Digitized by the Internet Arciiive in 2007 witii funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation littp://www.arcliive.org/details/bookofconstitutiOOwillrich THE BOOK OF THE .constitution: CONTAINING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES A SYNOPSIS OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONSTITUTIONS ; WITH VARIOUS OTHER IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS AND USEFUL INFORMATION. COMPILED BY EDWIN WILLIAMS, AtfTHOR OF THE NEW YORK ANNUAL REGISTER, &o. NEW YORK: PETER HILL, 94, BROADWAY. M ^CCC XXXIII. Entered according to act of ConOTess, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirtytliree, by Edwin Williams, in the Clerk's office of the District Court of tlie Southern District of New York. HENRY MASON, PRINT. HANOVER saUARE. / INTRODUCTION. v latter recognize no common tribunal of decision. In this point of view, the questions that have been lately discussed as to the manner of form- ing and ratifying the constitution, would seem to tend rather to the gratification of historical curiosity, than to be absolutely necessary to a right understanding or elucidation of the principles of the constitution. The view of the constitution taken by Mr. Madison (its last surviv- ing framer), in his admirable letter, which is given in this collection, and substantially by President Jackson, in his late Proclamation, ap- pears to be acquiesced in by the great majority of their fellow citizens, who rightly consider that under any other construction of it the go- yernment would be impracticable. To preserve, however, the impar- tiality of this collection, and to render it useful as the depository of the arguments of both parties, several documents in favor of nullification have been given, together with the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions ; the true meaning and object of which are a mooted point amongst politicians. The address and resolutions of the Hartford Convention, the name of which is so familiar, and the objects and motives of which are so little known, to the mass of readers, have also been added. It was considered unnecessary to insert the message of the President, of January 16, 1833, as its object seems to have been rather the recom- Mi^ndation of practical measures suited to the present emergency of affairs, than any new exposition of his opinions upon constitutional sub- jects, which had already been amply developed in his proclamation, and from which, in the message, there is no departure. Appended to this collection, will be found tables of the votes cast for different candidates, as President and Vice President of the United States, since tlie adoption of the Constitution, and of the votes given in Congress from the several states on the tariff acts, since 1816. The editor submits the whole collection to the public, as containing the largest mass of information, on Constitutional subjects, that has yet appeared in one volume, and as calculated to increase the information and facilitate the researches of the American citizen, in relation to the political institutions under which he lives. He thinks that it will be found not merely temporarily interesting, as suited to the present excite- ment of public feeling, but as permanently valuable, when patriotism and discretion shall have dissipated the clouds] that now lower upon the prospects of our country. 1* CONTENTS. PAGE. Introduction S Articles of Confederation 7 Constitution of the United States 13 Amendments to the Constitution 22 Resolutions and Address of the Convention of 1787 24 Synopsis of the Constitution of each of the United States . 96 Virginia Resolutions, and Mr. Madison's Report of 1799 42 Kentucky Resolutions, of 1798 19 Kentucky Resolutions, of 1799 84 Mr. Jefferson's Letter to Governor Giles 86 Mr. Madison's Letter to Mr. Everett 87 Remarks of the Richmond Enquirer on the right of Secession . 94 Hartford Convention — Names of Delegates, &c. . 95 Report, &c 96 Extracts from Mr. Hayne's Speech in the U. S. Senate, 1830 111 Elxtracts from Mr. Webster's Speech in reply to Mr. Hayne 113 South Carolina Ordinance, November, 1832 117 Remonstrance and Protest of the South Carolina Union Party 119 President's Proclamation, Dec. 1832 121 Elections of President and Vice President .... 136 Dates of the adoption of the Constitution by the several States 137 Votes on the Tariffs 138 Virginia Resolutions of 1810 MO Mr. Calhoun's Speech in the Senate, 1833 .... 142 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. In Congress, July 8, 1778. articles of confederatiojl and perpetual union Between the states of New Hampshire^ Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Article 1. The style of this confederacy shall be, " The United States OE America.'* Art. 2. ^ Each state retains its sovereignty , freedom, and inde pendence. and every pow ^r, jurisdiction, and right, wmch is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress as sembled. # Art. 3. The said state s hereby severally enter into a firm league of friend- ship with each'otlMr, Iot their common defence, the security of their liber- ties, and their mutual and general welfare, b [nding themselves to assist each o ther against all fome offered t^. o r attackV Iftade upon them , or any of them, on account or iftig l'on, sovereignty, ^trad^^ o r any o t her pretence whatever. Art. 4. Sec. 1. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states ; and the people of each state shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, imposi- tions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively ; provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any state, to any other state of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction, shall he laid by any state on the property of the United States, or either of them. Sec. 2. If any person guilty of, or charged with treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor in any state shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall, upon the demand of the governir or execuiiv* power of the state from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the state having jurisdiction of his offence. Sec. 3. Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states, to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other state. Art. 5. Sec 1. For the more convenient management of the general inte- rests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct, to meet in congress on the first Monday In November, in every year, with a power reserved to each state to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year. Sec. 2. No state shall be represented in congress by less than two, not y 8 ARTICLES OP CONFEDERATION. more tbao seven memben ; and no person shall be capable of being a dele- gate for more than three years, in any term of six years ; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under tlie United States, for which he, or any other for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument, of any kind. Sec. S. Each state shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the states, and while they act as members of the committee of these stalM. Sec. 4. In determining questions in the United States, in congress assem- bled, each state shall have one vote. Sec. '^^ FroaMfjpn ^f gpgfifih m j dAhatft in congress shall not be im peach- ed or questionec^ in any court orj lace o ut of cong ress, and the members of congress shall be prolecled in U!Rr persons Irom arrests and imprisonments during the time of their going to and from, and attendance on congress, except far treason, felony, or breach of the peace. Art. 6. Sec. 1. No state, without the consent of the United States in con- gress asssemhled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty, with any king, prince, or state, nor shall any person, holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States, in congress assembled, t»r any of them grant any title of nobility. Sec. 2. No two or more states shall enter into any%eaty. ctyifede ration, or alliance whatpvpr, tlP^Wftn ^iym. wiihom ihe cOT15 eRt ot the United Slates jciTvi in congress a ssembled, specifying, accurately, the pUtpUbeii Ail wilflih the same is to be entered into, and how long It shall caatinue. Sec. 3. No state shall lay any imposts or dutierwhich may interfere with any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the United States in congress assembled, with any king, prince, or sute, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by congress to the courts of France and Spain. Sec. 4 ^ No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace by any stat e, except such number onhr as shall be deemed necessary by the United l>tates in congress assembled, for the defence of such state, or its trade : nor shall any body of forces be kept up, by any state, in time of peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the United States in congress assem- bled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such state ; but every state shall always keep up a regular and well disci- plined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and con- stantly have ready for use, and in public stores, a due number of field pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage. Sec. g fjn ■*"**' °^?ll '"'Tfy' '" ""r "'*'' tmthmit thn ftnn^nTit nf ttiA TT^JIf /i S^a^es in Cono L C Ss assembled, unless such state be actually invaded by ene- mies, or shall nave received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of delay till the United States, in congress assembled, can be consulted ; nor shall any state grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States in congress assembled, and then only agaiost the kingdom or state, and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so dedared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in congress assembled, unless such state be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in congress assembled, shall determine otherwise. INTRODUCTION. The expediency of collecting into one volume all the documents that are given in the following pao;es, was first suggested to the editor, by the inconvenience which he himself experienced in the course of his own investigations, in referring to the different places where they are separately to be found. This inconvenience must be common to that very large number of readers who, in a country like ours, can scarcely be considered as possessing even a tolerable share of generaf knowl- edge, without bein^ acquainted with the history and nature of the govern- ments under which they live. To those whose professions or studies lead them more particularly to the investigation of constitutional ques- tions, the difficulty of reference, to which allusion has been made, forms a subject of constant embarrassment and complaint. The object of the present volume is to present in one collection a synopsis of the consti- tutions of the different states, of the constitution of the United States, and of the docimients that have been considered as the best explana- tions of their various provisions and relations. For the outlines of tne state constitutions, the editor is principally in- debted to the American Almanac, of 1831. Some of the documents, such as the proceedings and resolutions of the Virginia and Kentucky Legislatures, and of the Hartford Conven- tion, were procured with considerable difficulty, having been but sel- dom republished since their first promulgation. It was deemed expedient to include the old articles of confederation, which although superseded by the present constitution, are often refer- red to, as being the first successful attempt towards the formation of a regular and systematic Union, and as exhibiting most of the outlines of the present form of the general government. The articles of confederacy arose from the necessities of the revolu- tionary contest, and formed the first Union and general government that had existed in tlic North American Colonies. All the former con- nexions that had existed between.them, can be looked upon Only as leagues or confederacies, such as mi^ht have existed between nations perfectly independent of each other. Of this nature was the confederacy formed amongst the New England Colonies, as early as the year 1643, for certain limited purposes, principally connected with the Indian wars. The last attempt for a more general union amongst the colo- nies, was made in 1754, but was never carried into full effect. The difficulties which, shortly afterwards, arose between tlie colonies and the mother country, made it necessary that they should seek the aid of united councils. This necessity gave rise to the organization of the old Continental Congress, the first meeting of which took place on September 5th, 1774. In this Congress twelve colonies were repre- sented by delegates. When it was ascertained that the pacific mea- sures which had been adopted by Congress to resist the attempts which were made by the mother country to reduce them to unconditional sub- mission, were not sufficiently energetic for the crisis. Congress reas- it INTRODUCTION. sembled in May, 1775, and assumed tlie character of an independent nation to effect certain specified objects. The colonies ratified their proceedings, and conferred on that body, by resolutions passed in their primary assemblies, the powers of a national government, for the pur- poses conferred upon it. By the declaration of independence, in 1776, the colonies held them- selves out to the world, and made treaties, not as separate and inde- pendent sovereignties, but as one united nation, known in that capacity alone to foreign powers. The articles of confederation were agreed to in Congress, on the 15th November, 1777, but were not to be conclu- sive, imtil they were approved by the legislatures of all the states. Eleven of tlie states ratified them in 1778, one in 1779, and one state, thh last of the thirteen, on the 1st March, 1781. Every one who is at all familiar with tlie history of the revolution, must have observed how inadequate were the powers which were at that time granted to the general government ; how it was compelled to supplicate, when it should have had the power to command ; and to recommend, when it ought to have acted. Nothing but the necessity of imiting against the assaults of a powerful invading enemy, would have held the states to- gether under such a confederation, even for a single year, and the revo- lution was conducted to a successful issue, by the wisdom and valor of our forefathers, in spite of the feeble and ineffective government under which the struggle was made. It was intended to be merely tempora- ry, until the restoration of more tranquil times should give a better op- portunity to repair the political edifice, that had already begun to crum- ble to pieces. A government more energetic and able by the powers vested in it, to maintain its authority, without being entirely at the mercy of the separate states, was sought to be formed by tlie conven- tion which formed the present constitution of the United States, and except its framers grossly deceived themselves, that object was attain- ed, and the evils guarded against, of which there had been so bitter an experience. The present constitution was framed, instituted indeed for limited purposes, but for these purposes absolute and uncontrolled, except by its own appointed interpreter, the Supreme Court of the United States. The framers of the constitution, — men well acquainted with the ambiguities to which all language, however accurate and pre- cise, was necessarily exposed, even when examined by tlie eye of good sense and patriotism, and not ignorant of the doubts that might be rais- ed by weakness, by subtlety, or ambition, — were not so destitute of pru- dence as to suffer the constitution to pass from their hands, without de- claring the manner in which, in the last resort, it was to be interpreted, nor to suffer that interpretation to rest upon the will of each particular state. Even allowing the theory assumed by some statesmen to be cor- rect, that the government of the United States was the act of individu- ed states, operating in their sovereign capacities, yet even in that case, as a common umpire has been appointed by the instrument of confe- deration, to whose decision all questions arising as to its construction were to be referred, the right of aisunion by a single state would be en- tirely excluded. The analogy, so frequently instituted on this subject, by Uie strenuous advocates of nullification, between the case of our various state governments and that of sovereign independent na- tions, bound together by leagues, fails from the fact that an arbiter of disputes is expressly appointed by and amongst the former, whilst the ARTICLES OP CONFEDERATION. 9 Art. 7. When land forces are raised by any state for the common defeace, mil officers of or under the rank of colonel shall be appointed by the legisla- ture of each state respectively, by whom such forces shall be raised, or in tuch manner as such state shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by the state which first made the appointment. Art. 8. All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land within each state, granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United States in congress assembled shall, from time to time, direct and appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states within the time agreed upon by the United States in congress assem- bled. Art. 9. Sec. 1. The United States in congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, ex- cept in the cases mentioned in the sixth article, of sending and receiving ambassadors ; entering into treaties and alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreign- ers, as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exporta- tion or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever \ of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated ; of grant- ing letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace; appointing courts for the trial ot piracies and felonies committed on the high seas ; and establish- ing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of cap- tures; provided that no member of congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said courts. Sec. 2. The United States in congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that here- after may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdic- tion, or any other cause whatever; which authority shall always be exer- cised in the manner following: Whenever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any state in controversy with another, shall present a petition to congress, stating the matter in question, and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other state in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court /or hearing and determining the matter in question ; but if they cannot agree, congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alter- nately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen ; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of congress, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally de- termine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges, who shall hear the cause, shall agree in the determination: and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons which con- gress shall judge sufficient, or being present, shall refuse to strike, the con- 10 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION.^ gress iball proceed to nominate three persons out of each state, and the secretary of congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing: and the judgment and sentence of the court, to be appointed in the manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sen- tence, or judgment, which shall in like manner be final and decisive; the judgment or sentence and other proceedings being in either case transmitted to congress, and lodged among- the acts of congress, for the sccnrity of the parties concerned : provided, that every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take an oath, to be administered by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of the state where the cause shall be tried, "well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgment, witiiout favor, affettion, or hope of reward." Provided a^o, that no state shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States. Sec. 3. All controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed under diffef^nt grants of two or more states, whose jurisdiction, as they may respt^ct such lands, and the stales which passed such grants are adjust- ed, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction, shall, on the peti- tion of either party to the congress of the United States, be finally deter- mined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between difierent stales. Sec. 4 The United States in congress assembled, shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck hy their own authority, or by that of the respective states ; fixing tlie standard of weights and measures throughout the United States; regu- lating t he trade and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the states : provided that the legislative right of any state, within its own hraits, be not infringed or violated; establishing and regulating post offices from one state to another, throughout all the United States, and ex- acting such postage on papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office; appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the Unitad States, excepting regimental officers ; appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United States : making rules for the govern- ment and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operations. Sec. 5. The United States in congress assembled, shall have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of congress to be denominated, *♦ A Committee of the States," and to consist of one delegate from each state; and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction; 10 appoint one of their number to preside ; provided that no per- son be allSved to serve in the office of president more than one year in any term of three years; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses ; to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half year to the respective states an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted ; to build and equip a navy ; to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each state for its quota, in proportion to the num- ber of white inhabitants in such state, which requisition shall be binding ; and thereupon the legislature of each state shall appoint the regimental ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. 11 officers, raise the men, clothe, arm, and equip thera, in a soldier-like man- ner, at the expense of the United States ; and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in congress assembled ; but if the United States in congress assembled shall, on consideration of cir- cumstances judge proper that any state should not raise men, or should raise a smaller number than its quota, and that any other state should raise a greater number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped in the sanie manner as the quota of such state, unless the legislature of such state shall judge that such extra number cannot be safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, clothe, arm, and equip, as many of such extra num- ber as they judge can be safely spared, and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in congress assembled. See. 6. The United States in congress assembled, shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter in any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defence and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief of the army or navy, unless nine states assent to the same : nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the United States in congress assembled. Sec. 7. The congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space of six months, and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment require secresy ; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each state, on any question, shall be entered on the journal, when it is desired by any delegate; and the delegates of a state, or any of them, at his or their request, sliall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal, except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the several states. Art. 10. The committee olf the states, or any nine of them, shall be au- thorized to execute, in the recess of congress, such of the powers of con- gress as the United States, in congress assembled, by the consent of nine states, shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest them with ; provided that no power be delegated to the said committee, for the exercise of which, by the articles of confederation, the voice of nine states, in the congress of the United States assembled, is requisite. Art. 11. Ca nada accedin p; to this confedem tion, and joining in the mea- sures of the United States . shalTbe admitte d into, and entitled to all th e ad- vantages of this unio n ; hut n ^ other cnlonysjiall be admitted into t^^ ^ame unless sucn admfssTo n be agreed to by nine sia'tes. Art. ri. All bill^ 6f credit emiited, uiUtJCJ's borrowed, and debts Con- tracted by or under the authority of congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present confederation, shall be deemed und considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satis- faction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged. 12 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION. Art. 13. ^F.vpry Rtiitft shall abi^e hv the determination of thfi United Sftait in rongrosB nygjimMed, in all questions whick by this confederation are sub- mitted to them. And the articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and the union shall be perpetual ; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made Jn any of them, unless such alter- ation be agreed to in a congress of the United States, and be alterwards confirmed by the legislature of every state. And whereas it hath pleased the great Governor of the world to incline the hearts .of the legislatures we respectively represent in congress, to ap- prove of, and to authorize us to ratify the said articles of confederation and perpetual union, Know ye, that we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do, by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said articles of confederation and perpetual union, and all and singular the matters and things therein con- tained. And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of the United States in congress assembled, in all questions which by the said con- federation are submitted to them ; and that the articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the states we respectively represent, and that the union shall be perpetual. In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands in congress. Done at Philadelphia, in the state of Pennsylvania, the 9th day of July, in the year of our Lord 1778, and in the third year of the Independence of America. NEW HAMPSHIRE.— Josiah Bartlett, John Wcntworth, Jr. MASSACHUSETTS BAY.— John Hancock, Samuel Adams, Elbridge Gerry, Francis Dana, James Lovel, Samuel Holten. RHODE ISLAND, (fee— William Ellery, Henry Merchant, John Collins. CONWECTIGUT.— Roger Sherman, Samuel Huntington, Oliver Wolcott, Titus Hosmer, Andrew Adams. NEW YORK.— Jas. Duane, Fra. Lewis, Wm. Duer, Gouv. Morris. NEW JERSEY.— Jno. Witherspoon, Nath. Scudder. PENNSYLVANIA.— Robert Morris, Daniel Roberdeau, Jona. Bayard Smith, William Clingan, Joseph Reed. DELAWARE — Thos. M'Kean, John Dickinson, Nicholas Van Dyke. MARYLAND —John Hanson, Daniel Carroll. VIRGINIA.— Richard Henry Lee, John Bannister, Thomas Adams, Jno. Harvie, Francis Lightfoot Lee. NORTH CAROLINA.— John Penn, Cons. Harnett, Jno. Williams. SOUTH CAROLINA.— Henry Laurens, William Henry Drayton, Jmx Mathews, Richard Hutson, Thos. Heyward, Jr. GEORGIA.— Jno. Walton, £dwd. Telfair, Edwd. Langwortby. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES Copied from the RoH in the Department of State. :, the people of the IJnited States, m order to form a jnoreperfect nion/'establish jusrfce, insi%^omestic tranquillity, proyicle'tor the We, union, ^ . " - - - ' ■ - ^ common defence, promote the general welfare, and^secure,the blessings of liberty to ourselves' antl our posterity, do ordain' and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. ARTICLE I. Section I. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. Sec. II. The House of Representatives shall be composed of mem- bers chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each "Slate siirall have thg quatifications requisite for elec- tors of the most numerous branch of the state legislatm'e. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been sevgjo^ years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall b# chosen. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be detennined by adding to the whole nmnbers of free persons, including those bomid to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years, after the first meeting of the congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representa- tive ; and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eiffht, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six. New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Mary- land six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three. 2 14 CONSTITUTION OF THE When vacancies happen in llie representation from any state, the executive authority tliereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers ; and shall have the sole power of impeachment. Sec. III. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years ; and each senator shall have one vote. •*=*— -^ "* Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of tlie first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expir- ation of the second year, of the second class at tlie expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so tliat one third may be chosen every second year ; and if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislauire, which shall then fill such vacancies. No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years^ and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,' be an inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen. The vice-president of the United States shall be jiresident of Uie Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided. The Senate shall choose their otlmr officers, and also a president pro- tempore, in the absence of the vice-jn-esident, or when he sliall exercise the office of president of the United States. The Senate shall have the sole power to try allimpeachments : when sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oaflT^i* affinnat'ion. ' When the president of the United States is tried, the chief justice shall preside ; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-tliirds of the members present. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further tl\an to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any o^ce of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States ; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judg^^tient, and punishment, according to law. • Sec. ly. The times, place.^>, and manner of holding election for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the le;r- ' ' ^^ rcof; but the congress may at any time by law make or all ttions, except as to places of choosing senators. 1 111 I oii-K N.S shall assemble at least once in eveiy year, and such meeting shall be on the first ]yiondt\y.m December, unless they shall by law appoint a diflferent day. " Sec, V . Each House shall be tlie judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall consti- tute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties, as each house may provide. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and witli the concurrence of t\\•(^-tllirds, expel a member. UNITED STATES. 16 Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judg- ment require secrecy ; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth of those present, ' be entered on the journal. Neither house, during the session of congress, shall, without the con- sent of the otlier, adjom-n for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. Sec. VI. The senators and representatives shall receive a compen- sation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the trrnmry nf thn Tliiirrfi Mtptr- They shall in all cases, except treason, / ' felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same ; and for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place. No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office imder the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased dui-ing such time ; and no person holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of eitlier house during his continuance in office. Sec. VII. All bills fo r raising reven ue shall origina.te in tha.HfiUS£u. of Representatives ; but tlie fcienate may propose or concur witli amend- ments as on other bills. Every bill which shall have passed the Hcuse of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the presi- dent of tlie United Statwr if he approve he shall sigh il,"but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections «at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass tlie bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by whith it shall likewise be reconsi- dered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the president within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented \o him, the same shall be a law m like manner as if he had signed it, unless the congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives JTItiy be necessary (except on a ?uestion of adjournment) shall be presented to the president of the Fnited States ; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. Sec. yill. The congress shall have power to lay. and collect taxes, ^^ duties, imposts and exciseSj^to pay the debts agd provide for the com* v moi^"defence"ahd£e neraTw^ United States; but all duties, ' imposts, and exciseTsliall be umfonnlliroughout tlie JJnited States j ^ ■»' ; To borrow money on the credit of the United States. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several ^ etates, and with the Indian tribes; 16 CONSTITUTION OF THE To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and unifonn laws on the subject of bankruptcies lliroughout the United States: To coin money, regulate tlie value tliereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures : To provide for tlie pmiishment of counterfeiting the securities anci current coin of tlie United States ; To establish post offices and post roads ; To promote tlie progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their re- spective writings and discoveries ; To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court ; ^ To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on tlie high seaSj and offences against the law of nations ; To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water ; To raise and support annies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years j To provide and maintain a navy ; To make rules for the government and regula,tk)n of tlie land and naval forces ; ^, To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the *• ^union, suppress insuiTections and repel invasions ; Xo provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the united States, reserving to tlie States respectively the appointment of the officers, and tlie authority of training tlie militia according to tlie discipline prescribed by congress ; To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particu- lar states, and tlie acceptance of congrest, become the seat of govern- ment of the United States, and% exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other needful buildings ; and y To make all laws which shall be.Ji^e|sa^;.^ii4.p£Q£ej;^for carrying into execution the foregpuig powers^ and" ail other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any de^^ partment or office thereof.^ — i^ Sec. IX. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohi- bited by the congress prior to the year one thousand eight liundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not ex- ceeding ten dollars for each person. The privilege of the writjjfJiabeas corpus shall not be suspended^. • unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. i. No bill of attainder or e:JLpiistJiictQ law shall be passed. ,\ No cajiitatio^, or other diiTctJai,:^all be laid^ unless in proporlifln to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken, f. No tax or dut y shnll Lp ]iui\ pllijCticks cYpnrt o^fmm any State. I'ia4)relert'nc(^ shall be given by any regulation of commerce or ''enue to the*p()f-ts of one state over those of jnw.ilwr- nnr i^lmil vessels UNITED STATES. 17 bound to, or from, one state, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law : and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditure^ of all public money shall be published * from time to time. No title of nobility^hall be granted by the United States : And no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of the congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state. Sec. X. No state shall €nter into^a^^iegLt^ alliance^ QC confedera- . , tionj grant l etters of mar gafi-^nd reprisal;-, cojn .money ; einit billCjpf ^ creHit ; :make anylHng"butgold and silver coin a lender in paymeot ordeHtSj pass any bills bf^tt^inder^ex postfacto..la»^, or law impaur- ing the obligationj)f contracts^^r^gra^itan^ of nobility. -, No' slate sTTall, without the consienfof the~congress, lay anx imposts, X* or duties ^ impo^« "^ PYpn ris^ p.Y^ ppt what may be absolutely jaeces- ^ sary for executing its inspection laws: and the net produce of all dutie's~and imposts, laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and.all such laws shall be subject to the revision ahd control of the congress.. No state shalT, without the consent of congress, lay^^ny duty_of_^ton- ^ i nage^keep troops r^ r ships of war jn time of peace, enter into any - ^ agceement^r^ompact with another stat^ or with a._foi^ign power, or engagemwar, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will noTadnut of delay. ARTICLE II. 1^ Section I. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the vice-president, chosen for the same term, be elected, as follows : Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof • may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the state may be entitled in the congress : but no senator or representative, or person holding an office 9^ trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. [♦The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the per- sons voted for, and of the number of votes for each ; which list Uiey shall sign and certify, and transmit seal ed^ to the seat of government of the United States, directed to the presicM^f the senate. The presi- dent of the senate sl;iall, in the presen^^Bthe senate and house of representatives, open all the certificat^^BB the votes shall then be counted. The person bavins: the ffreatesoiumber of votes shall be the president, if such number be a majority of the whole nu^^fer of e appointed ; and if there be more than one who have sucjiPajority, and have an equal number of votes, then the house of representatives sh|U immediately choose by ballot one of them for president ; and if no p^ • This clause U annulled. See amendmenU, Art. 12. 2 * 18 CONSTITUTION OP THE son have a majority, then from the five highest 6n the list, the said house shall in like manner choose the president. >»But in choosing the president, tlie votes shall be taken by states, tlie representation from each state having one vote : A quorum for tliis purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-tliirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of tlie president, the person having the greatest number of votes of tlie electors shall be vice-president. But if Uiere should remain two or more who have equal votes, the senate shall choose from them by ballot the vice-president.] The congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes ; which day shedl be the same throughout the United States. No person, except a natural borft citizen, or a citizen of the 'United States, at the time of the adoption of tlirs constitution, shall be eligible to the office of president ; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained tKe a^e of tliirtj^-fiye years, and been fourteenjrears a resident within the United States'.'* ^ In case of tlie removal of the president from office, or his death, resig- nation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice-president, and the congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both of tlie president, and vice pfesident, declaring what officer shall then act as president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a president shall be elected. The president shall at stated times receive for his services a com- pensation, which sH^U neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United State^ or any of them. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the fol- lowing oath or affirmation : — " I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that 1 will faithfully execute the office of president of the United S^^tes, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the constitu- tion of t% United States." Sjgc. XL The president shall be commander-in-chief of the army and ^navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, '"^Vhen called into the actual service of tlie United States ; he may re- quire the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer m each of tl^ ex- ecutive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their re- spective offices, and he shall have power to grant rej^rieves and pardons for offences against tlie United States, except in cases of impeachment. He shall have power, b^^^witli the tidvice and coiisent of the se- nate, to make tr eatie s, pra^^^LworJliirds^oT'the senators present con- cur ; and he shall nomina^^^Vby and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint aiwHssadors, other public ministers and con- suls, judges i^he supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whoijp^pointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall oe established by law : but the congress may by law vest t9 appoihtment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may UNITED STATES. 19 happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. Sec. III. He shall from time to time give to the congress informa- tion of tlie state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene botli houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between tKem, with respect to the time of ad- journment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper : he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers ; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and ^ shall commission all the ofHcers of the United States. Sec. IV. The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. ARTICLE III. Sec. I. The judicial powers of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services La compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Sec. II. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and e quity , arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority ; — to all cases affectiirg^ttmbassadors, other public ministers and consuls ; — to all cases of admiraltY and m aritime iui'isdic tion ; — to controversies to which the United States shall be a party ; — ^to controversies between two or more states ; — between a state and citizen of another state ; — between citizens of different states ; — between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and con- suls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the supreme court shall have origiifSl jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the congress shall make. " ^ The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury ; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed ; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the congress may by law have directed. Sec. III. T ieason against tV>p TTi^i|^Pt"itr- nhnll -m-j"* -^nJY •'' levying war againsUiiSi^ or Jfl_^41iS^^R[iEirJBnemIe«, giving them, aia ana c omfp rt. -*^^^«-— — T^ person ^all be convicted of treasSi unless on the testiniony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession inf^en court. The congress shall have powder to declare the punisl^pnt of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. 91 CONSTITUTION OP THE ARTICLE IV. Sec. I. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to tlie public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof Sec. II. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on de- mand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime. No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. Sec. III. New states may be admitted by the congress into this union : but no new state shall be formed or erected withm the jurisdic- tion of any other state ; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of tlie states concerned as well as of the congress. The congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belong- ing to tlie United States ; and nothing in this constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state. Sec. IV. The United States shall guarantee to every state in the union, a republican form, of government, and shall protect each of tliem against invasion ; and on application of the legislature, or of the execut- ive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic vio- lence. ARTICLE V. The congress, whenever two-thirds of b oth house s shall deem it ne- cessary, shall prppmie liiTir ndmen ts t 5 this c6h§tit\! ffbn, or, on the appli- cation of the l eoj-slatures of iwo-lllirU!j bl tn e several states, shall call a conve ntion for prgposin^ amendH^titST^w Krchy^-in either ca|e, shall be valid to all intents and purpo!JUiS,g'y LiRTlof this co^^tjtutioQ^ when rati- fied by the legislatures ot' inj-p p-Tn\,rrfc£iJhe several states, or by con- ^ftlttntions in three-fourths' thereot, as the one'or the" oIR^r mode of ratifi- cation may be proposed by congress : provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hiyidred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article ; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate. eI^PKk [CLE VI. ♦. All debts contracted and ci^pRnents entered into, befo];e the adoption of this constitution, shall be as valid against tlie United States under this constitutJJ^as under the confederation. This constiBion, and the laws of the United States which shall be ms^e in pursuance thereof: and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby. UNITED STATES. n any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary not- withstanding. The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affii-mation, to support this constitution : but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office of public trust under the United'States. ARTICLE VII. The ratification of the conventions of nine states, shall be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the states so ratifying the same. Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the states present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the independ- ence of the United States of America the twelfth. In witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names. GEORGE WASHINGTON, President, and Deputy from Virginia, New Hampshire, John Langdon, Nicholas Gilman. Massachusetts. Nathaniel Gorham, ^ Rufus King. Connecticut. William Samuel Johnson, Roger Sherman. New York. Alexander Hamilton. New Jersey. William Livingston, David Brearly, William Patterson, Jonathan Dayton. Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Mifflin, Robert Morris, George Clymer, Thomas Fitzsimons, Jared IngersoU, James Wilson, Governor Morris. * Delaware..,, George Reed, Gunning Bedford, junr. John Dickinson, Richard Bassett, Jacob Broom. Maryland. James M' Henry, Dan. of St. Thomas Jenifer, Daniel Carroll. Virginia. j^ John Blair, James Madison, jimr. North Carolina. William Blount, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Hugh Williamsoo.^.-^''^'' South Carolina. John Rutledge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler. Georgia. William Few, Abraham Baldwin. Attest, William Jackson, Secretary. V as CONSTITUTION OP THE AMENDMENTS To the Constitution of the United States, ratified according to the provi- sions of tlie fifth article of the foregoing Constitution, [Congress at its first session, begun and held in the city of New York, on Wednesday, the 4th of March, 1789, proposed to the legisla- tures of the several states, twelve amendments to the constitution, ten of which, only, were adopted. They are the ten first following. The 11th Article of the amendments was proposed at the second session of the third congress, in 1794 ; and the 12th Article at the first session of the eighth congress in 1804. Both of which were afterwards adopted by the requisite number of states.] "^^ Article I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-^ ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ; or the right of tlie people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Art. II. A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security • of a free state, tlie right of the people to keep and bear anns shall not be infringed Art. III. No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. Art. IV. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the j place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. / Art. V. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other- wise infamous crime, unless on a presentiment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger ; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeo- - pardy of life or limb ; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or pro- perty, without due process of law ; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. Art. VI. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted by the wit- nesses against him ; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of council for his defence. Art. VII. In suits of common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be p.i^^rvedf, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be o,Lheo^isg,^;e^amineain any court of the United States, thanaccorclTng tome ruJes^o f the common law. ---^^ N^--^--..^ Art. VIII. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punisliments inflicted. UNITED STATES. 23 Art. IX. The enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. / Art. X. The powers not delegated to the United States, by the con- stitution, nor proliibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. ■"^ Art. XL The judicial power of the United States shall not be con- J strued to extend to any suit w 1f\-\ y or gj^u^ty^ commenc ftd or p rose g^it ed against onej)fJ;li« United States by^citizensof Another state, or by citi- zens or subjects of an3^foreigi^ state." " Art. IJII. The electors shall meet in their respective states, and*^ vote by ballot for president and vice president, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves ; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as president, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as vice-president, and they shall make dis- tinct lists of all persons voted for as president, and of all persons voted for as vice-president, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of govern- ment of the United States, directed to the president of tlie senate : — The president of the senate shall, in the presence of the senate and house of representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted : — The person having the gi'eatest number of votes for presi- dent, shall be the president, if such nmnber be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed ; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding tlure^ on the list of those voted for as president, the house of representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the president. But in choosing tlie president, tlie votes shall be taken by states^ the rep resen tation from each state having one vote ; a quorum for this purposS'sliall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of tlie states, and a majority of all tlie states shall be' necessary to a choice. And if the house of re- presentatives shall not choose a president whenever tlie right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the vice-president shall act as president, as in the case of the deam or other constitutio?ial disability of the president. The person having the greatest nmnber of votes as vice-president, shall be tlie vice-presi- dent, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors ap- pointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest nimibers on the list, the senate shall choose the vice-president ; a quo- rum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of presi- dent shall be eligible to that of vice-president of the United States. Note. Another amendment was proposed as Article xiii. at the second session of the eleventh congress, but not having been ratified by a sufficient number of the states, has not yet become valid, as a part of the constitution of the United States. It is erroneously given as a part of the constitution, in page 74, vol. I. Laws of the United States. 24 CONSTITUTION OF THE RESOLUTIONS AND ADDRESS, TO CONGRESS. Adopted by the ConTention which framed the Constitution in 1787. In Convention^ Monday, September 17, 1787. Present, the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. Hamilton, from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Dela- ware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Soutli Carolina, and Greorgia. Resolved, That the preceding constitution be laid before the United States in congress assembled, and that it is the opinion of tlii% conven- tion, that it should afterwards be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for their assent and ratification ; and that each conven- tion assenting to, and ratifying the same, shall give notice thereof to the United States in congress assembled. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this convention, that as soon as the conventions of nine states shall have ratified this constitution, the United States in congress assembled should fix a day on which electors should be appointed by the states which shall have ratified the same ; and a day on which the electors should assemble to vote for the presi- dent, and the time and place for commencing proceedings under this constitution. That after such publication, the electors should be ap- pointed, and the senators and representatives elected. That the electors should meet on the day fixed for the election of the president, and should transmit their votes certified, signed, sealed, and directed, as the consti- tution requires, to the secretary of the United States in congress assem- bled. That the senators' and representatives should convene at the time and place assigned. That the senators should appoint a president of the senate for the sole purpose of receiving, opening, and counting tlie votes for president ; and, that after he shall be chosen, the congress, to- gether with the president, should, without delay, proceed to execute this constitution. By the unanimous order of the convention. '' GEORGE WASHINGTON, President. William Jackson, Secretary. In Convention, September 17, 1787. SIR, — We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States in congress assembled, that constitution which has ap- jDeared to us the most adviseable. The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of making war, peace, and treaties, that of levying money, and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial au- thorities, should be fully and effectually vested in the general govern- ment of the union ; but the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident. Hence results tlie necessity of a diflferent organization. It is obviously mipracticable in the federal government of these states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of UNITED STATES. 25 the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precis- ion the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved ; and on the present occasion tliis difficulty- was increased by a difference among the several states, as to their situ- ation, extent, habits, and particular interests. In all our deliberations on this subject, we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest mterest of every true American, the Consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our National Existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each state in the con- vention, to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected : and thus the constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession, which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensible. That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state, is not, perhaps, to be expected : but each will, doubtless, consider, that had her interests been alone consulted, the consequences might have been parti- cularly disagreeable to others. That it is liable to as few exceptions, as could reasonably have been expected, we hope and believe. That it may promote the lasting welfare of that countiy so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish. With great respect, we have the honor to be, sir. Your excellency's most obedient and humble servant, GEORGE WASHINGTON, President By unanimous consent of the Convention. His excellency the President of Congress. Resolution of Congress recommending the appointment of State Con- ventions, to consider the preceding Constitution. The United States in Congress assembled, Friday Sept. 28, 1787. Present, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Gorgia, and from Mauyland, Mr. Ross. Congress having received the report of the convention lately assem- bled in Philadelphia, Resolved, unanimously, that the said report, with the resolutions and letter accompanying the same, be transmitted to the several legislatures, in order to be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each state by the people thereof, in conformity to the resolves of the conven- tion, made and provided in that case. CHARLES THOMSON, Secretary. STATE CONSTITUTIONS. A SYNOPSIS OP THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF EACH OF THE UNITED STATES. MAINE. The Constitution of this state was formed 1819, and went into ope- ration in 1820. The legislative power is vested in a Senate and a House of Repre- sentatives, both elected annually by the people, on the second Monday in September. These two bodies are together styled The Legislature of Maine. The number of representatives cannot be less than 100, nor more than 200. A town having 1,500 inhabitants is entitled to send 1 repre- sentative; having 3,750,2; 6,775,3; 10,500,4; 15,000,5; 20,250,6; 26,250, 7 ; but no town can ever be entitled to more than 7 representa- tives. — The number of senators ceuinot be less than 20, nor more than 31. The Legislature meets (at Augusta) annually, on the first Wed- nesday in January. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected annually by the people, on the second Monday in September, and his term of office commences on the first Wednesday in January. A Council of seven members is elected annually on the first Wednesday in January, by jomt ballot of the senators and reprentatives, to advise the governor in the executive part of government. The right of sufjrage is granted to every male citizen aged 21 years or upwards (excepting paupers, persons under guardianship, and In- dians not taxed), having had nis residence established in the state for the term of three months next preceding an election. The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Judicial Court, and such other courts as tne legislature may, from time to time, establish. All Cumberland 3, and Cape May L STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 31 The Legislature meets armugdly (at Trenton) on the fourth Tuesday in October. The governor is chosen annually by a joint vote of the Council and Assembly, at their first joint meeting after each annual election. The Governor is President of the Council ; and the Council also elect from their own body, at their first annual meeting, a vice-president, who acts in tlie place of the Governor in his absence. The Governor and Coun- cil form a Court of appeals, in the last resort in all causes of law ; and they possess the power of granting pardon to criminals after condem- nation. The Constitution grants the right of suffrage to " all persons of full age who are worth 50 pounds proclamation money, clear estate in the same, and have resided within the county in which they claim to vote for twelve months immediately preceding the election." [The Legis- lature has declared by law, that every white male inhabitant, who shall be over the age of 21 years, and shall have paid a tax, shall be consi- dered worth fifty pounds, and shall be entitled to vote ; — and by anotlier legislative act, females and negroes are prohibited from voting.] The judges are appointed by the Legislature ; those of the Supreme Oourt for a term of seven years, and those of the inferior courts, for five years, both are capable of being reappointed. PENNSYLVANIA. The first Constitution of Pennsylvania was adopted in 1776; the present Constitution, in 1790. The legislative power is vested in a General Assembl/y, consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives. The Representatives are elected annually on the second Tuesday in October, by the citizens of Philadelphia and of the several counties, apportioned according to the number of taxable inhabitants. The number cannot be less than 60, nor more than 100. The senators are chosen for four years, one fourth being elected an- nually, at the time of the election of the representatives. Their num- ber cannot be greater than one third, nor less than one fourth of the number of the representatives. [In 1829, it was enacted by the General Assembly, " that imtil the next enumeration of taxable inhabitants, and an apportionment thereon, the senate, at a ratio of 7,700 (taxable inhabitants), shall consist of 33 members;" and "the House of Representatives, at a ratio of 2,544, shall consist of 100 members." — The following statem^t shows the representative number, and the number of members of the legislature, at different pci'iods : Ratio. Senators. Ratio. Representa, 1793 to 1800 24 1800 to 1807 4,670 25 . . . 1807 to 1814 4,500 31 1814 to 1821 5,250 31 . . . 1821 to 1828 6,300 33 1828 to 1835 7,700 33 . . . The executive power is vested in a Grovemor, who is elected by the people on the 2d Tuesday in October, and who holds his oflUce during three years, from the third Tuesday in December next following his 78 1,350 86 1,500 95 1,750 97 2,100 100 •8,544 100.] 3d STATE CONSTITUTIONS. election ; and he cannot hold the office more than 9 years, in any term of 12 years. The General Assembly meets annucdly (at Harrisburg) on the first Tuesday in December, unless sooner convened by the Governor. The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, in Courts of oyer andi terminer and jail delivery, in Courts of Common Pleas, an Or- phans' Court, a Register's Court, a Court of Gluarter Sessions of the reace for each coimty ; and in such other courts as the legislature may from time to time establish. The judges of the Supreme Court and the several Courts of Common Pleas, are appointed by the Governor, and hold their offices during good behavior. The right of suffrage is possessed by every freeman of the age of 21 years, who has resided in the state two years next preceding an elec- tion, and witliin that time paid a state or county tax, assessed at least six months before the election. DELAWARE. Constitution formed in 1792, and amended 1831. The Legislature is styled the General Assembly, and consists of a Senate and House of Representatives. * The senators are nine in number, namely : three from each county, and are elected for a term of four years. The representatives are elected for a term of two years, and are 21 in number, 7 from each county. The General Assembly meets (at Dover), biennially, on the first Tuesday in January, imless sooner convened by the Governor. The generd election is held biennially, on the second Tuesday in November. The executive power is vested in a GovemOT, who is elected by tUe people for a term of four years, and is not eligible for a second term. The judicial power is vested in a Court of Errors and Appeals, a Superior Court, a Court of Chancery, an Orphans' Court, a (Jourt of Oyer and Terminer, a Court of General Sessions of the peace, and jail delivery, a Register's Court, Justices of the Peace, and such other courts as the General Assembly may (by a vote of two thirds of each house) establish. The right of suffrage is granted to every white male citizen, of the age of 22 years or upwards, having resided in the state one year, next before the election, and the last month in the county where he votes ; and having within two years paid a county tax. Also, to every free white male over 21, and under 22 years of age, having resided, as aforesaid, without payment of any tax. MARYLAND. The Constitution of this state was first formed in 1776; since which time many amendments have been made. The legislative power is vested in a Senate, consisting of 15 mem- bers, and a House of Delegates, consisting of 80 members ; and these two branches united are styled T%^ General Assembly of Maryland. The members of t^ie House of Delegates, four from each county, and two each fr»m the cities of Baltimore and Annapolis, are elected annually by the people, on the firg^ Monday in October ; and the members of the Senate are elected ev^y 'fiflh year on the third Monday in September, at Annapolis, by electors who are chosen by STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 33 the people on the first Monday of the same month of September. These electors choose by ballot 9 senators from the Western Shore, and 6 from the Eastern, who hold their offices five years. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected annually on the first Monday in January, by a joint bollot of both Houses of the General Assembly. No one can hold the office of governor more than three years successively, nor be eligible as governor until the expira- tion of four years after he has been out of that office. The governor is assisted by a Council of five members, who are chosen annually by a joint ballot of the Senate and House of Delegates. The General Assembly meets annually (at Annapolis) on the last Monday in December. The Council of the Governor is elected on the first Tuesday in January ; the governor nominates to office, and the council appoints. The Constitution grants the right of suffrage to every free, white, male citizen, above 21 years of age, having resided twelve months within the state, and six months in tlie county, or in the city of Anna- polis or Baltimore, next preceding the election at which he offers to vote. The chancellor and judges are nominated by the governor, and ap- pointed by the council j and they hold their offices during good be- havior. VIRGINIA. The old Constitution of this state was formed in 1776, and continued in operation until 1830, when the present amended Constitution was formed by a convention, and accepted by the people. By this Constitution the legislative power is vested in a Senate and a House of Delegates, which are together styled, T/ie General Assembly of Virginia. The House of Delegates consists of 134 members, chosen annually ; 31 from the 26 counties west of the Alleghany mountains ; 25 from the 14 counties between the Alleghany mountains and Blue Ridge, 42 from the 29 counties east of the Blue Ridge, and above tide-water ; and 36^ from the counties, cities, towns, and boroughs lying upon tide-water. The Senate consists of 32 members, 13 from the counties west of the Blue Ridge, and 19 from the counties, cities, towns, and boroughs east thereof. The senators are elected for four years 5 and the seats of one- fourth of them are vacated every year. In all elections to any office or place of trust, honor, or profit, the votes are given openly, or viva voce, and not by ballot. A reapportionment for representation in both houses, is to take place every ten years, commencing in 1841, until which time there is to be no change in the number of delegates and senators from the several divi- sions ; and after 1841, the number of delegates is never to exceed 150 j nor that of the senators, 36. The time of election of Delegates is fixed by the General Assembly, and at present tedces place in April, The General Assembly meets annually (at Richmond^ on the first Monday in December. The executive power is vested in a GJovemor elected by the joint vote of the two houses of the General Assembly. He holds his office three years, commencing on the 1st of Janueury next succeeding his election, or on such other day as may be from time to time prescribed by law ; H STATE CONSTITUTIONS. and he is ineligible for the three years next after the expiration of his term of office. There is a Council of State, consisting of Uiree members elected for three years, by the joint vote of tlie two houses : the seat of one being vacated annually. The senior counsellor is lieutenant governor. The judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals and of the Superior Courts are elected by a joint vote of both houses of the General Assem- bly, and hold their offices during good behavior ; or until removed by a concurrent vote of both houses ; but two- thirds of the members present must concur in such vote, and the cause of removal be entered on the journals of each house. The right of suffrage is extended to every white male citizen of the commonwealth, resident therein, aged 21 years and upwards, who is qualified to exercise the right of suffrage according to the former Con- stitution and laws ; — or who owns a freehold of the value of $25 ; or who has a joint interest to the amount of $25 in a freehold ; — or who has a life estate in, or reversionary title to, land of the value of S50, having had been so possessed for six months ; or who shall own and be in the actual occupation of a leasehold estate, having the title recorded two months before he shall offer to vote — of a term originally not less than five years, and of the annual value or rent of $!200 ; — or who for twelve months before offering to vote, has been a house-keeper and head of a family, and shall have been assessed with a part of the revenue of the commonwealth within the preceding year, and actually paid the same. NORTH CAROLINA. TheConstitution of North Carolina was agreed to and resolved upon, by representatives chosen for that purpose, at Halifax, December 18, 1776. The legislative authority is vested in a body, styled The General Assemblij, consisting of a Senate and a House of Commons, both elect- ed annually by the people. One senator and two members of the House of Commons are sent from each of the 62 counties ; and one of the latter also from each of the towns of Edenton, Newbem, Wilmington, Salisbury, Hillsborough, and Halifax. The chief executive officer is the Governor, who is chosen annually by a joint vote of the two Houses ; and he is eligible for 3 years only in 6. He is assisted by an executive Council of seven members, chosen annually by a joint vote of the two Houses. In case of the death of the Governor, his duties devolve upon the Speaker of the Senate. The judges of the Supreme and Superior Courts are appointed by a joint vote of the two Houses, and hold their offices during good be- havior. The Constitution grants the right of voting for members of the House of Commons to all freemen of the age of 21 years, who have been in- habitants of the state 12 months immediately preceding the election ; but in order to vote for a senator, a freeman must be possessed of a free- hold of 50 acres of land. The time of electing the members of the General Assembly is ap- pointed by the legislature, and commonly takes place in the month of August. The Assembly meeta annually (at Ralei^^h), and usually on the 2d Monday in November ; and the governor is commonly chosen in De- cember. STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 35 SOUTH CAROLINA. The first Constitution of this st£ite was formed in 1775 ; the present Constitution was adopted in 1790. The legislative authority is vested in a General Assembly j consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. The Senate consists of 45 members, who are elected by districts for foui- years, one half being chosen biennially. The House of Representatives consist of 124 members, who are ap- portioned among the several districts, according to the number of white inhabitants and taxation ; and are elected for two years. The repre- sentatives and one half of the senators are chosen every second year, on the second Monday in October and the day following. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected for two years, by a joint vote of the Senate and House of Representatives, at every first meeting of the House of Representatives. A governor edfter having performed the duties of the office for two years, cannot be re- elected till after the expiration of four years. At the time of the election of Governor, a Lieutenant Governor is chosen in the same manner, and for the same period. The General Assembly meets annually (at Columbia,)^ on the fourth Monday in November. The Chancellor and Judges are appointed by the joint ballot of the Senate and House of Representatives, and hold their offices during good behavior. The Constitution grants the right of suffrage to every free white, male citizen, of the age of 21 years, having resided in tJie state two years previous to the day of election, and having been possessed of a freehold of 50 acres of land, or a town lot, at least six months before such election, or (not having such freehold or town lot) having been a ' resident in the election district in which he offers his vote, six months before said election, and having paid a tax the preceding year of 3*. sterling towards the support of the government. GEORGIA. The first Constitution of Georgia was formed in 1777 ; a second, in 1785 ; and a third, the one now in operation, in 1798. The legislative power is vested in a Senate and House of Represent- atives, which together are styled The General Assembly. The members of both houses are chosen annually on the first Mon- day in October. One senator is elected for each county, and the number of representatives is in proportion to population, including three-fifths of all the people of color ; but each county is entitled to at least one, and no one to more than four members. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who was formerly elected by the General Assembly ; but he is now (and ever since 1824) elected by the people on the first Monday in October ; and he holds the office for two years. The General Assembly meets (at Milled^eville) on the first Monday in November ; unless convened at another time by the Governor. The Constitution grants the right of suffrage to all " citizens and in- habitants who have attained the age of 21 years, and have paid all the 36 STATE CONSTITUTIONS. taxes which may have been required of them, and which they may have had opportunity of paying, agreeably to law, for the year preced- ine; the election, and shall have resided six months within the county." The judicial power is vested in a Superior Court and in such inferior jurisdictions as the legislature may, from time to time, ordain and esta- blish; and the superior and inferior courts sit twice in each county every year. The judges of the Superior Court are elected by the legis- lature for three years ; the justices of the inferior courts, and justices of the peace, are elected quadriennally by tlie people ; and the clerks of the superior eind inferior courts biennially. ALABAMA. The legislative power is vested in two branches, a Senate and House of Representatives, which together are styled The General Assembly of the State of Alabama. The representatives are elected annually, and are apportioned among the different counties in proportion to the white population ; the whole nimiber cannot exceed 100, nor fall short of 60. The senators are elect- ed for three years, and one-third of them are chose every year. Their number cannot be more than one-third, nor less than one-fourth of the number of representatives. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected by the people for two years ; and is eligible 4 years out of 6. The representatives and one-third of the senators are elected annually on the first Monday in August and the day following ; and the governor is elected biennially at the same time. The General Assembly meets annually (at Tuscaloosa), on the fourth Monday in October. The right of suffrage is possessed by every white, male citizen of 21 . years of age, who has resided within the state one year preceding an election, and the last three months within the county, city, or town, in which he offers his vote. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts, and such inferior courts as the General Assembly may, from time to time, direct and establish. The judges, after November in 1833, are to be elected by a joint vote of both Houses of the Genered Assembly, every six years. MISSISSIPPI. The Constitution of this state was formed at the town of Washington, in August, 1817. The legislative power is vested in a Senate and a House of Repre- sentatives, which are together styled The General Assembly of the State of Mississippi. The representatives are elected annually on the first Monday in Au- gust, in the ratio of one to every 3,000 white inhabitants. Each county, however, is entitled to one ; and the present whole number is 33. Ac- cording to the Constitution, when tlie number of white inhabitants ex- ceeds 80,000, the number of representatives cannot be less than 35, nor more than 100. The members of the Senate are elected for three years, one-third being chosen annuallj. Their number cannot be less than one-fourtli, nor more than one-third of the whole number of representatives. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected by the STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 37 f|eople, for two years, on the first Monday in August. At every elec- tion of Governor, a Lieutenant Governor is also chosen, who is President of the Senate, and on whom the executive duties devolve in case of the death, resignation, or absence of the governor. The General Assembly meets (at Jackson\ annually on the first Monday in November. The right of suffrage is granted to every free, white, male citizen of the United States, of the age of 21 years or upwards, who has resided within this state one year next preceding an election, and the last six months within the county, city, or town in which he offers to vote, and is enrolled in the militia thereof, unless exempted by law from military service ; or having the aforesaid qualifications of citizenship and resid- ence, has paid a state or county tax. The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, and such superior and inferior courts of law and equity, as the legislature may from time to time establish. The judges of the several courts are elected by tlie General Assembly, and hold their offices during good behavior, till the age of 65 years. ' . LOUISIANA. The Constitution of this state was formed in 1812. The legislative power is vested in a Senate and House of Represent- atives, both together styled The General Assembly of the State of Louisiana. The representatives are elected for two years on the first Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday in July. Their number cannot be less than 25, nor more than 50 ; and they are apportioned according to the num- ber of electors, as ascertained by enumeration every 4 years. The members of the Senate are elected for four years ; one half being chosen every two years, at the time of the election of the repre- sentatives. The state is divided into 16 senatorial districts, in each of which one senator is chosen. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected for the term of four years. The people give their votes for a governor at the time and place of voting for representatives and senators ; and on tlie second day of the succeeding session of the General Assembly, the two Houses, by a joint ballot, elect for Governor, one of the two candi- dates who have the greatest number of votes. The governor's term of office commences on the fourth Monday succeeding his election. The General Assembly meets (since 1829, at Donaldson^ or Donald- sonville) annually, on the first Monday in January, except in the years of the election of President of the United States, when it meets on the 3d Monday in November. The right of suffrage is possessed by every white male citizen of the United States, of the age of 21 years, who has resided in the county in which he offers to vote one year next preceding the election, and who in the last six months prior to said election has paid a state tax. The judiciary power is vested in a Supreme Court, which possesses appellate jurisdiction only, and such inferior courts as the legislature may establish. The judges are appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and hold their offices during good behavior. 4 " 38 STATE CONSTITUTIONS. TENNESSEE. The Constitution of this state was formed at Knoxville, in 1796. The legislative autliority is vested in a General Assembly, consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives ; and the members of both houses are elected biennially on tlie first Thursday and Friday in Au^st. The number of representatives is 60, who are a'pportioned among the different counties according to the number of taxable inhabitants. The number of senators cannot be less than one-third, nor more than one-half of the nimiber of representatives., ♦ The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected ixU the same time with tlie senators and representatives ; and who holds his office for the term of two years, but is not eligible more than 6 years in any term of 8. The General Assembly meets (at Nashville) biennially, on the third Monday in September, next following the election ; and it may be called together, if necessary, at other times by the governor. The right of suffrage is granted to every freeman of the age of 21 years, possessing a freehold in the county where he offers his vote, and to every freeman who has been an inhabitant of any one county in the state six months immediately preceding the day of election. The judiciary power is vested in such superior and inferior courts, as the legislature may from time to time direct and establish. The judges are appointed by a joint bollot of both Houses, and hold tlieir offices during good behavior. KENTUCKY. On the separation of Kentucky from Virginia, in 1790, a Constitution was adopted which continued in force till 1799, when a new one was formed instead of it ; and this is now in force. The legislative power is vested in a Senate and House of Represent- atives, which together are styled The General Assembly of the Commotv- vjealth of Kentucky. The representatives are elected annually, and are apportioned, every fo'Jir years, among the different counties according to the number of electors. Their present number is 100, which is the highest number that the Constitution authorizes ; 58 being the lowest. The senators ai-e elected for four years, one quarter of them being chosen annually. Their present number is 38 ; and they cannot exceed this number, nor fall short of 24. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected for four years, and is ineligible for the succeeding seven years after the expira- tion of his term of office. At the election of Governor, a Lieutenant Governor is also chosen, who is Sj)eaker of the Senate, and on whom the duties of the Governor devolve, in case of his absence or removal. The representatives and one quarter of the members of the senate are elected annually by the people, on the first Monday in August ; the governor is elected by the people, every fourth year, at the same time ; and he commences the execution of his office on the fourth Tuesday succeeding the day of the commencement of the election at wliich he is STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 39 chosen. The polls are kept open three d ays ; and the votes are given openly, or viva voce, and not by ballot. The General Assembly meets (at Frankfort) annually on the first Monday in December. The Constitution grants the right of suffrage to every free male citizen (people of color excepted) who has attained the age of 21 years, and has resided in the state two years, or in tlie county where he offers his vote, one year, next preceding the election. The judiciary power is vested in a Supreme Court, styled the Court of Appeals, and m such inferior courts as the General Assembly may, from time to time, erect and establish. The judges of the different courts and justices of the peace, hold their offices during good behavior. OHIO. The Constitution of this state was formed at Chillicothe, in 1802. The legislative power is vested in a Senate and House of Represent- atives, which together are styled The General Assembly of the State of Ohio. The representatives are elected annually on the second Tuesday in October ; and they are apportioned among the counties according to the number of white male inhabitants above 21 years of age. Their num- ber cannot be less than 36, nor more than 72. The senators are chosen biennially, and are apportioned according to the number of white male inhabitants of 21 years of age. Their number cannot be less than one-third, nor more than one-half of the number of representatives. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected by the people for two years, on the second Tuesday in October ; and his term of service commences on the first Monday in December. The General Assembly meets annually (at Columbus), on the first Monday in December. The right of suffrage is granted to all white male inhabitants ahove the age of 21 years, who has resided in the state one year next preced- ing the election, and who have paid, or are charged with a stale or county tax. The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, in courts of Common Pleas for each county, and such other courts as the legislature may from time to time establish. The judges are elected by a joint ballot of both Houses of the General Assembly for the term of 7 years. INDIANA. * The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected by the people for a term of three years, and may be once re-elected. At every election of Governor, a Lieutenant Governor is also chosen, who is Pre- sident of the Senate, and on whom, in case of the death, resignation, or removal of the governor, the powers and duties of governor devolve. The legislative authority is vested in a General Assembly, consisting of a Senate, the members of which are elected for three yesirs, and a House of Repi'esentatives, elected annually. The nimiber of representatives can never be less than 36, nor more than 100 ; and they are apportioned among the several counties accord* ing to the number of white male inhabitants above 21 years of age. The number of senators, who are apportioned in like manner, cannot 40 STATE CONSTITUTIONS. be less than one-third, nor more than one-half of the number of repre- sentatives. The representatives and one-third of the members of the senate, are elected annually on the first Monday in August; and the Governor is chosen on the same day, every third year. The Greneral Assembly meets annually (at Indianapolis) on tlie first Monday in December. The right of suffrage is granted to all male citizens of the a^e of 21 years or upwards, who may have resided in the state one year mmiedi- ately preceding an election. The judiciary power is vested in one Supreme Court, in circuit courts, and in such other inferior courts as the General Assembly may esta- blish. The Supreme Court consists of three judges ; and each of the Circuit Courts consists of a president and two associate judges. The judges are all appointed for the term of seven years. The judges of the Supreme Court are appointed by the governor, with the consent of the Senate ; the presidents of the Circuit Courts, by the legislature ; and the associate judges are elected by the people. ILLINOIS. The legislative authority is vested in a General Assemhly, consisting of a Senate, the members of which are elected for four years; and of a House of Representatives, elected biennially. " The number of representatives shall not be less than 27, nor more . than 36, until the number of inhabitants within the state shall amount to one hundred thousand ; and the number of senators shall never be less than one-third, nor more than one-half of the number of representatives." The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected by the people for four years ; and he is not eligible for more than four years in any term of eight years. At the election of Governor, a Lieutenant Governor is also chosen, who is Speaker of the Senate ; and on whom, in case the governor vacates his office, the duties of governor devolve. The representatives and one-half of the senators are elected biennially on the first Monday in August ; and the governor is chosen every fourth year, at the same time. The General Assembly meets every other year (at Vandalia)^ on the first Monday in the December next following the election; and the governor is authorized to convene it, on extraordinary occasions, at other times. All white male inhabitants, above the age of 21 years, having resided in the state six months next preceding an election, have the rights of electors. The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the General Assembly may establish. The judges arc appointed by a joint ballot of both branches of the General Assembly, and hold their offices during good behavior. MISSOURI. The Constitution of this state was formed at St. Louis, in 1820. The legislative power was vested in a General Assembly^ consisting of a Senate and House of Representatives. The representatives are chosen every second year. Every county is STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 41 entitled to at least one representative ; but the whole number can never exceed 100. , The senators are elected for four years ; the seats of one- half being vacated every second year. The constitutional number is not less than 14, nor more than 33. They are chosen by districts, and are appor- tioned according to the number of free white inhabitants. The elections for representatives and senators are held biennially on the first Monday in Au^ist. The executive power is vested in a Governor, who is elected for four years, on the first Monday in August ; and he is ineligible for the next four years after the expiration of his term of service. At the time of the election of Governor, a Lieutenant Governor is also chosen, who is, by virtue of his office, President of the Senate. The Legislature meets every second year (at the City of Jefferson^ on the first Monday in November. The right of suffrage is granted to every white male citizen who has attained the age of 21 years, and has resided in the state one year before an election, the last three months thereof being in the county or district in which he offers his vote. The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, in a Chancellor, Circuit Courts, and such other inferior tribunals as the General Assem- bly may, fi-om time to time, establish. The judges are appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate ; and they hold their offices during good beha- vior, but not beyond tlie age of 65 years. 4* RESOLUTIONS OF VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY, PENNED BY MADISON AND JEFFERSON, IN RELATION TO THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS. We publish the Resolutions of Virginia and Kentucky, penned by Madison and Jefferson, in relation to the Alien and Sedition laws, in the years 1798 and 1799, from a copy in pamphlet form reprinted at Charleston in 1828, from a Richmond edition, issued two years before. The Alien and Sedition laws were enacted by Congress, during the session of 1797-98. On the 10th of November, 1798, Mr. John Breckenridge introduced into the Legislature of Kentucky, resolutions expressive of the sense of that body in relation thereto, which were known to have been written by Mr. Jefferson ; and on the 21st of December of the same year, Colonel John Taylor of Caroline, proposed in the Legislature of Vir- ginia, resolutions also on the same subject, drawn up by Mr. Madison. By these resolutions, the Governors were desired to transmit a copy to tire Executive of each of the States, to be laid before their respective Legislatures, the result of which was that the States of Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York and Delaware, passed resolves expressive of their disapprobation of the doctrines contained in the same. These dissenting resolutions were taken up on 'the 14th of Novem- ber, 1799, by the Legislature of Kentucky, which, by an unanimous vote, resolved to adhere to the principles originally laid down. The same subject was referred to a Committee in the Virgiiiia Legislature, and a report made thereon during the session of '99-1800. This report, of which, on the 20th of January of the latter year, five thousand copies were ordered to be printed for distribution, was penned by Mr. Madi- son, and as it contains in its body a verbatim copy of all the resolutions of December 21st, 1798, the necessity is obviated of inserting those resolutions in a separate form. — Banner of the Constitution. Virginia House of Delegates. Session of 1799 — 1800. REPORT of the Committee to whom were referred the Communica- tions of the various States, relative to the Resolutions of the last General Assembly of the State, concerning the Alien and Sedition Laws. Whatever room might be found in the proceedings of some of the States, who have disapproved of the Resolutions of the General As- sembly of this Commonwealth, passed on the 21st day of December, 1798, for painful remarks on the spirit and manner of those proceed- ings, it appears to the Committee most consistent with tlie duty as RESOLUTIONS &c. 43 well as dignity of tlie General Assembly, to hasten an oblivion of every circumstance, which might be construed into a diminution of mutual respect, confidence, and affection, among the members of the Union. The Committee have deemed it a more useful task to revise, with a critical eye, the resolutions which have met with this disapprobation ; to examine fully the several objections and arguments which have ap- peared against them ; and to inquire whether there be any errors of fact, of principle, or of reasoning, which the candor of tlie General Assembly ought to acknowledge and correct. The first of the resolutions is in the words following : " Resolved^ That the General Assembly of Virginia doth unequivo- cally express a firm resolution to maintain and defend the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of this State, against every aggression, either foreign or domestic, and that they will support the Government of the United States in all measures warranted by the former." No unfavorable comment can have been made on the sentiments here expressed. To maintain and defend the Constitution of the United States, and of their own State, against every aggression, both foreign and domestic, and to support the Government of the United States in all measures warranted by their Constitution, are duties which the General Assembly ought always to feel, and to which, on such an occasion, it was evidently proper to express their sincere and firm adherence. In their next resolution — " The General Assembly most solemnly declares a warm attachment to the Union of the States, to maintain which it pledges all its powers ; and, that for this end, it is their duty to watch over and oppose every infraction of those principles, which constitute the only basis of that Union, because a faithful observance of them can alone secure its existence and the public happiness." The observation just made is equally applicable to this solemn de- claration of warm attachment to the Union, and this solemn pledge to maintain it ; nor can any question arise among enlightened friends of the Union, as to the duty of watching over and opposing every infrac- tion of those principles which constitute its basis, and a faithful observ- ance of which can alone secure its existence, and tlie public happiness thereon depending. The third resolution is in the words following: " That this assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views the powers of the Federal Government, as resulting from the compact to which the States are parties, as limited by tlie plain sense and intention of the instmment constituting that compact — as no further valid than they are authorised by the grants enumerated in that com- pact ; and that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them." On this resolution the Committee have bestowed all the attention which its importance merits ; They have scanned it not merely with a strict, but with a severe, eye j and they feel confidence in pronouncing, 44 RESOLUTIONS OF that, in its just and fair construction, it is unexceptionnbly true in its several positions, as well as constitutional and conclusive in its infer- ences. The resolution declares, first^ that " it views the powers of the Federal Government, as resulting from the compact to wnich tlie States are parties ;" in other words, that the Federal powers are derived from the Constitution ; and, tliat tlie Constitution is a compact \o which the States are parties. Clear as the position must seem, that the Federal porwers are derived from the Constitution, and from that alone, the Committee are not un- apprised of a late doctrine, which opens another source (»f Federal powers, not less extensive and important, than it is new and unexpect- ed. The examination of this doctrine will be most conveniently con- nected with a review of a succeeding resolution. The Committee satisfy themselves here with briefly remarking, that in all the contemporary discussions and comments which the Constitution underwent, it was constantly justified and recommended, on the ground, that the powers not given to the Government, were withheld from it; and, that if any doubt could have existed on this subject, under the original text of the Constitution, it is removed, as far as words could remove it, by the 13th amendment, now a part of the Constitution, which expressly declares, " that the powers not delegated to the United States, by the Constitu- tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re- spectively, or to the people." The other position involved in this branch of the resolution, namely, " that the States are parties to the Constitution or compact," is, in the judgment of the Committee, equally free from objection. It is indeed true, that the term " States," is sometimes used in a vague sense, and sometimes in different senses, according to the subject to which it is applied. Thus, it sometimes means the separate sections of territory occupied by the political societies within each ; sometimes the particular governments established by those societies ; sometimes those societies as organized into those particular governments ; and lastly, it means the people composing those political societies, in their highest sovereign capacity. Although it miaht be wished tliat the perfection of language admitted less diversity in the signification of the same words, yet lit3e inconvenience is produced by it, where the true sense can be collected with certainty from the different applications. In the present instance, whatever different constructions of tlie term " States," in the resolution, may have been entertained, all will at least ccnciu* in the last mention- ed ; because in that sense the Constitution was submitted to the " States," in that sense the "States" ratified it; and, in that sense of the term " States," they are consequently parties to the compact, from which the powers of the Federal Government result. The next position is, that the General Assembly views the powers of the Federal Government, " as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact," and " as no fartlier valid than they are authorized by the grants therein enumerated." It does not seem possible that any just objection can lie against either of these clauses. The first amounts merely to a declaration that the compact ought to have the interpretation plainly intended by the parties to it ; the other to a declaration, that it ought to have the execution and effect intended by them. If the powers granted, be valid, it is solely because VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY. 45 they are granted ; and, if the panted powers are valid, because granted, all other powers not granted, must not be valid. The resolution having taken this view of the Federal compact, pro- ceeds to infer, " that, in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by the said compact, the States, who are parties thereto, have the right and are in duty bound to inter- pose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for mamtaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties, appertaining to them." It appears to your Committee to be a plain principle, founded in common sense, illustrated by common practice, and essential to the nature of compacts — that, where resort can be had to no tribunal, supe- rior to the authority of the parties, the parties themselves must be the rightful judges in the last resort, whether the bargain made has been pursued or violated. The Constitution of the United States was formed by the sanction of the States, given by each in its sovereign capacity. It adds to the stability and dignity, as well as to the authority of the Constitution, that it rests on this legitimate and solid foundation. The States, then, being the parties to the Constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity, that there can be no tribunal above their authority to decide in the last resort, whether the compact made by them be violated ; and, consequently, that, as the par- ties to it, they must themselves decide, in the last resort, such questions as may be of sufficient magnitude to require their interposition. It does not follow, however, that because the States, as sovereign parties to their Constitutional compact, must ultimately decide whether It has been violated, that such a decision ought to be interposed, either in a hasty manner, or on doubtful and inferior occasions. Even in the case of ordinary Conventions between different nations, where, by the strict rule of interpretation, a breach of a part may be deemed a breach of the whole ; every part being deemed a condition of every other part, and of the whole, it is always laid down that the breach must be both wilful and material to justify an application of the rule. But in the case of an intimate and Constitutional Union, like that of the United States, it is evident that the interposition of the parties, in their sove- reign capacity, can be called for by occasions only, deeply £ind essen- tially affecting the vital principles of their political system. The resolution has, accordingly, guarded against any misapprehen- sion of its object, by expressly requiring for such an interposition, " the case of a deliberate^ palpable, and dangerous breach of the Constitution, by the exercise of powers not granted by it." It must be a case, not of a light and transient nature, but of a nature dangerous to the great purposes for which the Constitution was established. It must be a case, moreover, not obscure or doubtful in its consti-uction, but plain and palpable. Lastly, it must be a case not resulting from a partial consideration, or hasty determination ; but a case stampt with a final consideration and deliberate adherence. It is not necessary, because the resolution does not require, that the question should be discussed, how far the exercise of any particular power, ungranted by the Constitu- tion, would justify the interposition of the parties to it. As cases might easily be stated, which hone would contend ought to fall witliin that description j cases, on the other hand, might, wiUi equal ease, be stated, From 41 RESOLUTIONS OP to iafRUit And to fainl, as to unite every opinion in placing Uiem with- in the description. But the rMolution has done more than gnard Against ; tion, bf viptmtAy r«f(^rring to caaet of a delikBraUj pilpab rous It •!»' ' ""' object of the inter{>(x»i cuntem- , to be s of arrcslini; the progrt> : usurpa- luid of moiuuuuiiig the authorities, rights, j 'pcrtarn- 10 the States, as parties to tiic conslituiion. Vom this view of the resolution, it would seem ii 'at it can incur any just disapprobation from those, who all momentary impressions, and recoileciin^ the gci t of the Federal Constitution, shall caudicily "od igof the General Assembly. If tli powers, palpably withheld by tJie C y parties to it, in intcqmsinsj even so far us to airc^il LUc pio^rtss of the evil, and thereby to preserve tJic Constitution itself, as well as to provide for the safety of the parties to it; tliere would bo ) all relief from usurped jmwer. and a direct subversion of th( |icci- fiedor necogni/ >(ate Constitutions, as well ai a ^jlain denial of the \\ . I i^e on which our independence itself was declared. But it is objected, that t]ie Judicial authority is to be regarded as the •ole expositor of the Constitution in the last resort ; and it may be ask- ed for what reason, the declaration by the General Assembly, supposing it to be tJieoreticaliy true, could be required at the present day and in so eolemn a manner. On this objection it might by observed, first: lliat there may be in- ■tances of tisurped power, which tlie forms of the Constitution would nererdraw within the control of the Judicial < • //«; that if the decision of tlie Judiciary be raised ab* ;" the aovereign parties to the Constitution, t1 Us ol Ui* art- -— «— , not carried by tlic forms of tlie C n before \\ iry, must be equally outiioritative and final wiili die decisions of Uiatde- ]Nurtment But the proper answer to tlie objection is, that the resolu- tioa of the Greneral Assembly relates to tliose great and » cans, in which all the forms of the Constitution may pro\ i against infractions dangerous to tlie essential rights of ih< , , it. The resolution supposes tliat dangerous i>owers not i\t\cir not only be usurped and executed by tlie otlier tho Juciicial department, also, may exercise or > , rs beyond the grant of the Constitution ; and «. > > j; dti. mala right of the parties to the Constitution, t<> judj, , ^m- paethaa been dangerously violated, must extend to > by one deiecaled authority, an wHi » ^ by another ; by the Ju< . . ^ well as by tne Exeeutive, or t mc. However true, th» i .be that the Judicial department is, in all ({uestiona submiUA^^d to it by the forms of the Con to ^eeide in the laat resort, this resort must necessarily be de* ' ist in relation to the authorities of the other departments of i n- ment; not in relation to tlie rights of the parties to the C< nal compaeL from which the Judicial as well ils the other dtimrunenta hold their delegated trusts. On any oUicr hypothesis the delegation of JudicuU power would annul the audiority delegating it; and the VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY. 47 concurrence of this department with the others in usurped powers, might subvert forever, and beyond the possible reach of any rightful remedy, tlie very Constitution which all were instituted to preserve. The truth declared in the resolution being established, Uie expedien- cy of making the declaration at the present day may safely be left to the temperate consideration and candid judgment of the American pub- lic. It will be remembered, that a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles, is solemnly enjoined by most of the State Constitutions, and particularly by our own, as a necessary safeguard against Uie danger of degeneracy to which Republics are liable, as well as other Govern- ments, thoiigli in a less degree than otJiers. And a fair comparison of the political doctrines not unfrequent at the present day, with those which characterized the epoch of our Revolution, and which forms the basis of our Republican Constitutions, will best determine whether the declaratory recurrence here made to those principles, ought to be view- ed as unseasonable and improper, or as a vigilant discharge of an im- portant duty. The authority of Constitutions over Governments, and of the sovereignty of the people over Constitutions, are truths which are at all times necessary to be kept in mind ; and at no time, perhaps, more necessary than at present. The fourth resolution stands as follows : " That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret, that a spirit has, in sundry instances, been manifested by the Federal Gro- vernment to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the Constitu- tional charter which defines them ; and that indications have appeared of a design to expound certain general phrases (which, having been copied from the very limited grant of powers in tlie fonner eurticles of confederation, were the less liable to be misconstmed), so as to destroy the meaning and effect of the particular enumeration which necessarily explains, and limits the general phrases; and so as to con- solidate the States by degrees, into one sovereignty, the obvious tend- ency and inevitable result of which would be, to transform the present Republic system of the United States into an ab$olute, or at best a mixed monarchy." The first question here to be considered is, wletlier a spirit has in sundry instances been manifested by the Federal Government to enlarge its powers by forced constructions of the Constitutional charter. The General Assembly having declared tlieir opinion merely by regret- ting in general tenns that forced constructions for enlarging the Fedferal powers nave taken place, it does not appear to the Committee necessary to go into a specification of every instance to which the resolution may allude. The Alien and Sedition Acts being particularly named in a succeeding resolution, are of course to be understo(5d as mcluded in the allusion. Omitting others which have less occupied public attention, or been less extensively regarded as unconstitutional, the resolution may be presumed to refer particulfirly to tlie Bank Law, which, from the cir- cumstances of its passage, as well as ilie latitude of construction on which it is founded, strikes the attention with singular force ; and the carriage tax, distinguished also by circumstances in its history, having a similar tendency. Those instances alone, if resulting from forced construction, and calculated to enlarge the powers of the Federal Grovemment, as the Committee cannot but conceive D be the case, suffi- ciently warrant tliis part of tlie resolution. The Committee have not RESOLUTIONS OP il incumbent on tlmn to extend their attention to laws which ol»)wled to, rather am varyine the Constitutional distribution €f poven in the Federal QoTemnient, uan as an absolute enlargement of them i because instanoat of this sort, however im}x>rUint in their principles and tendencies, do not appear to fall strictly wiilun tlie text under rcTiew. The other questions presenting themselTe^ are— 1. Whether indica- tions haTe appeared of a desijni to expound certain general phrases ttOied firom the *' Articles of Confederation" so as to oestroy the effect OitKe particular enumeration explaining and limiting tlieir meaning. 9L Whether this exposition would'by degrees consolidate tlie States into €oe aorereicinty. i. Whetlier the tendency and result of this consoli- dation woiud DC to transform the republican system of the United Stales into a monarchy. 1. The general phrases here meant must be those " of providing for the common defence and general welfare." In the " Articles of Confederation," the phrases are used as follows, in Art VIIl., " All charges of war, and all otlier expenses that shall be incurred for tkt common dejenu and general welfare, are allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States, in pro- Doition to the value of all land witliin each state, granted to, or surveyed ■or, any penoiL as such land and tlie building^ and the improvements estimated, according to such mode as ilie United States, in Congress assembled, jhall from time to time direct and appoint" In the existing Constitution, Ihey make the following part of Sec. 8. " The Congrees shall liave power, to lay and collect taxes, duties, im- posts and excises, to pay tlic debts, and provide for the conmion defence adceoeral wel Cure of the United States." Tfie similarity in the use of these phrases in the two great Federal duuters, might well be considered, as rendering their meaning less liable to be misconstmed in tlie latter: because it will scarcely be said that, in the former, lliey were ever understood to be eiilier a general grant of power, or U. authorize tlie requisition or application of money Djr the obi Congress to the common defence and general welfare, ex- oqpt in the cases ailerwards enumerated, which explained and limited uevmeamnc; and if such was the limited meaning atlatched to these Pm ^ * y .io the very instrument revised and remodeled by ilie present mirtitution, it can never be supposed that when copied into tlus Con- iCttatioD, a different meaning ought to be atlaclicd to tlieni. That, nocwithsumdin^ thu remarkable security against misconstruc- tion, a dcsi^ has Ijtcn iiMllcaiw! t.. ...«..,• ul i^csc phruiic^i in tlie Con- ■ti t u t io n^ as U • particular enumeration of ffowmhf mhieh II , ..i„ li, m, must have fallen under the otieenratioo 01 those who have utf.ndcd to tlie course of public ^ensactioos. Not to multiply proofii on this subject, it will suffice to refer to the DebatM of the Fecleral Legislature, in which arguments Sy*. ^ °'°^"^^ occasions been drawn, with apparent effect, from tMM phrases, m their indefinite meaning. To thete indici^ions might be added, without looking farther, the - report oo M a an fa ctu res, by the late Secretary of the Treasury, n the 5th of Deeembcr, 1751 j and the report of a Committee of VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY. 49 Congress, in January, 1797, on the promotion of Agriculture. In the first of tliese, it is expressly contended to belono^ " to the discretion of the National Legislature, to pronounce upon me objects which con- cern tlie general welfare, and for which, under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper. And there seems to be no room for a doubt, that whatever concerns the general interests of LEARNING, of AGRICULTURE, of MANUFACTURES, and of COMMERCE, are within the sphere of the National Councils, as far as regards an application of moiieyy The latter report assumes tlie same latitude of power in tlie National Councils, and applies it to the encouragement of Agriculture, bv means of a society to be established at the seat of Government. Although neither of these reports may have received the sanction of a law carrying it into effect ; yet, on the other hand, the extraordinary doctrine contained in both, has passed without the slight- est positive mark of disapprobation from tlie autliority to which it was addressed. Now, whether the phrases in question be construed to authorise every measure relating to the common defence and general welfare, as contended by some ; or every measure only in which there might be an application of money, as suggested by the caution of others ; the effect must substantially be the same, in destroying the import and force of the particular enumeration of powers which follow these general plirases in the Constitution. For, it is evident that there is not a single power whatever, which may not have some reference to the common defence, or the general welfare ; nor a power of any magnitude, which, iii its exercise, does not involve or admit an application of money. The Go- vernment, therefore, which possesses power in either one or other of these extents, is a government without the limitations formed 5y a par- ticular enumeration of powers; and, consequently, the meaning and effect of this particular enumeration, is destroyed by tb^ exposition given to these general phrases. This conclusion will not be affected by an attempt to qualify the power over the " general welfare," by referring it U cases where the general welfare is beyond the reach of se;;ara^ provisions by the individual states ; and leaving to these tlieir junsdictions in ceises to which their separate provisions may be competf<^t. For, as tlie autho- rity of the individual states must in all cases b* incompetent to general regulations operating tlirough the whole, thf autliority of the United States would be extended to every object reUting to the general welfare, which might, by any possibility, be proviaed for by tlie general autho- rity. This qualifying construction, therefore, would have little, if any tendency, to circumscribe the power naimed under the latitude of the tenns " general welfare." The true and fair construction of liiis expression, both in the original and existing Federal compacts, appears to the Committee too obvious to be mistaken. In botli, tlie Congress is authorised Ui provide money for die common defence and general welfare. In both is subjoined to this authority an enumeration of tlie cases to which their power shall extend. Money cannot be applied to the general welfare, otherwise than by an application of it to some particular measure conducive to the general welfare. Whenever, therefore, money has been raised by the general authority, and is to be applied to a particular measure, a question arises, whether the particular measure be within the enume- VIRGENIA RESOLUTIONS. TMted in Congress. If it be, '' v requisite for JL MAT btafMilied to it; if it be not, no such nj can be made. Aui niir aiidobvious inteipretatjon coincides with, and is enforced by, IIm danw in tlie constitution) which declares Uiat '' no money shall be drawn fton the Treasury^ but in consequence of appropriations by law." An appropriation of money to the general welfare, would be ' rather a mockery than an observance of tliis Constitutional inknictioo. ^t Whether the exposition of the g:eneral phrases here combatted, woald not, by demea, conHolidnte the States mto one sovereignty, is a flBMlion, concemmg w> ;iittee can perceive little room for JUhnnot of opinion, i < the States into one sovereignty, TM^h«»y more can be waut«;d iJmii to supersede their respective sove- rainties in the cases resefvcd to them, by extending the sovereignty of iheUnited States to all cases of the " general welfare," that is to say, to ali oises vhatever. 3. That the obvious tendency and inevitable result of a consolidation of the States into one sovrrriLnity, would be to transform tlie republican cyHan of the United St • monarchy, is a point which seems to have been sufficiently d y tiie general sentiment of America. In afanost every instance of discussion, relating to the consolidation in qiieetion, its certain tendency to pave the way to monarchy, seems not to have been contested. I'he prospect of such a consolidation has fimncd the only topic of controverfy. It would be unnecessary, there- fiire. for the committee to dwell long on the reasons which support the poaiv.'m of tlie General Assembly. It may not be improper, liowcver, to n PiArk two consequences, evidently flowing from an extension of the TwWal powers to every subject falling witliin tlie idea of the "general Welfare." One con»>quence must be, to enlarge the sphere of discretion alloted lo the KxeciRivc Magistrate. Even within the Legislative limits properly defined by the Constitution, the difficulty of accommodating le gal re gqlations ^ a country so great in extent, and so various in its dfcmiistaneea, ha^been much felt ; and has led to occasional invest- ■Mt i ti of jpower in (Ve Executive, which involve, perhaps, as large a portion or discretion vx can be deemed consistent with tli<; nature ofthe Executive trust. In pniiiortioii vi» tlie objects of I wi cure might be multiplied, would the ti^c allowed for each i ished, and the diilflnliy^or providing uiiiFjrm and particular regulations for all, be taarMMd. From these sotrrcs would necessarily ensue a greater latilnde lothe agency of that iK^wurUncnt which is always in existence, and whieb eoukl best mould r.lrmrnt to ihr- drfrirnry of the laws, that the degree ofExeeotireprero^ .Hints. td^^^StH y^l ' ' "f nn excessive augmentation 2J5^"i~*»t'*' •'" iJ^e Executive will. ^mu^iSlJl!?*' ^^^ description which aT «!1t*? ? ' would I.. linn, and turn over to IMrMMlGi.. .1 the p«ti t the Executive would £ak!tkioiW^ "* »wtUcd m.this caae, as iu prerogative would Thk dkpnipoitaoiiAta increase of prerogative and patronage, mini | VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. 5t evidently either enable the Chief Magistrate of the Union, by quiet means, to secure his re-election from time to time, and, finally, to regu- late the succession as he might please ; or, by giving so transcendent an importance to the office, would render the elections to it so violent and corrupt, that the public voice itself might call for an heriditary, in place of an elective, succession. Whichever of these events might follow, the transformation of the republican system of the United States into a monarchy, anticipated by the General Assembly from a consolidation of tlie States into one sovereignty, would be equally ac- complished; and whetlier it would be into a mixed or an absolute monarchy, might depend on too many contingencies to admit of any certain foresight. The resolution next in order is contained in the following terms : " That the GeiTeral Assembly doth particularly protest against the palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution, in the two late cases of tlie * Alien and Sedition Acts,' passed at the last session of Congress ; the first of which exercises a power no where delegated to the Federal Government ; and which, by uniting Legislative and Judi> cial powers to those of Executive, subverts the general principles of a free government, as well as the particular organization and positive provisions of the Federal Constitution ; and 3ie other of which acts exercises, in like manner, a power not delegated by the Constitution j but, on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto ; a power, whieh, more than any other, ou^ht to produce universal alarm ; because it is levelled agamst that right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communi- cation among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guurdian of every other ri»ht." The subject of tliis resolution having, it is presumed, more particu- larly led the General Assembly into the proceedings which they com- municated to the other States, and being in itself of peculiar importance ; it deserves the most critical and faithful investigation ; for tiie length of which no other apology, will be necessary. The subject divides itself inio,Jirst, " The Alien Act," secondlv. " The Sedition Act." Of the " Alien Act," it is affirmed by tlie Resolution, 1st That it exercises a power no where delegated to the Federal Gk)vemment. 3d. That it unites Legislative and Judicial powers to those of the Executive. 3d. Thai this union of power, subverts the general principles of free government. 4th. That it subverts the particular organization and positive' provisions of the Federal Constitution. In order to clear the way to a correct view of the first position, seve- ral observations will be premised. In the first place, it is to be borne in mind, that it being a characteri»> tic feature of tne Federal Constitution, as it was originally ratifiwl, and an amendment thereto having precisely declared, " That the powers not delegated to the United States by tlie Constitution, nor pronibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people ;" it is incumbent in this, as in every other exercise of power by die Federal Government, to prove, from the Constitution, that it grants theparticular power exercised. The next observation to be made, is, that much confusion and fallacy have been thrown into the question, by blending the two cases o{ aliens j ai VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. mimbers of a hostile nation ; and aliens, members of friendly nations. TlMse two cases are so obviously, and so essentiaify distinct, that it occasions no litUe surprise that the distinction should have been disre- garded ; and the surprise is so much the greater, as it appears that the two cases are actually distinguished by two separate acts of Congress, passed at the same session, and comprised in the same publication; the one providing for the case of" alien enemies," the other " concern- ing aliens" indiscriminately ; and conseqiiently extending to aliens of every nation in peace and amity with tlie United States. With respect to alien enemies, no doubt has been intimated as to the Federal authori- ty over them ; the Constitution having expressly delegated to Congress tne power to declare war against any nation, and of course to treat it and all its members as enemies. With respect to aliens, who are not enemies, but members of nations in peace and amity with the United States, die power assumed by the act of Congress, is denied to be con- stitutional ; and it is accordingly against this act that the protest of the Gteneral Assembly is expressly and exclusively directed. A third observation is, that were it admitted, as is contended, that the " act concerning Aliens^" has for its object, not a penal, but a prevent- ive juBiice -, it would still remain to be proved that it comes within the constitutional power of tlie Federal Legislature; and, if within its power, that the Legislature has exercised in a constitutional manner. In the administration of preventive justice, the following principles have been held sacred ; that some probable ^ound of suspicion be ex- hibited before some Judicial authority ; that it be supported by oath or affirmation ; that the party may avoid being thrown into connnement, by finding pledges or sureties for his legal conduct sufficient in the judgment ot some Judicial authority ; that he may have the benefit of a writ of habeas corpus, and thus obtain his release, if wrongfully confined ; and that he may at any time be discharged from his recog- nizance, or his confinement, and restored to his former liberty and rights, on the order of the proper Judicial authority, if it shall see suf- ficient cause. All these principles of the only preventive justice known to Ameri- can jurisprudence, are violated by the Alien act. Tjie ground of sus- picion is to be judged of not by any Judicial authority, but by the Exe- Olrtive Magistrate alone; no oath or affirmation is required; if the ■uspicion be held reasonable by the President, he may ord«M the sus- pected Alien to depart the territory of the United States, without the ^opportunity of avoiding the sentence, by finding pledges for his future good conduct; as the President may limit the time of departure as he pleaaes, the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus, may be su.sp( luled with retpect to the party, although the Constitution ordains, that it shall not be suspended, unless when the public safety may require it in case of rebellion or invasion, neither of which existed at the passage of the act; and the party, being under the sentence of the president, either removed firom the Untied States, or being pimished by imprisonment, or disqua- lification ever to become a citizen on conviction of not obeying the order of removal, he cannr>t be discharged from the proceedings against Um, and restored to the Ix'nefits of his former situation, although the kigkest Judicial authority should see the most sufficient cause fnr it. Vat, in the last place, it can never Ix* admitted that the removal of Aliens, authorised by the act, is to be considered, not as punishment for VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. S3 an offence, but as a measure of precaution and prevention. If the ba- nishment of an alien from a country into which he has been invited, as the asylum most auspicious to his happiness; a country where he may have formed the most tender connections ; where he may have invested his entire property, and acquired property of the real ancl permanent, as well as the moveable and temporary kind ; where he enjoys under the laws a greater share of the blessings of personal security, and personal liberty, than he can elsewhere hope for, and where he may have nearly completed his probationary title to citizenship ; if, moreover, in the ex- ecution of the sentence against him, he is to be exposed, not only to the ordinary dangers of the sea, but to the peculiar casualties incident to a crisis of war, and of unusual licentiousness on that element, and possi- bly to vindictive purposes which his emigration itself may have pro- voked ; if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied. And if it be a punishment, it will re- main to be inquired, whether it can be constitutionally inflicted, on mere suspicion, by the single will of the Executive Magistrate, on per- sons convicted of no personsal offence against the laws of the land, nor involved in any offence against the law of nations, charged on the foreign state of which they are members. One argument offered in justification of this power exercised over Aliens, is, that the admission of them into the country being of favor, not of right, the favor is at all times revocable. » To this argmnent it might be answered, tliat, allowing the truth of the inference, it would be no proof of what is required. A question would still occur, whether the Constitution has vested the discretionary power of admitting Aliens, in the Federal government or in the State governments. But it cannot be a true inference, that because the admission of an Alien is a favor, the favor may be revoked at pleasure. A grant of land to an individual, may be of favor, not of right ; but the moment the grant is made, the favor becomes a right, and must be forfeited be- fore it can be taken away. To pardon a malefactor may be a favor, but the pardon is not, on tliat account, the less irrevocable. To admit an Alien to naturalization, is as much a favor, as to admit him to reside in the country, yet it cannot be pretended that a person natiu-alized can be deprived of the benefits any more than a native citizen can be disfranchised. A^ain, it is said tliat Aliens not being parties to the Constitution, the rights and privileges which it secures, cannot be at all claimed by them. To this reasoning, also, it might be answered, that although Aliens are not parties to the Constitution, it does not follow tliat tlie Constitu- tion has vested in Congress an absolute power over them. The par- ties to the Constitution may have granted, or retained, or modified the power over Aliens, without regard to that particular consideration. But a more direct reply is, that it does not follow, because Aliens are not parties to the Constitutions, as citizens are parties to it, that whilst they actually conform to it, they have no right to its protection. Aliens are not more parties to the laws, than they are parties to the Constitu- tion ; yet, it will not be disputed, that as they owe, on one hand, a 5* 54 VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. IflBlpoifttry obediaooe, they are entitled in rabirn to their proteelte mod •dhrentage. IfAlienshadno right under the Constitution, the]r might not only be banithedi but even capitally punished, without a jury or the other incidents to a (air trial. But to far has a contrary principle been car* ried. in cTcry part of the United States, thatexcept on charges of treason, an Alien has, besides all the common privileges, the special one of bein^ tried by a jury, of which one half may be also Aliens. It u said, rurtner, that by the law and practice of nations, Aliens may be removed ai discretion, for offences against the law of nations : that Congress are authorized to define and punish such offences ; and that to be dangerous to the peace of society, is, in Aliens, one of thoee offences. The distinction between Alien enemies and Al • < Is, is a clear and conclusive answer to this argument Alien • ^re under the law of nations, and liable to be punished for otVciic^s against it. Alien fciends, except in the single cose of public ministers, are und» r the municipal law, ana must be tried and punished acr4)rding to that law onlv. This arg:ument also, by referring the Alien act to the power of Con- rB to define and punish ofTences against the law of nations, yields point that the act is of a pefuil, not merely of a preventive operation. It must in truth be so considered. And if it be a penal act, the punishment it indicts must be justified by some offence that deserves it Offences for which Aliens, within tlie jurisdiction of a country, are punishable, are first, offences committed by the nation of which they make a part, and in whose offences they are involved : Secondly, offences committed by themselves alone, without any rhar're to the nation to which they belong. The first is the case of Al the second, Uie case of Alien friends. In tlie first case, i nation can no otherwise l)e punished tlian by war, one of U»< which, authorises the expulsion of such of its members as found witliin country, against which tlie offence has been c»m In the second case, the offence bein^ committed by tlie indivi by his nation, and against the municipal law, not again nations, tlie individual only, and not Uie nation, is pun the punishment must be conducted acconling to tlie nn not according to the law of nations. Under this view «■: the act of Congress, for the removal of Alien enemies, \ni bleto the law of nations, is justified by the Constitution ; . for tlie removal of Alien friends, 1 ngnaiit to tlie coiit»uiuLiuual principles of Municipal law, is iin . . Nor is the act of Congress for the removal of Alien '- a^jeeable to the general practice of nations, than it is ^ > view of the law of nations. The general practice of naiuuui dt&uii- guishes between Alien friends and Alien enemies. The Inttcr it has proceeded against^ acconling to the law of nati as enemies; the u>micr it lias consitKred as un rary allegiance, and eniiilnl to a corresjKmdcnt prutectiuti. ll instances are tol>e found in barbaniun countries, under unHt i fogatives, or amid revolutionary daii^^ers, they will not I VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. 55 precedents for the Government of the United States, even, if not beyond Us constitutional authority. It is said that Congress may grant letters of marque and reprisal ; that reprisals may be ihade on persons, as well as property ; and that the removal of Aliens may be considered as the exercise, in an inferior degree, of the general power of reprisal on persons. Without entering mmutely into a c^uestion that does not seem to re- quire it, it may be remarked, that reprisal is a seizure of foreign persons or property, with a view to obtain that justice for injuries done by one State or its members to another State or its members : for which, a refusal of the aggressors requires such a resort to force under the law of nations. It must be considered as an abuse of words, to call the removal of persons from a country, a seizure or reprisal on them ; nor is tlie distinction to be overlooked between reprisals on persons within the country and under the faith of its laws, and on persons out of the country. But laving aside these considerations, it is evidently impossi- ble to bring the Alien act within the power of granting reprisals ; since it does not allege or imply any injury received from any particular nation, for which this proceeding against its members was intended as a reparation. The proceeding is authorized against Aliens of every nation ; of nations charged neither with any similar proceeding against American citizens, nor with any injuries for which justice might be sought, in the mode prescribed by the act. Were it true, therefore, that good causes existed for reprisals against one or more foreign nations, and that neither the persons nor property of its members, under the faith of our laws, could plead an exemption ; the operation of tlie act ought to have been limited to the Aliens among us, belonging to such nations. To license reprisals against all nations, for aggressions charged on one only, would be a measure as contrary to every principle of justice and public law, as to a wise policy and the universal practice of nations. It is said that the right of removing Aliens is an incident to the power of war, vested in Congress by the Constitution. This is a fonner argument in a new shape only ; and is answered by repeating, that the removal of Alien enemies is an incident to tlie power of war ; that the removal of Alien friends is not an incident to the power of war. It is said that Congress are by the Constitution to protect each state against invasion; and that the means of preventing invasion are in- cluded in the power of protection against it. The power of war, in general, having been before granted by the Constitution, this clause must either be a mere specification for greater caution and certainty, of which there are other examples in tlie instru- ment ; or by the iniunclion of a duty, superadded to a grant of the power. Under either explanation, it cannot enlarge tlie powers of Congress on tlie subgect. The power and the duty to protect each state affainst an invading enemy would be tlis samevmder the general power, if this regard to greater caution had been omitted. Invasion is an operation of war. To protect against invasion is an exercise of the power of war. A power, therefore, not incident to war, cannot be incident to a particular modification of war. And as the removal of alien friends, has appeared to be no incident to a gener£d 56 VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. state of war, it cannot be incident to a partial state, or a particular modification of war. Nor can it ever be granted, that a power to act on a case when it actually occurs, includes a power over all the means that may tend to prevent tlie occurrence of the case. Such a latitude of construction would render unavailing every practical definition of particular and limited powers. Under the idea of preventing war in general, as well as invasion in particular, not only an indiscriminate removal of all aliens might be enforced, but a thousand other things still more remote from the operations and precautions appurtenant to war, might take place. A bigotted or tyrannical nation might threaten us with war, unless certain religious or political regulations were adopted by us ; yet it never could be inferred, if the regulations which would prevent war, w^ere such as Congress had. otherwise no power to make, that the power to make them would grow out of the pui-pose they were to answer. Congress have power to suppress insurrections, yet it would not be allowed to follow, that they might employ all the means tending to prevent them ; of which a system of moral instruction for the igno- rant, and of provident support for the poor, might be regarded as among the most efficacious. One argument for the power of the General Government to remove aliens, would have been passed in silence, if it had appeared under any authority inferior to that of a report made during the last session of Congress, to the House of Representatives, by a committee, and approved by the House. The doctrine on which this argument is founded is of so new, and so extraordinary a character, and sti'ikes so radically at the political system of America, that it is proper to state it in the very words of the report. " The act [concerning aliens] is said to be unconstitutional, because to remove aliens is a direct breach of the Constitution, which provides, by the 9th section of the 1st article : That the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress, prior to the year 1808." Among the answers given to this objection to the constitutionality of the act, the following very remarkable one is extracted : " Thirdly, that as the Constitution has given to the states no power to remove aliens, during the period of the limitation under considera- tion, in the mean time, on the construction assumed there would be no authority in the country empowered to send away dangerous aliens, which cannot be admitted." The reasoning here used would not in any view be conclusive ; be- cause there are powers exercised by most other governments, which^^n the United States are withheld by the people, both from the General Government and from the State Gevernments. Of this sort are many of the powers prohibited by the declarations of right fDrefixed to the Constitutions, or by the clauses in the Constitutions in the nature of such declarations. Nay, so far is the political system of the United States distinguishable from that of other countries, by the caution with which powers are delegated and defined ; that in one very important case, even of commercial regulation and revenue, the power is abso- lutely locked up against the hands of both governments. A tax on e:jLports can be laid by no constitutional authority whatever. Under a system thus peculiarly guarded there could surely be no absurdity in VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. 57 supposing that alien friends, who, if guilty of treasonable machinations, may be punished, or if suspected on probable grounds, may be secured by pledges or imprisonment, in like manner with permanent citizens, were never meant to be subjected to banishment by any arbitrary and unusual process, either under the one government or the other. But it is not the inconclusiveness of the general reasoning in this pas- sage, which chiefly calls the attention to it. It is the principle assumed by it, that the powers held by the states are given to tl:iem by the Con- stitution of the United States ; and the inference from this principle, that the powers supposed to be necessary, which are not so given to the State Governments, must reside in the Government of the United States. The respect which is felt for every portion of the constituted authori- ties, forbids some of the reflections which this singular paragraph might excite ; and they, are the more readily suppressed, as it may be presumed, with justice perhaps, as well as candor, that inadvertence may have had its share in the error. It would be an unjustifiable delicacy, nevertheless, to pass by so portentous a claim, proceeding from so high an authority, witliout a monitory notice of the fatal tendencies with which it would be pregnant. Lastly, it is said that a law on the same subject with the Alien Act, passed by this state originally in 1785, and re-enacted in 1792, is a proof that a summary removal of suspected aliens, was not heretofore re- garded by the Virginia Legislature, as liable to tlie objections now urged against such a measure. This charge against Virginia vanishes before the simple remark, tliat the law of Virginia relates to " suspicious persons being the sub- jects of any foreign power or state, who shall have made a declaration of war^ or actually commenced hostilities^ or from whom the President shall apprehend hostile designs ;" whereas the act of Congress relates to aliens, being the subjects of foreign powers, and states, who have neither declared war, nor commenced hostilities, nor from whom hostile designs are apprehended. II. It is next aflirmed by the Alien Act, that it unites Legislative, Judicial, and Executive powers in the hands of the President. However diflicult it may be to mark in every ca^e with clearness and certainty, the line which divides Legislative power from the other de- partments of power, all will agree that the powers referred to these departments may be so general and undefined as to be of a legislative, not of an executive or judicial nature ; and may for that reason be un- constitutional. Details to a certain degree are essential to the nature and character of a law ; and on criminal subjects it is proper that de- tails should leave as little as possible to the discretion of those who are to apply and execute the law. If nothing more were required in exer- cising a legislative trust, than a general conveyance of authority, with- out laying down any precise rules, by which the authority conveyed should be carried into effect ; it would follow that the whole power of legislation might be transferred by the Legislature from itself, and pro- clamations might become substitutes for laws. A delegation of power in this latitude would not be denied to be a union of the different powers. To determine, then, whether the appropriate powers of the distinct departments are united by the act authorising tlie executive to remove 58 VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. aliens, it must be inquired whether it contains such details, definitions, and rules as appertain to the true character of a law ; especially a law by which personal liberty is invaded, property deprived of its \C^}g to the owner, and life itself indirectly exposed to danger. The Alien Act declares, " that it shall be lawful for the President to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have reasonable ground to suspect^ are concerned in any treasonable, or secret machinations against the go- vernment thereof, to depart," &c. Could a power be well given in terms less definite, less particular, and less precise 1 To be dangerous to the public safety ; to be 51^5- pected of secret machinations against the government : these can never be mistaken for legal rules or certain definitions. They leave every thing to the President. His will is the law. But it is not a Legislative power only that is given to the President. He is to stand in the place of the Judiciary also. His suspicion is the only evidence which is to convict : his order the only judgment which is to be executed. Thus it is, the President, whose will is to designate the offensive conduct ; it is his will that is to ascertain the individuals on whom it is charged ; and it is his will that is to cause the sentence to be executed. It is rightly affirmed, therefore, that the act unites Legislative and Judi- cial powers to those of the Executive. III. It is affirmed that this union of power subverts the general principles of free government. It has become an axiom in the science of government, that a separa- tion of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments is neces- sary to the preservation of public liberty. Nowhere has this axiom been better understood in theory, or more carefully pursued in practice, than in the United States. IV. It is affirmed that such a union of powers subverts the particular organization and positive provisions of the Federal Constitution. According to the particular organization of the Constitution, its legis- > lative powers are vested in the Congress, its Executive powers in the President, and its Judicial powers in a supreme and inferior tribunals. The union of any two of these powers, and still more of all three, in any one of these departments, as has been shown to be done by the Alien Act, must consequently subvert the constitutional organization of them. That positive provisions in the Constitution, securing to individuals the benefits of fair trial, are also violated by the union of powers in the Alien Act, necessarily results from the two facts, that the act relates to alien friends, and that alien friends being under the municipal law only, are entitled to its protection. The second object against which the resolution protests, is the Sedi- tion Act. Of this act it is affirmed, 1. That it exercises in like manner a power not delegated by the Constitution. 2. That the power, on the contary, is expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments to the Constitution, 3. That this is a power which more than any other ou^ht to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against that rignt of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. 69 communication thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only- effectual guardian of every other right. 1. That it exercises a power not delegated by the Constitution. Here again it will be proper to recollect, that the Federal government being composed of powers specifically granted, with a reservation of all others, to the states or to the people, the positive authority under which the Sedition Act could be passed must be produced by those who assert its constitutionality. In what part of the Constitution then is this authority to be found. Several attempts have been made to answer this question, which will be examined in their order. The Committee will begin with one, which has filled them with equal astonishment and apprehension ; and which, they cannot but persuade themselves, must have tlie same effect on all who will consider it with coolness and impartiality, and with a reverence for our Constitution, in the true character in which it issued from the sovereign authority of the people. The Committee refer to the doctrine lately advanced as a sanction to the Sedition Act; " that the common or unwritten law," a law of vast extent and complexity, and em- bracing almost every possible subject of legislation, both civil and cri- minal, makes apart of the law of these states, in their united and national capacity. The novelty, and, in the judgment of the Committee, the extrava- gance of this pretension, would have consigned it to the silence in which they have passed by other arguments, which an extraordinary zeal for the act has drawn into the discussion ; but tlie auspices under which this innovation presents itself, have constrained the Committee to be- stow on it an attention which other considerations might have forbid- den. In executing the task, it may be of use to look back to the colonial state of this country prior to the Revolution ; to trace the effect of the Revolution which converted the colonies into independent states ; to in- quire into the import of the articles of confederation, the first instrument by which the union of the states was regularly established ; and, finally, to consult the Constitution of 1787, which is the oracle that must decide the important question. In the state prior to the Revolution, it is certain that the common law, under different limitations, made a part of the colonial codes. But whether it be understood that the original colonists brought the law with them, or made it their law by adoption, it is equally certain that it was the separate law of each colony within its respective limits, and was unknown to them, as a law pervading and operating through the whole, as one society. It could not possibly be otherwise. The common law was not the same in any two of the colonies ; in some the modifications were ma- terially and extensively different. There was no common legislature, by which a common will could be expressed in the fonn of a law ; nor any common magistracy, by which such a law could be carried into practice. The will of each colony, alone and separately, had its organs for these purposes. This stage of our politiced history furnishes no foothold for the pa- trons of this new doctrine. Did, then, tlie principle or operation of the great event which made O) VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. the oolonie» n*(lon<^udeiu states, imply or inuoduce the conuiion law, as A law oft). Therm, I principle of tlie Revoliitinn WMK ilmt ill. rnlitnies •werc< s with each other, . : of r its ex« < "«' v i us it was in Great Britain, by virtue of a like ackii< A denial of these principles by Great Britain, and tliv, ...,^v...^... . . ...i .u by America, produced Uie Revolution. There was a time, indeed, when an exception to the legislative sepa- ration of tlie several conijmnent and co-equal parts of tlie empire, ob- tained a degree of acquiescence. The British Parliament was allowed to regulate the trade with foreign nations, and between the different parts of the empire. This was, however, mere practice witli our right, and contrary to tlie tluory of tlie Constitution. The convenience of some regulations in both cases was apparent ; and, as there was no legislature with power over the whole, nor any constitutional pre-emi- nence among tlie legi.slutures of the several parts, it was natural for the legislature of that particular part which was the eldest and the largest, to assume Uiis function, and for llie others to acquiesce in it. This tacit arrangement was tlie less criticised, as tlie regulations established by the British Parliament operated in favor of that part of the empire, which seemed to bear the principal share of tlie public burdens, ond were regarded as an indemnification of its advances for tlie other parts. As long as this regulating power was confined to tlie two objects of con- veniency and equity, it was not complained of, nor much inquired into. But, no sffoner was it perverted to tlie selfish views of Uie party assimi- ing it, than the injured parties began to feel and to reflect ; and tlic moment the claim to a direct and indefinite power was ingrafted on tlie preced- ent of the regulating power, the wliole chanii was dissolved, and every eye onen to tlie usurpation. The assertion by Great Britain of a power to maxe laws for tlie other members of the empire in all cases whaUo- ever ended in the discovery that she had a right to make laws for them in no cases whatsoever. Such bein^ the ground of our revolution, no support nor color can be drawn from it, for the doctrine that the conunon law is binding on these States as one society. The doctrine, on the contrary, is evidently repugnant to the fundamental principle of the Revolution. The articles of confederation, are tlie next source of information on this subject In the interval between the commencement of the Revolution and the final ratification of these articles, the nature and extent of the Union was determined by the circumstances of the crisis, ratlier than by any accurate delineation of the general authority. It will not be alledged that the " common law" could have had any legitimate birth as a law of the United States during tli ^ * f things. If it came assuch'into existence at all, the charter oi tiion must have been its parent Hchreagain, however, its pn ' itely destitute of lounda- tkML This instrument do<:s i ace or a syllabic that can be tortured into acQtmtenance oi me luca, mat the parties to it were, VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. 61 with respect to the objects of the common law, to form one community. No such law is named, or implied, or alluded to, as being in force, or as brought into force by that compact. No provision is made by which such a law could be carried into operation ; whilst On the other hand, every such inference or pretext is absolutely precluded by article 2, which declares " that each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Con- gress assembled." Thus far it appears that not a vestige of this extraordinary doctrine can be found in Uie origin or progress of American institutions. The evidence against it has, on the contrary, grown stronger at every step, till it has amounted to a formal and positive exclusion, by written arti- cles of compact among the parties concerned. Is this exclusion revoked, and the common law introduced as nation- al law, by the present constitution of the United States 1 This is the final question to be examined. It is readily admitted that particular parts of the common law may have a sanction from the Constitution, so far as they are necessarily comprehended in the technical phrases which express the powers dele- gated to the government ; and so far, also, as such other parts may be adopted by Congress as necessary and proper for carrying into execu- tion the powers expressly delegated. But, the question does not relate to either of these portions of the common law. It relates to tlie common law beyond these limitations. The only part of the Constitution which seems to have been relied on in this case, is the 2d section of Article III. "The Judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity , arising under this Consti- tution, the laws of the UnitedStates, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." It has been asked, what cases, distinct from those arising under the laws and treaties of the United States, can arise under the Constitution, other than those arising under the common law ; and it is inferred, that the common law is accordingly adopted or recognized by the Con- stitution. Never, perhaps, was so broad a construction applied to a text so clearly unsusceptible of it. If any color for the mference could be found, it must be in the impossibility of finding any other cases in law and equity, within the provisions of the Constitution, to satisfy the expression ; and rather than resort to a construction affecting so essen- tially the whole character of the government, it would perhaps be more rational to consider the expression as a mere pleonasm or inadvertence. But it is not necessary to decide on such a dilemma. The expression is fully satisfied, and its accuracy justified, by two descriptions of cases, to which the judicial authority is extended, and neither of which implies that the common law is the law of the United States. One of these descriptions comprehends the cases growing out of the restrictions on the Legislative power of the States. For example, it is provided that *' no State shall emit bills of credit," or " make any thing but ^old and silver coin a tender in payment of debts." Should this prohibition be violated, and a suit between citizens of the same State be the conse- quence, this would be a case arising under the -Constitution before the Judicial power of tlie United States. A second description comprehends 6 63 VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS. suits between citizens and foreigners, of citizens of different States, to be decided according to the State or foreign laws ; but submitted by the Constitution to the Judicial power of the United States ; the Judicial power being in several instances, extended beyond the Legislative power of the United States. To this explanation of the text, the following observations may be added: The expression, " cases in law and equity," is manifestly confined to cases of a civil nature ; and would exclude cases of criminal juris- diction. Criminal cases in law and equity would be a language un- known to the law. The succeeding paragraph of the same section is in haimony with this construction. It is in these words : " In all cases affecting AmbaS' sadors, or other public Ministers, and Consuls, and tliose in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdic- tion. In all the other cases [including cases of law and equity arising under the Constitution] the Supreme Court shall have appellate juris- diction both as to law and fact ; with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as Congress shall make." This paragraph, by expressly giving ^ an appellate jurisdiction, in een made by one of the amendments to tlie Constitution, which expressly declares that " Conpress shall make no law respecting tn establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of 8})eech or of tlie press " thereby guarding in the same sentence, and under the same words, the freedom of religion, of speech, and of the press, insomuch, that whatever violates either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the others, and that libels, falsehoods, and defamation, equally with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the cognizance of F^eral tribunals : That Ui^efore the act of the Congress of the United States, passed on the Htli day of July, 1798, entitled, " An act in addition to trie act, for tlie punishment of certain crimes against the United States," which does abridge KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. 81 the freedom of tlie press, is not law, but it is altogether void, and of no effect. 4. Resolved, That alien friends are under the jurisdiction and pro- tection of the laws of the state wherein ihey are ; that no power over them has been delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the indi- vidual states distinct from their power over citizens ; and it being true as a general principle, and one of tlie amendments to the Constitution having also declared, that " the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserv- ed to the states respectively or to the people," the act of the Congress of the United States, passed on the 22d day of June, 1798, entitled " an act concerning aliens," which assumes power over alien friends not delegated by the Constitution, is not law, but is altogether void and of no force. 5. Resolved, That in addition to the general principle as well as the express declaration, that powers not delegated are reserved, another and more special provision inserted in the Constitution from abundant cau- tion has declared, " that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808." That this Com- monwealth does admit the migration of alien friends described as the subject of the said act concerning aliens, that a provision against pro- hibiting their migration, is a provision against all acts equivalent there- to, or it would be nugatory ; that to remove them when migrated, is equivalent to a prohibition of their migration, and is therefore contrary to the said provision of the Constitution and void. * 6. Resolved, That the imprisonment of a person under the protec- tion of the laws of this Commonwealth on hisfailare to obey the simple order of the President, to depart out of the United States, as is under- taken by the said act, entitled " an act concerning aliens," is contrary to the Constitution ; one amendment to which has provided that " no person shall be deprived of liberty, without due process of law," and that another having provided, " that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a public trial by an impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtain- ing witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence," the same act undertaking to authorize the President to remove a person out of the United States who is under the protection of the law, on his own suspicion, without accusation, without jury, without pub- lic trial, without confrontation of the witnesses against him, without having witnesses in his favor, without defence, without counsel, is con- trary to these provisions also of the Constitution, is therefore not law, but utterly void and of no force. That transferring the power of judging any person who is under the protection of the laws, from the courts to the President of the United States, as is undertaken by the same act concerning aliens, is against the article of the Constitution which provides that " the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in courts, the judges of which shall hold their offices during good behavior," and tliat the said act is void for that reason also; and it is further to be noted that this transfer of judiciary power is to that magistrate of the General Government who 83 KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. already possesses all the executive, aiid a qualified negative in all the legislative powers. 7. Resolved J That the construction applied by tlie General Govern- ment (as is evinced by sundry of their proceedings) to those parts of the Constitution of the United States which delegate to Congress a power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises ; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States, and to nuike all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution in tlie Grovernment of the United States, or any depeirtment thereof, goes to the destruction of all the limits prescribed to their power by the Consti- tution — That words meant by that instnnnent to be subsidiary only to the execution of tlie limited powers, ought not to be so construed as themselves to give unlimited powers, nor a part so to be taken as to de- stroy the whole residue of tlie instrument ; that the proceedings of the General Government under color of these articles will be a fit and ne- cessary subject for revisal and correction at a time of greater tranc^uillity, while those specified in the preceding resolutions call for immediate re- dress. 8. Resolved, That the preceding resolutions be transmitted to the Senators and Representatives in Congress from this Common we ilth, who are hereby enjoined to present the same to their respective Houses, and to use their best endeavors to procure, at the next session of Con- gress, a repeal of the aforesaid unconstitutional and obnoxious acts. 9. Resolved, lastly, That the Governor of this Commonwealth be, and he is hereby, authorised and requested to communicate the preced- ing resolutions to the Legislatures of the several states, to assure them that this Commonwealth considers Union for specified national pur- poses, and particularly for those specified in their late Federal Compact, to be friendly to the penccj happiness, and prosperity of all the states : that, faithful to that compact, according to the plain intent and meaning in which it was understood and acceded to by the several parties, it is sincerely anxious for its preservation ; that it does also believe that to take from the states all the powers of self-government, and transfer them to a general and consolidated government, witliout regard to the special delegations and reservations solemnly agreed to in tliat com- pact, is not for the peace, happiness, or prosperity of tliese states : and that, therefore, this Commonwealth is determined, as it doubts not its co-states are tamely to submit to undelegated and consequently unlim- ited powers in no man or body of men on earth: that if the acts before specified should stand, these conclusions would flow from them ; that the General Government may place any act they tliink proper on the list of crimes, and punish it themselves, whether enumerated or not enumerated by the Constitution, as recognizable by them ; that they may transfer its cognizance to the President, or any other person, who may himself be the accuser, counsel, judge, and jury ; whose suspicions may be the evidence, his order the sentence, his officer tlie executioner, and his breast the sole record of the transaction : That a very numerous and valuable description of the inhabitants of these states, being by this precedent reduced as outlaws to the absolute dominion of one man, and the barrier of the Constitution thus swept away from us all, no rampart now remains against the passions and the power of a majority of Con- p*es8, to protect from a like exportation or other more grevious punish- KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. 68 ment the minority of the same body, the legislatures, judges, gover- nors, and counsellors of the states, nor their other peaceful inhabitants who may venture to reclaim the constitutional rights and liberties of the states and people, or who, for other causes, good or bad, may be ob- noxious to the views, or marked by the suspicions of the President, or be thought dangerous to his or their elections, or other interests, public or personal : That the friendless alien has indeed been selected as the safest subject of a first experiment; but the citizen will soon follow, or rather has already followed ; for, already has a Sedition Act marked him as its prey : that these and successive acts of the same character, unless arrested on the threshhold, may tend to drive these states into re- volution and blood, and will furnish new calumnies against Republi- can Governments, and new pretexts for those who wish it to be believ- ed that man cannot be governed but by a rod of iron ; that it would be a dangerous delusion, were a confidence in the men of our choice to si- lence our fears for the safety of our rights ; that confidence is every where the parent of despotism : that free government is founded in jea- lousy and not in confidence: it is jealousy, not confidence, which pre- scribes limited Constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power; that our Constitution has accordingly fixed the limits to which, and no further, our confidence may ^o ; and let the honest advocate of confidence read the Alien and Sedition Acts, and say if the Constitution has not been wise in fixing limits to the govern- ment it created, and whether we should be wise in destroying those limits 1 Let him say what the government is, if it be not a tyranny, which the men of our choice have conferred on the President, and the President ofour choice has assented to, and accepted over the friendly strangers, to whom the mild spirit ofour country and its law had pledged hospitality and protection : that the men of our choice have more re- spected the bare suspicions of the President, than the solid rights of in- nocence, the claims of justification, the sacred force of truth, and the forms and substance of law and justice. In questions of power, then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from mis- chief, by the chains of the Constitution. That this Commonwealth does, therefore, call on its co-states for an expression of their senti- ments on the acts concerning aliens, and for the punishment of certain crimes hereinbefore specified, plainly declaring whether tliese acts are or are not authorized by the Federal Compact 1 And it doubts not that their sense will be so announced, as to prove tlieir attachment unalter- ed to limited government, whether general or particular, and that the rights and liberties of their co-states, will be exposed to no dangers by remaining embarked on a common bottom with their own : That they will concur with this Commonwealth in considering the said acts as so palpably against the Constitution, as to amount to an undisguised de- claration, that the compact is not meant to be the measure of the powers of the General Government, but that it will proceed in the exercise over these states of all powers whatsoever : That they will view this as seizing the rights of the states, and consolidating them in the hands of the General Government, with a power assumed to bind the states, not merely in cases made Federal, but in all cases whatsoever, by laws made, not with their consent, but by others against their consent : That this would be to surrender the form of government we have cho- sen, and to live under one deriving its powers from its own will, and 84 KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. not from our authority : and that the co-states recurring to their natur- al right in cases not made Federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of no force, and will each unite with this Commonwealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress. EDMUND BULLOCK, 5f. H. R. JOHN CAMPBELL, 5:. S. P. T. Passed the House of Representatives, November 10th, 1798. Attest, THOMAS TODD, C. H. R. In SENATE, November 13th, 1798, unanimously concurred in. Attest, B. THURSTON, Clerk of Senate. Approved, November 16th, 1798. JAMES GARRARD, G. K. Bv the Governor : HARRY TOULMIN, Secretary of State. KENTUCKY LEGISLATURE. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. Thursday, Nov. Uth, 1799. The House, according to the standing order of the day, resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, on the State of the Common- wealth, Mr. Desha in the chair ; and after some time spent therein, the Speaker resumed the chair, and Mr. Desha reported, that the Commit- tee had taken under consideration sundry resolutions passed by several State Legislatures, on the subject of the Alien and Sedition Laws, and had come to a resolution thereupon, which he delivered in at the clerk's table, where it was read, and unanimously agreed to by the House, as follows : — The Representatives of the good people of this Commonwealth, in general Assembly convened, having maturely considered the answers of sundry states in the Union, to their resolutions passed at the last session, respecting certain unconstitutional laws of Congress, commonly called the Aliens and Sedition Laws, would be faithless indeed to them- selves, and to those tliey represent, were they silently to acquiesce in tJie principles and doctrines attempted to be maintained in all those an- swers, that of Virginia only excepted. To again enter the field of ar- gument, and atteinpt more fully or forcibly to expose the unconstitution- ality of those obnoxious laws, would, it is apprehended, be as unneces- sary as unavailing. We cannot, however, but lament that in the dis- cussion of those interesting subjects, by sundry of the Legislatures of our sister states, unfounded suggestions, and uncandid insinuations, derogatory of tlie true character and principles of the good people of this Commonwealth, have been substituted in place of fair reasoning and sound argument. Our opinions of these alarming measures of the General Government, together with our reasons for those opinions, were detailed with decency and with temper, and submitted to the dis- cussion and judgment of our fellow citizens throughout the Union. Whether the like decency and temper have been observed in the an- swers of most of those states ,who have denied or attempted to obviate KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS. 85 the great truths contained in those resolutions, we have now only to submit to a candid world. Faithful to the true principles of the Federal Union, unconscious of any designs to disturb the harmony of that Union, and anxious only to escape the fangs of despotism, the good peo- ple of this Commonwealth are regardless of censure or calumniation. Lest, however, the silence of this Commonwealth should be construed into an acquiescence in the doctrines and principles advanced and at- tempted to be maintained by the said answers, or lest those of our fel- low citizens throughout the Union, who so widely differ from us on those important subjects, should be deluded by the expectation that we shall be deterred from what we conceive our duty, or shrink from the principles contained in those resolutions ; therefore, Resolved^ That this Commonwealth considers the Federal Uilion, upon the tenns and for the purposes specified in the late compact, as conducive to the liberty and happiness of the several states ; that it does now unequivocally declare its attachment to the Union, and to that compact, agreeable to its obvious and real intention, and will be among the last to seek its dissolution: That if those who administer the General Government be permitted to transgress the limits fixed by that compact, by a total disregard to the special delegations of power therein contained, an annihilation of the State Governments, and the erection upon their ruins of a general consolidated government, will be the inevitable consequence : That the principle and construction con- tended for by sundry of the State Legislatures, that the General Govern- ment is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, stop nothing short of despotism, since the discretion of those who ad- minister the government, and not the Constitution^ would be the mea- sure of their powers. That the several states who formed that instru- ment, being sovereign and independent, have the unquestionable ri^ht to judge of.its infraction, and that a nullification by those sovereignties^ of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument^ is the rightful remedy : That this Commonwealth does, upon the most de- liberate reconsideration, declare that the said Alien and Sedition Laws are, in their opinion, palpable violations|of the said Constitution ; and, however cheerfully it may be disposed to surrender its opinion to a majority of its sister states in matters of ordinary or doubtful policy, yet, in momentous regulations like the present, which so vitally wound the best rights of the citizen, it would consider a silent acquiescence as highly criminal : That although this Commonwealth, as a party to the Federal Compact, will bow to the laws of the Union, yet it does at the same time declare that it will not now, nor ever hereafter, cease to op- pose in a constitutional manner, every attempt, from what quarter so- ever offered, to violate that compact. And, finally, in order that no pretexts or arguments may be drawn from a supposed acquiescence on the part of this Commonwealth in the constitutionality of those laws, and be thereby used as precedents for similar future violations of the Federal Compact, this Commonwealth does no^^ enter against them its SOLEMN PROTEST. Extract, &c. Attest : THOMAS TODD, C. H. R. In Senate, November 22, 1799. Read and concurred in. Attest: B. THURSTON, C. S. 8 EXTRACT OP A LETTER FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON, TO GOVERNOR GILES, OF VIRGINIA. " 26th December, 1825. " Dear Sir — I see asyoudo, and with the deepest affliction, the rapid strides with which the Federal branch of our government is advancing towards the usurpation of all the rights reserved to the states, and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign and domestic, and that, too, by constiTictions which, if legitimate, leave no limits to their power. Take together the decisions of the Ferderal Court, the doctrines of the President, and the misconstructions of the constitutional compact acted on by the legislature of the Federal branch, and it is but too evi- dent that the three ruling branches of that department are in combina- tion to strip their colleagues, the state authorities, of the powers reserv- ed by them, and to exercise themselves all functions, foreign and do- mestic. Under the power to regulate commerce, they assume indefinitely that also over agriculture and manufactures, and call it regulation, too, to take the earnings of one of those branches of industry, and that too the most def)ressed, and put them into the pockets of the other, the most flour- ishing of all. Under the authority to establish post roads they claim that of cutting down mountains for the construction of roads, of digging ca- nals, and aided by a little sophistry on the words ' general welfare,' a right to do, not only the acts to effect that which are specifically enu- merated and permitted, but whatsoever they shall think, or pretend, will be for the general welfare. And what is our resonrce for the preserva- tion of the Constitution 1 Reason and argument ! You might as well reason and argue with the marble columns encircling them. The re- presentatives chosen by ourselves 1 They are joined in the combina- tion, some from incorrect views of government, some from corrupt ones, suflficient voting together to out number the sound parts, and with ma- jorities of only 1, 2, or 3, bold enough to go forward in defiance. Are we, then, to stand to our arms ? " No ! that must be the last resource, not to be thought of until much longer and greater sufferings. If every infraction of a compact of so many parties is to be resisted at once as a dissolution of it, none can ever be formed which would last one year. We must have patience and long endurance, then, with our brethren, while under delusion. Give them time for reflection and experience of consequences ; keep ourselves in a sitution to profit by the chapter of accidents — and separate from our companions only when the sole alternatives left are the dissolution of our union with them, or submission to a government without limitation of powers." LETTER FROM MR. MADISON, TO HON. EDWARD EVERETT, OF MASSACHUSETTS PUBLISHED IN THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, OCT. 1830. " Montpelier, August, 1830. "Dear Sir, " I have duly received your letter, in which you refer to the ' nullifying doctrine,' advocated as a constitutional right, by some of our distinguished fellow citizens ; and to the proceedings of the Virgi- nia Legislature in '98 and '99, as. appealed to in behalf of that doctrine ; and you express a wish for my ideas on those subjects. " 1 am aware of the delicacy of the task in some respects, and the difficulty in every respect, of doing full justice to it. But, having, in more than one instance, complied with a like request from other friend- ly quarters, I do not decline a sketch of the views which I have been led to take of the doctrine in question, as well as some others connected with them ; and of the grounds from which it appears that the pro- ceedings of Virginia have been misconceived by those who have ap- pealed to them. In order to understand the true character of the Con- stitution of the United States, the error, not uncommon, must be avoided, of viewing it through the medium, either of a consolidated government, or of a confederated government, whilst it is neither the one nor the other ; but a mixture of both. And having, in no model, the similitudes and analogies applicable to other systems of government, it must, more than any other, be its own interpreter, according to its text and tJue facts of the case. " From these it will be seen that the characteristic peculiarities of the Constitution are, 1, the mode of its formation ; 2, the division of tlie supreme powers of government between the states in their united ca- pacity, and the states in their individual capacities. "1. It was formed, not by the governments of the component states, as the Federal Government for which it was substituted was formed. Nor was it formed by a majority of the people of the United States, as a single community, in the maimer of a consolidated government. " It was formed by the states, that is, by the people in each of the states, acting in their highest sovereign capacity ; and formed conse- quently by the same authority which formed the State Constitutions. " Being thus derived from the same source as the constitutions of the states, it has, within each state, the same authority as the constitution of the state : and is as much a constitution in the strict sense of the term, within its prescribed sphere, as the constitutions of the states are, within their respective spheres ; but with this obvious and essentifd difference, that being a compact among the states in their highest sovereign capacity, and constituting the people thereof one people for certain purposes, it cannot be altered or annulled at the will of th« 88 MR. MADISON'S LETTER. states individually, as the constitution of a state may be at its indivi- dual will. " 2. And that it divides the supreme powers of government, between the government of tlie United States, and the governments of the indi- vidual states, is stamped on the face of the instniment; the powers of war and of taxation, of commerce and of treaties, and other enumerated powers vested in the government of the United Stales, being of as high and sovereign a character as any of the powers reserved to the state governments. ** Nor is the government of the United States, created by the constitu- tion, less a government in the strict sense of tlieterm, within the sphere of its powers, than the governments created by the constitutions of the states are, within their several spheres. It is like them organized into Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary Departments. It operates, like them, directly on persons and things. And, like them, it has at com- mand a physical force for executing the powers committed to it. The concurrent operation in certain cases, is one of the features marking the peculiarity of the system. " jBetween these different constitutional governments, the one operat- ing in all the states, the others operating separately in each, with the aggregate powers of government divided between them, it could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the bounda- ries of jurisdiction; and that some provision ought to be made for such occurrences. A political system that does not provide for a peaceable and authoritative termination of occurring controversies, would not be more than the shadow of a government ; the object and end of a real government being the substitution of law and order, for uncertainty, confusion, and violence. " That to have left a final decision, in such cases, to each of the states, then thirteen, and already twenty-four, could not fail to make the con- stitution and laws of the United States different in different states, was obvious ; and not less obvious, that this diversity of independent decis- ions, must altogether distract the government of the Union, and speedi- ly put an end to the union itself A uniform authority of the laws is in Itself a vital principle. Some of the most important laws could not be partially executed. They must be executed in all the states, or they could be duly executed in none. An impost, or an excise, for ex- ample, if not in force in some states, would be defeated in others. It is well known that this was among the lessons of experience which had a primary influence in bringing about the existing constitution. A loss of its general authority would moreover revive the exasperating ques- tions between the states holding ports for foreign commerce, and the adjoining states without them ; to which are now added all the inland states, necessarily carrying on their foreign commerce through other states. " To have made the decisions under the authority of the individucii states, coordinate, in all cases, with decisions under the authority of the United States, would unavoidably produce collisions incompati- ble with the peace of society, and with that regular and efficient admi- nistration, wnich is of the essence of free governments. Scenes could not be avoided, in which a ministerial officer of the United States, and the correspondent officer of an individual state, would have rencounters in executing conflicting decrees ; the result of which would depend on MR. MADISON'S LETTER. 89 the comparative force of the local posses attending them ; and that, a casualty depending on the political opinions and party feelings in different states. " To have referred every clashing decision, under the two authorities for a final decision, to the states as parties to the constitution, would be attended with delays, with inconveniences, and with expenses, amount- ing to a prohibition of the expedient ; not to mention its tendency to impair the salutary veneration for a system requiring such frequent in- terpositions, nor the delicate questions which might present tliemselves as to the form of stating the appeal, and as to the quorum for deciding it *' To have trusted to negociation for adjusting disputes between the government of the United States and the state govermnents, as between independent and separate sovereignties, would have lost sight altogeth- er of a constitution and government for the Union, and opened a direct road from a failure of that resort, to the ultima ratio between nations wholly independent of and alien to each other. If the idea had its origin in the process of adjustment, between separate branches of the same government, the analogy entirely fails. In the case of disputes between independent parts of the same government, neither part being able to consummate its will, nor the government to proceed without a concurrence of tlie parts necessity brings about an accommodation. In disputes between a state government, and the government of the United States, the case is practically as well as theoretically different ; each party possessing all the departments of an organized government, Legis- lative, Executive, and Judiciary ; and having each a physical force to support its pretensions. Although the issue of negotiation might some- times avoid this extremity, how often would it happen, among so many states, that an unaccommodating spirit in some, would render that re->- source \m vailing % A contrary supposition would not accord with a knowledge of human nature, or the evidence of our own political his- tory. " The constitution, not relying on any of the preceding modifications, for its safe and successful operation, has expressly declared, on the one hand, 1, 'that the constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made under tlie authority of the United States, shall bejthe supreme law of the land ; 2, that the Judges of every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution and laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; 3, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States^ and treaties made under their authority, &c.' " On the other hand, as a security of the rights and powers of the states, in their individual capacities, against an undue preponderance of the powers granted to the government over them in their united ca- pacity, the constitution has relied on, 1, the responsibility of the Senat- ors and Representatives in the Legislature of the United States to the Legislatures and people of the states; 2, the responsibility of the Presi- dent to the people of the United States ; and 3, the liability of the Executive and Judicial functionaries of the United States to impeach- ment by the Representatives of the people of the states, in one branch of the Legislature of the United States, and trial by the Representatives of the states, in the other branch : the state functionaries. Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, being, at the same time, in their appointment 90 MR. MADISON'S LETTER. and responsibility, altogether independent of the agency or authority of the United States. '' How far this structure of the Government of the United States is adequate and safe for its objects, time alone can absolutely determine. Experience seems to have shown that whatever may grow out of future stages of our national career, there is, as yet, a sufficient control, in the popular will, over the Executive and Legislative Departments of the government. When the Alien and Sedition Laws were passed in contravention to the opinions and feelings of the community, the first elections that ensued put an end to them. And whatever may have been the character of other acts, in the judgment of many of us, it is but true, that they have generally accorded with the views of a majority of the states and of the people. At the present day it seems well under- stood that the laws which have created the most dissatisfaction, have had a like sanction without doors ; and that whether continued, varied, or repealed, a like proof will be given of the sympathy and responsi- bility of the representative body, to the constituent body. Indeed, the great complaint now is against the results of this sympathy and respon- sibility in the legislative policy of the nation. " With respect to the judicial power of the United States, and the au- thority of the Supreme Court in relation to the boundary of jurisdiction between the Federal and State Governments, I may be permitted to re- fer to the thirty-ninth number of the ' Federalist,'* for the light in which the subject was regarded by its writer, at the period when the Constitution was depending ; and it is believed that the same was the prevailing view then taken of it, that the same view has continued to prevail, and that it does so at this time, notwithstanding the eminent exceptions to it. " But it is perfectly consistent with the concession of this power to the Supreme Court, in cases falling within the course of its functions, to maintain that the power has not always been rightly exercised. To say nothing of the period, happily a short one, when judges in their seats did not abstain from intemperate and party harangues, equally at variance with their duty and their dignity ; there have been occasional decisions from the bench, which have incurred serious and extensive disapprobation. Still it would seem that, with but few exceptions, the course of the Judiciary has been hitherto sustained by the predominant sense of the nation. '* Those who have denied or doubted the supremacy of the judicial poAver of the United States, and denounce at the same time a nullifying power in a state, seems not to have sufficiently adverted to the utter inefficiency of a supremacy in a law of the land, without a supremacy in the exposition and execution of the law ; nor to the destruction of all equipoise between the Federal Government and the State Govern- ments, if, whilst the functionaries of the Federal Government are di- rectly or indirectly elected by and responsible to the states, and the functionaries of the states are in their appointment and responsibility • No. 39. 'Tt iR trae, that in controversies relating' to the boundary between the two Jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is m be establislied under the General Government. But this doea not change the princif-le ol" the case. The decision is lo be impartially made, according to th» rules of the Constitution ; and all the usual and most eflectual precautions are taken to secure this im- pjirliali'.y. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal (o the sword, and a dissolution of the cpmpact ; and that it ought to be established under the general, rather than under the local, govern- nients ; or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a positioA uoi likely to be combated.' MR. MADISON'S LETTER. 91 wholly independent of the United States, no constitutional control of any sort belonged to the United States over the states. Under such an organization it is evident that it would be in the power of the states, individually, to pass unauthorized laws, and to carry them into com- plete effect, any thing in the Constitution and laws of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding. This would be a nullifying power in its plenary character ; and whether it had its final effect, through the Legislative, Executive, or Judiciary organ of the state, would be equally fatal to the constituted relation between the two governments. " Should the provisions of the Constitution, as here reviewed, be found not to secure the government and rights of the states against usurpa- tions and abuses on the part of the United States, the final resort within the purview of the Constitution, lies in an amendment of the Constitution, according to a process applicalDle by the states. " And in the event of a failure.of every constitutional resort, and an accumulation of usurpations and abuses, rendering passive obedience and non-resistance a greater evil than resistance and revolution, there can remain but one resort, the last of all^ — an appeal from the cancelled obligations of the constitutional compact, to original rights and the law of self-preservation. This is the ultima ratio under all governments, whether consolidated, confederated, or a compound of both; and it can- not be doubted, that a single member of the Union, in the extremity sup- . posed, but in that only, would have a right, as an exti*a and ultra-con- stitutional right, to make the appeal. " This brings us to the expedient lately advanced, which claim? for a single state a right to appeal against an exercise of power by the govern- ment of the United States decided by the states to be unconstitutional, to the parties to the constitutional compact; the decision of the state to have the effect of nulUfying the act of the government of the United States, unless the decision of the state be reversed by three fourths of the parties. " The distinguished names and high authorities which" appear to have asserted and given a practical scope to this doctrine, entitle it to a respect which it might be difficult otherwise to feel for it. " If the doctrine were to be understood as requiring the three fourths of the states to sustain, instead of that proportion to reverse the decision of the appealing state, the decision to be without effect during the appeal, it would be sufficient to remark, that this exti a-constitutional course might well give way to that marked out by the Constitution, which authorizes two thirds of the states to institute, and three fourths to effectuate, an amendment of the Constitution, establishing a permanent rule of the highest authority, in place of an irregular precedent of construction only. " But it is understood that the nullifying doctrine imports that the deci- sion of the state is to be presumed valid, and that it overrules the law of the United States, unless overruled by three fourths of the states. " Can more be necessary to demonstrate the inadmissibility of such a doc- trine, than that it p>uts it in the power of the smallest fraction over one fourth of the United States, that is, of seven states out of twenty-four, to give the law and even the Constitution to seventeen states, each of the seventeen having, as parties to the Constitution, an equal right with each of the seven, to expound it, and t# insist on the exposition? That the seven might, in particular instanc^, be right, and the seventeen wrong, is more than possible. But to establish a positive and permanent rule giv- ing such a power, to such a minority, over such a majority, would over- n MR. MADISON'S LETTER. turn the first principle of free government, and in practice necessahlj overturn the government itself. " It is to be recollected that tlie Constitution was proposed to the peo- ple of the states as a whole^ and unanimously adopted by the slates aa a yjhole^ it being a part of the Constitution that not less than three fourths of the states should be competent to make any alterations in what had been unanimously agreed lo. So great is the caution on this point, Uiat in two cases where peculiar interests were at stake, a pro- portion even of Uiree fourths is distrusted, and unanimity required to make an alteration. " When the Constitution was adopted as a whole, it is certain that there were many parts, wliich, if separately proposed, would have been promptly rejected. It is far from impossible that every part of a Constitution might be rejected by a majority, and yet taken together as a whole be unanimously accepted. Free Constitutions will rarely, if ever be formed, without reciprocal concessions ; without articles con- ditioned on and balancing each otlier. Is there a Constitution of a single state out of the twenty-four that would bear the experiment of having its component parts submitted to the people and separately de- cided on 1 " What the fate of the Constitution of the United States would be, if a small proportion of the states could expunge parts of it particularly valued by a large majority, it can have but one answer. '• The difficulty is not removed by limiting the doctrine to cases of construction. How many cases of that sort, involving cardined provi- sions of the Constitution, have occurred! How many now exist 1 How many may hereafter spring up 1 How many might be ingeni- ously created, if entitled to the privilege of a decision in tlie mode pro- posed? " It is certain that the principle of that mode would not reach further than is contemplated. If a single state can of right require three fourths of its co-stcites to overrule its exposition of the Constitution, because that proportion is authorized to amend it, would the plea be less plausi- ble that, as the Constitution was unanimously established, it ought to be unanimously expounded 1 " The reply to all such suggestions seems to be unavoidable and irre- sistible ; that the Constitution is a compact, tliat its text is to be ex- pounded according to the provisions for expounding it — making a part of the compact; and that none of the parties can rightfully renounce the expounding provision more than any other part. When such a riffht accrues, as may accrue, it must grow out of abuses of tlie compact releasing the sufferers from their fealty to it. " In ftivor of the nullifying claim for the states, individually, it ap- pears, as you observe, that the proceedings of the Legislature of Vir- ginia, in 98 and '99, against the Alien and Sedition Acts, are much dwelt upon. " It may often happen, as experience proves, that erroneous construe- tions, not anticipated, may not be sufficiently guarded against, in the language used ; and it is due to the distinguished individuals, who have miseonceived the intention of those proceedings, to suppose that the meaning of the Legislature, tliough well comprehended at the time, may not now be obvious to those unacquainted with the contemporary indications and impressions. MR. MADISON'S LETTER. 93 " But it is b^eved that by keeping in view the distinction between the governments of the states, and 3ie states in which they were par- ties to the Constitution ; Ixtween the rights of the parties, in their con- current and in tluir individual capacities; between the several modes and objects of int. I iiM^ii, 111 against the abuses of, power, and especially between int( i hin the purview of the Constitution, and in- terpositions wj., m the Constitution to tlie rights of nature paramount to all < (ions; with an attention, always of explana- tory use, to the Viiv.v... ....d arguments which were combated, the Reso- lutions of Virgini'^ as vindicated in the Report on them, will be foimd entitled to an exposition, showing a consistency in their parts, and an inconsistency of the whole with the doctrine under consideration. " That the Legislature could not have intended to sanction such a doc- trine, is to be inferred from the debates in the Houses of Delegates, and from the address of the two Houses to their constituents, on the subject of the resolutions. The tenor of the debates, which were ably conduct- ed, and are understood to have been revised for the press by most, if not all, of the speakers, discloses no reference whatever to a constitutional right in an individual state, to arrest by force the operation of a law of the United States. Concert among the states for redress against the Aliien and Sedition Laws, as acts of usurped power was a leading sentiment ; and the attainment of a concert the immediate object of the coarse adopted by the legislature, which, was that of inviting the other states * to concur in declarmg the acts to be unconstitunal, and io co-operate by the necessary ami proper measures in maintaining unimpaired the authorities, rights and liberties reserved to the states respectively, and to the people."* Tliat by the necessary and proper measures to be C07icurrenfly and co- operatively taken, were meant measures known to the Constitution, particularly the ordinary control of the people and legislatures of the states, over the Government of the United States, cannot he doubted ; and the interposition of this control, as the event showed, was equal to the occasion. " It is worthy of remark, and explanatory of the intentions of the Legislature, that the words ' not law, but utterly null, void, and of no force or elfect,' which had followed, in one of the resolutions, the word ' unconstitutional,' were struck out by common consent. Though the words were in fact but synonymous with ' unconstitutional ;' yet to guard against a misunderstanding of this phrase as more than declaratory of opinion, the word ' unconstitutional ' alone was retained, as not liabl« to that danger. " The published Address of the Legislature to the people, their consti- tuents, affords another conclusive evidence of its views. The address warns them against the encroaching spirit of the General Government, argues the unconstitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts, points to other instances in which the constitutional limits had been overleaped ; dwells upon the dangerous mode of deriving power by implication ; and in general presses the necessity of watching over the consolidating ten- dency of the Federal jtoWcy, But nothing is said that can be understood to look to means of maintaining the rights of the states, beyond the regu- lar ones, within the forms of the Constitution. " If any futher lights on the subject could be needed, a very strong on© * See the eoncludine resolutioo of 1799. 94 ON THE RIGHT OF SECESSION. it reflected in the answers to the resolutions, by the states which pro- terted against them. The main objection of these, beyond a few general complaints of the inflammatory tendency of the resolutions, was directed against the assumed authority of a State Legislature to declare a law of the United States unconstitutional, which they pronounced an unwarrant- able interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States. Had the resolutions been regarded as avowing and maintaining a right, in an individual state, to arrest, by force, the execu- tion of a law of the United States, it must be presumed that it would have been a conspicuous object of their denunciation. " With cordial salutations, JAiMES MADISON." ON THE RIGHT OF SECESSION, [Extract from tfie Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 1, 1814.] Editorial Remarks. "No man, no association of men, no State, or set of States, has a right to withdraw itself from this Union of its own accord. The same power which knit us toffether can unknit. The same formality which formed the links of the Union is necessary to dissolve it. The majority of Slates which formed the Union must consent to the withdrawal of any one branch of it. Until that consent has been obtained, any attempt to dissolve the Union, or obstruct the efficacy of the constitutional laws, is treason — treason to all intents and purposes." HARTFORD CONVENTION A Convention of Delegates from the New England States, appointed to meet in Convention at Hartford, Connecticut, assembled for that purpose in the Council Chamber of the State House, in that city, on Thursday, December 15, 1814, at 10 o'clock, A. M. On being called to order they proceeded to organize themselves, by unanimously choosing the Hon. George Cabot, a member from Massachusetts, their President . and Theodore D wight, of Hartford, Secretary. The following are the names of the members : Elected by the Legislatures. From Massachusetts 12. From Connecticut 7. George Cabot, William Prescott, Harrison Gray Otis, Timothy Bigelow, Stephen Longfellow, Daniel Waldo, George Bliss, Nathan Dane, Hodijah Baylies, Sfimuel Sumner Wilde, Joseph Lyman, Joshua Thomas. Chauncey Goodrich, James Hillhouse, John Treadwell, Zephaniah Swift, Nathaniel Smith, Calvin Goddard, Roger Minott Sherman. From Rhode Island 4 Daniel Lyman, Samuel Ward, Benjamin Hazard, Edward Manton. Elected by County Conventions from Cheshire and Grafton. New Hampshire 2. Benjamin West, Mills Olcott 96 REPORT OP THE HARTFORD CONVENTION. REPORT, &c. The Delegates from the Legislatures of the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, and from the Counties of Grafton and Cheshire, in the State of New Hampsliire, and the County of Wind- ham, in the State of Vermont, assembled in Convention, beg leave to report the following result of their conference. The Convention is deeply impressed with a sense of tlic arduous nature of the commission which they were appointed to execute, of devising the means of defence against dangers, and of relief from oppressions proceeding from the act of their own government, without violating constitutional principles, or disappointing the hopes of a suf- fering and injured people. To prescribe patience and firmness to those who are already exhausted by distress, is sometimes to drive them to despair, and the progress towards reform by the regular road, is irksome to those whose imaginations discern, and whose feelings prompt to a shorter course. But when abuses, reduced to system and accumulated through a course of years, have pervaded every department of govern- ment, and spread corruption through every region of the state ; when these are closed with the forms of law, and enforced by an executive whose will is their source, no summary means of relief can be applied without recourse to direct and open resistance. This experiment, even when justifiable, cannot fail to be painful to the good citizen ; and the success of the effort will be no security against the danger of the exam- ple. Precedents of resistance to the worst administration, are eagerly seized by those who are naturally hostile to the best. Necessity alone can sanction a resort to this measure ; and it should never be extended in duration or degree beyond the exigency, until the people, not merely in the fervor of sudden excitement, but after full deliberation, are deter- mined to change the Constitution. It is a truth not to be concealed, that a sentiment prevails to no incon- siderable extent, that administration have given such constructions to that instrument, and practised so many abuses under color of its au- thority, that the time for a change is at hand. Those who so believe, re- gard the evils which surround tnem as intrinsic and incurable defects in the Constitution. They yield to a persuasion, that no change, at any time, or on any occasion, can aggravats the misery of their country. This opinion may ultimately prove to be correct. But as the evidence on which it rests is not yet conclusive, and as measures adopted upon the assumption of its certainty might be irrevocable, some general considera- tions are submitted, in the hope of reconciling all to a course of modera- tion and firmness, which may save them from the regret incident to sud- den decisions, probable avert the evil, or at least insure consolation and success in the last resort. HARTFORD CONVENTION. 97 The Constitution of the United States, under the auspices of a wise and virtuous administration, proved, itself competent to all the objects of national prosperity, comprehended in the views of its framers. No parallel can be found in history, of a transition so rapid as that of the United States from the lowest depression to the highest felicity — from the condi- tion of weak and disjointed republics, to that of a great, united, and prosperous nation. Although this high state of public happiness has undergone a misera- ble and artlicting reverse, through the prevalence of a weak and profligate policy, yet the evils and afflictions which have thus been induced upon the country, are not peculiar to any form of government. The lust and caprice of power, the corruption of patronage, the oppression of the weaker interests of the community by the stronger, heavy taxes, wasteful expenditures, and unjust and ruinous wars, are the natural offspring of bad administrations in all ages and countries. It was indeed to be hoped that the rulers of these states would not make such disastrous haste to involve their infancy in the embarrassments of old and rotten institutions. Yet all this have they done ; and their conduct calls loudly for their die- mission and disgrace. But to attempt upon every abuse of power to change the Constitution, would be to perpetuate the evils of revolution. Again, the experiment of the powers of the Constitution, to regain its vigor, and of the people to recover from their delusions, has been hitherto made under the greatest possible disadvantages arising from the state of the world. The fierce passions which have convulsed the nations of Eu- rope, have passed the ocean, and finding their way to the bosoms of our citizens, have afforded to administration the means of perverting public opinion in respect to our foreign relations, so as to acquire its aid in the indulgence of their animosities, and the increase of their adherents. Fur- ther, a reformation of public opinion, resulting from dear bought experi- ence in the southern Atlantic states, at least not to be despaired of They will have felt that the eastern states cannot be made exclusively the vic- tims of a capricious and impassioned policy. They will have seen that the great and essential interests of the people are common to the south and to the east. They will realise the fatal errors of a system which seeks revenge for commercial injuries in the sacrifice of commerce, and aggra- vates by needless wars, to an immeasurable extent, the injuries it professes to redress. They may discard the influence of visionary theorists, and recognise the benefits of a practical policy. Indications of this desirable revolution of oynnion among our brethren in those states, are already manifested. While a hope remains of its ultimate completion, its pro- gress should not be retarded or stopped by exciting fears which must check these favorable tendencies, and frustrate the efforts of the wisest and best men in those states, to accelerate this propitious change. Finally, if the Union be destined to dissolution, by reason of the multi- plied abuses of administrations, it should, if possible, be the work of peace- able times, and deliberate consent. Some new form of confederacy should be substituted among those states, which shall intend to maintain a federal relatiosterous, than to make a government for the whole union, and yet leave its powers sub- ject, not to one interpretation, but to thirteen or twenty-four interpreta- tions? Instead of one tribunal, established by all, responsible to all, with power to decide for all — shall constitutional questions be left to four and twenty popular bodies, each at liberty, too, to give a new constniction on every new election of its own members 1 Would any tiling, with such a principle in it, or rather with such a destitution of all principle, be fit to be called, a government ? No, sir. It should not be 116 MR. WEBSTER'S SPEECH. denominated a constitution. It should be called, rather, a collection of topics for everlasting controversy ; heads of debate for a disputatious people. It would not be a government. It would not be adequate to any good, nor fit for any country to live under. To avoid all possi- bility of being misunderstood, allow me to repeat again in the fullest manner, that I claim no powers for the government by forced or un- fair construction. I admit that it is a government of strictly limited powers; of enumerated, specified, and particularised powers; and that whatsoever is not granted, is withheld. But notwithstanding all this, and however the grant of powers may be expressed, its limit and extent may yet in some cases, admit of doubt ; and the general government would be good for nothing, it would be incapable of long- existing, if some mode had not been provided, in which those doubts, as they should arise, might be peaceably, but authoritatively, solved. Mr. President, I have thus stated the reasons of my dissent to the doctrines which have been advanced and maintained. I am conscious of having detained you and the Senate too long. I was drawn into the debate, with no previous deliberation, such as is suited to the discussion of so grave and important a subject. But it is a subject of which my heart is full, and I have not been willing to suppress the utterance of its spontaneous sentiments. I cannot even now persuade myself to relinquish it, without expressing, once more, my deep conviction, that since it respects nothing less than the union of the states, it is of most vital and essential importance to the public happiness. I profess, sir, in my career, hitherto, to have kept steadily in view the prosperity and honor of the whole country, and the preservation of our Federal Union. It is to that Union we owe our safety at home, and our consideration and dignity abroad. It is to that Union that we are chiefly indebted to whatever makes us most proud of our countiy. That Union we reached only by the discipline of our virtues in the severe school of adversity. It had its origin in the necessities of disordered finance, prostrate com- merce, and ruined credit. Under its benign influences, these great interests immediately awoke, as from the dead, and sprang forth with newness of life. Every year of its duration has teemed with fresh proofs of its utility and its blessings ; and, although our territory has stretched out wider and wider, and our population spread farther and farther, they have not outrun its protection or its benefits. It has been to us all a copious fountain of national, social, and personal happiness. I have not allowed myself, sir, to look beyond the Union, to see what might be hidden in the dark recess behind. I have not coolly weighed the chances of preserving liberty when the bonds that unite us together shall be broken asunder. I have not accustomed myself to hang over the precipice of disunion, to see whether, with my short sight, I can fathom the depth of the abyss below ; nor could I regard him as a safe counsellor in the affairs of this government, whose thoughts should be mainly bent on considering, not how the Union should be best preserved, but how tolerable might be the condition of the people when it shall be broken up and destroyed. While the Union lasts, we have hi^h, exciting, gratifying prospects spread out before us, for us and our children. Be- yond that I seek not to penetrate the veil. God grant that, in my day at least, that curtain may not rise. God grant that on my vision never may be opened what lies behind. When my eyes shall be turned to behold, for the last time, the sun in Heaven, may I not see him shining SOUTH CAROLINA ORDINANCE. 117 on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious Union ; on states dissevered, discordant, belligerent ; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood ! Let their last feeble and lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured, bearing for its motto no such miserable interrogatory as, WAat is all this toorth ? nor those other words of delusion and folly. Liberty first and Union afterwards — but every where, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing on all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole Heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every true American heart — " Liberty and Union, now and for ever, one and inseparable !" SOUTH CAROLINA ORDINANCE. PASSED IN CONVENTION, AT COLUMBIA, NOV. 24, 1832. An Ordinance to nullify certain acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be the laws giving duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities. Whereas the Congress of the United States, by various acts purport- ing to be acts laying duties and imposts on foreign imports, but in re- ality intended for the protection of domestic manufactures, and the giv- ing of bounties to classes and individuals engaged in particular employ- ment, at the expense and to the injury and oppression of other classes and individuals, and by wholly exempting from taxation certain fo- reign commodities, such as are not produced or manufactured in the United States, to aiford a pretext for imposing higher and excessive duties on articles similar to those intended to be protected, hath exceed- ed its just powers imder the constitution, which confers on it no autho- rity to aiford such protection, and hath violated the true meaning and intent of the constitution, which provides for equality in imposing the burdens of taxation upon the several states and portions of the confe- deracy. And whereas the said Congress, exceeding its just power to impose taxes and collect revenue for the purpose of effecting and ac- complishing, hath raised and collected unnecessary revenues, for ob- jects unauthorized by the constitution : We, therefore, the people of the state of Carolina in convention as- sembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, 118 SOUTH CAROLINA ORDINANCE. that the' several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importaitons of the United States, and more especially an act enti- tled " an act in alteration of the several acts imposing duties on im- ports," approved on the nineteenth day of May, one thousand eight hundred and twenty eight, and also an act entitled " an act to alter and amend the several acts imposing duties on imports," approved on the fourteenth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and thirty two, are unauthorized by the constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning thereof, and are null and void, and no law, now binding upon this state, its officers or citizens : and all promises, contracts, and obligations, made or entered into, with the purpose to secure the duties imposed by said acts, and all judicial proceedings which shall be here- after had in affirmance thereof, are, and shall be, held utterly null and void. And it is further ordained that it shall not be lawful for any of the constituted authorities, whether of this State or of the United States, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the said acts within the li- mits of this state ; but that it shall be the duty of the legislature to adopt such acts as may be necessary to give full effect to this Ordi- nance, and to prevent the enforcement and arrest the operation of the said acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States within the limits of this state, from and after the first day of February next, and the duty of all other constituted authorities, and of all persons re- siding or being within the limits of this state, and they are hereby re- quired and enjoined to obey and give effect to this ordinance, and such acts and measures of the legislature as may be passed or adopted in obedience thereto. And it is further ordained, that in no case of law or equity, decided in the court of this state, wherein shall be drawn in question the autho- rity of this ordinance, or the validity of such act or acts of legislature as may be passed for the purpose of gi vino; effect thereto, or the validity of tlie aforesaid acts of Congress, imposing duties, shall any appeal be taken, or allowed, to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be permitted or allowed for that pui-pose ; and if any such appeal shall be attempted to be taken, the courts of this state shall proceed to execute and enforce their judgments, according to the laws and usages of the state, without reference to such attempted appeal ; and the persons attempting to take such appeal may be dealt with for a contempt of the court. And be it further enacted, that all persons now holding any office of honor, profit or trust, civil or military, under this state, shall within such time as the legislature may prescribe, take, in such manner as the legislature may direct, an oath well and truly to obey, execute and en- force this ordinance, and such act or acts of the legislature as may be passed in pursuance thereof, according to the true intent and meaning of the same ; and on the neglect or omission of any such person or per- sons so to'do, his or their office or offices, shall be forthwith vacated, and shaU be filled up, as if such person or persons were dead or had resign- ed, and no person hereafter elected to any office of honor, profit or trust, civil or military, shall, until the legislature shall otherwise provide and direct, enter on the execution of his office, or be in any respect compe- tent to discharge the duties thereof, until he shall, in like manner, have PROTEST OP THE S. C. UNION PARTY. 119 taken a similar oath; and no juror shall be impannelled in any of the courts of this state, in any cause in which shall be in question this ordi- nance, or any act of the legislature passed in pursuance thereof, unless he shall first, in addition to the usual oath, have taken an oath, that he will well and truly obey, execute and enforce this ordinance, and such act or acts of the legislature, as may be passed to carry the same into operation and eiFect, according to the true intent and meaning thereof. And we, the people of South Carolina, to the end, that it may be fully understood by the government of the United States, and the people of the co-states, that we are determined to maintain this, our ordinance and declaration at every hazard, do further declare that we will not submit to the application of force, on the part of the Federal Govern- ment to reduce this state to obedience ; but that we will consider the passage by Congress, of any act authorizing the employment of any military or naval force against the state of South Carolina, her consti- tuted authorities or citizens, or any act abolishing or closing the ports of this state or any of them, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress and egress of vessels, to and from the said ports, or any other act on the part of the Federal Government to coerce the state, shut up her ports, destroy her commerce, or so enforce the acts hereby declared to be null and void, otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union : and that the people of this state will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their politi- cal connexion with the people of other states, and will forthw'ith pro- ceed to organize a separate government, and do all other acts and things, which sovereign and independent states may of right do. SOUTH CAROLINA REMONSTRANCE AND PROTEST OF THE UNION AND STATE RIGHTS PARTY. The Union and State Rights Party of South Carolina do remon- strate and solemnly protest against the Ordinance passed by the State Convention on the twenty fourth day of November last. 1st. Because the people of South Carolina elected delegates to the said convention under the solemn assurance that these delegates would do no more than devise a peaceable and constitutional remedy for the evils of the protective tariff, without endangering the Union of these states. Instead of which that convention has passed an Ordinance in direct violation of all these pledges. 120 PROTEST OF THE S. C. UNION PARTY. 2nd. Because the said Ordinance has insiduously assailed one of the inalienable rights of n^an, by endeavoring to enslave all freedom of conscience by the tyrannical engine of power — a Test Oath. 3rd. Because it has disfranchised and proscribed nearly one half of the Freeman of South Carolina/for an honest difference of opinion by declaring that those whose consciences will not permit them to take the test oath shall be deprived of every office, civil and military. 4th. Because it has trampled under foot the great principles of Liberty secured to the citizen by the constitution of this state in depriv- ing the freemen of this country of the right to an impartial trial by jury, thereby violating that clause of the constitution intended to be per- petual, which declares that " The trial by jury as heretofore used in this state, and the liberty of the press, shall be forever inviolably pre- served. 5th. Because it has violated the indepenidence guaranteed to the" Judiciary, by enacting that the judges shall take a revolting test oath, or be wchiixsin\Y femoved from office, thereby depriving them of the pri- vilege of trial by impeachment, which, by the constitution of the state, is intended to be secured to every civil officer. 6th. Because the Ordinance has directly violated the Constitution of the United States, which gives authority to Congress to collect revenue, in forbidding the collection of any revenue within flie limits of South Ca- rolina. 7th. Because it has violated the same Constitution, in that provision of it which declares that no preference shall be given to one port over any other in the United States by enacting that goods shall be imported into the ports of South CaroUna without paying any duties. 8tn. Because it violates the same Constitution, and tramples upon the RIGHTS of the citizen by denying him the privilege of appeal in cases in Law and Equity arising under the Constitution and Laws of the Union. 9th. Because it has virtually destroyed the Union by carefully pre- venting the General Government from enforcing their laws through the civil tribunals of the country, and then enacting that if that Government should pursue any other mode to enforce them, then this State shall be no longer a member of the Union. 10th. Because the tyranny and oppression inflicted by this Ordi- nance are of a character so revolting, and the effects anticipated from it so ruinous, that tlie commerce and credit of the state are already sen- sibly affected, and will soon he prostrated ; and its peaceable and mdus- trious citizens are driven from their homes to seek ti'anquility in some other state. The Union Party of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, do further remonstrate and solemnly protest against the project of a Stand- ing Army, proposed by the party m power, as dangerous to the liberties of the people. They would respectfully ask their fellow citizens, whe- ther such an army must not be confessedly inadequate to protect the Nullification Party against the people of the rest of the United States, should they resolve to coerce them. What other object, therefore, can such a force accomplish than to serve as an instrument of tyranny over their fellow citizens. This Convention doth further protest against any effort, by a system of Conscription, to force the citizens of~the state from their firesides and homes, to take up armSj and incur the pains and penalties of trea- PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. 121 son^ in support of a doctrine which the people were assured was pacific in its nature and utterly inconsistent with any idea of danger to the Constitution or the Union. Solemnly remonstrating, as they hereby do, against the above men- tioned grievances, the Union Party would further express their firm DETERMINATION to maintain the principles which have ever been the rule of their conduct ; and while, on the one hand, they will continue their unfaltering opposition to the protective tariffs, so on the other they will not be driven from the enjoyment of these inalienable rights which, by inheritance, belong to every American citizen. Disclaiming, there- fore, all intention of lawless or insurrectionary violence, they hereby proclaim their determination to protect their rights by all legal and constitutional means, and that in doing so they will continue to main- tain the character of peacable citizens, unless compelled to throw it aside by intolerable oppression. THOMAS TAYLOR, President. Henry Middleton, David Johnson, Richard I. Manning, Starling Tucket, [Signed, in addition, by' nearly one hundred and eighty members.] Done at Columbia, on Friday, the 14th day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirty- two, and in the fifty-seventJi year of the Independence of the United States of America. Attest : jlMrEL'^KTSKT,! ^-'--"Z contention. Vice Presidents. PROCLAMATION BY ANDREW JACKSON, president op the united states. Whereas, a Convention assembled in the state of South Carolina, have passed an Ordinance by which they declare, " That the several acts and parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of foreign commodities, and now having uctual operation and effect within the United States, and more especially," two acts for the same purposes, 11 122 PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. passed on the 29th of May, 1828, and on the 14th of July, 1832, "are unauthorised by tlie Constitution of the United States, and violate the true meaning and intent thereof, and are null and void, and no law," nor binding on tlie citizens of tliat state or its officers : and by the said Ordinance, it is further declared to be unlawful for any of the constituted autliorities of tlie state, or of the United States, to enforce tlie payment of the duties imposed by tlie said acts within tlie same state, and that it is the duty of tlie legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to give full effect to tlie said Ordinance. And whereas, by the said Ordinance it is further ordained, that in no case of law or equity, decided in the courts of tlie said state, wherein sheJl be drawn in question the validity of the said Ordinance, or of the acts of the legislature that may be passed to give it effect, or of the said laws of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be per- mitted or allowed for that purpose, and that any person attempting to take such appeal shall be punished as for a contempt of court : And, finally, the said ordinance declares, tliat the people of South Carolina will maintain the said Ordinance at every hazard ; and that they will consider tlie passage of any act by Congress abolishing or closing tlie ports of the said state, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress or egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the federal government to coerce the state, shut up jier ports, destroy or harrass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts otherwise than through the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer continuance of South Carolina in the Union ; and that the people of the said state will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection witli the people of the other states, and will forthwith proceed to organize a sepa- rate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign and independent states may of right do ; And whereas, the said Ordinance prescribes to the people of South Carolina a course of conduct in direct violation of their duty as citizens of the United States, contrary to the laws of their country, subversive of its constitution, and having for its object the destruction of the Union — that Union which, coeval with our political existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite them than those of patriotism and a com- mon cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a glorious independence — that sacred Union, hitherto inviolate, which, perfected by our happy Constitution, has brought us, by the favor of heaven, to a state of pros- perity at home, and high consideration abroad, rarely, if ever, equalled m tlie history of nations. To preserve this bond of our political exist- ence from destruction, to maintain inviolate this state of national honor and prosperity, and to justify the confidence my fellow citizens have reposed in me, I, Andrew Jackson, President of the United States, have thought proper to issue this my PROCLAMlATION, stating my views of the Constitution and laws applicable to the measures adopted by the Convention of South Carolina, and to the reasons they have^put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which duty will require me to pursue, and appealing to the understanding and patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must inevitably result from an observance of the dictates of the Convention. Strict duty would require of mo nothing more than the exercise of those PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. 123 powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be invested, for preserving the peace of the Union and for the execution of the laws. But the impos- ing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case, by clothing itself with state authority and the deep interest which the people of the United States must all feel in preventing a resort to stronger measures, while there is a hope that any will be yielded to reasoning and remonstance, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify, a full exposition to South Carolina and the nation of the views I entertain on this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation of the course which my sense of duty will require me to pursue. The Ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting acts which are plainly unconstitutional and too oppressive to be endured ; but on the strange position that any one state may not only declare an Act of Congress void, but prohibit its execution — that they may do this con- sistently with the Constitution — that the true construction of that instru- ment permits a state to retain its place in the Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may choose to consider as con- stitutional. It is true, they add, that to justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably, contrary to the Constitution ; but it is evi- dent, that to give the right of resisting laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of resisting all laws. For, as by the theory, there is no appeal, the reasons alleged by the state, good or bad, must prevail. If it should be said that pubUc opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of this power, it may be asked why is it not deemed a sufficient guard against the passage of an unconstitutional Act by Congress. There is, however, a restraint in this last case, which makes the assumed power of a state more indefensible, and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from the unconstituional Act passed by Congress — one to the Judiciary, the other to the People, and the States. There is no appeals from the State decision in theory, and the practical illustration shows that the courts are closed against an application to review it, both judges and jurors being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on this subject is superfluous when our social compact in express terms de- clares that the laws of the United States, its Constitution and treaties made under it, are the supreme law of the land — and for greater caution adds, " that the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." And it may be asserted without fear of refutation, that no Federative Grovemment could exist without a similar provision. Look for a moment to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws un- constitutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their collec- tion in every other port, and no revenue could be collected any where, for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat, that an unconsti- tutional law is no law, so long as the question of its legality is to be decid- ed by the state itself; for] every law operating injuriously upon any local interest will be perhaps thought and certainly represented, as unconstitu- tional, and, as has been shown, there is no appeal. If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law of Pennsylvania, the embargo and non-intercourse law in the Eastern States, the carriage tax in Virginia, were all deemed unconstitutional and were more equal in 124 PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. their operation than any of the laws now complained of; but fortunate- ly none of those states discovered that they had tlie right now claimed by Soutli Carolina. The war into which we were forced, to support the dignity of the nation and the rights of our citizens, might have ended in defeat and disgrace instead of victory and honor, if the states who supposed it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure had thought they possessed the right of nullifying tlie act by which it was declared, and denying supplies for its prosecution. Hardly and unequally as those measures bore upon several members of tlie Union, to the legisla- tures of none did this efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important feature in our consti- tution was reserved to the present day. To the statesmen of South Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens of that state will uniformly fall 3ie evils of reducing it to practice. If the doctrine of a state veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our constitution- al history will also afford abimdant proof that it would have been repu- diated with indignation had it been proposed to form a feature in our government. In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very early considered ourselves as connected by common interest with eacn other. Leagues were formed for common defence, and before the De- claration of Independence we w^ere known in our aggregate character AS THE United Colonies of America. That decisive and important step was taken jointly. We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts, and when tlie terms of our confederation were re- duced to form, it was in that of a solemn league of several states, by which had agreed that they would collectively form one nation for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic concerns and all foreign relations. In the instrument forming that union, is found an article which declares that " every state shall abide by tne determinations of Congress on all questions which by that confederation should be sub- mitted to them." Under the confederation, then, no state could legally annul a decision of the Congress, or refuse to submit to its execution ; but no provision was made to enforce these decisions. Congress made requisitions but they were not complied with. The government could not operate on individuals. They had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue. But the defects of the confederation need not be detailed. Under its operation we could scarcely be called a nation. We had neitlier pros- perity at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things could not be endured, and our present happy constitution was formed, but formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed for impor- tant objects that are announced in the preamble made in the name, and by the authority of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed, and whose conventions approved it. The most important among these objects, that which is placed first in rank, on which all the others rest, is ^Ho form a more perfect Union." Now, is it possible that even if there were no express provision giving supremacy to the constitution and laws of the United States over those of the states — can it be conceived, that an instrument made for the purpose of ^^ forming a more perfect Union" thsin ihoX of the confederation, could be so con- fttructed by the assembled wisdom of our country as to substiKite for PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. 125 that confederation a form of gjovemment, dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party spirit of a state, or of a prevailing faction in a state 1 Every man of plain, unsophisticated understanding, who hears the question, will give such an answer as will preserve the union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated to destroy it. I consider then the power to annul a law of ths United States, as- sumed by one state, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter op the Consti- tution, unauthorised by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive of the GREAT object FOR WHICH IT WAS FORMED. After this general view of the leading principle, we must examine the particular application of it which is made in the Ordinance. The preamble rests its justification on these grounds : — It assumes a fact, that the obnoxious laws, although they purport to be laws for rais- ing revenue, were in reality intended for the protection of manufactures, which purpose it asserts to be unconstitutional ; and that the operation of these laws is unequal ; that the amount raised by them is greater than is required by the wants of the government ; and, finally, that the pro- ceeds are to be applied to objects anauthorized by the constitution. These are the only causes alleged to justify an open opposition to the laws of the country, and a threat of seceding from the union, if any attempt should be made to enforce them. The first virtually acknow- ledges, that the law in question was passed under a power expressly given by the constitution, to lay and collect imposts, but its constitution- ality is drawn in question from the motives of those who passed it. However apparent this purpose may be in the present case, nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an unconstitutional purpose, entertained by the members who assent to a law enacted under a constitutional power shall make that law void ; for how is that purpose to be ascertained 1 Who is to make the scrutiny 1 How often may bad purposes be falsely imputed — in how many cases are they concealed by false profossions — in how many is no declaration of motive made % Admit this doctrine, and you give to the states an uncontrolled right to decide, and every law may be annulled under this pretext. If, therefore, the absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted that a state may annul an unconstitutional law, or one that it deems such, it will not apply to the present case. The next objection is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This objection may be made with truth, to every law that has been or can be passed. The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that would operate with perfect equality. If the unequal ope- ration of a law makes it unconstitutional, and if all laws of tliat de- scription may be abrogated by any state for that cause, then indeed is the Federed Constitution unworthy of the slightest eflfort for its preserva- tion. We have hitherto relied on it as the perpetual bond of our union. We have received it as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation. We have trusted to it as the sheet anchor of our safety in the stormy times of conflict with a foreign or domestic foe. We have looked to it with sacred awe, as to the palladium of our liberties, and with all the solemnities of religion have pledged to each other our lives and fortunes here, and our hopes of happmess hereafter, in its defence and support. 11* 126 PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. Were we mistaken, my coimtrymen, in attaching this importance to the constitiuioii of our country 1 Was our devotion paid to the wretched, incafficient, clumsy contrivance, which this new doctrine would make it 1 Did we pledge ourselves to tne support of an airy nothing, a bubble that must be blown away by the first breath of disaffection 1 Was this self-destroying, visionary, theory, tlie work of the profound statesman, the exaltedpatriots, to whom the task of constitutional reform was en- trusted '? Did the name of Washington sanction, did the states delibe- rately ratify sucli an anomaly in the history of fundamental legislation 1 No. We were not mistaken. The letter of this great instrument is free from this radical fault; its language directly contradicts the impu- tation ; its spirit — its evident intent contradicts it. No, we do not err ! Our constitution does not contain the absurdity of giving power to make laws, and another power to resist them. The sages whose memory will always be reverenced, have given us a practical, and as they hoped a permanent constitutional compact. The father of his contry did not affix his revered name to so palpable an absurdity. Nor did the states, when they severally ratified it, do so under the impression that a veto on the laws of the United States was reserved to them, or that they could exercise it by implication. Search the debates in all their conventions — examine the speeches of the most zealous opposers of federal autho- rity — look at the amendments that were proposed — ^they are all silent — not a syllable uttered, not a vote given, not a motion made to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws of the Union over those of the states — or to show that implication, as is now contended, could defeat it. No — we have not erred ! The constitution is still the object of our union, our defence in danger, the source of our prosperity in peace. It shall descend, as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical con- struction, to our posterity, and the sacrifices of local interest, of state prejudices, of personal animosities, that were made to bring it into ex- istence, will again be patriotically offered for its support. The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these laws are that the sums intended to be raised by them, are greater than are required, and that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally employed. The constitution has given expressly to Congress the right of raising revenue and of determining the sum the public exigences will require. The states have no control over the exercise of this right, other than that which results from the power of changing the representatives who abuse it, and thus procure redress. Congress may undoubtedly abuse this discretionary power, but the same may be said of others with which they are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The constitution has given it to the representative of all the people checked by the representatives of the states, and by the executive power. The &5uth Carolina construction gives it to the legislature or the conven- tion of a single state, where neither the people of the different states, nor the states in their separate capacity, nor the Chief Magistrate elect- ed by the people have any representation. Which is the most discreet disposition of the power 1 I do not ask you, fellow citizens, which is the constitutional disposition — ^that instrument speaks a language not to be misunderstood. But if you were assembled in general convention, which would you think the safest depository of this discreiionary pow- er in the last resort 1 Would you add a clause giving it to each of the states, or would you sanction the wise provisions already made by your PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. 127 constitution 1 If this should be the result of your deliberations when providing for the future, are you, can you be ready to risk all that you hold dear to establish, for a temporary and local purpose, that which you must acknowledge to be destructive and even absurd as a general provision*? Carry out the consequences of this right vested in the different states, and you must perceive that the crisis your conduct pre- sents at this day would recur whenever any law of the United States displeased any of the states, and that we should soon cease to be a nation. The Ordinance, with the same knowledge of the future tliat cheirac- terizes a former objection, tells you that the proceeds of the tax will be unconstitutionally applied. If this could be ascertained with certainty, the objection would, with more propriety, be reserved for the law so applying the proceeds, but surely cannot be urged against the laws levymg the duty. These are the allegations contained in the Ordinance. Examine them seriously, my fellow-citizens — judge for yourselves. I appeal to you to determine whether they are so clear, so convincing, as to leave no doubt of their correctness : and even if you should come to this conclusion, how far they justify the reckless, destructive course, which you are directed to pursue. Review these objections, and the conclusions drawn from them once more. What are they 1 Every law then, for raising revenue, ac- cording to the South Carolina Ordinance may be rightfully annulled, unless it be so framed as no law ever will or can be framed. Congress have aright to pass laws for raising revenue, and each state has a right to oppose their execution — two rights directly opposed to each other ; and yet is this absurdity supposed to be contained in an instrument drawn for the express purpose of avoiding collisions between the states and the general government, by an assembly of the most enlightened statesmen and purest patriots ever embodied for a similar purpose. In vain have these sages declared that Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises — in vain have they provided that they shall have power to pass laws which shall be necessary and proper to carry those powers into execution ; that those laws and that Constitution shall be the " supreme law of the land ; and that the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding." In vain have the people of the several states solemnly sanctioned these provisions, made them their paramount laws, and individually sworn to support them whenever they were called on to execute any office. Vain provisions ! ineffectual restric- tions ! vile profanation of oaths ! miserable mockery of legislation ! if a bare majority of the voters in any one state may, on a real or supposed knowledfge of the intent with which a law has been passed, declare them- selves free from its operation — say here it ^ves too little, there too much, and operates unequally— here it suffers articles to be free that ought to be taxed, there it taxes those that ought to be free — in this case the proceeds are intended to be applied to purposes which we do not approve ; in that the amount raised is more than is wanted. Congress, it is true, are invested by the Constitution with the right of deciding these questions according to their sound discretion. Congress is composed of the repre- sentatives of all the states, and of all thp people of all the states ; but W£, part of the people of one state, to whom the Constitution has given no power on the subject, from whom it has expressly taken it away — we, who have solemnly agreed that this Constitution shall be our law — we. 128 PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. most of whom have sworn to support it — we^ now abrogate this law, and swear, and force others to swear, that it shall not be obeyed — and we do this, not because Congress have no right to pass such laws ; this we do not allege; but because they have passed them with improper views. They are unconstitutonal from the motives of those who passed them, which we can never with certainty know, from their unequal operation ; although it is impossible, from the nature of things, that they should be equal, and from the disposition which we presume may be made of their proceeds, although that disposition has not been declared. This is the plain meaning of the Ordinance in relation to laws which it abrogates for alleged unconstitutionality. But it does not stop there. It repeals, in e?fpress terms, an important part of the Constitution itself, and of laws passed to give it effect, which have never been alleged to be unconstitu- tional. The Constitution declares that the judicial powers of the United States extend to cases arising under the laws of the United States, and that such laws, the Constitution, and treaties shall be paramount to the state constitutions and laws. The judiciary act prescribes the mode by which the case may be brought before a court of the United States, by appeal, when a state tribunal shall decide against this provision of the Constitution. The Ordinance declares there shall be no appeal ; makes the state law paramount to the Constitution and laws of the United States ; forces judges and jurors to swear that they will disregard their provisions ; and even makes it penal in a suitor to attempt relief by appeal. It further declares that it shall not be lawful for the authorities of the United States, or of that state, to enforce the payment of duties imposed by the revenue laws within its limits. Here is a law of the United States, not even pretended to be unconsti- tutional, repealed by the authority of a small majority of the voters of a single state. Here is a provision of the Constitution which is solemnly abrogated by the same authority. On such expositions and reasonings the Ordinance grounds not only an assertion of the right to annul the laws of which it complains, but to enforce it by a threat of seceding from the Union, if any attempt is made to execute them. This right to secede is deduced from the nature of the Constitution, which, they say, is a compact between sovereign states who have preserved their whole sovereignty, and, therefore, are subject to no supenor : that, because they made the compact, they can break it when, in their opinion, it has been departed from by the other states. Fallacious as this course of reasoning is, it enlists state pride, and finds advocates in the honest pr^udices of those who have not studied the nature of our government sufficiently to see the radical error on which it rests. The^ people of the United States formed the Constitution, acting through the state legislatures in making the compact, to meet and discuss its provisions, and acting in separate conventions when they ratified those provisions ; but the terms used in its construction, show it to be a govern- ment in which the people of all the states collectively are represented. We are one people in the choice of the President and Vice President. Here the states have no other agency than to direct the mode in which the votes shall be given. The candidates having the majority of all the votes are chosen. The electors of a majority of states may have given their votes for one candidate, and yet another may be chosen. The people then, and not the states, are represented in the executive branch. PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. 129 In the House of Representatives there is this diflference, that the people of one state do not, as in the case of President and Vice President, all vote for the same officers. The people of all the states do not vote for all the members, each state electing only its own representatives. But this creates no material distinction. When chosen, they are all representa- tives of the United States, not representatives of the particular state from which they come. They are paid by the United States, not by the state ; nor are they accountable to it for any act done in the performance of their legislative functions ; and, however they may in practice, as it is their duty to do, consult and prefer the interests of their particular constituents when they come in conflict with any other partial or local interest, yet it is their first and highest duty, as representatives of the United States, to promote the general good. The Constitution of the United States, then, forms a government^ not a league ; and whether it be formed by compact between the states, or in any other manner, its character is the same. It is a government in which all the people are represented, which operates directly on the people indi- vidually, not upon the states : they retained all the power they did not grant. But each state having expressly parted with so many powers as to constitute, jointly with the other states, a single nation, cannot, firom that period, possess any right to secede, because such secession does not break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation, and any injury to that unity is not only a breach which would result from the contravention of a compact, but it is an offence against the whole Union. To say that any state may at pleasure secede from the Union, is to say that the United States are not a nation : because it would be a solecism to contend that any part of a nation might dissolve its connexion with the other parts, to their injury or ruin, without committing any offence. Secession, like any other revolutionary act, may be morally justified by the extremity of oppression ; butt c call it a constitutional right is confounding the meaning of terms, and can only be done through gross error, or to deceive those who are willing to assert a right, but would pause before they made a revolution, or incur the penalties consequent on a failure. Because the Union was formed by compact, it is said the parties to that compact may, when they feel themselves aggrieved, depart from it ; but it is precisely because it is a compact that they cannot. A compact is an agreement or binding obligation. It may, by its terms, have a sanction or penalty for its breach, or it may not. If it contains no sanction, it may be broken with no other consequence than moral guilt : if it have a sanc- tion, then the breach incurs the designated or implied penalty. A league^ between independent nations, generally, has no sanction other than a moral one ; or, if it should contain a penalty, as there is no common supe- rior, it cannot be enforced. A government, on the contrary, always has a sanction, express or implied ; and, in our case, it is both necessarily implied and expressly given. An attempt, by force of arms, to destroy a govern- ment, is an offence, by whatever means the constitutional compact may have been formed ; and such government has the right, by the law of self- defence, to pass acts for punishing the offender, unless that right is modi- fied, restrained, or resumed, by the constitutional act. In our system, although it is modified in the case of treason, yet authority is expressly ^ven to pass all laws necessary to carry its powers into effect, and under this grant provision has been made for punishing acts which obstruct tb© due administration of the laws. 130 PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. It would seem superfluous to add any thing to show the nature of that union which connects us ; but as erroneous opinions on this subject are the foundation of doctrines the most destmctive to our peace, I must give some furtlier development to my views on this subject. No one, fellow citizens, has a higher reverence for the reserved right of the states, than the magistrate who now addresses you. No one would make greater personal sacrifices, or oflicial exertions, to defend them from violation ; but equal care must be taken to prevent, on their part, an improper inter- ference with, or resumption of, the rights they have vested in the na- tion. The line has not been so distinctly drawn as to avoid doubts, in some cases, of the exercise of power. Men of the best intentions and .soundest views may differ in their construction of some parts of the Constitution : but there are others on which dispassionate reflection can leave no doubt. Of this natiue appears to be the assumed right of secession. It rests, as we have seen, on the alledged undivided sove- reignty of the states, and on their having formed, in this sovereign capacity, a compact which is called the Constitution, from which, be- cause they made it, they have a right to secede. Both of these posi- tions are erroneous, and some of the arguments to prove them so nave been anticipated. The states severally have not retained their entire sovereignty. It has been shown that in becoming parts of a nation, not members of a league, they surrendered many of their essential parts of sovereignty. The right to make treaties — declare war — levy taxes — exercise exclu- sive judicial and legislative powers, were all of them functions of sove- reign power. The states, then, for all these important purposes, were no longer sovereign. The allegiance of their citizens was transferred, in the first instance, to the government of the United States — they became American citizens, and owed obedience to the Constitution of the United States, and to laws made in conformity witli the powers it vested in Congress. This last position has not been, and cannot be denied. How then can that state be said to be sovereign and inde- pendent, whose citizens owe obedience to laws not made by it, and whose magistrates are sworn to disregard those laws, when they come in conflict with those passed by another'? What shows conclusively that the states cannot be said to have reserved an undivided sovereignty is, that they expressly ceded the right to punish treason — not treason against their separate power — ^but treason against the United States. Treason is an offence against sovereignty y and sovereignty must reside with the power to punisn it. But the reserved rights of the states are not less sacred, because they have, for their common interest, made the general government the depositoiy of tliese powers. The unity of our political character (as has been shown for another purpose) commenced with its very existence. Under the royal government we had no sepa- rate character — our opposition to its oppressions began as United Colo- nies. We were the United States under the confederation, and the name was perpetuated and the Union rendered more perfect by the Federal Constitution. In none of these stages did we consider ourselves in any other light than as forming one nation. Treaties and alliances were made in the name of all. Troops were raised for the joint defence. — How then, with all these proofs that under all changes of our position we had, for designated purposes and with defined powers, created na- tional governments — how is it, that the most perfect of these several PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. 131 modes of Union, should now be considered as a mere league that may be dissolved at pleasure'? It is from an abuse of terms. Compact is used as synonomous with league, althought the true term is not employ- ed because it would at once show the fallacy of the reasoning. It would not do to say that our constitution was only a league, but it is labored to prove it a compact (which in one sense it is) and then to argue that as a league is a compact, every compact between nations must of course be a league, and that from such an engagement every sovereign power has a right to secede. But it has been shown that in this sense the states are not sovereign, and that even if they were, and the national constitution had been formed by compact, there would be no right in any one state to exonerate itself from its obligations. So obvious are the reasons which forbid this secession, that it is ne- cessary only to allude to them. The Union was fonned for the benefit of all. It was produced by mutual sacrifices of interests and opinions. Can those sacrifices be recalled 1 Can tlie states, who magnanimously surrendered their title to the territories of the west, recal the grant'? Will the inhabitants of the inland states agree to pay the duties that may be imposed without their assent by those on the Atlantic or the Gulf, for their own benefit '? Shall there be a free port in one state and onerous duties in an other *? No one believes that any right exists in a single state to involve all the others in these and countless other evils contrary to engagements solemnly made. Eveiy one must see that the other states, in self defence, must oppose it at all hazards. These are the alternatives that are presented by the convention : A repeal of all the acts for raising revenue, leaving the government with- out the means of support ; or an acquiescence in the dissolution of our Union by the secession of one of its members. When the first was proposed, it was known that it could not be listened to for a moment. It was known if force was applied to oppose the execution of the laws that it must be repelled by force — that Congress could not, without in- volving itself in disgrace and the country in ruin, accede to the proposi- tion; and yet if this is not done in a given day, or if any attempt is made to execute the laws, the state is, by the ordinance, declared to be out of the Union. The majority of a convention assembled for the purpose, have dictated these terms, or rather this rejection of all terms, in the name of the peo- ple of South Carolina. It is true that the governor of the state speaks of the submission of their grievances to a convention of all the states ; which he says they "sincerely and anxiously seek and desire." Yet this obvi- ous and constitutional mode of obtaining the sense of the other states on the construction of the federal compact, and amending it, if necesrary, has never been attempted by those who have urged the state on to this destructive measure. The state might have proposed the call for a gen- eral convention of the other states ; and Congress, if a sufficient number of them concurred, must have called it. But the first magistrate of South Carolina, when he expressed a hope that, " on a review by Congress and the functionaries of the general government of the merits of the contro- versy," such a convention will be accorded to them, must have known that neither Congress nor any functionary of the general government has authority to call such a convention, unless it be demanded by two thirds of the states. This suggestion, then, is another instance of the reckless inattention to the provisions of the constitution with which this crisis has 132 PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. been madly hurried on ; or of the attempt to persuade the people that a constitutional remedy has been soutrht and refused. If the legislature of South Carolina " anxiously desires" a general convention to consider their complaints, why have they not made application for it in the way the con- stitution points out. The assertion that they " earnestly seek" it, is com- pletely^ negatived by the omission. This, then, is the position in which we stand. A small majority of the citizens of one state in the Union have elected delegates to a state convention : that convention has ordained that all the revenue laws of the United States must be repealed, or that they are no longer a mem- ber of the Union. The gavernor of that state has recommended to the legislature tlie raising of an army to carry the secession into effect, and that he may be empowered to give clearances to vessels in the name of the state. No act of violent opposition to the laws has yet been com- mitted, but such a state of things is hourly apprehended, and it is the intent of this instrument to proclaim not only that the duty imposed on me by the constitution " to take care that the laws be faitlifully execut- ed," shall be performed to the extent of the powers already vested in me by law, or of such others as the wisdom of Congress shall devise and entrust to me for that purpose ; but to warn the citizens of South Caro- lina, who have been deluded into an opposition to the laws, of the dan- ger they will incur by obedience to the illegal and disorganizing ordi- nance of the convention — to exhort those who have refused to support it to persevere in their determination to uphold the constitution and laws of their country — and to point out to all, the perilous situation into which the good people of that state have been led — and tliat the course they are urged to pursue is one of ruin and disgrace to the very state whose rights they affect to support. Fellow citizens of my native state ! — let me not only admonish you, as the first magistrate of our common country, not to incur the penalty of its laws, but use the influence that a father would over his children whom he saw rushing to certain ruin. In that paternal language, with that paternal feeling, let me tell you my countrymen, that you are delud- ed by men who are either deceived themselves or wish to deceive you. Mark under what pretences you have been led on to the brink of insur- rection and treason, on which you stand ! First, a dimunition of the value of your staple commodity, lowered by over production in other auarters, and the consecjuent dimunition in the value of your lands, were le sole effect of the tariff laws. The effect of those laws was confess- edly injurious, but the evil was greatly exaggerated by tlie unfounded theory you were taught to believe, that its burdens were in proportion to your exports, not to your consumption of imported articles. Your pride was roused by the assertion that a submission to those laws was a state of vassalage, and that resistance to them was equal, in patriotic merit, to the opposition our fathers offered to the oppressive laws of Great Britain. You were told that this opposition might be peaceably — might be constitutionally made — that you might enioy all the advan- tages of the Union and bear none of its burthens. Eloquent appeals to your passions, to your state pride, to your native courage, to your sense of real injury, were used to prepare you for the period when the mask which concealed the hideous features of disunion, should be taken off. It fell, and you were made to look with complacency on objects which not long since you would have regarded with horror. Look back at PRESIDENT'S PtlOCLAMATION^I 1391 the iirts which have brought you to this state, look forward' to the con- sequences to which it must inevitably lead! Look back to what was first told you as an indiicerrtent- to enter into this dttngerous course. The great^political truth was repeated'to you, that you had the revolutionary right of resisting all laws that were palpably unconstitutional and in- tolerably oppressive — it was added that the right* to nullify a law rest- ed on the same principle, but that it was a peaceable? remedy ! This character which was given to it, madfe you I'eceive with too much con- fidence the assertions that were made of the unconstitutionality of the law and its oppressive effects. Mark, my fellow citizens, that by the admission of your leadfers^ the unconstitutionality must be palpable, or it will not justify either resist- ance or nullification! What is the meaning of the word /?a/pfl:^Ze in the sense in which it- is here used '?— that which is apparent to every one, tliat which no man of ordinary intellect will fail^ to perceive. Ifr the unconstitutionality of these laws of that description ? Let those among your leaders who once approved and advocated 'the principle of protective policy, answer the question; and let them choose whether- they will be considered as incapable, then, of perceiving that which must have been apparent to every man of common understanding, or as imposing upon your co)ifidence and endeavoring to mislead you now. In either case they are unsafe guides in the perilous paths they urge you to tread: Ponder well on this circumstance, and you will know now to appreciate the exaggerated language they address to you. They- are not champions of liberty emulating tile. fame of onr revolutionary fathers; nor are you an oppressed people, contendingj as they repeat to you, against worse than colonial vassalage.. You are free members ' of a flourishing and happy Union. There is no settled' design to op- press you. You have i^ideed felt the unequal operation of laws which may have been unwisely, not unconstitutionally passed ; bu^ that ine- qaality must necessarily be removed. At the very moment when you were madly urged on to the unfortu- nate course you have begim, a change in public opinion had 'commenc- ed. The nearly approaching payment of the public debt, and the con- sequent necessity of a dimunition of duties, had already produced a considerable reduction, and that too on some ai:ticles of general con- sumption in your state. The importance of thischmga was under- rated, and you were authoritatively told that no further alleviation of ' your burdens was to be expected at tbe very time when the condition of' the country imperiously demanded such a modification of the duties as should reduce them to a just and equitable scale. But,, as if appre- hensive of the effect of this change in all&.ying^ your discontents, ypu were precipitateJ into the feai*ful state in which you now find yourselves. ' I have urged you to look b^^ck to the means th^ were used to h urry you on to i\\e position you have now assumed, and forward to the eon- sequences it will prodiice. Something more is necessary, CiJn tem- plate the condition of that country of which ypu still farm an i^nportant part!— consider its ^ov,ernment uniting in ojie bondpf conifmon interest and general protection so many different states — giving to all their inha- bitants the proud title of American citizens — protecting their connuerce — securing their literature and their arts — facilitating tjieir intercom- munication — defending their frontiers — and makings their name respeet- 12 , 184 PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. ed in the remotest parts of the earth ! Consider the extent of its terri- tory, its increasing and happy population, its advance in arts, which render life agreeeble, and the sciences, which elevate the mind. See education spreading the lights of religion, humanity^ and general infor- mation, into every cottage in this wide extent of our territories and states ! Beliold it as the asylum where tlie wretched and the oppressed find a rufuge and support ! Look on this picture of happiness and ho- nor, and say, we, too^ are citizens of America ; Carolina is one of these pround states : her arms have defended — her best blood has ce- mented, this happy Union ! And then add, if you can, without horror and remorse, this happy Union we will dissolve — this picture of peace and prosperity we well deface — this free intercourse we will interrupt — these fertile fields we will deluge with blood — the protection of that glorious flag we renounce — the very name of Americans we discard And for what, mistaken men ! for whaldo you throw away these ines- timable blessings — for what would you exchange your share in the ad- vantages aud honor of the Union 'I For the dream of a separate inde- pendence — a dream interrupted by bloody conflicts with your neighbors,, and a vile dependence on a foreign power. If your leaders could suc- ceed in establishing a separation, what would be your situation ] Are you united at home — are you free from the apprehension of civil dis- cord, with all its fearful consequences 1 Do our neighboring republics^ every day suflfering: some new revolution^ or contending with some new insurrection — do they excite your envy'? But the dictates of a high duty oblige me solemnly to announce that you cannot succeed. The laws of the United States must be executed, I have no discre- tionary power on the subject ; my duty is emphatically pronounced in the constitution. Those who told you that you might peaceably pre- veiit their execution, deceived you — they could not have been deceived themselves. They know that a forcible opposition could alone prevent tlie execution of the laws, and they know that such opposition must be repelled. Their object is disunion : but be not deceived by names : dis- union, by armed force, is treasOxN. Are you really ready to incur its guilt ] If you are, on the heads of the instigators of the act be the dreadful consequences — on their heads be the dishonor, but on youra may fall the punishment, on your unhappy state will inevitably fall all the evils of the conflict you force upon the government of your coun- try. It cannot accede to the mad project of disunion, of which you would be the first victims — its first magistrate cannot, if he would, avoid the performance of his duty — the consequence must be fearful for you, distressing to your fellow citizens here, and to the friends of good government throughout the world. Its enemies have beheld our prosperity with a vexation they could, not conceal — it was a standing refutation of their slavish doctrines, and they will point to our discord with the triumph of malignant joy. It is yet in your power to disappoint them. There is yet time to show that the descendands of the Pinckneys, the Suinpters, the Rutledges, and of the thousand other names which adorn the pages of your revolutionary liistory, will not abandon that union, to support which so many of them fought, and bled, and died. I adjure you as you honor their memory — as you lova the cause of freedom, to which they dedicated their lives — as you prize the peace of your country, the lives of its best citi2Kns, and your own fair fame, to retrace your steps. Snatch from the archives PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. 135 of your state, the disorganizing edict of its convention — bid its mem- bers to reassemble and promulgate the decided expression of your will to remain in the path which alone can conduct, you to safety, prosperity, and honor — tell them that compared to disunion, all other evils are light, because tliat brings with it an accumulation of all — declare that you will never take the field unless the star-spangled banner of your country shall float over you — that you will not be stigmatized when dead, and dishonored and scorned while you livC; as the authors of the first attack on the constitution of your country ! — Its destroyers you cannot be. You may disturb its peace — you may interrupt the course of its prosper- ity — you may cloud its reputation for stability — but its tranquility will be restored, its prosperity will return, and the stain upon its national -character will be transferred and remain an eternal blot on the memory of those who caused the disorder. Fellow citizens of the United States ! The threat of unhallowed dis- union — the names of those once respected, by whom it is uttered — the array of military force to support it — denote the approach of a crisis in our aflfairs, on which the continuance of our unexampled prosperity, our political existence, and, perhaps, that of all free governments may depend. The conjuncture demanded a free, a full, and explicit enunci- ation, not only of my intentions but of my principles of action ; and as the claim was asserted of a right by a state to annul the laws of the union, and even to secede from it at pleasure, a frank exposition of my opinions in relation to the origin and form of our government, and the constniction I give to the instrument by which it was created, seemed to be proper. Having the fullest confidence in the justness of the legal and constitutional opinion of my duties which has been expressed, I rely with equal confidence on your undivided support in my determina- tion to execute the laws — to preserve the Union by all constitutional means — to arrest if possible, by moderate but firm measures, the neces- sity of a recourse to force ; and, if it be the will of Heaven that the recurrence of its primeval curse on man for the shedding of a brother's blood, should fall upon our land, that it be not called down by any of- fensive act on the part of tlie United States. Fellow citizens ! The momentous case is before you. On your un- divided support of your government, depends the decision of the great question it involves, whether your sacred union will be preserved, and the blessing it secures to us as one people shall be pei*petuated. No one can doubt the unanimity with which that decision will be expressed will be such as to inspire new confidence in republican institutions, and that the prudence, the wisdom, and the courage which it will bring to their defence, will transmit them unimpaired and invigorated, to our children. May the great Ruler of nations grant that the signal blessings with which He has favored ours, may not by the madness of party or per- sonal ambition, be disregarded and lost; and may His wise Providence bring those who have produced this crisis, to see the folly before they feel the misery of civil strife; and inspire a returning veneration for that union, which, if we may dare to penetrate His designs, he has chosen as the only means of attaining the high destinies to which we may reasonably aspire. In testimony whereof, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto ?ifl[i^ed, haying signed the same with my hand. 136 .KvFRESIDENTIAL ^TLECTIONS. Done at the City of Washington, 'this, 10th dp-y of December, in the year of our Lord, one thoussind eight hundred and thirty-two, and of the Inciependence of the United States, the fifty-seventh. ANDREW JACKSON. By the President, Edw. • Livingston, Secretary of State. ELECTIONS *** PRESIDENT AND VlCE PRESIDENT A statement of the voti^ given by the Presidential Electors^ for Presi- dent and Vice President of the United States, since the adop- tion of the Constitution. N. B. At the four first elections, the candidates were voted for agreeably to the original prrovision of the Constitution, [seepage 17] which was afterwards amended, by which the person havingthe high- est vote was elected President, and the next highest. Vice President. In 1800, the votes for Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Burr, being equal, the election was decided by the House of Repi-esentativeS, in 1801, after protracted ballotings, in favor of Mr. Jefferson. [Electors of -President appointed 1st Wednesday of Ja«. 1789. El^fctibnof Pre'side^t, 1st Wednesday of Feb. 178^. Constitation went into operation, 1st Wednesday of MaVch, 1789. President Washington inaugmrated, April 30, 1789.] ll89.-^Whole number- of vfftes for President d7id Vice PresidM,W. —George Washington, 69; John Adams, 84; John Jay, 9; R. R. Hanson, 6 ; Jcl^n Rutledge, 6 ; John Hancock, 4 ; George Clinton, 3 ; Samuel Huntioigton, 8*; John -Milton, '2>; James Armstrong, 1 ; Ed- ivaixi TeWait, 1 .; Benjamin Lincoln, 1:^-69 (At the first dlec^ioii the states were entitled to the following electoral votes, vik :— -Nc^v H'ampshii'e, 5 ; Massactmsetts, 10 ; Rhode Inland, 3; OonneMieut, 7.; New York, ^ ; New Jefrsey , 6 ; Petmsylvania, 10; Delaware, 3; Maryland, 8; Virginia, 12; North Carolina, 7; Soufh Carolina, 7 ; Georgia, 6.— TdtM, 91. Ne*^ Yoi4c, Rhode Mand, and Nimh Carolina did not vote.] i79^.~George Washington, '13S; Johh Adams, "77; 'Geo%e Clinton, 50; Thomas (JefferBon, 4; Aaron ^Btfrr, 1 ;— 182. 47^6.'-^John AdamB, 71 ; Thomas Jeffersoifi, 68-; Thomas :Pincfcney, 69.; Aiaron Burr, :36; Samuel Adams,, 16; Cliver Ellsworth, 11; i3«o»ge ^Clinton, 7.; iFoh'n Jay,'5; Jamds iredell,3; George Washing- ton, 2; Samuel Johnston, 2 ; John Henry, 2; Charies C, Pinckney, 1 ; --^876; tititiiberofVotete, 138. 1800.— Tholfnas Jeff^son, 73 ; Aai"on Bwr, 73^ Johh Adams, i65 ; Charles C. Pinckney, 64 ; John Jay, 1 ; — 276; number of votes, 138. ADOPTION OP THE CONSTITUTION. 137 1804. President— Thomas Jefferson, 162 ; Charles C. Pinckney, 14. Vice President— George Clinton, 162; | Rufus King, 14;— number of votes, 176. 1808. President — James Madison, 122 ; Charles C. Pinckney, 47 ; George Clinton, 6. Vice President — George Clinton, 113; RiifusKing, 47; John Langdon, 9 ; James Monroe, 3 ; James Madison, 3 ; number of votes, 175. 1812. President — James Madison, 128 ; Dewitt Clinton, 89. Vice President — Elbridge Gerry, 131 ; Jared Ingersoll, 86 ; number of votes, 217. 1816. President— James Monroe, 183 ; Rufus Kins;, 34. Vice President — Daniel D. Tompkins, 183; James E. Edwards, 22 ; James Ross, 5 ; John Marshall, 4 ; Robert G. Harper, 3 ; number of votes, 217. 1820. President— James Monroe, 228; John Cluincy Adams, 1. Vice President — Daniel D. Tompkins, 215; Richard Stockton, 8; Daniel Rodney, 4 ; Richard Rush, 1 ; Robert G. Harper, 1 ; number of votes, 229. 1824. President — Andrew Jackson, 99 ; *John Cluincy Adams, 84 ; William H. Crawford, 41 ; Henry Clay, 37. Vice President — John C. Calhoun, 182 ; Nathan Sanford, 30 ; Nathaniel Macon, 24; Andrew Jackson, 13; Martin Van Buren, 9; Henry Clay, 2; number of votes, 261. 1828. President— Andrew Jackson, 178 ; John Cluincy Adams, 83. Vice President — John C. Calhoun, 178 ; Richard Rush, 83 ; number of votes, 261. 1832. President. —Andrew Jackson, 219 ; Henry Clay, 49 ; Jolm Floyd, 11; William Wirt, 7. Vice President— Martin Van Buren, 189; John Sergeant, 49; William Wilkins, 30; Henry Lee, 11; Amos Ellmaker, 7 : number of votes, 286. 'A Dates of the Adoption qf the Constitution, by the several original States. 1— Delaware, December 7, 1787. ^ 2 — Pennsylvania, December, 12, 1787, 3 — New Jersey, December 18, 1787. 4 — Georgia, January 2, 1788. 5 — Connecticut, January 9, 1788. 6 — Massachusetts^ February 7, 1788. 7— Maryland, April 28, 1788. S— South Carolina, May 23, 1788. 9 — New Hampshire, June 21, 1788. 10— Virginia, June 27, 1788. n^New YorA;, July26, 1788. V2r— North Carolina, November 21, 1789. \Z-^Rhode Island, May 29, 1790. The seven states in italics, recommended amendments. * Mr. Adami was elected Pruideuibx th*«IIovM of RepreseDtativei, luviag tbe tote of thirteeti statet ouUicfirKtbaDoU 12» 188 VOTES ON TBE TAIUf^l^fe. ^ - Statement of the votes in the United States^ House of Rffpfe^^tMi^eSj 0fh the v'ariff%i T^iff^JBiUs, ^^ce 1&16. Vi)tem the Tdrifof 1816. Vot^ on the Tariff of 18'^. EAiiTEttN States. Yeas. 1 2 t 4 2 Ab.ent. 2 1 9 3 Maine. New Hampshire. Vermont. Massachusetts. Rhode Island. Conhecticut. Yeas. 1 i 5 1 2 5 5 1? 1 Ab^U' d d 1 d d li i5 16 MibDLE States. 15 i 1 17 d 5 d 3 d 5 10 5 1 3 13 New York. New jei-sey. Pennsylvania, l^elaware. Maryland. Southern &tateb. 24 \ 60 8 d 1 1 d d i 7 13 11 3 1 3 Virginia. 1 21 13 9 1 3 1 3 4 3 2 2 d North Carolina. South Carolina. Qedfgia. Alabama. Louisiahd. I j d 14 31 7 WESTEfei4 Sta^e^. 1 57 6 3 5 1 2 3 1 1 Kentucky. Teiliifess^e. Ohio. Indiana. Illinois. Missouri. 11 2 u si 1 I •? d d d 8 li 1 1 ii 7 2 i u id Total. m 102 4 7 4 2 2 11 1 1 4 e 4 1 VOTEB ON THE TAftlFFB. 139 mem the Tarif of 1828. Vote^f^th^e Tariff of 1832. Eastern States. Abseht Y^ Nayft. Absent. Maine. ' 6-1 New Harhpshire. 6 1 Massachusetts. *4 8 1 Rhode Island. 2 Gxiniie(^.tici«. 2 3 1 Vermont. 3 2 15 24 17 17 6 Middle dtates. 27 6 1 NewYcfik. '^ 2 b 5 1 NewJeVsey. 3 3 23 3 Pennsylvania. 14 12 i d Deldware. D 1 i) 1 5 3 Maryland. 8 1 57 11 8 32 18 6 SouTHERit States. 3 15 4 Virginia. 11 8 3 13 North Carolina. 8 4 1 8 1 Strath Carolina. 3 6 7 Georgia. 16 3 Louisiana. 1 2 6 «l ; AWBaihb. ^Uja^..i b 10 Mississippi. 10 3 50 a 27 27 4 WEStERk StAtfes. 12 Kentucky 9 3 9 Tfennesse^; 9 13 1 Ohio. 13 I 3 Iildi^hd. 3 . 1 Missouri. 1 . . . ^ a. .. 1 Illinois. .{'Ai^tnJVv 29 10 1 36 3 1 105 94 14 Total. 132 65 16 Thus it appears by tlie above table that at the passage of no Tariff has a majority of the whole New England delegation voted for the Ta- riflf, either in 1816, '24, '28 or 32. yeas. Nayt. Abaent- In 1816 16 10 15 1894 15 ^ 1 1898 19 24 1832 11 17 5 140 VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1810. The Middle States have sustained the several Tariffs which have been passed, by strong and decided majorities, as appears by examin- ation. In 1816 Yea«. 44 1824 60 1828 57 1832 52 Nay.. AbKnt. 10 13 15 1 11 8 18 6 The same remarks will also apply to the Western States. They have always gone for the Tariff. Yea«. Nara. ibMot. In 1816 14 3 5 7 3 10 1 3 1 The Southern States have gone strongly against every Tariff, until that of 1832. Yeai. Nara. Absent. In 1816 14 31 7 1824 1 57 1828 3 50 5 1832 27 27 4 1816 Yea*. 14 1824 31 1828 29 1832 36 VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1810. The following proceedings of the Vii^inia Legislature, in 1809-10, having been frequently referred to in Constitutional discussions, are deemed sufficiently iprjportant for insertion here. They were unani- mously adopted iii each House, namely, by the House of Delegates, January 23, and by the Senate, January 26, 1810. VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE. Extract from the Message of Gov, Tyler, of Virginia, Dec, 4, 1809. " A proposition from the state of Pennsylvania is herewith submitted, with Governor Snyder's letter accompanying the same, in which is suggested the propriety of amending the Constitution of the United States, so as to prevent collision between the Government of the Union and the State Governments." HOUSE OP DELEGATES. Friday, December 15, 1809. Qn motion, Ordered, That so much of the Governor's communica- tion as relates to the communication from the Governor of Pennsylva- nia, on the subject of an amendment proposed by the Legislature of that vmaiNiA RESOLUTIONS OP 1810. m state to tlie cdnstitUtitDn of*tlie tFiiitecl States, be ief erred to Messi^. Peyton, Otey, Cabell, Wklk^r, 'Maai^oh, Holt, Ne^vton, Parker, Ste- venson, Randolph (of Amelia), tJOcke, Wyatt, and Michh.^— Page 25 of the JcnlrTial. Thilrsdny, JUnkary 11, 18lO. 1^. Peyton, ^roih tHe committee, to whom was referrj^d tliat partx>f the Crovetno'r^s communication which relates to the aanenqment. propos- ed by the ^tate of, Pennsylvania, to the Constitution of the United Stilus, made tlie following report: ^ . , The conirhittee ^o whom was referred the communination of 'the Goveriipr -of Pennsylvania, (iovering^ certain resolutions of the Legisla- tiire 6'f tliat state, proposing an amendment of the Constitution of the United States, by the appointment of an impartial tribunal to decide disputes between, tlie states and Federal Judiciary, have had the same under their consideration, and are of opinion tliat a tribunal is already provided by the Constitution of the United States, to wit : the Supreme Court, more eminently qualified from tlieir habits and duties, from the mode of their selection, and from the tenure of tlieir offices, to decidecl the. disputes aforesaid, in an enlightened and impartial manner, than any other tribunal which could be created. The members of the Supreme Court are selected from tliose in the United States Who are itio^tccTebrMed for Virtue and legal learniiig, riot at tlie will df a sfngle individual, bbt by the cdrtcurrefit wishes of the President and Senate of the United States : they will therefore have no local prejudices and partialities. The duties they have to perfomi iead them ftecessari^y to 'thiB niffet enllai'fifed and iicc'iti-ate acquaintance \^ith the jurisdiction of 'the l-'edeVal kild^State Courts together, and with the admirable symmetry of orr government. The teniire of their oiH- ces 'eWMeS them to pi'(^ounce the sound and C(5rrrect opiidoris they may have formed without fear, favor, or partiality. T'he^frlendinfem to the constitution pr6p0s^d by Pe'tinsylvanra, g^^ms to be founded upon the idea tfhatthe federal judHctary ^11, ^froin a lust ofpoweh*^ enlarge their jui''isdiction to the total annihilation of the juris- diction of t^fe state cotn-ts, -^atdiey Will eierci^e their Will, instead of the laW and the'cdristittitioYi. This argumerrt, if it 'pi-oVcs anything, would Cipei'stte ttiore Strongly a^in^t the tribunal ^roflo^ed to be created, wliich promises so little, thaniAgain^ tJife Supreme Cc^rt, which, for the reasons g-iven before, have everythinsr connected with their appointrheilt calculated to erisirfe coftfldence. What seciti-ity have We, Were the proposed amendment ad«6^Ced, that this triljtrnal Would not ^(b^titutethehr Will, and their plea- stft^, in plcice of the law 1 The judiciai-y are the weakest of the three depaiUifients of goV'efrnmeht, and lea^ dangerous to the politicalrights of We '(Constitution i they hold neither the ptii-Se nor the sword; and eVeYi Yo enforce their oWn judgments aVld decisions, must ultimately dc^jjend tipon the executive arrhr Shoft/ld the federal judiciary, hoWeVer tiftniindfol of theit weaknefej*, unfrt^ndf^rofthe duty Which they owe to themi^c?lVes and their (iOuritry. become coi¥ttpt, and transcend the limits of 'their jurj^dtcti-OV*, Would ihe pr6"]lds(5d amendineilt 'oppose even a jn^6b^blebavriM- in^^Wc^'an'iWiprobable^ateo^^ » 'T*fe creation Of a'tribtin^, kic?h aB i^ JWopo^ed by Petmfeylvkwia, so far as t^c Mh able (6 fovm ^afft M^a of 4% ftom the descriptions given in 142 MR. CALHOUN'S SPEECH. the resolutions of the legislature of that state, would, in the opinion of your committee, tend rather to invite than to prevent collisions between the Federal and State Courts. It might also become, in pro« cess of time, a serious and dangerous embarrassment to the operations of the General Government. Resolved, therefore, that the legislature of this state do disapprove of the amendment to the Constitution of the United States, proposed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Resolved, also, that his excellency the governor be, and he is hereby, requested to transmit forthwith a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolutions to each of the senators and representatives of this state in Congress, and to the executive of the several states in the Union, with a request that the same be laid before the Legislatures thereof. The said resolutions, being read a second time, were, on motion, ordered to be referred to a committee of the whole house on the state of the commonwealth. [Adopted unanimously without amendment, in the House of Dele- gati^s. January 23, and in the Senate, January 26, 1810.J Mr. Calhoun'' s Remarls in the Senate of the United States, January I6th, 1833, on the President's Message transmitting the South Ca- rolina Documents, tf-c, A message was received from the President of the United states, ac- companying the Proclamation and other documents relating to South Carolina, her Ordinance, &c, &c. The reading of the message occupied an hour and a quarter. As soon as it was finished — Mr. Grundy moved to refer the message and documents to the commits tee on the Judiciary, and that they be printed. Mr. Calhoun then rose and said, that his object in taking the floor was not to make any remark on the motion which was immediately before the Senate. What he was al)out to sav, therefore, would, under parliamen- tary rule, be entirely out of order. But he would, in the peculiar circum- stances of his situation, throw himself on the indulgence of the Senate, for his pardon for the entire irrelevance of the remarks which he should feel himself bound to make. He felt no disposition to notice many of the errors which the message contained in reference to the documents bv which it was accompanied, but there was one which he should deem himself a recreant to his state if he did not rise emphatically and promptly to notice. It was stated by the Chief Magistrate, in substance, that the movements made by the state of South Carolina were of a character hostile to the Union. Was he right in this impression 7 If so, he would say that there was not a sha- dow of foundation for such a statement. There was not a state in the Union less disposed than South Carolina to put herself in such attitude of hostility. But the grounds on which the President founds this inference were not less extraordinary than the inference itself. When he stated that hostile movements had been made, it was to be regretted that the President did not state the whole of the movements of this character Tvhich had taken place. Before South Carolina had taken any position MR. CALHOUN'S SPEECH. 143 of a conflicting character, there had been a concentration of United States' troops on two points, obviously for the purpose of controlling the movements of the state. One of these concentrations was at Augusta, and the other at Charleston. Previous to this circumstance, the state of South Carolina had looked to nothing beyond a civil process, and had in- fended merely to give effect to her opposition in the form of a suit at law. It was only when a military force was displayed on her borders, and in her limits, and when the menace was thrown out against the lives of her citizens, and of their wives and children, that they found themselves driv- en to an attitude of resistance. Then it was that they all prepared tp resist any aggression. But the president had also rested his in Terence on another ground. He laid it down that the tribunal of the Supreme Court of the United States was, in the last resort, the only arbiter of the difference in the construtr- tion of the constitutionahty of the laws. On this point there seems to have been a great change in the op'.nion of the executive within the last twelve months. The president had not held this opinion in reference to the resistance of the state of Georgia. x\ narrow river only divides the territory of Greorgia from that of South Carolina, yet, on the one side, the power of the Supreme Court, as the arbiter in the last resort, is to be sus- tained ; while, on the other side the will of the exe^^utive is to be supreme. But, if the Supreme Court was to be the arbiter, he wished to know in what manner the decision of that tribunal as to the constitutionality of the Tariff law, as a measure of protection, was to be obtained 1 How was an issue to be made up'? This mode had already been tried in the case of Holmes, a citizen of Charleston, and the court had declared its inca- pacity to act for want of jurisdiction, and refused to take cognizance of the subject. Ho wished to know why this circumstance had been sup- pressed — no, supprestad was too strong a term — forgotten in the message of the executive. It will be remembered that when the bill of 1828 was introduced, which had been justly called by the Senator from Miissachu- setts, a bill of abominations, a representative from South Carolina had in- effectually endeavored to obtain an amendment of the title of it, so that it might bear on its face the character of protection, which belonged to it. But it was sent abroad under a delusive and deceptive name. How, then, was South Carolina to try the question 1 Even if she had every reliance on the authority of the Supreme Court, she could not obtain the judg- ment of that court. What course then was left for South Carolina^ but that which she had pursued 1 It was also sag;g;ested in the message of the executive, that tlie state ought to have resorted to the other remedy which was pointed out, and asked at an earlier period for a Convention of the States, in order to cimend the Constitution. South Carolina had been prevented from many applications on this subject. She had wished over and over a.'^^ain to- obtain a Convention, but she had uniformly found a fixed majority in both houses against her. How, then, was she to obtain the acquies- cence of the constitutional majority of two thirds of the two houses 1 Under these circumstances, she made no application until the State itself had declared it unconstitutional, and the emergency arose which called for it. It was obvious that the country had now reached a crisis. It had been often said that every thing which lives carries in* itself the ele- ments of its own desti-uction. This princinle was no less applicable to political, than to physical constructions. The principle of decay is to 144 MR, CALHOUN'S SPEECH. be found m our institutions ; and unless it can be checked and corrected in its course, by the wisdom of the federal government, its operation will form no exception to the general course of events. The only cause of vvonder in his opinion was, that our Union had continued so lon^ ; that, at the end of, forty-four years, our government should still retain its original form, He considered that to the great event of 1801, the success of the party which had elevated Mr. Jeft'erson to the presidencyj wa? mainly to be attributed this, duration. Nothing but the elevation of that individual had prevented the earlier termination of an experir ment. 3ut the time had at length come when we are required to decide whether this shall be a confederacy any longer, or whether it shall give way to a consolidated government. He called on. senators solemnly to pause and deliberate on this important question. As he lived, he be- lieved tliat the continuance of any consolidated government was impos- sible,. It must inevitably lead to military despotism. At this moment, Without having been brought into contact with any adverse circum- stances, without any conflicting causes, in a time of peace, and under ^ the influence of an unexampled prosperity, our Union stands on the eve of dissolution, or the verge of a civil war. How was this '? Was it npt attributable to the powerful workings of the consoUdation principle 1 Gentlemen might contend that this was not a question of consolida- tion. But it is consolidation. And he could see no distinction between a consolidated government and one which assumed the right of judging of the propriety of interposing military power to coerce a State. We (said Mr. C.) made no such government. South Carolina sanc- tioned no such government. She entered the confederacy with the understanding that a State, in the last resort, has a right to judge of' the expediency of resistance to oppression, or secession from the Union. And for so doing, it is that we are, threatened to have our throats cut, and those of our wives and children. No ; I' go too far. I did not intend to use language so strong. The chief magistrate had not yet recon\- mended so desperate a remedy. The present is a great question, and the liberties of the American people depend upon t^ie decision of it. It , was impossible that a. consolidf^^ted government could exist in this country. It never can. Did I say in this country'? It never can exist in any country. If any man would look into the history of the world, and' find any single case in which the govornment of, absolute majority, unchecked by any constitutional restraints, had lasted one century, he would yield the question. For himself ;he had been from his earliest life deeply attached to the Union ; and he. felt, with a proportionate intensity, the importance of this question. In his early youth, he had cherished a deep and enthusiastic admiration of this Union. He had looked on its progress with rapture, ajid encouraged the most sanguine expectations of its endurance. He still believed that if it could be con- formed to the principles of 1798, as they were then construed, it might endure forever. Bring back the government to those principles, and he would be th-e last to abandon it, and "South Carolina would be amongst its warmest advocates. But depart from these principles, and, in the course often year^, we shall degenerate into a military despotism. The cry hud been rased^' the Union is in danger." He knew of no other danger but that of military despotism., He would proclaim it on this floor .that tl;iis was the greatest danger with w^ich it, was m^naced^ a danger the greatest which any country had to apprehend. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED (Al724sl0)476B SEP17'66-1PM LOAN DEPT. .Generaltibrary University of CaJifirnia M 00989 U.C.BERKELEY LIBRARIES CDbl3a3^s^ UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY