sufficient in ^ Reg. v. Gazard, 8 C. & P. 595. But 
 
 his opinion, he shall decline to an- a judge cannot be interrogated as to 
 
 swer a question put to him as a wit- privileged communications with his 
 
 ness? Shall he ascend the bench, and colleagues, i Wharton on Ev., § 600. 
 
 with unseemliness and illegality pass Or as to the grounds upon which he 
 
 judicially upon his own conduct? Or decided a case. Agan v. Hey, 30 Hun 
 
 ought he to be committed for con- (X. Y.) 591.
 
 357 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. § IQI 
 
 it shall proceed before another judge or not. In either case the 
 judge is a competent witness under the statute, and he may, under 
 such circumstances^ testify to the same facts as other witnesses, 
 except that he cannot be questioned as to consultations with his 
 colleagues or similar matters. 
 
 For example, the judge holding the trial may, under the stat- 
 ute, testify that the testimony of the witness which he has just 
 heard is or is not consistent with that given on a prior trial, and 
 he may, if he can do so orally, state the evidence or state it after 
 consulting the transcript made by the stenographer.*^ 
 
 § 191. Privilege as relating to grand jurors. — Proceedings before 
 grand jurors may be regarded as privileged communications. 
 The law requires that the preliminary inquiry into the guilt or 
 innocence of the accused should be secret, in order that perfect 
 freedom of discussion may be had, and that suspected persons 
 may not be warned of their danger and enabled to make their 
 escape.^'' 
 
 Hence, in the absence of a statute permitting a disclosure, a 
 grand juror is not compellable to testify as a witness to anything 
 which took place in the jury room, and particularly to the testi- 
 mony which was heard, unless it is absolutely necessary for him 
 to do so in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice.^^ 
 
 He cannot be compelled to disclose as a witness the number 
 of grand jurors concurring in the finding of an indictment, °^ or 
 to state the evidence on which it was found in order to impeach 
 
 "State V. Houghton, 45 Ore. no, 140, and see remarks of court in 
 
 75 Pac. 887. State v. Baker, 20 Mo. 338, 345- 
 
 " Little V. Commonwealth, 25 " State v. Oxford, 30 Tex. 428, 431 ; 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 921, 930; Common- State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn. 95, 114, 
 
 wealth V. Scowden, 92 Ky. 120, 123, 115, ^6 Am. 54; State v. Davis, 41 
 
 17 S. W. 205, 13 Ky. L. 404. The Iowa 311, 316; Underhill on Evi- 
 
 free, impartial and unbiased adminis- dence, § 176. It is immaterial that 
 
 tration of justice requires that pro- the juror was not sworn to secrecy, 
 
 ceedings of grand jurors shall be kept Little v. Commonwealth, 25 Gralt. 
 
 secret in order that perfect freedom (Va.) 921, 930. 
 
 of deliberation and opinion among ^° Reg. v. Marsh, 6 Ad. & E. 236, 
 
 jurors may be effectually obtained 250, i N. & P. 187, 2 H. & W. 366, 6 
 
 and an energetic administration of L. J. M. C. 153; Reg. v. Russell, i 
 
 criminal justice be secured. Common- Carr. & M. 247; State v. Baker, 20 
 
 wealth V. Hill, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 137, Mo. 338, 345; State v. Johnson, 115
 
 § igi CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 358 
 
 it,^'' or wliat opinion any juror expressed, or how any juror voted 
 on any question. 
 
 It is the poHcy of the law that ah facts which are brought out 
 in the preHminary inquiry before tlie grand jury should be for- 
 ever secret. Persons who are present in the grand jury room 
 but not under an oath of secrecy, as the clerk to the grand jury,°* 
 or the state's attorney,^^ the witnesses or any other persons,^*"* 
 are not competent as witnesses to prove anything that w^as said 
 or done. 
 
 An indictment when found by the grand jury and filed in court 
 is a judicial record presumptively true and correct. It cannot 
 be collaterally impeached by evidence on the trial after the de- 
 fendant has pleaded. But where justice requires it, an indict- 
 ment or presentment will be set aside by the court on motion for 
 proper cause. On such a motion a grand juror may testify that 
 the indictment was indorsed "a true bill" by mistake, '^" or that 
 the jury acted upon evidence and not upon their own knowledge 
 or observation in making a presentment,^® or that some mistake, 
 misunderstanding or irregularity has occurred which would jus- 
 tify setting it aside. '"'^ The secrecy imposed by the common law 
 and statutes on proceeding before a grand jury will not prevent 
 the public or an individual from proving by members of the jury 
 what passed before it when, after the purpose of secrecy has been 
 effected, such disclosure becomes necessary in the furtherance of 
 justice or the protection of public or individual rights.*^'' So, a 
 
 Mo. 480, 22 S. W. 463. See, contra, °^ McLellan v. Richardson, 13 Me. 
 
 Low's Case, 4 Greenl. (Me.) 439, 446, 82. 
 
 453, 16 Am. Dec. 27111, holding that '*" Chit. C. L. 317; Rose. Cr. Ev. 
 
 the concurrence of twelve or more (7th ed.) 154; State v. Fasset, 16 
 
 in a bill is not a secret, but a result Conn. 457, 470. 
 
 which the grand jury of necessity ^" State v. Horton, 63 N. Car. 595. 
 
 disclose publicly every time they pro- ^* Commonwealth v. Green, 126 Pa. 
 
 mulgate their decision on any bill be- St. 531, 536, 17 Atl. 878, 12 Am. St. 
 
 fore them. See, also, Sparrenberger 894n. 
 
 v. State, S3 Ala. 481, 486, 25 Am. 643. ^'People v. Hulbut, 4 Denio (N. 
 
 °' People v. Hulbut, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 133, 136, 47 Am. Dec. 244; Com- 
 
 Y.) 133, 135, 47 Am. Dec. 244; State monwealth v. McComb, 157 Pa. St. 
 
 v. Comeau, 48 La. Ann. 249, 19 So. 611, 27 Atl. 714; People v. Briggs, 60 
 
 130. See, ante, §§ 25^29. How. Pr. (N. Y.) 17. 
 
 "12 Vin. Abr. 38. "^ State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 688, 
 
 8s Pac. 784, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) S33n.
 
 359 PRIVILEGED COMMUXICATIOXS. g I92 
 
 grand juror has been permitted to testify to what the defendant 
 stated and confessed to the grand jury;*"^ that he manifested 
 great anxiety to fix the charge upon another,*^- and that a person 
 named was not a witness before the grand jury/" 
 
 63 
 
 § 192. Statutory regulation of the competency of grand jurors. — 
 
 The common law obhgation of secrecy incumbent upon grand 
 jurors is generally, if not universally, confirmed by statutes in 
 the several states, which, being remedial in their character, should 
 be strictly construed. Their operation is usually confined, in ex- 
 press terms, to the evidence and the names of the witnesses who 
 appear before the grand jury. As to other matters within the 
 knowledge of its members, the common-law rules still suffice. 
 Some states have, in recent years, enacted statutes permitting 
 evidence given before the grand jury to be disclosed, and making 
 a grand juror a competent witness in certain cases. First, where 
 it is material to ascertain w^hether the testimony of a witness 
 before the grand jury is consistent with or different from the evi- 
 dence of the same w^itness at the trial,"* and, second, to disclose 
 the testimony given before them of any witness upon a charge 
 against him of. perjury. Statutes of this sort must be strictly 
 construed, and it is doubtless the rule, that if such a statute ex- 
 pressly states in what cases a grand juror may disclose evidence 
 which he has heard, he can do so in no other.''^ The cases, how- 
 
 " United States v. Porter, 2 Cranch certain statements before the grand 
 
 C. C. 60, 63, 27 Fed. Cas. 16072; jury. Jones v. Turpin, 6 Heisk. 
 
 United States v. Charles, 2 Cranch (Tenn.) 181, 185; Gordon v. Com- 
 
 C. C. 76, ^T, 25 Fed. Cas. 14786. monweahh, 92 Pa. St. 216, 221, 3-7 
 
 ^^ State V. Broughton, 7 Ired. (N. Am. 672; Reg. v. Gibson, i Carr. & 
 
 Car.) 96, loi, 45 Am. Dec. 507. M. 672. 
 
 °^ Commonwealth v. Hill, 11 Cush. "^ State v. Gibbs, 39 Iowa 318, 322; 
 
 (Mass.) 137. Commonwealth v. Scowden, 92 Ky. 
 
 "Little V. Commonwealth, 25 120, 122, 17 S. W. 205, 13 Ky. L. 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 921, 931; Common- 404; State v. Hayden, 45 Iowa 11, 
 
 wealth V. Mead, 12 Gray (Mass.) 167, 15; Ruby v. State, 9 Tex. App. 353, 
 
 170, 171, 71 Km. Dec. 741; United 356; Spratt v. State, 8 Mo. 247; State 
 
 States V. Reed, 2 Blatchf. C. C. 435, v. Beebe, 17 Minn. 241 ; State v. 
 
 465, 27 Fed. Cas. 16134; People v. Grady, 84 Mo. 220; Jenkins v. State, 
 
 Hulbut, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 133, 135, 47 35 Fla. T^l, 18 So. 182, 48 Am. St. 
 
 Am. Dec. 244; Hinshaw v. State, 147 267; State v. Campbell, Tz Kan. 688, 
 
 Ind. 334, 47 X.'e. 157. The witness 85 Pac. 784. 
 must be asked if he has not made
 
 §193 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 360 
 
 ever, are not harmonious in construing such statutes, and in some 
 of the states grand jurors have been permitted to divulge evi- 
 dence given before them in cases that could by no means be 
 brought under the statute.*'*' 
 
 Prosecutions for perjury committed by witnesses testifying 
 before the grand jury have been comparatively rare. It is a well- 
 settled rule, however, both at common law*'^ and by statute, that 
 any member of the grand jury may be compelled to testify to the 
 evidence of the accused given before the grand jury. If this 
 were not permitted it is very possible that untruthful witnesses 
 would be able to commit perjury before the grand jury with 
 perfect impunity, while subjecting all persons against whom 
 they might cherish animosity to accusations and arrest.*'^ The 
 secrecy of the grand jury proceedings is due to the public alone 
 and is to protect the jurors. It cannot be claimed as a privilege 
 by a witness who testifies falsely before a grand jury and who is 
 subsequently indicted for the perjury.*'^ 
 
 § 193. Evidence of traverse jurors. — As regards traverse jurors 
 the rule seems now to be that they may testify only to facts or 
 communications referring to their actions as individuals while 
 separated from their associates. They may testify to what third 
 persons said or did to them as individual jurors. But the motives 
 and reasons of the jury and the transactions and communications 
 referring to the subject-matter under their consideration as an 
 official body, and which were made in their capacity as jurors, 
 are privileged, whether made in the jury room or elsewhere.'" 
 
 *^ State V. Moran, 15 Ore. 262, 14 ler v. State, 2 Ga. App. 632, 58 S. E. 
 
 Pac. 419; State v. Broughton, 7 Ired. 1066; State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267, 
 
 (N. C.)g6, 45 Am. Dec. 507; People 285. 
 
 V. Young, 31 Cal. 563; State v. Wood, "^People v. Young, 31 Cal. 563, 564. 
 
 53 N. H. 484; Hinshaw v. State, 147 On the incompetency of grand jurors 
 
 Ind. 334, 47 N. E. 157. as witnesses, see, Thompson & Mer- 
 
 °'Thomp. & M. on Juries, 744; riam on Juries, § 701-707, where the 
 
 State V. Fasset, 16 Conn. 457, 468; subject is exhaustively discussed. Pil- 
 
 United States v. Reed, 2 Blatchf. C. grim v. State (Okla. Cr. App., 1909), 
 
 C. 435, 466, 27 Fed. Cas. 16134; Peo- 104 Pac. 383. 
 
 pie V. Young, 31 Cal. 563. ™ Commonwealth v. White, 147 
 
 ^ State V. Broughton, 7 Ired. ( N. Mass. 76, 80, 16 N. E. 707. For a 
 
 C.) 96, lOi, 45 Am. Dec. 507; Zeig- general discussion of this subject and 
 
 cases, see Underbill on Ev., § 176.
 
 36i 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. 
 
 193 
 
 Evidence from the jurors to show their ignorance,"^ or miscon- 
 duct/" or to impeach their verdict for the purpose of obtaining 
 a new trial, cannot be received/^ The admission of such evidence 
 is contrary to pubHc poHcy and injurious to the administration 
 of justice. It would expose the jurors to offers of bribes if a 
 new trial could be procured for the accused upon the affidavits 
 of jurors. But the evidence of a juror may be introduced to 
 show the misconduct or mistakes of others. Thus the affidavit 
 of a juryman has been received to show that the foreman made a 
 mistake in announcing a verdict, or the clerk a mistake in enter- 
 ing it, or to show the misconduct of the officer having the jury 
 in charge. And the general rule that a verdict may not be im- 
 peached is not without exceptions,^'* as for example where it ap- 
 peared that a verdict of guilty was rendered on insufficient evi- 
 dence with the expectation of executive clemency. So it may be 
 shown by a juror's testimony that the trial judge promised them 
 if they would convict they might rely upon him to be clement to 
 the prisoner.^^ 
 
 " State V. Cobbs, 40 W. Va. 718, 22 
 S. E. 310. 
 
 " State V. Wood, 124 Mo. 412, 417, 
 27 S. W. 1 1 14; State V. Best, 11 1 N. 
 Car. 638, 643, 15 S. E. 930; State v. 
 McLeod, I Hawkes (N. Car.) 344, 
 346; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 90 
 Va. 109, 117, 17 S. E. 812; State v. 
 Dusenberry, 112 Mo. 277, 295, 20 S. 
 W. 461 ; State v. Plum, 49 Kan. 679, 
 31 Pac. 308; Mattox v. United States, 
 146 U. S. 140, 36 L. ed. 917, 13 Sup. 
 Ct. 50; Heller v. People, 22 Colo. 11, 
 43 Pac. 124; Carr v. State, 96 Ga. 
 284, 22 S. E. 570; Mitchell v. State, 
 36 Tex. Cr. App. 278, 33 S. W. 367. 
 
 "In Woodward v. Leavitt, 107 
 Mass. 453, 461, 9 Am. 49, where this 
 subject is fully discussed, the court 
 says : "The proper evidence of the 
 decision of the jury is the verdict re- 
 turned by them upon oath and af- 
 firmed in open court; it is essential 
 
 to the freedom and independence of 
 their deliberations that their discus- 
 tions in the jury room should be kept 
 secret and inviolable." No affidavit 
 or other sworn statement will be re- 
 ceived to impeach a verdict, to ex- 
 plain it or to show on what grounds 
 it was rendered. Kelh^ v. State, 39 
 Fla. 122, 22 So. 303; Weatherford v. 
 State, 31 Tex. Cr. App. 530, 536, 21 
 S. W. 251, 37 Am. St. 828; McTyier 
 V. State, 91 Ga. 254, 260, 18 S. E. 
 140; Smith V. State, 59 Ark. 132, 140, 
 43 Am. St. 20; State v. Senn., 32 S. 
 Car. 392, 408, II S. E. 292; State v. 
 Bennett, 40 S. Car. 308, 311, 18 S. E. 
 886. As to testimony of judges and 
 jurors as to identity of crime and 
 prisoner, see § 197, post. 
 
 '* Crawford v. State, 2 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 60, 67, 24 Am. Dec. 467n. 
 
 "McBean v. State, 83 Wis. 206, 
 211, 53 N. W. 497.
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF FORMER JEOPARDY. 
 
 § 194. Pica of former conviction or 196. Essential facts to be shown, 
 
 acquittal. 197. Identity of crime and person. 
 
 195. The record of the former trial 198. Criminal judgments as admis- 
 as evidence. sions. 
 
 § 194. Plea of former conviction or acquittal. — The pleas of 
 autrefois acquit and autrefois convict are pleas in bar which are 
 favorably regarded by the law. By a plea of autrefois acquit 
 the accused in effect claims that he has already been acquitted of 
 the identical crime with w^hich he now stands indicted, while by 
 the plea of autrefois convict he declares that he was formerly 
 convicted of the same crime. Any extended consideration of the 
 form of such pleas or of the order or method in which they must 
 be made is manifestly out of place here. They will be found 
 sufficiently discussed in works treating of the details of criminal 
 trial procedure.^ Here we can only consider what facts must be 
 alleged and proved under these pleas and the mode of proving 
 them. 
 
 § 195. The record of the former trial as evidence. — In most of the 
 states, a plea of former acquittal or conviction must be specially 
 pleaded in bar. Such a plea is not proper as a defense nor can 
 evidence be offered to show a former conviction or acquittal un- 
 der a plea of not guilty. In other states it has been held that a 
 defense of former acquittal or conviction may be shown under a 
 plea of not guilty. A special plea in those states is unnecessary. 
 A plea of former acquittal or conviction can only be pleaded after 
 an actual acquittal or conviction. It cannot be based upon the 
 fact that another indictment is pending for the same crime. ^ 
 
 If a statute provides that a prosecution shall be suspended upon 
 the accused making restitution so far as he can, it will be pre- 
 
 ■^ Elliott Ev., § 2730 ; burden of " i Chitty Cr. L. 463. 
 proof of jeopardy, Elliott Ev., § 2731. 
 
 362
 
 363 FORMER JEOPARDY. § 195 
 
 sumed, where the accused in a subsequent prosecution for the 
 same offense alleges former jeopardy, that he consented to the 
 suspension, and the prosecution need not prove an express consent 
 on his part.^ 
 
 Though it is never necessary to prove a formal sentence to 
 sustain a plea of former acquittal or conviction,* it is always 
 necessary to show that the trial came to an actual end.^ The 
 best evidence of the fact that the trial was terminated is the ju- 
 dicial record of the prior proceedings. Ordinarily, this must be 
 produced to show the former conviction or acquittal and parol 
 evidence of its contents is usually not received, unless its loss or 
 destruction is shown.*' 
 
 If the record has not been made up. a continuance must be 
 granted in order that the accused may have an opportunity by 
 means of a mandamus to compel the clerk to make it up." Under 
 all circumstances, the accused should have a reasonable time to 
 enable him to produce the record.^ While it is true that the fact 
 of former acquittal or conviction cannot be proved by parol, 
 there are certain facts in connection with the former trial that 
 must necessarily be proved by oral evidence.®^ For example, it 
 may be shown orally that the verdict was not properly received f 
 that the jury were discharged because they could not agree upon 
 a verdict,^" or that the indictment was not maintained by the 
 evidence at the trial. ^^ 
 
 * Burnett v. State, 76 Ark. 295, 88 ^ Rex v. Bowman, 6 C. & P. loi, 25 
 S. W. 956. E. C. L. 342. 
 
 * State V. Elden, 41 Me. 165, 168 ; ^ Brady v. Commonwealth, i Bibb. 
 State V. Benham, 7 Conn. 414; Shep- (Ky.) 517. 
 
 herd v. People, 25 N. Y. 406, 420, 421. *a Jacobs v. State, 4 Lea (Tenn.) 
 
 * Lipscomb v. State, 76 Miss. 223, 196 ; Bailey v. State, 26 Ga. 579, 581 ; 
 25 So. 158; State v. Williams (N. Brown v. State, 72 Miss. 95, 97, 16 
 Car., 1909), 65 S. E. 908. So. 202; Walter v. State, 105 Ind. 
 
 "Walter v. State, 105 Ind. 589, 593, 589, 593, 5 N. E. 73s; Farley v. State, 
 
 5 N. E. 735; Rocco V. State, 37 :\Iiss. 57 Ind. 331; but compare, Durland 
 
 357; State V. Orr, 64 Mo. 339; Peo- v. United States, 161 U. S. 306, 40 L. 
 
 pie V. Benjamin, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) ed. 709, 16 Sup. Ct. 508. 
 
 201 ; Robbins v. Budd, 2 Ohio 16, * State v. Scott, i Kan. App. 748, 42 
 
 docket of justice; State v. Hudkins, Pac. 264. 
 
 35 W. Va. 247, 13 S. E. 367; Re.x v. ^" Helm v. State, 67 Miss. 562, 7 So. 
 
 Bowman, 6 C. & P. loi, 25 E. C. L. 487. 
 
 342. " State V. Judge, 42 La. Ann. 414, 
 
 7 So. 678.
 
 § 196 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 364 
 
 Parol evidence is always admissible to show that there were 
 fraud and collusion on a prior trial where the conviction or ac- 
 quittal was the result of such fraud or collusion.^^ If it shall 
 appear that the verdict of guilty on a former trial was subse- 
 quently set aside, the record is not admissible, for the verdict and 
 all incidents stand or fall together. ^^ 
 
 The record of the former trial so far as it is admissible is con- 
 clusive upon both parties, as to all issues which were raised or 
 could have been raised on a former proceeding/* 
 
 The general rule that a prior judgment on the merits is con- 
 clusive upon the parties thereto, and that it will be deemed to 
 have established all facts which were essential to the rendition of 
 the judgment in any subsequent proceeding between the same 
 parties, is applicable to criminal trial/^ 
 
 § 196. Essential facts must be proved. — The fact that a valid in- 
 dictment was found against the accused, and that on pleading 
 thereto he was regularly acquitted or convicted must be proved by 
 relevant evidence to the satisfaction of the court. In the first place, 
 it may be said that a plea of former acquittal or conviction is not 
 good unless it shall substantially appear in evidence that the pre- 
 vious trial was upon the merits.^® 
 
 Thus, the discharge of the accused on his prior trial because 
 the prosecution was not commenced within the statute of limita- 
 tion,^^ or for failure tO' admonish the jury before their separa- 
 
 " State V. Reed, 26 Conn. 202; the same court, but no judgment has 
 
 Commonwealth v. Dascom, in Mass. been entered, accused must move that 
 
 404. judgment be entered before he pleads 
 
 " Bailey v. State, 26 Ga. 579, 581. a prior conviction. De Leon v. State 
 
 "Myers v. State, 92 Ind. 390, 396; (Tex.), 114 S. W. 828. 
 
 Smurr v. State, 105 Ind. 125, 133, 4 " Commonwealth v. Curtis, Thach. 
 
 N. E. 445; Commonwealth v. Evans, Cr. Cas. (Mass.) 202; Halloran v. 
 
 loi Mass. 25, 27; Commonwealth v. State, 80 Ind. 586, 591; State v. 
 
 Goddard, 13 Mass. 455, 457; State v. Hodgkins, 42 N. H. 474, 477; State 
 
 Kelsoe, 11 Mo. App. 91, 92; State v. v. White, 8 Wash. 230, 35 Pac. iioo; 
 
 Taylor (Miss. 1898), 23 So. 34. Ballowe v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 44 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Evans, loi S. W. 646, 19 Ky. L. 1867; People v. 
 
 Mass. 25, 27; Commonwealth v. Aus- Fishman, 64 Misc. (N. Y.) 256, 119 
 
 tin, (yj Mass. 595, 597 ; State v. Lang, N. Y. S. 89. 
 
 63 Me. 215, 220. If the prior trial '' Xagel v. People, 229 111. 598, 82 
 
 was on the same indictment and in N. E. 315.
 
 365 
 
 FORMER JEOPARDY. 
 
 197 
 
 tion/^ or because the jury could not agree after repeated instruc- 
 tions/® is not sufficient to sustain a plea of former jeopardy. 
 
 So, also, it is a general rule well sustained by the cases that a 
 judgment in criminal and in civil cases in order to be conclusive 
 as a bar on the parties in a subsequent proceeding, must have been 
 rendered by a court having proper jurisdiction and whose pro- 
 ceedings were wholly regular.-" If the indictment on a former 
 trial was bad, so that a conviction thereon would be set aside be- 
 cause of the insufficiency of the indictment, a plea of former ac- 
 quittal or conviction is not sustained.-^ 
 
 Usually the record Is proper evidence to prove that the court 
 had jurisdiction and in the absence of proof of its loss or destruc- 
 tion, its production to prove jurisdiction may be required as the 
 best evidence of that fact."" 
 
 § 197. Identity of crime and person. — The accused must show 
 by evidence independently of the record the identity of the crime 
 for which he was convicted or acquitted with that for which he is 
 now on trial as regards time,^^ place and character.^* 
 
 ^' State V. McKinney, 76 Kan. 419, 
 91 Pac. 1068. 
 
 "Johnson v. State, 54 Fla. 45, 44 
 So. 760; Keerl v. State, 213 U. S. 135, 
 53 L. ed. — , 29 Sup. Ct. 469, afif'g 
 State V. Keerl, 33 Mont. 501, 85 Fac. 
 862. 
 
 ■" McNeil V. State, 29 Tex. App. 48, 
 14 S. W. 393 ; Blyew v. Common- 
 wealth, 91 Ky. 200, 15 S. W. 356, 12 
 Ky. L. 742; Alford v: State, 25 Fla. 
 852, 6 So. 857; Smith v. State, 67 
 Miss. 116, 7 So. 208; State v. Phil- 
 lips, 104 N. Car. 786, ID S. E. 463; 
 People V. Hamberg, 84 Cal. 468, 24 
 Pac. 298; State v. Hodgkins, 42 N. 
 H. 474, 477 ; State v. Odell, 4 Blackf . 
 (Ind.) 156; Commonwealth v. Peters, 
 12 Met. (Mass.) 387; Commonwealth 
 V. Bosworth, 113 Mass. 200, 202, 18 
 Am. 467; Brown v. State, 105 Ala. 
 117, 16 So. 929; People V. Connor, 
 142 N. Y. 130, 133, 36 N. E. 807; 
 Dulin V. Lillard (Dulin's Case), 91 
 
 Va. 718, 20 S. E. 821, 822; State v. 
 Sommers, 60 Minn. 90; 61 N. W. 
 907. Underhill on Ev., § 152. 
 
 " Timon v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. App. 
 363, 30 S. W. 808, 1063; State V. 
 Littschke, 27 Ore. 189, 40 Pac. 167; 
 United States v. Barber, 21 D. C. 
 456; Shepler v. State, 114 Ind. 194, 
 198, 16 N. E. 521; Ford v. State, 7 
 Ind. App. 567, 570, 35 N. E. 34. 
 
 " State V. Salge, 2 Nev. 321 ; State 
 V. Spencer, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 431, 
 432; Brill V. State, i Tex. App. 152. 
 
 ^ People V. Gault, 104 Mich. 575, 62 
 N. W. 724; Reed v. State (Tex. 
 1895), 29 S. W. 1085; Bickham v. 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 150, loi S. 
 W. 210. 
 
 '-' Wilkinson v. State, 59 Ind. 416, 
 26 Am. 84; Nagel v. People, 229 111. 
 598, 82 N. E. 315; Brown v. State, 72 
 Miss. 95, 16 So. 202; Henry, In re, 
 (Idaho) 99 Pac. 1054; State v. Hud- 
 kins, 35 W. Va. 247, 13 S. E. 367;
 
 § 197 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 366 
 
 The identity of the person who stands accused with the person 
 formerly acquitted or convicted must also be shown, and may be 
 proved by parol evidence, though identity of name may usually be 
 sufficient proof of identity of person in the absence of evidence to 
 the contrary.'^ The burden of proof to show the fact of the for- 
 mer acquittal or conviction and also to show the identity of the 
 person and of the crime is always upon the accused. "^ 
 
 Whether the proof of former acquittal or conviction is suffi- 
 cient is a question for the court to determine upon all the facts 
 and usually, unless it is evident that gross injustice has been done, 
 the determination of the court will not be reviewed."^ 
 
 If the accused offers no proof to sustain a plea of former ac- 
 quittal or conviction, it is the duty of the court to direct the jury 
 to find for the prosecution.^^ 
 
 Parol evidence from a judge, juror or witness at the former 
 trial is admissible to show the identity both of the person and of 
 the crime.*'' 
 
 Durland v. United States, 161 U. S. 
 306, 40 L. ed. 709, 16 Sup. Ct. 508; 
 Inman v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 36, 
 
 30 S. W. 219; State V. Chinault, 55 
 Kan. 326, 40 Pac. 662; State v. Rob- 
 inson, 116 N. Car. 1046, 21 S. E. 701; 
 Reddy v. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 7S4, 
 
 31 S. W. 730, 17 Ky. L. 536; State v. 
 Waterman, 87 Iowa 255, 54 N. W. 
 359; State v. Wister, 62 Mo. 592; 
 Burk V. State, 8r Ind. 128; King v. 
 State, 43 Tex. 351 ; State v. Atkin- 
 son, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 677; David- 
 son V. State, 99 Ind. 366, 367; Foster 
 V. State, 39 Ala. 229, 234; Vowells v. 
 Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 193, 7 Ky. 
 L. 176; Sims V. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 649, I S. W. 465; Faulk V. State, 52 
 Ala. 415, 417; Jenkins v. State, 78 
 Ind. 133, 134; Beyerline v. State, 147 
 Ind. 125, 45 N. E. 772. 
 
 "^ State V. Kelsoe, 11 Mo. App. 91, 
 92. 
 
 ■•'Faulk V. State, 52 Ala. 415; Em- 
 erson V. State, 43 Ark. 372; State v. 
 Norman, 135 Iowa 483, 113 N. W. 
 
 340; Vowells V. Commonwealth, S3 
 Ky. 193, 7 Ky. L. 176; Cooper v. 
 State, 47 Ind. 61 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Wermouth, 174 Mass. 74, 54 N. E. 
 352; Brown v. State, 72 Miss. 95, 97, 
 16 So. 202 ; Commonwealth v. Daley, 
 
 4 Gray (Mass.) 209; Commonwealth 
 V. Hoffman, 121 Mass. 369; State v. 
 Ackerman, 64 N. J. L. 99, 45 Atl. 27; 
 People V. Cramer, 5 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 171. 
 
 "' State V. Bradley, 45 Ark. 31. See 
 Allen V. State, 70 Ark. 22, 65 S. W. 
 933; Daniels v. State, 78 Ga. 98, 6 
 Am. St. 238n ; People v. Richards, 44 
 Hun (N. Y.) 278; State v. Bronkol, 
 
 5 N. Dak. 507, 67 N. W. 680. 
 
 "" Territory v. West (N. Mex. 
 1909), 99 Pac. 343- 
 
 ^ Bainbridge v. State, 30 Ohio St. 
 264; Rocco V. State, 37 Miss. 357; 
 Brown v. State, 72 Miss. 95, 97, 16 
 So. 202; Page V. Commonwealth, 27 
 Gratt. (Va.) 954; Commonwealth v. 
 Chilson, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 15; Com- 
 monwealth V. Austin, 97 Mass. 595,
 
 367 FORMER JEOPARDY. § 198 
 
 § 198. Criminal judgments as admissions. — A judgment in 
 a criminal trial may under some circumstances be admissible 
 in a subsequent civil proceeding. Thus, in an action to recover 
 damages for an assault and battery, the plaintiff may prove that 
 the defendant v^^as arrested and placed on trial for the same, and 
 also that he was tried and found guilty, or that he pleaded guilty 
 and was sentenced. Such a determination, deliberately made, is of 
 the highest value as evidence on the issue in the civil proceeding.^** 
 
 597; Commonwealth v. Dillane, 11 47, 49; Walter v. State, 105 Ind. 589, 
 
 Gray (Mass.) 67; State v. Water- 593, 5 N. E. 735; State v. Mclntyre 
 
 man, 87 Iowa 255, 257, 54 N. W. 359; (Wash. 1909), loi Fac. 710. Ante, 
 
 State V. Maxwell, 51 Iowa 314, i N. §§ 190, 193. 
 
 W. 666; Emerson v. State, 43 Ark. '"Green v. Bedell, 48 N. H. 546, 
 
 372; Swalley v. People, 116 111. 247, 549. 
 
 4 N. E. 379; Dunn v. State, 70 Ind.
 
 CHAPTER XVIL 
 
 THE COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 § 199. Definition and formal require- § 206. Incompetency of witnesses 
 ments of the oath. caused by conviction of in- 
 
 200. When witness may affirm. famous crime. 
 
 201. Religious belief of the witness. 207. The pardon of the convict — 
 
 202. Insanity — When disqualifying When restoring competency. 
 
 a witness. 208. Mode of proving pardon — 
 
 203. Mode of proving insanity of Parol evidence. 
 
 witness. 209. Statutory regulations removing 
 
 204. Deaf mutes as witnesses. the incompetency of persons 
 
 205. Children on the witness stand. convicted of crime. 
 
 210. Statutes construed. 
 
 § 199. Definition and formal requirements of the oath. — An 
 
 oath has been defined as an "outward pledge given by the juror 
 that his attestation [or promise] is made under an immediate 
 sense of his responsibility to God."^ The definition just given, 
 it may be noted, wholly omits the imprecatory elements of the 
 oath which were so prominent in the definitions of the common 
 law." It is certainly consistent with the most modern ideas upon 
 the subject, and less calculated to offend persons who may enter- 
 tain conscientious scruples against invoking God's wrath upon 
 themselves. 
 
 In criminal courts of inferior jurisdiction, where the issues of 
 fact are determined by the magistrate without the intervention 
 of "a jury, the oath is usually administered by the judge himself. 
 In the higher courts this duty is performed by the clerk, the 
 formula employed being usually "you do solemnly swear that you 
 will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as 
 a witness in this issue now joined between A. and B." 
 
 ^ Tyler on Oaths, London, p. 15. asseveration by which a person re- 
 
 - 1 Stark. Ev., 22. In Rex v. White, nounces the mercy, and imprecates 
 
 2 Leach Cr. L. 482 (1786), the court the vengeance of heaven, if he do not 
 
 thus defines an oath : "A religious speak the truth." 
 
 368
 
 369 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. § 200 
 
 The witness expresses his assent to this affirmation by raising 
 his hand only, or by placing it upon a copy of the Bible while the 
 oath is being administered, and by kissing the book at its con- 
 clusion.^ 
 
 But the main requirement is that the witness shall feel that he 
 is bound by the oath, and if he feels that he is bound the formula 
 is immaterial.'* If the court is informed by the witness or by any 
 other person that the witness is an adherent of a religious system 
 other than Christianity, he must be asked what form of oath he 
 considers most binding on his conscience. If the court is satisfied 
 that there is any peculiar form which the witness regards as more 
 obligatory than that usually employed he should be sworn accord- 
 ingly.' 
 
 A Chinaman is not incompetent as a witness oh account of his 
 inability to explain the nature of the oath which is ordinarily 
 taken by witnesses. Usually he will or may be sworn according 
 to the oath which he states is most binding on his conscience.*' 
 
 § 200. When witness may affirm. — The scriptural injunction, 
 "Swear not at all" is considered by many as an express prohi- 
 bition of oaths of every sort. Such persons on this account 
 decline to participate in or give their assent to any form of words 
 Avhich involves or implies an invocation of God. The wishes and 
 conscientious scruples of all such persons are carefully respected 
 by the law, both common and statutory, and to them a question in 
 the following form is put : "You do solemnly, sincerely and truly 
 declare and affirm that you will state the truth, the whole truth 
 and nothing but the truth, in the issue now joined between the 
 
 ^ See Underbill on Ev., § 315, and laws, religion and constitution of 
 
 cases there cited. those countries. But still the sub- 
 
 * In Omichund v. Barker, Willes, p. stance is the same, which is that God 
 
 547, the court said : "It is very plain in all of them is called upon as a wit- 
 
 from what I have said that the sub- ness to the truth of what we say." 
 stance of an oath has nothing to do ° People v. Green, 99 Cal. 564, 570, 
 
 with Christianity, only that by the 34 Pac. 231 ; State v. Chyo Chiagk, 92 
 
 Christian religion we are put still Mo. 395, 410, 48 S. W. 704; i Greenl., 
 
 under great obligations not to be § 371; Whart. Cr. Ev. (9th cd.), 
 
 guilty of perjury. The forms indeed § 354. 
 
 of an oath have been since varied, "State v. Lu Sing, 34 Mont. 31, 85 
 
 and have been always different in all Pac. 521. 
 countries, according to the different 
 24 — Underhill Crim. Ev.
 
 § 20I 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 6/' 
 
 people of the state, etc., and the defendant." The affirmative 
 answer of the witness given to this question is equivalent to an 
 oath/ and renders him liable to a prosecution for perjury if he 
 testifies falsely.® 
 
 A witness who is sworn before a separate trial is ordered, 
 where several are jointly indicted, must be re-sworn when testify- 
 ing at the separate trial of each.** 
 
 § 201. Religious belief of the witness. — The common law, 
 because of the great importance which in early times was attached 
 
 'State V. Welch, 79 Me. 99, 103, 8 
 Atl. 348. 
 
 * State V. Whisenhurst, 2 Hawks 
 (N. Car.) 458, 459. If the witness, 
 when sworn, fails to object to the 
 form of oath as taken by him, he is 
 still liable for perjury, though he did 
 not consider himself bound thereby. 
 State V. Whisenhurst, 2 Hawks (N. 
 Car.) 458, 459. It is not error in a 
 criminal trial, if the accused has as- 
 sumed various aliases, for the clerk 
 to repeat them in swearing a witness, 
 stating also his true name. If the 
 aliases are set forth in the indict- 
 ment, it is difficult to understand how 
 their repetition by the clerk in the 
 hearing of the jurors will prejudice 
 the accused. People v. Everhardt, 
 104 N. Y. 591, 596, II N. E. 62, 5 N. 
 Y. St. 793, 2 Sil. App. (N. Y.) 506, 
 6 N. Y. Cr. 231. 
 
 * Abbott Trial Brief (Cr. Causes), 
 § 3371 Babcock v. People, 15 Hun 
 (N. Y.) 347. On a trial for felony, 
 it is error to swear a witness while 
 the accused is not m court. Bearden 
 V. State, 44 Ark. 331. See Underbill 
 on Ev., §§ 346, 367. But the objec- 
 tion that a witness was not properly 
 sworn cannot be raised for the first 
 time when a motion is made for a 
 new trial. Goldsmith v. State, 32 
 Tex. Cr. 112, 115, 22 S. W. 405. 
 
 In Omichund v. Barker, i Atkyns, 
 
 p. S3> the court quotes Puffendorf, 
 4th book, § 4, p. 122: "That part of 
 the form in oaths under which God is 
 invoked as a witness, or as an aveng- 
 er, is to be accommodated to the re- 
 ligious persuasion which the swearer 
 entertains of God; it being vain and 
 insignificant to compel a man to 
 swear by a God whom he doth not 
 believe, and therefore doth not rever- 
 ence; and no one thinks himself 
 bound to the Divine Majesty in any 
 other words, or under any other 
 titles, than what are agreeable to the 
 doctrines of his own religion, which, 
 in his judgment is the only true way 
 of worship. And hence, likewise, it 
 is, that he who swears by false gods, 
 yet such as were by him accounted 
 true, stands obliged, and if he de- 
 ceives, is really guilty of perjury; 
 because, whatever his peculiar notions 
 are, he certainly had some sense of 
 the Deity before his eyes, and there- 
 fore by willfully forswearing himself, 
 he violated, as far as he was able, 
 that awe and reverence he owed to 
 Almighty God; yet when a person, 
 requiring an oath from another, ac- 
 cepts it under a form agreeable to 
 that worship which the swearer holds 
 true, and he himself holds for false, 
 he cannot in the least be said hereby 
 to approve of that worship."
 
 371 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 8 20I 
 
 to the religious element of an oath, declared all persons to be in- 
 competent as witnesses who did not believe in a Deity who would 
 punish perjury/" And it was said with much vehemence that to 
 require an oath to be taken by a person, who, like the atheist, de- 
 nied his existence, was a mockery of justice. But every one born 
 in a Christian land and educated under the influence of Chris- 
 tianity was presumed, until the contrary was shown, to possess 
 sufficient religious faith to qualify him as a witness. In any case 
 he was only required to believe in a God who would punish per- 
 jury, and it was immaterial whether he believed that the culprit 
 would be punished in this life by the pangs of remorse or other- 
 wise, or whether punishment would be inflicted beyond the 
 grave. ^^ 
 
 The witness could not usually be asked directly as to his pos- 
 session or lack of possession of a religious belief. His atheism 
 or infidelity must always be shown by the evidence of other wit- 
 nesses in whose presence and hearing he had voluntarily declared 
 his irreligion,^^ though the fact that he had subsequently acquired 
 sufficient religious faith to render him competent might also be 
 shown. ^^ 
 
 In almost every state of the Union statutes have been enacted, 
 providing in substance that no person shall be incompetent as a 
 witness because of his belief or disbelief in the tenets of any sys- 
 tem of religious teaching, provided he understands the nature of 
 an oath. 
 
 Where such statutory provisions prevail in conformity there- 
 with, and having regard to the existing federal and state consti- 
 tutional enactments which are intended to secure freedom of re- 
 ligious belief and worship,^* any question intended to discredit a 
 witness by showing him to be an atheist or an agnostic would be 
 very objectionable.^^ 
 
 "Rex V. White, 2 Leach Cr. L. 482. ^"Commonwealth v. Smith, 2 Gray 
 
 "Cubbison v. McCreary, 2 W. & S. (Mass.) 516, 61 Am. Dec. 478. 
 
 (Pa.) 262; Bush V. Commonweahh, "Atwood v. Welton, 7 Conn. 66; as 
 
 80 Ky. 244, 248; Commonweahh v. regards the reception of declarations 
 
 Hills, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 530, 532; to prove mental conditions, see Un- 
 
 Chappell V. State, 71 Ala. 322, 324; derhill on Ev., §§ 51, 52. 
 
 State V. Powers, 51 N. J. L. 432, 433, " U. S. Const. Amend., Art. i. 
 
 17 Atl. 969, 14 Am. St. 693. " People v. Copsey, 71 Cal. 548, 550, 
 
 12 Pac. 721.
 
 § 202 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 372 
 
 So, where it had been provided in the state constitution that no 
 person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil right or privi- 
 lege on account of his religious principles, it has been held that 
 the accused is not incompetent as a witness in his own behalf 
 because he does not belief in a God who will punish him if he 
 perjures himself/'' 
 
 So, usually, where the competency of witnesses is regulated by 
 a statute which fails to specify any religious test, the same rule 
 will apply and the fact that the witness is an atheist or a disbe- 
 liever in a future state of existence beyond the grave will not ren- 
 der him incompetent." 
 
 § 202. Insanity — When disqualifying a witness. — Very little 
 distinction, if any, was made by the common law between the 
 numerous forms which insanity assumes. As regards the com- 
 petency of a person as a witness, insanity of any kind, once estab- 
 lished, seems to have been an insurmountable objection. It was 
 immaterial whether the person mentally unsound was an imbecile 
 or idiot, a furious maniac, or a quiet sufferer from melancholia, 
 senile dementia, or from some harmless and perhaps temporary 
 monomania. ^^ 
 
 It is now held universally that the insanity or intellectual weak- 
 ness of a witness, no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid 
 objection to his competency if, at the time he is testifying, he has 
 mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, so far 
 as the facts in issue, and his testimony thereon, are involved, un- 
 derstands the nature and obligation of an oath, and can give a 
 fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matters about 
 which he testifies. ^^ 
 
 ^® Perry v. Commonwealth, 3 Gratt Greenleaf on Evidence, § 365; Ros- 
 
 (Va.) 632; Hronek V. People, 134 111. coe's Crim. Evidence, 118; Best Ev., 
 
 139, 152, 24 N. E. 861, 23 Am. St. 168. 
 
 652; Ewing V. Bailey, 36 111. App. "Tucker v. Shavir, 158 111. 326, 41 
 
 191 ; Colter v. State, 2,1 Tex. Cr. App. N. E. 914 ; State v. Brown, 2 Marv. 
 
 284, 39 S. W. 576; State V. Powers, (Del.) 380, 36 Atl. 458; Reg. v. Hill, 
 
 SI N. J. L. 432, 433-436, 17 Atl. 969, s Eng. L. & Eq. 547, 5 Cox. C. C. 259, 
 
 14 Am. St. 693. 266, 15 Jur. 470; District of Columbia 
 
 "State V. Williams, in La. 179, 35 v. Amies, 107 U. S. 519, 520-524, 2-] 
 
 So. 505. L. ed. 618, 2 Sup. Ct. 840; Coleman 
 
 "2 Elliott Ev., §§ 750-771; I v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. (Va.)
 
 373 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES, § 2O3 
 
 An inquisition of insanity,^" or the fact that a person alleges 
 and endeavors to prove his own insanity,^^ does not conclusively 
 render him incompetent as a witness. 
 
 A witness is not incompetent to testify upon the grounds of his 
 insanity merely because he has been adjudged insane and has been 
 confined in an insane asylum. Evidence of these facts is not con- 
 clusive of his insanity. They raise a prima facie presumption of 
 incompetency which the party offering the witness must over- 
 come. The question is one wholly for the trial court in determin- 
 ing the competency of the witness. There is no presumption that 
 insanity shown to have existed has continued down to the date of 
 the trial. The court should consider the conduct and actions of 
 the witness in the court room and may also take into consideration 
 his manner of giving testimony. If the witness appears rational 
 and meets the tests imposed by law in case of the alleged insanity 
 of a witness, he is competent, though it may appear that at one 
 time he was in an asylum for the insane.^^ 
 
 A witness examined out of court by a commission will be pre- 
 sumed to be sane. If evidence of his insanity is introduced when 
 his deposition is offered to be read, the jury will be permitted to 
 determine his mental capacity.-^ 
 
 § 203. Mode of proving insanity of witness. — The objecting 
 party may prove the insanity of the witness either by examining 
 him,"* or by other witnesses."^ or by written proof showing that 
 he has been legally pronounced a lunatic. 
 
 The question of competency is of course judicial, while the 
 credibility of the testimony is for the jury alone. If the inca- 
 
 865, 874, 875, 18 Am. 711; Walker v. "^ Mayor, etc., v. Caldwell, 81 Ga. 
 
 State, 97 Ala. 85, 86, 12 So. 83 ; State 76, 80, 7 S. E. 99. 
 
 V. Simes, 12 Idaho 310, 85 Pac. 914; "^ Reg. v. Hill, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 547; 
 
 Covington v. O'AIeara (Ky. 1909), 5 Cox C. C. 259, 15 Jur. 470. On his 
 
 119 S. W. 187. examination by the court in this case 
 
 '"Kendall v. May, 10 Allen (Mass.) the witness claimed to be possessed 
 
 59- of spirits who guided all his affairs 
 
 "' Dickson v. Waldron, 135 Ind. 507, yet recognizing the meaning and 
 
 34 N. E. 506, 35 N. E. I, 41 Am. St. soundness of his oath his testimony 
 
 440, 24 L. R. A. 483. See Ante, was received. 
 
 §§ 159-163. -^Livingston v. Kiersted, 10 Johns 
 
 "Covington v. O'Meara (Ky. (N. Y.) 362. 
 1909), 119 S. W. 187.
 
 § 204 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 374 
 
 pacity has intervened since the occurrence which the witness is 
 called on to relate; if it is temporary, and a speedy restoration to 
 sanity seems probable, the court may direct an adjourmnent.-" 
 
 If, in the course of the examination of a witness, it becomes 
 apparent to the court that he is incompetent because of insanity, 
 the court may stop the examination and instruct the jury to disre- 
 gard his evidence, though it had on the preliminary examination 
 to ascertain competency, pronounced him sane.^^ 
 
 The testimony of insane witnesses has usually been received 
 because of the necessity of the case and the absence of other wit- 
 nesses. The jury may consider the mental condition of the wit- 
 ness at the time of the transaction he describes, and while he is 
 testifying, in order to determine his capacity for observation, his 
 powers of recollection and his disposition and ability to describe 
 events correctly."^ If they disbelieve him, and his testimony is 
 uncorroborated, the jury should reject it altogether.-? 
 
 § 204. Deaf mutes as witnesses. — The early common law re- 
 garded the deaf mute as an idiot. ^'^ He was prima facie devoid 
 of intelligence or understanding, so that he was presumptively 
 incompetent as a witness until it was clearly and affirmatively 
 shown that he possessed a sufficient degree of intelligence to 
 qualify him. The burden of proving him competent was on the 
 party calling him to testify. 
 
 The intelligence of an ordinary deaf mute witness is for the 
 jury and where the facts are placed before the jury, it is improper 
 to permit another witness to express an opinion that the deaf mute 
 is or is not intelligent. A witness may testify to any facts from 
 which the condition of the deaf mute may be inferred, and while 
 
 *nVharton on Ev., § 402; Rex v. 512, 513, where a cross-examination 
 
 White, 2 Leach Cr. L. 482; Rex v. was impossible because of the serious 
 
 Wade, I Moody C. C. 86; Rex v. illness of the witness. 
 
 Kinloch, 18 How. St. Tr. 395, 402. ^ People v. New York Hospital, 3 
 
 "Reg. V. Whitehead, L. R. i C. C Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) 229, 249; Hol- 
 
 R. 33. If insanity, first showing it- comb v. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 177, 181. 
 
 self during the direct examination, ^ Worthington v. Mencer, 96 Ala. 
 
 results in depriving either side of the 310, 11 So. 72, 17 L. R. A. 407; Reg. 
 
 right to cross-examine, all the testi- v. Hill, 5 Eng. L. & Eq. 547, 5 Cox 
 
 mony of the witness must be stricken C. C. 259, 15 Jur. 470. 
 
 out. People V. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508, ^"* i Bl. Com. 304.
 
 375 COMPETEXCY OF WITNESSES. § 2O5 
 
 by the ancient common law the deaf mute was presumed to be 
 incompetent because of lack of intelligence, the modern rule is 
 that there is no presumption either way but that the question is 
 for the jury. 
 
 The party alleging lack of intelligence on the part of a deaf 
 mute witness will have to produce some evidence and then the 
 jury must decide upon the facts where there is a conflict of evi- 
 dence as to the intelligence of the witness.^^ 
 
 At the present day the examination of a deaf mute upon the 
 witness stand may be carried on by the use of signs, with the 
 aid of an interpreter, properly qualified,^" and this may be done 
 even where the witness can write.^^ His evidence is oral evi- 
 dence, provided the writing is written or the signs made in open 
 court."* Expert testimony is not necessary to show that a deaf 
 mute is sufificiently intelligent in the opinion of the witness to tes- 
 tify as a witness. His competency can be proved by the testimony 
 of a former employer or any other person who is acquainted with 
 him who can testify to his intelligence and his knowledge of the 
 sign language. ^^ 
 
 § 205. Children on the witness stand. — The competency of a 
 child under the age of fourteen years to testify in a criminal trial 
 must be shown to the satisfaction of the court. He is presump- 
 tively incompetent, but if he is shown to be competent it is imma- 
 terial how young he may be when he testifies. He is competent 
 if he possesses mental capacity and memory sufficient to enable 
 him to give a reasonable and intelligible account of the transaction 
 he has seen, if he understands and has a just appreciation of the 
 
 ^^ State V. Rohn (Iowa 1909), iig ^ State v. Howard, 118 Mo. 127, 
 
 N. W. 88. 144, 24 S. W. 41 ; Morrison v. Len- 
 
 " Skaggs V. State, 108 Ind. 53, 56, nard, 3 C. & P. 127. 
 
 57. 8 X. E. 695; Commonwealth v. '* Stephen's Digest, art. 106; Ritch- 
 
 Hill, 14 Mass. 207; Ruston's Case, i ey v. People, 47 Pac. 272, 384, 23 
 
 Leach Cr. L. 455, 456; State v. De- Colo. 314. 
 
 Wolf, 8 Conn. 93, 99, 20 Am. Dec. "^ State v. Weldon, 39 S. Car. 318. 
 
 90; State V. Howard, 118 Mo. 127, 322, 17 S. E. 688, 24 L. R. A. i26n; 
 
 144, 24 S. W. 41; Kirk v. State Underhill on Ev., § 186; 2 Elliott 
 
 CTex.), 37 S. W. 440; People v. Wes- Evid., § 764. 
 ton, 236 111. 104, 86 N. E. 188. See 
 Underhill on Ev., § 318.
 
 § 205 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 376 
 
 difference between right and wrong, and comprehends the char- 
 acter, meaning and obHgation of an oath.^" 
 
 If the witness fulfills these requirements, it is immaterial as 
 bearing upon his competency that he is unable to define the oath 
 or to define testimony.^^ It is the duty of the court to examine 
 the child witness in order to ascertain if he or she is competent. 
 This is usually done by putting leading questions to the child and 
 the answers to the questions are not objectionable because they 
 may be couched in childish language. A child should be per- 
 mitted to explain his understanding of the meaning and character 
 of an oath in simple words and it would be unfair to reject such 
 a witness because he does not state his meaning in the same lan- 
 guage employed by adults or because the witness does not define 
 the oath in the language that an attorney or other person educated 
 in the law would employ. Intelligence and not age is the test of 
 a child witness.^^ 
 
 No fixed rule can be laid down as to the age a child under the 
 age of fourteen must have attained to entitle him to testify. The 
 question of his competency must be left to the legal discretion of 
 the trial judge,^^ leaving it to the jury to determine the weight 
 and credit of his evidence. In the absence of clear abuse the judi- 
 cial discretion is not reviewable.'*" 
 
 ^2 Elliott Evid., §§ 766-771, Bras- 549, 60 Atl. 1089, 107 Am. St. 574; 
 
 ier's Case, i Leach Cr. L. 237; Davis Gordon v. State, 147 Ala. 42, 41 So. 
 
 V. State, 31 Neb. 247, 47 N. W. 854; 847; Young v. State, 122 Ga. 725, 50 
 
 McGuff V. State, 88 Ala. 147, 151, 7 So. S. E. 996; Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 
 
 35, 16 Am. St. 25; McGuire v. People, 98, 43 So. 312; Moore v. State, 49 
 
 44 Mich. 286, 287, 6 N. W. 669, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 449, 96 S. W. 327; 
 
 Am. 265 ; Hoist v. State, 23 Tex. App. Eatman v. State, 139 Ala. ^T, 36 So. 
 
 I, 8, 3 S. W. 757, 59 Am. 770 ; Moore 16. 
 
 V. State, 79 Ga. 498, 503, s S. E. 51; ^' State v. Meyer, 135 Iowa 507, 113 
 
 Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 10 N. W. ^'^■'2., 124 Am. St. 29in. 
 
 ]\Iass. 225 ; State v. Whittier, 21 Me. ^ Shannon v. Swanson, 208 111. 52, 
 
 341, 347, 38 Am. Dec. 272; Williams 69 N. E. 869, aff'g 109 III. App. 274; 
 
 V. United States, 3 App. D. C. 335; Clinton v. State, SZ Fla. 98, 43 So. 
 
 Williams v. State, 109 Ala. 64, 19 So. 312. 
 
 530; People V. Craig, in Cal. 460, 44 ^'People v. Bradford (Cal. App. 
 
 Pac. 186; State v. Cadotte, 17 Mont. 1905), 81 Pac. 712; People v. Stouter, 
 
 315, 42 Pac. 857; Gaines v. State, 99 142 Cal. 146, 75 Pac. 780. 
 
 Ga. 703, 2^ S. E. 760; Territory v. *" People v. Frindel, 58 Hun (X. 
 
 DeGutman, 8 N. Mex. 92, 42 Pac. 68; Y.) 482, 484, 12 N. Y. S. 498; Hawk- 
 
 Commonwealth v. Furman, 211 Pa. ins v. State, 27 Tex. App. 2-j2), 11 S.
 
 Z77 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 205 
 
 It is not only necessary to show that the child understands the 
 nature and application of an oath, but it must also appear that the 
 child is sufficiently intelligent to testify with an understanding 
 mind of what he or she has seen or heard. 
 
 If the child does not, in the opinion of the court, appear to un- 
 derstand the nature and obligation of an oath, the court may in 
 its discretion if the child seems to have the age and mental capa- 
 city to receive and profit by the instruction'*^ allow him to be in- 
 structed by a proper person as to the signification and obligation 
 of a judicial oath.'*- For the child is a competent witness if he 
 is reasonably intelligent, though he may not have learned those 
 facts which enable him to understand the obligation of an oath 
 until he learns them in court. *^ 
 
 W. 409; Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
 165 ]\Iass. 426, 43 X. E. 121 ; State v. 
 Sawtelle, 66 X. H. 488, 32 Atl. 831; 
 State V. Reddington, 7 S. Dak. 368, 
 64 X. W. 170. "Children of this age 
 usually have not sufficient develop- 
 ment to understand the nature and 
 effect of an oath, more especially if 
 their parents have been neglectful of 
 their care and education in religious 
 and moral truths. They may have 
 some knowledge that it is wrong to 
 tell a lie, yet this may be so slight 
 as to produce no decided or lasting 
 impression on their minds, but leave 
 them in a decidedly chaotic state, in 
 which they may easily be led to be- 
 lieve that the things that others in 
 authority over them instruct them to 
 say are the indistinct thing called 
 'truth'; and therefore they must re- 
 peat just what they are told to say, or 
 what has often been repeated in their 
 presence. X'ot being amenable to the 
 law for false swearing, and having 
 no knowledge of moral responsibility, 
 designing and wicked people may 
 easily use them to further intrigues 
 of their own, without fear of punish- 
 
 ment for subornation of perjury. 
 They are as clay in the potter's hand, 
 to be moulded, some to honor and 
 some to dishonor. Lacking con- 
 scientiousness, they repeat with phon- 
 ographic precision the things that 
 have been told them to say, be they 
 true or false." State v. Michael, 37 
 \V. Va. 565, 569, 16 S. E. 803, 19 L. 
 R. A. 6o5n. Leading questions are 
 always admissible when propounded 
 to a very young witness to ascertain 
 his intelligence, competency and un- 
 derstanding of an oath. Hodge v. 
 State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 So. 593. See as 
 regards the discretionary power of 
 the court, Underbill on Ev., § 386. 
 
 *^ Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43 
 So. 312. 
 
 **Rex v. White, 2 Leach Cr. L. 
 482; Rex V. Wade, i Mood. C. C. 
 86, 87; Commonwealth v. Lynes, 142 
 Mass. 577-580, 8 N. E. 408, 56 Am. 
 709, 2 Russ. Cr. (8th Am. Ed.) 969. 
 Contra, Rex v. Williams, 7 C. & P. 
 320, 321 ; Reg. v. Xicholas, 2 C. & 
 K. 246, 2 Cox C. C. 136. 
 
 •■'Landthrift v. State, 140 Ala. 114, 
 27 So. 287.
 
 § 206 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. .378 
 
 The I'liry may consider the yoiithfuhiess and intelhgence of 
 the witness. 
 
 ^ 206. Incompetency of witnesses caused by conviction of infamous 
 crimes. — \\' itnesses who had been convicted of murder, arson, per- 
 jury, piracy, forgery or other great and infamous crimes were by 
 the common law regarded as incompetent to testify. 
 
 The commission of a crime of this character was conclusively 
 presumed to indicate such a condition of moral perversion on 
 the part of the person who had been convicted that his absolute 
 incapacity to tell the truth could safely be assumed. 
 
 In other words, the probability that every witness who was 
 guilty of the crimes above enumerated would perjure himself 
 if he were permitted to testify was considered to be so great 
 that the interests of truth and justice imperatively demanded his 
 exclusion from the witness stand.'** 
 
 The common law required that the witness should have been 
 convicted of some infamous crime, and the early writers usually 
 denominated as such the offenses of treason, felony and the 
 crimen falsi^'^ As regards treason, and that very large number 
 of offenses which, in England, until the end of the eighteenth 
 century, constituted felony at common law or by statute, little 
 uncertainty existed. A conviction of perjury, of forgery or of 
 a conspiracy to suppress testimony or to obstruct justice was al- 
 ways sufficient to exclude the guilty person from the witness 
 stand. ^"^ Persons convicted of the crimen falsi were also incom- 
 petent. But the boundaries of this offense were somewhat 
 vaguely defied at common law. Under the term crimen falsi 
 many minor offenses such as criminal libel, barratry, maintenance 
 and the like were grouped. 
 
 These crimes, while not amounting to felony at the common 
 law, indicate such an inherent lack of respect for truth, or a de- 
 
 "i Greenleaf on Ev., § 372; 2 El- such a nature as would presumably 
 
 liott Evid., § 787. exclude the guilty person from the 
 
 *^ 7 Com. Dig. 461 ; Co. Lit., 6 b. ; 2 stand. A conviction of statutory em- 
 Hale P. C. 277. bezzlement is a misdemeanor only. 
 
 *'^ Rex V. Priddle, 2 Leach C. L. 496, Such a crime is a breach of trust and 
 
 497 ; Rex V. Edwards, 4 T. R. 440, 2 does not come within any of the 
 
 R. R. 427. Under the common law, classes mentioned in the text. United 
 
 the conviction of crime must be of States v. Sims, 161 Fed. 1008.
 
 379 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. 
 
 207 
 
 liberate intention to interfere with and obstruct the administra- 
 tion of justice, or to employ the machinery of the law for im- 
 proper purposes, that it was considered safe and proper to exclude 
 the evidence of all persons convicted of having perpetrated them.'*^ 
 The conviction of a witness of a crime which will render him 
 incompetent must be proved by producing the judgment of con- 
 viction or a certified copy thereof, and cannot be proved by his 
 oral testimony on cross-examination.'*'^ 
 
 § 207. The pardon of the convict, when restoring competency. — 
 
 The incompetency to testify caused by a conviction of an infa- 
 mous crime was always removable at common law by a full and 
 unconditional pardon of the witness,*® by the reversal of the judg- 
 ment against him, and by a suspension of sentence. 
 
 But a pardon will not restore competency if the statute which 
 prescribes the punishment for the crime also expressly provides 
 that every person who is convicted under it shall forever be in- 
 competent as a witness.^" 
 
 ^^3 Russ. on Crimes (9th. Am. Ed.) 
 620; I Greenl. on Ev., § 375. In Rex 
 V. Priddle, 2 Leach C. L. 496, 497, the 
 court said : "It is now settled that it 
 is the infamy of the crime which 
 destroys the competency, and not the 
 nature or mode of punishment." Cf. 
 State V. Green, 48 S. Car. 136, 26 S. 
 E. 234. 
 
 ^'Grabill v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 
 1906), 97 S. W. 1046; United States 
 V. Sims, 161 Fed. 1008. 
 
 ''Boyd V. United States, 142 U. S. 
 450, 453, 454, 35 L- ed. 1077, 12 S. 
 Ct. 292, citing United States v. Wil- 
 son, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 150, 162, 8 L. ed. 
 640; Singleton v. State, 38 Fla. 297, 
 21 So. 21, 56 Am. St. 177, 34 L. R. A. 
 25in; Ex parte Wells, 18 How. (U. 
 S.) 307, 315, 15 L. ed. 421; Ex parte, 
 Garland, 4 Wall. (U. S.) z^^, 380, 
 18 L. ed. 2>'^; Martin v. State, 21 
 Tex. App. I, II, 17 S. W. 430; United 
 States V. Hall, 53 Fed. 352, 354; State 
 V. Blaisdell, :iz N. H. 388; Rivers v. 
 
 State, 10 Tex. App. 177, 182; Hester 
 V. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 139, 
 155. See, also. Commonwealth v. 
 Bush, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 264, 266; State 
 V. Baptiste, 26 La. Ann. 134, 136; 2 
 Hawks P. C. 547. A witness may be 
 restored to competency even after he 
 has suffered the whole punishment 
 for his crime. United States v. Jones, 
 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. (N. Y.) 451; 
 State V. Dodson, 16 S. Car. 453, 461 ; 
 State V. Foley, 15 Nev. 64, 69, ^7 Am. 
 458; People V. Bowen, 43 Cal. 439, 
 442, 13 Am. 148; Hunnicutt v. State, 
 18 Tex. App. 498, 518, 51 Am. 330; 
 United States v. Hughes, 175 Fed. 
 238. 
 
 "Rex V. Ford, 2 Salk. 690; Blanc 
 V. Rodgers, 49 Cal. 15; 3 Russell on 
 Crimes (9th Am. Ed.) 621. In some 
 states it is provided that no person 
 convicted of perjury shall be render- 
 ed competent by a pardon. Virginia 
 Code, 1904, § 3898; Florida, Thomp- 
 son Digest, 334-5; West Virginia
 
 § 208 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 380 
 
 A pardon may be granted for the sole purpose of rendering a 
 convict competent to testify. And a pardon, if full and uncondi- 
 tional, is not ineffectual or in any way open to attack merely 
 because it was granted solely to enable a witness to testify for the 
 state in a criminal prosecution pending in a court which is under 
 the jurisdiction of the pardoning power.^^ An absolute pardon 
 is irrevocable as soon as it is delix'ered and accepted by the grantee 
 or his agent."'" If. however, the pardon is conditional, and some- 
 thing must be done before the pardon shall operate to restore 
 competency, the party who calls the witness will be required to 
 show that the condition has been performed. °^ 
 
 Sometimes the statute ]irovides that no person convicted of 
 crime shall be a witness unless he has been pardoned or punished. 
 Under a statute which provides that a person convicted of felony 
 shall not be a witness unless he has been punished therefore , a 
 person who has been fined, but who has not paid his fine, is not a 
 competent witness.^* 
 
 § 208. Mode of proving pardon — Parol evidence. — In accordance 
 with the rule that the courts will take judicial notice of all public 
 laws, a proclamation or statute granting a general amnesty need 
 not be proved,''^ though an executive pardon of any particular 
 individual, being in its nature a private deed or release, must be 
 proved. This must be done by the production in court of the in- 
 strument itself or a certified or exemplified copy.^*^ 
 
 Code, ch. 152. The incompetency of ^'' Waring v. United States, 7 Ct. 
 
 a witness because of conviction of Q. (U. S.) 501; State v. Keith, 63 
 
 crime is not removed by a pardon N. Car. 140, 142. 
 
 which merely remits a part of the " Quillin v. Commonwealth, 105 Va. 
 
 penalty. State v. Richardson, 18 Ala. 874, 54 S. E. 333. 
 
 109, or which may be revoked by the °^ United States v. Hall, 53 Fed. 
 
 pardoning power in case the convict 352, 354; United States v. Wilson, 7 
 
 is again convicted. McGee v. State, Pet. (U. S.) 150, 162, 8 L. ed. 640; 
 
 29 Tex. App. 596, 16 S. W. 422. C/. State v. Blalock, Phil. (N. Car.) 
 
 People V. Pease, 3 John. Cas. (N. Y.) 242; State v. Keith, 63 N. Car. 140, 
 
 ^^1^, 143. On Judicial notice, see Under- 
 
 "Boyd V. United States, 142 U. S. hill on Ev., §§ 240, 242. 
 
 450, 453, 454, 35 L. ed. 1077, 12 Sup. "'Hunnicutt v. State, 18 Tex. App. 
 
 Ct. 292. 498, 51 Am. 330; United States v. 
 
 ^' Rosson V. State, 23 Tex. App. 287, Wilson, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 150. 161, 8 
 
 289, 4 S. W. 897, 6 Cr. L. Mag. 480. L. ed. 640; State v. Baptiste, 26
 
 381 COMPETEXCY OF WITNESSES. § 2O9 
 
 A pardon is valid, though it incorrectly state the date of the 
 conviction, or even state an impossible date, if it was intended to 
 cover and does cover the offense.^^ Parol evidence is admissible 
 to identity the person and the particular conviction of crime named 
 in the pardon.^^ 
 
 The incompetency resulting from a conviction of crime is no 
 part of the punishment. Nor does a conviction disqualify the 
 convicted person as a witness beyond the geographical limits of 
 that state wherein judgment was rendered. Hence a person con- 
 victed in one state is not incompetent to testify in the courts of 
 another state, unless the statutes of the latter declare that persons 
 convicted of crime are not competent. ^^ 
 
 § 209. Statutory regulations removing the incompetency of per- 
 sons convicted of crime. — The common-law incompetency of per- 
 sons convicted of crime to testify as witnesses is generally abol- 
 ished by statute in this country. In many of the states the fact 
 that the witness has been convicted of any crime, however his 
 offense may show or imply an absolute lack of respect for the 
 truth, is not a valid objection to his competency. But it is always 
 permissible to prove the fact of his conviction by proper evidence, 
 that the jury may be enabled the better to estimate his moral 
 character, as a man, and the credibility of his evidence.®^ 
 
 La. Ann. 134, 137; Underbill on Ev., 632n. Contra, Pitner v. State, 23 
 
 §§ 142b, 320, citing cases. Parson v. Tex. App. 366, 5 S. W. 210. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 112 S. W. 617, ""Tbis is the statute law in New 
 
 33 Ky. L. 1051. York (Code Civ. Pro., § 832), Rhode 
 
 ^i Bish. Cr. L., § 906; Martin v. Island (Gen. Laws 1896, ch. 244, 
 
 State, 21 Tex. App. i, 11, 17 S. W. § 40), Utah (Comp. Laws 1888, Vol. 
 
 430; Hunnicut v. State, 18 Tex. App. 2, tit. 10, ch. 2), Colorado (§ 7266, 
 
 498, 521, 51 Am. 330. R. S. 1908), Georgia (Code, § 5269), 
 
 '^^ Martin v. State, 21 Tex. App. i, Michigan (Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 10, 
 
 II, 17 S. W. 430. 210), Illinois (R. S., ch. 51, § 1058, 
 
 "Logan V. United States, 144 U. ed. 1909), Massachusetts (Rev. Laws 
 
 S. 26s, 303, 36 L. ed. 429, 12 Sup. Ct. 1902, ch. 175, §§ 20, 21), Minnesota 
 
 617, citing Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. (Rev. Laws 1905, § 4780), New 
 
 Co., 127 U. S. 265, 32 L. ed. 239, 8 Hampshire (Pub. Stat., ch. 224, § 26), 
 
 Sup. Ct. 1370; Commonwealth v. Ohio (Bates' R. S., §§ 5240, 7284), 
 
 Green, 17 Mass. 515; Sims v. Sims, Iowa (Rev. Code 1897, § 4601), 
 
 75 N- Y. 466; National Trust Co. v. Maine (Rev. St. 1903, ch. 84, § 119), 
 
 Gleason, 77 N. Y. 400, 410, 33 Am. Missouri (R. S. 1899, § 4680, con-
 
 § 209 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 382 
 
 These statutes are not usually retroactive. So where a person 
 is convicted of a crime which, under an existing statute renders 
 him incompetent as a witness, a subsequent statute permitting 
 those convicted of criminal crimes to testify, does not make him 
 a competent witness.*'^ But where a statute provides that a con- 
 \-iction of any crime is not a valid objection to the competency of 
 the person convicted one under sentence of imprisonment for life, 
 may testify even though by statute he is deemed to be civilly 
 dead.®- 
 
 A conviction of some crimes, as perjury, the commission of 
 which involves an utter disregard for the obligation of an oath is 
 still, in some states, an insuperable objection to the competency 
 of a w^itness.*'^ In a few of the states a witness who has been con- 
 victed of a capital crime or of certain felonies which involve or 
 indicate great moral degeneration, such, for example, as burglary, 
 forgery, rape, arson, perjury, bigamy, sodomy, etc., is by statute 
 absolutely incompetent to testify.^* 
 
 These statutes are to be construed with strictness. The terms, 
 descriptive of crimes, mentioned in them, will be presumed to 
 have been used in the sense they possessed at common law.*'^ Nor 
 
 strued in State v. Myers, 198 Mo. ""Arkansas (Rev. Stat., § 2482), 
 
 225, 94 S. W. -^42), Delaware (Laws, Tennessee (Code, § 5595), Texas 
 
 Vol. 17, ch. 598, § 3), Kansas (Gen. (Code Crim. Pro., § 768), Virginia 
 
 St. 1905, § 5219), Nebraska (Comp. (Code of 1904, § 3898) ; Quillin v. 
 
 St. 1903, title X, ch. I, §§ 328, 330), Commonwealth, 105 Va. 874, 54 S. E. 
 
 Nevada (Comp. Laws 1900, § 3471), 333. In Pennsylvania, a person iin- 
 
 ^lontana (Code Civ. Pro., § 647), der sejitence of death for murder is 
 
 Oregon (Ann. Codes, St., § 722), a competent person to testify as a 
 
 Florida (Gen. St. 1908, § 1506), Con- witness. Commonwealth v. Clem- 
 
 necticut (Gen. St., § 1098). mer, 190 Pa. St. 202, 42 Atl. 675. 
 
 "^ State v. Landrum, 127 ]\Io. App. ^ Williams v. Dickenson, 28 Fla. 
 
 653, 106 S. W. nil. 90, 9 So. 847; Commonwealth v. Mi- 
 
 "■ Martin v. Territory, 14 Okla. 593, nor, 89 Ky. 555, 560, 13 S. \V. 5, 11 
 
 78 Pac. 88. Ky. L. 775. It seems that a person 
 
 "^ This is the case in Alabama convicted of felonj' is competent, pro- 
 
 (Code 1907, § 4008), Florida (Gen. vided he has not been sentenced. 
 
 St. 1906, § 1504), r^Iaryland (Pub. Hurley v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 Gen. Laws, Art. 35, § i), Mississippi 282, 33 S. W. 354; Evans v. State, 
 
 (Code of 1906, § 1920), Pennsylvania 35 Tex. Cr. App. 485, 34 S. W. 285; 
 
 (Code, § 2859), Vermont (R. S. 1880, Robinson v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 § 1008), Washington (Ball. Code, 104, 35 S. W. 651; State v. Dalton, 20 
 
 §§ 5992-6940). R. I. 114, 37 Atl. 673; Underwood v.
 
 383 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES. § 2IO 
 
 should any of these statutes be construed to prevent the accused 
 from testifying in his own behalf.*^*^ 
 
 § 210. Statutes construed. — The authorities are divided upon the 
 question whether, under the existing statutes, the conviction of 
 a witness for a crime which would not have rendered him incom- 
 petent at common law can be shown for the sole purpose of im- 
 peaching his credibility. A great deal depends upon the express 
 terms of the statute. On the one hand it has been held that the 
 witness may be discredited by showing him to have been guilty 
 of a misdemeanor,*^^ though of course, if a statute provides ex- 
 pressly that the witness may be interrogated as regards his "con- 
 viction of felony/' proof of a conviction of misdemeanor is in- 
 admissible.^^ 
 
 But the current of the decisions supports the more logical doc- 
 trine that a conviction of those infamous crimes only can be 
 shown which would have destroyed his competency at the com- 
 mon law.**^ Where a statute removes the common law disability 
 arising from a conviction of infamous crime, the confession of 
 a witness that he has perjured himself in the same matter as that 
 in which he is now testifying constitutes no objection to his com- 
 petency. ^° 
 
 State, 38 Tex. Cr. App. 193, 41 S. W. (N. S.) 45111; competency of defend- 
 
 618. ant as witness, 38 Am. St. 895, 897n; 
 
 ^ The interpretation and construe- competency as witness of declarant 
 
 tion of writings are discussed in Un- of dying declaration, 86 Am. St. 640- 
 
 derhill on Ev., § 206. 642n. 
 
 °' State V. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90, 95, "" Bennett v. State, 24 Tex. App. ~z, 
 
 12 Pac. 406 ; Commonwealth v. Ford, 5 S. W. 527, 5 Am. St. 875 ; Bartholo- 
 
 146 Mass. 131, 133, 15 N. E. 153; mew v. People, 104 111. 601, 44 Am. 
 
 Commonwealth v. Hall, 4 Allen 97; Coble v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100; 
 
 (Mass.) 305; Helm v. State, 67 Miss. Commonwealth v. Dame, 8 Cush. 
 
 562, 573, 7 So. 487; State V. (Mass.) 384; People v. Carolan, 71 
 
 Heusack, 189 Mo. 295, 88 S. W. 21. Cal. 195, 12 Pac. 52; Williams v. 
 
 **Hanners v. McClelland, 74 Iowa State (Ala. 1906), 40 So. 405. 
 
 318, 322, 2>7 N. W. 389; People v. '"People v. O'Neil, 109 N. Y. 251, 
 
 White, 142 Cal. 292, 75 Pac. 828. 16 N. E. 68, 6 N. Y. Cr. 48, 14 N. Y. 
 
 Testimony as to facts learned while St. 829. 
 spying or eavesdropping, 17 L. R. A.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 §2iT. Direct •examination — Leading 222. 
 questions. 
 
 212. When leading questions may 
 
 be asked on the direct ex- 
 amination. 
 
 213. Forgetful witness may be 
 
 asked leading questions. 223. 
 
 214. Questions put to the witness 224. 
 
 by the court. 225. 
 
 215. Judicial remarks upon the de- 
 
 meanor or credibility of a 226. 
 witness during his examina- 227. 
 tion. 
 
 216. Answers must be responsive. 228. 
 
 217. Refreshing the memory of a 
 
 forgetful witness by memo- 229. 
 randum. 
 
 218. Character of the memorandum 230. 
 
 employed to refresh the 
 memory. 231. 
 
 219. Purpose and importance of 
 
 cross-examination. 
 
 220. When right to cross-examina- 232. 
 
 tion is lost — Cross-examina- 
 tion confined to matters 233. 
 brought out on direct. 
 
 221. Cross-examination to test cred- 
 
 ibility. 
 
 When answers to questions in- 
 volving collateral matters 
 asked in cross-examination 
 may be contradicted — Hos- 
 tility or friendship towards 
 the accused. 
 
 Re-direct examination. 
 
 Recalling witnesses. 
 
 Exclusion and separation of 
 witnesses. 
 
 Refusal to testify. 
 
 Interpreting the language of 
 the witness. 
 
 Improper reception of evidence 
 by the jurors. 
 
 View by the jurors — Discre- 
 tionary power of the court. 
 
 Purpose of the view is to af- 
 ford evidence. 
 
 The right of the accused to be 
 present during the taking of 
 the view. 
 
 Presence of the accused while 
 taking testimony. 
 
 Experiments in and out of 
 court. 
 
 § 211. Direct examination — Leading questions. — The witness, 
 after being sworn, is asked his name and address, that his identity 
 may be ascertained or confirmed. He may then be interrogated 
 as to facts within his knowledge relevant to the guilt or innocence 
 of the accused. 
 
 Usually in criminal cases, the material facts within the knowl- 
 edge of a witness are elicited by questions put to him by the coun- 
 
 384
 
 385 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. § 211 
 
 sel calling him. By this means, the evidence is readily limited and 
 confined within the issue for the reason that the relevancy of the 
 answer can in most cases be ascertained from the character of the 
 question. But this is a matter of practice only and there is no 
 legal principle which prevents a witness from giving his testimony 
 in narrative form if he is requested to do so by counsel. The 
 danger of giving testimony in narrative form is that irrelevant 
 and other improper evidence may be interjected and a motion to 
 strike out may become necessary. Even though evidence given 
 is stricken out, it has had its effect and for this reason, testimony 
 given in narrative form must be closely watched and the improper 
 portion of it promptly objected to.^ 
 
 It is not usually allowable, on the direct examination, to ask 
 leading questions, '/. e., questions which, by their form or charac- 
 ter, "suggest to the witness the answer desired;"' as, for exam- 
 ple, questions which are a statement of fact, and suggest that the 
 witness is to deny or affirm its truth by answering "yes" or "no." 
 Somewhat similar and equally inadmissible are questions which 
 assume the truth of facts which are in issue, or which are mate- 
 rial, which have not been proved, or certain answers to have been 
 given to prior questions, when such answers have not been given. ^ 
 
 Except in the examination of experts, it is not permissible on 
 the direct examination to question a witness upon matters not 
 within his personal knowledge, or to endeavor, by assuming ques- 
 tions, to elicit his opinion on or inference from any matters of 
 fact. Sometimes, however, leading questions may be asked on 
 the examination-in-chief. The matter is largely in the control of 
 
 ^Horton v. State, 120 Ga. 307, 47 443; and see Underbill on Ev., p. 
 
 S. E. 969. 470. 
 
 ^ I Greenl. on Ev., § 434. Accused as Witness. — Compelling 
 
 ^ State V. Johnson, 29 La. Ann. accused to cover or uncover his head 
 
 717; Hays V. State (Tex.), 20 S. W. or face, 94 Am. St. 339. Compelling 
 
 361 ; Chambers v. People, 4 Scam, accused to utter certain words or 
 
 (111-) 351; State V. Duffy, 57 Conn, sounds, 94 Am. St. 341. Compelling 
 
 525, 18 Atl. 791 ; Bostic v. State, 94 accused to exhibit marks on his per- 
 
 Ala. 45, 10 So. 602; People v. Lange, son, 94 Am. St. 340. Compelling ac- 
 
 90 Mich. 454, 51 N. W. 534; People v. cused to make footprints, 94 Am. St. 
 
 Fong Ah Sing, 70 Cal. 8, i r Pac. 323 ; 343. Compelling accused to try on 
 
 Andrews v. State (Ala.), 48 So. 858; shoes, 94 Am. St. 344. Compelling 
 
 People V. Brow, 90 Hun (N. Y.) accused to give specimen of his hand- 
 
 509, 35 N. Y. S. 1009, II N. Y. Cr. writing, 94 Am. St. 344, 345. 
 
 25 — Underbill Crim. Ev.
 
 212 
 
 CRI.MINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 386 
 
 the judge, who may and should exercise a sound (Hscretion. The 
 general rule should not be departed from without good reason. 
 Least of all should the state he allowed to make out its case by 
 putting evidence in the mouths of its witnesses. If the witness is 
 intelligent, he must be asked general questions to save time and 
 facilitate justice; and where leading questions on vital and mate- 
 rial points are permitted to be put by the state, and no reason or 
 necessity appears for them, the judicial discretion will be deemed 
 to have been abused and a new trial may be ordered for this 
 alone.'* 
 
 ^212. When leading questions may he asked on the direct exami- 
 nation. — The general rule is subject to some important exceptions. 
 An exception is recognized in the case of an unwilling witness, or 
 one who, on the direct examination, is hostile to the party calling 
 him and refuses to answer fully, or one who colors his testimony 
 to favor the opposing party, or attempts to conceal what he knows 
 by ambiguous language.^ 
 
 *Coon V. People, 99 111. 368, 39 
 Am. 28; Cannon v. People, 141 111. 
 270, 30 N. E. 1027: Brassell v. State, 
 gi Ala. 45, 8 So. 639; McCain v. 
 Commonwealth, no Pa. St. 263, i 
 Atl. 45; Commonwealth v. Chaney, 
 
 148 Mass. 6, 18 N. E. 572; Harvey 
 V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 545, 34 S. W. 
 623; App. V. State, 90 Ind. 73; An- 
 derson V. State, 104 Ala. 83, 16 So. 
 108; Barnes v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 
 320, 39 S. W. 684 ; State v. Knost, 207 
 Mo. 18, 105 S. W. 616; Craddick v. 
 State, 48 Tex. Cr. 385, 88 S. W. 347; 
 State V. Bateman, 198 Mo. 212, 94 S. 
 W. 843; State V. Napper, 141 Mo. 
 401, 42 S. W. 957; Lyles V. State, 
 130 Ga. 294, 60 S. E. 578; State v. 
 Kendall, 143 N. Car. 659, 57 S. E. 
 340; People V. Way, 119 App. Div. 
 344, 104 N. Y. S. 277, 21 N. Y. 
 Cr. 149; State v. George, 214 Mo. 
 262, 113 S. W. 1 1 16; People V. Weber, 
 
 149 Cal. 325, 86 Pac. 671 ; State v. 
 
 Dalton, 43 Wash. 278, 86 Pac. 500; 
 Shaffer v. United States, 24 App. 
 Cas. (D. C.) 417; Taylor v. State, 
 82 Ark. 540, 102 S. W. 367. For a 
 very strong case where a witness who 
 refused to answer was plied with 
 leading questions by both the counsel 
 and the court and was finally com- 
 mitted for his persistent contempt in 
 refusing to answer, see State v. Dal- 
 ton, 43 Wash. 278, 86 Pac. 590. 
 
 ° People v. Caldwell, 107 Mich. 374, 
 65 N. W. 213; Fitzpatrick v. State, 
 37 Tex. Cr. 20, 38 S. W. 806; People 
 v. Gillespie, in jNIich. 241, 69 N. W. 
 490; Schuster v. State, 80 Wis. 107, 
 49 N. W. 30; State v. Tall. 43 Minn. 
 273, 45 N. W. 449; State v. Benner, 
 64 Me. 267; People v. Bernor, 115 
 Mich. 692, 74 N. W. 184; Hughes v. 
 State, 29 Ohio C. C. 237; Johnson 
 V. State, 133 Wis. 453, 113 N. W. 
 674; Caswell v. State (Ga. App.), 63 
 S. E. 566; Territory v. Meredith (N.
 
 387 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. § 212 
 
 And where a witness is very ignorant or refuses to answer, or 
 answers in such a way that his answer is likely to be misunder- 
 stood by the jurors, or where for any reason the interests of jus- 
 tice seem to require it, a leading question or indeed, several lead- 
 ing questions, put by the court itself are not error.*^ 
 
 This exception to the general rule excluding leading ques- 
 tions is of particular value and is most often invoked where the 
 prosecution must necessarily prove the guilt of the accused by the 
 testimony of his friends or associates. So the prosecution may 
 put leading questions to an accomplice' who has turned state's 
 evidence, but who equivocates or refuses to give his evidence in 
 full under the belief that his answers may incriminate him. The 
 exception is of the greatest importance where the material wit- 
 nesses against the accused are members of his family, or his col- 
 lateral kindred, or persons, not being of his kindred or family, 
 with whom he has been on terms of intimate friendship. For ex- 
 ample, a very slight unwillingness to answer, coupled with the 
 fact that the unwilling witness is the wife or child of the accused, 
 or his brother or sister will be sufficient to permit leading ques- 
 
 ^lex.), 91 Pac. 731; Underbill on shows a strong interest or bias in 
 Ev., § 335. P- 474- In Moody v. favor of the cross-examining party, 
 Rowell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490, 28 Am. and needs only an intimation to say 
 Dec. 317, the court said: "The court whatever is most favorable to that 
 have no doubt that it is within the party. The witness may have pur- 
 discretion of a judge at the trial, un- posely concealed such bias, in favor 
 der particular circumstances, to per- of one party, to induce the other to 
 mit a leading question to be put to call him and make him his witness ; 
 one's own witness, as where he is or the party calling him may be com- 
 manifestly reluctant and hostile to pelled to do so, to prove some single 
 the interests of the party calling him, fact necessary to his case. This dis- 
 or where he has exhausted his mem- cretionary power to vary the general 
 ory without stating the particular re- rule is to be exercised only so far as 
 quired, where it is a proper name, or the purposes of justice plainly re- 
 other fact, which cannot be signifi- quire it, and is to be regulated by the 
 cantly pointed to by a general inter- circumstances of each case." 
 rogatory, or where the witness is a "People v. Bernor, 115 Mich. 692, 
 child of tender years, whose atten- 74 N. W. 184; Hughes v. State, 29 
 tion can be called to the matter re- Ohio C. C. 237; Johnson v. State, 
 quired, only by a pointed or leading 133 Wis. 453, 113 N. W. 674; Caswell 
 question. So a judge may, in his v. State (Ga. App.), 63 S. E. 566; 
 discretion, prohibit certain leading Territory v. Meredith (N. Mex.), 91 
 questions from being put to an ad- Pac. 731. 
 versary's witness, where the witness
 
 § 213 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. . 388 
 
 tions.^ And so where a woman with whom the accused had 
 maintained ilHcit relations was called to testify to a conversation 
 she had had with him, any unwillingness on her part to disclose 
 the answers of the accused may justify leading questions.'* 
 
 As a general rule, the latitude allowed the state in respect of 
 leading questions in the examination of a witness apparently hos- 
 tile is largely in the discretion of the trial court." 
 
 § 213. Forgetful witnesses may be asked leading questions. — 
 
 Leading questions may, in the discretion of the court, be put to a 
 forgetful witness, or to one who simulates forgetfulness. And if, 
 by reason of the stupidity or ignorance of the witness, real or 
 assumed, or his inclination to prevaricate, the general questions 
 which have been put fail to bring specific answers, leading ques- 
 tions may lawfully be propounded.^" Leading questions are often 
 allowed in the examination of witnesses of tender years who may 
 be incapable, because of inexperience and the embarrassment at- 
 tendant on a public judicial examination, of framing their knowl- 
 edge in intelligible language.^^ But this exception is not univer- 
 
 ^ People V. Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495, the extent to which this may be done 
 
 80 N. K 396, 116 Am. St. 621. depends upon judicial discretion ex- 
 
 ^ State V. Walker, 133 Iowa 489, ercised in the light of the circum- 
 
 iro N. W. 925. stances in which the question arises. 
 
 " Ward V. State, 85 Ark. 179, 107 That these two persons, wife and 
 
 S. W. 677. "The district attorney daughter of the defendant, were un- 
 
 was permitted to cross-examine and willing witnesses against him was 
 
 impeach his own witnesses, the de- manifest from their relations to him 
 
 fendant's wife and daughter. The and from their apparent lack of rec- 
 
 reason of the rule upon which that ollection. It was, therefore, permis- 
 
 contention is based suggests the ex- sible for the district attorney to ply 
 
 ceptions that are necessary to its them with leading questions, and even 
 
 practical application. The party who to cross-examine them." People v. 
 
 calls a witness certifies his credibil- Sexton, 187 N. Y. 495, 80 N, E. 396, 
 
 ity. Therefore, a witness may not 116 Am. St. 621. 
 
 be impeached by the party at whose ^"Coon v. People, 99 111. 368, 39 
 
 instance he testifies. This general Am. 28; Mann v. State, 23 Fla. 610, 
 
 rule is subject, however, to the ex- 3 So. 207; Navarro v. State, 24 Tex. 
 
 ception that, when a witness proves App. 378, 6 S. W. 542; Cassem v. 
 
 hostile or unwilling, the party calling Galvin, 158 111. 30, 41 N. E. 1087; 
 
 him may probe his conscience or test Barker v. State, i Ga. App. 286, 57 
 
 his recollection, to the end that the S. E. 989. 
 
 whole truth may be laid bare; and "Hodge v. State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 So.
 
 389 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. § 2I3 
 
 sally recognized, and it would seem that the tender age of a wit- 
 ness may furnish a reason why leading questions should not be 
 asked, because of the ease with which young persons and children 
 may be misled thereby/" 
 
 Leading questions may also be put to a witness whose memory, 
 while clear and strong, as regards the main facts of a complicated 
 transaction, is weak and indistinct as to minor accompanying 
 facts, such as places or dates/^ 
 
 So, to refresh the memory of one's own witness, counsel may 
 ask if the witness did not at some prior date state facts which may 
 be inconsistent with his present testimony.^* If the memory of a 
 witness is faint, he may be plied with leading questions on unim- 
 portant and irrelevant, but suggestive facts. He may be asked 
 what his uniform habit or routine of acting was in connection 
 with certain transactions, if the evidence of the unimportant fact 
 or routine suggests to him a relevant but forgotten fact.^^ In the 
 introductory portion of the direct examination, leading questions 
 are allowed. Thus counsel are permitted, instead of asking what 
 was said, to ask a witness whether specific statements were made 
 
 593; Poison V. State, 137 Ind. 519, male, who is usually the principal 
 35 N. E. 907 ; Proper v. State, 85 witness for the state, to relate the 
 Wis. 615, 55 N. W. 1035 ; Paschal v. details of the crime, because of the 
 State, 89 Ga. 303, 15 S. E. 322 ; State natural timidity and female modesty, 
 V. Megorden, 49 Ore. 259, 88 Pac. which prompt her to remain silent 
 306; Leak v. State (Tex. Cr.), 97 S. as regards these indelicate details, 
 W. 476; McCann v. People, 226 III. proof of which is necessary to con- 
 562, 80 N. E. 1061 ; ante, § 205. In vict, leading questions are very prop- 
 State V. Megorden, 49 Ore. 259, 88 erly put to her. State v. Bauer- 
 Pac. 306, it is said : "Considering kemper, 95 Iowa 562, 64 N. W. 609 ; 
 the youth of these witnesses, one be- Callison v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 211, 39 
 ing 18 years of age and the other 14, S. W. 300; State v. Simes, 12 Idaho 
 and the fact that they were testify- 310, 85 Pac. 914. 
 
 ing upon the trial of their father " Schuster v. State, 80 Wis. 107, 
 
 for killing their mother, we think 49 N. W. 30; State v. Cummins, 76 
 
 there was no error in permitting Iowa 133, 40 N. W. 124; People v. 
 
 such questions. Durrant, 116 Cal. 199, 48 Pac. 75. 
 
 "^ Coon V. People, 99 111. 368, 39 " Prentis v. Bates, 88 Mich. 567, 50 
 
 Am. 28. N. W. 637; People v. Sherman, 133 
 
 '' In a prosecution for rape or se- N. Y. 349, 31 N. E. 107, 16 N. Y. S. 
 
 duction, or for an indecent assault, 782, 40 N. Y. St. 831, lO N. Y. 
 
 where it is difficult to induce the fe- Cr. 53.
 
 §214 CRIMINAL EV'IDENCE. 39O 
 
 in his hearing, for the purpose of contradicting a witness who 
 had testified that they were not made."' 
 
 The objection to the question as leading is an objection to the 
 form of the question, not to the competency of the evidence which 
 may be given in answer to it. If the court rules that the question 
 which is alleged to be leading is proper, it will be presumed that 
 the answer is competent in the absence of an objection, to its com- 
 petency. If the counsel desires to object to the competency of the 
 answer, he should do so, before it is given or having objected on 
 one ground only, he cannot subsequently take advantage of an- 
 other." 
 
 § 214. Questions put to the witness by the court. — The interests 
 of public justice and the punishment and prevention of crime on 
 the one hand, and principles of fairness toward the prisoner on 
 the other, demand that the presiding judge should not entertain, 
 or, at least, should not manifest, any partiality for or against the 
 accused during the examination of the witnesses. 
 
 It is necessary here to distinguish carefully between the compe- 
 tency of evidence and its credibility. The admissibility of evi- 
 dence is usually a judicial question with which the jury has no 
 concern.^'* It is the right, therefore, of the judge in a criminal 
 trial to determine all preliminary questions bearing on the compe- 
 tency of evidence or of a witness, and to enable him to do this he 
 may have to question the witness. And the court, in ruling on 
 the competency of evidence, may state the reasons and grounds 
 for offering^^ and receiving or rejecting it, or may declare its 
 probable effect if it had been received where it is excluded, if no 
 language is employed which will improperly influence the minds 
 of the jurors against the prisoner.-^ 
 
 " Shultz V. State, 5 Tex. App. 390 ; amining to disclose the substance of 
 
 Cannon v. People, 141 111. 270, 30 N. what is proposed to prove. People 
 
 E. 1027. See Underhill on Ev., p. v. White, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 11 1; 
 
 475, § 335, note 3. If a question calls State v. Small, 26 Kan. 209; Wood v. 
 
 for evidence which may or may not State, 92 Ind. 269. 
 
 be relevant, and sometimes even " Sweet v. State, 75 Neb. 263, 106 
 
 when no question has been asked, N. W. 31. 
 
 and the witness has neither been "Underhill on Ev., §§ 11-13. 
 
 sworn nor examined, the court may, " Armstrong v. State, 14 Ind. App. 
 
 in its discretion, on application by 566, 43 N. E. 142. 
 
 the other party, require counsel ex- "" State v. Milling, 35 S. Car. 16,
 
 391 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 8 214 
 
 With these qualifications no rule of law exists which limits the 
 power of a judge in a criminal trial to interrogate a witness dur- 
 ing his examination. He may ask any question which either the 
 state or the accused had a right to ask, or which it was their duty 
 to ask. but which has been omitted, if the answer may be relevant. 
 \\'here anything material has been omitted, it is the duty of the 
 court to bring it out.-^ But the court should be very careful to let 
 fall no remarks, and to put no questions which assume the prison- 
 er's guilt, for experience teaches all persons that jurors, particu- 
 larly in evenly balanced cases, are extremely prone to be influ- 
 enced by such judicial intimations, and to defer to them in ren- 
 dering their verdict.'' 
 
 The court may, in a criminal case, properly cross-examine the 
 witnesses for the accused. Questions put by the court should 
 follow the rules as to form observed on criminal trials.'^ The 
 judicial power to cross-examine should be carefully exercised so 
 as not to prejudice the accused. Questions by the court on exam- 
 ination or cross-examination w4iich assume the prisoner's guilt, 
 or which assume his witnesses are testifying falsely, or which give 
 to jury the impression that the court has determined that ^the 
 accused is guilty, furnish, in most cases, a basis for a reversal.'* 
 
 For example, where the defense was an alibi, the action of the 
 court in questioning at very great length a witness who swore to 
 the alibi, asking him inter alia if he were absolutely sure and cer- 
 tain he had seen the defendant at a certain place, telling him to 
 
 14 S. E. 284; Hodge V. State, 26 contra, State v. Milling, 35 S. Car. 
 
 Fla. II, 7 So. 593. 16, 14 S. E. 284. 
 
 ■' Colee V. State, 75 Ind. 511; De "^ Hopperwood v. State, 39 Tex. 
 
 Ford V. Painter, 3 Okla. 80, 41 Fac. Cr. 15, 44 S. W. 841. 
 
 96, 30 L. R. A. 722 ; Bowden v. "* Komp v. State, 129 Wis. 20, 108 
 
 Achor, 95 Ga. 243, 22 S. E. 254; Epps N. W. 46. To an objection on ap- 
 
 V. State, ig Ga. 102; State v. Lee, 80 peal that the manner of the judge in 
 
 N. Car. 483; State v. Caron, 118 La. asking a , proper question was sucli 
 
 349, 42 So. 960; Caswell v. State as to convince the jury that he be- 
 
 (Ga. App.), 63 S. E. 566; Miller v. lieved the accused was guilty, the 
 
 Territory, 15 Okla. 422, 85 Pac. 239. court said: "It is as yet impossible 
 
 "People V. Williams, 17 Cal. 142; for the tone and manner of a presid- 
 
 Durham v. State, 2 Ga. App. 401, 58 ing judge to be transmitted to a 
 
 S. E. 555 : Rouse V. State, 2 Ga. .App. court of review." Caswell v. State 
 
 184, 58 S. E. 416; Holt V. State, 2 (Ga. App.), 63 S. E. 566. 
 Ga. App. 383, 58 S. E. 511. Cf.
 
 § 214 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 392 
 
 think carefully a moment and see if he were not mistaken, assur- 
 ing him at the same time that he had a right to correct his testi- 
 mony if he were wrong and advising him to do so if there were 
 any doubt in his mind, was very prejudicial to the rights of the 
 accused and he is entitled to a new trial where the jury find him 
 guilty.-^ 
 
 But no remark by the judge made during the examination 
 of a witness can be urged as ground for a new trial which re- 
 fers solely to competency, to the relevancy of testimony, or to the 
 reason for its exclusion or admission.-'' The active participation 
 of the court in the examination of a witness, even to suggesting 
 the proper form of a question, is not reversible error.^^ 
 
 The witness may always be asked by the court whether he un- 
 derstands a question which has been put to him,^^ and the court 
 may, in order to facilitate and expedite the administration of 
 justice, peremptorily check or silence the irrelevant evidence of 
 a voluble or abusive witness,^'' or interpose sua sponte to stop the 
 prolonged and unnecessary examination of a witness,^'' to exclude 
 incompetent evidence, particularly where the accused has no 
 counsel, or he is a child of tender years. ^^ 
 
 Sometimes jurors are permitted to interrogate a witness and 
 his answers, if relevant, are not incompetent because thus infor- 
 mally obtained. A lengthy examination by a juror, during which 
 
 ^ Glover v. United States, 147 Fed. minutes after an order had been made 
 
 426, 77 C. C. A. 450. excluding the witnesses was not er- 
 
 "° State V. Young, 105 Mo. 634, 16 ror. 
 
 S. W. 408; Patterson v. State, 86 Ga. =' Hodge v. State, 26 Fla. 11, 7 So. 
 
 70, 12 S. E. 174; Lewis v. State, 90 593; Sanders v. Bagwell, Z7 S. Car. 
 
 Ga. 95, 15 S. E. 697; Commonwealth 145, 15 S. E. 714, 16 S. E. 770. 
 
 V. Ward, 157 Mass. 482, 32 N. E. 66z ', '^ State v. Mathews, 98 Mo. 125, 10 
 
 Arnold v. State, 81 Wis. 278, 51 N. S. W. 144, 11 S. W. 1135; Washing- 
 
 W. 426; Butler v. State, 91 Ga. 161, ton v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 184, 79 S. 
 
 16 S. E. 984; State v. Turner, 36 S. W. 811. 
 
 Car. 534, 15 S. E. 602; State v. "® Robinson v. State, 82 Ga. 535, 9 
 
 Barnes, 48 La. Ann. 460, 19 So. 251; S. E. 528; Bowden v. Bailes, loi N. 
 
 State V. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 Car. 612, 8 S. E. 342. 
 
 N. W. 63; Carter v. State, 2 Ga. App. =" People v. Turcott, 65 Cal. 126, 3 
 
 254, 58 S. E. 532, in which case it Pac. 461 ; State v. Southern, 48 La. 
 
 was held that the action of the court Ann. 628, 19 So. 668; State v. Caron, 
 
 in rebuking one of the witnesses for 118 La. 349, 42 So. 960. 
 
 the accused in the presence of the ^' McClure v. Commonwealth, 8r 
 
 jury for remaining in court for a few Ky. 448.
 
 393 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 215 
 
 his mental attitude or bias towards the accused, or towards the 
 issue is exhibited, should not be permitted or encouraged.^- 
 
 § 215. Judicial remarks upon the demeanor or credibility of a wit- 
 ness during his examination. — The credibility and weight of evi- 
 dence are for the jury exclusively. All judicial observations or 
 remarks upon the personal character of a witness or the nature, 
 credibility or weight of his evidence, made during his examina- 
 tion, are improper, and furnish grounds for objection.^^ It is 
 immaterial that the judicial observations were inadvertently made 
 if the accused was substantially prejudiced,^* though it seems that 
 the error may be cured by a prompt withdrawal or retraction of 
 the objectionable words,^^ or by an instruction to the jury to dis- 
 regard them.^® 
 
 ^" The accused is sometimes allowed 
 by statute to make a personal state- 
 ment of his defense under oath. He 
 is not a witness in such a case, and 
 cannot be examined or cross-exam- 
 ined by jurors or counsel. The court 
 must protect him sua sponte from the 
 questioning or interference of coun- 
 sel, or of others, and its neglect to do 
 this, if objection is promptly made, is 
 ground for reversing a conviction. 
 Bond V. State, 21 Fla. 738; Miller v. 
 State, 15 Fla. 575; Hawkins v. State, 
 29 Fla. 554, ID So. 822. 
 
 ^' State V. Philpot, 97 Iowa 365, 66 
 N. W. 730; Sharp v. State, 51 Ark. 
 147, 10 S. W. 228, 14 Am. St. 27n; 
 State V. Raymond, 53 N. J. L. 260, 
 21 Atl. 328; People V. Wood, 126 N. 
 Y. 249, 27 N. E. 362; Shepherd v. 
 State, 31 Xeb. 389, 47 N. W. 11 18; 
 State V. Jacobs, 106 N. Car. 695, 10 
 S. E. 1031 ; Campbell v. State, 30 Tex. 
 App. 64s, 18 S. W. 409; People v. 
 Xino, 149 X. Y. 317, 43 X. E. 853; 
 State V. Lucas, 24 Ore. 168, 33 Pac. 
 538; People V. Hull, 86 Mich. 449, 49 
 X. W. 288 ; Bone v. State, 86 Ga. 108, 
 12 S. E. 205. A remark by the court 
 that "witness has contradicted him- 
 
 self several times," is very objection- 
 able. People V. Willard, 92 Cal. 482, 
 28 Pac. 585; Grant v. State, 122 Ga. 
 740, 50 S. E. 946. 
 
 ^* Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 
 835, 29 Am. St. 232. 
 
 ''^Johnson v. State, 94 Ala. 35, 10 
 So. 667; Reinhold v. State, 130 Ind. 
 467, 30 N. E. 306; Ryan v. State, 83 
 Wis. 486, 53 X. W. 836; Common- 
 wealth V. Ward, 157 Mass. 48a, 32 X. 
 E. 663; State V. Black, 42 La. Ann. 
 861, 8 So. 594. 
 
 ^^ People V. Xorthey, 77 Cal. 6r8, 19 
 Pac. 86s, 20 Pac. 129; Vann v. State, 
 83 Ga. 44, 9 S. E. 945. 
 
 "The more serious question relates 
 to the remarks made by the court, in 
 passing upon the objection. The re- 
 marks were made, it is true, in the 
 heat of the trial, and were, no doubt, 
 called out by something that was said 
 by counsel, either in the objections in- 
 terposed, or in the arguments made in 
 support thereof, and were not uttered 
 with intent to prejudice the case, or 
 prejudice the effect of the witness' 
 testimony. But it is a matter of com- 
 mon knowledge that jurors liang 
 tenaciously upon remarks made by
 
 § 2l6 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 394 
 
 * § 216. Answers must be responsive. — The questions put should 
 be neither vague nor ambiguous."'' So the answers should be re- 
 sponsive, stating all facts called for, and no more, and generally 
 without any expression of opinions, inferences or conjectures.*^ 
 If the answer given is so irresponsive that it wholly or in part 
 fails to convey all the facts which were required, or if it states 
 facts or opinions not required, it may be stricken out on motion 
 as far as it is not responsive, and the refusal of this motion when 
 seasonable objection is made by the accused is reversible error.^'' 
 The court may always in its discretion direct a witness to an- 
 swer a relevant question responsively if he persists in replying 
 evasively,'**' and should promptly rebuke a witness who persists in 
 stating his opinion as to the gnilt of the prisoner.*^ 
 
 § 217. Refreshing the memory of a forgetful witness by memoran- 
 dum. — A witness will generally be permitted to speak of those 
 facts only that are within his personal knowledge and recollec- 
 tion. There are^ however, two sorts of recollection which the 
 witness may employ on the stand. They may be concisely de- 
 scribed as past recollection and present recollection. In the case 
 of past recollection,* the witness has no present recollection of 
 relevant facts, while he is on the witness stand, but remembers 
 that at sometime in the past he did have knowledge and recollec- 
 tion of certain events and that he made a record thereof. Having 
 no present recollection, however, he cannot use this record to re- 
 fresh his recollection, but if he can swear that when he made it, 
 
 the court during the progress of the ^° Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Wood- 
 trial, and if, perchance, they are en- ward, 47 Kan. 191, 27 Pac. 836. 
 abled to discover the views of the *° State v. Farley, 87 Iowa 22, 53 N. 
 court regarding the effect of a wit- W. 1089. Whether the answer is or 
 ness' testimony, or the merits of the is not responsive is for the court 
 case, they almost invariably follow alone. 
 
 them." State v. Philpot, 97 Iowa 365, " A witness, in his excitement, ac- 
 
 66 N. W. 730. cused the prisoner of being guilty of 
 
 ^ Hill v. State, 91 Tenn. 521, 19 S. the murder for which he was being 
 
 W. 674; Mann v. State, 23 Fla. 610, tried. The court need not stop the 
 
 3 So. 207. trial if the jury are properlj' cau- 
 
 ^ People V. Smith, 106 Mich. 431, 64 tioned to disregard the accusation. 
 
 N. W. 200. See Underbill on Ev.. p. Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 165 ^lass. 
 
 476, note 2; Smith v. State (Tex. 45, 42 N. E. 336. 
 Cr.), 99 S. W. 100.
 
 395 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. § 21J 
 
 it was a true statement of the facts as he then recollected them, 
 the record may, under certain circumstances, be admissible as 
 evidence in itself and aside from an3^thing the witness may testify 
 to orally. The using of the evidence of a past recollection embod- 
 ied in a writing- which the witness swears was true to his knowl- 
 edge when he made it, but about which he has no present recol- 
 lection whatever, depends upon certain rules which have nothing 
 to do with the use of memorandmn to refresh the recollection and 
 consecjuently demand no discussion in this place. 
 
 A present recollection of past events may be strong or weak 
 according to circumstances. These circumstances are the charac- 
 ter of the events, whether of striking interest or of mere com- 
 monplace routine ; and also on the remoteness of the events in 
 point of time. In the case of events of great importance and in- 
 terest, particularly if the witness was himself an interested person, 
 the present recollection is apt to be vivid and no refreshing is re- 
 quired. Events of routine or commonplace character are very 
 apt to be faint in the recollection of a witness who may have par- 
 ticipated in them and for this reason, the rule that he may refresh 
 his memory when necessary was enunciated. For a witness inay 
 aid or refresh his memory, meaning thereby his present recollec- 
 tion of past events, if he has a present recollection where it is 
 weak or faint by consulting, on the witness stand, a writing or 
 memorandum whether it was made by himself or some other per- 
 son; if after examining the memorandum and because of what 
 he has read thereon, he is able to testify of his present recollec- 
 tion thus renewed and revived.*" 
 
 If the memorandum is one whose sole use is to refresh the 
 memory, it is not usually competent evidence and a memorandum 
 or other writing which is admitted to be incompetent may always 
 be used to refresh the memory. The question of its relevancy 
 and materiality should not be considered.''^ It ought not to be 
 read to the jury as evidence,** though it has been held that the 
 
 *^ Jenkins v. State, 31 Fla. 196, 12 E. 184; O'Brien v. United States, 27 
 
 So. dTj; Kingory v. United States, 44 App. Cas. D. C. 263. 
 Fed. 669; Commonwealtii v. Clancy, '''Flood v. Mitchell, 68 N. Y. 507; 
 
 154 Mass. 128, 2.-J N. E. looi ; State Pickard v. Bryant, 92 Mich. 430, 52 
 
 V. Collins, 28 R. I. 439, 67 Atl. 796; N. W. 788. 
 Johnson v. State, 125 Ga. 243, 54 S. " Raynor v. Norton, 31 Mich. 210.
 
 § 217 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 396 
 
 jurors may examine it, not as evidence in the case but to test the 
 credibility of the witness by seeing from it whether it was of 
 such a nature that it could have refreshed the recollection of the 
 witness.*'^ 
 
 The opposite party is always entitled to cross-examine the wit- 
 ness in order to ascertain if he has testified truthfully after con- 
 sulting the memorandum, but he cannot introduce the memoran- 
 dum for the purpose of establishing the facts therein or for the 
 purpose of contradicting the witness. And inasmuch as the writ- 
 ing is solely to aid the memory if the witness can swear that he 
 has a full present recollection of the facts he should not be allowed 
 to inspect the writing.^*' 
 
 A witness in a criminal trial will be allowed to consult a writ- 
 ing to refresh his memory under the following circumstances: 
 First. If he, while retaining no independent recollection of the 
 facts transcribed, remembers having made the memorandum, or, 
 when it was made by another, if he remembers having seen it, 
 and that, when he saw it, he knew it was correct.*^ 
 
 ^^Commonwealth v. Halej^ 13 Al- 
 len (Mass.) 587. 
 
 ^^ State V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, 12 
 Pac. 318. 
 
 "The opposite party is entitled to 
 inspect it, and he may cross-exam- 
 ine the witness in regard to it ; and 
 it may be shown to the jury, not for 
 the purpose of establishing the facts 
 therein contained, but for the pur- 
 pose of showing that it could not 
 properly refresh the memory of the 
 witness." Commonwealth v. Jeffs, 
 132 Mass. 5. "But by resort to some 
 memorandum or writing, his memory 
 may be so stimulated and refreshed 
 as to enable him to recollect the fact, 
 and where this is so, it is not proper 
 to introduce the writing in evidence, 
 or read it in the presence of the jury, 
 because it forms no part of the testi- 
 mony, being used only for the pur- 
 pose of aiding the mental effort of 
 the witness to recollect the particular 
 
 transaction. State v. Legg, 59 W. Va. 
 315, 53 S. E. 545, 3 L- R- A. (N. S.) 
 ii52n. 
 
 *'' State V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, 12 
 Pac. 318; State v. Palmberg, 199 Mo. 
 222, 97 S. W. 566; Watters v. State 
 (Tex. Cr.), 94 S. W. 1038, 116 Am. 
 St. 476; State V. Colwell, 3 R. I. 132; 
 Woodruff V. State, 61 Ark. 157, 32 S. 
 W. 102; Owens V. State, 67 Md. 307, 
 10 Atl. 210, 302; Baum v. Reay, 96 
 Cal. 462, 29 Pac. 117, 31 Pac. 561; 
 Hartley v. Cataract, etc., Co., 64 Hun 
 634, 19 N. Y. S. 121 ; Card v. Foot, 56 
 Conn. 369, 15 Atl. 371, 7 Am. St. 311. 
 See Underbill on Ev., p. 478. In Du- 
 gan V. Mahoney, 11 Allen (Mass.) 
 572, the court said : "It is obvious 
 that this species of evidence must be 
 admissible in regard to numbers, 
 dates, sales, and deliveries of goods, 
 paj'ments and receipts of money, ac- 
 counts, and the like, in respect to 
 which no memory could be expected
 
 397 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. § 2l8 
 
 The other class of cases includes writings which the witness 
 does not remember having seen before, and of whose contents he 
 has no present recollection, but, being able to identify the hand- 
 writing as his own or as that of some other person, and knowing 
 it to be genuine, he is able on consulting the writing, and because 
 of its aid and his confidence in its genuineness, to swear independ- 
 ently, and of his own knowledge, to the facts. Suppose, for ex- 
 ample, a subscribing witness recognizes his signature to an at- 
 testation clause of a will. His memory refreshed, he may be able 
 to testify to the facts of acknowledgment or publication and sub- 
 scription by the testator and to other accompanying circum- 
 stances, though he may have no independent memory thereof. In 
 regard to the first class of writings, it is clear that, under certain 
 circumstances, they may be admissible as independent evidence 
 forming a part of the res gestcc. What the requirements are, 
 which must be fulfilled before declarations will be receivable as a 
 part of the res gestce, is fully explained elsewhere. 
 
 § 218. Character of memoranda employed to refresh the memory. — 
 
 The writing used to refresh the memory should ordinarily be con- 
 temporaneous with the transactions or facts which are mentioned 
 in it.^^ This is the rule which has received the support of the ma- 
 jority of cases. But many authorities hold that the writing need 
 not have been made precisely at the time of the events it describes, 
 if it was made before the memory of the person making it had 
 become weakened and unreliable by lapse of time.*^ 
 
 to be sufficiently retentive, without *" Sisk v. State, 28 Tex. App. 432, 
 
 depending upon memoranda, and 13 S. W. 647; Culver v. Scott, etc., 
 
 even memoranda would not bring the Lumber Co., 53 Minn. 360, 55 N. W. 
 
 transaction to present recollection. 552; McGowan v. McDonald, iii Cal. 
 
 In such cases, if the witness on look- 57, 43 Pac. 418, 52 Am. St. 149; Ad- 
 
 ing at the writing is able to testify ams v. Board of Trustees, Z7 Fla. 
 
 that he knows the transaction took 266, 20 So. 266; Wilber v. Scherer, 
 
 place, though he has no present mem- 13 Ind. App. 428, 41 N. E. 837 ; 
 
 ory of it, his testimony is admissible." Dwight v. Cutting, 91 Hun 38, 36 N. 
 
 "Williams v. Wager, 64 Vt. 326, Y. S. 99, 71 N. Y. St. 114. Testi- 
 
 24 Atl. 765; Weston v. Brown, 30 mony before the grand jury, taken 
 
 Neb. 609, 46 N. W. 826; Common- four months after the occurrences to 
 
 wealth V. Clancy, 154 Mass. 128, 27 which it relates, cannot be used to re- 
 
 N. E. looi, and Underbill on Ev., fresh the memory of witnesses called 
 
 § 338. to prove those occurrences. Putnam
 
 219 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 398 
 
 Sometimes copies of a writing or memorandum made at the 
 time of the facts which are transcribed have been used to refresli 
 the memory when the copy was made after the original, but only 
 if the witness could swear of his own knowledge to their accu- 
 racy,^*^ and the absence of the original is properl}' accounted for.^^ 
 So a newspaper reporter, testifying as a witness, may refresh his 
 memory by reading a printed article published from manuscript 
 furnished by him. on proof that the original was destroyed. '^^ 
 
 If on the examination of a witness for the i)rosecution, it turns 
 out that his memory is actually or apparently weak and particu- 
 larly where, as very frequently happens, he outlines the frame- 
 work of his evidence for the prosecution but omits details such as 
 dates and places, his memory may be refreshed by asking him 
 whether, on prior occasions he has not made statements contain- 
 ing the forgotten facts before the grand jury or to some of the 
 prosecuting officials or to police officials. His memory, having 
 been refreshed, he may then testify; but if he denies having made 
 the statements he cannot be contradicted by the prosecution by 
 proof that he has made them.^^ 
 
 § 219. Purpose and importance of cross-examination. — As a means 
 of ascertaining truth, cross-examination is correctly deemed to be 
 at once effective and impartial.^* Writers on evidence have fre- 
 
 V. United States, 162 U. S. 687, 40 46 Tex. Cr. 267, 81 S. W. 936, 108 
 
 L. ed. 1 1 18, 16 Sup. Ct. 923, 52 Am. St. 991. 
 
 Am. St. 149. Counsel have been "" Stavinow v. Home Ins. Co., 43 
 
 permitted to refresh the memory of AIo. App. 513; Watson v. ]\Iiller, 82 
 
 a forgetful witness by reading or Tex. 279, 17 S. W. 1053; Bonnet v. 
 
 having the witness read his evidence Gladfelt, 24 111. App. 533 ; Flint v. 
 
 on a former trial or from the Kennedy, 33 Fed. 820; People v. Mun- 
 
 stenographer's notes. Ehrisman v. roe, 100 Cal. 664, 35 Pac. 326, 38 Am. 
 
 Scott, 5 Ind. App. 596, 32 N. E. 867 ; St. 323, 24 L. R. A. 33n ; 
 
 Battishill v. Humphrej^s, 64 Mich. 514, ^^ Anderson v. Imhoff. 34 Neb. 335, 
 
 38 X. W. 581. The same rule applies 51 N. W. 854; Birmingham v. McPo- 
 
 to evidence taken on the preliminary land, 96 Ala. 363, 11 So. 427. 
 
 examination. State v. Legg, 59 W. ^" Hawes v. State, 88 Ala. 37, 7 So. 
 
 Va. 315, S3 S. E. 545- 3 L- R- A. (N. 302. 
 
 S.) ir52n; and to notes taken by ^Thomasson v. State, 80 Ark. 364, 
 
 counsel or other persons. State v. 97 S. W. 297. Supra, p. 397, note 40. 
 
 Dean, 72 S. Car. 74, 51 S. E. 524, or '* "Cross-examination is the right of 
 
 a statement made and signed by him the party against whom the witness 
 
 before the grand jury. Smith v. State, is called, and the right is a valuable
 
 399 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. § 220 
 
 quently adverted to its peculiar efficacy and excellence, as a means 
 of investigating the motives and personal prejudices of the wit- 
 ness, his relation to the accused or to the prosecution, or to the 
 criminal transaction which is under investigation. 
 
 By this process his knowledge and general intelligence, the 
 vividness of his memory, his impartiality or bias towards the ac- 
 cused, his means of observation and his opportunities for obtain- 
 ing accurate and full information may all be explored and ascer- 
 tained for the consideration of the jurors to assist them in deter- 
 mining the weight they shall give to his evidence.^^ Whether a 
 witness has been examined so that the opposite party shall be 
 entitled to cross-examine is sometimes an important question. A 
 witness who has been sworn, but to whom no questions have been 
 put, cannot be cross-examined.^*^ This is the case where the only 
 object of calling the witness is to procure a writing which is to be 
 proved by another witness. ^^ 
 
 One of several jointly indicted and tried may be required to 
 cross-examine the state's witnesses and produce his own before 
 the same is done by his co-defendants.^® 
 
 ^ 220. When right to cross-examine is lost — Cross-examination 
 confined to matters brought out on direct. — Where either party has 
 a right to cross-examine in civil cases, it is reversible error for 
 the court to refuse to permit the exercise of the right. But the 
 right of cross-examining is usually but not universally waived 
 by the party making the witness his own.^'* 
 
 one as a means of separating hear- criminal prosecutions, see 38 Am. St. 
 
 say from knowledge, error from 895-897. Right to cross-examine ac- 
 
 truth, opinion from fact, and infer- cused who has taken the witness 
 
 ence from recollection, and is a means stand as to a confession not admis- 
 
 of ascertaining the order of the sible in evidence, see 10 L. R. A. (X. 
 
 events as narrated by the witness in S.) 604. 
 
 his examination in chief, and the time " i Greenl. on Ev., § 446 ; i Stark, 
 
 and place, when and where they oc- on Ev., §§ 160, 161. 
 
 curred, and the attending circum- "^ Austin v. State, 14 Ark. 555. 
 
 stances; and of testing the intelli- "Rush v. Smith, i Cr. M. & R. 94: 
 
 gence, memory, impartiality, truth- Underhill on Evid., p. 481. 
 
 fulness and integrity of the witness." °* State v. Howard, 35 S. Car. 197, 
 
 The Ottawa, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 268, 18 14 S. E. 481. 
 
 L. ed. 165. ^''' Hemmingcr v. Western Assur. 
 
 Cross-examination of accused in Co., 95 Mich. 355, 54 N. W. 949.
 
 § 220 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 400 
 
 A party's right to cross-examine is not lost because he fails to 
 object to a direct examination had out of the regular order.*^'^ 
 The remedy for a defendant who has, for any reason, been de- 
 prived of an opportunity to cross-examine is to move to strike 
 out the evidence given on the direct examination and to request 
 an instruction that the jury should disregard it.*^^ 
 
 Though a party cannot usually cross-examine his own witness, 
 in criminal cases it has been held discretionary with the court to 
 permit the prosecuting attorney to do so where the witness is un- 
 expectedly hostile, or where the prosecuting attorney can show 
 that he is disappointed by the testimony of a witness whom he 
 expected to testify to facts showing the guilt of the accused.*'^ 
 
 The scope and right of a cross-examination are generally lim- 
 ited to subjects upon which the witness has been interrogated 
 on the direct examination. That is, counsel cross-examining will 
 not be permitted to ask leading or general questions on matters 
 which, though involved in the general issue of the prisoner's 
 guilt, were not touched on in the direct examination.**^ 
 
 *" Graham v. Larimer, 83 Cal. 173, 
 23 Pac. 286. 
 
 '' People V. Cole, 43 N. Y. 508. 
 
 *^ State V. Church, 199 Mo. 605, 98 
 S. W. 16; State V. Hughes, 8 Kan. 
 App. 631, 56 Pac. 142. 
 
 "Wood V. State, 92 Ind. 269; Brit- 
 ton V. State, 115 Ind. 55, 17 N. E. 
 254; Adams v. State, 28 Fla. 511, 10 
 So. 106; State V. Chamberlain, 89 
 Mo. 129, I S. W. 145; State v. Zeil- 
 man, 75 X. J. L. 357, 68 Atl. 468 ; Saf- 
 fer V. United States, 87 Fed. 329, 31 
 C. C. A. I, 59 U. S. App. 311; State 
 V. Rodriguez, 115 La. 1004, 40 So. 
 438; Morse v. Odell, 49 Ore. 118, 89 
 Pac. 139; State v. Nugent, 116 La. 
 99, 40 So. 581 ; Harrold v. Territory, 
 18 Okla. 395, 89 Pac. 202, 10 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 6o4n; Linnehan v. State, 120 
 Ala. 293, 25 So. 6; State v. Heidel- 
 berg, 120 La. 300, 45 So. 256; Stewart 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 273, 106 S. W. 
 685; Stone V. White, 55 Fla. 510, 45 
 
 So. 1032; State V. Williams, iii La. 
 205, 35 So. 521 ; State v. Farrington, 
 90 Iowa 673, 57 N. W. 606; Gale v. 
 People, 26 Mich. 157; State v. Wil- 
 lingham, ss La. Ann. 537; People v. 
 Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 Pac. 75; 
 Sheehan v. People, 131 111. 22, 22 N. 
 E. 818; People V. Van Ewan, 11 1 Cal. 
 144, 43 Pac. 520 ; Gemmill v. State, 16 
 Ind. App. 154, 43 N. E. 909; State 
 V. Case, 96 Iowa 264, 65 N. W. 149; 
 State V. Judiesch, 96 Iowa 249, 65 N. 
 W. 157; State V. Zimmerman, 3 Kan. 
 App. 172, 42 Pac. 828; State v. Lewis, 
 136 Mo. 84, 27 S. W. 806; People v. 
 Edwards (Cal.), 73 Pac. 416; Brown 
 V. State, 46 Fla. 159, 35 So. 82; Lewis 
 V. State, 55 Fla. 54, 45 So. 998, and 
 cases fully cited Underbill on Ev., p. 
 482. In Texas, it has been held that 
 the prosecution cannot go outside of 
 the direct examination of a witness 
 for the accused who testifies in her 
 husband's favor, under the statute in
 
 40I EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. S 220 
 
 Whether a question put on the cross-examination calls for a 
 collateral fact, or whether it is within the scope of the direct 
 examination, is always for the court to determine. Its discretion, 
 where properly exercised, will not be interfered with. The test 
 to determine whether a question is or is not collateral seems to 
 be that if the party cross-examining would under the rules of prac- 
 tice be entitled to prove it, as a part of his case, it is collateral to 
 the cross-examination and cannot be inquired into. Thus, for illus- 
 tration, if the plea of the defendant in a case of homicide is self- 
 defense, counsel cross-examining a witness for the state will not 
 be permitted to question him as to facts tending to establish that 
 plea, unless the direct examination of that witness relates ex- 
 clusively to the sanity of the accused."* 
 
 In all cases where a witness testifies to part of a conversation 
 on his direct examination, the other side must be permitted on 
 cross-examination to bring out the entire conversation so far as 
 it is relevant to the facts in issue. *'^ But this rule does not permit 
 or encourage the bringing out of evidence not within the scope 
 of the direct examination by asking the witness to make experi- 
 ments in court which will call upon him to give evidence which 
 the state should prove as part of its case.*'*' 
 
 While counsel may cross-examine on relevant facts gone into 
 on the direct examination, he may not open his own case and 
 present evidence to support it by cross-examining the adverse wit- 
 nesses. If he wants their evidence he must call them as wit- 
 nesses.^^ This rule, as we shall see, is qualified by the principle 
 which permits seemingly irrelevant questions on cross-examina- 
 tion for the purpose of testing credibility and bias. 
 
 A witness may be pressed for an answer when, on cross-exami- 
 
 that state which provides that a hus- "* Ferguson v. State, ^2 Xeb. 350, 
 
 band and wife shall not testify against 100 N. W. 800. 
 
 each other. If the wife of the ac- "^Lahue v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 159, 
 
 cused goes on the stand to testify in lOi S. W. 1008. 
 
 favor of her husband she may be "" State v. Snyder, 67 Kan. 801, 74 
 
 cross-examined as to all matters in- Pac. 231. 
 
 volved in her direct examination. She '" Eacock v. State, 169 Ind. 488, 82 
 
 cannot under the statute be cross-ex- N. E. 1039. This rule obtains in a 
 
 amined on matters not touched on in criminal prosecution as well as in a 
 
 her direct examination. Stewart v. civil action. Poston v. State, 83 Neb. 
 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. 273, 106 S. W. 240, no N. W. 520. 
 
 685. 
 
 26 — Underiiill Crim. Ev.
 
 § 221 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 402 
 
 nation, he avoids replying or parries the questions. And counsel 
 should not be allowed to interpose frivolous objections in order 
 to prevent a rapid cross-examination and to afford the witness an 
 opportunity to fabricate evidence.^* The extent, however, to 
 which the same question may be asked, is largely in the discretion 
 of the court.®® 
 
 § 221. Cross-examination to test credibility. — Though the refusal 
 or allowance of cross-examination upon irrelevant matters bear- 
 ing wholly on credibility is largely within the discretion of the 
 court, the right to cross-examine upon transactions directly rele- 
 vant which have been brought out in the examination-in-chief 
 is absolute. And the fact that relevant evidence, which is elicited 
 by a proper question put on the direct examination, has been im- 
 properly stricken out, furnishes no basis for a claim that other 
 strictly competent evidence of the same transaction should be 
 expunged when stated by the witness on the cross-examination.^*' 
 
 The limits within which either party may cross-examine upon 
 matters not strictly relevant, but which affect the credibility of 
 the evidence, is largely discretionary,^^ and a reasonable exercise 
 of this discretion in limiting the duration or modifying the 
 method of the cross-examination, or in admitting seemingly im- 
 material questions tending to explain the motives,"^ opportuni- 
 
 ** State V. Duncan, ii6 ]\Io. 288, 22 State v. Weems, 96 Iowa 426, 65 N. 
 
 S. W. 699. W. 387; Commonwealth v. Flynn, 165 
 
 *^ Brown v. State, ^2 Md. 477, 20 IMass. 153, 42 N. E. 562: State v. Rut- 
 
 Atl. 140; McGuire v. Lawrence Mfg. ledge, 135 Iowa 581, 113 X. W. 461; 
 
 Co., 156 Mass. 324, 31 N. E. 3; Wood State v. High, 116 La. 79, 40 So. 
 
 V. State, 92 Ind. 269. 538 ; State v. Smith, 106 Iowa 701 ; 77 
 
 ™Turnbull v. Richardson, 69 ]\Iich. N. W. 499; Bess v. Commonwealth, 
 
 400, 37 N. W. 499- 118 Ky. 858, 26 Ky. L. 839, 82 S. W. 
 
 '^ State V. Morris, 109 X. Car. 820, 576; Hill v. State, 146 Ala. 51, 41 So. 
 
 13 S. E. 877; State v. Miller, 93 Mo. 621; State v. Caron, 118 La. 349, 42 
 
 263, 6 S. W. 57 ; Bessette v. State, loi So. 960 ; State v. Stukes. TZ S. Car. 
 
 Ind. 85; Wachstetter v. State, 99 Ind. 386, 53 S. E. 643; Harrold v. Terri- 
 
 290, 50 Am. 94n ; United States v. tory, 18 Okla. 395, 89 Pac. 202, 10 L. 
 
 Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 41 L. ed. 300, 16 R. A. (X. S.) 6o4n; State v. Ross, 
 
 Sup. Ct. 1 192; Davidson v. People, "/■/ Kan. 341, 94 Pac. 270, and see Un- 
 
 90 111. 221; People V. Knight (Cal.), derhill on Ev., p. 483. 
 43 Pac. 6 ; State v. McGowan, 66 " People v. Thomson, 92 Cal. 506 ; 
 
 Conn. 392, 34 Atl. 99; State v. Os- Sims v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. 637, 44 S. 
 
 borne, 96 Iowa 281, 65 X. W. 159; W. 522.
 
 403 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 221 
 
 ties,^^ and powers of observation, the knowledge/* memory or 
 recollection,'^ reliability or good faith of the witness,"'' will always 
 be allowed. Questions put to the witness for the purpose of 
 ascertaining his relations, business, social or otherwise, with the 
 accused and his state of mind, whether hostile or friendly towards 
 him, are unobjectionable." 
 
 Thus, for example, on cross-examination a witness for the 
 prosecution may be asked if he has not contributed money to aid 
 in the prosecution,'® or if he does not expect to receive a share of 
 the reward offered for the conviction of the prisoner, or if he has 
 not been promised payment for his services.'® Where evidence 
 from which an inference unfavorable to the prisoner is given upon 
 the direct examination, everything within the knowledge of the 
 
 "For example, a witness to a noc- 
 turnal homicide may be asked if the 
 moon was shining, to ascertain his 
 facilities for observing the move- 
 ments of deceased and all the sur- 
 rounding circumstances. State v. 
 Avery, 113 Mo. 475, 21 S. W. 193. 
 The courts, while guarding against 
 any abuse of the right to cross-ex- 
 amine, must watch with care against 
 attempts to evade or restrict it. Rob- 
 nett V. People, 16 111. App. 299; Tracy 
 v. People, 97 111. loi ; Holmes v. 
 State, 88 Ala. 26, 7 So. 193, 16 Am. 
 St. 17. 
 
 '* Williams v. State, 32 Fla. 251, 13 
 So. 429. 
 
 " State V. Duffy, 57 Conn. 525, 18 
 Atl. 791 ; Sewall v. Robbins, 139 
 Mass. 164, 29 N. E. 650; Harrold v. 
 Territory, 18 Okla. 395, 89 Pac. 202, 
 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 6o4n; State v. 
 Brown, in La. 170, 35 So. 501. A 
 witness may be required to repeat on 
 cross-examination his evidence to a 
 particular point given on his direct 
 examination to test his memory and 
 to ascertain if he will contradict him- 
 self. Zucker v. Karpeles, 88 Mich. 
 413, 50 N. W. 373. 
 
 '" State v. Philpot, 97 Iowa 365, 66 
 N. W. 730; Commonwealth v. Flynn, 
 165 Mass. 153, 42 N. E. Rep. 562; 
 State V. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 
 N. W. 63; State v. Weems, 96 Iowa 
 426, 65 N. W. 387; Bessette v. State, 
 lOi Ind. 85 ; Murray v. Great Wes- 
 tern Ins. Co., 72 Hun 282, 25 N. Y. 
 S. 414, 55 X. Y. St. 748; Heninburg 
 V. State, 151 Ala. 26, 43 So. 959. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Lyden, 113 
 Mass. 452 ; Commonwealth v. Shaw, 
 4 Cush (Mass.) 593; People v. Thom- 
 son, 92 Cal. 506, 28 Pac. 589; United 
 States v. Cross, 20 D. C. 365 ; Holmes 
 V. State, 88 Ala. 26, 7 So. 193, 16 Am. 
 St. 17, and Underbill on Ev., p. 483; 
 State V. Rutledge, 135 Iowa 581, 113 
 N. W. 461 ; Isaac v. United States, 
 7 Ind. T. 196, 104 S. W. 588: Kipper 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 377, 77 S. W. 
 611; Beal V. State, 138 Ala. 94; 35 
 So. 58; Sylvester v. State, 46 Fla. 166, 
 35 So. 142; Jackson v. State (Ala.), 
 47 So. 77. 
 
 '* Miller v. Territory, 15 Okla. 422, 
 85 Pac. 239. 
 
 '" State V. Mulch, 17 S. Dak. 321, 96 
 X. W. loi.
 
 §221 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 4O4 
 
 witness and which may raise an inference to rebut, may be 
 brought out on cross-examination.®" 
 
 Questions on the cross-examination of a witness tending to 
 show that some particular person had tampered with him. are 
 competent; but a question to a witness for the prosecution if 
 some person interested in the case had not tried to get him to 
 testify falsely, was too general. The question should point out 
 the particular person who is alleged to have tampered with the 
 witness. ^^ A prosecuting witness may always be asked on cross- 
 examination any question which tends to show that he had made 
 a mistake in bringing the charge against the accused.^" 
 
 The court may, in its discretion, refuse to permit the cross- 
 examination to be unreasonably prolonged, ^^ or it may refuse to 
 allow a question to be repeated when it has been answered satis- 
 factorily,'''* or may exclude questions designed solely to ascertain 
 what witnesses it may be advantageous to call.'^^ 
 
 The rule under which evidence of collateral facts is excluded 
 during the direct examination is not applied with strictness to 
 the cross-examination. The theory upon which the latter is con- 
 ducted is that its primary object is the ascertainment of truth, not 
 by eliciting positive evidence directly bearing on the facts, but 
 by furnishing a means of testing the truthfulness and credibility 
 of the witness. 
 
 *" State V. Harvey, 130 Iowa 394, Carothers v. State, 75 Ark. 574, 88 
 106 N. W. 938. Questions on cross- S. W. 585 ; State v. Blee, 133 Iowa 
 examination put to the witness as to 725, in N. W. 19. Though a liberal 
 whether he told the truth in making cross-examination should be allowed 
 certain statements on the direct ex- where a witness is called to impeach 
 amination should be excluded, or sustain another by proof of gen- 
 Wright V. State, 149 Ala. 28, 43 So. eral character, the extent to which 
 575. it may go is largely within the discre- 
 
 *^ Sue V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 122, tion of the trial court. State v. Har- 
 
 105 S. W. 804. ris, 209 Mo. 423, 108 S. W. 28. 
 
 "State V. Dalcourt, 112 La. 420, 36 " Gutsch v. Mcllhargey, 69 Mich. 
 
 So. 479. 2>11, y? N. W. 303; Hughes v. Ward, 
 
 ^'Pennsylvania Co. v. Newmeyer, 38 Kan. 452, 16 Pac. 810; Mason v. 
 
 129 Ind. 401, 28 N. E. 860; State v. Hinds, 19 N. Y. S. 996, 47 N. Y. St. 
 
 Wren, 121 La. 55, 46 So. 99: State 163. 
 
 V. Rodriguez, 115 La. 1004, 40 So. -° United States v. Cross, 20 D. C. 
 
 438; Fuqua v. Commonwealth, 118 365. 
 Ky. 578, 81 S. W. 923, 26 Ky. L. 420;
 
 405 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 Ouestions may be put to an adverse witness on his cross-exami- 
 nation to show his prejudice in favor of, or against the accused 
 without laying any predicate fo'- them.'^" 
 
 § 222. When answers to g^uestions involving collateral matters 
 asked in cross-examinatio^j-^y be contradicted — Hostility or friei 
 ship towards the accu&eu. — It is never permissible to cross-examine 
 upon matters wholly' irrelevant and collateral to the crime merely 
 for the purpose of contradicting the witness on those points by 
 other evidence. And if the cross-examiner shall happen to bring 
 out irrelevant facts he is concluded thereby, and cannot contra- 
 dict thenT^^^^it is proper, however, to ask the witness if he did 
 not at a particular time and place, which must be mentioned, give 
 a different account of relevant facts to that which he gave on his 
 direct examination. If he denies that he has done so. a sufficient 
 foundation is laid for his impeachment, which may then be ac- 
 complished by the testimony of a witness who was present and 
 heard the contradictory statement.^^ 
 
 The feelings, bias and relationship of the witness are never 
 collateral.^^ A witness may be interrogated on cross-examina- 
 
 ^^ Telfair v. State (Fla.), 47 So. 
 863; State V. Nieuhaus, 217 Mo. 332, 
 117 S. W. -jz. 
 
 '^ I Greeiil. on Ev., p. 484 ; State v. 
 Ellwood, 17 R. I. 763, 24 Atl. 782; 
 Moore v. People, 108 111. 484; Bres- 
 sler V. People, 117 111. 422, 8 N. E. 
 62 ; People v. Hillhouse, 80 Mich. 580, 
 45 X. W. 484; Commonwealth v. 
 Hourigan, 89 Ky. 305, 12 S. W. 550, 
 II Ky. L. 509; Batten v. State, 80 
 Ind. 394; Crittenden v. Common- 
 wealth, 82 Ky. 164; State v. Reick, 
 43 Kan. 635, 23 Pac. 1076; Peo- 
 ple V. Tiley, 84 Cal. 651, 24 Pac. 
 290; People V. Dye, 75 Cal. 108, 16 
 Pac. 537; State v. Dunn COre.), 100 
 Pac. 258; People v. Darr, 3 Cal. App. 
 SO, 84 Pac. 457; People v. Van Tas- 
 sel, 26 App. Div. (X. Y.) 445, so X. Y. 
 S. 53 ; Smalls v. State, 102 Ga. 31, 29 S. 
 E. 153 ; Ferguson v. State, 72 Neb. 350, 
 
 100 N. W. 800; Saffer v. United 
 States, S9 U. S. App. 311, 87 Fed 329, 
 31 C. C. A. I. 
 
 ''People V. Williams, 18 Cal. 187; 
 State V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, 12 Pac. 
 318; State V. Talbott, T2> Mo. 347; 
 State V. Zimmerman, 3 Kan. App. 
 172, 42 Pac. 828. See Underbill on 
 Ev., § 350, for civil cases. Where a 
 witness makes a statement on cross- 
 examination he may be asked if he 
 did not give different testimony on a 
 former trial. 
 
 *" Crumpton v. State, 52 Ark. 273, 
 12 S. W. S63; United States v. Post, 
 128 Fed. 950; Cook v. State, 152 Ala. 
 (^, 44 So. 549; People V. Manasse, 
 153 Cal. ID, 94 Pac. 92; Brown v. 
 State, 1 19 Ga. 572, 46 S. E. 833 ; State 
 V. Nieuhaus, 217 Mo. 332, 117 S. W. 
 
 n-
 
 § 222 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 406 
 
 tion as to his interest, bias or prejudice, that is to say, if the sole 
 purpose of the question is to ehicidate the existing or previous 
 relationship, feeling or conduct of the witness toward the crime, 
 the accused, or the prosecutors. 
 
 The witness may be asked generally, if he has not expressed 
 or, perhaps, entertained feelings of hostility, or acted in an un- 
 friendly manner towards or cjuarreled with the accused. So, for 
 example, a prosecuting witness may be asked if he has not had 
 the accused arrested before, °** or if he has not quarreled with the 
 accused,^^ and if he has not retained counsel to aid the state in 
 the trial which is pending.*^- He should be allowed to explain his 
 motives in hiring counsel. °^ 
 
 If the witness refuses to answer such questions,^'* or answers 
 them in the negative, the contrary fact may be shown by the evi- 
 dence of others.''^ But where a witness states that though once 
 hostile he is so no longer, evidence of his previous hostility, being 
 too remote, is irrelevant."** 
 
 On the cross-examination of a witness for the state it may 
 properly be shown that he had come a long distance without a 
 subpoena and that his railroad fare had been paid by the prose- 
 cution.''^ The general rule is that where a witness on his direct 
 examination shows a violent hatred towards the accused, or where 
 he has been very active in securing evidence against him, the ac- 
 
 ^ People V. Lee Ah Chuck, 66 Cal. State, 64 Ind. 400 ; Crumpton v. 
 
 662, 6 Pac. 859. State, 52 Ark. 273, 12 S. W. 563 ; Peo- 
 
 "^ Sasser v. State, 129 Ga. 541, 59 pie v. Thompson, 92 Cal. 506, 28 Pac. 
 
 S. E. 255. 589 ; Newcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383 ; 
 
 °^ People V. Blackwell, 27 Cal. 65 ; People v. Goldenson, 76 Cal. 328, 19 
 
 United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, Pac. 161 ; Cornelius v. Common- 
 
 41 L. ed. 300, 16 Sup. Ct. 1 192: Miller wealth, 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 539; Com- 
 
 V. Territory, 15 Okla. 422, 85 Pac. monwealth v. Byron, 14 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 239. 31 ; Kent v. State, 6 Cr. L. Mag. 520. 
 
 *' People V. Blackwell, 27 Cal. 65. In People v. Brooks, 131 N. Y. 321, 
 
 "* State V. McFarlain, 41 La. Ann. 30 N. E. 189, it was held that the 
 
 686, 6 So. 728. hostility of an adverse witness might 
 
 ^' State V. Johnson, 48 La. Ann. be shown without questioning him, 
 
 437, 19 So. 476; Lyle v. State, 21 Tex. and see Underbill on Ev., § 354 b. 
 
 App. 153, 17 S. W. 425; People v. "^Consaul v. Sheldon, 35 Neb. 247, 
 
 Gillis, 97 Cal. 542, 32 Pac. 586; Bon- 52 N. W. 1104. 
 
 nard v. State, 25 Tex. App. 173, 7 "Sylvester v. State, 46 Fla. 166, 35 
 
 S. W. 862, 8 Am. St. 431; Scott v. So. 142.
 
 407 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. § 223 
 
 cused should be permitted the widest latitude on cross-examina- 
 tion.^^ 
 
 And a witness who is called to contradict a statement by a 
 prosecuting witness that he is not hostile to the accused must 
 do so by evidence of facts within his own knowledge showing the 
 disposition and attitude of the prosecuting witness. He may 
 prove declarations or acts showing hostility, but his opinion that 
 the witness is hostile is not admissible.''^ 
 
 § 223. Re-direct examination. — A party calling a witness may re- 
 examine him after he has been cross-examined. On this re- 
 examination the witness may be questioned as to contradictions, 
 and inconsistent statements made on his cross-examination ; and 
 he may state and explain the motives for his acts which he de- 
 scribed on cross-examination.^"*' 
 
 And where on the cross-examination of a witness for the prose- 
 cution new testimony develops which is unfavorable to the state, 
 on the re-direct examination it is permitted for the prosecution 
 to go fully into the new matter testified to on the cross-examina- 
 tion.^ Thus, if on cross-examination the prosecuting witness 
 admits that he has charged another than the accused with the 
 crime, the court must on the re-direct permit him to explain why 
 he did so." 
 
 The introduction on cross-examination of any evidence which 
 tends to impeach the witness cross-examined permits counsel on 
 the other side on the re-direct to introduce questions which will 
 tend to overcome the prejudicial inference thus created. For 
 example, when the witness admits on cross-examination that im- 
 mediately after the crime he left the state, his reasons for doing 
 so may be shown on the re-direct.^ So, too, where a witness, 
 
 "'State V. Griffin, 43 Wash. 591, 86 v. Tubbs, 147 Mich, i, no N. W. 
 
 Pac. 951. 132; State v. Lymens, 138 Iowa 113, 
 
 ""Burnett v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 515, 115 N. W. 878. 
 
 112 S. W. 74. ^ State V. Williams, in La. 179, 35 
 
 "" Commonwealth v. Dill, 156 Mass. So. 505 ; State v. Banner, 149 N. E. 
 
 226, 30 N. E. 1016; Wilson v. Peo- 519, 63 S. E. 84. 
 
 pie, 94 111. 299; State v. Flicks, 20 S. 'People v. Darr, 3 Cal. App. 50, 84 
 
 Car. 341; Kroell v. State, 139 Ala. i, Pac. 457. 
 
 36 So. 1025 ; Carwile v. State, 148 ^ Sims v. State, 146 Ala. 109, 41 So. 
 
 Ala. 576, 39 So. 220; Craig v. State, 413. 
 78 Neb. 466, III N. W. 143; People
 
 22-^ CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 408 
 
 being a police officer, stated on his cross-examination by counsel 
 for the accused that he was desirous of convicting accused, the 
 prosecution can show on the re-direct examination of the wit- 
 ness that he had no interest in convicting the accused except that 
 of a public officer.* A prosecuting witness, having been asked on 
 his cross-examination and having answered a question which 
 showed or tended to show that he had employed money for the 
 purpose of securing evidence against the accused, should be al- 
 lowed on his re-direct examination to explain the whole transac- 
 tion."' 
 
 Questions may be put on the re-direct examination for the 
 purpose of ascertaining the real meaning of the language used on 
 the cross-examination. From this it will often appear that the 
 inconsistent or contradictory character of the statements is more 
 apparent than real.** 
 
 The party calling the witness ought on the examination-in- 
 chief to interrogate him on all material matters. No new ques- 
 tions can be put on the re-direct examination which are not con- 
 nected in some way with the cross-examination. But the courts 
 of original jurisdiction have varied this rule, and it remains for 
 them to determine whether in any particular case the facts war- 
 rant a departure therefrom. This discretion the appellate court 
 will not interfere with except in the case of its gross abuse, when 
 manifest injustice would surely ensue.^ But on the re-direct ex- 
 amination counsel will be permitted to ask questions which will 
 explain all answers which were brought out on the cross-examina- 
 tion from which wrong inferences might be drawn by the jury, 
 or which have a tendency to cast doubt upon the credibility of 
 the evidence of the witness.** 
 
 * People V. Wenzel, 189 N. Y. 275, Iowa 567, 57 N. W. 418; Springfield 
 82 N. E. 130. ■ V. Dalby, 139 III. 34, 29 N. E. 860. 
 
 * Wheeler v. State, 79 Neb. 491, 113 'People v. Buchanan, 145 X. Y. 
 N. W. 253. I, 39 N. E. 846; State v. McGahey, 3 
 
 " Smith V. State, 21 Tex. App. 277, N. Dak. 293, 55 N. W. 753 ; Bracken 
 
 17 S. W. 471; State V. Reed, 89 Mo. v. State, in Ala. 68, 20 So. 636, 56 
 
 168, I S. W. 225; People V. Ryan, 152 Am. St. 23; Collins v. State, 46 Neb. 
 
 Cal. 364, 92 Fac. 853. ^7, 64 N. W. 432 ; United States v. 18 
 
 ^ Sartorious v. State, 24 Miss. 602, Barrels of High Wines, 8 Blatchf. 
 
 609; Schaser v. State, 36 Wis. 429. (U. S.) 475; Kidd v. State, lOi Ga. 
 
 Cf. Miller v. Illinois &c. R. Co., 89 528, 28 S. E. 990. When the pros-
 
 409 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. g 223 
 
 Where the defendant brings out on the cross-examination a 
 part of a conversation which is material to the crime, the prosecu- 
 tion on the re-direct may bring out all the conversation.^ One 
 who on cross-examination admits one conversation with the ac- 
 cused may be cjuestioned on his re-direct examination as to an- 
 other conversation if the latter is material.^'' If an incriminating 
 fact is brought out by the defendant on cross-examination of the 
 state's witness, the prosecution may on re-direct examination 
 bring out all the testimony which is material thereto/^ 
 
 But where a witness testifies on his cross-examination to pre- 
 vious difficulties and disputes with the accused from which it may 
 have been inferred that he was hostile to the accused and preju- 
 diced against him, the state cannot show on the re-direct exami- 
 nation any fact which furnishes a ground for such hostility.^- 
 
 A suggestive mode of questioning a witness on the re-direct 
 examination, though sometimes permitted,^^ and always in the 
 discretion of the court, is not to be commended. Counsel should 
 not be allowed to extricate an untruthful witness from the dif- 
 ficulties and inconsistencies into which he has plunged by repeat- 
 ing to him his evidence on the direct examination, and asking 
 him if the statements made on the cross-examination are con- 
 sistent therewith.^* If the court permits a witness to answer 
 irrelevant questions or to give irrelevant replies on the cross- 
 examination, the party calling him has the right to question him 
 on such matters on the re-direct examination.^^ In case the ad- 
 
 ecuting witness, a minor, admitted on " People v. Noblett, 184 X. Y. 612, 
 
 cross-examination that a writing 77 N. E. 1193, aff'g 96 App. Div. 293, 
 
 signed by her had been prepared by 89 N. Y. S. 181, 18 N. Y. Cr. 476. 
 
 the district attorney and signed at his " State v. Judd, 132 Iowa 296, 109 
 
 bidding, she was allowed, on the re- N. W. 892. 
 
 direct examination, to state that the " Smith v. State, 21 Tex. App. 277, 
 
 statement was wholly voluntary and 17 S. W. 471 ; State v. Vickers, 209 
 
 true, and that its language was sub- Mo. 12, 106 S. W. 999; Smith v. 
 
 stantially her own. People v. Mills, State, 52 Tex. Cr. 344, 106 S. W. 
 
 94 Mich. 630, 54 N. W. 488. See, 1161. 
 
 also. Underbill on Ev., p. 487. " Smith v. State, 21 Tex. App. 277, 
 
 'Simmons v. State, 145 Ala. 61, 40 17 S. W. 471; Stoner v. Devilbiss, 70 
 
 So. 660; Hudson v. State, 137 Ala. Md. 144, 16 Atl. 440; Moody v. Row- 
 
 60, 34 So. 854. ell, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 490, 28 Am. 
 
 '"People V. Majoine, 144 Cal. 303, Dec. 317. 
 
 77 Pac. 952. " People v. McXamara, 94 Cal. 509,
 
 § 224 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 410 
 
 verse part}' desires to re-examine tlie witness he may then do so 
 on the re-cross-examination, but must restrict himself to new 
 matter brought out on the re-direct examination. 
 
 § 224. Recalling witnesses. — Whether a witness, after he has 
 left the stand, shall be allowed to be recalled by the party in whose 
 behalf he testified, or for further cross-examination," is wholly 
 discretionary with the court, ^' and this discretion was held not 
 to have been abused where a witness was recalled after a direct, 
 cross, re-direct and re-cross-examination,^** and even after both 
 the state and the defense had rested.^" Where a witness is un- 
 able to answer positively or definitely, while on the stand, the 
 court may properly refuse to permit his recall for additional ex- 
 amination,-"^ or to permit a witness, who has already testified fully 
 and exhaustively, to be recalled solely for the purpose of having 
 
 29 Pac. 953; State v. Cardoza, 11 S. 
 Car. 195 ; Schaser v. State, 36 Wis. 
 429; Parks V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 100, 
 79 S. W. 301. See Underbill on Ev., 
 § 341. 
 
 " People V. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355, 
 48 N. E. 730; People v. Farton, 49 
 Cal. 632. 
 
 " State V. Robinson, 32 Ore. 43, 48 
 Pac. 357; Faust v. United States, 163 
 U. S. 452, 41 L. ed. 224, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 1 1 12; Pigg V. State, 145 Ind. 560, 43 
 N. E. 309; Chapman v. James, 96 
 Iowa 233, 64 X. W. 795 ; Robbins v. 
 Springfield &c. R. Co., 165 Mass. 30, 
 42 N. E. 334; Lafferty v. State (Tex. 
 Cr.), 35 S. W. 374; Riley V. State, 88 
 Ala. 193, 7 So. 149; State v. Dilley, 
 15 Ore. 70, 13 Pac. 648; Humphrey v. 
 State, 78 Wis. 569, 47 N. W. 836; 
 Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 
 679, 17 S. E. 238; State v. Huff, 76 
 Iowa 200, 40 N. W. 720; Hollings- 
 worth V. State, 79 Ga. 605, 4 S. E. 
 560; Commonweahh v. Kennedy, 170 
 Mass. 18, 48 X. E. 770; Upton v. 
 State, 48 Tex. Cr. 289, 88 S. W. 212; 
 
 Hammond v. State, 147 Ala. 79, 41 
 So. 761; Bellamy v. State (Fla. 1908), 
 47 So. 868; State v. Thompson, 68 
 S. Car. 133, 46 S. E. 941. Underbill 
 on Ev., § 342, citing civil cases. The 
 prosecutrix, in a trial for rape, may 
 be recalled to testify to non-consent 
 after both sides have rested. State 
 V. Case, 96 Iowa 264, 65 N. W. 149. 
 In State v. Clyburn, 16 S. Car. 375, 
 it was held that the judicial discretion 
 was properly exercised when a wit- 
 ness for the state was recalled to 
 prove a single fact, though the exam- 
 ination of the witnesses for the ac- 
 cused was thereby interrupted. State 
 V. Laycock, 141 Mo. 274, 42 S. W. 
 
 723- 
 
 " State V. Jacobs, 28 S. Car. 29. 4 
 S. E. 799; Brown v. State, 72 Md. 
 468, 20 Atl. 186. 
 
 '^ Cochran v. United States, 14 
 Okla. 108, ^d Pac. 672. 
 
 =" Bonnet v. Gladfeldt (Glattfeldt), 
 24 111. App. 533, 120 111. 166, II N. E. 
 250.
 
 41 I EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. g 225 
 
 him repeat his testimony or to obtain cumulative evidence.^^ If 
 there is a dispute as to what testimoney a witness has given, or 
 if the jurors did not understand or have forgotten what he said 
 it is very proper to ahow him to restate his testimony, even after 
 the case is closed.^" But the practice is open to the serious objec- 
 tion that it may lead to injustice to the prisoner by placing too 
 much emphasis on some material evidence against him. If a wit- 
 ness is recalled for further direct examination, or for further 
 cross-examination, the other side has the right of further cross- 
 examination or of further re-direct examination. 
 
 After a witness for the prosecution has left the witness stand 
 he may be recalled by the counsel for the accused at any time 
 during the trial to lay a foundation for his impeachment.^^ The 
 prosecuting attorney has the same right. The fact that a party re- 
 calls a witness for this purpose does not make him the witness of 
 the party recalling him."* 
 
 The rule that evidence which is not apparently relevant, or 
 Avhich is apparently irrelevant, may be received by the court, 
 upon the promise of the party offering it that he will show the 
 relevancy and connection later on, is applicable to criminal trials. 
 But the matter is within the discretion of the court who may re- 
 quire that the relevancy be shown at once by introducing some 
 evidence which will connect. The party offering evidence ap- 
 parently irrelevant may be required to state at once its connection 
 with other facts, and to promise to connect, and if he does not do 
 so, the evidence should be stricken out.^^ 
 
 § 225. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — The presiding 
 
 judge may, when it shall seem necessary for the due administra- 
 tion of justice, order a separation of the witnesses, and the ex- 
 
 ^ Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Hazels, 26 the purpose of laying a foundation 
 
 Neb. 364, 42 N. W. 93. for his impeachment. State v. 
 
 "Bennefield v. State, 62 Ark. 365, Brown, in La. 696, 35 So. 818. 
 
 35 S. W. 790 ; Hayes v. State, 36 Tex. ^^ Johnson v. State, 55 Fla. 46, 46 
 
 Cr. 146, 35 S. W. 983; Lafiferty v. So. 154; Vann v. State. 140 Ala. 122, 
 
 State (Tex. Cr.), 35 S. W. 374; State zi So. 158. 
 
 V. Johnson, 89 Iowa i, 56 N. W. 404; "Hammond v. State, 147 Ala. 79, 
 
 Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368; Haddix 41 So. 761. 
 
 V. State, 76 Neb. 369, 107 N. W. 781. "= Ross v. State, 169 Ind. 3S8, 8s 
 
 A witness may usually be recalled for N. E. 781.
 
 225 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 412 
 
 elusion of all witnesses, expert,-" or otherwise, from the court- 
 room while any witness is under examination.-' The value and 
 importance of this order in criminal trials to prevent collusion 
 among witnesses are self-evident, and can hardly be overesti- 
 mated. In the absence of statute the order is not of right. But 
 it is seldom refused if it appears that the ascertainment of truth 
 will be advanced. The matter, however, is wholly one of judicial 
 discretion and neither side can claim it as matter of right. 
 Hence the refusal of the court to exclude all the witnesses for 
 the prosecution except the witness who is testifying is not re- 
 versible error which will entitle the accused to a new trial upon 
 his conviction. ^'^ Thus the court does not err in refusing to ex- 
 clude a detective who caused the arrest of the accused, and he 
 may remain in court and assist the district attorney in framing 
 questions based upon what he has found out in searching for 
 the guilty party.^** 
 
 If a witness returns after leaving the court, or remains through 
 inadvertence after the separation of witnesses has been ordered, 
 the court may, in its discretion, refuse to permit him to be ex- 
 
 °° Vance v. State, 56 Ark. 402, 19 
 S. W. 1066; Reg. V. Frances, 4 Cox 
 
 C. C. 57. 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Thompson, 159 
 Mass. 56, 33 N. E. iiii; State v. 
 Whitworth, 126 Mo. 573, 29 S. W. 
 595 ; State v. Fitzsimmons, 30 Mo. 
 236; State V. Davis, 48 Kan. i, 28 
 Pac. 1092; Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 
 204, 7 So. 38, 16 Am. St. 48; Kelly v. 
 People, 17 Colo. 130, 29 Pac. 805 ; 
 Nelson v. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 237; 
 Heath v. State, 7 Tex. App. 464; 
 Roberts v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 
 499, 22 S. W. 845, 15 Ky. L. 341; 
 People V. Sam Lung, 70 Cal. 515, 11 
 Pac. 673 ; Haines v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 
 167, 13 Pac. 8; Talley v. State, 2 Ga. 
 App. 395, 58 S. E. 667; Joseph v. 
 Commonwealth, 99 S. W. 311, 30 Ky. 
 L. 638; Conley v. State (Tex. Cr.), 
 
 116 S. W. 806; State V. Pell (Iowa), 
 119 N. W. 154. 
 
 "* See, generally, McGuff v. State, 
 88 Ala. 147, 7 So. 35, 16 Am. St. 25; 
 Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 204, 7 So. 
 38, 16 Am. St. 48; Commonwealth v. 
 Follansbee, 155 ]\Iass. 274, 29 N. E. 
 471 ; Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580, 
 52 N. W. 778; State v. Davis, 48 
 Kan. I, 28 Pac. 1092; People v. 
 Machen, loi Mich. 400, 59 N. W. 664; 
 Murphey v. State, 43 Neb. 34, 61 N. 
 W. 491. 
 
 '" People V. Burns, 67 Mich. 537, 35 
 N. W. 154. 
 
 As to exclusion of attorneys who 
 are also witnesses see Allen v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 9 S. W. 703, 10 Ky. 
 L. 582; Powell V. State, 13 Tex. App. 
 244; State V. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, i7 Atl. 
 483.
 
 413 EXAMIXATIOX OF WITNESSES. § 225 
 
 aminecl^^ and its action will not be reversible error unless serious 
 injustice is done the prisoner, as, for example, where he is de- 
 prived of the evidence of a material witness/" But this rule is 
 not universally recognized. It is manifestly unfair to deprive one 
 not at fault, of testimony on which he relies, and which may prove 
 him innocent of a heinous and often capital crime, merely be- 
 cause his witness, through carelessness, obstinacy or caprice, re- 
 fuses or neglects to obey the court. So when the defendant is 
 not to blame the witness cannot be prevented from testifying.^^ 
 
 If, however, the accused detains one of his witnesses in court 
 or by any sort of connivance encourages the witness to remain 
 in court after an order has been made to exclude the witnesses 
 for the accused it has been held not error for the court to refuse 
 to permit the witness to testify.^* 
 
 After witnesses not under examination have been ordered to 
 withdraw, the court may permit one or more of them to remain, 
 as circumstances may require. An exception must always be 
 made in the case of the accused, if he is a witness, because of his 
 constitutional right to be present and to confront the witnesses 
 against him."^ So an exception is always made in the case of 
 
 ^^ State V. Fitzsimmons, 30 Mo. 236; Cunningham v. State, 97 Ga. 214, 22 
 
 State V. Brookshire, 2 Ala. 303; Mc- S. E. 954; Bow v. People, 160 111. 
 
 Lean v. State, 16 Ala. 672; Kelly v. 438, 43 N. E. 593; State v. Jones, 47 
 
 People, 17 Colo. 130, 29 Pac. 805; La. Ann. 1524, 18 So. 515; Hellems 
 
 Trujillo V. Territory, 6 N. M. 589, 30 v. State, 22 Ark. 207; Taylor v. State, 
 
 Pac. 870; Hey v. Commonwealth, 32 130 Ind. 66, 29 N. E. 415; State v. 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 946, 34 Am. 799; Taylor Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17 Atl. 483; Grant 
 
 V. State, 131 Ga. 765, 63 S. E. 296; v. State, 89 Ga. 393, 15 S. E. 488; 
 
 State V. High, 122 La. 521, 47 So. Sartorious v. State, 24 Miss. 602; 
 
 878; State V. Pell (Iowa), 119 N. W. Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624; State 
 
 154; Fouse V. State, 83 Neb. 258, 119 v. King, 9 S. Dak. 628, 70 N. W. 1046; 
 
 N. W. 478. Ashwood v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 550, 40 
 
 "'Carlton v. Commonwealth (Ky), S. W. 273. The disobedient witness 
 18 S. W. 535, 13 Ky. L. 946; Cook v. may be punished for contempt. Las- 
 State, 30 Tex. App. 607, 18 S. W. 412 ; siter v. State, 67 Ga. 739. 
 Turner v. State (Tex.), 32 S. W. ^* Jackson v. State, 14 Ind. 327; 
 700. State V. Gesell, 124 Mo. 531, 27 S. W. 
 
 ""* Parker v. State, 67 I\Id. 329, 10 hot. 
 
 Atl. 219, I .Am. St. 387; State v. Lee ^ Boatmeyer v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 
 
 Doon, 7 Wash. 308, 34 Pac. 1103; 473, 20 S. W. 1102.
 
 126 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 414 
 
 counsel, or a sheriff,^*' or other officer of the coiirt,^' or a juror^* 
 who is also a witness.^" 
 
 The fact that a witness comes into and remains in court, in 
 ignorance of the rule, does not of necessity render him in con- 
 tempt or make his testimony incompetent. This was so held 
 where a witness for the prosecution through ignorance disobeyed 
 the rule."" 
 
 And in conclusion it may be said that the fact that witnesses, 
 whether for the state or for the accused, have been put under the 
 rule and excluded from the court-room, does not prevent the at- 
 torney who has called them from consulting with them."^ 
 
 §226. Refusal to testify.— If a witness refuses to attend,*- or, 
 if he attend and refuse to be sworn, '^^ or to answer a relevant 
 question without a satisfactory excuse,** or acts insolently or dis- 
 respectfully towards the court or the grand jury,*^ he is guilty 
 of a contempt. 
 
 The power to punish a contumacious witness for refusing to 
 testify is limited to courts of record and to legislative bodies, in 
 the absence of any statute conferring it on other officials whose 
 
 ^* Askew V. State, 3 Ga. App. 79, 59 
 S. E. 311; Webb v. State, 100 Ala. 
 47, 14 So. 865. 
 
 "Kelly V. People, 17 Colo. 130, 29 
 Pac. 80s; State v. Hopkins, 50 Vt. 
 316; Green v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 645, 
 98 S. W. 1059 ; People v. Nunley, 142 
 Cal. 441, 76 Pac. 45 ; Jackson v. State, 
 55 Tex. Cr. 79, 115 S. W. 262; Smith 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 80, 105 S. W. 
 501; State V. Pell (Iowa), 119 N. W. 
 154. See People v. McGarry, 136 
 Mich. 316, 99 N. W. 147, II Det. Leg. 
 N. ID. 
 
 ^ State V. Vari, 35 S. Car. 175, 14 
 S. E. 392, and see Underbill on Ev., 
 p. 468, n. 4. 
 
 ^*The court will not prohibit ex- 
 cluded witnesses from reading news- 
 papers containing accounts of the 
 trial. Commonwealth v. Hersey, 2 
 Allen (Mass.) 173. 
 
 *" State V. Watson, t,^ La. Ann. 148; 
 Cook V. State, 30 Tex. App. 607, 18 S. 
 W. 412. 
 
 "Bryan v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 33 S. W. 95, 17 Ky. L. 965; Allen v. 
 State, 61 Miss. 627; Williams v. State, 
 35 Tex. 355; Jones v. State, 3 Tex. 
 App. 150; Brown v. State, 3 Tex. 
 App. 294. 
 
 ^ Burr's Trial, 354 ; Langdon, Ex 
 parte, 25 Vt. 680; Ellerbe, In re, 13 
 Fed. Rep. 530; Judson, Ex parte, 3 
 Blatchf. C. C. 89. An attachment will 
 not issue to compel an expert witness 
 or an interpreter to attend. Roelker, 
 In re, Sprague Dec. 276. 
 
 " Stice, Ex parte, 70 Cal. 51, 11 Pac. 
 
 459- 
 
 "United States v. Coolidge, 2 Gall. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 364, 25 Fed. Cas. 14858. 
 
 "United States v. Caton, i Cranch 
 C. C. 150.
 
 415 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 227 
 
 duty it may be to interrogate witnesses/" A court may punish 
 as a contempt the refusal of a witness to testify before a com- 
 missioner appointed by it to take depositions,*" or before the 
 grand jury over which it exercises control,** and it may do so 
 often as the witness refuses.*^ When the w^itness has the statu- 
 tory right to answer pertinent questions only, he cannot be com- 
 mitted for contempt if he refuses to answer those which are not 
 pertinent/** If the court has not obtained jurisdiction, a witness 
 who refuses to testify is not in contempt/^ 
 
 § 227. Interpreting the language of the witness. — The employ- 
 ment of an interpreter when the witness is unable to speak or to 
 understand the English language, ^^ and the manner in which the 
 examination through the interpreter shall be conducted, ^^ are 
 discretionary with the court when not expressly regulated by 
 statute. But, where a party in a civil trial was deprived of the 
 testimony of a material witness (and a fortiori this rule would 
 seem applicable where one is accused of crime), by the refusal 
 of the court to accept an interpreter who was offered, a new trial 
 was granted.^* 
 
 '"People V. Rice, 57 Hun (X. Y.) 
 62, 10 N. Y. S. 270, 32 N. Y. St. 7; 
 White V. Morgan & Co., 119 Ind. 338, 
 21 X. E. 968; Llewellyn's Case, 13 Pa. 
 Co. Ct. 126; Woodworth, Ex parte, 
 29 W. L. Bui. 315, and cases in Un- 
 derbill on Ev., p. 468. 
 
 "Robb's Petition, 11 Pa. Co. Ct. 
 442. "A justice of the peace, though 
 he cannot commit a witness for con- 
 tempt, may bind a party refusing to 
 testify to answer an indictment for 
 obstructing justice." Albright v. 
 Lapp, 26 Pa. St. 99. 
 
 " United States v. Caton, i Cranch 
 C. C. 150; Harris, Ex parte, 4 Utah 
 5, 5 Pac. 129; People v. Fancher, 2 
 Hun 226; People v. Kelly, 24 X. Y. 
 "4; Stice, Ex parte, 70 Cal. 51, 11 Pac. 
 45Q- 
 
 "Stice, Ex parte, 70 Cal. 51, 11 
 Pac. 459. 
 
 ^^ Zeehandelaar, Ex parte, 71 Cal. 
 238, 12 Pac. 259. 
 
 ^^ People V. Warner, 51 Hun 53, 3 
 X^. Y. S. 768. A publisher of a news- 
 paper who refuses to testif\' or give 
 the real name of the author of a 
 libelous article may be punished for 
 contempt, though he himself is under 
 indictment for the libel. Pledger v. 
 State, 77 Ga. 242, 3 S. E. 320. 
 
 ^- Horn V. State, 98 Ala. 23, 13 So. 
 329; State V. Severson, 78 Iowa 653, 
 43 X. W. 533 ; Livar v. State, 26 Tex. 
 App. 115, 9 S. W. 552; Thomason v. 
 Territory, 4 N. Mex. 150, 13 Pac. 222. 
 
 °' Skaggs V. State, 108 Lid. 53, 8 N. 
 E. 695. See People v. Salas, 2 Cal. 
 App. 537; 84 Pac. 295, where under 
 Code § 1884 the court had the right 
 to appoint a resident of tlic county 
 as an interpreter. 
 
 "Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Shenk, 131
 
 S 221 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 416 
 
 A witness may act as interpreter.-'^^" But ever}^ non-official in- 
 terpreter should be sworn to interpret truly.'"'" The accuracy of 
 the interpretation is a question for the jury,'"'" and either side may 
 impeach its accuracy by cross-examining the interpreter, or by 
 producing- another claimed to be more accurate.^^ 
 
 § 228. Improper reception of evidence by the jurors. — For the 
 jury in a criminal trial to seek or to receive evidence out of court 
 is in the highest degree improper. Such action prejudicing the 
 accused will, if the verdict might have been influenced thereby, 
 be ground for a new trial. 
 
 Jurors will not be permitted to experiment, ^^ or take a private 
 and unauthorized view, or to communicate with other persons. 
 
 111. 283, 23 N. E. 436. Cf. People v. 
 Constantino, 153 N. Y. 24, 47 N. E. 
 
 27- 
 
 '"'^ One of several witnesses sum- 
 moned before the grand jury may act 
 as an interpreter for the others. Peo- 
 ple V. Ramirez, 56 Cal. 533, 38 Am. 
 73. A juror may, with the defendant's 
 consent, act as interpreter. People v. 
 Thiede, 11 Utah 241, 39 Pac. 837; 
 Thiede v. Utah Territory, 159 U. S. 
 510, 40 L. ed. 237, 16 Sup. Ct. 62; 
 Chicago &c. Co. v. Shenk, 131 111. 283, 
 23 X. E. 436. 
 
 °" People V. Dowdigan, 67 Mich. 95, 
 38 N. W. 920. Cf. United States v. 
 Gibert, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 19. The fact 
 that the interpreter is assisted by one 
 or more bystanders who are unsworn, 
 and when he is doubtful uses their 
 knowledge as an aid to his own judg- 
 ment, rendering his own version 
 finally to the court, is not error. 
 United States v. Gibert, 2 Sumn. (U. 
 S.) 19. 
 
 " Schnier v. People, 23 111. il. 
 
 '^'Skaggs V. State, 108 Ind. 53, 8 
 X. E. 695. The fact that evidence in 
 a criminal trial is received through an 
 interpreter does not render it hearsay. 
 State V. Hamilton, 42 La. Ann. 1204, 
 
 8 So. 304; X^ioum v. Commonwealth, 
 128 Ky. 685, 108 S. W. 945, 23 Ky. L. 
 62. Though the appointment of an 
 interpreter is usually discretionary in 
 the absence of statute one is almost 
 always appointed if the necessity is at 
 all apparent. Usually it is the ac- 
 cused who needs the interpreter and 
 if he has any difficulty in understand- 
 ing English an interpreter ought to 
 be appointed in justice to him. The 
 fact that he understands or speaks 
 the English language to a limited ex- 
 tent ought not to deprive him of the 
 services of an interpreter if necessary 
 to enable him to make his defense. 
 
 "^ Yates V. People, 38 111. 527 ; Fore- 
 hand v. State, 51 Ark. 553, 11 S. W. 
 766; People V. Conkling, in Cal. 616, 
 44 Pac. 314; State v. Sanders, 68 
 Mo. 202, 30 Am. 782. Where the 
 question was, could the prisoner's 
 voice have been heard on a certain 
 occasion, the experiment of stationing 
 a man outside the jury-room, who 
 was to listen and report if he could 
 hear the voices of the jurors through 
 a closed door, was held ground for a 
 new trial. Jim v. State, 4 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 289.
 
 417 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 228 
 
 and particularly with witnesses."" But communications by jurors 
 with outsiders may be disregarded if it clearly appears that no 
 injustice has resulted to the accused.*'^ 
 
 Neither party to a criminal trial has the right to submit docu- 
 mentary or other evidence to the jury except during the trial and 
 in the presence of the court. The reception of evidence out of 
 court may cause a conviction to be reversed. And with much 
 better reason, writings which are no part of the evidence, such as 
 newspapers,*^- maps or diagrams,''^ scientific books,*'* or legal pub- 
 lications,*''^ are not permitted to be perused by the jury.*'® The 
 jurors may, when out of court, consult memoranda or notes of 
 the judge's charge,*'^ and all papers which are in evidence,*'^ in- 
 
 cluding the indictment.**® 
 
 ""Epps V. State, 19 Ga. 102; State 
 V. Fruge, 28 La. Ann. 657; March v. 
 State, 44 Tex. 64; Collier v. State, 
 20 Ark. 2)^. If a juror has knowledge 
 of the facts or of the character of a 
 witness, he should be called as a wit- 
 ness. Where the verdict is based upon 
 or influenced by statements of facts 
 known to the juror made in the jury- 
 room, which would be relevant evi- 
 dence if he were a witness, a new 
 trial will be granted. Taylor v. State, 
 52 Miss. 84; Anschicks v. State, 6 
 Tex. App. 524 ; McKissick v. State, 26 
 Tex. App. 673, 9 S. W. 269; Lucas v. 
 State, 27 Tex. App. 2^2, ir S. W. 443. 
 
 " People v. Boggs, 20 Cal. 432 ; 
 Epps V. State, 19 Ga. 102. 
 
 "* State V. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713, 
 43 Am. 799. 
 
 •"State V. Hartmann, 46 Wis. 248, 
 250, 50 N. W. 193; State v. Lantz, 23 
 Kan. 728, Z3 Am. 215. 
 
 ** State V. Gillick, 10 Iowa 98. 
 
 "'Phillips V. State (Tex., 1896), 34 
 S- W. 539; State v. Wilson, 40 La. 
 Ann. 751, 5 So. 52, i L. R. A. 795; 
 State v. Smith, 6 R. I. 33; Bernhardt 
 V. State, 82 Wis. 22,, 51 N. W. 1009; 
 Harris v. State, 24 Neb. 803, 40 N. 
 W. 317; State V. Hopper, 71 Mo. 425; 
 27 — Under HILL Crim. Ev. 
 
 Johnson v. State, 27 Fla. 245, 9 So. 
 208; State V. Gillick, 10 Iowa 98. 
 
 ^'^ See Underbill on Ev., p. 490, cit- 
 ing cases. The mere presence of law 
 books, etc., in the jury-room is not 
 enough, if the jury did not read them. 
 State V. Harris, 34 La. Ann. 118; 
 State V. Tanner, 38 La. Ann. 307. 
 This must be shown. It will not be 
 presumed. Jones v. State, 89 Ind. 82. 
 Cf. Mulreed v. State, 107 Ind. 62, 7 
 N. E. 884. 
 
 " State V. Thompson, 83 Mo. 257, 
 261 ; Hurley v. State, 29 Ark. 17. 
 
 "* People V. Formosa, 61 Hun 272, 
 
 16 N. Y. S. 753; Masterson v. State, 
 144 Ind. 240, 43 N. E. 138; United 
 States V. Wilson, 69 Fed. 584; State 
 V. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 24 S. E. 
 561 ; State v. Raymond, 53 N. J. L. 
 260, 21 Atl. 328; Baker v. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.), 17 S. W. 625, 13 Ky. 
 L. 571 ; State v. Tompkins, 71 Mo. 
 613; People V. Cochran, 61 Cal. 548; 
 Cargill V. Commonwealth, 93 Ky. 578, 
 20 S. W. 782, 14 Ky. L. 517. Deposi- 
 tions, however, may be excluded. 
 State V. Carr, 20 W. Va. 679; State 
 V. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 24 S. E. 
 561; Baker v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 17 S. W. 625. 
 
 •"• Stout v. State, 90 Ind. i.
 
 § 229 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 418 
 
 The impropriety and unfairness of permitting jurors to take 
 m the jury-room articles of personal property which have been 
 used to explain the evidence, and from which they may draw, in 
 the absence of judge, counsel and accused, erroneous and unjust 
 inferences will be admitted. Hence, by the majority of the cases 
 it is held that for the jury to take into the jury-room a weapon, 
 alleged to have been employed by the accused, is reversible error.'" 
 There are cases, however, which hold the contrary, and if the ac- 
 cused consent, it seems that articles, as clothing, not in evidence, 
 may be taken by the jury to aid them in their deliberations.^^ 
 
 § 229. View by the jurors — Discretionary power of the court. — 
 
 The court is sometimes permitted by statute to direct the jury 
 trying a criminal to be taken in a body, in charge of proper of- 
 ficers, to the place where the crime was committed, or where a 
 material fact or transaction occurred, or they may be taken out 
 of court to view some bulky article of personal property, as a 
 wagon, which cannot be brought into the court-room. The exer- 
 cise of the statutory power is usually altogether discretionary,^' 
 and a refusal to grant a view is not error unless it clearly appear 
 that it was necessary and practicable, and that the denial of the 
 request substantially injured the accused. 
 
 A view cannot, however, be ordered by the court in the ab- 
 sence of statute without the consent of all parties.'^ Sometimes 
 
 ""Forehand v. State, 51 Ark. 553, 311; People v. Bonne}-, 19 Cal. 426; 
 II S. W. "/(£; Yates v. People, 38 Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328; Chute 
 111. 527; Forehand v. State, 51 Ark. v. State, 19 Minn. 271. See also, Un- 
 553, 1 1 S. W. 766 ; People v. Thorn- derhill on Ev., § 344 ; State v. Hunter, 
 ton, 74 Cal. 482, 16 Pac. 244; English 18 Wash. 670, 52 Pac. 247. 
 V. State, 31 Fla. 340, 12 So. 689; Mc- "State v. Bertin, 24 La. Ann. 46; 
 Coy V. State, 78 Ga. 490, 3 S. E. 768; Bostock v. State, 61 Ga. 635; Corn- 
 compare contra, State v. Stebbins, 29 monwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 
 Conn. 463, 79 Am. Dec. 223; Powell 496, 20 Am. Dec. 491. In Smith v. 
 V. State, 61 Miss. 319; Jack v. Wash- State, 42 Tex. 444, it was held that a 
 ington Territory', 2 Wash. Ter. loi, 3 view cannot, in the absence of a 
 Pac. 832. statute, be ordered on the request of 
 
 " People V. Mahoney, TJ Cal. 529, the state, even if the accused con- 
 
 20 Pac. TZ- sents, as it will be presumed he con- 
 
 '" Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 sented because he did not wish to 
 
 Cush. (^lass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 7 1 in; show a lack of confidence in the 
 
 People V. Hawley, in Cal. 78, 43 jury's powers of observation. 
 Pac. 404; State v. Adams, 20 Kan.
 
 419 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. § 23O 
 
 the statutory power may be exercised sua spontc. Usually the 
 view can be directed only on request or with the consent of all 
 parties. Whether in any case a request or consent is necessary 
 depends upon the express terms of the statutes, which should be 
 consulted.'* 
 
 § 230. Purpose of the view is to afford evidence. — The authorities 
 are divided upon the question whether the purpose of taking the 
 view is to furnish new evidence or to enable the jurors to com- 
 prehend more clearly in the light of fuller knowledge, and by the 
 aid of visible objects, the evidence received in court. The latter 
 proposition is well supported,'" and seems more consistent with 
 the conservative theories on which the rules of evidence and pro- 
 cedure in jury trials are based.^*' But the contrary opinion that 
 the purpose of the view is to supply evidence is also held and sup- 
 ported by the majority of the cases."^ Indeed, where the evi- 
 dence regarding the locus in quo is at all contradictory, it is a 
 mental impossibility for the jury to view it without receiving 
 some knowledge through their eyes which, so far as it modifies 
 the facts proved, or reconciles conflicting evidence, is itself evi- 
 dence. '^^ 
 
 § 231. The right of the accused to be present during the taking 
 of the view. — From this diversity of opinion it follows that the 
 right of the accused to be present at the view is not settled. If 
 the purpose of the view is to obtain evidence the view is a part 
 
 '* Conrad v. State, 144 Ind. 290, 43 them, and not to make them silent wit- 
 
 N. E. 221. nesses in the case, burdened with tes- 
 
 '° Shular v. State, 105 Ind. 289, 4 timony unknown to both parties, and 
 
 N. E. 870, 55 Am. 211 ; Sasse v. State, in respect to which no opportunity for 
 
 68 Wis. 530, 32 N. W. 849; State v. cross-examination or correction of 
 
 Adams, 20 Kan. 311; O'Berry v. error, if any, could be afforded either 
 
 State, 47 Fla. 75, 36 So. 440. party. See cases cited in note i, p. 
 
 '" In Close V. Samm, 27 Iowa 503, 282, and civil cases Underbill on Ev., 
 
 it is said: The purpose is to enable p. 491. 
 
 the jury, by the view of the premises "State v. Bertin, 24 La. Ann. 46; 
 
 or place, to better understand and Smith v. State, 42 Tex. 444; Benton 
 
 comprehend the testimony of the wit- v. State, 30 Ark. 328. See cases cited 
 
 nesses respecting the same and there- in note. 
 
 by the more intelligently to apply the " People v. Bush, 68 Cal. 623, 10 
 
 testimony to the issues on trial before Pac. 169.
 
 8 231 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 420 
 
 of the trial and the presence of the accused is indispensable, even 
 where the statute is silent, as he has a constitutional right to con- 
 front the witnesses, to hear the evidence and to observe the actions 
 of the jury.'" While if the view does not furnish evidence his pres- 
 ence, while allowable, is not indispensable,**" for it is then held 
 that taking- the view is no part of the trial, but rather a part of the 
 jury's deliberation, during which the accused has no right to be 
 present. The accused cannot be compelled to be present, at least 
 in those states where the view^ is not regarded as furnishing evi- 
 dence. He may either expressly, or by laches in claiming his 
 right, waive the right to be present.**^ 
 
 A view may be had after the summing up,^" but no oral evi- 
 dence should be brought before the jury, nor should they be 
 separated while it is taken. ^^ The duty of the showers of the 
 view, who are usually officers sworn for the purpose, though a 
 watness,^* or a juror who is familiar with the scene, may serve, **^ 
 is only to point out the place.^*^ It is always the safer and better 
 course for the presiding judge to be present at the view.*^ His 
 absence has, in one instance at least, been held reversible error.^^ 
 
 " Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328; Peo- 
 ple V. Bush, 71 Cal. 602, 12 Pac. 781, 
 68 Cal. 623, 634, 10 Pac. 169; People 
 V. Palmer, 43 Hun 397, 109 N. Y. 413, 
 17 N. E. 213; Rutherford v. Com- 
 monwealth, 78 Ky. 639; State v. 
 Congdon, 14 R. I. 267; State v. San- 
 ders, 68 Mo. 202, 30 Am. 782; East- 
 wood V. People, 3 Park. Cr. Rep. 
 25 ; Sasse v. State, 68 Wis. 530, 32 N. 
 W. 849; Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 31; 
 Foster v. State, 70 Miss. 755, 12 So. 
 822; Conrad v. State, 144 Ind. 290, 43 
 N. E. 221. Contra, under statute 
 Shular v. State, 105 Ind. 289, 4 N. E. 
 870, 55 Am. 211. A person accused 
 of crime is deprived of his right of 
 appearing in person and of being con- 
 fronted by the witnesses if the jury 
 view the locus in quo without his 
 presence. People v. Lowrey, 70 Cal. 
 193, II Pac. 605. 
 
 '" Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 
 
 (Mass.) 496, 20 Am. Dec. 491; Peo- 
 ple V. Bonney, 19 Cal. 426; State v. 
 Ah Lee, 8 Ore. 214; State v. Lee 
 Doon, 7 Wash. 308, 34 Pac. 1103; 
 State v. Adams, 20 Kan. 311. 
 
 *^ State V. Reed, 3 Idaho 754, 35 
 Pac. 706; State v. Moran, 15 Ore. 
 262, 14 Pac. 419 ; Sasse v. State, 68 
 Wis. 530, 32 N. W. 849. 
 
 ^■Patchin v. Brooklyn, 2 Wend. (N. 
 Y.) 377- 
 
 ** People v. Hull, 86 Mich. 449, 49 
 N. W. 288 ; State v. Landry, 29 Mont. 
 218, 74 Pac. 418. 
 
 ^ People V. Bush, 71 Cal. 602, 12 
 Pac. 871. 
 
 *^ State V. Adams, 20 Kan. 311. 
 
 ^° State V. Lopez, 15 Nev. 407; Hay- 
 ward V. Knapp, 22 Minn. 5. 
 
 "Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328. 
 
 ^^ People v. Yut Ling, 74 Cal. 569. 
 16 Pac. 489. A view may be granted 
 though the place does not lie in the
 
 421 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. § 232 
 
 § 232. Presence of the accused while taking testimony. — In order 
 that a verdict of guilty of a felony shall stand, it is absolutely 
 necessary that the examination of witnesses shall take place only 
 during the actual presence of the accused in the court-room.** 
 He must be present when the witness is sworn,^'* and an error in 
 receiving evidence in his absence is not cured by the repetition 
 of the questions and answers on his return. 
 
 Whether the prisoner was prejudiced by the testimony given 
 in his absence is immaterial. Though the court has excluded 
 the evidence which he did not hear, or has caused it to be re- 
 peated in his presence, still he has been deprived of his right to 
 see the witness, and to watch and to observe his every look, ges- 
 ture and motion. The court must see that the prisoner is present, 
 and must allow nothing to be done in his absence. As soon as 
 his absence is noticed, the trial should be suspended or ad- 
 journed.®^ 
 
 But this rule, while designed to secure him in his constitutional 
 right to confront the witnesses, should not be invoked to delay 
 the trial. He may not indulge in disorderly actions or noisy and 
 outrageous behavior, and shelter himself behind his privilege. 
 No step which is original in character can be taken in the pris- 
 oner's absence. But after the evidence is in, and the jury has been 
 instructed and has retired, the stenographer may read the evi- 
 dence to the jury from his notes in the prisoner's absence. This 
 is merely a repetition of what has already been said in his pres- 
 ence. **' 
 
 county where the case is on trial. 196, 5 So. 385 ; State v. Greer, 22 W. 
 
 People V. Bush, 71 Cal. 602, 12 Pac. Va. 800. Where the accused is by 
 
 781. mistake taken from the court room 
 
 *" Jackson v. Commonweahh, ig while the competency of a witness is 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 656; State v. Moran, 46 under discussion an error is made. 
 
 Kan. 318, 26 Pac. 754; Adams v. The accused has a right to hear the 
 
 State, 28 Fla. 511, 10 So. 106; State argument on the admissibility of evi- 
 
 V. David, 14 S. Car. 428. dence as well as the evidence itself, 
 
 ■^^ Bearden v. State, 44 Ark. 331; and the fact that the court directs it 
 
 Simpson v. State, 31 Ind. 90 (a child to be gone over cannot place him in 
 
 witness) ; People v. McNair, 21 the position of having heard what 
 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 608. was said in his absence. Adams v. 
 
 "'Richards v. State, g^ Tenn. 723, State, 28 Fla. 511, 10 So. 106. 
 20 S. W. 533, 30 Am. St. 907 ; People °" State v. Haines, 36 S. Car. 504, 
 
 v. Kohler, 5 Cal. 72; Rolls v. State, 52 15 S. E. 555. 
 Miss. 391 ; Garman v. State, 66 Miss.
 
 § 233 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 422 
 
 The record must show that the prisoner was in court during 
 the trial, though it need not show his presence was continuous 
 and uninterrupted. If the record shows he was in court when 
 the trial began, his continuous presence during the taking of testi- 
 mony will be presumed in the absence of evidence to the con- 
 trary.''^ 
 
 § 233. Experiments in and out of court. — A non-expert witness 
 will not be permitted to testify to the results of experiments made 
 out of court."* But, if the conditions and circumstances existing 
 or alleged to exist in the case, and surrounding the subject-mat- 
 ter, are reproduced for the experiment, a witness who is an ex- 
 pert may accompany his statement of opinion with a statement of 
 the result of an experiment out of court."° 
 
 So, in a murder trial, the state may prove the result observed 
 after shooting a- bullet through material identical with the cloth- 
 ing worn by the deceased, the same weapon being employed.'"' 
 
 °^ Brown v. State, 29 Fla. 543, 10 
 So. 736; Sylvester v. State, 71 Ala. 
 17; Simpson v. State, 56 Miss. 297. 
 One accused of misdemeanor may in 
 the court's discretion be tried in his 
 absence. Sharp v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 30 S. W. 414, 16 Ky. L. 840; 
 State V. Lucker, 40 S. Car. 549, 18 
 S. E. 797. 
 
 °* State V. Justus, 11 Ore. 178, 8 Pac. 
 2,27, SO Am. 470; Smith v. State, 46 
 Tex. Cr. 267, 81 S. W. 936, 108 Am. 
 St. 991. 
 
 ®^ Commonwealth v. Piper, 120 
 Mass. 185; Boyd v. State, 14 Lea 
 (Tenn.) 161; State v. Jones, 41 Kan. 
 309, 21 Pac. 265 ; Underbill on Ev., 
 p. 296. Where the question is, were 
 the fatal wounds found upon the skull 
 of the deceased caused by a blow 
 from a poker which is in evidence, 
 the defendant cannot prove the re- 
 sults of an experiment with a differ- 
 ent poker on the skull of a dead body. 
 The different motives with which the 
 actual criminal and the experimenting 
 
 witness must have handled the wea- 
 pons must be considered. Common- 
 wealth v. Twitchell, i Brewst. (Pa.) 
 551. See also Lillie v. State, 72 Neb. 
 228, 100 N. W. 316; State v. Nowells, 
 13s Iowa 53, 109 N. W. 1016; State 
 V. Bean, yj Vt. 384, 60 Atl. 807. Com- 
 prehensive notes on experiments as 
 evidence, see 53 Am. St. 375, 14 L. R. 
 A. 221 ; discretion of court in admit- 
 ting or rejecting evidence of experi- 
 ments, 53 Am. St. 384. 
 
 "" Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 93 
 Pa. St. 284; Commonwealth v. Sulli- 
 van, 13 Phil. 410. Cf. Evans v. State, 
 109 Ala. II, 19 So. 535. On a trial for 
 poisoning a horse a witness was per- 
 mitted to state that, after the horse 
 died, he gave some of the contents of 
 its stomach to a hen, which died at 
 once. State v. Isaacson, 8 S. Dak. 69, 
 65 N. W. 430. An experiment, other- 
 wise admissible, is not to be excluded 
 because the defendant was not pres- 
 ent when it was made. Moore v. 
 State, 96 Tenn. 209, 33 S. W. 1046.
 
 423 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES. 
 
 ^?>2> 
 
 An expert may be allowed to conduct an experiment in court to 
 illustrate or emphasize his testimony, if it appears independently 
 that the exact conditions alleged to have existed are reproduced 
 before the jury.^^ 
 
 If the conditions under which the experiment is made out of 
 court do not correspond with those existing at the time of the 
 crime, evidence derived from the experiment must be rejected. 
 So where the point at issue was whether the witnesses had seen 
 a certain occurrence in a field, the evidence of a witness who 
 several months later went to the field and looked about and who 
 testified that the view was obstructed by trees and bushes so that 
 he could not see the field, will not be received. ®® 
 
 And articles with which experiments have been made are not 
 admissible in evidence unless they are similar in character to the 
 articles proved to have been connected with the commission of 
 the crime. "'^ But the reproduction in the experiments of the con- 
 ditions and circumstances existing, or alleged to have existed in 
 the case, need not be exact in all particulars if the material cir- 
 cumstances and conditions are reproduced. So, where an ex- 
 
 " State V. Smith, 49 Conn. 376 ; Si- 
 berry V. State, 133 Ind. 677, 2,2, N. E. 
 681 ; State v. Fletcher, 24 Ore. 295, :^^ 
 Pac. 575 ; People v. Hope, 62 Cal. 
 291 ; Hisler v. State, 52 Fla. 30, 42 
 So. 692; People V. Solani, 6 Cal. App. 
 103, 91 Pac. 654; State v. Ronk, 91 
 Minn. 419, 98 N. W. 334; Spires v. 
 State, 50 Fla. 121, 39 So. 181. In case 
 the experiment will consume some 
 time it is not an abuse of judicial dis- 
 cretion for the court to refuse to per- 
 mit an experiment to be made in open 
 court. People v. Levine, 85 Cal. 39, 
 22 Pac. 969, 24 Pac. 631. The matter 
 is largely in the judicial discretion. 
 Polin V. State, 14 Neb. 540, 16 N. W. 
 898. In the very recent case of the 
 People V. Luetgert, the trial of which 
 in the city of Chicago, 111., has just 
 terminated in a disagreement of the 
 jury, the relevancy and propriety of 
 evidence of experiments conducted 
 
 out of court received much attention. 
 The prosecution alleged that the pris- 
 oner, after killing his wife, immersed 
 her body for a lengthy period in a 
 chemical preparation contained in a 
 vat located in a factory of which he 
 was the proprietor, the effect of which 
 was to dissolve and disintegrate it to 
 such an extent that only a few small 
 pieces of bone were subsequently 
 found intact. The accused was per- 
 mitted to offer in evidence the results 
 of an experiment made by immersing 
 the body of a woman in a chemical 
 preparation admitted to be the same 
 as that alleged to have been used by 
 the accused. 
 
 "^ Sherrill v. State, 138 Ala. 3, 35 
 So. 129. Note on experiments before 
 jury during view, 42 L. R. A. 384. 
 
 "^ Hisler v. State, 52 Fla. 30, 42 So. 
 692.
 
 § 233 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 424 
 
 periment was made by firing bullets from a pistol which was 
 found at the scene of the crime, the bullets thus fired might be 
 offered in evidence in comparison with the bullets extracted from 
 the body of the person whom the accused was alleged to have 
 killed, though the pistol which was used had been cleaned after its 
 discovery at the scene of the crime/**" 
 
 Evidence procured by means of experiments is usually offered 
 in homicide upon the question of the manner in which the fatal 
 shot was fired or wound inflicted and particularly as to the near- 
 ness of the weapon to the body of the deceased. A witness, 
 whether an expert or a non-expert, may testify that, having meas- 
 ured the powder marks surrounding a gunshot wound which 
 cause death he experimented with the pistol alleged to have been 
 used by the deceased, or with a weapon of similar caliber, by dis- 
 charging it at an object substantially similar in character to the 
 skin or flesh of the human body. He may then testify to the ex- 
 tent and character of the bullet hole and powder marks which re- 
 sulted from his experiment, and may compare them with the 
 condition of the body of the deceased. If an expert, he may give 
 his opinion in connection with evidence of the experiment as to 
 how near the weapon was to the deceased when it was dis- 
 charged.^ 
 
 One who was present at the time and place of the crime may 
 be able to describe what took place, without being able to give 
 in detail everything that he could have seen there. This consti- 
 tutes no valid objection to the competency of his evidence, though 
 it may be considered in determining his credibility. If it be- 
 comes material to identify certain objects at the scene of the 
 crime, a witness may be permitted to revisit it in charge of an 
 ofiicer of the court and, thus having refreshed his memory, by 
 going over the ground, he may describe the objects which he saw. 
 Of course, this is proper only where it is proved that the condi- 
 tion of the scene of the crime has not been materially changed 
 since the crime.^ 
 
 '■^ People V. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 86 1063, 105 Am. St. 864 ; State v. Mel- 
 Pac. 671. vern, 32 Wash. 7, ^2 Pac. 489. 
 
 ^ State V. Nagle, 25 R. I. 105, 54 Atl. = State v. DeHart, 38 Mont. 211, 99 
 
 Pac. 438.
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 THE IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 ! 234. Impeachment of witnesses — 
 General rule. 
 
 235. The impeachment of necessary 
 witnesses and those unex- 
 pectedly hostile. 
 
 2.2,6. Impeachment of adverse wit- 
 nesses by showing bad repu- 
 tation for veracity — Belief 
 under oath. 
 
 237. Impeachment by showing the 
 
 general bad character of the 
 witness aside from truthful- 
 ness. 
 
 238. Impeachment of the adverse 
 
 witness by showing contra- 
 dictory statements — Neces- 
 sity for foundation. 
 
 239. Impeachment by contradictory 
 
 affidavits, depositions and 
 other writings. 
 
 240. Contradictory writings must be 
 
 shown to the witness who is 
 to be impeached. 
 
 241. Contradiction of irrelevant 
 ' matters not permissible — 
 
 Proof of confirmatory state- 
 ments. 
 
 242. Previous silence as impeach- 
 
 ment. 
 
 243. Relevancy of evidence to show 
 
 the general reputation for 
 truthfulness of a witness 
 who has been impeached. 
 
 244. Limitations upon the right to 
 
 ask questions w'hich disgrace 
 the witness. 
 
 245. Impeachment by showing so- 
 
 cial connections, occupation 
 and manner of living. 
 
 246. When and how previous im- 
 
 prisonment or conviction of 
 crime may be shown. 
 
 247. Incriminating questions. 
 
 248. Interest and bias of the Avit- 
 
 ness as impeachment. 
 
 § 234. Impeachment of witnesses — General rule. — A party in 
 whose behalf a witness is called to testify will not, as a general 
 rule (to which, however, there are some exceptions), be per- 
 mitted to impeach the veracity or credibility of the witness. 
 
 The law presumes that he is acquainted with the character of 
 his own witness, and knows before he calls him whether he is a 
 truthful man or the reverse. So, too, the party must or ought to 
 be thoroughly aware whether or no his witness has any knowl- 
 edge of the facts in issue, and if he calls him to prove any par- 
 ticular fact he is concluded by his testimony and cannot contra- 
 
 425
 
 § 235 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 426 
 
 diet him as to that fact. Hence, applying this rule to criminal 
 prosecutions, it cannot be presumed that the state's attorney, in 
 the performance of his duty to secure the punishment of crimi- 
 nals, will stoop to offer untruthful testimony for that purpose. 
 Nor can we with justice suppose that the accused, whom the law 
 presumes innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable 
 doubt, contemplates or intends the willful introduction of per- 
 jured testimony. Hence, the mere calling of a witness by either 
 side is, in law, an implied representation that the witness is 
 worth}^ of belief. 
 
 The rule, as thus stated, is applicable to exclude direct impeach- 
 ment alone. That is, the party cannot show that the reputation 
 of his own witness for veracity is bad, nor prove that he made 
 contradictory statements out of court, nor contradict him, solely 
 for the purpose of impeachment. The party may be compelled 
 by the exigencies of the case to impeach his witness incidentally 
 and indirectly. He may have to do this or lose the opportunity 
 of proving relevant facts which are vitally important in their 
 bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the accused. The law 
 does not forbid the proof of any relevant fact which may have a 
 tendency to show the truth merely because the proof of that fact 
 indirecth', though positively, contradicts, and thus, of necessity, 
 discredits and impeaches the testimony of some other witness to 
 that or some other relevant fact.^ Nor is it material that the 
 result of such an incidental conflict of evidence is to show that 
 one or the other of the witnesses is totally unworthy of credit. 
 
 § 235. The impeachment of necessary witnesses and those unex- 
 pectedly hostile. — If either party is, by law, under the circum- 
 stances of the case, compelled to call a particular person to prove 
 any fact, the party calling him cannot be said to vouch for this 
 witness that the law forces upon him. Accordingly, a party who 
 is compelled to prove the execution of a writing by producing 
 the subscribing witnesses under a statute requiring this proof is 
 
 ^United States v. Watkins, 3 Ga. 754, 13 S. E. 87; Reyes v. State, 
 
 Cranch C. C 441, 28 Fed. Cas. 16649; 48 Tex. Cr. 346, 88 S. W. 245. For 
 
 Chism V. State, 70 Miss. 742, 12 So. a discussion of the double meaning 
 
 852; State V. Cummins, 76 Iowa 133, of the word "impeach," see Under- 
 
 40 N. \V. 124; Dixon v. State, 86 hill on Evidence, p. 500, § 347.
 
 427 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. § 235 
 
 not concluded by the answers of such witnesses. If the subscrib- 
 ing witnesses deny their signatures or their presence at the exe- 
 cution, the party who cahed them may directly contradict them 
 by other witnesses, or their reputation for veracity may be im- 
 peached." Another exception to the rule forbidding a party to 
 contradict his own witness occurs where the witness is treacher- 
 ous and proves unexpectedly hostile in his testimony upon the 
 stand. In such circumstances it would be most unfair to the ac- 
 cused, if the witness has been called in his behalf, to permit him 
 to be convicted merely because a witness on whom he has de- 
 pended for exculpation has betrayed him at a critical moment in 
 his defense. The witness may have been, or may be when he 
 testifies, in the secret employment or under the control of a prose- 
 cuting attorney who may have permitted professional zeal to 
 overcome his sense of justice and right, or he may be a secret 
 enemy of the prisoner, desirous of revenging himself in this un- 
 derhand manner. On the other hand, the consciousness existing 
 in the mind of the accused that he is guilty may, and no doubt 
 frequently does, impel him to practice such an artifice by which 
 the case against him will unexpectedly be broken down. 
 
 A man who deliberately engages in such an enterprise, with 
 the purpose and intention of giving evidence when on the stand 
 by which the party who calls him will be routed and confounded, 
 may have stated the facts differently out of court for the express 
 purpose of luring the party into calling him. If he then gives a 
 widely variant version of relevant facts, to the surprise of the 
 party in whose favor he was called, his extra-judicial declara- 
 tions may be proved, but solely for the purpose of impeachment.^^ 
 
 The party must first show that the evidence, as given, has taken 
 him by surprise and that the witness is hostile. The witness may 
 then be asked if he has made contradictory statements out of 
 court, the times, places and circumstances of the statements being 
 described to him in detail.^ But the fact that a witness, when 
 
 ^Shorey v. Hussey, 32 Me. 579, 'Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482, 
 
 581; Orser v. Orser, 24 N. Y. 51; 488, 21 N. E. 285; Rhodes v. State, 
 
 Foster v. Dickerson, 64 Vt. 233, 24 128 Ind. 189, 192, 27 N. E. 866; Wil- 
 
 Atl. 253, and cases cited in Underbill Hams v. State, 25 Tex. App. 76, 90, 
 
 on Evidence, p. 502, § 348. 7 S. W. 661 ; Schuster v. State, 80 
 
 "a Sylvester v. State, 46 Fla. 166, Wis. 107, 117. 49 N. W. 30; State v. 
 
 35 So. 142. Tall, 43 Minn. 273, 275, 45 N. W.
 
 ^ 235 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 428 
 
 on the stand, seems ignorant of some or all the facts he was ex- 
 pected to know will not permit the examining party to prove that 
 he made the desired statements out of court.* In order that one's 
 own witness may be contradicted, mere silence or ignorance on 
 his part is not enough. The witness must testify expressly, and 
 in terms to facts wdiich are in direct contradiction to his prior 
 extra-judicial statements.'* 
 
 The rule by which one's own witness, who unexpectedly proves 
 hostile, may be impeached by proving contradictory statements 
 made out of court has been confirmed by statute in some states. 
 The rule applies to criminal as well as to civil cases." But such 
 statutes, being somewhat in derogation of common law principles, 
 usually receive a strict construction.'^ All the circumstances of 
 time, place and person ought to be detailed to the witness. It 
 is not enough merely to ask him if he made contradictory state- 
 ments to a particular person,^ without stating where and when 
 thev were made. 
 
 449; People V. Sweeney, 55 Mich. 
 586, 591, 22 N. W. 50; People v. 
 Jacobs, 49 Cal. 384; State v. Sortor, 
 52 Kan. 531, 34 Pac. 1036; McAlpine 
 V. State, 117 Ala. 93, 23 So. 130; 
 Barber v. State, 3 Ga. App. 598, 60 
 S. E. 285. For example, a witness 
 for the state, proving hostile, may be 
 asked if he did not make contradic- 
 tory statements before the grand 
 jury. People v. O'Neill, 107 Mich. 
 556, 65 N. W. 540. But see contra, 
 the divided opinion of the court in 
 Putnam v. United States, 162 U. S. 
 687, 40 L. ed. 1 1 18, 16 Sup. Ct. 923. 
 
 * Adams v. State, 34 Fla. 185, 15 
 So. 905; Chism v. State, 70 Miss. 
 742, 12 So. 852; People v. Mitchell, 
 94 Cal 550, 29 Pac. 1106. 
 
 " Gibson V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 218, 
 29 S. W. 471. Contra Southworth v. 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. 532, 109 S. W. 133. 
 To entitle the prosecution to impeach 
 one of its witnesses by contradictory 
 statements it must prove that having 
 taken due steps to inquire of the wit- 
 
 ness what he would testif}^ to it has 
 been deceived and surprised. If the 
 state's attorney relies solely for in- 
 formation as to the expected testi- 
 mony of his witness upon what out- 
 side parties tell him the witness will 
 say, and neglects to talk to his wit- 
 ness, he cannot plead surprise. Dunk 
 v. State, 84 Miss. 452, 36 So. 609. 
 
 * State V. Sederstrom, 99 Minn. 234, 
 109 N. W. 113. 
 
 ' Williams v. State, 25 Tex. App. 
 76, 7 S. W. 661 ; Blackburn v. Com- 
 monwealth, 12 Bush (Ky.) 181, 184, 
 185 ; Underbill on Evidence, p. 503, 
 note 3. 
 
 * Commonwealth v. Thyng, 134 
 Mass. 191 ; People v. Bushton, 80 
 Cal. 160, 22 Pac. 127, 549; Underbill 
 on Evidence, § 342. A statute per- 
 mitting a "person" introducing a wit- 
 ness, where he proves hostile, to im- 
 peach him, permits the state to do 
 this in a criminal case. Brown v. 
 State (Tex. Cr. 1908), 114 S. W. 
 820. The prosecution in the case of
 
 429 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. § 236 
 
 The extent to which the impeachment of one's own witness 
 may be carried is largely a matter of judicial discretion. It must 
 appear that the witness is hostile and not merely reluctant to give 
 testimony.'^ Unless the testimony is actually prejudicial to the 
 party calling the witness, he cannot be impeached.^" 
 
 And in all cases the court ought to limit the impeaching testi- 
 mony to the purpose for which it is introduced. Its purpose is 
 not so much to break down the credibility of all the testimony 
 of the hostile witness as to supply material facts which the hos- 
 tile witness was expected but failed to prove. The credibility of 
 the hostile witness is still for the jury.^^ 
 
 § 236. Impeachment of adverse witness by showing bad repu- 
 tation for veracity — Belief under oath. — Independent evidence 
 tending directly to show that a witness possesses a bad reputation 
 for veracity is always admissible to impeach an adverse witness 
 after he has been examined in chief by the party calling him.^- 
 The same rule applies where a showing is made for an absent 
 witness and received as evidence. ^^ The impeaching witness 
 ought to be called from among those persons who are resident 
 near the domicile of the witness to be impeached. He must first 
 be asked if he knows the general reputation of the witness, and 
 if he does not know it he is incompetent. If the court believes 
 he knows the reputation of the witness for veracity he may then 
 state what that reputation is.^* Evidence of reputation for truth- 
 fulness or the reverse is not admissible, unless it relates to the 
 reputation of the witness which is prevalent in the locality where 
 he resides. ^^ The reputation proved must be recent. The fact 
 
 an unexpectedly hostile witness may So. 259. Contra, People v. Pem- 
 
 show that he had testified differently broke, 6 Cal. App. 588, 92 Pac. 668, 
 
 at the inquest. State v. Jennings, 48 where evidence taken on the prelimi- 
 
 Ore. 483, 87 Pac. 524. nary examination was read at the 
 
 * Southworth v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. trial. 
 
 532, 109 S. W. 133. " State V. Johnson, 41 La. Ann. 
 
 '"Xathan v. State, 130 Ga. 48, 61 574, 7 So. 670; People v. Markham, 
 
 S. E. 994. 64 Cal. 157, 30 Pac. 620, 49 Am. 700; 
 
 "Sapp V. State (Tex. Cr. 1903), 77 Cole v. State, 59 Ark. 50, 26 S. \V. 
 
 S. W. 456. 377; Spies V. People, 122 111. i, 12 N. 
 
 ^■Hoge V. People, 117 111. 35, 6 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898, 3 Am. St. 32on. 
 
 E. 796. " Brown v. United States, 164 U. 
 
 ^Gregory v. State, 140 Ala. 16, 37 S. 221, 41 L. ed. 410, 17 S. Ct. 33;
 
 § 236 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 430 
 
 that a witness was reputed to be truthful when he was a boy by 
 no means tends to show that he is credible, when, as a man. he 
 testifies upon the witness stand. But evidence of good or bad 
 reputation existing two or three years prior to the trial is admis- 
 sible. It cannot reasonably be presumed that a man of mature 
 age and settled habits would acquire a new reputation in that 
 comparatively short time." 
 
 The evidence of the impeaching witness must be confined 
 strictly to the general reputation of the witness for veracity. /. c, 
 to what he has heard people say regarding this trait of character. 
 He will not be allowed to prove the commission of specific acts 
 of untruthfulness or other bad conduct. ^^ 
 
 A witness who is called to prove the bad reputation of another 
 may, after he has testified to that reputation, be asked if he 
 would believe the witness under oath.^"* Though the reputation 
 
 State V. Rugan, 5 Mo. App. 592; 
 State V. Beal, 68 Ind. 345, 346, 34 
 Am. 263; Mershon v. State, 51 Ind. 
 14; State V. Kirkpatrick, 63 Iowa 
 554- 559, 19 N- W. 660; State v. 
 Johnson, 41 La. Ann. 574, 577, 7 So. 
 670 ; Jackson v. State, 78 Ala. 471 ; 
 Combs V. Commonwealth, 97 Ky. 24, 
 29 S. W. 734; State V. Norman, 135 
 Iowa 483, 113 N. W. 340; Alford v. 
 State, 47 Fla. i, 36 So. 436. 
 
 " Davis V. Commonwealth, 95 Ky. 
 19, 21, 23 S. W. 585, 44 Am. St. 201 ; 
 Mynatt v. Hudson, 66 Tex. 66, 17 S. 
 W. 396; People V. Xunlej', 142 Cal. 
 441, 76 Pac. 45. 
 
 " People V. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171, 31 
 Pac. 45; People v. Rj^an, 55 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 214, 8 N. Y. S. 241; State v. 
 Rogers, 108 Mo. 202, 18 S. W. 976; 
 State V. Barrett, 40 Minn. 65, 41 N. 
 W. 459; People V. Wolcott, 51 Mich. 
 612, 17 N. W. 78; Randall v. State, 
 132 Ind. 539, 542, 32 N. E. 305; Con- 
 ley V. IMeeker, 85 N. Y. 618; State 
 V. Gesell, 124 Mo. 531, 27 S. W. 
 iioi; McArthur v. State, 59 Ark. 
 431, 27 S. W. 628; People V. Mon- 
 
 real, 7 Cal. App. 37, 93 Pac. 385; 
 Seaborn v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. 
 2203, 80 S. W. 223; State V. Arnold, 
 146 N. Car. 602, 60 S. E. 504. The 
 witness may testify that the man'3 
 neighbors said nothing as to his gen- 
 eral reputation for telling the truth. 
 Their silence may be evidence that 
 his reputation was imiformh- good. 
 Conrad v. State, 132 Ind. 254, 259, 
 31 N. E. 805. 
 
 ^^ Mayes v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 33, 
 24 S. W. 421 ; Ware v. State, 36 Tex. 
 Cr. 597, 38 S. W. 198 ; State v. Chris- 
 tian, 44 La. Ann. 950, 952, 11 So. 
 589; State V. Boswell, 2 Dev. ( N. 
 Car.) 209, 211; Hudspeth v. State, 
 50 Ark. 534; People v. Ryder, 151 
 ^[ich. 187, 114 N. W. i02t; Doug- 
 lass v. State (Tex. Cr. 1906), 98 S. 
 W. 840. An affirmative answer to 
 the question, "Would you believe the 
 witness under oath?" may be consid- 
 ered as sustaining the veracitj- of the 
 witness. Taylor v. State, 5 Ga. App. 
 237, 62 S. E. 1048. For civil cases see 
 Underbill on Evidence, page 505. 
 Contra, Walton v. State, 88 Ind. 9.
 
 431 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 ^Z7 
 
 of the witness is shown to be bad, his credibiHty is still a question 
 for the jury, who may believe him though he has a bad reputa- 
 tion for telling the truth/" The fact that they may believe him 
 to have a bad reputation does not justify an instruction that they 
 must disregard all his evidence.-" 
 
 Xo man can, with fairness, be required without warning to de- 
 fend or to disprove particular actions perhaps long since forgot- 
 ten by him.-^ It is not necessary that the impeaching witness 
 should be personally acquainted with the witness whose credibil- 
 ity he attacks.-- He may be cross-examined as to the sources 
 from which he has derived his knowledge of the reputation which 
 he has testified to, and he, in his turn, may have his reputation in- 
 vestigated.-' 
 
 It is not permissible in a criminal case to ask a witness whether 
 his own general character for veracit}'- is good.-* 
 
 § 237. Impeachment by showing the general bad character of 
 the witness aside from truthfulness. — A few authorities reject all 
 evidence to prove the good or bad character of a witness, except 
 so far as it is confined to his reputation for truthfulness, or the 
 reverse.-^ If the witness possesses no knowledge of that particu- 
 
 19; State V. Miles, 15 Wash. 534, 46 
 Pac. 1047; Cline v. State, 51 Ark. 
 140, 10 S. W. 225. But the witness 
 will not generally be permitted to 
 state that he would not believe a per- 
 son under oath, unless he knows that 
 person's reputation for veracity, and 
 is able to testify that his reputation is 
 bad. Spies v. People, 122 111. i, 208, 
 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. See also, 
 Mitchell V. State, 94 Ala. 68, 10 So. 
 518. 
 
 "Taylor v. State, 5 Ga. App. '22)T, 
 62 S. E. 1048; Peaden v. State, 46 
 Fla. 124, 35 So. 204. 
 
 ""Pentecost v. State, 107 Ala. 8r, 
 18 So. 146. 
 
 '' See Underbill on Evidence, page 
 .=506, n. 2. It may be shown that the 
 witness was intoxicated when he ob- 
 served the events which he describes 
 
 on the stand. But if, though intoxi- 
 cated, his evidence is corroborated, or 
 if his recollection appears to be clear 
 and distinct he ought to be believed. 
 State V. Castello, 62 Iowa 404, 407, 17 
 N. W. 605. 
 
 " State V. Turner, 36 S. Car. 534, 
 IS S. E. 602. 
 
 "State V. Perkins, 66 N. Car. 126; 
 Nelson v. State, z- Fla. 244, 13 So. 
 361. 
 
 ■* Glass V. State, 147 Ala. 50, 41 So. 
 
 ^ State V. Clawson, 30 Mo. App. 
 139; State V. Coffey, 44 Mo. App. 
 455 ; State v. Jackson, 44 La. Ann. 
 160, 162, ID So. 600; Briggs V. Com- 
 monwealth, 82 Va. 554; People v. 
 Abbott, 97 Mich. 484, 56 N. W. 862, 
 37 Am. St. 360 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Lawler, 12 Allen (Mass.) 585; State
 
 § 22,7 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 432 
 
 lar trait of character he is incompetent. But the majority of the 
 cases allow greater latitude. In most cases evidence involving 
 the whole moral character of the witness will be received upon 
 the reasonable theory that a man who is addicted to vicious habits, 
 or who is prone to commit immoral acts, may be presumed to 
 have lost respect for truth, and to be ready to perjure himself 
 when it is to his interest to do so."** 
 
 The rule that, in proving- character, the witness will be con- 
 fined to general reputation in the neighborhood, applies where 
 a witness is called to impeach another witness by proof of bad 
 character. The evidence of bad reputation may be supplemented 
 by proof of a report that the witness who is attacked had com- 
 
 V. Perkins, 66 N. Car. 126; Holmes 
 V. State, 88 Ala. 26, 7 So. 193, 16 
 Am. St. 17; State v. Grove, 61 W. 
 Va. 697, 57 S. E. 296; Elliott Evi- 
 dence, § 2721. Comprehensive note 
 on evidence and instructions as to 
 character of accused, see 20 L. R. A. 
 609. Note on evidence of specific in- 
 stances to prove character, 14 L. R. 
 A. (N. S.) 708. 
 
 ^Wachstetter v. State, 99 Ind. 290, 
 298, 50 Am. 94n; Boyle v. State, 105 
 Ind. 469, 475, 5 N. E. 203, 55 Am. 
 218; McTyier v. State, 91 Ga. 254, 18 
 S. E. 140; State v. Hart, 67 Iowa 
 142, 25 N. W. 99; State v. Kirkpat- 
 rick, 63 Iowa 554, 19 N. W. 660; 
 State v. McCiintic, TZ Iowa 663, 35 
 N. W. 696; State v. Froelick, 70 Iowa 
 213, 30 N. W. 487; Gilliam v. State, 
 I Head. (Tenn.) 39; State v. Miller, 
 
 93 Mo. 263, 6 S. W. 57; State v. 
 Boswell, 2 Dev. (N. Car.) 209, 210; 
 State V. Jackson, 44 La. Ann. 160, 
 162, 10 So. 600; Mitchell v. State, 
 
 94 Ala. 68, ID So. 518; Common- 
 wealth V. Lee, 143 Mass. 100, 9 N. E. 
 it; People v. Webster, 139 N. Y. "j^,, 
 34 N. E. 730; People v. Harrison, 93 
 Mich. 594, 597, 53 N. W. 725; Crump 
 V. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. L. 450, 20 
 
 S. W. 390; Hauk V. State, 148 Ind. 
 238, 46 N. E. 127, 47 N. E. 465 ; Hen- 
 derson V. State, Z7 Tex. Cr. 79, 38 
 S. W. 617, 39 S. W. 116; State v. 
 Blackburn, 136 Iowa 743, 114 N. W. 
 531 ; Sweatt v. State, 156 Ala. 85, 47 So. 
 194; State V. Sassaman, 214 Mo. 695, 
 114 S. W. 590; State V. Thompson, 
 127 Iowa 440, 103 N. W. 2>77- The 
 fact that a female witness is a pros- 
 titute may also be shown. People v. 
 Mills, 94 Mich. 630, 54 N. W. 488; 
 Paul V. Paul, 2,7 N. J. Eq. 23, 25. 
 While the fact that a witness is of 
 very bad moral character may call 
 for a careful scrutiny and considera- 
 tion of his testimony, the jury are 
 not bound in law, for that reason, 
 to disregard it if they believe it is 
 in itself credible; or if having a 
 doubt of his credibility they believe 
 he is corroborated by the circum- 
 stances or by the credible testimony 
 of other witnesses. People v. Mills, 
 94 Mich. 630, 54 N. W. 488; Duncan 
 v. State, 97 Ga. 180, 25 S. E. 182; 
 State v. Van Vliet, 92 Iowa 476, (:^ 
 N. W. 748; Douglass v. State (Tex. 
 1896), 22, S. W. 228; Schanzenbach 
 V. Brough, 58 111. App. 526.
 
 433 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. § 238 
 
 mitted larceny, but no evidence as to the details of the larceny 
 will be received.-' 
 
 The court should instruct on the impeachment of witnesses by 
 proof of their bad reputation, but an instruction which in effect 
 tells the jury that the witnesses for the defendant are disreputable 
 or lawless and criminal persons because evidence has been intro- 
 duced attacking their reputation is error. Whether the proof of 
 bad reputation or of lawless and criminal practices on the part of 
 the witnesses has impeached their testimony is for the jury alone 
 to determine. ■** 
 
 § 238. Impeachment of the adverse witness by showing con- 
 tradictory statements — Necessity for foundation. — The witness 
 whom it is desired to impeach may, upon his cross-examination, 
 be asked if he has not made statements out of court relevant to 
 the guilt of the accused which are inconsistent with or contra- 
 dictory of his testimony given on direct examination. All the 
 circumstances attendant upon the extra-judicial declarations must 
 be embodied in the question. If he does not admit that, upon the 
 particular occasion designated, he made the statement, it may be 
 proved that he did in fact make it.-'' 
 
 ■ The same course may be followed with a witness upon his di- 
 rect examination in case he proves hostile to the party calling 
 him. But in either case it is always absolutely essential in fair- 
 
 ^ State V. Sebastian, 215 Mo. 58, Cr. 164, 105 S. W. 796; State v. 
 
 114 S. W. 522. Burns, 148 Mo. 167, 49 S. W. 1005, 71 
 
 -' People V. Christensen, 85 Cal. 568, Am. St. 588 ; Wilson v. United States, 
 
 24 Pac. 888; State v. Lucas, 24 Ore. 5 Ind. Ter. 610, 82 S. W. 924; Sher- 
 
 168, 33 Pac. 538; Smith v. United rod v. State, 90 Miss. 856, 44 So. 813; 
 
 States, 161 U. S. 85, 40 Law Ed. 626, Ridgell v. State, 156 Ala. 10, 47 So. 71 ; 
 
 16 Sup. Ct. 483. Jones v. State, 141 Ala. 55, 37 So. 
 
 ^ State V. Lewis, 44 La. Ann. 958, 390 ; State v. Lockhart, 188 Mo. 427, 
 
 II So. 572; Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 87 S. W. 457; Brown v. State, 142 
 
 602, 71 Atl. 1058; People V. Row, 135 Ala. 287, 38 So. 268; Burton v. State, 
 
 Mich. S05, 98 N. W. 13, TO Detroit 115 Ala. i, 22 So. 585; Richards v. 
 
 Leg. N. 841; People v. Tice, 115 Commonwealth, 107 Va. 881, 59 S. E. 
 
 IMich. 219, 73 N. W. 108, 69 Am. St. 1104; Smith v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 27, 
 
 560 ; Pitts V. State, 140 Ala. 70, 37 So. 105 S. W. 182 ; People v. Yee Foo, 4 
 
 loi ; State v. Darling, 202 Mo. 150, Cal. App. 730, 89 Pac. 450; People v. 
 
 100 S. W. 631 ; Scott V. State, 52 Tex. Feinberg, 237 111. 348, 86 N. E. 584. 
 28 — Underhill Crim. Ev.
 
 238 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 434 
 
 ness to the witness to lay a foundation for contradicting- him by- 
 bringing to his attention in the question put to him, clearly and 
 distinctly, all the circumstances of time, place and person under 
 which the contradictory statements were made.^° By having his 
 attention called directly to the exact circumstances under which 
 it is alleged the contradictory or inconsistent statement was ut- 
 tered, the witness is protected from an unfair surprise. He has 
 the right to explain the contradiction. When his memory is 
 
 ^"^ People V. Chin Hane, io8 Cal. 597, 
 
 41 Pac. 697; Hester v. State, 103 Ala. 
 83, IS So. 857; People v. Bosquet, 116 
 Cal. 75, 47 Pac. 879; Commonwealth 
 V. Hosier, 135 Pa. St. 221, 19 Atl. 
 943; Hoge V. People, 117 111. 35, 6 N. 
 E. 796; Aneals v. People, 134 111. 401, 
 25 N. E. 1022; Carpenter v. State, 62 
 Ark. 286, 36 S. W. 900; King v. 
 State, 77 Ga. 734; Bruce v. State, 31 
 Tex. Cr. 590, 21 S. W. 681 ; Mont- 
 gomery V. Knox, 23 Fla. 595, 3 So. 
 211; State V. Turner, 36 S. Car. 534, 
 IS S. E. 602 ; State v. Goodbier, 48 
 La. Ann. 770, 19 So. 755 ; State v. 
 Delaneuville, 48 La. Ann. 502, 19 So. 
 SSo; State v. Jones, 44 La. Ann. 960, 
 962, II So. 596; Jones v. State, 65 
 Miss. 179, 3 So. 379; State v. Mc- 
 Laughlin, 44 Iowa 82; Kent v. State, 
 
 42 Ohio St. 426; State v. Glynn, 51 
 Vt. 577; State V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, 
 12 Pac. 318; State v. Hunsaker, 16 
 Ore. 497, 19 Pac. 605 ; Cotton v. State, 
 87 Ala. 75, 6 So. 396; State v. Free- 
 man, 43 S. Car. 105, 20 S. E. 974; 
 Crossland v. State, 77 Ark. 537, 92 S. 
 W. 776; State V. Anderson, 120 La. 
 331, 45 So. 267; Coker v. State, 144 
 Ala. 28, 40 So. 516; Alford v. State, 
 47 'Fla. I, 36 So. 436; State v. Mc- 
 Gowan, 36 Mont. 422, 93 Pac. 552; 
 Waller v. People, 209 111. 284, 70 N. 
 E. 681; People V. Mallon, 116 App. 
 Div. 425, loi N. Y. Supp. 814, 20 N. 
 Y. Cr. 427; affirmed in 189 N. Y. 
 
 520, 81 N. E. 1171 ; Burton v. State, 
 IIS Ala. I, 22 So. 585; Brown v. 
 State, 46 Fla. 159, 35 So. 82; State 
 V. Meyers, 120 La. 127, 44 So. 1008; 
 Lanasa v. State, 109 Md. 602, 71 
 Atl. 1058; Commonwealth v. Smith, 
 163 Mass. 411, 40 N. E. 189. Cf. 
 contra, People v. Shaw, in Cal. 
 171, 43 Pac. 593. See, also, cases in 
 Underhill on Evidence, p. S08, note i. 
 The witness may be contradicted by 
 his testimony given on a prior trial of 
 the same indictment if he asserts that 
 his present testimony is the same as 
 that previously given. Hudson v. 
 State, 28 Tex. App. 323, 13 S. W. 
 388; Brown v. State, 76 Ga. 623; or 
 by his testimony at the coroner's in- 
 quest. State V. Merriman, 34 S. Car. 
 576, 13 S. E. 328; Moran v. People, 
 163 111. 372, 45 N. E. 230; State v. 
 Taylor, 136 Mo. 66, 37 S. W. 907; 
 Williford v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 414, 37 
 S. W. 761 ; State v. O'Brien, 18 Mont. 
 I, 43 Pac. 1091, or by his deposition 
 taken before the examining magis- 
 trate. People V. Butler, 55 Mich. 408, 
 409, 21 N. W. 385; Falkner v. State, 
 151 Ala. 77, 44 So. 409, or tlae grand 
 jur}^ Bressler v. People, 117 111. 422, 
 8 N. E. 62 ; Dean v. Commonwealth, 
 25 Ky. L. 1876, 78 S. W. 1 1 12, where 
 a member of the grand jury was al- 
 lowed to testify to contradict a wit- 
 ness.
 
 435 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. § 238 
 
 aroused and refreshed by these details he may be able to show 
 that he was honestly mistaken on the former occasion, or that 
 the persons then present misunderstood or misquoted him. The 
 impeached witness ought to be permitted, in giving his evidence, 
 to state any facts which will explain or reconcile the seemingly 
 inconsistent utterances or show their relation to one another and 
 the meaning and purpose of each.^^ 
 
 If the witness declares he does not remember making the con- 
 tradictory statements, he may be contradicted at once, without 
 further foundation for their introduction.^^ 
 
 If the witness admits that he made the contradictory state- 
 ments it is not then competent to prove the statements by wit- 
 nesses to whom they were made or who overheard them,^^ 
 
 Both the admissions and the confessions of the accused are 
 admissible against him as a part of the evidence for the prosecu- 
 tion and as direct evidence of guilt, and not merely to contradict 
 him when he testifies as a witness. Hence, the fact that he tes- 
 tifies as a witness and denies that he confessed or affirms his in- 
 nocence does not render it necessary to lay a foundation before 
 introducing any of his contradictory statements, which are in 
 form or substance confessions and admissions, as in the case of 
 other witnesses who are to be impeached by contradiction.^* On 
 the other hand, if the accused is a witness, his confession is not 
 admissible as a contradictory statement to impeach him if it would 
 not be admissible as a confession. ^^ 
 
 But if the accused, being a witness, expressly denies on cross- 
 examination that on a prior occasion he had made an incriminat- 
 ing statement not already proven by the prosecution he may be 
 
 ^Bressler v. People, 117 111. 422, 8 145 Ala. 51, 40 So. 947; Campos v. 
 
 N. E. 62; Henson v. State, 120 Ala. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 289, 97 S. W. 100. 
 
 316, 25 So. 23; Brown v. State, 46 ^^ Bice v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 133, too 
 
 Fla. 159, 35 So. 82. S. W. 949- 
 
 ^" Payne v. State, 60 Ala. 80; Wag- ^* Klug v. State, ^y Ga. 734; Lewis 
 
 ncr V. State, 116 Ind. 181, 184, 18 N. v. State, 91 Ga. 168, 16 S. E. 986; 
 
 E. 833 ; Billings v. State, 52 Ark. 303, State v. Forsythe, 99 Iowa i, 68 N. 
 
 12 S. W. 574; Levy v. State, 28 Tex. W. 446. In State v. Callahan, 100 
 
 App. 203, 12 S. W. 596, 19 Am. St. Minn. 63, no N. W. 342, a foundation 
 
 826; Fuller V. State, 30 Tex. App. was required to be laid. 
 
 559, 17 S. W. 1 108; Smith v. State ''State v. Barrett, 40 Minn. 65, 74, 
 
 (Tex.), 20 S. W. 554; Jones v. State, 41 N. W. 459. See Underhill on Evi- 
 dence, p. 509, note 4.
 
 239 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 436 
 
 contradicted by the testimony of one who heard liim. His in- 
 criminating statement being in form either a confession or an ad- 
 mission is properly a part of the case for the prosecution. He has 
 a right to contradict it, of which he cannot be deprived by the 
 fact that it is offered out of its regular order. It is error to re- 
 fuse to permit him to attempt to show by other witnesses that he 
 never made such an incriminating statement.^" 
 
 And in conclusion we may say that the jury have a right to 
 determine what effect upon the credibility of the \vitness they 
 shall give to the statement."'" The mere fact of contradiction is 
 not in law' sufficient to justify a reasonable doubt of the truth of 
 all the testimony of the Avitness in the minds of the jury.'"'' 
 
 § 239. Impeachment by contradictory affidavits, depositions 
 and other writings. — The rules governing impeachment, by con- 
 tradictory statements, as above set forth, are equally applicable 
 whether the inconsistent declarations are oral or are contained in 
 affidavits and depositions,^'' or in publications by the witness on 
 the subject to which his testimony relates.*" 
 
 Thus the accused, when testifying, or any w^itness called in his 
 behalf, may be contradicted by the evidence as stated by him in 
 the affidavits wdiich were made and used by the accused upon a 
 motion for a continuance or postponement.*^ 
 
 Contradictory statements contained in affidavits, depositions 
 
 ''State V. Constantine, 48 Wash. " Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461, 468, 
 
 218, 93 Pac. 317. 49 Am. 185. 
 
 ''Jones V. State, 145 Ala. 51, 40 So. "Commonwealth v. Starr, 4 Allen 
 
 947. (Mass.) 301, 302; Pledger v. State, 
 
 '^Snyder v. State, 145 Ala. 33, 40 77 Ga. 242, 3 S. E. 320; State v. 
 
 So. 978. Hayes, 78 Mo. 307; People v. 
 
 '^ Gilyard v. State, 98 Ala. 59, 13 So. Sweeney, 55 Mich. 586, 590, 22 N. W. 
 
 391; State V. O'Brien, 18 Mont, i, 43 50; Weaver v. State, S3 Ark. 119, 102 
 
 Pac. 1091 ; United States V. Taylor, 35 S. W. 713. In Behler v. State, 112 
 
 Fed. 484. See also, Sullivan v. Jeffer- Ind. 140, 13 N. E. 272, the court says : 
 
 son, etc., Co. 133 Mo. i, 34 S. W. 566, "There is nothing giving to the state- 
 
 32 L. R. A. 167; Fein v. Covenant &c. ments in an affidavit for a continu- 
 
 Assn., 60 111. App. 274; State v. Cater, ance of a privilege; nor is there any- 
 
 100 Iowa 501, 69 N. W. 880; People thing which impresses upon them any 
 
 v. Smith, 114 App. Div. 513, 100 N. compulsory or confidential feature. 
 
 Y. Supp. 259; State v. Jennings, 48 The affidavit is a paper belonging to 
 
 Ore. 483, 87 Pac. 524. the files, public in its character and 
 
 freely executed."
 
 437 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. § 239 
 
 and other formal judicial documents are obviously to be consid- 
 ered from a different point of view, so far as their impeaching 
 character is concerned, than oral statements. 
 
 In the case of contradictory writings, it is manifestly unfair 
 to the witness to confront him with an affidavit or other paper 
 couched in formal and technical phraseology. The language of 
 the document is usually not his. In a criminal trial the affidavit 
 or other legal instrument is usually prepared by the clerk of the 
 court, as. for example, in the case of a complaint or affidavit on a 
 preliminary examination, and, though the affidavit or deposition 
 may have been read over to the affiant before he signed it, by the 
 person whom the witness trusted, or whose duty it was to frame 
 his ideas in proper words, he may have most likely wholly mis- 
 understood the true meaning of a writing couched in such tech- 
 nical, and to him novel and unusual, language.*^ 
 
 These considerations ought to be kept in view when the af- 
 fidavit or deposition of the complaining witness, taken down by 
 the clerk of the court, as a basis for issuing a warrant for the 
 arrest of the accused, is employed to contradict the witness at the 
 examination before the magistrate or at the trial.*^ 
 
 "Johnston v. Todd, 5 Beav. 597, The most common mode is that of 
 
 600. filing a written complaint with the 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Snee, 145 Mass. examining magistrate followed by a 
 351, 14 X. E. 157. A proceeding preliminary examination. It is usually 
 against an alleged criminal may be necessary that the complaint shall 
 begun by four methods. The party be sworn to before the examining 
 aggrieved may give information to magistrate, but not necessarily writ- 
 the public prosecuting officer, who ten out by him. The clerk, if any, of 
 prepares an indictment and brings the the justice of the peace or other ex- 
 evidence orally before the grand jury, amining magistrate usually prepares 
 The accuser may file a written com- the complaint and affidavit. If there 
 plaint on oath before a magistrate be no clerk the complaint is prepared 
 who issues a warrant, followed by the by the magistrate himself. Except 
 preliminary examination and the pos- perhaps in the cities, the magistrate 
 sible holding of the accused for the is rarely an attorney and even in the 
 action of the grand jury. The grand cities the clerk is usually a layman, 
 jury may act upon the knowledge It follows that complaints are often 
 of any of its members that a crime carelessly and unskillfully drawn, 
 has been committed and make a pre- omitting material facts and including 
 ^cntment against the accused. The much that is immaterial ; and by rea- 
 prosecuting attorney may file an in- son of lack of intelligence or for 
 formation with the grand jury. other causes, the statements of the
 
 § 240 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 438 
 
 § 240. Contradictory writings must be shown to the witness who 
 is to be impeached. — The writing by which it is proposed to con- 
 tradict the witness must be shown him on his examination so that 
 he may read it, or it may be read to him. He must be asked if he 
 wrote it or signed it, and if he admits this his attention must then 
 be called to the inconsistencies.^* If he admits that he wrote or 
 signed it, the whole ought to be read to the jury as the best evi- 
 dence of what the writing contains. If he denies that he is the 
 author, the fact that he wrote it may be proved by proper evi- 
 dence.*^ The stenographer who took down the testimony of a 
 witness at a former trial to impeach the witness may read from 
 his notes if he will swear that they are accurate, the witness hav- 
 ing first been asked if he has testified on the former trial.*" 
 
 § 241. Contradiction of irrelevant matters not permissible — 
 Proof of confirmatory statements. — The rules above discussed, 
 regulating the introduction of inconsistent declarations for the 
 purpose of contradicting a witness, permit him to be contra- 
 dicted only as regards matters relevant to the guilt or innocence 
 of the prisoner. Where the witness is confronted with contra- 
 dictory or inconsistent declarations made out of court and pertain- 
 ing solely to irrelevant matters, and denies that he is their author, 
 
 accuser may be incorrectly understood 578, 581, 7 So. 130; Cole v. State, 59 
 
 and transcribed by the clerk. So, Ark. 50, 26 S. W. ZTl', Gunter v. 
 
 also, in haste the clerk may omit to State, 83 Ala. 96, 3 So. 600; State v. 
 
 read the complaint and procure the Leeper, 70 Iowa 748, 751, 30 N. W. 
 
 signature of the accuser to statements 501 ; State v. Baker, 136 Mo. 74, Zl 
 
 of which he had no knowledge. These S. W. Rep. 810. The testimony of a 
 
 facts should be taken into considera- witness, taken before a magistrate, 
 
 tion on a criminal trial where the or at a coroner's inquest reduced to 
 
 prosecuting witness is confronted with writing and signed by the witness, is 
 
 contradictory statements in or omis- not admissible unless it is first shown 
 
 sions from his complaint before the to him and his attention called to the 
 
 examining magistrate. inconsistencies. Simmons v. State, z^ 
 
 " Gemmill v. State, 16 Ind. App. Fla. 387, 13 So. 896; State v. O'Brien, 
 
 154, 43 N. E. 909; Floyd v. State, 82 18 Mont, i, 43 Pac. 1091, 44 Pac. 
 
 Ala. 16, 2 So. 683; People v. Ching, 399. 
 
 74 Cal. 389, 16 Pac. 201; Cooper v. *" For numerous civil cases illustrat- 
 
 State, 90 Ala. 641, 8 So. 821 ; State v. ing this rule see Underbill on Ev., pp. 
 
 Crow, 107 Mo. 341, 17 S. W. 745; 510-512. 
 
 State V. Steeves, 29 Ore. 85, 43 Pac. " Casey v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 392, 
 
 947; State V. Callegari, 41 La. Ann. 97 S. W. 496.
 
 439 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES, 
 
 241 
 
 his replies are conclusive. He cannot be contradicted on that point 
 by the party seeking to impeach him.'*' The cases are not har- 
 monious upon the question whether, after it has been shown that a 
 witness has made contradictory statements out of court, it is per- 
 missible to prove upon his re-direct examination that he has made 
 other statements which are consistent with and confirmatory of his 
 testimony. The majority of the cases maintain the negative.'** 
 \\'hen, however, it appears that the witness is probably biased in 
 favor of the party calling him because of his relation to him, or 
 on account of his relation to the crime which is under investiga- 
 tion, it may be shown that, before such relation existed, the wit- 
 ness made statements confirmatory of his testimony now given in 
 open court.** 
 
 § 242. Previous silence as impeachment. — A witness may be 
 impeached, not only by his contradictory or inconsistent state- 
 
 " Crawford v. State, 112 Ala. i, 21 
 So. 214; State V. Conerly, 48 La. 
 Ann. 1561, 21 So. 192; Wilson v. 
 State, z-] Tex. Cr. 64, 38 S. W. 610; 
 Reynolds v. State, 147 Ind. 3, 46 N. 
 E. 31 ; State v. Brown, 100 Iowa 50, 
 69 N. W. 277; Carter v. State, 36 
 Neb. 481, 54 N. W. 853; Hill v. State, 
 91 Tenn. 521, 19 S. W. 674; State v. 
 Morris, 109 N. Car. 820, 2 Am. St. 
 415, 13 S. E. 877; Commonwealth v. 
 Jones, 155 Mass. 170, 171,29 N. E. 467; 
 Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 140 
 Mass. 455, 5 N. E. 272 ; Welch v. State, 
 104 Ind. 347, 351, 3 N. E. 850; Fordv. 
 State, 112 Ind. 2)7Z, 384, 14 N. E. 
 241 ; Huber v. State, 126 Ind. 185, 
 189, 25 N. E. 904; People v. Green- 
 wall, 108 N. Y. 296, 15 N. E. 404; 
 State V. Dunn (Oreg. 1909), 99 Pac. 
 278; Henson v. State, 120 Ala. 316, 
 25 So. 23 ; State v. Teachey, 134 N. 
 Car. 656, 46 S. E. 733; Dillard v. 
 United States, 72 C. C. A. 451, 141 
 Fed. 303 ; Justice v. Commonwealth, 
 20 Ky. L. 386, 46 S. W. 499; Mc- 
 Knight V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 252, 95 
 S. W. 1056; People V. Turner, i Cal. 
 
 App. 420, 82 Pac. 397. A witness can- 
 not be impeached by showing that out 
 of court he had expressed suspicions 
 of the prisoner, or an opinion of his 
 guilt, which he denies on cross-exam- 
 ination. Welch V. State, 104 Ind. 347, 
 351, 3 N. E. 850; People v. Stack- 
 house, 49 Mich. "](>, 77, 13 N. W. 364; 
 Commonwealth v. Snow, iii Mass. 
 411. 
 
 ** Sentell v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 260, 
 30 S. W. 226; Goode V. State, 32 
 Tex. Cr. 505, 24 S. W. 102; Williams 
 V. State, 24 Tex. App. 637, 7 S. W. 
 32,3; People V. Doyell, 48 Cal. 85; 
 Connor v. People, 18 Colo. 272>, Z3 
 Pac. 159, 2>^ Am. St. 295; Fallin v. 
 State, 83 Ala. 5, 3 So. 525; State v. 
 Flint, 60 Vt. 304, 14 Atl. 178; Lowe v. 
 State, 97 Ga. 792, 25 S. E. 676; 
 Holmes v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 352, 
 106 S. W. 1 160; Burks V. State, 78 
 Ark. 271, 93 S. W. 983; State v. Mc- 
 Daniel, 68 S. Car. 304, 47 S. E. 384, 
 102 Am. St. 661 ; State v. Houghton, 
 45 Oreg. no, 75 Pac. 887; Rice v. 
 State, 50 Tex. Cr. 648, 100 S. W. 
 771 ; Lounder v. State, 46 Tex. Cr.
 
 § 242 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 44O 
 
 ments, but also by proof that on a former occasion, under cir- 
 cumstances ^vhere it was his duty to state the whole truth, he 
 omitted to state material and relevant facts which he now states.*'"* 
 Thus, it may be proved that a witness omitted to state facts at the 
 preliminary examination which he testifies to on the trial.'"'" But, 
 for his silence to be admissible, it must apj^ear from all the cir- 
 cumstances that it was his duty to tell the whole truth. The wit- 
 ness must be permitted to explain his previous ignorance or si- 
 lence, and to show that his present forgetfulness or past ignorance 
 was real and not assumed. 
 
 He may testify that the occasion of his silence was a proceed- 
 ing in a court of justice during which he was not questioned 
 upon the matter at all.''^^ The denial by the witness that he 
 omitted any fact on a previous examination may be dispensed 
 with. If he says he does not remember, the party seeking to im- 
 peach may prove the omission to testify.^" 
 
 The witness may himself testify that he actually forgot the 
 facts upon the earlier occasion, ^^ or suppressed them through 
 fear,^* and, in a word, to any fact showing that his silence or con- 
 cealment was in good faith and prompted by right motives.'" 
 
 § 243. Relevancy of evidence to show the general reputation for 
 truthfulness of a witness who has been impeached. — The party 
 
 121, 79 S. W. 552; State V. Gilliam, " Babcock v. People, 13 Colo. 515, 
 
 66 S. Car. 419, 45 S. E. 6; State v. 22 Pac. 817; State v. Vickers, 47 La. 
 
 Sharp, 183 Mo. 715, 82 S. W. 134; Am. 1574, 18 So. 639; Territory v. 
 
 State V. Thomason, i Jones (N. Car.) Clayton, 8 Mont, i, 19 Pac. 293; Hy- 
 
 274; Thompson v. State, 38 Ind. 39; den v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 401, 404, 
 
 State V. Flint, 60 Vt. 304, 14 Atl. 178. 20 S. W. 764. 
 
 But see contra. Ball v. State, 31 Tex. "^ Brown v. State, 79 Ala. 61, 63. It 
 
 Cr. 214, 20 S. W. 363 ; Hobbes v. State, may be shown that his prior state- 
 
 •133 Ind. 404, 32 N. E. 1019, 18 L. R. ment was omitted from the record of 
 
 A. 774; State V. McKinney, 11 1 N. the former proceeding. United States 
 
 Car. 683, 16 S. E. 235, and civil cases v. Ford, 33 Fed. 861. 
 
 fully cited in Underbill on Ev., page ^^ State v. Turner, 36 S. Car. 534, 15 
 
 512. S. E. 602. 
 
 ^" Brown v. State, 79 Ala. 61, 62; "People v. Chapleau, 121 N. Y. 266, 
 
 Commonwealth v. Harrington, 152 24 N. E. 469. 
 
 Mass. 488, 25 N. E. 835. " Miller v. State, 97 Ga. 653, 25 S. 
 
 °° People V. Wirth, 108 Mich. 307, E. 366. 
 66 N. W. 41 ; Cook v. State, 124 Ga. 
 653, 53 S. E. 104.
 
 441 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 8 243 
 
 whose witness has been directly impeached has the right to intro- 
 duce evidence to overcome any presumption that may have 
 arisen that he is not credible. Not only may he introduce cumu- 
 lative evidence to corroborate him, but he may attempt to prove 
 that his general reputation for truthfulness is good. It has been 
 held that a party should not be permitted to prove that his witness 
 was a man whose reputation for veracity was good, where the 
 impeachment consisted wholly of evidence that the witness had 
 made contradictory statements out of court.^® But the majority 
 of the cases repudiate this distinction. It is now held almost uni- 
 versally that evidence to show that the reputation of the witness 
 for veracity is good may be introduced whenever the evidence of 
 the witness has been impeached in any way, whether by his con- 
 tradictory declarations or by a direct attack upon his character." 
 
 But evidence that a witness enjoys a reputation for truthfulness 
 is not receivable to strengthen his testimony merely because he 
 has been contradicted by an adverse witness,^* or because he has 
 been shaken or confused on cross-examination.^^ 
 
 But it has been held in Texas that a witness for the prosecu- 
 tion, who had been subjected to a most searching cross-examina- 
 tion having a strong tendency to discredit him before the jury, 
 might have his credibility sustained by the introduction on the 
 part of the state of proof that his reputation for truth and veracity 
 were good, though his character had not been directly attacked 
 and no contradiction had been shown.*'" A witness M'ho testifies 
 that the accused has a bad reputation for truth and veracity may 
 be contradicted by proving that on prior occasions he had made 
 an inconsistent statement.®^ 
 
 ^^ Brown v. IMooers, 6 Gray (Mass.) ham v. State, 153 Ala. 38, 45 So. 580; 
 
 451- State v. Christopher, 134 Mo. App. 6, 
 
 "Clem V. State, 33 Ind. 418; Surles 114 S. W. 549. For civil cases see 
 
 V. State, 89 Ga. 167, 15 S. E. 38; Underhill on Evidence, § 352. 
 
 Griffin v. State, 2(5 Tex. App. 157, ^^ Saussy v. South Florida R. Co., 22 
 
 9 S. W. 459, 8 Am. St. 460; Harris Fla. 327; Britt v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 v. State, 30 Ind. 131 ; State v. Jones, 215, 17 S. W. 255. 
 
 29 S. Car. 201, 7 S. E. 296; ]\Iagee v. ^"Stevenson v. Gunning, 64 Vt. 601, 
 
 People, 139 111. 138, 28 N. E. 1077; 23 Atl. 697; contra, State v. Rice (S. 
 
 State v. Fruge, 44 La. Ann. 165, 167, Car., 1897), 37 S. E. 452. 
 
 10 So. 621; People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. ""Harris v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 338, 
 61 ; Tipton v. State, 30 Tex. App. 94 S. W. 227. 
 
 530, 17 S. W. 1097; Commonwealth v. '" Norris v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 166, 
 Ingraham, 7 Gray. (Mass.) 46; Gra- 106 S. W. 136.
 
 § 244 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 442 
 
 § 244. Limitations upon the right to ask questions which dis- 
 grace the witness. — An important distinction must be noted as 
 regards the competency of questions the answers to which involve 
 facts which tend to disgrace the witness. The mere fact that a 
 witness on his direct examination must, in order to answer a 
 relevant question truthfully, make an admission which, while it 
 may not tend to criminate him, may disgrace him or lower him in 
 the estimation of his friends and acquaintances, is not sul^cient to 
 exclude the answer. Thus a woman or child may testify in rape 
 that she had sexual intercourse with the accused over an objec- 
 tion that this was evidence that would degrade her.''- It would 
 be not only unjust but absurd, particularly in a criminal prosecu- 
 tion, to close the mouth of a witness for that reason where the 
 liberty and perhaps the life of an innocent person may depend 
 upon his answer. His answer will not subject him to any crimi- 
 nal or civil liability. It may, on the other hand, be absolutely 
 essential to a proper administration of justice. Hence a witness 
 will be compelled to give relevant evidence, however greatly it 
 may degrade, disgrace or humiliate him, provided his reply will 
 tend to throw light upon the question at issue.'^^ 
 
 Other considerations may be invoked where the question which 
 tends to disgrace the witness is asked while he is under cross- 
 examination. The policy of the law does not permit, or at least 
 does not encourage, cross-examination upon matters wholly ir- 
 relevant merely for the purpose of subsequent contradiction. 
 Hence, if the witness, while being cross-examined, is asked, 
 "Have you ever been convicted of burglary?" and replies that he 
 has not, the interrogating party is bound by his answer. 
 
 But objections to evidence because of its irrelevancy are to be 
 taken by a party, not by the witness. It is impossible to formulate 
 any general rule by which can be determined the relevancy of 
 questions upon cross-examination. The matter is largely in the 
 judicial discretion. It may with safety be said that the court 
 
 "State V. George, 214 Mo. 262, 113 INIiller, 72 IMich. 265, 40 N. W. 429, 16 
 
 S. W. 1 1 16. Am. St. 536; Coleman v. State, 53 
 
 '"People V. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Tex. Cr. 578, in S. W. ion; Leach 
 
 Y.) 229, 250, 254; 21 Am. Dec. I22n; v. Commonwealth, 33 Ky. 1016, 112 
 
 Ex parte, Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463. 4 S. W. 595. 
 So. 279, 5 Am. St. 384; Johnston v.
 
 443 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. § 245 
 
 ought to interfere whenever necessary to protect the witness from 
 needless insult and contumely, and to forbid impertinent ques- 
 tions which are altogether irrelevant, and have been asked merely 
 to surprise, annoy and confuse the witness, and to cause him to 
 lose his temper."* 
 
 Subject to this limitation the law regards as relevant all facts 
 which tend to illustrate the credibility of the witness or which 
 may enable the jury to determine the weight of his testimony. 
 
 § 245. Impeachment by showing social connections, occupation 
 aiid manner of living. — The previous conduct of the witness, his 
 life and associations, whether irreproachable or the reverse, are 
 all relevant. Every person possesses, to a certain extent, the 
 power of selecting his domicile and avocation. So the choice of 
 his business and social connections, the circle of his friends and 
 acquaintances, and his general mode and course of living are 
 largely in his own control. If, therefore, he voluntarily associates 
 with those who are engaged in disreputable pursuits ; or if he is 
 addicted to disgraceful or vicious practices, or follows an occupa- 
 tion which is loathsome and vile, though not perhaps criminal; 
 no rule of law prevents such facts from being shown to determine 
 his credibility, by questions put to him upon his cross-examina- 
 tion. And usually he may be questioned as to specific facts, in 
 his past career, which .may tend to his disgrace, provided they are 
 not too remote in point of time.*^^ 
 
 But it is generally held that a female witness cannot be asked 
 if she is a professional prostitute or a dissolute woman, or if she 
 keeps a disorderly house.*^" And, as a rule, compelling a witness 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Shaw, 4 Cush. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 606, 13 S. W. 832, 
 
 (Mass.) 593; Commonwealth v. Sack- 1051 ; State v. Taylor, 117 Mo. 181, 22 
 
 et, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 394; State v. S. W. 1103; People v. Casey, 72 N. 
 
 Rogers, 31 Mont, i ; T] Pac. 293. Y. 393 ; Reg. v. Burke, 8 Cox C. C. 44; 
 
 " Warren V. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. People v. Giblin, 115 N. Y. 196, 21 
 
 370, 35 S. W. 1028, 18 Ky. Law 141; N. E. 1062, 4 L. R. A. 757; State v. 
 
 Clayton v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 489, 21 Hilsabeck, 132 Mo. 348, 34 S. W. 38; 
 
 S. W. 255; Carroll v. State, 32 Tex. State v. Moran, 216 Mo. 550, 115 S. 
 
 Cr. 431, 24 S. W. 100, 40 Am. St. 786; W. 1126; Dyer v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 Roberts v. Commonwealth, 14 Ky. 1903), ']^ S. W. 456. 
 Law 219, 20 S. W. 267; Ryan v. "" Holtz v. State, 76 Wis. 99, 44 N. 
 
 People, 79 N. Y. 593; State v. Phil- W. 1107, ttto; Stayton v. State, 32 
 
 pot, 97 Iowa 365, 66 N. W. 730; State Tex. Cr. ZZ, 22 S. W. 38; Retching-
 
 g 245 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 444 
 
 to answer degrading or disgracing questions is largely a matter 
 of judicial discretion.*^" 
 
 Thus, for example, the witness may be compelled to answer 
 the question, "How long since you lived with your wife?'' The 
 facts that a man had abandoned his family, has no permanent 
 place of abode and has become a tramp, are very material upon 
 his credibility.''*' So it may be shown by cross-examining a wit- 
 ness that he has sought to bribe another witness,"^ or otherwise 
 to fabricate evidence,"" or that he had been instructed what to 
 say upon the witness stand, "^ or had offered to leave the state if 
 paid for doing so." 
 
 Now that an ex-convict or a person convicted of a felony is 
 competent as a witness, it remains to inquire to what extent the 
 conviction may be shown as impeachment. As a matter of ordi- 
 nary observation it is clear to most persons that the mere fact 
 that a witness has been convicted of an infamous crime, or, in fact, 
 of any offense, will not prevent him from telling the truth or 
 from being believed in a case w'here he has no motive to deceive. 
 It is not usually the facts of a man's past which prompt him to 
 give false testimony, except where the circumstances of the past 
 create his present motives. Thus, it might be that a conviction 
 or even a prosecution brought about by a person against whom 
 the witness is testifying would create prejudice against that per- 
 son, and the convict witness could not fairly and truthfully testify 
 against him. Ordinarily this is not the case. The rule that a 
 prior conviction may be shown to impeach a witness which is 
 
 man v. State, 6 Wis. 417; La Beau v. 64 ]\Iich. 702, 31 X. W. 590; Browder 
 People, 34 N. Y. 223, 230. Contra, v. State, 102 Ala. 164, 14 So. 895. 
 State V. Hack, 118 ]\Io. 92, 23 S. W. "' Yanke v. State, 51 Wis. 464, 468, 
 1089; Tla-Koo-Y-et-Lee v. United 8 X. W. 276; Roberts v. Common- 
 States, 167 U. S. 274, 42 Law ed. 166, wealth, 14 Ky. L. 219, 20 S. W. 267. 
 17 S. Ct. 85s; State V. Romero, 117 °' State v. Hack, 118 Mo. 92, 23 S. 
 La. 1003, 42 So. 482; Swint v. State, W. 1089. 
 
 154 Ala. 46, 45 So. 901. But see. State '"England v. State, 89 Ala. 76, 8 
 
 V. Boyd, 178 Mo. 2; 76 S. W. 979, in So. 146. 
 
 which case the witness was permitted " State v. Tall, 43 Minn. 273, 276, 45 
 
 to be asked about her child being born N. W. 449 ; Boulden v. State, 102 Ala. 
 
 out of wedlock. 78, 15 So. 341. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. McDonald, no "Jenkins v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 201, 
 
 Mass. 405; State v. Hobgood, 46 La. 29 S. W. 1078. 
 Ann. 855, 15 So. 406; People v. Carr,
 
 445 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. S 245 
 
 imbedded in the statutes of the various states is a survival 
 of the rule that a prior conviction was an insurmountable objec- 
 tion to the competency of the witness. The modern rule is that 
 the conviction of an infamous crime, i. c, a crime which at com- 
 mon law would have rendered the witness incompetent or of a 
 crime involving great moral turpitude, may be proved to impeach 
 the credibility of the witness.'^ 
 
 After the witness has admitted or it is proved that he is a con- 
 vict his credibility cannot be sustained by proving that he was 
 unjustly convicted.'^ Nor is a conviction of an infamous crime 
 inadmissible because the judgment of conviction has been ap- 
 pealed from and the appeal is still pending.'^^ But a conviction 
 of a misdemeanor cannot be shown/'' nor should the court permit 
 a question to the witness as to whether he has ever been arrested 
 or indicted.'^ These facts are immaterial, for even innocent per- 
 sons are arrested and are subject to indictment. 
 
 Under the statute, which permits a conviction of an infamous 
 crime to be shown, a conviction of a statutory felony which was 
 not a crime at common law has been received."'' 
 
 If it appears that one or more of the witnesses is a convict, the 
 accused is entitled to an instruction on the effect of this fact on 
 the credibility of these witnesses. It is proper to instruct the jury 
 that they are not to disregard the evidence of a convict merely 
 
 "Fuller V. State, 147 Ala. 35, 41 '^Viberg v. State, 138 Ala. 100, 35 
 
 So. 774; Wheeler v. State, 4 Ga. App. So. 53. 
 
 325, 61 S. E. 409; Martin v. Common- "Wells v. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. 
 
 wealth, 25 Ky. L. 1928, 78 S. W. 1104; L. 504, 99 S. W. 218; Wheeler v. 
 
 State V. Powell, 5 Penn. (Del.) 24, State, 4 Ga. App. 325, 61 S. E. 409. 
 
 61 Atl. 966; Rollings V. State (Ala.), " Mullins v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. 
 
 49 So. 329; Wells V. Commonwealth, L. 2044, 79 S. W. 258; Ross v. State, 
 
 30 Ky. L. 504, 99 S. W. 218; State v. I39 Ala. 144, 36 So. 718; State v. 
 
 Griggsby, 117 La. 1046, 42 So. 497. Barrett, 117 La. 1086, 42 So. 513; 
 
 The proof of conviction in most cases (arrest) Starling v. State, 89 Miss. 
 
 is merely a convenient pretext on 328, 42 So. 798; Hays v. State, 47 
 
 which counsel can abuse the witness Tex. Cr. 149, 82 S. W. 511. 
 
 by describing him as "an ex-convict," "Fuller v. State, 147 Ala. 35, 41 So. 
 
 in his summing up ; Caples v. State 774. See, contra, as to an act which, 
 
 (Okla. Cr. App., 1909), 104 Pac. 493. under a statute, may under some cir- 
 
 ^* Fuller v. State, 147 Ala. 35, 41 cumstances be a misdemeanor and 
 
 So. 774. under others, a felony. Gordon v. 
 
 State, 140 Ala. 29, 36 So. 1009.
 
 § 246 CRIAIINAL EVIDENCE. 446 
 
 because he is a convict, but that they must weigh it, and consider 
 it according to the rules of evidence ; and that in so considering it, 
 they may take into consideration the conviction of the witness as 
 bearing upon his credibiHty, but that they should determine the 
 credibility of convict witnesses upon the same consideration as 
 that of any other witnesses.'*'' 
 
 § 246. When and how previous imprisonment or conviction of 
 crime may be shown. — To question the witness on cross-examina- 
 tion for the purpose of ascertaining from his own lips if he has 
 ever been convicted of, or imprisoned for, crime, is not usually 
 permitted, in the absence of statute.®^ The fact of conviction or 
 of incarceration is always of record. Hence, when either fact is 
 directly in issue, it must be proved by the best evidence of which it 
 is susceptible. A transcript of the prison register, or of the rec- 
 ord of conviction, ought to be produced.*" 
 
 A witness cannot be asked if he has been convicted of a crime 
 in a particular court where the statutes permit him to be exam- 
 ined only as to certain infamous crime.^^ The question is gen- 
 erally put to a witness in the following form, "Have you ever 
 been convicted of a felony?" or "Have you ever been in state's 
 prison ?" or some other similar question of this character.®* It is 
 always proper to permit the witness who is asked whether he was 
 convicted to state, in connection with the admission that he was 
 
 *° People V. Putman, 129 Cal. 258, 61 436, 15 N. E. 33; Saxon v. State, 96 
 
 Pac. 961; People v. McLane, 60 Cal. Ga. 739, 23 S. E. 116; Commonwealth 
 
 412; State V. Hubbard, 201 Mo. 639, v. Gorham, 99 Mass. 420; Green v. 
 
 100 S. W. 586. State, 125 Ga. 742, 54 S. E. 724; Gor- 
 
 *^ Fuller V. State, 147 Ala. 35, 41 don v. State, 140 Ala. 29, 36 So. 1009; 
 
 So. 774. Section 1796, Code 1896. O'Donnell v. People, 224 111. 218, 79 
 
 *^Boyd V. State, 94 Tenn. 505, 29 N. E. 639; James v. United States, 7 
 
 S. W. 901 ; State v. Farmer, 84 Me. Ind. T. 250, 104 S. W. 607 ; People 
 
 436, 24 Atl. 98s; Driscoll v. People, v. Cascone, 185 N. Y. 317, 78 N. E. 
 
 47 Mich. 413, 417, II N. W. 221; 287; McKevitt v. People, 208 111. 460, 
 
 State V. Minor, 117 Mo. 302, 22 S. 70 N. E. 693; Commonwealth v. 
 
 W. 1085; Chambless v. State (Tex., Walsh, 196 Mass. 369, 82 N. E. 19, 124 
 
 1894), 24 S. W. 899; State V. Alexis, Am. St. 559. 
 
 45 La. Ann. 973, 13 So. 394; Murphy *^ Williams v. State, 144 Ala. 14, 40 
 
 V. State, 108 Ala. 10, 18 So. 557 ; Com- So. 405. 
 
 monwealth V. Sullivan, 150 Mass. 315, *** Dodds v. State (Miss. 1908), 45 
 
 23 N. E. 47 ; Kirby v. People, 123 111. So. 863.
 
 447 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 § 247 
 
 convicted, that he was granted a new trial and acquitted or was 
 pardoned.®^ And finally, in Texas a conviction of crime is not ad- 
 missible to impeach a witness unless of comparatively recent 
 date.**' 
 
 But sometimes by statute it is permitted to ask the witness if 
 he has ever been convicted of crime.*^ In case the conviction or 
 imprisonment is denied by the witness, it must be proved by a 
 copy of the record.*^ 
 
 § 247. Incriminating questions. — No witness can be required or 
 compelled to answer a question, if, in the opinion of the court, it 
 seems evident that to answer it truthfully would tend to criminate 
 him, or even subject him to the danger of a criminal prosecution.*^ 
 
 Whether the question is wholly unanswered, or partly answered 
 
 ^ Thompson v. United States, 30 
 App. D. C. 352; O'Donnell v. People, 
 no 111. App. 250. 
 
 ^ Casey v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 392, 
 97 S. W. 496; Busby V. State, 48 Tex. 
 Cr. 83, 86 S. W. 1032. 
 
 "State V. O'Brien, 8r Iowa 88, 93, 
 46 N. W. 752, 861 ; People v. Hall, 48 
 Mich. 482, 12 N. W. 665, 42 Am. 477 ; 
 People V. Rodrigo, 69 Cal. 601, 11 Pac. 
 481 ; State v. Pfefferle, 36 Kan. 90, 12 
 Pac. 406; State v. Adamson, 43 Minn. 
 196, 45 N. W. 152; Marion v. State, 
 16 Neb. 349, 20 N. W. 289; State v. 
 Miller, 100 Mo. 606, 13 S. W. 832, 
 1051 ; State v. McGuire, 15 R. I. 23, 
 22 Atl. 1 1 18; State V. Merriman, 34 
 S. Car. 16, 12 S. E. 619; Common- 
 wealth V. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199, 205 ; 
 Helm V. State, 67 Miss. 562, 7 So. 487 ; 
 State V. Martin, 124 Mo. 514, 28 S. 
 W. 12; State V. Pratt, 121 Mo. 566, 
 26 S. W. 556; People V. Tubbs, 147 
 Mich. I, no N. W. 132; State v. Bar- 
 rington, 198 Mo. 23, 95 S. W. 235; 
 Koch V. State, 126 Wis. 470, 106 N. 
 W. 531; Fuller v. State, 147 Ala. 35, 
 4: So. 774. 
 
 ''* State V. Saucr, 42 Minn. 258, 44 
 
 N. W. 115; State v. McGuire, 15 R. 
 I. 23, 22 Atl. 1 1 18; People V. Carolan, 
 71 Cal. 195, 12 Pac. 52; State v. Wyse, 
 33 S. Car. 582, 12 S. E. 556; Titus v. 
 State, 117 Ala. 16, 23 So. 77; Under- 
 bill on Ev., p. 517, note 3, § 354. These 
 statutes are construed strictly. Where 
 the statute permits proof of a convic- 
 tion of any crime, a conviction of 
 either felony or misdemeanor may be 
 shown. Helm v. State, 67 Miss. 562, 
 7 So. 487; State V. Sauer, 42 Minn. 
 258, 44 N. W. 115; Commonwealth 
 V. Ford, 146 Mass. 131, 15 N. E. 153; 
 State V. Brown, 100 Iowa 50, 69 N. 
 W. 277. 
 
 *° Commonwealth v. Trider, 143 
 Mass. 180, 9 N. E. Sio; State v. Pan- 
 coast (N. Dak., 1896), 67 N. W. 1052; 
 Temple v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 
 892; Stevens v. State, 50 Kan. 712, 32 
 Pac. 350; Minters v. People, 139 111. 
 363, 29 N. E. 45 ; People v. Botkin 
 (Cal. App. 1908), 98 Pac. 861. Under- 
 bill on Ev., p. 519, note 11. This rule 
 is also applicable to the production of 
 l)0()ks and papers which will incrim- 
 inalc. Lamson v. Boyden, 160 Hi. O13, 
 43 N. E. 781, aff'g, 57 111. App. 232.
 
 § 247 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 44S 
 
 and the witness objects to going any further, is immaterial. If 
 the answer, though not embracing a full confession of criminal 
 liability, merely forms "one link in the chain of testimony which 
 would convict him," the witness may withhold it."" 
 
 It is the duty of the court, without request, to instruct the wit- 
 ness that he need not answer. He may then answer, if he chooses 
 to do so, and if. having been judicially informed of his legal pre- 
 rogative of silence, he answers the question fully, he may be com- 
 pelled to divulge every detail of the incriminating transaction."^ 
 
 The witness cannot be compelled to explain in detail how the 
 answer required would tend to incriminate him in order to enjoy 
 the privilege of refusing to answer. It is sufficient if he swears 
 that he believes that his answer will have that effect.''- Whether 
 the question calls for an answer which will tend to incriminate the 
 Avitness is for the court to determine."^ 
 
 The witness must answer, though he shall sw^ear that he be- 
 lieves his answer will incriminate him, if, from all the circum- 
 stances, and from the character of the question and the answer 
 required, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that any 
 possible answer he may make will not have that effect. If there 
 is no reasonable ground for supposing that he will incriminate 
 himself he ought to answer."* When the danger to the witness is 
 apparent he must be allowed a large discretion in remaining 
 silent."^ The accused who voluntarily becomes a witness in his 
 
 *" Where evidence, sought from a ""People v. Mather, 4 Wend. (X. 
 
 witness in a criminal case, has a ten- Y.) 229, 252-254, 21 Am. Dec. I22n; 
 
 dency to incriminate him or to estab- Bellinger v. People, 8 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 lish a link in a chain of evidence 595; State v. Bond, 12 Idaho 424, 86 
 
 which may lead to his conviction, or Pac. 43. 
 
 if the proposed evidence will disclose ^^ Ex parte, Irvine, 74 Fed. 954; 
 
 the names of persons upon whose tes- People v. Mather, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 timony the witness might be convicted 229, 252-254, 21 Am. Dec. I22n ; State 
 
 of a criminal offense, or will expose v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 45 N. W. 
 
 him to penalties or forfeitures, he 447; State v. Tall, 43 Minn. 273, 45 
 
 cannot be compelled to answer. Peo- N. W. 449; Commonwealth v. Bell, 
 
 pie v. Argo, 237 111. 173, 86 N. E. 679. 145 Pa. St. 374, 22 Atl. 641-644. 
 
 "'Williams v. State, 98 Ala. 52, 13 "Forbes v. Willard, 37 How. Pr. 
 
 So. 333; Commonwealth v. Pratt, 126 (N. Y.) 193; Lothrop v. Roberts, 16 
 
 Mass. 462 ; State v. Van Winkle, 80 Colo. 250, 27 Pac. 698. 
 
 Iowa 15, 45 N. W. 388; State v. "' Minter v. People, 39 111. App. 438. 
 Denny (N. D. 1908), 117 N. W. 869.
 
 449 
 
 IMPEACHMEXT OF WITNESSES. 
 
 247 
 
 own behalf waives the privilege of refusing to answer incriminat- 
 ing questions, so far as the charge against him is concerned, by 
 answering upon his direct examination questions relating to the 
 crime with which he is charged, and in which he denies his guilt. 
 He cannot, subsequently, on his cross-examination, refuse to an- 
 swer other incriminating questions.®*' 
 
 The right to refuse to answer incriminating questions is per- 
 sonal to the witness. To preserve his right he must himself object. 
 If he wishes to answer, he may do so and neither the prosecution 
 nor the accused has a right to object.®' 
 
 And a witness cannot refuse to answer incriminating questions 
 because his answer will incriminate another person by whom he is 
 employed, or will incriminate a corporation of which he is an 
 officer.®" 
 
 It is error not to instruct the jury that no inference that the wit- 
 ness is a criminal should be drawn from his refusal to answer an 
 incriminating question.®® 
 
 '° Shears v. State, 147 Ind. 51, 46 
 N. E. 331 ; McClain v. Common- 
 wealth, no Fa. St. 263, I Atl. 45; 
 Sullivan v. People, 114 111. 24, 28 N. 
 E. 381 ; Commonwealth v. Mullen, 97 
 Mass. 545 ; Stover v. People, 56 N. Y. 
 315; Rains v. State, 88 Ala. 91, 7 So. 
 315; Commonwealth v. Nichols, 114 
 Mass. 285, 19 Am. 346n; State v. 
 Ober, 52 N. H. 459, 13 Am. 88 ; People 
 V. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 30 N. E. 
 494; State V. Allen, 107 N. Car. 805, 
 II S. E. 1016; Spies V. People, 122 111. 
 I, 235, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898. See, 
 also, ante, § 61, and Underhill on Ev- 
 idence, page 521, note 4. 
 
 " State V. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234, 
 20 Am. 688; Bradford v. People, 22 
 Colo. 157, 43 Pac. 1013; State v. But- 
 ler, 47 S. Car. 25, 24 S. E. 991 ; State 
 v. Mungeon, 20 S. Dak. 612, 108 N. W. 
 552; People v. Gosch, 82 Mich. 22, 46 
 X. W. loi ; Commonwealth v. Shaw, 
 4 Cush. (Mass.) 594, 50 Am. Dec. 
 813; Samuel v. People, 164 111. 379, 
 29 — Underhill Crim. Ev. 
 
 45 N. E. 728; Brown v. State (Tex. 
 1893), 20 S. W. 924; Taylor v. State, 
 83 Ga. 647, ID S. E. 442; Ham v. 
 State, 156 Ala. 645, 47 So. 126; Taylor 
 v. United States, 81 C. C. A. 197, 152 
 Fed. I ; and see cases cited in Under- 
 hill on Ev., p. 521. 
 
 *^Hale V. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 50 
 L. ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, aff'g order 
 hi re, Hale, 139 Fed. 496; McAlister 
 V. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90, 50 L. ed. 671, 
 26 S. Ct. 385. 
 
 •° State V. Bartlett, 55 Me. 200 ; Dev- 
 ries V. Phillips, 63 N. Car. 53. The 
 refusal must not be considered by the 
 jury at all. It is gross injustice to the 
 prisoner, and constitutes reversible 
 error for the court, to charge that a 
 refusal to answer an incriminating 
 question may lead to the inference 
 that the witness is endeavoring to 
 shield the accused and not to protect 
 himself. Beach v. United States, 46 
 Fed. 754.
 
 § 247 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 45O 
 
 The information which is eHcited from a witness who, after he 
 has claimed his privilege, is forced to answer an incriminating 
 question, cannot be used against him subsequently."** 
 
 If facts are shown from wdiich the court is convinced that the 
 incriminating evidence called for by the question cannot be used 
 against the witness in a criminal prosecution, the witness must Idc 
 compelled to answer. 
 
 Such is the case when the prosecution of the crime has been 
 barred by the lapse of time,^ or where a statutory enactment for- 
 bids the use of such testimony in a criminal prosecution of the 
 witness.^ 
 
 A statutory provision of this nature should be liberally con- 
 strued for the purpose of affording the witness the fullest protec- 
 tion where he answers an incriminating question.^ A statute 
 which provides that no person shall be prosecuted or be subjected 
 to penalty or forfeiture on account of any transaction or matter 
 concerning which he may testify in a proceeding or prosecution 
 brought under certain statutes is constitutional and deprives a 
 wdtness of his right to claim a privilege against answering in- 
 criminating questions. The protection of the federal statute af- 
 fords the witness immunity only in the federal courts and this it 
 has been held is sufficient.* 
 
 In other words, the Supreme Court oi the United States has 
 held that the fact that the statute passed by congress does not 
 guarantee the witness against a prosecution in the state courts is 
 
 ^'"United States v. Smith, 47 Fed. around a witness bj' the fifth amend- 
 
 501. Ex parte Buskett, 106 Mo. 602, ment to the federal constitution, 
 
 17 S. W. 753; Taylor V. United States, which provides that no person shall 
 
 152 Fed. I, 81 C. C. A. 197. be compelled to be a witness against 
 
 ^Ex parte Boscowitz, 84 Ala. 463, himself, was intended to shield the 
 
 4 So. 279, 5 Am. St. 384; People v. witness from actual prosecution, and 
 
 Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74; Southern Railway not merely from the disgrace and in- 
 
 News Co. V. Russell, 91 Ga. 808, 18 S. famy resulting from incriminating 
 
 E. 40. Contra, McFadden v. Reynolds disclosures. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. 
 
 (Pa., 1887), II Atl. 638. S. 591, 40 Law ed. 819, 16 S. Ct. 644. 
 
 -Ex parte Buskett, 106 Mo. 602, 17 ^People v. Argo, 237 111. 173, 86 X. 
 
 S. W. 753, 27 Am. St. 378, 14 L. R. A. E. 679. 
 
 407n; Willis v. State, 12 Ga. 444, 448; * Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 50 
 
 Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. L. ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. 370; Nelson v. 
 
 (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 7lin. The United States, 201 U. S. 92, 50 L. ed. 
 
 constitutional protection thrown 673, 26 Sup. Ct. 358.
 
 451 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. § 247 
 
 not sufficient to invalidate it. This decision was made during a 
 search for evidence in a prosecution under the federal anti-trust 
 law and the same cjuestion has also arisen in Kansas under the 
 state anti-trust law and a similar decision was arrived at — that is, 
 the protection was sufficient although it did not protect in a prose- 
 cution under the federal anti-trust law.^ And the rule that a wit- 
 ness cannot refuse to answer incriminating questions where the 
 statute gives him full immunity, is illustrated in a New York case, 
 construing a statute which provides that no person shall be ex- 
 cused from testifying as to gambling on the ground that his evi- 
 dence may tend to convict him of a crime, but that no such evi- 
 dence shall be received against him upon any criminal investiga- 
 tion.*^ 
 
 Under a statute which provides that no witness shall be prose- 
 cuted on account of any testimony he may give in any proceed- 
 ing, suit or prosecution, it has been held that the examination of 
 witnesses before a grand jury is a proceeding.'^ And where a 
 state constitution provides that no person can be compelled in any 
 "criminal case," to give evidence against himself, an inquisition 
 before a grand jury has been held to be a criminal case.® 
 
 A statute which provides that no testimony given by a bank- 
 rupt under certain circumstances shall be used against him in a 
 criminal proceeding is meant to protect him only against the use 
 of his admissions against himself; and it does not permit him to 
 close his mouth when he is called as a witness to testify against 
 another person in a criminal proceeding. Its operation is con- 
 fined strictly to his admissions in his own bankruptcy proceed- 
 ings. It has been held under this statute that a bankrupt cannot 
 be convicted of perjury or false swearing committed in his own 
 bankruptcy proceedings in support of a claim filed by him against 
 his estate.^ 
 
 An inquiry by a justice in order to ascertain whether it will be 
 necessary for him to hold an inquest is not a legal examination 
 
 " State V. Jack, 69 Kan. 387, 76 Pac. ' Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 50 
 
 911. Law ed. 652, 26 Sup. Ct. 370. 
 
 " People V. Court of General Ses- * People v. Argo, 237 111. 173, 86 N. 
 
 sions &c., 96 App. Div. (N. Y.) 201, E. 679. 
 
 ^9 X. Y. Supp. 364; People v. "United States v. Simon, 146 Fed. 
 
 O'Brien, 176 N. Y. 253, 68 N. E. 353, 89. 
 afif'g, 80 N. Y. Supp. 816.
 
 § 248 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 452 
 
 within a statute which provides that, in a criminal prosecution, no 
 evidence shall be given against the accused of any statement made 
 by him as a witness on a legal examination/^ 
 
 § 248. Interest and bias of the witness as impeachment. — The 
 bias of the witness and his interest in the event of the prosecution 
 are not collateral, and may always be proved to enable the jury 
 to estimate his credibility. They may be proved by his own tes- 
 timony upon cross-examination or by independent evidence. ^^ 
 Thus, for example, the prosecution may show that its witness has, 
 on his direct examination, unexpectedly proved hostile, and may 
 then show by other witnesses that the biased witness was at one 
 time ready and willing to testify against the prisoner.^^ 
 
 On the other hand the defendant may show that he had a diffi- 
 culty with one of the witnesses for the state. ^^ He may show that 
 the witnesses for the prosecution hated him and from his evidence 
 the jury may infer that this hatred colored, the testimony.^* The 
 bias of the witness may be shown, either by independent testi- 
 mony or by questions put to him upon his examination. He may 
 be interrogated as to his sympathy with the prisoner,^^ or as to his 
 hostility towards him.^® Thus one accused of illegal dealing in 
 liquors may show that one of the prosecuting witnesses had been 
 convicted of an illegal sale and that the accused was a witness 
 against him.^^ 
 
 In proving bias or interest by questions put to the witness re- 
 
 " State V. Legg, 59 W. Va. 315, 53 '* State v. Barber, 13 Idaho 65, 88 
 
 S. E. 545, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 115211. Pac. 418. 
 
 " Sage V. State, 127 Ind. 15, 28, 26 " State v. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 
 N. E. 667; Bennett v. State, 28 Tex. 15 S. W. 141; Porch v. State, 51 Tex. 
 App. 539, 13 S. W. 1005; Eldridge v. Cr. 7, 99 S. W. 1122. 
 State, 27 Fla. 162, 9 So. 448; Davis "A witness who testifies for the 
 V. State, 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. 984; defendant may be asked if he did not 
 People V. Mallon, 116 App. Div. 425, leave the state to enable the accused 
 loi N. Y. S. 814; Wheeler v. State, 79 to procure a continuance. Sage v. 
 Neb. 491, 113 N. W. 253; State v. State, 127 Ind. 15, 26 N. E. 667; Bur- 
 Darling, 202 Mo. 150, 100 S. W. 631. nett v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 515, 112 S. 
 
 '^ See Underbill on Ev., § 340. W. 74. 
 
 "Jordan v. State, 79 Ala. 9, 12; "Vann v. State, 140 Ala. 122, 37 
 
 Lyle v. State, 21 Tex. App. 153, 17 So. 158. 
 S. W. 425; Scott V. State, 113 Ala. 64, 
 21 So. 425.
 
 453 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. § 248 
 
 garding his previous statements out of court indicating bias, it is 
 necessary to state details of time, place and person attendant upon 
 such declarations/* If the witness denies having uttered the 
 statement indicating bias, or if he refuses to answer or answers 
 evasively, the fact of bias may be proved by other witnesses.^* 
 Under modern rules the possession of an actual pecuniary interest 
 in the outcome of an action is not a valid objection to the compe- 
 tency of a witness. But it may always be shown, even in a crimi- 
 nal proceeding, as a fact from which the jury may infer that the 
 witness is biased. So a detective testifying against the accused 
 may be asked if he had received any money, or if he expected to 
 be paid for acting as a detective.^** 
 
 So, also, an attorney testifying against the accused may be 
 asked if he had received a retainer in the case to assist in its pros- 
 ecution and as to what capacity he was retained. If he denies 
 these facts, they may be shown by other evidence.^^ 
 
 It may always be shown that a witness testifying for the ac- 
 cused is related to him, either by blood or marriage. And the 
 jury may, with propriety, be warned that they should einploy 
 great caution in weighing the testimony of such a person,"^ un- 
 
 " Queen's Case, 2 Br. & Bing. 284, witness has frequently testified for 
 
 311, 22 R. R. 662; Crumpton v. State, the state in similar criminal prosecu- 
 
 52 Ark. 273, 12 S. W. 563 ; State v. tions is not admissible as impeach- 
 
 Brown, 28 Ore. 147, 41 Pac. 1042. It ment. Mitchell v. State, 94 Ala. 68, 
 
 is otherwise when the bias is to be 10 So. 518; Lea v. State, 64 Miss. 294, 
 
 proved by independent testimony i So. 244; Union v. State (Ga. App., 
 
 without interrogating the witness. 1909), 66 S. E. 24. 
 
 People V. Brooks, 131 N. Y. 321, 30 N. "^ Miller v. Territory, 15 Okla. 422, 
 
 E. 189. 85 Pac. 239, reversed in 149 Fed. 330, 
 
 " State V. McFarlain, 41 La. Ann. 79 C. C. A. 268. 
 
 686, 6 So. 728 ; Eldridge v. State, 27 "" Smith v. State, 143 Ind. 685, 42 
 
 Fla. 162, 9 So. 448; Bennett v. State, N. E. 913; State v. Calkins, ^2) Iowa 
 
 28 Tex. App. 539, 13 S. W. 1005; 128, 131, 34 N. W. '7^^', United States 
 
 State v. Kelley, 45 S. Car. 659, 668, v. Ford, zz Fed. 861 ; State v. Hilsa- 
 
 24 S. E. 45 ; State v. Darling, 202 Mo. beck, 132 Mo. 348, 34 S. W. 38 ; State 
 
 150, 100 S. W. 631. V. Byers, 100 N. Car. 512, 6 S. E. 420; 
 
 ^ State V. Tosney, 26 Minn. 262, 263, Simpson v. State, 78 Ga. 91 ; State v. 
 
 264, 3 N. W. 345; Heldt v. State, 20 Farrell, 82 Iowa 553, 48 N. W. 940. 
 
 Xeb. 492, 30 N. W. 626, 57 Am. 835n; Contra, People v. Shattuck, 109 Cal. 
 
 Rivers v. State, 97 Ala. ^2, 12 So. 434. 673, 42 Pac. 315. In Mj-ers v. State, 
 
 Cj. State V. Barber, 2 Kan. App. 679, 97 Ga. 76, 25 S. E. 252, it was held 
 
 43 Pac. 800. But the mere fact that a that the bare fact of a reward having 
 
 been offered for the apprehension of
 
 § 248 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 454 
 
 less the inference of bias is overcome by evidence which shows to 
 their satisfaction that the witness and the accused are on bad 
 terms. 
 
 The relations of the witness and the decedent in a murder trial 
 are always relevant. The witness may be compelled to disclose 
 his or her relations with the decedent, though they were improper 
 and they may be shown by other witnesses. If the witness is 
 questioned and denies that he knew the decedent at all, he may be 
 contradicted by other witnesses: the object of evidence to prove 
 that there existed improper relations between decedent and the 
 witness not being to blacken his or her character but to show bias 
 and prejudice against the accused. 
 
 Evidence of relations which are entirely proper, for example, 
 that the witness was the wife, sister or daughter of the decedent, 
 is always competent.-^ 
 
 On the other hand inasmuch as the friendly feeling of the pros- 
 ecuting witness for the accused cannot be considered by the jury 
 in arriving at their verdict it is not allowable for the accused to 
 prove that the prosecuting witness did not have the accused ar- 
 rested of his own free will or that he bore the accused no malice 
 or ill will."* 
 
 The bias of a witness in favor of the accused may have been 
 created by means of threats made or bribes offered by him or by 
 some one connected with him. The fact that a witness has been 
 thus tampered with does not exclude his testimony. But the 
 bribeiy of or attempts to bribe a witness either to testify or to re- 
 main silent when upon the stand are always relevant, ^^ though it 
 is for the jury to determine what effect, if any, the threats or 
 bribes have had upon the credibility of the wntness.^'' 
 
 Under the rule that the bias or interest of the witness may be 
 shown, it is competent to prove, either by his cross-examination 
 or by the evidence of another witness, that a witness for the state 
 
 the accused may be given in evidence ^ State v. Cook, 13 Idaho 45, 88 Pac. 
 
 as affecting the credibility of the virit- 240. 
 
 nesses for the prosecution. "" A witness may be impeached by 
 
 ^ Leach v. Commonwealth, 23 Ky. showing his refusal to attend the 
 
 L. 1016, 112 S. W. 595. funeral of a person murdered by con- 
 
 "* State V. De Hart, 38 Mont. 211, spirators under circumstances of un- 
 
 99 Pac. 438. usual brutality. Holtz v. State, 76 
 
 Wis. 99, 44 N. W. 1 107, inc.
 
 455 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES. § 248 
 
 knows that he himself, is accused of the crime for which the ac- 
 cused is being tried. This often appears without the cjuestion be- 
 ing put where one accompHce testifies against another and, for 
 that reason there exists the well-known rule that a conviction 
 cannot be had upon accomplice's evidence, alone. 
 
 The inference may be very strong that the witness Is endeavor- 
 ing to fasten the crime upon the accused on trial in order to ex- 
 culpate himself, and if this does not appear from the testimony 
 of the witness, counsel for the accused may bring it out to effect 
 his credibility.-^ 
 
 The jury have no right, however, to determine the credibility 
 of the witness upon his bias or prejudice alone. The bias or prej- 
 udice of the witness are only circumstances to be considered in 
 connection with other circumstances as his intelligence, his man- 
 ner of testifying and his conduct on the witness-stand. Though 
 a witness may be friendly to the accused, closely related to him, or 
 very intimate with him, it does not follow that he will perjure 
 himself to secure his acquittal, for the conscience of the witness, 
 or his regard for the binding obligation of his oath, or his fear of 
 punishment in case he shall swear falsely, may overcome his 
 prejudice in favor of the accused and prompt him to tell the truth. 
 
 Bias or prejudice is no more conclusive of the lack of veracity 
 on the part of the witness than is his prior bad reputation and 
 hence it is reversible error for the court to instruct the jury that 
 they may disregard the testimony of a witness who is biased. The 
 proper instruction is that they may, in determining the credibility 
 of witnesses, consider among other circumstances of proof of 
 bias or prejudice or interest in the outcome of the trial."'* 
 
 Where the impeachment of a witness is attempted, the accused 
 is entitled to a charge by the court. If direct impeachment has 
 not been attempted by some of the methods indicated In this chap- 
 ter, the court may charge to that effect, expressly pointing out the 
 methods of possible impeachment. A general charge that a wit- 
 
 " State V. Rosa, 71 N. J. L. 316, 58 Mo. 391, 6r S. W. 187; Van Burcn v. 
 
 Atl. loio. State, 63 Neb. 453, 88 N. W. 671; 
 
 "' People V. Amaya, 134 Cal. 531, 66 State v. Hoshor, 26 Wash. 643, 67 Pac. 
 
 Pac. 794; State v. Carey, 23 Ind. App. 386; State v. Dickey, 48 W. Va. 325, 
 
 378, 55 N. E. 261 ; State v. Adair, 160 37 S. E. 695.
 
 248 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 456 
 
 ness has not been impeached invades the province of the jury and 
 may properly be refused."" 
 
 The court may instruct the jury that they may disregard the 
 evidence of a witness if they determine that he has been success- 
 fully impeached, unless upon the whole evidence, they find that he 
 has been corroborated to their satisfaction.^" The jury, however, 
 are not at liberty to arbitrarily regard or disregard any evidence 
 which is ojflfered to impeach a witness and should be so instruct- 
 ed.^^ They must consider the credibility of the evidence of the 
 witness whose impeachment has been attempted and they may be- 
 lieve it, notwithstanding, that an attempt has been made to im- 
 peach him.^^ 
 
 ""Rambo v. State, 134 Ala. 71, 32 
 So. 650; Prior v. State, 99 Ala. 196, 13 
 So. 681 ; State v. Breckenridge, 33 
 La. Ann. 310. 
 
 ^"Osborn v. State, 125 Ala. 106, 27 
 So. 758; Loerh v. People, 132 111. 504, 
 24 N. E. 68; State v. Goforth, 136 
 Mo. Ill, 37 S. W. 8or. 
 
 ^^ Hall V. State, 130 Ala. 45, 30 So. 
 422; Hufif V. State, 104 Ga. 521, 30 
 S. E. 808. 
 
 ^- Plummer v. State, 1 1 1 Ga. 839, 36 
 S. E. 233; State v. Johnagen, 53 Iowa 
 250, 5 N. W. 176; People v. Lyons, 51 
 Mich. 215, 16 N. W. 380; Owens v. 
 State, 80 Miss. 499, 32 So. 152; Strong 
 
 V. State, 61 Neb. 35, 84 N. W. 410. 
 An instruction that, if the jury are 
 satisfied from the evidence that a wit- 
 ness has been impeached, or they have 
 a reasonable doubt on account of 
 such evidence as to his credibility, his 
 testimony should be disregarded ex- 
 cept as for as it has been corroborated 
 by credible witnesses, is properly re- 
 fused, a^ it directs, instead of permits, 
 the jury to disregard the testimony, 
 and excludes corroboration by cir- 
 cumstances and documents. Niezor- 
 awski V. State, 131 Wis. 166, 11 1 N. 
 W. 250.
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 
 THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. 
 
 § 249. The subpoena — Witness fees. § 255. Obstructing the attendance of 
 
 250. Constitutional right of the ac- witnesses. 
 
 cused to compulsory process 256. Change of venue for the con- 
 to procure the attendance of venience of witnesses, 
 witnesses. - 257. The intentional absence of 
 
 251. Subpoena duces tecum. witnesses — When it consti- 
 
 252. Validity of reasons for not tutes a contempt of court. 
 
 producing writings. 258. Privilege of witnesses from 
 
 253. Service of- the subpoena and civil arrest and from service 
 
 time allowed to witnesses. of civil process. 
 
 254. Recognizance to secure the at- 259. Attendance of witnesses in 
 
 tendance of witnesses where custody, 
 
 the hearing is postponed. 
 
 § 249. The subpoena — Witness fees. — The power of the court to 
 hear testimony and to determine controversies confers by imphca- 
 tion at common law the further power to require and to compel 
 the production of evidence for or against the controverted facts. 
 The judicial power to summon witnesses is commonly exercised 
 by the employment of a subpoena, which has been defined as a 
 "judicial writ, directed to the witness, commanding him to ap- 
 pear at the court, to testify what he knows in the cause therein 
 described, pending in such court, under a certain penalty men- 
 tioned in the writ."^ In the absence of statute the state is under 
 no obligations to pay the fees or expenses of its witnesses or of 
 the witnesses for the accused. 
 
 It is conceived to be the duty of every citizen to assist gratu- 
 itously so far as lies in his power in procuring the punishment of 
 
 ^ Grecnl. on Ev., § 309. The attend- cured by a subpoena, or order in the 
 
 ance of a witness before a commis- nature of one. State v. Bourne, 21 
 
 sioncr, who has been appointed to take Ore. 218, 27 Pac. 1048; Donnelly v. 
 
 his deposition by a court which has County, 7 Iowa 419. 
 received letters rogatory, may be se- 
 
 457
 
 S 250 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 458 
 
 wrong-doers." Hence, a statute providing; that a witness in a 
 criminal case is not entitled to fees does not conflict with a consti- 
 tutional guarantee that no man's services shall be demanded or 
 taken by the state without projDer compensation.^ 
 
 ? 250. Constitutional right of the accused to compulsory process 
 to procure the attendance of witnesses. — The prisoner, e\en though 
 on trial for his life, possessed, at common law, no absolute right 
 to command the process of the court to secure the attendance 
 of his witnesses, while if they voluntarily attended he was not 
 permitted to examine them.* By the provisions of the federal 
 constitution and those of the several states, the right to com- 
 pulsory process to obtain the attendance of witnesses is secured 
 to the accused,^ and he is thus placed on an equality with the 
 state." If he is unable to pay the expense of serving a subpoena, 
 the court may direct a court officer to serve it.'^ The courts con- 
 struing these constitutional enactments hold that they merely 
 confer a right to a subpoena or if this is not obeyed to further 
 compulsory process such as a recognizance or bench warrant.* 
 
 ' Commissioners v. Ballinger, 20 
 Kan. 590; State v. Massey, 104 N. 
 Car. 877, ID S. E. 608. In North Car- 
 olina by custom tlie prisoner if found 
 guilty was taxed with the fees for the 
 state's witnesses. Afterwards the mat- 
 ter was regulated by statute. For the 
 statutes compelling the state to pay 
 the fees of its witnesses, see Barrett 
 V. State, 24 Ala. 74; Briggs v. Cole- 
 man, 51 Ala. 561; Herrick, Ex parte, 
 78 Ky. 23; Sargent v. Cavis, 36 Cal. 
 552; Hall V. County Com'rs., 82 Md. 
 618, 34 Atl. 771, 51 Am. St. 484, 32 L. 
 R. A. 449. 
 
 ^ Daly V. Multnomah Co., 14 Ore. 
 20, 12 Pac. 11; United States v. Bur- 
 ling, 4 Biss. 509, 25 Fed. Cas. 15010; 
 State V. Massey, 104 X. Car. 877, 10 
 S. E. 608. 
 
 * State V. Hornsby, 8 Rob. (La.) 
 554, 41 Am. Dec. 305; United States 
 
 V. Reid, 12 How. (U. S.) 361, 13 L. 
 ed. 1023, 4 Bl. Com. 355, 358, 359. 
 
 ° West V. State, i Wis. 209 ; United 
 States V. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. I4692d; 
 United States v. Kenneally, 26 Fed. 
 Cas. 15522, 5 Biss. 122. 
 
 * State V. Massey, 104 X. Car. 877, 
 ID S. E. 608. 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Lindsey, 2 Ches. 
 Co. (Pa.) 268; Chamberlain, Ex 
 parte, 4 Cow. (X. Y.) 49. See Com- 
 monwealth V. Williams, 13 Mass. 501 ; 
 State V. Archer, 54 N. H. 465, in 
 which the rule is restricted to capital 
 cases. And where one accused of a 
 capital crime trusted to counsel to 
 summon his witnesses, which the lat- 
 ter neglected to do, it was held that 
 the trial must be postponed until the 
 witnesses could be subpoenaed. State 
 V. Lewis, 9 Mo. App. 321. 
 
 * State V. Pope, 78 S. Car. 264, 58 
 S. E. 815.
 
 459 
 
 ATTEXDAXCE OF WITXESSES. 
 
 250 
 
 The accused is not entitled to an allowance for his expenses in 
 summoning witnesses or procuring depositions,® unless it is ex- 
 pressly provided by statute that such expenses shall be paid by 
 the county if he is acquitted/" 
 
 It is always for the trial judge to determine whether the ac- 
 cused, when he applies for compulsory process for the procurement 
 of witnesses at the expense of the state, has properl}^ complied 
 with the requirements of the statute, and whether the accused is 
 making the application in good faith. ^^ The necessity and ma- 
 teriality of the evidence of the witness for whom compulsory 
 process is asked must be made to appear,^" 
 
 The prisoner must be granted the writ whenever he applies 
 for it during the trial,^^ though he should do so- at the earliest 
 reasonable opportunity.^* His constitutional right must be exer- 
 cised in conformity with recognized legal rules. It does not apply 
 to procure the personal attendance of a witness who resides out 
 of the jurisdiction of the court,^^ or to those within it whose 
 deposition in favor of the prisoner can easily be procured if they 
 are unable to attend in person,^® But any statute which prescribes 
 
 ° State V. Hornsby, 8 Rob. (La.) 
 554, 41 Am. Dec. 305. 
 
 ^^ State V. Massey, 104 N. Car. 877, 
 10 S. E. 608; State v. Willis, 79 Iowa 
 326, 44 X. W. 699; Carpenter v. Peo- 
 ple, 3 Gilm. (111.) 147; Bennett v. 
 Kroth, ij Kan. 235, 15 Pac. 221, i 
 Am. St. 248; Little v. Todd, 3 Rich. 
 (S. Car.) 91; Howell v. Blackwell, 
 7 Ga. 443 ; Donnelly v. County, 7 Iowa 
 419; Commonwealth v. Williams, 13 
 Mass. 501 ; Chamberlain, Ex parte, 4 
 Cow. (X. Y.) 49. In Chamberlain, Ex 
 parte, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 49, a distinction 
 was made between witnesses for the 
 accused in a case of felony and in a 
 case of misdemeanor, the court hold- 
 ing that a witness in the former case 
 must attend, when subpoenaed by the 
 accused, without payment of fees, 
 while in the latter he need not. But 
 this distinction, if ever generally rec- 
 ognized, has long since been abolished 
 
 either by express statute or well rec- 
 ognized practice. 
 
 "Jenkins v. State, 31 Fla. 190, 12 
 So. 680; State V. Godard, 4 Idaho 
 750, 44 Pac. 643. 
 
 ^^ State V. Godard, 4 Idaho 750, 44 
 Pac. 643. 
 
 ^^ Edmondson v. State, 43 Tex. 230 ; 
 Green v. State, 17 Fla. 669. Cf. State 
 V. Thornton, 49 La. Ann. 1007, 22 So. 
 315. 
 
 "Jenkins v. State, 31 Fla. 190, 12 
 So. 680. 
 
 " State V. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, 4 S. 
 W. 931; State V. Butler, 67 Mo. 59; 
 State V. Yetzer, 97 Iowa 423, 66 N. 
 W. 737; State V. Wilcox, 21 S. Dak. 
 532, 114 X. W. 687. 
 
 " Willard v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. 
 456, 22 Pac. 1 120. Cf. State v. Berk- 
 ley, 92 Mo. 41, 4 S. W. 24. In such 
 a case the accused has an absolute 
 right to a commission to take testi-
 
 § 251 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 460 
 
 that a criminal trial shall not be postponed if either party consents 
 that the facts contained in affidavits for a continuance shall be 
 regarded as the evidence of the absent witness, is unconstitutional, 
 as it deprives the accused of his constitutional right to compulsory- 
 process." 
 
 The court will grant the accused an attachment for a witness 
 only when his evidence is material/*^ and it affirmatively appears 
 he will testify in favor of the accused/® and when it also appears 
 that he has been summoned, or that diligence has been used to 
 secure his attendance, that he is in the state, and that his early 
 presence can be secured. "° 
 
 A statute or rule of court limiting the number of subpoenas for 
 witnesses to which one accused of felony is entitled is unconstitu- 
 tional."^ But a rule which authorizes the court to refuse the ac- 
 cused compulsory process unless he shall show the witnesses are 
 necessary for his defense and that their testimony is material is 
 not unconstitutional."^ 
 
 §251. Subpoena duces tecum. — Where the production of docu- 
 mentary evidence in the possession of the witness is required, a 
 subpoena duces tecum is employed, commanding him to search 
 for and bring to court certain books or papers which are specifi- 
 cally described, with all documents and writing which may be 
 evidence in the case. The papers are required to be stated with 
 that degree of certainty which is practicable under the circum- 
 
 mony. State v. Hornsby, 8 Rob. ^° State v. Pope, 78 S. Car. 264, 58 
 
 (La.) 554, 41 Am. Dec. 305. And it S. E. 815. 
 
 is not error for the court to exercise "° State v. Johnson, 41 La. Ann. 574, 
 
 its discretion in refusing to summon 7 So. 670. If the venue is changed on 
 
 witnesses for the defendant at the the motion of the prosecution, the 
 
 public expense, where it appears that court may make it a condition that 
 
 their evidence is cumulative or imma- the traveling expenses of the defend- 
 
 terial. Goldsby v. United States, 160 ant's witnesses, who cannot pay their 
 
 U. S. 70, 40 L. ed. 343, 16 Sup. Ct. own expenses, shall be provided for. 
 
 216; State v. O'Brien, 18 Mont, i, 43 People v. Baker, 3 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 
 
 Pac. 1091, 44 Fac. 399; State v. 42. 
 
 Graves, 13 Wash. 485, 43 Pac. 376. ^ State v. Gideon, 119 Mo. 94, 24 
 
 " State v. Berkley, 92 Mo. 41, 4 S. S. W. 748, 41 Am. St. 634r-. 
 
 W. 24; Graham v. State, 50 Ark. 161, "State v. O'Brien, 18 Mont, i, 43 
 
 6 S. W. 721. Pac. 109T, 44 Pac. 399; State v. 
 
 "People v. Marseiler, 70 Cal. 98, 11 Graves, 13 Wash. 485, 43 Pac. 376. 
 Pac. 503.
 
 461 ATTEXDAXCE OF WITNESSES. § 252 
 
 stances,-" that the witness may know what is wanted of him, and 
 the court may ascertain if the subpoena has been properly obeyed."* 
 The sole object of this writ is the production of documentary evi- 
 dence, and a piece of metal or other article, or a weapon with 
 which a crime has been committed, cannot be brought into court 
 by a subpoena duces teciiin.'^ Nor can the writ be employed to 
 compel the production of writings which are not to be used as 
 evidence, but to refresh the memory of a witness."'' 
 
 § 252. Validity of reasons for not producing writings. — Disobedi- 
 ence to a subpoena duces tecum by a post-office or internal revenue 
 official is not excused by the fact that the rules of his department 
 forbid him to disclose any information contained in its records."^ 
 A witness in whose possession are papers which it is sought to 
 produce by a subpoena duces tecum, is not excusable for refusing 
 or neglecting to obey it, because the papers do not belong to him. 
 But the custodian of public records, and even of the records of a 
 private corporation will be excused from bringing the originals 
 into court because of the great inconvenience which would cer- 
 tainly result, and because the writings can generally be proved in 
 a satisfactory manner by authenticated copies."* 
 
 The mere fact that the witness brings the documents in court, 
 in response to the subpoena, does not determine their admissi- 
 bility as evidence.^'' 
 
 Nor will the witness be compelled to produce the documents, 
 
 ^Starrer, In re, 63 Fed. 564; Mur- Steel &c. Co. v. North Branch &c. 
 
 ray v. Louisiana, 163 U. S. lOi, 41 L. Co., 48 Fed. 191. 
 
 ed. 87, 16 Sup. Ct. 990 ; Ex parte, ^ United States v. Tilden, 10 Ben. 
 
 Jaynes, 70 Cal. 638, 12 Pac. 117; Ex 566, 28 Fed. Cas. 16522. While a sub- 
 
 parte, Brown, 72 Mo. 83, 27 Am. 426. poena duces tecum is unreturned or 
 
 "' It is the duty of the person to unserved, no second subpoena will be 
 
 whom the writ is directed to make a valid for the same purpose. Elting v. 
 
 reasonable search for the documents United States, 27 Ct. CI. 158. 
 
 required if they are in his possession. ^^ Rice v. Rice, 47 N. J. Eq. 559, 21 
 
 United States v. Babcock, 3 Dill. 566, Atl. 286, 11 L. R. A. 59m. Hirsch, In 
 
 570, 571, 24 Fed. Cas. 14484; Elting r^ 74 Fed. 928. 
 
 v. United States, 27 Ct. CI. 158; =^ Corbett v. Gibson, 16 Blatchf. 334. 
 
 United States v. Hunter, 15 Fed. 712. ^ Rex v. Dixon, 3 Burr. 1687; 
 
 ''^ In re Shepard, 18 Blatchf. 225; Campl)cll v. Dalhousie, L. R. i II. L. 
 
 Shcphard, In re, 3 Fed. 12; Johnson Sc. App. 462; Mott v. Consumers' Ice 
 
 Co., 52 How. (N. Y.) Fr. 244.
 
 § 253 CRIMINAL EVIDEKCE. 462 
 
 though he have them \vi*^^h him in court, if he can show a lawful 
 or reasonable reason for withholding them.^'' The sufficiency and 
 validit}' of the reason for not producing a writing are for the 
 court."^ The mere assertion of the witness that writings are not 
 in his possession does not excuse their non-production, if it ap- 
 pears they were recently in his hands and he fails to account 
 for their disappearance.^" 
 
 ^ 253. Service of the subpoena and time allowed to witnesses. — 
 
 The subpccna should, in justice to the witness, be seasonably 
 served. He should be given a reasonable opportunity so to ar- 
 range his business that it will not suffer during his absence.^^ It 
 is now usually enacted by statute that a witness shall be allowed 
 one day's time for each twenty miles he is compelled to travel 
 from his residence to the court where his testimony is needed. At 
 least one day's notice is necessary in every case. The witness 
 must be served with the subpoena in person, so that being thus in- 
 formed of its contents, he may be chargeable with contempt if he 
 disobey it. To constitute a personal service, the subpoena should 
 be shown to the witness, and a copy or a ticket containing a con- 
 cise summary of its contents should be delivered to him, accom- 
 panied by his fees and an oral statement of what the paper is."'''* 
 A subpoena is only valid to secure the attendance of a witness in 
 the particular proceeding in which it issues. It is inoperative to 
 secure his presence at a later term to which the trial has been ad- 
 journed.^^ 
 
 g 254. Recognizance to secure the attendance of witnesses where 
 the hearing is postponed. — Where the accused on the preliminary 
 examination has been committed for trial, or is held to await the 
 action of the grand jury, or where the trial is continued, it is 
 sometimes the practice to require a witness to give his recog- 
 nizance or personal bond in order that his future attendance at 
 
 '"Lane v. Cole, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) '"Fenlon v. Dempsey, 21 Abb. N. 
 
 680; Central Nat. Bank v. Arthur, 2 Cas. 291. 
 
 Sweeney (N. Y.) 194. "' Hughbanks, lu re, 44 Kan. 105, 24 
 
 ^^ Bull V. Loveland, 10 Pick. (Mass.) Pac. 75. 
 
 9; Lane v. Cole, 12 Barb. (N. Y.) " See Undcrhill on Evidence § 281a. 
 
 680. '' Sapp V. King, 66 Tex. 570, i S. W. 
 
 466.
 
 463 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. § 254 
 
 the trial may be secured.'^*' It is in the discretion of the court to 
 accept sureties for the attendance of the witness, and if they are 
 not procurable, or if the witness refuses to give his recognizance, 
 the court may order that he shall be kept in custody until the 
 trial. ^' This is doubtless a correct statement of the practice as it 
 obtained at common law, but the modern tendency is to regard 
 such a mode of procedure as extremely oppressive and unjust. 
 It is certainly unfair to an innocent person, whose only offense 
 is his accidental presence at the time and place of a crime, to in- 
 carcerate him because he is unable to give sureties for his appear- 
 ance as a witness on the trial. ^^ Hence it is sometimes provided 
 by statute that a witness who is unable to give sureties for his 
 appearance may be released from custody on giving his deposi- 
 tion.^" And in any case it may be that there is an abuse of the 
 judicial discretion if a witness is committed to jail solely because 
 he cannot give bail for his appearance unless there is some proof 
 of an intention on his part not to appear and testify.*" 
 
 § 255. Obstructing the attendance of witnesses. — At the common 
 law,*^ and now frequently by statute, in many of the states, any at- 
 tempf*^ to retard or to prevent the attendance of witnesses called 
 to testify in either civil or criminal proceedings,*^ or the act of 
 
 '" Bickley v. Commonwealth, 2 J. J. deposition is admissible as evidence 
 
 Marsh. (Ky.) 572; State v. Grace, 18 against the accused unless he had a 
 
 Minn. 398; Means v. State, 10 Tex. full opportunity to confront the wit- 
 
 App. 16, 38 Am. 640; Shaw, Ex parte, ness and to cross-examine him at the 
 
 61 Cal. 58; United States v. Durling, previous hearing. 
 
 4 Biss. 509, 25 Fed. Cas. 15010. " State v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398. 
 
 " 2 Hale P. C. 282 ; Roscoe Cr. Ev. " Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 14 
 
 p. 87; Fawcet v. Linthecum, 7 Ohio Gray (Mass.) 87; State v. Carpenter, 
 
 Cir. Ct. 141 ; State v. Grace, 18 Minn. 20 Vt. 9, 74 Am. Dec. 665. 
 
 398; Petrie, In re, i Kan. App. 184, ^- State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 30 Am. 
 
 40 Pac. 118. Dec. 450. 
 
 "' See remarks of court in Hall v. " 4 Bl. Com. 129 ; State v. Keyes, 8 
 
 Somerset County, 82 Md. 618, on p. Vt. 57, 30 Am. Dec. 450 (even when 
 
 623, 34 Atl. 771, 51 Am. St. 484, 32 L. the witness has not been served with 
 
 R. A. 449. a subpoena) ; State v. Carpenter, 20 
 
 ""State v. Grace, 18 Minn. 398; Vt. 9; United States v. Kee, 39 Fed. 
 
 People v. Lee, 49 Cal. 37 ; Bickley v. 603 ; State v. Ames, 64 Me. 386 ; State 
 
 Commonwealth, 2 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) v. Bailer, 26 W. Va. 90, 53 Am. 66; 
 
 572. It is doubtful, however, if the (in which the character of an at-
 
 § 255 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 464 
 
 a party in advising a witness not to answer any question put to 
 him/* is a misdemeanor. 
 
 It is immaterial that the attempt was unsuccessful,*^ or that 
 the obstructor refrained from the employment of violence or force 
 and contined himself wholly to threats or scurrilous language," 
 got the witness intoxicated, so that he was unable to attend,*^ or 
 employed tlie machinery of the criminal law to prevent his at- 
 tendance l)y preferring an unfounded charge against him, and, 
 in collusion with a magistrate, procured his imprisonment.'*'* The 
 Avitness may obtain a warrant for the arrest of the party who has 
 obstructed him,*'' or the person who has thus illegally and ma- 
 liciously hindered the attendance of the witness may be indicted 
 by the grand jury.''''° 
 
 Intimidating a witness from testifying against one accused of 
 felony, though a misdemeanor, does not make the offender an 
 accessory to the felony. °^ 
 
 The rules and principles laid down above are usually invoked 
 in cases where private persons attempt to influence witnesses who 
 were called to testify against the accused. They are, of course, 
 equally applicable where police ofHcials or public prosecuting of- 
 ficers practice similar methods of intimidation upon the witness 
 for the accused. And in any event it is extremely improper to 
 allow a public prosecutor to endeavor to dissuade witnesses for 
 the accused from appearing and testifying, even though he may 
 
 tempt to obstruct a witness is dis- ^* United States v. Kindred, 4 
 
 cussed) ; Rex v. Lawley, 2 Str. 904. Hughes (U. S.) 493. 
 
 The fact that the witness was ex- ■"• Magnay v. Burt, 5 Q. B. 381. 
 
 pected to testify, even though he has ^° It is not necessary that the record 
 
 not been subpoenaed, and is not under of the case in which the witness was 
 
 recognizance to appear, is sufficient, to testify, State v. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 
 
 State V. Horner, i Marv. (Del.) 504, 9, or the fact that the evidence of 
 
 26 Atl. "/Z^ 41 Atl. 139. the witness was material, Common- 
 
 "Gandy v. State, 22, Neb. 436, 36 N. wealth v. Reynolds, 14 Gray. (Mass.) 
 
 W. 817; Per row v. State, 67 Miss. 87, 74 Am. Dec. 665, or the particular 
 
 365, 7 So. 349. method used to intimidate or obstruct 
 
 *^ Russell on Cr., p. 182; Gandy v. him, State v. Ames, 64 Me. 386, shall 
 
 State, 22, Neb. 436, 36 N. W. 817; be set forth in the indictment. 
 
 State V. Carpenter, 20 Vt. 9. ^^ Reg. v. Chappie, 9 C & P. 355. A 
 
 ^^ Reg. V. Onslow, 12 Cox C. C. 358 ; person is not guilty of intimidating or 
 
 Charlton's Case, 2 Myl. & Cr. 316. impeding a witness who beats him af- 
 
 "" State V. Holt, 84 Me. 509, 24 Atl. ter he has testified. United States v 
 
 951- Thomas, 47 Fed. 807; United States 
 
 V. Kee, 39 Fed. 603.
 
 465 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. §§ 256, 257 
 
 have the best of grounds to believe that they are unreHable and 
 that they will perjure themselves. 
 
 § 256. Change of venue for the convenience of witnesses. — In 
 civil cases in order to avoid the expenditure of large sums of 
 money as mileage, or for the taking of depositions, it is very fre- 
 quently provided by statute that, where the convenience of the 
 witnesses requires it, the venue or place of trial of the action may 
 be changed. But as a general rule, in criminal cases no change 
 of venue can be procured solely for the convenience of witnesses.^^ 
 
 § 257. The intentional absence of witnesses — When it constitutes 
 a contempt of court. — Every witness who has been properly sum- 
 moned to attend and give testimony is guilty of a contempt of 
 court if he intentionally fails, neglects or refuses to attend.^^ The 
 court may, upon the application of the party by whom he has 
 been summoned, grant an ex parte and immediate order for his 
 arrest upon facts showing that his contempt is intentional and 
 manifest.'"' But usually an attachment will issue only after the 
 granting and the return of a preliminary order to show cause.^^ 
 The subject is usually regulated by statute. Where this is not 
 the case the power to grant an attachment is discretionary.^" At 
 common law a witness is not in contempt who fails to attend on 
 his subpoena summoning him to appear before the grand jury. He 
 must be summoned to appear in court to give evidence before the 
 grand jury." 
 
 It is never essential that the trial should have been begun, or 
 that the witness should have been called in open court before 
 an attachment will issue to compel his presence. But it must be 
 satisfactorily proved that he is wilfully disobedient in absenting 
 
 "People V. Harris, 4 Denio. (N. Andrews v. Andrews, 2 John. Cas. 
 
 Y.) 150. (N. Y.) 109; People v. Vermilyea, 7 
 
 '^Gunn, In re, 50 Kan. 155, 2>2 Pac. Cow. (N. Y.) 108. 
 
 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; People v. "'Wilson v. State, 57 Ind. 71; Green 
 
 Brown, 46 Hun (N. Y.) 320; Com- v. State, 17 Fla. 669; State v. Hopper, 
 
 monwealth v. Carter, 11 Pick. 71 Mo. 425. 
 
 (Mass.) 277; Stephens v. People, 19 °" State v. Hillstock, 45 La. .Ann. 
 
 N. Y. 549; Baldwin v. State, 126 Ind. 298, 12 So. 352. 
 
 24, 25 X. E. 820. " Baldwin v. State, 126 Ind. 24, 25 
 
 " State V. Trumbull, 4 \. J. L. 139: X. E. 820. 
 30 — Underhill Crim. Ev.
 
 § 258 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. • 466 
 
 himself.^^ The party must move promptly for an attachment to 
 bring the witness before the court. The apphcation must be 
 founded upon affidavits showing facts sufficient to constitute a 
 prompt, seasonable and personal service of the subpoen?^'''' and 
 the payment or tender of all proper and necessary fees. A writ 
 of attachment for contempt is an extraordinary remedy which, in 
 the absence of a statute, is wholly in the discretion of the court, 
 and it should issue only upon evidence that is reasonably clear 
 and convincing, that its issuance is needed and that the evidence 
 of the witness is not cumulative, is material,*"' and that due dili- 
 gence has been employed,*'^ though the immateriality of his evi- 
 dence is no defense for a witness who distinctly refuses to obey a 
 subpoena. So also it must appear that the witnesses would be phys- 
 ically able to attend if the attachment were to issue.*'" Every .per- 
 son whatever his office or dignity, is bound to appear and testify 
 when he is required to do so by proper judicial process, unless 
 he has a lawful excuse. It has been held that the official engage- 
 ments of the higher officers of the government may be a sufficient 
 and legal excuse, though the dignity of the office is not."" 
 
 A witness who has received early notice to attend court may be 
 in contempt if, believing he has sufficient time, he postpones com- 
 pliance with the subpoena until the case is on trial. '^'* 
 
 § 258. Privilege of witnesses from civil arrest and from service of 
 civil process. — A witness who is beyond the jurisdiction of the 
 
 ^^ Wilson V. State, 57 Ind. 71. A 28 Pac. 961; State v. Johnson, 41 La. 
 
 member of congress is not exempt Ann. 574, 7 So. 670, and cases cited in 
 
 from subpoena by the accused in a Underbill on Ev., on page 420. 
 
 criminal case. The constitution con- " State v. Johnson, 41 La. Ann. 574, 
 
 fers upon every man charged with 7 So. 670. 
 
 crime the benefit of compulsory pro- "' State v. McCarthy, 43 La. .A.nn. 
 
 cess to obtain the attendance of wit- 541, 9 So. 493. 
 
 nesses. United States v. Cooper, 4 "' Thompson v. German Valley R. 
 
 Dall. 341, 25 Fed. Cas. 14861. R. Co., 22 N. J. Eq. iii; i Burr's 
 
 ^° State V. Allemand, 25 La. Ann. Trial 182. It is doubtful, however, if 
 
 525 ; State v. Trumbull, 4 N. J. L. the executive official can be proceeded 
 
 139. against for contempt. The party may 
 
 *" Garden v. Creswell, 2 M. & W. have a remedy in damages. Thomp- 
 
 319; State V. Trounce, 5 Wash. St. son v. German Valley R. R. Co., 
 
 804, 32 Fac. 750; People v. Van Tas- supra. 
 
 sel, 64 Hun (N. Y.) 444, 19 N. Y. S. "Jackson v. Seager, 2 D. & L. 13. 
 643; Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252,
 
 467 ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES. § 258 
 
 court is exempted from the service of a summons or other civil 
 process under the same conditions, as regards time and place, and 
 for the same reasons, as he is exempt from civil arrest while volun- 
 tarily within the jurisdictional limits of the court for the purpose 
 of testifying.*'^ Not only are witnesses privileged from service of 
 civil process during their attendance, but they are also protected 
 from arrest in civil actions during the time they are proceeding 
 to, remaining at, or returning from court,*'*' or any place where a 
 congressional or legislative investigation is in progress.^^ Non- 
 resident witnesses, in order to encourage their voluntary attend- 
 ance, and because they cannot be summoned by a subpoena, will 
 be privileged, although they may have come into the state volun- 
 tarily,^* but the rule is otherwise in the case of a witness who 
 resides within the jurisdiction and who attends voluntarily and 
 without a subpoena.*'^ 
 
 The non-resident witness will be regarded as having waived 
 his privilege if he shall voluntarily submit to arrest or fail to assert 
 his exemption and claim his liberty at his earliest opportunity. 
 He cannot then claim his privilege has been violated.'" 
 
 The trial in which he was to testify will be continued until his 
 discharge from arrest.'* The witness is privileged not only during 
 his journey to and from the place where the court is in session, 
 
 •''Hollander v. Hall, 58 Hun (N. "'Rogers v. Bullock, 3 N. J. L. 109. 
 
 Y.) 604, II N. Y. S. 521; Christian ™ Smith v. Jones, 76 Me. 138, 49 
 
 V. Williams, 35 Mo. App. 297 ; Larned Am. 598 ; Underhill on Evidence, page 
 
 V. Griffin, 12 Fed. 590; Compton v. 421, notes 5 and 6. The court in 
 
 Wilder, 40 Ohio St. 130; Massey v. which the witness is called to testify 
 
 Colville, 45 N. J. L. 119, 46 Am. 754; will, in the case of his illegal arrest. 
 
 Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. 124, 23 Am. order his immediate discharge upon 
 
 35. the proper motion supported by affida- 
 
 "' Ballinger v. Elliott, 72 N. Car. vits. Moore v. Green, 'jz N. Car. 394, 
 
 596; May V. Shumway, 16 Gray. 21 Am. 470. Though in the case of 
 
 (Mass.) 86, 77 Am. Dec. 40in; Norris inferior courts the witness may be 
 
 V. Beach, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 294; and under necessity of employing the writ 
 
 Underhill on Evidence, page 421, note of habeas corpus. Smith v. Jones, 76 
 
 2. Me. 138, 49 Am. 598. 
 
 " Thompson's Case, 122 Mass. 428, " Hurst's Cases, 4 Dall. 387, i L. cd. 
 
 23 Am. 370. 878; Commonwealth v. Daniel, 4 Pa. 
 
 ''"Christian v. Williams, 35 Mo. L. J. 49; United States v. Edme, 9 
 
 App. 297; Person v. Grier, 66 N. Y. S. & R. (Pa.) 147. 
 124, 23 Am. 35 ; Jones v. Knauss, 31 
 N. J. Eq. 211.
 
 §§ 258, 259 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 468 
 
 but also during his detention in the place where the court is held, 
 if the sole reason of his stay is his purpose to testify. The law- 
 allows a reasonahle time for the journey to and from the place 
 of trial, but does not countenance loitering,''- though a slight 
 deviation to partake of food, to see one's friends or to oljtain 
 papers which are to be used as evidence at the trial, will not nullify 
 the privilege from arrest. If the witness, after testifying, before 
 returning home, proceeds to transact business which is wdiolly 
 unconnected with his functions as a witness, his privilege ceases." 
 
 § 259. Attendance of witnesses in custody. — The attendance of a 
 witness who is incarcerated in prison,""* or who is in the military 
 or naval service, may be procured by the service of a writ of ha- 
 beas corpus ad testificandiim on the prison-keeper or officer in 
 whose immediate charge he is.'^ The application for the writ 
 should specify the nature of the suit in wdiich his attendance is 
 needed, that the evidence of the witness is material, and that the 
 witness is restrained from attending court, together with the cir- 
 cumstances of the restraint so far as they are known to the appli- 
 cant. It is not usually necessary in a criminal case that money 
 to pay the expenses of a witness in a penitentiary should be 
 tendered him.'*^ As the general rules governing the granting and 
 the service and return of this w-rit are those which obtain in con- 
 nection with the ordinary writ of habeas corpus, no elaboration 
 of them is necessary in the connection. 
 
 ^"Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. (Mass.) which was a case of a witness in jail 
 260. convicted of a murder. 
 
 ^^ See Underhill on Evidence, page '^People v. Sebring, 14 Misc. (N. 
 420, and notes. Y.) 31, 35 N. Y. S. 237, 69 N. Y. St. 
 
 '* Harris, Ex parte, 72 N. Car. 65, 612. 
 
 '"Roberts v. State, 72 Ga. 673.
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 ABSENT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. 
 
 260. Grounds for admitting the § 267. 
 
 testimony of missing wit- 
 nesses. 
 
 261. Deceased or insane witnesses 
 
 — How death of witness may 
 
 be proved. 268. 
 
 262. Witnesses sick or out of the 
 
 jurisdiction — Distinction be- 
 tween civil and criminal 
 cases. 269. 
 
 263. Mode of proving absence of 
 
 witness. 
 
 264. Absence of witness procured 
 
 by connivance — Relevancy 
 
 and use of evidence of such 270. 
 
 witness. 
 
 265. Cross-examining and confront- 271. 
 
 ing witnesses. 
 
 266. Mode of proving the evidence 
 
 of the absent witnesses — 
 Substance only need be 272. 
 stated. 
 
 Stenographer's notes, judge's 
 minutes and bill of excep- 
 tions when used to prove the 
 evidence of the absent wit- 
 ness. 
 
 Continuance when granted be- 
 cause of absence of witness 
 — Discretionary power of the 
 court. 
 
 Due diligence in summoning 
 witness must be proved — 
 The competency and mate- 
 riality of his testimony must 
 appear. 
 
 What facts the affidavit for the 
 continuance must contain. 
 
 Admissions to avoid contin- 
 uance — Constitutional right 
 of the accused to enjoy the 
 benefit of oral testimony. 
 
 Admission of facts as true to 
 avoid continuance. 
 
 § 260. Grounds for admitting the testimony of missing witnesses. 
 — The main reasons for the rejection of hearsay evidence are the 
 absence of a judicial oath and of an opportunity for the cross- 
 examination of the person who is the informant of the witness. 
 
 Where a witness who has given testimony in any judicial pro- 
 ceeding, civil or criminal, cannot be produced at a subsequent 
 trial of the same matter between the same parties, there can be no 
 objections on such grounds to receiving his sworn testimony at 
 the former trial, if the absence of the witness is not caused by the 
 party desiring to use his evidence. 
 
 The latter trial should be for the same ofifense, and the accused 
 
 469
 
 § 26l CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 47O 
 
 person should be the same as in the former. It is not material 
 that the later trial is under another indictment, if the offense 
 charged and the parties are identical.^ 
 
 § 261. Deceased or insane witnesses — How death of witness may 
 be proved. — In criminal, as in civil procedure," the evidence of a 
 witness at a prior trial may be proved as evidence in a subsequent 
 trial of the accused for the same offense if the witness is dead,^ 
 or has beome incompetent by reason of mental derangement.* 
 His testimony is admissible either for or against the party in 
 whose favor he originally testified. 
 
 The same rule is applicable to evidence received at the prelim- 
 inary examination, wdiether it was or was not committed to writ- 
 ing, where a witness is dead, but not where he is missing merely.^ 
 The death of the w-itness must be shown by the best evidence 
 which is obtainable, preferably a certified copy of the record of 
 his death kept by the proper officer. In the absence of such 
 proof of death, the oral testimony of a person wdio could swear, 
 of his own knowledge, that he was dead would doubtless be re- 
 ceived, as, for example, of a physician who had attended his death- 
 bed, or of one who, being acquainted with the witness, had at- 
 tended his funeral. Evidence that it is generally believed or re- 
 ported that an absent witness is dead is not competent.*^ 
 
 ^Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. "State v. King, 86 N. Car. 603; 
 
 S. 145, 158-161, 25 L. ed. 244; Putnal Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55, 42 Am. 
 
 V. State (Fla.), 47 So. 864. 95; State v. Laque, 41 La. Ann. 1070, 
 
 = See Underbill on Ev., § 120. 6 So. 787; State v. Wheat, in La. 
 
 'State V. Taylor, Phil. (N. Car.) 860, 35 So. 955- 
 
 508, 513; Hair v. State, 16 Neb. 601, "Davis v. State, 17 Ala. 354, 357; 
 
 605, 21 N. W. 464; State v. McNeil, State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 658; Cox v. ■ 
 
 33 La. Ann. 1332; O'Brian v. Com- State (Tex. Crim., 1896), 36 S. W. 
 
 monwealth, 6 Bush (Ky.) 563, 571; 435; United States v. Macomb, 5 Mc- 
 
 State V. Johnson, 12 Nev. 121, 123; Lean C. C. (U. S.) 286; State v. Mc- 
 
 State V. Able, 65 Mo. 357; Sullivan O'Blenis, 24 Mo. 402, 69 Am. Dec. 
 
 V. State, 6 Tex. App. 319, 32 Am. 580; 435; State v. Byers, 16 Mont. 565, 41 
 
 Nixon V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 325, 109 Pac. 708; State v. Bollero, 112 La. 
 
 S. W. 931; State V. Simmons (Kan. 850, 36 So. 754; Wilson v. State, 140 
 
 1908), 98 Pac. 277; Lrpscomb v. State, Ala. 43, Z7 So. 93. 
 
 76 Miss. 223, 25 So. 158; Weatherford 'State v. Wright, 70 Iowa 152, 153, 
 
 V. State, 78 Ark. 36, 93 S. W. 61; 30 N. W. 388; McGrew v. State, 13 
 
 Maloney v. State (Ark., 1904), 121 S. Tex. App. 340. 
 W. 728.
 
 471 
 
 ABSEXT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. §§ 262, 263 
 
 § 262. Witnesses sick or out of the jurisdiction — Distinction be- 
 tween civil and criminal cases. — It was formerly doubted, even in 
 civil cases, whether the testimony of a hving witness who was 
 absent merely would be received in trial. Though the authorities 
 sustain the rule by which in civil suits the testimony of an absent 
 witness is received not only in case of death, but where he is in- 
 competent by insanity or illness, or mere absence, the criminal 
 courts always hesitate, in the absence of a permissive or manda- 
 tory statute, to admit such evidence unless the death or insanity 
 of the witness is shown. 
 
 The mere fact that the witness is sick or out of the jurisdiction, 
 or that his whereabouts are unknown so that he cannot be reached 
 by a subpoena, is not enough.'^ The authorities are not wholly 
 harmonious, though usually now, by statute, such evidence is ad- 
 missible.* 
 
 § 263. Mode of proving absence of witness. — The absence of a 
 witness from the state may be proved by circumstantial evidence, 
 as by letters and telegrams alleged to have been written by him 
 while he was absent.'' The dates and places named therein are 
 
 "Reg. V. Scaife, 5 Cox. C. C. 243, 
 245, 246, 2 Den. C. C. 281, 17 Q. B. 
 238; McLain v. Commonwealth, 99 
 Pa. St. 86, 97 ; State v. Oliver, 43 La. 
 Ann. 1003, 10 So. 201 ; State v. 
 Staples, 47 X. H. 113, 90 Am. Dec. 
 565 ; Finn v. Commonwealth, 5 Rand. 
 (Va.) 701; People v. Newman, 5 Hill 
 (X. Y.) 295; Brogy v. Common- 
 wealth, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 722; Bergen 
 V. People, 17 111. 426, 65 Am. Dec. 
 672n; United States v. Angell, 11 
 Fed. 34, 42; Hall v. State, 6 Baxt. 
 (Tenn.) 522, 525; People v. Murphy, 
 45 Cal. 137; State v. King, 86 X. Car. 
 603, 605 ; Collins v. Commonwealth, 
 12 Bush (Ky.) 271; Bardin v. State, 
 143 Ala. 74, 38 So. 833; Kirkland v. 
 State, 141 Ala. 45, zi So. 352; Taylor 
 V. State, 126 Ga. 557, 55 S. E. 474. 
 
 * Shackelford v. State, 33 Ark. 539, 
 542; Dolan V. State, 40 Ark. 454, 461; 
 
 Benson v. Shotwell, 103 Cal. 163, yj 
 Pac. 147; Minneapolis Mill Co. v. 
 Minneapolis &c. R. Co., 51 Minn. 304, 
 53 X. W. 639; Perrin v. Wells, 155 
 Pa. St. 299, 26 Atl. 543; Matthews v. 
 State, 96 Ala. 62, 11 So. 203; Pruitt 
 V. State, 92 Ala. 41, 43, 9 So. 406; 
 State V. Xelson, 68 Kan. 566, 75 Pac. 
 505 ; Bell V. State, 156 Ala. 76, 47 So. 
 242; Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 
 So. 274; State V. Wheat, in La. 860, 
 35 So. 955; Pate V. State (Ala. 1909), 
 48 So. 388; Shirley v. State, 144 Ala. 
 35, 40 So. 269; Hobbs v. State, 53 
 Tex. Cr. 71, 112 S. W. 308; People 
 V. Gilhooley, 187 X. Y. 55i, 80 X. E. 
 1 1 16; Ozark V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 106, 100 S. W. 927; State V. Timber- 
 lake, so La. Ann. 308, 23 So. 276. 
 
 " Conner v. State, 23 Tex. App. 378, 
 5 S. W. 189; Carman v. Kelly, 5 Hun 
 (N. Y.) 283; People v. Barker, 144
 
 § 264 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 472 
 
 always relevant, though never conclusive. And all the facts 
 proved should be such as will justify a fair-minded and reasonable 
 man in believing that the witness is really out of the state. ^** If 
 the residence of the absentee is known his deposition ought to 
 be procured." 
 
 If, by statute or otherwise, the testimony of an absent witness 
 is receivable merely because his whereabouts cannot be ascer- 
 tained, it must appear that diligent search for him was made, and 
 that neither his attendance nor his deposition can be procured.^" 
 The absence of a w'itness being shown, it will be presumed to con- 
 tinue to the date of the trial. ^^ 
 
 § 264. Absence of witness procured by connivance — Relevancy and 
 use of evidence of such witness. — Where a living witness is absent 
 by the procurement or connivance of the accused, his evidence at 
 a former trial or before a coroner's jury, is not admissible for the 
 accused though it may be against him,^* It must be shown that 
 the absence was procured, ^^ though not necessarily by corrupt 
 means. If it is shown that the witness was sought diligently and 
 
 Cal. 705, 78 Pac. 266; Somers v. State, Tex. App. 162, 14 S. W. 1020; State 
 
 54 Tex. Cr. 475, 113 S. W. 533. v. King, 86 N. Car. 603, 605; People 
 
 "Wheat V. State, no Ala. 68, 20 So. v. Nelson, 85 Cal. 421, 24 Pac. 1006; 
 
 449; Harwood v. State, 63 Ark. 130, State v. Riley, 42 La. Ann. 995, 8 So. 
 
 37 S. W. 304; McCollum V. State, 469; Dorman v. State, 48 Fla. 18, 37 
 
 29 Tex. App. 162, 14 S. W. 1020, So. 561 ; State v. Riddle, 179 Mo. 287, 
 
 1021; People V. Barker, 144 Cal. 705, 78 S. W. 606; State v. Sejours, 113 
 
 78 Pac. 266; Kirkland v. State, 141 La. 676, 37 So. 599; State v. McClel- 
 
 Ala. 45, 37 So. 352; Robinson v. State, Ian, 79 Kan. 11, 98 Pac. 209; People 
 
 128 Ga. 254, 57 S. E. 315. The ans- v. Lewandowski, 143 Cal. 574, 77 Fac. 
 
 wers to inquiries made at the resi- 467. 
 
 dence of the missing witness, or in the ^^ Rixford v. Miller, 49 Vt. 319, 325 ; 
 
 neighborhood, are admissible. Mc- State v. Bollero, 112 La. 850, 36 So. 
 
 Collum V. State, supra; People v. 754. 
 Rowland, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 449, 452. "Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. 
 
 "Sullivan v. State, 6 Tex. App. S. 145, 155, 158, 25 L. ed. 244; State 
 
 319, 32 Am. 580; Brogy v. Common- v. King, 86 N. Car. 603; Reg. v. 
 
 wealth, 10 Gratt. (Va.) 722. Scaife, 5 Cox C. C. 243, 2 Den. C. C. 
 
 ^- State V. Stewart, 34 La. Ann. 281, 17 Q. B. 238, 242; Lord Morley's 
 
 1037; Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St. Case, 6 St. Trials 770; State v. Cole- 
 
 325; Dolan V. State, 40 Ark. 454; man, 199 Mo. 112, 97 S. W. 574- 
 Collins V. Commonwealth, 12 Bush. ^^ Williams v. State, 19 Ga. 402, 403 
 (Ky.) 271 ; McCollum v. State, 29
 
 473 ABSENT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. § 265 
 
 the circumstances indicate that he kept out of the way purposely, 
 the burden of proof is on the prisoner to prove good faith. 
 
 Where the evidence of an absent witness is admissible, if rele- 
 vant, is should be excluded if it was irrelevant on the prior trial, 
 though through inadvertence its incompetency was not recog- 
 nized and it was not objected to at the earlier trial. ^'^ And the 
 testimony of one of defendant's witnesses, at a former trial, who 
 is absent from the second trial, may, if he is deceased, be used by 
 the state in its own favor, ^' or, if the witness testifies at the later 
 trial, to impeach his credibility.^^ 
 
 § 265. Cross-examining and confronting witnesses. — Because of 
 the universal constitutional right of the accused to confront the 
 witnesses, it is absolutely necessary, in order that the testimony of 
 a deceased or absent witness may be admissible at a subsequent 
 trial against the accused, that the party against whom it is offered 
 should have had an opportunity of cross-examining him at the 
 earlier trial. ^^ Consequently on the trial of an indictment for 
 homicide, the testimony taken at the coroner's inquest, held to in- 
 vestigate the death, is not admissible against the accused where 
 the witness cannot be produced. "° 
 
 If the accused has once enjoyed his right to confront witnesses 
 his constitutional right to meet the witnesses against him face 
 to face is not violated by the admission of the testimony of such 
 
 ''Petrie v. Columbia &c. R. Co., 29 Putnal v. State (Fla.), 47 So. 864; 
 
 S. Car. 303, 317, 7 S. E. 515. Pratt v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 281, 109 
 
 "Hudson V. Roos, 76 Mich. 173, S. W. 138; Commonwealth v. Len- 
 
 180, 42 N. W. 1099. ousky, 206 Pa. 277, 55 Atl. 977. 
 
 ^* Nuzum V. State, 88 Ind. 599. -° Cline v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 320, 36 
 
 " O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 6 S. W. 1099, 37- S. W. 722, 61 Am. St. 
 Bush (Ky.) 563; State v. Johnson, 12 Sson ; State v. Campbell, i Rich (S. 
 Nev. 121; State v. O'Brien, 81 Iowa Car.) 124; Whitehurst v. Common- 
 88, 46 N. W. 752 ; Hair v. State, wealth, 79 Va. 556 ; State v. Cecil Co., 
 16 Neb. 601, 60s, 21 N. W. 464; 54 Md. 426; McLain v. Common- 
 Brown V. Commonwealth, 73 Pa. St. wealth, 99 Pa. St. 86, 97; Dupree v. 
 321, 13 Am. 740; Wray v. State, 154 State, 33 Ala. 380, 73 Am. Dec. 422. 
 -Ma. 36, 45 So. 697, 15 L. R. A. (N. In State v. McNeil, 33 La. Ann 1332, 
 S- ) 493n; Butler v. State, 83 Ark. the accused was permitted to intro- 
 272, 103 S. W. 382; Smith V. State, 48 duce testimony received at the cor- 
 Tox. Cr. 65, 85 S. W. 1 153; State v. oner's inquest. 
 Ilcrlihy, 102 Me. 310, 66 Atl. 643;
 
 266 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 474 
 
 a witness, who is absent, at a subsequent trial. -^ Hence, if the 
 defendant was represented by counsel at the preliminary examina- 
 tion and has had an opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses, 
 he has enjoyed his right to meet his accusers face to face, and no 
 objection exists to receiving the testimony of deceased or insane 
 witnesses. -■ But an opportunity to cross-examine is not shown 
 by evidence that the prisoner's counsel at the trial was also present 
 at the preliminary examination.^^ The testimony will not be ex- 
 cluded merely because the former trial was conducted under an 
 unconstitutional statute if the witness was amenable to the penalty 
 for perjury if he testified falsely.-* 
 
 § 266. Mode of proving the evidence of the absent witness — Sub- 
 stance only need be stated. — It was formerly considered essential 
 that the person, testifying to the evidence of the absentee, should 
 state his exact language."^ This rule has been relaxed. The ex- 
 act language need not now be given if the witness can state ac- 
 curately the substance of what was said,"*^ and his claiming to 
 repeat verhatim what w^as said might be a suspicious circum- 
 stance."' It is safe to assume, however, that all the evidence of 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Richards, i8 
 Pick. (Alass.) 434, 438, 29 Am. Dec. 
 608; State V. McO'Blenis, 24 Mo. 
 402, 69 Am. Dec. 435; People v. Pen- 
 hollow, 42 Hun (N. Y.) 103, 106; 
 State V. Walton (Ore. 1909), 99 Pac. 
 431 ; Arnwine v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 
 213, 114 S. W. 796, 802; Putnal V. 
 State (Fla.), 47 So. 864. Depositions 
 once legally taken may be used in a 
 subsequent trial. Johnson v. State, 
 I Tex. App. 2,23- 
 
 -Lucas V. State, 96 Ala. 51, 11 So. 
 216; Commonwealth v. Cleary, 148 
 Pa. St. 26, 23 Atl. mo, 11 13; Sulli- 
 van V. State, 6 Tex. App. 319, 32 Am. 
 580; Commonwealth v. Keck, 148 Pa. 
 St. 639, 24 Atl. 161 ; State v. Mc- 
 O'Blenis, 24 Mo. 402, 69 Am. Dec. 
 435 ; State v. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa 268, 
 19 N. W. 202 ; People v. Newman, 5 
 Hill (N. Y.) 295. 
 
 "Jackson v. Crilly, 16 Colo. 103. 
 109, 26 Pac. 331. 
 
 " State V. Johnson, 12 Nev. 121, 124. 
 
 " I Greenleaf on Ev., § 165 ; Rex v. 
 Jolliffe, 4 T. R. 285; Montgomery v. 
 State, II Ohio 424; United States v. 
 Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 440, 
 
 28 Fed. Cas. 16756; Commonwealth v. 
 Richards, 18 Pick. (Mass.) 434, 438, 
 
 29 Am. Dec. 608. 
 
 =" State V. O'Brien, 81 Iowa 88, 46 
 N. W. 752; People v. Murphy, 45 
 Cal. 137; State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 658; 
 Brown v. Commonwealth, y^i Pa- St. 
 321, 13 Am. 740; State v. Able, 65 
 Mo. 357, 369, 373; Davis v. State, 17 
 Ala. 354, 357; Commonwealth v. God- 
 dard, 14 Gray. (Mass.) 402; Jackson 
 v. State, 81 Wis. 127, 51 N. W. 89. 
 
 "' Cornell v. Green, 10 S. & R. (Pa.) 
 14; Ruch V. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 
 693, 24 L. ed. iioi ; Putnal v. State 
 (Fla.), 47 So. 864.
 
 475 ABSENT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. § 26/ 
 
 the witness bearing upon any particular point, must be repeated 
 in language as nearly identical with that originally used as pos- 
 sible, so that the effect which is produced may correspond with the 
 impression made upon the jury by the testimony of the witness 
 at the former trial. Hence the evidence, which was elicited upon 
 the cross-examination of the witness, must be substantially re- 
 peated.'* A witness who is relating the substance of the evidence 
 of an absent witness, should be required to state all the material 
 facts concerned in the issue in the later trial, so that his testimony 
 may not present the evidence of the absent witness in a loose and 
 fragmentary condition, or suggest that some important part has 
 been forgotten. If, however, the memory of the witness is weak 
 as to incidental or immaterial facts, the court should not therefore 
 exclude the testimony; for, if it appears complete and substantially 
 inclusive of what was said, it should go to the jurors. Slight 
 inaccuracies, omissions or contradiction, are for them to consider 
 in estimating its weight and credibility. But where, from the 
 language or demeanor of the witness, it is obviously apparent that 
 he has forgotten the substance of,^^ or has intentionally omitted a 
 material part of what was said,^° he is incompetent. Because of 
 lack of facilities in early times for taking down testimony in writ- 
 ing with rapidity and correctness it was a universal custom, and 
 in fact a rule for the common law, to receive only the oral nar- 
 rative of a person who heard the testimony on the former trial as 
 the best and perhaps the only evidence of it. 
 
 ^ 267. Stenographer's notes, judge's minutes and bill of exceptions 
 when used to prove the evidence of the absent witness. — The employ- 
 ment of a court stenograjjher whose duty it is to take the oral 
 evidence is now nearly universal. He is a sworn officer, and his 
 notes, or transcripts thereof, possess an official character which 
 renders them of great value in case of the subsequent death or 
 absence of a witness. If the statute provides for thus preserving 
 
 ^'Wade V. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) "» Puryear v. State, 63 Ga. 692; 
 
 ^, 81 ; and, see civil cases cited in Bush v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 244, 
 
 Undcrhill on Ev., p. 171, note 4. The 3 Cr. L. Mag. 505, 506, 507. 
 
 objection that the witness fails to re- ^"Tharp v. State, 15 Ala. 749; Com- 
 
 member the cross-examination is monwealth v. Richards, 18 Pick, 
 
 waived if not made immediately. State (Mass.) 434, 438, 439, 29 Am. Dec. 
 
 V. O'Brien, 81 Iowa 88, 46 N. W. 752. 608.
 
 267 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 476 
 
 evidence, the production of such records on a subsequent trial 
 may be required as the best proof. ^^ If the stenographer's notes 
 are not made evidence by statute, either expressly or by necessary 
 implication, they are not admissible as such while he is alive ;^- 
 though, perhaps, after his death they might be received as the 
 entries of a third person made in the course of his employment.^^ 
 If the reporter is called as a witness they may be used to refresh 
 liis memory, and may even be read by him on the stand, if he can 
 swear they were made when the testimony was taken, contain 
 its substance and are accurate.^* 
 
 A stenographer's notes taken out of the jurisdiction."" or not 
 made by or under the direction of a magistrate, or not signed by 
 the witnesses, or taken from the lips of an interpreter where a 
 witness testifies in a foreign tongue,^" have been rejected. But 
 the oral testimony of the stenographer after refreshing his mem- 
 ory by notes is always admissible, though his notes may not be 
 evidence,^^ even though their correctness be not conclusively 
 
 " Sage V. State, 127 Ind. 15, 26 X. 
 E. 667; Jackson v. State, 81 Wis. 127, 
 51 X. W. 89; Burnett v. State, 87 Ga. 
 622, 13 S. E. 552; Matthews v. State, 
 96 Ala. 62, II So. 203; Sullivan v. 
 State, 6 Tex. App. 319, 32 Am. 580; 
 People V. Garnett, 9 Cal. App. 194, 
 98 Pac. 247; Morawitz v. State, 49 
 Tex. Cr. 366, 91 S. W. 227; State v. 
 Heffernan (S. Dak.), 118 X. W. 1027; 
 State V. Laird, 79 Kan. 681, 100 Pac. 
 637 ; Jones v. State, 128 Ga. 23, 57 S. E. 
 313; Sanford v. State, 143 Ala. 78, 39 
 So. 370; United States v. Greene, 146 
 Fed. 796; People v. Buckley, 143 Cal. 
 375, 77 Pac. 169; Fertig v. State, lOO 
 Wis. 301, 75 N. W. 960. Unless the 
 statute in terms provides that the 
 notes are evidence when certified by 
 the reporter, they must be authenti- 
 cated in the mode prescribed for the 
 authentication of judicial records. 
 Rounds V. State, 57 Wis. 45, 14 X. 
 W. 865 ; State v. Frederic, 69 Mq. 400. 
 See Underbill on Ev., § 146. 
 
 ^' State V. Frederic, 69 Me. 400 ; 
 
 People V. IMcConnell, 146 111. 532, 34 
 N. E. 945; Rounds v. State, 57 Wis. 
 45, 47, 52, 14 X. W. 865; Dowd v. 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. 563, 108 S. W. 389- 
 ^'^ Underbill on Ev., §§ 58, 146. 
 "People V. Sligh, 48 Mich. 54, 58, 
 II X. W. 782; Jackson v. State, 81 
 Wis. 127, 51 X. W. 89; Common- 
 wealth V. Goddard, 14 Gray. (Mass.) 
 402; Hair v. State, 16 Xeb. 601, 606, 21 
 X. W. 464; Horton v. State, 53 Ala. 
 488; State V. Kendig, 133 Iowa 164, 
 no X. W. 463; IMiller v. People, 216 
 111. 309, 74 X. E. 743; Flohr V. Ter- 
 ritory, 14 Okla. 477, 78 Pac. 565 
 Austin V. Commonwealth, 124 Ky 
 55, 98 S. W. 295, 30 Ky. L. 295 ; Bur- 
 ton V. State, 115 Ala. i, 22 So. 585 
 State V. Fetterly, 33 Wash. 599, 74 
 Pac. 810; Hobbs v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 
 71, 112 S. W. 308; Fuqua v. Com- 
 monwealth, 118 Ky. 578, 81 S. W 
 923, 26 Ky. L. 420. 
 
 "" Herrick v. Swomley, 56 ?kld. 439 
 '"People v. Ah Yute, 56 Cal. ii9- 
 "State V. Freidrich, 4 Wash. 204,
 
 477 ABSENT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. § 268 
 
 shown. But the notes must be shown to the opposite party, and 
 he must have an opportunity to cross-examine to test their accu- 
 racy.^* It is never permissible on the later trial to show contra- 
 dictory statements to impeach the testimony of an absent witness. 
 The law requires that the witness himself should be interrogated, 
 giving the particulars of the time and place of the contradictory 
 utterances.^'' 
 
 The judge's notes are not evidence of what the witness said, 
 and, as a rule, they can be used only to refresh the memory of 
 a witness.'**' Their incompetency is due to the fact that they are 
 not a part of the record, and are not made within the scope of 
 official duty, or under the sanction of an official oath, which would 
 guaranty that they are complete or correct. For the same reasons 
 if it is sought to show, by the bill of exceptions or case on appeal, 
 the testimony of an absent witness, a foundation must first be laid 
 by proving (and for this purpose the certification and authentica- 
 tion by the court in accordance with the statute is usually suffi- 
 cient) that the bill does actually contain all the evidence given 
 by the witness.*^ It is a preliminary question for the court, upon 
 which it is error to refuse or neglect to rule, whether in any case 
 it is proper to admit the testimony of the witness given at a prior 
 proceeding.*" 
 
 ? 268. Continuance when granted because of absence of witness — 
 Discretionary power of the court. — The rules governing continu- 
 
 29 Pac. 1055, 30 Pac. 328, 31 Pac. 332; 5 Cox C. C. 197, 203; State v. Her- 
 
 People V. Chung Ah Chue, 57 Cal. lihy, 102 Me. 310, 66 Atl. 643; Butler 
 
 '567; State V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, 12 v. State, 83 Ark. 272, 103 S. W. 382. 
 
 Pac. 318; Shackelford v. State, 33 See, also, civil cases in Underhill on 
 
 Ark. 539. Cf. Cravens v. State (Tex. Ev., p. 172. 
 
 Cr. 1907), 103 S. W. 921 ; Kimberly V. ''^ Kean v. Commonw^calth, 10 Bush 
 
 State, 4 Ga. App. 852, 62 S. E. 571. (Ky.) 190, 19 Am. 63; State v. Able, 
 
 '^ People V. Lem You, 97 Cal. 224, 65 Mo. 357; Woollen v. Wire, no 
 
 32 Pac. II. Ind. 251, II N. E. 236; Case v. Blood, 
 
 ^^ Pruitt v. State, 92 Ala. 41, 43, 71 lov^a 632, 33 N. W. 144; Slinger- 
 
 9 So. 406; Matthevirs v. State, 96 land v. Slingerland, 46 Minn. 100, 
 
 Ala. 62, II So. 203; State v. Hunter, 103, 48 N. W. 605; Dwyer v. Rippc- 
 
 70 S. Car. 84, 60 S. E. 241. toe, 72 Tex. 520, 10 S. W. 668. And 
 
 ''State v. Dewitt, 2 Hill (S. Car.) cases cited Underbill on Ev., p. 172. 
 282, 27 Am. Dec. 371 ; Reg. v. Child, " People v. Willett, 92 N. Y. 29.
 
 268 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 478 
 
 ances are substantially the same in criminal and civil cases,*'' but 
 generally in the former an application for a continuance, coming 
 from the accused, may be scanned with some suspicion because of 
 his natural desire for delay,** 
 
 Neither the defendant nor the prosecution can claim to have 
 
 unlimited continuances granted. A continuance is not always a 
 matter of right. It lies in the sound discretion of the trial court 
 to grant and its action will not be reviewed, or a new trial granted 
 
 to the defendant, for a refusal to grant a continuance, unless there 
 has been a palpable abuse of that discretion to his disadvantage.*'^ 
 
 *^ People V. Vermikea, 7 Cow. (N. State, 139 Ala. i, 2^ So. 1025; Gers- 
 
 Y.) 369, 384; Howard v. Common- tenkorn v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 621, 44 
 
 wealth (Ky), 80 S. W. 817, 26 Ky. S. W. 503; Clements v. State, 51 Fla. 
 
 L. 148, reversed on rehearing (Ky), 6, 40 So. 432; State v. Chitman, 117 
 
 26 Ky. L. 465, 81 S. W. 689; People La. 950, 42 So. 437; State v. Thomp- 
 
 V. Plyler, 121 Cal. 160, 53 Pac. 553; son, 121 La. 1051, 46 So. 1013; AIc- 
 
 Ewert V. State, 48 Fla. 36, Z7 So. Farland v. State, 83 Ark. 98, 103 S. 
 
 334. W. i6g; Sisk v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 "Ballard v. State, 31 Fla. 266, 282, 1897), 42 S. W. 985; Early v. State, 
 
 12 So. 865; Gardner v. United States, 51 Tex. Cr. 382, 103 S. W. 868, 123 
 
 5 Ind. Ter. 150, 82 S. W. 704. Am. St. 889; Dallas v. State, 129 Ga. 
 
 ■^ State V. Johnson, 47 La. Ann. 602, 59 S. E. 279; Lewis v. State, 129 
 
 1225, 17 So. 789; State V. Dettmer, Ga. 731, 59 S. E. 782; People v. 
 
 124 Mo. 426, 432, 27 S. W. 1117; Grill, 151 Cal. 592, 91 Pac. 515; Peo- 
 
 People V. Considine, 105 Mich. 149, pie v. Fong Chung, 5 Cal. App. 587, 
 
 62, X. W. 196; State V. Liicker, 40 91 Pac. 105, People v. Boyd, 151 
 
 S. Car. 549, 550, 18 S. E. 797) Walker Mich. 577, ii5 N. W. 687, 15 Detroit 
 
 V. State, 136 Ind. 663, 666, 36 N. E. Leg. N. 36; Gallaher v. State, 78 
 
 356; Walker v. State, 91 Ala. y6, 79, Ark. 299, 95 S. W. 463; Goddard v. 
 
 9 So. 87; Ballard v. State, 31 Fla. State, 78 Ark. 226, 95 S. W. 4/6; 
 
 266, 281, 12 So. 865; Brown v. State, State v. Johnson, 136 Iowa 601, in 
 
 85 Tenn. 439; Hardesty v. Common- X. W. 827; State v. Kenny, yy S. 
 
 wealth, 88 Ky. 537, 11 S. W. 589, 11 Car. 236, 57 S. E. 859; Shaw v. State 
 
 Ky. L. 43; State v. Wyse, Z3 S. Car. (Tex. Cr.), 105 S. W. 500; Ryder 
 
 582, 12 S. E. 556; Price v. People, 131 v. State, 100 Ga. 528, 28 S. E. 246, 
 
 111. 223, 22, X. E. 639; Jackson v. 62 Am. St. 334, 38 L. R. A. 72in; 
 
 State, 54 Ark. 243, 15 S. W. 607; Turner v. State (Tex. Cr.) 46 S. W. 
 
 Woolfolk V. State, 85 Ga. 69, 11 S. 830; IMoss v. State, 152 Ala. 30, 44 
 
 E. 814; Thompson v. Commonwealth, So. 598; Isham v. State (Tex. Cr.), 
 
 88 Va. 45, 13 S. E. 304; Kefifer v. 49 S. W. 581; State v. Burns, 148 Mo. 
 
 State, 12 Wyo. 49, y^ Pac. 556; State 167, 49 S. W. 1005, 71 Am. St. 588; 
 
 V. Ripley, 32 Wash. 182, y2 Pac. State v. Cochran, 147 Mo. 504, 49 S. 
 
 1036; Commonwealth v. Delero, 218 W. 558; Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 
 
 Pa. 487, 67 Atl. 764; Stevens v. State, 43 So. 312. 
 138 Ala. 71, 35 So. 122; Kroell v.
 
 479 ABSENT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. § 269 
 
 This general principle, however, must be taken with the quali- 
 fication that the discretion of the court must be exercised in a 
 reasonable and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The 
 statutory and constitutional rights and privileges of the prisoner 
 must be considered. His right to a fair and impartial jury trial, 
 to procure and compel the attendance of witnesses, to be repre- 
 sented by counsel, and to have a reasonably full opportunity to 
 consult with counsel and to prepare his defense ; must be respected, 
 and a refusal to grant a continuance, which results in depriving 
 him of any of these rights, constitutes reversible error.**' Often 
 the matter is regulated by statute under which a continuance is 
 granted as a matter of right. All defendants jointly tried are, 
 under such a statute, entitled to the same privilege in this respect. 
 
 § 269. Due diligence in summoning witness must be proved — The 
 competency and materiality of his testimony must appear. — In order 
 to obtain a continuance because of the absence of a witness, cer- 
 tain facts must appear from the affidavits presented in support 
 of the motion. 
 
 First, it must be shown that due diligence was employed to 
 ascertain his whereabouts and secure his attendance. The de- 
 fendant should promptly, upon his arrest, ascertain who and 
 where his witnesses are, and should procure subpoenas or, if neces- 
 
 ^Claxon V. Commonwealth (Ky.), v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 16, 108 S. W. 
 
 30 S. W. 998, 17 Ky. L. 284; State 372; State v. VonKutzleben, 136 Iowa 
 
 V. Xewsum, 129 Mo. 154, 31 S. W. 89, 113 N. W. 484; Brown v. State, 
 
 605; Delk V. State, 100 Ga. 61, 27 S. 120 Ga. 145, 47 S. E. 543; Brooks v. 
 
 E. 152; Johnson v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. State, 3 Ga. App. 458, 60 S. E. 211, 
 
 201, 107 S. W. 52; Magee v. State 213; State v. Morgan, 27 Utah 103, 
 
 (Miss.), 45 So. 360; Johnson v. 74 Pac. 526; State v. Cummings, 189 
 
 Commonwealth (Ky), 107 S. W. 768, Mo. 626, 88 S. W. 706; State v. 
 
 32 Ky. L. 1 1 17; Swan v. State (Tex. Timberlake, 50 La. Ann. 308, 23 So. 
 
 Cr.), 76 S. W. 464; White v. State 276. No constitutional objections can 
 
 (Miss.), 45 So. 611; Moore v. Com- exist to a statute permitting a party 
 
 monwealth (Ky.), 81 S. W. 669, 26 to avoid a continuance by admitting 
 
 Ky. L. 356; Mays v. Commonwealth an absent witness will testify, in a 
 
 (Ky.), 76 S. W. 162, 25 Ky. L. 646; civil case, as alleged in the affidavit. 
 
 Long V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 461, 537, But the action of the legislature, in 
 
 46 S. W. 821, "j-i) Am. St. 954; Foster making such a statute apply to crim- 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 137, 105 S. W. inal trials, is unconstitutional. Gra- 
 
 498; State V. Hesterly, 182 Mo. 16, ham v. State, 50 Ark. 161, 167, 6 S. 
 
 81 S. W. 624, 103 Am. St. 634; Wingo W. 721.
 
 § 269 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 480 
 
 saiy, attachments, for them as soon thereafter as practicable. He 
 has no right to delay until a very few days before the trial, and 
 then to demand a postponement because his witnesses do not 
 attend.-*' 
 
 The competency and materiality of the testimony which the 
 absent witness is expected to give must also be shown. It must 
 
 *' Chapman v. State (Tex. Cr., 
 1895). 30 S. W. 225; State V. Lange, 
 59 Mo. 418; Pullen v. State, ir Tex. 
 App. 89; Pettit V. State, 135 Ind. 
 393, 405, 406, 34 X. E. 1 1 18; State 
 V. Hagan, 22 Kan. 490; Mackey v. 
 Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 345 ; Wray 
 V. People, 78 111. 212; Trask v. Peo- 
 ple, 151 111. 523, 527, 38 N. E. 248; 
 State V. Smith, 8 Rich (S. Car.) 460; 
 State V. Dixon, 47 La. Ann. i, 3, 16 
 So. 589; Blige V. State, 20 Fla. 742, 
 
 51 Am. 628; McDermott v. State, 89 
 Ind. 187; State v. Veillon (La., 1897), 
 21 So. 856; Robinson v. State (Tex. 
 Cr., 1898), 48 S. W. 176; Carter v. 
 State (Miss. 1898), 24 So. 307; Hull 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 607, 100 S. W. 
 403; Shelton v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 627, 100 S. W. 955 ; Ishani v. State 
 (Tex. Cr., 1899), 49 S. W. 594; State 
 V. Kindred, 148 Mo. 270, 49 S. W. 
 845; State V. Crane, 202 Mo. 54, 100 
 S. W. 422; State V. Burns, 124 Iowa 
 207, 99 N. W. 721 ; State v. Brown, 62 
 W. Va. 546, 59 S. E. 508; State v. 
 Rabens, 79 S. Car. 542, 60 S. E. 442, 
 mo; State v. Burns, 19 Wash. 52, 
 
 52 Pac. 316; State v. Mills, 79 S. 
 Car. 187, 60 S. E. 664; Jackson v. 
 State, 49 Tex. Cr. 215, 91 S. W. 788; 
 Early v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 382, 103 
 S. W. 868, 123 Am. St. 889; State v. 
 Morgan, 27 Utah 103, 74 Pac. 526; 
 State V. Thompson, 141 Mo. 408, 42 S. 
 W. 949; McQueen v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky), 88 S. W. 1047, 28 Ky. L. 20; 
 
 White V. State (Tex. Cr. 1906), 98 
 S. W. 264; Sizemore v. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.), 108 S. W. 254, 2>2 Ky. 
 L. 1 1 54; Hughes V. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 80 S. W. 197, 25 Ky. L. 2153; 
 Mullins V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 79 
 S. W. 258, 25 Ky. L. 2044; O'Rear v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 78 S. W. 407, 
 25 Ky. L. 1537; Garza v. State, 39 
 Tex. Cr. 358, 46 S. W. 242, y^i Am. 
 St. 927; Weaver v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 
 II, 105 S. W. 189; State V. Tucker, 72 
 Kan. 481, 84 Pac. 126; Melbourne v. 
 State, 51 Fla. 69, 40 So. 189; Williams 
 V. State, 53 Fla. 89, 43 So. 428; Harter 
 V. People, 204 111. 158, 68 N. E. 447; 
 High V. State (Tex. Cr. 1906), 98 S. 
 W. 849; Tanner v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 1898), 44 S. W. 489; Harmanson v. 
 State (Tex. Cr. 1897), 42 S. W. 995; 
 Davis V. State (Tex. Cr. 1907), 102 
 S. W. 1 1 50; Gerstenkorn v. State, 38 
 Tex. Cr. 621, 44 S. W. 503; Kroell v. 
 State, 139 Ala. i, 36 So. 1025; Bynum 
 V. State, 46 Fla. 142, 35 So. 65 ; Welty 
 V. United States, 14 Okla. 7, 76 Pac. 
 121 ; Watts V. State, 90 Miss. 757, 44 
 So. 36; People V. Browne, 118 App. 
 Div. (N. Y.) 793, 103 N. Y. S. 903, 21 
 N. Y. Cr. 91, aff'd in 189 N. Y. 528, 82 
 N. E. 1 130; Stegar v. State (Tex. Cr.), 
 105 S. W. 789 ; People v. Melandrez, 4 
 Cal. App. 396, 88 Pac. 27^) Kidd v. 
 State, loi Ga. 528, 28 S. E. 990. The 
 burden of proof to show diligence is 
 on the accused. Walker v. State, 
 13 Tex. App. 618.
 
 48 1 
 
 ABSENT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. 
 
 269 
 
 reasonably appear that the testimony of such a witness will, if 
 introduced, influence the verdict.'** 
 
 If from the evidence already received it is apparent that the ab- 
 sent witness has no knowledge of the matter in issue,'*® or if the 
 evidence to be procured is merely cumulative,^" or if the court 
 has sufficient reason for believing that certain facts which the 
 absent witness is expected to controvert are already so far sus- 
 
 ** Gilcrease v. State, ss Tex. Cr. 
 619, 28 S. W. 531; Cannon v. State, 
 60 Ark. 564, 576, 31 S. W. 150, 32 
 S. W. 128; Land v. State, 34 Tex. 
 Cr. 330, 30 S. W. 788; Crumpton v. 
 United States, 138 U. S. 361, 34 L. 
 ed. 959, II Sup. Ct. 355; Dow v. 
 State, 31 Tex. Cr. 278, 20 S. W. 583; 
 Knowles v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 383, 20 
 S. W. 829; Polin V. State, 14 Neb. 
 540, 16 N. W. 898; State v. Bennett, 
 52 Iowa 724, 2 N. W. 1103; State v. 
 Falconer, 70 Iowa 416, 30 N. "W. 655 ; 
 People V. Anderson, 53 Mich. 60, 18 
 X. W. 561 ; Moody v. People, 20 111. 
 316; Steele v. People, 45 111. 152; 
 State V. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642, 15 
 S. W. 141 ; Strauss v. State, 58 Miss. 
 53; People V. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. (N. 
 Y.) 369; State V. Spillman, 43 La. 
 .Ann. loor, 10 So. 198; Isham v. 
 State (Tex. Cr. 1899), 49 S. W. 581; 
 State V. Cochran, 147 Mo. 504, 49 S. 
 W. 558; State V. Kindred, 148 Mo. 
 270, 49 S. W. 845 ; Tanner v. State 
 (Tex. Cr., 1898), 44 S. W. 489; Clem- 
 ents V. State, 51 Fla. 6, 40 So. 432; 
 Williams v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 352, 
 102 S. 'W. 1 147; Morphew v. State, 
 84 Ark. 487, 106 S. W. 480; Holley v. 
 State, 49 Tex. Cr. 306, 92 S. W. 422, 
 122 Am. St. 810; Harris v. State, 52 
 Tex. Cr. 118, 105 S. W. 801. For 
 example, a continuance will be re- 
 fused in a murder trial where the ab- 
 sent witness was expected merely to 
 prove that unknown persons had 
 ilireatcned the deceased. Boyett v. 
 31 — Underhill Crim. Ev. 
 
 State, 26 Tex. App. 689, 9 S. W. 275 ; 
 Stapleton v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 3 S. W. 793. 
 
 ^"Griffin V. State (Tex., 1892), 20 
 S. W. 552; Jones v. State, 31 Tex. 
 Cr. 177, 20 S. W. 354; Childs v. State 
 (Tex. Cr. 1893), 22 S. 'W. 1039; State 
 V. Crane, 202 Mo. 54, 100 S. W. 422; 
 House V. State, 139 Ala. 132, 36 So. 
 732; State V. Kemp, 120 La. 378, 45 
 So. 283 ; State v. Horn, 209 Mo. 452, 
 108 S. 'W. 3 ; State v. 'Woodward, 182 
 Mo. 391, 81 S. W. 857, 103 Am. St. 
 646n; State v. Pope, 78 S. Car. 264, 
 58 S. E. 815; Kennedy v. State, loi 
 Ga. 559, 28 S. E. 979. 
 
 ^"Nelms V. State, 58 Miss. 362; 
 Varnadoe v. State, 67 Ga. 768; Robin- 
 son V. State (Tex. Cr. 1898), 48 S. 
 ■W. 176; State V. Crane, 202 Mo. 54, 
 100 S. 'W. 422; Dudley v. State, 40 
 Tex. Cr. 31, 48 S. W. 179; "Vanata v. 
 State, 82 Ark. 203, loi S. 'W. 169; 
 Richie v. State, 85 Ark. 413, 108 S. 
 "W. 511; State V. Horn, 209 Mo. 452, 
 108 S. 'W. 3; State V. Hasty, 121 
 Iowa 507, 96 N. 'W. 1115; Mullins v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 79 S. W. 258, 
 25 Ky. L. 2044; Williams v. State, 45 
 Tex. Cr. 218, 75 S. W. 859; Wash- 
 ington V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 542, 103 
 S. W. 879; Kelley v. United States, 
 7 Ind. Ter. 241, T04 S. W. 604; 
 Cravens v. State (Tex. Cr. 1907), 103 
 S. W. 921 ; Dean v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 78 S. W. 1 1 12, 25 Ky. L. 
 1876.
 
 § 270 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 482 
 
 tained by a preponderance of the evidence that his testimony 
 bearing thereon would beuntrue,^^ a continuance may be denied.'" 
 
 § 270. What facts the affidavit for continuance must contain. — 
 The affidavit for the continuance must show the names of the 
 absent witnesses and their residences, if known/'^ and the specific 
 facts to which the witnesses will testify, their connection with and 
 relevancy to the subject-matter.^* Merely to allege in the affida- 
 
 " Brown v. State, ^2 Tex. Cr. 119, 129 Ga. 602, 59 S. E. 279; Rush v. 
 
 22 S. W. 596; Rollins V. State (Tex. State (Tex. Cr. 1903), 76 S. W. 927; 
 
 Cr. 1892), 20 S. W. 358; Borroun v. Wiggins v. State, loi Ga. 501, 29 S. 
 
 State (Miss., 1897), 22 So. 62; An- E. 26; Territory v. Dooley, 3 Ariz, 
 
 drews v. State (Tex. Cr.), 100 S. W. 60, 78 Pac. 138; State v. Cummings, 
 
 922; Cravens v. State (Tex. Cr.), 103 189 Mo. 626, 88 S. W. 706; State v. 
 
 S. W. 921 ; Robinson v. State (Tex. Teachey, 138 N. Car. 587, 50 S. E. 
 
 Cr. 1898), 48 S. W. 176. 232; Renfroe v. State, 84 Ark. 16, 104 
 
 "Benson v. State (Tex. Cr.), 103 S. S. W. 542; State v. Howard, 120 La. 
 
 W. 911; Blanks v. Commonwealth, 311, 45 So. 260; State v. Leary, in 
 
 105 Ky. 41, 48 S. W. 161, 20 Ky. La. 301, 35 So. 559; Vanata v. State, 
 
 L. 1037; State V. Timberlake, 50 82 Ark. 203, loi S. W. 169. That the 
 
 La. An. 308, 2^ So. 276; Harris witness has knowledge of such facts. 
 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 118, 105 S. Long v. People, 34 111. App. 481; 
 
 W. 801. It has been held not error Benge v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. i, 
 
 ■to refuse the accused a continuance 17 S. W. 146, 13 Ky. L. 308. That the 
 
 asked merely to enable him to procure affiant believes the evidence of the 
 
 witnesses to prove his good char- witness to be true. State v. Dusen- 
 
 acter. Steele v. People, 45 111. 152; berry, 112 Mo. 277, 20 S. W. 461; 
 
 McNealy v. State, 17 Fla. 198. North v. People, 139 111. 81, 28 N. E. 
 
 "State V. Underwood, 76 Mo. 630; 966. That he also believes that his 
 
 Colton V. State, 7 Tex. App. 50 ; State testimony can be procured in time, 
 
 v. Horn, 209 Mo. 452, 108 S. W. 3; stating the grounds for such belief. 
 
 Xick V. State, 128 Ga. 573, 58 S. E. Shirwin v. People, 69 111. 55 ; Austine 
 
 48; State V. Jones, 53 W. Va. 613, 45 v. People, no 111. 248; State v. Har- 
 
 S. E. 916; State v. Morgan, 27 Utah rison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982, 18 
 
 103, 74 Pac. 526 ; State v. Kindred, L. R. A. 224n ; People v. McCrory, 
 
 148 Mo. 270, 49 S. W. 845. 41 Cal. 458; Skates v. State, 64 Miss. 
 
 " Long V. People, 135 111. 435, 25 644, i So. 843, 60 Am. 7on ; State v. 
 
 X. E. 851, 10 L. R. A. 48; State Moultrie, 33 La. Ann. 1146; State v. 
 
 V. Manceaux, 42 La. Ann. n64, Burwell, 34 Kan. 312, 8 Pac. 470; 
 
 8 So. 297; Carthaus v. State, 78 Faulkner v. Territory, 6 N. Mex. 464, 
 
 Wis. 560, 47 N. W. 629; State 30 Pac. 905; State v. Aired, n5 Mo. 
 
 V. Benge, 61 Iowa 658, 17 N. 471, 22 S. W. 363. and that proper 
 
 W. 100; Holland v. State, 31 Tex. diligence has been employed to pro- 
 
 Cr. 345, 20 S. W. 750; Dallas v. State, cure the attendance of the witness.
 
 483 ABSENT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. § 2/1 
 
 vit that proper diligence has been employed to procure the attend- 
 ance of the witness is not enough. Facts constituting diligence 
 must appear. Thus where it appears that the witness was at one 
 time in the jurisdiction of the court it must appear that a sub- 
 pcena was seasonably and properly issued and duly served on him 
 to procure his attendance. ^^ But under some circumstances ac- 
 tual service of a subpoena is not required, if it be shown that one 
 was issued and seasonably delivered to the proper officer for 
 service, and that he has made a return thereon that the witness 
 cannot be found. ^^ 
 
 If a witness is bound over to appear, the accused is not under 
 the necessity of serving him with a subpoena. But the fact that 
 the magistrate, at the preliminary examination, admonished a 
 witness to attend at the trial does not excuse the defendant from 
 serving him with process and then demanding a continuance 
 because of his absence.^" 
 
 § 271. Admissions to avoid continuance — Constitutional right of 
 the accused to enjoy the benefit of oral testimony. — The authorities 
 are divided on the question whether the state can defeat the de- 
 fendant's motion for a continuance to procure the testimonv of 
 an absent witness by a mere admission that he will testify to the 
 facts which the affidavit states the defendant expects to prove. 
 Some of the cases, basing their reasoning upon the existing con- 
 stitutional guaranty that the prisoner shall have the personal 
 presence of witnesses in his own behalf, maintain the negative. 
 Hence, it has been repeatedly held that a statute providing that 
 the defendant shall not be entitled to a continuance if the state 
 
 Havcrstick v. State, 6 Tnd. App. 595, Dingman v. .State, 48 Wis. 485, 4 N. 
 
 32 N. E. 785; Vogt V. Commonwealth, W. 668; State v. Burns, 54 Mo. 274; 
 
 92 Ky. 68, 17 S. W. 213, 13 Ky. L. Roussell v. Commonwealth, 28 Gratt. 
 
 376. That the witnesses are not ab- (Va.) 930. 
 
 sent through the procurement or con- ''"Murray v. State, i Tex. App. 417; 
 
 sent of the applicant, and that the Skipworth v. State, 8 Tex. App. 135; 
 
 application is not made for delay. Thomas v. State, 6r Miss. 60; People 
 
 Crews V. People. 120 111. 317, 11 N. v. Lampson, 70 Cal. 204, 11 Fac. 593; 
 
 K. 404; State V. P)radley, 90 Mo. 160. State v. Walker, 69 Mo. 274; Walton 
 
 Sec Undcrhill on Ev., §§ 355-358, as v. Commonwealth. 32 Gratt. (Va.) 
 
 to the ff)rm anrl language of affida- 855. 
 
 vits. "State v. Ilayden, 45 Towa 11; 
 
 "Henderson v. State, 22 Tex. 593; People v. Brown, 46 Cal. 102.
 
 s 271 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 484 
 
 shall consent that the afiidaxit stating the evidence which he is 
 to give may be read as his testimony is unconstitutional, if the 
 defendant has used due diligence in endeavoring to procure the 
 attendance of the witnesses, and the affidavit shows facts sufficient 
 for the purpose. ^^ 
 
 Others maintain a contrary view and sustain as constitutional 
 similar statutes, conferring upon the court the power to overrule 
 an application for a continuance, where the prosecution does not 
 admit that the missing testimony is true.^'' 
 
 '''State V. Berkley, 92 Mo. 41, 46- 
 53, 4 S. W. 24; Adkins v. Common- 
 wealth, 98 Ky. 539, 33 S. W. 948, 17 
 Ky. L. 1091, 32 L. R. A. 108; Graham 
 V. State, 50 Ark. 161, 167, 6 S. W. 
 721; State V. Baker, 13 Lea (Term.) 
 326, 329; Pace V. Commonwealth, 89 
 Ky. 204, 207, 12 S. W. 271, II Ky. L. 
 407. Cf. State V. Loe, 98 Mo. 609, 
 613, 12 S. W. 254; Goodman v. State, 
 Meigs (Tenn.) 195; Risner v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 117 S. W. 318; 
 Mise V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 80 S. 
 W. 457, 25 Ky. L. 2207; Foster v. 
 .State, 79 Neb. 259, 112 N. W. 656; 
 Gaines v. State, 146 Ala. 16, 41 So. 
 865 ; People v. Fong Chung, 5 Cal. 
 App. 587, 91 Pac. 105. The constitu- 
 tional right of the accused to have 
 process to compel the attendance of 
 witnesses in his own behalf is abso- 
 lute, and cannot be bartered or cut 
 down by statutory enactment. The 
 right is only enjoyed with complete- 
 ness if the personal attendance of a 
 witness is secured, for it is only then 
 that the accused can receive the full 
 benefit of his testimony. The de- 
 meanor of the witness on the stand 
 while giving his testimony viva voce 
 is an important factor in enabling the 
 jury to determine his credibility. The 
 defendant has a right to claim that 
 the influence upon the jury of the in- 
 telligence and candor of his witness. 
 
 his respectable and refined appear- 
 ance, his promptness and frankness 
 in answering questions, his unhesitat- 
 ing readiness in giving all details, 
 his calmness and self-restraint under 
 a searching and perhaps abusive 
 cross-examination, shall not be lost 
 to him by a statute which compels 
 him to accept a piece of paper in 
 place of a living human being. Sec 
 State v. Berkley, 92 Mo. 41, 46-53, 4 
 S. W. 24; Pace V. Commonwealth, 89 
 Ky. 204, 207-210, 12 S. W. 271, II Ky. 
 L. 407; a leading case and the dis- 
 senting opinion in State v. Jennings, 
 81 Mo. 185, 193, 195-208, 51 Am. 236. 
 "The value of oral testimony, over all 
 other, is too well understood to sup- 
 pose, for a moment, that such declar- 
 ations would have the same weight 
 on the minds of the jury as the tes- 
 timony of the witness, if he had been 
 examined before them in open court." 
 People V. Diaz, 6 Cal. 248. Cf. Good- 
 man V. State, Meigs (Tenn.) 195. 
 
 °° Keating v. People, 160 111. 480, 43 
 N. E. 724; Adkins v. Commonwealth, 
 98 Ky. 539, 22> S. W. 948, 17 Ky. L. 
 1091, 2^ L. R. A. 108; People v. Ley- 
 shon, 108 Cal. 440, 41 Pac. 480; Fan- 
 ton v. State, 50 Neb. 351, 69 N. W. 
 953, 2(> L- R- A. 158; Territory v. 
 Perkins, 2 Mont. 467, 470; Terri- 
 tory v. Harding, 6 Mont. 323, 332. 
 333, 12 Pac. 750; Bach, J., dissenting;
 
 48: 
 
 ABSENT WITNESSES AND CONTINUANCES. 
 
 § 272 
 
 If the absent witness is beyond the jurisdiction, so that com- 
 pulsory process will not reach him, a continuance, as it would only 
 bring his written evidence, may be denied on the admission.'^'' 
 
 § 272. Admission of facts as true to avoid continuance. — In the 
 
 absence of statute it is the rule, according to the decided current of 
 authorit}^, that the state may avoid the granting of a continuance 
 to defendant because of the absence of a material witness in 
 his behalf by admitting the truth of the statement of the evidence 
 he would give as it is set forth in the affidavit. The statements 
 go to the jury as true, and it is their positive duty so to regard 
 them. They are not open to contradiction, and though the accused 
 is deprived of his witness he receives the benefit of his evidence 
 free from impeachment.^^ And a statute laying down such a 
 rule has been held constitutional. But the state must admit the 
 truth of the evidence absolutely. It cannot reserve the right to 
 impeach its credibility in any way.®" 
 
 Territory v. Guthrie, 2 Idaho 398; 
 Hoyt V. People, 140 111. 588, 593, 
 594, 30 N. E. 315, 16 L. R. A. 239n; 
 Hickam v. People, 137 111. 75, 79, 27 
 N. E. 88; State v. Hartley, 48 Kan. 
 421, 425, 29 Pac. 701, citing cases; 
 State V. Shannehan, 22 Iowa 435, 437 ; 
 State V. McComb, 18 Iowa 43, 47. Cf. 
 Pace V. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 204, 
 207, 12 S. W. 271, II Ky. L. 407; 
 State V. Lund, 49 Kan. 580, 584, 31 
 Pac. 146; State v. Daniels, 49 La. 
 Ann. 954; 22 So. 415; State v. Hutto, 
 66 S. Car. 449, 45 S. E. 13; People v. 
 Mylin, 139 111. App. 500, aff'd 236 111. 
 19, 86 N. E. 156. 
 
 ""State V. Adams, 20 Kan. 311; 
 Thompson v. State, S Kan. 159. 
 
 "'Powers V. State, 80 Ind. 77, 11 
 Ky. L. 407; Pace v. Commonwealth, 
 8q Ky. 204, 207, 208, 12 S. W. 271 ; 
 O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 
 354, 361, 12 S. W. 471, II Ky. L. 534; 
 I'rowning v. State, Z2 Miss. 47; Van 
 Meter V. People, 60 111. 168; Miller 
 V. State, 9 Ind. 340; People v. Vcr- 
 
 milyea, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 369; Wassels 
 V. State, 26 Ind. 30; People v. Diaz, 
 6 Cal. 248, 249; Trulock v. State, i 
 Clarke (Iowa) 515; State v. Baker, 
 13 Lea (Tenn.) 326; People v. 
 Brown, 54 Cal. 243; People v. Wil- 
 son, 3 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 199, 202; 
 Nichols V. Commonwealth, 11 Bush 
 (Ky.) 575; Terry v. State, 120 Ala. 
 286, 25 So. 176; State v. Williams, 76 
 S. Car. 135, 56 S. E. 783; State v. 
 High, 116 La. 79, 40 So. 538; State 
 V. Wilcox, 21 S. Dak. 532, 114 N. W. 
 687. 
 
 "-People V. Diaz, 6 Cal. 248, 249; 
 Wassels v. State, 26 Ind. 30; Powers 
 V. State, 80 Ind. 77. Cf. Burchfield v. 
 State, 82 Ind. 580; Territory v. Em- 
 ilio (N. Mex.), 89 Pac. 239; Miller 
 V. State (Wis.), 119 N. W. 850; 
 Howerton v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 112 S. W. 606, 33 Ky. L. 1008; Iluf- 
 fakcr V. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. 115, 
 98 S. W. 331, 30 Ky. L. 334; Davis 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 332, 107 S. W. 
 855. "An unconditional admission of
 
 S 2 72 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 486 
 
 the truth of the facts souglit to l)c 
 proved by the absent witnesses would 
 necessarily have a different effect. 
 They would go to the jury as admit- 
 ted facts in the case, not open to 
 controversy, and it would be a posi- 
 tive duty of the jury so to consider 
 them in determining the question of 
 
 the defendant's guilt. Such an admis- 
 sion, we think, would give the accused 
 all the benefit that he could derive 
 from the testimony of the witness if 
 present at the trial." Wassells v. 
 State, 26 Ind. 30; Mayfield v. State, 
 no Ind. 591, 593, II N. E. 618.
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 THE PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 
 
 § 273. The power and right of the § 276. Charging on the evidence. 
 
 jury to determine the law — 277. Assumption of facts in charge. 
 
 Criminal libel. 278. Necessity for evidence to sus- 
 
 274. Character and analysis of a tain instructions. 
 
 general verdict. 279. Directing a verdict. 
 
 275. Charging the jury on the law 280. Order and manner of intro- 
 
 — Physical power of the jury ducing the proof. 
 
 to disregard the judge's 280a. The credibility of detectives 
 
 charge. * and experts. 
 
 § 273. The power and right of the jury to determine the law — 
 Criminal libel. — The main, if not the sole, purpose, of the intro- 
 duction of evidence in criminal trials, is to determine disputed 
 questions of fact. If the facts constituting the case for the plain- 
 tiff in a civil action are admitted by a demurrer, or if the matter 
 in defense constitutes no defense in law, or if the jury find a 
 special verdict, a pure question of law arises which is exclusively 
 for the judge to determine. This is universally the rule in all 
 civil proceedings. The jury are bound to take the law from the 
 court's instruction, and a verdict rendered by them which is 
 palpably against the law will be set aside. Whether a jury se- 
 lected to try a criminal case are under any circumstances judges 
 of the law, in the sense that they are judges of the issue of fact, 
 is a question which has received much attention. The subject 
 received much investigation and was debated with vast learning 
 and a great expenditure of eloquence and ability in England at 
 the end of the last century, in the numerous prosecutions for crim- 
 inal libel which were brought by the crown. It w^as admitted 
 by all parties that the question. Did the accused publish the libel ? 
 and its meaning, were exclusively questions of fact for the deter- 
 mination of the jury. The controversy turned upon the right to 
 determine whether the tendency of the publication was or was not 
 
 487
 
 /6 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 488 
 
 mischievous, and the intent of the accused in pubhshing" it. On 
 the one hand, it was held that the court had the exchisive right to 
 decide that the Hbel was or was not calculated to produce mischief, 
 and that the accused intended that it should do so. On the other, 
 it was maintained that the question of mischievous tendency and 
 criminal intent w-ere, as in all other crimes, mixed questions of 
 law and fact to be tried by the jurors, under proper instructions 
 from the bench. ^ 
 
 So far as the question of the right of jurors to determine the 
 laAv in prosecutions for criminal libel is concerned, it may be con- 
 sidered as set at rest by the various constitutional provisions that 
 in such cases the jurors shall have the right to determine both 
 the law and the facts. If the constitution provides that the jury 
 shall be judges of the law, "as in other cases," or may determine 
 Cjuestions both of law and fact "under the direction of the court." 
 it is very clear that it was intended merely to place criminal libel 
 on the same footing as other crimes, and that the jury, while hav- 
 ing the right to determine the intention of the accused, as well as 
 the facts of publication, must receive the law from the court.- 
 
 ^ See Rex v. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 
 2661 ; Rex V. Dean of St. Asaph, 3 
 T. R. 428; State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 
 14, 54 Am. Dec. 90; Commonwealth 
 V. Anthes, 5 Gray (Mass.) 185, 212, 
 219. For other cases bearing upon 
 this subject, see United States v. Bat- 
 tiste, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 240, 243, 24 
 Fed. Cas. 14545; United States v. 
 Morris, I Curt. (U. S.) 23, 26 Fed. 
 Cas. 15815 ; Pennsylvania v. Bell, 
 Add. (Pa) 156, I Am. Dec. 298; 
 Pennsylvania v. M'Fail, Add. (Pa.) 
 255; Townsend v. State, 2 Blackf. 
 (Ind.) 151; Hamilton v. People, 29 
 Mich. 173; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 
 ID Pick. (Mass.) 477, 20 Am. Dec. 
 534; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536; 
 People V. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. (X. 
 Y.) 337, 394. 
 
 Province of judge and jury, see 
 Elliott Evidence, § 2732, 68 L. R. A. 
 
 79. Proof of corpus delicti in crim- 
 inal cases, 68 L. R. A. 33. 
 
 " Coole}''s Cons. Limit., 567. By 
 constitutional enactment in some of 
 the states, the right to determine the 
 law as well as the facts is conferred 
 upon the jury in a criminal case. 
 Blaker v. State, 130 Ind. 203, 29 N. 
 E. 1077; Goldman v. State, 75 Md. 
 621, 23 Atl. 1097; State V. Arm- 
 strong, 106 Mo. 395, 16 S. W. 604, 27 
 Am. St. 361, 13 L. R. A. 4i9n. In 
 Pennsj-lvania and Tennessee by con- 
 stitutional provisions "in all indict- 
 ments for libel the jury shall have the 
 right to determine the law and the 
 facts under the directions of the court 
 as in other cases." There has been 
 much conflict of authority as to the 
 effect of these provisions but it is 
 apparently settled that the}- do not 
 alter the general rule that the court 
 must determine the law and the jury
 
 489 PROVINCE OF JUDGE AXD JURY. § 2/4 
 
 § 274. Character and analysis of general verdict. — By the plea of 
 not guilty both the law and the facts are put in issue. Two issues 
 thus arise and both must be tried. An acquittal is equivalent to 
 a finding that either the existence of the law or the existence of 
 the facts has not been established, while a verdict of guilty shows 
 that both the law and the facts have been found to be against the 
 accused. In other words, a general verdict, as Chief Justice Shaw 
 well points out. is an answer both to the question, "Is there a law 
 such as is alleged by the state?" and to the question, "Has the 
 defendant done the acts charged and violated that law ?" Hence, 
 it is very evident that a general verdict must and does embody and 
 declare the result of an inquiry into a question of law as well as 
 of fact. But no way of analyzing it exists to ascertain, as it 
 stands upon the record, whether the jury determined the law as 
 well as the weight of the evidence. Their verdict is conclusive 
 and unquestionable, because the law conclusively presumes that 
 they acted upon correct legal rules. But the fact that the question 
 of fact and the question of law are thus intermingled in the ver- 
 dict, and in the deliberations of the jury which led up to it, should 
 not be permitted to obscure the principle that both are independent 
 and distinct, and that each is to be determined by different and 
 distinct but co-ordinate tribunals. If we recognize the line of 
 demarkation between them and the exclusive province of judge 
 and jury we must also admit that the minds of the jurors must 
 act freely and fully within the scope of their authority and duty, 
 and the mind of the judge must operate with equal freedom 
 within the range of his right and authority. The law will presume 
 that both judge and jury have done their duty, and, this being so, 
 a general verdict is the proper answer to the double or mixed 
 question of law and fact, "Is the defendant guilty as charged in 
 the indictment ?" Such are the proper considerations when a gen- 
 eral verdict is rendered. But the jury may find a special verdict. 
 They can determine the material facts in detail upon the evidence 
 as submitted to them, and as the same are proved to their satisfac- 
 tion, and the judge can then decide whether, in law, the facts as 
 proved bring the accused within the penal statute which it is al- 
 
 acccpt it as laid down by the court. L. R. A. 89; Ford v. State, loi Tenn. 
 Commonwealth v. McManus, 143 Pa. 454, 47 S. W. 703. 
 St. 64, 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl. 761, 14
 
 § 275 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 49O 
 
 leged he has broken, and he can then pronounce him giiilty or the 
 reverse. On the other hand, the court can inform the jury what 
 the law is as apphed to the case, if certain facts, stated hypotheti- 
 cally, are proved to their satisfaction, leaving the proof entirely to 
 them. As the court cannot tell what facts the jury will find, it can 
 only of necessity give its direction in a hypothetical form. In so far 
 as the jury apply the rules of law thus stated to them by the court 
 they may, with correctness, be said to pass upon the law by in- 
 corporating it in their verdict and placing it on record with their 
 determination of the facts. They certainly have the physical 
 power to refuse to apply the rules of law stated to them, and if 
 their refusal results in an acc|uittal they may, to that extent, deter- 
 mine what the law is, or to decide the law, as stated, is not appli- 
 cable. But in the majority of instances in which a general verdict 
 is. returned it is more correct and nearer the truth to say that the 
 jurors merely affirm and declare the law than that they determine 
 Avhat it shall be. It is for the court to point out what facts are, ac- 
 cording to law\ necessary in the particular case to be proved and to 
 inform the jury that the law characterizes certain facts, taken to- 
 gether, as criminal or the re^'crse. It is for the jnry then, keep- 
 ing these rules of law in mind, to find a verdict of guilty or not 
 guilty, according as they find these facts proved or the reverse. 
 
 ^ 275. Charging- the jury on the law — Physical power of the jury 
 to disregard the judge's charge. — The judge presiding at a criminal 
 trial is performing one of his most delicate and important duties 
 when he charges the jury and endeavors to instruct them in the 
 rules of law^ which should regulate their deliberations. The im- 
 pressiveness and dignity of the judicial ofiice, the venerable and 
 upright character of its occupant, and the learning, acumen and 
 experience which he is assumed to possess, unite to impress the 
 jury. They are unconsciously influenced to accept everything 
 that comes from his lips as authoritative, and they permit his opin- 
 ions upon the issues of fact involved, so far as he may announce 
 them, to guide them in their deliberations. The frequency with 
 which convictions are reversed by appellate courts, because of er- 
 rors in judicial instructions, clearly demonstrates the truth of 
 this statement, and illustrates how extremely difficult it is for the 
 human mind to operate impartially in the presence of accusations
 
 491 PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY, § 2/5 
 
 of wicked conduct, even when trained to the task by years of study 
 and experience. 
 
 Under the quaHfications and limitations above pointed out it 
 is the duty of the judge to instruct the jury upon all questions of 
 law involved, and it is their duty to be governed thereby,^ The 
 jury are sworn to determine the issue according to the law and 
 the evidence, and the language of the court is the only proper 
 evidence of what the law is that is in their possession. In the 
 absence of any express constitutional or statutory provision mak- 
 ing them the judges of the law in criminal cases, they are bound 
 by their oaths to accept the judge's charge as proving what the 
 law is, and to act accordingly. It will be found, as a rule, that 
 juries obey and follow the judicial instructions implicitly. It is 
 evident, however, that they have the physical power, though not 
 the legal right, to disregard them. But the exercise of the power 
 does not involve the possession of a legal right to disregard the 
 judicial instructions as to the law, and the distinction between 
 the two is clear and vital.* Hence, if the jury shall disregard the 
 law, so far as it is stated favorably to the accused, and pronounce 
 him guilty, the verdict may be set aside and a new trial ordered, 
 
 'Duffy V. People, 26 N. Y. 588; Wright, 53 Me. 328, 330-344; People 
 
 People V. Worden, 113 Cal. 569, 45 v. Pine, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 566, 568; 
 
 Pac. 844; Sparf v. United States, 156 State v. Jeandell, 5 Harr. (Del.) 475; 
 
 U. S. 51, 39 L. ed. 343, 15 Sup. Ct. Davenport v. Commonwealth, i Leigh 
 
 273, et seq. (a leading case and well (Va.) 588; Danforth v. State, 75 Ga. 
 
 reasoned. Decided in October, 1894) ; 614, 58 Am. 480 ; McGowan v. State, 
 
 Commonwealth v. McManus, 143 Pa. 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 184, 193-19S; Pleas- 
 
 St. 64, 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl. 761, 14 ant v. State, 13 Ark. 360, 376; Adams 
 
 L. R. A. 89; Commonwealth v. Ab- v. State, 29 Ohio St. 412; Parrish v. 
 
 bott, 13 Mete. (Mass.) 120, 123, 124; State, 14 Neb. 60, 15 N. W. 357; Peo- 
 
 Hannum v. State, 90 Tenn. 647, 18 S. pie v. Ivey, 49 Cal. 56; State v. Han- 
 
 W. 269; United States v. Battiste, 2 nibal, 2>7 La- Ann. 619; State v. Mil- 
 
 Sumn. 240, 245, 24 Fed. Cas. 14545; Icr, 53 Iowa 84, IS4, 209, 4 N. W. 838, 
 
 People V. Finnegan, i Park. Cr. 147, 900, 1083; State v. Main, 69 Conn. 
 
 152; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 536; 123, 37 Atl. 80, 61 Am. St. 30, 36 L. 
 
 Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173, R. A. 623. Cautionary instructions, 
 
 192 ; Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J. see Elliott Evidence, § 2733. 
 J. Marsh. (Ky.) 132, 149, 151; State 'Parrish v. State, 14 Neb. 60, 15 
 
 V. Smith, 6 R. I. ^^2; State v. Pierson, N. W. 357; State v. Reed (Ore.), 97 
 
 12 .-Xla. 149, 153; Hardy v. State, 7 Pac. 627; Anderson v. State, 122 Ga. 
 
 Mo. 607; Commonwealth v. Anthes, 5 175, 50 S. E. 51; State v. Taylor, 57 
 
 Gray (Mass.) 185, 208, 218; State v. W. Va. 228, 50 S. E. 247.
 
 § 2-]-^ CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 492 
 
 for the same reason that a verdict which is against the weight of 
 the evidence would be set aside. When, however, a verdict of 
 acquittal is rendered in disregard of the law laid down by the 
 court, the decision of the jury is final, by reason of the existence 
 of the common-law rule that no man can twice be put in jeopardy 
 for the same offense. Hence, to this extent the jury may be saicl, 
 not indeed to settle the law, but to determine that the law is not 
 applicable, or to refuse to apply it. So far they have the power 
 (and perhaps the legal right) to disregard the instructions of the 
 court. ^ 
 
 It may be noted, however, that not every proposition which 
 is contained in a text-writer or reported case is the law.® It is 
 not a correct method of instructing the jury to read or to repeat 
 to them the process of reasoning or the arguments of legal authors, 
 or of judges relating to matters of fact or experience which do not 
 contain express propositions of law, but are mere enunciations of 
 opinions upon matters of fact or suggestions drawn from every- 
 day experience. These have an appropriate place in the argument 
 of counsel, but their weight and cogency in determining the issue 
 of guilt are for the minds of the jury alone.'^ 
 
 ' Commonwealth v. McManus, 143 court says : "The teachings of ex- 
 Pa. St. 64, 21 Atl. 1018, 22 Atl. 761, perience on questions of fact are not, 
 14 L. R. A. 89; Habersham v. State, however, doctrines of law, which may 
 56 Ga. 61, 64-67; Pierce v. State, be announced as such from the 
 13 N. H. 536; United States v. Wil- bench, nor j'et are they matters of 
 son, I Baldw. 78, 108, 28 Fed. Cas. proof to be shown as other facts in 
 16730; United States v. Taylor, 11 the case. They may well enter into 
 Fed. 470, 472, 3 McCrary 500, 505; the arguments of attorneys, one side 
 Duffy V. People, 26 N. Y. 588; Peo- claiming that experience teaches one 
 pie V. Pine, 2 Barb. (N. Y.) 566, 568. thing, and the other side asserting 
 "They are also, 'ex necessitate,' the another conclusion ; but the jury, not 
 ultimate judges, in one respect, of the the judge, is the arbiter of such con- 
 law. If they acquit, the judge cannot tentions, as of all questions of fact, 
 grant a new trial, how much soever The most that the judge may do, 
 they have misconceived or disregarded under our practice, which leaves ques- 
 the law." Montee v. Commonwealth, tions of fact entirely to the jury, is 
 3 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 132, 149, 151 ; to direct the attention of the jurors 
 Commonwealth v. VanTuyl, i Mete, to such propositions and leave them, 
 (Ky.) I, 5, 71 Am. Dec. 455. in the light of their experience, to 
 
 ® People V. Wayman, 128 N. Y. 585, say what credit should be given to any 
 
 27 X. E. T070. testimony on account of its alleged 
 
 'In Garfield v. State, 74 Ind. 60, the doubtful character."
 
 493 PROVINCE OF JUDGE AXD JURY, § 2/6 
 
 § 276. Charging on the evidence.— The judge may, and indeed 
 should, charge the jury on the evidence. It is his duty to marshal 
 all the evidence before the jury in such a way and with such com- 
 ments as will enable them to see its relevancy and pertinency. He 
 may state it, and a careful, logical and impartial repetition, or an 
 intelligent analysis of it will invariably facilitate their labors in 
 determining its credibility, appreciating its character and weight, 
 and thus ascertaining the truth. These are for their consideration 
 alone, but the court should aid them so that they may come to an 
 intelligent and satisfactory conclusion, which shall be in accord- 
 ance with the law and consistent with the proof. This must be 
 done fairly and impartially, with a due regard to the preservation 
 of the defendant's rights. Nor need- the court refrain from a fair, 
 just and accurate summary of the evidence because when thus 
 presented it may be unfavorable to the accused.^ On the other 
 hand the court must not select and give undue prominence to 
 certain parts of the testimony to the exclusion of others of equal 
 importance, but which do not seem as important to the judicial 
 mind.'' 
 
 The usual, and at the same time the safest, formula is, "if, from 
 the evidence, the jury believe, etc., then it is their duty to convict." 
 The court may proceed to lay down certain well recognized legal 
 rules which should be their gnide in weighing the evidence and 
 in determining its weight, for the power of the jury to determine 
 the weight and credibility of the evidence is not arbitrary. It 
 must be exercised in subordination to the logical principles which 
 underlie all evidence, and which, from long reiteration and experi- 
 ence, have acquired the effect and character of rules of law. Thus 
 the jury may with propriety be told that the testimony of an ac- 
 complice, uncorroborated, is to be viewed with distrust ; that the 
 admission of the prisoner is to be carefully scrutinized ; that a 
 witness shown to have testified falsely in any material particular 
 
 * State V. Rose, 47 Minn. 47, 49 N. pie, 141 111. 195, 30 N. E. 329; People 
 
 W. 404; People V. Fanning, 131 N. v. Hawes, 98 Cal. 648, ^3 Pac. 791; 
 
 Y. 659, 30 N. E. 569; State v. Valen- Bell v. State, 91 Ga. 15, 16 S. E. 207; 
 
 tina, 71 N. J. L. 552, 60 Atl. 177. Grant v. State, 97 Ala. 35, 11 So. 915; 
 
 "Goley V. State, 85 Ala. 333, 5 So. Miller v. State, 107 Ala. 40, 19 So. 
 
 167; State V. Ward, 19 Nev. 297, 10 37; Prine v. State, 73 Miss. 838, 19 
 
 Pac. 133; Morgan v. State, 48 Ohio So. 711; People v. Caldwell, 107 Mich. 
 
 St. 371, 27 N. E. 710; Scott V. Peo- 374, 65 N. W. 213.
 
 § 276 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 494 
 
 should be disbelieved, and that they may consider the interest of 
 the accused when he testifies as a witness. So they may be in- 
 structed generally upon the rules of law which determine the rele- 
 vancy and probative force of presumptions of law which are re- 
 ceived in lieu of proof, and of evidence such as dying declarations 
 and confessions, which constitute exceptions to general rules, 
 and are received ex necessitate rei. But the court cannot exceed 
 these limits and point out the particular and common details which 
 are within the knowledge and experience of men generally, and 
 are to be regarded in determining whether any evidence is or is 
 not to be believed. Thus, for example, the court should not dis- 
 credit a witness by stating that he has been impeached on liis 
 cross-examination because of his ignorance and want of expe- 
 rience.^" 
 
 The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of 
 the witnesses in every case where, upon the whole testimony, an 
 issue of fact arises, are for the exclusive consideration and deter- 
 mination of the jury." 
 
 ^"Thomas v. State, 95 Ga. 484, 22 
 S. E. Rep. 315. Cf., also, Hauk v. 
 State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 N. E. 127, 47 
 N. E. 465. 
 
 "State V. Jones, 44 La. Ann. 1120, 
 1 121, ir So. 827; State v. Plum, 49 
 Kan. 679, 31 Pac. 308; Baysinger v. 
 People, 115 111. 419, 5 N. E. 375; State 
 V. Jones, 86 Mo. 623, 628; State v. 
 Wisdom, 84 Mo. 177, 190; Jones v. 
 State, 59 Ark. 417, 27 S. W. 601 ; 
 State V. Kibling, 63 Vt. 636, 22 Atl. 
 613; People V. Minnaugh, 131 N. Y. 
 563, 29 N. E. 750; People v. Cowgill, 
 93 Cal. 596, 29 Pac. 228; Dean v. 
 State, 130 Ind. 237, 29 N. E. 911; 
 Rawls V. State, 97 Ga. 186, 22 S. E. 
 529; Ware v. State, 96 Ga. 349, 23 
 S. E. 410; Williams v. State, 46 Neb. 
 704, 65 N. W. 783; People v. Brow, 
 90 Hun (N. Y.) 509, 35 N. Y. S. 
 1009; Bonner v. State, 107 Ala. 97. 18 
 So. 226; State V. Aughtry, 49 S. Car. 
 285, 26 S. E. 619, 27 S. E. 199; State 
 V. Cannon, 49 S. Car. 550, 2y S. E. 
 
 526; State V. Walker, 149 X. Car. 
 527, 63 S. E. 76; Peak v. State, 5 Ga. 
 App. 56, 62 S. E. 665; State v. Fisliel 
 (Iowa), 118 N. W. 7^:^; Konda v. 
 United States, C. C. A. 166 Fed. 91, 22 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 304n; State v. Sassa- 
 man, 214 Mo. 695, 114 S. W. 590; 
 State V. Pirkey (S. Dak.), 118 N. W. 
 1042; Dennis v. State (Ark), 114 S. 
 W. 926; Post V. United States, 135 
 Fed. I, 67 C. C. A. 569, 70 L. R. A. 
 989n ; Shires v. State (Okla. Cr. App.), 
 99 Pac. 1 100; State v. Wilco.x, 132 N. 
 Car. 1 120, 44 S. E. 625; State v. Hall, 
 132 N. Car. 1094, 44 S. E. 553; Lyles 
 V. United States, 20 App. Cas. D. C. 
 559; State V. Dunn (Wis), 102 N. W. 
 935 ; Carson v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 157, 86 S. W. ion; State v. Collins, 
 28 R. I. 439, 67 Atl. 796; State v. 
 Thrailkill, 71 S. Car. 136, 50 S. E. 
 551; State V. Shuff, 9 Idaho 115, 72 
 Pac. 664; State v. Littooy, 52 Wash. 
 87, 100 Pac. 170.
 
 495 
 
 PROVINCE OF JUDGE AXD JURY. §§ 277. 278 
 
 § 277. Assumption of facts in charge.— The duty and the right 
 of the court to state the testimony does not, by implication, 
 authorize it to declare what is proved by the testimony, or what is 
 the result of the testimony. These are questions for the jury.'" 
 The credibility of any evidence which has been offered is for the 
 jury alone. Hence, the court should not. in its charge, assume, 
 as proved, any allegation unsupported by evidence, or on which 
 the evidence is so contradictory that reasonable men may form 
 opposite opinions. ^^ Whether a fact, upon which the evidence is 
 conflicting, is proved, is for the jury to determine. But where a 
 fact is conceded or is established clearly and satisfactorily by the 
 evidence without conflict or contradiction, the court may assume 
 it as proved, or instruct the jury that there is evidence tending to 
 prove that fact.^* 
 
 § 278. Necessity for evidence to sustain instruction. — It is not 
 proper for the court to give instructions which, though they em- 
 body a correct statement of the law of evidence, are merely legal 
 
 "People V. Flynn, T2, Cal. 511, 15 
 Pac. 102; People v. Casey, 65 Cal. 
 260, 3 Pac. 874; State v. Stewart, 
 Del. Gen. Sess., dy Atl. 786; Com- 
 monwealth V. Thomas (Ky.), 104 S. 
 W. 326, 31 Ky. L. 899; Hall v. State, 
 134 Ala. 90, 32 So. 750; People v. 
 Matthai, 135 Cal. 442, ^^ Pac. 694; 
 Doyle V. State, 39 Fla. 155, 22 So. 
 272, 63 Am. St. 159; Suddeth v. State, 
 112 Ga. 407, 37 S. E. 747; Hellyer v. 
 People, 186 111. 550, 58 N. E. 245; 
 State V. Bige, ri2 Iowa 433, 84 N. W. 
 518; State V. Lewis, 56 Kan. 374, 43 
 Pac. 265. 
 
 ^'Newton v. State (Miss.), 12 So. 
 560; State V. Hope, 102 Mo. 410, 14 
 S. W. 98s ; Horn v. State, 98 Ala. 23, 
 13 So. 329; Brown v. State, 72 Miss. 
 997, 17 So. 278; Commonwealth v. 
 McMahon, 145 Pa. St. 413, 22 Atl. 
 97' ; People v. Lang, 104 Cal. 363, 37 
 Pac. 1031 ; Scott v. People, 141 111. 
 195. 30 N. E. 329; State v. Lewis, 56 
 Kan. 374 ; 43 Pac. 265 ; Fowler v. 
 
 State, 100 Ala. 96, 14 So. 860; Butler 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 397 ; 58 S. E. 685. 
 " Koerner v. State, 98 Ind. 7, 13 ; 
 Spigner v. State, 103 Ala. 30, 15 So. 
 892; Hawkins v. State, 136 Ind. 630, 
 36 N. E. 419; Morgan v. State, 48 
 Ohio St. 371, 27 N. E. 710; State v. 
 Meshek, 61 Iowa 316, 16 N. W. 143; 
 State V. Aughtry, 49 S. Car. 285, 26 
 S. E. 619, 27 S. E. 199; Wiborg v. 
 United States, 163 U. S. 632, 41 L. 
 ed. 289, 16 S. Ct. 1 127, 1 197: Jeffries 
 V. State, 61 Ark. 308, 32 S. W. 1080; 
 State V. Zinn, 6r Mo. App. 476; HoUi- 
 day V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 133, Z2. S. W. 
 538; People V. Sternberg, 11 1 Cal. 3, 
 43 Pac. 198; State v. Kinney, 21 S. 
 Dak. 390, 1 13 N. W. T7 ; State v. Tay- 
 lor, 57 W. Va. 228, 50 S. E. 247; 
 People V. Phillips, 70 Cal. 61, ir Pac. 
 493; Hawkins v. State, 136 Ind. 630, 
 Z() N. E. 419; State v. McKnight. rug 
 Iowa 79, 93 N. W. (iZ\ Pisar v. State, 
 56 Neb. 455, ^(i N. W. 869; State v. 
 Nickels, 65 S. Car. 169, 43 S. E. 521.
 
 § 279 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 496 
 
 abstractions, because they are not sustained by any evidence in 
 the case/^' Thus, it is not error for the court to refuse to charge 
 upon evidence, which was excluded,^*' and a fortiori, on evidence, 
 which has not been offered, and which is absolutely irrelevant," 
 because the issue upon which it would alone be relevant does not 
 exist in the case. 
 
 § 279. Directing a verdict. — In a civil case the court has the 
 legal power to direct a verdict for plaintiff when his cause of 
 action is admitted, or even when the evidence or matter of defense, 
 if true, constitutes no defense in law.^^ So if the plaintiff fails to 
 substantiate his allegations by evidence showing at least a prima 
 facie case, there is nothing to go to the jnry, and the court may 
 direct a nonsuit. In other words, where the case turns upon an 
 issue of law, the court may, in a civil case, direct the jury to find 
 a verdict according as it determines the law, for the reason that it 
 has the power to set aside a verdict which is against the law. 
 But the court cannot in a criminal trial set aside a verdict of ac- 
 quittal. Hence, to permit it to direct a verdict of guilty would 
 be to allow it to do indirectly that which it has no power to do 
 directly. 
 
 For this reason the jury cannot be directed to render a verdict 
 of guilty, no matter how convincing the evidence may be, even 
 where the facts are admitted or settled beyond any possibility of 
 dispute. The constitutional right of the accused to have his guilt 
 or innocence determined by a jury of his peers cannot be denied 
 by the arbitrary exercise of the judicial power. ^° In a criminal 
 
 ^^ State V. Robinson, 35 S. Car. 340, 29 Tex. App. 159, 15 S. W. 601 ; 
 
 14 S. E. 766; Bostic V. State, 94 Ala. Grafif v. People, 134 111. 380, 25 N. 
 
 45, 10 So. 602; Hill V. Commonwealth, E. 563; Doyle v. People, 147 111. 394. 
 
 88 Va. 633, 14- S. E. 330, 29 Am. St. 35 N. E. 372 ; Jackson v. State, 91 Ga. 
 
 744; Crane v. State, in Ala. 45, 20 271, 18 S. E. 298, 44 Am. St. 22. 
 
 So. 590; Morearty v. State, 46 Neb. ^* United States v. Taylor, 3 IMc- 
 
 652, 65 N. W. 784 ; Doyle v. State, Crary 500, 505. 
 
 39 Fla. 155, 22 So. 272, 63 Am. St. '" State v. Wilson, 62 Kan. 621, 64 
 
 159. Pac. 22,, 52 L. R. A. 79; United States 
 
 ^* Commonwealth V. Cosseboom, 155 v. Taylor, 11 Fed. 470, 472, 3 Mc- 
 
 Mass. 298 ; 29 N. E. 463. Crary 500 ; United States v. Battiste, 
 
 " Felker v. State, 54 Ark. 489, 16 2 Sumn. 240, 243, 24 Fed. Cas. I4S4S ; 
 
 S. W. 663 ; Morgan v. State, 48 Ohio Commonwealth v. Werntz, 161 Pa. St. 
 
 St. 371, 27 N. E. 710; Massey v. State, 591, 29 Atl. 272; Tucker v. State, 57
 
 497 
 
 PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY. 
 
 § 279 
 
 trial under a plea of not guilty, no admission of a cause of action 
 by the state can be implied. This plea puts in issue the credibility 
 of the state's evidence, even if it is otherwise uncontradicted, be- 
 cause of the presumption of innocence which compels a determina- 
 tion by the jury. If no question of intent is involved in the crim- 
 inal transaction, and the facts are overwhelmingly proved or ad- 
 mitted, so that the only question is, has a statute been violated? 
 the court may properly point out that the law as applied to the 
 facts shows the defendant's guilt, and instruct the jury that it is 
 their duty to convict. ^° 
 
 The court cannot, during the progress of the trial, instruct the 
 clerk to enter a verdict of not guilty and then discharge a prisoner. 
 If there is no evidence tending to prove the offense charged, and 
 the only issue is one of law, it is the duty of the court to direct an 
 acquittal, and erroneous not to do so.^^ And it has been held that 
 
 Ga. 503, 505; State v. Picker, 2 Mo. 
 App. 1074; Sims V. State, 43 Ala. 33; 
 Nonemaker v. State, 34 Ala. 211; 
 People V. Collison, 85 Mich. 105, 48 
 X. W. 292; State V. Winchester, 113 
 N. Car. 641, 18 S. E. 657; State v. 
 Riley, 113 N. Car. 648, 18 S. E. 168; 
 State V. Picker, 2 Mo. App. 1074; 
 Townsend v. State, 137 Ala. 91, 34 
 So. 382; Territory v. West (N. 
 Mex.), 99 Fac. 343. 
 
 -° People V. Neumann, 85 Mich. 98, 
 48 N. W. 290; People v. Elmer, 109 
 Mich. 493, 67 N. W. 550. But where 
 intent is in question, an instruction 
 that if the jury believe the evidence it 
 is their duty to find the defendant 
 guilty, is erroneous as withdrawing 
 the question of intent from them. 
 Perkins v. State, 50 Ala. 154, 159. "A 
 charge to the jury, that upon the facts 
 testified to, assuming them to be 
 true, it would be their duty to con- 
 vict the prisoner, if ever proper, 
 would be so only in the very rare 
 cases in wliich the force of the facts 
 proved should be such, as to make 
 the inference of criminal intent, an 
 32 — Underhill Ckim. Ev. 
 
 inference of law and not of fact." 
 Duffy V. People, 26 N. Y. 588. 
 
 "^ State V. Trove, i Ind. App. 553, 
 27 N. E. 878; Commonwealth v. Low- 
 rey, 158 Mass. 18, 32 N. E. 940; 
 Commonwealth v. Ruddle, 142 Pa. St. 
 144, 21 Atl. 814; People V. Bennett, 
 49 N. Y. 137; State v. Green, 117 N. 
 Car. 695, 23 S. E. 98; State v. War- 
 ner, 74 Mo. 83, 85 ; People v. Besold, 
 154 Cal. 363, 97 Pac. 871 ; People v. 
 Minney, 155 Mich. 534,119 N. W. 918; 
 Murphy v. State, 124 Wis. 635, 102 N. 
 W. 1087. Cf. People V. Daniels, 105 Cal. 
 262, 38 Pac. 720, where the court has 
 power only to "advise" an acquittal. 
 People V. Roberts, 114 Cal. 67, 45 
 Pac. 1016. "In cases of weak and 
 unsatisfactory evidence, the court can 
 always impress a jury with the benign 
 principles of the common law estab- 
 lished for the protection of the inno- 
 cent, that the prosecution are bound 
 to establish a clear case; that the 
 prisoner is entitled to the benefit of 
 all reasonable doubts, and that it is 
 better that many guilty prisoners 
 should escape than that one inrtocent
 
 § 28o CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 498 
 
 even when the evidence is insufficient in the opinion of the court 
 to support a conviction on a motion for a new trial, it becomes its 
 duty, with or without"^ a rec|uest, to direct an acquittal. A request 
 to have the jury directed to acquit must state specifically the 
 grounds on which it is based. ^^ 
 
 § 280. Order and manner of introducin«f the proof. — Ordinarily 
 in all judicial proceedings the party who has the burden of proof 
 must, in the opening, introduce all the facts in evidence which 
 constitutes his case. He is required then to make out a prima 
 facie case only, and need not anticipate his adversary's case or 
 attempt to meet his evidence until the proof of the latter is heard. 
 
 In the case of homicide and other serious similar criminal of- 
 fenses, it is within the judicial discretion to require the state to 
 prove the corpus delicti at least prima facie, before admitting evi- 
 dence to connect the accused therewith. ^''^ 
 
 After the prosecution has exhausted its case and the accused 
 has had a full opportunity to introduce all the evidence upon 
 which he relies for an acquittal, the court may permit the intro- 
 duction of rebutting evidence on the part of the state. By rebut- 
 ting evidence is meant not merely evidence which contradicts the 
 w^itnesses upon collateral and irrelevant points, or which is cor- 
 roborative and confirmative of that which preceded it, but evi- 
 dence which squarely meets and controverts some affirmative 
 fact or facts which the adversary has attempted to prove. ^* 
 
 person should be punished; and there introduce its proof is usually a matter 
 
 may be cases so weak upon the facts of judicial discretion. Davis v. State, 
 
 as to justify the advice of the court 51 Neb. 301, 70 N. W. 984; State 
 
 that it is unsafe in the particular case v. Pruett, 49 La. Ann. 283, 21 So. 842; 
 
 to convict." People v. Bennett, 49 Brooke v. People, 23 Colo. 375, 48 
 
 N. Y. 137. Pac. 502; State v. Remington, 50 Ore. 
 
 -- Commonwrealth v. Merrill, 14 99, 91 Pac. 473; State v. DeHart, 38 
 
 Gray (Mass.) 415, 418, 77 Am. Dec. Mont. 21 1, 99 Pac. 438; People v. Car- 
 
 336; People V. Ledwon, 153 N. Y. 10, son (Cal.), 99 Pac. 970; Caswell v. 
 
 46 N. E. 1046; Taylor v. Territory State, 5 Ga. App. 483, 63 S. E. 566; 
 
 (Okla. Cr. App.), 99 Pac. 628. Crawford v. United States, 30 App. 
 
 -'State V. Nulty, 2 Eastern 347. Cas. D. C. i; Shires v. State (Okla. 
 
 ^a People V. Millard, 53 Mich. 63, 18 Cr. App.), 99 Pac. iioo. 
 
 N. W. 562; People v. Hall, 48 Mich. =" State v. Parish, 22 Iowa 284; 
 
 482, 12 N. W. 66s, 42 Am. 477. The People v. Mayes, 113 Cal. 618, 45 
 
 order in which the prosecution shall Pac. 860; Thomas v. State, 47 Fla.
 
 499 PROVINCE OF JUDGE AXD JURY. § 28oa 
 
 § 280a. The credibility of detectives and experts. — The evidence 
 of private detectives is justly regarded with some suspicion by the 
 courts, but there is no rule of law that their testimony is to be 
 weighed by any other method than that employed in the case of 
 other witnesses. ^^ It is usually a custom, as matter of practice, to 
 caution the jury to be very careful in estimating the evidence of 
 private detectives. This matter, however, is largely in the dis- 
 cretion of the court. "^ 
 
 It has been held improper for the court as invading the prov- 
 ince of the jury to instruct that the testimony of private detectives 
 or of public detectives or police officers should be received with 
 caution or with distrust."' 
 
 The jury may take into consideration the fact of the interest of 
 the detective or policeman in securing a conviction. The jury in 
 determining his credibility that it would be to his advantage to se- 
 cure a conviction as tending to give him credit and reputation, 
 but it would hardly be proper for the court to instruct that the 
 interest which the detective has in the conviction would justify 
 the jury in regarding his testimony with suspicion. His motive 
 is relevant and may be considered. It is immaterial, as matter of 
 law. that the detective acts in apparent connection with the ac- 
 cused in the commission of the crime and that he did so for the 
 purpose of procuring the arrest of the accused.^* And the fact 
 that a private detective or police officer procures evidence 
 that a crime has been committed by committing a trespass on the 
 premises occupied by the accused and by watching the accused 
 and others while they engaged in the commission of the crime, 
 does not violate the constitutional prohibition against compelling 
 the party to testify against himself."'^ 
 
 99, 36 So. 161 ; Smith v. State, 126 Ga. 24 N. E. 861, 23 Am. St. 652, 8 L. R. 
 
 803, 55 S. E. 1024; State v. Arnold, A. 837; State v. Hoxsie, 15 R. I. i, 
 
 206 Mo. 589, 105 S. W. 641. 22 Atl. 1059, 2 Am. St. 838; State v. 
 
 = Myers v. State, 97 Ga. •](>, 25 S. Bennett, 40 S. Car. 308, 18 S. E. 886. 
 
 E. 252; Burns v. People, 45 111. App. But the contrary has also been held. 
 
 70; People V. Shoemaker, 131 Mich. People v. Loris, 115 N. Y. S. 236. 
 
 107, 90 N. W. 1035; Copeland v. ^Commonwealth v. Foran, no 
 
 State, 36 Tex. Cr. 575, 38 S. W. 210. Mass. 179. 
 
 '"Jaynes v. People, 44 Colo. 535, 99 ^ Cohn v. State (Tcnn.), 109 S. W. 
 
 Pac. 325. 1 149. 
 
 "Hroneck v. People, 134 111. 139,
 
 § 28oa CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 5OO 
 
 There is no presumption in law against the testimony of an 
 expert witness who testifies for pay. It is error for the court to 
 charge in such a way that the jury will be prejudiced against ex- 
 pert testimony. For example, it would be error for the court to 
 tell the jury that experts can be found to swear on both sides of 
 any question.^" And it is manifest and glaring error for the court 
 to state to the jury that medical experts, employed by the accused, 
 are by reason of the fact that they testify for the defense entitled 
 to little or no credit, but that great weight should be given to the 
 testimony of an expert appointed by the court or produced by the 
 state.^^ The court may properly charge that expert opinions are 
 to be considered with all the evidence and that the jury are not 
 bound to act upon them.®- But the jury may determine whether 
 these opinions are reasonable on a consideration of all the facts 
 in the case and that they should subject all evidence, both expert 
 and non-expert, to a careful examination by the same test.'^ But 
 it is proper for the court to tell the jury that the weight of expert 
 testimony depends on the skill, knowledge and appearance of the 
 witness and his acquaintance with the subject under investiga- 
 tion.®^ 
 
 It is error for the court to go beyond this in charging the jury 
 on the weight of expert testimony. Thus, it is error where an 
 expert witness testifies that the accused was sane when he com- 
 mitted the crime to instruct that "great respect is due to the opin- 
 ion of those skilled in such matters and with reference to the phe- 
 nomena of the human mind.®^ 
 
 =» People V. Webster, 59 Hun 398, S. W. 312; Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 
 
 13 N. Y. S. 414; State v. Rathbun, 74 539, i N. E. 491. 
 
 Conn. 524, 51 Atl. 540. '' State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442, 30 
 
 '' Persons v. State, 90 Tenn. 291, 16 N. W. 742, distinguishing State v. 
 
 S. W. 726. Townsend, 66 Iowa 741, 24 N. W. 
 
 '= Wagner v. State, 116 Ind. 181, 18 535- 
 
 N. E. 833. " Smith v. State, 127 Ga. 56, 56 S. 
 
 "Wilcox V. State, 94 Tenn. 106, 28 E. 116.
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. 
 
 §281. 
 
 Embezzlement — Essential facts 
 constituting the crime. 
 
 § 296. 
 
 282. 
 
 Embezzlement — The intention 
 
 297. 
 
 
 to convert. 
 
 298. 
 
 283. 
 
 Proving other acts of embez- 
 
 
 
 zlement. 
 
 299. 
 
 284. 
 
 Ev'idence of demand and re- 
 
 
 
 fusal. 
 
 300. 
 
 285. 
 
 The existence of the trust rela- 
 
 
 
 tion. 
 
 301. 
 
 286. 
 
 The ownership of the property. 
 
 
 287. 
 
 Evidence of efforts to conceal 
 
 
 
 or dispose of property or 
 
 302. 
 
 
 money. 
 
 303- 
 
 288. 
 
 Circumstantial evidence to 
 prove the venue. 
 
 304- 
 
 289. 
 
 Value of the property. 
 
 305- 
 
 290. 
 
 Admissions by the defendant. 
 
 306. 
 
 291. 
 
 Documentary evidence. 
 
 
 291a 
 
 . Definition of larceny. 
 
 307. 
 
 292. 
 
 Larceny — The felonious inten- 
 
 308. 
 
 
 tion. 
 
 309- 
 
 293- 
 
 The carrying away. 
 
 
 294. 
 
 Ownership — Character and 
 
 
 
 proof of. 
 
 310. 
 
 295- 
 
 Competency of owner of stolen 
 goods as witness — Proof of 
 his non-consent. 
 
 3II- 
 
 Identifying the stolen prop- 
 erty. 
 
 Brands on cattle. 
 
 Evidence of venue and of the 
 value of money or property. 
 
 Inference from possession of 
 the property stolen. 
 
 Recent and exclusive charac- 
 ter of possession. 
 
 Burden of explaining posses- 
 sion — Character of explana- 
 tory evidence. 
 
 Explanatory declarations. 
 
 Evidence of footprints. 
 
 Financial standing and expend- 
 itures of the defendant. 
 
 Evidence of other crimes. 
 
 Stolen goods found through 
 inadmissible confession. 
 
 Malicious mischief. 
 
 Malicious intent. 
 
 Ownership and value of prop- 
 erty — Evidence that the ac- 
 cused acted in good faith. 
 
 Maliciously injuring animals. 
 
 Injuries to grain, trees, crops, 
 etc. 
 
 ,^ 281. Embezzlement — Essential facts constituting the crime. — 
 Four distinct propositions of fact must be established beyond a 
 reasonable doubt to sustain a prosecution for embezzlement by 
 an agent of a private person or a corporation. First, that the ac- 
 cused was the agent of the person or corporation, and that he, 
 by the terms of his employment, was charged with receiving the 
 
 501
 
 ^- 282 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 5O2 
 
 money or property of his principal. Second, that he did, in fact, 
 receive such money or property. Third, that he received it in 
 the course of his employment. Fourth, that he, knowing it was 
 not his own, converted it to his own use or to the use of some 
 third person not the true owner.^ 
 
 A statute defining embezzlement which provides that a conver- 
 sion to the use of the accused, or to that of any "other person" is 
 embezzlement or larceny, means some other person or some third 
 person other than the accused and not some person other than the 
 owner of the property." If the accused being a servant or an 
 agent converts goods or money of which he has merely the cus- 
 tody without the actual possession, the offense is larceny, not 
 embezzlement.^ 
 
 § 282. Embezzlement — The intention to convert. — The crime of 
 embezzlement was unknown at common law. It is wholly the 
 creature of statutory enactment.* And in determining whether 
 acts charged constitute embezzlement the terms of the statute are 
 controlling.^ Under most of the statutes, an appropriation of 
 the money or the property of another, entrusted to the care of the 
 
 ^ Leonard v. State, 7 Tex. App. 417. W. i ; Commonwealth v. Stearns, 2 
 
 Ex parte, Hedley, 31 Cal. 108; Webb Met. (Mass.) 343. 
 
 V. State, 8 Tex. App. 310, 311; State ^People v. Perini, 94 Cal. 573, 29 
 
 V. Schingen, 20 Wis. 74; People v. Pac. 1027; Brown v. People, 20 Colo. 
 
 Cobler, 108 Cal. 538, 41 Pac. 401 ; De- 161, 36 Pac. 1040. 
 
 Leon V. Territory, 9 Ariz. 161, 80 Evidence of embezzlement in gen- 
 
 Pac. 348; People v. Hemple, 4 Cal. eral, see Elliott Evidence, § 2969. Pre- 
 
 App. 120, 87 Pac. 227 ; Fields v. sumptions in prosecutions for embez- 
 
 United States, 27 App. D. C. 433 ; zlement, see Elliott Evidence, § 2964. 
 
 State V. Dudenhefer, 122 La. 288, 47 Burden of proof in prosecutions for 
 
 So. 614; State V. Shuman, loi Me. embezzlement, see Elliott Evidence, 
 
 158, 63 Atl. 665; State V. Stevenson, § 2965. Weight and sufficiency of the 
 
 91 Me. 107, 39 Atl. 471 ; State v. evidence, see Elliott Evidence, § 2972. 
 
 Newman, 74 N. H. 10, 64 Atl. 761 ; Questions of law and fact, see Elliott 
 
 Moore v. State, 53 Neb. 831, 74 X. W. Evidence, § 2966. Defenses in pros- 
 
 319 ; Flohr v. Territory, 14 Okl. 477, ecutions for embezzlement, see Elliott 
 
 78 Pac. 565; State v. Bogardus, 36 Evidence, § 2971. 
 
 Wash. 297, 78 Pac. 942; Bailey v. * Leonard v. State, 7 Tex. App. 417; 
 
 Commonwealth (Ky. 1908), 113 S. W. State v. Pellerin, 118 La. 547, 43 So. 
 
 140; State v. Foster, i Penn. (Del.) 159. 
 
 289, 40 Atl. 939. 'State V. Pellerin, 118 La. 547. 43 
 
 'Fleener v. State, 58 Ark. 98, 23 S. So. 159.
 
 503 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. § 282 
 
 accused, to his own use or to the use of any other person with a 
 fraudulent intent is embezzlement." Generally there must be 
 some act on the part of the accused to separate the property or 
 money from that held by him as an agent, to deprive the owner 
 of it. or to convert it to his own use, and he must assume some 
 personal dominion over the property.' 
 
 It consists of a fraudulent appropriation to one's own use of the 
 goods or money of another, which were entrusted, with the own- 
 er's consent, to one's care as agent, servant, bailee,'^ trustee, or in 
 some other fiduciary capacity. It differs from larceny in that 
 larceny involves an unlawful taking without the owner's consent, 
 while the gist of embezzlement is the conversion or breach of 
 trust.' 
 
 Larceny involves a trespass upon the possession of another, but 
 the accused in embezzlement being the agent or trustee of the 
 owner has the possession of the property converted and therefore 
 cannot be guilty of a trespass by converting the property.^" It 
 has been held that one who obtains possession of property with 
 the intention of subsequently stealing, and carries out this inten- 
 tion is guilty of larceny. The prosecution must show that he had 
 the intent to steal at the time he acquired possession in order that 
 the crime shall be larceny ;^^ for, if the intent to steal is conceived 
 
 * State V. Seeney, 5 Penn. (Del.) 16 Ky. L. 184; Commonwealth v. 
 
 142, 59 Atl. 48; State V. Foster, i Moore, 166 Mass. 513, 44 N. E. 612; 
 
 Penn. (Del.) 289, 40 Atl. 939. Wilson v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. App. 159, 
 
 'Knight V. State, 152 Ala. 56, 44 82 S. W. 651; State v. Dunn, 138 N. 
 
 So. 585. Car. (i'/2, 50 S. E. 772. The history 
 
 ' Any exercise of dominion or con- of the distinction at common law be- 
 
 trol by a bailee over property incon- tween the crimes of larceny and em- 
 
 sistent with the rights of the owner bczzlement and of the English legis- 
 
 or with the nature and purpose of the lation upon the subject is discussed 
 
 bailment is evidence of a conversion at considerable length in Common- 
 
 if done with intent to defraud. State wealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 527- 
 
 V. Sicnkiewiez, 4 Penn. (Del.) 59, 55 529, 30 N. E. 364, 31 Am. St. 560, 15 
 
 Atl. 346. L. R. A. 317. 
 
 "Ennis v. State, 3 Green (Iowa) ^"Knight v. State, 152 Ala. 56. 44 
 
 67; People V. Johnson, 91 Cal. 265, So. 585. 
 
 272. 273, 27 Pac. 663; Commonwealth "Johnson v. State, 119 Ga. 563, 46 
 
 V. CliflFord, 96 Ky. 4, 2^ S. W. 811, S. E. 839-
 
 s 282 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 504 
 
 after the taking of possession the crime is embezzlement/- Evi- 
 dence of motive is inadmissible in embezzlement/'' 
 
 The intent to defraud the true owner of his property and to 
 convert it to one's own use, or to the use of some third person, 
 must always be proved/* 
 
 The intent to defraud is always a question for the jury,^'^ and a 
 charge upon fraudulent or dishonest intent should be given.'" 
 
 The intent to convert may always be inferred from the circum- 
 stances/^ if they are sufficient to prove a willful and unlawful 
 conversion. ^"^ 
 
 The accused is entitled to a charge to the jury that the pre- 
 sumption of law was that the defendant would not steal or mis- 
 appropriate the money if it got into his hands. '^ 
 
 ^' Levy V. State, 79 Ala. 259. 
 
 "State V. Allen, 21 S. Dak. 121, no 
 N. W. 92. 
 
 " People V. Hurst, 62 Mich. 276, 
 277, 28 N. W. 838; State v. Carkin, 
 90 Me. 142, 37 Atl. 878; People v. 
 Galland, 55 Mich. 628, 629, 22 N. W. 
 81 ; Stallings v. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 220, 15 S. W. 7t6; State v. Reilly, 4 
 Mo. App. 392, 396-400 ; State v. Lyon, 
 45 N. J. L. 272, 27s; State v. Adams, 
 108 Mo. 208, 18 S. W. 1000; State v. 
 Kortgaard, 62 Minn. 7, 64 N. W. 51 ; 
 Mulford V. People, 139 111. 586, 28 N. 
 E. 1096; State V. Pratt, 98 Mo. 482, 
 485, II S. W. 977; State V. Trolson, 21 
 Nev. 419, 427, 32 Pac. 930; State v. 
 Hopkins, 56 Vt. 250; Robson v. State, 
 83 Ga. 166, 9 S. E. 610, 612; Beaty v. 
 S<:ate, 82 Ind. 228, 232; People v. 
 Page, 1x6 Cal. 386, 48 Pac. 326; State 
 V. Seeney, S Penn. (Del.) 142, 59 Atl. 
 48; O'Brien v. United States, 27 App. 
 D. C. 263; Eatman v. State, 48 Fla. 
 2T, 7,7 So. 576; Ehrhart v. Rork, 114 
 111. .\pp. 509; State V. McDonald. 133 
 N. Car. 680, 45 S. E. 582; State v. 
 Summers, 141 N. Car. 841, 53 S. E. 
 856; Busby V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 
 289, 103 S. W. 638; State V. Mis- 
 
 pagel, 207 Mo. 557, 106 S. W. 513; 
 State V. Newman, 74 N. H. 10, 64 
 Atl. 761. See Elliott Evidence, 
 §§ 2967, 2716, 2717, 21 Am. St. 314. 
 
 "Walker v. State, 117 Ala. 42, 23 
 So. 149. 
 
 ^^ State v. Dunn, 138 N. Car. 672, 50 
 S. E. 772. 
 
 " State V. Kortgaard, 62 Minn. 7, 64 
 N. W. 51, 55; People v. Wadsworth, 
 63 Mich. 500, 30 N. W. 99; State v. 
 Seeney, 5 Penn. (Del.) 142, 59 Atl. 48; 
 State v. Lentz, 184 Mo. 223, 83 S. W. 
 970. 
 
 " State v. Brame, 61 Minn. loi, 63 
 N. W. 250; State v. Noland, in Mo. 
 473, 485, 19 S. W. 715, 722; Common- 
 wealth v. Moore, 166 Mass. 513, 44 
 N. E. 612. In such a case the consent 
 or permission of the owner to the 
 taking is irrelevant. United States 
 V. Taintor, 11 Blatch. C. C. 374, 28 
 Fed. Cas. 16428, i Thomp. Nat. Bank 
 Cas. 256; Faust v. United States, 163 
 U. S. 452, 41 L. ed. 224, 16 S. Ct. 1 1 12; 
 Stephens v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. App. 
 489, 93 S. W. 545- 
 
 '"People V. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 
 253, 50 N. E. 846, reversing 20 App. 
 Div. (N. Y.) 139, 46 N. Y. Supp. 1020.
 
 0^0 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY, 
 
 § 283 
 
 The accused may always introduce evidence to show he acted 
 in good faith and that he had no intention to convert."'^ He may 
 testify he beheved he had authority to use the money as his own,"^ 
 as, for example, where his employer owed him a debt and he re- 
 tained money to offset it.-^ He may show that the money he is 
 accused of embezzling was employed to pay the debt of the princi- 
 pal to another with the consent of the owner.-^ If the jury are 
 convinced that the accused had appropriated, or applied the prop- 
 erty openly, and with an honest belief that he owned it, they 
 should usually, under the statutes, acquit, though the accused was 
 mistaken in his claim of title,^* and his good faith had nothing 
 for its foundation. ^^ 
 
 The offense is complete as soon as the property or money is in- 
 tentionally converted. The subsequent return of the property or 
 the repayment of the money to the owner is not admissible in 
 evidence and does not excuse or extenuate the offense."^ 
 
 § 283, Proving other acts of embezzlement. — Other similar acts 
 of embezzlement at about the same time are relevant to show the 
 criminal intent."^ 
 
 ""Frink v. State (Fla. 1908), 47 So. 
 514- 
 
 "' Eatman v. State, 48 Fla. 21, 37 
 So. 576. 
 
 "Eatman v. State, 48 Fla. 21, 2>1 
 So. 576. 
 
 "Walker v. State, 117 Ala. 42, 23 
 So. 149. 
 
 " People V. Lapique, 120 Cal. 25, 
 52 Pac. 40. 
 
 "Eatman v. State, 48 Fla. 21, yj 
 So. 576. It has been held that the in- 
 tent to convett may be inferred from 
 the non-payment of money to the 
 owner. O'Brien v. United States, 27 
 App. D. C. 263; Zuckerman v. People, 
 213 111. 114, 72 N. E. 741. The con- 
 trary has also been held. State v. 
 McDonald, 133 N. Car. 680, 45 S. E. 
 582. 
 
 ^' State V. Pellerin, 118 La. 547, 43 
 So. 159; State V. Lentz, 184 Mo. 223, 
 
 ^2, S. W. 970; Busby v. State, 51 Tex. 
 Cr. App. 289, 103 S. W. 638; State v. 
 Merkel, 189 Mo. 315, 87 S. W. 1186; 
 State V. Summers, 141 X. C. 841, 53 
 S. E. 856 ; Guenther v. State, 137 Wis. 
 183, 118 X. W. 640; United States 
 V. Gilbert, 25 Fed. Cases 15205 ; People 
 V. DeLay, 80 Cal. 52, 22 Pac. 90; 
 Shinn v. Commonwealth, 32 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 899; State v. Leicham, 41 Wis. 
 565; People V. Britton, 118 X. Y. S. 
 989. 
 
 " People V. Xeyce, 86 Cal. 393. 395, 
 24 Pac. 109T ; People v. Bidleman, 104 
 Cal. 608, 613, 38 Pac. 502; People v. 
 Connelly (Cal.), 38 Pac. 42; People 
 V. Van Ewan, in Cal. 144, 43 P'lc 
 520; State V. Kortgaard, 62 Minn. 7, 
 64 N. W. 51 ; Bulloch v. State, 10 Ga. 
 47, 54, 54 Am. Dec. 369; Common- 
 wealth V. Tuckcrman, 10 Gray 
 (Mass.) 173, 200; Cnmmnnweahh v. 
 Shcpard, i Allen (Mass.) 575. 581;
 
 284 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 506 
 
 So it may be shown that the accused failed to pay over money 
 belonging to other persons aside from the offense in question and 
 also promises by the accused that he would pay money entrusted 
 to him though such evidence tends to prove a distinct offense."'^ 
 
 § 284. Evidence of demand and refusal. — Whether proof of a de- 
 mand is necessary to show the conversion depends wholly upon 
 the language of the statute. Even if not absolutely essential it 
 may be relevant and proper to prove a demand, and that compli- 
 ance was refused to show the intention to convert.^" Proof of a 
 demand is certainly immaterial where the demand would be in- 
 effectual, as when the accused admits he has sold the goods.^"" 
 
 Proof of a demand is not necessary where it would be impos- 
 sible to make it because the accused disappeared shortly after the 
 embezzlement.^^ The same rule applies where before any demand 
 
 Commonwealth v. Eastman, i Cush. 
 (Mass.) 189, 216, 48 Am. Dec. 596; 
 Brown v. State, 18 Ohio St. 496; 
 People V. Hawkins, 106 Mich. 479, 64 
 N. W. 736; Jackson v. State, 76 
 Ga. 551, 568; Stanley v. State, 88 
 Ala. 154, 157, 7 So. 273; Lang v. State, 
 97 Ala. 41, 46, 12 So. 183; Ingram 
 V. State, 39 Ala. 247, 84 Am. Dec. 782 ; 
 People V. Gray, 66 Gal. 271, 5 Pac. 
 240; Reg. V. Richardson, 8 Cox C. 
 C. 448, 2 F. & F. 343. But the court 
 must, on request, instruct the jury that 
 this evidence must be confined to this 
 point. State v. Holmes (Mich., 
 1896), 68 N. W. 11; Eatman v. State, 
 48 Fla. 21, 2)7 So. 576; United States 
 V. Breese, 131 Fed. 915; State v. 
 Dudenhefer, 122 La. 288, 47 So. 614; 
 People V. Robertson, 6 Gal. App. 514, 
 92 Pac. 498; Kossakowski v. People, 
 177 111. 563, 53 N. E. lis; People v. 
 Rowland (Gal. App., 1909), 106 Pac. 
 428. 
 
 ® Schintz V. People, 178 111. 320, 52 
 N. E. 903. 
 
 Evidence of other crimes in prose- 
 cution for embezzlement, see 62 L. R. 
 A. 226, 264, 105 Am. St. 996, looi. 
 
 ^ State V. Bryan, 40 Iowa 379 ; Peo- 
 
 ple V. Royce. 106 Gal. 173, 39 Pac. 
 524, 525 ; Burnett v. State, 60 N. J. L. 
 255, y? Atl. 622; State V. Blackley, 138 
 N. Gar. 620, 50 S. E. 310. See Elliott 
 Evidence, § 2970. The felonious con- 
 version of the property, when com- 
 plete, constitutes the gist of the crime, 
 and if this is otherwise proved a de- 
 mand is superfluous. Wallis v. State, 
 54 Ark. 611, 620, 16 S. W. 821. Cj. 
 State V. Brooks, 85 Iowa 366, 371, 52 
 N. W. 240; State v. Ross (Ore., 1909)' 
 104 Pac. 596. 
 
 ™ United States v. Adams, 2 Dak. 
 305, 9 N. W. 718; State v. Foley, 81 
 Iowa 36, Z7, 46 N. W. 746; Dean 
 V. State, 147 Ind. 215, 46 N. E. 528; 
 State V. Fellerin, 118 La. 547, 43 So. 
 159; State V. Knowles, 185 Mo. 141, 83 
 S. W. 1083. Evidence' of demand 
 may be admissible and proper to show 
 a failure to pay over or account for 
 money. State v. Sarlls, 135 Ind. 195, 
 199, 34 N. E. 1 129; State v. Adam- 
 son, 114 Ind. 216, 219, 16 N. E. 187; 
 Hale v. Richards, 80 Iowa 164, 45 N. 
 W. 734. See, also. People v. Page, 116 
 Gal. 386, 48 Pac. 326. 
 
 ^' Kossakowski v. People, 177 111- 
 563, 53 N- E. 115.
 
 507 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. 
 
 § 285 
 
 is made the accused tells a witness that the money is all gone and 
 he supposes he is to be arrested. '- 
 
 § 285. The existence of the trust relation. — There can be no em- 
 bezzlement where the relation between the accused and the owner 
 of the property is that of debtor and creditor.^^ According- to 
 this, there can be no embezzlement as between partners.^* The 
 evidence must show that a relation of trust existed between the 
 defendant and the true owner of the money or property, and that 
 the thing embezzled came into the defendant's possession by vir- 
 tue of his employment as an agent or bailee.^^ 
 
 An agent or servant dc facto without an express or formal ap- 
 pointment, may be guilty of embezzlement. But one who is in no 
 position of trust or confidence towards the owner cannot be guilty 
 of embezzlement though he may commit larceny. 
 
 It is sufficient to prove the official character of an officer of a 
 corporation de facto. It is not necessary to produce a written 
 certificate of his appointment, or to show that he was sworn or 
 had given an official bond.^*' 
 
 " State V. Blackley, 138 X. Car. 620, 
 50 S. E. 310. No demand required 
 though it could have been made. 
 State V. Tompkins, 32 La. An. 620; 
 Commonwealth v. Tuckerman, 10 
 Gray (Mass.) 173; Wallis v. State, 
 54 Ark. 611, 16 S. W. Rep. 821 ; State 
 V. New, 22 Minn. 76; State v. Porter, 
 26 Mo. 201 ; Hollingsworth v. State, 
 III Ind. 289, 12 N. E. Rep. 490. These 
 cases were under particular statutes. 
 A demand was required to be proved 
 in People v. Tomlinson, 66 Cal. 344, 
 5 Pac. Rep. 509 ; People v. Royce, 
 106 Cal. 173, 39 Pac. Rep. 524; Wright 
 v. People, 61 111. 382; State v. Ban- 
 croft, 22 Kan. 170. But it need not 
 be in any particular form or lan- 
 guage. State V. Bancroft, 22 Kan. 
 170. 
 
 " Mulford v. People. 139 III. 586, 28 
 N. E. 1096. 
 
 "McCrary v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 
 App. 496, 502, 103 S. W. 924, 926, 123 
 Am. St. 903. 
 
 ^^ Bartow v. People, 78 N. Y. Z77, 
 381 ; Tipton v. State, 53 Fla. 69, 43 
 So. 684; McAleer v. State, 46 Neb. 
 116, 64 N. W. 358; State v. Mahan, 
 132 Mo. 112, 39 S. W. 465; State v. 
 Cooper, 102 Iowa 146, 71 N. W. 187. 
 Evidence of usage and custom is ad- 
 missible to show that the money came 
 into the custody of defendant by 
 virtue of his employment. State v. 
 Silva, 130 Mo. 440, 32 S. W. 1007. 
 
 ^ State V. Findley, loi Mo. 217, 14 
 S. W. i8s, 186; State v. Stone, 40 
 Iowa 457, 2 S. W. 286; State v. Dier- 
 berger, 90 Mo. 369, 371 ; Common- 
 wealth v. Logue, 160 Mass. 551, 36 
 N. E. 475; People v. Page, 116 Cal. 
 386, 48 Pac. 326; Tipton v. State, 53 
 Fla. 69, 43 So. 684; Walker v. State, 
 117 Ala. 42, 23 So. 149; Cooper v. 
 State, lOi Ga, 783, 29 S. E. 22; People
 
 § 286 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. :;o3 
 
 An entry in the book of the minutes of the board of directors 
 of a corporation, showing the election of the accused as president 
 is sufficient proof of official character with evidence that he acted 
 as president.^^ Whether or not a public official who is accused 
 of embezzlement of public funds was or was not lawfully ap- 
 pointed is immaterial. ^^ 
 
 But the crime is not proved merely by showing- the agency and 
 the conversion. To show the intent, it must appear beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt that the agent had no right to use the money or 
 goods in the manner he did. It must be shown to be a conver- 
 sion which the agent, under his contract, had no right to make.^* 
 Ordinarily, the contract of employment, when in writing, ought 
 to be produced. But it seems the principal may testify orally to 
 the fact of agency, and he is then open to cross-examination as to 
 the facts upon which this conclusion is based.*" 
 
 § 286. The ownership of the property. — The ownership of the 
 goods must be proved to be in some other person than the ac- 
 cused. When it is laid in a corporation, proof of a corporation 
 de facto is enough.*' The charter or certificate of incorporation 
 need not be produced." 
 
 V. Cobler, io8 Cal. 538, 41 Pac. 401 ; taxes. State v. Dudenhefer, 122 La. 
 
 State V. Mims, 26 Minn. 183, 2 N. W. 288, 47 So. 617. 
 
 494; Fortenberry v. State, 56 Miss. ^ State v. Brooks, 85 Iowa 366, 2>72, 
 
 286. 52 N. W. 240. But compare, contra, 
 
 " McKnight v. United States, 122 People v. Bidleman, 104 Cal. 608, 613, 
 
 Fed. 926,61 C C. A. 112. 38 Pac. 502; Thalheim v. State, 38 
 
 ^* People V. Sanders, 139 Mich. 442, Fla. 169, 20 So. 938. 
 
 102 N. W. 959; State v. Ring, 29 " Fleener v. State, 58 Ark. 98, 102, 
 
 Minn. 78, 11 N. W. 233. 23 S. W. i; Burke v. State, 34 Ohio 
 
 ^ State V. Wallick, 87 Iowa 369, 373, St. 79 ; Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio St. 
 
 54 N. W. 246; State v. Hill, 47 Neb. 366, 98 Am. Dec. 121; State v. Turner, 
 
 456, 66 N. W. 541; People v. Page, 119 N. Car. 841, 25 S. E. 810; Kos- 
 
 116 Cal. 386, 48 Pac. 326; Busby v. sakowski v. People, 177 111. 563, 53 N. 
 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. 289, 103 S. E. 115. 
 
 W. 638; McCrary v. State, 51 Tex. *" An immaterial variance in proving 
 
 Cr. App. 502, 103 S. W. 924, 123 Am. the name of the owner may be disre- 
 
 St. 905. A tax collector withholding garded. Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 551, 
 
 settlement raises a presumption of 567; Commonwealth v. Dedham, 16 
 
 embezzlement. It may not be neces- Mass. 141, 147; Eatman v. State, 48 
 
 sary to prove he has collected any Fla. 21, 37 So. 576. Contra, Washing- 
 ton V. State, 72 Ala. 272, 276.
 
 509 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. § 287 
 
 The ownership of money by a corporation is proved by evi- 
 dence that the corporation owned certain real estate and that 
 such real estate had been sold.*^ The conversion of the funds 
 of the local lodge of an unincorporated benevolent association is 
 embezzlement under a statute which punishes embezzlement by 
 officials or members of benevolent organizations and a local lodge 
 has such an ownership of the funds collected from its members 
 to be forwarded to the grand lodge as will justify alleging it to 
 be the owner.** The ownership of the money or property em- 
 bezzled must be proved substantially as laid in the indictment. 
 Proof of ownership in a corporation does not sustain an allega- 
 tion of ownership by a partnership.*^ But an allegation of owner- 
 ship by an express company is supported by proof that the money 
 appropriated belonged to parties who had delivered it to the ex- 
 press company for transportation.*^ So proof that money was 
 paid to a bank through checks drawn by the agent of the state 
 and collected by the bank is sufficient to show that the money was 
 the property of the state.*" 
 
 § 287. Evidence of efforts to conceal or dispose of property or 
 money. — It is always relevant, and, indeed, indispensable to prove 
 some kind or degree of concealment by the accused, either of the 
 property or of the facts regarding its disposal.*^ Fraudulent 
 vouchers and false statements,**^ and false entries in books con- 
 taining a record of the transaction in question are always relevant. 
 It need not be shown that the false entries were made at the time 
 of the embezzlement, or tnat they were made by the accused, if 
 
 ** Fields V. United States, 27 App. 181; State v. Tompkins, 32 La. Ann. 
 
 D. C. 433. 620; State v. Fain, 106 N. Car. 760, 
 
 "State V. Knowles, 185 Mo. 141, 83 764, 11 S. E. 593; Stallings v. State, 
 
 S. W. 1083. 29 Tex. App. 220, 15 S. W. 716, 717. 
 
 " State V. Morgan, 28 Oreg. 578, 42 But facts showing a conversion arc 
 
 Pac. 128. enough. It need not be shown how 
 
 *" Riley v. State, 32 Tex. 763. defendant finally disposed of the 
 
 "Busby V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. App. money. State v. King, 81 Iowa 587, 
 
 289, 103 S. W. 638. 47 N. W. 775; State v. Pierce, 77 
 
 ^'Fleener v. State, 58 Ark. 98, TO4, Iowa 245, 42 N. W. 181. 
 
 23 S. W. I ; Calkins v. State, 18 Ohio "State v. Cowan, 74 Iowa 53, 55, 
 
 St. 366, 98 -Am. Dec. I2in; State v. 36 N. W. 886; Commonwealth v. 
 
 Pierce, 77 Iowa 245, 249, 42 X. W. Moore, 166 Mass. 513,44 X. E. 612.
 
 ^§ 288, 289 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 5IO 
 
 it appears that they were made at his instance and with his 
 knowledge. °° 
 
 § 288. Circumstantial evidence to prove the venue. — Circumstan- 
 tial evidence is usually all that can be obtained to prove the venue 
 because of the customary secrecy of the act of conversion. If 
 it appears that the accused received the property in the county 
 alleged, and that, when it was last seen in his custody, he was 
 in that county, the venue is proved. ^^ This prima facie proof of 
 venue may be rebutted by showing that the money was taken to 
 another county and fraudulently converted there.^' 
 
 ^ 289. Value of the property. — The value of the property in- 
 volved need not be shown unless to ascertain whether the crime 
 is a felony or misdemeanor.^^ If the value of several articles is 
 alleged in a lump sum, the value of each may be shown sep- 
 arately.^* Proof of the embezzlement of any part of the sum al- 
 leged is sufificient.^^ But proof of the embezzlement of a draft or 
 check does not sustain an allegation of the embezzlement of 
 money.^® The crime of embezzlement is peculiar in some respects. 
 
 It is usually impossible to prove it with much preciseness of 
 detail, particularly in the case of superior executive, public or 
 private officials, who have no one to watch their manner of doing 
 business. The statute against embezzlement would be a dead 
 letter if it were required in every case to show precisely when the 
 accused received the funds or to prove their character, w'hether 
 
 ^Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 551, 568. '^^ Gerard v. State, 10 Tex. App. 690, 
 
 Proof of demand, and neglect to re- 692. 
 
 turn, is evidence of conversion ; but " State v. Mook, 40 Ohio St. 588, 
 
 mere neglect to return or to pay 590. Under a statute permitting the 
 
 money over is not proof of a fraud- money embezzled to be described as 
 
 ulent conversion. Fitzgerald v. State, gold, silver or paper in the indictment 
 
 50 N. J. L. 475, 477, 14 Atl. 746, 747; proof of the amount of money taken 
 
 People V. Wyman, 102 Cal. 552, 36 is enough and the jury may presume 
 
 Pac. 932, 934. it was in gold, silver or paper from 
 
 "Wallis V. State, 54 Ark. 611, 620, this proof. Storms v. State, 81 Ark. 
 
 16 S. W. 821 ; Robson v. State, 83 25, 98 S. W. 678. 
 
 Ga. 166, 9 S. E. 610, 611; State v. "= State v. Foster, i Penn. (Del.) 
 
 Small, 26 Kan. 209. 389, 40 Atl. 939. 
 
 " State V. New, 22 Minn. 76, 79. ^ State v. ]\Iispagel, 207 Mo. 557, 
 
 106 S .W. Rep. 513.
 
 511 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. § 29O 
 
 drafts, bank-notes or coin. Embezzlement usually consists of a 
 continuous series of acts of conversion, done at various times but 
 with a common design, and resulting in the principal and im- 
 portant fact of a shortage. Proof of such a series of criminal 
 acts is sufficient to sustain a verdict that the aggregate amount, 
 as alleged, was embezzled. ^'^ 
 
 § 290. Admissions by the defendant. — A confession to be admis- 
 sible must relate specifically to the matter charged in the indict- 
 ment. A confession, in general terms, that accused had been 
 taking money "all along, ever since he began to work for him, 
 and could not say how much he had taken," should be rejected, 
 as it does not refer to names, dates, amounts or any other specific 
 details.^® Admission by the accused, of relevant facts, are always 
 competent,^" though they may tend to prove him guilty of another 
 act of embezzlement.*"* 
 
 A draft paid to the defendant,^^ or a receipt signed by him in 
 his official capacity, is admissible against him.^" The check by 
 which the accused drew the money he embezzled is competent.''^ 
 But statements of accounts and letters passing between the prin- 
 cipal and the agent are not generally received as independent 
 evidence, unless they can be construed as constituting a part of 
 the res gestiv.^* 
 
 ^ 291. Documentary evidence. — The admissibility and effect of 
 transcripts of public records are frequently under consideration 
 
 "Jackson v. State, 76 Ga. 551, 573; 52 X. W. 246. Though not payalile 
 
 State V. Pratt, 98 Mo. 482, 489, 11 S. to him. People v. McBride, 120 Mich. 
 
 W. 977; State V. Ring, 29 Minn. 78, 166, 78 N. W. 1076. 
 
 84, II N. W. 233; Bolln V. State, 51 "-People v. Van Ewan, in Cal. 144, 
 
 Xeb. 581, 71 N. W. 444. 43 Pac. 520: Denton v. State, 77 Md. 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Sawtelle, 141 527, 529, 26 Atl. 1022. 
 
 Mass. 140, 144, 5 N. E. 312. *^ De Leon v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 161, 
 
 " Butler V. State, 91 Ala. 87, 9 So. 80 Pac. 348. 
 
 191 ; State V. Mims, 26 Minn. 183, 2 "* State v. Adams, 108 Mo. 208, 18 
 
 X. W. 494; Smith V. State, 34 Tex. S. W. 1000; Eatman v. State, 48 Fla. 
 
 Cr. 265, 30 S. W. 236, 237; State v. 21, 37 So. 576. The fact that the 
 
 Davison (N. H., 1906), 64 Atl. 761. defendant does not reply to a letter 
 
 ""Bode V. State, 80 Xcb. 74, 113 X. rcf|uesting a settlement is evidence 
 
 W. 996. with the letter. State v. .'\dams, 108 
 
 *' State V. Brooks, 85 Iowa 366, 371, Mo. 208, 213, 214, 18 S. W. 1000.
 
 § 291 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 5 12 
 
 in the trial of public officials for embezzling public property or 
 funds. The oreneral rule is that public records are admissible as 
 evidence of all facts which are contained therein, and which were 
 required by statute to be recorded by the official who made the 
 entry. So the failure of a public officer to pay over money which 
 he has collected may be shown by a transcript of an official regis- 
 ter in which the payment should have been entered. "^^ Such rec- 
 ords are not, however, conclusive against the defendant. He may 
 endeavor to explain or to impeach them unless he had already 
 examined them and appeared satisfied with the entries. Under 
 these circumstances he may be regarded as estopped by them.*'" 
 Entries made by the accused himself in his own hand in books 
 kept by him are received against him as admissions to show the 
 receipt of the money and a failure to pay over.*'^ But entries in 
 his books by others are not admissible unless there is preliminary 
 proof that his attention was called to them.**"^ An expert account- 
 ant may testify orally to the result of his examination of volumi- 
 nous books and accounts containing the amount of money received 
 and paid by the accused when it is not convenient to bring the 
 books into, court.*'^ 
 
 •^'Shivers v. State, 53 Ga. 149, 152; So. 183; People v. Burnham, 106 N. 
 
 State V. King, 81 Iowa 587, 47 N. W. Y. Sup. 57. 120 App. Div. 388. 
 
 775. See Elliott Evidence, § 2968. "' Hollingsworth v. State, in Ind. 
 
 •^ People V. Flock, 100 Mich. 512, 289, 297, 12 N. E. 490; State v. Find- 
 
 514, 59 N. W. 237; Bork V. People, 16 ley, lor Mo. 217, 14 S. W. 185, 187; 
 
 Hun (N. Y.) 476; Hockenberger v. Busby v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 289, 103 
 
 State, 49 Neb. 706, 68 N. W. 1037. A S. W. 638. Where the defendant was 
 
 check drawn by an official is admis- accused of embezzling the money of a 
 
 sible against him to show the manner bank of which he was cashier, and 
 
 in which he embezzled public funds, the point at issue was whether he had 
 
 though it may not be formally correct, conspired with others to get the 
 
 or a sufficient voucher as between the money of the bank into his possession 
 
 government and the bank upon which that he might convert it to his own 
 
 it is drawn. State v. Noland, in use, evidence is relevant to show that 
 
 Mo. 473, 19 S. W. 715. the bank became insolvent, its finan- 
 
 " State v. Ring, 29 Minn. 78, 83, cial condition at that date, its stock 
 
 TT N. W. 233; Commonwealth v. and liabilities, that defendant and his 
 
 Pratt, 137 Mass. 98, 105 ; Hocken- brother were insolvent and owed the 
 
 berger v. State, 49 Neb. 706, 68 N. W. bank large sums, that defendant had 
 
 1037. drawn large sums on his own account, 
 
 '''Lang v. State, 97 Ala. 41, 46, 12 and that a person whose draft had
 
 513 EMBEZZLEMEXT AND LARCENY. § 291a 
 
 As against the claim of the accused that he accounted for the 
 proceeds of a check which he is accused of embezzHng, it is per- 
 mitted to the state to give oral testimony showing the history of 
 the check from the time it was made out and mailed to the ac- 
 cused to the date when it was returned by the bank paying it."" 
 The true character of a check which the accused is charged to 
 have used fraudulently may always be shown by parol evidence.'^^ 
 Though a contract of hiring be in writing, parol evidence is re- 
 ceived to show how the money to become due thereunder was to 
 be used.^" To refresh the memory of the prosecuting witness a 
 memorandum may be referred to if it was properly made from 
 information within the recollection of the wntness at the time it 
 was made.'^^ 
 
 § 291a. Definition of larceny. — Larceny may be defined as the 
 unlawful or wrongful taking and carrying away of the personal 
 property of another with the intent to convert it to the use of the 
 accused or to the use of some third person without the owner's 
 consent.'* If the accused, intending to steal another's goods, per- 
 suades the owner to consent to give him the goods in any manner 
 showing an intention to pass title to him, it is not larceny.'^^ Lar- 
 ceny and robbery are distinct in that in the case of robbery the 
 taking is by physical force and without the consent of the owner. 
 So where the accused was discovered to have his hand in the 
 pocket of the prosecuting witness, and a struggle ensued between 
 them which ends in the taking of the money by force, a robbery 
 is committed, though in the beginning the accused intended only 
 to commit a larceny.'^^ But the taking of a purse from the pocket 
 
 been discounted for the defendant " People v. Alesser, 148 Mich. 168, 
 
 was also insolvent. Reeves v. State, lii N. W. 854. 
 
 Q5 Ala. 31, II So. Rep. 158. Evidence "Eatman v. State, 48 Fla. 21, 2,7 So. 
 
 to show that the bondsmen of the ac- 576. 
 
 cused had settled and paid the short- "Walker v. State, 117 Ala. 42, 23 
 
 age is irrelevant. Fleener v. State, 58 So. 149. 
 
 Ark. 98, 105, 23 S. W. i; Morehouse "State v. Wolf (Del.), 66 Atl. 739. 
 
 V. State, 35 Xeb. 643, 646, 53 N. W. "Welch v. State, 126 Ga. 495, 55 S. 
 
 571; State v. Pratt, 98 Mo. 482. 492, E. 183; State v. Court (Mo., 1910), 
 
 II S. W. 977; State V. Lcicham, 41 125 S. W. 451. 
 
 Wis. 565. '" Carter v. State, 3 Ga. App. 477, 
 
 "People v. Peck, 139 Mich. 680, 103 60 S. E. Rep. 216. 
 X. W. 178, 12 Detroit Leg. N. 28. 
 
 .13 — U.VDERHII.L CrIM. Ev.
 
 § 292 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 H 
 
 of the prosecuting- witness secretly and without his knowledge and 
 without force and violence is larceny only.'^ 
 
 ^ 292. Larceny — The felonious intention. — The felonious and 
 larcenous intention which was present in taking the goods must 
 be shoW'U beyond a reasonable doubt."'' 
 
 It may, of course, be inferred from circumstances indicating 
 motive. The intent is for the jury, and if it can fairly be inferred 
 on all the evidence a conviction must be affirmed." 
 
 To rebut the inference of a felonious intent the accused must 
 be permitted to testify that he had, .or believed he had, and 
 claimed in good faith a title to the property derived from its 
 owner,^" or that he took the property for any innocent purpose,^^ 
 or in an open manner, to satisfy a claim against the owner,"*- 
 or because he believed it to be his own.^^ The intoxication or 
 
 " Morris v. State, 125 Ga. 36, 53 S. 
 E. 564. For further definitions of the 
 crime, the reader is referred to the 
 cases cited in § 292 and § 293. 
 
 "' Long V. State, 1 1 Fla. 295, 297 ; 
 Phelps V. People, 55 III. 334; Britt v. 
 State, 2 Tex. App. 215, 222, 17 S. W. 
 255 ; Waidley v. State, 34 Neb. 25a, 
 252, 51 N. W. 830; Micheaux v. State, 
 30 Tex. App. 660, 18 S. W. 550; Fence 
 V. State, no Ind. 95, 99, 10 N. E. 
 919; State V. Fitzpatrick, 9 Houst. 
 (Del.) 385, 32 Atl. 1072; Green v. 
 State (Tex., 1896), 33 S. W. 120; 
 Truslow V. State, 95 Tenn. 189, 31 S. 
 W. 987; State V. Ravenscraft, 62 Mo. 
 App. 109; People V. Hendrickson, 18 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 404, 46 N. Y. S. 402 ; 
 People V. Frankenberg, 236 111. 408, 86 
 X. E. 128; State v. Allen, 34 Mont. 
 403, 87 Pac. 177; Todd v. Common- 
 wealth, 29 Ky. L. 473, 93 S. W. 631 ; 
 Flagg V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 602, 103 
 S:W. 855; Stoddard v. State, 132 Wis. 
 520, 112 N. W. 453; McMahan v. 
 State, 50 Tex. Cr. 244, 96 S. W. 17; 
 Malone v. State, 169 Ind. 72, 81 N. E. 
 1099; Ladeaux v. State, 74 Neb. 19, 
 
 103 N. W. 1048. See Elliott Evidence. 
 §§ 3055, 3056. Evidence of good 
 character of defendant in prosecution 
 for larceny, 103 Am. St. 901. Com- 
 prehensive note on proof of the cor- 
 pus delicti in criminal cases, 68 L. R. 
 A. 33- 
 
 '''Robinson v. State, 113 Ind. 510, 
 512, 16 N. E. 184; Malone v. State, 
 169 Ind. 72, 81 N. E. 1099; Jefferson 
 V. State (Ark.), 115 S. W. 1140. See, 
 also, Talbert v. State, 121 Ala. 33, 25 
 So. 690. 
 
 '"' State V. Williams, 95 Mo. 247, 250, 
 8 S. W. 217, 6 Am. St. 46; Common- 
 wealth V. Stebbins, 8 Gray (Mass.) 
 492, 495- 
 
 '^Brooks V. State (Tex., 1894), 27 
 S. W. 141. The declaration of a de- 
 ceased owner of property alleged to 
 have been stolen that he gave it to 
 the accused is admissible. People v. 
 Doyle, 58 Hun (N. Y.) 535, 538, 12 
 N. Y. S. 836. 
 
 '-People V. Husband, 36 Mich. 306, 
 308: State V. Bailey, 63 W. Va. 668, 
 60 S. E. 785. 
 
 "State V. Daley, 53 Vt. 442, 444,
 
 515 EMBEZZLEMEXT AND LARCENY. § 292 
 
 mental weakness of the accused before the taking- may be shown, 
 not in extenuation, but as a circumstance from which absence of 
 specific intent may be inferred.^'* 
 
 The state may always show circumstances from which it may 
 be reasonably inferred that the accused made a claim to the prop- 
 erty in bad faith or that he had no confidences in the claim under 
 which he took it away. It may be shown that the accused, though 
 claiming to own the property himself, endeavored to put it be- 
 A'ond the reach of the true owner, either by concealment, by sell- 
 ing it or by destroying- it.^^ 
 
 Evidence of the secret taking- of the goods, or of their open 
 taking with the owner's knowledge but without his consent, and 
 with the intent to sell them or to prevent the owner from finding 
 them is always relevant.^*' 
 
 Facts or declarations prior or subsequent to the taking away 
 may be proved if they are a part of the res gestcc. From these a 
 larcenous intent may properly be inferred. The false representa- 
 tions of the accused employed to procure money subsequently 
 stolen are relevant.*" The testimony of an accomplice who aided 
 the accused on an understanding with him that she was to induce 
 men to drink intoxicating liquors in order that the accused, a 
 saloon keeper, might steal their money is admissible.''^ 
 
 Parol evidence of a conversation between the prosecuting wit- 
 ness and the accused has been received where, prior to the taking 
 of the property they met and traveled some distance in company 
 to the place where the money was taken. *^ So. generally anv 
 statement made by the accused to the owner or to anv other per- 
 son having possession of the property by which he obtains its 
 possession that as. for example, where he states that he will keep 
 it until the owner calls for it, is admissible on the intent. '^^ All 
 
 ,■^8 Am. 694: Hunter v. State (Tex., '" Long v. State, ii Fla. 295. 297. 
 
 1897). 37 S. W. 323; State v. Ravens- "Towns v. State, 167 Tnd. 315, 78 
 
 craft, 62 Mo. App. 109: Johnson v. X. E. 1012, 119 \m. St. 50T. 
 
 United States fOkla. Cr. App.), 99 ** State v. McCarthy, 36 Mont. 226, 
 
 Pac. T022. 92 Pac. 521. 
 
 "Robinson v. State, 113 Tnd. 510, '"Viberg v. State, 138 Ala. 100, 35 
 
 513. 16 N. E. 184: ante. § 166. So. 53, too Am. St. 22. 
 
 "State V. Bailey, 63 W. Va. 668, ""State v. Levine, 79 Conn. 714, 66 
 
 60 S. E. 785. Atl. 529, ID L. R. A. (N. S.) 286.
 
 § 293 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 ;i6 
 
 these facts to be admissible must show an intention to commit 
 larceny and not some other crime."^ 
 
 § 293. The carrying away.— The felonious taking- away of the 
 stolen property out of the possession of the owner, though only 
 for an instant, without the owner's consent, being- a constituent 
 element of the crime, must usually be proved.^" It must be shown, 
 too, that the accused actually meant to deprive the owner of his 
 property permanently"^ and not merely to use it temporarily in 
 a mischievous or wanton manner, intending to return it.^* 
 
 One who accepting in good faith the custody of a lost article 
 for the purpose of restoring it to its owner subsequently appro- 
 priates it to his own use is guilty of larceny."^ 
 
 It is always proper to permit the state to prove that the accused 
 was in the house or in the room occupied by the prosecuting wit- 
 ness If the property stolen was there too. This evidence may be 
 very strong if the accused was near the stolen property while the 
 owner was absent and if on the return of the owner, the property 
 
 "Pence v. State, no Ind. 95, 99, 10 
 N. E. 919; People v. Burnham, 119 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 302, 104 N. Y. S. 
 
 725- 
 
 "' Mizell V. State, 38 Fla. 20, 20 So. 
 769; Wright V. State, 18 Tex. App. 
 358, 365 ; Sharp v. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 211, 213, 15 S. W. 176, 177; State V. 
 Wingo, 89 Ind. 204, 207 ; Starck v. 
 State, 63 Ind. 285, 30 Am. 214; Eads 
 V. State, 17 Wj-o. 490, loi Pac. 946; 
 State V. Wolf (Del.), 66 Atl. 739; 
 Hicks V. State, loi Ga. 581, 28 S. E. 
 917; People V. Burnham, 119 App. 
 Div. (N. Y.) 302, 104 N. Y. S. 725. 
 And this carrying away may be ac- 
 complished by any removal of the 
 property from its original situation 
 as would work a complete severance 
 from the possession of the owner. 
 State V. Taylor, 136 Mo. 66, 37 S. 
 W. 907; Edmonds v. State. 70 Ala. 
 8, 9, 45 Am. 67; State v. Seagler, i 
 Rich. (S. Car.) 30, 42 Am. Dec. 404; 
 State v. Gilbert, 68 Vt. 188, 34 Atl. 
 
 697; State v. Rozeboom (Iowa, 
 1910), 124 N. W. 783. 
 
 °^ State V. McKee, 17 Utah 270, 53 
 Pac. 733. 
 
 ^Colwell v. State (Tex., 1896), 34 
 S. W. 615; Pence v. State, no Ind. 
 95, 98, 10 X. E. 919; Robinson v. 
 State, 113 Ind. 510, 512, 16 N. E. 184; 
 State v. Hayes, 214 Mo. 230, 113 S. 
 W. 1050; State V. McGee, 212 Mo. 
 95, no S. W. 699; Daniels v. State, 
 148 Ala. 663, 41 So. 525 ; People v. 
 Rogers, 22 App. Div. (N. Y.) 147, 47 
 X. Y. S. 893; State v. Morse, 12 
 Idaho 492, 86 Pac. 53. 
 
 *^ State V. Levine, 79 Conn. 714, 66 
 Atl. 529, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 286. 
 
 The property, Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3052; the trespass, Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3050; the taking, Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3049 ; the carrying away, Elliott Ev- 
 idence, § 3051 ; nonconsent of owner. 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3054; testimony of 
 accomplice, 98 Am. St. 173; defenses, 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3059.
 
 517 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. 
 
 293 
 
 is missing.^® So evidence is admissible to show that persons who 
 were in the company of the accused and who aided him in com- 
 mitting the larceny were acquainted with the accused prior 
 thereto.^^ 
 
 Evidence that he was present when the taking occurred may 
 be sufficient, if his presence was an aid to an accomplice whO' did 
 the carrying away.''^ Proof of the slightest carrying away for a 
 very short time,^** by which the property is not taken out of the 
 presence of the owner/°° and also when immediately thereafter 
 it is restored to its former place/ is enough if the accused is 
 shown to have obtained full custody of, and entire and absolute 
 control over the property." If the goods were lawfully taken by 
 or delivered to the accused, the state must show an unlawful con- 
 version or appropriation by the accused, as in embezzlement.^ 
 
 § 294. Ownership — Character and proof of. — The ownership of 
 the property must be proved substantially as laid.'* Slight dis- 
 
 ^ Bradford v. State, 147 Ala. 95, 41 
 So. 462. 
 
 ''State V. McGee, 188 Mo. 401, 87 
 S. W. 452. 
 
 '' Edmonds v. State, 70 Ala. 8, 9, 45 
 Am. 68; Kent v. State, 64 Ark. 247, 
 41 S. W. 849. 
 
 ^Eckels V. State, 20 Ohio St. 508, 
 5i3~5i7; Commonwealth v. Luckis, 99 
 Mass. 431, 433, 96 Am. Dec. 769; Har- 
 rison V. People, 50 N. Y. 518, 522, 10 
 Am. 517; State v. Gebey, 196 Mo. 
 104, 93 S. W. 402. 
 
 "* Madison v. State, 16 Tex. App. 
 435, 441- 
 
 ^Harrison v. People, 50 X. Y. 518, 
 520, 521, 10 Am. 517. 
 
 " Rex V. Thompson, i ]Mood. C. C. 
 78. 
 
 " Shinn v. Commonwealth, 32 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 899, 910; Davis v. State, 100 
 Ga. 69, 25 S. E. 921 ; ante, § 282. 
 
 * Glover v. State, 40 So. 354, 146 
 Ala. 690; Bryan v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 
 196. 91 S. W. 580; Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3053- If it is laid in one person and 
 
 is proved to be in another a conviction 
 should be reversed. McDowell v. 
 State, 68 Miss. 348, 8 So. 508; Clark 
 V. State, 29 Tex. App. 437, 438, 16 S. 
 W. 171 ; Thurmond v. State, 37 Tex. 
 Cr. 422, 35 S. W. 965 ; Commonwealth 
 V. Trimmer, i Mass. 476; State v. 
 McCoy, 14 N. H. 364; State v. Bur- 
 gess, 74 N. Car. 272. If the owner is 
 alleged to be unknown to the grand 
 jury, he must be proved to have been 
 so. Sharp v. State, 29 Tex. App. 211, 
 15 S. W. 176; Logan v. State, 36 Tex. 
 Cr. I, 34 S. W. 925, and if this is 
 done, proof of ownership in a person 
 known is not fatal. People v. Flem- 
 ing, 60 Hun (N. Y.) 576, 14 N. Y. 
 Supp. 200. If one person has a gen- 
 eral and another a special ownership, 
 the ownership may be alleged and 
 proved in either. Trafton v. State, 5 
 Tex. App. 480, 484. So an allegation 
 of ownership by A. is not sustained 
 by proving a joint ownership in A. 
 and B. State v. Burgess, 74 N. Car. 
 272, 273.
 
 §§ 294. 295 CRIMIXAL EV^IDEXCE. 518 
 
 crepancies in proving the name of the owner may be disregarded.' 
 The best evidence of ownership is the instrument under which the 
 title is claimed, and it should be produced," though under most 
 circumstances, ownership of personal property may be proved by 
 parol. Direct proof of ownership is not always necessary. Owner- 
 ship may be inferred from circumstances.' Possession of personal 
 property is primary evidence of ownership,'^ if it appears that the 
 alleged owner exercised exclusive control, possession and manage- 
 ment over it.^ An absolute ownership need not be proved. Evi- 
 dence that the alleged owner held the property as bailee or trustee 
 will suffice.^" If the ownership is laid in a corporation proof of 
 its dc facto existence is enough," nor need it be shown that the 
 corporation was legally doing business in the state. ^- 
 
 ^ 295. Competency of owner of stolen goods as witness — Proof of 
 his non-consent. — At common law the owner was not incompetent 
 because of his interest to testify at the trial, even wdien he was 
 entitled to restitution on conviction,^^ or to a fine, the value of 
 wliich exceeded that of the goods stolen.^* The non-consent of 
 tlie owner must be proved, as it cannot be presumed from the 
 taking.^^ His testimony, wdiere he had the exclusive custody and 
 control of the property, and. w'here he has delegated his power 
 of management to another, the testimony of this agent with his 
 own evidence is primary evidence to prove non-consent.^^ 
 
 'Underwood v. State, 72 Ala. 220, ville, 21 Ale. 14, 38 Am. Dec. 248; 
 
 222 ; State v. Brin, 30 Minn. 522, 524, United States v. Jackson, 29 Fed. 503 
 
 r6 N. W. 406; Perry v. People, 38 (mail matter); State v. Brown 
 
 Colo. 23, 87 Pac. 796. (Mont.), 99 Pac. 954. 
 
 "Edwards v. State, 29 Tex. App. "Commonwealth v. Whitman, 121 
 
 452, 16 S. W. 98. Mass. 361. 
 
 " George v. United States, i Okla. ^ State v. Hopkins, 56 Vt. 250. 
 
 Cr. 407, 97 Pac. 1052, 100 Pac. 46. ^^ State v. Casados, i N. & McC. (S. 
 
 ^IMorris v. State, 84 Ala. 446, 4 So. Car.) 91. 
 
 912; Ledbetter v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. "State v. Pray, 14 N. H. 464, 466; 
 
 195, infra. Commonwealth v. Moulton, 9 Mass. 
 
 ^ State V. Robinson, 35 La. xA.nn. 29, 30. 
 
 964. The alleged owner is not the " State v. Storts, 138 Mo. 127, 39 
 
 best witness of the fact of possession S. W. 483; Garcia v. State, 26 Tex. 
 
 or ownership. Lowrance v. State, 4 209, 210, 82 Am. Dec. 605; Wilson v. 
 
 Yerg. (Tenn.) 145, 146. State, 12 Tex. App. 481, 487. 
 
 ^"Ledbetter v. State. 35 Tex. Cr. '"State v. Moon. 41 Wis. 684, 686: 
 
 195, 32 S. W. 903; State V. Somer- Bubster v. State, 33 Neb. 663, 664, 50
 
 ii9 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. 
 
 § 296 
 
 Other evidence is not admissible until the absence of the owner 
 or of his agent has been satisfactorily accounted for.^^ If this is 
 done, non-consent may be proved by circumstantial evidence/^ 
 provided the circumstances proved are such as exclude ever}^ rea- 
 sonable presumption that the owner consented, ^^ as, for example, 
 by showing that he was searching for his property soon after the 
 theft, -^ or by the declarations of the accused to the effect that he 
 had parted with possession and that the owner could not have his 
 property."^ 
 
 Evidence that the owner furnished an opportunity to a sus- 
 pected person to commit a larceny, for the purpose of detecting 
 and arresting him. is inadmissible to show he consented to part 
 with his property." 
 
 § 296. Identifying the stolen property. — The identity of the 
 stolen property must be established substantially as laid in the 
 indictment.-^ Where cattle are described by age, color, species or 
 brand, these details become material and a variance is fatal.-* 
 
 N. W. 953; Jackson v. State, 7 Tex. 
 App. 363, 364; Wilson V. State, 12 
 Tex. App. 481. 
 
 " State V. Osborne, 28 Iowa 9 ; State 
 V. !Morey, 2 Wis. 494, 496. 
 
 ^Carroll v. People, 136 111. 456, 465, 
 466, 27 N. E. 18; Rex V. Hazy, 2 C. 
 & P. 458; State V. Skinner, 29 Ore. 
 599, 46 Pac. 368; Trafton v. State, 5 
 Tex. App. 480; Files v. State, 36 Tex. 
 Cr. 206, 36 S. W. 93 ; State v. Porter, 
 26 Mo. 201, 203, 2 Russ. on Crimes 
 I'iT, George v. United States, i Okla. 
 Cr. 307, 97 Pac. 1052 ; Ray v. State, 4 
 Ga. App. 67, 60 S. E. 816; Van Syoc 
 V. State, 69 Neb. 520, 96 N. W. 266; 
 Jordan v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 646, T04 
 S. W. 900; State V. Faulk (S. Dak., 
 iOo8), 116 N. W. 72. 
 
 "Wilson V. States, 45 Tex. ^6, 78, 
 23 Am. 602 ; Housh v. People, 24 Colo. 
 262. 50 Pac. 1036. 
 
 "Rains v. State, 7 Tex. App. 588. 
 'Cf. State V. Porter, 26 Mo. 201, 207; 
 
 George v. United States, i Okla. Cr. 
 307, 97 Pac. 1052. 
 
 =^ People V. Dean, 58 Hun (N. Y.) 
 610, 12 N. Y. S. 749. 
 
 ^Varner v. State, 72 Ga. 745, 746. 
 See State v. Hull, 2>Z Oreg. 56, 54 Pac. 
 159, ~2 Am. St. 694n. 
 
 ^Hodnett v. State, 117 Ga. 705, 45 
 S. E. 61. 
 
 "•* State V. Jackson, 30 Me. 29, 30 ; 
 Wiley V. State, 74 Ga. 840; Hooker 
 V. State, 4 Ohio 348, 351 ; Banks v. 
 State, 28 Tex. 644, 647 ; Bush v. State, 
 18 Ala. 415, 416; Whart. Cr. Ev., 
 § 124; Robertson v. State, 97 Ga. 206, 
 22 S. E. 974; Mizell V. State, 38 Fla. 
 20, 20 So. 769; State V. Dale, 141 Mo. 
 284; 42 S. W. 722, 64 Am. St. 513. 
 If a statutory distinction is made be- 
 tween the species of any animal, proof 
 of one is a variance if another is al- 
 leged. State V. Buckles, 26 Kan. 237, 
 241. Otherwise, where no distinction 
 is made. People v. Pico, 62 Cal. 50,
 
 296 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 520 
 
 It is unnecessary that the stolen property, even though bank 
 notes, should be produced as evidence in court,"'"^ though this may 
 be done-" in the discretion of the court if the articles are first iden- 
 tified as having been stolen."' The identity of money received in 
 evidence with the stolen money is for the jury.-® If the article 
 is not produced the owner may testify to the marks thereon.-^ 
 
 But a witness cannot be permitted to prove a previous descrip- 
 tion, not verified by oath, which he received from a person who 
 went in search of the stolen property,^*^ or to testify that such a 
 description corresponds with his recollection. A witness to the 
 identity of the property need not be positive but may give his 
 opinion based in personal knowledge,^^ though a witness will not 
 be permitted to testify that on the previous date the owner identi- 
 fied it.^" An indictment for stealing chickens, ^^ a cow,^* a horse,^^ 
 or a hog,^" is sustained by proof of the larceny of any variety or 
 sex of the animal."' 
 
 52 ; State v. Hill, 65 Mo. 84, 85 ; Wiley 
 V. State, 3 Coldw. (Tenn.) 362, 375; 
 Turley v. State, 3 Humph. (Tenn.) 
 
 323, 324. 
 
 ^ Moore v. Commonwealth, 2 Leigh 
 (Va.) 701, 706; Spittorff v. State, 108 
 Ind. 171, 172, 8 N. E. 911; State v. 
 Clark, 27 Utah 55, 74 Pac. 119. 
 
 ^ Ledbetter v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 
 195, 32 S. W. 903 ; Lue v. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.), 15 S. W. 664; Bryant 
 V. State, 116 Ala. 445, 23 So. 40; Hoo- 
 ten V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 6, 108 S. W. 
 651. 
 
 " Buchanan v. State, 109 Ala. 7, 19 
 So. 410. 
 
 ^Hooten v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 6, 
 108 S. W. 651. 
 
 ^ State V. Ballard, 104 Mo. 634, 637, 
 16 S. W. 525. 
 
 ^^ Whizenant v. State, 71 Ala. 383, 
 
 385. 
 
 '' Misseldine v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 335. 17 S. W. 768; State v. Lockwood, 
 58 Vt. 378, 380, 3 Atl. 539; State v. 
 Babb, 76 Mo. 501, 404; State v. Mur- 
 
 phy, 15 Wash. 98, 45 Pac. 729; Minor 
 V. State, 55 Fla. 77, 46 So. 297. But 
 compare, contra, Elliston v. State, 50 
 Tex. Cr. 575, 99 S. W. 999. 
 
 " Anderson v. State, 14 Tex. App. 
 49, 52. Where the owner identified 
 goods found in defendant's possession 
 from their quality and color the de- 
 fendant should be allowed to show, 
 by a witness having experience in 
 such matters, that a merchant cannot 
 identify goods from color and quality 
 alone. Buchanan v. State, 109 Ala. 
 7, 19 So. 410. 
 
 ^ State V. Bassett, 34 La. Ann. 1108. 
 
 ^ Parker v. State, 39 Ala. 365. 
 
 ^' Davis V. State, 23 Tex. App. 210, 
 211, 4 S. W. 590. 
 
 ^ State V. Godet, 7 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 210, 211. 
 
 " It will be presumed that the ani- 
 mals alleged to have been stolen were 
 alive. If they were dead it should be 
 so stated, for an indictment for steal- 
 ing an animal is not sustained by 
 proof of stealing a carcass. Rex v.
 
 521 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY, § 296 
 
 ]\Ioney or valuable securities stolen must be properly identified, 
 and the proof of the money missing, or which was found in the 
 possession of the prisoner, must agree substantially with that 
 alleged in the indictment. A witness may be permitted to see coins 
 found in the possession of the accused for the purpose of identify- 
 ing them as stolen.^® Where it is alleged that bank notes,"® prom- 
 issory notes,*"' treasury notes, *^ or money,''" were stolen the proof 
 must correspond with the allegation, and any material variance 
 will be fatal. But strict proof of the identity of money is not re- 
 quired. The identity of stolen money may be determined from 
 circumstantial evidence.*^ So where several bills of high denomi- 
 nation were stolen, evidence was received to show that the accused 
 had bilb of that sort in his possession after the larceny, though 
 before he had been destitute.** 
 
 Evidence of the genuineness and value of stolen bank bills, 
 or of the corporate existence of the bank, is proper, though 
 usually the jury may infer these facts,*^ as from an admission 
 by the accused that he had passed them for value.**^ Parol evi- 
 dence may be given to prove the genuineness of stolen bank notes 
 or checks, without producing them or accounting for their non- 
 
 Halloway, i C. & P. 127; Common- Mete. (Mass.) 534, 537, 45 Am. 
 
 wealth V. Beaman, 8 Gray (Mass.) Dec. 227; Anglin v. State, 52 
 
 497, 499- Tex. Cr. 475, 107 S. W. 835 ; 
 
 ^Russell V. State (Ala.), 38 So. State v. Johnson, 36 Wash. 294, 78 
 
 291. Pac. 903, where the prosecuting wit- 
 
 "' Pomeroy v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. ness was allowed to state that within 
 
 Cas. 342. a half hour after the arrest he found 
 
 *" Stewart v. State, 62 Md. 412, 415. a $20 gold piece in the room of the 
 
 " State V. Collins, 72 N. Car. 144, accused though he could not identify 
 
 145 ; Keating v. People, 160 111. 480, 43 that particular piece of money as his 
 
 X. E. 724; State v. Clark, 27 Utah own. On trial for the larceny of a 
 
 55, 74 Pac. 119. roll of bills, the identification of a 
 
 *^ Lancaster v. State, 9 Tex. App. roll of paper with a single bill 
 
 393, 395 ; Braxton v. State, 50 Tex. wrapped around it to represent the 
 
 Cr. 632, 99 S. W. 994; Hooten v. roll taken is not error. Keating v. 
 
 State, 53 Tex. Cr. 6, 108 S. W. 651. People, 160 111. 480, 43 N. E. 724. 
 
 '■'McDonald v. State (Fla.), 47 So. "Clark v. State, 14 Ind. 26; Collins 
 
 485. V. People, 39 111. 233, 241. 
 
 "People V. Wilkinson, 60 Hun (N. '"'Baldwin v. State, i Snccd (Tcnn.) 
 
 Y.) 582, 14 N. Y. S. 827; Keating v. 411, 416. See, also, llildrcth v. Peo- 
 
 People, 160 111. 480, 43 N. E. 724; pie, 32 111. 36, 38. 
 Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 11
 
 § 297 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 522 
 
 production.'*' A failure to prcxluce the bank notes, though a cir- 
 cumstance which the jury may consider as favoring the prisoner's 
 innocence, does not render parol evidence of their value incompe- 
 tent. If they are produced, it is not necessary to call the officers 
 of the bank to prove them genuine.''^ 
 
 § 297. Brands on cattle. — That cattle are branded with the brand 
 of the prosecuting witness is some evidence of his ownership.'" 
 The state may prove that an unrecorded brand was used for years 
 by the party claiming ownership.'^^" A diagram of a brand has 
 been received, together with the hide of the stolen steer, where 
 they were properly identified.''^ Testimony that the prosecuting 
 witness made mistakes in branding- his cattle is irrelevant.''- 
 Brands duly recorded according to law must usually be proved 
 by a copy of the record to identify stolen animals. This is prima 
 facie proof of the ownership of the animal bearing that brand. ^^ 
 
 The statutes do not make brands and marks evidence of identity 
 for they are evidence aside from statute. The effect of the stat- 
 utes is to render a certified copy of the record admissible in 
 evidence.^'* In some cases, however, the statutes provide that no 
 brand except recorded brands shall be evidence of the ownership 
 of cattle.^^ 
 
 A witness who has seen the animal alleged to have been stolen 
 may describe any marks which he may have observed. ^*^ A witness 
 
 ^'People V. Holbrook, 13 Johns. (N. "People v. Hutchings, 8 Cal. App. 
 
 Y.) 90, 93; Milne's Case, 2 East C. 550, 97 Pac. 325. 
 
 L. 602; State V. Alayberry, 48 Me. "Dickson v. Territory, 6 Ariz. 199, 
 
 218, 238; Commonwealth v. Messin- 56 Pac. 971. 
 
 ger, I Binn. (Pa.) 273, 275, 278, 2 ^* Thompson v. State, 26 Tex. App. 
 
 Am. Dec. 441 ; Williams v. State, 34 466, 476, 9 S. W. 760 ; Brooke v. Peo- 
 
 Tex. Cr. 523, 31 S. W. 405, 406; Mc- pie, 23 Colo. 375, 48 Pac. 502; Areola 
 
 Ginnis v. State, 24 Ind. 500, 506, 507. v. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 51, 48 S. W. 195. 
 
 *^ Moore v. Commonwealth, 2 Leigh " Territory v. Smith, 12 N. Mex. 
 
 (Va.) 701, 706. 229, 78 Pac. 42. 
 
 ** State V. Wolfley, 75 Kan. 406, 89 "^ Lockwood v. State (Tex. Cr.), 26 
 
 Pac. 1046, 93 Pac. 337; People v. S. \V. 200; Eisner v. State, 22 Tex. 
 
 Romero (Cal. App., 1910), 107 Pac. App. 687, 688, 3 S. W. 474; Tittle v. 
 
 709. State, 30 Tex. App. 597, 599, I7 S. W. 
 
 •'•° Territory V. Aleredith (N. Mex.), 1118; Sapp v. State (Tex. Cr. App. 
 
 91 Pac. 731. 1903), 77 S. W. 456. But proof of the 
 
 " People V. Hutchings, 8 Cal. App. brand to show ownership is not indis- 
 
 550, 97 Pac. 325. pensable unless it is the only evidence. 
 
 Wolf V. State, 4 Tex. App. 332.
 
 523 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. § 298 
 
 may always be permitted to state that it is difficult to identify 
 cattle, because of the similarity of marks on them.^^ 
 
 § 298. Evidence of venue and of the value of money or property. — 
 The burden of proving the venue as laid, and beyond a reasonable 
 doubt,"'^^ is upon the state, though, if the state shall omit to prove 
 the venue specifically, the jury may infer it from all the evidence 
 on both sides.^" An allegation of larceny in one county is sup- 
 ported by evidence of a taking in another, and a transportation 
 into the county where the venue is laid.''" The property taken 
 must be proved to have some value, ''^ though the value alleged, 
 not being usually a part of the corpus delicti, need not be proved 
 unless proof of value is necessary to fix the grade of the offense."^ 
 
 Direct evidence of the precise value of the property stolen is 
 not required. The value of the stolen property is always largely 
 a matter of opinion. The opinion of a witness as to the value, 
 where value is material, is not of necessity conclusive on the jury. 
 They may disregard the opinion of the witness if they think he 
 has not testified honestly and fairly. The jury may infer that the 
 stolen property has value from evidence of its character and use,'''^ 
 
 "Lue V. Commonwealth (Ky. wealth (Ky.), 29 S. W. 16, 16 Ky. L. 
 
 1889), IS S. W. 664. The ears and 530. 
 
 dewlaps of a cow have been allowed ^^ Scott v. State, 42 Ark. y^, yj ; 
 
 to be exhibited, to identify the animal State v. Shour, 196 Mo. 202, 95 S. W. 
 
 and to show that the brand had been 405. 
 
 mutilated. State v. Crow, 107 Mo. *'" Commonwealth v. Dewitt, 10 
 34i> 350, 17 S. W. 745. And compare Mass. 154, 155; People v. Burke, 11 
 Mizell V. State, 38 Fla. 20, 20 So. 769. Wend. (N. Y.) 129, 4 Bl. Com. 305. 
 In some instances, it is provided by Cf. State v. Bartlett, 11 Vt. 650. 
 the statutes that in a prosecution for " Powell v. State, 88 Ga. 32, 2Zj I3 
 stealing a horse the ownership of S. E. 829; Parker v. State, iii Aia. 
 which is uncertain or unknown, the 72, 20 So. 641 ; Commonwealth v. Mc- 
 propcrty shall be held to be owned by Kcnney, 9 Gray (Mass.) 114; Benja- 
 the state. Contradictory evidence as min v. State, 105 Ga. 830, 31 S. E. 739. 
 to whether the horse is or is not "" Commonwealth v. Riggs, 14 Gray 
 branded leaves the ownership uncer- (Mass.) 376, 77 Am. Dec. 2>23'> Van- 
 tain within the statute. State v. degrift v. State, 151 Ala. 105, 43 So. 
 Eddy, 46 Wash. 494, 90 Pac. 641. 852; Herd v. United States, 13 Okla. 
 
 "Harsdorf v. State (Tex. App.), 512, 75 Pac. 291. 
 
 18 S. W. 415; Moyc V. State, 65 Ga. "'Commonwealth v. McKcnncy, 9 
 
 7.S4, 755; Thockmorton v. Common- Gray (Mass.) 114, 116; Whalon v.
 
 § 298 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 524 
 
 and a non-expert \vitness may always testify to the value of the 
 property."* 
 
 The courts will notice judicially the meaning of words used to 
 designate the circulating medium, its value, and that of all mon- 
 eys, foreign or domestic, whose value is established by law."^ 
 
 Evidence, therefore, that the property consisted of bank notes 
 or any description of money will always sustain an inference that 
 it was of some value."" Securities, as stock certificates, whose 
 real value is not proved, will be presumed to have a nominal 
 value."' 
 
 Expert evidence will be received to prove the value of stocks, 
 bonds and other securities, if the expert has bought or sold the 
 securities in question, and for that reason is competent."^ It will 
 be presumed that gold coin alleged to have been stolen was of its 
 face value."'* Where evidence of value is relevant to determine 
 the grade of the ofifense. the accused may show that the value of 
 the property was such that he should not be convicted of grand 
 larceny. Usually the market value "^ at the time and place of 
 the theft is the only proper evidence.^^ Evidence of value at the 
 time of the trial is competent unless it appears that the value at 
 the time of the trial differed from that at the time of the theft. '- 
 
 Commonwealth, 90 Va. 544, 19 S. E. Donald v. State, 2 Ga. App. 633, 58 
 
 182; State V. Faulk (S. Dak. 1908), S. E. 1067. 
 
 116 N. W. 72. "• People v. Griffin, 38 How. Pr. (N. 
 
 •^ State V. Finch, 70 Iowa 316, 317, Y.) 475, 480; Whalen v. Common- 
 
 30 N. W. 578, 59 Am. 443; Moss v. wealth, 90 Va. 544, 549, 19 S. E. 182; 
 
 State, 40 So. 340, 146 Ala. 686, not Rooney v. State, 51 Neb. 576, 71 N. 
 
 reported in full; Echols v. State, 41 W. 309. 
 
 So. 298, 147 Ala. 700, not reported in '^ People v. Turpin, 233 111. 452, 84 
 
 full; State v, Montgomery, 17 S. Dak. N. E. 679, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 276n. 
 
 SCO, 97 N. W. 716; Vandegrift v. ''State v. Faulk (S. Dak.), 116 N. 
 
 State, 43 So. 852, 151 Ala. 105; Lewis W. 72. 
 
 V. State (Ala., 1909), 51 So. 308. '"State v. Brown, 55 Kan. 611, 40 
 
 •^Underhill on Ev., § 237; McDon- Pac. looi ; Cannon v. State, 18 Tex. 
 
 aid V. State, 2 Ga. App. 633, 58 S. E. App. 172, 173; Glover v. State, 40 So. 
 
 1067. 354, 146 Ala. 690, not reported in full. 
 
 ** Nelson v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 205, "People v. Cole, 54 Mich. 238, 239, 
 
 32 S. W. 900; ^IcDowell V. State, 74 19 N. W. 968; Glover v. State, 40 So. 
 
 Miss. 37S, 20 So. 864; Vincent v. 354, 146 Ala. 690; Keipp v. State, 51 
 
 State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 120, 126; Tex. Cr. 417, 103 S. W. 392. 
 
 Bagley v. State, 3 Tex. App. 163, 169; '" Cummings v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 Duvall v. State, 63 Ala. 12, 15; Ale- 1907), 106 S. W. 363.
 
 525 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCEXY. § 299 
 
 If the property has no market vakie at the time of the trial, it is 
 competent to prove the purcliase price. '^ The owner's opinion of 
 the vahie of the property has been received.''* 
 
 The jury may fix the vahie of the property according to the 
 highest estimate of any witness. '° 
 
 § 299. Inference from possession of the property stolen. — The 
 rules which are elsewhere explained/'' in connection with the 
 question of a presumption of guilt arising where property stolen 
 from a house in which a burglary has been committed is found in 
 the possession of the accused, are applicable on an indictment for 
 larceny. 
 
 According to the most approved modern view, the possession 
 of stolen property, however recent and unexplained, creates no 
 presmnption of law that the possessor committed the larceny, and 
 consequently a conviction of larceny based upon an instruction 
 to that effect, and casting the burden of proving the innocent 
 character of the possession upon the accused, must be set aside. 
 The fact of the possession of stolen goods may always be shown. 
 From proof of this fact, in connection with other evidence, the 
 jury may infer as a matter of probability and reasoning, but not 
 as a rule of law, that is, they may, under the judicious guidance 
 of the court, draw the inference of fact that the possessor is guilty 
 of stealing them." 
 
 "State V. McDermet, 138 Iowa 86, W. 119; Orr v. State, 107 Ala. 35, 18 
 
 115 X. W. 884; !^IcCoy V. State So. 142; Hix v. People, 157 111. 382, 
 
 (Tex. Cr. App., 1909), 120 S. W. 41 N. E. 862; State v. Wilson, 95 
 
 858. Iowa 341, 64 N. W. 266; Dobson v. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Stebbins, 8 State, 46 Neb. 250, 64 N. W. 956; 
 
 Gray (Mass.) 492, 495; People v. State v. Velarde, 59 Cal. 457, 563; 
 
 Kehoe, 19 N. Y. S. 76^, 64 Hun. (N. Smith v. People, 103 111. 82, 85; State 
 
 Y.) 636, without opinion. v. Raymond, 46 Conn. 345; Under- 
 
 "Lane v. State (Tex. Cr., 1894), 28 wood v. State, 72 Ala. 220, 222; Boy- 
 
 S. W. 202, 203. Circumstantial evi- kin v. State, 34 Ark. 443, 445, 446: 
 
 dcnce of value may be sufficient. Col- State v. Hoffman, 53 Kan. 700, 708, 
 
 lins V. State (Tex. Cr., 1909), 118 S. 709, 37 Pac. 138; State v. Hodge, 50 
 
 W. 1038. N. H. 510; Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 
 
 "Sec post, § 378. 647, 4 N. W. 78s; Conkwright v. Peo- 
 
 " People V. Wong Chong Suey, lio pic, 35 111. 204; State v. Pennynian, 
 
 Cal. 117, 42 Pac. 420; People v. St. 68 Iowa 216, 217, 26 X.W. 82; Harper 
 
 Clair (Cal. 1896), 44 Pac. 234; Phil- v. State, 71 Miss. 202, 203; State v. 
 
 lips V. State (Tex. Cr., 1896), 34 S. Jennett, 88 N. Car. 665, 667; Com-
 
 § 300 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 526 
 
 § 300. Recent and exclusive character of possession. — The posses- 
 sion must not be too remote in time from the theft, or it wiU not 
 have much value as evidence.''' The lapse of time between the 
 taking and the date of the possession is a vevy important circum- 
 stance. If it is so g-reat tliat no connection between them can 
 reasonably be imagined, e^■idence of possession is of httle weight, 
 and, in an extreme case, it may be exchided as irrelevant. 
 
 But possession of the property so soon after the theft that the 
 possessor could not have obtained it unless he had just stolen it, 
 may, in the absence of a credible explanation, sustain a convic- 
 tion.'" As the intervening time lengthens the cogency of this 
 evidence diminishes.'"' But the period intervening which ought 
 
 monwealth v. Montgomery, 11 Met. 
 (Mass.) 534, 45 Am. Dec. 227; Blaker 
 V. State, 130 Ind. 203, 29 N. E. 1077; 
 Sahlinger v. People, 102 111. 241 ; 
 Sliepperd v. State, 94 Ala. 102, 10 So. 
 663 ; Gravely v. Commonwealth, 86 
 Va. 396, 400, 10 S. E. 431 ; Pace v. 
 State (Tex. Cr., 1894), 3i S. W. 173; 
 Perry v. State (Ala., 1908), 46 So. 
 470; Perry v. People, 38 Colo. 23, 87 
 Pac. 796; McDonald v. State (Fla. 
 1908), 47 So. 485; State V. Toohey, 
 203 Mo. 674, 102 S. W. 530; State v. 
 Sprague, 149 Mo. 409, 50 S. W. 901 ; 
 State V. Drew, 179 Mo. 315, 78 S. W. 
 594; loi Am. St. 474n ; Territory v. 
 Livingston, 13 N. Mex. 318, 84 Pac. 
 1021 ; State v. Lax, 71 N. J. L. 386, 59 
 Atl. 18; Randolph v. State (Tex. Cr., 
 1899), 49 S. W. 591 ; Kennon v. State, 
 46 Tex. Cr. 359, 82 S. W. 518; Fool v. 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. 596, 103 S. W. 892; 
 Bryant v. State, 1 16 Ala. 445, 23 So. 40 ; 
 ■ State v. Burns, 19 Wash. 52, 52 Pac. 
 316; State v. McClain, 130 Iowa 73, 
 106 N. W. 376. Evidence of posses- 
 sion of stolen goods is admissible. loi 
 Am. St. 485. Evidence of possession 
 of stolen goods does not warrant con- 
 viction if the jury have a reasonable 
 doubt of guilt. loi Am. St. 503. The 
 possession of a box in which stolen 
 
 goods were packed may be equivalent, 
 in force and effect, to the possession 
 of the goods. People v. Block, 15 
 N. Y. S. 229, 60 Hun (N. Y.) 583, 
 without opinion; State v. Record (N. 
 Car., 1909), 65 S. E. loio. 
 
 ^* Goldstein v. People, 82 N. Y. 231 ; 
 Davis V. State, 50 Miss. 86, 94, 95; 
 Commonwealth v. Montgomery, ir 
 Met. (Mass.) 534, 45 Am. Dec. 227; 
 Beck V. State, 44 Tex. 430, 432 ; Sloan 
 V. People, 47 111. y6, 2 Russ. on Crimes 
 (9th Am. Ed.) SS7 ; Graves v. State, 
 
 12 Wis. 591 ; Williams v. State, 40 
 Fla. 480, 25 So. 143, 74 Am. St. 154; 
 Bryant v. State, 4 Ga. App. 851, 62 S. 
 E. S40; Wiley V. State (Ark., 1909), 
 124 S. W. 249. 
 
 ^° Blaker v. State, 130 Ind. 203, 205, 
 29 N. E. 1077, 1078; Branson v. Com- 
 monwealth, 92 Ky. 330, 17 S. W. 1019, 
 
 13 Ky. L. 614 ; Brown v. State, 59 Ga. 
 456, 458; Madden v. State, 148 Ind. 
 183, 47 N. E. 220; State v. Eubank, 
 32 Wash. 293, 74 Pac. 378; Ingraham 
 V. State, 82 Xeb. 553, 118 N. W. 320; 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3058; Scott v. 
 State, 1 19 Ga. 425 ; 46 S. E. 637 ; State 
 V. Broxton, 118 La. 126, 42 So. 721; 
 Miller v. People, 229 111. 376, 82 X. 
 E. 391- 
 
 '"State V. Jcnnett, 88 X. Car. 665,
 
 527 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. § 3OO 
 
 to nullify any presumption from possession cannot be fixed, de- 
 pending not so much on mere lapse of time as on other circum- 
 stances and the defendant's declarations explanatory of the pos- 
 session.^^ 
 
 Though the element of time is important, other facts are to 
 be considered; among them is the character of the goods, for if 
 they are light and portable, such as coin, bank notes or jewelry, 
 which pass easily and quickly from hand to hand, possession a 
 few days after the theft might not, as matter of law, be recent.*- 
 The reverse is true when the goods are bulky and cumbersome. 
 But generally the recency of possession is a question for the jury 
 on all the evidence. 
 
 Not only must the possession be recent, but it must be personal, 
 exclusive, and with a distinct, implied or express assertion of 
 ownership. If these essentials are not proved, a conviction based 
 on the fact of possession must be set aside.^^ The possession of 
 the stolen property is personal and exclusive if it is exclusive as 
 to all persons not particeps criuiinis. As to accomplices the pos- 
 session of one is the possession of all.^* A mere constructive pos- 
 session is not enough. The accused will not be presumed to have 
 stolen articles which he does not know he possesses. If other 
 persons have equal right and facility of access with him to a 
 room, trunk or closet w^here stolen goods are discovered, posses- 
 sion, not being exclusive or personal, is of no value as evidence.'*^ 
 
 66; Martin v. State, 104 Ala. 71, 16 N. E. 1077; People v. Wilson, 7 App. 
 
 So. 82, 84; People V. Deluce, 237 III. Div. (N. Y.) 326, 40 N. Y. S. 107; 
 
 541, 86 N. E. 1080. ■ State v. Lackland, 136 Mo. 26, 37 S. 
 
 "State V. Miller, 45 Minn. 521, 522, W. 812; State v. Deyoe, 97 Iowa 744, 
 
 48 N. W. 401; Davis v. State, 50 66 N. W. 7Z2>; Funderburg v. State 
 
 Miss. 86, 94, 95; State v. Jennett, 88 (Tex. Cr., 1896), 34 S. W. 613; Peo- 
 
 N. Car. 665, 667; State v. Lange, 59 ple v. Wilson, 151 N. Y. 403, 45 N. E. 
 
 Mo. 418, 422. 862; Van Straaten v. People, 26 Colo. 
 
 "State V. Castor, 93 Islo. 242, 250, 184, 56 Pac. 905: Bryant v. State, 
 
 5 S. W. 906; Davis V. State, 50 Miss. 4 Ga. App. 851, 62 S. E. 540. 
 
 86, 95 ; Rex v. Partridge, 7 Car. & P. " People v. Horton, 7 Cal. App. 34, 
 
 551. 93 Pac. 382; Wiley v. State (Ark., 
 
 "State V. Castor, 93 Mo. 242, 250, 1909), 124 S. W. 249. 
 
 .S S. W. 906; Clark v. State, 30 Tex. "3 Greenl. on Ev., § :iT,; State v. 
 
 .•\pp. 402, 17 S. W. 942; People v. Wilks, 58 Mo. App. 159, 162. "If the 
 
 Hurley, 60 Cal. 74, 75, 44 Am. 55; article be small, and such as is easily 
 
 Hlaker v. State, 130 Ind. 203, 205, 29 and quickly transmissible from one 
 
 person to anotlicr, and when it is
 
 § o 
 
 OI 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 528 
 
 § 301. Burden of explaining possession — Character of explanatory 
 evidence. — Though hardly accurate to say that the burdeu of ex- 
 l)laining the possession of stolen property is upon the accused,*^" 
 yet he must offer some reasonable and probable explanation.*' 
 It is reversible error not to permit him to do so, or to reject anv 
 relevant evidence tending- to produce that result.^^ If, having 
 the power and opportunity he offers no explanation,"" or one 
 which is unsatisfactory in that it does not show that the character 
 of his possession is consistent with innocence, a conviction will 
 be justified."*' He may prove that he bought the goods," ^ that he 
 offered to pay the owner for them,"- or that he became possessed 
 of them, believing he was the owner's agent. "^ The accused may 
 show that he received money and checks from the prosecuting 
 witness, prior to the alleged larceny of a check which is found 
 
 found in the possession of the ac- State, 33 Tex. 480; State v. Miller, 
 
 cused, it is openly exposed where the 45 Minn. 521, 522, 48 N. W. 401 ; 
 
 owner may readily find it, and will Tilly v. State, 21 Fla. 242, 249; State 
 
 probably discover it, and he makes v. Jennings, 81 Mo. 185, 209, 51 Am. 
 
 no effort to conceal it, but gives an 236; Waters v. People, 104 III. 544, 
 
 account of his possession, which is 548; Commonwealth v. McGorty, 114 
 
 probable from the nature of the ar- Mass. 299; Miller v. People, 229 111. 
 
 tide, these circumstances would be 376, 82 N. E. 391 ; State v. McKin- 
 
 sufficient to destroy the presumption ney, 76 Kan. 419, 91 Pac. 1068; State 
 
 arising from mere possession." Jones v. Vinton (Mo., 1909), 119 S. W. 370. 
 
 V. State, 30 Miss. 653, 655. The denial by the accused of his 
 
 *" Baker v. State, 80 Wis. 416, 421, identity when discovered in the pos- 
 
 50 N. W. 518; State v. Eubank, 33 session of the property, and his 'ab- 
 
 Wash. 293, 74 Pac. 378. Cf. Waters surd explanations of his whereabouts 
 
 V. People, 104 111. 544, 548. An in- which are inconsistent with the testi- 
 
 struction which requires the accused mony of other witnesses, are corrobo- 
 
 to satisfy the jury of the good faith rative of possession sufficient to war- 
 
 of his claim of title is error. John- rant submission to the jury. People 
 
 son v. United States (Okla. App.), v. Vidal, 121 Cal. 221, 53 Pac. 558. 
 99 Pac. 1022. *' Though he has forgotten the 
 
 "State V. Vinton (Mo., 1909), 119 name of the vendor. Merriwether v. 
 
 S. W. 370. State (Tex. Cr.), 115 S. W. 44; Jones 
 
 ^' Crossland v. State, 77 Ark. 537, v. People, 12 111. 259, including all 
 
 92 S. W. 776; State v. Winter, 83 S. pertinent declarations made by him- 
 
 Car. 153, 65 S. E. 209. self or the vendors. People v. Dow- 
 
 *° Adams v. State, 52 Ala. 379, 381 ; ling, 84 N. Y. 478, 485. 
 Tilly V. State, 21 Fla. 242, 249. "" Hall v. State, 34 Ga. 208. 210. 
 
 *" State v. Garvin, 48 S. Car. 258, 26 "^ Lewis v. State, 29 Tex. App. 105, 
 
 S. E. 570; Franklin v. State, 37 Tex. 
 Cr. 312, 39 S. W. 680; State v. Ho- 
 gard, 12 Minn. 293; Mondragon v. 
 
 T4 S. W. 1008; Chambers v. State, 
 62 J\liss. 108.
 
 ;29 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AXD LARCENY. 
 
 § 301 
 
 in his possession to prove the lawfuhiess of his possession 
 of the check."* These aiid other explanatory facts may be 
 shown even where the defendant has failed or refused to 
 give a satisfactory explanation of the possession of the prop- 
 erty when it was first found in his possession."^ If the 
 explanatory evidence creates a reasonable doubt in the minds of 
 the jurors that he stole the property, he should be acquitted."" It 
 is not absolutely requisite that the accused should prove that his 
 possession was honest. It is sufficient to acquit him if he gives 
 a natural, reasonable and probable explanation of how he acquired 
 possession which the prosecution does not show to be false."' 
 Such an explanation may be taken as true if the state, relying for 
 a conviction and proof of the corpus delicti upon recent possession 
 alone, does not prove its falsity or attempt to do so."^ If the 
 explanation is absurd, unreasonable or unsatisfactory it is the 
 right of the jury, and often their dut}^ to disregard it though no 
 evidence in rebuttal on that point is offered."" But when the 
 explanation offered is reasonable and probable it must be over- 
 come, and its falsity shown by positive and definite evidence. 
 Thus if the accused states to a witness that he purchased the proi> 
 
 "Crossland v. State, 77 Ark. 537, 
 92 S. W. 77^. 
 
 ^Harris v. State, 15 Tex. App. 411 ; 
 Echols V. State, 41 So. 298, 147 Ala. 
 700, not reported in full ; People v. 
 Farrington, 140 Cal. 656, 74 Pac. 288. 
 
 ** State V. Peterson, 67 Iowa 564, 
 567, 25 X. W. 780; Grentzinger v. 
 State, 31 Xeb. 460, 462, 48 N. W. 148; 
 Clark V. State, 30 Tex. App. 402, 17 
 S. W. 942; Baker v. State, 80 Wis. 
 416, 421, 50 X. W. 518; Blaker v. 
 State, 130 Ind. 203, 207, 29 N. E. 
 1077; State V. Wilson, 95 Iowa 341, 
 64 X. W. 266; State V. Cross, 95 
 Iowa 629, 64 X. W. 614; Gilmore v. 
 State (Tex. Cr., 1895), 33 S. W. 120; 
 Crawford v. State, 113 Ala. 661, 21 
 So. 64; State V. Dillon, 48 La. Ann. 
 f.365, 20 So. 913; State V. Lax, 71 X. 
 J. L. 3f^6, 59 Atl. 18; Johnson v. 
 United States (Okla.), 99 Pac. 1022; 
 34 — U.N'DKknii.L Cki.m. Ev. 
 
 Xewton V. State (Tex. Cr.), 48 S. W. 
 507; Isham V. State (Tex.), 49 S. W. 
 581; McDonald v. State (Fla., 1908), 
 47 So. 485; Douglas V. State (Ark., 
 1909), 121 S. W. 923. 
 
 "'Hart V. State, 22 Tex. App. 563, 
 3 S. W. 741 ; Garcia v. State, 26 Tex. 
 209, 210; State V. Moore, loi Mo. 316, 
 14 S. W. 182; Jones v. State, 30 Miss. 
 653, 655, 64 Am. Dec. 175; State v. 
 Castor, 93 Mo. 242, 250, 5 S. W. 906; 
 Yarbrough v. State, 115 Ala. 92, 22 
 So. 534. As to changing brands on 
 cattle, Williams v. State, 40 Fla. 480, 
 25 So. 143, 74 Am. St. 154. 
 
 ■* People V. Hurley, 60 Cal. 74, 77, 
 44 Am. 55 ; Powell v. State, i t Tcx. 
 App. 401, 402; Johnson v. State, 12 
 Tcx. App. 385, 391 ; State v. Kimble, 
 34 La. Ann. 392. 395. 3 Grccnl. on 
 Evidence, § 32; Franklin v. State. 3 
 Ga. App. 342, 59 S. E. S35. 
 
 "Tilly V. State, 21 Fla. 242, 249.
 
 § 2,02 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 530 
 
 erty of a third person the latter is a competent witness to testify 
 that he did not sell the accused the property. ^^^ Direct evidence 
 is not always essential. Circumstantial evidence will answer if 
 upon all the evidence the prosecutor shall succeed in convincing 
 the jury of the guilt of the prisoner beyond a reasonable doubt. ^ 
 
 § 302. Explanatory declarations. — Any declaration made by the 
 accused explaining the reason or character of his possession, if 
 made while it lasts, is admissible as a part of the res gcstcc for 
 or against him." Under the older authorities, the defendant's 
 declarations were not admissible in his favor, if made after his 
 possession had terminated. This rule is now somewhat relaxed, 
 but not to the extent of permitting proof of his self-serving dec- 
 larations made at all times and under all circumstances. Where 
 no previous opportunity for explanation arose, he may now prove 
 his statements made when arrested, or when charged with theft, 
 or informed he is suspected, though he has parted with posses- 
 
 '°° State V. Grubb, 201 Mo. 585. 99 
 S. W. 585. 
 
 'Franklin v. State, 2>7 Tex. Cr. 312, 
 39 S. W. 680; State V. Schaffer, 70 
 Iowa 371, 375, 30 N. W. 639; Brown 
 V. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 150, 29 S. W. 
 yy2. So when the accused produces a 
 bill of sale to account for his posses- 
 sion the state may be permitted to 
 show its invalidity because procured 
 by undue influence and fraud prac- 
 ticed upon the owner. Watson v. 
 State, 36 Miss. 593, 609, 610. Where 
 a party is found in the possession of 
 recently stolen goods, and gives a 
 reasonable and credible account of 
 such possession or an account raising 
 a reasonable doubt, the state must 
 prove that such account is untrue, 
 otherwise he must be acquitted, but 
 the account may be reasonable and 
 highly plausible, yet, if the jury do 
 not believe, they have a right to con- 
 vict on such evidence alone, though 
 
 the state does not put in any evi- 
 dence to prove the falsity of such 
 account. McDonald v. State (Fla.), 
 47 So. 485. 
 
 Effect of evidence of defendant's 
 good character to rebut presumption 
 from possession of stolen goods, 20 
 L. R. A. 614; sufificiency of evidence 
 of possession of stolen goods, loi 
 Am. St. 505, S06. 
 
 ^Walker v. State, 28 Ga. 254, 256; 
 Hubbard v. State, 107 Ala. 23, 18 So. 
 225; Smith V. State, 103 Ala. 40, 16 
 So. 12, 14; State V. Moore, loi Mo. 
 316, 33 T, 14 S. W. 182; Mason v. 
 State (Ind., 1908), 85 N. E. 776', 
 Bryant v. State, 116 Ala. 445, 23 So. 
 40; Echols V. State, 41 So. 298, 147 
 Ala. 700, not reported in full; Whart. 
 C. E., § 761. The fact of possession, 
 or acts evincing ownership, must al- 
 ways be proved prior to the admis- 
 sion of the declarations. Cameron v. 
 State, 44 Tex. 652, 656.
 
 531 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY. § 3O3 
 
 sion. The declaration must have been uttered at the first mo- 
 ment he was expressly or by implication called on to explain." 
 
 Some of the cases admit only such declarations as were made 
 at the instant the defendant is discovered in possession/ and 
 obviously declarations made after the accused has had ample time 
 to concoct an explanation are inadmissible." Though the declara- 
 tions of the accused are admissible against him, the statements 
 of a third person, having charge of the stolen property, are not 
 admissible when they were not made in the presence of the ac- 
 cused. ** The presumption of larceny arising from possession, 
 may be wholly rebutted by proof of the good character of the 
 accused.' 
 
 § 303. Evidence of footprints. — Evidence of the identity of the 
 accused with the person who committed the theft, derived from 
 a comparison of foot-tracks, is admissible, as in the case of prose- 
 cutions for burglary, homicide and arson. '^ On a prosecution for 
 larceny, it may be shown that the accused had purchased boots 
 and shoes of the same size as those worn by a person whose foot- 
 tracks were discovered in the vicinity of a house from which 
 property was stolen.^ Evidence that wagon or foot-tracks were 
 observed on a road leading from a place whence the stolen prop- 
 erty was taken to where it was hidden, near the house of the 
 accused, may, if unexplained or unrebutted, and particularly if 
 there be some marked peculiarity in their form or character, ^^•it]l 
 proof that the stolen property was found in the possession of the 
 defendant, support a conviction.^" 
 
 'Ward V. State, 41 Tex. 611, 613; ford v. State (Tex. Cr., 1903), 78 S. 
 
 Taylor v. State, 15 Tex. App. 356, W. 692. 
 
 360; Carreker v. State, 92 Ga. 471, 17 ^People v. Hurley, 60 Cal. 74, 77. 
 
 S. E. 671; State v. McClain, 130 44 Am. 55; State v. Crooke, 129 Mo. 
 
 Iowa "jz, 106 N. W. Zl^\ Lohrey v. App. 490, 107 S. W. 1104. 
 
 State, 91 Miss. 853, 45 So. 145. * See § ZZT. 
 
 'State V. Moore, loi Mo. 316, 331, "State v. Reed, 89 Mo. 168, 170, r 
 
 14 S. \V. 182; Henderson v. State, S. W. 225. 
 
 70 Ala. 23, 25, 45 Am. 72, 2 Bish. Cr. '" Rryan v. State, 74 Ga. 393. 394 ; 
 
 I'ro., § 746. Holscy v. State, 89 Ga. 433, 434. \$ S. 
 
 ■* State V. Moore, lor Mo. 316, 330, K. $^9^. 
 14 S. W. 182; Cooper v. State, 63 When evidence of footprints is ad- 
 Ala. 80, 81, 82. missiblc. 94 Am. St. 342, 343. F.vi- 
 
 ° State V. May, 20 Iowa 305; Gil- dence that accused refused to make
 
 ^§ 304, 305 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 532 
 
 Evidence that footprints were found in the vicinity of the lar- 
 ceny may be received, though the footprints are not shown to 
 compare with the footgear of the accused, and though they may 
 not be in any way connected with him.^^ 
 
 § 304. Financial standing and expenditures of the defendant. — 
 Evidence that the defendant had ahvays been poor, or was Hving 
 extravagantly and beyond his means/- or that he was generally 
 reputed to be in good circumstances,^^ or as to the wages he was 
 receiving,^'* either before or after the larceny, is alike inadmis- 
 sible. But evidence that, though in moderate circumstances be- 
 fore the larceny, he was profuse in his subsequent expenditures,^^ 
 or that he spent a sum of money about the date of the larceny 
 nearly equivalent to what the stolen property may have sold for, 
 is admissible.^'' The reception of evidence that the person from 
 whom money was taken a day or two before had a large sum in 
 his possession is not error. ^'^ 
 
 § 305. Evidence of other crimes. — Evidence of distinct larcenies 
 by the accused is not generally admissible, though to this rule 
 many important exceptions are made.^'' It may be proper to 
 
 footprints not admissible, 94 Am. St. crime themselves are so well con- 
 
 343. cealed from view by the perpetrator, 
 
 " Rucker v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 222, as to furnish no immediate evidence 
 
 lOi S. W. 804. against him. * * * But they some- 
 
 " Snapp v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. times betray themselves by their con- 
 
 ^73, 183, 184. sequences, as by a sudden and mate- 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Stebbins, 8 rial change in life or circumstances. 
 
 Gray (Mass.) 492, 495. indicating, beyond question, the re- 
 
 "Dorsey v. State, no Ala. 38, 20 cent receipt of money or property 
 
 So. 450. from some quarter. Where a person, 
 
 ^^ Perrin v. State, 81 Wis. 135, 140, previously known to be poor, is 
 
 50 N. W. 516; Leonard v. State, 115 found, shortly after a robbery, lar- 
 
 Ala. 80, 22 So. 564. ceny, or murder, in possession of 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Grose, 99 Mass. considerable wealth, it is always a 
 
 423, 424. Cf. Fulmer v. Common- circumstance of suspicion." Burrell 
 
 wealth, 97 Pa. St. 503; Common- Circ. Ev., 457; Martin v. State, 104 
 
 wealth V. Montgomery, 11 Met. Ala. 71, 16 So. 82, 85. 
 (Mass.) 534, 45 Am. Dec. 227; State "Van Syoc v. State, 69 Neb. 520, 
 
 v. Grebe, 17 Kan. 458, 461 ; State v. 96 N. W. 266. 
 
 Bruce, 106 N. Car. 792, 795, it S. E. ''See §§ 84, 85: Alexander v. State, 
 
 475. "In most cases, the fruits of 21 Tex. App. 406, 17 S. W. 139. 57
 
 533 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AND LARCENY, 
 
 § 305 
 
 prove that other persons had their property stolen and that it 
 was found in the possession of the accused, to show his felonious 
 intention and guilty knowledge/" or to identify him as the per- 
 son mentioned in the indictment.-" So where the accused was on 
 trial for larceny of a horse it may be proved that a saddle was 
 stolen at the same time.^^ For w-here property is found in the 
 possession of the accused and he attempts to justify his posses- 
 sion his possession of other property stolen at the same time is a 
 strong circumstance against him.^^ The accused must then be 
 allowed to explain his possession of the other stolen property.'^ 
 In many cases where the crimes are separate and distinct, in 
 time, place or character, the courts refuse to admit evidence of 
 similar crimes, even to show a criminal intent. This is particu- 
 larly the case, if the evidence connecting the accused wnth the 
 similar offense is very slight, remote or unconvincing.^* The de- 
 fendant's admission that at times not mentioned in the indictment 
 he had stolen goods from a building in which were found goods 
 
 Am. 617; State v. Vinson, 63 N. Car. 
 335. 340; Links v. State, 13 Lea 
 (Tenn.) 701, 711, 712; People v. 
 Tucker, 104 Cal. 440, 448, 38 Pac. 
 195; State V. Goetz, 34 Mo. 85; Mc- 
 Queen V. State, 108 Ala. 54, 18 
 So. 843; Echols V. State, 41 So. 298, 
 147 Ala. 700, not reported in full; 
 People V. Cain, 7 Cal. App. 163, 93 
 Pac. 1037; Buck V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 
 319, 83 S. W. 387; Bryan v. State, 
 49 Tex. Cr. 200, 91 S. W. 581 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Sekeson, in App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 490, 97 N. Y. S. 917. Proof of other 
 crimes in prosecution for larceny, see 
 extensive note, 62 L. R. A. 231, 281, 
 315. 322, 105 Am. St. 976, Elliott Evi- 
 dence, §§ 2720, 3057. 
 
 "Lynns v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 375, 
 ni S. W. 729. 
 
 *• State V. Moore, loi Mo. 316, 327, 
 14 S. W. 182; People V. Robles, 34 
 Cal. 591, 593; Commonwealth v. 
 Rig(?s, T4 Gray (Mass.) 376, 77 Am. 
 I^cc. 333: State V. White, 89 \. Car. 
 4C>2, 466; Reed v. State, 54 Ark. 621, 
 
 16 S. W. 819; Bonners v. State (Tex. 
 Cr., 1896), 35 S. W. 650; People v. 
 Hughes, 91 Hun (N. Y.) 354, 36 N. 
 Y. S. 493; Hurley v. State, 36 Tex. 
 Cr. 73, 35 S. W. 371 ; People v. Nagle, 
 137 Mich. 88, 100 N. W. 273; Housh 
 V. People, 24 Colo. 262, 50 Pac. 1036; 
 State v. Bates, 182 Mo. 70, 81 S. W. 
 408; Watters v. State (Tex. Cr., 
 1906), 94 S. W. 1038; Cohoe V. State 
 (Neb.), 118 N. W. 1088; Brown v. 
 United States, 142 Fed. i, 73 C. C. A. 
 187; Territory v. Livingston, 13 N. 
 Mex. 318, 84 Pac. 1021. 
 
 '"Robinson v. State (Tex. Cr.), 48 
 S. W. 176. 
 
 " Penrice v. State (Tex.), 105 S. 
 W. 797- 
 
 " People V. Dowling, 84 N. Y. 478, 
 484; State v. Lcvich, 128 Iowa 372, 104 
 X. W. 334- 
 
 "' Snapp v. Commonwealth, S2 Ky. 
 173. 177-183; Boland v. People, 19 
 Hun (N. Y.) 80; Endaily v. State, 39 
 Ark. 278, 280, 62 L. R. ;\. 23 in.
 
 § 306 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 534 
 
 similar to those referred to in the indictment, is admissible. But 
 such an admission is only relevant to identify the prisoner and 
 not as a confession of the crime charged."^ 
 
 The crimes of larceny and embezzlement are distinct and dis- 
 similar offenses. Evidence tending to support either is not usually 
 relevant to sustain an allegation of the other.^" But if by statute 
 the crime of larceny is made to include analogous offenses, as ob- 
 taining goods by false pretenses and embezzlement, evidence 
 which is only relevant to show the latter offenses may be received, 
 though a conviction of larceny under such circumstances will not 
 be affirmed, unless the state shall prove beyond a reasonable 
 doubt an act containing all the elements essential to obtain a con- 
 viction of the crime of obtaining goods by false pretenses. ^^ Evi- 
 dence is admissible to show the contents of a package of letters, 
 under an indictment of a postoffice clerk for the larceny of letters 
 from a package which he had no authority to disturb.-^ 
 
 § 306. Stolen goods found through inadmissible confession. — The 
 
 rule that those portions of an inadmissible confession which are 
 conclusively corroborated by the facts discovered are admis- 
 sible^*^ is particularly applicable in larceny when the accused has 
 attempted to conceal the stolen goods. If he confesses he stole 
 the goods, and that they are concealed in his house or elsewhere, 
 where they are subsequently found, it may be shown that the 
 property was found and where it was found.^'^ The truthfulness 
 of that part of the confession being established, all that the ac- 
 cused said explanatory of the hiding or discovery, of his posses- 
 sion, or the locality of the hiding place, should be received. But 
 the rule excluding involuntary confessions remains intact, and 
 excludes that part of the confession stating directly that he stole 
 the goods or that he hid them.^^ 
 
 " Griffin V. State, 86 Ga. 257, 260, is part of the res gestce, 62 L. R. A. 
 
 12 S. E. 409. 315- 
 
 ^Fulton V. State, 13 Ark. r68. "^United States v. Falkenhainer, 21 
 
 "Fay V. Commonwealth, 28 Gratt. Fed. 624. 
 
 fVa.) 912; People v. Dumar, 106 N. "See, ante, § 137. 
 
 Y. 502, 511, 13 N. E. 325. Evidence ^'' Warickshall's Case, t Leach C. C 
 
 of other to prove defendant's connec- 298. 
 
 tion virith the acts charged, 62 L. R. '* Davis v. State, 8 Tex. App. 510, 
 
 A 281; and when the other crime 515; Strait v. State, 43 Tex. 486;
 
 535 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AXD LARCENY. §§ 307, 308 
 
 § 307. Malicious mischief. — This offense includes all acts of un- 
 necessary and malicious injury to the property of others which 
 impair the utility or diminish the value of such property to a 
 material extent.^" It was generally indictable at common law,^" 
 and proof of the destruction of the property was necessary;^* 
 and now statutes are found in most states defining the crime, 
 regulating its punishment and sometimes expressly enumerating 
 wliat acts must be proved to constitute it.^^ 
 
 § 308. Malicious intent. — Usually proof of the injury alone is 
 not enough, and this is always the case where a statute requires 
 that it shall be proved to have been wantonly or maliciously in- 
 flicted. Malice, it is said, must be alleged and proved.^** But 
 malice need not be express, nor need it be proved by direct evi- 
 dence.^' It may be inferred to exist from proof that the injury 
 was done to the property to secure revenge on its owner.^* In 
 
 Hudson V. State, 9 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 407 ; White v. State, 3 Heisk. 
 (Tenn.) 338; State v. Brick, 2 Harr. 
 (Del.) 530; State v. Garvey, 28 La. 
 Ann. 925, 927, 26 Am. 123 ; Laros v. 
 Commonwealth, 84 Pa. St. 200 ; Yates 
 V. State, 47 Ark. 172, 174; Belote v. 
 State, 36 Miss. 96, 118, 72 Am. Dec. 
 163. 2 East P. C. 657, 658; Reg. v. 
 Gould, 9 C. & P. (38 Eng. C. L.) 
 364 : Johnson v. State, 1 19 Ga. 257, 45 
 S. E. 960. 
 
 " State V. Watts, 48 Ark. 56, 3 Am. 
 St. 216; Elliott Evidence, § 3172. 
 
 "People V. Smith, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 258, 260; Res. V. Teischer, i Dall. 
 (Pa.) 335; Commonwealth v. Leach, 
 I Mass. 59; State v. Batchelder, 5 N. 
 H. 549. 552; State v. Simpson, 2 
 Hawks (N. Car.) 460, 461. 
 
 " State V. Martin, 141 N. Car. 832, 
 53 S. E. 874. 
 
 "State V. Tarlton (S. Dak), 118 
 N. W. 706; Commonwealth v. Byard 
 (Mass.. 1Q08), 86 N. E. 285, constru- 
 ing Rev. Law, c. 208, § 100, punish- 
 ing the willful and ma'icious cutting 
 of trees. In California, by .^ct 
 
 March 12, 1887 (St. 1886-87, P- 112, 
 c. 95), maliciously depositing and ex- 
 ploding any explosive near a building 
 with intent to injure same or to in- 
 jure a human being is a felony. In 
 re Mitchell, i Cal. App. 396, 82 Pac. 
 347. See Moody v. State, 127 Ga. 
 821, 56 S. E. 993, as to mutilating a 
 trespass notice maliciously. 
 
 *' See next note ; Knudson v. State 
 (Tex. Cr. App., 1909), 120 S. W. 
 878. 
 
 " The malicious intent essential to 
 constitute the offense of malicious 
 mischief may be inferred from the 
 nature of the act and the circum- 
 stances of the case. State v. Tarlton 
 (S. Dak.), 118 N. W. 706. 
 
 ^Thompson v. State, 51 Miss. 353, 
 356; Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 
 Cush. (Mass.) 558, 561; North Caro- 
 lina V. Vanderford, 35 Fed. 282, 287; 
 Johnson v. State, 61 Ala. 9, 11; Har- 
 ris V. State, 73 Ga. 41, 43; Goforth 
 V. State, 8 Humph. (Tenn.) 37 .39: 
 Losscn V. State, 62 Tnd. 437, 440; 
 Hughes V. State, 103 Tnd. 344, ,347. 
 2 N. E. 956; Pippcn V. State, 77 Ala.
 
 ?oS 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 536 
 
 this connection the declarations of the accused uttered at or about 
 •the time that he injured or destroyed the property are very useful, 
 and are relevant as a part of the res gcstce to illustrate his state of 
 mind. And where the accused stood charged with maliciously 
 destroying the property of a church the state was permitted to put 
 in evidence declarations evincing enmity on his part towards the 
 officers and .members of the church while the accused was engaged 
 with them in the business of the church.^^ 
 
 A malicious intent may be inferred from the means employed 
 or the instrument used, or from the wantonness and cruelty by 
 which the act of the accused was accompanied.^*^ Portions of the 
 .property injured, if properly identified by independent evidence 
 may be received in evidence.'*^ Whether the accused acted with 
 a malicious intent is a question for the jury to determine.''" 
 
 1 
 
 8r, 82; Duncan v. State, 49 Miss. 
 2)3'^, 339.' Brady v. State (Tex. Cr., 
 1894), 26 S. W. 621; Woodward v. 
 State, S3 Tex. Cr. 554, 28 S. W. 204; 
 State V. Flynn, 28 Iowa 26, 27 ; State 
 V. Brigman, 94 N. Car. 888, 889; 
 Brown v. State, 26 Ohio St. 176, 183. 
 Contra, Reg. v. Tivey, i Den. C. C. 
 63 ; Territory v. Crozier, 6 Dak. 8, 10, 
 50 N. W. 124. Cf. Johnson v. State, 
 61 Ala. 9, 11; Funderburk v. State, 
 75 Miss. 20, 21 So. 658; Edwards v. 
 State, IIS Ala. 52, 22 So. 564; Com- 
 monwealth V. Shaffer, 32 Pa. Super. 
 Ct. 375. The word "malicious" in a 
 statute providing for the punishment 
 of one who unlawfully destroys prop- 
 erty must receive the construction usu- 
 ally given to it in criminal statutes. It 
 is no defense that the accused was not 
 prompted to his act by actual ill will 
 to the owner of the property. State 
 v. Boies, 68 Kan. 167, 74 Pac. 630. 
 
 ^People v. Ferguson, 119 Mich. 
 373, 78 N. W. 334- 
 
 ^° State v. Enslow, 10 Iowa 115, 
 1x7; Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 
 Cush. (Mass.) 558, 561; Hobson v. 
 State, 44 Ala. 380, 381 ; State v. Mc- 
 
 Dermott, z^ Iowa 107 ; Harris v. 
 State, yz Ga. 41, 44; Shirley v. State 
 (Tex., 1893), 22 S. W. 42. 
 
 ^^ People V. Boren, 139 Cal. 210, 72 
 Pac. 899. 
 
 ^ McClurg V. State, 2 Ga. App. 624, 
 58 S. E. 1064. "The only facts estab- 
 lished by the verdict are, that the 
 mare was injured by the defendant 
 by the discharge of a gun loaded with 
 powder and shot, and that the act 
 was done willfully; but an act may 
 be unlawful, and may be done will- 
 fully, with or without malice, accord- 
 ing to the evidence of the motive, 
 and of the circumstances attending 
 the transaction. The evidence, there- 
 fore, should have been submitted to 
 the jury, with instructions that they 
 would not be warranted in finding 
 a verdict of guilty, unless the injury 
 charged in the indictment was done 
 by the defendant, not only willfully, 
 but also maliciously; that if the in- 
 jury was done intentionally and by 
 design, and not by mistake, accident, 
 or inadvertence, that would fully sup- 
 port the allegation in the indictment 
 that it was done willfully, according
 
 CO/ 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AXD LARCEXY. 
 
 8 309 
 
 § 309. Ownership and value of property — Evidence that the ac- 
 cused acted in good faith. — The ownership of the property, whether 
 it be real or personal, may. if possession is shown, be proved by 
 parol," but must be proved substantially as laid,'** though not 
 beyond a reasonable doubt. ^^ The accused may prove by oral 
 or written evidence that he in fact owned the property,**^ which is 
 a valid defense,*' or that (believing that he did) he had taken 
 legal advice and acted in accordance therewith,*^ All facts tend- 
 ing to show that he was acting in good faith, or under a misap- 
 prehension of his rights when he injured or destroyed the prop- 
 erty are relevant.*'' Proof of a total destruction is not necessary 
 to sustain an allegation of maliciously destroying or injuring 
 
 to the true meaning of the statute. 
 But the jury might infer malice from 
 the fact that the injury was done by 
 the discharge of a gun loaded with 
 powder and shot, unless the infer- 
 ence were rebutted by the evidence, 
 showing that the gun was so loaded 
 that it was not likely to kill or do 
 any great bodily harm ; and the jury 
 should have been so instructed. The 
 jury should also have been instructed 
 that, to authorize them to find the 
 defendant guilt}', they must be satis- 
 fied that the injury was done either 
 out of a spirit of wanton cruelty or 
 wicked revenge." By the court in 
 Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. 
 aiass.) 558. 
 
 "State v. Brant, 14 Iowa 180, 182; 
 State v. Semotan, 85 Iowa 57, 59, 
 51 N. W. 1161; Craighead v. State 
 (Tex.), 117 S. W. 128. 
 
 " Mayes v. State, 33 Tex. 340, 341 ; 
 Smith v. State, 43 Tex. 433, 439; 
 Hughes V. State, 103 Ind. 344, 347, 
 2 X. E. 956; Perry v. State, 149 Ala. 
 40, 43 So. 18; Holder v. State, 127 
 Ga. 51, 56 S. E. 71. 
 
 "State V. Scars, Phill. (N. Car.) 
 146, 149. Proof that the property 
 was in the possession of or occupied 
 
 by the alleged owner is sufificient. 
 People v. Coyne, 116 Cal. 295, 48 Pac. 
 218; State V. Semotan, 85 Iowa 57, 
 
 59, 51 N. W. 1 161, even though he 
 is not the sole owner. People v. 
 Horr, 7 Barb. (N. Y.) 9, 12. 
 
 ^^ State V. Zinn, 26 Mo. App. 17, 18. 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 32 Pa. 
 Super. Ct. 375. 
 
 ** People V. Kane, 142 N. Y. 366, 
 369, 37 N. E. 104; People v. Stevens, 
 109 N. Y. 159, 163, 16 N. E. 53. 
 
 ^""Lossen v. State, 62 Ind. 437, 442; 
 Palmer v. State, 45 Ind. 388, 391 ; 
 Barlow v. State, 120 Ind. 56, 58, 22 
 N. E. 88; Goforth v. State, 8 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 37; Reg. v. Langford, i C. 
 & M. 602 ; Sattler v. People, 59 111. 
 68, 70; State v. Flynn, 28 Iowa 26, 
 27; Commonwealth v. Drass, 29 W. 
 N. C. (Pa.) 463, 46s, 146 Pa. St. 55. 
 
 60, 23 Atl. 233 ; Reg. v. Mathews, 14 
 Cox C. L. 5, 7; State V. Haney, 32 
 Kan. 428, 430, 4 Pac. 831; Adams v. 
 State, 47 Tex. Cr. 35, 81 S. W. 963. 
 At common law the owner of the 
 property was not a competent witness 
 because of interest. Blackstonc v. 
 State, IS Ala. 415, 417; Pike v. State. 
 35 Ala. 419-
 
 § 3IO 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 538 
 
 property. '"^^ Proof of value is necessary and relevant only where 
 the degree of the crime or the penalty depends on the value of 
 the property destroyed. ^'^ 
 
 § 310. Maliciously injuring- animals. — Killing-, wounding, maim- 
 ing, injuring or disfiguring the animals of another is a very com- 
 mon form of malicious mischief,^- and is indictable at common 
 law.'^ The killing, maiming or injuring must always be proved 
 to be willful.^* An allegation of injuring an animal which is de- 
 scribed under its generic name is sustained by proof of an injury 
 to any species of the animal. Thus proof of injuring horses, pigs, 
 asses or .mares, will sustain an allegation of injury to cattle. ^^ 
 And an allegation of injuring any species of animal is sustained 
 by proof of injury to any one of that species irrespective of its 
 age, sex or condition.^" 
 
 The question whether an indictment for maliciously injuring 
 personal property, or for killing or maiming domestic animals 
 can be sustained by proof of maiming, wounding or killing a 
 dog has been variously decided. ^^ Evidence that the injured 
 
 '" State V. McBeth, 49 Kan. 584, 588, 
 31 Pac. 145; Brown v. State, 26 Ohio 
 St. 176, 183; State V. Cole, 90 Ind. 
 1 12, 113; State V. McKee, 109 Ind. 
 497. 499. 10 N. E. 405 ; Hannel v. 
 State, 4 Ind. App. 485, 486, 30 N. E. 
 1 1 18. 
 
 "Holder v. State, T27 Ga. 51, 56 S. 
 E. 71 ; State v. Heath, 41 Tex. 426, 
 428; State V. Garner, 8 Port. (Ala.) 
 447, 448 ; Commonwealth v. Cox, 7 . 
 Allen (Mass.) 577, 578; Walker v. 
 State, 89 Ala. 74, 75, 8 So. 144. If 
 the defendant claims that he de- 
 stroj^ed the property with the owner's 
 consent, the burden is on him. Ritter 
 V. State, 33 Tex. 608, 611; McClurg 
 V. State, 2 Ga. App. 624, 58 S. E. 
 1064; Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 32 
 Pa. Super. 375. 
 
 "■ Davis V. Commonwealth, 30 Pa. St. 
 421, 424; Atwood V. State, 106 S. W. 
 953. 84 Ark. 623, not reported in full. 
 
 " People V. Smith, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 
 
 258, 259, in which the court says : 
 "The direct tendency is a breach of 
 the peace. What more likely to pro- 
 duce it than wantonly killing, out of 
 mere malice, a useful domestic ani- 
 mal ?" 
 
 ''* Swinger v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 397, 102 S. W. 114. 
 
 '= Rex V. Moyle, 2 East P. C. 1076 ; 
 Rex V. Mott, I Leach C. L. 85n ; Rex 
 V. Chappie, R. & R. C. C. 77 ; State v. 
 Hambleton, 22 Mo. 452; Rex v. Whit- 
 ney, I Moody C. C. 3; Oviatt v. State, 
 19 Ohio St. 573; Snap v. People, 19 
 111. 80, 68 Am. Dec. 582; State v. 
 Grimes, loi Mo. 188, 190, 13 S. W. 
 956. 
 
 ■^Shubrick v. State, 2 S. Car. 21, 
 22 ; Gholston v. State, 33 Tex. 342, 
 343. Contra, where the statute enu- 
 merates various species of animals 
 all belonging to one genus. 
 
 "Pro. State v. Latham, .13 Ired. (N. 
 Car.) 33; State v. Sumner, 2 Ind.
 
 539 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT AXD LARCENY. 
 
 311 
 
 animal was running at large, or even that it was trespassing, is 
 irrelevant if it appear from all the evidence that the injury was 
 malicious.^® 
 
 As a general rule, malice towards the owner of the animal 
 must be proved. ^^ 
 
 § 311. Injuries to grain, trees, crops, etc. — It is often provided 
 by statute that it shall be an offense willfully and maliciously to 
 
 377; State V. M'Duffie, 34 N. H. 523, 
 69 Am. Dec. 516; Kinsman v. State, 
 "/"J Ind. 132, 13s; State v. Doe, 79 
 Ind. 9, 41 Am. 599; State v. McKee, 
 109 Ind. 497, 499, 90 N. E. 405 ; Sosat 
 V. State, 2 Ind. App. 586, 589, 28 N. 
 E. 1017; Nehr v. State, 35 Neb. 638, 
 642; 53 N. W. 589, 17 L. R. A. 771. 
 Contra, Commonwealth v. Maclin, 3 
 Leigh (Va.) 809; State v. Harriman, 
 75 Me. 562, 46 Am. 423n; Patton v. 
 State, 93 Ga. iii, 112, 116, 19 S. E. 
 734, 24 L. R. A. 1Z2. 
 
 " Branch v. State, 41 Tex. 622 ; 
 Wallace v. State, 30 Tex. 758; Cryer 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 621, zi S. W. 
 753. 38 S. W. 203; Snap V. People, 
 19 111. 80, 68 Am. Dec. 582; State v. 
 Fierce, 7 Ala. 728; State v. Davis, 2 
 Ired. (N. Car.) 153; State v. Waters, 
 6 Jones (N. Car.) 276, 277; State v. 
 Brigman, 94 N. Car. 888, 890 : Bcnne- 
 field V. State, 62 Ark. 365, 35 S. W. 
 7Q0. Contra. McMahan v. State, 29 
 Tex. App. 348, 349, 16 S. W. 171, where 
 defendant was allowed to prove that 
 his field was surrounded by a good 
 fence. But evidence of the thievish 
 and unmanageable character of the 
 trespassing animal is relevant, not to 
 justify maiming or wounding it, but 
 to show that defendant's motive was 
 to protect his crop and not spite to- 
 ward the owner. Sosat v. State, 2 
 Ind. App. 586, 592, 28 N. E. 1017; 
 Wright v. State, 30 Ga. 325, 327, 76 
 
 Am. Dec. 656; Farmer v. State, 21 
 Tex. App. 423, 2 S. W. 767; Benne- 
 field V. State, 62 Ark. 365, 35 S. W. 
 790. 
 
 ^^ State v. Wilcox, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 278, 279; Hampton v. State, 10 Lea 
 (Tenn.) 639, 641; Hobson v. State, 
 44 Ala. 380, 381 ; State v. Latham, 13 
 Ired. (X. Car.) 33, 35; Hill v. State, 
 43 Ala. 335; Shirley v. State (Tex., 
 1893), 22 S. W. 42; Shepherd's Case, 
 2 Leach C. C. 609, 610. Contra, 
 Brown v. State, 26 Ohio St. 176, 183; 
 State v. Phipps, 95 Iowa 491, 64 N. 
 W. 411. Evidence that animals found 
 and ate poison where it was exposed 
 with an intent that they should find 
 and eat it will sustain a charge of 
 causing them to eat it. Common- 
 wealth v. Falvey, 108 Mass. 304, 307- 
 Where one was indicted for mali- 
 ciously poisoning the horses of an- 
 other, the prosecution was allowed 
 to prove that the defendant had 
 bought poison, saying it was to kill 
 rats, that he had never used it for 
 that purpose, but that he had every 
 opportunity to administer it to the 
 horses, and a motive to do so. Croy 
 v. State, 32 Ind. 384, 385. An allega- 
 tion of poisoning animals by one 
 means is sustained by proof of a 
 means substantially similar. Com- 
 monwealth V. McLaughlin, 105 Mass. 
 460, 463.
 
 §311 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 54O 
 
 burn, cut down, destroy or injure any trees, grain or growing- 
 crops.'""'' When a statute points out specifically what injurio^-is 
 acts are punishable, it is usually required that the acts proved 
 shall substantially conform thereto."^^ If a man cut down a tree 
 in a boundary line, with intent to destroy the marks, no express 
 malice need be shown under a statute making such an act a 
 crime. If the immediate consequence of cutting down the tree 
 is to destroy certain marks upon it, the presumption will arise 
 that he intended to destroy those marks. The particular intent 
 must be left to the jury. If the act of destruction is criminal only 
 when done with a particular intent, the presence of the intent 
 must be proved."^ Where the statute makes it a crime to cut 
 or injure trees without the consent of the owner the intent is not 
 material, and the accused cannot show his motives for his ac- 
 tions.*'^ 
 
 "" Daily v. State, 51 Ohio St. 348, Graeme, 130 Mo. App. 138, 108 S. W. 
 
 Zy N. E. 710, 46 Am. St. 578, 24 L. R. 1131. 
 
 A. 724; People V. Horr, 7 Barb. (N. "State v. Allisbach, 69 Ind. 50, 54. 
 
 Y.) 9, 12; Parris v. People, ^(i 111. Cj. State v. Jones, 33 Vt. 443, 447. 
 
 274, 277. To authorize a conviction "■ State v. Malloy, 34 N. J. L. 410, 
 
 for "willfully and maliciouslj'" de- 417. 
 
 stroying any tree with malicious " Mettler v. People, 36 111. App. 324. 
 intent must be proved. State v. 
 
 I 
 \
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 § 312. Facts forming the corpus delicti § ;i26. 
 — Evidence to prove the 
 cause and manner of death. ;i2j. 
 
 313. The result of the autopsy as 
 
 evidence. 328. 
 
 314. Variance in proof of means or 
 
 weapon producing death. 329. 
 
 315. Weapons as evidence. 
 
 316. Identity of the deceased. 330. 
 
 317. The identification of the body 
 
 of the deceased. 330^. 
 
 318. Expert testimony and the em- 
 
 ployment of a chemical an- 331. 
 alysis in cases of homicide 
 by poisoning. 
 
 319. Relevancy of evidence to show ;i;i2. 
 
 poisoning. 
 319a. Declarations of the deceased. 33;^. 
 
 320. Presumption and proof of mal- 
 
 ice. 334. 
 
 321. Connected crimes. 
 
 222. Conduct of the accused subse- 335. 
 quent to the crime. 
 
 323. Facts showing possible motive. 336. 
 
 324. Competency of evidence show- 
 
 ing the habits, character and ^s?- 
 disposition of the deceased. 338. 
 
 325. Nature of the proof required 
 
 to show the character of the 338^ 
 deceased. 
 
 Evidence of threats by the de- 
 ceased. 
 
 Evidence to prove the peace- 
 able character of the accused. 
 
 Threats by the accused — Gen- 
 eral nature of the threats. 
 
 Form, character and mode of 
 proving the threats. 
 
 Declarations forming a part of 
 
 the 1-es gestcE. 
 Declarations of the accused af- 
 ter the crime. 
 
 Declarations of third persons 
 and cries and exclamations 
 of bystanders. 
 
 Threats against deceased by 
 third persons. 
 
 Animosity between the accused 
 and the deceased. 
 
 Expert and non-expert evi- 
 dence as regards blood stains. 
 
 Conspiracy to commit homi- 
 cide. 
 
 Preparations to commit homi- 
 cide. 
 
 Foot prints. 
 
 Self-defense — Burden of proof 
 — Malice. 
 
 . The alibi of the alleged victim. 
 
 .§ 312. Facts forming the corpus delicti — Evidence to prove the 
 cause and manner of death. — In homicide tlie necessary constituents 
 of the corpus delicti, tlie death of a human beint; and the criminal 
 .'if^encv producing it must be shown. The death of a person al- 
 
 (541)
 
 S 6 
 
 12 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 542 
 
 leged to have been killed must he establislied by direct testimony 
 or circumstantial evidence of the most cogent and irresistible 
 force/ If the circumstances point to the death of the person al- 
 leged to have been killed the finding of fragments of a human 
 body, or of tufts of hair and of articles known or proved to ha\e 
 been worn by the deceased is sufficient to establish the death. - 
 But proof that the person alleged to have been killed had disap- 
 peared, and evidence that a body taken from the river had on it 
 shoes and clothing similar to those worn by deceased is not such 
 proof of the corpus delicti as is required to corroborate a confes- 
 sion by the accused.^ Any evidence referring to either of these 
 facts and tending to establish or to disprove them is relevant. 
 The physical condition of the deceased prior to, or at the instant 
 of, his death, or when his body is found,* may be shown, ^ and the 
 state may prove his declarations made to a physician or to a non- 
 professional person concerning his physical health," or respecting 
 his physical peculiarities, as, for example, that he had a peculiar 
 
 ' State V. Williams, 46 Ore. 287, 80 
 Pac. 655. See State v. Nordall, 38 
 Mont. 327, 99 Pac. 960; Ausmus v. 
 People (Colo. 1910), 107 Pac. 204. 
 
 " State V. Williams, 46 Ore. 287, 80 
 Pac. 655. 
 
 'Follis V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 186, lOi 
 S. W. 242. It is competent to prove 
 the color of the hair of a daughter of 
 the deceased and that hair found 
 on the person of the accused was of 
 the same color where deceased and 
 his family were burned in their home. 
 State V. Nordall, 38 Mont. 327, 99 
 Pac. 960. The bones of a deceased 
 person who was killed by the burning 
 of his residence are competent to 
 prove the corpus delicti. Their com- 
 petency as evidence is not destroyed 
 by other evidence of the corpus de- 
 licti. Sprouse v. Commonwealth (Ky. 
 1909), 116 S. W. 344. 
 
 For extensive note on "Proof of 
 corpus delicti in criminal cases," see 
 68 L. R. A. 33. See also, Elliott Evi- 
 dence, § 2708. Evidence in general in 
 
 prosecution for homicide, see Elliott 
 Evidence, §§ 3043, 3044, 3045; confes- 
 sions, § 3034. Conviction on testi- 
 mony of accomplice, see 98 Am. St. 
 Rep. I58n. Evidence in prosecution 
 for negligent homicide, 6r L. R. A. 
 277n. Weight and sufficiency of evi- 
 dence in prosecution for inciting or 
 abetting a suicide, see 66 L. R. A. 
 304n. Proof in prosecution for homi- 
 cide committed in resisting arrest, see 
 66 L. R. A. 353n. Proof in prosecu- 
 tion for homicide resulting from per- 
 sons acting independently, see 67 L. 
 R. A. 426n. 
 
 * Terry v. State, 118 Ala. 79, 23 So. 
 776. 
 
 ^Williams v. State, 64 Md. 384, 389, 
 I Atl. 887; State v. Baldwin, 36 Kan. 
 I, 12 Pac. 318. It is unnecessary but 
 harmless to the accused to prove that 
 deceased was a human being. Epps 
 v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 549, i N. E. 491. 
 
 " State V. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 385, 
 14 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556; State v. 
 Fournier, 68 Vt. 262, 35 Atl. 178.
 
 543 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 8 31^ 
 
 tooth in his mouth." It may be shown by the testimony of a phy- 
 sician that a wound discovered upon a dead body was inflicted be- 
 fore or after death. ^^ Any witness famihar by experience with 
 the appearance or treatment of wounds," particularly a physician 
 or surgeon, may give an opinion as to the manner in which a mor- 
 tal wound was probably inflicted/" as to the kind of weapon used, 
 as to the distance from which a shot was fired, ^^ as to the degree 
 of force employed,^- and as to direction of a blow,^" and that in 
 
 ' Edmonds v. State, 34 Ark. 720, 
 
 HI- 
 
 ^ State V. Clark, 15 S. Car. 403, 408; 
 State V. Harris, 63 N. Car. i, 3. 
 
 " Lemons v. State, 97 Tenn. 560, ■^~ 
 S. W. 552; People V. Gibson, infra; 
 Rash V. State, 61 Ala. 89, 93 ; Wise v. 
 State, 100 Ga. 68, 25 S. E. 846. That 
 a wound was mortal is an inference 
 for the jury so that it is not necessary 
 for a physician to give his opinion 
 that the wound is mortal. Waller v. 
 People, 209 111. 284, 70 X. E. 68r. Evi- 
 dence of the locality and description 
 of wounds on the body of deceased 
 is always relevant. Basye v. State, 45 
 Xeb. 261, 286, 63 N. W. 811; People 
 v. Gibson, 106 Cal. 458, 39 Pac. 864, 
 870; State V. Megorden, 49 Ore. 259, 
 88 Pac. 306. 
 
 "People V. Fish, 125 X. Y. 136, 147, 
 26 X. E. 319; State v. Ginger, 80 Iowa 
 574, 577. 46 X. W. 657; State v. As- 
 bell, 57 Kan. 398, 46 Pac. 770; State 
 V. Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, 19, 12 Pac. 318; 
 Newton v. State, 21 Fla. 53, 102; 
 Boyle v. State, 61 Wis. 440, 448, 21 
 X. W. 289;Carthaus v. State, 78 Wis. 
 560, 564, 47 N. W. 629; People v. 
 Rector, 19 Wend. (X. Y.) 569, 577; 
 State V. Seymour, 94 Iowa 699, 63 X. 
 W. 661 ; Doolittle v. State, 93 Ind. 
 272, 275 ; I Grccnl., § 440 ; Bowers v. 
 State, 122 Wis. 163, 99 X. W. 447; 
 People V. Hagenow, 236 111. 514, 86 
 N. E. 370; demons v. State, 48 VVa. 
 
 9, yj So. 647; State v. Usher, 136 
 Iowa 606, III X. W. 811; Ozark v. 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. 106, 100 S. W. 927. 
 
 "State V. Voorhies, 115 La. 200, 38 
 So. 964. 
 
 ^" People V. Fish, 125 X. Y. 136, 147, 
 26 X'. E. 319; Owen v. State, 52 Tex. 
 Cr. 65, 105 S. W. 513. Where the 
 medical evidence showed that the 
 wounds on the deceased were caused 
 bj- a powerful blow, it may be shown 
 that defendant is a strong and pow- 
 erful man. Thiede v. Utah Territory, 
 159 LT. S. 510, 40 L. ed. 237, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. (>2. 
 
 ^* Territory v. Egan, 3 Dak. 1 19, 127, 
 13 X. W. 568; Commonwealth v. 
 Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 123, 19 Am. 
 40in: Kennedy v. People, 39 X. Y. 
 245, 256; Simon v. State, 108 Ala. 27, 
 18 So. 731. The question may be, 
 "What was the cause of a wound," 
 describing it, as, "What would be tlic 
 effect of a blow inflicted by a weapon 
 specified." Williams v. State, 64 Md. 
 384, 392, I Atl. 887. The court, in 
 Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 438, 30 
 L. ed. 708, 7 Sup. Ct. 614. "Upon tlie 
 same principle, the testimony of the 
 physician as to the direction from 
 which the blow was delivered was ad- 
 missible. * * * It Yvas not expert 
 testimony in the strict sense of the 
 term, but a statement of a conclusion 
 of fact, such as men who use tlicir 
 senses constaiulv draw from wliat
 
 ^^ 312 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 544 
 
 his opinion the deceased could not have inflicted the wound upon 
 himself.^'' A physician who has examined the wounds of the de- 
 ceased may testify that a certain weapon was a deadly weapon.*^' 
 If he states that death was caused by a certain weapon or instru- 
 ment, he may be shown an instrument, properly identified, as hav- 
 ing been in the possession of the accused, and may be asked if that 
 would ha\-e caused the wound. ^° A non-expert witness may tes- 
 tify that the deceased was conscious at a certain time," and he 
 may describe the wounds^'* he saw on the body,^° and a fortiori a 
 surgeon may give an opinion as to the probable cause of death,"" 
 and may state when, in his opinion, death occurred,"^ and that it 
 
 they see and hear in the daily con- 
 cerns of life." State \. Megorden, 
 49 Ore. 259, 88 Pac. 306. 
 
 " Miera v. Territory, 13 N. Mex. 
 192, 81 Pac. 586. 
 
 ^" State V. Spaugh, 199 'Mo. 147, 97 
 S. W. 901. 
 
 " People V. Carpenter, 102 N. Y. 
 238, 248, 6 N. E. 584; Tune v. State, 
 49 Tex. Cr. 445 ; 94 S. W. 231 ; Hardin 
 V. State, 57 Tex. Cr. 559, 103 S. W. 
 401. Photographs are admissible for 
 the purpose of identifying the de- 
 ceased. State V. Windahl, 95 Iowa 
 470, 64 N. W. 420, and showing the 
 wounds on his body. Malachi v. 
 State, 89 Ala. 134, 139, 8 So. 104; 
 People V. Fish, 125 X. Y. 136, 147, 26 
 X. E. 319; Wilson V. United States, 
 162 U. S. 613, 40 L. ed. 1090, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. 895. 
 
 '■ Walker v. State, 41 So. 878, 147 
 Ala. 699 (not reported in full). 
 
 '^ Smith V. State, 43 Tex. 643, 647- 
 649; Everett v. State, 62 Ga. 65, 71; 
 State V. Xieuhaus, 217 Mo. 332, 117 
 S. W. 73. 
 
 "Batten v. State, 80 Ind. 394, 399; 
 Hill V. State, 146 Ala. 51, 41 So. 621 ; 
 Fowler v. State, 155 Ala. 21, 45 So. 
 913; Patton V. State, (Tex. Cr.), 
 
 80 S. W. 86; Pitts v. State, 140 Ala. 
 70, 37 So. lOi. As for example that 
 it appeared that the skull of deceased 
 was crushed or broken. Terry v. 
 State, 120 Ala. 286, 25 So. 176. 
 ^ Boyle V. State, 61 Wis. 440, 448, 
 
 21 N. W. 289; Commonwealth v. 
 Thompson, 159 Mass. 56, 33 X. E. 
 iiii; State v. Chiles, 44 S. Car. 338, 
 
 22 S. E. 339; People v. Barker, 60 
 Mich. 277, 292, 293, 27 X. W. 539, I 
 Am. St. 50in; People v. Sessions, 58 
 Mich. 594, 600, 26 X. W. 291 ; Com- 
 monwealth V. Snell, 189 Mass. 12, 75 
 X. E. 75, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) loign; 
 State V. Wilcox, 132 X. Car. 1120, 44 
 S. E. 625; Smith V. State (Tex. Cr.), 
 99 S. W. 100; Xordan v. State, 
 143 Ala. 13, 39 So. 406; Burkett v. 
 State, 154 Ala. 19, 45 So. 682; Stovall 
 V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 30, 108 S. W. 
 699; Levering v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 117 S. W. 253; State v. Usher, 
 136 Iowa 606, III X. W. 811; Sims 
 v. State, 139 Ala. 74, 36 So. 138, loi 
 Am. St. 17; State v. Megorden, 49 
 Ore. 259, 88 Pac. 306; Fay v. State, 
 52 Tex. Cr. 185, 107 S. W. 55; Jones 
 V. State, 155 Ala. i, 46 So. 579. 
 
 ^ State V. Clark, 15 S. Car. 403.
 
 545 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 § 312 
 
 was not suicidal.-- But the question whether a wound was acci- 
 dentally self-inflicted is for the jury.-^ 
 
 The physician who was in attendance upon the victim of the 
 homicide during his mortal illness may properly repeat on the 
 witness stand the declarations of the deceased as to his feelings 
 and sufferings, the locality and character of his pain and as to his 
 physical condition generally. The physician may then testify as 
 to his opinion of the extent and character of the wounds, his 
 opinion being based in part upon what the deceased told him.-'* A 
 physician who is called to give an opinion as to the cause of death 
 may state that from his experience and learning as a practicing 
 physician he is competent to give an opinion as to the cause of 
 death. On such a statement he may be regarded as an expert.-^ 
 But e.xpert evidence is not admissible to show the probable posi- 
 tion of the deceased when the fatal blow was struck,'^ or whether 
 he would, after receiving it, have sufficient strength to inflict a 
 blow with an effect specified,-' as these are questions which the 
 jury can determine as well as any expert. 
 
 ~ Everett v. State, 62 Ga. 65. 
 
 ^ State V. Bradley, 34 S. Car. 136, 
 13 S. E. 315; Beene v. State, 79 Ark. 
 460, 96 S. W. 151; Covington v. Peo- 
 ple, 36 Colo. 183, 85 Pac. 832; Brock 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), no S. W. 
 878, 33 Ky. L. 630 ; People v. William- 
 son, 6 Cal. App. 336, 92 Pac. 313; 
 State V. Trusty, i Penn. (Del). 319, 
 40 Atl. 766. A non-expert witness 
 may testify as matter of common 
 knowledge that a pistol must be held 
 very close to clothing, when fired, to 
 scorch it. Miller v. State, no Ala. 
 674, 19 So. zi\ State v. Cater, 100 
 Iowa 501, 69 X. VV. 880. A woman 
 who has seen burns and who testifies 
 that she and her children have been 
 burned, though she is a non-expert 
 witness may state that wounds were 
 caused by burns. State v. Xieuhaus, 
 217 Mo. 2,2,2, 117 S. W. T2>. A radio- 
 graph showing the vertebra and an 
 object located near it has been ac- 
 
 35 — L'.NDERHILL CrIM. Ev. 
 
 cepted as competent. There must be 
 some evidence that the radiograph 
 correctly represents the condition of 
 the body though it is not absolutely 
 necessary that either a physician who 
 was present or the operator who took 
 the radiograph shall say that the ob- 
 ject in the radiograph is a bullet. 
 State V. Matheson, 142 Iowa 414, 120 
 X. W. 1036. 
 
 ^ Gregory v. State, 148 Ala. 566, 42 
 So. 829. 
 
 ^ State V. Wilcox, 132 X. Car. n20, 
 44 S. E. 625. 
 
 -° Brown v. State, 55 Ark. 593, 18 
 S. W. 1051 ; Kennedy v. People. 39 
 X. Y. 245, 256, 257; Watkins v. 
 State, 89 Ala. 82, 88, 8 So. 134; Peo- 
 ple v. Hill. n6 Cal. 562. 48 Pac. 7"- 
 Contra, State v. Sullivan. 43 S. Car. 
 205, 208. 21 S. E. 4: Miora v. Terri- 
 tory, 13 X. Mex. 102. 8t Pac. 586. 
 
 "People V. Rector, 19 Wend. (X. 
 V.) 5^)9. 577-
 
 313 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 546 
 
 The fact that the deceased died suddenly never warrants an in- 
 ference that he was foully dealt with. It is for the state to pro^•e 
 that his death was the result of a criminal act, and, unless or until 
 this is proved, it is presumed that death resulted from natural 
 causes."^ The accused may show the deceased was of a melan- 
 choly temperament or inclined to suicide, ''■' and may show any 
 acts or declarations on the part of the deceased showing his sui- 
 cidal purpose,^" while the state may prove the cheerful disposition 
 and good health, ^^ the social condition and favorable prospects 
 and the pleasant personal surroundings of the deceased, to show 
 the absence of a suicidal intent.'*^ So the state may prove that the 
 accused had threatened to kill a third j^erson at a particular place 
 and in a particular manner, and that the killing of the deceased 
 corresponded in time and manner with the threat to contradict the 
 contention by the accused that the deceased had committed sui- 
 cide. ^^ 
 
 § 313. The result of the autopsy as evidence. — The testimony of 
 a competent surgeon or medical practitioner, who conducted the 
 autopsy, is admissible, though some minor statutory details were 
 not observed,^* and though the accused was not notified to be 
 present, or, being present, was without counsel. The physician 
 may describe what tests are necessary to ascertain the cause of 
 
 "'State V. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374, 
 391, 14 S. W. 969, 15 S. W. 556; Rob- 
 erts V. State, 123 Ga. 146, 51 S. E. 
 374; State V. McDaniel, 68 S. Car. 
 304, 47 S. E. 384, 102 Am. St. 661. 
 A physician may testify which of two 
 wounds, both certainly fatal, caused 
 death. Eggler v. People, 56 N. Y. 
 642, 643. 
 
 ""Boyd V. State, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 
 i6r, 175-177; Blackman v. State, 23 
 Ohio St. 146, 163; Cf. Hall v. State, 
 132 Ind. 317, 325, 31 N. E. 536. Such 
 evidence is of peculiar relevancy in 
 case of death by poisoning. Hall v. 
 State, 132 Ind. 317, 325, 31 N. E. 536. 
 Threats by deceased to commit sui- 
 cide, unaccompanied by any attempt 
 to carry them into execution, are in- 
 
 admissible, as they are merely hear- 
 say. State V. Fitzgerald, 130 Mo. 
 407, 32 S. W. 1 1 13; State V. Punshon, 
 133 Mo. 44, 34 S. W. 25; State v. 
 Fournier, 68 Vt. 262, 35 Atl. 178. 
 
 "^Nardan v. State, 143 Ala. 13, 39 
 So. 406. 
 
 " State V. Marsh, 70 Vt. 288, 40 Atl. 
 836; Commonwealth v. Howard 
 (Mass. 1910), 91 N. E. 397. 
 
 °" State V. Lentz, 45 Minn. 177, 180, 
 47 N. W. 720. 
 
 ^''Commonwealth v. Snell, 189 
 Mass. 12, 75 N. E. 75, 3 L. R. A. (X. 
 S.) lorgn. 
 
 '* People V. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 86 
 Pac. 671 ; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
 132 Mass. 261, 263.
 
 547 HOMICIDE. § 313 
 
 death, and, after relating the facts revealed by the autopsy, may 
 give his opinion, based thereon, as to the cause and mode of 
 death.-' ■'' 
 
 In order that evidence of the result of an autopsy shall be re- 
 ceived it is not absolutely necessary for the prosecution to account 
 for the whereabouts of the viscera of the deceased during the 
 whole period which separates their removal from the body at the 
 morgue or elsewhere by an undertaker or physician, and the post 
 inortcni examination. In the absence of evidence to the contrary 
 it will be presumed that the viscera remained in proper custody 
 (luring this period.^" 
 
 The mere fact that the autopsy was made some time after the 
 death will not exclude its results as evidence unless the delay was 
 great, and the condition of the body at the autopsy was such that 
 it was impossible to determine whether its condition was attribu- 
 table to antc-inortciH or post-niortern causes.^" One of several 
 ])hysicians who conducted an autopsy may prove what was done 
 by the others, and what appeared as the result of a manual inves- 
 tigation by another.''" A physician who has performed the au- 
 topsy and has made an expert examination of the stomach of de- 
 ceased may state the probable length of time intervening between 
 the time the deceased had eaten supper until his death. ^" An ex- 
 pert who has heard the autopsy described may be asked if, in his 
 opinion, it was ])roperly conducted,'*" and he may be also asked 
 whether it is possible for a physician to determine, on the facts 
 which were observed, the exact point of time a poison which was 
 discox'ered began to o])erate.'*^ A physician may, though a person 
 who is noi familiar with anatomy can not. give an opinion of a 
 ])erson's sex, based u])on his examination of a skeleton.^'" 
 
 "State V. Merriman, 34 S. Car. 16, "■'People v. W'illson, 109 N. Y. 345, 
 
 12 S. E. 619, 626; procceding.s at in- 354, 16 X. li. 540. 
 
 qiicst, sec Elliott Evidence, § 3037 ; •'"State v. Mortcnscn. 26 Utah t,\j, 
 
 admissibility of evidence of accused 73 Pac. 562. 
 
 at coroner's inquest, see 70 L. R. A. *" State v. Moxley, 102 Mo. 374. 38/). 
 
 33. note; adinissil)ility of coroner's 14 S. W. f)6g. 15 S. W. 556. 
 
 finding to show cause of death, see 68 *' Hartung v. People. 4 Park. C'r. 
 
 I-. R. .\. 28s, note. ( \. Y.) 319. 325. 327. 
 
 ** Slate V. Daly. 210 Mo. C/)^, kx) S. *•' Wilson v. State. 41 Tex. 320, ,\J2- 
 
 ^V- .s.r 32.';. 
 
 ■'Williams v. State, 64 .\ld. 384, 
 391. I .Atl. 8X7.
 
 § 314 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 
 
 548 
 
 § 314. Variance in proof of means or weapon producing death. — 
 The substance of homicide being the felonious kilhng, proof of a 
 kilHng, in any manner or by any means, that correspond substan- 
 tially with the indictment, is sufficient. All the details of the 
 offense need not be proved precisely as alleged. Proof of a 
 shooting with a pistol will sustain an averment of shoot- 
 ing with a gun and vice versa,^^ and proof of killing with 
 a dagger or bowie-knife will sustain an averment of death from 
 stabbing with a dirk, sword, or similar weapon.** But proof of 
 a knife will not sustain an allegation of killing by shooting, and, 
 as a rule, where the killing is alleged to have been with a particu- 
 lar weapon, proof of a totally diverse weapon is a fatal variance.*^ 
 Proof of strangling with a scarf is sufficient where strangling 
 with the hands was alleged.**' Allegations of the place or nature 
 of wounds are generally immaterial.*^ 
 
 Evidence that a weapon, similar to that with which the deceased 
 was slain, was seen near the defendant's house shortly before the 
 homicide and subsequently disappeared,*^ or that defendant bor- 
 rowed,*" purchased, stole,^° had in his possession, ^^ or practiced 
 
 ^^ Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 
 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 321, 322, 52 Am. 
 Dec. 71 in; Rodgers v. State, 50 Ala. 
 102, 104; State V. Lautenschlager, 22 
 Minn. 514, 522; Turner v. State, 97 
 Ala. 57, 58, 12 So. 54 ; State v. Smith, 
 32 Me. 369, ziZ, 54 Am. Dec. 578. 
 
 ** Hernandez v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 
 271, 22 S. W. 972; Jones v. State, 137 
 Ala. 12, 34 So. 681. 
 
 "Witt V. State, 6 Cold. (Tenn.) 
 5, 8; Reg. v. Warman, 2 Car. & K. 
 195, I Den. C. C. 183. 
 
 *" Thomas v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 20 S. W. 226, 14 Ky. L. 288; Rex v. 
 Waters, 7 Car. & P. 250, i Moody C. 
 
 c. 457. 
 
 ^^ Commonwealth v. Coy, 157 Mass. 
 200, 214, 32 N. E. 4; State v. Waller, 
 88 Mo. 402, 404; Nelson v. State, i 
 Tex. App. 41. 
 
 *' State V. Brabham, 108 N. Car. 
 793, 794, 13 S. E. 217. 
 
 *" Finch V. State, 81 Ala. 41, 49, i 
 So. 565; Webb V. State, 138 Ala. 53, 
 34 So. loii; Glass v. State, 147 Ala. 
 50, 41 So. 727; People V. Del Vermo, 
 192 N. Y. 470, 85 N. E. 690; Arn- 
 wine V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 213, 114 S. 
 W. 796, 802; People V. Haxer, 144 
 Mich. 575, 108 N. W. 90; McKinney 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 591, 96 S. W. 48. 
 The question on cross-examination of 
 the accused "What did you have the 
 gim for?" is competent as bearing on 
 motive. Hill v. State, 156 Ala. 3, 
 46 So. 864. 
 
 ^People V. Rogers, 71 Cal. 565, 567, 
 568, 12 Pac. 679; People v. M'Kay, 
 122 Cal. 628, 55 Pac. 594. 
 
 ^^ Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 91 
 Va. 741, 21 S. E. 364; Walsh v. Peo- 
 ple, 88 N. Y. 458, 466; Collins v. 
 State, 138 Ala. 57, 34 So. 993; Webb 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 53, 34 So. TOii; 
 Smith V. State, 165 Ind. 180, 74 N.
 
 549 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 s 314 
 
 iising-,^" a similar weapon, is always receivable as relevant to show 
 preparation to commit a homicide. 
 
 Evidence of the finding of weapons, known to belong to the de- 
 fendant, near where the dead body was found, ^^ or the testimony 
 of a witness who is familiar with firearms, as to the kind of gun 
 by which a wound was inflicted, ^^ or that a jacketed bullet would 
 probably produce infection and inflammation/** that a gun or 
 pistol belonging to the defendant had°^ or had not^" been recently 
 used, is admissible. ^^ 
 
 So a person familiar with firearms may be allowed to give his 
 opinion that, judging from the report he heard, the weapon used 
 was a pistol.^* 
 
 E. 983; Rollings V. State (Ala. 1909), 
 49 So. 329; Morgan v. Territory, 16 
 Okla. 530, 85 Pac. 718; Poe v. State, 
 155 Ala. 31, 46 So. 521 ; Richardson 
 V. State, 145 Ala. 46, 41 So. 82 ; Smith 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 92 S. W. 
 610, 29 K^^ L. 231 ; State v. Ruck, 194 
 Mo. 416, 92 S. W. 706; Johnson v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 93 S. W. 581, 
 29 Ky. L. 442; Hardy v. Common- 
 wealth (Va. 1910), 67 S. E. 522; 
 Graham v. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 123 
 S. W. 691. 
 
 "■ Boiling V. State, 54 Ark. 588, 596, 
 16 S. W. 658; Burton v. State, 18 So. 
 284, 107 .Ala. 108; Allen v. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.), 82 S. W. 589, 26 Ky. 
 L. 807. 
 
 '^ State V. Craemer, 12 Wash. 217, 
 40 Pac. 944; State v. Jeffries, 210 
 Mo. 302, 109 S. W. 614; Yancey v. 
 State, 45 Tex. Cr. 366, 76 S. W. 571 ; 
 State V. Smalls, 73 S. Car. 516, 53 S. 
 E. 976. Cf. Thornton v. State, 113 
 Ala. 43, 21 So. 356, 59 Am. St. 97, 
 where a memorandum book and pen- 
 cil found at the locus in quo and 
 shown to have belonged to the de- 
 fendant was admitted in evidence 
 against him. 
 
 '^ Franklin v. Commonwealth, 48 S. 
 W. 986, 20 Ky. L. 1 137. 
 
 "a Harper v. State, 129 Ga. 770, 59 
 S. E. 792. 
 
 ""* Meyers v. State, 14 Tex. App. 35, 
 39, 48. Non-expert permitted to tes- 
 tify in Patton v. State, 156 Ala. 23, 
 46 So. 862. 
 
 °* People v. Driscoll, 107 K. Y. 414, 
 420, 14 N. E. 305. Where the defend- 
 ant, when arrested, had in his posses- 
 sion a revolver containing four empty 
 shells, it is proper to prove the cali- 
 ber of the weapon, that a witness 
 heard four reports of fire arms in the 
 direction of the house where the kill- 
 ing occurred, that, on going there, 
 bullet holes were found in the ceiling 
 of the room and the description of 
 the holes. State v. Fitzgerald, 130 
 Mo. 407, 32 S. W. 1 1 13. 
 
 " If it is proved that the defendant 
 carried a concealed weapon similar to 
 that with which the homicide was 
 committed, he cannot show that it is 
 a custom, where he resides, to carry 
 such weapons, though he may prove 
 his habit and motive in going armed. 
 Creswell v. State, 14 Tex. App. i, 18. 
 Nor usually should the accused be 
 permitted to state why he carried a 
 concealed weapon. Gregory v. State, 
 140 Ala. t6, 37 So. 259. 
 
 "Slate V. Graham, 116 La. 770. 41 
 So. 90.
 
 fj 314 CRIMIXAI. KVIOEXCE. 55O 
 
 The state should always be allowed to prove that there was 
 found, either upon the person of the accused or in his house at 
 the time of his arrest, if not too remote, a weapon similar to that 
 with which the homicide was committed. Thus, it is proper for 
 tlie state to show that the accused told a witness his pistol was at 
 his house, and that it was dug up where he had buried it some dis- 
 tance from his house ; but it is clear that evidence of the finding of 
 a pistol under such circumstances would have no force unless it 
 was of the caliber of that used.''" Evidence that a pistol was 
 found in the possession of the accused corresponding in caliber 
 Avith the bullet taken from the body of the deceased was admitted 
 where the accused was arrested six months after the crime."" 
 There must be some evidence, however, from which the jury may 
 reasonably infer that the pistol found in the possession of the 
 accused was that used in the commission of the crime.**^ The fact 
 of the finding of a pistol cartridge, loaded or not, or of a pistol 
 near the scene of the shooting shortly thereafter, or, if the shoot- 
 ing was done with a gun, the presence of cartridges used is always 
 competent, though there is no evidence to show that the accused 
 owned these articles. Such proof is usually received in cases 
 where the state has to rely on circumstantial evidence.®" 
 
 Where an article of a peculiar and exceptional nature is found 
 near the scene of the crime, a witness may identify it with an 
 article which is proved to have been owned by or to have been in 
 the possession of the accused before the crime."^ If the state 
 shows that the accused was in the possession of a particular 
 v.'eapon after returning from the homicide, and it is impossible 
 that he could have disposed of, or concealed it except in a particu- 
 lar place, evidence that this place has been searched and the 
 weajion not found, was admitted."* If there is a question as to 
 the caliber of the bullet by which the wound was made it is proper 
 to permit a physician to testify that on his examination of the 
 
 °°Moss V. State, 152 Ala. 30, 44 *" Nickles v. State, 48 Fla. 46, 37 So. 
 
 So. 598. 312. 
 
 "^ State V. Green, 115 La. 1041, 40 "^Richards v. Commonwealth, 107 
 
 So. 451. Va. 881, 59 S. E. 1 104. 
 
 "State V. Kehr, 133 Iowa 35, no '"Burton v. State, 115 Ala. i, 22 
 
 X. W. 149. So. 585.
 
 DO' 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 wound he could not tell the caliber of the cartridge. °^ A phvsi- 
 cian may always testify that the wound which, he has discox-ered 
 could not have been made with the gun or pistol of the accused."'"' 
 
 ^ 315. Weapons as evidence. — The state may introduce in evi- 
 dence the weapon with which it is charged the homicide was com- 
 mitted'*^ if properly identified as belonging to the defendant.""" or 
 bullets taken from the body of the deceased/'" or cartridges of the 
 caliber of a rifle apparently carried by the accused in his flight 
 after the crime and found on a highway some distance from the 
 scene of the crime,'** or a bullet of the size and caliber of the 
 pistol owned by the accused found near the scene of 
 the crime," or any weapon found in the possession of the 
 accused or his criminal associates, which is similar in form and 
 character to that which was employed.'- A weapon found on the 
 person of the deceased a few minutes after the homicide has been 
 
 ■^ Humphrey v. State, 74 Ark. 554, 
 S6 S. W. 431." 
 
 ""Franklin v. Commonwealth, 105 
 Ky. 237, 48 S. W. 986, 20 Ky. L. 
 II37- 
 
 ''' Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 685, 
 33 X. E. 681, 683; Thomas v. State, 
 67 Ga. 460, 465; Crawford v. State, 
 112 .Ala. I, 21 So. 214; McBrayer v. 
 State (Tex. Cr., 1896), 34 S. W. 114; 
 State V. Cushing, 14 Wash. 527, 45 
 Pac. 145. 53 Am. St. 883; Burton v. 
 State, 107 Ala. 108, 18 So. 284; State 
 V. Bean, 77 Vt. 384, 60 .Atl. 807; Fay 
 V. State, 52 Te.x. Cr. 185, 107 S. W. 
 55 ; Fuller v. State, 147 .Ala. 35, 41 
 So. 774; Long V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 175, 88 S. W. 203; State v. Sherouk, 
 6f .\\\. Sf)~, 78 Conn. 718, not reported 
 in full : People v. Lagroppo, 90 App. 
 Div. (.\. Y.) 219, 86 N. Y. S. 116; 
 means used and cause of death, see 
 I'lliott Evidence, § 3027: articles in 
 eviflence, § 3028. Sec § 48. A 
 liroken gun found near the locality 
 of the crime, and ajjparcntly the 
 instrument of death, is admissible, 
 though it was again broken after its 
 
 discovery. Ezell v. State, 103 .\]a. 
 8, 15 So. 818, 819. 
 
 "^ State V. Tippet, 94 Iowa 646. 63 
 N. W. 445, 447; Roberts v. State, 123 
 Ga. 146, 51 S. E. 374; Tolliver v. 
 State, 53 Tex. Cr. 329, in S. W. 655. 
 
 •^ People V. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 86 
 Pac. 671 ; People v. Morales, 143 Cal. 
 550, 77 Pac. 470. 
 
 '"Harn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80. 73 
 Pac. 705. 
 
 " Hickey v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 230, 
 102 S. W. 417. 
 
 '" Rodriquez v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 
 259, 22 S. W. 978; State V. Gallman, 
 79 S. Car. 229, 60 S. E. 682. A wit- 
 ness may state the result of a com- 
 parison of shot taken from defend- 
 ant's gun with other shot found in 
 the body of deceased. Granger v. 
 State (Tex. Cr.. 1895), 3i S. W. 671 ; 
 Lemons v. State, 97 Tcnn. 560. 37 S. 
 W. 552; Dean v. Conunonwcalth, 32 
 Gratt. (Va.) 912, 922; State v. Lem 
 Woon (Ore. 1910), 107 Pac. 974; 
 People V. Mar Gin Suic (Cal. App. 
 1909), 103 Pac. 951.
 
 § 3l6 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 552 
 
 received in evidence.'^ It is improper to allow experiments with 
 weapons in the presence of the jury,'* nor is expert evidence ad- 
 missible to show that a cartridge is marked in such a way as to 
 indicate it had been fired from a pistol belonging to the deceased."'' 
 On the other hand, if a number of shells are found on the ac- 
 cused which are marked with a peculiar mark, and it appears that 
 only two shots were fired, two empty shells bearing the mark, 
 and which were found near the scene of the crime, should be re- 
 ceived in evidence." 
 
 § 316. Identity of the deceased. — The identity of the deceased 
 with the party named in the indictment must be proved beyond a 
 reasonable doubt. And where the body of the deceased has been 
 wholly destroyed so that an ordinary identification is impossible, 
 as, for example, where it has been destroyed by fire in the burning 
 of a house, it is proper to permit great latitude to the prosecution 
 in the presentation of evidence of identity." The name must be 
 proved as alleged. Failure to prove the christian name of the de- 
 ceased is fatal, '^ though this variance may be cured if the occu- 
 pation and surname are proved as alleged."'^ And when the name 
 is proved as idem sonans, with respect to that alleged, slight diver- 
 gencies in spelling will be disregarded.*" 
 
 § 317. The identification of the body of the deceased. — The struc- 
 ture and condition of the teeth of a deceased person, by reason 
 of the imperishable nature of the materials w^hich compose them, 
 furnish an excellent means of identification. And a witness who 
 
 "Watson V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 85, '"Shepherd v. People, 72 111. 480, 
 
 105 S. W. 509. 481 ; State v. Lincoln, 17 Wis. 597, 
 
 "* United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 599, 6or. 
 
 662, 41 L. ed. 300, 16 Sup. Ct. 1 192; '"Girous v. State, 29 Ind. 93, 94; 
 
 Polin V. State, 14 Neb. 540, 545, 16 N. State v. Witt, 34 Kan. 488, 494, 8 Pac. 
 
 W. 898. 769; State V. Lincoln, 17 Wis. 597, 
 
 '° People V. Mitchell, 94 Cal. 550, 599. The fact that the deceased was 
 
 555, 29 Pac. 1 106. a white man may be proved by the 
 
 '° Fuller V. State, 147 Ala. 35, 41 confession of the accused. Isaacs v. 
 
 So. 774. United States, 159 U. S. 487, 40 L. ed. 
 
 " State V. Nordall, 38 Mont. 327, 99 229, 16 Sup. Ct. 51. 
 Pac. 960; Elliott Evidence, § 2715. 
 
 ■' Penrod v. People, 89 111. 150, 151.
 
 553 HOMICIDE. § 318 
 
 was acquainted with the appearance and conformation of the 
 teeth of the person in question may describe their condition of 
 soundness or decay, and point out whatever he may have observed 
 which was abnormal or pecuhar in them, as, for example, fillings, 
 etc. This evidence may then be followed up by the testimony of 
 experts, preferably dentists or dental surgeons, who have made an 
 examination of the teeth after death. The jury may then deter- 
 mine as an inference from the points of similarity, if any, the 
 identity of the remains with the person whose death is under con- 
 sideration.^^ 
 
 .3 318. Expert testimony and the employment of a chemical an- 
 alysis in cases of homicide by poisoning. — A conviction of homicide 
 by poisoning will stand though every fact, except, perhaps, the 
 death of the party, which must be proved by direct evidence, is 
 sustained by circumstantial evidence alone."" It is usually indis- 
 pensable to prove that the accused was in possession at the time 
 of the crime of the poison alleged to have been administered by 
 him.**^ A chemical analysis, an autopsy and the aid of expert 
 testimony, though very desirable, are never indispensable.^* 
 
 A physician cannot testify as an expert on symptoms of poison- 
 ing who has never treated or seen a case of poisoning in his prac- 
 tice, and whose knowledge is only such as he has obtained by 
 reading books and from his instruction at the medical school.''* 
 
 A properly qualified medical witness may state that, in his 
 
 "The subject is full}' discussed in State, 82 ]\Iiss. 498, 34 So. 360, as to 
 
 Rchfuss on Dental Jurisprudence, §9, necessity for proof of the corpus dc- 
 
 pp. 17-32. See also, Udderzook v. licti. 
 
 Commonwealth, 76 Pa. St. 340; Rex "Johnson v. State, 29 Tex. App. 
 
 V. Clewes, 4 Car. & P. 221; Common- 150, 153, 15 S. W. 647; Polk v. State, 
 
 wealth V. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 36 Ark. 117, 126; State v. Slagle, 83 
 
 295, 52 Am. Dec. 7iin; and ante, §7. N. Car. 630, 631; Nordan v. State, 
 
 ""Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580, 143 Ala. 13, 39 So. 406; Levering v. 
 
 597, 52 X. W. 778; Commonwealth v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 117 S. W. 253. 
 
 Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770. '" Soquct v. State, y2 Wis. 659, 662- 
 
 " State V. Rlydenburg, 135 Iowa 665, 40 N. W. 391. Contra, People v. 
 
 264, 112 N. W. 634. See Stanley v, Thacker, 108 Mich. 652, 66 N. W. 562.
 
 § 3^8 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 554 
 
 opinion, death was caused by a certain poison,"' that he found 
 a certain poison in the stomach of the deceased,"" or may describe 
 symptoms which accompany poisoning,"'' or may state that symp- 
 toms described in a hypothetical question indicate the presence 
 of arsenic or other poison.*"* 
 
 He cannot, perliaps, state the result of a chemical analysis un- 
 less he has had some special experience in chemical research and 
 a knowledge of the science."^ 
 
 The com])etency of the chemical expert is always a judicial 
 question, though his knowledge and experience may be brought 
 out to enable the jury to give proper weight to his evidence."" 
 It is now very customary in criminal trials to employ trained 
 analysts, or experienced physicians who have made a specialty 
 of the study of organic chemistry, to conduct the analysis of the 
 contents of the viscera where poisoning is suspected,®^ and ob- 
 "\-iously the opinions of such persons would have greater weight 
 with the jury than those of ordinary physicians."* 
 
 One who is by occupation a chemist and a professor of chem- 
 istry in a college and who has for many years made a study of 
 poisons, may testify as to the effect of poison on the human 
 system and also may state a particular poison in his opinion 
 caused the death of the deceased, though he is neither a druggist 
 
 See also Rice v. State, .S4 Tex. Cr. 
 149, 112 S. W. 2^9, where a physician 
 was accepted as an expert on strych- 
 nine poisoning who had no practical 
 knowledge of the subject. 
 
 "Mitchell V. State, 58 Ala. 417, 
 419; Davis V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 236, 
 114 S. W. 366. 
 
 ''People V. Quimby, 134 Mich. 625, 
 96 N. W. 1061, 10 Det. Leg. X. 618. 
 
 *•' People V. Robmson, 2 Park Cr. 
 (N. Y.) 235, 243, 245; Polk V. State, 
 36 Ark. 117, 124; State v. Terrell, 12 
 Rich. (S. Car.) 321. 
 
 ""Stephens v. People, 4 Park. Cr. 
 (N. Y.) 396, 432-438; State v. Rock- 
 er, 138 Iowa 653, irb N. W. 797. 
 
 °' Soquet V. State, 72 Wis. 659. 40 
 N. W. 391 ; State v. Cook. 17 Kan. 
 392, 395. But he need not be a prac- 
 
 tical analyst or chemist. Zoldoske v. 
 State, 82 Wis. 580, 597, 52 N. W. 778; 
 State V. Hinkle, 6 Iowa 380, 386; 
 Epps V. State, 102 Ind. 539, 548, i X. 
 E. 491 ; Hartung v. People, 4 Park. 
 Cr. (X. Y.) 319. 
 
 °^The fact that the opinion of an 
 expert chemist given on the witness 
 stand is based partly on his reading 
 is immaterial. State v. Baldwin, 36 
 Kan. I, 17, 12 Pac. 318: People v. 
 Pekarz, 185 X. Y. 470, 78 X. E. 294. 
 
 "^ People V. Buchanan, 145 X. Y. i, 
 11-14, 39 N. E. 846; State v. Bow- 
 man, 78 X. Car. 509, 511, 514; State 
 V. Cook, 17 Kan. 392, 394; Joe v. 
 State, 6 Fla. 591, 601-606, 65 Am. 
 Dec. 579n. 
 
 =^ State v. Hinkle, 6 Iowa 380, 386. 
 Cf. Sanders v. State, 94 Ind. 147, I49-
 
 0:5 : 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 § 319 
 
 nor a plwsician.^'' The identity of the subject analyzed with that 
 involved in the case, and the fact that it has not been improperly 
 tampered with, must be shown, '■*''^ though the e\'idence of identity 
 need not be absolutely convincing before it should be permitted to 
 go to the jury."*"' A hypothetical question containing facts proved 
 or claimed to be proved in connection with the poisoning may be 
 asked, and it is not material that the question does not contain 
 all the facts if those omitted are brought out on the cross-exam- 
 ination."^ The fact that the expert heard that there was poison 
 in the house, wdiich fact, being \iewed by him in conjunction with 
 the symptoms, influenced him in forming an opinion that the 
 deceased was poisoned, will not exclude his opinion."** 
 
 § 319. Relevancy of evidence to show poisoning. — Malice may be 
 reasonably presumed from the willful administration of poison 
 in a quantity sufficient to cause death under ordinary circum- 
 stances."" Evidence that a member of a family with whom the 
 defendant had lived had died from the same poison which he is 
 now accused of having administered is" relevant to aid the jury 
 in determining the probability that the death of the person with 
 whose murder he is charged was accidental.^"" 
 
 The evidence which tends to show the poisoning or death of 
 any other person than the deceased should usually be confined in 
 its bearing to the motive of the accused, or should be only con- 
 sidered by the jury in determining whether the death of the de- 
 ceasefl was accidental or not. The accused is usually in such cases 
 entitled to have the court charge to that effect.^ 
 
 •''■ .Scott V. State, 141 Ala. i, 37 So. 
 .157. 
 
 "a State V. Cook. 17 Kan. 392, 394. 
 The fact that the jar.s containing the 
 organs of the deceased were not her- 
 metically sealed. State v. Thompson, 
 132 Mo. 301, 34 S. W. 3r, and were 
 not kept under lock and key does not 
 exclude the analysis. State v. Cook, 
 17 Kan. 392, 394. 
 
 '•^People V. Williams, 3 Tark Cr. 
 (N. Y.) 84, 94-96. 
 
 "Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 550, 
 554-55^; Epps V. Slate, ro2 Ind, 539, 
 554, I N. E. 491 ; Zf)Idoske v. State, 
 82 Wis. 580, 597, 52 X. W. 77H: Con- 
 
 way V. State, 118 Ind. 482, 490, 21 N. 
 E. 285. 
 
 "'ATitchell v. State, 58 Ala. 417, 420. 
 
 ""People V. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17; 
 Commonwealth v. Danz, 211 Pa. St. 
 507, 60 .'\tl. 1070. 
 
 ""Zoldoske V. State. 82 Wis. 580, 
 597. 52 N. W. 778. See ante, § 89. 
 I'or evidence in prosecution for 
 homicide in commission or attempt 
 to commit ahortion, see 63 L. R. :\. 
 902, note; evidence in prosecution for 
 homicide l)y commission of unlawful 
 ;ict, see 63 L. K. A. 353. note 
 
 * Peo])l(; V. Zajicek. 233 111. iy8, 84 
 \. IC. 249.
 
 §319 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 556 
 
 The possession of poison by the accused is an important fact 
 and may always be proved." But evidence that the accused mixed 
 i:)oison or had poison in his possession is of httle weight unless 
 it is also shown that he had an opportunity to administer it.^ The 
 evidence to show possession need not be direct, nor need the pos- 
 session be exclusive. If it is shown that poison was in a house 
 where the accused lived, within easy reach, and that he had 
 knowledge of the fact, a conviction will be sustained.* 
 
 It is always proper for the state to show that the accused, or a 
 person closely resembling him, purchased or had in his posses- 
 sion the poison^ which, it is charged, was the cause of the death 
 of the deceased." Where the poison was mixed in food eaten by 
 deceased it is competent to prove that the accused purchased the 
 food.' The inability of the witness to identify positively the ac- 
 cused as the person who purchased the poison or the food does not 
 render his testimony incompetent.'* The witness, in fixing the 
 date of the sale, may, if necessary, refresh his memory by read- 
 ing from a shop book in which sales of poison are recorded," and 
 may also testify that sales of a certain poison were not common 
 and that tliere was only a small quantity on hand at the time as 
 tending to show facts which aided him in remembering the sale.^'' 
 
 The inference unfavorable to the accused, which may be created 
 by proof that prior to the death of the deceased he had purchased 
 and had in his possession, poison similar in cliaracter to that 
 found in the stomach of the accused may be rebutted by evidence 
 that he owned a farm and that farmers in his locality generally 
 kept this poison for poisoning vermin.'^ 
 
 "People V. Cuff, 122 Cal. 589, 55 ' State v. BIj'denburg, 135 Iowa 264, 
 
 Pac. 407. 112 N. W. 634; Commonwealth v. 
 
 ' Madden v. State, i Kan. 340. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770. 
 
 * Zoldoske v. State, 82 Wis. 580, ' State v. Thompson, 141 Mo. 408, 
 
 597, 52 N. W. 778 ; State v. Woodard, 42 S. W. 949. 
 
 132 Iowa 67s, 108 N. W. 753. The * State v. Thompson, 141 IMo. 408, 
 
 court may, with propriety, enlighten 42 S. W. 949; Commonwealth v. Ken- 
 
 the jury in its charge by defining such nedy, 170 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770. 
 
 words as "anaesthetic," "chloroform" " Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 
 
 and "poison." State v. Baldwin, 36 Mass. 18, 48 N. E. 770. 
 
 Kan. I, 22, 12 Pac. 318. "Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 
 
 ' State V. Woodard, 132 Iowa 675, Mass. 18. 48 N. E. 770. 
 
 108 N. W. 753; State v. Rocker, "People v. Cuff, 122 Cal. 589, 55 
 
 138 Iowa 653, 116 N. W. 797. Pac. 407.
 
 :>D/ 
 
 HOMICIDE. § 319a 
 
 ^ 319a. The declarations of the deceased. — The opinion of a physi- 
 cian that the accused died from natural causes may be received 
 where it is based on his examination and on the declarations of 
 the deceased as to her condition past and present made to him to 
 enable him to prescribe for her.^" Hence, it follows that his 
 declarations and statements of present pain and suffering should 
 be received in evidence. His statements which constitute a part 
 of the res gcstcc are always received. Thus the statements of the 
 deceased made after he has taken medicine given him by the ac- 
 cused that he had taken it and describing its eft'ect, should be re- 
 ceived.^'' And the statements of the deceased made while he was 
 eating the food in which it is alleged the poison was contained 
 is also admissible.^* 
 
 But a statement by the deceased descriptive of her illness made 
 son]etime after the date on which the illness commenced must be 
 rejected. ^^ The dying declarations of the deceased so far as they 
 are statements of fact and not of mere opinions are always re- 
 ceived. ^"^ Under the claim that the deceased has committed suicide 
 it may be shown that he was at times despondent and ill, pro- 
 viding this condition is not too remote.^' So also it may be shown 
 under the plea of suicide that the deceased had poison in his pos- 
 session and his declarations showing an intention on his part to 
 commit suicide have been received providing they are within a 
 reasonable period before her death. ^^ There is, how^ever, some 
 difference of opinion in the cases as to the propriety of admitting 
 the declarations of an intention to commit suicide. It seems that 
 a statement that he intended to take his life is admissible but 
 statements that he had poison in his possession is not received to 
 show such possession or to show that the deceased knew the ef- 
 fects of the poison administered.^® In other words declarations 
 of intent to commit suicide are received to show that the death 
 of the deceased was not caused by the accused ; but statements 
 
 "State V. Biydenburg, 135 Iowa S. W. 299; Boyd v. State, 84 Miss. 
 
 264, 112 X. W. 634. 414, 36 So. 525. 
 
 " N'ordan v. State, 143 /Ma. 13, 39 " State v. Kelly, 77 Conn. 266, 58 
 
 So. 406. Atl. 705. 
 
 "State V. Thompson, 141 Mo. 408, "State v. Kelly, 77 Conn. 266, 58 
 
 42 S. \V. 949. Atl. 705; Xordis'reii v. People. 2\\ 111. 
 
 " Boyd V. State, 84 Miss. 414, 36 So. 425, 71 \. E. 1042. 
 
 ^2^. "State V. Kelly, 77 Conn. 266, 58 
 
 "Rice V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 149, II2 Atl. 705; State v. Marsh, 70 Vt. 288, 
 
 40 Atl. 836.
 
 S 320 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 55S 
 
 accompanying tlicsc declarations of inlenlion will he rejected as 
 hearsay.-" 
 
 i; 320. Presumption and proof of malice. — The character of homi- 
 cide, whether murder or manslaughter, and the validity and co- 
 gency of a defense involving justification or excuse for the act 
 of killing, which itself is not denied, depends wholly upon the 
 presence or absence of a malicious intent. To constitute the kill- 
 ing murder in the first degree malice existing at the instant of the 
 killing, or, at least, at some time not too remote, must he shown, 
 or circumstances must he shown from whicli it may he presumed."' 
 
 "Malice aforethougiit," or tliat degree of malice which makes 
 a homicide murder, need not be shown l)y direct evidence. Malice 
 is the outcome of a mental condition, and direct proof of a mental 
 condition is usually impossible from the customary secrecy of 
 motive leading to the crime. 
 
 If an unlawful homicide is proved to have been committed and 
 is shown to ha\^e been the intentional and deliberate act of the 
 accused, the law will presume malice from these facts alone and 
 the intention to kill until he shall offer e\'idence to show mitigat- 
 ing, excusing or justifying circumstances. The legal presumption 
 of malice aforethought arises from the deliberate use of a deadly 
 weapon in a way which is likely to produce, and which does pro- 
 duce, death. -- 
 
 '" State V. Marsh, 70 Vt. 288, 40 Atl. Other presumptions, § 3020 ; pre- 
 
 836. For dying declarations, see Ch. sumption of innocence, Elliott Evi- 
 
 X; also, Elliott Evidence, §§ 3031, dence, § 3013; of intent, Elliott Evi- 
 
 3032, 3033; 86 Am. St. 637, note; dence, §3014: as to degree of offense, 
 
 56 L. R. A. 353, note; 6t, L. R. A. Elliott Evidence, § 3015; presump- 
 
 916, note. tions not conclusive, Elliott Evidence, 
 
 ^^ State V. Johnson, 8 Iowa 525, 74 § 3015; when no presumption arises, 
 
 Am. Dec. 321 ; State v. Decklotts, 19 Elliott Evidence, § 3018. 
 
 Iowa 447; State v. Peterson, 149 N. " McLeod v. State, 128 Ga. 17. 57 
 
 Car. 533, 6^ S. E. 87; State v. Har- S. E. 83; Ewing v. Commonwealth 
 
 mon, 4 Penn (Del.) 580, 60 Atl. 866; (Ky.), in S. W. 352. ^2 Ky. L. 749; 
 
 Bonner v. State, 125 Ga. 237, 54 S. E. State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 95 Am. 
 
 143; State v. Di Gugliclmo (Del), 55 Dec. 776n. See Commonwealth v. 
 
 Atl. 350; State V. Kindred, 148 Mo. York, 9 Met. (Mass.) 93, 121, 43 Am. 
 
 270, 49 S. W. 845; State V. Strong, Dec. 2)7i'< Pressley v. State, 132 Ga. 
 
 85 Ark. 536, 109 S. W. 536. See El- 64, 63 S. E. 784; State v. Prolow, 98 
 
 liott Evidence, §§ 3016, 3017; 4 L. R. Minn. 459, 108 X. W. 873; State v. 
 
 A. (N. S.) 934, note. liayden, 131 Iowa r, 107 N. W. 929;
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 The use of such a weapon is a fact which, when proved, if no 
 otlier evidence is offered on either side to show the contrary, raises 
 a presumption of law that a dehherately formed design existed 
 in the mind of the accused to kill the person on whom that weapon 
 was used.-'' Usually modifying facts are proved in connection 
 with the killing. These facts may be of such a character that no 
 necessity may exist for drawing a presumption from the use of a 
 deadly weapon, or they may rebut the presumption. It is then for 
 the jury to say on all the facts, whether malice or the deliberate 
 intention to kill was present."* 
 
 State V. Cole. 132 N. Car. 1069, 44 S. 
 E. 391 ; State v. Powell, 5 Penn. 
 (Del.) 24, 6r Atl. 966; State v. Har- 
 mon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 580, 60 Atl. 866; 
 State V. Honey, 6 Penn. (Del.) 148, 65 
 .•\tl. 764; State V. Rochester, 72 S. 
 Car. 194, 51 S. E. 685. 
 
 -' State V. Johns, 6 Penn. (Del.) T74, 
 65 Atl. 763; State V. Roberson, 150 X. 
 Car. 837, 64 S. E. 182; Rosemond v. 
 State, 86 Ark. 160, no S. W. 229; 
 State V. Moore (Del. 1909), 74 Atl. 
 1 1 12. See cases in next note. 
 
 ** The cases which may be consulted 
 upon the presumption or proof of 
 malice are as follows : Compton v. 
 State, no Ala. 24, 20 So. 119; State 
 V. Davis, 9 Houst. (Del.) 407, 33 Atl. 
 55; State V. Peo, 9 Houst. (Del.) 488, 
 33 Atl. 257; State V. Earnest, 56 Kan. 
 3r, 42 Pac. 359; State v. Jimmerson, 
 118 X. Car. 1 173, 24 S. E. 494; State 
 V. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308, 315, 12 .\m. 
 20on; State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11, 138; 
 Simmons v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 18 S. W. 534, 13 Ky. L. 839 ; State v. 
 Douglass, 28 W. Va. 297, 302; Jack- 
 son V. State, 81 Ala. 33, 35, i So. 33; 
 Daccy v. People, 116 111. 555, 575, ct 
 scq., 6 N. EL 165; Erwin v. State, 29 
 Ohio St. 186, 192, 23 Am. 733 ; Lamar 
 V. State, 63 Miss. 265, 272, 274; Mc- 
 Adams v. State, 25 Ark. 405, 408; 
 State V. Chavis, 80 N. Car. 353, 358; 
 State V. Ariel, 38 S. Car. 221, 223, 16 
 
 S. E. 779 ; Commonwealth v. Drum, 
 58 Pa. St. 9; Young v. State, 95 Ala. 
 4. TO So. 913; Hill V. Commonwealth, 
 2 Gratt. (Va.) 594, 599, 603; State 
 V. Willis, 63 X. Car. 26, 29; Murphy 
 V. People, 9 Colo. 435, 439, 13 Pac. 
 528; Hart V. State, 21 Tex. App. 163, 
 171, 17 S. W. 421 ; Boyle v. State, 105 
 Ind. 469, 477,^5 N- E. 203, 55 Am. 
 218; Thomas v. People, 67 N. Y. 218, 
 225 ; State v. Hockett, 70 Iowa 442, 
 450, 30 X. W. 742; State V. Whitson, 
 in X. Car. 695, 698, 16 S. E. 332; 
 Stokes V. People, 53 X. Y. 164, 182, 
 13 Am. 492; State v. Howell, 9 Ired. 
 (N. Car.) 485, 487; Hansford v. 
 State (Miss., 1891), n So. 106; State 
 V. Evans, 65 Mo. 574, 580; Common- 
 wealth V. York, 9 Met. (Mass.) 93, 
 103. 43 Am. Dec. 373; Davison v. 
 People, 90 111. 221, 229; Cherry v. 
 State (Miss., 1897), 20 So. 837; State 
 v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa 169; State v. Sul- 
 livan, 51 Iowa 142, 50 X. W. 572; 
 State v. Townsend, 66 Iowa 741, 24 
 X. W. 535 ; Donnellan v. Common- 
 wealth, 7 Bush (Ky.) 676, 679; State 
 V. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 570. 
 32 Atl. 137; McDermott v. Stale, 89 
 Ind. 187, 193; Allen v. LJnito<i States, 
 164 U. S. 4Q2. 4r L. cd. 528, 17 Suj). 
 Ct. 154; r.urkctt V. State, 154 Ala. H), 
 45 .So. 682; Allen v. State, 14K .\l.i. 
 588, 42 So. 1006; State V. Cei)hus
 
 CRI-MIXAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 5(3c 
 
 In other words, a relmtlablc presumption of law of a malicious 
 intention always arises as soon as a homicide with a deadly 
 weapon is proved. This may become conclusive if no defense is 
 made. But it may be rebutted 1)y evidence coming from the state, 
 i f this does not happen, the accused may offer evidence to show he 
 did the killing in self-defense, or while insane. The presumption 
 of malice thus removed, it is for the jury to find whether malice 
 existed on all the facts, and not merely from the use of a deadly 
 weapon alone. If malice is ascertained to have existed before the 
 killing, as, for example, from evidence of threats, its continuance 
 down to the homicide will be presumed as matter of law, in the 
 absence of evidence to the contrary.""'^ 
 
 § 321. Connected crimes. — Crimes leading up to or connected 
 with the homicide, so that they form parts of one transaction, 
 may be proved as part of the res gcstcc to illustrate the conduct 
 and disposition of the accused about the time of the homicide.-" 
 
 (Del.), 67 Atl. 150; State v. Tilgh- take life or infl'ct grievous bodily 
 man (Del.), 63 Atl. 772; Burley v. harm. The law implies malice where 
 State, 130 Ga. 343, 60 S. E. 1006; Nel- the circumstances of the homicide in- 
 
 son V. State, 4 Ga. App. 223. 60 S. E. 
 1072 ; Tolhirt v. State, 124 Ga. 767, 53 
 S. E. 2>27; State v. Hayden, 131 Iowa 
 I, 107 N. W. 929; State v. DiGugliel- 
 mo (Del.), 55 Atl. 350; Ewing v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), in S. W. 352, 
 ^T, Ky. L. 7.:|9; Adams v. State, 125 
 Ga. II, 53 S. E. 804; Kennedy v. 
 State, 40 So. 658, 147 Ala. 687, not re- 
 ported in full; State v. Whitbeck 
 (Iowa, 1909) 123 N. W. 982; State v. 
 
 dicate that the act proceeded from 
 an evil disposition or a heart regard- 
 less of social duty and bent on mis- 
 chief. For example, if death results 
 from a blow with the hand, inflicted 
 on a person of mature years and 
 great physical strength, no presump- 
 tion of malice arises, for usually 
 death does not ensue from the use of 
 such means. The case would be 
 quite otherwise if death should be 
 
 Blackburn (Del. O. & T. 1892), 75 caused by the same blow, inflicted 
 
 Atl. 536. 
 
 "'Riggs V. State, 30 Miss. 635, 648; 
 State V. Johnson, i Ired. (N. Car.) 
 354, 363, 364, 35 Am. Dec. 742; Com- 
 monwealth V. Gibson, 211 Pa. 546, 60 
 .\{\. 1086; State V. Powell, 5 Penn. 
 (Del.) 24, 61 Atl. 966; State v. Har- 
 mon, 4 Penn. (Del.) 580, 60 Atl. 866. 
 
 upon a new-born infant, or feeble, 
 old person, or upon one whose physi- 
 cal frame is debilitated from disease 
 or hunger. See remarks of the court 
 in Commonwealth v. Fox, 7 Gray 
 (Mass.) 585, 588. 
 
 -' State V. Williamson, 106 Mo. 162, 
 170, 17 S. W. 172; Cortez v. State, 47 
 
 In most cases, in order to prove mal- Tex. Cr. 10, 83 S. W. 812; Dudley v. 
 
 ice as the term is understood in law. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 31, 48 S. W. 179; 
 
 it is necessary to prove a killing with 62 L. R. .A.. 193, note ; People v. Hill, 
 
 a weapon or instrument calculated to 198 X. Y. 64, 91 N. E. 272.
 
 ;6i 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 § 3^i 
 
 It may be shown that in the same affray,-' or immediately be- 
 fore, ■'' or thereafter, the accused killed, or attempted to kill,-'' 
 another person than the one for whose homicide he is on trial."*' 
 Again, if the evidence shows that two or more persons were killed 
 at or about the same time and place, and by the same weapon, 
 so that the several crimes form one transaction, evidence of the 
 condition of any one of the bodies, showing the cause or means 
 of death, as ascertained by an autopsy, or otherwise, is admissible 
 against one on trial for the homicide of any one of the deceased 
 l)ersons.^^ So it may be shown that after the killing of the de- 
 ceased the accused immediately shot the brother of the deceased.^'- 
 But evidence of similar crimes committed by the accused, not con- 
 nected with that for which he is tried, is not generally admissible, 
 as such evidence casts no light upon his guilt and may prejudice 
 the jury against him.^^ 
 
 Thus, to illustrate, it may be shown that the accused after the 
 homicide, took money from the pocket of the deceased as this is 
 a part of the main transaction.^* Again, where the accused is on 
 trial for the homicide of a policeman it may be shown that the 
 
 "' People V. Pallister, 138 X. Y. 601, 
 605, 33 N. E. 741 ; Hickam v. People, 
 137 III. 75, 27 X. E. 88, 89; State v. 
 Testerman, 68 Mo. 408, 415 ; State v. 
 Vaughan, 200 Mo. i, 98 S. W. 2. 
 
 ^ State V. Fontenot, 48 La. .A.nn. 
 305, 19 So. hi; State v. La Rose 
 COre. 1909), 104 Pac. 299. 
 
 ^Killins V. State, 28 Fla. 313, 334, 
 9 So. 711; People v. Craig, in Cal. 
 460, 44 Pac. 186; State v. Gainor, 84 
 Iowa 209, 50 X. W. 947; Benson v. 
 State, 119 Infl. 488, 491, 21 N. E. 
 1 109; Wilkcrson v. State, 31 Te.x. Cr. 
 86, 90, 19 S. W. 903. 
 
 *" Evidence may also be given that 
 
 tlie accused committed a burglary for 
 
 tlic purpose of obtaining a weapon to 
 
 ■ "mmit the homicide. People v. Rog- 
 
 rs. 71 Cal. 565, 568, 12 Pac. 679. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 
 .Mass. 122. 13-'. 19 Am. 40in: Slate 
 
 36 — L'.NDKRIIILL CkI.M. Ev. 
 
 V. Haj-es, 14 Utah 118, 46 Pac. 752; 
 People v. Foley, 64 Mich. 148, 157, 
 158, 31 X- W. 94; State v. William- 
 son. 106 Mo. 162, 170, 17 S. W. 172; 
 State V. Perry, 136 Mo. 126, 37 S. W. 
 804; Heath v. Commonwealth, i Rob. 
 (Va.) 735, 743; Crews v. State, 34 
 Tex. Cr. 533, 31 S. W. 373; Brown 
 V. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. St. 319, 
 337 ; Commonwealth v. Robinson, 146 
 Mass. 571, 578, 16 X. E. 452; Green 
 v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 33 S. W. 
 100, 17 Ky. L. 943 ; Morris v. State, 
 30 Tex. App. 95. 16 S. W. 757 : Elliott 
 Evidence, § 2720. Reason for admit- 
 ting, 105 Am. St. 979, note ; 63 L. R. 
 A. 398, note. 
 
 °* Hammond v. State, 147 /Ma. 79. 
 41 So. 761. 
 
 "See 8§ 84, 85, 88. ct srq. 
 
 " Moran v. Territory, 14 Okla. 544, 
 78 Pac. III.
 
 § 322 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 562 
 
 accused or a member of his parly had. immediately before the 
 homicide, attempted to rob a person on the street. All the facts 
 and circumstances of the attempt at robbery, as for example, the 
 conduct and outcries of the intended victim, and the flight of the 
 accused and his companions, may be received to show the cause 
 of the homicide. ■'■' Where the accused is charged with having 
 killed a member of a particular class of persons and it appears 
 that he had threatened all members of that class, it may be 
 shown that a short time before the homicide he had attempted to 
 kill other members of the same class.^" Proof of crimes whicli 
 differ in their character from that of homicide has been recei\-ed ; 
 thus, it has been permitted llie state to put in evidence a forged 
 writing, apparently signed by the deceased, but four.d in the pos- 
 session of the accused."'"' So, also, where the motive of the accused 
 was apparently to obtain insurance money on a policy on the life 
 of the deceased, a note for premiums and other instruments pur- 
 porting to give tlie benefit of the policy to tlie accused, were re- 
 ceived, though their reception in evidence tended to prove the ac- 
 cused was guilty of the crime of forgery.^^ 
 
 § 322. Conduct of the accused subsequent to the crime. — The per- 
 petration of a homicide is well calculated to create a perturba- 
 tion in the mind of any one implicated in it, that will manifest 
 itself by the agitation subsequently noticeable in his conduct. If 
 the charge that the accused did the killing is disputed, or if it is 
 supported by circumstantial evidence only, such evidence is pe- 
 culiarly appropriate. It is proper to show the conduct of the ac- 
 cused on the night of the killing if any way unusual.^" It is 
 proper, therefore, to show that the accused acted unnaturally and 
 confusedly,*" was excited and nervous in manner, spoke hurriedly 
 and in a low tone, looked pale and appeared greatly distressed 
 shortly after the crime, or when accused of it.*^ 
 
 ^People V. Woods. 147 Cal. 265. 81 776; Streety v. State (Ala. 1909), 51 
 
 Pac. 652. So. 415. 
 
 ^° State V. Davis, 6 Idaho 159, 53 '" Xoftsinger v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 
 Pac. 678. 30T, 323. 
 
 ^' State V. Sassaman, 214 Mo. 695, " Lillie v. State, 72 Neb. 228, 100 X. 
 
 114 S. W. 590. W. 316; Bnrton v. State, 107 Ala. 
 
 ^ State V. Coleman. 17 S. Dak. 594, 108, 18 So. 284; Campbell v. State, 23 
 
 98 N. W. 175. Ala. 44, 69, 70; Williams v. State 
 
 ^ Terry v. State, 118 .Ma. 79, 23 So.
 
 ;63 HOMICIDE. § 3 
 
 ■0 
 
 If from his relation to the deceased it would be natural to ex- 
 pect that the accused would manifest grief or distress upon hear- 
 ing of the death of the deceased it is competent to show that he 
 did not do so. Where being a relati\-e of the deceased the accused 
 would naturally attend his funeral, it may be shown that he did 
 not do so.*- 
 
 The conduct of the accused after he hears that he is suspected 
 is also relevant. Any act proving, or tending to prove, an effort 
 or a desire on his part to obliterate the evidence of a crime, as 
 bv washing his hands or clothing to remove blood stains, or by 
 liiding or destroying weapons, concealing property proved to have 
 belonged to the deceased,^'' or his flight or attempts to escape,''* 
 or his nervousness or silence when first charged with the crime, 
 is always relevant, for from these facts, if unexplained, the jury 
 may justly apprehend his mental condition and may infer that 
 they indicate a consciousness of guilt on his part.*^ 
 
 ;^ 323. Facts showing possible motive. — Alotive upon a trial for 
 murder need not be shown. The absence of motive does not alone 
 require that the accused shall be acquitted though it may be con- 
 sidered in determining the presence of intention.*" Any evidence 
 that tends to show that the defendant had a motive for killing 
 the deceased is always relevant as rendering more i)robable the 
 inference that he did kill him.*^ Thus it may be shown that the 
 deceased was possessed of a large sum of money or of personal 
 
 (.^rk., 1891), 16 S. W. 816, 818; Mc- Benjamin v. State, 41 So. 739, 148 
 
 Cann v. State, 13 Sm. & M. (Miss.) Ala. 671, not reported in full; Roll- 
 
 471. 497; State V. Brabham, 108 N. ings v. State (.Xla., 1909), 49 So. 
 
 Car. 793, 794, 13 S. E. 217; State v. 329; People v. Quimby, 134 Mich. 625, 
 
 Nash, 7 Iowa 347, 382: State v. 96 N. W. io6r, 10 Det. Leg. N. 618. 
 
 Baldwin, 36 Kan. i, r2 Pac. 318. The "^ Thomas v. State, 139 .\la. 80, 36 
 
 conduct and appearance of defend- So. 734. 
 
 ant's wife after the crime is irrele- *' Sec, also, chapter Consciousness 
 
 vant, if she had no connection with it. of Guilt. 
 
 People V. Wood, 126 N. Y. 249, 271, "State v. Ihrailkill, 73 S. Car. 314, 
 
 272, 27 N. E. 362. S^ S. E. 482; Morris v. State, 146 
 
 "State V. Myers, 198 Mo. 225, 94 Ala. 66, 41 So. 274. 
 
 S. W. 242. *' Bonner v. State, 107 Ala. 97. 18 
 
 "Morris v. State, 30 Te.x. App. 95, So. 226; State v. West, r20 La. 747, 
 
 117. 16 S. W. 7S7; liraiiam v. State, 45 So. 594; Maloy v. State, 52 Fla. 
 
 14.^ Ala. 28, 38 So. 919. loi, 41 So. 791 ; Stale v. Wilco.x, 132 
 
 "Batten v. Slate, 8fj Ind. 394, 401; .\'. Car. 1120, 44 S. E. 625; Stale v.
 
 § z^z 
 
 CRIMIXAF- EVIDENCE. 
 
 5^4 
 
 property.'*''' that the defendant knew this'^ and spoke ahout heing 
 the heir of the deceased,^" or might have known this^^ and that 
 personal property owned by the deceased was found in the defend- 
 ant's possession,''- leading to an inference that his covetoiisness 
 or necessity was tempted. ^^ Whether the possession of money by 
 the deceased is so remote as to render it incompetent depends on 
 circumstances. If he was an active business man, or kept a bank 
 account, it would be of little value to prove that the accused knew 
 he received money several months before his death unless other 
 evidence showed its retention in his actual possession. But in the 
 case of a person of solitary and miserly habits, who lived poorly 
 and kept money in his house, a contrary inference may be drawn 
 by the jury,^* from the fact that he had received money some 
 
 Dull, 67 Kan. 793, 74 Pac. 235 ; Bur- 
 ton V. Commonwealth, 108 Va. §92, 
 62 S. E. 376; State v. Thrailkill, 72, 
 S. Car. 314, 53 S. E. 482; State v. 
 Gregory, 178 Mo. 48, 76 S. W. 970; 
 State V. Stratford, 149 N. Car. 483, 62 
 S. E. 882; State v. Bobbitt, 215 Mo. 10, 
 IT4 S. W. 511; Streety v. State (Ala., 
 1909), 51 So. 415; People V. Argentos 
 (Cal., 1909), 106 Pac. 65; State v. 
 Whitbeck (Iowa, 1909), 123 N. W. 
 982; State V. Vanella (Mont, 1909), 
 106 Pac. 364; Elliott Evidence, 
 §§ 2719, 3026; evidence of motive or 
 malice, 66 L. R. A. 384, note ; burden 
 of proving malice, Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3021. 
 
 ■•^Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245, 
 254; Shumway v. State, 82 Neb. 152, 
 T17 X. W. 407; Johnson v. State, 48 
 Tex. Cr. 423, 88 S. W. 223; People v. 
 Bonier, 189 N. Y. 108, 81 N. E. 949; 
 Dean v. State, 85 Miss. 40, :37 So. 501 ; 
 Fouse v. State (Neb., 1909), 119 N. 
 W. 478. 
 
 '"People V. Wolf, 95 Mich. 625, 55 
 N. W. 357; Byers v. State, 105 Ala. 
 31, 16 So. 716; State v. Donnelly, 130 
 Mo. 642^, 32 S. W. 1124; Ettinger v. 
 Commonwealth, 98 Pa. St. 338, 349. 
 Under such circumstance a declara- 
 tion by the deceased that he had no 
 
 monc}^ is incompetent. Lancaster v. 
 State, 36 Tex. Cr. 16, 35 S. W. 165 ; 
 Kennedy v. People, 39 X. Y. 245, 253. 
 
 °° Johnson v. State, 128 Ga. 71, 57 S. 
 E. 84, 130 Ga. 22, 60 S. E. 158. 
 
 " Marable v. State, 89 Ga. 425, 426, 
 427, 15 S. E. 453. See Carwile v. 
 State, 148 Ala. 576, 39 So. 220. 
 
 ''"Morris v. State, 30 Tex. App. 95, 
 117, 16 S. W. 757; People V. Smith, 
 106 Cal. 72, 39 Pac. 40; Garza v. 
 State, 39 Tex. Cr. 358, 46 S. W. 242, 
 72 Am. St. 927. It may be shown 
 that accused before the killing had 
 no money, that immediately there- 
 after he had a $10 bill and a $5 bill : 
 that about the time of the killing the 
 deceased had a $10 bill and a $5 bill, 
 and that no money was found on 
 the remains after the murder. Com- 
 monwealth V. O'Xcil, 169 Mass. .394, 
 48 N. E. 134. 
 
 °' Deceased being a Mexican, it may 
 be shown that defendant attended 
 meetings the object of which was to 
 get rid of Mexicans in that commu- 
 nity. Chalk V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 116, 
 2,2 S. W. 534- 
 
 " Kennedy v. People, 39 X. Y. 245, 
 255; Commonwealth v. Williams, 171 
 Mass. 461, 50 X. E. 1035.
 
 565 HOMICIDE. § T)22, 
 
 time prior to the homicide and that the accused l-cnew it. It 
 may also be shown that the accused was the heir at law of the de- 
 ceased or a devisee under his will, that the deceased was a man of 
 some wealth and that the accused was aware of these circum- 
 stances. So, too, as proving motive, it is competent to show that 
 the accused was a beneficiary named in an insurance policy on the 
 life of the accused."'^ In connection with such evidence it may be 
 rllowed for the prosecution to prove the value of the estate be- 
 longing to the ancestor or the amount of the insurance to em- 
 phasize the motive which may have prompted the accused.^'' 
 
 The statement of the accused that he attempted to borrow 
 money of the deceased and that instead of loaning it to him he 
 made a present of it, is admissible where it seems that the motive 
 of the homicide was to obtain money belonging to the deceased. ^'^ 
 And usually e\'idence which tends to show that the homicide was 
 committed for the purpose of obtaining the possession of papers 
 which were in the possession of the accused is admissible.^* 
 
 Many motives equally strong may be shown. The incitement of 
 jealousy."'" or envy, or the desire to be revenged for real or fancied 
 injuries, is often a potent motive for homicide. The means and 
 mode of showing that the defendant was prompted by revenge 
 are elsewhere treated,"" and here it need only be said that it is 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Clcmmer, 190 Andrews, 73 S. Car. 257, 53 S. E. 423; 
 Pa. St. 202, 42 .'\tl.. 675 : Jahnke v. State v. Beckner, 194 Mo. 281, 91 S. 
 State, 68 Xcb. 154. 94 X. W. 158. 104 \V. 892, 3 L. R. A. (X. S.) 53Sn. It 
 X. W. 154, holding that the accused is relevant to show that the def end- 
 may prove the policy was of small ant and the deceased were both suit- 
 value, ers for the hand of the same woman, 
 
 ""People V. Weber, 149 Cal. 325, 86 that the former had been rejected 
 
 Pac. 671. See Van Wyk v. People and the latter accepted, and that re- 
 
 45 Colo, r, 99 Pac. 1009, as to ports of the engagement and contem- 
 
 falsehoods by the wife of the ac- plated marriage had come to defend- 
 
 cused where the deceased applied for ant. Hunter v. State, 43 Ga. 483, 
 
 the policy of insurance. 489, 522, 523; McCue v. Common- 
 
 " Bess v. Commonwealth, 116 Ky. wealth, 78 Pa. St. 185, 189, 21 Am. 
 
 '.-'7, 77 S. W. 349, 25 Ky. L. 1091. 7n. See, also. Brown v. Common- 
 
 '• State v. Mortensen, 26 Utah 312, wealth TKy.). 17 S. W. 2Jo, 13 Ky. 
 
 73 Pac. 562. 633. L. 372; Commonwealth v. McManns, 
 
 " McCorf|uodaIe v. State (Tex. Cr., 143 Pa. St. 64, 83, 21 .Atl. 1018, 22 
 
 1906), 98 S. W. 879: Mathley v. Com- Atl. 761. 14 L. R. A. 89: People v. 
 
 monwcalth. 120 Ky. 389. 86 S. VV. 988, Brosfe (Mich.. 1910), 125 N. W. 87. 
 27 Ky. I,. 785; Moore v. State, 52 ^ See §§ .327-333. 
 Tc.\. Cr. 336, 107 S. W. 540; State v.
 
 CRI.MIXAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 566 
 
 relevant to show that the chmghter of the deceased had. by his 
 chrection, caused the arrest of the accused for bastardy/'^ or that 
 the deceased had procured the incHctment of the accused,"- or was 
 a witness against him or a friend, or relation of his in some ju- 
 dicial proceeding then pending or soon to be begun."" And testi- 
 mony of litigation pending between the accused and the deceased 
 is not to be excluded merely because it is not proved that ill feel- 
 ing actually existed in connection with it."''*'' The papers in a prior 
 litigation, ci\'il or criminal, instigated by the deceased against the 
 accused or in which he was a witness, such as for example, the in- 
 dictment, bail bond and sentence, are admissible against the ac- 
 cused to show motive.*^* The fact of an improper intimacy,"'^ or 
 illicit or incestuous connection,"*^ may always be proved to show a 
 motive, when the defendant is charged with the homicide of a 
 person whose existence was an obstacle to the complete gratifica- 
 
 ^ Franklin v. Commonwealth. 92 
 Ky. 612, 18 S. W. 532, 533. 534. 13 
 K}'. L. 814; State v. Martin, 47 Ore. 
 282, 83 Pac. 849. Letters written by 
 the accused showing the relations be- 
 tween him and deceased who had in- 
 stituted bastardy proceedings against 
 accused prior to her marriage are 
 competent. Nordan v. State, 143 .A.la. 
 13, 39 So. 406. 
 
 "■ Gillum V. State, 62 Miss. 547, 552 ; 
 Martin v. Commonwealth, 93 Ky. 189, 
 193, 19 S. W. 580, 14 Ky. L. 95; Ball 
 V. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 601, loi 
 S. W. 956, 31 Ky. L. 188; Zipperian 
 V. People, 331 Colo. 134, 79 Pac. 1018; 
 State V. Goodson, 116 La. 388, 40 So. 
 771. 
 
 •" Murphy v. People, 63 N. Y. 590, 
 594 ; Turner v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 103, 
 25 S. W. 635; Marler v. State, 68 
 -Ala. 580, 583; Easterwood v. State, 
 34 Tex. Cr. 400, 31 S. W. 294; John- 
 son V. State, 29 Tex. App. 150, 153. 
 15 S. W. 647; State V. Fontenot, 48 
 La. Ann. 305, 19 So. iii; Hayes v. 
 State, 126 Ga. 95, 54 S. E. 809 ; Terry 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 264. 76 S. W. 
 928; State V. Walker, 145 N. Car. 
 
 567, 59 S. E. 878; Porch V. State, 50 
 Tex. Cr. 335, 99 S. W. 102; Hardy v. 
 Commonwealth (Va., 1910), 67 S. E. 
 522. 
 
 •"aMaloy V. State, 52 Fla. toi. 41 
 So. 791. 
 
 ** Hayes v. State, 126 Ga. 95, 54 S. 
 E. 809. 
 
 " Webb V. State, 73 Miss. 456, 19 
 So. 238; Hall V. State, 40 Ala. 698: 
 People V. Montgomery, 176 N. Y. 
 2T9, 68 X. E. 258; State v. Strat- 
 ford, 149 N. Car. 483, 62 S. E. 882; 
 Lawson v. State, 171 Ind. 431, 84 V. 
 E. 974; Mencfee v. State, 50 Tex. 
 Cr. 249, 97 S. W. 486; Sasser v. 
 State, 129 Ga. 541, 59 S. E. 255; State 
 V. Marsh, 70 Vt. 288, 40 Atl. 836: 
 Sullivan v. State, 100 Wis. 283, 75 N. 
 W. 956; State V. Myers, 198 Mo. 225, 
 94 S. W. 242 ; Commonwealth v. How- 
 ard (Mass., 1910), 91 N. E. 397. 
 
 •"Stout V. People, 4 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 71, 128, 129; Davis V. State, .S4 
 Tex. Cr. 236, 114 S. W. 366: Reyes 
 V. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 422, 117 S. W. 152 ; 
 People V. Botkin, 9 Cal. App. 244, 98 
 Pac. 861.
 
 567 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 0-J 
 
 lion of his wrongful desires.''' Il may be shown to illustrate the 
 motive of the accused that an improper intimacy existed between 
 the accused and the wife of the deceased,'"'^ or between the de- 
 ceased and the wife of the accused. Evider-ce of improper rela- 
 tions between the accused and the sister of the deceased has been 
 received.*^" But evidence of an adulterous intercourse between the 
 accused and the divorced wife of the deceased has been rejected.'*^ 
 And, again, it may be shown that the defendant was a suitor of 
 the sister of the deceased, that the only opposition to his suit was 
 from the deceased, and that this fact, with the intention of the 
 V onian to defer to her brother's wishes, was known to the ac- 
 cused.'* The pendency of a suit brought by the deceased against 
 the accused for a divorce,'' or previous ill-treatment and lack of 
 affection''^ towards the wife.'* or unlawful relations with another 
 woman, '^^ may be shown where the homicide of a wife is con- 
 cerned, as supplying a moti\e. On the other hand the recent in- 
 fidelitv of a wife mav be shown on the trial of her husband for 
 
 "' State V. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44, 38 
 S. W. 554, 39 S. W. 266; Common- 
 wealth V. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. St. 386, 
 387; Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55, 56, 
 42 Am. 95 ; Pierson v. People, 79 .\'. 
 Y. 424, 435, 436, 35 Am. 524; State 
 V. Green, 35 Conn. 203, 206 ; Traverse 
 V. State, 61 Wis. 144, 20 X. W. 724; 
 Stout V. People, 4 Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 
 71, 128; Fraser v. State, 55 Ga. 325, 
 327; People V. Parmclee, 112 Mich. 
 291, 70 N. W. 577; State v. Chase, 68 
 Vt. 405, 35 Atl. 336; People v. Bero- 
 bute, 196 N. Y. 293, 89 X. E. 837. 
 
 ""State V. Page, 212 Mo. 224, no 
 S. W. 1057; Young V. State, 54 Tc.\. 
 Cr. 417, 113 S. W. 276. 
 
 "Morrison v. Commonwealth 
 < Ky.), 74 S. W. 277, 24 Ky. L. 2493; 
 Copcland v. State (Fla. 1909), 50 So. 
 621. 
 
 '"People V. Wright, 144 Cal. lOi, 
 77 Pac. 877- 
 
 "State V. L«-nfz, 45 .Minn. 177, iHo, 
 47 N'. VV. 720. 
 
 " Binns v. State, 57 In<l. 46, 32, 26 
 \in. 4K. 
 
 "The witness cannot testify to the 
 liad conduct of accused where the 
 basis of his evidence is only hearsay. 
 State V. McNamara, 212 Mo. 150, no 
 S. W. 1067; Commonwealth v. How- 
 ard (Mass. 1910), 91 X. E. 397. 
 
 "* Siberry v. State, 133 Ind. 677, 33 
 X. E. 681, 683; Burley v. State, 130 
 Ga. 343, 60 S. E. 1006; Nordan v. 
 State, 143 -Ala. 13, 39 So. 406; dem- 
 ons V. State, 93 Miss. 244, 45 So. 
 834; Green v. State, 125 Ga. 742, 54 
 S. E. 724 (various acts of ill treat- 
 ment need not be proved by same 
 witness") : Roberts v. State, 123 Ga. 
 146, 51 S. E. 374; Owen v. State, 52 
 Tex. Cr. 65, 105 S. W. 513; State v. 
 BIydcn1)urg, 135 Iowa 264, 112 X. W. 
 634; Fowler v. State, 155 .Ala. 21, 45 
 .So. 913. See State v. Cummings, 189 
 Mo. 626, 88 S. W. 706. 
 
 "Johnson v. State, 94 .Ala. 35, 40, 
 10 So. 6C)7; Wilkerson v. State, 31 
 Tex. Cr. 86, 90, 19 S. W. 903; Slate 
 V. Legg. 59 W. Va. 315. 53 S. F.. 545, 
 3 L. R. A. (S. S.) 115211; .Sasscr v. 
 State, 129 Ga. S4'. 59 S- I*-- ^5.S.
 
 ji; 3^4 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 568 
 
 her murder, if it ajipcars that he knew of it, but not otherwise. 
 And evidence that the wife of the accused shortly prior to the 
 homicide confessed to her husl^and that she had been guiUy of 
 adultery with decedent is relevant to show the motix'e of the ac- 
 cused wliich prompted him to commit the alleged criminal act.'" 
 
 § 324. Competency of evidence showing the habits, character and 
 disposition of the deceased. — ICvidence of the quiet, peaceable dis- 
 position, or sober and industrious habits of the deceased, or of 
 his general reputation as a good man or worthy citizen cannot 
 be proved in advance. These are relevant to rebut the presumption 
 which may result from an attack on his character by the accused." 
 The rule is also well settled that the reputation of the deceased 
 for turbulence, recklessness or violence is inadmissible, unless the 
 circumstances of the case at least raise a doubt whether the pris- 
 oner acted in self-defense. A murderer is not excusable merely 
 because the person murdered was a bad man.'^^ 
 
 '" Shipp V. Commonwealth, 124 Ky. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 54, 79 S. W. 565 ; 
 
 643, 99 S. W. 945, 30 Ky. L. 904, ID State v. Lejeune, 116 La. 193, 40 So. 
 
 L. R. A. (N. S.) 33Sn. 632; Pettis v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 66, 
 
 " Roten V. State, 31 Fla. 514, 523, 81 S. W. 312; State v. Peterson, 149 
 
 12 So. 910; Lemons v. State, 97 N. Car. 533, 63 S. E. 87. 
 
 Tenn. 560, 37 S. W. 552 ; Ben v. " Wise v. State, 2 Kan. 419, 85 Am. 
 
 State, S7 Ala. 103; Chase v. State, 46 Dec. 595; People v. Lamb, 2 Keyes 
 
 Miss. 683, 707; Pound v. State, 43 (N. Y.) 360, 365, 372; People v. 
 
 Ga. 88, 128; Bowman v. State (Tex., Murray, 10 Cal. 309, 310; People v. 
 
 1893), 21 S. W. 48; State V. Potter, Edwards, 41 Cal. 640: State v. Thaw- 
 
 13 Kan. 414, 424; People v. Powell, ley, 4 flarr. (Del.) 562; State v. Rid- 
 87 Cal. 348, 363, 25 Pac. 481, II L. die, 20 Kan. 711, 715; State v. Jack- 
 R. A. 75 ; People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich, son, 12 La. Ann. 679 ; Pritchett v. 
 9, 97 Am. Dec. i62n; Parker v. Com- State, 22 Ala. 39, 58 Am. Dec. 250; 
 monwealth, 96 Ky. 212, 28 S. W. 500, Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 2 Gray 
 16 Ky. L. 449; State v. Nash, 45 La. (i\Iass.) 294; Commonwealth v. Fer- 
 
 Ann. 974, 13 So. 265; Weaver v. 
 State, 83 Ark. 119, 102 S. W. 713; 
 Tribble v. State, 145 Ala. 23, 40 So. 
 938; Bloomer v. State, 75 Ark. 297, 
 
 rigan, 44 Pa. St. 386, 388; State v. 
 Field, 14 Me. 244, 248, 249, 31 Am. 
 Dec. 52; Wesley v. State, 37 Miss. 
 327, 349, 75 Am. Dec. 62; State v. 
 
 87 S. W. 438; Woods V. State, 90 Jackson, 17 Mo. 544, 548, 59 Am. Dec. 
 
 Miss. 245, 43 So. 433; Council v. 
 State, 45 Tex. Cr. 142, 75 S. W. 512; 
 Keith V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 63, 94 S. 
 W. 1044; Jones V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 
 206. 106 S. W. 126; Kirby v. State, 
 151 Ala. 66, 44 So. 38; Moore v. 
 
 281; Dock's Case, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 
 909, 911, State V. Tilly, 3 Ired. (N. 
 Car.) 424, 435: State v. Barfield, 8 
 Ired. (X. Car.) 344, 349: Franklin v. 
 State, 29 Ala. 14, 17, 19: Miers v. 
 State, 34 Tex. Cr. 161, 29 S. W. 1074,
 
 569 HOMICIDE. " § 324 
 
 But when the evidence tends to show, in the slightest degree, 
 lliat the kilhng was in self-defense, or shows a hostile demonstra- 
 tion hy the deceased against the accused at the time of the killing, 
 or even leaxes it in doubt who was the aggressor, it is always 
 relevant to show that the deceased was a quarrelsome, desperate 
 
 and revengeful man.''' provided it also appears that his reputation 
 
 5.^ Am. St. 705; Jenkins v. State, 80 State v. Zellers, 2 Halst. (X. Y.) 
 Md. "/Z, 30 Atl. 566; State v. Stew- 220, 230; State v. Dumphe3% 4 r^Iinn. 
 art, 47 La. Ann. 410, 16 So. 945; Ro- 438; Sindram v. People, 88 N. Y. 
 ten V. State, 31 Fla. 514, 523, 12 So. ig6; State v. Lull, 48 Vt. 581; 
 910: Gardner v. State, 90 Ga. 310, 17 Pfomer v. People, 4 Park. Cr. (N. 
 S. E. 86, 35 Am. St. 202; Evers v. Y.) 558, 570-581, citing cases; Tif- 
 State, 31 Tex. Cr. 318, 20 S. W. 744, fany v. Commonwealth. 121 Pa. St. 
 yj Am. St. 811, 18 L. R. A. 421; 165, 15 Atl. 462. 6 Am. St. 775; Rapp 
 Commonwealth v. Stracsser, 153 Pa. v. Commonwealth, 14 B. Mon. (Ky.) 
 St. 451, 456, 26 Atl. 17; Davidson v. 614; State v. Home, 9 Kan. 119; 
 State, 135 Ind. 254, 261, 34 X. E. 972. Smith v. United States, 161 U. S. 85, 
 See also, Ffomer v. People, 4 Park. 40 L. ed. 626, 16 Sup. Ct. 483 ; State 
 Cr. ex. Y.) 558, 570-5/1, where all v. Dill, 48 S. Car. 249, 26 S. E. 567; 
 the important cases are discussed and State v. Thompson, 49 Ore. 46, 88 
 harmonized. Patterson v. State Pac. 583, 124 Am. St. ioi5n; Com- 
 156 -Ala. 62, 47 So. 52; Earles v. monweallh v. Tircinski. 189 Mass. 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. 140, to6 S. W. 138; 257, 75 X. E. 261, 2 L. R. A. (X. S.) 
 State V. Churchill, 52 Wash. 210, 100 i02n ; Moseley v. State, 89 Miss. 802, 
 Pac. 309. Evidence of bad character 41 So. 384; People v. Rodawald, 177 
 of deceased, 2 L. R. A. (X. S.) 102, X. Y. 408, 70 X. E. i; State v. 
 note; 3 L. R. A. (X. S.") 351, note. Feeley, 194 Vlo. 300, 92 S. W. 663, 
 Specific instances to prove character, 112 Am. St. 511, 3 L. R. A. (X. S.) 
 14 L. R. A. (X. S.) 689, note. 35in; Humber v. Commonwealth 
 '"Perry v. State, 94 .-Ma. 25, 30. 10 (Ky.), 102 S. W. 1179, 31 Ky. L. 606; 
 So. 650; People v. Anderson, 39 Cal. Kiplcy v. People, 215 111. 358, 74 X. 
 703, 704; Roten v. State, 31 Fla. 514, E. 379; Teague v. State, 120 Ala. 309, 
 l^2S, \2 So. 910; People V. Harris, 95 25 So. 309; State v. Zorn, 202 Mo. 12, 
 Mich. 87, 91, 54 X. W. 648; State v. 100 S. W. 591; Morrison v. Common- 
 Matthews, 78 X. Car. 523, 530; Brow- wealth (Ky.), 74 S. W. 277, 24 Ky. 
 ncll v. People, 38 Mich, "js^; State L. 2493; State v. Banner, 149 X. Car. 
 v. Kcnyon, 18 R. I. 217. 26 Atl. 199; 519, (i^ S. E. 84; State v. Dunlap, 
 I-'ranklin v. State, 29 .Xla. 14, 17, 19; 149 X. Car. 550, 63 S. E. 164; State 
 I-'iclfls v. State, 47 Ala. 603, 11 .Am. v. Fisher, 149 X. Car. 557, 63 S. E. 
 771; State V. Collins, 32 Iowa 36; State 153; State v. Sliafcr, 22 Mnnt. 17. 55 
 V. Pcffers, 80 Iowa 580, 583, 46 X. Pac. 526; Lawson v. State, 155 .Ma. 
 \V. 662; State V. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 44, 46 So. 259. I-'vidoiice of habits 
 -•4. 3 .S. W. 2ig; State v. Claude, 35 and disposition, i-lllintt Evidence, 
 La. .-\nn. 71, 74. 75; May v. People, § 3040; evidence of |)liysicnl coiidi- 
 8 Colo. 210, 227, 228,6, Pac. 816; lion, Elliott Evidence, § 3025.
 
 ^^ 325 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 0/* 
 
 as such was known to the defenchmt/" The evidence of the char- 
 acter of the deceased must not be too remote or it may be excluded 
 as irrelevant. It is his character for peace and quietude at the 
 date of the homicide which is relevant."^ 
 
 ^ 325. Nature of the proof required to show character of deceased. 
 — The majorit}- of the cases reject evidence to prove the actual 
 moral character or disposition of the deceased, /. c, his inclina- 
 tion to do right, but admit his reputation in evidence, that is, the 
 general knowledge or opinion of his character and disposition 
 which i)re\"ails among his neighbors and acciuaintances.*"' The 
 
 ■■* People V. Powell, ^~ Cal. 348, 36.3, 
 
 25 Fac. 481, II L. R. A. 75; People 
 V. Lamb, 2 Keyes (N. Y.) 360, 364; 
 State V. Kcnnade, 121 Mo. 405, 415, 
 
 26 S. W. 347 ; State v. Nash, 45 La. 
 Ann. 974, 13 So. 265; State v. Rol- 
 lins, 113 N. Car. 722, 18 S. E. 394; 
 Commonwealth v. Stracsser, 153 Pa. 
 St. 451, 26 Atl. 17; McGowan v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 117 S. W. 387; 
 Arnwine v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 477, 99 
 S. W. 97; State V. Roderick, yy Ohio 
 St. 301, 82 X. E. 1082; State v. Ronk, 
 91 Minn. 419, 98 N. W. 334. "The 
 general principle, then, is this : not 
 that it is lawful coolly to attack 
 and kill a person of ferocious and 
 blood-thirsty character, * * * but 
 that, whenever it is shown that a 
 person honestly and non-negligently 
 believed himself attacked, it is ad- 
 missible for him to put in evi- 
 dence whatever could show the bona 
 fides of his belief. He may prove 
 that the person assailing him had 
 with him burglar's instruments, or 
 was armed with deadly weapons, or 
 had been lurking in the neighbor- 
 hood on other plans of violence" 
 * * * and may reason, "this man 
 now attacking me is a notorious ruf- 
 fian, he has no peaceable business 
 with me; his character and relations 
 
 forl^d any other conclusion than tliat 
 his present attack is felonious." 
 Wharton Cr. Ev., § 69. 
 
 "As a general principle such evi- 
 dence is inadmissible. When admis- 
 sible, it must be in a case where the 
 defendant had reason to be in fear 
 of his life, or had reasonable ground 
 to apprehend great bodily harm. 
 * * * .A.gain, it is fundamental to 
 the admission of this class of testi- 
 mony in a proper case, that knowl- 
 edge of the character of the de- 
 ceased must be brought home to the 
 knowledge of the defendant himself. 
 It might be presumed that a man 
 would know the character of his 
 wife in this respect. Yet, I think 
 this would not dispense with the rule, 
 that it should affirmatively appear 
 that the defendant had such knowl- 
 edge." People v. Lamb, 2 Keyes (X. 
 Y.) 360, 364. 
 
 "State v. Pettit, 119 Mo. 410, 41S, 
 24 S. W. 1014; Brooks v. State, 85 
 Ark. 376, 108 S. W. 205. 
 
 ^ People v. .'\nderson, 39 Cal. 703, 
 705 ; State v. Turpin, yy N. Car. 473, 
 478, 24 Am. 455; Moriarity v. State, 
 62 Miss. 654, 661 ; State v. Riddle, 20 
 Kan. 711, 714; Thomas v. People, 6y 
 X\ Y. 2x8, 222; Abbott v. People, 86 
 X. Y. 460, 470; State v. Ford, 37 La.
 
 ^71 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 § 3^5 
 
 reputation of the deceased for vindictivenesr. or quarrelsomeness 
 cannot be shown by proxing specific acts of violence^to third per- 
 sons."^ or acts of violence unless so connected with the fatal ren- 
 contre as to produce a reasonable apprehension of grievous bodily 
 harm/* as, for example, that he was an escaped convict, or that 
 ];e had threatened to shoot or kill a third person. ^^ The prosecu- 
 tion may show that deceased was unarmed wdien killed, but not 
 that he was in the habit of going unarmed and had refused to 
 arm himself.*" Nor can the prosecution put in evidence that the 
 deceased was not in the habit of tising vulgar and profane Ian- 
 
 Ann. 443, 460; State v. Kenyon, 18 
 R. I. 217, 26 Atl. 199; State v. Smith, 
 12 Rich. (S. Car.) 430, 441; Payne 
 V. Commonweahh, i Met. (Ky.) 370, 
 397; State V. Keefe, 54 Kan. 197, 203, 
 204, 38 Pac. 302; Dukes v. State, 11 
 Ind. 557, 565, 71 Am. Dec. 370; 
 Keener v. State, 18 Ga. 194, 222- 
 224, 63 Am. Dec. 269; Commonwealth 
 V. Hoskins (Ky.), 35 S. W. 284. 18 
 Ky. L. 59; Stalcup v. State, 146 Ind. 
 270, 45 N. E. 334; Elliott Evidence, 
 § 30.38; 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 708, 
 note. Contra, State v. Brown, 63 
 Mo. 439, 443 ; Marts v. State, 26 Ohio 
 St. 162, 168, admitting evidence of 
 disposition. Weaver v. State, 83 
 Ark. 119, 102 S. W. 713; Brownlee v. 
 State, 48 Tex. Cr. 408, 87 S. W. 
 1 1 53 ; Kennedy v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 102 S. W. 863, 31 Ky. L. 546. 
 "People V. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 361, 
 25 Pac. 481, II L. R. A. 75; .State v. 
 Dean, 72 S. Car. 74, 51 S. E. 524; 
 -McCoy V. State, 91 Miss. 257, 44 So. 
 H14; People V. Gaimari, 176 X. Y. 84, 
 68 X. E. 112; People v. Rodawald, 
 r77 N. Y. 408, 70 X. E. i; Warrick 
 V. State, 125 Ga. 133, 53 S. E. 1027; 
 Smith V. State, 142 Ala. 14, 39 So. 
 ^J()■, State V. Roderick, 77 Ohio St. 
 wi. 82 N. E. 1082, 14 L. R. A. (X. 
 .S.) 704n; Ilardj^ravcs v. State 
 88 Ark. 2<jr, 114 S. W. 216; Sturgeon 
 
 v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 102 S. W. 
 812, 31 Ky. L. 536. 
 
 ^*Ferrel v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 23 S. W. 344, 15 Ky. L. 321; Eggler 
 V. People, 56 N. Y. 642, 643; People 
 V. Druse, 103 N. Y. 655, 656, 8 N. E. 
 733; Campbell v. State, 38 Ark. 498; 
 Garrett v. State, 97 Ala. 18, 25, 14 
 So. 327; Dupree v. State, 33 Ala. 
 380, 387, 73 Am. Dec. 422; Xichols 
 V. People, 23 Hun (X. Y.) 165, 167; 
 Croom V. State, 90 Ga. 430, 434, 17 
 S. E. 1003; State v. Jones, 134 Mo. 
 254, 35 S. W. 607; State v. Peffers, 
 80 Iowa 580, 583, 46 X. W. 662 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Smith, 9 Cal. App. 644, 99 Pac. 
 I hi; Dean v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 78 S. W. 1 1 12, 25 Ky. L. 1876; Cole 
 V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 89, loi S. W. 
 218; St. Clair v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 
 479, 92 S. W. 1095; State v. Foster, 
 136 Iowa 527, 114 X. W. 36; Cole v. 
 State, 48 Tex. Cr. 439, 88 S. W. 341 : 
 United States v. Dcnsmore, 12 X. 
 Mex. 99, 75 Pac. 31 ; Darter v. State, 
 39 Tex. Cr. 40, 44 S. W. 850; State 
 v. Andrews, 73 S. Car. 257, 53 S. E. 
 423 ; Sneed v. Territory, 16 Okla. 
 641, 86 Pac. 70. 
 
 "Jenkins v. State, 80 Md. 72, 30 
 Atl. 566; Ryan v. State (Tex., 1896). 
 35 S. W. 288. 
 
 " People V. Powell, 87 Cal. 348, 363. 
 25 Pac. 481, II L. R. A. 75; Jackson
 
 § 3-6 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 57 J 
 
 guage or that lie was a good church member/''''' In a case where 
 the accused , alleges that the killing was in self-defense he may 
 prove that the deceased was in the habit of carrying a pistol or 
 other concealed weapon. But as a preliminary to such evidence the 
 accused must show some justification and must also show that he 
 had knowledge of the habit of the deceased in carrying weapons/^ 
 In some states the threats of the deceased or his dangerous, vio- 
 lent or vindictive character are only admissible when it is proved 
 that, at the time of the homicide, he assaulted the accused, in- 
 dulged in hostile demonstrations against him or did some act 
 indicating a purpose to do him serious bodily harm.""' Mere evi- 
 dence of an overt act, not amounting to proof, is not enough. 
 Whether an overt act has been proved is a preliminary question 
 bearing on the competency of evidence, and is for the judge. 
 His determination is conclusive.'*" But it has been held that the 
 court cannot exclude evidence of bad character and threats un- 
 less it is satisfied, not only that no overt act has been proved, but 
 that there is no evidence from which an overt act can be inferred. 
 If the evidence of an overt act is confiicting, it should go to the 
 jury with evidence of the bad reputation and threats.''*' The overt 
 act must have been against the accused and not a third person.''* 
 
 § 326. Evidence of threats by the deceased. — Evidence of threats 
 by the deceased, whether made to the accused or to others, and 
 
 V. State, 41 So. 178, 147 Ala. 699, not 333; Hill v. State (^liss., 1895), 16 
 
 reported in full ; Moore v. State, 86 So. 901 ; Travers v. United States, 6 
 
 Miss. 160, 38 So. 504. App. D. C. 450; Smith v. State, 142 
 
 **a Bowles V. Commonwealth, 103 Ala. 14, 39 So. 329 : Roch v. State, 
 
 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 527. 52 Te.x. Cr. 48, 105 S. \V. 202; Green 
 
 "'Gibbs V. State, 156 Ala. 70, 47 v. State, 143 Ala. 2, 39 So. 362. 
 
 So. 65 ; State v. Exum, 138 X. Car. ^ State v. Ford, 37 La, Ann. 443, 
 
 599, 50 S. E. 283; Sims v. State, 139 460. 
 
 Ala. 74, 36 So. 138, loi Am. St. 17; "' State v. Abbott, 8 \V. Va. 741. 
 
 Jackson v. State, 41 So. 178, 147 Ala. 759; Hawthorne v. State, 61 Miss. 
 
 699, not reported in full; Common- 749, 753; Smith v. State, 75 Miss, 
 
 wealth V. Booker (Ky.), 76 S. W. 542, 23 So. 260; McHugh v. Terri- 
 
 S3S, 25 Ky. L. 1025; Warrick v. State, tory, 17 Okla. i, 86 Pac. 433. 
 
 125 Ga. 133, 53 S. E. 1027; Rodgers "' ^loriarity v. State, 62 Miss. 654, 
 
 V. State, 144 Ala. 32, 40 So. 572. 661 ; White v. Commonwealth, 125 
 
 *^ State V. King, 47 La. Ann. 28, 16 Ky. 699, 102 S. W. 298, 1199, 31 Ky. 
 
 So. 566; West V. State, 18 Tex. .App. L. 271, 720. 
 640, 652; Eiland v. State, 52 Ala. 322,
 
 D/0 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 § 3^6 
 
 communicated to him, is always admissible to show the defend- 
 ant's motive. If the evidence tends to show that the killing was 
 in self-defense, threats may be proved to show that the accused 
 believed he was in imminent danger of death or wounding by the 
 deceased.^" The accused may prove the existence of a conspiracy 
 to kill or assault him in which deceased participated. If the homi- 
 cide occurred in an affray growing out of the conspiracy, he may 
 prove the acts and threats of any or all the conspirators as the 
 acts and declarations of the deceased, for tlie same purposes that 
 threats actually made by the deceased may be shown. *'^ The gen- 
 eral rule permits the communicated threats of the deceased to be 
 pro\-ed, though no evidence of any overt act is offered. °* But 
 threats are inadmissible if it indubitably appears that the accused 
 was the aggressor, or that he had no reasonable grounds for ap- 
 prehending an attack when he killed the deceased.''^ Usually there 
 
 ■^ Pate V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 462, 
 113 S. W. 759; State V. Rideau, 116 
 La. 245, 40 So. 691 ; State v. Barks- 
 dale, 122 La. 788, 48 So. 264; State 
 V. Coleman, 119 La. 669, 44 So. 338; 
 Dunn V. State, 143 Ala. 67, 39 So. 
 147; Bluett V. State, 151 Ala. 41, 44 
 So. 84 ; Sue v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 122, 
 :o5 S. W. 804; State v. Doris, 51 
 Ore. 136, 94 Pac. 44, 16 L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) 66on ; State v. Jackinan, 29 Nev. 
 403, 91 Pac. 143; Fleming v. State, 
 150 Ala. 19, 43 So. 219; State v. 
 Ilanlon, 38 Mont. 557, 100 Pac. 1035; 
 Martin v. State, 144 Ala. 8, 40 So. 
 275; State V. Scaduto, 74 X. J. L. 
 289, 65 Atl. 908; Xeathery v. People, 
 227 111. no, 81 X. E. 16; State v. 
 Turpin, 77 X. Car. 473, 480; State v. 
 Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741, 759; State v. 
 Gainor, 84 Iowa 209, 214, 50 X. \V. 
 947; State V. Dodson, 4 Ore. 64, 68, 
 69: KinK V. State, 55 Ark. 604, 607, 
 19 S. W. no; Lewis v. Common- 
 wealth, 78 Va. 732, 735; Eiland v. 
 State, 52 .Ma. 322, 333; State v. Rol)- 
 ertson, 30 La. .Xnn. 340, 341; Haw- 
 thorne V. State, 61 Miss. 749, 75-'; 
 
 Dickson v. State, 39 Ohio St. 73, 78; 
 Wood V. State, 92 Ind. 269, 273-275 ; 
 Pitman v. State, 22 Ark. 354, 357; 
 Wallace v. United States, 162 U. S. 
 466, 40 L. ed. 1039, 16 Sup. Ct. 859; 
 State V. Sullivan, 43 S. Car. 205, 21 
 S. E. 4; Grayson v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 35 S. W. 1035, 18 Ky. L. 205; 
 Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 
 232; Henson v. State, 112 Ala. 41, 21 
 So. 79; Underbill on Ev., pp. 27 
 and 69. 
 
 "^Williams v. People, 54 111. 422, 
 423, 426; People V. Lee Chuck. 74 
 Cal. 30, 35, 36, 15 Pac. 322; State v. 
 Hennessy, 29 Nev. 320, 90 Pac. 221 ; 
 State V. Lindsay, 122 La. 375, 47 So. 
 687: Dranc v. State, 92 Miss. 180, 
 45 So. 149. 
 
 "State V. Abbott, 8 W. Va. 741. 
 759; State V. Powell, 5 Penn. (Del.) 
 24, 61 Atl. 966; Hammond v. State, 
 147 Ala. 79. 41 So. 761. 
 
 »° Steele v. State. 3.3 Fla. 348. 14 
 So. 841: State V. Spell, 38 La. Ann. 
 20, 22; Moriarity v. State, 62 Miss. 
 654, 661 : I'.al! v. State, 20 Tex. .'\pp. 
 107, 125, 14 S. W. 1012; Payne v.
 
 ^ 3^6 
 
 CRIMINAL KVIDKXCE. 
 
 574 
 
 must be some overt act of violence on the part of the deceased suf- 
 licient to raise the issue of self-defense."'"'' I^he admissibility of 
 threats usually depends on the fact that they were communicated 
 to the accused before the homicide."" But uncommunicatod 
 threats may be recei\'ed to corroborate those communicated.''' 
 and to show the mental condition of the deceased toward the ac- 
 cused where there is doul)t who was the aggressor. Sometimes 
 the former may be regarded as of the res gcsfcc, explaining some 
 act already in evidence, as, for example, to show the mental state 
 of the deceased when the question is. did he intend to harm the 
 accused, and was he the attacking party in the affray during which 
 he was killed? Uncommunicated threats are then relevant to 
 show he provoked the affray, or to explain the intention with 
 wliich he participated in it, or to illustrate the character of the 
 attack.""* Evidence from the accused showing the communication 
 
 State, 60 Ala. 80, 87; State v. Guy, 
 69 Mo. 430, 435 ; Hill V. State ( Miss., 
 1894), 16 So. 901; People V. Lynch, 
 lor Cal. 229, 231, 35 Pac. 860; State 
 V. Reed, 137 Mo. 125, 38 S. W. 574; 
 State V. Nocton, 121 Mo. 537, 552, 26 
 S. W. 551 ; State v. Vaughan, 22 
 Xev. 285, 39 Pac. 733; State v. King, 
 47 La. Ann. 28, 16 So. 566; State v. 
 Fontenot, 48 La. Ann. 305, 19 So. 
 Ill : State v. Barber, 13 Idaho 65, 88 
 Pac. 418; State v. Peace, 121 La. 107, 
 47 So. 28; Brooks v. State, 85 Ark. 
 376, 108 S. W. 20s; Smith V. State, 
 142 Ala. 14, 39 So. 329; State v. 
 Birks, 199 Mo. 263, 97 S. W. 578; 
 Kirby v. State, 151 Ala. 66, 44 So. 38; 
 Dunn V. State, 143 Ala. 67, 39 So. 
 147; Oates V. State, 156 Ala. 99, 47 
 So. 74; State V. Bouvy, 124 La. 1054, 
 50 So. 849; Reed v. State (Okla. Cr. 
 App. T909), 103 Pac. 1042. 
 
 "a State V. Hanlon, 38 Mont. 557, 
 100 Pac. 1035. 
 
 "" Henson v. State. 120 Ala. 316. 25 
 So. 23; State V. Quinn (Wash. 1909). 
 105 Pac. 818. 
 
 "'Wilson V. State, 140 Ala. 43, 37 
 So. 93; State V. Kelleher. 201 Mo. 
 614, 100 S. W. 470; Tetterton v. 
 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 89 S. W. 8, 
 28 Ky. L. 146; Neathery v. People, 
 227 111. no, 81 N. E. 16; State v. 
 Edwards, 203 Mo. 528, 102 S. W. 520; 
 State V. Byrd, 121 N. Car. 684, 28 S. 
 K- 353; State V. Thomas, in La. 804, 
 35 So. 914; State V. Nix, in La. 812, 
 35 So. 917; Commonwealth v. 
 Thomas (Ky.), 104 S. W. 326. 31 
 Ky. L. 899; State v. Blee, 133 Iowa 
 725, ui X. W. 19; State v. Davis, 
 123 La. 133, 48 So. 771. 
 
 "* State V. Downs, 91 Mo. 19, 25, 3 
 S. W. 219; People V. Travis, 56 Cal. 
 251, 253, 254; Stokes V. People, 53 
 \. Y. 164. 165. 13 Am. 492; Mayfield 
 V. State, no Ind. 591, 594, n N. E. 
 618; Leverich v. State, 105 Ind. 277, 
 280, 4 X. E. 852; Martin v. State. 5 
 Ind. App. 453, 456, 32 N. E. 594: 
 State v. Turpin, 77 N. Car. 473, 480, 
 24 Am. 455 ; Hart v. Commonwealth, 
 8s Ky. 77, 80, 2 S. W. 673. 8 Ky. L. 
 714, 7 Am. St. 576; State v. Labuzan, 
 37 La. Ann. 489; Little v. State, 6 
 Baxt. (Tenn.) 491, 493: Dickson v. 
 vStatc. 39 Ohio St. 73, 76; State v. 
 Faile. 43 S. Car. 52, 20 S. E. 798; 
 Garner v. State, 28 Fla. 113, 9 So.
 
 V J 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 § 3-2/ 
 
 to him of a threat does not permit him to testify that he then said 
 lie had never injured the deceased and intended to avoid trouhk> 
 with him."'' A witness, called to prove threats, may state his repl_\' 
 tliereto as a part of the res gcstcc.'^"" Bnt he cannot he allowed to 
 express an opinion that the threats ha\'e heen carried into execu- 
 tion. That question is for the determination of the jury.^ Evi- 
 dence to prove threats must tend directly to show an intention to 
 injure the accused by violence. A statement by the deceased that 
 he is prejudiced against the accused is not a threat.- In conclu- 
 sion it may be said tliat declarations of peaceful intent by the de- 
 ceased communicated to the accused are competent to rebut 
 evidence of prex'ious threats by the deceased.'' 
 
 ;j 327. Evidence to prove the peaceable character of the accused. — 
 The rules regulating evidence of character in criminal cases are 
 applicable.* The state cannot attack the character of the defend- 
 ant in the first instance,''"' though it may do so after he has sought 
 to prove his good character. An accused person may always offer 
 evidence of his reputation, as a quiet, peaceable and inoffensive 
 man wherever the fact that he committed the homicide, or. if he 
 admits that he did commit it, the criminal intent, is in doubt iqx^n 
 the whole evidence.'' The state must not l)e permitted to intro- 
 
 •*^.35, 29 .'Km. St. 232; Brown v. State, 
 55 Ark. 593, 603. 18 S. W. 1051; 
 State V. Helm, 92 Iowa 540, 61 N. W. 
 246; State V. Gushing, 74 Wash. 527, 
 45 Pac. 14s, 53 Am. St. 883; Wig- 
 gins V. Utah, 93 U. S. 465, 2;i L. ed. 
 941 ; Campbell v. People, 16 111. 17, 
 ()i Am. Dec. 49n ; Princ v. State, 73 
 .Miss. 838, 19 So. 711; Newton v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 102 S. W. 
 264, 31 Ky. L. 327; Hargis v. Com- 
 mrmwealth (Ky., 1909), 123 S. W. 
 239. 
 
 ".Angus V. State, 29 Tex. .Ai)]). 52, 
 
 ■ S. W. 44.3. 
 "People V. PalnKT, 105 Mich. 56S, 
 63 \. VV. 656. 
 
 ' State V. Coella, 3 Wash. St. 99, 
 28 Pac. 28. 
 
 ' State V. VVvse. .33 S. Car. 582, 594, 
 S. E. 556. 
 
 ■'Taylor v. State, 121 Ga. 348, 49 S. 
 E. 303- 
 
 * Supra, cliap. VI 1. 
 
 ° State V. Lodge, 9 lloust. (Del.) 
 342, 33 Atl. 312; People V. Smith 
 (Cal. App.), 99 Pac. 11 11; Sims v. 
 State, 38 Tex. Cr. 637, 44 S. W. =,22 : 
 State V. Richardson, 194 Mo. 3^6, 92 
 S. W. 649; State V. Frederickson. 8r 
 Kan. 854, 106 Pac. 1061. The state 
 may introduce evidence of the liad 
 reputation of the accused in rebuttal 
 where he attempts to justify tlie 
 Iiomicide nn tlic groinid that the de- 
 ceased was attempting to ruin his 
 daughter and he was protecting her. 
 Gossett V. State, 123 Ga. 431, 51 S. !■".. 
 
 .W4- 
 
 "Warren v. State, 3r Tex. Cr. 573, 
 57(i. 21 S. W. r.yo; Walker v. Stale. 
 102 Ind. 502, 50(j, I .\'. !•'. 85(); Slate
 
 ^^ 3^8 
 
 CRI.MIXAL EVIDENCE, 
 
 576 
 
 (luce e\'i(lence of the l)a(l (lis])osition of the accused as chs- 
 tinguished from his reputation,' nor may it show that he pos- 
 sessed a nerA'Ous temperaiuent, was excita])le and eccentric," or 
 Hkely to resent in a \'iolcnl manner an indecent and insulting mes- 
 sage, or that he has heen guihy of particuhu^ acts of bad conduct. 
 ;\.ll such evidence is equally irrelevant to show guilt. 
 
 ^ 328. Threats by the accused — General nature of these threats. — 
 
 Evidence of threats made by the accused, or by a co-defendant in 
 the presence of the accused, or, if in his absence, subsequent to the 
 date when a conspiracy existed,'' prior to the killing, is always 
 relevant to show malice, or, when made long before, to show 
 deliberation and premeditation.^" It is immaterial that the threats 
 
 V. Cross, 68 Iowa 180, 195, 26 X. W. 
 62; Hall V. State, 132 Ind. 317, 323, 
 31 N. E. 536; McCarty v. People, 51 
 111. 231, 232, 99 Am. Dec. 542; Mc- 
 Daniel v. State, 8 Sm. & M. (Miss.) 
 401, 405, 47 Am. Dec. 93; People v. 
 Van Gaasbeck, 118 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 511, 103 N. Y. S. 249, aff'd, 189 N. Y. 
 408, 82 X. E. 718; State v. Dicker- 
 son, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 X. E. 969, 122 
 Am. St. 479. U L- R- A. (X. S.) 
 341 ; Maston v. State, 83 Miss. 647, 36 
 So. 70; Elliott Evidence, § 3039. Evi- 
 dence of good reputation of defend- 
 ant, 103 Am. St. 897, note. 
 
 ' Thomas v. People, 67 X. Y. 218, 
 223; Barnctt v. State (Ala., 1909), 51 
 So. 299. 
 
 * Commonweallli v. Clcary, 148 Pa. 
 St. 26, 23 Atl. 1 1 10. 
 
 "Ford V. State, 112 Ind. 373, 382, 14 
 N. E. 24T ; Rush v. State (Tex. Cr.), 76 
 S. W. 927; People V. Barthleman, 120 
 Cal. 7, 52 Pac. 112; State v. Wright, 
 T41 Mo. 333, 42 S. W. 934; Poole v. 
 State, 45 Tex. Cr. 348, 76 S. W. 565- 
 Previous circumstances, threats, prep- 
 aration and previous attempts, Elliott 
 Evidence, §§ 3035, 3036. Evidence of 
 being accused of threats by person 
 injured or killed, 17 L. R. A. 654, 
 note. Evidence of threats in prose- 
 
 cution for homicide, 89 Am. St. 691, 
 note. 
 
 "State v. Birdwell, 36 La. Ann. 
 850; Carr v. State, 23 Xeb. 749, 37 
 N. W. 630; Mathis v. State, 34 Tex. 
 Cr. 39, 28 S. W. 817; State v. Rash, 
 T2 Ired. (X. Car.) 382, 384, 55 Am. 
 Dec. 420; State v. Green, i Houst. 
 Cr. (Del.) 217; Griffin v. State, 90 
 Ala. 596, 599, 8 So. 670; State v. 
 Partlow, 90 Mo. 608, 609, 4 S. \V. 14, 
 59 Am. 31; State v. McCahill, 72 
 Iowa III, 117, 30 X. W. 553, 33 X. 
 W. 599; Goodwin v. State, 96 Ind. 
 550, 552; La Beau v. People, 34 X. Y. 
 223, 229; Westbrook v. People, 126 111. 
 81, 91, 18 X^ E. 304; Schoolcraft v. 
 People, IT7 111. 271, 7 X. E. 649; 
 Riggs v. State, 30 Miss. 635 ; Xichols 
 v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush (Ky.) 
 575, 580 ; State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330, 
 336; State V. Larkins, 5 Idaho 200, 
 47 Pac. 945 ; Brooks v. Common- 
 wealth, 100 Ky. 194, 37 S. W. 1043. 
 18 Ky. L. 702; Wilson v. State, no 
 Ala. I, 20 So. 415, 55 Am. St. 17; 
 Drake v. State, no Ala. 9, 20 So. 
 450; Allen v. State, ni Ala. 80, 20 
 So. 490; Phillips V. State, 62 Ark. 
 1 19, 34 S. W. 539 : People V. Evans 
 (Cal., 1895), 41 Pac. 444; Tuttle v.
 
 577 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 328 
 
 were not directed against the deceased individually/^ as where 
 they were made against a railroad company by which the de- 
 ceased was employed/- or against "anyone who hits A,"^^ against 
 a family by name/* or a class of men/^ as policemen/*' or non- 
 union men, to which class the deceased belong/" or against any 
 
 Commonwealth (Kj-.), ss S. W. 823, '^Benedict v. State, 14 Wis. 423, 
 
 17 K}-. L. 1 139; State v. Pain, 48 La. 426; Harrison v. State, 79 Ala. 29; 
 
 Ann. 311, 19 So. 138; Linehan v. State v. Harlan, 130 Mo. 381, 407, 32 
 
 State, 113 Ala. 70, 21 So. 497; Mc- S. W. 997; State v. Hymer, 15 Nev. 
 
 Daniel v. State, 100 Ga. 67, 27 S. E. 49; State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 518, 36 
 
 158; Underbill on Ev., §§ 5, 9, 52; Am. 89n; Friday v. State (Tex. Cr.), 
 
 Morris v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 515, 98 79 S. W. 815; Starr v. State, 160 Ind. 
 
 S. W. 873 ; State v. Feeley, 194 Mo. 661, 67 N. E. 527 ; McMahon v. State, 
 
 300, 92 S. W. 663, 112 Am. St. 511, 3 46 Tex. Cr. 540, 81 S. W. 296; State 
 
 L. R. A. (X. S.) 35in; State v. v. Exum, 138 X. Car. 599, 50 S. E. 
 
 King, 203 Mo. 560, 102 S. W. 515; 283; Bateson v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 
 
 Golatt V. State, 130 Ga. 18, 60 S. E. 34, 80 S. W. 88; Holland v. State 
 
 107; State V. Rideau, 116 La. 245, 40 55 Tex. Cr. 27, 115 S. W. 48; Wil- 
 
 So. 691 ; Washington v. State, 46 Hams v. State, 147 Ala. 10, 41 So. 992 ; 
 
 Tex. Cr. 184, 79 S. W. 811; People Hixon v. State, 130 Ga. 479, 61 S. 
 
 V. Gaimari, 176 X. Y. 84, 68 X^. E. E. 14; Hardy v. Commonwealth (Va., 
 
 112; State V. Fielding, 135 Iowa 255, 1910), 67 S. E. 522. 
 
 112 X". W. 539; Owen v. State, 52 " Xewton v. State, 92 Ala. S3, 36, 9 
 
 Tex. Cr. 65, 105 S. W. 513; Tipton So. 404. 
 
 V. State, 140 Ala. 39, 37 So. 231; "Jordan v. State, 79 Ala. 9, 12. 
 
 Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 120 Ky. "People v. Craig, iii Cal. 460, 44 
 
 697, 87 S. W. 1 106, 27 Ky. L. 1090; Pac. 186; State v. Belton, 24 S. Car. 
 
 -Miller v. State, 40 So. 342, 146 Ala. 185, 187, 190, 58 Am. 245 ; Hobbs v. 
 
 686, not reported in full; Glenn v. State, 86 Ark. 360, in S. W. 264; 
 
 State, 157 Ala. 12, 47 So. 1034; Bluett Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 So. 
 
 V. State, 151 Ala. 41, 44 So. 84; 274; George v. State, 145 Ala. 41, 40 
 
 Powers V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 92 So. 961, 117 Am. St. 17; People v. 
 
 S. W. 975, 29 Ky. L. 277; State v. Owen, 154 Mich. 571, 118 N. W. 590, 
 
 Allen, III La. 154, 35 So. 495; State 15 Det. Leg. N. 881, 21 L. R. A. (X. 
 
 V. Stratford, 149 X. Car. 483, 62 S. S.) 520. 
 
 E. 882; State V. Thompson, 127 Iowa "State v. Davis, 6 Idaho 159, 53 
 
 440, 103 X. W. 377; Graham v. State, Pac. 678; Commonwealth v. Lam- 
 
 125 Ga. 48, 53 S. E. 816; Johns v. tampa, 226 Pa. 23, 74 Atl. 736. 
 
 State, 46 Fla. 153, 35 So. 71; Jarvis " Di.xon v. State, 13 Fla. 636, 645: 
 
 V. State, 138 Ala. 17, 34 So. 1025; Whittaker v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 State V. Demming, 79 Kan. 526, 100 17 S. W. 358, 13 Ky. L. 504; State v. 
 
 Pac. 285; Blocker v. State, 55 Tex. Grant, 79 Mo. 113, 49 Am. 218. 
 
 Cr. 30, 114 S. W. 814; State v. Mc- "State v. Bailey, 190 Mo. 257. 88 
 
 Kcllar (S. Car., 1910), 67 S. E. 314; S. W. 733. Sec State v. Cochran. 
 
 Singleton v. State (Tex. Cr. .App. 147 Mo. 504, 49 S. W. 558, wIktc ac- 
 
 i<)0(j), 124 S. W. 92. cuscd said he would like to kill a 
 37 — Underiiill Crim. Ev.
 
 § 3^9 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 5/8 
 
 man whose attentions shonld be recei\'e(l by the woman witli 
 whom he was intimate/"* and one member only of the class or 
 family is slain by the accused. Under certain circumstances the 
 \ ague and uncertain threats of the accused may be shown to pro\e 
 the condition of his mind at the tijne of the crime. This rule 
 is applied to his declarations that he is going to kill somebody 
 without mentioning any names or that he is going to make trouble 
 or that he is going to shoot someone or similar indefinite threats 
 which indicate that he is in an ugly frame of mind and disposed 
 to commit some crime though not the particular crime for which 
 he is on trial.'" When, however, it clearly appears that the ac- 
 cused and the deceased were acquainted, and had always been 
 friends down to the homicide, general threats by the accused are 
 incompetent.^" So, too, a specific threat directed against one per- 
 son by name is not relevant on a trial for the homicide of an- 
 other,-' unless, perhai)s, when the threat has been executed and 
 the motive for the killing of both persons was the same."" 
 
 § 329. Form, character and mode of proving threats. — The rele- 
 vancy of threats depends largely upon the light they shed upon 
 previous malice or premeditation. Hence their remoteness in time 
 is no objection to their reception,"^ though it may, and indeed 
 
 Grand Army man and the deceased 105, 11 S. E. 814; State v. McCahill, 
 
 was not a Grand Army man. 72 Iowa in, S3 ^- W. 599; State v. 
 
 '* Brown v. State, 105 Ind. 385, 392; Compagnet, 48 La. Ann. 1470, 21 So. 
 
 Garrett v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 255, 106 46; Bradley v. State (Tex. Cr.), in 
 
 S. W. 389; Cardwell v. Common- S. W. 733; Stafford v. State, 50 Fla. 
 
 wealth (Ky.), 46 S. W. 705, 20 Ky. 134, 39 So. 106; Sprouse v. Common- 
 
 L. 496. wealth (Ky., 1909), n6 S. W. 344. 
 
 "State V. Brown, 188 Mo. 451, 87 ='Jefferds v. People, 5 Park. Cr. 
 
 S. W. 519; Helvenston v. State, 53 (N. Y.) 522 (two years); Redd v. 
 
 Tex. Cr. 636, ni S. W. 959; Burton State, 68 Ala. 492; Everett v. State, 
 
 V. State, IIS Ala. i, 22 So. 585. 62 Ga. 65; State v. Campbell, 35 S. 
 
 ""State V. Crabtrec, in Mo. 136, 20 Car. 28, 32, 14 S. E. 292; Goodwin 
 
 S. W. 7; State V. McGreevey (Idaho, v. State, 96 Ind. 550, 552; Graham 
 
 1909), 105 Pac. 1047. V. State, 125 Ga. 48, 53 S. E. 816; 
 
 -^Carr v. State, 23 Neb. 749, 761, 37 State v. Schuyler, 75 N. J. L. 487, 
 
 X. W. 630; Abernethy v. Common- 68 Atl. 56; People v. Johnson, 185 N. 
 
 wealth, loi Pa. St. 322, 330; People Y. 219, 77 N. E. 1164; State v. Dem- 
 
 V. Bezy, 67 Cal. 223, 7 Pac. 643; ming, 79 Kan. 526, 100 Pac. 285; 
 
 Clarke v. State, 78 Ala. 474, 56 Am. Rush v. State (Tex. Cr., 1907), 76 
 
 45. S. W. 927; Ward v. Commonwealth 
 
 "^'Woolfolk V. State, 85 Ga. 69, 104, (Ky.), 91 S. W. 700, 29 Ky. L. 62;
 
 579 HOMICIDE. § T^2C) 
 
 must, be considered In determining their weight as evidence of 
 existing intent.'-* For it is manifest that a threat made long prior 
 to the commission of a homicide may indicate that it was the 
 cuhnination and outcome of long-continued rancor rather than 
 the result of a sudden and momentary outburst of passion,-^ while 
 the fact that a threat is unrepeated and unexecuted for many 
 Aears may indicate that the feelings of hatred or revenge have 
 died out.-" The language used need not be specific as regards the 
 means by which, -^ or as to the time, place or manner in which, 
 \ iolence is to be inflicted. It is for the court to say whether the 
 utterance of the defendant imports a threat, and the cases go very 
 far in admitting as a threat any declaration which indicates, how- 
 ever vaguely and indefinitely, an intention on the part of the ac- 
 cused to inflict violence upon the deceased."^ Nor is it material 
 that the killing was accomplished by the use of means which 
 differ widely from those mentioned in the threat.-'" It is not nec- 
 essary that the witness should be able to relate the whole con- 
 versation of which the threat formed a part,^° or that the threat 
 should have been uttered in his presence, or to him, or that he 
 should have recognized the defendant's voice, if the evidence 
 shows that the accused and the deceased were so situated, as 
 respects the witness, that he must have heard all that was said,''' 
 as when he o\-erhears threats made by tlie deceased, who, while 
 into.xicated and alone, was talking to himself.''" It is always 
 
 State V. Rodriguez, 115 La. 1004, 40 "' Schoolcraft v. People, 117 111. 271, 
 
 So. 438; State V. Porter, 213 Mo. 43, 7 X. E. 649. 
 
 Ill S. W. 529, 127 Am. St. 589; State "'Drake v. State, no Ala. 9, 20 So. 
 
 V. Benjamin (R. L, 1908), 71 Atl. 450. In this case the defendant said 
 
 65. Evidence of threats in prosecu- to the deceased, "I will see you 
 
 tion for homicide, 89 .Am. St. 6g\, later." 
 
 note; .State v. Quinn (Wash., 1909), ™ La Beau v. People, 34 X. Y. 223, 
 
 105 Pac. 818. 229. 
 
 ■'State V. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330, ^,^7 '"State v. Oliver, 43 La. Ann. 1003, 
 
 f thirteen years); Erizzell v. State, 30 10 So. 201; People v. Dice, 120 Cal. 
 
 Tex. .\pp. 42, 16 S. \V. 75r; Sprouse 189, 52 Pac. 477; Woodward v. State, 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky., 1909), 116 S. 50 Tex. Cr. 294, 97 S. W. 499; State 
 
 W. 344. V. Benjamin (R. T., 1908), 71 .Atl. 65. 
 
 "JcfiFerds v. People, 5 Park. Cr. '"Short v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 (X. Y.) 522, 541. .=561. 4 S. W. 810. Si I, 9 Ky. L. 255: State 
 
 ^ State V. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330, 337; v. fiilliam. 66 .S. Car. 419, 45 S. E.. 6. 
 
 ■• oplc V. Johnson, 185 .\. Y. 219, 7y "''Smith v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 v.. 1 164. 4 S. W. 798, 799, 9 Ky. L. 215.
 
 § 330 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 5S0 
 
 competent to receive any cxidcncc e.\i)lanatorv of tlic tin-cats 
 and which shows their trne character and which may add weight 
 to or detract from t-heir force as evidence that the deceased was 
 moved by hatred of the accnsed."'^ But in conclusion, though the 
 remoteness in point of time will not exclude the threat, it may be 
 said that if a long period intervenes Ijetween the threat and the act 
 threatened, and there have been opportunities for carrying out 
 the threat and the accused has made no attempt to do so, the value 
 of the threat as indicating that the accused hated the deceased 
 is greatly weakened; and if between the threat and the act an 
 existing state of ill will is changed to one of good will, then the 
 value of the threat as evidence amounts to nothing.^^ 
 
 § 330. Declarations forming a part of the res gestae. — The rule 
 of the res gcstcc is applicable to the acts and declarations of the 
 accused and other persons which are attendant upon the homi- 
 cide.^"' All the occurrences and conversation of the period in 
 which the killing took place, from the instant the accused appeared 
 until the homicide, may be taken as constituting the res gestce.'^'' 
 Hence statements by the deceased made before or immediately 
 after the killing,^'^ but connected with and explanatory of an act 
 which led up to or jirepared for it, are relevant to show his mental 
 state and motives, ^"^ to show where he was going about the time 
 of the homicide, ■""* or to identify the defendants.*" His declara- 
 
 ^ Price V. State (Okla., 1908), 98 State v. Talbert, 41 S. Car. 526, 19 
 
 Pac. 447. S. E. 852; Commonwealth v. Werntz, 
 
 ** Crumley v. State, 5 Ga. App. 231, 161 Pa. St. 591, 29 Atl. 272; Von 
 
 62 S. E. 1005. Pollnitz V. State, 92 Ga. 16, 18 S. E. 
 
 ''See §§ 94-103, ante: Robinson v. 301, 44 Am. St. 72; Boyle v. State, 
 State, 118 Ga. 198, 44 S. E. 985; State 97 Incl. 322; Appleton v. State, 61 
 V. Heidelberg, 120 La. 300, 45 So. Ark. 590, 33 S. W. 1066; Harris v. 
 256. Res gcsta — attendant circum- State, 96 Ala. 24, 29, 11 So. 255; Ed- 
 stances in prosecution for homicide, monds v. State, 34 Ark. 720, 734-736; 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3029. Gibson v. State (Miss., 1894), 16 So. 
 
 '* Glass V. State, 147 Ala. 50, 41 So. 298; State v. Harris, 63 N. Car. i, 6; 
 
 727. Harris v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 74 
 
 "Starks v. State, 137 Ala. 9, 34 So. S. W. 1044, 25 Ky. L. 297; State v. 
 
 687. Lattin, 19 Wash. 57, 52 Pac. 314. 
 
 ^ State V. Moelchen, 53 Iowa 310, '' State v. Vincent, 24 Iowa 570, 95 
 
 5 N. W. 186; State v. Rollins. 113 N. Am. Dec. 753; State v. Mortensen, 
 
 Car. 722, 18 S. E. 394: People v. 26 Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562. 
 Hawes, 98 Cal. 648, 33 Pac. 791; "Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App. 254;
 
 '.Si 
 
 HOMICIDE, 
 
 330 
 
 tion that he preferred to use a knife in assaulting persons as it 
 was more rehable than a pistol/^ or that he wished to procure the 
 arrest of the defendant for threatening him,*- is relevant to show 
 the motive and inclination of the deceased to commit crime. 
 
 But declarations prior to the crime forming no part of the res 
 gcstcc of a relevant act and not communicated to the accused, or 
 if known to him not acquiesced in," or statements and accusations 
 by deceased which are narrative in their form and character and 
 inadmissible as dying declarations, are generally rejected.** 
 
 The declarations of the accused prior to the crime cannot be 
 put in evidence in his favor unless they are so closely connected 
 with the crime or with some relevant and connected transaction 
 as to form a part of it. Usually the accused will not be permitted 
 to introduce his statements of intention ; thus he cannot prove that 
 before the homicide he stated that he wished to get out of the 
 neighborhood fearing he might have trouble with him.*^ He can- 
 not prove his utterances at the time he bought the weapon with 
 which the homicide was committed to show the innocence of the 
 motives which prompted the purchase.*" But the declarations of 
 
 Warrick v. State, 125 Ga. 133, 53 S. 
 E. 1027; Gibbs V. State, 156 Ala. 70, 
 47 So. 65 ; Grant v. United States, 
 28 App. D. C. 169. How near the 
 main transaction must be to the dec- 
 laration made in order to be part of 
 the res gcstcc, 19 L. R. A. y^Jy note. 
 
 " Boyle V. State, 97 Ind. 322, 325. 
 
 *^ State V. Moelchen, 53 Iowa 310, 5 
 X. W. 186. 
 
 *' People V. Gress, 107 Gal. 461, 40 
 Pac. 752; State v. Punshon, 124 Mo. 
 448, 27 S. W. iiii; Commonwealth 
 V. Gray (Ky.), 30 S. W. 1015, 17 Ky. 
 L. 354; Macklin v. Commonwealth, 
 93 Ky. 294, 19 S. W. 931, 14 Ky. L. 
 180; Weyrich v. People, 89 111. 90, 
 96-98; McBride v. Commonwealth, 
 95 Va. 818, 30 S. E. 454; Bowles v. 
 Commonwealth, 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 
 527; State V. Shafcr, 22 Mont. 17, 
 55 Pac. 526; Ausmus v. People (Colo., 
 1910). ro7 Pac. 204. 
 
 "State V. Noeninger, 108 Mo. 166, 
 
 18 S. W. 990; State V. Duestrow, 137 
 Mo. 44, 38 S. W. 554, 39 S. W. 266; 
 Stevenson v. State, 69 Ga. 68; Hall 
 V. State, 132 Ind. 317, 322, 31 N. E. 
 536 ; State v. Carlton, 48 Vt. 636, 641 ; 
 Reg. V. Bedingfield, 14 Cox C. C. 
 341 ; Lambright v. State, 34 Fla. 564, 
 16 So. =582; Livingston v. Common- 
 wealth, 14 Gratt. (Va.) 592; State 
 V. Frazier, i Houst. Cr. (Del.) 176; 
 Wilson V. People, 94 111. 299. Decla- 
 rations as to slayer not made in ex- 
 tremis must be a part of the res 
 gestce. Mayes v. State, 64 Miss. 329, 
 333, I So. 733, 60 Am. 58; Jones v. 
 State, 71 Ind. 66. Declarations must 
 be spontaneous. Lockhart v. State, 
 53 Tc.x. Cr. 589, III S. W. 1024. 
 
 ^' Red V. State, 39 Tc.x. Cr. 414, 4C1 
 S. W. 408. 
 
 '"State V. Holcomb, 86 Mo. 371, 
 37^', Johnson v. State, 22 Tex. App. 
 206, 2 S. W. 609. Contra, Kollcr v.
 
 § ;^^0a CRIMIXAL KVIDEXCE. 582 
 
 the nccnscd uttered l)et()re the eriiiie iii(lieatin_L; that he entertained 
 enmity towards the deceased or towards a class of persons to 
 which he belonged/' or that he was contemplating the commis- 
 sion of a homicide.'"' or other crime upon him,'" or some person 
 whose name is not mentioned,'" are always admissible as of the 
 res gcstcc tending to increase the probability that he is the slayer."' 
 Declarations of the accused uttered before the crime may be 
 competent in his favor or against him when they are spontaneous 
 and also when they explain or illustrate the circuiustances of the 
 crime. They are received to show his state of mind towards the 
 deceased and to show the motives and intentions of the accused. 
 Thus it may be shown that before the commission of the homi- 
 cide the accused inquired as to the whereabouts of the deceased, " 
 and that on seeing the deceased the accused said to him, "Now I 
 have found you,""'^ or uttered some other language showing anger 
 towards or hatred of the deceased."* The statements of the ac- 
 cused may also be received in his favor. Where the accused, 
 being a police ofificer, w^as charged with homicide it was held that 
 he might prove that on the occasion of the crime he was about 
 placing the deceased under arrest and that he ordered him to 
 throw up his hands saying that he was a policeman." 
 
 § 330a. Declarations of the accused after the crime. — The declara- 
 tions and statements of the accused uttered immediately after 
 
 State, 36 Tex. Cr. 496, 38 S. W. 44; 26 S. W. 201; Palmer v. People, 138 
 
 Arnwine v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 213, 114 111. 356, 28 N. E. 130, 32 Am. St. 146. 
 
 S. W. 796, 802. Declarations of accused, just before 
 
 "^ People V. Hayes, 9 Cal. App. 301, the killing, that he felt like killing 
 
 99 Pac. 386. some one, are admissible. Muscoe v. 
 
 "State V. Ellis, lOi N. Car. 765, Commonwealth, 87 Va. 460, 12 S. E. 
 
 768, 7 S. E. 704, 9 Am. St. 49; State 790. 
 
 V. Vallery, 47 La. Ann. 182, 16 So. "' Xewcomb v. State, 37 Miss. 383, 
 
 745, 49 Am. St. 363; State v. Home, 399. 
 
 9 Kan. 119; State V. Windahl, 95 Towa ^'Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 
 
 470, 64 N. W. 420; Denson v. State So. 274. 
 
 (Tex. Cr., 1896), 35 S. W. 150; State ■'•■' Hamblin v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. I35- 
 
 V. Lance, 149 N. Car. 551. 63 S. E. 50 S. W. 1019, 51 S. W. iiii. 
 
 I9'8; Self v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 455, '^Harris v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 47 S. W. 26. 74 S. W. 1044, 25 Ky. L. 297. 
 
 " Mimms v. State, 16 Ohio St. 221, '' People v. Lee, i Cal. App. 169, .Sr 
 
 3. Pac. 969. 
 
 ■" Butler V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 232, 
 
 o-j
 
 ^8^ HOMICIDE. § 331 
 
 the homicide and connected with it are often received as a part of 
 the res gcstcc.^^' They may be received in favor of the accused. 
 Thus, he may prove that after the homicide he said he had shot 
 the deceased and that he wanted somebody to go to him as quick 
 as possible, that he would be glad if a doctor could be procured, 
 and that he was going for a doctor himself.''' And the accused 
 may also prove that he stated to a physician who was dressing 
 his wound how he received that wound and that it was inflicted 
 on him by the deceased."^ The accused may show that, within 
 a minute or two after the shooting, he stated to a third person 
 that he had shot the deceased in self-defense.''^ The declarations 
 of the accused when he was arrested are admissible;''*' though 
 where he surrendered himself to an officer some time after the 
 commission of the homicide he cannot prove what he said at the 
 time.''^ The statements of the accused made immediately after 
 the crime are usually received if they are admissions or confes- 
 sions.*'" 
 
 § 331. Declarations of third parties and cries and exclamations of 
 bystanders. — Declarations or exclamations uttered by third per- 
 sons, not associated with the accused, after the commission of the 
 homicide, not forming a part of the res gestcc, and not acquiesced 
 in by the defendant, are not admissible against him,*'^ except so 
 far as such declarations may be introduced for the sole purpose of 
 
 ^'Taggart v. Commonwealth, 104 ""''Allen v. State, 11 1 Ala. 80, 20 So. 
 
 Ky. 301, 46 S. W. 674, 20 Ky. L. 493. 490; State v. Ramsey, 48 La. Ann. 
 
 ■" Cole V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 225, 75 1407, 20 So. 904. See Sanders v. 
 
 S. W. 527. Commonwealth (Ky.), 18 S. W. 528. 
 
 ■^Wakcficlcl V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 13 Ky. L. 820; Brooks v. State, 96 
 
 124, 94 S. W. 1046. Ga. 353, 23 S. E. 413; State v. Snecd, 
 
 "^ State V. Rutlcdge, 135 Iowa 581, 88 Mo. 138, 140-142; People v. Wal- 
 
 113 X. W. 461. lace, 89 Cal. 158, 26 Pac. 650; People 
 
 ■"'' Darter v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 40, 44 v. Shattuck, 109 Cal. 673, 42 Pac. 
 
 S. W. 850. 315; Marks v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 274, 
 
 ■"People V. Dice, 120 Cal. 189, 52 92 S. W. 414; Trinkle v. State, 52 
 
 Pac. 477. Tex. Cr. 42, 105 S. W. 201 ; Gorman 
 
 "Graham v. State, 125 Ga. 48, 53 v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 24, 105 S. \V. 
 
 S. E. 816; Collins V. State, 137 Ala. 200; State v. Gallman, 79 S. Car. 229. 
 
 50, 34 So. 403; Stacy V. Common- 60 S. E. 682; Alford v. State, 52 
 
 wealth CKy.), 97 S. W. 39, 29 Ky. Tex. Cr. 621, 108 S. W. 364; Hun- 
 
 L. 1242. drick v. State, 125 Ga. 753, 54 S. V..
 
 § 33^ 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 584 
 
 impeaching a witness by showing contradictory statements. "^^ The 
 exclamations or declarations of bystanders uttered during or im- 
 mediately after the commission of the crime are often received 
 as a part of the res gcsicc.'''' In order that the exclamations of 
 bystanders may be recei\-ed, it must be shown that they were in 
 some way connected with the main fact. So where it was alleged 
 that defendant had shot deceased with a pistol on a car platform, 
 and had thrown the body from the train while it was in motion, 
 passengers on the train were not permitted to testify to exclama- 
 tions made by persons standing on the platform where the homi- 
 cide had been committed."*' 
 
 § 332. Threats against deceased by third persons. — The general 
 rule is that threats by a third person against the deceased are 
 inadmissible to absolve the accused."" The latter may introduce 
 direct evidence to show that some one else committed the crime. 
 If the connection of the third party with the crime is shown 
 pruna facie,^^ his threats may be received in corroboration or to 
 show a motive to kill the deceased. "" If the accused admits the 
 killing, threats of a third person should be rejected. If this fact 
 
 683; State V. Xewman, y^ N. J. L. 
 202, 62 Atl. 1008; Coker v. State, 
 144 Ala. 28, 40 So. 576. Attendant 
 circumstances — declarations, Elliott 
 Evidence, § 3030. 
 
 ^Mixon V. State, 55 Miss. 525; 
 Kendall v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 19 
 S. W. 173, 14 Ky. L. 15; Jones v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 46 S. W. 217, 
 20 Ky. L. 355; State v. Blee, 133 
 Iowa 725, III N. W. 19. 
 
 "^ Johnson v. State, 88 Ga. 203, 14 
 S. E. 208. See cases, § loi. Excla- 
 mations of bystanders "there he 
 comes with a gun," referring to the 
 accused, have been received. State v. 
 Biggerstaff, 17 Mont. 510, 43 Pac. 
 709; Shumate v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 
 266, 42 S. W. 600. 
 
 *° Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 10 
 Bush (Ky.) 576. See also, Felder 
 V. State, 23 Tex. App. 477, 486, 5 S. 
 W. 145, 59 Am. 777n. 
 
 *^ Henry v. State (Tex., 1895), 30 
 
 S. W. 802; Wilkins v. State, 35 Tex. 
 Cr. 525, 34 S. W. 627; State v. Beau- 
 det, 53 Conn. 536, 4 Atl. 237, 55 Am. 
 155; Morris v. Territory, i Okla. Cr. 
 617, 99 Pac. 760, loi Pac. in; Hall 
 v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 93 S. W. 
 904, 29 Ky. L. 485. 
 
 ''^ There should be some proof of 
 an overt act on the part of the third 
 party directed against the deceased 
 or of some fact or circumstance of 
 his conduct which would tend to con- 
 nect the third person with the crime. 
 Harn v. State, 12 Wyo. 80, 7^ Pac. 
 705. 
 
 "'State V. Davis, 77 X. Car. 483; 
 State V. Hajmes, 71 N. Car. 79; 
 Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510; 
 Boothe v. State, 4 Tex. App. 202; 
 Morris v. Territory, i Okla. Cr. 617, 
 99 Pac. 760, loi Pac. in; State v. 
 Cremeans, 62 W. Va. 134, 57 S. E. 
 405.
 
 585 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 8 o "> '> 
 
 is in doubt, and particularly if the e\-idence is wholly circumstan- 
 tial, the threats of a third person, not shown to have been con- 
 nected with the crime, may be received.'" The names of the per- 
 sons and the circumstances attending the threats must be stated."^ 
 The defendant may pro^•e threats against the deceased made by a 
 witness who. testifying as an accomplice, alleges he was instigated 
 by defendant to commit the crime to show that the witness was 
 actuated by personal motives involving malicious intent.^' 
 
 § 333. Animosity between the accused and the deceased. — Where 
 the existence of present malice or premeditation is in issue, evi- 
 dence of previous quarrels or difficulties between the accused and 
 the deceased is always received'^ if the parties have not become 
 completely and permanently reconciled."'* Thus, evidence that the 
 
 '"Murphy v. State, s6 Tex. Cr. 24, 
 35 S. W. 174; Commonwealth v. Ab- 
 bott, 130 IMass. 472, 476; State v. 
 Hawley, 63 Conn. 47, 27 Atl. 417; 
 Alexander v. United States, 138 U. 
 S. 353, 34 L. ed. 954, 11 Sup. Ct. 350; 
 Pollard V. State (Tex. Cr. App. 1910), 
 125 S. W. 390. 
 
 "State V. Johnson, 31 La. Ann. 
 368; Pace V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 37 S. W. 948, 18 Ky. L. 690. It is 
 improper to admit evidence that some 
 third person had a motive to kill de- 
 ceased and was near the scene of the 
 crime where such third person is in no 
 wise connected with the crime by 
 other evidence. Walker v. State, 139 
 .•\la. 56, 35 So. loii. 
 
 '• Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55, 66, 
 42 .Am. 95; Sanford v. State, 143 Ala. 
 78, 39 So. 370. 
 
 " Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 91 
 Va. 741, 21 S. E. 364, 366; State v. 
 Pennington, 124 Mo. 388, 27 S. VV. 
 1 106; State V. Rash, 12 Ired. (N. 
 Car.) 382, 55 Am. Dec. 420; State v. 
 Pike, 65 Me. II r; State v. Pctsch, 43 
 S. Car. 132, 20 S. K. 993; State v. 
 Craftnn, 89 Iowa 109, 56 N. W. 257; 
 Mcf'ridc v. People, 5 Colo. App. 91, 
 37 Pnc. 953 ; People v. M'Kay, 122 
 
 Cal. 628, 55 Pac. 594; State v. Cole- 
 man, III La. 303, 35 So. 560; State 
 V. Brooks, 79 S. Car. 144, 60 S. E. 
 518, 128 Am. St. 836, 17 L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) 483; Pratt V. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 
 281, 109 S. W. 138; Waters v. State, 
 54 Tex. Cr. 322, 114 S. W. 628; State 
 V. Churchill, 52 Wash. 210, 100 Pac. 
 309; State v. Clark, 119 La. 733, 44 
 So. 449; State v. Baudoin, 115 La. 
 837, 40 So. 239; State V. Exum, 138 
 N. Car. 599, 50 S. E. 283; Shirley v. 
 State, 144 Ala. 35, 40 So. 269 ; People 
 v. Williamson, 6 Cal. App. 336, 92 
 Pac. 313; Sylvester v. State, 46 Fla. 
 166, 35 So. 142; Gallegos v. State, 
 48 Tex. Cr. 58, 85 S. W. 11 50; San- 
 derson v. State, 169 Ind. 301, 82 N. 
 E. 525 ; People v. Dinser, 49 Misc. 
 (X. Y.) 82, 98 N. Y. S. 314; Spencer 
 v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 107 S. W. 
 342, 32 Ky. L. 880. The rule of the 
 text is applical)lc to a prosecution for 
 assault with intent to murder. Ellis 
 V. State, 120 Ala. 333, 25 So. i; Bar- 
 nett V. State (Ala., 1909), 51 So. 299; 
 State V. Butler (Iowa, 1910), 125 N. 
 W. 106. 
 
 '^Tidwell V. Slate, 70 Ala. 33, 46; 
 Early v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 382, 103
 
 ^ ?>33 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 586 
 
 accused had frequently (|uarreled with. Ijrulally beaten and threat- 
 ened to kill his wife, with whose murder he is charged, or had 
 made remarks reflecting on her character,''' is competent to enable 
 the jury to determine whether malice was present. The fact that 
 these marital bickerings cover a period of years and continue 
 down to the death, strengthens this evidence.'" This evidence is 
 recei\cd for the same reason that previous threats by any person 
 are admissible." It tends to show the existence of animosity 
 between the parties, xmd its relevancy results from the fact that 
 the existence of prior ill-feeling not onh- renders the commission 
 of the crime more probable, but tends to show' the malice or ])re- 
 meditation of the accused."® It is immaterial how remote in time 
 the hostile acts were, as far as the competency of the evidence is 
 concerned,"'' nor can the details of the previous difficulty be 
 proved to show which party was in the wrong.*"* 
 
 Evidence of prior ill-feeling between the defendant and the 
 deceased is admissible in favor of the former as well as against 
 him. This is the case where a plea of provocation or self-defense 
 is made and the evidence is contradictory as to whom was the 
 aggressor."*' The i)rosecution may prove that when a third person 
 
 S. W. 868, 123 Am. St. 889. Evi- 
 dence of friendly conduct and decla- 
 rations on the part of the parties is 
 always competent in rebuttal of a 
 former difficulty and threats and ill 
 will of the deceased. Watson v. 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. 85, 105 S. W. 509. 
 
 '^ People V. Buchanan, 145 N. Y. i, 
 39 N. E. 846. 
 
 '"3 Greenl. Ev., § 145; Koerner v. 
 State, 98 Ind. 7, 25; State v. O'Neil, 
 51 Kan. 651, 665, 33 Pac. 287, 24 L. 
 R- A. 555; McCann v. People, 3 
 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 272; Sayres v. 
 Commonwealth, 88 Pa. St. 291 ; State 
 V. Bradley, 67 Vt. 465, 32 Atl. 238; 
 Phillips V. State, 62 Ark. 119, 34 S. 
 ^V. 539; Thiede v. Utah Territorj-, 
 159 U. S. 510, 40 L. ed. 237, 16 Sup. 
 Ct. 62. 
 
 " A non-expert witness may be per- 
 mitted to give an opinion that the 
 
 deceased and the defendant were on 
 good terms. State v. Stackhousc, 24 
 Kan. 445, 453. 
 
 ■nVhite v. State, 30 Tex. App. 652, 
 18 S. W. 462; Finch v. State, 81 Ala. 
 41, 50, I So. 565. 
 
 " Sayres v. Commonwealth, 88 Pa. 
 St. 291 ; Koerner v. State, 98 Ind. 7. 
 But compare Poe v. State, 155 Ala. 
 31, 46 So. 521. 
 
 ^ People v. Thomson, 92 Cal. 506, 
 512, 28 Pac. 589; Gordon v. State, 
 140 Ala. 29, 36 So. 1009; Logan v. 
 State, 149 Ala. 11, 43 So. 10; Patter- 
 son v. State, 156 Ala. 62, 47 So. 52; 
 Stallworth v. State, 146 .Ala. 8, 41 So. 
 184; Thompson v. State, 84 Miss. 758, 
 36 So. 389; State V. Birks, 199 Mo. 
 263, 97 S. W. 578: Jay V. State. 52 
 Tex. Cr. 567, 109 S. W. 131; Bluett 
 V. State, 151 Ala. 41, 44 So. 84. 
 
 *'Coxwell V. State, 66 Ga. 309, 3^3',
 
 587 HOMICIDE. § 334 
 
 attempted to make peace between the deceased and tlie accused 
 that the latter refused to settle the trouble amicabh' and said he 
 would not accept an apology from the deceased/- 
 
 ^ 334. Expert and non-expert evidence as regards blood stains. — 
 All persons are more or less familiar with the a])pearance of stains 
 caused by blood. It has, therefore, been repeatedly held from 
 time immemorial that ordinary witnesses may testify that certain 
 stains on clothing or other articles "look like" or resemble blood 
 stains. A non-expert may state that he saw stains and describe 
 their color, "^ or that garments "looked like the blood had been 
 M-ashed off."*"* No peculiar skill or experience is required to be 
 possessed by a w^itness who saw the stains in court or elsewhere 
 to render his evidence admissible, nor need a chemical analysis, 
 or test, or a microscopical examination have been made.^^ 
 
 The testimony of a witness that he recognized blood stains on 
 an article which he has seen is not secondary evidence, compared 
 with the opinion of a chemist, based solely on an analysis.""' 
 though the oi)inion of the expert witness may be received with 
 more confidence in the minds of the jury. Though any witness 
 may testify that a stain looks like a blood stain, only a skilled 
 physician or microscopist should be permitted to give an opinion, 
 after analysis, on the question, was the stain in question caused 
 
 Wcllar V. People, 30 Mich. 16; Gun- '^Walker v. State, 153 .Ma. 31, 45 
 
 ter V. State, in Ala. 23, 20 So. 632, So. 640. 
 
 56 Am. St. 17; People v. Hecker. log '"People v. Gonzalez, 35 X. Y. 49, 
 
 Cal. 451, 42 Pac. 307, 30 L. R. A. 61 ; State v. Bradley, 67 Vt. 465, 32 
 
 403; Stewart v. State, 78 .Ala. 436; .\tl. 238; State v. Welch, 36 W. Va. 
 
 State V. Cooper, 32 La. Ann. 1084; 6go, 15 S. E. 419; Thomas v. State, 
 
 McMccn V. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 67 Ga. 460, 464; McLain v. Common- 
 
 St. 300, 9 .Atl. 878; Marnoch v. State, wealth, 99 Pa. St. 86, 100; Greenfield 
 
 7 Tex. App. 269, 272 (to explain why v. People, 85 X. Y. 75, 83, 39 Am. 
 
 defendant went armed to the place 636: Dillard v. State, 58 Miss. 368; 
 
 where he met deceased) ; State v. People v. Deacons, 109 X. Y. 374, 382, 
 
 Seymour, 94 Iowa 699, 63 X. W. 661; 16 X. E. 676; People v. Smith, 106 
 
 .•\ustin V. Commonwealth fKy.), 40 Cal. TJ^, 39 Pac. 40. 
 
 S. W. 905, 19 Ky. L. 474. " People v. Gonzalez, 35 X. Y. 49 
 
 "Pettis V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 66, 81 6r. A piece of board cut from tin 
 
 S. W. 3r2. floor of a room in which a homicido 
 
 " Gantling v. State, 40 Fla. 237, 23 was conmiittcd is admissible to show- 
 So. 857. the stains. State v. M.irlin, 47 S 
 
 Car. 67, 25 S. E. \\z.
 
 ^ 334 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCI 
 
 588 
 
 1)}" the blood of a Ininian l)cinj; or Ijy that of otlicr animals?" 
 Evidence that there was a great effusion of blood may be admis- 
 sible to show the nature of the wound. '^'^ A fatal blow with a 
 heavy blunt instrument produces little effusion of blood, while 
 a cut or a stab with a sword or knife will cause an outpouring 
 that may spatter with blood every person and object in the vicin- 
 ity. Evidence that the clothing of the accused was spattered 
 with blood is relevant, and may justify a strong inference that he 
 is guilty. On the other hand, the absence of such stains is not 
 relevant, and usually would have no force as indicating inno- 
 cence. The accused may have removed the incriminating marks 
 or, even in the case of homicide by cutting, may have inflicted the 
 wound in such a way that no blood was spattered on him. 
 
 The direction and form of blood stains on doors, walls or fur- 
 niture is relevant to show the position of the deceased when he 
 was killed. So the position of such stains on the clothing of de- 
 ceased may be relevant to show whether he was standing or re- 
 clininir when the fatal blow was received.**" 
 
 " People V. Bell, 49 Cal. 485 ; Com- 
 monwealth V. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412, 
 420; Gaines v. Commonwealth, 50 Pa. 
 St. 319; State V. Knight, 43 Me. 11; 
 Lindsay v. People, 63 N. Y. 143; 
 State V. Miller,9 Houst. (Del.) 564,32 
 Atl. 137; State V. Alton, 105 Minn. 410, 
 117 N. W. 617. In State v. Knight, 43 
 Me. II, pp. 19-25, will be found fully 
 reported the language of an expert 
 chemist who had made a chemical 
 and microscopical examination of 
 blood stains, detailing in full the 
 methods of examination, the facts 
 observed and the results achieved. 
 Sime microscopists affirm that it is 
 easy to recognize human blood by 
 the size and shape of the corpuscles. 
 The more recent and, perhaps, better 
 opinion is, that "while a skillful ex- 
 pert can, with certainty, distinguish 
 between human blood corpuscles and 
 those of the blood of a cow, pig or 
 other domestic animals with which it 
 
 would be likely to be confounded, 
 still, in a murder trial, where human 
 life is at stake, the expert is hardly 
 warranted to swear that the blood 
 stain is any more than that of an 
 animal." See Reese Med. Jurispru- 
 dence, p. 132 (2d ed.), 1889; Beale's 
 Microscope in Medicine, 4th ed., p. 
 266, 10 Cent. Law Jour. (Feb., 1880) 
 183, and the remarks of the court in 
 pointing out with what caution such 
 expert evidence should be received. 
 State v. Miller, 9 Houst. (Del.) 564, 
 32 Atl. 137. 
 
 ^ O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 
 St. 424. 
 
 ^ Richardson v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 486, 492; Wilson v. United States, 162 
 U. S. 613, 40 L. ed. 1090, 16 Sup. Ct. 
 895 ; Jackson v. Commonwealth, 100 
 Ky. 239, 38 S. \V. 422. 109T, 18 Ky. L. 
 795, 66 Am. St. 22>(>'^ Hinshaw v. 
 State, 147 Ind. 334, 47 N. E. 157.
 
 589 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 
 § 335. Conspiracy to commit homicide. — If the homicide is the 
 result of a conspiracy the acts or declarations of anv one of the 
 conspirators are binding upon his criminal associates if made 
 during the existence of the conspiracy and in furtherance of its 
 object.^'' 
 
 § 336. Preparation to commit homicide. — Evidence of prepara- 
 tion to commit a homicide, or of attempts to prepare for its com- 
 mission, is always relevant. It may be shown that the accused 
 was armed shortly before the commission of the crime. ^^ It is 
 always relevant to show that the defendant at or immediately 
 before the date of the crime had in his possession the means for 
 its commission. It may be shown that a few days before the 
 crime he bought shells for use in his gun where similar shells 
 were found near the scene of the crime.''- It may also be proved 
 that a third person purchased cartridges a short time before the 
 crime if there is evidence of a conspiracy between the purchaser 
 and the accused.'*^ And such evidence is competent, it seems, 
 even where the purchaser was present at the commission of the 
 
 '" See §§ 492, 493; State v. McCahill, 
 72 Iowa III. This rule is well illus- 
 trated in Spies v. People, 122 111. i, 
 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898, 3 Am. St. 
 320n, commonly called the "Anar- 
 chists' Case." Here it appeared from 
 the evidence that an illegal association 
 had been formed, having for its ob- 
 ject the overturning of government 
 and the abolition of law. It was 
 proved that certain newspapers and a 
 book entitled the "Science of Revo- 
 lutionary Warfare," advocating these 
 views and pointing out how they 
 might be advanced and the purposes 
 of the society accomplished by the 
 use of dynamite bombs and other 
 violent means, were read and circu- 
 lated by members of the association 
 and approved by its officials. It was 
 also shown that the speakers of the 
 association had, at its meetings, used 
 language inciting their hearers to as- 
 
 sault policemen and to commit riot 
 and murder. Upon murder resulting 
 from the conspiracy, these written and 
 spoken declarations were held binding 
 upon all members of the association. 
 Evidence in prosecution for homi- 
 cide in carrying out unlawful conspi- 
 racy, 68 L. R. A. 215, note. 
 
 *'Way V. State (Ala., 1908), 46 So. 
 273; Ferguson v. State, 141 Ala. 20, 
 27 So. 448; People v. Sutherland, 154 
 N. Y. 345, 48 X. E. 518. The accused 
 cannot offer evidence to show his 
 "uncommunicated intention" in thus 
 arming himself. Dean v. State, 105 
 Ala. 21, 17 So. 28, 29. Cf. Gilcreasc 
 V. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 619, 28 S. W. 
 
 531. 
 
 *" Anderson v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 
 341, no S. W. 54; Garner v. State, 
 6 Ga. App. 788, 65 S. E. 842. 
 
 •' Pulpus V. State, 84 Miss. 49, 36 
 So. 190.
 
 § 2)3^ CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 59O 
 
 crime without actual proof of couspiracy.""* It would seem that 
 evidence of the purchase or possession of the means of commit- 
 ting the homicide would only be relevant where the homicide 
 was in fact committed by the use of such means, but it has been 
 permitted to be proved that the accused purchased i)istol car- 
 tridges where the crime was not committed with a pistol.''^ If 
 the body of the decedent shows incised wounds it is proper to 
 permit the state to show that the accused was the owner of a 
 knife, and had it a short time before the crime, though it is not 
 identified as the weapon with which the crime was committed."" 
 And in one case evidence to show that the accused had access to 
 a weapon with which the crime might have been committed was 
 received."" So it may be proved that the accused w^as familiar 
 with the use of firearms."- But proof that the accused had in his 
 possession, or attempted to procure a weapon, is not conclusive 
 and in fact does not necessarily create any presumi)tion that he 
 intended to use it for criminal purposes. He may always show 
 that the deceased had threatened him and other circumstances 
 wdiich would justify a plea of self-defense."" The presence of 
 the accused in the locality of the crime, immediately prior to its 
 commission, may be shown. But this fact possesses little value 
 as evidence, unless coupled with a suspicious circumstance, as his 
 being disguised, or armed, or his uttering threats against the de- 
 ceased.^"" 
 
 § 337. Footprints. — A comparison of footjM'ints proved to have 
 been made by the ])risoner with other tracks or footprints found 
 near the scene of the homicide is relevant, if a doubt arises on the 
 evidence which was the slayer.^ But the o])inion of a witness 
 
 ** State V. ThrailkiU, 71 S. Car. 136, "^ Rodriquez v. State. 32 Tex. Cr. 
 
 50 S. E. 551. 259. 22 S. W. 978: State v. Craemer, 
 
 "■''Hocker v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 12 Wash. 217, 40 Pac. 944- 
 
 III S. W. 676, 33 Ky. L. 944. ' Bouldin v. State, 8 Tex. .\pp. .3.32; 
 
 "* Jones V. State, 137 Ala. 12, 34 So. Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 44: People 
 
 681. V. McCurdy, 68 Cal. 576: Stokes v. 
 
 "• Lillie V. State, 72 Xcb. 228, 100 X. State, 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 619. 30 Am. 
 
 W. 316. 72; Dunn v. People, 158 HI. .s86, 42 
 
 'M.illie V. State, 72 Xeb. 228, 100 X. E. 47; Dillin v. People. 8 Mich. 
 
 X. W. 316. 357; Murphy v. People. 63 X. Y. 590. 
 
 ■^ State V. Hough, 138 X. Car. 663, 395, 596; State v. Sanders. 73 S. Car. 
 
 50 S. E. 709. 409, 56 S. E. 35 ; Krens v. State, 75
 
 )9i 
 
 HOMICIDE. 
 
 
 that footprints near the scene of the crime were those of the 
 accused not based on a comparison is not admissible." But the 
 accused, by virtue of his constitutional immunity against being" 
 compelled to testify against himself, cannot be compelled to make 
 an impression of his shoe or foot in some soft substance so that 
 the footprints thus produced may be compared with others which 
 have been disco\-ered in the vicinity of the place of the homicide."' 
 If the accused \'oluntarily places his foot in a footprint near 
 the scene of the homicide or permits his shoe to be placed in the 
 track by a third person, the latter may testify to the result of 
 the comparison and, where such testimony was given at the cor- 
 oner's inquest in the presence of the defendant it may subse- 
 quently be proved at the trial.* 
 
 5 338. Self-defense — Burden of proof — Malice. — In a murder trial 
 if the homicide is denied, the burden of proving the crime beyond 
 a reasonable doubt in all its constituent elements, /. e., the corpus 
 delicti and the malicious intention is upon the state throughout.' 
 If the killing is proved or admitted by the accused, malice may be 
 inferred from the circumstances already proved, and it is then 
 incumbent upon the defendant to prove circumstances that will 
 
 Xeb. 294, 106 X. \V. 27, and § ^7^^ 
 burglary. 
 
 ■ Du Bosc V. State, 148 .Ma. 560, 42 
 So. 862. Evidence of footprints of 
 accused, 94 .•\m. St. 342, note ; evi- 
 dence of measurements of footprints, 
 53 .'\m. St. 383, note. 
 
 "Stokes V. State, 5 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 619, 30 Am. 72, and see § 372, where 
 this subject is fully discussed. 
 
 ■* State V. Sanders, 75 S. Car. 409, 
 56 S. E. 35. 
 
 '" People V. Coughlin, 65 Mich. 704, 
 2,2 X. W. 905, 9 West. 129; State v. 
 Porter, 34 Iowa 131 ; State v. WinRo, 
 66 Mo. 181, 27 Am. 329; State v. Don- 
 ahoe, 78 Iowa 486, 43 X. W. 297; 
 People V. Riordan, 7 X. Y. Cr. 7; 
 State V. Allen, 48 La. .Ann. 1387, 20 
 So. iot2; King v. State, 74 Miss. 576, 
 2\ So. 23s; State V. Williams, 122 
 
 Iowa 115, 97 X. W. 992; State v. 
 Tcachcy, 138 X. Car. 587, 50 S. E. 
 232; Commonwealth v. Dcitrick, 221 
 Pa. 7, 70 Atl. 275. The burden is on 
 the accused to show inability to re- 
 treat with safety and all the elements 
 of self-defense. McBryde v. State, 
 156 Ala. 44, 47 So. 302; State v. 
 Thrailkill, 71 S. Car. 136, 50 S. E. 
 551. In the case of State v. Quick, 150 
 N. Car. 820, 64 S. E. 168, it was said 
 that an intentional killing with a 
 deadly. weapon creates a presumption 
 of malice and the crime is nuirder 
 unless tlie facts subsequently proved 
 either justify the killing or reduce it 
 to manslaughter and that the burden 
 is on (he accused to show these facts 
 though proof of such facts may arise 
 out of tile evidence against him.
 
 § 7,^8 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 592 
 
 excuse, mitigate or justify tlic killing, unless (and this exception 
 is extremely important), the proof offered by the state tends to 
 show the defendant was exctised or justified." If circumstances 
 are shown by the state from wliich. when uncontradicted or 
 proved, a presumption of malice is drawn by the law as for ex- 
 ample the intentional use of a deadly weapon, or an inference may 
 be drawn b}' the jurors, it is considered that the state has satis- 
 fied the rule casting the burden upon it, and that the accused, if 
 he wishes to exculpate himself by a plea of self-defense, must 
 ]Mo\e the facts on which his plea is based, ^ perhaps by a prepon- 
 derance of the evidence.** 
 
 The rule as here stated is perhaps equivalent in meaning to 
 an instruction that the burden of proof is upon the defendant 
 where he relies upon any distinct affirmative fact to exonerate 
 him. Such an instruction has been supported by numerous cases 
 where the fact relied on to obtain an acquittal was the insanity 
 of the accused, or an assertion that the defendant killed the de- 
 ceased under a reasonable apprehension that his own life was in 
 danger." But the qualification may always be safely added that 
 the defendant need not himself offer positive and affirmative 
 evidence to sustain this burden. He should receive the benefit 
 of all the evidence in the case, whether offered by him or by the 
 state. If any fact proved against him by the prosecution satis- 
 
 " State V. Cephus (Del.), 67 Atl. State v. Dillard, 59 W. Va. 197, 53 S. 
 
 150; State V. Peterson, 149 N. Car. E. 117; State v. Skinner (Nev., 1909), 
 
 533. 63 S. E. 87; State v. Walker, 145 104 Pac. 223. 
 
 N. Car. 567, 59 S. E. 878; People v. * State v. Jones, 20 W. Va. 764; 
 
 Tarm Poi, 86 Cal. 2^5 , -?.i Pac. 998; Henson v. State, 112 Ala. 41, 21 So. 
 
 Gibson v. State, 89 Ala. 121, 8 So. 98, 79; State v. Ballon, 20 R. I. 607, 40 
 
 18 Am. St. 96; State v. Yates, 132 Atl. 861; State v. Moss, 77 S. Car. 
 
 Iowa 475, 109 X. W. 1005; Lawson v. 391, 57 S. E. 1098; Commonwealth 
 
 State, 171 Ind. 431, 84 N. E. 974. v. Palmer, 222 Pa. 299, 71 Atl. 100. 
 
 Compare Nail v. State, 125 Ga. 234, 128 Am. St. 809, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 54 S. E. 145. 483n; Hoffman v. Commonwealth 
 
 ^Sawyer v. People, 91 N. Y. 667; (Ky., 1909), 121 S. W. 690; State v. 
 
 State V. Skidmore, 87 X. Car. 509; Strother (S. Car.), 66 S. E. 877. 
 
 State V. Kibler, 79 S. Car. 170, 60 S. " Burden of proof as to insanity or 
 
 E. 438; Lewis V. State, 120 Ala. 339, self-defense, Elliott Evidence, §§ 3022, 
 
 25 So. 43; State V. Byrd, 121 N. Car. 3023, 3041, 3041a; self-defense, bur- 
 
 684, 28 S. E. 353; Robinson v. State, den of proof of freedom from fault, 
 
 155 Ala. 67, 45 So. 916; Coolman v. 45 L. R. A. 687, note. 
 State, 163 Ind. 503, 72 X. E. 568;
 
 593 HOMICIDE. § 338a 
 
 fies the jury that the kilHng was excusable or justifiable, the jury 
 should acquit him/*' Any instruction, whatever its language, 
 which in effect imposes an obligation upon the defendant of prov- 
 ing affirmatively that no crime was committed, constitutes re- 
 versible error, as it clearly deprives him of the benefit of the 
 reasonable doubt which may arise on all the evidence." 
 
 § 338a. The alibi of the alleged victim. — Not only must the state 
 l^rove the death of sonic human being, l)ut it must also prove that 
 the identical human being named in the indictment as having 
 been killed is dead as the result of some act of the accused. The 
 fact that such a person is actually dead may, in the large majority 
 of cases, be readily proved by the direct evidence of those who 
 were his friends and acquaintances in life, and who have seen 
 his corpse. In some exceptional cases such proof is impossible. 
 The state in proving the corpus delicti and the identity of the 
 deceased will then have to rely upon circumstantial evidence 
 alone. Such proof is all that is available and necessary wherever 
 the killing was procured or was accompanied by methods which 
 resulted in a more or less complete destruction, by fire or other- 
 wise, of the body of the alleged deceased;^- so that all that re- 
 mains for purposes of identification is a handful of bones or a 
 charred or decapitated corpse. 
 
 Where this happens the accused, while denying, and, perhaps, 
 attempting to disprove the identity of the remains, also fre- 
 quently alleges, directly or by inference, that the alleged victim 
 of the homicide is alive. 
 
 That a man has disappeared suddenly from his accustomed 
 h.aunts without having prepared for, or informed his associates 
 of, his intended departure is by no means proof that he is dead. 
 But evidence of a sudden and unexplained disappearance is al- 
 ways admissible and may be considered by the jury. If, however, 
 
 '"State V. Castle, 133 X. Car. 769, So. 497; State v. Hatch, 57 Kan. 420, 
 
 ^t S. E. I. 46 Pac. 708, 57 Am. St. 337; State v. 
 
 " Clirisman v. State, 54 .\rk. 283, 15 Crca, 10 Idaho 88. 76 Pac. 1013; State 
 
 S. VV. 889, 26 .'\m St. 44; People v. v. Presslcr, 16 Wyo. 214, 92 Pac. 806; 
 
 Downs, \23 X. Y. 558, 25 X. E. 988; State v. Dillard, 59 W. Va. 197, 53 S. 
 
 Tweedy v. State, 5 Iowa 433; Gravely E. 117. 
 V. State, 38 N'fh- 871, 874. 57 X. W. "See ante. § 7- 
 75'; I-inchan v. State, 113 .Ma. 70, 21 
 38 — U.M)ERiiii,i. Ckim. Ev.
 
 35^^ 
 
 CRIMINAL KVIDKXCE. 
 
 594 
 
 the state offers such evidence in connection with proof of tlu 
 finding of the alleged remains of the deceased in such a condition 
 as to render their identity in the least doubtful, it is comi)etent 
 for the accused to prove that the alleged deceased was not killed. 
 The production of the person in court, provided he is proj)- 
 erly identified, would, of course, be conclusive. This, however, 
 is seldom attempted. Witnesses are usually introduced who tes- 
 tify that they are acquainted with the deceased, and that thev 
 have seen him alive at a date subsequent to the alleged killing. 
 \\'hile there is nothing per sc suspicious in such testimony, ex- 
 ])erience teaches us that such e\'idence can be readily fabricated 
 without much danger of detection or punishment. But if, by 
 such testimony, the accused shall succeed in raising a reasonable 
 doubt of the death of the deceased he ought to be acquitted.^'' 
 
 "Ausmus V. People (Colo., 1910), 
 107 Pac. 204. Two curious and im- 
 portant cases recently pending in the 
 courts of New York and Illinois illus- 
 trate the principles set forth in the 
 text. In the case of the People v. 
 Luetgert (tried in the citj^ of Chicago) 
 the accused was charged with killing 
 his wife and with subsequently at- 
 tempting to destroy her body by 
 immersing it in powerful chem- 
 icals in a vat in a factory of 
 which he was proprietor. The 
 only proof of the corpus delicti 
 offered b}' the state was a few bones, 
 or portions of bones, and evidence 
 that the woman had unexpectedly and 
 unaccountably disappeared. The ac- 
 cused, to account for his wife's disap- 
 pearance, endeavored to show that he 
 and she had disagreed and that she 
 had deserted him for the purpose of 
 procuring a divorce. He also pro- 
 duced witnesses who swore, with 
 
 great positiveness, that they had seen 
 a woman, whom they then identified 
 as the missing wife, alive since the 
 commission of the crime charged. In 
 the New York case a woman, named ' 
 Xack, was jointly indicted with her 
 paramour, one Thorn, for the murder 
 of Goldensuppe, her discarded lover. 
 The woman, it was alleged, lured the 
 deceased to a vacant house in a lonely 
 and quiet suburb of New York city, 
 where he was shot by Thorn and his 
 body cut into three pieces. The sev- 
 ered portions of the trunk were care- 
 fully wrapped in oil cloth and cast 
 into the river, where they were sub- 
 sequentb' found and positively identi- 
 fied by the associates of the deceased. 
 The head has never been found. In 
 this case the defense was that Golden- 
 suppe was still alive. 
 
 Proof of alibi under a charge of 
 conspiracy to kill, 68 L. R. A. 222, 
 note.
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. 
 
 §339- Abduction — Proving the taking 351. 
 away or enticement — Corrob- 
 oration of the prosecutrix. 
 
 340. Abduction of a minor — Proof 352. 
 
 of the non-consent of the 
 mother or other guardian. 353. 
 
 341. Chastity of the female — Pre- 
 
 sumption of chastity. 
 
 342. Evidence to show the age of 354. 
 
 prosecutrix. 
 
 343. Abduction for purposes of 
 
 prostitution or concubinage. 355. 
 
 344. Abortion at common law and 356. 
 
 by statute distinguished. 
 
 345. Intention to produce an abor- 
 
 tion — Evidence of other 356a 
 crimes. 
 
 346. Victim of abortion is not an 357. 
 
 accomplice — Corroboration, 
 
 when required. 35S. 
 
 347. Necessity for the operation — 
 
 Burden of proof. 359. 
 
 348. Declarations of present pain 360. 
 
 and suffering and dying dec- 361. 
 larations of the victim. 362. 
 
 349. Evidence of the woman's phys- 363. 
 
 ical condition and illness — 
 Direct and circumstantial evi- 364. 
 dence. 
 
 350. Expert testimony of physician 365. 
 
 — Evidence afforded by the 
 pnxt-ujortciu. 
 
 Exception to rule regulating 
 privileged communications to 
 physicians. 
 
 .•\ssault and battery — Defini- 
 tion. 
 
 Evidence to show present abil- 
 ity of assailant to put his at- 
 tempt in action. 
 
 Intention to do bodily harm — 
 Circumstances which are rel- 
 evant. 
 
 Evidence of other assaults. 
 
 Assault with deadly weapons — 
 Evidence to show character 
 of weapon used. 
 
 Declarations constituting a part 
 of the res cjcstcc. 
 
 Evidence of threats and pre- 
 vious hostility. 
 
 Robbery — Intention present and 
 force employed. 
 
 The crime of mayhem. 
 
 Sodomy. 
 
 Criminal libel defined. 
 
 The publication of the libel. 
 
 The meaning of the language 
 used. 
 
 Malicious intention in publish- 
 ing. 
 
 Evidence of the truth as a de- 
 fense. 
 
 .;■ 339. Abduction — Proving the taking away or enticement — Cor- 
 roboration of the prosecutrix. — In niminal law, the act of takiiiu; 
 away a woman against her will, 01, if she is a minor, against the 
 
 (595)
 
 339 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE, 
 
 596 
 
 will of her parents or some oilier person having lawful control 
 over her, is an abduction. Whether abduction is a crime in the 
 absence of statute is doubtful. But this is now an unimportant 
 question, as the subject is almost universally regulated by statute. 
 The taking away or enticement must be proved.^ It need not be 
 proved that the taking was by force or fraud. It is enough thai 
 persuasion or enticement was employed." But evidence that 
 force or fraud was employed in taking the female is always rele- 
 vant. A direct proposal or express enticement need not be 
 proved. Either may be inferred by the jury from circumstances, 
 such as the association of the prosecutrix and the prisoner, and 
 from the fact that a meeting was arranged for them by some 
 third person.^ Proof of a taking away for any period or dis- 
 tance, however short, is enough.* 
 
 Sometimes, as in seduction,'^ it is enacted that a conviction 
 cannot be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of the female. 
 If corroborated evidence is required, it need not be direct or 
 
 ^ Slocum V. People, 90 111. 274, 279. 
 Evidence that the accused merely 
 harbored a female, though for im- 
 moral purposes, but in ignorance of 
 whom she was or whence she came, 
 will not sustain a conviction of ab- 
 duction. People V. Plath, 100 N. Y. 
 590, 594-597, 3 N- E. 790, 53 Am. 236. 
 
 Proof in prosecution for kidnap- 
 ping, Elliott Evidence, § 2736; com- 
 mon law rule changed, § ^T^y. Proof 
 of intent in abduction, §2738; in kid- 
 napping, § 2744. Proof of taking 
 away or detention, Elliott Evidence, 
 §§ 2742, 2743. 2747. Proof of phys- 
 ical force not required, Elliott Evi- 
 dence, § 2741. 
 
 ■ People V. ^rarshall, 59 Cal. 386, 
 388; People V. Demousset, 71 Cal. 611, 
 613, 12 Pac. 788; State v. Johnson, 
 115 Mo. 480, 22 S. W. 463; State v. 
 Stone, 106 Mo. i, 16 S. W. 890; State 
 V. Keith, 47 Minn. 559, 561, 50 X. W. 
 691 ; State v. Jamison, 38 Minn. 21, 
 23, 35 N. W. 712; Wallace v. State, 
 
 147 Ind. 621, 47 N. E. 13; Beyer v. 
 People, 86 N. Y. 369; People v. See- 
 ley, 2>7 Hun (N. Y.) 190. Amatory 
 letters, written by the defendant, 
 though without date, unsigned by him, 
 and not proved to have been in the 
 possession of the girl abducted, may 
 be proved against him as his admis- 
 sions. State V. Overstreet, 43 Kan. 
 299, 23 Pac. 572. 
 
 ^People' v. Carrier, 46 Mich. 442, 
 447, 9 N. W. 487 ; People v. Wah Lee 
 Mon, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 626, 13 N. Y. 
 S. 767; Huff V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 37 S. W. 1046, 18 Ky. L. 752. 
 
 * Slocum V. People, 90 111. 274, 276 ; 
 State V. Stone, 106 Mo. i, 16 S. W. 
 890; Reg. V. Baillie, 8 Cox C. C. 238. 
 Any representation, or suggestion 
 made to influence the female, will, if 
 it induces her to go away, bring the 
 case within the statute, though no di- 
 rect solicitation be used. People v. 
 Carrier, 46 :Mich. 442, 9 N. W. 487. 
 
 " See § § 389, 390.
 
 597 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. 
 
 § 340 
 
 positive, or sufficient alone to convict.'' Circumstantial evidence 
 will suffice. But the corroboration should extend to every ma- 
 terial fact essential to constitute the crime (among which the 
 taking away is most important), and the criminal intent and 
 identity of the abductor." 
 
 ^ 340. Abduction of a minor — Proof of the non-consent of the 
 mother or other guardian.— If the female abducted is a minor, the 
 burden is on the state to prove the non-consent of the parent or 
 guardian.*^ The latter may testify that the taking was without 
 his or her consent," and perhaps on this point he is an indispensa- 
 ble witness.^" It is no defense to prove that the taking was with- 
 out force, and with the consent of the minor." As tending to 
 show the lack of the consent of the parents it may be shown that 
 neither of them knew where the child was and that the mother 
 sent the father out to look for her.^- 
 
 § 341. Chastity of the female — Presumption of chastity. — Where 
 
 the statute provides a punishment for the abduction of any or 
 every female, evidence of her chastity, or the reverse, is irrele- 
 
 • State V. Keith, 47 Minn. 559, 562, 
 50 X. W. 691 ; Minn. Penal Code, 
 § 241 ; Elliott Evidence, § 2757. 
 
 ^ People V. Plath, 100 X. Y. 590, 593, 
 594, 3 N- E. 790, 53 Am. 236 ; i Cent. 
 772; State V. Keith, 47 Minn. 559, 
 562, so X. W. 691 ; People v. Brandt, 
 14 X. Y. St. 419, whether the taking 
 or enticement is corroborated is for 
 the jury. People v. Brown, 71 Hun 
 fX. Y.) 601, 24 X. Y. S. nil. See, 
 also, cases cited in §§ 389, 390, post. 
 In the absence of statute, corrobora- 
 tion is unnecessary. State v. Stone, 
 106 Mo. T. 16 S. W. 890. 
 
 • But State v. Burnett, 142 X. Car. 
 577. .S.T S. E. 72, places the burden of 
 proving the parents' consent on the 
 accused. See, also, State v. Chisen- 
 hall. 106 X. Car. 676, 11 S. E. 518. 
 
 • ScruRRs V. State, 90 Tcnn. 81, 15 
 S. W. 1074; State V. Stone, 106 Mo. 
 
 I, 7, 16 S. \V. 890; State V. Baldwin, 
 214 Mo. 290, 113 S. W. 1 123. 
 
 '" It would seem by analogy that the 
 evidence of the person whose consent 
 was not given is primary evidence of 
 non-consent, as in larceny, where the 
 owner of the goods must, if possible, 
 be called to prove non-consent. 
 
 Taking against will of person ab- 
 ducted, Elliott Evidence, § 2751. 
 
 " State V. Stone, 106 Mo. i, 7, 16 
 S. W. 890; State V. Bobbst, 131 Mo. 
 328, 32 S. W. 1 149. Proof of age and 
 consent in prosecution for kidnap- 
 ping, Ellif)tt Evidence, § 2739; ab- 
 duction from house without consent 
 r)f parent or guardian, Elliott Evi- 
 tlencc, 8 2748; taking from residence 
 or custody, § 2749; taking from par- 
 ent without consent. § 2750. 
 
 " State v. Chisi-nhall, 106 X. Car 
 676, II S. E. 518.
 
 § 341 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 598 
 
 vant.'^ It is otherwise if the statute refers to the taking away 
 of a female of chaste repute or character/^ and then a single act 
 of illicit intercourse witii another man than accused may be 
 proved/'' 
 
 Upon the question whether the previous chastity of the prose- 
 cutrix will be presumed, or whether the state will have to prove 
 it. as an essential element of its case, the authorities are divided. 
 Some of the cases, basing their reasoning upon the almost uni- 
 versal prevalence of female chastity admitted to exist in modern 
 civilized society, maintain that it is a presumption of law that she 
 is chaste,^'' and cast the burden of proving her lack of chastity 
 on the accused. 
 
 It has also been held that no presumption exists either way, 
 but tliat, in view of the presumed innocence of the accused, the 
 state must, in the first instance, introduce some evidence of chas- 
 tity.^' It is competent on the one hand to show^ that the girl ab- 
 ducted was reputed to be a prostitute^** and that she had lived in 
 a disreputable house and associated generally with disreputable 
 persons, or, to show her chastity, that she had before the abduction 
 attended Sunday school and church and had been welcomed in 
 good society.^^ The evidence of the unchastity of the prosecutrix 
 must be confined to her conduct, or reputation, prior to the ab- 
 duction by which she has been corrupted."" But evidence that 
 after the taking away she had sexual intercourse with the accused 
 
 ^'People V. Demousset, 71 Cal. 611, 38 X. E. 652; Slocum v. People, 
 
 612, 614, 12 Pac. 788; State v. John- 90 111. 274; Elliott Evidence, § 2755. 
 
 son, 115 Mo. 480, 492, 22 S. W. 463; Previous chaste character, Elliott 
 
 State V. Gibson, iii Mo. 92, 19 S. W. Evidence, §§ 2753, 2754; character of 
 
 980; Scruggs V. State, 90 Tenn. 81, victim of crime, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 15 S. W. 1074; State V. Bobbst, 131 725, note. 
 
 Mo. 328, 32 S. W. 1 149, 1 1 50. "Kerr v. United States, 7 Ind. 
 
 "Brown v. State, 72 Md. 468, 476, Terr. 486, 104 S. W. 809; Common- 
 
 20 Atl. 186; People V. Roderigas, 49 wealth v. Whittaker, 131 Mass. 224, 
 
 Cal. 9. Proof of previous unchastity 225. See, also, §§ 392, 393. 
 
 as a defense, Elliott Evidence, § 2756. " Brown v. State, 72 Md. 468, 20 
 
 " Lyons v. State, 52 Ind. 426, 427. -Xtl. 186. 
 
 *• Andre v. State, 5 Iowa 389, 68 '" Bradshaw v. People, 153 111. 156, 
 
 Am. Dec. 7o8n ; State v. Higdon. t,2 38 X. E. 652. 
 
 Iowa 262; People v. Brewer, 27 Mich. '"Scruggs v. State, 90 Tenn. 81. 85. 
 
 134; Bradshaw v. People, 153 111. 156, 15 S. W. 1074; Slocum v. People, 90
 
 599 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 342 
 
 is receivable to show his intent.-' Evidence that the mother, or 
 other female relatives of the prosecutrix, had been addicted to 
 lewdness,"" or that the accused had, when a child, lived with a 
 prostitute,"^ is inadmissible as being too remote. 
 
 § 342. Evidence to show age of prosecutrix. — The age of a prose- 
 cuting witness alleged to be under the age of consent may be 
 pro\'ed by her own testimony,"* though her parents are present 
 and testify to her age."^ A parent may testify to a child's age 
 if he knows the age independently of the record though he had 
 written the date in the family Bible."'* Her evidence is primary 
 and original, though her knowledge is based solely on what her 
 parents have told her,"" and though the fact is also recorded. A 
 non-expert witness may testify to the age of a person seen out 
 of court. He should be asked to describe the person's dress and 
 appearance, and he may then state his opinion as to his or her 
 age."'"* He may then be asked, as a test, to give his opinion of the 
 age of a bystander, the latter being called to state his own age in 
 rebuttal."'* In some states in criminal trials, family reputation 
 as to age has been held inadmissible as being hearsay.^'' Whether 
 
 111. 274, 281; People V. Carrier, 46 Mass. 433. 49 N. E. 632; Elliott Evi- 
 
 Mich. 442, 9 N. W. 487. dence, § 2752. 
 
 ■'Henderson v. People, 124 111. 607, ""State v. Miller, 71 Kan. 200. 80 
 
 614, ly N. E. 68, 7 Am. St. 391 ; State Pac. 51. 
 
 V. Johnson, 115 Mo. 480, 495, 22 S. W. -° Bynum v. State, 46 Fla. 142, 35 
 
 463; People V. Brown, 71 Hun (N. So. 65. 
 
 Y.) 601, 24 N. Y. S. nil. "Cherry v. State, 68 Ala. 29, 31; 
 
 ~ Scruggs V. State, 90 Tenn. 81. 86, State v. Trusty, 122 Iowa 82, 97 N. 
 
 15 S. W. 1074. W. 989; Underhill on Ev., p. 74. 
 
 " Brown v. State, 72 Md. 468, 480, ^ Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 134 
 
 20 Atl. 186. Mass. 198, 200; Carr v. State, 24 Tex. 
 
 ■^ Bain v. State, 61 Ala. 75 ; Com- App. 562, 7 S. W. 328, S Am. St. 905 ; 
 
 monwcalth v. Stevenson, 142 Mass. State v. Douglass, 48 Mo. App. 39, 41 ; 
 
 466, 468, 8 N. E. 341 ; Mason v. State, Marshall v. State, 49 Ala. 21 ; Under- 
 
 29 Tex. App. 24, 14 S. W. 71; Curry hill on Ev., p. 269; State v. Romero, 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 158, 94 S. W. 117 La. 1003, 42 So. 482; Simpson v. 
 
 1058; People V. Bernor, 115 Mich. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 320, yy S. W. 819. 
 
 692. 74 N. W. 184; Loose V. State, ^Louisville &c. R. Co. v. I'alvey, 
 
 120 Wis. 115, 97 N. W. 526: Rcnfroe 104 Ind. 409, 3 N. E. 389, 4 N. E. 908. 
 
 V. State, 84 Ark. 16, 104 S. VV. 542; '"'Rex v. Wedge, 5 Car. & P. 298: 
 
 State V. Scroggs, 123 Iowa 649, 96 \'. Clark v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 92 S. 
 
 W. ']2},; Commonwealth v. Hollis, 170 W. 573, 29 Ky. L. 154; People v. Col- 
 
 balli, 141 Mich. 189, 104 N. W. 633.
 
 § 343 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 6oO 
 
 the age of a witness can be (Ictcnnincd by tbe jury solely from 
 his personal ai)pearance has been variously decided. Some cases 
 hold that his personal appearance, aside from direct oral or writ- 
 ter proof, is competent to go to the jury,^^ while others support 
 the contrary proposition.^- But evidence is not admissible to 
 show that the defendant was ignorant of the age of the female, 
 or that he believed or had good reason to believe that she was 
 over the age of consent.^^ A family Bible in which the girl's par- 
 ents entered the birth of the child within a year after the birth 
 and which has ever since been in his possession is competent.^* 
 This is also true of a piece of paper kept as a record of births in 
 a family when the entries were made by strangers at the request 
 of the parents who were unable to write and the person who 
 made the entry could not be found. ^^ For a Bible or other family 
 record is not the best proof of birth or age where the person who 
 made the record is alive, competent to testify and can be reached 
 by a subpoena.^" 
 
 § 343. Abduction for purposes of prostitution or concubinage. — 
 When a statute provides that the taking must have been for pur- 
 poses of prostitution, the evidence must show beyond a reason- 
 able doubt that the accused intended to cause the female to enter 
 upon a life of indiscriminate sexual intercourse.^' It is not 
 
 ''Commonwealth v. Emmons, 98 ''State v. Xeasby, 188 ]\Io. 467, 87 
 
 Mass. 6; People v. Special Sessions, S. W. 468. 
 ID Hun (\. Y.) 224. ""Loose v. State, 120 Wis. 115, 97 
 
 "- Stephenson v. State, 28 Ind. 272 ; N. W. 526. 
 State V. Arnold, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) '^ Osborn v. State, 52 Tnd. 526. The 
 
 184; Bird V. State, 104 Ind. 384, 3 N. intention to have sexual intercourse 
 
 E. 827. See "Inspection," Underbill maj- be inferred from the making of 
 
 on Ev., pp. 492-495. a proposition for it, or from an at- 
 
 '^ People V. Dolan, 96 Cal. 315, 31 tempt to procure it by force. Huff v. 
 
 Pac. 107; State v. Johnson, 115 Mo. Commonwealth (Ky.), 37 S. W. 1046, 
 
 480, 494, 22 S. W. 463; Riley v. State 18 Ky. L. 752. It is not material to 
 
 (Miss., 1896), 18 So. 117; but cf. prove or allege the actual accomplish- 
 
 contra, Mason v. State, 29 Tex. App. ment of the purpose of the accused 
 
 24, 14 S. W. 71, and State v. Houx, in this respect. State v. Bobbst, 131 
 
 T09 Mo. 654, 19 S. W. 35, 32 Am. St. Mo. 328, 2>2 S. W. 1149, 1151; State 
 
 686; Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 30 v. Knost, 207 jNlo. 18. 105 S. W. 616; 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 845; State v. Xewton, Elliott Evidence, §§ 2745, 2746; State 
 
 44 Iowa 45. V. Fleetwood (Mo., 1909), 122 S. W. 
 
 "* Simpson v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 320, 696. 
 77 S. \V. 819.
 
 60I CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 343 
 
 enough to show that he,^*^ or some third person, intended to have 
 intercourse with her occasionally.^'^ Direct evidence that the ac- 
 cused intended to devote his victim to purposes of prostitution 
 is not required. This intent may be inferred from evidence that 
 tlie woman was taken from her home by a prostitute and her 
 companion directly to a house of prostitution,'"^ and from evi- 
 dence that, prior to the abduction, illicit relations had existed 
 between the parties.'*^ 
 
 Some statutes provide for the punishment of abduction for 
 purposes of concubinage as well as prostitution. Concubinage 
 may be defined as the -informal and illicit cohabitation of a man 
 and woman as husband and wife without being such. Proof of a 
 single act of sexual intercourse is enough when the other material 
 elements of the crime are proved.^- Xo length of time or long 
 continuance of illicit intercourse is necessary. The concubinage 
 exists as soon as the single woman consents to unlawfully co- 
 habit with a man generally, as though the marriage relation 
 existed between them, without any limit as to the duration of 
 such intercourse and actually commences such cohabitation.*^ 
 Under an indictment for abducting a chaste woman for the 
 purpose of prostitution specifying only one house of prostitution 
 to which she was taken** it may be proved that she was taken to 
 
 ^ State V. Gibson, iii Mo. 92, 19 S. '"People v. Marshall, 59 Cal. 386, 
 
 \V. 980, 982; Commonwealth v. Cook, 388; State v. McCrum, 38 Minn. 154, 
 
 12 Met. (Mass.) 93; State v. Brow, 155, 36 X. W. 102. 
 
 64 X. H. 577, 15 .\tl. 216; Osborn v. ^"People v. Carrier, 46 Mich. 442, 
 
 State. 52 Ind. 526, 528; State v. Stoy- 447, 9 X. W. 487, or subsequently, 
 
 ell, 54 Me. 24, 27, 89 Am. Dec. 716; State v. Johnson, 115 Mo. 480, 495, 22 
 
 State V. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447 ; United S. W. 463 ; People v. Claudius, 8 Cal. 
 
 States V. Zes Cloya, 35 Fed. 493 ; App. 597, 97 Pac. 687. 
 
 State V. Jamison, 38 Minn. 21, 23, 35 "State v. Gibson, in Mo. 92, 19 
 
 X. \V. 712; Haygood v. State, 98 .-Ma. S. W. 980, 982; State v. Gibson, 108 
 
 61, 13 So. 325; Henderson v. People, Mo. 575, 18 S. W. T109, mo; State v. 
 
 124 111. 607, 612, 17 X. E. 68, 7 Am. Ovcrstreet, 43 Kan. 299, 23 Pac. 572; 
 
 St. 39r ; State v. Wilkinson, 121 Mo. People v. Sprig^s, 119 .\pp. Div. (X. 
 
 ;.^5. 486. 26 S. W. 366. The principal Y.) 236, T04 X. Y. S. 539. 
 
 ■ Icment is the taking away and the *' Henderson v. People, 124 III. 607, 
 
 purpose of the taking and subsequent 17 N- E- 68, 7 Am. St. 391. 
 
 '"habitation or sexual intercourse is "3 Inst. 50, i Hale P. C. 433. 
 
 •!'>t essential to be proved, but arc "State v. Savant, 115 La. 226, 38 
 
 iicrcly evidence of intent. Stale v. So. 974. 
 1 uckcr, 72 Kan. 481, 84 Pac. 126.
 
 § 344 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 602 
 
 Other houses as showing the purpose of the accused in the ab- 
 duction. 
 
 § 344. Abortion at common law and by statute distinguished. — It 
 was not a crime at common law to operate upon a pregnant 
 woman for the purpose of procuring an abortion unless she were 
 actually quick with child. ^^•'' But if this were the case an abortion 
 was a misdemeanor at common law.^" So, anciently, if a woman 
 quick with child killed it herself, or was beaten so that she was 
 delivered of a dead child, it Avas not murder.^" The same prin- 
 ciple applied when the acts with an intention to produce an abor- 
 tion were by another. Even when the mother died as a result 
 of an attempt to procure an abortion, the killing was not regarded 
 as murder, for the death was collateral, and aside from the 
 principal design and the procurement of the abortion was not a 
 felony.*' These rules are now generally changed by statute. It 
 is now equally criminal to produce abortion before and after 
 quickening, and if the statute, as is usually the case, makes an 
 abortion a felony, then the death of the woman as a result of the 
 subordinate crime is murder.** 
 
 ij 345. Intention to produce an abortion — Evidence of other crimes. 
 
 — An abortionary intent must be proved.*" Evidence of an as- 
 
 "a Commonwealth v. Farker, 9 Met. monwealtli v. Surles, 165 Mass. 59, 42 
 
 (Mass.) 263, 43 Am. Dec. 396; Peo- N. E. 502. 
 
 pie V. McDowell, 63 Mich. 229, 30 N. " But see State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 
 
 W. 68; State v. Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 299. 
 
 52, 51 Am. Dec. 248, and compare " Slattery v. People, 76 Til. 217. 
 
 contra, State v. Fitzgerald, 49 Iowa 220. Proof of motive, Elliott Evi- 
 
 260, 31 Am. I48n; Smith v. State, 33 dence, § 2762; advising or adminis- 
 
 Me. 48, 54 Am. Dec. 607; Common- tering, sufficiency of proof, § 2763: 
 
 wealth V. Wood, 11 Gray (Mass.) 85. effect on woman, consent, § 2764: 
 
 ^'^ State V. Slagle, 82 N. Car. 653; proof of nature of means used, 
 
 Commonwealth v. Dcmain, 6 Pa. L. J. § 2765; proof of pregnancy, § 2766; 
 
 29,3 Clark (Pa.) 487. proof of opportunities and facilities, 
 
 *" Smith V. State, 33 Me. 48, 53-60, § 2767; proof of similar acts, § 2768: 
 
 54 Am. Dec. 607. See this case for a corroborative proof, § 2769; testimn- 
 
 thorough discussion of the meaning ny of accomplice, 98 Am. St. 179: 
 
 of miscarriage. See, also, State v. evidence of other crimes, 62 L. R. A. 
 
 Cooper, 22 N. J. L. 52-58, 51 Am. 229, note. 
 
 Dec. 248; Mitchell V. Commonwealth, "Elliott Evidence. §§2760, 2761; 
 
 78 Ky. 204-210, 39 Am. 227; Com- 62 L. R. A. 229, note.
 
 6o3 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSOX. 
 
 346 
 
 sank or beating alone is not enongh, thongli a miscarriage actu- 
 ally should ensue as a result thereof/" If an intention to produce 
 an abortion is shown, it is immaterial that the means employed 
 did not and could not have produced the result intended,^ ^ and 
 even though it conclusively appear that the abortion resulted 
 from other means.'"" Evidence that the accused prior," or sub- 
 sequently, to the act alleged, had attempted to procure an abor- 
 tion on the same woman.''* using the same or different means, 
 or that on other occasions he had operated on other women, ^^ 
 or held himself out as being able and willing to commit an abor- 
 tion,"^ is always admissible to show his purpose and intention in 
 connection with tlie act charged.^' 
 
 ^ 346. Victim of abortion is not an accomplice — Corroboration 
 when required. — The woman on whom an abortion is performed 
 is not an accomplice,"'"' as she cannot be indicted for the same 
 offense as the accused. But the fact that, from a moral point of 
 view, she is implicated in the crime may be considered by the 
 jury as bearing on her credibility.^® A person is not an accomplice 
 
 '"" State V. Fitzgerald, 49 Iowa 260, 
 262, 31 Am. 14811. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Corkin, 136 
 Mass. 429, 430; People v. Seaman, 
 T07 Mich. 348, 65 N. W. 203, 61 Am. 
 St. 326; State V. Gedicke, 43 N. J. L. 
 86; State v. HoUenbeck, 36 Iowa 112; 
 State V. Fitzgerald, 49 Iowa 260, 31 
 -Am. 148. 
 
 "State V. Morrow, 40 S. Car. 221, 
 18 S. E. 8S3- 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Brown, 14 Graj' 
 CMass.) 419, 432. 
 
 "Scott V. People, 141 III. 195, 30 N. 
 E. 329; Commonwealth v. Corkin, 136 
 Mass. 429. 
 
 " Lamb v. State, 66 Md. 285, 287, 7 
 .•\tl. 399, 67 Md. 524, 10 Atl. 208, 298; 
 Scott V. People, 141 111. 195, 213, 30 
 N'. E. 329; State v. CroflFord, 121 
 Iowa 395, 96 N. W. 889; People v. 
 Hagenow, 236 111. 514, 86 N. E. 370. 
 See, also, Underbill on Ev., §89, 10. 
 
 ^ Clark V. People, 224 111. 554, 79 
 X. E. 941. 
 
 " State V. Smith, 99 Iowa 26, 68 X. 
 W. 428, 61 Am. St. 219; Common- 
 wealth V. Wood, II Gray (Mass.) 
 85, 93 ; Commonwealth v. Boynton, 
 1x6 Mass. 343, 345; Commonwealth 
 V. Follansbee, 155 Mass. 274, 277, 29 
 X. E. 471 ; Dunn v. People, 29 X. Y. 
 523, 527, 86 Am. Dec. 3i9n; State v. 
 Vedder, 98 X. Y. 630, 632; People v. 
 Hodge, 141 Mich. 312, 104 X. W. 599; 
 Clark V. People, 224 111. 554, 79 X. E. 
 941. 
 
 ^*Rcx V. Hargravc, 5 Car. & P. 170; 
 Thompson v. United States, 30 .■^pp. 
 D. C. 352 ; State v. Carey, 76 Conn. 
 342, 56 Atl. 632; Smartt v. State, 112 
 Tenn. 539. 80 S. VV. 586. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Wood, 11 Gray 
 (Mass.) 85; Watson v. State, 9 Tex. 
 App. 237, 245; State V. Carey, 76 
 Conn. 342, 56 Atl. 632.
 
 § 347 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 604 
 
 who procures an aiicTSthetic which is administered to the victim, 
 if it is not shown that he knew the purpose for which it was 
 used."" Nor is a woman an accomplice, who, being an intimate 
 friend and confidant of the deceased, knew of her pregnancy and 
 her desire for rehef, and accompanied her to the defendant's 
 house, when she did not aid or advise the defendant, and was 
 not present when the crime was committed. ''^ Because of the 
 confidential and secret character of the relations existing between 
 physicians and their female patients, and, also, on account of the 
 great danger to which physicians would be exposed if an accusa- 
 tion of the crime of abortion committed on a patient could be 
 sustained by the uncorroborated statement of the latter, it has 
 been enacted by statute that a physician shall not be arrested, 
 indicted'or convicted of abortion on the testimony of the woman 
 alone. Her testimony must be corroborated in respect to some 
 material facts which constitute a necessary element in the crime, 
 as, for example, the use of an instrument and the intent."- Very 
 frequently several defendants are jointly indicted for the abor- 
 tion. In such a case the criminal lial)ility is several as well as 
 joint, and one defendant may be convicted and the other ac- 
 quitted. Hence, criminatory evidence may be received against 
 either, though the state shall fail to connect the other with it."^ 
 
 § 347. Necessity for the operation — Burden of proof. — Whether 
 the abortion was necessary to save life is a question for the jury 
 to determine, principally upon the facts involved in the victim's 
 illness. The opinion evidence of physicians to its necessity, 
 though desirable, is not indispensable."* The burden of estab- 
 lishing that the abortion was actually necessary,"^ or that the 
 
 *° Commonwealth v. Follansbee, 155 *" Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 
 
 Mass. 274, 29 N. E. 471. 361, 48 X. W. 380. 
 
 " People V. McGonegal, 42 X. Y. "^ People v. McGonegal, 42 X. Y. 
 
 St. 307, 314. 17 N. Y. S. 147, 62 Hun St. 307, 313, 17 N. Y. S. 147. 62 
 
 (X. Y.) 622, aff'd without opinion, Hun (X. Y.) 622, without opinion; 
 
 136 N. Y. 62, 76, 32 X^. E. 616. Contra, Bradford v. People, 20 Hun (X. Y.) 
 
 People V. Spier, 120 App. Div. (X. 309; Elliott Evidence, § 2771, but cf. 
 
 Y.) 786, 105 X. Y. S. 741. contra, State v. Clements. 15 Ore. 237, 
 
 "• People V. Josselyn, 39 Cal. 393, 246-249, 14 Pac. 410. citing i Greenl., 
 
 398. § 7S, and State v. Wells (Utah, 1909). 
 
 "Baker v. People, 105 111. 452, 456. 100 Pac. 681, is also contra.
 
 6o; 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSOX. 
 
 348 
 
 accused was advisecr'"''" it was necessary, is on him as facts pecul- 
 iarly within his own knowledge."'" He need not establish its 
 necessity beyond a reasonable doubt. ''^ 
 
 § 348. Declarations of present pahi and suffering and dying dec- 
 larations by the victim. — The declarations of the \ictim are not 
 generally admissible unless they are so far contemporaneous 
 with and explanatory of an act or transaction already in evidence 
 that they may be received as a part of the res gestcc,^^ or unless 
 they consist of exclamations or ejaculations of present suffering 
 uttered during the lying-in. '° If the woman not only consents 
 to the operation, but actually seeks and adopts means in further- 
 ance of it, her declarations may be admitted against the accused 
 as the declarations of a fellow-conspirator made to promote the 
 common design.'^ They should be admitted in his favor where 
 
 •^^ Hatchard v. State, 79 Wis. 357, 
 48 X. \V. 380. 
 
 *" That the accused thought the op- 
 eration was necessary is irrelevant. 
 Hatchard v. State, supra. 
 
 °* State V. Stevenson, 68 Vt. 529, 35 
 Atl. 470; State V. McCoy, 15 Utah 
 136, 49 Pac. 420; State v. Lee, 69 
 Conn. 186, 27 Atl. 75. As to the ne- 
 cessity of the operation see, also. 
 State V. Watson, 30 Kan. 281, i Pac. 
 770 ; State v. Glass, 5 Ore. y^. 
 
 "" Scott V. People, 141 111. 195, 214, 
 30 X. E. 329; State v. Gedicke, 43 X. 
 J. L. 86, 89; Commonwealth v. Leach, 
 156 Mass. 99, loi, 30 X. E. 163; 
 Clarke v. People, 224 III. 554, 79 X. E. 
 941, holding that statements of the 
 victim of a murder resulting from an 
 abortion to a physician in a prior ill- 
 ness as to how such prior illness was 
 the result of an al)ortion arc hearsay. 
 
 '" People v. .\ikin, 66 Midi. 460, 475, 
 33 X. W. 821, II Am. St. 512; Rhodes 
 V. State, 128 Ind. 189, 191, 27 X. E. 
 866, 25 \m. St. 429. "These declara- 
 tions were made by her to the physi- 
 cian at the time he was called upon 
 
 as an expert to determine the state of 
 her health, and were statements of 
 her bodily feelings, and the symp- 
 toms of her supposed pregnancy. 
 This evidence was admissible * * * 
 from the necessity of learning from 
 the patient herself facts within her 
 own knowledge, which the physician 
 should know to form an intelligent 
 and accurate opinion of her present 
 health and situation. The usual symp- 
 toms of pregnancy in its early stage 
 must be obtained from the patient 
 herself, such as the obstruction of 
 the usual course of nature, morning 
 sickness, head-ache, nervousness and 
 other indications hidden from the 
 observation of others." State v. 
 Gedicke, 43 X. J. L. 86, 89 ; People v. 
 Aikin, 66 Mich. 460, 475, 33 X. W. 
 821, II Am. St. 512: Hays v. State, ^o 
 Md. 633, 651 ; Weightnovel v. State, 
 46 Pla. I, 35 So. 856. (Declaration l)y 
 deceased that she was going to stay at 
 defendant's house for an operation.) 
 " Solander v. People, 2 Colo. 48, 
 62-64.
 
 § 349 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 606 
 
 he alleges that when he fust met her as a physician she was suffer- 
 ing from a miscarriage and that he operated on her in good faith 
 in company with another physician.'- The fact that the victim is 
 dead does not admit her declarations. They will not be received 
 as dying declarations, though possessing all the characteristics 
 which would admit them in a trial for homicide. ''' 
 
 ^ 349. Evidence of the woman's physical condition and illness — 
 Direct and circumstantial evidence. — The evidence will be permitted 
 to take a wide range. Facts elicited by a post mortem are always 
 admissible to prove the corpus delicti. But evidence of the vic- 
 tim's pregnancy, her medical treatment,'* the appearance of her 
 bed and clothing,"" and her physical condition,'® her health and 
 spirits,'' and her relations, including acts of sexual intercourse''* 
 with the defendant or with one accused of being an accessory.'''' 
 
 •"State V. Fuller (Ore., 1908), 96 
 Pac. 456. 
 
 '^ Underbill on Ev., p. 141. See 
 also, § 106; Maine v. People, 9 Hun 
 (X. Y.) 13; State v. Harper, 35 Ohio 
 St. 78, 35 Am. 596; Railing v. Com- 
 monwealth, no Pa. St. 100, I Atl. 
 314. In Massachusetts, by St. 1889, 
 c. 100, dying declarations are admis- 
 sible. Commonwealth v. Homer, 153 
 Mass. 343, 344, 26 N. E. 872. And 
 other declarations are received to 
 show that the former were made un- 
 der a sense of impending death. 
 Commonwealth v. Cooper, 5 Allen 
 (^lass.) 495, 497, 81 Am. Dec. 762; 
 Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 
 Mass. 180, 184-188, 31 X. E. 961, 24 
 L. R. A. 235 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Thompson, 159 Mass. 56, 59, Zi ^^ 
 E. nil. In Maryland a statement by 
 the woman accusing the accused of 
 having committed the abortion was 
 received as a dying declaration. 
 Hawkins v. State, 98 Md. 355. 57 Atl. 
 2~. The rule is that dying declara- 
 tions are not admissible unless the 
 
 death of the woman is by statute an 
 indispensable element of the crime 
 charged against the accused. State 
 V. Fuller, 52 Ore. 42, 96 Pac. 456. 
 See also, Elliott Evidence, § 2770; 
 86 Am. St. 666, note; 6z L. R. A. 
 916, note. 
 
 '* People V. Aikin, 66 Mich. 460, 474, 
 2,3 X. W. 821, II Am. St. 512. It is 
 proper to permit the state to prove 
 the previous condition of the woman, 
 that she had never been pregnant be- 
 fore and had never been operated on. 
 Thomas v. State, 156 Ala. 166, 47 So. 
 
 257. 
 
 '* People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich. 431. 
 
 ""Commonwealth v. Follansbee, 155 
 Mass. 274, 29 X. E. 471. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Wood, 11 Gray 
 (Mass.) 8s, 91 ; Hays v. State, 40 Md. 
 63Z; State V. Fletcher (X. J. L.), 72 
 Atl. 3Z- 
 
 "Scott V. People, 141 III. 195. 211, 
 30 X. E. 329. 
 
 "' State V. Carey, 76 Conn. 342, 56 
 Atl. 632, to show motive for employ- 
 ment of principal.
 
 60/ 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. 
 
 349 
 
 subsequent to the date of the alleged abortion, is ahvavs admis- 
 sible."' 
 
 It need not be shown that the defendant knew the woman was 
 pregnant. If the intent to produce a miscarriage is present, it is 
 enough that the defendant may only have had a mere suspicion 
 that pregnancy existed. ""^ But evidence that the defendant had 
 or had not a knowledge of the woman's pregnancy is relevant to 
 support or to rebut a presumption of an abortionary intention.''' 
 Evidence that the defendant advertised he would procure abor- 
 tions,*^ that several months prior to the alleged offense he had 
 articles in his possession which he knew were calculated to pro- 
 duce an abortion, ''■' that he supplied the woman with the means 
 of producing an abortion and gave her minute directions how 
 those means were to be employed,"^ is admissible. Direct evi- 
 dence that the defendant committed the crime is not demanded. 
 He may be convicted on circumstantial evidence alone,**'"' if it is 
 sufficient to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
 woman was pregnant,'"' and that drugs or instruments were used 
 on her by the defendant with a criminal intent.^** But a convic- 
 tion of having in one's possession instruments Intended to cause 
 
 ™ Commonwealth v. Follansbee, 155 
 Ivlass. 274, 277, 29 N. E. 471. In 
 People V. Aikin, 66 Mich. 460, 33 X. 
 \V. 821, II Am. St. 512, it is said, "a 
 history of her illness from the very 
 beginning to the end, in detail, was 
 most proper, and perfectly legitimate 
 to prove the corpus delicti, and what 
 the respondent did and said in con- 
 nection with such illness while in the 
 house attending upon the sick girl 
 was properly a part and parcel of 
 such history." 
 
 " Powe V. State, 48 X. J. L. 34, 36, 
 2 .Atl. 662. 
 
 "'Scott V. People, 141 111. 195, 211, 
 30 X. E. 329; State v. McLeod, 136 
 .Mo. 109. 37 S. W. 828; People v. 
 I lagcnow, 236 111. 514, 86 X. E. 370. 
 
 "Weed v. People. 3 Thomp. & C. 
 (S. Y.) 50: Pc-Dpk- V. Sessions, 58 
 -Mich. 594, 26 X. VV. 291 ; reopic v. 
 
 Hagenow, 236 111. 514, 86 X. E. 370. 
 As to proof of venue. State v. Hogan, 
 123 Mo. App. 319, 100 S. W. 528. 
 
 "* Commonwealth v. Blair, 126 
 Mass. 40, 42 ; People v. Vedder, 98 X. 
 Y. 630; Commonwealth v. Brown, 121 
 Mass. 69. 
 
 "^ Jones V. State, 70 Md. 326, 327, 17 
 Atl. 89, 14 Am. St. 362. 
 
 '"See §5. 
 
 " State V. Stewart, 52 Iowa 284, 
 286, 3 X. W. 99; State V. Rogers, 135 
 Mo. App. 695, 116 S. W. 469. 
 
 ''''Commonwealth v. Leach, 136 
 Mass. 99, 102, 30 X. E. 163; Clarke 
 V. People, 16 Colo. 511, 27 Pac. 724: 
 State V. Stewart, 52 Iowa 284, 3 X. 
 W. 99; Commonwealth v. .Adams, 127 
 Mass. 15, 19; Dougherty v. People, i 
 Colo. 5r4; Earil v. People, 99 111. 
 123.
 
 sj 350 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE, 608 
 
 an al)Oi'lion cannot be sustained l)y proof of the possession of an 
 instrument which. th()UL;ii often used for that purpose, was made 
 and designed for a dittercnt one/"' 
 
 § 350. Expert testimony of physicians — Evidence afforded by the 
 post-mortem. — A ])h}-sician, if properly quahfied, may, it seems, 
 testify to the result of his examination of the person of the 
 woman, '"^ testify to the time required to produce an abortion,'" 
 that in his opinion an abortion had been procured.''- and that 
 death had resulted therefrom,"^ that traces of an abortion would 
 remain if one had been committed or attempted,"'* as to the kind 
 of instrument and the mode of using it which w^ould produce the 
 condition in which the woman was found, "^ and that certain 
 drugs,''^^ or instruments,'^*' which the jury may be permitted to in- 
 spect, were popularly supposed "'' to be calculated to produce an 
 abortion. While a physician who made a post inortcui examina- 
 tion is undoubtedly a competent witness to any of the above 
 matters,"* his is not the best nor only proper evidence and any 
 competent medical man may testify. The expert may testify 
 that it is impossible for any woman unaided to have produced an 
 abortion upon herself by the use of a certain instrument. Then 
 
 *" State V. Forsythc, 78 Iowa 595, wealth v. Thompson, 159 Mass. 56, z;^ 
 
 597, 43 N. W. 548. Evidence that N. E. iiii; State v. Wood, 53 N. H. 
 
 articles adapted to procure an abor- 484; Stevens v. People, 215 111. 593, 
 
 tion were found in the abode of the 74 X. E. 786. 
 
 defendant is admissible. Common- "^ Commonwealth v. Thompson, 159 
 
 wealthy. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519, 521, Mass. 56, 59, 22> ^- E. iiii; People 
 
 2,2 N. E. 910. It is not necessary to v. Hagenow, 236 111. 514, 86 N. E. 
 
 prove that the defendant used all the 370. 
 
 instruments alleged in the indictment. "* P>athrick v. Detroit &c. Co., 50 
 
 It is enough to prove that one of Mich. 629, 16 N. W. 172, 45 Am. 6^. 
 them was used. Scott v. People, 141 °^ Commonwealth v. Sinclair, IQS 
 
 111. T95, 210, 30 X. E. 329; Rex v. Mass. 100, 80 X. E. 799. 
 Phillips, 3 Camp, "/t,; Rex v. Coe, 6 °°a Williams v. State (Tex., 1892), 
 
 Car. & P. 403; Moore v. State, 2>7 IQ S. W. 897; Carter v. State, 2 Ind. 
 
 Tex. Cr. 552, 40 S. W. 287. 617. 
 
 ""Thomas v. State, 156 Ala. 166, 47 ""Commonwealth v. Brown, 121 
 
 So. 257. Mass. 69, 81. 
 
 "People v. McGonegal, 136 X. Y. "'Carter v. State, 2 Ind. 617, 618, 
 
 62, 75, Z2 X. E. 616. 624, 62^. 
 
 "^Hauk V. State, 148 Ind. 238, 46 '"People v. Sessions, 58 Mich. 594, 
 
 X. E. 127, 47 N. E. 465 ; Common- 26 X. W. 291.
 
 6og CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 351 
 
 under the rule that where an opinion has been given that, in the 
 nature of things, a certain thing is impossible, a woman mav 
 testify that she has used such an article upon herself for a legiti- 
 mate purpose."'* To explain and emphasize his evidence the 
 physician who made the post iiiortcni may exhibit parts of the 
 body preserved in spirits to the jury.^°° 
 
 § 351. Exception to rule regulating- privileged communications to 
 physician. — The question may arise are communications made to 
 a physician by the \-ictim of an abortion privileged so that the 
 physician may decline to disclose them? It is well settled that 
 the statutory privilege cannot be invoked for the sole purpose of 
 shielding a criminal. And though the accused, being a physician, 
 may refuse to testify at all, yet, if he go on the stand, he cannot 
 claim the professional privilege. A distinction is made by the 
 cases as regards the testimony of a physician who has treated 
 the woman after the commission of the alleged crime. If she is 
 living the law forbids the physician to disclose any fact that he 
 may have learned while attending her professionally, for the 
 reason that his statement inevitably tends to convict her of a 
 crime and to discredit and disgrace her.^ If, however, the 
 woman is dead this evidence cannot incriminate her, though it 
 may disgrace her memory, and on this account the physician may 
 speak.- And, generally, a physician who was consulted as to the 
 best mode of procuring an abortion may state what was said by 
 him and the person who consulted him and what was done by him 
 if anything.^ 
 
 ** Commonwealth v. Leach, 156 '"" Commonwealth v. Brown, 14 
 
 Mass. 99, 102-107, 30 X. E. 163, Gray (Mass.) 419, 431. 
 
 Knowlton, J., dissenting. The expert ^ People v. Murphy, loi N. Y. 126, 
 
 should be interrogated upon hypo- 129, 4 X. E. 326, 54 Am. 661. In this 
 
 thetical questions containing facts case the public prosecutor sent a 
 
 proved or which may be assumed to physician to make an examination of 
 
 be proved. He cannot be asked if the woman, to which she voluntarily 
 
 he has read or heard the testimony, submitted. 
 
 and to give his opinion thereon. Pco- ' Pierson v. People, 79 X. Y. 424, 35 
 
 pie V. Aikin, 66 Mich. 460, 476, 33 N. Am. 524. 
 
 W. 821, II Am. St. 512. ' Babcock v. People, 15 Hun (N. 
 
 Y.) 347, 354- Sec, ante. § 174- 
 39 — Underhill Grim. Ev.
 
 35^ 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE, 
 
 6lO 
 
 i:^ 352. Assault and battery — Definition. — An assault has been de- 
 fined as "any attempt or offer, with force or \iolence, to do a 
 corporal hurt to another, whether wantonly or with a malicious 
 intention, with such circumstances as denote an intention to do it 
 at the time, coupled with a present ability to carry that intention 
 into execution."^ An assault is involved in the procurement of 
 an abortion, a rape, a robbery and all crimes against tiie i)erson. 
 But usually the word assault is employed in connection with the 
 word battery. The battery is merely the successful termination 
 of the assault. The assault is the beginning of a crime the motive 
 of which is the infliction of some corporal hurt upon another 
 without that person's consent, as for example an assault with in- 
 tent to commit rape. As soon as the person assaulted is touched, 
 no matter how trifling the hurt of touch may be. the battery has 
 been committed.'' 
 
 ^ 353. Evidence to show present ability of assailant to put his at- 
 tempt in action. — l-Aidence that the accused did not. at the instant 
 of the assault, possess the ability to carry out his attempt to in- 
 jure, is always relevant to excuse him. If he can show that he 
 
 * Roscoe Cr. Ev., p. 304 ; Tarvcr v. 
 State, 43 Ala. 354, 356; State v. Di- 
 Guglielmo, 4 Penn. (Del.) 336. 55 
 Atl. 350; Wilson V. State (Tex. Cr.), 
 74 S. W. 315; State V. Harrigan, 4 
 Penn. (Del.) 129, 55 Atl. 5; State v. 
 Mitchell, 139 Iowa 455, 116 X. W. 
 808 (holding a threat of injury to be 
 an assault). In United States v. 
 Hand, 2 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 
 435, 437. ^ Fed. Cas. 15297, 
 the court says: "It is as if one 
 person strike at another with his 
 hands, or with a stick, and misses him ; 
 for, if the other be stricken, it is a 
 battery, which is an offense of a 
 higher grade. Or if he shake his fist 
 at another, or present a gun or other 
 weapon, within such distance as that 
 a hurt might be given ; or drawing a 
 sword, and brandishing it in a menac- 
 ing manner." People v. Carlson 
 (Mich.. 1910). 125 X. W. 361. 17 Det. 
 Leg. N. 120; Co.\ V. State (Fla., 
 
 ^909), 50 So. 875; Dickinson v. State 
 (Okla. Cr. App. 1909), 104 Pac. 923. 
 ''Alston V. State, 109 Ala. 51, 20 
 So. 81 ; Lawson v. State, 30 Ala. 14, 
 15; Hill V. State, yj Tex. Cr. 279, z% 
 S. W. 987, 39 S. W. 666, 66 Am. St. 
 803; State V. Harrigan, 4 Penn. 
 (Del.) 129, 55 Atl. 5: Combs v. 
 State (Tex. Cr.), it6 S. W. 595. 
 Attempt or offer to strike. Elliott 
 Evidence, § 2824; assault by strik- 
 ing at variance, § 2825 : assault 
 and menace, § 2827; drawing firearm, 
 § 2829; pointing firearms, § 2830; 
 drawing unloaded gun, §§ 283 r, 2832, 
 2833 ; drawing gun — burden of proof, 
 § 2834; time of striking not neces 
 sary, § 2737 ; assault and battery on 
 child by parent, §§ 2843. 2845: as- 
 sault and battery on pupil by teacher, 
 § 2834; self-defense. §§ 2846. 2847, 
 2849, 2855: defense of family, §2850: 
 defense of possession, § 2851 : defense 
 of property, § 2852; degree of force,
 
 6ii 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSOX, 
 
 
 was not able to do the violent or injurious act which he was 
 threatening, there is no assault." Accordingly, evidence is rele- 
 vant to show that the accused was at such a distance that an 
 immediate contact was impossible, as when he threatened one 
 with an ax, at a distance of twenty-five feet,' or pointed a gun at 
 a person who was not in carrying distance,^ or pointed an un- 
 loaded gun or pistol at a person." Some cases, however, hold that 
 the physical ability of the accused to carry out his threats or 
 menacing motions is irrelevant.^" In such cases it will generally 
 appear that the menacing gesture w^as W'Cll calculated to affect, 
 and did in fact affect, the mind and purpose of the person threat- 
 ened ; and that he w-as led to act against his wall, because he be- 
 lieved his assailant had the power to execute his threats. In 
 other words, if the menacing conduct, though not amounting to 
 a battery, actually puts a person in fear of bodily harm, it is not 
 relevant to pro\-e that the accused did not possess the ability to 
 carrv his threats into execution. ^^ 
 
 S§ 2853, 2854; retaking property, jus- 
 tification, §§ 2856, 2857. 
 
 ' Klein v. State, 9 Ind. App. 365, 
 368: People V. Yslas, 27 ,Cal. 630, 
 635 ; Thomas v. State, 99 Ga. 38, 26 
 S. E. 748; Smith v. State, 39 Miss. 
 52T : Mullen v. State, 45 Ala. 43, 45, 
 6 Am. St. 691 ; Elliott Evidence, 
 §§ 2822, 2823. 2S26. Proof of mere 
 threats uttered by the defendant, 
 without an attempt at actual violence 
 :ind the ability to inflict an injurj-, 
 will not sustain a conviction of as- 
 ^Huh. Smith V. State, 39 Miss. 521, 
 529; Williams v. State, 99 Ga. 203, 25 
 S. E. 681; State v. Davis, i Ired. (X. 
 Car.) 125, 35 .Am. Dec. 735; State v. 
 Napper, 6 N'ev. 113; People v. Lillcy, 
 43 Mich. 521. 5 \. W. 982; People 
 v. Jacobs. 29 Cal. 579; State v. Mar- 
 tin. 30 Wis. 2r6, 225, M .Xm. 567; 
 RcR. V. James, i Car. & K. (47 Eng. 
 C. L.) 530. r Cox C C. 78: Chap- 
 man V. State, 78 .\la. 463. 465, 56 .Xm. 
 42: State V. Church, 63 N'. Car. 15, 
 16: Robinson v. State, 3? Tex. 170, 
 3 GrecnI. on Ev. 6t. "These aiitlinri- 
 
 ties clearly show that to constitute 
 an assault there must be an inten- 
 tional attempt to do injury to the 
 person of another by violence, and 
 that such attempt must be coupled 
 with a present ability to do the in- 
 jury attempted." State v. Godfrey, 
 17 Ore. 300, 305, 20 Pac. 625, ir Am. 
 St. 830. 
 
 ^Thomas v. State, sufm: State v. 
 Blackwell, 9 Ala. 79. 
 
 * People V. McKenzie, 6 App. Div. 
 (K. Y.) 199, 39 N. Y. S. 951; State 
 V. Yancey, 74 N. Car. 244; Tarver v. 
 State, 43 .Ala. 354. What is carrying 
 distance is a question for the jury to 
 determine. Clark v. State, 84 Ga. 577, 
 579. 10 S. E. 1094. 
 
 "Chapman v. State, 78 .Ala. 463, 
 465, 56 Am. 42. 
 
 '"Brooke v. State, 155 Ala. 78, 46 
 So. 491. 
 
 "State V. Marsteller. 84 \'. Car. 
 726, 728; Crunibky v. State. 61 G;i. 
 382, 584; Unite<l Stales v. Ortega. 4 
 Wash. C. C. rU. S.) 531, 27 Fc<l. 
 Cas. 1 597 1 ; Slate v. Taylor. 20 K.in.
 
 § 354 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 6l2 
 
 ^ 354. Intention to do bodily harm — Circumstances which are rele- 
 vant. — A present intention to do some bodily hn.rni to the person 
 assaulted by means of the force employed must be proved be- 
 yond a reasonable doubt. ^- The gist of assault with intention to 
 do great bodily injury is the intention. The same rule holds with 
 relation to the crime of assault with intent to murder. Hence 
 not only must the assault be proved but the particular intent must 
 also be proved.^'' Thus, as a general rule, the force or violence 
 which was employed must be proved to have been intentional, or 
 to have been conceived in such a spirit of wantonness as to sup- 
 ply a malicious intention. The accused may always testify to 
 his own intention.^^ Where he alleges the assault was committed 
 in self-defense he should be permitted to testify that he carried, 
 or that he drew a revolver in self-defense, though he should not 
 be permitted to testify that he carried or attempted to use a re- 
 volver for any other purpose.^'^ The intention to do great bodily 
 harm, to murder or to commit any other crime by means of an 
 assault may be inferred from the circumstances. Circumstantial 
 evidence is usually the only available evidence of intention aside 
 from the declarations of the accused. The intention may be 
 inferred from the force or direction, or from the natural or con- 
 templated result of the violence employed,^" from the weapon or 
 implement used by the accused,'' from his threats or prior con- 
 
 643, 64s; Thomas v. State, 99 Ga. 38, 35 Atl. 1030; Elliott Evidence, 
 
 26 S. E. 748; People v. Morehouse, §§ 2818, 2828, 2838. 
 
 53 Hun (N. Y.) 638, 6 N. Y. S. 763; "State v. Mills, 6 Penn. (Del.) 497, 
 
 State V. Lightsey, 43 S. Car. 114, 20 69 Atl. 841; State v. Mitchell, 139 
 
 S. E. 975. Iowa 455, 116 N. W. 808. 
 
 "State V. Morgan, 3 Ired. (N. "Berry v. State, 30 Tex. App. 423, 
 
 Car.) 186, 38 Am. Dec. 714; Craw- 424, 17 S. W. 1080. 
 
 ford V. State, 21 Tex. App. 454, i S. "Ryan v. Territory (Ariz., 1909), 
 
 W. 446; Smith V. State, 39 Miss. 100 Pac. 770. 
 
 521; Johnson v. State, 35 Ala. 363; "People v. Conley, 106 Mich. 424, 
 
 State V. Church, 63 X. Car. 15: State 64 N. W. 325; People v. Miller. 91 
 
 V. King, 86 X. Car. 603; Cowley v. Mich. 639, 643, 52 N. W. 65; Hill v. 
 
 State, ID Lea (Tenn.) 282; People v. State, zy Tex. Cr. 279, 38 S. W. 987. 
 
 Yslas, 27 Cal. 630; Commonwealth v. 39 S. W. 666, 66 Am. St. 803. 
 
 Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 324, 19 Am. " State v. Dickerson, 98 N. Car. 
 
 362; State V. Davis, i Ired. (X. Car.) 708, 3 S. E. 687; People v. Smith, 
 
 125, 35 Am. Dec. 735; Keefe v. State, 106 Mich. 431, 64 N. W. 200; Dean 
 
 19 Ark. 190 ; State v. Sears, 86 Mo. v. State, 89 Ala. 46, 8 So. 38 ; State v. 
 
 169, 174; State V. Carver, 89 Me. 74, Broadbent, 19 Mont. 467, 48 Pac. 775-
 
 6l3 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 354 
 
 duct towards the person assaulted and generally from the extent 
 and effect of the injury inflicted/'' or from any deliberate action 
 which is naturally attempted and usually results in danger to the 
 life of another/^ Hence it follows that the language of the ac- 
 cused at the time of the commission of the assault and his acts 
 and conduct are relevant to prove his intent."** The evidence of 
 the condition of the person injured, showing the character of 
 his wounds and the manner in which they were treated by a 
 physician and evidence to show how long he was confined in a 
 hospital is always relevant on a prosecution for assault with in- 
 tent to murder to show the grievous nature of the injuries in- 
 flicted from which injur}' the court may infer that the accused 
 intended to kill the person assaulted.-^ Where an assault is 
 claimed to have been committed by one having lawful authority 
 to punish by that method there is a presumption that it was done 
 in the exercising of such authority and the burden of proof is 
 on the prosecution to show otherwise.-^^ Thus where a question 
 arose as to whether a teacher who had punished a scholar was 
 guilty of an assault, it was held that his intention was to be 
 measured, not alone by the character of the punishment inflicted, 
 but that all the circumstances attendant should be considered by 
 the jury and that all such circumstances were relevant. " 
 
 A specific intent to cause the very injury, and that only which 
 ensued, need not be proved. If bodily harm was intended, proof 
 of any injury will sul^ce."^ 
 
 Intent may be inferred from circum- ^ Wright v. State, 148 .-Ma. 596, 42 
 
 stances, Elliott Evidence, § 2841. So. 745. 
 
 " State V. Remington, 50 Ore. 99, ^^ Elliott Evidence, § 2844. As- 
 
 91 Pac. 473. sault and battery by parent on child, 
 
 "Conn V. People, 116 111. 458, 464, Elliott Evidence, §§ 2843, 2845. 
 
 6 X. E. 463; Cowley v. State, 10 Lea ^ Greer v. State (Tex., 1907), 106 
 
 (Tcnn.) 282, 284; Commonwealth v. S. W. 339. See also, Elliott Evi- 
 
 Randall, 4 Gray (Mass.) 36; State v. dence, § 2840. Intent is not always 
 
 -Meek, 41 La. Ann. 83, 5 So. 639; necessary, Elliott Evidence, §§ 2820, 
 
 People v. Miller, 91 Mich. 639, 644, 2839. Assault with intent to ravish 
 
 52 .\. W. 65; Ullman v. State, 124 character of victim, 14 L. R. A. (X. 
 
 Wis. 602, 103 X. W. 6; Combs v. S.) 724, note. 
 
 State, 55 Tex. Cr. 332, 116 S. W. 595- =" People v. Marsoikr (Cril.. 1886), 
 
 "State V. Mills, 6 Penn. (Del.) 497, 11 Pac. 503; Cowley v. Stale, 10 Lea 
 
 69 .'Xtl. 841. (Tcnn.) 282, 284; Tarver v. State, 43
 
 § 355 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 614 
 
 § 355. Evidence of other assaults. — Tt is not permissible to prove 
 assaults by the defendant upon other persons or upon the same 
 person at other times and places, unless there is some connection 
 between them. But where the specific intent present in making 
 the assault is in question, evidence of other assaults is relevant. 
 Thus where an assault with intent to kill is alleged, the previous 
 relations of the parties, whctlicr friendly or otherwise, are rele- 
 vant,-* and it may then be shown that, at some prior time and 
 other place, the defendant assaulted the same person.-^ 
 
 § 356. Assault with deadly weapons — Evidence to show character 
 of weapon used. — The expression "deadly weai)on," synonymous 
 with dangerous weapon, occurs very often in statutes defining 
 the character of assaults, and in the common law of homicide. 
 Some weapons are so clearly deadly wlien used under particular 
 circumstances that the court may declare them so as a matter of 
 law. So it has been held that a club,-" a large stone,-' a chisel,-'* 
 a loaded gun or pistol,-" or one unloaded and used as a club,^" a 
 knife, when used in striking distance,^^ is a deadly weapon per 
 
 Ala. 354; Reg. v. Fretwcll, 9 Cox C. 
 C. 471, ID L. T. (N. S.) 428, 12 Wkly. 
 Rep. 751 ; People v. Miller, 91 Mich. 
 639, 52 N. W. 6s; Elliott Evidence, 
 §§ 2819, 2821. Thus, pointing a pistol 
 alone may, if nothing else is proved, 
 justify an inference of an intent to 
 harm. But this inference may be re- 
 butted by a declaration by the ac- 
 cused that he does not intend to 
 shoot, leaving it a question for the 
 jury to find the intent on all the 
 facts. The circumstances may shovir 
 that his statement was untrue and 
 employed to put the person off his 
 guard. Richels v. State, i Sneed 
 (Tenn.) 606, 608. 
 
 -* State V. Forsythe, 89 Mo. 667, i 
 S. W. 834; State V. Sanders, 106 Mo. 
 188, 17 S. W. 223; State V. Mont- 
 gomery, 65 Iowa 483, 22 N. W. 639; 
 Nelson v. State (Tex. Cr. A pp.), 20 
 S. W. 766. Evidence of other crimes 
 
 in prosecution for assault, see 62 L. 
 R. A. 193, extensive note. 
 
 "Pontius V. People, 82 N. Y. 339; 
 State V. Kline, 54 Iowa 183, 6 N. W. 
 184; State V. Patrick, 107 Mo. 147, 17 
 S. W. 666; State v. Place, 5 Wash. 
 773, 32 Pac. 736; Owen v. State (Tex. 
 Cr. App. 1910), 125 S. W. 405. 
 
 =» State V. Phillips, 104 N. Car. 786, 
 10 S. E. 463. 
 
 "Regan V. State, 46 Wis. 256, 50 
 N. W. 287. 
 
 '^ Commonwealth v. Branham, 8 
 Bush (Ky.) 387. 
 
 =" State V. Painter, 67 Mo. 84 ; Wil- 
 son V. State, 27 Tex. Cr. 156, 38 S. 
 W. 1013; Heningburg v. State, 153 
 Ala. 13, 45 So. 246. 
 
 ^"Riggs V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 33 S. W. 4I3> 17 Ky. L. 1015; Allen 
 v. People, 82 111. 610. 
 
 "' Walters v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. :>,9S. 
 35 S. W. 652 ; Ferguson v. State, 6 
 Tex. App. 504; Brown v. State, 142
 
 6l5 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. §§ 356-357 
 
 sc, and proof of an assault with any of these will sustain a con- 
 viction of an assault with a deadly weapon. 
 
 If the evidence as to the character of the weapon or the mode 
 in which it was used is at all conflicting, the determination of the 
 question whether a weapon is deadly is exclusively for the jurors, 
 to decide upon all the facts. ^^'- The size, shape, character and 
 weight of the weapon or implement used, its manner of use, the 
 strength and physical condition of the defendant and of the per- 
 son attacked, are all relevant. ^^ 
 
 ^ 356a. Declarations constituting a part of the res gestae. — The 
 
 declarations and acts of all participating in the assault, if con- 
 'stituting a part of the res gcstcc are admitted against any one of 
 the defendants.^* In a case where there is a positive contradiction 
 as to which party is the aggressor, but the accused admits that 
 he struck the prosecuting witness, the statements of third parties 
 which shov/ or tend to show that a conspiracy had been formed 
 to mob the accused, are admissible though the accused had not 
 knowledge of it.^" The exclamations of the person assaulted 
 strictly contemporaneous with the assault are relevant. But those 
 which are uttered thereafter are usually rejected upon the ground 
 that they are not res gestcc.^^ 
 
 § 357. Evidence of threats and previous hostility. — The prior 
 
 Ala. 2S7, 3S So. 268: State v. Spaugh, ing cane, a switch of the size of a 
 
 199 Mo. 147, 97 S. W. 901. woman's finger, if strong and tough, 
 
 •'" Smallwood v. CommonwcaUh may be made a deadly weapon if the 
 
 (Ky.), 33 S. W. 822, 17 Ky. L. 1134; aggressor shall use such instrument 
 
 People V. Leyba, 74 Cal. 407, 16 Pac. with great or furious violence, am! 
 
 200. especially, if the party assailed should 
 
 " State V. Godfrey, 17 Ore. 300, 307, have comparatively less power than 
 
 20 Pac. 625, ir Am. St. 830: Skid- the assailant, or be helpless and 
 
 more v. State, 43 Tex. 93; State v. feeble." State v. Huntley. 91 X. Car. 
 
 McDonald, 67 Mo. 13; Kouns v. 617. 
 
 State. 3 Tex. App. 13; Berry v. Com- '* P.louni v. State, 49 .Ma. 381 ; Col- 
 
 monwcalth. 10 Bush (Ky.) 15. "Some quitt v. State, 34 Tex. 550. 
 
 weapons arc per se deadly; others, "Tompkins v. State. 17 Ga. 356. 
 
 owing to the manner in which they " People v. Hicks, 98 Mich. 86. 56 
 
 arc used, become deadly. A gun, a N. W. 1102: State v. Nocninger. 108 
 
 pistol, or a dirk knife, is of itself Mo. 166. 18 S. W. 990; Veal v. State, 
 
 deadly; a small pr)ckct knife, walk- 8 Tex. App. 474.
 
 § 357 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 6l6 
 
 threats of the accused are always relevant to illustrate his menial 
 attitude towards the prosecuting witness at the time of the as- 
 sault,^" unless suhsequent to the making of the threats the 
 parties have become friends."'' If the accused claims that he 
 acted in self-defense, he may prove the prior general hostility 
 of the injured party to him. including threats made to others 
 and communicated to him,"''" as well as the fact that the person 
 had assaulted others, and had a reputation for quarrelsomeness.'"* 
 The reputation of the prosecuting witness for peaceableness is 
 then relevant." 
 
 The burden of proving justification for an assault is upon the 
 accused.''" and inasmuch as mere words, however abusive or 
 vexatious, will never justify an assault or battery, the accused will 
 not be permited to prove bad language on the part of the person 
 assaulted.'*"^ 
 
 But where the assault is alleged to have grown out of writings 
 or letters written bv the prosecuting witness to the accused and 
 containing abusive language, the wa'itings are admissible to show 
 the condition of affairs existing between the parties though they 
 may not supply justification.** 
 
 If the accused is shown to have been acquainted with the person 
 assaulted, and to have known his disposition either by reputation 
 or actual acquaintance, it is proper to permit him to prove that 
 the prosecuting witness was reputed to have a quarrelsome dis- 
 position.'*^ 
 
 ^ State V. Henn, 39 Minn. 476, 40 " Bowlus v. State, 130 Ind. 227, 230, 
 
 N. 'W. 572, and ante, § 326. 28 X. E. 1115. 
 
 ^People V. Deitz, 86 Mich. 419, 49 *^ Badger v. State, 5 Ga. App. 477, 
 
 X. W. 296; Sharp v. People, 29 111. 63 S. E. 532. 
 
 464. ''^ State V. Harrigan, 4 Penn. (Del.) 
 
 "" Bolton V. State (Tex. Cr., 1897), 129, 55 Atl. 5; Sutton v. State, 2 Ga. 
 
 39 S. W. 672; Rauck V. State, no App. 659. 58 S. E. 1108: State v. Kim- 
 
 Ind. 384, II N. E. 450; Martin v. brell (X. C. 1909), 66 S. E. 208. 
 
 State, 5 Ind. App. 453, 456; Read v. " De Silva v. State, 91 Miss. 776, 
 
 State, 2 Ind. 438. But not uncom- 45 So. 611; Brooke v. State, 155 Ala. 
 
 municated threats. Guy v. State, 37 78, 46 So. 491, under Cr. Code 
 
 Ind. App. 6gi, 77 N. E. 855. 1896, § 4345. admitting proof of op- 
 
 " People V. Frindel, 58 Hun (N. probrious words. 
 
 Y.) 482, 12 X. Y. S. 498. See ante, ''' People v. Kirk, 151 Mich. 253, 114 
 
 § 324. N. W. 1023, 14 Detroit Leg. N. 927-
 
 61/ CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 358 
 
 § 358. Robbery — Intention present and force employed. — Rob- 
 bery is tbe felonious and forcible taking of goods or money from 
 die person of another by \-iolence or by putting him in fear and 
 against his will." To constitute the crime of robbery there must 
 be violence or intimidation of such a character as that the injured 
 party is put in fear of such a nature as in reason and common 
 experience is likely to induce a person to part with his property 
 against his will and for the time being suspend the power of exer- 
 cising his will.'*' Stated in a few words the taking of property 
 must be accomplished by force or by fear, and the force or the 
 fear must precede the taking.'*'' Thus snatching a watch from the 
 person of the owner or snatching money from his hand consti- 
 tutes robbery though the force used is very slight.'*'* 
 
 The elements in the crime of robbery which have been just 
 described distinguish it from larceny, for if money or goods are 
 obtained by trick or contrivance, rather than by force or fear, the 
 crime is larceny and not robbery. ^*^ 
 
 If there be force employed to secure the possession of the 
 property its degree is immaterial if it was sufficient to compel the 
 owner to part with his property.^^ Usually if the jury have a 
 leasonable doubt as to the exercise of force or violence, they 
 may convict of larceny where that crime is alleged in the indict- 
 ment.^" It is no variance to prove that the crime was accomplished 
 
 "State V. McAllister, 65 W. Va. °'' Routt v. State, 61 .Ark. 594, 34 S. 
 
 97, 63 S. E. 758; McGinnis v. W. 262; People v. Church, 116 Cal. 
 
 State, r6 Wyo. 72, 91 Pac. 936: 300, 48 Pac. 125; Johnson v. State, 
 
 Brown v. Commonwealth (Ky., 1909), 35 Tex. Cr. 140, 32 S. W. 537; Pick- 
 
 117 S. W. 281. It was an infamous erel v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 30 S. 
 
 crime at the common law. United W. 617, 17 Ky. L. 120; Huber v. 
 
 States V. Evans, 28 App. D. C. 264. State, 57 Ind. 341, 26 .Xni. 57; Doyle 
 
 "Steward v. People, 224 111. 434, v. State, jj Ga. 513; McCloskey v. 
 
 79 X. E. 636. People, 5 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 299; 
 
 "Jones V. Commonwealth, 115 Ky. People v. AIcGinty, 24 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 592, 74 S. W. 263, 24 Ky. L. 2481, 103 62; Dawson v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 .Am. St. 340. 74 S. W. 701, 25 Ky. L. 5; State v. 
 
 "Perry v. Commonwealth (Ky.), Duffy, 124 Iowa 705, 100 N. W. 796. 
 
 85 S. W. 732, 27 Ky. L. 512; Stock- "State v. Parsons, 44 Wash. 299, 87 
 
 ton V. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 268, Pac. 349, 120 .Am. St. 1003. 
 
 loi S. W. 298, 30 Ky. L. 1302; Rrown "State v. Taylor, 140 Iowa 470, 118 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky., 1909), 117 S. X. \V. 747. 
 W. 281.
 
 
 CRIMIXAL F.\-IDEXCE. 
 
 6l8 
 
 by both force and fear where it is alleged that the taking of the 
 property was accomplished by force only.'-*'' 
 
 "Putting in fear" is equivalent to the use of force. Facts suf- 
 ficient to imply the greatest degree of terror or fright need not 
 be proved. It is usually enough that the facts jiroved show such an 
 emi)lovment of force alone or willi threatening language or 
 gestures as will result in the person robbed surrendering his 
 ]M-opertv without or against his consent. "''•' The party who was 
 robbed may testify that he was in fear of violence at the hands 
 of the accused, and may state his oral threats and \-iolent ges- 
 tures.'"* as, for example, that the accused pointed a pistol at him 
 and ordered him to throw up his hands.''"' The fact that force was 
 employed may usually be proved by the testimony of the person 
 robbed.""' He may testify that he did not consent"'' and may show 
 tlie nature and extent of the violence inflicted.'"* In case he is 
 contradicted on this point, evidence of all circumstances, such as 
 the strength and physical condition of the parties and the place 
 ^v•here the crime was committed may be received.'" 
 
 It mav also be j^jresumed by the jury, upon whom is the ex- 
 clusive determination of the question, that the person robbed was 
 
 "a State V. Sanders, 14 X. Dak. 203, 
 103 N. W. 419. 
 
 "United States v. Jones, 3 Wash. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 209, 216, 26 Fed. Cas. 
 15494; Ashworth v. State, 31 Te.x. 
 Cr. 419, 20 S. W. 982 ; Tones v. State, 
 
 '■■'Dill V. State, 6 Tex. App. 113; 
 Long V. State, 12 Ga. 293. 
 
 ^'^ State V. Sanders, 14 N. Dak. 203, 
 103 X. W. 419. 
 
 ''"Tones v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 363, 
 88 S. W. 217, 122 Am. St. 759, i L. R. 
 
 48 Tex. Cr. 363, 88 S. W. 217, 122 A. (N. S.) I024n. 
 
 Am. St. 759, I L. R. A. ex. S.) " Davis v. State, 159 Ala. 104, 48 So. 
 
 I024n; State v. Sanders, 14 X. Dak. 694. 
 
 203, 103 X. W. 419; State V. Vaughan, ''^ Brown v. State, 120 Ala. 342, 25 
 
 • 99 Mo. 108. 97 S. W. 879; Fannin v. So. 182. 
 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. 41. 100 S. W. 916, '"People v. McElroy, 14 X. Y. S. 
 
 123 .Am. St. 874, 10 L. R. A. (X. S.) 203, 60 Hun (X. Y.) 577, without 
 
 744n; Grant v. State, 125 Ga. 259, 54 opinion. The physical condition of 
 
 S. E. 191. As to proof of identity of the person robbed, after the crime, 
 
 accused, see Elliott Evidence, § 3133; may be proved by the testimony of 
 
 evidence of value, § 3135; evidence a physician who had examined him. 
 
 of good character of defendant, 103 Commonwealth v. Flynn, 165 Mass. 
 
 .Am. St. 901, note; testimony of ac- 153. 42 X^ E. 562. His declarations 
 
 complice, 98 Am. St. 172, note; cir- and exclamation, "I have been 
 
 cumstantial evidence. Elliott Evi- robbed," may be received as res gcstcr 
 
 dence, §§ 3138, 3139; defenses, § 3140. if contemporaneous. Walling v. State, 
 
 55 Tex. Cr. 254, 116 S. W. 813.
 
 6l9 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 358 
 
 put in fear from acts of violence on the part of the accused."" 
 Actual fear of life or bodily injury on the part of the victim need 
 not be strictly and precisely proved as the law will presume the 
 existence of fear where there appears to be just ground for it."^ 
 The aninuis fiirandi must be proved. It must be shown that the 
 accused took the property without the consent of the owner, in- 
 tending to deprive him of it and to convert it to another use."- 
 This intent may be inferred from the same description of facts 
 and circumstances which would justify a similar inference in a 
 charge of larceny.^" Thus, the intent may be inferred from the 
 circumstances attendant upon the taking of the property ; neces- 
 sarily the taking implies that the person robbed must have been 
 in possession of the thing taken which must usually be of some 
 value."' 
 
 The accused may always show any facts tending to prove 
 that he took the property in good faith ; he may show that he 
 was an ofificer of the law, that he had arrested the prosecuting 
 witness, and that he had searched him and had taken his personal 
 property from him in order that it might be safely kept during his 
 imprisonment. If, however, in doing this he uses force which is 
 sufficient to overcome his resistance, and does this with the intent 
 
 "" State V. Lawler, 130 Mo. 366, 32 Mo. 569, 74 S. W. 846 ; State v. Mc- 
 
 S. W. 979, 51 Am. St. 575; Mc- Coy, 63 W. Va. 69, 59 S. E. 758: 
 
 Xamara v. People, 24 Colo. 61, 48 State v. Carroll, 14 Mo. 392, 113 S. 
 
 Pac. 541; State v. Lamb, 141 Mo. W. 1051,21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 31m. 
 
 298, 42 S. W. 827; Tones v. State, "'State v. Woodward, 131 Mo. 369, 
 
 48 Tex. Cr. 2i6^, 88 S. W. 217, 122 33 S. \V. 14; Crawford v. State, 90 
 
 Am. St. 759, i L. R. A. (N. S.) Ga. 701, 17 S. E. 628, 35 Am. St. 242: 
 
 102411. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 
 
 °' .McN'amara V. People, 24 Colo. 61, (Va.) 943; People v. Hughes, ir 
 
 48 Pac. 541; State v. Lawler, 130 Mo. Utah 100, 39 Pac. 492; Long v. State, 
 
 366, 32 S. W. 979; State V. Lamb, 12 Ga. 293; State v. Deal, 64 N. Car. 
 
 [41 Mo. 298, 42 S. W. 827; Jones v. 270; Tones v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 363, 
 
 State, 48 Tex. Cr. 363, 88 S. W. 217, 88 S. W. 217, T22 Am. St. 759. i I- R- 
 
 122 Am. St. 759. I L. R. A. (N. S.) A. (N. S.) I024n ; Triplett v. Coin- 
 
 I024n ; Elliott Evidence, § 3131. monwealth, 122 Ky. 35, 91 S. W. 28t, 
 
 "= Sledge V. State, 99 Ga. 684, 26 S. 28 Ky. L. 974; Elliott I'Aideiice. 
 
 E. 756; State V. Smith, 174 Mo. 586, § 3132. Sec, also, §§ 292, 293. 
 
 74 S. W. 624; Triplett v. Common- "'Tones v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 363, 
 
 wealth, 122 Ky. 35, 91 S. W. 281. 28 HK S. \V. _'r7, uj Am. St. 759. i L. 
 
 Ky. L. 974; Jones v. State (Miss., R. A. (N. S.) 102411. 
 '909), 48 So. 407; .State V. Spray, 174
 
 ^ 358 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 62O 
 
 of taking" liis property or money from him, the riglit of search is 
 not a defense, hnt the jury must determine the intent of the officer 
 in taking the jiroperty upon all the circumstances.'"'' 
 
 Where the accused alleges that at the time of committing the 
 crime or robbery, he was incapable of entertaining any intent, 
 because of his intoxication, the question of intent is for the jury 
 on all the circumstances.'"' It may be proved thai the thief was dis- 
 guised. So, too, in robbery as in larceny, the possession of the 
 stolen property by the accused, if recent and unexplained, may 
 justify an inference that he was implicated in it."' But the ac- 
 cused must always be allowed to explain his possession of the 
 property, and on the whole, the possession of the property, wdiile 
 a circumstance to be considered in any case, is by no means con- 
 clusive of the guilt of the accused,*'^ 
 
 And it has also been held that it was proper to permit the 
 state to show that articles taken from the person robbed were 
 found in the possession of a woman with whom the accused had 
 been very intimate where the possession was recent.*^'* The own- 
 ership of the money may be inferred as being in the person robbed 
 from the fact that it was taken from his possession."" Evidence 
 that the defendant owns property is inadmissible.'^ So it has 
 been held that evidence to show that the accused for a long time 
 prior to the date of the crime, had a large sum of money in his 
 
 " State V. ^McAllister, 65 \V. Va. 97, felonious intention. Brown v. State, 
 
 63 S. E. 758; Wynn v. Common- 28 Ark. 126; State v. Hollyway, 41 
 
 wealth (Ky., 1909), 122 S. W. 516. Iowa 200, 20 Am. 586; Carr v. State, 
 
 ""Latimer v. State, 55 Neb. 609, ^d 55 Tex. Cr. 352, 116 S. W. 591. 
 
 N. W. 207, 70 Am. St. 403. '^People v. Hallam, 6 Cal. App. 331, 
 
 '" State V. Harris, 97 Iowa 407, 66 92 Pac. 190. 
 
 N. W. 728; State v. Wyatt, 124 Mo. ""Clay v. State, 122 Ga. 136, 50 S. 
 
 537, 27 S. W. 1096; Bradley v. State, E. 56. 
 
 103 Ala. 29, IS So. 640; State v. "Bow v. People, 160 111. 438, 43 N. 
 
 Balch, 136 Mo. 103, yj S. W. 808; E. 593; People v. Oldham, iii Cal. 
 
 People V. Mackinder, 80 Hun (X. Y.) 648, 44 Pac. 312; Riggs v. State, 104 
 
 40, 29 X. Y. S. 842; State v. Moore, Ind. 261, 3 X. E. 886; People v. Mc- 
 
 106 Mo. 480, 17 S. W. 658; Tabor v. Donald (Cal., 1896), 45 Pac. 1005; 
 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. 387, 107 S. W. State v. Adams, 58 Kan. 365. 49 Pac. 
 
 1116; Elliott Evidence, § 3136. Evi- 81; State v. Howard, 30 Mont. 518, 
 
 dence tending to show that the tak- 77 Pac. 50; Elliott Evidence, § 3^30- 
 
 ing was under claim of title is ad- "^ Reynolds v. State, 147 Ind. 3, 46 
 
 missible to show that there was not X'. E. 31.
 
 621 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 359 
 
 house is inadmissible.'- But on the other hand it may be proved 
 that the accused on the day before the robbery was without 
 mone}% and wore shabby clothing and, that on the day after the 
 robbery he appeared in a new suit of clothes and exhibited or 
 boasted of having large sums of money in his possession.'^ The 
 person robbed may always testify that he had the money or other 
 property which is alleged to have been stolen in his possession. 
 These facts may be proved by other persons. Indeed, it may 
 be shown that shortly before the robbery he was seen to have 
 been spending money and that he exhibited money, had it in his 
 possession, and particularly that he exhibited or spoke of having 
 money in the presence of the accused.'* Evidence of other rob- 
 beries or of attempts to commit other robberies at or about the 
 same time as the one for which the accused is being tried and 
 with which the accused is connected may be shown to identify 
 the accused or to show his intention. '^^ Anything the person 
 robbed may have said during the assault which preceded or ac- 
 companied the robbery, if a part of the res gcstcu, is admis- 
 sible."^ 
 
 § 359. The crime of mayhem. — The facts which must be proved 
 to sustain an allegation of mayhem at common law are : First, 
 the injury ; second, malice,'' and third, an intent to maim and 
 disfigure.''^ Thus a conviction of an attempt to commit mayhem 
 cannot be sustained by proof of the throwing of red pepper into 
 
 "Craig V. State, 171 Ind. 317, 86 N. "See Green v. State, 151 Ala. 14, 
 
 E. 397. 44 So. 194, 125 Am. St. 17, as to dis- 
 
 " People V. Sullivan, 144 Cal. 471, tinction between "malice" and "malice 
 
 77 Pac. 1000. aforctliought." 
 
 "Boyd V. State, 153 Ala. 41, 45 So. "United States v. Gunthcr, 5 Dak. 
 
 591. 234, 241, 38 N. W. 79; Bowers v. 
 
 "State V. Howard, 30 Mont. 518, State, 24 Tex. App. 542, 549, 7 S. W. 
 
 77 Pac. 50 ; Wyatt v. State, 55 Tex. 247, 5 Am. St. 901 ; Davis v. State, 
 
 Cr. 73, 114 S. W. 812; Tabor v. 22 Tex. App. 45, 51, 2 S. W. 630: 
 
 State, 52 Tex. Cr. 387, 107 S. W. State v. Johnson, 58 Ohio St. 417, 51 
 
 1116, 62 L. R. A. 193, extensive note; N. K. 40, 65 Am. St. ;69n ; Carpenter 
 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3137. v. People, 3r Colo. 284, 72 Pac. 1072, 
 
 " State v. Ripley, 32 Wash. 182. 72 holding that, under Laws 1895, p. 156, 
 
 Pac. 1036; State v. I'inn, 199 Mo. c. 69, a specific intent to maim is not 
 
 507. 98 S. W. 9; Elliott Evidence, necessary to be proved. 
 § 3r.34-
 
 § :i60 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 622 
 
 the eve of another where il appears that tlie substance thrown 
 would not destroy the eye unless allowed to remain an extra- 
 ordhiary time.''' Malice.''" and the specific intent to injure, dis- 
 fisfure or maim ma\- alwaws he inferred from the circumstances 
 under the rule that a man may be inferred to have intended the 
 natural, probable and reasonal)le consequences of his acts/^ Pre- 
 meditation existing prior to the conflict in which the injury 
 v/as inflicted is not necessary/- 
 
 The circumstances attending the injur\- may ])c shown to rebut 
 tlie intent h\ proxing the defendant indicted the injury under 
 jiressure of necessity or while lawfully defending himself, or 
 that it was purely accidental. "*'' .V previous assault ui)on the de- 
 fendant is admissible in justification. It must be made to appear 
 that the striking was in self-defense and that the force employed 
 was in proportion to the attack. Son assault is a good plea in 
 mayhem, Init it must ai)pear that the resistance w^as in proportion 
 to the nature of the injury offered.**^ 
 
 ^ 360. Sodomy. — This crime may be defined as the carnal co])u- 
 lation of one human being with another in a manner "against 
 nature," or, to be more definite, in any manner than that provided 
 by nature. Bestiality is the carnal copulation of a man or woman 
 with a beast. *'■'' Writers upon criminal law ]ia\e frequently, and 
 with reason, called attention to the ease with which one may be 
 accused of this crime and the extreme dif^culty of proving its 
 
 ■" Dahlberg v. People, 225 111. 485, "'State v. Hair, 2,7 ^tinn. 351, 354, 
 
 80 N. E. 310. 34 -N- W. 893. Compare Green v. 
 
 *" State V. Bloedow, 45 Wis. 279; State, 151 Ala. 14, 44 So. 194, 125 
 
 State V. Evans, i Hayw. (X. Car.) Am. St. 17. 
 
 281. "'Hayden V. State, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 
 
 *• State V. Hair, 27 Minn. 351, 354, 5461 547; Green v. State, 151 .Ala. 14, 
 
 34 N. W. 893; State v. Jones, 70 44 So. T94, 125 Am. St. 17. A pre- 
 
 lowa 505, 30 N. W. 750; Davis v. vious threat or attempt by tiic dc- 
 
 State, 22 Tex. App. 45, 51, 2 S. W. fendant to assault the prosecuting 
 
 630; State V. Abram, 10 .Ma. 928, witness before the final assault is 
 
 93T ; State v. Girkin, i Ired. (\. relevant. People v. Demasters, 109 
 
 Car.) 121, 122; Ridenour v. State, 38 Cal. 607, 42 Pac. 236. 
 
 Ohio St. 272, 274. " See Rish. Cr. Law. 1029. 4 Bl. 
 
 "State V. Simmons, 3 Ala. 497, 498; Com. 415; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
 
 State V. Crawford, 2 Dev. (N. Car.) i Va. Cas. 307. 
 4^5. 427-
 
 623 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 36 1 
 
 commission. If the crime is consummated, both parties consenting 
 thereto, each is an accomphce of the other and neither can be con- 
 victed upon the uncorroborated testimoii}' of the other.**'' And, 
 as the crime is usually committed when no third person is present, 
 corroboration is very difficult, if not impossible to obtain, except 
 so far as it may be found in circumstances which would naturally 
 accompany the commission of such an offense.'*^ When, however, 
 the crime is attempted or committed without or against the con- 
 sent of the pathic party he is not an accomplice, and a conviction 
 may be had upon his testimony alone. Whether he consented is a 
 question for the jury*"^ in all cases where the evidence is at all 
 doubtful. Evidence to show that he did or did not consent is 
 always relevant,**** particularly in the case of a charge of an as- 
 sault with intent to commit sodomy.****^ But a minor under twelve 
 years of age cannot consent so that his submission without resist- 
 ance does not constitute a defense.**" 
 
 § 361. Criminal libel defined. — This may be defined as a publica- 
 tion in print or writing without justification or lawful excuse, 
 which is calculated to injure the reputation of another, by expos- 
 ing him to hatred, ridicule or contempt.**^ The state must prove 
 the following facts: First, the publication by the defendant: sec- 
 ond, that the matter published is libelous: third, the intent, and. 
 fourth, when the truth is admissible in defense, the falsity of the 
 assertions made.**' 
 
 *' Medis V. State, 27 Tex. App. 194, Pac. 1027. See Commonwealth v. 
 
 IT S. W. 112, IT Am. St. 192. .Snow, tri Mass. 411. 
 
 " See Williams v. Commonwealth '" State v. Smith, 137 Mo. 25, 38 S. 
 
 (Va., 1895), 22 S. E. 859; Territory W. 717. 
 
 V. MahafFey, 3 Mont. T12; Hodges '"a People v. Ilickey, T09 Cal. 275, 
 
 V. State, 94 Ga. 593, 19 S. E. 758; 41 Pac. 1027. 
 
 People V. Boyle, 116 Cal. 658, 48 Pac. "" Mascolo v. Montcsanto, 61 Conn. 
 
 800. The declarations of the person 50, 23 .Xtl. 714, 29 Am. St. 170. 
 
 .issaulted are not admissible unless "^ People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 
 
 said in the presence of the accused, CN. Y.) ;^^7; Raker v. State, 50 \ch. 
 
 .IS direct evidence, though perhaps ad- 202, 69 N. W. 749; People v. Ritchie, 
 
 missihlc as corroboration. I'ostcr v. 12 Utah 180, 42 Pac. 209; Elliott Evi- 
 
 Statc, r Ohio Cir. Ct. 467, i Ohio Cir. dencc, § 31^)9. 
 
 Dec. 261; State v. Gruso, 28 La. .Ann. ""Odgcrs on T.ihel and Slander 580. 
 
 052. Criminal libel is "ni;dicions defama- 
 
 " Pef)ple V. Hickcy, 109 Cal. 275, 41 tioiis, expressed in printing or writ-
 
 § 3(^2 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 
 
 624 
 
 j< 362. The publication of the iibel. — The ])ul)licati(in of the lihcl 
 in language substantially as laid in the incHctnient must be 
 pro\e(l.'''' A slight \ariruice between the publication as proxed l)v 
 a copy and llie incHctnient may be disregarded. If the libel is in 
 writing the production of the writing, with sufficient proof that 
 it is in the handwriting of the accused, is enougii.'"'* If tlie hbel 
 Avas printed eitlier in a Ijook or newspaper, the production of a 
 copy with proof that it was purchased witliin the territorial juris- 
 diction of the court, will raise a presumption of publication. °'''' 
 Proof that the accused is the editor or publisher of the news- 
 paper in which the alleged libelous article was pul)lished is suf- 
 ficient to connect him with the publication. He cannot prove that 
 lie never saw the libel in fact. Xor can it be shown in his favor 
 that he had no actual knowledge of the publication. ^"^ To sustain 
 the allegation of publishing in a charge of criminal libel it is not 
 necessary to prove that the matter complained of was acttiallv 
 seen by another person. If it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
 that the accused knowingly displayed the libelous matter, or 
 parted witli it under circumstances which exposed it to be seen 
 or understood by another than himself, the proof suffices."' It 
 
 ing. or by signs or pictures, tending 
 either to blacken the memory of one 
 who is dead, or the reputation of one 
 who is living, and thereby to expose 
 him to public hatred, contempt and 
 ridicule." State v. ShafFner, 2 Pcnn. 
 (Del.) 171, 44 Atl. 620. 
 
 "^A slight variance between the 
 publication as proved by a copy and 
 the indictment may be disregarded. 
 Collins V. People, 115 111. App. 280; 
 Hartford v. State, 96 Ind. 461, 49 
 Am. 185; McArthur v. State, 41 Tex. 
 Cr. 635, 57 S. W. 847; Gipson v. 
 State (Tex., 1903), 77 S. W. 216. 
 
 " Rex v. Beare, i Ld. Rd. 414. 
 
 "' Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107 
 Mass. 199, 202. And evidence to 
 show the number of papers contain- 
 ing the libel which were printed or 
 sold, or to prove its general circula- 
 tion, is always competent. Boyle v. 
 State, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 163, but never 
 
 indispensable. Baker v. State. 97 Ga. 
 452, 25 S. E. 341. 
 
 '^ Commonwealth v. Morgan, 107 
 Mass. 199, 202. Papers signed by the 
 accused as president of the paper 
 publishing the libel are admissible tn 
 show his connection with the paper. 
 Boyle V. State, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 163, 3 
 Ohio Cir. Dec. 397. Hostile feeling 
 between the accused and the prose- 
 cuting witness may be shown. Peo- 
 ple V. Ritchie, 12 Utah 180, 42 Pac. 
 209. See also. United States v. Cran- 
 dell, 4 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 683. 25 
 Fed. Cas. 14885, as to proof of find- 
 ing other copies of same libel in pos- 
 session of the accused. 
 
 ''Giles V. State, 6 Ga. 276; New 
 York Penal Code, 245. See also, 
 Haase v. State, 53 N. J. L. 34. 20 
 Atl. 751; State V. Barnes, 32 Me. 
 530.
 
 625 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 362 
 
 is not usually necessary that the state should prove every part 
 of the libelous article, though it is necessary for it to prove enough 
 of the article to convince the jury that it is libelous. Therefore, 
 all portions of the article, or of the newspaper or pamphlet which 
 contain or relate to the subject-matter of the libel, ought to be 
 introduced in evidence by the state; and, while its failure to do 
 this may not justify an acquittal, yet it is a dangerous practice 
 for the prosecution to omit to prove any portion relating to the 
 libel. On the other hand, any other part of the publication which 
 is upon an entirely different topic, and which in no way qualifies 
 or explains that portion which is alleged to be libelous may be 
 omitted and, indeed, evidence of this character is properly ex- 
 cluded.^* While a criminal libel may be sustained by proving 
 the substance of the printed or written language, slander, where 
 it is criminal, is not proved unless the exact language which is 
 alleged to have been used or enough of it to constitute the charge 
 is pro\-ed, for it is not enough that the words which are proved 
 vo have been uttered are equivalent in their meaning to the words 
 charged.'*^ Several persons may be libeled in an article of which 
 there is but a single publication. The libelous charge against 
 them may be identical, or there may be separate libels against 
 them separately ; though each person thus libeled may have a 
 separate civil action against the offender, the state may treat the 
 publication as a single crime where all the libels are contained in 
 one article and may indict tlie person responsible, though two or 
 more persons have been lil)eled, and the indictment will 1)e good. 
 Where a statute permits the truth to be pleaded in justification 
 of the libel, the accused may plead and prove the truth as to one 
 of the persons whom he is charged to have libeled, and not as 
 to the other, at least where tlie statements are capable of being 
 separated. But the wliole publication may be admitted in evidence 
 for the purpose of showing the intention of the accused.^"" And 
 finally, though it is customary to allege in the indictment that 
 the libel was published on a particular day, proof of this fact is 
 
 "'State V. Williams, 74 Kan. 180, 85 ""State v. Fenn, 112 Mo. App. 531. 
 
 Pac. 9.38; Collins V. People. 115 111. 86 S. W. 1098. 
 
 App. 280; Jones V. State. 38 Tex. Cr, ^™ Tracy v. Commonwealtli, Sj Ky. 
 
 364. 43 S. W. 78, 70 Am. St. 75m. 578, 9 S. W. 822, 10 Ky. L. 611. 
 40— Unueriull Cki.m. Ev.
 
 § 36: 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 626 
 
 not always necessary if it be proved that the publication took 
 place at anv time within the statute of limitations.^ 
 
 § 363. The meaning of language used. — Parol evidence is always 
 admissible to explain the meaning of the language used, where it 
 is ambiguous, and to identify the persons, objects and incidents 
 referred to. Thus, where the libelous article does not refer to the 
 ])rosecuting witness noininati)n, a witness may testify that from 
 his knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, he understood 
 that he was the i:)erson alluded to." So the meaning of words 
 which are slangy, technical or ambiguous, may be explained by 
 parol evidence.^ 
 
 § 364. Malicious intention in publishing. — ]\Ialice on the part of 
 the accused must be proved.* But it is not to be understood that 
 it must be shown that the accused was actuated by ill-will or 
 vindictive feeling towards the person who is the object of the libel- 
 ous allegations. ^lalice in the legal, not the ordinary sense of the 
 term, is meant, and this may be inferred from the publishing of 
 a charge which is actionable per sc.^ So malice may be inferred 
 
 * Commonwealth v. Varnej^ 10 
 Cush. (Mass.) 402. 
 
 " Commonwealth v. ^Morgan, T07 
 Mass. 199; State v. Mason, 26 Ore. 
 273, 38 Pac. 130, 46 Am. St. 629, 26 
 L. R. A. 779n ; Enquirer Co. v. John- 
 ston, 72 Fed. 443, 18 C. C. A. 628; 
 Commonwealth v. Buckingham, 
 Thach. Cr. Cas. CMass.) 29; People 
 V. Ritchie, 12 Utah 180, 42 Pac. 209; 
 Whitehead v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 89, 
 45 S. W. 10. But see contra, People 
 V. McDowell, 71 Cal. 194, 11 Pac. 
 868; Dickson v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. i, 
 28 S. W. 815, 30 S. W. 807, 53 Am. 
 St. 694n. 
 
 ^ Dickson v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. i, 
 28 S. W. 815, 30 S. W. 807, 53 Am. 
 St. 694n ; State v. Fitzgerald, 20 Mo. 
 App. 408; State V. Bonine, 85 Mo. 
 .App. 462; Haley v. State, 6^^ .Ala. 89. 
 The libelous language, as set forth in 
 
 the indictment, must be proved 
 strictly as alleged. Frisby v. State, 
 26 Tex. App. 180, 9 S. W. 463 ; Berry 
 V. State, 27 Tex. App. 483, 11 S. W. 
 521 ; State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 
 395, 16 S. W. 604, 27 Am. St. 361 : 
 Neely v. State, 2^ Tex. Cr. 370, 23 
 S. W. 798; Stichtd V. State, 25 Tex. 
 App. 420, 8 S. W. 477, 8 Am. St. 444. 
 So of slanderous words. Barnett v. 
 State, 35 Tex. Cr. 280, 22 S. W. 340. 
 
 * Cornelius v. State, 145 Ala. 65, 40 
 So. 670; State V. ShafFner, 2 Penn. 
 (Del.) 171, 44 Atl. 620: England v. 
 State (Tex. Cr. App.), 49 S. W. 379; 
 State V. Lomack, 130 Iowa 79, 106 
 X. W. 386. 
 
 '" State V. Brady, 44 Kan. 435, 24 
 Pac. 948, 2T Am. St. 296, 9 L- R- A. 
 606; Fitzpatrick v. Daily States Pub. 
 Co., 48 La. Ann. 11 16, 20 So. 173.
 
 62^ 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. 
 
 § 3^U 
 
 from the falsity of the accusations and the absence of reasonable 
 grounds for it.** 
 
 The existence of malice is a question for the jury. Evidence of 
 all facts and circumstances is admissible which may throw any 
 light upon the intention of the defendant, and which will show 
 that he acted honestly, or the reverse, that he was prompted by 
 a desire to stir up strife or to promote the public welfare by his 
 publication."^ Evidence of other libelous publications by the ac- 
 cused, directed against the same person or against others, uncon- 
 nected with the one complained of, is admissible to prove the in- 
 tention, "^ if the date of publication is near enough to afford an 
 inference that similar motives prompted the accused in both 
 cases. ^ The accused should always be permitted to testify to his 
 own intention,^" and may also prove all the circumstances under 
 •which publication was made, the facts on which it was based, and 
 the source of the information which is contained in the state- 
 ment.^^ 
 
 * State V. Lomack, 130 Iowa 79, 106 
 X. W. 386; Haley v. State, 63 Ala. 
 89 ; Pledger v. State, "]•] Ga. 242, 3 S. 
 E. 320; State V. Clyne, 53 Kan. 8, 35 
 Pac. 789; State v. Brady, 44 Kan. 
 ^35, 24 Pac. 948, 21 Am. St. 296, 9 L. 
 R. A. 606; Commonwealth v. Bland- 
 ing, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 304, 15 Am. 
 Dec. 2r4n ; State v. Patterson, 2 N. 
 J. L. J. 218. 
 
 ' Smith V. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 
 437. ZZ S. W. 419, 17 Ky. L. 10 10. 
 Proof of good character of defend- 
 ant, 103 Am. St. 900, note. 
 
 * Commonwealth v. Harmon, 2 
 Gray CMass.) 289; Manning v. State, 
 },■] Te.x. Cr. 180, 39 S. W. 118; State 
 V. Conable, 8r Iowa 60, 46 N. W. 759; 
 Grant v. State, 141 Ala. 96, -y] So. 
 420; State V. Heacock, 106 Iowa 191, 
 76 X. W. 654; Manning v. State, zi 
 Tex. Cr. 180, 39 S. W. 118; Riley v. 
 State, 132 Ala. 13, 31 So. ^2>^\ State 
 V. Riggs, 39 Conn. 498; Eldridge v. 
 State, 2'7 Fla. 162, 9 So. 448; Com- 
 monwealth V. Damon, 136 Mass. 441; 
 State V. Mills, 116 X. Car. 1051, 21 
 
 S. E. 563; Butler v. State (Ala., 
 1909), SO So. 400; Cox V. State (Ala., 
 1909), 50 So. 398. 
 
 " Eldridge v. State, 27 Fla. 162, 9 
 So. 448. See § 88, et seq. 
 
 "People V. Stark, 59 Hun (X. Y.) 
 5T, T2 X. Y. S. 688; State v. Clyne, 
 53 Kan. 8, 35 Pac. 789. But only 
 where the language is ambiguous." 
 State V. Heacock, 106 Iowa 191, 76 
 X. W. 654- 
 
 " Duke V. State, 19 Tex. App. 14 ; 
 People V. Glassman, 12 Utah 238, 42 
 Pac. 956; Commonwealth v. Snclling, 
 15 Pick. (Mass.) 2)Z7> ZZf^'- Common- 
 wealth V. Bonner, 9 Met. (Mass.) 
 410; Benton v. State, 59 X. J. L. 551, 
 36 Atl. 1041 ; Commonwealth v. Swal- 
 low, 8 Pa. Super. Ct. 539. But it 
 seems that he cannot prove that he 
 repeated what another had told him 
 to corroborate him where the l.iiter 
 was accused of falsehood and threat- 
 ened with personal violence. Sliaw 
 V. State, 28 Tex. ;\pp. 236, 12 S. \V. 
 741.
 
 364 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 628 
 
 The question of the intention of the accused in pul)hsliino- tlie 
 libel is a mixed question of law and fact, to be determined by 
 the jury under the instruction of the court/" 
 
 "Benton v. State, 59 N. J. L. 551, 
 36 Atl. 1041 ; State v. Norton, 89 Me. 
 290, 36 Atl. 394; Baker v. State, 97 
 Ga. 452, 25 S. E. 341 ; People v. See- 
 ley, 139 Cal. 118, 72 Pac. 834; State 
 V. Ford, 82 Minn. 452, 85 N. W. 217; 
 Drake v. State, 53 N. J. L. 23, 20 
 Atl. 747. Evidence of other crimes 
 to show intent, 62 L. R. A. 230, note. 
 In Rex V. Woodfall, 5 Burr. 2661, 
 Lord Mansfield thus expresses him- 
 self upon the question of intent: 
 "Where an act, in itself indifferent, 
 if done with a particular intent be- 
 comes criminal, there the intent must 
 be proved and found ; but where the 
 act is in itself unlawful, as in this 
 case, the proof of justification or ex- 
 cuse lies on the defendant ; and in 
 failure thereof the law implies a 
 criminal intent." This is certainly 
 good law where a man publishes mat- 
 ter criminal per se and offers no evi- 
 dence in explanation or exculpation. 
 But usually the evidence as to the 
 intent of the accused is conflicting, 
 and the jury must consider other 
 facts than publication only. The 
 court adds : "There may be cases 
 where the fact proved as a publica- 
 tion may be justified or excused as 
 lawful or innocent. For, no fact 
 which is not criminal, in case the 
 paper be a libel, can amount to a 
 publication of which a defendant 
 ought to be found guilty." In the 
 case of the King v. The Dean of St. 
 Asaph, reported 3 T. R. 428, the right 
 of the jury to determine the intent of 
 the defendant in publishing a libel re- 
 ceived a thorough discussion. Down 
 to that time the uninterrupted cur- 
 
 rent of the decisions undoubtedly 
 confined the jury to determining the 
 fact of publication and the meaning 
 of the words only. The question of 
 intent, whether the publication was or 
 was not libelous, or, in other words, 
 the criminality of the act of publish- 
 ing, was for the court to determine 
 upon the record after the jury had 
 found that the accused had published 
 it, and the meaning of the language. 
 So far as the jury were forbidden to 
 consider the intention of the accused, 
 the crime of libel constituted, it was 
 admitted, an exception to the rule by 
 which the jury determined the guilty 
 intent of the accused in all cases. 
 The natural consequence of this was, 
 that juries, finding that the accused 
 was prevented from offering any evi- 
 dence to explain the motives of his 
 actions, and that they were shut out 
 from considering them, and that all 
 that remained for them to do was to 
 find the fact of publication, which 
 was usually admitted, very often im- 
 properly acquitted those who were in 
 fact guilty in order merely to show 
 their independence of judicial domi- 
 nation. After the decision of the 
 case above mentioned, the Statute 32, 
 Geo. Ill, c. 60, was passed, which 
 provided as follows : "That on every 
 such trial, the jury sworn to try the 
 issue may give a general verdict of 
 guilty or not guilty upon the whole 
 matter put in issue upon such indict- 
 ment or information; and shall not 
 be required or directed, by the court 
 or judge before whom such indict- 
 ment or information shall be tried, to 
 find the defendant or defendants
 
 629 CRIMES AGAIXST THE PERSOX. § 365 
 
 § 365. Evidence of the truth as a defense. — At common law the 
 defendant in a criminal prosecution was not permitted to prove 
 the truth of the statement complained of. Hence arose Lord 
 Mansfield's celebrated dictum, "the greater the truth, the greater 
 the libel;" the supposition being that the greater the appearance 
 of truth in a criminal libel, the more likely would it tend to stir 
 up the victim to revenge himself and lead to a breach of the 
 peace, with possible homicide or bloodshed. But now by statute 
 in England,^^ and under various constitutional and statutory pro- 
 visions in the states, the defendant is permitted to prove the truth 
 of his assertions, and that they were published for the public bene- 
 fit.^* 
 
 The accused is permitted to prove the truth of the statements 
 for which he is to be held responsible.^^ But usually the truth 
 alone is not a sufficient excuse if the libel was published in bad 
 faith and with an intent to injure.^** Where the truth is a suf- 
 ficient justification, the accused is not compelled to prove it 
 beyond a reasonable doubt. ^^ It is enough if upon all the evidence 
 the jury believe his statements are true. And where the evidence 
 for the defendant creates a prima facie presumption in the minds 
 of jurors that his statements are true, it is incumbent upon the 
 prosecution to convince them of their falsity beyond all reasonable 
 doubt.^* It is only necessary to prove the truth of that part of 
 
 guilty, merely on the proof of the " Barthelemy v. People, 2 Hill (N. 
 
 publication by such defendant or de- Y.) 248; State v. Bush, 122 Ind. 42, 
 
 fendants of the paper charged to be 23 N. E. 677; State v. Lehre, 2 Brev. 
 
 a libel." (S. Car.) 446, 4 Am. Dec. 596; State 
 
 " Lord Campbell's Act, 6 and 7 Vic. v. Lyon, 89 N. Car. 568. 
 
 C1843), c. 96. "Manning v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 
 
 "Odger's Libel and Slander, 388- 180, 39 S. W. 118. 
 
 390; Reg. V. O'Brien, 4 Cr. L. ]\Iag. "State v. Bush, 122 Ind. 42, 23 N. 
 
 424. E. 677; AIcArthur v. State, 59 Ark. 
 
 "People V. Seeley, 139 Cal. 118, 72 431, 27 S. W. 628; State v. Wait, 44 
 
 Pac. 834; State v. Keenan, in Iowa Kan. 310, 24 Pac. 354; Common- 
 
 286, 82 X. W. 792; State V. Conable, wealth v. Rudy, 5 Pa. Dist. Ct. 270; 
 
 81 Iowa 60, 46 X. W. 759; State v. Smith v. Commonwealth, 98 Ky. 437, 
 
 Wait, 44 Kan. 310, 24 Pac. 354; Com- 33 S. W. 419, 17 Ky. L. loio; State 
 
 monwealth v. Snelling, Thach. Cr. v. Grinstead, 10 Kan. App. 90, 61 Pac. 
 
 Cas. (Mass.) 318; Boyle v. State, 6 980; Manning v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 
 
 Ohio Cir. Ct. 163, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 180, 39 S. W. 118. 
 
 .397; Johnson v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. • 
 569, 21 S. W. 541.
 
 § 3^5 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 63O 
 
 the publication which is alleged to be libelous." Evidence to 
 prove the truth of the charges made by the accused must come 
 from witnesses who have a competent knowledge of the facts, 
 acquired by their own observation. Hearsay is not admissible. 
 Hence it is not allowable to prove that the matters referred to in 
 the alleged libel were rumored about the neighborhood, and were 
 accepted as the truth by persons who knew the party libeled.-" 
 
 Where the statute permits the truth of the charges which are 
 alleged to have been libelous to be proved in justification, any 
 evidence which tends to prove their truth is relevant. The test 
 of relevancy is whether the facts would be relevant if the truth 
 or falsity of the charges were directly in issue in some legal pro- 
 ceeding either criminal or civil. For example, if the libel consists 
 in charging the prosecuting witness with a crime, the relevancy 
 of the evidence to prove the truth of the charge on the part of 
 the accused would be determined by the answer to the question, 
 would such evidence be relevant in a criminal prosecution 
 brought against the prosecuting witness based upon the crime 
 charged? Thus, proof of the commission of one crime is not 
 relevant to prove in justification the truth of an allegation charg- 
 
 " State V. Wait, 44 Kan. 310, 24 the party libeled to prove the truth of 
 
 Pac. 354. the charge. People v. Stokes, 24 X. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Place, 153 Pa. Y. S. -ji-/, 30 Abb. X. Cas. 200; State 
 St. 314, 26 Atl. 620; People v. Jack- v. Bush, 122 Ind. 42, 23 N. E. (i-jT\ 
 man, 96 Mich. 269, 55 X. W. 809; Commonwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick. 
 State V. Hinson, 103 X. Car. 374, 9 (Mass.) zyj; State v. Lyons, 89 X. 
 S. E. 552; State v. Butman, 15 La. Car. 568; McArthur v. State, 41 Tex. 
 Ann. 166; State v. Ford, 82 Minn. Cr. 635, 57 S. W. 847. Contra, by 
 452. 85 X. W. 217; State V. White, 7 statute in Texas. Manning v. State, 
 Ired. (X. Car.) 180. Contra, Hum- 37 Tex. Cr. 180, 39 S. W. it8. In 
 bard v. State, 21 Tex. App. 200, 17 Texas, Penal Code, Art. 646; Mis- 
 S. W. 126. In Commonwealth v. souri. Rev. St., § 3858; North Caro- 
 Snelling, 15 Pick. (Mass.) 337, 342, lina, X. Car. Code, § 11 13, and some 
 the court, by Shaw, C. J., said : "But other states slander, consisting of 
 how is this defense to be made? By words, imputing unchastity to a 
 proof of the truth of the matter, woman, is good ground for an in- 
 charged as libelous, not his belief of dictment. The mode of proof, ex- 
 the truth, not his information, nor cept so far as the words uttered are 
 the strength of the authority upon oral and not written, is the same as in 
 which such belief was taken up." criminal libel. Burnham v. State, 37 
 The accused will not be permitted to Fla. 327, 20 So. 548. 
 prove the general bad character of
 
 631 CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON. § 365 
 
 ing the witness with a distinct offense involving different acts on 
 his part.-^ After the accused has oft'ered evidence to prove that 
 his charge was true, the state must be permitted to meet this with 
 proof tending to show that the charge was false. Where the 
 libelous charge was that the prosecutor was dishonest, and the 
 accused was permitted to show that he did not pay his debts and 
 that lie had to be sued ; he was permitted to show his family and 
 his means and other circumstances as explaining his inability to 
 pay his debts and he may also testify how many times and for 
 what reasons he was sued."" 
 
 ^ State V. Lomack, 130 Iowa 79, 106 "State v. Keenan, iii Iowa 286, 82 
 X. W. 386. N. W. 792.
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 OFFENSES AGAINST HUMAN HABITATIONS. 
 
 366. Arson — At common law and by 
 
 statute — Evidence to show 
 locality of building. 
 
 367. Proof of actual burning re- 
 
 quired — Non-accidental char- 
 acter of fire — Proof of prem- 
 ises burned. 
 
 368. Threats and declarations by 
 
 the accused — Remoteness. 
 
 369. Relevancy of evidence to show 
 
 the intent — Proof of other 
 similar crimes. 
 
 370. Evidence of preparation to 
 
 show that the accused was 
 near the burned premises. 
 
 371. Burglary defined — Entrance at 
 
 night time — Preparations to 
 commit. 
 2,72. Evidence to prove forcible 
 breaking in and entering — 
 The condition of the prem- 
 ises. 
 
 yjZ- Proof of constructive breaking 
 — Xon-consent of owner — 
 Evidence of ownership and 
 value of property. 
 
 374. Correspondence of foot-prints 
 
 with the foot-wear of the 
 accused. 
 374a. Evidence obtained by trailing 
 with bloodhounds. 
 
 375. Burglarious tools in the posses- 
 
 sion of the accused. 
 yid- Other burglarious acts. 
 2)77. The felonious intention present 
 
 in entering. 
 
 378. Presumption from the posses- 
 
 sion of stolen property. 
 
 379. Articles stolen from the prem- 
 
 ises as evidence. 
 
 ^ 366. Arson — At common law and by statute — ^Evidence to show 
 locality of building. — The malicious or willful burning of the 
 house or out-house of another, or the burning of any building, so 
 situated as to endanger a dwelling-house, is arson at common 
 law.^ This crime is sometimes graded by statute according to 
 the degree in which it involves danger to human life. The malic- 
 ious and intentional burning of one's own house, or of buildings 
 which are not the subject of arson at common law," is sometimes 
 
 M Bl. Com. 220; Kopcyznski v. S. E. 53, 55 Am. St. 806, 32 L. R. A. 
 State, 137 Wis. 358, 118 X. W. 863. 647n. 
 - State V. Sarvis, 45 S. Car. 668, 24 
 
 (632)
 
 633 OFFENSES AGAINST HUMAN HABITATIONS. § 366 
 
 made arson by statute.^ The character of the dwelHng or other 
 building must be proved substantially as laid in the indictment.* 
 A charge of burning a building is sustained though the proof 
 shows that the building was not completed.^ So it has been held 
 that a charge of burning a ''house" is sustained by showing the 
 burning of a gin set up on posts with the lower part thereof used 
 for the engine and the upper part enclosed with walls.*' Whether 
 a structure is or is not a building within the statute is a question 
 of fact for the jury." The title or occupancy of the building need 
 not be proved with the fulness which is necessary in actions in- 
 volving the title or the right to possession.* Description and 
 proof by street and number, or by its proximity to well-known 
 landmarks, is sufficient to sustain the venue. The ownership of 
 the building need not be strictly proved, unless it is an essential 
 element of the crime, as when one is indicted for setting fire to 
 his own house.^ Any evidence tending to prove ownership in a 
 civil action is competent. It has been held that ownership must 
 be proved by the production of the deed, though apparently this 
 is not the general rule.^*' In another case a receipt for rent was 
 received signed by the accused while in jail." Under a statute 
 making it arson for one to burn his own property, proof that he 
 
 ^Burger v. State, 34 Xeb. 397, 51 'Van Immons v. State, 29 Ohio 
 
 N. W. 1027; State v. Grimes, 50 Cir. Ct. 681. 
 
 Minn. 123, 52 N. W. 275 ; People v. ^ IMorgan v. State, 120 Ga. 499, 48 
 
 Fairchild, 48 Mich. 31, 11 X. W. ^^y, S. E. 238. 
 
 State V. Harvey, 131 Mo. 339, 32 S. " People v. Handley, 100 Gal. 370, 
 
 W. mo; Commonwealth v. Uhrig, 34 Pac. 853; People v. Laverty, 9 
 
 167 Mass. 420, 45 X. E. 1047. Cal. App. 756, 100 Pac. 899; Heard 
 
 * State V. Jeter, 47 S. Car. 2, 24 S. v. State, 116 Tenn. 713, 94 S. W. 605. 
 
 E. 889. See Elliott Evidence, § 2816. Whe<i ownership is relevant, it may 
 
 Presumptions in prosecution for ar- be proved by a certified copy of a 
 
 son, see Elliott Evidence, § 2807. recorded deed, with oral evidence that 
 
 Evidence of certain facts concerning the accused had made an oral lease, 
 
 the property burned, see Elliott Evi- or had signed as owner. Common- 
 
 dencc, § 2814. Evidence of good wealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 278, 
 
 character of defendant in prosecution 5 N. E. 494. 
 
 for arson, see 103 Am. St. 902. " Goldsmith v. State, 46 Tc.x. Cr. 
 
 ''Van Immons v. State, 29 Ohio 556,81 S. W. 710. 
 
 Cir. Ct. 681. " State v. Watson, 47 Ore. 543, 85 
 
 '■' Cadflcll V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 380, Pac. 33C. 
 97 S. W. 705.
 
 § 'ifj'J CRIMINAL •EVIDENCE. 634 
 
 had some estate therein is sufficient, tliough it be not proved that 
 lie owned all of it.'-' 
 
 § 367. Proof of actual burning' required — Non-accidental char- 
 acter of fire — Proof of premises burned. — In order to prove the 
 corpus delicti of arson, it is not sufficient merely to show a burn- 
 ing, which may have been the result of an accident. It must be 
 proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the burning was not acci- 
 dental, but was willfully and maliciousl)- caused by some person 
 who was morally resjionsible for his actions.'^ I^'or in arson the 
 corpus delicti consists hrst in the burning of the premises de- 
 scribed in the complaint and second in the fact that the burning 
 was the result of the agency of the accused.^'* If nothing appears 
 in the evidence but the fact that a house was consumed by fire, 
 it will be presumed that the fire was the result of accident, and it 
 is for the state to overcome this presumption and to prove that 
 the fire was willfully caused by the accused.^'' At common law 
 the actual burning of the whole or of some part of the house 
 must be proved, though proof of the actual burning of the small- 
 est part is sufficient. It need not be shown that the wood blazed, 
 but proof that the wood or other inflammable material was 
 charred, i. c, reduced to charcoal, and its identity destroyed, is 
 always required. A mere discoloration or scorching black by 
 smoke or heat is not enough.^" 
 
 "Jones V. State, 70 Ohio St. 36, 70 v. State, 6 Ga. App. 776, 65 S. E. 816. 
 
 X. E. 952. "West V. State, 6 Ga. App. 105, 64 
 
 "Winslow V. State, 76 .Ma. 42; S. E. 130; Spears v. State, 92 Miss. 
 
 Jesse V. State, 28 Miss. 100, 109; 613, 46 So. 166. 
 
 Thomas v. State, 41 Tex. 27; Com- '^Williams v. State, 125 Ga. 741, 54 
 monwealth v. Phillips (Ky.), 14 S. S. E. 661; Ragland v. State, 2 Ga. 
 W. 378, 12 Ky. L. 410; Jenkins v. App. 492, 58 S. E. 689; West v. State. 
 State, 53 Ga. 2i'> Brown v. Common- 6 Ga. App. 105, 64 S. E. 130. Ad- 
 wealth, 87 Va. 215, 12 S. E. 472; Wil- missions and Confessions, see Elliott 
 liams V. State, 125 Ga. 741, 54 S. E. Evidence, § 2816. 
 661 : State v. Pienick, 46 Wash. 523, '" State v. Hall, 93 N. Car. 571 : 
 90 Pac. 645, II L. R. A. (X. S.) 987; Woolsey v. State, 30 Tex. App. 346. 
 Ragland v. State, 2 Ga. .-Xpp. 492, 58 17 S. W. 546. The opinion of a wit- 
 S. E. 689. Proof of corpus delicti, ness to the effect that he thought a 
 see 68 L. R. A. 41, note ; 16 L. R. \. house had been set on fire is not ad- 
 (N. S.) 285, note. Burden of proof, missible. State v. Nolan, 48 Kan. 
 see Elliott Evidence, § 2808; Burley
 
 635 OFFEX.-ES AGAIXST II UMAX HABITATIOXS. § 368 
 
 § 368. Threats and declarations by the accused — Remoteness. — 
 Any statements, utterances or declarations which are connected 
 with the res gcstar of the burning are receivable. Under this head 
 may be grouped tlu-eats made prior to the fire, and, where it is 
 his own property which is destroyed, the statement of the accused 
 as to the probable cause of the fire, the value of the property 
 whicli was burned and of the amount of tlie insurance thereon. 
 So, too. any declarations made by him or in his presence and 
 adopted by him. contemporaneous with and explanatory of the 
 main transaction are admissible.^' 
 
 In a prosecution for arson in setting fire to the dw-elling or 
 otlier building owned by another person, a declaration made by 
 the accused that, as he liad l)een put out of the dwelling no one 
 else would ever prosper in that place,^^ or threats of bodih^ harm 
 made by liim and directed against the owner, are always admis- 
 sible to show malice and ill-well. It is not material that the threats 
 were vague and general in their character, and that they did not 
 point directly to the property which was burned, if they indicated 
 hostility to its owner.^'' So it may be proved that the accused had 
 said to the person wliose place of business was burned that, if 
 were not for him. he would not care if the town were in ashes.-" 
 
 Threats will not be rejected because directed against members 
 
 723. 20 Pac. 568, 30 Pac. 486. An "People v. Eaton, 59 Mich. 559. 
 allegation of burning a dwelling- 561, 26 X. W. 702; State v. Ledford, 
 house is not sustained by proof of 133 N. Car. 714, 45 S. E. 944. Ex- 
 burning a house not a dwelling, press threats to burn the house of 
 Commonwealth v. Hayden, 150 Mass. another, with the whole conversation 
 332, .333, 23 X. E. 51 ; Commonwealth which led up to them, are particularly 
 V. Wellington, 7 .Allen (Mass.) 299, relevant. State v. Lytle, 117 N. Car. 
 or a dwelling which is vacant. Peo- 799, 23 S. E. 476; Prater v. State, 
 pic V. Handley, 93 Mich. 46, 48, 52 107 .Ala. 26, 18 So. 238. See also, 
 X. W. 1032. Cf. State v. Carter, 49 Elliott Evidence, § 281 1. 
 S. Car. 265, 27 S. E. T06. Questions "Davis v. State, 152 .Ala. S2, 44 So. 
 of law and fact, soc Elliott I-^vidence, 545; Ford v. State, 112 Ind. 373, 383, 
 § 2809. 14 N. E. 241 ; State v. Crawford, 99 
 "Commonwealth v. Wesley, 166 Mo. 74, 77-79, 12 S. W. 354; State v. 
 Mass. 248, 44 N. E. 228; People v. Barrett, 151 X. Car. 665, 65 S. E. 894. 
 Eaton, 50 Mich. 559, 26 X. W. 702: '"Morgan v. State, 120 Ga. 499, 48 
 State v. Ward, 6r Vt. 153. 17 .Atl. S. E. 238. 
 483; State v. Lockwood (Del., 1909), 
 74 .Atl. 2.
 
 >^ 369 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 63 
 
 of the owner's family generally who did not reside in the building 
 which was burned or because they show a general intention to be 
 revenged, though not by any particular means."^ It may be shown 
 that the accused had threatened the owner of a house adjacent to 
 that which was burned,-"- or a person wdio, though not the owner, 
 had goods stored in the building.*^ The length of time which has 
 elapsed between the utterance of the threat and the destruction of 
 the building, though, perhaps, affecting the weight of the threat 
 as evidence, is no objection to its admission.-^ 
 
 i^ 369. Relevancy of evidence to show the intent — Proof of other 
 similar crimes — The intent to set fire must be shown, whether the 
 crime alleged is the arson of one's own house or of some other 
 person's. Direct proof of an intent to commit the crime is never 
 required. The criminal intent may be inferred from the circum- 
 stances attendant on the burning," or from the hostility of the 
 accused to the owner.-" If the accused is charged with the arson 
 of his own house it may always be shown to supply a motive that 
 he was financially embarrassed at the time,'" and that he had 
 overvalued and unduly insured his property."** 
 
 But it cannot be proved against the accused, who is charged 
 with having committed arson for the purpose of securing insur- 
 ance money that he had had fires in buildings other than the one 
 mentioned in the indictment."'** And generally where the accused 
 
 -^Johnson v. State, 89 Ga. 107, 14 ""Commonwealth v. Goldstein, 114 
 
 S. E. 889; Clinton v. State (Fla., Mass. 272; State v. England, 78 N. 
 
 1909), 50 So. 580. Car. 552; State v. Lytle, 117 N. Car. 
 
 "Bond V. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 799, 23 S. E. 476; Luke v. State, 49 
 
 581, 3 S. E. 149. Ala. 30, 20 Am. 269. 
 
 ''State V. Emery, 59 Vt. 84, 7 Atl. =" See ante, § 368. 
 
 129. "State V. Hull, 83 Iowa 112, 48 N. 
 
 ■* Commonwealth v. Quinn, 150 W. 917. See Elliott Evidence, § 2810. 
 
 Mass. 401, 23 N. E. 54; Clinton v. "^ Stitz v. State, 104 Ind. 359, 4 N. 
 
 State, 56 Fla. 57, 47 So. 389. A E. 145 ; Commonwealth v. Hudson, 97 
 
 threat, directed against a building Mass. 565; People v. Sevine (Cal.), 
 
 specified, is not excluded as evidence, 22 Pac. 969; State v. Cohn, 9 Nev. 
 
 by a subsequent change in the owner- 179; People v. Kelly, ti App. Div. 
 
 ship of the building. State v. Fenla- (X. Y.) 495. 42 X. Y. S. 756; State 
 
 son, 78 Me. 495, 7 Atl. 38s ; Common- v. Brand (X. J. L.), 72 Atl. 131; 
 
 wealth V. Crowe, 165 Mass. 139, 42 Hooker v. State, 98 Md. 145, 56 Atl. 
 
 X. E. 563. 390.
 
 62^"] OFFENSES AGAIXST HUMAN HABITATIONS. § 369 
 
 is charged with arson for the purpose of securing insurance 
 money evidence showing or tending to show that he was inter- 
 ested in preserving the building that has been burned is compe- 
 tent.^*' 
 
 The amount of the loss,^^ the value of the whole property,^- 
 and the fact that the defendant consented to a settlement of the 
 loss at one-half of the adjusted amount of the same,^'' are always 
 relevant in evidence. The written proof of loss sworn to by one 
 who is indicted for arson of his own buildings, where it describes 
 them and their contents, is admissible against him,^* though he 
 should be permitted to show that other property of his was de- 
 stroyed by the fire which is not mentioned in the writing.^"' But 
 evidence of a demand upon the accused, to allow an examination 
 of the personal property destroyed ; and his refusal should be re- 
 jected as not tending to show his guilt. ^^ If the accused refuses 
 to produce his insurance policy, its contents, execution and deliv- 
 er}- may be proved by parol evidence.^' Except, perhaps, to show 
 that burning was intentional, evidence of the burning of other 
 property belonging to the accused is not received. Thus, when 
 it is charged that the accused has set his own liouse on fire, it may 
 be shown that at some previous time the same or other buildings 
 belonging to him had burned, or that he had endeavored to induce 
 some one to set fire to his buildings.^^ Evidence that the accused 
 
 " Dunlap V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 504, Cal. 403, 24 Pac. 1091 ; Meister v. 
 
 98 S. W. 845. People, 31 Alich. 99; People v. Four- 
 
 ^ People V. Sevine (Cal.), 22 Pac. nier (Cal., 1897), 47 Pac. 1014; Peo- 
 
 969. pie V. Jones, 123 Cal. 65, 55 Pac. 698; 
 
 "State V. Ward, 61 Vt. 153. 17 .-Vtl. Smith v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 80, 105 S. 
 
 483; State V. Harvey, 130 Iowa 394, W. 501; Knights v. State, 58 Neb. 
 
 106 X. VV. 938. 225, 78 N. W. 508, 76 Am. St. 78n. 
 
 "State V. Brand (X. J. L., 1909), Evidence of other fires was held to 
 
 72 A. 131. have been improperly admitted in 
 
 "People v. Mix, 149 Mich. 260, 112 People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253, 
 
 X. W. 907. 50 X. E. 846, reversing 20 App. Div. 
 
 "People V. Mix, 149 Mich. 260, 112 (X. Y.) 139, 46 X. Y. S. 1020. 
 
 X. W. 907. Evidence of other offenses in prose- 
 
 '^ People v. Brown, no .App. Div. cution for arson, see 62 L. R. A. 
 
 (X. Y.) 490, 96 X. Y. S. 957. 193, note; 105 .'\m. St. 996. note; El- 
 
 " Knights V. State, 58 Xcb. 225, 78 liott Evidence, § 2813. Evidence of 
 
 X. W. 508, 76 Am. St. 78n. previous attempts, sec Elliott Evi- 
 
 ** Commonwealth v. Bradford, 126 dencc, § 2812. 
 Mass. 42; People v. Lattimorc, 86
 
 § 2,yO CRIMINAI- KVIDEXCE. 63!^ 
 
 forbade the removal of i)roi)erty from tlic house of which he was 
 the owner while it was burning is admissible to prove that he 
 started the fire.^" If the accused is charged with setting fire to the 
 house of another, evidence to show his familiarity with the prem- 
 ises/" and that goods which w^ere in the house when it was burned 
 were subsequently found in a trunk in his possession, is always 
 admissible."" So it may be shown that a few days before the fire 
 one w'ho is charged with burning a building owned by himself 
 disposed of personal property, taken from the building in such a 
 way as to exempt them from all possibility of being destroyed by 
 the fire.*- 
 
 The opinions of fire insurance experts, based on an examina- 
 tion of the debris, are admissible as to the quantity of goods 
 \vhich have been burned, ^^ and perhaps as to the origin of the 
 fire.^* The location and occupation of buildings near that which 
 was burned may be showm by maps, photographs or otherwise, to 
 enable the jury to understand the evidence more clearly.*^' A 
 photograph of the burned premises, if it is properly verified as 
 correct, is not inadmissible merely because it shows other prem- 
 ises which Avere owned by the accused and which had been de- 
 stroyed by a previous fire if the court instructs the jury that no 
 inference was to be drawn from it that the accused w^as guilty of 
 setting fire to the other building.*® 
 
 § 370. Evidence of preparation to show that the accused was near 
 the burned premises. — Evidence tending to show^ that the defend- 
 ant made preparations to commit the crime is always admissible. 
 So it may be pro\'ed wdiere and how he procured gunpowder with 
 
 ^ Bluman v. State, 2>2 Tex. Cr. 43, ^'' People v. Cassidy, 133 N. Y. 612, 
 
 21 S. W. 1027, 26 S. W. 75. 30 N. E. 1003. If it appears that the 
 
 *° People V. Murphy, 135 X. Y. 450, defendant had removed goods from 
 
 32 N. E. 138. the burned building prior to the fire 
 
 " State V. Vatter, 71 Towa 557. he must be permitted to explain the 
 
 *" State V. !Mann, 39 Wash. 144, 81 removal. People v. Fournicr (Cal., 
 
 Pac. 561. 1897), 47 Pac. 1014. 
 
 *' Birmingham Fire Ins. Co. v. Pul- *" Commonwealth \^ Fielding, 184 
 
 ver, 126 111. 329, 18 X. E. 804, 9 Am. Mass. 484. 69 N. E. 216. Use of pho- 
 
 St. 598. tographs in criminal cases, see 75 Am. 
 
 "Cook V. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437, St. 477, note; 114 Am. St. 427, note. 
 25 X. W. 388, 55 Am. 703.
 
 639 OFFEXSES AGAINST HUMAX IIAP.ITATIOXS. § 3/0 
 
 which the fire was started/' even where this involves proving an- 
 other crime: and that he was seen in the hnilding after business 
 hours or observed skulking near by.''^ 
 
 The testimony of a prosecuting witness, that he took extraor- 
 dinary precautions against fire because of other fires, is relevant 
 to show the incendiary origin of the fire in question ; but evidence 
 that other buildings in the vicinity were burned about the same 
 time as the building in question is always irrelevant, in the ab- 
 sence of evidence connecting the defendant therewith.*-^ It is al- 
 ways relevant. ])articularly in the case of the crime of arson, 
 which is usually committed at night and with the greatest secrecy, 
 to show that the accused was seen in the vicinity of the burned 
 building about the time of the fire, whether before or after it oc- 
 curred/'' 
 
 Evidence to show that the accused was in the crowd which sur- 
 rounded the building at the time of the fire is competent, and, 
 where the fire took place in the night time, it is also competent to 
 show that the condition of the dress or person of the accused 
 when he was seen, was such tliat it might readily be inferred that 
 he had not slept in the building that night."" His ])resence near 
 tlie scene of the fire may also be shown by evidence of footprints 
 which on comparison with shoes worn by him appeared to be of 
 the same size. The weight of such evidence is always for the 
 jury.'^^ 
 
 It may always be shown, where the footprints and the shoes of 
 the defendant do not correspond, that he changed his shoes after 
 he was arrested and while in jail.''- 
 
 *' State V. Roberts, 15 Ore. 187, 13 ted to show the accused had used 
 
 Pac. 896. such a sleigh on the night of the fire; 
 
 "State V. Crawford, 99 Mo. 74, 12 and that, on the same night, he had 
 
 S. W. 354. hired a horse, which, wlien driven 
 
 *'=> State V. McMahon, 17 .\'cv. 365, without guiflance, within four days 
 
 ^74. 376, 30 Pac. 1000. thereafter voluntarily chose the route 
 
 "''Commonwealth v. Ciauviii, 143 lakiii hy the person who fired the 
 
 -Mass. 134, 8 N. K. 89-;. house. Heidelbaugh v. State, 79 Meb. 
 
 "In State v. Ward, 6r Vt. 153, 17 ^(jo, 'M \. W. 145. 
 \tl. 483, after evidence tending to ''"State v. Harvey, 130 Iowa 394, 
 
 < onncct the accuscrl with the fire had 106 N. W. 938. 
 
 been introduced, and it alsf) apjxared ''' Davis v. State, 132 .Ala. 8_', .(4 So. 
 
 that the incendiary had driven a 545. 
 Itigh over a certain route, which left "Moore v. Statf, 51 Te.x. Cr. 46H, 
 
 joculiar tracks, the state was permit- 103 S. W. 188.
 
 § T^yi CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 64O 
 
 Where an incendiarv fire was jiroxed to have been kindled wiili 
 kerosene, it may be shown that, about the same date, the accused 
 had kerosene stains upon his clothing',"''' or that two or three davs 
 after the lire a witness smelled the earth luidcr the building and 
 that it smelled of kerosene,'* and that the accused was seen leav- 
 ing the building burned with an oil can in his hands. '^^ 
 
 It may be shown that the accused, when arrested, soon after the 
 fire, had poisoned meat in his possession, prepared in a peculiar 
 manner, where a dog belonging to the owner of the burned prop- 
 erty was poisoned on the night of the fire and a post-fiwrtciii ex- 
 amination show poisoned meat in the animal's stomach similarly 
 prepared.'"' If the accused is charged with the arson of his own 
 building it may be relevant to show that he accused another of 
 this crime, but such evidence is not admissible where the building 
 is owned by a person other than the accused. ^^ 
 
 ^371. Burglary defined — Entrance at night-time — Preparations 
 to commit. — Burglary is the breaking in and entering the house of 
 another in the night-time with the intent to commit a felony (usu- 
 ally larceny, but often rape or murder), and whether the felony 
 is actually committed or not.^^ The elements to be proved at com- 
 mon law are: First, a felonious breaking and entering; second, 
 that it was a dwelling-house; third, that it occurred in the night- 
 time ; fourth, an intention to commit some felony in the house. 
 The intent to commit a felony is always for the jury to determine. 
 In doing so they may consider all the facts and circumstances as 
 disclosed by the evidence.^® For it is a well-settled proposition 
 that burglary may be proved by circumstantial evidence.*^" 
 
 At common law it must always be shown beyond all reasonable 
 
 "'State V. Kingsbury, 58 Me. 238. '^^2 Russ. on Crimes (gth Am. Ed.), 
 
 "State V. Watson, 47 Ore. 543, 85 p. i ; State v. Beeman, 51 Wash. 557, 
 
 Pac. 336. 99 Pac. 756; People v. Finer (Cal. 
 
 '^People V. Burridge, 99 Mich. 343, App. 1909), 105 Pac. 780. 
 
 58 X. W. 319. Cf. Thomas v. State, "^^ State v. Teeter, 69 Iowa 717, 27 
 
 107 Ala. 13, 18 So. 229; Gawn v. N. W. 485; People v. Soto, 53 Cal. 
 
 State, 7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 19. 415. 
 
 '^ Halleck v. State, 65 Wis. 147, 26 "'' Dupree v. State, 148 Ala. 620, 42 
 
 \. W. 572. So. 1004: State v. Perry, 124 La. 931, 
 
 " State V. McLain, 43 Wash. 267, 86 50 So. 799. 
 Pac. 390.
 
 641 OFFENSES AGAIXST HUMAN HABITATIONS. § 37I 
 
 doubt that the breaking in and entering occurred in the night- 
 time,"^ i. e., the period intervening between the total disappear- 
 ance of daylight in the evening and its reappearance at the earli- 
 est dawn of the next day, during which a person's features are not 
 discernible. Evidence that features were discernible by artificial 
 light, or by moon light, is not admissible.'^- Proof of a breaking 
 in one night and an entrance the following night will sustain a 
 conviction."^ If the evidence leaves the exact time in doubt, and 
 it cannot be positively ascertained whether the breaking in was 
 in the night-time or not, the prisoner should have the benefit of 
 the dotibt." 
 
 Evidence to show the condition of the house, when the owner 
 or any other witness arrived there on the morning after the bur- 
 glary is competent."" It may be inferred that the crime was com- 
 mitted during the night from proof that at half-past five in the 
 morning, when the occupant awoke, he found that the house had 
 been broken open while he slept and articles were missing."^ 
 
 Evidence that the accused had prepared to commit a burglary ; 
 that lie had endeavored to induce the custodian of the premises 
 which were broken into to absent himself, or had procured bur- 
 glar's tools, is competent."'^ It may be proved that tools were 
 found in the building entered which had been taken by breaking 
 and entering anotlier building near by on the same night. ^'^ Evi- 
 dence that he had been seen lurking about the premises,"" or had 
 made inquiries as to property which was in the house,'" or as to 
 
 •Asliford V. State, 36 Xeb. 2,^. 40, Bancroft, 10 X. H. 105, 107. 2 East 
 
 53 X. W. 1036; State V. Seymour, 36 P. C. 509, i Hale P. C. 550. 
 
 Me. 225, 227; State v. Leaden, 35 "'Rex v. Smith, Russ. & Ry. 417. 
 
 Conn. 515; Guynes v. State, 25 Tex. "Waters v. State, 53 Ga. 567. 
 
 .•\pp. 584, 8 S. W. 667: Waters v. '" Herndon v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 
 State, 53 Ga. 567 ; People v. Taggart, 552, 99 S. W. 558. 
 
 43 Cal. 81, 87; Allen v. State, 40 Ala. "People v. Lowric, 4 Cal. .App. 137, 
 
 334. 91 Am. Dec. 477n ; Common- S:7 Pac. 253. 
 
 wealth V. Glover, iii Mass. 395, 402; *"» People v. Calvert, 22 X. V. S. 
 
 Kcclcr V. State, 7^ Xeb. 441, 103 X. 220, 67 Hun (X. Y. ) without opinidii. 
 
 W. 64. ""State V. Arthur. 135 Iowa 4X. io<) 
 
 '•State V. .Morris. 47 Conn. 179; X. W. T083. 
 
 State V. McKnight, rir N. Car. 690, ""State v. Turner, 106 Mo. 272, 17 
 
 692, 16 S. E. 319; Commonwealth v. S. W. 304: People v. Ranicr. 127 App. 
 
 'Kaas, 3 Brewst. TPa.) 422: State v. Div. (X. Y.) 47. 111 \ V. S. 112. 
 
 '"Gilmore v. .State, (/j Ala. 154. 13 
 So. 536. 
 41— Underhiu. Crim. Ev.
 
 § 3/2 
 
 CRIMIXAI. FAIDHXCE. 
 
 642 
 
 the character, financial circumstances and haljils of its inmates, is 
 always admissible."' 
 
 So it may also be shown where the accused resided, with what 
 people he associated.'- and that property taken from the [)remises 
 was found in his possession after the crime. "^ 
 
 Evidence that the accused was found in the premises which 
 were broken into is always competent, provided his presence there 
 is not too remote from the time of the breaking in, but the accused 
 should be permitted to show his reasons for being there ; and. if he 
 went there to obtain property belonging to him, he may be per- 
 mitted to prove that he obtained the property, and also show what 
 he did with it.'* 
 
 § 372. Evidence to prove forcible breaking in and entering — 
 Condition of the premises. — The gist of the crime is the forcible and 
 malicious breaking in. Hence the condition of the premises be- 
 fore and after the offense may always be shown. It may be 
 shown that foot-prints were observed on a road leading to or in 
 the grounds around the house.''' that shoes of the size worn b}- 
 the accused,'" or articles of wearing a])]mrel belonging to him, 
 were found near by, and that, from appearances, and in the opin- 
 ion of witnesses ( but based on their own observation only ), force 
 had been used to effect an entrance,"' that being a (|uestion upon 
 which any man of common understanding is qualified to express 
 an opinion.^'* 
 
 ■" State V. Ward, 103 X. Car. 419, 
 423, 8 S. E. 814. Proof that the value 
 of the property in the house was 
 small does not admit evidence that 
 the accused is a man of large means 
 and in good circumstances. Coates 
 V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 257, 261, 20 S. 
 W. 585. 
 
 " Osborn v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 46, 
 94 S. W. 900. 
 
 "^ Delmont v. State, 15 Wyo. 271, 88 
 Pac. 623. 
 
 '' Mason v. State, 153 Ala. 46, 45 
 So. 472. 
 
 "'See §§ 303. 337< 374- Proof of 
 the corpus delicti, see 68 L. R. A. 41, 
 note. Evidence that the crime was 
 committed in the night time, see 2 
 
 Am. St. 396, note; declarations of ac- 
 cused, 2 Am. St. 396. Evidence of 
 breaking and entering, see Elliott Ev- 
 idence, § 2912. 
 
 ■"England v. State, 89 Ala. 76, 78. 
 8 So. 146; Field v. State, 126 Ga. 571, 
 55 S. E. 502. 
 
 "Fort v. State, 52 Ark. r8o, ri S. 
 W. 959, 20 -Am. St. 163; People v. 
 Block, 15 X. Y. S. 229. 60 Hun ( X. 
 Y.) 583, without opinion. The ques- 
 tion. "How did the accused get in?" 
 is not leading. Vallereal v. State 
 (Tex., 1892). 20 S. W. 537: State v. 
 Moore, 117 Mo. 395, 40 r. 22 S. U'. 
 1086. 
 
 " As to opinion evidence in burg- 
 lary, see 2 Am. St. 397, note.
 
 643 
 
 OFFENSES AGAINST HUMAN HABITATIONS. 
 
 § 373 
 
 A view of the premises by the jurors in a trial for burglary will 
 undoubtedly aid them materially in determining the means em- 
 ployed in breaking in, and whether or not an entrance was gained 
 by force. As the rules and principles which regulate and govern 
 the taking of a view are elsewhere fully elucidated no extended 
 discussion of them is necessary in this place.'® - 
 
 It has been held competent to prove that burglars' instruments 
 and implements and tools which might be used for breaking into 
 the premises were found in or near the premises after the alleged 
 crime, even though it may not appear that they were owned by the 
 accused.^'' The condition of the premises or of a safe or other 
 article of furniture contained in them is relevant."^ 
 
 ^ 373. Proof of constructive breaking — Non-consent of owner — 
 Ownership and value of property. — The Ijreaking must be proved. 
 Proof of drawing a bolt."*- lifting a latch, *^ or a window sash,"* 
 pushing open a closed door,^^ or a window or transom which was 
 fastened,*'' or breaking in an inner door,*^ or opening it with a 
 
 •' See §§ 229-232. 
 
 *' Russell V. State (Ala., 1905), 38 
 So. 291. 
 
 "Russell V. State CAla., 1905), 38 
 So. 291. 
 
 '- Kent V. State, 84 Ga. 438, 11 S. E. 
 355. 20 .Am. St. 376. 
 
 "State V. O'Brien, 81 Iowa 93, 95, 
 46 X. VV. 86 r ; State v. Groning, 23 
 Kan. 18, 21, 5 Pac. 446: Carter v. 
 State, 68 .Ma. 96, 97: .McCourt v. 
 People. 64 N'. Y. 583 ; Gonzales v. 
 State CTe.x. Cr. App., 1899) 50 S. W. 
 lorS. 
 
 "Frank v. State, 39 Miss. 705, 715. 
 
 "* People V. N'olan, 22 Mich. 229, 
 235: .State V. Rcid, 20 Iowa 413, 421, 
 422; Mason v. People, 26 X. Y. 200; 
 State V. Conncrs, 95 Iowa 485, 64 X. 
 W. 295 ; Price v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.). ir2 S. W. 855; People v. 
 rjartland. 30 App. Div. (X. Y. ) 534, 
 52 X. Y. S. 352. The opening of a 
 window or of a door whicli is closed 
 
 with no greater force than is gener- 
 ally necessary for that purpose is a 
 breaking into the house. Scott v. 
 State, 122 Ga. 138, 50 S. E. 49. 
 
 ** Sims V. State, 136 Ind. 358, 360, 
 36 X. E. 278; State v. Moore, 117 
 Mo. 395, 22 S. W. 1086; Holland v. 
 State, 47 Tex. Cr. 623. 85 S. W. 798. 
 The raising of a window which has 
 been left partly open is a breaking 
 into the house. People v. White, 153 
 Mich. 617, 117 X. W. 161, 15 Del. 
 Leg. X. 554. 17 L. R. A. (X. S.) 
 Ii02n. Any person may testify to the 
 size of a pane of glass that was 
 broken in a window, Welch v. State, 
 156 .Ala. 112, 46 So. 856; or on the 
 question whether a lock was broken 
 from the inside or the outside of the 
 df)or, Dupree v. State, 148 .\!a. 620, 
 42 So. 1004. 
 
 " Daniels v. State, 78 Ga. 98, 6 Am. 
 St. 238n.
 
 § :w3 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 644 
 
 key.""' will sustain an allegation of breaking in. But evidence that 
 an entrance was made (e\'en in the night-time )'''■' through an open 
 door."" or transom,''" or through any opening already existing, 
 and not forcibly made, will not sustain an allegation of breaking. 
 Proof of the actual use of force in breaking in and entering is not 
 always necessary. A verdict will stand, though it be not shown 
 affirmatively that the premises were locked during the period in 
 which the breaking in must have occurred, and the only proof is 
 that property was missed from a building, such as a stable, in 
 which horses were confined, which would have escaped had not 
 the door been locked."- If there is no evidence tending to show 
 that the entering was in the night-time the accused is entitled to an 
 instruction that he should be acquitted if the jury believe that he 
 entered in the day-time."^ 
 
 Where a building was left apparently unoccupied, no presump- 
 tion obtains that a person found in it, attempting to commit a 
 felony, had not broken, but had secreted himself therein."^ The 
 entrance must have been without the owner's consent to consti- 
 tute a burglary. "^^ Xon-consent need not be proved by direct evi- 
 dence, but mav be inferred from the circumstances.'''' If the ac- 
 
 '' I Hale P. C. 553 ; State v. Scrip- 
 ture, 42 X. H. 485 ; Lowder v. State, 
 63 Ala. 143, 146. 
 
 *° Williams v. State (Tex. App., 
 1890), 13 S. W. 609. 
 
 ""Costello V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 
 21 S. W. 360; Newman v. State, 55 
 Tex. Cr. 273, 116 S. W. 577; Lock- 
 hart V. State, 3 Ga. App. 480, 60 S. 
 E. 215; Carroll v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 155, 86 S. W. 1012; Pinson v. State 
 (Ark., 1909), 121 S. W. 751. If the 
 door of a storehouse is open when the 
 accused enters and he picks up the 
 property for the purpose of returning 
 it to the owner and not for the pur- 
 pose of stealing it he is not guilty of 
 burglary. Fields v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 App.. 1903), 74 S. W. 309. 
 
 "McGrath v. State, 25 Xcb. 780, 
 41 X. W. 780. 
 
 ""■ State V. Warford, 106 Afo. 55. 60, 
 61, 16 S. W. 886, 27 Am. St. 322; 
 
 Hays V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. in, 100 S. 
 W.926. 
 
 *' Henderson v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 620, 99 S. W. TOO I. 
 
 °'a United States v. Lantry, 30 Fed. 
 232. 
 
 "Van Walker v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 
 
 359, 26 S. W. 507 ; State v. Hayes, 105 
 Mo. 76, 84, 16 S. W. 514, 24 Am. St. 
 
 360. A detective employed to dis- 
 cover persons suspected of burglary, 
 ingratiated himself into the confi- 
 dence of the defendants, loaned them 
 money and finally suggested that they 
 should engage in burglary. He then 
 arranged with the owner of the build- 
 ing that marked money should be 
 placed in a safe, and having made the 
 defendants drunk, he took them to 
 the building, opened the safe and 
 taking out the money handed it to 
 thorn, and it was divided among the
 
 645 OFFENSES AGAIXST HUMAN HABITATIONS. § 374 
 
 ciised was rightfully on the premises, having entered by the per- 
 mission or command of the owner, or of some person who had the 
 right to permit, ^^ or command him, and stole while there, his of- 
 fense is larceny only.^" 
 
 Hence, any evidence is relevant which tends to prove or dis- 
 prove the fact that the entrance was made with the owner's con- 
 sent. The ownership of the property stolen, '^^ its value, ®^ the 
 number of articles taken."'' the ownership of the building broken 
 into,^"" or the date of the burglary,^ is not an essential element of 
 the crime. These facts, therefore, need not be proved precisely 
 as alleged. The ownership of the building broken into may be 
 projjerly inferred from proof that the party alleged to be the 
 owner was in possession,^ but the allegation of possession must be 
 sustained by evidence of actual occupancy and not merely by a 
 constructive possession.^ An allegation of possession by a corpo- 
 ration does not require proof of the incorporation unless this fact 
 is expressly denied by a special plea.^ 
 
 § 374. Correspondence of foot-prints with foot-wear of accused. — 
 The presence of recently made and unaccounted for footprints of 
 
 party. As the entrance was with the '"" State v. Lee, 95 Iowa 427, 64 N. 
 
 owner's consent, it was held that a W. 284; State v. Porter, 97 Iowa 450, 
 
 conviction of burglary could not be 66 N. W. 745; State v. Horned, 178 
 
 sustained. Love v. People, 160 111. Mo. 59, 76 S. W. 953; Boyd v. State, 
 
 501, 43 X. E. 710, 32 L. R. A. 139. 4 Ga. App. 273, 6r S. E. 134; Scoville 
 
 ''People v. McCord, 76 Mich. 200, v. State (Tex. Cr. App., 1904), 81 S. 
 
 42 X. W. 1 106. W. 117. 
 
 ** Colbert v. State, 91 Ga. 705, 17 S. Evidence as to time of oflFense, see 
 
 E. 840. Contra, People v. Barry, 94 Elliott Evidence, § 2914. Testimony 
 
 Cal. 481, 483, 29 Pac. 1026. of accomplice, 98 Am. St. 172. 
 
 " State v. Tyrrell, 98 Mo. 354. II S. ^ State v. Dawkins, 32 S. Car. 17, 
 
 W. 734; Brown v. State, 72 Miss. 990, 10 S. E. 772; State v. Daniels, 122 
 
 18 So. 431 ; People v. Edwards, 59 La. 261, 47 So. 599. 
 
 Cal. 359; State v. Hutchinson, iii ^ State v. McGuire, 193 Mo. 215,91 
 
 Mo. 257, 263, 20 S. \V. 34; Calloway S. W. 939; Hall v. State (Ga. -App., 
 
 V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. App. 72, 94 S. 1909), 66 S. E. 390. 
 
 \V. 902. Sec Elliott Evidence, § 2913. ' Daggett v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 5, 44 
 
 " Farley v. State, 127 Ind. 419, 26 S. W. 148. 842. 
 
 X. E. 898; Mason v. State (Tex. Cr. 'Burrow v. State, 147 Ala. 114, 41 
 
 -App., 1906), 98 S. W. 854; Boyd v. So. 987; State v. SowcU (S. Car., 
 
 State, 4 Ga. App. 273, 61 S. E. 134. 1910), 67 S. E. 316. 
 
 "Johnson v. Commonwealth, 87 
 ^y- '^. 7 S. \\^ 927, 10 Ky. L. 100.
 
 N 37-'r 
 
 CRI.MIXAI. I'AIDI^XCE. 
 
 646 
 
 man/' or beast/' or of wajjion tracks/ in the curtilage of a lionsc 
 which has been entered, or on a road Icachng to it. may always 
 be considered in determining whether a burglary has been com- 
 mitted. As the accused must not be compelled to furnish evi- 
 dence incriminating himself, or to testify against himself, he can 
 not be comi)elled to submit to a comjiarison of footprints in open 
 court/ Nor can the accused be compelled to place his foot in 
 a shoe-track found in the vicinity of the crime." His refusal to do 
 so can neither be proved against him nor commented on by coun- 
 sel,^" while, generally, if he is forcibly compelled to do so, a wit- 
 ness, who was present at the comparison, cannot testify to the 
 results. ^^ But it may always be proved that the accused volun- 
 tarily went to the locus in quo and placed his foot in footprints 
 found there and that his foot fitted the foot])rints perfectly. '- 
 
 A distinction, however, was made where the officer having 
 charge of the prisoner took off his shoes without his consent, or 
 took shoes found in the house of the accused and compared them 
 with the tracks. The officer was allowed to testify to the results, 
 the court basing its ruling on the admitted right of police officials 
 
 ■"■ England v. State, 89 Ala. 76, 8 So. 
 146; Moss V. State, 152 Ala. 30, 44 So. 
 598; State V. Daniels, 134 X. Car. 641, 
 46 S. E. 743 ; State v. Freeman, 146 
 N. Car. 615, 60 S. E. 986; Leonard 
 V. State, 150 Ala. 89, 43 So. 214; 
 State V. Arthur, 135 Iowa 48, 109 N. 
 W. 1083; Doss V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 48, 95 S. W. 1040 ; State v. Fuller, 
 34 Mont. 12. 85 Pac. 369, 8 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 762n; Davis v. State, 152 
 Ala. 82, 44 So. 545 (arson). Contra, 
 Kinnan v. State (Neb., 1910), 125 N. 
 
 \y. 594- 
 
 "Miller v. State, 91 Ga. 186, 16 S. 
 E. 98s; Doss V. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 48, 95 S. W. T040, where it was 
 proved accused had been riding a 
 horse near the scene of the crime. 
 ' Bryan v. State, 74 Ga. 393, 394- 
 Mn Stokes v. State, 5 Baxt. 
 (^Tenn.) 619, 621, 30 Am. 72, the con- 
 viction was reversed because the 
 state was permitted to bring a pan 
 
 of mud in court and to request de- 
 fendant to place his foot in it. The 
 court said : "In the presence of the 
 jury the prisoner is asked to make 
 evidence against himself. The court 
 should not have permitted the pan 
 of mud to have been brought before 
 the jury, and the defendant asked to 
 put his foot in it. We are satisfied 
 the jury was improperly influenced 
 thereby. And it is no sufficient an- 
 swer that the judge afterwards told 
 the jury that the refusal to put his 
 foot in the mud was not to be taken 
 as evidence against him." Cf. Walker 
 V. State, 7 Tex. App. 245, 32 Am. 
 
 595- 
 
 ° See Dunwoody v. State, 1 18 Ga. 
 308, 45 S. E. 412. 
 
 " See, ante, §§ 303, 337, 372. 
 
 " Day V. State, 63 Ga. 667. 
 
 "State V. Graham. 116 La. 779, 41 
 So. 90.
 
 cr, 
 
 OFFEXSES AGAINST II UMAX HABITATIONS. 
 
 >^ 374 
 
 to search the clothing" of prisoners and to testify to what thev 
 find.^" 
 
 The reception of such evidence does not depri\'e the accused 
 of his constitutional right to refuse to testify against himself in 
 any criminal proceeding.'* 
 
 The accused may waive his rights and submit to a voluntary 
 comparison/^ by putting his foot in tracks found in the neighbor- 
 hood of the crime.''' His offer to place his foot or shoe in the 
 footprints may be proved in his favor/^ but if he does so he can- 
 not object to evidence that it seemed to fit.^"* A witness who has 
 measured the tracks of man or beast and compared his measure- 
 ments with the footwear of the accused, worn about the time of 
 the crime, or of a horse owned by him, may testify to the results 
 and may state that in his opinion a correspondence exists in size 
 and shape.'"' 
 
 A witness cannot testifv that he thouirht when he first saw the 
 
 " State V. Graham. 74 X. Car. 646, 
 649, 21 Am. 493 ; Myers v. State, 97 
 Ga. 76, 25 S. E. 252; Krens v. State, 
 ■/^ Xeb. 294, 106 X. \V. 27; Har- 
 grove V. State, 147 Ala. 97, 41 So. 
 972, 119 Am. St. 60; Guerrero v. State, 
 46 Tex. Cr. 445, 80 S. W. ioot ; State 
 V. Williams, 120 La. 175, 45 So. 94. 
 The court declined to decide whether 
 tile policeman could compel a pris- 
 oner to place his foot in the track. 
 
 '* State V. Fuller. 34 Mont. 12, 85 
 Pac. 369. 8 L. R. A. (X. S.) 76211. 
 
 '"People V. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 
 X. \\. 95; State V. Sexton, 147 Mo. 
 89. 48 S. W. 452. 
 
 "' Burks V. State, 92 Ga. 461, 17 S. 
 K. 619. 
 
 '' Rouldin v. State, 8 Tex. .Xpp. 
 ^?>2. 335. Contra, Potter v. State, 92 
 .\la. 27, 40, 9 So. 402. Compare Har- 
 Krovc V. State, 147 Ala. 97, 41 So. 
 <)72, 1 19 Am. St. 60, where shoes 
 that the accused admitted he wore 
 about the time of the burRlary were 
 taken from his house and compared 
 
 witli tracks near the scene of the 
 crime. 
 
 '* Potter V. State, 92 Ala. :^7, 40, 9 
 So. 402. 
 
 " State V. Jeffries, 210 Mo. 302, 109 
 S. W. 614: People V. Wolcott, 51 
 Mich. 612, 615, 17 X. W. 78; Com- 
 monwealth V. Pope, 103 Mass. 440; 
 Harris v. State, 84 Ga. 269, 10 S. E. 
 742; State V. Reitz, 83 X. Car. 634, 
 636; Cooper V. State, 88 Ala. 107, no, 
 7 So. 47; Miller v. State, 91 Ga. 186, 
 16 S. E. 985 ; Porch v. State, 50 Tex. 
 Cr. 335, 99 S. W. 102; Thompson v. 
 State, 45 Tex. Cr. 397, 77 S. W. 
 449; Johnson v. State, 55 Fla. 46, 46 
 So. 154; Alford V. State, 47 Fla. i, 
 36 So. 436; Parker v. State, 46 Tex. 
 Cr. 461, 80 S. W. 1008, 108 Am. St. 
 1021 ; Smith v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 405, 
 77 S. W. 453; Weaver v. State. 46 
 Tex. Cr. 607, 81 .S. W. 39: State v. 
 Arthur, 135 Iowa 48. 109 X. W. 1083; 
 State V. Lanfiford. 74 S. Car. 460. 55 
 S. E. 120; Moore v. State. 51 Tox. 
 Cr. 46S. 103 S. W. 188: State v. \(.r- 
 man, 135 Iowa 483, it3 X. W. 340.
 
 § 374^ CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 64S 
 
 tracks, and still believes, they were made by the defendant, or that 
 thev were like those of the defendant. This is only an expression 
 of an opinion upon a question properly to l)e determined by the 
 jury."" But a witness may testify that the ground in a highway 
 near the scene of the crime and the residence of the accused was 
 so hard that no track could be made."^ The accused may intro- 
 duce any evidence tending to show that it is physically impossible 
 that he made the tracks," or that he had never worn or possessed 
 a shoe that would fit them. 
 
 § 374a. Evidence obtained by trailing with bloodhounds. — The 
 
 well-known instinct possessed by certain breeds of dogs, com- 
 monly known as bloodhounds, which enables them to track per- 
 sons or objects wholly by their sense of smell, has caused them 
 to be employed in tracking persons accused of crime and fugitives 
 from justice from the earliest times. The exceptional keenness 
 of scent, sagacity and capacity for training of these animals, their 
 perseverence and intelligence in following the fugitive are well 
 known. .Vnd, however we may doubt the humanity of employing 
 animals whose nature is, or may upon occasion be, so ferocious 
 to detect and apprehend criminals, there can be no doubt that the 
 results often obtained can be usually relied upon. Thus it has 
 been held that testimony that bloodhounds of pure blood, and ex- 
 perienced in tracking human beings, were put upon the trail at the 
 scene of a crime such as arson, homicide, rape or burglary, and 
 followed the trail to the home or other abiding place of the ac- 
 cused is admissible.'^ The evidence of a witness to these facts, if, 
 
 =" State V. Green, 40 S. Car. 328, 18 "State v. Alelick, 65 Iowa 614, 615, 
 
 S. E. 933, 42 Am. St. 872; Collins v. 22 N. W. 895. 
 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 25 S. W. 743, '^ Spears v. State, 92 Miss. 613, 46 
 
 745, 15 Ky. L. 691; State v. Senn, 32 So. 166; State v. Hunter, 143 N. Car. 
 
 S. Car. 392,400, II S. E. 292; Heidel- 607, 56 S. E. 547, 118 Am. St. 830; 
 
 baugh V. State, 79 Neb. 499, 113 X. Davis v. State, 46 Fla. 137, 35 So. 
 
 W. 14s; Terry v. State, 118 Ala. 79, 76; Parker v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 461, 
 
 23 So. 776. The witness must state 80 S. W. 1008, 108 Am. St. 1021 ; 
 
 the facts showing identity. The Hargrove v. State, 147 .Ma. 97, 41 
 
 same rule applies to horse tracks. So. 972, 119 Am. St. 60; State v. 
 
 State V. Wideman, 68 S. Car. 119, 46 Freeman, 146 X. Car. 615, 60 S. E. 
 
 S. E. 769. 986; State v. Peebles, 178 Mo. 475. 
 
 "State V. Sanders, 75 S. Car. 409, 77 S. W. 518: Simpson v. State, in 
 
 56 S. E. 35. Ala. 6, 20 So. 572; State v. Spivey (X.
 
 649 CFFEXSES AGAINST HUMAN HABITATIONS. § 374a 
 
 at the same time, he was acquainted with the dogs and knew them 
 to be trained and experienced, though not substantive proof of 
 guilt which will alone and uncorroborated sustain a conviction, is 
 admissible as corroboration of other evidence as to the identity of 
 the accused."* In order that such evidence may be received there 
 must be preliminary proof, usually coming from a witness who 
 accompanied the bloodhounds, that they are animals of pure 
 blood, previously trained to trail human beings, that they have 
 been tested by trailing other men and found reliable, and that 
 they were laid on the track at such a time and under such circum- 
 stances as tended to show the track or trail was actually where the 
 accused had been.-^ In a case of arson the testimony showed the 
 dog was put on the trail on the afternoon after the fire.'** On the 
 other hand, if the evidence of the prior training of the dogs is un- 
 convincing, so that the court is not convinced that they are acute 
 of sense or trained in the tracking of human beings this evidence 
 must be rejected. It ought to be rejected where the preliminary 
 proof shows that no care was taken to prevent the hounds from 
 following the tracks of other persons who since the time of the 
 crime had frequented the scene of it. And where, with these cir- 
 cumstances, it also appears that no opportunity was given to the 
 hounds to obtain the scent of any article of wearing apparel be- 
 longing to the supposed criminal, and the dogs were on the trail 
 accompanied by a large and noisy crowd, whose cries urging them 
 on confused them, and also that it was from time to time neces- 
 sary to urge them on, it would be reversible error to admit proof 
 of the fact that they finally trailed the defendant to his place of 
 residence." The accused should always be permitted, through 
 counsel, to cross-examine the witness who testifies to the training 
 and experience of the dogs to bring out any circumstances to show 
 that they were unreliable and unskilled. He may cross-e.xamine 
 as to the circumstances of the trailing to show that its result are 
 
 Car., 1909), 65 S. E. 995. Evidence of L. R. A. (N. S.) 341; State v. 
 
 trailing by bloodhounds, see 42 L. R. Hunter, 143 X. Car. 607, 56 S. E. 
 
 .\. 432, note. 547, 118 .'Km. St. 830. 
 
 •* State V. Hunter, 143 X. Car. 607, -"Davis v. State, 46 Fla. 137, 35 
 
 56 S. E. 547, 118 .Xm. St. 830. .So. 76. 
 
 ^ State V. Dickcrson, "]•] Ohio St. " Sprouse v. Commonwealth ( Ky.. 
 
 34, 82 X. E. 969, 122 .'\m. St. 479, 13 1909), 116 S. W. 344.
 
 >j 375 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 65O 
 
 not lo be depended upon because of the fact that the dogs were 
 not acquainted with the scent or were confused by the crowds, or 
 to show any otlier relevant fact.""" 
 
 vi 375. Burglarious tools in possession of the accused. — It mav 
 usually be sIk^wu that burglars' tools were found on the person 
 of the accused,"'' in his dwelling, in a trunk shown to be 
 his. or in his constructive possession and control at or about the 
 lime of his arrest, particularly where it is shown that such tools 
 were used in the perpetration of tlie crime.'"' But evidence that 
 after the commission of the crime the room occupied by the ac- 
 cused was searched and no burglars' tools or implements, files or 
 keys is not admissible to prove innocence.'*' All the details of the 
 linding, including the declarations of the accused, may be proved, 
 and it is immaterial that the tools found were not adapted to the 
 burglarious act alleged."'- It may also be shown that burglars' 
 tools similar to others found in the defendant's possession were 
 discovered in the premises which had been burglariously en- 
 tered."^ The purjDose and object of the possession of articles or 
 tools which, though usually employed for lawful purposes, may 
 be used by burglars, are always for the jury."* It may be shown 
 that chloroform was found in tlie possession of the accused, or 
 in his house after the crime where chloroform was used in the 
 commission of the crime, and the occupant of the house may tes- 
 tify that he smelled chloroform when he was aroused, though he 
 is not an expert.^"' 
 
 § 376. Other burglarious acts. — Evidence that the defendant had 
 
 "* Richardson v. State, 145 Ala. 46, ''' People v. Lowrie, 4 Cal. App. 
 
 41 So. 82. 137, 87 Pac. 253. 
 
 ^'' McCoy V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 30, ^- Bish. Cr. Proc, § 151; Common- 
 
 85 S. W. 1072 (skeleton keys) ; State wealth v. Tivnon, 8 Gray (Mass.) 
 
 V. Clark (S. Car., 1910), 67 S. E. 375, 69 Am. Dec. 248; Knickerl)ockcr 
 
 300. V. People, 43 N. Y. 177; Frank v. 
 
 "*" People V. Winters, 29 Cal. 658; State, 39 Miss. 705. 
 
 People V. Hope, 62 Cal. 291; People ^^ People v. Hope, 62 Cal. 291, 295. 
 
 V. Wilson, 7 App. Div. (N. Y.) 326, =* Reg. v. Oldham, 2 Den. C. C. 
 
 40 N. Y. S. 107; 2 Am. St. 397, note. 472. 
 
 See also, EllioU Evidence, § 2916; ''Miller v. State (Tex. Cr.), 50 S. 
 
 Russell V. State (Ala., 1905), 38 So. W. 704. 
 291.
 
 651 
 
 OFFENSES AGAINST HUMAN HABITATIONS. 
 
 § Z77 
 
 committed, or had attempted,^'^ or had planned to commit,^" sim- 
 ilar offenses on the same or on other premises," is admissible, 
 when the circumstances of time and place attendant upon both 
 crimes are connected and form a part of one criminal system or 
 transaction.^* Evidence of a separate and distinct burglary is not 
 admissible^^ unless introduced solely to prove the defendant's 
 whereabouts'*" on the night of the crime in issue. 
 
 § 377. The felonious intention present in entering. — The entrance 
 must have been made with a felonious and unlawful intention. 
 The intention of the accused to commit some felony in the prem- 
 ises broken in must be shown. ''^ specifically, as alleged in the in- 
 dictment.*" The fact that a felony was actually committed by the 
 accused in the house is strong prima facie evidence that he entered 
 
 "■a Cook V. State. 80 Ark. 495, 97 S. 
 
 ^\^ 683. 
 
 ■"" Dawson v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 535, 
 25 S. W. 21, 40 Am. St. 791. 
 
 "Marshall v. State (Tex., 1893), 
 22 S. W. 878. A police officer may 
 testify that certain tools and other 
 articles found in the house of the 
 accused were such as burglars ordi- 
 narily use, and may testify how they 
 were used. And mendicant cards 
 found in the house at the same time 
 are relevant to show the occupation 
 f>{ the accused. Commonwealth v. 
 Johnson, 199 Mass. 55, 85 X. E. 188. 
 
 "' Frazier v. State, 135 Ind. 38, 40, 
 34 X. E. 817 ; State v. Robinson, 35 
 S. Car. 340, 14 S. E. 766; State v. 
 Weldon, 39 S. Car. 318, 17 S. E. 688, 
 24 L. R. A. I26n; People v. Mead, 
 50 Mich. 228, IS N. W. 95; Eley v. 
 State (Tex., i8go), 13 S. W. 998; 
 (iiite, § 88, et seq. 
 
 "'People V. McXutt, 64 Cal. ir6, 28 
 Pnc. 64; People v. Grcenwall, 108 N. 
 \. 2r/i, 301 (murder), 15 X. E. 404, 
 2 .Am. St. 415; People v. White. 3 X. 
 Y. Cr. 366. Proof of other crimes, 
 see 62 L. R. A. 193, note. See also, 
 l-'lliott Evidence, § 2917. 
 
 *" People V. Mead, 50 Mich. 228, 15 
 X'. W. 95 ; State v. Fitzsimon, 18 
 R. I. 236, 27 Atl. 446, 448, 49 Am. 
 St. 766. The loss of articles other 
 than those mentioned in the indict- 
 ment may be shown. Walker v. 
 State, S Ga. App. 430, 63 S. E. 534. 
 
 *^Ashford v. State, 2,(> Neb. 38, 40, 
 53 N^. W. 1036; State v. Meche, 42 
 La. Ann. 273, 7 So. 573 ; Harris v. 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. 564, 103 S. W. 
 390; Jones V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 336, 
 87 S. W. 1157; Johnson v. State, 52 
 Tex. Cr. 201, 107 S. W. 52; Moore 
 V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 364, 107 S. W. 
 355. Evidence of the intent, see El- 
 liott Evidence, § 2915; 2 Am. St. 396, 
 note. 
 
 *- Miller v. State, 28 Tex. App. 445, 
 446, 13 S. W. 646; State V. Taylor, 
 136 Mo. 66, 2y S. W. 907; Moore v. 
 State (Tex., 1896), ^7 S. W. 747- 
 The intent is a question for the jury. 
 Woodward v. State, 54 Ga. 106, 107; 
 Franco v. State, 42 Tex. 276, 281 ; 
 Clifton V. State, 26 I'-la. 523, 525, 7 
 So. 863; Commonwealth v. Williams, 
 2 Cush. (Mass.) 582; People v. Hope. 
 62 Cal. 291, 296; State v. Wrifjilit 
 ( IXl., 1907), 66 .\\\. 364; Trcvcnio
 
 Z77 
 
 CRIMIXAT- EVIDENCE. 
 
 65-2 
 
 ii with a felonious inteiilion. If the entrance and tlie commission 
 of a felony on the premises are shown, the jury will he juslilied in 
 inferring a criminal intention in entering. ■*•' The jjurglarious in- 
 tention may be inferred from many other circumstances in evi- 
 dence. So, if it is proved that the accused induced, "*•* or attempted 
 to induce, ■'^ the custodian of the premises to absent himself, or en- 
 tered the building after dark,"' and was found there with bur- 
 glars' tools, or with implements by which it is apparent from the 
 evidence that the breaking into was effected, ^''^ or keys which will 
 open the doors of the building, in his possession,*' or was discov- 
 ered engaged in ransacking a trunk,*** or in putting aside articles 
 of value,*''' and, when discovered, made a hasty and immediate 
 flight"" through an open window,^^ or attempted to conceal him- 
 self,''"" or was found running along a neighboring road soon after 
 a burglary had been attempted,^'' a criminal intent may be in- 
 ferred. Hence these circumstances and others of a similar charac- 
 ter are relevant, wdth other evidence, to show a burglarious in- 
 tent. The accused must be allowed to account for his presence in 
 the house, and his explanation may be considered by the jury in 
 the light afforded by the other evidence.^* 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr., 1897), 42 S. W. 
 594. A specific intent to commit lar- 
 cenj- may be inferred from proof of 
 a breaking in, and of the presence of 
 valuables in the house. Steadman v. 
 State, 81 Ga. Ti(y, 8 S. E. 420. 
 
 "Stokes V. State, 84 Ga. 258, 263, 
 10 S. E. 740; State v. Wilkes, 82 S. 
 Car. 163, 63 S. E. 688; Vance v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 115 S. W. 774; 
 Jenkins v. State (Fla., 1909), 50 So. 
 582. 
 
 " Wright V. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 
 183, 187; Nightengale v. State, 50 
 Tex. Cr. 3, 95 S. W. 531 ; Gunter v. 
 State, 79 Ark. 432, 96 S. W. 181, 116 
 Am. St. 85; State v. Raphael, 123 
 Iowa 452, 99 X. W. 151, loi Am. 
 St. 334; People V. Lang, 142 Cal. 482, 
 76 Pac. 232; Kennedy v. State, 71 
 Xeb. 765, 99 N. W. 645. 
 
 *^ People V. Calvert, 22 X. Y. S. 
 220, d-j Hun 649, without opinion. 
 
 *" State V. Fox, 80 Iowa 312, 45 X. 
 W. 874, 20 Am. St. 425. 
 
 ^''a Taylor v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 190, 
 107 S. W. 58. 
 
 *• People V. }^Iorton, 4 Utah 407, 
 408, II Pac. 512; State v. Christmas, 
 loi X. Car. 749, 756, 8 S. E. 361. 
 
 ■" State V. Anderson, 5 Wash. St. 
 350, 31 Pac. 969. 
 
 *^ Clifton V. State, 26 Fla. 523, 525, 
 7 So. 863. 
 
 "Hill V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 15 
 S. W. 870, 12 Ky. L. 914. 
 
 "Alexander v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 
 359, 362, 20 S. W. 756. 
 
 "' People V. Hagan, 14 N. Y. S. 2^^, 
 60 Hun (X. Y.) 577, without opin- 
 ion. 
 
 ■^^ Steadman v. State, 81 Ga. 736, 8 
 S. E. 420. 
 
 '* People V. Griffin, 77 Mich. 585, 
 587, 43 X. W. 1061 ; State v. Perry, 
 124 La. 931, 50 So. 799.
 
 653 
 
 CFFEXSES AGAIXST IIUMAX HABITATIONS. 
 
 3/8 
 
 § 378. Presumption from possession of stolen property. — It has 
 been lield that a person in whose possession money or goods were 
 found, recently taken from premises which had been broken in, 
 would be presumed from possession alone as matter of law, at 
 least in the absence of a valid explanation, guilty not only of lar- 
 ceny, but of the burglary as well.^^ The large majority of the 
 cases, however, while admitting that recent possession alone may 
 in some circumstances create a presumption of larceny, repudiate 
 this doctrine as regards burglary. The true rule doubtless is that 
 the mere possession of stolen property creates no presumption of 
 law that the person in whose possession it was found committed 
 the burglary in wdiich they were taken. The possession is a cir- 
 cumstance to go to the jury, and its weight is for them. The 
 corpus delicti of the burglary, that is, the breaking in and en- 
 tering, must be proved by independent evidence and can not be 
 presumed from evidence of mere possession.'"^ If it appears that 
 a burglary was in fact committed, the possession by the accused is 
 a circumstance from which, in connection with all the evidence, 
 the jury may presume as a matter of fact that he committed it." 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Millard, i 
 Mass. 6; State v. Toohey, 203 Mo. 
 674, 102 S. W. 530; Scott V. State, 
 122 Ga. 138, 50 S. E. 49. Where 
 property had been stolen by means 
 of a burglary, and recently there- 
 after the property is found in the 
 possession of another, the latter is 
 presumed to be the thief and to have 
 used all means necessary to have se- 
 cured access to and possession of 
 such property, and, if he fails to ac- 
 cf)unt for his possession in a man- 
 ner consistent with his innocence, or 
 to overcome the presumption by di- 
 rect or circumstantial evidence, a ver- 
 dict of guilty of larceny and bur- 
 glary is authori/.ed. State v. James, 
 [94 Mo. 268, 92 S. W. 679. See El- 
 liott Evidence, § 2918: 12 L. R. A. 
 CS. .S.) 200, note. Burden of proof 
 and prcsumi)tion in prosecution for 
 liuris'lary, sec 2 Am. St. 397, note ; 
 
 TCI Am. St. 482, note; Elliott Evi- 
 dence, § 29x0. 
 
 ■^Lester v. State, 106 Ga. 371, 32 
 S. E. 335, and see cases in next note. 
 
 °' King v. State, 99 Ga. 686, 26 S. 
 E. 480; State V. Conway, 56 Kan. 
 682, 44 Pac. 627; Metz v. State, 46 
 Neb. 547, 65 N. W. 190; State v. 
 Ham, 98 Iowa 60, 66 N. W. 1038; 
 Porterfield v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 
 801, 22 S. E. 352; State v. Blue, 136 
 Mo. 41, 37 S. W. 796; State v. Wil- 
 son, 137 Mo. 592, 39 S. W. 80; State 
 V. Jennings, 79 Iowa 513, 44 N. W. 
 799; State V. Reid, 20 Iowa 413, 420, 
 421; State V. Owsley, 111 Mo. 450, 
 20 S. W. 194; Xeuhrandt v. State, 
 53 Wis. 89. 90, <) X. W. 824; People 
 v. Carroll, 54 Mich. 334, 20 N. W. 
 66; Dawson v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 
 .S.35. 23 S. W. 21 : Goldsmith v. State, 
 32 Tex. Cr. 112. 2J S. W. 405: 
 Tiircadgill v. State, 3J Tex. Cr. 45 1,
 
 378 
 
 CRI M I X A L i:\- i 1 )E X CE. 
 
 <'>54 
 
 The relevancy of the possession of articles taken from the 
 jireniises is to a certain extent due to the fact that the possession 
 sliows that the accused has been in the i)reniises. The possession 
 may. and in most cases does, show a criminal intent, i. c, the in- 
 lent to steal, where proof of this intent is necessary. But even 
 where proof of an intent to steal is not allci^ed evidence of recent 
 possession after the breaking' in is competent to identify the per- 
 son wlio did it.'''' The possession by one of several jointly indicted 
 for burglary is the possession of all. and may be proved against 
 any or all,"''' and possession by all those jointly charged may be 
 proved on the trial of any one of them."" But in burglary, as in 
 the kindred offense of larceny, the possession of the defendant 
 must be personal and exclusive and unexplained, and must in- 
 volve a conscious assertion of ownership by him. He should al- 
 ways be permitted to explain how he obtained the property, and if 
 
 24 S. W. 511; People v. Ah Sing, 59 
 Cal. 400; People v. Titherington, 59 
 Cal. 598; People v. Cline, 74 Cal. 575, 
 16 Pac. 391 ; State v. Frahm, 7^ Iowa 
 .355, 35 N. W. 451; State v. Rivers, 
 68 Iowa 6ri, 27 N. W. 781; People 
 v. Wood, 99 Mich. 620, 58 N. W. 638; 
 Stuart V. People, 42 Mich. 255. 3 N. 
 W. 863; State V. Moore, 117 Mo. 395, 
 22 S. W. T086; Brooks v. State, 96 
 Ga. 353, 23 S. E. 413 ; State v. Rights, 
 82 N. Car. 6/5, 678; Methard v. 
 State, 19 Ohio St. 363; Davis v. 
 State, 76 Ga. 16; State v. Raymond, 
 46 Conn. 345; Magee v. People, 139 
 111. 138, 28 N. E. 1077; Gravely v. 
 Commonwealth, 86 Va. 396, 401, 403, 
 10 S. E. 431 ; Wright v. Common- 
 wealth, 82 Va. 183, 188; Ryan v. 
 State, 83 Wis. 486, 53 N. W. 836; 
 Davis V. People, i Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 447, 452; Sahlinger v. People, 102 111. 
 241; Hays v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. iii, 
 TOO S. W. 926; State v. Dale, 141 
 Mo. 284, 42 S. W. 722, 64 An St. 
 513; Lynne v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 386, 
 III S. W. 151; Johnson v. State, 52 
 Tex. Cr. 201, 107 S. W. 52; Davis v. 
 State, 45 Tex. Cr. 166, 74 S. W. 919; 
 
 Quong Yu v. Territory (Ariz., 1909), 
 100 Pac. 462; State v. Vicrck (S. 
 Dak., 1909), 120 N. W. 1098; People 
 V. King, 4 Cal. App. 213. 87 Pac. 
 400; Davidson v. State, 104 Ga. 761, 
 30 S. E. 946; Richardson v. State 
 (Tex. Cr., 1897), 42 S. W. 996; Col- 
 lier v. State, 55 Fla. 7, 45 So. 752; 
 State V. Hiillen, 133 N. Car. 656, 45 
 S. E. 513; State v. Peach, 70 Vt. 283, 
 40 Atl. 732; State V. Toohey, 203 Mo. 
 674, 102 S. W. 530; State V. Beeman, 
 51 Wash. 557, 99 Pac. 756; Cuthbert 
 V. State, 3 Ga. App. 600, 60 S. E. 
 2,22; Collier v. State, 55 Fla. 7, 45 
 So. 752; State V. Brady, 121 Iowa 
 561, 97 N. W. 62; Thompson v. State 
 (Fla.. 1909), 30 So. 507; People v. 
 Everett, 242 111. 628, 90 N. E. 226; 
 State V. Short (Del., 1909), 75 .Atl. 
 
 787. 
 
 "^ Walker v. State, 5 Ga. .App. 430, 
 63 S. E. 534. 
 
 ^^ State v. Toohey. 203 Mo. 674. 102 
 S. W. 530; Herndon v. State. 50 Tex. 
 Cr. 552, 99 S. W. 558 ; State v. Leon- 
 ard, 135 Iowa 371, ir2 N. W. 784- 
 
 "" People V. Wilson, 133 Mich. 517, 
 95 X. W. 536, 10 Det. Leg. N. 287.
 
 6s 
 
 50 
 
 OFFENSES AGAINST HUMAN HABITATIONS. 
 
 ^ 379 
 
 his explanation is reasonable and probable, he should be ac- 
 quitted.''' 
 
 ij 379. Articles stolen from the premises as evidence. — The non- 
 production in evidence of articles alleged to have been stolen, is 
 not ground for a new trial when the accused does not expressly 
 demand their production and their identity is not disputed.'"'- But 
 articles found in defendant's possession and taken from him by 
 force, which are alleged to have been taken by the burglar, may 
 if identified by the owner,''^ or by some other witness, and, it 
 seems, where the evidence of identity is contradictory,"* be in- 
 spected by the jury.**^ • A witness may testify that merchandise 
 purchased by him from the accused was of the same character as 
 a sample shown him in court on making an examination and com- 
 parison."** The jury may compare articles of wearing apparel 
 worn by the defendant when arrested with clothing belonging to 
 
 *" See cases in note 57, also, Gather 
 V. State (Tex. Cr., 1904), 8r S. W. 
 717; Lovelace v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 
 261, 76 S. W. 756; Hays v. State, 30 
 Tex. App. 472, 17 S. W. 1063 ; Mor- 
 gan V. State, 25 Tex. App. 513, 8 S. 
 W. 487; Field V. State, 24 Tex. App. 
 422, 6 S. W. 200; Jackson v. State, 
 28 Tex. App. 143, 12 S. W. 701 ; 
 State V. Owsley, 11 1 Mo. 450, 20 S. 
 W. 194; Payne v. State, 21 Tex. App. 
 184, 17 S. W. 463; autc, § 378, et scq. 
 Possession of stolen goods, though 
 unexplained and exclusive, has no 
 weight as evidence if not recent or 
 proved after the offense. Whether 
 possession is recent depends on the 
 circumstances of each case and is 
 usually for the jury, though, in ex- 
 ceptional cases, the evidence may so 
 preponderate that the court may de- 
 cide. White V. State, 72 .Ma. 195. 
 Where a party charged with l)reak- 
 ing and entering a building with in- 
 tent to steal is found in possession 
 
 of goods recent!}' stolen gives a rea- 
 sonable and credible account of how 
 he came into such possession, or an 
 account which will raise a reasonable 
 doubt, the state must prove that such 
 account is untrue ; otherwise he 
 should be acquitted; but, if the ac- 
 count, though reasonable, is not 
 credible, the jury have a right to 
 convict, though the state puts in no 
 proof directly to prove the falsity of 
 the account given. Collier v. State, 
 55 Fla. 7, 45 So. 752. 
 
 "■Johnson v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 15 S. W. 671. 12 Ky. L. S7i- 
 
 "'Walker v. State, 97 Ala. 85, 12 
 So. 83; Barnett v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 
 538, 99 S. W. 556. 
 
 "* Jackson v. State, 28 Tex. App. 
 370, 13 S. W. 451, 19 Am. St. 839; 
 State V. Groiiing, t,;^ Kan. 18, 21, 5 
 Pac. 446. 
 
 '"* See ante, § 47. 
 
 '"Stevens v. State (Tex. Cr., 190^)). 
 95 S. W. 505.
 
 § 379 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 656 
 
 an inmate of the building which was entered, where a striking 
 similarity in style and numbers renders them relevant."" 
 
 A failure to prove any particular walue for the goods may be 
 cured by their production in court and tlieir examination by the 
 jur}', who may take judicial notice thereby of the value of the 
 goods.'''* 
 
 Property brought from the building entered at the time of the 
 trial is admissible to identify similar property found in the de- 
 fendant's house."'"* 
 
 "'Woodruff V. State (Tex., 1891), ""People v. Van Dam, 107 Mich. 
 20 S. W. 573. 425, 65 N. W. 277. 
 
 ** State V. Peach, 70 Vt. 283, 40 Atl. 
 72,2.
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES. 
 
 § 380. Adultery and fornication — De- § 395. 
 fined and distinguished. 396. 
 
 381. Evidence to prove the inter- 
 course — Acts of aduhery 397. 
 other than that charged. 
 
 SS2. Competency of accomplice. 
 
 383. Character of evidence to prove 398. 
 
 the fact of marriage. 
 
 384. Lascivious cohabitation or liv- 
 
 ing in unlawful cohabitation. 399. 
 
 385. Seduction defined. 
 
 386. The sexual intercourse — Rele- 400. 
 
 vancy of evidence. 
 
 387. Evidence to prove the prom- 401. 
 
 ises. 402. 
 
 3S8. Relevancy of the previous con- 
 duct of the parties. 403. 
 
 389. The examination, credibility 
 
 and corroboration of the 
 prosecutrix. 404. 
 
 390. Character of corroborative evi- 
 
 dence required. 
 
 391. The marriage of the accused to 
 
 the seduced female. 
 
 392. The chastity of the female — 405. 
 
 What constitutes chastity 
 and how it may be proved. 
 
 393- The presumption of chastity. 
 
 394. Defilement of female ward or 406. 
 servant. 
 
 Incest defined. 
 
 Evidence to show the sexual 
 intercourse. 
 
 The kinship existing between 
 the parties — Evidence of ac- 
 complices. 
 
 Bigamy — The intent — Invalid- 
 ity or annulment of former 
 marriage. 
 
 Presumption and proof of 
 death of spouse. 
 
 Competency of wife of ac- 
 cused. 
 
 Absence of lawful spouse. 
 
 Proof of marriage by eye-wit- 
 ness or certificate. 
 
 Proof of marriage by reputa- 
 tion, cohabitation and con- 
 duct. 
 
 The admissions of the accused 
 as evidence to prove the 
 marriage — Primary evidence 
 of the ceremony — When re- 
 quired. 
 
 Marriage certificates and tran- 
 scripts of records as evidence 
 — Presumption of validity — 
 Venue. 
 
 Bigamous cohabitation. 
 
 § 380. Adultery and fornication — Defined and distinguished. — 
 l-Vjrnicalion i.s sexual intercourse between a man, married or 
 single, and an unmarried woman.' Adultery is .sexual intercour.se 
 
 'State V. Chandler, 96 Ind. 591, 593; State v. Hasty, 121 Iowa 507. 
 
 96 X. W. 1115. 
 
 42 — Undkkiiii.i. Crim. Ev. 
 
 (<^>S7)
 
 § 38i 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDIiXCE. 
 
 658 
 
 between a married i)ersoii and one of the opposite sex, whether 
 married or sinjjle." 
 
 >i 381. Evidence to prove the intercourse — Acts of adultery other 
 than that charged. — Direct evidence of the act of sexnal inter- 
 course can seldom be obtained. Proof of opportunity and inchna- 
 tion will support a con\-iction of adultery. But opportunity means 
 more than mere chance and, as evidence of inclination there must 
 be circumstances reasonably suggestive of an adulterous tendency 
 of each of the parties to the other.^ Hence, evidence of all the cir- 
 cumstances of the parties, their relations to one another, their 
 domestic and social surroundings, their acquaintance, conduct and 
 familiarity, the facts that they went out together and visited each 
 ether, and often expressed a desire to be together are relevant.* 
 Improper familiarities and adulterous acts betw^een the same 
 parties prior,^ or subsequent to," the act charged, but not too re- 
 
 • Aliner v. People. 58 111. 59; State 
 v. Fellows, so Wis. 65, 6 N. W. 239; 
 Hood V. State, 56 Ind. 263, 271, 274, 
 26 Am. 2in; Helfrich v. Common- 
 wealth, 3S Pa. St. 68, 75 Am. Dec. 
 579; Cook V. State, 11 Ga. 53, 56 Am. 
 Dec. 410; State v. Wilson, 22 Iowa 
 364; State V. Donovan, 61 Iowa 278, 
 16 N. W. 130; State v. Clark, 54 N. 
 H. 456; White V. State, 74 Ala. 31; 
 State V. Taylor, 58 X. H. 331; 
 Walker v. State, 104 Ala. 56, 16 So. 
 7; Banks v. State, 96 Ala. 78, 11 So. 
 404; State V. Anderson (Iowa, 1908), 
 118 N. W. 772. As to mistake of 
 fact under which a man marries and 
 cohabits with a woman married to 
 another, see State v. Andette, 81 Vt. 
 400, 70 Atl. 833. 
 
 •■'Till V. State, 132 Wis. 242. iii X. 
 W. 1 109; State V. Thompson, 134 
 Iowa 25, III N. W. 328. See also, 
 Elliott Evidence, §§ 2790, 2791, 2792, 
 2793, 2794. Proof not limited as to 
 time and place, see Elliott Evidence, 
 § 2796; relation as to single act. 
 S 2797. Proof of corpus delicti in 
 adulterj', see 68 L. R. A. 44, note. 
 
 Evidence of other crimes in prose- 
 cution for criminal offenses, see 6j 
 L. R. A. 193, note; 105 Am. St. 1003. 
 note. Evidence of character of hus- 
 band or wife, see 14 L. R. A. (X. S.) 
 749, note. 
 
 * State V. Brecht, 41 Minn. 50, 55. 
 42 N. W. 602; People v. Girdler. 65 
 Mich. 68, 31 X. W. 624; Starke v. 
 State, 97 Ga. 193, 23 S. E. 832; State 
 V. Ean, 90 Iowa 534, 58 N. W. 898; 
 State V. Brink, 68 Vt. 659, 35 .-Ktl. 
 492; Coons V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 256, 
 91 S. W. 1085; Palmer v. State (Ala., 
 1909), 51 So. 358; State V. Baker 
 (Iowa, 1910), 125 X. W. 659.' 
 
 ^' Cross V. State, 78 Ala. 430, 433 : 
 People V. Jenness, 5 Mich. 305, 322, 
 324; Brevaldo v. State, 21 Fla. 789; 
 State V. Cannon, 72 X. J. L. 46, 60 
 Atl. 177; Xobles V. State, 127 Ga. 
 212, 56 S. E. 125 ; Coons v. State, 49 
 Tex. Cr. 256, 91 S. W. 1085; Radford 
 V. State (Ga. .-^pp., 1910), 67 S. E. 
 707. See also, § 388. 
 
 "State V. Stubbs, 108 X. Car. 774- 
 r3 S. E. 90: Coons v. State, 49 Tex. 
 Cr. 256, 91 S. W. 1085; Hill V. State,
 
 659 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES. 
 
 § 382 
 
 mote,' or, if remote, connected with it so as to form a part of a 
 continuous course of conduct, may be shown for the purpose of 
 bringing out the relations and adulterous disposition of the de- 
 fendant.^ 
 
 § 382. Competency of accomplice. — The party with wdiom the 
 adultery was committed is always a competent witness," though, 
 as he or she is an accomplice,^" a conviction may not be had upon 
 his or her uncorroborated testimony, ^^ nor is her confession ad- 
 missible against the accused unless connected with his.^" Her un- 
 chastity is immaterial, but evidence to show her previous bad 
 character, as, for example, that she was a prostitute, has been re- 
 
 137 Ala. 66, 34 So. 406; State v. 
 Brown (Iowa, 1909), 121 N. W. 513. 
 
 ' People V. Hendrickson, 53 Mich. 
 525. 526, 19 N. W. 169; State v. Eg- 
 gleston, 45 Ore. 346, TJ Pac. 738. 
 
 * State V. Witham, 72 Me. 531 ; 
 Owens V. State, 94 Ala. 97, 10 So. 
 669; State V. Henderson, 84 Iowa 
 161, so N. W. 758: State v. Briggs, 
 68 Iowa 416, 423, 2-j N. W. 358; 
 State V. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202, 24 
 Am. 124; State v. Marvin, 35 N. H. 
 22; Bodiford v. State, 86 Ala. 67, 5 
 So. 559, II Am. St. 20; Common- 
 wealth V. Nichols, 114 Mass. 285, 288, 
 19 Am. 346n ; State v. Potter, 52 Vt. 
 33 ; Commonwealth v. Merriam, 14 
 Pick. (Mass.) 518, 520, 25 \m. Dec. 
 420n ; Commonwealth v. Morris, i 
 Ciish. (Mass.) 391, 394; Common- 
 wealth V. Lahey, 14 Gray (Mass.) 
 91, 93; Richardson v. State, 37 Tex. 
 346; Cole V. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 239: State V. Way, 5 Neb. 283; Searls 
 V. People, 13 III. 597. Cf. State v. 
 Donovan, 61 Iowa 278, 282, 16 N. W. 
 130. In the case of an indictment 
 for such intercourse, previous famil- 
 iarity, and the general or hal)itual 
 submission of the female to his sex- 
 ual embraces, must, in the nature of 
 things, tend to render it more prob- 
 able that like intercourse took place 
 
 on the occasion charged. Such is the 
 force and ungovernable nature of 
 this passion, and so likely is its in- 
 dulgence to be continued between the 
 same parties, when once yielded to, 
 that the constitution of the human 
 mind must be entirely changed l)c- 
 fore any man's judgment can resist 
 the force of such an inference to bo 
 drawn from previous acts of inter- 
 course. People V. Jenness, 5 Mich. 
 30s, 322. 
 
 ° State V. Colby, 51 Vt. 291 ; State 
 V. Crowley, 13 Ala. 172; Garland v. 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. 643, 104 S. W. 898. 
 
 "State V. Scott, 28 Ore. 331, 42 
 Pac. I ; Jackson v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 
 220, loi S. W. 807; Howe V. State, 
 SI Tex. Cr. 174, 102 S. W. 409, q8 
 .Am. St. 179, note. 
 
 " People V. Hendrickson, 53 Mich. 
 525, 19 N. W. 169; Jackson v. State, 
 51 Tex. Cr. 220, loi S. W. 807; 
 Powell v. State (Tex., 1898), 44 S. 
 W. 504; Palmer v. State (Ala., 19a)), 
 51 So. 358; State v. Brown (Iowa, 
 1910), 124 N. W. 899; Blue V. State 
 (Xcb., 1910), 125 .\". \V. 136; State 
 V. Walsh (S. I)., 1910), 125 N. W. 
 ^295. But compare State v. Atiiey, 133 
 Iowa 382, 108 N. W. 224. 
 
 "Stale V. Minis, 39 S. Car. 557. 1; 
 S. IC. 850.
 
 § 3S3 
 
 CRI M I X A L EMDE X (^K. 
 
 660 
 
 ccived to show the i)iohabiHty of the intercourse." In the absence 
 of a statute requiring a prosecution to be commenced on the com- 
 plaint of the husband or wife/^ this fact need not be sliown,'"' 
 nor tliat an a(hiherous cohabitation continued (huMug all the 
 l)eriod as charged, if it existed during any portion of the ])criod.^'^ 
 
 ;< 383. Character of evidence to prove the fact of marriage. — It 
 must be proved that one of the parties to the adultery was married 
 at the time.^^ A much stricter degree of proof is required to show 
 marriage in criminal proceedings than will suffice in a civil trial. ^'* 
 Often by statute the marriage certificate is made prima facie evi- 
 dence of the marriage. Such a statute does not, by implication 
 alone, exclude other proof/" and the introduction of the certifi- 
 cate must always be supplemented by some evidence from which 
 the jury may identify the party named therein as the accused."" 
 
 • " Commonwealth v. Gray, 129 
 Mass. 474, 476, 37 Am. 378; United 
 States V. Bredemeyer, 6 Utah 143, 22 
 Pac. no; State v. Eggleston, 45 Ore. 
 346, 77 Pac. 738; Sutton v. State, 124 
 Ga. 815, 53 S. E. 381. 
 
 " State V. Stout, 71 Iowa 343, 32 
 N. W. 372; State v. Andrews, 95 
 Iowa 451, 64 N. W. 404; State v. 
 Wesie, 17 N. Dak. 567, 118 N. W. 20; 
 State V. Clemenson, 123 Iowa 524, 99 
 X. W. 139. 
 
 '^ State V. Brecht, 41 Minn. 50, 42 
 N. W. 602; State v. Harmann, 135 
 Iowa 167, 112 N. W. 632. 
 
 '"Bailey v. State, 36 Xeb. 808, 55 
 X. W. 241. 
 
 " Banks v. State, 96 Ala. 78, 11 So. 
 404; Tison V. State, 125 Ga. 7, 53 S. 
 E. 809; Elliott V. State, 125 Ga. 31, 
 53 S. E. 809, holding that on a failure 
 to prove marriage the verdict must 
 be set aside. See Elliott Evidence, 
 § 2798. 
 
 '* See post, §§ 402-405. The bur- 
 den of proof of marriage is on the 
 prosecution. Zackery v. State, 6 Ga. 
 App. 125, 64 S. E. 281. Method 
 of proving, see Elliott Evidence, 
 
 § 2799 ; proof by record, § 2800 ; 
 proof of marriage — prima facie case, 
 § 2803. 
 
 '° People V. Stokes, 71 Gal. 263, 12 
 Pac. 71; Thomas v. State (Tex.), 
 26 S. W. 724; State V. Clark, 54 X. 
 H. 456, 560. 
 
 "" State V. Brink, 68 Vt. 659, 35 Atl. 
 492; People V. Broughton, 49 Mich. 
 339, 340, 13 X. W. 621 ; State v. 
 Brecht, 41 Minn. 50, 53, 42 X. W. 
 602 ; Wedgwood's Case, 8 Me. 75 ; 
 People V. Isham, 109 Mich. 72, 67 X. 
 \V. 819. In a prosecution for adul- 
 tery the husband or wife of the de- 
 fendant cannot testify for the state 
 as to her marriage to, or cohabita- 
 tion with, him or her. People v. 
 Isham, 109 Mich. 72, 67 X. W. 819; 
 People V. Imes, no Mich. 250, 68 X. 
 W. 157; State V. Russell, 90 Iowa 
 569, 58 X. W. 915; State V. Vollan- 
 der, 57 Minn. 225, 58 X. W. 878; 
 Commonwealth v. Sparks, 7 Allen 
 (Mass.) 534, 535, 536; State v. 
 Welch, 26 Me. 30, 45 Am. Dec. 94; 
 State V. Gardner, i Root (Conn.) 
 485; State V. Berlin, 42 Mo. 572, 577. 
 See ante, § 186.
 
 66i 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES. 
 
 O^v) 
 
 Ihe certificate should show a ceremony performed by a duly au- 
 thorized official. He will be presumed to have acted within the 
 scope of his authority.-^ But the certificate is not conclusive of 
 all facts necessary to constitute a valid marriage. Thus, if it 
 appears that one of the parties \vas under age, ratification must 
 be shown.-- The certificate is not the best evidence, even when 
 admissible by statute."" The ceremony may be proved by the 
 testimony of any one who was present and saw it performed.-* 
 But it is not enough that he shall testify that he saw a ceremony 
 performed by some one. He ought to be able to testify that all 
 the circumstances were such as to apparently constitute a legal 
 marriage ceremony.-' Despite some uncertainty in the early cases, 
 it is now well settled that the marriage of the accused may be 
 proved by his admissions, oral or in writing. But his statement 
 that he is married, to be admissible, must have been made vol- 
 untarily and with deliberation.-*' 
 
 A lawful marriage, when proved, will be presumed to continue 
 until the contrary is shown. The fact that the marriage was void, 
 or had been terminated by death, divorce or otherwise, is always 
 relevant in adultery.'^ 
 
 '' State V. Clark, 54 X. H. 456, 459. 
 
 - People V. Bennett, 39 Mich. 208, 
 209. 
 
 ^ State V. Marvin, 35 X. H. 22, 27, 
 2 Grcenl. on Ev., § 461, i Phil. Ev., 
 410. 
 
 " State V. Clark, 54 X. H. 456, 560 ; 
 Owens V. State, 94 Ala. 97, 10 So. 
 669: Commonwealth v. Littlejohn, 15 
 Mass. 163 : Commonwealth v. Morris. 
 I Cush. (Mass.) 391, 394: Chew v. 
 State, 23 Te.\. App. 230. 5 S. W. 373. 
 Some of the cases hold that an eye- 
 witness, if living, must be produced. 
 Commonwealth v. Xorcross. 9 Mass. 
 492, 493 ; Wood V. State, 48 Ga. 192, 
 15 -Am. 664; P.uchanan v. State, 55 
 -Ma. 154; Elliott I'.videncc. § 2801. 
 
 ° State V. lloflgskins, 19 Mo. 155. 
 157. 3^> Am. Dec. 742n. 
 
 "People V. Imcs, no Mich. 250, M 
 X. W. 157: Ham's Case. 11 Me. 391, 
 396; State V. Ilod^skins, 19 .Me. 155, 
 
 157. 36 Am. Dec. 742n ; State v. 
 Libby, 44 Me. 469, 69 Am. Dec. 115; 
 State V. Medbury, 8 R. I. 543; Com- 
 monwealth V. Holt, 121 Mass. 61 ; 
 State V. Still, 68 S. Car. 37, 46 S. E. 
 524. 102 Am. St. 657; State v. Moore 
 (Utah, 1909), 105 Fac. 293. A photo- 
 graph of the defendant, with an in- 
 dorsement in his handwriting "from 
 your dear husband," has been received 
 as an admission. State v. Rehrman, 
 114 X. Car. 797, 19 S. E. 220, 25 L. 
 R. A. 44911. See Elliott Evidence, 
 § 2802. 
 
 "Banks v. State. 96 Ala. 78. ri .So. 
 404. The liurden to show this is 
 upon the defendant. People v. 
 Stokes, 71 Cal. 263. 12 Pac. 71 ; 
 State V. Weatherby. 43 Me. 258. 263, 
 69 .\m. Dec. 59. The intermarriage 
 (if the parties to tlu' adultery will 
 not be i)resume<I. If they are jointly 
 indicted the burden of proving their
 
 § 384 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 662 
 
 § 384. Lascivious cohabitation or living in unlawful cohabitation. 
 — It must appear that the parties lived together openly and 
 notoriously as though husband and wife. The crime of living in 
 adultery must of necessity be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
 The mere fact that the parties lived together in one house or 
 were guilty of a single act, or even of several acts, of adultery,-' 
 is not enough."" They must live together, if only for a short 
 time, as for a single day,-"^ as though the marriage relation ex- 
 isted, and the evidence must be such that a continuance in adultery 
 may be inferred.^" There need not be direct proof of even a single 
 act of adultery. The crime is sufficiently proved by showing cir- 
 cumstances which will raise the presumption of an unlawful inti- 
 macy, and the continuance of sexual and adulterous intercourse.^' 
 Thus it may be shown that the defendant and the paramour were 
 living together in the same dwelling, that the woman cooked the 
 meals and performed the usual household duties of a wife, that 
 accused paid the living expenses,^- that both ate at the same table 
 and occupied the same room, that their clothing was mingled in 
 
 intermarriage is upon them, as it is 
 a fact peculiarly within their own 
 knowledge. State v. McDuffie, 107 
 X. Car. 885, 12 S. E. 83; State v. 
 Pope, 109 N. Car. 849, 13 S. E. 700. 
 As it is the sexual intercourse rather 
 than the intent or knowledge with 
 which it is accompanied that consti- 
 tutes the crime, it is not necessary 
 to prove that the accused did or did 
 not know that the other party was 
 married. Fox v. State, 3 Tex. App. 
 329, 30 Am. 144. Invalid divorce no 
 defense, see Elliott Evidence, § 2805. 
 
 ^ State V. Cassida, 67 Kan. 171, 72 
 Pac. 522. 
 
 ^ As master and servant not suf- 
 ficient. Boswell v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 
 47, 85 S. W. 1076, 122 Am. St. 731. 
 
 ^a Alpine v. State, 117 Ala. 93, 23 
 So. 130 (intending to continue the 
 relation). 
 
 ^ State V. Chandler, 132 Mo. 155, 33 
 S. W. 797; State V. Chandler, 96 
 Ind. 591, 593; Wright v. State, 108 
 Ala. 60, 18 So. 941 ; State v. Miller, 
 
 42 W. Va. 215, 24 S. E. 882; Schou- 
 del V. State, 57 N. J. L. 209, 30 Atl. 
 598; State V. Cassida, 67 Kan. 171, 
 72 Pac. 522; Collins v. State, 46 Tex. 
 Cr. 550, 80 S. W. 372. See Shaw v. 
 State, 49 Tex. Cr. 379, 91 S. W. 
 1087; State v. Poyner (Wash., 1910), 
 107 Pac. 181. See Elliott Evidence, 
 § 2795. 
 
 ^ Brown v. State, 108 Ala. 18, 18 
 So. 8ti; Searls v. People, 13 111. 597; 
 Richardson v. State, 37 Tex. 346; 
 Pruner v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 115, 
 10 Va. L. J. 520; Cranberry v. State, 
 61 Miss. 440; State v. Chandler, 96 
 Ind. 591, 593; Jackson v. State, it6 
 Ind. 464, 465, 19 N. E. 330; People 
 V. Gates, 46 Cal. 52; Van Dolsen v. 
 State, I Ind. App. 108, no; Bird v. 
 State, 27 Tex. App. 63S, n S. W. 
 641, II Am. St. 214; Kahn v. State 
 (Tex., 1897), 38 S. W. 989; Counts 
 V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 329, 94 S. W. 
 220. 
 
 ''Hill V. State, 137 Ala. 66, 34 So. 
 406.
 
 663 
 
 SEXL'AL CRIMES. 
 
 § 385 
 
 the wardrobe, that there was but one bed in the house, and that 
 each spoke of the other as though the marriage relation existed 
 between them. 
 
 § 385. Seduction defined. — Seduction may be defined as the per- 
 suading or inducing a woman of previous chaste character to 
 depart from the path of virtue by an}- species of arts, persuasions 
 or wiles which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and 
 which- result in her ultimately submitting to the sexual embrace 
 of the accused. ^^ 
 
 § 386. The sexual intercourse — Relevancy of evidence. — The sex- 
 ual intercourse must be proved, and, if it is proved, the accused 
 may be convicted of adultery, though a promise be not proved.^* 
 Any evidence admissible to prove adultery may be received. The 
 time the parties were together, the particular places they visited, 
 and their opportunities to indulge in intercourse without detec- 
 tion are all relevant. ^^ The record of a conviction of bastardy 
 secured by the prosecutrix against the defendant is not admissible 
 on his subsequent trial for seduction. It is in no way res adjitdi- 
 cata as to any issue involved. ^^ But proof of the birth of a child 
 
 ^ People V. Gibbs, 70 Mich. 425, 
 430, 38 N. W. 257, 260; People v. De 
 Fore, 64 Mich. 693, 699, 31 X. W. 
 585, 8 Am. St. 86311. "Where con- 
 sent is given, pending a virtuous en- 
 gagement, in consequence of a repeti- 
 tion of a promise to marry already 
 made and accepted, the woman yield- 
 ing in reliance on the plighted faith 
 of her lover, and he intending that 
 she shall trust and be deceived, the 
 case is one of seduction." Wilson 
 V. State, 58 Ga. 328, 331. 
 
 '* Dinkey v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa. 
 St. 126, 129, 55 .'Xm. Dec. 542; Nich- 
 olson V. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 
 .390, 392; Hopper V. State, 54 Ga. 
 389: Disharoon v. State, 95 Ga. 351, 
 22 S. E. 698. 
 
 "^ Bailey v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 540, 
 38 S. W. 185; ante, § 381. Res gestce 
 
 in prosecution for seduction, Elliott 
 Evidence, § 3149; circumstantial evi- 
 dence in prosecution for seduction, 
 § 3153; admission, § 3150; burden of 
 proof, § 3142; question of law and 
 fact, § 3144. 
 
 ^ State V. Wenz, 41 Minn. 196, 197, 
 42 N. W. 933. It is not proper to 
 permit the prosecution to exhibit a 
 very young infant to the jury, as di- 
 rectly relevant to prove the guilt of the 
 accused, charged with either seduction 
 or rape, or merely to corroborate the 
 prosecutrix, because of a supposed 
 resemblance between the child and 
 accused. State v. Dan forth, 48 Iowa 
 43, 30 Am. 387. See also, Hanawalt 
 V. State, 64 Wis. 84, 24 N. W. 489. 
 54 Am. 588; Risk v. State, 19 Ind. 
 152: Reitz V. State, 33 Ind. 187; 
 Barnes v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 320, 39
 
 ^ 3^7 
 
 CRIMINAL EMDKXCE. 
 
 664 
 
 to the prosecutrix is some exidcncc and may be shown by the evi- 
 dence of the prosecutrix to corroborate her testimony.^' 
 
 .^ 387. Evidence to prove the promise. — Tlie sexual intercourse is 
 an essential element of the seduction, and must always be proved 
 beyond a reasonable doubt. But mere illicit sexual intercourse 
 alone does not constitute seduction."''^ It must appear that it was 
 procured by some artifice, deception or promise, usually an un- 
 conditional promise of marriage, and that it was solely because 
 of this promise that the female was induced to surrender her 
 \irtue.""'^ What cxidence will justify the jury in finding that the 
 
 S. W. 684. But in State v. Horton, 
 100 X. Car. 443, 449, 6 S. E. 238, 6 
 Am. St. 613, it was held that a child 
 might be exhiliited to the jury to 
 prove the sexual intercourse. The 
 exact date of the intercourse is im- 
 material. State V. Moore, 78 Iowa 
 494, 43 N. W. 273; State v. AlcClin- 
 tic, 7S Iowa 663, 665, 35 X. W. 696; 
 State V. Deitrick, 51 Iowa 467, 472, i 
 X. W. 732. 
 
 ^ State V. Xugent, 134 Iowa 2^~, 
 III N. W. 927. 
 
 ^ People V. Gumacr, 4 App. Div. 
 (X. Y.) 412, 39 X. Y. S. 326. 
 
 ^ State V. Knutson, 91 Iowa 549, 
 60 X. W. 129; State V. Lingle, 128 
 ^lo. 528, 31 S. W. 20; State v. 
 Crowell, 116 X. Car. 1052, 21 S. E. 
 502; Smith V. State, 107 Ala. 139, 18 
 So. 306; Anderson v. State, 104 Ala. 
 83, 16 So. 108; Powell V. State 
 (Miss., 1896), 20 So. 4; State v. 
 Sharp, 132 Mo. 165, 33 S. W. 795; 
 Barnes v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 320, 39 
 S. W. 684; People V. De Fore, 64 
 Mich. 693, 31 X. W. 585, 8 Am. St. 
 863n ; State v. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa 
 268, 270, 19 X. W. 202; State V. 
 Hemm, 82 Iowa 609, 616, 48 X. W. 
 971; People V. Clark, 33 Mich. 112; 
 State V. Heatherton, 60 Iowa 175, 14 
 X. W. 230; People V. Kane, 14 Abb. 
 
 Pr. (X. Y.) 15; Carnc.v v. State, 79 
 Ala. 14; Phillips v. State, 108 Ind. 
 406, 9 X. E. 345; Bowers v. State, 29 
 Ohio St. 542, 546; Spenrath v. State 
 (Tex. Cr., 1898), 48 S. W. 192; Wal- 
 ton V. State, 71 Ark. 398, 75 S. W. 
 I ; State v. Sortviet, 100 Minn. 12, 
 no X. W. 100; Xeary v. People, 115 
 111. App. 157; Simmons v. State, 54 
 Tex. Cr. 619, T14 S. W. 841: State 
 V. Attcrbury, 59 Kan. 237. 52 Pac. 
 451 ; Xolan v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 436, 
 88 S. W. 242; Howe v. State, 51 Tex. 
 Cr. 174, 102 S. W. 409. The promise 
 of marriage must, according to the 
 majority of the cases, be an uncon- 
 ditional promise, and must be made 
 under such circumstances that the 
 one to whom it was made might 
 reasonably rely on it. Russell v. 
 State, 77 Xeb. 519, no X. W. 380. 
 To establish the charge of seduction 
 it must be made to appear that the 
 intercourse was accomplished by 
 some artifice. Something more than 
 an appeal to lust or passion must be 
 proved. State v. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa 
 268, 19 X. W. 202; Powell V. State 
 (Miss., 1896), 20 So. 4. See Elliott 
 Evidence, § 3148. Circumstantial evi- 
 dence to prove seduction, see Elliott 
 Evidence, § 3151 ; presumptions in 
 prosecution for seduction, § 3143.
 
 665 SEXUAL CRIMES. § 388 
 
 intercourse was procured by a promise depends on the circum- 
 stances of each case.^" The evidence to proxe the making of a 
 promise or of the employment of an artifice which was the in- 
 chicement for the sexual intercourse must necessarily take a wide 
 range. ^^ 
 
 The promise to marry need not be proved to have been made in 
 any particular form of words. It is enough if language has been 
 used implying such a promise, intended to convey that meaning, 
 and it is so understood by the woman.*- An express promise to 
 marry need not be proved for a conviction will be sustained, if 
 from all the evidence the jury can fairly infer that the seduction 
 was accomplished b}^ reason of the promise, gixing the accused the 
 benefit of any reasonable doubt. ■*^ The character and intelli- 
 gence of the woman must be considered. \\'hat might be insuf- 
 ficient to overcome or deceive the mind of a mature and edu- 
 cated woman might succeed in the case of a young and ignorant 
 girl.''* The prosecuting witness may be permitted to testify that 
 she submitted her person to the embraces of the accused because 
 of his promise to marry her.'*^ 
 
 ^ 388. Relevancy of the previous conduct of the parties. — The 
 conduct of the parties prior to the alleged seduction, their rela- 
 tions toward one another, the fact that the accused was accus- 
 tomed to visit the woman as her lover, was welcomed by her 
 mother at her house and was treated well,*" or met her clan- 
 Testimony of accomplice in prosecu- 406, 9 N. E. 345 ; Woodward v. State, 
 tion for seduction, see 98 Am. St. 5 Ga. App. 447, 63 S. E. 573; State 
 179, note. Character of victim of v. Stolley, 121 Iowa iii, 96 N. W. 
 crime, see 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 727, 707. 
 note. *- State v. Brinkhaus, 34 Minn. 285, 
 
 '"People V. Wallace, 109 Cal. 611, 286, 25 N. W. 642. 
 42 Pac. 159, and cases in last note. '"State v. Ring, 142 N. Car. 596, 55 
 Knight V. State, 147 Ala. 93, 41 So. S. E. 194, 115 Am. St. 759. 
 S50. r 19 Am. St. 58. It is not material " State v. EitzRcrald, 63 Iowa 26S, 
 that the promise was made previous 270, 19 N. W. 202. 
 to the time of the seduction. State ** State v. Rcnnctt, 137 Iowa 427, 
 V. Raynor, 145 N. Car. 472, 59 S. E. no X. W. 150; State v. Raynor, 145 
 344- ^'- Car. 472, 59 S. E. 344; State v. 
 
 " State V. Sharp, 132 Mo. 165, 33 Whitley, 141 X. Car. S2T;. 53 S. E. 
 S. W. 795; People V. Kane, 14 Abb. 820. 
 
 Pr. ex. 'y.) 15; Carney v. State, 79 *" Howe v. Slate. 51 Te.\. Cr. 174. 
 Ala. 14; Phillips v. State, 108 Ind. 102 S. W. 409.
 
 § 388 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 666 
 
 (leslinely, and kept company with her;'" that he expressed a pref- 
 erence for her society, and said he intended to have sexual inter- 
 course with her,*"* or boasted that he had enjoyed sexual favors 
 at her hands,""' or that he intended to marry her,"'" that she ex- 
 pected he would marry her and that the day had been fixed, ''^ are 
 always relevant." 
 
 So, to corroborate the woman's evidence, it may be shown that 
 the demeanor of the parties was that of an engaged couple and 
 that it was admitted by them, and currently reported among 
 their friends and acquaintances that they were engaged. The 
 declarations of the accused to the effect that he loved the woman 
 and wanted or intended to marry her are always relevant to cor- 
 roborate her testimony."'" The fact that the woman had made 
 preparations for the celebration of the marriage is relevant. On 
 the other hand evidence of i)rior acts of intercourse is admissible 
 to sliow that the act charged was not under a promise of mar- 
 riage.^'* 
 
 The conduct and relations of tlie parties after, as well as before, 
 the date of the alleged seduction, may be shown. Such evidence 
 is relevant to sliow tliat consent was obtained by promises and in- 
 ducements and wliat they consisted of.^"' So a promise of mar- 
 
 " State V. McCIintic, 72) Iowa 663, to complaints by the prosecuting wit- 
 
 665, 35 N. W. 696 ; Faulkner v. State, ness to her mother. State v. Whit- 
 
 53 Tex. Cr. 258, 109 S. W. 199. ley, 141 N. Car. 823, 53 S. E. 820. 
 
 ** Bailey v. State (Tex.), 30 S. W. "" Weaver v. State, 142 Ala. 2,3^ 39 
 
 669. So. 341. 
 
 " State V. Hill, 91 Mo. 423, 4 S. W. " Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542, 
 
 121. 546; State V. Brassfield, 81 Mo. 151, 
 
 ■■'"Munkers v. State, 87 Ala. 94, 97, 159, 51 Am. 234. 
 
 6 So. 357. "State v. Curran, 51 Iowa 112, 49 
 
 "Faulkner v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. X. W. 1006; People v. Gibbs, 70 
 
 258, 109 S. W. 199. Mich. 425, 38 N. W. 257, 260; People 
 
 "The declarations of the prosecut- v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112, 114; Bracken 
 
 ing witness are not receivable to in- v. State, iii Ala. 68, 20 So. 636, 56 
 
 criminate the defendant unless they Am. St. 23. The promise may be 
 
 are a part of the res f/cstcr or were very properly proved by the written 
 
 made in his presence and were not admission of the defendant con- 
 
 contradicted by him. State v. Sibley, tained in a letter sent by him to the 
 
 131 Mo. 519, 3S S. W. 167; State v. prosecutrix, expressly mentioning the 
 
 Bennett, 137 Iowa 427, no N. W. engagement as existing. Webb v. 
 
 150; Fine v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 290, State (Miss., 1897), 21 So. I33- 
 77 S. W. 806. Compare, contra, as
 
 66/ SEXUAL CRIMES. § 389 
 
 riage made subsequently to the alleged crime but at a period when 
 tlie immoral relations between the parties continued is relevant, 
 and may be considered as a circumstance to prove the prior 
 promise/^ 
 
 ^ 389. The examination, credibility and corroboration of the prose- 
 cutrix. — From the necessity of the case, the making of the prom- 
 ise, and the sexual intercourse are usually provable by the direct 
 evidence of the female only. Her situation as a witness is pecul- 
 iar. The novelty and embarrassment of her position, the presence 
 around her of a gaping and curious crowd, the confronting with 
 court and jury, the terror produced by the examination and cross- 
 examination, the memory of her shame ever before her, all com- 
 bine to depress and confuse her. If she is a modest woman her 
 answers are likely to be in monosyllables and to present but a 
 feeble account of the manner of her seduction. Much must of 
 necessity be left to the jurors to gather from her appearance and 
 demeanor as well as from her language. In weighing her testi- 
 mony the jurors must consider her age and situation, and what 
 they would expect of their own daughters if similarly placed. 
 How many or what kind of seductive arts are necessary to estab- 
 lish the crime cannot be exactly defined. Every case must depend 
 on its own circumstances, considering the condition in life, ad- 
 vantages, age and intelligence of the parties. ^^ 
 
 ^ State V. Waterman, 75 Kan. 253, and surrender her virtue, we must in- 
 
 88 Pac. 1074. elude all acts, artifices, promises, en- 
 
 " State V. Higdon, 32 Iowa 262, ticements and inducements calculated 
 264; State V. Fitzgerald, 63 Iowa 268, to accomplish this object. All tests 
 19 X. W. 202. The prosecutrix may having any tendency to establish any 
 be asked if she authorized any one to of these should be admitted to prove 
 settle the matter for her and to take the criminal conduct. The age, ex- 
 money to dismiss it. State v. Eckler, pcrience, artfulness and blandish- 
 106 Mo. 585, 17 S. W. 814. 27 Am. mcnts of the offender, and the youth- 
 St. 372. Evidence to show a con- fulness, innocence, guilelcssness and 
 spiracy between the complainant and confiding nature of the injured party, 
 her father and mother to inveigle the will be found to enter largely into 
 defendant into a marriage, and, fail- the causes of the- act. The largest 
 ing this, to prosecute him, has been latitude, consistent with safety, 
 received. People v. Clark, 33 Mich, should be allowed in developing the 
 r[2, 119. In considering the means evidence in the case. People v. Ciibbs. 
 iiscfi to induce the woman to yield 70 Mich. 425, 428, 429, 38 N. \V. 257.
 
 ^ 390 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 668 
 
 § 390. Character of corroborative evidence required. — \\'here a 
 statute requires that the evidence of the prosecuting witness shall 
 be corroborated, it has been held sufficient if she was corroborated 
 as to some material fact or part of the case, so that the jury were 
 satisfied that her whole evidence was credible.""^ Some statutes 
 require corroboration only as regards the promise of marriage,^" 
 while elsewhere the corroboration must extend to every material 
 fact, including the promise to marry, the seductive arts or decep- 
 tion used, the chastity of tlie woman, the intercourse, and that the 
 last was the result of the promise.*'** The circumstances relied on 
 as corroboration of the evidence offered to i)rove the promise of 
 marriage must be so convincing as to equal the testimony of 
 a disinterested witness. It is absolutely essential that the corrobo- 
 rative evidence should come from some other witness than the 
 woman. ^'^ On the other hand some cases hold that the corrobora- 
 tion need not be direct or positive, or sufficient in itself to con- 
 vict."- It may consist of proof of circumstances which customarily 
 
 '* Boyce v. People, 55 X. Y. 644, 
 647; People V. Orr, 92 Hun (N. Y.) 
 199, 36 N. Y. S. 398; Wilson v. State, 
 "/S Ala. 527, 534; Tedford v. United 
 States, 7 Ind. Terr. 254, 104 S. W. 
 608. See, as to corroboration in se- 
 duction under California Penal Code, 
 § 1 108, People V. Wade, 118 Cal. 672, 
 50 Pac. 841. See Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3152. 
 
 '"' State V. Hill, 91 Mo. 423, 4 S. W. 
 121 ; State v. Reeves, 97 Mo. 668, 673, 
 ID S. W. 841, 10 Am. St. 349; Spen- 
 rath V. State (Tex. Cr., 1898), 48 S. 
 W. 192. 
 
 '"La Rosae v. State, 132 Ind. 219, 
 31 X. E. 798; State v. Bauerkemper, 
 95 Iowa 562, 64 X. W. 609; State 
 V. Timmens, 4 Minn. 325, 332 ; An- 
 dre V. State, 5 Iowa 389, 398, 68 Am. 
 Dec. 7o8n ; State v. Painter, 50 Iowa 
 317; Zabriskie v. State, 43 X. J. L. 
 640, 647, 39 Am. 610; Woolley v. 
 State, 50 Tex. Cr. 214, 96 S. W. 27 ; 
 Wisdom v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 215, 75 
 
 S. W. 22\ Burnett v. State, 76 Ark. 
 295, 88 S. W. 956; Hart v. State, 
 117 Ala. 183, 23 So. 43. 
 
 '"a Russell v. State, -/- Xeb. 519, no 
 X. W. 380. 
 
 "^ State V. Dolan, 132 Iowa 196, 109 
 X. W. 609: State V. Sortviet, 100 
 Minn. 12, no X. W. 100; People v. 
 Tibbs, 143 Cal. 100, 76 Pac. 904; 
 State V. Hill, 91 Mo. 423, 426, 4 S. 
 W. 121 : ]\IcCullar v. State, 36 Tex. 
 Cr. 213, 36 S. W. 58s; 61 Am. St. 
 847; State V. Reeves, 97 Mo. 668, 10 
 S. W. 841 ; State v. McCaskey, 104 
 Mo. 644, 16 S. W. 511, 512; Mills 
 V. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 815, 22 S. 
 E. 863 ; Cooper v. State, 90 Ala. 641, 
 642, 8 So. 821 ; Munkers v. State, 87 
 Ala. 94, 97, 6 So. 357; Barnard v. 
 State (Tex. Cr.), 76 S. W. 475- 
 
 "Wright v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 354, 
 20 S. W. 756, 2>7 Am. St. 822; State 
 V. Waterman, 75 Kan. 253, 88 Pac. 
 1074; Lasatcr v. State, 77 Ark. 468, 
 94 S. W. 59.
 
 669 SEXUAL CRIMES. § 39I 
 
 accompany a marriage engagement, such as lover-like attentions, 
 the receipt of love letters and of visits from the defendant, going 
 with him to church and to places of amusement, consultations 
 with the woman's parents and preparations for marriage, to- 
 gether with the fact that she was at that time not receiving at- 
 tentions from any other man.*'^ The proof of the admission by the 
 accused that he had promised to marry the prosecuting witness, 
 and that he had subsequently had sexual intercourse with her is 
 sufficient corroboration alone without other circumstances to sus- 
 tain a verdict of guilty when the statute requires corroboration/'* 
 \Miether the female can testify that she did or did not voluntarily 
 submit to intercourse with the defendant, or state the reason that 
 she yielded, has been differently decided. It has been held that it 
 is exclusively for the jury to determine whether the intercourse 
 \\-as brought about by the arts or promises of the man, or by the 
 ungovernable passions of the w^oman.*^^ 
 
 ;< 391. The marriage of the accused to the seduced female. — An 
 offer to marry the female seduced does not in the absence of stat- 
 ute exempt the accused from prosecution or punishment.*^® By 
 statute in many of the states if the accused makes such an offer 
 in open court and the prosecutrix declines to accept it, the charge 
 must be dismissed.*^' The state cannot be permitted to introduce 
 evidence to show the bad faith of the defendant in making the 
 
 " State V. Hill, 91 Mo. 423, 426, 4 "^ Wilson v. State, 73 Ala. 527, 532. 
 
 S. W. 121; State V. Brassfield, 81 Mo. Contra, Ferguson v. State, 71 Miss. 
 
 151, 156, 160, 51 Am. 234; State v. 805, 15 So. 66, 42 Am. St. 492. 
 
 Timmens, 4 Minn. 325, 333; State v. *' State v. Brandenburg, 118 Mo. 
 
 Crawford, 34 Iowa 40; State v. Fitz- t8i, 186, 23 S. W. 1080, 40 Am. St. 
 
 gerald, 63 Iowa 268, 272, 19 N. W. 362; State v. O'Keefe, 141 Mo. 271, 
 
 202; State V. Lauderbeck, 96 Iowa 42 S. W. 725; State v. Bauerkemper, 
 
 258, 65 X. W. 158; State V. Eisen- 95 Iowa 562, 64 N. W. 609; Williams 
 
 hour, 132 Mo. 140, 33 S. W. 785; v. State, 92 Miss. 70, 45 So. 146. 
 
 State V. Ayers, 8 S. Dak. 517, 67 N. "'Commonwealth v. Wright (Ky.), 
 
 W. 611; Bailey v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 27 S. W. 815; State v. Otis, 135 Ind. 
 
 540. 38 S. W. 185; State V. Waterman, 267, 270, 34 N. E. 954, 21 L. R. A. 
 
 75 Kan. 253, 88 Pac. 1074: Lasater v. 733; People v. Gould, 70 Mich. 240, 
 
 State, 77 Ark. 468, 94 S. W. 59; 245, 38 N. W. 232, 14 Am. St. 493n ; 
 
 Cooper V. State, 86 Ark. 30, 109 S. Wright v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 354. 20 
 
 W. 1023. S. W. 756, 37 Am. St. 822; People v. 
 
 ■■■* State V. Raynor, 145 X. Car. 472, Frost (N. Y., 1910), 91 N, E. 376. 
 59 S. E. 344; Wilhitc V. State, 84 
 Ark. 67, 104 S. W. 531.
 
 392 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 670 
 
 offer. It cannot be j^rovcd that lie had previously declared that he 
 would never live with her, or that he would leave her at the first 
 opportunity. '^•- 
 
 The state must prove that the woman was unmarried."'' 'fhi> 
 will not be presumed. She may, and perhaps should, testify to the 
 facts, or. if she is silent, it may be inferred from her extreme 
 youth, the fact that she resided in her father's house under her 
 maiden name and received the attentions of the accused and of 
 other men, and the surrounding circumstances and relations of 
 the parties,'" all of which are relevant. 
 
 § 392. The chastity of the female — What constitutes chastity and 
 how it may be proved. — Seduction is usually a statutory crime. It 
 is often provided by statute that the female must have been chaste 
 or virtuous, or of chaste character or repute previous to the inter- 
 course with the accused.'"^ It is for the court to construe the 
 meaning of these words in a statute.'^ .\s a matter of law, every 
 woman who has never been married and who is a virgin is chaste. 
 The test is usually illicit sexual intercourse.'- Whether the fe- 
 male is a virgin is always a question of fact for the jury. The 
 evidence upon this question need not be direct. Positive evidence 
 
 ■^^ People V. Gould, 70 Mich. 240, 
 245, 38 N. W. 232, 14 Am. St. 493n; 
 People V. Samonset, 97 Cal. 448, 32 
 Pac. 520; Smith v. State, 108 Ala. i, 
 19 So. 306, 54 Am. St. 140. The 
 offer of marriage ought to be made 
 to the female in person and kept 
 open until the time of the trial. La- 
 sater v. State, TJ Ark. 468, 94 S. 
 W. 59- 
 
 ""State V. Wheeler, 108 Mo. 658, 
 18 S. W. 924, 927; People V. Krusick, 
 93 Cal. 74, 28 Pac. 794; Mesa v. 
 State, 17 Tex. App. 395; State v. 
 Bryan, 34 Kan. 63, 8 Pac. 260. 
 
 '"Lewis V. People, zi Mich. 518, 
 520; Bailey v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 540, 
 38 S. W. 185; State V. Waterman, 75 
 Kan. 253, 88 Pac. 1074. 
 
 '"a Walton V. State, 71 Ark. 398, 75 
 S. W. I. 
 
 '^ Where the statute merely require 
 that the female shall be of "good re 
 pute," or "of chaste character," some 
 of the cases hold that proof of actual 
 physical chastity is not necessary. 
 State V. Sharp, 132 Mo. 165, Z2> S. W. 
 795 ; Kerr v. United States, 7 In<]. 
 T. 486, 104 S. W. 809; Woodard v. 
 State, 5 Ga. App. 447, 63 S. E. 57.^, 
 in which it was said the test of vir 
 tue within the seduction statute i- 
 whether the female had ever had a' 
 the time of the seduction unlawful 
 sexual intercourse, not purity of mind 
 or heart, but actual physical purity of 
 person. Contra, Mills v. Common- 
 wealth, 93 Va. 815, 22 S. E. 863. See 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3145. 
 
 " State V. Whitley, 141 N. Car. 82.^, 
 53 S. E. 820.
 
 6/1 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES. 
 
 39-2 
 
 of an act of sexual intercourse with a man is of course conclusive 
 evidence of unchastity.'^ Physical unchastity may also be inferred 
 from proof of indecent familiarities with men, or indecent lan- 
 guage and conduct, and, perhaps, from mere indiscretion and im- 
 proper associations.' * All the previous acts, conduct and conversa- 
 tions of the woman are received to prove or disprove her chastity, 
 if actual physical unchastity is not proved.'^ And where actual 
 chastity of the female is admitted, the moral and mental chastity 
 of the female may be relevant to enable the jury to determine 
 whether the woman, though physically chaste, was seduced, or 
 whether the intercourse was indulged in by her for the purpose of 
 gratifying her lascivious desires.'^ The facts that the prosecutrix 
 lived with her parents, relatives or guardians,'" moved in the 
 society of respectable people, and was reputed to be chaste ;"* went 
 to church and to social gatherings, are always relevant to prove 
 her actual chastity. To prove that the prosecutrix was unchaste at 
 the time of her alleged seduction her previous reputation as an 
 unchaste woman is admissible. The evidence must be strictlv 
 
 " Simmons v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 
 619. 114 S. W. 841. 
 
 "* Wood V. State, 48 Ga. 192, 289, 
 299, 15 Am. 664; O'Neill v. State, 85 
 Ga. 383, 408, II S. E. 856; State v. 
 Rell, 49 Iowa 440, 443; State v. 
 Wheeler, 94 Mo. 252, 7 S. W. T03 ; 
 Crozier v. State, i Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 
 453. 457; Barnes v. State, z-j Tex. Cr. 
 320, 39 S. W. 684; Kenyon v. People, 
 26 X. Y. 203, 207, 84 .^m. Dec. 177; 
 People V. Brewer, 27 Mich. 134, 135; 
 Powell V. State (Miss., 1896), 20 So. 
 4; People V. Nelson, 153 X. Y. 90, 
 46 X. E. 1040, 60 Am. St. 592; Sim- 
 mons V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 619, 114 
 S. W. 841; State V. Whitley, 141 X. 
 Car. ^2T,, 53 S. E. 820. Compare 
 State V. Hummer, 128 Iowa 505, 104 
 X. W. 722. 
 
 ".\nflrc V. State, 5 Iowa 389, 68 
 Am. Dec. 7o8n ; People v. McArdlc, 
 5 Park. Cr. CN. Y.) 180, 184; Nolan 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 436. 88 S. W. 
 
 242; Jeter v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 212, 
 106 S. W. 371. Specific instances to 
 prove character for chastity, see 14 
 L. R. A. (X. S.) 727, note. 
 
 '"O'Neill V. State, 85 Ga. 383. 409, 
 Ti S. E. 856; Smith v. State, 108 Ala. 
 I, 19 So. 306, 54 Am. St. 140; State 
 V. Aker (Wash., 1909), 103 Pac. 420. 
 There can be no seduction, though the 
 woman be a virgin, unless she has 
 been actually seduced ; on that ques- 
 tion, her moral qualities, as well as 
 her physical chastity, are relevant. 
 
 " People V. Rodcrigas, 49 Cal. 9. 
 The head of a family of which the 
 prosecuting witness was a member 
 for three months may state his opin- 
 ion as to her previous chaste char- 
 acter based on his acquaintance with 
 her and on what he has seen of her 
 conduct. People v. Wade, 118 Cal. 
 672, 50 Pac. 841. 
 
 "Vandivcer, In re, 4 Cal. .\pp. 650, 
 88 Pac. 993, under Penal Code. S 268.
 
 ^ 392 
 
 CRIMINAL HVIDEN'CE. 
 
 G']2 
 
 coiitined to her rcpulation for nioialily in sexual relations.'-' and 
 must also be limited to her reputation for chastity or unchastitv 
 before the seduction.^" Derogatory rumors are sometimes re- 
 ceived, though a witness who has not testified on his direct exam- 
 ination to the reputation for chastity of the prosecutrix cannot 
 be cross-examined as to derogatory reports."*^ It may always be 
 shown that a witness had never heard her reputation for chastity 
 called in question.''- The woman may testify to her own chastity,**^ 
 and may be cross-examined as to specific unchaste acts and con- 
 versations with men other than the defendant,*** whose names are 
 t;iven or whose names are unknown. She may refuse to answer 
 wiiere the answer would incriminate her. Actual unchastity, \. c, 
 criminal intimacy and lascivious conduct with other men exist- 
 ing after the date of the alleged seduction, is excluded as proof of 
 the fact that prosecutrix was unchaste by the probability that it 
 resulted from it."*"' 
 
 Where the evidence shows the actual physical unchastity of the 
 female it may be jiroved that she had reformed and was leading 
 a chaste life at the date of the seduction.'"^ A presumption of re- 
 form may arise where a reasonable time has elapsed since the 
 
 "" State V. Hummer, 128 Iowa 505, 
 104 X. W. -22. See Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3T46. 
 
 '-People V. Wade, 118 Cal. 672, 50 
 Pac. 841. 
 
 " State V. Whitley, 141 X. Car. 823, 
 53 S. E. 820. 
 
 "Zabriskie v. State, 43 X. J. L. 
 640, 644, 39 Am. 610; State v. Bryan, 
 34 Kan. 63, '/2, 8 Pac. 260; State v. 
 Deitrick, 51 Iowa 467, 469, i X. W. 
 732; Xight V. State, 147 Ala. 93, 41 
 So. 850, 119 Am. St. 58. Evidence 
 of reputation for chastity must refer 
 to a time subsequent to the seduc- 
 tion. People V. Brewer, 27 Mich. 
 134. 135- 
 
 ^''Kenyon v. People, 26 X. Y. 203, 
 209, 84 Am. Dec. T77. 
 
 " State V. Sutherland, 30 Iowa 570. 
 
 ''Bracken v. State, in Ala. 68, 20 
 So. 636, 56 Am. St. 23 ; State v. 
 Wells, 48 Iowa 671 ; Slocum v. Peo- 
 ple, 90 111. 274; Mann v. State, 34 
 Ga. I ; Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644, 
 646; Russell V. State, ^^ Neb. 519, 
 no X. \y. 380; State v. Atterbury, 
 59 Kan. 237, 52 Pac. 451. Contra. 
 Xolan V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 436. 88 
 S. W. 242. 
 
 ^ Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 
 84 Am. Dec. 177; Wilson v. State, •/}, 
 Ala. 527; State v. Timmens, 4 Minn. 
 325 ; State v. Dunn, 53 Iowa 526, 5 X. 
 W. 707; People V. Clark, n Mich. 112; 
 State V. Fogg, 206 ^lo. 696, 105 S. 
 W. 618. The burden is on the prose- 
 cution. State V. Bennett, 137 Iowa 
 427, no X. W. 150. See Elliott Evi- 
 dence. § 3147.
 
 67 
 
 /o 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES. 
 
 § 393 
 
 intercourse but when it was frequently repeated at short intervals 
 the burden of proving reformation is on the prosecutrix.®" 
 
 § 393. The presumption of chastity. — Two views are held upon 
 the question whether any presumption of law exists as to the 
 chastity of the female in a trial for seduction. Some of the cases, 
 basing their reasoning upon the presumption of the prisoner's 
 innocence, deny the existence of any presumption of chastity and 
 require the state to produce some evidence that the prosecutrix 
 IS chaste.^^^ 
 
 Other cases hold that as chastity is the general rule in modern 
 society, and a want of it the exception, the prosecutrix starts with 
 a presumption of chastity in her favor.'*'* 
 
 *' People V. Clark, 33 Mich. 112, 
 117; People V. ^lillspaugh, 11 Mich. 
 278. 282. Where a woman previously 
 unchaste reforms and maintains her 
 personal chastity for such a time that 
 the jury could see that she was ac- 
 tually chaste at the time of the al- 
 leged seduction, then if accused ob- 
 tained carnal knowledge of her per- 
 son by the false express promise of 
 marriage he should be convicted, and 
 if it appeared that the woman at the 
 time of the seduction was not pos- 
 sessed of actual personal chastity he 
 should be acquitted. Cooper v. State, 
 86 Ark. 30, 109 S. W. 1023. Defenses 
 in seduction, see Elliott Evidence, 
 
 S 3153- 
 
 "' People v. Squires, 49 Mich. 487, 
 4.S9, 13 X. W. 828; Zabriskie v. State, 
 43 X. J. L. 640, 644, 39 Am. 610; 
 State v. Wenz, 41 Minn. 196, 197, 42 
 \. W. 933; People v. Wallace, 109 
 Cal. 611, 42 Pac. 159; West v. State, 
 I Wis. 209. 217, 218; Commonwealth 
 V. Whittakcr, 131 Mass. 224, 225; 
 Oliver V. Commonwealth, loi Pa. St. 
 215. 218, 47 Am. 704; State v. Mc- 
 Caskey, 104 Mo. 644, 16 S. W. 511; 
 Underbill on Ev., 234 ; Walton v, 
 43 — L'nderuill Cri.m. Ev. 
 
 State, 71 Ark. 398, 75 S. W. i. On 
 a trial for seduction, the previous 
 want of chastity of the prosecutrix 
 is defensive matter, and accused has 
 the burden of proving it by a pre- 
 ponderance of the evidence, and 
 where there is a reasonable doubt of 
 his guilt on the whole case he is en- 
 titled to the benefit of it, but it is not 
 proper to charge that the jury must 
 be convinced beyond a reasonable 
 doubt of the previous chastity of the 
 prosecutrix to warrant a conviction. 
 Wilhite V. State, 84 Ark. 67, 104 S. 
 
 w. 531. 
 
 ""Tedford v. United States, 7 Ind. 
 Terr. 254, 104 S. W. 608; Woodard 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 447, 63 S. E. 
 573; Weaver v. State, 142 Ala. 33, 39 
 So. 341 ; Kerr v. United States, 7 
 Ind. Terr. 486, 104 S. W. 809; Nor- 
 ton v. State, 72 Miss. 128, 16 So. 264, 
 18 So. 916, 48 Am. St. 538: State v. 
 Baucrkemper, 95 Iowa 562. 64 N. W. 
 609; Mills v. Commonwealth, 93 Va. 
 815, 22 S. E. 863; Crozicr v. People, 
 I Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 453. 457; Slocum 
 v. People. 90 111. 274, 281 ; State v. 
 Higdon, 32 Iowa 262, 264 ; Wilson 
 V. State, 73 Ala. 527, 533, 535; Fcr-
 
 § 394 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 6/4 
 
 § 394. Defilement of female ward or servant. — A statute which 
 provides punishment for any guardian of a female under the age 
 of eighteen years, or any person to whose care or protection such 
 female shall have been confided, who shall defile her while in his 
 care, custody or employment is sustained by proof tliat a person 
 in whose family the female w^as employed as a servant had defiled 
 her when the evidence showed that he had promised the girl's 
 father to w^atch over and care for her."° It is not necessary to 
 prove an express agreement confiding the girl to the defendant's 
 care."^ The character of the woman is immaterial. Hence her 
 acts of illicit sexual intercourse w'ith others cannot be shown,°- 
 but the continuation of the intercourse with the defendant after 
 the termination of the employment is always relevant."^ 
 
 § 395. Incest defined. — "Incest, where statutes have not modi- 
 fied its meaning, is sexual commerce, either habitual or in a single 
 
 guson V. State, 71 Miss. 805, S08, 15 
 So. 66, 42 Am. St. 492. "The question 
 is not 'Are the majority of women 
 chaste?' but rather was this woman 
 chaste who admits she consented to 
 illicit intercourse and who carries 
 with her the bastard which is the 
 result and evidence of her shame? 
 The presumption of chastity in such 
 a case not only encounters the pre- 
 sumption of the prisoner's innocence, 
 but, as it must be universally appli- 
 cable, raises the future presumption 
 that all women who bear illegitimate 
 children, and seek the punishment of 
 their seducers, were absolutely chaste 
 and pure before their seduction. This 
 is manifestly untrue and absurd." 
 Zabriskie v. State, 43 N. J. L. 640, 
 644, 39 Am. 610; State v. IMcClintic, 
 73 Iowa 663, 667, 35 N. W. 696 ; State 
 V. Hemm, 82 Iowa 609, 612, 48 N. W. 
 971 ; People v. Brewer, 27 Mich. 134, 
 138; State V. Gates, 27 Minn. 52, 6 
 N. W. 404; Carpenter v. People, 8 
 Barb. (\. Y.) 603; State v. Shean, 
 32 Iowa 88, 90, 91 ; State v. Carron, 
 
 18 Iowa 372, 375, 87 Am. Dec. 40m; 
 Andre v. State, 5 Iowa 389, 398, 68 
 Am. Dec. 7o8n; People v. Clark, 33 
 Mich. 112; State v. Sutherland, 30 
 Iowa 570. 
 
 '" State v. Young, 99 Mo. 284, 288, 
 289, 12 S. W. 642; State V. Strattman, 
 100 Mo. 540, 550, 13 S. W. 814; State 
 V. Terry, 106 Mo. 209, 215, 17 S. W. 
 288. The statute applies to the case 
 of a female pupil under 18 years of 
 age who is seduced by her teacher 
 and the fact that the pupil's mother 
 knew of the illicit relations of her 
 daughter with the teacher and con- 
 sented thereto is no defense. State 
 V. Oakes, 202 Mo. 86, 100 S. W. 434, 
 119 Am. St. 792. 
 
 '"■ State V. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519, 33 S. 
 W. 167; State V. Hill, 134 Mo. 663, 
 36 S. W. 223. 
 
 "- State V. Rogers, 108 Mo. 202, 204, 
 18 S. W. 976; State V. Sibley, 131 Mo. 
 519, 33 S. W. 167. 
 
 "'State V. Young, 99 Mo. 284, 290, 
 12 S. W. 642; State V. McClain, 137 
 Mo. 307, 38 S. W. 906.
 
 ^7: 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES. 
 
 § 396 
 
 instance, and either under a form of marriage or without, be- 
 tween two persons too nearly related in consanguinity or affinity 
 to intermarry."^* 
 
 Incest was not indictable at the common law. It is so only by the 
 various statutes which have been enacted both in England and 
 the United States, and which usually define the crime in express 
 terms prescribing what are its essential ingredients and particu- 
 larly the prohibited degrees of kinship.^^ The sexual intercourse, 
 whether habitual or not. must of necessity be a concurrent act. 
 The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
 woman voluntarily consented to it. If it appears that she was com- 
 pelled either by force or fraud to submit without consent, the 
 crime is not incest but rape, though the parties are related within 
 the forbidden degrees."^ 
 
 § 396. Evidence to show sexual intercourse. — Proof of a single 
 act of sexual intercourse is enough. °^ Intermarriage, though 
 
 ** Bishop's St. Cr., § 727 ; State v. 
 Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102, 23 X. E. 747, 
 21 Am. St. 790n. For other defini- 
 tions see Daniels v. People, 6 Mich. 
 381; Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 
 Mass. 458, 463, 18 Am. Sogn ; De 
 Groat V. People, 39 ]\Iich. 124; Ter- 
 ritory V. Corbett, 3 Mont. 50, 55; 
 Shelly V. State, 95 Tenn. 152, 31 S. 
 W. 492, 49 Am. St. 926; Porath v. 
 State, 90 Wis. 527, 63 X. W. io6r, 48 
 \m. St. 954; Barrett v. State, 55 
 Tex. Cr. 182, 115 S. W. 1187: Gilles- 
 pie V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 530, 93 S. 
 W. 556; Pate V. State TTex. Cr.), 93 
 S. W. 556; People V. Koller, 142 Cal. 
 -T, 76 Pac. 500; Adams v. State, 78 
 Ark. 16, 92 S. W. 1 123. 
 
 '■* Sexual intercourse between a 
 stepfather and his unmarried step- 
 dauRhter is incest. Xcphcw v. State, 
 5 Ga. A pp. 841, 63 S. E. 930. 
 
 " State V. Jarvis, 20 Ore. 437, 26 
 Pac. 302, 303, 23 Am. St. 141 ; State 
 V. Ellis. 74 Mo. 385. 41 Am. 321 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Harridcn, i Park. Cr. (X. Y.) 
 
 344; State V. Hurd, loi Iowa 391, 70 
 X". W. 613. This offense can only be 
 committed by the concurrent act of 
 two persons of opposite sexes; and 
 the assent or concurrence of the one 
 is as essential to the commission of 
 the offense as that of the other, and 
 as a general rule both must be guilty 
 or neither. People v. Jenness, 5 
 Mich. 305, 321 ; Delany v. People, 10 
 Mich. 241 ; Croghan v. State, 22 Wis. 
 444; Schoenfeldt v. State, 30 Tex. 
 App. 695, 18 S. W. 640; De Groat v. 
 People, 39 Mich. 124, 125. The ac- 
 quittal of one is a bar to the trial of 
 the other. Baumer v. State, 49 Ind. 
 544, 549, TQ Am. 691 ; State v. Thom- 
 as, 53 Iowa 214, 217, 4 X. W. 908; 
 Yeoman v. State, 21 Xcb. 171, 31 X. 
 W. 669. Cf. Mathis v. Common- 
 wealth (Ky.). 13 S. W. 360, II Ky. L. 
 ?S.2. See Elliott Evidence. § 3168. 
 Character of victim of crime, sec 14 
 L. R. A. (X. S.) 725. 
 
 "State V. Brown, 47 Ohio St. roj. 
 23 X. v.. 747, 21 .'\in. St. 79011.
 
 § 397 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 676 
 
 rele\ant, need not be proved/"" Any evidence which is relevant 
 to prove adultery between a man and woman is admissible. '''■* The 
 relation and conduct of the parties toward one another, their op- 
 portunities for meeting, their oral expressions of affection or 
 liking, and their inclination to seek each other's societv are alwa\'S 
 relevant. Prior acts of incest between the same parties may al- 
 ways be proved.^"" So, too. it may be shown that they indulged 
 in familiarities and caresses when alone or in the presence of 
 others. But evidence of demonstrations of aff'ection indulged in 
 by the parties should always be considered by the jury in the light 
 cf the kinship of the parties.^ 
 
 § 397. The kinship existing between the parties — Evidence of ac- 
 complices. — The kinship between the parties to the incest may be 
 proved by the evidence of relatives and friends; and, perhaps, by 
 family reputation. The jury are to determine from the evidence 
 what degree of consanguinity or affinity has been shown. But 
 whether the kinship thus proved is or is not within the prohibited 
 degrees is a question wdiich is for the judge exclusively." 
 
 The la\v regards both parties to the incestuous adultery as 
 accomplices. Hence, the rule requiring the testimony of an ac- 
 complice to be corroborated is applicable to the testimony of either 
 testifying against the other.^ 
 
 ** Simon v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 186, forbidden degrees. State v. Bul- 
 
 20 S. W. 399, 716, 37 Am. St. 802. linger, 54 Mo. 142; Simon v. State, 
 
 •"See §§ 381, 386. 31 Tex. Cr. 186, 20 S. W. 399, 7i6, Zl 
 
 ^°" People V. Cease, 80 Mich. 576, 45 Am. St. 802. 
 N. W. 585 ; Lefforge v. State, 129 Ind. ^ State v. Streeter, 20 Nev. 403, 22 
 
 551, 29 X. E. 34. See ante, § 390. Pac. 758, 759; State v. Dana, 59 Vt. 
 
 ^ Evidence to show the bad char- 614, 10 Atl. 727 ; State v. Jarvis, 18 
 
 acter of the woman previous to the Ore. 360, 23 Pac. 251, 253; Freeman 
 
 incest and that defendant lived upon v. State, 11 Tex. App. 92, 40 Am. 
 
 the wages of her shame is irrelevant. 787; Coburn v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 257, 
 
 People V. Benoit, 97 Cal. 249, 31 Pac. Z^ S. W. 442 ; State v. Jarvis, 20 Ore. 
 
 1 128. 437, 26 Pac. 302, 304, 23 Am. St. 141; 
 
 ' State V. Brown, 47 Ohio St. 102, State v. Miller, 65 Iowa 60, 21 N. W. 
 23 N. E. 747, 749, 21 Am. St. 790n. 181, 182; Clifton v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 
 The fact that the daughter was ille- 18, 79 S. W. 824; Watkins v. State 
 gitimate is no defense to a charge of (Tex. Cr. App., 1910), 124 S. W. 959. 
 incest against the father. People v. It seems that a person may be con- 
 Lake, no X. Y. 6t, 17 X^. E. 146, 6 victcd of incest though he gains his 
 Am. St. 344. It is not necessary to ends hy such force as would render 
 prove that the accused knew that the him guilty of rape. Here, as the 
 other party was related within the woman is not an accomplice, her evi-
 
 677 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES. 
 
 § 398 
 
 § 398. Bigamy — The intent — Invalidity or annulment of first 
 marriage. — Bigamy may be defined as the crime of going through 
 the marriage ceremony with another, while a former husband or 
 wife is living, and not divorced, knowing or having reason to be- 
 lie^■e, that the former spouse is still alive. The material facts are 
 the first and second^ marriages and the fact that the first consort 
 was alive'' and undivorced at the date of the void marriage. From 
 such facts a bigamous intent may be inferred.*^ That the first 
 marriage was void,' or had been annulled or dissGl\-ed by a 
 divorce, is always relevant as a defense.'* But the good faith of 
 the accused, or his belief or opinion that the first marriage was 
 \ oid, or that he had been granted a divorce before his second 
 marriage, is no defense.^ 
 
 § 399. Presumptions and proof of death of spouse. — The accused 
 may prove that he has been credibly informed that his wife had 
 procured a di\'orce from him, and may show that he had made 
 due inquiry, and endeavored to ascertain the truth. If he believed, 
 v.ith good reason, that such was the case, he should be acquitted, 
 as the criminal intent is not present." The state must prove af- 
 
 dence does not need corroboration. 
 Smith V. State, 108 Ala. r, 19 So. 306; 
 54 Am. St. 140; Whittaker v. Com- 
 monwealth, 95 Ky. 632, 27 S. W. 83, 
 16 Ky. L. 173; State v. Hurd, lOi 
 Iowa 391, 70 X. W. 613. Contra, 
 State V. Aker (Wash., 1909), 103 
 Pac. 420. 
 
 * Elliott Evidence, §§2864, 2865. 
 Proof of jurisdiction, Elliott Evi- 
 dence, § 2860. Second marriage in 
 good faith, when defense, Elliott Ev- 
 idence, § 2872; when not, § 2871. 
 Polygamy, proof under Edmunds' 
 Law, Elliott Evidence, § 2870. Proof 
 of corpus delicti in bigamy, sec 68 
 I.. R. A. 42. 
 
 ^ Elliott Evidence, §§ 2866, 2869. 
 
 " People V. Spoor, 235 111. 230, 85 
 N'. E. 207, 126 Am. St. r97n; Robin- 
 son V. State, 6 Ga. .A pp. 696, 65 S. 
 E. 792. 
 
 '3 Grccnl. on Ev., § 203; Hal- 
 
 brook V. State, 34 Ark. 511, 517, 36 
 Am. i/n; People v. Chase, 27 Huh 
 (N. Y.) 256, 270; McCombs v. State, 
 50 Tex. Cr. 490, 99 S. W. 1017, 123 
 Am. St. 855. 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) I036n. 
 
 * Commonwealth v. Boyer, 7 Allen 
 (Mass.) 306; Tucker v. People, 122 
 111. 583, 13 X. E. 809. The fact that 
 the first marriage was voidable only 
 is no defense and is never relevant. 
 People v. Beevers, 99 Cal. 286, 33 
 Pac. 844; Barber v. People, 203 111. 
 543, 68 N. E. 93; Elliott Evidence. 
 § 2861. Divorce as defenses, § 2S73. 
 
 "Russell v. State, 66 Ark. 185, 49 
 S. W. 821, 74 Am. St. 78; Rice v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.). 105 S. W. 123, 
 31 Ky. L. 1354, Elliott Evidence, 
 § 2804. 
 
 '"Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459, 463. 
 Cf. State v. Hughes, 58 Iowa 165, 11 
 X. W. 706.
 
 ij 400 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 678 
 
 firmalively, and beyond a reasonable doubt that tlie first husl)an(l 
 or wife was alive at the date of the void marriage. This is not 
 presumed, as matter of law, from proof that he or she was ali\e 
 at a prior date, for the presumption that the accused is innocent 
 will nullify the presumption of the continuance of life. Hence, in 
 the absence of direct evidence, that the earlier spouse is alive 
 when the later marriage was solemnized, the jury must acquit. ^^ 
 
 §400. Competency of wife of accused. — The first and true wife 
 will never be i)crniitted to testify against her husliand when he is 
 accused of bigamy.^" The second wife may testify to prove the 
 second marriage, but only if the first marriage is already proved 
 or admitted. As the existence or validity of the first marriage is 
 usually the sole issue, and is not usually established until a verdict 
 is reached, the rule often. results in excluding botli women as wit- 
 nesses. As the fact of the first marriage alone renders the second 
 wife competent, it must be proved by independent witnesses be- 
 fore she testifies. Even then she is competent only to prove the 
 second marriage, or show facts rendering it void.'^ The unchas- 
 tity of the second wife is inadmissible to impeach her evidence.^* 
 
 " IMitchcll V. Commonwealth, 78 
 Ky. 204, 39 Am. 227; Commonwealth 
 V. Parker, 9 Met. (Mass.) 263, 43 
 Am. Dec. 396; Commonwealth v. 
 Bangs, 9 Mass. 387; Commonwealth 
 V. Hayden, 163 Mass. 453, 40 N. E. 
 846, 47 Am. St. 468, 28 L. R. A. 3i8n ; 
 State V. Howard, 32 Vt. 380; Hilcr v. 
 People, 156 111. 511, 41 X. E. t8i, 47 
 Am. St. 22in ; Wilson v. State, 2 
 Ohio St. 319; Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 
 459, 467; Cameron v. State, 14 Ala. 
 546, 48 Am. Dec. 11 in; Reg. v. Liim- 
 ley, L. R. i C. C. 196. Some authori- 
 ties hold that the jury may consider 
 the fact that she was alive at a prior 
 date and base an inference of fact 
 upon it that she wa5 alive at the date 
 of the second marriage. Common- 
 wealth V. Caponi, 155 Mass. 534, 30 
 N. E. 82 ; Commonwealth v. McGrath, 
 
 140 Mass. 296, 6 N. E. 515. See El- 
 liott Evidence, § 2867. 
 
 "See § I Hale P. C. 693; i East. 
 469 ; Miles v. United States, 103 U. S. 
 304, 309, 313-315, 26 L. ed. 481 ; State 
 V. Patterson, 2 Ired. (N. Car.) 346, 
 38 Am. Dec. 699; Williams v. State, 
 44 Ala. 24; State v. McDavid, 15 La. 
 Ann. 403. Contra, State v. Sloan, 55 
 Iowa 217, 7 X. W. 516. Under stat- 
 ute in Maryland making the husband 
 or wife competent the wife is compe- 
 tent. Richardson v. State, 103 Md. 
 112, 63 Atl. 317. Evidence of hus- 
 band or wife, see Elliott Evidence, 
 § 2868; first and second wives as 
 witnesses, § 2874. 
 
 "3 Greenl. on Ev., § 206; Miles v. 
 United States, 103 U. S. 304, 315, 26 
 L. ed. 481. 
 
 "State v. Xadal, 69 Iowa 478, 482, 
 29 X. W. 451.
 
 6/9 SEXUAL CRIMES. § 4OI 
 
 ^ 40i. Absence of lawful spouse. — It is sometimes provided by 
 statute that the absence of a husband or a wife without having 
 been heard from during a period specified, ranging from two to 
 >even years, may be proved as a defense by a party who marries 
 again. It may be shown that the absentee was not heard from as 
 alive during the statutory period. ^^ But this presumption of 
 death from unexplained silence and absence may be overcome by 
 evidence that the absentee was alive a short time before the sec- 
 ond marriage. As we ha\e seen, the burden of proof is always on 
 the state to show the first spouse is alive, and that the accused 
 knows it.^*' And the absence of a wife resulting from having been 
 dri\-en away by the husband is not such absence as will excuse 
 him though more than seven years. ^' 
 
 The absence of circumstances from which death may be pre- 
 sumed does not justify an inference that the party is alive. There 
 must be positive evidence that he or she is alive, and whether the 
 presumption of death from unexplained absence has been rebutted 
 is for the jury. The burden is on the accused to show that he did 
 not know his wife was living during the seven years prior to his 
 second marriage.^^ Whether evidence of a reasonable belief on 
 the part of the prisoner that tlie former luisband or wife is dead 
 is admissible in his defense, has been differently decided. Some 
 cases maintain the affirmative of this proposition,^'' though later 
 cases support a contrary view."*^ 
 
 § 402. Proof of marriage by eye witness or certificate. — A higher 
 degree of proof of a marriage is required in criminal trials than 
 
 " Poss V. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 486, S3 6y Ala. 84, the court said : "Every 
 
 S. W. 1 109; Robinson v. State, 6 Ga. act was done * * * which is de- 
 
 App. 696, 65 S. E. 792. clarcd criminal, and from the act and 
 
 "Gibson v. State, 38 Miss. 313, 322. the circumstances, the criminal intent 
 
 " State V. Goulden, 134 X. Car. 743, must be deduced. There was the in- 
 
 47 S. E. 450. tent to marry a second time, not 
 
 ''State V. Goulden, 134 X. Car. 743, ktwiving the husband to be dead, who 
 
 47 S. E. 450. had been absent for a period of about 
 
 "Reg. V. Horton, 11 Cox C. C. 670; one year only, and this is the criminal 
 
 RcK. V. Turner, 9 Cox C. C. 145. intent, and the only intent which is 
 
 " Medrano v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. of the essence of the offense," and sec 
 
 214, 22 S. W. 684; Reg. V. Gibbons, 12 State v. Zichfcld, 23 Ncv. 304, 46 
 
 Cox C. C. 237. 238; Rep. V. Bennett. Pac. 802, 62 Am. St. 800, 34 L. R. A. 
 
 14 Cox C. C. 45. In Jones v. State, 784.
 
 § 403 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 680 
 
 is necessary in ci\'il actions,"' in whicli marriage may be inferred 
 to exist from evidence of reputation coupled with cohabitation. A 
 marriage in fact must be proved. This may l^e done by the testi- 
 mony of an eye witness to the ceremony,-- by that of the person 
 who performed it, or by a marriage certificate."^ 
 
 § 403. Proof of marriage by reputation, cohabitation and conduct. 
 — Though mere cohabitation and holding out do not constitute 
 marriage, in civil cases the existence of the marital relation may 
 be inferred from evidence that the parties cohabited as man and 
 wife, and were reputed to be such among their friends and ac- 
 quaintances. In a prosecution for bigamy such evidence alone 
 is not sufficient to prove the first marriage. Some of the cases 
 admit evidence of cohabitation, conduct and reputation"* to cor- 
 
 ^ Halbrook v. State, 34 Ark. 511, 
 517, 36 Am. 1711. 
 
 " Crane v. State, 94 Tenn. S6, 28 S. 
 W. 317; People V. Perriman, 72 Mich. 
 184, 40 N. W. 425. Method of prov- 
 ing first marriage, see Elliott Evi- 
 dence, § 2862. 
 
 -^2 Greenl. on Ev., § 461; 2 Stark, 
 on Ev., 698; Faustre v. Common- 
 wealth, 92 Ky. 34, 17 S. W. 189, T3 
 Ky. L. 347; State v. Johnson, 12 
 ]\Iinn. 476, 481, 93 Am. Dec. 24in ; 
 State V. Armstrong, 4 Minn. 335, 344 ; 
 State V. Hodgskins, 19 Me. 155, 158, 
 36 Am. Dec. 742n; State v. Clark, 54 
 N. H. 456, 459; State v. Williams, 20 
 lov^a 98; Arnold v. State, 53 Ga. 
 574. 575; Johnson v. State, 60 Ark. 
 308, 30 S. W. 31 ; Swartz v. State, 7 
 Ohio Cir. Dec. 43. Proof that the 
 ceremony was performed by a justice 
 or other official will suffice without 
 proving his appointment. This will 
 be presumed, i Greenl. on Ev., § 92 ; 
 State V. Abbey, 29 Vt. 60, 65, 67 Am. 
 Dec. 754. A constitutional provision 
 that the accused shall be confronted 
 with the witnesses against him does 
 not exclude certified copies of mar- 
 
 riage records which are made re- 
 ceivable by a statute. State v. Mat- 
 lock, 70 Iowa 229, 30 X. W. 495. A 
 marriage certificate, though inadmis- 
 sible as such because not properly 
 authenticated and certified according 
 to statute, may, perhaps, be received 
 as a part of the res gestce of the mar- 
 riage if it is shown to have been 
 made and delivered at the time. Peo- 
 ple V. Crawford, 133 X. Y. 535, 30 N. 
 E. 1 148. See, also, ante, § 383, as to 
 proof of marriage. 
 
 ■* Gahagan v. People, i Park. Cr. 
 (X. Y.) 378, 383; People v. McQuaid, 
 85 Mich. 123, 48 N. W. 161 ; Hayes v. 
 People, 25 X^. Y. 390, 393, 396, 82 Am. 
 Dec. 364; State v. Xadal, 69 Iowa 478, 
 29 X. W. 451 ; United States v. Ten- 
 ne}% 2 Ariz. 127, it Pac. 472; Rice v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 105 S. W. 123, 
 31 KJ^ L. 1354; State v. Pendleton, 
 67 Kan. 180, 72 Pac. 527; People v. 
 Mendenhall, 119 Mich. 404, 78 N. W. 
 325, 75 Am. St. 408; Hearne v. State, 
 50 Tex. Cr. 431, 97 S. W. 1050; 
 Coons V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 256, 91 
 S. W. 1085.
 
 68 1 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES. 
 
 $ 404 
 
 roborate direct evidence and to prove the continuance of the mar- 
 riage. Other authorities reject it ahogether.-^ 
 
 ^ 404. The admissions of the accused as evidence to prove the mar- 
 riage — Primary evidence of the ceremony — When required. — The 
 cases are not harmonious on the question whether the declarations 
 of the accused are receivable to prove the ceremony of marriage, 
 the names of the parties, or the time and place, when these facts 
 are material. The admissions of the accused, deliberately made, 
 that the marriage relation existed have been repeatedly received.-^ 
 
 On the other hand, it has been repeatedly decided that the de- 
 fendant's admissions would not dispense with primary, i.e., writ- 
 ten e\idence, of the specific facts regarding the ceremony, etc., at 
 least where such evidence was in existence and could be pro- 
 cured.-' Such e\-idence is not conclusive and creates no presump- 
 
 " State V. Roswell, 6 Conn. 446 ; 
 State V. Johnson, 12 Minn. 476, 482, 
 93 Am. Dec. 24in; Adkisson v. State, 
 34 Tex. Cr. 296, 30 S. \V. 357; State 
 V. Cooper, 103 Mo. 266, 15 S. \V. 327; 
 Tison V. State, 125 Ga. 7, 53 S. E. 
 809. 
 
 " State V. Goulden, 134 X. Car. 743, 
 47 S. E. 450; Caldwell v. State, 146 
 
 \la. 141, 41 So. 473; Le Grand v. 
 State, 88 .-\rk. 135, 113 S. W. 1028; 
 Murphy v. State, 122 Ga. 149, 50 S. 
 E. 48; Tucker v. People. 117 111. 88, 
 rx), 7 X. E. 51 ; State v. Melton, 120 
 \'. Car. 591, 26 S. E. 933; State v. 
 Abbey, 29 Vt. 60, 64, 67 Am. Dec. 
 754; Commonwealth v. Jackson, ir 
 liush (Ky.) 679, 21 .\ni. 225; Hal- 
 brook V. State, 34 Ark. 511, 517, 36 
 Am. I7n; Oncalc v. Commonwealth, 
 17 Gratt. (Va.) 582: State v. Xadal, 
 
 '> Iowa 478, 482, 29 X. W. 451 ; Miles 
 United States, 103 U. S. 304, 311, 
 
 ''> L. ed. 481 ; StanKlein v. State, 17 
 ' )hio St. 453, 561 ; United States v. 
 
 I enncy, 2 Ariz. 2(), 8 I'ac. 295; State 
 V HrxlKskins, ig Mi-. 155, 158, 36 .Am. 
 Dec. 742n ; Commonwealth v. Mur- 
 
 tagh, I Ashm. (Pa.) 272, 275; War- 
 ner V. Commonwealth. 2 Va. Cas. 95 ; 
 State V. Hilton, 3 Rich. ( S. Car.) 
 434. 435. 45 Am. Dec. 783; Wolver- 
 ton V. State, 16 Ohio 173, 17S, 47 Am. 
 Dec. 373 ; Crane v. State, 94 Tenn. 86, 
 28 S. W. 317; State V. Ulrich, no 
 Mo. 350, 19 S. W. 656; State v. 
 Hughes, 35 Kan. 626, 12 Pac. 28, 57 
 Am. 195; State v. Jenkins, 139 Mo. 
 535, 41 S. W. 220. See Elliott Evi- 
 dence, § 2863. Letters written by 
 the accused to his first wife were re- 
 ceived against him in Tucker v. Peo- 
 ple, 122 III. 583, 13 X. E. 809. The 
 silence of the accused under circum- 
 stances where it is his duty to speak 
 may doubtless be proved against him 
 as an admission of his marriage. 
 
 ■' People V. Humphrey, 7 Johns. 
 ( X. Y.) 314; State v. Roswell. 6 
 Conn. 446, 449: Commonwealth v. 
 Xorcross, 9 Mass. 492; Common- 
 wealth v. Littlejohn. 15 Mass. 163: 
 Miner v. People. 58 111. 59, 60: Sher- 
 man V. People. 13 Hun (X. Y.) 575; 
 South V. People. t)H III. j6i. 265: 
 State V. Armstrong. 4 Minn. 335. 344.
 
 v; 405 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 682 
 
 lion of law that a \alitl marriage existed at the time of the biga- 
 mous union. It should go to the jury for what it is w^orth. Coup- 
 led with evidence of reputation and cohabitation, it is very strong 
 proof of a valid marriage."^ 
 
 ,^ 405. Marriage certificates and transcripts of records as evidence 
 — Presumption of validity — Venue. — A marriage, celebrated in a 
 foreign country, may be proved by a transcript of the foreign 
 record,-'' if it is also shown that the law of the place of the mar- 
 riage required that a record should be made and kept, and 
 that the record was made and kept under and in conform- 
 ity with that law.''" A marriage certificate or a license and 
 the return are competent as evidence under the rule admitting 
 the entries of third persons made in the course of their profes- 
 sional employment, though there be no evidence of the ofifiicial 
 character of the person performing the ceremony except his own 
 statement following his signature. ^^ But a certified copy of a 
 marriage license and of the return thereto by the person officiating 
 at the marriage were held to be inadmissible on a trial for bigamy 
 to prove the prior marriage under a statute providing that certi- 
 fied copies of certain records may be admitted in evidence on 
 
 "^ State V. Sanders, 30 Iowa 582, 1059. But in State v. Sharkey, 73 N. 
 
 584; State V. Cooper, 103 Mo. 266, 15 J. L. 491, 63 Atl. 866, a record of a 
 
 S. W. 327; People V. Crawford, 133 divorce suit b}^ the prosecuting wit- 
 
 ^'- Y. 535, 30 N. E. 1 148. Evidence ness against accused was held to be 
 
 that the defendant cohabited with a inadmissible as proof of a former 
 
 woman and had children by her who marriage on the ground that the suit 
 
 lived with him, that the woman was a civil proceeding and not admis- 
 
 signed and acknowledged deeds as sible because the proof was not be- 
 
 his wife, sued for and was granted a j-ond a reasonable doubt. As to a pe- 
 
 divorce, the defendant answering in tition for a divorce, see Adkisson v. 
 
 the suit, is competent, and has been State, 34 Tex. Cr. 296, 30 S. W. 357. 
 held sufficient proof of a marriage. "" State v. Dooris, 40 Conn. 145 ; 
 
 State v. Gonce, 79 Mo. 600. Proof Stanglein v. State, 17 Ohio St. 453; 
 
 that A was granted a divorce from State v. Melton, 120 N. Car. 591, 26 
 
 B on a given date is strong evidence S. E. 933; Nelson v. State, 151 Ala. 
 
 that a marriage had existed between 2, 43 So. 966. 
 
 A and B at that date, as a divorce is '"Tucker v. People, 117 111. 88, 7 N. 
 
 never granted unless a marriage is E. 51 ; Pontier v. State, 107 Md. 384, 
 
 proved or admitted. Halbrook v. 68 Atl. 1059. 
 
 State, 34 Ark. 511, 519, 36 .'^m. I7n; ^' Baker v. State (Tex. Cr.), 118 
 
 Pontier v. State, 107 ISId. 384, 68 Atl. S. W. 542.
 
 683 SEXUAL CRIMES. § 406 
 
 three days' notice when notice was not given. ^- A marriage 
 shown to have been solemnized will be presumed to be valid until 
 its invalidity is shown. The rule that, when a marriage has been 
 consummated, it will be presumed that the former marriage of 
 one of the parties has been legally dissolved, does not apply in 
 a prosecution for bigamy, so, where the state showed that the ac- 
 cused had been married to a woman who was still living at the 
 time of his second marriage to another, the burden was on him to 
 show that his former marriage had been legally dissolved. ^^ The 
 burden of proof, where the validity of the first marriage is dis- 
 puted, is upon the prosecution,^* and direct evidence of non-as- 
 sent by either party to the marriage is relevant to rebut the pre- 
 sumption of validity.^^ The burden is on the accused to prove the 
 validity of a decree of divorce granted before the alleged big- 
 amous marriage and offered by him in evidence where its validity 
 is attacked by the prosecution.^'' The venue of the bigamous mar- 
 riage, unless essential to confer jurisdiction,^' or to establish the 
 specific character of the offense, need not be proved precisely as 
 laid.^' 
 
 § 406. Bigamous cohabitation. — The corpus delicti of bigamy is 
 the unlawful marriage contract. Cohabitation in a bigamous 
 union is not material, and need not be proved unless its proof is 
 required by statute."'* But proof of unlawful cohabitation is al- 
 ways admissible as tending to show the relations of the parties 
 and to corroborate the evidence of a marriage.*'^ The first wife 
 will not be permitted to testify against the defendant.''^ 
 
 ^Burton v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 196, ''State v. Nadal, 69 Iowa 478, 483, 
 
 loi S. W. 226. 29 N. W. 451. 
 
 "Fletcher v. State, 169 Ind. 77, 81 •'"' State v. Sloan, 55 Iowa 217, 7 N. 
 
 N. E. 1083, 124 Am. St. 219. W. 516; Nelms v. State, 84 Ga. 466, 
 
 "People V. Chase, 27 Hun (N. Y.) 20 Am. St. 377, 10 S. E. T087; Gise 
 
 256, 260; Weinberg- v. State, 25 Wis. v. Commonwealth, 8r Pa. St. 428; 
 
 370; Bird V. Commonwealth, 21 State v. Patterson, 2 Ircd. (N. Car.) 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 800. Contra, Sokcl v. 346, 38 Am. Dec. 699. 
 
 People, 212 111. 238, 72 N. E. 382. ''"United States v. Tcnncy, 2 Ariz. 
 
 "Kopke V. People, 43 Mich. 41, 4 127, 11 Pac. 472. 
 
 N. W. 551. •" Underbill on Ev., § 168; State v. 
 
 "People V. Spoor, 235 111. 230, 85 Patterson, 2 Ired. (N. Car.) 346, 38 
 
 N. E. 207, 126 Am. St. r97n. Am. Dec. 699; Williams v. State, 44 
 
 "Tucker v. People, 117 111. 88, 92, Ala. 24; State v. McDavid, 15 La. 
 
 7 N. E. 51. .Ann. 403.
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 § 407. Rape defined — The non-consent 
 of the prosecutrix — Pre- 
 sumption of incapacity to 
 consent. 
 4c8. Rape by infants. 
 
 409. Relevancy of the victim's com- 
 
 plaints — Proving the details 
 of what she said. 
 
 410. Proving the details to impeach 
 
 or corroborate. 
 
 411. Delay in making complaint — 
 
 Reasons for delay. 
 
 412. Medical testimony. 
 
 413. Relevancy of the physical con- 
 
 dition of the prosecutrix. 
 
 § 414. The prosecutrix as a witness 
 — Her competency and credi- 
 bility — Infancy of the prose- 
 cutri.x when rendering her 
 incompetent as a witness. 
 
 415. The prior relations of the par- 
 
 ties. 
 
 416. Proof of carnal knowledge 
 
 requisite. 
 
 417. The force or fraud employed — 
 
 Threats and mortal fear — 
 Failure to make outcry. 
 
 418. Reputation of the prosecutrix 
 
 for chastity — Proof of spe- 
 cific unchaste acts. 
 
 § 407. Rape defined — The non-consent of the prosecutrix — Pre- 
 sumption of incapacity to consent. — Rape is the crime of obtaining 
 carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and without her consent/ 
 or "against her will," the latter word as thus used being synony- 
 mous with desire or inclination. - 
 
 The absence of consent, where it is not presumed from the 
 immaturity of the female, must always be proved beyond a rea- 
 sonable doubt. ^ The absence of consent need not be the result of 
 a concious exercise of volition withholding it. It is not always 
 
 *4 Bl. Com. 210. In Hale's Pleas 
 of the Crown this crime is defined as 
 "the carnal knowledge of any woman 
 above the age of ten years against her 
 will, and of a woman child under the 
 age of ten years with or against her 
 will." It is not easy to express in one 
 definition all the refinements of the 
 cases. Statutory definitions differ, 
 
 and cases may be stated which art- 
 punishable as rape in some jurisdic- 
 tions, while not in others. 
 
 - People V. Crosswell, 13 Mich. 427. 
 432, S7 Am. Dec. 774 ; Brown v. State. 
 127 Wis. 193, 106 N. W. 536. See 
 State v. Pickett, 11 Xev. 255, 21 .-Xm. 
 
 754- 
 •■' Elliott Evidence. § 3093. 
 
 (684)
 
 68: 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 8 407 
 
 necessary to prove active resistance on the part of the female. 
 Absence of consent will be presumed whenever sexual intercourse 
 is procured by fraud, or the woman is physically or mentally in- 
 capable of consenting, because she has been drugged, is non com- 
 pos iiiciitis, or is under the statutory age of consent.* If the 
 woman having legal capacity to consent, shall consent to the con- 
 summation of the intercourse, a verdict of guilty cannot be sus- 
 tained, no matter how reluctant or tardy her consent may have 
 been, or how much force had been used." The question whether 
 she consented is for the jury. As consent, that is the concurrence 
 of her will with the will of the accused, is purely a mental con- 
 dition, its existence, when put in issue, must be inferred from the 
 facts in the case. From the secret nature of the crime, evidence 
 of circumstances from which intent must be inferred should be 
 carefully scrutinized.'^ Among the facts which are relevant to 
 show the absence or presence of consent are the resistance which 
 was offered by the w^oman, her physical condition and strength, 
 and tiiat of the accused," and the means employed by the latter to 
 inspire her with fear. 
 
 A child under the age of ten years was, at common law, con- 
 clusi\'ely presumed incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse,^ 
 
 *2 Bish. Crim. Law, § 11 15; i Hale 
 P. C. 629; Hubert v. State, 74 Neb. 
 220, 104 X- W. 276, 106 N. W. 774; 
 Harlan v. People, 32 Colo. 397, 76 
 Pac. 792 ; State v. Whimpey, 140 Iowa 
 199, 118 X. W. 281; State V. Peyton 
 (.•\rk., 1910), 125 S. W. 416; Elliott 
 Evidence, § 3094. 
 
 'Mills V. United States, 164 U. S. 
 644, 41 L. ed. 584, 17 Sup. Ct. 210; 
 Conners v. State, 47 Wis. 523, 2 N. 
 W. 1 143; Pollard v. State, 2 Iowa 
 567; Wliittakcr v. State, 50 Wis. 518, 
 7 N. W. 43r, 36 Am. 856n; Reynolds 
 V. State, 27 Xeb. 90. 92, 42 N. W. 903, 
 20 Am. St. 659; Hollis V. State, 27 
 Ma. 3^*7. .191-394, 9 So. 67. 
 
 ".Anderson v. State. 41 Wis. 430; 
 P>rown V. State, 76 Ga. 623, 626. "The 
 importance of resistance is simply to 
 bow two elements in the crime; car- 
 nal knowledge by force by one of the 
 
 parties, and non-consent thereto by 
 the other." State v. Shields, 45 Conn. 
 256. 
 
 "" Brown v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 
 653, 656; State V. Cunningham, 100 
 Mo. 382, 391, 12 S. W. 376. 
 
 * Commonwealth v. Sugland, 4 
 Gray (Mass.) 7; Commonwealth v. 
 Roosnell, 143 Mass. 32, 37, 39, 8 N. 
 E. 747; State V. Sullivan, 68 Vt. 540, 
 35 Atl. 479; Proper v. State, 85 Wis. 
 615, 631, 632, 55 N. W. 1035; Farrell 
 V. State, 54 N. J. L. 416, 419, 24 Atl. 
 723; State V. Miller, 42 La. Ann. 1186, 
 8 So. 309, 21 .Am. St. 418; People v. 
 Crosswcll, 13 Mich. 427, 87 Am. Dec. 
 774: People V. McDonald, 9 Mich. 
 150: Moore V. State, 17 Ohio St. 521, 
 525; Coates V. State. 50 .Ark. 330. 335. 
 356, 7 S. W. 304. The mother of the 
 child may testify to her age. Mc-
 
 4oS 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 686 
 
 though, if she were so developed mentally and physically as to 
 understand the nature and consequences of the act, the presump- 
 tion was sometimes regarded as rehuttahle. The statutory age of 
 consent now varies in the several states." If the female is under 
 the statutory age, the presumption of non-consent is conclusive, 
 and evidence to show that force was or was not used, or generally 
 that she did or did not consent, is alike inadmissihle.^" If the fe- 
 male is over the age of consent, proof of mere absence of consent 
 is enough, and evidence of facts constituting an active and posi- 
 tive dissent is not required. The non-consent may be inferred by 
 the jury from proof that the female was mentally weak, at least 
 where such a degree of imbecility is shown that it is evident that 
 she did not realize the meaning, or the nature and consequences of 
 the sexual act.^^ 
 
 § 408. Rape by infants. — In England at common law a boy, 
 under the age of fourteen, was conclusively presumed unable to 
 
 Math V. State, 55 Ga. 303, 307. See 
 Elliott Evidence, §§ 3095, 3096. Re- 
 sistance of the female, see Elliott 
 Evidence, § 3097. 
 
 °3 Crim. L. Mag. 347. 
 
 "People V. Miller, 96 Mich. 119, 55 
 X. W. 675; State V. Wray, 109 Mo. 
 594, 599, 19 S. W. 86; Reg. v. Beale, 
 10 Cox C. C. 157; White v. Common- 
 wealth, 96 Ky. 180, 28 S. W. 340, 16 
 Ky. L. 421 ; State v. Eberline, 47 Kan. 
 155, 157, ^7 Pac. 839; State v. Stor- 
 key, 63 N. Car. 7; Murphy v. State, 
 120 Ind. 115, 116, 22 X. E. 106; State 
 V. Dancy, 83 X. Car. 608, 609; Wil- 
 liams V. State, 47 Miss. 609, 613 ; 
 State V. Wright, 25 Xeb. 38, 41, 40 X. 
 W. 596; Wood V. State, 46 Xeb. 58, 
 64 X. W. 355; McMath v. State, 55 
 Ga. 303; Farrell v. State, 54 X. J. L. 
 416, 419, 24 Atl. ^22,', Comer v. State 
 (Tex. Cr.), 20 S. W. 547; State v. 
 Lacey, in Mo. 513, 516, 20 S. W. 
 238; Givens v. Commonwealth, 29 
 Gratt. (Va.) 830, 832; Davis v. State, 
 31 Xeb. 247, 47 X. W. 854; ]\Iayo v. 
 State, 7 Tex. App. 342; Fizell v. 
 State, 25 Wis. 364; People v. Goulette, 
 
 82 Mich. 36, 45 X. W. 1 124; State v. 
 Tilman, 30 La. Ann. 1249, 31 Am. 
 236 ; State v. Grossheim, 79 Iowa 75, 
 44 X. W. 541 ; Proper v. State, 85 
 Wis. 615, 55 N. W. 1035; Common- 
 wealth v. Murphy, 165 Mass. 66, 42 
 X. E. 504, 52 Am. St. 496, 30 L. R. 
 A. 734; State V. Forsythe, 99 Iowa i, 
 68 X. W. 446; State v. Bricker, 135 
 Iowa 343, 112 X^. W. 645; State v. 
 Mehojovich, 118 La. 1013, 43 So. 660; 
 Sigerella v. State (Del, 1909), 74 Atl. 
 1081; Heath v. State (Ind., 1909), 
 90 X. E. 310; State v. Jones (Iowa, 
 1909), 123 X. W. 960; Perkins v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky., 1909), 124 S. 
 W. 794- 
 
 " State v. Enright, 90 Iowa 520, 58 
 X. W. 901 ; Rodriguiz v. State, 20 
 Tex. App. 542; Reg. v. Barratt, 12 
 Cox C. C. 498; People v. Crosswell, 
 13 ]\Iich. 427, 432, 87 Am. Dec. 774; 
 State V. Cunningham, 100 Mo. 382, 
 392, 12 S. W. 376. If the female is 
 actually under the statutory age of 
 consent, evidence to show facts from 
 which the accused might have in- 
 ferred that she was of age to consent
 
 68; 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 § 409 
 
 commit rape.^- ]Most, if not all the American authorities, reason- 
 ing from the difference in climate between England and Amer- 
 ica, the diversity of habits of living and the peculiar intermingling 
 of races in America, ha\'e regarded this presumption as rebut- 
 table/^ 
 
 But the evidence of physical capacity or of the actual maturity 
 
 of the infant must be clear and cogent. 
 
 Slight or unconvincing 
 
 evidence of actual capacity will not be enough to justify submit- 
 ting the case to the jury.^'* 
 
 § 409. Relevancy of the victim's complaint — Proving the details 
 of what she said. — The fact that the victim of a rape was weep- 
 ing,^^ or that she made immediate complaint, as well as when she 
 made it and to whom, being material and relevant to show the 
 commission of the crime, may be proved as original evidence on 
 the direct examination of the prosecutrix^*^ as an exception to 
 
 is inadmissible. People v. Ratz, 115 
 Cal. 132, 46 Pac. 915. 
 
 "Reg. V. Philips, 8 C. & P. 7z(i; 
 Reg. V. Jordan, 9 C. & P. 118; Rex 
 V. Groombridge, 7 C. & P. 582; State 
 V. Handy, 4 Harr. (Del.) 566, 567; 
 McKinny v. State, 29 Fla. 565, 10 So. 
 '/Z'2', 30 Am. St. 140. 
 
 " Williams v. State, 14 Ohio 222, 45 
 Am. Dec. 536; People v. Randolph, 
 
 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 174, 177; Heilman 
 V. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 457, 461, i 
 S. W. 731, 8 Ky. L. 451, 4 Am. St. 207 ; 
 State V. Jones, 39 La. Ann. 935, 936, 
 
 3 So. 57; Beason v. State (Miss., 
 1909), 50 So. 488, 
 
 "Godfrey v. State, 31 Ala. Z'^s^ Z'^^^ 
 70 \m. Dec. 494n ; State v. Goin, 9 
 Humph. (Tcnn.) 174, 177; Peckham 
 V. People, 32 Colo. 140, 75 Pac. 422. 
 A boy over fourteen is presumed ca- 
 pable. State V. Handy, 4 Harr. 
 TDcI.) 566, 567; State v. Goin, supra. 
 If a crime be not merely the result of 
 boyish pugnacity, but of some pas- 
 sion such as lust in the case of rape, 
 the law will interpose and the infant, 
 though under fourteen, will be pun- 
 i^icd. Malice and wickedness will 
 
 supply the want of age. State v. 
 Pugh, 7 Jones (N. Car.) 61, 63. C/. 
 Heilman v. Commonwealth, 84 Ky. 
 457, I S. W. '/2,i,'& Ky. L. 451, 4 Am. 
 St. 207. 
 
 "State V. Bedard, 65 Vt. 278, 26 
 Atl. 719. 
 
 '" State V. Patrick, 107 ]\Io. 147, 163, 
 17 S. W. 666; Poison v. State, 137 
 Ind. 519, 35 X. E. 907; Griffin v. 
 State, 76 Ala. 29, Z^'^ Territory v. 
 Godfrey, 6 Dak. 46, 50 N. W. 481; 
 People V. Barney, 114 Cal. 554, 47 
 Pac. 41; Oleson v. State, 11 Neb. 276, 
 279, 9 N. W. 38, 38 Am. 366; People 
 V. Scalamiero, 143 Cal. 343, 76 Pac. 
 1098; State V. Carpenter, 124 Iowa 
 5, 98 N. W. 775 ; State v. Sudduth, 
 52 S. Car. 488, 30 S. E. 408; People 
 V. Scattura, 238 III. 313, 87 N. E. 2,^2; 
 State V. Neil, 13 Idaho 539, 90 Pac. 
 860, 91 Pac. 318; State v. Symens, 138 
 Iowa 113, IIS N. W. ^-j^; State v. 
 Bebb, 125 Iowa 494, loi N. W. 189; 
 State V. Stincs, 138 X. Car. 686, 50 S. 
 E. 851; Dickey v. State, 86 Miss. 525. 
 38 So. 776; Posey V. State, 143 Ala. 
 54, 38 So. 1019; State V. Egbert, 125 
 Iowa 443. loi N. W. 191 ; State v.
 
 § 410 
 
 CRIMINAL EVaDENCE. 
 
 688 
 
 the rule exchiding hearsay e\i<leiice, or of anv other witness. It 
 may be shown that the complaint was made, where and to whom 
 it was made, and that some person was accused who must not be 
 named. But the details of wliat the ])rosecutrix said, and par- 
 ticularly the name of the person she accuses of the crime. ^' can- 
 not be proved on the direct examination.^^ unless the complaint is 
 so closely connected with the time or place of the crime as to 
 form a part of the res gcstcc.^'' 
 
 § 410. Proving details to impeach or corroborate. — Though the 
 particulars of the complaint are not generally receivable from the 
 
 Alyrberg (Wash., 1909), 105 Pac. 622. 
 
 '" State V. Griffin, 43 Wash. 591, 86 
 Pac. 951. 
 
 " Hannon v. State, 70 Wis. 448, 451, 
 36 N. W. I ; Lee v. State, 74 Wis. 45, 
 41 N. W. 960; State v. Langford, 45 
 La. Ann. 1177, 1179, 14 So. 181, 40 
 Am. St. 277; Lowe v. State, 97 Ga. 
 792, 25 S. E. 676; Baccio v. People, 
 41 N. Y. 265, 272 ; Thompson v. State, 
 38 Ind. 39; Ellis V. State, 25 Fla. 702, 
 708, 6 So. 768; State v. Shettleworth, 
 18 Minn. 208, 212; People v. Stewart, 
 97 Cal. 238, 32 Pac. 8; Stephen v. 
 State, II Ga. 225; State v. Campbell, 
 20 Nev. 122, 17 Pac. 620; State v. 
 Mitchell, 68 Iowa 116, 119, 26 N. W. 
 44 ; State v. Richards, 33 Iowa 420 ; 
 State V. Clark, 69 Iowa 294, 28 N. 
 W. 606; Parker v. State, 67 Md. 329, 
 TO Atl. 219, I Am. 387; Stevens v. 
 People, 158 111. in, 41 N. E. 856; 
 Pefferling v. State, 40 Tex. 486; Peo- 
 ple V. Tierney, 67 Cal. 54, 7 Pac. 37; 
 People V. IMayes, 66 Cal. 597, 6 Pac. 
 691, 56 Am. 126; Hornbeck v. State, 
 35 Ohio St. 277, 35 Am. 608; Oleson 
 V. State, II Neb. 276, 279, 9 N. W. 
 3S, 38 Am. 366; Hoist V. State, 23 
 Tex. App. I, 3 S. W. 757, 59 Am. 
 770; Reg. V. Walker, 2 Moo. & R. 
 212; People V. Bernor, 115 Mich. 692, 
 74 N. W. 184; People v. Lambert, 120 
 Cal. 170, 52 Pac. 307; Anderson v. 
 State, 82 Miss. 784, 35 So. 202; State 
 
 V. Fowler, 13 Idaho 317, 89 Pac. 757; 
 People V. Scattura, 238 111. 313, 87 N. 
 
 E. 332; State V. Griffin, -43 Wash. 591, 
 86 Pac. 951 ; Jeffries v. State, 89 Miss. 
 643, 42 So. 801 ; People v. Weston, 
 236 111. 104, 86 N. E. 188; State v. 
 Symens, 138 Iowa 113, 115 N. W. 878. 
 
 "State V. Fitzsimon, 18 R. I. 236, 
 27 Atl. 446, 49 Am. St. 766; People 
 V. Glover, 71 Mich. 303, 38 N. W. 
 874; People V. Gage, 62 Mich. 271, 
 274, 28 N. W. 835, 4 Am. St. 854; 
 Castillo V. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 145, 150, 
 19 S. W. 892, 37 Am. St. 794 ; Barnett 
 V. State, 83 Ala. 40, 3 So. 612; 
 Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 204, 208, 7 
 So. 38, 16 Am. St. 48; State v. Byrne, 
 47 Conn. 465, 467; State v. Kinney, 
 44 Conn. 153, 26 Am. 436; State v. 
 Patrick, 107 Mo. 147, 163-168, 17 S. 
 W. 666; State v. Jerome, 82 Iowa 
 749, 48 N. W. 722; Laughlin v. State, 
 18 Ohio 99, 51 Am. Dec. 444; Mc- 
 Math v. State, 55 Ga. 303, 307; Bac- 
 cio v. People, 41 N. Y. 265 ; Stephen 
 V. State, II Ga. 225; Reg. v. Eyre, 2 
 
 F. & F. 579; Cunningham v. People, 
 210 111. 410, 71 N. E. 389; Adams v. 
 State, 50 Tex. Cr. 586, 99 S. W. 1015; 
 Skaggs V. State, 88 Ark. 62, 113 S. W. 
 346; State V. Colombo (Del. O. & T., 
 1909), 75 Atl. 616; Huey v. State 
 (Ga. App., 1910), 66 S. E. 1023. 
 
 Declarations of prosecutrix as res
 
 689 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 § 411 
 
 witness who testifies to the fact that it was made, counsel for the 
 accused may. with propriety, bring out the details upon cross- 
 examination to contradict or to impeach the witness, or the prose- 
 cutrix if she testifies.-" 
 
 As an exception to the general rule the details of the complaint 
 are sometimes allowed to be shown, sometimes upon the direct 
 examination but usually in rebuttal solely to corroborate the pros- 
 ecutrix (and then only after she has been impeached on cross- 
 examination), by showing that she told the same story to several 
 persons in or out of court. -^ 
 
 But the details of the complaint cannot be introduced if the 
 prosecutrix refuses to testify, or if she cannot testify because she 
 has died before the trial,'- or because she is an imbecile.-^ 
 
 >j 411. Delay in making complaint — Reasons for delay. — Undue 
 delay and e\-en delay for a few days, unless reasonably explained. 
 
 (jcstcc, see 19 L. R. A. 744, note; 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3098. Admissions 
 and confessions, see Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3103; corroboration, § 3102; cir- 
 cumstantial evidence, § 3104; vari- 
 ance, § 3109; clothing worn by prose- 
 cutrix or by defendant, admissible, 
 § 3106. 
 
 ■" State v. Freeman, 100 X. Car. 429, 
 433, 5 S. E. 921 ; Wood v. State, 46 
 Xeb. 58, 64 X. W. 355; State v. Clark, 
 69 Iowa 294, 296, 28 X. W. 606; Bar- 
 nett V. State, 83 Ala. 40, 44, 3 So. 612; 
 Griffin v. State, 76 Ala. 29, 32; Pleas- 
 ant v. State, 15 Ark. 624; Thompson 
 v. State, 38 Ind. 39, 3 Greenl. on Ev., 
 § 213; Parker v. State, 67 Md. 329, 
 331, 10 Atl. 219; Sc.xton V. State 
 (.\rk., 1909), I2r S. W. 1075. "If 
 these declarations are in accordance 
 with the testimony given irr court, they 
 tend to strengthen and give effect to 
 that testimony; if against it, the tes- 
 timony is destroyed." Johnson v. 
 State, 17 Ohio 593; approved in State 
 v. Patrick. 107 Mo. 147, \C,t., 17 S W. 
 
 44 — L'niiki!IIIi.i. Ckim. 1-.\. 
 
 ^Castillo v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. 145, 
 151, 19 S. W. 892, 2)7 Am. St. 794; 
 State v. Byrne, 47 Conn. 465, 467; 
 State V. Kinney, 44 Conn. 153, 26 Am. 
 433; Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40, 44, 
 3 So. 612; Oleson v. State, 11 Neb. 
 276, 281, 9 N. W. 38, 38 Am. 366; 
 Proper v. State, 85 Wis. 615, 55 N. 
 W. 1035 ; State v. Langford, 45 La. 
 Ann. 1 177, 1 180, 14 So. i8r, 40 Am. 
 St. 277; State V. Hutchinson, 95 Iowa 
 566, 64 X. W. 6to; State v. Werner, 
 16 N. Dak. %2„ 112 X. W. 60; State 
 V. Carpenter, 124 Iowa 5, 98 N. W. 
 775; State v. Parker, 134 N. Car. 
 209, 46 S. E. 511, and see cases in last 
 note. 
 
 ~ Reg. V. ]\Iegson, 9 C. & P. 420. 
 
 " State V. Meyers, 46 Xeb. 152, 64 
 N. W. 697, 37 L. R. A. 423n. Such 
 evidence, though in corroboration, 
 may be received before she testifies. 
 Proctor V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 20 
 S. W. 213, 14 Ky. L. 248: State v. 
 Mitchell. 68 Iowa 116, 119. 26 X. W. 
 44. Contra, Johnson v. State, 17 Ohio 
 593-
 
 § 411 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 690 
 
 may, it seems, result in the rejection of evidence of the fact that 
 a complaint was made.-* 
 
 No invariable rule can be laid down defining what weight delay 
 will have. It is so natural that a virtuous female should immedi- 
 ately complain of such an outrage to those connected with her by 
 ties of blood or friendship, that her neglect to do so is a circum- 
 stance which may discredit her. Silence and delay in making 
 complaint would be likely to awaken suspicion and doubt as to 
 the truth of the complaint. F'ailure to make an outcry or com- 
 plaint is always relevant. "° How much it ought to discredit 
 her depends wholly upon the circumstances and upon the nature 
 and validity of the reasons for her silence. -'' 
 
 "* Hornbeck v. State, 35 Ohio St. 
 277, 35 Am. 608; Bueno v. People, i 
 Colo. App. 232, 28 Pac. 248; Higgins 
 V. People, 58 N. Y. zil', Thompson 
 V. State, Z2> Tex. Cr. 472, 26 S. W. 
 987; State V. Reid, 39 Minn. 277, 280, 
 39 X. \V. 796; State V. Wilkins, 66 
 Vt. I, ID, 28 Atl. 323; State v. Byrne, 
 47 Conn. 465, 467; Jackson v. State, 
 91 Wis. 253, 64 N. W. 838; State v. 
 Peter, 8 Jones (N. Car.) 19; Maillet 
 V. People, 42 ]\rich. 262, 3 X. W. 854; 
 People V. Brown, 53 Mich. 531, 19 N. 
 W. 172; People V. Glover, 71 ]\Iich. 
 303, 38 N. W. 874; State v. Xiles, 47 
 Vt. 82; Johnson v. State, 27 Xeb. 
 687, 43 X. W. 425; Bailey v. Com- 
 monwealth, "^2 Va. 107, 113, 3 Am. 
 St. 87; State V. Cassidy, 85 Iowa 145, 
 52 X. W. I, 2 ; People v. Lambert, 120 
 Cal. 170, 52 Pac. 307; People v. Gon- 
 zalez, 6 Cal. App. 255, 91 Pac. 1013; 
 Kearse v. State (Tex. Cr.), 88 S. W. 
 363; Cowles V. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 498, 
 102 S. W. 1128; State V. Griffin, 43 
 Wash. 591, 86 Pac. 951. "Mere lapse 
 of time between the perpetration of 
 the act and the complaint is not the 
 test of its admissibility. The time 
 that intervenes is a subject for the 
 jury to consider in passing upon the 
 
 weight of her testimony; and the de- 
 gree of credit to be given it on ac- 
 count of the delay in making it de- 
 pends on the particular circumstances 
 of the case." The court in State v. 
 ]^Iulkern, 85 Me. 106, 107, 26 Atl. 
 1017; People V. Gage, 62 Mich. 271, 
 275, 28 X. W. 835, 4 Am. St. 854- 
 
 ■^ People V. Fong Chung, 5 Cal. 
 App. 587, 91 Pac. 105. In a prosecu- 
 tion for rape, a concealment of the 
 injury for any considerable time after 
 the woman has had an opportunity to 
 complain, and a failure on her part 
 to make an outcry where the act is 
 committed within the probable hear- 
 ing of other persons, are circum- 
 stances which will justify a strong, 
 but not conclusive, inference that the 
 act was with her consent, and not by 
 force. State v. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275, 
 109 S. W. 9. 
 
 =° Higgins V. People, 58 X. Y. zn, 
 379; State V. Knapp, 45 X. H. 148; 
 Baccio V. People, 41 X. Y. 265 ; State 
 V. Wilkins, • 66 Vt. i, 17, 28 Atl. 323; 
 State V. Xiles, 47 Vt. 82; Vaughn v. 
 State, 78 Xeb. 317, no X. W. 992; 
 People V. Keith, 141 Cal. 686, 75 Pac. 
 304.
 
 691 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 § 412 
 
 If the silence or the delay of the prosecutrix in complaining is 
 urged to lessen the force or credibility of her evidence, she should 
 always be permitted to explain why she was silent. Her delay 
 may be explained and excused by proof of sufficient cause there- 
 for, as, for example, by want of opportunity, or by duress or 
 threats by the perpetrator of the wn'ong.-' Thus, if she is a child 
 she may show she did not complain immediately to her mother 
 because' she was afraid of a whipping, or because the latter was 
 away from home when the crime was committed,-^ or because 
 shame prompted her to suppress the fact,"'* or that she w^as deaf 
 and dumb,^** or was very young, lived with the defendant and was 
 influenced and threatened by him.^^ 
 
 § 412. Medical testimony. — A physical examination to procure 
 evidence is not indispensable,^- nor should the refusal of a modest 
 prosecutrix to submit to one be allowed to discredit her as a wit- 
 ness. ^^ But a physician, after he has made such an examination, 
 may state the age of the prosecutrix, that he found bruises on 
 her,^* may state in detail the appearance of the limbs and genital 
 
 ■^ State V. Bebb, 125 Iowa 494, loi 
 N. W. 189. 
 
 ^Poison V. State, 137 Ind. 519, 35 
 N. E. 907, 908; People v. Terwilliger, 
 74 Hun (N. Y.) 310, 26 N. Y. S. 674, 
 aflf'd 142 N. Y. 629, Z7 X- E. 565. 
 
 =* State V. Wilkins, 66 Vt. i, 10, 28 
 Atl. 323, 2)27. Whether the reason is 
 a good one is for the jury. State v. 
 Reid, 39 Minn. 277, 281, 39 N. W. 
 796; Baccio V. People, 41 N. Y. 265, 
 271. And it is for them to estimate 
 the force and effect of the silence 
 and delay of the prosecutrix, keeping 
 in view the reasons which caused 
 them. 
 
 '^ State V. DeWolf, 8 Conn. 93, 20 
 Am. Dec. 90. 
 
 ^' State V. Byrne, 47 Conn. 465 ; 
 State V. Baker, 136 Mo. 74, 37 S. W. 
 «^io. Cf. People V. O'Sullivan, 104 
 .\'. Y. 481, 490, 10 N. E. 880, 58 Am. 
 530. "It would then clearly be 
 
 proper to show the reasons of such 
 delay, whether caused by the threats 
 of the prisoner, inability caused by 
 the violence, want of opportunity, or 
 the fear of injury by the communi- 
 cation to the only persons at hand." 
 State V. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148, 155; 
 People V. Glover, 71 Mich. 303, 307, 
 38 N. W. 874; People v. Knight 
 (Cal., 1895), 43 Pac. 6. 
 
 ^"Frazier v. State, 56 Ark. 242, 19 
 S. W. 838. 
 
 " Barnett v. State, '^z Ala. 40, 3 So. 
 612. Defendant cannot insist that 
 the prosecutri.x, though a young child, 
 shall submit to a medical examina- 
 tion. It is wholly discretionary with 
 the court. McGufF v. State, 88 Ala. 
 147. 153, 7 So. 35, 16 Am. St. 25. 
 
 ■'"Myers v. State, 84 Ala. 11, 12, 4 
 So. 291 ; Poison v. State, 137 Ind. 
 519. 3.'? N. K. 907; Neill v. State, 49 
 Tex. Cr. 219, 91 S. W. 791. The fact
 
 § 413 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 692 
 
 organs of the female.''" and llial there had been actual penetra- 
 tion,^'' or he may give an opinion whether penetration^^ or com- 
 plete sexual intercourse was jiossible,"'- and whether pregnane)- 
 would ensue if a rape had been committed.^'' Expert testimony 
 of the physical strength and condition of the prosecutrix is always 
 received to show her ability or inability to resist." The medical 
 expert witness may give an opinion based upon a hypothetical 
 question containing material facts proved or assumed to be 
 proved, or he may base his opinion as to the causes of the physical 
 condition of the prosecutrix upon the evidence of another physi- 
 cian who, having examined her, describes her condition as he 
 observed it.*^ 
 
 A physician cannot testify as to the mental effects of indecent 
 liberties on a woman's person/- or whether the accused could 
 have had sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, 
 without resorting to extraordinary physical violence,'*^ as the 
 question of consent is for the jury. The victim's exclamations 
 evincing her present feelings, or her statements of present suffer- 
 ing made to a physician in the course of medical treatment or 
 examination may be proved by any one who heard them. They 
 are original evidence, and whether the feelings were or were not 
 simulated is for the jury.** 
 
 § 413. Eelevancy of the physical condition of the prosecutrix. — 
 
 that, on an examination six months ^People v. Clark, S3 Mich. 112; 
 
 later than the alleged rape, the hymen Proper v. State, 85 Wis. 615, 55 N. 
 
 was found unruptured, is admissible, W. 1035. 
 
 the remoteness of such evidence go- ^"People v. Tarbox, 115 Cal. 57, 46 
 
 ing merely to its probative force. Pac. 896. 
 
 Gifford V. People, 148 111. 173, 178, ^° State v. Knapp, 45 N. H. 148, 154. 
 
 35 N. E. 754. Cf. State v. Evans, '"State v. Watson, 81 Iowa 380, 46 
 
 138 Mo. 116, 39 S. W. 462, 60 Am. St. N. W. 868. 
 
 549. As to physical examination and *' People v. Royal, 53 Cal. 62. 
 
 medical testimony, see Elliott Evi- ■" Woodin v. People, i Park. Cr. 
 
 dence, § 3107; 68 Am. St. 252, note. (N. Y.) 464, 467. 
 
 "State v. Symens, 138 Iowa 113, *^ Poison v. State, 137 Ind. 519, 35 
 
 115 N. W. 878. N. E. 907, 919; Underbill on Ev., 
 
 ^Woodin v. People, i Park. Cr. § 52. Cf. State v. Yocum, 117 Mo. 
 
 (N. Y.) 464, 467. 622, 23 S. W. 765, which holds that 
 
 "Hardtke v. State, 67 Wis. 552, whatever the female told her physi- 
 
 554. 30 N. W. 72;^ ; State v. Watson, cian is not admissible. 
 81 Iowa 380, 46 X. W. 868.
 
 693 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 § 413 
 
 Evidence of the physical appearance and condition of the prose- 
 cutrix subsequent to the date of the alleged rape is always rele- 
 vant to corroborate her evidence and as tending to show the prob- 
 ability or improbability that a rape was committed.'*- Non-expert 
 witnesses, who have had adec[uate opportunities for observation, 
 may testify to facts relating to her condition, if within their own 
 knowledge, where their observation does not require or presup- 
 pose the possession of special scientific or medical training.*"' 
 Thus, the husband, mother or other relative of the prosecuting 
 witness may testify that they found bruises and other marks of 
 violence on her body,*"* or to the condition of her underclothing, 
 or the bedding used by her, if it is first shown that they were 
 worn when the alleged rape was committed.*^ The birth of a 
 child to the prosecuting witness on such a date as it would occur 
 in the course of nature, assuming that she had had sexual inter- 
 course with the accused at the date mentioned is always rele- 
 vant,**' and the prosecuting witness may herself testify to the 
 birth of a child.*' It is not permissible to prove a resemblance 
 between the prisoner and a child born to the prosecutrix by exhib- 
 
 *^ Myers v. State, 84 Ala. 11, 12, 4 
 So. 291 ; Brauer v. State, 25 Wis. 
 413, 418; Commonwealth v. Allen, 
 13s Pa. St. 483, 19 Atl. 957: People 
 V. Baldwin, 117 Cal. 244, 49 Pac. 186; 
 Skaggs V. State, 88 Ark. 62, 113 S. 
 W. 346; Sigerella v. State (Del., 
 1909), 74 Atl. 1081 ; State v. Colomba 
 (Del. O. & T. 1909), 75 Atl. 616. 
 
 *■'' State V. Murphj% ri8 Mo. 7, 25 
 S. W. 95 ; State v. Sanford, 124 Mo. 
 484, 27 S. W. 1099; Poison V. State, 
 137 Ind. 519, 35 N. E. 907; State v. 
 Suddiith, 52 S. Car. 488, 30 S. E. 
 408. One who has married the prose- 
 cutrix after the crime may testify 
 that he had discovered she was not 
 a virgin. Smith v. State, 52 Tex. 
 Cr. 344, 106 S. W. 1 161. 
 
 " Ilannon v. State, 70 Wis. 448, 451, 
 36 X. W. T ; State v. Harness, 10 
 Idaho 18, 76 Pac. 788. 
 
 " Gonzales v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 
 61 r, 620, 25 S. W. 781. The clothing 
 worn by the woman assailed, as well 
 
 as that worn b}^ tlie accused, may be 
 received in evidence to corroborate 
 the evidence of the prosecutrix and 
 as independent evidence to prove the 
 commission of the crime. Ransbot- 
 tom v. State, 144 Ind. 250, 43 N. E. 
 218; State V. Murphy, 118 Mo. 7, 16, 
 25 S. W. 95 ; State v. Duffy, 124 Mo. 
 
 I, 10, 27 S. W. 358, 360; McMurrin 
 V. Rigby, 80 Iowa 322, 324, 45 N. W. 
 877. But the clothing must be iden- 
 tified as that which she wore at the 
 time of the crime. Gonzales v. State, 
 32 Tex. Cr. 611, 25 S. W. 781. 
 
 '"State V. Walke, 69 Kan. 183, 76 
 Pac. 408; State v. Danforth. 73 N. 
 
 II. 215, 60 .Atl. 839, rii Am. St. 600; 
 Druin v. Commonwealth (Ky., 1910), 
 124 S. W. 856. 
 
 ■"State v. Miller, 71 Kan. joo. 80 
 Pac. 51 ; State v. Stone, 74 Kan. 189, 
 85 Pac. 808; and compare People v. 
 Robertson, 88 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
 198, 84 N. Y. S. 401.
 
 § 414 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 694 
 
 iting an infant three months old to the jury,'*'' though the con- 
 trary has been held in the case of an older infant.'" nor can her 
 statement that the accused is the father of her child be received.'"* 
 It may be shown that the female was, upon an examination, 
 found to have a venereal disease. To connect the accused with 
 the rape evidence is then admissible to show that he had a sim- 
 ilar disease when he was arrested, and if he denies this he may 
 be cross-examined upon his physical condition at that time."'^'- 
 Evidence that the prosecutrix had a venereal disease is not ad- 
 missible to discredit her," though it may be proved by the ac- 
 cused by medical testimony that she had such a disease at the date 
 of the rape, that it was contagious and that accused never had 
 it." 
 
 ? 414. The prosecutrix as a witness — ^Her competency and credi- 
 bility — Infancy of prosecutrix when rendering her incompetent as a 
 v;itness. — The woman is competent to testify to the facts of the 
 rape, though her evidence, because of the customary secrecy of 
 the crime, and the ease with which such a charge may be made, 
 should be somewhat carefully scrutinized. It has been held that 
 to sustain a conviction her evidence must be corroborated on all 
 material facts and circumstances if the accused goes on the stand 
 and denies the crime.^* But it would seem that in the absence of 
 
 '' State V. Danforth, 48 Iowa 43-48, Cal. App. 626, 95 Pac. 380. The tes- 
 
 30 Am. 387. timony of a physician to the physical 
 
 *' State V. Danforth, 78 N. H. 215, condition of the defendant, gained 
 60 Atl. 839; State V. Falmberg, 199 by an examination in the jail, sub- 
 Mo. 232, 97 S. W. 566, 116 Am. St. mitted to voluntarily, the defendant 
 476- being told that the prosecuting at- 
 
 °° State V. Hussey, 7 Iowa 409, 411. torney had sent the physician for that 
 
 °* People V. Glover, 71 Mich. 303, purpose only, is not privileged. Peo- 
 
 305, 38 X. W. 874. Such a coin- pie v. Glover, 71 ]\Iich. 303, 307, 38 
 
 cidence may create a very strong N. W. 874. See also, § 178, et scq. 
 
 presumption of guilt in the minds of Privileged communications, 
 
 the jurors which the accused may ^- State v. Smith, 18 S. Dak. 341, 
 
 endeavor to rebut by proving that 100 N. W. 740. 
 
 prior to the date of the alleged rape ""People v. Fong Chung, 5 Cal. 
 
 the woman had sexual intercourse App. 587, 91 Pac. 105. 
 
 with other men. Nugent v. State, 18 "Innis v. State, 42 Ga. 473; 
 
 Ala. 521, 526; State v. Otey, 7 Kan. Thompson v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 472, 
 
 69, 77. See People v. Ah Lean, 7 26 S. W. 987; Mathews v. State, 19
 
 695 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 414 
 
 Statute the credibility of her evidence should be left wholly to the 
 jury as in other cases. They will be justified in convicting the 
 defendant on her evidence alone, though it may be uncorrobo- 
 rated, if it convinces them beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
 accused is guilty.'^'' But her testimony should be carefully scru- 
 tinized, and court and jury should diligently guard themselves 
 from the undue influence of the sympathy in her behalf which the 
 circumstances are apt to excite. ^^ So on appeal the testimony 
 
 Neb. 330, 336-338, 27 N. W. 234; 
 People V. Kunz, 76 Hun (N. Y.) 610, 
 27 N. Y. S. 945; State v. Connelly, 
 57 ]Minn. 482, 485, 59 N. W. 479; 
 Bradshaw v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 165, 
 94 S. \V. 223 ; Livinghouse v. State, 
 76 Neb. 491, 107 N. W. 854; Klawit- 
 ter V. State, ^6 Neb. 49, 107 N. W. 
 121 ; Fitzgerald v. State, 78 Neb. i, 
 no N. W. 676; People v. Farina, 118 
 N. Y. S. 817; Donovan v. State, 140 
 Wis. 570, 122 N. W. 1022. By statute 
 in Iowa Code, § 5488; State v. Norris, 
 127 Iowa 683, 104 N. W. 282, corrob- 
 oration is required solely for the 
 purpose of connecting accused with 
 the crime. State v. Bartlett, 127 Iowa 
 689, 104 N. W. 285; State v. Black- 
 burn flowa, 1907), no N. W. 275. 
 
 "Scott V. State, 3 Ga. App. 479, 60 
 S. E. 112; Hill V. State (Tex. Cr.), 
 T7 S. W. 808; Hammond v. State, 
 39 Neb. 252, 58 N. W. 92; State v. 
 Lattin, 29 Conn. 389; Shirwin v. 
 People, 69 111. 55 ; Givens v. Com- 
 monwealth, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 830, 835; 
 State V. Hert, 89 Mo. 590, 591, i S. 
 W. 830; State V. Wilcox, in Mo. 
 569, 20 S. W. 314, 33 Am. St. 551; 
 Fager v. State, 22 Neb. 332, 35 N. 
 W. 195 ; Barnett v. State, 83 Ala. 40, 
 3 So. 612; Lynn v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 13 S. W. 74, n Ky. L. 772; 
 State V. Dusenberry, 112 Mo. 277, 
 296, 20 S. W. 461. Cf. State v. Con- 
 nelly, 57 Minn. 482, 485, 59 N. W. 
 479; State V. McLaughlin, 44 Iowa 
 
 82 ; 2 Bish. on Cr. Pro., § 963 ; i 
 Phill. on Ev., 7 ; Curby v. Territorj^ 
 4 Ariz. 371, 42 Fac. 953. Cf. 
 Mathews v. State, 19 Neb. 330, 2^ N. 
 W. 234; People V. Doyle (Fla., 1897), 
 22 So. 272; State V. Fetterly, 33 
 Wash. 599, 74 Pac. 810; State v. Day, 
 188 Mo. 359, 87 S. W. 465; Brown 
 V. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N. W. 
 536; Thomas v. Commonwealth, 106 
 Va. 855, 56 S. E. 705; State v. Con- 
 lin, 45 Wash. 478, 88 Pac. 932 ; State 
 V. Jones, 32 Mont. 442, 80 Pac. 1095 ; 
 Allen V. State (Miss., 1908), 45 So. 
 833 ; People v. Keith, 141 Cal. 686, 75 
 Pac. 304; Druin v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky., 1910), 124 S. W. 856. Admis- 
 sions showing a plan to commit a 
 rape or the flight of the accused 
 have been held to be sufficient 
 corroboration. Loar v. State, 76 
 Neb. 148, 107 N. W. 229; State v. 
 Hetland, 141 Iowa 524, 119 N. W. 961. 
 But the refusal of the accused to be 
 examined by a physician is not suffi- 
 cient corroboration. Rc.x v. Gray, 68 
 J. P. Z2T. 
 
 "" Boddie v. State, 52 Ala. 395, 398 ; 
 State V. Hatfield, 75 Iowa 592, 596, 
 39 N. W. 910; Smith v. State, ^^ Ga. 
 705, 711-716. The party ravished 
 may give evidence, but the credibility 
 of her evidence must be left to the 
 jury. If she be of good fame, pres- 
 ently disclosed the ofTeiise and made 
 search for the offender, these and 
 like circumstances give greater prob-
 
 8 414 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 696 
 
 of the prosecutrix will be closely scrutinized and if it appears 
 incredible a judgment of guilty should be reversed.'' 
 
 A conviction will not be sustained if the prosecutrix is unable 
 to identify the prisoner. Her statements, describing the man 
 who assaulted her, cannot be proved at the trial by a witness to 
 whom she made them out of court/''* If the complainant is too 
 young to comprehend the nature and responsibility of an oath, 
 her testimony is not admissible,"'^" nor are her statements made 
 out of court permitted to be proved."" But the infancy or im- 
 becility of the prosecutrix,''"^ though of such a nature as to pre- 
 clude her from giving consent or making resistance, will not ex- 
 clude her evidence if she is shown to have sufficient mental capac- 
 ity to comprehend and appreciate the nature of an oath."^ Much 
 latitude is allowable in the cross-examination of the prosecutrix. 
 She may be asked if she consented to the intercourse with the 
 accused,"- and she may also be interrogated upon her silence in 
 reference thereto. She may be asked if she reported the outrage 
 to her priest,"^ or if she said that the accused was innocent, and 
 that his prosecution was for blackmailing purposes.''* 
 
 ability to her testimony. If she be 
 of evil fame, unsupported in her tes- 
 timony by others, concealed the in- 
 jury a considerable time, and might 
 have been heard, yet made no out- 
 cry, these and like circumstances cre- 
 ate a strong but not a conclusive pre- 
 sumption that her testimony is in- 
 credible. 4 Bl. Comm. 213. When 
 the woman is the sole witness for 
 the prosecution, and her evidence is 
 impeached and contradicted, it may 
 be proved that she had made charges 
 of a like nature against her brother 
 and man}' others which she subse- 
 quently admitted were false. People 
 V. Evans, 72 Mich. 367, 381, 40 N. 
 
 w. 473. 
 
 "State V. Goodale, 210 Mo. 275, 
 109 S. W. 9. 
 
 ^* Brogy V. Commonwealth, 10 
 Gratt. (Va.) '/22, 725. 
 
 '"^ Reg. V. Cockburn, 3 Cox C. C. 
 543; McMath v. State, 55 Ga. 303, 
 308. See also, 65 L. R. A. 316, note. 
 
 '■"Reg. V. Nicholas, 2 C. & K. 246; 
 Rex V. Williams, 7 C. & P. 320. 
 
 ""a State V. Crouch, 130 Iowa 478, 
 107 N. W. 173. 
 
 "^ Smith V. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 
 924, 927, 9 S. E. 148; Rodgers v. 
 State, 30 Tex. App. 510, 17 S. W. 
 T077; IMcMath V. State, 55 Ga. 303, 
 308; State V. Lattin, 29 Conn. 389. 
 The witness, if young and very ig- 
 norant, may be plied with leading 
 questions by the prosecutor. Ellis 
 V. State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768. See 
 § 204. People V. Baldwin, T17 Cal. 
 244, 49 Pac. 186. 
 
 "■Woodin V. People, i Park. Cr. 
 (N. Y.) 464; Brown v. State, 127 
 Wis. T93, 106 N. W. 536; Schults v. 
 State, 49 Tex. Cr. 351, 91 S. W. 786. 
 
 "'Maillet v. People, 42 Mich. 262, 
 264, 3 N. W. 854- 
 
 •" Shirwin v. People, 69 111. 55, 59! 
 People V. Knight (Cal., 1895), 43 
 Pac. 6.
 
 697 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 415 
 
 ^ 415. The prior relations of the parties. — The state may prove 
 improper acts and solicitations to sexual intercourse by the ac- 
 cused toward the prosecutrix and other assaults by the accused 
 on her,"^ as well as acts of voluntary sexual intercourse between 
 them prior to the rape charged,''^^ in order to show his probable 
 motive or intent."'^ On the other hand, to prove consent, it may 
 be shown that the prosecutrix sought the company of the ac- 
 cused,'^' and that their relations were always friendly, though 
 chaste and proper.*"* But evidence that the prosecutrix knew the 
 accused was a man of bad character,"'^ or evidence to show acts 
 of sexual intercourse by the accused with other women, is not 
 admissible."" 
 
 '^ State V. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202, 
 109 S. W. 706; State V. Allison (S. 
 Dak., 1909), 124 X. W. 747. 
 
 •"a State V. Palmberg, 199 Mo. 233, 
 
 97 S. W. 566, I r6 Am. St. 476 ; State 
 V. Johnson, 133 Iowa 38, no N. W. 
 70; State V. Mobley, 44 Wash. 549, 87 
 Pac. 815; Leedom v. State, 81 Xeb. 
 585, 116 X. W. 496. 
 
 °* State V. Carpenter, 124 Iowa 5, 
 
 98 X. W. 775 ; State v. Crouch, 130 
 Iowa 478, 107 X. W. 173; People v. 
 Morris, 3 Cal. App. i, 84 Pac. 463 ; 
 State V. Fetterly, ss Wash. 599, 74 
 Pac. 810; State v. Trusty, 122 Iowa 
 82, 97 X. W. 989; State V. Borchert, 
 68 Kan. 360, 74 Pac. iro8; People v. 
 Manahan, 32 Cal. 68; State v. Robi- 
 son, 32 Ore. 43, 48 Pac. 357; People 
 V. Abbott, 97 Mich. 484, 486, 56 N^. 
 W. 662, 37 Am. St. 360; Hardtke v. 
 State, 67 Wis. 552, 554, 30 X. W. 723 ; 
 State V. Knapp, 45 X. H. 148, 156; 
 State V. Patrick, 107 Mo. 147, 155, 17 
 S. W. 666; People v. O'SuUivan, 104 
 X. Y. 481, 484, 10 X. E. 880, 58 Am. 
 530; Barnes v. State, 88 .Ma. 204, 
 207, 7 So. 38, 16 Am. St. 48; Taylor 
 V. State, 22 Tex. App. 529, 545, 3 S. 
 W. 753, 58 Am. 656n; State v. Sysin- 
 Kcr (S. Dak., 19 10), 125 X. W. 879. 
 Evidence of a previous attempt to 
 
 ommit a rape is not incompetent, 
 
 because it comes from the prosecu- 
 trix. People V. O'Sullivan, 104 
 X. Y. 481, 484, 10 X. E. 880, 58 
 Am. 530; State v. Parish, 104 X. 
 Car. 679, ID S. E. 457, and she may 
 be asked why she did not complain of 
 the previous attempts. People v. 
 Lenon, 79 Cal. 625, 631, 21 Pac. 967. 
 Evidence of other rapes, or attempts 
 at rape, by the defendant upon the 
 prosecutrix or other females, is 
 usually irrelevant. Janzen v. People, 
 159 111. 440, 42 X'. E. 862; State v. 
 Stevens, 56 Kan. 720, 44 Pac. 992; 
 State V. Thompson, 14 Wash. 285, 44 
 Pac. 533. // seems, that such evi- 
 dence is admissible to account for 
 the absence of an outcry and to ex- 
 plain why there was no laceration of 
 the female organ. People v. Fultz, 
 109 Cal. 258, 41 Pac. 1040; State v. 
 Gaston, 96 Iowa 505, 65 X. W. 415. 
 
 "Shirwin v. People, 69 111. 55, 6r ; 
 Warren v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 443, 114 
 S. W. 3B0. 
 
 "'Hall V. People, 47 ^hch. 636, 11 
 X. W. 414. 
 
 '"State v. Porter, 57 Iowa 691. n 
 X. W. 644. 
 
 ■"' People V. Bowcn, 49 Cal. 654. 
 The girl may testify that the accused, 
 lu-r father, was a man of great 
 strength, iiad beaten her mother, was
 
 4i6 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 698 
 
 § 416. Proof of carnal knowledge requisite. — Despite some lack 
 of harmony in the early English cases, it is now settled that an 
 allegation of carnal knowledge is sustained by proof of actual 
 penetration alone ; and it is not now, and never seems to have 
 been, required in iVnicrica, that actual emission should be 
 proved.'^ Penetration may be proved by the direct evidence of 
 the female, though her evidence is neither the best nor the only 
 proper evidence of that fact. Her ex'idence on this point ought 
 to be convincing and consistent to sustain a conviction.'- It may 
 be inferred from the circumstances, as from the physical condi- 
 tion of the female, the marks of violence on her and her com- 
 plaints of pain and soreness. This rule is very important, and of 
 frequent application in the case of the rape of children, who, 
 from ignorance and inexperience, arc incapable of testifying in- 
 telligently to this essential fact.''' Proof of penetration beyond 
 a reasonable doubt is always absolutely essential, ""^ both at com- 
 mon law and under tlie statutes." Evidence that the woman vol- 
 untarily remained with the defendant in a room all night is not 
 sutiicient to sustain a conviction.'^" But proof beyond a reason- 
 able doubt of the least penetration is sufficient." 
 
 drunk when he outraged her, and 
 that she was frightened and in great 
 fear. Maillet v. People, 42 Mich. 
 262, 263, 3 N. W. 854. Cf. Bean v. 
 People, 124 111. 576, 583, 16 N. E. 
 656. Statements by the defendant, 
 made months before the crime, tend- 
 ing to show his passion towards the 
 woman, are receivable. Barnes v. 
 State, 88 Ala. 204, 7 So. 38, 16 Am. 
 St. 48. 
 
 " Comstock V. State, 14 Xeb. 205, 
 206, IS N. W. 355 ; Waller v. State, 
 40 Ala. 325, 332; People v. Crowley, 
 102 N. Y. 234, 237, 6 X. E. 384; 
 State V. Hargrave, 65 X. Car. 466, 
 467; Osgood V. State, 64 Wis. 472, 
 25 N. W. 529; State v. Shields, 45 
 Conn. 256; Taylor v. State, iii Ind. 
 279, 12 X^. E. 400; I Hale P. C. 628; 
 2 Bish. Cr. Law, § 1127; Bradburn 
 V. State, 162 Ind. 689, 71 X. E. 133. 
 
 "" State V. Forshee, 199 Mo. 142, 97 
 S. W. 933- 
 
 " Brauer v. State, 25 Wis. 413, 415; 
 Taylor v. State, iii Ind. 279, 280, 12 
 X. E. 400; Wesley v. State, 65 Ga. 
 73i> 734; People v. Crowley, 102 X. 
 Y. 234, 237, 6 X. E. 384; Comstock 
 V. State, 14 Xeb. 205, 209, 15 X. W. 
 355 ; State v. Depoister, 21 Xev. 107, 
 25 Pac. 1000; Givens v. Common- 
 wealth, 29 Gratt. (Va.) 830, 835; Peo- 
 ple V. Bernor, 115 Mich. 692, 74 X. W. 
 184; State V. Biggs (Wash., 1910), 
 107 Pac. 374. 
 
 ^^Hardtke v. State, 67 Wis. 552, 
 SS3, 30 X. W. 72^; State v. Dalton, 
 106 Mo. 463, 17 S. W. 700; State v. 
 Grubb, 55 Kan. 678, 41 Pac. 951 ; 
 Vickers v. United States, i Okla. Cr. 
 452, 98 Pac. 467. 
 
 ''" People V. Sheffield, 9 Cal. App. 
 130, 98 Pac. 67. 
 
 ™ Dickey v. State, 21 Tex. App. 430, 
 2 S. W. 809; Jacques v. People, 66 
 III. 84, 86. 
 
 " People V. Crowley, 102 X^ Y. 234,
 
 699 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 § 417 
 
 § 417. The force or fraud employed — Threats and mortal fear — 
 Failure to make outcry. — To convict, the jury must be satisfied that 
 the sexual intercourse was either obtained by force, or if it' was 
 actually obtained by trick or fraud, that the accused intended to 
 employ force if the fraud should fail.'* An actual force used by 
 the accused sufficient to create an apprehension of death in the 
 mind of the victim need not be proved.'" If a less degree of 
 force is used but coupled with threats to kill or to inflict bodily 
 harm, in, fear of which she involuntarily submits, the intimidation 
 practiced will be regarded as constructive force. *° The kind and 
 
 237, 6 X. E. 384; People v. Courier, 
 79 :Mich. 366, 367, 44 N. W. 571; 
 Brauer v. State, 25 Wis. 413, 415; 
 State V. Shields, 45 Conn. 256; Bailey 
 V. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 107, 113, 3 
 Am. St. 87; Bean v. People, 124 111. 
 576, 583, 16 N. E. 656; People v. 
 Rivers, 147 Mich. 643, iii N. W. 201, 
 14 Det. Leg. N. 6. If the evidence 
 satisfies the jury that any part of the 
 membrum virile of the accused was 
 within the labia of the pxidenduin, a 
 verdict of guilt}' should be rendered. 
 Reg. V. Lines, i C. & K. 393, 47 E. C. 
 L. 393- 
 
 '' Commonwealth v. Fields, 4 Leigh 
 (Va.) 648; State v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 
 54; Eberhart v. State, 134 Ind. 651, 
 655, 34 N. E. 627', Garrison v. Peo- 
 ple, 6 Xeb. 274; McNair v. State, 53 
 Ala. 453; Lewis v. State, 30 Ala. 54, 
 56, 68 Am. Dec. 113; Osgood v. State, 
 64 Wis. 472, 474, 25 N. W. 529; Reg. 
 V. Stanton, i C. & K. 415; Reg. v. 
 Camplin, i C. & K. 746; State v. 
 Urie, lor Iowa 411, 70 N. W. 603; 
 State V. Neil, 13 Idaho 539, 90 Pac. 
 860, 91 Pac. 318. It is usually said 
 that the utmost reluctance and re- 
 sistance by the woman should appear. 
 People V. Morrison, i Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 625; People V. Crosswell, 13 
 Mich. 427, 433, 87 Am. Dec. 774; 
 People V. Abbot, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 
 192, 195; Whittaker v. State, 50 Wis. 
 S18, 523, 7 N. W. 431, 36 Am. 856n; 
 State V. Burgdorf, 53 Mo. 65, 67; 
 Don Moran v. People, 25 Mich. 356, 
 12 Am. 283n; Anderson v. State, 104 
 Ind. 467, 474, 4 N. E. 63, 5 N. E. 711 ; 
 People V. Murphy, 145 Mich. 524, 108 
 N. W. 1009; Gaskin v. State, 105 Ga. 
 631, 31 S. E. 740; 3 Greenl. on Ev. 
 210. "The resistance must be up to 
 the point of being overpowered by 
 actual force, or of inability from loss 
 of strength longer to resist, or from 
 the number of persons attacking re- 
 sistance must be dangerous or abso- 
 lutely useless, or there must be du- 
 ress or fear of death." People v. 
 Dohring, 59 N. Y. 374, 382, 383, 17 
 Am. 349; People v. Bransby, 32 N. 
 Y. 525, 531, 540. 
 
 "Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 325, 331. 
 
 ^ Pleasant v. State, 13 Ark. 360 ; 
 State V. Urie, loi Iowa 411, 70 N. W. 
 603 ; Huston v. People, 121 111. 497, 
 499, 13 N. E. 538; State v. Ward, y^ 
 Iowa 532, 35 N. W. 617; State v. Du- 
 scnberry, 112 Mo. 277, 282, 296, 20 
 S. W. 461 ; Turner v. People, 33 
 Mich. 363; llubcr v. State, 126 Ind. 
 185, 186, 25 N. E. 904. To establish 
 the crime of rape, the utmost re- 
 luctance on the part of the woman 
 must be shown, and also that she 
 availed herself of every reasonable
 
 § 417 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 700 
 
 degree of resistance which must be exerted, and which may rea- 
 sonably be expected, depend upon the physical and mental con- 
 dition of the parties, their ages and the relations existing between 
 them and the surrounding circumstances. No invariable rule 
 can be laid down as to the amount or character of the facts which 
 must be proved to show a reasonable resistance.-^ Facts must 
 be shown. The testimony of the woman that she fought accused 
 or did her utmost to resist him is merely an opinion or conclusion 
 and not proof.''" 
 
 It is always admissible, as bearing on the cjuestion of resist- 
 ance, and consent, to show that the woman screamed or cried out 
 for aid when she was assaulted by the defendant. And proof 
 that she was silent or that her garments were neither torn, soiled 
 nor disarranged may also be received. Such evidence, though 
 by no means conclusive, is of weight in favor of the defendant 
 if not sufficiently explained. From proof of her silence at the 
 time of the alleged commission of the crime, taken in connection 
 with evidence of her mature age and general intelligence, the jury 
 may be justified in the inference that she consented to the inter- 
 course.*^ But her silence is always open to explanation. Hence 
 
 opportunity to make the utmost re- 
 sistance in repelling the assailant and 
 preventing him from accomplishing 
 his purpose; and a showing of a 
 passive demeanor is not sufficient, 
 where the woman is sufficiently pos- 
 sessed of her mental faculties to ap- 
 prehend her danger and to control 
 her physical powers in her defense. 
 Devoy v. State, 122 Wis. 148, 99 N. 
 W. 455. 
 
 *"a Hawkins v. State, 136 Ind. 630, 
 36 N. E. 419; Anderson v. State, 104 
 Ind. 467, 474, 4 N. E. 63, 5 N. E. 711 ; 
 Commonwealth v. McDonald, no 
 Mass. 405, 406; Eberhart v. State, 
 134 Ind. 651, 655, 34 N. E. 637; Fom- 
 eroy v. State, 94 Ind. 96, 48 Am. 146; 
 People V. Dohring, 59 N. Y. 374, 383, 
 17 Am. 349; Waller v. State, 40 Ala. 
 325 ; State v. Sudduth, 52 S. Car. 488, 
 30 S. E. 408; State v. Carpenter, 124 
 Iowa 5, 98 N. W. 775. 
 
 ^ "The nature and extent of resist- 
 ance which ought reasonably to be 
 expected in each particular case, 
 must necessarily depend verj' much 
 upon the peculiar circumstances at- 
 tending it, and it is hence quite im- 
 practicable to lay down any rule upon 
 that subject as applicable to all cases 
 involving the necessit}^ of showing a 
 reasonable resistance." Anderson v. 
 State, 104 Ind. 467, 474, 4 N. E. 63, 
 5 N. E. 711; Eberhart v. State, 134 
 Ind. 651, 655, 34 N. E. 637; Huber 
 V. State, 126 Ind. 185, 186, 25 X. E. 
 904; Davis V. State, 63 Ark. 470, 39 
 S. W. 356. 
 
 *- Devoy v. State, 122 Wis. 148, 99 
 N. W. 455; Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 
 193, 106 N. W. 536. 
 
 ^ State V. Cone, i Jones (N. Car.) 
 18; Eberhart v. State, 134 Ind. 651, 
 656, 34 N. E. 637; State v. Cross, 12 
 Iowa 66, 70, 79 Am. Dec. 519; Peo-
 
 yoi 
 
 RAPE. 
 
 § 418 
 
 her evidence explaining and giving reasons for her silence, as 
 for example, where she testifies that she did not make an outcry 
 hecause she was gagged or choked by the accused, or because she 
 was terrified by his threats, or because she was unconscious, must 
 always be considered by the jury in determining the evidential 
 value of her silence.** 
 
 It is never absolutely necessary to prove that her screams 
 were heard by every person who was within earshot, if her state- 
 ment that she made an outcry is corroborated by some evidence.*^ 
 The clothing of the prosecutrix, an infant properly identified by 
 her mother, is competent to show the force employed which may 
 be inferred from their torn condition.'^'' 
 
 § 418. Reputation of the prosecutrix for chastity — Proof of specific 
 unchaste acts. — The bad reputation of the prosecuting witness for 
 unchastity existing prior to the date of the crime is always rele- 
 ^•ant in evidence to show that the sexual intercourse may have 
 been consented to by her.*^ An exception to this rule is made 
 
 pie V. Morrison, i Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 
 625, 644; State V. Brown, 54 Kan. 
 71, 72, 2)7 Pac. 996; People v. Kir- 
 wan, 22 X. Y. S. 160, 67 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 652, without opinion; Warren v. 
 State, 54 Tex. Cr. 443, 114 S. W. 
 380. 
 
 ** State V. Reid, 39 Minn. 277, 279, 39 
 N. W. 796. 
 
 ^'Bean v. People, 124 111. 576, 580, 
 16 N. E. 656. Cf. Brown v. Com- 
 monwealth, 82 Va. 653 ; Reynolds v. 
 People, 41 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 179; 
 Barney v. People, 22 111. 160; State 
 V. Marcks, 140 Mo. 656, 41 S. W. 973, 
 43 S. W. 1095. 
 
 *^ State V. Brannan, 206 Mo. 636, 
 105 S. W. 602. 
 
 "State V. Barrick, 60 W. Va. 576, 
 55 S. E. 652; People v. Ryno, 148 
 Mich. 137, III X. W. 740, 14 Det. 
 Lcj?. X. 69; State v. Dctwiler, 60 W. 
 Va. 583, 55 S. E. 654 ; Black v. State, 
 \\() Ga. 746, 47 S. E. 370; Clark v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 92 S. W. 573, 
 
 29 Ky. L. 154; 14 L. R. A. (X. S.) 
 714; Elliott Evidence, § 3101; 
 O'Blenis v. State, 47 N. J. L. 279, 
 280; Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624, 
 645-653 ; People v. Johnson, 106 Cal. \r 
 289, 39 Pac. 622; People v. Hart- 
 man, 103 Cal. 242, 246, 2)7 Pac. 153, 
 42 Am. St. 108; State v. Hollenbeck, 
 67 Vt. 34, 30 Atl. 696; Brown v. 
 State, 72 Miss. 997, 17 So. 275; State 
 V. Eberline, 47 Kan. 155, 27 Pac. 
 839; State V. Brown, 55 Kan. 766, 42 
 Pac. 363 ; State v. Forshner, 43 N. H. 
 89, 80 Am. Dec. 132; Shields v. State, 
 32 Te.x. Cr. 498, 502, 23 S. W. 893; 
 Commonwealth v. Kendall, 113 Mass. 
 210, 211, 18 Am. 469; Rex v. Barker, 
 3 C. & P. 589; State V. Daniel, 87 N. 
 Car. 507 ; Anderson v. State, 104 Ind. 
 467, 471, 4 N. E. 62, 5 N. E. 711: 
 State V. Johnson, 28 Vt. 512, 514; 
 Boddic V. State, 52 Ala. 395, 398; 
 Rex V. Clarke, 2 Starkie 214. Cf. 
 Fry V. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 334; 
 Tyler V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 10, 79 S.
 
 4i8 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE, 
 
 702 
 
 where the female is under the age of consent. Evidence of her 
 reputation for unchastity or of acts of sexual intercourse with 
 the accused or with other men is then irrelevant as her consent is 
 immaterial.'"'* When tlie accused attacks the chastity of the pros- 
 ecuting witness by evidence of reputation for unchastity or of 
 illicit intercourse, the prosecution may introduce evidence of her 
 reputation for chastity to discredit such testimony.'^'' 
 
 The cases are not harmonious upon the question whether the 
 reputation for unchastity of a woman over the age of consent, 
 existing subsequent to the date of the alleged crime, is admissible. 
 The weight of the cases is against it.''" The evidence of un- 
 chaste reputation must come from a witness who has been a resi- 
 dent in the neighborhood where the female also resided. The 
 report of what a detective heard about the woman, on inquiring 
 among her acquaintances, is inadmissible.'*^ 
 
 Acts of voluntary sexual intercourse by the prosecuting wit- 
 ness with the defendant prior to the date of the crime may be 
 proved by her extra-judicial admissions, °- by her answers on her 
 
 W. 558; Shoemaker v. State (Tex. 
 Cr. App., 1910), 126 S. W. 887. Her 
 bad character for chastity may show, 
 or tend to show, that the prisoner 
 believed he would meet with little or 
 no resistance. Pratt v. State, 19 Ohio 
 St. 277, 279. Cf Myers v. State, 51 
 Neb. 517, 71 N. W. S3. Evidence of 
 good character of defendant in prose- 
 cution for rape, see 103 Am. St. 899, 
 note. 
 
 ^ State V. Smith, 18 S. Dak. 341, 
 100 X. W. 740; People V. Abbott, 97 
 Mich. 484, 486, 56 N. W. 862, 37 Am. 
 St. 360; People V. Glover, 71 Mich. 
 303, 38 N. W. 874; Plunkett v. State, 
 72 Ark. 409, 82 S. W. 845; State v. 
 Lawrence, 74 Ohio St. 38, 77 N. E. 
 266; Renfroe v. State, 84 Ark. 16, 
 104 S. W. 542; State V. Rivers (Conn., 
 1909), 74 Atl. 757. Compare, contra, 
 Sykes v. State, 1 12 Tenn. 572, 82 S. W. 
 185, 105 Am. St. 972n. 
 
 ""Leedom v. State, 8t Neb. 585, 116 
 N. W. 496; Warren v. State, 54 Tex. 
 Cr. 443, 114 S. W. 380. 
 
 ""State V. Ward, 73 Iowa 532, 35 
 N. W. 617; State v. Forshner, 43 N. 
 H. 89, 90, 80 Am. Dec. 132; Rex v. 
 Clarke, 2 Stark. 214; People v. Ab- 
 bot, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 192; State v. 
 Day, 188 Mo. 359, 87 S. W. 465 
 (where prosecutrix was under the 
 age of consent). Contra, Rex v. 
 Barker, 3 C. & P. 589, 3 Greenl., 
 § 214; Lake v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 104 S. W. 1003, 31 Ky. L. 1232. 
 
 "'State v. Forshner, 43 N. H. 89, 
 80 Am. Dec. 132. It may not be nec- 
 essary to prove that the reputation 
 for unchastity is well known or an- 
 cient. Thus evidence of the general 
 reputation of the prosecutrix for 
 chastity in the community is relevant 
 where it appeared that she had only 
 been in town for about twenty-four 
 hours, during which time she had 
 openly solicited sexual intercourse 
 with several men. State v. Brown, 
 55 Kan. 766, 42 Pac. 363. 
 
 ^ State V. Cook, 65 Iowa 560, 562, 
 22 N. W. 675.
 
 /^6 
 
 RAPE, 
 
 418 
 
 cross-examination."'' or otherwise.''^ Such evidence is relevant 
 to show that the apparently forced intercourse was voluntarily 
 submitted to by her. 
 
 The great majority of the cases maintain the rule that acts 
 of sexual intercourse participated in by the alleged victim of the 
 rape prior to the date of the crime but with other men than the 
 accused cannot be shown to prove her consent. '•'•"' This rule is 
 said to be based upon the assumption that the prosecutrix is 
 unprepared to confute and disprove sudden and unexpected ac- 
 cusation of adulterous acts. In the main, how^ever, it is founded 
 upon the theory that no inference can be drawn that she con- 
 sented to intercourse with the accused from the fact that she had 
 previously submitted to the embraces of other men. Though 
 evidence of adulterous acts with other men is not generally ad- 
 missible, evidence of other acts indicating the possession of an 
 immoral character is relevant. Evidence of drunkenness and 
 
 " Bedgood v. State, 115 Ind. 275, 17 
 X. E. 621 ; Shirwin v. People, 69 111. 
 55 ; State v. Gereke, 74 Kan. 196, 86 
 Pac. 160, 87 Pac. 759; State v. Se- 
 christ (Mo., 1910), 126 S. W. 400. 
 
 "People V. Abbott, 97 Mich. 484, 
 486, 56 N. W. 862, 37 Am. St. 360; 
 Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 204, 207, 7 
 So. 38, r6 Am. St. 48; State v. Jef- 
 ferson, 6 Ired. (X. Car.) 305; Woods 
 V. People, 55 N. Y. 515, 14 Am. 309; 
 Rex V. Martin, 6 C. & P. 562; Bed- 
 good V. State, IIS Ind. 275, 279, 17 
 N. E. 621 ; Hall v. People, 47 Mich. 
 636, II N. W. 414; State v. Cassidy, 
 85 Iowa 14s, 52 X. W. I ; State v. 
 Forshner, 43 X. H. 89, 80 Am. Dec. 
 132; People V. Grauer, 12 App. Div. 
 rX. Y.) 464. 42 X. Y. S. 721; State 
 V. Conlin, 45 Wash. 478, 88 Pac. 932; 
 People V. Xichols (Mich., 1909), 124 
 X. W. 25, 16 Det. Leg. X. 890; Boyd 
 V. State (Ohio. 1910), 90 X. E. 355. 
 
 ** State V. Cassidy, 85 Iowa 145, 
 149, 52 X. W. I ; State v. Brown, 55 
 Kan. 766, 42 Pac. 363; Common- 
 wealth V. Harri':, 131 Mass. 336; 
 
 Commonwealth v. Kendall, 113 Mass. 
 210, 211; State V. Fitzsimon, 18 R. I. 
 236, 27 Atl. 446, 49 Am. St. 766; 
 Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624, 648; 
 O'Blenis v. State, 47 X. J. L. 279; 
 State V. Knapp, 45 X. H. 148, 156; 
 McCombs V. State, 8 Ohio St. 643, 
 646; People V. Abbott, 97 Mich. 484, 
 486, 56 X. W. 862, 37 Am. St. 360; 
 State V. Patrick, 107 Mo. 147, 17 S. 
 W. 666; State v. Campbell, 20 Xev. 
 122, 17 Pac. 620; McQuirk v. State, 
 84 Ala. 435, 4 So. 775, 5 Am. 381; 
 People V. McLean, 71 Mich. 309, 38 
 X. W. 917, IS Am. St. 263; 2 Phil, 
 on Ev., § 940; I Greenl. Ev., § 458; 
 Rose. Cr. Ev. 903 ; State v. Turner, i 
 Hous. C. C. (Del.) 76. Contra, State 
 V. Johnson, 28 Vt. 512, 513, 515; Ben- 
 nett, J., dissenting; People v. Ab- 
 bot, 19 Wend. (X. Y.) 192; Benstine 
 V. State, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 169, 173, 31 
 Am. 593; People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 
 221, 65 Am. Dec. 506; People v. 
 Knight (Cal., 1895), 43 Pac. 6; State 
 V. Whitescll, 142 Mo. 467, 44 S. W. 
 332. Evidence of other offenses in 
 prosecution for rape, see Elliott Evi-
 
 § 4i8 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 704 
 
 dissipation, of the keeping of late hours and of street walking on 
 the part of the prosecutrix will always be received.'"' 
 
 Because of the irrelevancy of adultery with other men it has 
 been held, according to the majority of the earlier cases in both 
 England and America, that when on her cross-examination 
 a question is put to the woman as regards her illicit relations 
 with other men, and she waives her privilege of refusing to 
 answer and denies the act, the accused is bound by her answer.''" 
 The more recent cases hold, however, that the accused under such 
 circumstances is not concluded by her answer, though the matter 
 may not be strictly relevant; but may contradict it solely for im- 
 peachment, by proving adulterous actions with other men if they 
 are not too remote in point of time."*' 
 
 The admissions of the defendant, particularly an offer on his 
 part to pay a certain sum of money to the prosecutrix or her 
 mother to settle the matter, are always relevant against him."''' 
 And on the other hand it is competent for the prosecution to 
 prove that the prosecutrix felt friendly toward the accused and 
 did not wish to have him indicted."" 
 
 dence, § 3105; 62 Am. St. 193, note; 
 105 Am. St. 1004, note. 
 
 ""Brennan v. People, 7 Hun (X. 
 Y.) 171. This reasoning clearly pos- 
 sesses little validity or application 
 where the accused is shown to be a 
 prostitute, who disposes of her fa- 
 vors to all men indiscriminately. 
 
 *'Reg. V. Cockcroft, 11 Cox C. C. 
 410; Reg. V. Holmes, 12 Cox C. C. 
 137 ; People v. Jackson, 6 X. Y. Cr. 
 393- 
 
 "'People V. Flaherty, 79 Hun (X. 
 Y.) 48, 29 X. Y. S. 641; People v. 
 Knight (Cal., 1895), 43 Pac. 6. "In 
 determining that question [of con- 
 sent], which is purely a mental act, 
 it is important to ascertain whether 
 her consent would, from her previous 
 habits, be the natural result of her 
 mind, or whether it would be incon- 
 sistent with her previous life, and 
 repugnant to all her moral feelings." 
 By the court in State v. Johnson, 28 
 
 Vt. 512; Strang v. People, 24 Mich. 
 
 h 7. 
 
 "'■* Hardtke v. State, 67 Wis. 552, 30 
 X. W. 723; McMath V. State, 55 Ga. 
 303, 308. But evidence to prove acts 
 of sexual intercourse by him with 
 other women must be rejected. Peo- 
 ple V. Stewart, 85 Cal. 174, 24 Pac. 
 722; State V. La Alont (S. Dak., 1909), 
 120 X. W. 1 104. Where the evidence 
 tends to show that the prosecutrix is 
 pregnant, and the accused denies the 
 sexual intercourse, it may be shown 
 that the woman had intercourse with 
 another man at a period which would 
 account for her pregnancy. Rice v. 
 State, 37 Tex. Cr. 38, 38 S. W. 803. 
 Contra, State v. Blackburn (Iowa, 
 1907), no X. W. 275, permitting evi- 
 dence of adulter}^ with other men t'l 
 take a wide range as impeachment. 
 
 '~ Huff V. State, 106 Ga. 432, 32 S. 
 E. 348; Denton v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 
 193, 79 S. W. 560.
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AND FALSE PRETENSES. 
 
 i 419. Forgery — Definition and classi- § 432. 
 fication. 
 
 420. Competency of witnesses. 
 
 421. Variance in proving the writ- 
 
 ing- 433- 
 
 422. Fraudulent intent and guilty 
 
 knowledge — Circumstantial 
 evidence to show. 
 
 423. Evidence of similar crimes to 
 
 show the intent — Effect of 434. 
 acquittal — Relevancy of pos- 435. 
 session of forged papers on 436. 
 charge of forgery. 
 
 424. Proof of uttering forged pa- 437. 
 
 per. 438. 
 
 425. The writing alleged to have 
 
 been forged as evidence — 
 Primary evidence. 
 
 426. Proving the venue. 439. 
 
 427. Fictitious names — Evidence to 
 
 prove existence or non-exist- 440. 
 ence of person. 
 
 428. Proving the corporate exist- 441. 
 
 ence of the bank upon which 
 
 the forged check is drawn. 442. 
 
 429. Proving the handwritinj — Ex- 
 
 pert evidence — Standards of 443. 
 comparison. 
 
 430. Evidence to show that the 
 
 forged writing could not ac- 
 complish the purpose in- 444. 
 tended. 
 
 431. Sufficiency of evidence — Pccu- 445. 
 
 niary condition of the ac- 
 cused. 
 
 Counterfeiting — Elements of 
 the crime — Intent and guilty 
 knowledge — Evidence of simi- 
 lar offenses. 
 
 Evidence to show that counter- 
 feit money or implements for 
 its manufacture were found 
 in the possession of the ac- 
 cused. 
 
 Resemblance to the genuine. 
 
 False pretenses. 
 
 Evidence to show the inten- 
 tion of the owner. 
 
 The intent to defraud. 
 
 Evidence of other similar 
 crimes not inadmissible when 
 relevant to show the intent 
 to defraud. 
 
 The pretenses made and evi- 
 dence to show their falsity. 
 
 The pretenses must have been 
 calculated to deceive. 
 
 The value of the property ob- 
 tained. 
 
 Belief in the false representa- 
 tions. 
 
 Evidence of the pecuniary con- 
 dition of the accused at the 
 date of making tiic repre- 
 sentations. 
 
 The false pretenses not neces- 
 sarily verl)al. 
 
 Proving the venue. 
 
 .^419. Forgery — Definition and classification. — l-'orj^crv at ll 
 common law i.s the fraudulent making or alteration of a writii 
 45— Underhill Ckim. Ev. ( 705 )
 
 § 419 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 706 
 
 to the prejudice of another's right. It may be committed in any 
 writing, which, if genuine, would operate as the foundation of 
 another's HabiHty or the evidence of his right. ^ The following 
 facts must be shown. First, that a false writing has been made. 
 Second, that it was apparently capable of accomplishing a fraud- 
 ulent purpose. And third, the fraudulent intent." A material 
 alteration in a true document may under some circumstances be 
 forgery.^ To constitute an alteration a forgery it must be proved 
 that some material part of the instrument has been altered.^ 
 Whether an alteration is material or not is a question of law for 
 the court. ^ Generally, any alteration in an instrument which 
 makes it speak a language which is different in its legal effect 
 from that which it originally spoke or which creates some change 
 in the rights, interests or obligations of the parties may be re- 
 garded as a material alteration." 
 
 ^ State V. Thompson, 19 Iowa 299 ; 
 McLean v. State, 3 Ga. App. 660, 60 
 S. E. 332; Goodman v. People, 228 
 111. 154, 81 N. E. 830. 
 
 " Mr. Bishop thus defines the crime : 
 "Forgery is the false making, or ma- 
 terially altering, with intent to de- 
 fraud, of any writing which, if genu- 
 ine, might apparently be of legal ef- 
 ficacy, or the foundation of a legal 
 liability." 2 Bish. Cr. L. adopted as 
 correct in Rembert v. State, 53 Ala. 
 467, 468, 25 Am. 639. Forgery is the 
 fraudulent making of a false writing, 
 which, if genuine, would apparently 
 be of some legal efficacy ; and the 
 uttering, publishing, and putting off 
 as true of the same, with intent to 
 defraud, is the offense specified in 
 Gen. St. 1894, § 6702. State v. Wills 
 (Minn.), ^2, N. W. 177. A fraudu- 
 lent insertion of additional words, 
 or an alteration in a material part of 
 a true document by which another 
 may be defrauded is a forgery. State 
 V. Brett, 16 Mont. 360, 40 Pac. 873, 
 877; Commonwealth v. Boutwell, 129 
 Mass. 124, 125; Rex v. Dawson, i 
 
 Stra. 19; State v. Flye, 26 Me. 312, 
 318; State V. Floyd, 5 Strobh. (S. 
 Car.) 58, S3 Am. Dec. 689; State v. 
 Weaver, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 491, 493; 
 State V. Maxwell, 47 Iowa 454, 455; 
 State V. Marvels, 2 Harr. (Del.) 
 527; Haynes v. State, 15 Ohio St. 
 455, 457; State v. Van Auken, 98 
 Iowa 674, 68 N. W. 454; State v. 
 Wills (Minn., 1897), 7Z N. W. 177; 
 Murphy v. State, 118 Ala. 137, 23 So. 
 
 719. 
 
 ^ State V. Mitton, 36 Mont. 376, 92 
 Pac. 969; State v. Barrett, 121 La. 
 1058, 46 So. 1016; Fischl v. State, 54 
 Tex. Cr. 55, iii S. W. 410; State v. 
 Lotono, 62 W. Va. 310, 58 S. E. 621 ; 
 People v. Collins, 9 Cal. App. 622, 
 99 Pac. 1 109; State v. Floyd, 169 Ind. 
 136, 81 N. E. 1 1 53. 
 
 ^ State V. Mitton, 36 Mont. 376, 92 
 Pac. 969. 
 
 ''State V. Lotono, 62 W. Va. 310, 
 58 S. E. 621. 
 
 " State V. Lotono, 62 W. Va. 310, 
 58 S. E. 621. An alteration of the 
 figures in a check is an immaterial 
 alteration, the words of the check
 
 707 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AND FALSE PRETENSES. § 42O 
 
 ;< 420. Competency of witnesses. — A subscribing witness or a 
 person taking an acknowledgment to a forged instrument may 
 testify that what purports to be his signature is forged.^ 
 
 In England at common law the person bound on the forged 
 instrument, if not discharged from his liability was incompetent 
 because of interest. If the instrument were genuine he would be 
 liable thereon; while, if it were a forgery, the writing was for- 
 feited to the crown and destroyed.* This rule, though followed 
 in a few early cases, is now universally rejected in America. The 
 obligor is always competent for the state,^ and if he can be pro- 
 duced he is a proper witness and should be called by the state. ^^ 
 His interest as obligor may be proved to affect the credibility of 
 his evidence. ^^ He is not an indispensable witness. The falsity 
 of the writing may be proved by other witnesses.^^ 
 
 .^ 421. Variance in proving the writing. — Any material variance 
 between the alleged forged writing as proved and as set forth in 
 the indictment is fatal when the writing is pleaded according to 
 its tenor. ^^ The cases are strict in defining the diversity between 
 
 determining its legal effect. State v. forged was absent from the state liis 
 
 Lotono, 62 W. Va. 310, 58 S. E. 621. partner may testify that the signature 
 
 Presumptions and burden of proof in was not in the handwriting of the ab- 
 
 prosecution for forgery, see Elliott sentee. Washington v. State, 143 Ala. 
 
 Evidence, § 2986, 2987. 62, 39 So. 388. Condonation by the 
 
 ' People V. Sharp, 53 Mich. 523, 19 obligor is irrelevant. State v. Tull, 
 
 X. W. 168. See Underbill on Ev., 119 Mo. 421, 24 S. W. lOio. 
 
 §§ 138-142. '"Simmons v. State, 7 Ohio 116. 
 
 *2 Stark. Ev. 338, 339. See Elliott Cf. Anson v. People, 148 111. 494, 505, 
 
 Evidence, § 2989. 35 K. E. 145. 
 
 * Anson v. People, 148 111. 494, 505, " State v. Henderson, 29 W. Va. 
 
 35 X. E. 145; State v. Bateman, 3 147, i S. E. 225. 
 
 Ired. (X. Car.) 474, 479; People v. ^ State v. Farrington, 90 Iowa 673, 
 
 Howell, 4 Johns. (X\ Y.) 296, 302; 57 X. W. 606; Commonwealth v. 
 
 State v. Phelps, 11 Vt. 116. 122, 34 Smith, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 568, 570; 
 
 .\m. Dec. 672; Commonwealth v. State v. Hooper, 2 Bailey (S. Car.) 
 
 Waitc, 5 Mass. 261; State v. Hooper, 37, 40; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5, 22 
 
 2 Bailey (S. Car.) 27, 40; Simmons Am. Dec. 767n; 2 Stark. Ev, 585. Sec 
 
 v. State, 7 Ohio 116; Williams v. t^ost, § 429. 
 
 State CTex. Cr., 1895), 2)2 S. W. 532; " Mackquirc v. Stale, or Miss, i.sr, 
 
 -McClasson v. State, 37 Tc.x. Cr. 620, 44 So. 802; State v. Handy, 20 Mo. 
 
 40 S. W. 503, 66 Am. St. 842. Where 81. 83; LuttrdI v. State, 85 Tenn. 
 
 one of a firm whose signature was 2^2, 239, 1 S. W. 886, 4 .Am. St. 7(0;
 
 § 4^1 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 tlie indictment and the writing as proved which shall constitute 
 a material variance and which shall exclude the alleged forged 
 instrument from evidence. 
 
 The misspelling/"* or the omission of a linal letter from the 
 alleged forged name as proved, or of a single figure from the 
 amount/^ or reversing the order of names/" are some extreme 
 instances of material and fatal variance.^' But other cases per- 
 ni.it a wider latitude in the proof and disregard unimportant dis- 
 crepancies in names and dates, particularly if the names are idem 
 sojians.^^ An allegation of forging a writing is sustained by 
 proving an instrument partly written and partly printed,^" and 
 the fact that tlie instrument proved was acknowledged, while 
 
 Wilson V. State, 70 Miss. 595, 12 So. 
 332, 13 So. 225, 35 Am. St. 664; Has- 
 lip V. State, 10 Neb. 590, 592, 7 N. W. 
 331 ; Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 
 435, 2 N. E. 808; People v. Marion, 
 29 Mich. 31; State v. Carlson (Iowa, 
 1909), 123 X. W. 765. Though it is 
 not necessary for the indictment to 
 describe the writing with extreme mi- 
 nuteness, 3'et when so described strict 
 proof must be had. Powell v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 9 S. W. 245, ID Ky. 
 L. 329; State V. Smith, 31 Mo. 120, 
 121 ; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5, 9, 22 Am. 
 Dec. 767n ; State v. Fleshman, 40 W. 
 Va. 726, 22 S. E. 309; Common- 
 wealth V. Wilson, 2 Gray (Mass.) 
 70, 71; McDonnell v. State, 58 Ark. 
 242, 24 S. W. 105. 
 
 "Westbrook v. State, 23 Tex. App. 
 401, 403, 5 S. W. 248; McClellan v. 
 State, 32 Ark. 609, 611 ; Hale v. State, 
 120 Ga. 183, 47 S. E. 531. 
 
 " Burress v. Commonwealth, 27 
 Gratt. (Va.) 934, 944. 
 
 ^' State V. Lane, 80 X. Car. 407 ; 
 State V. Woodrow, 56 Kan. 217, 42 
 Pac. 714. 
 
 "A note signed "J. C. Orr" will 
 not sustain an allegation of forging 
 one signed "James C. Orr." State v. 
 Fay, 65 J\Io. 490, 494. See State v. 
 Pease, 74 Ind. 263, 264. 
 
 "People V. Munroe (Cal., 1894), 
 3S Pac. 776; Bench v. State, 63 Ark. 
 488, 39 S. W. 360; Davis V. State, 37 
 Tex. Cr. 218, 39 S. W. 296; Agee 
 V. State, 113 Ala. 52, 21 So. 207; All- 
 good V. State, 87 Ga. 668, 13 S. E. 
 569; Sutton V. Commonwealth, 97 
 Ky. 308, 30 S. W. 661, 17 Ky. L. 184; 
 State V. Collins, 115 N. Car. 716, 20 
 S. E. 452; People v. Smith, 103 Cal. 
 563, 37 Pac. 516; Stewart v. State, 
 113 Ind. 505, 508, 16 N. E. 186; 
 Trask v. People, 151 111. 523, 38 X. 
 E. 248; Roush V. State, 34 Neb. 325, 
 51 N. W. 755; State v. Bibb, 68 Mo. 
 286, 288; State V. Gryder, 44 La. 
 Ann. 962, 965, II So. 573, 32 Am. St. 
 358; Cross V. People, 47 111. 152, 95 
 Am. Dec. 474; Hennessy v. State, 23 
 Tex. App. 340, 354, 5 S. W. 215; 
 State V. Lane, 80 N. Car. 407, 409; 
 State V. Blanchard, 74 Iowa 628, 38 
 N. W. 519, 520.; Langdale v. People, 
 TOO III. 263, 268; Garmire v. State, 
 104 Ind. 444, 446, 4 N. E. 54; Las- 
 sitcr V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 540, 34 S. 
 W. 751 ; Telfair v. State, 56 Fla. 104, 
 47 So. 863 ; People v. Dole, 122 Cal. 
 486, 55 Pac. 581, 68 Am. St. 50. 
 
 '"State V. Jones, i McMuIlen (S. 
 Car.) 236, 243, 36 Am. Dec. 257.
 
 709 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AND FALSE PRETENSES. 
 
 § 422 
 
 that alleged was not. is immaterial.-" The delivery of a writing 
 containing blanks which are evidently intended to be filled creates 
 an implied authority on the recei\-er to complete the instrument. 
 This is a rule in the law of contracts but it does not apply to a 
 prosecution for forgery where it appears that the instrument was 
 complete when delivered and the filling of the blank was not only 
 without the consent of the person who signed the instrument but 
 was a material alteration of it.-^ 
 
 ^ 422. Fraudulent intent and guilty knowledge — Circumstantial 
 evidence to show. — The intent of the accused to defraud is the es- 
 sence of the crime and must be proved beyond a reasonable 
 doubt. -^ And if it is shown, evidence that the party whose name 
 was forged had no legal capacity to sign is irrelevant.-^ 
 
 '"People V. Baker, 100 Cal. 188, 
 190, 34 Pac. 649, 38 Am. St. 276; 
 Lassiter v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 540, 34 
 S. W. 751. The peculiar strictness 
 required at the common law was 
 largely the outcome of the severity 
 of the punishment inflicted. In con- 
 sequence of the more humane rules 
 now in force, a wider latitude in va- 
 riance would doubtless be allowed. 
 Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 437, 2 
 X. E. 808. See also, Reg. v. Wil- 
 son, 2 C. & K. 527. An allegation of 
 an intent to defraud several persons 
 is sustained by proving an intent to 
 defraud any one of them. McDon- 
 nell v. State, 58 -Ark. 242, 24 S. W. 
 105. 
 ■^ ■* State V. Mitton, 37 Mont. 366, 96 
 Pac. 926, 127 Am. St. 732. 
 
 ~ People v. Corrigan, 129 .App. Div. 
 <N'. Y.) 75, 113 X. Y. S. 513; Mont- 
 gomery v. State, 12 Te.x. A pp. 323, 
 330; People V. Wiman, 148 X. Y. 
 29. 42 X. E. 408; Sntll v. State, 2 
 Humph. (Tcnn.) 347; Common- 
 wtalth V. Lad<l. 15 .Mass. 526. 529; 
 People V. Stearns, 21 Wend. (X. Y.) 
 409; Fox V. People, 95 III. 7r. 75; 
 Elscy V. State, 47 Ark. 572, 2 S. W. 
 
 3:i7 ; Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127, 74 
 Am. Dec. 49; Leonard v. State, 29 
 Ohio St. 408; State v. Shelters, 51 
 Vt. 102, 105, 31 Am. 679; State v. 
 Gavigan, 36 Kan. 322, 13 Pac. 554; 
 State V. Redstrake, 39 N. J. L. 365, 
 369; State V. Williams, 66 Iowa 573, 
 24 X. W. 52; People V. Caton, 25 
 Mich. 388; Couch v. State, 28 Ga. 
 367, 368; Stephens v. State, 56 Ga. 
 604 ; Commonwealth v. Connolly, 1 1 
 Pa. Co. Ct. 414; Agee v. State, 113 
 Ala. 52, 21 So. 207; People v. Elphis, 
 72 Pac. 838, 139 Cal. XIX, not re- 
 ported in full ; Xorton v. State, 129 
 Wis. 659, 109 X. W. 531, 116 Am. 
 St. 979; Wells v. Territory (Okla. 
 Cr. App., 1908), 98 Pac. 483; Elliott 
 Evidence, § 2990; Feeney v. State 
 (Tex. Cr. .App., 1910), 124 S. W. 9.^4. 
 One who, with intent to defraud, 
 utters a promissory note as the 
 note of a person other than the 
 signer and procures to it the name 
 of an innocent person who does not 
 thereby intend it to bind himself, 
 is guilty of forgery. "When that 
 intent exists, and the instrument is 
 •the fruit of it. the author of the 
 fraud cannot escape the charge of
 
 § 422 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 710 
 
 It is not necessary to show that it was the intention of the de- 
 fendant to defraud any particular person. It is enough that a 
 general intent to defraud is shown."* 
 
 The intent is always a Cjuestion for the jury. It may be in- 
 ferred by them from what the accused does and says and from all 
 the facts and circumstances involved in the transaction."" 
 
 The intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the 
 accused doing an act which he knows the law forbids, as signing 
 a name not his own."" or making a false entry to conceal a pre- 
 vious defalcation,-' but not alone from an act not criminal per sc 
 and which may be innocent under particular circumstances."'* 
 
 A false or fictitious entry or written instrument may be made 
 by mistake, or for book-keeping purposes, or a forged writing 
 may be innocently uttered. Guilty knowledge is always material. 
 It must be strictly proved, though direct and positive evidence is 
 not required if, from existing circumstances, it may be inferred 
 that the accused knew the fraudulent character of the transac- 
 tion, as where he makes a false statement that he was the payee 
 of the alleged forged note.^® 
 
 forgery by procuring one who hap- 
 pens to bear a name that suits his 
 purpose to supply him with a pre- 
 tended genuine signature." Com- 
 monweahh v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311, 
 322, 19 Am. 353. 
 
 ^ People V. Krummer, 4 Park. Cr. 
 (N. Y.) 217; State v. Eades, 68 Mo. 
 150, 152, 30 Am. 780. 
 
 "* McClure v. Commonwealth, 86 
 Pa. St. 353, 356; State v. Keneston, 
 59 X. H. 36, 37; Snell v. State, 2 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 347, 350; United 
 States V. Moses, 4 Wash. C. C. 726, 728, 
 27 Fed. Cas. 15825; Reg. v. Vaughan, 
 8 C. & P. 276, 281. Cf. Common- 
 wealth V. Brown, 147 Mass. 585, 18 
 N. E. 587, 9 Am. St. 736n, i L. R. 
 A. 620; Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 
 503, 517; Green v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 
 109, 35 S. W. 971 ; Rohr v. State, 60 
 X. J. L. 576, 38 Atl. 673; People v. 
 Campbell (Mich.. 1910'), 125 X. W. 
 42, 16 Det. Leg. X. 1082. 
 
 -'State V. Williams, 66 Iowa 573, 
 575, 24 X. W. 52; Timmons v. State, 
 80 Ga. 216, 4 S. E. 766; Reg. v. 
 Cooke, 8 C. & P. 582, 585; State v. 
 Mitton, 37 Mont. 366, 96 Pac. 926, 
 127 Am. St. 732; Fischl v. State, 54 
 Tex. Cr. 55, ii'i S. W. 410; Spears 
 V. People, 220 111. 72, 77 X. E. 112, 
 4 L. R. A. (X. S.) 402n. 
 
 -" State V. Hahn, 38 La. Ann. 169, 
 172; Smith V. State (Tex. Cr., 1895), 
 32 S. W. 696; United States v. 
 Houghton, 14 Fed. 544, 549. 
 
 "' Phelps V. People, 72 X. Y. 365, 6 
 Hun (X. Y.) 428. 
 
 ^Fox V. People, 95 111. 71. 
 
 ^ State V. Williams, 66 Iowa 573, 
 575, 24 N. W. 52; Parker v. People, 
 97 111. 32, 38; Reg. V. Geach, 9 C. & 
 P. 499, 503. In proving a charge of 
 uttering forged writings, it must be 
 proved that the accused knew they 
 were forged. State v. Lowry. 42 W. 
 Va. 205, 24 S. E. 561 ; Sands v. Com-
 
 711 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AXD FALSE PRETENSES. 
 
 § 423 
 
 ^ 423. Evidence of similar crimes to show intent — Effect of ac- 
 quittal — Relevancy of possession of forged papers on charge of for- 
 gery. — Evidence of similar forgeries, or of the possession of 
 forged papers about the same time, is admissible to show a uni- 
 form course of acting from which guilty knowledge and criminal 
 intent may be inferred,^'^ though an indictment is pending against 
 
 monwcalth, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 800, 823; 
 United State v. Mitchell, Bald. C. C. 
 (U. S.) 366, 26 Fed. Cas. 15787; 
 Commonwealth v. Searle, 2 Binn. 
 (Pa.) 332, 4 Am. Dec. 446; Miller 
 V. State, 51 Ind. 405, 406. The jury 
 may infer guilty knowledge if they 
 are satisfied that the accused had 
 reason to believe the writing was 
 forged. Wells v. Territory, i Okla. 
 Cr. 469, 98 Pac. 483. 
 
 ^'Lingafelter v. State, 28 Ohio Cir. 
 Ct. 800; Wooldridge v. State, 49 Fla. 
 137, 38 So. 3; Wright V. State, 138 
 Ala. 69, 34 So. 1009; State v. Mitton, 
 2,7 Mont. 366, 96 Pac. 926, 127 Am. 
 St. 732; People V. Peck, 139 Mich. 
 680, 103 X. W. 178, 12 Det. Leg. N. 
 28; Dillard v. United States, 141 Fed. 
 303, ^2 C. C. A. 451 ; People v. Do- 
 lan, 186 X. Y. 4, 78 X. E. 569, 116 
 Am. St. 521 ; People v. Harben, S 
 Cal. App. 29, 91 Pac. 398; People v. 
 Dolan, III .App. Div. (X. Y.) 600, 97 
 N. Y. S. 929; State v. Stark, 202 Mo. 
 210, 100 S. W. 642; Jurctich v. Peo- 
 ple, 223 111. 484, 79 X. E. 181 ; State 
 V. Newman, 34 Mont. 434, 87 Pac. 
 462; State V. Murphy, 17 X. Dak. 
 48, 115 X. W. 84; Wooldridge v. 
 State, 49 Fla. 137, 38 So. 3; Lang- 
 ford V. State. ZZ F'^- 233, 242, 14 
 So. 815; Carver v. People, 39 Mich. 
 786, 79^\ People V. Everhardt, 104 
 N. Y. 591, 594, II X. E. 62; People 
 V. Bibby, 91 Cal. 470, 477, 27 Pac. 
 781; Fox V. People. 95 111. 71. 75; 
 State V. Myers, 82 Mo. 558. 564-570, 
 52 Am. 389; People v. I'rank, 28 
 
 Cal. 507, 515; Commonwealth v. Rus- 
 sell, 156 Mass. 196, 30 N. E. 763; 
 Hennessy v. State, 23 Tex. App. 340, 
 5 S. W. 215; Devere v. State, 5 Ohio 
 Cr. Ct. 509; United States v. Burns, 
 5 McLean (U. S.) 23, 24 Fed. Cas. 
 14691 ; Anson v. People, 148 111. 494, 
 503, 35 ^'- E. 145; Strang v. State, 
 32 Tex. Cr. 219, 22 S. W. 680; State 
 V. Minton, 116 Mo. 605, 613, 22 
 S. W. 808; State v. McAllister, 
 24 Me. 139, 143 ; Commonwealth 
 V. Edgerly, 10 Allen (Mass.) 184, 
 186, 187; State V. Twitty, 2 
 Hawks (X. Car.) 248, 258; Martin 
 V. Commonwealth, 2 Leigh (Va.) 
 745, 749; Harding v. State, 54 Ind. 
 359; Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 
 432, 2 X. E. 808; Card v. State, 109 
 Ind. 415, 421, 9 N. E. 591 ; Common- 
 wealth V. Stearns, 10 Met. (Mass.) 
 256 ; Wash v. Commonwealth, 16 
 Gratt. (Va.) 530; Commonwealth v. 
 Turner, 3 Met. (Mass.) 19, 24; Com- 
 monwealth V. Stone, 4 Met. (Mass.) 
 43, 47; Smith V. State, 29 Fla. 408, 
 421, TO So. 894; Lindsey v. State, 38 
 Ohio St. 507; United States v. Craig, 
 4 Wash. C. C. (U. S.) 729, 25 Fed. 
 Cas. 14883; State v. Williams, 2 
 Rich. (S. Car.) 418, 45 Am. Dec. 74^ ; 
 Bishop V. State, 55 Md. 138, 141. Cj. 
 People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216, 46 
 Pac. 153. It is error not to warn the 
 jury against accepting such evidence 
 as proof of the corpus delicti. An- 
 son v. People, 148 111. 494, S04. 35 ^^• 
 E. 145; Francis v. State, 7 Tex. App. 
 501; Carver v. People, 39 Mich. 7?f),
 
 § 4^3 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 '12 
 
 the accused for the other acts.'" Evidence that the accused had 
 heen indicted for another forgery, or for having forged papers 
 in his possession, is not inachnissible because he had been ac- 
 quitted. The acquittal merely exempts him f roni punishment and 
 from another prosecution. It does not necessarily show that he 
 was innocent.^- Proof of possession and of use of forged i)apers, 
 whether by the accused or by an accomplice, is admissible whether 
 before or after the date of the alleged forgery for which the ac- 
 cused is upon trial.^^ But the admission by the accused of any 
 facts concerning the false instrument found in his possession, or 
 which he is shown to have uttered, is not receivable," thougli 
 
 788; People V. Everhardt, 104 N. Y. 
 59T, 594, II N. E. 62. Evidence of 
 other crimes in prosecutions for for- 
 ger\% see Elliott Evidence, § 2994; 62 
 L. R. A. 193, note; 105 Arri. St. 976, 
 note. 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Wiiite, 145 
 Mass. 392, 395, 14 X. E. 611; State 
 V. Williams, 2 Rich. (S. Car.) 418, 
 45 Am. Dec. 741 ; State v. McAllister, 
 24 Me. 139, 143; United States v. 
 Doebler, i Bald. C. C. (U. S.) 519, 
 527, 25 Fed. Cas. 14977 ; Bell v. State, 
 57 Md. 108, 115. 
 
 ^=Bell v. State, 57 Md. 108, 117; 
 McCartney v. State, 3 Ind. 353, 354, 
 56 Am. Dec. 510; State v. Houston, 
 I Bailey (S. Car.) 300, 303; State v. 
 Jesse, 3 Dev. & Bat. (N. Car.) 98, 
 103, 108, 109; State V. Robinson, 16 
 X. J. L. 507, 508, 509. In McCartney 
 V. State, 3 Ind. 353, on pp. 354 and 
 355, the court says: "We can see no 
 reason why the fact that indictments 
 had been found, or that convictions 
 or acquittals had been had upon 
 them, should affect the admissibility 
 of such utterings. Neither the in- 
 dictments nor the records of con- 
 viction or acquittal need be, nor, it 
 strikes us (though the point is not 
 for decision in this case), should be 
 given in evidence, but the facts and 
 
 attendant circumstances alone of the 
 utterings as though no indictments 
 had been found. N^or do we think 
 that the fact that some of these other 
 counterfeit or false bills purported to 
 be upon banks different from that on 
 which the indictment being tried was 
 based, should render the evidence in- 
 admissible. It might affect its force, 
 but not, we think, its competency." 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Price, 10 Gray 
 (Mass.) 472, 476, 71 Am. Dec. 668n ; 
 Commonwealth v. Coe, 115 Mass. 
 481, 501 ; Commonwealth v. Hall, 4 
 Allen (Mass.) 305, 306; Common- 
 wealth V. White, 145 Mass. 392, 395, 
 14 N. E. 611; Harding v. State, 54 
 Ind. 359, 365; I Greenl. Ev., § 53. 
 See ante, note. It is not necessary 
 to prove that they were technically 
 forgeries if they were fabricated 
 with an intent to deceive. People v. 
 Altman, 147 N. Y. 473, 42 S. E. 180; 
 Commonwealth v. Ayer, 3 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 150, 152; Commonwealth v. 
 Hinds, loi ]\Iass. 209, 210. 
 
 ** People V. Corbin, 56 X. Y. 363, 
 365, 15 Am. 427; Anson v. People, 
 148 III. 494, 506, 35 X. E. 145; Fox 
 V. People, 95 111. 71, 75. Evidence of 
 other forgeries is competent where 
 the accused admits he signed a name 
 and claims he was authorized to do
 
 713 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AXD FALSE FRETEXSES. § 423 
 
 liis admissions or statements of any fact regarding the note with 
 whose forgery he is charged are always receivable. ^^ 
 
 Evidence of the possession of forged papers by the accused or 
 by an accomplice,^" while always admissible upon the question of 
 intent, is never conclusive upon the general issue of the guilt of 
 the accused. The fact that a forged writing is found in the de- 
 fendant's possession raises no presumption of law that he forged 
 it or any other writing.^^ The possession or uttering may be 
 proved upon a charge of forgery, but merely as a circumstance 
 to be considered by the jury. The defendant should then be 
 allowed to prove any facts which may rebut the possible inference 
 of guilt or of guilty knowledge.^** If, however, it is proved to 
 the satisfaction of the jury that the accused had forged notes 
 in his possession, with the plates or other instruments used in 
 forging them, a prima facie case is made out' against him. Such 
 facts, unexplained, may create as strong a presumption that the 
 person in whose possession they were found is the actual forger, 
 as the possession of stolen goods creates that the one in whose 
 possession they are found is the actual thief. Both presumptions 
 may be repelled by proof. But in the absence of any explanation 
 the inference may be as strong in the one case as in the other."'''' 
 
 so. Usher v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 93, 
 81 S. W. 309. 
 
 "Thus it may be shown that he 
 had, after indictment, released a 
 judgment taken on the note without 
 consideration. Burdge v. State, 53 
 Ohio St. 512, 42 X. E. 594. Evi- 
 dence that forged notes were found 
 in the possession of the wife of the 
 accused is not received against him 
 unless a concert of action is proved 
 between them or it appears that she 
 was cognizant of their character and 
 of the connection of the accused with 
 them. People v. Thorns, 3 Park. Cr. 
 
 X. Y.) 256, 271. 
 
 ^United Stales v. Ilinman, i Bald. 
 C. C. (U. S.) 292, 26 Fed. Cas. 15370. 
 
 "Miller v. State, 51 Tnd. 405, 406; 
 I'ox V. People, 95 III. 71. 75. 
 
 "People V. Evcrhardt, 104 N. Y. 
 
 59i> 595, II ^^- E. 62; Crossland v. 
 State, 77 Ark. 537, -92 S. W. 776. 
 Proof of the existence or the pro- 
 duction of the collateral forged writ- 
 ings is always indispensable. State v. 
 Breckenridge, 67 Iowa 204, 205, 25 
 N. W. 130; Fox v. People, 95 111. 
 71, 74; Anson v. People, 148 111. 494. 
 506, 35 N. E. 14s ; Reg. v. Cooke, 8 
 C. & P. 582; 3 Greenl. on Ev., §§ 107- 
 113. Cf. Reed v. State, 15 Ohio 217, 
 and Barnes v. Commonwealth, loi 
 Ky. 556, 41 S. W. 772, 19 Ky. L. 803. 
 ^"Spencer's Case, 2 Leigh (Va.) 
 751, 757; Gardner v. State, 96 Ala. 
 12, II So. 402; State V. Morgan, 2 
 Dcv. & B. (N. Car.) 348; State v. 
 Britt, 3 Dev. (N. Car.) 122; State v. 
 Lane, 80 N. Car. 407. 4C0. "The con- 
 ditions to the introduction of such 
 evidence are, that where such instru
 
 4-'4 
 
 CRI.MIXAI. EVIDEXCE. 
 
 7M 
 
 \) 
 
 § 424. Proof of uttering forged paper.— Proof tliat a forged writ- 
 ing was delivered lo a person for \-alue with an intent to pass it 
 as good, or was used to obtain money or credit, directly or in- 
 directly, is enough to sustain a charge of uttering,""' without proof 
 of forging it."*^ It must also be proved that there was a declara- 
 tion or assertion, either by language or actions, that the signature 
 was valid and the instrument good."*" 
 
 § 425. The writing alleged to have been forged as evidence — Pri- 
 mary evidence. — 'I'his must usually be produced in evidence by the 
 prosecution, or its absence satisfactorily accounted for.*^ It is 
 
 ments are offered in proof of guilty 
 knowledge, there must be strict proof 
 that they are forgeries, and the for- 
 gery, possession or uttering must, in 
 point of time or circumstances, be 
 so near the commission of the al- 
 leged offense, that the inference 
 arises that the defendant must have 
 intended, by the principal forgery, to 
 perpetrate a fraud, or knew that the 
 instrument uttered was spurious." 3 
 Greenl., § in; Rose. 95; Anson v. 
 People, 148 111. 494, 504, 35 N. E. 145 ; 
 People V. Whiteman, 114 Cal. 338, 46 
 Pac. 99. 
 
 '"State V. Redstrake, 39 N. J. L. 
 365; State V. Horner, 48 Mo. 520, 
 522; People V. Ah Woo, 28 Cal. 205, 
 212; People V. Brigham, 2 Mich. 550; 
 United States v. Mitchell, i Bald. C. 
 C. (U. S.) 366, 26 Fed. Cas. 15787; 
 People V. Rathbun, 21 Wend. (N. 
 Y.) 509; Thurmond v. State, 25 Tex. 
 App. 366, 8 S. W. 473; Espalla v. 
 State, 108 Ala. 38, 19 So. 82; State 
 V. Sherwood, 90 Iowa 550, 58 N. W. 
 911, 48 Am. St. 461. The note must 
 have been parted with or tendered or 
 offered in some wa}^ to get money or 
 credit. Rex v. Shukard, Russ. & Ry. 
 200. A person is guilty of forgery, 
 notwithstanding he intends ultimately 
 to take up the forged paper, and al- 
 though he supposes that the man 
 
 whose name is forged will suffer no 
 loss. If the jury are satisfied that 
 the accused knew the writing was 
 forged, and uttered it as true and 
 believed that the party to whom he 
 offered it would advance money upon 
 it, they have ample evidence of an 
 intent to defraud. That the forged 
 bill has since been paid by the pris- 
 oner is immaterial if the offense was 
 complete at the time of the uttering. 
 Reg. V. Geach, 9 C. & P. 499, 505. 
 
 ^ State V. Fisk, 170 Ind. 166, 83 N. 
 E. 995; Maloney v. State (Ark., 
 1909), 121 S. W. 728. The making of 
 a forged instrument, and the uttering 
 it by the same person at the same time 
 as one transaction, constitute but one 
 offense. State v. Klugherz, 91 Minn. 
 406, 98 N. W. 99. 
 
 " People V. Brigham, 2 Mich. 550 ; 
 Chahoon v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 733; Folden v. State, 13 Neb. 
 328, 14 N. W. 412, 413; Couch V. 
 State, 28 Ga. 367, 368; Common- 
 wealth V. Searle, 2 Binn. (Pa.) 332, 
 4 Am. Dec. 446; Koch v. State, 115 
 Ala. 99, 22 So. 471. 
 
 '■^ State V. Breckenridge, 67 Iowa 
 204, 25 N. W. 130; Haun v. State, 
 13 Tex. App. 383, 387, 44 Am. 706; 
 Butler V. State, 22 Ala. 43 ; Manaway 
 V. State, 44 Ala. 375, 379', 2 Arch.
 
 715 FORGERY, COUNTERFEITING AND FALSE PRETENSES. § 425 
 
 immaterial that it is badly written, if it is decipherable.'** Its 
 meaning may be ascertained by parol evidence; and. if it is am- 
 biguous, the jury may infer its true meaning from all the evi- 
 dence."*^ Where the alleged forged writing is shown to have 
 1)een lost or destroyed, or is beyond the jurisdiction or suppressed 
 by the accused, or if it is so mutilated that its identity is unascer- 
 tainable. its contents may be proved by secondary evidence.*'^ If 
 the state alleges that the writing is in the hands of the accused, or 
 his friends, it must prove a seasonable demand on him or his 
 counsel before secondary e^■idence is admissible.*' In order that 
 the contents of the forged writing or its signature shall be proved 
 by secondary evidence it is necessary to show that a diligent 
 search has been made for the original in a place where it was 
 likely to be found.*'^ The best evidence in the possession of the 
 state is always. required. If a copy exists, oral proof wih be re- 
 jected, and the copy must be produced.*" 
 
 A photograph is admissible to prove the language of the writ- 
 
 er. Pr. & PI. 395; 2 Bish. Cr. Pro., 
 § 433; Elliott Evidence, § 2992; Deal 
 V. State (Miss., 1909), 50 So. 495. Sec- 
 ondary evidence of forged instru- 
 ments, see Elliott Evidence, § 2993. 
 
 " Hagar v. State, 71 Ga. 164, 166; 
 McGarr v. State, 75 Ga. 155, 158. 
 
 *°McGarr v. State, 75 Ga. 155, 158. 
 
 "Thornlcy v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 
 118, 34 S. W. 264, 61 Am. St. 837; 
 Mead v. State, 53 N. J. L. 601, 605, 23 
 Atl. 264; State V. Potts, 9 N. J. L. 
 26, 17 Am. Dec. 449; State v. Davis, 
 69 N. Car. 313, 317; Henderson v. 
 State, 14 Te.x. 503, 511. See Under- 
 bill on Ev., § 130, 132; State v. 
 Champoux, 33 Wash. 339, 74 Pac. 
 
 557- 
 
 *'' State v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 205, 
 24 S. E. 561 ; Rollins v. State, 2r 
 Tex. App. 148, 152, 17 S. W. 4^)6; 
 Henderson v. State, 14 Tex. 503, 511 ; 
 Dcvere v. State, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 509; 
 Johnson v. State, 9 Tex. App. 249, 
 258; State v. Flanflcrs. 118 Mo. 227, 
 '37, 239, 23 S. \V. 10H6; State v. 
 Saunders, 68 Iowa 370, 27 X. W. 455; 
 
 State V. Potts, 9 N. J. L. 26, 17 Am. 
 Dec. 449; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 107; 2 
 Bish. Cr. Pro., § 433; 2 Arch. Cr. Pr. 
 & PI- 555; Rex V. Haworth, 4 Car. 
 & P. 254. On the general subject of 
 notice to produce writings, see Un- 
 dcrhill on Ev., § 126. 
 ■""Sims v. State (.Ala., 1908), 46 So. 
 
 493- 
 
 ^"Thompson v. State, 30 Ala. 28; 
 Commonwealth v. Sncll, 3 Mass. 82, 
 86; Pendleton's Case, 4 Leigh (Va.) 
 694, 26 Am. Dec. 342; State v. Ford, 
 2 Root (Conn.) 93. When it is sought 
 to prove the forged paper by a certi- 
 fied or examined copy, under a stat- 
 ute permitting such proof, it must ap- 
 pear from the copy itself that all the 
 requirements of the statute have been 
 rigidly complied with, or the copy 
 may he rejected. The copy siiould 
 he supplcniciitcd by the oath of .some 
 competent witness that it is a true 
 and correct copy. Uiulcriiill on K\\, 
 § r42c ; Johnson v. State, 9 Tex. .App. 
 249, 258.
 
 § 4-6 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 716 
 
 ing- when the ink lias faded, if it is shown In- any witness that it 
 is hterally rcprochiced. But when the question is. does the photo- 
 graph exactly reproduce the form, color and shading of the orig- 
 inal? supplementary expert evidence may be required.''" 
 
 ^ 426. Proving the venue. — The difficulty of proving the locality 
 in which the writing was actually forged, because of the cus- 
 tomary secrecy by which this act is accompanied, is elsewhere 
 adverted to.^^ It need only be said in this i)lace that the posses- 
 sion of forged instruments, or the uttering of them in the county 
 where the indictment was found, is strong evidence in law that 
 the forgerv was committed in the same county.''" 
 
 >^ 427. Fictitious names — Evidence to prove existence or non-ex- 
 istence of persons. — l^'orgery is committed when a fictitious name,^^ 
 or the name of a dead person,^* is signed to an instrument with a 
 fraudulent intent. The name signed must be that of some other 
 person than the accused though it may be of a man of the same 
 name, if by signing that name the accused meant to defraud 
 someone.^^ Hence, evidence is relevant, which shows or tends 
 to show the existence or non-existence of the person who is sup- 
 posed, or pretended to be indicated by the name. But the state 
 need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no such 
 
 °" Duffin V. People, 107 III. 113, 122, Am. 183; Commonwealth v. Costello, 
 
 47 Am. 431. See Underbill on Ev., 120 Mass. 358, 370; Thompson v. 
 §§ 38a, 132. State, 49 Ala. 16; Peete v. State, 2 
 
 '^ See ante, § 37. Lea (Tenn.) 513; State v. Covington, 
 
 " State V. Yerger, 86 Mo. 33 ; State 94 N. Car. 913, 55 Am. 650n ; State v. 
 
 V. Rucker, 93 Mo. 88, 90, 5 S. W. Bauman, 52 Iowa 68, 2 N. W. 956; 
 
 609; Spencer's Case, 2 Leigh (Va.) People v. Warner, 104 Mich. 337, 62 
 
 751, 757; Heard v. State, 121 Ga. 138, N. W. 405, 406; Davis v. State, 34 
 
 48 S. E. 905. Tex. Cr. 117, 29 S. W. 478; Lasister 
 "^Lascelles v. State, 90 Ga. 347, 16 v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 532, 94 S. W. 
 
 S. E. 945, 35 Am. St. 2x6; Rex v. 233; People v. Browne, 118 App. Div. 
 
 Bolland, i Leach C. C. 97; Ex parte (N. Y.) 793, 103 N. Y. S. 903; Logan 
 
 Ilibbs,. 26 Fed. 421, 423 ; Johnson v. v. United States, 123 Fed. 291, 59 C. 
 
 State, 35 Tex. Cr. 271, 33 S. W. 231; C. A. 476; IMaloney v. State (Ark., 
 
 State v. Hahn, 38 La. Ann. 169, 170; 1909), 121 S. W. 728. 
 
 People V. Krummer, 4 Park. Cr. (N. "Brewer v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 74, 
 
 Y.) 217; State V. jMinton, 116 Mo. 22 S. W. 41, 40 Am. St. 760. 
 
 605, 610, 22 S. W. 808; State V. Vine- "Murphy v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 488, 
 
 yard, 16 Mont. 138, 40 Pac. 173, 175; 93 S. \V. 543. 
 
 People V. Brown, 72 N. Y. 571, 28
 
 71 7 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AXD FALSE PRETENSES. §§ 427-428 
 
 person.^'^ A resident of the town in which he is alleged to have 
 lived is competent to prove that he was unknown there, though 
 the witness may not be able to swear absolutely that he knew 
 every resident.^' It is not always necessary for the prosecution 
 to produce in court the person whose name is alleged to have been 
 forged. The fact that he did not consent to the signing of his 
 name may be proved from the circumstances.^^ It may be shown 
 in general that policemen, postmen and residents had never heard 
 of him,"'' and that an officer of the court, as a sheriff, though he 
 made a diligent search among persons most likely to know him, 
 was unable to find him, or to secure any information of his 
 whereabouts.*"' The searcher may state what he did and the fact 
 that he had a conversation with some one, and with whom, and 
 could get no information, though he may not repeat answers 
 made to his inquiries (as these would be hearsay) for the pur- 
 pose of proving the fictitious character of the person. °^ Evidence 
 of this sort, proving prima facie the non-existence of the person 
 whose name was signed, may be sufficient in the absence of re- 
 buttal. The defendant may prove any facts by which the infer- 
 ence that the name is fictitious may be overcome. So, when it 
 was shown that no one could be found to answer to the name 
 which was signed, the accused was allowed to show that the per- 
 son, being threatened with a criminal prosecution, had left the 
 state, and that he had endeavored in vain to find him.*''- 
 
 .§ 428. Proving the corporate existence of the bank upon which 
 the forged check is drawn. — The existence of the bank must be 
 
 '"State V. Allen, 116 Mo. 548, 22 S. state may prove the falsity of that 
 
 W. 792. person's statement regarding his busi- 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Meserve, 154 ness, residence, occupation and own- 
 Mass. 64, 71, 27 X. E. 997, 998. crship of property. This is so, even 
 
 "People V. Browne, 118 App. Div. when the accused admits the name is 
 
 (X. Y.) 793, 103 X. Y. S. 903. fictitious. Commonwealth v. Costello, 
 
 "State V. Hahn, 38 La. Ann. 169, 120 Mass. 358, 359. 
 
 172. "' People v. Jones. 106 X. Y. 523, 
 
 "* People v. Sharp, 53 Mich. 523, 526, 13 X. E. 93 ; Wiggins v. People, 
 
 525, 19 X. W. 168. The extent of the 4 Ilun (X. Y.) 540; State v. Ryno, 68 
 
 search goes to the weight not to the Kan. 348, 74 Pac. 1114. 64 \.. R. .\. 
 
 competency of this evidence. When 303n. 
 
 the accused having signed a fictitious "Commonwealth v. Costello, no 
 
 name has procured some one to repre- Mass. 214, 215. 
 i-nt himself as of that name, the
 
 f 
 
 -t 
 
 § 429 CRIMINAL EXIDEXCE. 718 
 
 shown under an allegation of forginj;- l)ank notes or checks/"'' The 
 charter or articles of incorporation need not be produced. It 
 is enough to prove the existence of the bank cic facto by parol 
 e\"idence that it had a banking house, issued bills and exercised 
 banking powers,*^^ or by the production of a note whose genuine- 
 ness is proved or admitted/^ and in the case of a foreign bank by 
 rei)utation,"" whether the intent charged was to defraud the bank 
 or an indi\'idual."^ 
 
 § 429. Proving the handwriting — Expert evidence — Standards of 
 comparison. — Expert evidence is admissible to prove the genuine- 
 ness or falsity of the writing. The expert may testify to his 
 opinion and may then state the reasons for his opinion."® He 
 may explain how writing may be removed from paper by chem- 
 icals or other means, and the blank space filled with other writ- 
 ing; and this he may do even where it lias not first been proved 
 that the accused was acquainted with this method of treating 
 wnntings.*'^ The expert may illustrate his testimony by illustra- 
 tions on the blackboard. The expert may, as a rule, state his 
 opinion based upon a comparison made by him of the forged 
 instrument with any writing pro\'ed to have been made by the de- 
 fendant, whether it has been introduced in evidence or not.'° The 
 
 "^ State V. Murphy, 17 R. I. 698, 707, Y.) 469, 473; State v. Sharpless, 212 
 
 24 Atl. 473, 16 L. R. A. 550; Com- Mo. 176, iii S. W. 69. Contra, Jones 
 
 monwealth v. Smith, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) v. State, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 346, 347. 
 
 568, 570; Elliott Evidence, § 2956. ""State v. Ryno, 68 Kan. 348, 74 
 
 " Cady V. Commonwealth, 10 Gratt. Pac. 11 14, 64 L. R. A. 303 n ; Ausmus 
 
 . (Va.) 776, 779; People v. Caryl, 12 v. People (Colo.. 19T0), 107 Pac. 204. 
 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 547, 548; People v. ""People v. Dole, 122 Cal. 486, 55 
 
 Chadwick, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 163, Pac. 581, 68 Am. St. 50. 
 
 165; Dennis v. People, i Park. Cr. '"Mallory v. State, 2>7 Tex. Cr. 482, 
 
 (N. Y.) 469, 473. 36 S. W. 751, 66 Am. St. 808; State 
 
 °° People V. Davis, 21 Wend. (N. v. Calkins, 72) Iowa 128, 131, 34 N. 
 
 Y.) 309, 313; People V. Peabody, 25 W. 777; State v. Farrington, 90 Iowa 
 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 472, 473. 673, 57 N. W. 606; State v. Phair, 48 
 
 *■ People V. Ah Sam, 41 Cal. 645," Vt. 366; State v. Bibby, 91 Cal. 470, 
 
 People V. D'Argencour, 18 N. Y. 476, 27 Pac. 781 ; State v. Tompkins, 
 
 Wkly. Dig. 532; Sasser v. State, 13 71 Mo. 613, 616; State v. David, 131 
 
 Ohio 453 ; Cady v. Commonwealth, 10 Mo. 380, t,2, S. W. 28. See, on this 
 
 Gratt. (Va.) 776, 779; Reed v. State, subject, Underbill on Ev., §§ 140. 141 5 
 
 IS Ohio 217; Stone v. State, 20 N. J. State v. Scott, 45 Mo. 302; State v. 
 
 L. 401. Shinborn, 46 N. H. 497, 501, 88 Am. 
 
 "Dennis v. People, i Park. Cr. (N.
 
 719 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AXD FALSE PRETENSES. § 429 
 
 remoteness of the date of making the comparison from the trial, 
 or the fact that the accused was not present when the compar- 
 ison was made, does not necessarily exclude the opinion of the 
 expert based on a comparison.'^ This would seem the most 
 reasonable rule, but some cases hold that the standard of com- 
 parison can be selected only from writings which are relevant, 
 and which are actually introduced as evidence.'- The court must 
 usually by statute first find as a matter of fact that the standard 
 was written by the accused before it should go to the expert or 
 to the jury. Press copies and copies made by machine cannot be 
 used as standards." Any one who is familiar with a person's 
 writing from having seen him write, though only once, or, never 
 having seen him write, from canying on a correspondence with 
 him, or from opportunities afforded from frequently handling 
 writings known to have been written by the person, is competent, 
 
 Dec. 224; People v. Hutchings, 137 
 Mich. 527, 100 X. W. 753; State v. 
 Webb, 18 Utah 441, 56 Pac. 159; 
 Johnson v. State (Tex. Cr., 1907), 
 102 S. \V. 1 133; Warren v. State, 54 
 Tex. Cr. 443, 114 S. W. 380; State 
 V. Skillman (N. J. Eq. 1908), 70 Atl. 
 83; Riley v. State (Tex. Cr., 1898), 44 
 S. W. 498; Rinker v. Unted States, 
 151 Fed. 755, 81 C. C. A. 379; Wool- 
 dridge v. State, 49 Fla. 137, 38 So. 3; 
 Ausmus V. People (Colo., 1910), 107 
 Pac. 205. 
 
 ■'Riley v. State (Tex. Cr., 1898), 
 44 S. W. 498. 
 
 " People V. Parker, 67 Mich. 222, 
 224, 34 X. W. 720, II Am. St. 578; 
 Merritt v. Campbell, 79 X. Y. 625 ; 
 Hynes v. McDermott, 82 X. Y. 41, 52, 
 2,7 Am. 538; Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 
 287, 293, 294; Van Sickle v. People, 
 29 Mich. 6r, 64; State v. Clinton, 67 
 Mo. 380, 383, 385, 29 Am. 506; State 
 V. Scott, 45 Mo. 302, 305; Manaway 
 V. .State, 44 Ala. 375 ; Moore v. 
 United States, 91 U. S. 270, 274, 23 
 L. c(l. 346; Morgan's Case, i Mood. 
 &• R. 134 ; People V. Schoolcy, 149 N. 
 Y. 99, 43 N. E. 53^^; People v. Crcc- 
 
 gan, 121 Cal. 554, 53 Pac. 1082; State 
 V. F"illpot, 51 Wash. 223, 98 Pac. 659. 
 The papers to be used as standards of 
 comparison must be admitted, ac- 
 knowledged or otherwise proved to 
 be in the handwriting of the accused. 
 State V. Ezekiel, 2>Z S. Car. 115, 116, 
 II S. E. 63s; Johnson v. Common- 
 wealth, 102 Va. 927, 46 S. E. 789. 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Eastman, i 
 Cush. (Mass.) 189, 48 Am. Dec. 596; 
 State V. Simmons, 52 Wash. 132, 100 
 Pac. 269; Gaut v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 
 493, 94 S. W. JO34; Washington v. 
 State, 143 Ala. (i2, 39 So. 388. The 
 condition of a person, whether drunk 
 or sober, when he wrote the standard, 
 is competent. People v. Parker, 67 
 Mich. 222, 228, 34 X. W. 720, II Am. 
 St. 578. In Oregon the statute pro- 
 vides that comparison shall be made 
 only with writings "admitted or treat- 
 ed as genuine" by the party against 
 whom offered; this means the ac- 
 cused in a criminal proceedings and 
 limits the comparison to instruments 
 actually admitted l)y him to have been 
 written by him. State v. Hranton, 49 
 Ore. Kr.. 87 P.-ir, 535.
 
 § 429 
 
 CRIMINAL F.VIDEXCE, 
 
 720 
 
 as a non-expert, to give his opinion as to the gentiinencss of his 
 signature.'^ The weight of the evidence to prove the genuineness 
 of handwriting, whether given by experts or by those who know 
 the party's handwriting, is wholly for the jury, who, of course, 
 may be guided in their deliberations by the instructions of the 
 court relative to the force and credibility of expert evidence. But 
 as a matter of law, evidence of witnesses who knew the hand- 
 writing of tb.e accused, to the efifect tliat the signature to the 
 alleged forged writing is not his, is of little value, as the forger 
 seeks to disguise his own handwriting and to imitate that of the 
 man whose signature he forges.''' On the other hand, it is not 
 relevant to show that the accused was skilled in imitating writ- 
 ing.'^" The guilt or innocence of the accused is not to be de- 
 termined on such grounds. No inference of guilt can be estab- 
 lished by proving that the accused had the ability to commit the 
 crime." 
 
 '* State V. Goldstein, 74 X. J. L. 598, 
 62 Atl. 1006; De La Alotte's Case, 21 
 How. St. Tr. 564, 810 ; State v. Hoop- 
 er, 2 Bailej' (S. Car.) yi, 42; State v. 
 Gay, 94 N. Car. 814, 819; State v. 
 Stair, ^-j :Mo. 268, 56 Am. 449; State 
 V. Farrington, 90 Iowa 673, 57 N. W. 
 606; State V. Minton, 116 Mo. 605, 
 22 S. W. 808; Commonwealth v. 
 Smith, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 568, 571; 
 Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 429, 2 
 N. E. 808; Redd v. State, 65 Ark. 
 475, 47 S. W. 119; State V. Fresh- 
 water, 30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447, 
 116 Am. St. 853; Bess v. Common- 
 wealth, 118 Ky. 858, 82 S. W. 576, 
 26 Ky. L. 839; Rinker v. United 
 States, 151 Fed. 755, 81 C. C. A. 379; 
 State V. Goldstein, 72 N. J. L. 336, 
 62 Atl. 1003; State V. Simmons, 52 
 Wash. 132, 100 Pac. 269; Common- 
 wealth V. Meehan, 170 Mass. 362, 49 
 N. E. 648; State v. Olds, 217 Mo. 305, 
 116 S. \V. 1080; Wooldridge v. State, 
 49 Fla. 137, 38 So. 3 ; Pittman v. State, 
 51 Ala. 94, 41 So. 385. The letters re- 
 
 ceived may be produced and identi- 
 fied, and the genuineness of their sig- 
 natures proved by another witness to 
 corroborate the first. Thomas v. 
 State, 103 Ind. 419, 429, 2 N. E. 808; 
 I Greenl. Ev., § 577; Rose. 174, 175. 
 Any person accustomed to receive, 
 handle or pay out bank-notes may tes- 
 tif\- to the signatures to them though 
 he may never have seen the person 
 write. May v. State, 14 Ohio 461, 45 
 Am. Dec. 548; United States v. Keen, 
 I McLean (U. S.) 429, 26 Fed. Cas. 
 155 ro; People v. Caryl, 12 Wend. (X. 
 Y.) 547; Commonwealth v. Carey, 2 
 Pick. (Mass.) 47. As to testimony by 
 person familiar with the handwriting 
 of the accused, see Underbill on Ev., 
 
 § 139- 
 
 '"Langdon v. People, 133 111. 382, 
 394, 24 X^ E. 874; People v. Sanders, 
 1 14 Cal. 216, 46 Pac. 153. 
 
 '" State v. Hopkins, 50 Vt. 316, 2>?>^. 
 
 "The subject of comparison of 
 handwriting is fully discussed in Un- 
 derbill on Ev., § 140, ct scq.
 
 721 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AND FALSE PRETENSES. § 43O 
 
 .^ 430. Evidence to show that the forged writing could not ac- 
 complish the purpose intended.— It may be shown by producing the 
 writing itself that it could not, in law, be employed to defraud or 
 prejudice any person.'** If this fact is shown to the satisfaction 
 of the jury- the accused should be acquitted. In other words it 
 is necessary to show not only that the document forged was not 
 signed by the party whose name purports to be attached to it. 
 but also that the forged writing was so similar to the genuine 
 writing of the party that persons ordinarily would be deceived 
 thereby. But the similarity between the forged and the genuine 
 handwriting need only be sufficient to deceive a reasonable and 
 ordinary person into accepting the same as true and genuine. The 
 forged writing need not be so skillfully done as to require an ex- 
 pert to detect its falsity.'" The writing should be such a one as 
 would be available in law to produce the result required. It must 
 be such an instrument as, if genuine, would have a legal validity, 
 and hence an instrument which on its face shows that it has no 
 legal force is not the subject of forgery.*" It matters not how 
 clearly a fraudulent intent may be proved, a writing which is 
 upon its face illegal or innocuous, or which is intrinsically void 
 and incapable of creating a legal obligation, as, for example, an 
 unattested will, or a mere letter of recommendation, is not enough 
 to support a charge of forgery. But extrinsic circumstances may 
 be proved showing how such a writing may have been used to 
 defraud,'*^ if such extrinsic facts and circumstances are set out 
 
 "Waterman v. People, 67 111. 91, 209; People v. Stearns, 21 Wen"a. (X. 
 
 93; People V. Tomlinson, 35 Cal. 503; Y.) 409, 414; People v. Shall, 9 Cow. 
 
 Xorton V. State, 129 Wis. 659, 109 N. (N. Y.) 778; State v. Smith, 8 Ycrg. 
 
 W. 531, 116 .\m. St. 979. (Tenn.) 150, 152; People v. Tomlin- 
 
 " Goodman v. People, 228 111. 154, son, 35 Cal. 503, 507; Brown v. Peo- 
 
 81 X. E. 830; Wilson V. State (Ga. pie, 86 111. 239, 242, 29 Am. 25; Com- 
 
 App., 1910), 67 S. E. 705. monweplth v. Ladd. 15 Mass. 526, 
 
 *°Farrcll. In re, 36 Mont. 254, 92 527; Rcmbcrt v. State, 53 .Ma. 467, 
 
 Pac. 785; People v. Di Ryana. 8 Cal. 469, 47h 25 Am. 639; Finlcy, Ex 
 
 App. 333, 96 Pac. 919; Crayton v. t>artc, 66 Cal. 262, 263. 5 Pac. 222; 
 
 State, 47 Tex. Cr. 88, 80 S. W. 839; People v. Galloway. 17 Wend. (X. 
 
 People V. McGIade, 139 Cal. 66. 72 Y.) 540, 541; State v. Wheeler. 
 
 Pac. 600. 19 Minn. 98, 100; Roodc v. State, 
 
 *" LinKafclicr v. State, 28 Ohio Cir. 5 Xch. 174, 177. 25 Am. 475; Re.\ v. 
 
 Ct. 800; Howell V. State, 37 Tex. 591 ; Moffatt. 2 Leach C. C. 483; United 
 
 Commonwealth v. Ilinrls, loi Mass. States v. Williams, 14 Fed. 550. 552- 
 46 — Unufrhill Crim. Ev.
 
 § 431 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 722 
 
 with reasonable certainty in tlie averments of the indictment.^" 
 If the writing purports to be a vahd instrument it is enough,*^ 
 nor is it necessary to show that any particular person has been 
 defrauded if the writing was effectual for that purpose.^* 
 Whether the writing shows on its face that it is capable of creat- 
 ing a legal obligation is a question of construction, and for this 
 reason, is for the court to determine. Where there is ambiguity 
 . in the meaning of the language the introduction of parol evidence 
 
 to explain the writing may raise a question of fact which would 
 be for the jury under instructions from the court. In the case 
 of an order for the payment of money, as a check or draft on a 
 bank, or directing the delivery of goods, the wn-iting is a subject 
 of forgery if there appears on the face of the waiting itself that 
 the drawer has the disposing power over the goods or money, 
 that it indicates a person who is under an obligation to him to 
 pay or to deliver the goods, and someone is sufficiently described 
 therein to whom delivery or payment must be made.*^ 
 
 § 431. Sufficiency of evidence — Pecuniary condition of the accused. 
 
 — The weight of evidence is for the jury. They may be justified 
 in convicting the accused upon proof of a few essential facts, if 
 they are convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
 evidence of the person whose name was forged to that fact, with 
 proof that the accused had passed the forged check or other in- 
 strument, or had obtained money or credit thereon, may, unless 
 rebutted or explained, be sufficient. ^"^ 
 
 554; Henry v. State, 35 Ohio St. 128, *- Goodman v. People, 228 111. 154, 
 
 130; State V. Dalton, 2 Murph. (N. 81 N. E. 830. 
 
 Car.) 379; Bennett v. State, 62 Ark. *^ United States v. Turner, 7 Pet. 
 
 516, 36 S. W. 947; State V. Van Au- (U. S.) 132, 134, 8 L. ed. 633; State 
 
 ken, 98 Iowa 674, 68 N. W. 454; Bur- v. Hauser, 112 La. 313, 36 So. 396; 
 
 den V. State, 120 Ala. 388, 25 So. 190, Shelton v. State, 143 Ala. 98, 39 So. 
 
 74 Am. St. y]; State v. Mitton, ■^y yjj. 
 
 ]\Iont. 366, 96 Pac. 926, 127 Am. St. " State v. Hahn, 38 La. Ann. 169, 
 
 732; Belden v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 565, 172; State v. Gullette, 121 Mo. 447, 26 
 
 99 S. W. 563 ; McLean v. State, 3 Ga. S. W. 354. 
 
 App. 660, 60 S. E. 2>Z'2. Whether a "Russell v. State, 51 Fla. 124, 40 
 
 paper is so imperfect and inaccurate So. 625. 
 
 as not to deceive a man of ordinary ^° Allgood v. State, '^'j Ga. 668, 13 
 
 prudence is a question for the jury. S. E. 569; Henderson v. State, 14 
 
 State V. Warren, 109 ]\Io. 430, 19 S. Tex. 503. Weight and sufficiency of 
 
 W. 191, 32 Am. St. 681.
 
 ']2^ FORGERY, COUNTERFEITING AND FALSE PRETENSES. § 43 1 
 
 It may be shown that a person accused of forging- a deed had 
 a record title to the property conveyed,**' or that shortly before 
 uttering the forged deed he claimed the land under another deed. 
 A genuine deed on record is not notice to the prisoner, and can- 
 not be proved to bring home to him knowledge that his own deed 
 was a forgery. Constructive or actual notice of the genuine deed 
 is not a substitute for guilty knowledge in a criminal trial. '^^ Thus 
 it is an error to charge the jury that the accused had knowledge 
 of the character of a forged instrument passed by him, if he had 
 notice of any suspicious circumstance sufficient to put a reason- 
 ably prudent man on an inquiry which, if followed up, would 
 have led him to a knowledge of the forgery.^'' In spite of the 
 general rule that mere constructive notice raises no presumption 
 of actual knowledge that a deed or other writing is forged, it 
 has been held in one case that the possession by the accused of a 
 forged instrument payable to his order raises a presumption that 
 he knew that it was forged. The presumption, however, is one 
 of fact and may be overcome by proof showing the accused was 
 ignorant of the false character of the instrument."'^ 
 
 As an exception to the general rule the pecuniary condition of 
 the accused may sometimes be shown, as, for example, where he 
 stands charged with forging a receipt for money alleged to have 
 been paid by him. The fact that he was impecunious immediately 
 before or at the date of the receipt may justify the inference 
 that no money was paid and that the receipt was forged. And 
 where the accused is charged with the forgery of a check 
 cashed for him it may be shown that he was without money be- 
 fore the check was cashed and immediately thereafter had a con- 
 siderable sum in his possession."^ 
 
 the evidence, see Elliott Evidence, ^' Pearson v. State, 55 Ga. 659, 662 ; 
 
 § 2997. Evidence in general in prose- State v. Harness, 10 Idaho 18, 76 Pac. 
 
 cution for forgery, see Elliott Evi- 788. 
 
 dcnce, § 2995. Evidence in defense '"' Wells v. Territory, i Okla. Cr. 
 
 in prosecution for forgery, see Elliott 469, 98 Pac. 483. 
 
 Evidence, § 2996. Questions of law °° State v. Waterbury, 133 Iowa 135, 
 
 or fact in prosecutions for forgery, no N. W. 328. 
 
 sec Elliott Evidence, § 2988. "^Valkcr v. State. 127 Ga. 48, 56 S. 
 
 "People V. Parker, d-j Mich. 222, K. 113, t 19 Am. St. 3i4n, 8 L. R. \. 
 
 227, 34 N. W. 720, II Am. St. 578. (N. S.) 11 75"-
 
 § 432 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 724 
 
 § 432. Counterfeiting — Elements of the crime — Intent and guilty 
 knowledge — Evidence of similar offenses. — It must be shown to the 
 satisfaction of the jury that the defendant uttered the note"- with 
 the intention to defraud the person receiving it, or some other 
 person through him, and that the note uttered was a counterfeit."'^ 
 The existence of the bank by which the note purports to have 
 been issued need not be shown,"* even when the court permits 
 an expert to testify that a bill submitted to his inspection is, in 
 his opinion, a counterfeit."^ The knowledge of the defendant 
 that he was passing counterfeit money must be shown. 
 
 Evidence that the defendant was seen several times in com- 
 pany with another person when the latter passed counterfeit 
 bills,*''' and evidence to show that the accused and some third 
 person had conspired to pass counterfeit money, or that a coun- 
 terfeit had been passed by some person resembling the defend- 
 ant,"' or that he had, about the same time, knowingly uttered a 
 counterfeit,"* or that he had been indicted and convicted at an- 
 other time for the same offense,"" is always admissible to show 
 
 "'United States v. Weikel, 8 Mont. 
 124, 19 Pac. 396. 
 
 "^United States v. Provenzano, 171 
 Fed. 675, Elliott Evidence, § 2954. 
 
 "* State V. Cole, 19 Wis. 129, 135, 88 
 Am. Dec. 678; People v. Peabody, 25 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 472; Jennings v. Peo- 
 ple, 8 Mich. 81; State v. Playden, 15 
 ^'- H. 355, 359; Kennedy v. Common- 
 wealth, 2 Met. (Ky.) 36. 
 
 "^ Jones V. State, 1 1 Ind. 357, 360. 
 
 "" State V. Spalding, 19 Conn. 233, 
 238, 48 Am. Dec. 158; Martin v. Com- 
 monwealth, 2 Leigh (Va.) 745. 
 
 *^ People V. Clarkson, 56 Mich. 164, 
 165, 22 N. W. 258. 
 
 As to mode of proving corporate 
 existence of bank without producing 
 its charter, see People v. McDonnell, 
 80 Cal. 285, 22 Pac. 190, 13 Am. St. 
 159; Sasser v. State, 13 Ohio 453; 
 Commonwealth v. Riley, Thach. Cr. 
 Cas. (Mass.) 67; People v. Davis, 21 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 309; Elliott Evidence, 
 § 2956. 
 
 "^ State v. Cole, 19 Wis. 129, 134, 
 88 Am. Dec. 678; Commonwealth v. 
 Stearns, 10 Mete. (Mass.) 256, 258; 
 Commonwealth v. Bigelow, 8 Mete. 
 (Mass.) 235, 236; Hendrick's Case, 
 5 Leigh (Va.) 707; Steele v. People, 
 45 111. 152, 157; State v. Tindal, 5 
 Harr. (Del.) 488, 490; United States 
 v. Noble, 5 Cranch C. C. (U. S.) 371, 
 27 Fed. Cas. 15895. If it is sought to 
 prove that defendant passed other 
 counterfeit bills of the same denomi- 
 nation, and on the same bank, they 
 should have been produced, if within 
 reach of the prosecution. State v. 
 Cole, 19 Wis. 129, 135, 88 Am. Dec. 
 678; People V. Lagrille, i Wheel. Cr. 
 (N. Y.) 412; Reed v. State, 15 Ohio 
 217; Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 10 
 Allen (Mass.) 184, 186. 
 
 "'' McCartney v. State, 3 Ind. 353, 
 56 Am. Dec. 510; Elliott Evidence, 
 § 2954.
 
 725 FORGERY, COUNTERFEITING AND FALSE PRETENSES. § 433 
 
 the criminal intent. And the defendant's declarations when 
 passing other counterfeit money may be proved against him for 
 the same purpose.^"" But evidence of similar offenses is only 
 admissible to prove guilty knowledge, never solely to show that 
 the bill or coin was a counterfeit.^ The inference of guilty 
 knowledge which the jury may draw from such evidence may be 
 rebutted. Thus the defendant may bring out facts and circum- 
 stances tending to show that he was so drunk as not to know 
 what he was doing;' he supposed the money was genuine; that 
 it was so, in fact, and may also prove that his belief in the genu- 
 ineness of the money was founded upon information derived 
 from the most approved sources.^ 
 
 § 433. Evidence to show that counterfeit money or implements 
 for its manufacture were found in the possession of the accused. — 
 
 The possession of implements or appliances, such as plates and 
 dies adapted or designed for making counterfeit coin or bills, or 
 the possession of the counterfeits, with a knowledge of their 
 spurious character, and with an intent to pass them, is, in many 
 states, a felony by statute.* And the finding of tools or machin- 
 ery^ for the coining of money, or of spurious coin,*^ in defendant's 
 
 ^°° State V. Smith, 5 Day (Conn.) session must be proved. People v. 
 
 175. 178, 5 Am. Dec. 132; Common- White, 34 Cal. 183, 187; Hutchins v. 
 
 wealth V. Edgerly, 10 Allen (Mass.) State, 13 Ohio 198, 200. See United 
 
 184, 186; United States v. Doebler, States v. Taranto, 74 Fed. 219. 
 
 Baldw. (U. S.) 519, 25 Fed. Cas. ^ State v. Antonio, 3 Brev. (S. 
 
 14977. Car.) 562; Hess v. State, 5 Ohio 5, 9, 
 
 ^ Elliott Evidence, § 2954. 22 Am. Dec. 767n ; United States v. 
 
 ^ Jones v. State, 11 Ind. 357, 360. Provenzano, 171 Fed. 675. Whether 
 
 ■^ State V. Morton, 8 Wis. 167. Evi- he knew the false character of the 
 
 dence of other crimes in prosecution money in his possession is for the 
 
 for counterfeiting, see 62 L. R. A. jury. United States v. Stevens, 52 
 
 193, note; 105 Am. St. 996, note. Fed. 120. 
 
 Presumptions and burden of proof, "Stalker v. State, 9 Conn. 341, 343; 
 
 see Elliott Evidence, § 2953. Admis- United States v. Hinman, i Baldw. 
 
 sions in prosecution for counterfeit- (U. S.) 292, 26 Fed. Cas. 15370; 
 
 ing. see Elliott Evidence, § 2957. Ev- People v. Thorns. 3 Park. Cr. (N. 
 
 idcnce of accomplice, see Elliott Ev- Y.) 256, 262, 270; State v. Twitty, 2 
 
 idence, § 2958. Evidence of good Hawks (N. Car.) 248, 258; State v. 
 
 character of dcfenrlant, see 103 Am. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202, 210, 24 .Am. 
 
 St. 903. 124; People V. White, 34 Cal. 183, 
 
 * The criminal intention of the pos- 189. The counterfeit money found
 
 § 434 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 726 
 
 possession, even subsequenlly to the act for which he is indicted." 
 may always be proved for the purpose of showing guihy knowl- 
 edge and criminal intent."* But the accused must be allowed to 
 explain his possession, in order to rebut any presumption that 
 may arise against him.** His failure to explain how he became 
 possessed of counterfeit money may be proved.' ^^ The possession 
 must be exclusive and actual. The fact that counterfeiter's tools 
 were found in the possession of the wife of the accused is not 
 relevant where he exercised no control over tliem." 
 
 § 434. Resemblance to the genuine. — This is a question for the 
 jury,'- and must l)e proved by evidence that will show an imita- 
 tion or a resemblance that will deceive persons of ordinary in- 
 
 must, it seems, be similar in kind to 
 that for uttering which he is on trial. 
 Bluflf V. State, 10 Ohio St. 547. 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Price, 10 Gray 
 (Mass.) 472, 476, 71 Am. Dec. 668n; 
 Reg. V. Forster, 6 Cox C. C. 521 ; 
 Bottomle}- v. United States, i Story 
 (U. S.) 135, 3 Fed. Cas. 1688; Elliott 
 Evidence, § 2955 ; 25 Am. St. 387, 389. 
 Defenses in prosecution for counter- 
 feiting, see Elliott Evidence, § 2961. 
 
 *"The object of the testimony is 
 not to convict or accuse him of other 
 crimes, but to establish the fact of 
 such a knowledge, on his part, of the 
 true character of the bill uttered by 
 him, and which is proved to be coun- 
 terfeit, as will justify the jury in in- 
 ferring his guilt in the case on trial. 
 And so far as this may be deemed a 
 departure from the technical rules of 
 evidence, it is a departure justified 
 by the peculiar nature of the crime of 
 passing counterfeit money; consisting 
 not in the fact of passing, which may 
 be done by an innocent person, but 
 in the guilty knowledge connected 
 with such passing." Commonwealth 
 V. Bigelow, 8 Met. (Mass.) 235; 
 United State v. Mitchell, Baldw. CU. 
 S.) 366, 26 Fed. Cas. 15787; United 
 
 State v. Noble, 5 Cranch C. C. (U. 
 S.) 371, 27 Fed. Cas. 15895; State v. 
 Brown, 4 R. I. 528, 70 Am. Dec. 168. 
 
 " United States v. Burns, 5 McLean 
 (U. S.) 23, 24 Fed. Cas. 14691 r 
 United States v. King, 5 McLean (U. 
 S.) 208, 26 Fed. Cas. 15535; United 
 States V. Craig, 4 Wash. C. C. (U. 
 S.) 729, 25 Fed. Cas. 14883. 
 
 '" United States v. Kenneally, 5 Biss. 
 (U. S.) 122, 26 Fed. Cas. 15522. 
 
 " People V. Thoms, 3 Park. Cr. (N. 
 Y.) 256, 262. It may be proved that 
 the prisoner attempted to utter the 
 note at different times and places, 
 where it had been suspected and chal- 
 lenged as false, that he had declared 
 it to be genuine and true; or that he 
 attempted to secrete himself, or to 
 destroy a note found on him. State 
 V. Smith, 5 Day (Conn.) 175, 178, 5 
 Am. Dec. 132. A person who, in con- 
 cert with the police, buys counterfeit 
 money of the accused for the purpose 
 of entrapping him, is not an accom- 
 plice, and the rule requiring corrobo- 
 ration does not apply to him. People 
 v. Farrell. 30 Cal. 316. 
 
 ^United States v. Stevens, 52 Fed. 
 120.
 
 727 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AXD FALSE PRETENSES. § 435 
 
 telligence and powers of observation.^" Expert evidence is admis- 
 sible to prove the genuineness of the alleged counterfeit/* though 
 it seems that experience acquired in judging bank notes when 
 receiving, handling and paying them out does not necessarily 
 qualify a witness as an expert upon the genuineness of the signa- 
 tures.^^ The money which it is alleged has been counterfeited 
 ought to be produced in court. Evidence that bills or coin were 
 counterfeit is not ordinarily received unless this is done, though if 
 the money has been lost or destroyed secondary evidence may be 
 received to show what sort of money it was.^*^ It is not usually 
 necessary in the case of the counterfeiting of bank bills to pro- 
 duce an officer of the bank to prove that the signatures of the 
 bank officers to the bills are forged or to prove that the bills are 
 counterfeit.^' 
 
 § 435. False pretenses. — At common law defrauding a person of 
 money or of other property by mere lying was no offense. It was 
 necessary to prove that the fraud was accomplished by means of 
 some false token^* or writing, or by means of false weights or 
 measures, or that there was a conspiracy to defraud. In other 
 Avords, besides the intention to cheat, it must be shown that the 
 means employed were such as would deceive persons who used 
 due diligence and precautions.^" 
 
 "State V. McKenzie, 42 Me. 392, 2 Leigh (Va.) 745; Commonwealth 
 
 394: People V. Osmer, 4 Park. Cr. v. Carej-, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 47; Com- 
 
 (X. Y.) 242, 244. See ante, § 430. monwealth v. Taylor, 5 Cush. 
 
 ''United States v. Keen, i McLean (Mass.) 605; Sarles, In re, 4 City H. 
 
 (U. S.) 429, 26 Fed. Cas. 15510; Hess Rcc. (X. Y.) T07. 
 
 V. State, 5 Ohio 5, 7, 22 Am. Dec. '* Elliott Evidence, § 2977. 
 
 767n; Keating v. People, 160 111. 480, "Commonwealth v. Warren, 6 
 
 43 X. E. 724; Elliott Evidence, §2959. Mass. 72, 73; People v. Johnson, 12 
 
 "State V. Allen, r Hawks (N. Johns. (X. Y.) 292, 293; People v. 
 
 Car.) 6, 10, 9 Am. Dec. 6i6n. See Babcock, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 201, 204, 5 
 
 ante, § 429. Am. Dec. 256; Rex v. Lara, 6 T. R. 
 
 "State V. Orsborn, i Root (Conn.) 565; State v. Patillo, 4 Hawks (X. 
 
 152; State V. Phelps, 2 Root (Conn.) Car.) 348; State v. Stroll, i Rich. 
 
 87; Armitage v. State, 13 Ind. 441; (S. Car.) 244; State v. Justice. 2 
 
 State v. Potts, 9 X. J. L. 26, 17 Am. Dev. (N. Car.) 199, 201; Hughes v. 
 
 Dec. 449. People, 223 111. 417, 79 X. E. 137: 
 
 "State V. Hooper, 2 Bailey (S. Commonwealth v. Burton, 183 Mass. 
 
 Car.) 37; Martin v. Commonwealth, 461, 67 X. E. 419; Elliott Evidence,
 
 § 435 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 728 
 
 Four essential facts must be proved to constitute the crime of 
 false pretenses. First, the intent to defraud some particular per- 
 son or peojile generally. Second, an actual fraud committed. 
 Third, the false pretense, and fourth, that the fraud resulted 
 from the employment of the false pretense.-'^ But this rule that 
 to obtain money or property by mere lying did not constitute a 
 crime, was found inadequate as soon as the employment of com- 
 mercial credit became general in consequence of the increase of 
 commerce, domestic and foreign. Hence by statute, 30 George 
 IL, ch. 24, it was enacted that "All persons who knowingly and 
 designedly, by false pretense or pretenses, shall obtain from any 
 person or persons"^ money, goods, wares or merchandises with 
 intent to cheat or defraud any person or persons of the same 
 * * * shall be deemed offenders against law and the public 
 peace." The crime of false pretenses is distinct from larceny in 
 the following particulars: If the evidence shows that the trick 
 or fraud practiced resulted only in inducing the owner of the 
 property to part with the naked possession of the same, he in- 
 tending to retain in himself his right and title as owner, the tak- 
 ing Vv^ill be larceny only; but if the owner intended not only to 
 part with possession but with the title or right of property in 
 the goods, the offense is false pretenses. " 
 
 § 2978. Evidence to prove the false tenses must be used for the purpose 
 
 pretense, see Elliott Evidence, § 2980; of perpetrating the fraud, and the 
 
 10 L. R. A. 307, note. fraud must be accomplished by means 
 
 "" Commonwealth v. Drew, 19 Pick, of the false pretenses made use of for 
 
 (Mass.) 179; State v. Clark, 46 Kan. that purpose. Clawson v. State, 129 
 
 65, 66, 26 Pac. 481; People v. Jordan, Wis. 650, 109 N. W. 578, 116 Am. St. 
 
 66 Cal. 10, 12, 4 Pac. ■/■jz, 56 Am. 73 ; 972. 
 
 People V. Wakely, 62 Mich. 297, 303, ^^ Which obviously in modern times. 
 
 28 X. W. 871; State V. Bingham, 51 at least would include a corporation. 
 
 Wash. 616, 99 Pac. 735; Morris v. State v. Briscoe (Del.), 67 Atl. 154; 
 
 State, 54 Fla. 80, 45 So. 456; Young State v. Harnett (Del., 1909), 74 Atl. 
 
 V. State, 156 Ala. 670, 46 So. 580; 82. 
 
 Ryan v. State, 104 Ga. 78, 30 S. E. "2 Russell on Crimes (9th Am. Ed.) 
 
 678; Griffin V. State, 3 Ga. App. 476, 618; Smith v. People, 53 X. Y. rii, 
 
 60 S. E. 277; State v. Wedbee (X. C, 114, 13 Am. 474; Lewer v. Common- 
 
 1910), 67 S. E. 60; People v. Point- wealth, 15 S. & R. (Pa.) 93; Cline v. 
 
 dexter, 243 111. 68, 90 X. E. 261. To State, 43 Tex. 494, 497; Miller v. 
 
 constitute the ofifense of obtaining Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 15, 19, 39 Am. 
 
 property by false pretenses there must 194 ; State v. Anderson, 47 Iowa 142, 
 
 be an intent to defraud, there must be 14S ; People v. Rae, 66 Cal. 423, 425,. 
 
 an actual fraud committed, false pre- 6 Pac. i, 56 Am. 102; Zink v. People,
 
 729 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AND FALSE PRETEXSES. §§436-437 
 
 If the accused, having obtained legal possession of tlie goods 
 with the owner's consent, and, as a bailee or trustee, afterwards 
 converts them to his own use he is guilty of embezzlement 
 only. To constitute the crime of false pretenses it must be 
 proved that the accused, at the time of the taking of the prop- 
 erty, was acting dishonestly and with a fraudulent intent and 
 that he then and there, by false pretenses, induced the owner to 
 part with both the title and the possession and not with the pos- 
 session alone. "^ 
 
 § 436. Evidence to show the intention of the owner. — It will thus 
 be seen that the intention of the owner as respects his title to the 
 property is of the greatest importance, for it is upon his intention 
 that the character of the crime depends. He may always testify 
 to the intention with which he transferred the property to the 
 accused.-* He may relate in evidence at length the circumstances 
 under which the transfer was made, includins: evervthine that 
 was said or done, either by him or by the accused, as a part of the 
 res gestcc; and from these circumstances the jury may infer that 
 he consented to divest himself of his title in the property upon 
 the strength of the false representations.*^ 
 
 ^ 437. The intent to defraud. — An intent to defraud must always 
 be proved-" beyond a reasonable doubt. The intent is always a 
 
 77 N. Y. 114, ZZ Am. 589; Canter v. Ky. 510, 513, 18 S. W. 358, 775, i3 
 
 State, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 349, 350; Peo- Ky. L. 929, 36 Am. St. 609. Cf. State 
 
 pie V. Martin, 102 Cal. 558, 36 Pac. v. Vaughan, i Bay (S. Car.) 282, 
 
 952; Jones V. State, 93 Ga. 547, 553, 283; State v. Benson, no Mo. 18, 21, 
 
 19 S. E. 250; Commonwealth v. Call, 19 S. W. 213; State v. Bingham, 51 
 
 21 Pick. (Mass.) 515. Wash. 616, 99 Pac. 735; People v. 
 
 ^^Commonwealth v. Barry, 124 Snyder, no App. Div. (N. Y.) 699, 
 
 Mass. 325, 327 ; State v. Keyes, 196 97 X. Y. S. 469. 
 
 Mo. 136, 93 S. W. 801, 6 L. R. A. (X. =» Sharp v. State, 53 X. J. L. 511, 
 
 S.) 369n ; Day v. Commonwealth 513, 21 .\\\. 1026; Carlisle v. State, 
 
 CKy.), no S. W. 417, T,?i Ky. L. 560: 76 Ala. 75; Todd v. State, 31 Ind. 
 
 State V. Dickinson, 21 Mont. 595, 55 514, 516; State v. Fields, n8 Ind. 
 
 Pac. 539; Beckwith v. Galice Mines 491, 492, 21 X. E. 252; Bowler v. 
 
 Co., 50 Ore. 542, 93 Pac. 453, 16 L. State, 41 Miss. 570, 578: People v. 
 
 R. A. (N. S.) 723. Kendall. 25 Wend. fX. Y.) 309. 401, 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Drew, 153 37 Am. Dec. 240; Commonwealth v. 
 
 Mass. 588, 595. 27 X. E. 593. Devlin, 141 Mass. 423, 430. 6 X. E. 
 
 ^Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 92 64; People v. Baker, 96 X. Y. 340,
 
 § 437 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 730 
 
 question for the jury."' The intent to defraud may be inferred 
 from the facts and circumstances of the case, as, for example, 
 from the fact that llie representaiions were false and that the 
 accused knew they were so when he made them.-'* And where the 
 alleged fraudulent transaction is at all complicated, it is compe- 
 tent to prove, not only the facts constituting the transaction 
 itself, but also all facts and circumstances involved in the steps 
 preliminary thereto, and all facts which tend to show the course 
 of dealing between the parties before and after the date of the 
 offense laid in the indictment. The widest latitude is allowed. 
 All available information should be received and no circum- 
 stances should be excluded which w^ill throw, or tend to throw, 
 any light upon the intent of the parties, or upon the falsity of 
 the representations.-" 
 
 An intention upon the part of the defendant to pay for the 
 property obtained, or to return the money procured by false pre- 
 tenses, is immaterial. Hence the defendant cannot prove, to re- 
 but the intent to defraud, that he promised to repay, or that he 
 was able or willing to repay,^" wanted to procure work so as to 
 
 349; People V. Getchell, 6 Mich. 496, 
 504; Ager V. State, 2 Ga. App. 158, 
 58 S. E. 374; State v. Briscoe (Del., 
 1907), 67 Atl. 154; 25 Am. St. 387, 
 note ; Elliott Evidence, § 2975 ; Mar- 
 tins V. State, 17 Wyo. 319, 98 Pac. 
 709; State V. Luff (Del., 1909), 74 Atl. 
 1079. Presumption and burden of 
 proof in prosecution for false pre- 
 tense, see 25 Am. St. 380, 389. De- 
 fenses in prosecutions for false pre- 
 tense, see Elliott Evidence, § 2982. 
 Evidence of good character of de- 
 fendant, see 103 Am. St. 902; suf- 
 ficiency of evidence — variance, see El- 
 liott Evidence, § 2984; 25 Am. St. 
 389. 
 
 ^ State V. Norton, 76 Mo. 180, 182; 
 Brown v. People, 16 Hun (X. Y.) 
 53S> 537; People v. Thomas, 3 Hill 
 (N. Y.) 169; Parmelee v. People, 8 
 Hun (N. Y.) 623; Dorsey v. State, 
 III Ala. 40, 20 So. 629. 
 
 -^People v. Herrick, 13 Wend. (N. 
 Y.) 87, 91; State v. Walton, 114 N. 
 
 Car. 783, 787, 18 S. E. 945; Pepple v. 
 Baker, 96 N. Y. 340, 2 N. Y. Cr. 218. 
 Cf. People v. Getchell, 6 Mich. 496, 
 505; State V. Briscoe (Del., 1907), 67 
 Atl. 154; People V. Leavens (Gal. 
 App., 1909), 106 Pac. 1 103. 
 
 *• People V. Gibbs, 98 Cal. 661, 665, 
 33 Pac. 630; State v. Rivers, 58 Iowa 
 102, no, 12 N. W. 117, 43 Am. 112; 
 People v. Shelters, 99 Mich. 2>22,> 334. 
 58 N. W. 362; People v. Winslow, 39 
 Mich. 505, 506; State v. Hartnett 
 (Del., 1909), 74 Atl. 82. As to deeds, 
 letters and telegrams forming a part 
 of the res gestce, see Commonwealth 
 V. Jeffries, 7 Allen (Mass.) 548, 561, 
 83 Am. Dec. 7l2n, and State v. Alex- 
 ander, 119 Mo. 447, 462, 24 S. W. 
 1060. 
 
 ™ People V. Oscar, 105 Mich. 704, 
 63 X. W. 971 ; People v. Lennox, 106 
 Mich. 625, 64 X^ W. 488; Common- 
 wealth V. Coe, 115 Mass. 481, 503; 
 Commonwealth v. Mason, 105 Mass.
 
 731 FORGERY, COUNTERFEITING AND FALSE PRETENSES. § 438 
 
 earn money to repay, "^ or actually did repay, persons from whom 
 money had been obtained.^- Xor can he prove that, in procuring 
 the money, he was acting under legal adx'ice unless he shows, 
 first, that he stated to the attorney who advised him, fullv and 
 fairly all the facts, and unless it also appears that he acted m 
 perfect good faith.^^ 
 
 § 438. Evidence of other similar crimes not inadmissible when 
 relevant to show the intent to defraud. — Evidence of similar of- 
 fenses, involving the making of other false representations, is 
 admissible against the prisoner to show that he was aware of the 
 falsity of the statements made by him in the present instance, 
 and that, knowing them to be false, he made them with the intent 
 to deceive.^* Evidence of similar false pretenses is particularly 
 relevant when it appears that the fraudulent act for which the 
 accused is on trial does not stand alone, but is a part of a scheme, 
 not merely to defraud one individual, but to swindle the com- 
 
 163, 7 Am. 507; State v. Thatcher, 35 
 X. J. L. 445, 448; People v. Wieger, 
 100 Cal. 352, 34 Pac. 826; Reg. v. 
 Xaylor, 10 Cox C. C. 149; Reg. v. 
 Boulton, I Den. C. C. 508, 509; State 
 V. Hill, 72 Me. 238, 242 ; Common- 
 wealth V. Schwartz, 92 Ky. 510, 514, 
 18 S. W. 358, 775, 13 Ky. L. 929, 36 
 Am. St. 609; State v. Hartnett (Del., 
 1909), 74 Atl. 82. Contra, People v. 
 Herrick, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 87, 92. 
 
 "^^ Meek v. State, 117 Ala. 116, 23 
 So. 155. 
 
 "'Commonwealth v. Howe, 132 
 Mass. 250, 261. 
 
 "State V. Oppenheimer, 41 Wash. 
 630, 84 Pac. 588. 
 
 ^Hutcherson v. State (Tex., 1896), 
 35 S. W. 375; Martin v. State, 36 
 Tex. Cr. r25, 35 S. VV. 976; People 
 V. Hensslcr, 48 Mich. 49, 11 N. W. 
 804; State V. Walton, 114 N. Car. 
 783, 18 S. E. 945; TroRclon v. Com- 
 monwealth, 31 Gratt. (Va.) 862, 871- 
 875; State V. Myers, 82 Mo. 558, 52 
 Am. 389; State v. Lonf.;, 103 Ind. 481, 
 
 485, 3 N. E. 169; State v. Jackson, 
 112 Mo. 585, 589, 20 S. W. 674; Com- 
 monwealth V. Eastman, i Cush. 
 (Mass.) 189, 48 Am. Dec. 596; Com- 
 monwealth V. Jeffries, 7 Allen 
 (Mass.) 548, 83 Am. Dec. 7i2n; 
 State V. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245, 24 
 Am. 69; Bielschofsky v. People, 3 
 Hun (N. Y.) 40; Mayer v. People, 80 
 N. Y. 364, 372; Strong v. State, 86 
 Ind. 208, 213, 44 Am. 292n. Contra, 
 State V. Bokicn, 14 Wash. 403, 44 
 Pac. 889; People v. Garrahan, 19 
 App. Div. (N. Y.) 347, 46 N. Y. S. 
 497; Meek v. State, 117 Ala. 116, 23 
 So. 155; State V. Sparks, 79 Neb. 
 504, 113 N. W. 154; State v. Jackson, 
 21 S. Dak. 494, 113 N. W. 880: Peo- 
 ple V. Levin, 119 App. Div. (X. Y.) 
 233, 104 N. Y. S. 647, affirmed in 194 
 X. Y. SS4, 87 N. K. 1 124. Evidence 
 of other offenses in prosecution for 
 false pretense, see 62 L. R. \. 193, 
 note; 25 Am. St. 387, note; 105 .Am. 
 St. looi, note.
 
 § 439 
 
 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 1Z-2- 
 
 miinity at large. ^'' Thus, where the representations consist of 
 statements by the accused of his financial condition, and the ex- 
 hibition of a memorandum claimed by him to be a correct ac- 
 count of the profits of his business, it may be shown that previous 
 to these statements he had made similar statements to other per- 
 sons and by such statements had procured money from others.^" 
 The same rule has been applied to statements of the accused in an 
 endeavor to sell stock in a corporation.^' The theory upon which 
 similar statements by the accused are admitted in evidence is that 
 they bring home to him a knowledge of the falsity of the repre- 
 sentations, when he made them and also show his intent to de- 
 ceive. 
 
 § 439. The pretenses made and evidence to show their falsity. — 
 
 The burden of proving the nature of the representations is always 
 upon the prosecution. An indictment charging two or more false 
 pretenses is sustained by proving one or more of them.^* Having 
 
 '^Rafferty v. State, 91 Tenn. 655, 
 666, 16 S. W. 728; Carnell v. State, 
 
 85 Md. I, 36 Atl. 117; Common- 
 wealth V. Howe, 132 Mass. 250, 260; 
 Commonwealth v. Coe, 115 Mass. 
 481, SOI ; People v. Henssler, 48 Mich. 
 49, 53, II N. W. 804; Strong v. State, 
 
 86 Ind. 208, 217, 44 Am. 292n; Com- 
 monwealth V. Blood, 141 Mass. 571, 
 576, 6 N. E. 769; State v. Gibson, 
 132 Iowa 53, 106 N. W. 270; 
 State V. Sparks, 79 Neb. 504; 113 
 N. W. 154, rehearing denied, 79 
 Neb. SI I, 114 N. W. S98; Com- 
 monwealth V. Burton, 183 Mass. 461, 
 67 N. E. 419; State v. Newman, 73 
 N. J. L. 202, (i2 Atl. 1008; State v. 
 Seligman, 127 Iowa 415, 103 N. W. 
 357; State V. Poole, 42 Wash. 192, 
 84 Pac. 727; People v. Weil, 244 111. 
 176, 91 N. E. 112. But independent 
 fraudulent acts unconnected with the 
 crime in question were rejected in 
 Todd V. State, 31 Ind. 514, 519; Com- 
 monwealth V. Jackson, 132 Mass. 16, 
 21. The entire history of the fraud 
 
 may be shown. If the facts disclose 
 that other similar crimes have been 
 committed, this does not render them 
 incompetent. Commonwealth v. Blood, 
 141 Mass. 571, 575, 6 N. E. 769. 
 
 "■" People V. Noblett, 184 N. Y. 612, 
 'J^ N. E. II93- 
 
 ^'People V. Whalen, 154 Cal. 472, 
 98 Pac. 194. 
 
 ^Woodruff V. State, 61 Ark. 157, 
 32 S. W. 102; Limouze v. People, 58 
 III. App. 314; State V. Vandimark, 35 
 Ark. 396, 402 ; Skiff v. People, 2 
 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 139, 146; Todd v. 
 State, 31 Ind. 514, 523; Rex v. Ady, 
 7 C. & P. 140; Commonwealth v. 
 Morrill, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 571, 574; 
 State V. Mills, 17 Me. 211; Webster 
 V. People, 92 N. Y. 422, 427; People 
 V. Blanchard, 90 N. Y. 314, 319; 2 
 Bish. Cr. Pro. (4th ed.), § 187(2): 
 State V. Keyes, 196 Mo. 136, 93 S. W. 
 801, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 36911; Cun- 
 ningham V. State, 61 N. J. L. 666, 40 
 Atl. 696 ; Day v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), no S. W. 417, ZZ Ky. L. 560.
 
 "JT^T^ FORGERY, COUNTERFEITING AND FALSE PRETENSES. 
 
 439 
 
 proved the making of the pretenses, the burden remains upon the 
 state to prove their falsity."" The admissions of the defendant 
 tending to show the falsity of the representations made by him, 
 though not usually enough to sustain a conviction, unless corro- 
 borated,*" may always be received in evidence against him,*^ their 
 weight being left to the jury, who must determine whether the 
 representations made were false or true. Direct evidence to es- 
 tablish the falsity of the representations is not indispensable. 
 This may be inferred from evidence of circumstances which tend 
 legitimately and necessarily to show it.*^ The false representa- 
 tion must be of some existing or past material fact, as distinct 
 from a mere promise or opinion.'*^ Only such pretenses can be 
 proved as relate to events past or present which are complete and 
 certain. The representations must be of such a character that 
 their truth or falsity can be determined. This necessarily cannot 
 be done where the representations relate to future events which 
 are uncertain and contingent, or where they consist of promises 
 or vague opinions concerning the truth of which no person can 
 tell anything.** But, though false representations as to future 
 
 '''Babcock v. People, 15 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 347, 352; Bowler v. State, 41 
 Miss. 570, 577; State v. Wilbourne, 
 87 N. Car. 529, 532; People v. Leav- 
 ens (Cal. App., 1909), 106 Pac. 1 103. 
 
 ■"State V. Lewis, 45 Iowa 20, 22; 
 State V. Penny, 70 Iowa 190, 30 N. 
 W. 561. 
 
 "State V. Long, 103 Ind. 481, 3 N. 
 E. 169; Meek v. State, 117 Ala. 116, 
 23 So. 155 ; Lawrence v. State, 103 
 Md. 17, 63 Atl. 96; People v. Chrones, 
 75 Pac. 180, 141 Cal. XVIII, not re- 
 ported in full. 
 
 *" People V. Pinckney, 67 Hun (N. 
 Y.) 428, 430, 22 X. Y. S. 118. 
 
 "2 Bish. Cr. L., § 429; Biddle v. 
 L'nited States, 156 Fed. 759, 84 C. C. 
 A. 415; State V. Hollingsworth, 132 
 Iowa 471, 109 N. W. 1003; Cook v. 
 State, 71 Xeb. 243, 98 N. W. 810; 
 Goddard v. State, 2 Ga. App. 154, 58 
 .S. K. 304; People v. Huggins, no 
 App. Div. (X. Y.) 613, 97 X. Y. S. 
 
 187; State V. Phelps, 41 Wash. 470, 
 84 Pac. 24; Young v. State (Ala., 
 1908), 46 So. 580. 
 
 " Dillingham v. State, 5 Ohio St. 
 280, 285; Rex V. Codrington, i C. & 
 P. 661 ; People v. Morphy, 100 Cal. 
 84, 87, 34 Pac. 623 ; Commonwealth 
 V. Drew, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 179, 185; 
 Commonwealth v. Warren, 94 Ky. 
 615, 619, 23 S. W. 193, IS Ky. L. 249; 
 Commonwealth v. Moore, 99 Pa. St. 
 570, 574; Gray v. State, 55 Ala. 86; 
 Ryan v. State, 45 Ga. 128, 129; 
 Thomas v. State, 90 Ga. 437, 440, 16 
 S. E. 94; Keller v. State, 51 Ind. iii, 
 117; Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 127 
 Mass. 446, 449; Snyder, In re, \y 
 Kan. 542, 557 ; State v. Green, 7 Wis. 
 571; State V. Phifcr, 65 X. Car. 321, 
 325; State V. Daniel, 114 X. Car. 823, 
 824, 19 S. E. 100; People v. Hlanch- 
 ard, 90 X. Y. 314, 325; Allen v. State, 
 16 Tex. App. 150, 151 ; Johnson v.
 
 § 440 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 734 
 
 events which of necessity are in the nature of a promise or opin- 
 ion, may not be enough alone to sustain a conviction of false 
 pretenses, it often happens that false representations of material 
 facts and promises are intermingled in the same statement. This 
 does not necessarily keep out the statement if the statement of a 
 fact and the promise can be separated. And if it is proved that 
 the person defrauded relied in part on the statement of fact the 
 promise may be disregarded by the jury and the defendant prop- 
 erly convicted.'*^ For if the statement of an existing fact which is 
 false produces its result only because it is coupled with a promise 
 that is also false a statement of fact and the promise may be 
 reasonably regarded as constituting a false misrepresentation, 
 upon which the prosecuting witness relied.**' Representations of 
 value of property as an existing fact are not mere opinion, but are 
 material ; and if made with a knowledge of their falsity, with an 
 intent to procure money or property, and if the party to whom 
 they are made parts with money or property to the person making 
 them in reliance upon their truth, a conviction will be sustained. 
 It is a question for the jury to determine upon all the facts and 
 circumstances whether a representation of value is a mere opinion 
 or the statement of a fact.'*^ 
 
 § 440. The pretenses must have been calculated to deceive. — Not 
 
 only must the representations be proved to have been false, but it 
 must also be shown that they were such as were calculated to 
 
 State, 41 Tex. 65, 67; State v. Haines, the owner of a lucrative business and 
 
 23 S. Car. 170, 173; Canter v. State, had a substantial bank account, it 
 
 7 Lea (Tenn.) 349, 351; State v. will not be permissible to prove in 
 
 Petty, 119 Mo. 425, 24 S. W. lOio; his defense that he was the owner of 
 
 State V. Stanley, 64 I\Ie. 157, 159; considerable real estate. Such evi- 
 
 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 132 Mass. dence, however, would be admissible 
 
 16, 17; State V. Moore, iii N. Car. where his statement was merely that 
 
 667, 673, 16 S. E. 384; State v. King, he was a man of wealth. Carnell v. 
 
 67 N. H. 219, 34 Atl. 461. The evi- State, 85 Md. i, 36 Atl. 117. 
 
 dence to prove the truth or falsity *° Morris v. State, 54 Fla. 80, 45 So. 
 
 of the representations will vary ac- 456; McDowell v. Commonwealth 
 
 cording to their nature. The evi- (Ky., 1909), 123 S. W. 313. 
 
 dence must be relevant to the specific ** Morris v. State, 54 Fla. 80, 45 So. 
 
 facts contained in the representations. 456. 
 
 Thus, if the statement upon the ''"Williams v. State, 77 Ohio St. 
 
 strength of which goods were sold 468, 83 N. E. 802. 
 on credit was that the accused was
 
 735 FORGERY, COUNTERFEITING AND FALSE PRETENSES. § 44I 
 
 deceive a person of ordinary caution and intelligence.** Hence 
 evidence is always admissible to show that the person who was 
 defrauded could have ascertained the truth or falsity of the state- 
 ments of the accused.'*'' Whether the representations were cal- 
 culated to deceive, whether the owner relied upon them as the 
 main inducement, and whether they were known to be false, by 
 the accused, are questions for the jury. In determining them the 
 jurors must consider all the circumstances of the case, such as tlie 
 ages of the parties, their experience and knowledge of the world, 
 the customs of the business or profession in which they are en- 
 gaged, and their several means of acquiring knowledge.^" 
 
 § 441. The value of the property obtained. — It must be proved, 
 beyond a reasonable doubt, that the property which was ob- 
 tained by means of the false representations had some value ;^^ 
 and that the representation^ operated to prejudice or injure the 
 person to whom they were made.^- In a prosecution for obtain- 
 ing a specified sum of money proof of obtaining any sum 
 
 **Higler v. People, 44 Mich. 299, 
 303, 6 N. W. 664, 38 Am. 267; Com- 
 monwealth V. Moore, 99 Pa. St. 570; 
 Scott V. People; 62 Barb. (X. Y.) 
 62, 75-81 ; Shaffer v. State, 82 Ind. 
 
 221, 224, 225; State V. Burnett: 119 
 Ind. 392, 393, 21 N. E. 972; Com- 
 monwealth V. Grady, 13 Bush (Ky.) 
 285, 286, 26 Am. 192; Thomas v. 
 People, 113 111 531, 533, 537; Delaney 
 V. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 28, 30; 
 Miller V. State, 7Z Ind. 88, 91 ; Mc- 
 Corkle v. State, i Cold. (Tenn.) zzi'. 
 People V. Cook, 41 Hun (X. Y.) 67, 
 69, State V. DeHart, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 
 222, 224; Watson V. People, 87 N. Y. 
 561, 565, 41 Am. 397n ; Common- 
 wealth V. Haughey, 3 Met. (Ky.) 223; 
 Meek V. State, 117 Ala. 116, 23 So. 
 155; Elliott Evidence, § 2979. 
 
 ** People V. Hcnsslcr, 48 Mich. 49, 
 II X. VV. 804; Wagoner v. State, 90 
 Ind. 504, 507; People v. Oyer & Ter- 
 miner, 83 X. Y. 436, 449; People v. 
 
 Dimick, 41 Hun (X. Y.) 616; State 
 V. Jones, 70 X. Car. 75, "JT, McKee 
 V. State, III Ind. 378, 381, 12 X. E. 
 510; Shaffer v. State, 100 Ind. 365, 
 368; Goddard v. State, 2 Ga. App. 
 154, 58 S. E. 304. 
 
 ^" See also. Commonwealth v. 
 Grady, 13 Bush (Ky.) 285, 286, 26 
 Am. 192; Winslow v. State,. 97 Ala. 
 68, 12 So. 423; Woodbury v. State, 
 69 Ala. 242, 44 Am. 515; McDowell 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 123 S. W. 
 
 313- 
 
 "State V. Lewis, 26 Kan. 123, 129; 
 State V. Shaeffer, 89 Mo. 271, 278, i 
 S. W. 293 ; Rosales v. State, 22 Tex. 
 App. 673, 675, 3 S. W. 344; Moore 
 V. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. St. 260 ; 
 Morgan v. State, 42 Ark. 131, 140, 48 
 Km. 55; State v. Gibson, 132 Iowa 
 53, 106 X. W. 270. 
 
 "People V. Galloway, 17 Wend. 
 (X. Y.) 540; People v. Cook, 41 Hun 
 (X. Y.) 67, 70.
 
 § 442 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 736 
 
 is sufficient,^"' as this crime is not usuall}- graded according to 
 the amount taken.'"* 
 
 § 442. Belief in false representations. — The prosecuting witness 
 may testify that he behevcd in the false pretenses.'"'"' The evidence 
 must show beyond a reasonable doubt that he believed that the 
 representations were true and that, relying and acting upon them. 
 he parted with his property upon faith in them.^'' But they need 
 not be proved to have been the sole, exclusive and decisive cause 
 thereof. He may have been influenced by considerations of 
 friendship, or the desire of gain, and wliether he was so in- 
 fluenced, and by what and to what extent, are questions for the 
 jury.^' It is a false pretense under the statute for the accused to 
 represent himself or his firm to be in a sound pecuniary condition, 
 or worth so much, or to have a certain sum of money in his or 
 tlieir hands or in the bank, knowino- these assertions to be false. ^'^ 
 
 "State V. Briscoe (Del.), (^y Atl. 
 154; Bowman v. State, 54 Fla. 16, 45 
 So. 308; People V. Osborn (Cal. App., 
 1910), 106 Pac. 891. 
 
 "As to procuring a promissory 
 note by false pretenses, Clawson v. 
 State, 129 Wis. 650, 109 N. W. 578, 
 116 Am. St. 972. Cf Brunaugh v. 
 State (Ind., 1910), 90 N. E. 1019. 
 
 °^ People V. Herrick, 13 Wend. (N. 
 Y.) 87, 91 ; Snyder, /;;. re, 17 Kan. 
 542, 553; People V. Weil, 244 111. 176, 
 91 N. E. 112. 
 
 "^Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 31 
 Gratt. (Va.) 862, 884; Reg. v. Mills, 
 7 Cox C. C. 263; Meek v. State, 117 
 Ala. 116, 2.Z So. 155; Swift V. State, 
 126 Ga. 590, 55 S. E. 478; People V. 
 Sattlekau (App. Div. (N. Y.)) 104 
 N. Y. S. 805 ; Goddard v. State, 2 Ga. 
 App. 154, 58 S. E. 304; State v. Bing- 
 ham, 51 Wash. 616, 99 Pac. 735; 
 State V. Pickett, 174 Mo. 663, 74 S. 
 W. 844; Elliott Evidence, §2981. See 
 also cases in next note. 
 
 " State V. Thatcher, 35 X. J. L. 445, 
 449; Therasson v. People, 20 Hun 
 (N. Y.) 55, 67; Van Buren v. Peo- 
 ple, 7 Colo. .-\pp. 136, 42 Pac. 599; 
 
 People V. Haynes, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 
 546-555, 28 Am. Dec. 530; People v. 
 Baker, 96 N. Y. 340, 348; Berry v. 
 State, 97 Ga. 202, 23 S. E. 833; Skiff 
 V. People, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 139; 
 State V. Williams, 103 Ind. 235, 237, 
 2 X. E. 585; Woodbury v. State, 69 
 Ala. 242, 246, 44 Am. 515; Wax v. 
 State, 43 Xeb. 18, 61 X. W. 117; State 
 V. Dunlap, 24 Me. TJ ; Commonwealth 
 V. Stevenson, 127 Mass. 446; Fay v. 
 Commonwealth, 28 Gratt. (Va.) 912; 
 Cowen V. People, 14 111. 348; Britt 
 V. State, 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 30; State 
 V. Fooks, 65 Iowa 196, 21 X. W. 561, 
 '/Ty, Snyder, In re, 17 Kan. 542; 
 State V. Tessier, 32 La. Ann. 1227; 
 Smith V. State, 55 Miss. 513; People 
 V. Gibbs, 98 Cal. 661, 663, 33 Pac. 
 630 ; Donohoe v. State, 59 Ark. 375 ; 27 
 S. W. 226; State v. Palmer, 50 Kan. 
 318, 32 Pac. 29. 
 
 ^^ Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 92 
 Ky. 510, 51S, 18 S. W. 358, 775. U Ky. 
 L- 929, 36 Am. St. 609; Rothschild v. 
 State, 13 Lea (Tenn.) 294, 300-302; 
 Commonwealth v. Drew, 153 Mass. 
 588, 595. 27 X. E. 593; State v.
 
 "J^J FORGERY. COUXTERFEITIXG AXD FALSE PRETENSES. § 443 
 
 ij 443. Evidence of the pecuniary condition of the accused at the 
 date of making the representations. — The rule that the pecuniary 
 condition of the accused is irrelevant is subject to an exception in 
 the case of the crime of false representation. That a man is desti- 
 tute or embarrassed with debt does not justify an inference that 
 he will forge or steal and evidence that the defendant is very pooi 
 should be rejected in a prosecution for larceiiy or forgery. But 
 where one person procures the property of another because of 
 the confidence the owner has in his financial responsibility and 
 mtention to pay. the fact that the person obtaining the goods 
 was insolvent, and that he knew it, would indicate very strongly 
 that he intended to deprive the owner of his property without 
 paying for it, and with an intention to defraud. Hence, evidence 
 tending to show the solvency or insolvency of the accused,^" or 
 of some other person,*'" upon whose credit property is procured. 
 is relevant to prove that he made the statements in good faith, or 
 the reverse." 
 
 If the accused refers the owner of the property to a third per- 
 son for information, who, on being questioned, and while the 
 transaction is pending, makes a statement, upon faith in which 
 
 Xeimeier, 66 Iowa 634, d^l^ 24 N. W. 
 247 ; Higler v. People, 44 IMich. .299, 
 303, 6 N. W. 664, 38 Am. 267; Com- 
 monwealth V. Wallace, 114 Pa. St. 
 405, 411, 6 Atl. 685, 60 Am. 353; 
 Reg. V. Howarth, 11 Cox C. C. 588; 
 State V. Pryor, 30 Ind. 350, 351 ; 
 Hathcock v. State, 88 Ga. 91, 13 S. E. 
 
 959- 
 
 " State V. Hill, ^2 Me. 238, 242. 
 
 '"^ Where a person was defrauded 
 by a false statement as to which of 
 two persons of the same name was 
 the maker of a note, evidence of the 
 financial standing of the alleged 
 maker, and of the irrcsponsibilitj' of 
 the other, is admissible to show in- 
 tent. People V. Cook, 41 linn (.\. 
 Y. 67. 71. 
 
 •"f<cg. V. Howarth. ir Cox C. C. 
 588. 592: Wood V. People, 53 X- V- 
 511; Brown v. State, yj Tex. Cr. 104, 
 
 47 — Unijerhm.i. Ckim. Iw. 
 
 38 S. W. 1008, 66 Am. St. 794- "Evi- 
 dence of the pecuniary condition of 
 the accused in such a case is not 
 offered to show that he was under a 
 peculiar temptation to commit the of- 
 fense, or was more likely to cheat 
 and defraud because he was in em- 
 barrassed circumstances, but for the 
 purpose of showing the natural and 
 necessary consequence of his act, 
 which the law presumes he intended." 
 Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 7 .Mlon 
 (Mass.) 548, 569, 83 .'\m. Dec. 7i2n; 
 Commonwealth v. Drew, 153 Mass. 
 588, 595, 27 N. E. 593. Evidence that 
 the accused mortgaged all his prop- 
 i.'v\y, including the goods obtained, 
 three days thereafter, is relevant. 
 State V. Call, 48 N. H. 126, 131. See 
 also. State v. Long, 103 Ind. 481, 484, 
 3 .\. \\. 169.
 
 § 444 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 738 
 
 the owner acts, the statement is received as the statement of the 
 accused.*^- Where the representations of financial ahihty made by 
 the accused were alleged to be false, his subsequent declaration 
 that he was too poor to retain counsel are relevant. "^^ But the ad- 
 missions of the accused, made upon an examination in proceed- 
 ings supplementary to execution, are not receivaljle where the 
 statute expressly provides that such admissions cannot ho. used 
 against him upon a criminal prosecution.*^* The insolvency of tlie 
 defendant may be pro\-ed by any witness having a competent 
 knowledge of his financial condition."^ 
 
 § 444. The false pretenses not necessarily verbal. — It is never 
 necessary for the prosecution to prove that the false pretenses 
 were made by, or contained in, verbal statements or communica- 
 tions, oral or written. Actions often speak louder than words. 
 The language of the accused is always relevant in evidence; but 
 evidence of his actions, unaccompanied by language, may also 
 be received a;nd the false representations may be implied by the 
 jury from evidence of such actions.*''^ 
 
 If the ideas properly and naturally conveyed by the actions of 
 the accused produce a false impression upon the mind of the 
 owner of the property wdiich is obtained, and it also appears from 
 all the facts in evidence that the accused knew and intended that 
 they should produce such a false impression, an allegation of false 
 pretenses is sustained.*^" Thus it has repeatedly been held that 
 the action of the accused in drawing a check upon a bank in which 
 he has no funds, and which he therefore knows will not be 
 honored on presentation, and passing the same, is by implication 
 
 "^Todd V. State, 31 Ind. 514, 520. len (Mass.) 548, 83 Am. Dec. 71211. 
 
 Cf. State V. McCormick, ^7 Kan. 440, The notes of the accused are rele- 
 
 46 Pac. 777, 57 Am. St. 341. vant to show what he owes. Hath- 
 
 "'^ State V. Fooks, 65 Iowa 196, 198, cock v. State, 88 Ga. 91, 13 S. E. 959. 
 
 452, 21 N. W. 561, 773. If the indict- ""State v. Briscoe (Del., 1907), 67 
 
 ment does not negative the repre- Atl. 154. 
 
 sentations of solvency, evidence of "" Musgrave v. State, 133 Ind. 297, 
 
 insolvency is not admissible. State 306, 32 N. E. 885 ; Commonwealth v. 
 
 v. Long, 103 Ind. 481, 3 N. E. 169. Murphy, 96 Ky. 28, 27 S. W. 859, 16 
 
 "Barber v. People, 17 Hun (X. Ky. L. 224; Brown v. State, 37 Tex. 
 
 Y.) 366, 368. Cr. 104, 38 S. W. 1008, 66 Am. St. 
 
 " Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 7 Al- 794.
 
 739 FORGERY, COUXTERFEITIXG AND FALSE TRETENSES. § 445 
 
 a false representation that he has money in the bank on which 
 the check is drawn. "^^ 
 
 § 445. Proving the venue. — The false representation may be 
 proved to have been made in one place and the property may have 
 been obtained in another. This occurs where the accused has writ- 
 ten and mailed a letter to the owner of the money or goods, who 
 resides or does business in a distant city, and the property is sent 
 to him upon faith in the false representations contained in the 
 letter. The place in which the owner parts with his property deter- 
 mines the venue of the crime. Hence, evidence to prove where the 
 false representations were made is immaterial. But it must al- 
 ways be proved where the false statements were acted upon by 
 the ow^ner and where the money or goods were obtained.*'^ 
 
 ** People V. Donaldson, 70 Cal. 116, 
 118, II Fac. 681; Commonwealth v. 
 Drew, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 179, 27 N. 
 E. 593 ; Rex v. Jackson, 3 Campb. 
 370, 371; Foote V. People, 17 Hun 
 (N Y.) 218, 219; Reg. V. Radcliffe, 12 
 Cox C. C. 474. Contra, Reg. v. Part- 
 ridge, 6 Cox C. C. 182, 186 ; Brown v. 
 State, 27 Tex. Cr. 104, 38 S. W. 1008, 
 66 Am. St. 794. The fact that a per- 
 son, not a member of the university, 
 went to a shop wearing a cap and 
 gown and obtained goods is sufficient 
 evidence of false pretenses though 
 he said nothing. Rex v. Barnard, 7 
 C. & P. 784, 785. See also, Speer v. 
 State, 50 Tex. Cr. 273, 97 S. W. 469. 
 
 "'State V. Shaeffer, 89 Mo. 271, 278, 
 I S. W. 293 ; State v. House, 55 Iowa 
 
 466, 472, 8 X. W. 307; Norris v. 
 State, 25 Ohio St. 217, 18 Am. 291 ; 
 Commonwealth v. Van Tuyl, i Met. 
 (Ky.) I, 4, 71 Am. Dec. 455; People 
 v. Adams, 3 Denio (N. Y.) 190, 45 
 Am. Dec. 468; Commonwealth v. 
 Karpouski, 15 Pa. Co. Ct. 280. A 
 letter may be relevant evidence aside 
 from the writing contained in it to 
 show the representations made and 
 the place of their making. The 
 printed matter at the head of the 
 letter may indicate the false character 
 which the accused has assumed in or- 
 der to effect his criminal designs and 
 purposes. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 
 94 Ky. 281, 284, 22 S. W. 217, 15 Ky. 
 L. 49-
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 § 446. Obstructing justice and resist- 
 ing arrest — Proof of official 
 character of officer resisted— 
 Validity of his appointment. 
 
 447. Intention to obstruct justice — 
 
 Evidence of threats or to 
 show validity of warrant. 
 
 448. Preventing attendance of wit- 
 
 nesses. 
 
 449. False swearing. 
 
 450. Embracery — Evidence required. 
 
 451. Bribery defined — Evidence of 
 
 circumstances to prove cor- 
 rupt intention. 
 
 452. Judicial notice of official char- 
 
 acter and acts. 
 
 453. Necessity for reliance on evi- 
 
 dence of accomplices in the 
 bribery — Compulsory exami- 
 nation of accomplice. 
 
 454. Proving other acts of bribery. 
 
 455. Bribery of voters — Jud-cial no- 
 
 tice of elections. 
 
 456. Extortion — Intent and guilty 
 
 knowledge — E v i d e n c e to 
 prove ignorance or mistake 
 of law or fact. 
 
 457. Value of the thing extorted — 
 
 Burden of proving exception 
 to statute. 
 
 § 458. Compounding offenses — The 
 intent to screen the offender 
 — Mode of proving that a 
 crime was committed. 
 
 459. Contempt defined — Inherent ju- 
 
 dicial power to punish. 
 
 460. Direct and constructive con- 
 
 tempt distinguished — Court 
 may take notice of without 
 evidence. 
 
 461. Procedure in receiving evi- 
 
 dence of constructive con- 
 tempt. 
 
 462. Escape — Distinct from prison 
 
 breach. 
 
 463. Intention of permitting escape 
 
 — Negligence of officer. 
 
 464. Aiding prisoner to escape. 
 
 465. Illegality of arrest, when rele- 
 
 vant. 
 
 466. Perjury — The intent to swear 
 
 to what is false. 
 
 467. Materiality of the testimony. 
 
 468. Number of witnesses required 
 
 and corroboration of single 
 witness to prove falsity. 
 
 469. Falsity of the testimony. 
 
 470. Proof of the testimony alleged 
 
 to be false. 
 
 g 446. Obstructing justice and resisting arrest — Proof of official 
 character of officer resisted — Validity of his appointment. — Though 
 in civil cases the courts will judicially notice that certain persons 
 are officers/ on a trial for resisting or assaulting an officer it 
 
 ^ Underbill on Ev., § 240. 
 
 (740)
 
 741 
 
 OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 § 446 
 
 must be shown that the person resisted was an officer and that 
 the accused was aware of his official character." These facts can- 
 not be presumed." The officer who issued or served the writ 
 may testify orally that he was an officer and acted as such. It 
 is enough that he was an officer dc facto,* and evidence to prove 
 the invalidity of his appointment is usually inadmissible.^ If the 
 officer is alleged with unnecessary particularity "to have been 
 legally appointed and duly qualified," the court may require his 
 appointment to be proved.'' In the case of an indictment for 
 
 " Pettibone v. United States. 148 U. 
 S. 197, 205, 27 L- ed. 419, 13 Sup. Ct. 
 542; Merritt v. State (Miss., 1889), 
 5 So. 386 ; Rex v. Osmer, 5 East 304 ; 
 State V. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 551 ; State 
 V. Maloney, 12 R. I. 251 : State v. 
 Downer, 8 Vt. 424, 429, 30 Am. Dec. 
 482; Commonwealth v. Israel, 4 
 Leigh (Va.) 675; Yates v. People, 32 
 N. Y. 509; Commonwealth v. Kirby, 
 2 Cush. (Mass.) 577; State v. Hilton, 
 26 Mo. 199; State v. Smith, 11 Ore. 
 205, 8 Pac. .343 : Horan v. State, 7 
 Tex. App. 183; Duncan v. State, 7 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 148; State v. Bea- 
 som, 40 N. H. z'^j; State v. Murphy 
 (Del., 1907), ()6 Atl. 335. Cf. Put- 
 man V. State, 49 Ark. 449, 453, 5 S. 
 W. 715; State V. Pickett. 118 N. Car. 
 1231, 24 S. E. 350; Johnson v. State, 
 51 Fla. 44, 40 So. 678. Evidence of 
 other oflFenses to show that accused 
 was resisting arrest for another 
 crime, see 105 hm. St. 99T, note. 
 
 ^ State V. Downer, 8 Vt. 424, 429, 
 30 Am. Dec. 482; State v. Carpenter, 
 54 Vt. 551, 553. It may, and perhaps 
 must, be proved that the officer stated 
 he came to arrest the defendant, or 
 that he read a warrant to him, or 
 stated he had a warrant for him. 
 These facts are essential, though if 
 the accused began his resistance on 
 seeing the officer it is not necessary 
 
 to prove the warrant was read. Com- 
 monwealth V. Cooley, 6 Gray (Mass.) 
 350, 356. See Ormond v. Ball, 120 
 Ga. 916, 48 S. E. 383 ; State v. Smith, 
 II Ore. 205, 207, 8 Pac. 343; State 
 V. Maloney, 12 R. I. 251 ; Oliver v. 
 State, 17 Ark. 508, 510; Common- 
 wealth V. McCue, 16 Gray (Mass.) 
 226, 227 ; State v. Zeibart, 40 Iowa 
 169, 175- 
 
 * Floyd V. State, 79 Ala. 39, 42; 
 Cockerham v. State (Miss., 1895), ^9 
 So. 195 ; State v. Bates, 23 Iowa 96, 
 99. To require every officer to estab- 
 lish the validity of his appointment 
 in collateral proceedings would be in- 
 tolerable and a dangerous obstruction 
 of justice. Heath v. State, 36 .A.la. 
 273, 276. 
 
 ^ Robinson v. State. %2 Ga. 535, 546, 
 9 S. E. 528; Commonwealth v. Kirby, 
 2 Cush. (Mass.) 577, 581; State v. 
 Armistead, 106 N. Car. 639, 642, 10 
 S. E. 872 ; People v. Hopson, i Denio 
 (X. Y.) 574. Contra, Creighton v. 
 Commonwealth, ^2 Ky. 142, 147, 4 
 .^m. St. 143. It seems, however, that 
 the validity of a written warrant of 
 appointment may be inquired into and 
 if invalid, it is inadmissible. United 
 States V. Phelps, 4 Day (Conn.) 469, 
 470. 
 
 "State v. Sherburne, 50 N. IT. 99; 
 State V. Copp, 15 X. M. 212.
 
 § 447 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 742 
 
 resisting arrest it must be shown to authorize a conviction that an 
 attempt was made to arrest the accused." 
 
 i:^ 447. Intention to obstruct justice — Evidence of threats, or to 
 show invalidity of warrant. — The intention to obstruct the otiicer 
 may be inferred from the language of the accused. Threats and 
 violent epithets against the officer are admissible,^ though not 
 alone sufficient to constitute the offense of obstructing an officer," 
 nor is it necessary to prove that the officer was beaten or as- 
 saulted.^" Evidence that the obstruction was unsuccessful/^ or 
 that the person wdiose arrest the accused tried to prevent was 
 not in fact guilty,^" or that property which the officer attached, 
 believing it belonged to tlie defendant, did not belong to him," 
 has been held not relevant. 
 
 The motive which prompts the conduct of the accused in resist- 
 ing arrest is important. The accused may show any fact tending 
 to prove that the officer used undue violence or force in arresting 
 him, and that he, in self-defense, used force necessary to repel 
 it.^'* If, however, having submitted to an arrest which was ac- 
 companied wnth undue violence or force, he subsequently resists 
 the officer wdiile in his custody, a verdict of guilty will be 
 sustained. ^^ The validity of the warrant under which an arrest 
 w-as attempted will be presuined until the contrary is shown. ^'^ 
 The burden to prove its invalidity is on the defendant." The 
 illegality or invalidity of the w'arrant is always relevant. Any 
 
 '^Cooksey v. State, 84 Ark. 485, 106 "Commonwealth v. Tracy, 5 Met. 
 
 S. W. 674. (Mass.) 536, 553; State v. Bates, 23 
 
 ^ State V. Morrison, 46 Kan. 679, Iowa 96, 98; State v. Garrett, So 
 
 684-689, 27 Pac. 133; State v. Seery, Iowa 589, 590, 46 N. W. 748. 
 
 95 Iowa 652, 64 N. W. 631 ; Wood- " State v. Downer, 8 Vt. 424. 428, 
 
 ward V. State (Tex. Cr. App., 1910), 30 Am. Dec. 482; State v. Fifield, 18 
 
 126 S. W. 271. N. H. 34, 38. 
 
 'Allen V. State, 5 Ga. App. 237, 62 "State v. Dennis, 2 Marv. (Del.) 
 
 S. E. 1003. 433- 
 
 "Woodworth v. State, 26 Ohio St. '''State v. Dennis, 2 Marv. (Del.) 
 
 196, 200. But evidence showing only 433. 
 
 an effort to elude arrest will not sus- '" Undcrhill on Ev., § 231. 
 
 tain a charge of resisting an officer. " State v. Freeman, 8 Iowa 428, 74 
 
 State V. Welch, 37 Wis. 196, 202, 203; Am. Dec. 317; Kernan, v. State, 11 
 
 Clay v. State (Miss., 1897), 22 So. Ind. 471, 472; Spear v. State, 120 Ala. 
 
 62. 351, 25 So. 46. Cf. Gibson v. State, 
 
 " State v. Gilbert, 21 Ind. 474. 118 Ga. 29, 44 S. E. 811.
 
 743 OFFEXSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. §§ 448-449 
 
 person may resist arrest and may use such force as is necessary 
 to prevent the arrest under an illegal warrant and may show its 
 invalidity on his trial by parol evidence/"* 
 
 The defendant cannot be permitted to prove that, after having 
 resisted arrest, he offered to surrender himself and to go before 
 some other justice if his attorney should advise him the warrant 
 was valid/ '^ 
 
 §448. Preventing attendance of witnesses. — A willful and cor- 
 rupt attempt to prevent the attendance of a witness before a 
 lawful tribunal is an offense at common law. The essence of 
 the oft'ense is the attempt to interfere with and obstruct the ad- 
 ministration of justice."" No physical act of intervention is 
 necessary to constitute the crime, but it may be committed by 
 persuasion, advice or threats.-^ At common law it need not be 
 proved that the witness was under a subpoena,"^ that he was called 
 in behalf of either party, or that his evidence was material."^ 
 
 § 449. False swearing, — This crime consists in testifying know- 
 ingly and falsely under oath in a non-judicial proceeding, as, for 
 example, on applying for a marriage license, or on registration as 
 a voter. The language used by the accused and his knowledge 
 
 " State V. Wimbush, 9 S. Car. 309, "" State v. Holt, 84 Me. 509, 24 Atl. 
 
 317; State V. ?Iailey, 2 Strob. (S. 951; Perrow v. State, 67 Miss. 365, 
 
 Car.) 73; Underbill on Ev., § 208; 368, 7 So. 340; State v. Curdy (Del., 
 
 State V. Knapf, 50 Wash. 229, 96 1910), 75 Atl. 868. 
 
 Pac. 1076, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 66; -^ State v. Bringgold, 40 Wash. 12, 
 
 Lee V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 94, 74 S. 82 Pac. 132. 
 
 W. 28 ; Ryan v. City of ChicaRO, 124 " State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57, 66, 67, 
 
 111. App. 188. It is sufficient to 30 Am. Dec. 450; State v. Horner 
 
 charge resistance or obstruction in (Del.), 26 Atl. 72, 74', State v. Bring- 
 
 the language of the statute. The par- gold, 40 Wash. 12, 82 Pac. 132; Com- 
 
 ticular manner is matter of evidence, monwealth v. Bailey (Ky.), 87 S. W. 
 
 Oliver V. State, 17 Ark. 508, 509; 299, 26 Ky. L. 583. 
 
 United States v. Bachelder, 2 Gall. ^ Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 14 
 
 (U. S.) 15, 24 Fed. Cas. 14490; State Gray (Mass.) 87, 89, 74 Am. Dec. 
 
 V. Copp, 15 N. H. 212, 215; Gibson 665. Sec Gandy v. State, 77 Neb. 782, 
 
 v. State, 118 Ga. 29, 44 S. E. 811. no X. W. 862. See post, § 470. Cf. 
 
 Contra. Horan v. State, 7 Tc.k. App. Tcdford v. People, 219 III. 2^, 76 N. 
 
 1H3, 191 ; Lambcrton v. State, it Ohio E. 60; Young, In re, 137 N. Car. 552, 
 
 282. .150 S. E. 220. 
 
 '"Kin^ V. State, 89 Ala. 43, 46, 8 
 So. 120, 18 Am. St. 89.
 
 § 45^ CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 744 
 
 of its falsit}^ must be proved.-* If the accused is alleged to have 
 sworn falsely to several facts, proof that he swore falsely to one 
 is insufficient.-^ A conviction will not be sustained unless founded 
 on the evidence of two credible witnesses, or on that of one such 
 witness corroborated strongly by circumstances pointing to the 
 falsity of the statements.-" 
 
 False swearing is a statutory offense, and is distinct from 
 perjury at common law.-' Neither can be sustained by proving 
 the other, nor can a statute requiring a grand juror to disclose 
 the testimony of a witness on the trial of the latter for perjury 
 before the grand juiy be construed to apply to his indictment 
 for false swearing before them.-^ 
 
 § 450. Embracery — Evidence required. — This crime, which may 
 be regarded as a particular form of bribery, is defined as an at- 
 tempt to influence a juror or jurors corruptly by gifts, per- 
 suasions or threats, or by any other means (except the evidence 
 or argument submitted in open court), by a party or by a 
 stranger, whether tlie verdict be given or not and whether the 
 verdict, if given, be true or false.-" Proof of giving money to 
 a person to be distributed among jurors is sufficient, though the 
 money never reached them. For proof of an actual tender or 
 offer of the money so as to enable the juror to expressly re- 
 ceive or reject it is not necessary.^" A proposal or expression of 
 a willingness to bribe is sufficient. A mere attempt to bribe a 
 jury is embracery, though it may for any reason have been un- 
 successful.^^ 
 
 -*Aguierre v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. ^i Russell on Cr. (9th Am. Ed.) 
 
 519, 21 S. W. 256. 264; 4 Bl. Com. 140; Doan's Case, 5 
 
 ^Reg. V. Chapman, i Den. C. C. Pa. Dist. 211. 
 
 432. ^" State V. Woodward, 182 Mo. 391, 
 
 '' State V. Miller, 44 Mo. App. 159, 81 S. W. 857, 103 Am. St. 646n. 
 
 165; Aguierre v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. ^"a State v. Miller, 182 Mo. 370, 81 
 
 519, 520, 21 S. W. 256: Reg. V. S. W. 867; State v. Davis, 112 Mo. 
 
 Browning, 3 Cox C. C. 437, 438. See App. 346, 87 S. W. 33. 
 
 post, § 468. ^^ State V. Williams, 136 Mo. 293, 38 
 
 "State V. Coleman, 117 La. 973. 42 S. W. 75; State v. Sales, 2 Nev. 268; 
 
 So. 471. Rose. Cr. Ev. 721. Evidence that de- 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Scowden, 92 fendant has solicited money to use 
 
 Ky. 120, 122, 17 S. W. 205, 13 Ky. L. in corruptly influencing the jurors is 
 
 404. See ante, §§ 192-194. also sufficient. ]\Iere words may con-
 
 745 OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. § 45 1 
 
 The presence of a criminal intention to corruptly influence 
 the juror must be shown. This is now doubtless the correct rule 
 in this country, though the earlier common law, because of its 
 intense abhorrence of any act savoring of maintenance, punished 
 as embracery a mere exhortation on the part of a stranger that 
 a juror should appear and act according to his conscience.^' 
 
 § 451. Bribery defined — Evidence of circumstances to prove cor- 
 rupt intention. — The crime may be defined as an attempt, whether 
 successful or the reverse, to influence an officer in his official 
 conduct, either in the executive,^^ legislative^* or judicial depart- 
 ment of the government, by the offer of a reward or pecuniary 
 consideration.^^ The scope of this definition is as broad as the 
 
 stitute an attempt to bribe or influ- officer. Haynes v. Commonwealth, 104 
 
 ence a juror. Thus evidence that Va. 854, 52 S. E. 358. 
 
 the accused said to a juror "you are ^* State v. Sullivan, no Mo. App. 
 
 the only friend I have on the jury, 75, 84 S. W. 105. 
 
 and I want you to look after my ^The offer of a bribe, though un- 
 
 right. How will it go? I will make accepted, is bribery at common law. 
 
 it all right. It will not be to your Walsh v. People, 65 111. 58, 59, 61, 16 
 
 loss when we meet again" has been Am. 569; Rex v. Plympton, 2 Ld. 
 
 held to constitute an attempt to bribe Raym. 1377; State v. Ellis, 33 N. J. 
 
 a juror. State v. Dankwardt, 107 L. 102, 97 Am. Dec. 707n; People v. 
 
 Iowa 704, 77 N. W. 495. Ah Fook, 62 Cal. 493, 495 ; Barefield 
 
 ^i Russ. on Cr. (9th Am. Ed.) v. State, 14 Ala. 603, 607; State v. 
 
 264. It is not essential to prove that Miles, 89 Me. 142, 36 .A.tl. 70; People 
 
 the person to whom the bribe was v. Hammond, 132 Mich. 422, 93 N. W. 
 
 offered had been drawn as a juror, 1084, 9 Det. Leg. X. 667. It is not 
 
 if it appears that he was summoned necessarj' to prove the money was 
 
 as such. And the testimony of other either actually tendered or produced, 
 
 jurors that the defendant tried to Jackson v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. 260, 64 
 
 bribe them is admissible. State v. S. W. 864. See Glover v. State, 109 
 
 Williams, 136 Mo. 293, 38 S. W. 75; Ind. 391, 401, 10 N. E. 282; State v. 
 
 State v. Woodward, 182 Mo. 391, 81 Geyer, 3 Ohio X. P. 242. As to the 
 
 S. W. 857, 103 Am. St. 646n. Rut solicitation of a bribe. State v. 
 
 in the case of State v. Williford, iii Bowles, 70 Kan. 821, 79 Pac. 726, 69 
 
 Mo. App. 668, 86 S. W. 570, it was L. R. A. 176; punishable at common 
 
 held that a conviction could not be law. Walsh v. People. 65 111. 58, 16 
 
 sustained unless it was shown that Am. 569; People v. Hammond, 132 
 
 the juror had been impaneled and Mich. 422, 93 X. W. 1084: .State v. 
 
 sworn in a criminal case then pend- Desforges, 48 La. Ann. 73. 18 So. 
 
 ing. 912. The tender and taking of a 
 
 " A police officer is an executive check is not bribery under U. S. R. S.
 
 § 45- CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 746 
 
 duty of the officer who accepts a bribe. If the object of the offer- 
 ing is to influence the officer in any matter which may''' come 
 before him, that is, which is within his official jurisdiction and 
 duty, it is immaterial that he fails, or has no opportunity or 
 power to carry out the illegal agreement.^' On the trial of the 
 person giving the bribe, corrupt intent on the part of the recipient 
 need not be proved. If the briber parted with the bribe with an 
 intent to bribe, the offense is proved, though the officer did not 
 know what it was, or its purpose, and kept it solely for the pur- 
 pose of public justice.^® The corrupt intention of the officer 
 receiving,"^ or of the person offering a bribe, must be proved, 
 when necessary, beyond a reasonable doubt. ■*" The briber's in- 
 tention to influence can be inferred only from his language where 
 no money or other valuable thing is produced. He may show his 
 intoxication at the time to rebut the inference of corrupt intent 
 by proving he did not know what he was saying. But the witness 
 will not be permitted to state that the accused was so drunk as 
 not to know what he was doing. ^^ 
 
 § 452. Judicial notice of official character and acts. — The courts 
 will take notice that the person who was bribed was a public 
 
 5451, as the check is void. Green v. 316, gg N. W. 147, 11 Det. Leg. N. 10; 
 
 MacDougall, igg U. S. 601, 50 L. State v. Lehman, 182 Mo. 424, 81 S. 
 
 ed. 328, 26 Sup. Ct. 748. Defenses W. 11 18, 103 x\m. St. 670, 66 L. R. A. 
 
 in prosecution for bribery, see Elliott 4go; People v. Van de Carr, 87 App. 
 
 Evidence, § 2go8 ; what need not be Div. 386, 84 N. Y. S. 461 ; People v. 
 
 proved, § 2905; confessions and ad- Mol, 137 Mich. 692, 100 N. W. 913, 68 
 
 missions, § 2907; financial standing of L. R. A. 87in, 11 Det. Leg. N. 446; 
 
 parties, § 2904; documentary evidence, People v. Jackson, 47 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 § 2903. Evidence of indebtedness, 60, 95 N. Y. S. 268. 
 
 see 116 Am. St. 40, note. ^Commonwealth v. Murray, 135 
 
 ^^ State v. Butler, 178 j\Io. 272, 77 Mass. 530, 532. 
 
 S. W. 560. '"' State v. Pritchard, 107 N. Car. 
 
 "Ruffin V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 565, 921, 926, 12 S. E. 50; People v. Sals- 
 
 38 S. W. 169; Newman v. People, 23 bury, 134 Mich. 537, 96 N. W. 936; 
 
 Colo. 300, 47 Pac. 278; People v. State v. Ames, 91 Minn. 365, 98 N. 
 
 Markham, 64 Cal. 157, 161, 30 Pac. W. igo. 
 
 620, 4g Am. 700. Cf. Messer v. State, " White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 So. 
 
 37 Tex. Cr. 635, 40 S. W. 488, as to 63, 67: State v. Campbell, 73 Kan. 
 
 receipt of bribes by an agent of the 688, 85 Pac. 784, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
 
 accused. State v. Ames, 90 Minn. 533n. 
 
 183, 96 N. W. 330. As to power of ^ White v. State, 103 Ala. 72, 16 So. 
 
 officer. People v. McGarry, 136 Mich. 63; ante, § 166.
 
 747 
 
 OFFEXSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 453 
 
 officer/- of the date of his appointment or accession/" of his 
 pubHc acts/* and of the date when his term expires by death or 
 limitation.*^ It suffices if the officer is an officer dc facto. The 
 regularity and validity of his tenure are irrelevant. The defend- 
 ant will not be permitted to show that the officer was not ap- 
 pointed in writing, or sworn, or that he was otherwise unqualified 
 imder a statute.**^ 
 
 § 453. Necessity for reliance on evidence of accomplices in the 
 "bribery — Compulsory examination of accomplice. — As soon as the 
 crime is consummated by the delivery of the money or valuable 
 thing by the briber to the bribed, the latter is an accomplice of 
 the former.*' The voluntary testimony of either may be used 
 against the other separately tried.*'* It is sometimes provided by 
 statute that an accomplice in bribery may be compelled to testify 
 at any trial or investigation, that his evidence thus given cannot 
 be used against him, and that he shall not be liable to indictment 
 or prosecution for the bribery.*^ Because of the secret nature 
 
 *^Rath V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 142, 33 
 S. W. 229; State V. McDonald, 106 
 Ind. 233, 235, 6 N. E. 607. 
 
 ^^ Hizer v. State, 12 Ind. 330, 334; 
 State V. Boyd, 34 Neb. 435. 437. 
 
 ** State V. Gramelspacher, 126 Ind. 
 398, 403, 26 X. E. 8r, citing cases; 
 Jones V. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 
 34 L. ed. 691, ir Sup. Ct. 80. As to 
 member of congress. United States 
 V. Dietrich, 126 Fed. 676. 
 
 " Doe V. Riley, 28 Ala. 164, 65 Am. 
 Dec. 334. For civil cases holdingthat 
 the courts will judicially notice of- 
 ficial names, etc., see Underbill on 
 Ev., § 244. 
 
 ■^' Florez v. State, 11 Tex. .'Xpp. 102, 
 104 ; State v. Gardner, 54 Ohio St. 24, 
 42 N. E. 999, 31 L. R. A. 660; Com- 
 monwealth V. Saulsbury, 152 Pa. St. 
 554. 558, 25 Atl. 610 (extortion). See 
 ante, §§ 446, 447; Commonwealth v. 
 Wotton, 201 Mass. 81, 87 N. E. 202; 
 State V. Haas, 163 Fed. 908. 
 
 " Ruffin V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 565, 
 38 S. W. 169. One who gives money 
 to a person who solicits a bribe, in- 
 tending to denounce him, and to pro- 
 cure his arrest, is not an accomplice. 
 It is proper, however, to subject the 
 decoy to a rigid cross-examination as 
 to his motive. People v. Liphardt, 
 105 Mich. 80, 62 N. W. 1022; New- 
 man V. People, 23 Colo. 300, 47 Pac. 
 278. The admission of evidence from 
 witnesses employed to entrap the ac- 
 cused is not contrary to public policy. 
 People V. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197, 
 84 Pac. 364, rehearing denied, 84 Pac. 
 370. Testimony of accomplices, de- 
 coys and conspirators, see Elliott Evi- 
 dence, § 2906. Testimony of accom- 
 plices in prosecution for bribery, see 
 98 Am. St. 176, note. 
 
 **See ante, § 71, et scq. 
 
 *' Penn. Const., § 32, Art. Ill, N. Y. 
 Penal Code, § 79.
 
 § 454 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 748 
 
 of the crime, and the necessity that tliere slionld always be at 
 least two participants, it is both necessary and customary to rely 
 largely on accomplice evidence. When an accomplice is used as a 
 witness, the utmost good faith should be observed in dealing with 
 him. The spirit as well as the letter of the statute should be 
 regarded.^" 
 
 § 454. Proving other acts of bribery. — The giving or the receipt 
 of other bribes, remote in time, differing in purpose and distinct 
 from the act charged, is inadmissible.'^^ Where defendant was 
 indicted for receiving a bribe to permit gambling, and it was 
 agreed that other bribes should be paid in the future, separate 
 acts of bribery are relevant as part of a system and to show 
 the intent, purpose and understanding with which the money was 
 received. ^^ The declarations of the accused before the commission 
 of the crime to the person from whom he is charged with solicit- 
 ing a bribe are admissible on the question of his intent. The 
 objection that they tend to show a separate crime w'ill not cause 
 their rejection. ^'^ The rule that the acts and declarations of one 
 of several conspirators during the conspiracy and intended to 
 carry it into effect are admissible against the others, is applicable 
 to a prosecution for bribery where it appears from the evidence 
 that there was a conspiracy to bribe and the accused is connected 
 with it.^'* Everything the accused said to his confederates and 
 did to carry out the plan to bribe is admissible.^^ 
 
 A witness for the prosecution may testify what he did after 
 a conversation with one involved in a conspiracy to bribe on the 
 separate trial of a co-conspirator. This testimony may be admis- 
 sible on the question whether the witness was or was not an ac- 
 
 °" People V. Spencer, 66 Hun (N. '^^ Guthrie v. State, 16 Neb. 667, 672, 
 
 Y.) 149, 151, 21 X. Y. S. 33; People 21 N. W. 455; State v. Ames, 90 
 
 V. Singer, 18 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y.) Minn. 183, 96 N. W. 330; State v. 
 
 96 ; People V. Clark, 14 N. Y. S. 642 ; Schnettler, 181 Mo. 173, 79 S. W. 
 
 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 1123. See ante, § 88, ef seq. 
 
 547, 35 L. ed. mo, 12 Sup. St. 195; ^^ State v. Durnam, 72 Minn. 150, 
 
 People V. Clements, 5 N. Y. Cr. 282, 75 N. W. 1127. 
 
 298, 300; Commonwealth v. Bell, 145 °* People v. McGarry, 136 Mich. 316, 
 
 Pa. St. 374, 391, 22 Atl. 641, 644. 99 N. W. 147, II Det. Leg. N. 10. 
 
 " People V. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427, ^ People v. McGarry, 136 Mich. 316, 
 
 457-463. 14 N. E. 319, I Am. St. 851. 99 N. W. 147, 11 Det. Leg. N. 10. 
 See ante, § 87.
 
 749 OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. § 455 
 
 complice, in a case where the prosecution aUeges that the witness 
 was employed to entrap the accused.^'' So conversations between 
 third persons may be admitted where it appears that the money 
 was obtained from them for the purposes of bribery, in order that 
 the jury may see the connection between the source from which 
 the money came and the accused."" 
 
 § 455. Bribery of voters — Judicial notice of elections. — Bribery, 
 and attempts to influence voters at elections, were in England 
 indictable at common law,^'^ and this rule is generally recognized 
 in the United States.'" A conviction of bribing a \-oter has been 
 sustained on proof of a promise to pay for loss of time,*'" to 
 pay the traveling expenses of the voters,"^ or by showing that a 
 candidate supplied voters with refreshments,"- or that he publicly 
 declared that if he were elected he was willing to perform the 
 duties of the office for a smaller compensation than was allowed 
 by law,''" or promised to appoint an opposing candidate as his 
 deputy if the latter would withdraw from the contest.*''* But a 
 conviction for receiving a bribe to vote for a particular candidate 
 is not sustained unless the state proves that the vote was cast. 
 This fact must not be left to the jury to infer from the former 
 political convictions of the accused. Under the secret ballot it is 
 extremely difficult for this to be done, unless the voter shall vol- 
 untarily lift the veil of secrecy. No one can examine his ballot, 
 or testify to its contents, unless his knowledge was acquired from 
 the voter himself.'"' The courts will take judicial notice of the 
 
 •"People V. Emmons, 7 Cal. App. 626, 38 L. J. Q. B. 313, 21 L. T. (N. 
 
 685, 95 Pac. 1032. S.) 56. 
 
 " People V. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. " Bayntun v. Cattle, i Mood. & R. 
 
 197, 84 Pac. 364, rehearing denied, 84 265. 
 
 Pac. 370. "'Duke v. Asbee, 11 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 "^Russell on Crimes (9th Am. Ed.) 112, 114, 115. 
 
 224.. "^ State V. Purdy, 36 Wis. 213, 216, 
 
 '"State V. Jackson, 72, Me. 91, 94, 223, 17 Am. 485; State v. Dustin, 5 
 
 40 Am. 342 (attempt) ; 2 Bish. Cr. L. Ore. 375, 378, 20 Am. 746. 
 
 (7th Ed.), § 86; Commonwealth v. "* Lewis Cr. L. 126. 
 
 Hoxey. 16 Mass. 385; Commonwealth "'Johnson v. Commonwealtli, 90 
 
 V. McHalc, 97 Fa. St. 397, 39 Am. Ky. 53, 58, 13 S. W. 520, 12 Ky. L. 
 
 808, 24 Albany L. J. 412. See Doyle 20. Cf. State v. Minnick, 15 Iowa 
 
 V. Kirby, 184 Mass. 409, 68 N. E. 843. 123, 127. 
 
 "" Simpson v. Ycend, L. R. 4 Q- B.
 
 § J^.^6 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 75O 
 
 days of holding general elections and of the officers voted for.'''' 
 that an election has in fact been held."' the whole nnmber of votes 
 cast and the result.'''' together with the fact that the result is con- 
 tested.°° 
 
 ^ 456. Extortion — Intent and guilty knowledge — Evidence to 
 prove ignorance or mistake of law and fact. — I extortion is an unlaw- 
 ful taking bv an officer, under color of his office, of money or 
 other valuable thing not due him, or more than is due him, or 
 before it is due.'" Whether a corrupt intention and knowledge 
 are always essential is not positively decided. The majority of 
 the cases require them to be proved, leaving their existence to be 
 determined by the jury,''^ and permit the accused officer to show 
 that he was ignorant of the law, and thought he was entitled to 
 the fee, or that he erred in computing the fees due him. But evi- 
 dence of a usage among officials to take the illegal fees, or of 
 the construction w'hich is placed upon the statute by officers 
 generally to disprove a criminal intent, has been rejected.'- But 
 some authorities hold that corrupt knowledge or intent to extort 
 is not essential, and where this is the rule, evidence to prove 
 official ignorance or mistake is inadmissible." This lack of 
 harmony arises from a failure to distinguish between the quality 
 and character of an act done under a mistake or in ignorance of 
 fact, and an act arising from a mistake or ignorance of law. The 
 
 "* State V. Minnick, 15 Iowa 123. People v. Summers, 40 Misc. (X. Y.) 
 
 "'Urmston v. State, 73 Ind. 175, 384, 82 X. Y. S. 297, 17 X- Y. Cr. 
 
 177. 321. Maine statute, State v. Hanna, 
 
 '''* Thomas v. Commonwealth, 90 99 Me. 224, 58 Atl. 1061. 
 
 Va. 92, 17 S. E. 788; State v. Swift, '^Commonwealth v. Shed, i Mass. 
 
 69 Ind. 505, 526, 527. 227; Cutter v. State, 36 X. J. L. 125, 
 
 '"'Lewis V. Bruton, 74 Ala. 317, 49 127; Cleaveland v. State, 34 Ala. 254, 
 
 Am. 816. 259; People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. (X. 
 
 '"4 Bl. Com. 141; Commonwealth Y.) 661; State v. Pritchard, 107 X. 
 
 V. Wilson, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 26; State Car. 921, 927, 12 S. E. 50. 
 
 V. Cooper, 120 Tenn. 549, 113 S. W. '- Commonwealth v. Dennie (Mass.), 
 
 1048; Commonwealth v. Saulsbury, Thach. Cr. Cas. 165. 
 
 152 Pa. St. 554, 559, 25 Atl. 610; "United States v. Harned, 43 Fed. 
 
 United States v. Deaver, 14 Fed. 595 ; 376, 377 ; Commonwealth v. Bagley, 
 
 People V. McLaughlin, 2 App. Div. 7 Pick. (Mass.) 279, 281: State v. 
 
 (X. Y.) 419, 37 X. Y. S. 1005; Kirby Jones, 71 Miss. 872, 15 So. 237; State 
 
 V. State, 57 X. J. L. 320, 31 Atl. 213. v. Merritt, 5 Sneed (Tenn.) 67, 69. 
 See, under the Xew York statute.
 
 751 OFFEXSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. §§ 457-458 
 
 rule that a mistake, or misapprehension of fact, may be proved 
 to negative a criminal intent is broad enough to include and ex- 
 culpate officials accused of extortion. On the other hand the 
 maxim, "ignorance of law excuses no one," will not permit an 
 officer to prove that he did not know the law, and hence that he 
 thought he was taking legal and statutory fees."'' 
 
 ^ 457. Value of the thing- extorted — Burden of proving exception 
 to statute. — It is absolutely essential to a conviction to prove that 
 the thing extorted had some value,'" and that the money or 
 thing taken was unwillingly paid or given. ^"^ 
 
 An allegation of taking higher fees than the officer is entitled 
 to may be sustained by evidence which leaves the exact amount 
 in doubt." The burden of proof is on a defendant who claims 
 he has a legal right to the fee under an exception in a statute.'^ 
 If an officer is indicted for extortion for receiving a fee for the 
 pretended service of a writ the truth of his return, showing serv- 
 ice, is directly in issue. While the return is prima facie evidence 
 of the service, under the presumption that the officer did his 
 duty, it is never conclusive."^ 
 
 § 458. Compounding offenses — The intent to screen the offender — 
 Mode of proving that a crime was committed. — Compounding a 
 
 •' People V. Monk, 8 Utah 35, 28 " The giving of a promissory note, 
 
 Pac. 1 1 15, 1 1 16; Birney v. State, 8 necessarily void, because of illegality 
 
 Ohio 230. A taking under color of of consideration, does not constitute 
 
 office is of the essence of the offense, extortion. Commonwealth v. Cony, 2 
 
 It must be proved that the money was Mass. 523, 524. 
 
 taken in right of office, and that the '"United States v. Harncd, 43 Fed. 
 
 person paying unwillingly yielded to 376, 377. 
 
 official authority. Money paid for " Spcnce v. Thompson, ir Ala. 746. 
 
 services not official, or to an officer in " United States v. Rose, 12 Fed. 
 
 his private capacity, is not extorted. 576. See atilc, § 24. 
 
 Collier V. State, 55 Ala. 125, 128; "Williams v. State, 2 Snccd. 
 
 United States v. Deaver, 14 Fed. 595, (Tcnn.) 160, 163. For the effect and 
 
 509; State v. Pritchard, 107 N. Car. conclusiveness of official returns as 
 
 921, 927, 12 S. E. 50. ■ Evidence of evidence, the power of the courts 
 
 other extortionate acts distinct from over them and the admissibility of 
 
 that alleged is not, it seems, admis- parol evidence to show tluir invalid- 
 
 iblc to raise a presumption of crimi- ity and to contradict their recitals, 
 
 ii.il intent. Commonwealth v. Sauls- see I'nderliill on Ev., § 150a, pages 
 
 bury, 152 Fa. St. 554, 558, 25 Atl. 2-7--230. 
 'lie. See ante, § 87, ct seq.
 
 § 45^ CRIMINAL i:\Il)KXCE. 752 
 
 crime consists in taking goods or other amends on an agreement 
 not to prosecute. Compounding a felony is, at common law, 
 equally criminal with the felony, and is also a misdemeanor 
 against public justice.""" The material facts are knowledge of 
 the actual commission of a crime, the taking of the money or 
 property of another and the intent to conceal or to compound the 
 felony.''' 
 
 The gist or essence of this crime is the intention to screen an 
 offender and to smother a criminal prosecution. Hence evidence 
 of the giving of a note on condition that the promisee would re- 
 frain from prosecuting the promisor will sustain a conviction. 
 The note is a valuable consideration. It is voidable only and may 
 never be disputed.^" Evidence that no benefit came to the de- 
 fendant, he having acted as an agent for another, is also ir- 
 relevant.*"' 
 
 The felony, which is alleged to have been compounded, must 
 be proved to have been committed by someone beyond a reason- 
 ?.ble doubt,®* and this may be done prima facie, by producing a 
 record of a conviction.®^ It seems that it is not necessary to prove 
 that any particular person suspected or accused was convicted,^" 
 or even tried:®' if the jury are satisfied, beyond a reasonable 
 doubt and on all the evidence, that the accused knew the criminal 
 and took the money corruptly, not intending to bring him to 
 justice but to shield him.®® 
 
 ^4 BI. Com. 136. '"Fribly v. State. 42 Ohio St. 205, 
 
 " People V. Bryon, 10.3 Cal. 675, 677, 206 ; State v. Hanson, 69 N. J. L. 42, 
 
 37 Pac. 754. As to misprision of 54 Atl. 841. 
 
 felony which is either a criminal neg- ^' Watt v. State, 97 Ala. 72, 11 So. 
 
 lect to prevent a felony from being 901. 
 
 committed or to bring the offender *' Reg. v. Pascoe, i Den. C. C. 456, 
 
 to justice after its commission, State 458. The person accused of com- 
 
 V. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 Atl. 533. pounding cannot prove the acquittal 
 
 *" Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass. of the criminal, as it may have been 
 
 91, 94. procured by his own corrupt act. 
 
 '^ State v. Ruthven, 58 Iowa 121, People v. Buckland, 13 Wend. (N. 
 
 124, 12 N. W. 235. Y.) 592, 596. As to proof of judicial 
 
 ** State v. Hanson, 69 N. J. L. 42, records, see Underhill on Ev., Chap. 
 
 54 Atl. 841. XHI. 
 
 " State v. Duhammel, 2 Harr. 
 (Del.) 532. Cf. ante, § 195.
 
 ■yjT, OFFENSES AGAIXST PUBLIC JUSTICE. §§ 459-460 
 
 v; 459. Contempt defined — Inherent judicial power to punish. — 
 Contempt of court is an offense the essential ingredients of which 
 are disobedience to the court or despising or opposing its author- 
 ity or dignity. It may consist of disorderly or insolent behavior 
 or language indulged in in the actual presence of the court, in 
 willful disobedience to its mandate, in resisting or evading its 
 process, or in assaulting its officer. So, too, using language which 
 is scornful or reproachful, or which tends to diminish the respect 
 for or authority of the court, or which is likely to obstruct the 
 service or execution of its process or orders, is contempt. And 
 generally to abuse judicial process by willfully executing it in 
 an illegal manner, or making use of it to do wrong under the 
 color or pretense of the authority of the court, is a contempt.®** 
 
 The power to punish for contempt is inherent in e^•ery court 
 of justice. And to deny this power, or to abridge it in any mate- 
 rial respect, is to deprive the court of the power to protect itself 
 from insult, to render it the mark of insult and obloquy, and to 
 take from it the ability to enforce its mandates and decrees, or 
 to perform the functions and powers wnth which it is invested 
 by the law.«^ 
 
 ^ 460. Direct and constructive contempt distinguished — Court may 
 take notice of without evidence. — A contempt is direct where it is 
 the doing of any improper act in the presence of the court while 
 in session, tending directly to disturb the proceedings, as. for 
 example, noisy or tumultuous conduct on the part of a person 
 
 " 4 Bl. Com. 283 ; Cohen, Ex parte, Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 69 Atl. 1057, 
 
 5 Cal. 494. Criminal contempts em- 125 Am. St. 141. 
 
 brace all acts committed against the "" State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384, 389 ; 
 
 majesty of the law, and the primary State v. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 69 
 
 purpose of their punishments is the Atl. 1057; Cossart v. State, 14 Ark. 
 
 vindication of pulilic authority. s;\S; United States v. Hudson, 7 
 
 Clark, Ex parte, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S. Cranch (U. S.) 32, 34, 3 L. cd. 259; 
 
 W. 990. 15 L- R- A. ex. S.) 389n. Adams, Ex parte, 25 Miss. 883, 885. 
 
 .'\ proceeding for contempt is not a 59 .Am. Dec. 234; Cartwright's Case, 
 
 criminal prosecution though of that 114 Mass. 230, 238; Anderson v. 
 
 nature; courts without criminal juris- Dunn, 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 204, 5 L. 
 
 diction having jurisdiction to punish cd. 242; Tcnncy's Case, 23 N. II. 162; 
 
 for contempt, and contempt being an State v. Copp, 15 N. II. 212: State 
 
 oflfcnsc against the court as an organ v. Matthews, ^7 N. II. 450, 453: Mid- 
 
 f>i public justice, is not strictly a vio- dlcbrnok v. State, 43 Conn. 257, 268, 
 
 lation of the criminal law. State v. 21 Am. 650. 
 48 — Under HILL Ckim. Ev.
 
 § 4^0 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 754 
 
 present in the courtroom or tending to defeat, to disturb, or to 
 impair the administration of justice, as, for example, open de- 
 fiance of the powers of the court or disrespectful behavior or 
 language to the judge. It may also consist in the refusal to do a 
 proper act required to be done in open court ; where the refusal 
 directly tends to disturb the proceedings or to defeat the interests 
 of justice."^ As soon as the contempt is committed, the court may 
 act at once, for though the guilty party immediately withdraws 
 and goes beyond the reach of the court, the jurisdiction remains. 
 It is not necessary that he should be brought into court. He may 
 be sentenced for contempt, though absent."- The power to com- 
 mit for a direct contempt must of necessity be arbitrarily and 
 summarily exercised, that disorder may be quelled without delay 
 and the dignity of the court maintained. The facts of the con- 
 tempt, together w^ith the judgment, are usually entered upon the 
 record, which is conclusive as evidence of all facts which it con- 
 tains. °^ Because of this difference in the nature of the con- 
 temptuous act, tw^o methods of procedure and of proof have been 
 adopted. The court will of its own motion notice and punish a 
 direct contempt. The judge acts upon knowledge which he has 
 acquired by his own organs of hearing and siglit. The judicial 
 power may act summarily to punish the contempt which the ju- 
 dicial eye has seen and the judicial mind has apprehended."* 
 There need be no charge, no plea, no issue, no trial, no examina- 
 tion, no proof and no record. ^^ 
 
 "^ Stuart V. People, 4 111. 395 ; Ferri- ®* ]\Iahoney v. State, 33 Ind. App. 
 
 man v. People, 128 111. App. 230; 655, 72 N. E. 151, 104 Am. St. 276. 
 
 Clark, Ex parte, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S. '^ People v. Turner, i Cal. 152, 155; 
 
 W. 990, IS L. R. A. (N. S.) 389n. State v. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450, 453; 
 
 *- Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn. Clarke Ex parte, 208 Mo. 121, 106 S. 
 
 257, 269, 21 Am. 650. W. 990, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 389n; 
 
 ^^ State V. Woodfin, 5 Ired. (N. Council v. State, 80 Xeb. 296, 114 N. 
 Car.) 199, 200, 42 Am. Dec. 161; Ma- W. 294. The court says in Wright, 
 honey v. State, 33 Ind. App. 655, 72 Ex parte, 65 Ind. 504, 508: "A con- 
 N. E. 151, 104 Am. St. 276. It has tempt of court is either direct or con- 
 been held that a prosecution for a structive ; or, as the latter was an- 
 contempt is a criminal proceeding and ciently called, consequential. A di- 
 the accused is entitled to the benefit rect contempt is an open insult, in the 
 of every reasonable doubt. Council face of the court, to the person of 
 V. State, 80 Neb. 296, 114 N. W. 294; the judges while presiding, or a re- 
 United States V. Carroll, 147 Fed. sistance to its powers in their pres- 
 947- ence. A constructive contempt is an
 
 /:)D 
 
 OFFEXSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 461 
 
 § 461. Procedure in receiving evidence of constructive contempt. 
 — The contempt is constructive when it is committed out of the 
 actual presence and hearing of the court, so that the court has no 
 personal knowledge of it."" 
 
 The contempt must be proved by the affidaxits"" of eye-wit- 
 nesses,"*^ upon which an order to show cause may issue."" It is 
 only when the contempt is flagrant and clearly shown that an 
 attachment will issue in the first instance."*' The proceedings on 
 ihe return of the writ are regarded as criminal,^ and the accused 
 h.as the right to be heard and to defend himself." He may file 
 counter affidavits, or demand that the prosecutor shall file inter- 
 rogatories for him to answer. These are usually filed with the 
 clerk, ^ and, with the answers of the accused thereto, may be taken 
 down by the clerk, or by a commissioner appointed for the pur- 
 pose, and referred to the court."* Where the statute provides for 
 
 act done, not in the presence of the 
 court, but at a distance, which resists 
 their authority, as disobedience to 
 process, or an order of the court, 
 such as tends in its operation to ob- 
 struct, interrupt, prevent or embar- 
 rass the administration of justice." 
 Hamma v. People, 42 Colo. 401, 94 
 Pac. 326, 15 L. R. A. CN. S.) 62in; 
 Ferriman v. People, 128 III. App. 230. 
 
 "■ State v. IMatthews, zi N. H. 450, 
 454; Clarke, Ex parte, 208 Mo. 121, 
 106 S. W. 990, 15 L. R. A. (X. S.) 
 389n ; People v. News-Times Pub. 
 Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 Pac. 912; Sny- 
 der V. State, 151 Tnd. 553, 52 N. E. 
 152. In a contempt proceeding for 
 the violation of an injunction guilt 
 need not be proved beyond a reason- 
 able doubt. Flannery v. People, 225 
 111. 62, 80 N. E. 60. 
 
 "Snyder v. State, 151 Ind. 553, 52 
 \. E. 152. 
 
 "'State V. Newton, 16 N. Dak. 151, 
 112 N. W. 52; Saunderson v. State, 
 151 Ind. 550, 52 N. K. i.sr. 
 
 "Jordan v. Circuit Court, 69 Iowa 
 177, 28 N. W. 548; French v. Com- 
 
 monwealth (Ky.), 97 S. W. 427, 30 
 Ky. L. 98, holding that the order in 
 criminal contempt need not be as pre- 
 cise as an indictment. 
 
 '~ State v. Mathews, 2,1 N. H. 450, 
 454; Judson, In re, 3 Blatch. (U. S.) 
 148, 14 Fed. Cas. 7563. 
 
 ^ Langdon, Ex parte, 25 Vt. 680 ; 
 United States v. Wayne, Wall. C. C. 
 (U. S.) 134, 28 Fed. Cas. 16654; 
 United States v. Richards, i Alaska 
 613; State V. Matthews, 2,7 N. H. 
 450, 455. Contra, Flannery v. People, 
 225 111. 62, 80 N. E. 60. 
 
 " People V. Wilson, 64 111. 195, 16 
 Am. 528; Jordan v. Circuit, 69 Iowa 
 177, 28 N. W. 548. 
 
 'If not filed as required by a stat- 
 ute the commitment is void. Walker 
 V. Kennedy, 133 Iowa 284, no X. W. 
 581. 
 
 * Commonwealth v. Snowdcn, i 
 Rrcw. (Pa.) 218, 219; Slate v. Mat- 
 thews, 37 N. H. 450, 453; People v. 
 Hrowii, 6 Cow. ex. Y.) 41 ; Ilollings- 
 worth V. Du.-mo. Wall. C. C. (U. S.) 
 y7, \2 I'cd. Cas. C616.
 
 § 46i 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 756 
 
 a rule to sliow cause based on duly verified information by an 
 officer of the court or some responsible person the prosecution 
 cannot be by indictment.*^ 
 
 One charged with criminal or quasi contempt, committed out 
 of the presence of the court, enjoyed at common law the right to 
 purge himself if possible, by his oath, and all evidence which 
 would controvert his sworn answer on any matter of fact was 
 rigidly excluded.""' The rule in equity was otherwise," and doubt- 
 less the modern practice would be to receive proofs on both 
 sides, including the sworn answers of the respondent, admitting 
 them as evidence in his favor, to be considered and weighed as 
 part of the evidence.' The accused is not confined to his answers, 
 but may examine witnesses in his own favor.* If from his an- 
 swers it appears that lie was not intentionally contumacious, but 
 was acting in good faith, he should be discharged. ** The contempt 
 must be prox'ed to the satisfaction of the court either by the re- 
 spondent's answers or by other witnesses in addition to the affida- 
 vits." It must appear to the satisfaction of the court that the ac- 
 
 *^ Saunderson v. State, 151 Ind. 
 550, 52 N. E. 151. 
 
 ^ Ex parte Pitman, In re, I Curtis 
 (U. S.) 186, 190, 19 Fed. Cas. 11184; 
 United States v. Dodge, 2 Gall (U. 
 S.) 313, 25 Fed. Cas. 14975; State v. 
 Tipton, I Blackf. (Ind.) 166; Mur- 
 dock's Case, 2 Bland. (Md.) 461; 
 Burke v. State, 47 Ind. 528; State v. 
 Earl, 41 Ind. 464; People v. Comp- 
 ton, I Duer (N. Y. Super.) 512; Rex 
 V. Wheeler, i W. Bl. 311, 3 Burr 
 1256; People V. News-Times Pub. 
 Co., 35 Colo. 253, 84 Pac. 912; Chris- 
 tensen v. People, 114 111. App. 40; 
 Longenbook v. People, 130 111. App. 
 320; Coleman v. State (Tenn., 1908), 
 113 S. W. 1045. 
 
 "4 Bl. Com. 288; Rex v. Vaughan, 
 2 Doug. 516; Cartwright's Case, 114 
 Mass. 230, 239; Employers' Teaming 
 Co. V. Teamsters' Joint Council, 141 
 Fed. 679. 
 
 'Coleman v. State (Tenn., 1908), 
 113 S. W. 1045. 
 
 ® Magennis v. Parkhurst, 4 X. J. 
 Eq. 433; Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 
 196, 213; Commonwealth v. Dan- 
 dridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; State v. Mat- 
 thews, 37 N. H. 450, 455. The ac- 
 cused is entitled to reasonable notice 
 of the proceedings sufficient to pre- 
 pare his defense. Clark, Ex parte, 
 208 Mo. 121, 106 S. W. 990, 15 L. R. 
 A. (N. S.) 389n. As to rule in 
 United States Supreme Court, see 
 United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 
 51 L. ed. 319, 27 Sup. Ct. 165; United 
 States V. Carroll, 147 Fed. 947. 
 
 "People V. Few, 2 Johns. (N. Y.) 
 290; State V. Trumbull, 4 N. J. L. 
 i39;Beebees, Ex parte, 2 Wall. Jr. C. 
 C. (N. S.) 127, 3 Fed. Cas. 1220; 
 Meeks v. State, 80 Ark. 579, 98 S. W. 
 378; McHenry v. State, 91 Miss. 562, 
 44 So. 83T, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) io62n. 
 
 ^" Commonwealth v. Davis, i W. N. 
 C. (Pa.) 18; Albany City Bank v. 
 Schermerhorn, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 372, 
 38 Am. Dec. 55in; State v. Mat-
 
 757 OFFENSES AGAIXST PUBLIC JUSTICE, § 461 
 
 cused willfully and maliciously intended to lower or assail the 
 dignity of the court or to interfere in the administration of jus- 
 tice.'^ Where the respondent fails to appear, or, if he appears 
 and admits his guilt, the court may at once render its decision and 
 inflict summary punishment. He is not entitled to a jury trial/" 
 
 The determination by the court that the accused is in contempt 
 may be regarded as a conviction of a crime.^^ AVhether an ap- 
 peal may be taken depends upon the statutes. Usually the pro- 
 ceedings may be reviewed on habeas corpus." In the United 
 States supreme court a writ of error may be brought to review a 
 judgment for contempt. Where the contempt consists of a re- 
 fusal of a witness to testify, the court will not consider, on the 
 writ of error whether the testimony to be given w^as or was not 
 material. ^^ The presumption of innocence should be considered 
 by the court even where a proceeding to punish for contempt is 
 not strictly a criminal proceeding; it is enough, usually, that the 
 contempt is shown to the satisfaction of the court by a pre- 
 ponderance of the evidence.^'' If the proceedings for punishment 
 for contempt be regarded as criminal the rule that there can be 
 no conviction on the uncorroborated testimon}' of an accomplice 
 may apply. ^" 
 
 To show the motive of the accused in publishing certain articles 
 in a newspaper which tended to bring the court in contempt it 
 may be shown that on other occasions he had published similar 
 articles relating to the same case and these articles are admissible 
 in evidence to show his intention. ''' 
 
 Contemptuous language may be proved b>- anyone who heard 
 it and the meaning is for the court to determine. The accused will 
 
 thews, 37 X. If. 430, 455; State v. "Clark, Ex f^arfe, 208 Mo. 121, T06 
 
 Small, 49 Ore. 595, 90 Pac. mo. S. W. 990, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 38911. 
 
 "Powers V. People, 114 111. App. ''^ Xelson v. United States, 201 U. 
 
 323. S. 92. 50 L. ed. 673, 26 Sup. Ct. 358. 
 
 "State V. Matthews, 37 X. II. 450, '" McCormick, /;; re, 132 App. Div. 
 
 456; Necl V. State, 9 Ark. 259, 270, 50 (N. Y.) 921, T17 X. Y. S. 70. 
 
 Am. Dec. 209; State v. Bccht, 23 " Frencli v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 
 Minn. 411. 412. 97 S. W. 427, 30 Ky. L. 98. 
 
 "Mahoncy v. State, 33 liid. .\pp. "State v. Howell. 80 Conn. 668, 69 
 
 655, 72 N. E. 151, 104 Am. St. 276. Atl. 1057, 125 Am. St. 141.
 
 § 462-463 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 758 
 
 not be permitted to pro\-e the truth of statements made by him 
 as a justification.^'* 
 
 § 462. Escape — Distinct from prison breach. — A person who, be- 
 ing a prisoner in lawful confinement or custody, regains his lib- 
 erty with or without force, prior to his legal discharge, or who, 
 having a prisoner lawfully in his custody, suffers him to regain 
 his liberty before his legal discharge, is guilty of an escape. ■" The 
 flight of a prisoner while being worked on the highway from the 
 custody of a jailer is an escape to the same extent as though from 
 jail.--'^ 
 
 § 463. Intention of permitting escape — Negligence of officer. — A 
 sheriff or other officer is guilty of a misdemeanor if through his 
 negligence a prisoner escapes from his custody without his con- 
 sent and is not recaptured before he is out of sight. The defend- 
 ant may offer evidence to show the escape was the result of the 
 act of God, or of the public enemy ; but not to show that the place 
 of custody was defectively constructed."- \Miether the defendant 
 was negligent in permitting an escape is for the jury. Omitting 
 to handcuff a prisoner and letting him go out of sight does not 
 constitute negligence in law, but are facts from which it may be 
 inferred."^ Actual negligence need not be proved. It may be 
 inferred from the fact of the escape alone. The defendant then 
 has the burden of proof to show due diligence, the use of all law- 
 
 " Stewart v. Reid, 118 La. 827, 43 an officer dc facto, capable of mak- 
 
 So. 455. ing an arrest, is an off'ense and it 
 
 ^2 Hawk's P. C, chaps. 18, 19; 2 cannot be proved that his appoint- 
 
 Bish. Cr. L., §§ 1064-1066; 2 Whart. ment was conditional when he has 
 
 Cr. L., § 1667. An escape is distin- actually served as an officer. Robin- 
 
 guished from prison breach and res- son v. State, 82 Ga. 535, 547, 9 S. E. 
 
 cue in that the latter off'enses are nee- 528. 
 
 essarily accomplished by force ex- "^ Saylor v. Commonwealth, 122 Ky. 
 
 erted by the prisoner himself in the 776, 93 S. W. 48, 29 Ky. L. 3:^7. 
 
 case of prison breach and by others ~ Shattuck v. State, 51 Miss. 575, 
 
 in the case of rescue. An actual 580, 584; State v. Halford, 6 Rich, 
 
 breaking is not necessary to consti- (S. Car.) 58. 
 
 tute prison breach. A constructive "^ State v. Hunter, 94 N. Car. 829, 
 
 breaking is enough. Randall v. State, 835; Shattuck v. State, 51 Miss. 575, 
 
 53 N. J. L. 488, 490, 22 Atl. 46. An 580. 
 escape from the lawful custody of
 
 759 OFFENSES AGAIXST PUBLIC JUSTICE. § 464 
 
 fill means to prevent the escape, and that it was caused by the 
 act of God, or by some irresistible force.-* 
 
 A material and important distinction is made between the 
 voluntary act of an officer, who knowingly and voluntarily gi\es 
 a prisoner his liberty, and one who suffers his prisoner to escape 
 because of his negligence in guarding him. In the former case, 
 the intention to do a wrong is an essential and fundamental fact, 
 but may be inferred from the facts in the case.-"' At common law 
 an official who permitted a voluntary escape involves himself in 
 tlie guilt of the crime charged against his prisoner.-*^ But a neg- 
 ligent escape is at most a misdemeanor only.-^ The accused cus- 
 todian may always show, to rebut the intention of allowing a 
 voluntary escape, that he acted bona fide in discharging a prisoner 
 or that he did not know that a discharge regular on its face was 
 invalid and illegal."^ 
 
 § 464. Aiding- prisoner to escape. — At common law, and fre- 
 quently by statute, a person who conveys disguises, instruments, 
 weapons or any information,-''' etc., into a jail with the intent to 
 facilitate the escape of a prisoner, or in any other way assists 
 in an escape, is guilty of felony.^*' A general intent to aid some 
 prisoner to escape must be proved and may be inferred from 
 proof of an intentional prison-breaking by the accused. But an 
 
 '* See cases in last note. So L. 355, 358. See also, Martin v. 
 
 strongly does the law incline to pre- State, ^2 Ark. 124, 126. 
 
 sume negligence in the officer, where '^ 2 Hawk's P. C. 192. 
 
 an escape occurs, that, though such " State v. Sparks, 78 Ind. 166, 167. 
 
 prisoner should break jail, yet it The intent is immaterial under the 
 
 seems that it will be deemed a negli- statute. Lynch v. Commonwealth, 
 
 gent escape in the jailer, because it 115 Ky. 309, 72, S. W. 745, 24 Ky. L. 
 
 will be attributed to a want of due 2180. 
 
 vigilance on the part of the jailer or ™ Mcehan v. State, 46 X. J. L. 353, 
 
 his officers. 2 Bish. Cr. L., § 1096. 358. 
 
 ° In order to constitute the crime "° People v. Buckley, 91 App. Div. 
 
 of voluntary escape, the act must be (X. Y.) 586, 87 X'^. Y. S. 191, 18 X. 
 
 done by the officer vialo auimo, and Y. Cr. 215. 
 
 if he discharge the prisoner through ^Wilson v. State, 61 .Ma. T51, 154; 
 
 an erroneous interpretation of the I'luty v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 105 
 
 law he is not guilty of that crime, but S. W. 1.^8, 32 Ky. L. 80; Maxcy v. 
 
 of the minor offense of negligent State, 76 Ark. 276, 88 S. W. 1009. 
 escape. Meehan v. State, 46 N. J.
 
 § 465 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 760 
 
 especial intent to ]il)cratc or to aid in the escape of any particular 
 prisoner need not be proved."" i"'x])ert testimony will be received 
 to show how articles, which arc alleged to have been furnished 
 to aid an escape, may be used for iliat purpose. "'- 
 
 By statute it is also a crime for a person confined in jail to 
 attempt to escape. The accused under such a statute cannot show 
 as a defense that he was sent out to work without a guard to a 
 certain place and that because he was without a guartl he es- 
 caped.^^ 
 
 vj 465. Illegality of arrest, when relevant. — It is generally pre- 
 sumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that courts 
 of general or superior jurisdiction have acted regularly and 
 legally within the boundaries of their powers and jurisdiction,^* 
 and that public officials have obeyed the law and done their duty. 
 But the accused, whether a prisoner under indictment who has 
 escaped or attempted to do so, a person confined under civil proc- 
 ess,^^ or an official charged with a voluntary escape,^" may show 
 that the detention was without any w^arrant,^^ or under one issued 
 by a court having no jurisdiction.^'* If the legality of the custody 
 is attacked the burden of proof to convince the jury of the legality 
 of the custod}' is upon the state.^'' The records of the committing 
 court and the warrant itself are relevant to show the la w^ fulness 
 of the custody.*" If the lawfulness of the custody is proved, evi- 
 
 ^^ Hurst V. State, 79 Ala. 55, 58; State v. Hollon. 22 Kan. 580, 584; 
 
 Holland v. State, 60 Miss. 939; State v. Clark (Xev., 1909), 104 Pac. 
 
 Vaughan v. State, 9 Tex. App. 563; 593. 
 
 Simmons v. State, 88 Ga. 169, 14 S. '' Housh v. People, 75 111. 487, 491 ; 
 
 E. 122. Martin v. State, 32 Ark. 124, 129. 
 
 ="= Watson V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 80, =" State v. Hollon, 22 Kan. 580, 584 ; 
 
 22 S. W. 46. State V. Beebe, 13 Kan. 589, 593, 595, 
 
 ^ State V. Wright, 81 Vt. 281, 69 19 Am. 93; State v. Jones, 78 N. Car. 
 
 Atl. 761. 420, 422; State V. Baldwin, 80 N. 
 
 ^ Underhill on Ev., § 232. Car. 390, 393 ; 2 Bish. C. L., § 1065. 
 
 ^ Housh V. People, 75 111. 487, 49T ; '"State v. Whalen, 98 Mo. 222, 11 
 
 State V. Leach, 7 Conn. 452, 456, 18 S. W. 576. The fact that a person 
 
 Am. Dec. 118. was in lawful custody who was ac- 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Barker, 133 cused of resisting his jailer must be 
 
 !Mass. 399; Housh v. People, 75 111. proved by the mittimus. People v. 
 
 487,491. :\Iuldoon, 2 Park. Cr. (N. Y.) 13. 
 
 ^ People V. Ah Teung, 92 Cal. 421, The distinction is very clear between 
 
 425, 28 Pac. 577, 15 L. R. A. I90n; an imprisonment without process, and
 
 76i 
 
 OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 § 466 
 
 dence that the prisoner was subsequently acquitted is irrelevant.*^ 
 Nor can the accused be permitted to introduce evidence of the 
 filtliv and unwholesome condition of the jail to show his escape 
 was absolutely necessary to preserve his health unless he shows 
 he had exhausted all lawful means of obtaining relief by com- 
 plaining to the authorities.'*- Nor can one who is on trial for an 
 escape prove in his defense that he was a trusty, or that after 
 his escape he paid his fine to the sheriff, or that he escaped to 
 avoid unmerited punishment at the hands of his jailer.*^ 
 
 § 466. Perjury — The intent to swear to what is false. — This crime 
 may be defined as the taking of a willful false oath by one who, 
 being lawfully required to depose the truth in any judicial pro- 
 ceeding.** swears absolutely in a matter material to the point in 
 question. ■'^ Proof of a willful intention to swear falsely is neces- 
 sary.**' It is for the jury to determine whether the accused was 
 
 hence wholly illegal, and an imprison- 
 ment under process which is sub- 
 stantially legal, but which may be 
 technically irregular. The fact that 
 the imprisonment was without process 
 may always be shown. But the 
 courts rather discourage the practice 
 of attacking process collaterally by 
 rejecting evidence of mere technical 
 irregularities therein. State v. Mur- 
 ray, 15 Me. 100, 103,; State v. Armi- 
 stead, 106 N. Car. 639, 644, 10 S. E. 
 872; Commonwealth v. Morihan, 4 
 Allen (Mass.) 585; People v. Ah 
 Teung. 92 Cal. 421, 426, 28 Pac. 577, 
 15 L. R. A. I90n. 
 
 " State V. Lewis, 19 Kan. 260, 265, 
 27 Am. Ii3n. 
 
 ■" State V. Davis, 14 .W-v. 439, 445, 
 .-^^ Am. 563. 
 
 "Johnson v. State, 122 Ga. 172. 50 
 S. E. 65; State v. King, 71 Kan. 287, 
 80 Pac. 606. 
 
 " A prosecution in a nuinicipal 
 court for the violation of an ordi- 
 nance is within the statute. Gardner 
 V. State, 80 Ark. 264. 97 S. W. 48. 
 
 ^^Commonwealth v. Smith, 11 .Al- 
 len (Mass.) 243. 
 
 *" I Hawk's P. C, p. 429, § 2 ; Mc- 
 Laren V. State, 4 Ga. App. 643, 62 S. 
 E. 138; People V. Martin, 175 X. Y. 
 315, 67 N. E. 589, 97 Am. St. 
 628; affirming 17 App. Div. (X. 
 Y.) 396. 79 X. Y. S. 340; State 
 V. Faulkner, 175 Mo. 546, 75 S. 
 W. 116; State V. Luper (Ore., 
 1908), 95 Pac. 811 ; Goodwin v. State, 
 118 Ga. 770, 45 S. E. 620; Pilgrim v. 
 State (Okla. Cr. App., 1909), 104 Pac. 
 :^S':^; Elliott Evidence. § 3078. To con- 
 stitute perjury the party charged must 
 take an oath before some competent 
 tribunal or dlTiccr that he will testify, 
 declare, depose or certify truly that 
 his written testimony, declaration or 
 certificate by him submitted was true; 
 when in fact some material matter 
 so testified, declared, or certified by 
 him was false and untrue ami known 
 by him at the time of taking such 
 natli to have been false and untrue. 
 United States v. Richards, i.jo IVil, 
 443. 'i'lu- elements of the crime of 
 perjury to be alleged and proved arc
 
 466 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 76: 
 
 or was not honestly mistaken in testifying. It is not sufficient to 
 prove that testimony, alleged to be false, has been given, and thai 
 it was false. It must also be proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
 that the accused knew its falsity, and that he willfully, corruptly, 
 and with deliberation and consideration, swore to it as true.'*^ 
 Evidence of the conduct and actions of the accused while he was 
 testifying, as, for example, that he was insolent, and had to be 
 rebuked by the court,'"* and of his manner of speaking when on 
 the witness stand, is relevant to show guilty knowledge and in- 
 tent. It may also be shown for the same purpose that the accused 
 had tried to induce another witness to give false testimony." The 
 fact that perjury is the result of a conspiracy to commit some 
 other crime permits the evidence to take a wide range. The facts 
 connected with or growing out of the conspiracy may be shown 
 for the purpose of establishing the guilty intent of the accused, 
 or to show^ knowledge on his part though such evidence may tend 
 to show that he has committed another crime. '^'^ 
 
 a judicial proceeding or course of 
 justice; the swearing of defendant to 
 give testimony therein ; his testi- 
 mon\- : its falsity, and its materiality 
 to the issue or point of inquiry. Peo- 
 ple V. Tatum, 60 Alisc. (N. Y.) 311, 
 112 N. Y. S. 36. Circumstantial evi- 
 dence in prosecution for perjury, see 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3087; 103 Am. 
 St. 902, note. Proof of other offenses 
 in prosecution for perjury, see 105 
 Am. St. 983, note; materiality of evi- 
 dence, see Elliott Evidence, § 3079; 
 presumptions, § 3072; burden of 
 proof, § 3071; materiality^ §§ 3080, 
 3081; the best evidence, § 3083; ad- 
 missions and confessions, § 3088. 
 Evidence of good character, see 103 
 Am. St. 902. The res gesta, see El- 
 liott Evidence, § 3086. Testimony of 
 accomplice, see 98 Am. St. 175, note. 
 Weight and .sufficiency of evidence, 
 see 10 L. R. A. 749, note. Defenses, 
 see Elliott Evidence, § 3090; vari- 
 ance, § 3091 ; questions of law and 
 fact, § 3073. 
 
 ^'People V. German, no Mich. 244, 
 68 X. W. 150; People v. Ross, 103 
 Cal. 425,-37 Pac. 379; Davidson v. 
 State, 22 Tex. App. 372, 3 S. W. 662 ; 
 People V. Stone; 32 Hun (N. Y.) 
 41; McClerkin v. State, 20 Fla. 879: 
 Williams v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 
 St. 493; State v. Brown, no La. 591, 
 34 So. 698; Xurnberger v. United 
 States, 156 Fed. 721, 84 C. C. A. 2>77\ 
 People V. Van Tassel, 26 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 445, 50 N. Y. S. 53; United 
 States V. Kennej', 90 Fed. 257; Tid- 
 well V. State, 40 Tex. Cr. 38, 47 S. 
 W. 466, 48 S. W. 184; Goodwin v. 
 State, n8 Ga. 770, 45 S. E. 620; State 
 v. Loos (Iowa, 1909), 123 N. W. 962. 
 
 ^* Foster v. State, 22 Tex. Cr. 39, 
 22 S. W. 21. 
 
 '"Heflin v. State, 88 Ga. 151, 14 S. 
 E. 112, 30 Am. St. 147. 
 
 "" Williamson v. United States, 207 
 U. S. 425, 28 Sup. Ct. 163, 52 L. 
 ed. — .
 
 yo^o 
 
 OFFEXSES AGAINST FUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 § 467 
 
 § 467. Materiality of the testimony. — The materiality of the 
 testimony which is alleged to be false must be established satis- 
 factorily."'^ Where there "is no dispute as to what the accused 
 testified whether the testimony was material is for the court. ^" 
 The opinions of witnesses who heard it that it was or was not 
 material are never recei\-ed.^^ 
 
 As a rule of law the evidence which is alleged to be false is 
 material if it prove or tend to prove or to disprove any fact which 
 iiself was material. Whether e\-idence is or is not material is 
 not to be determined by the effect which it in fact did have on the 
 case but rather by the effect which it could have had assuming 
 that it were true.^* Tims, for example, all the testimony by a wit- 
 ness before the grand jury which might legally affect their find- 
 
 "^ State V. Faulkner, 175 Mo. 546, 
 75 S. \V. it6; State v. Dineen, 203 
 Mo. 62^, 102 S. W. 480; State v. 
 Brown, iii La. 170, 35 So. 501; 
 Bledsoe v. State, 64 Ark. 474, 42 S. 
 W. Sgg; State v. Moran, 216 Mo. 
 550, 115 S. W. 1 126; State V. Cline, 
 146 N. Car. 640, 61 S. E. 522; State 
 V. Faulkner, 175 Mo. 546, 75 S. W. 
 116; People V. Corrigan, 195 N. Y. 
 I, 87 X. E. 792; Gardner v. State, 
 80 Ark. 264, 97 S. W. 48; State v. 
 Dineen, 203 Mo. 628, 102 S. W. 480; 
 People V. Chadwick, 4 Cal. App. 6^, 
 87 Pac. 384, 389; Brown v. State, 47 
 Fla. 16, 36 So. 705; Wilkinson v. 
 People, 226 111. 135. 80 N. E. 699; 
 Leak V. State, 61 Ark. 599, ^^ S. W. 
 1067; Masterson v. State, 144 Ind. 
 240, 43 N. E. 138; State v. Swafford, 
 98 Iowa 362, 67 X. W. 284; People 
 V. Macard, 109 Mich. 623, 67 X. W. 
 968; Rich V. United States, i Okla. 
 354. ii Pac. 804. Perjury may be as- 
 signed on the giving of false testi- 
 mony which if true would have been 
 incriminating, as where a witness be- 
 fore a grand jury is compelled to in- 
 criminate himself. Stale v. Lehman, 
 175 Mo. 619, 75 S. W. 1.19. 
 
 " State v. Caywood, 96 Iowa 3C)7, 
 
 65 X. W. 385; State V. Swafford, 98 
 Iowa 362, 67 X. W. 284; Hanscom 
 v. State, 93 Wis. 273, 67 N. W. 419; 
 State V. Park, 57 Kan. 431, 46 Pac. 
 71s; Powell V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. ^77, 
 T,7 S. W. 322 ; Grissom v. State, 
 88 Ark. 115, 113 S. W. ion; State 
 V. Brown, 128 Iowa 24, 102 N. W. 
 799; Wilkinson v. People, 226 111. 
 135, 80 X. E. 699; State v. Dineen, 
 203 Mo. 628, 102 S. W. 480; Maroney 
 V. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 524, 78 S. W. 
 696; Saucier v. State (Miss.), 48 So. 
 840; Brooks y. State (Ark., 1909), 
 121 S. W. 740; People v. Bradbury 
 (Cal., 1909), 103 Pac. 215. 
 " Foster v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. .39, 
 
 22 S. W. 21 ; Washington v. State, 
 
 23 Tex. App. 336, 5 S. W. 119; Gor- 
 don V. State, 48 X. J. L. 611, 7 All. 
 476; Peters v. United States, 2 Okla. 
 'if>. i?> Pac. 1031; Butler v. State, 36 
 Tex. Cr. 444, 37 S. W. 746; State v. 
 Sutton, 147 Ind. 158, 46 X. E. 468. 
 The fact that evidence is cumulative 
 does not prevent it from being ma- 
 terial. State v. Faulkiu-r, 175 Mo. 
 546, 75 S. W. 116. 
 
 "State V. lloel, 77 Kan. 334, <)| 
 I'ac. 267.
 
 4C8 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 764 
 
 ins^ or re fusilier to find an indiclniont is material.'"'^ It is not 
 necessary to show that the accused knew his testimony was mate- 
 rial.'^" Testimony of the accused falsely denying that he had 
 made contradictory statements is material." 
 
 ^ 468. Number of witnesses required and corroboration of single 
 witness to prove falsity. — According to the earlier cases no con- 
 viction of perjury could be had unless the falsity of the evidence 
 given under oath was proved by the direct evidence of two cred- 
 ible witnesses, the evidence of the second witness being required 
 to overcome the ])resumi)tion of innocence which the law indulged 
 in favor of the accused. ''''' Such is not now the law. The accused 
 may be convicted on the evidence of one witness, which, however, 
 must in all cases be corroborated. The corroboration by circum- 
 stances must be strong, though it need not be equivalent or tanta- 
 mount to another witness. ^''' But it must be clear and positive and 
 so strong that, with the evidence of the witness who testifies di- 
 rectly to the falsity of the defendant's testimony, it will convince 
 the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. *^'' 
 
 "State V. Sargood, 80 Vt. 415, 68 
 Atl. 49- 
 
 "" State V. Sargood, 80 Vt. 415, 68 
 Atl. 49. 
 
 ^^ Rrown v. State, 47 Fla. 16, 36 
 So. 70s. 
 
 ^ I Greenl. on Ev., § 257 ; 4 Rl. 
 Com. 358; 3 Russell on Crimes Cgth 
 Am. Ed.) 78. 
 
 °' I Greenl. on Ev., § 257 ; State v. 
 Peters, 107 N. Car. 876, 12 S. E. 74; 
 Sweat V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 96 S. 
 W. 843, 29 Ky. L. 1067; Saucier v. 
 State (Miss.), 48 So. 840; Kelley v. 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. 507, 103 S. W. 
 189; Parham v. State, 3 Ga. App. 
 468, 60 S. E. 123 ; Stamper v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 100 S. W. 286, 30 
 Ky. L. 992; State v. Rutledge, 37 
 Wash. 523, 79 Pac. 1123; Brooks v. 
 State (Ark., 1909), 121 S. W. 740. 
 See Elliott Evidence, § 3089. 
 
 "" Commonwealth v. Rutland, IT9 
 Mass. 317; State v. Blize, in Mo. 
 
 464, 20 S. W. 210; State V. Miller, 44 
 ]\Io. App. 159; State v. Gibbs, 10 
 Mont. 213, 25 Pac. 289, 10 L. R. .A. 
 749n ; People v. Stone, 32 Hun (X. 
 Y.) 41; Waters v. State, 30 Tex. 
 .^pp. 284, 17 S. W. 411; ]\IcClerkin 
 v. State, 20 Fla. 879; Heflin v. State, 
 88 Ga. 151, 14 S. E. 112, 30 Am. St. 
 147; United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. 
 (U. S.) 430, 10 L. ed. 527; United 
 States V. Hall, 44 Fed. 864, 10 L. R. 
 A. 324; Harris v. People, 64 X. Y. 
 148; People V. Hayes, 70 Hun (X. 
 Y.) Ill, 24 X. Y. S. 194; Reg. V. 
 Rraithwaite, 8 Cox C. C. 254; Reg. 
 V. Shaw, 10 Cox C. C. 66; Common- 
 wealth V. Parker, 2 Cush. (Mass.) 
 212; State V. Pratt, 21 S. Dak. 305, 
 112 N. W. 152; Grady v. State, 49 
 Tex. Cr. 3, 90 S. W. 38; Stamper v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 100 S. W. 
 286, 30 Ky. L. 992; State v. Rutledge, 
 37 Wash. 523, 79 Pac. 1123; State
 
 7^1 
 
 OFFEXSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 § 468 
 
 The rule as to the corroboration of the evidence of an ac- 
 complice applies to a prosecution for a perjury. If the statute 
 requires corroboration, the corroboration cannot be furnished by 
 the testimony of an accomplice and usually whether the witness 
 is or is not an accomplice is for the jury to determine."'^ 
 
 The direct evidence of the witness may be corroborated by 
 circumstantial evidence. All relevant evidence which, if true, 
 tends to corroborate him, should go to the jury, and it is for 
 them to determine whether the corroboration is sufficient to con- 
 vince them of the falsity of the defendant's testimony beyond a 
 reasonable doubt."- It has been repeatedly held that while cor- 
 roboration is essential the additional evidence need not be such as, 
 standing by itself, would justify a conviction in case where the 
 testimony of a single witness is sufficient for a conviction."^ And 
 the written or oral admissions of the accused,"* or documentary 
 evidence found in his possession, or in the possession of those 
 who may be criminally associated wit.h him. may be received as 
 corroborative, and these, if believed by the jury, will be equivalent 
 to another witness."^ 
 
 V. Hunter, i8i Mo. 316, 80 S. W. 
 955; Nance v. State, 126 Ga. 95, 54 
 S. E. 932; Howell V. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 104 S. \V. 685, 31 Ky. L. 983; 
 Parham v. State, 3 Ga. App. 468, 60 
 S. E. 123; State v. Pratt, 21 S. Dak. 
 305, 112 X. W. 152; State V. Faulk- 
 ner, 175 Mo. 546, 75 S. W. 116; Bell 
 V. State, 5 Ga. App. 701, 63 S. E. 860 
 (holding that the procuring of one 
 to commit perjury may be proved by 
 the evidence of the person suborned). 
 
 "' Peop'e V. Gilhooley, 187 X. Y. 
 551, 80 X. E. 1 1 16. 
 
 •"State V. Blize, in Mo. 464, 20 S. 
 W. 210; Beach v. State, 22 Tex. Cr. 
 240, 22 S. W. 976; State V. Swaim, 
 07 X. Car. 462, 2 S. E. 68; People 
 V. Hayes, 70 Hun (X. Y.) in, 24 
 X. Y. S. 194; Maines v. State, 26 
 Tex. App. 14, 9 S. VV. 51 ; Gartman 
 V. State. 16 Tex. App. 215; Com- 
 monwealth V. Parker, 2 Cush. 
 (Mass.) 212; State v. Heed, 57 Mo. 
 
 252; People V. Davis, 61 Cal. 536; 
 Williams v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 
 St. 493 ; IMaroney v. State, 45 Tex. 
 Cr. 524, 78 S. W. 696. Under a stat- 
 ute requiring a credible witness with 
 corroboration, an accomplice being by 
 law discredited is not a credible wit- 
 ness, so that there must be at least 
 one credible witness aside from the 
 accomplice. Conant v. State, 51 Tex. 
 Cr. 610, 103 S. W. 897. 
 
 •"State V. Hunter, i8r Mo. 316, 80 
 S. W. 955. 
 
 °* State V. Swafford, 98 Iowa 362, 
 67 N. W. 284; United States v. De 
 Amador, 6 N. Mex. 173, 27 Pac. 488; 
 Brooks V. State. 29 Tex. App. 582, 16 
 S. W. 542: United States v. Wood. 
 14 Pet. (U. S.) 430, 440, 441. 10 L. 
 ed. 527; State v. Hunter, 181 Mo. 
 316, 80 S. W. 955: Schmidt v. L^iited 
 States, 133 Fed. 257, 66 C. C. A. 380. 
 
 "The circumstances in whiili tin- 
 corroboration by a living witness may
 
 § 469 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 766 
 
 Where the indictment contains several assignments of perjury, 
 a conviction cannot be had on the direct exidence of a Hving wit- 
 ness to the falsity of one with circumstantial evidence of the 
 falsity of another. The evidence of the witness and the evidence 
 of circumstances must both bear upon tlie falsity of the same 
 statement of fact.*^" But several assignments on material matters 
 may be joined where they all relate to the same transaction and 
 if there is sufficient evidence to sustain one or more of them the 
 l)rosecution need not prove all."" Whether a witness is credible, 
 under a statute requiring corroboration by evidence of a credible 
 witness, is a question for the jury."® In conclusion, it may be said 
 that any fact essential to conviction, except the falsity of the testi- 
 mony given by the accused, may be proved by the uncorroborated 
 testimony of a single living witness."" 
 
 § 469. Falsity of the testimony. — The falsity of the statement, 
 or of the evidence to the truth of which the accused has sworn, 
 must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'** 
 
 be dispensed with are thus tersely 
 enumerated in United States v. 
 Wood, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 430, on page 
 440: 
 
 1. Where the accused has sworn to 
 a fact which is directly disproved by 
 documentary or written testimony 
 springing from himself (/. e., a writ- 
 ten admission) under circumstances 
 showing a corrupt intent. 
 
 2. Where the fact sworn to is di- 
 rectly contradicted by a public record 
 with which the accused is proved to 
 have had an actual acquaintance. 
 
 3. Where he swears to what he 
 must necessarily have known to be 
 false, and where the truth can be 
 proved by his own letters relating to 
 the fact, or by other written evi- 
 dence found in his possession, and 
 which has been treated by him as 
 containing a true account of the facts 
 stated. 
 
 •^Reg. V. Virrier, 12 A. & E. 317, 
 324; Reg. V. Parker, i C. & M. 639; 
 
 Williams v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 
 St. 493, 501 ; State v. Hascall, 6 X. 
 H. 352; Harris v. People, 64 N. Y. 
 148; Commonwealth v. DeCost, 35 
 Pa. Super. Ct. 88; Adellberger v. 
 State (Tex. Cr., 1897), 39 S. W. 103. 
 "It will not be sufficient to prove by 
 one inadequate line of testimony that 
 one statement made by the defendant 
 is false, and then by another inade- 
 quate line of testimony that another 
 statement made by him is false." 
 Wharton Cr. Ev., § 387. 
 
 "^ State v. Taylor, 202 Mo. i, 100 
 S. W. 41 ; McLaren v. State, 4 Ga. 
 App. 643, 62 S. E. 138. 
 
 "^ IMeeks v. State, 22 Tex. Cr. 420, 
 24 S. W. 98; Kitchen v. State, 29 
 Tex. App. 45, 14 S. W. 392. 
 
 ""United States v. Hall, 44 Fed. 
 864, ID L. R. A. 324; People v. 
 Haves, 70 Hun (X. Y.) in. 24 X. 
 Y._ S. 194. 
 
 ""Howell V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 
 104 S. W. 685, 31 Ky. L. 983; People
 
 76; 
 
 OFFENSES AGAIXST PUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 § 470 
 
 Any fact is relevant which proves or tends to prove or to dis- 
 prove either its truth or its falsity.'* Though both at common 
 law and by statute corroboration is required, the falsity of the 
 statement may be proved by circumstantial evidence."" 
 
 § 470. Proof of the testimony alleged to be false. — Tt must 1)e 
 shown that the accused was sworn. '^ by an officer who had legal 
 authority to administer the oath.'* 
 
 The form of the oath is not material. The most important 
 question is, did the accused intend to be sworn and was he sworn 
 in a form and manner wliich he regarded as binding?''' For lie 
 must by some unequivocal act consciously take upon himself 
 the obligation of an oath.'"^ All the circumstances connected with 
 the taking of the oath are relevant. The person who has ad- 
 ministered the oath or any person who is present must be ])er- 
 mitted to testify as to all the facts connected with it ui)on the 
 
 V. Strassman. IT2 Cal. 6Ss, 45 Pac. 
 3; Goslin V. Commonwealth, 121 Ky. 
 698, 90 S. W. 223. 28 Ky. L. 683; 
 Baker v. State, 87 Ark. 564, 113 S. 
 W. 205 ; Cook V. United States, 26 
 App. D. C. 427. See Elliott Evi- 
 dence, § 3077. 
 
 " Walker v. State, 107 .Ma. 5, t8 
 So. 393; People V. Macard, 109 Mich. 
 623, 67 X. VV. 968; Rogers v. State, 
 35 Te.\. Cr. 221, 32 S. W. 1044; 
 United States v. Shinn, 8 Saw. (U. 
 S.) 403, 410, 411; United States v. 
 Moore, 2 Low. (U. S.) 232, 235, 2.18, 
 26 Fed. Cas. 15803; State v. Smith, 
 119 X. Car. 856, 25 S. E. 871; State 
 V. Gordon, 196 Mo. 185, 95 S. VV. 420. 
 Hut the fact that the accused was 
 acfjuittcd on the former trial, durinR 
 which he is charRcd with having 
 committed the perjury, is not ad- 
 mis-^ihlc to prove the truth f)f his 
 testimony then fjivcn. Hemphill v. 
 State. 7r Miss. 877, 16 So. 261; 
 Ifutcherson v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 67, 
 24 S. W 'X^)8. 
 
 " Plummcr v. State. 35 Tex. Cr. 
 202, 33 S. W. 228; Gandy v. State, 23 
 Xeb. 436, 36 X. W. 817; People v. 
 Porter, 104 Cal. 415, 38 Pac. SS; 
 State V. Hunter, 181 Mo. 316, 80 S. 
 
 w. 955. 
 
 "Sloan v. State, 71 Miss. 459. 14 
 So. 262. A copy of an oath may be 
 received if the original is missing. 
 State V. Matlock, 5 Pen. (Del.) 401, 
 64 .Xtl. 259. 
 
 ''United States v. Curtis, 107 U. 
 S. 671, 27 L. ed. 534, 2 Sup. Ct. 507; 
 People V. Xolte, 19 Misc. (X. Y.) 
 674, 44 X. Y. S. 443; Marki-y v. 
 State, 47 I'la. .^8, 37 So. 53; Manning 
 V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 326, 81 S. \V. 
 957; Phillips v. State, 5 Ga. .Vpp. 
 ."197, ^>3 S. E. (/>7\ State v. Pratt. 21 
 S. Dak. 30s, U2 X. W. 152. (By 
 clerk in open court is sufficient.) 
 
 "State v. Day. 108 Minn. I2i, lai 
 X. W. 611. See Elliott Evidence, 
 » .1074. 
 
 " Markey v. State. 47 Kla. 38. 37 
 So. 5j.
 
 § 4/0 CRIMINAL EV'IDENCE. 768 
 
 question of whether the accused was actually sworn or not." 
 Thus, is may be shown that the oath was interpreted to the ac- 
 cused.'** The authority of the officer to administer the oath may 
 be presumed under some circumstances. The burden is on the 
 slate to prove that the officer was authorized to administer an 
 oath, as c. g., where he is a notary public, to show his jurisdiction 
 included the place of the oath and the time when it was taken."''' 
 Usually proof of an officer dc facto will suffice and his written 
 appointment need not be produced. ^° The official character may 
 always be shown 1\v the production of the written appointment,"^ 
 though, if the original appointment cannot be found secondary 
 evidence is admissible.^" The fact that there are irregularities in 
 an appointment of an officer to take testimony or that the order 
 appointing him fails to designate him by any official title. ■'^•' or 
 that the officer who administered the oath knew at that time that 
 it was false and that it was made for a fraudulent purpose is not 
 material.^* 
 
 The testimony in giving which the perjury is alleged to have 
 been committed must be shown ; the best evidence is the record 
 or a certified copy. A stenographer may read his notes of the 
 testimony given by the accused, and which is alleged to be false, 
 if he is able to swear that the notes contained a true and correct 
 transcript of all the testimony given by the accused.*^ It has 
 also been held that parol evidence given by one who has heard 
 the alleged false testimony is admissible even though a record 
 may be in existence. ^"^ It is not necessary that the witness shall 
 
 "Markey v. State, 47 Fla. 38, 37 "■' Markey v. State, 4" F'a- 38, 37 
 
 So. 53. So. 53. 
 
 '*Trevinio v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. "Thompson v. State, 120 Ga. 132, 
 
 350, 88 S. W. 356. 47 S. E. 566. 
 
 '* Commonwealth v. Schwieters ^ State v. Vandemark, 77 Conn. 
 
 (Ky.), 93 S. W. 592, 29 Ky. L. 417. 201, 58 Atl. 715; People v. Macard, 
 
 *" State V. Geer, 48 Kan. 752, 30 109 Mich. 623, 67 N. W. 968; State 
 
 Pac. 236. V. Camley, 67 Vt. 322, 31 Atl. 840; 
 
 ^'JNIahon v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 234, Leaptrot v. State, 51 Fla. 57, 40 So. 
 
 79 S. W. 28, 67 L. R. A. 499n. 616; State v. Pratt, -21 S. Dak. 305. 
 
 *= People V. Ellenbogen, 186 N. Y. 112 N. W. 152. 
 
 603, 79 N. E. 1112; State v. Horin, ** State v. Gibbs, 10 Mont. 213, 25 
 
 70 Kan. 256, 78 Pac. 411. Pac. 289, 10 L. R. A. 749"; State v.
 
 769 
 
 OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE. 
 
 § 470 
 
 testify to the identical language which it is alleged in the indict- 
 ment was used by the accused, or that he should recollect all 
 that the accused said, if he can repeat in substance that which 
 was alleged to be false.""' One who was present may testify to 
 oral statements made by the accused corresponding in substance 
 to the contents of the alleged false affidavit, -** and the fact that the 
 signature to an affidavit was in the handwriting of the accused 
 need not be proved, but will l^e presumed where the affidavit was 
 actually used for him in court.""' It must usually be proved that 
 the perjury was committed in a judicial proceedings. Proof that 
 the perjury was committed in a judicial proceedings usually con- 
 sists of the record of such proceedings with oral evidence to 
 identify the accused as the witness who testified falsely.'""' The 
 object of the introduction of such evidence is to show the juris- 
 diction of the court, the regularity of the proceedings and the 
 materiality of the evidence.^^ Jurisdiction will usually be pre- 
 sumed where the record is apparently regular in the absence of 
 proof to the contrary. The fact that the proceedings are avoidable 
 only does not destroy jurisdiction and perjury may be com- 
 mitted."" Nor can the fact that the accused was not warned that 
 any statements made by him might be used against him, author- 
 ize the court to exclude his evidence given in a former trial or in 
 some other prior proceedings where he is subsequently tried for 
 perjury committed under such circumstances.''* 
 
 Woolridge, 45 Ore. 389, 78 Pac. 333; 
 Stanley v. State (Tex. Cr.), 74 S. 
 W. 318. Stenographer's notes, see 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3084; records of 
 former proceedings, § ,3082. 
 
 " McLaren v. State, 4 Ga. App. 643, 
 62 S. E. 138. 
 
 " Simpson v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 
 77, 79 S. W. 530. 
 
 ■* Markcy v. State, 47 Fla. 38, 37 
 So. 53. 
 
 '"Ik-nin V. State. 88 Ga. 151. 14 S. 
 E. F12, 30 Am. St. 147; King v. State, 
 32 Tex. Cr. 463, 24 S. W. 514; Par- 
 49 — Underiull Crim. Ev. 
 
 tain V. State, 22 Tex. App. 100, 2 S. 
 W. 854 ; Washington v. State, 23 Tex. 
 App. 336, 5 S. W. 119; State v. How- 
 ard, 137 Mo. 289, 38 S. W. 908. 
 
 "State V. Brown, iii La. 170, 35 
 So. 501 ; State v. Justescn (Utah), 
 99 Pac. 456. 
 
 "'AL-irkey v. State, 47 F'a. 38. 37 
 So. 53 ; State v. Brown, 68 X. H. 
 200, 38 Atl. 731. 
 
 "'Stanley v. State (Tex. Cr.), 74 
 S. VV. 318; People v. Cahill, 193 N. 
 Y. 232, 86 N. E. 39. -'o L. R. A. (N. 
 S.) 1084.
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. PUBLIC PEACE AND PUBLIC 
 
 HEALTH. 
 
 § 4/1. Lotteries and gaming or gam- § 483. 
 bling — What constitutes. 
 
 472. Evidence to prove manner of 484. 
 
 playing. 
 
 473. The bet or wager — Plaj-ing in 
 
 public. 485. 
 
 474. Accomplice evidence. 
 
 475. Keeping gambling houses. 486. 
 
 476. Presumptions and burden of 
 
 proof. 487. 
 
 477. Gambling instruments as evi- 488. 
 
 dence. 489. 
 
 478. Mailing obscene literature, etc. 490. 
 
 479. Evidence obtained b\- decoy 491. 
 
 letters. 492. 
 
 480. Adulteration of food, drugs, 
 
 etc. 
 
 481. Evidence furnished by analy- 493. 
 
 sis. 
 
 482. Keeping disorderly house. 
 
 494- 
 
 Dueling — Sending a challenge 
 to light a duel. 
 
 Carrying concealed weapons — 
 How concealment may be 
 proved — Intent. 
 
 Apprehension of danger as a 
 defense. 
 
 Character of the defendant as 
 an officer or traveler. 
 
 Forcible entry and detainer. 
 
 Affray. 
 
 Riot. 
 
 Conspiracy. 
 
 Circumstantial evidence. 
 
 Admissibility of acts and dec- 
 larations of fellow-conspira- 
 tors. 
 
 Must be made during exist- 
 ence of and in furtherance 
 of the conspiracy. 
 
 Order of proving conspiracy to 
 let in declarations. 
 
 § 471. Lotteries and gaining or gambling — What constitutes. — 
 
 Gaming or gambling is a misdemeanor by statute in many states. 
 Under such statutes it is. of course, always necessary, in order 
 to sustain a conviction, to prove the necessary constituents of the 
 crime, i. e., the element of chance in the game itself, and that a 
 wager was actually made. A game of chance may be defined as 
 one in which the result is determined by luck or lot, and not by 
 adroitness, practice, skill, or judgment in play, such as. for exam- 
 ple, cards, ^ dominoes,- bagatelle.^ bowls,'* baseball,'' dice throwing,'' 
 
 ^ Commonwealth v. Coding, 3 Met. 
 
 * Drawpoker, Shreveport v. Bowen, 
 116 La. 522, 40 So. 859; State v. 
 Mathias, 206 Mo. 604, 105 S. W. 604, 
 121 Am. St. 687n. 
 
 "Harris v. State, 31 Ala. 362. 
 
 (Mass.) 130. 
 
 ^ Mace V. State, 58 Ark. 79, 22 S. W. 
 1 108; People V. Weithoff, 51 Mich. 
 203, 209, 212, 16 X. W. 442, 47 Am. 
 
 'Neal's Case, 22 Gratt. (Va.) 917, 557- 
 giQ. " State V. DeBoy, 117 X- Car. 702. 2t, 
 
 S. E. 167; Jones v. State, 26 Ala. i55- 
 
 (770)
 
 7/1 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 472 
 
 or keno." Such games are gambling when played for money or 
 other valuable thing. And generally, betting on elections,^ horse 
 races." a coin in the slot machine,^" shooting matches, ^^ billiards, 
 or other game of skill, is gambling under the statute.^" 
 
 § 472. Evidence to prove manner of playing. — The jury are not 
 presumed to know how an unlawful game is played, and the 
 mode of playing may be explained to them by professional 
 players as expert witnesses.^^ Such testimony is not indispensa- 
 ble. Any witness may describe a game he has seen, though he has 
 only played it twice, and seldom seen it played," and the depth 
 and extent of his knowledge and experience are relevant to dimin- 
 ish or increase the value of his evidence." 
 
 ' Miller v. State, 48 Ala. 122. 
 
 * Sharkey v. State, 33 Miss. 353, 355 ; 
 Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 15 B. 
 Mon. (Ky.) 531, 533; Commonwealth 
 V. Wells, no Pa. St. 463, 467, i Atl. 
 310. Contra, Hickerson v. Benson, 8 
 Mo. 8, 40 Am. Dec. 115. 
 
 " State V. Falk, 66 Conn. 250, 33 Atl. 
 913 ; Debardelaben v. State, 99 Tenn. 
 649, 42 S. W. 684; People V. Weithoff, 
 51 Mich. 203, 16 N. W. 442, 47 Am. 
 557; Watson V. State, 3 Ind. 123, 124; 
 Redman v. State, 33 Ala. 428. A horse 
 race is not a game under a statute 
 making it criminal to bet on a game. 
 State V. Vaughan, 81 Ark. 117, 98 S. 
 W. 685, 118 Am. St. 29, 7 L. R. A. 
 (N. S.) 889n; as to bookmakers' 
 Ijooth, Miller v. United States, 6 App. 
 D. C. 6. 
 
 "Lang V. Mcrwin, 99 Me. 486, 59 
 Atl. 1021, 105 Am. St. 293. 
 
 "Myers v. State, 3 Snecd (Tenn.) 
 98, 106, 107. 
 
 "'i'hc charge of selling lottery tick- 
 ets is sufficiently proved by evidence 
 that the defendant received money for 
 them, sent for them and received a 
 commission for his trouble. The ticket 
 itself ought to be produced or its ab- 
 
 sence satisfactorily accounted for. An- 
 derson V. State (Tex., 1897), 39 S. W. 
 109. A poolroom where betting is 
 done on horse races is a gaming house 
 and a nuisance at common law. State 
 V. Nease, 46 Oreg. 433, 80 Pac. 897; 
 though not productive of any disorder. 
 Commonwealth v. Huber, 126 Ky. 456, 
 104 S. W. 345, 31 Ky. L. 929. 
 
 Evidence of sale of lottery ticket, 
 3 L. R. A. 404. 
 
 "State V. Behan. T13 La. 701, 37 So. 
 607; Commonwealth v. Adams, 160 
 Mass. 310, 312, 35 N. E. 851. 
 
 " Nuckolls v. Commonwealth, 32 
 Gratt. (Va.) 884. 887; Miller v. Com- 
 monwealth, 117 Ky. 80, 77 S. W. 682, 
 25 Ky. L. 1236. 
 
 "One witness may testify he saw 
 the defendant conduct a game for 
 money, describing it in detail, and 
 another may then state it was a cer- 
 tain game, though the latter may have 
 seen the game played only two or 
 three times. People v. Sam Lung, 70 
 Cal. 515, 517, 518, II Pac. 673. The 
 courts will take judicial notice of the 
 meaning of the words "gift ciiter- 
 j)rise," Lohnian v. State, 81 In<l. 15, 18, 
 and of the use of billiard tables for
 
 X 1--. 
 
 b 4/0 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 77^ 
 
 § 473. The bet or wager— Playing- in public— Tt must be proved 
 that a bet or wager was made, whether tlie game be one of 
 chance or of skill,'" and that the stake had value intrinsically ; 
 or that, by agreement among the bettors, it represented value/" 
 The amount and character of the articles wagered are immaterial. 
 A conviction of gambling will be sustained by proof of playing 
 for chips or checks,^® for the price of refreshments,^" or for the 
 hire of the table or other apparatus."'* The making of tlie wager 
 may be inferred from an offer and acceptance, and neither of 
 these need be proved to ha\e been made orally or in express 
 terms.-^ Both may be inferred by the jury from evidence that 
 the accused placed money or chips upon a table where a game was 
 in progress, without objection from other players,-- or stated he 
 would pay the amount wagered after the game was ended, -^ and 
 even from evidence that the accused was sitting and playing at a 
 table or in a circle around a box"-* upon which money and gam- 
 bling devices, such as cards and a faro box, were lying.-^ 
 
 gambling purposes. State v. Price. 12 
 Gill & J. (Md.) 260, Z7 Am. Dec. 81 ; 
 that "craps" is a game played with 
 dice, Sims v. State, i Ga. App. ']'j6, 57 
 S. E. 1029; but not of the fact that 
 policy is a game of chance. State v. 
 Sellner, 17 Mo. App. 39. 
 
 Prima facie evidence of gaming, 36 
 Am. St. 685 ; illegality of contract for 
 future delivery, i Am. St. 764; com- 
 mon gamblers, Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3008; minors plaj'ing, § 3010; lot- 
 teries, § 301 1 ; variance, § 3007. 
 
 " Middaugh v. State, 103 Ind. 78, 80, 
 2 N. E. 292; Jackson v. State (Tex., 
 1894), 25 S. W. 773; Jackson v. State, 
 117 Ala. 155, 23 So. 47; Proctor v. 
 Territory, t8 Okla. 378, 92 Pac. 389; 
 Barker v. State, 127 Ga. 276, 56 S. E. 
 
 419. 
 
 ^" Oder V. State, 26 Fla. 520, 522, 7 
 So. 856 ; State v. Bishel, 39 Iowa 42. 
 
 "Porter v. State, 51 Ga. 300, 301; 
 Ransom v. State, 26 Fla. 364, 7 So. 
 860. 
 
 "People V. Cutler, 28 Hun (X. Y.) 
 
 465, 466; Hitchins v. People, 39 N. Y. 
 
 454, 456; Walker v. State, 2 Swan 
 (Tenn.) 287, 290, 291 ; Hopkins v. 
 State, 122 Ga. 583, 50 S. E. 351, 69 L. 
 R. A. 117. 
 
 =°Hall v. State (Tex., 1896), 34 S. 
 W. 122; Alexander v. State, 99 Ind. 
 450, 451 ; Hamilton v. State, 75 Ind. 
 586, 587; Bachellor v. State, 10 Tex. 
 258, 261 ; Middaugh v. State, 103 Ind. 
 78, 79, 2 X. E. 292. 
 
 ■^Rainbolt v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 153, 
 TCI S. W. 217; Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3004. 
 
 '" Thompson v. State, 99 Ala. 173, 13 
 So. 753; Goslin V. Commonwealth, 121 
 Ky. 698, 90 S. W. 22Z, 28 Ky. L. 683. 
 
 -^ State V. Leicht, 17 Iowa 28. 
 
 -^ Butler V. State, 2 Ga. App. 623, 
 58 S. E. 1 1 14. 
 
 ^ State V. Andrews, 43 Mo. 470, 471 ; 
 State V. Boyer, 79 Iowa 330, 44 X. W. 
 558; St. Louis V. Sullivan, 8 Mo. App. 
 
 455. 457. 458; Cohen v. State, 17 Tex. 
 142. Cf. Middaugh v. State, 103 Ind. 
 78, 80, 2 X. E. 292; Harmon v. State,
 
 -J-J}, CRIMES AGAIXST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 473 
 
 Publicity is often by statute essential to make it a crime to bet 
 on a game or sport, and must be shown. The court cannot take 
 notice that certain places are public, under a statute which forbids 
 gambling in public places.-^ ^^'hether a game is public, or whether 
 it is carried on in a building or place which is within the prohi- 
 bition of the statute"" is a question for the jury to determine"* 
 on all the circumstances.-'* Evidence that a game was carried 
 on in a shop,^** or public road,'^ in the office of a physician,^" 
 magistrate,^^ or broker,^* aboard a steamboat in a navigable 
 stream, ^^ or in a barn.^'^ will sustain an allegation that a game was 
 played in public.^' Where the place where the gambling took 
 place is not per sc a public place, the burden of proof is upon 
 the prosecution to prove that it is a public place. Proof that 
 prior to the occasion in question other games had been played in 
 that place is relevant to show that it is a public place. ^* 
 
 120 Ga. 197, 47 S. E. 547. Evidence 
 that other persons, present with the 
 accused in the room where gambling 
 is alleged to have taken place, were 
 playing or betting, is relevant ; and 
 perhaps indispensable, as the defend- 
 ant conld not play a game alone or 
 bet with himself. Thompson v. State, 
 99 .Ala. 173, 13 So. 753, 754. See 
 Griffin V. State, 2 Ga. .A-pp. 534, 58 S. 
 E. 781. 
 
 -" Grant v. State, Z2> Tex. Cr. 527, 27 
 S. W. 127. 
 
 '" In Texas the playing of cards at 
 any place not a private residence is 
 prohibited, Fallwell v. State, 48 Tex. 
 Cr. 35, 85 S. W. 1069, as for example 
 in a schoolhouse, Mapes v. State 
 (Tex. Cr.), 8s S. W. 797- See also, 
 Waggoner v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 260, 
 92 S. W. 38. 
 
 ^ Lewis V. State, 140 Ala. 126, Zl 
 So. 99; Ferrell v. Opclika, 144 Ala. 
 135. 39 So. 249. The yard of a board- 
 ing house. Walker v. State (Ala.), 
 41 So. 176; a lodging house, Winston 
 v. State, 145 Ala. 91, 41 So. 174; or a 
 
 room occupied in a jail h\ the keeper. 
 Lewis v. State, 140 .-Ma. 126, 2>1 So. 
 99, is not a public place. 
 
 ^ The burden is upon the prosecu- 
 tion to prove beyond a reasonable 
 doubt that the place is public. Brad- 
 ford V. State, 147 Ala. 118, 41 So. 
 1024. 
 
 ^Bentley v. State, 32 Ala. 596; 
 Tatum v. State, 156 Ala. 144, 47 So. 
 
 339- 
 
 =' Mills V. State, 20 Ala. ^. 
 
 '= Williams v. State (Tex., 1896), 34 
 S. W. 271 ; Redditt v. State, 17 Tex. 
 610. 
 
 "Burnett v. State, 30 Ala. 19. 
 
 ^'Wilson V. State, 31 .\la. 371. 
 
 *= Dickey v. State, 68 Ala. 508. 
 
 " Huffman v. State, 29 Ala. 40. 
 
 ^ Xickols v. State, in Ala. 58, 20 
 So. 564. See, also, Downey v. State, 
 1 10 Ala. 99, 20 So. 4.39 ; Gomprccht v. 
 State. 36 Tex. Cr. 434. 11 S. W. 734- 
 
 " Winston v. State, 145 Ala. 91. 41 
 So. 174; Dennis v. State. 139 Ala. 109, 
 35 So. 651 : Lee V. State. 136 Ala. 31, 
 2>i So. 894; Elliott Evidence, § 3004.
 
 § 474 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. ' 774 
 
 ^ 474. Accomplice evidence.— The rules oovcrning the introduc- 
 tion and employment of this species of evidence^*^ have been often 
 modified by statute, so far as the offense of gambling is con- 
 cerned. Thus it has been enacted that a conviction may be had 
 upon the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice,*'' and that he 
 shall not be excused from testifying because his evidence may 
 incriminate him.*^ No person is an accomplice unless proved to 
 have actually taken part in the game or to have had a bet depend- 
 ing on its result.*" 
 
 § 475. Keeping gambling houses. — Keeping a public gambling 
 or gaming house, or keeping or exhibiting implements for gam- 
 bling was indictable as a nuisance at common law. It is now 
 generally a statutory misdemeanor. The statutes differ greatly 
 in their details and should invariably be consulted to ascertain 
 what facts are essential to be proven.*^ That a 'certain house or 
 other place was maintained or kept as a public gaming house 
 may be shown by proof of its general reputation in the community 
 by the reputation of its inmates and frequenters as professional 
 gamblers and by the fact that gambling paraphernalia were found 
 there.** Proof that the accused had actual custody, control or 
 possession of a public gambling house, that he presided o\-er a 
 gambling table and admitted persons to the house,*^ or the fact 
 that he derived or expected to derive gain or profit from it, is 
 always relevant and may justify an inference that he was keep- 
 ing it in the statutory sense.*" Proof of a single act of possession 
 
 "* See ante, §§ 69-75. 202, 87 S. W. 152; State v. Oswald, 59 
 
 *° Wright V. State, 22 Tex. App. 670, Kan. 508, 53 Pac. 525 ; Strong v. State, 
 
 3 S. W. 346; Elliott Evidence, § 3006. 52 Tex. Cr. 133, 105 S. W. 785; State 
 
 *' Cheesum v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) v. Oldham, 200 Mo. 538, 98 S. W. 497 1 
 
 332, 44 Am. Dec. 771. See Moore v. Elliott Evidence, § 3009. 
 
 State, 97 Ga. 759, 25 S. E. 362. See ^ State v. Hoyle, 98 Minn. 254, 107 
 
 ante, § 72. N. W. 11 30. 
 
 *^ Commonwealth v. Baker, 155 *^ Groves v. State, 123 Ga. 570, 51 S. 
 
 Mass. 287, 29 N. E. 512. E. 627. 
 
 ^'Cox v. State, 95 Ga. 502, 20 S. E. ""Lettz v. State (Tex., 1893), 21 S. 
 
 269; Commonwealth v. Blankinship, W. 371; Harman v. State (Tex.), 22 
 
 165 Mass. 40, 42 N. E. 115; State v. S. W. 1038; Wren v. State, 70 Ala. i, 
 
 Metcalf, 2 Mo. App. 1269; Copeland 4; Nelson v. United States, 28 App. 
 
 V. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 576, 38 S. W. D. C. 32; Robbins v. People, 95 IH- 
 
 189; Coleman v. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 175, 178; Commonwealth v. Clancy,
 
 ■J-Jl CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 475 
 
 or supervision may not be enough to sustain a con\-iction of keep- 
 ing, for the offense is continuous.*" Nor can the fact that the 
 house where gambhng was going on was owned or conducted by 
 the accused be proved by the declarations of third persons whicli 
 are hearsay merely."** Under a statute prohibiting gcnerallv the 
 keeping of gambling houses, the particular game which was played 
 need not be alleged/'' or proved."'*' The reputation of those who 
 frequent a particular house, including the defendant, as being 
 gamblers, may always be shown. "'^ Under a prosecution for being 
 a common gambler, it may be shown that the defendant visited 
 the house named in the indictment and then, to show he did so 
 for the purpose of gaming, his visits to other gaming houses may 
 be shown. •"'- 
 
 A charge of frequenting gaming houses is not sustained by 
 showing that the defendant was in such a place on one occasion 
 only."" So in order to sustain a conviction for leasing premises 
 
 154 Alass. 128, 27 X. E. looi ; Hamil- 
 ton V. State. 75 Ind. 586, 591 ; Ford v. 
 State, 86 Miss. 123, 38 So. 229 ; Groves 
 V. State, 123 Ga. 570, 51 S. E. 627; 
 State v. Mathis, 206 Mo. 604, 105 S. 
 W. 604, 121 Ain. St. 687n. 
 
 *' United States v. Smith, 4 Cranch 
 C. C. (U. S.) 659, 27 Fed. Cas. 16329; 
 Jessup V. State, 14 Ind. App. 230, 42 
 X. E. 948. Contra, State v. Crogan, 8 
 Iowa 523, 524; Bryan v. State, 120 
 Ga. 201, 47 S. E.- 574; Xelson v. 
 United States, 28 App. D. C. 32. 
 
 " Machen v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 115, 
 109 S. W. 126. 
 
 *' State V. Dole, 3 Black f. (Ind.) 
 294. 
 
 "'When alleged it must be strictly 
 proved. Dudncy v. State, 22 Ark. 251, 
 252. The same rule is applicable 
 where the statute forbids the playing 
 of games specified and the games arc 
 expressly mentioned in the indict- 
 ment. Webb V. Slate, 17 Tex. App. 
 205. 
 
 " State V. Mosby, 53 Mo. App. 571, 
 577; Bashinski v. State, 122 Ga. 164, 
 
 50 S. E. 54; State v. Behan, 113 La. 
 701, 37 So. 607. 
 
 '" Courtney v. State, 5 Ind. App. 356, 
 367, 32 X. E. 335 ; White v. State, 127 
 Ga. 273, 56 S. E. 425. 
 
 "Green v. State, 109 Ind. 175, 176, 
 9 X. E. 781 ; DeHaven v. State, 2 Ind. 
 App. 376, 380, 28 X. E. 562. § 2128, 
 Burns' R. S. 1908, of Indiana, pro- 
 vides that it shall be sufficient evidence 
 that a room or house was rented for 
 gaming, if gaming is carried on to the 
 knowledge of the owner or under 
 such circumstances that he has good 
 reason to believe his property is so 
 used. Any evidence is relevant to 
 show the use of the room, and the 
 owner's knowledge, as, for example, 
 the general reputation of the room, 
 the fact that the lessee had been con- 
 victed of gambling, and that the lessor 
 resided near by. It need not be shown 
 that there was any specific agreement 
 as to the use of the room. Voght 
 V. State, 124 Ind. 358, 362, 24 N. E. 
 680; iMshcr V. State. 2 Ind. .\pp. 365. 
 3C9, 28 X. E. 565.
 
 § 476 CRIMIXAL EVIDEXCE. 776 
 
 for gambling purposes it must always l)c ])rove(l beyond a reason- 
 able (loul)t that at the date that the landlord executed the lease 
 he actually knew that the premises were to be used for gambling 
 purposes.^* 
 
 § 476. Presumptions and burden of proof. — The owner of a house 
 is not presumed, as matter of law, to know tliat gambling is 
 carried on there. His knowledge must l)e shown.''"' But the occu- 
 pant of a house or room is conclusively presumed to know' while 
 he occupies it that gambling is going pn therein,'^'' though not 
 subsequently.'''" 
 
 The burden of proof is always on the state to show' beyond a 
 reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, the essen- 
 tial elements of the offense,"'- including the want of consent, 
 where a statute makes it a misdemeanor to permit a minor to play 
 without his guardian's consent.^" Under a statute making it a 
 misdemeanor for one to visit a gambling house, it is not necessary 
 to prove or to allege one went there to gamble, though if the 
 accused had a legitimate reason for visiting the house the burden 
 is on him to show it."^" 
 
 § 477. Gambling instruments as evidence. — On a trial for keep- 
 ing a gambling house, implements employed in playing illegal 
 games are always admissible, if found in his possession or prop- 
 erly identified and connected with the accused.*'^ Sometimes the 
 police are authorized by statute to seize articles which may be 
 
 " Flynn v. People, 123 111. App. 591. the accused may show that he used 
 
 ■^Harris v. State, 5 Tex. 11. care to ascertain the age of the player, 
 
 ** Robinson v. State, 24 Tex. 152. and for this purpose may introduce in 
 
 " Barnaby v. State, 106 Ind. 539, evidence facts descriptive of his per- 
 
 543, 7 N- E. 231. sonal appearance and his replies to 
 
 °*Rodifer v. State, 74 Ind. 21, 23; questions put to him. Stern v. State, 
 
 Fleming v. State, 125 Ga. 17, 53 S. E. 53 Ga. 229, 21 Am. 266; Goetz v. State, 
 
 579; Abies V. State, 49 Tex. Cr. 292, 41 Ind. 162. 
 
 92 S. W. 414; Herr v. Commonwealth ""State v. Bridgewater, 171 Ind. i, 
 
 (Ky.), 91 S. W. 666, 28 Ky. L. 1131; 85 N. E. 715. 
 
 3 Elliott Evidence, § i Am. St. 764. "People v. Sam Lung, 70 Cal. 515, 
 
 ^"Conyers v. State, 50 Ga. 103, 106, 517, 11 Pac. 673; State v. Harmon, 70 
 
 107, 15 Am. 1686. Under an indict- Kan. 476, 78 Pac. 805; Elliott Evi- 
 
 ment for permitting a minor to play dence, § 3005. 
 
 without the consent of his guardian.
 
 -■J- CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 478 
 
 used for gambling purposes, as tables, cards, etc.''- \\1iile they 
 cannot be confiscated or destroyed without due notice to their 
 owner and an opportunity for him to be heard and to prove their 
 lawful character in judicial proceedings,"" the summary methods 
 by which the prosecution has acquired them does not prevent their 
 use as evidence upon the grounds that the accused is protected by 
 constitutional provisions from being compelled to furnish evi- 
 dence against himself."* And a statute which makes the possession 
 of certain gambling instruments presumptive evidence of an un- 
 lawful possession contrary to the statute is constitutional and 
 simply prescribes a rule of evidence. *^^ 
 
 ii 478. Mailing obscene literature, etc. — It is provided by stat- 
 ute'''' that all printed matter which is obscene in its character, and 
 everything" which is designed to pre\'ent conception or procure 
 an abortion, or for any immoral or indecent purpose, with all 
 advertisements giving information where such printed matter 
 may be obtained, are not mailable, and the act of mailing them is 
 punishable. To sustain a conviction under this statute the follow- 
 ing facts must be proved : First, that the article or printed matter 
 was obscene or intended for an immoral use."" Second, that the 
 defendant was cognizant of the fact. Third, that he or his agent 
 
 "" Ridgeway v. West, 60 Ind. 371 ; 
 Commonwealth v. Gaming Imple- 
 ments, 119 Mass. 332. 
 
 •^ State V. Robbins, 124 Ind. 308, 24 
 X. E. 978, 8 L. R. A. 438; Lowry v. 
 Rainwater, 70 Mo. 152, 35 Am. 420. 
 
 ■^ Commonwealth v. Smith, 166 
 Mass. 370, 44 N. E. 503; State v. 
 Pomcroy, 130 Mo. 489, 32 S. W. 1002. 
 
 "^People V. Adams, 176 X. Y. 351, 
 68 X. E. 6.36. 98 Am. St. 67511, 63 L. 
 R. A. 406, aff'g 85 App. Div. (X. Y.) 
 390. 83 X. Y. S. 481. 
 
 -U. S. R. S. § 3893 ^U. S. Comp. 
 St. 1901, p. 2658). 
 
 '' Hanson v. United States, 157 Fed. 
 749. 85 C. C. A. 325. The obscenity 
 of a writing, ox the intention with 
 whirh it is to Ik- used, is a question 
 
 for the jury on all the evidence. The 
 court may instruct as to the meaning 
 of the words used. Dunlop v. United 
 States, 165 U. S. 486, 41 L. ed. 799. 17 
 Sup. Ct. 375 ; Swearingen v. United 
 States, 161 U. S. 446, 40 L. ed. 765. 16 
 Sup. Ct. 562; United States v. Davis. 
 38 Fed. 326, 328; Rosen v. United 
 States, 161 U. S. 29, 40 L. ed. 606, 16 
 S. Ct. 434. The test of obscenity is 
 the tendency to corrupt or deprave the 
 minds of those who are open to such 
 influences. Macl'adden v. Ignited 
 States, 165 F'ed. 51. 91 C. C. .\. S(). 
 The newspaper or other printed mat- 
 ter which is allegetl to be obscene may 
 be admitted in evidence. Dunlop v. 
 United Stales. 165 U. S. 486, 41 L. ed. 
 79^;, 17 Sup. Ct. 375.
 
 ^ 479 CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 778 
 
 deposited in tlie mail,'"'"' or that it was deposited in ihc mail as 
 a natural consequence of some intentional act by the accused."" 
 The gist of the crime is the mailing. If this be not shown, evi- 
 dence that the defendant wrote the article is irrelevant.'" 
 
 If upon an examination of a book it is apparent upon the whole 
 that its contents are calculated to deprave the morals of the 
 reader by exciting sexual desires and licentious thoughts, it is 
 obscene under the statute. This is a question for the court to 
 determine as it is usually held upon the language of the book, 
 though in some cases the question of obscenity has been permitted 
 to go to the jury under proper instructions. It has been held that 
 evidence to show that the information conveyed by the book 
 is accurate and scientific, that such information tends to prevent 
 disease by dispelling ignorance on such topics, and that the book 
 would be of value to men in the medical profession and to per- 
 sons in the marriage relation was irrelevant."^ 
 
 § 479. Evidence obtained by decoy letters. — From the very neces- 
 sity of the case, evidence obtained by the use of decoy letters is 
 received. The deceit and underhand methods employed do not, in 
 law, discredit such testimony, though of course these may be 
 sho\vn to enable the jur}^ to ascertain the motives prompting the 
 prosecution.'" The action of agents of the postofiice department 
 
 *' United States v. Clark, 2)7 Fed. ''• Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 2 
 
 106, 108; United States v. Bebout, 28 N. E. 808. If, however, it appears 
 
 Fed. 522, 523. The government may, that he mailed it, evidence to show 
 
 to prove the mailing, give evidence that he also wrote it is relevant to 
 
 showing the i:sual course of business show guilty knowledge. The fact that 
 
 in the post-oflfice and the methods used he wrote it may be shown by any of 
 
 in collecting and distributing the mail, the methods employed in proving 
 
 So it may be shown that on the same handwriting. United States v. Ma- 
 
 daj' that a certain newspaper was thias, 36 Fed. 892. As to proof of 
 
 mailed which is proved or admitted to handwriting, see Underbill on Ev., 
 
 have been received, other copies of the §§ 131-141, pp. 185-205. 
 
 same newspaper were mailed which " Burton v. United States, 142 Fed. 
 
 have not been shown to have been 57, ^2) C. C. A. 243. 
 
 received. Dunlop v. United States, "- United States v. Whittier, 5 Dill. 
 
 165 U. S. 486, 41 L. ed. 799, 17 Sup. C. C. (U. S.) 35, 39, 45, 28 Fed. Cas. 
 
 Ct. 375. 16688; United States v. Wightman, 29 
 
 ''' Demolli v. United States, 144 Fed. Fed. 636; United States v. Slenker, 32 
 
 363, 75 C. C. A. 365, 6 L. R. A. (N. Fed. 6qi ; United States v. Bott, 11 
 
 S.) 424n. Blatchf. C. C. (U. S.) 346, 24 Fed.
 
 779 CRIMES AGAIXST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE. HEALTH. § 480 
 
 in writing decoy letters by which the accused is led to commit a 
 criminal act does not make the agents parties to the offense so as 
 to render their testimony subject to the rule relating to accom- 
 plices.'^ 
 
 Sealed mail matter cannot legally be opened except bv the 
 addressee. It it is sought to discover whether a package con- 
 tains obscene articles or writings, a search warrant must be pro- 
 cured.'* When the matter inclosed is admitted in evidence, the 
 wrapper or envelope should also be recei\ed as a part of the res 
 gcstcc to show how it reached the party addressed."^ 
 
 If the meaning of the language of an alleged obscene writing 
 is not clear to the casual reader, parol evidence is admissible 
 to show that it was intended to give, and, in fact, does give, in- 
 formation regarding obscene literature.'^'' 
 
 § 480. Adulteration of food, drugs, etc. — Bv the common law. 
 and also frequently by statute, the mingling of unwholesome 
 ingredients with food, or the selling or offering for sale of 
 adulterated or impure articles of food is a misdemeanor. A 
 criminal intent need not be proved under a statute making the 
 mere act of selling food adulterated below a certain standard 
 a misdemeanor." Xor need it be shown that the accused knew 
 
 Cas. 14626 ; Bates v. United States, 10 their duties, the accused is not entitled 
 
 Fed. 92, 97, 100; Price v. United an instruction that, as a rule of law. 
 
 States, 165 U. S. 311. 41 L. cd. 727, the presumption of innocence is to be 
 
 I- Sup. Ct. 366; Goode V. United given greater weight than the prc- 
 
 States, 159 U. S. 663, 40 L. ed. 297, 16 sumption of the proper performance 
 
 S. Ct. 136. For other cases bearing of dut3^ Dunlop v. United States, 165 
 
 on the general principles of evidence U. S. 486, 41 L. ed. 799, 17 Sup. Ct. 
 
 obtained by artifice, see Underbill on 375. 
 
 Fvidcnce. § 127, p. 177. Evidence of other crimes to show 
 
 ■" Shepard v. United States, 160 Fed. intent, 62 L. R. A. 239. 
 
 584. 87 C. C. A. 486. ■" People v. Kibler, 106 N. Y. 321, 12 
 
 '* Jackson, Ex parte, 96 U. S. 727, 24 X. K. 795; Commonwealth v. Wheeler 
 
 L. ed. 877. (Mass.. i9io).9i X. K. 415. A statute 
 
 " United States v. Xoclke, 17 making proof of sale and false repre- 
 
 I'.latchf. C. C. (U. S.) 554. sentation presumptive evidence of 
 
 ■'United States v. Grimm, 50 Fed. guilt is constitutional. .And such 
 
 528. Where the fact of the delivery an inference of guilt, when cre- 
 
 of obscene printed matter rests for ated, cannot be overcome by proof 
 
 proof largely upon the presumption of of actual ignorance and abst-nce of .11 1 
 
 law that public officials in the post- intent to deceive. "Whether or not 
 
 office department properly performed the seller knows his representations to
 
 48 1 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 780 
 
 of the adulteration, unless the statute ex])ressly requires him to 
 know of it."'' If by statute it is essential that the accused should 
 know of the adulterated condition of the article, it must be 
 proved.'-' If actual adulteration is proved it may be presumed 
 to have been done for a fraudulent purpose, particularly if the 
 article sold was, either expressly or by implication of law (as is 
 the case in the sale of provisions), represented to be adulterated 
 or of standard quality.-" When the crime is alleged with extreme 
 particularity, it must be proved as laid.^^ Thus, evidence that the 
 accused had impure milk in his possession, or that he brought it 
 to market, will not sustain an indictment for selling it or expos- 
 ing it for sale.''" 
 
 i? 481. Evidence furnished by analysis. — The evidence contained 
 in a certificate of a milk inspector,'''' or that resulting from a test 
 made with a lactometer, while not irrebutable or conclusive of the 
 guilt of the accused'-'* charged with selling watered milk, is always 
 
 be false, or intends to deceive, is im- 
 material. He subjects himself to the 
 penalties of the statute by making the 
 representation, not knowing it to be 
 true." People v. Mahaney, 41 Hun 
 (N. Y.) 26. See Elliott Evidence, 
 § 3165. 
 
 '* Commonwealth v. Evans, 132 
 Mass. 1 1 ; Commonwealth v. Vieth, 
 155 Mass. 442, 29 N. E. 577; Bissman 
 V. State, 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. 714; Myer 
 V. State, ID Ohio Cir. Ct. 226; State v. 
 Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 335, 38 S. W. 
 317; Chicago V. Bowman Dairy Co., 
 234 111. 294, 84 N. E. 913, T23 Am. 
 St. 100, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 684. 
 The courts will take notice of scien- 
 tific facts of an elementary char- 
 acter, and of the meaning of words. 
 The nature and quality of various ar- 
 ticles of food in common use, as but- 
 ter, milk, bread and the like, need not 
 be shown. It is otherwise with drugs 
 and substances not in ordinary use. 
 State V. Hutchinson, 56 Ohio St. 82, 
 46 N. E. 71. 
 
 ™Cantee v. State (Tex., 1889), 10 S. 
 
 W. 757. Such knowledge will not be 
 presumed from the fact of possession 
 alone. Sanchez v. State, 27 Tex. App. 
 14, 10 S. W. 756. Evidence that de- 
 fendant was seen on a wagon, contain- 
 ing cans of milk, that his name was 
 painted on the wagon, and that he 
 gave samples of milk taken from the 
 cans to the inspector, is relevant to 
 show that he had adulterated milk in 
 his possession. Commonwealth v. 
 Rowell, 146 Mass. 128, 15 N. E. 154. 
 The possession of a servant is the pos- 
 session of his master. Commonwealth 
 V. Proctor, 165 Mass. 38, 42 N. E. 335. 
 
 "" People V. West, 106 N. Y. 293, 12 
 N. E. 610, 60 Am. 452 ; State v. Hutch- 
 inson, 55 Ohio St. 573, 45 N. E. 1043. 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Luscomb, 130 
 Mass. 42. 
 
 ^ Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y. 65. 
 See also, People v. Wright, 19 Misc. 
 (N. Y.) 13s, 43 N. Y. S. 290. 
 
 *^ Commonwealth v. Waite, 1 1 Allen 
 (Mass.) 264, 87 Am. Dec. 711. 
 
 ** People V. Salisbury, 2 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 39, 37 N. Y. S. 420. As to
 
 /Si crimes agaixst public policy, peace, health. § 481 
 
 relevant/'' if it appears that the test was not too remote in point 
 of time from the violation complained of. The defendant may 
 introduce evidence to discredit the results of an analysis made by 
 an official. He may show that there has been no physical inter- 
 ference with the milk since it was taken from the cows,"'' that the 
 chemist was inefficient or inexperienced, that the test was made 
 inaccurately,^' or under unfair conditions, as when the sample 
 taken does not fairly represent the article whose quality is in 
 question. ^'^ 
 
 The facts ascertained by a test or analysis may by statute be 
 made conclusive. Such a statute is not unconstitutional as depriv- 
 ing one of liberty or property without due process of law pro- 
 vided it is also enacted that the accused, as well as the prosecu- 
 tion may ofter in evidence the result of an analysis. ^'^ In the 
 absence of express provision a statutory mode of procuring a 
 sample by a food inspector is not exclusive. In Xew York the 
 statute provides that the accused shall be furnished with a sample 
 of the milk taken by the inspector which shall be placed in a 
 sealed jar and given to the person who delivers the adulterated 
 milk. The question whether the sample given by the inspector 
 fairly represents the milk is for the jury on all the facts. "° The 
 e\-idence against the prisoner arising from an analysis of a sample 
 cannot be rejected because the sample was obtained by purchase 
 rather than by a taking under the statute."^ A food inspector is 
 
 skimincd milk, see People v. Kostcr, cused may prove that some statutory 
 
 121 App. Div. (N. Y.) 852, 106 X. Y. requirement, as delivering- to him a 
 
 S. 793. sealed bottle containing a duplicate 
 
 " It may be dispensed with and sample of the article, has not been 
 
 adulteration otherwise proved. Cope- complied with. Commonwealth v. 
 
 land V. Boston Dairy Co., 189 Mass. Lockhardt, 144 Mass. 132, 10 N. E. 
 
 342. 75 X. E. 704; Commonwealth v. 511. 
 
 Nichols. 10 Allen (Mass.) 199. See *" People v. Cipperly. lOi N. Y. 634. 
 
 as to analysis of oleomargarine, Peo- 4 N. E. 107; following People v. 
 
 pie v. Wahlc, 124 App. Div. (N. Y.) Eddy, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 615. 12 N. Y. 
 
 762, 109 \. Y. S. 629. S. 628. Compare St. Louis v. Bip- 
 
 *" People V. Salisbury, 2 ;\pp. Div. pen, 201 Mo. 528, 100 S. VV. 1048. 
 
 (N. Y.) 39, i7 N. Y. S. 420. •" People v. Weaver, 116 App. Div. 
 
 "State v. Groves. 15 R. I. 208. (N. Y.) 594, loi N. Y. S. 961. 
 
 "People V. Hodnctt, 68 llun (N. "'Commonwealth v. Coleman, 157 
 
 Y.) 34r, 22 N. Y. S. 809. The ac- Mass. 460, 32 N'- I'-- 662.
 
 § 4^2 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 782 
 
 not the only proper witness to prove adulteration. Any person 
 having competent knowledge may testify."" 
 
 §482. Keeping disorderly house. — A disorderly house is one 
 where lewd, drunken, idle and dissolute persons resort ; or whose 
 inmates behave themselves so badly that it is a nuisance to the 
 neighbors;"^ as a bawdy house, gambling house,"* or liquor 
 saloon carried on so as to violate the law,"' or any habitation 
 which is obnoxious by reason of the habitual disturbance, noise 
 or violent conduct which prevails there. Proof that a house was 
 resorted to by persons for the purpose of prostitution is, at com- 
 mon law, sufHcient to sustain the charge of keeping a disorderly 
 house."® It is not usually necessary to show that the house was 
 kept for gain. And specific acts of immorality committed else- 
 where by persons who frequent the house are admissible to estab- 
 lish the reputation of such persons."^ The evidence of those who 
 have gone to the house for such purpose is always competent, 
 though not indispensable, for any witness having a knowledge of 
 the circumstances may relate what he knows. And the commission 
 of an act of prostitution may be inferred from circumstances that 
 would ordinarily justify an inference of sexual intercourse in 
 a trial for adultery or fornication."^ Direct evidence is not neces- 
 sary."" 
 
 "'Commonwealth v. Spear, 143 States, 155 Fed. 50, 83 C. C. A. 646; 
 
 Mass. 172, 9 X. E. 632; People v. Hall v. United States, 155 Fed. 52, 84 
 
 Bailey, 120 N. Y. S. 618; People v. C. C. A. 215. 
 
 Jones, 195 N. Y. 547, 88 N. E. 1127; °*Arenz v. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. 
 
 State V. Martin (N. J., 1909), 73 Atl. -7^7, 102 S. W. 238, 31 Ky. L. 321. 
 
 548. It need not be shown that "^People v. Eckman, dz Hun (N. 
 
 imitation butter or any adulter- Y.) 209, 18 N. Y. S. 654. 
 
 ated article was calculated to de- ^^ Cornmonwealth v. Goodall, 165 
 
 ceive the particular person who Mass. 588, 43 N. E. 520; State v. 
 
 bought it, if it appears that it was an Young, 96 Iowa 262, 65 N. W. 160, 59 
 
 intentional imitation and calculated to Am. St. 371 ; State v. Wilson, 124 
 
 deceive some person. People v. Ar- Iowa 264, 99 N. W. 1060, 4 L. R. A. 
 
 ensberg, 105 N. Y. 123, 11 N. E. 277, 676n. 
 
 59 Am. 483. '■" State v. Baans (N. J. L.), 71 All. 
 
 "^Cahn V. State, no Ala. 56, 20 So. in. 
 
 380; Price V. State, 96 Ala. i, n So. "* State v. Price, ns ]\Io. App. 656, 
 
 128; People V. Jones, 129 App. Div. 92 S. W. 174. 
 
 (N. Y.) 772, \\z N. Y. S. 1097; Arenz ""State v. Steen, 125 Iowa 307, loi 
 
 V. Commonwealth, 125 Ky. Tn, T02 S. N. W. 96. 
 W. 238, 31 Ky. L. 321 ; Botts v. United
 
 /St, crimes against public policy, peace, health. § 4S2 
 
 In a prosecution for keeping a house of ill fame, evidence that 
 some of the inmates were women of ill fame or reputed to b^ 
 common prostitutes is admissible^"*' to prove that the accused 
 knew the character of the house, and it seems that the character 
 of the house may be inferred from tlie reputation of those who 
 resort there without direct proof of disorderly acts or proof of 
 a knowledge by the defendant of the purpose of their coming/ 
 
 In a prosecution for keeping a disorderly house the character 
 of the house may be proved by showing its general reputation 
 in the community." A statute which provides for the introduction 
 in evidence of the general reputation of a house is not unconsti- 
 tutional."^ 
 
 The reputation of the house as given in evidence may extend 
 for two or three years prior to the earliest date alleged in the 
 indictment provided it was during that time occupied by the 
 accused f but proof that the premises mentioned in the indictment 
 had possessed for several years past the reputation of being a 
 disorderly house will not alone be sufficient to warrant a convic- 
 tion for there must be some evidence aside from reputation which 
 corroborates the proof of reputation, and this may be either direct 
 or circumstantial.* A statute providing that the character of the 
 
 ^""People V. Russell, no Mich. 46, = Sprague v. State (Tex. Cr. 1898), 
 
 67 N. W. 1099; State v. Plant, 67 Vt. 44 S. W. 837; State v. Steen, 125 Iowa 
 
 454, 32 Atl. 237, 48 Am. St. 821 ; State 307, lOi N. W. 96; Wimberly v. State, 
 
 V. Bresland, 59 Minn. 281, 61 N. W. 53 Tex. Cr. 11, 108 S. W. 384; Ma- 
 
 450, 20 L. R. A. 612; State v. Steen, chen v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 115, 109 S. 
 
 125 Iowa 307, loi N. W. 96; Brown v. W. 126; McConnell v. State, 2 Ga. 
 
 State (Tex. Cr. 1898), 48 S. W. 176; App. 44S, SS S. E. 546; Owens v. 
 
 State V. Price, 115 Mo. App. 656, 92 State, 53 Tex. Cr. i, 108 S. W. 379; 
 
 S. W. 174. Moore v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. 559, no 
 
 ^ Weideman v. State, 4 Ind. App. S. W. 911 ; State v. Anderson (Conn., 
 
 397. 30 N. E. 920. C/. People V. Rus- 1909), 75 .Atl. 81; Lismore v. State 
 
 sell, no Mich. 46, 67 N. W. 1099; Cal- (Ark., 1910), 126 N. W. 853. 
 
 laKhan v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 536, 38 "a State v. Wilson, 124 Iowa 264, 99 
 
 S. W. 188; State V. Olds, 217 Mo. 305, N. W. 1060. 
 
 116 .S. W. 1080; State V. Price, 115 ' Sprauue v. State (Tex. Cr. 1898), 
 
 Mo. App. 656,92 S. W. 174; Beard v. 44 S. W 837; Frazier v. State, 47 
 
 State. 71 Md. 275, 17 All. 1044, 17 Am. Tex. Cr. 24, 81 S. W. 5.32: People v. 
 
 St. 536, 4 L. R. A. 67Sn; Hcnson v. Wheeler, 142 Mich. 212, 105 X. W. 
 
 State, 62 M<1. 230, 50 Am. 204n ; Her- 607, 12 Det. Loj,'. N. 684. 
 
 zinRcr v. State, 70 Md. 278, 17 Atl. * Botts v. United States, 155 Fed. 
 
 81: State V. Kelly. 76 N. J. L. 57O, 70 50, 83 C. C A. 646; Hall v. United 
 
 \tl. 342. States, 155 Fed. 5-'. 84 C. C. A. 215;
 
 § 483 CRIMIXAL EVIDENCE. 784 
 
 house as a disorderly house ma}- he i)ro\-cd hy reputation is cuniu- 
 lati\e and does not exckide evidence of facts and circumstances 
 which may prove the character of the house independently of 
 reputation. Any evidence tending to show what business was 
 carried on in the house, and in what manner, the situation of and 
 furniture in the rooms, the character of persons who went there, 
 how and when they made their visits, what they did at the house, 
 the purpose of their visits and similar facts is admissible. It may 
 be shown that liquor was sold at the house, that prostitution was 
 indulged in and that men came to the house at all hours of the 
 night in cabs and otherwise."' Evidence is always relevant which 
 tends to show the disorderly, lewd," or boisterous^ actions of the 
 occupants, inmates and frequenters of the house; and the noise 
 and uproar which were observed to proceed therefrom. The char- 
 acter of the house, and the purpose for which it is used, are ques- 
 tions for the jury.® 
 
 A person may be convicted of keeping ° a disorderly house, 
 though no direct evidence was offered to show he was a lessee or 
 tenant ^° or that he had power to suppress the disorder ; or that he 
 took part therein. Whether the bad character of the defendant 
 for chastity is admissible, depends largely upon the purpose with 
 which the disorderly house is kept. If it is a bawdy house, the 
 previous unchastity of the accused and of the inmates is rele- 
 vant, ^^ otherwise not. ^- 
 
 § 483. Dueling — Sending a challenge to fight a duel. — The act of 
 
 participating in a duel, either as a i)rincipal. second or spectator 
 
 JilcConnell v. State, 2 Ga. App. 445, * People v. Drum, 127 App. Div. (N. 
 
 58 S. E. 546. Y.) 241, no N. Y. S. 1096. 
 
 '' State V. Cambron, 20 S. Dak. 282, ° State v. Schaffer, 74 Iowa 704, 39 
 
 105 N. W. 241 ; Beard v. State, 71 Md. N. W. 89 ; Griffin v. People, 44 Colo. 
 
 275, 17 Atl. 1044, 17 Am. St. 536, 4 L- 533. 99 Pac. 321. 
 
 R. A. 675 ; Commomvealth v. Cardoze, " Stone v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 575, 85 
 
 1 19 Mass. 210; Sullivan v. State, 75 S. W. 808. 
 
 Wis. 650, 44 N. W. 647 ; State v. Wil- " Betts v. State, 93 Ind. 375 ; Whit- 
 
 liams, 30 N. J. L. 102. lock v. State, 4 Ind. App. 432, 30 N. 
 
 "Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275, 17 Atl. E. 934. 
 
 1044, 17 Am. St. 536, 4 L. R. A. 675n ; ^ Gamel v. State, 21 Tex. App. 357. 
 
 State V. Cambron, 20 S. Dak. 282, 105 17 S. W. 158. No actual lease or 
 
 N. W. 241. rental to disorderly persons need be 
 
 'People V. Jones, 129 App. Div. (N. proved. Stratton v. State (Tex. Cr. 
 
 Y.) 772, 113 N. Y. S. 1097, 1898), 44 S. W. 506, 20 L. R. A. 6ion.
 
 7S5 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 4S4 
 
 is merely a misdemeanor, unless one of the principals is slain, in 
 \vhich case all participants are guilty of murder/-^ Where one is 
 indicted for taking part in a duel, it is not absolutely necessary to 
 allege and prove the actual sending of a challenge, either spoken 
 or written/* If. however, it is alleged that a written challenge 
 was sent, it will be necessary to prove it substantially as alleged, 
 and, a fortiori, this is the case where the indictment is merelv 
 for sending the challenge.^^ The question whether the accused 
 intended to challenge another person to fight a duel is ordinarily 
 a question of fact for the jury/" The written challenge must be 
 proved by producing it as primary evidence, or by secondary 
 evidence, after sufficiently accounting for its absence. If the chal- 
 lenge is set out at full length in the indictment, a failure to prove 
 it in some slight particular is not material.^' The meaning of the 
 writing purporting to be a challenge and the intent of the sender 
 are for the jury. A\'hether it was intended for a deliberate chal- 
 lenge to mortal combat or was merely a foolish and idle boast, or 
 the meaningless outpouring of irrepressible passion, is for them 
 to determine.^- As all who participate in any capacity in the 
 duel are accomplices, the declarations of any one of them, uttered 
 in furtherance of the common undertaking, are admissible against 
 any or all the others.^" 
 
 ;^ 484. Carrying concealed weapons — How concealment may be 
 shown — Intent. — To protect indixiduals against sudden and deadly 
 violence, inflicted with weapons concealed about or conveniently 
 near the person, whether used on sudden impulse or deliberately, 
 statutes have been passed forbidding the carrying of concealed 
 weapons. Though the open carrying of unusual and dangerous 
 weapons was an offense at common law. because it tended to 
 
 "4 Bl. Com. 199, 145; 2 Bisli. Cr. '"Ward v. Commonwealth (Ky.. 
 
 L. 8§ 311-315; I Russ. Cr. (Qtli cdi- 1909), 116 S. W. 786. 
 
 tion) 413; 3 Chitty Cr. Law 728, "State v. Farrier, i Hawks (X. 
 
 848; Bundrick v. State, 125 Ga. 753, Car.) 487. 
 
 54 S. E. 683. " Ivcy V. State, 23 Ga. 576. 
 
 "DauRhtry V. State, 54 Tex. Cr. 394, "State v. Dupont, 2 McCord ( S. 
 
 113 S. W. 14. Car.) 3.34; State v. Taylor. 3 Brcv. 
 
 "'Commonwealth v. Hooper, (S. Car.) 243; Commonwealth v. 
 
 Thatcher C. C. (Mass.) 400; Ward v. Boott, Thatcher Cr. Cas. (Mass.) 390. 
 Commonwealth ( Ky.. hkj*;), wd S. 
 W. 786. 
 
 50 — UNriKRiiii.i. Chim. Rv.
 
 484 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 786 
 
 terrify and alarm peaceable persons,-" evidence is always admis- 
 sible, under these statutes, to show that the weapon, though 
 carried, was not concealed on the occasion charged ;-^ but not that 
 the accused was generally in the habit of carrying weapons on his 
 person, openly exposed to view." The concealment of the 
 weapon, with an intent to produce the impression of being un- 
 armed, must be shown affirmatively.*" 
 
 If concealed, the jury may infer that the weapon, if a pistol, 
 was loaded, and was worn as a weapon. This is a presumption of 
 fact, not of law, and is rebutable."'* The burden is upon the prose- 
 cution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the weapon was 
 concealed or carrying in concealment on the person of the 
 accused.-^ That the weapon was so hidden that it could not pos- 
 sibly be seen, in whatever posture the accused might be, need not 
 be proved. If it was not visible to those meeting him in the 
 customary and ordinary associations of social and commercial 
 intercourse, the jury will be justified in finding that it was con- 
 cealed.-*^ Hence, proof that the weapon was carried in a locked 
 
 ■°4 Bl. Com. 149; State v. Huntlj-, 
 3 Ired. (N. Car.) 418, 421, 40 Am. 
 Dec. 4x6. It is sometimes bj' statute 
 made a misdemeanor to point a fire- 
 arm at another person, whether the 
 weapon be loaded or not. Herrington 
 V. State, 121 Ga. 141, 48 S. E. 908; 
 Elliott Evidence, § 3x66; Davenport v. 
 State, 1x2 Ala. 49. 20 So. 97X ; 
 Sturgeon v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 2>7 
 S. W. 679, 8 Ky. L. 668 ; Anderson v. 
 State, 133 Wis. 601, 1x4 N. W. XX2. 
 
 "^ Stockdale v. State, 32 Ga. 225, 227 ; 
 State V. Roten, 86 X. Car. 70X, 703; 
 Smith V. State, 69 Ind. X40-X43 ; Plum- 
 mer v. State, X35 Ind. 308, 318, 34 N. 
 E. 968; Brown v. State, X4X Ala. 80, 
 Zl So. 408. 
 
 " Washington v. State, 36 Ga. 242, 
 244. 
 
 "State V. Pigford, XX7 N. Car. 748, 
 23 S. E. 182; State v. Gilbert, 87 N. 
 Car. 527, 528, 42 Am. 5x8; Ridenour 
 V. State, 65 Ind. 4xx, 4x3; Burst v. 
 State, 89 Ind. IZZ', Carr v. State, 34 
 
 Ark. 448, 450, 36 Am. X5; State v. 
 Johnson, x6 S. Car. X87; Martin v. 
 State, 93 Miss. 764, 47 So. 426; State 
 v. Miles, X24 Mo. App. 283, lox S. W. 
 67X ; Edwards v. State, 126 Ga. 89, 54 
 S. E. 809. 
 
 -* Carr v. State, 34 Ark. 448, 450, 36 
 Am. X5. 
 
 "^ People V. Carvelto, 12.2, App. Div. 
 (X. Y.) 822, X08 X. Y. S. 126; 
 Schroeder v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. xii, 99 
 S. W. 1003. 
 
 =^ Smith V. State, 96 Ala. 66, 68, ix 
 So. 71 ; State v. Bias, zi La. Ann. 
 259; Killct V. State, 2)'2' Ga. 292, 294; 
 Sutton V. State, 12 Fla. 135; Hainey 
 V. State, X47 Ala. 146, 41 ' So. 968. 
 Under the rule that as between wit- 
 nesses having equal opportunities of 
 observation, the positive testimony of 
 one that "an event happened is en- 
 titled to more weight than the evi- 
 dence of another that, though present, 
 he did not see it; a conviction upon 
 the testimonv of one who swears he
 
 y'B^'J CRIMES AGAIXST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 484 
 
 satchel,"' in a wagon box on which the defendant was seated,-^ 
 in a bundle,"^ in the pocket,"''" in a scabbard, ^^ in a basket on one's 
 arm,^- or standing near by in a railroad car,^^ not as a means of 
 transportation, but for more convenient access and use, is admis- 
 sible, and will sustain a conviction.^* Evidence that the defendant, 
 when arrested for another offense which is not proved, voluntarily- 
 surrendered a weapon, is admissible as a ^«a^i-confession of 
 concealment, and will alone sustain a conviction.^^ Evidence that 
 he threatened a man with a weapon, or had one in his possession 
 shortly before the act charged, is admissible.^*' 
 
 The accused may show that the concealment involved no crim- 
 inal intent. He will not usually be permitted to testify in express 
 
 saw the weapon will be sustained, 
 though another swears he looked at- 
 tentively but did not. Fitzgerald v. 
 State, 12 Ga. 213, 216; but contra, 
 Haskew v. State, 7 Tex. App. 107; 
 Underbill on Ev., § 385. As to what 
 evidence is negative, see Hunter y. 
 State, 4 Ga. App. 761, 62 S. E. 466. 
 The jury may, in weighing the testi- 
 mony of a witness who says that he 
 did not see the weapon, consider what 
 opportunity he had to see it in con- 
 nection with all the evidence. Newell 
 V. State, 109 Ala. 5, 19 So. 511. Cf., 
 also, Howe v. State, no Ala. 54, 20 
 So. 451. The witness will be permitted 
 to state that he saw "something that 
 looked like a pistol" in the pocket of 
 defendant. Mayberry v. State, 107 
 Ala. 64, 18 So. 219. 
 
 ^ Warren v. State, 94 Ala. 79, 10 
 So. 838; Commonwealth v. Sturgeon 
 (Ky.), 37 S. W. 680, 18 Ky. L. 613. 
 
 ™ Barnes v. State, 89 Ga. 316, 318, 15 
 S. E. 313. 
 
 '■* Edwards v. State, 126 Ga. 89, 54 
 S. E. 809. 
 
 ""Scott v. State, 94 Ala. 80, 8r, 10 
 So. 505. Ha weapon was seen in the 
 defendant's hand a few minutes after 
 he had made a manual motion 
 
 towards his pocket, concealment in the 
 pocket may be inferred. State v. Live- 
 say, 30 J\Io. App. 622, 636. 
 
 ^Barton v. State, 7 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 105; Williams v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 27 S. W. 680, 18 Ky. L. 663. 
 
 "^ Boles v. State, %6 Ga. 255, 257, 12 
 S. E. 361; Johnson v. State, 51 Tex. 
 Cr. 648, 104 S. W. 902. 
 
 ^'Diffey v. State, 86 Ala. 66, 67, 5 
 So. 576. 
 
 ^ State V. McManus, 89 X. Car. 555. 
 
 ^ Terry v. State, 90 Ala. 635, 636, 8 
 So. 664. A person imder arrest for 
 any crime may be searched for con- 
 cealed weapons and disarmed. The 
 facts thus ascertained may be proved 
 against him on his trial for carrying 
 such weap'ons, and may be sufficient 
 for his conviction. His constitutional 
 rights are not infringed thereby, nor 
 is he required to furnish evidence 
 against himself. Chastang v. State, 83 
 Ala. 29, 30, 3 So. 304; Springer v. 
 State, 121 Ga. 155, 48 S. E. 907; 
 Shields v. State, 104 Ala. 35, 16 So. 
 8s, ST, Am. St. 17. 
 
 '"O'Neal v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 42, 
 44, 22 S. W. 25 ; Dean v. State, 98 
 Ala. 71, 13 So. 318; Etress v. State, 
 88 Ala. 191, 7 So. 49.
 
 485 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 788 
 
 terms that he did not intend to carry the weapon.^'' He mav prove 
 that the weapon was not concealed or carried as arms,^^ but for 
 the purpose of having it cleaned,"'' or repaired,*" or returning it to 
 its owner,*^ or shooting at a mark,*- or that he had found it," 
 or bought it to sell again,** and was carrying it home, to negative 
 the criminal intent.*^ 
 
 § 485. Apprehension of danger as a defense. — The burden is on 
 the defendant to prove, as an affirmative defense, that he feared 
 bodily harm,*" but it is not enough for him to show apparent or 
 simulated threats, or those couched in vague and general lan- 
 guage,*" or made by a person who is under bonds to keep the 
 peace,*^ or that a criminal, whom the defendant arrested, was 
 
 ^ State V. Simmons, 143 N. Car. 613, 
 56 S. E. 701. 
 
 ^Page V. State, 3 Heisk. (Temi.) 
 ipSn, holding, also, that proof of a 
 single act of carrying a weapon will 
 sustain a conviction. 
 
 ^Boissean v. State, (Tex., 1890), 15 
 S. W. it8. 
 
 *" Pressler v. State, 19 Tex. App. 52, 
 53 Am. 383 ; Fitzgerald v. State, 52 
 Tex. Cr. 265, 106 S. W. 365, 124 Am. 
 St. 1095. 
 
 " State V. Brodnax, 91 X. Car. 543, 
 544; State V. Roberts, 39 Mo. App. 
 47, 48. 
 
 ■*- State V. Murray, 39 Mo. App. 127, 
 130. 
 
 ^^Mangum v. State, 15 Tex. App. 
 362, 363. 
 
 "State V. Gilbert, 87 X. Car. 527, 
 529, 42 Am. 518; Irvin v. State, 51 
 Tex. Cr. 52, 100 S. W. 779. 
 
 ■"* State V. Harrison, 93 X. Car. 605 ; 
 Granger v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. 488, 98 
 S. W. 836; Carr v. State, 34 Ark. 448, 
 450, 36 Am. 15; State v. Chippey, 9 
 Houst. (Del.) 583; Christian v. State, 
 37 Tex. 475 ; but contra, Cutsinger v. 
 Commonwealth, 7 Bush (Kj^.) 392, 
 393; State V. Martin, 31 La. Ann. 849; 
 
 Walls V. State, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 572, 
 573 ; Goldsmith v. State, 99 Ga. 253, 25 
 S. E. 624; State v. Woodfin, 87 X. 
 Car. 526, 527, holding the intention in 
 concealment immaterial. 
 
 ^° Skeen v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 308, 30 
 S. W. 554; State v. Livesay, 30 Mo. 
 App. 633, 637 ; Curlee v. State, 53 Tex. 
 Cr. 395, no S. W. 65. 
 
 " Strother v. State, 74 Miss. 447, 21 
 So. 147; State V. Speller, 86 X. Car. 
 697, 699; Coffee V. State, 4 Lea 
 (Tenn.) 245, 246; Shorter v. State, 63 
 Ala. 129, 132. A threat, if recent, 
 though unaccompanied by violence, is 
 admissible if communicated to the ac- 
 cused. State V. Venable, 117 Mo. App. 
 501, 93 S. W. 356; but if enough time 
 has elapsed to give the person threat- 
 ened an opportunity to seek legal pro- 
 tection, it is inadmissible. State v. 
 Workman, 35 W. Va. 367, 375, 14 S. 
 E. 9, 14 L. R. A. 6oon. The accused 
 ought to convince the jury that he in 
 fact believed the threats would be ex- 
 ecuted. State V. Casto, 119 Mo. .^.pp. 
 265, 95 S. W. 961. 
 
 ''O'Xeal V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 42, 
 45, 22 S. W. 25.
 
 789 CRIMES AGAIXST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 486 
 
 known to be armed,''" or that the accused feared a savage dog.^*' 
 Evidence that many lawless men lived near the defendant,^^ 
 that he had been shot at two years before,^- and that he had been 
 advised to go armed, is inadmissible.^^ The fact that the accused 
 \\'as expressly threatened b}' name by an armed man with whom 
 he had quarreled,^* and, a fortiori, that his life is in imminent 
 danger,"^ is enough. He need not prove that an attack was antici- 
 pated by him at any particular date,''"''''' or place,""'" to justify his 
 belief that he is in immediate danger. To establish this defense, 
 the accused must show facts from which the jury may infer that 
 his purpose in carrying a weapon was defense against an attack 
 which he had reason to apprehend. The conduct of the accused 
 and of the prosecuting witness, their altercations and rencontres, 
 specific threats, reported to the defendant as made, though not 
 made in fact, hostile demonstrations or actual preparations for 
 an assault, are all admissible to establish the defense of an appre- 
 hended attack.^' 
 
 ^ 486. Character of the defendant as an officer or traveler. — The 
 peaceable character of the accused is relevant to determine his 
 motives and purpose in carrying the weapon. So it is sometimes 
 provided by statute that he must be acquitted if he shall prove 
 satisfactorily that he is a quiet and peaceable person, of good 
 character in the community, and that he carried the weapon 
 because he believed himself to be in great bodily danger.^'^ The 
 
 "Reach v. State, 94 Ala. 113, 11 So. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 166 Mass. 
 
 414. 17T, 44 X. E. 138. 32 L. R. A. 606. 
 
 "" State V. Barnett, 34 W. Va. 74, 75, '-^ Dooley v. State, 89 Ala. 90, 91, 8 
 
 76, II S. E. 735. So. 528. 
 
 " O'Xeal V. State, 32 Tex. Cr. 42, "Coleman v. State. 28 Tex. App. 
 
 44, 22 S. W. 25. Evidence that lawless 173, 174. 12 S. W. 590. 
 
 men who had once ill used and threat- *"» Sudduth v. State, 70 Miss. 250, 11 
 
 ened the defendant were prowling So. 680. 
 
 about, armed, and without employ- "Bailey v. Commonwealth, 11 Bush 
 
 ment, is relevant. Hardin v. State, 63 (Ky.) 688, 692. 
 
 Ala. 38, 40. "Shorter v. State, 63 Ala. 129, 133, 
 
 "Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 3 citinjj^ Baker v. State, 49 Ala. 350; 
 
 Bush (Ky. ) 480. State v. Venable, 117 Mo. App. 501, 
 
 "Sec Dillingham v. State (Tex., 93 S. W. 356. 
 
 '895), 32 S. W. 771; Brnwnlee v. '•' 103 Am. St. 904n. 
 State, 35 Tex. Cr. 213, 32 S. VV. 1043;
 
 § 486 
 
 CRi:kIIXAL FA'IDENCE. 
 
 790 
 
 official character of the clcfcnclant is often by statute relevant as 
 a valid defense, and in such a case evidence is admissible,'^'* to 
 show that he is a sheriff, marshal, deputy marshal, ''" or other 
 officer charged with the duty of preserving the peace, or serving 
 judicial process,*'" or a mail carrier."^ The officer must show that 
 he was actually engaged in executing process,"^ or searching for 
 or arresting a criminal,"^ and of these facts the existence of 
 process is evidence. The process itself or a certified copy is the 
 best evidence of its existence, and must be produced."* 
 
 A written appointment offered to prove official character need 
 not be technically correct if it was sufficient to cause the defendant 
 to believe that he was exempt."''"' Persons traveling are sometimes 
 privileged to carry concealed weapons. Whether a person is a 
 traveler is usually for the jury to determine upon all the facts,"" 
 as, for example, quitting the neighborhood of one's accjuaintances 
 and friends, going among strangers, the distance covered and the 
 purpose and objects contemplated in going, loitering or return- 
 ing. These facts are, therefore, admissible in evidence."^ The 
 
 ^^ Including the declarations of the 
 defendant, made while carrying the 
 weapon, as a part of the res gestce. 
 Irvine v. State, 18 Tex. App. 51, 52. 
 
 ^^ Lee, In re, 46 Fed. 59, 62, 63. 
 
 '" State V. Williams, 72 Miss. 992, 18 
 
 50. 486 ; Irvine v. State, 18 Tex. App. 
 
 51, 53; Snell V. State, 4 Tex. App. 
 171, 172; Carmichael v. State, ii Tex. 
 App. 27, 28; Mclntyre v. State, 170 
 Ind. 163, 83 N. E. 1005. 
 
 "' Lott V. State, 122 Ind. 393, 395, 24 
 N. E. 156; A person specially depu- 
 tized by the court to make an arrest 
 where a constable is not procurable 
 may carry a pistol. Jenkins v. State, 
 47 Tex. Cr. 224, 82 S. W. 1036. 
 
 "Miller v. State, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 
 449, 450. 
 
 *^ State V. Wisdom, 84 IMo. 177, 190. 
 
 **Beasley v. State, 5 Lea (Tenn.) 
 705, 706. The declaration of the ac- 
 cused that he carried a weapon 
 coupled with a statement that he had 
 a right to do so is not a confession. 
 
 State V. Abrams, 131 Iowa 479, 108 N. 
 W. 1041. 
 
 "'Lyle V. State, 21 Tex. App. 153, 
 17 S. W. 425. Evidence that he 
 thought he was still an officer is inad- 
 missible, if it clearly appears that his 
 term had expired. O'Neal v. State, 
 32 Tex. Cr. 42, 22 S. W. 25. 
 
 "^Lawson v. State (Tex., 1895), 31 
 S. W. 645 ; Blackwell v. State, 34 Tex. 
 Cr. 476, 31 S. W. 380; Price v. State, 
 34 Tex. Cr. 102, 29 S. W. 473; Dil- 
 lingham v. State (Tex., 1895), Z^ S. 
 W. 771 ; Hathcote v. State, 55 Ark. 
 181, 184, 17 S. W. 721 ; Impson v. 
 State (Tex., 1892), 19 S. W. 677; 
 Wilson v. State, 68 Ala. 41 ; Lott v. 
 State, 122 Ind. 393, 395, 24 N. E. 156; 
 Stiewell v. State (Ark., 1890), 12 S. 
 W. 1014. 
 
 "Davis V. State, 45 Ark. 359, 361; 
 Wilson V. State, 68 Ala. 41; Carr v. 
 State, 34 Ark. 448, 449, 2>^ Am. 15; 
 Burst V. State, 89 Ind. 133, 135.
 
 791 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 48/ 
 
 presumption is that the accused is not a traveler and the burden 
 of proof is on him to show this excuse."^ 
 
 §487. Forcible entry and detainer. — This is often by statute 
 made a crime and consists of forcibly taking or keeping posses- 
 sion of lands and tenements by menaces, force and arms, and 
 without authority of law."'' 
 
 Evidence to show title in the defendant or in some person for 
 whom he is acting is irrelevant.'" The object of the statute is not 
 to determine to whom the premises belong of right, but to dis- 
 courage a resort to violence and prevent a breach of the peace. 
 
 But it may be shown that the accused took possession by virtue 
 of a judicial writ or order, regular upon its face, issuing from 
 a court of competent jurisdiction. It cannot be proved collaterally 
 that the process is void.^^ 
 
 Evidence tending to show the employment of force by the 
 accused is always relevant. And to sustain a conviction such 
 high-handed proceedings, or such a show of force must be 
 proved as overawed and intimidated the injured party, and either 
 deterred him from defending his possession, or coerced him into 
 surrendering it."' If the evidence shows the taking possession 
 was peaceable and with the consent of all parties the accused 
 must be acquitted.'^ It is not necessary, however, to show that 
 the accused actually assaulted the owner or the person in posses- 
 sion.^^ 
 
 ■"''Wiley V. State, 52 Ind. 516, 519; with force, with violence, and unusual 
 
 Brownlec v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 213, 32 weapons." 4 Bl. Com. 148. 
 
 S. W. 1043; EasHck V. United States, '"Lasserot v. Gamble (Cal., 1896), 
 
 7 Ind. Ter. 707, 104 S. W. 941 ; Col- 46 Pac. 917; Vess v. State, 93 Ind. 211, 
 
 son V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 138, 105 S. 215. 
 
 W. 507; State V. Miles, 124 Mo. App. '^Vcss v. State, 93 Ind. 211, 215. 
 
 283, loi S. W. 671. As to when the "Strong v. State, 105 Ind. i, 4, 4 
 
 accused ceased to be a traveller by N. E. 293 ; State v. Glenn, 130 Mo. 
 
 reaching his destination, see Holland App. 145, 108 S. W. 1073; State v. 
 
 V. State, ^^ Ark. 425, 84 S. W. 468; Leary, 136 N. Car. 578, 48 S. E. 570; 
 
 Rosaman v. Okolona, 85 Miss. 583, Z7 State v. Pollok, 4 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 
 So. 641, 107 Am. St. 257; Navarro v. 305, 42 Am. Dec. 140. 
 
 State, 50 Tex. Cr. 326, 96 S. W. 932. " Strong v. State, 105 Ind. i, 5, 4 X. 
 
 •" "The entry now allowed by law is E. 293. 
 
 a peaceable one: that forbifldcn is " Ellis v. Stale, 124 Ga. 91. 52 S. E. 
 
 uch as is carried on and maintained 147, in which the court said: "If, at
 
 488 
 
 CRIMINAL FA-IDI-.XC-IC 
 
 792 
 
 § 488. Affray. — Tliis offense lias 1)cen defined as the fighting 
 of two or more persons in some ])ul)hc place to the terror of his 
 majesty's subjects.''' If the fighting be private it is not an affray 
 but an assault.'" The state must prove as elements of the crime : 
 First, the fighting. Second, the fact that it was in a public place. 
 Third, that it was in terror of the king's subjects, and, fourth, 
 that two or more persons were engaged in it." Evidence of any 
 fact which shows or tends to show an assault and battery by one 
 person on another is admissible to prove the figliting.'** The dec- 
 larations of any one implicated, uttered during the affray or 
 v\iiich are otherwise a part of the res gcsfcr, are admissible against 
 any of the others.^" The accused may always prove in justifica- 
 tion that he was attacked and that he fought to defend himself.^" 
 But he cannot put in evidence his belief that he was in danger 
 to sustain this defense. The burden of proof is on him to show 
 that he fought in self-defense.*^ It must also be proved that the 
 fighting was in public.*^ 
 
 the time the effort to re-enter is made, 
 there be an exhibition, b}' words, acts, 
 or circumstances, calculated to intim- 
 idate the former possessor, and to im- 
 press on him an intention on the part 
 of the person unlawfully detaining the 
 premises to hold possession of them 
 by force and violence, the offense is 
 complete." 
 
 '^4 Bl. Com. 145; Thompson v. 
 State, 70 Ala. 26; State v. Brewer, 33 
 Ark. 176; State v. Davis, 65 N. Car. 
 298; State V. Perry, 5 Jones (N. Car.) 
 9, 69 Am. Dec. 768 ; State v. Priddy, 4 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 429; Simpson v. 
 State, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 356; Pollock v. 
 State, 32 Tex. Cr. 29, 22 S. W. 19; 
 State V. Freeman, 127 X. Car. 544, 37 
 S. E. 206. 
 
 ™ Thompson v. State, 70 Ala. 26; 
 State V. Stanly, 4 Jones (X. Car.) 
 290; State V. Heflin, 8 Humph. 
 (Tenn.) 84; Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg. 
 (Tenn.) 356. 
 
 "" Roscoe's Crim. Ev. 270. 
 
 ''Ohio V. Foy, Tappan (Ohio) 71; 
 Simpson v. State, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 
 
 '" State V. Harrell, 107 X. Car. 944, 
 12 S. E. 439; McClellan v. State, 53 
 Ala. 640; Childs v. State, 15 Ark. 204; 
 Commonwealth v. Simmons, 6 J. J. 
 Marsh (Ky.) 614; State v. Warren, 
 57 Mo. App. 502; State v. Huntly, 3 
 Ired. (X. Car.) 418, 40 Am. Dec. 416. 
 
 ^'Coyle V. State (Tex. Cr.), 72 S. 
 W. 847; People V. Moore, 3 Wheeler 
 Cr. (X. Y.) 82. 
 
 *^ State V. Barringer, 114 X. Car. 
 840, 19 S. E. 275. 
 
 ^Skains v. State, 21 Ala. 218; Car- 
 wile V. State, 35 Ala. 392; Taylor v. 
 State, 22 Ala. 15; State v. Heflin, 8 
 Humph. (Tenn.) 84; State v. War- 
 ren, 57 Mo. App. 502 ; State v. Woody, 
 2 Jones (X. Car.) 335; State v. Sum- 
 ner, 5 Strobt. (S. Car.) 53; Shelton 
 V. State, 30 Tex. 431; Reg. v. Hunt, 
 I Cox. C. C. 177; Gamble v. State, 113 
 Ga. 701, 39 S. E. 301 ; State v. Fritz, 
 133 X. Car. 725, 45 S. E. 957; P'per 
 V. State (Tex. Cr.), 51 S. W. 1118.
 
 793 CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 489 
 
 ^ 489. Riot. — Where three or more actually do an unlawful act 
 of violence, either with or without a common cause or quarrel, 
 as, if they beat a man, or do other unlawful act with force, or 
 even a lawful act, as removing a nuisance, in a violent and tumult- 
 uous manner,®^ it is a riot. There must not only be a common 
 intent to do an unlawful act or some lawful act in a violent 
 manner but also concert of action.^* An unlawful assembly must 
 be proved. Then whatever act will constitute a trespass may sub- 
 stantiate a charge of riot.^^^ The defendant's connection with the 
 unlawful assembly must be shown by evidence satisfactory to the 
 jury. His purpose and intent may be inferred from the circum- 
 stances.^" As soon as it is proved, he will become responsible for 
 all the acts and declarations of the others made during the prog- 
 ress of the riot.*^ If during the riot some one is killed, it is 
 not necessary to prove that he struck the fatal blow. It is suffi- 
 
 *^4 Bl. Com. 146; Whitley v. State, 57 S. E. 953; Jemley v. State, 121 Ga. 
 
 66 Ga. 656. As by cursing and threat- 346, 49 S. E. 292. 
 
 ening a man in his house and by re- ^"A riot is a common-law offense, 
 
 peatedly firing a gun. Lewis v. State, and is said to be a tumultuous disturb- 
 
 2 Ga. App. 659, 58 S. E. 1070; Croy 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 457, 61 S. E. 847. 
 If three persons have a common pur- 
 pose to do an unlawful violent act it is 
 not material that the act of each indi- 
 vidual was separate. State v. Mizis, 48 
 
 ance of the peace, bj'^ three or more 
 persons, assembled together, of their 
 own authority, with an intent mutually 
 to assist one another, against any who 
 shall oppose them, in the execution of 
 some enterprise of a private nature. 
 
 Ore. 165,85 Pac. 611, rehearing denied, and afterwards actually executing the 
 
 86 Pac. 361. In Reg. v. Soley, 11 
 Modern 115, the court, on p. 116, 
 said : "The books are obscure in 
 the definition of riots. I take it, it 
 is not necessary to say they assem- 
 bled for that purpose, but there must 
 be an unlawful assembly, * * * such 
 an act as will make a trespass will 
 make a riot. If a number of men 
 assemble with arms, in tcrrorcm f>op- 
 uli, though no act is done, it is a riot. 
 If three come out of an alehouse and 
 go armed, it is a riot. Though a man 
 may ride with arms, yet he cannot 
 take two with him tr) defend himself, 
 even though his life is threatened, for 
 he is in the |)rntection of the law, 
 which is sufTicient for his dofcnsf." 
 •*Stanfield v. Stale, I Ga. App. 532, 
 
 same in a violent and turbulent man- 
 ner, to the terror of the people, 
 whether the act intended were of itself 
 lawful or unlawful." State v. Russell, 
 45 N. H. 83, 84; Commonwealth v. 
 Runnels, 10 Mass. 518, 6 Am. Dec. 
 148; People V. Judson. il Daly (N. 
 Y.) i; State v. Cole, 2 McCord (S. 
 Car.) 117; State v. Connolly, 3 Rich. 
 (S. Car.) Tii7; State v. Brooks, 4 
 Hill (S. Car.) 361; People v. Greg- 
 ory. 120 Cal. 16, 52 Pac. 41 ; Hunter 
 V. State, 127 Ga. 43, 55 S. E. 1044: 
 Carter v. State (Ga. App., 1909), 65 
 S. E. 1072. 
 
 ".State V. Seiliy, 51 Ong. 13'. ()4 
 Pac. ?,7. 
 
 "Shnler v. Slate, I JO Ga. 030, 55 
 S. E. 496.
 
 § 490 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 794 
 
 cient to prove that some one implicated in the unlawful assembly 
 struck the blow, though it may not appear who it was.-'* All the 
 circumstances attending the riotous assemblage including the facts 
 showing the violence or force employed, the threats, oaths and 
 outcries of those participating, and their other declarations being 
 a part of the res gestcc and showing intention are relevant in 
 evidence. It may also be shown what was done by the prosecu- 
 ting witness or by members of his family or other persons not 
 incriminated with the accused. It may be shown that the prosecut- 
 ing witness or his wife fainted and was terrified by the action of 
 the rioters, and missiles or arms used by the rioters and identified 
 with the scene of the riot may also.be introduced in evidence.^'* 
 
 v:^ 490. Conspiracy. — When two or more persons unite to execute 
 a purpose to injure or destroy the life, or the property, or per- 
 sonal rights of another, a conspiracy exists. The mere combina- 
 tion of persons to do a criminal act is a crime, even though the 
 object of the combination is not consummated. Here the gist 
 of the crime is the conspiracy, and, both at common law and 
 under statute, any participant may be indicted for his share in the 
 illicit transaction. But usually the proof of a conspiracy is merely 
 incidental to proving some other crime in which several have 
 taken part. Thus, where a man has been killed as the result of 
 
 *' State V. Jenkins. 14 Rich. (S. "Where many individuals are acting 
 
 Car.) 215, 94 Am. Dec. I32n. See gen- separately, or in small parties distinct 
 
 erally, Hawk. P. C. Ch. 65; 5 Burns from each other, at different times and 
 
 Justice 142; 2 Chitty Cr. Law 488; at different places, but manifestly for 
 
 3 Greenl. Ev., § 216; 2 Wharton Am. the same general purpose, as to break 
 
 Cr. L. (loth ed.), § 1542; Roscoe Cr. into a theater, or to injure it by the 
 
 Ev., 902 ; and State v. Renton, 15 N. throwing of stones, and missiles, or to 
 
 H. 169, 172. "The law does not dis- resist or attack those who are there in 
 
 tinguish between the relative degree authority to preserve the peace, it is 
 
 of violence used by individuals, but not a series of affrays but a general 
 
 every one who participates is respon- riot." People v. Judson, 11 Daly (N. 
 
 sible for all that has taken place. * * * Y.) i, 17,83,84. 
 
 It is not necessary that a party should *" Johnson v. State, 124 Ga. 656, 52 
 
 commit personal violence; being S. E. 880; Elliott Evidence, § 3128. 
 
 armed with offensive weapons, or Order of proof, Elliott Evidence, 
 
 making use of threatening speeches or § 3124; presumptions and burden of 
 
 turbulent gestures ; indeed, any act of proof, § 3124; number of persons, 
 
 assistance or encouragement is suffi- § 3125; proof of participation, § 3126; 
 
 cient to make him a principal." proof of terror of the people, § 3127.
 
 795 CRIMES AGAIXST "'UBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 49 1 
 
 a preconcerted assault upon him by several persons, it becomes 
 necessary to prove a conspiracy to show the relations of the ac- 
 cused persons to one another. But generally it is not material that 
 the plan which was carried out differs widely from the original 
 plan, nor will it be required to show the existence of any previous 
 plan if. from the evidence, it seems clear that there had been 
 negotiations to the same end.°° 
 
 ^ 491. Circumstantial evidence. — Direct evidence is not essential 
 to pro\-e the conspiracy. It need not be shown that the parties 
 actually came together and agreed in express terms to enter in and 
 pursue a common design.®^ The existence of the assent of minds 
 which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from the secrecy 
 of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof 
 of facts and circumstances which, taken together, apparently 
 indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole.®- If 
 
 *^Grogan v. State, 63 Miss. 147. 152; 
 Spies V. People, 122 111. i, 229, 12 N. 
 E. 865, 17 N. E. 898, 3 Am. St. 32011; 
 Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen 
 (Mass.) 264, 87 Am. Dec. 711; State 
 V. Messner, 43 Wash. 206, 86 Pac. 636. 
 
 At common law the crime of con- 
 spiracy is complete without an overt 
 act, State v. Dalton, 134 Mo. App. 
 517. 114 S. W. 1 132; but, under the 
 United States statute, there must not 
 only be a combination to commit a 
 crime, but also an overt act done to 
 carry into effect the object of the con- 
 spiracy. United States v. Cole, 153 
 Fed. 801. If the object of a con- 
 spiracy is criminal, or if the means by 
 which a legal purpose is to be carried 
 out arc criminal, the conspiracy is a 
 criminal conspiracy. State v. Stock- 
 ford, 77 Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769, 107 
 Am. St. 28; but a conspiracy may be 
 criminal though the purpose to be car- 
 ried out would not have been crimi- 
 nal if performed by a single individ- 
 ual, 'nie means of accomi»lishing the 
 purpose or the purpose itself may be- 
 
 come criminal by reason of the fact 
 that the combination renders it more 
 easy of accomplishment. State v. Dal- 
 ton, 134 Mo. App. 517, 114 S. W. 1132. 
 
 "United States v. Babcock, 3 Dill 
 C. C. (U. S.) 581, 585, 24 Fed. Cas. 
 14487; People v. ]Miles, 123 App. Div. 
 (N. Y.) 862, 108 N. Y. S. 510 ; Mor- 
 ris V. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 So. 274; 
 McLeroy v. State, 125 Ga. 240. 54 
 S. E. 125; State v. Walker, 124 Iowa 
 414, 100 N. W. 354; People v. Woods, 
 147 Cal. 265, 81 Pac. 652. 
 
 "-Hunter v. State, 112 Ala. 77, 21 
 So. 65; McKee v. State, in Ind. 378, 
 12 N. E. 510; Spies v. People, 122 III. 
 I, 101-158, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 
 898, 3 Am. St. 320n ; United States v. 
 Sacia, 2 Fed. 754. 758; Mussel Slougli 
 Case, 5 Fed. 680, 683. 684; State v. 
 Anderson, 92 N. Car. 732, 747; Keiley 
 v. People, 55 N. Y. 565. 576. 14 Am. 
 .342; United States v. Graff, 14 
 Blatchf. C. C. (U. S.) .181; O'Brien 
 v. State, 69 Neb. 691, q6 N. W. 6.10; 
 Sanderson v. State, 169 Iiid. .^oi, H2 
 N, K. 525; Chaplinc v. State, 77 Ark.
 
 § 491 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 796 
 
 it is proved that two or more persons aimed l)v tlieir acts towards 
 the accompHshment of the same unlawful dhject, each doing- a 
 part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in 
 fact connected and co-operati\e, indicating a closeness of personal 
 association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be 
 inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means 
 is proved."^ Evidence of actual participation, rather than of 
 passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of acquiescence in, 
 or consent to, the actions of others is relevant to show the crim- 
 inal intention of the passive party, and generally the smallest de- 
 gree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act or words 
 of one against the others."* The details of the conspiracy need not 
 be proved. If a community of jiurpose among the parties to do 
 some criminal act or acts is shown, it is not necessary that the 
 acts which are charged, or of which evidence has been given, were 
 specifically contemplated by them or included in the original de- 
 sign. In other words, if some general community of interest and 
 purpose to do some act is shown, the declarations are admissil)le. 
 
 444, 95 S. W. 477 ; Brummett v. Com- 
 monwealth (Ky.), 108 S. W. 861, 33 
 Ky. L. 355; People v. Simmons, 125 
 App Div. (N. Y.) 234, 109 N. Y. S. 
 190; Lawrence v. State, 103 Ind. 17, 63 
 Atl. 96; Collins V. State, 138 Ala. 57, 
 34 So. 993; Butt V. State, 81 Ark. 
 173, 98 S. W. 723, 118 Am. St. 42; 
 Smith V. State, 46 Tex. Cr. 267, 8r 
 S. W. 936, 108 Am. St. 991 ; State v. 
 Lewis, 51 Ore. 467, 94 Pac. 831 ; Peo- 
 ple V. Moran, 144 Cal. 48, TJ Pac. 
 "^-JT, Ripley v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. 126, 
 100 S. W. 943 ; United States v. Cole, 
 153 Fed. 801. 
 
 Classification of, 97 Am. St. T]2)-, 
 note; liberality of rule admitting, 97 
 Am. St. 782; necessity for receiving, 
 97 Am. St. 772; facts admissible, 97 
 Am. St. 782; relative value of circum- 
 stantial and direct evidence, 97 Am. 
 St. 774; when regarded as secondary, 
 97 Am. St. 788; to corroborate other 
 
 evidence, 97 Am. St. 788; instances of 
 admissibility, 97 Am. St. 782; flight 
 admissible as, 97 Am. St. 784; not ad- 
 missible when direct evidence is with- 
 held, 97 Am. St. 788 ; when insufficient 
 to sustain a conviction, 97 Am. St. 
 774^778 ; must exclude every reason- 
 able hypothesis except that of guilt, 
 97 Am. St. 776; failure of to explain 
 suspicious circumstances, 97 Am. St. 
 
 783- 
 
 ®* Spies v. People, 122 III. i, loi- 
 158, 12 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898, 3 Am. 
 St. 320n; Archer v. State, 106 Ind. 
 426, 7 N. E. 225 ; Lawrence v. State, 
 103 Md. 17, 62, Atl. 96. Evidence to 
 show that the conspirators were ac- 
 quainted with one another, and were 
 endeavoring to meet each other, is 
 relevant. Reinhold v. State, 130 Ind. 
 467, 470, 30 N. E. 306. 
 
 "^ State V. Anderson, 92 N. Car. ']7>2, 
 72,7, 7A7-
 
 797 CRIMES AGAIXST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 492 
 
 thougli a conspiracy to commit the offense in question is not 
 proved. °^ 
 
 § 492. Admissibility of acts and declarations of co-conspirators. 
 
 If a conspiracy is proved prima facie the acts or the declarations 
 of any conspirator done in its prosecution and furtherance, or 
 whicli form a part of the res gcstcc of any act designed to advance 
 the object of the conspiracy, which is already in evidence are 
 admissible against any or all of the conspirators.®" The safest 
 
 ^ State V. Anderson, 92 N. Car. 732, 
 737, 7X7 \ State v. Morton, 27 Vt. 310, 
 65 Am. Dec. 201. 
 
 ■^ People V. ;McKane, 143 N. Y. 455, 
 470, 38 N. E. 950; State v. Ford, yj 
 La. Ann. 443; Card v. State. 109 Ind. 
 415, 419, 422. 9 N. E. 591 ; Williams v. 
 State. 81 Ala. i, 60 Am. 133; Spies v. 
 People, 122 111. I, 224, 228^-9rT2^N. E. 
 865. 17 X. E. 898, 3 Am. St. 320n; 
 State V. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl. 
 890, 3 Am. St. 23 ; Commonwealth v. 
 O'Brien, 140 Pa. St. 555, 561, 21 Atl. 
 385 ; Horton v. State, 66 Ga. 690, 693 ; 
 State V. James. 34 S. Car. 49, 53, 12 
 S. E. 657; People v. Collins, 64 Cal. 
 293. 295, 30 Pac. 847; McKenzie v. 
 State, 32 Tex. Cr. 568. 25 S. W. 426, 
 40 \m. St. 795 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Brown, 14 Gray (Mass.) 419; Wil- 
 liams V. State. 47 Ind. 568, 572; State 
 V. Carson, 2,fi S. Car. 524, 15 S. E. 588; 
 State V. Green, 40 S. Car. 328, 18 S. 
 E. 9.33, 42 Am. St. 872; People v. 
 Collins, 64 Cal. 293, 30 Pac. 847; 
 Priest V. State, 10 Neb. 393, 399, 6 
 X. W. 468; State V. Weasel, 30 La. 
 .^nn. 919; State v. Thibcau, 30 Vt. 
 100, 104; Bennett v. State, 62 Ark. 
 516, 36 S. W. 947; State V. Lewis, 96 
 Iowa 286, 65 X. W. 295; State v. 
 I'.yers, \G Mont. 565, 41 Pac. 708; 
 Hunter V. State, 112 Ala. 77, 21 So. 
 ^5; Commonwealth v. Huntor, 168 
 Mass. 130, 46 N. E. 404; Wcisenbach 
 
 V. State, 138 Wis. 152, 119 N. W. 843: 
 Price V. State, i Okla. Cr. 358, 98 
 Pac. 447 ; Van Wyk v. People, 45 Colo. 
 I, 99 Pac. 1009; Long v. State, 55 Tex. 
 Cr. 55, 114 S. W. 632; Baldwin v. 
 State, 46 Fla. 115, 35 So. 220; San- 
 derson V. State, 169 Ind. 301, 82 X. E. 
 525; O'Brien v. State, 69 Neb. 691. 
 96 N. W. 649; Chadwick v. United 
 States, 141 Fed. 225, 72 C. C. A. 343; 
 State V. Kennard, 74 N. H. 76, 65 Atl. 
 376; Carter v. State, 106 Ga. yj^, 32 
 S. E. 345, 71 Am. St. 262n; State v. 
 Kenny, j-j S. Car. 236, 57 S. E. 859; 
 Morris v. State, 146 Ala. 66, 41 So. 
 274; Toliver v. State, 142 Ala. 3, 38 
 So. 801 ; United States v. Francis, 144 
 Fed. 520; People v. Gregory, 120 Cal. 
 16, 52 Pac. 41 ; People v. Stokes, 5 
 Cal. App. 205, 89 Pac. 997; State v. 
 Vaughan, 200 ^lo. i, 98 S. W. 2; State 
 V. Dix, 33 Wash. 405, 74 Pac. 570; 
 Butt V. State, 81 Ark. 173, 98 S. W. 
 72}, ; Porter v. People, 31 Colo. 508. 
 74 Pac. 879; Schultz v. State, 133 Wis. 
 215, 113 N. W. 428; Collins V. State, 
 138 Ala. 57, 34 So. 993; Eacock v. 
 State, 169 Ind. 488, 82 N. E. 1030; 
 Raymond v. People, 226 III. 433, 80 
 N. E. 996; State v. Arthur, 135 Iowa 
 48, 109 N. W. 1083; Richards v. State, 
 53 Tex. Cr. 400. no S. W. 432; State 
 V. Dilley, 44 Wash. 207, 87 Pac. 133; 
 State V. White, 48 Ore. 416, 87 Pac. 
 137; Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17, 63
 
 § 49- CRIMINAL EVIDEXCE. 798 
 
 rule is to satisfy the jury by a prima facie case that a conspiracy- 
 existed and then to offer evidence of the declarations of any con- 
 spirator."' Ho\veyer, as will be elsewhere explained, the declara- 
 tions are often receiyed before there is any proof of a conspiracy, 
 and then, if the conspiracy be not shown, the jury is instructed to 
 disregard the declarations. The rule is applicable where the con- 
 spirators are separately tried. The declarations of other con- 
 spirators jointly indicted, but separately tried may be received 
 against the accused who is on trial. It is not necessary to show 
 that the accused took part in every act of the conspiracy or that he 
 had actual knowledge of every act.''® But mere knowledge by one 
 of the conspirators that the others were involved in some criminal 
 scheme does not necessarily permit the declarations or acts of the 
 others to be received against him. It is only where knowledge and 
 active participation or an express or implied ratification can be 
 proved that one conspirator is bound by the statements or dec- 
 larations of another.*'" 
 
 For illustration, where a conspiracy is proved in substance the 
 state may prove the acts and declarations of one conspirator on 
 the trial of another though the person whose conduct and lan- 
 guage are proved has not been arrested."'' The principle at the 
 
 Atl. 96; Graff v. People, 208 111. 312, 745, note; 3 Am. St. 482, 485; two 
 
 70 N. E. 299 ; State v. Stockford, 77 or more engaged, Elliott Evidence, 
 
 Conn. 227, 58 Atl. 769, 107 Am. St. § 2935; order of proof, § 2934; proof 
 
 28; State V. Roberts, 201 Mo. 702, of formal agreement not necessary, 
 
 100 S. W. 484; Hanners v. State, 147 § 2938; presumptions, 3 Am. St. 843; 
 
 Ala. 27, 41 So. 973 ; Marrash v. proof when conspirators are not 
 
 United States, 168 Fed. 225; Cabrera named, Elliott Evidence, § 2945; la- 
 
 V. State (Tex. Cr., 1909), 118 S. W. bor combinations, strikes, boycotts 
 
 1054; Chicago, &c.. Coal Co. v. Peo- and picketing, Elliott Evidence, §§ 
 
 pie, 214 111. 421, 7Z N. E". 770; Holt 2945, 2951; proof of overt acts, §§ 
 
 V. State, 39 Tex. Cr. 282, 45 S. W. 2946, 2947, 2948; weight and suffi- 
 
 1016, 46 S. W. 829; Christensen v. ciency of circumstantial evidence, 68 
 
 People, 114 111. App. 40; Snelling v. L. R. A. 213, note. 
 
 State (Tex. Cr. App., 1909), 123 S. *"■ Schultz v. State, 133 Wis. 215, 113 
 
 W. 610; State v. Kennedy (S. Car., N. W. 428. 
 
 1910), 67 S. E. 152. *^ People v. :\Iiles, 123 App. Div. 
 
 Prima facie evidence of conspiracy, (N. Y.) 862, 108 N. Y. S. 510, aff'd 
 
 Elliott Evidence, § 2942; admissibil- in 192 N. Y. 541, 84 N. E. 1117. 
 
 ity of declarations of conspirators, ™ ]\Iarrash v. United States, 168 
 
 Elliott Evidence, §§ 2936, 2939, 2940, Fed. 225. 
 
 2941. 2943. 2944; I L. R. A. 273, note, ^""Weisenbach v. State, 138 Wis. 
 
 12 L. R. A. 197, note; 19 L. R. A. 152, 119 N. W. 843.
 
 799 CRIMES AGAINST TUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 493 
 
 basis of this rule is that which regulates the competency of the 
 admissions of partners against each other. When men are asso- 
 ciated for a common purpose, and with a common object in view, 
 the law, presuming that the benefits, if any, which may ensue 
 from their accomplishment will be shared by all, impresses upon 
 the conspirators or partners, collectively, the attribute of indi- 
 ^'iduality so far as the common design in concerned. No member 
 of the combination will be permitted to escape the consequences 
 of the actions or words of his associates. But the acts or declara- 
 tions, in order to be admissible, must have been made in further^ 
 ance of the common design, or must accompany and explain such 
 an act or declaration.^ The fact that declarations were made by 
 a conspirator before the defendant became associated with the 
 conspiracy does not render them inadmissible against him. But 
 his subsequent connection therewith must be shown and knowl- 
 edge of the existence of the declarations be brought home to him 
 or circumstances shown from which such knowledge and a rati- 
 fication by him may be implied or inferred. - 
 
 § 493. Must be made during existence of, and in furtherance of, 
 conspiracy. — That the accused was not present when the declara- 
 tion, which is introduced against him, was uttered by a fellow- 
 conspirator, does not of necessity render it incompetent if it con- 
 forms to the rule in other respects.^ But those declarations only 
 
 ^ State V. McGee, 8i Town 17, 22, 46 Commonwealth (Ky.), 31 Ky. L. 64, 
 
 N. W. 764; Long V. State, 13 Tex. loi S. W. 376; Wallace v. State. 46 
 
 App. 211; Horton v. State, (£ Ga. Tex. Cr. 341, 81 S. W. 966; Miller v. 
 
 690, 695; Spies V. People, 122 111. i, 12 State, 139 Wis. 57, 119 N. W. 850; 
 
 N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898, 3 Am. St. O'Brien v. State, 69 Neb. 691, 96 N. 
 
 320n; People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, W. 649; Dolan v. United States, 123 
 
 120, 17 Am. 401; Walton v. State, 88 Fed. 52, 59 C. C. A. 176. 
 
 Ind. 9, 15; Card v. State, 109 Ind. ■ Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265, 272; 
 
 415, 418, 9 N. E. 591 ; McKee v. State, Cox v. State, 8 Tex. App. 254, 34 Am. 
 
 Ill Ind. 378, .382, 12 N. E. 510; State 746; Browning v. State, 30 Miss. 656; 
 
 V. Melrose, 98 Mo. 594, 12 S. W. 250; Avery v. State, 10 Tex. App. 199, 
 
 Kiindc V. State, 22 Tex. App. 65, 3 212; Spies v. People, 122 111. i, 12 N. 
 
 S. W. 325; People V. McQiiade, no E. 865, 17 N. E. 898, 3 ,'\m. St. 320n ; 
 
 N. Y. 284. 18 N. E. 156; State v. Lar- llnited States v. Bahcock, 3 L)ill- C. 
 
 kin, 49 N. H. .39; People v. Irwin, ■77 C. (U. S.) 581, 5S6, 24 Fed. Cas. 
 
 Cal. 494, 20 Pac. 56; State v. Grant, 14487. 
 
 86 Iowa 2l6, 53 N. W. 120; Hall v. ' Statt- v. .McGce, 81 Iowa 17, 22,
 
 § 493 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 800 
 
 are admissible which are made by a conspirator during the exist- 
 ence of the conspiracy and in furtherance of it. The statements of 
 a conspirator, made after the conspiracy has ceased to exist, either 
 by success or failure, and which are merely narrative of past 
 events (though in form a confession, /. c, an admission of the 
 conspiracy), are not receivable against a fellow conspirator,* un- 
 less the latter was present when they were made and heard them, 
 and expressly or by implication acquiesced in them.''' On the other 
 hand, declarations made after the conspiracy are always admis- 
 sible against the declarant, the jury being instructed to disregard 
 them as far as they refer to other persons.** A declaration by one 
 conspirator made at any time while the conspiracy exists is not 
 
 46 N. W. 764; State v. Anderson, 92 
 N. Car. 732; Hunter v. State, 112 
 Ala. 77, 21 So. 65 ; Grogan v. State, 
 63 Miss. 147, 151 ; Sanderson v. State, 
 169 Ind. 301, 82 N. E. 525; Shiflett v. 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. 530, 102 S. W. 
 1 147; State V. Austin, 183 Mo. 478, 
 82 S. W. 5. 
 
 ■•Bennett v. State, 62 Ark. 516, 36 
 S. W. 947; People V. Oldham, iii 
 Cal. 648, 44 Pac. 312; Jenkins v. State, 
 35 Fla. 737, 18 So. 182, 48 Am. St. 
 267; Schwen v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. 
 368, 35 S. W. 172; State v. Duffy, 
 124 Mo. I, 27 S. W. 358; Everage v. 
 State, 113 Ala. 102, 21 So. 404; State 
 V. Tice, 30 Ore. 457, 48 Pac. 367; 
 Logan V. United States, 144 U. S. 
 263, 309, 36 L. ed. 429, 12 Sup. Ct. 
 617; State V. Dean, 13 Ired. (N. Car.) 
 63; Patton V. State, 6 Ohio St. 467; 
 Rowland v. State, 45 Ark. 132, 135; 
 State V. McGraw, 87 Mo. 161, 164; 
 State V. Thibeau, 30 Vt. 100; State 
 V. Larkin, 49 N. H. 39; Heine v. 
 Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 145 ; Reg. 
 V. Murphy, 8 C. & P. 297, 310, 311; 
 Benton v. State, 78 Ark. 284, 94 S. 
 W. 688; Frazier v. Commonwealth 
 (Ky.), 76 S. W. 28, 25 Ky. 461 ; State 
 V. Kennedy, 177 Mo. 98, 75 S. W. 
 979; State V. Myers, 198 Mo. 225, 94 
 S. W. 242; Chicago &c. Coal Co. v. 
 
 People, 214 III. 421, 73 N. E. 770; 
 State V. Dickerhoff, 127 Iowa 404, 
 103 N. W. 350; Choice v. State, 52 
 Tex. Cr. 285, 106 S. W. 387 ; Gambrell 
 V. Commonwealth, 130 Ky. 513, 113 
 S. W. 476; State V. Horseman, 52 Ore. 
 572, 98 Pac. 135; Miller v. State, 139 
 Wis. 57, 119 N. W. 850; Chapline v. 
 State (Ark.) 95 S. W. 477; Berry v. 
 State, 122 Ga. 429, 50 S. E. 345 ; State 
 V. Philips, 73 S. Car. 236, 53 S. E. 
 370; State V. Walker, 124 Iowa 414, 
 100 N. W. 354; Wallace v. State, 48 
 Tex. Cr. 318, 87 S. W. 1041 ; Nelson 
 V. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 274, 87 S. W. 
 143; Commonwealth v. Ellis (Ky., 
 1909), 118 S. W. 973; Wright V. State, 
 40 Tex. Cr. 447, 50 S. W. 940 ; Smith 
 V. People, 38 Colo. 509, 88 Pac. 453; 
 Wiley V. State (.^rk., 1909), 124 S. 
 W. 249; State V. Smith (Ore., 1909), 
 106 Pac. 797. 
 
 ^ Holden v. State, 18 Tex. App. 91 ; 
 Shelby v. Commonwealth, 91 Ky, 
 563, 16 S. W. 461, 13 Ky. L. 178. 
 
 "Rex V. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221, 225; 
 Crosby v. People, 137 H^- 325, 334. 27 
 N. E. 49; People v. Arnold, 46 Mich. 
 268, 277, 9 N. W. 406; State v. Dod- 
 son, 16 S. Car. 453, 461 ; Van Wyk v. 
 People, 45 Colo. I, 99 Pac. 1009: Bald- 
 win V. State, 46 Fla. 115, 35 So. 220.
 
 8oi CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY, PEACE, HEALTH. § 494 
 
 admissible against another merely because the offense for which 
 the latter is on trial preceded it. The several successive crimes 
 committed during the conspiracy are regarded merely as the 
 parts of one indivisible whole." An exception to the general rule 
 may be mentioned here. At common law proof of the guilt of 
 the principal is required on the trial of a person as an accessory 
 to a crime. Hence of necessity the principal's confession, though 
 in form a declaration made after the conspiracy, is admissible at 
 the trial of a confederate as an accessory, whether tried jointly 
 or separately, but only to show the guilt of the principal as such.* 
 
 § 494. Order of proving conspiracy to let in declarations. — The 
 
 general rule is that the existence of the conspiracy must be proved, 
 at least prima facie, to the satisfaction of the judge, before the 
 declarations or acts are admitted in evidence.^ Many authorities, 
 however, hold that the order of the proof is discretionary with 
 the court, and that the court may. for the sake of convenience, 
 admit the declarations at any time during the trial on the promise 
 to prove the existence of the conspiracy and the connection of the 
 defendant therewith subsequently." This is particularly the case 
 
 ■ Card V. State, 109 Ind. 415, 9 N. 
 E. 591. 
 
 'United States v. Hartwell, 3 Cliflf. 
 (U. S.) 221, 26 Fed. Cas. 15318. 
 
 * Belcher v. State, 125 Ind. 419, 420, 
 25 N. E. 545; Ford v. State, 112 Ind. 
 37S, 14 N. E. 241 ; Card v. State, 109 
 Ind. 415, 418, 9 N. E. 591 ; Tarbox v. 
 State, 38 Ohio St. 581, 584; Casey 
 V. State, 37 Ark. 67, 85 ; McGraw v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky.), 20 S. W. 279, 
 14 Ky. L. 344; Amos v. State, 96 Ala. 
 120, 125, II So. 424; Horton v. State, 
 66 Ga. 690, 693 ; Cook v. State, 169 
 Ind. 430, 82 N. E. 1047; Wallace v. 
 State. 48 Tex. Cr. 318, 87 S. W. 1041 ; 
 Schultz V. State, 133 Wis. 215, 113 N. 
 W. 428; Schutz V. State, 125 Wis. 
 432, 104 N. W. 90; Proctor v. State, 
 54 Tex. Cr. 254, 112 S. W. 770; Peo- 
 ple V. Carson, 155 Cal. 164, 99 Pac. 
 51 — Underhill Crim. Ev. 
 
 970; People V. Donnolly, 143 Cal. 394, 
 77 Pac. 177; State v. Crofford, 121 
 Iowa 395, 96 N. W. 889; Ripley v. 
 State, 51 Tex. Cr. 126, 100 S. W. 943; 
 State V. Roberts, 201 Mo. 702, 100 S. 
 W. 484; Wiley v. State (Ark., 1909), 
 124 S. W. 249. 
 
 '"State V. Alushrush, 97 Iowa 444, 66 
 N. W. 746; Hall V. State, 31 Fla. 176, 
 188, 189, 12 So. 449; State V. Ward, 
 19 Nev. 297, 308, 10 Pac. 133, 7 Crim. 
 L. Mag. 748; State v. Grant, 86 Iowa 
 216, S3 N. W. 120; Avery v. State, 10 
 Tex. App. 199, 210; State v. Ander- 
 son, 92 N. Car. 732, 748; State v. 
 McGee, 81 Iowa 17, 46 N. W. 764; 
 State V. Cardoza. 11 S. Car. 195, 237; 
 State V. Grant, 76 Mo. 236; Hamilton 
 V. People, 29 Mich. 195. 197; Schultz 
 V. State. 133 Wis. 215. 113 N. W. 428; 
 People V. Bunkers, 2 Cal. App. 197.
 
 § 494 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 802 
 
 where establishing" the conspiracy depends npon proving a large 
 number of facts or a vast amount of circumstantial evidence and 
 the existence of the conspiracy be inferred from numerous ap- 
 parently independent facts and circumstances.^^ 
 
 84 Pac. 364, 370; Cook V. State, 169 691, 96 N. W. 649; State v. Lewis, 51 
 Ind. 430, 82 N. E. 1047; People v. Ore. 467, 94 Pac. 831; People v. Em- 
 Miles, 123 App. Div. (N. Y.) 862, 108 mons, 7 Cal. App. 685, 95 Pac. 1032. 
 N. Y. S. 510; Butt V. State, 81 Ark. "State v. Winner, 17 Kan. 298, 
 173, 98 S. W. 72^; People V. Stokes, 5 305; Spies v. People, 122 111. i, 238, 12 
 Cal. App. 205, 89 Pac. 997 ; Cohen v. N. E. 865, 17 N. E. 898, 3 Am. St. 
 United States, 157 Fed. 651, 85 C. 320n. 
 C. A. 113; O'Brien v. State, 69 Neb.
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 EVIDENCE IX INTERXATIOXAL AND IXTERSTATE EXTRADITION. 
 
 495. International e x t r a d i t i on — 
 
 Treaties and statutory regu- 
 lation. 
 
 496. Burden of proof and amount 
 
 of evidence required in in- 
 ternational and interstate 
 extradition to show crimi- 
 nality and other essential 
 facts. 
 
 497. Fugitive character of the per- 
 
 son claimed for extradition. 
 
 498. Evidential rules governing in- 
 
 terstate extradition. 
 
 499. Character, form and authenti- 
 
 cation of indictments, etc., 
 in interstate extradition. 
 
 500. Constitutional and statutory 
 
 regulation of the mode of 
 
 proving and effect of records 
 of other states. 
 
 501. General rules regulating the 
 
 taking of evidence in foreign 
 extradition. 
 
 502. Authentication by consular 
 
 certificate of warrants and 
 other papers used as evi- 
 dence in international ex- 
 tradition. 
 
 503. The competency of certified 
 
 copies as evidence of crim- 
 inality. 
 
 504. Proof of foreign laws and 
 
 treaties in international ex- 
 tradition. 
 
 505. Proof of laws in interstate ex- 
 
 tradition. 
 
 § 495. International extradition — Treaties and statutory regula- 
 tions. — The demand and the return of fugitives from justice 
 as between independent nations and states are, in the absence of 
 treaties providing for the reciprocal return of such persons, 
 wholly a matter of international comity. The law of nations im- 
 poses no obligation upon the sovereign state in which a person 
 charged with crime has sought an asylum, to return him to the 
 officials of the state against the law of which he has offended.^ 
 But often because of the principles of international comity, as 
 it is termed, or in other words because of the expectation that the 
 favor granted by the asykim state would be reciprocated by the 
 authorities of the state which demands the return of tlie fugitive 
 from its criminal jurisdiction, persons have been returned in tlie 
 
 ' Rx parte McCabc. 46 Fed. 363. 12I.. R. A. SS9; In re Cook, 49 Fed. 833, 
 836. 
 
 (803)
 
 § 49^ CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 804 
 
 absence of treaty to meet criminal charges pending against them 
 in the country of their domicil.- At the present time treaties exist 
 between the United States and nearly all civilized states, by virtue 
 of which all persons charged with certain crimes therein speci- 
 fied may be returned to the country whence they have fled to the 
 United States.^ These treaties provide what evidence shall be nec- 
 essary in any case to procure the extradition of the accused. I1ie 
 statutes of the United States provide that all hearings in extra- 
 dition cases shall be held on land, in a room or office which is 
 easily accessible to the public. If the person whose extradition 
 is sought shall file an affidavit that he can not go to trial without 
 the evidence of certain witnesses, showing also what he intends 
 to prove by them, and that he is not possessed of sufficient means 
 and is actually unable to pay the fees of such witnesses, the judge 
 or commissioner, before whom the hearing is had, may order 
 that the witnesses shall be subpoenaed, the costs to be paid as 
 similar fees are paid in the case of witness subpoenaed in behalf of 
 the United States. 
 
 § 493. Burden of proof and amount of evidence required in inter- 
 national and interstate extradition to show criminality and other 
 essential facts. — The burden of proof to show criminality, and 
 all other facts which will warrant the return of the alleged 
 
 ^l Kent Com. 2,6; In re Metzger, 5 12 Statutes at L. 199, 15 Statutes at 
 
 How. (U. S.) 176, 188, 12 L. ed. 104; L. 688; Hayti, 13 Statutes at L. 711; 
 
 United States v. Rauschcr, 119 U. S. Republic of Dominica, 15 Statutes at 
 
 407, 411, 30 L. ed. 425, 7 Sup. Ct. 234; L. 473; Italy, 11 Statutes at L. 629, 16 
 
 United States v. Davis, 2 Sumner C. Statutes 767, 24 Statutes at L. looi ; 
 
 C. (U. S.) 482,, 25 Fed. Cas. 14932, Salvador, 18 Statutes at L. 693, 796; 
 
 and see the remarks of Judge Jenkins Nicaragua, 17 Statutes at L. 815; 
 
 in 49 Fed. 833, on page 837. Peru, 18 Statutes at L. 719; Orange 
 
 ^The countries with which treaties Free State, 18 Statutes at L. 751; 
 have been made are as follows : Great Ecuador, 18 Statutes at L. 756 ; Bel- 
 Britain, 8 Statutes at L. 576; France, gium, 18 Statutes at L. 804, 22 Statutes 
 8 Statutes at L. 582, 617, 741 ; Hawai- at L. 972 ; Ottoman Empire, 19 Statutes 
 ian Islands, 9 Statutes at L. 981; at L. 572; Spain, 19 Statutes at L. 
 Swiss Confederation, II Statutes at L. 650; 22 Statutes at L. 991; Nether- 
 587; Prussia, 10 Statutes at L. 964; lands, 21 Statutes at L. 769; Japan, 
 Austria, 11 Statutes at L. 691, 17 24 Statutes at L. 1015. See, also, 
 Statutes at L. 835; Sweden and Nor- United States Revised Statutes, 
 way, 12 Statutes at L. 1125; Vene- §§5270-5280. 
 zuela, 12 Statutes at L. 143; Mexico,
 
 805 IXTERNATIOXAL AXD INTERSTATE EXTRADITION. § 496 
 
 fugitive from justice to the state under whose laws he is charged 
 with crime, is upon the officer sent to effect his return ; or on the 
 person demanding it. It was formerly held that the proof of 
 criminality should be as full and satisfactory as in the judgment 
 of the magistrate would suffice to authorize a conviction if he 
 were sitting at the trial of the accused.'* 
 
 This, however, is no longer the law. The demanding party is 
 never required to produce proof of the necessary facts which shall 
 convince the court beyond all reasonable doubt ; for an extradition 
 proceeding is not, in strictness of law, regarded as a criminal 
 trial, nor do the rules of evidence which apply to criminal trials 
 apply to it. It possesses more of the character of a preliminary 
 examination of a person accused of crime, the final determination 
 of whose criminality will take place in the jurisdiction where the 
 alleged crime was committed.^ Hence, according to the present 
 state of the law, the commissioner or magistrate will do well to 
 avoid acting in a technical spirit, or requiring the same amount 
 or degree of proof that would be demanded to convict the accused 
 before a jury.® 
 
 Some satisfactory and legal evidence of guilt will be required. 
 But if the necessary facts, i. e., that the accused is a fugitive, and 
 that he is charged with crime, are satisfactorily proved, the 
 examining magistrate ought to commit the accused to await the 
 action of the executive directing his return, though the evidence 
 of guilt does not possess that weight and cogency which would be 
 required to convict him were he on trial before a jury. 
 
 But in any case tlie evidence to show criminality must be legal, 
 and such as will create a probability that the alleged fugitive is 
 guilty. Though it may be unsatisfactory and far from convincing 
 >et if, on the whole, it may create conllicling presumptions and 
 probabilities that the accused is guilty, then he should be com- 
 
 * jSa- /'or/e Kaine, 3 Rlatchf. fU. S.) missioncr, need not state the facts 
 
 I, 14 Fed. Cas. 7597; /n rr Macdonnell, with the precision of an indictment; 
 
 II Blatchf. (U. S.) C. C. 170, 16 Fed. hut it should set forth the suhstantial 
 
 Cas. 8772. features of the crime so that the 
 
 " See Spear on Fxtradition, page 25. court can readily sec therefrom that 
 
 " In re Rrecn. 7.1 Fed. 458, 45Q. The the offense is one of those which arc 
 
 complaint, sif^ncd hy a foreign consul, enumerated in the treaty. In re 
 
 on which is based a warrant f-f extra- Adutt, 55 Fed. 376, 379. 
 dition issued by a United States com-
 
 497 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 806 
 
 mitted.' In other words it is generally required, both in inter- 
 national and interstate extradition, that such an amount and 
 degree of evidence shall be produced before the commissioner or 
 magistrate as would justify committing the accused for trial 
 if the crime charged against him was alleged to have been com- 
 mitted in the state where the examination is had.* 
 
 § 497. Fugitive character of the person claimed for extradition. — 
 
 Whether the person whose extradition is demanded has fled from 
 justice to the country or state in which he is found is a question 
 to be determined in the first instance by the executive of that 
 state. ^ The proof that the accused is a fugitive from justice must 
 be of such a character and force that the executive is satisfied 
 that he is such, though it need not be such as will meet the 
 requirements of legal evidence on a trial. A copy of an affidavit 
 
 ' Sternaman v. Peck, 80 Fed. 883, 
 884, 26 C. C. A. 214; In re Oteiza, 136 
 U. S. 330, 336, 34 L. ed. 464, 10 Sup. 
 Ct. 1031. 
 
 ^ In re Bryant, 80 Fed. 282, 284; 
 Bryant v. United States, 167 U. S. 
 104, 42 L. ed. 94, 17 Sup. Ct. 744; In 
 re Farez, 7 Blatchf. C. C. 345, 8 Fed. 
 Cas. 4645, 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 107; 
 In re Henrich, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 414, 
 425, 12 Fed. Cas. 6369; In re Doo 
 Woon, 18 Fed. 898, 899; Ex parte 
 Morgan, 20 Fed. 298, 307; Elias v. 
 Ramirez, 215 U. S. 393, 30 Sup. Ct. 
 T31 ; Benson v. McMahon, 127 U. S. 
 457, 461, 8 Sup. Ct. 1240, 32 L. ed. 234, 
 in which the court said, "We are not 
 sitting in this court on the trial of the 
 prisoner, with power to pronounce 
 him guilty and punish him or declare 
 him innocent and acquit him." In re 
 Oteiza, 136 U. S. 330, 335, 34 L- ed. 
 464, ID Sup. Ct. 1031, in which case 
 the court held that there was no error 
 in excluding evidence consisting of 
 depositions offered on the part of the 
 accused though the statute permitted 
 such proof offered against him. 
 
 *Hess V. Grimes (Kan., 1897), 48 
 
 Pac. 596; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 
 642, 652, 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. 
 1 148; In re White, 55 Fed. 54, 57, 5 
 C. C. A. 29, citing and approving 
 Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 29 L. 
 ed. 544, 6 Sup. Ct. 291 ; Dennison v. 
 Christian, 196 U. S. 62,7, 49 L- ed. 
 630, 25 Sup. Ct. 795. A prisoner who 
 is allowed to go outside of a reforma- 
 tory in the state of New York on 
 parole under a statute of that state, 
 he promising to obey the directions of 
 the parole, which are that he shall go 
 to IMichigan, and who, instead of do- 
 ing so, comes to Connecticut, is a 
 fugitive from justice within the pro^ 
 visions of the United States consti- 
 tution. Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68 Conn. 
 441, 36 Atl. 830, 36 L. R. A. 486. A 
 person may in law be regarded as a 
 fugitive from justice when he has 
 committed a crime in a state, and 
 withdraws from the jurisdiction of its 
 courts without waiting to abide the 
 consequences of his action. In re 
 White, 55 Fed. 54, 57> 5 C. C A. 29, 
 citing Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 
 86, 29 L. ed. 544, 6 Sup. Ct. 291.
 
 Soy IXTERXATIOXAL AND INTERSTATE EXTRADITION. § 497 
 
 sworn to before a notary public or justice of the peace by the 
 governor of the state demanding extradition alleging that the 
 accused is or was a fugitive from justice has been held sufficient/" 
 
 Some few authorities hold that the determination of this ques- 
 tion by the executive of the state is conclusive upon the courts; 
 and, where this view is admitted to be the correct one, the courts 
 will not, upon the return of a writ of habeas corpus, receive evi- 
 dence to show that the accused was never in, and had not in fact 
 fled from, the state which demands his return to its domain. 
 
 Other cases support the proposition that the decision of this 
 question by the executive is reviewable by the federal courts. It 
 must be made to appear from the evidence that the accused is a 
 fugitive from the justice of the demanding state. The federal 
 statute does not prescribe the character of the proof required to 
 show that he is a fugitive. An affidavit, sworn to, and attested 
 by the seal of the court in which an indictment is pending against 
 the accused, and stating that "he is a fugitive from justice," and 
 that he is then in the asylum state, has been held sufficient over 
 an objection that such a statement is only a conclusion of law 
 and does not state any facts."^' And the accused ought to be per- 
 mitted to disprove the allegation that he is a fugitive from justice 
 by any proper evidence, as, for example, by proof that he had 
 never been a resident of the state from which the demand came." 
 
 ^'' State V. Clough, 72 N. H. 178, 55 laws of the demanding state, without 
 
 Atl. 554, 67 L. R. A. 946. exception as to the nature of the 
 
 "a£,t- parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, crime. * * * Upon the executive 
 
 643, 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. 1 148. of the state in which the accused is 
 
 In the case of Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, found rests the responsibility of de- 
 
 650, 652, the court, by Harlan, J., termining, in some legal mode, 
 
 said : "It is within the power of each whether he is a fugitive from the 
 
 state, except as her authority may be justice of the demanding state. He 
 
 limited by the constitution of the does not fail in duty if he makes it 
 
 United States, to declare what shall a condition precedent to the sur- 
 
 be offenses against her laws, and render of the accused that it be shown 
 
 citizens of other states, when within to him, by competent proof, that the 
 
 her jurisdiction, are subject to those accused is, in fact, a fugitive from 
 
 laws. In recognition of this right the justice of the demanding state." 
 
 * * * the words of the clause in " /T.i- (yartc Smith (The Mormon 
 
 reference to fugitives from justice Prophet), 3 McLean C. C. (U. S.) 
 
 were made sufficiently comprehensive 121, 137, 22 Fed. Cas. 12968; In re 
 
 to include every offense against the Cook, 49 Fed. 833 ; In re Manchester,
 
 § 498 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 808 
 
 The determination of the question wlictlier the person wlio is 
 claimed to be a fugitive is "charged with treason, felony, or 
 other crime," is exclusively for the examining magistrate or fed- 
 eral commissioner to decide upon all the facts in evidence. 
 Proof that the defendant was in the demanding state when a 
 crime was committed and when his arrest was sought he was 
 found in another state shows that he is a fugitive from justice." 
 Wliether the person whose extradition is demanded is charged 
 with any crime is a question of fact to be shown by the evidence 
 in the case. Whether the crime is extraditable under the consti- 
 tution or under a treaty is a question of law. The determination 
 of the former question cannot be reviewed under an exception 
 that it is against the weight of the evidence. But the issue of law, 
 whether the crime as proved is extraditable under the statute or 
 treaty, is one involving the construction of a writing, and the 
 judgment of the magistrate or commissioner thereon may be re- 
 versed if palpably erroneous in law.^^ 
 
 § 498. Evidential rules governing interstate extradition. — The 
 constitution of the United States provides,^* "that any person 
 charged in any state with treason, felony or other crime, who 
 shall flee from justice and be found subsequently in any other 
 state of the Union, shall, on the demand of the executive of the 
 state from whence he has fled, be delivered up to be removed to 
 the state having jurisdiction of his crime." 
 
 At a very early period congress endeavored by statutory enact- 
 ment to carry into effect this section of the constitution.^^ 
 
 5 Cal. 237; Jones v. Leonard, 50 Iowa Nichols, 203 U. S. 192, 51 L. ed. 148,27 
 
 106, 32 Am. 116; Hartman v. Aveline, Sup. Ct. iii; Appleyard v. Massachu- 
 
 63 Ind. 344, 30 Am 217; Wilcox v. setts, 203 U. S. 222, 51 L. ed. 161, 27 
 
 Nolze, 34 Ohio St. 520, 521 ; In re Sup. Ct. 122. 
 
 White, 55 Fed. 54, 58, 5 C. C. A. 29; " Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U. S. 502, 40 
 
 Hyatt V. New York, 188 U. S. 691, 47 L. ed. 787, 16 Sup. Ct. 689. 
 
 L. ed. 657, 23 Sup. Ct. 456, aflf'g Peo- " Art. 4. § 2. 
 
 pie V. Hyatt, 172 N. Y. 176, 64 N. E. "United States Statute of 1793. c. 
 
 825, 92 Am. St. 706, 60 L. R. A. 774; 7, § i. The act of 1793, U. S. R. S., 
 
 where accused was in the state for § 5278, reads as follows : "Whenever 
 
 only one day. the executive authority of any state 
 
 ^ Straviss, In re, 126 Fed. z^y, 63 C. or territory demands any person as 
 
 C. A. 99; Hughes v. Pflanz. 138 Fed. a fugitive from justice of the execu- 
 
 980, 71 C. C. A. 234; Pettibone v. tive authority of any state or terri-
 
 809 IXTERXATIOXAL AXD IXTERSTATE EXTRADITION. § 499 » 
 
 In construing this statute the courts have held: First, that the 
 return of the fugitive from justice must have been demanded by 
 the executive authorities of the state from whence he has flecl. 
 Second, it must affirmatively appear by the evidence that he is 
 charged with the commission of some extraditable crime which 
 is within the jurisdiction of its courts. The fact that he is charged 
 with such a crime may be proved by the production of a warrant 
 for his arrest,^ "^ or an indictment duly certified and authenticated 
 as provided by statute, supplemented by an affidavit reciting any 
 other facts which are necessary to confer jurisdiction and charg- 
 ing him substantially with a crime against the laws of the state 
 demanding his return.* ' 
 
 ^ 499. Character, form and authentication of indictments, etc., in 
 interstate extradition. — Hie documents accompanying the requisi- 
 tion papers to be admissible in evidence must be certified as au- 
 thentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the state or terri- 
 tory from whence the person deinanded has fled.^*^ The indict- 
 ment which is produced to show that the accused is charged with 
 a crime must allege some definite crime. If it does this, and if 
 
 tory to which such person has fled charged. Ail costs or expenses in- 
 and produces a copy of an indictment curred in the apprehending, securing 
 found or an affidavit made before a and transmitting such fugitive to the 
 magistrate of any state or territory, state or territory making such de- 
 charging the person demanded with mand shall be paid by such state or 
 having committed treason, felony or territory." 
 
 other crime, certified as authentic by " People v. Warden of City Prison, 
 
 the governor or chief magistrate of 83 App. Div. (N. Y.) 456, 82 N. Y. 
 
 the state or territory from whence the S. 439; oral evidence as to requisi- 
 
 person so charged has fled, it shall be tion papers, 112 Am. .St. 120, note; 
 
 the duty of the executive authority of evidence of the law of the demanding 
 
 the state or territory to which such state, 112 Am. St. 126. 
 
 person has fled to cause him to be ar- ^' Ex parte Slcrnaman, 77 Fed. 595; 
 
 rested and secured, and to cause no- Ex t^artc Rcggcl, 114 U. S. 642, 649, 
 
 tice of the arrest to be given to the 29 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. 1148. 
 
 executive authority making such de- "Kingsbury's case, 106 Mass. 223; 
 
 mand, or to the agent of such author- State v. Goss, (^ Minn. 291, 68 N. W. 
 
 ity appointed to receive the fugitive, 1089; People v. Donohuc. 84 N. Y. 
 
 and to cause the fugitive to be de- 438; Ex f^arlc Powell. 20 Fia. 806. 
 
 livered to such agent when he shall .Sec. also, Mississippi Code. 1892, 
 
 apj)car. If no such agent appears § 2162; oral evidence as to requisi- 
 
 within six months from the time of tion papers, 112 .^m. .St. 120, note. 
 the arrest, the prisoner may be dis-
 
 § 499 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 ;io 
 
 it is also properly aiilhenticated by the executive as required by 
 statute, it will be sufficient proof of the fact that the accused is 
 charged with crime to pre\'ent his discharge from custody on the 
 return of a writ of habeas corpus, though the indictment is in- 
 artistically drawn or is otherwise technically defective in form/'' 
 An affidavit alleging upon information and belief that the 
 fugitive has committed a crime is wholly insufficient as proof of 
 criminality.-'' The general rule is that the affidavits and the 
 requisition papers which are used as evidence in an interstate ex- 
 tradition proceeding need not be framed with extreme technical 
 precision in order to be admissible. But they must show with 
 clearness to the satisfaction of the magistrate that the party 
 whose extradition is sought was in the demanding state at the 
 time of the crime, "^ that he is a fugitive from justice,-- as well 
 as the character and venue of the crime with which he stands 
 charged."^ 
 
 " Jackson v. Archibald, 12 Ohio Cir. 
 Ct. 155 ; Davis's case, 122 Mass. 324, 
 329; In re Greenough, 31 Vt. 279; 
 State V. O'Connor, 38 Minn. 243, 36 
 N. W. 462; In re Voorhees, 32 N. J. 
 L. 141; Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 
 80, 29 L. ed. 544. 6 Sup. Ct. 291 ; Ex 
 parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 651, 29 
 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. 1 148; Hayes v. 
 Palmer, 21 App. D. C. 450; Ex parte 
 Pierce, 155 Fed. 663. 
 
 ■"£4: parte Smith, 3 McLean C. C. 
 (U. S.) 121, 137, 22 Fed. Cas. 12968; 
 Ex parte ^lorgan, 20 Fed. 298, 307. 
 "It must appear, therefore, to the 
 governor of the state to whom such 
 a demand is presented, before he can 
 lawfully comply with it, first, that the 
 person demanded is substantial!}' 
 charged with a crime against the laws 
 of the state from whose justice he is 
 alleged to have fled, by an indict- 
 ment or an affidavit, certified as au- 
 thentic by the governor of the state 
 making the demand, and. second, that 
 the person demanded is a fugitive 
 from the justice of that state. The 
 
 first of these prerequisites is a ques- 
 tion of law, and is always open upon 
 the face of the papers to judicial in- 
 quiry, on an application for a dis- 
 charge under a writ of habeas corpus. 
 The second is a question of fact 
 which the governor of the state upon 
 whom the demand is m.ade must de- 
 cide, upon such evidence as he may 
 deem satisfactory." A certified copy 
 of the law said to have been broken 
 need not be furnished. The courts of 
 the United States take judicial notice 
 of the law of all the states. Remarks 
 of the court in Roberts v. Reilly, 116 
 U. S. 80, 95-96, 29 L. ed. 544, 6 Sup. 
 Ct. 291. 
 
 "People V. Conlin, 15 Misc. (X. 
 Y.) 303, 36 N. Y. S. 888. 
 
 "In re Hey ward, i Sandf. (N. Y. 
 Super.) 701 ; Ex parte Smith. 3 Mc- 
 Lean c c. (u. s.) 121, 137-139. 22 
 
 Fed. Cas. 12968; Dennison v. Chris- 
 tian, 72 Neb. 703, loi N. W. 1045, 117 
 Am. St. 817. 
 
 ^ Ex parte Romanes, i Utah 2^; 
 In re Manchester, 5 Cal. 237; Ex
 
 8ll IXTERXATIOXAL AXD IXTERSTATE EXTRADITIOX. § 5OO 
 
 If the indictment and the affidavit are properly authenticated 
 as required by the statute, the court will not, upon the return of 
 a writ of Jiabcas corpus, receive evidence to prove or to disprove 
 its validity, or to contradict its allegations, or generally to inquire 
 into the guilt or innocence of the accused.'* 
 
 ^ 500. Constitutional and statutory regulation of the mode of prov- 
 ing and effect of records of other states. — As regards the mode of 
 proving the necessary facts in interstate extradition, it may be 
 sufficient to call attention to the provision of the federal consti- 
 tution which enacts that "full faith and credit shall be given in 
 each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of 
 every other state ; and the congress may, by general laws, pre- 
 scribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings 
 shall be proved, and the effect thereof.""^ 
 
 To fully efifectuate this constitutional provision congress has 
 enacted "that the records and judicial proceedings of the courts 
 of any state shall be proved or admitted in any other court within 
 the United States by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of 
 the court annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate 
 of the judge, chief justice or presiding magistrate, as the case 
 may be, that the said attestation is in due form. And the said 
 records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, 
 shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court 
 within the United States as they have by law or usage in the 
 courts of the state from whence such records are or shall be 
 taken."-« 
 
 parte Smith, 3 McLean C. C. (U. S.) N. Y. S. 888; People v. Pinkerton, 77 
 
 121, 134, 137, 22 Fed. Cas. 12968; Ex N. Y. 245; In re White, 55 Fed. 54, 58. 
 
 parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 651, 29 5 C. C. A. 29. So, also, of a record of 
 
 L. ed. 250, 5 Sup. Ct. 1148; State v. a conviction, Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 
 
 White, 40 Wash. 560, 82 Pac. 907, Fed. 980, 71 C C. A. 234. The execu- 
 
 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 563n ; Cheatham, tive warrant is prima facie proof tliat 
 
 Ex parte, 50 Te.x. Cr. 51, 95 S. W. the accused is a fugitive from justice, 
 
 1077. Ex parte Edwards, 91 (Miss.) 621, 
 
 ^ Ex parte Devine, 74 Miss. 715, 22 44 So. 827. 
 
 So. 3; Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio ^'Constitution of the ITnitcd States, 
 
 St. 64, 32 Am. 345n ; Ex parte Shcl- article 4, section t. 
 
 don, 34 Ohio St. 319; State v. '""United States Statute, May 26, 
 
 Schlemn, 4 Harr. (Del.) 577; People 1790; United States Statutes at Large, 
 
 V. Conlin, 15 Misc. (N. Y.) 303, 36 L. and B. Edition 122.
 
 § 500 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 8l2 
 
 The attestation of the clerk which is required l)y the statute 
 must be in form the same as that usually employed in the state 
 wlience it comes. If the court has a seal it must be affixed to the 
 certificate of the clerk, while if it has none this fact must appear 
 on the face of the certificate.^^ 
 
 The certificate of the judge, to the effect that the attestation is 
 in due form, must show on its face that the judge certifying is 
 the chief or presiding judge at the date of certifying the record.-^ 
 It must also show that the clerk who attests is at the date of the 
 attestation the clerk of the court, and that his attestation is in 
 due form. Where a court has gone out of existence, the clerk and 
 presiding justice of another court with which it has been consoli- 
 dated, or upon which its powers and jurisdiction have been con- 
 ferred, may furnish the requisite certification and attestation. 
 
 The statute, despite the mandatory character of its language, 
 has been held not to furnish an exclusive mode of authenticating 
 public records. And for the reason that the statute refers ex- 
 pressly only to courts having a presiding judge, a clerk and a 
 seal, it has been held that courts not of record, or those having 
 only limited powers and jurisdiction, were not included in its 
 terms. The copies of the records and the proceedings of such 
 courts as, for example, courts of justices of the peace and minor 
 municipal courts, are to be proved and authenticated according 
 to the procedure of the state in whose tribunals they are to be 
 used.-" If the requirements of the federal statute are substantially 
 complied with, a certified and attested copy ought not to be re- 
 jected because of mere formal verbal and technical irregularities, 
 as, for example, because it does not show the identity of the ac- 
 cused, or that the court had competent jurisdiction, or the facts 
 upon which his conviction was founded.^** 
 
 § 501. General rules regulating the taking of evidence in foreign 
 extradition. — In all cases of foreign extradition, the taking of the 
 evidence and the examination of the accused, so far as these mat- 
 
 "For a full citation of civil and Bibb. (Kj^.) 369, and cases cited Un- 
 criminal cases, see Underbill on Evi- derhill on Evidence, note 4, p. 224. 
 dence, § 148. ^ See Underbill on Evidence, p. 225. 
 
 ^Settle V. Alison, 8 Ga. 201, 52 Am. for cases. 
 Dec. 393 ; Stephenson v. Bannister, 3 ^" See cases cited in Underbill on 
 
 Evidence, §§ 148, 159.
 
 8l3 IXTERXATIOXAL AXD IXTERSTATE EXTRADITION. § 5OI 
 
 ters are not controlled bv statute, must be conducted according: 
 to the laws of the state in which the proceedings are had. If the 
 law of that state entitles the accused on his preliminary examina- 
 tion to testify in his own behalf, a person under examination for 
 extradition is entitled to be so examined. ^^ But generally the 
 rules and principles of the English common law as applied to 
 criminal charges are not controlling to their fullest extent in cases 
 of international extradition. Usually the statutes and treaties 
 provide for the character of the evidence and what form it shall 
 assume. Their provisions are controlling and under them it has 
 been held that the accused is not entitled to be confronted with 
 the witnesses against him.^" 
 
 So, too, the documentary evidence, if properly authenticated. 
 must receive the same degree of credit and weight as proof in the 
 court wherein it is offered, as would be accorded to living wit- 
 nesses who give testimony personally in the presence of that 
 court. ^^ 
 
 The federal commissioner should keep a record of all the oral 
 evidence taken before him, written out in a narrative form and 
 not by question and answer. Fie should note therein all objec- 
 tions to the admissibility of the evidence and the grounds of such 
 objections. The party seeking the extradition of the fugitive 
 ought to furnish the commissioner with an accurate translation 
 of every piece of documentary evidence which is written in a 
 foreign language, accompanied by an affidavit sworn to by the 
 translator to the effect that the translation is correct.^* 
 
 The statute provides^ ^ that the commissioner shall receive the 
 testimony of such witnesses as are offered by the accused. He 
 need not adjourn the proceedings in order to permit the accused 
 to procure depositions to prove an alibi. ^^ 
 
 "7« re Fare;:. 7 RIatchf. C. C. (U. 205, 48 L. cd. 938. 24 Sup. Ct. 657. 
 
 S.) 345, 8 Fed. Cas. 4645, 40 How. "=■/» re Farez, 7 Blatchf. C. C. (U. 
 
 Prac. (N. Y.) 107. S.) 345, 8 Fed. Cas. 4645; Elias v. 
 
 "/« re Dupan. 2 Lowell C. C. (U Ramirez, 215 U. S. 398, 30 Sup. Ct. 
 
 S.) TMass. District Court) 367,7 Fed. 131. 
 
 Cas. 4120. The evidence of criminal- '**/» re Henrich, 5 Blatchf. C. C. 
 
 ity must be such as accordinj? to the (U. S.) 414. 425, 12 Fed. Cas. 6369. 
 
 laws of the state where he is found "* 3 Fed. Stat.. § 5280 : 22 U. S. Stat, 
 
 justifies his apprehension and commit- at Larpe. p. 215, Au^fust 3. 1882. 
 
 mcnf if the crime had been committed " /« re Wadge, IS Fed. 864, aff'.c; 
 
 there. Pcttit v. Walshc, 194 U. S. 21 Blatchf. C. C (U. S.) 300.
 
 S 502 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 814 
 
 It is sufficient if there is some competent evidence of guilt or 
 that probable cause exists for believing the accused guilty. The 
 evidence of guilt need not be conclusixe nor must the commis- 
 sioner be absolutely certain of the guilt of the accused. 
 
 ^ 502. Authentication by consular certificate of warrants and 
 other papers used as evidence in international extradition. — The 
 statute also provides that where any deposition, warrant or other 
 papers, or copies thereof, shall be offered in evidence upon the 
 hearing of any case, in which the extradition of an alleged fugi- 
 tive is required, the same shall be received as evidence for all pur- 
 poses of the hearing if they shall be legally authenticated so as to 
 entitle them to be received for similar purposes in the courts and 
 tribunals of the foreign country whence the accused is alleged to 
 have escaped. And it is further provided that the certificate of the 
 principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resi- 
 dent in such foreign country shall be proof that any deposition, 
 warrant or other paper or copies thereof, so offered, are authen- 
 ticated in the manner required by this act.^^ 
 
 In construing this statute the courts have held that it provides 
 for the introduction of two sorts of documentary evidence. First. 
 Original depositions, original warrants and original "other pa- 
 pers." Second. Copies of any such depositions, warrants or 
 "other papers," which must be originals or copies of such orig- 
 inals as are legally entitled to be received in the tribunal of the 
 foreign country as proof of criminality with respect to the offense 
 charged if the inquiry were had in the foreign tribunal. And all 
 papers are to be authenticated according to the law of the foreign 
 country.^" 
 
 s- T '.. 
 
 'United States v. Piaza, 133 Fed. crime by the party held for extradi- 
 
 gg8. tion "are properly and legally authen- 
 
 ^ United States R. S., §5271; In re ticated. so as to entitle them to be 
 
 Henrich, 5 Blatchf. C. C. (U. S.) 414. received for similar purposes by the 
 
 425, 426, 12 Fed. Cas. 6369. See, also, tribunals of Great Britain." is the 
 
 In re Wadge, 16 Fed. 332, 2,Z2- In a proper form, and the documents are 
 
 case of international extradition, the to be received as competent evidence, 
 
 certificate of the American embas- In re Breen, 73 Fed. 458, 459. 
 
 sador to Great Britain to the ^ In re Fowler, 4 Fed. 303, 309. 18 
 
 effect that the papers containing the Blatchf. C. C. (U. S.) 430. 
 evidence of the commission of the
 
 8l5 IXTERXATIOXAL AND IXTERSTATE EXTRADITIOX. § 
 
 D^O 
 
 It would seem from the language of the statute that its provi- 
 sions were mandatory. But it has been held that, under certain 
 circumstances, the certificate, if it is presented in such a form as 
 not to comply strictly with the statute, may be aided and supple- 
 mented by other evidence, either documentary or oral. Thus, 
 where the consular certificate omitted to state expressly that depo- 
 sitions were legally authenticated so as to be receivable as valid 
 evidence of criminality in the courts of the kingdom of Prussia, 
 it was permitted to introduce the certificates of court officials of 
 that country to the effect that the depositions were proper and 
 valid evidence. The oral testimony of a police officer, to the effect 
 that the depositions attached to the requisition papers had been 
 signed and sworn to in his presence, that they were originals and 
 that they would be received to show criminality in the tribunals 
 of the foreign country, is sufficient to supplement an insufficient 
 authentication by a diplomatic official.'*'^ 
 
 ^ 503. The competency of certified copies as evidence of criminal- 
 ity. — The competency of the evidence offered in cases of foreign 
 extradition must be determined according to the law of the place 
 where the proceeding is had. In the absence of statute, copies of 
 ex parte depositions taken out of the jurisdiction, though prop- 
 erly attested by the clerk of the foreign court, are never evidence 
 of the commission of a crime by the accused.'*^ 
 
 If the fact to be proved is only the existence of a foreign rec- 
 ord, as, for example, the fact that the accused had been convicted 
 of a crime, a certified copy of the record is competent evidence 
 of that fact, even in the absence of statute. But when the fact to 
 be proved is the commission of a crime by the accused, and when, 
 as in the present instance, such proof of that fact is required as 
 would suffice to commit him on a preliminary examination were 
 the venue of the crime laid in this country, then a different ques- 
 tion is presented and a different rule applies. 
 
 '"In re Wadfic, 15 Fed. 864, 16 Fed. In re Kaine, 14 How. U. S. 10.1, 115. 
 
 3.32, 3.34, 21 Rlatchf. C. C. (U. S.) 116, 144, 146, 14 L. ed. 345. 10 N. Y. 
 
 300; In re Fowler, 4 Fed. 303, 312, Lep. Observer, 257, 268; evidence re- 
 
 18 Blatchf. C. C. CU. S.) 430, 437, f|uircd before the issuing of the rov- 
 
 438. ernor's warrant, 92 Am. St. 731, note. 
 
 "In re Wadge, \U Fed. 332, 334;
 
 § 504 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 8l6 
 
 Proof that there is legal and competent proof of criminalitv 
 elsewhere on file in some other court is never equivalent to proof 
 here. The documents, whether originals or copies, must be such 
 as would be competent for a similar purpose, i. c, as evidence of 
 criminality, in the tribunals of the foreign country. The full cer- 
 tificate of the diplomatic officer that they are so is absolute and 
 conclusive, and admits them in the court here, whether they are 
 originals or copies. But if they are copies, and it does not ap- 
 pear either from this certificate or from some other competent 
 evidence, either oral or written, that copies of original depositions 
 are received by the foreign court for the purpose of proving crim- 
 inality, they will not be received for that purpose here.^^ 
 
 vj 504. Proof of foreign laws and treaties in international extradi- 
 tion. — In the case of foreign extradition, the foreign law. which 
 tlie prisoner is charged with breaking, will not be judicially no- 
 ticed by the federal court. ''^ The existence, contents and character 
 of the foreign law must be proved. This may usually be done, in 
 the case of a foreign statute, by reading it from a printed book 
 purporting to contain the statute in question ; and which is prop- 
 erly attested or authenticated as a true copy of the statute by the 
 supreme executive authority of the foreign country : or which is 
 otherwise satisfactorily proved to have been published by proper 
 authority and wdiich is shown to have been received as ])roof of 
 the statute in the courts of the foreign state.** Doubtless under 
 the existing statute the certificate of the principal diplomatic or 
 consular officer of the United States, to the effect that the book 
 was authenticated, so as to entitle it to be received for a similar 
 purpose in the foreign country, would be sufficient.*^ 
 
 A practicing attorney of the foreign state, or some other per- 
 son, official or otherwise, Avho has had some practice in the courts 
 of the foreign state, and who is familiar with its laws, may testify 
 to his knowledge or opinion as to w'hat that law is. Such a wit- 
 ness, called to prove a foreign law, may refresh his memory by 
 
 ^- In re McPhun, 30 Fed. 57, 59. 60; p. t,-6, n. 4, for a full citation of 
 
 In re Fowler, 4 Fed. 303, 312, 18 cases; 112 Am. .St. 126. note. 
 Blatchf. C. C (U. S.) 430, 439. See, "* See Underbill on Evidence, § 14.3. 
 
 also, Ex parte Ross, 2 Bond. (S. Dist. p. 2ti. 
 Ohio) 252, 20 Fed. Cas. 12069. "/n re Oteiza, 136 U. S. 330. 2,?>7< 
 
 " See Underhill on Evidence, § 242, 34 L. ed. 464, 10 Sup. Ct. 1031.
 
 8l7 INTERXATIOXAL AND IXTERSTATE EXTRADITION. § 505 
 
 reading from text-books of authority and from the reports of 
 cases decided in the courts of the foreign country, and he may, 
 perhaps, read such books to the court, provided he is able to swear 
 that they are admitted as authorities by the courts of the foreign 
 country." 
 
 All treaties entered into by the government of the United States 
 with foreign nations are, as soon as they are confirmed by the 
 senate of the United States, a component part of the supreme 
 statutory law of tlie land. They possess the character and efficacy 
 of an act of congress, and are to be regarded in that light for all 
 purposes by tlie courts and by all officials attached to them. 
 Hence the courts, both federal and state, will take judicial notice 
 of their existence, the date upon which they became law, their 
 contents and provisions, and the rights and obligations of all par- 
 ties, public and private, under them.'*^ 
 
 So. too. the courts will take judicial notice of the existence 
 of all foreign go\ernments whose existence, either dc facto or 
 dc jure, has been acknowledged by the executi\e branch of the 
 federal government. Whether a government has been thus ac- 
 knowledged is a question of fact to be proved when required by 
 a certificate from the secretary of state, or, perhaps, by oral evi- 
 dence of the fact that its diplomatic representatives have been 
 dul}- received by our government.*'* 
 
 ^ 505. Proof of laws in interstate extradition. — The mode above 
 described for pro\'ing foreign laws is applicable where the law 
 of one state of the Union is to be proved in the courts of another 
 state. But in many of the states the statutorv law of a sister state 
 may. unrler special statutes, be proved bv reading the same from 
 a printed volume which, upon its face, purports to contain the 
 statutory law of that state. "*" 
 
 "^ I'nflcrhill on Evidence, pp. 212, "See Underbill on Evidence, §24,^ 
 
 21.^; 112 .'\m. St. 126, note. "Sloan v. Terry, 78 Mo. 623; St. 
 
 " United States v. Arredondo, 6 Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Weaver, 35 
 
 Peters (U. S.) 691, 8 L. ed. 547; Fos- Kan. 412, 11 Pac. 4aS, 57 Am. I76n; 
 
 ter V. Neilson, 2 Peters fU. S.) 253, Eastman v. Crosby, S Allen (Mass.) 
 
 314, 7 L. ed. 415. .^nd for all full 206; and see cases fully cited m Un- 
 
 ritation of cases on this question, see rlerbill on Evidence, p. 213. and 8 242. 
 
 ( nrlcTliill (,n Evidence, 8 242. p. 37R, p 377. note I; 112 Am St. 126. note 
 nr)te I. 
 
 52 — U.N'DKKUII.I. CRIM Ev.
 
 § 50: 
 
 CRIMINAL F.VTDENCE. 
 
 8l8 
 
 The federal courts will take judicial notice of all the state con- 
 stitutions and of all statutes which are applicable to the subject 
 of interstate extradition. The statutory law of the various states 
 of the Union is in no sense a foreign law as regards the delibera- 
 tions of the federal judges to be pro^•ed as the law of a foreign 
 country. It must be taken notice of in the same manner as the 
 laws of the United Stales are taken notice of bv these courts.^'* 
 
 '" See remarks of Story, J., in 36 Fed. 841 ; Jasper v. Porter, 2 Mc- 
 
 Owings V. Hull, g Pet. (U. S.) 607, Lean C. C (U. S.) 579. 13 Fed. Cas. 
 
 624, 9 L. ed. 246; Jones v. Hays, 4 7229; Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U. S. 
 
 McLean C. C. (U. S.) 521, 13 Fed. 623, 34 L. ed. 1086, 11 Sup. Ct. 453, 
 
 Cas. 7467; Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 and see other cases fully cited in 
 
 U. S. I, 29 L. ed. 535, 6 Sup. Ct. 242; Underbill on Evidence, §242, p. 373, 
 
 Course v. Stead, 4 Dall. (U. S.) 22, n. 13. 
 1 L. ed. 724; Newberry v. Robinson,
 
 CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF PREVIOUS CRIME TO IN' CREASE PENALTY. 
 
 S 506. Statutes enhancing tb.e punisli- 
 ment of habitual criminals. 
 
 507. Constitutionality of legislation 
 
 punishing habitual criminals. 
 
 508. Conviction of the former crime 
 
 must have been prior to the 
 commission of the crime now 
 being tried. 
 
 509. Effect of pardon of former 
 
 crime in excluding proof of 
 prior conviction. 
 
 510. Setting out the former convic- 
 
 tion in the indictment — Vari- 
 ance. 
 
 511. Effect of plea of not guilty. 
 
 512. Order of trying the issue of 
 
 former conviction. 
 
 513. Necessity of proving discharge 
 
 from prison. 
 
 514. Proof of the prior conviction — 
 
 How made. 
 
 515. Proof of the identity of the ac- 
 
 cused with the person previ.- 
 ouslv convicted. 
 
 § 506. Statutes enhancing the punishment of habitual criminals. — 
 In England, and in veiy many of llie states of the American 
 Union, from the earliest times statntoiy enactments have existed 
 hy \'irtue of which a severer punisliment has been inflicted upon 
 the accused, if the crime of which he is convicted is a second, a 
 third or a subsequent offense.^ 
 
 * Section 688 of the Xew York 
 Penal Code provides, "that a person, 
 who, after having been convicted 
 within this state, of a felony, * * * 
 commits any crime, within this state, is 
 punishable upon conviction of such 
 second offense as follows: (i) If the 
 subsequent crime is such that, upon a 
 first conviction, the offender might 
 be punished, in the discretion of the 
 court, by imprisonment for life, he 
 must be sentenced to imprisonment 
 in a state prison for b'fe; (2) if the 
 subsefjuent crime is such that, upon 
 a first conviction, the offender would 
 
 be punishal)le by imprisonment for 
 any term less than his natural life, 
 then such person must be sentenced 
 to imprisonment for a term not less 
 than the longest term nor more than 
 twice the longest term, prescribed 
 upon a first conviction." In the state 
 of Massachu.setts this matter is regu- 
 lated by Statutes of 1817, chapter 176, 
 which provide "that whenever any 
 person wdio shall l)e convicted of 
 crime, before any court competent to 
 try the same, the punishment whereof 
 shall be confinement to bard labor 
 for aiiv term of vears, shall li.'ive been 
 
 (819)
 
 § 507 CRIMIxXAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 520 
 
 These statutes, it will be observed, are highly penal in their 
 character, and their application ought not to be extended to cases 
 which do not, by the strictest rules of construction, come under 
 their provisions. It is clear that they were intended by the legis- 
 lature to prevent the repetition of crime by the same persons by 
 imposing increased penalties upon old offenders, and inflicting a 
 severer punishment upon the repetition of certain crimes." 
 
 The purpose of all these statutes is the very laudable one of 
 reforming offenders by grading the punishment for crime in such 
 a manner that a person who has once offended against the law, 
 and who has been convicted and punished for his crime, will 
 be deterred from a repetition of his act by the fear of an en- 
 hanced punishment for a future crime. After the conviction of 
 the earlier offense, the offender is given a period for amendment 
 and reformation, and to enable him, if he will, to return to the 
 paths of rectitude and usefulness. If he shall fail to profit by 
 this opportunity for his moral rehabilitation and shall con- 
 tinue in his criminal career, he is presumed to be incorrigible, and 
 the law demands that he shall be permanently secluded from 
 association with other persons that they may not be contaminated 
 by his pernicious example. 
 
 § 507. Constitutionality of legislation punishing habitual crimi- 
 nals. — The statutes enhancing the punishment upon a subsequent 
 conviction are not open to the objection that they are ex post 
 facto laws, or in the nature of such laws, or that they are in 
 any sense retrospective in their action.^ Nor can they, with 
 
 before sentenced to a like punishment (Mass.) 165, 170; Ex parte Gutierrez, 
 by courts of this or of any other of 45 Cal. 429; Com. v. Graves, 155 
 the United States, whether such con- Mass. 163, 165, 29 N. E. 579, 16 L. 
 vict shall have been pardoned or not, R. A. 256; Sturtevant v. Com., 158 
 he shall be sentenced to solitary im- Mass. 598, 600, 33 N. E. 648; Black- 
 prisonment, etc., in addition to the burn v. State, 50 Ohio St. 428, 438, 
 punishment by law prescribed for the 36 N. E. 18; Commonwealth v. Get- 
 offense for which he shall be tried." chell, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 452, 453". 
 See IDS Am. St. 983, note. Kinney v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. 500, 78 
 
 ^Ex parte Seymour, 14 Pick. S. W. 226, reversed in 79 S. W. 570; 
 
 (Alass.) 40, 42. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 11 Pick. 
 
 ^Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Gratt. (Mass.) 28; Herndon v. Common- 
 
 (Va.) 738; People v. Raymond. 96 wealth, 105 Ky. I97. 48 S. W. 989. 20 
 
 N. Y. 38, 40; Ross' Case, 2 Pick. Ky. L. 11 14, 88 Am. St. 303; White
 
 821 PREVIOUS CRIME TO IXCREASE PENALTY. § 507 
 
 justice, be regarded as inflicting or imposing a double punishment 
 for the one offense/ or as inflicting a cruel or unusual punish- 
 ment,"' or as putting the accused twice in jeopardy for the same 
 oft'ense.*^ 
 
 V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 50 S. W. State v. Dowden, 137 Iowa 573, 115 
 
 678, 20 Ky. L. 1942; Whorton v. N. W. 211. 
 
 Commonwealth, 7 Ky. L. 826; Mc- "Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. ^^z, 
 
 Donald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. ^77, 40 L. ed. 301, 16 Sup. Ct. 179; 
 
 311, 313, 45 L. ed. 542, 21 S. Ct. 389; affirming Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S. 
 
 People V. Craig, 195 N. Y. 190, 193, 88 583, 27 L. ed. 207, i Sup. Ct. 637 ; and 
 
 N. E. 38, reversing 60 ]^lisc. (N. Y.) Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 468, 
 
 529, 112 N. Y. S. 781. 35 L. ed. 225, ir S. Ct. 577; Kelly v. 
 
 "People V. McCarthy, 45 How. Pr. People, 115 111. 583, 4 N. E. 644, 56 
 (N. Y.) 97; Chenowith v. Common- Am. 184; Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. 
 wealth (Ky.), 12 S. W. 585, ir Ky. 647, 658, 4 N. W. 785; People v. 
 L. 561 ; People v. Raymond, 96 N. Y. Lewis, 64 Cal. 401, i Pac. 490. In 
 38, 40; [Nlaguire v. State, 47 Md. 485, Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Gratt. 
 497; Blackburn v. State, 50 Ohio St. (Va.) 738, People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 
 428, 438, 36 N. E. iS; Rand v. Com- 113, 17 Am. 401; McDonald v. Com- 
 monwealth, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 738, 743; monwealth, 173 Mass. 322, 53 N. E. 
 People V. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 116, 874, 72, Am. St. 293; State v. Hodg- 
 17 Am. 401 ; Ingalls v. State, 48 Wis. son, (£ Vt. 134, 28 Atl. 1089, on page 
 647, 4 N. W. 785; State v. Austin, 113 743, the court says: "No constitu- 
 Mo. 538, 21 S. W. 31 ; Johnson v. tional or other obstacle, however, 
 People, 55 N. Y. 512; Kelly v. Peo- seems to stand in the way of the legis- 
 ple, 115 111. 583, 4 N. E. 644, 56 Am. lature's passing an act declaring that 
 184; People V. Bosworth, 64 Hun (N. persons thereafter convicted of cer- 
 Y.) 72, 19 N. Y. S. 114; Common- tain offenses committed after the 
 wealth V. Marchand, 155 Mass. 8, 9, passage of the act, may. if shown to 
 29 N. E. 578; Commonwealth v. have committed like offenses before. 
 Hughes, 133 Mass. 496, 497; Riley's be subjected to greater punishment 
 Case, 2 Pick. (IMass.) 172: Hopkins than that prescribed for those whose 
 V. Commonwealth, 3 Mete. (Mass.) previous course in life does not indi- 
 460, 467; State V. Benson, 28 Minn, cate so great a degree of moral de- 
 424, 425, ID N. W. 471 ; Plumbly v. pravity. One convicted under such a 
 Commonwealth, 2 Mete. (Mass.) 413, statute cannot justly complain that 
 415; State v. Austin, 113 Mo. 538, 21 his former transgressions have been 
 S. W. 31. brought up in judgment against him. 
 
 ^ Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. (i7Z, He knew, or is presumed to have 
 
 (\77, 40 L. ed. ,301, 16 Sup. Ct. 179; known, before the commission of the 
 
 State V. Hodgson, ^ Vt. 134, 157, 28 second offense, all the penalties dc- 
 
 Atl. 1089; People V. Stanley, 47 Cal. nounced against it; and if, in some 
 
 113, 117, 17 Am. 401; Borck v. State sense, the additional punishment may 
 
 r-Ma. 1905), .39 So. 580; In re. Fin- be said to be a consequence of the 
 
 ley, I Cal. App. 198, 81 Pac. 1041 ; first offense (inasmuch as there could
 
 § 5o8 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 § 508. Conviction of the former crime must have been prior to the 
 commission of the crime now being tried. — Many of the statutes 
 regulating the punishment of liabitual criminals expressly declare 
 that it must appear in evidence that the subsequent crime was 
 committed after the date of the prior conviction of the accused. 
 This rule requiring it to be proved that the conviction of the 
 earlier crime antedates the commission of the latter offense 
 for which the accused is now on trial would doubtless apply even 
 where the statute is silent on this point, as otherwise the offender 
 would have had no opportunity to reform because of the salu- 
 tary discipline of the punishment which he has received as a con- 
 sequence of the first conviction." 
 
 The infliction of the increased punishment is a consequence 
 of the failure to reform on the part of the accused after his earlier 
 punishment. Hence, if the latter crime has been committed ])rior 
 to the con\-iction, it is no proof whatever that the sentence and 
 punishment under such conviction had failed in their reforma- 
 tory effect upon the accused.^ • 
 
 he no sentence for such punishment 
 in the absence of proof of the first 
 conviction), still it is not a necessary 
 consequence, but one which could 
 only arise on the conviction for the 
 second offense, and one therefore, 
 which being fully apprised of in ad- 
 vance, the offender was left free to 
 brave or avoid." In construing such 
 a statute the court, in Commonwealth 
 V. Graves, 155 Mass. 163, 165, 29 N. 
 E. 579, 16 L. R. A. 256, said: "It is 
 prospective and not retrospective. It 
 deals with offenders for offenses com- 
 mitted after its passage, but it pro- 
 vides that, in considering the nature 
 of an offense and the condition into 
 which the offender is brought by it, 
 his previous conduct may be regarded. 
 * * * It is not unconstitutional as 
 an ex post facto law. In punishing 
 offenses committed after its passage, it 
 punishes the offenders for a criminal 
 liabit whose existence cannot be 
 proved without showing their volun- 
 
 tary criminal act done after they are 
 presumed to have had knowledge of 
 the statute. Such an act is a manifes- 
 tation of the habit, which tends to es- 
 tablish and confirm it, and for which 
 the wrongdoer may well be held re- 
 sponsible." 
 
 '' Long V. State, 36 Tex. 6 ; People 
 V. Butler, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 347; 
 Brown v. Commonwealth, 100 Ky. 
 127, 2>7 S. W. 496, 18 Ky. L. 630; 
 Brown v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 61 
 S. W. 4, 22 Ky. L. 1582; Rand v. 
 Commonwealth. 9 Gratt. (Va.) 738; 
 Commonwealth v. Welsh, 2 Va. Cas. 
 57, IDS Am. St. 983, note; Sharp v. 
 Commonwealth (Ky., 1909) ; 124 S. 
 W. 316. 
 
 * In Rand v. Commonwealth, 9 Gratt. 
 (Va.) 738, 746-748, the court says: 
 "The statute intended that convic- 
 tion should precede the second of- 
 fense; that the mischief was a want 
 of reformation by the first punish- 
 ment, and that the previous convic-
 
 S23 PREVIOUS CRIME TO INCREASE TEXALTY. § 509 
 
 § 509. Effect of pardon of former crime in excluding proof of prior 
 conviction. — \\'hether the fact that the accused has been pardoned 
 for the prior crime will prevent a conviction of it from being- 
 considered in enhancing the punishment for the subsequent 
 one has been differently determined. Usually the statute expressly 
 provides that the increased penalty shall be imposed irrespective 
 of the mode in which tlie accused has procured his discharge 
 from his previous imprisonment. In one case, however, where 
 the statute was silent, it was held that, as a pardon relieved the 
 oft'ender of all the consequences of his crime, one of which was 
 liis liability under the statute to receive an additional punishment 
 in case of a subsequent conviction, the prior conviction was 
 immaterial.^ 
 
 But elsewhere it has been held that a pardon cannot be pros- 
 pective in its operation, so as to operate to relieve an offender 
 from the consequences of a future infraction of the criminal 
 law. The increased punishment is not one of the consequences 
 of the former crime from which the pardon relieves the prisoner, 
 but grows out of and is the result of his failure to reform prior 
 to the latter oft'ense, upon which the pardon for an earlier crime 
 cannot legally operate.^" 
 
 § 510. Setting out the former conviction in the indictment — Vari- 
 ance. — The commission of the former crime by the accused, its 
 nature, and the date of its commission, together with the fact 
 and date of his conviction and sentence, must be set forth at 
 length in the indictment or information.^^ This is absolutely 
 
 tion was required as evidence that the monwealth, 105 Ky. 197, 48 S. W. 989, 
 
 mild correction for one offense had 20 Ky. L. 11 14, 88 Am. St. 303; State 
 
 failed of its effect ; that the legislature v. Manickc, 139 Mo. 545, 41 S. W. 
 
 intended that the culprit should first 223; People v. Price, 53 Hun (N. Y.) 
 
 hear the monitory voice of the law 185, 6 N. Y. S. 833. 
 hcfore the heavier doom should be "Evans v. State, 150 Ind. 651, 50 
 
 announced." N. E. 820; People v. Sickles, 156 N. 
 
 " Edwards v. Commonwealth, 78 Y. 541 ; 57 N. E. 288, affirming 26 App. 
 
 \'a. 39, 49 Am. yjT, State v. Martin, Div. (N. Y.) 470. 47^. 5° N. Y. S. 
 
 50 Ohio St. 212, 52 N. E. 188, 69 Am. },7i; People v. Price, 119 N. Y. 650. 
 
 St. 762, 43 L. R. A. 94. 23 N. E. 1 149; People v. Craig, 195 
 
 "Mount v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. N. Y. 190, 194. 88 N. E. 38; Wood v. 
 
 (Ky.) 93; Williams v. People 196 111. People, 53 N. Y. 511 ; State v. Marku- 
 
 173, 63 N. E. 681; Hcrndon v. Com- son, 7 N. Dak. 155, Ti N. W. 82.
 
 §§ 5II~5I2 CRIMINAL EX'IUENCE. 824 
 
 essential in order that the accused may be properly informed 
 of the nature of the allegations against him and that he may 
 thus be enabled to prepare his evidence to confute and disprove 
 them.^" It is not necessary to set forth in the indictment the 
 entire record of the former trial and conviction/^ It is enough if 
 the place and the nature of the crime are stated clearly, and the 
 details of the conviction and sentence, including the date, are 
 given with such precision as will enable the court to determine 
 whether or no the case is within the statute/* In case several 
 prior convictions are alleged in the indictment it is no variance 
 if only one is proved/^ 
 
 § 511. Effect of plea of not guilty. — Where a prior conviction is 
 alleged in the indictment, a plea of not guilty generally puts the 
 fact of prior conviction in issue, as well as the commission of the 
 subsequent crime. ^'^ If the accused, while pleading not guilty, 
 voluntarily confesses a former conviction as laid, it is enough, 
 and the jury may accept his admission as conclusive.^" But when 
 the accused, on his arraignment, pleads not guilty merely, and 
 says nothing as to his prior conviction, he cannot be asked on 
 arraignment if he has been previously convicted of crime.^* 
 
 § 512. Order of trying the issue of prior conviction. — Where the 
 accused pleads not guilty generally and an indictment, contain- 
 ing an allegation of his former conviction, is read to the jurors, 
 
 "^Maguire v. State, 47 Md. 485, Pick. (Mass.) 40. 42; £.r />ar/'t' Dick, 
 
 496; Plumbly V. Commonwealth, 2 14 Pick. (Mass.) 86, 88. 
 
 Mete. (Mass.) 413. The general rule '"People v. Carlton, 57 Cal. 559; 
 
 is that the indictment must contain an People v. Lewis, 64 Cal. 401, i Pac. 
 
 averment of every fact necessary to 490; People v. Gutierrez, 74 Cal. 81, 
 
 justify the infliction of the proper 83, 15 Pac. 444; Ex parte Young Ah 
 
 punishment. Gow, 73 Cal. 438, 442, 445, i5 Pac 
 
 '^Plumbly V. Commonwealth, 2 76; Hines v. State, 26 Ga. 614. Contra 
 
 Mete. (Mass.) 413. Thomas v. Commonwealth, 22 Gratt. 
 
 "Wilde V. Commonweahh, 2 Mete. (Va.) 912, 916. 
 
 (]\Iass.) 408, 410. "ii.r parte Young Ah Gow, 7^, Cal. 
 
 ''Reg. V. Clark, 6 Cox C. C. 210. 438, 15 Pac. 76. 
 
 Where proof of a conviction for a '^^ Ex parte Young Ah Gow, 7^, Cal. 
 
 term of years is required, proof of a 438, 446, 15 Pac. 76; People v. King, 
 
 conviction for at least two years must 64 Cal. 338, 30 Pac. 1028. 
 be proved. Ex parte Seymour, 14
 
 525 PREVIOUS CRIME TO INCREASE PENALTY. § 5 12 
 
 it is extremely probable that the fact of his former conviction, 
 as thus called to their attention, will prejudice him greatlv in 
 their minds, and tend to make them think that his prior character 
 is bad.^° Notwithstanding this it is always proper, in the absence 
 of a statute providing a contrary rule, that the indictment should 
 be laid before the jury and read to them. And usually the state 
 is permitted to put in the record of the prior conviction as 
 a part of its case before the verdict is reached on the substantive 
 crime.'" Often by statute it is enacted that if the accused admits 
 the prior conviction, and that he was the person thus convicted, 
 the part of the indictment relating thereto need not be read to the 
 jurors, nor have they any right or occasion to consider it in any 
 way. No evidence of any sort relating to the prior conviction 
 can then be produced before them, nor can they be charged 
 thereon by the court. "^ But in New York it has been held that as 
 a prior conviction is a fact of criminality which the state must 
 prove, the admission of a prior conviction by counsel for the 
 accused does not preclude the state from proving it, particularly 
 where the admission does not concede the prior conviction as 
 alleged in the indictment and is made after the state has begun its 
 case.'' 
 
 By virtue of the discretionary power of the court to regulate 
 its own procedure, the court may withhold from the jurors the 
 issue of former conviction until after a verdict is reached, and 
 may then determine the issue by taking judicial notice of the 
 prior conviction, or by the production of the record. But where 
 this is done it may be that the issue of the identity of the accused 
 
 "Commonwealth v. Morrow, 9 Smith, 129 Iowa /C), 106 X. W. 187, 
 
 Phila. (Pa.) 583. 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 539n. 
 
 -" Maguire v. State. 47 Md. 485, ■'■ People v. Meyer, 73 Cal. 548. .S49. 
 
 497; State V. Manicke, 139 Mo. 545, 550, 15 Pac. 95; Ex parte Young \\\ 
 
 41 S. W. 223; People V. Sickles, 156 N. Gow, 72, Cal. 438, 443-451, IS Pac. 7^^ 
 
 Y. 541, 51 N. E. 288, followed in construing sections 1093, 1158 of Cali- 
 
 People V. Craig, 195 N. Y. 190, 194. fornia Code. 
 
 88 N. E. 38; which expressly holds "People v. Jordan, 125 .App. Div. 
 
 that a prior conviction is an essential (N. Y.) 522, 109 N. Y. S. 840. The 
 
 element of the criminality of the pris- rule is the same as to the right of the 
 
 oner and that it may and in fact must state to prove a prior conviction even 
 
 be proved by the state as a part of its when it was conceded before the jury 
 
 case. Compare McWharter v. State, was impanelled. People v. .Sickles, 
 
 118 Ga. 55, 44 S. E. 873; State v. 156 N. Y. 541, 51 N. E. 288.
 
 §§ 5I3~5I4 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 826 
 
 with the man mentioned in the record ma}' come up, and this issue 
 of identity cannot then be tried by the jury to whom it of right 
 belongs. 
 
 In England it is provided by statute^'' tha* the accused shall 
 only be called on to plead to so much of the indictment as charges 
 th.e subsequent offense. If he pleads guilty, or is found guilty, he 
 shall then be asked whether he has previously been convicted, and 
 if lie denies that he has the jury may determine the fact.'"' 
 
 § 513. Necessity of proving discharge from prison. — Where the 
 statute provides in terms for a subsequent crime committed "after 
 a conviction and a discharge from prison, by reason of expira- 
 tion of sentence or pardon/' it will be necessary not only to 
 prove the conviction but the discharge from prison as well. The 
 fact of the expiration of the term of imprisonment or the pardon 
 is material and must be affirmatively proved. Neither can be 
 presumed from mere lapse of time, so as to require that the 
 accused shall be compelled to prove that he was not discharged. -'' 
 The fact of the discharge may be proved by a certified copy of 
 the prison record where such a record is admissible by statute, 
 or by the oral testimony of a prison official who has a competent 
 knowledge of the fact. The mode of proving pardons is else- 
 where fully elucidated.'*' 
 
 ^ 514. Proof of the prior conviction — How made. — The prior con- 
 viction of the accused can only be proved by the production in 
 court of an attested or duly authenticated copy of the record, 
 which usually must be certified as a true copy by the clerk, under 
 the seal of the court, if it have a seal.'" A statute which provides 
 
 ■^24 and 25 Vic, ch. 96, § 116. and "' Maguire v. State. 47 Md. 485. 497; 
 
 ch. 99, § 2,-]. Reg. V. Clark, 20 Eng. L. & E. 582; 
 
 =*Reg. V. Fox, 10 Cox C. C. 502; Commonwealth v. Miller, 8 Gray 
 Reg. V. }^Iartin, L. R. i C. C. 214; (Mass.) 484, 485; Kane v. Common- 
 Reg. V. Hilton, 8 Cox C. C. 87, 5 Jur. wealth, 109 Pa. St. 541, 545; Com- 
 N. S. 47, 28 L. J. M. C. 28, 7 W. R. monwealth v. Phillips, 11 Pick. 
 59; Reg. V. Woodfield, 16 Cox C. C. (Mass.) 28, 30; Commonwealth v. 
 314. Hughes, 133 Mass. 496, 497: Rector 
 
 "•''Wood V. People, 53 N. Y. 511, v. Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 468, 470, 
 
 514. construing Kentucky General Stat- 
 
 '"See ante, § 208. utes, chap. 25, art. i, § 12; State v.
 
 827 PREVaOUS CRIME TO INCREASE PENALTY. § 515 
 
 for proof of previous conviction by the record lets in only the 
 A'crdict, judgment of conviction and sentence, and the previous 
 indictment is inadmissible.'^ Nor can the prosecution show the 
 facts relating to the prior offense. Sometimes the docket entries 
 of the clerk have been received when no other record has been 
 kept, or where the record was not made up."" And in case 
 documentary evidence cannot be procured the prior conviction 
 may be proved by parol, if no objection is made.^° 
 
 The issue of the prior conviction of the prisoner is for the 
 jury, involving, as it does, a question of the identity of the per- 
 son now accused with the person whose name is mentioned in 
 the record of the prior conviction. ^^ It has been held that proof 
 of a prior conviction is not open to the objection that it tends to 
 prejudice the jury by showing that the accused has been guilty 
 of a separate and independent crime ; or because it tends to 
 establish his bad character before he has put his character in 
 issue, as the purpose of this evidence is not solely to prove bad 
 character.^" The state is not bound to prove as a part of its 
 case that the prior conviction had not been vacated, set aside or 
 reversed, and if such be the case the burden of proof is on the 
 accused. ^^ 
 
 § 515. Proof of the identity of the accused with the person previ- 
 ously convicted. — Tht identity of the accused with him who was 
 previously convicted must be proved and the burden of proof is 
 
 Vaughan, 199 Mo. 108, 97 S. W. 879; that a sentence was had. State v. 
 
 Oliver V. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 228, Hines, 68 Me. 202, 203. 
 
 67 S. W. 983, 24 Ky. L. 84; People v. "State v. Lashus, 79 Me. 504, 506, 
 
 Meyer, y^ Cal. 548, 15 Pac. gs; Ex 11 Atl. 180; State v. Robinson, 30 
 
 parte Young Ah Gow, 73 Cal. 438, 15 Me. 150, 155; State v. Spaulding, 61 
 
 Pac. 76; Mitchell v. State, 52 Tex. Vt. 505, 17 Atl. 844; State v. Frec- 
 
 Cr. :i7, 106 S. W. 124, 105 Am. St. man, 27 Vt. 523, 527; State v. Hayncs, 
 
 983, note; People v. Kochlcr, 146 111. 35 Vt. 570, 572; Rector v. Common- 
 
 App. 541. wealth, 80 Ky. 468, 471 ; Maguire v. 
 
 -*Tall V. Commonwealth (Ky.), no State, 47 Md. 485, 497- 
 
 S. W. 425, 33 Ky. L. 541. Nor can ^Johnson v. People, 55 N. Y. 512, 
 
 the prosecution show the facts relat- 514, affirming 65 Barb. (N. Y.) 342. 
 
 ing to the prior ofTen.se. and compare Kane v. Commoiiwfaltli, 
 
 '^ State V. Hines, 68 Me. 202, 203; 109 Pa. St. 541, 54.=^- 
 
 State V. Neagle, 65 Me. 468, 469. °^TaIl v. Connnonwealth (Ky.), no 
 
 •■^' State V. Rockett. 87 Mo. 666. 'Ihe S. W. 4-'5. n Ky. L. 541. 
 certificate of the clerk need not show
 
 § 515 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 828 
 
 on the state."'* The question whether the person who was con- 
 victed at the former trial is identical with the person who is now 
 accused, and who is now on trial, is one of fact for the jury.^^ 
 The defendant's admission of identity will not be sufficient to 
 establish it.''" But, in the absence of this, the identity must be 
 proved."*' 
 
 The identity of the name of the convict mentioned in the 
 record witli the name of the prisoner at the bar, is some evidence 
 of identity of person. Whether it shall be conclusive depends 
 on the connecting circumstances.^^ In most cases, however, 
 identity of name alone is not sufficient,^" but ought to be supple- 
 mented by other evidence, preferably by that of an eye-witness 
 of the former trial or by that of some accjuaintance of the 
 prisoner.""^ 
 
 It is never necessary to produce an eye-witness who can 
 swear of his own knowledge that he saw the accused convicted.'*' 
 The proof of the identity may relate to the identity while the 
 accused was in custody under the prior sentence.*" In con- 
 
 ^ State V. Smith, 129 Iowa 709, 106 
 N. W. 187, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 539n. 
 
 "" State V. Freeman, 27 Vt. 5^23 ; 
 State V. Haynes, 35 Vt. 570, 572 ; 
 Hines v. State, 26 Ga. 614; State v. 
 Lashus, 79 Me. 504, 11 Atl. 180. 
 
 "" Kane v. Commonwealth, 109 Pa. 
 St. 541, 545. 
 
 ^' Commonwealth v. Briggs, 7 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 177, 179; Reg. v. Leng, i F. 
 &F.77. 
 
 "* State V. Lashus, 79 Me. 504, 506, 
 II Atl. 180; State V. Court (Mo., 
 1910), 125 S. W. 451. 
 
 ^ State V. Smith, 129 Iowa 709, 106 
 N. W. 187, 4 L. R- A. (N. S.) 539n; 
 Reg. V. Lev3^ 8 Co.x C. C. 73 ; Reg. 
 V. Crofts, 9 C. & P. 219, 38 E. C. L. 
 137; Reg. V. Leng, i F. & F. 77. 
 
 *" See, also, atite cases, cited page 
 668, note 20, as to identity of persons 
 named in marriage certificates. In 
 the case of State v. Lashus, 79 ^le. 
 504, 506, II At!. 180, the court said: 
 "The identity of the defendant on 
 
 trial, with the person named in the 
 record is a question of fact. The 
 identity of name is some evidence of 
 identity of person, more or less potent, 
 according to connecting circum- 
 stances, but it is not. certainly in this 
 case, sufficiently conclusive to author- 
 ize the court to take it from the jury." 
 
 '' Reg. V. Leng, i F. & F. 77, 78. 
 
 ■■■ Thus, in an English case, evi- 
 dence that the prisoner was brought 
 to the Leeds Borough Gaol under a 
 warrant which is produced, which is 
 signed bj' the same magistrate, which 
 bears the same date, having the same 
 names of prosecutor and prisoner, and 
 for the same offense, and having the 
 same kind and duration of punish- 
 ment as was imposed under the com- 
 mitment, and which are recited in the 
 certificate of the record, has been held 
 sufficient to prove identity. Reg. v. 
 Leng, I F. & F. 77, 78. In Reg. v. 
 Crofts, 9 C. & P. 219, the governor of
 
 829 
 
 PREVIOUS CRIME TO INCREASE PENALTY. 
 
 § 515 
 
 tlusion it may be said that the principal crime charged for which 
 the accused is now on trial will be presumed to be the only one 
 that the accused has ever committed until the contrary is 
 proved/^ 
 
 the gaol was permitted to testify on 
 the issue of identity as follows : "The 
 prisoner was in mj' custody before the 
 Newbury Borough Sessions, in Oc- 
 tober, 1837; I sent him to Newbury at 
 that time ; I was not at the trial, but 
 I received him back with an order 
 
 from the Newbury Sessions ; and he 
 remained in my custody for four 
 months under that sentence." This 
 was held sufficient. 
 
 " Kilbourn v. State. 9 Conn. 560, 
 563; People V. Cook, 45 Hun (N. Y.) 
 34. 37; I Bish. Cr. Law, § 961.
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 newly-disco\-eri-:d kn'tdence. 
 
 § 516. General considerations. 
 
 517. Diligent efforts to find and to 
 
 procure the evidence in sea- 
 son must be shown. 
 
 518. Burden of proof — The new evi- 
 
 dence must be set out in the 
 affidavits. 
 
 §519. Credibility of the new evidence. 
 
 520. Materiality and relevancy of the 
 
 newly-discovered evidence. 
 
 521. Xew evidence impeaching 
 
 merel}^ 
 
 522. The new evidence must not be 
 
 cumulative merely. 
 
 § 516. General considerations. — In tlie absence of a permissive 
 statute, a court has no power to grant a new trial in case of a 
 felony on account of newly-discovered evidence. As regards 
 misdemeanors, a court possessing general jurisdiction has inher- 
 ent power at common law to grant a new trial on motion, if it 
 shall appear that justice will be advanced thereby. So far as 
 felonies are concerned, the right of the accused to a new trial, 
 upon the grounds of newly-chscovered evidence, is wholly the 
 creature of statutes, which usually pro^■ide for the cases in which 
 the right may be recognized,^ and the mode in which its exercise 
 may be secured. The right to a new trial is never al)solute." 
 Whether a new trial shall be granted upon the grounds of 
 newly-discovered evidence is in the legal discretion of the court. 
 If this discretion is exercised in a legal and proper manner, the 
 
 ' "Where it is made to appear, by 
 affidavit, that upon another trial, the 
 defendant can produce evidence such 
 as, if before received, would probably 
 have changed the verdict ; if such evi- 
 dence has been discovered since the 
 trial, is not cumulative ; and the fail- 
 ure to produce it on the trial was not 
 owing to want of diligence. The 
 court in such cases can, however, 
 compel the personal appearance of the 
 affiants before it for the purposes of 
 
 their personal examination and cross- 
 e.xamination, under oath, upon the 
 contents of the affidavits which they 
 subscribed." N. Y. Code Criminal 
 Procedure, § 465, subd. 7. 
 
 -State V. Pell (Iowa, 1909), 119 N. 
 W. 154; People V. Jones, 115 N. Y. 
 S. 800; Byers v. Territory, i Okla. 
 Cr. (^-/T, 100 Pac. 261, 103 Pac. 532; 
 I'homas v. State, 129 Ga. 419- 59 S. E. 
 246. 
 
 (830)
 
 831 
 
 XEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDEXCE. 
 
 § 517 
 
 action of the court denying a motion for a new trial is not 
 reversible. But if the discretion of the court is exercised arbi- 
 trarily or capriciously, or in such a manner as to work a manifest 
 injustice to an innocent person, so that it can be said to be clearly 
 and unmistakably abused, the action of the court will not be 
 regarded as final. ^ 
 
 § 517. Diligent efforts to find and to procure the evidence in sea- 
 son must be shown. — The accused, when moving for a re-trial u])on 
 the grounds of newly-discovered evidence, must show by affida- 
 A'its that he used due diligence to procure the exiclence in time 
 for use at the trial if he knew of its existence prior to his con- 
 
 ^ People V. Trezza, i2cS N. Y. 529, 
 28 N. E. 533, 8 N. Y. Cr. 291, 295; 
 People V. Lane, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 13, 
 15; Commonwealth v. Ruisscau, 140 
 Mass. 363, 365, 5 N. E. 166; People 
 V. Demasters, 109 Cal. 607, 608, 42 
 Pac. 236; People v. Urquidas, 96 Cal. 
 239, 242, 31 Pac. 52; People v. Sut- 
 ton, 72 Cal. 243, 15 Pac. 86; United 
 States V. Williams, i Cliff. C. C. 5, 
 28 Fed. Gas. 16707 ; State v. Powell, 
 51 Wash. 372, 98 Pac. 741; State v. 
 P>rown, 121 La. 599, 46 So. 664. It 
 may be well in this place to call at- 
 tention to the rule which, in the ab- 
 sence of a statute prescribing when 
 a motion for a new trial must be 
 made, requires that it shall be made 
 before the e.xpiration of the term at 
 which the trial was had. People v. 
 Bradner, 107 N. Y. i, 13 N. E. 87; 
 People V. Hovey, 30 Hun (N. Y.) 
 354; Ex parte Holmes, 21 Neb. 324, 
 22 N. W. 69. In Chandler v. 'I'homp- 
 son, .30 Fed. 38, the court, on page 
 44, says: "The statute conferring jur- 
 isdiction upon the Federal cf)urts to 
 grant new trials expressly provides 
 that such power should be exercised 
 'for reasons which new trials have 
 been usually grantcrl in courts of law.' 
 This provision applies only to jury 
 
 trials, and is directory to the courts, 
 to be governed by the rules and prin- 
 ciples of the common law. The courts 
 of the common law have usually 
 granted new trials when the verdict 
 is against the weight of the evidence, 
 or contrary to law; * * * for the 
 admission of illegal evidence, or the 
 rejection of competent evidence"- or 
 when a part}^ has been deprived of 
 evidence by accident and without 
 fault on his part, or is taken by sur- 
 prise in a matter that he could not 
 reasonably anticipate, for misdirection 
 of the court upon material questions 
 of law or for serious irregularity in 
 the trial; or misconduct of the jury; 
 or unfair conduct of the prevailing 
 party; or manifest injustice has been 
 done, * * * when the losing party 
 has discovered material evidence since 
 the trial, and satisfied the court that 
 he had used due diligence in preparing 
 bis case fnr trial; that tlic newly-dis- 
 covered evidence will tend to prove a 
 material fact which was not directly 
 in issue on the trial, or was not then 
 known and investigated by proof, ;ind 
 will probably produce a different re- 
 sr.lt, + * * and is not merely cu- 
 nudative."
 
 § 5: 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 832 
 
 \ iction. He must state facts in the affidavits explicitly and spe- 
 cifically accounting for his failure to produce such evidence and 
 constituting a proper degree of diligence on his part.* A mere 
 allegation that he used due diligence will not suffice. The affiant 
 ought to set forth with reasonable length and with some par- 
 ticularity the various measures resorted to by him to procure the 
 production of the evidence at his trial. He ought also, if it is 
 possible, to state the reasons why his efforts were not successful. 
 But he must state facts, and not mere conclusions, opinions or 
 guesses.^ 
 
 The reasons for requiring the exercise of diligence by the 
 accused in this connection are obvious. H the existence and the 
 character of the evidence were known to him while his trial was 
 pending, and if he could have procured it in season by the exer- 
 
 ■* Harper v. State, 131 Ga. 771, 63 
 S. E. 339 ; State v. Pell, 140 Iowa 655, 
 119 N. W. 154; Evans v. State, 55 
 Tex. Cr. 649, 117 S. W. 820; Williams 
 V. State, 4 Ga. App. 853, 62 S. E. 525 ; 
 People V. Landiero, 192 N. Y. 304, 
 85 N. E. 132; Parker v. State, 3 Ga. 
 App. 336, 59 S. E. 823 ; Davis v. State, 
 52 Tex. Cr. 149, 106 S. W. 144; Rog- 
 ers v. State, 129 Ga. 589, 59 S. E. 288 ; 
 Day v. State, 91 Miss. 239, 44 So. 813 ; 
 State V. Sargood, 80 Va. 412, 68 Atl. 
 515, 130 Am. St. 992; State v. Hall, 
 97 Iowa 400, 66 N. W. 725 ; Sconyers 
 V. State, 85 Ga. 672, 678, 12 S. E. 
 1069; Lynch v. State, 84 Ga. 726, 730, 
 II S. E. 842 ; Statham v. State, 86 Ga. 
 331, 12 S. E. 640; Ford v. State, 91 
 Ga. 162. 164, 17 S. E. 103; Gaddis v. 
 State, 91 Ga. 148, 151, 16 S. E. 936; 
 Meurer v. State, 129 Ind. 587, 29 N. 
 E. 392; Aholtz V. People, 121 111. 560, 
 13 N. E. 524; Bean v. People, 124 111. 
 576, 585, 16 N. E. 656; State v. 
 Koontz, 31 W. Va. 127, 5 S. E. 328; 
 Field v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 690, 
 694, 16 S. E. 865 ; State v. Gunagy, 
 84 Iowa 177, 182, 183, 30 N. W. 882: 
 Washington v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 154, 
 
 32 S. W. 693; Bell V. State (Tex.), 
 20 S. W. 362; McVey v. State, 23 
 Tex. App. 659, 5 S. W. 174; State v. 
 Moses, 139 Mo. 217, 40 S. W. 883; 
 State V. Musick, loi Mo. 260, 14 S. W. 
 212; State V. Lichliter, 95 Mo. 402, 
 408, 8 S. W. 720; State v. Keaveny, 
 49 La. Ann. 667, 21 So. 730 ; State v. 
 Hanks, 39 La. Ann. 234, 236, i So. 
 458 ; State v. Washington, 36 La. Ann. 
 341 ; People v. McCurdy, 68 Cal. 576, 
 10 Pac. 207; People v. Jones (Cal.), 8 
 Pac. 611; People v. Freeman, 92 Cal. 
 359, 28 Pac. 261 ; Klink v. People, 16 
 Colo. 467, 27 Pac. 1062. 
 
 ^ State v. Crawford, 99 Mo. 74, 80, 
 12 S. W. 354; Taylor v. State, 132 
 Ga. 235, 63 S. E. 1 1 16; Orr v. State, 
 5 Ga. App. 76, 62 S. E. 676; Cheek v. 
 State, 171 Ind. 98, 85 N. E. 779. 
 Where the accused submits proper af- 
 fidavits showing facts constituting dil- 
 igence on his part, the state may ofifer 
 counter affidavits for the purpose of 
 proving that he did not use due dili- 
 gence. Smith V. State, 143 Ind. 685. 
 687, 42 N. E. 913; People v. Casena, 
 90 Cal. 381, 383, 27 Pac. 300.
 
 833 XEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. § 518 
 
 cise of diligence, it was his duty to do so at the earhest oppor- 
 tunity/ A person indicted for a crime and on trial cannot be 
 allowed to speculate upon the outcome of his trial and to hold back 
 e^•idence which he may easily procure, with the hope and expecta- 
 tion that, should the proof against him be more convincing than 
 he anticipates, he can put the state to the additional expense of 
 another trial, at which the evidence that he has suppressed 
 can be introduced. The law favors a full discovery of all relevant 
 evidence which has a bearing upon the criminality of the defend- 
 ant. It will not permit the accused to mask his batteries, and, 
 having thus drawn all the fire of the prosecution, he cannot, 
 after having been convicted, take the chances of a new trial in 
 which everything would be in his favor. 
 
 Hence the relevancy of the evidence, its cogency and cred- 
 ibility, and even the reasonable probability that its introduction, 
 if a new trial is granted, may result in the acquittal of the 
 accused, will not relieve him from the consequences of his prior 
 laches. < 
 
 sj 518. Burden of proof — The new evidence must be set out in the 
 affidavits. — The burden of proof to show that the accused has com- 
 plied with all the requirements of the law is on the party moving 
 for the new trial." The motion for a new trial must be accom- 
 [)anied by and be based upon a proper affidavit, sworn to by 
 the accused, showing in detail all the essential jurisdictional facts, 
 unless some xalid reason exists for its non-production.^ 
 
 So, too, all the facts which constitute the newly-discovered 
 evidence ought to be set forth at reasonable length, either in 
 the affidavit of the accused, or in an affidavit of the witness 
 whom he expects to testifv to them. This is absolutely necessary 
 in order that the court may ascertain the materiality and cred- 
 ibility of the testimony, and may determine if it be cumulative or 
 not." 
 
 "People V. Landiero, 192 N. Y. 304, Laughlin, 27 AIo. ill; State v. Camp- 
 
 85 N. E. 132. bell, IIS Mo. 391, 393. 22 S. W. 2,67; 
 
 ' People V. Fice, 97 Cal. 459, 32 Pac. State v. Ray, 53 Mo. 345 ; Weeks v. 
 
 531. State. 79 Ga. 3>^, 3 S. E. 323: Hear. 
 
 'State V. Laycock, 136 .\lo. 93, 100. v. State, 93 Ga. 184, 18 S. E. 557. 
 
 27 S. W. 802; .State v. Nagel, 136 Mo. • State v. Moses, 139 Mo. 217, 49 S. 
 
 45, 50, 2,7 S. W. 821; State v. Mc- W. 883; State v. Ilollier, 49 La. Ann. 
 53 — Underhill Cki.M. Ev.
 
 §519 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 834 
 
 j^ 519. Credibility of the new evidence. — As a result of the re- 
 quirement that the new evidence must be such as would, had 
 it been introduced at the trial, have probably resulted in the 
 acquittal of the accused, it is necessary that it shall appear to 
 the court hearing the motion that it is probably true.^" 
 
 The witness who is expected to testify must appear to the court 
 to be credible. His credibility is to be determined by the judge 
 hearing the motion," who may examine him in open court, and 
 he may also examine any other person who has made an affidavit 
 which is offered to support the motion in order to test his cred- 
 ibility.^" And the prosecuting attorney may submit affidavits 
 of persons who know the reputation for veracity of the proposed 
 witness, and who are able and willing to swear that they would 
 not believe him under oath.^^ 
 
 The admission by a witness for the prosecution that he had 
 sworn falsely at the trial does not alone constitute new evidence. 
 Even though he shall state that he deliberately gave false testi- 
 mony to some material facts, and it shall also appear that the 
 conviction of the accused was largely owing to his testimony, it 
 does not follow that a retrial ought to be had ; for the court may 
 not believe his present statement is true and made in good faith. 
 But if the present statement of the witness is so far contradictory 
 
 371, 21 So. 6s3; People v. Eppinger, Pro., § 465, subd. 7; Johnson v. State, 
 
 114 Cal. 350, 46 Pac. 97; Richardson 85 Ga. 561, 11 S. E. 844; Neill v. 
 
 V. State, 47 Ark. 562, 2 S. W. 187; State, 79 Ga. 779, 4 S. E. 871; State v. 
 
 Slater v. United States, i Okl. Cr. Tall, 43 Minn. 273, 45 N. W. 449; 
 
 275, 98 Pac. no. In a case where the People v. Noonan, 14 N. Y. S. 519, 
 
 accused moved for a new trial on the 60 Hun (N. Y.) 578, without opin- 
 
 ground that another person had con- ion, 38 St. Reporter (N. Y.) 854; 
 
 fessed the commission of the crime People v. Lane, i N. Y. Cr. 548, 31 
 
 of which he stood convicted, he was Hun (N. Y.) 13; People v. Henry, 
 
 required to state in his affidavit the 127 App. Div. (N. Y.) 489, in N. 
 
 name of the person, his residence and Y. S. 1005. 
 
 whether his attendance could be pro- "People v. Shea, 16 Misc. (N. Y.) 
 
 cured in season. State v. Miller, 3 in, 38 N. Y. 821. 
 
 Wash. St. 131, 28 Pac. 375. "^ Moore v. State. 96 Tenn. 209, 33 
 
 "Lawrence v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. S. W. 1046; Glidewell v. State, 15 
 
 173, 36 S. W. 90; Clark v. State, 38 Lea (Tenn.) 133; N. Y. Code Cr. 
 
 Tex. Cr. 30, 40 S. W. 992; Grant v. Pro., § 465, and see United States v. 
 
 State, 97 Ga. 789, 25 S. E. 399; People Angney, 15 Wash. Law Rep. 560. 
 
 V. Mayhew, 19 ]\Iisc. (N. Y.) 313, 44 "Grant v. State, 97 Ga. 789, 25 S. 
 
 N. Y. 206, construing Code Crim. E. 399.
 
 83: 
 
 NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDEXCE. 
 
 § 
 
 20 
 
 of his previous testimony as to wholly obliterate it and destroy its 
 effect, the court ought to grant a retrial if it believes the state- 
 ment to be credible/'* 
 
 § 520. Materiality and relevancy of the newly-discovered evidence. 
 — The accused must show by affidavits that the new evidence 
 would have been material if it had been offered at his trial and, 
 had it been produced and admitted, that it would have probably 
 resulted in his acquittal. ^^ It must appear to the satisfaction of 
 the court that, if a new trial is granted, it is reasonably probable 
 that, on the introduction of the new evidence, the accused will 
 be acquitted. If the new evidence is so weak, unsatisfactory or 
 inconclusive, or if it is so far reconcilable with the guilt of the 
 accused, that it will not bring about a different result, then, as 
 a new trial would be useless, it will not be granted. 
 
 The moving j)art3' must show that the new evidence would 
 have been admitted as relevant to show his innocence had it been 
 offered on his former trial. The irrelevancy of the evidence alone 
 may prevent the granting of a new trial. On the other hand 
 mere relevancy alone is not sufficient to admit the evidence if 
 it is incredible, cumulative, unconvincing or otherwise unsatis- 
 factory.'*' 
 
 "Dennis v. State, 103 Ind. 142, 151, 
 2 X. E. 349. 
 
 "Taylor v. State, 132 Ga. 235, 63 
 S. R 1 1 16; Reyes v. State, 55 Tex. 
 Cr. 422, 117 S. W. 152; Howell v. 
 State, 5 Ga. App. 612, 63 S. E. 600; 
 Weatherby v. State (Miss., 1909), 48 
 So. 724; Fleming v. State, 54 Tex. 
 Cr. 339, 114 S. VV. 383; Ludwig v. 
 State, 170 Ind. 648, 85 N. E. 345; 
 Nioum V. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 
 685, 108 S. W. 945, 33 Ky. L. 62; 
 Gibbs V. United Stales, 7 Ind. T. 182, 
 104 S. W. 583 ; Washington v. State, 
 (Tex. Cr. 1907), 105 S. W. 789; 
 Davis V. State, 52 Tex. Cr. 149, 106 
 S. W. 144; I-'icld V. Commonwealth, 
 89 Va. 690, 694, 16 S. E. 865; People 
 V. Lane, i N. Y. Cr. 548. 31 Hnn (N. 
 Y.) 13; Tollcson V. State, 97 Ga. 352, 
 
 23 S. E. 993; State v, Armstrong, 48 
 La. Ann. 314, 19 So. 146; People v. 
 Stanford, 64 Cal. 27, 28 Pac. 106; 
 Cooper V. State, 91 Ga. 362. 18 S. E. 
 303 ; Williams v. United States, 137 
 U. S. 113, 34 L. ed. 590, II Sup. Ct. 
 43 ; State v. Foster, 79 Iowa 726, 45 
 N. W. 385; United States v. Smith, 
 I Sawyer (U. S.) 277, 27 Fed. Gas. 
 16341 ; United States v. Gibcrt. 2 
 Sumn. (U. S.) 19, 25 Fed. Gas. 15204. 
 '"Humphrey v. State, 78 Wis. ^6c), 
 47 N. W. 836; Field v. Common- 
 wealth, 89 Va. 690, 694, 16 S. E. 863 ; 
 State V. Keaveny, 49 La. Ami. 667, 21 
 So. 730; Briscoe v. State, 95 Ga. 496. 
 20 S. E. 211. Where the new evidence 
 presents a theory of the case utterly 
 at variance with the slatement of the 
 accused which he made at his trial,
 
 §§ 5-' 1-5^2 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 836 
 
 § 521. New evidence impeaching merely. — A motion for a new 
 trial ought to be denied where the evidence which the accused 
 proposes to introduce merely impeaches that of a witness at the 
 former trial whose evidence was credible or fully corroborated.^'^ 
 
 § 522. The new evidence must not be cumulative merely. — A mo- 
 tion for a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence 
 must be denied, if it appears to the court that the evidence would 
 have been cumulative merely if it had been introduced at the 
 trial.'^ 
 
 the new trial was held to be properly 
 refused. Grant v. State, 97 Ga. 789, 
 25 S. E. 399. 
 
 "State V. Pell, 140 Iowa 655, T19 X. 
 W. 154; Bailey v. State (Miss.), 48 
 So. 227, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 409; 
 Shelton v. State, 132 Ga. 413, 64 S. E. 
 262; Clark V. State, 5 Ga. App. 605, 
 63 S. E. 606; State v. Sebastian, 215 
 jMo. 58, 114 S. W. 522; Harrolson v. 
 State, 54 Tex. Cr. 452, 113 S. W. 544; 
 Fletcher v. People, 117 111. 184, 189, 
 7 N. E. 80; Hudspeth v. State, 55 
 Ark. 323, 18 S. W. 183 ; State v. Pot- 
 ter, 108 AIo. 424, 22 S. W. 89; State 
 V. Potts, 83 Iowa 317, 49 N. W. 845; 
 Pease v. State, 91 Ga. 18, 19, 16 S. E. 
 113; Marable v. State, 89 Ga. 425, 15 
 S. E. 453; Statham v. State, 84 Ga. 
 17, 10 S. E. 493 ; Reid v. State, 81 Ga. 
 760, 8 S. E. 431 ; Dominick v. State, 
 81 Ga. 715, 8 S. E. 432; Johnson v. 
 State, 83 Ga. 553, 10 S. E. 207; Ram- 
 sey V. State, 89 Ga. 198, 202, 205, 15 
 S. E. 6; Sutherlin v. State, 108 Ind. 
 389, 391, 9 N. E. 298; Meurer v. 
 State, 129 Ind. 587, 588, 29 N. E. 392; 
 Evans v. State, 67 Ind. 68; Winsett 
 V. State, 57 Ind. 26; Grate v. State, 
 23 Tex. App. 458, 5 S. W. 245 ; People 
 V. Loui Tung, 90 Cal. y^y, 27 Pac. 
 295 ; Field v. Commonwealth. 89 Va. 
 690, 694, 16 S. E. 865; Whitehurst v. 
 Commonwealth, 79 Va. 556, 559 ; Read 
 
 V. Commonwealth. 22 Gratt. (Va.) 
 924; State V. Chambers, 43 La. Ann. 
 1 108, ID So. 247. In case the new evi- 
 dence would be merely cumulative, or 
 would only serve the purpose of im- 
 peachment, a new trial should not be 
 granted though the party was sur- 
 prised by the witness who is to be 
 impeached. IMeurer v. State, 129 Ind. 
 587, 588, 29 N. K 392. 
 
 ^* Young v. State, 131 Ga. 498, 62 S. 
 E. 707; People V. Probst, 237 111. 390, 
 86 N. E. 588; State v. Turner, 122 La. 
 371, 47 So. 685; State V. Bridgham, 
 51 Wash. 18, 97 Pac. 1096; Adams v. 
 State, 55 Fla. i, 46 So. 152; Hamblin 
 V. State, 81 Neb. 148, 115 N. W. 850; 
 Rogers v. State, 129 Ga. 589, 59 S. E. 
 288; Clements v. State, 80 Neb. 313, 
 114 N. W. 271; People v. Demasters, 
 109 Cal. 607, 608, 42 Pac. 236; People 
 V. Cesena, 90 Cal. 381, 383, 27 Pac. 
 300; People V. Urquidas, 96 Cal. 239, 
 242, 31 Pac. 52; People v. Hong Quin 
 Moon, 92 Cal. 41, 27 Pac. 1096; Lang- 
 don V. People, 133 111. 382, 409, 24 
 N. E. 874; Fletcher v. People, 117 111. 
 184, 7 N. E. 80; Stalcup v. State, 129 
 Ind. 519, 522, 28 N. E. 1 1 16; Suther- 
 lin V. State, 108 Ind. 389, 391, 9 N. 
 E. 298; Meurer v. State, 129 Ind. 587. 
 29 N. E. 392; Smith v. State, 143 
 Ind. 685, 688, 42 N. E. 913; State v. 
 Tyson, 56 Kan. 686, 44 Pac. 609, 689;
 
 837 
 
 XEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
 
 § 522 
 
 The court must decide whether the evidence offered is cumu- 
 lative. Cumulative evidence is additional evidence tending to 
 prove facts of the same general character as those supported by 
 other evidence previously produced. Such evidence merely re- 
 peats in substance and effect what has already been put in proof 
 by other evidence of the same character. Thus, for example, if 
 the accused has endeavored to prove an alibi at his trial, and for 
 this purpose lias introduced the testimou}- of one or more wit- 
 nesses who have sworn that, at the time of the crime, he was in 
 another place, the evidence of another witness that, at the same 
 time, he had seen him in that place would clearly l)e cumulati\"e. 
 Or. if the issue in the trial was his insanity, and he had called 
 medical experts to sustain his allegation of mental incapacity, 
 the testimony of other experts to this same fact would be cumu- 
 lative and inadmissible. But the new evidence is not cumulative 
 where it is of a different kind or character from evidence given to 
 sustain the same point on the prior trial. ^'^ 
 
 State V. Rohrer. 34 Kan. 427, 8 Pac. 
 718; State V. Stickney. 53 Kan. 308, 
 36 Pac. 714, 42 Am. St. 284; State v. 
 Gleason, 68 Iowa 618, 619, 27 N. W. 
 785 ; State v. Johnson. 72 Iowa 393, 
 401. 34 X. W. 177; State V. Potts, 83 
 Iowa 317, 319, 49 N. W. 845; State v. 
 Wliitmer. 77 Iowa 557. 560, 42 N. W. 
 442; Scruggs V. State, 35 Tex. Cr. 
 622, 34 S. W. 951 ; King v. State, 91 
 Tenn. 617, 20 S. W. 169; People v. 
 Peacock, 5 Utah 240. 14 Pac. 332; 
 United States v. Eldredge. 5 Utah 161, 
 1 3 Pac. 673 ; Casey v. State, 20 Neb. 
 138, 29 N. W. 264; State v. Hendri.x, 
 45 La. Ann. 500. 12 So. 621 ; State v. 
 Hanks, 39 La. Ann. 234, 236, i So. 458; 
 State V. Lamothe, 37 La. Ann. 43, 44; 
 Williams v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 18 
 S. W. 364, 13 Ky. L. 753; State v. 
 Woodward, 95 Mo. 129, 8 S. W. 220; 
 Tripp V. St3te, 95 Ga. 502, 20 S. E. 
 
 248; Dale V. State. 88 Ga. 552. 561, 15 
 S E. 287; Greer v. State, 87 Ga. 
 .S59. 13 S. E. 552; Neill v. 'State. 79 
 Ga. 779, 4 S. E. 871 ; Bond v. Com- 
 monwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S. E. 149; 
 State V. Starnes, 97 N. Car. 423, 2 S. 
 E. 447 ; State v. Workman, 39 S. Car. 
 151, 17 S. E. 694; People v. Noonan. 
 14 N. Y. S. 519. 38 N. Y. St. 854, 60 
 Hun CN. Y.) 578. without opinion. 
 
 ''' Fletcher v. People. 117 III. 184. 
 190, 7 N. E. 80, citing Wharton on 
 Grim. PI. & Practice, 870; Long v. 
 State, 54 Ga. 564, and see People v. 
 Leighton, i N. Y. Grim. 468. In Peo- 
 ple V. Lane, 31 Hun (N. Y.) 13, it 
 was held that newly-discovered evi- 
 dence of general good character was 
 not cumulative when the accused had 
 not offered any proof of good charac- 
 ter on his trial though his character 
 for veracity had been impeached.
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 EVIDENCE IN BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 5 523. Bastardy proceedings — Whether 
 criminal or civil in their 
 character. 
 
 524. Degree of proof required — Doc- 
 
 trine of reasonable doubt not 
 applicable. 
 
 525. Evidence for the jurj' from the 
 
 inspection of the child. 
 
 526. Presumption of legitimacy. 
 
 527. Evidence rebutting the pre- 
 
 sumption of legitimacy. 
 
 528. The relations of the parties. 
 
 529. Competency and credibility of 
 
 the prosecutrix. 
 
 § 530. Variance in proving the date of 
 the conception. 
 
 531. The reputation of the prosecu- 
 
 trix. 
 
 532. Sexual intercouse with other 
 
 men during the period of ges- 
 tation. 
 
 533. Admissibility of the admissions 
 
 and declarations of the par- 
 ties. 
 
 534. Evidence of the preliminary ex- 
 
 amination. 
 
 535. Evidence of compromise and 
 
 settlement. 
 
 § 523. Bastardy proceedings — Whether criminal or civil in their 
 character. — In the absence of statute at the common law no re- 
 sponsibility rested upon the father of an illegitimate child to 
 provide for its care, education or maintenance, or for the expenses 
 of the lying-in or nursing.^ But at the present time in nearly 
 every state of the Union statutes exist casting this responsibility 
 upon him, and providing for enforcing the same by appropriate 
 legal proceedings, which are usually commenced at the instance 
 of the mother.- 
 
 ' Moncrief v. Ely, 19 Wend. (N. 
 Y.) 405; Birdsall v. Edgerton, 25 
 Wend. (N. Y.) 619; Vetten v. Wal- 
 lace, 39 111. App. 390, 396 ; Glenn v. 
 State, 46 Ind. 368, 376; State v. Tie- 
 man, 32 Wash. 294, -z}, Pac. 375, 98 
 Am. St. 854. 
 
 ^ State v. ]\Iize, 117 N. Car. 780, 
 781, 23 S. E. 330, Code N. Car., § 31. 
 Some statutes provide that the pro- 
 ceeding may be initiated by a superin- 
 
 tendent or overseer of the poor or 
 other similar ofificial. Where such is 
 the case the mother has no power to 
 prosecute the proceeding, or to appeal 
 from any order which is made there- 
 in. People v. Ogden. 8 App. Div. (N. 
 Y.) 464, 40 N. Y. S. 827; People v. 
 Shulman, 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 514, 
 40 N. Y. S. 779; construing N. Y. 
 Code Cr. Pro., § 840. Cf. State v. 
 Bunker, 7 S. Dak. 639, 65 N. W. 2>Z. 
 
 (838)
 
 839 
 
 EVIDENCE IN BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 523 
 
 A statutory mode of ascertaining who is the father of the 
 child and of compelHng the father to assume the responsibihty 
 for its support, is a bar to a civil suit against him brought by any 
 person who has incurred expense in caring for or supporting 
 the child. ^ \\'hether the proceedings given by the statute are 
 civil or criminal is a question which has received much considera- 
 tion in the cases. In some states the begetting of a bastard is 
 a statutory misdemeanor ;* and, because of this fact, a discussion 
 of the rules governing the procedure and the presentation of evi- 
 dence in bastardy proceedings will not be out of place in this 
 treatise. The current of the authorities favors the view that the 
 proceedings under the statute by virtue of which the father of 
 the bastard is compelled to contribute towards its support^ is a 
 
 "Thej' (the proceedings) are partly 
 for the benefit of the complainant, 
 and may be instituted in her name, 
 and partly for the purpose of indem- 
 nifying the public, and may be insti- 
 tuted in the name of the people." Sut- 
 fin V. People, 43 ^lich. y]> 4 N. W. 
 509; State V. Patterson, 18 S. Dak. 
 251, 100 N. W. 162. 
 
 '" Nixon V. Perry, "j- Ga. 530, 3 S. 
 E. 253. 
 
 "State V. Ostwalt, 118 N. Car. 1208, 
 1216, 24 S. E. 660. 2,2 L.. R. A. 396; 
 Myers v. Stafford, 114 N. Car. 689, 
 figo, 19 S. E. 764; construing Code 
 N. Car., § 35; State v. Cagle, 114 N. 
 Car. 835, 19 S. E. 766; State v. Brun- 
 son, 38 S. Car. 263, 268, 16 S. E. 
 looi, Z7 Am. St. 752n, 19 L. R. A. 
 362; General Statutes, S. Car., § 1582; 
 Georgia Code, § 4564, as amended by 
 Act of March 20, 1866; Cady v. St. 
 Clair Cir. Judge, 139 Mich. 618, 102 
 N. W. 1025, 12 Det. Leg. N. 2. 
 
 ° Smith V. Lint, Z7 Me. 546, 547 ; 
 State V. Blackburn, 61 Ark. 407, 2>?< 
 S. W. 529; People V. Harty, 49 Mich. 
 490, 492, 13 N. W. 829; People v. 
 Cole, 113 Mich. 83, 71 N. W. 455; 
 
 Glenn v. State, 46 Ind. 368, zi^'. State 
 V. Shoemaker, 62 Iowa 343, 17 N. W. 
 5S9, 49 Am. 146; Lewis v. People, 82 
 111. 104; State V. Mcintosh, 64 N. Car. 
 607; Millett V. Baker, 42 Barb. (N. Y.) 
 215; People V. Phalen, 49 Mich. 492, 
 494; Corcoran v. Higgins, 194 Mass. 
 291, 80 N. E. 231 ; State v. Liles, 
 134 N. Car. 735. 47 S. E. 750: 
 Harley v. Jonia Circuit Judge, 140 
 ]Mich. 642, 104 N. W. 21, 12 Det. Leg. 
 N. 260; Gooding v. State, 39 Ind. 
 App. 42, 78 N. E. 257. But compare 
 State V. Rogers, 119 N. Car. 793, 26 
 S. E. 142, 143 ; Baker v. State, 56 
 Wis. 568, 14 N. W. 718; Jackson v. 
 State, 29 Ark. 62; Semon v. People, 
 42 Mich. T41. 3 N. W. 304; Oldham 
 V. State, 5 Gill (Md.) 90; Bake v. 
 State, 21 Md. 422; Dorgan v. State, 
 72 Ala. 173; Jn re Lee, 41 Kan. 318, 
 21 Pac. 282; State v. Lang (X. Dak., 
 1910), 125 N. W. 558; Paulk V. State, 
 52 Ala. 427, holding that this proceed- 
 ing is criminal or (7»rt.y/-criminal in its 
 character. Where the statute in terms 
 provides that the issue of paternity 
 shall be tried in a court which has an
 
 524 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 840 
 
 civil action, though not in the sense of that term as it is used in 
 a statute forhidding arrest in a civil action. ° 
 
 And the amount charged against the father of the bastard as 
 the result of the statutory proceeding is not a debt within the 
 meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision prohibiting 
 imprisonment for debt." 
 
 >J 524. Degree of proof required — Doctrine of reasonable doubt not 
 applicable. — The rules and principles of the law of evidence which 
 are applicable to civil proceedings are also applicable to bastardy 
 proceedings. The defendant may be compelled to testify as a wit- 
 ness for the mother of the child, ^ and, in case of the absence of 
 any material witnesses, their depositions may be available as 
 evidence.'* 
 
 The burden of proof to show the paternity of the child is upon 
 its mother, but this fact need never be proved by her beyond a 
 
 exclusive criminal jurisdiction, pro- 
 vides also that the proceedings shall 
 be commenced by a warrant, as is the 
 case in other criminal actions, uses 
 the words "accused," "acquitted," and 
 "convicted," and furthermore provides 
 that the defendant shall be liable to 
 an execution to the same extent as are 
 those convicted of misdemeanors, the 
 conviction is irresistible that the legis- 
 lature intended to make it a criminal 
 offense. State v. Brewer, 38 S. Car. 
 263, 268, 16 S. E. looi, 1004, 2>7 Am. 
 St. 752n, 19 L. R. A. 362. 
 
 " Hodgson V. Nickell, 69 Wis. 308, 
 34 X. W. 118; State V. Brewer, 38 
 S. Car. 263, 268, z"/ Am. St. 752n, 19 
 L. R. A. 362. Where a statute, as 
 Acts 1879, chapter 92, § 2, provides 
 that the accused, if he is found to be 
 the father of the child, may be fined 
 a certain sum for the benefit of the 
 school fund, the proceedings may be 
 regarded as criminal. Hence a stat- 
 ute limiting the right of appeal on the 
 part of the state in criminal actions is 
 applicable in such case. State v. Ost- 
 walt, 118 N. Car. 1208, 1216, 24 S. E. 
 
 660, z^ L. R. A. 396, construing S. 
 Car. Code, § 1237. In State v. All- 
 rick, 63 Minn. 328, 65 N. W. 639, it 
 was held that a statutory' provision 
 relating to appeals in civil actions had 
 no application whatever to a bastardy 
 proceeding. 
 
 " State V. Brewer, 38 S. Car. 263, 
 268, 16 S. E. lOOi, 1003, zi Am. St. 
 752n, 19 L. R. A. 362 ; In re Wheeler, 
 34 Kan. 96, 8 Pac. 276; Musser v. 
 Stewart, 21 Ohio St. 353; Ex parte 
 Cottrell, 13 Neb. 193, 13 N. W. 174; 
 State V. ]\Iushied. 12 Wis. 561 ; State 
 V. Jager, 19 Wis. 235; Bookhout v. 
 State, 66 Wis. 415, 28 N. W. I79- 
 Where the defendant is acquitted the 
 costs cannot be taxed against the 
 county or other governmental subdi- 
 vision instituting the proceeding, as 
 is the rule in criminal proceedings. 
 But the rule may be otherwise in the 
 case of express statutory provisions. 
 State v. Blackburn, 61 Ark. 407, 33 
 S. W. 529. 
 
 * Booth V. Hart, 43 Conn. 480. 
 
 " State V. Hickerson, 72 N. Car. 421, 
 422; Richardson v. People, 31 111. 170-
 
 841 
 
 EVIDENCE IX BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 § 525 
 
 reasonable doubt/" nor to the reasonable and conclusive satisfac- 
 tion of the jury." 
 
 A verdict casting the paternity of the child on the accused ought 
 to be sustained though it is supported by a preponderance of the 
 evidence only/- 
 
 ^ 525. Evidence for the jury from the inspection of the child. — 
 
 An irreconcilable diversity of opinion exists upon the proprietv of 
 ])ermitting the child, whose paternity is in issue, to be inspected 
 by the jury. Xo principle of law ought to be permitted to operate 
 to prevent the mother from ha\-ing her infant child with her in 
 the court-room during the trial. ^■' The maternal instinct, and, per- 
 haps, necessity both may prompt her to have the child with her ; 
 and, if such is the case, it may be very difficult to prevent the 
 members of the jury from making an inspection of the child, and 
 
 "Dibble v. State. 48 Ind. 470. 471; 
 Askren v. State, 51 Ind. 592, 593; Dc 
 Priest V. State, 68 Ind. 569; Reynolds 
 V. State, 115 Ind. 421, 422, 17 N. E. 
 909; Dukehart v. Coiighman, 36 Neb. 
 412, 414, 54 N. W. 680; State v. Nich- 
 ols, 29 Minn. 357, 13 N. W. 153; State 
 V. Black, 89 Iowa yyj, 738, 55 N. W. 
 105 ; Satterwhite v. State, 28 Ala. 65 ; 
 Knowles v. Scribner, 57 Me. 495 ; 
 People V. Phalen, 49 Mich. 492, 494, 
 13 N. W. 830; Semon v. People, 42 
 Mich. 141, 149, 3 N. W. 304; Stovall 
 V. State, 9 Baxt. (Tcnn.) 597, 598; 
 Lewis V. People, 82 111. 104; State v. 
 Rogers, 79 N. Car. 609, 610. But see 
 contra, Van Tassel v. State, 59 Wis. 
 351, 352, 18 N. W. 328; State v. Knut- 
 son, 18 S. Dak. 444, loi N. W. 
 33: Norwood V. State, 45 Md. 68; 
 Sonnenberg v. State. 124 Wis. 124, 102 
 N. W. 233 ; Altninowic7. v. People, 
 117 111. App. 415; Bussc V. State, 129 
 Wis. 171, 108 N. W. 64. 
 
 " Miller v. State, no Ala. 69, 20 So. 
 392. 
 
 '" State V. Romaine, 58 Iowa 46, 49, 
 II N. W. 721; Altschulcr v. Algaza, 
 
 16 Neb. 631, 21 N. W. 401 : Olson v. 
 Peterson, Z2> Neb. 358, 50 N. W. 155; 
 Davison v. Cruse, 47 Neb. 829, 66 N. 
 W. 823; State V. Bunker, 7 S. Dak. 
 639. 65 N. W. 2,2) ; People v. Tripicer- 
 sky, 38 N. Y. S. 696. 4 App. Div. (N. 
 Y.) 613, not reported in full. So, too, 
 counsel representing the prosecutrix 
 may, in summing up, comment upon 
 the failure of the defendant to testify 
 in his own behalf in denial of the 
 charge against him. State v. Snure, 
 29 ?ilinn. 132, 12 N. W. 347; Ingram 
 V. State, 24 Neb. 2>Z, 27 N- W. 943; 
 Miller v. State, no Ala. 69, 20 So. 
 392. 
 
 Character of victim of crime, 14 L. 
 R. A. (N. S.) 7i2< note; evidence of 
 declarations to show maternity, 11 L. 
 R. A. CN. S.) 1052. note; evidence of 
 husband or wife to prove illegitimacy. 
 69 Am. St. 571, note. 
 
 " Hutchinson v. State, 19 Neb. 262, 
 266, 27 N. W. 113: State v. Patter.son, 
 18 S. Dak. 251, roc N. W. 162 (hold- 
 ing that counsel may call attention to 
 the child where it is in court). Esch 
 V. Graue, 72 Neb. 719, loi N. W. 978.
 
 s 525 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 842 
 
 a comparison of its features with those of the accused, though 
 their attention is not expressly called to the matter. The Cjuestion 
 is has the court a right to instruct the jury in express terms that 
 tliey may, from a personal examination of the child, and from a 
 comparison of its appearance, features and complexion with simi- 
 lar characteristics of the accused, draw the inference that he is 
 the father of the child? The right of the court to give such an 
 instruction is supported by very many of the authorities.^* But 
 the evidence thus procured by visual inspection has often been 
 excluded, particularly when the child was very young. If the in- 
 fant is so young and so immature and undeveloped that its fea- 
 tures have not assumed a permanent character, any resemblance, 
 fancied or real, would doubtless be misleading. ^^ 
 
 "State V. Britt, 78 N. Car. 439. 
 442; State V. Woodruff, 6-] N. Car. 
 89, 91. 92; State V. Horton, 100 N. 
 Car. 443, 448, 6 S. E. 238, 6 Am. St. 
 613; State V. Arnold. 13 Ired. (N. 
 Car.) 184; Hutchinson v. State, 19 
 Neb. 262, 266, 27 N. W. 113; Scott v. 
 Donovan, 153 Mass. 378, 379, 2(> N. 
 E. 871 ; Finnegan v. Dugan, 14 Allen 
 (Mass.) 197; Risk v. State, 19 Ind. 
 152, 153; State V. Smith, 54 Iowa 104, 
 106, 6 N. W. 153, 2>7 Am. 192; Crow v. 
 Jordon, 49 Ohio St. 655, 656, 32 N. E. 
 750; Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 N. H. 
 108, 115. Compare, Johnson v. Walk- 
 er, 86 Miss. 757, 39 So. 49, 109 Am. 
 St. 733n, I L. R. A. (N. S.) 4700; 
 Shailer v. Bullock, 78 Conn. 65, 61 
 Atl. 65. 112 Am. St. 87. 
 
 '°Risk V. State, 19 Ind. 152, 153; 
 Overlock v. Hall, 81 Maine, 348, 351, 
 17 Atl. 169; State V. Danforth, 48 
 Iowa 43, 47, 30 Am. 387 ; Hanawalt 
 V. State, 64 Wis. 84, 85-89, 24 N. W. 
 489, 54 Am. 588; Gaunt v. State, 50 
 N. J. L. 490, 493; Reitz v. State, ZZ 
 Ind. 187; Copeland v. State (Tex., 
 1897), 40 S. W. 589; Benes v. Peo- 
 ple, 121 111. App. 103. In those states 
 where the proceeding is not regarded 
 as criminal in its character, the ac- 
 
 cused will not be allowed to prove 
 his good character, nor can the prose- 
 cutrix attack it. Houser v. State, 93 
 Ind. 228; Sidelinger v. Bucklin, 64 
 Main 371 ; Low v. Mitchell, 18 Maine 
 2,72. "The resemblance of the child 
 to the accused alone, however striking 
 it may be, is insufficient evidence to 
 go to the jury as sole proof of pater- 
 nity. It is merely one circumstance to 
 be considered in connection with other 
 relevant evidence. The child is re- 
 garded as an exhibit from which the 
 jury alone are to draw inferences with- 
 out any oral comments or accompany- 
 ing explanations by witnesses in the 
 same manner applicable to any rele- 
 vant evidence. The personal appear- 
 ance of the infant, his form, features 
 and complexion, as they appear to 
 the eyes of the jury, being evidence of 
 facts within the common knowledge 
 of most men, is an invasion of their 
 province and a usurpation of their 
 powers to admit the opinions of ex- 
 pert or other witnesses upon such 
 points in connection with the inspec- 
 tion itself." Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 
 144, 148; Warlick v. White, -76 N. 
 Car. 175, 179. In Clark v. Bradstreet, 
 80 Maine 454, on p. 456, 15 Atl. 56, 6
 
 843 EVIDENCE IX BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. § 526 
 
 \Miether an inspection by the jury in court ]je permitted or 
 not, it is very well settled that an inspection by the jury, out of 
 court, during an adjournment, is erroneous. But perhaps such an 
 error might be cured by the judicial instruction that the jury 
 must not consider the appearance of the child in determining its 
 paternity.^'^ 
 
 Resemblance of features is largely a matter of opinion, and on 
 this point the jurors are as competent to judge as any witnesses. 
 Hence, a witness cannot testify that the child which is in court, 
 and which the jurors can see, resembles the defendant, ^"^ thous^h, 
 on the other hand, a witness may testify for the defendant that 
 the child resembles some other m^an, who, it is alleged, has had 
 sexual intercourse with the mother." 
 
 § 526. Presumption of legitimacy. — It was the rule at the com- 
 mon law that if the husband was within the four seas, i. e., if he 
 was resident either in Great Britain or Ireland, the issue of the 
 wife born during coverture was conclusively presumed to be 
 legitimate. The only exception to this rule was where the hus- 
 band was shown to be actually impotent. ^^ 
 
 But in the early days of the present century this rule received 
 
 Am. St. 221, where it was sought to ous doctrine to permit a child's pater- 
 have an inspection of a six weeks old nity to be questioned or proved by the 
 child, the court said: "Where the comparings of the color of its hair 
 child was a mere infant, such evidence or eyes with that of the alleged par- 
 is too vague, uncertain and fanciful, ent." 
 
 and if allowed, would establish not ^^ La Matt v. State, 128 Tnd. 123, 124, 
 only an unwise, but a dangerous and 27 N. E. 346. It seems that an infant 
 imcertain rule of evidence." In the may be exhibited to the jurors to en- 
 case of People V. Carney, 29 Hun (N. able them to determine the question 
 Y.) 47, where a young child was ex- whether a mulatto child can possibly 
 hibited to the jury, the court said: be born of parents both of whom are 
 "This evidence enabled the court to white. Watkins v. Carlton, 10 Leigh 
 compare the color of the child's eyes (Va.) 560. See remarks of court on 
 with those of the defendant who was p. 576. 
 
 present in court. We do not regard "a McCalman v. State. 121 Ga. 491, 
 
 this kind of evidence as safe or proper. 49 S. E. 609. 
 
 * * * Common observation reminds "State v. Rritt, 78 N. Car. 439: 
 
 us that in families of children, differ- Paulk v. State, 52 Ala. 427. 
 
 ent colors of hair and eyes are com- '' i Black Comm. 457; Coke Litt. 
 
 mon and that it would be danger- 244.
 
 ;26 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 844 
 
 some very substantial modifications/^ and it is now the law that 
 the presumption of legitimacy may be rebutted though it is not 
 shown that the husband is out of England.-" If access be shown, 
 meaning b}' that word the opportunity for sexual intercourse be- 
 tween the parties to a marriage, the presumption of legitimacy is 
 and always has been very strong.-^ But wliere non-access at the 
 date of the conception is prox'ed to the satisfaction of the court, 
 the presumption is readily rebuttable, e\'en when the parties to 
 the marriage cohabit after the conception of the child. ■'■ So, in a 
 bastardy proceeding the presumption of legitimacy which attaches 
 to the child of a married woman may be rebutted by proving the 
 non-access of the husband or by showing his actual impotency."^ 
 A man who, knowing a woman is pregnant, marries her during 
 her pregnancy, is conclusively presumed to be the father of the 
 unborn child. The putative father of a bastard is not responsible 
 for its support or maintenance, under such circumstances, where 
 another man has thus agreed to stand /// loco parentis to the un- 
 born child, "^ even though the child is born so soon after the date 
 of the marriage that its conception must have necessarily preceded 
 it.-^ But it will not be presumed that a man who marries the 
 
 " Foxcroft's case, i Rolle Abr. 359. 
 
 ■° Reg V. Murrey, i Salk. 122; Pen- 
 drell V. Pendrell, 2 Stra. 925 ; Wright 
 V. Hicks, 12 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 
 451 ; Morris v. Davies, 5 C. & F. 163. 
 
 "^ Plowes V. Bossey, 31 L. J. Ch. 
 681 ; Vernon v. Vernon, 6 La. An. 
 242; Woodward v. Blue, T07 N. Car. 
 407, 12 S. E. 453, 22 Am. St. 897, 
 10 L. R. A. 662n. Thus in one case 
 it was held that the issue of a mar- 
 riage, which was conceived while the 
 parties thereto were living together, 
 would be conclusively presumed to be 
 legitimate, though it was affirmatively 
 proved that the wife had been guilty 
 of adultery. Banbury Peerage Case, 
 I Sim. & Stu. 153. 
 
 "Bullock V. Knox, 96 Ala. 195, li 
 So. 339; State V. Worthingham, 23 
 Minn. 528, 534; Wright v. Hicks, 12 
 Ga. 155, 56 Am. Dec. 451; Herring v. 
 
 Goodson, 43 Miss. 392, 396; Cross v. 
 Cross, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139, 23 Am. 
 Dec. 778; Vetten v. Wallace, 39 111. 
 App. 390, 397 ; Dean v. State, 29 Ind. 
 483, 485 ; State v. Pettaway, 3 Hawks 
 (N. Car.) 622,. 
 
 -" State V. ^McDowell, loi N. Car. 
 734. 735. 7 S. E. 785 ; State v. Lavin, 
 80 Iowa 555, 562, 46 N. W. 553 ; State 
 V. Britt, 78 N. Car. 439- See, also, 
 cases cited in last note. 
 
 -^ ■Miller v. Anderson, 43 Ohio St. 
 473, 476, 477, 3 N. E. 605, 54 Am. 823 ; 
 State v. Shoemaker, 62 Iowa 343, 344. 
 17 N. W. 589, 49 Am. 146; State v. 
 Romaine, 58 Iowa 46, 48, 11 N. W. 
 721 ; Rhyne v. Hoffman, 6 Jones Eq. 
 (N. Car.) 335; State v. Herman, 13 
 Ired. (N. Car.) 502. 
 
 -^Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. St. 4.20, 
 72 Am. Dec. 644n, 5 Amer. Law Reg. 
 (O. S.) 469-
 
 84: 
 
 EVIDEXCE IX FiASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 § S27 
 
 mother of a bastard which was born before the marriage is its 
 father."'' 
 
 § 527. Evidence rebutting the presumption of legitimacy. — Nei- 
 ther husband nor wife can testify to the fact of non-access during 
 coverture to rebut the presumption of legitimacy in an action 
 brought by a married woman against one whom she claims is the 
 father of her bastard child.-' The rule is stringent and excludes 
 all evidence, direct or collateral, from which the fact of non- 
 access might be inferred.-'^ 
 
 The fact of non-access may be established by other evidence. 
 It may be proved that the husband was absent from the wife at 
 the date when the child was conceived. If it appears that the hus- 
 band and the wife were not living together at the time of the 
 
 '"Janes's Estate, 30 W. N. Cases 
 Pa. 166. 
 
 ^ Easley v. Commonwealth (Pa., 
 1887), II Atl. 220; Mink v. State. 60 
 Wis. 583, 585, 19 N. W. 445, 50 Am. 
 386; Cope V. Cope, i Moody & R. 
 269; Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 
 Binney (Pa.) 283, 285, 6 Am. Dec. 
 449; Chamberlain v. People, 23 N. 
 Y. 85, 88, 80 Am. Dec. 255 ; State v. 
 Pettaway, 3 Hawks N. Car. 623; Rex 
 V. Sourton, 5 Ad. & E. 180; Vetten v. 
 Wallace, 39 111. App. 390, 397. The 
 fact that the other parent is dead does 
 not alter this rule, i Taylor Evidence 
 837, 838. The recent statutory regu- 
 lations removing common law disqual- 
 ifications do not remove them unless 
 it is expressly so stated. Tioga 
 County V. South Creek Township, 75 
 Pa. St. 433. The fact that the mother 
 of the child was a single woman will 
 he held to he sufficiently proved by 
 her uncontradicted testimony to the 
 eflfect that she was engaged to marry 
 the defendant and that she is unmar- 
 ried at the time of trial. La Plant v. 
 People, 60 Til. App. 340. '{"he fact 
 that the brother of the accused with- 
 
 out his knowledge attempted to com- 
 promise the matter with the mother is 
 no evidence of his guilt. People v. 
 Hawks, 107 Mich. 249, 65 N. W. 100. 
 ■^ Questions such as "Who was with 
 you on a certain date?" or "Where 
 was your husband on that date?" are 
 objectionable as tending to prove non- 
 access indirectly. "The presumption 
 of the law is in such a case that the 
 husband had access to the wife, and 
 this presumption must be overcome by 
 the clearest evidence that it was im- 
 possible for him by reason of im- 
 potency or imbecility, or entire ab- 
 sence from the place where the wife 
 was during such time, to have had 
 access to the wife, or to be the father 
 of the child. Testimony of the wife 
 even tending to show such fact, or of 
 any fact from which such non-access 
 could be inferred, or of any collateral 
 fact connected with this main fact, is 
 to be most scrupulously kept out of 
 the case; and such non-access and il- 
 legitimacy must be clearly proved by 
 other testimony." Mink v. State, 60 
 Wis. 583. on page 585, 19 N. W. 445. 
 50 Am. 386.
 
 528 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 846 
 
 alleged conception, and conld not have had sexnal intercourse at 
 that date, the presumption of legitimacy is overcome. So where 
 it appears from the evidence that the husband has been absent 
 from the country for a period which is longer than the period 
 of gestation of the child, as when the parties had separated years 
 before and had since resided in cities which are widely separated, 
 the fact of non-access may be regarded as conclusively estab- 
 lished.-^ 
 
 § 528. The relations of the parties. — Evidence of all facts which 
 tend to prove the intimate relations which existed between the 
 accused and the prosecutrix, including an engagement and mutual 
 
 "'Rex V. Luffe, 8 East 193; State v. 
 Lavin, 80 Iowa 555, 562, 46 N. W. 
 55,3, citing cases fully; Haworth v. 
 Gill, 30 Ohio St. 627, 628; Common- 
 wealth V. Shepherd, 6 Binn. (Pa.) 283, 
 286, 6 Am. Dec. 449; Watts v. Owens, 
 62 Wis. 512, 22 N. W. 720; Chamber- 
 lain V. People, 23 N. Y. 85, 80 Am. 
 Dec. 255 ; Herring v. Goodson, 43 
 ]\Iiss. 392, 396; Dean v. State, 29 Ind. 
 483, 485 ; Boykin v. Boykin, 70 N. 
 Car. 262, 264, 16 Am. 'J^^•, Pittsford 
 V. Chittenden, 58 Vt. 49; Cross v. 
 Cross, 3 Paige (N. Y.) 139, 22, Am. 
 Dec. 778; Rex v. Maidstone, 12 East 
 550. In a bastardy case if the husband 
 had access his impotence must be 
 clearly proved. Commonwealth v. 
 Shepherd, 6 Binney (Pa.) 283, 286, 6 
 Am. Dec. 449 ; Commonwealth v. 
 Wentz, I Ashmead (Pa.) 269, 270. 
 "Non-access cannot be proved by 
 either the husband or the wife, 
 whether the action be civil or crim- 
 inal, or whether the proceeding is one 
 of settlement or bastardy, or to re- 
 cover property claimed as heir at law." 
 By the court in Dennison v. Page, 29 
 Pa. St. 420, 12. Am. Dec. 644n ; Rex 
 v. Book, I Wils. 340 ; Egbert v. Green- 
 
 wait, 44 Mich. 245, 6 N. W. 654, 38 
 Am. 260 ; Corson v. Corson, 44 N. H. 
 587. "That issue born in wedlock, 
 though begotten before, is presump- 
 tively legitimate is an axiom of law 
 so well established, that to cite au- 
 thorities in support of it, would be a 
 mere waste of time. So the rule that 
 the parents will not be permitted to 
 prove non-access for the purpose of 
 bastardizing such issue is just as well 
 settled. Many reasons have been 
 given for this rule. Prominent among 
 them is the idea that the admission of 
 such testimony would be unseemly 
 and scandalous, and this not so much 
 from the fact, that it reveals immoral 
 conduct upon the part of the parents, 
 as because of the efifect it may have 
 upon the child, who is in no fault, but 
 who must nevertheless be the chief 
 sufferer thereby. That the parents 
 should be permitted to bastardize the 
 child, is a proposition which shocks 
 our sense of right and decency, and 
 hence the rule of law which forbids 
 it." By the court in Tioga County v. 
 South Creek Township, 75 Pa. St. 
 433, 436.
 
 847 
 
 EVIDENCE IN BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 § 5-^8 
 
 promise to marry,^*^ is relevant. ^^ Thus, acts of sexual inter- 
 course, other than the one alleged to have resulted in pregnancv,"- 
 and opportunity for the intercourse prior to the conception,"" are 
 always relevant. 
 
 Advances and attempts by the accused to have sexual inter- 
 course with prosecutrix at other times, though not successful, are 
 always relevant to show the desire for such intercourse.^* 
 
 A letter proved or admitted to have been written by the defend- 
 ant to the prosecutrix, containing expressions showing the inti- 
 macv and affection between them, is admissible.'^ 
 
 '"'Gemmill v. State, i6 Ind. App. 
 154, 43 N. E. 909. 
 
 "' Strickler v. Grass, 32 Neb. 811, 
 814, 49 N. W. 804. 
 
 ^"Ramey v. State, 127 Ind. 243, 244; 
 26 N. E. 818; Gemmill v. State, 16 
 Ind. App. 154, 43 N. E. 909; State v. 
 Smith, 47 Minn. 475, 476, 50 N. W. 
 605 ; Harty v. Malloy, 67 Conn. 339, 35 
 Atl. 259; People V. Schilling, 1 10 
 Mich. 412, 68 N. W. 233. 
 
 ^ Goodwine v. State, 5 Ind. App. 6;^, 
 68, 31 X. E. 554; Harty v. ^Malloy, 67 
 Conn. 339, 35 Atl. 259; Thayer v. 
 Davis, 38 Vt. 163 ; Francis v. Rosa, 
 151 Alass. 532, 24 N. E. 1024; Benton 
 V. Starr, 58 Conn. 285, 20 Atl. 450. 
 "The previous familiarity or intimacy 
 existing between the parties was a 
 circumstance bearing on the proba- 
 bility of the alleged sexual intercourse 
 which is the subject of the prosecu- 
 tion. It tended to illustrate the rela- 
 tion of the parties to each other at 
 the time when, as is claimed by the 
 prosecutrix, the child to which she 
 gave birth was begotten, and this re- 
 lation has always been considered 
 proper evidence as well for one party 
 as the other." Thayer v. Davis, 38 
 Vt. 163, on page 164. Evidence that 
 both before and after the date of the 
 conception of the child the complain- 
 
 ing witness was accustomed to sleep 
 with a man who could have easily 
 been the father of the child, has been 
 received to impeach her credibility. 
 State V. Read, 45 Iowa 469. 
 
 ^ Baker v. State, 69 Wis. 32, 38, 33 
 N. W. 52; Walker v. State, 92 Ind. 
 474. The accused may be compelled 
 on cross-examination to answer sucli 
 questions relating to other acts of in- 
 tercourse. State V. Klitzke, 46 ^linn. 
 343, 345, 49 N. W. 54. 
 
 "'Williams v. State, 113 Ala. 58, 21 
 So. 463, 464; Walker v. State, 92 Ind. 
 474; Sullivan v. Hurley, 147 Mass. 
 387, 18 N. E. 3; La Matt v. State. 128 
 Ind. 123, 27 N. E. 346; Beers v. Jack- 
 man, 103 Alass. 192. "In proof of un- 
 lawful se.xual intercourse, the adulter- 
 ous disposition of the parties at the 
 time may be shown. To this end, the 
 antecedent and subsequent conduct 
 and declaratif)ns of the parties, if it 
 lias a tendency to prove the fact, is 
 admissible. It is a matter of common 
 observation, that a criminal intimacy 
 is usually of gradual development, 
 and, when established, is likely to con- 
 tinue between the parties. The act 
 itself is the strongest evidence of the 
 existence of the disposition, and it 
 has been recently held that fm' the 
 purpose of proving it, an act of adul-
 
 §§ 5-9~530 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 848 
 
 It has been held that the accused cannot be permitted to prove 
 that the mother had attempted to procure an abortion,^" though, 
 on the other hand, she may sb.ow that he had advised her to pro- 
 cure an abortion,"' and had offered lier medicine for that pur- 
 pose,"'^ as tending to prove the intimate relations existing between 
 them.^^ 
 
 § 529. Competency and credibility of prosecutrix. — The mother 
 is a competent,^" and perhaps an indispensable, witness.*^ Her 
 evidence is in law no less credible than that of the accused,'*" the 
 credibility and weight of the evidence of both being for the jury. 
 But they may consider the pecuniary interest of the accused in 
 denying the paternity of the child as likely to affect his credi- 
 bility.^" In the absence of any statute requiring the testimony of 
 the prosecutrix to be corroborated, the jury may find that the 
 accused is the father of the child upon the testimony of the mother 
 alone, provided they shall believe it is credible.''* 
 
 ^ 530. Variance in proving the date of the conception. — The pre- 
 cise date of the conception is not material except so far as a fail- 
 ure to prove it precisely on the part of the mother may invalidate 
 
 tery at another time may be shown, testify to the absence of her husband. 
 
 * * * It has long been held that Evans v. State, 165 Ind. 369, 74 N. E. 
 
 prior acts of familiarity were admis- 244, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 6i9n, rehear- 
 
 sible to render it not improbable that ing denied, 75 N. E. 651. 
 
 the act might have occurred." By the "Reg. v. Armitage, 27 L. T. 41, L. 
 
 court in Beers v. Jackman, 103 Mass. R. 7 Q. B. "JT^. 
 
 192, p. 193. ^' State V. Ginger, 80 Iowa 574, 46 
 
 ^^ Sweet V. Sherman, 21 Vt. 23, 29. N. W. 657; Roberts v. State, 84 Wis. 
 
 ^'Miller v. State, no Ala. 69, 20 So. 361, 363, 54 N. W. 580; Altschuler v. 
 
 392. Algaza, 16 Neb. 631, 21 N. W. 401. 
 
 '■^Alcllvain v. State, 80 Ind. 69, 72; *' McClellan v. State, 66 Wis. 335, 
 
 Nicholson v. State, "72. Ala. 176. 2>y/> 28 N. W. 347. 
 
 ^° A rumor which was prevalent in ''* Olson v. Peterson, 33 Neb. 358, 50 
 
 the neighborhood that the prosecutrix N. W. 155; State v. McGlothlen, 56 
 
 had been improperly intimate with the Iowa 544, 545, 9 N. W. 893 ; Miller v. 
 
 accused is not admissible to prove the State, no Ala. 69, 20 So. 392; Evans 
 
 paternity of the child. Saint v. State, v. State, 165 Ind. 369, 74 N. E. 244. 
 
 68 Ind. 128, 130. 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 6i9n, rehearing do- 
 
 *" Bowers v. Wood, 143 Mass. 182, nied, 75 N. E. 651; Matteson v. Peo- 
 
 184, 9 N. E. 534. If married she may pie, 122 III. App. ^.
 
 849 
 
 EV'IDENCE IN BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. §§ 53I-532 
 
 the credibility and effect of her evidence.'*^ But the act of inter- 
 course must be shown to have occurred on such a date as will 
 satisfy the jury that the infant, whose paternity is in question, 
 was the result of it. 
 
 § 531. The reputation of the prosecutrix. — The general rule is 
 that the reputation of the prosecutrix is irrelevant.*" The respon- 
 sibility of fhe accused for the support of the bastard depends upon 
 its paternity, not upon the good or bad reputation of the mother. 
 Hence, the court should not permit questions to be put to her 
 tending to prove her immoral actions with other men, merely for 
 the sake of impeaching her, by showing her evil reputation. Un- 
 der some circumstances, how^ever, her adultery with other men 
 may become relevant.*^ 
 
 § 532. Sexual intercourse with other men during the period of ges- 
 tation. — The prosecutrix may be questioned as to acts of sexual 
 intercourse with other men when the sole object of the questions 
 is to ascertain the paternity of the child. Any question put to her 
 for this purpose involving her immorality w^ith other men must 
 relate to actions coming wnthin a period during which the child 
 might have been conceived.*® 
 
 *^ Francis v. Rosa, 151 Mass. 532, 24 
 N. E. 1024; Ross V. People, 34 111. 
 App. 21 ; Holcomb v. People, 79 111. 
 409; Hamilton v. People, 46 Mich. 
 186, 9 N. W. 247. 
 
 " Sidelinger v. Bucklin, 64 Maine 
 371 ; Davison v. Cruse, 47 Neb. 829, 
 66 N. W. 823; Swisher v. Malonc, 31 
 W. Va. 442, 7 S. E. 439; People v. 
 Wilson, 136 Mich. 298, 99 N. W. 6, 10 
 Det. Leg. N. 1047; State v. O'Rourke 
 (Neb., 1909), 124 N. W. 138; Clow v. 
 Smith (Neb., 1909), 124 N. W. 140. 
 
 " "The character for chastity of a 
 woman who appears in court to affili- 
 ate her bastard child is pretty effectu- 
 ally impeached without further proof 
 on the subject; but that has no di- 
 rect bearing upon the question to be 
 tried — whether the accused is the fa- 
 ther of such child. Of course, he may 
 54 — Underhii.f. Ckim. Kv. 
 
 show what her reputation is for truth 
 and veracity, and thus attack the cred- 
 ibility of her testimony, but that is as 
 far as he can go on questions of repu- 
 tation." By the court in Bookhout v. 
 State, 66 Wis. 415, 28 N. W. 179. 
 
 ^* Humphrey v. State, 78 Wis. 569. 
 571, 47 N. W. 836; Ginn v. Common- 
 wealth, 5 Lilt. (Ky.) 300; Burris v. 
 Court, 34 Neb. 187, 191, 51 N. W. 745; 
 Davison v. Cruse, 47 Neb. 829, 66 N. 
 W. 823; Goodwine v. State, 5 Ind. 
 App. 63, 31 N. E. 554; Whitman v. 
 State, 34 Ind. 360; People v. Kamin- 
 sky, 73 Mich. 637, 639, 41 N. W. 833 ; 
 State V. Giles, 103 N. Car. 391, 9 S. E. 
 433; State V. Britt, 78 N. Car. 439. 
 440; Scliarf V. People, 34 111. App. 
 400; llolcoml) V. People, 79 111. 409; 
 Easdale v. Reynolds, 143 Mass. 126, 
 128, 9 N. E. 13; Bowcn v. Reed, 103
 
 § S3^ CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 85O 
 
 The questions must indicate explicitly the time and place of the 
 sexual intercourse and the name of the person with whom it is 
 alleged that it was indulged in." 
 
 If the woman denies the sexual intercourse, it may be proved 
 by the testimony of a man who can testify that she has had inter- 
 course with him.^" And on the other hand it is relevant to prove 
 that, prior to the date of the conception, the mother had received 
 no attention from any man except the accused. ^^ 
 
 The length of the period over which the incjuiry into the illicit 
 relations of the prosecutrix wath other men may extend is not 
 definitely fixed by the cases. A great deal depends on the circum- 
 stances of each case, and particularly on the obstetrical facts as 
 they appear from the medical testimony or otherwise. In the 
 majority of cases it is futile to extend the inquiry more than 
 three weeks later or earlier than the probable date of the concep- 
 tion of the child. If we assume that the length of the period of 
 gestation is about ten lunar months or nine calendar months, or 
 say about two hundred and eighty days, a question as to inter- 
 course with any other man at a date a month or more prior or 
 subsequent to the beginning of the period of gestation would 
 clearly be inadmissible, unless it is also shown that the illicit in- 
 Mass. 46 ; Commonwealth v. ]\Ioore, 3 1901), 95 N. W. 1053; Guthrie v. 
 Pick. (]\Iass.) 194, 197; Sabins v. State (Neb. 1901), 96 N. W. 243. "In 
 Jones, 119 Mass. 167, 171; Swisher v. this class of cases an innovation has 
 Malone, 31 W. Va. 442, 7 S. E. 439; been made on the strict rules of cross- 
 State V. Karver, 65 Iowa 53, 55. 21 examination, so far as to permit the 
 N. W. 161 ; Olsen v. Peterson, 33 Neb. defendant to ask the woman whether, 
 358, 50 N. W. 155; Sang v. Beers, 20 within the period of gestation, she has 
 Neb. 365, 30 N. W. 258; Benham v. had intercourse with other men." By 
 State, 91 Ind. 82; Walker v. State, the court in Holcomb v. People, 79 111. 
 6 Blackf. (Ind.) i; JNIarks v. State, 409. 
 
 loi Ind. 353; People v. Schildwachter, ^® Meyncke v. State, 68 Ind. 401. 
 ,S App. Div. (N. Y.) 346, 39 N. Y. S. ""State v. Read, 45 Iowa 469; Peo- 
 288; State V. Coatney, 8 Yerg. pie v. Kaminsky, 73 Mich. 637, 639, 41 
 (Tenn.) 210; Short v. State, 4 Harr. N. W. 833; McCoy v. People, 65 111. 
 (Del.) 568; Kintner v. State, 45 Ind. 439; Williams v. State, 113 Ala. 58, 21 
 175; Crawford v. State, 7 Baxt. So. 463, 465; State v. Perkins, 117 N. 
 (Tenn.) 41; Anon, 37 Miss. 54; Peo- Car. 698, 23 S. E. 274, or by her ad- 
 ple V. Keefer, 103 ^^lich. 83, 61 N. W. missions in writing. Walker v. State, 
 338; Zimmerman v. People, 117 111. 165 Ind. 94, 74 N. W. 614. 
 App. 54; Ankeny v. Rawhouser (Neb. " Curran v. People, 35 111. App. 275.
 
 8;i 
 
 EVIDENCE IX BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 ^ 533 
 
 timacy existed between the same persons at or very near to the 
 time of conception/ - 
 
 If the prosecutrix is proved to have inckilged in promiscuous 
 sexual intercourse with other men at or about the date she alleges 
 the child was conceived, she will not be permitted to state while 
 on the stand that she became pregnant as the result of any par- 
 ticular act of intercourse. Her testimony on that point would be 
 merely an inference. If she had submitted to the embraces of 
 several men on or about the same date, it is impossible for any 
 person, in view of her physical organization and for physiological 
 reasons, to state positively who is the father of the child, how- 
 ever readily paternity may be determined when sexual intercourse 
 with only one man is in question. ^^ 
 
 ^ 533. Admissibility of the admissions and declarations of the 
 parties. — In some of the states the declarations of the mother of 
 the child made during her travail and which are continued or 
 persisted in subsequently, and which charge a particular person 
 with its paternity, are received as original evidence both for and 
 against the accused. °* Whether declarations of this sort are re- 
 ceivable in the absence of a statute is an undecided point. Some 
 authorities hold that thev are not admissible either to corroborate 
 
 " State V. Phillips, 5 Ind. App. 122, 
 31 X. E. 476; Ronan v. Dugan, 126 
 Mass. 176, 177; State v. Granger, 87 
 Iowa 355, 54 N. W. 79 ; Duck v. State, 
 17 Ind. 210; Olson v. Peterson, 33 
 Neb. 358, 50 N. W. 155; Scharf v. 
 People, 34 111. App. 400; Sabins v. 
 Jones, 119 Mass. 167. In a recent case 
 where the child was born on the 8th 
 day of June, 1888, the prosecutrix 
 was required to answer the question, 
 "Did you have se.xual intercourse with 
 any other man than the accused at 
 any time between August 10 and No- 
 vember I, 1887?" Pike V. People, 34 
 111. App. 112; and see, al.so, Swisher 
 V. Malonc, 31 W. Va. 442, 7 S. K. 
 439. It is the exclusive right of the 
 jury to determine the probable length 
 
 of the period of gestation as a ques- 
 tion of fact on the circumstances of 
 the case. Davison v. Cruse, 47 Neb. 
 829, 66 N. W. 823. 
 
 "Baker v. State, 47 Wis. in, 2 N. 
 W. 110. 
 
 " Mass. Public Stat., c. 85, 16 Maine 
 Rev. Stat., c. 97, section 6; Robl)ins 
 V. Smith, 47 Conn. 182; Scott v. Don- 
 ovan, 153 Mass. 378, 26 N. E. 871. 
 Contra, State v. Tipton, 15 Mont. 74, 
 38 Pac. 222; Richmond v. State, 19 
 Wis, 307. The expression used in one 
 statute is, "having been put to the dis- 
 covery of the truth of such statement 
 at the time of her travail." Wilson v. 
 Woodside, 57 Maine 489; Hums v. 
 Donoghuc, 185 Mass. 71, 69 N. E. 
 1060.
 
 533 
 
 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 852 
 
 her testimony or as evidence directly on the issue. ^^ But elsewhere 
 it has been held that statements made, both before and after the 
 birth of the child, that the accused is its father, should be re- 
 ceived. ^*^ 
 
 Declarations are to be regarded as made during travail, if they 
 are proved to have been uttered between the instant that the pains 
 of labor begin and the moment when the delivery of the child is 
 completed by the severance of the umbilical cord.^' 
 
 They will be admitted though the child is born subsequently to 
 the making of the charge against the defendant.^"* 
 
 The admission of the prosecutrix that another man is the father 
 of the child is receivable as a contradictory statement for the 
 purpose of impeachment.^" 
 
 But the statements of third persons as to the paternity of the 
 child not made in her presence and constituting no part of the 
 res gcstcc of any. relevant act ^re never received."*' On the other 
 hand all the utterances of the accused having any bearing on his 
 relations Vv'ith the prosecutrix, as, for example, his promise to 
 marry her, are admissible against him.''^ 
 
 " State V. Hussey, 7 Iowa 409 ; Side- 
 linger V. Bucklin, 64 Maine 371, 272>'> 
 State V. Lowell, 123 Iowa 427, gg N. 
 W. 125 ; Sidelinger v. Bucklin, 64 Me. 
 371 ; Ray v. Coffin, 123 Mass. 365 ; 
 State V. Spencer, '/2> ^linn. lOi, 75 
 N. W. 893, 76 N. W. 48; Stoppert v. 
 Nierle, 45 Neb. 105, 63 N. W. 382; 
 Wilkins v. ]Metcalf, 71 Vt. 103, 41 
 Atl. 1035. 
 
 ^ Harty v. Malloy, 67 Conn. 339, 35 
 Atl. 259; Benton v. Starr, 58 Conn. 
 28s, 20 Atl. 450; Welch V. Clark, 50 
 Vt. 386 ; Baxter v. Gormley, 186 IMass. 
 168, 71 N. E. 575- 
 
 " Tacey v. Noyes, 143 Mass. 449, 
 451, 9 N. E. 830; Scott V. Donovan, 
 153 IMass. 378, 379, 26 N. E. 871. For 
 other definitions of "travail" see Den- 
 nett V. Kneeland, 6 Maine 460; Bacon 
 V. Harrington, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 63, 64; 
 Drowne v. Stimpson, 2 Mass. 441, 443, 
 444, limiting it to the birth of the 
 child. 
 
 ^ Bowers v. Wood, 143 ]\Iass. 182, 
 184, 9 N. E. 534. 
 
 '"^ Houser v. State, 93 Ind. 228 ; E. 
 N. E. v. State, 25 Fla. 268, 6 So. 58; 
 Johnson v. People, 140 111. 350, 29 
 N. E. 895; Meyncke v. State, 68 Ind. 
 401 ; People v. White, 53 Mich. 537, 
 19 N. W. 174. The admissions of the 
 prosecutrix as to the paternity of the 
 child ought to be received with ex- 
 treme caution. Morris v. State, lOi 
 Ind. 560, 562. A statement by the 
 prosecutrix that it is necessary for a 
 woman to get in the family way in 
 order to procure a husband is not ad- 
 missible as impeachment. Johnson v. 
 People, 140 111. 350, 29 N. E. 895. 
 
 '^"Prince v. Gundaway, 157 Mass. 
 417, 418, 22 N. E. 653; Benton v. 
 Starr, 58 Conn. 285, 20 Atl. 450. 
 
 "^Laney v. State, 109 Ala. 34, 19 So. 
 531 ; Woodward v. Shaw, 18 Maine 
 304. 307 ; Sale v. Crutchfield, 8 Bush 
 (Ky.) 636; Miller v. State, no Ala.
 
 S5: 
 
 EVIDENCE IX BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS. 
 
 § 534 
 
 Some of the statutes require that au accusation made during 
 pregnancy shall be continued in subsequently. This requirement 
 that the mother shall be constant refers only to the name of the 
 man who is accused. A variance as regards the time, place or 
 other circumstance of the intercourse will not render the declara- 
 tion incompetent, though perhaps affecting its credibility."" In 
 conclusion it may be said that the mother is a competent witness 
 to prove her own declarations,^^ though such evidence may be 
 more valuable and convincing if coming from another witness."^* 
 
 § 534. Evidence of the preliminary examination. — When, prior to 
 the trial, a preliminary examination is had, the record thereof 
 may be given in evidence in favor of either party at the trial, and, 
 if lost, the contents may be proved orally by testimony from the 
 prosecutrix or any other person who was present.*'^ But the judg- 
 ment in an action, brought by the mother to recover damages for 
 her seduction, is not competent to prove the paternity of the child 
 in a subsequent bastardy proceeding.*"' 
 
 69, 20 So. 392. Evidence by the phy- 
 sician who attended the prosecutrix 
 that she told him who was the father 
 of the child is not a communication of 
 information within a statute forbid- 
 ding disclosures of information neces- 
 sary to enable him to act as a surgeon 
 or to prescribe as a physician. People 
 V. Cole, 113 Mich. 83. 71 N. W. 455. 
 
 "" Woodward v. Shaw, 18 Maine 
 304; Totman v. Forsaith, 55 !Maine 
 360. 
 
 •"Reed v. Raskins. 116 Mass. 198, 
 
 199- 
 
 " Murphy V. Spcnce. 9 Gray (Mass.) 
 399. "The general object was to give 
 competency to a witness, who, by the 
 general rule of evidence, would be ex- 
 cluded as interested, in a case in 
 which, without such evidence, the mis- 
 chief intended to be cured would be 
 irremediable. The danger of such evi- 
 dence was not overlooked by the leg- 
 
 islature and was intended to be 
 guarded against by placing the witness 
 in such circumstances at the time of 
 her accusation as would in all proba- 
 bility insure her veracity. In the time 
 of her utmost peril, with the fear of 
 death and judgment before her eyes, 
 it was wisely thought that a false ac- 
 cusation would rarely if ever be 
 made ; upon the same principle that 
 the declarations of a person in ex- 
 tremis which may affect the life of a 
 party accused of murder are admitted, 
 though not under the sanction of an 
 oath." :\Iaxwell v. Hardy. 8 Pick. 
 (Mass.) 560, on p. 561. 
 
 •"Hoff v. Fisher, 26 Ohio St. 7, 8; 
 Stoppert V. Nierle, 45 Neb. 105, 63 
 N. W. 382; McLaughlin v. Joy, 100 
 Me. 517, 62 Atl. 648; McCalman v. 
 State, 121 Ga. 491, 49 S. E. 609. 
 
 ""Glenn v. State. 46 Ind. 368.
 
 § 535 CRIMINAL EVIDENCE. 854 
 
 § 535. Evidence of compromise or settlement. — Inasmuch as a 
 proceeding to affiliate a bastard child is generally regarded as in 
 the nature of a civil action, no objection, either in law or upon 
 the ground of public policy, can exist to prevent a compromise 
 or extra-judicial settlement between the parties. A note given 
 to settle such an action is valid and based on good consideration, 
 and cannot be invalidated on the grounds that such a compromise 
 is against public policy, or contrary to good morals.**^ The pri- 
 mary object of the proceeding is not to determine the paternity of 
 the child, but to compel its father to provide for its support. If, 
 therefore, the defendant is willing to do this voluntarily, the pro- 
 ceedings ought to be dismissed; for if the action is brought to a 
 termination, favorable to the complainant, the defendant cannot 
 be compelled to do any more.''^ 
 
 Hence, it is always relevant to show in evidence that the de- 
 fendant has voluntarily recognized the claim of the illegitimate 
 child, and has entered into an agreement by which he is effectually 
 bound to provide for its care and supjXDrt, and for the lying-in 
 and nursing expenses and medical attendance of the mother. 
 
 ^ Billingsley v. Clelland, 41 W. Va. "^ See People v. Wheeler, 60 111. 
 234, 23 S. E. 812. App. 351.
 
 INDEX 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 ABDUCTION, 
 
 definition of, 339. 
 
 evidence to prove the enticement, 339. 
 
 amatory letters as admissions, 339. 
 
 necessity for corroborating the prosecutrix, 339. 
 
 burden to show non-consent of guardian, 340. 
 
 presumption and burden of proving chastity, 341. 
 
 evidence to show age of prosecutrix, 342. 
 
 for prostitution or concubinage, 343. 
 
 ABILITY, 
 
 of accused to commit assault, 353. 
 
 ABORTION, 
 
 incriminating articles may be produced in, 48. 
 
 at common law and by statute, 344. 
 
 intention to produce, 345. 
 
 evidence of similar crimes, 345. 
 
 victim of, is not accomplice, 346. 
 
 statutory corroboration, when required, 346. 
 
 evidence against one of several indicted for, 346. 
 
 burden of proof to show necessity for, 347. 
 
 declarations by the victim of, 347. 
 
 evidence of physical condition and illness, 349. 
 
 medical evidence and evidence of the post mortem, 350. 
 
 exception to rule of privileged communications, 351. 
 
 ABSENCE, 
 
 of lawful spouse as defense in bigamy, 401. 
 
 ABSENCE OF WITNESS, 
 
 when intentional, constitutes contempt, 225. 
 permits admission of testimony at former trial, 260. 
 distinction between civil and criminal cases, 260. 
 mode of proving, 266.^ 
 procured by connivance, 266. 
 
 (855)
 
 856 ' INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 ABSENCE OF WITNESS— Contimted. 
 
 cross-examining and confronting, 265. 
 mode of proving testimony in case of, 267. 
 continuances granted because of, 268. 
 in extradition, 495. 
 
 ABSENT WITNESS, 
 
 when impeachable, 271. 
 
 AB;USIVE WITNESS, 
 
 judge may silence, 215. 
 
 ACCIDENT, 
 
 evidence to show, 89. 
 
 burning, the result of, not arson, 367. 
 
 ACCOMPLICE, 
 who is, 69. 
 
 court may determine that witness is, 69. 
 competency of, in general, 69. 
 in bribery, 69. 
 
 competency of, when jointly indicted, 69. 
 when separately indicted, 69. 
 when acquittal of may be directed, 70. 
 when competent for the state, 71. 
 immunity when testifying for the state, 72. 
 separate trial of, when necessary, 72. 
 competency when convicted, 72. 
 good character of, not relevant, 72. 
 right of defense to prove agreement to testify, 72. 
 credibility and corroboration of, 73. 
 when competent for each other, 70. 
 victim of abortion is not, 346. 
 
 evidence of, in adultery must be corroborated, 382. 
 person involved in crime of incest is an, 397. 
 may be compelled to testify in bribery, 453. 
 what constitutes, in bribery, 453. 
 testimony of, to prove gambling, 473. 
 what constitutes, in gambling, 473. 
 
 ACCOUNTANT, 
 
 may testify to general result, 45. 
 
 ACCOUNTS AND PAPERS, 
 
 seized by search warrant, 58a.
 
 IXDEX. 857 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 ACCUSED, 
 
 presumption of innocence in favor of, 19. 
 
 when compelled to sustain burden of proof, 23. 
 
 requiring or permitting to testify before grand jury, 26, 27. 
 
 wife of, as witness before grand jury, 27. 
 
 how prior arrest may be shown, 40. 
 
 articles taken from, as evidence against, 48. 
 
 may be identified by photograph, 50, 51. 
 
 inspection of, by jury, 53. 
 
 may be compelled to stand for identification, 54. 
 
 identification of, by voice, 56. 
 
 when may be recalled, 62. 
 
 search of, 58a. 
 
 cannot be compelled to meet independent crimes, 87. 
 
 declarations of, will be received in his favor, 100. 
 
 dying declarations received in favor of, in. 
 
 demeanor of, subsequent to crime may be shown, 115-119. 
 
 silence of, charged with crime, 122. 
 
 insanity of, 154-168. 
 
 intoxication of, 164-168. 
 
 his right to examine and confront witness, 221. 
 
 his right to process, 250. 
 
 charged with larceny, may testify to intent in taking goods, 292. 
 
 possession of stolen property by, may be shown, 299-304. 
 
 affidavit of on application for new trial, 517. 
 
 in bastardy proceedings, 523. 
 
 admissions of as to paternity of child, 533. 
 
 presence of at autopsy not necessary, 312. 
 
 evidence to connect, with weapon, 312. 
 
 peaceable character of, 327. 
 
 his presence near scene of crime, 369. 
 
 cannot be compelled to make footprints for comparison, 374. 
 
 pecuniary condition of, 304. 
 
 right to testify in extradition, 497. 
 
 fugitive character of in extradition, 497. 
 
 prior conviction of to increase punishment, 506. 
 
 ACCUSED AS A WITNESS, 
 
 statutory competency of, 57. 
 
 in Federal courts, 57. 
 
 not compellable to testify, 58. 
 
 credibility of, 58. 
 
 interest may be considered, 58. 
 
 jury may not arbitrarily reject evidence of, 58. 
 
 mode of examination, 59.
 
 858 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 ACCUSED AS A WITNESS— Co;;//«»rc/. 
 may testify to intent, 59. 
 must be permitted to explain, 59. 
 cross-examination of, 60. 
 limiting cross-examination of, 60. 
 
 incriminating and disgracing questions put to the, 60. 
 prior arrest, indictment, conviction, imprisonment and vagrancy of, 
 
 may be shown, 61. 
 is entitled to same rights as other witness, 62. 
 
 statutory limitation of cross-examination of, as to relevant matters, 62. 
 mode of carrying on cross-examination of, 63. 
 statutes are strictly construed, 64. 
 recalling, 64. 
 
 privileged communications on cross-examination, 64. 
 waiver of privilege to refuse to divulge confidential communications, 64. 
 conclusiveness of answers by, 65. 
 contradicting the, 65. 
 bad character of, for veracity, 66. 
 impeaching, as in case of other witness, 66. 
 rights of, 66. 
 
 commenting on failure to testify, 67. 
 exclusion of comment on silence of, 68. 
 failure to testify as to particular matters, 67. 
 
 ACQUITTAL, 
 
 best evidence of, 40. 
 
 directing, of accomplice, 70. 
 
 directing, of accused, 279. 
 
 evidence of, does not exclude proof of other forgeries, 423. 
 
 of felon, cannot be proved under charge of compounding felony, 458. 
 
 ADMISSIONS, 
 
 receivable though involuntary, 137. 
 
 in connection with possession of forged writings, 423. 
 
 by accused, to show falsity of pretenses, 438. 
 
 to avoid granting a continuance, 272. 
 
 relevancy of, in embezzlement, 290. 
 
 See Confession. 
 ADULTERATION, 
 
 when proof of Ijnowledge and intent is unnecessary, 480. 
 
 presumption of guilty knowledge, 480. 
 
 inferences from possession of food, 480. 
 
 presumption of fraudulent purpose, 480. 
 
 variance in, 480. 
 
 evidence furnished by analysis, 481. 
 
 showing incompetency of chemist, 481.
 
 INDEX. 859 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 ADULTERY, 
 
 defined and distinguished from fornication, 380. 
 may be proved from circumstances of parties, 380. 
 evidence tending to prove other adulteries, 380. 
 evidence of accomplice to show, 382. 
 evidence of character of accomplice, 382. 
 marriage must be proved, 383. 
 marriage certificate is evidence, 383. 
 evidence of eye-witness of ceremony, 383. 
 presumption of continuance of marriage, 383. 
 living in, 383. 
 
 of prosecutrix to impeach her, 413. 
 proof of by prosecutrix in bastardy, 531. 
 
 ADVERSE WITNESS, 
 
 may be impeached, 234, 240. 
 
 AFFIDAVITS, 
 
 to prove contempt, 461. 
 
 use and character of, in extradition, 498. 
 
 form and contents of, on motion for new trial, 516-522. 
 
 AFFIRMATIVE, 
 
 burden of proof on party alleging, 24. 
 
 AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE, 
 weight of, i6a. 
 
 AGE, 
 
 competency of prosecutrix or parent to testify to, 342. 
 witness may give opinion of, 342. 
 family reputation of, not admissible, 342. 
 jury may determine, from inspection, 342. 
 ignorance or belief of accused as to, of female, 342. 
 physician may testify to, 407. 
 
 AGENT OF ATTORNEY, 
 
 communication to or by, when privileged, 173. 
 
 ALIBI, 
 
 defined, 148. 
 
 plea of, how regarded, 148. 
 
 burden of proof of, 148. 
 
 relevancy of distance and time to travel, 149. 
 
 evidence of probability sufficient, 149.
 
 860 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 ALIBI— Continued. 
 
 testimony of witness who has traveled over the route, 150. 
 
 evidence of conversations, dechirations and rumors to prove, 151. 
 
 impeachment of, 151. 
 
 evidence to show persons present, 151. 
 
 conduct of witness as bearing on, 151. 
 
 inadmissibilit}^ of self-serving declarations as to whereabouts, 151. 
 
 need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, 152. 
 
 evidence of, should always be considered, 152. 
 
 failure to prove, 152. 
 
 cautioning the jury on evidence to show, 153. 
 
 ALTERATION, 
 
 of writing when forgery, 419. 
 
 ANALYSIS, 
 
 value of, in case of homicide by poison, 318. 
 
 ANIMALS, 
 
 variance in proving species and genus of, 34, 297. 
 variance in proving species of, maliciously injured, 310. 
 evidence to show running at large of, 310. 
 presumption of malice toward owner of, 310. 
 
 ANIMOSITY, 
 
 between deceased and accused, 324-327. 
 between deceased and third person, 326. 
 
 ANSWER, 
 
 of witness, must be responsive, 216. 
 
 APPOINTMENT, 
 
 best evidence of, 46. 
 
 of officer, evidence to show, 452. 
 
 invalidity of, cannot be shown, 452. 
 
 of officer in perjury, 470. 
 
 proof of, in embezzlement, 286. 
 
 APPREHENSION OF DANGER, 
 
 as a defense to charge of carrying concealed weapons, 485. 
 
 ARREST, 
 
 warrant for, oral proof of contents, 40. 
 of accused, how shown, 43. 
 identification of accused after, 55.
 
 INDEX. 86l 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 ARREST— Continued. 
 
 resistance to, as indicating consciousness of guilt, 120. 
 
 silence while under, 122-124. 
 
 confessions while under, 128. 
 
 homicide of officer making, 90. 
 
 proof of, does not impeach, 245. 
 
 privilege of witness from, 258. 
 
 of witness for contempt, 256. 
 
 under warrant in extradition, 494-505. 
 
 ARSON, 
 
 evidence of locality of building, 366. 
 evidence of actual burning required, 366. 
 variance in proof of premises, 367. 
 threats and declarations by accused, 368. 
 remoteness in time of the threats, 368. 
 circumstantial evidence to show intent, 369. 
 proof of other crimes, 369. 
 preparation to commit, 370. 
 
 ARTIFICE, 
 
 employed to seduce female, 387. 
 
 confession obtained by, 135. 
 
 See Promise of Marriage. 
 ASSAULT, 
 
 evidence of similar crimes, 88. 
 
 res gestae in, 97. 
 
 evidence of intoxication to negative specific intent, 166. 
 
 though causing miscarriage, not abortion, 344. 
 
 declarations of accused, 356a. 
 
 ASSAULT AND BATTERY, 
 definition of, 352. 
 
 relevancy of present ability of assailant, 352. 
 intention to do bodily harm, 353. 
 intent in, may be proved from circumstances, 353. 
 proof of other crimes, 355. 
 character of weapon used, 356. 
 evidence of threats and previous hostility, 356. 
 
 ASSAULTING OFIICHK, 446. 
 
 ASSUMED NA.MK. 
 
 crime committed un<kT, 91.
 
 862 INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 ATTACHMENT, 
 
 may be granted accused to compel attendance of witnesses, 250. 
 accused must show he has used due dihgcnce, 251. 
 in the absence of a statute is discretionary, 254. 
 
 ATTExNDANCE OF WITNESSES, 
 obtained by use of subpoena, 249. 
 when necessary to pay witness fees, 249. 
 
 right of accused to obtain compulsory attendance of witness, 250. 
 subpcena duces tecum, 251. 
 
 validity of reason for not producing papers called for, 252. 
 service of subpoena and time allowed to witness, 253. 
 recognizance to procure, 254. 
 obstructing, 254, 446. 
 change of venue to procure, 256. 
 intentional absence of witnesses, 257. 
 privilege of witness, 258. 
 when in custody or military service, 258. 
 in extradition, 495. 
 
 ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS TO, 
 
 may testify as non-expert to insanity, 161. 
 
 rule at common law, 172. 
 
 statutory extension of rule, 172. 
 
 doctrine applicable in criminal as in civil trials, 172. 
 
 payment of retainer not required, 173. 
 
 when made to agent, 173. 
 
 third person may testify, 173. 
 
 must have been made while relation of attorney and client existed, 174. 
 
 facts not regarded as, 174. 
 
 statements intended to be repeated to third parties, 174. 
 
 made in contemplation of future crime, 175. 
 
 knowledge by attorney that crime is to be committed, 175. 
 
 permanency of privilege, 176. 
 
 clients may waive all rights under, 176. 
 
 what acts of the client constitute a waiver, express or implied, 176. 
 
 contained in writings, 177. 
 
 when attorney is acting as a conveyancer, 177. 
 
 AUTOPSY, 
 
 presence of accused at, not necessary, 313. 
 
 opinion based on, admissible, 313. 
 
 remoteness of, in time, 313. 
 
 expert may testify whether properly conducted, 314. 
 
 in homicide by poisoning, 318.
 
 INDEX. 863 
 
 [Rcfcrou'cs arc to Sections.] 
 AUTHENTICATION, 
 
 of foreign evidence, 502. 
 
 AVARICE, 
 
 as motive for homicide, 323. 
 
 B 
 BAD CHARACTER, 
 
 See Character of Accused. 
 of accused for veracity may be shown, 66. 
 
 BAIL, 
 
 to procure attendance of witness, 254. 
 
 BALLOTS, 
 
 proof of, in election case, 44. 
 
 BANK, 
 
 corporate existence of, how proved, 428. 
 
 BANK NOTES, 
 
 variance in proof of, 298. 
 
 BANK OFFICIAL, 
 
 may testify to handwriting, 429. 
 
 BANKRUPT, 
 
 incriminating questions answered by, 247. 
 
 BASTARDY, 
 
 conviction of, not admissible in seduction, 386. 
 
 BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS, 
 
 whether criminal or civil in their character, 523, 524. 
 
 by whom begun, 523. , 
 
 burden of proof in, 524. 
 
 doctrine of reasonable doubt not applicable, 524. 
 
 inspection of the child by the jury in, 525, 526. 
 
 presumption of legitimacy, 527. 
 
 the celations of the parties, 528. 
 
 competency and credibility of the prosecutrix, 529. 
 
 variance in proving the date of the conception, 530. 
 
 reputation of the mother, 531. 
 
 sexual intercourse of the prosecutrix witli ollu r men, 532. 
 
 declarations during travail, 533.
 
 864 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sectio)is.] 
 
 BASTARDY PROCEEDIXGS—Confiiiued. 
 admissions of the accused, 533. 
 evidence of the preliminary examination, 534. 
 evidence of compromise or settlement, 535. 
 
 BELIEF, 
 
 of accused in genuineness of notes, 437. 
 
 BETTING, 
 
 See Gambling. 
 BIAS, 
 
 may be rebutted by confirmatory statements made out of court, 241. 
 « of witness may be shown by cross-examination, 222. 
 
 BIGAMY. 
 
 defined, 398. 
 
 annulment or dissolution of first marriage may be shown, 398. 
 
 that marriage is voidable is not relevant, 398. 
 
 belief of accused as to death of former spouse, 399. 
 
 absence of former spouse, 399. 
 
 proof of marriage, 402-405. 
 
 •BLOODHOUNDS, 
 
 evidence obtained by use of, 374a. 
 
 BLOOD STAINS, 
 
 evidence to show, 47. 
 
 expert evidence to character of, 334. 
 
 articles containing may be introduced in evidence, 334. 
 
 evidence to show stains were made by human blood, 334. 
 
 size and nature of, may indicate weapon used, 334. 
 
 clothing introduced, to show, 48. 
 
 non-expert may testify to, 334. 
 
 BODILY FEELINGS, 
 
 declarations descriptive of, 348. 
 
 BOUNDARIES, 
 
 primary evidence of, 49. 
 judicial notice of, 21, 36. 
 
 BRANDS, 
 
 on cattle may be proved, 297.
 
 INDEX. 86- 
 
 [References are to Sections.^ 
 BREAKING IN, 
 
 evidence to prove, 2)72- 
 maj- be constructive, 372. 
 
 BRIBERY, 
 
 who is accomplice, 69. 
 
 of witness as indicating guilt, 121. 
 
 defined, 451. 
 
 unsuccessful attempts constitute, 451. 
 
 when proof of intent is required, 451. 
 
 intent in, may be inferred from language, 451. 
 
 judicial notice of official character, 452. 
 
 validity of official appointment, 452. 
 
 evidence of accomplice, 453. 
 
 immunity of accomplice testifying in, 453. 
 
 other similar acts of, 454. 
 
 declarations of parties interested, 454. 
 
 of voters, 455. 
 
 of jurors, 450. 
 
 BRIBING WITNESS, 
 
 when relevant to prove, 121. 
 
 BRUISES, 
 
 evidence of, on body of woman raped, 413. 
 
 BUILDINGS, 
 
 photographs of, 50. 
 
 BULLETS, 
 
 as evidence, 315. 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF, 
 
 requires prima facie case made out, 22. 
 
 how accused may meet, 22. 
 
 general rule casts, on state, 23. 
 
 how met by presumption of innocence, 2^. 
 
 on accused to show distinct defense, 24. 
 
 under negative allegations, 24. 
 
 in case of rape, 24. 
 
 facts peculiarly within knowledge of party alleging, 24. 
 
 to show license and nonage, 24. 
 
 to show qualifications under statute, 457. 
 
 distinguished from presumption of innocence, 22. 
 
 to show venue is on prosecution, 36. 
 
 55 — Underbill Crim. Ev.
 
 S66 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 BURDEN OF PROOF— Co;;/n;!«-(/. 
 
 to show sense of approaching death, 102. 
 
 to show confession was voUmtary, 125. 
 
 to show alibi, 148. 
 
 to show insanity, 154. 
 
 to show intoxication, 166. 
 
 to show malice in homicide, 320. 
 
 to show self-defense, 338. 
 
 to show non-consent in case of abduction of minor, 341. 
 
 to show necessity for abortion, 347. 
 
 to show female seduced was unmarried, 392. 
 
 to show chastity of female seduced, 392. 
 
 to show that unchaste female had reformed, 393. 
 
 to show material facts in bigamy, 399. 
 
 to show validity of marriage, 402. 
 
 to show falsity of pretenses, 439. 
 
 in extradition, 496. 
 
 to show prior conviction to increase penalty, 512-514. 
 
 to show jurisdictional facts on application for a new trial, 518. 
 
 BURGLARY, 
 
 evidence of homicide in connection with, 90. 
 
 breaking in and entering must be in night-time, 371. 
 
 night-time defined, 371. 
 
 preparations to commit, 371. 
 
 condition of premises, 371. 
 
 presence of accused in building, 371. 
 
 evidence to prove breaking in and entering, 372. 
 
 view of the premises, 372. 
 
 facts from which breaking in may be inferred, 373. 
 
 evidence to show owner's consent to entrance, 373. 
 
 proving ownership of goods, 373. 
 
 comparison of foot-prints, 374. 
 
 inferences from possession of burglar's tools by accused, 375. 
 
 evidence of other crimes, 376. 
 
 the criminal intention, 377. 
 
 presumption from possession of stolen goods, 378. 
 
 articles from the premises as evidence, 379. 
 
 BURGLAR'S TOOLS, 
 
 evidence of purchase of, 372, 375. 
 
 finding of, near scene of crime and possession of, by accused, 375. 
 
 BURNING, 
 
 must be proved in arson, 367.
 
 INDEX. 867 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 BY-STANDERS, 
 
 exclamations and cries of, in homicide, lOi, 2^2. 
 
 CAPACITY FOR CRIME, 
 of infant, 20. 
 
 CAPITAL CRIME. 
 
 number of witnesses required, i6a. 
 
 CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 necessity and mode of proof of, 416. 
 
 CARRYING AWAY IN LARCENY, 
 
 must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 293. 
 evidence to connect accused with the, 293. 
 
 CARRYING CONCEALED WEAPONS, 
 
 See CONCE.\LED We.\I'ONS. 
 
 CARTRIDGES, 
 
 as evidence, 315. 
 
 CATTLE. 
 
 maliciously injuring, 310. 
 
 CAUSE, 
 
 of death, may be shown, 312. 
 
 CAUTION, 
 
 as to reception of dying declarations, 109. 
 as to evidence of alibi, 153. 
 on use of confession, 146. 
 
 CAUTIONING THE ACCUSED, 
 efifect of, 129, 130. 
 before grand jury, 27. 
 on preliminary examination, 132, 
 
 CEREMONY, 
 
 of marriage, evidence of, 403. 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE, 
 
 not excluded Ijy provision ccjnfcrring rij^lit t<' In- cnnfrnntrd with wit- 
 nesses, 403. 
 though not properly authenticated in.ty lie received as of res ticslic, 403.
 
 868 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.\ 
 
 CERTIFICATE OF ^lARRWG'E.— Continued. 
 in foreign country, 405. 
 presumption of validity, 405. 
 character of, as evidence, 402. 
 
 CERTIFIED COPIES, 
 
 as evidence in extradition, 503. 
 as evidence, 405. 
 
 CHALLENGE, 
 
 sending, mode of proof, 483. 
 
 CHANCE, GAME OF, 
 defined, 471. 
 
 CHARACTER, 
 
 of woman seduced, 392. 
 of witness, 3. 
 
 CHARACTER OF ACCUSED, 
 when open to attack, 66. 
 defined, 76. 
 
 presumed to be good, 76. 
 traits of which are relevant, yy. 
 in case of homicide, yy. 
 in case of rape, yy. 
 good character of associates, yy. 
 when bad, 78. 
 
 state cannot attack in first instance, 78. 
 rebutting evidence to show bad, 78. 
 for veracity, when admissible, 78. 
 eflfect and operation of evidence of, yg. 
 evidence of, is never to be disregarded, 79. 
 evidence of, is never conclusive, 80. 
 evidence of, may raise reasonable doubt, 80. 
 mode of proving, 81. 
 leading questions, 81. 
 reputation alone relevant, 81. 
 derogatory rumors regarding, 81. 
 witness must know accused, 81. 
 specific bad actions not admissible to prove, 82. 
 remoteness of evidence of, 83. 
 evidence of, subsequent to date of crime, 83. 
 grade and moral nature of the crime, 84. 
 evidence of disposition not relevant to prove, 85.
 
 INDEX. 869 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 CHARACTER OF ACCUSED— Continued. 
 number of witnesses allowed, 86. 
 instructions as to, 86a. 
 as an habitual criminal, 506. 
 in bastardy, 525. 
 
 CHARACTER OF DECEASED, 
 
 not relevant for state in first instance, 324. 
 
 may be proved where evidence raises presumption of self-defense, 324. 
 
 mode of proving, 325. 
 
 specific acts of violence not received to prove, 325. 
 
 evidence of threats to show, 326. 
 
 CHARGE OF CRIME, 
 
 in interstate extradition, 498. 
 
 CHARGING ON EVIDENCE, 
 
 right and duty of court, 275. 
 
 laying down rules of law which govern the application of the evidence, 
 
 276. 
 assumption of facts by court in, 277. 
 necessity of some evidence to sustain charge, 278. 
 
 CHASTITY, 
 
 in abduction of females, 19, 340. 
 
 of female seduced, 392. 
 
 presumption of, 393. 
 
 proof of, 392. 
 
 reputation for, 392. 
 
 of prosecutrix in rape, 418. 
 
 of prosecutrix in bastardy, 531. 
 
 CHECK, 
 
 proof of details in embezzlement, 290. 
 
 CHE.\nCAL ANALYSIS, 
 
 results of, as evidence, 318. 
 
 precautions necessary in, 318. 
 
 proof of adulteration furnished by, 481. 
 
 discrediting results of, 481. 
 
 when conclusive, 481. 
 
 CHE.MISTS, 
 
 their competency, 318. 
 weight of evidence, 318.
 
 cyO INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 CHILD, 
 
 may explain delay in complaint of rape, 411. 
 
 competency of, as witness, 205. 
 
 credibility of, 205. 
 
 may be asked leading questions on direct examination, 212, 213. 
 
 dying declarations by, 114. 
 
 confessions by, 143. 
 
 CIRCUMSTANCES, 
 
 when corroborating each other, 3. 
 
 CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, 
 nature of, 4, 5. 
 
 corroboration by connected and concurrent circumstances, 5. 
 amount of, required to convict, 53. 
 jury must believe beyond reasonable doubt, 6. 
 character of instructions on, 6. 
 degree of certainty required, 6. 
 must be some direct evidence as basis for, 62. 
 every reasonable hypothesis must be excluded, 6. 
 corpus delicti in homicide may be proved by, 7, 312, 
 but proof must be convincing, 7. 
 
 proof by, must be beyond a reasonable doubt, 11, 14. 
 verdict of guilty on, 5. 
 prejudice against, 5. 
 conclusiveness of, 5. 
 duty of jury to reconcile, 6. 
 duty of court to charge on, 6. 
 admissible to prove venue, 35, 288. 
 of enticement, 339. 
 to prove intent, 354, 364. 
 to prove promise of marriage, 387. 
 to prove intent to defraud, 358, 437. 
 to show falsity of pretenses (see Res Gestae), 439. 
 
 CLEMENCY, 
 
 confession made under promise of, 126. 
 
 CLERGYMAN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS TO, 
 not recognized under common law, 178. 
 statutory regulation of, 177. 
 constitutionality of statutes regulating, 178. 
 
 CLOTHING. 
 
 of victim of homicide, 48.
 
 INDEX. 871 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 COHABITATION, 
 
 as evidence of marriage, 403. 
 need not be proved in bigamy, 406. 
 
 COLLATERAL FACTS, 
 
 primary evidence of, 44. 
 
 how far competent on cross-examination, 221. 
 
 bias and prejudice of witness are not, 221. 
 
 COLOR OF OFFICE, 
 
 taking under, must be proved in extortion, 456. 
 
 COMITY, 
 
 between states, 495. 
 
 COMPARISON, 
 
 of shot may be proved, 314, 315. 
 
 of articles of clothing worn by accused, 374. 
 
 proof of handwriting by, 429. 
 
 standard of, must be relevant writing, 429. 
 
 opinion evidence on, 430. 
 
 of foot-prints, 337, 374. 
 
 of foot-prints in burglary, 374. 
 
 cannot be made compulsorily, 374. 
 
 voluntary is admissible, 374. 
 
 COMPETENCY OF TESTIMONY, 
 
 constitutional rights of the accused, 55. 
 
 the accused as a witness, 58. 
 
 judge may properly comment upon, 214. 
 
 of newly-discovered evidence, 520. 
 
 of dying declarations, 108, 109. 
 
 of owner of stolen goods as witness, 295. 
 
 of witness to testify to age, 342. 
 
 of husband or wife in bigamy, 402. 
 
 of prosecutrix as witness in rape, 414. 
 
 of obligor on forged writing, 420. 
 
 of prosecutrix in bastardy, 529. 
 
 of witness to show non-existence of fictitious person, 427. 
 
 of proof in extradition, 496, 497, 4^9, 450. ( 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES, 
 
 definition and formal requirement of oath, 199. 
 under what circumstances witness may affirm, 200. 
 religious belief as afifccling, 201.
 
 8/2 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES— Continued. 
 insanity of witness, 202. 
 deaf mutes, 204. 
 children as witnesses, 205. 
 
 persons convicted of infamous crimes, 206, 207, 208, 209. 
 compounding offenses, 404. 
 
 COMPROMISE, 
 
 when offer maj' be shown, 117, 119, 414. 
 
 COMPULSORY PROCESS, 
 right of accused to, 250. 
 constitutional provisions, 250. 
 in extradition, 495. 
 
 CONCEALED WEAPONS, 
 open carrying, 484. 
 
 intent of concealment may be shown, 484. 
 mode of concealment, 484. 
 relevancy of purpose of concealment, 484. 
 apprehension of danger, 485. 
 character of accused as officer or traveler, 486. 
 
 CONCEALMENT, 
 
 when relevant, 118, 119, 120. 
 
 of property under charge of embezzlement, 287. 
 
 necessity for proof of, 287. 
 
 of crime does not create an accomplice, 69. 
 
 CONCLUSIONS, 
 
 not admissible when contained in dying declarations, 108. 
 
 CONCLUSIVENESS, 
 
 of circumstantial evidence, 6. 
 
 of answers by accused, 65. 
 
 of flight, 118. 
 
 of replies on cross-examination, 222. 
 
 of answers as to irrelevant matters, 241. 
 
 of evidence furnished by lactometer, 481. 
 
 of executive determination that accused is a fugitive from justice, 497. 
 
 of evidence by accused, 517. 
 
 CONCUBINAGE, 
 defined, 343. 
 abduction for purposes of, 343.
 
 INDEX. Sj^ 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 CONDUCT, 
 
 of parties to seduction, relevancy of, to prove promise of marriage, 387, 
 
 388. 
 of accused as a test of perjury, 466. 
 
 CONDUCT OF ACCUSED. 
 
 See CoxsciocsNESs of Guilt. 
 CONFESSIONS, 
 
 definition and classification of, 125. 
 
 must be voluntary, 126. 
 
 question of voluntary character of, when for judge and when for jury, 
 126. 
 
 burden of proof to show voluntary character of, 127. 
 
 voluntary character, when presumed, 127. 
 
 cross-examination as to voluntary character of, 127. 
 
 under what circumstances involuntary, 128. 
 
 made under arrest are not rendered involuntary thereby, 129. 
 
 to prosecuting attorney, 129. 
 
 effect of cautioning the accused, 130. 
 
 when made after duress is removed, 130. 
 
 when made under oath, 131. 
 
 made at coroner's inquest, 131. 
 
 at preliminary examination, 132. 
 
 to coroner, 133. 
 
 of conspirators, 134. 
 
 •when obtained by artifice or deception, 135. 
 
 made under misunderstanding or contained in privileged communica- 
 tions, 135. 
 
 when made under influence of intoxication, 136. 
 
 distinguished from admissions, 137. 
 
 when facts discovered admit parts of, 138. 
 
 when procured by persons in authority, 139. 
 
 need not be spontaneous, 140. 
 
 may be obtained by questioning, 141. 
 
 procured by promise of collateral benefit, 141. 
 
 made by signs or gestures, 141. 
 
 of treason, 142. 
 
 by infants, 143. 
 
 when made in open court by plea of guilty, 144. 
 
 by persons not indicted, 145. 
 
 value of, as evidence, 146. 
 
 mode of proof and corroboration when required, 147. 
 
 may be rejected in part, by jury, 146. 
 
 mode of proof, 147a. 
 
 interpreting, 147a.
 
 874 INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 CONFESSIONS— Coji/iHHrrf. 
 
 evidence for the accused, 147a. 
 
 how to be considered by jury, 147a. 
 
 to priest or clergyman, not privileged at common law, 178. 
 
 by habitual criminal of prior conviction, 512. 
 See also. Declarations; Consciousness of Guilt; Flight of the Accused; 
 
 Silence. 
 
 COXFIRAIATORY STATEMENTS, 
 when may be proved, 241 
 
 CONFLICT, 
 
 of presumptions, 19, 393. 
 
 CONFRONTING WITNESS, 265. 
 
 CONGRESS, 
 
 power of, to commit for contempt, 226. 
 
 CONNECTED CRIMES, 
 
 proof of, in homicide, 90, 321, 369. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS, 
 
 of nearness of death, 103. 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT, 
 facts showing, 115. 
 
 demeanor, language, etc., of accused indicating, 115. 
 falsehoods and concealment indicating, 116. 
 how falsehood may be shown, 116. 
 
 intoxication, excitement, fear and mental preoccupation of accused in- 
 dicating, 117. 
 oflFers of compromise, 117. 
 flight, and attempts to escape, 118. 
 possession of tools to break jail, 118. 
 motive of flight must be considered, 119. 
 " resistance to arrest, as indicating, 120. 
 fabricating evidence, 121. 
 silence as evidence of, 122, 123. 
 
 CONSENT, 
 
 to sexual intercourse, in incest, 395. 
 reputation of woman to show, 418. 
 physician cannot testify to, in rape, 412.
 
 INDEX. . 8/5 
 
 [References are to Sectious.] 
 
 CONSENT, ABSENCE OF, 
 
 must be proved in rape, 3. 
 resistance to show, 407. 
 presumption of in case of infant, 408. 
 statutes regulating, 407, 
 
 CONSPIRACY, 
 
 definition of, 490. 
 
 circumstantial evidence of, 491. 
 
 details of, need not be proved, 491. 
 
 acts and declarations of fellow-conspirators, 492. 
 
 admissible declarations must be made in furtherance of, 493. 
 
 order of proof, 494. 
 
 CONSULAR CERTIFICATE, 
 
 of authentication in international extradition, 502. 
 
 CONTEMPT, 
 
 refusal to be sworn or testify is, 226. 
 
 refusal to answer impertinent question is not, 227. 
 
 refusal to obey subpoena constitutes, 253. 
 
 failure to testify before grand jury is, 29. 
 
 defined, 459. 
 
 inherent judicial power to punish for, 459. 
 
 direct and constructive, distinguished, 460. 
 
 affidavits to prove, 461. 
 
 accused may introduce affidavits and examine, 461. 
 
 CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS, 
 
 compelling accused to testify in, 58. 
 
 CONTINUANCE, 
 
 presumption of, 19, 156, 320. 
 
 discretionary power of court to grant, because of absence of witness, 
 
 268. 
 party asking, must show due diligence and materiality s^ul competency 
 
 of evidence, 269, 270. 
 admission of facts to avoid, 271, 272. 
 
 CON'TRADICTION, 
 
 of prosecutrix in rape, 409. 
 
 of collateral matters brought out on cross-examination, 61, 222.
 
 876 INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 CONTRADICTORY STATEMENTS, 
 
 of accused may be shown on his cross-examination, 60. 
 
 may be brought out on cross-examination as impeachment, 238. 
 
 time and place of, must be stated, 238. 
 
 when made at prior trial or coroner's inquest, 238. 
 
 when witness claims he does not remember making, 238. 
 
 contained in depositions or other writings, 239. 
 
 writings containing must be read and shown to witness, 240. 
 
 CONVERSATION, 
 
 proof of part lets in whole, 221. 
 
 CONVERSION, 
 
 of property, in embezzlement, 282, 289. 
 
 CONVEYANCER, 
 
 communications to attorney in capacity of, 175. 
 
 CONVICTION, 
 
 best evidence of, 40. 
 
 on circumstantial evidence, 6. 
 
 plea of former, 194. 
 
 mode of proof, 207. 
 
 may be shown to impeach witness, 245, 246. 
 
 of felony, mode of proof, 404. 
 
 of habitual criminals, 508. 
 
 CORONER'S INQUEST, 
 
 best evidence of proceedings at, 40. 
 confessions at, 132, 133. 
 
 CORPORATE EXISTENCE, 
 
 of bank on which forged check is drawn, 428. 
 may be proved orally, 44, 428. 
 evidence of reputation, 428. 
 
 CORPUS DELICTI OF HOMICIDE, 
 
 necessity for and relevancy of evidence to prove, 7, 252. 
 
 declarations of deceased to show, 312. 
 
 expert evidence to show manner of death, 312. 
 
 relevancy of photographs on, 312. 
 
 evidence of, as disclosed by the autopsy, 313, 318. 
 
 direct evidence to prove, 312. 
 
 in arson, defined, 367.
 
 INDEX. 8/7 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 CORROBORATION, 
 in general, 5. 
 
 when required to confession, 147. 
 
 competency of evidence to corroborate accomplice, 73, 74. 
 necessity of, of accomplice as a witness, 74. 
 detectives and decoys not within rule requiring, 69. 
 extent of, required, 74. 
 when required in abduction, 339. 
 
 required on charge of abortion against physician, 346. 
 of accomplice in adultery, 382. 
 
 of prosecutrix in seduction must be of material facts, 389. 
 of prosecutrix in seduction may be by circumstances which accompany 
 
 marriage engagement, 391. 
 of prosecutrix in rape by details of complaint, 404- 
 necessity for, in perjury, 449, 466. 
 by newly-discovered evidence, 522. 
 of prosecutrix in bastardy proceeding, 529. 
 
 COUXTERFEITING, 
 
 intent and guilty knowledge, 368, 432. 
 
 presumption of, from possession of tools, 433. 
 
 necessity of evidence to show resemblance, 434. 
 
 evidence of similar crimes, 432. 
 
 evidence of genuineness, 434. 
 
 money counterfeited ought to be produced, 434. 
 
 proof of signature of bank officer, 434. 
 
 COUNTERPARTS, 
 
 use and effect as evidence, 39. 
 
 COUNTY LINES, 
 
 judicial notice of, 21. 
 
 COURTS OF RECORD, 
 
 power of to punish for contempt, 225. 
 
 must have jurisdiction to exercise power, 227. 
 
 CREDIBILITY, 
 
 as affected by character of witness, 3. 
 
 of affirmative and negative evidence, i6a. 
 
 of accused as a witness, 58. 
 
 of accused, jury is to determine, 59. 
 
 of accused, how tested nn cross-examinaiimi, 61. 
 
 of evidence of good character, 79. 
 
 of dying declarations, no.
 
 878 INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 CREDIBILITY— Coil ti mi ed. 
 of confessions, 146, 147a. 
 of alibi, 153. 
 
 of husband or wife, testifying against the other, 185. 
 of insane witness, 202. 
 of children and deaf mutes, 204, 205. 
 
 of witness, judicial remarks on may furnish grounds for new trial, 215. 
 as tested by the cross-examination, 221. 
 of witness who is prejudiced, 248. 
 of detectives and experts, 280a. 
 of woman on whom abortion procured, 346. 
 of prosecutrix in bastardy, 529. 
 of defendant's admissions of marriage, 403. 
 of female affected by delay in complaining, 409. 
 two witnesses required in false swearing, 448. 
 of witness to prove concealment of weapon, 484. 
 of newly-discovered evidence, 519-522. 
 
 CRIES, 
 
 of by-standers, loi. 
 
 of woman raped, 409-411. 
 
 CRIMES, 
 
 See Other Crimes. 
 CRIMINAL INTENT, 
 
 absence of, presumed in case of infant, 20. 
 
 evidence of other crimes admissible to show, 87. 
 
 in arson, necessity of evidence to show, 366. 
 
 in burglary, may be inferred from commission of felony or from pres- 
 ence of accused in house, 375. 
 
 present in entering must be shown, 377. 
 
 in embezzlement, 282. 
 
 in larceny, 292. 
 
 may be inferred from the circumstances, 292. 
 
 in malicious mischief, 307. 
 
 presumption and burden of proof in homicide, 320. 
 
 in forgery, 421. 
 
 may be general in forgery, 422. 
 
 circumstantial evidence of, in forgery, 422. 
 
 other crimes to show, in forgery, 423. 
 
 in bigamy, 398. 
 
 in counterfeiting, 432. 
 
 evidence of other crimes to show, in counterfeiting, 432. 
 
 to defraud in false pretenses, 437. 
 
 in obstructing justice, 447.
 
 IXDEX, 8/9 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 CRIMIXAL l^TE^T— Continued. 
 in embracery, 450. 
 in bribery, 451. 
 in extortion, 456. 
 to screen felon, 458. 
 in allowing escape, 463. 
 in aiding escape, 464. 
 
 CRI.MIXALITY, 
 
 burden of proof to show in extradition, 496. 
 legal proof of, 496. 
 indictment to prove, 496. 
 copies as proof of, 503. 
 
 CRIMIXAL LIBEL, 
 
 province of jury to determine intent in, 273. 
 
 defined, 361. 
 
 evidence to prove publication of, 362. 
 
 meaning of the language used in, 363. 
 
 the intention in, 364. 
 
 truth as a defense, 365. 
 
 CRIMIXATIXG QUESTIONS, 
 
 See Inxrimixatixg Questions. 
 
 CROSS-EXAMINATION, 
 
 by accused before grand jury not allowed, 25. 
 
 of accused, 61. 
 
 of witness on character, 82. 
 
 of insanity expert, 162. 
 
 as to voluntary, character of confession, 127. 
 
 value and importance of, 219. 
 
 of witness to hand-writing, 219. 
 
 waiver of right to, 219. 
 
 evidence of witness should be stricken out on refusal of right to, 220. 
 
 confined to matters brought on direct, 220. 
 
 value of, when conducted rapidly, 220. 
 
 to test credibility, 221-223. 
 
 questions on, to ascertain memory, knowledge, prejudice of witness, 221. 
 
 discretion of court to limit, 221. 
 
 repetition of evidence given on direct examination on, 221. 
 
 prolongation of, 221. 
 
 repetition of questions on, 223. 
 
 collateral facts, 222. 
 
 impeaching witness on, 221.
 
 880 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sectiotis.] 
 
 CROSS-EXAMINATION— Co»f/"Hf(/. 
 
 irrelevant facts brought out on, cannot be contradicted, 222. 
 
 hostility and bias of witness may be shown on, 221. 
 
 recalling witness for, 219. 
 
 of accomplice testifying as witness, 74. 
 
 of accused testifying as witness, 58. 
 
 as to vagrancy, 60. 
 
 power of court to exclude disparaging questions during, 62. 
 
 to ascertain voluntariness of confession, 128. 
 
 of witness who is absent at subsequent trial, 264. 
 
 as to details of complaint in rape, 409. 
 
 in extradition, 501. 
 
 CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED. 
 
 when limited to matter brought out on direct examination, 60. 
 
 questions to test credibility, 60. 
 
 limited by statute, 62. 
 
 court may interfere to limit, 62. 
 
 mode of conducting, 63. 
 
 privileged communications on, 64. 
 
 CRUEL PUNISHMENT, 
 
 what is not, 507. 
 
 CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE, 
 
 newly discovered evidence must not be, 522. 
 
 CUSTODY, 
 
 acts and statements of accused while in, 122-123, 128. 
 of witness to identify accused, 55. 
 
 D 
 
 DANGER, 
 
 apprehension of, as a defense to carrying concealed weapon, 485. 
 
 DEAD BODIES, 
 
 photographs to identity, 50. 
 
 DEADLY WEAPONS, 
 
 when court and when jury may determine what are, 356. 
 
 DEAF MUTE, 
 
 slips used in conversation with, how proved, 45.
 
 INDEX. 88l 
 
 [References arc to Sections.'] 
 
 DEAF MUTES AS WITNESSES, 
 
 common-law incompetency and present competency of, 204. 
 may testify in writing or by signs, 204. 
 
 DEATH, 
 
 provable by circumstantial evidence on trial for homicide, 7. 
 
 burden of proof to show, 17. 
 
 by suicide, presumption against, 19. 
 
 effect of, on competency of husband or wife, 187. 
 
 of witness testifying on former trial, 261. 
 
 of witness, how proved, 261. 
 
 when sudden presumed to result from natural causes, 312. 
 
 evidence to show cause, time and means of, 312, 318. 
 
 cause of, may be shown to be abortion, 350. 
 
 presumption of, from unexplained absence, 399. 
 
 DECEASED, 
 
 identification of, in homicide, 316. 
 
 evidence of character, habits and disposition of, 324, 325. 
 
 evidence to show reputation of, but not specific acts of turbulence, 325. 
 
 evidence of threats by, 326. 
 
 DECEASED WITNESS, 
 
 testimony of, may be proved, 263. 
 death of, how proved, 263. 
 
 DECEPTION, 
 
 confession obtained by, 135. 
 
 DECLARATIONS, 
 
 in homicide, 97, 98. 
 
 forming part of the res gestcc, 93-101, 330. 
 
 self-serving, 119a. 
 
 in consciousness of approaching death, 102-114. 
 
 by accused, inadmissible to prove alibi, 150, 151. 
 
 to show flight, 118. 
 
 to prove absence of material witness, 263. 
 
 of deceased owner of goods stolen, 295. 
 
 explaining possession of stolen property, when admissible, 302. 
 
 of accused admissible to prove malicious intent, 308. 
 
 of deceased, 312. 
 
 of third parties, 331. 
 
 admissibility of, in abortion, 348. 
 
 of prosecutrix in seduction, when relevant, 389. 
 
 accompanying possession of burglar's tools, 375. 
 
 56 — Unijkkmill Crim. Ev.
 
 882 INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 DECLARATIONS— Coutiuued. 
 
 of accused, in seduction, 389. 
 
 of accused, to prove his marriage, 404. 
 
 of female in rape, 409-411. 
 
 of accused to show guihy knowledge, 431. 
 
 in case of poisoning, 319a. 
 
 of accused in assault, 354, 356a. 
 
 of accused in bribery, 454. 
 
 of accomplice in bribery, 454. 
 
 See Res Gestae. 
 
 DECLARATIONS OF CONSPIRATORS, 
 when admissible, 492. 
 
 must be made during existence of conspiracy, 493. 
 order of proving, 494. 
 
 DECLARATIONS DURING TRAVAIL, 
 admissibility of, 533. 
 must be persisted in, 533. 
 length of period of travail, 533. 
 
 DECOY, 
 
 confession to, through trick, 134, 135. 
 
 DECOY LETTERS, 
 
 use and credibility of, 479. 
 
 DEFILEMENT OF FE.MALE SERVANT, 
 character of woman not material, 394. 
 
 DELAY, 
 
 in making complaint in rape may cause its rejection, 411. 
 as determining credibility of complaint, 411. 
 may be explained, 411. 
 
 DELIVERY, 
 
 of forged writing as evidence of uttering, 424. 
 
 DEMAND, 
 
 in embezzlement, 284. 
 in larceny, 284. 
 
 DEMEANOR, 
 
 when indicating guilt, 1 15-124. 
 
 of accused, as evidence of insanity, 160-162. 
 
 of accused toward prosecutrix in seduction, 388.
 
 INDEX. 883 
 
 [Rcferoiccs arc to Sections.] 
 
 DEMONSTRATION, 
 
 distinguished from reasonable doubt, 11. 
 
 DENIAL OF GUILT, 
 
 by accused, when competent, 122-124. 
 
 DEPOSITIONS, 
 
 when receivable before grand jury, 25. 
 
 DESCENDANT, 
 
 insanity of, when relevant, 160. 
 
 DESTRUCTION, 
 
 need not be total in malicious mischief, 309. 
 
 DETECTIVES. 
 
 motives to misrepresent, 4. 
 
 is not an accomplice, 69. 
 
 confessions obtained by artifice, 135. 
 
 zeal of, may produce untrue confession, 146, 
 
 credibility of evidence of, 280a. 
 
 evidence of, in extradition, 504. 
 
 DEVICE, 
 
 See Trick. 
 DILIGENCE, 
 
 in application for continuation, 269-270. 
 
 burden of proving, in escape, 462. 
 
 in case of newly-discovered evidence, 517. 
 
 DIRECT EVIDENCE, 
 
 when required to prove corpus delicti, 6. 
 
 DIRECT EXAMIN.\TION, 
 of witness, 211. 
 as narrative, 212. 
 leading questions, when may be put on, 212, 213. 
 
 DIRECTING VERDICT, 
 when proper, 279. 
 
 DISAPPEARANCE, 
 
 of person supposed to have been murdered, 6. 
 
 DISCHARGE FROM PRISON, 
 of habitual criminal, 513.
 
 884 INDEX. 
 
 [References ore to Sections.] 
 DISCOVERY, 
 
 of property stolen, inadmissible confession leading up to, 138, 139, 306 
 
 DISCRETION OF COURT, 
 
 to determine character of confession, 126. 
 to limit cross-examination, 222. 
 to grant continuance, 268. 
 
 DISGRACING QUESTIONS, 
 
 as to irrelevant matters, 61. 
 
 on cross-examination, 60. 
 
 limitations upon the right to ask, 245. 
 
 involving previous life, social connections, etc., of witness, 245. 
 
 DISMISSAL, 
 
 of indictment not founded on competent evidence, 26. 
 
 DISPOSITION OF ACCUSED, 
 
 not competent to prove character, 85. 
 to commit adultery, 384. 
 
 DISQUALIFICATION OF JUROR, 6. 
 
 DIVORCE, 
 
 granting of, as evidence of prior marriage, 404. 
 effect of, on competency of husband or wife, 187. 
 mode of proof of, 187. 
 
 DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE, 
 
 proper certification of, 499, 500-502. 
 
 DOG, 
 
 malicious injury to, 310. 
 evidence obtained by use of, in tracking, 374. 
 See Bloodhounds. 
 
 DOMESTIC ANIMALS, 
 
 whether dogs are or not, 310. ' 
 
 DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 
 
 evidence of, in incest, 397. 
 
 DOUBT, 
 
 See Reasonable Doubt. 
 DRAWINGS, 
 
 See Paintings.
 
 INDEX. 5(55 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 DRESS, 
 
 articles of, when admissible, 48. 
 
 DROWNED PERSON, 
 
 identification of, by photograph, 50. 
 
 DRUGS, 
 
 adulteration of, 480-481. 
 
 DRUXKEXXESS, 
 
 See Intoxication. 
 DUELIXG, 423. 
 
 DURESS, 
 
 effects of, in excluding confessions, 125-131, 137-140. 
 
 DUTY OF COURT, 
 
 to instruct on presumption of innocence, 17. 
 
 DUTY OF JURY, 
 
 to consider evidence of good character, 80. 
 
 DYING DECLARATIOXS, 
 definition, 102. 
 religious element in, 102. 
 motive present in, 102. 
 may be prompted by revenge, 102. 
 
 will be presumed to be made under sense of religious responsibility, 102. 
 must be made under sense of approaching death, 103. 
 evidence of sense of approaching death, from declarant's own words, 
 
 103. 
 from sending for priest, 104. 
 from sending for physician or making will, 104. 
 from character of wounds, 104. 
 period intervening, 105. 
 expectation of recovery subsequent to, 106. 
 not admissible to prove all crimes, 106. 
 admissible in homicide, 106. 
 not receivable in abortion, 106, 348. 
 in cases of double homicide, 107. 
 
 distinguished from those which are part of the res gestcc, 107. 
 necessity for reception of, 108. 
 fipinions contained in, when admissil)k', 108. 
 absence of cross-examination, 107. 
 must refer to act of killing, when inadmissible, 108.
 
 886 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 DYING DECLARATIONS— Co;!//««rJ. 
 
 mode of proof and credibility of, Ii2. 
 
 competency of, is for the court, 112. 
 
 relevancy and weight, 112. 
 
 is evidence for the accused, 112. 
 
 as well as against him, 112. 
 
 precise language of, need not be proven, 112, 
 
 admissible in its entirety, 1 12. 
 
 partially incompetent, 112. 
 
 circumstances attending their utterance, 112. 
 
 taken down in writing, 112. 
 
 may be contradicted or shown to be untrue, 113. 
 
 formal examination not required, 113. 
 
 persuasion and leading questions, 113. 
 
 made under narcotics, 113. 
 
 if written writing must be produced, 113. 
 
 by signs, 113. 
 
 by children, 90, 114. 
 
 of wife, competent against husband, 185. 
 
 in poisoning, 319. 
 
 in abortion, 348. 
 
 E 
 ELECTIONS, 
 
 bribery at, 455. 
 
 judicial notice of times of, 455. 
 
 EMBEZZLEMENT, 
 
 definition, 281, 282. 
 distinguished from larceny, 282. 
 essential facts constituting, 281. 
 intent to defraud, 282. 
 intent to convert, 282. 
 proving other acts of, 283. 
 
 proof of demand and refusal to surrender, 284. 
 proof of trust relation, 285. 
 right of trustee, 286. 
 ownership, of the property, 286. 
 
 evidence of efforts to conceal or dispose of property, 287. 
 relevancy of false statements, 288. 
 proof of venue in, by circumstantial evidence, 289. 
 value of the property taken, 289. 
 confessions and admissions by the accused, 290. 
 
 documentary evidence, checks and entries in account books by de- 
 fendant, 291.
 
 INDEX. 887 
 
 [References are to Sectious.l 
 
 EMBRACERY, 
 
 defined, 450. 
 
 attempt to bribe may constitute, 450. 
 
 criminal intent must be proved, 451. 
 
 ENTICEMENT, 
 
 in abduction, evidence to show, 339, 340. 
 
 ENTRIES, 
 
 as evidence against accused, 291. 
 
 ESCAPE, 
 
 distinguished from prison breach, 462. 
 proof of actual breaking not necessary, 462. 
 intention and negligence of the accused, 463. 
 aiding prisoner to, 464. 
 presumption of legality of process, 465. 
 burden of proof to show legality, 465. 
 
 ESSENTIAL DESCRIPTION, 
 
 matter of, when must be proved, 32. 
 
 EXAMINATION, 
 
 of accounts, primary evidence of, 44. 
 by jury, when may be compelled, 53. 
 to ascertain insanity of the accused, 163. 
 communications made to physician on, 181. 
 
 EXAMINATION OF ACCUSED, 
 
 as witness must be voluntary, 58. 
 must be regularly conducted, 58. 
 explanation during the, 58. 
 in extradition, 501. 
 
 See Cross-Examination of Accused 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES, 
 direct, 211. 
 
 when leading questions are permissible, 212, 213. 
 by the court, 214. 
 judicial remarks during, 215. 
 answers must be responsive, 216. 
 memorandum to refresh memory during, 217-220. 
 cross-examination, 221. 
 re-direct, 223. 
 re-calling witness, during, 224.
 
 888 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 EXAMINATION OF WUXESSES— Continued. 
 separation of witnesses during, 225. 
 refusal to testify, 226. 
 
 interpreter for witness unable to speak English, 227. 
 view by jurj% 229. 
 presence of accused during, 231. 
 experiments, 233. 
 
 EXCEPTIONS UNDER STATUTE, 
 burden of proof to show, 24. 
 
 EXCLAMATIONS, 
 
 by third parties, in homicide, loi, 331. 
 of suffering, when admissible, 349. 
 of suffering, received in rape, 409. 
 
 EXCLUSION OF WITNESSES, 
 from court-room, 225. 
 
 EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, 
 their privileged character, 169. 
 
 EXHIBITION IN COURT, 
 of persons, 54. 
 of articles of personal property, 47, 316, 375. 
 
 EXONERATION, 
 
 confessions of third party in, of accused, 145. 
 
 EXPERIMENT, 
 
 with weapons, not allowable, 255. 
 
 presence of defendant while making, 232. 
 
 expert may testify to, where conditions are reproduced, 233. 
 
 shooting bullet through clothing, 233. 
 
 may be made in court by witness, 233. 
 
 See Inspection; View. 
 EXPERTS. 
 
 qualifications of, 318. 
 
 their views on insanity, 162. 
 
 EXPERT EVIDENCE, 
 
 to character of wounds, 312. 
 
 to show how wound was inflicted, 312. 
 
 to show how wound was made, 312. 
 
 not admissible to show probable position of deceased, 312.
 
 INDEX. 889 
 
 [References are to Sections.l 
 
 EXPERT EVlDE}<CE—Co,iiimied. 
 
 as to facts revealed by autopsj^ 313. 
 
 as to use of cartridge, 315. 
 
 in case of poisoning, 318. 
 
 to show time and means of abortion, 350. 
 
 results of autopsy may be proved in abortion bj% 350. 
 
 as to writing based on standard of comparison, 429. 
 
 as to condition, age, etc., in rape, 412, 414. 
 
 form of questions to, 163. 
 
 competency of, 163. 
 
 character of evidence of, in forgery, 429. 
 
 credibility of evidence of, 280a. 
 
 EXPLAIXIXG SILEXCE AXD FLIGHT, 
 of accused, 119. 
 
 EX POST FACTO LAWS, 
 
 statutes increasing punishments for habitual criminals are not, 507. 
 
 EXPRESSIOXS, 
 
 of bodily or mental feelings, 93-102, 
 during travail, 533. 
 
 EXTORTIOX, 
 
 defined, 456. 
 
 necessity for proof of criminal intent, in, 456. 
 
 ignorance of officer as defense, 456. 
 
 taking under color of office must be shown, 456. 
 
 value of thing taken in, 457. 
 
 collateral attack on officer's return, 458. 
 
 EXTRADITIOX, 
 
 treaties and statutes, 495. 
 
 international comity, 495. 
 
 witnesses and subpoenas, 495. 
 
 burden of proof to show criminality, 496. 
 
 legal proof of criminality, 496. 
 
 fugitive character of the person claimed, 497. 
 
 evidence in interstate extradition, 498. 
 
 authentication of documentary evidence in interstate extradition, 499. 
 
 records of sister states in interstate extradition, 500. 
 
 character and mode of proof in foreign, 501. 
 
 authentication of diplomatic certificates, 502. 
 
 certified copies as evidence of criminality, 502. 
 
 proof of foreign laws and treaties, 504.
 
 890 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sectious.] 
 EVIL ACTIONS, 
 
 evidence of, inadmissible to show character, 82. 
 
 FABRICATION OF EVIDENCE, 
 indicating guilt, 121. 
 
 FACTS, 
 
 excluding evidence of absent witness by admitting, 271. 
 exclusion of secondary evidence does not apply to collateral, 42. 
 cross-examination upon particular, 8r. 
 
 FAILURE, 
 
 to prove alibi, effect of, 153. 
 
 FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO TESTIFY, 
 
 when new trial may be granted for comment on, 68. 
 
 no presumption from, 67. 
 
 comment on not allowed, 67. 
 
 what does not constitute comment on, 68. 
 
 FAILURE TO PRODUCE WITNESS, 
 may be commented on, 68. 
 
 FALSE ENTRIES, 
 
 as evidence of conversion in embezzlement, 287. 
 intent to defraud may be inferred from, 422. 
 
 FALSEHOODS, 
 
 when indicating guilt, 121. 
 
 FALSE PRETENSES, 
 
 defined and distinguished from larceny and embezzlement, 435. 
 
 evidence to show intent of owner, 436. 
 
 wide range of circumstantial evidence to show intent to defraud owner, 
 
 437- 
 evidence of similar crimes to prove intent, 438. 
 burden of proof to show nature and falsity of pretenses, 439. 
 must have been calculated to deceive, 440. 
 knowledge of falsity by accused, 441. 
 value of property, 441. 
 
 evidence must show belief and reliance of person defrauded, 442. 
 evidence of pecuniary condition of accused, 443. 
 not necessarily verbal, 444. 
 as to value of property, 439.
 
 INDEX. 891 
 
 [Rcfcrcuccs arc to Sections.] 
 
 FALSE STATEMENTS, 
 
 intent to defraud inferred from, 437, 442. 
 
 FALSE SWEARING, 
 
 necessity for corroboration, 449. 
 
 FALSITY, 
 
 of evidence under charge of perjury, 69. 
 
 FEAR, 
 
 confession under influence of, 125-130. 
 of accused on arrest may be shown, 118. 
 
 FEELINGS, 
 
 declarations to prove, 93-101, 
 
 FEES OF WITNESS, 
 
 prosecution need not pay, 249. 
 in extradition, 555. 
 
 FELONY, 
 
 when conviction of renders one incompetent as witness, 495. 
 conviction of, may be shown to discredit, 206. 
 
 FEMALE, 
 
 chastity of, when presumed, 19, 341. 
 
 FICTITIOUS CRIME, 
 
 confession to person confined with accused on charge of, 135. 
 
 FICTITIOUS PERSONS, 
 forging names of, 427. 
 
 evidence of existence or non-existence of, 427. 
 competency of witnesses to show search for, 427. 
 accused may show absence of, 427. 
 
 FIDUCIARY RELATION, 
 
 necessity for proof of, in embezzlement, 285. 
 
 FINANCIAL CONDITION, 
 
 of accused, when relevant, 304, 431, 443. 
 
 FLAGS, 
 
 inscriptions on, may be proved orally, 48.
 
 Sg2 INDEX. 
 
 [RcfcmiCiS arc to Sections.] 
 
 FLIGHT OF ACCUSED. 
 
 presumption of guilt from, 117. 
 
 motives, means and occasion of, 117. 
 
 may be shown by questions to accused, 117. 
 
 can not be proved against accomplice, 117. 
 
 conclusiveness of, 118. 
 
 of accomplice may be proved, 118. 
 
 explanation of, 119. 
 
 jurors arc to determine weight of, 119. 
 
 means of, may be shown, 119. 
 
 motives for, need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, 119. 
 
 when caused by threats, 119. 
 
 FOOD, 
 
 adulteration of, 480-481. 
 
 FOOT-PRIXTS, 
 
 evidence of, 303, 374. 
 
 FORCE, 
 
 evidence to show degree of, in rape, 417. 
 employed in robbery, 358. 
 
 FORCIBLE ENTRY, 426. 
 
 FOREIGN EXTRADITION, 
 
 See Extradition. 
 FOREIGN LAWS, 
 
 how proved, 504. 
 
 FORGERY, 
 
 evidence of similar crimes, 88. 
 
 consultations in contemplation of, not privileged, 175. 
 
 defined, 419. 
 
 fraudulent alteration or insertion of words, 419. 
 
 party bound is competent, 420. 
 
 competency of witness to prove, 420. 
 
 what constitutes variance in proving the writing, 421. 
 
 intent to defraud must be proved, 422. 
 
 general intent sufficient, 422. 
 
 circumstantial evidence to show intent in, 422. 
 
 evidence of similar crimes to show intent, 423. 
 
 possession of forged papers as evidence of guilty knowledge, 423. 
 
 proof of uttering, 424. 
 
 the w-riting involved in, 43, 425.
 
 INDEX. 893 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 FORGERY— Co;; tin ued. 
 
 evidence to show venue, ^y, 426. 
 of fictitious names, 427. 
 existence of corporation, 428. 
 
 expert evidence and standard of comparison to prove handwriting;, 42Q. 
 evidence to show writing forged could not accomplish purpose in- 
 tended, 430. 
 sufficiency of evidence, 431. 
 pecuniary condition of accused, 431. 
 
 FORGETFUL WITNESS, 
 
 n-.emory of may be refreshed by consulting memoranda, 212-220. 
 
 FORMER JEOPARDY, 
 
 trial terminated by agreement to turn states evidence does not consti- 
 tute, 71. 
 plea of former conviction or acquittal, 194, 195. 
 record of former trial as evidence under this defense, 195. 
 best evidence must be produced, 195. 
 record is conclusive on both parties, 195. 
 evidence to show that previous trial was regular, final ami by court 
 
 having competent jurisdiction, 196. 
 evidence of identity of crime and person, 197. 
 increased punishment of former criminal not in violation of, 506. 
 
 FORMER TRIAL, 
 
 testimony of witness at, 260-267. 
 
 FORMULA, 
 
 of oath as administered to witness, 199. 
 
 FORXICATIOX, 
 
 See Adultf.ry. 
 FRAUD, 
 
 evidence of other frauds, 89. 
 
 evidence tending to prove another offense in prosecution, 438. 
 
 enticement of female by, 339. 
 
 sexual intercourse obtained by, 407. 
 
 FRAUDULENT INTENT, 
 
 in forging name of fictitious person, 427. 
 in passing counterfeit money, 433. 
 in false pretenses, 437. 
 
 Sec Criminal I.ntknt.
 
 ^4 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 FUGITIVES FROM JUSTICE, 
 
 See Extradition. 
 
 FURTHER TESTIMONY, 
 recalling to obtain, 224. 
 
 FUTURE CRIMES, 
 
 communications in contemplation of, 180. 
 
 FUTURE EVENTS, 
 
 pretenses regarding, 439. 
 
 G 
 
 GAMBLING, 
 
 what constitutes, 471. 
 
 non-expert may describe manner of playing, 472. 
 
 necessity to prove making of the wager, 473. 
 
 proof of playing in public, 473. 
 
 conviction of, on evidence of accomplice, 474. 
 
 keeping house for, 475. 
 
 presumptions and burden of proof, 476. 
 
 instruments for, in evidence, 477. 
 
 GENERAL BAD CHARACTER, 
 
 may be shown for purposes of impeachment, 236. 
 credibility and weight of evidence of, 236. 
 
 GENERAL INTENT, 
 
 to defraud, sufficient in forgery, 422 
 
 GENERAL RESULT, 
 
 best evidence of, after examination of books, 45, 291. 
 
 GENERAL VERDICT, 
 
 character and analysis of, 274. 
 
 GENUINENESS, 
 
 of bank-notes, must be proved by parol, 296. 
 evidence to show, of writing, 425, 434. 
 
 GEOGRAPHICAL FACTS, 
 judicial notice of, 35. 
 
 GESTATION, 
 
 intercourse during period of, 530-532.
 
 INDEX. 895 
 
 [References are to Sections.} 
 GESTURES, 
 
 dying declarations made by, 113. 
 
 confessions by. 141. 
 
 testimony of deaf mutes by, 204. 
 
 GOOD ACTIONS. 
 
 evidence of, inadmissible to show character, 81. 
 
 GOOD CHARACTER, 
 
 See Character of Accused. 
 
 GOOD FAITH, 
 
 of accused in larceny, 292. 
 
 of the accused in robbery, 358. 
 
 accused may testify to, when charged with malicious mischief, 292, 307. 
 
 of accused may be shown in forgery and trial for passing counterfeit 
 
 money, 432. 
 not material in false pretenses, 437. 
 of accused, charged with permitting escape, 463. 
 in discharging prisoner, 464. 
 
 of accused in offering to marry prosecutrix, 391. 
 as a defense in bigamy, 398-401. 
 of officer, relevancy to rebut extortion, 456. 
 
 GOVERNOR OF STATE, 
 
 when he may refuse to testify, 170. 
 may issue warrant in extradition, 496. 
 
 GRAND JUROR.S, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS TO, 
 required that an impartial investigation may be had, 191. 
 grand juror cannot be compelled to disclose facts coming to his knowl- 
 edge in jury room, 191. 
 statutory regulation of the competency of grand jurors, 192. 
 in prosecutions for perjury, 193. 
 
 GRAND JURY. EVIDENCE BEFORE, 
 is ex parte, 25. 
 right of accused to offer, 26. 
 must be properly weighed, 26. 
 should be competent and proper, 26. 
 best evidence required to be given, 26. 
 must be under oath, 26. 
 depositions containing, 26. 
 effect of receiving incompetent cvidince. 26. 
 obtained by compelling accuse<l to testify, 27.
 
 896 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 GRAND JURY, EVIDENCE BEFORE— Continued. 
 
 obtained frcm wife of accused, 27. 
 must be some, to sustain indictment, 26. 
 accused may give, voluntarily, 28. 
 given by suspected person, 28. 
 given by co-defendant, 27. 
 sufficiency of, 28. 
 belief in guilt of accused, 28. 
 contempt in refusing to give. 29. 
 incriminating questions before, 247. 
 confession before, 132. 
 
 GUILT, 
 
 cross-examining accused as to acts indicating consciousness of, 59. 
 consciousness of, 1 15-124. 
 
 GUILTY, 
 
 See Plea of Guilty. 
 
 GUILTY KNOWLEDGE, 
 in extortion, 456. 
 of adulteration, 480. 
 in forgery may be shown by proving other forgeries, or possession of 
 
 forged paper, 423. 
 necessity for proof of, in counterfeiting, 369, 432. 
 evidence of other crimes admissible to show, 89. 
 evidence of intoxication to show absence of, 165, 166. 
 
 H 
 HABEAS CORPUS, 
 
 to procure attendance of witness in jail, 259. 
 in extradition, 497. 
 
 HABITUAL CRIMINAL, 
 
 increasing punishment of, 506, 515. 
 
 constitutionality of statutes, 507. 
 
 date of conviction of prior crime, 508. 
 
 effect of pardon of prior crime, 509. 
 
 setting out former conviction, 510. 
 
 variance, 510. 
 
 plea of not guilty, 511. 
 
 proof of discharge from prison, 513. 
 
 proof of prior conviction, 514. 
 
 identity of accused, 515.
 
 INDEX. 897 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 HAXDWRITIXG. 
 
 primary evidence to prove, 39. 
 
 HAXDWRITIXG OF FORGED PAPER, 
 
 for proof by expert evidence and comparison, 429. 
 standard of comparison must be relevant, 429. 
 persons familiar with, may testifj', 429. 
 weight of evidence to prove, 429. 
 
 HEREDITARY INSANITY, 
 
 when it may be shown, 160. 
 
 HIDING, 
 
 See Flight of Accused. 
 HOME, 
 
 cross-examining witness to show he has abandoned, 61. 
 
 HOMICIDE, 
 
 corpus delicti, circumstantial evidence to prove, 7. 
 
 skull of victim may be produced, 48. 
 
 evidence of good character in case of, 78. 
 
 similar crimes, 90. 
 
 declarations in, 93. 
 
 res gestce of, 93, 97, 98. 
 
 djing declarations in, 102-114. 
 
 consultations in contemplation of, not privileged, 175. 
 
 relation of witness to deceased, 248. 
 
 evidence to prove the corpus delicti and the manner and cause of death, 
 
 312. 
 expert evidence of physicians, 312. 
 photographs to identify the corpse, 312. 
 evidence resulting from the autopsy, 313. 
 
 evidence to prove weapon or other means producing (katli, 314. 
 proof of finding of weapons, 314. 
 
 admissibility of clothing and weapons in evidence, 48, 315. 
 necessity for proving the identity of the deceased, 316. 
 doctrine of idem sonans, 316. 
 identification of the body of the deceased, 317. 
 expert evidence in case of poisoning, 318. 
 evidence resulting from chemical analysis, 318. 
 relevancy of evidence to show poisoning, 318, 319. 
 presumption and proof of malice in, 320. 
 proof of other crimes which arc connected or were the motive for. 88. 
 
 32t. 
 evidence of facts showing consciousness of guilt, 3JJ. 
 
 57 — Unmikrhill Chim. Ev.
 
 898 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 HO^nClDE— Continued. 
 
 evidence to show possible motive, 323. 
 
 evidence of the habits, character and disposition of deceased, 324. 
 
 nature of the evidence required to show tiie character of the deceased, 
 
 324-325. 
 evidence of threats made by the deceased, 326. 
 evidence of the peaceable character of the accused, 327. 
 general nature of and mode of proving threats made by the accused, 
 
 328, 329. 
 : declarations forming part of the res gcstcc of the crime, 328, 329, 330. 
 declarations of the accused, 330, 330a. 
 declarations of the accused after the crime, 330a. 
 declarations of third parties and cries and exclamations of by-standcrs, 
 
 loi, ZZ^- 
 evidence to show threats against deceased made by third persons, 332. 
 animosit)^ existing between deceased and accused, 22iZ- 
 evidence of blood-stains, 334. 
 conspiracy to commit, 335. 
 preparations to commit, 336. 
 evidence of foot-prints, 2)i7- 
 self-defense, 338. 
 
 HOMICIDE BY POISON, 
 burden of proof, 318. 
 
 HOPE, 
 
 confessions made under influence of, 126-130. 
 
 HORSES, 
 
 maliciously injuring, 310. 
 
 HOSTILE WITNESS, 
 
 leading questions to, 212. 
 
 feelings of, may be shown on cross-examination, 222. 
 his replies denying hostility may be contradicted, 222. 
 may be impeached, 234. 
 
 HOSTILITY, 
 
 of deceased, when relevant in homicide, 323-326. 
 relevancy of, to determine intent in assault, 357. 
 of accused against owner of house burned, 368-370. 
 
 HUMAN VOICE, 
 
 identification by, 56.
 
 INDEX. 899 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 HUSBAXD AND WIFE, 
 
 presumption of friendly relations between, 19. 
 
 competency of, as witnesses for or against one another at common 
 
 law, 184. 
 either competent against the other where personal injurv is involved, 
 
 185, 
 credibility of, as witnesses, 185. 
 statutory competency of, 186. 
 confidential communications passing between, 187. 
 as witnesses for or against an accomplice of the other, 188 
 existence of valid marriage must be proved, 189. 
 competency of, in trial for adultery, 381. 
 competency of, in bigamy, 400. 
 may not testify to non-access, 527-528. 
 
 HYPOTHESIS OF IXNOCENCE, 
 
 must be wholly excluded by criminating circumstances before verdict 
 of guilty can be rendered, 6. 
 
 HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION, 
 
 may be put to physician in rape, 412. 
 
 may be put to expert witness to testify to insanity of accused, 163, 165. 
 
 may be put to expert, 312, 319. 
 
 to expert in abortion, 350. 
 
 IDEM SONANS. 
 
 what constitutes, ss, 316. 
 
 IDENTIFICATION, 
 
 of body of person murdered, 7. 
 
 of articles of personal property, 47. 
 
 of persons and premises by photographs, 50. 
 
 without standing up, 54. 
 
 of accused, mode and effect of evidence, 54, 55. 
 
 opinion evidence as to the identity of the accused, 55. 
 
 by pointing out a person, 55. 
 
 forget fulness of witness to, 55. 
 
 relevancy of evidence of, 55. 
 
 hearsay and evidence of by-standcr, 55. 
 
 by photograph. 55. 
 
 by circumstantial evidence, 55. 
 
 by human voice, 56. 
 
 of speaker at telephone. 5''>. 
 
 evidence of, to show habitual criminality, 515.
 
 900 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 INDENTIFICATION— Con//»n(7/. 
 silence of accused, 122. 
 of stolen property, variance in, 296. 
 of stolen goods by hearsay, inadmissible, 296. 
 of money or securities stolen, 296. 
 of weapon found in possession of accused, 315. 
 of the deceased in homicide, 316. 
 of substance chemically analyzed, 318. 
 of stolen goods, 379. 
 of deceased person, by photographs, 312. 
 
 IDENTITY, 
 
 evidence of other crimes admissible to shovir, 91. 
 
 of offenses under plea of former jeopardy, burden of proof, 197. 
 
 of accused with person before convicted, 515. 
 
 of deceased when body destroyed, 316. 
 
 IGNORANCE, 
 
 pleas of guilty made through, 144. 
 
 may be proved to rebut intent in extortion, 456. 
 
 IGNORANCE OF WITNESS, 
 
 does not permit his impeachment by party calling him, 236. 
 permits leading question, 212. 
 
 ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, 
 
 See Bastardy Proceedings. 
 
 ILLNESS OF WITNESS, 260-272. 
 
 lAIMORALITY, 
 
 of accused, may be shown, 61. 
 
 IMMUNITY, 
 
 under statute, as regards incrimination, 247. 
 
 IMPEACHMENT, 
 
 of accused on cross-examination, 65. 
 
 of accused by showing bad character, 65, 66. 
 
 of dying declarations, 88. 
 
 of alibi, 151. 
 
 of witness in rape by showing details of complaint, 410. 
 
 of prosecutrix by showing adultery, 418. 
 
 by new evidence, 521.
 
 INDEX. 901 
 
 [Refcroiccs arc to Sections.] 
 
 IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES, 
 
 cannot be done by party calling, 234. 
 
 unexpectedly hostile, 235. 
 
 limits of discretionary, 235. 
 
 partj' must prove his surprise, 235. 
 
 by showing bad reputation for veracitj', 236. 
 
 never by specific bad actions, 236. 
 
 by showing disbelief under oath, 236. 
 
 by showing general bad moral character aside from trutli fulness, 237. 
 
 by proving extra-judicial statements contradictory of testimony, 238. 
 
 by contradictory writing, etc., 239. 
 
 contradictory writings must be read to witness. 240. 
 
 by contradiction of irrelevant matters not allowable, 241. 
 
 confirmatory statements, 241. 
 
 by evidence of their previous silence when it was their duty to speak, 
 
 242. 
 reputation for truthfulness of witness who has been impeached, 243. 
 by asking disgracing questions, 244, 247. 
 by asking incriminating questions, 247. 
 by showing interest and bias, 248. 
 
 IMPLEMENTS, 
 
 for gambling in evidence, 477. 
 
 IMPRISONMENT, 
 
 of accused, best evidence of, 46. 
 
 of accused, when may be shown, 61, 62. 
 
 of witness, as impeachment, 245. 
 
 best evidence of, 247. 
 
 to show habitual criminal, 515. 
 
 IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, 
 in bastardy action, 523. 
 
 IMPROB.XRILITY AND IMPOSSIRILTTY, 
 as affecting belief. 5. 
 
 IMPROPER FAMILI.\RITIES, 
 
 evidence of, to prove adultery, ;^S:i, 392. 
 
 INCAPACITY, 
 
 to commit crime because of infancy, 20. 
 
 INCEST. 
 
 defined, 395. 
 
 intercourse must be voluntary, 396.
 
 g02 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sectio}is.] 
 
 IXCEST — Coutiiiucd. 
 
 parties concerned are accomplices, 396. 
 
 evidence to prove the intercourse, 396. 
 
 other acts of, 396. 
 
 kinship of the parties. 397. 
 
 necessary for corroboration of the accomplice. 397. 
 
 distinguished from rape, 397. 
 
 See Adultery, Rape and Sexual Crimes. 
 
 IXCRnilXATING ARTICLES, 
 
 may be introduced in evidence, 48, 49. 
 
 admissible though forcibly taken from accused, 48. 
 
 IXCRIMIXATING CIRCUMSTAXCES, 
 
 must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 7. 
 
 IXCRIMIXATIXG QUESTIOXS, 
 
 to accused on cross-examination, 60-63. 
 waiver of rights, by the accused, 247. 
 when witness may be compelled to answer, 247. 
 witness may waive privilege for himself, 247. 
 statutory privilege against, 247. 
 
 See Grand Jury axd Bankrupt. 
 
 IXDECEXT LIBERTIES, 
 effect of, 411. 
 
 IXDEPEXDEXT CRIMES, 
 
 relevancy of evidence to prove, 87-91. 
 
 IXDICT^IEXT, 
 
 based on incompetent evidence, 25, 26, 28. 
 
 based on admissions of accused examined as a witness, 27, 
 
 is not evidence, but may be read to jurors, 30. 
 
 material variance, 31. 
 
 best evidence of pendency of, 41, 61. 
 
 when contents of may be shown by parol, 41. 
 
 of accused to show identity, 55. 
 
 of accused, when may be shown, 61. 
 
 use of copies of in extradition. 499. 
 
 when must contain allegation of former conviction, 510. 
 See Grand Jury. 
 IXEBRIETY, 
 
 See Intoxication.
 
 INDEX. 903 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 INFAMOUS CRIME, 
 
 statutorj- regulations removing incompetency caused bj- conviction of, 
 
 206. 
 conviction of may be shown to discredit witness, 209. 
 when conviction of renders witness incompetent, 206. 
 pardon restores competency, 207. 
 mode of proving pardon, 208. 
 
 IXFANXY, 
 
 presumption of incapacity to commit rape from, 408. 
 
 IXFAXT, 
 
 presumed incapable of committing crime, 20. 
 
 when this presumption may be rebutted, 20. 
 See Child. 
 INFIDELITY, 
 
 as regulating the competency of witnesses, 201. 
 
 INFORMER, 
 
 name of cannot be divulged b\' witness, 170. 
 See Decoys. 
 INJURING ANIMALS, 
 
 when maliciously done, 310. 
 
 INNOCENCE, 
 
 hj'pothesis of, when excluded, 6. 
 
 explanation of incriminating facts consistent witli innocence, 17. 
 
 right to instruction as to presumption of, 17, 18. 
 
 INSANITY, 
 
 capacity to know right and wrong as test of, 154. 
 
 presumption of sanity, 154. 
 
 uncontrollable impulse and delusion, when amounting to, 155. 
 
 medical evidence of, 156. 
 
 presumption of continuance of, 156. 
 
 burden of proof to show, 157. 
 
 proof of, beyond reasonable doubt, 15R. 
 
 evidence of previous conduct and language of accused, 158. 
 
 prior insanity may be proved, 160. 
 
 declarations to show, 160. 
 
 evidence of demeanor and language of accused subsequent to crime, 160. 
 
 character of crime as evidence of, 160. 
 
 reputation not admissible as proof of, 160. 
 
 evidence of, in family of accuscci, 160. 
 
 non-cxpcrt evidence to show, 160, 161.
 
 904 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sectious.] 
 
 INSANITY— Co;i//»Hrrf. 
 
 facts forming basis of must be stated, i6t, 162. 
 
 witness giving must have adequate knowledge, 162. 
 
 expert evidence to show, 163. 
 
 witness giving expert evidence of, must have had some experience in 
 treating the insane, 163. 
 
 opinion as to, may be based on a hypothetical question, or on knowl- 
 edge obtained and facts observed during medical examination of ac- 
 cused, 163. 
 
 examination of accused to ascertain sanity, when compulsory, 163. 
 
 cannot be inquired into by grand jury, 25. 
 
 simulation, 61. 
 
 INSANITY OF WITNESS, 
 
 when rendering incompetent, 202. 
 
 mode of proving, 203. 
 
 adjournment may be directed in case of, 203. 
 
 INSCRIPTIONS, 
 
 primary evidence of, 49. 
 
 INSERTION, 
 
 in writing, fraudulent character of, 419. 
 
 INSOLVENCY, 
 
 of accused, when relevant, 443. 
 
 INSTRUCTION, 
 
 required on circumstantial evidence, 6. 
 
 on weight of negative evidence, i6a. 
 
 on credibility of accused, 57. 
 
 as to character of accused, 86a. 
 
 as to alibi, 149, I53- 
 
 as to credibility of detectives, 280a. 
 
 INSPECTION, 
 
 by jury, of persons, 53, 54. 
 
 jury may determine age from, 53, 342- 
 
 by jury of instruments causing abortion, 350. 
 
 of child in filiation suit, 525. 
 
 INSTRUMENTS IN WRITING, 
 
 certified copies of, as evidence, 43. 
 
 INSURANCE, 
 
 evidence of, in arson, 369.
 
 INDEX. 905 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 INTEXTIOX, 
 
 to commit crime, when absence of, will be presumed in case of in- 
 fant, 20. 
 accused may testif j- to his, 59. 
 of person acting as decoy, 69. 
 necessity of evidence of, 59. 
 of accused to convert, 282. 
 province of jury to determine in libel, 273. 
 of accused to abduct, 345. 
 to do bodily harm, how proved, 354. 
 in robbery, 358. 
 
 evidence to show in mayhem, 359. 
 to burn must be proved in arson, ^6. 
 present in entering, jurj^ to determine, 373. 
 of owner in false pretenses, 436. 
 in constructive contempt, 461. 
 in carrying concealed weapon, 484. 
 
 INTEREST, 
 
 of accused, may be considered by jury, 58. 
 of obligor may be proved, 420. 
 
 INTEREST AND BIAS, 
 of witness, 248. 
 
 IXTERFERENXE, 
 
 with witnesses, 448. 
 
 INTERMARRIAGE, 
 
 of accused and female seduced, 391. 
 need not be proved in incest, 395. 
 
 INTERMINGLED CRIMES, 
 
 evidence of, when admissible, 88. 
 
 INTERNATIONAL COMITY, 495. 
 
 INTERNAL REVENUE, 
 
 privileged communications, 170. 
 
 INTERPRETER. 
 
 confessions by, 133. 
 
 of sign language of deaf mute witnc-ss, 204. 
 
 employment of, during examination of witness, discretionary at com- 
 mon law, usually required by statute, 227.
 
 906 INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 i:<TERVRETER— Continued. 
 
 witness or juror may act as, 227. 
 accuracy of, may be attacked, 227. 
 by-standers may assist, 227. 
 
 IXTERROGATORIES, 
 
 tiling of, in case of contempt, 461. 
 
 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 
 compulsory testimony before, 58. 
 
 INTERSTATE EXTRADITION, 
 
 See Extradition. 
 
 INTIMIDATING WITNESS, 256. 
 
 INTONICATING LIQUORS, 
 
 effect and quality of may be judicially noticed, 21. 
 labels may be proved orally, 49. 
 
 INTONTCATION, 
 
 of accused, as bearing on confession, 136. 
 
 no excuse for crime, 165. 
 
 evidence of, when admissible to show physical condition at instant of 
 crime, 165. 
 
 evidence of, to show specific intent, 166. 
 
 evidence of, to show absence of guilty knowledge, 166. 
 
 evidence of, to show absence of premeditated design, 166. 
 
 to show meaning of threats uttered, 166. 
 
 non-expert witness may testify to. 166. 
 
 evidence of conduct of accused on previous occasions while in condi- 
 tion of, 166. 
 
 confessions made under influence of, 136. 
 
 of witness, admissibility of, to impeach, 237. 
 
 INVALIDITY. 
 
 of writing forged may be shown, 430. 
 
 of official appointment cannot be shown, 446. 
 
 of warrant may be shown in escape, 465. 
 
 IRRESISTIBLE HIPULSE, 
 as test of insanity, 155. 
 
 J 
 JAIL, 
 
 identification of accused in, 50.
 
 INDEX. 907 
 
 [References ere to Sections.] 
 JAILER, 
 
 may testify to contents of letter by accused, 42. 
 may testify to imprisonment of accused, 44. 
 
 JEALOUSY, 
 
 as motive for homicide, 323. 
 
 JEOPARDY, 
 
 See Former Jeopardy. 
 
 JOINT DEFEXDAXTS, 
 
 See Accomplices. 
 JUDGE, 
 
 name of, when judicially noticed, 21. 
 
 right of, to determine preliminary questions of competency, 214. 
 
 may interrogate witnesses, 214. 
 
 duty of, to silence abusive witness, 213. 
 
 remarks by, referring to credibility or weight of evidence are ground 
 for new trial, 215. 
 
 province, 273-276. 
 
 power of, to commit for contempt, 459, 461. 
 
 right of to charge on evidence, 222. 
 
 duty of, to instruct the jury on questions of law, 221, 275. 
 
 may not read from text-writers in charging jury, 275. 
 
 JUDICIAL XOTICE, 
 
 of prior proceedings in the record, 21. 
 
 of municipal ordinances, 21. 
 
 of the meaning of scientific language, 21. 
 
 of character of sheriff, 21. 
 
 of public streets, 21. 
 
 of statutes, 21. 
 
 of value of stolen money, 298. 
 
 of public officers, 452. 
 
 of times of election, 455. 
 
 of meaning of words, 471. . 
 
 of use of billiard tables, 471. 
 
 of treaties, 505. 
 
 JURISDICTIOX. 
 
 proof that accused has fled, 118. 
 witnesses out of, 260-272. 
 presumption of, 465, 470. 
 evidence to show lack of, 465. 
 
 JURISDICTIOXAL LI. M ITS, 
 judicial notice of, 21.
 
 908 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 JURORS, 
 
 may question witness, 214. 
 
 improper reception of evidence by, out of court, 228. 
 
 unauthorized view by, 228. 
 
 must testify as witnesses if they know the facts, 228. 
 
 may not read newspapers, scientific or legal books in jury room, 228. 
 
 duty of, to reconcile evidence with presumption of innocence, 17. 
 
 questions put to witness by members of, 214. 
 
 solely to determine credibility, 218. 
 
 power of, to disregard the judge's charge, 275. 
 
 province of, 273, 274. 
 
 JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, 
 
 may testify to dying declarations, 112. 
 
 K 
 
 KEEPING DISORDERLY HOUSE, 
 defined, 482. 
 
 competency of witness to prove character of, 482. 
 reputation of inmates, 482. 
 evidence of disorderly actions, 482. 
 character for chastity of accused, 482. 
 
 KEEPING GAMBLING HOUSE, 
 
 proof of actual control not essential, 475. 
 crime of, is continuance, 475. 
 
 KEROSENE, 
 
 evidence of stains caused by, 370. 
 
 KINSHIP, 
 
 of parties concerned in incest, 397. 
 
 LABELS, 
 
 on bottles, how proved, 49. 
 
 LACTOMETER, 
 
 evidence of, 481. 
 
 LANGUAGE, 
 
 evidence to show meaning of, 363.
 
 INDEX. 909 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 LARCENY, 
 
 variance in proof of. 34. 
 
 evidence of good character in, 77. 
 
 evidence of intoxication to disprove intent to commit, 166. 
 
 distinguished from embezzlement, 282. 
 
 defined, 291a. 
 
 necessity for and mode of proving the intent, 292. 
 
 accused must be permitted to testify to explanatory circumstances to 
 
 rebut criminal intent, 292. 
 evidence of false declarations by accused, 292. 
 presence of accused near stolen property, 293. 
 carrying away of property stolen in, 293. 
 character and proof of ownership, 294. 
 competency of owner of stolen property as a witness, 295. 
 non-consent of owner must be proved, 295. 
 non-consent of owner may be proved circumstantially, 295. 
 identification of the property stolen, 296. 
 variance in proof of the stolen property, 296. 
 proof of genuineness of bank-bills, 296. 
 recorded brands of stolen cattle, 297. 
 venue in, 298. 
 
 value of stolen property, 298. 
 
 presumptions for the jury from possession of stolen property, 299. 
 possession must be recent and exclusive in character, 300. 
 burden of explaining possession, 301. 
 admissibility of declarations by accused explanatory of possession of 
 
 stolen goods, 302. 
 evidence of foot-prints, 303. 
 
 evidence to show the financial standing and expenditure of accused. 304. 
 evidence of other crimes, 305. 
 
 stolen goods found through inadmissible confession, 306. 
 distinguished from false pretenses, 437. 
 distinguished from robbery, 358. 
 
 LASCIVIOUS COHABITATIOX, 
 
 proof of circumstances to show, 384. 
 
 LAW, 
 
 evidence to show accused acted under mistake of, 309. 
 judicial notice of, 505. 
 
 LEADIXG QUESTION'S. 
 
 when in discretion of court to allow to hostile witness, 212. 
 
 may be put to children, 205, 212. 
 
 not permissible on direct examination. 212. 
 
 new trial grantfd, because of, 212. 
 
 may be asked of unwilling witness on direct examination, 212.
 
 910 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 LEGISLATURE, 
 
 power of, to punish for contempt, 58, 226. 
 
 LEGIT nL\CY, PRESUAIPTION OF, 524-526. 
 
 LENIEXXY, 
 
 confession made under expectation of, 127. 
 
 LETTER, 
 
 contents and receipt of, may be sliown orally, 43. 
 
 used as decoys, 479. 
 
 as evidence against accused charged witli cml)czzlemcnt, 291. 
 
 as evidence against accused charged with bastardy, 528. 
 
 suggesting flight of the accused, 118. 
 
 constituting a confession, 133. 
 
 LETTER PRESS COPY, 
 as evidence, 38. 
 
 LIBEL, 
 
 See Criminal Libel. 
 LICENSE. 
 
 production in court may be dispensed with, 49. 
 
 LIE, 
 
 See Consciousness of Guilt. 
 
 LIFE, PRESUMPTION OF. 
 
 when in conflict with presumption of innocence, 19. 
 
 LIMITING EFFECT OF EVIDENCE, 
 in proving other crimes, 283. 
 
 LIQUOR, 
 
 proof of character of, by parol, 47. 
 
 LOST RECORDS, 
 
 See Primary Evidence. 
 
 LOST WRITING, 
 
 evidence to prove in forgery, 425. 
 
 LOTTERIES, 
 
 See Gambling.
 
 INDEX. 911 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 LUCID INTERVALS, 
 
 See IxsAXiTY. 
 LUNACY, 
 
 See Insanity. 
 
 MAILING OBSCENE LITERATURE, 478, 479. 
 
 MALICE, 
 
 necessity for proof of, in injuring animal, 308. 
 presumption of in homicide, 320. 
 
 MALICIOUS MISCHIEF, 
 
 proof of destruction necessary, 307. 
 
 at common law and by statute, 307. 
 
 malicious intent must be proved, 308. 
 
 intent may be inferred from acts or contemporaneous declarations of 
 
 accused, 308. 
 evidence of value and ownership of property destroyed, 309. 
 good faith of accused, 309. 
 injuring or killing animals, 310. 
 in cutting or destroying grain, trees or fruit, 311. 
 
 MAP, 
 
 accuracy of, how proved, 52. 
 
 MARRIAGE, 
 
 primary evidence of, 44. 
 annuUment of, may be shown in bigamy, 398. 
 necessity for proof of, in adultery, 3S3. 
 strict proof of, required, 383, 404. 
 certificate of, prima facie evidence, 383. 404. 
 eye-witness may prove ceremony of, 3S3. 
 of accused, provable by his admissions, 3S3. 
 presumption of continuance of, 383. 
 of parties to adultery not presumed, t^S^. 
 evidence of cohabitation and reputation, 403. 
 admissions of accused to prove, 404. 
 certificates and copies of records to prove, 405. 
 when solemnized in foreign country, 405. 
 
 MATERIALITY, 
 
 of evidence, necessity for in pirjury. 4^17. 
 opinion t-vidcncc not adnnssiblc t<> prove, 468. 
 of ncwly-discovcrcd evidence, 5JO.
 
 912 INDEX-. 
 
 [References are to Scctions.'\ 
 MAYHEM, 
 
 evidence to sustain charge of, 359. 
 
 MEDICAL WITNESSES, 
 
 See Expert Witnesses. 
 
 MEMORANDA TO REFRESH MEMORY, 
 when copies may be used as, 218. 
 when evidence, 217. 
 must be contemporaneous, 218. 
 
 MEMORY, 
 
 of witness, 3. 
 
 of witness, cross-examination to test, 221, 222. 
 
 MENTAL CAPACITY, 
 
 of child as witness, 205. 
 
 of witness, when relevant, 202-205. 
 
 may always be considered by the jury, 202. 
 
 MENTAL CONDITION, 
 
 as determining the admission of declarations, 113. 
 
 of one making dying declaration, 112. 
 
 of person making confession, 136. 
 
 of accused or other intoxicated person, 136, 165-167. 
 
 of child making confession, 143. 
 
 of person making incriminating statements, 123. 
 
 MENTAL FEELINGS, 
 
 oral expressions of, 93-101. 
 
 MILK, 
 
 adulteration of, 480. 
 
 MINOR, 
 
 abduction of, 339-342. 
 
 MISDEMEANORS, 
 
 doctrine of reasonable doubt applicable to, trials of, 516. 
 conviction of, may be shown to impeach, 210. 
 
 MISTAKE OF LAW, 
 
 accused may prove he acted under, 309. 
 
 MOB, 
 
 confession in presence of, 128.
 
 INDEX. 913 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 MONEY, 
 
 desire for, as motive for homicide, $23. 
 variance in proof of stolen, 296. 
 possession of, presumption from, 299-301. 
 proof of passing, not required in bribery, 453. 
 
 MORAL CERTAINTY, 
 
 See Reasonable Doubt. 
 
 MORPHINE HABIT, 
 
 relevancy of, as evidence to show mental condition of accused, 168. 
 
 MOTIVE, 
 
 of witness to misrepresent, 5. 
 
 crimes united in, may be proved, 88-92. 
 
 prompting declarations which are part of res gestcc, 93. 
 
 prompting dying declarations, 102. 
 
 relevancy of evidence to show, for homicide, 322-323. 
 
 for homicide, need not be proved, 323. 
 
 in constructive contempt, 461. 
 
 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 
 
 powers of, may be judicially noticed, 21. 
 
 MURDER, 
 
 See, also. Homicide. 
 MUTES, 
 
 See Deaf Mutes as Witnesses. 
 
 N 
 NAME, 
 
 allegation and proof of, 22- 
 variance in proof of, in forgery, 421. 
 identity of, 55. 
 
 Sec Fictitious Persons. 
 NARCOTIC, 
 
 dying declarations given under influence of, 112. 
 
 NARRATIVE DECLARATIONS, 
 
 not receivable as part of the res gestcc, 96-98. 
 
 NATURAL DISPOSITION. 
 
 of accused, not competent in evidence, 85. 
 
 58 — Underhill Cki.m. Ev.
 
 914 INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Scctions.l 
 
 NEARNESS OF DEATH, 
 
 as furnisliing sanction for dying declarations, 102, 103. 
 character of wounds tending to show, 104. 
 
 NECESSITY, 
 
 for producing abortion, 347. 
 
 NEGATIVE EVIDENCE, 
 weight of, i6a. 
 
 NEGATIVE FACTS, 
 
 burden of proof to show, 24. 
 
 NEGATIVE TESTniONY, 
 
 to prove good character, 81. 
 
 NEGLIGENCE, 
 
 in permitting escape, 463. 
 
 NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE, 
 new trial, when granted on, 516. 
 due diligence must be shown, 517. 
 must appear from the affidavits, 518. 
 credibility of, 519. 
 materiality and relevancy of, 520. 
 when impeaching only, 521. 
 when cumulative only, 522. 
 
 NEWSPAPER, 
 
 may be used to refresh memory, 217, 218. 
 
 NEW TRIAL, 
 
 when granted for permitting comment on failure of accused to tes- 
 tify, 67. 
 
 NIGHT-TIME, 
 
 defined, 371. 
 
 evidence to show breaking in occurred during, 371. 
 
 NOLLE PROSEQUI, 
 
 power of court to enter, in case of accomplice, 71. 
 
 NON-ACCESS, 
 
 cannot be proved by evidence of either party to marriage, 527, 528. 
 evidence of absence to show, 528.
 
 INDEX. 915 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 XOX-COXSENT, 
 
 of owner of goods stolen, must be proved, 295. 
 owner or agent may testify to, 295. 
 may be proved by circumstantial evidence, 295, sj^. 
 burden of proof to show, 55. 
 
 burden of proof and competency of witness in case of abduction of 
 minor, 340. 
 
 XOX-EXISTEXCE, 
 
 of fictitious person, 427. 
 
 XOX-EXPERT, 
 
 may testify to handwriting, 429. 
 ma}' testify to insanity, 160, 161. 
 form of opinion as to insanity, 161. 
 competency of, for court, 162. 
 may testify to blood stains, 334. 
 
 XOX-RESIDENCE, 
 
 when conferring privilege from arrest on witness, 258. 
 in extradition, 497. 
 
 XOTICE, 
 
 judicial, 15. 
 
 XOTICE TO PRODUCE, 
 
 when applicable in criminal proceedings, 41, 42. 
 instrument alleged to be forged or stolen, 43. 
 
 XOTORIOUS FACTS, 
 
 judicial notice of, 21. 
 
 NUMBER OF WITXESSES, 
 to character, 86. 
 generally, i6a. 
 
 OATH, 
 
 confessions made under, before and after accused is indicted, 131. 
 
 definition and formal requirements of. 190. 
 
 when taken by a person not an adherent of Christianity, 200. 
 
 children not understanding nature of, are incompetent, 205. 
 
 of interpreter, 227. 
 
 insane witness must understand, 202.
 
 9l6 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Seetions.] 
 OBLIGOR, 
 
 may testify to forgery of instrument by wliicli he is bound, 419. 
 
 interest of, may be proved, 420. 
 
 may be dispensed with as wUness, 420. 
 
 OBSCENE LITERATURE, 
 
 statute against mailing, 478. 
 
 character of, for jury, 478. 
 
 decoy letters, 479. 
 
 oral evidence to show meaning of language, 479. 
 
 OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE, 
 
 necessity for proof of official character, 446. 
 
 officer may testify to character, 446. 
 
 invalidity of appointment cannot be shown, 446. 
 
 intention to obstruct may be inferred from language, 447. 
 
 presumption and burden of showing validity of warrant, 447. 
 
 preventing attendance of witnesses, 448. 
 
 OFFER, 
 
 of accused to surrender, 118, 465. 
 
 by accused of seduction to marry prosecutrix, 391. 
 
 OFFICER, 
 
 resistance to, 118. 
 
 confession made to, 129. 
 
 furnishing liquor to accused by, effect upon confession, 136. 
 
 may carry concealed weapon, 486. 
 
 resisting an, 446, 447. 
 
 may testify to search for accused, 118. 
 
 before whom oath is taken in perjury, 470. 
 
 OFFICIAL CHARACTER, 
 
 provable by oral evidence, 44, 46. 
 necessity to show, 446, 447. 
 proof of, in embezzlement, 286. 
 
 OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS, 
 when privileged, 170-172. 
 
 OMISSION OF EVIDENCE, 
 
 supplying evidence of witness kept away, 263. 264. 
 
 OPINION EVIDENCE, 
 
 not admissible when contained in dying declarations, 108.
 
 INDEX. 917 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 OPIXIOX EVlDEy:CE— Continued. 
 
 inadmissible to show character, 80, 81. 
 
 of identity, 55. 
 
 to show intoxication, 167. 
 
 as to burning, 370. 
 
 inadmissible to show cause of fire, 372. 
 
 of age. 342. 
 
 in burglary, as to means of entrance, 372. 
 
 as to character of foot-prints, 374. 
 
 OPIXIOX EVIDEXCE OF IXSAXITY, 
 by non-expert witness : 
 
 non-expert must have adequate knowledge of facts, 161. 
 
 must state facts with his opinion, 162. 
 
 opinion of, cannot be based upon hj-pothetical question, 162. 
 
 weight of evidence of, 162. 
 
 competency of, is for court to determine, 162. 
 by medical expert witness : 
 
 his opinion must be based on hypothetical question, 163. 
 
 when his opinion may be based on evidence given in the case, 163. 
 
 general qualifications of, 163. 
 
 must have had some experience in treating the insane, 163. 
 
 facts and symptoms observed in physical examination may be de- 
 scribed, 163. 
 
 OPPORTUXITY, 
 
 as evidence of sexual intercourse, 381, 386, 396. 
 
 ORAL EVIDEXCE. 
 
 testimony of deaf mute by signs is, 204. 
 
 to prove official character, 287. 447. 
 
 to prove contract of employment in embezzlement, 287. 
 
 to prove ownership of property, 309. 
 
 to prove forged writing, 425, 426. 
 
 of corporate existence, 428. 
 
 to show use of forged writing, 430. 
 
 to supply omitted details in consular certificate, 502. 
 
 to contradict official return. 456, 437. 
 
 to show meaning of language used, 483. 
 
 to prove identity of accused alleged to be habitual criminal, 515. 
 
 ORDER OF PROOF. 
 
 each side to exhaust its case. 280. 
 evidence in chief received during rebuttal, 280. 
 
 in case of plea of not guilty where accused is alleged to be li.ilpitual 
 criminal, 511.
 
 9l8 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 OTHER CRIMES, EVIDENCE OF, 
 
 not admissible where crimes are independent, 87. 
 
 receivable where crimes are connected, 88, 321. 
 
 where parts of a general scheme, 87, 88. 
 
 connection must be clearly shown, 88. 
 
 admissible to show intention or guilty knowledge, 89. 
 
 in homicide by poison, 89. 
 
 when united in motive, 90. 
 
 when one crime is committed to conceal another, 90, 321. 
 
 admissible to show identity of means or person, 91. 
 
 admissibility in cases of adultery, incest, etc., 92, 396. 
 
 admissibility in embezzlement, 283. 
 
 under indictment for larceny, 305. 
 
 in homicide, 89, 321. 
 
 in abortion, 345. 
 
 to prove intent of assault, 355. 
 
 in arson, 89, 369. 
 
 in burglary, 376. 
 
 in forgery to show guilty knowledge, 89, 423, 432. 
 
 fact of acquittal does not exclude, 423. 
 
 where accused is alleged to be habitual criminal, 512. 
 
 not usually relevant in rape, 415. 
 
 to show intent in bribery, 451. 
 
 OUTCRIES, 
 
 of woman on whom rape is made, 417. 
 
 OWN DWELLING, 
 
 when burning of, is arson, 367. 
 
 OWNER, 
 
 evidence to prove consent of, to entrance, 309. 
 intention of, as regards title in false pretenses, 436. 
 
 OWNERSHIP, 
 
 of property injured, 309. 
 
 in embezzlement, 286. 
 
 of building burned, 366, 367. 
 
 OWNERSHIP OF STOLEN GOODS, 
 variance in, 294. 
 best evidence of, required, 294. 
 by corporation, 294. 
 proving by recorded brands, 297.
 
 INDEX. 919 
 
 [Ri^fcrciiccs arc to Sections.] 
 OWN WITNESS, 
 
 cannot be impeached by party calling, 235. 
 
 P 
 
 PAIX, 
 
 utterances descriptive of, 348, 417, 533. 
 
 PAIXTIXGS, 
 
 as evidence, 52. 
 
 accuracy must be shown, 51, 52. 
 
 PARDOX, 
 
 removes incompetency to testify caused b}' conviction of infamous 
 
 crime, 206. 
 must be full and unconditional, 207. 
 
 courts will judicially notice proclamation of general amnesty, 208. 
 primary evidence of, is required, 208. 
 parol evidence to identifj' person named in, 208. 
 as excluding proof of former conviction, 509, 510. 
 
 PAREXT, 
 
 may testify to age of child, 40. 
 
 PAROL EVIDEXCE, 
 
 to show contents of warrant or indictment, 40, 41. 
 
 to show contents of letters received by prisoner in jail, 43. 
 
 to show imprisonment of accused, 44. 
 
 of confessions taken at the preliminary examination, 132. 
 
 PARTICULAR FACTS, 
 
 cross-examination upon, of witness testifying to good character, 82. 
 
 PASSIXG COUXTERFEIT MOXEY, 432-434- 
 
 PASSIXG WORTHLESS CHECK, 
 
 false pretenses inferred from, 444. 
 
 PATERXITY, 
 
 inspection to determine, 525. 
 burden of proof, 524. 
 
 PAUPER DEFEXDAXT. 
 
 service of process for, 249. 
 
 PEACEABLENESS, 
 
 character of accused for, 76, 327.
 
 920 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 PECULATIOX, 
 
 competencj- of evidence proving another offense under charge of, 283. 
 
 PECUNIARY COXDITIOX, 
 
 of person accused of forgery of receipt, 431. 
 false representations of, 442. 
 evidence to show, 443. 
 
 PEDIGREE, 
 
 as proof of age, 342. 
 
 PENETRATION, 
 
 evidence of physician to show, 412. 
 
 character of proof, 412. 
 
 circumstantial evidence to show, 412. 
 
 in cases of child, 412. 
 
 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, 412. 
 
 PERJURY, 
 
 definition and intent to swear falsely, 466. 
 
 materiality of the evidence, 467. 
 
 number of witnesses and corroboration required, 468. 
 
 falsity of the testimony, 460, 470. 
 
 conviction of, disqualifies witness, 209. 
 
 who is accomplice, 69. 
 
 intention to be sworn, 470. 
 
 authority of officer to administer oath, 470. 
 
 PERSON, 
 
 variance in names of, 3S- 
 exhibiting, to show identity, 53-55. 
 photograph of, 50. 
 
 PERSONAL IDENTITY, 
 evidence of, 53, 54. 
 
 PERSONAL PROPERTY, 
 
 primary evidence of its physical condition, 47. 
 
 evidence to identity, 48. 
 
 weapons in evidence, 315. 
 
 desire to obtain, as motive for homicide, 323. 
 
 articles of, in evidence, 481. 
 
 taken from accused on search, 58a. 
 
 discovered by inadmissible confession, 138. 
 
 used in experiment, 233. 
 
 as evidence in malicious mischief, 308.
 
 INDEX. 921 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 PERSONS IX AUTHORITY, 
 
 when confessions made to, are presumed involuntary, 139. 
 
 PHOTOGRAPHS, 
 
 by X-Ray received, 50. 
 
 of accused in prison clothes, 50. 
 
 as primary evidence, 50. 
 
 received to identifj^ premises, persons and dead bodies, 50. 
 
 as evidence of public records, 50. 
 
 as evidence of disputed writings, 50. 
 
 accuracy and relevancy of, 51. 
 
 change in scene prior to taking, 51. 
 
 stationing men about while taking, 51. 
 
 by amateur is admissible, 51. 
 
 familiarity with locality, 51. 
 
 admissibility of, to identify deceased person, and show character of 
 
 wounds, 312. 
 to prove language of faded writing, 425. 
 as proof in arson, 369. 
 
 PHYSICAL COXDITIOX, 
 
 primary evidence of. 47. 
 
 of person, evidence to show, 53. 
 
 of the accused, 53. 
 
 inspection by jury, 53. 
 
 of deceased in homicide, 312. 
 
 of woman on whom abortion was committed, 349. 
 
 evidence of, to rebut presumption. 413. 
 
 of prosecutrix in rape, medical evidence to show, 412-414. 
 
 of accused, in rape, 416. 
 
 PHYSICAL EXAMIXATIOX, 
 
 may be dispensed with in rape, 412. 
 evidence ascertained by, 413, 414. 
 
 PHYSICAL IXCAPACITY OF ACCUSED, 
 when it may be shown, 165. 
 
 PHYSICAL IXJURIES, 
 
 photographs to show, 50, 312. 
 of person assaulted, 354. 
 
 PHYSICIANS. 
 
 credibility of, 280a. 
 
 their competency as witnesses, 312.
 
 922 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 TUYSICIA'^S— Continued. 
 
 testimony of as to weapons, 312. 
 
 accused of abortion, privileged communications to, 351. 
 may testify to age, strength, physical and mental condition, of prosecu- 
 trix in rape, 412-414. 
 testimony of, as to penetration, 412. 
 cannot testify as to consent in rape, 412. 
 
 PHYSICIAN, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS TO, 
 
 dying declarations not regarded as, 180. 
 
 made in contemplation of crime, 180. 
 
 when made during examination to detect or ascertain insanity of ac- 
 cused, 181. 
 
 not recognized at common law, 179. 
 
 statutory regulation of, 179. 
 
 proof of express hiring not required to establish relation, 179. 
 
 when communication must have been necessary to enable physician to 
 prescribe, 179. 
 
 waiver of privilege in civil cases, 180. 
 
 waiver in prosecution for rape, 180. 
 
 death of the patient as affecting the character of, 180. 
 
 PLACE, 
 
 allegation and proof, variance, 32. 
 
 PLEA OF GUILTY, 
 
 when conclusive, 144. 
 may be withdrawn before judgment, 144. 
 discretion of court to refuse to permit withdrawal of, 144. 
 entered through mistake or ignorance, 144. 
 See Confession. 
 
 POISONING, 
 
 evidence of similar crimes, 87. 
 
 dying declarations in death by, 107. 
 
 evidence of, afforded by autopsy, 258, 313, 318. 
 
 essential facts may be sustained by circumstantial evidence, 318. 
 
 qualifications of expert in, 318. 
 
 to what facts expert may testify in, 318. 
 
 inference of intent, 318. 
 
 death of other persons, 318. 
 
 possession of poison by accused, 318. 
 
 motive of accused, 319. 
 
 declarations of the accused, 319a.
 
 INDEX. 923 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 POLICE OFFICIAL, 
 
 best evidence of his appointment and authority, 46. 
 when communications to, are privileged, 170. 
 admissibility of, confession made to, 124, 129, 140. 
 unconscious influence of, on confession, 150. 
 may testify in extradition, 502. 
 homicide of, 90. 
 credibility of, 280a. 
 
 POPULATION, 
 
 judicial notice of, 21. 
 
 POSSESSION, 
 
 of weapons, by accused, 314, 336. 
 of instruments to cause abortion, 349. 
 of burglar's tools, evidence to show, 375. 
 inference of guilty knowledge from, 423. 
 of forged writings by accomplice, 423. 
 of poison by accused, 319. 
 
 POSSESSION OF COUNTERFEIT NOTES, 
 
 guilty knowledge may be inferred from, 43Z 
 
 accused may explain, 433. 
 
 must be exclusive and personal, 433. 
 
 POSSESSION OF STOLEN GOODS, 
 may always be proved, 299. 
 inferences from, 299. 
 must be recent in time, 300. 
 
 weight of, as evidence as affected by intervening time, 300. 
 as affected by portable character of money or goods stolen, 300. 
 must be personal and exclusive, 300. 
 not sufficient if constructive only, 301. 
 accused has burden of explaining, 301. 
 presumption in case of failure to explain, 302. 
 when explanation will be accepted as satisfactory, 302. 
 declarations accompanj'ing, may be proved as a part of res gestcc, 302. 
 revealed by an inadmissible confession, 306. 
 as supplying motive for homicide, 324. 
 presumption from in burglary, 378. 
 
 in burglary, must be recent, personal, and unexplained, 378. 
 in robbery, 358. 
 
 POSTPONEMENT, 
 
 Sec Continuance.
 
 924 INDEX. 
 
 [References ore to Sections.] 
 POVERTY, 
 
 of accused, relevancy of, 304, 323, 358, 431, 443. 
 
 PRECAUTION, 
 
 to prevent fire, relevancy of, 369. 
 
 PREGXANXY, 
 
 in abortion, defendant's knowledge of, need not be proved, 349. 
 knowledge of, to prove intent, 349. 
 
 PREJUDICE, 
 
 against circumstantial evidence may disqualify juror, 5. 
 instruction as to, 248. 
 of suspected witness, 248. 
 
 PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION, 
 
 best evidence of proceedings at, 40, 41. 
 
 evidence taken at, how proved, 129. 
 
 testimony of witness at, admissible at subsequent trial, 260. 
 
 testimony of accused at, 132. 
 
 extradition proceedings in nature of, 496. 
 
 evidence of in bastardy, 534. 
 
 accused should be cautioned, 132. 
 
 PREMEDITATION, 
 
 evidence of intoxication to show absence of, 166. 
 evidence of hostility to show, 333. 
 proof of, not necessary in mayhem, 359. 
 
 PREMISES, 
 
 taking the view of, 230, 231. 
 
 condition of, where burglary committed, 372. 
 
 PREPARATION, 
 
 for crime, declarations made in, when received, 99. 
 
 to commit arson, 370. 
 
 to commit burglary, 371. 
 
 for marriage, may be shown in seduction, 388. 
 
 PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE, 
 
 not sufficient for conviction in criminal trial, 8. 
 
 PRESENCE OF ACCUSED, 
 
 while taking the view, 231. 
 
 during examination of witnesses, 232.
 
 INDEX. 925 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 PRESENCE OF ACCUSED— Co»f(««^£/. 
 
 during argument as to competency, 232. 
 
 record must show, 232. 
 
 ma\- be dispensed with while stenographer reads minutes of testimony, 
 
 233- 
 near scene of burglary, ^77' 
 
 PRESENCE OF WITNESSES, 
 
 See Attendance of Witnesses and Separation of Witnesses. 
 
 PRESS COPY, 
 
 when admissible, 38. 
 
 PRESUMPTION, 
 
 of good character, 76. 
 
 of incapacity to commit crime because of infancy, 20. 
 
 as to accuracy of photograph, 51. 
 
 of voluntary character of confession, 127, 138. 
 
 of continuance of insanity, 156. 
 
 of sanit}^, 154. 
 
 of sanity, when equivalent to proof, 157. 
 
 from possession of stolen goods, 299, 378. 
 
 of malice in homicide, 320. 
 
 of chastity of female abducted, 341. 
 
 of death from unexplained absence, 399. 
 
 of continuance of marriage, 383. 
 
 of continuance, 19, 392. 
 
 of valid marriage, 403. 
 
 of incapacity to commit rape, 407. 
 
 of forgery from possession of forged writings, 423. 
 
 of jurisdiction, 463. 
 
 that owner knows what house is used for, 476. 
 
 of validity of warrant, 465. 
 
 PRESUMPTION OF CHASTITY OF FEMALE, 
 in seduction, 19. 
 when opposed by presumption of innocence, 19. 
 
 PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, 
 always applicable, 17. 
 
 can only be overcome by evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, 17. 
 accompanies accused until verdict, 18. 
 when conflicting with other presumptions, 19. 
 distinguished from burden of proof, 22. , 
 
 in conflict with presumption of chastity, 393.
 
 926 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 FRESUMPTIOX OF LEGITIMACY, 
 when conclusive, 526. 
 rebuttable by proving non-access, 527, 528. 
 
 PRESUMPTIOX OF LIFE, 
 when existing, 19. 
 when conflicting with presumption of innocence, 19. 
 
 PREVIOUS IMPRISONMENT OF WITNESS, 246. 
 
 PRIEST, 
 
 how sending for may indicate sense of approaching death, 104. 
 
 privileged communications to, 178. 
 
 See Clergyman, 
 PRIMA FACIE CASE, 
 
 when state must make out, 22-24. 
 
 PRIMARY EVIDENCE, 
 defined, 38. 
 of age, 38. 
 of handwriting, 39. 
 
 of indictment pending or acquittal, 40. 
 
 of proceedings at coroner's inquest or preliminary examination, 41. 
 statutes regulating, 41. 
 loss of original must be shown, 41a. 
 when papers cannot be found, 43. 
 of warrant, 43. 
 of indictment, 43. 
 of ofifense named in warrant, 43. 
 of instrument acknowledged, 43. 
 notice to produce, 42. 
 of forged writmg, 43. 
 
 of writings whose existence or contents are in issue, 43, 425. 
 of contradictory writings and writings which cannot be found, 43, 425. 
 of collateral facts, 44. 
 of lease, 44. 
 
 of conviction of crime, 44. 
 of prior arrest, 44. 
 of sending telegram or letter, 44. 
 of the existence of the marriage relation, 44, 383. 
 of writings customarily destroyed, 44. 
 
 of the general result of examination of books and papers, 45- 
 of insolvency, 45. 
 of balance due, 45. 
 of result of examination of public record, 45.
 
 INDEX. 927 
 
 [References are to Sectiojis.] 
 
 PRIMARY EVIDENCE— Continued. 
 of records, 46. 
 by certified copies, 46. 
 of official appointment, 46. 
 of physical condition of personal property, 47. 
 of identity, 47. 
 
 of inscriptions on bulky articles, 49. 
 of labels, tags, etc., 48. 
 photographs as, 48-50. 
 drawings and sketches as, 52. 
 of identity of persons and property, 53-55. 
 certified copies as, 43. 
 of age, 39. 
 of ownership, 44. 
 of lease, 44. 
 of imprisonment, 44. 
 of public appointments and records, 46. 
 of blood stains on clothing, 47. 
 of character of intoxicating liquors, 47. 
 of identity of personal property, 47. 
 of signboards, monuments, boundaries, etc., 51. 
 of dying declarations, 112-114. 
 
 of judicial determination that witness is a lunatic, 203. 
 of pardon of witness, 207. 
 
 of former trial under plea of former jeopardy, 195. 
 of marriage ceremony, 402. 
 of marriage, 383. 
 of corporate existence, 428. 
 of ownership of stolen goods, 294. 
 
 PRIOR CONVICTION, 
 
 of accused, when may be shown, 59. 
 
 evidence of, excluded by new trial, 6r. 
 
 issue and mode of proof in case of habitual criminality, 512. 
 
 PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS, 
 may be proven, 238. 
 
 PRISONER, 
 
 See Accused. 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS, 
 
 protected on cross-examination of accused, 62. 
 
 confessions contained in, 135. 
 
 the doctrines of, generally considered, i6q.
 
 928 _^ INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sectio7ts.] 
 
 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS— Continued. 
 between executive ofificials, 170. 
 between attorney and client, 172, 178. 
 between priest and penitent, 178. 
 between physician and patient, 178, 179. 
 as regards telegrams, 182. 
 between husband and wife, 184-189. 
 as relating to the evidence of judicial officers, 190. 
 grand jurors, 191, 192. 
 traverse jurors, 193. 
 before grand jury, 26. 
 between witness and attorney, 172. 
 where hearer is not professional person, 173. 
 
 PROBABLE CAUSE, 
 of fire, 370. 
 
 PROCESS, 
 
 to procure attendance of witness, 250. 
 
 PRODUCTION OF WRITINGS, 
 by subpoena duces tecum, 251. 
 necessar}^ in trial for forgery, 425. 
 
 PROMISE OF MARRIAGE, 
 
 must be proved in seduction, 387. 
 may be inferred from circumstances, 387. 
 need not be in express language, 21^7. 
 prior conduct of the parties to show, 388. 
 subsequent conduct of the parties to show, 388. 
 prosecutrix in seduction may testify to, 389. 
 corroboration as regards, 389. 
 in bastardy proceedings, 528. 
 
 PROOF OF HANDWRITING, 
 
 by subscribing witnesses, 39. 
 
 See Burden of Proof. 
 
 PROPERTY, 
 
 intent to convert, in embezzlement, 2^:2, 283. 
 declarations of accused explaining possession of, 300-302. 
 
 PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, 
 
 must not refer to failure of accused to testify, 67. 
 confessions to, 129, 133.
 
 INDEX. 929 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 PROSECUTION, 
 
 must sustain the burden of proof, 23. 
 
 PROSECUTRIX, 
 
 her examination, credibility and corroboration in seduction, 389. 
 
 PROSTITUTION, 
 
 of female witness may be shown to impeach, 245. 
 abduction for purpose of, 343. 
 evidence to show use of house for, 482. 
 
 PROVINCE OF JUDGE AND JURY, 273-280. 
 
 PUBLICATION, 
 in libel, 362. 
 
 PUBLICITY, 
 
 as an element of gambling, 473. 
 
 PUBLIC OFFICERS, 
 
 best evidence of appointment of, 46. 
 
 PUBLIC PLACE, 
 
 what constitutes, 473. 
 
 PUBLIC RECORDS, 
 
 primary evidence of, 46. 
 
 primary evidence of fact not found in, 46. 
 
 as evidence against the accused charged with embezzlement, 291. 
 
 as proof in extradition, 500. 
 
 PUBLIC STREETS AND SQUARES, 
 judicial notice of, 21, 36. 
 
 PUNISHMENT, 
 
 increasing because of repetition of crime, 506-514. 
 
 PURCHASE, 
 
 of weapon by accused, 336. 
 
 PURPOSE, 
 
 of forged writing may be shown by oral evidence, 430. 
 
 59^Unuerhili, Ckim. Ev.
 
 930 INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to S':ciio)is.] 
 
 Q 
 QUESTION, 
 
 confession made in answer to, 140. 
 
 R 
 
 RACE, 
 
 evidence of, from inspection, 53. 
 
 RAPE, 
 
 defined, 407, 
 
 presumption of non-consent in case of infants, 407. 
 
 committed by infants, 408. 
 
 evidence to rebut the presumption against capacity to commit, 408. 
 
 evidence of complaint by victim, 409. 
 
 details of complaint in, may be proved to impeach or corroborate, 409- 
 
 410. 
 delay in making complaint, 411. 
 testimony of physician, 412. 
 
 evidence of the physical condition of prosecutrix, 413. 
 competency and credibility of prosecutrix as a v^^itness, 414. 
 infancy of prosecutrix, 414. 
 evidence to show relations of the parties, 415. 
 direct and circumstantial evidence to prove penetration, 416. 
 force or fraud must be shown, 417. 
 failure of female to make outcry, 417. 
 reputation of prosecutrix in, for chastity, 418. 
 
 READING INDICTMENT, 
 effect of, 30. 
 
 REAL EVIDENCE, 
 
 to show identity of personal property, 46. 
 defined, 53. 
 
 REASONABLE DOUBT, 
 
 guilt must be proved beyond, 6. 
 
 difficulty of defining, lo-ii, 12. 
 
 not applicable in civil cases, 8. 
 
 distinction as regards weight of evidence, 8. 
 
 doctrine of, not applicable in civil cases, 8, 9. 
 
 distinguished from demonstration, 11. 
 
 equivalent to "moral certainty," 11. 
 
 attempted definitions, 12. 
 
 precautions to be employed in defining, 13.
 
 INDEX. 931 
 
 [Rcfcrcuccs arc to Sections.] 
 
 REASOXABLE DOUBT— Co«/n;»r(/. 
 
 doctrine of, applicable to misdemeanors, 14. 
 
 conviction beyond, of every material fact not required, 14. 
 
 when entertained by one juror, 15. 
 
 evidence of good character not confined to cases of, 80. 
 
 evidence of good character may create, 80. 
 
 doctrine of not invoked in bastardy, 524. 
 
 alibi need not be proved beyond, 151. 
 
 insanity not required to be proved beyond, 158. 
 
 not applicable, in extradition, 496. 
 
 REASOXABLE HYPOTHESIS, 
 
 must be excluded when verdict of guilty is based on circumstantial evi- 
 dence, 6, 7. 
 
 RECALLIXG WITXESS, 
 
 discretion of court to permit, 224. 
 wholly in discretion of court, 224. 
 after re-direct and re-cross-examination, 224. 
 
 RECEIPT, 
 
 as evidence against accused when charged with embezzlement, 291. 
 
 RECEIVER, 
 
 is not accomplice of thief, 69. 
 
 RECEIVIXG EVIDEXCE OUT OF COURT, 
 generally improper, 228. 
 experiments of jurors, 228. 
 
 from private view of premises or scene of crime, 228. 230. 
 from witnesses not sworn and from writings not in evidence, 228. 
 from criminating articles in jury room, 228. 
 
 RECOGXIZAXCE, 
 
 to secure the attendance of witness, 254. 
 
 RECORD, 
 
 photographs of, received, 50. 
 
 evidence from, to identify the accused, 55. 
 
 copy of, to prove conviction, 195. 
 
 received to prove former jeopardy, 195. 
 
 as conclusive evidence of direct contempt, 458. 
 
 proof of, in interstate cxtra<!ition, 499, 501. 
 
 admissible to prove perjury, 470. 
 
 See PuilLIC KlXORDS.
 
 932 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 RECORDED DEED, 
 
 to prove ownership, 23^. 
 
 RECOVERY, 
 
 when hope of excludes dying declaration, 103-105. 
 
 RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION, 
 must not be suggestive, 223. 
 
 irrelevant evidence received on cross-examination, its effect on, 223. 
 explaining contradictory statements and motives on, 223. 
 new matter, not touched on in cross-examining, cannot be brought in, 
 223. 
 
 REFERENCE TO THIRD PERSON FOR INFORMATION, 442-445- 
 
 REFRESHING MEMORY, 
 
 when witness is forgetful, 217. 
 what writings may be used, 217. 
 writing used is not usually competent, 217. 
 opposite party may inspect writing, 217. 
 to recall details, 218. 
 
 REFRESHMENTS, 
 as a wager, 417. 
 
 REFUSAL, 
 
 proof of, in embezzlement, 284. 
 
 REFUSAL TO TESTIFY, 
 
 when a contempt of court, 226. 
 how and by whom punishable, 226. 
 before justice of the peace, 226. 
 
 RELATIONSHIP, 
 
 as impeachment, 248. 
 
 RELIGIOUS BELIEF, 
 
 as sanction for dying declarations, 102. 
 witness may be interrogated as to his, 201. 
 statutes regulating the subject, 201. 
 
 REMARKS OF COURT, 
 
 if made during examination of witness may furnish grounds for new 
 trial, 214.
 
 INDEX. 933 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 REMOTENESS, 
 
 of evidence to character, 83. 
 
 of possession of stolen property, 299. 
 
 of autopsy from death. 313. 
 
 of proof of insanity, 160. 
 
 REPETITIOX OF CRIME, 
 
 statute to prevent, 506-514. 
 
 REPLIES, 
 
 of witness must be responsive, 216. 
 
 REFUTATION, 
 
 not admissible to prove insanity, 159. 
 
 evidence of, when bad, to impeach witness, 236, 237. 
 
 must come from acquaintances of the witness, 236. 
 
 must not be too remote, 236. 
 
 must be local, 235. 
 
 to sustain witness who has been impeached, 243. 
 
 for peace and quietness, of accused, 324, 325. 
 
 of accused, 327. 
 
 as evidence of marriage, 403. 
 
 of prosecuting witness in bastardy, 531. 
 
 of prosecutrix in rape, for chastity, 418. 
 
 of house as gambling house, 475. 
 
 of person as common gambler, 475. 
 
 of house of ill fame, 482. 
 
 See Character of Accused. 
 
 REQUISITION PAPERS, 
 
 form and character of, in interstate extradition, 499. 
 
 RES GEST^, 
 
 definition and scope and limit of facts forming part of, 93. 
 
 illustrated in circumstantial evidence in homicide. 93. 
 
 instinctive declarations and utterances included under, 93. 
 
 declarations must approximate in time, place and motive, 94. 
 
 circumstances which may exclude declarations, 94. 
 
 declarations received to show malice and premeditation, 94. 
 
 declarations must illustrate main transaction, 95. 
 
 declarations must be contemporaneous with main transaction, 96. 
 
 length of period intervening, 97. 
 
 narrative declarations not incUulcd under, 96. 
 
 interval for consideration, 97. 
 
 spontaneous character of declarations rctiuired, 97.
 
 934 ixDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 RES GEST^^ — Continued. 
 
 declarations in homicide, 97. 
 
 mental condition of declarant, 98. 
 
 admissibility for the accused, 99. 
 
 whole declaration must be received, 100. 
 
 declarations accompanying acts of preparation, 100. 
 
 declaration must refer to some relevant act, 100. 
 
 utterances of by-standers and third persons, lOi. 
 
 declarations which are part of, distinguished from dying declarations, 
 
 106-107. 
 of homicide, dying declarations must refer to, 109. 
 declarations forming part of possession of stolen property, 302. 
 declarations a part of the, admissibility in abortion, 348. 
 declarations a part of, in arson, 368. 
 
 complaint of prosecutrix in rape when a part of, 339, 409. 
 declarations of, in poisoning, 319a. 
 in homicide after the crime, 330a. 
 in robbery, 358. 
 motive of accused, 447. 
 
 See Declarations of By-Staxders. 
 
 RESIDEXXE, 
 
 . inquiries at, to ascertain existence of fictitious person, 426, 427. 
 proof of, in extradition, 497. 
 
 RESISTANCE, 
 
 to arrest, showing consciousness of guilt, 120. 
 
 degree of, required in rape, 412. 
 
 evidence of physical condition of parties to show, 413. 
 
 RESISTING OFFICER, 
 
 See Obstructing Justice. 
 
 RESOLUTIONS, 
 
 primary evidence of, 50. 
 
 RESPONSIVENESS, 
 
 of answers on the direct examination, 216. 
 
 RESWEARING WITNESS, 
 when necessary, 199. 
 
 RETAINER, 
 
 payment of not required to render communication passing between at- 
 torney and client privileged, 173.
 
 ixDEx. 935 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 RETURN, 
 
 of property in larcen}*, 282. 
 
 of official may be contradicted by parol, 401, 463. 
 
 of fugitive to state, 495. 
 
 REVEXGE, 
 
 as furnishing motive for homicide, 323. 
 
 REVOLVER, 
 
 condition and use of, when relevant, 315. 
 
 REWARD, 
 
 for accused, 118. 
 
 RIGHT AND WRONG, 
 
 capacity to know, 154. 
 
 RIOT, 
 
 defined, 489. 
 
 declarations forming a part of res gestcr, 489. 
 
 ROBBERY, 
 
 distinguished from larceny, 291a, 358. 
 evidence of other crimes, 358. 
 good faith of the accused, 358. 
 
 ROGUE'S GALLERY, 
 
 admissibility of photographs taken from, 50. 
 
 RUMORS, 
 
 derogatory to good character, 81. 
 accused need not deny, 124. 
 
 s 
 
 SANITY, 
 
 presumption of, 156, 157. 
 burden of proof to show, 157. 
 
 SEARCH, 
 
 for lost w-iting, 41a. 
 
 evidence obtained by, 58a. 
 
 when illeRal, docs not exclude evidence, 58a. 
 
 of officer for accused, 118. 
 
 of accused revealing burglar's tools, 375.
 
 93^ INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.'] 
 
 SEARCH WARRANT, 
 
 papers seized under, are not competent, 58. 
 to obtain knowledge of letter, 479. 
 
 SECONDARY EVIDENCE, 
 
 See Primary Evidence. 
 
 SECRECY OF TELEGRAMS, 
 
 dispatches are not privileged, 182. 
 subpoena to produce, 182. 
 
 SECRET BALLOT, 
 
 proving that it was cast, 455. 
 
 SEDUCTION, 
 
 defined, 385. 
 
 circumstantial evidence to prove sexual intercourse, 386. 
 
 proving the promise in, 387. 
 
 promise need not be express, 387. 
 
 evidence of prior attention, and declarations of accused, 
 
 reputation as engaged, 388. 
 
 credibility and corroboration of prosecutrix, 389. 
 
 what facts must be corroborated, 390. 
 
 corroboration of prosecutrix by circumstances, 390. 
 
 question of consent for jury, 390. 
 
 marriage of accused to prosecutrix as defense, 391. 
 
 evidence to show chastity of female, 392. 
 
 relevancy of prior conduct to show chastity, 392. 
 
 presumption of chastity of female in, 393. 
 
 of female ward or servant, 494. 
 
 SELF-CONTROL, 
 
 See Insanity. 
 SELF-DEFENSE, 
 
 reputation of deceased, when relevant under, 324, 325. 
 
 evidence of threats by deceased, 326. 
 
 proof of, in homicide and maj^hem, 326. 
 
 deceased carrying weapons, 325. 
 
 SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS, 
 
 explanatory of possession of stolen goods, 301, 302. 
 not admissible, 99, 119a. 
 distinguished from res gestce, 99.
 
 INDEX. 937 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 SEPARATION OF WITXESSES, 
 
 under what circumstances ordered, 225. 
 
 discretion of court to exclude testimony of witness refusing to go out, 
 225. 
 SEX, 
 
 opinion of, based on examination of skeleton, 312. 
 
 SEXUAL CRIMES, 3S0-406. 
 
 SEXUAL INTERCOURSE, 
 
 evidence to prove, 381, 386, 396. 
 
 by prosecutrix in rape with men other than accused, 415. 
 
 SEXUAL RELATIONS, 
 
 evidence of, in rape, 414. 
 evidence of, in abduction, 343. 
 as furnishing motive for crime, 323. 
 evidence of in bastardy, 528. 
 
 SHOES, 
 
 comparison of tracks with those of accused, 374. 
 
 SIGNATURE, 
 
 when required to written confession, 133. 
 
 SIGNBOARDS. 
 
 primary evidence of contents, 50. 
 
 SIGNS, 
 
 dying declarations by, 113. 
 
 confessions by, 141. 
 
 testimony of deaf mutes by, 204. 
 
 SILENCE, 
 
 of female raped, 409, 417. 
 
 as impeachment of witness, 242. 
 
 witness must be permitted to explain, 242. 
 
 SILENCE UNDER CHARGE OF CRIME, 
 when indicating guilt, 67, 122. 
 accused must have heard charge, 122. 
 when occurring in judicial proceedings, 122. 
 weight of, as evidence, 122. 
 circumstances of, may be shown, 123. 
 at coroner's inquest, etc., 123.
 
 938 INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 SILENCE UNDER CHARGE OF CRIME— Conthmcd. 
 motives of, may always be explained, 123. 
 when under arrest, 123. 
 assertion or question may be proved, 124. 
 mode of proving accused heard the charge, 124. 
 of accused, not evidence, where accusation was not relevant, 124. 
 
 SKETCHES, 
 
 See Paintings. 
 
 SOCIAL COXXECTIOXS, 
 
 of witness, when relevant, 247. 
 
 SODOMY, 
 
 essential facts and accomplice evidence, 360. 
 
 SPECIAL VERDICT, 
 
 jury may render, 274. 
 
 SPECIES, 
 
 variance in, 34, 310. 
 
 SPECIFIC FACTS, 
 
 cross-examination upon, of witness to character, 82. 
 
 SPECIFIC TRAITS, 
 
 of character, evidence to prove, 77. 
 
 SPELLING, 
 
 effect of mistake in, 33. 
 
 SPONTANEOUS CHARACTER, 
 of res gcstcE, 96, 97. 
 of confessions, 140. 
 
 STAINS, 
 
 of blood, evidence to show, 47. 
 
 STATES, 
 
 extradition among, 46, 498. 
 
 STANDARDS OF COMPARISON, 
 
 See Handwriting; Comparison. 
 
 STATE'S EVIDENCE, 
 
 See Accomplices.
 
 INDEX. 939 
 
 [Refcroiccs arc to Sections.] 
 STATUTES, 
 
 judicial notice of, 505. 
 
 STENOGRAPHER, 
 
 may read contradictory statement, 240. 
 testimony read by, in perjury, 470. 
 
 STENOGRAPHER'S NOTES, 
 
 received to prove testimony of deceased or absent witness, 267. 
 may also be used to refresh memory, 267. 
 
 STOLEN PROPERTY, 
 
 may be put in evidence, 47. 
 
 identification of, 47. 
 
 carrying away of, 293. 
 
 ownership of, 294. 
 
 non-consent of owner to carrying away, 295. 
 
 identification of, 296. 
 
 production in evidence not indispensable, 296. 
 
 value of, 298. 
 
 presumption from possession of, 299-301, 378. 
 
 finding of, through inadmissible confession may be proved, 138, 306. 
 
 STREETS AND SQUARES, 
 judicial notice of, 21, 38. 
 
 SUBORNING WITNESS, 
 
 evidence to show attempt at, 120, 121. 
 
 SUBPOENA, 
 
 definition of, 249. 
 
 to procure papers and documents, 251. 
 
 time and mode of service, 251. 
 
 right of accused to, 250. 
 
 may be granted accused in extradition, 495. 
 
 SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM, 
 to produce telegrams, 182. 
 when granted, 251. 
 
 must describe papers with certainty, 251. 
 production of articles of personal property not obtained by means of, 
 
 251. 
 excuse for disobedience to, 252.
 
 940 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 
 SUBSCRIBING WITNESS, 
 
 proof by, necessity for calling, 39. 
 
 may be impeached, 235. 
 
 may testify to forgery of his name, 420. 
 
 SUBSTANCE OF CRIME, 
 
 must be proved as laid in indictment, 31. 
 
 SUFFERING, 
 
 declarations of, in poisoning, 319a. 
 admissibility of declarations of, 348. 
 
 SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE, 
 to sustain indictment, 28. 
 
 SUICIDE, 
 
 no presumption against, 19. 
 
 possession of poison as indicating, 319a. 
 
 declarations of intention to commit, 319a. 
 
 SUMMARY CONVICTION, 
 of contempt, 459. 
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEEDINGS, 
 admissions made in, 443. 
 
 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE, 
 
 absence of witness procured by connivance, 264. 
 indicating guilt, 115, 121. 
 
 SURGEON, 
 
 sending for, may indicate sense of approaching death, 103. 
 
 SURPLUSAGE, 
 
 in indictment defined, 31. 
 when may be omitted, 31. 
 
 SURPRISE, 
 
 party may show, caused by unexpected hostility of his own witness. 235. 
 of accused, when arrested, 119. 
 
 SURVEYOR, 
 
 may testify orally as to boundaries, 50.
 
 INDEX. 941 
 
 [Refcroiccs arc to Sections.] 
 SUSPECT, 
 
 evidence'of, before coroner, 132. 
 
 SUSPICIOUS CIRCUMSTAXXES, 
 relevancj- of, 115. 
 
 SYMPTOMS, 
 
 statements of admissible in abortion, 348. 
 
 T 
 TAKING CASE FROM JURY, 
 
 duty of court to direct acquittal, 279. 
 court can not direct conviction, 279. 
 
 TAKING THE VIEW, 
 
 power to order discretionary, 229. 
 
 consent of parties must be had, 229. 
 
 when consent may be dispensed with, 229. 
 
 knowledge thus acquired by the jury is not evidence, 230. 
 
 right of the accused to be present at, 231. 
 
 after summing up, 231. 
 
 oral evidence inadmissible while taking, 231. 
 
 presence of presiding judge requisite at, 232. 
 
 of premises broken into, 373. 
 
 TAMPERING, 
 
 with witness, effect of, 121. 
 
 TANGIBLE EVIDENCE, 
 
 physical condition of personal property, 47. 
 
 TEETH, 
 
 identification of deceased by means of, 312, 316. 
 
 TELEGRAM, 
 
 primary evidence of, 44. 
 
 when may be proved by type-written copy, 44. 
 
 privileged character of, 182. 
 
 TELEPHONE. 
 
 conversation over, 56. 
 
 TERMS OF COURT. 
 
 when judicially noticed, 21. 
 
 TESTIMONY ON PRIOR OCCASIONS, 260-272.
 
 942 IXDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Scctious.] 
 THIRD PERSONS, 
 
 confessions of, in exoneration of accused, 145. 
 declarations of, loi. 
 
 THREATS, 
 
 against accused, when producing flight, 119. 
 
 against witnesses, 120. 
 
 confessions made under influence of, 128, 139. 
 
 evidence to show meaning of, 166. 
 
 evidence of, by the deceased, in homicide, 326. 
 
 if not communicated to accused, 326. 
 
 evidence of, by the accused, to show premeditation, 328. 
 
 by co-defendant in presence of accused. 328. 
 
 not inadmissible though general in character, 328. 
 
 remoteness of as regulating their weight, 328. 
 
 language of, need not be specific, 328. 
 
 competency of witness, 329. 
 
 evidence of, made against deceased by third persons, 332. 
 
 relevancy of, to prove intent to assault, 357, 358. 
 
 against owner of house burned, 368. 
 
 proof of, in assault, 354. 
 
 though indefinite, may be proved, 328. 
 
 remoteness of, 329. 
 
 may be proved to explain delay in making complaint, 411. 
 
 employment of, in rape, 417. 
 
 against officer, evidence to show intent in assaulting, 447. 
 
 TIME. 
 
 allegation and proof of variance, 32. 
 as element of res gesfcc, 96. 
 evidence of, to show alibi, 149. 
 
 TOOLS, 
 
 possession of, used by burglars, 375. 
 possession of, for counterfeiting, 433. 
 for gambling as evidence, 477. 
 
 TRAITS OF CHARACTER, 
 evidence to prove, 76-86. 
 
 TRAMP, 
 
 cross-examining witness to show he is a, 60. 
 
 TRAVELERS, 
 
 may carry concealed weapon, 486.
 
 INDEX. 943 
 
 [Rcfornccs arc to Sections.] 
 
 TRAVERSE JURORS. 
 
 when testimony of is admissible, 193. 
 
 TREASON, 
 
 confessions of, 142. 
 
 TREATIES. 
 
 judicial notice of, 504. 
 providing for extradition, 495. 
 
 TREES, 
 
 malicious destruction of, 307. 
 
 TRESPASS. 
 
 by animals, evidence to show, 310. 
 in larceny, 282. 
 
 TRICK, 
 
 confession procured by, 135. 
 sexual intercourse obtained bj', 410. 
 
 TRUTH, 
 
 confession under an exhortation to tell, 130. 
 
 in libel, 362. 
 
 mode of proof in libel, 365. 
 
 relevancy of evidence to prove, 365. 
 
 U 
 
 UNXHASTITY, 
 
 evidence of, in adulterj', 381. 
 
 See, also, Chastity. 
 as impeachment of witness, 396. 
 
 UXCOMMUXICATED THREATS, 
 their inadmissibility, 326. 
 
 UN'COXTROLLARLE niPULSE, 
 
 when amounting to insanity, 155. 
 
 UNTRUTHFULNESS, 
 
 evidence of reputation for, 236. 
 
 UNWILLING WITNESS. 
 
 may be plied with leading questions, 213.
 
 944 INDEX. 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 L'SAGE, 
 
 to ask illegal fees, not relevant, 457. 
 
 UTTERING FORGED PAPER, 
 
 sufficiency of evidence, 424. 
 declarations accompanying, 424. 
 possession as evidence of, 423. 
 venue of forgery from, 426. 
 
 V 
 
 VAGRANXY, 
 
 cross-examination of witness to show, 60. 
 
 VALIDITY, 
 
 of warrant presumed, 447. 
 
 of marriage, presumption and burden of proof, 398. 
 
 VALUE, 
 
 need not be proved by direct evidence, 298. 
 
 of goods obtainec by false pretenses, embezzlement or extortion, 309, 
 
 457- 
 of stolen property, proof of, 298. 
 of money stolen, judicial notice of, 298. 
 presumptions as to, 298. 
 of article wagered, 473. 
 
 VARIANXE, 
 
 when material, 31. 
 
 in matter of substantial description, 31. 
 
 in proving identity of defense, 31. 
 
 in larceny of animal, 32. 
 
 in allegation of time and place, 32. 
 
 in allegation of person, 32, 33. 
 
 in spelling, idem so)iaus, 33. 
 
 in species or genus of animal stolen, 34. 
 
 in proving the venue, 35. 
 
 in proving ownership of stolen goods, 294, 309, 373. 
 
 in mode of killing, 314. 
 
 in proving name in homicide, 318. 
 
 in proving building burned, 367. 
 
 in proving forged writing, 421. 
 
 in proving official character, 452. 
 
 in proof of adulteration, 480. 
 
 VENEREAL DISEASE, 
 
 relevance of, in rape, 413.
 
 INDEX. 945 
 
 [References are to Sections.] 
 VENUE, 
 
 may be proved by circumstantial evidence, ^6, 298. 
 
 need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, 36. 
 
 may be inferred from evidence of accused, 36. 
 
 burden to prove on state, 36, 298. 
 
 must be proved precisely as laid, 36, 298. 
 
 proof of county sufficient, 36. 
 
 change of, for convenience of witnesses, 256. 
 
 in bigamy, 405. 
 
 proof of in forgerj', $7, 426. 
 
 of false pretenses, 445. 
 
 court will notice judicially its limits, 21. 
 
 evidence of on part of defense supplies omission by prosecution, 35. 
 
 VERACITY, 
 
 bad character of accused for may be shown. 65, /S. 
 evidence of bad reputation for, to impeach witness, 236. 
 
 VERDICT, 
 
 essentials of, on plea of former jeopardy, 196. 
 
 VERDICT OF GUILTY, 
 
 when may be rendered on circumstantial evidence, 6. 
 
 VERTEBRA, 
 
 exhibition of, to jury to explain evidence, 48. 
 
 VICTIM, 
 
 declarations of, in homicide, 98. 
 
 See Complaint of Victim in Rape. 
 VIEW, 
 
 Sec Taking the View. 
 VOICE. 
 
 identification by, 56. 
 
 accused cannot put his own in evidence, 57. 
 
 VOLU.VTARIXESS. 
 
 must be shown before admittinR confession, 126. 
 
 preliminary question of, to be tried by court, 126-131. 
 
 presence of jury durinR argument on, 127. 
 
 cross-examination as to, 127. 
 
 right of jury to determine, 127. 
 
 not necessary in ca.sc of admissions, 137. 
 
 6c>— Underhill Cbim. Ev.
 
 94^ INDEX. 
 
 [References arc to Sections.] 
 
 W 
 WAGER, 
 
 making of, must be proved, 473. 
 circumstantial evidence of, 473, 
 value of thing involved, 473. 
 
 WAGES, 
 
 of accused, relevant in larceny, 304. 
 
 WAGON TRACKS, 
 
 evidence to show, in larceny, 303. 
 
 WAIVER, 
 
 of right to cross-examine, 220. 
 
 as to privileged communications, 64, 159, 177. 
 
 must be express, 64. 
 
 WANTONNESS, 
 
 when malicious intent may be inferred from, 308. 
 
 WARNING ACCUSED, 
 
 confession made without, 127-130. 
 
 WARRANT, 
 
 when contents of may be shown by parol, 41. 
 validity of, may be inquired into, 447, 465. 
 as proof in extradition, 499. 
 
 WEAPON, 
 
 variance in proof of, in homicide, 314. 
 
 purchase, use and possession of, by accused, 314. 
 
 admissibility of and experiments with in evidence, 48, 314. 
 
 inference of intent to do bodily harm from use and character of, 354. 
 
 what is deadly, 356. 
 
 experiments with, 233. 
 
 finding near place of crime, 314. 
 
 possession of, by accused in homicide, 336. 
 
 WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, 
 before grand jury, 25-27. 
 
 rules in civil and criminal cases distinguished, 7-9. 
 to be determined exclusively by jury, 215. 
 Judge may not comment upon, 215. 
 in extradition, 498.
 
 INDEX. 947 
 
 [References are to Sectio]ts.] 
 WHISKEY, 
 
 judicial notice of its nature, 21. 
 
 WIFE, 
 
 evidence of quarrels with, SS3- 
 
 dying declaration of, competent against husband, 185. 
 
 confession of, competent against husband, 185. 
 
 WITHDRAWAL OF WITNESSES, 
 
 See Separatiox of Witnesses. 
 WITNESS, 
 
 character and mental capacity of, 3. 
 
 before the grand jury, 25-30. 
 
 primariness of, 39. 
 
 credibility of, in perjury, 468. 
 
 attendance in extradition procurable by subpoena, 495. 
 
 number required, i6a. 
 
 contempt by, before the grand jury, 29. 
 
 under suspicion of the crime, 248. 
 
 WOUNDS, 
 
 sense of approaching death may be inferred from nature of, 104, 
 witness may testify as to time and manner, 47. 
 relevancy of evidence of, to show locality and description, 312. 
 photographs received to show, 312. 
 
 WRITING, 
 
 invalidity of, when forged may be shown, 430. 
 
 variance in proof of, 429, 430. 
 
 must be produced in forgery, 425. 
 
 secondary evidence to prove, if lost, 425. 
 
 photographs to prove, 425. 
 
 when loss or destruction may be proved, 41a. 
 
 of accused to show motive, 323, 357. 
 
 WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS, 
 
 See Best Evidence; Primary Evidence. 
 
 whuW .Nuiiiii.T nf rair<'s, iii;{.
 
 LAW LIF.RARY
 
 AA 000 847 832 3