THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESENTED BY PROF. CHARLES A. KOFOID AND MRS. PRUDENCE W. KOFOID THE EVOLUTION HYPOTHESIS A CRITICISM OF THE NEW COSMIC PHILOSOPHY. J BY W. TODDIMAETIN, M.A, D.Lit., v MINISTER OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN IRELAND. EDINBURGH : JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE. 1^87. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/evolutionhypotheOOmartrich D 5/^ M 23 TABLE OF CONTENTS, CHAPTER I. Introductory. PAGE The Evolution Hypothesis has stamped its impress on thought of our time — Claims to dominate all experience — Here dealt with as formulating the entire cosmic move- ment — Examined as elaborated by Mr. Herbert Spencer — Tested at vital points — Term evolutionism defined — The question touches vitally the interests of men — Effect of the acceptance of the Hypothesis — Yearning after unity in the world and in our intellectual life — Evolution answers the craving for manifested continuity — Its acceptance due to its answering that craving rather than to evidence — The relations of Religion and Science not discussed — How best harmonized — The dominance of the new philosophy a peril to scientific progress — Would overbear intellectual freedom — The question not, What is truth ? but, Is evolutionism true % ... 1 CHAPTER II. The Complete Unification of Knowledge Impossible. Philosophy defined by Mr. Spencer as "completely unified knowledge" — Philosophy in that sense not possible — Its task to "unify all concrete phenomena" — Unity may be sought in God, or in unity of the object, or in the absolute self- revealing — Cannot be reached by way of the absolute — May be sought in manifested process of change — Problem stated — Facts to be unified — Lying in distinct 1^375301 iv Contents. which the entire course of change may be deductively demonstrated — Under that principle every known law must be subsumed — It must account for all the known phases of all known phenomena — Mr. Spencer finds such principle in ' ' the law of the continuous redistribution of matter and motion " — This dynamic principle universal — The problem in the solution of which alone philosophy comes into existence a problem in dynamics — No other principle available on the evolution doctrine — Mr. Spencer embraces thought, emotion, and conscience under it — He denies that his doctrine is materialistic— So far as the universe of material forces reaches, it is admitted that dynamic law is universal — But all kinds of knowledge cannot be included under it — It does not account for life or sentience or thought — But to all these Mr. Spencer applies this law — He takes exception to the application of the term " mechanical " to his hypothesis — It is dynamical —We are carried back to the Greek atomists, . . 65 CHAPTER VIII. The Persistence of Force. Section I. — Is t'h^ Persistence of Force a datum of conscious- ness ? Mr. Spencer claims for it the authority of a datum of consciousness — The content of consciousness stated — If Mr. Spencer's reasoning be sound all existence is eter- nal — He identifies being and persistence — The force whose persistence is attested by consciousness is, on Mr. Spencer's theory, the absolute force — But the force we know is that with which alone science is concerned — What we know does not persist ; what persists we can never know — Mr. Spencer falls back on an impotence of thought — This will not avail in founding a system of positive philosophy, . . . . .78 Section II. — What is included in the term Force? Force used in two senses — We know it as an object of sense — We use the term metaphorically of mental activities — Does the persisting force include Spirit? — Spirit must have existed either as matter, or as a separate mode of Contents, existence — If the latter, where during all the ages did it lie hidden? 87 Section III. — The Force persisting the Absolute Force. Mr. Spencer employs the word force to denote force as it is within the limits of definite knowledge, and force as it is for ever unknowable — Science requires the persistence of force within the reach of knowledge — The validity of the axiom requires that we should take the persisting force to be the absolute — Evolution is founded on the persist- ence of manifested force — But force as existing within the knowable does not persist — Force recedes into the unsearchable, . . . . . .89 Section IV. — Can ive predicate persistence in any Jcnowahle mode ? The predication of persistence in identity will not hold — The predication, Force continues to be force, yields no profitable result — Persistence may mean con- tinuance in equality of amount — This predication also fails us — We must reject the predication of persistence in identity, or in kind, or in quantity — Removing these modes we reach the bare thought of bei^ig — We are not far from Hegel's identification of pure Being and pure No-thing — The knowable universe will not rest firmly on such a basis, . . . . . .95 Section Y.— Corollaries of the persistence of jorce. 1. — The indestructibility of matter. — The persistence of force does not guarantee the persistence of matter — Two essential attributes of matter, resistance and occupation of space — No sufiicient ground for affirming that matter, whether viewed as resistant or space-occupying, persists. 2. — The continuity of motion. — Persistance of force gives no warrant for affirming the ceaseless continuity of motion. 3. — The persistance of relations among forces. — The rela- tions comprise space, time, quantity, quality, cause and effect — These relations do not all persist, else there could be no change — Mr. Spencer deals only with cause and effect — This relation examined as an instance of persist- ence — Final conclusion that the persistance of force has no validity as a universal truth — But Evolutionism is based on it, . . . . . . 103 vi Contents. CHAPTER IX. Postulates of Evolution. PAGE The Evolution Philosophy requires as its basis certain pos- tulates — 1. It presupposes, as its primal conception, the cosmos as a force homogeneous or nearly homogeneous — It is either finite or infinite — examined under either supposition — 2. The evolving force must be assumed equal in amount throughout all time — This impossible of proof — 3. The hypothesis postulates the inclusion of all change and of every event under the law of the con- tinuous redistribution of matter and motion — If mental phenomena cannot be included, this postulate is rejected — 4. The total of matter in the universe must be granted a fixed quantity — and also the total of motion — 5. It must further be granted that force as manifested in the cosmos includes in these manifestations all the causes of every change — This postulate examined, and found when enlarged so as to embrace all facts, to be worthless to the evolutionist — 6. There must be given a determinate ex- tent and relation of parts — This postulate examined and the assumptions involved in it set out — These postulates essential to the Evolution Hypothesis, . . . 112 CHAPTER X. The Formula of Evolution. The formula — Is it a law ? — The terms examined — In what sense " indefinite " ? — This concept only thinkable as the negation of definite thought — " Incoherent " yields no pre- cise conception — " Homogeneity " also vague — Summing all up, the total could hardly be surpassed in vagueness — Inconsistent with the conception of the imperceptible out of which the existing order rises — The '* definite, coherent heterogeneity," which is the evolved result does not yield a more exact conception — The words "integra- tion of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion," do not furnish an instrument of exact reasoning — This Contents. vii PAGE formula cannot be applied to individual objects or classes of things — In them the force does not persist, but is continually changed in amount — Every principle of cosmic evolution is in such cases violated — The formula when tested is found wanting, .... 133 CHAPTER XL Evolution as it gives Account of Inorganic Matter. Evolution should throw clearest light on inorganic matter — Here dynamic law is supreme — Mr. Spencer does not apply his doctrine in this field — This to be regretted— It could have been more easily tested by known physical law — The atomic theory adopted by Mr. Spencer — The one quality of the atom resistance — Is the atom a force- bearer, or is the force inherent in the atom ? — Mr. Spencer favours the former — Then we have, besides the atoms, operative forces moving them — How can the law of these forces be reached ? — The atoms are combined in molecules and these in systems — All future changes lay in these co-ordinate movements — These movements are not ex- plained — Of this world behind the visible evolution can tell us nothing — Yet the visible cannot be understood till it is known — It is a barren hypothesis — No instance of evolution in the whole range of dynamic operations — Differentiation the necessary form of all definite concepts — In pure physics evolutionism is silent in face of every fundamental question, ..... 145 CHAPTER XII. The Transition from Inorganic Matter to Life. Mr. Spencer repudiates "spontaneous generation" — His account of the transition to life — Instability of the inor- ganic compounds — Atoms aggregated into molecules — molecules into protein — Portions of inorganic matter displaying activities varying little by little into vital — Ceaseless adjustments between aggregates and their units viii Contents, PAOK differentiate organisms into kinds — This exposition a brilliant effort of scientific imagination — 1. The hypothesis assumes the evolution of molecules differentiated into kinds and reproduced in their kinds prior to the evolution of protoplasm — The two most difficult problems in organic life antecedent to the first beginning of life — 2. Mr. Spencer assumes, contrary to uniform experience, the existence of protoplasm prior to life — 3. He takes for granted that by minute variations molecular motion may become vital action — 4. To account for the varieties of kind he introduces the " physiological unit," . . 156 CHAPTER XIII. The Physiological Unit. The physiological unit is : 1. Extremely minute — 2. It is a highly organized body — 3. It is composed of system upon system of molecules — 4. These units differ in kinds — 5. They have a "more or less distinctive character" — The ' ' polarity " of the units — Immense variety of hereditary attributes stored up in each unit — 6. Individual charac- teristics of the unit— due to the incident forces — Adjust- ment of units as difficult to comprehend as adjustment of living bodies — 7. The units possess marvellous inherent powers — Proclivities, tendencies, power of arranging themselves — The environing forces the source of the power that effects re-arrangement, the polarity of the units determining the direction — This no addition to real knowledge — It carries us back to a defined, differentiated system — The physiological unit necessary to Mr. Spencer's hypothesis — It is a "special creation "of the evolution philosophy, ...... 168 CHAPTER XIV. The Origin of Sentient Life. Question discussed only in relation to lower animals — Take dog as an example — Facts to be explained : (a) his Contents, ix intelligence, (6) his sense of pleasure and pain, (c) his complex and highly developed organism — Putting aside question of intelligence, what account does evolution give of the organism and its sensibility ? — Is the sense of pain seeming only or real ? — Where lies the source of the feel- ing ? — Suppose the universe composed of atoms and their motions; how does feeling arise? — Either the capacity for, feeling is a property resident in atoms, or something ■exists other than matter — In the former case the atoms are monads, possessing properties other than dynamic ; in the latter, we affirm the existence of concrete being other than the forces manifested in atoms and their motions — A supra-dynamical element is introduced — In •either case the dynamic doctrine is found defective — Feel- ing reveals another mode of being — It can never have its place assigned in an order dominated throughout by phy- sical law — When feeling appeared, the process of change was profoundly modified — It affects all modifications of organisms — The physical process ^Zi/s the feeling deter- mines the next process, and so on — The feeling necessary to the result — The operative cause not physical force alone, but physical force pZm feeling — Evolutionist unable to assign any knowable cause to account for the origin of sentient life — Nor any explanation of the part of sentience in working out modifications of organic forms, . . 178 CHAPTER XV. The Origin of Organic Forms. Vast multiformity in organized matter — Evolution bound to show that all forms mud have sprung from one primordial mode of living matter, and to show how — Only on these conditions can a philosophy of evolution be established — Facts divided into two classes, organisms as at present known and those found in the geological record — No direct evidence of transition from lower to higher species — Gradual advancement from lower to higher forms through- out the geological periods inevitable — Science looks in Contents. PAGK vain for the common ancestor of differentiated species — The genealogical tree is all branches and no stem — The proposal to treat man as an exception fore-doomed — If Divine intelligence be needful to account for man, it is needful to account for inferior species — Wallace regards man as exempt from the great law of organic change — Darwin's position safer as an evolutionist, in boldly in- cluding him — Spencer stakes his theory on the adequacy of dynamic law to account for the whole — He condemns Prof. Owen's ' ' continuous unknown process " — No more comprehensible by science than "special creations" — The causes recognized by Mr. Spencer are (a) an innate ten- dency or polarity in the physiological units, and (6) the play of incident forces — The unit has an internal system of forces equilibrated in harmony with ancestral form, the incident forces disturb this equilibrium — In regaining equilibrium the structure is modified — The explanation carries us back to the atom and its environment — The differentiation of sex — Differentiation of structure due altogether to environment — Physiological unit dethroned — How account for the diverse action of the same en- vironment ? — Mr. Spencer gives two conflicting answers — Evolution cannot show in any comprehensible way the mode of operation of the causes producing variety of forms — The dynamic hypothesis furnishes basis for theory dif- ferent from " natural selection " — Similarity of incident forces should produce similarity of structure — The verte- brate structure may be result of similarity of causes and not the outcome of identity of descent — In Darwinian theory the " incident forces " play a part that is negative — The removal of the less fit will not account for the pro- duction of the fittest — At bottom, the question is the pro- duction and continuance of any — The growth of a single germ cannot be accounted for on the dynamic theory — No vital activity can be explained wholly by knowledge of dynamic law — A cause continually operative — not to be confounded with physical force — Its truest representation the energy of self-conscious mind, . . . 187 Contents. xi CHAPTER XVI. PAOK. Section I. — The origin of consciousness. The science of mind lies at foundation of philosophy — The evolutionist must show the relation of consciousness to the antecedent modes of concrete being — If an immediate operation of First Cause be assumed, it is at the cost of the principle of evolution — Criticism of Mr. Spencer's statement : "The raw material of consciousness is present even in undiflferentiated protoplasm : " " The raw material of con- sciousness everywhere exists protentially in the unknow- able Power" — To have recourse to the unknowable is to take refuge in the outer darkness — The theist holds a clear and tenable position ; the agnostic is hopelessly at fault — Self, conscious of itself, stands apart — The chasm cannot be bridged over — But if consciousness and phy- sical phenomena cannot be brought together in one, evolutionism is proved impossible, . . . 20^ Section II. — hi what does consciousyiess inhere ? Conscious- ness is not latent in the matter of the organism — Nor in the force manifested in it — But in the unknowable actu- ality — As a wave of molecular motion passes through a nerve-centre, consciousness comes into being out of the inscrutable — If so every act of consciousness is deter- mined by the fixed f)hysical succession — The law of mind is subsumed under the law of matter — Physical force is enthroned as sovereign over the whole extent of know- ledge, . . . . . . . 21& Section III. — The unit of consciousness. "Something of the same order as that which we call a nervous shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness" — A nervous shock not a feeling till it is felt — Evolutionism cannot bring consciousness within its sweep — The central factor stands out the great exception — Consciousness essentially cogni- tive — The consciousness itself cannot be broken up into units — But to make the object of consciousness the unit is impossible, for there is no one object of consciousness — That nerve-pulses and pisses of feeling are "inner and outer faces of the same change " disputed — Consciousness xii ^ Contents. PAGB is the primary attribute of mind — We begin with know- ledge, 218 Section IV. — TAe relations of Feelings. The theory of rela- tions of feelings examined, and knowledge of relation proved impossible on the principles of evolution, . 225 Section V. — Reasoning. Defined as the "formation of cohesions among manifestations " — Grouping shown to be impossible without intellection implying (1) a faculty of perception of external objects, (2) a faculty of reproduc- tion of the objects in thought, (3) a faculty of comparison of object with object, (4) ability to group objects accord- ing to known resemblances — Call this mind or by any other name it is there in the simplest beginnings of thought, 230 Section VI. — Self atid not- self. Classed with fundamental intuitions — Mr. Spencer distinguishes between conscious- ness and consciousness of self — Sir W. Hamilton quoted in proof that this is not a valid distinction — To avoid a breach of continuity the evolutionist splits up conscious- ness into separate fragments— Criticism of Mr. Spencer's three postulates — He repudiates material or spiritual monism — Manifestations are feelings, "vivid" or "faint" — The ego is the power manifested in the vivid, the non- ego that manifested in the faint — These powers not dis- tinguishable — The feelings are inner faces of nerve- thrills whether vivid or faint — Mind conscious of itself not evolved by clustering of aggregates of feelings — There are involved sensation, perception, imagination, comparison, judgment, reasoning — The evolving mass has no promise in it of a self -knowing mind, .... 235 Section VII. — Innate principles. Mode in which evolu- tionist deals with perception of external world — He pushes into the background the primary mental characteristic, knowing — Inquiry as to axiomatic truths — Mr. Spencer claims that his doctrine harmonizes the a priori and sensationalist schools — Organized ancestral experiences registered in the brain are the forms of thought — The intuitions fixed functions of fixed structures — This theory makes dominant the physical law of the organism — These Contents. ■ xiii innate principles are valid only within the adjustments of the organism, and only for a brief time — This doctrine overturns evolutionism, ..... 245 Section VIII. — The correlation of mental and physical forces. Impossible to embrace all change in one process unless mental and physical actions be correlated — Mr. Spencer rejects the monist doctrine — The unknowable energy con- ditioned in matter otherwise than in mind — This correla- tion can only exist in either material or spiritual monism — Correlation involves (a) expenditure of force which passes into new form, (b) equivalence of the amount of force under both forms — If applicable to mental and physical action it implies (a) the passing of physical force into intellectual force, and (6) the amount of physical force expended balances the mental force produced — This inter- change absurd — A universal law of evolution therefore imposssible, ...... 255 CHAPTER XVII. The Evolution of Morals. Life directed towards an end voluntarily chosen — Moral life everything to man — Aim of Mr. Spencer's philosophy to find scientific basis for right and wrong in conduct — His ethics must be outcome of his system — Apologists do not disparage moral lessons drawn from nature — Re- vealed moral teaching could not be accepted as true if antagonistic to the first principles of morals — Religion has been the most important source of moral impulse — 1. Moral law can only be obeyed in conscious freedom — Moral obedience willing obedience — Evolution determines action by physical law — The Calvinist contends for liberty — He rejects an imaginary liberty — Evolution ethics sheer dynamic determinism — 2. The evolutionist account of sense of obligation — Race-needs enforce the sacrifice of present to future pleasures — Moral self-restraint, how originated — Two elements in the "notion of obligation" — (a) surrender of present pleasure for sake of future xiv Contents. benefit, (6) coercive sense of obligation to do so — The latter driven into the primeval man from fear of visible ruler, of invisible ruler, and of society — It was then an illusion — Evolutionist very familiar with the primitive savage man — How will the sense of obligation be main- tained in highly evolved man ?— Because the good is always pleasure to some one somewhere — But why sacri- fice present pleasure ? — If sense of duty be maintained, we must recognise the existence of a moral nature — 3. What chief end does evolution set before man ? — Adjust- ment to environment, and consequent fulness of life — But equilibration is beginning of death — For the individual it has no significance — Struggle soon ended — 4. The ethical doctrine of evolution leaves man without effective moral guidance — Its precepts not universal — ever changing — 4. It is a system of hedonism — moral quality confounded with the consequences of actions — Difi*erent light shed on duty if we hold that man has a moral nature and is im- mortal — The ethical teaching of evolution has no solid basis and no imperativeness, .... 259 CHAPTER XVIII. Creation. To deny creation is to modify profoundly the idea of God — The idea of creation alleged to be unthinkable — Lange affirms the same — The edge of the criticism turned against Mr. Spencer — The conception proved to be thinkable — The possibility of the fact denied — (1) God may be con- ceived as the Absolute, His activity immanent — (2) It may be alleged that He could not have created the exist- ing universe — that a spirit could not create matter — The marvellous subtilty of matter — Thought cannot pass in known continuity from power immanent in God, to power manifested in the universe — Passes by faith — Creation congruous with experience — (1) We must believe in a First Cause — (2) In a Cause the origin of law and •order — (3) The author of self-conscious intelligence — (4) Contents. xv PAGB The power effecting adjustments of means to ends — A self-conscious intelligence — not one with His creatures, but distinct from them — This relation is creation — The term covers theories not diflferent within the knowable from evolution — as contrasted with evolution, it implies a beginning of the cosmos, also everywhere in it intelligent purpose and intervention of divine power — The question of origins, within the cosmos, approached from opposite sides by the creatiojiist and the evolutionist — The former begins with intelligence, the latter with the physical order — The creationist seeks the key to the problem in Thought — Existences differenced as new kinds are "special •creations " — Evolutionist asks to see the process of their coming to be new kinds — The records do not furnish materials — Evolutionist unable to show how species have •originated — Equally at fault with creationist — The Crea- tionist sees variety at beginning as well as now — Creationist doctrine does not necessitate the supposition of a clearly defined and separate beginning of species — a first pair having no kinship with former living things — He accepts the uniformity of nature — The conception of the ■cosmic process involved in evolution cannot be definitely represented in thought — Three stages in the progress from inorganic matter to organisms — these passed through •every day through the power of life — May have been so at beginning by agency of the Author of life — The evolu- tionist compares the method in nature to the work of an ■unskilful artificer — succeeding through failure — Creationist free to hold that there have been beginnings within the cosmos — The unity is in God — when unknowable power is introduced to account for change it is in efi'ect a ' ' special creation," . . . . . . . 226 CHAPTER XIX. Summary and Conclusion. The Evolution Hypothesis looks outward to find one domi- nant principle — All mental and moral phenomena re- garded as modes of expeiiience determined by physical xvi Contents, necessity — The Creator extruded beyond range of know- ledge — Always at work under dynamic yoke — That Power in its manifestations passes for ever through Evolution and Dissolution — Summary of the argument — The con- clusion that the Evolution Hypothesis is incompetent to interpret the most obvious facts in nature, and is indefens- ible as a philosophy — An edifice without foundation or top-stone — Man will seek elsewhere the home of his spirit, ....... 295- THE EVOLUTION HYPOTHESIS. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTOBY. THE Evolution Hypothesis has stamped its impress on the thought of our time. It claims to dominate the whole field of experience, and to direct all inquiry. As a theory of universal truth, it lies open to the criticism of every student of philo- sophy. How far in certain groups of physical phenomena it expresses justly the law of change, I do not discuss. Examination in detail, over the whole extent of the knowable, can be effectively conducted only by division of labour among many workers, each handling some part of the question, which he has made the subject of special study. In this way the measure of truth contained in the hypothesis must ultimately be defined. My purpose is to deal with the theory as it undertakes to formulate the entire cosmic movement within the knowable — as it aims at the unification of all knowledge. The following criticisna takes the form of an ex- A The Evolution Hypothesis. amination of the system elaborated by Mr. Herbert Spencer, Choosing the ablest expositor of the hypo- thesis, and testing it as shaped by him, the critic escapes the necessity of settling amid minor varieties of opinion the exact statement of the point in debate. We may be confident that we shall find all that is essential to evolutionism,* carefully reasoned out in Mr. Spencer's works. The theory, as he states it, may be discussed with the assurance that we are not beating the air. If the doctrine fail in the hands of the master, it will not triumph in the hands of his disciples. Mr. Spencer's System of Philosophy is a life-work, remarkable as well for the high order of intellectual power displayed in it, as for the vast and varied stores of exact knowledge by which it is enriched. The whole is worked out with rare analytical and constructive skill. The apt instances and illustrations, gathered from the entire range of physical science, give apparent breadth and solidity, and are introduced with such nice adjustment, that want of coherence is not readily de- tected. I propose to test at vital points the soundness of the structure. To follow Mr. Spencer step by step, through volumes that contain the results of the scien- tific and literary labours of a busy life, would be im- possible, and, if possible, for my purpose needless. It is enough to examine the essential and distinctive * I use the term Evolutionism to express the Evolution Hypo- thesis as a theory co-extensive with the knowable. Introductory. features of his philosophy, so as to judge of the worth of evolutionism as an all -comprehending hypothesis. The question is not one lying in some remote and barren region of metaphysical debate : it touches vit- a-lly the present and real interests of men, "The matter," Mr. Spencer tells us, " is one which concerns each and all of us more than any other matter what- ever. Though it affects us little in a direct way, the view we arrive at must indirectly affect us in all our relations — must determine our conception of the universe, of life, of human nature — must influence our ideas of right and wrong, and so modify our con- duct." * This estimate of the results that would ensue on the acceptance of evolutionism, as the true philosophy, is not an exaggeration. Before it old things would pass away, and all things become new. Under its universal sway Christianity must wither : religion in any real sense would be impossible. Morality must find another basis, or disappear with faith. The matter does, indeed, concern each and all of us "more than any other matter whatever." An hypothesis claiming to be the true interpretation of all the knowable, and deeply affecting the interests of mankind, challenges the keenest criticism. We shall need to be fully persuaded of its truth, before we dis- card the old beliefs, and begin to repeat the new credo. Every age has its fashionable philosophy. "We * First Principles, Part I., § 8. The Evolution Hypothesis. are constituted not merely to know, but also to imagine and construct ; and though with more or less mistrust of the definite validity of what the understanding and the senses have to offer us, yet mankind will ever hail with joy the man who under- stands how, by the force of his genius, and by em- ploying all the constructive impulses of his era, to create that unity in the world and in our intellectual life, which is denied to our knowledge. This creation will, indeed, be only the expression of the yearning of the age after unity and perfection; yet even this is no small thing, for the maintenance and nourishment of our intellectual life is as important as science itself, although not so lasting as this is : since the investigation of the details of positive knowledge, and of the relations which are the exclusive objects of our knowledge, is absolute, owing to its method,, while the speculative apprehension of the absolute can only claim a relative importance as the expression of the views of an epoch." * The yearning of this age after " unity in the world and in our intellectual life" finds expression in evo- lutionism. But evolutionism is not content to rest in " relative importance as the expression of the views of an epoch ; " it advances a claim to absolute import- ance " owing to its method," as being the unification of all truth. It is a characteristic of the intellectual * Lange's History of Materialism, Book I. , Chap. III. Introductory. temper of our time to be dissatisfied with less than unity. Science, looking on nature as continuous, ac- counts it her task to disclose how phenomenon is linked to phenomenon throughout the entire cosmos. The evolution doctrine satisfies this craving after mani- fested continuity. It proposes to reveal the universe as one in co-existence and succession throughout all space and all time. It is the embodiment of the modern scientific spirit. The man of science recog- nises in it the articulate expression of his mental attitude towards the universe. His faith in the hypo- thesis stands not in the conclusiveness of the proofs adduced in its support, but in his sense of its fitness to harmonize the separate parts of his knowledge, and to answer his intellectual yearning after organ- ized completeness of thought. In that inner scientific sense — analogous to the spiritual feeling that responds to religious truth — there is a strong persuasion in favour of the doctrine. To the inquirer who knows his mind at rest ; who, if we might venture to borrow the expression, " has found peace " in the new mode of conceiving the order of the universe, the conviction of its truth seems irresistible. He discovers confirma- tion where the doubter finds contradiction. He be- comes impatient as a zealot with those who cannot see with his eyes and receive his teaching. Every soul that will not accept his gospel is under condem- nation, and in danger of being left in the outer darkness. No article of reliofion has been maintained The Evolution Hypothesis. by the most bigoted ecclesiastic with greater arro- gance, or in a narrower spirit. Mr. Spencer, for his part, follows out his conclusions with the confidence of one assured of their validity, yet without dis- paragement of those who interpret nature from a different standpoint; but the disciples outrun the master, and one who boldly questions the popular creed may look for rough handling as a heretic. It does not lie in my way, in the following discus- sion, to engage in the well-worn controversy as to the relations of science and religion. Mr. Spencer has devoted a chapter to the exposition of his view that the knowable is the realm of science and the unknow- able the home of religion. Into this question I do not enter. The harmony of these contrasted departments of knowledge, too often placed in apparent conflict, will be most efiectively established by a careful exa- mination of their distinctive principles and methods,, and a clear recognition of the just claims of each in its own province. Religion, in so far as it touches science, is only concerned in securing veracity in searching for and dealing with facts, so as to arrive at a truthful elucidation of the complex world in which man lives and serves. Faith is not directly concerned in the acceptance or rejection of any theory lying clearly within the domain belonging of right to science. No interpretation of the order of nature within the limits of actual or possible discovery conflicts, or can conflict,, with any distinctively religious truth. Whether the Introductory. earth revolves round the sun, or the sun round the earth ; whether the visible universe has been shaped by gradual solidification from a gaseous mass or had its origin in solid orbs; whether the divisions of animal and vegetable life arose as perfect and distinct species or have been differentiated through processes of change — questions like these do not in the least impinge on man's belief in the existence of a personal God, the Maker of heaven and earth, or on the assurance with which faith receives the testimony of Scripture as to the person and mission of Jesus Christ. It is when generalizations are lifted out of their place in the realm of experimental knowledge, and are invested with the authority of universal truths, that the teaching of science conflicts with the doctrines of the Church. The progress of truth is slow. The discussion of the order of the cosmos is not closed. Science has as yet advanced but a little way in de- ciphering the vast records. Faith can aflbrd to wait : nullum tempus ecclesiae. The Church of God will! be dealing with the great questions of life and duty/ when the thunders of these conflicts shall have been long silenced, and the smoke of the battlefield shall have cleared away, revealing the brightness of anj unclouded heaven encompassing the little world of' human thought. The dominance of the new system of philosophy would prove as great a peril to scientific as to spiritual truth. If every fact is* to be studied in the light of 8 The Evolution Hypothesis. evolution, if dynamical law is to be recognized as ruling all processes and events, the growth of intelli- gence will be distorted and the advancement of know- ledge impeded. The Scholastic Philosophy, through its formal completeness, became an intolerable bond- age. System strangled truth. It left no room for the free pursuit of inquiry, and stood a barrier in the way of the forward movement of thought. A like danger threatens in the present stage of progress. The evolutionist is the schoolman of our day. He ^ will have his hypothesis prevail everywhere. He constitutes it the criterion of truth. Observations are recorded, and experience read in the light of it. Everything that will not fall into position under it, he condemns. These are not conditions favourable to the right exercise of intelligence. Intellectual freedom is overborne ; well-springs of knowledge are sealed up; a one-sided and iron system rules. It is imperative, in the interests of progressive thought, that this yoke be broken, that the mind may be free in the pursuit of truth. The following discussion, directed to the disproof of the Evolution Hypothesis as a system co-extensive with knowledge, is not constructive, but critical. The inquiry is not. What is the truth ? but, Is Evolu- tionism true ? The final answer is a decided negative. The argument is cumulative ; to find it inconclusive at some points will not invalidate its effectiveness in others. It deals only with questions that seem to be Introductory, g of vital importance to the doctrine under examination. Whatever may be the worth o£ the argument, no one can doubt the gravity of the issues involved. The highest interests are at stake. Evolutionism, if ac- cepted, must eventually crush the liberty of the spirit in man ; and the liberty of the spirit is indispensable to the progress of humanity. CHAPTER 11. THE COMPLETE UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE IMPOSSIBLE, MR. SPENCER defines philosophy as "completely- unified knowledge."* Before proceeding to the examination of his system, which claims to answer this definition, a previous question must be deter- mined. Is the complete unification of knowledge pos- sible ? In other words, Is philosophy, in Mr. Spencer's meaning of the term, possible ? I answer in the negative. It is a fundamental error to assume that thought is competent to embrace all the knowable in one organic whole in a comprehen- sible unity. A necessary condition of scientific pro- gress is to accept the limits of intelligence. From the Eleatic to the Evolutionist an overweening desire for systematized unity has perverted science. The system- builder has been one of the chief hindrances in the way of advancing knowledge. Intellectual progress cannot proceed with steady step along the whole line of the knowable, until it is clearly seen and frankly acknowledged that complete unification transcends- * First Principles, Part II., § 37. The Unification of Knowledge Impossible, ii the limits of intelligence, and that every system pro- fessing to have reached such completeness is thereby self -convicted as being necessarily false. In discussing the unification of knowledge, it is to be kept in view that we are not dealing with the question of method. We are not inquiring as to the criterion of truth or the form of correct reasoning. The unity aimed at is not the coherence and congruity of our thinking ; not the unity of the mental process, but the unity of knowledge as knowledge of objects, as conversant about things and their relations: it is the unity of knowledge dealing with all knowable modes of existence. " If philosophy," says Mr. Spencer,, "is completely unified knowledge — if the unification of knowledge is to be effected only by showing that some ultimate proposition includes and consolidates all the results of experience; then, clearly, this ulti- mate proposition which has to be proved congruous with all others must express a piece of knowledge, and not the validity of an act of knowing." * *' Philo- sophy, as we understand it, must not unify separate concrete phenomena only; and must not stop with unifying separate classes of concrete phenomena ; but must unify all concrete phenomena"f The task which philosophy undertakes in attempt- ing this complete unification of all concrete pheno- mena is one the magnitude of which it is not easy at * First Principles, f 42. t Ibid., § 186. 1 2 The Evolution Hypothesis. first sight to apprehend. It is nothing less than an attempt to present, in the unity of thought, the unity of all real existence and all relations of real -existence, in co-existence and succession throughout all time. All orders of persons and things, and all processes of change, must find their due place in the reproduction in thought of that organic whole which is assumed to embrace all things in its totality. The vastness of such an undertaking might well impart a feeling of mistrust to the boldest and most self- <;onfident. Man buried, according to the doctrine of the evolutionist, in the depth of this incomprehensible universe of concrete being, tossed like a particle of dust in the whirl of its incalculable eddies, stretching hopelessly towards its infinite bounds, groping blindly after its oricrin and end — man, in his felt insie^nificance over against the unsearchable actuality, might well enter with hesitancy on the task of framing, in the shape of organized knowledge, a true representation of the whole range of being from God to inanimate nature, and of the law of the activities, inter-rela- tions, and changes of the whole and every part. Yet this is the achievement which a philosophy, successful in the task of unifying all knowledge, must accom- plish. For " it is not enough to unify different classes of phenomena ; philosophy must unify all concrete phenomena." The goal of unity has been sought along various lines. The Unification of Knowledge Impossible, 13 (1.) The Calvinist finds that unity in God. All things have been ordered according to His will ; they are the manifestation of His power, and have their harmony in His decree. This is unification ; but it is the attainment of that aim throuo^h faith, not tbrouofh knowledge. The co-ordination of all departments of knowledge in one organic and comprehensible whole is not reached by this method. (2.) The unification of knowledge may be approached by positing the unity of the object of knowledge. But our knowledge is not of One Thing; it is of many things. To know individual things as individual things, is to difference them ; and the knowledge is diverse as the objects. Knowledge is at first of indi- vidual things ; to reach unity of knowledge through the unity of the thing known, the Eleatic removed the many, affirming reality only of the One. We need hardly pause to show that the knowledge of the One as thus attained is not real knowledge. There is no knowledge without judgment, and no judgment without comparison, and no comparison without like- ness or difference; nor these without plurality. Sa that in the removal of the multiple and the positing of the One the conditions of knowledge have vanished. Like Samson, who at one stroke overthrew his enemies and sacrificed himself, knowledge, in sweeping away plurality, is self- destroyed. So soon as the unifica- tion is complete, thought is extinguished. If, then,. 14 The Evolution Hypothesis. the existence of the object as one be essential to the unity aimed at, unification is impossible ; for knowledge itself is impossible. Again, to know the object of knowledge as one is incompetent owing to the fundamental contrast between the ego and the non-ego : unity is not complete until the subject and object are reduced to identity. In the pursuit of the unity of knowledge along the line of the unity of the object known, we are driven to look for it in an ultimate real oneness of the ego and non-ego : but the identification is unthinkable ; it cannot arise in expe- , rience. The contrast between subject and object is essential to thought. If I am no longer able to say, I myself exist, I am no longer capable of conscious in- tellection. Knowledge itself is impossible. (3.) Unity may be sought, not in the One eternal ^nd unchanged — the absolute in being — but in the One eternally self-revealing, that is, in an absolute process. In every attempt to reach unification of the phenomenal through the absolute, whether in being or in process, there is involved the implication that the absolute is known. That a philosophy based on knowledge of the absolute is impossible, has been, once for all, demonstrated by Sir William Hamilton, in his "Philosophy of the Unconditioned." Unifica- tion based on such assumed knowledge is clearly invalid. All search for unity by the way of the absolute must fail ; for it involves acts of intelligence that transcend the limits of thought. The Unification of Knowledge Impossible. 15 Driven back from the attempt to reach unity from the side of the absolute, are we left without any hope of combining the different elements and separate parts of truth in one consistent and organic whole ? Must we abandon in despair all endeavour after the unifica- tion of knowledge ? From Heraclitus to Mr Herbert Spencer there has been a succession of philosophers who have looked for the unifying principle, not in oneness of being, or in the self -revelation of the abso- lute, but in the process of ceaseless change. The present state of knowledge is especially favourable to such a doctrine. Knowledge proceeding from the cognition of individual things, strives towards unification by combining the many in one through unity of law. The rapid development of experimental science, re- vealing order everywhere, has impressed all minds with a sense of the universality of law, and prepared the way for a philosophy claiming to have discovered, in a law governing all change, the principle of that complete unification of knowledge which has been sought so ardently. The problem then is, to find one unifying principle actually operative over the whole extent of being and of mutation. The principle sought must embrace the immeasurable spaces of the material world, and govern €very thrill of each atom, and every movement of the entire mass : it must be seen in operation at the first moment, when the universe emerges into the field of thought, and must regulate the entire course of change 1 6 The Evolution Hypothesis. onward to the end of time : it must bring to light the- beginning of life, and disclose the origin and growth of every individual and every species : it must show how organic sensibility came to be, and elucidate the complex and wonderful adaptations by which, even in the case of microscopic forms, the living creature is fitted to its habitat, and enabled to maintain itself in life during its brief day, and perpetuate the existence of its kind : it must account for the human conscious- ness, and explain how it has arisen : it must determine how the faculties of mind have come to be, and reveal the origin of conscience : it must unveil the source of religious feeling, and furnish the key to the indestruc- tible belief in God : it must afford explanation of the marvellous achievements of intelligence in unravelling the complexities of things, and making known their order and law ; in accomplishing astounding feats of power and skill, by the combination of resources through political and social organizations ; in produc- ing works of art, whose beauty rivals the perfection of nature ; in attaining moral ends through the sense of personal freedom voluntarily submitting to the law of duty; in reaching spiritual results through knowledge that pierces the encompassing veil, and through devotion that freely sacrifices self. It must thus account for man, the most wonderful of all the phenomena of the universe ; it must, above all, account for the appearance in this world of the man Christ Jesus, for the power of His teaching and life, and for The Unificatio7t of Knowledge Impossible, 17 the transforming influence of that most notable of all phenomena — the Christian Faith. And this gigantic task is to be accomplished, not inl the region of ideas, but in the realm of fact. The principle that unifies is to be known as a principle operative throughout the entire range of knowable existence, as the bond which unites in one organic and indivisible whole all objects, from the molecule that vibrates at the centre of the universe to the Almighty Source of all things, as the law that reorulates all events throughout the entire succession of change from everlasting to everlasting. The facts, which are to be brought together in one, lie in clearly marked departments or kingdoms, each distinguished from the others by a well-defined line of discrimination, w^hich science, as it advances, does nothing to obliterate ; on the contrary, the clearer the light of science, the deeper and the more marked the distinction is seen to be. These objects of knowledge are: — (1.) Supreme over all — GoD. (2.) The self-conscious intelligence of man. (3.) Objects endowed with life and sensibility. (4.) Objects endowed with vegetal life. (5.) Inorganic matter. Throughout the entire series of created existence, there are common characteristics that reveal a certain sort of oneness. But that unity is far different from the oneness of an organic whole, the same in substance 1 8 The Evolution Hypothesis. throughout, moulded and moved in every part by the same active principle. It is community of the sort we recoofnize when we observe in different works traces of the same intelligence, touches of the same hand. Consider these fields of knowledge, and it will be evident how fruitless is the attempt to find in them one operative principle by which they may be reduced to unity. (1.) God exists in the view of thought : it is impos- sible, if we would, to rid ourselves of that Presence. Mr. Spencer bears convincing testimony to this fact. Under the veil of what he calls the Unknowable, a something — the Absolute Reality — lies present to thought in every process of reasoning. Granted that our consciousness of it is vague, undefined, still the inscrutable actuality is there. This element — being a real and necessary element of consciousness — brings into view, though it may be indefinitely, a real exis- tence. To unify all objects of whose existence we have proof is manifestly impossible, until we shall have brought this Reality into organic relation with all other concrete existences known to us. But no principle can be discovered which will effect such unification. There is here a manifest and insuperable breach of continuity in our knowledge. Till continuity is established at this point, it is clear that the totality of existences — not imaginary but concrete existences, existences of which we have indubitable evidence — cannot be brought together in one. Much more, if we TJie Unification of Knoiu ledge Impossible, 19 follow the Christian doctrine of the Divine Personality, ^ is it impossible to institute an organic oneness between Ood and His creatures.* However imperative it may be, that we should recognise the presence and power of the Divine Being as manifested in all things, re- ligious faith refuses to confound the Creator with His works : it sees a line of distinction which cannot be obliterated or transcended, differencing all created beings from the eternal source from which they have sprung. The continuity of knowledge is broken. God and the universe cannot be broufyht toojether in one. Philosophy cannot "unify all concrete! phenomena." (2). Man is conscious of himself. In every act of intelligence he knows himself as differenced from the surrounding world. The line that separates the e(jo from the non-ego, runs throughout all conscious in- tellection.- No unifying principle can obliterate it. The knowledge which the mind has of its own opera- tions is primary. No other source of knowledge can Assert superior authority. What consciousness attests in its primary exercise, cannot be set aside by secon- dary evidence. All knowledge ultimately rests on its veracity. Even if there were a principle adequate to the unification of consciousness and the object of consciousness, it would be impossible that that prin- * The incarnation does not lie within the scientific field : its significance is spiritual. Jt is an unwarrantable use of the doctrine to constitute it a link in a cosmic theory. 20 The Evoltitio7i Hypothesis, ciple should be realized in thought ; for to apprehend the unity of itself and its objects, consciousness must transcend itself, and contemplate the relation from without. But such an achievement is manifestly impossible : it would be fatal ; for consciousness must perish in the act. The law of continuity is violated in every exercise of conscious intelligence. Self-con- sciousness is an insuperable barrier in the way of the complete unification of knowledge. (3). Life manifested in organisms endowed with sensibility presents another wide and distinct depart- ment of phenomena, which has hitherto defeated all attempts at reducing it to knowable unity with other modes of concrete existence. The animal kingdom is divided by an impassable separation from that of vegetable life. It may be alleged that the lowest forms in both are hardly distinguishable from eacb other. But even though these lowest forms should be to us indistinguishable, it does not follow that they are not distinct. The higher organisms are not dis- tinguishable in their earliest stage ; yet these germs, whose differences are indiscernible, pursue, with un- erring and infallible certainty, paths of development which result in clearly differenced structures. The germs out of which animals of different species are developed, must have, though not discernible by us, characteristics by which they are discriminated. Even in the same species the germs, though altogether in- distinguishable, are of quite distinct varieties. That The Unification of Knowledge Impossible. 2 1 the lowest forms cannot be, with certainty, classified, •does not prove that they are not separated by any real difference into animal or vegetal, but only that science is not able to bring the difference to light, and that our classification is no more than a rough approximation to reality. To affirm that there are no discriminating marks, because we can- not discover them, is to assume, against all expe- rience, that science succeeds in tracing the lines of demarcation in nature wherever such lines exist. Every living germ is a witness to the contrary. The primal forms of the higher species cannot be sorted by science. (4). The vegetal kingdom forms another vast group of organisms, separated on the one side from inorganic matter, and on the other, from organisms endowed with sensibility. The differences on either side must be accounted for before unification is complete. The origin of organization lies — and seems as if it would for ever lie — a mystery to science. No attempt to trace the process of change from the inorganic to the organic has succeeded, or has come near success. It still remains an unsolved problem to find an operative principle adequate to the task of bringing organic and inorganic processes together in a real oneness. We shall have to look more closely at this point in another part of the discussion. (5). Nor is it possible to unify knowledge even within the compass o^ inorganic matter. The laws 2 2 The Evohition Hypothesis, of the inorganic world cannot be unified. No one dynamic principle will account for the play of forces in nature, or reduce all their operations to unity. To explain the action of inorganic matter there is more needed than the persistence of force. "The antecedent forces must be adequate in their quanti- ties, kinds, and distribution."* When the imagina- tion has pushed back the conception of matter and force to the utmost limit, to derive the universe that is, the evolutionist must assume a certain position of the atoms, certain orderly relations among the atoms, certain activities and their laws — a conception as com- plex and as far from being resolved into unity as the visible cosmos. The world that now is lay, by hypo- thesis, wrapped up in that original collocation of matter and force. Systems on systems of atoms rising through systems on systems of molecules, ac- cording to Mr. Spencer, constitute the imperceptible out of which the visible has been shaped. This in- finitely complicated and inexplicable series of systems is necessary, even in one field of observation, to the conception of that unity which science seeks. How inconceivable the complexity, when we survey the whole world of thought ! As the stream of created being flows forth from the unseen, obedient to the Divine word, like the Edenic river, it is " parted into four heads " : — inor- * Spencer's Frinciples of Biology, Vol. I., Appendix. The Unification of Knowledge Impossible. 23 ganic matter, organisms endowed with vegetal life, organisms endowed with animal life, and man en- dowed with self-conscious intelligence and a moral nature. These great fountain-heads of created being are distinct throughout all the cosmic history in so far as we can know it, and they seem destined to con- tinue distinct departments of knowledge until the existing framework of things shall be dissolved. No principle has been discovered, nor is, as we believe, discoverable, which will unite all these orders of existences in one coherent organic body. No principle can be found — and if it could be found its applica- bilty must be for ever undiscoverable — through which it can be shown how consciousness may rise out of and sink again into the unintelligent world. No principle has heretofore been broucfht to lisfht, nor can be, which, operative in all forms of being and furnishing an explanation of their distinctive characteristics, is adequate to bring existences subject only to dynamic laws, and those which are subject to the higher laws of life, sensation, and mind, together in one. The unification of knowledge is not complete ; nor is completeness of unification possible. The pretence of completeness can only be attained by hiding the difficulties from view. But to do so is to be false to scientific progress. Knowledge advances towards per- fection by clearing, not blurring, the lines of discrimi- nation. Jf there are distinctions in nature, these must 24 The Evolution Hypothesis. have their counterpart in a corresponding demarca- tion in thought. The great departments of inquiry- are mutually helpful, and throw light one upon the other. They have much in common ; but they can never be brought together in a complete unity of knowledge. Each must in the main pursue its own aim by' its own appropriate methods. The results reached along this way will be solid additions to science and valuable contributions to human well-being ; when, on the other hand, research is set to the task of filling up the empty outline of a universal system of organised knowledge, it ceases to be the devotee of truth, and is transformed into the advocate whose business is to compel every fact to fit his theory, and every witness to give such evidence as suits his case. The interests of science and of faith alike require that thought should recognize the bounds set to it, and, accepting its appointed conditions, work out patiently, and with veracity, its task of deciphering such pages of the book of the universe as are open to the view of man. He is a false prophet of the natural who will profess to write out the whole, or even to furnish a complete table of contents. One of the greatest of the prophets of the spiritual has laid down a principle as entirely applicable to scientific as to religious thought : " We know in part and we prophesy in part." * The complete unification of knowledge is impossible. * 1 Corinthians xiii. 9. CHAPTER III. THE LIMITS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE. THE Physical Sciences have advanced with such rapidity, and have succeeded in so large a number •of instances in unifying what appeared to be alto- gether separate classes of facts by the discovery of their law, that at first sight it seems reasonable to hope for a still wider unification embracing all de- partments of truth. " The truths of philosophy bear the same relation to the highest scientific truths, that each of these bears to lower scientific truths. As each widest generalization of science comprehends and consolidates the narrower generalization of its own division; so the generalizations of philosophy comprehend and consolidate the widest generalizations of Science. It is therefore a knowledge the extreme opposite in kind to that which experience first accumulates. It is the final product of that process which begins with a mere colligation of crude observations, goes on establish- ing propositions that are broader and more separated from particular cases, and ends in universal proposi- tions. Or, to bring thfe definition to its simplest and 26 The EvohUion Hypothesis. clearest form : — Knowledge of the lowest kind is un- unified knowledge; Science is partially - unified knowledge ; Philosophy is com'pletely -unified know- ledge." * Mr. Spencer's system is framed of such " universal propositions" derived from generalizations of science besfinnincy "with a mere colliixation of crude observa- tions." Do these generalizations furnish truths which may be turned into universals holding good over the whole universe of being, and dominating all thought ? They do not. The truths of experiential science cannot be so used legitimately : and the philosophy founded on such a basis is demonstrably false. To make this position clear it is necessary to inquire into the limits of physical science. The physicist Imay not add anything to nature: it is his business to I see what is, and notbinor but what is. His science is strictly bounded by observation, and can speak only in the name of known facts, and of such facts as are, in the points of comparison, precisely similar. Physical science is imperatively enclosed within the actually known. Where it deals with that which is not actuall}^ known, it must invariably carry forward into the unknown that which is known, and with the assumption that the conditions, so far as affects the matter dealt with, are identical. Given other con- ditions, and the result will be different. Science may * First Princlphs, § 37. The Limits of Physical Science. 27 not invent a conjectural state of things, and profess,, by setting out the operation of known laws in such supposed circumstances, to extend the bounds of real knowledge. All scientific work of that kind — and it forms a considerable part of popular science — is merely imaginative ; it lies in the department of; romance. There are bounds which ought not to be passed in framing hypotheses to account for phenomena that remain unexplained. It is not allowable to set up any hypothesis which lies outside the possibility of being established by evidence. Every legitimate conjecture lies within the possibility of actual proof. It is fatal to any hypothesis to show that it is incapable of being- proved. Its author is bound to point out a possible line of adequate evidence, or his conjecture must be rejected as illegitimate. The doctrine of universal evolution belongs to this class of illegitimate hypo- theses ; if it were true, it could not be proved true. The requirements of satisfactory proof transcend the limits of human thought. Every attempt to formulate truths derived from experiential science that shall be held to be good over the whole past, present, and future of concrete being, encounters insuperable difiiculties. Man is not omniscient: he must gather his facts from experience, and must interpret them by compari- son and inference. At every step he comes in contact with the inscrutable ; gftid his intelligence is in every 28 The Evolution Hypothesis. process liable to error. Even if we grant that the mind is a quite perfect reasoning instrument, the physicist is beset with liabilities to misconceptions and mistakes. These sources of error may be grouped under five heads, — duration, extent, minuteness, com- plexity, and imperfection of the organs of sense. (1.) Duration. The stretch of time which may be •called the period of observation is as nothing com- pared with the supposed duration of the universe ; and the period of skilled and reliable observation is still less. All scientific conclusions are based on observa- tions made at one point in a boundless reach of move- ment and ceaselessly flowing change. Two sources of •doubt lie in every instance; — (a) whether the whole thing, or all that is essential to the right understand- ing of it for the purpose in hand, has been seen on the side within the field of observation; and (6) whether the facts observed adequately represent the whole series, which is conceived as extending backward to a measureless distance in time. Observation, to yield a valid result, must conform fully to both conditions. If there be room for questioning the exactness or •sufficiency of the facts observed, we are bound to refuse Acceptance to any doctrine built thereon, when it transcends the immediate bounds of experience and formulates a law for all time. The divergence from reality may be infinitesimal at the outset, and within the range of experience of no practical account, but •carried over the entire sweep of cosmic history, back- The Limits of Physical Science. 29 ward and forward to infinity, the result will be wholly- false. When the order of the universe, as at the beginning of its history it emerges out of and at the close of its- history it passes again into the imperceptible, is- deduced from present knowledge of phenomena, this liability to error is always present. Unless our knowledge of fact be precise and adequate — if aught be misread or omitted — all reasonings based on it, and extending before and after over unimaginable stretches of time, are fatally tainted with Uncertainty. The result is wholly unreliable. The amount of reality with which the physicist set out remains a fixed quantity, while the margin of error has increased at every step. That which, within experience, was an. imperceptible divergence from fact has widened to infinity. (2.) The bounds of things as existing in space at any given point in time are practically infinite. However far scientific vision may reach, the cosmos extends beyond. The sphere of observation is but a speck in the limitless expanse. Now, to infer from the little portion observed to the vastly wider regions remaining for ever inscrutable, is fraught with peril.. We must be assured not only of the similarity, but identity, of concrete existences within experience and beyond it, before we can venture to draw any conclu- sion with an approach to certainty. In every case we ar5 met by the initial difficulty of The Evohttion Hypothesis. assuring ourselves that the whole fact has been — for our purpose — discovered. It' all nature form one cosmos, as the scientist assumes, the whole is joined together in a real unity, so that no one part is separ- able from any other part. Each instance is in effect the entire universe. Every object of inquiry thus -extends immeasurably beyond the limits of possible experience ; and that vast unknown is as essential to the instance before us as that in it which may be brought within the field of vision. We may suffi- ciently understand the phenomenon, and its relations within the visible, to reach conclusions that will be valid within experience ; but we should need to ex- haust every relation in which the object stands to every other mode of existence in the cosmos, before we could reason with confidence from the instance and its law to the limitless totality of things. Such completeness of knowledge is not given to man. The scientific inquirer must always remain in the attitude of expectance, willing to modify his doctrine should any new phase of the phenomena under investigation be presented. There are laws, within their proper limits, well-established and sure: but when the physicist carries them beyond the bounds of ex- perience he is always beset by doubt ; he cannot reason with the full assurance of one who deals with universal and necessary truth. When, therefore, an h3^pothesis is framed to cover the whole extent of knowable existence, and is based The Limits of Physical Science. 31 •on professed observation, it must be always open to the objection, and its certainty qualified by the con- sideration, that the vastly greater part of the contem- poraneous fact was beyond the ken of the observer. This source of error will appear the more formidable, if we keep in view that the concrete existence forming the matter of investigation is united with other exist- ences not in our plane only, but in an infinite number of planes intersecting at the point of observation. We are not situated at a point in a level surface •over which the eye may range to the utmost stretch of vision ; we are enclosed within a sphere whose centre is in relation to us everywhere, and its circum- ference nowhere. The instances examined by the scientist, and on the precise and complete knowledge of which our cosmic theories are built, are assumed to be one organically with every part of that un- bounded whole, which in every direction passes beyond the range of our experience into infinity. We are not warranted, then, in concludinsf w^th assured certainty, from the limits of our narrow and imperfect experience, over the whole universe of con- crete being. For whatever doubt attaches to the completeness of our interpretation of nature, as seen, •expands and grows with every step outward, increas- ing as the sphere widens in every direction towards illimitable space. A scientific truth, as close to reality as any induction of physical science can be, and valid within the range of exjferience, becomes, when carried 32 The Evolution Hypothesis. from the central point of observation over the wholfr extent of co-existent things, so doubtful as to be value- less. The error has enlarged at every step, while the truth has remained a fixed quantity. (3.) A further source of error presents itself when we bring into view the fact, that as nature stretches out of view beyond us in time and space, so it passes out of view beneath us in indiscernible minuteness.. The instrumental aid by which the physicist brings within the range of observation a vast extent of phe- nomena, imperceptible to unaided sense, has revealed at the same time regions still more minute, forming a part of the concrete whole, whose law science under- takes to expound. These infinitesimal forms of exis- tence are beyond the reach of observation — " monads,, compared with which a grain of sand is an earth."* But they are an integral part of the world we know- It is made up of them. They are factors, it may be the most important factors, in the processes of change.. Our rude manipulation leaves them in every experi- ment untouched. Too subtile to be apprehended, they are none the less potent. What part they have played, or may play, in the drama whose movement philo- sophy would formulate, we can never learn. They may have been the leading actors in former scenes. In omitting them when we write out the plot, we may be leaving out the Hamlet of the play. This, at * Spencer : T&xjch. Vol. II., Part VII., Chap. II. The Limits of Physical Science, 2iZ' any rate, we may boldly affirm, that the hypothesis which formulates the law of concrete being and ex- plains the whole series of cosmic and individual change while it is confessedly ignorant of the law of that ever present and ceaselessly active world of real ex- istence lying around us, and touching us at every instant, must have in it a large imaginative element. (4.) The inexactness of all observation and experi- ment is further illustrated, when we bring into view the endless complexity of all causes and effects. Every experiment is complicated by the co-existence of a countless number of co-operating forces, each of which is correlated with all the rest, and contributes its part to the combined result. The scientific principle of the correlation of physical forces brings this aspect of the intricateness of nature very emphatically into view. The relations of forces, whether in masses or in mole- cules, are for man limitless. Every new discovery of correlation among the special sciences is fresh evi- dence of the boundless complexity of causes, and additional ground for questioning the perfect exact- ness of any experimental truth. Every correlation on which attention is fixed shows, with greater clear- ness, the exhaustless inter-relations of things. As we become more fully alive to the inconceivably complex whole which constitutes the totality of the universe,, we shall advance with less assurance to universal truths from generalizations of science, valid so long- as the scientist continues on the solid ground of 34 T^fi^ Evolution Hypothesis, experience, but which are not safer than the wings •of Icarus when he attempts a flight towards the boundless distances of the cosmos, or poises himself above the ever-rolling ocean stream of change. (5.) When we turn from the objects of knowledge to test the instruments of observation, the grounds of mistrust are multiplied. The field is narrowed by the limitations of the organs of sense. On the evolution theory the trustworthiness of the organs of sense is extremely limited. They are products of evolution, shaped in the gradual adaptation of man to his sur- roundings. They are in number and range determined by their utility in adjusting his organism to his en- vironment. What is useful for this purpose, and nothing further, has been evolved. But the elabora- tion of a true system of philosophy is not a condition of the continuance of the human species. The race lias persisted for a long period with, as the advocates of evolution believe, a very incorrect conception of the universe. It is not clear, then, how sense organs evolved for a quite difiPerent end can be relied on to give such a full and complete knowledge of the phenomena as will furnish a basis for a perfect €0smic theory. There may be, probably there are, many modes of activity continually operating through- out the universe, affecting the relations of its parts, and directing its movement, which are not in relation to our sensibility, and which we have no means of apprehending. The senses with which we are en- The Limits of Physical Science. 35 cloweJ are, on the hypothesis of evolution, defective in their adaptation to any purpose except the prac- tical end of adjustment to environment, and so to the maintenance of man's life on the earth. Admirably fitted to serve the purpose for which they have been evolved, they fail us when applied to any other use. They cannot, therefore, be depended on as instruments of exact knowledge. The power of sight, for example, is extremely restricted in its compass. Our perception of colour is limited to a narrow range, and within that range is very imperfect. The lower animals are in many instances endowed w^ith more perfect organs than man. Defective sense-perception is corrected by comparison, but even then the means are not furnished for attaining absolute precision. " The mind of man, as Francis Bacon said, is like an uneven mirror, and does not reflect the events of nature without distor- tion."* The most skilful observer cannot adjust his intellectual compensations with perfect success to de- fects of nerve and organ. The gift of exact observa- tion is extremely rare. We tend to see that for which we look. "It is exceedingly rare," says Professor Jevons, " to find persons who can, with perfect fair- ness, estimate and register facts for and against their own peculiar views and theories."f The mind brings with it an anticipation which colours the event. Those parts of the concrete whole which favour the conclu- * Jevon's Principles of Scie^ice. Vol. II., Book IV., Chap. XVIII. t Ibid. • 36 The Evolution Hypothesis. sion we wish to establish stand clearly out in view, 'while that which conflicts with the desired conclusion falls into the backs^rouncl. Accordinof to the common adage, "seeing is believing;" but it as often happens [that "believing is seeing." What man is there, glow- ing and ardent in the pursuit of knowledge, and at the same time altogether unprejudiced and impartial, having no favourite view to support, nor any obnoxious opinion to impugn ? What observer possesses an eye and mind perfectly achromatic? Human frailty scarcely warrants the supposition that such an one is to be found. Individual aberrations from exact truth are no doubt counteracted by the multiplication of observations and the ceaseless conflict of opinion. These compensations in the end work a truer balance of doctrine, and bring theories nearer to reality. But approximations to truth, however close the approach may be, are not sufficient when the philosopher is laying foundations on which his theory of all things is to be based. When he undertakes to unify all knowledge — to include in one formula the law of all processes throughout the universe during all time, ap- proximations will not serve. We must build on reality the world of thought, if it is to correspond with the world that is. A slight want of precision, of no account when the target is at fifty paces, will prove fatal to accuracy of aim when the distance is a thousand yards ; a trifling inaccuracy in measurement, not worth noticing in calculating the dimensions of a The Limits of Physical Science. ^J field, will involve disastrous consequences if it should occur in fixing a base line for the survey of a kingdom. Takino' too-ether in one view these five sources of error, to each of which the observer is in every in- stance liable, no one can accept as secure and well- founded any world-embracing hypothesis based on the sciences of observation. Everyone will recognize the wisdom of the caution — "We can seldom trust our best established theories and most careful inferences far from their data." * * Jevon's Principles of Science^ Book VI. , Chap. XXVI. CHAPTER IV. THE LIMITS OF NATURAL LAW. THERE is a suggestion of definiteness and cer- tainty in the word Laiv, which imparts an air o£ solidity to the loftiest theories. Granted, it may be argued, that mutation is the order of the cosmos, granted that the greater part of every fact eludes the observer, still there is something invariable and con- stant within the bounds of knowledge. By the dis- covery of their law, the shifting mass of seemingly incoherent experiences may be knit into a compact and orderly system. A firm foundation can be thus laid for hypotheses that tower to heaven. We shall examine this ground of certainty. (1). Natural law is not something existing apart from or outside phenomena. It is simply their order. When we speak of the laws of nature, we mean no more than the ascertained mode of behaviour of things. "A law of nature, as I regard the meaning of the expression, is not a uniformity which must be 'obeyed by all objects, but merely a uniformity which ;'is, as a matter of fact, obeyed by those objects that have come beneath our observation.""^ Law has no * Jevon's Principles of Science, Book VI., Chap. XXXI. The Limits of Natural Law. 39 existence in itself : take away the things, and the mode of their action is taken away. If matter ceased to exist in ponderable form, the law of gravity would cease to have any real existence ; if it remained it would exist, not as a law of things, but as a concep- tion shaped by intelligence. If, then, we build on the universality and necessity^ of any given physical law, if we found our theory on the certainty of its continuance throughout all time, and its dominance over the whole breadth of concrete existence, we put into the law a content to which it has no claim. Wherever there are like things in like conditions, we necessarily find the same mode of action ; for like things are things that behave alike : the truth in fact amounts to an identical proposition. But where the law is assumed to be constant, there is always, and must be presupposed, the existence of like things and like conditions. The law does not create the concrete realities that conform to it, nor does it subdue to its sway things lying outside its dominion. It is not a self-existent something exercising an independent authority : it is the mode of behaviour of objects. No law of nature has validity beyond the class of phenomena whose mode of action it expresses. If it be affirmed that any given law has existed at other periods of time, or exists in undiscoverable distances of space, the existence of like phenomena is invariably presupposed. If we ate not entitled to assume the 40 The Evohction Hypothesis. •existence of phenomena, in all respects that are essen- tial to the point of view in question, identical with those lying within experience, we are not entitled to assume the applicability of the law beyond the region in which its operation has been observed. No experi- ential law carries with it the authority of a universal truth. (2). Every law of nature, being a generalization from experience, is more or less inexact. The degree of inexactness varies from rough approximations to formulae which may be made the basis of calculations that are justified by the foretold event ; yet it will not be claimed for any generalized experience that it is characterized by absolute precision. The laws of number and form dealing with purely abstract re- lations are absolutely true; but the laws of nature have to do with concrete things — not with abstrac- tions. They express the mode of action of complex realities. No experiential law can be established by demonstration. Its truth lies in the exactness with which it interprets the mode of action of classes of •concrete existences, and is not in any case absolute. It might, indeed, be questioned if any object whatever has been known to act with perfect precision accord- ing to any known law or combination of known laws. Law, as generalized from observation, is not in any instance obeyed perfectly. Law is abstract: objects are concrete. The formula which expresses a law •of nature cannot include the conditions which are J The Lwiits of Natural Law. 41 an inseparable part of the instance. " All laws and explanations are in a certain sense hypothetical, and apply exactly to nothing which we can know to exist." * Throuorhout all nature there is not found a straiofht line, or a perfect circle, or an exact ellipse : these are abstract notions, not real things. Nor does nature furnish an example of motion in a straight line, or in a perfect circle or ellipse, or in a curve whose law may be mathematically expressed. The earth does not in its orbit round the sun move in an ellipse whose form is mathematically exact, nor does it trace the same line in each succeeding year. No two plants are exactly alike ; nor in inanimate nature are there ever found two instances of absolute sameness. Did we know the totality of laws and know each and the whole perfectly, we should then, no doubt, see the entire concrete fact and comprehend it : but such knowledge implies omniscience. So far as discernible by us, the action of every concrete object is more or less erratic, and is not perfectly conformable to any one law or to all known laws. " Onl}^ a mind which stood at the centre of this real world, not outside individual things, but penetrating them with its presence, could command such a view of reality as left nothing to look for, and was therefore the perfect image of it in its own being and activity. But the * Jevon's Principles of Science, Book IV"., Chap. XXI. 42 The Evolution Hypothesis. human mind does not thus stand at the centre of things, but has a modest position somewhere in the extensive ramifications of reality."* (3.) The inconceivable complexity of relations in the universe involves inter-relations of laws of like com- plexity. It is impossible to ascertain with anything approaching certainty in how far any given uni- formity is the resultant of the combined action of conflicting laws, and how far such uniformity will be found to recur in conditions but slightly modified. A law may be subsumed under a higher law, or counter- acted by forces lying outside or beneath the ken of science, or modified by altered relations arising out of the movement of cosmic change. Taking into view the immeasurable field of existence, and the infinite complexity of the inter-relations of things, it is wholly impossible to aflSrm with certainty the applicabilty of any law generalized from experience, outside the bounds of circumstances identified with the experi- ences from which it has been derived. To carry a law over the whole length and breadth and height and depth of being, back to the first beginning of things and forward to the end, is to multiply at every step occasions of doubt, and to end in removing every ground of certainty. (4.) One other source of uncertainty may be noticed. Science cannot in any instance determine with com- * Lotze, Logic, Introduction, § IX. The Limits of Natural Law, 43. plete confidence whether a law derived from observa- tion represents a permanent or a variable and transient condition ; whether it sets out a mode of action essential in the constitution of things, or but a passing interaction of forces as they sweep onward in vast curves of change. We cannot follow with certainty the path of any great cosmic movement. We see too minute a portion of the line to assert with confidence whether it be straight or curved. What is true of the physical sciences is true, TYiutatis "mutandis, of all tha sciences which proceed on the experiential method. So far as they formulate the results of experience they are reliable; when they extend their formulsB into other departments or make them rules for all forms of being they are delusive. The experiential laws of mind will not elucidate the problems of matter; nor the dynamic laws of matter solve the problems of intelligence. Experience, good in its own channel, is an unsafe pilot in strange waters. Assur- ance of the permanence and universality of any law^ supposed to cover the whole field of knowledge, cannot be based on experience. It is a delusion to suppose, if the evolution hypo- thesis be true, that experience gives us knowledge of stability. Stability is, according to the evolution doctrine, the seeming, mutability the real in experience. Not stability but mutability is the condition which evolution teaches us to recognize as the mode of concrete being. Evolution discloses to us the homo- •44 ^^^^ Evolution Hypothesis. sreneous becomino^ heteroofeneous, throucrh the integra- tion of matter and dissipation of motion, and so onward to dissolution. " Apparently the universally-