■3qc*K.x*jgtytjBUUi ■ lUji ■lMBP»«3QBwg5^BBMWWWMWI 2£r?a!i£b l&rabtng* «.". Vil i is'? f ; L EC T ! ON S f ro ill n THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES GIFT OF PROF. MALBONE W. GRAHAM SELECTIONS FROM THE PROSE WRITINGS OF MATTHEW ARNOLD Edited with Notes and an Introduction BY LEWIS E. GATES w WW NEW YORK HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY Copyright, 1897, BY HENRY HOLT & CO. PREFACE. These Selections from Arnold are meant to go with the Selections from Newman already included in Eng- lish Readings. Newman and Arnold were both Oxford men ; both were devoted believers in the academic ideal; both discussed and dealt practically with edu- cational problems, and yet both touched life in many other ways and are remembered as men of letters or leaders of thought, rather than as mere academicians. Although Arnold never imposed himself on his gener- ation as did Newman, never ruled the imaginations of large masses of men, or was so prevailing and picturesque a figure as Newman, yet no less than New- man he represents one distinct phase of nineteenth- century academic culture; from 1855 to 1870 he was probably the man of letters whom the younger genera- tion at Oxford most nearly accepted as their natural spokesman. The Selections aim to present, in the briefest possible compass, what is most characteristic in Arnold's criti- cism of literature and life. His conception of the critic was as the guardian of culture, as called upon to pass judgment on the various expressions of life, and especially upon books in their relation to life, and to determine their influence on the temper and ideals of the public. He is to be an adept in life, 691368 iv PREFACE. a diviner of the essentials that underlie the multi- form play of human energy ; he must know life inti- mately; and being concerned that life shall have its best quality, he will strive for this perfection not only through what he says about books, but also through direct comment on those modes of living — those ideals — which his analysis and imagination detect as ruling his contemporaries. In obedience to this conception of the critic, Arnold had much to say not only on poetry and belles lettres, but on politics, religion, theology, and the general social con- ditions of his time. The Selections include one or more of his characteristic comments on each of these topics. It should also be noted that many of the Selections are complete essays or lectures, not mere extracts. The Function of Criticism at the Present Time is an en- tire essay; On Translating Homer is the entire first lecture on this subject; Oxford and Philistinism and Culture and Anarchy are entire prefaces or introduc- tions; Compulsory Education and " Life a Dream " are entire Letters; Literature and Science and Emerson are entire Discourses — two of the three that Arnold gave repeatedly in America. His Discourses in America stood specially high in Arnold's favor; shortly before his death he spoke of the book as that " by which, of all his prose-writings, he should most wish to be re- membered." The Selections are believed also to present Arnold's style adequately throughout its whole range. In some respects his style, despite possible faults of manner that will later be considered, is the best model avail- PRE FA CE. V able for students of prose. It is not so idiosyncratic as are the styles of Carlyle or Mr. Ruskin, not so inimitably individual; it is more conventional and unimpassioned, more expressive of the mood of prose, with little of the color and few of the overtones of poetry. Yet it is an intensely vital style, and every- where exemplifies not simply the logic of good writing, but the intimate correspondence of phrase with thought and mood that great writers of prose continually secure. Individual it therefore is, and yet not arbitrarily or forbiddingly individual. Its merits and possible short- comings are analyzed at length in the Introduction. The more important dates in Arnold's life and a list of his main publications are given just after the Intro- duction. ■ A brief sketch of his life may be found in Men of the Time, ed. 1887; a longer, more appreciative sketch, in Eminent Persons, or Biographies reprinted from the Times, vol. iv. Mr. Andrew Lang's article on Arnold, in the Century for April, 1882, also contains much interesting biographical detail. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., August, 1S97. CONTENTS. Introduction : PAGB I. Arnold's Manner, . ix II. Criticism of Life, • . . xiv III. Theory of Culture, . . xxii IV. Ethical Bias, • xxxii V. Literary Criticism, xliii VI. Appreciations, • li VII. Style, lix VIII. Relation to his Times, . • lxxvii Selections : * ""The Function of Criticism (1865), .... On Translating Homer (1861), .... Philology and Literature (1862), .... ^The Grand Style (1862) "^Style in Literature (1866), ..... pfature in English Poetry (1866), .... Poetry and Science (1S63) 102 literature and Science (1882), .... 104 * The date assigned each Selection is that of its earliest appear- ance in print. V11J CONTENTS. Uxford and Philistinism (1865), Philistinism (1863), . . . vDulture and Anarchy (1867), Sweetness and Light (1867), . Hebraism and Hellenism (1868), N The Dangers of Puritanism (1868), The Not Ourselves (1871), Paris and the Senses (1873), . The Celt and the Teuton (1866), The Modern Englishman (1866), . Compulsory Education (1867), . " Life a Dream " (1870), . . America (1869), xlmerson (1884), . Notes ... . PAGE . 132 139 . 144 147 . l8l 193 . 204 218 . 224 235 . 242 250 . 258 265 . 295 INTRODUCTION. Admirers of Arnold's prose find it well to admit frankly that his style has an unfortunate knack of exciting prejudice. Emerson has somewhere spoken of the unkind trick fate plays a man when it gives him a strut in his gait. Here and there in Arnold's prose, there is just a trace — sometimes more than a trace — of such a strut. He condescends to his readers with a gracious elaborateness ; he is at great pains to make them feel that they are his equals ; he undervalues him- self playfully ; he assures us that " he is an unlearned belletristic trifler"; 1 he insists over and over again that " he is an unpretending writer, without a phil- osophy based on interdependent, subordinate, and coherent principles." 2 All this he does, of course, smilingly ; but the smile seems to many on whom its favors fall, supercilious ; and the playful undervalua- tion of self looks shrewdly like an affectation. He is very debonair, — this apologetic writer ; very self-as- sured ; at times even jaunty. 3 Thorough-going admirers of Arnold have always 1 Celtic Literature, p. 21. 2 Culture and Anarchy, p. 152 ; Friendship's Garland, p. 273. 3 Various critics have complained of Arnold's tone and bearing. Mr. Saintsbury, for example, objects to his " mincing" manner j Professor Jowett, to his " flippancy." x INTRODUCTION. relished this strain in his style ; they have enjoyed its delicate challenge, the nice duplicity of its innuendoes; they have found its insinuations and its covert, satirical humor infinitely entertaining and stimulating. More- over, however seriously disposed they may have been, however exacting of all the virtues from the author of their choice, they have been able to reconcile their enjoyment of Arnold with their serious inclinations, for they have been confident that these tricks of manner implied no essential or radical defect in Arnold's humanity, no lack either of sincerity or of earnestness or of broad sympathy. Such admirers and interpreters of Arnold have been amply justified of their confidence since the publication in 1895 of Arnold's Letters. The Arnold of these letters is a man the essential integrity — whole- ness — of whose nature is incontestable. His sincerity, kindliness, wide-ranging sympathy with all classes of men, are unmistakably expressed on every page of his correspondence. We see him having to do with people widely diverse in their relations to him ; with those close of kin, with chance friends, with many men of business or officials, with a wide circle of literary acquaintances, with workingmen, and with foreign savants. In all of his intercourse the same sweet-tempered frankness and the same readiness of sympathy are manifest. There is never a trace of the duplicity or the treacherous irony that are to be found in much of his prose. Moreover, the record that these Letters contain of close application to uncongenial tasks must have been a revelation to many readers who have had to rely INTRODUCTION. XI upon books for their knowledge of literary men. Popular caricatures of Arnold had represented him as "a high priest of the kid-glove persuasion," as an incorrigible dilettante, as a kind of literary fop idling his time away over poetry and recommending the parmaceti of culture as the sovereignest thing in nature for the inward bruises of the spirit. This con- ception of Arnold, if it has at all maintained itself, certainly cannot survive the revelations of the Letters. The truth is beyond cavil that he was one of the most self-sacrificingly laborious men of his time. For a long period of years Arnold held the post of inspector of schools. Day after day, and week after week, he gave up one of the finest of minds, one of the most sensitive of temperaments, one of the most delicate of literary organizations, to the drudgery of examining in its minutest details the work of the schools in such elementary subjects as mathematics and grammar. On January 7, 1863, he writes to his mother, "I am now at the work I dislike most in the world — looking over and marking examina- tion papers. I was stopped last week by my eyes, and the last year or two these sixty papers a day of close hand-writing to read have, I am sorry to say, much tried my eyes for the time." ' Two years later he laments again: "I am being driven furious by seven hundred closely-written grammar papers, which I have to look over." ' During these years he was holding the Chair of Poetry at Oxford, and he had long since established his reputation as one of the 1 Letters, i. 207. 5 Letters, i. 285 Xll INTRODUCTION. foremost of the younger poets. Yet for a livelihood he was forced still to endure — and he endured them till within a few years of his death in 1888 — the exactions of this wearing and exasperating drudgery. More- over, despite occasional outbursts of impatience, he gave himself to the work freely, heartily, and effect- ively. He was sent on several occasions to the Con- tinent to examine and report on foreign school systems ; his reports on German and French educa- tion show immense diligence of investigation, a thorough grasp of detail, and patience and persistence in the acquisition of facts that in and for themselves must have been unattractive and unrewarding. The record of this severe labor is to be found in Arnold's Letters, and it must dispose once for all of any charge that he was a mere dilettante and coiner of phrases. Through a long period of years he was working diligently, wearisomely, in minutely prac- tical ways, to better the educational system of Eng- land ; he was persistently striving both to spread sounder ideals of elementary education and to make more effective the system actually in vogue. And thus, unpretentiously and laboriously, he was serv- ing the cause of sweetness and light as well as through his somewhat debonair contributions to literature. In another way his Letters have done much to reveal the innermost core of Arnold's nature, and so, ultimately, to explain the genesis of his prose. They place it beyond a doubt that in all he wrote Arnold had an underlying purpose, clearly apprehended and faithfully pursued. In 1867, in a letter to his mother, he says : " I more and more become conscious of INTRODUCTION. Xlli having something to do and of a resolution to do it. . . Whether one lives long or not, to be less and less personal in one's desires and workings is the great matter." ' In a letter of 1863 he had already written in much the same strain : " However, one cannot change English ideas as much as, if I live, I hope to change them, without saying imperturbably what one thinks, and making a good many people uncomfort- able." And in a letter of the same year he exclaims : "It is very animating to think that one at last has a chance of getting at the English public. Such a pub- lic as it is, and such a work as one wants to do with it." 3 A work to do ! The phrase recalls Cardinal Newman and the well-known anecdote of his Sicilian illness, when through all the days of greatest danger he insisted that he should get well because he had a work to do in England. Despite Arnold's difference in temperament from Newman and the widely dis- similar task he proposed to himself, he was no less in earnest than Newman, and no less convinced of the importance of his task. The occasional supercilious jauntiness of Arnold's style, then, need not trouble even the most consci- entious of his admirers. To many of his readers it is in itself, as has been already suggested, delightfully stimulating. Others, the more conscientious folk and perhaps also the severer judges of literary quality, are bound to find it artistically a blemish; but they need not at any rate regard it as implying any radical defect in Arnold's humanity or as the result of cheap 1 Letters, i. 400. J Letters, i. 225. 3 Letters, i. 233. xiv IN TROD UC TION. cynicism or of inadequate sympathy. In point of fact, the true account of the matter seems rather to lie in the paradox that the apparent superciliousness of Arnold's style comes from the very intensity of his moral earnestness, and that the limitations of his style and method are largely due to the strenuousness of his moral purpose. II. What, then, was Arnold's controlling purpose in his prose writing ? What was " the work " that he " wanted to do with the English public " ? In trying to find answers to these questions it will be well first to have recourse to stray phrases in Arnold's prose ; these phrases will give incidental glimpses, from differ- ent points of view, of his central ideal ; later, their fragmentary suggestions may be brought together into something like a comprehensive formula. In the lectures on Celtic Literature Arnold points out in closing that it has been his aim to lead English- men to " reunite themselves with their better mind and with the world through science " ; that he has sought to help them "conquer the hard unintelligence, which was just then their bane ; to supple and reduce it by culture, by a growth in the variety, fullness, and sweet- ness of their spiritual life." In the Preface to his first volume of Essays he explains that he is trying " to pull out a few more stops in that powerful but at present somewhat narrow-toned organ, the modern English- man." In Culture and Anarchy he assures us that his object is to convince men of the value of " culture "; introduction: xv to incite them to the pursuit of "perfection"; to help "make reason and the will of God prevail." And again in the same work he declares that he is striving to intensify throughout England "the impulse to the development of the whole man, to connecting and harmonizing all parts of him, perfecting all, leaving none to take their chance." These phrases give, often with capricious pictur- esqueness, hints of the prevailing intention with which Arnold writes. They may well be supplemented by a series of phrases in which, in similarly picturesque fashion, he finds fault with life as it actually exists in England, with the individual Englishman as he encounters him from day to day ; these phrases, through their critical implications, also reveal the pur- pose that is always present in Arnold's mind, when he addresses his countrymen. "Provinciality," Arnold points out as a widely prevalent and injurious charac- teristic of English literature ; it argues a lack of centrality, carelessness of ideal excellence, undue devotion to relatively unimportant matters. Again, "arbitrariness," and "eccentricity" are noticeable traits both of English literature and scholarship ; Arnold finds them everywhere deforming Professor Newman's interpretations of Homer, and he further comments on them as in varying degrees " the great defect of English intellect — the great blemish of English literature." In religion he takes special exception to the "loss of totality" that results, from sectarianism ; this is the penalty, Arnold contends, that the Nonconformist pays for his hostility to the established church ; in his pursuit of his own special xvi INTRODUCTION. enthusiasm the Nonconformist becomes, like Ephraim, "a wild ass alone by himself." From all these brief quotations this much at least is plain, that what Arnold is continually recommend- ing is the complete development of the human type, and that what he is condemning is departure from some finely conceived ideal of human excellence — from some scheme of human nature in which all its powers have full and harmonious play. The various phrases that have been quoted, alike the positive and the negative ones, imply as Arnold's continual pur- pose in his prose-writings the recommendation of this ideal of human excellence and the illustration of the evils that result from its neglect. The significance and the scope of this purpose will become clearer, however, if we consider some of the imperfect ideals which Arnold finds operative in place of this absolute ideal, and note their misleading and depraving effects. One such partial ideal is the worship of the excessively practical and the relentlessly utilitarian as the only things in life worth while. England is a prevailingly practical nation, and our age is a prevailingly practical age ; the unregenerate product of this nation and age is the Philistine, and against the Philistine Arnold never wearies of inveighing. The Philistine is the swaggering enemy of the chil- dren of light, of the chosen people, of those who love art and ideas disinterestedly. The Philistine cares- solely for business, for developing the material resources of the country, for starting companies, building bridges, making railways, and establishing plants. The machinery of life — its material organ- INTRODUCTION. xvu ization — monopolizes all his attention. He judges of life by the outside, and is careless of the things of the spirit. The Philistine may, of course, be religious ; but his religion is as materialistic as his everyday existence ; his heaven is a triumph of engi- neering skill and his ideal of future bliss is, in Sydney Smith's phrase, to eat "pdte's de foie gras to the sound of trumpets." Against men of this class Arnold can- not show himself too cynically severe ; they are piti- ful distortions ; the practical instincts have usurped, and have destroyed the symmetry and integrity of the human type. The senses and the will to live are mo- nopolizing and determine all the man's energy toward utilitarian ends. The power of beauty, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of social manners are atrophied. Society is in serious danger unless men of this class can be touched with a sense of their shortcomings ; made aware of the larger values of life ; made pervious to ideas ; brought to recognize the importance of the things of the mind and the spirit. Another partial ideal, the prevalence of which Arnold laments, is the narrowly and unintelligently religious ideal. The middle class Englishman is according to Arnold a natural Hebraist; he is pre-occupied with matters of conduct and careless about things of the mind; he is negligent of beauty and abstract truth, of all those interests in life which had for the Greek of old, and still have for the modern man of " Hellen- istic " temper, such inalienable charm. The Puritan- ism of the seventeenth century was the almost unrestricted expression of the Hebraistic temper, and xvm INTRODUCTION. from the conceptions of life that were then wrought out, the middle classes in England have never wholly escaped. The Puritans looked out upon life with a narrow vision, recognized only a few of its varied in- terests, and provided for the needs of only a part of man's nature. Yet their theories and conceptions of life — theories and conceptions that were limited in the first place by the age in which they originated, and in the second place by a Hebraistic lack of sensitiveness to the manifold charm of beauty and knowledge — these limited theories and conceptions have imposed themselves constrainingly on many generations of Englishmen. To-day they remain, in all their nar- rowness and with an ever increasing disproportion to existing conditions, the most influential guiding prin- ciples of large masses of men. Such men spend their lives in a round of petty religious meetings and em- ployments. They think all truth is summed up in their little cut and dried Biblical interpretations. New truth is uninteresting or dangerous. Art dis- tracts from religion, and is a siren against whose seductive chanting the discreet religious Ulysses seals his ears. To Arnold this whole view of life seems sadly mistaken, and the men who hold it seem fan- tastic distortions of the authentic human type. The absurdities and the dangers of the unrestricted Hebra- istic ideal he satirizes or laments in Culture and Anarchy, in Literature and Dogma, in God and the Bible, and in St. Paul and Protestantism. Still another kind of deformity arises when the in- tellect grows self-assertive and develops overween- ingly. To this kind of distortion the modern man ui INTRODUCTION. XIX science is specially prone ; his exclusive study of material facts leads to crude, unregenerate strength of intellect, and leaves him careless of the value truth may have for the spirit, and of its glimmering sugges- tions of beauty. Yes, and for the philosopher and the scholar, too, over-intellectualism has its peculiar dan- gers. The devotee of a system of thought is apt to lose touch with the real values of life, and in his exor- bitant desire for unity and thoroughness of organiza- tion, to miss the free play of vital forces that gives to life its manifold charm, its infinite variety, and its ultimate reality. Bentham and Comte are ex- amples of the evil effects of this rabid pursuit of system. :i Culture is always assigning to system- makers and systems a smaller share in the bent of human destiny than their friends like." ' As for the pedant he is merely the miser of facts, who grows withered in hoarding the vain fragments of precious ore of whose use he has lost the sense. Men of all these various types offend through their fanatical devotion to truth ; for, indeed, as someone has in recent years well said, the intellect is " but a parvenu" and the other powers of life, despite the Napoleonic irresistibleness of the newcomer, have rights that de- serve respect. Over-intellectualism, then, like the over-development of any other power, leads to dis- proportion and disorder. Such being some of the partial ideals against which Arnold warns his readers, what account does he give of that perfect human type in all its integrity, in terms 1 Culture and Anarchy, p. 33. XX INTRODUCTION. of which he criticises these aberrations or deformities ? To attempt an exact definition of this type would perhaps be a bit presumptuous and grotesque, and, with his usual sureness of taste, Arnold has avoided the experiment. But in many passages he has recorded clearly enough his notion of the powers in man that are essential to his humanity, and that must all be duly recognized and developed, if man is to attain in its full scope what nature offers him. A representative passage may be quoted from the lecture on Literature and Science : "When we set ourselves to enumerate the powers which go to the building up of human life, and say that they are the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, and the power of social life and manners, he [Professor Huxley] can hardly deny that this scheme, though drawn in rough and plain lines enough, and not pre- tending to scientific exactness, does yet give a fairly true representation of the matter. Human nature is built up of these powers ; we have the need for them all. When we have rightly met and adjusted the claims for them all, we shall then be in a fair way for getting soberness and righteousness with wisdom." ' These same ideas are presented under a somewhat different aspect and with somewhat different termi- nology in the first chapter of Culture and Anarchy : " The great aim of culture [is] the aim of setting our- selves to ascertain what perfection is and to make it prevail." Culture seeks " the determination of this question through all the voices of human experience 1 Selections, p. 116. INTRODUCTION. XXI which have been heard upon it, — of art, science, poetry philosophy, history, as well as of religion, — in order to give a greater fullness and certainty to its solution. . . Religion says: The Kingdom of God is within you j and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth and predomi- nance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality. It places it in the ever-increasing efficacy and in the general harmonious expansion of those gifts of thought and feeling which make the peculiar dignity, wealth, and happiness of human na- ture. As I have said on a former occasion : ' It is in making endless additions to itself, in the endless ex- pansion of its powers, in endless growth in wisdom and beauty, that the spirit of the human race finds its ideal. To reach this ideal, culture is an indispensable aid, and that is the true value of culture.' " ' In such passages as these Arnold comes as near as he ever comes to defining the perfect human type. He does not profess to define it universally and in ab- stract terms, for indeed he " hates " abstractions almost as inveterately as Burke hated them. He does not even describe concretely for men of his own time and nation the precise equipoise of powers essential to per- fection. Yet he names these powers, suggests the ends toward which they must by their joint working contribute, and illustrates through examples the evil effects of the preponderance or absence of one and another. Finally, in the course of his many discus- sions, he describes in detail the method by which the 1 Selections, p. 152- XXII INTRODUCTION. delicate adjustment of these rival powers may be secured in the typical man ; suggests who is to be the judge of the conflicting claims of these powers, and indicates the process by which this judge may most persuasively lay his opinions before those whom he wishes to influence. The method for the attain- ment of the perfect type is culture ; the censor of defective types and the judge of the rival claims of the co-operant powers is the critic ; and the process by which this judge clarifies his own ideas and enforces his opinions on others is criticism. III. We are now at the centre of Arnold's theory of life and hold the keyword to his system of belief, so far as he had a system. His reasons for attaching to the work of the critic the importance he palpably attached to it, are at once apparent. Criticism is the method by which the perfect type of human nature is at any moment to be apprehended and kept in uncontami- nate clearness of outline before the popular imagina- tion. The ideal critic is the man of nicest discernment in matters intellectual, moral, aesthetic, social ; of perfect equipoise of powers ; of delicately pervasive sympathy ; of imaginative insight; who grasps comprehensively the whole life of his time ; who feels its vital tendencies and is intimately aware of its most insistent preoccupations ; who also keeps his orienta- tion toward the unchanging norms of human endeavor : and who is thus able to note and set forth the imper- INTRODUCTION. xxill fections in existing types of human nature and to urge persuasively a return in essential particulars to the normal type. The function of criticism, then, is the vindication of the ideal human type against perverting influences, and Arnold's prose writings will for the most part be found to have been inspired in one form or another by a single purpose : the correction of ex- cess in some human activity and the restoration of that activity to its proper place among the powers that make up the ideal human type. Culture and Anarchy (1869) was the first of Arnold's books to illustrate adequately this far-reachingconcep- tion of criticism. His special topic is, in this case, social conditions in England. Politicians, he urges, whose profession it is to deal with social questions, are engrossed in practical matters and biassed by party considerations ; they lack the detachment and breadth of view to see the questions at issue in their true rela- tions to abstract standards of right and wrong. They mistake means for ends, machinery for the results that machinery is meant to secure ; they lose all sense of values and exalt temporary measures into matters of sacred import ; finally they come to that pass of ineptitude which Arnold symbolizes by the enthusiasm of Liberals over the measure to enable a man to marry his deceased wife's sister. What is needed to correct these absurd misapprehensions is the free play of criti- cal intelligence. The critic from his secure coign of vantage must examine social conditions dispassion- ately ; he must determine what is essentially wrong in the inner lives of the various classes of men around him and so reveal the real sources of those social evils xxiv INTRODUCTION. which politicians are trying to remedy by external readjustments and temporary measures. And this is just the task that Arnold undertakes in Culture and Anarchy. He sets himself to consider English society in its length and breadth with a view to discovering what is its essential constitution, what are the typical classes that enter into it, and what are the characteristics of these classes. So far as concerns classification, he ultimately accepts, it is true, as ade- quate to his purpose the traditional division of English society into upper, middle, and lower classes. But he then goes on to give an analysis of each of these classes that is novel, penetrating, in the highest degree stimulating. He takes a typical member of each class and describes him in detail, intellectually, morally, socially; he points out his sources of strength and his sources of weakness. He compares him as a type with the abstract ideal of human excellence and notes wherein his powers "fall short or exceed." He indi- cates the reaction upon the social and political life of the nation of these various defects and excesses, their inevitable influence in producing social misad- justment and friction. Finally, he urges that the one remedy that will correct these errant social types and bring them nearer to the perfect human type is culture, increase in vital knowledge. The details of Arnold's application of this concep- tion of culture as a remedy for the social evils of the time, every reader may follow out for himself in Culture and Anarchy. One point in Arnold's concep- tion, however, is to be noted forthwith; it is a crucial point in its influence on his theorizings. By culture IN TROD UCTION. xx v Arnold means increase of knowledge; yes, but he means something more; culture is for Arnold not merely an intellectual matter. Culture is the best knowledge made operative and dynamic in life and character. Knowledge must be vitalized ; it must be intimately conscious of the whole range of human interests; it must ultimately subserve the whole nature of man. Continually, then, as Arnold is plead- ing for the spread of ideas, for increase of light, for the acceptance on the part of his fellow-countrymen of new knowledge from the most diverse sources, he is as keenly alive as anyone to the dangers of over- intellectualism. The undue development of the intellectual powers is as injurious to the individual as any other form of deviation from the perfect human type. This distrust of over-intellectualism is the ultimate ground of Arnold's hostility to the claims of Physical Science to primacy in modern education. His ideas on the relative educational value of the physical sciences and of the humanities are set forth in the well-known discourse on Literature and Science} Arnold is ready, no one is more ready, to accept the conclusions of science as to all topics that fall within its range; whatever its authenticated spokesmen have to say upon man's origin, his moral nature, his rela- tions to his fellows, his place in the physical universe, his religions, his sacred books — all these utterances are to be received with entire loyalty so far as they can be shown to embody the results of expert scientific 1 Selections, p. 104. XXVI INTRODUCTION. observation and thought. But for Arnold the great importance of modern scientific truth does not for a moment make clear the superiority of the physical sciences over the Humanities as a means of educa- tional discipline. The study of the sciences tends merely to intellectual development, to the increase of mental power ; the study of literature on the other hand trains a man emotionally and morally, develops his human sympathies, sensitizes him temperamentally, rouses his imagination, and elicits his sense of beauty. Science puts before the student the crude facts of nature, bids him accept them dispassionately, rid himself of all discoloring moods as he watches the play of physical force, and convert himself into pure intelligence ; he is simply to observe, to analyze, to classify, and to systematize, and he is to go through these processes continually with facts that have no human quality, that come raw from the great whirl of the cosmic machine. As a discipline, then, for the ordinary man, the study of science tends not a whit toward humanization, toward refinement, toward temperamental regeneration ; it tends only to develop an accurate trick of the senses, fine observation, crude intellectual strength. These powers are of very great importance ; but they may also be trained in the study of literature, while at the same time the student, as Sir Philip Sidney long ago pointed out, is being led and drawn " to as high a perfection as our degenerate souls, made worse by their clay lodgings, can be capable of." Arnold, then, with characteristic anxiety for the integrity of the human type, urges the superior worth to most young men of a literary rather than a INTRODUCTION-. xxvii scientific training. Literature nourishes the whole spirit of man ; science ministers only to the intellect. The same insistent desire that culture be vital is at the root of Arnold's discomfort in the presence of German scholarship. For the thoroughness and the disinterestedness of this scholarship he has great re- spect; but he cannot endure its trick of losing itself in the letter, its " pedantry, slowness," its way of " fum- bling" after truth, its ''ineffectiveness." 1 "In the German mind," he exclaims in Literature and Dogma, " as in the German language, there does seem to be something splay, something blunt-edged, unhandy, infelicitous, — some positive want of straightforward, sure perception." 2 Of scholarship of this splay variety, that comes from exaggerated intellectuality and from lack of a delicate temperament and of nice perceptions, Arnold is intolerant. Such scholarship he finds work- ing its customary mischief in Professor Francis New- man's translation of Homer, and, accordingly, he gives large parts of the lectures on Translating Homer to the illustration of its shortcomings and maladroitness ; he is bent on showing how inadequate is great learning alone to cope with any nice literary problem. New- man's philological knowledge of Greek and of Homer is beyond dispute, but his taste may be judged from his assertion that Homer's verse, if we could hear the liv- ing Homer, would affect us *' like an elegant and simple melody from an African of the Gold Coast." ' The remedy for such inept scholarship lies in cul- 1 Celtic Literature, p. 75. l Literature and Dogma, p. xxi. * On Translating Homer, p. 295 . xxvm INTRODUCTION. ture, in the vitalization of knowledge. The scholar must not be a mere knower ; all his powers must be harmoniously developed. One last illustration of Arnold's insistence that knowledge be vital, may be drawn from his writings on religion and theology. Again criticism and cul- ture are the passwords that open the way to a new and better order of things. Formulas, Arnold urges, have fastened themselves constrainingly upon the English religious mind. Traditional interpreta- tions of the Bible have come to be received as be- yond cavil. These interpretations are really human inventions — the product of the ingenious think- ing of theologians like Calvin and Luther. Yet they have so authenticated themselves that for most readers to-day the Bible means solely what it meant for the exacerbated theological mind of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If religion is to be vital, if knowledge of the Bible is to be genuine and real, there must be a critical examination of what this book means for the disinterested intelligence of to-day; the Bible, as literature, must be interpreted anew, sympathetically and imaginatively; the moral inspiration the Bible has to offer, even to men who are rigidly insistent on scientific habits of thought and standards of historical truth, must be disengaged from what is unverifiable and transitory, and made real and persuasive. " I write," Arnold declares, " to convince the lover of religion that by following habits of intellectual seriousness he need not, so far as re- ligion is concerned, lose anything. Taking the Old Testament as Israel's magnificent establishment of IN TROD UC 7 ION. xx ix the theme, Righteousness is salvation! taking th» New as the perfect elucidation by Jesus of what righteous- ness is and how salvation is »von, I do not fear com- paring even the power over the soul and imagination of the Bible, taken in this sense, — a sense which is at the same time solid, — with the like power in the old materialistic and miraculous sense for the Bible, which is not." ' This definition of what Arnold hopes to do for the Bible may be supplemented by a descrip- tion of the method in which culture works toward the ends desired : " Difficult, certainly, is the right read- ing of the Bible, and true culture, too, is difficult. For true culture implies not only knowledge, but right tact and justness of judgment, forming themselves by and with knowledge; without this tact it is not true culture. Difficult, however, as culture is, it is neces- sary. For, after all, the Bible is not a talisman, to be taken and used literally; neither is any existing Church a talisman, whatever pretensions of the sort it may make, for giving the right interpretation of the Bible. Only true culture can give us this interpreta- tion ; so that if conduct is, as it is, inextricably bound up with the Bible and the right interpretation of it, then the importance of culture becomes un- speakable. For if conduct is necessary (and there is nothing so necessary), culture is necessary." 2 Enough has now been said to illustrate Arnold's conception of culture and of its value as a specific against all" the ills that society is heir to. Culture 1 God and the Bible, p. xxxiv. 2 IJiterature and Dogma, p. xxV\ XXX INTRODUCTION. is vital knowledge and the critic is its fosterer and guardian ; culture and criticism work together for the preservation of the integrity of the human type against all the disasters that threaten it from the storm and stress of modern life. Politics, religion, scholarship, science each has its special danger for the individual; each seizes upon him, subdues him relentlessly to the need of the moment and the requirements of some particular function, and converts him often into a mere distorted fragment of humanity. Against this tyranny of the moment, against the specializing and materializing trend of modern life, criticism offers a powerful safeguard. Criticism is ever concerned with archetypal excel- lence, is continually disengaging with fine discrimina- tion what is transitory and accidental from what is permanent and essential in all that man busies himself about, and is thus perpetually helping every individual to the apprehension of his "best self," to the develop- ment of what is real and absolute and the elimination of what is false or deforming. And in doing all this the critic acts as the appreciator of life; he is not the abstract thinker. He apprehends the ideal intuitively; he reaches it by the help of the feelings and the imagination and a species of exquisite tact, not through a series of syllogisms; he is really a poet, rather than a philosopher. This conception of the nature and functions of criticism makes intelligible and justifies a phrase of Arnold's that has often been impugned — his descrip- tion of poetry as a criticism of life. To this account of poetry it has been objected that criticism is an intel- INTRODUCTION. XXXI tectual process, while poetry is primarily an affair of the imagination and the heart; and that to regard poetry as a criticism of life is to take a view of poetry that tends to convert it into mere rhetorical moraliz- ing; the decorative expression in rhythmical language of abstract truth about life. This misinterpretation of Arnold's meaning becomes impossible, if the fore- going theory of criticism be borne in mind. Criticism is the determination and the representation of the archetypal, of the ideal. Moreover, it is not a deter- mination of the archetypal formally and theoretically, through speculation or the enumeration of abstract qualities ; Arnold's disinclination for abstractions has been repeatedly noted. The process to be used in criticism is a vital process of appreciation, in which the critic, sensitive to the whole value of human life, to the appeal of art and of conduct and of manners as well as of abstract truth, feels his way to a synthetic grasp upon what is ideally best and portrays this con- cretely and persuasively for the popular imagination. Such an appreciator of life, if he produce beauty in verse, if he embody his vision of the ideal in metre, will be a poet. In other words, the poet is the appreciator of human life who sees in it most sen- sitively, inclusively, and penetratingly what is arche- typal and evokes his vision before others through rhythm and rhyme. In this sense poetry can hardly be denied to be a criticism of life ; it is the winning portrayal of the ideal of human life as this ideal shapes itself in the mind of the poet. Such a criticism of life Dante gives, a determination and portrayal of what is ideally best in life according to mediaeval XXXll INTRODUCTION. conceptions ; a representation of life in its integrity with a due adjustment of the claims of all the powers that enter into it — friendship, ambition, patriotism, loyalty, religion, artistic ardor, love. Such a criticism of life Shakspere incidentally gives in terms of the full scope of Elizabethan experience in England ; with due imaginative setting forth of the splendid vistas of possible achievement and unlimited development that the new knowledge and the discoveries of the Renais- sance had opened. In short, the great poet is the typically sensitive, penetrative, and suggestive appre- ciator of life, — who calls to his aid, to make his appreci- ation as resonant and persuasive as possible, as potent as possible over men's minds and hearts, all the emotional and imaginative resources of language, — rhythm, figures, allegory, symbolism — whatever will enable him to impose his appreciation of life upon others and to insinuate into their souls his sense of the relative values of human acts and characters and passions ; whatever will help him to make more over- weeningly beautiful and insistently eloquent his vision of beauty and truth. In this sense the poet is the limiting ideal of the appreciative critic, and poetry is the ultimate criticism of life — the finest portrayal each age can attain to of what seems to it in life most significant and delightful. IV. The purpose with which Arnold writes is now fairly apparent. His aim is to shape in happy fashion the lives of his fellows ; to free them IN TROD UC riON. XXXU1 from the bonds that the struggle for existence imposes upon them; to enlarge their horizons, to enrich them spiritually, and to call all that is best within them into as vivid play as possible. When we turn to Arnold's literary criticism we shall find this purpose no less paramount. A glance through the volumes of Arnold's essays renders it clear that his selection of a poet or a prose- writer for discussion was usually made with a view to putting before English readers some desirable trait of character for their imitation, some temperamental ex- cellence that they are lacking in, some mode of belief that they neglect, some habit of thought that they need to cultivate. Joubert is studied and portrayed because of his single-hearted love of light, the purity of his disinterested devotion to truth, the fine distinc- tion of his thought, and the freedom of his spirit from the sordid stains of worldly life. Heine is a typical leader in the war of emancipation, the arch-enemy of Philistinism, and the light-hearted indomitable foe of prejudice and cant. Maurice and Eugenie de Guerin are winning examples of the spiritual distinction that modern Romanism can induce in timely-happy souls. Scherer, whose critiques upon Milton and Goethe are painstakingly reproduced in the Mixed Essays, repre- sents French critical intelligence in its best play- acute, yet comprehensive; exacting, yet sympathetic; regardful of nuances and delicately refining, and yet virile and constructive. Of the importance for mod- ern England of emphasis on all these qualities of mind and heart, Arnold was securely convinced. Moreover, even when his choice of subject is deter« xxxiv INTRODUCTION. mined by other than moral considerations, his treat- ment is apt, none the less, to reveal his ethical bias. Again and again in his essays on poetry, for example, it is the substance of poetry that he is chiefly anxious to handle, while the form is left with incidental analy- sis. Wordsworth is the poet of joy in widest common- alty spread — the poet whose criticism of life is most sound and enduring and salutary. Shelley is afebrile creature, insecure in his sense of worldly values, " a beautiful and ineffectual angel, beating in the void his luminous wings in vain." ' The essay on Heine helps us only mediately to an appreciation of the volatile beauty of Heine's songs, or to an intenser delight in the mere surface play of hues and moods in his verse. From the essay on George Sand, to be sure, we receive many vivid impressions of the emotional and imagina- tive scope of French romance ; for this essay was written con amore in the revivification of an early mood of devotion, and in an unusually heightened style ; the essay on Emerson is the one study that has in places somewhat of the same lyrical intensity and the same vividness of realization. Yet even in the essay on George Sand, the essayist is on the whole bent on revealing the temperament of the woman rather in its decisive influence on her theories of life than in its reaction upon her art as art. There is hardly a word of the Romance as a definite literary form, of George 1 This famous image was probably suggested by a sentence of Joubert's : " Plato loses himself in the void, but one sees the play of his wings, one hears their rustle. . . It is good to breathe his air, but not to live upon him." The translation is Arnold's own. See his Joubert, in Essays in Criticism, i. 294, INTRODUCTION. XXXV Sand's relation to earHer French writers of fiction, or of her distinctive methods of work as a portrayer of the great human spectacle. In short, literature as art, literary forms as definite modes of artistic expres- sion, the technique of the literary craftsman receive for the most part from Arnold slight attention. Perhaps, the one piece of work in which Arnold set himself with some thoroughness to the discussion of a purely literary problem was his series of lectures on Translating Homer. These lectures were pro- duced before his sense of responsilility for the moral regeneration of the Philistine had become im- portunate, and were addressed to an academic audi- ence. For these reasons, the treatment of literary topics is more disinterested and less interrupted by practical considerations. Indeed, as will be presently noted in illustration of another aspect of Arnold's work, these lectures contain very subtle and delicate appreciations, show everywhere exquisite responsive- ness to changing effects of style, and enrich gratefully the vocabulary of impressionistic criticism. Even in these exceptional lectures, however, Arnold's ethical interest asserts itself. In the course of them he gives an account of the grand style in poetry, — of that poetic manner that seems to him to stand highest in the scale of excellence; and he carefully notes as an essential of this manner, — of this grand style, — its moral power ; " it can form the character, ... is edifying, . . . can refine the raw natural man . . . can transmute him." ' This definition of the grand x On Translating Homer, ed. 1883, p. 197. xxxvi INTRODUCTION. style will be discussed presently in connection with Arnold's general theory of poetry ; it is enough to note here that it illustrates the inseparableness in Arnold's mind between art and morals. His description of poetry as a criticism of life has already been mentioned. This doctrine is early im- plied in Arnold's writings, for example, in the passage just quoted from the lectures on Translating Homer; it becomes more explicit in the Last Words ap- pended to these lectures, where the critic asserts that "the noble and profound application of ideas to life is the most essential part of poetic greatness." 1 It is elaborated in the essays on Wordsworth (1879), on the Study of Poetry (1880), and on Byron (1881). "It is important, therefore," the essay on Words- worth assures us, " to hold fast to this: that poetry is at bottom a criticism of life; that the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful application of ideas to life, — to the question: How to live." 2 And in the essay on the Study of Poetry Arnold urges that " in poetry, as a criticism of life under the conditions fixed for such a criticism by the laws of poetic truth and poetic beauty, the spirit of our race will find . . . as time goes on and as other helps fail, its consolation and stay." 3 With this doctrine of the indissoluble connection between the highest poetic excellence and essen- tial nobleness of subject-matter probably only the most irreconcilable advocates of art for art's sake 1 On Translating Homer, ed. 1883, p. 295. 2 Essays, ii., ed. 1891, p. 143. 3 Essays, ii., ed. 1S91, p. 5. INTRODUCTION. xxxvn would quarrel. So loyal an adherent of art as Walter Pater suggests a test of poetic " greatness " substan- tially the same with Arnold's. " It is on the quality of the matter it informs or controls, its compass, its variety, its alliance to great ends, or the depth of the note of revolt, or the largeness of hope in it, that the greatness of literary art depends, as The Divine Comedy, Paradise Lost, Les M is e rabies, The English Bible, are great art." ! This may be taken as merely a different phrasing of Arnold's principle that " the greatness of a poet lies in his powerful and beautiful application of ideas to life — to the question : How to live." Surely, then, we are not at liberty to press any objection to Arnold's general theory of poetry on the ground of its being over-ethical. There remains nevertheless the question of emphasis. In the application to special cases of this test of essen- tial worth either the critic may be constitutionally biassed in favor of a somewhat restricted range of defi- nite ideas about life, or even when he is fairly hos- pitable toward various moral idioms, he may still be so intent upon making ethical distinctions as to fail to give their due to the purely artistic qualities-of .poetry. It is in this latter way that Arnold is most apt to offend. The emphasis in the discussions of Words- worth, Shelley, Byron, Keats, Gray, and Milton is prevailingly on the ethical characteristics of each poet; and the reader carries away from an essay a vital conception of the play of moral energy and of spiritual passion in the poet's verse rather than an im- 1 Pater's Appreciations, ed. 1890, p. 36. xxxvm INTRODUCTION. pression of his peculiar adumbration of beauty, the characteristic rhythms of his imaginative movement, the delicate color modulations on the surface of his image of life. It must, however, be borne in mind that Arnold has specially admitted the incompleteness of his descrip- tion of poetry as "a criticism of life "; this criticism, he has expressly added, must be made in conformity " to the laws of poetic truth and poetic beauty." "The profound criticism of life" characteristic of " the few supreme masters " must exhibit itself " in indissoluble connection with the laws of poetic truth and beauty." ' Is there, then, any account to be found in Arnold of these laws observance of which secures poetic beauty and truth? Is there any description of the special ways in which poetic beauty and truth manifest themselves, of the formal characteristics to be found in poetry where poetic beauty and truth are present ? Does Arnold either suggest the methods the poet must follow to attain these qualities or classify the various subordinate effects through which poetic beauty and truth invariably reveal their presence? The most apposite parts of his writings to search for some declaration on these points are the lectures on Translating Homer, and the second series of his essays which deal chiefly with the study of poetry. Here, if anywhere, we ought to find a registration of beliefs as regards the precise nature and source of poetic beauty and truth. And indeed throughout all these writings, which run 1 Essays, ii., ed. 1S91, pp. 186-187. INTRODUCTION. xxxix through a considerable period of time, Arnold makes fairly consistent use of a half dozen categories for his analyses of poetic effects. These categories are sub- stance and matter, style and manner, diction and movement. Of the substance of really great poetry we learn repeatedly that it must be made up of ideas of profound significance " on man, on nature, and on human life." ' This is, however, merely the prescrip- tion already so often noted that poetry, to reach the highest excellence, must contain a penetrating and ennobling criticism of life. In the essay on Byron, however, there is something formally added to this requisition of "truth and seriousness of substance and matter " ; besides these, " felicity and perfection of diction and manner, as these are exhibited in the best poets, are what constitute a criticism of life made in conformity with the laws of poetic truth and poetic beauty." 3 There must then be felicity and perfection of diction and manner in poetry of the highest order ; these terms are somewhat vague, but serve at least to guide us on our analytic way. In the essay on the Study of Poetry, there is still further progress made in the description of poetic excellence. " To the style and manner of the best poetry, their special character, their accent is given by their diction, and, even yet more, by their movement. And though we distinguish between the two characters, the two accents, of supe- riority," [/. 5 to Luther. Now it is just this kind of false estimate which the critical spirit is, it seems to me, bound to resist. It is really the strongest possible proof of the low ebb at which, in England, the critical spirit is, that while the critical hit in the religious literature 20 of Germany is Dr. Strauss's book, in that of France M. Renan's book, the book of Bishop Colenso is the critical hit in the religious literature of England. Bishop Colenso's book reposes on a total misconcep- tion of the essential elements of the religious problem, 25 as that problem is now presented for solution. To criticism, therefore, which seeks to have the best that is known and thought on this problem, it is, however well meant, of no importance whatever. M. Renan's book attempts a new synthesis of the elements 30 furnished to us by the Four Gospels. It attempts, in my opinion, a synthesis, perhaps premature, per- haps impossible, certainly not successful. Up to the 3© THE FUNCTION OF CRITICISM present time, at any rate, we must acquiesce in Fleury's sentence on such recastings of the Gospel- story : Quiconqtte s 1 imagine la pouvoir mieux ecrire, 7ie Ventend pas. M. Renan had himself passed by anticipation a like sentence on his own work, when 5 he said : " If a new presentation of the character of Jesus were offered to me, I would not have it ; its very clearness would be, in my opinion, the best proof of its insufficiency." His friends may with perfect justice rejoin that at the sight of the Holy 10 Land, and of the actual scene of the Gospel-story, all the current of M. Renan's thoughts may have naturally changed, and a new casting of that story irresistibly suggested itself to him ; and that this is just a case for applying Cicero's maxim : Change of 15 mind is not inconsistency — nemo doctus unquam muta- tionem consilii inconstantiam dixit esse. Nevertheless, for criticism, M. Renan's first thought must still be the truer one, as long as his new casting so fails more fully to commend itself, more fully (to use Coleridge's 20 happy phrase about the Bible) to find us. Still M. Renan's attempt is, for criticism, of the most real interest and importance, since, with all its difficulty, a fresh synthesis of the New Testament data, — not a making war on them, in Voltaire's fashion, not a 23 leaving them out of mind, in the world's fashion, but the putting a new construction upon them, the taking them from under the old, traditional, conventional point of view and placing them under a new one, — is the very essence of the religious problem, as now 30 presented ; and only by efforts in this direction can it receive a solution. AT THE PRESENT TIME. 3 1 Again, in the same spirit in which she judges Bishop Colenso, Miss Cobbe, like so many earnest liberals of our practical race, both here and in America, herself sets vigorously about a positive 5 reconstruction of religion, about making a religion of the future out of hand, or at least setting about making it. We must not rest, she and they are always thinking and saying, in negative criticism, we must be creative and constructive ; hence we have 10 such works as her recent Religious Duty, and works still more considerable, perhaps, by others, which will be in every one's mind. These works often have much ability ; they often spring out of sincere con- victions, and a sincere wish to do good ; and they 15 sometimes, perhaps, do good. Their fault is (if I may be permitted to say so) one which they have in common with the British College of Health, in the New Road. Every one knows the British College of Health ; it is that building with the lion and the 20 statue of the Goddess Hygeia before it; at least I am sure about the lion, though I am not absolutely certain about the Goddess Hygeia. This building does credit, perhaps, to the resources of Dr. Morrison and his disciples ; but it falls a good deal short of 25 one's idea of what a British College of Health ought to be. In England, where we hate public inter- ference and love individual enterprise, we have a whole crop of places like the British College of Health ; the grand name without the grand thing. 30 Unluckily, creditable to individual enterprise as they are, they tend to impair our taste by making us for- get what more grandiose, noble, or beautiful charac f er 32 THE FUNCTION OF CRITICISM properly belongs to a public institution. The same may be said of the religions of the future of Miss Cobbe and others. Creditable, like the British Col- lege of Health, to the resources of their authors, they yet tend to make us forget what more grandiose, 5 noble, or beautiful character properly belongs to religious constructions. The historic religions, with all their faults, have had this ; it certainly belongs to the religious sentiment, when it truly flowers, to have this ; and we impoverish our spirit if we allow 10 a religion of the future without it. What then is the duty of criticism here ? To take the practical point of view, to applaud the liberal movement and all its works, — its New Road religions of the future into the bargain, — for their general utility's sake ? By no 15 means ; but to be perpetually dissatisfied with these works, while they perpetually fall short of a high and perfect ideal. For criticism, these are elementary laws ; but they never can be popular, and in this country they have 20 been very little followed, and one meets with immense obstacles in following them. That is a reason for asserting them again and again. Criticism must maintain its independence of the practical spirit and its aims. Even with well-meant efforts of the practi- 25 cal spirit it must express dissatisfaction, if in the sphere of the ideal they seem impoverishing and limiting. It must not hurry on to the goal because of its practical importance. It must be patient, and know how to wait ; and flexible, and know how to 30 attach itself to things and how to withdraw from them. It must be apt to study and praise elements AT THE PRESENT TIME. 33 that for the fulness of spiritual perfection are wanted, even though they belong to a power which in the practical sphere may be maleficent. It must be apt to discern the spiritual shortcomings or illusions of 5 powers that in the practical sphere may be beneficent. And this without any notion of favouring or injur- ing, in the practical sphere, one power or the other ; without any notion of playing off, in this sphere, one power against the other. When one looks, for 10 instance, at the English Divorce Court, — an institu- tion which perhaps has its practical conveniences, but which in the ideal sphere is so hideous ; an institution which neither makes divorce impossible nor makes it decent, which allows a man to get rid 15 of his wife, or a wife of her husband, but makes them drag one another first, for the public edification, through a mire of unutterable infamy, — when one looks at this charming institution, I say, with its crowded trials, its newspaper reports, and its money 20 compensations, this institution in which the gross unregenerate British Philistine has indeed stamped an image of himself, — one may be permitted to find the marriage theory of Catholicism refreshing and elevating. Or when Protestantism, in virtue of its 25 supposed rational and intellectual origin, gives the law to criticism too magisterially, criticism may and must remind it that its pretensions, in this respect, are illusive and do it harm ; that the Reformation was a moral rather than an intellectual event ; that Luther's 30 theory of grace no more exactly reflects the mind of the spirit than Bossuet's philosophy of history reflects it ; and that there is no more antecedent probability 34 THE FUNCTION OF CRITICISM of the Bishop of Durham's stock of ideas being agree- able to perfect reason than of Pope Pius the Ninth's. But criticism will not on that account forget the achievements of Protestantism in the practical and moral sphere ; nor that, even in the intellectual 5 sphere, Protestantism, though in a blind and stumb- ling manner, carried forward the Renascence, while Catholicism threw itself violently across its path. I lately heard a man of thought and energy contrast- ing the want of ardour and movement which he now ia found amongst young men in this country with what he remembered in his own youth, twenty years ago. "What reformers we were then!" he exclaimed; "what a zeal we had ! how we canvassed every insti- tution in Church and State, and were prepared to 15 remodel them all on first principles ! " He was inclined to regret, as a spiritual flagging, the lull which he saw. I am disposed rather to regard it as a pause in which the turn to a new mode of spiritual progress is being accomplished. Everything was long seen, by 20 the young and ardent amongst us, in inseparable con- nection with politics and practical life. We have pretty well exhausted the benefits of seeing things in this connection, we have got all that can be got by so seeing them. Let us try a more disinterested mode of 25 seeing them ; let us betake ourselves more to the serener life of the mind and spirit. This life, too, may have its excesses and dangers ; but they are not for us at present. Let us think of quietly enlarging our stock of true and fresh ideas, and not, as soon as 30 we get an idea or half an idea, be running out with it into the street, and trying to make it rule there. Our AT THE PRESENT TIME. 35 ideas will, in the end, shape the world all the better for maturing a little. Perhaps in fifty years' time it will in the English House of Commons be an objec- tion to an institution that it is an anomaly, and my 5 friend the Member of Parliament will shudder in his grave. But let us in the meanwhile rather endeavour that in twenty years' time it may, in English literature, b.e an objection to a proposition that it is absurd. That will be a change so vast, that the imagination 10 almost fails to grasp it. Ab iniegro scedorum nascitur ordo. If I have insisted so much on the course which criticism must take where politics and religion are concerned, it is because, where these burning matters 15 are in question, it is most likely to go astray. I have wished, above all, to insist on the attitude which criticism should adopt towards things in general ; on its right tone and temper of mind. But then comes another question as to the subject-matter which literary 20 criticism should most seek. Here, in general, its course is determined for it by the idea which is the law of its being ; the idea of a disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world, and thus to establish a current 25 of fresh and true ideas. By the very nature of things, as England is not all the world, much of the best that is known and thought in the world cannot be of English growth, must be foreign ; by the nature of things, again, it is just this that we are least likely to 30 know, while English thought is streaming in upon us from all sides, and takes excellent care that we shall not be ignorant of its existence. The English critic 3<5 THE FUNCTION OF CRITICISM of literature, therefore, must dwell much on foreign thought, and with particular heed on any part of it, which, while significant and fruitful in itself, is for any reason specially likely to escape him. Again, judging is often spoken of as the critic's one business, and so 5 in some sense it is ; but the judgment which almost insensibly forms itself in a fair and clear mind, along with fresh knowledge, is the valuable one ; and thus knowledge, and ever fresh knowledge, must be the critic's great concern for himself. And it is by com- 10 municating fresh knowledge, and letting his own judg- ment pass along with it, — but insensibly, and in the second place, not the first, as a sort of companion and clue, not as an abstract lawgiver, — that the critic will generally do most good to his readers. Sometimes, ij no doubt, for the sake of establishing an author's place in literature, and his relation to a central standard (and if this is not done, how are we to get at our best in the world?) criticism may have to deal with a sub- ject-matter so familiar that fresh knowledge is out of 20 the question, and then it must be all judgment ; an enunciation and detailed application of principles. Here the great safeguard is never to let oneself become abstract, always to retain an intimate and lively con- sciousness of the truth of what one is saying, and, the 25 moment this fails us, to be sure that something is wrong. Still, under all circumstances, this mere judg- ment and application of principles is, in itself, not the most satisfactory work to the critic ; like mathematics, it is tautological, and cannot well give us, like fresh 50 learning, the sense of creative activity. But stop, some one will say ; all this talk is of no IO AT THE PRESENT TIME. 37 practical use to us whatever ; this criticism of yours is not what we have in our minds when we speak of criticism ; when we speak of critics and criticism, we mean critics and criticism of the current English 5 literature of the day ; when you offer to tell criticism its function, it is to this criticism that we expect you to address yourself. I am sorry for it, for I am afraid I must disappoint these expectations. I am bound by my own definition of criticism :(a disinterested endea- vour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world. J How much of current English literature comes into this "best that is known and thought in the world ? " Not very much, I fear certainly less, at this moment, than of the currem. 15 literature of France or Germany. Well, then, am I to alter my definition of criticism, in order to meet the requirements of a number of practising English critics, who, after all, are free in their choice of a business? That would be making criticism lend itself just to one 20 of those alien practical considerations, which, I have said, are so fatal to it. One may say, indeed, to those who have to deal with the mass — so much better dis- regarded — of current English literature, that they may at all events endeavour, in dealing with this, to try it, 25 so far as they can, by the standard of the best that is known and thought in the world ; one may say, that to get anywhere near this standard, every critic should try and possess one great literature, at least, besides his own, and the more unlike his own, the better. 30 But, after all, the criticism I am really concerned with, — the criticism which alone can much help us for the future, the criticism which, throughout Europe, 38 THE FUNCTION CF CRITICISM is at the present day meant, when so much stress is laid on the importance of criticism and the critical spirit, — is a criticism which regards Europe as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great con- federation, bound to a joint action and working to a 5 common result ; and whose members have, for their proper outfit, a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one another. Special, local, and temporary advantages being put out of account, that modern nation will in the intellectual and spiritual 10 sphere make most progress, which most thoroughly carries out this programme. And what is that but saying that we too, all of us, as individuals, the more thoroughly we carry it out, shall make the more progress ? 15 There is so much inviting us ! — what are we to take ? what will nourish us in growth towards perfec- tion ? That is the question which, with the immense field of life and of literature lying before him, the critic has to answer ; for himself first, and afterwards for 20 others. In this idea of the critic's business the essays brought together in the following pages have had their origin ; in this idea, widely different as are their sub- jects, they have, perhaps, their unity. I conclude with what I said at the beginning : to 25 have the sense of creative activity is the great happi- ness and the great proof of being alive, and it is not denied to criticism to have it ; but then criticism must be sincere, simple, flexible, ardent, ever widening its knowledge. Then it may have, in no contemptible 3a measure, a joyful sense of creative activity ; a sense which a man of insight and conscience will prefer to AT THE PRESENT TIME. 39 what he might derive from a poor, starved, fragmen- tary, inadequate creation. And at some epochs no other creation is possible. Still, in full measure, the sense of creative activity 5 belongs only to genuine creation; in literature we must never forget that. But what true man of letters ever can forget it ? It is no such common matter for a gifted nature to come into possession of a current of true and living ideas, and to produce amidst the 10 inspiration of them, that we are likely to underrate it. The epochs of yEschylus and Shakspeare make us feel their pre-eminence. In an epoch like those is, no doubt, the true life of literature ; there is the promised land, towards which criticism can only beckon. That 15 promised land it will not be ours to enter, and we shall die in the wilderness ; but to have desired to enter it, to have saluted it from afar, is already, per- haps, the best distinction among contemporaries ; it will certainly be the best title to esteem with pos- terity. — Essays, I,, ed. 1896, pp. 1-41. ®n {Translating Ibomer. . . . Nunquamne reponam ? It has more than once been suggested to me that I should translate Homer. That is a task for which I have neither the time nor the courage ; but the sug- gestion led me to regard yet more closely a poet whom I had already long studied, and for one or two years 5 the works of Homer were seldom out of my hands. The study of classical literature is probably on the decline ; but, whatever may be the fate of this study in general, it is certain that, as instruction spreads and the number of readers increases, attention will be 10 more and more directed to the poetry of Homer, not indeed as part of a classical course, but as the most important poetical monument existing. Even within the last ten years two fresh translations of the Iliad have appeared in England : one by a man of great 15 ability and genuine learning, Professor Newman ; the other by Mr. Wright, the conscientious and painstak- ing translator of Dante. It may safely be asserted that neither of these works will take rank as the standard translation of Homer; that the task of 20 rendering him will still be attempted by other trans- lators. It may perhaps be possible to render to these some service, to save them some loss of labour, by pointing out rocks on which their predecessors have 40 ON TRANSLATING HOMER. 4* split, and the right objects on which a translator of Homer should fix his attention. It is disputed what aim a translator should propose to himself in dealing with his original. Even this 5 preliminary is not yet settled. On one side it is said that the translation ought to be such " that the reader should, if possible, forget that it is a translation at all, and be lulled into the illusion that he is reading an original work — something original " (if the translation 10 be in English), "from an English hand." The real original is in this case, it is said, " taken as a basis on which to rear a poem that shall affect our countrymen as the original may be conceived to have affected its natural hearers." On the other hand, Mr. Newman, 15 who states the foregoing doctrine only to condemn it, declares that he " aims at precisely the opposite: to retain every peculiarity of the original, so far as he is able, with the greater care the more foreign it may happen to be "; so that it may " never be forgotten 2othat he is imitating, and imitating in a different material." The translator's " first duty," says Mr. Newman, " is a historical one, to be faithful" Probably both sides would agree that the translator's "first duty is to be faithful'"; but the question at 25 issue between them is, in what faithfulness consists. My one object is to give practical advice to a trans- lator ; and I shall not the least concern myself with theories of translation as such. But I advise the translator not to try " to rear on the basis of the Iliad, 30 a poem that shall affect our countrymen as the original may be conceived to have affected its natural hearers "; and for this simple reason, that we cannot 42 ON TRANSLATING HOMER. possibly tell how the Iliad "affected its natural hearers." It is probably meant merely that he should try to affect Englishmen powerfully, as Homer affected Greeks powerfully ; but this direction is not enough, and can give no real guidance. For all great poets 5 affect their hearers powerfully, but the effect of one poet is one thing, that of another poet another thing ; it is our translator's business to reproduce the effect of Homer, and the most powerful emotion of the unlearned English reader can never assure him 10 whether he has reproduced this, or whether he has produced something else. So, again, he may follow Mr. Newman's directions, he may try to be ''faithful," he may "retain every peculiarity of his original"; but who is to assure him, who is to assure Mr. New- 15 man himself, that, when he has done this, he has done that for which Mr. Newman enjoins this to be done, " adhered closely to Homer's manner and habit of thought" ? Evidently the translator needs some more practical directions than these. No one can tell him 20 how Homer affected the Greeks : but there are those who can tell him how Homer affects them. These are scholars ; who possess, at the same time with knowl- edge of Greek, adequate poetical taste and feeling. No translation will seem to them of much worth com- 25 pared with the original ; but they alone can say whether the translation produces more or less the same effect upon them as the original. They are the only competent tribunal in this matter : the Greeks are dead ; the unlearned Englishman has not the data 30 for judging ; and no man can safely confide in his own single judgment of his own work. Let not the ON TRANSLATING HOMER. 43 translator, then, trust to his notions of what the ancient Greeks would have thought of him ; he will lose himself in the vague. Let him not trust to what the ordinary English reader thinks of him ; he will 5 be taking the blind for his guide. Let him not trust to his own judgment of his own work ; he may be misled by individual caprices. Let him ask how his work affects those who both know Greek and can appreciate poetry ; whether to read it gives the Pro- iovost of Eton, or Professor Thompson at Cambridge, or Professor Jowett here in Oxford, at all the same feeling which to read the original gives them. I con- sider that when Bentley said of Pope's translation, " It was a pretty poem, but must not be called 15 Homer," the work, in spite of all its power and attractiveness, was judged. 'fis av 6 (frpovinos opLaucv, — "as the judicious would determine," — that is a test to which every one pro- fesses himself willing to submit his works. Unhappily, 20 in most cases, no two persons agree as to who "the judicious " are. In the present case, the ambiguity is removed : I suppose the translator at one with me as to the tribunal to which alone he should look for judgment ; and he has thus obtained a practical test 25 by which to estimate the real success of his work. How is he to proceed, in order that his work, tried by this test, may be found most successful ? First of all, there are certain negative counsels which I will give him. Homer has occupied men's 30 minds so much, such a literature has arisen about him, that every one who approaches him should resolve strictly to limit himself to that which may 44 ON TRANSLATING HOMER. directly serve the object for which he approaches him. I advise the translator to have nothing to do with the questions, whether Homer ever existed ; whether the poet of the Iliad be one or many ; whether the Iliad be one poem or an Achilleis and an 5 Iliad stuck together ; whether the Christian doctrine of the Atonement is shadowed forth in the Homeric mythology ; whether the Goddess Latona in any way prefigures the Virgin Mary, and so on. These are questions which have been discussed with learning, 10 with ingenuity, nay, with genius ; but they have two inconveniences, — one general for all who approach them, one particular for the translator. The general inconvenience is that there really exist no data for determining them. The particular inconvenience is 15 that their solution by the translator, even were it possible, could be of no benefit to his transla- tion. I advise him, again, not to trouble himself with constructing a special vocabulary for his use in trans- 20 lation ; with excluding a certain class of English words, and with confining himself to another class, in obedience to any theory about the peculiar qualities of Homer's style. Mr. Newman says that " the entire dialect of Homer being essentially archaic, that of a 25 translator ought to be as much Saxo-Norman as possible, and owe as little as possible to the elements thrown into our language by classical learning." Mr. Newman is unfortunate in the observance of his own theory ; for I continually find in his translation words 30 of Latin origin, which seem to me quite alien to the simplicity of Homer, — '" responsive," for instance, ON TRANSLATING HOMER. 45 which is a favourite word of Mr. Newman, to repre* sent the Homeric d/x.et/3o'/A£vos : — " Great Hector of the motley helm thus spake to her responsive* " But thus responsively to him spake god-like Alexander." 5 And the word " celestial," again, in the grand address of Zeus to the horses of Achilles, " You, who are born celestial, from Eld and Death exempted ! " seems to me in that place exactly to jar upon the feeling as too bookish. But, apart from the question roof Mr. "Newman's fidelity to his own theory, such a theory seems to me both dangerous for a translator and false in itself. Dangerous for a translator ; because, wherever one finds such a theory announced (and one finds it pretty often), it is generally followed 15 by an explosion of pedantry; and pedantry is of all things in the world the most un-Homeric. False in itself; because, in fact, we owe to the Latin element in our language most of that very rapidity and clear decisiveness by which it is contradistinguished from 20 the German, and in sympathy with the languages of Greece and Rome : so that to limit an English trans- lator of Homer to words of Saxon origin is to deprive him of one of his special advantages for translating Homer. In Voss's well-known translation of Homer, 25 it is precisely the qualities of his German language itself, something heavy and trailing both in the struc- ture of its sentences and in the words of which it is composed, which prevent his translation, in spite of the hexameters, in spite of the fidelity, from creating 30 in us the impression created by the Greek. Mr. 46 ON TRANSLATING HOMER. Newman's prescription, if followed, would just strip the English translator of the advantage which he has over Voss. The frame of mind in which we approach an author influences our correctness of appreciation of him ; and 5 Homer should be approached by a translator in the simplest frame of mind possible. Modern sentiment tries to make the ancient not less than the modern world its own ; but against modern sentiment in its applications to Homer the translator, if he would feel 10 Homer truly — and unless he feels him truly, how can he render him truly ? — cannot be too much on his guard. For example : the writer of an interesting article on English translations of Homer, in the last number of the National Review y quotes, I see, with 15 admiration, a criticism of Mr. Ruskin on the use of the epithet 4>vo-i£oo<>, "life-giving," in that beautiful passage in the third book of the Iliad, which follows Helen's mention of her brothers Castor and Pollux as alive, though they were in truth dead : — 2G ois vcrt£oos, because, " though he had to speak ioof the earth in sadness, he would not let that sadness change or affect his thought of it," but consoled him- self by considering that " the earth is our mother still — fruitful, life-giving." It is not true, as a matter of general criticism, that this kind of senti- 15 mentality, eminently modern, inspires Homer at all. " From Homer and Polygnotus I every day learn more clearly," says Goethe, " that in our life here above ground we have, properly speaking, to enact Hell": 2 — if the student must absolutely have a key- conote to the Iliad, let him take this of Goethe, and see what he can do with it ; it will not, at any rate, like the tender pantheism of Mr. Ruskin, falsify for him the whole strain of Homer. These are negative counsels ; I come to the posi- 25 tive. When I say, the translator of Homer should above all be penetrated by a sense of four qualities of his author ; that he is eminently rapid ; that he is eminently plain and direct, both in the evolution of his thought and in the expression of it, that is, both 30 in his syntax and in his words ; that he is eminently plain and direct in the substance of his thought, that 2 Brief wechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe, vi. 230. 48 ON TRANSLATING HOMER. is, in his matter and ideas ; and, finally, that he is eminently noble ; — I probably seem to be saying what is too general to be of much service to anybody. Yet it is strictly true that, for want of duly penetrating themselves with the first-named quality of Homer, : his rapidity, Cowper and Mr. Wright have failed in rendering him : that, for want of duly appreciating the second-named quality, his plainness and directness of style and diction, Pope and Mr. Sotheby have failed in rendering him ; that for want of appreciating ic the third, his plainness and directness of ideas, Chap- man has failed in rendering him ; while for want of appreciating the fourth, his nobleness, Mr. Newman, who has clearly seen some of the faults of his prede- cessors, has yet failed more conspicuously than any of 15 them. Coleridge says, in his strange language, speaking of the union of the human soul with the divine essence, that this takes place " Whene'er the mist, which stands 'tvvixt God and thee, 20 Defecates to a pure transparency ; " and so, too, it may be said of that union of the trans- lator with his original, which alone can produce a good translation, that it takes place when the mist which stands between them — the mist of alien modes 25 of thinking, speaking, and feeling on the translator's part — " defecates to a pure transparency," and dis- appears. But between Cowper and Homer — (Mr. JVright repeats in the main Cowper's manner, as Mr. Sotheby repeats Pope's manner, and neither Mr. 30 Wright's translation nor Mr. Sotheby's has, I must ON TRANSLATING HOMER. 49 be forgiven for saying, any proper reason for existing) — between Cowper and Homer there is interposed the mist of Cowper's elaborate Miltonic manner, entirely alien to the flowing rapidity of Homer ; between Pope 5 and Homer there is interposed the mist of Pope's literary artificial manner, entirely alien to the plain naturalness of Homer's manner ; between Chapman and Homer there is interposed the mist of the fanci- fulness of the Elizabethan age, entirely alien to the 10 plain directness of Homer's thought and feeling; while between Mr. Newman and Homer is interposed a cloud of more than Egyptian thickness — namely, a manner, in Mr. Newman's version, eminently ignoble, while Homer's manner is eminently noble. is I do not despair of making all these propositions clear to a student who approaches Homer with a free mind. First, Homer is eminently rapid, and to this. rapidity the elaborate movement of Miltonic blank verse is alien. The reputation of Cowper, that most 20 interesting man and excellent poet, does not depend on his translation of Homer ; and in his preface to the second edition, he himself tells us that he felt, — he had too much poetical taste not to feel, — on re- turning to his own version after six or seven years, 25 " more dissatisfied with it himself than the most difficult to be pleased of all his judges." And he was dissatisfied with it for the right reason, — that " it seemed to him deficient in the grace of ease." Yet he seems to have originally misconceived the manner of 30 Homer so much, that it is no wonder he rendered him amiss. " The similitude of Milton's manner to that of Homer is such," he says, " that no person 50 ON TRANSLATING HOMER. familiar with both can read either without being re- minded of the other ; and it is in those breaks and pauses to which the numbers of the English poet are so much indebted, both for their dignity and variety, that he chiefly copies the Grecian." It would be 5 more true to say : " The unlikeness of Milton's manner to that of Homer is such, that no person familiar with both can read either without being struck with his difference from the other ; and it is in his breaks and pauses that the English poet is ia most unlike the Grecian." The inversion and pregnant conciseness of Milton or Dante are, doubtless, most impressive qualities of style ; but they are the very opposites of the direct- ness and flovvingness of Homer, which he keeps alike 15 in passages of the simplest narrative, and in those of the deepest emotion. Not only, for example, are these lines of Cowper un-Homeric : — " So numerous seemed those fires the banks between Of Xanthus, blazing, and the fleet of Greece 20 In prospect all of Troy ; " where the position of the word "blazing" gives an entirely un-Homeric movement to this simple passage, describing the fires of the Trojan camp outside of Troy ; but the following lines, in that very highly- 25 wrought passage where the horse of Achilles answers his master's reproaches for having left Patroclus on the field of battle, are equally un-Homeric : — " For not through sloth or tardiness on us Aught chargeable, have Ilium's sons thine arms 30 Stript from Patroclus' shoulders ; but a God Matchless in battle, offspring of bright-haired ON TRANSLATING HOMER. 5 1 Latona, him contending in the van Slew, for the glory of the chief of Troy." Here even the first inversion, " have Ilium's sons thine arms Stript from Patroclus* shoulders," gives 5 the reader a sense of a movement not Homeric ; and the second inversion, "a God him contending in the van Slew," gives this sense ten times stronger. In- stead of moving on without check, as in reading the original, the reader twice finds himself, in reading the io translation, brought up and checked. Homer moves with the same simplicity and rapidity in the highly- wrought as in the simple passage. It is in vain that Cowper insists on his fidelity : " my chief boast is that I have adhered closely to my 15 original": — "the matter found in me, whether the reader like it or not, is found also in Homer ; and the matter not found in me, how much soever the reader may admire it, is found only in Mr. Pope." To suppose that it is fidelity to an original to give its 20 matter, unless you at the same time give its manner ; or, rather, to suppose that you can really give its matter at all, unless you can give its manner, is just the mistake of our pre-Raphaelite school' of painters who do not understand that the peculiar effect of 25 nature resides in the whole and not in the parts. So the peculiar effect of a poet resides in his manner and movement, not in his words taken separately. It is well known how conscientiously literal is Cowper in his translation of Homer. It is well known how 30 extravagantly free is Pope. "So let it be! Portents and prodigies are lost on me:" 52 ON TRANSLATING HOMER. that is Pope's rendering of the words, A&vde, tI poi Ba.va.rov fxavreiieai ; oidt rl ere X9"h' 3 " Xanthus, why prophesiest thou my death to me? thou needest not at all : " — yet on the whole, Pope's translation of the Iliad is 5 more Homeric than Cowper's, for it is more rapid. Pope's movement, however, though rapid, is not of the same kind as Homer's ; and here I come to the real objection to rhyme in a translation of Homer. It is commonly said that rhyme is to be abandoned ia in a translation of Homer, because " the exigencies of rhyme," to quote Mr. Newman, "positively forbid faithfulness"; because "a just translation of any ancient poet in rhyme," to quote Cowper, " is im- possible." This, however, is merely an accidental 15 objection to rhyme. If this were all, it might be supposed, that if rhymes were more abundant, Homer could be more adequately translated in rhyme. But this is not so ; there is a deeper, a substantial objec- tion to rhyme in a translation of Homer. It is, that 20 rhyme inevitably tends to pair lines which in the original are independent, and thus the movement of the poem is changed. In these lines of Chapman, for instance, from Sarpedon's speech to Glaucus, in the twelfth book of the Iliad : — 25 " O friend, if keeping back Would keep back age from us, and death, and that we might not wrack In this life's human sea at all, but that deferring now We shurned death ever, — nor would I half this vain valor show, 3c 3 Iliad, xix. 420. ON TRANSLATING HOMER. 53 Nor glorify a folly so, to wish thee to advance ; But since we must go, though not here, and that besides the chanc* Proposed now, there are infinite fates," etc. Here the necessity of making the line, 5 " Nor glorify a folly so, to wish thee to advance," rhyme with the line which follows it, entirely changes and spoils the movement of the passage. oijre Kev avrbs ivl irpwroicri fj.axolp.rii>, oijre Ke o~k (TTiWoL/XL p.dxv & Kvdi&veipav 4 io " Neither would I myself go forth to fight with the foremost, • Nor would I urge thee on to enter the glorious battle," says Homer ; there he stops, and begins an opposed movement : — vvv 5' — efjLTrrjs yap Kijpes icpeffraaiv davaroio — 15 '■' But — for a thousand fates of death stand close to us always" — This line, in which Homer wishes to go away with the most marked rapidity from the line before, Chap- man is forced, by the necessity of rhyming, intimately to connect with the line before. 20 " But since we must go, though not here, and that besides the chance " — The moment the word chance strikes our ear, we are irresistibly carried back to advance and to the whole previous line, which, according to Homer's own feel- 25 ing, we ought to have left behind us entirely, and to be moving farther and farther away from. Rhyme certainly, by intensifying antithesis, can intensify separation, and this is precisely what Pope 4 Iliad, xii. 324. 54 ON TRANSLATING HOMER. does ; but this balanced rhetorical antithesis, though very effective, is entirely un- Homeric. And this is what I mean by saying that Pope fails to render Homer, because he does not render his plainness and directness of style and diction. Where Homer marks 5 separation by moving away, Pope marks it by antithe- sis. No passage could show this better than the passage I have just quoted, on which I will pause for a moment. Robert Wood, whose Essay on the Genius of Hornet- ia is mentioned by Goethe as one of the books which fell into his hands when his powers were first develop- ing themselves, and strongly interested him, relates of this passage a striking story. He says that in 1762, at the end of the Seven Years' War, being 15 then Under-Secretary of State, he was directed to wait upon the President of the Council, Lord Gran- ville, a few days before he died, with the preliminary articles of the Treaty of Paris. "I found him," he continues, " so languid, that I proposed postponing 20 my business for another time ; but he insisted that I should stay, saying, it could not prolong his life to neglect his duty ; and repeating the following passage out of Sarpedon's speech, he dwelled with particular emphasis on the third line, which recalled to his mind 25 the distinguishing part he had taken in public affairs : — <3 iriirov, d /xhv yap iroKep.ov irepl rdvde yap, irbXep-ov irepl rdvde vy6i>Te, alel St] fiiWoL/xev ayr/po) t' adavaru re %btlologg ano Xiterature. But Mr. Newman does not confine himself to com- plaints on his own behalf, he complains on Homer's behalf too. He says that my " statements about Greek literature are against the most notorious and 5 elementary fact"; that I "do a public wrong to literature by publishing them "; and that the Pro- fessors to whom I appealed in my three Lectures, "would only lose credit if they sanctioned the use I make of their names." He does these eminent men iothe kindness of adding, however, that, "whether they are pleased with this parading of their names in behalf of paradoxical error, he may well doubt," and that " until they endorse it themselves, he shall treat my process as a piece of forgery." He proceeds to discuss 15 my statements at great length, and with an erudition and ingenuity which nobody can admire more than I do. And he ends by saying that my ignorance is great. Alas ! that is very true. Much as Mr. Newman 20 was mistaken when he talked of my rancour, he is entirely right when he talks of my ignorance. And yet, perverse as it seems to say so, I sometimes find myself wishing, when dealing with these matters of poetical criticism, that my ignorance were even greater 25 than it is. To handle these matters properly there is needed a poise so perfect that the least overweight in 67 68 PHILOLOGY AND LITERATURE. any direction tends to destroy the balance. Temper destroys it, a crotchet destroys it, even erudition may destroy it. To press to the sense of the thing itself with which one is dealing, not to go off on some col- lateral issue about the thing, is the hardest matter in 5 the world. The " thing itself " with which one is here dealing, — the critical perception of poetic truth, — is of all things the most volatile, elusive, and evanes- cent ; by even pressing too impetuously after it, one runs the risk of losing it. The critic of poetry should 10 have the finest tact, the nicest moderation, the most free, flexible, and elastic spirit imaginable ; he should be indeed the "ondoyant et divers," the undulating mid diverse being of Montaigne. The less he can deal with his object simply and freely, the more things 15 he has to take into account in dealing with it, — the more, in short, he has to encumber himself, — so much the greater force of spirit he needs to retain his elasticity. But one cannot exactly have this greater force by wishing for it ; so, for the force of spirit one 20 has, the load put upon it is often heavier than it will well bear. The late Duke of Wellington said of a certain peer that "it was a great pity his education had been so far too much for his abilities." In like manner, one often sees erudition out of all proportion 25 to its owner's critical faculty. Little as I know, there- fore, I am always apprehensive, in dealing with poetry, lest even that little should prove " too much for my abilities." With this consciousness of my own lack of learning, 30 — nay, with this sort of acquiescence in it, with this belief that for the labourer in the field of poetical PHILOLOGY AND LITERATURE. 69 criticism learning has its disadvantages, — I am not likely to dispute with Mr. Newman about matters of erudition. All that he says on these matters in his Reply I read with great interest : in general I agree 5 with him ; but only, I am sorry to say, up to a certain point. Like all learned men, accustomed to desire definite rules, he draws his conclusions too absolutely ; he wants to include too much under his rules; he does not quite perceive that in poetical criticism the 10 shade, the fine distinction, is everything ; and that when he has once missed this, in all he says he is in truth but beating the air. For instance : because I think Homer noble, he imagines I must think him elegant ; and in fact he says in plain words that I do think 15 him so, — that to me Homer seems " pervadingly elegant." But he does not. Virgil is elegant, — "pervadingly elegant," — even in passages of the highest emotion : " O, ubi campi, 20 Spercheosque, et virginibus bacchata Lacaenis Taygeta ! " ' Even there Virgil, though of a divine elegance, is still elegant : but Homer is not elegant ; the word is quite a wrong one to apply to him, and Mr. Newman is 25 quite right in blaming any one he finds so applying it. Again ; arguing against my assertion that Homer is not quaint, he says : " It is quaint to call waves wet, milk white, blood dusky, horses single-hoofed, words winged, Vulcan Lobfoot (KuAAo7roSiW), a spear long- 1,1 O for the fields of Thessaly and the streams of Spercheios ! O for the hills alive with the dances of the Laconian maidens, the hills of Taygetus ! " — Georgics, ii. 486. 7© PHILOLOGY AND LITERATURE. shadoivy," and so on. I find I know not how many distinctions to draw here. I do not think it quaint to call waves wet, or milk white, or words winged ; but I do think it quaint to call horses single-hoofed, or Vul- can Lobfoot, or a spear long shadowy. As to calling 5 blood dusky, I do not feel quite sure ; I will tell Mr. Newman my opinion when I see the passage in which he calls it so. But then, again, because it is quaint to call Vulcan Lobfoot, I cannot admit that it was quaint to call him KuAAo7roS for Ur)\ei8ov, in Homer, no more sounded antiquated to Sophocles than artne'd for arm'd, in Milton, sounds antiquated to us ; but Mr. Newman's withouten and 15 muchel do sound to us antiquated, even for poetry, and therefore they do not correspond in their effect upon us with Homer's words in their effect upon Sophocles. When Chaucer, who uses such words, is to pass cur- rent amongst us, to be familiar to us, as Homer was 20 familiar to the Athenians, he has to be modernised, as Wordsworth and others set to work to modernise him ; but an Athenian no more needed to have Homer modernised, than we need to have the Bible modern- ised, or Wordsworth himself. 25 Therefore, when Mr. Newman's words bragly, bulkin, and the rest, are an established possession of our minds, as Homer's words were an established possession of an Athenian mind, he may use them ; but not till then. Chaucer's words, the words of 3a Burns, great poets as these were, are yet not thus an established possession of an Englishman's mind, and PHILOLOGY AND LITERATURE. 79 therefore they must not be used in rendering Homei into English. Mr. Newman has been misled just by doing that which his admirer praises him for doing, by taking a 5 " far broader historical and philological view than " mine. Precisely because he has done this, and has applied the " philological view " where it was not applicable, but where the '' poetical view " alone was rightly applicable, he has fallen into error. 10 It is the same with him in his remarks on the diffi- culty and obscurity of Homer. Homer, I say, is per- fectly plain in speech, simple, and intelligible. And I infer from this that his translator, too, ought to be perfectly plain in speech, simple, and intelligible ; 15 ought not to say, for instance, in rendering Oijre Ke 5pei NouTav, Kal iv eirTairvXois &Cov Qrj(3ais . . . 3 There is a limpidness in that, a want of salient points 15 to seize and transfer, which makes imitation impos- sible, except by a genius akin to the genius which produced it. — On the Study of Celtic Literature and on Translating Homer, ed. 1895, pp. 264-269. 3 " A secure time fell to the lot neither of Peleus the son of i'Eacus, nor of the godlike Cadmus ; howbeit these are said to have had, of all mortals, the supreme of happiness, who heard the golden-snooded Muses sing, one of them on the mountain (Pelion), the other in seven-gated Thebes." 5t#e in Xfterature. If T were asked where English poecry got these three things, its turn for style, its turn for melan- choly, and its turn for natural magic, for catching and rendering the charm of nature in a wonderfully near and vivid way, — I should answer, with some 5 doubt, that it got much of its turn for style from a Celtic source ; with less doubt, that it got much of its melancholy from a Celtic source ; with no doubt at all, that from a Celtic source it got nearly all its natural magic. I0 Any German with penetration and tact in matters of literary criticism will own that the principal de- ficiency of German poetry is in style ; that for style, in the highest sense, it shows but little feeling. Take the eminent masters of style, the poets who best give 15 the idea of what the peculiar power which lies in style is, — Pindar, Virgil, Dante, Milton. An example of the peculiar effect which these poets produce, you can hardly give from German poetry. Examples enough you can give from German poetry of the 20 effect produced by genius, thought, and feeling ex- pressing themselves in clear language, simple lan- guage, passionate language, eloquent language, with harmony and melody ; but not of the peculiar effect exercised by eminent power of style. Every reader 25 of Dante can at once call to mind what the peculiar 88 STYLE IN LITERATURE. 89 effect I mean is ; I spoke of it in my lectures on translating Homer, and there I took an example of it from Dante, who perhaps manifests it more emi- nently than any other poet. But from Milton, too, 5 one may take examples of it abundantly ; compare this from Milton : . . . . nor sometimes forget Those other two equal with me in fate, So were I equall'd with them in renown, |o Blind Thamyris and blind Mseonides — ■ with this from Goethe : Es bildet ein Talent sich in der Stille, Sich ein Character in dem Strom der Welt. Nothing can be better in its way than the style in 15 which Goethe there presents his thought, but it is the style of prose as much as of poetry ; it is lucid, harmonious, earnest, eloquent, but it has not received that peculiar kneading, heightening, and recasting which is observable in the style of the passage from 20 Milton, — a style which seems to have for its cause a certain pressure of emotion, and an ever-surging, yet bridled, excitement in the poet, giving a special intensity to his way of delivering himself. In poetical races and epochs this turn for style is peculiarly »5 observable ; and perhaps it is only on condition of having this somewhat heightened and difficult man- ner, so different from the plain manner of prose, that poetry gets the privilege of being loosed, at its best moments, into that perfectly simple, limpid style, 30 which is the supreme style of all, but the simplicity 90 STYLE IN LITERATURE. of which is still not the simplicity of prose. The simplicity of Menander's style is the simplicity of prose, and is the same kind of simplicity as that which Goethe's style, in the passage I have quoted, exhibits ; but Menander does not belong to a great 5 poetical moment, he comes too late for it ; it is the simple passages in poets like Pindar or Dante which are perfect, being masterpieces of poetical simplicity. One may say the same of the simple passages in Shakspeare ; they are perfect, their simplicity being 10 a poetical simplicity. They are the golden, easeful, crowning moments of a manner which is always pitched in another key from that of prose, a manner changed and heightened ; the Elizabethan style, reg- nant in most of our dramatic poetry to this day, is 15 mainly the continuation of this manner of Shak- speare's. It was a manner much more turbid and strewn with blemishes than the manner of Pindar, Dante, or Milton ; often it was detestable ; but it owed its existence to Shakspeare's instinctive impulse 20 towards style in poetry, to his native sense of the necessity for it ; and without the basis of style every- where, faulty though it may in some places be, we should not have had the beauty of expression, unsur- passable for effectiveness and charm, which is reached 25 in Shakspeare's best passages. The turn for style is perceptible all through English poetry, proving, to my mind, the genuine poetical gift of the race ; this turn imparts to our poetry a stamp of high distinc- tion, and sometimes it doubles the force of a poet not 30 by nature of the very highest order, such as Gray, and raises him to a rank beyond what his natural STYLE IN LITERATURE. 91 richness and power seem to promise. Goethe, with his fine critical perception, saw clearly enough both the power of style in itself, and the lack of style in the literature of his own country ; and perhaps if we 5 regard him solely as a German, not as a European, his great work was that he labored all his life to im- part style into German literature, and firmly to estab- lish it there. Hence the immense importance to him of the world of classical art, and of the produc- iotions of Greek or Latin genius, where style so emi- nently manifests its power. Had he found in the German genius and literature an element of style existing by nature and ready to his hand, half his work, one may say, would have been saved him, and 15 he might have done much more in poetry. But as it was, he had to try and create, out of his own powers, a style for German poetry, as well as to provide con- tents for this style to carry ; and thus his labour as a poet was doubled. 20 It is to be observed that power of style, in the sense in which I am here speaking of style, is some- thing quite different from the power of idiomatic, simple, nervous, racy expression, such as the expres- sion of healthy, robust natures so often is, such as 25 Luther's was in a striking degree. Style, in my sense of the word, is a peculiar recasting and heightening, under a certain condition of spiritual excitement, of what a man has to say, in such a manner as to add dignity and distinction to it ; and dignity and distinc- 3otion are not terms which suit many acts or words of Luther. Deeply touched with the Gemeinheit which is the bane of his nation, as he is at the same time a 92 STYLE IN LITERATURE. grand example of the honesty which is his nation's excellence, he can seldom even show himself brave, resolute, and truthful, without showing a strong dash of coarseness and commonness all the while ; the right definition of Luther, as of our own Banyan, is 5 that he is a Philistine of genius. So Luther's sincere idiomatic German, — such language as this : " Hilf lieber Gott, wie manchen Jammer habe ich gesehen, dass der gemeine Mann doch so gar nichts weiss von der christlichen Lehre ! " — no more proves a power of u style in German literature, than Cobbett's sinewy idiomatic English proves it in English literature. Power of style, properly so called, as manifested in masters of style like Dante or Milton in poetry, Cicero, Bossuet, or Bolingbroke in prose, is something 15 quite different, and has, as I have said, for its charac- teristic effect, this : to add dignity and distinction. — On the Study of Celtic Literature, ed. 1895, pp. 102-107. IRature in Bnglfsb fl>oetrg. The Celt's quick feeling for what is noble and distinguished gave his poetry style ; his indomitable personality gave it pride and passion ; his sensibility and nervous exaltation gave it a better gift still, the 5 gift of rendering with wonderful felicity the magical charm of nature. The forest solitude, the bubbling spring, the wild flowers, are everywhere in romance. They have a mysterious life and grace there ; they are Nature's own children, and utter her secret in a jo way which make them something quite different from the woods, waters, and plants of Greek and Latin poetry. Now of this delicate magic, Celtic romance is so pre-eminent a mistress, that it seems impossible to believe the power did not come into romance from 15 the Celts. 1 Magic is just the word for it, — the magic of nature ; not merely the beauty of nature, — that the Greeks and Latins had ; not merely an honest smack of the soil, a faithful realism, — that the Germans had • but the intimate life of Nature, her weird power and 20 her fairy charm. As the Saxon names of places, with the pleasant wholesome smack of the soil in them, — 1 Rhyme, — the most striking characteristic of our modern poetry as distinguished from that of the ancients, and a main source, to our poetry, of its magic and charm, of what we call its romantit element, — rhyme itself, all the weight of evidence tends to show, comes into our poetry from the Celts. 93 94 NA TURE IN ENGLISH POE TR V. Weathersfield, Thaxted, Shalford, — are to the Celtic names of places, with their penetrating, lofty beauty, — Velindra, Tyntagel, Caernarvon, — so is the homely realism of German and Norse nature to the fairy-like loveliness of Celtic nature. Gwydion wants a wife 5 for his pupil : " Well," says Math, " we will seek, I and thou, by charms and illusions, to form a wife for him out of flowers. So they took the blossoms of the oak, and the blossoms of the broom, and the blossoms of the meadow-sweet, and produced from them a 10 maiden, the fairest and most graceful that man ever saw. And they baptized her, and gave her the name of Flower-Aspect." Celtic romance is full of exquisite touches like that, showing the delicacy of the Celt's feeling in these matters, and how deeply Nature lets 15 him come into her secrets. The quick dropping of blood is called " faster than the fall of the dewdrop from the blade of reed-grass upon the earth, when the dew of June is at the heaviest." And thus is Olwen described : " More yellow was her hair than 20 the flower of the broom, and her skin was whiter than the foam of the wave, and fairer were her hands and her fingers than the blossoms of the wood- anemony amidst the spray of the meadow foun- tains." For loveliness it would be hard to beat 25 that ; and for magical clearness and nearness take the following : — "And in the evening Peredur entered a valley, and at the head of the valley he came to a hermit's cell, and the hermit welcomed him gladly, and there 30 he spent the night. And in the morning he arose, and when he went forth, behold, a shower of snow NA TURE IN ENGLISH POETR Y. 95 had fallen the night before, and a hawk had killed a wild-fowl in front of the cell. And the noise of the horse scared the hawk away, and a raven alighted upon the bird. And Peredur stood and compared 5 the blackness of the raven, and the whiteness of the snow, and the redness of the blood, to the hair of the lady whom best he loved, which was blacker than the raven, and to her skin, which was whiter than the snow, and to her two cheeks, which were redder 10 than the blood upon the snow appeared to be." And this, which is perhaps less striking, is not less beautiful : — "And early in the day Geraint and Enid left the wood, and they came to an open country, with 15 meadows on one hand and mowers mowing the meadows. And there was a river before them, and the horses bent down and drank the water. And they went up out of the river by a steep bank, and there they met a slender stripling with a satchel 20 about his neck; and he had a small blue pitcher in his hand, and a bowl on the mouth of the pitcher." And here the landscape, up to this point so Greek in its clear beauty, is suddenly magicalised by the romance touch : — 35 'And they saw a tall tree by the side of the river, one-half of which was in flames from the root to the top, and the other half was green and in full leaf." Magic is the word to insist upon, — a magically vivid and near interpretation of nature ; since it is 30 this which constitutes the special charm and power of the effect I am calling attention to, and it is for this that the Celt's sensibility gives him a peculiar o6 NA TURE IN ENGLISH FOE TR Y. aptitude. But the matter needs rather fine handling, and it is easy to make mistakes here in our criticism. In the first place, Europe tends constantly to become more and more one community, and we tend to become Europeans instead of merely Englishmen, 5 Frenchmen, Germans, Italians ; so whatever aptitude or felicity one people imparts into spiritual work, gets imitated by the others, and thus tends to become the common property of all. Therefore anything so beautiful and attractive as the natural magic I am ia speaking of, is sure, nowadays, if it appears in the productions of the Celts, or of the English, or of the French, to appear in the productions of the Germans also, or in the productibns of the Italians ; but there will be a stamp of perfectness and inimitableness 15 about it in the literatures where it is native, which it will not have in the literatures where it is not native. Novalis or Riickert, for instance, have their eye fixed on nature, and have undoubtedly a feeling for natural magic ; a rough-and-ready critic easily credits them 20 and the Germans with the Celtic fineness of tact, the Celtic nearness to Nature and her secret ; but the question is whether the strokes in the German's picture of nature 8 have ever the indefinable delicacy, 2 Take the following attempt to render the natural magic sup- posed to pervade Tieck's poetry: — 'In diesen Dichtungen herrscht eine geheimnissvolle Innigkeit, ein sonderbares Einver- standniss mit der Natur, besonders mit der Pflanzen- und Stein- reich. Der Leser fiihlt sich da wie in einem verzauberten Walde ; er hort die unterirdischen Quellen melodisch rauschen ; wildfremde Wunderblumen schauen ihn an mit ihren bunten sehnsiichtigen Augen ; unsichtbare Lippen kiissen seine Wangen mit neckender Zartlichkeit ; hohe Pilze, wie goldne Glocken, NA TURE IN ENGLISH POE TR Y. 97 charm, and perfection of the Celt's touch in the pieces I just now quoted, or of Shakspeare's touch in his daffodil, Wordsworth's in his cuckoo, Keats's in his Autumn, Obermann's in his mountain birch-tree or 5 his Easter-daisy among the Swiss farms. To decide where the gift for natural magic originally lies, whether it is properly Celtic or Germanic, we must decide this question. / ee^^juJbU^^eJL, In the second place, there (are maiwTwflys* of 10 handling n^tur^jsx^p^ are nbttftferfyMftncenred with one, ofjtheni^^ui a roifehlland-readji critic imaginSf tlwtAPi&jfilAfc? same\o fii%^« ^Nature is handl^^gfttfil^ fJlV % to' draL tpVtf^^jjW^L-Q. tinction between^io^^ojLhandlii\g her. ^BuTInese 15 modes are many!; Iwill mention four of them Stow : there is the conventional way of handling nature, there is the faithful way of handling nature, there is the Greek way of handling nature, there is the magical way of handling nature. In all these three 20 last the eye is on the object, but with a difference; in the faithful way of handling nature, the eye is on the object, and that is all you can say ; in the Greek, the eye is on the object, but lightness and brightness are added ; in the magical, the eye is on the object, wachsen klingend empor am Fusse der Baume ; " and so on. Now that stroke of the hohe Pilze, the great funguses, would have been impossible to the tact and delicacy of a born lover of nature like the Celt, and could only have come from a German who has hineinstudirt himself into natural magic. It is a crying false note, which carries us at once out of the world of nature- magic and the breath of the woods, into the world of theatre- magic and the smell of gas and orange-peel. 98 NA TURE IN ENGLISH FOE TR V. but charm and magic are added. In the conventional way of handling nature, the eye is not on the object ; what that means we all know, we have only to think of our eighteenth-century poetry : — " As when the moon, refulgent lamp of night" — 5 to call up any number of instances. Latin poetry supplies plenty of instances too ; if we put this from Propertius's Hylas : — . . . " manus heroum .... Mollia camposita litora fronde tegit " — 10 side by side the line of Theocritus by which it was suggested : — " Aei/xwv yap crcpiv e/ceiro /xiyas, (rTt^ddecrffiv 6veiap " — we get at the same moment a good specimen both of the conventional and of the Greek way of handling 15 nature. But from our own poetry we may get speci- mens of the Greek way of handling nature, as well as of the conventional : for instance, Keats's : — " What little town, by river or seashore, Or mountain-built with quiet citadel, 20 Is emptied of its folk, this pious morn?" is Greek, as Greek as a thing from Homer or The- ocritus ; it is composed with the eye on the object, a radiancy and light clearness being added. German poetry abounds in specimens of the faithful way of 25 handling nature ; an excellent example is to be found in the stanzas called Zueignutig, prefixed to Goethe's poems ; the morning walk, the mist, the dew, the NA TURE IN ENGLISH FOE TEY. 99 sun, are as faithful as they can be, they are given with the eye on the object, but there the merit of the work, as a handling of nature, stops ; neither Greek radiance nor Celtic magic is added ; the power 5 of these is not what gives the poem in question its merit, but a power of quite another kind, a power of moral and spiritual emotion. But the power of Greek radiance Goethe could give to his handling of nature, and nobly too, as any one who will read his Wanderer, 10 — the poem in which a wanderer falls in with a peasant woman and her child by their hut, built out of the ruins of a temple near Cuma, — may see. Only the power of natural magic Goethe, does not, I think, give ; whereas Keats passes at will from the Greek 15 power to that power which is, as I say, Celtic ; from his : — " What little town, by river or seashore " — to his : — " White hawthorn and the pastoral eglantine, 20 Fast-fading violets cover'd up in leaves " — or his : — . . . " magic casements, opening on the foam Of perilous seas, in fairy .lands forlorn " — in which the very same note is struck as in those 25 extracts which I quoted from Celtic romance, and struck with authentic and unmistakable power. Shakspeare, in handling nature, touches this Celtic note so exquisitely, that perhaps one is inclined to be always looking for the Celtic note in him, and not 30 to recognise his Greek note when it comes. But if one attends well to the difference between the two IOC NA TURE IN ENGLISH POETR Y. notes, and bears in mind, to guide one, such things as Virgil's " moss-grown springs and grass softer than sleep ": — " Muscosi fontes et somno mollior herba " — as his charming flower-gatherer, who : — 5 " Pallentes violas et summa papavera carpens Narcissum et florem jungit bene olentis anethi " — as his quinces and chestnuts : — . . . " cana legam tenera lanugine mala Castaneasque nuces " 10 then, I think, we shall be disposed to say that in Shakspeare's : — " I know a bank where the wild thyme blows, Where oxlips and the nodding violet grows, Quite over-canopied with lucious woodbine, 15 With sweet musk-roses and with eglantine " — it is mainly a Greek note which is struck. Then, again in his : — " look how the floor of heaven Is thick inlaid with patines of bright gold ! " — 20 we are at the very point of transition from the Greek note to the Celtic ; there is the Greek clearness and brightness, with the Celtic aerialness and magic com- ing in. Then we have the sheer, inimitable Celtic note in passages like this : — 2 5 " Met we on hill, in dale, forest or mead, By paved fountain or by rushy brook, Or in the beached margent of the sea " — NATURE IN ENGLISH POETRY. ioi or this, the last I will quote : — " The moon shines bright. In such a night as this, When the wind did gently kiss the trees, And they did make no noise, in such a night 5 Troilus, methinks, mounted the Trojan walls — " in such a night Did Thisbe fearfully o'ertrip the dew — " in such a night Stood Dido, with a willow in her hand, 10 Upon the wild sea-banks, and waved her love To come again to Carthage." And those last lines of all are so drenched and in- toxicated with the fairy-dew of that natural magic which is our theme, that I cannot do better than end 15 with them. — On tlie Study of Celtic Literature, ed. 1895, pp. 120-128. Ipoetrg anD Science. The grand power of po et ry is its interpret ative power ; by which I mean, not a power of drawing out in black and white an explanation of the mystery of the universe, but the power of so dealing with things as to awaken in us a wonderfully full, new, and inti- 5 mate sense of them, and of our relations with them. When this sense is awakened in us, as to objects with- out us, we feel ourselves to be in contact with the essential nature of those objects, to be no longer be- wildered and oppressed by them, but to have their 10 secret, and to be in harmony with them ; and this feeling calms and satisfies us as no other can. Poetry, indeed, interprets in another way besides this ; but one of its two ways of interpreting, of exercising its highest power, is by awakening this sense in us. 1 15 will not now inquire whether this sense is illusive, whether it can be proved not to be illusive, whether it does absolutely make us possess the real nature of things ; all I say is, that poetry can awaken it in us, and that to awaken it is one of the highest powers of 20 poetry. The interpretations of science do not give us this intimate sense of objects as the interpretations of poetry give it ; they appeal to a limited faculty and not to the whole man. It is not Linnaeus or Cavendish or Cuvier who gives us the true sense of animals, or 25 water, or plants, who seizes their secret for us, who POETRY AND SCIENCE. 103 makes us participate in their life ; it is Shakspeare, with his " daffodils That come before the swallow dares, and take 5 The winds of March with beauty ; " it is Wordsworth, with his " voice .... heard In spring-time from the cuckoo-bird, Breaking the silence of the seas 10 Among the farthest Hebrides ; " it is Keats, with his " moving waters at their priestlike task Of cold ablution round Earth's human shores ; " it is Chateaubriand, with his, " cime indetermine'e des is/orets j " it is Senancour, with his mountain birch-tree : " Cette e'corce blanche, lisse etcrevasse'e ; cette tige agreste ; ces branches qui s'inclinent vers la terre ; la mobilite des feuilles, et tout cet abandon, simplicite' de la nature, atti' tude des deserts." — Essays, I., ed. 1896, pp. 81-82. Xiteraturc ano Science. Practical people talk with a smile of Plato and of his absolute ideas ; and it is impossible to deny that Plato's ideas do often seem unpractical and impracti^ cablejjmd especially when one views them in con- nexion with the life of a great work-a-day world like 5 the United States. The necessary staple of the life of such a world Plato regards with disdain ; handi- craft and trade and the working professions he regards with disdain ; but what becomes of the life of an industrial modern community if you take handi- ia craft and trade and the working professions out of it? The base mechanic arts and handicrafts, says Plato, bring about a natural weakness in the principle of excellence in a man, so that he cannot govern the ignoble growths in him, but nurses them, and cannot 15 understand fostering any other. Those who exercise such arts and trades, as they have their bodies, he says marred, by their vulgar businesses, so they have their souls, too, bowed and broken by them. And if one of these uncomely people has a mind to seek self- 20 culture and philosophy, Plato compares him to a bald little tinker, who has scraped together money, and has got his release from service, and has had a bath, and bought a new coat, and is rigged out like a bride- groom about to marry the daughter of his master who 25 has fallen into poor and helpless estate. 104 LITER ATURE AND S CIENCE. 105 Nor do the working professions fare any better than trade at the hands of Plato. He draws for us an inimitable picture of the working lawyer, and of his life of bondage ; he shows how this bondage from his 5 youth up has stunted and warped him, and made him small and crooked of soul, encompassing him with difficulties which he is not man enough to rely on justice and truth as means to encounter, but has recourse, for help out of them, to falsehood and 10 wrong. And so, says Plato, this poor creature is bent and broken, and grows up from boy to man without a particle of soundness in him, although exceedingly smart and clever in his own esteem. One cannot refuse to admire the artist who draws 15 these pictures. But we say to ourselves that his ideas show the influence of a primitive and obsolete order of things, when the warrior caste and the priestly caste were alone in honour, and the humble work of the world was done by slaves. We have now changed 20 all that; the rnodern majority consists in work, as Emerson declares ; and in work, we may add, princi- pally of such plain and dusty kind as the work of cultivators of the ground, handicraftsmen, men of trade and business, men of the working professions. 25 Above all is this true in a great industrious com- munity such as that of the United States. Now education, many people go on to say, is still mainly governed by the ideas of men like Plato, who lived when the warrior caste and the priestly or 30 philosophical class were alone in honour, and the really useful part of the community were slaves. It is an education fitted for persons of leisure in such 106 LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. a community. This education passed from Greece and Rome to the feudal communities of Europe, where also the warrior caste and the priestly caste were alone held in honour, and where the really useful and working part of the community, though 5 not nominally slaves as in the pagan world, were practically not much better off than slaves, and not more seriously regarded. And how absurd it is, people end by saying, to inflict this education upon 1 an industrious modern community, where very few 10 indeed are persons of leisure, and the mass to be con- sidered has not leisure, but is bound, for its own great good, and for the great good of the world at large, to plain labour and to industrial pursuits, an d the e du- cation in question tends necessarily to make men dis- 15 satisfied with these pursuits and unfitted for them ! That is what it said. So far I must defend Plato, as to plead that his view of education and studies is in the general, as it seems to me, sound enough, and fitted for all sorts and conditions of men, whatever 20 their pursuits may be. /An intelligent man," says Plato, " will prize those studies which result in his soul getting soberness, righteousness, and wisdom, and will less value the others?7 I cannot consider that a bad description of the aim of education, and of 25 the motives which should govern us in the choice of studies, whether we are preparing ourselves for a hereditary seat in the English House of Lords or for the pork trade in Chicago. Still I admit that Plato's world was not ours, that 30 his scorn of trade and handicraft is fantastic, that he had no conception of a great industrial community LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. 1 07 such as that of the United States, and that such a community must and will shape its education to suit its own needs. If the usual education handed down to it from the past does not suit it, it will cer- 5 tainly before long drop this and try another. The usual education in the past has been mainly literary. The question is whether the studies which were long supposed to be the best for all of us are practically the best now ; wheth er other s are not better. The 10 tyranny of the past, many think, weighs on us injuri- ously in the predominance given to letters in educa- tion. The question is raised whether, to meet the needs of our modern life, the predominance ought not now to pass from letters to science ; and naturally 15 the question is nowhere raised with more energy than here in the United States. The design of abasing what is called " mere literary instruction and educa- tion," and of exalting what is called " sound, ex- tensive, and practical scientific knowledge," is, in this 20 intensely modern world of the United States, even more perhaps than in Europe, a very popular design, and makes great and rapid progress. I am going to ask whether the present movement for ousting letters from their old predominance in 25 education, and for transferring the predominance in education to the natural sciences, whether this brisk and flourishing movement ought to prevail, and whether it is likely that in the end it really will pre- vail. An objection may be raised which I will antici- 30 pate. My own studies have been almost wholly in letters, and my visits to the field of the natural sciences have been very slight and inadequate, al- 108 LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. though those sciences have always strongly moved my curiosity. A man of letters, it will perhaps be said, is not competent to discuss the comparative merits of letters and natural science as means of education. To this objection I reply, first of all, that his incom- 5 petence, if he attempts the discussion but is really incompetent for it, will be abundantly visible ; nobody will be taken in ; he will have plenty of sharp observers and critics to save mankind from that dan- ger. But the line I am going to follow is, as you will 10 soon discover, so extremely simple, that perhaps it may be followed without failure even by one who for a more ambitious line of discussion would be quite incompetent. Some of you may possibly remember a phrase of 15 mine which has been the object of a good deal of comment ; an observation to the effect that in our culture, the aim being to know ourselves and the world, j\ we have, as the means to this end, to know the best \\ which has been thought and said in the world. A man of 20 science, who is also an excellent writer and the very prince of debaters, Professor Huxley, in a discourse at the opening of Sir Josiah Mason's college at Bir- mingham, laying hold of this phrase, expanded it by quoting some more words of mine, which are these : 25 " The civilised world is to be regarded as now being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great con- federation, bound to a joint action and working to a common result ; and whose members have for their proper outfit a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and 30 Eastern antiquity, and of one another. Special local and temporary advantages being put out of account, LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. 109 that modern nation will in the intellectual and spirit- ual sphere make most progress, which most thoroughly carries out this programme." Now on my phrase, thus enlarged, Professor Hux- 5 ley remarks that when I speak of the above-mentioned knowledge as enabling us to know ourselves and the! world, I assert literature to contain the materials^ which suffice for thus making us know ourselves and the world. But it is not by any means clear, says he, 10 that after having learnt all which ancient and modern literatures have to tell us, we have laid a sufficiently broad and deep foundation for that criticism of life, that knowlege of ourselves and the world, which con- stitutes culture. On the contrary, Professor Huxley 15 declares that he finds himself " wholly unable to admit that either nations or individuals will really advance, if their outfit draws nothing from the stores of physical science. An army without weapons of precision, and with no particular base of operations, 20 might more hopefully enter upon a campaign on the Rhine, than a man, devoid of a knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, upon a criticism of life." This shows how needful it is for those who are to 25 discuss any matter together, to have a common under- standing as to the sense of the terms they employ, — how needful, and how difficult. What Professor Huxley says, implies just the reproach which is so often brought against die study of belles lettres, as they 30 are called : that the study is an elegant one, gut sligh t a nd inef fectual ; a smattering of Gre ek and Latin and other ornamental things, of little use for any one \ HO LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. whose objec t is to get at truth , and to be a practical man. So, too, M. Renan talks of the "superficial humanism " of a school-course which treats us as if we were all going to be poets, writers, preachers, orators, and he opposes this humanism to positives science, or the critical searcli after truth. And there is always a tendency in those who are remonstrating against the predominance of letters in education, to understand by letters belles letlres, and by belles lettres a superficial humanism, the opposite of science or true 10 knowledge. But when we talk of jcnowing Gre ek and R oman antiqui ty, for instance, which is the knowledge people have called the humanities, I for my part mean a knowledge which is something more than a super- 15 ficial humanism, mainly decorative. " I call all teach- ing scientific" says Wolf, the critic of Homer, "which is systematically laid out and followed up to its origi- nal sources. For example : a knowledge of classical antiquity is scientific when the remains of classical 20 antiquity are correctly studied in the original lan- guages." There can be no doubt that Wolf is per- fectly right; that all learning is scientific which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources, and that a genuine humanism is scientific. 25 When I speak of knowing Greek and Roman an- tiquity, therefore, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, I mean more than a knowledge of so much vocabulary, so much grammar, so many portions of authors in the Greek and Latin languages, I mean 30 knowing the Greeks and Romans, and their life and genius, and what they were and did in the world ; LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. in what we get from them, and what is its value. That, at least, is the ideal ; and when we talk of endeavour- ing to know Greek and Roman antiquity, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, we mean endeavour- 5 ing so to know them as to satisfy this ideal, however much we may still fall short of it. The same also as to knowing our own and other modern nations, with the like aim of getting to under- stand ourselves and the world. To know the best iothat has been thought and said by the modern nations, is to know, says Professor Huxley, " only what modern literatures have to tell us ; it is the criticism of life contained in modern literature." And yet " the dis- tinctive character of our times," he urges, " lies in 15 the vast and constantly increasing part which is played by natural knowledge." And how, therefore, can a man, devoid of knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, enter hopefully upon a criticism of modern life ? 20 Let us, I say, be agreed about the meaning of the terms we are using. I talk of knowing the best which has been thought and uttered in the world ; Professor Huxley says this means knowing literature. Litera- ture is a large word ; it may mean everything written 25 with letters or printed in a book. Euclid's Elements and Newton's Principia are thus literature. All knowledge that reaches us through books is literature. But by literature Professor Huxley means belles lettres. He means to make me say, that knowing the best 30 which has been thought and said by the modern nations is knowing their belles lettres and no more. And this is no sufficient equipment, he argues, for H2 LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. a criticism of modern life. But as I do not mean, by .■ knowing ancient Rome, knowing merely more or less of Latin belles lettres, and taking no account of Rome's military, and political, and legal, and administrative work in the world ; and as, by knowing ancient 5 Greece, I understand knowing her as the giver of Greek art, and the guide to a free and right use of reason and to scientific method, and the founder of our mathematics and physics and astronomy and biology, — I understand knowing her as all this, and not iq merely knowing certain Greek poems, and histories, and treatises, and speeches, — so as to the knowledge of modern nations also. By knowing modern nations, I mean not merely knowing their belles lettres, but knowing also what has been done by such men as 15 Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Darwin. " Our ances- tors learned," says Professor Huxley, "that the earth is the centre of the visible universe, and that man is the cynosure of things terrestrial ; and more especially was it inculcated that the course of nature has no 20 fixed order, but that it could be, and constantly was, altered." But for us now, continues Professor Hux- ley, " the notions of the beginning and the end of the world entertained by our forefathers are no longer credible. It is very certain that the earth is not the 25 chief body in the material universe, and that the world is not subordinated to man's use. It is even more cer- tain that nature is the expression of a definite order, with which nothing interferes." "And yet," he cries, "the purely classical education advocated by the 30 representatives of the humanists in our day gives no inkling of all this ! " LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. 1 13 In due place and time I will just touch upon that vexed question of classical education ; but at present the questionis as to what is meant bv knowing th e best which modern nations have thought and said. 5 iFTs not knowing their belles lettres merely which is meant. To know Italian belles lettres is not to know Italy, and to know English belles lettres is not to know England. Into knowing Italy and England there comes a great deal more, Galileo and Newton 10 amongst it. The reproach of being a superficial humanism, a tincture of belles lettres, may attach rightly enough to some other disciplines ; but to the par- ticular discipline recommended when I proposed knowing the best that has been thought and said in 15 the world, it does not apply. In that best I cer tainl y include what in modern times has been thought and said by the great observers and knowers of nature. There is, therefore, really no question between Professor Huxley and me as to whether knowing the 20 great results of the modern scientific study of nature is not required as a part of our culture, as well as knowing the products of literature and art. But to follow the processes by which those results are reached, ought, say the friends of physical science, to 25 be made the staple of education for the bulk of man- kind. And here there does arise a question between those whom Professor Huxley calls with playful sar- casm " the Levites of culture," and those whom the poor humanist is sometimes apt to regard as its 30 Nebuchadnezzars. The great results of the scientific investigation of nature we are agreed upon knowing, but how much H4 LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. of our study are we bound to give to the processes by which those results are reached ? The results have 3 their visible bearing on human life. But all the pro-! cesses, too, all the items of fact by which those results are reached and established, are interesting. All i knowledge is interesting to a wise man, and the knowledge of nature is interesting to all men. It is very interesting to know, that, from the albuminous white of the egg, the chick in the egg gets the materials for its flesh, bones, blood, and feathers ; while, from 10 the fatty yelk of the egg, it gets the heat and energy which enable it at length to break its shell and begin the world. It is less interesting, perhaps, but still it is interesting, to know that when a taper burns, the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water. 15 Moreover, it is quite true that the habit of dealing with facts, which is given by the study of nature, is, as the friends of physical science praise it for being, an excellent discipline. The appeal, in the study of nature, is constantly to observation and experiment ; 20 not only is it said that the thing is so, but we can be made to see that it is so. Not only does a man tell us that when a taper burns the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water, as a man may tell us, if he likes, that Charon is punting his ferry-boat on the 25 river Styx, or that Victor Hugo is a sublime poet, or Mr. Gladstone the most admirable of statesmen ; but we are made to see that the conversion into carbonic acid and water does actually happen. This reality of natural knowledge it is, which makes the friends of 3° physical science contrast it, as a knowledge of things, with the humanist's knowledge, which is, they say, a LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. 1 15 knowledge of words. And hence Professor Huxley is moved to lay it down that, " for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively scientific educa- tion is at least as effectual as an exclusively literary 5 education." And a certain President of the Section for Mechanical Science in the British Association is, in Scripture phrase, " very bold," and declares that if a man, in his mental training, " has substituted litera- ture and history for natural science, he has chosen 10 the less useful alternative." But whether we go these lengths or not, we must all admit that in natural science the habit gained of dealing with facts is a most valuable discipline, and that every one should have some experience of it. 15 More than this, however, is demanded by the reformers. It is proposed to make the training in natural science the main part of education, for the great majority of mankind at any rate. And here, I confess, I part company with the friends of physical 20 science, with whom up to this point I have been agreeing. In differing from them, however, I wish to proceed with the utmost caution and diffidence. The smallness of my own acquaintance with the disciplines of natural science is ever before my mind, and I am 25 fearful of doing these disciplines an injustice. The ability and pugnacity of the partisans of natural science make them formidable persons to contradict. The tone of tenative inquiry, which befits a being of dim faculties and bounded knowledge, is the tone I 30 would wish to take and not to depart from. At present it seems to me, that those who are for giving to natural knowledge, as they call it, the chief place Il6 LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. in the education of the majority of mankind, leave one important thing out of their account : .the con- stitution of human nature. But I put this forward on the strength of some facts not at all recondite, very far from it; facts capable of being stated in the 5 simplest possible fashion, and to which, if I so state them, the man of science will, I am sure, be willing to allow their due weight. Deny the facts altogether, I think, he hardly can. He can hardly deny, that when we set ourselves to 10 enumerate the powers which go to the building up of human life, and say that they are the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, and the power of social life and manners, — he can hardly deny that this scheme, though drawn in 15 rough and plain lines enough, and not pretending to scientific exactness, does yet give a fairly true repre- sentation of the matter. Human nature is built up by these powers ; we have the need for them all. When we have rightly met and adjusted the claims of them 20 all, we shall then be in a fair way for getting soberness and righteousness, with wisdom. This is evident enough, and the friends of physical science would ad- mi., it. But perhaps they may not have sufficiently observed 25 another thing : namely, that the several powers just mentioned are not isolated, but there is, in the gener- ality of mankind, a per petu al tendency to relate them one to another in divers ways. With one such way of relating them I am particularly concerned now. Fol- 33 lowing our instinct for intellect and knowledge, we acquire pieces of knowledge ; and presently, in the LITERATURE A. YD SCIENCE. 1 17 generality of men, there arises the desire to relate these pieces of knowledge to our sense for conduct, to our sense for beauty, — and there is weariness and dis- satisfaction if the desire is baulked. Now in this 5 desire lies, I think, the strength of that hold which letters have upon us. All knowledge is, as I said just now, interesting ; and even items of knowledge which from the nature of the case cannot well be related, but must stand isolated 10 in our thoughts, have their interest. Even lists of ex- ceptions have their interest. If we are studying Greek accents, it is interesting to know that pais and pas, and some other monosyllables of the same form of declen- sion, do not take the circumflex upon the last syllable 15 of the genitive plural, but vary, in this respect, from the common rule. If we are studying physiology, it is interesting to know that the pulmonary artery carries dark blood and the pulmonary vein carries bright blood, departing in this respect from the common 20 rule for the division of labour between the veins and the arteries. But every one knows how we seek natur- ally to combine the pieces of our knowledge together, to bring them under general rules, to relate them to principles ; and how unsatisfactory and tiresome it 25 would be to go on for ever learning lists of exceptions, or accumulating items of fact which must stand isolated. Well, that same need of relating our knowledge, which operates here within the sphere of our knowl- 30 edge itself, we shall find operating, also, outside that sphere. \Ve experience, as we go on learning and knowing, — the vast majority of us experience, — the Il8 LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. need of relating what we have learnt and known to the sense which we have in us fo r conduct, to the sense which we have in us for beauty._ A certain Greek prophetess of Mantineia in Arca- dia, Diotima by name, once explained to the philoso- 5 pher Socrates that love, and impulse, and bent of all kinds, is, in fact, nothing else but the desire in men that good should for ever be present to them. This desire for good, Diotima assured Socrates, is our fun- damental desire, of which fundamental desire every 10 impulse in us is only some one particular form. And therefore this fundamental desire it is, I suppose, — this ( desire in men that good should be for ever present to' them, — which acts in us when we feel the impulse forj relating our knowledge to our sense for conduct and 15 to our sense for beauty. At any rate, with men in general the instinct exists. Such is human nature. And the instinct, it will be admitted, is innocent, and human nature is preserved by our following the lead of its innocent instincts. Therefore, in seeking to 20 gratify this instinct in question, we are following the instinct of self-preservation in humanity. But, no doubt, some kinds of knowledge cannot b& made to directly serve the instinct in question, cannon- be directly related to the sense for beauty, to the 25 sense for conduct. These are instrument-knowl- edges ; they lead on to other knowledges, which can. A man who passes his life in instrument-knowledges is a specialist. They may be invaluable as instru- ments to something beyond, for those who have the 30 gift thus to employ them ; and they may be disci- plines in themselves wherein it is useful for every one LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. HO to have some schooling. But it is inconceivable that the generality of men should pass all their mental life with Greek accents or with formal logic. My friend Professor Sylvester, who is one of the first 5 mathematicians in the world, holds transcendental doctrines as to the virtue of mathematics, but those doctrines are not for common men. In the very Senate House and heart of our English Cambridge I once ventured, though not without an apology for 10 my profaneness, to hazard the opinion that for the majority of man kind a little of mathematics, even. g°jr s .i!: lo. n S AY^X.- Of course this is quite consistent with their being of immense importance as an instru- ment to something else ; but it is the few who have 15 the aptitude for thus using them, not the bulk of mankind. The natural sciences do not, however t stan d on the same foo ting with these instrument-knowl - edges. Experience shows us that the generality of 20 men will find more interest in learning that, when a taper burns, the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water, or in learning the explanation of the phenomenon of dew, or in learning how the circula- tion of the blood is carried on, than they find in 25 learning that the genitive plural of pais and/tfj does not take the circumflex on the termination. And one piece of natural knowledge is added to another, and others are added to that, and at last we come to propositions so interesting as Mr. Darwin's famous 30 proposition that "our ancestor was a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits." Or we come to propositions 120 LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. of such reach and magnitude as those which Profes- sor Huxley delivers, when he says that the notions of our forefathers about the beginning and the end of the world were all wrong, and that nature is the expres- sion of a definite order with which nothing interferes. 5 Interesting, indeed, these results of science are, important they are, and we should all of us be acquainted with them. But what I now wish you to mark is, that we are still, when they are propounded to us and we receive them, we are still in the sphere 10 of intellect and knowledge. And for the generality of men there will be found, I say, to arise, when they have duly taken in the proposition that their ancestor was " a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits," there 15 will be found to arise an invincible desire to relate this proposition to the sense in us for conduct, and to the sense in us for beauty. But this the men of science will not do for us, and will hardly even pro- fess to do. They will give us other pieces of knowl- 20 edge, other facts, about other animals and their ancestors, or about plants, or about stones, or about stars ; and they may finally bring us to those great " general conceptions of the universe, which are forced upon us all," says Professor Huxley, "by the 25 progress of physical science." But still it will be knowledge only which they give us ; knowledge not put for us into relation with our sense for conduct, our sense for beauty, and touc hed with emotion by being so put ; not thus put for us, and therefore, to 30 the majority of mankind, after a certain while, un- satisfying, wearying. LITERATURE A AW SCIENCE. 12 1 Not to the born naturalist, I admit. But what do we mean by a born naturalist ? We mean a man in whom the zeal for observing nature is so uncom- monly strong and eminent, that it marks him off from 5 the bulk of mankind. Such a man will pass his life happily in collecting natural knowledge and reasoning upon it, and will ask for nothing, or hardly anything, more. I have heard it said that the sagacious and admirable naturalist whom we lost not very long ago, 10 Mr. Darwin, once owned to a friend that for his part he did not experience the necessity for two things which most men find so necessary to them, — religion and poetry ; science and the domestic affections, he thought, were enough. To a born naturalist, I can 15 well understand that this should seem so. So ab- sorbing is his occupation with nature, so strong his love for his occupation, that he goes on acquiring natural knowledge and reasoning upon it, and has little time or inclination for thinking about getting 20 it related to the desire in man for conduct, the desire in man for beauty. He relates it to them for himself as he goes along, so far as he feels the need ; and he draws from the domestic affections all the additional solace necessary. But then Darwins are extremely 25 rare. Another great and admirable master of natural knowledge, Faraday, was a Sandemanian. That is to say, he related his knowledge to his instinct for con- duct and to his instinct for beauty, by the aid of that respectable Scottish sectary, Robert Sandeman. 30 And so strong, in general, is the demand of religion and poetry to have their share in a man, to associate themselves with his knowing, and to relieve and 122 LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. rejoice it, that probably, for one man amongst us with the disposition to do as Darwin did in this respect, there are at least fifty with the disposition to do asi Faraday. Education lays hold upon us, in fact, by satisfying 5 this demand. Professor Huxley holds up to scorn mediaeval education, with its neglect of the knowledge of nature, its poverty even of literary studies, its . . formal logic devoted to " showing how and why that j^f which the Church said was true must be true." But ic the great mediaeval universities were not brought into being, we may be sure, by the zeal for giving a jejune and contemptible education. Kings have been their nursing fathers, and queens have been their nurs- ing mothers, but not for this. The mediaeval uni- 15 versities came into being, because the supposed knowledge, delivered by Scripture and the Church, so deeply engaged men's hearts, by so simply, easily, and powerfully relating itself to their desire for conduct, their desire for beauty. All other knowledge was 20 dominated by this supposed knowledge and was sub- ordinated to it, because of the surpassing strength of the hold which it gained upon the affections of men, by allying itself profoundly with their sense for con- duct, their sense for beauty. 25 But now, says Professor Huxley, conceptions of the universe fatal to the notions held by our forefathers have been forced upon us by physical science. Grant to him that they are thus fatal, that the new conceptions must and will soon become current 30 everywhere, and that every one will finally perceive them to be fatal to the beliefs of our forefathers. The (jLAJLI tVM^u,» GXX W' "^X**-*- LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. 1 23 need of humane letters, as they are truly called, because they ser ve the paramount desire in men th at good should be for ever present to them, — the need_of humane letters to establish a relation between the 5 new conceptions, and our instinct for beauty, our instinct for conduct, is only the more visible. The Middle Age could do without humane letters, as it could do without the study of nature, because its sup- posed knowledge was made to engage its emotions so 10 powerfully. Grant that the supposed knowledge dis- appears, its power of being made to engage the emotions will of course disappear along with it, — but the emotions themselves, and their claim to be engaged and satisfied, will remain. Now if we find by 15 experience that humane letters have an undeniable power of engaging the e motions, the importance of hu- mane letters in a man's training becomes not less, but greater, in proportion to the success of modern science in extirpating what it calls " mediaeval thinking/^' 20 Have humane letters, then, have poetry and elo- quence, the power here attributed to them of engaging the emotions, and do they exercise it ? And if they have it and exercise it, how do they exercise it, so as to exert an influence upon man's sense for conduct, 25 his sense for beauty ? Finally, even if they both can and do exert an influence upon the sensgs in question, how are they to relate to them the results, — the modern results, — of natural science ? All these ques- tions may be asked. First, have poetry and eloquence 30 the power of calling out the emotions? The appeal is to experience. Experience shows that for the vast majority of men, for mankind in general, they have the iJrfdQjUuu-l 124 LITERATURE AND SCIENCE. power. Next, do they exercise it ? They do. But then, how do they exercise it so as to affect man's sense for conduct, his sense for beauty ? And this is perhaps a case for applying the Preacher's words : " Though a man labour to seek it out, yet he shall not 5 find it ; yea, farther, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it." ' Why should it be one thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say, " Patience is a virtue," and quite another thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with Homer, 10 tXtjtov yap Mo?pcu Ov/ibv 6£