THE LIBRARY
OF
THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA
PRESENTED BY
PROF. CHARLES A. KOFOID AND
MRS. PRUDENCE W. KOFOID
THE
EVOLUTION HYPOTHESIS
A CRITICISM
OF THE
NEW COSMIC PHILOSOPHY.
J
BY
W. TODDIMAETIN, M.A, D.Lit.,
v MINISTER OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN IRELAND.
EDINBURGH :
JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE.
1^87.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
IVIicrosoft Corporation
http://www.archive.org/details/evolutionhypotheOOmartrich
D 5/^
M 23
TABLE OF CONTENTS,
CHAPTER I.
Introductory.
PAGE
The Evolution Hypothesis has stamped its impress on
thought of our time — Claims to dominate all experience —
Here dealt with as formulating the entire cosmic move-
ment — Examined as elaborated by Mr. Herbert Spencer
— Tested at vital points — Term evolutionism defined —
The question touches vitally the interests of men — Effect
of the acceptance of the Hypothesis — Yearning after unity
in the world and in our intellectual life — Evolution
answers the craving for manifested continuity — Its
acceptance due to its answering that craving rather than
to evidence — The relations of Religion and Science not
discussed — How best harmonized — The dominance of the
new philosophy a peril to scientific progress — Would
overbear intellectual freedom — The question not, What is
truth ? but, Is evolutionism true % ... 1
CHAPTER II.
The Complete Unification of Knowledge Impossible.
Philosophy defined by Mr. Spencer as "completely unified
knowledge" — Philosophy in that sense not possible —
Its task to "unify all concrete phenomena" — Unity may
be sought in God, or in unity of the object, or in the
absolute self- revealing — Cannot be reached by way of the
absolute — May be sought in manifested process of change
— Problem stated — Facts to be unified — Lying in distinct
1^375301
iv Contents.
which the entire course of change may be deductively
demonstrated — Under that principle every known law
must be subsumed — It must account for all the known
phases of all known phenomena — Mr. Spencer finds such
principle in ' ' the law of the continuous redistribution of
matter and motion " — This dynamic principle universal —
The problem in the solution of which alone philosophy
comes into existence a problem in dynamics — No other
principle available on the evolution doctrine — Mr. Spencer
embraces thought, emotion, and conscience under it — He
denies that his doctrine is materialistic— So far as the
universe of material forces reaches, it is admitted that
dynamic law is universal — But all kinds of knowledge
cannot be included under it — It does not account for life
or sentience or thought — But to all these Mr. Spencer
applies this law — He takes exception to the application of
the term " mechanical " to his hypothesis — It is dynamical
—We are carried back to the Greek atomists, . . 65
CHAPTER VIII.
The Persistence of Force.
Section I. — Is t'h^ Persistence of Force a datum of conscious-
ness ? Mr. Spencer claims for it the authority of a datum
of consciousness — The content of consciousness stated —
If Mr. Spencer's reasoning be sound all existence is eter-
nal — He identifies being and persistence — The force whose
persistence is attested by consciousness is, on Mr.
Spencer's theory, the absolute force — But the force we
know is that with which alone science is concerned —
What we know does not persist ; what persists we can
never know — Mr. Spencer falls back on an impotence of
thought — This will not avail in founding a system of
positive philosophy, . . . . .78
Section II. — What is included in the term Force? Force
used in two senses — We know it as an object of sense —
We use the term metaphorically of mental activities —
Does the persisting force include Spirit? — Spirit must
have existed either as matter, or as a separate mode of
Contents,
existence — If the latter, where during all the ages did it
lie hidden? 87
Section III. — The Force persisting the Absolute Force. Mr.
Spencer employs the word force to denote force as it is
within the limits of definite knowledge, and force as it is
for ever unknowable — Science requires the persistence of
force within the reach of knowledge — The validity of the
axiom requires that we should take the persisting force
to be the absolute — Evolution is founded on the persist-
ence of manifested force — But force as existing within
the knowable does not persist — Force recedes into the
unsearchable, . . . . . .89
Section IV. — Can ive predicate persistence in any Jcnowahle
mode ? The predication of persistence in identity will
not hold — The predication, Force continues to be force,
yields no profitable result — Persistence may mean con-
tinuance in equality of amount — This predication also
fails us — We must reject the predication of persistence in
identity, or in kind, or in quantity — Removing these
modes we reach the bare thought of bei^ig — We are not
far from Hegel's identification of pure Being and pure
No-thing — The knowable universe will not rest firmly on
such a basis, . . . . . .95
Section Y.— Corollaries of the persistence of jorce. 1. — The
indestructibility of matter. — The persistence of force does
not guarantee the persistence of matter — Two essential
attributes of matter, resistance and occupation of space —
No sufiicient ground for affirming that matter, whether
viewed as resistant or space-occupying, persists. 2. — The
continuity of motion. — Persistance of force gives no
warrant for affirming the ceaseless continuity of motion.
3. — The persistance of relations among forces. — The rela-
tions comprise space, time, quantity, quality, cause and
effect — These relations do not all persist, else there could
be no change — Mr. Spencer deals only with cause and
effect — This relation examined as an instance of persist-
ence — Final conclusion that the persistance of force has
no validity as a universal truth — But Evolutionism is
based on it, . . . . . . 103
vi Contents.
CHAPTER IX.
Postulates of Evolution.
PAGE
The Evolution Philosophy requires as its basis certain pos-
tulates — 1. It presupposes, as its primal conception, the
cosmos as a force homogeneous or nearly homogeneous —
It is either finite or infinite — examined under either
supposition — 2. The evolving force must be assumed
equal in amount throughout all time — This impossible of
proof — 3. The hypothesis postulates the inclusion of all
change and of every event under the law of the con-
tinuous redistribution of matter and motion — If mental
phenomena cannot be included, this postulate is rejected
— 4. The total of matter in the universe must be granted
a fixed quantity — and also the total of motion — 5. It
must further be granted that force as manifested in the
cosmos includes in these manifestations all the causes of
every change — This postulate examined, and found when
enlarged so as to embrace all facts, to be worthless to the
evolutionist — 6. There must be given a determinate ex-
tent and relation of parts — This postulate examined and
the assumptions involved in it set out — These postulates
essential to the Evolution Hypothesis, . . . 112
CHAPTER X.
The Formula of Evolution.
The formula — Is it a law ? — The terms examined — In what
sense " indefinite " ? — This concept only thinkable as the
negation of definite thought — " Incoherent " yields no pre-
cise conception — " Homogeneity " also vague — Summing
all up, the total could hardly be surpassed in vagueness
— Inconsistent with the conception of the imperceptible
out of which the existing order rises — The '* definite,
coherent heterogeneity," which is the evolved result does
not yield a more exact conception — The words "integra-
tion of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion,"
do not furnish an instrument of exact reasoning — This
Contents. vii
PAGE
formula cannot be applied to individual objects or classes
of things — In them the force does not persist, but is
continually changed in amount — Every principle of
cosmic evolution is in such cases violated — The formula
when tested is found wanting, .... 133
CHAPTER XL
Evolution as it gives Account of Inorganic Matter.
Evolution should throw clearest light on inorganic matter —
Here dynamic law is supreme — Mr. Spencer does not
apply his doctrine in this field — This to be regretted— It
could have been more easily tested by known physical
law — The atomic theory adopted by Mr. Spencer — The
one quality of the atom resistance — Is the atom a force-
bearer, or is the force inherent in the atom ? — Mr. Spencer
favours the former — Then we have, besides the atoms,
operative forces moving them — How can the law of these
forces be reached ? — The atoms are combined in molecules
and these in systems — All future changes lay in these
co-ordinate movements — These movements are not ex-
plained — Of this world behind the visible evolution can
tell us nothing — Yet the visible cannot be understood till
it is known — It is a barren hypothesis — No instance of
evolution in the whole range of dynamic operations —
Differentiation the necessary form of all definite concepts
— In pure physics evolutionism is silent in face of every
fundamental question, ..... 145
CHAPTER XII.
The Transition from Inorganic Matter to Life.
Mr. Spencer repudiates "spontaneous generation" — His
account of the transition to life — Instability of the inor-
ganic compounds — Atoms aggregated into molecules —
molecules into protein — Portions of inorganic matter
displaying activities varying little by little into vital —
Ceaseless adjustments between aggregates and their units
viii Contents,
PAOK
differentiate organisms into kinds — This exposition a
brilliant effort of scientific imagination — 1. The hypothesis
assumes the evolution of molecules differentiated into
kinds and reproduced in their kinds prior to the evolution
of protoplasm — The two most difficult problems in organic
life antecedent to the first beginning of life — 2. Mr.
Spencer assumes, contrary to uniform experience, the
existence of protoplasm prior to life — 3. He takes for
granted that by minute variations molecular motion may
become vital action — 4. To account for the varieties of
kind he introduces the " physiological unit," . . 156
CHAPTER XIII.
The Physiological Unit.
The physiological unit is : 1. Extremely minute — 2. It is a
highly organized body — 3. It is composed of system upon
system of molecules — 4. These units differ in kinds — 5.
They have a "more or less distinctive character" — The
' ' polarity " of the units — Immense variety of hereditary
attributes stored up in each unit — 6. Individual charac-
teristics of the unit— due to the incident forces — Adjust-
ment of units as difficult to comprehend as adjustment
of living bodies — 7. The units possess marvellous inherent
powers — Proclivities, tendencies, power of arranging
themselves — The environing forces the source of the
power that effects re-arrangement, the polarity of the
units determining the direction — This no addition to real
knowledge — It carries us back to a defined, differentiated
system — The physiological unit necessary to Mr. Spencer's
hypothesis — It is a "special creation "of the evolution
philosophy, ...... 168
CHAPTER XIV.
The Origin of Sentient Life.
Question discussed only in relation to lower animals — Take
dog as an example — Facts to be explained : (a) his
Contents, ix
intelligence, (6) his sense of pleasure and pain, (c) his
complex and highly developed organism — Putting aside
question of intelligence, what account does evolution give
of the organism and its sensibility ? — Is the sense of pain
seeming only or real ? — Where lies the source of the feel-
ing ? — Suppose the universe composed of atoms and their
motions; how does feeling arise? — Either the capacity
for, feeling is a property resident in atoms, or something
■exists other than matter — In the former case the atoms
are monads, possessing properties other than dynamic ;
in the latter, we affirm the existence of concrete being
other than the forces manifested in atoms and their
motions — A supra-dynamical element is introduced — In
•either case the dynamic doctrine is found defective — Feel-
ing reveals another mode of being — It can never have its
place assigned in an order dominated throughout by phy-
sical law — When feeling appeared, the process of change
was profoundly modified — It affects all modifications of
organisms — The physical process ^Zi/s the feeling deter-
mines the next process, and so on — The feeling necessary
to the result — The operative cause not physical force
alone, but physical force pZm feeling — Evolutionist unable
to assign any knowable cause to account for the origin of
sentient life — Nor any explanation of the part of sentience
in working out modifications of organic forms, . . 178
CHAPTER XV.
The Origin of Organic Forms.
Vast multiformity in organized matter — Evolution bound to
show that all forms mud have sprung from one primordial
mode of living matter, and to show how — Only on these
conditions can a philosophy of evolution be established —
Facts divided into two classes, organisms as at present
known and those found in the geological record — No direct
evidence of transition from lower to higher species —
Gradual advancement from lower to higher forms through-
out the geological periods inevitable — Science looks in
Contents.
PAGK
vain for the common ancestor of differentiated species —
The genealogical tree is all branches and no stem — The
proposal to treat man as an exception fore-doomed — If
Divine intelligence be needful to account for man, it is
needful to account for inferior species — Wallace regards
man as exempt from the great law of organic change —
Darwin's position safer as an evolutionist, in boldly in-
cluding him — Spencer stakes his theory on the adequacy
of dynamic law to account for the whole — He condemns
Prof. Owen's ' ' continuous unknown process " — No more
comprehensible by science than "special creations" — The
causes recognized by Mr. Spencer are (a) an innate ten-
dency or polarity in the physiological units, and (6) the
play of incident forces — The unit has an internal system
of forces equilibrated in harmony with ancestral form,
the incident forces disturb this equilibrium — In regaining
equilibrium the structure is modified — The explanation
carries us back to the atom and its environment — The
differentiation of sex — Differentiation of structure due
altogether to environment — Physiological unit dethroned
— How account for the diverse action of the same en-
vironment ? — Mr. Spencer gives two conflicting answers —
Evolution cannot show in any comprehensible way the
mode of operation of the causes producing variety of forms
— The dynamic hypothesis furnishes basis for theory dif-
ferent from " natural selection " — Similarity of incident
forces should produce similarity of structure — The verte-
brate structure may be result of similarity of causes and
not the outcome of identity of descent — In Darwinian
theory the " incident forces " play a part that is negative —
The removal of the less fit will not account for the pro-
duction of the fittest — At bottom, the question is the pro-
duction and continuance of any — The growth of a single
germ cannot be accounted for on the dynamic theory — No
vital activity can be explained wholly by knowledge of
dynamic law — A cause continually operative — not to be
confounded with physical force — Its truest representation
the energy of self-conscious mind, . . . 187
Contents. xi
CHAPTER XVI.
PAOK.
Section I. — The origin of consciousness. The science of
mind lies at foundation of philosophy — The evolutionist
must show the relation of consciousness to the antecedent
modes of concrete being — If an immediate operation of
First Cause be assumed, it is at the cost of the principle
of evolution — Criticism of Mr. Spencer's statement :
"The raw material of consciousness is present even in
undiflferentiated protoplasm : " " The raw material of con-
sciousness everywhere exists protentially in the unknow-
able Power" — To have recourse to the unknowable is to
take refuge in the outer darkness — The theist holds a
clear and tenable position ; the agnostic is hopelessly at
fault — Self, conscious of itself, stands apart — The chasm
cannot be bridged over — But if consciousness and phy-
sical phenomena cannot be brought together in one,
evolutionism is proved impossible, . . . 20^
Section II. — hi what does consciousyiess inhere ? Conscious-
ness is not latent in the matter of the organism — Nor in
the force manifested in it — But in the unknowable actu-
ality — As a wave of molecular motion passes through a
nerve-centre, consciousness comes into being out of the
inscrutable — If so every act of consciousness is deter-
mined by the fixed f)hysical succession — The law of mind
is subsumed under the law of matter — Physical force is
enthroned as sovereign over the whole extent of know-
ledge, . . . . . . . 21&
Section III. — The unit of consciousness. "Something of
the same order as that which we call a nervous shock is
the ultimate unit of consciousness" — A nervous shock
not a feeling till it is felt — Evolutionism cannot bring
consciousness within its sweep — The central factor stands
out the great exception — Consciousness essentially cogni-
tive — The consciousness itself cannot be broken up into
units — But to make the object of consciousness the unit
is impossible, for there is no one object of consciousness —
That nerve-pulses and pisses of feeling are "inner and
outer faces of the same change " disputed — Consciousness
xii ^ Contents.
PAGB
is the primary attribute of mind — We begin with know-
ledge, 218
Section IV. — TAe relations of Feelings. The theory of rela-
tions of feelings examined, and knowledge of relation
proved impossible on the principles of evolution, . 225
Section V. — Reasoning. Defined as the "formation of
cohesions among manifestations " — Grouping shown to be
impossible without intellection implying (1) a faculty of
perception of external objects, (2) a faculty of reproduc-
tion of the objects in thought, (3) a faculty of comparison
of object with object, (4) ability to group objects accord-
ing to known resemblances — Call this mind or by any
other name it is there in the simplest beginnings of
thought, 230
Section VI. — Self atid not- self. Classed with fundamental
intuitions — Mr. Spencer distinguishes between conscious-
ness and consciousness of self — Sir W. Hamilton quoted
in proof that this is not a valid distinction — To avoid a
breach of continuity the evolutionist splits up conscious-
ness into separate fragments— Criticism of Mr. Spencer's
three postulates — He repudiates material or spiritual
monism — Manifestations are feelings, "vivid" or "faint"
— The ego is the power manifested in the vivid, the non-
ego that manifested in the faint — These powers not dis-
tinguishable — The feelings are inner faces of nerve- thrills
whether vivid or faint — Mind conscious of itself not
evolved by clustering of aggregates of feelings — There are
involved sensation, perception, imagination, comparison,
judgment, reasoning — The evolving mass has no promise
in it of a self -knowing mind, .... 235
Section VII. — Innate principles. Mode in which evolu-
tionist deals with perception of external world — He pushes
into the background the primary mental characteristic,
knowing — Inquiry as to axiomatic truths — Mr. Spencer
claims that his doctrine harmonizes the a priori and
sensationalist schools — Organized ancestral experiences
registered in the brain are the forms of thought — The
intuitions fixed functions of fixed structures — This theory
makes dominant the physical law of the organism — These
Contents. ■ xiii
innate principles are valid only within the adjustments of
the organism, and only for a brief time — This doctrine
overturns evolutionism, ..... 245
Section VIII. — The correlation of mental and physical forces.
Impossible to embrace all change in one process unless
mental and physical actions be correlated — Mr. Spencer
rejects the monist doctrine — The unknowable energy con-
ditioned in matter otherwise than in mind — This correla-
tion can only exist in either material or spiritual monism
— Correlation involves (a) expenditure of force which
passes into new form, (b) equivalence of the amount of
force under both forms — If applicable to mental and
physical action it implies (a) the passing of physical force
into intellectual force, and (6) the amount of physical force
expended balances the mental force produced — This inter-
change absurd — A universal law of evolution therefore
imposssible, ...... 255
CHAPTER XVII.
The Evolution of Morals.
Life directed towards an end voluntarily chosen — Moral
life everything to man — Aim of Mr. Spencer's philosophy
to find scientific basis for right and wrong in conduct —
His ethics must be outcome of his system — Apologists do
not disparage moral lessons drawn from nature — Re-
vealed moral teaching could not be accepted as true if
antagonistic to the first principles of morals — Religion
has been the most important source of moral impulse —
1. Moral law can only be obeyed in conscious freedom —
Moral obedience willing obedience — Evolution determines
action by physical law — The Calvinist contends for liberty
— He rejects an imaginary liberty — Evolution ethics sheer
dynamic determinism — 2. The evolutionist account of
sense of obligation — Race-needs enforce the sacrifice of
present to future pleasures — Moral self-restraint, how
originated — Two elements in the "notion of obligation"
— (a) surrender of present pleasure for sake of future
xiv Contents.
benefit, (6) coercive sense of obligation to do so — The
latter driven into the primeval man from fear of visible
ruler, of invisible ruler, and of society — It was then an
illusion — Evolutionist very familiar with the primitive
savage man — How will the sense of obligation be main-
tained in highly evolved man ?— Because the good is
always pleasure to some one somewhere — But why sacri-
fice present pleasure ? — If sense of duty be maintained,
we must recognise the existence of a moral nature — 3.
What chief end does evolution set before man ? — Adjust-
ment to environment, and consequent fulness of life — But
equilibration is beginning of death — For the individual it
has no significance — Struggle soon ended — 4. The ethical
doctrine of evolution leaves man without effective moral
guidance — Its precepts not universal — ever changing — 4.
It is a system of hedonism — moral quality confounded
with the consequences of actions — Difi*erent light shed on
duty if we hold that man has a moral nature and is im-
mortal — The ethical teaching of evolution has no solid
basis and no imperativeness, .... 259
CHAPTER XVIII.
Creation.
To deny creation is to modify profoundly the idea of God
— The idea of creation alleged to be unthinkable — Lange
affirms the same — The edge of the criticism turned against
Mr. Spencer — The conception proved to be thinkable —
The possibility of the fact denied — (1) God may be con-
ceived as the Absolute, His activity immanent — (2) It
may be alleged that He could not have created the exist-
ing universe — that a spirit could not create matter —
The marvellous subtilty of matter — Thought cannot pass
in known continuity from power immanent in God, to
power manifested in the universe — Passes by faith —
Creation congruous with experience — (1) We must believe
in a First Cause — (2) In a Cause the origin of law and
•order — (3) The author of self-conscious intelligence — (4)
Contents. xv
PAGB
The power effecting adjustments of means to ends — A
self-conscious intelligence — not one with His creatures,
but distinct from them — This relation is creation — The
term covers theories not diflferent within the knowable
from evolution — as contrasted with evolution, it implies a
beginning of the cosmos, also everywhere in it intelligent
purpose and intervention of divine power — The question
of origins, within the cosmos, approached from opposite
sides by the creatiojiist and the evolutionist — The former
begins with intelligence, the latter with the physical order
— The creationist seeks the key to the problem in Thought
— Existences differenced as new kinds are "special
•creations " — Evolutionist asks to see the process of their
coming to be new kinds — The records do not furnish
materials — Evolutionist unable to show how species have
•originated — Equally at fault with creationist — The Crea-
tionist sees variety at beginning as well as now —
Creationist doctrine does not necessitate the supposition
of a clearly defined and separate beginning of species — a
first pair having no kinship with former living things — He
accepts the uniformity of nature — The conception of the
■cosmic process involved in evolution cannot be definitely
represented in thought — Three stages in the progress from
inorganic matter to organisms — these passed through
•every day through the power of life — May have been so
at beginning by agency of the Author of life — The evolu-
tionist compares the method in nature to the work of an
■unskilful artificer — succeeding through failure — Creationist
free to hold that there have been beginnings within the
cosmos — The unity is in God — when unknowable power is
introduced to account for change it is in efi'ect a ' ' special
creation," . . . . . . . 226
CHAPTER XIX.
Summary and Conclusion.
The Evolution Hypothesis looks outward to find one domi-
nant principle — All mental and moral phenomena re-
garded as modes of expeiiience determined by physical
xvi Contents,
necessity — The Creator extruded beyond range of know-
ledge — Always at work under dynamic yoke — That Power
in its manifestations passes for ever through Evolution
and Dissolution — Summary of the argument — The con-
clusion that the Evolution Hypothesis is incompetent to
interpret the most obvious facts in nature, and is indefens-
ible as a philosophy — An edifice without foundation or
top-stone — Man will seek elsewhere the home of his
spirit, ....... 295-
THE EVOLUTION HYPOTHESIS.
CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTOBY.
THE Evolution Hypothesis has stamped its impress
on the thought of our time. It claims to
dominate the whole field of experience, and to direct
all inquiry. As a theory of universal truth, it lies
open to the criticism of every student of philo-
sophy. How far in certain groups of physical
phenomena it expresses justly the law of change, I do
not discuss. Examination in detail, over the whole
extent of the knowable, can be effectively conducted
only by division of labour among many workers,
each handling some part of the question, which he
has made the subject of special study. In this way
the measure of truth contained in the hypothesis
must ultimately be defined. My purpose is to deal
with the theory as it undertakes to formulate the
entire cosmic movement within the knowable — as it
aims at the unification of all knowledge.
The following criticisna takes the form of an ex-
A
The Evolution Hypothesis.
amination of the system elaborated by Mr. Herbert
Spencer, Choosing the ablest expositor of the hypo-
thesis, and testing it as shaped by him, the critic
escapes the necessity of settling amid minor varieties
of opinion the exact statement of the point in debate.
We may be confident that we shall find all that
is essential to evolutionism,* carefully reasoned out
in Mr. Spencer's works. The theory, as he states it,
may be discussed with the assurance that we are not
beating the air. If the doctrine fail in the hands of
the master, it will not triumph in the hands of his
disciples.
Mr. Spencer's System of Philosophy is a life-work,
remarkable as well for the high order of intellectual
power displayed in it, as for the vast and varied stores
of exact knowledge by which it is enriched. The whole
is worked out with rare analytical and constructive
skill. The apt instances and illustrations, gathered
from the entire range of physical science, give apparent
breadth and solidity, and are introduced with such nice
adjustment, that want of coherence is not readily de-
tected. I propose to test at vital points the soundness
of the structure. To follow Mr. Spencer step by step,
through volumes that contain the results of the scien-
tific and literary labours of a busy life, would be im-
possible, and, if possible, for my purpose needless. It
is enough to examine the essential and distinctive
* I use the term Evolutionism to express the Evolution Hypo-
thesis as a theory co-extensive with the knowable.
Introductory.
features of his philosophy, so as to judge of the worth
of evolutionism as an all -comprehending hypothesis.
The question is not one lying in some remote and
barren region of metaphysical debate : it touches vit-
a-lly the present and real interests of men, "The
matter," Mr. Spencer tells us, " is one which concerns
each and all of us more than any other matter what-
ever. Though it affects us little in a direct way, the
view we arrive at must indirectly affect us in all
our relations — must determine our conception of the
universe, of life, of human nature — must influence our
ideas of right and wrong, and so modify our con-
duct." * This estimate of the results that would
ensue on the acceptance of evolutionism, as the true
philosophy, is not an exaggeration. Before it old
things would pass away, and all things become new.
Under its universal sway Christianity must wither :
religion in any real sense would be impossible.
Morality must find another basis, or disappear with
faith. The matter does, indeed, concern each and all
of us "more than any other matter whatever." An
hypothesis claiming to be the true interpretation of
all the knowable, and deeply affecting the interests of
mankind, challenges the keenest criticism. We shall
need to be fully persuaded of its truth, before we dis-
card the old beliefs, and begin to repeat the new credo.
Every age has its fashionable philosophy. "We
* First Principles, Part I., § 8.
The Evolution Hypothesis.
are constituted not merely to know, but also to
imagine and construct ; and though with more or
less mistrust of the definite validity of what the
understanding and the senses have to offer us, yet
mankind will ever hail with joy the man who under-
stands how, by the force of his genius, and by em-
ploying all the constructive impulses of his era, to
create that unity in the world and in our intellectual
life, which is denied to our knowledge. This creation
will, indeed, be only the expression of the yearning of
the age after unity and perfection; yet even this is
no small thing, for the maintenance and nourishment
of our intellectual life is as important as science
itself, although not so lasting as this is : since the
investigation of the details of positive knowledge,
and of the relations which are the exclusive objects
of our knowledge, is absolute, owing to its method,,
while the speculative apprehension of the absolute
can only claim a relative importance as the expression
of the views of an epoch." *
The yearning of this age after " unity in the world
and in our intellectual life" finds expression in evo-
lutionism. But evolutionism is not content to rest
in " relative importance as the expression of the views
of an epoch ; " it advances a claim to absolute import-
ance " owing to its method," as being the unification
of all truth. It is a characteristic of the intellectual
* Lange's History of Materialism, Book I. , Chap. III.
Introductory.
temper of our time to be dissatisfied with less than
unity. Science, looking on nature as continuous, ac-
counts it her task to disclose how phenomenon is linked
to phenomenon throughout the entire cosmos. The
evolution doctrine satisfies this craving after mani-
fested continuity. It proposes to reveal the universe
as one in co-existence and succession throughout all
space and all time. It is the embodiment of the
modern scientific spirit. The man of science recog-
nises in it the articulate expression of his mental
attitude towards the universe. His faith in the hypo-
thesis stands not in the conclusiveness of the proofs
adduced in its support, but in his sense of its fitness
to harmonize the separate parts of his knowledge,
and to answer his intellectual yearning after organ-
ized completeness of thought. In that inner scientific
sense — analogous to the spiritual feeling that responds
to religious truth — there is a strong persuasion in
favour of the doctrine. To the inquirer who knows
his mind at rest ; who, if we might venture to borrow
the expression, " has found peace " in the new mode
of conceiving the order of the universe, the conviction
of its truth seems irresistible. He discovers confirma-
tion where the doubter finds contradiction. He be-
comes impatient as a zealot with those who cannot
see with his eyes and receive his teaching. Every
soul that will not accept his gospel is under condem-
nation, and in danger of being left in the outer
darkness. No article of reliofion has been maintained
The Evolution Hypothesis.
by the most bigoted ecclesiastic with greater arro-
gance, or in a narrower spirit. Mr. Spencer, for his
part, follows out his conclusions with the confidence
of one assured of their validity, yet without dis-
paragement of those who interpret nature from
a different standpoint; but the disciples outrun the
master, and one who boldly questions the popular
creed may look for rough handling as a heretic.
It does not lie in my way, in the following discus-
sion, to engage in the well-worn controversy as to the
relations of science and religion. Mr. Spencer has
devoted a chapter to the exposition of his view that
the knowable is the realm of science and the unknow-
able the home of religion. Into this question I do not
enter. The harmony of these contrasted departments
of knowledge, too often placed in apparent conflict,
will be most efiectively established by a careful exa-
mination of their distinctive principles and methods,,
and a clear recognition of the just claims of each in its
own province. Religion, in so far as it touches science,
is only concerned in securing veracity in searching for
and dealing with facts, so as to arrive at a truthful
elucidation of the complex world in which man
lives and serves. Faith is not directly concerned in
the acceptance or rejection of any theory lying clearly
within the domain belonging of right to science. No
interpretation of the order of nature within the limits
of actual or possible discovery conflicts, or can conflict,,
with any distinctively religious truth. Whether the
Introductory.
earth revolves round the sun, or the sun round the
earth ; whether the visible universe has been shaped
by gradual solidification from a gaseous mass or had
its origin in solid orbs; whether the divisions of
animal and vegetable life arose as perfect and distinct
species or have been differentiated through processes
of change — questions like these do not in the least
impinge on man's belief in the existence of a personal
God, the Maker of heaven and earth, or on the
assurance with which faith receives the testimony of
Scripture as to the person and mission of Jesus Christ.
It is when generalizations are lifted out of their place
in the realm of experimental knowledge, and are
invested with the authority of universal truths, that
the teaching of science conflicts with the doctrines of
the Church. The progress of truth is slow. The
discussion of the order of the cosmos is not closed.
Science has as yet advanced but a little way in de-
ciphering the vast records. Faith can aflbrd to wait :
nullum tempus ecclesiae. The Church of God will!
be dealing with the great questions of life and duty/
when the thunders of these conflicts shall have been
long silenced, and the smoke of the battlefield shall
have cleared away, revealing the brightness of anj
unclouded heaven encompassing the little world of'
human thought.
The dominance of the new system of philosophy
would prove as great a peril to scientific as to spiritual
truth. If every fact is* to be studied in the light of
8 The Evolution Hypothesis.
evolution, if dynamical law is to be recognized as
ruling all processes and events, the growth of intelli-
gence will be distorted and the advancement of know-
ledge impeded. The Scholastic Philosophy, through
its formal completeness, became an intolerable bond-
age. System strangled truth. It left no room for
the free pursuit of inquiry, and stood a barrier in
the way of the forward movement of thought. A like
danger threatens in the present stage of progress.
The evolutionist is the schoolman of our day. He
^ will have his hypothesis prevail everywhere. He
constitutes it the criterion of truth. Observations
are recorded, and experience read in the light of it.
Everything that will not fall into position under it,
he condemns. These are not conditions favourable
to the right exercise of intelligence. Intellectual
freedom is overborne ; well-springs of knowledge are
sealed up; a one-sided and iron system rules. It is
imperative, in the interests of progressive thought,
that this yoke be broken, that the mind may be free
in the pursuit of truth.
The following discussion, directed to the disproof of
the Evolution Hypothesis as a system co-extensive
with knowledge, is not constructive, but critical. The
inquiry is not. What is the truth ? but, Is Evolu-
tionism true ? The final answer is a decided negative.
The argument is cumulative ; to find it inconclusive
at some points will not invalidate its effectiveness in
others. It deals only with questions that seem to be
Introductory, g
of vital importance to the doctrine under examination.
Whatever may be the worth o£ the argument, no one
can doubt the gravity of the issues involved. The
highest interests are at stake. Evolutionism, if ac-
cepted, must eventually crush the liberty of the spirit
in man ; and the liberty of the spirit is indispensable
to the progress of humanity.
CHAPTER 11.
THE COMPLETE UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE
IMPOSSIBLE,
MR. SPENCER defines philosophy as "completely-
unified knowledge."* Before proceeding to the
examination of his system, which claims to answer
this definition, a previous question must be deter-
mined. Is the complete unification of knowledge pos-
sible ? In other words, Is philosophy, in Mr. Spencer's
meaning of the term, possible ?
I answer in the negative. It is a fundamental error
to assume that thought is competent to embrace all
the knowable in one organic whole in a comprehen-
sible unity. A necessary condition of scientific pro-
gress is to accept the limits of intelligence. From the
Eleatic to the Evolutionist an overweening desire for
systematized unity has perverted science. The system-
builder has been one of the chief hindrances in the
way of advancing knowledge. Intellectual progress
cannot proceed with steady step along the whole line
of the knowable, until it is clearly seen and frankly
acknowledged that complete unification transcends-
* First Principles, Part II., § 37.
The Unification of Knowledge Impossible, ii
the limits of intelligence, and that every system pro-
fessing to have reached such completeness is thereby
self -convicted as being necessarily false.
In discussing the unification of knowledge, it is to
be kept in view that we are not dealing with the
question of method. We are not inquiring as to the
criterion of truth or the form of correct reasoning.
The unity aimed at is not the coherence and congruity
of our thinking ; not the unity of the mental process,
but the unity of knowledge as knowledge of objects,
as conversant about things and their relations: it is
the unity of knowledge dealing with all knowable
modes of existence. " If philosophy," says Mr. Spencer,,
"is completely unified knowledge — if the unification
of knowledge is to be effected only by showing that
some ultimate proposition includes and consolidates
all the results of experience; then, clearly, this ulti-
mate proposition which has to be proved congruous
with all others must express a piece of knowledge, and
not the validity of an act of knowing." * *' Philo-
sophy, as we understand it, must not unify separate
concrete phenomena only; and must not stop with
unifying separate classes of concrete phenomena ; but
must unify all concrete phenomena"f
The task which philosophy undertakes in attempt-
ing this complete unification of all concrete pheno-
mena is one the magnitude of which it is not easy at
* First Principles, f 42. t Ibid., § 186.
1 2 The Evolution Hypothesis.
first sight to apprehend. It is nothing less than
an attempt to present, in the unity of thought, the
unity of all real existence and all relations of real
-existence, in co-existence and succession throughout
all time. All orders of persons and things, and all
processes of change, must find their due place in the
reproduction in thought of that organic whole which
is assumed to embrace all things in its totality. The
vastness of such an undertaking might well impart
a feeling of mistrust to the boldest and most self-
<;onfident. Man buried, according to the doctrine of
the evolutionist, in the depth of this incomprehensible
universe of concrete being, tossed like a particle of
dust in the whirl of its incalculable eddies, stretching
hopelessly towards its infinite bounds, groping blindly
after its oricrin and end — man, in his felt insie^nificance
over against the unsearchable actuality, might well
enter with hesitancy on the task of framing, in the
shape of organized knowledge, a true representation
of the whole range of being from God to inanimate
nature, and of the law of the activities, inter-rela-
tions, and changes of the whole and every part. Yet
this is the achievement which a philosophy, successful
in the task of unifying all knowledge, must accom-
plish. For " it is not enough to unify different classes
of phenomena ; philosophy must unify all concrete
phenomena."
The goal of unity has been sought along various
lines.
The Unification of Knowledge Impossible, 13
(1.) The Calvinist finds that unity in God. All
things have been ordered according to His will ; they
are the manifestation of His power, and have their
harmony in His decree. This is unification ; but it is
the attainment of that aim throuo^h faith, not tbrouofh
knowledge. The co-ordination of all departments of
knowledge in one organic and comprehensible whole
is not reached by this method.
(2.) The unification of knowledge may be approached
by positing the unity of the object of knowledge.
But our knowledge is not of One Thing; it is of many
things. To know individual things as individual
things, is to difference them ; and the knowledge is
diverse as the objects. Knowledge is at first of indi-
vidual things ; to reach unity of knowledge through
the unity of the thing known, the Eleatic removed
the many, affirming reality only of the One. We need
hardly pause to show that the knowledge of the One
as thus attained is not real knowledge. There is no
knowledge without judgment, and no judgment
without comparison, and no comparison without like-
ness or difference; nor these without plurality. Sa
that in the removal of the multiple and the positing
of the One the conditions of knowledge have vanished.
Like Samson, who at one stroke overthrew his enemies
and sacrificed himself, knowledge, in sweeping away
plurality, is self- destroyed. So soon as the unifica-
tion is complete, thought is extinguished. If, then,.
14 The Evolution Hypothesis.
the existence of the object as one be essential to
the unity aimed at, unification is impossible ; for
knowledge itself is impossible. Again, to know the
object of knowledge as one is incompetent owing to
the fundamental contrast between the ego and the
non-ego : unity is not complete until the subject and
object are reduced to identity. In the pursuit of the
unity of knowledge along the line of the unity of
the object known, we are driven to look for it in an
ultimate real oneness of the ego and non-ego : but the
identification is unthinkable ; it cannot arise in expe-
, rience. The contrast between subject and object is
essential to thought. If I am no longer able to say, I
myself exist, I am no longer capable of conscious in-
tellection. Knowledge itself is impossible.
(3.) Unity may be sought, not in the One eternal
^nd unchanged — the absolute in being — but in the
One eternally self-revealing, that is, in an absolute
process. In every attempt to reach unification of the
phenomenal through the absolute, whether in being
or in process, there is involved the implication that
the absolute is known. That a philosophy based on
knowledge of the absolute is impossible, has been,
once for all, demonstrated by Sir William Hamilton,
in his "Philosophy of the Unconditioned." Unifica-
tion based on such assumed knowledge is clearly
invalid. All search for unity by the way of the
absolute must fail ; for it involves acts of intelligence
that transcend the limits of thought.
The Unification of Knowledge Impossible. 15
Driven back from the attempt to reach unity from
the side of the absolute, are we left without any hope
of combining the different elements and separate parts
of truth in one consistent and organic whole ? Must
we abandon in despair all endeavour after the unifica-
tion of knowledge ? From Heraclitus to Mr Herbert
Spencer there has been a succession of philosophers
who have looked for the unifying principle, not in
oneness of being, or in the self -revelation of the abso-
lute, but in the process of ceaseless change. The present
state of knowledge is especially favourable to such a
doctrine. Knowledge proceeding from the cognition
of individual things, strives towards unification by
combining the many in one through unity of law.
The rapid development of experimental science, re-
vealing order everywhere, has impressed all minds
with a sense of the universality of law, and prepared
the way for a philosophy claiming to have discovered,
in a law governing all change, the principle of that
complete unification of knowledge which has been
sought so ardently.
The problem then is, to find one unifying principle
actually operative over the whole extent of being and
of mutation. The principle sought must embrace the
immeasurable spaces of the material world, and govern
€very thrill of each atom, and every movement of the
entire mass : it must be seen in operation at the first
moment, when the universe emerges into the field of
thought, and must regulate the entire course of change
1 6 The Evolution Hypothesis.
onward to the end of time : it must bring to light the-
beginning of life, and disclose the origin and growth
of every individual and every species : it must show
how organic sensibility came to be, and elucidate the
complex and wonderful adaptations by which, even in
the case of microscopic forms, the living creature is
fitted to its habitat, and enabled to maintain itself in
life during its brief day, and perpetuate the existence
of its kind : it must account for the human conscious-
ness, and explain how it has arisen : it must determine
how the faculties of mind have come to be, and reveal
the origin of conscience : it must unveil the source of
religious feeling, and furnish the key to the indestruc-
tible belief in God : it must afford explanation of the
marvellous achievements of intelligence in unravelling
the complexities of things, and making known their
order and law ; in accomplishing astounding feats of
power and skill, by the combination of resources
through political and social organizations ; in produc-
ing works of art, whose beauty rivals the perfection
of nature ; in attaining moral ends through the sense
of personal freedom voluntarily submitting to the
law of duty; in reaching spiritual results through
knowledge that pierces the encompassing veil, and
through devotion that freely sacrifices self. It must
thus account for man, the most wonderful of all the
phenomena of the universe ; it must, above all, account
for the appearance in this world of the man Christ
Jesus, for the power of His teaching and life, and for
The Unificatio7t of Knowledge Impossible, 17
the transforming influence of that most notable of all
phenomena — the Christian Faith.
And this gigantic task is to be accomplished, not inl
the region of ideas, but in the realm of fact. The
principle that unifies is to be known as a principle
operative throughout the entire range of knowable
existence, as the bond which unites in one organic
and indivisible whole all objects, from the molecule
that vibrates at the centre of the universe to the
Almighty Source of all things, as the law that
reorulates all events throughout the entire succession
of change from everlasting to everlasting.
The facts, which are to be brought together in one,
lie in clearly marked departments or kingdoms, each
distinguished from the others by a well-defined line
of discrimination, w^hich science, as it advances, does
nothing to obliterate ; on the contrary, the clearer the
light of science, the deeper and the more marked the
distinction is seen to be. These objects of knowledge
are: —
(1.) Supreme over all — GoD.
(2.) The self-conscious intelligence of man.
(3.) Objects endowed with life and sensibility.
(4.) Objects endowed with vegetal life.
(5.) Inorganic matter.
Throughout the entire series of created existence,
there are common characteristics that reveal a certain
sort of oneness. But that unity is far different from
the oneness of an organic whole, the same in substance
1 8 The Evolution Hypothesis.
throughout, moulded and moved in every part by the
same active principle. It is community of the sort we
recoofnize when we observe in different works traces
of the same intelligence, touches of the same hand.
Consider these fields of knowledge, and it will be
evident how fruitless is the attempt to find in them
one operative principle by which they may be reduced
to unity.
(1.) God exists in the view of thought : it is impos-
sible, if we would, to rid ourselves of that Presence.
Mr. Spencer bears convincing testimony to this fact.
Under the veil of what he calls the Unknowable, a
something — the Absolute Reality — lies present to
thought in every process of reasoning. Granted that
our consciousness of it is vague, undefined, still the
inscrutable actuality is there. This element — being a
real and necessary element of consciousness — brings
into view, though it may be indefinitely, a real exis-
tence. To unify all objects of whose existence we
have proof is manifestly impossible, until we shall
have brought this Reality into organic relation with
all other concrete existences known to us. But no
principle can be discovered which will effect such
unification. There is here a manifest and insuperable
breach of continuity in our knowledge. Till continuity
is established at this point, it is clear that the totality
of existences — not imaginary but concrete existences,
existences of which we have indubitable evidence —
cannot be brought together in one. Much more, if we
TJie Unification of Knoiu ledge Impossible, 19
follow the Christian doctrine of the Divine Personality, ^
is it impossible to institute an organic oneness between
Ood and His creatures.* However imperative it may
be, that we should recognise the presence and power
of the Divine Being as manifested in all things, re-
ligious faith refuses to confound the Creator with His
works : it sees a line of distinction which cannot be
obliterated or transcended, differencing all created
beings from the eternal source from which they have
sprung. The continuity of knowledge is broken.
God and the universe cannot be broufyht toojether
in one. Philosophy cannot "unify all concrete!
phenomena."
(2). Man is conscious of himself. In every act of
intelligence he knows himself as differenced from the
surrounding world. The line that separates the e(jo
from the non-ego, runs throughout all conscious in-
tellection.- No unifying principle can obliterate it.
The knowledge which the mind has of its own opera-
tions is primary. No other source of knowledge can
Assert superior authority. What consciousness attests
in its primary exercise, cannot be set aside by secon-
dary evidence. All knowledge ultimately rests on
its veracity. Even if there were a principle adequate
to the unification of consciousness and the object of
consciousness, it would be impossible that that prin-
* The incarnation does not lie within the scientific field : its
significance is spiritual. Jt is an unwarrantable use of the
doctrine to constitute it a link in a cosmic theory.
20 The Evoltitio7i Hypothesis,
ciple should be realized in thought ; for to apprehend
the unity of itself and its objects, consciousness must
transcend itself, and contemplate the relation from
without. But such an achievement is manifestly
impossible : it would be fatal ; for consciousness must
perish in the act. The law of continuity is violated
in every exercise of conscious intelligence. Self-con-
sciousness is an insuperable barrier in the way of the
complete unification of knowledge.
(3). Life manifested in organisms endowed with
sensibility presents another wide and distinct depart-
ment of phenomena, which has hitherto defeated all
attempts at reducing it to knowable unity with other
modes of concrete existence. The animal kingdom is
divided by an impassable separation from that of
vegetable life. It may be alleged that the lowest
forms in both are hardly distinguishable from eacb
other. But even though these lowest forms should
be to us indistinguishable, it does not follow that they
are not distinct. The higher organisms are not dis-
tinguishable in their earliest stage ; yet these germs,
whose differences are indiscernible, pursue, with un-
erring and infallible certainty, paths of development
which result in clearly differenced structures. The
germs out of which animals of different species are
developed, must have, though not discernible by us,
characteristics by which they are discriminated. Even
in the same species the germs, though altogether in-
distinguishable, are of quite distinct varieties. That
The Unification of Knowledge Impossible. 2 1
the lowest forms cannot be, with certainty, classified,
•does not prove that they are not separated by any
real difference into animal or vegetal, but only
that science is not able to bring the difference to
light, and that our classification is no more than
a rough approximation to reality. To affirm that
there are no discriminating marks, because we can-
not discover them, is to assume, against all expe-
rience, that science succeeds in tracing the lines of
demarcation in nature wherever such lines exist.
Every living germ is a witness to the contrary. The
primal forms of the higher species cannot be sorted
by science.
(4). The vegetal kingdom forms another vast group
of organisms, separated on the one side from inorganic
matter, and on the other, from organisms endowed
with sensibility. The differences on either side must
be accounted for before unification is complete. The
origin of organization lies — and seems as if it would
for ever lie — a mystery to science. No attempt to
trace the process of change from the inorganic to the
organic has succeeded, or has come near success. It
still remains an unsolved problem to find an operative
principle adequate to the task of bringing organic
and inorganic processes together in a real oneness.
We shall have to look more closely at this point in
another part of the discussion.
(5). Nor is it possible to unify knowledge even
within the compass o^ inorganic matter. The laws
2 2 The Evohition Hypothesis,
of the inorganic world cannot be unified. No one
dynamic principle will account for the play of forces
in nature, or reduce all their operations to unity.
To explain the action of inorganic matter there is
more needed than the persistence of force. "The
antecedent forces must be adequate in their quanti-
ties, kinds, and distribution."* When the imagina-
tion has pushed back the conception of matter and
force to the utmost limit, to derive the universe that
is, the evolutionist must assume a certain position of
the atoms, certain orderly relations among the atoms,
certain activities and their laws — a conception as com-
plex and as far from being resolved into unity as the
visible cosmos. The world that now is lay, by hypo-
thesis, wrapped up in that original collocation of
matter and force. Systems on systems of atoms
rising through systems on systems of molecules, ac-
cording to Mr. Spencer, constitute the imperceptible
out of which the visible has been shaped. This in-
finitely complicated and inexplicable series of systems
is necessary, even in one field of observation, to the
conception of that unity which science seeks. How
inconceivable the complexity, when we survey the
whole world of thought !
As the stream of created being flows forth from
the unseen, obedient to the Divine word, like the
Edenic river, it is " parted into four heads " : — inor-
* Spencer's Frinciples of Biology, Vol. I., Appendix.
The Unification of Knowledge Impossible. 23
ganic matter, organisms endowed with vegetal life,
organisms endowed with animal life, and man en-
dowed with self-conscious intelligence and a moral
nature.
These great fountain-heads of created being are
distinct throughout all the cosmic history in so far
as we can know it, and they seem destined to con-
tinue distinct departments of knowledge until the
existing framework of things shall be dissolved. No
principle has been discovered, nor is, as we believe,
discoverable, which will unite all these orders of
existences in one coherent organic body. No principle
can be found — and if it could be found its applica-
bilty must be for ever undiscoverable — through which
it can be shown how consciousness may rise out of and
sink again into the unintelligent world. No principle
has heretofore been broucfht to lisfht, nor can be,
which, operative in all forms of being and furnishing
an explanation of their distinctive characteristics, is
adequate to bring existences subject only to dynamic
laws, and those which are subject to the higher laws
of life, sensation, and mind, together in one.
The unification of knowledge is not complete ; nor
is completeness of unification possible. The pretence
of completeness can only be attained by hiding the
difficulties from view. But to do so is to be false to
scientific progress. Knowledge advances towards per-
fection by clearing, not blurring, the lines of discrimi-
nation. Jf there are distinctions in nature, these must
24 The Evolution Hypothesis.
have their counterpart in a corresponding demarca-
tion in thought. The great departments of inquiry-
are mutually helpful, and throw light one upon the
other. They have much in common ; but they can
never be brought together in a complete unity of
knowledge. Each must in the main pursue its own aim
by' its own appropriate methods. The results reached
along this way will be solid additions to science and
valuable contributions to human well-being ; when, on
the other hand, research is set to the task of filling up
the empty outline of a universal system of organised
knowledge, it ceases to be the devotee of truth, and is
transformed into the advocate whose business is to
compel every fact to fit his theory, and every witness
to give such evidence as suits his case.
The interests of science and of faith alike require
that thought should recognize the bounds set to it, and,
accepting its appointed conditions, work out patiently,
and with veracity, its task of deciphering such pages
of the book of the universe as are open to the view
of man. He is a false prophet of the natural who
will profess to write out the whole, or even to furnish
a complete table of contents. One of the greatest of the
prophets of the spiritual has laid down a principle as
entirely applicable to scientific as to religious thought :
" We know in part and we prophesy in part." * The
complete unification of knowledge is impossible.
* 1 Corinthians xiii. 9.
CHAPTER III.
THE LIMITS OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE.
THE Physical Sciences have advanced with such
rapidity, and have succeeded in so large a number
•of instances in unifying what appeared to be alto-
gether separate classes of facts by the discovery of
their law, that at first sight it seems reasonable to
hope for a still wider unification embracing all de-
partments of truth.
" The truths of philosophy bear the same relation
to the highest scientific truths, that each of these
bears to lower scientific truths. As each widest
generalization of science comprehends and consolidates
the narrower generalization of its own division; so
the generalizations of philosophy comprehend and
consolidate the widest generalizations of Science. It
is therefore a knowledge the extreme opposite in kind
to that which experience first accumulates. It is the
final product of that process which begins with a mere
colligation of crude observations, goes on establish-
ing propositions that are broader and more separated
from particular cases, and ends in universal proposi-
tions. Or, to bring thfe definition to its simplest and
26 The EvohUion Hypothesis.
clearest form : — Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-
unified knowledge; Science is partially - unified
knowledge ; Philosophy is com'pletely -unified know-
ledge." *
Mr. Spencer's system is framed of such " universal
propositions" derived from generalizations of science
besfinnincy "with a mere colliixation of crude observa-
tions." Do these generalizations furnish truths which
may be turned into universals holding good over the
whole universe of being, and dominating all thought ?
They do not. The truths of experiential science cannot
be so used legitimately : and the philosophy founded
on such a basis is demonstrably false.
To make this position clear it is necessary to inquire
into the limits of physical science. The physicist
Imay not add anything to nature: it is his business to
I see what is, and notbinor but what is. His science is
strictly bounded by observation, and can speak only in
the name of known facts, and of such facts as are, in
the points of comparison, precisely similar. Physical
science is imperatively enclosed within the actually
known. Where it deals with that which is not
actuall}^ known, it must invariably carry forward into
the unknown that which is known, and with the
assumption that the conditions, so far as affects the
matter dealt with, are identical. Given other con-
ditions, and the result will be different. Science may
* First Princlphs, § 37.
The Limits of Physical Science. 27
not invent a conjectural state of things, and profess,,
by setting out the operation of known laws in such
supposed circumstances, to extend the bounds of real
knowledge. All scientific work of that kind — and it
forms a considerable part of popular science — is
merely imaginative ; it lies in the department of;
romance.
There are bounds which ought not to be passed in
framing hypotheses to account for phenomena that
remain unexplained. It is not allowable to set up any
hypothesis which lies outside the possibility of being
established by evidence. Every legitimate conjecture
lies within the possibility of actual proof. It is fatal
to any hypothesis to show that it is incapable of being-
proved. Its author is bound to point out a possible
line of adequate evidence, or his conjecture must be
rejected as illegitimate. The doctrine of universal
evolution belongs to this class of illegitimate hypo-
theses ; if it were true, it could not be proved true.
The requirements of satisfactory proof transcend the
limits of human thought.
Every attempt to formulate truths derived from
experiential science that shall be held to be good over
the whole past, present, and future of concrete being,
encounters insuperable difiiculties.
Man is not omniscient: he must gather his facts
from experience, and must interpret them by compari-
son and inference. At every step he comes in contact
with the inscrutable ; gftid his intelligence is in every
28 The Evolution Hypothesis.
process liable to error. Even if we grant that the
mind is a quite perfect reasoning instrument, the
physicist is beset with liabilities to misconceptions
and mistakes. These sources of error may be grouped
under five heads, — duration, extent, minuteness, com-
plexity, and imperfection of the organs of sense.
(1.) Duration. The stretch of time which may be
•called the period of observation is as nothing com-
pared with the supposed duration of the universe ; and
the period of skilled and reliable observation is still
less. All scientific conclusions are based on observa-
tions made at one point in a boundless reach of move-
ment and ceaselessly flowing change. Two sources of
•doubt lie in every instance; — (a) whether the whole
thing, or all that is essential to the right understand-
ing of it for the purpose in hand, has been seen on the
side within the field of observation; and (6) whether
the facts observed adequately represent the whole
series, which is conceived as extending backward to a
measureless distance in time. Observation, to yield
a valid result, must conform fully to both conditions.
If there be room for questioning the exactness or
•sufficiency of the facts observed, we are bound to refuse
Acceptance to any doctrine built thereon, when it
transcends the immediate bounds of experience and
formulates a law for all time. The divergence from
reality may be infinitesimal at the outset, and within
the range of experience of no practical account, but
•carried over the entire sweep of cosmic history, back-
The Limits of Physical Science. 29
ward and forward to infinity, the result will be wholly-
false.
When the order of the universe, as at the beginning
of its history it emerges out of and at the close of its-
history it passes again into the imperceptible, is-
deduced from present knowledge of phenomena, this
liability to error is always present. Unless our
knowledge of fact be precise and adequate — if aught
be misread or omitted — all reasonings based on it, and
extending before and after over unimaginable stretches
of time, are fatally tainted with Uncertainty. The
result is wholly unreliable. The amount of reality
with which the physicist set out remains a fixed
quantity, while the margin of error has increased at
every step. That which, within experience, was an.
imperceptible divergence from fact has widened to
infinity.
(2.) The bounds of things as existing in space at
any given point in time are practically infinite.
However far scientific vision may reach, the cosmos
extends beyond. The sphere of observation is but a
speck in the limitless expanse. Now, to infer from
the little portion observed to the vastly wider regions
remaining for ever inscrutable, is fraught with peril..
We must be assured not only of the similarity, but
identity, of concrete existences within experience and
beyond it, before we can venture to draw any conclu-
sion with an approach to certainty.
In every case we ar5 met by the initial difficulty of
The Evohttion Hypothesis.
assuring ourselves that the whole fact has been —
for our purpose — discovered. It' all nature form one
cosmos, as the scientist assumes, the whole is joined
together in a real unity, so that no one part is separ-
able from any other part. Each instance is in effect
the entire universe. Every object of inquiry thus
-extends immeasurably beyond the limits of possible
experience ; and that vast unknown is as essential to
the instance before us as that in it which may be
brought within the field of vision. We may suffi-
ciently understand the phenomenon, and its relations
within the visible, to reach conclusions that will be
valid within experience ; but we should need to ex-
haust every relation in which the object stands to
every other mode of existence in the cosmos, before
we could reason with confidence from the instance
and its law to the limitless totality of things. Such
completeness of knowledge is not given to man. The
scientific inquirer must always remain in the attitude
of expectance, willing to modify his doctrine should
any new phase of the phenomena under investigation
be presented. There are laws, within their proper
limits, well-established and sure: but when the
physicist carries them beyond the bounds of ex-
perience he is always beset by doubt ; he cannot
reason with the full assurance of one who deals with
universal and necessary truth.
When, therefore, an h3^pothesis is framed to cover
the whole extent of knowable existence, and is based
The Limits of Physical Science. 31
•on professed observation, it must be always open to
the objection, and its certainty qualified by the con-
sideration, that the vastly greater part of the contem-
poraneous fact was beyond the ken of the observer.
This source of error will appear the more formidable,
if we keep in view that the concrete existence forming
the matter of investigation is united with other exist-
ences not in our plane only, but in an infinite number
of planes intersecting at the point of observation.
We are not situated at a point in a level surface
•over which the eye may range to the utmost stretch
of vision ; we are enclosed within a sphere whose
centre is in relation to us everywhere, and its circum-
ference nowhere. The instances examined by the
scientist, and on the precise and complete knowledge
of which our cosmic theories are built, are assumed
to be one organically with every part of that un-
bounded whole, which in every direction passes beyond
the range of our experience into infinity.
We are not warranted, then, in concludinsf w^th
assured certainty, from the limits of our narrow and
imperfect experience, over the whole universe of con-
crete being. For whatever doubt attaches to the
completeness of our interpretation of nature, as seen,
•expands and grows with every step outward, increas-
ing as the sphere widens in every direction towards
illimitable space. A scientific truth, as close to reality
as any induction of physical science can be, and valid
within the range of exjferience, becomes, when carried
32 The Evolution Hypothesis.
from the central point of observation over the wholfr
extent of co-existent things, so doubtful as to be value-
less. The error has enlarged at every step, while the
truth has remained a fixed quantity.
(3.) A further source of error presents itself when
we bring into view the fact, that as nature stretches
out of view beyond us in time and space, so it passes
out of view beneath us in indiscernible minuteness..
The instrumental aid by which the physicist brings
within the range of observation a vast extent of phe-
nomena, imperceptible to unaided sense, has revealed
at the same time regions still more minute, forming a
part of the concrete whole, whose law science under-
takes to expound. These infinitesimal forms of exis-
tence are beyond the reach of observation — " monads,,
compared with which a grain of sand is an earth."*
But they are an integral part of the world we know-
It is made up of them. They are factors, it may be
the most important factors, in the processes of change..
Our rude manipulation leaves them in every experi-
ment untouched. Too subtile to be apprehended, they
are none the less potent. What part they have played,
or may play, in the drama whose movement philo-
sophy would formulate, we can never learn. They
may have been the leading actors in former scenes.
In omitting them when we write out the plot, we
may be leaving out the Hamlet of the play. This, at
* Spencer : T&xjch. Vol. II., Part VII., Chap. II.
The Limits of Physical Science, 2iZ'
any rate, we may boldly affirm, that the hypothesis
which formulates the law of concrete being and ex-
plains the whole series of cosmic and individual change
while it is confessedly ignorant of the law of that
ever present and ceaselessly active world of real ex-
istence lying around us, and touching us at every
instant, must have in it a large imaginative element.
(4.) The inexactness of all observation and experi-
ment is further illustrated, when we bring into view
the endless complexity of all causes and effects. Every
experiment is complicated by the co-existence of a
countless number of co-operating forces, each of which
is correlated with all the rest, and contributes its part
to the combined result. The scientific principle of the
correlation of physical forces brings this aspect of the
intricateness of nature very emphatically into view.
The relations of forces, whether in masses or in mole-
cules, are for man limitless. Every new discovery of
correlation among the special sciences is fresh evi-
dence of the boundless complexity of causes, and
additional ground for questioning the perfect exact-
ness of any experimental truth. Every correlation
on which attention is fixed shows, with greater clear-
ness, the exhaustless inter-relations of things. As we
become more fully alive to the inconceivably complex
whole which constitutes the totality of the universe,,
we shall advance with less assurance to universal
truths from generalizations of science, valid so long-
as the scientist continues on the solid ground of
34 T^fi^ Evolution Hypothesis,
experience, but which are not safer than the wings
•of Icarus when he attempts a flight towards the
boundless distances of the cosmos, or poises himself
above the ever-rolling ocean stream of change.
(5.) When we turn from the objects of knowledge
to test the instruments of observation, the grounds of
mistrust are multiplied. The field is narrowed by the
limitations of the organs of sense. On the evolution
theory the trustworthiness of the organs of sense is
extremely limited. They are products of evolution,
shaped in the gradual adaptation of man to his sur-
roundings. They are in number and range determined
by their utility in adjusting his organism to his en-
vironment. What is useful for this purpose, and
nothing further, has been evolved. But the elabora-
tion of a true system of philosophy is not a condition
of the continuance of the human species. The race
lias persisted for a long period with, as the advocates
of evolution believe, a very incorrect conception of the
universe. It is not clear, then, how sense organs
evolved for a quite difiPerent end can be relied on
to give such a full and complete knowledge of the
phenomena as will furnish a basis for a perfect
€0smic theory. There may be, probably there are,
many modes of activity continually operating through-
out the universe, affecting the relations of its parts,
and directing its movement, which are not in relation
to our sensibility, and which we have no means of
apprehending. The senses with which we are en-
The Limits of Physical Science. 35
cloweJ are, on the hypothesis of evolution, defective
in their adaptation to any purpose except the prac-
tical end of adjustment to environment, and so to the
maintenance of man's life on the earth. Admirably
fitted to serve the purpose for which they have been
evolved, they fail us when applied to any other use.
They cannot, therefore, be depended on as instruments
of exact knowledge. The power of sight, for example,
is extremely restricted in its compass. Our perception
of colour is limited to a narrow range, and within that
range is very imperfect. The lower animals are in
many instances endowed w^ith more perfect organs
than man. Defective sense-perception is corrected by
comparison, but even then the means are not furnished
for attaining absolute precision. " The mind of man,
as Francis Bacon said, is like an uneven mirror, and
does not reflect the events of nature without distor-
tion."* The most skilful observer cannot adjust his
intellectual compensations with perfect success to de-
fects of nerve and organ. The gift of exact observa-
tion is extremely rare. We tend to see that for which
we look. "It is exceedingly rare," says Professor
Jevons, " to find persons who can, with perfect fair-
ness, estimate and register facts for and against their
own peculiar views and theories."f The mind brings
with it an anticipation which colours the event. Those
parts of the concrete whole which favour the conclu-
* Jevon's Principles of Scie^ice. Vol. II., Book IV., Chap. XVIII.
t Ibid. •
36 The Evolution Hypothesis.
sion we wish to establish stand clearly out in view,
'while that which conflicts with the desired conclusion
falls into the backs^rouncl. Accordinof to the common
adage, "seeing is believing;" but it as often happens
[that "believing is seeing." What man is there, glow-
ing and ardent in the pursuit of knowledge, and at
the same time altogether unprejudiced and impartial,
having no favourite view to support, nor any obnoxious
opinion to impugn ? What observer possesses an eye
and mind perfectly achromatic? Human frailty
scarcely warrants the supposition that such an one
is to be found. Individual aberrations from exact
truth are no doubt counteracted by the multiplication
of observations and the ceaseless conflict of opinion.
These compensations in the end work a truer balance
of doctrine, and bring theories nearer to reality. But
approximations to truth, however close the approach
may be, are not sufficient when the philosopher is
laying foundations on which his theory of all things
is to be based. When he undertakes to unify all
knowledge — to include in one formula the law of all
processes throughout the universe during all time, ap-
proximations will not serve. We must build on
reality the world of thought, if it is to correspond
with the world that is. A slight want of precision,
of no account when the target is at fifty paces, will
prove fatal to accuracy of aim when the distance is a
thousand yards ; a trifling inaccuracy in measurement,
not worth noticing in calculating the dimensions of a
The Limits of Physical Science. ^J
field, will involve disastrous consequences if it should
occur in fixing a base line for the survey of a kingdom.
Takino' too-ether in one view these five sources of
error, to each of which the observer is in every in-
stance liable, no one can accept as secure and well-
founded any world-embracing hypothesis based on the
sciences of observation. Everyone will recognize the
wisdom of the caution — "We can seldom trust our
best established theories and most careful inferences
far from their data." *
* Jevon's Principles of Science^ Book VI. , Chap. XXVI.
CHAPTER IV.
THE LIMITS OF NATURAL LAW.
THERE is a suggestion of definiteness and cer-
tainty in the word Laiv, which imparts an air
o£ solidity to the loftiest theories. Granted, it may
be argued, that mutation is the order of the cosmos,
granted that the greater part of every fact eludes the
observer, still there is something invariable and con-
stant within the bounds of knowledge. By the dis-
covery of their law, the shifting mass of seemingly
incoherent experiences may be knit into a compact
and orderly system. A firm foundation can be thus
laid for hypotheses that tower to heaven. We shall
examine this ground of certainty.
(1). Natural law is not something existing apart
from or outside phenomena. It is simply their order.
When we speak of the laws of nature, we mean no
more than the ascertained mode of behaviour of
things. "A law of nature, as I regard the meaning
of the expression, is not a uniformity which must be
'obeyed by all objects, but merely a uniformity which
;'is, as a matter of fact, obeyed by those objects that
have come beneath our observation.""^ Law has no
* Jevon's Principles of Science, Book VI., Chap. XXXI.
The Limits of Natural Law. 39
existence in itself : take away the things, and the
mode of their action is taken away. If matter ceased
to exist in ponderable form, the law of gravity would
cease to have any real existence ; if it remained it
would exist, not as a law of things, but as a concep-
tion shaped by intelligence.
If, then, we build on the universality and necessity^
of any given physical law, if we found our theory on
the certainty of its continuance throughout all time,
and its dominance over the whole breadth of concrete
existence, we put into the law a content to which it
has no claim.
Wherever there are like things in like conditions,
we necessarily find the same mode of action ; for like
things are things that behave alike : the truth in fact
amounts to an identical proposition. But where the
law is assumed to be constant, there is always, and
must be presupposed, the existence of like things and
like conditions. The law does not create the concrete
realities that conform to it, nor does it subdue to its
sway things lying outside its dominion. It is not a
self-existent something exercising an independent
authority : it is the mode of behaviour of objects.
No law of nature has validity beyond the class of
phenomena whose mode of action it expresses. If it
be affirmed that any given law has existed at other
periods of time, or exists in undiscoverable distances
of space, the existence of like phenomena is invariably
presupposed. If we ate not entitled to assume the
40 The Evohction Hypothesis.
•existence of phenomena, in all respects that are essen-
tial to the point of view in question, identical with
those lying within experience, we are not entitled to
assume the applicability of the law beyond the region
in which its operation has been observed. No experi-
ential law carries with it the authority of a universal
truth.
(2). Every law of nature, being a generalization
from experience, is more or less inexact. The degree
of inexactness varies from rough approximations to
formulae which may be made the basis of calculations
that are justified by the foretold event ; yet it will
not be claimed for any generalized experience that
it is characterized by absolute precision. The laws of
number and form dealing with purely abstract re-
lations are absolutely true; but the laws of nature
have to do with concrete things — not with abstrac-
tions. They express the mode of action of complex
realities. No experiential law can be established by
demonstration. Its truth lies in the exactness with
which it interprets the mode of action of classes of
•concrete existences, and is not in any case absolute.
It might, indeed, be questioned if any object whatever
has been known to act with perfect precision accord-
ing to any known law or combination of known laws.
Law, as generalized from observation, is not in any
instance obeyed perfectly. Law is abstract: objects
are concrete. The formula which expresses a law
•of nature cannot include the conditions which are
J
The Lwiits of Natural Law. 41
an inseparable part of the instance. " All laws and
explanations are in a certain sense hypothetical, and
apply exactly to nothing which we can know to
exist." *
Throuorhout all nature there is not found a straiofht
line, or a perfect circle, or an exact ellipse : these are
abstract notions, not real things. Nor does nature
furnish an example of motion in a straight line, or
in a perfect circle or ellipse, or in a curve whose law
may be mathematically expressed. The earth does
not in its orbit round the sun move in an ellipse
whose form is mathematically exact, nor does it trace
the same line in each succeeding year. No two plants
are exactly alike ; nor in inanimate nature are there
ever found two instances of absolute sameness.
Did we know the totality of laws and know each
and the whole perfectly, we should then, no doubt, see
the entire concrete fact and comprehend it : but such
knowledge implies omniscience. So far as discernible
by us, the action of every concrete object is more or
less erratic, and is not perfectly conformable to any
one law or to all known laws. " Onl}^ a mind which
stood at the centre of this real world, not outside
individual things, but penetrating them with its
presence, could command such a view of reality as
left nothing to look for, and was therefore the perfect
image of it in its own being and activity. But the
* Jevon's Principles of Science, Book IV"., Chap. XXI.
42 The Evolution Hypothesis.
human mind does not thus stand at the centre of
things, but has a modest position somewhere in the
extensive ramifications of reality."*
(3.) The inconceivable complexity of relations in the
universe involves inter-relations of laws of like com-
plexity. It is impossible to ascertain with anything
approaching certainty in how far any given uni-
formity is the resultant of the combined action of
conflicting laws, and how far such uniformity will be
found to recur in conditions but slightly modified. A
law may be subsumed under a higher law, or counter-
acted by forces lying outside or beneath the ken of
science, or modified by altered relations arising out of
the movement of cosmic change. Taking into view
the immeasurable field of existence, and the infinite
complexity of the inter-relations of things, it is wholly
impossible to aflSrm with certainty the applicabilty of
any law generalized from experience, outside the
bounds of circumstances identified with the experi-
ences from which it has been derived. To carry a
law over the whole length and breadth and height and
depth of being, back to the first beginning of things
and forward to the end, is to multiply at every step
occasions of doubt, and to end in removing every
ground of certainty.
(4.) One other source of uncertainty may be noticed.
Science cannot in any instance determine with com-
* Lotze, Logic, Introduction, § IX.
The Limits of Natural Law, 43.
plete confidence whether a law derived from observa-
tion represents a permanent or a variable and transient
condition ; whether it sets out a mode of action
essential in the constitution of things, or but a passing
interaction of forces as they sweep onward in vast
curves of change. We cannot follow with certainty
the path of any great cosmic movement. We see too
minute a portion of the line to assert with confidence
whether it be straight or curved. What is true of the
physical sciences is true, TYiutatis "mutandis, of all tha
sciences which proceed on the experiential method.
So far as they formulate the results of experience
they are reliable; when they extend their formulsB
into other departments or make them rules for all
forms of being they are delusive. The experiential
laws of mind will not elucidate the problems of
matter; nor the dynamic laws of matter solve the
problems of intelligence. Experience, good in its own
channel, is an unsafe pilot in strange waters. Assur-
ance of the permanence and universality of any law^
supposed to cover the whole field of knowledge, cannot
be based on experience.
It is a delusion to suppose, if the evolution hypo-
thesis be true, that experience gives us knowledge of
stability. Stability is, according to the evolution
doctrine, the seeming, mutability the real in experience.
Not stability but mutability is the condition which
evolution teaches us to recognize as the mode of
concrete being. Evolution discloses to us the homo-
•44 ^^^^ Evolution Hypothesis.
sreneous becomino^ heteroofeneous, throucrh the integra-
tion of matter and dissipation of motion, and so
onward to dissolution. " Apparently the universally-
<jo-existent forces of attraction and repulsion, which, as
we have seen, necessitate rhythm in all minor changes
throughout the imiverse, also necessitate rh3'thm in
the totality of its changes — produce now an immeasur-
able period during which the attractive forces pre-
dominating, cause universal concentration, and then
an immeasurable period during which the repulsive
forces predominating, cause universal diffusion — alter-
nate eras of Evolution and Dissolution."* There is
then no stability : all is everlasting flux. No mode of
force is fixed : forces are being constantly transformed.
No law is stable ; for laws are but the relations of
forces. Fixedness based on law is as fleeting as the
iorces whose mode of action the law expresses.
Among the generalizations from experience, the
law of gravitation may be taken as established be-
yond cavil ; it is accepted not only as holding good
throughout all actual experience, but as forming a
solid basis for deductions that are valid beyond the
Teach of observation. Yet we are not thoroughly
imbued with the evolution doctrine if we regard it so.
Bodies, as we know them, tend towards one another
accordinix to this law. But it is not demonstrable
that gravity is a property of matter universally.
Spencer, First Principles, § 183.
The Limits of Natural Laiu. 45.
Body — matter in the aggregate — is a temporary mode
of force. We cannot reason from matter in mass ta
matter in all its forms. All modes of force, ponder-
able and imponderable, come under the universal
principle of the transference and equivalence of forces.
The ponderable may then become imponderable, and
the imponderable ponderable; in which case gravity
must be accepted as no more than a temporary quality*
attachino^ to certain chano^eable modes of force. As-
suming gravity to be an attribute universally of the
form of force we call matter, it is far from proved
that its law is constant. There is, according to Mr.
Spencer, a rhythm of motion in all moving force, from,
the vibrations of a tuning-fork to the oscillations of
the earth in its orbit.. We cannot fix the range or
determine the limits of rhythmic movements. That
manifestation of force called gravity, instead of being
fixed, may be constant only in changing. It is not
unreasonable to suppose that the law of gravitation,
as we now express it, is true only for the present; it
may be a mode of force at the moment of the return
of a curve of oscillation, and be true but for a brief
period of time. Carried into the past and future, it
may lead only to error. We are ephemera at best,
and the age of scientific knowledge is but a span.
In the line of the limitless sweep of cosmic forces we
cannot measure so much as an handbreadth ; and
our instruments are rude and clumsy, forbidding us to-
hope for absolute exa<?tness, even within our narrow
46 The Evolution Hypothesis.
horizon. How can we then jud^^e with certainty the
direction or calculate the law of universal mutation ?
According to the principles ot' the evolutionist, we
are driven to hold that conclusions regarding the past
■or future of the universe arrived at on the faith of
the validity throughout all time of any physical law
may — very probably do — rest on a mistake. Taking
the position of the evolutionist, we must feel that to
be slippery ground on which we stand, if stand it can
be called, when we are submerged in a stream of
-constant change. That we have traced with precision
the law of cosmic movement while we ourselves are
drifting in the ceasless flux, is surely open to the
ixravest doubt. One law after another which seemed
well-founded having slipped away from us, we poise
ourselves, as on the ultimate certainty, on a principle
supposed to govern repeatedly recurring eras of evolu-
tion and dissolution, — " ever the same in principle,
but never the same in concrete results."
But it is folly to speak of man as if he were
the spectator of this eternal stream of change ; he is
himself an integral part of it : nos r)iutamur in illis.
Reason, an evolved product, cannot stand apart and
survey the ceasless flow from the security of a self-
conscious intelligence, which has derived its being
from a super- sensual source. Mind is a phase of the
mutation — an insignificant eddy in the vast — the
unfathomable whirl. Reason has been evolved and
passes towards dissolution. The play of the cosmic
The L im its of Natu ral Law. 47
forces has moulded it in forms of thought ; but these
are mutable as the interactions of the forces which
have shaped them. The laws of thought are but the
reflection in consciousness of a temporary phase of
the illimitable stream. The stores of knowledge —
our boasted treasures of scientific discovery — are no
more than ever-shifting ripples thrown for a moment
into view in the never-ending flow of the absolute
and unknowable energy. Instability of the homo-
geneous is a principle frequently recurring in^Mr.
Spencer's exposition. It is not the homogeneous alone
that is unstable. Instability is the only universal —
the summation of all we know. The one thing
fixed is that nothing is fixed; the one thing, certain
is that all is uncertain. To attempt to mark out the
law of the universe throughout the past and future
is an undertaking which, on evolution principles,
reaches the climax of absurdity. We who pretend
to determine what has been and what shall be, are
ourselves momentary manifestations shaped in that
swift-moving current whose ceasless mutations form
the essence of the thinker and of his thought. Mr.
Spencer's philosophy overturns all law and destroys
all certainty : it dissolves in universal scepticism.
A survey of the possibilities of physical science
and of the limits of natural law, brings us back
to the point from which we set out, strengthening
the position that the complete unification of know-
ledge is impossible. ^s\ all-embracing philosophy,
48 The Evolution Hypothesis.
based on experiential knowledge, falls to pieces. It
will not stand the test of critical examination. If
unity of thought be attainable, it must be sought
elsewhere. This mistrust of intelligence, passing be-
yond its bounds, has characterised all the most illus-
trious of those who have spoken as prophets of the
spiritual. They have, with Job, heard a voice from
the whirlwind, challenging man's ability to reach a
complete knowledge even of that which lies close
around him.* Like Solomon, they are persuaded
that " A man cannot find out the work that is done
under the sun : because though a man labour to seek
it out, yet he shall not find it ; yea farther, though a
wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able
to find it."-|- They willingly accept with Paul the
limits of intelligence, " we know in part." % With the
last of the great succession, they let fall on the in-
tellectual impotence of man an immortal hope in God :
"It doth not yet appear what we shall be, but we
know that when He shall appear w^e shall be like
Him, for we shall see Him as He is." \
* Joh, Chap. XXXVIII. t Ecdesiastes, Chap. VIII, 17.
I 1 Carinthians, Chap. XIII. 9. IF i John, Chap. III. 2.
CHAPTER y.
THE UNKNOWABLE.
A PHILOSOPHY undertaking to deal with all
possible knowledge must determine the rela-
tion of thought to that which lies beyond experience :
it must take account of the absolute. Experience
has a beginning and bounds: it is conditioned. Is
knowledge of that by which it is conditioned pos-
sible ? We cannot estimate justly the Evolution
Hypothesis, as formulated by Mr. Spencer, without
first ascertaining, and carrying with us in our ex-
amination, his doctrine on this point. His theory
of the Unknowable is a characteristic feature of his
philosophy, and afiects it in every part.
Can we have a real knowledge of that which tran-
scends experience ? The two great schools of thinkers
— those who derive all knowledsfe from sensation, and
those who hold the human intelligence to be itself a
source of knowledge — are fundamentally opposed in
their answers. The sensationalist cannot accept as
valid any conception not ultimately resolvable into
what he holds to be the primal constituent of all
thought — sensation. The absolute cannot be so
reached. It is, therefore, rejected as a pseud-idea,
D
50 The Evolution Hypothesis.
and all knowledge limited to the phenomenal. The
a 'priori school is not at one on the question. For
the purpose in hand we may note three main divi-
sions of opinion, (a) It is maintained that knowledge
of the Unconditioned is possible : that the absolute
may be positively construed to the mind. (6) All
positive knowledge of the absolute is denied ; the
concept of the unconditioned is held to be a pure
negation ; but while the absolute is removed from
the domain of knowledge, its certainty is regained
through an act of faith. (c) The assumption that
all knowledge is of the relative is rejected, and it is
contended that knowledge of the infinite is attainable,
that it may be thought under the form of a concept,
which, though inadequate, is positive.
Mr. Spencer's position is distinct from all three.
As in his account of intuitive or innate principles,
he attempts to combine the a priori and experiential
theories by his doctrine of the creation of forms of
thought through the hereditary organization of ex-
periences ; so in this instance he introduces elements
from both sides. He grounds his system on the
relativity of all knowledge, but, at the same time,
holds that we have a positive, though indefinite, con-
sciousness of the absolute.
In discussing the question of the Unknowable, Mr.
Spencer examines at great length the various modes
under which the unconditioned has been supposed
to be thought, and aims at showing that they are
The Uiiknozvable. 51
each impossible, as transcending the necessary limits
of intelliorence. Availinof himself of the aro^ument
of Sir William Hamilton in his "Philosophy of the
Unconditioned," he proceeds to show that no definite
conception of the infinite is possible, that every
attempt to think it lands us in contradictions. He
supports his position by quoting the most telling
parts of Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought;"
and by a criticism of the process and the product
of thought, he endeavours to establish the principle
that no concept of the absolute can be formed ; all
knowledge is, therefore, relative.
"Ultimate scientific ideas, then, are all representa-
tive of realities that cannot be comprehended. After
no matter how great a progress in the colligation of
facts, in the establishment of generalizations ever
wider and wider — after the merging of limited and
derivative truths in truths that are larger and deeper
has been carried no matter how far ; the fundamental
truth remains as much beyond reach as ever
In all directions the investigations of the man of
science eventually bring him face to face with an
insoluble enigma ; and he ever more clearly perceives
it to be an insoluble enigma. He learns at once
the greatness and the littleness of the human intellect
— its power in dealing with all that comes within the
range of experience ; its impotence in dealing with
all that transcends experience. He realizes with a
special vividness the ittter incomprehensibleness of
52 The Evolution Hypothesis.
the simplest fact considered in itself. He, more than
any other, truly hnoivs that in its ultimate essence
nothing can be knowji." *
But while Mr. Spencer goes fully with Sir William
Hamilton in denying any definite conception of the
absolute, and upholding the doctrine of the relativity
of knowledge, he rejects the position that there is no
positive content in our consciousness of the uncondi-
tioned. He falls back on the fact that, notwithstandino:
the confutation of every definite concept which may be
formed of it, the absolute still persists in consciousness ;
and that it survives as a positive consciousness, and
not merely as a negation of the conditioned. Hence
he concludes that " besides that definite consciousness
of which logic formulates the laws, there is also an
indefinite consciousness which cannot be formulated."-f-
"To say that we cannot know the Absolute is, by
implication, to affirm that there is an Absolute. In
the very denial of our power to learn what the
Absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption that it is ;
and the making of this assumption proves that the
Absolute has been present to the mind, not as a noth-
ing but as a something. The Noumenon, everywhere
named as the antithesis of the Phenomenon, is through-
out necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigor-
ously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a
knowledge of Appearances only, without at the same
* First Principles, § 21. + First Principles, § 26.
The Unknowable. 53
time conceiving a Reality of which they are appear-
ances. . . . Clearly, then, the very demonstration that
a definite consciousness of the Absolute is impossible to
us pre-supposes an iiidefinite consciousness of it. . . .
Impossible though it is to give this consciousness any
qualitative or quantitative expression whatever, it is
not the less certain that it remains with us as a
positive and indestructible element of thought
It is impossible to get rid of the consciousness of an
actuality lying behind appearances."*
There is here a clear and important advance on the
teaching of the school of Comte. Mr. Spencer carries
us from phenomenon to noumenon. To admit the
existence of a consciousness of the absolute is fatal to
the positivist doctrine. The leading disciples of Comte
are, consequently, very wroth with Mr. Spencer for
giving so firm a foothold to those who believe in the
supernatural. Mr. Spencer has done good service in
emphasizing this element of consciousness and illus-
trating its existence as a fundamental fact. He has
at the same time put into the hands of his critics a
very effective instrument in the examination of his
own system. The co- existence with the knowable,
both in thought and in reality, of an Infinite Power
remaining for ever inscrutable renders, as we shall see,
every interpretation of observed facts doubtful out-
side the bounds of the facts observed : it eviscerates
* First ri-inciples, § 26.
54 The Evohition Hypothesis.
generalizations of all content as forming part of a
doctrine of universal truth ; it consequently reduces
' to a mere unprovable guess the Evolution Hypothesis.
Let us, with a view to the criticism of the evolution
doctrine as Mr. Spencer expounds it, inquire what is,
on his theory, the relation subsisting between that of
which we are vaguely conscious, that is, the unknow-
able, and that of which we are definitely conscious,
that is, the knowable.
The unknowable is not wholly unknown. Mr.
Spencer predicates of it, in the most assured and
positive manner, in several modes.
(1.) He affirms the consciousness of the unknowable
to be an essential part of the exercise of thought.
"By the necessary conditions of thought we are
obliged to form a positive, though vague conscious-
ness of this which transcends distinct consciousnessr"*
The consciousness of the absolute lies, then, in every
act of knowledge, as an essential part of it, determined
by " the necessary conditions of thought." The mind
carries with it always and everywhere as essential to
its operations, a positive, though undefined, conscious-
ness of the absolute.
(2.) By the use of a great variety of phrases, Mr.
Spencer affirms the objective reality of that which is
thus present to consciousness. He speaks of it as
present to the mind "not as nothing but as a some-
First Principles, Part I., § 26.
The U7iknowable. 55
thing." He describes it as " an actuality," " a reality,"
" the real existence," " reality which is behind the veil
of appearance," " the ultimate existence." It is power,
energy, force ; " the absolute power," " the absolute
force."
It is the " source of power," " the absohite cause,"
"the first cause," "the power which works in us
certain effects," " that throug^h which all thinofs exist,"
"an absolute reality by which the relative reality is
immediately produced," "the energy from which all
things proceed;" "an infinite and eternal energy by
which all things are created and sustained."*
(3.) The unknowable stands related to the cosmos as
noumenon to phenomenon, power and the manifesta-
tion of power, cause and effect, reality and appearance.
The cosmos, on the other hand, is " the totality of the
manifestations of the unknowable," and spirit and
matter are represented as "signs of the unknown
reality which underlies both."
(4.) This absolute reality lies for ever beyond the
reach of human thought. It is the "unknown reality,'
"the unknown cause," "the inscrutable power," "the
unknowable," "utterly inscrutable," "absolutely in-'
comprehensible," " for ever inconceivable."
We have, in these affirmations, a very considerable
amount of knowledge. It is evident that in the un-
knowable we are dealing with the largest part of the
* Mr. Spencer in 19</i Century, No. 93, Nov. 1884, and First
Frinciplenj passim.
56 The Evolution Hypothesis.
raw material given in consciousness. The circle oi*
definite knowledge may extend ever more widely ;
yet still the wider circle of real, though incompre-
hensible, existence, is seen to enclose it.
But there underlies the entire doctrine of Mr.
Spencer, a postulate into the validity of which we
must inquire at some length. He assumes that the
absolute, while co-existing with the conditioned in
every experience, everywhere and at every moment,
stands so related to the knowable that it adds nothing
to it, nor takes aught from it, nor in any particular
modifies the series of manifestations. The totality
of matter remains fixed ; the totality of motion is un-
changed ; the law of the redistribution of matter and
motion proceeds uninterruptedly ; the unsearchable
actuality has not revealed itself throughout the entire
course of mutation in any mode not implicily included
in its primal manifestation. This postulate is so
I vitally important to the Evolution Hypothesis that we
( shall devote a separate chapter to a consideration of
i the relation of the Unknowable to the Knowable.
CHAPTER VI.
THE RELATION OF THE UNKNOWABLE TO
THE KNOW ABLE.
"\TTHAT we know is, on Mr. Spencer's theory, bound
' ' in an essential union, both in thought and reality,
with that which transcends knowledge. The union is
such that to take away the unknowable is to remove
the knowable also. The unknowable is as necessary
to thought as the knowable. "The connection, be-
tween the two being absolutely persistent in our
•consciousness, is real in the same sense as the terms it
unites are real." * They co-exist in thought and co-
exist in reality. In every affirmation as to the
knowable there lies the implication that it stands in a
real relation to the unknowable. In every affirmation
•as to the persistence of the knowable there is involved
the implication that it persists as related to the un-
knowable ; in other words, that its relation to the
unknowable remains unaltered. The persistence of
the absolute in sameness of relation to the conditioned
is assumed. This regulative principle must, on Mr.
Spencer's hypothesis, be taken for granted at every
* First Principles, § 46.
58 TJie Evolution Hypothesis.
step in scientific inquiry. Wherever the mind turns
in the investigation of cosmic phenomena, it is face to-
face with the absolute as, not only a part of the
reality, but the reality itself. If, then, the inductions
of science are to hold good beyond the immediate
limits of observation, it must be constantly assumed
that the absolute is fixed in a permanent and un-
chanofins relation to the known. We have here a
principle all-embracing in its application — a law for
all time, reaching to the bounds of concrete existence,
and penetrating to the unsearchable depths of actuality.
Its validity is vital to all scientific generalizations, and^
above all, is essential to the evolution doctrine, as
claiming to interpret the entire compass of that which
is, or may be, known.
At the risk of seeming tedious, we must examine
this principle still more closely.
The underlying Unknowable Power stands related,
according to Mr. Spencer's teaching, to the knowable
as reality to appearance ; it is the cause of the universe,,
that by which the knowable is "immediately pro-
duced." * At every instant in time and at every point
in immensity this inscrutable Energy is present, form-
ing a part of the object of thought, itself the real thing.
The universe is the " conditioned effect of the absolute
reality " and stands in " indissoluble relation with its
Unconditioned Cause." ^
* Mrst Principles, § 50. t Ibid., § 46.
The Unknowable and the Knowable. 59
If then, discarding the idea of a Supreme Intelligence,
we are to have a knowledge of the universe that shall
be auorht more than the coojnition of individual in-
stances, if we proceed from particular propositions to
general truths, we need to be assured that the known
is not at any point altered in its relations to the un-
knowable. If it shall be warrantable for us to group
phenomena, to ascertain their law, to carry forward
our generalizations beyond immediate observation ;
much more if we shall aspire to a complete unifica-
tion of knowledge, w^e must have granted to us the
postulate, that over the whole field traversed by
thought the relation of the conditioned and uncon-
ditioned has remained fixed. We must assume that
the underlying actuality is established in an un-
changing relation to its phenomena, the absolute cause
to manifested effects. If the inscrutable cause has not
always revealed itself in the same manner ; if the mani-
festations of the absolute power have been increased
or diminished in amount, or modified in mode, at any
point in the series of change, the Evolution Hypothesis
is false.
But how may this uniformity of relation be estab-
lished ? Not by observation ; for observation has not
surveyed the whole extent of phenomena, or traversed
the entire succession of the manifiestations of the
infinite : not by knowledge of the absolute power ;
for that is, by hypothesis, for ever inscrutable. But
there are open to us onl^ these two methods of deter-
6o The Evolution Hypothesis.
mining the relations of the known and the unknow-
able. We must either claim a complete knowledge of
all the manifestations of the absolute ; in which case
we shall be able to affirm from observation that these
have not been either modified in kind or altered in
amount ; or we must assume an exact knowledge of
the law of the manifestation of the incomprehensible
actuality — that is, we must , know the unknowable.
Either supposition is on the face of it absurd.
The absurdity of a postulate which affirms the per-
sistence of the knowable as an unmodified revelation
of the unknowable, will be still more apparent, if we
fix our thought on the cosmos as effect and the
absolute as cause.
The absolute reality is the First Cause, the cosmos
is its effect. Now the inscrutable power manifested
in the cosmos is either exactly equal to the effect, so
that the wdiole cause passes into the eflfect, or it is
greater. Assuming the cause and eflfect to be equal
the eflfect is the measure of the cause, the cause is
fully manifested in the eflfect. To know the effect,
then, is to know the cause : if the eflfect, being exactly
equal to the cause, is completely known, the cause is
completely known ; there is nothing left to know.
Now the cosmos is known or knowable, and beinof
equal to its cause, the cause is alike known or know-
able. But this Mr. Spencer denies ; for he affirms
the first cause to be " utterly inscrutable," " absolutely
incomprehensible." We must conclude, then, that the
The Unknowable and the Knowable. 6 1
absolute cause is not measured by its cosmic effects.
It is, therefore, greater than the cosmos.
Let us assume it to be greater. A cause can only
exist as cause in relation to effects. Either, then, there
are effects of the unknowable power which do not
come within the domain of possible knowledge, or
the causal energy of the first cause did not exhaust
itself in the effects produced by it as first cause, and
this portion of its causal energy remains. Take
either supposition. If there are effects of the first
cause which are not revealed in the universe we know,
a relation subsists .between the knowable cosmos and
other manifestations of the absolute lying outside it :
in which case another disturbing element impinges
upon the field of experience. In the new conditions,
the law of the cosmos has to be determined over
against a second unknowable, and scientific hypotheses
reaching beyond observation are rendered doubly
doubtful.
Let the other side of the alternative be taken ; let
it be supposed that the unexhausted energy of the
first cause has not gone forth in effects beyond the
knowable universe. On this supposition a new
element of incertitude emerges. The causal energy
of the absolute cause has not been at any moment
fully manifested ; there is something still in reserve
at every point in cosmic history. There can be no
certainty, then, that the inscrutable energy has not
at various points in time, or continuously along the
62 The Evolution Hypothesis.
whole stream of change, manifested itself in modes
not antecedently existent, in their entirety, within
precedent cosmic phenomena. It is, indeed, more
than possible, it is probable, that a cause which did
not in its primal passing into effect exhaust its causal
efficiency may have, in the processes of change
throughout the unimaginable cycles of time, revealed
itself in ways not implicitly included in antecedent
manifestations. But, however this may be, to affirm
positively, on the other side, that the absolute cause,
though its causal energy was not exhausted, did not
operate as cause in any new mode along the entire
course of cosmic history, and shall not in the future,
is either to assume definite knowledge of the incom-
prehensible, or to assert that experience yields a com-
plete knowledge of past and future events.
That this criticism is not strained is evident, if it be
borne in mind that Mr. Spencer asserts the continuity
of the absolute reality with its phenomenal manifes-
tation at all times everywhere. When we think of
the absolute cause, we are apt to think of it as that
to which the first link in the chain of causation is
attached ; we conceive of it as lying behind the stream
of causation at that point where its effects first rise
into view. When so conceived, the first cause can
be easily thought of as ceasing to act when secondary
causes come into operation, and as being thus excluded
from any real causal efficiency onward throughout all
succeeding phases of change. But the absolute cause
The Unknowable a7td the Knowable. 6^)
is not, on Mr. Spencer's theory, the initial b'nk in a
-chain of successive causes and effects. It is the in-
scrutable power, the actuality revealed in that which
is seen. At each instant of time it is the present
reality, the something ever in process of manifesta-
tion, the underlying energy of which what we know
is the effect.
To quantify these manifestations, and lay it down
as an axiom that their sum total has never been
greater or less, — a supposition necessary to the Evolu-
tion Hypothesis, — to ^^ the law of the production of
its effects by the absolute power ; to take it as a
fundamental principle on which to found a system of
philosophy that the mode of manifestation has been
and shall be for ever the same ; in other words, to
determine the law of the unconditioned, and to regard
it as necessarily operating thus and not otherwise, is
most evidently to transcend the capabilities of intelli-
ofence : since on the one hand the conditions of thouo^ht
are taken to necessitate the acceptance of the ultimate
cause as wholly and for ever incomprehensible ; and
on the other, the totality of phenomenal effects cannot
be brought within the field of experience, whether in
-co-existence or in succession.
Yet this postulate is vital to Mr. Spencer's philo-
sophy. For if it be so that in the course of change,
from the first moment at which the knowable passes
into the view of thought onward, there has been any
modification of the relation subsisting between the
64 The Evolution Hypothesis.
unknowable power and the knowable in which it is
revealed ; if any new force has emerged out of, or any
manifestation of force has sunk again into, the in-
scrutuble ; if there has arisen any new mode of
activity which did not exist implicitly in the primal
totality of the conditioned ; if any form of being or
forth-going of energy has welled up out of the depths
of the incomprehensible, the system which Mr. Spencer
has constructed with so much learning and labour is
disintegrated and dissolved — his evolution has ended in
dissolution ; for it is essential to his philosophy that
the relation between the unknowable actuality and
knowable appearance remain for ever fixed and con-
stant — that the same quantity of the absolute energy
be emergent from age to age, ever equal in its sum,
neither less nor more. Doubt of this postulate is
doubt of the Evolution Philosophy; to doubt a
critical examination leads us, and through doubt to
denial.
CHAPTER VII.
THE EVOLUTION HYPOTHESIS A DYNAMIC
THEOBY.
A PHILOSOPHY rightly so called" can, on Mr.
Spencer's theory, only come into existence by
finding a principle, operative throughout the whole
range of the knowable, to which every line of research
ultimately leads and from which the entire course of
change may, with adequate enlargement of knowledge,
be deductively demonstrated. " A philosophy stands
self -convicted of inadequacy, if it does not formulate
the whole series of changes passed through by every
existence in its passage from the imperceptible to the
perceptible and again from the perceptible to the im-
perceptible. If it begins its explanations with exist-
ences that already have concrete forms, or leaves off
while they still retain concrete forms ; then, mani-
festly, they had preceeding histories, or will have
succeeding histories, or both, of which no account is
given The formula sought, equally applicable
to existences taken singly in and their totality, must
be applicable to the whole histories of each and to
the whole history of all." * It is clear that unless
* First Principles, § 186.
66 The Evolution Hypothesis.
such a formula be discoverable evolution cannot be
raised to the dignity of an all-embracing hypothesis,
or successfully maintained as a sufficient explanation
of any individual thing. It has, in that case, no
claim to rank as a cosmic philosophy.
A unifying principle is indispensable, if evolution is
to be accepted as a rational theory. Under that prin-
ciple every knowable law must be subsumed. There
may not be any law discoverable in any department
of thouo^ht that cannot be brouorht under it, as the
lower under the higher generalization.
The weight of Socrates was determined by the
dynamic law of gravity, and when his disciples
covered his face after death his body was still subject
to that law ; but governing his action while alive
were other laws — laws of the true Socrates. If among
these there were any — the laws of thought and con-
science, for example — not reducible to unity with the
physical universe, it would be but trifling with the
question to affirm that knowledge is unified, simply
because the body of Socrates is known to have been
included under physical law while the real Socrates,
who passed out of reach of his disciples, is left out
of account. The principle that is to unify all
knowledge must account for all the known phases,
of all known phenomena, and especially those charac-
teristics by which they are diflerenced. It is not
enough that it should deal with a part of concrete
being, it must deal with all concrete being : it must
A Dynamic Theory. 67
face the task of accounting for all we know or can
know.
Mr. Spencer thinks he has discovered the key which
unlocks all knowable secrets — the law which brings
together in one all possible knowledge — the principle
whose sovereignty is wide as the bounds of being. It
is a " dynamic principle."
" The law we seek must be," he says, " the law of
the continuous redistribution of matter and motion.
Absolute rest and permanence do not exist. Every
object, no less than the aggregate of all objects, under-
goes from instant to instant some alteration of state.
Gradually or quickly it is receiving or losing motion,
while some or all of its parts are simultaneously
changing their relation to one another. And the
question to be answered is — What dynamic principle
true of the metamorphosis as a whole and in its details
expresses these ever- changing relations. ... A philo-
sophy rightly so-called can come into existence only
by solving the problem." '^
The universality of this principle is stated more
fully in another passage : —
" Setting out from an established ultimate principle,
it has been shown that the cause of transformation
among all kinds of existences cannot but be that which
we have seen it to be. It has been shown that the
redistribution of matter and motion must everywhere
* First PrincipleSy § 92.
68 The Evolution Hypothesis.
take place in those ways, and produce those traits
which celestial bodies, organisms, societies, alike dis-
play. And it has been shown that this universality of
process, results from the same necessity which deter-
mines each simplest movement around us, down to
the accelerated fall of a stone, or the recurrent beat
of a harp-string. In other words, the phenomena of
evolution have to be deduced from the Persistence of
Force. As before said — ' to this an ultimate analysis
brings us down ; and on this a rational synthesis must
build up.' This being the ultimate truth which
transcends experience by underlying it, so furnishing
a common basis on which the widest generalizations
stand, these widest generalizations are to be unified by
referrinoj them to this common basis."* " The detailed
phenomena of life and mind and society are to be
interpreted in terms of matter, motion, and force."-f'
As Mr. Spencer states the problem, in the solution
of which alone philosophy comes into existence, he
states it as a problem in dynamics. The principle
which is to express the ever-changing relations of
concrete existences is " a dynamic principle " — the law
" must be the law of the continuous redistribution of
matter and motion." It is indisputable that in choos-
ing a dynamic principle he has, as an evolutionist,
chosen wisely. Indeed it is with him a case of
Hobson's choice : no other principle is available.
* First Principles, § 147. t Ibid. § 194.
A Dynamic Theory. 69
Dynamic laws exist as an important part of experi-
ence. The evolution theory cannot furnish any higher
principle under which these might be included.
Either dynamic law is supreme, or it constitutes a
separate kingdom : it must be enthroned as supreme,
if knowledge be unified ; for a separate kingdom is not
admissible. Every fact capable of explanation, every
thing that comes within the field of knowledge, is to
be brought under " the law of the continuous redistri-
bution of matter and motion." This law is made to
account for the present form and order of the heavens
and the earth ; the whole universe of inanimate matter
is interpreted by its aid. Subtile molecular motions
in complex systems, too minute to be discoverable by
the most powerful microscope, emerge into the field of
knowledge in the shape of living organisms, vegetal
and animal. Like subtile combinations of moving
molecules, built up into systems of inconceivable com-
plexity, and with adjustments, the nice precision of
which cannot be realized by the keenest scientific
imagination, create those higher organisms, having
their consummation and crown in man. His mental
nature is not excepted from the all-pervading and all-
govering dynamic principle. Thought and emotion,
conscience and will take their place in the continuity
of the correlation of physical forces. The rhythmic
thrill of the atom, combined and recombined in rela-
tions whose complexity exceed immeasurably the
utmost power of thoughiii is the ultimate conceivable
70 The Evolution Hypothesis,
beginning of all concrete forms. The law of the
knowable universe is the law of the atoms and their
vibrations. They are aggregated into masses; their
movements are gathered together into the vast sweep
of celestial motions ; their pulsations are the outer face
of the thrill of pleasure and the throb of pain ; their
waves of molecular action, passing through the nerve
centres, are the shocks which, repeatedly recurring^
combined and recombined, call into being and mould
the self-knowing intelligence and world-embracing
thoughts of man. Such is the evolutionist theory
of concrete existence. Dynamic law rules. The oscil-
lating atom — matter and motion — the law of their
continuous redistribution — all knowable concrete
being is there. If there be any mode of existence
, or of activity not included, of it we can have no de-
\ finite knowledge ; it is for ever hidden from man.
i Evolution covers the knowable ; and evolution is " an
integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of
j motion."
This theory we are not allowed to speak of as
materialistic: Mr. Spencer repudiates the charge of
materialism. No one can have any desire to affix the
offensive word to his name or doctrine. He is on the
point an agnostic. He cannot tell what may be the
nature of the Ultimate Power, whether matter or
spirit, or both, or neither. He refuses to predicate of
it in any definite mode. But we are not in the least
concerned about the ultimate reality, whether it is
A Dynamic Theory. yi
matter or something other than matter, if it is to re-
main for ever absolutely unknown. We want to
know what we are to think about that actuality as
conditioned in the knowable universe — as we see it
manifested within the compass of experience. In the
reofion of the visible, within the view of science, the
evolutionist doctrine is clear and unmistakable. Over
the whole field of scientific knowledge, over the whole
range traversed by intelligence, there is no law known,
or that can be known, that is not included under the
one regulative principle — that of the redistribution of
matter and motion ; and there is no power operative
within the cosmos, as open to the view of science, that
does not operate in accordance with that supreme law.
The law of the continuous redistribution of matter and
motion rules all change : wherever the eye pierces, it is
there ; wherever science illumines the depths of exist-
ence with the collected rays of organized knowledge, it
is there ; thought can never pass beyond its domain or
escape from its grasp ; it commands all the knowable.
Dynamic law is the one universal. Evolutionism is a
thorough-going dynamic theory.
Let us look at the breadth of the application of this
dynamic principle. We have already, in outline,
sketched the realm of knowleds^e as embracino^ the
Supreme Source of all things ; and as including four
great streams flowing from that Source — the know-
ledge of the world of inorganic matter, the knowledge
of organisms endowed with vegetal life, of organisms
']2 The Evolution Hypothesis.
endowed with life and sensation, and of man possessed
of self-conscious intelligence and a moral nature.
The knowledge of God stands apart : it is the answer
of mind to the Supreme Mind as His thought touches
ours in the intelligible in the universe, or speaks to
us in immediate revelation. The other departments
of knowledge are at once combined and separate —
combined in the operation of certain laws common to
the whole ; and separate in having each a system of
laws peculiar to itself alone. The laws that run
throughout the wdiole field are the mechanical laws
of inorganic matter. Wherever we are able to subject
matter to the scrutiny of science, we discover similar
modes of action. The same kind of matter is the
same in behaviour everywhere ; our language implies
this fact when we speak of it as of the same kind.
If matter is ponderable, it will be found so whether in
Saturn or in the brain.
Dynamic law is universal so far as the universe of
material forces reaches. In so far as matter, however
widely separated by distance in space, is the same
kind of matter, its behaviour w^ill be the same ; it will
be found subject to the same dynamic law. That
matter should be continuous — that is, that matter
should in all its visible forms, and in its modes that
lie deeper than observations can reach, be essentially
one in kind, and that it should pervade all cosmic
space — though wholly unprovable — seems a probable
hypothesis. Over all that reach its law will be the
A Dynamic Theory. ']2i
same ; for its mode of action, unless some Power
intervene, will be uniform. In so far as the accept-
ance of dynamic law in its applicability wherever
moving matter exists may be regarded as a unification
of knowledge, no one will think it worth disputing
that there has been a step — though a very short step,
in the direction of unity. We are still, however, a
long way from the great central questions. We have
not so much as touched the extreme verge of the real
problems of philosophy. If " divine philosophy " be
narrowed to questions of dynamics — to the mechanical
relations of matter, in whatever form matter is found —
however subtile these relations may be, the greater
part of knowledge is left out of view ; knowledge is
unified by being mutilated. A neighbour of mine has,
by working out his idea year after year, succeeded
in evolving out of a growing thorn-bush a figure
having some resemblance to a peacock. The ingenuity
and labour of the artist have been considerable, yet
the result is a very ill-shaped thorn- bush, and a very
poor representation of a peacock. The greatest skill
■and the most persistent toil expended in endeavouring
to mould all kinds of knowledge into the hard outline
of dynamic law is not likely to reach a more satisfac-
tory issue.
For the distinctive features of each department are
sacrificed to a pretence of oneness. That which con-
stitutes the vegetal kingdom a distinct division of
■concrete existence is Orverlooked. The force that
74 ^>^^ EvohUion Hypothesis.
counteracts the law of gravity, and builds up the com-
plex structure of the plant is not accounted for. Why
the vegetal kingdom is v^hat it is, as differenced from
all other known things, is just what the dynamic prin-
ciple fails to explain. It can tell us why the branches-
laden with fruit bend towards the ground, or why
their curve is such as it is, and can tell us much more
of substantially the same kind, gathered from me-
chanical or chemical science ; but philosophy aims at
interpreting that which is distinctive, and strives
after a system of truth in which the separate depart-
ments of knowledge shall have each its due place.
Mr. Spencer applies his dynamic principle to the
phenomena of animal life. Here also there is a large
scope for the application of chemical and mechanical
law. But the characteristic part of the phenomena —
that which constitutes the animal organism a dis-
tinctive class of concrete existence — is the very thing
the dynamic principle will not cover. Yet everything
in the instance that will not come under the law of
the redistribution of matter and motion is to be
removed from the field of knowledo^e and releofated to
the region of the unknowable.
The thinker is himself the great exception. To
reduce himself in his self-knowledge, in his intellection,
in his moral being, to an instance of dynamic law —
to constitute himself a part of the redistribution of
matter and motion — is the crucial test of the thorough-
ness with which the evolutionist carries out his theory.
A Dynamic Theory. 75,
Mr. Spencer does not shrink from this test. He not
only asserts in general terms the universal applica-
bility of his principle, but applies it in detail, with
what success we shall subsequently inquire, to the
phenomena of mind, and morals, and society. What
we have here to keep steadily in view is the fact that
Mr. Spencer's philosophy is a system dynamic through-
out. It is thorough-going. He never falters in ad-
hesion to his fundamental principle.
He takes exception to the term "mechanical" as
applied to his hypothesis, though he himself charac-
terises his biological doctrine as "the mechanical
hypothesis " and speaks of proceeding " on mechanical
principles." * "The common uses of the words
' mechanical ' and ' mechanist ' are," he says, " such as
inevitably call up in all minds the notion of visible
masses of matter acting on one another by measur-
able forces, and producing sensible motions. In the
absence of explanations or illustrations serving ta
enlarge the conception thus suggested, so as to bring
within it the oscillations of the molecules of matter
and the undulations of the molecules of ether per-
vading all space, even the cultivated reader must
carry with him an extremely crude and narrow idea
of the ' mechanist theory,' and cannot fail to be struck
with the seeming absurdity of interpreting vital
phenomena in mechanical terms." ^
* Biologij, vol. I., § 5.
t Biology, vol. I. Appendix p. 490.
76 The Evolution Hypothesis,
Now, however recondite what Mr. Spencer de-
scribes as the "developed ideas of matter and motion"
may be, it is matter and motion with which we are
still dealing, and nothing but matter and motion. The
play of atoms internal to the most minute molecule,
is as truly an instance of matter and motion as the
revolution of the earth round the sun. Differences in
size do not constitute differences of kind. " The play
of forces is essentially the same in principle through-
out the whole region explored by our intelligence " ; *
whether it be the movement of masses or "the oscilla-
tions of the molecules of either " the principle is the
same ; and it matters little whether we call the
doctrine "dynamic" or "mechanical." Let the evolu-
tionist extend as widely as he will the conception of
dynamic law, by imagining a series of systems reaching
towards infinity in their minuteness, subtil ty, and
complexity ; let him give freest play in the invention
of composition of causes adequate to the production of
any conceivable result ; yet, however far the fancy
travels from the visible, however marvellous that
other world revealed in its worders to the scientific
imagination, the materials of which it is built up are
still the same — force manifested in the atom and its
vibrations, matter and motion, and the law of their
continuous redistribution shaping and ruling all
t Vir&t Principles, § 91.
A Dynamic Theory. "]"j
thino-s. Within the knowable evolution finds no
other exercise of real power.
Are we again among the keen-eyed thinkers of
ancient Greece ? Are we sitting at the feet of
Democritus or Epicurus, or listening to their teaching
set in the via-orous verse of Lucretius ? We see, as
we have seen with their eyes, the fathomless im-
mensity filled far as imagination reaches with the
whirling atoms ; we see matter and motion and cease-
less physical change occupying the whole field of
vision. In the depths of this ocean-stream we seem
to live, and move, and have our being. Above us,
around us, within us, one supreme, all-ruling, and all
prevading law — the dynamic principle of the con-
tinuous redistribution of matter and motion. '
Into this abyss Evolutionism carries its disciples. '
CHAPTER YIII.
THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE
SECTION I.
Is THE Persistence of Force a Datum of Consciousness ?
" rpHE sole truth which transcends experience by
-A- underlying it is the persistence of Force. This
being the basis of experience, must be the basis of
any scientific organization of experiences. To this an
ultimate analysis brings us down ; and on this a rational
synthesis must build up."* This "alone makes pos-
sible each concrete interpretation and at last unifies
all concrete interpretations."*!' It is "the deepest of
all truths."! It is "that primordial truth which
underlies our intelligence,"] [ " the truth by derivation
from which all other truths are to be proved."§
The persistence of force is Mr. Spencer's ultimate
principle. It is the measure of his system. His
philosophy covers only what the persistence of force
covers. If the persistence of force be too narrow
include all knowledge, the evolution doctrine canno
include all knowledge. If there be any truth, not
* First Principles, § 62, t Ihid. § 191. J Ibid. § 162.
11 Hid. § 155. § Ihid. % 185.
The Persistence of Force. 79
derivable from the persistence of force, evolutionism
falls short of its pretension as a philosophy em-
bracing all truth. If, in the course of change in
organisms or in the universe, there is aught that is
not deducible from the persistence of force, the Evo-
lution Hypothesis fails as a rational doctrine : science
is left to describe, without explaining, phenomenal
processes that are still unaccounted for. It is vital to
Mr. Spencer's theory that the persistence of force
should be accepted as a principle co-extensive with
the field of knowledge ; for it is the foundation on
which the new cosmic philosophy is built. We must
subject it to the closest examination.
Mr. Spencer claims for it the authority of an ulti-
mate datum of consciousness. " If it can be shown,"
he says, " that the persistence of force is not a datum
of consciousness, .... then indeed it will be shown
that the theory of evolution has not the high warrant
here claimed for it."* Let us test this claim.
It is at once granted that the cognition of force is
a primary datum of consciousness. In every experi-
ence of material objects there lies the cognition of
force. We know force in matter as resisting; we
have a sense of active force in the effects produced on
the organism and felt as sensations ; we have also
•experience of force in the exertion of bodily strength
in response to volition. The experience of something
8o The Evolution Hypothesis.
resisting, affecting, operating, is co-extensive with our
knowledo^e of the external world. That somethinor
we know as independent of our consciousness of it.
Its existence is not commensurate with our cognition :
our thinking does not create it, nor does the cessation
|of our thought annihilate it. It exists at the instant
when we cognize it; it remains in existence at the
moment when our cognition of it ceases. This is the
whole content of consciousness so far as it bears
primary testimony to the existence of external things.
In subsequent acts of cognition we add to this experi-
ence : we are again conscious of the same object ; we
re-cognize it as the same. Hence we form a second-
ary judgment as to its perpetuity. It has been: it
is. But consciousness has no knowledge — it can have
none — as to the antecedent existence of the object
before our cognition of it, or its continuance in the
future. It has been : it is. But if we ask, How long
has it been ? How long shall it continue to be ?
Consciousness cannot answer, for it has no means of
knowing. Its primary deliverance is limited to an
affirmation of the existence of an external object, or if
the word be preferred, the existence of force, as some-
thing independent of the mental act, — not originated
by the act of perceiving, nor ceasing with the cessa-
tion of that act. Further than this consciousness
cannot go.
But Mr. Spencer argues that " the assertion of an
existence beyond consciousness is itself an assertion
i
The Persistence of Force. 8i
that there is something beyond consciousness that
persists ; for persistence is nothing more than con-
tinued existence, and .existence cannot be thought of
as other than continued."* That is, if the reasoning
be sound, all existence is eternal. To assert " an ex-
istence beyond consciousness "is to assert its persist-
ence, that is, its " continued existence ; " in other words,
its existence without beginning or end ; for " existence
cannot be thought of " otherwise. This doctrine is so
astounding, whether viewed in relation to the nature
of things or to the knowledge of things, that one is
curious to obtain some fuller explanation of the terms.
Turning to Mr. Spencer's Psychology, we find a fuller
statement. In examining Hume's theory of impres-
sions and ideas, he says : " To he is ' to remain,' ' to
be fixed.' Existence is defined as 'continued beinof,'
' duration,' ' continuation.' Persistence is the root-
notion running through all the meanings. So long as
a pain persists we say it is still there. . . The flash of
lightning, not having persisted, is regarded as having
ceased to be Above all, it is this continuity, or
endurance, or fixity, or persistence, which we specially
mean when we assert the existence of what may be
called objects ; among which, too, we draw the distinc-
tion between existing or ceasing to exist according as
we do or do not find persistence."*
Mr. Spencer does not gain anything by this iden- \
* Fird Principles, § 65. • t Psych. Vol. H. § 394.
F
82 The Evolution Hypothesis.
tification of being and persistence; for in the very
language he uses he contradicts himself. The lightning
flash " ceases to he ; " but it must have been before it
could cease to be. Was there no ''continuity, or
endurance, or fixity, or persistence," during the time —
and it matters not whether that time was a fraction
of a second or a cycle of years — precedent to this
ceasing ? Is it an illegitimate use of words to speak of
something as existing when we know that it will cease
to exist ? How are we to express the mode of being
of all the ever-changing manifestations of the absolute
force ? They are ; they cease to be : in the very re-
cognition of their ceasing to be there is an affirmation
that they have been. It would close a great number
of debated questions, if it were received as the law of
our intelligence and of being, that all existence of
which we have consciousness is continued existence
without origin or end. But we are not here concerned
with questions of ontology ; our business, meanwhile,
is but to interrogate consciousness and to ascertain
what this — the only available witness — has to testify.
The deliverance of consciousness is, as we have seen,
simply attestation of the existence of something out-
side itself, not dependent on the percipient mind for
its beginning or its continuance. The lightning flash,
of which there has been momentary cognition, may,
for all consciousness can attest, have originated at that
instant and have at that instant ceased to be. Our
consciousness of it is the act of perception, and nothing
The Persistence of Force. 83
more. The comet that is visible for a few successive
nights may have come into existence with its first and
ceased with its last appearance, in so far as conscious-
ness can bear witness. The period of duration of
existence is a question of fact, and — especially on
a purely experiential theory — there can be no
immediate knowledge of fact beyond the present, or
that knowledge which results from a past cognition
and a present re-cognition of the same. Consciousness
testifies that force exists here and now; the testi-,
mony goes no farther and can go no farther.
The absurdity of assuming to have on the side of
the persistence of force, as Mr. Spencer uses the phrase,
a primary deliverance of consciousness is still more
-evident when we discover what it is that conscious-
ness is supposed to attest. " What," he asks, " is the
force of which we predicate persistence ? It is not the
force we are immediately conscious of in our muscular
^flforts ; for this does not persist. As soon as an out-
stretched limb is relaxed the sense of tension dis-
appears. True, we assert that in the stone thrown, or
the weight lifted, is exhibited the eflfect of this mus-
cular tension ; and that the force which has ceased to
be present in consciousness, exists elsewhere. But it
does not exist elsewhere under any form cognizable
by us."
Where then, we may ask, is the testimony of con-
sciousness to its persistence ? It has ceased to be
" present in consciousness* and is no longer cognizable.
84 The Evolution Hypothesis.
" Hence," Mr. Spencer adds, " the force of which we
assert persistence is the absolute force of which we are
indefinitely conscious as the necessary correlate of the
force we know." * " The one thing permanent is the
Unknowable reality hidden under all these changing
shapes." i*
This is a curious specimen of metaphysical theoriz-
ing. "The force we know "is the very thing — the
only thing about which we are concerned ; with it
science has to do, and with it alone. Does that known
force persist ? No ; that of which we have definite
consciousness — that which furnishes the whole matter
of science — that does not persist. We are not per-
mitted to assert persistence of any existence in the
realm of knowledge, of any concrete thing with which
science is conversant. The persistent force is the
absolute force; but of it w^e are only "indefinitely
conscious." What we know does not persist; what
persists we can never know. This is Mr. Spencer's-
fundamental principle ; a doubtful foundation, surely,
on which to erect a temple of universal truth.
To bring his first principle within the primary data
of consciousness, Mr. Spencer falls back upon an impo-
tence of thought. He argues the validity of his axiom
from our inability to think matter either as coming
into being or as ceasing to exist. " It is impossible,"
he says, "to think of something becoming nothing,
* First principles, § 62. t Psychology, Vol. II. , § 475.
The Persistence of Force, 85
for the same reason that it is impossible to think of
nothing becoming something — the reason, namely,
that nothing cannot become an object of conscious-
ness." * The possibility of thinking the creation of
something out of nothing will come up for discussion
subsequently. It may be easily shown that pictur-
ability is not the measure of legitimate thought. But
suppose we grant that it is impossible to think of some-
thing becoming nothing, and suppose we are driven
to accept the persistence of force, because we cannot
represent to the mind any force ceasing to be, evolu-
tionism has gained no solid advantage. If our in-
ability to think force as becoming non-existent is
"immediately consequent on the nature of thought;"
if, therefore, it is through this mental impotence that'
we are compelled to accept the principle of the per-
sistence of force, the foundation of the evolution
doctrine as a system of positive truth is taken away.
For our inability to think cannot form the basis of
real knowledge. A system of positive philosophy
cannot be established on the warrant of an impotence
of intelligence. If Mr. Spencer were engaged only
with the coherence and conclusiveness of abstract
reasoning; if his system were a system of thought
and not of things ; if his aim were to show us what
concepts are permissible to human intelligence and
what are not; if he were constructing an ideal
■^ ¥ir&t Ffinciples, § 53.
86 The EvohUion Hypothesis.
universe instead of interpreting the universe that is, it
would form an important part of his task to take
account of the impotence as well as the potences of
thought; or if his aim were to remove from the
cosmos constructed by science imaginative additions
for which no counterpart could be found in the cosmos,
as actually existent, it might be competent for him to
base his reasoning on what the mind cannot do, and
require science to keep within the limits of intelli-
gence. But he has undertaken to construct a system
of positive truth ; he is dealing with concrete exist-
ences ; he is interpreting a universe not created by our
thouo-ht, but havinof a real existence outside our
consciousness ; to rest the foundation principle of this
Philosophy, which is to unify all knowledge, on what
the mind is unable to do, is to base science on nescience
— to unify knowledge by ignorance.
Mr. Spencer calls consciousness as a witness bearing
primary testimony to the persistence of force. The
reader may interrogate the witness for himself. What
is that of which consciousness attests the existence in
the cognition of an external object ? Is it not the
existence of an external something here and now ? It
is this and nothing more. The fundamental principle
of evolutionism has not the warrant of a primary
deliverance of consciousness.
The Persistence of Force. ^J
Section II.
What is Included in the term Force ?
That there is no warrant for the acceptance of the
persistence of force as a regulative principle authori-
tative over the whole range traversed by human
intelligence will the more evidently appear from an
examination of its terms.
First, let us inquire, What is included in the term
force ? We are familiar with force in its material
modes. We cognize it under the form of matter ; we
see it manifested in the movement of bodies ; we have
experience of it in aifections of the organism ; we know
it in the effect produced in obedience to the will.
These experiences furnish us with the concept of
force. To these and the like instances the word is in
its original and proper signification limited. * In a
secondary or metaphorical sense, we apply the term to
express experiences of a wholly different nature. We
speak of intellectual force, of force of character, of
moral force, of the force of public opinion, including
in such usage a meanino: altoojether different from
that conveyed when we speak of the force of a blow.
* Force is defined by Thomson and Tait as being " any cause
which tends to alter a body's natural state of rest or of uniform
motion in a straight line." Elements of Natural Philosophy,
Parti., §183.
'* Force in point of fact is a direct object of sense ; probably
of all our senses, and certainly of the muscular sense." Ibid.
§ 173. ♦
83 The Evolution Hypothesis.
In an exact use of terms there must be a clear re-
cocrnition of this distinction. There is no more
fruitful source of error in philosophizing than the
confounding of metaphor and fact. It is unworthy
of scientific thinking to group under one term, as the
same, things that are only metaphorically alike.
Does the persisting force include Spirit ? There
is an underlying something manifested in conscious
thought, does the persistence of force guarantee the
persistence of that unknown existence ? If force per-
sists, then the force manifested in mind persists. But
it is hard to comprehend how, on evolution principles,
this can be ; for there was a time when all manifested
force was included in matter and motion. Mind sub-
sequenty arose. The cosmos is represented at two
points in time by the following equation :
Matter + motion = matter + motion +*mind.
Mind is either a mode of matter and motion or it is
not. If it be taken as a mode of matter and motion,
we are landed in materialism, which Mr. Spencer re-
pudiates. If we choose the other alternative, we are
compelled to maintain that a new manifestation of
force, not included in the primal manifestations, has
emerged, in which case fixedness of the relation be-
tween the knowable and the unknowable is rejected.
But if one new manifestation has emerged, there is no
limit to the modification of the knowable, and the
;whole fabric of evolution is overturned. Besides, the
persistence of force is itself proved to be false, for one
The Persistence of Force, 89
of the corollaries necessarily following from it is that
the relations among forces persist ; but the persistence
of relations is impossible, if new manifestations of
iinknown forces may from time to time intervene.
When we ask, Does the force manifested in mind
persist ? we receive no satisfactory answer. We
know that the force manifested in matter and that
manifested in motion persist ; for matter is held to be
indestructible and motion continuous. The force
manifested in mind — not being matter — cannot pass
into the force manifested in matter and motion. It
exists for ever distinct. But in what mode has it
existed ? Where during all the ages did it lie hidden ?
How did it stand related to the other forces of the
■cosmos ? The evolutionist has no intelligible answer.
The force has not persisted so far as intelligence can
discover. Within the knowable, the persistence of
force as a universal principle is at a fault. If Mr.
Spencer save his axiom, by carrying it out of the
realm of knowledge into the incomprehensible, we do
not care to follow him.
" Yivida vis anirai pervicit, et extra
Processit flammantia moenia mundi."
Section III.
The Force Persisting the Absolute Force.
Mr. Spencer's doctrine as to the relation of the
knowable to that which transcends knowledge leads
90 The Evolution Hypothesis,
in the analysis of his ultimate principle to inextric-
able ambiguities. In conformity with his ontological
theory, he employs the word force to denote twa
things which are profoundly different — force as it is
the object of consciousness and within the limits of
definite knowledge, and force as it lies beyond the
ken of knowledge and is for ever inscrutable. The
necessities of scientific reasoning demand the persist-
ence of a force that is within the reach of knowledge \
the validity of the axiom as a universal and neces-
sary truth requires that we should take, not the
knowable, but the absolute force as that of which
persistence is predicated. Hence an ambiguous use
of the term which runs through Mr. Spencer's entire
system. His ordinary usage is to employ the word
in the sense of force as manifested and knowable.
For example, in dealing with the correlation of forces,
he says, "a certain amount of each is the constant
equivalent of certain amounts of others. Everywhere
throughout the cosmos this truth must invariably
hold We must recognize the amounts of these
forces as determinate — as necessarily producing such
and such quantities of results, and as necessarily
limited to those quantities Forces, unceasingly
metamorphosed are nowhere increased or decreased." *
Elsewhere he affirms that this truth of the corre-
lation of forces " is a necessary corollary from the
* Mr&t Principles^ §§ 66, 67,
The Persistence of Fo7'ce. g i
persistence of force. Setting out with the proposi-
tion that force can neither come into existence nor
cease to exist," it necessarily follows.* This reason-
ing is totally void of meaning, unless on the assump-
tion that the persisting force is force within the range
of possible science, force as knowable and measurable.
We cannot quantify the unlimited. In like manner, he
has in view force which may be measured, when he
argues that " every antecedent mode of the unknow-
able must have an invariable connection quantitative
and qualitative with that mode of the unknowable
which we call its consequent. For to say otherwise
is to deny the persistence of force." -|- His synthetic
philosophy is the application of this principle to con-
crete phenomena. His reasoning would be altogether
inconclusive, if the force persisting is to be assumed
unthinkable. His philosophy proceeds throughout on
the supposition that the persistence of force holds
good over the entire domain of knowledoe. Reason-
ing from this assumption, as his fundamental prin-
ciple, he proposes to demonstrate the law of evolution
deductively, and show it to be the necessary law of
cosmic change. His whole system is founded on
the persistence of manifested force, in sameness of
quantity from everlasting to everlasting — on the re-
cognition of a persisting force " ever changing its
manifestations, but unchanged in quantity throughout
* First Principles, §<3. t Ibid. § 63.
92 The EvohUion Hypothesis.
all past time and all future time." * His reasoning is
wholly delusive, unless it be held true that the force
of which he predicates persistence is force as mani-
fested, that is, force existing within the knowable.
But does force, as existing within the knowable,
persist ? The individual manifestations of force are
continually changing, no mode of manifestation con-
tinues constant. What we see is not persistence, but
change. Is it, then, that amount of the Absolute
Force which is manifested in the individual instance
that persists ? To affirm so is to frame an impossible
proposition ; for the absolute is unthinkable and in-
scrutable, and we cannot cut out of it a portion,
which may be supposed to be continually changing
its mode of manifestation while still retaining its
identity.
The peristence of force as known or knowable is
not, as Mr. Spencer shows, provable by experience.
We cannot by any process of experiment arrive at
a knowledge of the fact, if it be a fact. In every
experiment we must take for granted the very thing
which is to be proved. If we measure, the persist-
ence of our standard must be assumed ; if we weigh,
the persistence of matter and of gravity must be
taken for granted. No manifestation of force can be
isolated, so as to be made a separate and distinct
subject of observation and experiment. To establish
■jf Yif^i Pri7iciples, § 191.
The Persistence of Force,
by any inductive or experimental process, the truth
of the persistence of force, is clearly impossible : what
we know by experience throughout all the knowable
is not persistence, but mutability. No single mani-
festation of force abides. Mr. Spencer acknowledges
that it is so. " We are compelled to admit that Force
as it exists out of our consciousness is not force as we
know it. Hence the force of which we assert per-
sistence, is that Absolute Force of which we are
indefinitely conscious as the necessary correlate of
the force we know. By the persistence of Force,,
we really mean the persistence of some Cause, which
transcends our knowledge and conception. In other
words, asserting the persistence of Force is asserting
an Unconditioned Reality without beginning or end." *
" Once more," he says elsewhere, " we are brought
round to the conclusion, repeatedly reached by other
routes, that behind all manifestations, inner and outer,
there is a Power manifested. Here, as before, it has
become clear that while the nature of this Power
cannot be known — while we lack the faculty of fram-
ing even the dimmest conception of it, yet its universal
presence is the absolute fact without which there can
be no relative facts. Every feeling and thought being
but transitory — an entire life made up of such feelings
and thoughts being also but transitory — nay, the
objects amid which life is passed, though less transi-
* First Frinciploif, § 62.
94 ^/^^ Evolution Hypothesis.
tory, being severally in course of losing their indivi-
dualities, quickly or slowly; we learn that the one
thing permanent is the Unknowable Reality hidden
under all these changing shapes." *
Mutability is the law of the knowable ; persistence
in the realm of the known is only persistence of
chano^e. And so into that resrion of darkness, of
which we are indefinitely conscious, where there is
neither before nor after, neither antecedent nor con-
sequent, neither greater nor less; where it is not
allowable for reason to predicate anything of any-
thing, we are sent to search for the persisting force.
Mistrusting our vision in the dim realm of the
inscrutable, we take the equivalents which Mr.
Spencer furnishes, and we write his fundamental
axiom with equal exactness in any of the forms, — The
Unknowable Reality persists, or the Ultimate Cause
persists, or the Absolute Force persists. Having ex-
pressed our ultimate truth in this formula, we have,
according to Mr. Spencer, possessed ourselves of a
principle which unifies all concrete existences, and
compacts into one organic whole the divided limbs
of the entire body of actual or possible knowledge.
But of what value is a principle like this ? Will it
bear up a system of philosophy ? When we reach Mr.
Spencer's meaning of the term force, it is only to find
the signification utterly incomprehensible and wholly
* Psychology, vol. II., § 475.
The Persistence of Force. 95
worthless. The thing denoted by the word, when the
dry light of criticism falls on it, recedes, like a ghost,
beyond the limits of intelligence into the shades of
the unsearchable.
Section IV.
Can we Predicate Peesistence in any Knowable Mode ?
In endeavouring to fix with precision what is meant
by Force in Mr. Spencer's ultimate principle, we reach
no satisfactory result. Directing our criticism to the
predicate of his proposition, let us inquire whether
persistence is predicated in any mode that may form
^ basis for real knowledge.
Persistence, in Mr. Spencer's use of terms, means
continued existence ; for he tells us we cannot think
existence except as continued. We may, then, take
the forms — A is, and, A continues to be, as equivalents.
Assuming their equivalence, we write the law of per-
sistence in the form, A continues to be A — a predica-
tion of continued identity. If this predication hold
good universally, we may transform it into the indi-
vidual instance — This A continues to be this A. A
piece of coal lies before me; I write This piece of
coal continues to be this piece of coal. The coal Ls
put into the fire and this piece of coal ceases to be,
this piece of coal. Th^ predication is proved to bel
96 The Evolution Hypothesis.
false : it is clear the predication A continues to be A
does not hold universally. It must then be limited.
What is the limitation ? The answer may be given,
It was not the coal, but the force manifested in the
coal of which persistence was affirmed. We may,
then, write, This A (the force manifested in the coal)
continues to be this A (the same force manifested
otherwise). At this point we are far removed from
the primary dicta of consciousness. We have drawn
a distinction between force and the manifestation of
force, and we have affirmed the continued existence
of the force under varying manifestations. Force is
known to us only as manifested : it stands related to
our senses. " To conceive " force " is to represent it in
some terms derived from our experience — that is,
from our sensations." * But our axiom requires that
we should separate the manifestation from the force,,
and think the force apart from the manifestation.
Apart from manifestation no definite conception of
the force is possible ; unmanifested it is a part of the
inscrutable actuality. To individualize this force
apart from its manifestations, and think it in the pre-
sent, to individualize it, apart from its manifestations,
and think it in the future, and to affirm continued
identity is, on Mr. Spencer's theory, unquestionably
illeofitimate ; we cannot conceive either term in the
proposition — they are alike unknowable. We con-
* Psychology, vol. II., § 428, note.
i
The Persistence of Force. 97
elude, then, that the predication of persistence in
identity is not valid.
We may take the predication in another sense ; it
may mean, Force continues to be force : force persists
as force and not under any other form. It is, then,
predication of continuity in sameness of kind. But
is the persistence of force as force a truth ascertain-
able in any possible manner ? When force is con-
ceived as existing in the unknowable we are, on
evolutionist principles, forbidden to afl&rm of it in
any mode. No definite conception is possible. Force,
as know^n, stands related to our senses. Out of
relation to nerve-sensibility it is assumed to be out of
relation to intelligence. The continuance of force (if
it continue) in the incomprehensible in unthinkable
modes can, give no validity to an axiom lying at the
base of a theory of the knowable cosmos — a cosmos
knowable only through the senses. That force con-
tinues to be for ever force and nothing else is not a
self-evident proposition. Consciousness has no know-
ledge on the point, and can give no testimony. In
what form force existed prior to the coming to be of
that universe of which the senses give us means of
knowledge, is a problem insoluble by man. Mr.
Spencer himself acknowledges it to be so, when he
carries force back from the relations of sense and
thought into the unknowable actuality. "Force as
we know it" he says, "can be regarded only as a
certain conditioned effect* of the Unconditioned Cause
98 The Evolution Hypothesis.
— as the relative reality indicating to us an Absolute
Reality by which it is immediately produced."* In
that reo:ion of the unknowable he will not allow us to
form of it any definite concept: whether, in the in-
scrutable it has uniformly existed as force, or whether
it may have existed in some other mode of actuality,
we are not warranted either to afiirm or deny. We
may conclude that the interpretation of the propo-
sition to mean, Force remains force, yields no profit-
able result.
But the predication may be read with another
implication, — one which Mr. Spencer himself has
indicated. Persistence may mean continuance "un-
changed in quantity throughout all past time and
all future time."-f- That is, the force that persists
was a million years ago exactly the same in amount
that it is to-day, and so shall be a million years hence.
Now it is evident that this afiirmation is wholly be-
yond the reach of experiential proof. We have no
means of measuring with exactness any manifested
force in the state in which it is, or in the state into
which it subsequently passes. Observation cannot
assure us that the quantity remains unaltered. At
the very moment of observation the process of change
is going on. When a gun is fired, a certain amount of
force is liberated and a certain amount of effect pro-
duced; but these cannot be quantified. The forces
* First Principles, § 50. t Ihid. , § 191.
The Persistence of Force. 99
contained in the cartridge cannot be estimated; nor
can they be summed up in the new forms into which
they pass. The persistence, in equality of amount, of a
force as manifested, cannot be ascertained experiment-
ally in any instance. To say that any manifested
force ever has been and ever shall be the same in,
quantity is an illegitimate affirmation.
It is supposable, however, that the sum total of
manifested force is that the amount of which is to
be held constant. This mode of conceiving persist-
ence also fails us. For there can be no experience
of a totality stretching beyond the bounds of attain-
able knowledo:e. Besides, manifestations are muta-
tions. It is their characteristic to be ever coming
into view and ever vanishing from observation. The
totality of manifestations cannot be summed; but
even if we were able at any one point in time to
sum up the total of manifested force, it would be im-
possible for us to affirm its perpetuity. For the
knowable touches the unknowable at every point in
space and time; we cannot, therefore, separate the
knowable to measure the sum of it. The law of the
manifestation of the inscrutable power is hidden
from us. Mr. Spencer, no doubt, assumes that the
manifestations of the absolute are throughout all
time " unchanged in quantity." But another thinker
is as free to conclude — and has as much reason on
his side — that the amount has not continued constant.
The manifestations of the unknowable power may at
lOO The Evolution Hypothesis.
some point in time have been less or greater than at
present. The cosmos, as we see it, may be one throb
in the pulsations of a mighty rhythmic movement
through which the absolute energy has been revealing
itself in a constantly changing totality of manifesta-
tions. That the amount remains constant, and has
for ever remained constant, is a supposition not only
unwarranted, but out of harmony with the evolution
doctrine itself. We should, as disciples of Mr. Spencer,
be led rather to conceive of the unknowable actuality
as revealing itself in modes ceaselessly changing, both
in amount and in variety. Out of the depths of the
absolute cause all manifested force wells up. The
fountain out of which it springs is infinite. As the
myriad moving atoms, whirling in systems of inex-
plicable complexity, rise into view, we can think
of them as in continual play of perpetually changing
shapes, the totality rising and falling with ceaseless
rhythmic mutations, in endless diversity of mode and
in continually varying amount. We can imagine also
that, in the great cosmic movement, ever moulding it
anew, are forms of beauty and forthgoings of power
which intelliorence can never reach through sense.
A vision of this kind is in truer harmony with the
whole course of change than Mr. Spencer's hypothesis
of a hard line on the one side of which thought has
an " indefinite consciousness " of the absolute energy,
«;nd on the other, sees an unalterable sum of mani-
fested power. If we take the persistent force to be
The Persiste7ice of Force, loi
the absolute actuality, as, following Mr. Spencer, we
are w^arranted to do, — for " by the persistence of
force" he says, "we really mean the persistence of
some cause which transcends our knowledge and con-
ception," — we predicate the continued existence of
the absolute force in equality of sum throughout
all time. But to affirm that the incomprehensible
" continues unchanged in quantity " is manifestly in-
competent to human intelligence. At every point in
time it is assumed to be unbounded and ever inscrut-
able : we are forbidden to form of it any definite con-
cept whatever. To predicate of it persistent equality
in amount is doubly absurd.
We make no real advance, then, by taking persist-
ence to mean continued sameness of quantity.
Even if it were possible to quantify the totality of
force, or to isolate and compare individual instances,
persistence could guarantee one thing only, that is,
the constancy of the amount. The something might
become another thing in all respects save in quantity.
For brass we might have gold and for stones iron,
provided only the balance of the totals remained
undisturbed. For force is with Mr. Spencer the
equivalent of all modes of being, spiritual and
material, of every mode of motion, or exercise of
thought ; of everything that exists or has existed.
To affirm, then, that the sole ultimate truth is the
persistence of force in equality of amount, is to re-
move from thought all* questions of kind and to
102 The Evolution Hypothesis.
reduce all truth to relations of quantity, all know-
ledge to measurement. But, as we have seen, exact
quantification is impossible. If all truth be precision
of measurement, truth is forever hidden from man,
and the light of real knowledge can never fall upon
his path. The exact quantification, towards which
science, following the method of experiment, more
and more tends as it becomes perfected, is in every
instance but an approximation. Exactness of quanti-
fication, carried backward and forward from an in-
conceivably remote past to an inconceivably distant
future, is unattainable, whether in the individual
instance or in the totality of things.
We are compelled, then, to reject the predication of
persistence as continued existence, whether in identity,
or in kind, or in quantity. Removing these modes of
predication, what thinkable conception remains ? We
reach as a residual notion the bare thought of heing ;
and lay at the basis of our cosmic philosophy, as its
fundamental truth from which all other truths are to
be derived, the continued existence of being without
attributes. We are not far from the foundation prin-
ciple of Hegel — the identity of pure Being and pure
No-thing. But will the knowable universe rest firmly
on such a basis ? We are doubtful of its stability.
Ex nihilo nihil fit
The Persistence of Force, 103
SECTION V.
Corollaries of the Persistence of Force.
There are three truths coming immediately under
the principle of the persistence of force which are
indispensable to evolutionism and which we shall
briefly examine — the indestructibility of matter, the
continuity of motion, and the persistence of relations
among forces. Without these the evolutionist cannot
build up his system : they must be granted him as
necessary and universal.
1. The indestructibility of matter.
"Our conception of matter reduced to its simplest
shape is that of co-existent positions that offer re-
sistance." * It has two essential attributes. We are
under necessity of " representing to ourselves the ulti-
mate elements of matter as being at once extended
and resistent Of these two inseparable elements,
the resistance, is primary and the extension secon-
dary." -f- Mr. Spencer holds the " indestructibility of
matter " to be a derivative truth, the persistence of
force being the ultimate from which it is derived.
Does the persistence of force necessitate the persistence
of matter ? Clearly not. The persistence of force
only warrants us in affirming the persistence of force.
Matter is a manifestation, and manifestations are
* First Pri7iciples, § 48. t Ibid.
I04 The EvoliUioii Hypothesis,
inconstant. Being a manifestation, matter is not
guaranteed continued existence; for the continued
existence of force does not necessitate the continued
existence of every manifestation of force. Force per-
sists, while its manifestations change. Is the mani-
festation known as matter so differenced from all other
manifestations that the persistence of force should
determine its persistence ? The two essential at-
tributes of matter are resistance and occupation . of
space. Now these are not attributes essential to the
idea of force, and do not necessarily persist with its
persistence. Space-occupying — that is, bulk — is rela-
tive; it is capable of more and less. Mr. Spencer
speaks of it as a special kind of force. " The first of
these," he says — the space-occupying kind of force —
" has no specific name." * But we are familiar with
the fact that the kind of force manifested in "space-
occupying " may be increased or diminished. Now
if the space-occupancy may become less, is there a
point at which this diminution necessarily stops ? Is
there a line drawn at which the continuity of move-
ment is broken, and at which it is said to the vanishing
process, " Hitherto shalt thou come, but no farther ? "
If so, then the law of continuity is violated. If, on
the other hand, the law of continuity prevail, and the
space-occupying mode of force gradually merge in
some other mode, then matter has lost one element of
* First Principles, § 58.
The Persistence of Force. 105
the force manifested in it, and it has been, in so far,
destroyed.
Take the other attribute. Resistance is also relative
— a question of more and less. It is relative also in
this, that it cannot be known except in the relation of
matter to matter. If we think of an atom, removing
from our thought all other matter, and conceiving it
out of relation to all other matter, we are not necessi-
tated to ascribe to it the attribute of resistance. Besides,
there is no sufficient reason for excepting matter from
the law of the correlation of forces. " Forces standing
in certain correlations form the whole content of our
idea of matter." * If it be a correlated force, matter
may, in the inscrutable cosmic activity, be interchange-
able with other modes. Otherwise we set bounds to
the principle of the correlation forces, and in drawing
the boundary line we violate the law of continuity.
There is, then, no sufficient ground for affirming
that matter, whether viewed as resistant or space-
occupying, persists. But turning from force as mani-
festated, which, on Mr. Spencer's theory, does not
persist, to the presisting force — the unconditioned and
unknowable power — we find no support for the
doctrine of the everlasting^ continuance of matter.
The absolute force does not persist in any knowable
mode. The persistence of a knowable mode cannot,
therefore, be deduced from the persistence of the un-
*• 'Pir&i Principles, § 48.
ic6 The Evolution Hypothesis.
knowable ; and no warrant is given for aflSrming the
indestructibility of any manifestation. Whether
matter does or does not continue to exist, the principle
of the persistence of force cannot determine. The
permanence of a manifestation in the knowable cannot
be established by assuming the permanence of un-
conditioned force in the unknowable. If the per-
sistence of the unconditioned force necessitated the
continued existence of all modes of manifested force,,
all manifestations would be eternal.
To deduce from the persistence of force the inde-
structibility of matter is obviously illegitimate.*
(2.) The continuity of motion.
By a like process of reasoning, we are led to the con-
clusion that the persistence of force gives no warrant
for affirming the ceaseless continuity of motion. It
will not enable us to determine whether or not the sum
of motion in the universe remains equal over all the
cycles of change. Visible motion is not continuous:
the continuity is " the constancy of the total made by
adding together actual and potential, molar and mole-
cular."-|- But we have no means of arriving at a war-
rantable affirmation of the constancy of this total:
these modes of motion are modes of force, and may
be interchanged with other manifestations of the un-
knowable energy. Experientially they cannot be
* The inconceivability of matter ceasing to be is dealt with in
discussing the question of creation,
t First Principles, § 56.
The Persistence of Force. 107
summed. Jf the force manifested in them is mani-
fested in any other forthgoing of energy, or if it sink
into the depths of the inscrutable, the persistence of
force is equally satisfied. This corollary also fails as
an axiomatic truth.
8. The persistence of the relations among forces.
" The first deduction to be drawn from the ultimate
universal truth that force persists, is that the relations
among forces persist." * Is this a universal principle ?
Clearly it must be, if it be an immediate deduction
from the " ultimate universal truth." Now observe,
it is not some relations, but " the relations " that per-
sist. " We cannot assert persistence of this something
beyond consciousness without asserting that the rela-
tions among its manifestations are persistent."*!- The
relations among the manifestations of the persistent
" something beyond consciousness " comprise relations
of space, time, number, quantity, quality, and cause
and efiect. Do all these relations among forces per-
sist ? To answer in the affirmative launches us on a
sea of absurdities. Forces are manifested as occupy-
ing positions in space, if these spatial relations con-
tinue constant, every part of the cosmos must remain
eternally in fixed relation of distance to every other,
and motion internal to it is impossible : if time rela-
tions remain persistent, there can be no succession ;
the outflow of change was at the first instant stayed
* First Principlh, § 63. t Ihid., § 65.
Jo8 The Evohition Hypothesis.
and set in an eternal rest : if relations of number
persist, there can be neither union nor division.
Two forces may be conceived as becoming one force,
as two dew drops may merge in one, or one force may
be thought of as dividing into two ; but if the one
continues one and the plural remains plural, there can
be neither union nor division throughout all time. In
like manner, if the relations of quantity remain fixed
there cannot be either addition or diminution : if
relations of quality are constant, the universe is
doomed to everlasting sameness ; differences of kind
cannot arise ; the homogeneous can never become
heterogeneous.
Passing by all other relations, Mr. Spencer deals
only with that of cause and effect, and to it applies
his axiom. " Every antecedent mode of the Unknow-
able must have an invariable connection, quantitative
and qualitative, with that mode of the Unknowable
which w^e call its consequent. For to say otherwise
is to deny the persistence of force. If in any two
cases there is exact likeness, not only between those
most conspicuous antecedents which we distinguish
as the causes, but also between those accompanying
antecedents which we call the conditions, we cannot
affirm that the effects will differ, without affirming
either that some force has come into existence or
that some force has ceased to exist."*
* Flrd PrincipleSy § 63.
The Persistence of Force. 109
There is an evident fallacy in this reasoning if we
take our stand on Mr. Spencer's principles. What is
that we call effect ? Clearly it is a manifestation of
force ; that which we call cause — that is, cause within
the knowable — is also a manifestation of force. What
then, is the relation that persists ? Is it the relation
of manifestation to manifestation, or force to force ?
It cannot be the relation of manifestation to manifes-
tation ; for the manifestations are ever changing ; the
course of cosmic movement is ceaseless mutation. The
relation of manifestation to manifestation is wholly
phenomenal — mutable as the fleeting manifestations.
The persisting relation must then be that of force to
force. But do the forces that persist stand related ?
and if so, do they stand related in any knowable
mode ? The persisting forces are part of the inscrut-
able energy. A new and interesting question presents
itself. Do the inter-related forces exist as constituents
of the absolute force, continuing distinct throughout
all modes of its manifestation ? If so, we shall need
to know their law before we can claim to understand
their manifestations in the cosmos: if we are pre-
cluded from affirming anything of the forces consti-
tuting the incomprehensible, how can we assure
ourselves that the relations of forces wholly inscrut-
able, and whose continued persistence as distinct
sources of causative energy is doubtful, persist ?
We can draw no conclusion as to the persistence of
knowable relations front the persistence of the uncon-
no The Evolution Hypothesis.
ditioned force — a force that does not exist " under any
form cognizable by us."
It may be answered, The causal manifestations are
by hypothesis the same : they being assumed the same
in every particular, the form of manifestation, called
the effect, will be necessarily the same. Let it be
remembered, however, that we are engaged — not with
speculations as to what might be, but with inquiry as
to what is and has been. On what ground do we base
the assumption that groups in every particular alike
do from age to age recur ? We have to face the great
•experiential inquiry. Do manifestations precisely the
same ever reappear ? On evolutionist principles the
universe is not at two successive stages exactly
similar. It is only observation that can assure us
whether groups of manifestations that can be identi-
fied as the same, recur; and, consequently, every
inference carried beyond the ken of observation is
to be received w^ith doubt. But even though it were
certain that groups phenomenally alike had been
observed, we could not, from the persistence of force,
conclude with certainty that they contained the same
measure of causal efficiency : for the inherent energy
is the forthgoing of the inscrutable power, of which,
under the same phenomenal appearance, there may
be more or less. We are again driven back to the
ever-recurring assumption, involved in every part of
Mr. Spencer's system, that the law of the unknowable
is known, that we have ascertained as an indubitable
The Persistence of Force, 1 1 1
truth that the visible universe is an ever unmodified
manifestation of the Incomprehensible Actuality — an
assumption which is not a dictum of consciousness
and which is impossible of proof.
Tested in itself or in its corollaries, Mr. Spencer's
fundamental axiom is found wanting. It has no
validity as a universal truth. Evolutionism founded
on it is a pyramid built upon its apex. But no wider
foundation is available. " The sole truth which trans-
-cends experience by underlying it is the Persistence
of Force. This being the basis of experience must
be the basis of any scientific organization of experi-
ence. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down,
and on this a rational synthesis must build up." *
* ¥ir8i Principles, § 62.
CHAPTER IX.
POSTULATES OF EVOLUTION.
THE Evolution Philosophy requires as its basi»
certain postulates, without which it cannot be
constructed. We shall inquire what these postulates
are, and subject them to a critical examination with
a view to test their validity. If they are questioned,
the entire system is questioned ; if they are rejected,,
the entire system falls to pieces.
1. The theory of Evolution presupposes, as its
primal conception, the cosmos coming into the view
of science as a force homogeneous or nearly homo-
geneous. We cannot take a step forward until we
have first assumed the existence of a force, described
by Mr. Spencer also as a " mass," in a state of homo-
geneity or something very nearly approaching that
condition. The more nearly this first force approxi-
mates to a perfect homogeneity, the more complete
wil} be the unification of knowledge. Every trace of
heterogeneity accepted in our primal concept, marks
a breach of continuity and is evidence that the unity
aimed at is not perfect.
Let us examine this conception, that we may
Postulates of Evolution. 113
see what is taken for granted as to the force whose
existence we posit.
1. Our .first question, then, is as to the extent of it.
It is either infinite or finite : let us suppose it infinite.
If the force be infinite it must be heterosfeneous ; for
an infinite homogeneity does not afford the conditions
necessary for cosmic motion in accordance with dy-
namic law. In a homos^eneous mass extend inof to
infinity, every line of force would be counteracted
by a line of force equal and opposite, and motion
would be impossible. Let us, then, suppose the
cosmos in its primal state to be heterogeneous.
This heterogeneity may be either of two kinds — the
heterogeneity of a universe regulated and shaped in
accordance with law, as the universe is in its present
condition seen to be, or the heterogeneity of an in-
determinate mass in which there is no known or
discoverable law. The former fails to unify know-
ledge, for it begins with the very diversity now
.existing; we may for the present, then, put it
aside, and examine the latter conception. Is this
conception one which may form the starting point of
scientific knowledge ? Clearly it is not. A hetero-
geneous mass extending to infinity can have no place
in scientific thought. An infinite heterogeneity would
aflford a limitless field for surprises. Traversing
this boundless region of heterogeneity, science could
never know what she might stumble upon at the next
step. Miracles would (fease to be wonders. This
H
114 ^^^ Evolution Hypothesis.
omnipresent heterogeneity, working on in the un-
bounded activity of an infinite energy, could never be
fathomed, or the mode of its operation determined :
thought could not set to it any bounds, or lay upon
it any constraint of law. In face of it intelligence
is bewildered. Like Noah's dove, reason may for a
time circle in unresting flight over the boundless
waters, but it soon returns, not bearing even an olive
leaf. If an infinite heterogeneity be taken as the
primary condition, the evolution hypothesis breaks
down in its initial conception.
Let us suppose the cosmos to be finite. This finite
force may be assumed to be either homogeneous or
heterogeneous, and it must exist under some particular
form. If it be limited and spherical, and at the same
time homogeneous, every atom will move in a right
line towards the centre ; these motions being uniform
and in one direction, circular motion is excluded, and
the conditions necessary to evolution are not given.
If the form be not perfectly spherical, but irregular,
motion may arise, but from the ensuing motion it will
be impossible to deduce a cosmos characterized by
orderly movement. Physics will fail to furnish any
explanation which will connect the existing condition
of the universe with that original shape. When we
go back by this line and seek for a firm footing on
which science might rest securely, and, from that solid
ground, work forward in the elucidation of things, we
plunge into the depths of chaos.
Postulates of Evolution, 115
Suppose the primal form to be limited and hetero-
geneous. Then in going back to search for an ex-
planation of heterogeneity, we are driven to posit
heterogeneity as our starting point. We begin with
an imperfect unification of the first matter. The law
of continuity is violated at the first step : the stream
whose divisions are to be traced back to unity is
assumed to be divided at the outset. If the hetero-
geneity which w^e posit be that of law as at present
operative, we have made no approach towards unifi-
cation of knowledge. If the heterogeneity be inde-
terminate and lawless, science can never rest in any
assured confidence that the best established generaliz-
ations may not be overturned. Law is, in that case,
strictly limited to the bounds of observation. A
finite heterogeneity does not furnish a starting point
from which to work out the complete unification of
scientific knowledge.
Whether regarded as homoo^eneous or heterogeneous,
when we think the cosmos as finite, we circumscribe
it within a limit. Beyond that limit no force by
hypothesis exists. If force existed anywhere beyond,
it would necessarily stand related to the cosmic force,
aflfecting it and being affected by it ; and the cosmic
force is on the supposition wholly insphered within
itself. Considering the force then as bounded, we
must think it as enclosed within a boundary line,
within which all being is included, and beyond it not-
being. Let us try to realize in thought this concep-
u 6 The Evolutio7i Hypothesis,
tion. We reach a line of limit, on the one side of it
is force, on the other — nothing: that line divides
being from not-being. But Mr. Spencer has been at
great pains to show that no such mental process is
possible ; that non-existence cannot be presented in
thought. Taking his own criterion as the test of
truth, this conception must be rejected.
One other criticism may be added. The unification
of knowledge is the answer of philosophy to the
craving for unity of thought. That evolution seems
to explain nature so as to let the mind pass con-
tinuously onward without break in the connection of
fact with fact, is a chief source of its hold on men of
science. In view of this habit of scientific thinking,
it is curious to see how the very first step in the pro-
cess is a breach of continuity. If the universe be
infinite, continuity is broken by every line that marks
heterogeneity : if the universe be finite, the mind
must fix a circumscribing limit ; when thought reaches
that line, it is sharply arrested by a boundary beyond
which nothing exists. Now, if the law of continuity
must be broken when we come to the " walls of the
world ; " if evolution lays down limiting, or differenc-
ing, lines as essential to its initial process in inter-
preting the universe, it is manifest that breach of
continuity lies at the root of all mental activity, that
it is an essential necessity of thought, and " to know
in part " is the normal condition of intelligence.
One other mode of conceiving the primal form of
Postulutes of Evolution, 1 1 7
the cosmos may be adopted. We may attempt to
think it as the bounded manifestation of an infinite
force ; but we shall then be in no better position. We
shall have increased our burdens and gained nothing ;
for we cannot determine the self -revelation of the
infinite, or trace the bounds within which the limitless
energy is manifested.
The postulate fails us, therefore, whatever be the
mode in which we try to represent it in thought.
In the book of Genesis, as written by the evolutionist,
the first sentence is unintelligible.
2. The evolution hypothesis assumes the continu-
ance of the evolving force, throughout all time, in
invariable equality of amount.
Having already discussed the possibility of quanti-
fying the force of which persistence is predicated, it
is not needful to repeat the argument.* We may
note briefly that it is incompetent to human intelli-
gence, in any mode of representing the cosmos in
thought, to conceive the sum of it. If it be infinite,
the total is in terms declared to be immeasurable ; if
it be finite, it is still immeasurable, for it is practically
limitless to thought ; if it be the bounded manifesta-
tion of an infinite power, we are as far afield as before
in the attempt to quantify. The sum of force must,
in any case, remain undefined. It is, therefore, im-
possible to compare the amount of force existing at
* Su^ra, Chapter VIII., § IV.
1 1 8 The Evolution Hypothesis.
the beginning with the total at any succeeding point
in time : both terms in the comparison are beyond the
capacity of intelligence, and comparison fails.
Yet the entire chain of reasoning by which it is
proposed to establish the evolution doctrine proceeds
on this fixedness of quantity. The matter in the
universe remains by hypothesis undiminished and un-
increased ; " the quantity of motion is fixed ; " the force
" remains unchanged in amount throuorhout all time."
If this assumption be rejected, the whole system goes
to pieces. But this assumption has no scientific value ;
for even if it were true it is unprovable. The new
cosmic philosophy, the unification of all knowledge, is
not only in its initial step, but throughout the whole
course of its interpretation of nature, necessitated to
employ a postulate involving affirmations regarding
matters of fact in the world of concrete reality, as to
the truth of which experience can tell us nothing. Yet
the whole process is, at every step throughout, depen-
dent on the truth of this assumption : if it be rejected
every link in the chain of reasoning is broken.
Has the total sum of manifested force remained
equal throughout the ages? Who can answer ? Not
the evolutionist, for he has no knowledge beyond that
furnished through the senses : not the experientialist,
for he cannot survey the entire universe of being:
there is no evidence furnished by the mind itself;
for in mind there is nothing, according to the evo-
lution hypothesis, except what individual or race
Postulates of Evolution, 119
experiences have imparted to it. This postulate,
required at every step in the interpretation of nature
on the principles of evolution, is one which could be
affirmed only by Absolute Intelligence itself.
Whether it be true or not true as a matter of fact
that the total sum of force in the cosmos remains
constant, the need of takinor it for granted, while its
truth is altogether unprovable, taints the evolution
theory throughout. The conditions in which the doc-
trine of evolution could be established do not exist.
3. The evolution hypothesis postulates the inclu-
sion, under the law of the continuous redistribution
of matter and motion, of every event or change in
the universe. This law is taken as covering all
activities and all orders of existence. "Existences
of all orders do exhibit a progressive integration of
matter and concomitant loss of motion."* Mr. Spencer
applies his law alike to mechanical, vital, and mental
action. It must be accepted as of universal applica-
tion, for by it all knowledge is to be unified.
In the postulates already examined, we had to do
with what we showed to be illegitimate processes of
thought. The conceptions were impossible or incon-
gruous with other conceptions necessary to the evolu-
tion doctrine. The postulate now in question lies so
far within the compass of knowledge of fact that it
may be tested by experience. There are whole classes
* First ^rincipleSj § 107.
I20 The Evolution Hypothesis,
of facts apparently in direct conflict with it, and
which must be got out of the way before it can be
accepted. For if there be any fact incapable of being
interpreted in terms of matter and motion, the postu-
late in question is untrue. To bring the intellectual
activities, the moral feeling, and the emotions under
the law in question, the phenomena of mind must be
compelled to take a place among the correlated forces
of the cosmos, each of which may be transformed into
I one of the others. The endeavour to reduce mental
operations to instances of the correlation of physical
forces, has, as we shall see, failed. If our reasoning
on that question, set out in a future chapter prove to
be well-founded, this postulate also must be swept
away.
4. It is necessary also to grant the evolutionist,
that the total amount of matter in the cosmos is
never increased or diminished ; and that the total
amount of motion remains invariable.
If the matter existing in the primal form of the
universe were either increased or diminished, the
law of the continuous redistribution of matter and
motion would not furnish a true account of cosmic
change. Let us imagine matter at any moment, in-
creased by the transference of force existing in some
other mode into matter, that is, into force " resis-
tent and occupying space ; " the doctrine of evolution
would be falsified. All the relations of the physical
cosmos would be modified; for the proportions of
Postulates of Evolution. 1 2 1
the masses would be altered. All motion must now
take a new direction ; for being invariably in the
line of the greatest force, and the relations of
forces being changed, the direction is necessarily
•changed. The introduction of this new piece of
matter sends a thrill through the whole system, and
separates, by a clearly defined demarcation, the past
from the future series of changes ; it cuts the course
•of cosmic history, by a distinct breach of con-
tinuity, in two. A like consequence would ensue
were motion either arrested, diminished, or increased.
The thorough-going evolutionist will, therefore, con-
tend vigorously for the indestructibility of matter
and the continuity of motion, and refuse to admit
the possibility of the increase or dimintion of either*
The introduction ah extra of any alteration of the
materials on which his process of quantifi.cation pro-
ceeds, would be fatal to the accuracy of his results.
5. The evolutionist must be further given, as a
fundamental truth, that force as manifested in the
cosmos includes in these manifestations all the causes
•of each change, and of the total course of change. It
is essential to the evolution hypothesis, as a complete
theory of the universe, that the whole sum of
phenomena, physical, mental, moral, spiritual, found
^t any time existing, shall be taken as the necessary
outcome of the immediate past, and that past the out-
come of a preceding past, and so backward to the primal
condition of the univQfse, posited by evolutionism
122 The Evolution Hypothesis,
as its first conception. When we go back, then, to-
that primordial manifestation of force with which
evolution sets out — a mass homogeneous or nearly
homogeneous, " diffuserl, uniform, indeterminate." * we
are to find in it the causes of all knowable pheno-
mena. That mass contained in it, by hypothesis, all
the causes which, gradually evolving, have issued in
the unimaginable diversity of the universe at it is.
These causes are such as may be comprehended in
one moving mass, and have their operation in new
modes of the relations of matter and motion. They
are generalized in a "dynamic principle." The law
expressing their combined operations, is the law of
the continuous redistribution of matter and motion.
The links of physical causation, on this supposition,,
bind the present in all its varied phenomena — phy-
sical and mental — in one unbroken chain of necessity
to that far off past. In this primordial manifestation
of force, rising into the view of science, lay the causes
that have evolved the heavens and the earth, that
have shaped all forms of knowable existence, thai
have generated all sensate being, that have created
Adam and Christ.
Let not our position be misapprehended. We re-
cognize it to be the work of science to search in
antecedent cosmic phenomena, for the causes of all
that comes within the field of observation. It is the
* Fird Principles, § 187.
Posttdates of Evolution. 1 2 3.
very business of science to do so. Nothing is to be
deemed inexplicable by natural law, unless there be
good reason to judge that such explanation is not
possible. Even when for a time baffled, it is the part
of science to return again and again to the search, in
hope of accomplishing, by patient toil, the seemingly
impossible achievement. But it is not to be tolerated
that there should be buried under the pretence of
solution, diflSculties that remain still unsolved. Nor
are working hypotheses to be raised to the rank of
established truths. There should be as much keen-
sightedness in recognizing the want of completeness
in proof, as there is in noting facts that seem to
support a theory. The adverse facts are to be re-
corded with as much care as those that are favour-
able. The one class of instances is as precious to true
science as the other.
When it is asserted that all the causes of all that
may be known are included within the cosmos, the
proposition is ambiguous till we have first fixed the
limits of the cosmos as conceived in thought. If tlie
cosmos be infinite, embracing all existences — God, the
soul, and the world — it includes of necessity all causes.
The proposition, read in that sense, is an identical
proposition — it amounts to affirming that all things
include all things. It does not in the least degree
advance our knowledge ; for what science has to do
is to trace the relations among phenomena within
that infinite, in their Mo- ordination and succession ;
1 24 The EvoluHon Hypothesis.
and it serves in no respect, when dealing with any
given instance, to carry with us the assurance that in
the bosom of immensity lie all the causes of the
phenomenon in question. It is drawing water with
a bottomless bucket.
If the cosmos be finite and self-enclosed, embracing
all being and encompassed by not-being ; then equally
the postulate is an identical proposition ; for we have
■excluded all causes lying outside the cosmos, when we
have included all being within it. In this form it is
also equally useless ; for it is no aid to us to know
that the totality of existence includes the totality of
•causes. If, indeed, the cosmos were assumed to be
within the compass of experience ; if observation and
experiment could traverse it to its farthest boundary
and most profound depths, then to be assured that it
■contains all causes could have a real significance to
the inquirer; but if it go deeper, higher, wider than
we can reach, there is still unbounded room in which
•causes may lie hidden ; for the reality and its possi-
bilities are in respect of our intelligence unlimited.
To assume a defined cosmos, therefore, including all
•causes within itself, secures a merely visionary advan-
tage : but that advantage is gained at an infinite cost ;
for, in drawing a boundary line inclusive of all being,
thought has, according to Mr. Spencer, contravened
its primary condition and destroyed itself.
If, again, we hold a cosmos limited in extent, the
manifestation of the unlimited power, and including
Postulates of Evolution. 125,
within itself all the causes of the phenomena evolved
in its history, we gain no single advantage, and w&
increase many times the difficulties that meet us.
There lie against this mode of conceiving the primal
condition of the universe all the objections that lie
against the modes already considered, while other in-
separable difficulties are added. We begin, in thia
case, by attempting to draw a boundary line around
the infinite by determining how the absolute power
must manifest itself : we lay down as fixed that the-
unconditioned energy, operating as cause, has produced
no effects except those emerging in its primordial
manifestation; but to fix such a limit pre-supposes,
as we have already seen, either that the entire course
of cosmic history is experientially known in its to-
tality and in detail, or that we have discovered the
law of the manifestation of the incomprehensible
and infinite ; either of which suppositions is obviously
absurd.
Let us take an instance as illustrative of our argu-
ment. When the physical condition of the earth was-
such as to be adapted to the existence of vegetal life,
vegetal forms appeared. How did this life originate ?
Evolution asserts that it was produced as the effect
of the physical forces already in operation, being their
necessary outcome, and that no cause may be sought
outside these physical antecedents : the dynamic action
passed into the form we call vital action by physical
necessity. Is this an adequate explanation ? If the
126 The Evolution Hypothesis.
process from dynamic to vital action is found to be
inscrutable by science ; if every explanation that pro-
fesses to set out the transition fails, we are thrown
back on the inquiry, Is physical science adequate to
the explanation of all knowable things ? Do the
principles of dynamics cover and elucidate all the
phenomena of concrete existence ? How if the origin
of life lie in something outside dynamic law ? if
the behaviour of matter according to dynamic law be
not all that is in the phenomenon ? if we are here
face to face with another mode of being? Or, to
put it more nearly after the fashion of Mr. Spencer's
philosophy, in a supposition equally thinkable with
that adopted by him and equally scientific, vegetal
life may at the fitting moment have arisen out of the
depths of the inscrutable power. The existence of an
incomprehensible actuality having been postulated as
.an ultimate datum of consciousness, we are not charge-
able with following an unphilospohic method if we see
appearing in the first beginning of life a new mani-
festation of that " absolute Reality by which the rela-
tive reality is immediately produced *
In like manner, the beginning of sentient life pre-
sents an inexplicable problem to science endeavouring
to solve it by means of dynamic principles. The life
of the animal, like that of the plant, arose when
physical conditions suitable for its continuance ex-
* Mr&i PrincipleSj § 50.
Postulates of Evolution. 127
isted. But science has no evidence on which to affirm
that the antecedent mode of being manifested in the
dynamic laws of matter and motion and force was its
sole cause. No connecting links can be shown to
account for the transition from the insensate to the
sensate : nothing has been brought to light by science
which is fitted to elucidate the origin of feeling. It
is an assumption wholly without warrant that the
physical causes already operating in the universe, at
the moment when feeling first came into existence as
a mode of being, were adequate to produce it. It is
more reasonable to suppose that it came to be by the
immediate operation of the inscrutable first cause,
whose continued existence in relation to the pheno-
menal Mr. Spencer affirms.
But the exception to the universality o£ physical
.law, which stands out most clearly and indubitably,
is the beginning of self-conscious intelligence. When
the universe had reached a state in which it afforded,
a fitting habitat for such a being, man appeared.
Conscious thought, knowing itself and its environ-
ment, is the most notable of all phenomena in the
<josmos. Till man is accounted for, the first question
of philosophy, and the question which gives the key
to every other, is unanswered. If the law of the
continuous redistribution of matter and motion can
account for consciousness, it has won universal do-
minion, and is the law of all knowable being ; but if
it does not furnish a true solution of this problem,
128 The Evolution Hypothesis.
it has no claim to universality, and evolution fails in
the accomplishment of its task. The great central
fact still stands apart: the unification of knowledge
is not complete. The appearance in the universe of
a being who can say, / am, is the one fact which, if
left unaccounted for, renders any theory worthless, as
a complete interpretation of the universe. Do the
causes in operation in the knowable, antecedent to
man's appearance in the universe, give an adequate
explanation of the origin of mind ? We shall, subse-
quently, at some length, discuss the proposed solution,
and show that it leaves out of view the most essential
features of the phenomenon. It will be found to deal
with that which lies circa hominem, rather than in
honfiine. When a human mind awoke to conscious-
ness of itself and its environment, there occurred an
event not explicable by the laws of physical causation.
No dynamic principle will cover it. A new realm of
existence is revealed, wholly diverse from that ruled
by the laws of matter and motion : it is the realm of
being conscious of itself, of being whose characteristic
attribute is Thought.
Before it will be possible to admit that the cosmos,
contains within itself all the causes of all knowable
phenomena, these unmistakable exceptions must be
explained ; these separating lines obliterated ; these
large classes of facts brought within the grasp of
physical causation: or we shall have to widen the
conception of the universe until it include all con-
Postulates of Evolution. 129
Crete being — embracing under that one terra God, the
soul, and the world. But when the conception i&
enlarged so as to correspond with reality, it becomes
worthless to the evolutionist, and is discarded.
6. To produce the cosmos that is, and as it is, there
is needed one other datum. A determinate extent and
relation of parts in its primal state must be given, or a
wholly different cosmos must have evolved. Inasmuch
as the existing cosmos is, on the evolution hypothesis,
limited by necessity to the original homogeneity,
there must have been a special form and collocation
of the diffused mass, and a special fixed quantity
of motion distributed in a determinate manner to pro-
duce, in the operation of dynamic law, the known
result. For the present cosmos is not the only
form conceivable — the possible variations are infinite.
Nothing can be clearer than that this primordial
arrangement must be postulated by the evolution
hypothesis : without it the cosmos as it is could not
have arisen. The most trifling shade of difference —
the oscillation of a molecule in the least degree more
or less — the position, by a hair's breadth on one side
or on the other, of the line marking the heterogeneity
of part from part would, in the lapse of inconceivable
periods of change, have wrought out incalcuable differ-
ences of result. Any other imaginable condition and
collocation of matter, and these are infinite, and any
greater or less amount of motion, would have produced
a universe wholly different from that we see. The
130 The Evolution Hypothesis.
■existence of Mr. Spencer's system of philosophy was
determined by a nice adjustment in that original
•collocation of forces : a difference quite imperceptible
would have left the thinking portion of the world,
■if in that case any thinking portion had ever
•come to be, without the very important addition
which Mr. Spencer has contributed to speculative
thought.
No doubt we must postulate some mode in which
the original matter and motion were distributed in
space, and one is as readily taken for granted as
another. But by what right does the evolutionist
demand that among the infinite possibilities we should
, posit just that one mode, and no other, which contains
I the amount and arrangement of matter and motion
that will, if his theory is true, evolve the existing
universe ? From that which is, he may reply, I infer
what must have been. The inference is doubly illegi-
timate; for the point in debate is whether, from a
primordial homogeneity to the present form of things,
there may or may not have been any intervention of
the absolute power, whether the process has been
vnecessarily from the beginning until now the con-
tinuous and untouched operation of dynamic law, and
he posits an ordered heterogeneity : not only so, but
to show that all new manifestations of power and the
revelation of being in any mode not the outcome of a
dynamic principle are for ever excluded, he assumes a
specific and determinate arrangement of the imagined
Postulates of Evohction. 1 3 1
mist cloud. We may with as much warrant take for
granted repeated interventions of the absolute energy.
The evolutionist rejects the doctrine of final causes :
he refuses to allow, as legitimate, belief in a directing
intelligence; yet he requires to have given him an
original arrangement of the universe exactly adapted
to his hypothesis. When we admire the order, and
rejoice in the beauty of the world that is, when we
turn to nature and ask, " How have all these exquisite
adaptations of one part of the organisation to another
part, and to the continuance of life, and of one organic
being to another being been perfected ?" * When the
mind turns back upon itself and marvels at the mys-
tery of that inner world; when we reflect that we
live, and that we live in a cosmos with marvellous
mutual adaptations between it and our thought, we
may well suspect the soundness of a theory which,
while rejecting the doctrine of a presiding intelligence,
directing all things towards its purpose, needs to
assume a special collocation of forces in the original
indeterminate mass — a collocation so special and so
definite that the very least departure from it would
have been fatal to all this order, and would have
brought into existence a universe possibly without ad-
justments, fitting movement to movement, and part to
part, without the orderly and the beautiful to admire,
and without a self-conscious being to delight in it.
* Darwin's Origm of Species, Chap. III.
The Evolution Hypothesis.
Yet that primal force, endowed with a dynamic
potency capable of evolving through inconceivable
cycles of change — all the while receiving no fresh
impulse and no guidance — this universe whose order
science explores — this world peopled by myriad intel-
ligences engaged in the task of its interpretation — Mr.
Spencer finds it needful to his philosophy to charac-
terize as " an indefinite, incoherent, homgeneity."
When we consider the number and the gravity of
the demands made by evolutionism in the form of
postulates incapable of proof, we are justified in deal-
ing with the hypothesis at the outset as illegitimate.
The conditions needful for the establishment of it by
sufficient evidence do not exist. Even if it were true,,
it could not be proved true.
But the evolutionist replies. Grant, meanwhile, these
postulates ; we shall proceed to apply the hypothesis
in the elucidation of facts ; we shall prove to you that
the key is the right one by showing that it fits the
lock.
We proceed, then, to examine the detailed explana-
tion of phenomena furnished by evolutionism; we
enter upon the examination weighted with a heavy
load of assumptions under which reason staggers.
But knowledge is to be completely unified. We
strive for a high prize. The appeal is to experience.
Solvitur ambulando. Let us see.
CHAPTER X.
THE FOMMULA OF EVOLUTION.
PHILOSOPHY," says Mr. Spencer, "has to formu-
late the passage from the imperceptible into
the perceptible and from the perceptible into the im-
perceptible." * " The change from a diffused imper-
ceptible state to a concentrated, perceptible state, is
an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation
of motion, and the change from a concentrated, per-
ceptible state to a diffused impreceptible state is an
absorption of motion and concomitant disintegration
of matter. . . . Loss of motion and consequent inte-
gration, eventually followed by gain of motion and
consequent disintegration — see here a statement com-
prehensive of the entire series of changes passed
through." "f*
By a succession of tentative applications of the law
— gradually filling up the outline, Mr. Spencer moulds
it into its final perfected form, which stands thus : —
" Evolution is an integration of matter and con- 1
comitant dissipation of motion; during which the \
m^atter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homo-'
geneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and;
* First Principles* § 93. t Ihicl, § 94.
134 1^^^^ Evolution Hypothesis.
during which the retained motion undergoes a
parallel transformationy *
This formula expresses the one law which covers all
the knowable, embraces all concrete being, and is the
complete unification of knowledge actual and possible.
It must be carefully weighed, and its pretensions
tested.
Examining it closely, one is at first puzzled to decide
whether it can in any proper sense be characterized as
a laiu. It is rather a description of certain processes
of change — and a description of a somewhat loose and
inexact kind. The terms are wanting in precision.
They do not convey any conception sufficiently clear
and definite to form a basis for scientific reasoninsf.
It will not enable us to forecast definite results with
anything approaching certainty. With this formula
as the instrumental aid to vision, the future and the
' past are alike blurred and dim. No form comes out
sharp and clear. We never fully escape out of the
original mist-cloud. Let us take the terms and
examine them.
The matter evolved is described as "indefinite."*
But in what sense ? It cannot be in the sense of un-
limited, or having no defined measure or bounds. To-
apply the term to the totality of matter in the sense
of existence without limit, or with limits unknowable,,
lis to set out with an inconceivable or merely negative
Iconception, by which we can advance nothing towards
* First Principles, ^ 145.
The Formula of Evolution. 135
positive knowledge of the cosmos as it is. If we have
in view not the totality of things, but a portion of
matter — say a plant germ — we are in no respect
helped towards a right understanding of its growth
by the implication that it has, at the outset, no dis-
tinguishable bounds separating it from surroundings
matter. If we take the term to mean — as seems
intended — that which is undefined in qualities, that is-
having no attributes that can be clearly differenced,
we start with a something assumed to possess nO'
known or knowable properties by which it may be
distinctly and definitely represented in thought.
The conception of this " indefinite " existence within
the knowable has a close kinship with the " indefinite-
consciousness " by which the existence of the unknow-
able is known. But we are entitled to ask whether
this indefiniteness is the absence of definite qualities or
the impossibility of our knowledge of them. If it be the
latter, we begin by positing our own ignorance, and not
a quality of things ; if the former, how does it accord
with the assumption that all the causes of the existing
order of knowable things lay in that original homo-
geneity ? It was, on Mr. Spencer's theory, definite m,
its relation to the knowable, definite in the amount of
force manifested in it, definite in the collocation of its-
forces, definite in the direction of its motion, definite
in the dominion over it of dynamic law, definite in the^
possession of just such causal energy, and of just such
operation of that energy under definite law as issue
136 The Evolution Hypothesis.
1 necessarily in the universe we see. Yet Mr. Spencer
- defines it to be " indefinite."
But granted that this homogeneity is indefinite,
that it has neither defined boundaries nor defined
qualities, Mr. Spencer begins with a concept which is
only thinkable as the negation of definite thought,
and proposes by its aid to clarify the vagueness of
unorganized knowledge. He posits matter void of
form to produce an ordered cosmos without the aid
of a divine intelligence. He bases his philosophy on
an impossible idea.
The word '' incoherent " does not bring us nearer to
a, precise conception. What is meant by not cohering ?
All matter coheres, if there be any quality essential
to matter, as we know it, it is this very quality of
coherence. The incoherence is then relative — a ques-
tion of more or less. If so, the evolutionist must have
a standard of comparison. What is that standard ?
The particles of aqueous vapour in a cloud cohere;
Iparticles of sand cohere ; particles of wax cohere : par-
jticles of steel cohere : what degree of coherence is
'marked by the term " incoherent ? " The thought is
'again found wanting in exactness.
"Homogeneity" is also a vague term. It may
express the uniformity of one substance, as gold, or
of a compound evenly mixed, as biscuit, or particles of
'many kinds equally distributed, as in a deposit of
mud. Homegeneity furnishes no distinct conception.
Summing up all these ambiguities, we have a total
The Formula of Evolution. 137
that could hardly be surpassed in vagueness. It
would serve as a more or less apt description of the
universe at any stage of its progress, from the imper-
ceptible to the imperceptible again. Such a concept
was surely never before laid at the foundation of any
system of philosophy.
The unscientific indefiniteness of these descriptive
phrases will appear still more evident, when we keep
in view Mr. Spencer's hypothesis as to the constitu-
tion of that something, as it rises into the view of
science, emerging into the perceptible. In the imper-
ceptible state it was not an "indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity." It was an aggregate of systems incon-
ceivable in complexity and intricateness ; moving not
in a chaotic, confused, and irregular manner, but with
the orderly, harmonious, and measured movement of
system and law. Mr Spencer supposes the combina-
tion of atoms into aggregates, with inter-equilibrated
motions and standing related to other aggregates, in
systems of ever-increasing intricateness, the whole
forming a system as extensive and as complex as the
visible cosmos at any stage. Surely such a condition
of the universe is badly represented in the phrase,
"indefinite, incoherent homogeneity." The "inde-
finite" has, on Mr. Spencer's own theory, defined
relation of its parts and aggregates, the " incoherent "
is united in an ascending series of systems, and the
^'homogeneity" is a whole of inconceivable complexity,
having: within it the sunt of the activities to be after-
138 The Evolution Hypothesis,
wards made visible. What scientific value attaches to
loose use of phrases like this ? Yet this is the founda-
tion laid for a system of universal truth.
Turning to the evolved result, we do not find our-
selves in clearer light. What do we learn from the
expression, "a definite, coherent heterogeneity." In
what sense is the product evolved more definite than
that out of which it has been evolved ? It is not
more definite in quantity — Mr. Spencer assumes that
the amount remains invariable, — it is not more definite
in bounds — evolution is not a process of contraction :
it is not more definitely one thing or many things, one
force or many forces ; for unless some power has inter-
vened, or something has arisen out of nothing, it had,
at the very outset, inclosed within it and its law, all
that is in it now. The forces were as definite, the law
of their operation as definite. An infinite intelligence
might bring order out of confusion, might mould the
definite out of the indefinite, might give form to the
unformed ; but it is wholly absurd to conceive of order
rising spontaneously out of confusion, or the indefinite
of itself becoming definite. This supposition — which
Mr. Spencer would most emphatically repudiate — is the
only alternative if, without the intervention of intel-
ligence, that which was before " indefinite " is now " de-
finite." In the change it must have become endowed
with new qualities ; matter without form has given
form to itself : somethinor has arisen out of nothinty.
In what sense is the evolved cosmos more "co-
The Foi^mula of Evolution. 139'
herent?" Its parts cohered in the primal state, do!
they now cohere more than at the first ? Then the-i
total of attraction in the universe has increased, and
the law of gravity is a fiction. Is the coherence butl
the closer packing of the original matter at certain
points, and greater separation of it at others ? It then
means only a re-arrangement of positions, and all
science is knowledge of spatial relations. Coherence
yields no knowable modification except that of form.
The troops that had been arranged in open order are
now shown as massed in columns or in squares. But
we have no account of the way in which new arms of
precision have been elaborated, and how the parts
have been endowed with the higher qualities of in-
telligence and courage, as well as arranged in new
positions. " Coherence," even if we could measure it,,
would explain but a small part of the phenomena.
"Heterogeneity" does not help us to any real mean-
ing. What constitutes exactly the diff*erence marked
by the term ? Is it altered distribution in space, or
altered arrangement of parts in mutual relation or in
bulk, or is it difiference in the mode of motion of the
whole or of the parts ? Or is it all these together, or
something else ? What it may be precisely, the for-
mula leaves undefined : it is elastic enough to bear a
variety of interpretations. That into which the
universe passes in evolution is left by the formula
as vague as that out of which it proceeds.
When the explanatory* clause of the formula fails
140 The Evolution Hypothesis.
us, we need not look for much light from a study of
the phrase which the explanation is supposed to
•elucidate. The words " integration of matter and
•concomitant dissipation of motion" do not furnish an
instrument of exact reasoniner. In dealing with the
o o
relations of matter and motion, we have not reached a
scientific conception till we have formulated definite
relations of quantity. There is no quantitative rela-
tion between this " integration " and " dissipation " set
out in the formula. What the relation may be, if
there be definite relation, is left undetermined. We
have elsewhere general statements as to progress from
*'the extreme of diflfusion to the extreme of concen-
tration," and from the " greatest quantity of contained
motion to the least quantity of contained motion ;" but
these phrases give us no material for scientific know-
ledge. The exactness with which a law of science cor-
responds with reality is proved by the certainty with
which, by means of it, definite results may be predicted.
What prevision of future events does this law furnish ?
What event has it enabled the evolutionist to foresee ?
It will not help us to write out in advance the series
•of changes through which the whole universe or any
part of it will pass. It does not supply an instrument
•of discovery where observation has not reached ; we
cannot determine by it the form of any organism
, outside the field of observation. It cannot, except in
^ loose use of terms, be called a Za^t^.
On further examination of this boasted all-corn-
The Formula of Evolution, 141
prehending principle, we are left in perplexity by the
diflSculty of bringing under it two classes of processes
differenced by quite opposite conditions. Mr. Spencer
lays down his principle as applicable alike to the
movement of the totality of concrete being and to the
evolution of individual things. To bring under the
same formula the totality of cosmic movement and
the changes taking place in individual things is mani-
festly impossible. The conditions are opposite. A
lengthened discussion in his First Principles estab-
lishes as the foundation of the law of evolution, the
indestructibility of matter, the continuity of motion,,
the persistence of force ; and from these Mr. Spencer
deduces the " law of evolution," which is, " the law of
the continuous redistribution of matter and motion." *
Evolution is, then, a continuous redistribution; the
quantity of matter remains the same, the amount of
motion is unchanged : no addition or diminition is
supposed to be possible. The doctrine of evolution
professes to show how they are redistributed. To
increase or diminish the amount of manifested force
would be destructive of Mr. Spencer's demonstration,,
and fatal to his whole theory of cosmic evolution.
All depends on the persistence of force. " Persistence
of force is the deepest knowable cause of evolution."
But when we come to apply Mr. Spencer's formula to
individual objects or classes of things, we must dis-^
* First Pri7icipleSf § 92.
142 The Evolution Hypothesis.
card everyone of those principles which he had so
laboriously illustrated, and applied deductively with
such seemingly conclusive demonstration. The con-
ditions no longer admit of their application. Force
does not persist, matter is not indestructible, motion is
not continuous within the limits of the phenomena in
question. Let us take as an illustration the growth
•of the germ out of which an oak is evolved. Without
pausing to dwell on the difficulty of applying the
phrase, " indefinite, incoherent homogeneity," to a germ
which, Mr. Spencer tells us, " is not absolutely struc-
jtureless, but consists of a mass of cells,"* let us note
the progress of its growth. The plant grows by con-
stant augmentation from without ; it is continually
addinof, from surroundinor matter, to the matter of
which it is composed. The contained motion increases
with the increase of bulk. The process is not integra-
tion but aggregation of matter ; not dissipation but in-
crement of motion ; not in either case redistribution,
but increase. Redistribution is a misleading name for
the process. The matter does not remain the same in
quantity, nor the same in its parts : new matter is
being continually added and old matter removed.
The sum of motion is ever changing — increasing
during growth and diminishing in decay ; and whether
increasing or diminishing, subject to periodical ebb
und flow. Mr. Spencer tells us that "living bodies
* Biology, Vol. I. , § 55.
The Formula of Evolution. 143
display in the highest degree the structural changes
constituting evolution." Yet it would be as easy to
bring the cosmos, viewed after Plato's conception as
an animal, and Plato himself, under the same biolo-
gical laws, as to embrace under one law of the redis-
tribution of matter and motion the living body and
the entire universe. In the evolution of any living^
thing from germ to maturity, every principle of cosmic^
evolution is violated — the force does not persist, thd
matter does not remain equal in quantity, the sum of
the motion does not continue the same. A law based onj
constancy of amount cannot be adapted to ceaseless
increase and diminution. The process is not one of
redistribution of materials, but of ingathering, sorting,
and changing. So far as evolution is exemplified in the
growth of any living thing, or in the larger group of
changes embodied in the development of a species or
variety, it proceeds equally whether force persist or
not. Any given portion of force ceases to persist as
regards the individual or the class, so soon as it has
passed out of the environment ; it may persist in the
vast tracts of space beyond Sirius, but for the living
thing it exists no more. If evolution be redistribution
of matter and motion, then its formula is inapplicable
to the growth of organic forms, and they are exempted
from its law; if evolution be not redistribution of
matter and motion, then it conflicts with Mr. Spencer's
first principles, and the foundation of his philosophy
is shaken. Taking it either way, we are driven to
144 '^^^^ Evolution Hypothesis.
deny the exactness of Mr. Spencer's formula as a
scientific principle, and its universality as a law. We
look in vain to discover in it the basis of a complete
theory of things.
An examination of this formula in its relation ta
thought and sensation would bring to light another
vast field in which it proves wholly without signi-
ficance; but that question, presenting itself for dis-
cussion elsewhere, need not engage our attention at
this point.
Our criticism of the formula which expresses the
law of evolution may be summed up in a few words.
We find it to be wanting in precision, incapable of
exact application, of no scientific worth, a loose gen-
eral description of change rather than a definite ex-
pression of the law of change; yet we are asked ta
receive this formula as the embodiment of a principle
which is to dominate all thought, shape all doctrine,
form the basis of a universal philosophy, and effect
" the complete unification of all knowledge."
CHAPTER XL
EVOLUTION AS IT GIVES ACCOUNT OF
INORGANIC MATTER.
THE Evolution Hypothesis, interpreting the uni-
verse by means of a dynamic principle, might
be expected to throw its clearest light on the processes
of inorganic matter. In this region dynamic law is
supreme. The law of the redistribution of matter and
motion should, therefore, have its most perfect illus-
tration in instances gathered from the changes taking
place in matter where vital action does not intervene.
In examining Mr. Spencer's system, the critic is placed
at a disadvantage in not having the doctrine applied
in this field. After discussing the general question
in his First Principles, Mr. Spencer devotes the
subsequent discussion to the application of his theory
in the departments of Biology and Psychology, Social
Organization, and Ethics. He does not expound in
any systematic way the bearing of his hypothesis as an
interpretation of the law of change in inorganic matter.
This omission is greatly to be regretted. Matter and
motion are more clearly seen in operation when un-
disturbed by vitality or mind, and the principles of
mathematical physics could have been more exactly
and rigidly applied a»a test of the conclusiveness of
K
146 The Evolution Hypothesis,
the reasoning. In this field it is difficult to hide in-
conclusive thinkinor under the mist of ijeneralities :
mathematical reasoning does not admit of the substi-
tution of illustrations for arguments and doubtful
analogies for conclusive proofs.
We are not, perhaps, pressing too far some indica-
tions in his works, if we infer that Mr. Spencer has not
in this department arrived as yet at conclusions that
could be established by incontestable reasoning. We
find him admitting that " the antecedents of those
forces which our solar system displays belong to a
past of which %ve can never have anything hut in-
ferential knowledge ; and at ^present %ve cannot he said
to have even this. Numerous and strong as are the
reasons for believing the nebular hypothesis, we can-
not yet regard it as more than an hypothesis."* But if
the nebular hypothesis be still doubtful ; if we cannot
be said to have even " inferential knowledge " of it,
the same dubiety attaches to the evolution hypo-
thesis ; for the existence of a nebulous mass gradually
passing, by the operation of dynamic law, into the
present state of the universe is essential to the evolu-
tion doctrine.
Not having before us a detailed exposition of the
application of the evolution hypothesis to the pro-
cesses of cosmic change, we must content ourselves by
examining it in its answer to questions that lie at the
* First PHnciples, § 68.
Inorganic Matter, 147
root of the doctrine as an interpretation of all forms
of concrete being.
The atomic theory of matter is taken by Mr,
Spencer as the foundation of his physical system.
What account does he give of the atom ? Its incon-
ceivable minuteness may be gathered from his state-
ment that by reason we have been helped to explore
a " universe compared with which our earth is a grain
of sand, and to detect the structure of a monad com-
pared with which a grain of sand is an earth."*
The statement is more rhetorical than exact ; yet we
may infer from it how minute in his view" are the
atoms forming the ultimate constituents of matter.
The one knowable quality of the atom would seem
to be resistance. " A thing cannot be thought of as
occupying space, except as offering resistance. Even
though but a point, if it be conceived to offer
absolutely no resistance it ceases to be anything —
becomes Tio-thing."*!- " Our conception of Matter,"
he says elsewhere, " reduced to its simplest shape, is
that of co-existent positions that offer resistance.''^
Again, he says, " this conception uniting independence,
permanence, and force, is the conception we have of
matter." 1 1
In so far as the atom has resistance it manifests
force ; beyond this its relation to force is left unde-
* T^xjch, Vol. II., ^ 389. t Ihid. ^348.
X First Principles, § 4a |1 Fsijch. Vol. II., § 468.
148 The Evolution Hypothesis.
fined. But if the essential characteristic of the atom
is resistance, how does kinetic energy arise ? Is the
atom a force-bearer, or is the force inherent in the
atom ? Have we the atom + kinetic energy exerted
through it, or are the atom and the kinetic energy
one ? The distinction here indicated may seem some-
what fine-drawn ; but it is important as marking two
wholly diverse views of the universe. Is all force
immanent in the atom, or is the atom the instrument
of force ? The difference is a very real one : it marks the
discrimination between agent and instrument, between
that which acts, and that wliich is acted upon. Mr.
Spencer favours the latter view. It has an important
bearing on his hypothesis ; for if the atoms that are
built up into the cosmos are not themselves the active
forces ever working in it, but are only the vehicles
or instruments of the operative forces, then have
we, besides matter and motion, a something which
is not matter, but plays with it. The atoms, form-
ing the stuff of which the universe is built up, are
moved and directed by this force, or these forces,
for it may be one force or many, and the result
is not the outcome of the law of the atoms, but is
wrought out by the undiscoverable force or forces
behind them : in which case we are not dealing: with
matter whose law we might be able to discover, but
with forces behind matter whose law is wholly in-
scrutable, except in so far as it may be revealed in the
mode in which the atoms aggregated in molecules or
Inorganic Matter, 149
masses are moved. But our knowledge of the law
of these hidden forces must be arrived at by observa-
tion so far removed from the original activities as
to be of very doubtful validity. The action of the
forces through the atoms may be controlled by higher
laws that are undiseoverable ; or the force acting
through an atom may cease to act through it and
pass into some other mode of activity, wholly out of
relation to man's sensibility, and therefore according
to Mr. Spencer's theory, out of the knowable. Even
the atom itself may disappear, if we may speak of the
disappearance of what is for ever invisible : for its re-
sistance is a manifestation of force ; if that force cease
to act through it in resistance, the atom, according to
Mr. Spencer, " ceases to be something and becomes no-
thing." If, then, each atom is not the embodiment
of a quantum of force remaining unchanged, but, on
the contrary, is the bearer or instrument of force, not
immanent in it but exterior to it, the law of "the
redistribution of matter and motion " has no rational
basis : it cannot be maintained as the law of the
successive changes of all concrete existence, and the
evolution hypothesis is not tenable. The atom being-
enthroned as kinoj in the realm of knowledge, it is not
satisfactory, when we would ascertain clearly and
without ambiguity what this is which is to be to us in
the place ot* God, to be left without a fully reasoned
account of it.
But, leaving this pflint undetermined, we may ad-
150 The Evolution Hypothesis,
vance a step, and inquire what the evolution doctrine
has to say about the combination of atoms in aggre-
gates with definite internal relations. Suppose three
atoms united in such an aggregate : they come
together in motion, and ceaseless internal oscillation
characterizes the little system. These combined atoms
or molecules, with their internal relations, are sur-
rounded by other like infinitesimal bodies, and move
in relation with them ; and these combinations go
on increasing in intricateness, forming a more and
more complex system or aggregate of systems. Some
such process is indicated by Mr. Spencer as going on
through countless cycles before evolution has reached
the stage of visibility ; while the universe is still in
the imperceptible. What rational account can the evo-
lution doctrine give of this original process in the
building up of atoms into molecules and systems of
molecules ? In these systems there is the complete
outline of Mr. Spencer's future cosmos : all coming-
changes lay in those first co-ordinated movements.
The universe is not interpreted till they are eluci-
dated. The atoms have not only moved -themselves,
or been moved by the forces behind them ; but they
have moved, or been moved, in such directions and in
such skilful combination of motions, that the continu-
ance of the process on the same lines gives the universe
as we know it. Here is another question of vital
moment unanswered.
The progress of organization goes on, according to
Inorganic Mattel^ 1 5 1
Mr. Spencer's view, continually increasing in com-
plexity : system is built up after system, till to
conceive the involved combinations of atoms and
movements contained in a particle of matter invisible
under the microscope, exceeds the utmost power of
intelligence. In that molecule lies a little universe.
And all this world of order and energy, in which every
atom thrills in ceaseless swift vibration, and all groups
of atoms balanced in relations internal and external,
are being ever more perfectly adjusted in harmony
with the end towards which all is moving, lies behind
and beneath that visible cosmos which is the field of
scientific research. The evolutionist can give noi
answer to the eager questioning of those who wishl
to find some reasonable explanation of how there
arose, out of a pre-supposed universe of whirling
atoms, a cosmos which, at its first appearing in view
of science, contains within it all the causes that evolve
into the order, beauty, intelligence, and moral and
religious feeling known to us.
Of the world that lies behind the visible, evolution
can tell us nothing : yet the visible can never be
understood till that world is known ; if final causes
be dismissed from thought and a directing intelligence
be denied. Every department of physical science
runs ultimately into problems of molecular physics.
Chemistry, optics, mechanics, mineralogy, physio-
logy, all reach in the last resort problems which,
if they are to receive a scientific solution, must be
1 5 2 The Evolution Hypothesis.
solved by a true theory of the ultimate constitution
of matter.
Even within the seen, evolution has no liffht to
throw on those differentiations of matter indicated in
the long list of elementary substances — a list which
has grown with the advance of chemical science.
"Much evidence now conspires to show that mole-
cules of the substances we call elementary are in
reality compound:"* but of their composition, as a
process in the continuous redistribution of matter and
motion, evolution can teach us nothing. Take as an
jinstance gold : the continuous redistribution is here
jat fault for the compound molecules of gold, if ex-
/perience may be trusted, suffer no redistribution; the
' continuity of change is broken. Evolutionism fails
us. What problem is there, in terrestial or celestial
physics, of which the evolution hypothesis furnishes
a valid solution ? So soon as we reach a question
that runs deep into the constitution of the universe,
evolution has nothing better than a guess to offer.
It is a barren hypothesis. It adds nothing to our
knowledge of the laws that direct the shaping of a
dewdrop or the formation of a crystal. If it has any-
thing definite to teach us in the realm of inorfjanic
matter, Mr. Spencer has not given the world the bene-
fit of that knowledge. Suppose a portion of sea water
has evaporated, leaving as a deposit the crystal of salt
* Biology, Vol. I., Appendix, j). 486.
Inorganic Matter, 153
before held in solution, would it not be the merest
pretence of knowledge to bring the process under Mr.
Spencer's law of the redistribution of matter and mo-
tion, and describe it as an " integration of matter and
•concomitant dissipation of motion?" It would not add
much to the information of the dairy-maid, who had
separated the butter from milk, to be told that the
" indefinite, incoherent homogeneity" which she calls
milk, had been evolved into a "definite, coherent
lieterogeneity," made up of butter-milk and butter.
The whole range of the dynamical operations of
nature may be searched in vain, we think, for a single
instance of what could be with exact propriety of
language described as evoluti(m. There are abundantj
•examples of something that seems homogeneous be-
coming heterogeneous : the fluid holding a salt in/
solution may lose its seeming homogeneity and de-
posit the salt in the form of crystals ; but such a case
•does not exemplify progress towards a new state of
heterogeneity ; it is reversion to a previously existing
form. The instances furnished by inorganic matter
are never illustrations ot' evolution. They are ex-
amples ot* recurrence to the normal condition as soon
as the action of disturbing causes is withdrawn. The
evolutionist, when he is limited to the inorganic, is
thrown back for his illustrations on the operation of
vast cosmic forces : he narrates the story of the birth
and death of worlds, and traces with the utmost ease
cyclic movements of evolution and dissolution. But
154 ^'^^^ Evolution Hypothesis.
the proof is not such as would determine the framing
of any hypothesis worthy of being regarded as more
than the merest guess. There is no practical business
in which such evidence as is adduced would be regarded
as of any real worth. Why should it not be main-
tained that a differentiated condition was the original
and is the normal state of the physical universe, and
that every seeming homogeneity is a departure from
that normal condition, possibly through the inter-
actions of forces producing effects analogous to those
breaks of uniformity which present an appearance of
exception to the known laws of nature ? The suppo-
sition is as good as its opposite, and it is more nearly
conformable to fact ; for science has no knowledge in
any field of the actual existence of an " indefinite, inco-
herent homogeneity." If there be such, it is, on Mr.
Spencer's principles, unknowable. Differentiation is-
the necessary form of all definite concepts. Not only is
it necessary in thought ; it is invariable in experience.
There is no such thino* known as a concrete existence
which is homogeneous ; nor is there any existing thing,
the explanation of which, so far as it is within the
possibility of knowledge, is furthered by supposing a
state of homogeneity. Science begins with differen-
tiation. If a Divine Being created the universe, it
was as easy for Him to create it in a differentiated
form, as in an immeasurable mist-cloud, or imper-
ceptible mass, containing within it the cause and law
of all things : if the universe is not the work of an
Inorganic Matter. 155
intelligent Power, then it is equally mysterious and
incomprehensible whether we contemplate the existing
order as science knows it, or posit in a distant past a
universe of movinof atoms havinor in them, or in the
forces operating through them, the origin of all know-
able existences and the law in accordance with which
all things as we know them act.
The evolutionist fails to unify the concrete existences
lying under view in the field of inorganic matter. His
dynamic principle is fruitless in the region of inquiry
where dynamic law is supreme. Even in pure physics
evolutionism is silent in face of every fundamental
question. The veil is not taken away.
CHAPTER XII.
THE TBANSITION FROM INORGANIC MATTER
TO LIFE.
MR. SPENCER is too clear a thinker to fall into
the absurdities of the advocates of " sponta-
neous generation." It is a complete misunderstanding
of his doctrine, to assume that he has any interest in
finding, by experiment or observation, evidence of
new forms of life risinof into beinfy out of inoro^anic
matter. Supposed instances of this kind are of value
only to advocates who aim at catching the crowd.
Mr. Spencer strengthens his position by confuting the
advocates of " spontaneous generation." His theory of
evolution — and every possible rational theory of evolu-
tion — would be overturned if it were proved that new
forms of organic life could, in a few hours or days,
spring out of inorganic matter. " That creatures
having quite specific structures are evolved in a few
hours, without antecedents calculated to determine
their specific forms is," he says, "to me incredible. . . .
My disbelief extends not only to the alleged cases of
* spontaneous generation,' but to every case akin to
From Inorganic Matter to Life. 157
them. The very conception of spontaneity is wholly
incongruous with the conception of evolution, ....
No form of evolution, inorganic or organic, can be
spontaneous ; but in every instance the antecedent
forces must be adequate in their quantities, kinds, and
distribution to work the observed effects. Neither
the alleged cases of ' spontaneous generation,' nor any
imaginable cases in the least allied to them fulfil this
requirement Granting that the formation of
organic matter and the evolution of life in its lowest
forms may go on under existing cosmical conditions ;
but believing it more likely that the formation of
such matter and such forms, took place at a time
when the heat of the earth's surface w^as falling-
through ranges of temperature at which higher or-
ganic compounds are unstable ; I conceive that the
moulding of such organic matter into the simplest
types, must have commenced with portions of pro-
toplasm more minute, more indefinite, and more in-
constant in their character than the lowest Rhizopods,
less distinguishable from a mere fragment of albumen
than even the Protogenes of Professor Haeckel. The
evolution of specific shapes must, like all other organic
evolution, have resulted from the actions and re-
actions between such incipient types and their en-
vironments, and the continued survival of those which
happened to have specialities best fitted to the speci-
alities of their environments. To reach by this process
the comparatively well* specialized forms of ordinary
158 The Evolution HypotJiesis.
infusoria must, I conceive, have taken an enormous
period of time." *
Allowing Mr. Spencer thus, in his own words, to
clear away misconceptions that have gathered round
his doctrine, let us go on to ask how he conceives the
transition from inorganic matter to living organisms.
He first prepares the way by setting out at con-
siderable length, and very minutely, the characteristics
of the four chief elements comprising living bodies,
and shows that their compounds are unstable and
conform to "the conditions necessary to that redis-
tribution of matter and motion which constitutes
evolution." -f- But it is not enough to show that the
materials of which organisms are composed are speci-
ally fitted to the place and work assigned them. On
the theory of a creative intelligence, it will be before-
hand certain that the material used will be adapted
to its end. Bodies designed to grow, but formed of
matter extremely ill-adapted to the processes of
growth, would be evidence that the world was or-
dered by something very different from intelligence.
To support the evolution doctrine, it is needful to show
— not only that the chemical compounds forming the
material of organisms are unstable, and therefore well
adapted to the changes necessary in vital action — but
in what way that which before existed as matter
without life has become a living organism.
"^ Biology, Yol. I., Appendix, p. 481. t Biology, Vol. I., i^ 9.
From Inorganic Matter to Life. 159
To trace the course of this change, Mr. Spencer
goes back to the invisible world of atoms. He sup-
poses them aggregated into molecules, and these into
other aggregates, and so onward, in ever more com-
plicated systems, until we reach the molecule of
which protein is formed. We have then found a
form of matter modifiable with extreme facility by
surrounding agents. This protein " is capable of ex-
isting under probably at least a thousand isomeric
forms ; and, as we shall presently see, it is capable
of forming with itself and other elements, sub-
stances yet more intricate in composition, that
<ire practically infinite in their varieties of kind.
Exposed to those innumerable modifications of con-
ditions which the earth's surface aflforded, ....
this extremely changeable substance must have
undergone now one now another of its countless
metamorphoses. And to the mutual influences of its
metamorphic forms, under favouring conditions, we
may ascribe the production of the still more compo-
site, still more sensitive, still more variously-change-
able portions of organic matter, which, in masses more
minute and simple than existing Protozoa, displayed
activities varying little by little into those called
vital — actions which protein itself exhibits in a certain
degree, and which the lowest known living things
exhibit only in a greater degree." *
Biology J Vol.i., Appendix, p. 483.
^
1 60 The Evolution Hypothesis.
In this way Mr. Spencer reaches actions " called
vital." How out of these minute fragments of protein
have special kinds of organisms arisen ?
"Molecules, perhaps, exceeding in size and com-
plexity those of protein, as those of protein exceed
those of inorganic matter, may, I conceive, be the
special units belonging to special kinds of organisms,
.... The existence of such physiological units, pecu-
liar to each species of organism, is not unaccounted
for. They are evolved simultaneously with the
evolution of the organism they compose : they dif-
ferentiate as fast as the organisms differentiate ;
and are made multitudinous in kind by the same
actions which make the organisms they compose
multitudinous in kind Every physicist
will endorse the proposition, that in each aggregate
there tends to establish itself an equilibrium between
the forces exercised by all the units upon each and
by each upon all Organic molecules of each
kind, no matter how complex, have a form of equili-
brium in which, when they aggregate, their complex
forces are balanced. . . . The special molecules having a
special organic structure as their form of equilibrium
must be reacted upon by the total forces of the
organic structure Setting out with the stage
in which protein in minute aggregates took on those
simplest differentiations which fitted it for differently
conditioned parts of its medium, there must have un-
ceasingly gone on perpetual re-adjustments of the
From Inorganic Matter to Life. i6i
balance between as^ofregates and their units — actions
and reactions of the two, in which the unit tended ever
to establish the typical form produced by actions and
reactions in all antecedent generations, while the aggre-
gate, if changed in form by change of surrounding
conditions, tended ever to impress on the units a corres-
ponding change of polarity, causing them in the next
generation to reproduce the changed form — their new
form of equilibrium." *
These quotations fairly represent Mr. Spencer's
hypothesis of the evolution of organic matter, the
evolution out of that matter of living things, and
finally, the evolution of living things differentiated
into special kinds of organisms.
On the entire exposition of the change from inor-
ganic matter to living bodies differenced into kinds,
we would first of all observe, that there is not one
step in the process of which it is possible to furnish
any proof. The whole is an effort — a very brilliant
effort the reader will readily admit — of the scientific
imagination. It is as truly an imaginative creation
as the "Midsummer Night's Dream." The scientific
mind may say it is very like what might have hap-
pened, but we have no evidence that it is the actual
course of nature. It is a guess after truth, and guesses
as to matters of fact are more likely to be wrong than
right. He who shoots into a mist-cloud is not likely
* Biology, Vol. I., Appendix, pp. 486-7.
L
1 62 The Evolution Hypothesis.
to hit the mark. A closer examination will confirm
the judgment that Mr. Spencer has not in this in-
stance hit the truth.
1. The hypothesis assumes the evolution of mole-
cules distinct in kinds, as a process prior to the
evolution of protoplasm. Before Mr. Spencer is in a
position to obtain those " portions of protoplasm more
minute, more indefinite, more inconstant in their cha-
racters than the lowest Rhizo'pods — less distinguish-
able from a mere fragment of albumen than even the
Frotogenes of Haeckel," there must have been evolved
out of the simplest aggregates of atoms, molecules (a)
differentiated into kinds, and (6) reproduced in their
kinds. He must show, then, that the persistence of
force will account for the origination of differences of
kind among molecules ; he must show further that
the sam.e dynamic principle will account for the re-
production true to kind of these several kinds.
If it be assumed that a universal law of aggrega-
tion of atoms determined the formation of molecules
unlimited in number and in variety, we may find the
first requirement. But then we have begun the first
chapter of the scientific book of Genesis with a de-
claration of the existence and universality of law —
and we take for granted in the collocation and law
of the primordial forces all the phenomena of the
universe as it now is.
Waiving this criticism, and accepting the formation
of myriad kinds of aggregates compounded of the
From Inorganic Matter to Life. 163
moving atoms that pervade immensity, we inquire
how the kinds are perpetuated. It can only be {a)
by the molecules when formed remaining for ever
fixed, or (6) by the continuous formation of new
molecules of the different kinds in the same manner
in which the original molecules of these kinds were
produced, or (c) by the propagation of successive
generations of molecules generating after their kind^
in the language of Moses, " seeding seed after their
kind." The first supposition is contrary to the prin-
ciples of evolution ; the persistence of force, as Mr,
Spencer applies it, renders such perpetuity impossible.
Fixedness of these composite molecules is inconsistent
with the continuous mutation constituting the cosmic
process. The second supposition is also incongruous
with the principles of evolution, according to which
the movement of the universe is a ceasless movement
onward: "into the same river no man can enter
twice." The third is the only supposition consonant
with Mr. Spencer's doctrine ; but it lands us in inex-
plicable mystery. The propagation of molecular
structures true to their kind is wholly inconceivable.
Mr. Spencer does not undertake to give an account of
it. We have, then, at the very outset, the two most
difficult problems which meet the student of organic
life in its fully developed state — differentiation into
kinds, and propagation of each after its kind. The
evolutionist begins, where Moses begins, with the seed
reproducing its kind. 'But there is this wide differ-
164 The Evolution Hypothesis.
ence : Moses begins with life — the living seed. The
evolutionist must be given kinds and the reproduction
of kinds in the primal atomic aggregates, in the
earliest conceivable stage of evolution ; he must find
kinds and the reproduction of each after its kind long
antecedent to the first bes^inninof of life.
Again, there is pressed on our attention an instance
of the manner in which evolution, when one reaches
a point of real moment, leaves the vital question
unanswered.
2. But let us, for the sake of argument, grant Mr.
Spencer his molecules of "extreme modifiability,"
he has still out of these to build up the protoplasm,
portions of which began, as he supposes, to display
actions approximating to those called vital. Now he
is at this point met by an obstacle which lies in the
way of his theory, and which has for so far proved
insuperable. He has to get protoplasm antecedent ta
the existence of any living thing. Here he is met by
a uniform experience — an experience without known
exception, that protoplasm is only found in that
which is, or has been, living. Mr. Spencer must, then,
before he can take a single step in his progress
towards organized bodies, obliterate one of the clearest
drawn lines in nature, and postulate the existence of
protoplasm prior to the existence of life, while all
observation and experience bear testimony to the
presence of life as the invariable condition of the
existence of protoplasm. That is, he has introduced
From Inorganic Matter to Life. 1 65
the very property or principle to be accounted for —
life, in assuming the production of protoplasm — which
is a form of living matter — as an intermediate step in
the progress towards life. The assumption is in direct
oonflict with a quite uniform experience.
3. But granting Mr. Spencer his "still more com-
posite, still more sensitive, still more variously
changeable portions of organic matter," we cannot
at once allow him that they "displayed actions
varying little by little into those called vital." He
takes for granted that by variations added by little
and little the actions displayed by the minute aggre-
gates of protein molecules would in the end reach
actions properly called vital. This is to take for
granted the very point at issue. To assume that the
addition of a sufficiently prolonged series of changes,
each in itself infinitesimal, to action which is not
vital, will constitute vital action, is to assume that the
difference between mechanical and vital action is one
of minute variation and not of kind. The two kinds
of action are altogether diverse. To assume that they
are similar, that they are but varieties of the same,
is another of the instances so frequently occurring in
the evolution doctrine of obliterating dividing lines
when they run across the doctrine and break its
continuity. It is the business of science not to bury
facts but to explain them.
Motion internal to the aggregates called molecules
may be conceived as changed in many ways : it may
1 66 The Evolution Hypothesis.
be modified by the growth of new molecules; the
inter-molecuJar motions may be modi tied by the
inter-actions of each molecule and its environment ;
but no increase or diminution, or composition, or
variation of such motion will constitute that differ-
ence which exists between vital and mechanical action.
No change in the times of oscillation of the atomic
constituents or inter-action between molecular aggre-
gates and their environment will produce that which
is signified by the word life. Motions that are me-
chanical (or, if the term be preferred, dynamical) and
nothing more will not yield vital actions.
It is not unusual for a disputant to cover a false
process in his logic by departures from sound reasoning
which escape detection from their apparent insignifi-
cance. Mr. Spencer's indiscernable modifications make
the contrast between life and the action of inorganic
matter less marked; but we repeat, additions may
increase motion, variations may render it more complex
or chanofe its direction or its mode, but no increase or
variation can make it other than dynamic. Minute
variations may insensibly change the physical action
or alter the chemical qualities of a portion of matter,
but can never bridge over the separation between the
dynamical and the vital. It is directly in the teeth
of all experience to deem it possible to divide and
subdivide life by little and little downward until
its distinctive characteristics have been pared away,
and it has become only a mode of molecular motion :
From Inorganic Matter to Life, 167
it is equally in conflict with all knowledge of nature
to assume it to be possible, by inappreciable increments
of molecular motion added on through infinitesimal
stages, to turn it into life. The difference between
living bodies and inorganic matter cannot be obliter-
ated by such gradations of change.
4. When the evolutionist has advanced from in-
organic matter to life, he has then to undertake the
task of accounting for the innumerable varieties of
kind which characterize the organic kingdom. From
the lowest vegetal and animal forms to the highest,
over the whole range of life, the varieties surpass the
power of thought. How have all these arisen, and
how are they perpetuated ? Mr. Spencer answers by
introducing the " physiological unit." This special
creation fills so important a place in his doctrine
that we must examine it closely as to its origin
and nature. " Organisms," he says, " are built up of
certain highly-complex molecules, which we distin-;
guished as physiological units — each kind of organ- j
ism being built up of physiological units peculiar to 1
itself."*
* Biology, Vol. II., § 178.
CHAPTER XIII.
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL UNIT.
LET us call up the physiological unit, and examine
it as keenly as we can ; for it yields the explana-
tion — the only rational explanation which evolution
oifers — of organic structure, and of the multiplied
forms of life.
1. We, first of all, notice that it is extremely small
— so small that we must add another lens to our
microscope, the lens called imagination, to bring it
within the range of vision. Extremely minute though
lit be, it may still contain within it the secret of organic
life and of sensation ; for these mysteries are not ques-
tions of bulk, but of kind. Let us then study closely
this minute exponent of the invisible, who holds the
mystic scroll, whereon is written the solution of every
problem in the range of organized nature.
2. We find that it is a highly organized body — " a
definite, coherent heterogeneity." It has parts, and
each part is distinctly differenced from every other,
and is definitely related to every other. The soaring
eagle is not more really a systematized structure.
"Molecules, perhaps exceeding in size and complexity
those of protein, as those of protein exceed those of
The Physiological Unit. 169
inorganic matter, may, I conceive, be the special units
belonging to special kinds of organisms. By their
constitution they must have a plasticity, or sensitive-
ness to modifying forces, far beyond that of protein ;
and bearing in mind not only that their varieties are
practically infinite in number, but that closely allied
forms of them, chemically indifferent to one another
as they must be, may co-exist in the same aggregate,
we shall see that they are fitted for entering into
unlimited varieties of orijanic structures." *
3. A further examination shows the physiological'
unit to be composed of system upon system of mole-
cules, in successive degrees of complexity; each system,
and each combination of systems, having its peculiar
internal motions, and its individual polarity; and each
system having the equilibration of its polarity in the
perfected structure of the entire unit. "By combina-
tion of molecules with one another, and recombinations
of the products, there are formed systems of systems
of molecules unimaginable in their complexity. Step
by step, as the aggregate molecules so resulting grow
larger and increase in heterogeneity, they become more
unstable, more readily transformable by small forces,
more capable of assuming various characters."-]- " The
chemical units combine into units immensely more
complex than themselves, complex as they are." %
* Biology, Vol. I., Appendix, p. 486. t Ibid., p. 486.
I ^bid., § 66.
1 70 The Evolution Hypothesis.
Each unit is, then, a little universe or infinitesimal
microcosm, complex beyond conception. The visible
heavens, in the correlations of the solar and astral
systems, are simplicity itself compared with the in-
tricacy of the correlated motions and equilibrated
systems enclosed in each physiological unit.
4. These units differ in kinds as the developed
organisms differ in kinds. They " possess the property
of arranging themselves into the special structure of
the organism to which they belong." * From the
lowest forms of vegetal and animal organizations, to the
highest, from the Amoeba to man, immense as are the
varieties of organisms, so immense are the varieties of
physiological units — each of them as completely dif-
ferentiated as the perfected structure of the living
thing — each stamping with its own character every
kind of living thing.
But the incalculable diversity is still greater than is
thus indicated : for not only do kingdoms, genera,,
species, varieties, and all the other recognized groups
of organisms, mark divisions among the physiological
units, but the differentiation among the units runs
down to the differences which may be seen among^
the children of the same parent, or in growths
from the same seed ; not only so, but every organ of
the body has its own special kind. The little
world of relations and adaptations in a single living^
* Biology^ § 66.
The Physiological Unit. 1 7 1
thing are all traceable to modifications of these units.
Each one of them is thus complex beyond the power
of thought to imagine, and the multiformity in their
intricate structure is beyond the power of figures to
express. Yet these varieties of character are necessary
to the evolutionist's explanation of the diversity seen
in organized nature. The explanation is not less
complex than the thing explained.
5. The physiological units have "a more or less
distinctive character." " The form of each species of
organism is determined by a peculiarity in the struc-
ture of its units." These units " have a special struc-
ture in which they tend to arrange themselves." They
have " an innate tendency to arrange themselves into
the shape of the organism to which they belong." " A
plant or animal of any species is made up of special
units, in all of which there dwells the intrinsic apti-
tude to aggregate into the form of that species." They
show a " proclivity towards a particular arrangement." *
These characteristics are ancestral : they are inherited.
The extreme modifiability of organic aggregates of
molecules is the property most frequently brought
into view by Mr. Spencer. He has been at great
pains to illustrate the instability of the organic com-
pounds. Yet each physiological unit, however mobile,
has stability enough to retain the impress of its
ancestry, and to perpetuate it by reproduction. At
* J5io%i/, Vol. I., §65.
172 The Evohttion Hypothesis.
this remote point in the history of organisms we are
taught to recognize the principle of heredity. Mr.
Spencer calls the sum of these individual character-
istics " polarity," taking the term from a phenomenon of
inorganic matter, " a power of whose nature we know
nothing."* Under this term in physics, "a name for
something of which we are ignorant — a name for a
hypothetical property which as much needs explana-
tion as tliat which it is used to explain "-|- — he covers
all these innate tendencies and proclivities. The
polarity of the units is the original of the law of
heredity. Polarity in physics is the name of an
unknown mode of force. What light does the evolu-
tionist throw on the dark places of organic history, by
clothing with the same robe of mist the unit, which
the spell of his imagination has summoned out of the
unseen world ?
Every observer, from the herdsman of Haran on-
w^ard, has known that the offspring derives its char-
acteristics from the parent. Is our knowledge of the
fact more clear to us when we are told that there are
physiological units lying far below the visible, which,
if we could see them, would be found to manifest
•these same characteristic's, and of which the bodies
pf our cattle are built up ?
But think of the number and variety of hereditary
attributes that we must suppose to be stored up in
* Biology, Vol. L, § G4. t Ibid., § G5.
The Physiological Unit, i 73
any single unit. When two cells — the sperm-cell and
the germ-cell — are brought together and their enclosed
physiological units have been brought into contact, on
Mr. Spencer's theory, the decaying vigour is revived
and a new evolution initiated. These units bring —
each of them — into the contact and new relation that
ensues the hereditary characteristics of a series carried
back through myriads of ages. In all that succession
nothing has been lost. Throughout the vast series
of births and deaths no part of the family wealth
has been squandered : each bequeathed to its sucessor
the heritage of ancestral experience unimpaired, en-
hancing it with that gained in the space of its own
existence, and the physiological units that, coming to-
gether in generation, form the germ of the animal
beo^otten, are thus the sum of all the immense com-
plexity of moving systems of atoms and molecules
from the first beginning of cosmic history till now.
But is this science or fancy ? Are we seriously dealing
with knowable facts, or building up a universe exist-
ing only in the scientific imagination ? Whatever the
the reply may be, it is plain the cosmos is not made
more intelligible to us than before. The evolutionist
has only carried the most distinctive phenomena of
organic life back to a mysterious region occupied by
myriad whirling molecules whose oscillations and
combined motions, though they include the cause of
all the visible universe, lie for ever far below the range
of observation. •
1 74 The Evolution Hypothesis.
6. Each physiological unit, in addition to its innate
proclivities, has its individual characteristics. These are
due to the incidence of environing forces. The history
of each unit being different from that of every other,
and the incident forces in their impact being diverse
in each instance, these diversities involye modifications
which give a special peculiarity to each. The unit is
inevitably dissolved unless it can adjust its polarity to
the new conditions. Its internal equilibration must be
brought into accord with the incident forces. Hence
the constant change in organisms and the evolution of
new forms. If this doctrine be true, we have to clear
up a new perplexity. The process of adjustment of
units is as difficult to comprehend as the adjustment of
living bodies ; and the difficulty is increased by bring-
ing into view the further consideration, that while the
unit builds up the organism, the organism determines
the structure of the unit. Each acts and reacts on the
other. Evolution undertakes to elucidate the equili-
bration of unit and organic structure, as a means of
elucidating the equilibration of the living body and its
environment. Is the equilibrium of a system of in-
visible molecules more easily determined than the
equilibrium of visible masses ?
7. The physiological units possess inherent powers
and properties of the most surprising sort. They
have " powers of arranging themselves into the forms
of the organism to which they belong." "The
polarity of the physiological units produces, during
The Physiological Unit. 175
the developmenfc of any organism, a combination of
internal forces that expend themselves in working
out a structure in equilibrium with the forces to which
ancestral organisms were exposed." * The form of
each species of organism is determind by a peculiarity
in the constitution of its units. That is, the per-
manent characteristics of every organism are deter-
mind by the physiological^ units, while the forces in
the environment tend to produce modifications of the
structure.
In criticising the theories of Dr. Erasmus Darwin,
Lamark, and Professor Owen, Mr. Spencer condemns
the ascription of organic evolution to '' some aptitude'
naturally possessed by organisms." "In brief," he
says, " this assumption of a persistent formative power
inherent in organisms and making them unfold into
higher forms is an assumption no more tenable than
the assumption of special creations ; of which, indeed,
it is but a modification ; diflfering only by the fusion
of separate unknown processes unto a continuous un-
known process." -f- Yet Mr. Spencer cannot avoid the
use of similar terms. When he is most emphatic in
repudiating all discipleship in any school which
acknowledges the operation of supra - dynamical
powers, his " speech bewrayeth " him. He speaks of
proclivities, tendencies, power of arranging themselves,
as characteristic of his units. Of these attributes,
* Bloloyyj, Vol., II. § ITS. t Ihid., Vol. I., § 144.
1 76 The Evolution Hypothesis.
evolution must give some clear account, unless it alto-
gether fail as an explanation of organic nature. Mr.
Spencer is very much displeased if these powers im-
manent in the units should be confounded with the
" archseus, vital principle, nisus formiativus and so on."
He rejects such implication as unfounded, and givea
the explanation that " the proclivity of units of each
order towards the specific arrangement seen in the
organism they form, is not to be understood as result-
ing from their own structures and actions only ; but
as the product of these and the environing forces to
which they are exposed In its complete form,
the conception is that these specific molecules, ....
have for their form of aggregation in which their forces
are equilibrated the structure of the adult organism
to which they belong, and that they are impelled ta
fall into this structure by the co-operation of the en-
vironing forces and the force they exercise on one
lanother — the environing forces being the source of
the power which effects the arrangement, and the pol-
arities of the molecules determining the direction." *
But this explanation does not satisfactorily clear up
the point: the environing forces may be the power
which effects the re-arrangement, but the inherent
proclivities of the units direct it. The winds may
drive the ship; the captain and crew steer it: the
course is determined by the intelligence on board.
* Biology J Vol. I., Appendix, p. 488.
The Physiological Unit. 177
It is no addition to real knowledge to be told that
the innate tendencies, inherent proclivities, and powers,
of directing the formation of organic structure that
lie in the physiological units have been derived from
the environment in the past, and are due to a suc-
cession of minute modifications wrought through an
innumerable series of changes. The action of the en-
vironment had over against it from the beginning the
reaction of the molecular system. On Mr. Spencer's
theory there could not have been any organic struc-
ture without an antecedent molecular constitution.,
Go as far back as we will, we must begin, not with
the "indefinite," but with a defined order, not with
the " incoherent," but with a combined and compacted
system, not with " homogeneity," but with a state of
differentiation than which nothinor hio^her in kind can
be conceived.
Evolution again breaks down when it faces an ulti-
mate question.
The physiological unit is a necessary link in Mr.,
Spencer's hypotliesis; if we doubt its existence we
doubt his doctrine. An examination of what is in-
volved in the assumption of its existence leads us to
the conviction that it is a " special creation," not of the
Supreme Wisdom, but of the Evolution Philosophy.
y
CHAPTER XIV.
THE ORIGIN OF SENTIENT LIFE.
A BEING endowed with sentience is a phenomenon
of which the Evolution Hypothesis must give
intelligible account, or confess that it is unable to in-
terpret some of the most obvious facts in nature. In
this chapter we shall examine the question only in
relation to the lower animals, leaving for separate
discussion the origin and growth of self-conscious in-
telligence.
Sentient life is best exemplified in some of its more
advanced forms. In the very lowest kinds it may be
difficult to distinguish with certainty the animal from
the vegetable. But when we turn to the more highly-
organized beings, the differences between the two
kingdoms are so great that we are embarrased to find
characteristics common to both. Take the dog as an
example. The facts which await explanation are (a)
his intelligence, (b) his sense of pleasure and pain,
(c) his complex and highly developed organism. Put-
ting aside the question of intelligence, which will be
best examined in its highest form in man, we shall
test Mr. Spencer's theory by its success in giving
account of the origin of the organism and its sensi-
The Origin of Sentient Life. 179
bility. Organic sensibility, feeling ; what account can
evolution give o£ these most notable phenomena ?
The living organism, immensely complex and most
skilfully adjusted to its uses, is, by hypothesis, whether
in its present activities or in the process of its con-
struction through an incalculable series of changes, to
be accounted for by the laws of matter and motion
and these only. Given an adequate knowledge of
these laws, the entire phenomenon would be compre-
hended. The living organism is, on Mr. Spencer's
theory, in all its activities and properties, wholly
mechanical, — using that term in its widest sense, as in-
cluding all modes of molecular motion.
The dog is struck ; he utters a cry of pain. Is the
sense of pain seeming only, or real ? Is it a dynamic
product solely — an effect of the same kind as the
vibration of a tuning-fork, or the changed molecular
^condition of the snowy petal of a lily when it is
marred by a touch of the finger ? To answer in the
affirmative is to accept a thorough-going doctrine of
the mechanical structure of animals, making them
merely automatic machines of inconceivable subtilty
of adjustment and action. On the other hand, we
ourselves know what it is to suffer pain ; we have a
more immediate knowledge of pain than of mechanical
effects. Transferring our own feeling to a like in-
stance, we do not doubt that the dog has a real sense
of suffering.
What, then, is the 5xact nature of that activity in
t8o The Evolution Hypothesis.
which the sense of pain arises ? There are two aspects
of the phenomenon — a change in the condition of the
oro^anism and a sensation. It is the latter with which
we have to do. The question at issue is not as to the
mode of molecular action in the nerve-tissue. We
have no controversy with the evolutionist as to his
explanation of nerve-action. We are ready to accept
any theory of isomeric change or decomposing mole-
cular processes that may seem to accord with the
facts. Let the motions internal to the molecules, or
due to the interactions between molecules, or arising
from the relation of molecules and their aggregates be
what it may ; let the disordered movement be of any
kind that may be imagined, there remains still un-
touched the essential part of the instance — the feeling
of these disordered activities. Until this fact is eluci-
dated evolutionism is at fault.
Where lies the source or origin of the feeling ? Is
it a property of matter, or of some special collocation
or movement of matter, or is it an attribute of some
mode of concrete being distinct from matter ? Let us
suppose the entire universe to be composed of forces
manifested in atoms and their motions ; or, if it be
preferred, let the primary constituents of matter be
conceived of as points of force or vortex rings in a
uniform tenuous ether. The same method of criticism
is equally applicable under any one of these supposi-
tions; but, as the conception of atoms in motion is
more easily represented in thought, and is that adopted
The Origin of Sentient Life. 18 1
l3y Mr. Spencer, we shall employ it in our argument.
Let us then regard the universe as composed of atoms
and their motions ; let these atoms be supposed to be
arranged in any imaginable order : if in that universe
there should arise this most remarkable phenopienon
€alled feeling, how can it be accounted for ? Several
hypotheses are conceivable. Feeling may be assumed
to be latent in every atom, or in special kinds of
atoms, or it may be supposed to lie hidden in some
peculiar combination of atoms, or to be a mode of
atomic motion, or to arise by the combination of
atomic motions. No other supposition seems possible.,
Now, if the sense of pain is not latent in the atoms, it
is inconceivable that it could come to be through any
combination of them. Aggregates of atoms, each
devoid of sensibility, having immanent in them
severally no rudiment of feeling, or capacity for
feeling, cannot acquire it by being brought into
contact. Did feeling arise in such conditions it
would be uncaused : something had then come out
of nothing. Nor is it possible to imagine that atoms
without capacity for feeling could acquire that capa-
city by being moved in some particular manner,
either individually or in groups. We are then driven
either to affirm the capacity for feeling to be a pro-
perty resident in atoms, or to posit the existence of
something other than matter. If we choose the
former alternative, we ascribe to the atoms feelinsf,
actual or potential : w^ constitute them monads ; and
1 82 The Evohition Hypothesis.
they, in that case, possess properties which are not
dynamic. The dynamic theory is abandoned at the
very outset, as insufficient to account for the simplest
phenomena ; and the philosophy based on it is over-
turned. If we adopt the latter alternative, and affirm
the existence of concrete being other than the forces
manifested in atoms and their motions, then, while we
can still hold by mechanical law as the law of atoms,
and may affirm the universality of dynamic law in so
far as the universe is constituted of atoms, we have
introduced a supra-dynamical element; we have
affirmed the existence of a mode of being other
than force as revealed in matter and motion; we
stand face to face with another form of concrete
existence, and the assumption that the principle of
the persistence of force covers the whole realm of the
knowable, is by consequence rejected. Choose which
of the alternatives we will, in either case, the dynamic
doctrine of evolution is found defective as a theory of
sentient organic life.
Having reached the existence of feeling, we have
touched the boundary of another world. We are as
yet on the outer verge of that new mode of being;
but even at this point we feel the presence of other
powers ; we must henceforth take account of feeling
as well as force. Pleasure and pain form the most
characteristic feature of animal life. Here, within the
horizon of experience, a new phenomenon is full in
view. In accounting for it the evolutionist is again
The Origin of Sentient Life. 183
at fault. He cannot set it in its true place as an.
integral part of the universal system. His hypothesis
compels him to attempt what can never be accom-
plished — to assign to feeling its place in an order
dominated throughout by physical law. If he take
refuge in the unknowable, and affirm that feeling is a
manifestation of the inscrutable power in a mode not
existing potentially in any antecedent manifestation,
he transcends scientific knowledge, and derives his
doctrine from a source which, if it be not supernatural,
lies admittedly beyond nature, so far as nature con-
sists of phenomena that may be known. The cause to
which feeling, in that case, is referred is not a cause of
which science can take cognizance.
In dealing with the question of feeling, the evolu-
tionist encounters further insurmountable difficulties.
At the moment when this new mode of the unknow-
able power appeared within the knowable, the process
of change was profoundly modified. The evolution of
animal organisms must have proceeded henceforth in
every part of it, in relation to this unique manifesta-
tion, which stands related to every molecular move-
ment throughout the range of animal life.
The relations subsisting within the organism are ex-
tremely complex : physical forces are related to physical
forces, forces to feelings, feelings to feelings, feelings
to feelings through forces, and forces to forces through
feelings. Take the last set of relations. Where a feel-
ing, say of hunger, is a^vakened, it calls forth a series
184 The Evolution Hypothesis.
of exercises of physical force. Energy is expended in
the pursuit and capture of prey. In this succession
of states the feeling of hunger is a necessary element.
The antecedent actions stand related to the subsequent
actions through the feeling: take away the feeling, and
the forth-putting of physical energy consequent upon
it, is taken away. The feeling is an essential part of
the instance. It matters nothing how the physical
series may be otherwise related. Without the feeling
the result must be entirely other than it is.
Let us examine the fact more closely. A physical
change — a manifestation of the absolute cause in a
material mode — is accompanied by feeling, which is a
manifestation of the absolute cause in a mode not
material. The physical process _p^i(/S the feeling deter-
mines the next physical process, which is again
accompanied by a second manifestation of the un-
knowable in feeling. The second physical process p^us
the second feeling determines the next physical
process, and so on continually — the manifestation in
feeling being as necessary to each subsequent deter-
mination as the physical process. If, then, the
evolutionist is unable to constitute the feeling an
integral part of the manifestations cohering by dis-
coverable physical law, but is driven to refer it to
the unknowable, organic evolution is condemned as
a one-sided and inadequate hypothesis, incompetent
to account for the whole fact; for it proposes to
formulate the law of all livinof thinofs in their orisfin
The Origin of Sentient Life. 185
and development, and it is proved incapable of setting
in a comprehensible order the most notable of the
phenomena. It is compelled to introduce an incom-
prehensible cause, not at one point only, but along
the entire stream of chanofe. But to fall back on a
mysterious, inscrutable cause revealing itself in sen-
tient organic life at every instant and everywhere in
manifestations that co-operate with knowable causes,
and give to the result its special characteristics, is to
condemn evolution as a rational hypothesis.
That this conclusion is just will appear the more
evident, if we consider the influence of feeling in the
growth and development of organisms. The loss of
nerve-sensibility is the precursor of decay in the
individual ; and the sense of pleasure and pain is,
perhaps, the most potent factor in the changes
wrought in living things in the course of generations.
Through pleasures and pains, the modifications which
arise are in great part effected. These feelings can-
not be either ignored or placed in a position so
relatively unimportant that they may be dealt with as
incidents, rather than causes in the process. Environ-
ing physical forces are, no doubt, continually operating,
and must produce their legitimate effect; but the
results brought about are not wholly due to forces
operating according to dynamic law ; they are in
great part owing to the activities called forth by the
sense of pleasure enjoyed in certain affections of the
organism, and the sen^e of pain suffered in others.
1 86 The Evolution Hypothesis.
The operative cause is not the physical force alone, but
the physical force 'plus the feeling.
To affirm that the modification of organisms is
carried on wholly according to the laws of the under^
lying absolute energy as revealed in matter and
motion, is most evidently an unproved and unprov-
able assumption. In animal life physical action can-
not be severed from feeling and studied and measured
apart ; for sensibility is a primary characteristic of a
sensitive organization. The manifestation of the
unknowable in feeling is as necessary to the forma-
tion or modification of animal organisms as the
redistribution of matter and motion, or the persist-
ence of force.
Evolutionism once more fails us. The evolutionist
is unable to assign any knowable cause for the origin
of sentient life ; he cannot disclose its place in the
cosmos or its relations to the universal order: nor
does his hypothesis furnish an explanation of the
part which sentience plays in the shaping of organs^
the growth of bodies, or those modifications of or-
ganic forms that have been wrought out in the course
of change.
CHAPTER XV.
THE ORIGIN OF ORGANIC FORMS,
THE account which it gives of the origin of
organic forms has gained for the Evolution
Hypothesis its widest acceptance. Here its advocates
put forth all their strength. They claim to have
established the doctrine in this department beyond
reasonable doubt.
Surveying the realm of organized matter, we see
broad and deep lines differencing great classes of
instances ; and within these lines large groups clearly
distinguished by dividing limits — limits never, within
the range of experience, obliterated ; and so, by suc-
cessive divisions, until we reach variations that char-
acterize, not the species, but the individual. This
vast multiformity, seen in the contrasts between the
two great kingdoms and in the incalculable diversities
found in either, is to be derived from one primordial
mode of living matter. Evolution is bound, not only|
to show that out of the same original living matter
all these organisms r}iay have sprung ; it is bound to
show that they rmist have sprung from it, and to show
how : it is bound to account for their present form by
setting out the law of a ceaseless onward movement;
1 88 The Evolution Hypothesis.
and of modifications that, by hypothesis, have been
growing ever more complex. It is impossible to con-
struct a rational theory on other terms. On these
conditions only can a philosophy of evolution be esta-
blished. The evolutionist must not only prove that
all organisms have been gradually differentiated
jthrough continuous successive changes ; he must also
iaccount for the process.
The facts open to observation lie within a brief
period of the history of the universe. No more than
a narrow strip across the pattern which is being
woven in the loom of time is visible to man. From this
restricted experience he is left to trace the design back-
ward to the far distant beginning. The instances out
of which all theories as to the orio^in of ororanic forms
•are framed may be divided into two classes, organisms
as found at the present time with their resemblances
and differences, and distribution ; and the facts of
organic history in so far as they are revealed in the
:geological record. Over the entire field there has not
I been discovered anywhere direct evidence of transition
jform a less developed to a more highly developed
'species. That the earlier are the lower in organization
is to be looked for on any hypothesis. If we accept
the geologist's account of the history of the earth's
crust, a ofradual advancement from lower to hiccher
forms is inevitable. No species can exist except in a
suitable habitat ; and the earlier geological periods did
not afford terrestrial conditions adapted to beings
The Origin of Organic Forms. 1 89
highly organized. Over the whole region open to
observation, the lowest organisms are as fixed as the
highest : they are never modified to such an extent as
to change their kind. To draw out a genealogical tree
of the totality of species, it would be necessary to find
a series of organisms that have passed by direct ascent
into more highly organized species. But just as
science looks in vain for the common ancestor of man
and the monkey, so does it search to no eflfect for the
common ancestor in every case of diflPentiated species.
down to the simplest. The discovery of forms assimi-
lated to allied species on either side, and in part
filling up the interval between, will not furnish satis-
factory evidence of the transition, unless there is proof
that the allied species are its offspring. What is
wanted is the immediately precedent organism out of
which the more advanced has sprung. Such common
parentage is nowhere found. The very thing needed
to give an unassailable basis for the hypothesis of
organic evolution is, from the lowest point to the
highest, along the whole line, invariably and entirely
absent : the genealogical tree is altogether made up
of branches ; it has no stem.
The series embraced in organic evolution includes
Man. The proposal to treat him as an exception is
fore-doomed. It is a half-way house, which cannot
be the permanent home of science. Every argument
against the inclusion of the human organism in the
evolution process has it^ counterpart equally effective
190 The Evolution Hypothesis,
against the inclusion of any distintcly differenced
tind. If it be necessary to introduce a Divine
directing Intelligence to account for man, it will be also
needful to call in the same supernatural aid to account
for inferior species. It is conceivable that an evolu-
tionist, believing in a Divine Creator, might take up
the position that in the fulness of time God sent forth
His son Adam, formed in the womb of one of the
lower animals, and endowed with spiritual life; but
I an attempt of this sort to reconcile the doctrine of
1 organic evolution with belief in the supernatural
I origin of the human race is not likely to command
assent. To accept it would be fatal to evolutionism ;
for it breaks the continuity by a special creation and
acknowledges the impossibility of interpreting all the
known phenomena of the cosmos without introducing
immediate supernatural agency, which, if admissible
in one instance, must be granted admissible in others
also. The distinguished naturalist, Mr. Wallace, who
[shares with Mr. Darwin the credit of having origi-
jnated the hypothesis of the formation of species by
(natural selection, regards man as exempt from the great
Iresfulative law of organic change. Mr. Darwin has
taken, as an evolutionist, a safer position, in boldly in-
cluding man — ^body and spirit — in the operation of his
principle. His hypothesis stands condemned unless it
is adequate to the task of ranging all organic life in
one continuous process. Just as, on the other side, the
doctrine of the creationist is defective if he fail to
The Origin of Organic Forms. 1 9 1
trace evidence of intelligence and will everywhere
in the organic kingdoms. Mr. Spencer stakes his
theory on a single issue. With him the discussion is
narrowed to the inquriy whether the changes which
matter undergoes in passing from the unorganized to
the organized form, and the series of modifications
produced in the vegetal and animal kingdoms, from the
simplest to the most highly differentiated organisms,
are due wholly to dynamic law, or whether fully to
account for the phenomena will require that we shall
introduce some other principle or cause. The former
view is clearly inconsistent with the facts. It is ten-
able as a provisional hypothesis only by dropping out
•of sight some of the most significant phenomena.
To accept the alternative and hold that a cause other
than force operating according to dynamic law is
indispensable to account for the whole, is to set aside
a fundamental principle of Mr. Spencer's philosophy,
which cannot admit of any such causation.
Mr. Spencer examines Professor Owen's "axiom of
the continuous operation of creative power, or of the
ordained becoming of living things," and condemns it,
as no more scientific than the belief in special crea-
tions. He says, " Though these highly-general expres-
sions do not suggest any very definite idea, yet they
imply the belief that organic progress is a result of
some indwelling tendency to develop, supernaturally .
impressed on living matter at the outset — some ever-
acting constructive fcftce, which, independently of
192 The Evolution Hypothesis.
other forces, moulds organisms into higher and higher
forms.
" In whatever way it is formulated, or by whatever
language it is obscured, this ascription of organic
evolution to some aptitude naturally possessed by
organisms, or miraculously imposed on them, is un-
philosophical. It is one of those explanations which
explains nothing — a shaping of ignorance into the
semblance of knowledge. The cause is not a true
cause — not a cause assimilable to known causes — not
a cause that can be anywhere shown to produce
analogous effects. It is a cause unrepresentable in
thought: one of those illegitimate symbolic concep-
tions which cannot by any mental process be elabo-
rated into a real conception. In brief, this assumption
of a persistent formative power, inherent in organisms,
and making them unfold into higher forms, is an as-
sumption of special creations : of which, indeed, it is
but a modification; differing only by the fusion of
separate unknown processes into a continuous un-
known process." *
This criticism is, from the standpoint of the thorough-
going evolutionist, perfectly just. An hypothesis in-
volving the recognition of a cause of this kind, is no
more comprehensible by science than the theory of
special creations. Whether that cause be designated,
with Hartman, the Unconscious, or be called God,
* Biology, Yol. I., § 144.
The Origin of Organic Forms. 193
organic evolution is thereby made of none effect ; for,
within the ken of science, it is reduced to a merely
phenomenal succession of forms, without a causal
nexus binding them to one another. Instead of the
disclosure of a knowable cause, which may be brought
into relation with other known causes, the evolutionist
sees ignorance wrapped up in an incomprehensible
term, or hidden behind a sacred name.
Mr. Spencer, on the other hand, undertakes to carry
his hypothesis through without taking account of any'
cause unknown to science. The active causes which
he finds operative in the course of organic evolution
are : — (a) An innate tendency or polarity in the physi-!
ological units of which organized bodies are built up ;
and (6) the play of the incident forces of the environ-
ment. The entire process is explained by these two
sets of forces. In what proportions they co-operate
in producing all known varieties of living things, Mr.
Spencer has not indicated. He deals in a hesitating
and tentative way with the whole subject. The sum
of his teaching is that the environing forces are the
source of the power which effects the changes, the
polarity of the units directing it. The doctrine is not
by any means expounded with clearness and precision.
The following fairly represents it : — The physiological
unit has its internal structure — its equilibration of
forces within itself. All other units in the organism
form a part of its environment ; while to these groups
of units the entire organic structure stands in the
194 ^^^ Evolution Hypothesis.
relation of environment. The cause of variation in
the units is thus in part internal to the organism ; but
the organic whole, as well as every part of it, is ex-
posed continually to the impact of the forces consti-
tuting the larger environment in which the organism
lives. We have, then, a series of contrasts between
the environed and the environment, running from the
individual unit to the organism, and outward to the
entire universe, which complicates the question and
renders Mr. Spencer's explanation hardly explicable.
We may regard it thus : The unit has an internal
system of forces equilibrated in harmony with the
ancestral form of organism; all other units making
up the living thing have similarly their equilibrations ;
but the incident forces bear in upon the whole and
upon the parts, disturbing the equilibrium. Every
such disturbance modifies the internal relations of
each several unit, and the inter-relations of the units
to one another and to the entire aggregate. In re-
gaining equilibrium the organic structure is modified.
Now, if the modified form arise in this way, it is not
easy to see how the direction of movement is due
altogether to the units, the incident forces only com-
municating the power. The principle in question
seems right in the face of Newton's second law of
motion — that change of motion is proportioned to
the impressed force, and takes place in the direction
of the straight line in which the force acts. Mr.
Spencer may take refuge in the distinction between
The Origin of Organic Forms. 195
molar and molecular motion, and thus try to elude
the grip of Newton; if so, we should not care to
follow him into the imperceptible.
Searching for a safe starting point anywhere, from
which we may advance along the line of causal
activity to the results before us, we go back, finding
no resting place till we reach the atom and its en-
vironment. Each instance of composition of atoms,
and further composition of molecules of greater com-
plexity, and so onward to the physiological unit, is to
be explained — if explicable — by the equilibration of
the constituent parts and the incident forces. We
are, then, driven in the last resort to assume, as exis-
tent in the original atom and the force immanent in
it, or impelling it, the primal source of that power of
•direction supposed to be inherent in the physiological
units. The gleam of light which seemed to break
Tipon us leads us into the darkness of the incompre-
hensible, and is dispersed in the atomic whirl. Emerg-
ing out of this dim region, we are directed to turn our
•eyes towards the environment, and seek in it the
source of the impelling power which produces the
continuous development. Mr. Spencer cites an ex-
ample. "During its earlier stages every embryo is
sexless — becomes either male or female as the balance
of forces acting on it determines. Each advance in
embryonic complication results from the action of
the incident forces on the complication previously
■existing. Indeed the now accepted doctrine of epi-
196 The Evolution Hypothesis.
genesis neccessitates the conclusion that organic
evolution proceeds after this manner. For since it
is proved that no germ contains the slightest rudi-
ment, trace, or indication of the future organism —
since the microscope has shown that the first process
set up in every fertilized germ is a process of repeated
spontaneous fissions ending in the production of a
mass o£ cells, not one of which exhibits any special
character The partial organization is trans-
formed by the agencies acting upon it into the suc-
ceeding phase of organization, and this into the next,^
until, through ever increasing complexities, the ulti-
mate form is reached Structureless, as every
germ originally is, the development of an organism
out of it is otherwise impossible."*
One cannot but admire the intelligence with which
the incident forces are supposed to act : for it is note-
worthy, that however the balance in families may
be, the number of male and female children, if ac-
count be taken of the entire population, is nearly
equal. It is quite remarkable how, over the entire
animal kingdom, the balance of the incident forces
works out a numerical proportion between the sexes,
which, however it may vary, is always exactly
adjusted to the well-being of the species. It is
surely to be excused if one feel sceptical as to the
completeness of an explanation which ascribes such
* First Principles, § 159.
The Origin of Organic Forms, 197
intelligent results to the blind forces of the environ-
ment. But the evolutionist may not question the
doctrine ; for " structureless as every germ originally
is, the development of an organism out of it is other-
wise impossible."
The same principle is stated more generally else-
where. "The change from uniformity into multi-|
formity in organic aggregates, is caused, as in all
inorganic aggregates, by the necessary exposure of
their component parts to actions unlike in kind or
quality, or both."*
The process of differentiation by which cells are
built up into an organized structure is, according to
Mr. Spencer's teaching, due altogether to the environ-
ment. The fertilized germ, in certain cases, multiplies
by simple fission, increasing the number of cells, but
without change in the arrangement of the parts.
The difference between the cell splitting up into
separate cells, each of them a simple cell and nothing
more, and the cell developed into an eagle or an
elephant, is due wholly to the incident forces of the
environment. The physiological unit is dethroned.
It is not easy to see how this doctrine accords with
the principle of heredity. It would seem that but
for the environing forces every fertilized cell would
go on perpetually producing new cells by fission ; in
which case the ancestral characteristics must perish.
* Biology^'Vol. II., § 311.
198 The EvoImHoii Hypothesis.
But it is not enough that the environment initiate
the development of structure ; what is begun needs
continued causation to carry it forward to future
stages. Observation shows that the process is liable
to stop short at any point. There are living creatures
that are structureless beino^ nothinor more than a
bundle of cells multiplying by simple fission. There
are others slightly more developed — living beings
which still retain the structureless condition, and
make no advance in organization. Others have an
organization of the most rudimentary sort and never
advance beyond the point at which the ancestral cell
stopped short. These lowly forms of life are no more
modifiable than the highest. They are as fixed in
kind, and are, in reproduction, as true to kind, as the
most highly developed species. How then are we ta
account for the extremely diverse action of the same
environment ?
It may be answered, The environments are not the
same. The environment of the fertilized germ-cell in
the Qgg of an eagle, is not identical with that in the
^gg of an ostrich. But such an answer would not be
satisfactory ; for, by hypothesis, there was a time
when the germ-cell of what is now an ostrich was
identical with the germ-cell of what is now an eagle ;
and when two germ-cells of the remote ancestor
became differentiated, what ground is there for affirm-
ing that they were exposed to dissimilar environ-
ments ? We assume the very point in question. But
The Origin of Organic Forms. 1 99
if this supposition be maintained as legitimate and
necessary, we may fairly challenge the evolutionist
to point out the diversity in the environing forces
which causes the diversity in the cell-growth. No
relation, either qualitative or quantitative, is discover-
able. The cause is wholly unknown.
What, we may ask, is the scientific worth of a
theory that tells us to look to the incident forces of j
the environment for the cause of certain changes,
and cannot give us the faintest clue to the precise
mode of force in the environment to which the effects
under examination are due ? Is this science, or is it;
not rather the merest ghost and shadow of science ?
Look again at these living germs. One remains"
destitute of any trace of organization, a second
developes the simplest structure, a third grows into
a highly developed organism. They are, at the out-
set, indistinguishable in chemical composition ; their
molecular constitution, so far as known, is the same;
yet they evolve into the most widely separate struc-
tures. If we go back through successive countless
p'enerations till we reach the ancestral ^erms, indistin-
guishable in their composition or constitution and
with the same cosmic and terrestrial surroundings,
we are entitled to ask by what causes these germs
have passed to such opposite destinies. What dy-
namic law accounts for their movement onward to
that point which they severally reach ? Mr. Spencer
replies: The law of the continuous redistribution of
200 The Evolution Hypothesis.
matter and motion. But when pressed for a more
definite explanation, he answers with two discordant
voices. The direction of the movement, he tells us,
is due to the polarity of the physiological units
[forming the contents of the cell : the directing power
Jay wrapped up in the germs themselves. This is
one answer. Elsewhere he accounts for the direction
i>f movement by the operation of the incident forces
>f the environment: these have determined whether
he primal cell should evolve into a Newton or an
bx. This is a second and quite conflicting answer.
It is for the evolutionist to reconcile them.
It is the special claim of the evolution hypothesis
that it traces all the changes wrought in the organic
kingdoms to causes known to science — rejecting all
other ; but though the causes by which it is proposed
to account for all change may be of a kind embraced
in scientific knowledge, there is an utter failure in
the attempt to show, in any comprehensible way, the
mode of the operation of these causes in producing
the forms we see. It is no more unscientific to
assume a cause otherwise unknown to science, where
it is needful to do so in accounting for ascertained
facts, than it is to present as scientific a theory which
refers phenomena to known causes, but can furnish
no explanation as to how the results arrived at have
been reached. In that case, though the causes are
known causes, the law of their operation in the in-
stance under examination is unknown ; and science
The Origin of Organic Forms. 201
is equally at fault. Mr. Spencer's own doctrine is
fairly open to the condemnation pronounced by him
on the view of Professor Owen : it is " a shaping of
ignorance into the semblance of knowledge ....
the fusion of separate unknown processes into a con-
tinuous unknown process."
But if the dynamic hypothesis hold good, it affords
the basis for a theory of the origin of species markedly
different from that of natural selection. In account-
ing for the variety of organisms, the Darwinian theory
proceeds on the supposition that sameness of struc-
ture proves identity of origin. The various groups
of vertebrates, for example, are assumed to be differ-
entiated descendants from the same stock ; just as all
the varieties of pigeons have sprung from one pair.
It is taken for granted that sameness of structurer
implies community of parentage. If the kangaroo'
and the fox are alike in having a vertebral column, it
is concluded they must have had a common ancestor.
But the principle is not self-evident : on Mr. Spencer's
theory, it is not even probable. The advocate of
community of descent is liable to be charged, as Mr.
Spencer charges the creationist, with an imperfect
appreciation of the great principle of causation. For
the vertebrate structure is an effect; and similarity
of effects is due to similarity of causes. In so far as
the causes operating on living matter are the same,
the effects will be the same. If, as Mr. Spencer holds,
variation of incident forces determines variety in the
202 The Evolution Hypothesis.
organisms evolved, it is equally certain that sameness-
of incident forces will produce similarity in the re-
sulting forms : for to affirm otherwise is to deny the
persistence of force. The vertebrate structure may,
then, be the effect of similarity of causes operating
in the environment and not the outcome of identity
of descent.
The evolution hypothesis supposes a moment in the
gradual cooling of the earth, when organic matter ia
the form of protein was produced, out of which, after
a vast series of minute changes, there arose particles
endowed with vital activities. The principle of cau-
sation renders it inconceivable that such dynamic
processes should be limited to one spot, or to one
particle of organic matter. Like the formation of
crystals of salt in all parts of the globe where water
containing salt in solution has evaporated, the pro-
duction of protein matter must have spread over the
whole earth, as zone after zone reached the precise
degree of temperature required. And so soon as pro-
tein was evolved, then began everywhere the further
changes that result in organized life. To doubt this^
— if the dynamic theory is true — is to reject the
principle of causation. Now the incident forces are
the same, yet not absolutely the same, over the whole
earth. The law of gravitation operates everywhere
and ceaselessly. If it be of advantage in the develop-
ment of animal forms that the strength and flexibility
of a vertebrate skeleton should form the framework
The Origin of Organic jForms. 205.
of the living body, that result will necessarily arisa
everywhere. The force of gravity is continually
active and the organism is exposed to constant strain.
Why then search in the distant past for a commoni
ancestry to account for similarities necessarily in-
volved in the problem in physics which the cosmos is
supposed to be engaged in solving — to find the organ-
ized structure best adapted to the forces operating in
its environment, most perfectly adjusted to the me-
chanical conditions of organic life ? All these ela-
borate efforts to show how the varieties of living
things have arisen from the same primordial living
matter, is evidence that the evolution doctrine has
not thoroughly penetrated and shaped the thinking
of men of science. Every system of natural classifi-
cation is framed on the principle that likeness of
structure is evidence of community of descent. No
inference could be less in harmony with cosmia!
evolution. Similarity of causes will of necessity pro-
duce likeness of form in organisms as well as in
crystals. A thorough-going acceptance of causation
will lead the student of nature who proceeds on the
principles of evolution to turn his eyes to the environ-
ment, to discover in dynamic law operating therein
the origin of resemblances as well as of differences-
among living things. If the vertebrate skeleton be
that best suited to the conditions of animal life in
its highest forms, there can be no sufficient ground for
tracinoj back to one vertebrate ancestor what must
204 The Evolution Hypothesis.
necessarily have come into being as the effect ot* uni-
formity in the causative action of the environment.
In the Darwinian theory the " incident forces " play
a part that is negative rather than positively opera-
tive. Nature sweeps out of the way the less fit,
and so makes room for the fittest to live and multiply.
All are more or less adapted to the environment ;
the incident forces bear against the ill-adjusted, and
thus indirectly favour those better suited to their con-
ditions. But the "survival of the fittest" w^ill not
-account for the production of the fittest. Nothing can
survive till it has first been brought into existence. If
an organism is nearly balanced in adjustment to its
environment, it will probably " increase and multiply"
-and very largely " replenish the earth." But there is
-a very important antecedent inquiry : we want to
know first how these fittest have come to be. Here
Mr. Darwin's doctrine of natural selection fails us, the
interval between the fit and the more fit is not bridged
over. He cannot show us how those very qualities
^ that give advantage in the struggle have been pro-
-duced. When the living: creatures that are to wrestle
for the crown of life have been presented in the arena,
'appearing with their acquired attributes and adap-
tations, nature, sternly just, may judge of their worth,
'perpetuating the meritorious and punishing with
l-death those that do not deserve to live. But the real
'question is not touched by a theory which can account
•only for the removal of the less fit: organic evolution
The Origin of Organic Forms. 205
breaks down unless it tell us how the competitors
have been reared and trained, and have been endowed
with the qualities and requirements that bring them
into competition.
For at bottom the question is not the survival of
the fittest, but the origination, development, and con-,
tinuance of any. How has any portion of matter came I
to be a living thing ? How did the life of one indi-'
vidual pass on into another ? How has the broad dif- ,
ference between animal and vegetable been produced r
How did all the complex adaptations of organs and the
nice adjustments of organisms to environment arise t\
" Is there not a cause ? " Evolution must disclose it '
or confess all vital problems are left unsolved. Ifl
dynamic law covers the whole ground and elucidates
all the facts, let its applicability be exhibited with
reasonable explicitness. No such scientific precision
is attempted. When we ask for definite conceptions,
or look for explanations that will have something
approaching scientific exactness, we get vague general-^
izations, far fetched analogies, an imposing array of ab-
stract principles, and are in the last resort conducted
into the eternal darkness of the unknowable. Evolu-
tion, as a rational theory of organic nature, is fatally
defective. The new cosmic philosophy is found want-
ing in its own chosen field.
An illustration may make more evident the just-i
ness of this criticism. The growth of a single germ^
presents to the dynamic theory of organic evolution.
2o6 The Evolution Hypothesis,
a wholly insoluble problem. Take an example from
incubation. With no special operation of incident
forces beyond the maintenance of a certain degree of
; warmth, the fertilized cell passes in a few days
; thiough a complete process of evolution; and the
-chick comes forth a highly developed organism,
■capable of free motion and of acts that simulate
intelligence. Has all this vastly complicated process
been initiated and carried out solely by the operation
of dynamic law ? Is it an instance of the redistribu-
tion of matter and motion, and nothing more ? The
persistence of force is, as we have seen, in such cases,
inapplicable ; for the forces are being constantly
altered in their sum, and in their inter-relations. Mr.
Spencer is not able to reduce to a mere dynamic
process the development of a living germ into an
organized structure. If he prove himself able to
reduce to the redistribution of matter and motion the
series of changes by which the "uniform mass of
matter " forming the germ passes into a highly organ-
ized living creature, then he may hope to explain by a
like process the modifications exhibited in the whole
breadth of the vegetal and animal kingdoms. The
■difference is one of degree, not of kind. Science is
never repelled by consideration of the magnitude or
difficulty of the task set before her. The most involved
and intricate problems, if within the limits of science,
I yield to patient and well-directed effort. It is not
that the evolution of kingdoms and kinds is avast
The Origin of Organic Forms. 207
:and immensely complicated question that any thinker
will regard it as a hopeless one. Evolutionism is,
■challenged because, in the individual instance no less \
than in the inmeasurable aggregate of organic life,
it attempts to solve the problem on principles which
are demonstrably defective. No single pulsation in
the circulatory system, has been, or can be, explained,
if the solution be rigorously limited to dynamic prin-
-ciples, and every other cause excluded. Life in its
simplest manifestations, in its least intricate activities,
•cannot be reduced to molar and molecular motions ;
which, if we had a complete knowledge of them,
might be written out in the formulae of mathematical
physics. It is here that the antagonists who take
firm hold of each other must join issue. The simplest
obtainable instances should form the subject of experi-
ment and illustration : let it be fairly discussed by
the experts whether there be any vital activity, the
phenomena of which can be fully exhausted by a
knowledge of dynamic law, and if it can be proved
that a dynamic principle accounts for the whole, then
we shall admit that the evolution philosophy has a
strong presumption in its favour. But we are con-
vinced that no such conclusion is possible. There
are causes, or a Cause, working, in the whole realm
of organic nature — notably in sensation and the
phenomena of intelligence — directing and controlling
all things, which may not be confounded with that
force whose law the physicist expounds. That which
2o8 The Evolution Hypothesis.
affords to thought the truest representation of this
unseen Power is not the operation of any dynamic
principle, but the energy of self-conscious mind.
CHAPTER XVJ.
THE EVOLUTION OF MIND.
Section I.
The Origin of Consciousness.
WHEN a being arose to whom it was given to say
" I AM," there appeared in the cosmos the most
marvellous of its phenomena. "On earth there is
nothing great but man : in man there is nothing great
but mind." The science of mind lies at the founda-
tion of philosophy. In any rightly ordered attempt
to combine all knowledge in one system, self-conscious
intelligence is the first subject of study. It is incum-
bent on the evolutionist to set consciousness in its
place in that vast flow of change, and show how it has
arisen through the operation of the great cosmic law.
A philosophy may be fairly tested by the mode in
which it deals with this fundamental question. The
issue in the case of evolutionism is not doubtful ; in-
competent to answer any vital question in the realm
of inorganic matter or organized life, the evolution
hypothesis is wholly inadequate to the task of solving
the problems that arise in the investigation of the
intellectual and moral nature of man.
o
2IO The Evolution Hypothesis,
\ When human consciousness first came into being,
how did it stand related to the antecedent modes of
concrete being? Consciousness did not exist within
the knowable at that moment. Human consciousness,
when it arose, was a unique phenomenon. All know-
able relations were, by hypothesis, relations of persist-
ing forces, directed solely by the laws of matter and
motion. How, as the outcome of that immediately
precedent condition of the universe, did consciousness
/emerge ? A universe existed without thought ; a
universe now exists with thought. Has the uncon-
scious become conscious ? and if so, how ? The evolu-
tion hypothesis is bound to explain the mystery by
\ exhibiting the transition as a phase of its continuous
process. If it can do this it has triumphed : the
priest of the coming dispensation has vindicated his
authority ; Aaron's rod has budded.
An immediate operation of the first cause may be
assumed, but at the cost of sacrificing the very prin-
ciple of evolution ; for the supposition implies a direct
intervention within the knowable, a distinct breach
of continuity, in effect a special creation.
Criticising the opinion laid down in his Physical
Ethics by Mr. Alfred Barrat, that consciousness " must
be considered as an invariable property of animal
life, and ultimately in its elements of the material
universe," Mr. Spencer says: "Without questioning
that the raw material of consciousness is present even
in undifferentiated protoplasm, and everywhere exists
The Evolution of Mind. 2 1 1
potentially in that unknowable Power which, other-
wise conditioned, is manifested in physical action
(Principles of Psychology, § 273-4), I demur to the
conclusion that it at first exists under the form of
pleasure and pain."* Mr. Spencer does not question
that "the raw material of consciousness is present
even in undifferentiated protoplasm." Out of this
raw material evolutionism undertakes to produce the
manufactured article. Let us scrutinize this undif-
ferentiated protoplasm : What do we find ? Only
processes of physical change — atoms and their motions,
atoms and their motions only. Along that entira
series, exceeding in extent, multiplicity, and intricacy
all powers of thought, there appears nothing having
knowable kinship with self-conscious intelligence,
The atoms whirl in ceasless eddies, combine and re-
combine, form system after system of molecules, ever]
growing in complexity until they arrive at the stage
of protein compounds. They aggregate into proto-
plasm ; but no thrill of atom or internal throb of
molecule contains, so far as intelligence can judge, the
promise of self-conscious life. If the raw material
of consciousness is there, it is indistinguishable : if
the process of manufacture is going on, it is undis-
coverable.
But when physical law fails, the incomprehensible ^
is at hand to rescue the evolutionist from manifest
* Data of Ethics, § 39, Note.
2 12 The Evolution Hypothesis.
absurdity. " The raw material of consciousness ....
everywhere exists potentially in that unknowable
Power which otherwise conditioned is manifested in
physical action." This is a striking instance of the
method of evolutionism when it faces a question that
goes deep into the nature of things. " The raw
material of consciousness is present even in un-
differentiated protoplasm : " " the raw material of
consciousness everywhere exists potentially in that
unknowable Power." Choose either answer, you are
left equally unenlightened. If the raw material of
consciousness " everywhere exists potentially " in the
unknowable power, it exists potentially in that power
wherever and however manifested : it exists poten-
tially in the inscrutable actuality that manifests itself
in the sands of the Sahara, or in the red granite of
Aberdeen. We learn nothing from being told that
the raw material of consciousness exists in the un-
knowable reality. Everything that has come to be
has existed potentially in the great First Cause. But
there may be a gleam of light in the statement that
this raw material exists in that power " which oilier-
wise conditioned is manifested in physical action."
We have here two contrasted modes of conditioning
of the unknowable energy, — "variously conditioned
modes of the universal immanent force."* One is the
physical universe, with uniformities of action which
* Biology J Vol. I., Appendix, p. 491.
The EvoliUiofi of Mind. 2 1 3
science formulates in physical law. In this condition-
ing the persistence of force is found everywhere ex-
>emplified : dynamic law everywhere prevails. But^
the unknowable is conditioned otherwise. This other
-conditioning: is contrasted with the former and cannot
be brouoht within it. The law of the conditionino^ in
physical action is not applicable in the new order.
The present is, therefore, not the outcome of the pre-
•cedent cosmic state : the series of continuous mani-
festations is broken, science cannot connect the one
<3onditioning with the other.
In having recourse to the unknowable cause, the
evolutionist confesses that the origin of consciousness
is not discoverable by his methods; he acknowledges
the presence of another form of being in the elucida-;
tion of which the work of the laboratory is of noi
-avail. To refer the inquirer to the inscrutable reality'
is, from the standpoint of scientific knowledge, mean- ^
ingless : it is to admit philosophic impotence. To j
say with the intellectualist that consciousness had its 1
origin from the Supreme Intelligence, is to give an!
answer consistent with itself, and having on the facej
•of it the semblance of truth, but to account for\
consciousness by carrying it back into the incom- ^
prehensible, is simply to take refuge in the outer
darkness. No doubt, if there be an intelligent power
behind all we know, that infinite Mind will be com-l
■ i
petent to furnish not onl}'- the " raw material of con-
sciousness," but consciousness itself. The theist holds
214 The Evohttion Hypothesis.
a clear and tenable position : the agnostic is hopelessly
at fault. If the evolutionist is compelled to have
recourse to the unknowable, conditioned otherwise
than in physical action, to explain the origin of con-
sciousness, what has come of his boasted all-embracing
principle ? — his unbroken operation of dynamic law ?
The continuous redistribution of matter and motion
has been proceeding with unceasing flow : a point
is reached where consciousness comes into view of
thought. It emerges as a direct emanation from the
unknowable power '• otherwise conditioned." It is not,
then, the outcome of that power as conditioned in phy-
sical action. The universality of the dynamic principle
is denied ; and the evolution hypothesis falls with it.
Consciousness in every intellection testifies against
the proposal to constitute of the knowable one organ-
ized system cohering by physical bonds. Self, con-
scious of itself, stands apart ; in the physical universe,
but not of it. The chasm cannot be bridged over.
It is impossible to embrace all experience in one
coherent process of evolution. Mr. Spencer states,
with great force, the contrast between the two realms.
"There lies," he says, "a class of facts absolutely
without any perceptible or conceivable community
of nature with the facts that have occupied us. The
truths here to be set down are truths of which the
very elements are unknown to physical science."*
* Psychology, Vol. I., § 41.
The EvohUion of Mind. 215
" Psychology is a totally unique science, independent
of and antithetically opposed to all other sciences
whatever. The thoughts and feelings which consti-
tute a consciousness, and are absolutely unanswerable
to any but the possessor of that consciousness, form
an existence that has no place among the existences
with which the rest of the sciences deal. Though
accumulated observations and experiments have led
us by a very indirect series of inferences to the belief
that mind and nervous action are the subjective and
objective faces of the same things, we remain utterly
incapable of seeing and even imagining how the two
are related. Mind still continues to us a something
without any kinship to other things ; and from the
science which discloses by introspection the laws of
this something, there is no passage by transitional
steps to the sciences which discover the laws of these
other things." *
Evolutionism has, at this point, reached a demarca-j
tion so clear and deep that it would appear hopeless
to attempt to combine in one the two classes of facts. '
But if they cannot be brought into one coherent
organic whole, the unification of knowledge is still
incomplete; the principle of continuity is violated
the knowable is parted into two distinctly differenced
realms ; dynamic principles do not rule all experience ;
the totality of concrete existences cannot be made to
Psychology J Vol. I., § 56.
2i6 The Evohttion Hypothesis.
form parts of one unbroken stream of change ; and a
philosophy on the basis of evolution is impossible.
Section 1 1.
In What does Consciousness Inhere?
Granting for the moment that consciousness is not
existent in any knowable mode until a wave of
molecular motion thrills through a nerve centre, and
that it is then startled into being in the form of a
nerve-shock, we ask, In what did consciousness lie hid
up to that moment ? and where is it concealed till it
reappears when the nerve-pulse throbs again ? It
was not latent in the matter of which the organism
is composed ; for Mr. Spencer very strongly repudiates
the charge of being a materialist: nor can we go
behind the matter to the force which is manifested
in it to find consciousness there ; for the portion of
matter is a fixed quantum of manifested force, no
part of which can be transformed into a new mode
called feeling. Under the guidance of Mr. Spencer
we have recourse to the unseen to look for that in
which consciousness inheres ; it lies hid in the un-
knowable actuality. But then the question arises,
What relation does that actuality bear to the organ-
ism and its activities ? Let us try to see the fact
quite clearly. A wave of molecular motion passes
The Evolution of Mind, 2 1 7
-fchrouofh a nerve centre : consciousness comes into
beinsf out of the inscrutable. Does the inscrutable
power, in response to each pulsation that runs along
^ nerve, reveal itself in consciousness for an instant,
^nd when the nerve-thrill ceases, fall back again into
a condition of incomprehensibility ? It would appear
so. The conception is a most curious one, and deserv-
ing the closest scrutiny. It may be represented in
this way. The laws of dynamics regulate the eternal
whirl of atomic motion. In the process of change
certain molecular orbs, in these vast atomic systems,
come into conjunction. At that instant the molecular
movement is answered by the inscrutable power
flashing forth into consciousness, vanishing and re-
turning in response to the rhythmic pulse of physical
force. Now note the consequence : if it be that the
dynamic law of matter and motion is that which,
without interference and without cessation of its
continuous operation, directs all motion throughout
the universe; if throughout all processes the know-
able causes and effects are calculable with rigid mathe-
matical certainty ; if every throb of physical force is
determined in a fixed physical succession, then every
occasion of the manifestation of the unknowable in
consciousness is an effect determined not by intelli-
gence, but by inflexible physical necessity, is due not to
the infinite power revealing itself in consciousness, but
as " otherwise conditioned " in the physical law of its
manifestation through matter. The evolution philo-
2 1 8 The Evohttion Hypothesis.
sophy is, on this supposition, founded on an entirely
materialistic basis. What is latent in the incompre-
hensible we cannot discover ; what lies in the know-
able is the law of physical force dominant everywhere^
It is a mere evasion of a conclusion repugnant to
reason to carry us back to an ultimate actuality
which is neither matter nor spirit, but is manifested
in both; seeing that the manifestations of the un-
knowable in mind are wholly conditioned and are
irresistibly determined by the laws of matter and
motion, and stand in a relation to the thrill of the
nerve centres as definitely fixed as a musical note to
(the vibration of a harp-string. Conditioned in one
mode the inscrutable reality is matter, conditioned
otherwise it is mind : but as mind the law of its
manifestation is subsumed under and wholly shaped
by the laws in which it is conditioned as matter. It
is clear that evolutionism is, as a philosophy of the
knowable, in principle and in efiect, thoroughly
materialistic : it enthrones physical force as sovereign
over the whole extent of knowledge.
Section III.
The Unit of Consciousness.
On tlie evolution hypothesis mind is a growth.
To bring the growth of mind into harmony with the
The Evolution of Mind, 2 1 9-
evolution of material forms, it is necessary for Mr.
Spencer to obtain a unit of intelligence analogous to
the chemical and physiological units which play
so important a part in his doctrine of inorganic
and organic evolution. This " unit of conscious-
ness" is indispensable to his hypothesis. Without
it, he can no more build up a mind than he could
build up an organism without his physiological units.
We shall examine this unit of consciousness some-
what closely.
"There may be a single primordial element of
consciousness, and the countless kinds of consciousness
may be produced by the compounding of this element
with itself, and recompounding of its compounds with
one another in higher and higher degrees ; so produc-
ing increased multiplicity, variety, and complexity
... It is possible then — may we not say probable ? —
that something of the same order as that which we call
a nervous shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness;
and that unlikeness among our feelings results from
unlike modes of integration of the ultimate unit. . . .
Our typical case of musical sound will exhibit the
agreement Here the nerve pulses and the
pulses of feeling clearly answer to one another ; and
it can scarcely be doubted that they do so through-
out." " Mind is certainly in some cases, and probably
in all, resolvable into nervous shocks ; and these^
nervous shocks answer to the waves of molecular
motion that traverse ne^v^es and nerve centres." . . . ►
2 20 The Evolution Hypothesis.
" Mind is certainly in some cases, and probably in all,
resolvable into nervous shocks." *
Though Mr. Spencer seems to speak with confidence
that he has found the unit of consciousness, out of
which mind may be built up ; yet there is consider-
able hesitancy in his treatment of the question. " The
subjective effect," he says, "produced by a crack or
noise that has no appreciable duration is little else
than a nervous shock The state of conscious-
ness so generated is in fact comparable in quality to
the initial state of consciousness caused by a blow . . .
I which state of consciousness may be taken as the
primitive and tpyical form of the nervous shock.
It is possible, then — may we not say probable — that
somethint^ of the same order as that which we call a
nervous shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness." -[•
The subject is dealt with in a hesitating and tentative
jway. Possibilities and probabilities will not suffice.
(The doctrine of the evolution of mind lies at the very
heart of evolutionism. Mr. Spencer cannot evolve
mind without his unit of consciousness. Whatever
doubt attaches to this primal element, attaches to the
■composite whole built up out of it. If the evolu-
tionist is not fully confident about his unit, he needs
to be much less confident when he proceeds to com-
pound his units with one another, and recompound
* Psychology, Vol. L, § 60, § 61, § 62.
+ Ibid., Vol. I., ^GO.
The Evolution of Mind. 221
their composites. The doubt does not diminish in the
process : it is multiplied.
In inquiring into the nature and reality of this-
primordial constituent of mind, I would first observe
that a nervous shock is not a feeling till it is felt.;
It is the consciousness of it that constitutes it a
feeling. A nervous shock, without consciousness, is a
nerve-thrill and nothing more. Two successive waves-
of molecular motion may pass through the brain, one
of them is felt the other is not; of the one we are
conscious, we are not conscious of the other. The
characteristic fact, the consciousness, is not accounted
for by the wave of nerve-action. The analysis of
mind into nervous shocks, as its elementary consti-
tuents, does not avail to bring within the compass
of the dynamic theory. the consciousness which is the
most distinctive feature in the phenomena. At this
point in advancing along the forward movement of
the cosmic force, thought is arrested. An invisible,,
but very real line of separation divides the self-
knowing / from the vast stream moving onward
according to dynamic law. Evolutionism is, con-
fessedly, for Mr. Spencer repeatedly acknowledges it,,
unable to bring consciousness within its sweep. When
it touches one of the most vital questions in philosophy,
it acknowledges itself unable so much as to to attempt
an answer. In the proposed unification, the central
factor in knowledge stands out the great exception.
But, to return to the point immediately before us,.
222 The Evolution Hypothesis.
we reject, as inconsistent with what convsciousness
itself testifies, this theory of a unit of consciousness
corresponding to a nervous shock. Whether violent
or gentle, nervous shocks have reality to me, as a fact
of my experience, in no other way than by my con-
sciousness of them. "I know, — I desire, — I feel.
What is it that is common to all these ? Knoiving
and desiring and feeling are not the same, and may
be distinguished. But they all agree in one funda-
mental condition. Can I know, without knowing, that
I know ? Can I desire, without Jcnoiving, that I desire ?
Can I feel, without knowing, that I feel ? This is im-
possible. Now this knowing that I know, or desire,
hr feel, — this common condition of self-knowledge is
precisely what is denominated consciousness."*
Whether I perceive, or feel, or will, whatever be
the mode of experience of which I have direct know-
ledge, consciousness forms its primary element. To
search for a unit of consciousness is to assume that
there is some elementary form of consciousness which
-can be distinguished and dealt with as a distinct and
definable part of the whole. It is to ignore the fact
that consciousness is essentially cognitive and is in
every case the same. To be conscious that I feel is
the same in respect of consciousness as to be conscious
that I will. The consciousness itself cannot be broken
up into units : it is identical in all forms of experience.
* Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures, Metaphysics, Vol. I., p. 158.
The Evolution of Mind. 223
To break up consciousness into units, we must deal
with the object of consciousness, not with conscious- .
ness itself — not with the knowing that I feel, but with ; \^'^'
the thing felt. But to make this the principle ofl
discrimination is to seek, not the unit of consciousness,
but the primary object in experience. We are no
nearer the unit of consciousness by the process. We
cannot go back and find what is the first object of
•consciousness; and if we could, we should not have
laid a firm foundation for the superstructure of in-
telligence. Mind is best studied in its highest and
most perfect state; not in the dim beginnings of
cognition in undeveloped childhood. But another
-difficulty presents itself. Given the unit, it must be
multiplied and compounded either as an act of con-
sciousness or as an object of consciousness. It cannot
be dealt with in this fashion as an act of conscious-
ness ; for consciousness is simple and remains simple.
'Throughout all complex intellectual operations, it re-
mains one and unchanged. The boy who feels the
rod knows that he feels ; the boy who works out an
abstruse problem knows that he reasons. The con-
sciousness viewed simply as consciousness is the same.
Taken as the object of consciousness the unit cannot
be built up into the structure of developed intelli-
gence. There is no one object of consciousness :
experience is manifold : the objects revealed in ex-
perience are endlessly varied ; and unless there be one
thing the sole constituent of all things, no process of
224 T"^^^ Evolution Hypothesis.
compounding and recompounding the proposed unit
will yield a body of intellection corresponding with
reality.
Even though the pulse of feeling could be shown to
answer in every case to a nerve-pulse, even though
it were granted that they are inner and outer faces of
the same, Mr. Spencer's attempt to find a unit of con-
sciousness in the pulse of feeling fails : it is not the
pulse of feeling, but the consciousness of it, with
which he must set out.
But we deny that " nerve pulses and pulses of feel-
ing clearly answer to one another," as " inner and outer
faces of the same." The correspondence of mind and
body is a commonplace of psychology in all schools.
That nerve-action and feeling correspond is proved
jin every twinge of toothache. But that the corres-
pondence is that of the outer and inner faces of the
same thing is not proved : on the contrary, there is
grave doubt of its truth. If the nerve-thrill and the
feeling are two sides of the same they should invari-
ably exist together : where the outside is discovered
the inside should be found with it. But this is not
the case. Thrills of nerve-change pass through the
nerve-centres often, and no feeling answers them.
The outer face is there, while the inner face is want-
ing. The nerve-thrill has no counterpart in feeling
unless we are conscious of it. Consciousness is, then,,
the characteristic element in this instance. It is not a
wave of molecular motion, but knowing to which we
The EvohUioii of Mind. 225
come in the ultimate resort. Consciousness is the
primary attribute of mind : we begin with knowledge.
Evolutionism is again at fault. It cannot build up
mind without a primal constituent which may be
brought into correlation with the physical forces of
the cosmos. Mind, conscious of itself, rejects as
illusive and unreal — as a mere creature of imagination
— the unit whose composition into ever more complex
modes is to exhibit the law of the formation of mind
and the history of the growth of thought : but if the
unit of consciousness be discarded, the edifice into
which it has been so laboriously built up, disappears
wdth it.
Section IV.
The Relations of Feelings.
Let us grant the evolutionist his unit of conscious-
ness and accept his hypothesis that feeling and waves
of molecular motion in the central ganglion are inner
and outer faces of the same, and let us inquire how
he proposes to build up mind out of these materials.
" The proximate components of mind are," on his
doctrine, " of two broadly contrasted kinds — Feelings
and the Relations between feelings Each feeling,,
as we here define it, is any portion of consciousness
which occupies a place sufficiently large to give it a
perceivable individuality A relation between
feelings is, on the contrary, characterized by occupy-
226 The Evolution Hypothesis.
ing no appreciable part of consciousness. Take away
the terms it unites and it disappears along with them ;
having no independent place, no individuality, of its
own. It is true that, under an ultimate analysis,
what we call a relation, proves to be itself a kind of
feeling — the momentary feeling accompanying the
transition from one conspicuous feeling to an adjacent
conspicuous feeling. And it is true that, notwith-
standing its brevity, its qualitative character is appre-
ciable ; for relations are (as we shall hereafter see)
distinguishable from one another only by the unlike-
ness of the feelings which accompany the momen-
tary transition." *
Let us see how this theory will work. A molecular
wave passes through the central ganglion. Its inner
face is a feeling sufficiently large to constitute a per-
ceivable individuality. A second similar wave follows,
and a feeling like the first ensues. The feelings being
alike, if they are co-terminous they cannot be dis-
tinguished ; they flow together and constitute, not two
feelings, but one : no perceptible relation subsists be-
tween them. To be distinguishable, they must be
separated either by the intervention of a dissimilar
feeling or by the lapse of an interval of time. The
separation cannot be by the former ; for in that case
the immediate succession would be that of two unlike
feelinofs, and the relation would be between these two.
* Psychology f Vol. I., § 65.
The Evolution of Mind, 227
Like feelings must, then, be parted by an interval of
time — an interval sufficient to discriminate the one
feeling from the other. An insuperable difficulty now
comes into view. How is this interval to be bridged
over ? The feeling that has just vanished cannot do it ;
for it has ceased to be : the new feeling cannot help ;
for it has not yet come into being : the waves of mole-
cular motion are of no avail ; for the one wave has
ceased and the other has not arisen : the organism
cannot accomplish the transition ; for it can only
make itself felt by a new wave, with its inner face of
feeling. This, feeling, again is either like or unlike
those in the original relation. If like, it runs into
continuity with them, and the three merge into one :
if unlike, we have then to compare feelings that are
dissimilar, a second series of difficulties present them-
selves, and we are no nearer the relation sought. We
are, of course, precluded from introducing something-
having consciousness of both waves of molecular
change, and so knowledge of the resemblance; for
that would be to introduce Mind, which has yet to be
built up of feelings and relations of feelings.
Once more the evolutionist is at fault. In his
hypothesis there is no place for knowledge of the
likeness of successive like feelings.
Take now the occurrence of dissimilar waves and
concomitant dissimilar feelings. Suppose one feeling
to be followed by a second of unlike quality ; in which
<iase the feelings may come together without a dividing
2 28 The Evolution Hypothesis,
interval. How in this instance does the knowledge
of relation arise ? " The requisite to the existence of
a relation is the occurrence of a change — the passage
from one apparently-uniform state to another appa-
rently-uniform state, implying the momentary shock
produced by the commencement of a new state." *
The relation is " itself a kind of feeling," and we
are necessitated to ask, How does this " kind of feel-
ing " arise ? It is not accounted for by either of
the related feelings. The first cannot yield it ; for
the first has just passed away: the second will not
yield it; for the second cannot give the transition to
itself from the first. We shall look in vain to the
organism. It can only furnish a new wave of mole-
cular motion with its inner face of feeling: a third
feeling then comes into view, and the relation of this
third feeling to the original pair augments the com-
plexity. The new feeling cannot intervene between
the other two ; for they are assumed to be contiguous :
it must come after the second ; but to compare it with
the second presents all the difficulties involved in com-
parison of the second with the first, and enhances the
perplexity ; for we have then to compare it with the
first through the second. A third shock is added, and
the complication is increased.
Another supposition is conceivable : the initial part
of the second feeling may be the feeling required.
* Psychology, Vol. I., § 67.
The Evolution of Mind, 229
But how is this part of the feeling felt as a dis-
tinguishable shock ? It is absurd to imagine that the
initial portion of a feeling could feel the shock arising
on the coming of itself into being. It may be main-
tained, however, that the feeling sought is not the
initial moment of the second feeling, but the passage
from the first to the second. We ask, then, what is
that which passes from the one feeling to the other ?
What is it that feels the transition ? Not the first
feeling ; for it does not pass into the second — it ends
as the second begins : if it passed into the second
the result would be continuity of feeling and a
shock could not arise : not the nerve-thrills ; for
these have their inner faces in the related feelings,
and to change the relation of the thrills would be to
change the relation of the feelings : not the organism ;
for it cannot pass consciously from feeling to feeling
except by a nerve-thrill and its corresponding feeling ;
in which case this feelino^ must also be brouf^ht into
relation to that preceding and following, and the
original difficulty recurs.
We make no advance by supposing the case of
related feelings that are co-existent. If the feelings
are alike and co-existent, they are indistinguishable ;
they merge in one. If they are unlike, the old diffi-
culty reappears. " The requisite to the existence of a
relation is the occurrence of a change .... implying
the momentary shock produced by the commencement
of a new state." To call up the feeling of relation
230 The Evolution Hypothesis.
there must be " the commencement of a new state ; "
that is, there must be a transition from the one feeling
to the other. But this passage from the one state to
the other implies an order of succession, and we are
involved in exactly the same perplexities as before.
The evolutionist is again face to face with an in-
soluble problem : he cannot account for the knowledge
of relations. Feelino^s are related : but these relations
can become a part of knowledge no otherwise than
by being known. Molecular action and concomitant
feelings will not yield known relations. We must
postulate something, call it what you will, having
the faculty of comparing and taking knowledge of
like and unlike, of equality and difference, of greater
and less.
Section V.
Reasoning.
We have seen that the evolutionist cannot on his
hypothesis obtain the feelings out of which he pro-
poses to create mind ; and given the feelings, he cannot
account for the knowledge of their relations. But let
us suppose that this fatal blank is filled up ; he is still
only at the beginning of his task : he must now, out
of feelings and relations of feelings, frame intelligence
and build up the whole edifice of reasoned thought.
" Reasoning is but a formation of cohesions among
The Evolution of Mind, 231
manifestations."* The evolution of mind is a process
of grouping. Feelings are arranged in clusters ; these
clusters grow more definite, more coherent, more
heterogeneous, in accordance with the universal law
of the evolving cosmos.
Now it is to be noted that the most elementary
grouping requires the presence of the relational ele-
ment ; but relations can have no place in consciousness
without comparison : something must exist before-
hand having a faculty of comparing. We can begin
the process of grouping only by assuming the exist-
ence of intellectual power. " All thought involves the
consciousness of likeness :" -[■ consciousness must " be
a competent judge of the likeness and unlikeness of its
states." J It is just in proportion to the presence in
experience of this element of knowledge that feelings
are found capable of being grouped ; and the grouping
consists of " decided mutual cohesions " that " cling
together with tenacity "§ in proportion to the definite-
ness of the relations. The absence of " the relational
element of mind" leaves the states of consciousness
altogether incoherent.
When tracts of consciousness are distinguished by
predominance of the relational element, "the com-
pound feelings can unite into coherent and well-
defined clusters." || But this amounts to saying that
* Fini Principles, § 45. ^ t Ibid., § 44. I Ibid., § 41.
§ Psychology, Vol. I., § 69. 1| Ibid., § 70.
^32 The Evolution Hypothesis.
where the intellectual element predominates, the
feelings are thereby constituted a part of thought.
The very thing to be evolved is assumed as condi-
tioning the evolution.
" In tracts of consciousness where the relational
element predominates, and where the clustering of
feelings is consequently well-defined, the clusters
themselves enter into relations one with another." *
Here, again, as we advance to a higher stage in the
composition of mind, the coherence of groups with
groups is determined by the relational element —
that is, by the faculty of perceiving relations. The
intellectual power by which objects are compared, is
the condition that regulates the clustering of groups
with groups. Once more, the very thing to be evolved
— the ultimate goal of the operation — is the most
important factor in working out the higher degree
of mental composition.
Feelings of one order enter into relation with those
of another ; but those of " different orders which enter
into definite relations and cohere most strongly, are
those in which there is predominance of the relational
elements," "I" and " the method remains the same
throughout." Throughout the whole process of the
evolution of mind, the relational element determines
the grouping ; in other words, the intelligence in-
volved effects the advance and is the measure of it:
* Psychology, Vol. I., § 71. t Ihid, § 72.
The Evolution of Mind. 233
the amount of mind already existing is the amount
of mind evolved. The grouping does not originate
intelligence ; intelligence regulates the grouping : mind
is not the fruit of the clusters ; the clusters are the
product of mind.
These groups are separated into real and ideal.
What we call knowing an object is the assimilation
of a group of real feelings with one or more ideal
groups.* Grouping implies the distinction between
what Mr. Spencer calls real and ideal feelings — that
is, between presentative and representative know-
ledge. The evolutionist cannot take a single step
forward in his clustering of feelings, unless there be
granted him the existence of some means by which
what has been presented in perception can be retained
and reproduced and compared with the new object.
Here we have cognition of objects, retention and re-
production of percepts, knowledge of relations, and
comparison of the objects of consciousness condition-
ing the evolution of mind. " The feelings called
sensations cannot of themselves constitute Mind, even
when great numbers of various kinds are present
together. Mind is constituted only when each sensa-
tion is assimilated to the faint forms of antecedent
sensations." -f* This "consolidation of successive sen-
sations to form what we call a knowledge of the
sensation as such," is needed "to form the smallest
* Psychology, Vol. I., § 73. t Ibid., § 73.
234 The Evolution Hypothesis.
portion of what we call thought, as distinguished
from mere confused sentiency." * Throughout th&
entire range, from the simplest recognition of likeness
or difference up to the most complicated and profound
intellectual process, the one characteristic, essential
at every step, and which determines the whole, is the
knowledge of relations, or in Mr. Spencer's language
" intellection " which " comprehends only the relational
elements of mind." In intellection there is implied
(1) a faculty of perception of external objects, (2) a
faculty of reproducing the object in thought, (3) a
faculty of comparison of object with object, either
directly or through the representative faculty, (4)
ability to group objects according to known resem-
blances. The exercise of all these powers is necessary
to the simplest beginnings as to the greatest achieve-
■ments of thought. It is of little moment what name
we give to that which is assumed to be in active
exercise throughout the whole range of intellection.
Call it mind, or by what name you will, it is not a
product of evolution: it is there alike in the first
dawn of consciousness and in the mightiest efforts of
intellectual power. Ever revealing itself in the con-
scious life of each man is that something which hears,.
and sees, and feels ; which remembers, and imagines ;.
which compares, and judges; which links concept to
concept and group to group ; which, acting according-
Psychology f Vol. I., § 74.
The Evolution of Mind, 235
to its own laws, builds up slowly from generation to-
generation the vast, complicated, orderly, and impos-
ing edifice of knowledge. At every stage in the
reach of human progress that something is seen in
exercise ; it is not in process of being evolved : on
the contrary, it is that which is continually evolving,,
out of the raw material of experience, the marvels of
disciplined thought.
When we enter the world of mind we know our-
selves in a realm which dynamic principles do not
rule ; we see another system of laws in operation.
Man is not a ripple on the stream of cosmic mutation :
he derives his origin from another source.
Section VI.
Self and Not- Self
What account does the evolution philosopy give of
the fundamental cognition of self as contrasted with
not-self? How does this essential element of ex-
perience arise as a product in the course of cosmic
change ? It will not suffice to say : the origin of this
essential characteristic of thought is inscrutable — it
has emerged out of the unknowable ; for that is to
affirm that so far as knowledge reaches consciousness-
of self is not a part of the evolving process — is not an
integral part of the totality of the universe as it passes
from stage to stage continuously, in an unbroken
evolution. •
2 2,6 The Evolution Hypothesis,
In dealing with this subject, Mr. Spencer is not so
lucid in his exposition as is his wont : he writes like
one carefully guarding against difficulties. The know-
ledge of sdf and not-self he classes among the intui-
tions which must be accepted provisionally—" Those
fundamental intuitions that are essential to the process
of thinking " and that " must be temporarily accepted
■as unquestionable, leaving the assumption of their
nnquestionableness to be justified by the results."*
We are quite willing to grant that the fundamental
intuitions "are to be accepted" as unquestionable; but
to do so is fatal to evolution as a doctrine to be held
true universally ; for the evolutionist is bound to find
the place of these fundamental truths, as they arise of
necessity in that universal movement which the evo-
lution hypothesis undertakes to formulate. Results
may justify the intuition, but cannot justify the
evolutionist. The intuition is called as a witness
against him : its absolute veracity only renders its
adverse testimony the more damaging.
While classing it with fundamental intuitions, Mr.
Spencer speaks of the cognition of the ego as "a
primordial product of consciousness " -f "a cumulative
result of persistent consciousness of likeness and
■difierences among manifestations ; " X that is, he dis-
tinguishes between consciousness and consciousness of
self, and regards the latter as resulting from conscious-
* First Pnnciples, § 39. t Ibid., § 45. I Ibid., § 44.
The Evolution of Mind. 237
ness of those likenesses and differences that group all
manifestations into the two great divisions — the ego
and the non-ego. But is this a valid distinction ?
Can there be a consciousness without consciousness of
self ? Let Sir W. Hamilton answer : — " I know, I feel j
I desire, etc. What is it that is necessarily involved
in all these ? It requires only to be stated to be
admitted, that when I know, I must know that I
know, — when I feel, I must know that I feel, — when
I desire, I must know that I desire. The knowledge,,
the feeling, the desire, are possible only under the
condition of being known, and being known by me.
For if I did not know that I knew, I would not know.
Now this knowledge, which I, the subject, have of
these modifications of my being, and through which
knowledge alone these modifications are possible, is
what we call consciousness. The expressions / hnow
that I know, — I know that I feel, — / know that I desire,
— are thus trranslated by, I am conscious that I know,
— I am conscious that I feel, — I am conscious that
I desire.
" Consciousness is thus, on the one hand, the recogni-
tion by the mind or ego of its acts and affections ; in
other words, the self-affirmation that certain modifica-
tions are known by me and that these modifications-
are mine Though the simplest act of mind, con-
sciousness thus expresses a relation subsisting between
two terms. These terms are, on the one hand, an I or
Self, as the subject of a certain modification, — and on
238 The Evolution Hypothesis.
the other, some modification, state, quality, affection,
or operation belonging to the subject. Consciousness,
thus, in its simplicity, necessarily involves three
things, — 1°, A recogizing or knowing subject ; 2^, A
recognized or known modification ; and 3°, A recog-
nition or knowledge by the subject of the modi-
fication." *
We have found the evolutionist charoreable with
o
obliterating dividing lines where they run across his
hypothesis : we have here an instance of the opposite
error. He discriminates consciousness from the con-
sciousness of self, representing the former as in full
exercise without the latter. Sir W. Hamilton clearly
establishes the fact that they are one. To distribute
experience into successive morsels, so as to avoid a
breach of continuity, the evolutionist splits up con-
sciousness into separate fragments : he creates a
difference where no difference exists.
At the foundation of his philosophy Mr. Spencer
lays these postulates : — " An unknowable Power ; the
existence of knowable likenesses and differences
among the manifestations of that Power ; and a
resulting segregation of the manifestations into those
of subject and object."-(- Accepting the existence of
an unknowable power and of knowable likenesses and
differences among the manifestations of that power,
we are no nearer a reconciliation of the consciousness
of self with the evolution hypothesis. Likenesses and
* Lectures. Metaphysics, p. 192. t First Principles, § 45.
The Evolution of Mind, 239
differences are found in every part of nature. Their
•existence is co-extensive with concrete being. Each
thing is either like or unlike every other. It is
evident, then, that the emphasis is to be laid on the
word knoivable. The possibility of our knowing these
likenesses and differences is the real thing postulated ;
in which case the assumption is of man's ability to
know the like and the unlike ; that is, the evolutionist
grounds his " fundamental cognition " on the possession
by man of a faculty of comparison. He must find a
power of comparing like and unlike, and of classifying
objects accordingly, prior to the differentiation of con-
sciousness into consciousness of self. Given an un-
knowable power, and given a faculty of comparing
and classifying, there will follow " a resulting segrega-
tion of the manifestations into those of subject and
object." But what the power is by which this segre-
gation is effected is left undefined. Elsewhere we are
told that " the manifestations of the unknowable fall
into the two separate aggregates," and again it is said
that " strictly speaking it is in great part spontaneous."
Mindful of Mr. Spencer's repudiation of everything
like spontaneity, we are somewhat puzzled to fix the
-exact meaning ; for " the very conception of sponta-
neity is wholly incongruous with the conception of
-evolution."* Nor are we helped by learning that "it
is a legitimate deliverance of consciousness elaborating
* Biology, Vol. I., Appendix, p. 480.
240 The Evolution Hypothesis.
its materials after the laws of its normal action ;"-|-
which certainly involves the implication that con-
sciousness is an operative element in the process of
evolution, and that in so far as consciousness is a
manifestation of the unknowable diverse from its
manifestations in matter and motion, the dynamic
movement is directed from a source extern to it.
The salient characters by which the two orders are
discriminated are seven. " Manifestations of the one
order are vivid and those of the other are faint.
Those of the one order are originals, while those of
the other are copies. The first form with one another
a series or heterogeneous current, that is never broken ;.
and the second also form with one another a parallel
series or current that is never broken: or, to speak
strictly, no breakage of either is ever directly known.
Those of the first order cohere with one another, not
only longitudinally, but also transversely ; as do also-
those of the second order with one another. Between
manifestations of the first order the cohesions, both
longitudinal and transverse, are indissoluble ; but
between manifestations of the second order, these
cohesions are most of them dissoluble with ease.
While the members of each series or current are sa
coherent with one another that the current cannot be
broken, the two currents, running side by side as they
do, have but little coherence — the great body of the-
t Fir&i Frindples, § 45.
The Evolution of Mind. 241
vivid current is absolutely unmodifiable by the faint,
and the faint may become almost separate from the
vivid. The conditions under which modifications of
either order occur, themselves belong to that order;
but whereas in the faint order the conditions are
always present, in the vivid order the conditions are
often not present, but lie somewhere outside of the
series. Seven separate characters, then, mark off
these two orders of manifestations from one another."*
I quote this enumeration at length, as a full state-
ment of Mr. Spencer's position is necessary to justify
my criticism. He bases on this ground his doctrine
that the unknowable power is conditioned in mani-
festations of two orders — mental and material — and
repudiates either material or spiritual unitarianism.
What are here called manifestations, vivid or faint,
are elsewhere spoken of as feelings — " primary or
vivid feelings," and " secondary or faint feelings."-!- It
could not be otherwise ; for manifestations can have
place in consciousness, on the evolution hypothesis,
only as feelings. This fact has an important bearing
on the doctrine that " each order of manifestations
carries with it the irresistible implication of some
power that manifests itself ; and by the words ego
and non-ego respectively, we mean the power that
manifests itself in the faint forms, and the power
that manifests itself in the vivid forms." J At first
* Mrst Pri7iciples, § 43. • t Psychology, Vol. I. , § 73.
I First Principles, § 44.
Q
242 The Evolution Hypothesis.
sight the language might seem to indicate that there
are two unknowable powers manifested in the two
classes of phenomena. But such a supposition is so
entirely alien from Mr. Spencer's system that we are
not entitled to draw the inference. The underlying
power is the one unknowable energy immanent in all
things. It is only the manifestations that may be differ-
enced. Let us fix our thoughts by citing an example.
A soldier passes : the perception of him constitutes a
feeling of the vivid order. The image remains in the
memory and can be recalled at pleasure : when recalled
it appears as a feeling of the faint order. Next day a
soldier in similar uniform passes. Again a vivid feel-
ing is produced. This feeling forms a cohesion with
the faint feelino: that remains from seeinor the soldier on
the preceding day. Now, according to Mr. Spencer's
doctrine, the vivid feeling is a manifestation of the un-
knowable in the non-ego, while the faint feeling is a
manifestation of the unknowable in the ego. A rela-
tion subsists between the two manifestations : we may
ask to which aggregate does it belong ? So far as it
is a relation of the vivid feeling it is a part of the
non-ego ; so far as it is attached to the faint feeling
it must be taken as belonging to the ego. But waiv-
ing minute criticism, we ask, How does the manifes-
tation in the aggregate called self, differ from that in
the aggregate called not-self, as a manifestation of the
unknowable ? A nerve-thrill is the outer face of the
vivid feeling : a nerve-thrill is the outer face of the
The Evolution of Mind. 243
faint feelino-. The mode of manifestation in either
instance is a certain molecular action in the central
ganglion. The actions are localized in the same part
of the organism : the molecules are the same ; they
are the constitutents of the brain substance : the
mode of action is the same — the only difference con-
ceivable being one of degree. The manifestations of
the unknowable in the vivid and faint feelings are
not distinguishable in any intelligible manner : as
feelings, the manifestations are the inner faces of
nerve-thrills ; as nerve- thrills, they are modes of mole-
cular motion. The exciting stimuli may be in the
one class external to the organism, and in. the other
internal to it ; but these are no more than variations
in the operation of known or knowable causes of the
same kind and set in one series, the links of which
-evolution forbids us to break or to search for a new
beo^inninor in the unknowable. Is it not, then, alto-
gether futile to lay it down as a first principle that
there are two orders of manifestation clearly segre-
gated one from the other, each order carrying with it
the irrestible implication of some power that mani-
fests itself ; " and that by the words ego and non-ego
respectively are meant the power that manifests itself
in the faint forms, and the power that manifests itself
in the vivid forms ? "
Mind conscious of itself can never be evolved by
the clustering of aggregates of feelings. In the pro-
cess every characteristic of mind is brought into play,
244 '^^^^ Evolution Hypothesis.
not as the result of the grouping, but as its condition.
Mind directs the work. See how much is implied:
a sentient organism, feelings, relations of feelings,
knowledge of relations, composition of feelings and
of relations of feelings — all that which is included
in the word thought. To borrow our terms from
another school of psychology — we find sensation, per-
ception, memory, imagination, comparison, judgment^
reasoning ; and yet, with all these in exercise, we are
supposed to be but in the process of evolving a self-
conscious mind.
Evolutionism is necessitated to assume an order
that will admit a gradual and unbroken advance
from the lowest form of sentience to the highest
powers of reasoning : the consciousness of self as
contrasted with not-self breaks the continuity. The
cohesion of the whole can only be effected by account-
ing for this fundamental distinction as having arisen
in the gradual clustering of feelings into the two
groups above described. But there is nothing in
experience to warrant such a theory of the origin of
self- consciousness.
The evolutionist is unable to give account of any
vital fact arising in the study of mental science. The
evolving mass, working in limitless energy through
its perpetual mutations, has no promise in it of a
self-knowing mind. However varied the multiplicity
of change, there cannot emerge out of it a being con-
scious of self, and who, surveying the world in which
The Evolution of Mind. 245
he lives, is able to reduce its varied phenomena to
order in his thought.
Section VII.
Innate Principles.
The Evolution Hypothesis cannot admit the exist-
ence in man of a source of intellectual and moral
power, intimately united to, but not identical with,
the sentient oro^anism, havino- relation to its en-
vironment by means of the organism through which
it affects and is affected by the external world. If
man be constituted with a dual nature — mental and
physical — he cannot have arisen in an unbroken
course of cosmic mutation. It is essential, therefore,
to evolutionism to account for his mental faculties, and
for those axiomatic truths which are accepted by
reason as soon as their terms are understood, in a way
that will prove congruous with the supposed ceaseless
dynamic process.
The mode in which the evolutionist deals with our
knowledge of the external world is a crucial instance
of his treatment of the question. Rejecting what are
called faculties of the mind, he interprets the rela-
tion of consciousness to the surroundinof universe from
a quite different point of view. According to Mr.
Spencer the gradual evolution of organs, becoming
more and more perfectly adjusted, is accompanied by
the gradual formation of correspondences between
246 The Evolution Hypothesis.
associated groups of feelings, that is nervous shocks,
and the physical changes in the environment. Sense-
perception is, then, the answer of the nervous organism
to the impact of an external force, and is the setting
up of a series of composite nerve-actions correspond-
ing with the external order. Ultimately and essen-
tially every perception is a group of nervous shocks
co-ordinated so as to be in more or less exact accord
with the relations existing in nature. The " unit of
conciousness " has been compounded and re-com-
pounded : the organism has registered these waves
of molecular change ; and the cognition of an ex-
ternal object is the bringing into play of the accu-
mulated experiences, through impact of the object
itself in direct contact, or mediately, as in vision
through the agency of light.
But perception of the world around us cannot be
generated by nerve-shocks. Something with faculty
of knowing must exist before there is any cognitive
act. Some one with a faculty of perceiving exists
before anything is perceived. We must start in the
study of mind with knowledge. Cognition of external
objects is not the consequent ; it is the condition of
experience. The knowledge may be of the most rudi-
mentary kind ; but it is knowledge. Without it no
play of nerve-thrills, no composition of nervous shocks
will build up the cosmos in our experience. A mind
with power of perceiving, and that power in exercise,
is necessary on the one hand ; an organism, endowed
The Evohction of Mind. 247
with sensibility, and affected by a wave of molecular
motion, is indispensable on the other, that in the
combined result there may be experienced what we
may regard either as a sensation or a percept — as a
sensation, if the sense element is predominant in con-
sciousness, as a percept if the intellectual prevail. In
this case, and the same criticism holds good through-
out, Mr. Spencer pushes into the background the
primary mental characteristic — knowing. He groups
units of feeling, and constructs an objective world
in this fashion in thought : but he loses sight of the
fact that to know is the first and most distinctive
attribute of mind.
Passing from the discussion of these inborn modes
of composite action displayed in the cognition of
external objects, and in the higher exercises of in-
telligence operating on the materials furnished in
sensation, we proceed to inquire how evolution deals
with those attributes of mind, which the intuitionist
holds to be essential to all reasoning, innate principles
— not derived from without, not generated by experi-
ence, brought by the mind with it as it comes into
existence — the law of its distinctive form of being.
These primary intuitions, operative without conscious-
ness of them, when analyzed and formulated, are
axiomatic truths — a priori synthetic judgments. The
experientialist denies that there are such principles
native to intelliorence ; affirminoj that these axioms are
nothing more than generalizations from a uniform
248 The Evolution Hypothesis,
experience, Mr. Spencer, on the other hand, claims for
his theory that it brings into harmony the two great
schools : while holding that all knowledge is derived
from experience, he maintains that organized experi-
ences constitute forms of thought. Axiomatic truths
are innate to the individual, but experiential to the
race. The space - intuitions which are recognized as
necessary and universal "are the fixed functions of
fixed structures that have been moulded into corres-
pondence with fixed outer relations The truth
that a straight line is the shortest line between two
points lies latent in the structure of the eyes and the
nervous centres which receive and co-ordinate visual
impressions Just as it has become impossible
for the hand to grasp by bending the fingers outwards
instead of inwards ; so has it become impossible for
those nervous actions by which we apprehend primary
space-relations to be reversed so as to enable us to
think of these relations otherwise than we do." *
This view is expounded more fully in another
passage : —
" What is the meaning of the human brain ? It is
that the many established relations among its parts,
stand for so many established relations among the
psychical changes. Each of the constant connections
among the fibres of the cerebral masses, answers to
some constant connection of phenomena in the ex-
* Psychology, Vol. II., § 332.
The Evolution of Mmd. 249
perience of the race All the organized arrange-
ments subsisting among the nerves of the infant's
brain, not only make possible certain combinations of
impressions, but also imply that such combinations will
hereafter be made — imply that there are answering
■combinations in the outer world — a preparedness to
cognize these combinations — imply faculties of com-
prehending^ them In the sense, then, that there
exist in the nervous system certain pre-established
relations answering to relations in the environment,
there is truth in the doctrine of ' forms of intuition '
— not the truth which its defenders suppose, but a
parallel truth. Corresponding to absolute external
relations, there are established in the structure of the
nervous system absolute internal relations — relations
that are potentially present before birth in the shape
-of definite nervous connexions These pre-
determined internal relations, though independent of
the experiences of the individual, are not independent
of experiences in general : they have been determined
by the experiences of preceding organisms. The cor-
ollary here drawn from the general argument is that
the human brain is an organized register of infinitely
numerous experiences received during the evolution of
life, or rather, during the evolution of that series of
organisms through which the human organism has
been reached. The effects of the most uniform and
frequent of these experiences have been successively
bequeathed, principal and interest ; and have slowly
250 The Evolution Hypothesis.
amounted to that high inteUigence which lies latent
in the brain of the infant — which the infant in after
life exercises, and perhaps strengthens or further
complicates — and which, with minute additions, it
bequeaths to future generations. And thus it happens^
that the European inherits from twenty to thirty
cubic inches more brain than the Papuan. Thus it
happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely
exist in some inferior races, become congenital in
superior ones. Thus it happens that out of savages
unable to count up to the number of their fingers and
speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs,
arise at length our Newtons and Shakespeares."*
There is no mistaking the significance of this doc-
trine. It makes the evolution of the nervous organ-
ism the origin of those innate principles that lie at
the basis of experience, and regulate all reasoning.
Intuitions are organized ancestral experiences regis-
tered in the brain, and become " the fixed functions of
fixed structures." Truth is the accord of the " absolute
cohesions" among the fibres of the cerebral masses-
with constant connections among the phenomena of
the environment. Reason has no more to do with
these organized experiences than to read the record :
nor, indeed, is its part even so active as reading would
imply: the brain works out the result; consciousness
means no more than our being aware of it, sometimes
* Fsychology, Vol. I., § 208.
The Evolution of Mind. 2 5 1
in the process, more frequently only when the work is-
completed. The physical laws of the organism domi-
nate and determine the whole. The intuitions of
space relations, the principles that form the conditions
precedent to experience, the primal elements of reason,
as well as the laws of discursive thought are, on this
theory, fixed functions of fixed nervous structures
which have been oro^anized through the invariable
experiences of ancestral organisms reaching back to a
time long antecedent to the differentiation of the
human race.
Let this doctrine be called materialism or not — it
assumes that the laws of the physical organism, not
only correspond with, but are the laws of thought.
Just as the "physiological units" are supposed by
their polarity to build up new particles into the spe-
cific structure of the animal, or as the equilibration :
which has been correlated with the ancestral structure,
fixes the colour of the hair or the contour of the face ;
so do these same units mould the nervous system into
those modes of nerve-action, which are the forms of
thought — the regulative principles of reasoning. The
processes of thouojht are pre-determiiied by the inborn
forms of thoughtj the forms of thought are determined
by the inborn law of organic action, that law is a
mode of molecular motion of the physiological units —
their equilibration as constituents of the organized
body — and is the resultant of the entire series of inci-
dent forces which have impinged upon the organism
252 The Evolution Hypothesis.
from its primeval state, cycles of ages before the
•differentiation of man, onward until now. If this
be not materialism, it at any rate ascribes all that is
distinctive in intelligence to the physical forces oper-
ating in the environment. Man's mind is on the
hypothesis as necessarily shaped in the mould of
physical nature as is the rounded pebble on the beach.
Note the consequences that inevitably follow. The
innate principles that lie at the basis of all reasoning
are not on this theory to be accounted universal and
necessary, truths. They are, in the narrowest sense,
relative. They are functions of the organism, and
hold good only in the relations of that organism and
its environment. Carried beyond the environment
that has shaped them, they are inapplicable and in-
valid. If the brain has been envolved through
physical causes only, then the evolved product has only
lYv physical correlations. Its intuitions are limited to the
physical : they have no wider validity or meaning.
Besides, the adjustment of organism and environment
has been a constant process of equilibration, and is not
at any two points in time exactly alike. The adjust-
ments of the past are not precisely congruous with
the conditions of to-day. The congruity between the
organized forms of thouo^ht and the environment,
J-l ITS '
continues constant only through the continued har-
monious chanorinor of both. No doubt some elements
o o
are comparatively stable : still the present adaptation
cannot be taken as the measure of the past or as a
The Evolution of Mind. 255
sure forecast ot* the future. All mental phenomena
are "incidents of the correspondence between the
organism and the environment." There are, no doubt,,
sequences that seem to be constant: so far as our
limited experience reaches, in space and time, we find
the adjustment true ; but experience is, on the point,
an unreliable witness ; for organized experiences ara
antecedent to conscious experiences and direct them.
We are always looking through an elaborately con-
structed series of lenses which are being constantly
modified. How far they can be relied upon as, at any
given point in human history, representing a correct
adjustment of vision to object we have no means of
testing. We only know with certainty that there has-
been a continuous course of adaptation, and that every
adjustment was temporary, being no more than a
moment in a ceaseless process of equilibration. True
for that moment, the adjustment must be untrue at
every other point in time.
Mr. Spencer's doctrine of first principles involves-^
the denial of the universal validity of any truth.
Truth is, on his theory, never fixed ; it is a ceaseless^l
moving equilibration. Evolutionism is an essentially/
sceptical theory. .
But the consequences reach still further. This
doctrine of innate principles overturns the imposing^
edifice which Mr. Spencer has erected with so much
labour. Evolutionism is based on the validity of
dynamic principles throughout all cosmic change. Mr.
2 54 'The Evolution Hypothesis.
Spencer founds his philosophy on a dynamic law
whose applicability throughout all time is founded on
the first principles underlying experience. Reject
these and the whole structure falls to pieces. But
first principles are on his hypothesis functions of the
nervous organization, formed by interaction of nerve
and environment. Now the formative period, during
which the human organization has been evolved, is
but a span, and the environment whose incident forces
have shaped it, is but a hand-breadth in the limitless
universe. Myriad forces are continually playing around
the nerve tissue ; of these some, perhaps, the largest
part, are imperceptible and unknowable. The adapta-
tions of the organism are only adjusted to such of them
as may tend to further or hinder its organic life.
But evolutionism is not narrowed to the adjustments
and experiences of the human organism in its environ-
ment, in so far as these bear relation to its mainten-
ance in life. It proposes to embrace the whole
movement of manifested force. It reaches back to a
condition antecedent to the origin of any organic
form, covers the whole extent of inorganic matter, and
undertakes to recount the past and forecast the future
of all concrete being. Yet its only basis is the record
of ancestral experiences in the fixed structures of the
brain.
If the central ganglia are not a true and complete
record of the past in the law of its immeasurable
movement, Mr. Spencer has no foundation for his
The Evolution of Mind. 255
system and no material out of which to build it.
Granted that the organized sensibility of man re-
gisters with exactness the invariable sequences in
its environment, granted also that philosophy can
correctly decipher the inconceivably complicated re-
«cord, the validity of the testimony is, as we have seen,
narrowed to the physical surroundings of the organism,
and has no meaning beyond that range. Take out of
Mr. Spencer's philosophy every proposition affirmative
of any fact except such facts as are vital to the con-
tinuance of man as a livino^ orojanism ; narrow it
strictly to its own field — its only possible field — and his
system, so vast and so elaborate, will shrink into a few
truths in physics and physiology.
To grant the evolutionist his own first principles is f
the destruction of his hypothesis. In truth, evolu- \
tionism is a parasitic growth living on the sap of I
more vigorous organisms. Deprive it of this stolen ^
nutriment and it dies.
Section VIII.
The Correlation op Mental and Physical Forces.
To bring the activity of mind within a universal
law of physical change, it is necessary to establish
the correlation of every exercise of mental power
with the forces of the material universe. No one
-will seriously dispute that there is a relation subsist-
256 The EvolMtion Hypothesis,
ing between the forces of the organism and the
mental operations embodied in thought. The fact
that in connexion with and through a bodily organi-
zation, the spiritual nature of man receives knowledge
of and acts on the external world, renders it certain
that there will be found remarkable correspondences
between the activities of the mind and the functions
of the body ; but it is quite a different thing to assert
that mental operations and physical forces are em-
braced under one law of correlation and equivalence.
" Yet," Mr. Spencer says, " there is no alternative but
to make the assertion : the facts which justify, or
rather which necessitate it being abundant and con-
spicuous." " Between the physical forces and the
sensations there exists a correlation like that between
the physical forces themselves." * This view is
ireasoned out both in his First Princi'ples and in his
Princi'ples of Psychology with much fulness of argu-
anent and illustration. The cogency of the reasoning
is, however, greatly weakened by Mr. Spencer's re-
pudiation of the materialist theory. If it were
maintained that intellection is a mode of molecular
motion ; if the mental were accepted as merely phy-
sical, — or if monism were reached from the opposite
side and the material held to be spiritual, — one could
readily comprehend how the operations of mind might
be set in a series of correlations of physical force.
* First Principles, § 71.
The Evolution of Mind. 257
But within the knowable Mr. Spencer rejects the
monist doctrine : he holds that the immanent energy
is conditioned in two modes; it is conditioned in
matter otherwise than in mind. He must, therefore,
bring the manifestations thus distinctively conditioned
into a unity of relation such that mental activity may
be interchanged with physical action. If we look
closely at the correlation assumed to exist, it will be
seen to be impossible, unless on a unitarian basis, —
either that of sheer materialism or thorouojh-o^oinof
idealism.
The use of steam as a driving power furnishes a
good example of correlation. Coal generates steam;
steam produces motion. The coal is expended in
raising the steam, and the steam in causing the
motion: the one form of force passes into the other
— the amount expended being balanced by the work
done. The principle of correlation involves — (ob) the
expenditure of force which passes into a new form,
(6) equivalence in the amount of the force under both
forms. If mental activity be brought within the
correlation of physical forces, there must be — (a) the
passing of physical force into intellectual force, and
vice versa ; and (6) the amount of physical force
expended must balance the mental force produced.
When a nerve-thrill passes into the sensorium, and a
cognitive act ensues, has the physical force operating
in the molecular motion in the brain passed into the
cognition and been wholly, or in part, expended in
258 The Evolution Hypothesis.
producing it? Either the cognition is a physical
phenomenon — a new mode of matter and motion, or
the physical force which has passed into the intellec-
tion, and which has been expended in producing it,
has ceased to exist as physical force. If the physical
force continue to exist, then, on the principle of
correlation, the cognitive act cannot take place : the
persistence of force forbids it. If the physical force
operating in the brain pass into intellectual energy,
it must expend itself in the work, and w^e have so
much force taken out of the physical universe, and
transformed into an immaterial form in intellection.
This intellection may, in like manner, be transformed
back again into molecular motion ; in which case
the spiritual mode of being is robbed of so much
existence, while the material universe has restored
to it the former amount. Is not such an interchange
of the intellectual and physical — of cognition and
motion, absurd ? Yet there is no other supposition
Ipossible, if while we reject materialism we maintain
Ithe correlation of mental and physical forces. The
correlation cannot come into play unless by the ex-
penditure of so much physical force in the production
of so much spiritual force, and vice versa — the force
jin either case passing into the new form. We con-
clude that it is not possible to bring into correlation
with physical forces the exercise of intellectual and
'moral power. But if it be impossible to do so, it is
impossible to establish a universal law of evolution.
CHAPTER XVII.
THE EVOLUTION OF MORALS.
I OUGHT ; I WILL : these words express the most
noteworthy of all experiences — the obedience of
law in conscious freedom. We are now at the
opposite pole of being from the whirling molecule or
the revolving planet. We have entered a realm
altogether diverse from that ruled by physical law.
The whole scene is changed. Life is here directed
towards an end voluntarily chosen as an object of
pursuit. Motives — not forces — are the impelling
power: reason — not dynamic law — determines con-
duct. Consciousness of liberty is the condition under
which obedience is rendered.
No philosophy can long command a wide assent
that does not deal in a satisfactory way with the
problems of morality. The worth of a system may
be fairly judged by its account of the principles that
regulate conduct. Moral life is everything to man :
it is the man. In his best moments he feels that it
will profit him nothing, if he gain the whole cosmos,
and lose himself, or be cast away. Mr. Spencer cannot j
be charged with under- estimating this great theme.
His ethical doctrine has*been, he tells us, the final aim
26o The Evohttion Hypothesis,
of all his labours in philosophy. ''This last part of
the task it is, to which I regard all the preceding
parts as subsidiary. Written as far back as 1842, my
first essay, consisting of letters on Tlie Proper Sphere
of Government, vaguely indicated what I conceived ta
be certain general principles of right and wrong in
political conduct; and from that time onwards my
ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate purposes,
has been that of finding for the principles of right and
wrong in conduct at large, a scientific basis."*
It is Mr. Spencer's aim to establish moral principles
on a rational basis. The foundation has been laid in
his philosophy. He is consequently precluded from
expounding any ethical doctrine that is not the legiti-
mate fruit of his system. We are not prepared to
deposit in the ark of the comiug dispensation the
tables of a new law, till we have tested their scientific
worth : we must also see how they follow, as a
necessary outcome of the philosophy from which they
derive their authority.
" Critics of a certain class," he says, " far from re-
joicing that ethical principles otherwise derived by
them, coincide with ethical principles scientifically
derived, are offended by the coincidence. Instead of
recognizing essential likeness they enlarge on super-
ficial difference."* We question if the defenders of
Christian ethics are chargeable generally with this
* The Data of Ethics, Preface, p. iii. t Ihid. , Preface, p. v.
The Evolution of Morals. 261
offence. They do not commonly disparage moral
lessons drawn from nature. The testimony of nature
to the spiritual and moral law of God, is a favourite
topic with apologists. To discover a fundamental
antagonism between scientific, or natural, and super-
natural, or revealed, morality, would be fatal to the
<loctrine of a divine revelation ; for if natural morality
were opposed to revealed morality, the claims of
revelation to be from God could not be maintained :
conscience would be bound to reject as false ethical
teaching in conflict with the first principles of morals.
But it is fair and right to point out that a system of
ethics derived exclusively from natural law is inade-
quate ; that something more, something higher, is
requisite for the guidance of human life. Still more
needful is it to examine the ethical teaching of a
philosophy which claims to embody all truth. So far
as the merit of Mr. Spencer's doctrine is concerned, the
question is not whether an ethical code can be framed
apart from revelation ; but whether the evolution
hypothesis can, consistently with its principles, provide
it. Religion has heretofore been the most important
source of moral impulse, and the chief light for its
guidance. The Church of God is the great school of
ethics. A high standard has been set before mankind
—a standard approached in but few instances. Yet
there have never been wanting in the Christian
society some who have ^exemplified in a high degree
the noblest qualities — devotion, self-sacrifice, patience,.
262 The Evolution Hypothesis.
gentleness, courage, purity, charity. Soldiers unsur-
passed in valour, scholars pre-eminent in learning,
statesmen illustrious for wisdom, have reverenced a
divine ideal and submitted themselves to the revealed
law of God. Out of a supra-natural source the water
of life has flowed, refreshing and reinvigorating the
moral strength of the greatest and best of men. We
have to inquire what the new philosophy has to ofler
in the stead of this venerated authority.
1. Moral law is obeyed, and can be obeyed, only in
conscious freedom. Moral obedience is willing obedi-
ence. The evolution hypothesis cannot account for
the consciousness of liberty; and if accepted as the
true philosophy would inevitably destroy it. Evolu-
tion cannot create the conditions requisite to conduct
that lies under a sense of responsibility; it cannot
furnish the requirements indispensable to the coming
to be of moral life. For evolution proceeds on the as-
sumption that inflexible physical law dominates every-
where, directinof all the activities of the oro-anism.
" Mental acts are nervous functions." It is dynamic
law that moulds the innate truths of reason, and
shapes the fundamental principles of morals : the law
of the organism is the law of mind. Nerve-action is
correlated in the bonds of physical necessity with the
forces of the environment ; so that the physical law of
the universe governs absolutely the conscious life.
These are not conditions in which action that deserves
the name of moral is possible ; let them be realized in
The Evolution of Morals. 263
thought, and for that mind morality can have no
longer any real meaning. The evolutionist may reply
that his is not the only system of determinism;
that he lays no greater constraint on man's freedom
than the Calvinist. But the fact is not so : the Cal-
vinist does not deny liberty, he contends for it.*
What he rejects is an imagined liberty that can have
no existence in a real world — a liberty which divests
the individual of every trace of character, deprives
reason of all decisive judgment, and robs motives of
their power. Moral action is no more possible %n
vacuo than vital action.
Exception is taken to the evolution hypothesis in the
interests of morality, on the ground of its doctrine of
physical causation in mental operations. Man knows
himself to choose and to resolve : it is when he would
carry out his intention through the organism that he
becomes conscious of the control of physical law. He
recognizes in this realm the fixed physical order of
the world, and by obedience accomplishes his purpose.
It is not correct to say that moral action is, on the
intuitional theory, uncaused. The intuitionist seeks
a cause, but looks for it in the man himself — in his
intellectual and moral nature. Man in his own inner
* In his Dissertatio de Libertate Humana, contra Spinozum,
Turretin gives the following definition of liberty : — " Libertas,
juxta simplicissimam et receptissimam ejus notionem, est
facultas eligendi, seu, quod idem est, facultas agendi ut lihet;
vel, ut aliis verbis rem eani^em exponamus, imperium quod quis
Jiahet in proprias actiones."
264 The Evohdion Hypothesis.
experience knows that he acts freely. " If that sense
of liberty is deceptive/' says Turrentin, " and we can-
not trust it, nothing human is certain, and universal
scepticism must follow."* Evolutionism treats as
illusive this consciousness of freedom. It frames a
theory of the correlation of organic and mental action
which fixes every purpose in a necessary physical
succession. The law of molecular motion in the physio-
logical units rules " the thoughts and intents of the
heart." But liberty and responsibility are crushed
out by this physical necessity. In the evolution hypo-
thesis there is no room for moral life. Its ethical
doctrine is sheer dynamic determinism.
2. Having seen that evolution does not furnish the
conditions requisite for free and responsible action, let
us inquire what account it gives of the sense of obliga-
tion, and whether under its sway that moral intuition
could survive.
Mr. Spencer arrives at the sense of obligation in this
way : — In the evolution of animal organisms race-
needs render it inevitable that at times " the pleasures
of the present must be sacrificed to the pleasures of the
future." In this is found the essential characteristic
of the moral consciousness — "the control of some
feeling or feelings by some other feeling or feelings."
"This conscious relinquishment of immediate and
special good to gain distant and general good, while it
* Turretini i)e Lihertate Humana.
The Evolution of Morals, 265
is a cardinal trait of the self-restraint called moral, is
also a cardinal trait of self-restraints other than those
<3alled moral — the restraints that originate from fear
of the visible ruler, of the invisible ruler, and of society
at large Eventually the moral control, with its
.accompanying conceptions and sentiments, emerges as
independent As with the restraints thus gener-
.ated is always joined the thought of external coercion,
there arises the notion of obligation ; which so becomes
habitually associated with the surrender of immediate
special benefits for the sake of distant and general
benefits."*
There are two elements in this " notion of obliga-
tion : " (a) the surrender of a present pleasure for the
:sake of a future benefit, and (6) the coercive sense
of obligation to do so. Now there is little doubt
that men would in any circumstances soon discover
that some present pleasures must be sacrificed that
more distant benefits might be gained ; but this implies
forethought, comparison, preference, choice — the very
•qualities that characterize the developed moral nature.
Just as in the supposed evolution of mind we found it
necessary to assume in every instance the exercise of
the mental power to be evolved.
The second element in the "notion of obligation"
•originated in a diflferent way. It w^as driven into the
primeval man by the club of his chief, while alive, and
* The Data of Ethics, § 44.
266 The Evolution Hypothesis.
by the ghost of the chief, when dead ; by the dread of
the avenging gods ; and by the stern action of society
putting down conduct that proved injurious to it.
Created in this fashion, the sense of obligation was^
originally an illusion — a falsehood. The poor savage
in whose breast it was engendered was the dupe of
his own fears. In passing, one may be permitted to
notice how familiar the evolutionist is with the
feelings and experiences of the primitive savage man :
he speaks of him as if he were his next door neigh-
bour. Our dusky African brother will not, on
evoli^tion principles, serve as a true specimen of
primeval humanity; for through myriad ages the
evolution of the race has been going on — each new
experience marking some change, however slight.
The fixedness that would assimilate the savage of
to-day with the human being of the first ages is a
phenomenon wholly at variance with the assumed
unceasing process of change.
We shall suppose, however, that the simple primi-
tive man had thus imposed on him a coercive sense of
obligation : How will it be with the more highly
evolved man, who sits in judgment on his chief s,^
relegates his God to the unknowable, and delights in
dissecting with keen scalpel the nerves and ligaments-
of society ? Will he continue to allow^ himself to be
coerced by the authority of moral law ?
Mr. Spencer answers by bringing into view what
he reofards as the sanction of moral action — the neces-
The Evolution of Morals. 267
sary issue of every act in pleasure or pain. A penalty
or reward attaches to everything we do : either the
individual or the race is benefited or injured thereby.
Personal desires and the interests of humanity often
conflict ; but the rival claims are being continually
adjusted in the equilibration which evolution is ever
more perfectly working out. Let us grant all thisi
still the difficulty is not removed. If we were dealing
with objects without reason, we might calculate with
some confidence as to the operation of seemingly
conflicting forces ; we might compute their resultant ;,
but we have to do with men, who are impelled by
many motives, whose moral sense has to keep strong
passions in control. Let every member of the social
organization know and believe that the sole moral
quality of actions is to minister pleasure, and that the
claim of moral law is nothing else than a demand that^ \
the individual should sacrifice a present and certain '
to a distant and uncertain pleasure in his own experi-
ence ; or that he should bear pain — sometimes to the
extent of sacrificing his life — that a modicum of
pleasure might be ultimately added to the sum total
enjoyed by the race : what will his response to such
ethical doctrine be ? He is not bound to do or to
refrain from doing because of any penalty attaching
to conduct; if there be penalty afifecting the indi-
vidual at all, he may judge, perhaps, that in his present
environment it is as often ao^ainst the ricrht action a&
in favour of it : he is not bound to subordinate the
y
.^68 The Evolution Hypothesis.
lower feelings to the higher ; if the lower — being for
the most part more intense — yield him a greater sum of
pleasure in this life, it is his duty, as well as privilege,
to indulge in them: he is not bound to be truthful or
honest ; for though society is much injured by roguery
.and deceit, the harm wrought by his conduct would
i^fFect him little in comparison with the many advan-
tages to be secured by his dishonestly gotten wealth.
The ethical doctrine of evolution is exposed to the
same criticism that lies against every form of Hedon-
ism : it cannot give a rational account of the origin of
moral obligation, or reasonable assurance of its per-
petuity. As in the case of intellection, so in morals,
we must recoofnize the existence of somethincr with
faculty of comparing, judging, choosing — conscious
that there is that in conduct which is rio^ht or wron^f
— in many instances seeing dimly, or not at all, the
true relations of things ; yet in experience, as in lan-
guage, acknowledging all the while the ought and the
ought not.
3. Moral life works out a purpose : through proxi-
mate ends it strives towards some chief end. What
object can the evolution hypothesis set forth as the
I supreme aim of human action ? The perfectly evolved
life is one perfectly adjusted to environment: this
completeness of adaptation is the only ideal state
•conceivable on the principles of evolution. " The
acts adjusted to ends, .... become, as evolution pro-
gresses, better adjusted ; until finally they make the
The Evolution of Morals. 269"
life of each individual entire in length and breadth,
at the same time that they efficiently subserve the
rearing of young, and do both these not only without
hindering other individuals from doing the like, but
while giving aid to them in doing the like." * This !
completing of the life in length and breadth is more
fully stated elsewhere. " The type of nature to
which the highest social life affords a sphere such
that every faculty has its due amount, and no more
than its due amount, of function and accompanying-
gratification, is the type of nature towards which
progress cannot cease till it is reached." i*
That the state of humanity on the earth will yet
be elevated and improved, so as to attain a fulness of
life and satisfaction in living not now known, is a
reasonable hope. But in procuring that blessedness
other influences must be brought into exercise, of
which evolution can give no account. It can only
set before man, as his ideal condition, a perfect equili-
bration of the personal life in the harmonious action
of all the faculties, and the constant accompaniment
of their activity with a sense of pleasure ; a perfect
adaptation of the individual life to the social organi-
zation, enhancing the personal enjoyment by a com-
munity of pleasurable feelings ; and therewith a
perfect adjustment of society in its members one ta
another and to the whole, and the whole to the
* TKq Data of Ethics, § 15. Ibid., § 67.
270 The Evolution Hypothesis,
-environing cosmos, thereby securing the greatest ful-
ness o£ life possible of attainment by man. It is not
conceivable that such a result could be reached by
the sole operation of the forces recognized in the
-evolution hypothesis; but if it were conceivable, we
must bear in mind that at the moment when that
ideal state is perfected its dissolution begins. The
persistence of force forbids its continuance for one
hour. The forces that have slowly accomplished the
perfect adjustment cannot rest: they must work on:
further change towards adaptation is precluded; the
movement can only be towards the disturbance of
the equilibrium — which is dissolution. The fulness
of life is the beginning of death.
Now we may fairly ask, what is it in the history
of the race, from the present moment to the final
destruction, that is to form the supreme end of
action ? If we strive toward the consummated equili-
': bration, we pursue a shadow ; for when the harmony
' is complete, it forthwith perishes in discord : if our
aim be not the perfected state, but the progress to-
I wards it : then inadequate adjustment is a thing to
I be desired ; for it is that very lack of adaptation
; which prolongs the process, and so lengthening out
the life of humanity, increases the total sum of
fCnjoyment.
But for the individual member of society this ideal
fulness of life can have no practical significance. He
is destroyed in the progress towards it : it can profit
^
The Evolution of Morals. 271
him nothing. The evolution of his personal life is a
brief process of adjustment, which, soon reaches its
•climax ; and then, the adverse influences predomina-
ting, the struggle is speedily ended. The great social
organization itself is overmastered by forces that are
sovereign over the direction and mode of its corporate
life. The sweep of these causes is beyond the reach,
•or even the vision of the members. Why contend
for an evanescent dream ? Why wrestle with or seek
to aid the vast forces of the cosmos ? Let them drift
•onward to universal disintegration. His own satis-
faction in life is for every man the main concern:
■can evolutionism help him to a greater sum of plea-
sure ? Conflicting motives toss him to and fro ;
impulses are strong; passions turbulent: what ideal
can evolution furnish to the individual life, whereby
these conflicting influences may be set in their due
order ? What ultimate personal aim to regulate all
proximate aims ? Around us there is a ceaseless
struggle : more of pleasure than of pain, perhaps ;
iDut the pleasures and the pains very unequally dis-
pensed. Escape pain and seize pleasure, is the dictate
of self-indulgence. Evolutionism has no countervail-
ing persuasion to offer — no "chief end" imperative
over all balancing of conflicting feelings; no moral
nature capable of being developed in strength and
beauty ; no future in which there may be reaped the
seed here sown in tears.
4. The evolution hypothesis leaves man without
^
272 The Evolution Hypothesis.
effective moral guidance. It has no means of devising-
rules of conduct that might constitute a permanent
ethical code. Pursuing the method followed in ac-
counting for the innate principles of reason, Mr.
Spencer finds in man moral intuitions which are the
organized experiences of the race. But just as he
cannot on his own principles discover any truth that
is universal and necessary, so is it incompetent for him
to lay down any moral precept as binding on all men
everywhere. No precept derived from the principles
of evolution can be a universal and authoritative rule-
of moral action. The great ethical principle of Mr-
Spencer's system is adjustment to environment for
the individual and the race, so as to secure the fullest
attainable life for each and for all. Moral action is^
then, a process of continuous adaptation — a ceaseless
changing. No code can be framed, whose precepts
will have more than a temporary value. " Eternal
and immutable morality " is but a fine phrase. Life
being adjustment to conditions, the rule of right-living,,
true for a time, must fall into desuetude. The ethical-
code is for ever changing to suit the continuous move-^
ment towards equilibrium. Designed to be perpetual,.
\ the moral law given to Israel was graven on the
granite of Sinai ; but the precepts delivered to man*
under a dispensation of evolution, need to be inscribed
on waxen tablets; for the lawgiver must turn his^
stylus often and, as conditions alter, amend his work.
5. The ethical doctrine of evolution is characterized
The Evolution of Morals. 273
throughout by dominance of the pleasurable. It is
pleasure that furnishes the end, the impulse, the
standard, the rule, the sanction. " Life is good or bad
according as it does, or does not, bring a surplus of
agreeable feeling." " Conduct is good or bad according
as its total effects are pleasurable or painful."* " Plea-
sure, somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings,
.... is as much a necessary form of moral intuition
as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition."-|-
This is thorough-going hedonism, tempered by the
theory of a natural codification, or digest, of the l-aws
of pleasure in the organized experiences registered in
the nervous system.
To discuss adequately the ethical value of pleasure
would necessitate an examination of what is conveyed
by the term. As Mr. Spencer uses it, he includes every
form of gratification — the joy of one who bears suffer-
ing for the benefit of another, and the delight of the
glutton in his feast. Give width enough to the mean-
ing, and it may embrace at once paradise and the pot-
house.
But, passing from this point, note the confusion be-
tween the moral quality and the consequences of its
exercise. It may be true that the right always results
in a surplus of pleasure ; while it may be false that
the surplus of pleasure constitutes the rightness of the
right. The evolutionist is bound to show that the
* The Data of Ethics, § 10. t Ibid., § 15.
S
/^
2 74 '^^^ Evolution Hypothesis,
moral quality of the action is its tendency to pro-
duce agreeable or painful sensations.
It is clear no moral teaching could spring from the
evolution hypothesis except the ethics of pleasnre.
Out of the primordial homogeneity no other doctrine
could be evolved. Is 'it a sound theory of life? Is
there nothing better within the range of human experi-
ence than pleasure, and nothing worse than pain ? Is
the good nothing more than that which imparts enjoy-
ment ? and is the essence of evil that it entails suf-
fering ?
The whole question will appear in a different light
if we approach it from the opposite standpoint : if we
hold that there is that in man which is in its nature
moral — that which is capable of moral growth or
decay, of being perfected or debased. The moral attri-
butes of mind give man a sovereignty over agreeable
or painful sensations : pleasure is not to him the very
substance of his life — the form of moral intuition.
The relations of experience are still further modified if
we cherish belief in a future state. Weal and woe are
not measurable within the limits of the present world :
there are results that do not lie within the visible ;
and the hedonist computation of the worth of actions
is manifestly false. The broken life is perfected : the
seemingly complete is seen to be defective. In the
hope of another life, all things appear in a new light.
Mr. Spencer has in his ethics, as in his sociology,
presented many questions of conduct in a novel and
The Evolution of Morals. 275
striking manner : but as a whole his moral system is
unsound. It has no solid basis and no imperativeness.
In accordance with his cosmic hypothesis he can pre-
sent no other. Man is a passing phase of a vast muta-
tion. The individual perishes ; so also does the race.
All things hasten to dissolution. Why strive to gain
for man a little increase of length or fulness of life ?
Let the mighty forces sweep on and evolve what
result they may : we shall soon disappear, merged in
the great cosmic stream.
CHAPTER XVIII.
CBEATION.
THE bearing of the Evolution Hypothesis on belief
in creation, and especially the creation of man,
has at once aroused antagonism and won support.
The doctrine of creation lies much nearer the central
truths of revealed religion than might at first sight
appear. It shapes our creed as to the Divine Being in
Himself and in His relation to those who are thought
of as His creatures : His creatures they are not, if He
is not Creator. Deny creation and you profoundly
1 modify the idea of God — an idea determining all
religious dogma and prevading all devotion. But we
are not here concerned with the theological bearings
ipf the question : our business is to examine the doc-
trine of evolution in contrast with that of creation,
that we may judge which presents the great mystery
in most complete harmony with what reason accepts
as assured truth.
The denial of the possibility of creation is a denial
either of its possibility to thought or its possibility in
fact. The evolutionist challenges the legitimacy of
the idea of creation, alleging that it is unthinkable.
Mr. Spencer says, " Our inability to conceive matter
Creation. 277
becoming non-existent, is immediately consequent on
the nature of thought. Thought consists in the estab-
lishment of relations. There can be no relation estab-
lished, and therefore, no thought framed, when one of
the related terms is absent from consciousness. Hence
it is impossible to think of something becoming no-
thing, for the same reason that it is impossible to
tliink of nothing becoming something — the reason,
namely, that nothing cannot become an object of
consciousness. The annihilation of matter is unthink-
able for the same reason that the creation of matter
is unthinkable."* Again, " Those who entertain the
proposition that each kind of organism results from
a divine interposition, do so because they refrain from
translating words into thoughts. The case is one of
those where men do not really believe, but rather
believe they believe. For belief, properly so called,
implies a mental representation of the thing believed ;
and no such mental representation is here possible."*!*
Lange is still more emphatic. " The creation of the
world from nothing is at least a clear and honest
theory. It contains so open and direct a contradic-
tion of all thought, that all weaker and more reserved
contradictions must feel ashamed beside it."J
Creation is, then, alleged to be impossible to thought
— " a mental representation of the thing " is impossible
* First Principles, § 53. t Biology, Vol. I., § 112.
I History of Materialism, •Y oh I., Second Section, Chapter I.
278 The Evolution Hypothesis.
and this inability to think creation "is immediately
consequent on the nature of thought."
It would be easy to turn the edge of Mr. Spencer's,
criticism upon himself. The relation which he sub-
p ^yvA/f stitutes for that of Creator and creature, is no more
thinkable. It is as diflBcult to represent in thought
the relation of noumenon and phenomenon, reality and
appearance, absolute cause and conditioned effect, as it
is to conceive of " God, the Father Almighty, maker
of heaven and earth."
But there is an obvious fallacy in assuming that
no conception can be thought unless it can be repre-
sented to the mind in an image or other sensible form.
Nothing could be more completely unfounded than
this assumption. A great part of the matter of
^thinkinor, and above all of exact thinkinof, is such
Ithat it cannot be presented to consciousness in any
visual or sensible mode. Mr. Spencer's test would
remove from the range of knowledge all relations of
relations ; none of which can become objects of con-
sciousness by an image or " mental representation of
the thing." It is as impossible to conceive a point, or
a line, or the millionth power of six, or the equality
of ratios, as to conceive not-being. Mr. Spencer's
jcriterion would also exclude from thought all concep-
ftion of mind. Here is an object of knowledge of
which we cannot form any " mental representation ; "
yet men reason with precision, taking mind, or a
faculty of mind, as one of the terms. Abstractions
Creation, 279
constitute the greatest part of the material of thought,
and the more completely abstract the relation is — the
more entirely apart from concrete things — the more (
definite and exact the process of reasoning. If the
criterion in question were valid, arithmetic should get
rid of as being the sign of a concept of which no
mental representation is possible. Symbolic represeu-(
tation, it may be said, furnishes the means of thinking
abstract relations : if so, we can equally well think ,
under a symbol the relation of Creator and creation. |
But is not-being, is no-thing so far removed from ex-
perience ? Does it not rather run alongside of all ex-j
perience ? The school-boy becomes alive to it when\ - "*"
he puts his hand into an empty pocket; we find it
laid as a competent mode of thought at the basis of !
his philosophy by one of the greatest thinkers of this 1
century. How can that be said to be unthinkable
which is being constantly thought ? " Note the am-
biguity of saying that the idea of destruction is un- /
thinkable, in the face of the fact that for centuries it
has been thought. This has been evaded by the asser-
tion that ' men did not really think the idea, they only
thought that they thought it.' But this is to confound \
conception with imagination. In almost every thought,
idea, conception, there are, over and above the con-
densed perceptions capable of definite expression in
terms of sense, elements incapable of such expression."*
A
* Lewes, Problems oftLife and Mind, Vol. II. , p. 270.
28o The Evolution Hypothesis.
But though creation be granted thinkable, its reality
may be denied on the ground that it is impossible in
fact. This impossibility may be founded on either
of two grounds — (a) a supposed inability in God to
create, or (6) a supposed inability to create the uni-
verse that is.
(1.) God may be so conceived in thought that the
idea of God is inconsistent with the idea of creation,
and creation concluded to be impossible. We may
think of God as the Absolute, as existing out of
all relations, — altogether self-contained, — His whole
activity immanent. If we so think of Him, we
iexclude of necessity the possibility of creation. But
such a mode of representing the Divine Being in
jthought is contrary to the revelation of Him in
Scripture : self-communication, not self-inclusion is
His characteristic. His activity does not remain
immanent : it is manifested. His " sfoinofs forth have
been of old from everlasting." * If, then, we have
formed any idea of God inconsistent with the exercise
of creative power, we are not to discard the belief in
creation, but to amend our idea of God.
(2.) It may be supposed that the universe that is,
could not have been created by God. A lurking
doubt of this kind is often discoverable. If God be
a Spirit, how, it is asked, can He be the Creator of
that which is so entirely diverse from Him as matter ?
* Micah v., 2.
Creatio7i. 281
To harmonize in thought the belief in God as a Spirit,
and belief in the origin of matter by His creative
power, it is open to the thinker to modify his con-
ception of God, or of matter, or to bring them to-
gether in an act — not of knowledge, but of faith.
The conception of matter may be modified. Berke- ^
ley, seeing that the atheism of his day lurked in
matter, attempted to remove the shelter for unbelief |
by denying the existence of matter, except as an idea, \
laying down the principle that its essence is to bey
perceived. Minds with power of intellection so con-
ditioned as to yield a world, subjective in its origin,
but objective to consciousness, can be readily thought
of as created in the likeness of the supreme Intelli-
gence, and the difficulty of the origination of matter is
evaded. But every system of idealism must encounter^
the ineradicable belief that a world external to the
mind exists. There is, however, a quite needless use
of disparaging epithets when matter is spoken of ini
<iontrast with spirit. The physicist has done much\
to alter this tone of thought, and to elevate the con- !
ception of the material universe as a work of God.
It is impossible to study the visible cosmos without
having our admiration excited at every step. There
is nothing foul in the world apart from the depravity
of moral evil. This mass of ice melts into a runnino*
o
stream ; it rises into vapour ; touched by the morning
sunlight it glows with the most brilliant hues; the
cloud vanishes into the azure sky : the solid mass is
The Evolution Hypothesis.
changed into a form so far removed from grossnes^
that the air into which it has passed furnishes the
very term in which the thought of God is clothed,
when me speak of Him as " a most pure Spirit." But
we have not yet reached a full conception of the
marvellous subtilty of matter, when we have looked
into the translucent clearness of the sky. Matter is.
a mode of force. However constituted — whether
composed of atoms ; or of vortex rings ; or of points
of force — its ultimate constituents present to the
scientific imagination a tenuity immeasurably sur-
passing anything revealed through the senses. The
ultimate form of matter is not an inert thin^: : it
thrills with unceasing movement ; its pulsations are
the continuous play of all-pervading and limitless
energy. In accordance with Mr. Spencer's termin-
ology, matter is a manifestation of force, and force is-
a mode of power, and power is an attribute of God.
On the other hand, obstacles in the way of the
acceptance of the fact of creation, are raised by mis-
conception as to the divine nature. The idea of God
comprises many attributes. These attributes the
limits of intelligence compel us to think separately.
In accurate thinking the divine idea will be presented
in that aspect which stands related to the experience
at the time in question. When the mind is engaged
about the creation of matter, we think of power.
Whatever power in kind or in amount is implied ift
the work, that power is to be ascribed to the Creator.
Creation. 285
But even though we should remove every misappre-
hension that tends to render difficult our conception
of the relation, when we try to represent in thought
the creative act, we reach at that point a breach of
continuity over which knowledge cannot carry us.
The transition from power immanent in a " most pure
Spirit," to energy as we know it operative in the
physical universe, cannot be effected by science. We
must believe ; we cannot see : " By faith we under-
stand that the worlds were made by the word of
God." * There is, however, within experience, an
instance which helps us to conceive, though we can-
not comprehend, the transition. We know ourselves
as willing, and we see that act of the spirit embodied
in the origination of physical change. The transition
from the act of the spirit of which we are immediately
conscious, to the external operation revealed to us by
sense, is not cleared up by any known or conceivable
explanation. Science is here, in our most constant
and intimate experience, as much at fault as in the
attempt to conceive that primal act of the Infinite
Spirit which " in the beginning " issued in the existence
of manifested energy — which "created the heavens
and the earth."
Maintaining that creation is both possible to thought
and possible in fact, we advance to the affirmation
that creation is consonant with experience. This posi-
* Hebrews xi., 3.
284 The Evolution Hypothesis.
tion will be strenuously assailed by the evolutionist.
It will be maintained that there is nothing in experi-
ence in the least favouring the belief in creation.
Of course experience is unable to testify to its own
origin ; it cannot transcend itself. A witness has no
evidence at first hand to give as to the date or manner
of his own birth. His presence, however, is conclusive
proof that he has come to be. At the same time ex-
perience has relevant and important testimony to offer
on the question at issue. There lie in it regulative
principles that are proof of a something prior to it —
its mould and law. These principles, indispensable to
experience — not its outcome but its condition, we may
call into court and receive from them valuable evidence
as to the first ori^jin of the things we see.
(1.) The knowledge of effects compels us to believe
in an idtimate cause. " We cannot think at all about
the impressions which the external world produces in
us, without thinking of them as caused, and we cannot
carry out our inquiry concerning their causation with-
out inevitably committing ourselves to the hypothesis
of a First Cause." *
(2.) Over the whole range of observation we find
form and order. At the earliest moment when the
universe comes into the view of science it emerges in
thought under the reign of law, orderly in its arrange-
ment and movement — a cosmos, not a chaos. This
* First Principles, § 12.
Creation. 285
conception is, indeed, a notable characteristic of evolu-
tionism : for it must assume that the universe at the
first moment of its existence in the knowable, contains
the whole law of its future history, including implicitly
the entire order now existing. But the cosmos has
not originated the law that moulds it : it is no more
credible that it should have originated the law in
accordance with which its movements are directed,
than that it should have produced the matter of which
it consists. This order must also be referred back to
the ultimate cause.
(3.) A necessary condition of experience is a self-
conscious intelligence; where there is no one to see,,
there is nothing seen. Man is himself one of the con-
crete existences in the universe, and his thoufrht is the
most notable of its phenomena. How has intelligence
come to be ? we seek an adequate cause and find none
till we have ascended to the Primal Cause.
(4.) Experience shows everywhere adjustments of
means to ends. It will not satisfy reason to turn, as
the evolutionist does, from these adjustments to the
mode in which they have been produced, and to argue
that having been brought about in this or that manner
they are not to be regarded as adaptations — that there
is in them no evidence of purpose. Suppose, with the
evolutionist, that the order of the movement of things
produces necessarily in process of time manifold adap-
tations ; suppose a tendency to adjust the balance of
each thing with its en¥ironment to be the very prin-
f
286 The Evolution Hypothesis.
■ciple of progress ; we are bound to take notice of this
order, and look for that in the cause which will account
for this universally operative principle of adaptation.
The adaptation of mind to that world in which it
•dwells and of which it has knowledge, is the most
wonderful of all adjustments. The most significant of
^11 the characteristics of the universe, is the existence
in it of that which answers to intelligence. The possi-
i ijbility of nature being thought involves the implication
' / jthat there is thought in it. Mind answers to the mani-
ijfestation of mind. The intelligible in the cosmos leads
irresistibly to the recognition of an intelligent author.
The existence of a conscious ego — knowing self and
the environment of self — cannot be a product of the
RJnconscious. Nothing comes of nothing ; there is no
more in the effect than there was in the cause. If it
I be given me to say " / am," I cannot but believe that
the great First Cause can also say, " I AM."
But if the Primal Cause be a self-conscious Intelli-
gence, His I AM differences Him from human intelli-
gence; as my I am differences me from Him. His
intellio^ence is not one with the intelliojence of man.
i My intelligence is a form of being face to face with
the Infinite Intelligence. I am not enclosed in the
Divine Being. God is not all things, for He is not
This I. The First Cause and the cosmos are not one
: throughout. If they are not one throughout, there is
no ground to suppose that they are one at any point
in immensity. We cannot identify the world with
Creation. 287
Ood. God is, then, the cause of nature, and at the
«ame time not one with it ; the cause has not passed
into the effect, but co- exists with it. The primal
causation, therefore, differs from all known instances
of causation : it is Creation.
To sum up the argument : we are compelled, in every
process of reasoning as to concrete existence, to reach
back to a First Cause. We must recognise that Cause
as the author of order and law — a cause having as
effect a cosmos with numberless adaptations of means
to end, and in which the principle of adjustment is
the universal condition of progress. This cause is the
source of human intelligence and the origin of a world
in which there is everywhere that which answers
to intelligence, and, when apprehended, constitutes
Thought. Intelligences, countless in number, have
been called into being — self-knowing agents, in every
conscious act differenced from their cause. How may
we most justly represent in the light of experience
this beginning ? How express the relation of the
universe to a First Cause, almighty, self-knowing,
intelligent, not passing into — not becoming — the effect,
but abiding co-existent with it ? How may we think
such a cause in relation to the effect ? Not by a
pantheistic theory of identity, not by the physicist's
conception of continuity ; not as noumenon and phe-
nomenon : it is Creation.
If, then, creation be competent to thought, and
possible in fact ; if thew regulative principles of expe-
288 The Evolution Hypothesis.
rience are so congruous with the conception as to bring
it within the probable ; if the religious conviction is
thus found to be in accord with experiential truth, we
may take a step in advance and place the doctrine of
creation over against the hypothesis of evolution.
The term creation will cover theories which, within
the knowable, differ from evolution in no important
respect. With such theories we have, for the present,
nothins: to do. Creation, as contrasted with evolution,
implies not only a beginning of the universe in its-
matter, force, and law, but such a conception of its
constitution and history as sees everywhere traces of
intelligence, everywhere the embodiment of thought
and purpose ; and which, recognizing the vastness of
the problem and the limitation of thought, admits the
impossibility of interpreting the whole as a continuous
process, whether physical or spiritual, and accepts the
intervention of divine power as the only rational
solution. The conditions of that intervention tran-
scend human knowledge ; they lie hidden in the pur-
pose of God.
The question of origins within the cosmos may be
approached from opposite points of view. The evolu-
tionist begins with the law of the physical order on
the side most remote from the acts of intelligence, and
depends for his solution entirely on dynamic principles.
The creationist begins with the exercise of intelligence
— the side most remote from the physical order, and
proceeds from that in nature which reveals the opera-
Creation. 289
tion of mind ; he seeks a key to the problem in thought.
Wherever he sees existences differenced as a new kind
he finds a special creation : that which was not and
now is, is as a new manifestation of divine intelligence
and power. It matters nothing at what moment in
time this kind may have come to be ; it matters not
what was antecedent to it, or at what point of contact
it touched the forms of being already existent, or how
close its kinship to them : what the creationist sees i&
a new manifestation of the all-comprehending mind ;
in so far as the conception is separate or special, he
sees in it a special creation.
But the evolutionist will urge that the question for
science is the mode of the divine operation on the side
of the phenomenal. There has been a visible embodi- v_
ment; show us, he may say, what was before and
after, and its relation to what has preceded, that we
may discover the outward and sensible effect. When,,
for example, a dog first came into existence, picture to
us the process. The creationist replies that he cannot.
There are no materials to enable him to do so. The
scanty records of the past do not warrant any definite
representation of the fact. He cannot trace the
history of any living thing back to the moment when ■
it emerged within the visible in its primal form. But '
the evolutionist is in no better case ; he is equally at
fault. He has not been able to show^ in any satis-
factory manner the powers of nature at work in
originating any given species. How the primordial
290 The Evolution Hypothesis.
form has been modified into clearly differenced
structures he has failed to show. His one continuous
process is not more comprehensible or more congruous
with well established truths than special creations.
Over against his one process, continuous, uniform, we
place the endless variety of nature. The evolutionist
professes to begin with uniformity and end with
variety ; the creationist sees variety everywhere — at
the beginning as well as at the end of the cosmic
record. The evolutionist postulates an unknown uni-
formity that he may evolve known variety: the
creationist ascribing to the great First Cause an
infinite wealth of wisdom — an inexhaustible fulness of
life, feels it to be more in consonance with his belief
to recognize, from the outset, in the works of God an
unbounded plenitude of power, conditioned in its
endlessly varied activity by wisdom, justice, goodness.
He can ill brook such limitation of the Absolute
Cause as is set up by the evolutionist, who will have
the Author of all things eternally occupied with the
task of working out an infinitely complicated problem
in mathematical physics.
The doctrine of creation, applied to account for the
origin of the multitudinous varieties of living things,
does not entail the necessity of supposing that differen-
tiated species are to be held as having a clearly-defined
beginning separate from all antecedent forms of life —
a first pair rising into view without kinship with any
former living thing, a wholly separate root from which
Creation. 291
a new genealogical tree springs. The creationist is not
driven to assume that the various organic forms have
been caused in this way. Nor does he come into con-
flict with what is called the uniformity of nature. He
accepts as fully as the evolutionist that there is no
lawlessness in the operations of the Inscrutable Power ;
but he refuses to determine the whole law of God's
working by the "parts of His ways" that are dis-
covered or discoverable by man — he refuses to attempt
to measure the infinite in hand-breadths. He finds in
Moses a precedent and example which commends itself
to his reason as congruous with experience — a method
of handling the question whose most marked character-
istic is the recognition of variety of operation.
The successive changes formulated in evolution are
divided into an incalculable series of modifications
extending over immeasurable cycles of duration. The
conception is so vast that it cannot be definitely repre-
sented in thought. It embraces the unimaginable
variety of nature in the sameness of one method of
mutation ; but it stretches the process back to infinity
in a measureless series of infinitesimal modifications.
We gain nothing in extent or clearness of vision by
adopting this standpoint. If we try to summarize
the whole, we may note three zones of change, the first
from the primal molecule to the condition in which it
appears in protoplasm, the second from protoplasm to
the cell, the third from the cell to the fully differen-
tiated structure. No\^ it is noteworthy that these
292 The Evolution Hypothesis,
reaches of change, which, on the evolution doctrine, ex-
tend indefinitely, are being traversed every day before
our eyes in brief spaces of time. Inorganic matter is
being changed in vast quantities into protoplasm, cells
are being evolved in immense numbers at every mo-
ment, and growth from germ-cell to the perfected
organic structure is accomplished in instances of slowest
development in a few years. From molecule to proto-
plasm ; from protoplasm to cell ; from cell to organism-
— is not this an epitome of the age-long process of
i evolution ? What power is working out at every
j moment such marvellous results ? It is the power of
living things : the condition of the accomplishment of
these inexplicable effects, is thq possession of that
mysterious attribute called Life. Surely what is being
done every day by living creatures, may have been
done in the origin of these creatures by that Being
who is the source of their life.
It is charged against the creationist that he de-
grades the idea of creation to the likeness of human
invention — that God is represented as a skilled arti-
ficer constructing the universe after a plan. But the
charge may, with greater efi'ect, be retorted on the
I evolutionist, and with this difference — that he likens
j the cause of all things to a workman with a very
! limited amount of skill. He takes human progress as
1 his pattern of the method of cosmic activity. Limited
; in intelligence, in experience, and in power, man is ever
advancing by tentative efforts. He makes many f ail-^
Creation. 293
ures before he achieves a complete success. His first
rude steam-engine is exhibited that workmen may
follow the slow steps of progress, and see how far me-
chanical skill has advanced by gradual improvement ;
how the idea has been by degrees more fully explicated
and the difficulties of adjustment overcome. It is in
the likeness of human progress reaching achievement
through failure, that the evolutionist pourtrays the
advance in nature from lower to higher organizations.
The failures are buried, the successes survive.
To conceive the cosmic process as an endless weav-
ing, out of a uniform, homogeneous first matter, the
myriad forms of design traceable in the universe, is an
unfounded representation of the course of things. We
maintain, on the contrary, that however the pattern
may be involved or evolved, however this particular
form or that may grow out of or run into other forms,
the design is along the whole course of time various,
manifold. We are free to hold in the face of science
that creation is special, as well as general — that there
have been beginnings within the cosmos as well as
continuous operation — that the continuity of one cease-
less and unvarying movement is possible to thought
only by transcending the visible and finding it in
the forth-going of energy from the unseen. Unifica-
tion is attainable not by knowledge, but through faith.
The unity is in God ; the uniformity in His law ; the
continuity in His purpose. When man transcends the
visible to account for ah origin or change ; when he
294 '^^^^ Evolution Hypothesis,
refers it back to the Ultimate Cause and arrives at hi&
explanation through belief in the source of all things ;
whatever be the name under which he presents that
Power — however he may express in words his concep-
tion of the relation of that Power to the event, he
affirms an origin which is, in so far as intelligible
■meaning is conveyed, in effect a "special creation."
CHAPTER XIX.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
THE Evolution Hypothesis builds on the material
cosmos. It looks outward to discover in physical
nature a principle of change shaping thought and
constituting the law of concrete being. It sees matter
and mind cast in one mould and under the same law :
it finds one principle dominant throughout experience :
it interprets the phenomena of mind in terms of
matter and motion and force : it regards reason, con-
science, duty, responsibility, emotion, will — all mental
and moral phenomena — as modes of experience
determined by physical necessity : it extrudes the
Creator of all things beyond the range of intelligence
— outside the compass of knowledge. A God, of whom
man may have even an " indefinite consciousness,"
there is none in the new philosophy, other than the
incomprehensible immanent energy revealed in the
universe. That Being comes into the view of reason
only in manifestations forming the subject-matter of
science, and which philosophy combines in a continuous
process. The evolutionist teaches us to see that
unbounded Power ceaselessly at work, labouring under
the rigid yoke of ai* dynamic principle. From an
296 The Evolution Hypothesis.
"indefinite, incoherent homogeneity" it evolves into
a " definite, coherent heterogeneity." Then when the
evolution is complete, there remains for it but to undo
what has been so laboriously done : it works universal
dissolution, and reappears an "indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity," or an inert compact mass. If it take
the latter form, it is doomed to remain in eternal
quiescence, solid, insensate — without life or motion for
ever. This result the evolutionist cannot accept as
probable. Will not the limitless energy energize ?
How can it be thought as entering into everlasting
repose ? The persistence of force forbids it. The
conception of a resulting indefinite, incoherent homo-
geneity seems alone congruous with the hypothesis.
When dissolution is complete, the evolving process
must once more begin. How it will be shaped in the
future condition of things, man, a product of the
present evolution, cannot conjecture. But amid much
that is doubtful this is clear, that if the principles on
which the new philosophy is grounded be valid, they
carry with them the certainty of either an eternal dy-
namic process, without meaning or purpose, through
which the infinite First Cause passes from everlasting
to everlasting continually; or perpetual quiescence in
undisturbed inaction — an unbroken stillness of death,
neither living God nor living creature existing thence-
forth for ever.
It may seem to some that the naked statement
of a theory so repugnant to reason is a sufificient
Summary and Conclusion. 297
confutation. It must, however, be kept in view that,
proceeding from well established scientific truths, the
hypothesis carries with it the apparent sanction of
physical science. It is necessary, therefore, to bring
it to the test of criticism. This I have endeavoured
to do in the foregoing discussion. How far the argu-
is valid and effective it is for the reader himself to
judge. The sum of it is this : —
We have challenged the aim of the evolutionist, as
transcending the limits of intelligence and inconsis-
tent with the nature of the objects with which
intelligence is conversant. His hypothesis is, we
maintain, from the outset, illegitimate, as attempting
an impossible task — the bringing of all concrete being
and its activities within a single formula, and that
formula derived from one department of experience.
Examining the limits of physical science and natural
law, we have seen that they do not furnish material
for constructing a system of universal truth. We
have discussed Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the unknow-
able and the knowable, and have argued that it
renders his philosophy nugatory, and reduces his
hypothesis to a mere unprovable guess. We have
seen that to bring the moral and the physical — the
soul and the world — to^rether under one re^julative
principle, and constitute them parts of one process,
all concrete existences and all activities must be
embraced within the compass of dynamic law. We
have disputed this rrarrowing of existence within
298 The Evolution Hypothesis.
dynamic bonds, and have claimed for intelligence a
realm peculiar to itself, and in which the laws of
mind, and not those of matter and motion, are the
discoverable order. We have examined critically the
fundamental axiom of evolution — the persistence of
force; and have demonstrated that it is illusory as
a basis on which to rear a system of philosophy.
We have tested the formula which expresses the law^
of the cosmic movement, and have shown it to be
wanting in precision and of no scientific value. We
have inquired what are the postulates involved in
the hypothesis, and have proved that from its initial
step evolution is burdened with unwarranted assump-
tions. By this criticism of first principles, we have
been led to the conclusion that evolutionism is not
tenable as a philosophy ; that if accepted it must lead
to universal scepticism.
Having dealt with the fundamental principles un-
derlying the hypothesis, we then proceeded to test-
its worth as an interpretation of known phenomena.
Our first inquiry has been as to the origin of the
forms and activities of inorganic matter, and we have
shown that in this field evolution fails us in every
vital question. We then examine its account of the
transition from inorganic matter to life, and we find
it incompetent to give any rational answer to the
questions that arise in discussing the origin of living^
things. We have subjected to criticism the physio-
logical unit, by whose polarity all forms of organisms-
Stim7iiary and Conclusion, 299',
are supposed to be explained ; and we have seen that
this invisible creation of the evolutionist, is as inex-
plicable as the visible forms themselves. Seeking for
some account of the origin of sentient life, we have
found that the hypothesis is wholly at fault when
called upon to show how feeling could arise out of
cosmic mutation. We have examined the evolutionist
theory of the origin of the various kinds of living
things, and have proved it to be defective and alto-
gether inadequate as a solution of the problem.
Tested as to its competence to explain the origin of
consciousness and of intellection, or the growth of
mind, or the moral nature of man, evolution is demon-
strated to be a worthless — a barren hypothesis. The
allegation that the conception of creation is unthink-
able has been examined, and the doctrine of evolu-
tion placed in contrast with the belief in creation ;
and the latter has been shown to be most in accord
with the regulative principles of experience, and most
in harmony with the evidences of mind everywhere
seen in nature and self -known in consciousness.
Over the entire range of this discussion the ques-
tions dealt with have been questions vital to any
system of cosmic philosophy. In one or another
point the conclusivenesss of the reasoning may be
challenged ; but the cumulative effect of the whole is,
we think, irresistible.
The aim has been critical throughout. No attempt
has been made to define the limits within which, in
300 The Evolution Hypothesis.
groups of instances, evolution may be accepted as ex-
pressing a law of nature. How far, for example, the
nebular hypothesis is a true theory of the formation
of the heavenly bodies, and whether evolution fur-
nishes an adequate statement of its law, can be deter-
mined only by those who have made the question a
special study ; but it is intolerable that the experts
should lay down as an article of our scientific creed
any doctrine that is merely conjectural, or but a
fiction — however truthlike — created by the scientific
imagination. How far existing organisms are to be
taken as descended from a common stock, is also a
question to be settled by careful and candid examina-
tion of all available facts. That many variations now
established as specific differences have arisen in the
course of change, seems unquestionable ; but that all
organic kinds have been so created by differentiation
of the same living matter, is by no means proved ; and
it is indubitable that neither the dynamic principle of
Spencer, nor the "natural selection" of Darwin will
account for all that is to be explained in the simplest
and plainest instances.
Our conclusion is, that the Evolution Hypothesis is
incompetent to interpret the most obvious facts in
nature, and is wholly illegitimate and utterly indefen-
sible, as a philosophy embracing the fundamental
principles of all departments of knowledge. Man
cannot recognize in it the goal of his labours, or find
in it the rest of his spirit. It is out of harmony with
Summary and Conclusion. 301
his best feelings and truest thoughts : it is in conflict
with himself. He knows it to be more in accord with
reason to lift up his eyes, and see around him traces of
intelligent purpose, and delight himself in the com-
munion of mind with mind. The new cosmic philo-
sophy is an imposing edifice, constructed with great
and painstaking labour ; but it has neither foundation
nor top-stone : it sets forth no discoverable origin ;.
nor is it directed to any conceivable end. Claiming
to be the crown of scientific knowledge, it is a poor
result of the intellectual industry of the ages. The
student of nature, eager to frame for himself some
intelligible conception of the world in which he lives,
will not accept it as a satisfactory response to his
questioning. The more keenly it is criticized the
more inadequate will it appear : its dominance is but a
passing fashion of opinion. Men whose best thoughts
wither at its touch will turn away and seek elsewhere
a home for the spirit; they will look for a temple of
truth established on a wider and surer basis ; — they
will choose as their abode "a city which hath founda-^
tions, whose builder and maker is God."
LIST OF SOME RECENT PUBLICATIONS
OF
JAMES GEMMELL,
GEORGE IV. BRIDGE,
EDINBURGH.
LONDON Hamilton, Adams, & Co. ; Simpkin, Marshall, & Co.
EDINBURGH OLIVER & BOYD ; J, Mknzies & Co.
GLASGOW J. AlENziES & Co. ; PoRTEous Brothers.
Lectures and Sermons by Martyrs. Con-
taining Sermons and Lectures by Richard Cameron,
Alexander Peden, Donald Cargill, William Guthrie,
Michael Bruce, Alexander Shields, John Livingstone,
John Wellwood, John Welsh, John Guthrie. With
Prefaces by John Howie, of Lochgoin ; and Brief Bio-
graphical Notices of the Authors of the Sermons by the
Rev. James Kerr, Glasgow, and the following Illus-
trations : — Grassmarket of Edinburgh, Canongate Tol-
booth, Martyrs' Monument, Greyfriars ; House where
Cameron was born ; Netherbow Port, Edinburgh ; Grey-
friars Churchyard ; Monument at Airsmoss ; and Both-
well Bridge. Demy 8vo, d. (674 pp.) 7/6.
"The volume contains a mine of doctrinal and experimental wealth. It
■cannot be read without both pleasure and profit. It is worth tons of what
passes now-a-days for sermonic literature."— Christian Age.
" No one that values the conten dings of Scotland's martyrs should be with-
out a copy."— The Covenanter.
" This volume is fitted to prove a genuine memorial of the humble yet truly
illustrious band who jeoparded their lives for Christ's crown and the nation's
-weal. The book is very creditably got up." — R. P. Witness.
History of the Westminster Assembly of
Divines. By Prof. Wm. M. Hetherington, D.D.,
LL.D., Free Church College, Glasgoiv. Edited by Robert
Williamson, D.D., Ascog. With Notes and Fac-similes
of Title-pages of the Original Editions of the Confession
of Faith, the Catechisms, Larger and Shorter, and the
Directory of Church Government and Ordination of
Ministers. Fourth edition, cr. 8vo, cl. (499 pp.) 6/.
" The value of the present edition has been greatly enhanced by the care
and judgment with which Dr. Williamson of Ascog has readjusted its con-
tents, and added what brings its information into accord with the light of the
latest discoveries."— F. C. Record.
'• An admirable edition of a valuable work at a reasonable price."— The
R. p. Witness. .
"■Z JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
Four Prize Essays on the Sabbath, by Rev.
Mr. Hamilton, Belfast ; Rev. W. C. Wood, Boston,
U. S. ; Rev. Dr. Orr, Hawick ; and A Member of the
College of Justice, Scotland. Thick 8vo, ci., iprice 7/6.
To the Authors of these Essays were awarded Prizes of £100, £50, £30, and
£20, by the Sabbath Alliance of Scotland. The Adjudicators were : Professor
Mitchell, D.D., St. Andrews; Rev. A. Thomson, D.D., Edinburgh; Principal
Rainy, D.D., Edinburgh; Rev. J. Marshall Lang, D.D., Glasgow; Rev. J. C.
Burns, D.D., Kirkliston.
"Of the first essay we have already spoken in commendation The
other essays are well worthy of a thoughtful perusal." — The Noncoi\formist
hvlependent.
" These essays are all of them well written, .... they are a storehouse of
facts and arguments to all who may have to defend the Rest Day from the
attacks sure to be renewed from time to time." — Dundee Advertiser.
"In the four treatises now on our table, we can say that each essayist has
thought for himself, and in their combined labours they have done more
than reproduce the arguments and defences of former authors Con-
stitute an encyclopasdia of facts and arguments which criticism will only
prove to be in hai-mony with the Bible and science." — Presbyterian Messenger.
Our Rest Day : its Origin, History and
Claims, with Special Reference to Present Day Needs.
By the Rev. Thomas Hamilton, A.M., Belfast. Being
the Essay to which was awarded a Prize of One Hundred
Pounds, offered by the Sabbath Alliance of Scotland.
Crown 8vo, cloth, 3/.
"His style is lucid, terse, and vigorous "We most cordially recom-
mend all our readers to procure this able and masterly treatise." — Witness.
" It deserves a foremost place amongst the somewhat extensive literature
of the Sabbath It is clear, concise, and conclusive."— Primitive
Methodist World.
" A storehouse of fact and argument."— Ecclesiastical Gazette.
" Written in an excellent spirit, abounds in learning, is marked by never-
failing candour, and contains much practical council, as well as valuable in-
formation."— The Christian Advocate.
"The Work is ably done."— Life and Work.
"Knowing how many valuable manuscripts were submitted to the adjudi-
cators, we were prepared to expect something unusually good, and we have
not been disappointed."— Free Church Monthly.
" Other works may have been good, but none could have been better. It
is as interesting as it is instructive, and we give it our hearty praise."—
Sword and trowel.
" We consider the book the best and most useful on the subject in the Eng-
lish language."— Presbyterian Messenger.
The Homes, Haunts, and Battlefields of the
Covenanters. By A. B. Todd, Author of ' ' The Circling
Year," "Poems, Lectures, and Miscellanies." Cr. 8vo,
cloth, 3/6. Second Series in Preparation.
"The volume is a very interesting one."— Scotsman.
" The work of a thorough man of genius He has a full knowledge of
his subject and a love for it ; and he has a fervid poetical temperament, a
sympathy with all that is good and true. . . . The topographical sketches
with which the book abounds are beautifully drawn."— Dwm/ries and Gallo-
way Standard and Advertiser.
JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH. 3
The Scottish Church and its Surroundings
in Early Times. By Robert Paton, Minister of Kir-
kinner. Cr. 8vo, cl. 2/6.
"His sketches are vigorous and animated writes very well."— Thb
Scotsman.
"A clear narrative which sustains the leader's attention all through." —
North British Daily Mail.
"Fascinating work from beginning to end."— IRISH Baptist Magazine.
"We will find here a great deal of information, the result of much research
and careful study, presented in a very attractive form and style." — The
Christian Agr.
"The style is lucid and the contents interesting." — The Scottish Con-
GKEQATIONALIST.
Protestant Missions (Outhne of the History
of), from the Reformation to the Present Time. By Dr.
GusTAV Warneck, Pastor at Bothenschirmbach. Trans-
lated from the Second edition, by Dr. Thomas Smith,
Frofessor of Evangelistic Theology, New College, Edinburgh.
Cr. 8vo, (232 pp.) 3/6.
" Dr. Smith's translation of Dr. Warneck's able and valuable treatise vdll
prove of great value, and cannot fail to stimulate and encourage." — Aber-
deen Journal.
"It presents a careful summary of Protestant Mission Work, from the
Reformation to the close of the eighteenth century, and deals more fully,
though in a sort of statistical and commercial fashion, with the operations
that have been carried on in the mission field during the present century."
— Scotsman.
"A deeply interesting work." — Christian Age.
" The work is not only a valuable one for the private reader, it is fitted to
be an excellent class-book, and in this respect meets a decided want." — THK
Baptist.
" An encyclopaedia of Missions." — Literary World.
The Story of Daniel : His Life and Times.
By P. H. Hunter, Minister of Tester. Crown 8vo, 357
pp. , second edition, 5/.
" The difficult task has been skilfully done. It has resulted in a graphic
and vivid historical biography as engrossing as a volume of Macaulay ; and
proving that, whatever else there may be, there is at all events a warm in-
terest in the ancient documents. If books like the ' Story of Daniel ' were
more common, modern faith in the flesh and blood reality of the Old Testa-
ment saints would not be so exclusively an intellectual effort as it now often
is."- Scotsman.
" Mr. Hunter has done his work very thoroughly, laying under contribu-
tion a throng of writers, ancient and modern, and gathering into a focus the
scattered rays of light which they send upon one of the dimmest periods of
history."— Glasgow Herald.
"He has grasped the main features in the character and career of the
prophet with penetrating insight ^^^ ^^ presents them to the reader with
graphic force and felicity."— Christian Leader.
U
4 JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
History of the Canon of the Holy Scriptures
in the Christian Church. By Edward Reuss, Professor
in the University of Strashurg. Translated from the
Second French Edition, by Rev. David Hunter, B.D.,
Partick. In 1 thick vol. (416 pages), 9/.
"A book I highly value."— Prof. A. B. Bruck, D.D., Free Chxirch College,
Glasgow.
"A most valuable and useful book."— Prof. Wm. Milligan, D.D., Univer-
sity, Aberdeen.
"I have found it very stimulating."— Prof. A. H. Charteris, D.D., Edin-
burgh University.
"A most scholarly and comprehensive work. The most complete on the
subject we know of."— Christian Age.
"Wide knowledge of Church history, impartial judgment of the evidence
of facts, keen historical insight, are certainly not lacking in the History of the
Canon Its accuracy is guaranteed by the fact that all the proofs have been
revised by the author himself." — Literary World.
The Atonement : In its Relation to the
Covenant, the Priesthood, and the Intercession of our
Lord. By Hugh Martin, D.D. Fourth British edition^
demy 8vo, cl. (324 pp.) 7/6.
"Written with remarkable vigour and earnestness."— BRITISH Quarterly
Review.
"In these days of lax and shallow theology, it is refreshing to come
upon a volume like Dr. Martin's. The subject is one of surpassing impor-
tance, and upon the treatment of it the author brings to bear extraordinary
powers of reasoning, warmed and animated by a soul that has felt the
blessedness of an interest in the blood of the atonement The whole
volume is one of no ordinary kind."— ROCK.
"Something like theology. We wish our young divines would feed on
such meat as this." — Spurgeon.
The Prophet Jonah : His Character and
Mission to Nineveh. By Hugh Martin, D.D. Second
edition, demy 8vo, (369 pp. ) 7/6.
"A good specimen of the author's power of exposition, and is certain to be
useful to those who intend to devote special study to the book whose con-
tents are discussed."— Glasgow News.
" The book is no less rich and varied in matter and earnest in spirit than it
is vigorous in style."— R. P. Witness.
" Dr. Martin is well-known as an able author. His Jonah is a work of con-
siderable merit, and is written in an attractive and interesting style."—
Edinburgh Courant.
Chalmers' (Thomas, D.D.) Select Sermons,
with Tribute to his Memory, by Rev. Dr. Lorimer.
Cr. 8vo, cl. Is. 6d.
"Judiciously selected, and will serve, as far as printed words can serve,
to convey to a new generation an idea of the power and eloquence which
entranced their fathers. It is fitting, too, that Dr. Lorimer's funeral sermon
should escape any hostile criticism. From an evangelical and Free Church
point of view it is a noble eZoflfe. "—SCOTSMAN.
JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
Candid Reasons for Renouncing the Princi-
ples of Antipaedobaptism. By Peter Edwards. Cr.
8vo, cl. 2s. Qd.
Recommkndatory Note.
"The following treatise, written by a man who was for ten years a Baptist
minister, we very earnestly recommend to the careful study of those who
desire to make themselves acquainted with the argument in favour of infant
Baptism. The book contains this argument summarily stated, and most
logically defended. There is probably no treatise in the English language
on a theological subject in which the reasoning is closer. "We consider that
its careful perusal is fitted, by the blessing of God, to lead Christian parents
to understand clearly the ground on which the ordinary doctrine of the
Church is maintained, and to value, more than many do, the privilege
of obtaining the Church membership of their children."
To the above Note are subscribed the signatures of Eminent Clergymen of
various denominations, including the ^following : —
Principals Rainy and Douglas ; Professors M'Gregor, Smith, and Smeaton ;
Drs H. Bonar, Kennedy, Wilson, and Begg.
Principal Lindsay Alexander, Dr James M'Gregor, St. Cuthbert's, Edin. ;
and Dr K,obert Jamieson, St Paul's, Glasgow.
•'Furnishes sufficient materials wherewith to meet and demolish the
arguments of the opponents of mi&nt-haptism."— The Meformed Presbyterian
Witness.
Willison (late Rev. John, Dundee). An Ex-
ample of plain Catechising upon the Shorter Catechism.
Isew Edition, cr. 8vo, cl. 3s. Cd.
The Afflicted Man's Companion ;
or, A Directory for Families and Persons afflicted with
Sickness, or any other Distress. 12mo, cl. Is. Od.
Sacramental Meditations and Ad-
vices for the Use of Communicants, fcap. 8vo, cl. 2s.
These valaable books have been long out of print, difficult to get separately,
and have now been reprinted at the request of many.
Begg (James, D.D.), Memoirs of, Minister
of Newington Free Church, Edinburgh, by Thomas
Smith, D.D., Professor of Evangelistic Theology, New
College, Edinburgh. With Portrait and views of Dr.
Begg's Birthplace, etc. 2 vols. 8vo, 15/.
" Will be read with keen interest and enjoyment."— Daily Revikw.
"The book will be eagerly read by the admirers of this polemical
worthy."— The Bookseller.
" The volume is a most interesting production, and one which is certain
to command a wide circulation." — Glasgow News.
"To say that this volume is full of interest is little in praise of what bids
fair to be a most elaborate and important work." — Protestant Times.
" The charm of the volume will be found in the racy sketches Dr Begg gives
of the old ministers whom he knew, whose very names are now passing out of
remembrance."— Ayr Advertiser.
" The volume is exceedingly entertaining, it cannot fail to afford
much gratification to all classes of readers."— Irish Christian Advocate.
"This volume will be popular with Scotch people everywhere."— Liverpool
Mercury. •
6 JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
The True Psalmody; or, the Bible Psalms
the Church's only Manual of Praise. With Prefaces by
the Rev. Drs. Cooke, Edgar, and Houston ; and Re-
commendations from Eminent Divines. Cr. 8vo, cl.
(220 pp.) price 2/.
'"The True Psalmody' is a book that is calculated, we firmly believe, to
convince any mind that is open to conviction, that the Psalms alone are to
be employed in the service of God, and that the use of hymns is wholly
unwarrantable."— Reformed Presbyterian Magazine.
"All that can be said in favour of using the Book of Psalms, and none
other, in the worship of the sanctuary."— Edinburgh Courant.
" All who believe that nothing should be sung in the worship of God but
Psalms will find in it a repertory of argument on the subject, ably and popu-
larly put."— The Witness.
"Those who deny the right or the propriety of Christian people to sing
uninspired compositions in the services of the Church .... will find the
arguments in favour of their opinion set forth in this volume with all the
lucidity and force that can be given them."— North British Dailv Mail.
The Kittlegairy Vacancy ; or, a New Way
of Getting Rid of Old Ministers. By John Plender-
LBITH. 143 pp., crown 8vo, sewed, price 1/6.
"This is an excellent satire on the democratic spirit which manifests itself
too often in the heartless treatment of ancient ministers, who deserve well
of their Church and people."— Presbyterian Churchman.
"A very clever story of the difficulties which beset certain ministers—
especially of the old school— in the smaller towns of Scotland, and perhaps
in England also Many of the characters are well drawn, and the re-
marks of the ministers' clerical colleagues on their conduct and the hami
they were doing to the 'cause' are clearly put."— The Bookseller.
"A story of ecclesiastical troubles, trenchantly exposing the scandals often
associated with the selection and treatment of ministers It will be read
with interest."— Literary World.
"One of the most racy contributions to ecclesiastical satire that has ap-
peared for many years."— Courant.
Pulpit Table-Talk ; containing Remarks and
Anecdotes on Preachers and Preaching, by Dean
Ramsay, Edinburgh. 18mo, sewed, (162 pp.) 1/6.
Two lectures of a popular and discursive character on styles of preaching,
modes of preparing sermons, preachers of different eras, quaint texts,
preachers of the Reformation and Puritan periods ; French, Nonconformist,
and American preachers, etc.
Our Children for Christ : a Plea for Infant
Church Membership, with a full Discussion on the Mode
of Baptism. By the Rev. Samuel Macnaughton, M.A.,
Predon. Cloth, price 9d. post free ; or, for circulation,
12 copies post free for 6/.
"These arguments will no doubt be regarded as convincing by the nume-
rous sections of the Christian Church who accept the doctrine." — Scotsman.
"Free from all controversial bitterness." — Daily Review.
"The book is one of marked ability. In our opinion irresistible."— Chris-
tian News.
JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
The Establishment Principle Defended ; A
Reply to the Statement by the Committee of the United
Presbyterian Church on Disestablishment and Disen-
dowment. By the l^ev. William Balfour, Holyrood ;
with Preface by Dr. Begg. Crown 8vo, seiced, 2nd edi-
tion, 1/6.
" The book is very powerfully written ; the discussion of the whole ques-
-tion in its Scriptural aspects is searchinjr, logical, and exhaustive Every
Kslergyman should procure the small volume."— Belfast Weekly News.
"One of the most fascinating works of the kind we ever read."— Huntly
Express.
" We most cordially recommend this very able work to all interested in the
subject."— Western Standard.
" It has been perused by us with mingled admiration and satisfaction, and
most cordially do we thank the talented author for such a timely and powei'-
ful defence of the principle of Establishments, or of national obligation to
honour Christ by serving His Church."— Dr. Manson, Perth.
Church Establishments ; or, the Bible and
the Nation, with a Special Reference to the Church of
Scotland. By the Rev. Daniel Fraser, A.M., Helms-
dale. Crown 8vo, cl. 3s. 6d.
"We recommend Mr. Eraser's book to the friends, but especially to the op-
ponents, of National religion. In all cases he assigns a reason for what he
;states, an example which we wish the Liberationists to follow." — Perth-
shire Courier.
" An earnest and splendid plea for a National recognition of the Protestant
religion, and an exposure of the evils and follies of Voluntaryism The
<;ase of the Established Church of Scotland is admirably dealt with, and a
most fervid and powerful appeal is made in her behalf. The whole work
is carefully and thoughtfully composed."— The Protestant Times.
Statement of the Difference between the
Profession of the REFORMED CHURCH OF SCOT-
LAND, as adopted by the Seceders, and the Profession
contained in the New Testimony and other Acts lately
adopted by the GENERAL ASSOCIATE SYNOD : par-
ticularly on the POWER OF THE CIVIL MAGIS-
TRATE respecting Religion, National Reformation, etc.
By the late Thomas M'Crie, D.D., Author of"*" Life of
John Knox," etc. With Preface by Prof. Smeaton,
D.D., Edinburgh. Crown 8vo, cloth, 499 pp., price 5/.
" It is a masterly defence of the principle of Establishments as a Scripture
truth ; and the most complete vindication ever given to the world of the
position occupied by the Reformed Church of Scotland on the whole subject
•of National Religion, and of the magistrate's legitimate power in promoting
it."— Prof. Smeaton.
" A masterly and exhaustive treatise."— Watchword.
" We heartily and earnestly recommend all who are in doubt and difficulty,
■or who may wish instruction on the Voluntary controversy, and the prin-
-ciples that underlie it, to this reprint of Dr. M'Crie's Statement."— Edinburgh
•COURANT.
" Whoever wishes to study the.important subject here treated of will do
well to have the little book beside him."— Scotsman.
8
JAMES GKMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDIXBURGH.
Principal Acts of Assembly (Handbook and
Index to the) of the Free Church of Scotland, 1843-1885.
By Rev. Thomas Cochrane, Edinburgh. Second edUicyiij
brought up to date (1885). Cr. 8vo, 3/6.
"Students of ecclesiastical history belonging to other branches of the-
Christian Church will not fail to bestow a benediction Masterpiece of
intelligent condensation Will stand years of wear and tear."— Chris-
tian Leader.
" Admirable book, every kirk-session ought to possess."— DAILY
flEVIEW.
" Most useful book."— Scotsman.
"An ably constructed compend."— B. AND F. EVANGELICAL Review.
Digest and Report of, and Handbook and
Index to, the Principal Cases Decided in the General
Assembly of the Free Church, 1843-1886. By Rev.
Thomas Cochrane, Edinburgh, Cr. 8vo, 3/6.
"Evidently the result of great labour and infinite pains indeed, an
indispensable hand-book . . . can heartily commend the clearness of method
and statement that marks the digest. An appendix containing the Acts of
Assembly which have a bearing on the cases reported completes a work which
m ust be of great use to those for whom it is intended."— Sco tsma n .
Digest of liules and Procedure in the In-
ferior Courts of the Free Church of Scotland. With an
Appendix, embracing a Ministerial Manual, and also con-
taining Forms and Documents. By the late Rev. Robert
Forbes, M.A., Minister of Woodside, and Joint-Clerk of
the Free Church Presbytery of Aberdeen. Fourth edition,
revised and brought up to date (end of 1885). Cr. 8vo,
d. , price 3/6.
" The merits of Mr. Forbes' Manual have long been recognised, and its-
indispensability as a Free Church ministers' and office-bearers' guide and
companion has been further increased by the conscientious and intelligent
labour put upon it by the Rev. Mr Cochrane."— Daily Review.
" It has long been acknowledged as an excellent and trustworthy guide to
the members of these courts, and as affording the best instiuction for those
who wish information about their procedure."— Scotsman.
"a capital manual for those who need some guidance in the subject which
it treats.'"— NuKTH British Daily Mail.
" A clear and careful manual .... The Appendix includes a large amount
of varied and practically useful matter."— Christian Leader.
The Modern Scottish Pulpit : Sermons by
Eminent Presbyterian Ministers of various Denomina-
tions. 2 vols., demy 8vo, (577 pp.)) 3/6 each, sold sepa-
rately.
•' There are weighty doctrinal discourses, scholarly expositions of Scripture,
ably maintained theses, pointed practical exhortations, and fervent evangel-
ical appeals. The styles vary from the severely classic to the faultlessly
rhetoric. Variety and unity are apparent throughout. They are designed to
be useful rather than ornamental. They possess the best characteristics of
what has been known as distinctively Scottish preaching." — Daily Review.
" Here are discourses * sound as a bell.' " — C. H. Spurgeon.
"The subjects treated are very varied, and the modes of treatment equally
so ; but one and all of them, we believe, give forth a certain sound on the^
great verities of the gospel."— 0. S. Magazine.
JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
Perth — Ecclesiastical Annals of Perth to
the Period of the Reformation. By Robert Scott
FiTTis, 8vo, cl. 6s.
" One of the best local histories we have seen .... The scheme of arrange-
tment is so simple and orderly that an index might have been dispensed with,
but Mr Fittis is too painstaking and thorough a workman to omit what is
.generally regarded as an indispensable adjunct to a large historical book, and
his index is a satisfactory bit of workmanship."— Daily Review.
" Most attractive to those who have any leaning towards local antiquarian
studies We can sincerely commend this book to all who desire to
deepen their acquaintance with the condition of Scotland prior to and at the
Reformation, and can only wish that every reader may derive the same plea-
:sure from its perusal as it brought to us."— ORiaiNAL Secession Magazine.
Communion and other Sermons. By the Pev.
William Forbes, A.M., late Minister of Tarbat, Easter
Boss. Partly Edited by the late Rev. John Kennedy,
D.D., Dingwall. Completed, with Life by Rev. M.
Macgregor, M.A., lerintosh. Cr. 8vo, 3/6.
" We have here sermons of the good old evangelical type, rich in Scriptural
truth and unction."— Presbyterian Churchman.
"Sermons, all on important topics, all thoroughly evangelical, and they
^all afford evidence of ability and scholarship of no mean order This
volume will be prized by all who love and value pure Gospel truth."— iie-
,formed Presbyterian Witness.
" The sermons speak with no uncertain sound of the great truths of
righteousness, temperance, and the judgment to come, and their voice is
always powerful, and often most eloquent." — Northern Chronicle.
"The sermons were partly edited by the Rev. Dr. Kennedy of Dingwall. . .
fifteen in number, are earnest and evangelical, and give evidence of
•careful preparation."— iVor^Aern Ensign.
" They are evidently the production of a man of deep earnest piety, and
•of considerable culture and accomplishments." — Original Secess-ion Magazine.
"We commend the volume as furnishing a very admirable example of
preaching which was common in the days of the fathers in Ross-shire."- -
Free Church Monthly.
"They form an excellent record of faithful work done." — John 0' Groat
Journal.
A Method of Prayer, with Scripture Ex-
pressions proper to be used under each Head. By the
Rev, Matthew Henry. 16mo, cloth, (288 pp.) 1/.
€UR MOTHER: A LIFE PICTURE; being a Life of Mrs.
Krummacher, xvife of Author of " The Suffering Saviour"
etc. Translated from the German by a well-known
Author. Fcap. 8vo, cloth, price 1/6.
"Possesses all the pathos, sweet simplicity, and lofty teaching which
<;haracterises the best German story writers."— Irish Baptist Magazine.
"Will be perused with profit and delight."— Alloa Circular.
"Of more than ordinary interest."— Evening Telegraph.
"The book is a very attractive one."— Christian Banner.
^' An unusually attractive biogmphy."— Christian Treasury.
10 JAMES GEMiMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
Demy 16mo, in Ornamental Cloth Covers.
BIOGRAPHIES OP SCOTTISH
REPORMBRS, MARTYRS,
PREACHERS, etc.
BY JEAN L. WATSON.
LIFE OF RICHARD CAMERON. 70 pp., with View of
Monument at Airsmoss, and of Falkland Palace, price 6d.
" A brief and appreciative biography of C&m&con."- -Edinburgh Courant.
LIFE OF HUGH MILLER. 132 pp., with View of Bass
Rock on Cover, price 9d.
" A well-condensed biographical notice."— Daily Review.
LIFE OF RALPH ERSKINE. 99 pp., with Portrait,,
price 9d.
"This lady wields tlie pen of a ready writer." — Northern Ensign.
LIFE OF EBENEZER ERSKINE 104 pp., with Portrait,.
price 9d.
" Few religious biographies are more instructive,"— LeiiTi Burghs Pilot.
LIFE OF THOMAS GUTHRIE, D.D. 106 pp., with Por-
trait and Illustration on Cover, price 9d.
" A short, well-written sketch of the great preacher's life and wovk."— Rock.
LIFE OF DONALD CARGILL 60 pp., with Views of
Glasgow Cathedral, and Martyrs' Monument, Edinburgh,^
price 6d.
"The reader will lay down exclaiming, 'Grand old Donald Cargill!'" —
Kirkcudbright Advertiser.
LIFE OF ROBERT MURRAY M'CHEYNE With View
of his Church in Dundee, price 9d.
" Could not have a briefer or \)QiteT."— Aberdeen Journal.
LIFE OF THOMAS CHALMERS, D.D., LLD. With View
of Kilmany Church, 134 pp. , price 9d.
" Essentially just and true, as it certainly is attractive."— X>at7t/ Review.
LIFE OF NORMAN MACLEOD. D.D. With Portrait andl
View of Barony Church on cover, price 9d.
"Well written .... the leading events pass rapidly before us. "—iJ^ormed:
Presbyterian Witness.
JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH. 11
BY ROBERT MACGREGOR.
LIFE OF JOHN MACDONALD, D.D., "The Apostle of
the North." 96 pp., price 9d.
" In the ninety-six pages of this book there is not one without interest."—
HuNTLY Express.
THE JESUITS ; a Sketch of the Origin and Progress of the
Society of Jesus. 110 pp., price 9d.
" Contains pages of thrilling interest."— Dumfries Advertiser.
MEMORIALS OF THE BASS ROCK. 136 pp., price 9d.
"A very interesting account of the Rock."— Kelso Chronicle.
BY JOHN KER, D.D.
THE ERSKINES : EBENEZER AND RALPH. With En-
graving of Gairney Bridge, price 6d.
" These biographies are well written. The leading events in each life pass
rapidly before us, and the story is so well told that the reader will find it
difficult to lay down any of the 'Lives' until he has finished it."— Reformed
Presbyterian Witness.
BY ANNIE C. MACLEOD.
GIROLAMO SAVONAROLA {LIFE AND TIMES OF).
Demy 16mo, cloth, 132 pp., with Portrait, price 9d.
" The author is a daughter of the late Dr. ]S"orman 3tIacleod. She has done
her work extremely well."— Scotsman.
" To those who have little time to read, desire to read profitably, and for
the young who must necessarily begin their studies of great subjects with
short books, this life of Savonarola can be most confidently recommended as
a slight sketch of Florence in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and also-
of that time."— Edinburgh Courant.
BY JEAN L. WATSON.
THE WATER-CRESS BOY. Demy 16mo, cloth, with
Frontispiece, price 6d.
"This is a fresh pretty little story." — Courant.
WILLIE'S BRINGING UP. Demy 16mo, limp cloth, with
Frontispiece, price 6d.
"Forms a wonderfully true picture of Scottish peasant life. Must have
been drawn from nature."— Fifeshire Advertiser.
" The story is well told."— Christian Treasury.
" This is a nice story very becomingly told in simple language. ...... It is
true to the life, as few readers frill fail to see."— Hawick Express.
u2
12 JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
BY JOHN KER, D.D., and J. L. WATSON.
THE ERSKINES: EBENEZER AND RALPH. Cr. 8vo,
cloth, with Two Portraits and Engraving of Gairney
Bridge. Price 1/6.
"This is tiie joint production of a distinguished U. P. divine and a well-
known Free Church authoress. They have succeeded between them in
making a very readable book It is written in an agreeable and attrac-
tive style, which is certain to ensure its popularity."— Edinburgh Courant.
BY JEAN L. WATSON.
Life of Dr Andrew Thomson, Minister of
St. George's Church, Edinburgh. Price 1/6
' ' Her biography will be prized by many admirers of its subject. "—Scotsman.
"Has done her work with conscientious care."— Aberdeen Free Press.
"Interesting, .... will do much to supply a long-felt want."— Daily
Review.
PRINCIPAL CANDUSH.
LIFE OF ROBERT SMITH CANDLISH, D.D.,
Minister of Free St. George's Church, and Principal of
the New College, Edinburgh. By Jean L. Watson.
Crown 8vo, cloth, with portrait, price 2/.
" In selection, arrangement, and graphic description, the little volume is
all that could be desired."— Edinburgh Courant.
THOMAS BOSTON (LIFE AND TIMES OF), Pastor of
Ettrick. Crown 8vo, cloth, price 2/.
"That the autobiography is so little known is much to be regretted : it is a
picture of one of the most momentous periods in the religious history of
Scotland ; it is, moreover, the mirror of a life spent in high communion with
God, and gifted with a vision penetrating far into the kingdom. Miss
Watson's ' Life ' is based upon this larger work, and abundant extracts ai*e
given from it. She has selected her materials wisely, and the result is a
book which cannot fail to interest."— British Messenger.
Disruption Memories : being the Personal
Narrative of a Lay Voluntary. With Remarks on the
Present Condition of the Church. Fcap. 8vo, 1/.
"Of the many books about the Disruption this is one of the most read-
able."— Courant.
The School of Christ : a Song to Christ the
Lord. A Metrical Rhyme. Crown 8vo, post free 1/.
" The spirit breathed is one saturated with Scripture, and one of glowing
admiration of Christ, His truth and ways."— 0. S. Magazine.
" The spirit breathed is admirable."— Kef. Press. Magazine.
JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH. 13
Just published, cr. 8vo, cloth, (341^^.), price 5/.
REAL RELIGION AND REAL LIFE.
BY THE
Rev. SAMUEL MACNAUGHTON, M.A.,
AUTHOR OF " OUR CHILDREN FOR CHRIST," " DOCTRINE AND DOUBT," ETC. ETC.
" ' Real Religion and Real Life ' is clear in style, practical in aim, direct
In appeal, and the discourses are models of what popular preaching should
1)6. They deserve the study of all who desire to cultivate a mode of speaking
which shall interest and impress alike the educated and the uneducated." —
The Literary World.
"A volume of rare excellence." — Christian Commonwealth.
" A strong, healthy book, admirably suited to present times. Many striking
thoughts will be found in its pages The author is widely known by
his other works." — The Christian.
" The conspicuous typographical clearness of this collection of discourses
is a fair measure of its inner beauty. . . , 'The Reality of God,' * The Reality
of Sin,' ' Christian Toleration,' are ensamples of the deep things discussed by
this chastened preacher to men For those content with solid thought-
fulness nothing could be better than the book before us." — The Methodist
Recorder.
"A clear, vigorous, and able exposition of the duty of Christian men to
-carry their Christianity into daily life. In every sense of the word it is a
well-timed book Take it as a whole it is one of the most readable and
freshest religious books that has appeared for a long time, and it well deserves
and will receive general acceptance." — Dundee Advertiser.
"By the publication of this volume the author will add to his reputation
as a learned theologian and able preacher His pages are eminently
readable, pervaded as they are all through with earnest thought, often new,
and always unhackneyed and lucidly expressed."— Drtm/ries Standard.
" Some of these discourses are of high excellence."— Giasgrow Herald.
" Marked by much intelligence and earnestness." — Scottish Leader.
" These sermons are fitted to be widely useful, and. they cannot be too ex-
tensively c\tc\\\2XqA." —Liverpool Mercury.
"Mr. MacNaughton's sermons are quite worthy of a place beside some of
the best of his land. They are fresh in treatment, original in idea, tolerant
in spirit, and quite in touch with the most recent thought. They breathe
the spirit of devout thoughtfulness. No one can read them without having
that true delight of a thoughtful reader,- viz., the mind stirred and led
unconsciously into new tracts of meditation The book as a whole will
prove suggestive to many preachers, and helpful to many believers."— CA»-t«'-
tian Advocate. •
14 JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
Treatise on the Lord's Supper ; Its Nature^
Uses, Ends, and Perpetual Obligation. Exposure of
Romanist and Ritualistic Perversions. With Practical
Directions for its Observance. By Prof. Thomas
Houston, D.D., R, P. Church of Ireland, Knockhracken,
Belfast. Crown 8vo, (350 pp.)? price 5/.
" This work, uudertaken by Dr. Houston partly at the suggestion of friends
who knew his competency, is really a treatise on the Lord's Supper. The
author is well acquainted with the history aud literature of the subject, and
has succeeded in his aim, which was to present a comprehensive exhibition
of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper as it appeared in its primitive institu-
tion and apostolic practice, and as it is held forth in the symbolic books of
the purest Protestant Churches. The questions, ancient and modern, that
have arisen round this sacrament are more or less touched upon — the ' un-
fermented wine' question, and also simultaneous communion, being referred
to However the shaking theology of the present day may receive the
work, it is full of the 'old wine ' of Scriptural and Puritan teaching, such as
would have delighted the communicants of other days, and will still be re-
lished by those who prefer the old to the new, for the old is better
This volume is a compact treatise, elegantly got up and full of excellent
matter." — Presbyterian Monthly.
"The volume is the result of extensive reading and much thought. The
list of books upon the subjects which appear in the Appendix is taken from
all sections of the Church of Christ, and will give the reader some idea of
the literature of the question The book will repay an attentive per-
usal, and is well fitted to impress on devout readers the spiritual advantages
to be derived from the frequent observance of the ordinance." — Scottish Con-
gregational Magazine.
" Full of excellent m^iiev."— Presbyterian Monthly.
" A most valuable treatise on the Lord's Supper."— Irish Baptist Maga-
zine.
" The result of extensive reading and much thought."— Scottish Congre-
gational Magazine.
The Dominion and Glory of the Redeemer,
The Support and Confidence of the Church, and the Joy
of the Saints. By Prof. Thomas Houston, D.D., R.
P. Church of Ireland, Knockhracken, Belfast. Crown
8vo, cl., with port., (48U pp.), price 5/.
"We have here twenty-three sermons selected by Dr. Houston from 'the
numerous manuscripts that have been accumulating during a lengthened
ministry of more than fifty-two years.' . . . . ' The chief aim in delivering
these discourses was to display the Saviour in the transcendent glory of His
Person, Character, and "Work, .... while some of the subjects are more
directly connected with the subjective condition of believers — their labours,
trials, conflicts, and deliverances in life and death ' . . . . The sermons are
Scriptural, sound, earnest, and mingle the doctrinal and practical elements
as these should ever be mingled in the preaching of the Word. There are no
modern vagaries or aberrations." — Witness.
" From the author's familiar acquaintance with the original languages, he
often .... throws what will be to the unlearned reader new or clearer
light on a word or phrase None more suitable could be found for
family reading on the evening of the Sabbath." — The Covenanter.
The Scots Worthies. By John Howie, of
Lochgoin. New edition, with Notes, 464 pp., 32mo, 6d,
or in cloth 1/.
JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH. 15
Dissertations on the Philosophy of the Crea-
tion and the First Ten Chapters of Genesis allegorized in
Mythology : containing Expositions of the Ancient Cos-
mogonies, the Invention of Hieroglyphics and of the
Ancient Hebrew Language and Alphabet. By William
Galloway, M.A., Ph.D., M.D., Licentiate of the Royal
College of Physicians, Edinburgh, and of the Royal
College of Surgeons, Edinburgh. Demy 8vo, (660 pp.,)
price 14/
" The style is a pleasing one and free from obscurity, and the book through*
out is a monument of careful thought and laborious research."— Dundee
Courier and Argus.
"A monument of patient industry and devotion, .... a welcome intro-
duction to lives of thought and research, .... will prove a useful repertory
of out-of-the-way information."— ^ft^rrfee^t Journal.
"Curious and interesting."— C/im«ian World Pulpit.
" Immense labour has been evidently spent in preparing this work, which
contains many curious facts "—1 he Bookseller.
"One of the ablest, noblest, and most instructive works which have in
recent years been written on the scientific, and the Biblical aspects of the
creation, .... a most brilliant contribution towards current controversies,
and sure to take a first position Ministers, divinity students, teachers,
and thoughtful Christians generally ought to lose no time in securing this
invaluable, charming, and stimulating work." — Oldham Chronicle.
"Crammed with learning." — North British Mail.
" This work is both learned and luminous He is most familiar with
the literature of his great theme, and hence his volume, which is well got up,
is quite a storehouse of interesting and important fact and arguments
deserves a wide circulation."— Sword and Trowel.
The Future as Revealed in Divine Predic-
tion. By the Rev. JOHN STORIE, late minister of
ST. Andrew's, hobart ; author of " the sacraments ; "
"the paganism of ROME ;" etc. Cr. 8vo, cL, price bj
"Proceeds on strictly literal lines of interpretation, .... contains many
valuable hints on passages taken from both the Old and New Testaments,
. . . . the book will yield interest to students of prophecy ; bears the impress
of earnest thought and honest purpose."— The Christian.
" I look upon your book as one of, if not, the very best books on the Reve-
lation of our beloved Lord I have read it with the intensest plea-
sure."— Major-Gen. HOGGAN, C.B.
In the Press.
The Heroic Days of the Church : being
Sketches in the Struggle for Religious Liberty. By
Rev. David Mrrson, M.A., B.D., Presbyterian Church
of England, Stamfordham. Crown 8vo, cl., price 2/6.
In the Press.
South African Traits. B}^ the Rev. James
MACKINNON, Edinbwj^h. Cr. 8vo, cL, price 7/6.
U 3
16 JAMES GEMMELL, GEORGE IV. BRIDGE, EDINBURGH.
IMPORTANT BOOK (ISSUED ANNUALLY), INVALUABLE TO EVERY
CLERGYMAN.
The Pastors Diary and Daily Record.
Non-Denominational. Prepared by Rev. Lewis H.
Jordan, B.D., Erskine Church, Montreal. Hand-
somely bound in flexible covers, of convenient size for
pocket. Price 2/.
"Decidedly the most comprehensive and cheapest yet produced. Every
minister should get it."— Prksbyterian Churchman.
" We have used the Diary, and have found it all that could be desired."—
Donoreqational Magazine.
Biblical Geography in a Nutshell, contain-
ing many of the most recent Identifications. With
Specially Prepared Map. By M. Shekleton. Cr. 8vo,
cloth, price 3/.
" The Book will be found of real service in the systematic study of the
Scriptures."— Scotsman.
"The study is made not only instructive but delightful."— The League
Journal.
Wilson's Tales of the Borders and of Scot-
land. Vols, sold separately, each vol. complete in itself.
Recently issued, in 8 vols., new edition, 2/ per vol.
"Mr James Gemmell adds to the literature of this time of year in a very
pleasant way. He produces a new edition of Wilson's Tales of the Borders.
It is not, as we understand it, to be a complete work, but is to contain a
selection of some of the best stories If the first two volumes which
we have received are to be taken as specimens of what the others will be,
then a distinct good is to be done to the reading public by their iaaue."— The
Scotsman.
"One of the neatest and cheapest we have seen, each volume being of cr.
8vo size, handsomely bound, with gilt top, and published at two shillings,
certainly a very moderate price for a book of 224 pages All who wish,
in the words of Sir Walter Scott, to read of— 'Lovers' sleights, of ladies'
charms, of witches' spells, of warriors' arms,' cannot do better than procure
these volumes, which contain quite a storehouse of material bearing upon the
hills, glens, and folk-lore of Scotland."— Liverpool Mercury.
"It is a great boon to ordinary readers to have these admirable tales
placed so handsomely and so cheaply before them. The series of eight
volumes furnishes as delightful a collection as any one could desire."— 27jc
Presbyterian Churchman.
"This is one of the best collections of stories ever published." — Bookseller.
"There are, we imagine, few Scotchmen and Scotchwomen who are un-
acquainted with these charming stories. But there are also few, we are sure,
who will not welcome such an opportunity as these volumes present of
renewing their acquaintance ; and whoever sits down to read the stories
will soon be surprised into a feeling of regret that there are not so many,
but so few to read. Time flies quickly when one is listening to a Border
tale, even though it be to some extent familiar."— Z)ai7?/ Review.
"Seeing that on the average about a dozen complete stories appear in
each volume, nicely printed and neatly bound, for a florin, the opportunity
is afforded of adding a large amount of standard fiction to any library at a
moderate cost." — Daily Chronicle.
J//
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