SKETCH O F Moral Philofophy ; OR AN ESSAY To demonftrate the Principles of Virtue and Religion upon A New, Natural, and Eafy Plan. By JOHN TAYLOR, late of Norwich, D. D. LONDON: Printed for J. Waugh, at the Turk's-head in Lombard- ftreet ; and W. Fenner, at the Angel and Bible in Pater- nofter-r ow. m . d c c . l x. • • I THE t/> m PREFACE. >- ee Reader, }*y&£)&~^HE chief Defign of this Treatife is '& cr* B to e/lablifi and explain the Princi- S M pi* 5 re I at i f? g t0 ^ Je Foundation, or k&K&jNf primary Reafon, of Virtue. And therefore, if any Proportions, or Afertions, | which do not immediately relate to them, fiould appear to be dubious , let it be remembered, that the main Scheme may not thereby be affected ; but, for all that, may fiand firm upon it's own Foundation. Thofe Principles are here confidered fimply and abfolutely in themfehes, as the Ground, or Reafon, of right Action, without attending to the Confequences of juch Ac~lion, or what Good may follow from it. Ju/l as in Euclid, the fimple Principles of Geometry are demonfirated, in a Series oj Pro- pofitiom, without confidering the Purpofes to A 2 w^ CM or Q_ CtZ I ■ iv The PREFACE. 'which they may be applied. The Principles are my own, the Refult of my own Reflections ; and Jo is the Plan. But I have freely extracted Explications and Improvements out of an ex- cellent Book, intiiled, An Enquiry concern- ing Virtue and Happinefs, publified 1751 ; the Work cf my worthy, and much efleemed Friend, Philips Glover Efq-,late c/"Wifping- ton in Lincolnfhire ; with whom I had fre- quent Conversations upon this Subject for fede- ral Tears ; which, perhaps, may give me feme Right to any Th/ng in that Book that rfiay be ufeful in this, The fame Liberty I have taken with .another valuable Performance, which doth much Honor to the Author, and Service to the Caufe -, I mean the Reverend Mr. Price's Review, &c. publifned lajl Tear, ^Ihis Piece of mine is not a Syflem, but a Sketch ; originally defgned for young Stu- dents, only as an Introduction to the reading of Woolaflon's Religion of Nature delineated, and now publifted chiefly for their Vfe. I wife it may prove a Hint to feme abler Hand to bring it to a greater Degree of Perfection, $JpZuT 17 59. John Taylor, A SKETCH O F MORAL PHILOSOPHY. The INTRODUCTION. FH&K^O have a clear View, and /olid w t S Conviction of the Principles and 5 § Obligations of Virtue, or natural £j3(M;?SjK£ Religion, as ftanding. upon an eternal and immutable Founda- tion, muft give great Satisfaction, Aflurance and Stability to any Mind in the -Practice of all Duty. But it is of lingular Importance to the Study of the facred Writings : not only to prove, in general, the Truth of Re- velation ; but alfo to explain the particular Doctrines therein contained. For every Dif- A 3 penfation 6 The IntroduSfion. penfation and Doctrine, which is of God 7 mull necefTarily be in Confiftency with what He hath already difeovered to us in the Na- tures of Things, and the certain Deductions of Reafon from them. This is the princi- pal Clue, which muft guide us in our Search- es into Revelation. Revelation is of no Ufe to us, if it is not an Addrefs to the Under- standing and common Senfe of Mankind. And therefore, without a faithful Ufe of our own Faculties, and a proper Acquaintance with the Principles of Truth and Reafon, by mistaking the Senfe and Phrafes of the Scriptures, we may be led to deduce from them fuch Doctrines as are altogether un- worthy of God, and the Reproach of Rea- fon and Humanity. Which, in Fact:, hath been the Cafe. But if the Judgment is well fettled in the true Principles of natural Re- ligion, we mall be furnifhed with a Stand- ard, by which to meafure every Part of Re- velation ; a Standard of the fame Authority with Revelation it felf. And it muft be the nrongeft Confirmation of any Revelation, and give the Student the greateft Satisfaction of the Truth of its Do&rines, when he fees plainly, that they are all worthy of the Wifdora and Goodnefs of God, and per- fectly confonant to all the Appearances of Na- ture, and to the true State of Things in our "World. Thus Reafon, rightly directed, will aillit and guide Criticifm - 9 and juft Criticifm will ItM Introduction. J will Confirm the Dictates of Reafon ; and both will join their Forces in fixing the Judg- ment upon a (olid Bafis, and in giving n Jatif- iaclcry and pleafing View of the Principles of Chriftianity. WritN the Principles and Laws of Virtue are drawn up into an artificial Scheme, it may look as if they were abitrufe, and re- quired great Depth of Skill todifcover them. But the contrary is true. The Rule of right Action lies open to every honefr. Mind -, and all Men fee, or may fee, the Difference be- tween moral Good and Evil, as plainly as they fee with their Eyes the Difference of Objects which are before them. But though the Ufe of Sight is familiar to every Body, yet when it is treated of philofophically, many Things mud be confidered end ex- plained by the R.ules of Art, which are not obvious to every Underftanding. Nothing is more common than the Ufe of Speech : but to refolve it in it's grammatical Principles, and to underftand all it's Elegancies, is the peculiar Advantage only of the learned. In like Manner, though the Rule of right Ac- tion is plane to every Capacity, yet, when we come to fhevv it's Foundation, Obligations and Extent, and to explane the Faculties of the Mind, by which it is exerted and appli- ed, we are obliged by the Laws of Art and Method, to take id many Particulars and A 4 Argu- 8 The Introdu&icri. Arguments, which the Bulk of Mankind are not acquainted with. They, if their Hearts are but true, can perform their Duty iuffici- ently well, without fuch a nice and curious Detail of abnrae~r. Reafonings. For as all Virtue is founded in Truths the Rule of Vir- tue mufl be as plane and certain as that Truth, which every Man has a Capacity and Oppor- tunity of understanding ; beyond which his Obligations cannot extend. Neverthelefs, fuch a methodical and accurate Difquifition is of great Uie to thofe who have Leifure and Inclination to gain the moft perfect Knowledge of the Principles of Morality. The primary Reafon, or Foundation of Virtue, is that Principle, which being fup- pofed, Virtue, or Action morally right, ne- cefTarily refults -, which being taken away, there remains no Ground, nor Reafon for Virtue. Which Principle fhould have the follow- ing Properties. i. It mould be fo demonftrative as to lay the Mind under the fame Force of Evidence as any demonftrated' Propofition in Euclid. But obferve ; Demon ft ration in Morality may be afteded by Paffion and Prejudice : and therefore, how ftrong and clear foever it is, may not be feen, or net a/Tented to, through fome The Introdu&ion, g fome wrong Byafs, or Difpofition of Mind.* This is a Difadvantage, to which mathemati- cal Demon ftration is not fubject. Men can- not fee moral Truth in it's proper Light, un« lefs their Minds be well tempered and difpo- fed. It is neceffary, therefore, that every Perfon bring to this Study a Mind difengaged from all partial and irregular Affections, and quite free and open to the Truth. 2. It mould be an univerfal Princiole, at all Times, and in all Places, to all moral Agents invariably the fame. Otherwife, Vir- tue will be uncertain and precarious. 3. It mould be perfectly confident with Liberty, or Freedom of Choice. Otherwife it will, in it's own Nature, be deftructive of Virtue or Morality j as will afterwards be fhewn. The * The famous Mr. Hobbes took it into his Head to fquare the Circle, and to folve many other Problems of a difficult Nature ; but being bafHed and confuted in thefe Attempts, by many learned Men, he, in a kind of Re- venge, wrote an elaborate Book to difprove the 47th Prop, of the firft Book of Euclid. Now had that Pro- portion been oppofite to the PrepoiTeffions, Paffions, Lufts or temporal Intereiis of Mankind, doubllefs Mr. Hobbes would have had many Followers, notwithftand- ing the cleareft Demonflralion of the Truth or it. Sec Harris's Obfervations critical and miicellansous. Pref. P. 6. io Of right A£lion Chap. I. The following Sketch is an EfTay towards reprefenting the Foundation of Morality in a Manner agreeable to thofe Properties. CHAP. I. Of right and wrong Atlions f imply confdered. DEFINITIONS. I. HHH E Nature of any Thing is all that is ■*■ contained within the Compafs of it's Be- ing ; or all that can be truly known, or af- firmed of it, namely, all it's Parts, Powers, Properties, Qualities, P^elations, Circumftan- ces, whereby it is diftinguifhed from all o- ther Beings of a different Kind, or of dif- ferent Parts, Powers, Properties, Relations and Circumftances. Or, the Nature of a Thing is it's true Definition, defcribing it to be what it really is. Or, it is an Idea in the Mind, apprehending a Thing to be what it truly is in it felf. So the Nature of a Man, or of any A&ion, is the fame as the true De- finition, or Idea of a Man, or of any Action. Note j When I any where mention the Natures of Things, abfolutely, I thereby mean their whole real Being ; as in the above Definition. But when I fpeak of the Na- tures of Things, as the Objects of human Under- Chap. I. fimply conjidered. 1 1 Understanding, or moral Agency, I mean the Natures of Things as they appear to, or may be known by, our limited Capacities. Which, with regard to Morality, is the fame Thing, as if we underfbod them ever fo perfectly. II. INTELLIGENCE, or Under/land- Ing, is that Faculty, whereby we perceive and compare the Natures of Things, III. Postulates, or Things taken for granted. 1. That there is a God, the firfl: Caufe of all Things, infinite in every natural and moral Perfection. 2. That there is a Difference between Perfons, Things, Actions, Relations, Cafes and Circumnances. PROPOSITIONS. IV. Things that are different are treated in a different Manner. Iron is treated, or ufed, in a different Manner from Wood, Lead horn Wool, Fire from Water, &c. This is the primary Law of Action, and, in fact, the Senfe and Practice of all Mankind. V. DIF- 12 Of right Action Chap. I, V. DIFFERENT Things are treated in a different Manner, becanfe their Natures appear to us to differ. It is of the apparent and experienced Nature of Iron to bear the Vio- lence of Fire, and thereby to be made fo foft and duclil, that it m:iy be hammered in o various Forms. But we find, that the Na- ture of Wood, will not bear the Violence of Fire in the fame Manner. Therefore, the Carpenter and Smith work Wood and Iron in a different Way, fuitably to their different Natures : the Carpenter in the Way, which fuits, or fits, Wood - 3 and the Smith in the V/ay, which fuits Iron. VI. TO treat, or life, different Things, agreeably to their apparent different Natures ; or, to treat Things according to what we know of their Natures^ is to ab~l rightly, or is right Action. And to do ctherwi/e, is to at~l wrong, or is wrong Aclion ; as it is acting contrary to what we know of the Natures of Things. VII. TH US, the Difference of ABions re- . fuits naturally from the Difference of ObjeBs. For if there was no Difference of Things, or Objects, there would be no B.eafon, or Ground, for any Difference of Actions. No Action could be either right or wrong; but, all Things being alike, all Actions would be alike ; Chap. I. fethply confidered. 13 alike ; and we might, for any Reafon to the contrary, treat, ufe, or act towards all Things in the fame Manner. VIII. THE Rightnefs of an Aflion, or the right Treatment of an Object, doth not depend upon the Will or Power of him that performs it. Or, an Action is not therefore right, merely becaufe the Agent chufeth, or hath it in his Power, to act as he pleafeth. But the Rightnefs of the Action confifts in • the right Treatment of the ObjeB, or in treating the Object according to it's known Nature and Properties. The known Nature and Properties of the CbjecJ do determine and prefcribe the Rightnefs of the Action. It is in the Power and Choice of the Work- man to endeavour to work Wood in the fame Manner as Iron. But it is felf-evident, that his Power and Choice doth not make the Action to be right : becaufe, independent of his Power and Will, the Nature of the Ob- ject makes "it to be wrong : and, confequent- ly, independent of the Power and Will of any other Being, IX. THE Rightnefs of an A ft ion, or the right Treatment of an Object, is not offered by good or bad Confequences ; or by the Good or Harm, which may refult from it. If the Workman treats his Materials according to their true Natures, the Action is right, [Prop. J 4 Of right ABion Chap. I. [Prop. VI.] whether the Ship happens to be ufed for Piracy, or fair Trade ; or the Sword for Defence, or Murther. X. TH E Rightnefs of an Aclion is not affecled by any Lofs or Gain which may accrue to the Author of it. Lofs or Gain forefeen may affect his Mind by Way of Difcourage- ment or Motive ; but are effentially diftinct from the Action it felf, and follow it, or are confidered as following it, after it is done, and hath received it's whole true Nature and Properties ; and therefore cannot alter it's Na- ture, caufe it to be what it is not, or make it to be wrong, when it is in it felf right. For the fame Reafon, XI. THE Rightnefs of an ABion is not affeBed by the after RefeBio?is y or AffeBions of the Author, or of any other Perfon. Ap- probation, Applaufe, Satisfaction, Pleafure, &c. are all eftentiallv different from the Ac- tion, and follow it after it is done, and hath received it's whole true Nature and Proper- ties : and therefore can only {hew what the Author, or others, do think of it, or how they are affected with it ; but cannot confli- tute it's Nature, in Whole or in Part, or give it any of it's Qualities. Or, if Appro- bation, Applaufe, &c. are previously confi- dered, they may influence as Motives to the Action j but cannot affect the Rightnefs of it Chap, I. fmpty confidered. 15 it in it felf 5 feeing it muft be previoufly fup- pofed to be done and finished, before they can be fuppofed to be Motives to it. XII. TO right ABion, thus confidered, or confidered only with refpect to the Nature and Properties of the Object, we are not 0- bliged by any private Gain or Advantage ; nor by any Compact or Agreement between Party and Party j nor by the Will, Command, or Force of any fuperior Power or Authority ; but purely by the Nature of the Thing, antecedently to all politive Laws and Sanctions, and inde- pendently of all Will and Power whatever. Which may properly be called a natural Obli- gation, as it is involved in the Natures of Things, and immediately refulteth only and wholly from them, fo far as we know them.* XIII. De- * To fay, that to treat an Object, or to do a Thing rightly, according to it's known Nature, is not obliga- tory in it felf, without regard to any private Advantage, onto any Will or Power, is a manifeft Contradiction. It is to fay, that a Thing is what it is not ; or that we are not obliged to do what, according to the Nature of the Thing, it is right to do. And fuppofe a Perfon {hould gain by doing a Thing wrong, or lofe by doing it right, ftill the Right and Wrong of "the A&ion, in it felf confidered, would be the fame, whatever he gaineth or lofeth. His Lofs or Gain may aftecT: his Purfe, but doth not change the Nature of the' A&ion. So the Autho- rity or Power of a Superior may command or force an Inferior to do what is wrong ; but that Command or Force 1 6 Of right Aclion Chap. I. XIII. Definit. By Obligation, in this Treatife, 1 mean, A Re a f on for acling in any particular Manner ', re fulling jrom the Na- tures of Things, and Jhewing that juch an Aclion is agreeable to them ; and therefore,, that it is reafbnable, or fit to be done. Or, Obligation is the Reafonablenefs of treating 'rings according to their fever al different Na-. tures. XIV. TO know the Natures of Things, is the fame as to know the Obligation to right Aclion. XV. Corol. i. The primary Obligation to right Aclion is to gain the moft exacl Know- ledge, we are able, of the Natures of tkofe Things, in which we are concerned. Other- wife we cannot know whether we treat them right or wrong. Therefore, XVI. Corol. 2, Our own Underftanding r and the Cultivation of it, is the primary Ob- jet~i of right Aclion. Or, he that would adt rightly, muft begin with ufing his Under- ftanding rightly. XVII. THE Force doth not change the Nature of the Aclion, or make it to be right; becaufe it is in it felf, or in it's own Nature, wrong. Chap. I. fimfl% conftdercd. \J XVII. THE Obligation to right Action mu/1 be univerfally binding to all intelligent Beings, at all Times, and in all Places. For where ever, and when ever there hath been, is, or (hall be Difference in the Natures of Things, every intelligent Being, fo far as, in the due Exercife of it's Powers, it fees that Difference, hath been, is, and will be for ever obliged to ad agreeably to it. Prop. XIV. XVIIL From the Whole, it follows ; That right A6ion hath a real Foundation, not in the Profpeel of Gain ; nor in the Will, Power, Command, Law or Authority of any Being whatever ; but in the different Natures of Things, as they are perceived by an intelligent Being. And that, the differ- ent Natures of Things being fuppofed, Obli- gation to right Adion neceftarily refults -, being taken away, there can be no Reafon or Ground for it. CHAP. II. Of Truth. XIX. n^HE true Natures of Things, and -* the Truth do coincide, or are the fame, B Because 1 8 Of Truth. Chap. IV Because all the Truth, that can pofli bly be conceived, or fpoken of Things, is con- tained in their Natures, and the Properties, Relations, Circumftances belonging to them. [Prop. I.] Nor is there any Truth, that can be known, or declared, concerning them, bat what is contained in their Natures, &c. Thus the Natures, &c\ of all Things do comprehend and include all the Truth that can be known in the whole Univerfe. This is Truth in the primary and mofl proper Smfe. Truth may alfo fignify the Conformity of our Ideas to the real Natures of Things in Oppofition to Error or Fiction. This is the Truth of Ideas, or their Agreement with the Truth of Objects, whether fuch Truth be only conceived in the Mind, or exprefled in Definitions. And this Species of Truth, fo far as it is conformable to the real Natures of Things, or gives true Definitions of them, coincides and comes under the fame Rules with Truth in the primary and moil proper Scnfe, Truth is alfo ufed to fignify the Confor- mity of our Words to the Apprehenfion or Senfe of our Minds, in Oppofition to Deceit or Lying. But it is Truth, in the two pre- ceding Senfes, which wc are now explaining, and Chap. IF. Of "Truth. ig and which is principally intended in this Treatife. XX. TRUTH, or the true Natures of Things , exijls necefjarily\ and therefore eternal- ly ■, independently ', univerfally and unchangeably, Defin. Necefjity is either independent of all Will and Power univerfally ; or indepen- dent only of fame particular Will and Power : it is either abfolute, or relative ; antecedent, or confequent. Neceffity univerfally indepen- dent> abfolute and antecedent is the Neceffity by which God exifts j and is Neceffity in the very Nature of the Thing, as it implies a Contradiction not to exift; and is not pro- duced by any antecedent Caufe, or Agent, but exifts antecedent to all Caufes and Ar- gents befides it felf. Relative Neceffity, or Neceffity independent only on fome particular Will or Power, is Neceffity in fome Refpc only : as when I am impelled, or conftrain- ed, by a fuperior Power to be moved agamft my Will. I then am rn by a Neceffity relative to my ""'■ ' • I aril not able to refill: the ing Power. Confequent Need! i ccflary P^efult of Exiftence; applied to any cojiting'. in cenfequence" of it's Exiftence. For when it doth exift, it muft exift rity in this Refpect, that it cannot both exift, and not exift, at the B 2 fame 2o Of 'Truth. Chap. II. fame Time. And by the fame Neceiiity, it muft necefiarily exift in the Marnier in which it doth exift. That is to fay, with the Na- ture, Properties, Qualities with which, and in the Relations and Circumftances, in which, it doth exift. So that, though the great God may create Beings with what various Natures, Properties, &c. t he pleaf- cth ; yet there is a Neceiiity, a conj'equent Neceflity, that every Thing, when he hath created it, mould exift, with the Nature and Properties, and in the feveral Relations and Circumftances, in which he hath made it to exift. And as the Nature, Properties, Re- lations and Circumftances of every Being do in.clude the whole Truth, or all the Truths which can belong to that Being, or be truly affirmed of it [by Prop. XIX.] therefore I fay, that the Truths belonging to fuch a Be- ing are consequentially neceffary, or neceflarily refult from it's Nature, and cannot but be contained in it. Nor is it in the Power of any Being whatever to make it true, that thofe Truths do not belong to it's Nature, while that Nature continues the fame. For Inftance ; it is in the Will and Pleafure of God, whether he will, or will not, create two fuch Beings as a Man and a PIorse, un- der their particular Natures, Properties, Re- lations and Circumftances. But when he has made a Man, that Beinsr muft of Ne- cefiity be a Man, endowed with the Na- ture Chap. II. Of Truth. 21 ture and Properties of a Man, and in the particular Relations and Circumftances in which he is produced and placed. And fo, when God has made an Horse, or any o- ther Creature, all the Truths included in it's Nature, Properties, &c. or it's real Idea, mud exift. For, though no created Being exifteth necefTarily, yet every Being, when created, is necefTarily what it is. And, to advance a Step further j as the Nature, /. e. the real Idea, or Definition of a Man, or of any other particular Being, always was, and always will be, what it now is ; juft as much as the Nature of a Triangle, with all it's Properties and Propor- tions, always was, and always will be, what it now is, whether a Man, or Triangle ever aclually exifted or not, (as fuch Ideas do not depend upon any Fact, or real Exif- tence of Things,) therefore I fay, that fuch Ideas or Truths belonging to the Natures of a Man, Horfe, Triangle, are abfolntely necef- fary j and confequently, independent, eternal^ univerfal, immutable, always and every where the fame. For whatever exifts by alfolute Necejfty, can be affected by no Will or Power, by no Time or Place ; but mult be independent, eternal, univerfal and unchange- able. Infinite Power, may turn a Man into a Horfe, or a Horfe into a Man ; a Triangle into a Circle, or a Circle into a Triangle. But B 3 no 22 Of Truth. Chap. II. no Power, in any Part of the Univerfe, from all Eternity even to all Eternity, could, or can ever change or turn the Idea, or Truths belonging to a Man, or to a Triangle into the Idea, or Truths belonging to a Horfe, or a Circle. Thefe muft remain for ever and immutably the fame. For though Beings are mutable, as to their aBual Natures, yet the Truths belonging to their Natures, (or their zVftf/ Natures,) are not mutable. Seeing the Idea, or Definition of a Horfe, as fuch, can never become the Idea, or Definition of a Man, as fuch, or of any other Thing or Being. Thus Truth, even all Truth, which relates to all actual and poiTible Beings, ex- ifts by an antecedent, or abjolute Necemty. For as it is true, that there never was a Time when, nor Place where, the great God was any other than what he is now ; fo it is true, that there never was a Time when, nor Place where, the Idea of a Triangle or a Man was any other than what it is now. It is alfo true, That the Relations, or Ref- pect, which Things bear to one another, are, in their Natures, or Ideas, in the fame Manner, neceffary, eternal, and unalterable. For the Idea of a Creator, always did, and always neceflarily muft have refpect to the Idea of a Creature ; and vice verfd. The Idea of a Father always was, and muft ne- cefTarily be always^ connected with the Idea of Chap. II. Of Truth. 23 of a Son or Daughter : and vice verfa. Circumjiances are only the Relations of a Be- ing to it's Situation, to the Things that are about it, or to the Objects of it's Perception. — — Proportion too is but the Relations of higher or lower, ftronger or weaker, more or lefs, as to Degrees of Being, Powers, Senfes, Capacities, or Faculties : and there- fore, both thefe mud come under the fame Rule with Relations in general. XXI. Corol. Hence it follows; that the Natures, /'. e. the Ideas or Definitions, and Relations of all Things whatfoever, or the Truths belonging to them, are as neceffary, independent, univerfal and immutable, as the Ideas, Definitions and Relations, or Pro- portions of Lines and Figures in Geometry. For if there is a real Difference between the true Nature, or the true Definition or Idea, of a Man, and of a Horfe, or of any other Thing, that Difference was always, and al- ways will be the fame. Becaufe the Idea, or true Definition of a Man, and of a Horfe, or of any other Thing, or the Truths be- longing to them, never could, nor ever can be any other than what they are now, at this Time. Therefore, their Difference, to- gether with the Properties, Relations, Pro- portions, Cii'cumltances, which neceffarily attend, or refult from that Difference, muft always be the fame, as really and truly as B 4 the 24 Of Truth. Ch;,p IT. the Difference, and different Properties, Re- lations and Proportions of a Circle and Tri- angle, or any other geometrical Figure. XXII. slLL the Obligations that refit, or flow from, the Truth, or the true Natures of Things, are neceffary, and therefore indepen- dent, eternal, nniverfal, and immutable. That Obligation to right Action imme- diately remits from the Truth, or the true Natures, &c. of Things, hath been efta- blifhed by Prop. VII, XII. And that the Truth, or the true Natures of Things, do exift neceffariiy, &c. hath been proved under the preceding Proportion. Hence it follows ; That whatever immediately refults from a neceffary Exiftence, as fuch, muft refult ne- ceffariiy, or be neceffary. But Obligation to right Action immediately refults, or follows from a neceffary Exiftence, as fuch, namely, the Truth, &c. therefore, fuch Obligation muft refult neceffariiy, or be neceffary. It refults neceiTarily, becaufe it is no other than the neceffary Exiftence of it felf, or the true Idea of it, confidered as what it is, with Refpect to the Ufage or Treatment of the Object to which it belongs. Prop. XIV. And therefore, becaufe it is what it is, and the Idea of it cannot be changed, we are, by the Nature of the Thing, neceiTarily obli- ged to ufe and treat the Object according to what Chap. II. Of Truth. 25 what it is. Not, that an Obligation of Con- jiraint is laid upon the Mind in Fad:, or ac- tually, to treat it according to what it is, fo, as that the Mind cannot poffibly do other- wife. The Mind of an intelligent Being may be fuppofed to act in what Manner it pleafeth. But it is an Obligation of right DireSlion^ or of a true, infallible Rule, that is laid before the Mind ; which Rule is the Nature of the Thing, or the Truth belong- ing to it, neceffarily requiring, that it be treared according to that Nature, or Truth, and not otherwife : and demonftrating, that if is treated in a Manner different from it's Nature, it is treated wrong. [Prop. VI.] The Nature of the Thing flands before the Mind as neceffary, or as what it is. And in that neceffary Nature the Obligation lies ; and therefore neceffarily rifes or refults from it, as it determines and (hews the only true and right Manner in which it is to be treat- ed, whether the Mind attends to it, or not ; or treats it agreeably to it's Nature, or not. From the Idea or Nature of Man an Obliga- tion neceffarily refults, or (lands before the Mind, to confider and treat him as what he is, or as a Man ; and (hews, that there is no other Way of treating him rightly. From the Idea or Nature of a Triangle arifes an Obligation to confider and apply it in P4a- thematics, or in Works of Art, according to it's true Nature : otherwife, it will be wrong 26 Of Truth. Chap. II. wrong confidered, or applied, by the fame Proportion. And this Obligation is univer- fal and eternal, by Prop. XVil. Nor doth it depend upon any Gain or Advantage, up- on any Compact or Agreement j upon any Will, Command or Force of any fuperior Power or Authority ; but is neceffary and independent. [Prop. XII.] XXIII. Corol. I. The Obligations of Truth do not depend upon the arbitrary Will of GOD. Prop. XII. XXIV. Corol. II. The great GOD him- felf is necefjarily under the Obligations of Truth. God is neceflarily what he is, as to his ac- tual as well as ideal Exigence, and he ne- cefTarily knows this. And he as necefTarily knows all the Natures, Capacities, Relations and Circumstances of all Things, which he hath produced, becaufe he hath produced them. Nor can he poinbly conceive, or conlider them to be any other, or in any Refpect otherwife, than what, and as what he has made them. And therefore, the fame Obligations muil: necefTarily refult from their Natures, Capacities, &c, to treat them, or to deal with them, according to their ref- pective Natures, &c. as refult to any other in- telligent Being. For if thofe Obligations re- fult Chap. II. Of Truth. 27 fult necejfarily, [Prop. XXII.] they mud refult unfrverjaily, to one intelligent Nature as well as to another. For though the Extent or De- gree of the Knowledge of the Natures, &c. of the Beings that exiir, muft be according to the Extent or Degree of Intelligence, with which any Being is endowed j yet the refus- ing of thofe Obligations neceflarily from the Natures of Things hath no Connection with, nor Dependence upon, any Perception or Knowledge of any Being whatever : but is connected with, and depends upon, only the Natures, &c. from which fuch Obligations refult. And therefore, thofe Obligations muft refult equally to all Minds that confider, or are acquainted with them ; as their Exigence neither is, nor can be affected (altered or changed) by any Mind, that confiders and obferves them, leeing they have no Depen- dence on any Mind whatfoever ; but refult neceflarily from the Natures of Things. The* great God may create what Beings he thinks fit. But when he hath created any Beings, the Natures, &c. of thofe Beings muft be what they are, independently even of his Will, and only with Refpect to their own Exiftence and Situation, what and where they are. And as He, who made all Things, muft have the moft perfect and extenfive Knowledge of all Natures. &c. and can ne- ver have any poffible Reafon, or Inducement, to act contrary to them, it is infallibly certain, that 23 Of Truth. Chap. IL that he always will actually treat and deal with them according to their true Natures, Properties, Relations or Circumftances ; or according to what they really are : unlefs he will contradict, or acl inconfiflently with, his own certain Knowledge, or violate a known Obligation, and fo be felf- condemned -, which is ablurd. Therefore, the Divine Being, though he hath no Superior to direct him, and though his Happinefs can neither be in- creafed, nor diminifhed, mud be as necefTarily obliged to obferve Truth and Reafon in all his Actions, as any other intelligent Nature : and that, as much more perfectly and ftrong- ]y, as he doth more perfectly perceive thofe eternal and neceffary Obligations. And his Divine Rectitude, or Perfection of Holinefs, confifls in his conftant and invariable Con- formity to this eternal and immutable Rule of all right Action. "Which indeed is no o- ther than his own infinite, eternal and all- perfect Underftanding ; which Underfland- ing is the eternal and unchangeable Law, or Rule by which He is directed in all his Ac- tions. From thefe Propositions we may de- duce the following Axioms, Canons or Laws of Truth. XXV. Canon i. [That which is, is] is the unherfal Rule of all Truth : as on the contrary. Chap. II. Of Truth. 29 contrary, [that is, which is not ;] or [that is not, which is,] are the univerfal Rules of all Error. That is to fay, all Truth and Error may be reduced to thofe Rules. XXVI. Canon 2. All Truth exifts hide* pendently of all Will and Power whatfoe r oer. Prop. XX. XXVII. Canon 3. No Truth, though of the leajl Importance, can ever be changed or deflroyed. All created Beings may be chang- ed or deftroyed ; but the Truths belonging to their feveral Natures can never, by any Power whatever, be deftroyed or changed. [Prop. XX.] For as the leaft Drop of Wa- ter, or the fmalleft Atom of Duft, muft ne- cefTarily, while it continues in Being, fill up fome Space, and Mountains heaped upon Mountains cannot crufh it into Nothing : fo the lead: Truth is of Force to refift the united Power of the whole Univerfe ; nor can the joint Endeavours of all Beings make it not to be true. Hence, whatever Action we commit at any Time, it muft be eternal- ly true, that we have done that Action. It is as true now, that the Wickednefs committed 4000 Years ago, was then committed, as it was the very Day it was donej and muft re- main equally true to all Eternity. Truth may be denied, or forgotten j but can never be deftroyed. XXVIII. 3° Of Truth. Chap. II. XXVIII. Canon 4. Truth, as it can ne- ver be changed or destroyed, may equally 0- perate in the Mind that is confcious to it, with the fame unvaried Force, and have equal Ef- fects upon fuch a Mind, to all Eternity. XXIX. Canon 5. No ojie Truth can pof fibly be inconfifient with any other Truth. If One Thing be true, it may indeed follow, that another is falfe : but if one Thins: be true, it can never follow, that another true Thing is falfe ; becaufe the one is as true as the other, both being founded in the real Nature or Exiftence of Things. XXX. Canon 6. Whatever is inconfi/lent with, or contradictory to, Truth, is Faljhood or Error. XXXI. Canon 7. A Thing cannot be true and falfe, at the fame Time, and in the fame Refpecl. XXXII. Canon 8. There are no Degrees of Truth, fmply confidercd ; all Truth being equally true, though not equally important. The Truths belonging to the Deity are in- finitely more important than the Truths be- longing to any Portion of mere Matter. Ne- yerthelefs, the Truths belonging to both are caually true. XXXIII. Chap. II. Of "truth. 3 1 XXXIII. Canon 9. There is no Medium between Truth and Falfiood ; as there is no Medium between Exiflence and Non Exif- tence. XXXIV. Canon 10. No one Intelligence can under jland that to be true, without Error \ which another Intelligence under/lands to be falfe, without Error. Or, All Truth mufl be underftood to be Truth by all intelligent Beings, Jo far as they do under/land it. XXXV. Canon ii. All Underfianding mufl necejfarily be fubjetf to Truth. Or, the true Natures and Exigences of Things are the Rule and Meafure of all Underfianding, from which no Underfianding can deviate without falling into Error, or Ignorance-. And, underfianding any Thing to be true, it is not in the Power of any intelligent Be- ing to under/land it to be falfe, or otherwife than as true. XXXVI. Canon 12. No Truth whatfoever can be fnbjecl to any Under/landing, or Au- thority whatfoever. Or, // is not in the Pow- er of any Under/landing or Authority to make what it pleajes to be true. Truth cannot be determined, decreed, or eflablimed by the Pleafure, Numbers, or Authority of any Men, or of any other Beings: but is de- termined 32 Of Reafon. Chap. III. termined and eftablirhed by it's own necefTary Exiftence alone. XXXVII. Canon 13. As the great GOD perfectly wider/lands all Manner of Exigences, both actual and poffible, his Under/landing muji be a Rule and Meafure of Truth, no lefs perfeB than the real Natures of Things, to which it is fully com men] urate. CHAP. III. Of Reafon. XXXVIII. DEFW.nEASON is that Fa- *^ culty of the Mind, by which we perceive, or under/land the 'Truth, or the true Natures of Things, and are cap a- ble of confide ring, diflinguifiing, comparing and judging of their Natures, Properties, Cir- cumjlances and Relations, and of discovering what is agreeable to, or inconfiftent with them. Thus Reafon is diftinguimed from the fimple Perceptions of Sen/e, or the Feelings of mere animal Nature, iuch as Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tailing. Which indeed may ge- nerally perceive, or feel, Objects truly ; but cannot perceive or apprehend the Truth, or reflect upon their own Feelings, fo as to de- duce any Truths from the Natures, or Re- lations of Objects 5 which is the Work, not of Chap. III. Of Reafom 33 of Senfe , but of Reafon alone. Senfe only fees a Part, and a Whole : Reafon compares them, and difcovers, that the Whole is e- qual to all it's Parts. Senfe only hears Sounds : Reafon diftinguiftres, compares and compounds them. Thus Reafon is aUo dif- tinguifhed from Tajlincls ; which, according to their true Nature, are to be considered as the mechanical Part of our Conftitution j feeing they have the fame Effect upon the. Motions of an Animal, as Weights and Springs upon a Machine, as a Clock, &c. moving, impelling, exciting or determining the Animal involuntarily, or without Thought or Reflection. Some Animals feem to be wholly under the Influence of fuch mechanical Powers, or Impreffions. How- ever fuch Inftincls we certainly experience in the Inclinations, Paffions, Affections, De- fires and Appetites, which were originally implanted in our Conftitution, and which are perpetually working in it : fuch as Fear, Anger, Love, Hatred, Pity, Affection to Offspring, an Inclination to Society, Bene- volence or good Nature, Hunger, Thirrr, &c. T:.J" Inftincts are, in themfelves, manifeftly the ii « lor Part of our Conftitu- tion, and have no Connection with Reafon, or Underftanding; faving only fo far as they are rightly directed, or governed by it. C Note ; 34 Of Reafon. Chap. III. Note ; In this Definition of Reason I include both the Faculty, and the Appli- cation of it 5 the Capacity of perceiving, and the actual Perception of Truth. I alfo ufe Reafon and Undemanding as fynonymous. XXXIX. REASON is that Principle, in all Beings endowed *whb it, which is in it's own Nature fupreme and commanding j before which all Means and Ends, that any Mind is capable of regarding, are to be tried as reafonab'e or unreafonable ; and accordingly to be purfued or avoided. In Deity, Un- demanding or Reafon is the Principle, which makes all his natural Attributes to be Per- fections. For, without Reafon, his Being would be reduced to the State of thoughtlefs Matter, or to an infinite Abfurdity. His Im- rnenfity would be but as mere Extenfion, and his Power a boundlefs Force without Direc- tion. And, without Underftanding and Reafon, his moral Perfections could have no Exigence at all. For it is manifeft, that a Being without Reafon is altogether uncapa- ble of Juftice, Goodnefs, Truth or Holinefs j or of fo much as knowing what they are, or what the proper Objects, upon which they are to be exercifcd. In fhort, without Rea- fon, the Divine Nature would be a kind of univerfal Darknefs, and whatever he is ne- ceiTariiy, would be neceilarily uncapable of being Chap. IN. Of Reafon. 35 being applied to any proper End. And in human Life, Reafon is mod evidently the reigning Principle, which alone is capable of ordering and directing all Affairs. And in our Conftitution, it is fupeiior to, and capa- ble of controuling and regulating, all our Paffions, Affections and Appetites. XL. REASON in any Being neceflvrily implies an Obligation upon that Being to right Acllon. For Obligation to right Action a- rifes neceffarily from the Natures and Rela- tions of Things, fo far as they are known, by Prop. XII, XIV. Therefore, where there is the mod perfect Knowledge of the Na- tures and Relations of all Beings, as in the. moft high God, there the moft. perfect: and flrongeft Obligations muft neceffarily refult. And with Regard to all other Beings, the nearer they approach, in the Scale of Being, to the Perfection of Reafon, the more per- fect and extenfive their Obligations to right Action muft be. And the lowed Clafs of rational Nature, fo far as it is capable of knowing the Truth, muft fo far neceffarily be under an Obligation to follow it. XLI. WHEN we anfwer this Obliga- tion^ and aft agrecabh to the "Truth, or the true Natures, Properties, Relations and Clr- cumflances of Things, we then acl reason- ably j or our Actions and Purfuits are C 2 reafonable. 36 Of Reafon, Chap. III. reafonable. Reafon difcovers, or perceives the Truth ; and we act reafonably, in any Refpect, when we act agreeably to what Reafon difcovers concerning the Natures, Properties, Relations, and Circumftances of Things. XLII. THE Faculty of Reafon may be more or lefs perfeB in different Beings. The Difference of mental Capacities is certain. In God, Reafon rnuft neceflarily be in the hipheft Degree of Perfection. In all other Beings, it is in that Degree and Extent, which He is pleafed to allot. And among Men we iind, that he has allotted very dif- ferent Capacities to different Perfons. XLIII. BUT TJnderftanding or Reafon in different Beings, is not different with RefpeSl to what it truly imderjlands ; but only in De- gree or Extent of Capacity, by Prop. XXXIV. For Inftance ; fuppofe any rational Being can only underffand the Relation between two and four, or that four is double to two ; though it mould underftand no other Rela- tion or Proportion j yet it underftands this, as truly as that Being, whofe rational Capa- city is of a higher Degree, or much larger Extent. And thus it's Understanding is in- ferior, only as it is lefs exteni!ve, not as it underftands differently, what it doth under- ftand, from a fuperior Capacity. XLIV. Chap. IV. Of Agency. 37 XL1V. THE Obligations of rational Be- ings to right ASlion mufi be according to their fever al Degrees of Reafon, and the Extent of their intellectual Capacities. For it is very evident, that as no Being can act, fb no Be- ing can be obliged to act, beyond the Limits of it's natural Powers. CHAP. IV. Of Agency. XLV. Defin. /jGENCr is Liberty of ■" Mind to prefer one Thing before another •, to will or nill, to choofe to exert to any Power, or not to exert it. He who hath a Capacity of choofing to rife up, or to fit {till ; to fpeak, or to be filent j to turn his Thoughts to this, or to the other Object, is indued with Agency. XL VI. Freedom and Agency are the fame Thing. He that hath Freedom of Mind to choofe and will, to nill or refufe, is an Agent. But he that hath not that Freedom is no Agent. To will and to act are the fame Thing : and to afk, if a Man be free, is the fame as to afk, if he be an Agent. XLVII. THE Exigence of any Being, feparate and dijlincl from the firjl necejj'arily C 3 exi fling 38 Of Agency. Chap. IV. exiting Caufe, is fuficient Evidence of the A- gency of the frfi Caufe, or fupreme Being. For' if any other Being doth exift, it mud either cxiit neceffarjly, or by the Will, or A^encv, of the firft Caufe. There is no third Reafon or Ground of Exigence. It is abfurd, or rather impofllble, that I fhould think myfelf a necefTarily exifting Being, or any Part of fuch a Being : becaufe I know certainly that I have not the Attributes, which necefTarily belong to fuch a Being : I muft therefore either be produced by the Will, cr Agency, of fuch a Being, or be neceilariiy produced. If the latter, then I ex ill neceilariiy ; feeing that which is necef- Tarily produced, mud: exift by the fame Nc- ceffity, by which it's Caufe doth exift, and muft have the Attributes of a necefTarily exifting Being. But I am lure I have not thofe Attributes : therefore, I am the free Prcdu&ion of the firft Caufe, who had it in his Option to give me Exiftence or not. This (hews, that Agency, or Freedom of Choice, is not impolTible, or a Contradic- tion 3 feeing the whole Creation proves, that God, w 10 produced it, produced it vo- luntarily ; and confequently is an Agent. XLVIII. Man is an Agent. If Man was free, he could not have greater Confciouf- nefs, or Evidence, of his Freedom than he hath. Any one Inftance of Self-Motion in us Chap. IV. Of Jgency. 39 us will prove us to be Agents. And any one may give himfelf at any Time a De- monftration of this, by only ftirring his Finger, or (hutting his Eyes whenever he plealeth. It is unreafonable and abfurd to fuppofe, that God hath given us Under- ftanding and Judgment without a Power of ufing them. Or that we fhould be capable of knowing and reafoning about right Ac- tion, and yet not be capable of acting. Our being necerTarily juftified, or condemned by the Reflections of our Minds upon our own Actions, proves that we are accountable for them, as being the proper and only Authors of them -, and, confequently, that we are Agents. XLIX. AGENCT, or Freedom of Mind, is the fame in nilling as in willing j in refw f?ig y as in confenting j or in choofmg not to do a Thing, as in choojing to do it. If at prefent I do not like to do a Thing, and fo refufe to do it j but afterwards alter my Mind, and then am willing to do it, or choofe it mould be done : the Freedom of the Mind is e- qually exerted in refufing to do the Thing, in altering my Mind, and in choofing to do it. L. Agency, or a Capacity of willing or choofing that any EffeSi Jhould be produced, and Power, or an Ability to produce that EJ- fecl, are different Things, and may exijl the C 4 one '40 Of Agency. Chap. IV. one without the other. The Power ,of God is infinite, and perfectly commenfurate to his Agency : infomuch that whatever he wills, is immediately effected. But human Power is confined to very narrow Bounds, and ca- pable of producing, comparatively, but very few Effects' : fo that it is eafy to conceive, that we may will, or cboofe, to have that done, which is not in our Power to effect - 3 or, that we may will to reft, or not to move, even when a fuperior Power conftrains us to be moved. Further ; any Action is juftly attributed to the Assent, who willed it to be effected, though the Effect did not follow, through Defect of his Power ; or though the Power of another Agent effected it, in Confequence of his willing it. Ke is a Murderer, who wills the Murther, though lie employs a Ruffian to perpetrate what he willeth. Power may poffibly refide in a Sub- ject that is no Agent : as in the Cafe of pby- iical or natural Powers ; fuch as Springs, Weights, or the Power of a Body in Mo- tion to impel or move another Body. And Agency may poffibly be in a Subject that hath no Power to produce the external Ef- fect ; as in a Man who hath no Ufe of his Limbs, and yet wills, or deiires to walk. For it is very plain 3 that Agency, which is the voluntary Exertion of the Mind, is not deftroyed by any Gbfiruction of the Effect. Therefore, LI. WANT Chap. IV. Of Agency. 41 LT. W A NT of Power doth not defiroy Agency. Indeed, the Confcioufnefs that I want Power to effect a Thing, may prevent my willing of it ; but takes not away my Agency, or Capacity of willing it. And my not acting, or willing, in fuch a Cafe, only mews my Prudence, not Want of Agency. Though the Body be bound in Fetters, or confined to the clofefl: Prifon, the Mind is ftill free, and can, notwithstanding, exert it felf voluntarily. And fo in all Cafes where the Power of effecting, or moving, is want- ing, or. is obstructed by a fuperior Power. LII. THE Decifion of the Judgment for or againfl a Thing doth not affefi or deflroy, Freedom, or Agency. The Judgment fimply fhews, what is, or appears to be, right and wrong; and though Men mould generally be determined to act according; to it's Deci- fion ; yet it is certain, from undoubted Ex- perience and Facts, which in this Cafe are as good Evidence, as Experiments in natural Philofophy, that they are not determined ne- cefTarily, but freely. Not necefarily, by a relative, particular Neceffity ; [See the De- finition under Prop. XX.] for then they muft always follow the Decifion of the Judgment by the Constraint of a Force which they are not able to refift. Which is contrary to Ex- perience and Fact. Men too frequently choofe to 42 Of Agency. Chap. IV. to act contrary to the Deciiion of the Judgment concerning Right and Wrong. They fee and acknowledge the Right, and do the Wrong. Olherwiie, Men would always, and univer- faliy do what is morally right, as they would always follow the Dictates of their Judg- ments ; as will be feen afterwards. LIII. FOR the fame Reafon, Motives of Plea/ure, or Pain, Profit* or Lofs, do not af- fecl Agency. Thefe work powerfully upon the human Mind, but not neceffarily j feeing there are many who choofe to act contrary to their Influence. They are abftract No- tions, or Confiderations, in the Mind, which therefore, may induce, or incline, but have no Power to compel or force. They are not Agents, or efficient Caufes, but an End pro- pofed, or in View : and therefore, can in- fluence the Mind only as Objects or Ends propofed to it's Con fide rat ion. The Frof- pect or Consideration, of fome very great Evil, Pain or Suffering, which makes it, as we fay, morally certain, that I (hall not choofe to do what would bring upon me the dread- ed Evil, doth not fufpend, much lefs def- troy, my Freedom, or Agency. In fuch Cafes, my not chooiing, or refuting, fhews only my Care or Caution to preferve my Life, Eafe or Safety : or my Fear of Pain and Death ; but not my Want of Liberty. For though it be certain, that I (hall not choofe to do what would bring upon me the fuppofed Chap. IV. Of Ag$ncy< 43 fuppofed Evil, yet am I (till at Liberty to choofe it, did I not prefer the Prefervation of my Life and Safety. My Freedom of Judg- ment and Choice remains entire : for if I judged it proper, or had Reafons, which determined me to choofe or prefer the con- trary, I mould, at that very Inftant, choofe the contrary. No Man would choofe to have his Flefh burnt with a hot Iron without any Reafon, or when he hatha very good Reafon againft it : but when there is a good Reafon for it, to preferve Life or Limb, he will choofe that the Surgeon (liould apply a Cau- tery, or hot Iron, to his Flefh. No Man would choofe to be burnt alive : but rather than do Violence to Religion or Confcience, many have gone to the Stake with furprizing Courage and Firmnefs of Mind. No Man would willingly incur the Danger of loiing his Life : but in his Country's Caufe, and for other Reafons, which have appeared to him very important, good and juft, many a Man hath voluntarily expofed his Life to this Danger. We choofe Evil, when of two Evils we choofe the leaft. This plainly proves, that in fuch Cafes a Man choofeth or refufeth, nilleth or willeth, not becaufe his Liberty is affected ; but becaufe he hath, or hath not, Reafons or Motives to determine him this or the other Way. His Agency is the fame both in refufing and in chooling, by Prop. XLIX. LIV. AG EN- 44 Of Agatcy. Chap. IV. IAN. AGENCY, or Freedom, admits not of Degrees ; or cannot be more or le/s y partly free, and partly forced. For though a Being may both act, and be acted upon ; yet this cannot be in the fame Refpects. For io far as any Being adetb, he is perfectly free : fo far as he is acted upon, he is no A- gent at all. For, LV . A N irrefijlible Impulfe upon the Mind from fome fuperior 'Power, which forces us to will, or to confent, dejlroys Agency : or rather is a Contradiction. It is impoffible, that the Will, or free Choice, mould be forced. And if it be forced, it cannot, for that Reafon, be free. For Force neceiTarily makes the Thing, fuppofed to be freely willed, not to be at all willed, or chofen, by the Being, who is under the Constraint of fuch Force. Therefore, in the Nature of the Thing, the Will cannot be fubjedt to any overbearing Violence. For by fuch Violence it mult ceafe to be a Will, or an Agent ; and be- comes as paffive as inert Matter, when it is put into Motion by mere Power. Nor can any Thing, effected in the Mind by mere Force, be accounted the Action of the Be- ing, in whom it is effected, any more than the Motion of any Body can be ac- counted the Action, or freely chofen Motion, of that Body. LVI. THE Chap. IV. Of Agency. 45 LVI. THE proper Caufe of an ABion is the Will of the Agents and nothing clfe. If any Effect is produced by any external Force impreffed upon my Mind or Body, that Ef- fect is not my Action, but the Action of that Being, who willed, or chofe, to force me, not indeed to off, but to be moved in fuch a Manner as to produce the fuppofed. Effect : for which I can in no Senfe be ac- countable, as I was only a pafiive Inftrument in the Hand of a fuperior Agent. That Ef- fect being truly and only my Action, which I freely will to exift. Therefore, . LVII. ON LT what an Agent intends to do is to be accounted his ASlion. What arifes beyond or contrary to his Intention, however it may eventually happen, or be derived by the Connection of natural Caufes, from his Determination, ought not to be imputed to him. Our own Determinations alone are our Actions. [LV. LVI.] Thefe alone we have abfolute Power over, and are immediately and truly the Caufes of, and refoonfible for. [Price.] A Perfon intending to fell a Tree, may accidentally, by the Head's flying from the Helve of the Ax, kill a Man : but this, not being his Intention, is not his Action. C H A P. 46 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. CHAP. V. Of Virtue^ or Atlion morally right. LVIII. ]\ yJOR AL Aftion comprehends all JlVJL Tttfidfices of Regard or Behavi- our towards ourfelves, and all other rational, and fenjible, or mere animal Beings, from the mofl high GOD down to the meanejl Reptil, to which we are related, with which we have any Society, or Intercourfe, or which we can any JVays voluntarily a feet by our Anions, Thefe are the Limits of Morality, with Regard to Objedts and Actions. Therefore, LIX. FROM the Objects and Ideas of Morality we exclude all Things merely material or inanimate, with their Natures and Proper- ties, as PP r ood, Stone, Iron, Water, Air, &c. and any mechanical Operations, or Actions upon, or relating to them 3 fitch as Painting, Sculpture, Building, Mujich, &c. excepting only Jo far as fitch inanimate Things, or fuch Operations have any Connection with our Regards to, or Treatment of rational or fenfble Beings. Such Operations may befrnply right or wrong ac- cording to the Natures, or Properties of the Things : that is to fay, may be painted, carved, performed, &c. truly or agreeably to the true Nature of Things -, but they are not Chap. V. Action morally right. 47 not morally'tight or wrong, any further than they are, or are not, done honejlly, afejully or beneficently. LX. WE mufl alfo exclude from the Idea of Morality all mere Knowledge^ or Science ; as Mathematics, Hiftory, Skill in Languages, &c . As alfo all Ingenuity , cr Sagacity of Mind y Strength, or Agility of Body. Ail thefe may, in fome Refpects, bear a Conformity ta Truth, or to the true Natures of Things. But being only fimple Knowledge, or Pow- ers, they cannot be morally right or wrong, any further than as they are applied • or are, or are not ufed konejily, iifejidly y or bencfi- cently. Any Skill, Capacity, Ingenuity or Sa- gacity in Arts and Sciences may exi(t, and a A with great Truth and Accuracy in Ref- pec~t to their particular Objects and Ends, without connoting or influencing right Beha- viour, or any good Difpofition of Mind ; and are confident with the mod vicious and im- moral Lives. LXI. AND we may exclude from the Idea- of Morality the Performance of any Functions merely natural or animal ; as eating, drink- ing, fleeping, &c, excepting fo far as Rea- fon, or Behaviour, are concerned in the Per- formance of them. For though the per- forming fuch Functions may be acting ac- cording to the true Natures of Things, yet in 48 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. in themfelves they are mere natural Actions, to which, in Part at leaft, we are compelled by Neceflity of Nature. And fo far they cannot be judged Actions at all. [XLV, XLVl.j LXII. ALSO all inftinBlve Inclinations, Pajfions and Affections, fuch as Fear, Sorrow, foy, Companion, Love, &c. mufi be excluded from the Notion and Principle of moral Action. Seeing thefe are, as it were, the Mechanifm of our Frame, which move, impel, excite or determine the animal Part of our Confti- tution involuntarily, or without Thought or Reflection ; and fo far their Motions are no Actions at all; nor, while we are under their Impulfe alone, are we Agents, by Prop. XLV, XLVI. Confequently, Inftincts can conftitute no Part or Principle of Morality, any further than they are overruled, retrain- ed, dire&ed and applied by the Interpofition of Reafon to moral Purpoies. LXIII. As all the foreo-oing: Rules and Laws of right Aclicn /imply confdered, of 'Truth-, of Reafon and of Agency, are univer- fally true - 3 fo they muft necefiarily be true of ABion morally right in particular : and we have, accordingly, a Right to argue from them ; or to refer to them, as Truths al- ready eftablimed. LXIV. IF Chap. V. Action morally tight. 49 LXIV. IF there was no Difference in the Natures, Relations, and Properties of Perjbns, Things and Actions ; but all Per/bus, Things and Actions, and their fever al Natures, Re - la! ions and Properties were the fame, in all Re/pecls equal and alike, then there could be no Reajon, nor Foundation, for moral Action, by Prop. VII. Eecaufe it muft then be perfect- ly indifferent how we behave ; nor could we be under any Obligation to ad in this, or in the other Manner ; feeing there would be nothing in any Objec~i, which required any Difference in our Actions, or Behaviour, all Objects being in all Refpects the fame 3 a Man, a Horfe, a Tree, a Stone, Money in the Purfe, or Pebbles on the Sea-fliore 5 Blood in the Veins, or Sludge in a Gutter. Nor would there be any Thing in any Ac- tion, which could make any Difference be- tween it, and it's Oppofite. Love, Hatred ; Gratitude, Ingratitude ; Intemperance, So- briety ; Lewdnefs, Chaftity ; {tabbing a Man, and running a Spade into a Heap of Clay, would be Actions and Habits all alike, and all alike indifferent, neither morally right, nor morally wrong. LXV. BUT there is a real Difference in the Natures, Properties and Relations cj Per- fens, Things and Actions, which, in feme Meajurc, is obvious to all Mankind, and D known 50 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. known and allowed over all the World. Prop. IV. V. And this Difference in the Natures, &c. of Perfons, Things and Anions, (being in it felf neceiTary and eternal, by Prop. XX.) neceffarily lays us under an Obligation to act and behave differently towards them ; or to coniider and treat them feverally, according to their Natures, by Prop. XXII. or accord- ing to Truth, by Prop. XII. XIX. whether Men choofe to coniider them in this Manner or not. Prop. VIII. LXVI. FAITHFULLY to treat, or behave towards^ all rational and fen fib le Be- ings, and the Things which may affecl them> according to their Natures, Properties, Rela- tions, and Circumftances, or according to the Truth, * fo far as known, or apprehended by any * TO afl according to Truth, is a right Definition of Virtue. But fonie have attempted to overthrow this Definition by alleging, " That as many Truths, or true " Proportions, may be affirmed of an Action morally " wrong, as of an Aclion morally right : confequent- " iy, that an Aclion morally wrong, may, by this Rule, ** be as conformable to Truth, as an Action morally " right. For Inftance ; it may be truly faid of a vir- " tuous Action, that it ex/jls, or is done ; that it is d all-perfect Underftanding, to do what is right j nor can He be obliged by any Thing elfe. Nor is it poflible He mould, in any Cafe or Degree whatever, not comply with fuch His Obligations. For there can be no poflible Hindrance to His Judgment or Actions in the leaft Degree. The perfect Wifdom and Power of God, together with His Self-fufnciency, muft render all His Ac- tions, moral as well as natural, abfolutely complete. For there can be no poflible Reafon why Fie mould ever do that which is unreafonable, or not do that which is reason- able 5 feeing He necefTanly knows what is reafonable, and has all Power abfolutely in His own Hands, directed by infinitely per- fect Knowledge and Wifdom. He cannot pcilibly want, or defire any Thing for Him- felf: and therefore can never poffibly have any Chap. V. Action morally right. 55 any Inducement to Adion, but the Reafon of ABion. And, as it is impoflible that Reafon fhould be both for and againft any Action, it follows, that God will always do what is right and reafonable : not becaufe He has not the natural Power to do otherwife j but becaufe He can have no Motive to it, but will always choofe to ad reafonably : hence arife thole Perfections in God, which are called moral; fuch as Juflice, Goodnefs, Faith- fulnefs, Truth, and the like ; which may be comprized under the Name and Notion of Divine Reclitude, meaning, that Conftancy and Certainty, with which God doth inva- riably act according to Truth and the Reafon of Things ; which is the fole Ground of his moral Perfections. And as God is, in the higheft Degree, under the Obligations of Virtue 5 fo all inferior rational Beings are un- der the fame Obligations, fo far as their Knowledge and Power can extend. And fuch Beings can never ad fuitably to their rational Natures, or comply with their moral Obligations, without a conftant and upright Exertion of all their Powers, according to their feveral Circumftances, in the Difcovery of Truth, (fuch fir ft as mod concerns them, and fo on,) and in acting agreeably to it. LXX. ALL particular Obl : gatiom to ac~l yirtuoujly are included in the general one -[Prop. LXVI.] of afting agreeably to tk true Na- D 4 * ures * 56 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. tures, &c. of Things, and are moral "Duties only by Virtue of it's Force. For whatever is required of moral Agents by the Will of God ; or by the Will of any other Being; or by the Profpect of any Happinefs, or Freedom from Pain, can oblige them only as rational Agents, or as they lie under the Obligations of this everlafting univerfal Rule of Action. And whatever doth not oblige them as rational Agents, can be no moral Obligation at all ; but mere inftinclive Incli- nation, or abfurd Force and Conftraint. The Perception of Truth being that alone, which can poffibly render any Agent, or Action moral. For where there is no Truth, or no Truth perceived, there can be no Exercife of Reafon, or moral Agency. LXXT. VIRTUE, with- RefpeB to it's Obligations, is a Law. And it is the first and supreme Law, to which all other Laws owe their Force, on which they depend, and in Virtue of which alone they oblige. [Prop. LXX.] It is an universal Law. The whole Creation is ruled by it : under it Men, and all rational Beings do fubfift. [Nor is it fit they mould fubfift, or continue in Being, but as they are voluntarily ruled by it.] It is the Source and Guide of all the Actions of Deity Himfelf, and on it his Throne and Government is founded. [Prop. XXIV, LX1X.] Ife is an unalterable and in- DISPEN- Chap. V. Aulion morally right, $j dispensible Law. The Repeal, Sufpen- fion, or even Relaxation of it, but for a Moment, in any Part of the Univerfe, can- not be conceived without a Contradiction • [or without fuppofmg Things to be what they really are not ; or without a Difiblution of the whole Univerfe. It is an eternal and everlasting Law.] Other Laws have had a Date ; a Time when they were enac- ted and became of Force. They are con- fined to particular Places, reft upon uncer* tain Foundations, may lofe their Vigor, grow obfolete with Time, and become ufe- lefs and neglected. None of thefe are true of this Law. It has no Date ; was never made or enacted ; is prior to all Things, and governs all Things; is felf- originated, and felf valid; ftands on immoveable Founda- tions, and can never lofe it's Vigor and Ufe- fulnefs; but muft ever retain them, with- out the Poilibility of Diminution or Abate- ment. It is coeval with Eternity ; as unal- terable as neceftary, everlalting Truth ; as independent as the Exigence of God ; and as facred, venerable and awful as His Nature and Perfections. Prices Review, Chap. VI. P. 189. LXXII. VIRTUE, with Refpctftotbe Practice of it, is the Perfection of rational Beings. Becaufe it is the only right IVlanner of applying and ufing the Powers of Reafon, in 58 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. in all Cafes and Circumftances, according to their true Nature, and for the higheft Ends and Purpofes for which they could be given. For they couid be given for no higher End, than to underftand the Truth, and to acl: a- greeably to it. Which rnuft include all good Difpoiitions of Mind ; all that can render a moial Agent ufeful to others, and happy in himfelf : that is to fay, all that is perfec- tive of his Nature, both abfolutely and rela- tively. By Virtue, one Man is a God to an- other. By this noblefr. of all Principles we move regularly and honorably in every Sphere of A&ion 5 and behave properly under all Events in every Relation, State and Condi- tion. And by the Habits of Virtue, gained in this prefent World, we are duely qualified to acl; for ever properly and worthily ; and in a manner perfectly agreeable to any new inlarged or exalted Citcumftances, Ingage- ments or Relations in any future State of Ex- igence, and in any other Part of God's Cre- ation, to which we can be raifed, or remov- ed j feeing the Laws and Obligations of Vir- tue are the fame every where, throughout the whole Univerfe, and throughout all Eternity. LXXIII. VIRTUE is the only Mean of rendring moral Agents the proper Objects of Approbation, Efieem, Encouragement and Re- ward. Mere Exigence, though attended with the higheft Powers, being fimplv the Work Chap. V. ASllon morally right. 59 .Work and Gift of God, and no ways the Merit of the Agent, who pofTerTes them, cannot recommend that Agent to Efteem, or render him praife-worthy or rewardable. Mod evidently, it is only his own proper Ufe and Application of his Being and Pow- ers, that can give him a Character of Worth, and intitle him to Honor and Reward. LXXIV. Corol. // feems agreeable to the Reafon of Things^ that moral Agents^ after their Creation, ftould be, for fome Time, in a State of Trial or Difcipline ; to exercife, prove and feafon their Virtue in it's proper Habits, (which cannot be forced upon them. Prop. LV.) in order to render them the qualified Objects of the Divine Approbation, and the proper Subjects of Honor and Ex- altation. And this may well be fuppofed to be the prefent Cafe of Mankind. LXXV. OUR Maker, by giving us ra- tional Powers^ hath neceffdrily laid us under all moral Obligations , and, confequently, hath made us the Subjects of moral Government, as far as thofe Powers extend, By Prop. XL, LX1X. LXXVI. Corol. The promoting of Virtue among moral Agents is the End and Defign cf all the Divine Conftitutions and Difpenj'ations relating to fich Agents, For God has plain- 'y 60 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. ]y declared, in the Frame of their Nature, that he has made them for the Purpofes of Virtue ; and as this muft be the principal End, becaufe it is the Perfection, of their Being, [Prop. LXXII.] God will certainly, and conftantly act agreeably to thefe Truths, in all his Dealings, Appointments and Tranf- actions with moral Agents, according as their feveral Cafes and Circumftances do require. [Prop. XXIV.] LXXVII. REASON, or Vnderfianding, is the only Vacuity in the human Confiitution, which can perceive fnoral Obligations. Becaufe this is the only Faculty that can difcern Truth, or the true Natures, Circumftances and Relations of Things ; [Prop. XXXVIII.] and, confequently, the Obligations, which neceilarily refult from them. [Prop. XXII.] LXXVIII. WITHOUT a right and faithful Ufe of Underfiafiding, Virtue cannot be praclifed, Becaufe Virtue is acting con- formably to the Natures of Things j and therefore thofe muft be known according to our Capacity j otherwife, it is not poflible we mould act agreeably to them. [Prop. XV.] LXXIX. THEREFORE, the rational Powers, or Intelligence, of every finite moral Agent, is the firfl, or nearefl, ObjeB of that right Acliork, or virtuous Conduit t to which fuch Chap. V. Action morally right. 61 fuch Agent is obliged. [Prop. XVI.] Which mental Powers he is neceiTarily obliged, or it will always be reafonable for him. to cul- tivate and improve, according to their Ex- tent and Capacity, and the Opportunities he enjoys, by the general Lav/, which obliges him to treat or ufe every Thing according to it's true Nature. For as it is the true Nature and Ufe of the Eye to difcern Objects ; and the Eye, which is always wilfully clofed, is, in Effect, deftroyed : fo it is the true Nature and Ufe of Intelligence, or Reafon, to confider and compare Objects, their Pro- perties and Relations ; otherwife, it is, in Effect, deftroyed, and is no Underftanding, or underflands nothing as it mould do. And fo the Conduct of the moral Agent, who neglects or perverts his Understanding, is vicious, by the foregoing Proportion. There- fore, the primary Object of Virtue is our own Faculties, and a right Ufe of them. And the Obligation to a right Ufe of them neceffarily arifes from our being poffeffsd of them. [Prop. LXXV.] Th3t is to fay, while we are poffeffed of them, it will always be reafonable to ufe them rightly, or according to their true Nature : and can never be o- therwife. Prop. XII. LXXX. THE Extent of our intellectual Capacities, and the Means and Opportunities ive enjoy of improving and exerting them, miift 62 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. muft be taken into the Account of our Virtue, and of the Degree of our Obligations. For Capacity, Means and Opportunity are Truths relating to our Being and Circumftances, as much as any other whatever ; and therefore, ought to be confidered as being what they truly are. No Man can be obliged to Im- poflibilities ; or it cannot be reasonably ex- pected, that he mould do no more than is in his Power. No Beings can lie under fur- ther Obligations than their Powers extend to. Prop. LXIV. LXXXL Cgrol. The Differences of Ca- pacities, Educations, Opportunities, and va- rious other Circumftances of our Exigence, make the Trial, or moral State, of different Mm different and peculiar. Which Differ- ence of moral State is a Secret to our narrow Minds, and can be known to God alone. LXXXII. GOD, who is infinite in Power and Wifdom, can inlarge our faculties, dif- cover new Objecfs cf Attention and Regard ; or fupply new, and mere effectual Means of Improvement, as he pkafes. And it is agree- able to His Character, as He is our Maker and Father, that He mould afford His Oif- fpring fuch Means of Improvement. LXXXII I. I F at any Time the great GOD hath been p leafed, or Jkall think fit, to Chap. V. Action morally right. 6% to inlarge our Faculties, or to difcover any new ObjecJ of our Regard and Attention, bejides and beyond what appears to us in the prefent Conftitution of things ; or to fupply any new or more effectual Means of improving our Minds , we are obliged, by the necejfary and eter- ?ial Law of 'Truth, [Prop. LXVI.] to regard and to ufe them according to what they are, as much as we are obliged to regard and improve thofe, which He hath already difcovered and fupplied in the prefent Confiitution of Things* This Rule mud hold good to all Eternity. If God difcovers a new Benefactor, our Gratitude immediately, and neceflarily be- comes due to that Benefactor, If he dif- plays new InMances of Goodnefs and Favor fc our Obligations to Love and Thankfulnefs necefTarily refult. If he furnifhes new Mo- tives to Duty and Virtue, we are bound by the eternal and immutable Laws of Truth, to admit their Force upon our Minds. Objects and Favors may be new ; but Obligations cannot be of a new Sort, but muft be of the fame Kind with any other we are at any Time under. The Sphere of Duty may be inlarged -, but Duty, or right Action mud, in it's own Nature, ever remain unaltered. LXXX1V. A NEW, or different Rela- tion or Circum/lance, according to the eternal and immutable Lazv oj Truth, con/lit utes new and different Duties, with their proper Obli- gations. 64 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. gatiom *. When a Perfon is advanced to JVlagirtracy, his Obligations and Duties, as a Magistrate, are different from thofe of pri- vate Life. As a private Perfon, he was obliged indeed to be concerned for, and to wifh well to, the whole Community ; but was not inverted with Power and Authority to guard, or to effect it's Welfare. But as a Masiftrate, inverted with Power and Autho- rity to guard the Safety, and promote the Welfare of the Whole, he is obliged by the true Nature of the Relation, in which he ftands to the Community, not only to wi(h it well, but to confider by what Means his new Power is to be employed, that the Pros- perity of the Community may be bert fecured and promoted, and to act accordingly. As a private Perfon he is obliged, as all private Perfons are, by the Laws of Truth, to make favorable Allowances for the Infirmities, Mif- takes and Paffions of Mankind} and fo to be of a forbearing Temper, and ready to forgive Wrongs and Injuries. But as a Ma- giftrate, the State of the Community mud: determine him in difpenfing Pardons and Punimments, according as they affect the State of the Public. Thus the Injury, which * Lines and Figures have different Properties and Proportions, as they are differently drawn and htuated. So the moral Qualifications of Actions vary, as their Objects and Ends, Cafes and Circumftances alter. [Price.] Chap. V* Action morally right. 65 which mould always be forgiven, as it affecls only a fingle Perfon, in his private Capacity, (I mean, fa far forgiven, as that he mould not retaliate, or take a private Revenge) mould not be forgiven by the Magiftrate, when brought before him, as it is dangerous to the Peace or Safety of the Public. And in doing Juftice, as a Magiflrate, he ought to retaliate, or proportion Punimments to Crimes. LXXXV. THE Nature of Virtue alters not with the different Capacities cf Beings^ only the Degree and Extent of it. Virtue is true Virtue in Man, or agreeable to the Truth of Things, though infinitely inferior to, and more contracted than, Virtue in the Divine Being. The Nature, though not Degree of Virtue is the fame in all Beings. All moral Agents, fo far as their Capacities extend, are under the fame Obligations to Reafon and Truth. LXXXVJ. THE Foundation of moral Obligation is not affected by any Doubts or Difficulties concerning the Natures of Sub- fiances, or their Efiences, no more than the Foundation of mathematical Truth. Mathe- matical Truth is eternal and unalterable, whatever the Subftances of Things are, to which they relate ; and even though fuch Subftances fhould not exift at all, being E founded 66 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. founded upon the eternal and immutable Relations and Proportions of Numbers, Lines and Figures. So moral Truth is' eter- nal and unalterable, whether our Percep- tions of Objects are true Reprefentations or their intimate Natures, or Subftances, or not. It is enough that we faithfully en- deavor to perceive and underftand Objects, according to the Extent of thofe Capacities which God hath given us j and that we act agreeably to the Ideas and Definitions of them, as they appear to the human Under- ftanding, whatever they are in themfelves. For we can be obliged to argue and reafon from the Natures, &c. of Things, and to form our Actions upon them, only as they appear to us, and are faithfully apprehended and perceived by us. Thus we {halt act agreeably to the Truth of our Capacities, and the Truth of Things, fo far as we can know them. However, in the abdract Ideas, and Definitions of Things, as they appear to us, and in, their feveral Relations, Proportions and Circumftances, we cannot be deceived, unlefs we wilfully deceive our felves. LXXXVII. THE Imperfe&iom, which attend our Nature, do not affeSi the Ride of Duty, Seeing all Beings are neceffarily obliged to the Practice of Virtue, according to their Degree of Reafon, or moral Capa- city, Chap. V. Action morally right. 67 city, be it more or lefs j but no farther. For no Beings can lie under any Obligations, beyond the Extent of their P#wers or Ca- pacities. Prop. LXXX. LXXXVIH. ALL the Obligations and Duty of inferior Beings, or imperfect Agents, are neceffarily comprehended within the Limits of their true and faithful Endeavors. la God, his perfect Nature excludes all Need of Endeavors. In all imperfect Beings, faithful Endeavors mull be the Perfection of their Virtue : becaufe their Powers and Ca- pacities reach no further. LXXXIX. THEREFORE, in Man, the Virtue relating to his Principles, or the Perfuafion of his Mind concerning Duty, cannot be meafured ekher by the Quantity, or Exaclnefs of his Knowledge, or the Truth and Rightnefs of his Opinions, but only by his real andfncere Love of Truth, and faithful Enquiry after it, (according to his Capacity, Opportu- nitics and Circus/lances, J upon which thofe Principles or Perfuajions are embraced, Be- caufe this is all that he can do to gain true Knowledge and right Opinions, how much foever he may happen to be wrong in either. [LXXX.] Hie Opinions are morally right, and have all the Merit of true ones, mould they happen to be really wrong. So little Reafon is there for pcrfecuting thofe that E 2 really 68 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. really are ; and flill lefs for perfecuting thofe who we only think are, in the Wrong. • XC. THE Virtue relating to a Man's Behaviour tnuji be mcafured by the confant, fincere, uniform Endeavor •, with which he con- forms to Confcience, or the DiBates of his own Mind, according to his Powers, Afjijlences and Oppofition. The aclual fincere Love of Truth is the only virtuous Principle in Man ; and fincere Obedience to Conscience, or the Sentiments and Perfuaiions, of our Minds, is the only virtuous Practice. Thefe two laft Propofitions conftitute Integrity. It is truly and abfolutely right that a Perfon mould do, what the Reafon of his Mind, though per- haps unhappily, but not wilfully, mistaken, requires of him : or what, according to his bed: Judgment, he is perfuaded is the Will of God. If he neglecls this, he becomes neceffarily and juftly the Object of his own Diflike, and forfeits all Pretenfions to Virtue and Integrity. [Price.] XCI. This lays the Foundation of a Dif- tindtion of Virtue into abfirabl and abfolute ; practical and relative. The firft denotes what an Action is in it felf and abfolutely, independently of the Sen fe of the Agent, and what, if he judged truly, he would judge he ought to do. Practical Virtue has a ne- cefTary Relation to, and Dependence upon, the Chap. V. Aclion morally right. 69 the Senfe and Opinion of the Agent concern- ing his Actions. It fignifies what he ought to do, upon Supposition of his having fuch and fuch Sentiments of Things. A moral Agent may be [honeftly] mistaken j but what in the Sincerity of his Heart he thinks he ought to do, that he ought to do, and would be juftly blamcable, if he omitted to do, though contradictory to what, in the former Senfe, is his Duty, [but which he doth not fee to be his D Jty.] A Magistrate, upon the beft Evidence he can procure, may, according to his own Confcience, adjudge an Eftate to one Perfon, which according to real Ri^ht belongs to another. Not that an Action, in this Cafe, is right and wrong at the fame Time j but it is right or wrong in different Refpects and Senfes. [Price.] XCII. TEMPTATION, or Trial, doth not kjjen The general Obligation to Virtue j though, under fome Circumfiances, it may al- leviate Guilt. Cafes of extreme Danger are put ; in Reference to which it is queried, Whether we may not extricate our felves by violating the Truth, without tranfgreffing the Laws of Virtue ? The Ahfwer is, By no Means. The Laws of Truth are of eternal and unalterable Obligation, by Prop. XXII, and cannot, in themfelves, and therefore ought not, in Practice, to give Way to, or to be fet afide by Hope, Shame, Fear, or E 3 any yo Of Virtue 3 or Chap. V. any other PaiHon. The greatefl Lofs we can fuftain is that of Life. Life, by the right- ful and primary Tenure, we hold, only under God and Truth ; and therefore, ihould be willing to retain it no longer than God pleafesj or than we can keep it without violating Truth. To lofe it in the Caufe of Truth, is to lofe it honorably. And the Reparation of the Lofs, in thai Cafe, may ftcurely be left to the Honor of the Supreme Governor. Belides ; to fay we may violate the Truth, in fome Cafes of Danger, is to eftablifh a Rule, whereby we may be allowed to violate it, in all other Cafes of Danger j which will open a wide Door to all Immorality, where Plea- fare and Pain, Profit and Lofs are concerned. But it Pain, Dread, Terror, or any Affec- tion of the Mind, are fo great as to overpower Reafon, moral Agency, in iuch Cafes, is deftroyed ; nor can we be accountable for what is &o\iz or faid, under an Influence, which is irremlibie, and overbearing. But ftfch Cafes happen but feldom. XCIII. MORAL Obligations cannot, in their own Nature^ interfere^ or be ofpofite. For they are all founded in Truth ; and one Truth cannot interfere with, or be contrary to, another, by Prop. XXIX. No Obliga- tion can fet afide, or annul another j but both muit fubiift together j though imper- fect Chap. V. Ac~lion morally right. 71 feet Beings may not be able to attend to both at once. XCIV. BUT there may be Degrees of Obligation, as there may be more Truths, or Reaforis t obliging to Duty, in one Cafe than another. It is true, and reafonable, that I fhould be kindly affected to all Men, and be ready to do any Man a good Office. But there are more Truths and Reafons obliging mf, and therefore I am under greater De- grees of Obligation, to be kindly affected, and to do good Offices to thofe that are near- eft to me in Lite. But in this Cafe, general and particular Obligations do not interfere, fo as to be oppofite, or contradictory. Only as the particular Obligations require my im- mediate and firft Attention, I may not have Power, or Opportunity, to anfwer the general Obligations. Which doth not < prove the Nullity of thofe Obligations ; but the Im- perfection of my Nature. They are (till in Force, whenever I have Power and Oppor- tunity to anfwer them ; though the Obliga- tion be fufpended, while 1 want Power and Opportunity, by Prop. LXXXVII. and fo may be conlidered as not obliging at that particular Time. XCV. ALL Vi is neccffarilj private, or the Rcjtdt of every Per fin's private Judg- tntnty and cannot be the SubjeSl of any An. ■ E 4 * rify J* Of Virtue, or Chap. V. rjty whatever, any further than that Autho • rity is judged to be reafonable, (as in martial Affairs, or the ordering of Children,) by- Prop. Xil, XXXVI. It is directly contrary to Reafon to act by the Command of an- other, 'till it appears to me to be reafonable to do fo. Thus my Reafon and private Judgment become the Rule, which examines and judges the Right and Truth of Autho- rity j to which I am obliged to fubmit, not fun ply becaufe it is Authority • but becaufe it is juft and true Authority. But as the great God can command nothing that is wrong, by Prop. XXIV, [and therefore it is not merely His Will, but Truth and Right that oblige us to obey Him, J our Examina- tion and judging of what He commands, cannot be, as in the Cafe of fallible Men, whether what He commands may not be wrong j but to difcover the Truth and Right- nefs of what He commands ; (for fo it will certainly be found, if we judge truly ;) or whether it be indeed His Commandment, or not. This eflabli/hes a Right in every Man to judge for himfelf. XCVI. VIRTUE, or moral ABion, as it is Aclion, can in no Sen/e, or Re [peel, be neceflary ; but mufi be necefjarily and efential- ly free, by Prop. XLVI. Nor can any Be- ing be capable of it any farther than fuch Being is an Agent, or is free, by Prop. LV. XCVII. Chap. V. Action morally right. y^ XCVII. BUT though Virtue is ejfentially the Effect of free Choice, yet the great GOD can abundantly afjill our virtuous Choices and Endeavors, 'without interfering with our Freedom, or Agency. As by propofing Mo- tives, weakning the Imprefiions of L : enfe and Paffion, throwing more Light into the Mind, comforting the Heart, flrengthning virtuous Defires, Endeavors and Refolu- tions. XCVIII. SUCH Powers as may be abufed are ejjential to moral Agents. Becaufe they are Agents, and, as fuch, free to act, or not to act : to ad this Way, or the contrary, by Prop. XLV, XLVI. All mere fenfible, or animal Agents, do invariably act according to the respective Laws of their Natures, and obey, if not under the Conftraint of Vio- lence, the immediate Senfations they are under. Moral Agents can difobey the Laws of their Natures ; and therefore fuch Pow- ers, as may be abufed, are elTential to fuch Beings. A virtuous Perfon muft neceiTarily have a Power of being vicious, otherwife, he could not be virtuous. For then he would be necefTarily virtuous ; which is abfurd, by Prop. LV. XC1X. MORAL Agents are the only Beings that can refijt the Will of GOD. Not the 74 Q/" Virtue, or Chap. V. the abfolute Will of God, or what He him- lelf determines to do. To this Will, moral Agents, as all other Parts of the Cre- ation, are naturally and necefTarily fubject. Bv: it is the preceptive Will of God, which in .. : Agents can refift, or His Will com- Tfy. ling what they are to do. For what He wills them to do, or wills to be their Duty, raiiu of Neceffity be in their Power, or fub- ject to their Agency -, and confequently, mud depend on them alone, with Refpecl to their Obedience. For if they cannot but obey, or muit neceilarily obey, it is very plain, they do not obey at all j but are compelled by fome, either internal or external Force ; which deftroys the very Effence of Obedi- ence. Prop. LV. C. VIRTUE, or Aclion morally right, cannot conffi in any naturally good Difpoftion, Temper or Inclination, any further than fucb Difpoftion, or Temper, is actually approved of, and voluntarily encouraged and cultivated in the Mind, by Prop. LXil. But good Bifpofitions, which are moral Habits, or the Effect of repeted morally good Actions, of Attention, Care, Culture of the rVIind, and the conftant, perfevering Practice of Virtue ; fuch good Difpofitions are virtuous. But what is originally implanted in our Nature cannot be our Virtue ; becauie it cannot be our A&ion. CI. A C- Chap. V. Action morally right. J5 CI. ACTION is ejjential to a virtuous Char after. No Being can be accounted good or virtuous, but only fo far as it performs morally good Actions, either internally, in the Mind or Thoughts ; or, fo far as it hath Power and Opportunity, in external Practice. For a mere Capacity of Virtue, is no more Virtue, than a Capacity of Action is Action. Nor is an Intention of acting, Virtue, which Intention, when it is in the Agent's Power, is not put in Execution. CII. IN Morality, the End and Means are the fame.* That is to fay, no moral Agent mould propofe any End, but only fo far as it is virtuous ; nor purfue it by any Means, but only fuch as are virtuous. All other Ends are diflinct from the Means of obtaining them: but in Morality both End and Means coincide, and are the fame ; there being no Way to Vir- tue, but the Practice of Virtue j nor any End to be thereby propofed, but. the Rea- fonablenefs of our Actions, and their Con- formity to Truth. For to propofe any other End is abfurd. Becaufe thereby the Action ceafeth to be virtuous, or reafonable, fo far as that other End, which is not virtuous; or reafonable, alone is regarded. To propofe the ■* Stcici dlcebanty tloncjlatem propter fe expctendam. Cicero de Offic. Lib. I. Cap. II. Virtue is neceiTurily obligatory on all rational Beings, for it's ov/n Sake aione, exclufively of what may be gained by it, or any Lonfc- quences that may flow from it, Prop. IX, X. y5 Of Virtue, or Chap. V. the greater! Happinefs to our felves or others, is the molt important End we can purfue. Bu! to purfue this End, without perceiving or conforming to the rational Obligation fo to do y cannot be virtuous ; but mutt only be what all mere fenfible and animal Beings, void cf any moral Capacity, and without any Perception of moral Obligation, are capable of, and conilantly comply with, according to the Natures of their feveral Inftincts, or Sen- fations. No Inflance of Happinefs is to be intended, but what is reafonable ; nor to be purfued by any Means, but fuch as are rea- fonable. If we propofe the Favor of God or Men as an End, it muft be purfued as a reafonable End, by reafonable Action, or our Conduct cannot be virtuous. For what ever is not a reafonable Object of Purfuit cannot be purfued reafonably, or virtuouily. A moral Agent is bound to purfue Happinefs, Honor or Glory : but in no other Way than what is fuitable to the Nature of Things ; that is to fay, by a&ing in Conformity to the true Nature of the Object, his own Nature, and all other Circumftances. Therefore the mere Purfuit of Happinefs is not Virtue ; but the purfuing it reafonably is Virtue. Therefore, even in feeking Happinefs, the End is fiill being virtuous, or approving our felves to our own Minds, as having done Right in the purfuit of Happinefs ; not merely as having gained Happinefs or En- joyment, but as having gained it as a reafon- able Chap. V. Action morally right. jj able and virtuous End, by reafonable and vir- tuous Means. A Brute might applaud it felf as having gained what is pleafing to it's Ap- petite. The being (imply pleafed with any Degree of Enjoyment, hath, in it felf, no Connection with Virtue, or right moral Ac- tion j the proper Pleafure of Virtue reach- ing no farther than being fatisfied or pleafed in having aSed virtuoufly. Any other Plea- fure muft be of the fame Kind with animal Pleafures, viz. only the Perception, or Feel- ing, of fome Senfe. Vicious Perfons purfue Happinefs, Pleafure or Enjoyment, as well as the virtuous. Therefore, with the mere Purfuit of Enjoyment, neither Virtue nor Vice are in any Connection, being a mere natural, inftindive Object or Purfuit. The Differ- ence is, the virtuous do not make Pleafure or Happinefs the primary and principal End of their Purfuit, but the being virtuous, or acting virtuoufly : the vicious make Pleafure and Happinefs the primary and principal End of their Purfuit, without any Regard to be- ing virtuous. CIII. THOSE Afiions are indifferent, with ReJpecJ to which there is no Room for the Exercife of Reafon, or a Regard to Truth j if any fuch Actions can be. But no Adion can be indifferent, where there is any Place for the Exercife of Pveafon. CIV. AS 7$ Of Virtue, &c. Chap. V. CIV. AS the Cir cum fiances of Actions are very different, and their Degrees of Im- portance are infinite ; Jo the moral Obligations in many Actions are very jmall and few. CV. ALL merely animal, material and infenfMe Things can reafonably be regarded in our Actions, only according to their Ufes and proper Applications to rational and Jenfible Be- ings. To this Rule mufr. be reduced the ex- tirpating of Weeds, the pruning, and felling of Trees, the deftroying of noxious Crea- tures, and the taking away the Lives of o- thers for Food ; which is indeed contrary to their feveral Natures, confidered limply as living and growing ; but agreeable to their Natures, or to the Truth, as they are either hurtful, or fubfervient to human Life. For as they are not capable of ufing themfelves, or of directing their Bring, or Faculties, to rational Ends, they are to be ufed and direct- ed by rational Agents according to their Na- tures, and Capacities of Ufefulnefs, or of the contrary. CVI. IT is immoral and contrary to the true Natures cf the Things, to deflroy without Reafon, any material Things, that may be ujejul to rational or fenfible Beings. CVII. IT Chap. VI. Of Happinefs. 79 CVII. IT is immoral mine ceffarily to take away Life from, or to give itnnecefjary Pain to, any fenfible Being whatever. C II A P. VI. Of Happinefs, CVIILDefin. TJAPPINESS is agree- *■ ■*■ able Senfations, or pleafant Peelings of Mind, or Body, in a Freedom from all that may give Uneafmefs. Happinefs may otherwife be called Pleafure or Enjoy- ment \ and the Means of producing or ob- taining Happinefs, may be called Good, Pro- ft, Advantage, Inter eft. CIX. BT the Definition Happinefs is ef- fentially different jrom Virtue. For, CX. 1 . Happinefs is a pleafng Senfation ; Virtue is right Aftion. But to feel what is pleafant, and to do what is right, are in Na- ture quite diftinct. Mere Animals can per- ceive Happinefs, or pleaiing Senfations, and are capable of purfuing them, without being able at all to diftinguifh or praclife moral Good or Evil. And therefore, a Senfe or Capacity of Happinefs is not neceflaiily con- nected So Of Happinefs. Chap. VI. neiled with, much lefs can it conftitute, mo- ral Agency. CXI. 2. HAPPINESS is a Manner or State of Exijlence ; Virtue is a Maimer of Afiion. Everv Manner cr State of Exigence is the Effect of Power not our own, pro- ducing it independently of our Choice ; as whether we (hall be in Health or Sicknefs, in Peace or Trouble, in a chearful Temper or in low Spirits, and fad Dejection of Mind. But Virtue is the Choice of our own Wills, and is always abfolutely in our own Power. We cannot at all alter the State and Manner of our Being, as originally conflituted : nor can we always, and perhaps but in few In- Aances, alter the State and Manner of our Being, as it may afterwards accidentally be attended with Pain and Suffering. But what- ever is the Manner and State of our Being, we can always be virtuous. CXII. 3. HAPPINESS is the Gift, Operation, Confiitution or Appointment of GOD alone, and can be neither more nor lefs, than what he willeth, or effe&etb ; whe- ther it arifeth from the proper Exercije of thofe Powers he bath given to any Being, or be referred to his wife and equitable Diflribu- tion in fome future Time. For the Divine Power is abfolute over all Beings, Minds and Bodies without Exception. And as he can put Chap. VI. Of Happinefs. 8 1 put them into any Srate or Mode of Being as he pleafcth ; fo it is not pofTible they (liould, either by their own Adions, or otherwife, be in any State of Being, but what he effeds or hath conttituted. For as no Creature can give it felf Exiftence ; fo neither can it give it felf any particular State of Exiftence ; but mud neceltarily take it's Exiftence, as ca- pable of Pleafure, or obnoxious to Pain, juft as God hath allotted, and appointed ; who, if he had pleafed, could have made thofe Objeds or Adions the Occafion of the greateft Pleafure, which are now the Occa- sion of the greateft Pain or Uneafinefs. But Virtue is the Ad and Choice of our own Mind, independent of the Will and Pleafure of God ; who cannot alter it's Nature, or change a virtuous Adion into it's contrary ; as he can turn the Senfations, which are now pleafurable, into fuch as are painful, and vice verjci. CXIII. 4. NO Being can be hippy with- out a Power, Force or Strength, jufficient to fecure to it felf whatever is agreeable and pleafing to it's Nature, and renders, it's Cir- cumftances perfectly ea/y on the one Hand ; and on the other to guard and preferve itfelf in perfecJ Safety from all Annoyance, or jrom whatever may occafion Pain, Sorrow, Solici- tude and Dejection of Mind. Happinefs, or pleafing Senfations of Body or Mind, is ne- F cefiarily 82 Of Happinefs. Chap. VI. cefTarily the Effect of Power, and fubject to it. But rational Beings may be virtuous in fole Agency, or in a Capacity of choofing to do what is right. CX1V. 5. SUFFERING and Sorrow, the Oppofites to Happinefs, may be the mofl proper Means of gaining the highejl Degree of Happinefs : but Falfiood and Vice, the Oppo- fites of Virtue, can in no Inflance, or ReJpecJ, be any Means of gaining Virtue, or ofrendring ihofe, who praclife them, virtuous, CXV. 6. MORAL Obligations and Hap- pinefs may interfere -, but moral Obligations never do, nor can, interfere with each other. Prop. XV. XCIII. Nothing is more common than for the Practice of Virtue to be attended Vvith Suffering in one Kind or other. CXVI. 7. HAPPINESS is of a va- rious, uncertain Nature -, and depends upon the Apprehenfions, Opinions, Tempers, Difpofiiions, and even j :aticns of Men. He is not happy, who doth not think himfelf fo 3 or, who is not in a Temper for relifhing what otherwife wouid give Happinefs or Enjoy- ment. But Virtue is of a certain and un- alterable Nature, and has no Dependence upon Temper, Conceit or Opinion. CXVII. Chap. VI. Of Happinefs. 83 CX V II. Vf r t u e therefore and Happinefs are in their federal Natures ejjentially dif- ferent and dijlindl - 3 quite unconnected and independent, as much as Senfation or Feel- ing, the Effect of mere Power or Force, is diftinct from, and unconnected with, right Action, or the free Choice of a moral Agent -, or as much as a good Character is different from, and unconnected with, the enjoying of a good Eitate, or the relifhing of pleafant Food. CXVIII. HAPPINESS, or the Enjoy- ment of Good } cannot be the proper Foundation, primary Reafon, or catholic Rule of Virtue ; though, in a rational Way, it may be a Motive to it. It cannot be the primary Reafon, or Rule of Virtue 5 becaufe Virtue is. in it's own Nature, diftinct, and may exift feparate from Happinefs, and confequently, may be where Happinefs is not. Our Senfations may be fometimes agreeable, fornetimes dis- agreeable : but under all fuch Changes, the Obligations of Virtue are not affected, but remain unalterably the fame, ftanding upon an eternal and immutable Bafts. Further ; Happinefs, Enjoyment or Good, cannot be the abfolute and univerfal Rule of Duty; becaufe thefe are not always, and in every Inflance, a proper Rule of Duty, or Object of Purfuit. For the Rule of Duty in many Cafes will lead us to Suffering, and oblige F 2 us 84 Of Happinefs. Chap. VI. us to refufe and pay no Regard to Enjoy- ment, Advantage, Good or Happinefs. But that Rule, which is not univerfal, at all Times and in all Cafes the fame, cannot be the Foundation of Virtue : becaufe fuch a Rule would be uncertain and various ; and fo, fometimes it's contrary would be the Rule. But Truth is immutable, always, and in all Cafes, the invariable Rule of Conduct. Prop. XX, LXVI1I. Therefore, the Truth is the only proper Foundation of Virtue. CXIX. Happiness is not the necelTary Confequence of Virtue. Becaufe, in many Cafes, Suffering attends Virtue, or is the Confequence or it. But Necejfity is a Prin- ciple, or Reafon, which fubfifts equally, and univerfally, at all Times, every where, and in all Cafes. Therefore, if Happinefs were necejfarily connected with Virtue, the virtuous could not but be always actually happy, and every where, and in all Cafes, poffefs En- joyment, in Proportion to the Degree of their Virtue. But this is contrary to certain Fact and Experience ; which is Evidence as clear and ftrong as the mod certian Experiment in natural Philofophy, and abfolutely overthrows the Notion, that Happinefs is the neceflary Confequence of Virtue. For, if but one fingle rightlin'd Triangle could at any Time be found, in any Part of the Univerfe., whofe three Chap. VI. Of Happinefs. 8$ three Angles added together could be de- monftrated to be more or lefs than two Right- Angles, that fingle Inftance would overthrow the necejjary and univerfal Truth of this Pro- portion , That in every rightlirid triangle the three Angles taken together are equal to two Right- Angles. In like Manner, if there can be found but one Inftance, (and many In- ftances may be found) of diftreffed, fuffer- ing Virtue, it muft abfolutely deftroy the Truth of this Proportion, That Happinefs is the neceiLry Confequence of Virtue. The mod virtuous Perfons may be in Pain, Trouble, Sorrow, and fad unaccountable De- jection of Spirit and Horror of Mind. Nor can their Virtue free them from their Suf- ferings. This can be done only by fome Power, Force or Strength, by Prop. CXIII. But Virtue, (efpecially confidered as already performed or practifed,) is not Power, Force or Strength. Virtue is Action, but not an Agent ; and it's Action, as fuch, ter- minates wholly in it felf, or is it's own End. The proper End of Virtue, or right Action, being to act rightly, to regulate our Behavior, or to conftitute a virtuous Character. Virtue, in it felf, extends no further, by Prop. CII. Virtue, indeed, in any Cafes of Diftrefs, where it is remembered and attended unto, (for it may poffibly be forgot, or not attended unto, and then certainly it can give no Re- lief ) will fupply comfortable, alleviating Confiderations. But in fuch Cafes, when it F 3 is 86 ' Of Happinefs: Chap. VI. is remembered and attended unto, the only Reflection, relating to Virtue, is, that we have acted virtuoufly, that we have done no Wrong. All the reft, even all the Comfort, is an Inference from this j namely, therefore we have not deferved tbofe Sufferings : or therefore fome juft Power wiil interpofe to deliver us from them. Confolation is not the immediate Effect of Virtue, which is no Caufe, no Agent, but the Inference of our Minds drawn from the Virtue to which we are confcious ; which Inference may, or, through Excefs of Anguifh, may not, be made : if not, then no Confolation will fol- low from Virtue. Thus a Perfon under a painful Diforder, if he reflects, may have ibme Comfort, from this Confideration, that it cannot hold long. Now, it is not the Dif- temper, in it felf, that effects this Comfort; but the Reflection or Inference of the Mind, that it muff foon be over. Virtue, when we have praclifed it, is no Power, no Agent, but only a Notion, or abftract Idea, in our Minds, which can effect nothing, but as it is remembered, reflected upon, and Infer- ences are drawn from it. Indeed We> our- felves, are Agents, and have Power ; but not Power to make curfelves or others happy, by guarding againft all poflible Evils, or fe- curing the Poffeflion and Enjoyment of all, or any Good fuitable to our Nature in this World j much lefs, in a future State. God only hath Power to do this. CXX, B UT Chap. VI. Of Happinefs. 87 CXX. BUT though Virtue is not the ne- ceflary Caufe of Happinefs > yet it is necefla- rily the only Ground of Happinefs ; as it is true, thai Virtue is the higheft Perfection of rational Nature, which is the moft excellent Kind of Being ; [LXXII,] and as Virtue is the only Object of Reward, Encouragement, Protedion and Honor. [LXXIII.] This re- fults from the intrinfic Excellence of Virtue, as it is right Action. And this muft lay an Obligation upon, or make it fit and reafon- able for, the great God, who alone hath Power to confer Happinefs, to make Virtue finally happy. Though, (as he muft be obliged to give Happinefs in a rational Way,) He may have preponderating Reafons for a while, or in a State of Trial, to fufpend Happinefs, or to permit the Sufferings even of virtuous Beings ; as, if for no other Reafon, to prove, exercife and raife their Virtue, to it's proper Degree of Strength and habitual Perfection. To this Obligation we are fure God, the mod perfect Intelli- gence, doth, in every State of Things, con- ftantly and invariably attend ; and therefore we are as fure, that the virtuous will be happy, as we are of the Effects of any of the divine moral Perfections. And even in the prefent State of Things, God hath fup- plied us with Facts and Experience fufri- F 4 cient 83 Of Happinefs. Chap. VI. cient to fhew, that Virtue will be finally happy.* CXXI. Corol. I. There can he no other Way of being happy , but in the Practice of Virtue. Becaufe we can in no other Way attain to the Perfection of our Nature, pro- cure Satisfaction, Peace and Comfort of Mind, or gain the Favor of God. Hap- pinefs is necejjarily connected with no Power we have, and cannot be procured without the Will of God j therefore the Practice of Virtue, which muft be his Will, is the only Way, and the infallible Way, to obtain it. CXXII. Corol, 2. The Scriptures are true in directing us to a Dependence upon GOD alone > and to jeek unto him for Happinefs ; for Succefs, Safety, Peace, and a comfortable Enjoyment of ourfehes, in en abfoiute Triijl in his Goodnefs^ Submifjion to his Will, and in the life offuch Means only as he hath appointed for * The Obligation to the Practice of Virtue, in a State of Things, where it frequently expofes the Vir- tuous to Suffering and Mifery, would be an abfurd Con- stitution, if there was not a moral Governor of the World, upon whom virtuous Beings might depend for final Happinefs, in the PrraStice of Virtue. For either all virtuous Beings fhould be infenfible to Pleafure and Pain ; or Pleafure ihould always, in all Circumftances, attend Virtue, neither of which is true in Facl ; or elfe, (which is the Truth,) there muft be a moral Governor of the Univerfe. Enquiry concerning Virtue, &c. Chap. VI. Of Happinefs. 89 for promoting our prejent or future well- being, CXXIII. Corol. 2' Happinefs, or Self- Enjoyment, is the * natural Effecl of Virtue j that is to fay, by the Will and Conftitution of God : even as Light is the natural Effect of the Sun, or Nourifhment the natural Ef- fecl of eating. The Sun, by the general Constitution of it's Nature, would fhine upon us always, did not God appoint Clouds, and the Interpolation of the Earth, to intercept it's Rays : and Food would always nouriih the Body, had not God, in certain Cafes, and for wife Ends, ordained, that Difeafes mould interrupt it's natural Efficacy, even when it is ufed according to the flri£teft Rules of Temperance. So Virtue would naturally, that is, by the general Constitution of God, produce pleafing, and Vice difpleafing Sen- fations, unlefs God is pleafed by his Power to interpofe in either Cafe. For the human Mind, as all dependent Beings, is neceflarily fubjedt to the abfolute Power of God. He can make what Impreffions He pleafes upon our Spirits, to deprefs or to raife them, to fufpend their Powers or Reflections, to abate their Vigor, and, in lhort, totally to anni- hilate * In this, and the next Propofition, I ufe the Word natural, in Oppofition to necejjary : meaning thereby, the mere Will of God, or what he has been pleafed to appoint. 9 o Of Happhufs. Chap. VI. hilate them. The Mind cannot poffibly he in any State of Pleafure or Uneafinefs, but what God is pleafed to effect, conftitute or permit. Thus the v.ery bed of Men may, unaccountably, be under very fad Dejections of Mind, without the lead Comfort from their Integrity ; while vicious Perfons may be jovial and merry, without any prefent In- terruption from a Senfe of Guilt. Both which Cafes mufl be by the Permiflion of God, or his Impreffions upon the Mind; and both in much Wifdom adapted to a State of Trial, where the Virtue bf good Men is to be va- rioufly exercifed ; and where, if the natural Confequences of Vice were always to take Place, bad Men would not be free, but forced to be virtuous : which is a Contradic- tion, by Prop. XCVI, LV. By the Way, I cannot fee how Beings, that have contracted Guilt, perhaps in a heinous Degree, can, though pardoned, be happy in a future State, unlefs the Divine Power, by it's Impreffions, fufpends or fup- prefTes Reflections upon their Guilt, or takes off the Force of Truth, by taking off the Attention of their Minds to it. Otherwife, were they always attentive to it, the Truth relating to every Inftance and Degree of Guilt would be the fame, and their Senfe of it the fame to all Eternity, by Prop. XXVII. No Truth can be deftroyed j but the Attention and Chap. VI. Of Happinefs. 91 and Affections of the Mind may be altered, by the ImprelTions of Almighty Power. CXXIV. THE Happinefs or Pleafures, which naturally attend the Practice of Virtue^ are the greatejl we are capable of enjoying in this imperfect State. Becaufe they are the Refult of the righteft and belt V(e of our nobleft Powers. Which Ufe of our Powers, when the free and juft Exercife of them is not hindered, clouded or fufpended, by men- tal Diforders, exceffive Pains, or ever whelm- ing Sorrows, muft, therefore, when reflected upon, yield a Pleafure, Satisfaction or Com- fort, in the Confcioufnefs of our Integrity, the inward Approbation of our own Actions, and a Senfe of the Divine Favor, as much fuperior to any other Pleafure we are capable of, as the Mind, and it's Perceptions, is fu- perior to the Body, and the Senfations thereof. Without this Pleafure, a Man may be in Mifery, with all other Ingredients of Hap- pinefs ; and with it, the meaneil: Circum- ftances are not only comfortable, but infi- nitely preferable to all the criminal Enjoy- ments of Affluence. CXXV. HAPPINESS, as all other E?ids, is only to be purfued, when it is reafonable, cr> in Conjijlence with, all other Truth and Obligation. For Truth and Obligation are not alterable by any Circumftances or Prof- peels 92 Of Happinefs. Chap. VI. pects of Pleafure and Pain, by Prop. XX, XXII. Where Truth and Reafon require certain Actions, no Intereft of Pleafure or Pain can alter the Obligation ; fince in that Caie, a lefs Pleafure, or even Pain, is to be chofen, not indeed for it's own Sake, which is abfurd, but for the Sake of Virtue, Reafon or Truth, which moral and rational Beings are obliged to obferve. Therefore, CXXVI. HAPPINESS is only an End fuhordinate to 'Truth and Reafon. By moral Agents, or reafonable Beings, not Pleafure or Pain, but Reafonablenefs, the acting reafon- ably,* or according to the Obligations of Truth, is, in the Nature of Things, firft to be confidered, and is therefore the final End, by Prop. CII. And after that, the Confi- deration of any other End, and of Happi- nefs, in particular, may take Place ; which, therefore, can only be a fubordinate End. He acts againft Reafon, who doth not make it his firft and principal Intention and Aim to act reafonably. This is the general Law of his Nature, and ought to be the primary View and End of all his Action 3. CXXVII. HAPPINESS, as the file End of Action, can never be purfued reafon- ably, or according to Truth, except when Hap- pinefs alone conjlitutes the Obligation to purjue it. For if there is in any Cafe, any other Obligation Chap. VI. Of Happinefs. 93 Obligation different from Happinefs, or in- continent with it, fuch Obligation is negative to the Purfuit of Happinefs, or forbids the Purfuit of it. Becaufe it muft then be in- conliftent with fome Reafon or Truth 5 that is, it muft be unreafonable to purfue it. For Happinefs is not reafonable, but when it hath all Reafon and Truth on it's Side, or not againft it. All Happinefs, or Pleafure, of any Kind, muft neceflarily give Way to Reafon ; and no more is to be endeavored after, than is confident with Duty. There- fore, Happinefs can never be the Object of any moral Confideration, but when A&ions relate to that alone. C XXVIII. HAPPINESS is a proper Motive to Virtue. Or, to praciife Virtue in Hopes of either prefent Comfort , or future Happinefs, is to pradlife it with Regard to it's natural Confequence ; [Prop. CXX1IL] and therefore is perfectly confident with the Love of Truth, and with the true Nature of Virtue. Or thus ; to purfue Happinefs by the PraBice of Virtue \ is to purfue it in the only right, juftifiable, and effectual Method. Becaufe then we purfue Happinefs in Subordination to every moral Obligation ; [Prop, CXXV, CXXVL] or we expect Happinefs as the Reward of nothing but Virtue; and as the Gift of God, who can love and favor us, only fo far as we are virtuous. It is recommending our felves to 94 Of Happinefs. Chap. VI. to the Approbation and Efteem of the mod pure and perfect moral Agent, by being vir- tuous as he is virtuous ; who, for that Rea- fon, will infallibly make us Anally happy. [Prop. CXX.] Indeed, fo far as Happinefs alone is regarded, and fo far as we are deter- mined to purfue it, in any Way, right or wrong, our Regard to Happinefs is vicious. But to chocfe, and refolve to purfue it in no other Way than what is quite honorable, that is to fay, in the Practice of Virtue and Truth, and to refufe it in any other Way, is to act in Confidence with the moft perfect Kind, and higheft Degree of Virtue. CXXIX. HAPPINESS, Plcafure, En* joyment, are, in their own Nature, preferable to Mifery, Pain and Suffering. And there- fore, where no other moral Obligation in- terferes, lay every Perfon under a moral Obli- gation to purfue the one, and avoid the other, by all Means in his Power. Becaufe thus he acts according to their true Nature, and the Truth of his own Nature, which re- quires it of him. To act otherwife, would be to mifbehave towards himielf, or to treat himfelf differently from what he is, and to neglect one of the mod important Concern- ments of Life. CXXX. For the fame Reafon, it is our Ditty) when no ether Obligation interferes, to make Chap. VI. Of Happinefs. 95 make all other Beings happy ', as far as our Power extends, and as jar as they jland in Need of our Ajfiflence. That is to fay, it is our Duty to make others happy, as far as it is reafonable j or fo far as Things and Cir- cumftances do in Reafon and Truth require. Otherwife, we fhall rnifbehave towards them, by treating them differently from what their Nature, Relations to us, and Circumftances really are. Not to fay, that by refufing our good Offices, we mall preclude our felves from all Right to their Affiftence, when we ftand in Need of it. The Defire and Study to promote univerfal Happinefs, or public Good, feems to be the mcft excellent Kind of Virtue, as it is the moft confpicuous and comprehenflve. • CXXXI. THE Happinefs of the whole Univerfe, or of any Part of it, is not a reafon- able End merely for ifs own Sake, and in all Circumftances, without any Regard to the Rea~ fonablenefs of it. For then it would be im- poffible to fee any Inftance of Pain, Suffering or Mifery, in the Univerfe, or in any Part of it, confidering the infinite Power, Wiidom and Goodnefs of God ; who muit fee the Reafonablenefs of the fuppofed univeifal Hap- pinefs, muft be difpofed to will it, and who cannot poflibly want Power in any Inftance to effect it. Which demonftrates, that it is not always right and reafonable to give Pleafure 5 but 96 Of the Will of GOB. Chap. VII. but that our own Happinefs, and that of others is to be endeavored and promoted, only fo far as it is reafonable, or agreeable to Truth. Prop. CXXVI. CXXXIT. IN Cafes, where it is reafon- able to purfue Happinefs, it is always reafon- able to choofe the great ef j and of Pains the leaft. CHAP. VII. Of the Will of GOD. CXXXIII. y#£ Will of GOD is necef ■*• farily under the Obligations of Truth and Right ; and is as much more cer- tainly and immutably determined by them, than the Will of any inferior rational Being, as He is infinitely more perfect than any of his Creatures. For, obferve, His Obligation to do right, is the Refult of His own infinite, eternal, and all-perfect Understanding, and of nothing befides. [Prop. XXIV.] CXXXIV. CoPvOl. GOD cannot alter any eternal and necejf&ry Obligations that moral Agents lie under j iince thofe do equally, or, in Proportion to His infinite Perfection, more ftrongly, bind God Himfelf But in all other Cafes, He may difpofe of His own, that Chap. VII. Of the Will of GOD. gy that is to fay, of the whole Univerie, and all the Being, Life, Power and Property in it, in what Manner He pleafes, without any Wrong to his Creatures j for He is ahfolute Proprietor of all. CXXXV. HE that afleth according to Truth, or the true Natures of Things, to the befl of his Knowledge, mufi afl agreeably to the Will of GOD, and cannot but be approved by Him. Obedience to Truth and Reafon, is Obedience to God.* The Laws of our Nature are the furefl Indication of the Will of God. CXXXVI. IN Virtue, of the general and eternal Law of Truth, the Will of GOD is of the higbefi Authority, and abfolutely indif- fuiable. For He is infinitely excellent, the fole Fountain of Reafon and Wifdom, our Maker and Proprietor, from whom we have received our all, and upon whom we en- tirely depend j -f for whom, therefore, we * Aoy® ct>$a ir&Qt&ati y.oa Ota T/xvTiV vri. Hieroc. Carm. Bythag. ■\ It is thefe render him the proper Object of cur eternal Homage, constitute his Right of Government, vefr. him with univeri',.1 and juft Dominion, and make it the fuprcme Duty of all reasonable Beings to obey, pleafe and honor him, in all they think or do : [Price.'] for his Nature, and Relations to them, make this their mod reafonable Duty. G ought 9 8 Of the Will of G OD. Chap. VII. ought to have the higheft Efleem and Re- gard, and to vvhofe Commands we are bound to yield the mod implicit Obedience ; as we know that the divine Will is always under the Direction of the mod perfect Reafon ; and therefore is always mod perfectly wife, good and righteous. But the Will, or Command of God, can poffibly lay no moral Obliga- tion on a rational Being, contrary to, or fe- parate from, this firfr, great and immutable Law, any more than the Nature of Truth, or the eternal Differences of Things, or the Rule of evevlafting Righteoufnefs, can be altered by the Will of God j who, indeed, hath, no Will to alter them. CXXXVII. G O D cannot but he the Judge of all moral AcJions and Agents. See- ing he cannot but know all Beings, and Ac- tions, in all their Natures and Circumtl ances ; and cannot but approve or diflike their Ac- tions, according to the true Natures and Cir- cumfcances of them. CXXXVIII. IT, is very jit and becoming \ : imiverfal moral Judge, to interpofe in our World, and to declare pofitively, as he fall judge expedient, his prefent Approbation of \ Irtue, and Difike of Vice ; and his Rejoin- tion finally to reward the one, and to punijh the other. For as he necefTarily judgeth, and upprcveth or condemneth, all moral Agents, accorcing Chap. VII. Of the Will of G D. 99 according to their Behavior, and yet, doth not, at prefent, think proper to interpofe in every State of their Exiftence, in order to mew (by apparent Difplays of his Power rewarding and punifhing) .this his Approba- tion or Diilike, which might be inconfiftent with our Circumftances, as we are now in a State of Probation. And as this Favor and Difpleafure of God are mod of all obfeure, (though ever certain in the Judgment of right Reafon,) in the Imperfection and Corruption of any State j and as our State is manifeftly very imperfect and corrupt, and the vilible Diltindion between the Virtuous and Vicious in it is very fmall, and generally not difcerni- ble. Add to this, the Darknefs and Diffi- culty that muit needs attend fo imperfect and corrupt a State, and the Difcourag and guarding againjl all Deception, to make faithful Enquiry after the Truth, and to gam the ciearejl Knowledge of it we are able, by Prop. XV, XVI, LXXiX. CXLIX. THUS endeavouring to gain the clear eft Knowledge of Truth and Right, we are obliged to perform thofe Acfiohs, which our Confcien.ee, or judgment, apprehends to be our Duty in any Cafe or Circumjtance. For thus we anfwer the peculiar Obligations, to which we are fubject, in a iincere Ufe of our own Capacities, Opportunities, Means and A&- vantages, whether they afford us more or lefs Light, by Prop. LXXXVII, LXXXVIU. It is all we have, and all we can have at prefent. FINIS.