UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
Class
STUDIES
IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION
STUDIES
IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION
BY
GEORGE GALLOWAY, B.D.
^ \
FORMERLY EXAMINER IN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF ST ANDREWS
OF THE
UNIVERSITY
Of
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
MCMIV
SENERAL
PEEFACE.
THIS volume does not claim to be more than its
title indicates. I have not attempted, more Ger-
manico, to deal with the subject systematically.
On the one hand, I doubt my own competency
for the task ; and, on the other hand, it seems
to me that in the present condition of speculative
thought such an attempt is hardly desirable. But
the reader will find that the following essays, so
far as they go, form a fairly connected treatment.
All I can hope is that at points I have dealt sug-
gestively with a deeply important subject.
The fourth essay is the statement of a philos-
ophical position, which I try to develop and apply
to religion in the essay which follows. It is
reprinted by kind permission from * Mind/ My
cordial thanks are due to my friend, the Eev. D.
Frew, B.D., for valuable aid in revising the proof-
sheets.
G. G.
CASTLE-DOUGLAS, N.B.
CONTENTS.
ESSAY I.
HEGEL AND THE LATER TENDENCY OP KELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY 3
ESSAY II.
THE NATURAL SCIENCES, ETHICS, AND RELIGION . . 41
ESSAY III.
RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT : ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 97
ESSAY IV.
ON THE DISTINCTION OF INNER AND OUTER EXPERIENCE . 169
ESSAY V.
THE ULTIMATE BASIS AND MEANING OP RELIGION . . 209
ESSAY VI.
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY: THE RITSCHLIAN STANDPOINT 291
INDEX 325
ESSAY I.
HEGEL AND THE LATER TENDENCY OF
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
ESSAY I.
IT may be well to state at the outset the object we
set ourselves in the present paper. We have no
idea of attempting to give a history of the Phil-
osophy of Keligion from Hegel to the present day.
That has been already done, and by more competent
hands. Our aim here is a more restricted one. We
wish to compare and contrast the method and spirit of
later religious philosophy with the method and spirit
in which the subject was treated by Hegel. To go
into the details of the treatment, however, lies
beyond the scope of the essay. We shall deal more
particularly with the attitude of reason to religion,
trying to show the difference which becomes more
and more apparent between the view of later
thinkers on this point and the view of Hegel. The
result, we think, will be to show that there has been
a very marked process of change. This change
corresponds to a general change in the philosophic
standpoint. The consequence has been new ways
4 Hegel and the later Tendency
of regarding religion and its problems. We shall
see that the earlier tendency was to exalt reason,
while the later makes much of feeling : the earlier
thinkers sought to offer something like a complete
explanation, while the later are burdened with a
sense of the limitations of knowledge and the
defects of human insight. Or, what is the same
thing from a slightly different point of view, we
begin with a strong constructive movement which
gradually exhausts itself, to be followed by a
sceptical and critical tendency.
We propose, then, to begin our review with
Hegel's ' Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.' *
Hegel's work is the first profound, comprehensive,
and systematic treatment of the whole subject. It
marks the rise of a distinct and influential tendency.
Moreover, Hegel was the first who sharply defined
the problem of Religionsphilosophie, and gave the
subject a determinate place in the body of the
philosophical sciences. From that time the general
scope of the science and the broad outlines of its
1 Hegel's ' Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophic der Keligion ' were
published in 1832, after his death. A 2nd edition, forming vols. xi.
and xii. of his collected works, was issued in 1840. I have given
the titles of the works referred to in the course of the paper, but
have not thought it necessary to burden the article with continuous
references to the pages of the books themselves. I have taken pains
to present accurately the views of the different writers. But if any
one desires to verify my statements, he will, I think, have little
difficulty in doing so.
of Religious Philosophy. 5
treatment have been more or less fixed. Earlier
discussions of religious problems present us with
the religious aspect of philosophy rather than the
Philosophy of Keligion in the modern sense. 1
Hegel was the strong son of an age when hopes in
speculative effort ran high. As we all know, philos-
ophy was for him denkende Anschauung der Welt,
and he believed the universe must yield its secret
at the pressure of thought. Logic lays bare the
structure of the Absolute, and the philosopher
traces its dialectic evolution in the spheres of
nature and mind. In that evolution religion has
its place, and its essence and meaning can be
speculatively determined in the systematic whole
of things. That place, we may remind our readers,
is in the domain of mind which has become absolute
spirit, and midway between Art and Speculative
Philosophy. Religion manifests the Absolute in the
form of representation (Vorstellung), while philos-
ophy grasps it as the notion (Begriff). So religion
shelters no mystery which thought cannot penetrate.
Hegel's general method is now tolerably familiar
to us in this country. First an idea, or concept, is
analysed; then it is shown by its own immanent
movement to specify or differentiate itself in the
judgment ; and finally it issues in the conclusion,
the concrete and individual whole. Applying this
1 As in the case, e.g., of Leibniz and Kant.
6 Hegel and the later Tendency
method to the matter on hand, he analyses the
general or abstract concept of religion, and then
passes to the historic religions as specific forms of
the religious idea, and finally treats Christianity as
the absolute or consummated notion of religion.
Without denying the high merits of Hegel's
work, it is clear to us that it has also grave defects.
In his reaction against Schleiermacher and the
Romantic School, Hegel ignores the great import-
ance of feeling in the religious consciousness. If
the "feeling of dependence" were the essence of
religion, then, he remarks scornfully, the dog would
be the most religious of creatures. The animal, we
are told, feels, but it is the characteristic of man to
think. True, but man also feels, and he does not
feel as the animal feels. It is safe to say that if
man were a purely thinking being, he would not be
the religious being that experience shows him to
be. Occupying the standpoint of an all-embracing
idealism, Hegel gives no adequate psychological
analysis of the religious consciousness. He does not
treat of faith in its specific character ; and though
he indicates the dialectic movement by which feeling
passes into representation, he fails to recognise how
essential the interplay of sentiment, emotion, and
idea is in the maturest spiritual experience.
It would be unfair to criticise Hegel severely for
his treatment of the historic religions : his materials
of Religious Philosophy. 7
were necessarily scanty. Suffice it to note that the
way in which he labels the particular religions is
often fanciful ; as every religion implies a complex
process of development, no single term can fairly
describe its character. The logical nexus which he
discovers between the different religions is largely
imaginary. So, profound and suggestive though it
was, the weaker elements in Hegel's interpretation
of religion were bound ere long to be recognised.
Especially was this the case when the Hegelian
School in Germany broke up, and its general
method and principles were weighed in the critical
balance and found wanting.
But there were interesting survivals of what we
may term the gnostic attitude in the Philosophy of
Keligion. Such a survival is the ' Christliche
Dogmatik' of the Zurich theologian, A. E. Bieder-
mann. 1 Yet already a change of method is seen
here. Biedermann does not seek to construe
religion by applying to it the ready key of the
dialectic process. He tries rather to rise to the
speculative import of religion by analysing the
historic phenomenon. He accepts from Hegel the
principle that the Philosophy of Religion must
1 The 1st edition of this work was published in 1869, and a 2nd
edition, with a new epistemological introduction, in 1884. Under
the same general category would fall, I believe, Lasson's 'Ueber
Gegenstand und Behandlung der Eeligionsphilosophie.' But I have
not examined the book.
8 Hegel and the later Tendency
exhibit the notion of what is historically given in
the form of representation, or figurative thought.
The historic matter to which he turns is the dog-
matic system of the Christian Church. And his
aim is to show how the difficulties and contradic-
tions which exist within it lead up to, and find their
solution in, the concluding and speculative part of
his book.
A method like this is less likely to do violence to
the facts. At the same time Biedermann's con-
fidence in his ability to convey the whole truth in
philosophic terminology is curious. When we read
that the Absolute Being is "reines Insich und
Durchsichselbst-sein und in sich Grundsein alles
Seins ausser Sich," the doubt will suggest itself how
far this formidable phraseology really takes us. The
unsympathetic will recall the scoff of Goethe's
Mephistopheles,
" An Worte lasst sich trefflich glauben,
Von einem Wort lasst sich kein Iota rauben."
Yet despite the reproach of empty logomachy
levelled at it by theologians, Biedermann's work has
substantial merits. The modern student, however,
will doubt what the Swiss theologian did not
appear to doubt, that he had succeeded in present-
ing in a final form the philosophic meaning of
religion.
of Religious Philosophy. 9
Another noteworthy example of the idealistic
standpoint is the Philosophy of Eeligion of the
late Principal Caird. 1 This well-known and sugges-
tive book states the Hegelian position with great
persuasiveness. Yet it is not exactly the Hegelian-
ism of the older time. The formal dialectic recedes
into the background, and it is recognised that the
emotions have a place in the religious consciousness.
But still it is thought which makes religion possible.
And Dr Caird believes that reason can criticise
religious experience, and resolve the contradictions
of ordinary belief in the speculative interpreta-
tion of religion. In that interpretation God is the
Absolute Self- consciousness to which all finite con-
sciousnesses are organically related. The work only
professes to be an introduction to the Philosophy of
Eeligion. Yet we are forced to ask ourselves if the
speculative view here unfolded could justify itself
by solving the time-worn problems which confront
the theologian. Is there proper room for such a
view of human personality as would make human
responsibility real and sin possible? If nature
has no reality apart from God, are its evils only
good in the making? For a human consciousness
which blends constantly and inevitably with the
divine, is there full scope for faith and reverence ?
Finally, in what sense is that Self ethical and
1 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Eeligion, 1880.
i o Hegel and the later Tendency
personal which is the unity of all thinkers and " all
objects of all thought" ? One cannot but doubt if,
within the general speculative view outlined in this
volume, room is to be found for a satisfactory treat-
ment of these problems. One also misses in this
book the explicit recognition of the truth, that the
religious idea of God involves ethical predicates
which are not the product of pure thinking. The
careful reader carries away the impression, after the
perusal of the book, that the author's genuine
spiritual feeling unconsciously led him to a more
positive and theistic view than his speculative
principles strictly warranted.
The ' Philosophy of Eeligion ' of Otto Pfleiderer is
a work of wide learning and penetrating insight
which is tempered by sound judgment. 1 While
sympathising with the idealism of an earlier day,
Pfleiderer modifies it at essential points and rejects
the claim to absolute knowledge. The central place
of reason and its rights are fully recognised, but
alongside of it are set the ideals of practical reason.
The theoretical and the practical reason must have
one source, but to grasp and formulate their unity is
not an achievement of thought but its goal. The
method by which Pfleiderer sets himself to work out
1 Keligionsphilosophie auf Geschichtlicher Grundlage. The 1st
edition was published in 1878, the 3rd edition, largely recast,
in 1896.
of Religious Philosophy. 1 1
the problem of Religionsphilosopliie is, in his own
words, " the genetic-speculative method." That is
to say, the historic evolution of religious ideas is
traced, and through the study of their development
it is sought to determine their essence. History
criticises itself, and its larger logic corrects subjective
opinions and prejudices. This is, in fact, the Aris-
totelian method by which the essential nature of
an object is brought to light by tracing its evolu-
tion. 1 Pfleiderer works on these lines with much
success. The difficulty is that the wealth of historic
detail is apt to overburden the religious philosopher.
And where materials are so varied, and earlier and
later elements come down to us so intermingled, it
is hard to determine their relative importance and
the order of development. On the one hand, there
is the temptation to select the facts which suit a
preconceived theory. And on the other hand, the
very desire to do justice to all the facts may cause
the treatment to become purely historic. In which
case philosophic principles are brought in afterwards
to explain the historic process rather than shown
to issue from it.
The epistemological theory which Pfleiderer adopts
is transcendental realism. The conscious self builds
1 Cp., e.g., Politics, A. 1252, a. 24 : ei Srj TIS e d
<vd/u.va /3Aei^tv w<77rep ev rot? aAAois KOL Iv TOVTOIS, KaAAicrr av
OVTO)
1 2 Hegel and the later Tendency
up the world of experience from the impressions of
sense. But the laws of our mind are not identical
with the laws of the objective world, nor is thought
the same as the being of things. The two spheres
correspond to one another, whence we infer that a
universal Keason co-ordinates the world of being
and the world of thought. This, we are told, is
the true form of the metaphysical proof of God's
existence. But the argument from the moral order
must supplement this proof and give ethical con-
tent to the idea of the Absolute Being. Pfleiderer
thus holds a midway position between the view that
asserts the perfect cognisibility of God and the view
that denies all theoretical knowledge of Him. We
know God both speculatively and practically, but
our knowledge though real is limited. The whole
inner side of the divine life is beyond our grasp.
And when we try to express the idea of a Being
who is beyond space and time, our thought must
perforce be figurative.
To our mind this is a sound and satisfactory
standpoint. At the same time we think that ob-
jections can be urged against the special form of
transcendental realism which Pfleiderer accepts as
an epistemological theory, though this is not the
place to urge them. 1
In discussing the later tendency in the Philosophy
1 Vid. Essay v., where the point is discussed.
&f Religious Philosophy. 13
of .Religion we must not omit the name of Lotze
from our survey. No doubt Lotze's direct contri-
bution to the subject is not extensive, and is con-
tained in a small volume of ' Outlines ' compiled
after his death from class lectures. 1 In the ' Micro-
cosmus,' however, he had handled in some detail
the questions of the personality of God and the
nature of religion. And more important still, his
philosophical principles have greatly influenced many
who have worked in the department of religious
philosophy and speculative theology.
From first to last Lotze was the strenuous foe
of the Hegelian attempt to explain the universe as
the work of thought. He constantly recurs to the
contrast between the concrete world in which man
acts and feels and the spectral region of thought
formulae. Thought, he tells us, interprets but does
not make reality, and in its movement it always
depends on something which is not itself. Thought
is general, but the core of reality lies in the indi-
vidual self-feeling. The real is that which has
being for itself. Hence Lotze, following in the
track of Leibniz, builds up a view of things from a
pluralism as a starting-point. His monads, however,
unlike those of his great predecessor, act and react
on one another, and by their action and passion
make possible the orderly system of things. Here
1 Grundziige der Keligionsphilosophie, 1884.
14 Hegel and the later Tendency
we can only note the highly important and sig-
nificant step by which Lotze, in order to explain
how interaction is possible, converts his pluralism
into a monism. Individuals act and react on one
another, for in the last resort they all fall within
the one real Being.
It must be confessed that this Absolute Being,
the M. of the ' Metaphysics/ seems a somewhat
unpromising object for a Philosophy of Keligion to
deal with. One cannot help thinking of the Sub-
stance of Spinoza. But a remarkable change seems
to come over Lotze's thought when he goes on to
consider his Absolute from the ethical and religious
point of view. The Supreme Being is personal, or
rather, more than personal in the human sense, for
man is only an imperfect personality. The inner
distinction of the Absolute from its own states
makes possible, we are told, its personality. The
justification for attributing ethical and spiritual
content to the idea of God, Lotze finds in the
value- judgments of the human subject. Man claims
that the Being who is the ground of all things
must respond to the demands of his spiritual life,
and what ought to be must be that which truly is.
The stress which Lotze laid on the value-judg-
ment has had a marked influence on subsequent
religious thought. No doubt the idea in its first
form goes back to Kant, who spoke of the ends
of Religious Philosophy. 15
given by the practical reason, and of the moral
imperative laid upon the subject to act as a member
of a kingdom of ends. Here under another name
we have the thought of a system of values, which
has its source in the demands of the inner life of
men. Lotze, however, brought the conception into
vital relation with the emotional and spiritual ex-
perience of the individual, and asserted for it a
validity independent of intellectual processes. Hence
he claims the right to speak of the Infinite Being
as Love, and to regard the mechanism of nature
and the course of history as the unfolding of a
loving purpose. We are now listening to the
language of theism. But whether Lotze's ethical
construction of the Absolute coheres with the meta-
physical basis on which it rests may well be
doubted.
Beyond question the thought of Lotze has very
materially influenced the subsequent development
of the Philosophy of Eeligion. Lotze's continued
reiteration of the view that the formal activity of
thought could not give the content of reality, and
that the categories of logic could neither do justice
to the processes of nature nor to the movements
of history, gave strength and definiteness to the
reaction against the Hegelian system. His insist-
ance on the uniqueness of individuality tended in
the same direction, and imparted vitality to the
1 6 Hegel and the later Tendency
movement towards pluralism. And lastly, in set-
ting the claims of the value-judgment in a new and
fuller light, he made clear the right of spiritual
consciousness to have a voice in the final interpre-
tation of reality. No one who is acquainted with
recent developments in philosophy and theology
will deny the great influence of this side of Lotze's
work. The reader will no doubt be able to trace it
in the works we have still to mention.
A very able treatise on the Philosophy of Eeligion,
which, while showing traces of Lotze's influence, is
in many ways an independent treatment of the
subject, is the work of Professor Siebeck. 1 Like
Lotze and Pfleiderer, he does not admit the claim
of speculative thought to know God fully. But
while Siebeck differs from Pfleiderer in the view
he takes of the essence of religion, and the charac-
teristic features of its development, he is at one
with him in holding that we have some speculative
knowledge of the Absolute World-Ground. Yet he
lays less stress on the value of theoretical cognition.
It is a means and not an end, and has its place as
an element in the personal movement of the ethical
and religious life. That life, expressing itself in
value - judgments, postulates for its ground and
explanation a Supreme Value. The theoretical
conception of a Highest Being finds its continua-
1 Lehrbuch der Keligionsphilosophie, 1893.
of Religious Philosophy. 17
tion and conclusion in the practical belief in a
Eeality which is the Highest Good. Siebeck does
not think it necessarily invalid to conceive God
ex analogia hominis. But he holds strongly that
pure thought cannot give us the idea of God, who is
the object of spiritual faith, and the source and end
of personal religion. Metaphysics, he contends, is
monistic ; religion is individual ; and a theoretical
solution of this difference is not possible.
It cannot be doubted that the movement hostile
to a theoretical philosophy of religion has been
powerfully helped by the theological system of
Eitschl, and by the work of his numerous followers.
Eitschl at one period was disposed to admit that
it was the function of philosophy to try to compre-
hend the world as a whole, and so religion as an
element in it. But he finally abandoned this view,
and excluded theoretical philosophy entirely from
the domain of religion. 1 Taking stand with Kant,
Eitschl maintains the strict limitation of the theo-
retical faculty, and insists that the idea of God is
not an object of speculative cognition at all. The
religious consciousness moves altogether in the
sphere of value -judgments. God ceases to be a
valid conception for the reason which is common
1 Vid. Pfleiderer, 'Development of Theology,' p. 184. Kitschl's
theological system is unfolded in the 3rd vol. of his * Christliche Lehre
der Kechtfertigung und Versohnung.'
B
1 8 Hegel and the later Tendency
to all men, but is posited as the answer to inner
needs and desires. Hence the Kitschlian system
is a sort of theological positivism which seeks to
rest on, and to elaborate itself out of, historical
experience. The Christian view of God, and the
corresponding view of the world, are neither justi-
fied nor refuted by reason. Their only verification
is the way in which they have satisfied and still
satisfy the needs of the inner life.
In a similar spirit one of Ritschl's best known
followers, Kaftan, expresses himself in a lecture on
' Christianity and Philosophy/ * There is no way,
he tells us, leading from natural science and psy-
chology to philosophy ; nor is the last the central
science, as Aristotle conceived it. Philosophy only
exists in the true sense as the practical reason of
Kant, i.e., as the doctrine of the highest good ; and
here only do we have the key to the meaning of
reality. In other words, the idea of God is posited
by the moral and spiritual life, and receives no
justification whatever from pure reason. The func- i
tion of thought is subordinate ; it is the servant of(
the ethical will from which it derives its value.
The School of Bitschl is thus thoroughly opposed
to any application of speculative philosophy to the
interpretation of religion. It treats theology as a
purely historical science, and justifies its principles
1 Das Christenthum und die Philosophic, 1895.
of Religious Philosophy. 19
by the way in which it is claimed that they enter
into the spiritual experience of Christians. Yet one
may well doubt if the Eitschlian notion of religion
has been developed without any aid from theoretical
reflexion on the nature of God and man. The norm
by which we appreciate and select our historical
materials can hardly be a merely empirical one.
Eitschl's speculative agnosticism has found a wide
following in Germany, and it is not unintelligible as
a reaction against the earlier gnosticism. But the
foundations of the system are so unstable that one
cannot believe the superstructure will permanently
withstand the tide of criticism.
The other works which I shall mention all be-
longing to the last twenty years are not written
by Germans ; but they bear out the opinion I stated
at the outset, that the newer attitude in Religions-
philosophic is distinctly critical and sceptical. I refer
first to the acute and powerful book of a distin-
guished Dutch scholar, the late Prof. Kauwenhoff. 1
The Philosophy of Eeligion, he holds, is not to
be treated as a mere aspect of general philosophy.
It has its own sphere and matter. It has to give
a psychological account of the origin and develop-
ment of religion, and then goes on to investigate
its essence and justification. And the relation into
1 Philosophy of Eeligion. The original Dutch edition appeared
in 1887. There is a German translation by Hanne.
2O Hegel and the later Tendency
which it enters with general philosophy will depend
on the results at which it arrives in treating these
subjects.
The foundation of religion, according to Eauwen-
hoff, lies in the unconditioned consciousness of duty.
The ethical consciousness itself postulates religious
faith. But the essence of religious faith is just
faith in a moral order. Unlike Kant, Kauwenhoff
does not find that the moral consciousness postulates
the idea of God or immortality. Kant, he urges,
was really bringing in the theoretical judgment in
an illegitimate way when he sought to make the
conception of God a postulate of the practical
reason. All that the ethical consciousness pos-
tulates is the existence of a moral order of things.
The necessary implicate of this faith is, that the
world is so constituted that the moral law can rule
therein. Kant, it will be remembered, refused to
admit that the notion of end or final cause had
objective validity in nature. Eauwenhoff, however,
finds that nature not only allows of but positively
favours the idea that a principle of teleological con-
nexion obtains within it.
The question naturally presses itself on us, What
place in religion does Eauwenhoff assign to the idea
of God, and what reality does he concede to it ? If
faith in an ethical order is the essence of religion, is
that order only another name for God, as Fichte, for
of Religious Philosophy. 21
example, at one time held ? It was to be expected
that one deeply imbued with the Kantian spirit like
this writer should find the proofs for the being of
God, both in the older and revised form, untenable.
A scientific proof of the divine existence is im-
possible, and the ethical consciousness fails to give
us the assurance that an objective reality corresponds
to our notion of deity. The idea of God which
faith gives us is the product of poetic imagination.
And if we seek a counterpart of it in the real world,
we get only a bare scientific notion. Faith creates
for us a picture of the divine ; and, although theo-
retical proof is impossible, we can at least apply to
it the negative test that it must not be obviously
false when translated into a scientific conception.
Yet it seems we have ground for believing that we
have truth under this poetic form, truth at all events
so far as our stage of development enables us to
grasp it, truth clad in a partially transparent garb.
And we accept faith's object as containing truth,
because otherwise the realities around us are un-
intelligible. But EauwenhofF denies our right to
construct an idea of God ex analogia hominis :
attributes of the finite are not to be transferred to
the infinite. On the other hand, he maintains that
religious imagination has a claim upon belief when
its object corresponds to the need of the inner life
and aids the realisation of our spiritual capacity.
22 Hegel and the later Tendency
That truth underlies the symbolism of religious
faith we have practical assurance. At most thought
can only furnish religion with a Weltanschauung to
which faith can link itself, and in which its ideals
can be realised.
Rauwenhoff's book is valuable for its keen and
searching analysis and its criticism of religious
conceptions. His critical knife, wielded with a
fearless hand, leaves nothing untouched. The
reader who accepts his arguments will come to
the conclusion that religion offers us an intoler-
able deal of assumptions with a poor pittance of
assured fact. Still Kauwenhoff cannot fairly be
accused of reducing the object of religion to a
purely subjective creation after the manner of
Feuerbach. At the same time I do not see that,
from his point of view, any convincing reply can
be given to those who ask a reason for the faith that
is in us. If reason is impotent to lead us towards a
God, why should not faith give us mere mythology ?
Where much is confessedly pure poetry, why may
not all be imagination ? To satisfy a need is in
itself no sufficient guarantee of truth, though the
fact may go to support and confirm conclusions to
which we are led on other grounds.
A work less subtle and thorough than the fore-
going, though interesting and eloquent in its way,
is the Philosophy of Religion of the French theo-
of Religious Philosophy. 23
logian Auguste Sabatier. 1 The larger portion of
the book is occupied with the psychology of reli-
gion and a critical discussion of Christian faith and
Christian doctrines ; it does not concern us here.
In the third part of the volume, however, there
is a chapter entitled " A Critical Theory of Religious
Knowledge," to which we may refer.
Sabatier adopts the theory that the God-con-
sciousness is the solution of the conflict between
the ego and the world, and between the pure and
practical reason. Without at present impugning
the correctness of this view as a psychological
explanation, we ask, "What is supposed to be
the character and validity of the knowledge of
God attained in this way ? " The act, says Sabatier^
by which the human spirit posits God is an act
of faith, not of reason, the spiritual counterpart
of the instinct of self-preservation in the natural
world. Yet we are told that the practical solution
implies the possibility and the hope of a theoretical
solution. For the pure and the practical reason
are united in the subject which knows and acts. 2
1 Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion, 3rd edition, 1897.
Sabatier's book has been the occasion of a good deal of criticism and
controversy among French Protestant theologians: vid. t e.g., 'La
Connaissance Religieuse,' by H. Bois, of Montauban, and ' Le Danger
Moral de 1'Evolutionisme Religieux, 3 by G. Frommel.
2 Compare with this R. A. Lipsius, ' Glauben und Wissen,' p. 54 ff.
But I cannot see that Sabatier's position, as it is further denned,
really admits of such a hope.
24 Hegel and the later Tendency
And further, in asserting the sovereignty of spirit
in ourselves and in the world, we affirm that we
and the world have in spirit the principle and end
of our being. There is here apparently an ontolog-
ical inference from a psychological experience which
at least needs explanation and defence. For the
movement of soul which finds in God a solution of its
felt inner contradiction does not in itself guarantee
the objective supremacy of spirit in nature and life.
Does Sabatier, then, hold that our knowledge of
God which is subjectively realised is at the same
time objectively valid? In common with recent
theologians he distinguishes sharply the existential-
judgment from the value-judgment, which are as
the foci of an ellipse in relation yet always apart.
The former deals with the external facts of nature
and their relations, and excludes any reference to
the sentiment or will of the subject. In the latter
the reference to the will and feeling of the subject
is central and essential ; and to this order belongs
our religious knowledge. We do not apprehend
God as a being without us, nor do we grasp Him
by logical thought : we experience Him in the
heart. Eeligious knowledge and knowledge of
nature are, therefore, two separate orders not to
be deduced from each other; the passage from the
one to the other is a ^era^acns eis aXXo yeVos.
Spiritual truths are apprehended by a subjective
of Religious Philosophy. 25
act, an act of the " heart," to use Pascal's word.
Headers of the ' Pensees ' will remember the sentence,
"Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait
pas." These interior reasons, we learn from Sabatier,
are as sure in their way as the truths of science.
An objective demonstration of God, were it pos-
sible, would be futile. To the man without piety
it would be useless, to the man who is pious it
would be superfluous. It is a curious symptom
of the philosophic temper of the age that this
clear-cut division of knowledge into two diverse
kinds should seem satisfactory to many. I cannot
see how the fact that both orders fall within the
consciousness of the subject can be a guarantee
for their solidarity and correspondence, unless we
further grant that the idea of God as unitary
ground of both series has theoretical validity.
Moreover the heart is semper varium et mutabile;
and if the verities of religion are apprehended only
by inner spiritual experience, universality and
consistency of belief appear to be impossible.
The Danish philosopher Hoffding, whose intel-
lectual affinity is more with Spinoza than with
Kant, has lately given us a striking, and in some
respects independent, treatment of the Philosophy
of Eeligion. 1 The book offers abundant material
1 Religionsphilosophie, 1901. German translation with the co-
operation of the author, by F. Bendixen.
26 Hegel and the later Tendency
for discussion, but I must confine myself to one
or two salient points which bear on the subject
in hand.
The task which Hoffding sets to himself is to
determine the place and significance of religion in
life. A Philosophy of Keligion instead of solving
problems rather shows how these arise, and ex-
plains their meaning and bearing. He begins
with an epistemological discussion which yields
the conclusion that religion can lay no claim to
explain the world where science fails. And as the
result of an interesting argument, Hoffding finds
that theoretical thought gives no objective validity
to the idea of God. What is given in experience
is totality; multiplicity and unity are abstractions,
and the one is not to be deduced from the other.
Materialism is indeed a fallacy, but idealism lacks
cogent proof. It is even possible that reality may
have other aspects than those we term psychical
and material, for the division is purely empirical. 1
We must, no doubt, presuppose some kind of
ultimate unity as the ground of the interaction
and interdependence of things, but this is the goal
to which knowledge cannot rise. Hoffding thinks
his standpoint might be termed " critical monism."
He denies our right to apply analogically concepts
1 This of course suggests Spinoza. But how much is a possibility,
which has no positive point of contact with reality, worth ?
of Religious Philosophy. 27
valid within experience to the ultimate ground of
all experience. Notions like ' personality ' and
' activity ' are quite inapplicable to God, who can
mean no more for logical thought than the prin-
ciple of explanation. Even more thoroughly than
Kauwenhoff, Hoffding reduces the dogmas of
religion to mere poetry and symbolism.
It might seem, then, that religion had no title to
exist at all. That depends, however, on what we
mean by religion, and Hoffding means something
curiously vague and abstract. In his c Outlines of
Psychology' he defined religion as " cosmic life-feel-
ing," and here we learn that it signifies a " Faith in
the maintenance of Value" (Erhaltung des Wertes),
the conviction that value persists in the world.
Like many others Hoffding thinks the religious
consciousness expresses itself in value -judgments ;
but in place of the ethical order which Kauwenhoff
found to be its presupposition, he finds a general
principle implied. And this principle is, as we have
said, that the good (value) persists, and maintains
itself, through all the changing forms it assumes
in the world -development. 1 As parallels to the
spiritual principle we have the conservation of
energy in nature, and the principle of continuity or
causal connexion in science. All three, inasmuch as
1 With this we may compare M. Arnold's faith in " a stream of
tendency which makes for righteousness."
28 Hegel and the later Tendency
they carry in them an inference as to the future
from the basis of a present and past experience
which is incomplete, involve faith.
So far as I can see, the Philosophy of Eeligion
in Hoffding's hands casts no light on the deeper
meaning of religion, nor discloses any satisfactory
ground for its emergence on the stage of human
history. The developed religions, on this view,
contain a great mass of spurious accretions. The
latter are the work of thought, whose proper
function in religion is very subordinate ; but it has
managed to import into religion many unwarrant-
able assumptions. It has, for example, illegitimately
personified the notion of a highest value. We must
discard, however, this illegitimate extra -belief, for
the essence of religious faith is no more than faith
in an abstract principle of value. Hoffding thinks
the principle can be shown to be implicit in all the
historical forms of religion. Even if it were so, it
does not follow that a colourless common residuum
is the constitutive idea. And I cannot comprehend
how "faith in the persistence of value" is an
adequate psychological motive for the historic
development of the religious consciousness. But
even if we accept HofFding's view of the essence of
religion, its validity on his theory remains un-
certain. For we cannot pass simply from ap-
preciation of value, which is subjective, to the
of Religious Philosophy. 29
persistence of value as an objective principle in
the universe.
In his epistemology Hoffding leaves the gulf
unbridged between the value-series in the mind and
the real or causal series in the objective world. And
to do him justice, he admits " conservation of value "
is, strictly considered, a principle held by faith, which
cannot be proved by reason to be immanent in the
world-process. Faith, however, claims its object to
be real : it does not say, " I must act as if this were
true," but " This is true." And though the outlook
of JReligionsphilosophie be restricted in these days,
it ought at least to say something to justify or con-
demn the claims of faith. But Prof. Hoffding gives
us no positive ground of confidence in his principle.
He only goes the length of trying to remove certain
objections which may be urged against it. He
adduces arguments to show why the apparent loss
or extinction of value in the world-process need not
be so in fact. Yet when all is said, the principle
hangs in the air without proper support. It cannot
be argued that the persistence of value is a postulate
of the existence of value ; and the purely empirical
warrant for the belief is by no means convincing.
We may fine down the essence of religion to a thin
abstraction, but so long as it implies that we
postulate ethical law as realised, and maintaining
itself in the objective world, we must seek some
30 Hegel and the later Tendency
guarantee for this in the character of the ultimate
Keality. And the vague " critical monism" of
Hoffding gives no real basis to the conservation of
value as an immanent law of the universe.
I shall conclude this survey by a short reference
to the philosophical point of view indicated by
Prof. James in his extremely interesting lectures on
' Varieties of Eeligious Experience/
"We have spoken of a philosophical point of view
for convenience' sake, but Prof. James is a foe to
metaphysics in the old sense. In Plato's days he
would have been ranked among the /uo-oXdyoi or
"haters of ideas." Eeaders of his book will re-
member that religious experiences somehow well up
into the conscious region from the sub -conscious
self. Distinguishing the existential from the value-
judgment, he properly remarks that the description
of their genesis does not involve a pronouncement
on the real meaning and worth of these experiences.
Has Prof. James, then, any theory of the philosophic
meaning of the psychological process ? He will not
call his view a theory, it is only an hypothesis ; and
" who says hypothesis renounces the ambition to be
coercive in his arguments ? " In religious experience
we feel ourselves to be connected with a " something
more," we feel the "conscious person to be con-
tinuous with a wider self through which saving
experiences come." But James declares explicitly,
of Religious Philosophy. 31
" What the more characteristically divine facts are
apart from the actual inflow of energy in the faith-
state and the prayer-state I know not." The intel-
lectual constructions by which we seek to explain
our religious experiences are worthless. They are
" over-beliefs," unconvincing structures reared by
thought on the basis supplied by feeling. Philos-
ophy lives in words and fails to be objectively con-
vincing. " The recesses of feeling are the only places
in the world in which we can catch real fact in the
making." So apparently Faust was right, GefiM
ist Alles. Naturally God, as commonly conceived,
falls to be reckoned as an ' over-belief/ The prac-
tical needs of religion are satisfied by faith in a
larger power friendly to us : indeed " anything
larger will do, if it is large enough to trust for the
next step." In fact, the universe " may be a collec-
tion of larger selves " without any true unity in it.
On such high matters there is no certainty, but
" human nature is willing to live on a chance," II
faut parier. And Prof. James is willing to make
his 'personal venture 7 on the 'over -belief that
there is something divine in the universe after all.
If we are to believe this trenchant writer, theology
and philosophy of religion are deeply discredited.
Feeling is mistress of the house, and reason is the
obedient drudge, " it finds arguments for our con-
victions, for, indeed, it has to find them." The
32 Hegel and the later Tendency
' philosophic climate ' in which Mr James lives is
radically different from that in which the men
flourished who trusted thought to read the riddle
of things. But I shall not attempt to criticise
the writer's position in detail. In these lectures
he only indicates his philosophic standpoint in out-
line, reserving its fuller development for another
occasion. But we are told enough to infer that
the claim of any religion to be a ( reasonable ser-
vice 7 is quite unsubstantiated. "We hardly ex-
aggerate James's point of view when we say that
spiritual experience is an eruption from beneath,
which inundates the conscious region, an experi-
ence whose ultimate origin and meaning we may
speculate about, if we please, with the certainty
that no certainty is possible on the subject. Prof.
James's hostility to speculative construction is firmly
rooted in his first principles. Fundamental fact is
given only by feeling; belief is a matter of will
rather than of intellect. In conceptual thinking
we dwell in a shadowy realm of abstractions, the
dim reflection of the world of living realities. The
inherent weakness of thought makes a Philosophy
of Eeligion, save in the most restricted sense, a
fruitless task. We have reached a point of view
the polar opposite of that with which we began.
Here, then, we close our short survey. It lays
no claim to be complete, but seeks merely to in-
of Religious Philosophy. 33
dicate in a general way the growth of a tendency.
We have taken Hegel's work as representing the
high-water mark of confidence in the speculative
method and in its power of solving the problems
of religion. And it appeared both interesting and
instructive to point out the difference of spirit
and aim with which religious philosophy has been
pursued during the past generation. It would not
be true to say that the anti-speculative tendency
is the exclusive tendency, but it is, on the whole,
the prevailing tendency. On the other hand,
thinkers like Dr E. Caird and Prof. Eoyce have
made important contributions to the subject in
quite recent times, and they have a real faith in
the capacity of reason to deal effectively with the
highest problems. Works like these at least serve
to show that idealism in one form or another is
still a force in England and America, and that
Pragmatism, as represented by Prof. James, will
not win its way without dispute. But the per-
sistence of an older tendency is compatible with
the growth of a new and different tendency, and
the evidence for the latter is convincing. The
general direction of the current is fairly clear.
We begin with the Hegelian reaction against the
exaltation of feeling in religion by the Eomantic
School and its endeavour to explain religion through
the dialectic of thought. The absolute claim of
34 Hegel and the later Tendency
reason gradually broke down, and the need of an
unbiassed study of historic facts asserted itself.
The philosophic standpoint moved back towards
Kant, and the importance of feeling was again
recognised in the stress which Lotze and many
after him laid on the value-judgment. Some of
the best work in the Philosophy of Eeligion has
been done by those who have treated the pure and
the practical reason, the intellectual and the value-
judgment, as complementary and mutually support-
ing, and so have endeavoured to rise to a view of
God which satisfies the whole man. The recogni-
tion of feeling and will as well as reason was
amply justified, and is indispensable to the proper
treatment of religious phenomena.
But the further development of tendency was
to reduce thought to an entirely subordinate place,
and to regard the other elements alone as the
essentials of the religious consciousness. In har-
mony with this the problem of the Philosophy of
Religion comes to be viewed as a much narrower
one. Thought is sent on no adventurous task of
scaling the heavens, but is put to the humbler
work of ordering the house on earth. Little is
said of the ontological questions raised by religion,
and that little is mainly negative. We are rather
invited to consider the rise and growth of religion
as an element in human culture, to determine its
of Religious Philosophy. 35
relation to other elements, to understand its func-
tion and to appreciate its value in life. One has
no desire to ignore the worth of work of this
kind, and the Psychology of Keligion has profited
much in recent years by the concentration of atten-
tion on the subjective aspects of religion. At the
same time, there is a danger in turning away from
the larger problem of religious philosophy. Man
is not merely interested in knowing how religion
works in life, he desires also to know how far the
claim which religion makes of setting before us a
true view of the world can be justified. If he is
asked to look on theological creeds as no more
than poetry and symbol, he will press the question,
" What, then, is true ? " And justly so ; for the
effective negation is only made from a positive
standpoint. When the philosopher criticises and
finds contradictions in the current religious con-
ceptions, he must try to vindicate his criticisms
by revealing some higher and more harmonious
point of view. To what end? cries the sceptic;
the new view will turn out inadequate, like all
those which have gone before. There is no doubt
of this. Pure truth, as Lessing said, is for God
alone ; but to man belongs the right and the duty
to search for truth. It will be enough if the later
synthesis represent a further stage of progress, a
more advanced point at which the pilgrim spirit
36 Hegel and the later Tendency
of humanity pauses, and surveys in the light of
reason the wide fields of experience, ere it again
resumes its onward journey towards the kingdom
of all truth. Agnosticism is intelligible as a re-
action, but it can never be an abiding attitude of
the human mind.
Accordingly, while we are clear that the claims
of Hegelianism were extravagant, we are just as
clear that the position say of Prof. James is
equally extravagant. Granted that a purely rational
nature would not be religious, it is no less true
that a purely feeling and willing nature would not
be religious either. Thought is not a subordinate
but an essential element in the religious conscious-
ness, for feeling and will are useless without the
presence of ideas. We cannot discredit reason
without likewise casting discredit on religion. The
self-conscious spirit demands to be in harmony with
itself, and this it cannot be if reason is excluded
from its deepest experiences.
It is usual for those who take the opposite view
to urge that in practice thought has very little to
do with the making or unmaking of religion.
Apollo and Minerva, as Comte said, were never
refuted : they vanished away because they no longer
answered a spiritual need. Logic does not create
faith, and faith often resists the assaults of logic.
There is an element of truth here. No one will
of Religious Philosophy. 37
say that purely intellectual forces built up any
religion ; and we know that the conservative in-
fluence of feeling and sentiment can keep doctrines
alive long after they have been disowned by reason.
Yet even here the credulous devotee does not sup-
pose his belief to be irrational, although he is not
able to show that it is reasonable. The "credo,
quia absurdum est " of Tertullian, the apotheosis of
purely emotional certainty, is, in its extravagance,
an impracticable attitude for normal human nature.
The developed religions claim to be consistent with
reason, and the growth of doctrine attests the need
that religion should appeal to the mind as well as
satisfy the heart. Indeed the secondary function
of thought in religion is apparent rather than real.
Keligious experience inevitably clothes itself in
forms of thought, and acquires meaning and general
value only as it does so. And the intellectual out-
look reacts on the religious feelings, and gives a
tone to them. The subtle change of spiritual
climate by which people explain the decadence of
a faith once vigorous is due in part at least to
intellectual causes. Greek philosophy had much to
do in producing the religious atmosphere in which
Apollo and Minerva withered away. And the
Christian consciousness to-day reflects in an un-
mistakable way the influence of modern science.
On the other hand, it must be fully granted that
38 Later Tendency of Religious Philosophy.
pure thought can never give us the God whom the
religious consciousness demands. Hence those are
right who urge that value- judgments are essential
in religion. For only through the value realised
in experience can we give positive spiritual content
to the idea of Him who is the living Source and
the abiding Ground of all truth and goodness.
The error which the religious philosopher must
guard against is one-sidedness. Religion is a rich
and complex growth, and he must endeavour to do
justice to all its elements.
ESSAY II.
THE NATURAL SCIENCES, ETHICS,
AND RELIGION
"ME
UNIVERSITY
*LfF
ESSAY II.
DURING tlie first two or three decades of the latter
half of the nineteenth century much was heard of
the disagreement between Science and Keligion.
And even that general public which cares nothing
for the controversies of the schools was in this
-case interested in the issues of the dispute, for
views were being urged which, it was thought,
seriously menaced the integrity of the dominant
Faith. In a sense, however, it was only an old
war which had entered on a new phase. The
quarrel between Science and Eeligion goes at least
as far back as the days of Anaxagoras, who was
accused of impiety because he ventured to say
that the glorious Sun -God was only a red-hot
stone. Such incidents, however, were isolated and
occasional ; with the advent of the modern world
the protests of individuals took the larger and
more permanent form of antagonism between two
discordant points of view.
42 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
In the sixteenth century Natural Science, which
had so far won its independence and had entered
on its marvellous career, came into sharp conflict
with the Church. Nor can we wonder that the
Church, whose way of thinking was based on the
Ptolemaic system, found the Copernican scheme of
the universe revolutionary and dangerous. But
the new Astronomy was not to be denied ; and if
Eeligion protested against it at the first, it was
forced to come to terms with it at the last. Nor
is it likely that the result will be different in the
case of the controversy which sprang up last
century. The geologic record is just as convinc-
ing on the vast age of the earth as astronomy is
on the boundless extension of the heavens. The
Church, as many now recognise, must adjust its
outlook to the larger scheme of things. We have
even fallen on a time when the more thoughtful
public is no longer interested in attempts to
reconcile Genesis and Geology. The Darwinian
theory of the Descent of Man is not, of course,
universally accepted yet, for the evidence is still
incomplete. But the old prejudice is broken down,
and the general readiness to regard it as a good
working hypothesis is a victory for Science. At
the close of the nineteenth century we find the
doctrine of a special series of creative acts has
fallen into the background, a doctrine religious
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 43
in its origin and long an article of religious belief.
In its stead the notion of evolution, or of con-
tinuous development, has won widespread accept-
ance as a sound principle of scientific method.
The dispassionate observer at present naturally
asks, What have been the gains and losses on
either side ? In what case have the so - called
victories of Science left Eeligion? It is histori-
cally evident that Copernicus dealt piety no deadly
blow, nor in these days does it seem hardly smitten
by the followers of Darwin. Those who thought
to do Eeligion grievous hurt have found their
sword pass through no earthly body, and they
have seen the foeman, like the legendary heroes
in the Norse Walhalla, still vigorous and ready
to renew the fight. The votaries of Religion,
proud of its power to survive assault, might say
to its opponents,
" You do it wrong, being so majestical,
To offer it the show of violence ;
For it is, as the air, invulnerable,
And your vain blows malicious mockery."
Are we to suppose, then, that Eeligion dwells in
some supersensuous region where, as Kant held,
Science can neither make nor mar? Not exactly
so. But we must insist that it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between the substance and the secondary
products, between the spiritual life and the theories
44 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
and inferences which have grown up around it.
The former is of primary, the latter of lesser,
importance. Religion gives meaning and imparts
a purpose to life, and therefore it involves a general
view of the world. It bids man regard himself
and his surroundings, the world and historic
events, in the light of an all-embracing end.
But the reality of the object of religious faith,
and the value of the spiritual life, do not stand
or fall with a particular interpretation of the
connexion of phenomena in nature or the order
of their development in the cosmic whole. One
cannot see how the worth of Eeligion is impaired
by the nebular theory of the origin of the solar
system, or by the Darwinian account of the descent
of our race. Certain traditional views which have
been associated with Religion will have to be
corrected; Religion itself is not discredited.
Indeed, when we look into the matter closely,
we see that the quarrel of Science has been much
more with specific theological doctrines than with
Religion as a whole. In an earlier day theology
set forth what it thought was the religious ex-
planation of facts in nature. There was no ex-
isting body of scientific knowledge to control its
activity. At a later time, when Science set to
work in this field, it gradually discovered that
these facts came under the dominion of natural law
The Natural Sciences, Ethics ', and Religion. 45
and causality. It therefore strenuously resisted
the theological dogma as an explanation, and
upheld the sufficiency of the mechanical inter-
pretation. Now the controversy is dying down ;
and those who have the interests of Keligion at
heart are recognising that they can frequently
accept the explanations of Science as valid in their
sphere without sacrificing the spiritual interests-
they hold sacred.
But a rapprochement like this has not always
been possible. For Science has sometimes not been
content to attack weak and exposed outposts of the
spiritual kingdom, but has hurled itself against the
citadel. And Eeligion has had to fight pro aris et
focis. I refer to the assaults of materialism which,
in the name of Science, sought to reduce life and
mind to matter and force. One can understand how
vigorous spirits, elated at the success of the mechan-
ical method of explanation, were bold to think that
the principle might be indefinitely extended in its
scope. Thus in his famous Belfast Address, we find
Prof. Tyndall speaking of the " intellectual neces-
sity " by which we discern in matter " the promise
and potency of all terrestrial life." Another well-
known writer has said, " As surely as every future
grows out of past and present, so will the physi-
ology of the future gradually extend the realm of
matter and law until it is coextensive with know-
46 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
ledge, and feeling, and action." : So wrote Prof.
Huxley in 1868; and though he never repudiated
the words, it may be doubted whether he would
have chosen to speak so confidently twenty -five
years later. For the discussions of the last thirty
years have been quite unfavourable to the conten-
tion that mental and spiritual processes can ever be
explained by concepts like matter and force. The
" beggarly elements " of things must certainly be
very much better than they are supposed to be, if
they are to beget life and mind. Materialism really
assumes what it pretends to deduce. And while it
has attacked religion in the name of Science, in the
end it has itself been discredited.
But it is not only with Science that Religion has
had disputes. The domain of Ethics lies so near
to that of Religion that concord between them
would seem to be essential and in the best interests
of both. Yet though near relations they have occa-
sionally differed with one another. Historically this
has usually happened when the moral ideal has
advanced beyond the level represented in existing
religious thought and practice. Thus we see the
Greek dramatists purifying and elevating the old
stories about the Gods, which had the sanction of
the ancient faith, but were condemned by their
1 It ought to be said, however, that this does not necessarily mean
more than a thorough-going psycho-physical parallelism.
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 47
moral consciousness. In the person of Xenophanes
we find the philospher roundly denouncing the tradi-
tional way of representing the divine powers as im-
moral. Again, among the Hebrews the prophetic
movement of the eighth century B.C. reveals the
conflict of a deeper ethical consciousness with a
religion which had stiffened into a mechanical and
external cult. Indeed the uprising of the ethical
spirit in new strength has always been a powerful
source of religious reform and progress. Here, how-
ever, it is plain that the quarrel of Ethics is not
with Eeligion as such, but with its defective or un-
satisfactory form. The demand of the moral con-
sciousness is for a purification of the old faith ; it
has no thought of offering itself as the substitute
of Eeligion.
And we can understand why it has been so. For
Eeligion is older than Ethics, and under its shelter-
ing shadow the virtues have grown up. To cast off
piety altogether was to the men of an earlier time
to pass outside the social bond, to break with im-
memorial custom, to be an outcast from family and
tribe. But the modern world has witnessed the
rise of Ethics to a new importance and a larger
independence. The moral life is no longer regarded
simply as an aspect of the religious life, or as the
outer court of the spiritual temple. Indeed in these
days the demand is frequently made that morality
48 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
should be cultivated for its own sake entirely, and
we are told it needs no ulterior sanctions. Here is
something sure, it is urged, on which many may
agree and whose practical value no one doubts ; but
in Eeligion all is uncertainty and matter of dispute.
Thus in recent years Ethical Societies have sprung
up in England and America, which aim at supplying
moral teaching and stimulus apart from religious
dogma. The leading spirits in these societies do not
aim at a reformation of the Church ; they rather
appeal to the class which regards Keligion in any of
its historic forms as unsatisfactory. Morality, it is
contended, wants no religious panoply; it is itself
the guarantee of its practical validity and value.
Although individuals may disagree about the ulti-
mate foundations of Ethics, they can co-operate har-
moniously in an association which seeks to deepen
the consciousness of duty and to strengthen the
sentiment of social obligation. 1 Here, then, we
have a denial of the claim of Eeligion to be the
necessary guide of life. And we learn that ethical
principles supply all the rules of conduct men re-
quire. To decide as to the rights and wrongs of this
dispute we must come to an understanding about
the meaning and function of Ethics and Eeligion.
1 In a lecture entitled "The Ethical Movement Defined," Dr
Stanton Coit gives as its main doctrines (1) devotion to the good
of the world, and (2) the highest reverence for individual duty.
The Natural Sciences^ Ethics, and Religion. 49
The fact that both Natural Science and Ethics
have been at variance with Eeligion gives point and
urgency to the problem of the relation of Eeligion
to the other elements in human culture. Before,
then, passing to the further questions involved in
the nature and origin, the value and ultimate
validity of Eeligion, we may clear the ground a
little by discussing the relation of Eeligion to
Natural Science and to Ethics. This preliminary
investigation will, I think, be useful if, by way of
contrast and distinction, it helps to bring into
clearer light what is characteristic in Eeligion as
well as make plain the significance and scope of
scientific and ethical principles. Whatever view is
taken of them, Natural Science, Ethics, and Ee-
ligion are three normal and constant aspects of
human culture. Each has its practical justification
and title to existence. And if we try to understand
their several functions, and to see their respective
limitations, we may perhaps find that it is possible
to treat them as coherent elements in the larger
whole of human experience.
We commonly distinguish between a scientific, a
religious, and a philosophic point of view. Each
offers in its way an explanation of facts in experi-
ence, but the explanations are on different levels.
It may be useful for us to touch briefly on the his-
toric development of these distinctions.
D
50 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
In the beginnings of culture the three spheres
were not differentiated ; the primitive cosmogony
or religious myth was at once science, religion, and
philosophy wrapt up in one. In early Greek
thought the first decisive step was taken which
separated the scientific from the religious view of
things. For the myths of the popular creed an
explanation of the cosmos by known causes was
substituted. But as yet no distinction was drawn
between science and philosophy. The ovra of the
Pre-Socratic thinkers, as Aristotle has told us, were
simply the alo-OrjTa. Plato, in clearly marking off
sense-perception (aicr^cris) from thought (vorjcns),
opened out the way for this further differentiation.
In the Platonic system the sciences form a kind of
introductory discipline to philosophy, the supreme
science of StaXe/crt/c^. 1 The type of science Plato
found in mathematics, and he has the mathematical
sciences always in view. For him the knowledge
which is "scientific" lies between mere belief, or
uncriticised opinion, and the supreme knowledge
which sees all the facts in the light of the highest
principle. Science, therefore, to Plato represents a
real but an incomplete form of knowledge, inasmuch
1 Kep., vii. 533, C. ; Sympos., 210, C.
The ' Philebus ' marks a stage of Plato's thought considerably later
than the 'Kepublic,' but the view of dialectic is substantially the
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 5 1
as it does not dialectically deduce the postulates
from which it sets out. 1 Or as we might put it in
the language of our own day, science is an advance
on the common consciousness, but it makes assump-
tions which philosophy must revise and correct from
the higher standpoint of system.
With Aristotle we note the beginning of a division
of knowledge into special disciplines. The Aristo-
telian system falls into two parts, theoretical and
practical ; and the ^ecup^rt/cat hrurnftud are divided
into Mathematics, Physics, and Metaphysics or
Theology. But, as we might expect from his
method and point of view, the special sciences
have a more independent value for Aristotle than
for Plato. In contrast to philosophy they are
occupied with a particular phase or aspect of re-
ality. 2 On the other hand, Aristotle makes no
sharp distinction between the special sciences and
philosophy. For the latter is simply the most
general and so the central science, and deals with
the first principles of reality as such. 3 The special
sciences investigate grounds or causes in a limited
sphere, while Metaphysics goes back to the ultimate
grounds of all things. The distinction is not one
of method but of scope. It should also be said, that
neither for Plato nor Aristotle does the religious
1 Eep., vi. 510. 11.
2 Meta., iv. 1. 1, and vi. 1. 3. 3 Meta., i. 2, and xi. 3. 1.
5 2 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
view of the world have any validity apart from the
philosophic.
The close relation with First Philosophy into
which Aristotle brought the special sciences was less
difficult then, in view of the slender development
of the latter. But when the progress in this direc-
tion made afterwards in Greece was continued with
marvellous success in modern times, the problem
became vastly harder. The natural sciences, having
gained their independence, set to work with a will ;
and they have amassed a great body of detailed
knowledge in various departments, which it becomes
ever less easy to organise into a systematic whole.
The scientific field has been divided and subdivided,
and the individual investigator has usually neither
time nor interest to discuss the wider bearings of
the special knowledge with which he deals. The
philosopher, however, cannot evade the duty of
giving some general pronouncement on the meaning
and value of the knowledge supplied by the par-
ticular sciences. Or at least he cannot do so with-
out abandoning the claim to be 'synoptic' in the
sense of Plato. For the modern world the ' Critique '
of Kant set this problem in a new light. The
radical result of Kantian criticism, embodied in the
principle that "the understanding makes nature,"
was to pronounce the accumulated knowledge of the
external universe to be phenomenal merely. Beyond
The Natural Sciences ', Ethics, and Religion. 5 3
the lower realm in which the understanding moves,
above the region of things in space and time, lies a
real world ; but its portals are for ever barred, alike
to the man of science and the speculative inquirer.
In this supersensuous world faith finds God, Free-
dom, and Immortality. But it was a dubious boon
to religion to deliver it from the assaults of the
materialist and the sceptic at the expense of making
it theoretically unintelligible. Nor could the scien-
tific mind, so fruitful in practical results, feel re-
conciled to a criticism which cut the ground from
beneath it, and refused to assign to its work any
definite degree of reality in the ultimate constitu-
tion of things.
To fill up the chasm left by the Kantian criticism,
and to rethink experience in a more thorough way,
became an urgent task. Hegel sought to do so by
abandoning altogether the notion of ' things in
themselves,' and by treating reason as one and
continuous through all the stages of its development
from mere immediacy of consciousness, pure being
to absolute self-consciousness, perfect Keality.
Broadly speaking, the work of Hegel was to in-
terpret the universe as an evolution, whose stages
are stages in the development of self-consciousness
or reason. Accordingly the standpoint of science
represents a level of development above that of the
ordinary consciousness but below that of philosophy.
54 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
The similarity to Plato is thus apparent. Hegel's
view of science is at all events more satisfactory
than that of Kant, for he allows to it a definite
degree of reality and a value in the larger system
of experience. And it had the undoubted merit
of bringing into relief the truth that science pro-
ceeds by abstraction ; it concentrates attention upon
a special aspect of reality and neglects the rest.
On the other hand, few or none will now admit
that thought has succeeded in rising to the absolute
point of view, and has given the final reinterpre-
tation of the results of science. Hegel's own efforts
to apply the dialectic to nature were by no means
happy. In fact, the scientific investigation of
nature is still so incomplete that the present-day
thinker, with a better intellectual perspective, re-
frains from publishing a ' Naturphilosophie.' Our
valuation of the sciences must to some extent be
provisional, and cannot go beyond certain broad
statements.
We may take it, however, that Modern Idealism
has made it clear that the natural sciences are ab-
stract in their point of view, therefore partial in
their explanations. They take the objects of outer
experience as given, they raise no questions how
they come to be given. Yet a fact of outer experi-
ence implies concepts as well as percepts in space
and time. Apart from the activity of conscious
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 55
subjects, the object in presentation would not be
what it is. With the purpose it has in view natural
science rightly neglects the ideal aspect of experi-
ence, but in so doing it inevitably sacrifices com-
pleteness of interpretation. Accepting, then, reality
as given, the objective sciences restrict themselves
almost entirely to the mechanical standpoint in
dealing with it. They are engaged in determining
the quantitative relations of things ; of their qualita-
tive differences they have little to say. The sensa-
tion of violet is qualitatively distinct from that of red ;
but optics, in tracing the distinction to a difference
of length in the respective light-waves of violet and
red, furnishes an explanation which, if important, is
obviously incomplete. Why this particular light-
wave should give this particular quality of sensation
we do not learn.
In general the method of the Natural Sciences is
to establish a connection between things by the
principle of causality. They endeavour to trans-
form what at first seem isolated events into a
connected series, and in this way they seek to
show that experience is rational. To know what
precedes and what succeeds a certain fact is practi-
cally important ; but it is, even from the standpoint
of science, meagre and one-sided as an explanation.
Eeflexion shows that elements in the background are
also indispensable to the effect. So, as a more com-
56 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
plete statement, science interprets an event through
an assemblage of causes. But the result is to show
that a perfectly adequate statement of the total
grounds of any event is not attainable. Indeed the
full presentation of the conditions of an effect would
involve the statement of the effect itself, as in turn
conditioning the action of its causes. Science, how-
ever, cuts this perplexing knot; and in practice it
works well by explaining an event through its more
prominent, or, for the specific purpose, its more im-
portant, conditions.
Nevertheless when science, though refusing to go
beyond the mechanical point of view, bids us rec-
ognise the eternal necessity of 'laws of nature/
we pause and ask why. For if we incautiously
accept the statement as a major premiss, we may
be afterwards presented with the inference that
causal initiative, human or divine, is a fiction.
There is no place, it is urged, for such effects in
the strictly determined order of nature. The ex-
pression c law of nature ' is of course anthropo-
morphic. And analogy must not lead us to regard
such laws as having a validity beyond the partic-
ular facts in which they are realised. No natural
law can be deduced a priori in the Kantian sense.
It neither of itself creates the facts which exemplify
it, nor shows why they come to be. A 'law of
nature/ as in chemistry, is often no more than a
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 57
quantitative formula which states the proportions
in which elements unite to form new products.
That sixteen parts by weight of oxygen unite with
two parts of hydrogen to form water is true as a fact
but meagre as an explanation. That gravity as a
force varies with the mass, and inversely, as the
square of the distance, describes how bodies act
under certain conditions and no more. Laws are
generalised expressions of the behaviour of things,
and they are without significance apart from the
things. Their ultimate meaning depends on the
inner nature of the things of which they are
the expression. In fact, the idea of a 'law of
nature' seems, under examination, to sink back
into the more general principle that nature is
uniform. In other words, the things and elements
in nature act on and respond to one another in
uniform ways, so that experience is continuous, the
present harmonises with the past, and the logical
movement of thought is in correspondence with the
outward order of events. The scientific notion of
necessity, like that of law and causality, is not a
principle which imposes itself on facts and rules
them by some superior right. It can only find
what warrant it has in the inner constitution of the
facts themselves. And, from its mechanical stand-
point, Natural Science is obviously unable to solve
this problem.
58 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
The jurisdiction of Natural Science is thus limited.
Without going beyond its province it cannot sit in
judgment on the spiritual side of experience. On
the other hand, Ethics and Eeligion are alike con-
cerned to maintain that the mechanical view of
nature is not final, that it can and ought to be
supplemented. For both presuppose that the world
of outer experience subserves moral and spiritual
ends. Does nature itself lend any countenance to
the contention that the standpoint of mechanism
must be transcended ? This at least we know, that
to explain mechanically is to explain inadequately.
Do the facts, then, demand a teleological interpre-
tation? The old argument which demonstrated
everywhere the hand of an external designer is
discredited, and it is seldom urged now. And one
may admit that Bacon's protest against explanation
by final causes, on the part of science, was sound
advice against confusing two different standpoints. 1
Yet nature itself, in setting before us the varied
phenomena of life, puts in a plea for teleology.
The relation of the parts in^ an organic body visibly
calls for a way of regarding them which is higher
than mechanical. For we find here a grouping and
co-ordination of elements into a whole, which we
1 (" Causoe finales) quse stint plane ex natura hominis potius quam
universi, atque ex hoc fonte philosophiam miris modis corruperunt."
'Nov. Org.,'49.
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 59
make intelligible to ourselves through the notion of
means and end. To Aristotle it seemed that the
idea of the whole, or complete organism, was the
presupposition and final cause (TO o5 l^e/ca) of the
arrangement and growth of the parts. His concep-
tion of an immanent teleology has been a fruitful
one, and it has not lost its value. We cannot
ignore the fact that in nature, in the sphere where
mechanical explanations prevail, complex products
appear in which external causality has been con-
verted into a systematic connexion of parts, so that
each part is determined in meaning and function
by the whole, If, then, within the realm of nature,
forms of unity which are determined by an end are
present beyond dispute, can we draw any inference
as to the constitution of the world in which these
forms appear? The inorganic elements we know
are made subservient to the life-process, they are
converted into means to an end. This would be
impossible, were these elements in their inner
character not susceptible of a connexion which is
more than mechanical. Tf the material world were
only a vast series of externally related things with
no inward unity, the continuous process of life
within it would be a hopeless puzzle. The nature
which constantly ministers to that which is clearly
teleological must, in some sense, be a whole per-
vaded by the principle of end.
6o The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
The mechanical method is an abstract and, for
practical purposes, highly convenient way of inter-
preting nature. Mechanism has its value as an
aspect of a more concrete point of view ; and that
within its limits it is valid the discoveries of
science attest. It only becomes false when it
asserts its own sufficiency. The mechanism of the
organ is implied in the production of the fugue
which is played upon it. But it would be ridicu-
lous to say that it explains the musical meaning
of the piece as a harmonious whole.
When we pass from the domain of nature to
that of consciousness, the futility of a merely
mechanical interpretation is transparent. The point
has been so often and so effectively insisted on
that we do not feel called upon to urge it here.
Nor does the notion of psycho-physical parallelism,
or the view of mind as an epiphenomenon, offer
any real explanation of the nature and origin of
consciousness. 1 If an organic world supervenes on
a mechanical system, and if life in turn blossoms
into conscious selves which think, feel, and will,
and invest experience with meaning and value, we
must construe the beginning in the light of the
rich result. The e^epyeta interprets the SiW/xis,
and not vice versa. The deeper and more com-
plete interpretation of reality will be spiritual, and
1 Vid. Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, caps. 11 and 12. t
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 6 1
what seems lowest must have some affinity with
spirit. The procedure of natural scientists to some
extent supports this contention, for they find it
necessary to idealise "matter" to fit it for the
rdle it has to play.
" Natura non facit saltum " was once a favourite
motto with physicists, and Leibniz gave a higher
turn to the principle when he declared experience
to be continuous through all its grades. It is of
value to remember that no phase of experience is
isolated, but each derives meaning from its relation
to other phases. And so it would be overstraining
the point to say that the ethical world represents
a complete break in the chain of development. In
the region of instinctive behaviour, in the uncon-
scious but purposive selection of what conserves the
life of the individual and the species, it may be
conceded there is a dim forecast of the higher
realm of moral conduct. For morality is also action
which conduces to the wellbeing of the individual
and race, and the customs and laws of primitive
society were developments which ministered to the
conservation of the social whole. And while with
the deepening of self-consciousness, and the growth
of personal character, these laws gradually take a
higher and more distinctly ethical character, it is
still true that we cannot fix a point and say that
there is here a break in the continuity of the
62 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
process. The danger is that a false inference may
be drawn from the principle of continuity. For
if you assume that you have got a complete
explanation of the facts on a lower level, and
then suppose that the same explanation must
hold at a higher level, you are likely enough
to go astray. The abstract principles of mechan-
ism, for instance, give a useful interpretation
of natural phenomena: apply them to spiritual
phenomena, and they are notoriously insuffi-
cient. In the same way the self-regarding in-
stinct may be helpful in shedding light on bio-
logical facts ; but make it the universal law of
action, and by it explain all civic virtue and moral
heroism, and your principle breaks down. The
truth would seem to be that such generalisations,
even in the lower sphere, are not perfect and ex-
haustive, but their inadequacy becomes palpable in
the higher. Hence it seems to me that the con-
tinuity of the ethical and spiritual life of man
with lower levels of being, instead of suggesting
an interpretation of the higher by the lower,
should warn us that the explanations which will
work at the lower level are really incomplete.
It is undoubted that man as a personal and
ethical being stands in marked contrast to the
merely natural order of things. Though person-
ality be gradually evolved, it none the less marks
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 63
a distinctive stage of world -development. And
first and foremost, in the moral world the differ-
ence between what is and what ought to be has
come to decisive expression. Man does not con-
fine his judgment to mere facts. Over against
fact he sets up the notion of value, and declares
that the good which is not here and now, ought
to be. The idea of moral obligation is the great
obstacle to the satisfactory treatment of Ethics
from the strictly scientific point of view. Up to
a point, indeed, such a line of treatment may
be followed, but only up to a point ; and in the
end we cannot get quit of the fact that Ethics
is a normative science. It is not merely descrip-
tive ; it prescribes rules of conduct and sets forth
what ought to be.
All conduct, as Aristotle has told us, is directed
to some end or good : moral conduct is so directed
consciously and of choice. It is necessary, however,
to distinguish the immanent teleology which exists
in nature from the teleology of moral action. In
the former we have the whole determining the
interaction of its elements and developing itself
through it. The final end is thus the comple-
mentary notion to that of causality. In the one
case we go from the parts to the whole, in the
other from the whole to the parts. And so, we
may remark in passing, we cannot hold with Kant
64 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
that cause is constitutive, but the end only regu-
lative. For the end is the more complete state-
ment of what is involved in the cause. But here
we cannot speak of the end being a motive to
the parts, nor is there any contrast implied be-
tween a higher and a lower end. The particular
quality which attaches to the word ought is want-
ing. Or, what is the same thing, moral growth
is not a movement determined from point to
point by the completed result. An end which
thus dominates the process of development is not
an ethical end, and though you might speak of it
as that which has to be, you could not speak of
it as that which ought to be. In other words
man selects his ends, chooses between them, and
determines himself. Moral obligation rests on the
freedom of the subject ; remove this, and obli-
gation sinks to non-moral constraint. I suppose
that most people will agree that moral conduct
presupposes some kind of freedom, and that there
is a sense in which such conduct is not mechani-
cally determined. But nevertheless there is dis-
agreement as to what exactly is signified by free-
dom. And even though the question is an old
one, it may be well to examine it.
The Natural Sciences, we may take it, cannot
disprove freedom. For, on the one hand, they
cannot show that the mechanical point of view is
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 65
applicable to the spiritual world : and, on the other
hand, they do not prove that nature itself is
satisfactorily explained from the standpoint of
mechanism. Hence they have no title to insist
that nature is a strictly determined whole which
excludes the free realisation of moral ends within
it. As Science, then, is not in a position to op-
pose a non possumus to the claim for freedom, the
validity of the claim must be judged on other
grounds. And to begin with, it is highly signifi-
cant that the claim should be made. Those who
deny freedom ought to explain why we act, and
cannot help acting, under the idea of freedom.
" Paradoxical as it may appear," says Prof. Ward,
" even the illusion of activity and spontaneity is
certain evidence that activity and spontaneity
somehow exist." And certainly if man were only
a conscious automaton, it does not seem possible
to offer any plausible reason why he should even
imagine himself free.
The most ordinary analysis will show that there
is that in moral action which differentiates it
qualitatively from mechanical process. Between
the stimuli A, B, C, and the acts which correspond
to them X, Y, Z there intervenes the conscious
subject S. And the fact that A, B, and C can
only become motives by losing their externality
and forming part of the living content of S, this
E
66 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
constitutes the difference between compulsion and
self-determination, as Aristotle pointed out. 1 Man,
as has often been said, is free, because he is not
externally determined but determines himself.
It is, however, apparent that the idea of self-
determination may cover two distinct conceptions
of personal freedom. In the one case, where
there are alternatives before the individual, he
chooses between them, and while he selects one
it was possible for him to select the other. This
we may call the freedom of the real alternative.
In the other case he chooses, but his whole char-
acter is expressed in the choice, and of acts that
seem alternative only one is consistent with the
self. A man's character determines his action,
but as character is just the self as it has come to
be qualified, we can still say he is self-determined
and therefore free. It is of importance to the
interpretation of the religious consciousness that
we should decide, if possible, which of these views
is to be accepted. For the way we regard moral
evil, and the manner in which we construe the
act of faith, will depend on the kind of freedom
we take to be true.
Now it must be frankly admitted that some
considerations tell in favour of what we may call
1 Eth. Nic., iii. 1. Biaiov Se ov 17 a-PX*l 2<t>#ev, roiavrr] ovcra ev
$ fj,r)$v (rv/A/JaAAcTai 6 Trparrwv r) 6
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 67
spiritual determinism, and it has commended itself
to many philosophical thinkers. If choice is
absolutely indifferent, it is hardly moral ; and in
practical life we do not suppose S to be just as
likely to choose A as B. Moral valuation goes on
the assumption that acts are somehow the outcome
of character expressed in desire. And experience
of men serves to show that there is very little
which is arbitrary in human conduct. Moreover,
against those who maintain a real contingency of
choice, it is contended that this means the intro-
duction of a fictitious pure self which is without
content ; and so the vital nerve is cut which binds
the character to the act of the agent, and makes
him responsible. Still, when all is said, spiritual
determinism raises grave difficulties, although those
who advocate it are not always willing to allow
this. The difficulties come out in the facts of
remorse and repentance. We are here confronted
with the dilemma that, if the acts repented of are
not connected with the character of the agent, they
are not really his and he cannot truly regret them.
On the other hand, there would be no cause for
regret if the individual could not have acted other-
wise. Eepentance, to the determinist, is an illusion
engendered by a discord between a man's present
emotional condition and his condition when he did
the deed. The interpretation, it must be said, is
68 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
not credible. A similar difficulty confronts the
spiritual determinist in dealing with the fact of a
moral reformation in the individual history. In
his view the self-conscious principle in man has
transformed the natural desires and dispositions
into a moral character. Between the present and
past of this character there is a necessary connex-
ion, and each new act is an outcome of the past
and becomes a condition of the future. How, then,
does man draw from the past the will to reform
himself in the present ? The late Prof. Green has
suggested as an explanation that a man's past
conduct may have been determined by "a concep-
tion of personal good" which has failed to bring
satisfaction, and his attitude may be one of " con-
scious revulsion from it." 1 True ; but the self
which thus reacts against the past is not the deter-
minate outcome of the past. The present reaction
of the self is not intelligible apart from the past.
Yet the self which the past has failed to satisfy
cannot fairly represent the whole character de-
veloped in the past. Else why the revulsion ?
We may find some help in this difficulty by con-
sidering more closely the relation of the self to
character. The self which stands for the person
with his history, his interests, ideals, is an ideal
construction, not a fact immediately given. Here
1 Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 115.
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 69
the self includes the character it has developed in
time. But behind the ideally constructed self there
is the self which is the basis of memory, recognition,
and continuity of interest. Ideal construction with-
out an active centre which constructs and is referred
to does not seem possible. On the other hand, the
character which is related to and owned by the
fundamental self is not a perfectly coherent and
organic whole. It is formed gradually out of un-
harmonised natural tendencies, dispositions, and
desires, as the self works itself free from mere
impulse and comes to fuller consciousness of itself.
The inner life is, to use a figure, composed of
different strata at different levels, and some of
these may commonly fall within the focus of con-
sciousness while others lie more usually in the
subconscious region. The self in its development
from the material to the spiritual has to construct
from these a consistent whole of character. A
fallacy seems to lurk in the ordinary assertion
that action is necessarily determined by character,
for, in point of fact, man in his temporal history
has never unified his character so completely as to
exclude the possibility of a real alternative in
conduct. Every moral act is related to an aspect
of a man's character, else we should not commend
him or condemn him for it, and he himself would
not be conscious of self - approval or repentance.
70 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
But all acts are not equally characteristic. We re-
mark, for instance, of an act which springs directly
from the main current of an individual's interest
and effort, that it was "So like him." Of another
act we say that it was " So unlike him," implying
that it proceeds from a more obscure and less active
aspect of his inner life. The truth seems to be that
the self as will which determines to action can take
up into the content of its will different conceptions
of the self as object. These conceptions may not
harmonise, though all are potentially capable of
more or less close relation to the self which wills,
for they have had a place in the development of
the inner life. And a true liberty to choose between
them is not inconsistent with a constant relation of
character and conduct, arid it gives a real meaning
to facts like repentance and moral obligation.
Freedom of moral choice has limits imposed on it
by the inner life of the individual, for the moral
act must always be related to that life. Before
self-consciousness has developed the rude elements
of character out of the natural desires, there is no
responsible action. On the other hand, the charac-
ter as it becomes more and more unified and con-
solidated, as it is drawn into more close organic
relation to the self which wills, so does it leave less
scope for the alternative in action. As a man be-
comes thoroughly bad, his power to choose the good
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 7 1
diminishes : and the more disciplined we are in
the life of virtue, the less does evil appeal to us.
In general, the more fully and consistently we take
up a conception of self into the principles of our
will, the more we lessen the possibility of develop-
ing an alternative conception. Hence the larger
and ideal meaning which has been attached to
freedom. In this sense freedom denotes the fullest
and most harmonious development of human powers,
a state in which goodness is the immanent law of
life, and evil has ceased altogether to be a motive.
This of course is an ideal which in temporal experi-
ence is not attained; all that the individual can
hope for is to make progress towards it. The im-
portant point is that man's path to this higher
freedom is by the real exercise of his choice, and
the journey is significant and testing because of the
alternatives which open out before the wayfarer.
For the ideal freedom postulates a real freedom
to realise it.
We have so far discussed the problem of freedom
from the individual point of view, but we are fully
aware that the question has a social aspect. Behind
the inner life of the individual, and fostering its
growth, is the larger life of the society to which he
belongs. The nature of the alternatives which are
possible to him is conditioned by the stage of social
progress and the character of his social environment.
72 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
The virtue and vice of the savage are not those of
the civilised man, and the points where moral
choice was most urgently necessary were not the
same in mediaeval as in modern times. Again, the
full fruition of human capacities is not possible in
isolation : man only finds scope and exercise for his
powers in interaction with others. So we could not
conceive that an individual should attain to perfect
freedom apart from a perfected society. It is true,
indeed, that some men have been remarkably in
advance of their age and environment. Still there
are boundaries which even genius cannot overpass.
Shakespeare could not have appeared in the age
of Dante, nor Isaiah among the Athenian contem-
poraries of Socrates. The highest civic, moral, or
artistic powers cannot come to full and harmonious
utterance in a rude, lawless, or decadent society.
For though these capacities be latent in a man,
there is neither a sympathetic medium to elicit
them nor a free field for their exercise. The inner
development of the individual, therefore, is historic-
ally and socially conditioned. And the advance to
the higher freedom is a historic process, in which
society and individuals act and react one on another.
The development of this ideal must, then, be studied
historically, and to this aspect of ethical develop-
ment we now turn.
Man is by nature a TroXmKoz/ tfiov as Aristotle
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 73
said, and morality is social in its origin. Ethics
coming from e#os and morals from mores, point
to the ancestry of moral ideas in customs. The
study of the subject from the evolutionary stand-
point dispels the illusion that, from the first,
morality was a separate province of life presided
over by a special ' faculty.' If we go back to the
tribe, and we cannot go further, primitive ethics
are there represented simply by tribal customs.
The norm of conduct is the traditional usage or
unwritten law of the tribe, and conformity with
this law is the rudimentary expression of what
ought to be. Fear of punishment human or divine
ensuing on breach of the custom, is the earliest
phase of conscience. At this level of culture per-
sonality is undeveloped, and the social whole is
all-important. Spiritual life is hampered by material
conditions, and there is no independent growth of
the inner nature. Hence we find a lack of specific
character in the products of the primitive mind.
There is a certain monotony in early myth, custom,
and religion, and the same circle of ideas recurs
among many races. And the development of per-
sonal character is restricted by the narrow range
of possible motives. Man's gradual triumph over
natural impediments, and his advance from savagery
to civilisation, are primarily due to the pressure of
spiritual life within him. In the course of develop-
74 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
ment the inner life deepens and defines itself pari
passu with the growth of social organisation. A
cardinal point in that history, regarded objectively,
is the transition from the tribe to the nation as
social whole. To the outer expansion correspond
an inner concentration and advance in self -con-
sciousness which make possible the rdle of law-
giver, prophet, and reformer. The inward disposi-
tion now receives a value over against external
acts. By - and - by legal enactments and ancient
usages are supplemented by the thought of "un-
written laws," of larger scope and more divine
authority. So the human end is defined in terms
of law, which is the * custom ; of the olden time
idealised and made universal. To the Hebrew
prophet this end was obedience to the law of the
Covenant - God, written on " fleshly tables of the
heart." To the Greek thinker it was participation
in that immanent justice which is the "bond of
perfectness" in society.
The growing consciousness of the worth of the
subjective side of morality paved the way for that
distinction between ethics and politics which was
made after Aristotle. It is a development of this
tendency which, in modern times, has prompted the
effort to determine morality by conscience and to-
value conduct simply by motives. Conscience, said
Bishop Butler, is " the rule of right within " ; the
The Natural Sciences y Ethics, and Religion. 75
one unconditional moral good, said Kant, is " a
good will." We sympathise with these views as
a protest against an external utilitarianism, but
the rigid exclusion of results from the valuation
of conduct is not possible. The motive and the
consequences of an act must both enter into a full
appreciation of it. In practice we should dis-
approve of actions done with the best intent, but
the results of which the doer had ample oppor-
tunity of seeing to be socially demoralising. And
our disapproval of the acts would mean a disap-
proval of the character from which they proceeded.
The historic and evolutionary methods of the nine-
teenth century have served to correct a one-sided
stress on the subjective side of morality. The
essential interdependence of society and individuals,
revealed in their common growth, has been insisted
on. The good for the individual is recognised to
be a common good, and subjective approval must
in the last resort be based on this good. From
the school of scientific evolution we have the chief
good described as " social health," or "general in-
crease of life." These definitions at least imply
that valuation must be in terms of the ethical end,
and that this end is social as well as individual.
As definitions, however, they must be reckoned
partial and one-sided. In fact, the ethical end must
be regarded not only as a common end but as ideal,
76 The Natiiral Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
if we are to do justice to the inner life which is
the source of moral values. In other words, the
perfection which is the ethical end is an ideal which
transcends present attainment, and implies a per-
fected social system as its condition. This corre-
sponds to the higher freedom already referred to,
the actualisation of all capacities for good in the
individual in and through a society which makes
this possible. A school of English ethical writers
has termed this ideal self-realisation, and the phrase
can be commended on several grounds. For it
keeps in view the fact that the highest value must
be something personal. If a social system is good,
it is because the good has its living centre in the
personal beings who make up the system. Ethical
goodness has a reference in the last resort to persons,
and the fact is kept in mind when we speak of it
as a realisation of the self. Again this designation
of the ideal does justice to the truth that the de-
velopment is in and through a historical process. It
is a making real in time what the self has in it to
become through interaction with other selves. We
progress to the ideal by the way of the better, but
we cannot now give full content to it. Only through
the process of development itself could we know how
much there is in a fully realised self. The definition
has the terseness and the general applicability which
are needed in a definition of the ethical end.
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 77
Still there is an ambiguity in the phrase, as will
be seen when we ask, What is the relation of the
ideal self to the actual self ? Plainly the self which
has to be made real has not here and now come to
the fulness of its utterance. It must be a larger
self than the already existing self. Is this ideal
self implicit in individual selves ? the flower and
fruit, as it were, while they are the germ ? And
is ethical progress a progress by which the ideal
self works itself out through the historically given
self by an inward course of development? If so,
self-realisation would have a lower counterpart in
organic growth. But there can be little doubt
that it is not possible by this construction to do
justice to the facts of the moral life. For the
ideal self does not explain the real moral develop-
ment of the individual in time, which is not con-
tinuous and consistent. To understand this we are
thrown back on the self which determines itself to
act, and in choice identifies itself with conceptions
of self which are not always compatible. If we
are to describe the moral life in time as a process
of self-realisation, we must mean that the self
which men are realising is a projected or future
self. The self which is taken into the content of
the will as end is not the complete and ideal self.
It may be an idea of self lower than what we are.
But if the act is morally good, it is a self better
78 The Natural Sciences ', Ethics, and Religion.
than the existing self, and represents a value in
excess of that already attained. The "ought" is
ever reflected against the background of the pre-
sent. Yet it is not, as we see it, an eternally
fixed beacon -light but a luminous point which
moves with the background against which it is
projected. The better self which ought to be real-
ised is conditioned by the self which is, and this
in turn is largely influenced by the historical and
racial environment in which it appears. Ideals,
we all know, vary with individuals and races and
epochs in history. Accordingly the end defined
as self - realisation has a certain vagueness. We
want, if possible, to know more about the kind of
self which should be realised, that we may have
some principle of appreciation to go on.
In these circumstances we are forced to ask,
whether the idea of a supreme good, or perfectly
realised self, is more than an abstract generalisa-
tion from the partial forms of good which have
existed. It has not been shown, and it may not
be possible to show in a convincing way, by a
study of human progress, that the diverse ideals
of various races and ages are slowly converging
towards a central good. And at the best our
survey of the evolution of experience is limited.
But still it is a very unsatisfactory view that the
supreme ideal is only a useful fiction, and has no
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 79
reality. For then there would be no reason why
different men and races should not content them-
selves where they could with quite different con-
ceptions of human good. And there could not
be any sure conviction on the meaning of progress
and the direction in which it lay. For there would
be no goal by which to judge of movement. We
seem driven to conclude that a Supreme Ideal must
in some way be real, if the ends of conduct are to
be co-ordinated, if partial ideals are to be trans-
cended, and if the good is to grow from less to
more. In what sense are we to say, then, that
the ideal of a perfectly realised self is real ? Here
the student of Ethics is forced, whether he likes
it or not, to enter the domain of metaphysics.
Readers of Green's ' Prolegomena to Ethics ' will
remember that he found it necessary to postulate
that the fully realised self was actual in the Eternal
Consciousness or God. 1 And he endeavours to
bring the ideal into an operative connexion with
the historical process by his theory that the in-
dividual is in possibility what the Eternal Self
is in actuality. Of God, Green remarks, "He
is a Being in whom we exist," and " He is all we
are capable of becoming." This is not the place
to discuss the speculative difficulties in Green's
doctrine of the relation of the Eternal to the in-
1 Op. tit., p. 196 ff.
8o The Natiiral Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
dividual consciousness. But we must ask if it
offers a satisfactory solution of the ethical problem
involved. The difficulty lies in the connexion of
the Eternal and Ideal Self, which is above de-
velopment, with the development of the self in
time. If the finite self knows itself in God to
possess eternally the complete good it seeks in
piecemeal fashion in time, this temporal develop-
ment partakes of the nature of appearance and
loses value in consequence. And if the eternally
perfect Self is so intimately bound up with our
self -consciousness, it does not seem clear what
spiritual gain comes of the temporal efforts after
a higher good, or why there should be such a
circuitous process. But we may cling to the reality
and value of the development in time. We may
say that the perfectly realised self somehow exists
in God, and is the final form of goodness, though
it is differentiated from the self which wills the
good in time. Then, if we hold to self-realisation
as an absolute principle, it is hard to see how the
separation of the two selves can be overcome.
Between the temporal becoming of the self and
its eternal goal inner identity, and so moral con-
tinuity, is wanting. For development presupposes
incompleteness : and we cannot conceive a process
of self-realisation issuing in a timeless and perfect
self, which is bound by continuity of consciousness
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 8 1
and character to the self which wills the good in
experience. That is to say, the self as active will
cannot bridge the cleft between the real and the
ideal, and freedom does not come as the fruition
of moral endeavour.
The course of the argument thus seems to have
brought us to a dilemma. We saw that if a final
good or highest value did not exist, there was no
trustworthy test of value or determination of pro-
gress. And yet, when we try to give an ultimate
expression to the ethical end, we find ourselves
entangled in contradictions. It seems to me that
the only solution to this difficulty lies in the
recognition that the ethical consciousness itself
is not ultimate and must be transcended. Self-
realisation as an ethical principle is not at fault.
It is a good working idea of the ethical end, and
up to a point satisfies the needs of a theory on
the subject. It only becomes contradictory when
we try to state it as an absolute principle of
spiritual life. For no working out of the moral
ideal brings man to the fulfilment of his destiny
in the real universe. The Eternal and Perfect
Self exists, but by no process of self-realisation
can the individual become identical with it. The
endeavour of the developing moral life comes to
its goal not in the sphere of morality but in that
of religion, and here spiritual life takes a new and
F
82 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
higher form. In communion with God, the Perfect
Good, man finds, in principle at least, that comple-
tion of himself which by no effort of his own after
the good has he been able to gain. The deeper
drift of the moral life comes to light in religion,
and through religion receives a satisfying meaning.
God, as Plato noted, rather than man is the true
measure of value. 1 And the religious consciousness
is the final expression of a man's personal attitude
to life.
From the formal point of view, then, Eeligion
is the goal and completion of Ethics, and there is
no antagonism between them. On the level of
Ethics man seeks the satisfaction of the self by
a process of realising the good in time. Eeligion
does not nullify this process but transcends it.
The satisfaction man seeks under the form of the
moral life it gives, not in the way of personal
achieved gain, but in the form of an inward com-
pletion and harmony wrought by union with God.
It is true, as we pointed out before, that in the
historical evolution of Ethics and Eeligion the
content of the moral consciousness has sometimes
been at discord with the content of the religious
consciousness. But such antagonism is temporary :
it is not grounded in the nature of things, and has
been useful in bringing about a more harmonious
1 Laws, 716 c.
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 83
relationship. And there can be no doubt that in
the course of development the moral consciousness
has powerfully influenced religion. For while
religion fostered the ethical virtues by acting as
a social bond, the ethical spirit in turn reacted
on religion, and purified and elevated it. The
growing perception of moral values on earth gave
man a nobler conception of the things in heaven.
The object of faith in every higher religion is
qualified by ethical predicates. Yet morality is
not the basis of religion, since it really presupposes
it. For man would not be moral if he had it not
in him to be more than moral. The pursuit of ends
entails a final end, and appreciation of value rests
on a Supreme Value. But in the region of moral
endeavour the ideal is elusive and fades,
" For ever and for ever when we move."
The fact that man follows and follows vainly the
fugitive ideal, is a token that he is somehow cap-
able of the satisfaction for which he yearns. He
condemns the good he has realised as partial be-
cause he feels the contact and appeal of the Good
which is complete. And if he is conscious of failure
to gain the larger freedom by his own endeavour,
it is because he has had a foretaste of the freedom
which comes through obedience.
The transition of the ethical into the religious
84 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
consciousness is a movement from a narrower to
a larger and more concrete point of view. Eeligion
is the expression of a practical relation to experi-
ence and its ground. This relation is established
by faith, and faith is the utterance of the free
spirit within. Our religious faith is just the
personal affirmation of the ultimate meaning life
has for us. The soul which temporal experience
cannot satisfy declares that there is a Being who
can satisfy its deepest needs. So religion is the
personal expression of human trust in a Keality
behind the changing world of experience, a reality
at once the source and end of all partial good.
Man rises in faith above the strife and limitation
of a world where the good develops painfully,
and here and now realises in some degree that
his broken and fragmentary life is being har-
monised and completed by the indwelling Life of
God.
The psychological motives to religion, as we shall
see afterwards, are complex. But they all involve
the principle that man is a limited and dependent
being, who yet seeks more than he can find within
himself. Were men " Finished and finite clods,
untroubled by a spark," they would never be
religious. An inner need impels man to religion,
and faith posits the object to supply the need.
Here we have not intellectual inference, but the
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 85
more insistent logic of the inner life. The univer-
sality of religion is a testimony that the need which
is expressed by faith is a normal outcome of human
nature. Still, it has often been regarded as a weak-
ness that the attitude of the religious consciousness
to its object should be one of faith rather than
reason. In this respect religion, it is said, is at
a disadvantage compared with the Natural Sciences
and Ethics which are based on the stable foundation
of reason. But this is to overstate the case to the
disadvantage of religion ; for the Natural Sciences
and Ethics also involve faith, if perhaps not so
obviously. The man of science, for example, trusts
the principles on which he works, but the field in
which he can apply them, and the test to which
he can put them, are restricted. And with the
ampler evolution of experience they may require
modification in the future, just as the modern in-
vestigator has revised the principles on which
primitive man interpreted nature. The scientific
man believes that the particular connexion he
establishes between elements, and the ' laws ' he
finds in nature, will be valid of experience distant
in time and place from his own. Yet he could
not make this good by logical proof. A perfect
guarantee of his generalisations could only be
attained by a rational insight into experience as
an inclusive and systematic whole, which determines
86 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
the development of its parts. Needless to say, the
man of science has no such insight. And though
his belief in his explanations may have excellent
practical justification, this only helps to show that
it contains an element of faith.
In the region of Ethics faith even more plainly
plays a part. Those moral ideals which grow out
of the inner life of men are no purely intellectual
creations, nor do we believe in them on rational
grounds simply. Indeed we could not think them
out in clear and detailed form, and we only realise
gradually their meaning as we progress towards
them. We have faith in their reality and value,
but we could not prove these. The appeal of the
' ought ' to the will of man as embodying a value
he has not yet, must always contain a demand on
his faith. The truth is that faith and reason both
issue out of the personal life of man and develop
with personal development, and neither is alto-
gether separated from the 'other. Faith certainly
cannot be held to exclude thought. When it is
used in the lower sense of supposition, the mere
opinion (Sda) of Plato, it is largely, if not entirely,
an imperfectly developed intellectual process. And
even that more definitely and intimately personal
faith which is the expression of emotional and
practical demands, can only attain clearness and
generality by connecting itself with ideas which
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 87
are given through the intellect. But its distin-
guishing feature is that it is personal at the core,
and has its stronghold in the emotions and the
will ; and to this we can trace that characteristic
of faith in virtue of which it often continues to
affirm the reality of its postulate even against the
verdict of reason. Thought, again, seeks to present
a larger and connected view of things, and it tries
to exclude the subjective and emotional element
from its working. But it develops on a personal
basis, and it never succeeds in becoming strictly
impersonal. The operation of thought, moreover,
is always incomplete. It has to begin somewhere
and to assume something, but it can never come
back on its beginnings and take them up into an
all-inclusive whole. Hence reason can never abso-
lutely justify its conceptions on grounds of reason.
Thought is supplemented by an act of faith which
justifies a conception on grounds of value. And the
value -judgment springs from the inner personal
life, and we cannot reduce it to the theoretical
judgment, though there cannot ultimately be a
dualism between them.
If this view be correct, the prominence of faith
in religion is not a token of special defect. The
range of faith is wide, and reason cannot take over
its office. And it belongs to the psychological
nature of religion that the intellectual element
88 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
should not be so dominant in it as is the case
with philosophy.
The function of faith in religion will become
plainer to us, if we keep in mind that the mere
desire for explanation could not of itself beget
religion. Piety would be unmeaning in a purely
intellectual being. The restless endeavour of the
will, the pressure of emotional need as well as the
thoughts which " wander through eternity," are
all active in creating the demand for an object
which can satisfy and harmonise the inner life.
Hence no intellectual conception can exhaust the
significance of the object of religious faith. To the
piously disposed a philosophic notion of the Infinite
is a stone rather than bread. In view of what the
object of faith does and means for those who are
religious, we must also conceive it in terms of
value as a highest value which gives order and
meaning to the partial values realised in the life
of the individual and the race. That the spirit
of man, which seeks support and satisfaction in
communion with an unseen object, finds what it
seeks, is, in some degree, an evidence that faith
does not fall down before a phantom of its own
creation but establishes contact with reality.
Eeligion, although its aim is not theoretical, yet
as it postulates a highest value which completes
and harmonises the personal life, involves a Welt-
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 89
anschauung. Like philosophy it presents us with
a view of the world as a whole, and so furnishes
a wider outlook than either Science or Ethics.
That outlook is primarily an appreciation, a judg-
ment of facts in terms of a central value. To the
religious man as such, scientific explanations are of
minor interest ; he rather considers whither things
tend and what their worth is in relation to the
perfect good. Life unrolls before him as a system
of ends, which have meaning and coherence by
reference to a supreme End. So the world becomes
a graduated order seen sub specie boni. Yet it is
not true to say, as some do, that the religious
consciousness moves entirely on the lines of the
value-judgment. For the religious man must think
as well as feel and will, and the kingdom of the
soul cannot be at peace if thought is in rebellion.
So he cannot help regarding his highest value as
somehow satisfying thought and explaining what
exists. He derives the world from God, the
Supreme Good. But the religious mind, we repeat,
is not interested in finding significance in things
through their complex relations to one another.
It neglects the intermediate links, and construes
nature and life by the final purpose which is being
wrought out in them. But inasmuch as it does
this, religion involves a synthesis which gives
meaning to reality. In the more developed re-
QO The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
ligions, which have expanded into systems of
theology, considerable emphasis is frequently laid
on the fact that they explain things, and up to a
point at least satisfy the demands of the intellect.
Nevertheless religion neither does nor can identify
itself fully with the standpoint of intellectualism.
It will not embark on a thorough criticism of its
own postulates, and pleads the necessity of faith.
It refuses to admit that the world of values can be
reduced to categories of thought. The stronghold
of religion is personal experience, and this experi-
ence is richer than any satisfaction of the intellect.
" Our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee,"
cried Augustine, who had found neither the pleas-
ures of life nor philosophy satisfying. "Pectus
theologum facit," said a school of later divines, thus
giving their testimony that spiritual life is the true
fountain of profitable doctrine.
Still religion does not utter the last word on
things human and divine. Thought with its
" obstinate questionings " refuses quietly to merge
itself in faith. For problems are left confronting us
which do not admit of solution from the purely
religious point of view. The world of facts and the
world of values remain apart from one another,
and an inner bond between them has not been
established. That they fall within experience we
know, and we judge now from the one point of
The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 9 1
view and again from the other. But how there is
continuity of development between fact and value,
so that both form valid and consistent aspects of the
organised whole of experience, is not clear. The
question thrusts itself upon us, and religion cannot
answer it. And further, we find the problem of
religious value complicated by the fact that religions
differ, and so do their scales of value. The religious
good, for example, as the Hindu conceives it, is
curiously unlike that of a European Christian, and
so the goods which are a means are likewise regarded
differently. With varying notions of value before
us, we have to ask ourselves, Is there any common
standard of appreciation ? Is there a normal human
nature whose value-experiences are regulative ? Or
can we by reflecting on the development of the
religious consciousness, and on the historic forms in
which it is embodied, bring to light an ideal of
religion by which we can determine the relative
worth of different religions ? Then there is another
and related problem which calls for discussion.
Eeligion, if an important aspect of culture, is still
only one aspect. How are we to conceive its rela-
tion to the other aspects ? By a study of the
respective processes we can try, as we have done,
to show how it relates itself to, and contrasts itself
with, Ethics and Science. In a like way one might
discuss the relation of religion to Art. The results
92 The Natiiral Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
of such discussions cannot, however, be final, as our
point of view has been partial. While the study of
the parts should precede the whole, yet the full
meaning of the parts can only be determined in the
light of the whole. So it would seem that the
ultimate significance of religion and its function in
culture can only be appreciated by the mind which
sees the different aspects of experience together.
To deal fully with the problems raised by religion
we must, therefore, go beyond the purely religious
point of view. They can only be properly treated
by a Philosophy of Keligion. And the latter again
will be determined in its method and point of view
by general Philosophy. At present, however, it will
be widely admitted that Philosophy is not in a
position to synthesise and explain the whole of
experience by a universal principle. The matter to
be explained has become vast and complex, and
between the general principles with which Phil-
osophy works and the world of particular facts, there
is for us a breach of continuity. Similarly, between
the experience we designate 'mere fact' and the
higher spiritual experiences of the individual, a line
of immanent development has not been traced. But
Philosophy, if it cannot unify all experience, at least
helps us to understand the nature of the problem
and the conditions under which a solution may be
attempted. And it opens out general points of view
TJu Natiiral Sciences, Ethics, and Religion. 93
by which we can correct the onesidedness which
clings to special sciences and phases of culture. It
suggests, tentatively at all events, the standpoint
from which the universe may be best regarded as a
coherent whole. Hence the concluding word on the
relations of Science, Ethics, and Keligion falls to be
spoken by Philosophy. Although that word be not
ultimate, it represents the deepest insight of a
particular stage of human culture.
The Philosophy of Eeligion, it may be added, dis-
tinguishes itself from general Philosophy mainly by
its starting-point and method. The one begins with
the part and tries to show its meaning in the whole ;
the other seeks to show how the whole includes the
part. Philosophy deals with religion as an element
falling within the synthesis of experience. Philos-
ophy of Keligion begins with the study of religious
phenomena, in order to bring to light the essential
principles. Hence it proceeds to show how these
find a meaning and a place in the larger order of
things. This is its point of contact with general
Philosophy. But even though the latter fails to
offer any adequate interpretation of all experience,
the Philosophy of Keligion may still perform an
important office. It will discuss the origin and
development of the religious consciousness, the
psychological factors involved, as well as the func-
tion and value of religion in culture. And as the
94 The Natural Sciences, Ethics, and Religion.
outcome of this it will try to unfold the deeper
meaning of religion. But the success of a Philos-
ophy of Eeligion in attacking the latter problem
must finally depend on the sufficiency of the point
of view offered by Philosophy in the larger sense.
ESSAY III.
RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT:
ITS HISTOEY AND INTERPRETATION
ESSAY III.
THE present-day student who devotes himself to
the History of Religion is oppressed by the wealth
of material which lies before him. The investiga-
tions of the last century, pursued in the dis-
passionate spirit which befits science, have made a
multitude of fresh facts available. Through the
intricate and varied mass of phenomena set before
him the student finds it no easy thing to thread
his way, and reach a point where he can see
general principles and state determinate con-
clusions. We might compare him to a man
wandering in a vast forest, now overshadowed by
great trees, now plunged into a rank undergrowth,
and doubtful whether he will ever see the wood
for the trees. The phenomena are so complex, and
higher and lower elements are so often inter-
mingled, that a logical arrangement of them must
to some extent be arbitrary. Hence to accept
Plato's rule and follow always the natural joints
98 Religious Development :
in our divisions is, in the nature of the case, not
practicable. 1 Tiele, one of the most competent
workers in this field, finally contents himself with
a broad classification of religions into Natural and
Ethical. And even here there may be difference
of opinion as to where the line should fall.
This difficulty then faces us when we turn to
study the history of religion. The facts cannot
naturally be compressed within a scheme of logical
development. There is, indeed, a continuity in the
growth of a religion, and no phase of it but has a
meaning. Thought, however, is only one element in
the religious consciousness, and does not suffice to
control the evolution of religion by the principle
of intellectual consistency. If we are to speak
of the logic of religious evolution, it must be that
larger logic which embraces the working of human
needs, emotions, and desires.
The worker, then, in the field of religious pheno-
mena has a complicated material to deal with, and
he has to face the question of the method he will
follow. He may decide to proceed on purely
historic lines. He therefore endeavours above all
to ascertain the facts, to present them accurately
and group them as far as possible, but he avoids
any comprehensive explanation of them. Such is
the method adopted by Dr Tylor in his excellent
1 Phsedrus, 265, E.
its History and Interpretation. 99
book on ' Primitive Culture/ and it has given it
a permanent value which does not belong to bolder
but more imaginative works in the same field. But
the careful sifting, arrangement, and presentation
of materials only lay the foundation for further
inquiry, and in themselves cannot satisfy the reason.
To know the facts is necessary, but we also want
to know the meaning of the facts : the on, in
Aristotelian phrase, must become the Sicm. Most
people will admit that it is only when we go
beyond merely empirical results, and discern law
and connexion behind things, that we can duly
appreciate their significance. The scientific spirit
always refuses to regard phenomena, whether
natural or historical, as isolated and independent.
And the scientific historian, if he knows his
business, tries to show how events and movements
connect themselves with what has gone before and
with what comes after. The student of religious
development cannot be indifferent to the pressure
of this demand ; for even the domain of faith
the region par excellence of human hopes
and fears is not, after all, a fairyland where any-
thing may be the result of anything. Still the
elucidation of the early history of religion offers
peculiar difficulties. It is not possible for the
modern inquirer to grasp fully the condition of
mind of primitive men. If it is difficult for the
ioo Religious Development :
mature man to enter into the mental world of
childhood, it is harder for him to appreciate the
psychical condition of his remotest ancestors. He
is apt to forget this, and to interpret the savage
mind too much through his own. But in a matter
like this we cannot attain to more than probable,
it may sometimes be highly probable, inference.
And yet it is just an insight into the psychology
of the primitive mind which is most important
in interpreting the origin and growth of religious
belief.
Again, at particular points we find ourselves
hampered by evidence which lends itself to diverse
inferences. Hence it is sometimes difficult to
prevent subjective presuppositions from influenc-
ing the treatment of our materials. The cautious
student will now and then have to leave points
undecided in the interests of objective interpreta-
tion. And where more than one explanation is
possible he will be careful not to press a particular
theory further than the evidence warrants. 1
What is the proper method to follow, it may be
asked, in trying to understand the evolution of
religion ? The so-called a priori method does not
1 As an example of this error one might instance the excessive
importance attached to totemism by Mr Jevons, in his ' In-
troduction to the History of Eeligion,' or the ubiquitous part
played by the spirit of vegetation in Mr Frazer's 'Golden
Bough.'
its History and Interpretation. 101
find much favour in these days when there is a
reaction against the bolder flights of speculation.
The wealth and variety of material discourage the
attempt to apply transcendental principles of ex-
planation in the sphere of religious history. Such
interpretations, when carried out, may be ingenious
and perhaps at points suggestive, but they are
artificial, and do not arise naturally out of a study
of the phenomena. Nor is there, it seems to me,
any gain in introducing scientific concepts, drawn
from the domain of biology, into the history of
religion for the purpose of interpretation. Terms
like ' natural selection ' and the ' survival of the
fittest,' when applied to the rise and fall of re-
ligions, import misleading associations from a lower
sphere into a higher. And they are useless as
explanations of the transition from one form of
religion to another.
Neither Metaphysics nor Science can help us
here. Our key must be a psychological one ; it
must lie in the inner nature of man, from which
religion everywhere proceeds. The mind of man,
thinking, feeling, and willing, is the constant factor
in religious history; and the stages and forms of
spiritual development must in their characteristic
features reflect the nature of the source from which
they issue. So it seems to me that Hoffding is
entirely in the right when he insists that the true
IO2 Religious Development :
method by which to study the growth of religion
is the psychological-genetic method. 1 We shall be
strengthened in this conviction when we remember
that, while thought largely predominates in the
development of science and philosophy, it is by no
means so in religion. In the latter feeling and will
play as large a part as the intellect, and they make
their presence constantly felt in the evolution of
religious belief. For example, in trying to under-
stand the phenomena of religious progress and
reform, survival and decadence, we must connect
them, first of all, with the psychological elements
which are at work in human nature. In this way
we may find that what seems obscure and incon-
sistent in the evolution of religions becomes more
intelligible by being brought into relation with one
or other of the factors of the inner life.
Is the psychological interpretation of the religious
development a final one ? Some, no doubt, in these
days when a certain distrust of metaphysical specu-
lation is abroad, will be disposed to reply in the
affirmative. Yet it is plain that, if we cannot go
beyond the psychological meaning of religious ex-
perience, the whole question of the objective truth
and validity of that experience is left in abeyance.
The claim which every religion makes to be true
urges us beyond the limits of a psychological
1 Keligionsphilosophie, pp. 123, 124.
its History and Interpretation. 103
inquiry. The final interpretation of religious evolu-
tion presupposes a determination of the idea of
religion as well as an explanation of the ultimate
meaning and ground of religious experience. Only
in this way, and not from a purely psychological
study, can we gain an objective standard of appre-
ciation in dealing with religions. This task, of
course, falls to a Philosophy of Keligion, and it may
be any solution we can give will be tentative and
provisional. Still, a Philosophy of Eeligion, if it
is to be true to its function, must deal with the
problem, and its treatment will only be effective if
it takes into consideration the psychological facts.
This will be the best guarantee that the theory it
offers is neither fanciful nor one-sided. Our aim in
the present essay is a limited one, and does not go
beyond an attempt to interpret psychologically the
development of religion.
Our inquiry may begin with the question of the
origin of religion. A certain ambiguity lurks in
the word origin. Like the Aristotelian apx 7 ?* it is
susceptible of two meanings : it can signify the
beginning or temporal starting-point of a series,
and likewise the cause or ground of the series
(OLLTLOV). The origin of religion in the former sense
would be a purely historical question. When and
how in the history of the world did religion first
appear? In the second case the inquiry turns on
IO4 Religious Development :
the psychological causes which bring religion into
being. The first problem in the nature of the case
cannot be solved with the materials at our disposal ;
the vast prehistoric period is veiled in darkness,
and the conditions and character of the earliest
human life can only be inferred more or less
uncertainly. How or when religion first appeared
in the world is, therefore, a hopeless inquiry. This
much we may affirm, anything worthy to be called
religion could not have emerged among mankind
prior to the formation of some kind of social union,
and without a certain development of language.
The second problem offers a more fruitful field of
inquiry. It signifies that we investigate the
genetic - causal ground of religious development.
The question may be put thus, What elements in
the inner life of man, interacting with his outer
environment, beget that attitude of mind which is
termed religion ? The sources cannot be temporary
or accidental. For amid ceaseless change in out-
ward circumstances and social conditions religion
abides as an element in culture. Like art and
morals, it is a permanent expression of the human
spirit. What, then, are its roots in man's inner
nature ? We seek a psychological explanation, and
the ontological ground of the phenomenon is not in
question.
Before dealing with this matter, it might seem
its History and Interpretation. 105
advisable to define religion. Such a definition,
however, to have any value would require to be
based on an adequate examination of the pheno-
mena. And while I admit we need some principle
of distinction between what is religious and what is
not, I believe the importance of a verbal definition
to be secondary. In point of fact I doubt whether,
in a case where the phenomena are so wide in
range and diverse in spiritual significance, any one
formula will perfectly embrace all the facts. 1 Such
a definition, for example, as is given by Menzies in
his 'Handbook on the History of Keligion,' " Eeligion
is the worship of unseen powers from a sense of
need," will work well enough ; but it is not always
equally applicable. Still, I do not see that we
should gain anything by going over the historic
types of religion to find, if possible, a common
feature which will serve as a label. And there is
a danger that if we proceed by eliminating the
specific features of particular religions in order to
come to some common quality which belongs
equally to all, the result may be a superficial
abstraction. 2
We are more likely to grasp the essence of religion
by showing the constant factors which generate it.
1 Cp. Caird, Evolution of Eeligion, vol. i. p. 39 ff.
2 It seems to me that Hoffding has fallen into this error when he
finds the essence of religion to be " faith in the persistence of value."
1 06 Religious Development :
The significance of these factors changes with the
different phases and stages of the religious conscious-
ness, but they maintain an identity in their differ-
ences. Stated in their most general form these
factors are the subject and object : and religion
from religare, to bind denotes a bond between
them. Both terms of the relation must, however,
be qualified in a particular way ere we have that
determinate modification of consciousness called
piety, or religion. The object always comes before
the mind as real, as possessing power, and so able
to affect men for weal or woe. A powerless god
is a contradiction ; and so the fetish which is
judged to be impotent is discarded. Further, the
subject must be determined in a special way by the
object. The purely intellectual apprehension of the
object may be the attitude of mind in science or
philosophy, but it is not so in religion. Hence,
to say that religion arises from the Infinite involved
in consciousness is not enough. Though the fact be
true, there would not be religion without further
predisposing conditions in the subject. An epis-
temological analysis cannot do duty for the present-
ation of psychological motives. For religion a cer-
tain emotional tone is necessary the feeling of awe
and reverence. But religion as an affection of the
subject is not merely an impression received from
the object. The subject relates itself to the object,
its History and Interpretation. 107
and the pressure of its inwardly felt needs prompts
it to do so. These needs the power or powers wor-
shipped are believed to be able to satisfy. Hence
the sense of trust and dependence which is involved
in the religious consciousness. 1
Moreover, the bond between worshipper and wor-
shipped is a practical one : it appeals to the will, and
is realised in the acts which constitute the cultus
and represent religious conduct. For " religion
means that action is bound, obliged, that there is
no choice between opposites, but supreme decided-
ness for the right without option." 2
The primacy of feeling in originating religion has
often been noted. "Primus in orbe fecit deos
timor." The frequently quoted saying of Statius,
however, unduly limits the emotional motives. Not
only fear but awe and wonder, gratitude and hope,
assist at the birth of faith. Nevertheless we admit
that fear, disappointment, anxiety, the feelings in
short which are most closely connected with the
limitations of the human lot, would be specially
active in urging man to find a more assured exist-
ence, by establishing a bond of union with higher
powers. Faith, even in its rudest form, implies a
1 Even on purely psychological grounds M. Arnold's definition of
religion as ' morality touched by emotion ' is defective.
2 Schelling, quoted by Wallace, 'Lectures on Natural Theology
and Ethics,' p. 59.
io8 Religious Development :
certain discontent with what is : the sober present
never fully corresponds to human desire and long-
ing. Eeligion is the abiding witness to the truth
that the human self can never find a full satisfaction
through its environment.
But though great stress be laid on the urgency of
feeling in developing the religious consciousness,
feeling cannot stand alone as an explanation. For
religion is also belief and demands a certain activity
of mind. Feeling must be qualified by thought if it
is to be significant : and the crudest religious rela-
tionship must have an element of universality in it.
We cannot, as already remarked, conceive of a re-
ligion prior to the evolution of forms of speech ; and
language which implies some sort of social union
also implies some development of thought. The
worshipper must have an idea of the powers or
spirits which he worships, and this means at least a
rudimentary capacity to generalise and hold before
consciousness. H. Usener, in a suggestive investi-
gation into the names of the gods, deals with the
relation of language to primitive religion. 1 In his
view the earliest objects of worship are gods of the
moment (AugenblicJcsg otter), objects whom the de-
sire and stress of the instant have made divine.
By repetition a deity of this fugitive kind develops
into a specific, or departmental god, and is desig-
1 Die Gotternamen.
its History and Interpretation. 109
nated adjectivally (the bright, the strong). Finally
a god gets a name, becomes personal, and rises from
the sensuous to the ideal sphere. Classes two and
three in Usener's theory, correspond generally to the
distinction between spiritism and polytheism. As
to the first class, I doubt whether it can fairly be
regarded as the primitive and original stage of the
religious consciousness. 1 To invoke a thing as divine
in the stress of the moment surely implies a con-
sciousness of the divine which is wider than the
particular experience. And a relation which is of
the moment merely does not seem to be in the full
sense religious. So far as Usener's AugenblicJcsgotter
represent a real phase in the evolution of religion,
they are best regarded as a degenerate outgrowth
of his second class : we shall find that much the same
relationship exists between fetishism and spiritism.
We conclude, then, that the psychological genesis
of religion cannot be traced back to the emotional
impulse of the moment. Feeling, we repeat, to be
religious, involves some activity of thought ; and
religion presupposes that man has already put some
sort of meaning into his experience of things. The
crude meaning which he has read into the world
about him serves as the basis on which he builds his
religious faith. The early view of things which lies
1 Usener cites as an illustration of an AugenblicJcsgott, ^Eschylus y
' Septem contra Thebas,' 529, 530.
1 1 o Religious Development :
behind religion is animism. In its origin animism
is not a conscious theory, but man's instinctive
projection of his own experience into the objects
around him. The savage reads into the chang-
ing phenomena of nature the same life and power
which he is conscious of within himself. Only thus
are growth, movement, change in nature, intelligible
to him. Winds and waters, clouds and stars, trees
and plants were instinctively regarded as possessing
a life like his own. Though we find it hard to
realise, in the lower culture the idea of the inani-
mate and the unconscious does not exist; it only
appears with the development of a greater capacity
to abstract and generalise. Originating in an in-
stinctive act of mind and not in deliberate reflexion,
animism came to represent the way in which primi-
tive man habitually thinks of the world around
him. It is explanation in its primeval form. Anim-
ism is universal as a stage of culture ; we see evid-
ence of it among all races, from the Esquimaux and
Finns in the north to the Australian aborigines in
the south. By itself, however, it is not religion,
as it is sometimes loosely termed. For in religion
there must be a distinctive relation of the subject
to an object, and this means an act of selection on
the part of the subject. From the nature of the
case worship must be directed to some things and
not to everything, and what determines choice ?
its History and Interpretation. 1 1 1
The answer clearly is that those objects which are
believed to stand in close relation to individual
desires and wants will be chosen. Primitive man
acted on the rule do ut des, and the things he rever-
enced were always those he supposed could affect
him for good or ill. It is the supervention of
human need on the animistic view of the world
which begets the religious bond : the determining
factor is within, not without. 1
The distinction between animism and spiritism
is not hard and fast. There is no historic evidence
of a stage of culture where the first existed but
not the second. The difference in name is justified
if we regard spiritism as the result of a process
which gave a higher form to the animistic con-
sciousness. Worship, we saw, implied selection, and
the attribution of a special power to the object
selected. If a man reverences a tree or a stone it
must be more than other trees and stones. It
possesses power for good or ill, but why ? The
answer is that there is a spirit in it. This inter-
pretation is psychologically intelligible, and is simply
man's inreading into things of a development in
his own experience. For the primitive mind the
1 To say that religion is " the solution of the contradiction between
outer determination and inner freedom " is no more than an abstract
way of putting the psychological facts. In reality it does not describe
these fully, and is of course no explanation of the ultimate meaning
of religion.
1 1 2 Religious Development :
distinction between fact and fancy, hallucination
and real perception, the dream and the waking
consciousness, does not exist. All experiences are
alike objective. But the savage is confronted by
the fact that his fleshly body has not really fol-
lowed the course of his dreams. So a distinction
develops between the body and the soul, the latter
being conceived as a finer self, which usually dwells
within the body though it is not confined to it,
and sometimes wanders forth to strange adven-
tures. 1 The dream is true, but it is a history of
what happened to the soul in its absence from the
body. The distinction which primitive man drew
within his own experience he transferred to things
about him. Hence arose the conception of spirits
which reside in things but yet are not bound to
them. The saying attributed to Thales, rraivTa
7T\rjp-rj 0ea>v, is a reminiscence of the ubiquity of
spirits in early culture. In springs and rivers,
trees and groves, in fire and earth, they were
found, all possible objects of reverence, if not all
actually worshipped. All races have passed through
this stage of belief, though they have differed in
the degree of development they have given to it.
1 Cp. the remarks on the same point in the essay " On the Distinc-
tion between Inner and Outer Experience." The dream -soul or
shadow-self plays a great part in the lower culture. For the Homeric
view vid. Iliad, 23, 101-105. The Egyptian Ka, as is well known,
was made the subject of elaborate doctrines.
its History and Interpretation. 1 1 3
Spiritism is closely interwoven with minor nature-
worship, to use the phrase of Keville. Places
frequented by spirits, the objects in which they
dwelt, became sacred. Hence there were holy wells
and groves, trees and mountains, for spirits haunted
them who could help or hurt men. The selection
of these sites was sometimes due to the need they
supplied : the spring quenched man's thirst, the
tree gave him fruit. At other times choice may
have been due to some fortuitous circumstance
which convinced the savage mind, not able to dis-
tinguish between conjunction and causality, that
spirits were present there. 1 When once selected,
sentiment gathered round a spot and tradition
handed down its sanctity. The mystery of age
by-and-by cast a spell on men's minds ; and holy
places have enjoyed a local reverence, and some-
times more than this, even when the faith which
created them has lost its power to move mankind.
The tree in the Arician grove, the oak of Dodona,
the 'green tree' which overshadowed the Canaan-
itish altars, and the sacred wells of our own land,
all tell the tale how the vestiges of an older cult
may linger on and touch the imagination of an
after-age. The careful inquirer who looks beneath
the surface of a later culture will always find
1 The application of the principle post hoc ergo propter hoc is the
source of many of the vagaries of early belief.
H
H4 Religious Development :
traces of a minor nature-worship which once was
flourishing.
The question suggests itself, What is the relation
of the minor to the greater n ature- worship ? By
the latter is meant the worship, for example, of
heaven, sun and moon, dawn and thunder. Keville
has suggested that the latter is an extension or
outgrowth from the lesser nature- worship. 1 The
hypothesis is tempting, especially to those who
like to see orderly progress everywhere. For minor
nature-worship is circumscribed in its appeal and
conservative in its tendency. But the greater
nature-worship cannot be locally restricted in this
way : even the primitive barbarian would find it
hard to claim for his tribe a monopoly of the sun
or the heavens. Man in all his wanderings could
not pass away from them, and so the worship of
the larger phenomena of nature ultimately became,
as we shall see, a means of transition from the
tribal to a wider form of religious union. Never-
theless one cannot see why the one form of wor-
ship necessarily precedes the other ; and the savage
who is capable of reverencing an animal or a tree
should also be able to worship the sun or moon.
It would be hazardous to apply the maxim of Cicero
in this case, " Quod crebro videt non miratur " ;
1 Eeligiona des Penples non Civilians, vol. ii. p. 225.
its History and Interpretation. 115
for the rolling thunder, the howling wind, the
changing moon must have forced themselves on
the notice and provoked the awe and wonder of
the humblest barbarian. It seems safer to conclude
that the greater nature-worship, if it did not develop
so rapidly, in its beginnings may be as early as the
minor nature- worship. 1 And both have their roots
in animism.
But the individual who has reached a satisfactory
conclusion about the facts we have been considering
is perplexed by a fresh group of religious phenomena
which, to appearance, seems rather remotely related
to the other group. I refer to Ancestor-worship, the
worship of the souls of the dead, and Totemism.
Between the members of this second class a connex-
ion may be shown, but the relation of the whole
class to the first class is less clear. Is the one group
earlier than the other, and, if so, which is the earlier ?
Are both independent growths, and, if not, is it
possible to show how the one developed out of the
other? Mr Herbert Spencer, it is well known, re-
gards ancestor - worship as primitive and nature-
worship as derivative " an aberrant form of ghost-
worship." 2 The theory has found few supporters,
1 This seems to me one of the points where our defective knowledge
of primitive psychical conditions makes it unsafe to dogmatise.
2 Ecclesiastical Institutions, 687.
1 1 6 Religious Development :
and in itself it is neither natural nor probable. Yet
the cult of the Manes is undoubtedly very old, older
among the Aryans, according to Fustel de Coulanges,
than the cult of Indra or Zeus. 1 But though it
existed prior to the evolution of the greater gods,
we cannot say that it is the oldest form of spiritism.
The spirits man found in nature were a reflex of the
soul he had learned to recognise in himself; and it
seems at least likely that the spirits in the world
about him first provoked his worship, because they
were more readily associated with his daily wants
and fears. The psychological causes which special-
ised spiritism in the cult of souls are fairly clear.
Early man, we saw, had no notion of the inanimate,
and death appeared to him no more than a kind
of sleep in which the soul was still active. The
reappearance of the dead in dreams was a sure
token that they still haunted the earth in ghost-
like form. The soul was thought to linger near the
body it once inhabited, and like other spirits these
souls of the departed could powerfully affect the
living for good or evil. Of the doctrine of ghost-
souls Dr Tylor says, that " it extends through
barbarian life almost without a break, and survives
largely and deeply in the midst of civilisation."
The student of Greek and Koman religion, for
example, will find abundant evidence for it in the
1 La cit6 antique, p. 19.
its History and Interpretation. 1 1 7
burial customs and other survivals in the historic
period. 1
It is to be inferred that the organised worship
of the spirits of ancestors is later than the primitive
cult of ghosts ; for it implies a growth in the con-
sciousness of the value of family and social ties.
The god who is an ancestor in claiming the worship
of his descendants rests his appeal on the sense of
a common bond and 'the duty of a common loyalty.
The cult of ancestral souls depends on family and
tribal solidarity. At this point emerges the link
of connexion between ancestor-worship and totem-
ism. In the lower stages of culture the tribal bond
could only be conceived in an external and material
way, as embodied in a thing. The totem is the
reflex of the sense of unity in clan or tribe. It is
true that totemism is not a purely religious phe-
nomenon. It is connected with exogamy, and is
associated with prohibitions which may not have
had a religious significance at first. But un-
doubtedly the totem the plant or animal which
was the ancestor of the tribe and embodied its life
came to be an object of religious reverence. The
1 Besides the work of F. de Coulanges, we may refer to E. Kohde's
book, 'Psyche.' The reader will find there the evidence for a
primitive cult of souls in Greece, drawn from burial customs recorded
in Homer and elsewhere. On Greek and Eoman tombs the inscrip-
tions are found 0eots \9ovio^ Dls Manibus. Cp. Eurip., Alcestis,
1003, 1004, vvv &' <JTI /AttKcupa Sat/xcov x^P* & '""OTVI', *v &* 801175.
1 1 8 Religious Development :
selection of an ancestor from the animal or
vegetable kingdom will cease to surprise us when
we remember how vague is the conception of
causality in the savage, and how constantly he
reads his own consciousness into the things around
him. The point of interest is that the thought
of religion as represented in a physical bond
one of blood was a germ which in a favourable
soil might rise to a higher form and bring forth
ethical fruit. Totemism flourished most luxuriantly
among the Indians of North America, and we find
it in Australia and among the Arabs and other
Semites. That it was a widespread phenomenon
is undeniable ; that it was a phase through which
all religions passed, like spiritism, is not proved, and
can well be doubted. The reverence paid to animals,
as in Egypt, may be due to a primitive animal-
worship and not to totemism. And some religions,
like the Greek and Koman, show no clear trace of
it at all. Between the worship of the totem-ancestor
and the worship of the soul of the human ancestor
of the family or clan there is no clearly marked line
of separation. But the latter object has a more
ideal significance, and is better fitted to be a means
to a higher development of the religious conscious-
ness. The rude fear of the souls of the dead, out of
which ancestor- worship issues, is gradually leavened
by sentiments of loyalty and devotion. As the
its History and Interpretation. 119
sense of the worth of social union deepens, so is the
religious relation elevated. In the Koman cult of
the forefathers of the family who in spirit watched
over its fortunes, representing to the later genera-
tions its best traditions and linking the present to
the remoter past by the bond of filial piety and
common interest, we realise the possibilities of
growth in this form of worship. 1 In China, the
land of ancestor- worship, piety takes as its main
form fidelity to the tie which links the children to
divine forefathers. As a general fact we note that
at the stage of ancestor- worship man's social relations
begin to play a part in colouring his religious con-
ceptions. The tie of family and of tribe is traced
back to the more enduring bond which links man
to his gods.
At this point it will be convenient to discuss
briefly the place of Fetishism and Magic in the
development of religion. Both have sometimes
been regarded as primitive, although the majority
of writers incline to treat them as later products
fetishism especially being reckoned a degeneration
from something higher. The only useful test we
can apply to settle the question is that of psycho-
logical consistency. A fetish may be any kind of
material object, a stone, shell, claw, or root. The
1 For the higher side of Roman family piety, see Pater's chapter on
" The Religion of Numa " in ' Marius the Epicurean.'
1 20 Religious Development :
point is that it is conceived to be the abode of a
spirit, and so is credited with superhuman powers.
Belief in spirits, therefore, is a psychological condi-
tion presupposed by the selection of the fetish, and
fetish -worship is thus a special application of spirit-
ism. In harmony with this fetishism is rife where
spiritism is rampant. To the mind of the West
African negro the world teems with spirits, and
West Africa is the land where fetishism abounds.
Though fetishism is not primitive, it does not stand
on the line of higher religious development. For it
gives a form to the religious relationship which is
crude and arbitrary to a degree, and it offers no
possibilities of progress. Psychologically fetishism
is explicable by the natural desire of man to estab-
lish a closer connexion with the spirits by physical
means, in order to further his own ends. But its
tendency is to set up a kind of control over, instead
of dependence on, higher powers, which is not in
harmony with the religious idea. 1
A similar line of argument applies to magic.
Like fetishism it has its root in spiritism, and it has
flourished most where spiritism has prevailed greatly.
We may illustrate this from the Finns and the early
Sumerian inhabitants of Babylonia; and Koman and
1 Fetishism, it should be noted, is closely associated with idolatry,
but it exists in some of the lower races without it e.g., among the
Bushmen, the Esquimaux, and the Andaman Islanders.
its History and Interpretation. 121
Chinese magic had their roots in the dominant
animism which gave a character even to the later
religious development of both peoples. The same
psychological motives are at work as in fetishism.
The magic word, rite, or formula can control the
spirits, and the sorcerer is venerated for his know-
ledge and power. Hence it is hard to believe that
Dr J. G. Frazer's view of magic, as set forth in the
second edition of ' The Golden Bough,' is correct.
He thinks that religion arose out of the failure of
magic, and in despair of its efficacy. 1 Dr Frazer, I
think, fails to recognise the universal character of
the psychological motives which led to religion.
There are plenty of examples to show that magic
and religion can easily exist together among the
same people. Nor is it likely that primitive peoples
came naturally to despair of magic. Faith in its
efficacy has often survived the strongest reasons
for disbelief. And even granted the existence of
such a despair, one does not see why the reaction
against magic should constantly issue in religion as
a kind of dernier ressort. Moreover, there is no
evidence that there are or have been low tribes who
practised magic but had not a religion ; and even
were it so, it might be argued that it was religion
which had died out while magic survived. 2 It is
1 Vol. i. p. 62 ff.
2 Vid. A. Lang, Magic and Eeligion, p. 47.
1 2 2 Religious Development :
altogether much more intelligible to regard magic as
a lower outgrowth of the religious consciousness.
The forms of religion we have been considering
are all found at the tribal stage of culture. Do
these forms represent the full development of tribal
religion? There is a certain amount of evidence
that even on this low level of culture advances
have been made towards the conception of a
Supreme Being. As illustrating this we may point
to Torngarsuk, or Great Spirit, of the Greenlanders,
Atahocan, or Creator, of the Algonquin Indians,
Unkulunkulu, the Old Old One, of the Zulus.
Manitu, the Great Spirit of the North American
Indians generally, and Baiame, the Creator, of the
native Australian tribes, may also be noted. In
some cases we can see that ancestor-worship led to
the idea of a Great or First Ancestor, as among the
Zulus. In others the supremacy of the greater and
stronger over the smaller and weaker perhaps
suggested a highest god. This may have been so
where ancestors were not worshipped. And some-
times the great god of low tribes is plausibly ex-
plained by contact, direct or indirect, with Christian
ideas ; but it is not always so. The existence of
great gods amongst savage races has, curiously
enough, prompted Mr A. Lang to rehabilitate the
old hypothesis of a primitive theism. " Our con-
ception of God descends not from ghosts but from
its History and Interpretation. 123
the Supreme Being of non- ancestor -worshipping
peoples." 1 Animism Mr Lang finds to be "full
of the seeds of degeneration " ; and it appears to
have ousted a purer religion by the attractions it
possessed for the natural man. 2 So in Guiana, we
are told, the ghost-cult has reduced the primitive
Father of all to a nominis umbra ; among the
Bantu tribes devotion to fetishes and ghosts has
brought the Supreme Being into neglect ; while
among the Zulus Unkulunkulu is a vanishing
greatness. Mr Lang's contributions to our know-
ledge of early culture and mythology have secured
a hearing for this venturesome hypothesis. But if
he is right the current notions of religious develop-
ment must be entirely revised ; animism and
spiritism cease to be primitive, and must be re-
garded as lapses from a higher and an earlier
religious level. On this theory it may be sufficient
to remark (1) The evidence that some low tribes
have risen to the idea of a Supreme Being, where
it is satisfactory, still only refers to a stage of
development which is comparatively recent, and
cannot be taken as a proof of what is primitive.
Though some modern savages have formed for
themselves an idea of a Supreme Being, this is no
proof that prehistoric man could have done so. (2)
Such great gods, where genuine native growths, are
1 Making of Religion, p. 191. 2 Ibid., pp. 264, 257.
1 24 Religious Development :
explicable as later products of the savage mind.
They were superadded to the spirits, but were
never so firmly fixed in the traditions and senti-
ments of the people. (3) While the vestiges of a
primitive animism are to be found everywhere be-
hind the ]ater stages of religious development, the
same is by no means true of a primitive theism.
(4) The theory attributes too great psychical
capacity to primitive races, and ignores the force
and intelligibility of the psychological reasons
which produced animism.
We may now attempt to state briefly the general
features of religion at the tribal stage of its history.
Here, as elsewhere, the character of religion reflects
the inner consciousness of man, which again is con-
ditioned by his social relations. At this period self-
consciousness is relatively undeveloped, and the
spiritual life does not definitely contrast itself with
or oppose itself to the natural world. Imagination
is fettered to the domain of sense, and cannot
rise to the thought of an ideal bond or a super-
sensuous world. The gods belong to the realm of
nature : if not absolutely identified with material
objects, they are more or less closely bound up with
them. Personality is dormant, the individual is
merged in the tribe, and religious growth is uncon-
scious. The day of the prophet, reformer, and
spiritual teacher has not dawned. The rude pre-
its History and Interpretation. 125
cursor of these is the sorcerer and the medicine-man.
As yet religious change is gradual and comes with-
out observation. In harmony with this, the private
belief of the individual, if he has any, is unim-
portant : each member of the tribe shares its religion
by taking part in the cult. His religion is deter-
mined for him by his membership of the family or
clan, and is part of his birth inheritance. A man
can only change his religion by breaking his social
bonds and undergoing initiation into an alien tribe
which " serves other gods." The spiritual not being
properly differentiated at this stage from the
natural, human needs are restricted to the material,
and desires do not rise above the sensuous. The
stress of life is embodied in the constant endeavour
to supply the wants of the body and to gain protec-
tion or deliverance from danger. For man has not
yet gained that material basis of existence which, in
giving him fuller security, also gives him leisure to
reflect : and as the circle of his needs is limited, so
is the scope of his religious interest. The colourless
uniformity which is manifest in tribal religions
is a consequence of the poverty of social life,
which cannot nourish a complex and developed
personality.
At first we are astonished at the recurrence of the
same beliefs and rites among the most distant tribes.
But we wonder less when we remember that men
126 Religious Development :
everywhere have the same limited group of material
wants, and bring the same mental constitution to
bear on these wants. Monotony the lack of
distinctive character is a note of tribal religions.
Primitive religion certainly made for loyalty to the
tribal bond, yet in casting the shadow of a religious
sanction over tribal divisions, it hindered rather
than helped the advent of wider forms of social
union. The merging of tribes in the nation was not
due to the pressure of religious motives.
In correspondence with man's slender inner
development the gods of tribal religion are lacking
in content. The worshipper's poverty of character
is mirrored in the objects which he worships. The
host of spirits which encircled the savage were
differentiated one from another only in an external
way i.e., by local habitation and office. One dwells
in a tree and another in a spring, one is invoked that
he may do good, another is propitiated lest he work
harm : but otherwise their nature remains vague and
undefined. The god is not personified ; he does not
combine and body forth a group of determinate
qualities. In other words, the gods of tribal
religion do not rise to the level of personal
character. 1 Hence their relations to the worshipper
1 Usener thinks that up to the time of the division of the Indo-
Germanic peoples the Aryans did not have concrete personal gods.
' Gotternamen,' p. 279.
its History and Interpretation. 1 27
are material and external. To this the religious
rites bear witness. Sacrifice, for example, goes far
back in the history of the race. Yet in primitive
sacrifice the ethical element is quite undeveloped.
As is now generally agreed, sacrifice was originally
a common meal which the god shared with his
worshippers, and was a means of strengthening the
bond of union between them. 1 That bond was one
of life or blood. So with prayer ; it was only the
expression of personal desire for some tangible
good. A higher stage of religion could only come
with the development of a deeper personal con-
sciousness in man. For with the deepening of the
inner life there goes perforce a demand for more
elevated ideas of the gods and a recasting of the
religious relationship. The new wine must have
new bottles. We shall now try to indicate shortly
the significance of the transition from tribal to
national religion.
The process by which various clans and tribes are
fused into a nation is not one which we can actually
observe. In some cases, however, analysis of the
composite product enables us to form a fairly clear
idea of the different elements, and of the way
in which they were gradually combined in the
national whole. It may be confidently asserted
1 Vid. W. E. Smith's Religion of the Semites, p. 439. Cp. Iliad,
i. 451.
128 Religious Development :
that no nation was ever formed by simple and
continuous expansion of a single stock or clan.
Tribal history is full of warfare and conquest.
The victory of the stronger tribe, the subjuga-
tion and final incorporation of the weaker, have
been the means by which the formation of larger
social organisations has been promoted. The
building up of the Roman people from a nucleus
of Italic clans is a case in point. As a nation
develops, the elements which have entered into
it consolidate ; men enjoy a larger security and
have less anxiety about the satisfaction of bodily
wants. Hence the way is opened out for the growth
of reflective consciousness, and to the outward ex-
pansion of the social system there corresponds an
inward deepening of the personal life. A new and
higher range of desires emerges ; and along with
this goes the demand for a definite advance in the
form of religion. The local aspects of the older
faiths are felt to be out of harmony with a wider
outlook and higher needs. The sacred spring and
tree and the spirit-haunted holy place do not lend
themselves to the reverence of a whole nation. Nor
can family ancestors, or the totem of the clan, both
resting on ties of blood, become truly national gods
without losing their significance. In Eome, for
instance, although Vesta, the deity of the domestic
hearth, became a state -goddess, the cult of the
its History and Interpretation. 129
forefathers of the family was shared only by the
family. 1
The birth of a nation brings with it a new sense
of the value of order and uniformity which, in the
religious sphere, makes for a new organisation of
beliefs. Moreover, the interaction of the diverse
religious ideas which tribes bring with them into
the nation is favourable to religious development.
The need of harmonising discordant elements and
establishing some form of unity is a stimulus to
religious reflexion. 2 It might be thought that a
ruling race whose influence was dominant would
simply impose its religion on the lower peoples
under its sway. But only to a limited extent is
this possible. The conservative force of sentiment
and tradition always prevents one religion from
completely usurping the place of another. The
dominant and official cult never wholly ousts the
weaker one from its local strongholds, and in its
own development is modified by it. Behind Baby-
lonian polytheism lurk the magic and the spirits
of the old Sumerian inhabitants. The primitive
1 Perhaps in the general idea of kinship between men and gods we
may trace the survival, at a higher level of development, of tribal
notions of blood- relationship. But the important thing is that
tribal religion, in any of its forms, is not adequate to the national
consciousness.
2 It is worthy of note that races which have suffered from
isolation e.g., Finns and Lithuanians have remained long on the
lower levels of religious belief.
I
1 30 Religious Development :
animal worship of the different nomes shows itself
beside the greater gods of the Egyptian Empire.
Hindu idolatry suggests how the religion of the
Aryan conquerors of India has been influenced
by the fetishism of the aborigines. Keligions
die hard. Indeed the tenacious life which pre-
serves a lower form of faith beside a higher
is a widespread phenomenon, well known to
all students of human culture. It can be illus-
trated from Christian as well as from pagan
lands.
Minor nature-worship, as we have seen, is local
and tribal in its character and tendency, while the
worship of the greater powers of nature lends
itself to the outlook of a larger religious faith.
The heavens and the sun, the thunder and the
storm, have a world - wide range and sphere of
operation. They were therefore fitted to be the
objects of a worship that transcended the local
cults of clan and tribe. We can understand, then,
how the national consciousness, reacting against
the narrow form of tribal religion, and stirred to
advance by the opposition of beliefs, intuitively
laid hold on the greater nature -worship, as that
side of older faith which could be expanded to
meet its larger wants. A personification of the
greater powers of nature lies behind the organised
its History and Interpretation. 131
polytheism of the national religions. 1 The traces
of the nature - origin of many of the greater gods
have almost vanished, but sometimes we can detect
enough to suggest to us what the basis of the
later development has been. A few illustrations
will make this more plain. That the chief gods
of the Veda are personifications of natural powers
appears fairly certain. The drama of the storm
lies at the root of Indra, and Agni is primarily
fire. Yaruna is possibly the all -seeing heaven.
In China, Tian is the personification of the celestial
firmament. The Baalim, or Lords, of the Semites,
Merodach, god of Babylon, and the Egyptian Ka
are sun-gods. The Hellenic Zeus shows vestiges of
his connexion with the phenomena of the sky, with
rain, wind, and thunder 5croi>, w </>iXe Zet), /caret
The Roman Jupiter has likewise a primitive con-
nexion with the heaven "Sub frigido Jove" and
a philological kinship with his Hellenic counterpart.
These examples might be added to. But enough
has been said to justify the view we have taken of
the way in which the national consciousness raised
1 It is not, of course, meant that all the greater gods were
originally nature-powers. Brahma is an instance of a god origin-
ating in the cult. The Eoman religion furnishes examples of the
apotheosis of purely social functions.
132 Religious Development :
tribal religion to a form adequate to its needs.
It did so by developing the greater nature- worship
into a polytheistic system. And in the process the
material basis of the gods was gradually outgrown.
The physical root of a deity is overlaid with higher
attributes, and resembles the rudimentary organs of
some animal type by which the biologist is able to
spell out its remoter lineage. This development
consists in giving content and personal definiteness
to the idea of a god ; and it is made possible by the
growth of higher social and ethical qualities within
the nation. The evolution of personal character
on earth gives a higher conception of the things
in heaven.
" Und wir verehren
Die Unsterblichen
Als waren sie Menschen,
Thaten im Grossen
Was der Beste im Kleinen
Thut oder mbchte."
The movement of the mind by which the gods
are clothed with all human virtues likewise invests
them with higher social meaning. They become
the ideal representatives and protectors of special
departments of the national life. The earthly state
has a counterpart in the commonwealth above. So
the interests, aspirations, and activities of a race, as
well as the different aspects of its social life, are
its History and Interpretation. 133
represented in the gods of the State, and as the
moral consciousness grows they receive a corres-
pondingly higher moral character. To illustrate
this. In China, Tian, or Heaven, was identified
with the principle of order, and measure, and just
custom, and became the pattern of right for those
upon the earth. The Vedic Varuna was exalted to
the place of a highest ruler who saw all things, who
required piety in his worshippers, and to whom
confession of sins was made. The Greek Apollo
may have been originally a light-god, but he after-
wards became the deity who presided over the art
of healing, and wielded the gift of prophecy.
Athene, who was perhaps at first the lightning-
flash, became the goddess who was the pattern of
civic valour and good counsel, and whose interests
were bound up with the city which was called by
her name. Mars, an ancient Italian deity of spring
and fertility, cast his preserving care over agri-
culture, and became the god of war as well. The
Teutonic Odin, besides war, took understanding and
culture under his protection. The Egyptian Osiris,
who appears to have been originally the Sun after
his setting, was raised to be ruler of the realm
of departed spirits, the moral judge who weighs
in a balance the good and evil done in the flesh.
The ascription of diverse functions to the one god
was a consequence of the multiplication of human
134 Religious Development :
interests and activities. Yet this was not the sole
reason. Sometimes the process was due to the
desire to introduce unity and coherence into the
local cults. In Egypt the sun-god Ka absorbed the
various local sun-gods, who became aspects of Ra.
In Greece we find a like movement working upon
more diverse materials. The Zeus e^SeVSptos of
Dodona was no doubt a primeval tree-spirit. The
Zeus cDuos was a god of the sea. The Zeus x#oi>ios
worshipped at Mount Ida and Crete at both of
which the grave of Zeus was shown was probably
an earth-spirit. These gods, really of diverse origin,
were harmonised by being designated as aspects of
Zeus. But this tendency to unify is not strictly
universal, and a society as it grows more complex
sometimes goes on adding to its deities. This was
markedly the case among the Komans, whose crowd
of 'little gods,' thinly veiled abstractions as they
were, was constantly being augmented. 1 But the
influences which make for unification commonly pre-
dominate at this stage. Political and social reasons
make it desirable that the citizens of a state should
not be divided in their religion.
The organisation of society suggests a supremacy
and headship among the gods. The reflective con-
sciousness seeks unity behind multiplicity, and looks
for a greater god on whom the lesser gods depend.
1 Vid. Aust, Die Eeligion der Komer, 19, 20.
its History and Interpretation. 135
Moreover, this tendency of thought is supported by
the instinct which is in the worshipper to adore a
particular god as supreme in the act of reverence.
The suppliant craving the help of a god thinks
of that god for the time being as greatest and
strongest. The existence of the other gods is of
course in no sense denied. This attitude of the
religious mind has been termed Kathenotheism, and
Vedic worship is usually cited as an illustration of
it. Sayce finds the same movement of mind in the
religion of Egypt. 1
A further advance towards unity is revealed in
Henotheism, which means that while many gods
are admitted to exist, worship is reserved for one
only. The dividing line between these two phases
of belief is shadowy. In the latter case, however,
faith in the supremacy and uniqueness of the god
worshipped has become a permanent, not a passing,
attitude of mind.
The Hebrew Psalmist has been quoted as speaking
the language of Henotheism. " Thou, Lord, art high
above all the earth : Thou art exalted above all
gods" (Ps. xcvii. 9). And the well-known lines
of Xenophanes are henotheistic in spirit :
Efc #609 %v re Qeolai KOL avdpcoTroicrt,
Ol/T6 SeJLdS QvYToi<JlV OJLOUOS OVT
1 Religions of Ancient Egypt and Babylonia, p. 93.
1 36 Religious Development :
But there is another and a more developed aspect
of the tendency to unify. The reflective conscious-
ness discerns a divine element in all the gods, or
recognises some higher law immanent in the world
of gods. Such are the Greek To Belov and Motpa,
and the Hindu Rita. The further progress of this
movement leads to pantheism with its reduction of
the manifold world of divine forms to appearances
of the One. Whether this path is followed to its
logical conclusion or not depends on several condi-
tions. Capacity for speculative thought in a people
counts for something. Still more important is the
degree in which personality has been developed in
the social system. Where a high sense of person-
ality has been linked with imaginative power the
forms of divine beings are clearly defined, and their
character is concrete. In which case the gods resist
the process of fusion into a pantheistic whole. It
is also true that where the developed consciousness
of personality is accompanied by a keen perception
of moral values, pantheism does not find a favour-
able soil in which to grow. In India the Aryan con-
querors seem early to have lost the vigour and self-
assertion of their race. The Hindu was oppressed
by the burden of life in a tropical land rather
than quickened by its interests : personality was
slenderly developed, and the forms of the gods
remained vague and shadowy. Already in the
its History and Interpretation. 137
Veda the process of blending has begun. "They
have styled him Indra, Mithra, Varuna, Agni, for
the poets have many names for the One." The
issue of this movement of thought is contained in
the words of the Vedanta, " He who knows the
highest Brahma becomes Brahma." Nay, such
knowledge is only the intuition of what always has
been, the Eternal One ! All else is illusion. In
ancient Egypt the official religion was construed by
the priesthood into a subtle pantheism, which, how-
ever, was more an esoteric product than was the
case in India. On the other hand, the Greek genius
had given such definite and artistic form to the
gods that the process of fusion could not be carried
out. Greek pantheism is a late philosophical pro-
duct which did not concern itself with the tradi-
tional religion.
In contrast to this line of development which
ends in the impasse of pantheism, another line leads
on to monotheism. The former movement is mainly
intellectual, in the latter moral forces play a part.
And if it be granted that piety and reverence are
rooted in the nature of man, then beyond question
monotheism is the higher and truer development :
it gives the more complete expression to the religious
principle. Historically the advance from polytheism
to monotheism has been by way of monarchism.
The term signifies that one out of a circle of gods is
138 Religious Development :
represented as supreme and having sway over the
rest : the favoured god may have been the deity of
a conquering race, or of a city which has established
a rule over other cities. Such were Amon-Ea of
Thebes, and Merodach of Babylon. Among the
Greeks Zeus was raised to a kind of sovereignty
over the other gods, and so Homer depicts him. 1
He has a shadowy counterpart in the Jupiter Opti-
mus Maximus of the Eoman Capitol.
Monotheism is distinguished from monarchism
by its refusal to admit the existence of many gods,
and its affirmation that there is but one Glod. The
Psalmist speaks the language of monotheism when
he declares, "All the gods of the nations are idols,
but the Lord made the heavens " (Ps. xcvi. 5). On
a superficial view it might seem that the transition
from monarchism to monotheism was simple and
easy. But it is not so : the definite rejection of
the claim to existence of all gods save the One is
a step as difficult as it is important. Sentiment
and tradition as well as local associations do battle
for polytheism, and the conservative instincts,
which are so powerful in religion, protest against
the thought that the objects of a long-lived faith
are unreal. Even though discredited in the eyes of
those who know, the old gods find a refuge in
quiet places among the simple and unlearned. The
1 Vid. Iliad, viii. 1-35.
its History and Interpretation. 139
strenuous warfare the Hebrew prophets had to
wage against the local Baalim is an illustration of
the tenacious life of polytheism. Indeed the estab-
lishment of a pure monotheism means a self-
conscious reaction against the religion of the past
which is more the outcome of moral and spiritual
than of intellectual forces. It argues a higher
spiritual development in individuals, in virtue of
which they realise keenly that their worship cannot
be divided among several but must be reserved for
the one object. When men are fully persuaded
that there is but the one God who is worthy of
their reverence and service, the figures of other
deities perforce grow shadowy and unreal ; and the
process ends in the explicit denial of their existence.
Monotheism, as distinguished from pantheism and
polytheism, rests on a developed sense of spiritual
personality. In harmony with this God is con-
ceived as a Being who transcends the world and
His worshippers, but enters into personal relations
with men.
On the higher levels of ethical religion the in-
fluence of individuals on the course of religious
development becomes very important. Even at
the stage of the nature-religions it must have been
true that the influence of some individuals on
religious development was greater than that of
others. Yet growth was, on the whole, uncon-
140 Religious Development :
scious ; for the individual had not come to the
consciousness of an inner life of his own, in virtue
of which he could set his own experience in contrast
with that of his tribe, and initiate changes on his
own responsibility. Tribal society does not give
scope for personal centres of light and leading.
The development of self - consciousness through a
higher social organisation makes it possible for the
individual to become a determining factor in the
advance of religion. He recognises that what he
feels and thinks has a value. In virtue of their
inner experience the prophet and the religious
teacher purify religious ideas and hand them on
in a higher form. Seeing further than other men,
they give articulate voice to what the popular mind
is only dimly groping after. They become them-
selves personal influences, the sources of far-reaching
movements, the centres round which thought and
sentiment gather and from which they continue to
be inspired. And when the historic form has
grown faint, seen through a space of intervening
years, pious imagination adorns it with myth and
legend.
In a sense, humanity ; is right in magnifying the
great spiritual personalities of the past. For these
men are only explicable up to a point through
their environment. We can, for instance, always
find links which connect them and their message
its History and Interpretation. 141
with what has gone before : so it cannot be said
that the principle of continuity between the past
and present is wholly set aside. On the other
hand, the attempt to show that they are simply
the products of their age and surroundings is never
perfectly convincing. 1 The spiritual genius is usu-
ally in advance of his time, and sometimes in
sharp opposition to its main tendency ; and he
gives a specific direction to religious progress
which is not explained by a general reference to
the " spirit of the age." The depth of individual
character and the uniqueness of personal experience
contribute a distinctive element to the riper stages
of religious development, an element which we
cannot bring entirely within the scope of racial
tendencies and social forces. The prophet of one
age would have been different in another, but this
does not prove that the age is the exhaustive
explanation of the man. Does Judaism, for
example, at the beginning of our era render
perfectly intelligible the life and teaching of
Christ? One cannot resist the conviction that
explanations of this kind are made to appear
sufficient by unwarrantably reading into the past
what is necessary for the purpose in hand. The
adequate discussion of the question would lead us,
however, beyond the domain of psychology. So
1 Vid. Tiele, Science of Religion, vol. i. p. 244 ff.
142 Religious Development :
we simply note the fact that the deepening of the
religious self-consciousness and the advent of great
religious personalities render the development of
religion more complex, and so more difficult to
interpret as the outcome of general conditions.
We find an analogy to the spiritual genius rather
in the poet or creative artist than in the speculative
thinker. And it is easier to detect rational con-
tinuity in the evolution of philosophy than of
religion.
The stress which is laid on the inward and
spiritual side of religion is fruitful in conse-
quences. Worship of itself tends to stiffen into
a mechanical and external cult, where the opus
operatum counts for much and faith for very
little. The dominance of the ritual element makes
religion one-sided and provokes reaction. So on
the upper levels of Ethical Eeligion, with the
deepening of the subjective consciousness there
is a recoil from the tyranny of outward form ;
and the result is to bring into relief the religious
value of inner experience, and to emphasise the
need of faith. The new prominence of the sub-
jective factor helps to liberate religion from the
local and racial limitations which have hitherto
clung to it. For these appear alien and burden-
some as men come to recognise the value of piety
in the heart. The Hebrew prophets who found
its History and Interpretation. 143
the law of God within, and preached the cleansing
of the heart and not of the garments, were the
pioneers of an ampler creed. Already the weight
of national exclusiveness was falling from them,
and with the images at their disposal they pro-
phesied the day of universal religion, the day
when all nations should come to Zion. The
message of Buddha is strangely unlike that of the
prophets of Israel. But he resembled them in
this, that, as against the claims of a legal ritual
and a material sacrifice, he declared the way of
salvation to be within. And the inner sanctuary
is a refuge for every man. "My redemption,"
he said, "is a redemption for all." The inner
life receives a more positive value and a richer
content in the teaching of Christ. The worth
of a soul, he tells us, is greater than the world,
and "the pure in heart see God." And just
because faith is an inward possession, and the
only worship which avails is worship in "spirit
and in truth," the Christian religion rises in
principle above all local and national limitations
and becomes universal. That which is deepest
in religion is likewise that which is free to every
man spiritual life. " One is your Father," said
Christ to men, "and all ye are brethren,"
brethren after the spirit though not after the
flesh. As an ethical and spiritual religion Christi-
1 44 Religious Development :
anity is the ripest fruit of religious development
and the outcome of the fulness of the time. And
it is of necessity that the religion which lays the
deepest stress on individual faith and personal
character should at the same time be the most
universal. For faith is possible to all, and man
is " saved " by faith, not by the " works of the
law." In its historical evolution Christianity has
doubtless not always been true to its principles.
Alien ideas have affected its creed, and the religions
which it superseded have reacted upon it. Hence
the working out of its spiritual ideal has been
hampered by lower elements. But the fact re-
mains that Christianity has best enabled us to
realise the thought of religion as a universal as-
pect of life and the deepest possession of the soul.
Beyond doubt it is the maturest product of the
historic development of the religious consciousness.
We must now try to gather together and to
state more directly the conclusions which our
historic discussion suggests. At the outset some
general propositions will probably be agreed on.
It will be granted that there is a progress in
human culture, and religion as an element in
culture shares in that progress. It is for instance
clear that, as social life expands and grows more
highly organised, it is accompanied by a refine-
ment and elevation of religious conceptions. We
its History and Interpretation. 145
cannot go so far as to say that the progress of
the one measures that of the other. But it is at
least true that religion cannot remain apart from
and unaffected by the development of the social
whole in which it exists. In the second place, it
is evident that the general trend of the religious
advance is from the material to the spiritual.
This upward movement is not so rapid in one
religion as in another, nor is it uniform through
different stages of the same religion : in some
cases it may not exist at all. But that there is,
on the whole, a progress of the kind mentioned
will not be denied. The religious bond, for ex-
ample, in early races one of blood, is gradually
converted into one of inner character. And, in
the third place, the direction which religious pro-
gress takes is towards universality. The history
of religion discloses a movement from tribal
through national to universal religion. The sub-
jective factor in the religious consciousness, un-
important to begin with, becomes more and more
important. Universal religion demands faith,
which means an act of personal freedom, and it
calls for piety, which is the expression of inward
character. And there are no barriers to ' salvation '
but those which a man raises within himself.
It being granted that there is a development
of religion such as we have indicated, we must
K
146 Religious Development :
now deal more directly with its interpretation.
In what sense can we regard the higher and more
complete form of religion as growing out of the
ruder and earlier? That the later stage of a
religion is related to the earlier, and cannot be
understood apart from it, is of course clear. But
can we speak of the religious idea as a germ which
develops by an immanent law the blossom and
fruit which were somehow in it from the begin-
ning? The analogy of an organism is a tempting
if not always a safe one, and it has been much
used as a key to intellectual and spiritual progress.
In the case of organic growth we may try to
explain the process to ourselves by supposing that
the typical line which that growth follows is due
to the fact that the fully developed whole is
somehow implicitly present in the beginning.
How we are to think of this presence is not at
all clear, and the explanation does not amount to
much. 1 At the same time, I do not see that we
can deny that organic growth is a movement to
an end ; which end, or developed result, appears
to determine the successive phases of growth, so
that the development follows a characteristic order.
Interaction of organism with environment is, of
1 A thoughtful criticism of the idea of development will be found
in the lectures on ' The Development of Modern Philosophy ' by the
late Prof. Adamson. Vid. vol. ii. p. 185 ff.
its History and Interpretation. 1 47
course, necessary as a means, but the typical form
is not created by the environment. The living
germ means a determinate development and noth-
ing else. Now I doubt if we can speak of the
evolution of religion as a development in the fore-
going sense. In organic growth the earlier stages
are transmuted and taken up into the later. They
cease to exist for themselves, and are only repre-
sented in the higher product. But in the history
of religion we find that a lower stage survives
alongside and refuses to be merged in the higher.
This phenomenon of survival is too frequent to be
treated as sporadic. And so we have religions
in which the growth of higher beliefs has been
hampered, and it may be arrested, by the pressure
of older beliefs and practices. 1
The analogy is defective at another point. I do
not think we can assign a distinct germinal basis
to religion such as the analogy of an organism
requires. Eeligion is not a fact by itself: it is a
psychological state, and it only exists as an aspect
of the greater whole of self-conscious life. Hence,
as its vitality and significance depend on the larger
content of which it is an element, we cannot regard
it as possessing a principle of growth in abstraction
1 An example of this is the Roman religion, which never fairly
succeeded in transmuting its primitive basis in animism into a higher
system of belief.
148 Religious Development :
from the unity to which it belongs. Eeligion grows
with the growth of the mind. The other aspects of
consciousness are essentially involved in the growth
of the religious consciousness. We cannot correctly
speak of the religious consciousness of itself unfold-
ing by an immanent law the wealth implicit in it
from the beginning. To put the same truth from
another point of view, the social, scientific, and
ethical culture of a race all help to determine the
character of its religion.
It will perhaps be said that the other aspects of
consciousness play the part of a spiritual environ-
ment to the religious idea, and are only necessary as
a means to its unfolding. We cannot, however,
make a valid distinction of active and passive in
consciousness like this. And the facts of religious
evolution do not bear out the view that these
elements, which are described as a means, have no
share in determining the characteristic form which
religion takes at a given stage.
If we say, then, that there is a continuity in re-
ligious development, and different religions have a
common character, in what sense do we understand
the statement ? Eeligions have a common character
inasmuch as they are the expressions of the one
human mind seeking satisfaction for needs which,
broadly speaking, are the same. In our analysis of
the religious consciousness we saw that it had a sub-
its History and Interpretation. 1 49
jective and an objective aspect, on the one side the
sense of need, incompleteness, and dependence, and
on the other the conception of an object which can
satisfy the subject. This is the generic form of the
religious idea and the bond of unity between the
different types of religion. These types are diverse,
but they cannot fall outside the general notion and
yet remain religions. The continuity of religious
development has, as its primary condition, therefore,
the unity of principle which is realised in all the
phases of that development. The higher religions
embody the idea in a larger and worthier form than
the lower : they are the same spiritual consciousness
on a further stage of its upward journey. Between
the new and the older phase of religious develop-
ment there is no absolute break, just as there is
none in the individual between the religion of child-
hood, youth, and manhood. As the content of the
religious consciousness deepens, it reacts on the
form and strives to bring it into harmony with
itself. But the new is ever reached by modification
of the old, and it is not to be understood apart
from it. Even where the principle of continuity is
most threatened viz., in the case of those religions
which trace their distinctive character to the spiritual
genius of great teachers seeds of the new faith will
be found in the past. And the greatest of religious
teachers is under the necessity of appealing to men
1 50 Religious Development :
through the ideas and forms to which they are
accustomed. He can never inaugurate a new faith
which is devoid of relation to the old, although at
the same time we contend that personal initiative,
resting on freedom, contributes an element to de-
velopment which is more than the past can explain. 1
Another question suggests itself. Have all specific
religions played a part in the general development
of religion ? Many of these withered and died.
Others, after a period of development appeared to
lose vitality, and hardened down into a form which
resisted further progress. Some vanished away when
the culture out of which they arose broke up, and
no one could say in what definite respect they
have influenced the religion of posterity. As we
look back on the extinct types of faith they seem
futile creations of the human spirit, passing products
of a passing age, their meaning and value perishing
with them.
Yet it is possible to press the point of view too
far. It would be absurd, for example, to assume
that the various religions are isolated growths which
run their course in mutual independence. Direct
interaction can often be proved, and must have
existed in many cases where clear evidence has not
been discovered. The accumulation of fresh historic
1 This takes us back to the old problem of the reality of freedom,
a matter which has been referred to in the previous essay.
its History and Interpretation. 151
materials has already established points of contact
not suspected before. We shall more readily admit
the possibility of one religion influencing another
when we keep in mind that religion is intimately
related to the culture of a people, and is, perhaps,
its most characteristic expression. An older civilisa-
tion breaks up and is followed by a younger, and a
weaker is dominated by a stronger. Yet the earlier
never vanishes utterly : surrounding civilisations
retain traces of its influence, and in more ways
than can be defined and measured it affects and
modifies the civilisations which succeed it. Now it
cannot be supposed that religion is excluded from
this general influence, for it is a characteristic ex-
pression of the culture to which it belongs. Never-
theless, it must often be impossible to weigh and
appreciate the effect of an element which is so
interwoven with the whole.
The general conclusion that, in so far as there
is a continuity in culture, there must also be a
continuity in the various historic manifestations of
religion, may seem meagre and indefinite. The
speculative thinker will try, perhaps, to find some
indwelling principle in religion, which realises itself
in the historic religions and determines their place
and sequence. But there are great obstacles to the
working out of this conception. The solidarity of
humanity is still imperfect, and it was far more
152 Religious Development :
imperfect in primitive times. Consequently, though
certain sections of the race have developed, others
have been nearly stationary. The latter is especially
true of tribes which have suffered from isolation and
hard external conditions. Eeligious development
has been conspicuous at favoured points rather than
over the whole area of the race. Then while there
is a connexion between certain centres of develop-
ment, between the more distant points it becomes
exceedingly vague. Thus we can show no valid
reason for asserting that the development of religion,
say in China, had a relation to and significance for
the development of religion in Egypt. Humanity
is not an organic whole, so that each religion must
have a determinate place and value in the whole.
Hence I think we must abandon the attempt to
interpret the different religions by assigning them
a place in a general scheme of development.
We shall be confirmed in this view by the
examination of a very able and ingenious effort in
this direction. I refer to the conception set forth
by Dr Caird in his lectures on 'The Evolution of
Eeligion.' He finds the key to the problem in a
general analysis of consciousness. This yields an
objective and a subjective factor, while the Absolute
unites and harmonises them. Logically the Absolute
is presupposed in the simplest act of knowledge, but
as a temporal process mind advances by a movement
its History and Interpretation. 153
from objective to subjective consciousness, and finds
its goal in the Absolute consciousness. Here we
have the general form of religious development.
We need not pause to urge the objection that the
specific nature of religion is assumed, not explained,
by an epistemological analysis of this kind. Dr
Caird then goes on to show that in the earliest
phase of religion God is represented under the
form of an object among other objects. Against
this defective form the mind ultimately reacts and
passes over into the second stage, that of subjective
religion, where God takes the higher form of the
subject, and is conceived as mainly dwelling in and
speaking to the soul of the individual. The final
stage of the movement attains to adequacy of form
in the idea of God as Universal Spirit, immanent
in all objects and persons. The proper develop-
ment of the final stage will, we are told, be the
work of the future.
That primitive religion is objective in the sense
indicated will be admitted. If the writer meant
no more by the second stage than ethical religion,
as Tiele suggests, 1 we should agree that the trend
of development is in this direction. It seems clear,
however, the meaning is that there is a dialectic
movement which by way of reaction posits God,
not in the world of objects, but dwelling in and
1 Elements of the Science of Religion, vol. i. p. 61.
1 54 Religious Development :
speaking through the inner life of the subject.
But it is conceded that only nations which have
attained a certain stage of civilisation display this
phenomenon. 1 We would like to know more pre-
cisely what the stage is, and whether the only
test of its being reached is the manifestation of
the movement in question. Civilisations have
lasted long and still have not entered on the phase
of subjective religion. And religions which, in their
later stage at all events, contain ethical elements,
such as the Eoman, Egyptian, and Chinese, do not
reveal this kind of movement. The illustrations
which Dr Caird gives of his principle are not quite
convincing. Buddhism may be called a subjective
religion, but it is so because it sacrifices the idea
of God altogether and substitutes for it an inner
principle of redemption. The Israelitish prophets
did lay stress on the divine ]aw written on the
heart and the divine voice speaking to the soul.
But it is an exaggeration to call their religion
subjective : they always believed in God as an
objective and righteous Power. The prophets
simply purified and gave new ethical content to
the national religion. 2 Dr Caird's formula is a
1 Evolution of Religion, vol. ii. p. 4.
2 Another of Dr Caird's examples is Stoicism. But Stoic subject-
ivity represents a philosophical and political movement. We do not
construe it as a reaction against the defective form of earlier Greek
religion.
its History and Interpretation. 155
broad and flexible one, but for all that it does
not find a simple and natural verification in the
history of religion. Whether the Absolute Eeligion,
as he conceives it, will complete the process and
satisfy the modern consciousness is far from clear.
If the practical religion of mankind depended on
metaphysics, and certain metaphysical principles
were generally accepted, it might be so. But
these are not conditions likely to be fulfilled. Dr
Caird on the whole fails to convince us that he
has formulated the immanent law of religious de-
velopment. There seems to be no inherent neces-
sity that, when religious evolution takes place, it
should proceed exactly in this way. There is not
a general stage of subjective religion which cor-
responds to the nature - religions. Nor is there
warrant for the view that any particular religion
can reach a higher development only by passing
through the subjective stage.
The effort then to interpret the evolution of
religions through universal categories like subject
and object is not, I think, helpful. But though
we reject this method as inadequate there is
another way open to us. We can at least try to
set forth clearly the psychological principles in-
volved. Indeed this seems to be a necessary
preparation for any valid conclusions on the sub-
ject. The study of religion has suffered much
156 Religious Development :
from the neglect of psychology, and the defect is
only beginning to be remedied.
As we have remarked more than once, the mind
or spirit as a whole is active in deepening the con-
tent of the religious consciousness, which in turn
strives to give a more adequate form to the religious
principle. And the law which seems to govern the
spirit's operation is the necessity under which it
lies of being in unity or harmony with itself. This
has been enunciated by Tiele as the law of the unity
of the mind. 1 So stated it is a general, not a
specifically religious, principle. Still this is not a
decisive objection ; for, as we hold proved, the self-
conscious mind works in religious development and
not the religious consciousness in abstraction from
the rest.
In all consciousness, and so in the religious con-
sciousness, three factors thought, feeling, and will
are present. One of them may be dominant at
a given time, but the others are never entirely
absent. In the degree that each element gets its
due, and is in concord with the rest, we experience
inner harmony and satisfaction. A belief, for
example, as my belief, must be pervaded by a
certain emotional tone ; it must be something on
which I can act, and only as acted on is it vigorous ;
and finally, it must fit into and cohere with my
1 Op. tit., vol. i. p. 232.
f UN1VERS1T
OF
its History and Interpretation. 157
system of ideas. Where there is opposition between
the elements, where thought, for instance, is at dis-
cord with feeling, the mind is urged to gain a
content in which they will be harmonised. The
operation of this law of unity is distinctly to be
recognised in the evolution of religion. It is the
pressure of this immanent need which, in one form
or another, brings about transition and change in
the religious consciousness. To use a figure, the
emphasis on one element at the expense of another
creates an instability which precipitates movement.
The satisfaction and completion which the religious
spirit seeks through the divine object of its faith
must be a life in which feeling, intellect, and
practical endeavour are at one with each other.
And while this is an ideal which in finite and
temporal experience is never fully realised, yet
man's incapacity to be satisfied with less impels
him to transcend each partial satisfaction and seek
a spiritual life fuller and more harmonious. In the
interplay of these three elements, in the reaction
against the excessive predominance of any one of
them, in the persistent effort towards harmony, I
think we find a psychological explanation of some
of the characteristic features of religious evolution.
At the risk of some repetition I will try briefly to
justify and illustrate this statement ere I bring this
essay to a close.
158 Religious Development :
The predominance of feeling in the form of
emotion at the origin and primitive stage of
religion has been noted. Emotion and not in-
tellectual interest engenders religious belief. But
belief, however crude, exists as a starting-point for
action, and can only maintain itself in and through
the exercise of will. Hence religious belief takes
form as a religious bond which is realised in con-
duct, and a cultus grows up with a ritual, fixed
observances, and definite obligations. These be-
come the nucleus around which religious sentiment
gathers and by which it is in turn fostered. Thought
is too slenderly developed to play an aggressive
part. The savage's ideas of the world form no
coherent system, and he is not pressed to revise
his religious creed by any urgent demand of reason.
Beliefs are modified simply through practical needs
and interests, and the only test of religious loyalty
is the performance of the prescribed acts. The
emotional feeling which associates itself with ritual
performance grows into a fixed sentiment which
resists change. The meagre power of development
revealed by tribal religion is due to the poverty of
social and intellectual life and the consequent lack
of diversity within the mind calling for recon-
ciliation by progress. The cohesive force of senti-
ment giving support to existing religious practice
has no strong disintegrating influences to withstand.
its History and Interpretation. 159
The importance of those social changes by which
the nation takes the place of the tribe, and the
accompanying expansion and deepening of self-
consciousness, have been referred to. The content
of the self has been enriched by a new range of
practical ends and interests, and now finds itself
out of harmony with the older and narrower form
of the religious consciousness. National religion
is the outcome of man's endeavour to bring the
traditional religion into concord with the deepened
and enlarged life of the self. At this stage thought
attains a greater influence in the evolution of reli-
gion, and coherency of ideas is recognised to be an
element of the spirit's inner satisfaction. In the
first instance, the endeavour of thought is to give
a kind of connexion and explanation to religious
beliefs. Myths and theogonies indicate the rise of
this tendency, which indeed goes back to the stage
of tribal religion. Afterwards the gods are grouped
and arranged according to eminence and function.
When a religion has struck deep roots in the social
life, and an influential cultus has grown up, thought
proceeds to elaborate on a larger scale the meaning
or reason for what is done : the result is religious
doctrine. Theology represents the effort to set
forth the truths implied in a religion in a connected
body of propositions ; it will give a rational and
systematic form to belief, and so satisfy the mind's
1 60 Religious Development :
desire for an intelligent presentation of its faith.
Thought, however, as it grows more conscious of
its power, inclines to free itself from bondage to
the religious interest and to follow its own course
in independence. An intellectual movement which
thus begins within the sphere of religion, but
gradually enters on an independent path, becomes
in the end one-sided. In its anxiety to minister
to the intellect it neglects the other religious needs.
The outcome may be Eationalism, in its narrower
sense, or Pantheism, according as the analytic or
synthetic tendency prevails. In either case, the
Weltanschauung which has been reached is in-
compatible with the adequate satisfaction of the
spiritual self. And in the result we have a phase
of religious belief, which, in exercising a purely
intellectual appeal to men, fails to minister to other
vital needs, and is superseded in the interests of a
fuller satisfaction of the self.
But there is another aspect to the influence of
thought on religion. In the foregoing case reason
began by working from within the religious sphere,
in this case it approaches it critically from without.
At the higher stages of culture thought, in its own
interest, investigates the nature of the world and
man, and the outcome of this is science and phil-
osophy. It is perhaps inevitable that the scientific
and religious view of the world, developed as they
its History and Interpretation. 1 6 1
have been by different interests and in independ-
ence, should fail to coincide with one another.
This discord begets controversy, and the religious
interpretation of things is subjected to the criticism
of thought at various points. But a lasting dualism
between the two interpretations is impossible. For
both science and religion fall within the unity of
self-consciousness, and division between them cannot
be accepted as permanent. The necessary endeavour
of the mind to establish harmony within itself
affects religious ideas which undergo modification
and development. The resisting forces of senti-
ment and habit hamper and retard the process,
and changes are usually slow ; but they are not the
less real though they come gradually.
The conservative function of feeling in religious
evolution is not its only one. As an indispensable
element of the religious consciousness it asserts
itself against a one-sided intellectualism. Thought
never coalesces with its object : the element of
difference is essential to its movement. And this
movement seems to have no end; the conclusion
arrived at becomes only a starting-point for fresh
processes. To the soul hungering for union with
the object of its faith, the labour of thought seems
tedious and external as it is unsatisfying. Theo-
logical and philosophical constructions of God
appear by their method to cast a veil over the
L
1 62 Religious Development :
spiritual substance of religion. The emotional
nature cries for bread and reason offers a stone.
Mysticism is the outcome of this craving ; and in
exalted or ecstatic emotion the sense of estrange-
ment is done away and the worshipper feels himself
at one with the Being he adores. But the goal is
not really reached by a route so easy, and Mysticism
in turn proves no abiding refuge to the spiritual
seeker. Its neglect of practical effort and its
disparagement of thought render it a partial satis-
faction at the best. The spirit asserts its claim to
a harmony of all its elements ; and as Mysticism
cannot respond to this demand, man cannot rest in
it, and moves forward in quest of an ampler self-
fulfilment. Here as elsewhere reaction is the result
of one-sided development, and leads in turn to new
development.
All that we can claim for the psychological in-
terpretation of religious development is that it
casts a certain amount of light on a very compli-
cated process. The explanation it yields is partial,
and the objective validity of the ideas involved is
not determined. But our only hope of keeping in
touch with the facts of religious evolution and of
intelligently grasping them is to interpret them
psychologically in the first instance i.e., in the
light of the working of the human mind. We are
under no obligation to fit the facts into intellectual
its History and Interpretation. 163
categories, or to make them square with abstract
principles, when we follow this method. For the
student of religion like other people is tempted
to neglect facts which are inconvenient, and he
is likewise inclined to use terms which imply
an undue simplification. The latter fault, I fear,
cannot be altogether avoided. We have, for ex-
ample, been constrained to speak of the " religious
consciousness " as it exists at a particular epoch or
stage of development. Yet how hard it is, among
the higher races at all events, to give an exact
meaning to the phrase ! Its connotation varies as
you pass from one stratum of society to another.
The Brahminism of the cultured Hindu is very
different from that of the lowly ryot, and the
Christianity of the speculative theologian is not
the same as that of the day-labourer. Accordingly,
when we speak of the " religious consciousness," at
a particular stage of a race's history, feeling acutely
the need of religious reform and development, in
strictness the judgment applies only to the more
enlightened members of society. The dull and
ignorant hardly experience the need at all. And
so development, when it takes place, is seldom or
never a simultaneous movement of all elements in
the social whole : only very slowly does the in-
fluence of new ideas filter down to the many. The
"religious consciousness" of a people, if we are to
1 64 Religious Development :
use the phrase, is thus a composite thing. And
when we speak of it developing, it must be with
the proviso that development is always partial and
elements remain which are not fused in the process.
Even when a high form of religion has long been
the official creed of a country, here and there frag-
ments of older belief and practice always survive. 1
And this may help us to understand better how, in
certain circumstances, there may be a recrudescence
of an elder phase of faith instead of advance to a
higher. Taking a broad survey of history, we do
not hesitate to regard religious development as a
fact. But we would compare it to the seaward
movement of a great and deep river, breaking into
eddies in its course and containing backward
currents.
The history of religion is the record of man's
endeavour, ever and again renewed, to find, through
union with an object above him, the harmony and
completion for which his soul yearns. This object,
from the first, is conceived to be something better
than the common objects of experience, and grows
in worth and dignity with the growth of man's
inner life. Did faith realise all it seeks, there
1 The Christianity of the ignorant peasantry in some Roman
Catholic countries is really a blending of Christian and pagan be-
liefs, the latter never having completely died out.
its History and Interpretation. 165
would not be any development of religion. But
man suffers disillusion, his gods disappoint him,
and he must fare forth in quest of a better pattern
of the things in heaven. As each stage of religion
is found to yield only a partial satisfaction, the
inner need of the soul urges it to clothe the
religious idea in some higher form. And the very
consciousness that a time-honoured faith has grown
too narrow is a token that the mind has already
some intuition of what is better. The term " dia-
lectic movement " has misleading associations, and
I would not wish to apply it to the evolution of
religion : but religious progress may fairly be de-
scribed as a transcending by the spirit of partial
satisfactions in order to gain one which is full
and abiding. Behind the varied manifestations of
religion is the spiritual nature of man from which
they issue. And the long history of religious faith
and hope, of spiritual desire that never finds "an
earthly close," suggests that the soul is inwardly
related to the Infinite, the true source of its
aspiration and the goal of its endeavour.
" Our destiny, our being's heart and home,
Is with Infinitude and only there ;
With hope it is, hope that can never die,
Effort and expectation and desire,
And something evermore to be."
1 66 Religious Development.
But to justify this belief, if it can be jus-
tified, we must quit the humbler but surer
region of psychology and adventure ourselves in
that loftier realm where Speculative Philosophy
holds sway.
ESSAY IV.
ON THE DISTINCTION OF INNER AND
OUTER EXPERIENCE
ESSAY IV.
WE may regard this problem from two points of
view. In the first place, we may treat the question
simply from the historical standpoint, and try to
show the causes which led to the gradual separa-
tion of experience into two different spheres, an
outward and an inward. From the nature of the
case such an investigation must be largely psycho-
logical. It cannot in itself be taken as determin-
ing the ultimate validity of the distinction, though
it may furnish facts which an epistemological theory
must take into consideration. But, in the second
place, we can try to determine the real meaning
and value of the distinction in the ultimate nature
of things ; and this of course will be a problem
for metaphysical discussion. A larger inquiry of
this kind may furnish the conclusion that experi-
ence is fundamentally one, and that outer and inner
are only different phases or stages in its develop-
ment. Or it may lead us to conclude that the
170 On the Distinction of
contrast we make and act upon in our ordinary
conduct is based upon a real difference which is
more than one of degree. It will be convenient
for us to consider first of all the genesis of the
distinction.
For ordinary thought nothing seems more obvi-
ous than the difference between outer and inner
experience. And one naturally assumes that a
distinction, which he draws himself so readily,
was always drawn with the same facility. But
undoubtedly this cannot have been the case. If
we distinguish two grades of experience, the former
perceptual and therefore concrete and individual,
the latter conceptual or generalised, it will only
be at the second stage that the distinction is con-
sciously made. The separation into two spheres,
inner and outer, and the apt reference of experience
to one or other of them, imply some development
of the power of generalisation. To a merely per-
ceptual consciousness the act of reflexion which
marks off the percept from the perceiving mind
would not be possible. Nevertheless we must
guard against a rigid division of perceptual from
conceptual experience. For the process of develop-
ment is continuous, and in perception itself un-
conscious inference is present. Even in the higher
animal self- conservation implies a rudimentary
capacity to draw conclusions. Only, however, on
Inner and Outer Experience. 171
the level of conscious generalisation can individual
experience receive a name and acquire a meaning.
In his lectures on ' Naturalism and Agnosticism '
Prof. Ward has justly insisted that conceptual
thought is developed by intersubjective intercourse.
In other words, it involves language, and therefore
a social system. It is not as an isolated individual
but as a member of society that man has uni-
versalised his experience. On the other hand,
we must bear in mind that intersubjective inter-
course could not create an intellectual realm apart,
but has only developed to clear consciousness
elements implicitly present at the perceptual
stage.
If, then, the distinction of outer and inner experi-
ence only becomes possible on the level of con-
ceptual thought, how and why was it made and
elaborated then ? Great certainty on such a matter
can hardly be expected. I shall first examine an
ingenious theory on this point which is originally
due to K. Avenarius. It is termed the fallacy of
introjection. The theory is reproduced by Prof.
Ward in his lectures on ' Naturalism and Agnostic-
ism/ and for convenience I shall take his statements
in explanation. Substantially the process called
introjection rests on an error which is due to
common thought and language. Its essence "con-
sists in applying to the experiences of my fellow-
172 On the Distinction of
creatures conceptions which have no counterpart
in my own. ... Of another common thought
and language lead me to assume not merely that
his experience is distinct from mine, but that it
is in him in the form of sensations, perceptions,
and other * internal states.' . . . Thus while my
environment is an external world for me, his ex-
perience is for me an internal world in him." 1
Consequently as we apply this conception to
the experience of others, and they do the same
for us, we are also led to apply it to our-
selves, and so to construe our own experience
in the light "of a false but highly plausible
analogy."
The foregoing solution of the problem is plausible,
but, as it stands, somewhat artificial and not quite
convincing. Beyond doubt intersubjective inter-
course has been necessary to develop a distinction
which implies conceptual thinking. But the part
in introjection assigned to an " involuntary error,"
due to common thought and language, is hardly
intelligible, and appears to be superfluous. Evi-
dently some psychical growth is presupposed in the
act of interpretation by which common thought
places the thoughts and perceptions of another
within him. The process of inreading would be
meaningless unless each individual had already
1 Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. ii. p. 172.
Inner and Outer Experience. 173
some key to it in his own experience. 1 General-
ised experience implies a society, but it is not
credible that men in society elaborated a distinction
which did not somehow rest upon and appeal to
the life-history of individuals.
What facts, then, led to the historical genesis of
this distinction ? One of the earliest would be the
distinction of the body from surrounding objects.
The beginnings of this separation take us back to
the animal world. An animal would have no
chance of survival in the struggle for existence
if it did not note the difference between visual
changes due to movement on its own part and
those due to movement on the part of the object. 2
But man might have consciously differentiated his
body from surrounding objects without recognising
a soul or life within the body. The phenomena of
sleep and dreams must have decisively contributed
to this further result. In the lower culture dreams
are regarded as real occurrences, and are attributed
to a second or shadowy self within, which can leave
the body and return to it. In giving clearness to,
and in marking off, the experiences of this inner
self, no doubt the utterances and testimony of other
1 A similar objection is urged against Avenarius's view of introjec-
tion by W. Jerusalem, in his suggestive book, ' Die Urtheilsf unction/
vid. p. 245.
2 Stout, Manual of Psychology, p. 323.
174 On the Distinction of
individuals were highly important. Then the voice
and the breath coming from within seemed a
witness of the reality of the soul in the eyes of
primitive men. 1 When conceptual thinking had
given some fixity and generality to the notion of a
soul, we may conjecture that the phenomena of
error and illusion facts which must have been soon
noted because practically so important were treated
in the same way as dreams and attributed to the
inner self, which of course was still conceived in a
material way. A conscious contrast between objects
given in presentation and objects reproduced in
memory and imagination cannot be primitive, but
when the differentiation was made the latter pro-
cesses would naturally fall to be regarded as inward.
We need only further mention the activity of the
will, with the corresponding sense of a resisting
environment, which would give force and vividness
to the incipient distinction between an outward
world and an inward self.
If our view be right, then, the distinction of
outer and inner has its rude beginning in the
animistic mode of thought : and animism, as Dr
1 There seem to be reminiscences of ancient beliefs about respira-
tion in the Ionic school. Anaximenes, for example, supposes the
soul to be composed of air, ^ fax*]* ^caV, -YJ fjfjLerepa aijp ovcra
o-vyKpartl ^/xas (Hitter and Preller, 20). Heraclitus speaks of it
as a bright exhalation, di/adv/uaori?. Cp. also the use of the Hebrew
nV), Gen. ii. 7 ; Job xxvii. 3.
Inner and Outer Experience. 175
Tylor and others have shown, is universal in the
lower culture. Survivals among civilised races
prove the presence among them long before of
animistic beliefs. Avenarius supposes that the
wide-spread phenomenon of animism is an extension
to nature of the principle of introjection as applied
to human beings. This is true if introjection means
nothing more than the attribution of a soul. But
the act of interpretation by which we place the
thoughts and perceptions of another man within
him as " internal states " is a somewhat developed
one. It is not natural to make the cruder pheno-
mena of animism depend on introjection thus
conceived. We do better justice to the facts when
we conclude that the distinction of outer and inner
has its germ in the experience of individuals. The
distinction was then developed by intersubjective
intercourse, and the notion of an internal soul
came to be applied not only to human beings but
also to natural objects. The idea of "internal ex-
perience " is later, and grows out of the theory of a
soul or finer second self within the body.
We find, then, this theory of a fallacy of primitive
thought does not solve our problem. But though
we trace the distinction to a basis in the actual
experience of individuals, the larger question of its
final validity still remains. For it is always possible
that thought may misconstrue experience. And, so
176 On the Distinction of
far as we have gone, the division of our world into
two spheres may or may not have a justification in
the real nature of things. To this further aspect of
the problem we now turn.
The expression outer and inner, when applied to
experience, is to some extent metaphorical. For
experience is not a process carried on within the
head, nor are objects which appear external to us
and to one another on that account outside con-
sciousness. The distinction of inner and outer is
one which falls within experience, and what we call
an outward object and an inward idea are alike
states of consciousness. That externality in space
is not externality to mind was clearly brought out
by Kant. It lay beyond Kant's mental horizon to
discuss the distinction of outer and inner from the
point of view of the historical growth of experience.
But he accepts the distinction as justifiable and in-
corporates it in his theory of knowledge. That
which is in space and time belongs to outer sense,
that which is in time alone belongs to inner sense.
And there is a necessary connexion between the
two spheres, for that which is determined in space
is determined from the side of the subject in terms
of inner sense. By attending to the mental process
by 'which all objects become possible the inward
side of experience would be differentiated from the
outer. But Kant afterwards saw that in putting
Inner and Older Experience. 177
this interpretation on the common distinction he
involved himself in difficulties which affected the
consistency of his theoretical philosophy. For the
inner life was perpetually changing, and we could
not, as he thought, apply to it the category of
substance as the permanent in time. Nor could
that product of Kantian abstraction, the spectral
pure ego, which was without content, serve as a
permanent unity to which inner changes were
referred.
Accordingly in the second edition of the 'Critique,'
in the " Remark on the Principles of Judgment," we
find Kant modifying his earlier view, and asserting
that outer sense is presupposed in the conscious
determination of ourselves in time. "It is by
means of external perception that we make intel-
ligible to ourselves the various successive changes
in which we ourselves exist. . . . No change can
possibly be an object of experience apart from the
consciousness of something that is permanent, and
in inner sense nothing that is permanent can be
found." On this view it would be as logically sub-
sequent to and contrasted with the determination
of objects in space that the consciousness of inner
experience is possible. 1 It is of course evident that
1 Dr Caird thinks that the modifications in statement made by
Kant, in dealing with this point in the second edition of his ' Critique,'
indicate a movement of his mind, of which perhaps he was not him-
M
178 On the Distinction of
Kant in his treatment of this distinction is greatly
influenced by the general theory of experience
which he found it necessary to postulate. He
could not admit that the self was real in the
sense of maintaining its identity amid its changing
activities. Hence the fact of external perception
was judged necessary to give the contrast of per-
manence over against inner changes. Yet in Kant's
theory it is impossible to understand how a pure
form of perception like space, when somehow super-
induced on an affection of sense which is mysteriously
given, could, even with the necessary help of the
schematised categories, produce those localised ob-
jects in space which fill the field of outer experience.
It is conceivable that spatial and temporal relations
may have been evolved out of sense-affection as a
form which is implicitly contained in it ; but it is
not intelligible how pure forms of intuition could
self fully conscious, towards a larger and more consistent idealism
(* Phil, of Kant,' i. 417, 614). I am not aware how far he is supported
in this view by competent Kantian scholars. But I venture to think
that Kant simply desired to give a statement of his critical idealism
less open to objection and more carefully guarded than that which
he had given in the first edition and in the Prolegomena. While he
shows in the second edition that inner sense depends on outer sense,
he also repeats that a phenomenon (Erscheinung) must be a pheno-
menon of Something (ed. ' Kehrbach,' p. 23). And though he admits
that this reference of perception to a reality beyond it might not be
necessary for intellectual perception (op. eit. t p. 32), yet it is no part
of his theory that human intelligence is implicitly a consciousness
which is capable of exercising an intellectuelle Anschauung.
Inner and Outer Experience. 179
be read into an alien matter. We refrain, however,
from entering on a detailed criticism of Kant, for
it will generally be admitted that his theory of
knowledge is too unsystematic, too little penetrated
by the notion of development, to be accepted as it
stands. The motto simplex sigillum veri may not
always be true, but the cumbersome and ill-adjusted
machinery of the * Critique ' of itself provokes doubt
and unbelief. Let us rather see how Kant's view
on this subject is amended and developed by Dr
Caird in his well-known treatise on the * Philosophy
of Kant.' l
Inner and outer experience we are there told
are only different stages in the development of
consciousness, which in another aspect is the de-
velopment of the object. From the simplest
determinations of the object in space and time
we advance organically through the categories, or
forms of judgment, to the world as completely
determined by reason or self - consciousness, which
if logically posterior is the real presupposition of
the whole movement. The later and more highly
articulated stage of this development is, properly
speaking, inner experience, and it can only be dis-
tinguished from the consciousness of the world in
the sense that it is that consciousness in a more
completely developed form. But as each fact of
1 Phil, of Kant, vol. i. p. 614 ff.
180 On the Distinction of
experience involves a reference to the self, so
every outer experience will have its inner side.
On the other hand, there is no inner experience
which is not also outer, but we call it inner be-
cause the inner side is specially reflected on, in
other words we definitely recognise it as belonging
to the self.
That there are elements of truth in this statement
we do not seek to deny. Inner experience could
not consistently develop except in relation to and
in distinction from outer experience. And what
we call an outer experience must also have an
inner side. Nor can there be doubt that in the
historical growth of experience its two aspects have
advanced pari passu. None the less it is difficult
to regard inner experience as merely outer experi-
ence at a more concrete and highly articulated
stage of growth. If we set aside for the moment
the question whether the distinction between them
can be minimised in this fashion, we might still
argue that, from the point of view of psychological
development, it is inner experience which is primary
and outer which is derivative. A developed self-
consciousness is mediated by the consciousness of
objects, but in the last resort we must postulate
a direct and real activity of the self as the
ground and beginning of all progress in experience.
There is a sense in which we must be immediately
Inner and Outer Experience. 1 8 1
conscious of the operations of our own minds, and
it is only as the result of inferential thought that
we mark off a section of experience as outer. On
this ground we should be disposed to modify Dr
Caird's statement, and to treat inner experience
as fundamentally the more simple and elementary.
From this standpoint development begins from an
active self in relation to an environment, which
gradually distinguishes that environment from itself,
and by the aid of conceptual thought defines a
portion of its whole experience as external.
But the further question remains whether a dis-
tinction of degree between outer and inner experi-
ence covers all the facts. Dr Caird does not find
anything in the object as determined in space
which is not taken up into self-consciousness. The
advance from outer to inner experience is just a
process in which thought goes on to a more and
more complete determination of things, till "it
finds its own unity in the object." 1 It is hard
to see how on this view the individuality and
uniqueness which we discover in experience are
explained at all. And in reference to the matter
on hand this theory does not afford room for certain
obvious facts. Inner and outer experience refuse
to melt into one another in the way suggested.
Mere reflexion on the inner side of an outer
1 Phil, of Kant., vol. i. p. 470.
1 82 On the Distinction of
experience does not lead us to regard it as inner.
A man, for instance, examining a statue critically
in order to give his opinion of it, reflects on the
impressions he receives and recognises them as his
own. Yet he would not call his experience an
inward one. Even more decisively would the same
individual refuse to term outward his experience
when, leaning back on his chair and closing his
eyes, he thought out carefully the merits of several
possible lines of action in order to select the best.
And between the one experience and the other
there would appear to him to be a qualitative
difference. If every inner experience is outer as
well, why do we habitually distinguish what we
call subjective mental processes from the percep-
tion of outward objects, and contrast the one with
the other? No doubt each outer experience has
an inward side, and in virtue of this we some-
times wrongly interpret an inner state to signify
facts in the external world. But we never mistake
our perception of objects in space for a purely
inward mental process. We find, therefore, a diffi-
culty in accepting the view that the contrast of
inner and outer experience rests entirely on a
difference of degree in the development of con-
sciousness. From this standpoint distinctions
which are universally noted and acted upon are
not adequately explained.
Inner and Outer Experience, 183
Against this it may be urged that inner and
outer experience cannot be two diverse kinds of
experience, for both are experiences of the one
subject and are distinctions within the one con-
sciousness. We have already admitted this. For
the purely perceptual consciousness experience
would be one, and the generalised distinction of
outward and inward we know is made possible by
conceptual thinking. But on the level of mediate
thought, or rational inference, a new question
presses itself upon us. We ask, Does the ulti-
mate raison d'etre of the distinction lie in the
conscious selves who make it? Or is the inference
reasonable that the experience which we name ex-
ternal gets its character from the implication of
realities, which are not those of self - conscious
subjects? In other words, Is outer experience
the interpretation by self-conscious subjects of the
action of reals which thought itself does not create ?
This we believe to be the true solution of the
problem, and the explanation of the refusal of
outer experience to be taken up into and merged
in inner experience.
But before going further let us deal with an
objection which is certain to be raised. The as-
sumption that a trans - subjective real is implied
in presented objects will be termed gratuitous.
The apparent independence of the object, it will
1 84 On the Distinction of
be contended, is entirely the outcome of conceptual
thought. For the application of the concept
generalises the particular experience of perception,
and treats it as an instance of a general relation :
and this just means that " we are conscious we
have before us an object which exists independ-
ently of its presentation in the particular case."
On this view the seemingly independent outer
object would be, if not relative to the individual
thinker, yet relative to " consciousness in general/'
the rational self-consciousness which is the same
in all human subjects.
In reply we may point out that conceptual
thought depends for its individual reference upon
perceptive experience, which is altogether special
and concrete. As Kant himself granted, particular
connexion in experience can only be learned from
experience ; laws of nature like gravitation cannot
be deduced a priori. The ground, then, of the
particular character of individual objects and the
special relations in which they stand to one another
can only be found in perceptual experience. It is
indeed only by an act of abstraction that we can
picture a purely percipient ego. But none the less
this percipient consciousness must take note of, and
be affected by, realities other than itself, in order
that universal experience may have its specific side.
For conceptual thought can only evolve out of per-
Inner and Outer Experience. 185
ception what is implicitly contained in it. That
the perceptive consciousness is not aware of this
reference of the percept to something beyond itself
is no disproof of the fact that there is such a
reference. If inferential thought compels us to
postulate this reference, we must accept its verdict.
For we open the door to a hopeless scepticism, if
we refuse to admit that the real must conform to
what is rational. I shall now give one or two
illustrations to show that experience is not explic-
able unless we posit such a trans- subjective reality.
What we term external experience impresses us
as containing an element of inevitableness. We
are conscious that we have a share in directing the
process of our thoughts or the movement of our
limbs, but if we look to the heaven above or the
earth around, the things we see we cannot help
seeing. 1 The process of consciousness in the in-
dividual persons A, B, C, and D, may be very
different at a particular time, but at a certain
moment they all, without choice on their part,
register an experience X, say the appearance of
the sun. Let us call the percepts of A, B, C, and
D, a, 6, c, d; then a, 6, c, d contain an implicit
reference to x, which becomes for universal thinking
X. But suppose they do not, and that X is an
1 Berkeley, in his * Principles of Human Knowledge,' distinguishes
in this way perception from imagination.
1 86 On the Distinction of
abstraction elaborated out of a, 6, c, d. Then there
must be some reason in the series a, b, c, d why
the abstract X should be evolved and not Y or Z.
That is to say a, 6, c, and d must each be so
qualified that it accepts the interpretation X but
excludes Y or Z. Ex hypothesi the cause of the
specially qualified percepts a, 6, c, d cannot be
found in the previous condition of A, B, C, D.
Nor can the abstract X give any common qualifica-
tion to these percepts. Consequently the sudden
manifestation to different minds, the consistency,
the inevitableness of the experience we call X
becomes quite unintelligible. And the facts remain
inexplicable unless we admit that X is more than
an abstraction, and is significant of something (x)
which has a reality for itself.
We put the same point in a somewhat different
light when we direct attention to the fact that a
person refers various experiences which he has had
at different times to one object A. He has seen
A frequently, and believes that if he complies with
the conditions he will see it again. For popular
thought this is the common, if fallacious, argument
for the independent existence of A as it stands.
Plainly, however, A in its unique setting cannot
be deduced from the universal side of experience :
nor is there any constraining reason in the in-
dividual himself why he should refer various
Inner and Outer Experience. 187
percepts to one and the same object A. That
necessity comes from the side of the object, and
A must stand for something which has had a
determining influence on perception while it
persists beyond it. Again, however inadequate
the "laws of nature" may be as an explanation
of concrete reality, yet they have validity in
nature. They enable us to anticipate experience.
An eclipse is predicted years before it happens,
and it takes place exactly as predicted. Here we
have a perceptual experience A furnishing the
basis for a mathematical construction on which
the forecast was made which was verified in per-
ceptual experience B. Between A and B there
is a process which need not come into consciousness
at all, but must be real if B is to take place. The
facts require us here to assume that the rational
process by which B is deduced from A has for
its counterpart an activity in things which thought
interprets but does not create.
These are somewhat obvious instances, but we
must not ignore their significance on that account.
They all unite in enforcing the one lesson. We
admit that the objects of outer experience are ideal
constructions, but the facts compel us to add that
these constructions can only be valid interpreta-
tions of a reality beyond. And in regard to the
distinction between inner and outer experience, we
1 88 On the Distinction of
conclude that outer experience has the special char-
acter which attaches to it, because it directly
implies that the subject is influenced by realities
other than itself. The subject creates the dis-
tinction, but it does so as its interpretation of
a real difference within the whole of its ex-
perience.
We must now try to form a more definite concep-
tion of this trans-subjective reality which we find it
necessary to postulate. But we require to state our
position in this reference with some care. It will not
do to argue that in "physical events," as distinguished
from the subjective sequence of ideas, we have the
fundamental notion of externality. 1 For a ' physical
event' is by no means a primitive datum of con-
sciousness, but implies ideal construction ; and it is
absurd to suppose that the object as it exists for
developed consciousness has the same significance
apart from consciousness. Influenced by these con-
siderations, J. S. Mill, as is well known, defined
matter as " a permanent possibility of sensations " ;
and he explains that these " permanent possibilities"
are " not constructed by the mind itself but merely
recognised by it." 2 That which persists through
changes and has capacities must in some sense be
real ; but Mill gives us no light as to how we are to
1 Vid. Mind, N.S., No. 22, p. 222.
2 Exam, of Hamilton, 6th edition, p. 239.
Inner and Outer Experience. 189
think of this reality. Nor, on the whole, has Kant's
treatment of the subject been helpful. His "thing
in itself" is at one point regarded as the positive
source of sensations, but afterwards it is fined down
to a mere limiting notion. 1 On neither view is the
process of experience intelligible ; and the conclu-
sion seemed inevitable that philosophy must either
return to the realism of Locke or advance to the
absolute idealism of the post - Kantian thinkers.
Without committing ourselves to this inference, we
may frankly allow that the notion of " things in
themselves " is inconsistent as well as useless. That
which ex hypothesi possesses no knowable qualities
can never be coerced into active relations with
elements within conscious experience. If this were
possible the original assumption must have been
wrong, and the 'thing in itself ' instead of being an
impenetrable mystery has some affinity to conscious-
ness. It might seem, then, that in trying to do
justice to the facts of outer experience we have
reached an impasse. On the one side it appears
impossible to explain the facts of sense-perception if
the object only exists as experienced. On the other
side, if we postulate an unknowable reality behind
1 With this we may compare the Aristotelian v\rj which is some-
times spoken of as mere privation o-rep^cris, and at other times is
regarded as a positive means through which individuals are differen-
tiated.
190 On the Distinction of
the things of sense, the unity of experience becomes
inexplicable.
There is one sense in which no sober idealist
refuses to admit that the object of experience has
a reality of its own. Among the objects of our
experience are other human subjects who, we inevit-
ably infer, have a reality for themselves. Entering
into our experience they can never be dissolved into
it, but persist beyond it. This is an admission of
some significance. For it means that we recognise
individual centres of thought, feeling, and will,
which decisively influence our consciousness, while
they are independent of it. Here we have a prin-
ciple of individuality as object, whose qualities, as
recognised and interpreted by us, are represented in
it by modes of its own activity. And when we have
admitted this we are bound in consistency to go
further. The law of continuity, as justly insisted
on by Leibniz, forces us to regard the principle of
individuality as having many stages and degrees of
development. There is no break in the process by
which life advances to consciousness and to self-
consciousness ; and the line of separation between
organic and what we call inorganic matter is a vanish-
ing one. Moreover, the psychologist is compelled to
postulate the reality of a subconscious mental world,
in order to explain phenomena which are manifest
above the threshold of consciousness. And it is
Inner and Outer Experience. 191
reasonable to suppose that what is substantial in
lower forms of life is one in kind (though very dif-
ferent in degree) with the conscious self in man. The
latter would be the e^epyeia of which the former was
the Swapis. The real on which the ideational activity
of the subject works in constructing the phenomenal
world is, on this view, manifold spiritual substances
or causalities ; and the diverse qualities of the world,
as given in experience, would be grounded in the
various activities of these substances. The basis of
the phenomenon termed matter is, on this theory, an
inner life which is allied to our own consciousness. 1
The point we wish to urge, then, is that if you
accept the world of intersubjective intercourse as a
fact, you cannot restrict the principle to the rela-
tions of human individuals with one another. The
interaction of individuals not existing merely for
each other, but each for itself, must also be possible
at lower stages of development, and there is no
break in the process of advance from the lower to
the higher. Hence there seems to be no valid
reason why one should not admit that our so-called
external experience involves the presence to our
consciousness of manifold spiritual substances which
are subjects at lower planes of development. A
trans-subjective real is inferentially necessary to
1 Cf. Paulsen, Einleitung in die Philosophie, p. 387 ; Stout, Manual
of Psychology, p. 54.
192 On the Distinction of
explain external experience ; and as we construe this
real in terms of spirit and not of matter, we cannot
be accused of setting up a dualism which makes
knowledge inexplicable. The constructive work of
thought has been already referred to. But thought
cannot weave out of itself the content of experience.
Something must be given, and the requisite funda-
menta relationis are supplied by individual reals,
by everything which possesses a degree of inner life
and is for itself as well as for others. On this
hypothesis we do justice to the primacy and cen-
trality of the inner life, while we avoid the absurdity
of reducing external experience to thought-relations,
or of positing unknowable "things in themselves"
behind the phenomena of sense.
We are now in a position to deal with a point
of some importance which bears on the distinction
of inner and outer. We mean the spatial reference
which the distinction suggests. It may be assumed
here that neither space nor time can be an empty
form having a real existence, which is somehow
applied to things. 1 They must, therefore, be in
some way developed out of the content of experience
itself : though not real in themselves, they must be
evolved from some basis in reality, or to use a phrase
employed by Leibniz, they must be phenomena bene
fundata. This point of reference to reality can only
1 Vid. Lotze, Metaphysics, bk. ii. chaps, i., iii.
Inner and Outer Experience. 193
be found in the interaction of those individual reals
which are the ground of experience. The mutual
determination of different spiritual substances would
be represented from the standpoint of the perceiving
subject under the form of space. And inasmuch as
all experience must be construed in terms of the
states of a subject for which both itself and other
selves exist, we have time as the universal form
in which the subject represents everything that
happens. The long history of experience, and the
generalisation which is its outcome, have served to
invest space and time with a seeming reality and
independence of their own. Only the unworkable
nature of this conclusion and the contradictions in
which it involves him, shake a man's natural faith
in an opinion which seems so well founded. It
would be too much to say that the theory we accept
satisfactorily solves every difficulty, but it avoids a
twofold error. For it treats neither space nor time
as an independent real, nor does it reduce them to
subjective mental fictions which cut' us off from
reality. They are representations in the subject,
but they are also valid forms under which he in-
terprets what is real.
From the standpoint of the historic development
of experience the universal point of view is late. To
the merely perceptual consciousness space and time
would not be distinguished. The " selective in-
N
194 On the Distinction of
terest " or the practical need which turns the atten-
tion of the animal to space and time is concerned
with the fact of movement which involves both. I
refer to the temporal and spatial adjustments which
are necessary to secure food, to seize prey, and to
escape a foe. And it is from the association in man
of active movement with the capacity of generalising
that the differentiation and development of the ideas
of space and time are due. The stages of this
progress are however matter for psychological dis-
cussion. The final result is that space is hypos-
tatised as a comprehensive whole which exists for
itself, and which contains within it all that general-
ised experience treats as an independent reality.
And language has given universal currency to the
habit of speaking of what is believed to belong to
the mind as in it and of what does not belong to it as
outside it. Philosophic reflexion forces us to correct
this abstraction. Both the spatial image and the
object it contains are shown to belong to the mind
as ideal constructions. Yet the common-sense point
of view has a certain justification. For ideal con-
struction is at root interpretation ; and in the exist-
ence and activity of trans-subjective realities lies the
possibility of our representing to ourselves the world
of objects extended in space.
In the remainder of this paper I will try to
answer certain objections which may be made to
Inner and Outer Experience. 195
the theory of reality we have accepted. You have
admitted, it will be said, the presence of ideal con-
struction in experience, why should you infer that
so-called things are anything more than such con-
structions? A thing, however seemingly solid, is
only the meeting-point of universal qualities or rela-
tions. In reply it may be asked, What is meant by
a meeting-point ? Evidently something which serves
as a ground of identity and a bond of connexion
between the qualities. These cannot fly loose and
unclaimed in the world of experience. For if in a
sense they belong to reality as a whole, yet they
definitely pertain to particular determinations of
reality and not to others. No doubt if we suppose
that qualities are somehow attached as adjectives to
isolated fragments of reality, we shall be proved
inconsistent : the substance does not exist outside
its attributes. But this objection does not apply
when we conceive the 'support of qualities' after
the analogy of the self, and construe the qualities
themselves as representations in consciousness of
the interaction between spiritual substances. 1 In
a similar spirit it is said that to advocate the reality
of things is to champion a mere fiction of the mind.
1 It will be said that this is tacitly to admit that the individual
is only qualified in virtue of its relations. I do not think so, for the
qualities which become explicit through interaction point to positive
differences in the monads themselves.
196 On the Distinction of
For the so-called thing is " ruined by thought " : it
goes to pieces under the touch of the speculative
inquirer. Popular thought is certainly arbitrary in
the way in which it applies the name ; and we do
not deny that things are sometimes mental fictions.
A bag of grain might be called a thing/ while the
name would not be given to the contents spread out
upon the floor. But popular terminology does not
concern us here ; and we prefer to speak of indi-
vidual reals which have a being for themselves.
These are not due to ideal construction, but are
presupposed by it, for without them thought would
not have data on which to work. Obviously it will
not be possible for us, with our present knowledge,
to distinguish what is individual at levels of develop-
ment far distant from our own.
But even in this sense, it is contended, the exist-
ence of individual reals cannot be maintained. The
more we reflect the better we shall see that the
significance of every predicate involves relations
which force us to go beyond the individual itself;
and the further we carry the process, the more un-
real becomes the abstraction which remains. The
fact is, as we learn, that an individual, or monad, is
a fiction ; it is reducible to a mere adjective which
falls within the only true individual, the universe as
a whole the one ultimate reality.
As a result of this drastic argument, not only
Inner and Outer Experience. 197
' things ' but conscious selves are * ruined/ or at
least they should be. For the reasoning employed,
if valid, ought also to undermine the individuality
and identity of the human self by dissolving it into
a changing tissue of relations. The logical conse-
quence of this argument must be to discredit any
theory of reality which the human ego can form.
Experience, on the contrary, testifies to a self which
distinguishes itself from its states and maintains its
unity in them. And it is after the analogy of the
self that we conceive the individual reals which are
the ground of the external world as perceived.
It will still be urged that the test of the truth of
any theory is its coherency ; in other words, if we
can " think it out " consistently in all its bearings,
we establish its claim to truth. And individual
reals cannot be "thought out" without yielding up
their reality to the absolute. That there is an ele-
ment of truth in this contention we do not deny,
and we will return to the point presently. But if
you reduce individuals to mere appearance, and turn
their identity into a fiction, in the ostensible in-
terests of rational explanation you are ignoring
facts which require to be explained. If, like Par-
menides, you say that the one only is and the many
are not, you have still to account for the illusion of
* not-being.'
Suppose for the moment that thought did compel
198 On the Distinction of
us to merge all individuals in the one perfect in-
dividual or absolute, I do not see how, on this
supposition, we are to explain the appearance of in-
dividuality within the whole. For it can hardly be
maintained that the illusion is due to the abstract
method of ordinary thought which concentrates
attention on one aspect of reality and neglects
the rest. On this assumption the term might be
applied or rejected according as the point of view
changed. Yet there are centres of experience which
claim to have a reality of their owij from whatever
standpoint they are regarded. And one cannot
understand how, if the theory of reality we are
considering be true, such a claim could ever come
to be made. But, it may be urged, the rights of
logical thought are supreme, and to deny these
rights is to pave the way to a scepticism of the
worst kind. And certainly, if thought and reality
are not ultimately consistent, philosophical discus-
sion must be fruitless. Still it does not seem to me
that the demands of coherent thinking forbid us to
attribute reality to individuals which are not them-
selves absolute. If you assume that the individual
is simply its relations, then it may consistently be
deprived of any being for itself in the ultimate
system : but the validity of the conclusion is spoiled
by the inadequacy of the premises. The self which
thinks, and so relates itself to other objects and
Inner and Outer Experience. 199
objects to one another in the relational form of con-
sciousness, is not the whole self. And though we
are bound to accept the relational system as a valid
interpretation by thought of what is given in ex-
perience, we are not entitled to say that the whole
self of experience is exhausted by this interpreta-
tion. Thought presupposes experience, and in some
form experience must have preceded the genesis in
time of intellectual activity. It is just because
experience is richer than thought that a self, or
individual centre of experience, is, in Prof. Ward's
phrase, a fundamentum relationis.
A few further observations on this point may be
made. Mr Bradley has justly remarked that the
subject in a judgment must always have a reality
beyond the predicate. To reduce the two sides to
a fundamental identity as aspects of one thought-
content is to destroy the possibility of predication. 1
And this must apply to the judgment of self-con-
sciousness as well as to that of perception. Thus,
when we predicate thought of the self, the judg-
ment is made possible by the fact that the self is
also a centre of feeling and will, and cannot be
dissolved in the pure unity of thought. This dis-
tinction makes the judgment significant ; and self-
consciousness is an illustration of the principle that
the object of thought is more than thought. On the
1 Appearance and Eeality, p. 170.
20O On the Distinction of
other hand, all three elements are embraced in the
self as subject of experience, and so the self is not
a reality beyond experience in this wider sense.
We are not, therefore, entitled to argue that the
subject of experience is equivalent to thinking-
subject, and on this ground to claim that the object
is thought and nothing more. The reality to which
I refer my states of consciousness must always be
more than these states. We have already tried to
show in what way we think this reality is to be
conceived.
It would be futile, however, to deny that those
who believe the hypothesis of individual reals to
be justifiable, and even necessary, are in a posi-
tion of great difficulty when they try to explain
their place and meaning in the ultimate system of
things. Prof. Ward, for example, in his lectures on
' Naturalism and Agnosticism ' accepts the principle
of individual selves or centres of experience, but it
is somewhat difficult to understand the relations in
which he conceives these centres to stand to the
Absolute. God, we are told, is " the living Unity
of all," and behind the development of experience
there can only be " the connecting conserving
acts of the one Supreme." x Moreover, Prof. Ward
admits real contingency in the divine working, but it
is the contingency " not of chance but of freedom."
1 Op. tit., vol. ii. pp. 280, 281.
Inner and Outer Experience. 201
In his view the divine Unity which comprehends
all is evidently not that of a system where all the
elements are determined in relation to one another
and to the whole. A view like the foregoing
requires a good deal of explanation, and if it
obviates certain difficulties, it also exposes itself to
certain criticisms. In any case, it would have been
interesting and valuable to have had a more explicit
statement on this point from so able a thinker.
For it is just on this question of the relation of
individuals which are real to the Absolute, that
opponents press home their arguments most
strongly. Thus it is urged, "Those who cling to
the idea that there is an absolute principle of
individuality in man and in other finite substances,
seem necessarily to be led to a denial of all real
connexion or relation between such substances." l
It must be granted, of course, that there can be
only one absolute Being, and a plurality of res
completce is impossible. To claim such absolute
reality for individuals would be suicidal, seeing
that each is only an element in the universe, and
all must find a place and receive a meaning in a
coherent system. For this we require a supreme
connecting and organising activity which is present
in all individuals. Lotze tries to satisfy this need
by saying that all substances " are parts of a single
1 Caird, Evolution of Eeligion, vol. ii. p. 83.
2O2 On the Distinction of
real Being." l Yet if this statement be accepted
as it stands, it does not appear possible to resist
the inference that the Pluralism, which philosophy
found it necessary to postulate at an earlier stage,
is only a temporary hypothesis, and is superseded
when thought rises to the final synthesis. The use
of the term ' substance ' in this connexion has been
objected to. Wundt, for example, criticises it, and
would substitute for it causality or activity. 2 But
it is not clear that the material associations which,
as he points out, cling to the one word are absent
from the other. Moreover, if we are to think of
activity at all, it must be as the activity of some-
thing real ; and we do not mean more when we use
the word substance to denote a centre of experience.
In his c Microcosmus ; Lotze has stated somewhat
differently his attitude to the ultimate Unity which
philosophy strives after. " It seems to me that philo-
sophy is the endeavour of the human mind, after this
wonderful world has come into existence and we in
it, to work its way back in thought and bring the
facts of outer and inner experience into connexion
so far as our present position in the world allows." 3
1 Metaphysics (Eng. trans.), vol. i. p. 165.
2 System der Philosophic, p. 427. Paulsen's position on this point
is, I think, just. He advocates the use of the term substance here,
only demanding that we first make clear what we mean by it.
Atomistic associations are, of course, out of place.
3 Microcosmus (Eng. trans.), vol. ii. p. 718.
Inner and Outer Experience. 203
The note of caution here is justifiable. For our
thought is necessarily infected by spatial and tem-
poral metaphors. And space and time on any
view cannot adequately express the nature of the
Absolute. We are inclined to forget that cate-
gories which are valid within experience cannot
be employed in the same way to the ultimate
conditions of experience. And it is evident that
no category at our disposal is entirely adequate
to explain the relation of the Absolute to the
individual.
The result of our discussion then is, that the facts
of outer experience lead us to infer that the in-
dividual subject is here in direct relation with a
system of other-selves. In inner experience, again,
the subject's own activity is primary, and relation
to other -selves is only indirectly implied. But
though we claim that the monads are real, the
reality which pertains to each individual can only
be secondary or derivative. For the individual has
its determinate character elicited through interaction
with other monads, and the whole system pre-
supposes an organising ground and principle of
unity. If we desire a figurative expression of this
unity in difference, perhaps we might find it in the
connexion of soul and body. In an organism the
separate parts, or members, are essentially related to
one another, while each has its specific function in
2O4 On the Distinction of
the whole. The soul, again, or the e^reXe^cta, to use
Aristotle's word, is the presupposition of the organ-
ism and the ideal principle which gives it meaning
and truth. By some such analogy we may conceive
of the Absolute as immanent in all individuals, yet
allowing to each a definite function and degree of
reality in the whole, while its own being is not lost
in the process of finite experience. For that the
universe is a coherent whole is a presupposition
both of thought and of ethical action.
A final observation may be added.
In any view we take of the ultimate Unity, we
must not ignore the world of ethical and spiritual
values. For the facts of moral and religious experi-
ence have as good a claim to be taken into account
as the facts of science. The tendency to " excessive
unification," which Aristotle objected to in Plato,
has always been a danger to which philosophy is
peculiarly liable. And a philosophy which, in the
interests of system, undermines the moral-respon-
sibility of the individual and treats religion as an
illusion, lays itself open to the charge of explaining
away what it cannot explain. The intellectual
necessity we are under of striving after unity in
all experience must be conditioned by the ethical
necessity by which we postulate that the Supreme
Reality satisfies our spiritual nature. There can be no
final dualism between the two spheres any more than
Inner and Outer Experience. 205
there can be between inner and outer experience.
But the Absolute, be it remembered, does not merely
explain an aspect of the world, but the world as a
whole. And a thinker whose outlook is catholic will
try neither to ignore nor to misconstrue any phase
of experience in order to secure unity of system.
ESSAY V.
THE ULTIMATE BASIS AND MEANING
OF RELIGION
ESSAY V.
To determine the ultimate basis of religion, the
ground in reality which conditions its manifestation,
is at once the most difficult as it is the most im-
portant part of our subject. At present the tend-
ency of those who know' is to say little, and
that not dogmatically, on this matter. Nevertheless
it is clear that, if we refuse to face the enterprise,
we surrender at the outset any claim to put a final
interpretation on the religious consciousness and its
development in time. One reason which no doubt
deters students of religion from embarking on onto-
logical speculations is the difficulty of verifying
them. For here we have not simply a definite
group of religious phenomena, psychological or his-
torical, which we have to connect together and inter-
pret. In this case it is more easy to test a theory
from point to point by bringing it into contact with
facts of experience. But when we pass to consider
the ultimate ground and meaning of religious ex-
2io The ultimate Basis and
perience as a whole, the process of verification is
much more difficult. For, needless to say, the
thinker cannot rise to an absolute principle, and
then descend again to the region of temporal ex-
perience, and exhibit this experience in its diverse
phases as necessary stages or moments in the un-
folding of that principle. The only feasible test
of our speculations must be a less rigorous one.
We can but ask that they give a coherent view
of the facts in their broad features, and that, to
some extent at least, they impart a satisfying
meaning to them.
The word experience is general, and the thing itself
has manifold forms. And the phenomena of religion,
though regarded in their entirety, only make part
of a larger whole. In other words, they constitute
a special phase of general experience. The task of
interpreting the latter falls to philosophy in the
wider sense of the word. Metaphysics has to in-
vestigate the meaning of experience : it has to
bring out its implications and to show the ulti-
mate grounds and presuppositions on which it rests.
Philosophy endeavours to carry out the principles
thus reached, so as to make it clear that the
universe, or experience in all its aspects, is a
coherent and continuous whole. Even though there
be irreducible elements in experience which refuse
to be fused by the thought-process, philosophy cer-
Meaning of Religion. 211
tainly cannot assume this to begin with, and can
only follow persistently the plan of trying to
think things out. The test we apply to the
Weltanschauung which it offers us will be the
internal consistency of its principles as well as
their consistency with the world as experienced.
Do things both in their individuality and their
connexions receive their due in the interpretation
which is put upon them?
As we pointed out in an earlier essay, the
Philosophy of Keligion, which is engaged with a
special phase of experience, must always be de-
pendent on general Philosophy, which deals with
the larger problem. On the other hand, owing
to the limitation of its outlook, it has the pheno-
mena of the religious consciousness more fully and
directly in view. This concentration of interest
makes it less likely to sacrifice the claims of the
part to those of the whole. Hence the Philosophy
of Religion, alive to the large and systematic aims
of Philosophy, but also cognisant of the needs of
its own special subject-matter, seeks to mediate
between the demands of the speculative and the
spiritual mind. It goes without saying that the
Philosophy of Eeligion is inspired by no apologetic
interest : its exclusive interest is the truth. But
it recognises that religion is a normal aspect of
human life, and has to be interpreted by the
212 The ultimate Basis and
philosopher. With perfect fairness it seeks to bring
the point of view of reason into comparison with
that of faith, and dispassionately asks how far they
can be reconciled. And even though he believes
that the result of the inquiry can only be pro-
visional and not final, the thinker who cares for
the interests of reason, and likewise appreciates the
claims of religion, will not wish to evade the
problem which a Philosophy of Religion presents.
In entering on the task he is in a sense only
honestly trying to come to an understanding with
himself.
The need of an inquiry of the kind is both real
and urgent, and the modern world has in the main
recognised this. Both Philosophy and Religion set
before us a view of the universe, and as a rule
their views are in somewhat sharp contrast. Phil-
osophy introduces us to a reasoned theory of reality,
and tries to unfold in logical sequence the steps
which lead to its conclusions. Religion, again, is
not interested in rigid deduction, and it encourages
its votaries to believe where they cannot prove.
Nor does it hesitate to follow the less rigorous
method of analogy in its interpretation of the
ground of experience, and it upholds the claim of
faith that the supreme Reality must satisfy the
needs of man's spiritual nature. Religion centres
in spiritual experience, and the religious man finds
Meaning of Religion. 213
the root of this experience in a personal relation
between himself and God. He indeed thinks and
speaks of God as the first Cause of all things, but
yet for him God is not merged in that which He
produces. He can fitly be addressed in prayer as
'Thou 1 ; and while His will is manifested in the
world, He is not identified with the world. For
Pantheism, though it frequently appears in the
history of religious development, is not a normal
expression of the religious consciousness. But when
we pass from Eeligion to Metaphysics a change
in the atmosphere is apparent. The philosopher
is chary of using human analogies in reference
to the ultimate ground of things, and sometimes
deliberately rejects them altogether. Instead of
God we hear rather of Substance, the Absolute,
the Idea : and even when the time-honoured name
is used, the connotation is commonly very different.
The God, for example, of Spinoza and the God of
the average worshipper stand for conceptions which
hardly have any common content. The source of
this diversity of meaning and tendency is the
difference of the interest which engrosses the specu-
lative and the religious mind. The philosopher aims
at unification of experience ; a final dualism in his
eyes spells defeat ; and he is anxious to show that
the differences in experience, which prompt the
ordinary man to rest in dualism, can ultimatelv
214 The ultimate Basis and
be resolved into a monism. So for him the
Supreme Keality is to be found within the world-
process rather than without it. The religious in-
terest, in contrast, centres in a personal relation-
ship between the human and the divine. The
existence of this relationship seems incompatible
with a Deity who has no reality apart from the
process of experience in which He is manifested.
Accordingly, the religious spirit clings to the be-
lief that God somehow transcends the world. 1
It is natural, then, that the view of the world
presented by philosophy should distinguish itself
somewhat sharply from that of religion. And as
religion lays claim to be true as well as philosophy,
it is not surprising that the attitude of the one to
the other should often be hostile. On the one side,
religion objects that philosophy does not give due
heed to the demands of the spiritual consciousness,
that it is dominated by an interest too prevailingly
intellectual, and that, in consequence, it sets up
pale abstractions in the place of living reality. On
the other side, philosophy retorts that religion un-
fairly exalts one aspect of experience, that it evades
the duty of examining its presuppositions and test-
ing their consistency with the larger whole of
things, and that it uses analogies without consider-
1 We are, of course, speaking here of religion in its highly devel-
oped forms.
Meaning of Religion. 2 1 5
ing whether they are really applicable or not. So
we often find philosophical thinkers speaking of
religious beliefs with a certain tone of superiority
and condescension. For these beliefs, they hold,
are at best only figurative thoughts which must
be criticised and transformed ere they can seriously
claim to be true. And it' is one of the blessings
of a philosophical culture, that it delivers the mind
from bondage to those idols which the common
people take for truth. Eeligious persons, again,
are prone to regard philosophy and its obstinate
questioning with suspicion and dislike. Even when
it approaches, extending the olive branch, they mis-
trust it, and doubt the wisdom of an alliance. For
some of them complain, and not without some show
of justice, that although philosophy uses the same
words it does not mean the same thing as they
do. Others are bold to declare that the truths of
faith are of a different order from those of reason,
and do not require to be buttressed by thought
even if that were possible. Hence a Philosophy
of Keligion, in so far as it seeks to bring about a
rapprochement between the two, is not likely to
win the unqualified approval of either. On the
side of religion, at all events, there are reasons
why one should not expect too much. For the
latter has, without due criticism, as the philosopher
is inclined to think, taken religious experience and
2 1 6 The ultimate Basis and
historic facts as a basis on which to build its own
interpretation of the world, which it terms theology.
Yet whatever elements of value theology may con-
tain and that it does contain them we do not
in the least deny it is too much to expect the
philosopher to accept its conclusions as they
stand. Theology sets out from authoritative pre-
suppositions, while philosophy requires that they be
reasoned. And the speculative thinker does not
find in the theologian's results either the internal
consistency, or the harmony with the larger whole
of experience, which he sets before him as a standard.
It is therefore inevitable that the view he develops
should call for some concessions on the part of
those who hold the traditional doctrines which
have become associated with religion. To the
theologically - minded person this criticism will
commonly appear too drastic, and the critic's rever-
ence for the past too slender. Ignoring that pro-
cess of change which is * without observation,' and
which makes a 'form of sound words' mean one
thing to an earlier and another to a later age, he
sees in the philosopher only the representative of
an ephemeral fashion of speculation who sets him-
self to judge venerable and time-tried doctrines.
Such an objection is to be expected, and the
religious philosopher must be prepared to hear it
urged against his results. At the same time, he
Meaning of Religion. 217
does well to remember that his own gospel is not
likely to be the end of all wisdom. New thoughts
grow out of the growing experience of the world ;
and the speculations which represent the mind of
one generation have to be remoulded to satisfy
another. If a theology becomes old and needs to
be reconstructed, a philosophy is not exempt from
the same law of progress.
With these preliminary remarks we go on to
indicate the method we propose to follow in this
important part of our investigation.
To interpret religion speculatively signifies that
we try to show its ultimate basis, and to explain
its meaning and function in the real universe.
The question is not simply how religion works,
how it is related to other activities, and what
its value is in the life of individual and people.
However profitable such an inquiry might be, at
the end of it we should still be ignorant of the
final truth about religion, and whether it had any
ultimate justification. We have to go deeper than
this, and must try to show, if we can, what is
the reality which lies behind and gives meaning
to the phenomena of religion. The problem in
technical language is ontological : and plainly the
reality which belongs to religion can only be
reached through the determination of the nature
of reality in general. Now it seems to me that
2 1 8 The ultimate Basis and
the most fruitful line we can follow in an investi-
gation of this kind is to argue back inferentially
from experience to its ground. By ground is not
meant cause in the purely scientific sense, but
those fundamental and real conditions which lie
behind the realm in which cause and effect operate.
But experience is a large word, and it has two
generally recognised aspects, the subjective and
the objective. To these correspond the spheres
of Psychology and Cosmology. Our regressive
movement towards a common ground must have
regard to both aspects of experience. We must
keep in view alike the facts of nature and of
mind in attempting to define the character of
their ultimate basis.
It will be said that we are here making an
assumption the assumption that the ordinary
distinction between subject and object has some
warrant in the nature of things. This is true,
but we base our right to do so >on the epistemo-
logical discussion in the preceding essay. It was
there argued that outer experience implied realities
which were not created by the perceptive subject.
The point now before us is the nature of the
ground which these substances presuppose. But
to whatever result the discussion of this problem
may lead us, it will not be a final and complete
determination of the World - Ground. We must
Meaning of Religion. 219
bring our result into relation with the implica-
tions of inner experience, with the realm of self-
consciousness and those personal aspirations and
ethical values which form an essential aspect of
the self-conscious life. The result will show how
far we can hope to determine the final ground of
all experience, alike from the point of view of form
and of content. We shall then have to consider
the ground in the definite aspect in which it is
the basis of the religious consciousness. The last
step will be to suggest a view of the meaning of
religion and its development, founded on the con-
clusions we have come to on the nature of the
finite spirit and its relation to God, the ultimate
ground of all things.
Our first task, then, is to examine the implications
of outer experience, and try to determine the nature
of the reality which it presupposes as its ground
and condition. The argument in the preceding
paper led us to the view that experience is a historic
development, in which we can distinguish sensitive,
perceptual, and conceptual stages. Only at the
latter level, and as the result of the generalised
thinking which intersubjective intercourse makes
possible, is the universal distinction of inner and
outer elaborated and fixed. But the distinction
drawn by subjective thinking is the interpretation
of a real difference. The objective world must be
220 The ultimate Basis and
more than a generalised notion which takes form as
the result of the interplay of many minds. If not,
obvious facts of experience remain unexplained.
The question then arises, What are the realities
which we must presuppose are involved in the pre-
sentation in experience of that which we call nature ?
As we saw already, we cannot accept the scientific
conception of atoms or for that part the more
recent analysis of the atom into electrons as the
answer. For that which implies the process of
ideal construction cannot at the same time be that
which lies beyond it. And everything which has
dimensions and sensible qualities involves the work
of mind. The fact of an external world seemed
best explained on the theory that it meant the
existence of spiritual centres of experience, con-
tinuous in character with the human ego, but
standing at lower levels of development. A system
of monads acting and reacting on each other, and
giving rise in self-conscious minds to the interpre-
tation of reality as a variously qualified world of
things, we took to be the basis both of perceptual
and conceptual experience.
We shall not repeat the arguments by which we
sought to defend this pluralism against objections
more or less serious. Our aim now is to find out
how far we can determine the ultimate ground of
such a system of spiritual substances. The phrase
Meaning of Religion. 221
" spiritual substance " is used here, it will be recol-
lected, for that which is a centre of experience, and
which in some way has a being-for-self. To call
these centres causalities or activities, as Wundt does,
is rather a matter of terminology than of real differ-
ence in meaning. For we cannot think of activity
without thinking of that which maintains itself and
has a being for itself. A formless and indeterminate
activity could not explain anything. If represented
relations and qualities imply the interaction of reals,
these reals must be something for themselves ere
they can be something to one another. Kelations
without a basis of relation melt away in the unsub-
stantial void. But while the monad is not con-
stituted by its connexion with other monads, its
character can only become explicit by its interaction
with them. Development of reality as experience
is not of the abstract unit, but is always by a syn-
thesis, and the reference to self becomes explicit
and fully defined through reference to another.
But while interaction thus gives articulation to
the self, it cannot create those centres of experi-
ence which are necessary to the development of
experience.
When we speak of the relations of the reals to
one another, we must bear in mind that the term
implies ideational activity, and this has its root in
the action and reaction of substances. In other
222 The ultimate Basis and
words, the growth of experience is based on the
activity which exists between its real elements.
To call this process an interaction of wills, as has
been done, is no doubt, from one point of view,
open to objection : for the term will has a special-
ised psychological meaning, and implies a process of
mental construction. But we must speak of the
centres of experience as active, and the right to
employ the notion of activity in this connexion has
been called in question. The point is important,
for in the long-run our title to speak of God as
active is involved in it. The gist of the objection
to the use of the term in Metaphysics is, that it is
only a working conception in the domain of psy-
chology. It contains, we are told, assumptions and
involves contradictions ; and while it may be con-
veniently used to describe psychological phenomena,
there is no ground for treating it as ultimately real.
Now it is true that the word activity, as we use it
in reference to ourselves, stands for something more
than we are immediately conscious of. The feeling
of inner vation, the sense of power going from us
into act, is not simple, but implies experience, and so
expectation of the result. That is to say, it involves
generalisation. But all this may be true and yet the
idea of activity need not rest on an illusion. Indeed
the fact that we use, and cannot help using, the
idea, is so far evidence that it stands for something
Meaning of Religion. 223
real. Deny it of the self, and you are compelled
to attribute it to the ideas which belong to the self.
Suppose for the moment that activity is no more
than a mental fiction which we find it convenient
to employ, then our experience is reduced to a
series of presentations without purposive connexion,
and we ourselves are only the ineffectual spectators
of a drama in which we fondly dream that we play
a part. It is certainly in point to urge that our
whole practical life becomes unintelligible on this
assumption. If there could be such a thing as a
self purely passive, the development of experience
in it would be impossible. On the other hand, it
may well be that the reason why we are not able to
know ourselves immediately as active, just lies in
the fact that we are dealing with something primi-
tive and inseparable from experience in any form.
We cannot instinctively distinguish the feeling of
activity from that of pure passivity, for the latter
is not a possible experience ; and when we try to
analyse the notion, the thing itself is presupposed
by the process of analysis. I cannot see that
because the concept activity implies mental con-
struction, it is therefore not based upon what is
real : this would only be a valid inference if such
construction could be shown to involve what is
fundamentally false. It will, I suppose, be agreed
that the self, as we habitually use the term, is an
224 The ultimate Basis and
ideal construction : if for that reason you say it is a
fiction, then your very assertion cannot ultimately
be valid. The pressure of practical life always
corrects such vagaries of thought. And as regards
activity, we cannot banish it from the real universe
without inconsistency.
It would no doubt be inconsistent to transfer the
notion of activity from the region of experience to
a system of dead elements ; for there is no inner
connexion between personal experience and that
which has no being for itself. The objection does
not hold in the case of a system of monads conceived
as centres of experience, though on a lower level
than that of thinking subjects. In such a system
action and passion express the nature of beings
which are for themselves. For even passivity is
not intelligible apart from reaction and self-
maintenance.
If, then, we have so far vindicated our right to
speak of active spiritual substances, we must now
ask, What is the ground of their interaction ? What
makes it possible ? For the argument has been
that the centres of experience have a being of
their own : they are not abstract qualities, or mere
appearances, which are really merged in a whole.
How, then, do individuals come to be manifested
as an interconnected system? As is well known,
Leibniz refused to conceive the problem in this
Meaning of Religion. 225
way. Following the lead of a logic according to
which in every true proposition all predicates were
analytically contained in the subject, he affirmed
that each monad contained within itself the source
or ground of all its changes. No monad interacts
with another, but each ideally represents the uni-
verse. And though Leibniz extends his principle
of Sufficient Eeason in order to find a ground for
the monads in God, the inference under these cir-
cumstances lacks cogency, and it is difficult to see
what essential office Deity fills in a universe so
constituted. But the Leibnizian conception of the
monad is an impossible one. How a simple sub-
stance can evolve from itself the countless differences
of experience we are not told. And the whole work
of intersubjective intercourse in building up ex-
perience must be interpreted, on this theory, in so
artificial a way as to be quite unconvincing, not to
say incredible.
If it be agreed that we cannot eliminate the
idea of interaction between the spiritual substances
which are the basis of the material world as ex-
perienced, we may now go on to ask, What are the
implications of the process ? In this way we shall
try to carry out our regressive movement towards
the ultimate ground of things. It will be obvious
that we are following the line laid down by Lotze,
whose carefully reasoned statement has had an
p
226 The ultimate Basis and
important influence on subsequent thought. The
view which commends itself to us may be made
clearer by considering the adequacy of the solution
offered by Lotze. In his { Metaphysics ' he examines
the idea of a transeunt operation the passage of an
influence from one independent real to another
and finds it unintelligible and contradictory. 1 It will
not be denied that the transference of some inexplic-
able force or energy from one thing to another is a
fiction of the mind. Every effort we make to think
out what the action of one thing on another means,
ends with the confession that the reals between
which the operation takes place cannot be absolutely
independent of each other to begin with. Therefore,
argues Lotze, we must abandon the notion of in-
dependent substances. Take the two substances
A and B, the change of A into Aa is accompanied
by a change of B into Bb. And this is only explic-
able if the real being of both A and B is M, and
if the change in M called a evokes as compensa-
tion that modification of M we call b. What popular
thought regards as an external process between A
and B is reduced on examination to an immanent
operation in M. As Lotze himself says, " The
Pluralism with which our view of the universe
began has to give place to a Monism." 2 It is thus
1 Metaphysics (Eng. trans,), bk. i. chap. vi.
2 Ibid., i. 165.
Meaning of Religion. 227
difficult to avoid the conclusion that in the last
resort the monads are virtually reduced to qualifica-
tions of the one real Being. 1 Lotze certainly says
that, if interaction is to be possible, all elements
"must be regarded as parts of a single and real
being." At the same time, his persistent endeavour
is to maintain the uniqueness and individuality of
everything that can be called a self. But if we
are to hold to the latter principle, then the interac-
tion between A and B must be something for both
A and B. Yet the nerve of the foregoing argument
is that the interaction takes place because A and B
are parts of the same Being M, in which alone
the process has meaning. It is conceivable that
some one might urge that the difference exists
within the unity, but that conceptual thinking
cannot explain how it does so. But though this
plea is not always to be made light of, in the
present case it is not satisfactory. For the difficulty
is due to the exclusive claim of the hypothetical M,
put forward in explanation of the fact of interaction.
If we are to believe a recent writer, 2 this impasse
is the natural doom which overtakes realism in
^very form. Either all is unity, or else there are
1 Cp. the remark of Mr F. H. Bradley in his ' Appearance and
Reality,' 1st edition, p. 118, "the attentive reader of Lotze must, I
think, have found it hard to discover why individual selves with him
are more than phenomenal adjectives."
2 Eoyce, The World and the Individual, vol. i. p. 112.
228 7"he ultimate Basis and
" no linkages." Here the most wary voyager can
steer no middle course between Scylla and Charyb-
dis. The only choice is an all-inclusive unity or
eternally isolated individuals. To this one might
reply that it is no doubt possible so to state the
case for realism, that there would seem to be no
escape from one horn or the other of the dilemma
which is here thrust before us. But many realists
will fail to recognise their own likeness in the
picture which Prof. Eoyce has drawn for them.
In point of fact, few would seriously contend that
individual reals, on whatever level of development,
are eternally complete and self-sufficing. The self-
sufficing individual in any form is a fiction : the
connexion of individuals with one another shows
that they all depend on a common ground, and
this makes possible that lively interaction by which
they evolve their distinctive character. The special
point we have to consider is, whether what Prof.
Koyce terms linkage , or as we put it, interaction,
is not possible save on the assumption that the
ground is a unity in which all individuality is
really absorbed. For, as a consequence, this in
its turn renders unintelligible the distinctive dif-
ference which separates the experience of one
self from that of another. To put the matter
more definitely. We postulate individual reals or
spiritual substances to avoid the inevitable con-
Meaning of Religion. 229
tradiction of supposing that nature is only an
ideal construction. The action and passion out of
which experience grows must be viewed in terms
of the inner life of these substances, otherwise we
remain outside the region of individual experience
altogether. And on the other hand, interaction
between centres of experience would be impossible,
if there were not some inner bond of connexion
between them. A ground which is merely external
does not explain anything. For then in postulating
M to explain the interaction of A with B, you
leave unexplained the interaction of both A and B
with M. The conclusion appears unavoidable that
the World -ground must in one aspect be an im-
manent one, and is somehow present in all the
individuals which it connects. But again, if in
the interests of unity you merge the differences in
an identity, you reduce them to an illusion, or at
all events to an appearance ; and you leave yourself
unable to give any valid reason why there should
be even the semblance of individuality in the
universe. This objection may be pertinently urged
against a system like that of Spinoza, and against
the views of Mr Bradley in our own day. An
Absolute such as Mr Bradley presents to us may
fulfil the office of a cid de sac into which intract-
able matter is flung ; it certainly does not offer
any consistent explanation of the evolution of
230 The ultimate Basis and
experience. After all, we live and act sufficiently
well in the world ; and if thought finds the simplest
processes of experience riddled with contradictions,
the presumption is that there is something wrong
with the thought. Nor is it more than a tour de
force to tell us that the shreds and tatters left by
dialectic are, in a way we can never understand,
woven into a harmony in the Absolute. In the
interests of experience itself we must therefore
refuse to follow this course.
The problem which the facts set before us is
this. Can we think of a ground which is at once
immanent in all individual centres of experience,
and at the same time does not reduce these centres
to mere appearance? Is it possible to conceive a
connecting activity which explains the inter-
dependence of spiritual substances and still leaves
to them a being of their own ? This condition can
only be fulfilled by a ground which is both im-
manent and transcendent, a ground which, while
it unites individuals, has also a being for itself,
and so always distinguishes itself from the elements
it connects. And if there be evidence of such a
type of connexion, we need not hesitate to refer
to it in the solution of our problem, even though
we cannot think out in detail its mode of operation.
But at the same time I grant that a type of unity,
illustrated in experience, cannot adequately describe
Meaning of Religion. 231
that which is the ground of experience. With this
proviso I go on to suggest that in the idea of soul
there is a helpful notion for the purpose we have
in hand. To some, perhaps, the conception will
seem threadbare, calling to mind the superficial
philosophy of Pope :
" All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is and God the soul."
We shall, however, only be antiquated and super-
ficial if we take up the idea blindly and use it
without examining it to discern its true import.
We have nothing to do here, it may be well to say,
with any theories about the nature of soul in the
narrower sense. For we are now using the word in
its broader meaning, in its biological and not in its
theological significance. What we are mainly con-
cerned with is the kind of unity, the sort of inter-
connexion disclosed in living things. In its simplest
forms life involves a central activity, which is
revealed in the process of assimilation and the
capacity to react on stimulus. There is a sense in
which all life - activity is purposive, for it means
selection and subordination of elements in the fulfil-
ment of function, and it implies the power to reject
what is alien to the unity which it maintains. The
question of consciously willed ends does not of course
arise here : and if we term the central activity will,
232 The ultimate Basis and
because it is purposive, we must bear in mind that
we are dealing with something on a lower level than
human volition. The fact remains that, from the
humblest unicellular organism to the most complex
and highly differentiated animal body, a central will
or soul connects and dominates all the elements.
If you assert there is no such principle, then you
have the hopeless task of explaining how, by
mechanical action and reaction, the highly special-
ised organs of the body have become reciprocally
means and end to one another, and subserve the
interest of the whole. The attempt to solve the
problem of organic growth in this way fails, because
it has to assume what it ought to explain. In the
simplest form of life an immanent activity is in-
volved, and it is this central will which builds up
the organism. This active principle brings all the
elements into closest interaction, and yet allows to
each organ its own peculiar function and meaning
in the whole. It at once gives the parts their
systematic arrangement, and operates as the inward
bond between them. We cannot indeed make clear
to ourselves in thought the precise way in which
this interconnexion is realised : we are not able to
lay bare the modus operandi of the inner activity.
Certainly we do not do so by generalising and call-
ing the whole process a category. Nevertheless, it
is important to know that experience contains this
Meaning of Religion. 233
type of unity, and we are justified in considering
how far it may offer us suggestions in dealing with
the problem we have before us. For we are seeking
a principle which will connect the various individual
centres of experience without at the same time sup-
pressing their individuality. And in life the central
will, which has a reality of its own, so correlates the
changing elements on which it works that a rela-
tively stable system emerges, in which each organ
has an individual office and is likewise intimately
linked to all the rest. In other words, the soul is
not an expression simply for the interior harmony
of the living being, but the formative ground which
brings about the harmony. It is the dominant
power which builds up the organism and manifests
itself in it.
Is it not possible, then, that the principle which
obtains in the microcosm has its counterpart in the
macrocosm ? May not a supreme Will be the ground
of all interactions between spiritual substances ?
May we not say that all centres of experience act
and react on each other in uniform ways through an
ever-present connecting agency, of which we see
a reflexion in the organic world ? In suggesting
this supreme activity we can at least say that such
a mode of action is not purely hypothetical, but is
really found within experience. It may be urged
that we are here transferring by analogy a principle
234 The ultimate Basis ana
which works within experience to the ground of
experience as a whole. This is true. But no philos-
ophy can condemn the use of analogy altogether if
it is not to sink into scepticism, and the only
question is one of justification in the particular case.
Moreover, it is not disputed that the primal Will
cannot be simply a magnified copy of the will in
the physical organism. The represented world in
space and time grows out of the interactions of
individual substances, and we are here dealing with
the ground of that interaction. Hence it is neces-
sary to think of a fundamental Activity which is
neither temporal nor spatial. It will be said that
activity is inconceivable apart from time : and it
may be admitted that our ideally constructed notion
of activity seems to imply succession. On the other
hand, there must be, as we tried to show, a reality
behind the psychologically formed idea, and time,
from its very nature, cannot constitute activity but
presupposes it. Plainly the fundamental Will must
be distinguished from the will which is a mental
construction based on personal experience. For it
cannot depend for its exercise on an external occa-
sion, nor are we entitled to speak of it as an inter-
mittent agency, now operative and now quiescent.
We must not use language which would mean that
the centres of experience are scattered over space
and require a bridge to establish intercommunica-
Meaning of Religion. 235
tion. One easily drops into the use of such
figurative speech, and to some extent it may be
unavoidable. Yet when the spatial element is
discarded, we are justified in thinking of the funda-
mental Will as present and operative in all monads
without having to overcome an external separation
of individuals. The purposive activity of the one
ever-present Ground makes possible the conative
synthesis by which each centre of experience
develops its meaning, and it also is the condition of
that systematic connexion of elements in virtue of
which an individual can have a function in the
whole. Kant spoke of thought through its cate-
gories building up the fair fabric of nature out of a
chaotic material somehow supplied to it. The con-
ception is unworkable, for thought cannot impose
its own laws upon an alien element. Nature could
not become an ordered whole for thought if an
invisible order did not lie behind it. The individual
reals which nature presupposes form, as we believe,
a spiritual system of which the active soul is an
omnipresent Will. The characterless and unrelated
"thing in itself" is a fiction which explains
nothing.
An ever-present, eternally operative Will, then,
we conclude to be the ground of the external
world as experienced. But this determination is
largely formal. Whether this Will is the will of
236 The ultimate Basis and
a self-conscious, personal, and ethical being, we do
not know as yet. If there be justification for this
view, it must be found in the inner or subjective
development of experience. And to this aspect of
the question we must now turn.
In one sense all experience is subjective. It is
in a subject : every thing which is individual or
real has an inner life, and its qualities are repre-
sented in it by its own states. But in the narrower
sense that is subjective which not only is for itself
but is also conscious of itself. The stages of de-
velopment toward the latter are tolerably familiar.
From the dim self-feeling which reveals itself in
the instinctive assimilation of one element and the
rejection of another, there is an advance to the
level of sensation. When the inner development
makes selection and association of sense impressions
possible, we have the stage of perception. And
when the level of intellection and conceptual think-
ing is attained, the subject, now fully self-conscious,
finds himself confronted by an objective world.
From the lowest phase of " conative synthesis" to
the most fully developed conceptual thinking, the
objective world grows pari passu with the sub-
jective : with increasing differentiation between the
worlds there goes at the same time increasing con-
nexion. Hence the world of conceptual thought
is not to be treated as a secondary and less real
Meaning of Religion. 237
world, which is somehow superimposed on a solid
reality. Thinking is experience in its most de-
veloped form, and is not the mere excrescence of
will, its tool in the endless struggle with fact.
Accordingly we may say that the world which takes
form as the outcome of intersubjective thinking is
the way in which reality reveals itself in us. 1 On
the other hand, thought and reality are not simply
to be identified. For thought, if the highest aspect
of experience, is not the whole of it, and develops
temporally out of experience which is not con-
ceptual. And experience in its widest sense is a
process which is not complete. The growth of
mind through intersubjective intercourse shows the
never-ceasing endeavour of thought to give more
adequate and perfect expression to experience.
The fact that the historic evolution of thought
is an endeavour, by a constant process of criticism
and reconstruction, to give a more perfect state-
1 Mr F. H. Bradley, laying stress on the negative and distinguish-
ing element in thought to the disadvantage of its positive and con-
necting aspect, finds it inherently inadequate to reality, and only
saves himself from complete scepticism by his doctrine of degrees of
reality. No one has more extravagantly depreciated thought than
Nietzsche in his latest writings. Vid. Orestano, 'Le Idee Fonda-
mentali di F. Nietzsche/ p. 305. " Parmenide ha detto : non si puo
pensare ci6 che non esiste. Nietzsche 6 pervenuto all altra estrem-
ita : ci6 che puo venir pensato dev'essere necessariamente una
finzione."
One is tempted to add that, if all thought be fiction, Nietzsche's
view of thought is itself fiction.
238 The ultimate Basis and
ment of reality is a warning against any thorough-
going identification of the one with the other. A
connexion in thought will represent a real con-
nexion, if the material premises have been ade-
quately stated as logical premises to begin with. 1
Strict proof, as the establishment of necessary con-
nexion, is between given elements within experi-
ence, and does not reach to the ground of all
experience.
Hence the well-known attempts to prove the
existence of God by logical inference have no
proper cogency. To begin with, it is plain that
even were the reasoning valid, it would prove
very much less than those who used it hoped to
do. That which is commonly connoted by the
word God contains much more than the so-called
theistic proofs can yield in any case. There need
be no spiritual content in the idea of an External
Designer, a First Cause, or a most Keal Being.
Again, the Cosmological and Teleological arguments
assume that, from one element or aspect of ex-
perience, you can pass by a necessity of thought
to a reality which is the ground of all experience.
Yet here the necessity of thought, supposing that
it did exist, could not give as a conclusion a
Being who was not finite and limited. In the
1 " If the essential conditions of error are absent, what is taken
for real must be real." G. F. Stout, in ' Personal Idealism,' p. 35.
Meaning of Religion. 239
Ontological proof, as Kant showed, the assumption
common to the different arguments, that necessity
of thought gives necessity of fact, is explicitly pre-
sented. But the important point is, that the argu-
ment becomes absolutely futile for the purpose on
hand at the point where it has any semblance of
validity. We contradict ourselves if we affirm that
being does not exist, and that there is a sum-total
of being it is meaningless to deny. But when we
go on to qualify this indeterminate Being to fit it
for the rdle of Deity, we have no guarantee that
the reality must conform to our idea, and to speak
of proof is absurd.
The Ontological proof, in its scholastic form, has
now become a matter of purely historical interest.
It may be well, however, to refer to a sugges-
tive if radical reconstruction of the argument by
Pfleiderer. Things, so Pfleiderer puts it, conform
to our ideas : the laws of nature are in harmony
with the laws of mind. The being of mind is not
identical with the being of nature, but the outer
and inner worlds are in correspondence. And how
is this ? The teleological inference is unavoidable ;
they have been adapted to one another. This
adaptation is due to God, the Supreme Keason,
who is the ground both of nature and mind. But
though we accepted this argument, it would not
prove that the common ground of both worlds was
240 The ultimate Basis and
a self-conscious Person : * it would require to be
supplemented by the argument drawn from the
practical reason, as Pfleiderer would admit. But
the real difficulty is to suppose that the world of
thought and the world of things are divided in
the way suggested, so that the former is a kind
of duplicate of the latter. If the theory we have
already advanced is correct, there is no such
separation. Experience is continuous through all
its stages, and the laws of thought are only its
fullest development. There is no reality which is
not experience in some form. But others who
cannot accept this view will still find transcendental
realism unsatisfactory. And because it makes this
assumption, that nature and mind are two diverse
worlds which somehow correspond, Pfleiderer 7 s ver-
sion of the Ontological argument, it seems to me,
will not be generally convincing. You divide
reality as 'with a hatchet/ and then require a
bridge between the severed parts. Of the theistic
proofs as a whole, it may be said that it is just
in giving proofs that they fail.
At this point it will be best to state the result
to which our own course of thought has brought
us. We found it necessary to postulate a ground
1 E. Von Hartmann, who also accepts the principles of transcen-
dental realism, argues, as is well known, from the correspondence of
thought and being only to an unconscious World-ground.
Meaning of Religion. 241
for the interaction of spiritual substances. An
active Soul or Will seemed the most satisfactory
conception of a ground which would make possible
the connexion of individual substances without
suppressing their individuality. But though we
postulate this we cannot turn the postulate into
a proof, for we are not able to show that the
ground on its part must issue or manifest itself
in a world of individual realities. We have now
to ask how far the developments of experience
through self-conscious subjects will warrant us
in giving further determination to the ground
postulated.
The cardinal fact in the subjective process of
experience is the fact of self-consciousness itself.
The whole realm of science, art, and religion has
unfolded itself in man because he is an active,
self-conscious being. The intellectual and spiritual
creations which make up the world in which man
lives and moves, are only possible for beings who
reflect upon themselves, who both relate themselves
to the object and distinguish themselves from it.
The importance of the fact of self - consciousness
has justified the stress which modern philosophy
has laid upon it. Nor should the fact that the
consciousness of self has been historically evolved
lead us to minimise its significance, or to dethrone
it from its central place in human experience. The
Q
242 The ultimate Basis and
unfolding of individuality in its lower forms is
mediated, as we saw, by interaction between in-
dividuals. And the same law obtains at the stage
when individuality assumes a higher and more
complex shape. The friction of suitable materials
begets the spark. So the contact between selves,
the endless give and take between members of a
society of which language is the outcome, the
sharpening effect of social intercourse upon the
mind, have generated the light of self-knowledge.
The phrase sometimes used, "the socialised self,"
at least reminds us how much the human ego
depends for its contents on the social system in
which it lives and moves. None the less an
account of the historical genesis of self-conscious-
ness does not solve the problem of its origin.
Social conditions are the means which develop it,
but they do not create it.
If we rule the purely materialistic explanation
out of court, we may still be told that self-con-
sciousness is the product of unconscious will. The
will creates the intelligence as its instrument, the
means to its ends. Yet is this really possible ? If
D an unconscious will becomes S a thinking will,
and we exclude the supposition that D is potentially
S, then the reason for the development must be
sought in the factual experiences by which D is
qualified. Let D then interact with A, B, and C :
Meaning of Religion. 243
it will respond to these changes in its environment
by becoming D S, D S', D S". The question is, How
can 8, S', S", which represent the reactions of D, in
turn so modify D that it becomes S, a self-conscious
subject ? Stated thus, we can see that the supposi-
tion involves a false abstraction. For the states
symbolised as S, S', S" have no meaning in them-
selves but only as expressions of D. And no
repetition or variation of these states could modify
D in any way that was not the utterance of its
own character. We can only make intelligible to
ourselves the transformation of D into S by sup-
posing that it really represents the inner develop-
ment of D, of which 8, S', S" may be the occasion
but cannot be the cause. Stated generally, while
self-consciousness can be conceived as the fullest
development of an individual substance, it can
never be consistently thought as superimposed upon
it by conditions acting from without. If uncon-
scious will in the process of experience becomes
thinking will, then it must have possessed the
character which could be quickened to this high
issue. If you deny this, you must take up the
untenable position, as it seems to us, that the
outcome of development has no necessary relation
to its beginning, and then you abandon any prin-
ciple of explanation, and your assertion ceases to
be more than an ex cathedra statement. It may
244 The ultimate Basis and
be true, as we see in cases of degeneration, that
the Aristotelian principle that what is vo-repov
yeVeo-ei is TrpoTtpov <f)V(TL is not always applicable.
But in normal development there must be con-
tinuity between the germ and the fruit, and we
read the meaning of the beginning in the light of
the end. In the general evolution of experience
sub- conscious preceded self-conscious life, and in the
history of the individual person the same order is
repeated. And it seems clear that the only way
we can put a meaning into sub-conscious mental
activity is by regarding it in connexion with its
developed result in self-consciousness.
We ought to keep these facts in view when we
consider what must be the character of the ultimate
Ground which has made possible the development
in time of self-conscious beings. For the supreme
Will, which conditions the interactions of all in-
dividuals, also makes possible the far more com-
plex and highly organised system of intercourse
termed social life, the medium out of which self-
consciousness emerges in time. To the same im-
manent activity we must trace that character in
the individual real which makes the fullest ex-
pression of its nature to be self-consciousness. And
the point is whether a ground which is Will and
nothing more can be the source of a character
which has a development so momentous. The
Meaning of Religion. 245
answer must be the same as that already given.
If individual centres of experience were will and
nothing more, they could not evolve self-conscious-
ness : and just as little can we suppose that a
universal and unconscious Will created by its
activity self-conscious subjects. No doubt some
have asserted this to be true, but the assertion
in this case raises grave practical as well as
theoretical difficulties. We live and act on the
assumption that the self-conscious world, which is
likewise the world of values, is the fullest develop-
ment of reality. Yet if naked Will is the ground
and creator of this world, then an unconscious
principle is the source of all value, and is itself
the highest value. It is only consistent that those
who hold this speculative theory should treat the
kingdom of self-conscious spirits as a lapse from the
unconscious, and advocate a revaluation in the inter-
ests of pessimism. The radical contradiction between
this Weltanschauung and our most deep-rooted per-
sonal instincts is a strong argument against it.
No doubt, although the fundamental Will be
self-conscious, it is not possible for us to define
the way in which it is the active ground of self-
consciousness in individual centres of experience. 1
1 "When Leibniz, for example (' Monadologie,' 47), speaks of his
monads as " des figurations continuelles de la divinite"," the language
can only be taken as metaphorical.
246 The ultimate Basis and
On the other hand, if our regressive movement only
brings us to an unconscious ground of experience,
the ground is plainly insufficient, for it cannot
impart that which is alien to itself. The nature
of developed experiences therefore justifies the
postulate, that the Will, which is the ground of
all centres of experience, is the Will of a conscious
Self.
At this point I will notice an objection that may
be directed against the argument. We shall be
told, perhaps, that if the World -Ground is self-
conscious, it may be conceived as purely immanent
without being open to the objections previously
urged against a purely immanent Ground. The
difficulties we raised before, it will be contended,
were plausible just owing to the fact that we were
taking experience at too low a level. Follow it out
to its fullest expression in self-consciousness, and
you will find you have a principle which duly
differentiates subject and object, universal and par-
ticular, and still contains them in an inclusive
unity. We can only say again that the generalised
experience which gives us an objective world is
only intelligible on the assumption that it pre-
supposes reals which are not adjectives. To put
it generally, all experience does not fall within the
aelf-conscious subject. It may be said that this is
true of the finite self-consciousness, but it does not
Meaning of Religion. 247
hold of the Absolute, which, while giving full scope
to differences, maintains itself in them. If this be
so, then, as the individual self -consciousness falls
within the whole of reality, the Absolute self must
contain all such selves within itself. Can the
Universal Self and individual selves be so related
and continue to possess what is claimed for them ?
In other words, can the Absolute Self and the
finite self, so conceived, be each for itself as well
as for the other? It is easy to speak vaguely of
a Universal Self which is the unity of all particular
selves, but those who use this language are not
always careful to explain exactly what they mean.
I believe those who adopt this standpoint must be
driven in the end to accept one of two alternatives :
either the Universal Self alone is real and finite
selves are an illusion, or the finite selves only are
real and the Universal Self is a fiction. For if the
Absolute Self S exists in the individual selves
a, fe, c, it must be in each of them. Yet it cannot
be in a, or 6, or c, taken in isolation, but only as
entering into the whole, or it would not unify
them. The fact that a, b, and c are for S, which
is a supreme and inclusive self, because it unites
all finite selves in a totality outside of which it
does not itself exist, forbids us to suppose that
the claim of a, 6, and c to be for themselves over
against S, is anything but an illusion. For in the
248 The ultimate Basis and
very assertion of themselves they refuse to merge
wholly in S. I cannot see that under these con-
ditions a, 6, and c could be anything more than
the states of consciousness in which the Supreme
Subject expresses its activity. 1 Again, if you persist
under these conditions in maintaining the personal-
ity of individuals, the unreality of the Absolute
Self becomes just as inevitable. This is well
brought out in a very clear and candid discussion
by Mr J. E. M'Taggart. 2 He holds that personal
selves are the fundamental differentiations of the
Absolute, and fall of course entirely within its
unity. The Absolute is in each individual self, but
also outside it, and therefore is for it. But we
cannot say that individual selves are also for the
Absolute, since there is nothing outside the Ab-
solute. Hence Mr M'Taggart comes to the con-
clusion that the Absolute cannot be a person (unless
in some utterly incomprehensible way). It is really
a system of selves, a society of eternally existing
spirits. This bold discussion of the problem will
probably do good, because it sets forth in a vivid
light the inherent difficulties of the view that an
1 It is noteworthy that Paulsen, in his endeavour to round off
his pluralism in a monism, uses this notion. We may conceive, he
tells us, the relation of the Absolute to individual spirits after the
analogy of the thinking subject to its states ('Einleitung in die
Philosophic,' p. 250).
2 Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology, chap. iii.
Meaning of Religion. 249
Absolute Self is the immanent unity of all finite
selves. But the objections to Mr M'Taggart's own
theory are, to say the least, very serious. If, as he
seems to say, the only reality is the fundamental
differentiations of the Absolute, self-conscious sub-
jects, what are those centres of experience which
are not self-conscious? How are we to interpret
nature? Fundamental differentiations of the Ab-
solute can neither begin nor pass away. Has every
person, then, existed from all eternity ? The Ab-
solute, it must be supposed, is perfect ; yet how
can this be reconciled with the fact that error,
weakness, and sin attach to its constituent dif-
ferentiations ? That kind of apotheosis of the
individual spirit which Mr M'Taggart's theory
seems to imply has no warrant in facts. And it
is in conflict with an essential aspect of religious
experience. We conclude on the general question
that the idea of a Supreme Self -consciousness,
which is the purely immanent unity of all indi-
vidual selves, is inconsistent with what is involved
in the nature of the self.
But there is one other theory which I should like
to consider in this connexion before going further.
It is that of Lotze. He holds, as we know, that
the Absolute is the one real Being, but he also tries
to show that it is personal, or something more and
better than personal. No competent thinker will
250 The ultimate Basis and
suppose that the divine Personality is nothing
more than a magnified copy of the human. There
are limitations involved in the latter which cannot
be transferred to the former; and popular religion
very commonly forgets this. On any view, how-
ever, that is not personal which cannot use the
pronoun 'I,' which is not self-conscious. If, then,
it can be shown that the Absolute is self-conscious,
we are justified in calling it personal. Now, a
constant feature of self- consciousness, as we know
it, is the contrast of ego and non-ego. I affirm
myself and know myself as over against a not-self.
Lotze's problem, therefore, is to show how the
Absolute, which is the supreme and sole reality,
can be a self-conscious Being. His argument, put
briefly, runs thus. 1 Self -consciousness is not de-
veloped by forming an image, which is identified
as an image of the ego. For this operation pre-
supposes an already existing self-feeling. In this
feeling lies the principle which differentiates one
self from another. The self is not gradually
defined over against an outward reality but by
contrast with its own inward and changing states.
No doubt in the case of finite persons there is an
ultimate reference to something without implied
in sensation : but Lotze urges that this is not an
1 Vid. Religionsphilosophie, p. 39 ff., and Microcosmus (Eng.
trans.), vol. ii. 680 ff.
Meaning of Religion. 251
essential feature of personality, but a defect which
attaches to its finite form. In an infinite personal-
ity no such external reference is necessary.
This ingenious argument has been accepted by
several thinkers, and it is undoubtedly suggestive.
At the same time, supposing it to be valid, I think
it still leaves the old difficulty unexplained how
there can be individual personalities within the one
real personal Being. And it is at least doubtful if
any distinction between a self and its inner states
does not ultimately involve a reference to a not-
self or other. It must indeed be granted that an
original self- feeling is presupposed in forming the
distinction of ego and non-ego, as well as in the
process by which the ego is able to recognise itself
as an identity which maintains itself through its
own states. Yet all our experience goes to show
that the feeling only becomes an explicit conscious-
ness, because we find it practically necessary to
mark off gradually a section of our ideas as repre-
sentative of the not-self. And on this contrast
appears to depend the generalisation by which we
designate a part of our experience as inner. The
interior world of human memory and reflection, in
which we are invited to see a faint adumbration of
the closed inner life of the Absolute, is a highly
complex construction which could not be developed
apart from the not-self. Is there any proof that
252 The ultimate Basis and
this reference to another than the self, which is
implied in our developed self-consciousness, is a
feature which is restricted to the finite ? If there
is, Lotze does not supply it. And it remains a
puzzle how the Absolute could refer its states to
itself, if there were nothing with which it could
contrast itself. If an Absolute Self-consciousness
were possible under these conditions, and on this
we will not dogmatise, the analogy between it and
our own self -consciousness must be very slender
indeed.
While the necessary reference to the not-self in
finite self-consciousness is not, I think, in itself a
defect, yet there can be no doubt that, in the
particular form in which it manifests itself in our
experience, it does carry with it a limitation. As
Lotze says, we do not contain within ourselves
the conditions of our own existence, and external
stimuli come to us from an object which does not
depend upon us. The work of ideal construction
by which we interpret experience we are compelled
to envisage in forms of space and time, and cogni-
tion is a process which goes from part to part,
and is never complete and adequate to its object.
Memory, the instrument by which we link the
present to the past, is only fragmentary in its
achievement, and severely restricts the contents of
individual knowledge. Hence to some extent the
Meaning of Religion. 253
wide fields of experience always appear to the
individual knower a foreign territory, which shuts
in his own slender property. Again, the act of
will, by which we seek to modify reality in accord-
ance with our idea, is the expression of a desire in
us. And this desire is born of an incomplete har-
mony of inner and outer, and is a demand for fuller
correspondence between the self and its object.
But the process of will in time never gives the
completeness which is its ideal, and endeavour
never closes in a full satisfaction. Nor is it other-
wise when a man makes himself his object, and
reflects upon his own life. If self-knowledge is desir-
able, it is proverbially difficult. We do not succeed
in gathering up into a whole, and illuminating with
a clear light, the inner history. Here and there
spaces of our life remain brightly lighted, but
greater interspaces have faded into darkness and
are forgotten ; and these have been important
elements in making us what we are. And phases
of our inner experience which we do remember,
with the lapse of years we sometimes find ourselves
unable fully to understand and appreciate. Indeed
many considerations go to show that man is not a
complete self - consciousness, he is not a perfect
personality. For this can only be said of a subject
for whom the object contains no alien element, and
is fully comprehended ; where will is activity which
254 The ultimate Basis and
is no token of defect ; and where the self in all its
meaning is ever present to consciousness, and the
whole is a full harmony.
After these criticisms and discussions we come to
the important question whether, and if so, how far,
we can offer any theory of the nature of God as
personal, which would serve to justify the use of
the term in this reference. There are some, who
have the interests of religion at heart, who hold
that any speculative construction of the nature of
God is valueless. The theologian, K. A. Lipsius, for
instance, has declared that God is personal in the
faith relation, but we cannot translate what is real
to faith into an independent metaphysical deter-
mination. 1 If we take this to mean that we cannot
give an adequate speculative construction of the
divine nature, the statement need not be disputed.
But if we take it to mean that the personality of
God is a pure matter of faith, which reason is
powerless to justify, then the case is surely put too
strongly. If reason were entirely dumb on the
subject, the verdict of faith, standing quite unsup-
ported, would be felt in the long-run to be unsatis-
factory. A Philosophy of Religion, though it does
not pretend to give a full solution of this question,
may properly be expected to show reason for one
1 Dogmatik, 1879, pp. 175, 176. Cp. also the remarks a little
further on in this essay.
Meaning of Religion. 255
view or the other. And if it argues that God is
personal, it should try to show that this deter-
mination is so far consistent with the ground of
experience.
The result which our discussion up to this point
seems to have yielded may be stated thus. If God,
conceived as Absolute, be the whole of reality, one
of two results follows. Either individual selves are
real, but God the system in which they are con-
nected is not a person ; or the Absolute as the sum
of experience is a self, but the selves which fall
within it are mere appearance. Neither view is
satisfactory. In the one case we cannot understand
how self-conscious persons should issue out of the
unconscious world-process, in the other we virtually
explain them away. If, then, we are to maintain
the reality both of the divine and the human self,
we cannot speak of God as the Absolute in the
common philosophic use of the term. For if God
be the all-inclusive whole of reality, a personal rela-
tion between Him and individuals is not possible,
and there is no real place for religion. If we do
use the term Absolute of God, it must be in a more
restricted sense. We may speak of God as the
absolute ground or condition of experience, not as
the all-inclusive whole of experience. It will be a
gain if recent discussions have made it clear that
the philosophic Absolute and the religious idea of
256 The ultimate Basis and
God cannot, as they stand, be made to coincide. If
the notion of the Absolute is right, our view of
religion cannot hold good : if the claim of religion
is valid, the idea of the Absolute must be revised. 1
The World-Ground, we already concluded, must
be self-conscious, and we now add that, though all
finite experience depends on it, it is not the whole
of experience. The question will perhaps be put
to us, How is it possible to think of a Supreme Self
who is the ground of all human selves, while both
are for themselves as well as for one another?
Plainly our view involves the inference that the
activity of the divine Will by which He is ground
of all human experience is not a stage or step by
which He becomes self-conscious. For this takes
us back to the unworkable notion of a purely im-
manent divine consciousness. Hence the Supreme
Being must contain eternally within Himself the
actualised conditions of self -consciousness. These
conditions, we found reason to believe, were that
1 Philosophy and Religion frequently agree in regarding God as
the Supreme Spirit. But when a distinguished exponent of the
all-inclusive notion of the Absolute, like Prof. Jones, tells us ('Hib-
bert Journal,' Oct. 1903, p. 31) that reality is a coherent system all
of whose parts and elements exist in and through a supreme principle
which manifests and embodies itself in them, and adds that religion as
well as philosophy calls this principle God, we must take leave to
doubt the statement. The weight of historic evidence is that the
religious mind means by God a reality which differs in essential points
from such a principle.
Meaning of Religion. 257
there should be a not-self contrasted with and yet
related to the self. This appears to be a feature in
all gradations in the development of self in finite
experience. No doubt in the region of our experi-
ence we never find a perfect harmony and corres-
pondence between the self and its object, as the
existence of evil and error testify : and the historic
process seems to be an endeavour towards fuller
concord. The Divine Being, it may be suggested,
is the eternally perfect and complete type, of which
human self-consciousness is the partial and imperfect
reflexion. This would mean that God is not to be
conceived as pure unity. The element of difference
must enter into His nature, but here it does not
carry with it external limitation or defect of any
kind. Rather we must think of a unity which is
differentiated but is at the same time a perfect
harmony ; of a not-self which in no way impedes
the activity of the self, and of a subject which fully
realises itself in the object ; of a Being, in short, in
whom subject and object completely and harmoni-
ously interpenetrate. It is important to remember
here that the Divine Nature is not under the con-
ditions of time and space, and that the defects
which pertain to perceptual and cognitive process
in our experience do not exist in it. The piece-
meal character which attaches to our thought and
will cannot belong to the divine thought and
258 The ultimate Basis and
will. And the fact that we are under these limi-
tations debars us from comprehending adequately
the Supreme Consciousness in our discursive
thought.
The same difficulty besets us when we try to
understand the divine world - grounding activity.
We ca,n hardly avoid using words which contain
spatial and temporal images, and yet these must
be more or less misleading. The phrase ' act of
will/ for instance, suggests a passing into activity
due to some occasion at a particular point of time.
And an idea like this applied to God is full of diffi-
culties and contradictions. It is perhaps less open
to objection to say that God's will is eternally
ground of all individual experience, in the sense
that we cannot consistently represent to ourselves
His bringing it into being at any particular point
in time. On the other hand, we do not know enough
of the divine nature to warrant us in saying that
the manifestation of the Divine Will, as ground of
a connected world of individual selves, is necessarily
involved in that nature. The divine self-conscious-
ness is not made possible by the existence of a world
in space and time. Nevertheless if we say that God
might equally have manifested, or refrained from
manifesting, His Will in a world of individual
spirits, this would mean that self-revelation is not
essential to His nature. And the notion that the
Meaning of Religion. 259
present world has been preferentially chosen by
God, out of various possible worlds, implies an
anthropomorphic conception of Deity which it is
hard to justify : both from a metaphysical and ethi-
cal point of view it is open to serious objections.
Nor can we give any satisfying explanation how
'spiritual substances come to exist for themselves,
while they form a coherent whole only through the
immanent connecting activity of the Divine Will.
Explanation is the fruit of the endeavour to find
and state in general terms the continuity which
exists between elements within experience, and it
always carries with it the impress of its origin.
Indeed the explanation how anything takes place,
if sufficient for the purpose in hand, is never theo-
retically complete. So we cannot be expected to
establish the exact connexion between centres of
experience and their ultimate ground, for the con-
nexion would have to be stated in a form of thought
properly applicable to elements which fall within our
experience. But though we cannot explain how
spiritual Beings proceed from the Divine Will, this
does not invalidate the postulate, if it can be justi-
fied on other grounds.
According to the view here suggested, God is the
actual and perfect form of personality, and, as time-
less ground of the world, He is the condition of the
development of personal experience in time. We
260 The ultimate Basis and
cannot conceive Him as an individual spirit in a
society, for then His meaning must be found in
the system of which He was a member, and He
would be conditioned as well as conditioning. And
He would thus share the limitations of finite spirits,
and could not contain in Himself the reason of His
activity. God must ever be differentiated from
finite persons, in that He is the active ground on
which they all depend. He is the supreme Self-
consciousness who transcends the divisions of space
and time, and makes possible that partial reflexion
of Himself which is the developing self-conscious-
ness of man.
The foregoing argument has led us by successive
stages to the determination of the World-Ground as
Supreme Will, as Self-conscious Will, and finally as
the Will of a complete or perfect Personality. We
must now ask how far the nature of personal ex-
perience warrants us in giving more definite content
to the idea of God. The speculative thinker cannot
follow in the track of the older theologians and,
selecting certain ethical predicates, simply declare
that they must belong in perfection (via eminentice)
to the divine character. It has been said that all
such analogical attribution of content is here in-
valid. 1 The statement is too sweeping. But no
doubt we cannot postulate ethical qualifications of
1 E.g., by Wundt. Vid. System der Philosophie, p. 438.
Meaning of Religion. 261
the Divine Nature in the way that we postulate a
personal ground of the world. Obviously many
qualities we judge good in men cease to have a
meaning in an eternal and perfect Being. And if
the mere fact that certain virtues have come to exist
in men be a pledge that they have a counterpart
in God, we ought to say the same of human vices.
The truth is that experience, viewed as existing
fact, gives no valid ground for inferring that God
is a spiritual personality, such as He appears to the
developed religious consciousness. Pure thought
can never show us that ethical content must be
predicated of the Deity : speculative thinkers who
ostensibly deduce such content really assume it. If
we are to justify ourselves in giving this further
qualification to the idea of God, it must be on
other grounds than those which are purely intel-
lectual. The claim so to interpret the character
of God must rest on the demand of our inner
nature, that the Being who is the ground of all
reality satisfy our moral and spiritual needs and
aspirations. Is the claim a valid one?
If the demand in question were simply a subjec-
tive desire that ultimate Eeality should be qualified
in particular ways, it would be hard to defend its
validity ; and we are not in the habit of assuming
that what we wish to be must be. The case would
be different if it should appear that the claim is the
262 The ultimate Basis and
normal outcome of the practical life of men. Now
in the forefront of the practical life the distinction
has been set between what is and what ought to be.
Man in the exercise of his will ever places a better
before him, and moves in a world of values. A
being " of large discourse," he looks before and
after; and with the possible satisfaction of the
moment he contrasts a greater good, which may be
inconsistent with it and should be preferred before
it. By allegiance to some central end or chief good,
to which other values are related as a means, he
seeks more or less consciously to organise his con-
duct as a consistent whole. The affirmation that
something ought to be, the demand that value
should be realised, this has been the constant wit-
ness of the human spirit throughout its history.
The content of the idea of value has changed with
the changing life of societies, but the historic process
has been, on the whole, from material to ethical and
spiritual conceptions of good. No doubt man, speak-
ing at a particular point and time in the evolution
of experience, cannot give final and determinate
content to the idea of what ought to be. He sees
' as through a glass darkly/ but he has faith that
the good dimly discerned is no abstraction and
works as a living influence on human souls. In
his endeavour to fill his personal life with a good
which he has not yet, man finds a meaning for his
Meaning of Religion. 263
existence and a scope for his freedom. Not the
world of mere fact but that which ought to be has
the best title to exist. So humanity, clinging in
faith to the thought of a good which transcends all
other goods, moves forward to its goal by the way
of the better. Faith, it must be said, will not accept
the view that its ideal good is a purely relative
notion which, Proteus-like, takes many forms, and
is only consistent in refusing to be fixed to any one
of them. Nor can it agree that a Supreme Value is
a mere abstraction, although when pressed for a
reason it cannot point and say, Lo here, or lo there !
The kingdom of faith is within, and its members are
convinced that they experience the presence and
appeal of the good which ought to be. This faith is
the utterance of the free spirit, and is its personal
affirmation that that is real which is demanded by
its own deepest needs. The judgment of faith is
certainly not a logical inference which follows
analytically from premises which are given ; yet it
would, not be fair to say that it is only a psycho-
logical statement of what occurs in a particular
person. The judgment which faith makes is not an
isolated one. It is rather the normal utterance of
the spiritual nature, the affirmation of what men
recognise to be the demand of their moral and
spiritual life. Directly or indirectly you must
attest its practical validity. The Buddhist, for
264 The ultimate Basis and
example, while radically differing in his valuations
from Western races, is still impelled to assert the
claim of a higher good to be : Nirvana is what
ought to be, and it is better than any existence in
sense and time. We conclude that it is a normal
characteristic of man as an active spiritual being to
assert over against mere fact the claim of a higher
good ; and this involves the faith that all values
stand in organic relation to a Supreme value.
The existence of a highest value, though not a
logical inference, might be named with Kant a
postulate of the practical reason, for it is a
demand which grows out of the organisation of
practical life.
That in the historical development of the race the
step of personifying the highest value should have
been taken is significant. It is intelligible, too, for
goodness has always a personal reference, and in
the last resort is something personally realised.
Hence the value-judgment finds its goal in a God
who is perfectly good, the source of all the value that
is, and the pledge of its completion. We do not
underrate this movement as a historical testimony to
man's need of God. At the same time, if the ground
of our theistic belief is only a judgment of value, I
cannot but think the foundation is not sufficiently
stable. Let me state shortly some objections to the
view, held by not a few at present, which throws
Meaning of Religion. 265
the whole stress of the theistic inference on the
value-j udgment .
Although in practical life we must affirm our faith
in value, and even in a highest value, the need of
finding this value personified in a Supreme Being
has not been universally experienced. There are
always some in every age who do not feel that their
inward needs call for the existence of a God. Nor
does it seem inconsistent with our faith in value,
that the highest good should be, not a single
Supreme Person but a celestial oligarchy, or even
a society of souls who find a perfect satisfaction in
one another. Such a conception may be contradic-
tory, but from the value standpoint it need not be
so ; and if we reject it, it must be for other reasons.
Again, it is decidedly unsatisfactory that on grounds
of faith alone we should predicate a highly developed
notion like personality of the supreme good : at
the very least we ought to discuss how far it is
applicable in such a case. If it were argued that
personality is a form of the finite only, it would not
be enough for the theologian to say, " Faith assures
us that the Infinite is personal, and therefore it must
be so in fact." He would require to show that the
concept of the Infinite, or the World-Ground, was at
least not inconsistent with personality. We have,
however, already touched on the point, and will only
add here that a theism which rests entirely on a
266 The ultimate Basis and
reading of the value-judgment must be perilously
weak.
We have tried to show that there are other
grounds why God should be conceived as personal.
And if the conclusion be accepted, then the service
the value- judgment can render in this connexion
becomes clear. Faith completes the more formal
determinations of reason, and the practical postulate
of a highest good gives content to our conception
of the self-conscious ground of things. The Supreme-
value which faith affirms to be real must belong to
the inner nature of the Supreme Self. In the
Divine Consciousness the highest good eternally
has that reality which the finite self, from its
standpoint in time, affirms it ought to have.
Hence to the eye of faith the process of experience
is neither a mechanical movement nor a dialectic
evolution but stages in the development of the
good which is the content of the Divine Will.
From this point of view the demands of the
ethical consciousness represent the inner meaning
of the historic process, and witness to the char-
acter of its ground. But it must be confessed
that we cannot give adequate specification to the
highest value conceived as the world-end. Man
must be content to gather glimpses of his goal
with the progressive development of the good in
the growing riches of personal life. The spirit of
Meaning of Religion. 267
the age, " dreaming of things to come," can never
give a clear form and body to the ideal it aspires
after, and the prophets who would "describe it speak
in doubtful oracles. When we turn the eye from
the illuminated space called the present, the forms
of distant things are dim. Man, however, sees
enough for the conduct of life when he can
advance on the line of the goal, and pass from
the lesser to the greater good. Moreover, the
highest good, as it would be for our thought, would
still fall far short of that living fulness of personal
experience in which alone it could be adequately
known and appreciated. The experience we have
to go on is incomplete. For aught that we know,
terrestrial experience may be only a fragmentary
portion of a vaster experience. So the faith which
speaks confidently of a final good is also con-
strained to confess that "it doth not yet appear
what we shall be." But it is at least clear that
the ultimate good must be a personally realised
experience, and it cannot be apart from God, who
is the source and consummation of all goodness.
Let me add that, as it is by an act of faith we
affirm the reality of the Absolute Value, so it is
likewise an act of faith by which we affirm that
it coincides with the Self-Conscious ground of all
experience. Not reason, then, but faith gives
ethical content to the idea of God. Nevertheless
268 The ultimate Basis and
there is a justification for the conviction that the
theoretical and the value-judgment must converge
towards, and find their goal in, one Supreme
Being. For though we cannot unify the two
in thought, yet both proceed from one and the
same personal life in man, which cannot finally
be divided against itself. And this life every-
where has its roots in the activity of the personal
World- Ground.
We now turn to the concluding part of our
task in the present essay. We proceed to con-
sider the final interpretation of religion in the
light of its ultimate basis. The discussion in an
earlier essay was concerned with the psychological
interpretation of religious development ; it remains
for us to try to complete this statement by re-
considering our results from the speculative stand-
point, which we have sought to make good in the
foregoing pages.
The objective basis of religion is God, and more
definitely God as the supreme and perfect Spiritual
Personality. All experience has its ground in the
Divine Will ; but it is only with the development
of personal centres of experience that the divine
activity within experience can be the ground for
conscious acts which have a religious significance.
Very important is it in the interpretation of religion
to remember that the Divine Being, while immanent
Meaning of Religion. 269
in all centres of experience, also transcends them,
and does not derive the fulness of His personal
life from them. For religion, it cannot be dis-
guised, means a personal relationship, and the
object of reverence must at least be invested with
some personal qualities. Within a strictly pan-
theistic whole there is scope neither for judgments
of value nor for religious faith. On the other
hand, if we so differentiate the divine and the
human that the immanence of the divine in the
human is lost sight of, the facts of the religious
consciousness again become inexplicable. The
universal character of religion shows that it is a
native expression of the human soul, and its root
must lie in that immanent activity of God by
which He is the ground of personal and self-
conscious beings. This seems to us the ontological
explanation of the psychological fact that religion
is the expression of certain common elements in
the personal life of men. With a merely external
relation of God to man, religion likewise becomes
external, and ceases to be a vital utterance of
human needs and energies. The old words which
speak of the divine as the "life and light of men"
find ample justification in the witness of the religi-
ous consciousness.
The psychological study of religious development
has shown us that religion is the utterance of man's
2 ye The ultimate Basis and
nature as a whole, yet certain feelings are specially
active in promoting it. I refer to the feeling of
incompleteness and need, to the sense of depend-
ence. From the first this attitude of spirit had a
practical justification in the circumstances of the
human lot on earth. The Philosophy of Religion
gives a deeper and a broader basis to the psycho-
logical facts. The feeling of need and dependence
ultimately springs from the nature of human per-
sonality. The finite spirit has not the ground of
its being in itself but in God, who makes possible
its activity. Historically it was the physical facts
of his limitation which first pressed themselves on
primitive man, but the process of inner develop-
ment led to the recognition that incompleteness is
a note of the personal life itself. All individual
being is derivative, it has its ground in the Divine
Will; and this fundamental fact lies behind that
experience of incompleteness and dependence which
marks the religious consciousness. The growth in
the religious consciousness has been in the direction
of converting this material and external idea of
dependence into an inward and spiritual idea, or,
what is the same thing, the desire for freedom
has passed from a negative to a positive form.
That primitive piety which is concerned with the
deliverance from brute wants and fears is slowly
transmuted into the spiritual mind, which yearns
Meaning of Religion. 271
for the inward completion of its own life through
the indwelling life of God. And the process by
which man rises to this lofty thought is the pro-
cess by which he comes to the consciousness of the
immanent ground of his own being.
But it is necessary to the right interpretation
of religion to keep in view the special character
of the Divine Ground on which personal life
depends. We must remember that the Divine
Being who stands in intimate relation to the
lives of men is a perfect and complete Personality.
The defects which are involved in human know-
ledge and volition have no counterpart in God,
who is eternally in harmony with Himself. And
it is the immanent working of the divine in the
human, the contact and pressure of the larger
Self, which gives the impulse to development and
is the living source of religious aspiration. It is
because our life is grounded in a perfect Being
that we strive after a perfect satisfaction of the
self, and can finally be content with no temporal
good. The history of religion is the record how
man transcends each partial satisfaction of his
spiritual nature, and seeks a satisfaction final and
complete ; and the explanation of the process is
the inner relation of the soul to God.
The significance of religion, however, will not be
grasped if we do not recognise a special character in
272 The ultimate Basis and
the imperfection which attaches to human person-
ality. This is not simply that of an undeveloped
being, who has not yet realised the latent richness
of his nature. If this were all, then the sense of
discord and division in the self, which in the
developed religious consciousness utters itself in the
longing for redemption and spiritual deliverance,
would not be intelligible. The truth is that, over
and above what may be called natural imperfection,
there is that particular quality of evil in the human
self which we designate sin. Sin is a contradiction
of the divine law of man's nature, and is made
possible by the fact that the human self is so
differentiated from its divine ground that it calls
its will its own and can oppose the Divine Will.
There is an irrational element in sin, and it is not
fully explicable; but it is a fact which the Philos-
ophy of Keligion cannot ignore, though it is not
able to offer a speculative theory of its origin and
meaning. Any attempt to rationalise moral evil,
by showing that it is somehow involved in the
evolution of the good as its necessary contrast, can
only be partially successful. For in the last resort
we are confronted with the verdict of the moral
consciousness that sin is just what ought not to be.
And one must distrust the power of the most
synoptic mind to rise to a standpoint, where that
which the moral judgment says ought not to be is
Mean ing of Religion. 273
seen as possessing a proper title to exist. 1 The fact
of sin, however you interpret it, gives emphasis to
the reality of human freedom, a point of great
importance to the right understanding of religion.
For apart from this freedom the discord which is
in our nature is not intelligible a discord which
makes the burden of the higher Ethical Keligions
a longing for inward reconciliation. And then the
act of faith by which the individual finds deliver-
ance in communion with a Divine Being is also
an exercise of freedom : you cannot construe it as
the necessary outcome of inward development. If
you eliminate this element of personal freedom, I do
not see how a man's religion should be to him an
inward and personal expression of himself. It could
not be so any more than the language he habitually
1 In a system like Hegel's sin must somehow find a place in the
dialectical evolution of spirit. Mr M'Taggart, in his * Studies in
the Hegelian Cosmology,' chap, vi., advances some considerations in
favour of the view that it is the negative moment in the transition
from innocence to virtue. But his remarks are not convincing. Say
what you will, when sin becomes a necessary stage in personal
development, it ceases to be sin in the full sense of the word. In
individual experience it is not necessary to participate in sin in order
that there be that reaction against it which promotes the formation
of disciplined virtue. Moreover it does not seem correct to say that
virtue reached after personal experience of sin is thereby more com-
plete. It would be nearer the mark to affirm that, though a man's
conscious antagonism to sin may be sharpened by experience of the
misery it entails, yet'his bygone indulgence in evil habit leaves an
element of weakness in his character which may reveal itself in time
of stress.
S
274 The ultimate Basis and
speaks is the expression of his character and indi-
viduality. 1
Behind this exercise of freedom on man's part,
and never destroyed by it, is the fundamental
relation in which he stands to God, the perfect
Personality. On this depends the fact that in the
use of his freedom he has brought discord into his
nature. For discord takes us back to a harmony of
which it is a disturbance, and just because the har-
mony strives to assert itself are there division and
pain. That discontent with itself which impels the
soul to look above itself, if a token of imperfection,
is also a witness to the enduring bond which links it
to a harmonious and perfect Life. The development
of religion in the individual and the race is an
endeavour to gain a harmonious personal existence,
and the common need and demand for this arise out
of the immanent relation of the human self to a
Divine Self. " Be ye therefore perfect, even as
your Father in heaven is perfect." The pressure of
the Divine ideal from within is man's warrant and
encouragement to embark on this high enterprise.
Nor is it alien work at which he is invited to
labour : he is only bidden strive to enter into the
1 These remarks no doubt apply chiefly to the higher religions.
At the stage of nature -religion personal freedom is undeveloped.
To the savage freedom means no more than deliverance from the
oppression of physical evils.
Meaning of Religion. 275
full enjoyment of that heritage which is his spiritual
birthright.
But religion, as an endeavour after personal har-
mony, though in its development it presents features
of its own, is of course subject to the general condi-
tions of human development. Even on the lower
levels of individual being, the nature of the indi-
vidual is only unfolded through interaction with
other individuals. And at a higher stage we have
recognised that self - consciousness is mediated by
the interplay of mind with mind in a social system.
Nor is it otherwise with the development of the
personal capacity for religion. The growth in self-
consciousness which society makes possible is also
accompanied by a growth in the religious conscious-
ness : and at all its stages religion reflects the
character of the society to which it belongs. When,
for instance, the social medium becomes rich enough
to nourish a highly developed personality, then this
is reflected in the inner religion of the prophet and
spiritual teacher. And, as it is a general law that
self-consciousness unfolds by interaction with other
selves, the same is true in the case of the spiritual
consciousness. The latter finds expression and wins
strength for progress in the mutual affections, duties,
and services of persons within a social whole. In
and through their relations to others men give prac-
tical form to their religious faith. At whatever
276 The ultimate Basis and
level you take religion, you always see that it con-
tains the idea of a bond linking men to their God
and to one another. The idea may be crude and
external, or it may be refined and spiritual, yet it is
ever present. A religion for the single soul and for
no other is instinctively felt to be a contradiction.
Plainly this feature is not arbitrary or accidental,
but belongs to the nature of religion itself; and
it seems possible to suggest a speculative interpreta-
tion of it. It must have its basis in the fundamental
character of the divine activity that activity by
which individuals are placed in a position of
common dependence, while at the same time they
are made interdependent. God is the immanent
Ground of each personal life, and connects all
personal centres of experience. It is the harmony
of the divine Self in inner contact with the human
self which urges man to seek satisfaction in religion.
Hence the religious impulse, proceeding from a com-
mon source and tending to the like expression,
was felt as a bond of union in tribe or people :
and this bond had its visible form in the God of
their worship. Under existing psychological and
social conditions man has given what utterance he
could to the truth, that what is central in each man
is common to all, and that the religious bond is
rooted in the inner nature of men. He has had to
use the symbols which lay to his hand in his
Meaning of Religion. 277
endeavour to express the tie which bound him and
his fellows to divine powers. He conceives the
bond to be one of blood, or he thinks of it less
crudely as a kinship which goes back to a common
divine ancestor ; or, finally, he regards it as the
spiritual brotherhood which proceeds from the one
spiritual Father in heaven. But though they may
have expressed the principle inadequately in symbol
or in creed, men have always believed, and acted on
the belief, that the tie which bound them to their
God also bound them intimately to one another.
The persistence of this feature shows that it belongs
to the essence of religion. We suggest that its
ultimate explanation lies in the fact that God, the
source of the religious consciousness, is the ground
on which all spirits depend, and by which they are
linked to one another. And the religious conscious-
ness in its temporal development gives expression
to the nature of the Power which works in its
working.
The thinker who tries to read a philosophic
meaning into the history of religious development
has a hard task, for the facts are often stubborn
and refractory. But any attempt to deal with
the problem must keep, as it seems to us, two
things in view. These are (1) the common Divine
Ground from which the religious consciousness pro-
ceeds, and (2) the temporal conditions and limita-
278 The ultimate Basis and
tions under which that consciousness can reveal
itself. By the former we explain the universality
of religion and the continuity of its manifestation
through all the stages of human culture. And by
the second we must explain the diverse and often
conflicting utterances of that consciousness in its
temporal unfolding. The changing social medium
reflects the spiritual light in manifold ways. But
when we take into account the difference in the
character of the medium, the phenomena need not
be inconsistent with unity of source. For the self
is socially evolved, and the god in whom the
self seeks satisfaction corresponds to the self which
has to be satisfied. But it is just the presence
of the Divine in man throughout the long evolu-
tion of personal life which makes him realise the
partial nature of the satisfaction he has attained.
It impels him to pass beyond the one-sided forms
in which he has given expression to his faith,
and urges him to seek a satisfaction deeper and
more complete. This is the principle which lies
behind the rise and fall of religions in history.
And the fact that the religious spirit is in move-
ment, that it transcends the incomplete and, as
it may seem, conflicting forms in which it em-
bodies itself, should make us willing to admit that
there may be unity of meaning and purpose in a
process which we can only survey in part.
Meaning of Religion. 279
But we must also remember that the divine
immanence does not work so as to submerge the
individual personality and supersede its freedom.
The form which the religious consciousness takes
is not wrought in man independently of his own
will. An act of choice and personal appropriation
are implied. And it is possible for him to give it an
expression which neither corresponds to his deeper
nature nor ministers directly to progress. Fetish-
ism and, at a higher stage, pantheism are such
forms ; for neither lends itself to that inner per-
sonal development which is essential to religious
progress. Still, though such phases of religion
stand for a retrograde movement, they may have
a function in religious development, if only a
negative one. Their incapacity to satisfy the need
of the personal life may promote a reaction of
the religious spirit towards a fruitful line of ad-
vance. The spiritual nature, in sympathetic re-
sponse to its divine ground, asserts itself against
the claims of a one-sided development.
That there is on the whole a progress in religious
history we have already concluded. But standing
as we do in the midst of this great movement,
we can hardly expect to perceive its full and
final significance. Nevertheless the prospect is not
wholly dark. The movement has its ground in the
working of a supreme and perfect Personality.
280 The ultimate Basis and
Finite personality has its preliminary basis in in-
dividuality, and develops out of it. Individual
centres of experience lie behind the ideally con-
structed world. The individual real becomes the
self-conscious individual, and the self-conscious
individual in interaction with others acquires con-
tinuity of interest and determinate character. He
becomes personal in the larger sense. So ex-
perience comes to ripe blossom and fruit in per-
sonality. And if experience has its highest issue
in personal life, it is in religion that personal life
gains its fullest development. The evolution of
religion itself is a deepening and enrichment of
self-consciousness. In this process in time, as we
venture to interpret it, the Divine Spirit, working
through human aspiration and endeavour, seeks to
bring human souls to their amplest self-fulfilment
in living harmony and fellowship with Himself.
The general trend of religious evolution we have
already described as a movement from the sensuous
to the spiritual. And in the course of this history
personality plays an increasingly important part.
This fact has perhaps been sufficiently brought
out in an earlier essay. There are two special
points, however, connected with the development
of this conception which have an interest for the
Philosophy of Eeligion. The first of these is the
force and definiteness given to the personal idea
Meaning of Religion. 281
through the life and work of the great spiritual
teachers and founders of religion. They impressed
on men the truth that religion was a personal
attitude, a matter of faith and conduct : and they
on their part seemed to men to set before them
a true knowledge of what God was and man
ought to be. They revealed God to human faith ;
in their words and works they gave forth the
divine spirit which filled them. And to the pious
imagination of later generations they became ideal
figures who represented the perfection of a religious
personality. They gave concrete shape to the ideal,
they brought the divine near to men, and they
stood forth on the historic stage the spiritual
helpers of those who struggled towards the heavenly
goal. The Philosophy of Eeligion cannot prove that
these personalities have been the special organs of
higher revelation to humanity, though their influ-
ence on religious development has been very great.
But, as we have argued before, they are not fully
explained by their age and circumstances. And
while there is a sense in which all religion has
its root in the divine, there is no valid reason
for denying that the Supreme Spirit may be more
directly operative at one point than another. In-
deed if we are clear, as we ought to be, that the
World-Ground is not mere substance but an active
personal Spirit, we shall regard such action as prob-
282 The ultimate Basis and
able. The verdict of historical criticism in any
given case is of value, but in the region of
spiritual causality it cannot give a final decision.
Where faith finds a quickening and renewing influ-
ence flowing from a personality, the way is open
to recognise there a revelation from a divine source.
There are two aspects of the divine nature, as
our speculative discussion showed, the immanent
and transcendent. And our second point is, that
in the higher development of religion the trans-
cendent aspect comes to clear consciousness. The
statement may be controverted. It will be said
that an immanent God is the only one which the
modern mind can entertain. There is a tendency
in recent thought to lay stress on the immanence
of God to the exclusion of His transcendence.
But it seems to me the tendency is speculative in
its motive rather than religious. The religious con-
sciousness has always recognised a presence of God
in the world, but as the spiritual mind developed
it came to realise the complementary side of the
divine nature. And this has been the fruit of
the growing perception in spiritual experience of
the demands of personality. The higher religious
consciousness finds that the things of sense and
time cannot satisfy it. Likewise it sees that the
most potent obstacles to its development are within,
the selfish desires and evil passions. And the soul
RS!TY
Meaning of Religion. 283
which can gain the harmony it craves neither with-
out nor within is urged towards a power above it.
Hence the part redemption plays in the higher
ethical religions. And the God who redeems is
always thought to be elevated above the evils
and defects of temporal existence, and so able to
impart that spiritual harmony to the soul which
the world cannot give. This negative relation to
the world has indeed sometimes been emphasised
overmuch. The way to God has been conceived,
as Plato at one time conceived it, to be a retreat
from the things of sense, <j)vy7j Se O/JUHOXJIS c<
Kara TO Swaroi/. 1 The exaggerations of this idea
in Neo-Platonic thought and Christian practice are
well known, and naturally brought about a reaction.
For the world after all is God's world, and He
must be in it as well as above it. None the less
the enlightened worshipper does not address him-
self to a Deity who has no being outside the
world-process. For he feels that a God who is
thus interwoven with this unsatisfying experience
in sense and time cannot ensure the fulfilment of
his deep desire for spiritual deliverance and personal
completion. It would thus appear that religious
experience and speculative thought converge towards
a common conception of God. The metaphysical
problem, as we tried to show, was how to think
1 Thesetetus, 176 B.
284 The ultimate Basis and
the World-Ground, so that, while all things depend
upon it, the individuality which is at the core of
experience may not be reduced to unreal appear-
ance. The ripest outcome of religious experience,
which is expressed in faith in a God who is in
the world but also above it, agrees with the
speculative conclusion, though the line of ap-
proach has been different. That is to say, the
demands of consistent theory and the needs of
the spiritual life lead toward the same result.
Any speculative interpretation of religion must
ultimately be determined by the idea of God. If,
for instance, God is concluded to be impersonal, it
would not be possible to regard the end of religion
as the completion and harmony of human personal-
ity. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect that the
basis from which a Philosophy of Eeligion is de-
veloped will be carefully and critically examined.
I do not doubt that some will find the speculative
idea of God, suggested in the present paper, to be
inconsistent, or at least defective. In any case it
will be said that it raises perplexing questions which
it does not answer. The latter complaint, it must
be granted, has justification. Difficulties, for ex-
ample, are connected with the interpretation of the
nature of space and time, and with the manner of
the divine immanence in the world. On the other
hand, it may be replied that there is no meta-
Meaning of Religion. 285
physical theory of reality which does not lay itself
open to objections more or less important. The
test applied to a theory of the kind must be a
modified one viz., how far it does justice to the
essential aspects of experience. And I will say
this, the conception of God as personal World-
Ground offers fewer and less serious difficulties than
that which regards Him as an impersonal Absolute.
Thus, if the non - personal nature of God be
maintained, not only does the evolution of the
human self become an enigma, but the historic
development of the religious consciousness can only
mean the fictitious projection into the sphere of
real being of purely subjective needs and desires.
It has been truly said, " If it be denied that the
concept of personality is applicable to the nature
of God, the whole historical development of the
religious consciousness must be termed the de-
velopment of an illusion." x And while some are
prepared frankly to accept this consequence, they
must do so at the cost of declaring the fundamental
and persistent need in human nature, which en-
gendered the illusion, to be false and misleading.
This would mean that there is an abiding discord
between the claims of the spiritual and intellectual
nature. As against this we cherish the conviction,
that a world in which spiritual life can realise itself,
1 Siebeck, Lehrbuch der Eeligionsphilosophie, p. 364.
286 The ultimate Basis and
and advance progressively to higher forms, must be
a world, on the whole at least, in accord with spirit-
ual ends. From this we would infer that it has a
spiritual ground. And if the theistic inference be
wrong, we can have no confidence in the continued
growth and dominance of spiritual life in the world.
It has blossomed forth in the process of experience,
and it may fade and die, for there is nothing in the
nature of things which can secure its persistence.
This can only be assured by an ethical and personal
World- Ground.
The individual who strives to know the reasons of
things is driven to confess that there are heights
and depths in experience which baffle the philo-
sophic mind. Even in the matter of our personal
history, the inner fulness of experience and its
subtle transitions are more than we can adequately
express in the general ideas with which thought
works. Still more inadequate must be our in-
tellectual conception of that ideal experience, the
experience complete and harmonious in which per-
sonal beings come to spiritual fruition in union with
God and one another, which is the goal of religious
endeavour. Dante, when at the close of his arduous
journey he approached the sphere of the Eternal
Light, found his speech brief and stammering, and
strength failed him to pursue the lofty vision :
" All' alta fantasia qui manc6 possa."
Meaning of Religion. 287
And of God as He is for Himself, of the depths
of His inner nature, human thought could only
speak surely if it had ceased to be human, and if
it had become God's own thought. It is faith
which completes the work which reason has to
leave unfinished, and sets before men the Deity
who can be an object of reverence, loyalty, and
love. Faith gives that fulness of spiritual content
to the idea of God without which the religion of
personal experience and communion would be im-
possible. The office of faith thought cannot take
upon itself, and a speculative theory of religion
can lay no claim to exhaust the meaning of the
object of faith. But it should not be deemed to
have failed if it opens out deeper points of view
on the subject, suggests the larger meaning of re-
ligious development, and throws a light on the
place religion fills in experience as a whole.
The philosopher, according to the splendid idea
of Plato, is a c spectator of all time and existence ' :
in truth, he is the son of his age, and utters his
oracles on the deep things of eternity in the
language and tones of his time. The activity of
thought arises out of the wider movement of life,
and has its roots therein. Behind it work the
practical interests of a social era, and the verdicts
of reason are not absolutely impartial and im-
personal. The later speculator has the ampler ex-
288 Ultimate Basis and Meaning of Religion.
perience to draw upon, if he has the wisdom to
read its lesson ; and he commonly finds it necessary
to preface his own message by a statement of the
shortcomings of those who have gone before him.
Human experience is incomplete, and while it con-
tinues to widen and deepen, the task of philosophy
will not be ended. Moreover, he would be a rash
man who ventured to declare that the universe
contains no other evolution of experience than the
terrestrial. Religion in these days has been re-
proached for failing to take to heart the teaching
of Copernicus, but philosophy has often laid itself
open to the same censure. And if Philosophy,
depending as it does on the larger movement of
experience, can advance no claim to finality, the
Philosophy of Religion is of necessity in the same
case. To some extent its conclusions must be
tentative, and there are things which it has to
leave unexplained. But if we reject the gospel
which some at present preach, that reason is only
the slave of feeling or the hired servant of will ; if
we are satisfied that thought is an essential aspect
of a developed personal life; we shall recognise
that man must take on him the task of searching
out the deeper meaning of religious experience.
ESSAY VI.
PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY: THE
EITSCHLIAN STANDPOINT
ESSAY VI.
THE word theology (OeoXoyiKij) was used by Aristotle
as a designation of First Philosophy. For his ex-
position of principles led up to a Supreme Principle,
to a Being who is the ground of all being. Follow-
ing this lead, and keeping to the meaning of the
term, we should regard theology as dealing only
with the nature and attributes of God. In practice,
however, the word theology has come to have a
wider meaning. It is used to denote the connected
presentation of a system of religious doctrine. And
such a system is based on a concrete historic
religion.
The formation of doctrine belongs to the later
period of religious growth, for in the early stages of
religion the intellectual element is little developed.
Custom, worship, and ritual precede the evolution
of doctrine. Among the nature-religions doctrine,
in the ordinary sense, is not explicit, and remains
unseparated from myth, ritual, and tradition. Nor
29 2 Philosophy and Theology :
is this further development possible before the
appearance of ethical religion, and the advent of
reflective self -consciousness. But when this poico
is reached, thought asserts for itself a distinct
function in interpreting and directing the express-
ion of the religious spirit. The beliefs which have
silently grown up are now defined and organised,
and appeal is made to the understanding as well as
to the feelings and will. Man desires to find a
general meaning for the acts which are the practical
expression of religion, and this meaning he seeks to
formulate in doctrine. Illustrations of this tend-
ency will be readily found in the religions of India
and of ancient Egypt. But beyond all doubt the
Christian Eeligion furnishes the best example of the
growth of an elaborate doctrinal system. And it
is the only system which has a direct and living
interest for Western peoples. In the present
paper theology is used exclusively in its Christian
reference.
Like every other religion, Christianity did not
establish itself, in the first instance, on a doctrinal
foundation. Beliefs there were, of course, but they
were relatively few and simple, and faith was
intimately united to life. But as the spiritual
movement grew and gathered strength, as it passed
beyond the limits of the Jewish people and appealed
to Gentiles reared under alien traditions and ideas,
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 293
it became necessary for the Church consciously to
realise and to put in intelligible form the outlines
of her teaching. And the task was the more urgent
from the fact that Christianity from a very early
period had to meet distortions and perversions of
what was felt to be true belief. The presence and
the oppositions of heresies forced the Church to
draw out with increasing fulness the details of the
orthodox creed. And by the end of the second
century the phrase TO 8o'y//,a became current as the
sign of a doctrine accepted by the Church. The
dogma was regarded as the intelligible formula-
tion of a truth implied in the common Christian
consciousness. And with the multiplication of
doctrinal principles, it became necessary to connect
and organise them in a systematic way.
The important part played by Hellenism in the
development of the Church's theology has been
widely recognised. The formal terms in which the
early theologians expressed their doctrines were
borrowed from Greek thought, through the medium
of Hellenism, and the form could not but react
upon the matter. And in the Greek language the
thinkers of the Church had an instrument to express
the subtle distinctions they desired to draw. But
over and above this, we find philosophy affecting
theology in a more direct way in the work of
the Alexandrine School. In the first and second
294 Philosophy and Theology :
centuries the pseudo-philosophy of the Gnostics had
offered itself as a larger and more profound inter-
pretation of Christianity. But though the fantastic
constructions of Gnosticism were rejected, some at
least were disposed to admit that its general prin-
ciple was right. There was a higher wisdom to
which the philosopher could attain. This yvaxris
was a moris enrior^fAoi/ucq faith elevated by know-
ledge so said Clement of Alexandria. The philo-
sopher, in this view, was able to grasp by thought
the meaning of the dogma which the common
Christian consciousness held by faith. Between
knowledge and faith there was no antagonism.
The influence of speculative thought on the
Church's theology is still more apparent in
Clement's great pupil Origen. Some of Origen's
theories, like that of the eternal generation of the
Son, the Church accepted as true ; others, like that
of the eternal creation of the world, she rejected
as false. But it is clear that while the Church,
through her councils, claimed to be the judge of
what was Catholic truth, she was not disposed to
refuse the aid of the philosopher in helping her
to a more profound interpretation of Christian
doctrine.
When we pass to mediaeval times, we find
the religious atmosphere and outlook changed.
The formative period has passed, dogma has
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 295
hardened down into fixed form, and the work of
the theologian is to systematise. The fundamental
assumption of Scholasticism is the truth of the
dogma : reason may support the dogma, but can-
not alter it. One thinker in the ninth century,
Scotus Erigena, had shown a speculative boldness
which recalls Origen, but it was at the expense
of being considered heretical. 1 And in the eleventh
century Anselm's words, " credo ut intelligam," set
forth the spirit of the movement. Keason is to
be valued as the ancilla fidei, but it must not
alter or criticise the faith. Nevertheless, if the
Church's theology could be buttressed and con-
firmed by the Aristotelian Philosophy, this was
tacitly to admit the independent authority, and
in a sense the superiority, of the philosophic
reason to the dogma. Philosophy, ostensibly the
handmaid of theology, was in a way to become
the mistress. And though this drastic change
was not accomplished by Scholasticism, yet reason
became a disintegrating influence on the structure
of mediaeval theology. This appears in the
theory of the "double truth" held by Occam and
the later schoolmen. What was true in philosophy
might be false in theology, and what was true
1 In one place, speaking of God, Erigena says, " Deus propter emi-
nentiam non immerito nihil vocatur." One does not wonder that his
orthodoxy was doubted.
296 Philosophy and Theology :
in theology might be false in philosophy. Such
a position, from the intellectual point of view,
was virtually suicidal : and if those who adopted
it found it convenient, it is not likely that many
of them took it seriously. The inevitable result
was the abandonment of the assumption on which
Scholastic theology rested ; and the birth of the
Eeformation signalised the open revolt of reason
against the dogmatic system of the mediaeval
Church.
The theology of the Eeformed Churches was
not reared by the help of speculative thought.
It represented in the main an endeavour to cut
away what was judged to be false in Komish
doctrine, and to build up a system of theology
on biblical lines. Nor was philosophy itself in a
condition to aid in the work of reconstruction.
Condemned for centuries to a merely formal
activity, it had to come in contact with reality,
to find content in the fresh movements of science
and social life, ere it could rise to an effective
development and make its voice heard in matters
of faith.
There is one episode, however, in the space
between the Eeformation and the beginning of
last century to which it may be instructive to
refer. I mean the Deistic controversy and the
discussions on " natural religion," which extended
tfie Ritschlian Standpoint. 297
from the middle of the seventeenth well into the
eighteenth century. Here rational thought takes
up a distinctive attitude to "revealed religion"
as represented in the theology of the Church.
That attitude was both positive and negative.
Positive, in so far as the English rationalistic
thinkers held that there was a core of truth
beneath the doctrines of the Church ; negative,
in so far as they held that this truth was to
be reached by an external process of cutting away
the overgrown branches of the theological tree,
and reducing it to the bare stem of rational re-
ligion the religion endorsed by the natural light
of reason in man. The idea of a simple, clear-
cut, and universally intelligible ' religion of nature,'
which is the norm of religious appreciation, is a
curious evidence of the limitations of the eight-
eenth century mind. That mind, as we all know,
was not historical. Eeason to it meant the logical
understanding, a ready-made instrument, not a
developing capacity. It construed history by the
light of fictions of its own creation. ' Natural
religion' was an artificial product, just as were
the 'state of nature' and 'natural rights.' Hence
a sympathetic view of religious development, and
of the growth of dogma as an aspect of that
development, lay beyond the mental horizon of
the eighteenth century thinkers. No fruitful
298 Philosophy and Theology :
application of speculative ideas to the content of
religion was possible. Even Kant, in so many
ways the herald of a new age, was still largely
influenced by the ideas of the past. His reflexions
on the subject of religion were entitled " Eeligion
within the Limits of Mere Beason," and in his
general treatment of religion the influence of the
eighteenth century is unmistakable.
This sober rationalism melted away in that
wonderful spring-time of speculative ardour and
religious interest which marked the early decades
of the nineteenth century in Germany. The
Eomantic movement, headed by Schleiermacher,
and the far-reaching systems of the Post-Kantian
thinkers, were in different ways instrumental in
bringing philosophic ideas into living contact with
theological doctrines. The speculative keenness and
confidence which were inspired by the * kings of
thought' bore fruit in numerous attempts to give
a philosophical interpretation of the main dogmas
of Christianity. Between 1830 and 1850 the
German mind was extraordinarily active in the
department of speculative theology, as any reader
may satisfy himself who consults a good history
of the movement. 1
In the first essay I have indicated the general
standpoint of those who sought to recast and re-
1 Vid. Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology.
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 299
interpret religious doctrine on Hegelian principles.
The old contrast of TTLCTTLS and y^oio-is had a
counterpart in the distinction of Vorstellung and
Begriff. But the speculative theologian claimed
the right to criticise, reject, or transform religious
dogma by reference to the philosophical idea of
religion. That there was, after all, a certain in-
definiteness in this idea, was apparent from the
very different valuations put on the doctrines of
the Church by those who professed to share the
same philosophic principles. The doctrine which
one thinker reduced to a myth another thought
worthy of a speculative interpretation 1 . With the
decadence of faith in the principles which the
speculative theologians sought to apply to religious
doctrines their work gradually fell into disrepute.
The mind of the theologian, it was urged, must
not be warped by preconceived ideas. He must
bring an open mind to the study of Christian
development, and he must recognise that feeling
and will play a larger part than thought in
religious evolution. The growth of Christian
doctrine, for example, is not to be reduced to a
progress through antagonism of ideas as it seemed
to the Tubingen School, but should be connected
with the practical needs, interests, and aspirations
1 Daub, for instance, speculatively constructs the person of the
Devil. To theologians of the type of Strauss this was folly.
300 Philosophy and Theology :
which entered into the life of the Church. We
ought to stand close to the historic facts in the
fulness of their meaning. And a doctrine has
meant more for the religious mind than can be
represented in general notions.
It will not now be denied that there is truth in
these contentions. To some this truth has seemed
so all-important that they declare that, in its basis
and methods, theology must be purely historical.
In Germany, once its home, speculative theology
to-day receives no courteous treatment at the hands
of theologians ; and for a generation their attitude
to it has been in the main hostile. I have already
referred to the leading part played in the reaction-
ary movement by the large and influential Bitschlian
School. 1 A year or two ago Harnack, in the intro-
duction to those eloquent and illuminating lectures
which he delivered to the Berlin students on " What
is Christianity?" remarked, " Had we held these lec-
tures sixty years ago, we should have occupied our-
selves in trying to find a general idea of religion by
speculation, and in determining the Christian (idea)
in accordance with it. Only we have justly grown
sceptical about this procedure. Latet dolus in
generalibus. We know to-day that life does not
admit of being compassed by universal notions." 2
And these words of the distinguished historian of
1 See Essay I. 2 Das Wesen des Christenthums, pp. 5, 6.
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 301
dogma express the mind of that numerous group of
theologians who treat religious problems after the
method and in the spirit of Eitschl. The followers
of Eitschl differ among themselves in their epis-
temology, and in the value they attach to particular
dogmas and religious movements, but they are all
at one with the master in maintaining that meta-
physics cannot help theology, and must be sternly
excluded from it. Non tali auxilio, nee defens-
oribus istis !
Some fifteen or twenty years ago the Ritschlian
theology was little known in this country. And
such verdicts as were passed on it were, in the
main, unfavourable. But now signs of a change
of attitude are not wanting. The monistic idealism
which traced its inspiration to Kant and Hegel does
not command the same assent : and a philosophic
movement which tends to subordinate thought to
will, the theoretical to the personal and practical
aspect of life, has made its appearance. As yet the
partisans of the movement are chiefly engaged in
clearing the ground for themselves by a vigorous
assault on the philosophic powers that be. The
elements of value in their gospel will be better
judged when they have constructively developed
their principles. Meanwhile the sympathetic hear-
ing accorded to the new views is a sign that older
forms of speculation are ceasing to satisfy. And it
302 Philosophy and Theology :
may be supposed that this change in the philosophic
temper of our time will help in disposing the theo-
logically-minded to give a favourable reception to
the Eitschlian system. Indeed there are signs that
this is already the case. Where not so long ago
Kitsehlianism would have been condemned for its
lack of philosophic basis, it now receives attentive
and appreciative study. That this theology, laying
stress as it does exactly on those points where
speculative idealism was weak, has a function to
fulfil in the development of religious thought I do
not doubt. But there are good reasons why the
Bitschlian standpoint should not be accepted as a
whole. I must, however, limit as far as possible
the discussion to a single, if prominent, aspect of
the system. We are at present concerned with the
question, whether Eitschl and his followers success-
fully justify the exclusion of philosophy from theo-
logy. When we have sufficiently considered this
point, we will state our own view on the relation of
the one to the other.
According to Kitschl the fundamental fact for
Christian theology is the revelation of God in
Christ. 1 This is the basis of the Kingdom of God,
1 In this examination of Eitschlianism I have used at one or two
points an article of my own, published a good many years ago in
the American 'Presbyterian Eeview.' English readers will find a
clear and fair-minded statement of KitschFs system in Dr Garvie's
book, * The Kitschlian Theology.' Instructive criticisms are con-
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 303
the spiritual society founded by Christ, in which
man realises his freedom and works out his religious
vocation. The idea of the kingdom of God, as the
highest good of Christian men, is the central idea
in the light of which Ritschl constructs his doctrinal
system. Hence for him a particular historical mani-
festation guides and controls the working out of
Christian Dogmatics. The Christian consciousness,
which expresses itself in value -judgments, affirms
the Kingdom of God to be the supreme good. And
it is by judgments of value in relation to the King-
dom that the attributes of God, the person and
work of Christ, and the practical religious life are
determined for the Christian consciousness. Putting
it generally, we may say that the Christian conscious-
ness, from the content of which Christian doctrine
is evolved, has an objective and a subjective side.
The former is the fact of revelation, the latter is
the judgment by which faith affirms the value of
that revelation for the inner life. Through these
two factors, then, we are supplied with the materials
for constructing a theology positive and historical,
which is without any admixture of the baser ele-
tained in the English translation of Prof. Pfleiderer's * Philosophy of
Eeligion ' and in his ' Development of Theology. 5 In his ' Unterricht
in der christlichen Eeligion, 3 Ritschl has given a clear and useful
outline of his theology. The full exposition of his system is contained
in his great work in three volumes, * Die christliche Lehre der Eecht-
fertiguug und Versohnung.'
304 Philosophy and Theology :
ment of metaphysics. And so to theologians, to
quote the words of Herrmann, " Whether philosophy
be deistic, pantheistic, theistic, or whatever it is, is
a matter of indifference. 1
It is of course inevitable that a theology, which
is built up by personal value-judgments operating
on the historic fact of the Christian Eevelation,
should at many points be antagonistic to ecclesias-
tical dogma. Eitschl and his followers are at no
pains to conceal this antagonism. For the dog-
matic system of the Churches has been leavened
by metaphysical thought, due largely to Greek
influence, and is therefore no satisfactory state-
ment of objective Christian Revelation. Hence,
in their reconstruction of Christian doctrine, the
Ritschlians eliminate the metaphysical element and
replace it by the practical aspect. Instead of the
ecclesiastical doctrines of the Trinity, the meta-
physical attributes of God, the transcendent nature
of Christ, they substitute such practical interpre-
tations of these as are made possible by bringing
them into organic relation with Christ's Kingdom
as the supreme end. The eternal and divine nature
of Christ, for instance, simply means that He had
an eternal place in the divine world-plan which
embraced the kingdom, and that his person has the
religious value of God for the Christian community.
1 Quoted by Pfleiderer, Phil, of Keligion (Eng. trans.), vol. ii. p. 100.
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 305
An exposition or a criticism of the Kitschlian
theology is not our task at present. But one may
express appreciation of its boldness and decision
of purpose. Kitschl was always resolved to call
his soul his own; and antagonism to movements
he disliked exercised a considerable influence in
fixing his own standpoint. One can also admire
the persistency with which certain fundamental
principles are kept in sight in the system, and
the unity of spirit and method which characterises
it. Nor is it a slight merit that the School should
lift up its voice with courage and conviction against
the dead weight of ecclesiastical dogma, and demand
a return to what is practical and historical. For
those at all events who are unfettered by tradition,
and can read the signs of the times, recognise that
reconstruction is inevitable, if the study of theology
is to be pursued with more than an antiquarian
interest. Last, but not least, Eitschlians have done
a real service in insisting on the indispensable office
of the value-judgment in the religious consciousness.
The tendency of speculative theologians had been
to ignore this, and to the disadvantage of their
work.
We have still to ask, however, if Kitschl and his
followers are really successful in eliminating meta-
physics from theology, and in showing that the
latter can be quite independent of the former.
u
306 Philosophy and Theology :
The reply to this question must be in the nega-
tive. Indeed Eitschl's contemporary, Lipsius, said
no more than the truth when he declared that
Eitschl's rejection of philosophical principles was
ostensible rather than real. 1 It may conduce to
clearness if I state, under separate heads, what
seem to me the main objections to the Eitschlian
position on this point.
I. The rejection of metaphysics by the Eitschlian
school is not thorough, although it claims to be so.
Even those who deeply distrust metaphysics have
usually some metaphysical presuppositions on which
they take stand in delivering their attack upon it.
Eitschl himself develops an epistemological theory
with the aid of Kant and Lotze, which forms the
introduction to his theology. As the result of this
he is able to define the sphere and function of the
theoretical and of the value-judgment, and to de-
termine the limitations of the former. By its own
means, he tells us, theoretical knowledge cannot
at all attain to a highest universal law of existence.
The idea of the world as a totality is not due to
philosophy but to the religious consciousness. Yet
finally Eitschl is led to conclude that, if we set
out from the Christian idea of God, a theoretical
knowledge of the world as a totality is still
possible. "If theoretical knowledge will not re-
1 Glauben und Wissen, p. 324.
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 307
nounce the attempt to comprehend the co-ordina-
tion of nature and spiritual life, it must accept
the Christian idea of God as scientifically valid
truth." One might argue against this statement
that the idea of the world-unity is implied in the
exercise of reason, and is not a pure gift of revealed
religion. But apart from this the passage quoted
shows that Ritschl was in the end disposed to
grant, albeit in a half-hearted way, a liberty of
philosophising under certain conditions. The in-
complete exclusion of philosophy from theology is
further shown in the Ritschlian treatment of the
idea of God. The idea is supposed to be entirely
given through the value- judgment in which the
religious consciousness expresses itself. If so, it
cannot contain elements which fall outside per-
sonal experience. That Ritschl really includes
such elements in his exposition of the divine
Idea can hardly be doubted. In point of fact, he
tries to formulate in general terms the conditions
which produce in man the conception of God. His
theory is related to the Kantian. " The idea of
God in religious knowledge is attached to the
condition that man sets himself over against the
world, and makes his position in it, or over it,
sure through trust in God." 1 That is to say, the
1 Lehre der Eechtfertigung und Versohnung, iii. 204. The theory
of the genesis of the idea of God as a Hilfsvorstellung, or helping-con-
308 Philosophy and Theology :
idea of God helps man over the opposition between
his spiritual consciousness and his natural limita-
tions, and assures to him his freedom. Now the
value -judgment which gives us the idea of God
cannot also give us the universal conditions which
make itself possible. These can only be stated as
the result of theoretical reflexion which goes beyond
what is given in particular experience. Kitschl's
epistemology of the religious consciousness, what-
ever we may think of it, is a theory elaborated
by reflective thought, which states in general terms
the meaning of the object of faith. It cannot be
said that this is presented or directly involved in
Christian experience. Again, in exhibiting the
Christian idea of God, as given in revelation and
verified by the value - judgment, it is hard to
maintain that Eitschl keeps within the limits laid
down. The thought of the time at least exerts a
regulative influence upon him. And his views of
the eternity, unity, and the omnipresence of God
can scarcely be traced to the value-judgments of
Christian experience.
II. Ritschl's theology claims to be non-speculative
because it pretends to be purely historical. It rests
on a historic revelation. And I would urge that
ception, is a weak point in the Kitschlian system, and stands in the
way of the full recognition of the truth, that God is directly related
to the spiritual life of the individual and completes it.
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 309
the narrow Kitschlian conception of revelation is
not tenable. For, be it remembered, it is denied
that philosophic thought, by the examination of
general experience, can show that such a revelation
is even possible. Christianity, according to Eitschl,
stands in no vital relation to other religions, nor
will he allow that there is any universal conscious-
ness of God. Hence there is no proper sphere for
a philosophy of religion, which seeks to arrive at
the essential meaning of religion, through the re-
flective study of its history. But this emphasis on
an objective revelation, single and unique, carries
with it serious difficulties. By divorcing Chris-
tianity from the general development of religion
its appearance becomes a mystery, which is in no
way lessened by insisting that it is a fact. For a
fact loses meaning in isolation. And if revelation,
as Kitschl conceives it, did take place and diffused
itself among men, it would still imply a capacity
to receive it : this argues a common relation to
God, not created by revelation, but involved in the
nature of the human spirit itself. If there were
not a common though undeveloped consciousness of
God involved in the nature of mind, what could
revelation appeal to ? The inherent difficulty of
a pure religious empiricism, which will not allow
even a regulative function to philosophic thought,
becomes clearer when we ask how the definite
3 1 o Philosophy and Theology :
content of revelation is to be determined. No one
will contend that the content of revealed truth will
be immediately certain to any one who examines the
Christian canonical writings. Kitschl himself used
considerable freedom in dealing with them. This
is still more marked in the case of his distinguished
follower Harnack, who frankly admits that there
is a good deal in New-Testament literature which
will not satisfy the demands of modern criticism.
In his lecture on " Christianity and History," he
labours to show that, behind these accretions,
there is a core which constitutes the objective
fact of revelation. 1 And he says that this fact is
certified by the effect it produces. Yet if the
essence of Christianity were generally apparent
through its effects, would there have been so much
dispute about what the essence was ? Mere ex-
perience will not define the content of revelation,
if the experience of one man does not coincide with
that of another. Nor is it possible to separate
out of the historic development of Christian ex-
perience certain elements which have remained
fixed and constant in their significance throughout.
Indeed, Eitschlians bring with them to the selection
and valuation of historic materials an idea of true
religion which is not impressed on them from
1 The lecture is now included in the 2nd volume of his ' Eeden
und Aufsatze.'
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 311
without. It really, as we think, presupposes theo-
retical reflexion on their part, and it involves them
in the rejection of not a little which others claim
to belong to the content of revealed religion. In
the light of the ideal of what constitutes revelation
an ideal which is no pure deduction from history
the theologians of the School regard the later
dogmatic developments of the Church very un-
favourably. They see there an object-lesson of the
fatal results which follow the union of metaphysics
with theology. Yet the germs of these metaphysi-
cal developments may be found in the Pauline and
Johannine literature. And those whose standpoint
is severely historical can hardly prove that these
germs represent the intrusion of an alien element
into the body of the Christian faith. Put briefly,
our point is that Ritschlians, who are constantly
able to distinguish pure Christianity from its
false accretions, are going on a standard of valua-
tion which has been elaborated by thought out of
experience, and is not immediately given in ex-
perience. In short, though the claim to build a
theology on a purely historic basis is plausible,
and appeals to those who desire to have done with
subjective opinion and prejudice and to rest on the
firm ground of fact, the principle cannot be con-
sistently worked out in practice. Eeason, we are
told, must bow in silence before fact. But we are
312 Philosophy and Theology :
not so much impressed by the dictum, when we
find that reason has asserted itself in determining
what is fact.
III. The conviction that thought exercises no con-
stitutive function in religion led Kitschl to maintain
that this constitutive office is entirely fulfilled by
the value -judgments. In this he has been gen-
erally, if not universally, followed by the theo-
logians of the School. 1 This exaltation of the
value-judgment is the outcome of a psychology
which acknowledges the primacy and dominance
of will in the personal life. In the case of the
Eitschlian movement this feature has a connexion
with the stress laid on the practical reason by
Kant. Now, that judgments of value play an im-
portant part in religion has been fully admitted.
But the point is whether theology, as a science,
can be reared on this basis. For the characteristic
of the value-judgment is, that it only defines the
object in so far as it affects the subject. And
theology must therefore be restricted to dealing
with the objects of faith only as they reveal them-
1 Kaftan, I understand, holds that the theoretical judgment may
play a part in religion on the basis given by the value- judgment. It
would be an exaggeration to say that Eitschlians believe that what
is true for the one form of judgment may be false for the other.
But the dualism between them is left standing, and no effort after
unification is made. One would at least desire the recognition of
unity as an ideal we must strive after.
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 3 1 3
selves, or enter into the experience of persons.
That Kitschl succeeded in keeping his theology
within the limits thus laid down, we have already
seen reason to doubt. A still more serious difficulty
is the element of subjectivity which will cling to
theological propositions, whose only guarantee is
judgments of value. For there is nothing in the
mere experience of value which invests the ex-
perience with any element of necessity, or lays us
under the obligation of believing that our ex-
perience must be that of other people. Nor does
revelation, conceived as an objective fact, offer a
means by which we can free ourselves from this
difficulty. For the only mode of determining and
appreciating revelation is subjective i.e., the way
it affects us.
No doubt it would be unfair to suggest that the
value- judgments of religion are merely the isolated,
and it may be inconsistent, utterances of individuals.
They have a certain unity of ground. Christian
experience expresses itself through individuals, who
are spiritually what they are in and through their
membership in a living Christian community. In
this way it might seem we have a normative body
of value-judgments, on which a theological system
may be developed. This argument is not without
weight. There is a sense in which those who are
living the life together know the truth of the
314 Philosophy and Theology :
doctrine. But none the less an empirical generalisa-
tion will not guarantee its own objective validity.
And it seems to me we can only find security for
the objective reference of the value -judgments of
Christian experience if we take them in connexion
with, and make them supplement and complete, the
objective determinations of reason. For then our
judgments of value, which represent the demands of
the inner life, give spiritual content to the more
formal but objective determination of the Divine
Being by thought. If we follow Eitschl, however,
and deny that thought is a constitutive element
of religion, even the appeal to that general Christian
experience which is based on revelation will not
help us beyond the subjective standpoint to the
firm ground of the objective and universal. For all
we have to go on is the fact of this experience : we
cannot say why this experience should be, and that
it is the expression of universal principles. Accord-
ingly the experience of the Christian Church can
only be authoritative to the individual, in so far as
he shares it, and can verify it in his own personal
judgments of value. And at the most he can only
have a limited empirical assurance that his own
valuations hold good for other persons. We have
certainly no right to say that they must do so, if
we are true to Eitschlian principles.
Indeed, I believe Eitschlians regard the valua-
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 315
tions of the Christian consciousness as more con-
sistent and coherent than they really are. It would
not be difficult to show that the values on which
the Christian mind of one age laid stress did not fill
the same place in another age. Christians of the
fourth century were no doubt persuaded that a
metaphysical theology was involved in the needs of
a spiritual life. Many of their descendants in these
days do not find that this theology stands in a vital
relation to practical religion. Again, the Catholic
of the middle age judged an authoritative Church
to be of high value in supplying his spiritual wants :
the Protestant, on the other hand, accentuated the
worth of personal faith. In truth, the broad ethical
conceptions of value developed by Christian experi-
ence may be used as indicating what the spiritual
consciousness postulates in the object of its faith.
But it is a very different thing to make them the
exclusive basis of theological construction. Value-
judgments do not fulfil the conditions of the old
canon of Catholicity, " Quod semper, quod ubique,
quod ab omnibus." And the theologian has to go
beyond the narrow and uncertain basis they supply.
This is still more evident if we consider, as I think
we must do, the Christian consciousness in relation
to the general religious consciousness of mankind.
For then the differences in valuation are much
greater. Yet if we refuse to do this how can we
3 1 6 Philosophy and Theology :
justify the claim of Christianity to be a universal
religion ? How can we assert that in principle it
is the highest and fullest expression of that rela-
tion of sonship in which all men stand to God ?
If the foregoing arguments are well-founded,
Ritschlianism has not proved that theology can
successfully dispense with metaphysics. But though
this be granted, it may still be contended that
theology cannot afford to be allied with, or to be
dependent on, secular philosophy. Christian revela-
tion, it is urged, is a fact of supreme importance,
and it must decisively determine our views of the
world and man. Therefore theology must develop
its own metaphysics, for metaphysics in independ-
ence cannot by any means yield results of the same
value. 1
This standpoint is of the nature of a compromise.
It commends itself to those who recognise the diffi-
culty of banishing all speculative reflexion from
theology, and who nevertheless distrust the capacity
of any philosophy to deal with religious problems
if it does not rest on certain Christian presupposi-
tions. That the advocates of this view have some-
thing to say on their side is probably true. Christian
experience is an important fact, and philosophy
1 This view, for instance, is put forward by Dr Garvie, vid. ' The
Ritschlian Theology,' pp. 68, 69, 392, 393. And it was at least sug-
gested by Kitschl himself, if never definitely set forth.
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 317
must take it into account in forming its conception
of the world as a whole. The demands of the
higher spiritual nature enter into the meaning of
the world which thought seeks to explain. For the
rest, the idea of a separate and independent
Christian metaphysics seems to us wrong in con-
ception and unworkable in practice. It cannot, of
course, be contended that there is any dualism in
reason : the thinking process of the Christian meta-
physician is the same as that of the ordinary
metaphysician. The difference between them is,
that the latter reaches his principles from the study
of general experience, the former evolves them from
a particular experience. And in the second place,
Christian metaphysics so conceived takes certain
historic facts as normative in forming its theory.
Such a Christian philosophy would claim to be
generally valid. In which case its postulates would
require to commend themselves to reason as worthy
of general acceptance. Now in a case where postu-
lates imply an interpretation of history an inter-
pretation presenting peculiar difficulties and involv-
ing in the end a demand on faith it would be too
much to expect agreement. Even those who speak
from within the Church would not be at one about
the basis, which the Christian faith offers to specu-
lative thought for development. But suppose we
waive this objection. Grant that Christian meta-
3 1 8 Philosophy and Theology :
physics is in a position to develop its theory. Then
it may either create or borrow the general notions
which it employs. If the former, it could only
justify their extension to the wider realm of ex-
perience by examining and criticising them in rela-
tion to experience, and this in the spirit of meta-
physics in its wider sense. And the process could
not be carried out unless the original postulates
were reconsidered and tested in the light of general
experience. If the latter, then in accepting from
philosophy conceptions such as cause, substance, and
end, as valid in experience, it has ceased in any
strict sense to be independent.
Moreover, in regard to its method we must criti-
cise adversely this idea of a Christian metaphysics.
It takes the Christian consciousness by itself, and
on this basis proposes to develop its speculative
theory. But Christianity would have been histori-
cally unintelligible, if it had been without organic
relation to the prior 1 development of the religious
consciousness. And no theory which treats it in
isolation can do justice to its contents. A Christian
metaphysics, from the nature of its object-matter,
must begin by broadening out into a philosophy of
religion. Finally, I would urge that no metaphysics
can give a satisfactory theory of reality by inter-
preting all experience through one of its phases.
Keligion itself is only one aspect of experience.
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 3 1 9
And however philosophy may come short in its
task, it has to think things together and as ele-
ments in a whole. For it is catholic in its outlook,
and tries to do justice to all the aspects of the
complex experience with which it deals. This im-
partial and objective treatment is a condition of its
success, because our insight into the meaning of the
whole depends on the degree in which we have been
able to perceive the connexion of the parts and
their mutual interdependence. It might be argued
that a Christian metaphysics is also in a position
to think things together. This is true to the extent
that it tries to show how the whole is related to one
of the parts. But it interprets the significance of
the part in isolation to begin with, and so cannot
guarantee the validity of its principles for experi-
ence as a whole. I fear, too, that the record of
history does not encourage us to expect that this
kind of religious metaphysics would be convincing
in its treatment of speculative problems. And it-
would only gain in strength and in breadth of
appeal by ceasing to be, what it set out by claim-
ing to be, independent of the general speculative
thought of the age.
If, then, theology is not able to create its own
metaphysics, and if we cannot keep theology rigidly
apart from philosophy, we must ask finally if the
two may not fruitfully and helpfully be connected
320 Philosophy and Theology :
with one another. I venture to offer a few remarks
on the point, which, to some extent perhaps, may
suggest an answer to the question.
Theology on any view is not a purely speculative
science. It has practical ends to serve the in-
struction of a Christian community and these it
must keep before it. It builds on the basis of
Christian experience, as contained in biblical litera-
ture and the tradition of the Church, and it has to
formulate doctrines from this experience, and to
present them in forms which will edify the existing
Christian consciousness. Therefore theology is, in
the first instance, a historical science, for it develops
its doctrines out of what has been historically ex-
perienced. The theologian makes certain presup-
positions on historical grounds, and he does not
arrive at his first principles by purely critical re-
flexion. Nor is this to be objected to in the cir-
cumstances. Theology is not philosophy, and does
not pretend to be so. But the articulation and
development of a system of doctrine is the work
of thought, and in the statement of its results
theology inevitably puts forward a general view
of the world. In giving determinate expression
to this view the earlier theologians made them-
selves debtors to the speculative heritage of the
past, and used it where they consistently could.
Nevertheless the theological Weltanschauung has
the Ritschlian Standpoint. 321
commonly presented sharp points of contrast to
the philosophical ; and this might be expected
from the fact that the former sets out from par-
ticular, the latter from universal, experience.
Now it is just in forming this general view of
things that the need of co-operation between phil-
osophy and theology is evident. As a result of
the growth of science and the activity of phil-
osophic thought, new conceptions of the world have
been formed and exist alongside those which the
traditional theology presents to us. And where
there is opposition and contradiction between them,
reconciliation is called for. Both cannot be right,
and reason demands consistency. Theology can
only be indifferent to this demand at the expense
of losing its interest and vitality for the present
age : decadence is always the consequence of iso-
lation. In so far, then, as theology finds it neces-
sary to put forward a theoretical view of the
world which is in harmony with the knowledge
of the age, it must have the co-operation of phil-
osophy. The fear about the intrusion of a foreign
and hostile influence into theology under these
conditions argues a strange distrust of human
nature. For reason is one and the same, whether
it is exercised in the sphere of theology or meta-
physics ; and its effort, whatever be the object,
is to think out the meaning of the object
x
322 Philosophy and Theology :
coherently. And as theology cannot exclude reason,
it must accept the task which reason imposes,
and strive after a view of things into which
the existing body of knowledge may enter con-
sistently.
In following out this, the theoretical aspect of
its mission, theology passes gradually into the
philosophy of religion. And Christian Dogmatics
has been treated by some in the spirit of a
religious philosophy. But though there is a real
contact between the two, it is not desirable that
theology should be identified with a philosophy of
religion. The former has a practical aspect, which
the latter has not. Then the object-matter of the
philosophy of religion is the religious consciousness
as a whole : it sets out to investigate this. But
theology begins by taking as its object-matter the
Christian consciousness and the historical experience
out of which it has grown. No doubt the Christian
consciousness is not to be isolated from the general
religious consciousness ; but we must remember that
the former has a special value on which the
theologian lays stress. He holds that the ex-
perience, which is the basis of his doctrine, has
an authority that does not belong, in the same
degree at least, to other manifestations of the
religious consciousness. And this fact has im-
portant bearings. Human knowledge is partial,
the Ritscklian Standpoint. 323
and faith has a real part to play in life. If
the speculative reason could give us a complete
and convincing interpretation of the universe, it
might be urged that theology only states, in a
figurative form, ideas which are presented in their
true form in the system of philosophy. But if
we renounce, as we must do, any claim to com-
plete and absolute knowledge, then a theology, so
far as it succeeds in presenting in general and con-
nected fashion the truths involved in a divinely-
wrought experience, has a special significance and
value.
But the point we wish to press is that spiritual
experience is not to be severely separated from
general experience. Those who insist on doing this
appear to forget that the value they claim for
spiritual experience implies a contrasted aspect of
experience which makes the valuation possible.
And if theology, as the science of Christian ex-
perience, enters into relation with philosophy, as
the science of general experience, it is only follow-
ing out a connexion implied in its own existence.
Such a relation, if cultivated in the right spirit
by both sides, will be helpful. For neither in
theology any more than in philosophy do we have
a pure and final system of truth. Both are capable
of development, and live only as they develop.
Now though the unification attempted by specula-
324 Philosophy and Theology,
tive science is provisional only, yet there are advan-
tages in considering religious doctrines in relation
to it. This lets us see in what degree our theology
coheres with experience, in so far as we are able
to think it as a consistent whole. Philosophy,
be it remembered, is in no position to discredit
the value of Christian experience. But it is in a
position to affect theology in its theoretical aspect.
For it will set problems to the theologian, and
indicate the line of advance. He will be led to
recognise the points where doctrine must be recast
and developed, and so brought into organic relation
with the growing whole of knowledge.
For these reasons I venture to doubt that the
Eitschlian standpoint will, in the long run, be
found to subserve the best interests of theological
science. The gospel of the limitation of knowledge
is a wholesome doctrine, but speculative agnosti-
cism is a dangerous kind of error. When faith
can give no reason for itself, and is constrained
to appeal simply to feeling, it is only another step
to the conclusion that religion is nothing but the
shadowy projection of human hopes and fears.
And then theology, once named the queen of the
sciences, becomes a futile endeavour to give form
and body to a baseless vision of our own creation.
INDEX.
Absolute, its relation to individ-
uals, 201 ; to God, 255, 256.
Activity, idea of, examined, 222-
224.
Anaxagoras, 41.
Ancestor- worship, 115-119.
Animism, 110 ff., 175.
Anselm, 295.
Apollo, 133.
Aristotle, 11 n. ; on the sciences,
51 ; final cause, 59 ; on choice,
66 ; view of matter, 189 n. ;
theology, 291.
Athene, 133.
Augustine, 90.
Avenarius, R., 171, 175.
Bacon, on final causes, 58.
Belief, and sentiment, 158.
Berkeley, 185 n.
Biedermann, A. E., his 'Dog-
matik,' 7, 8.
Bradley, F. H., 199, 229, 237 n.
Brahma, 131 n. ; 137.
Breath, primitive idea of, 174.
Buddhism, 143, 154.
Caird, E., 33; on evolution of
religion, 152 ff. ; on inner and
outer experience, 179 ff. ; 201.
Caird, J., his 'Philosophy of Re-
ligion,' 9, 10.
Causality, 55.
Cause, and end, 63, 64 ; and
ground, 218.
Character and freedom, 67 ff.
Christ, 141, 143, 304.
Christianity, 143, 144.
Christian metaphysics, 316 ff.
Cicero, 114.
Comte, 36.
Continuity, principle of, 61, 190;
in religious development, 148 ff.
Coulanges, F. de, 116, 117.
Dante, 286.
Darwin, C., 'Descent of Man,' 42,
43.
Deism, 296, 297.
Determinism, 67 ff.
Doctrine, growth of, 291 ff.
Dreams, in early culture, 112, 173.
Erigena, J. S., 295.
Ethical predicates, applied to God,
260, 261, 267.
Ethical societies, 48.
Ethics, a normative science, 63 ;
and Religion, 46 ff., 82-84.
Evolution, scientific idea of, 42, 43.
Experience, perceptual and con-
ceptual, 170, 171 ; in relation
to thought, 237, 238.
External experience, implies trans-
subjective, 185-188.
Faith, 85 ff., 145, 262, 263.
Feeling, and origin of religion,
107 ; it implies thought, 37,
108, 109.
Fetishism, 119, 120.
Fichte, J. G., 20.
Final Cause, 58, 59.
Finite personality, defects of, 252,
253.
Frazer, J. G., 121.
326
Index.
Freedom, of will, 65 ff. ; its re-
lation to sin, 273, 274 ; social
aspect of, 71 ff.
God, not a pure unity, 256, 257 ;
the ground of religious con-
sciousness, 277 - 279 ; as im-
manent, 269, 276, 277 ; as
transcendent, 282-284.
Gods, of moment, 108, 109 ; social
meaning of gods, 132-134.
Goethe, 8, 132.
Greater gods, nature-origin of, 131,
132.
Green, T. H., 68, 79.
Harnack, A., 300, 310.
Hebrew prophets, 47, 143, 154.
Hegel, his 'Philosophy of Re-
ligion,' 3 ff. ; view of natural
sciences, 53, 54 ; 273 n.
Henotheism, 135.
Herrmann, 304.
Hoffding, his 'Philosophy of Re-
ligion,' 25 ff., 101.
Holy places, 113.
Homer, 112 n., 127 n., 138.
Ideal, and real self, 78-81.
Individual reals, 197, 198, 201,
228.
Individual selves, 247-249.
Individuals, influence on religious
development, 139 ff.
Inner and outer experience, genesis
of distinction, 173 ff. ; both de-
velop together, 180.
Inters ubjective intercourse, 171,
191.
Introjection, 171-173.
Isolation, unfavourable to religious
development, 129.
James, W., his ' Varieties of Reli-
gious Experience,' 30-32.
Jerusalem, W., 173 n.
Jones, H., 256 n.
Judgment, a feature of, 199.
Jupiter, 131, 138.
Kaftan, 18, 312 n.
Kant, 20, his 'Critique' and
natural sciences, 52, 53 ; on
inner and outer experience,
176 ff. ; on ontological proof,
239 ; on religion, 298.
Kathenotheism, 135.
Kingdom of God, Ritschlian idea
of, 302-304.
Lang, A., 122, 123.
Language, and religion, 104 ; and
thought, 171.
Laws of nature, 56, 57.
Leibniz, 61, 190, 192, 225, 245 n.
Lipsius, R. A., 23 n., 254, 306.
Locke, 189.
Lotze, his contribution to philos-
ophy of religion, 13 ff. ; on
value - judgment, 14, 15; on
space and time, 192 ; on ultimate
unity, 201, 202, 226, 227; on per-
sonality of the Absolute, 249 ff.
M'Taggart, J. E., 248, 249, 273 n.
Magic, 120-122.
Mars, 133.
Materialism, 45, 46.
Mechanism, and explanation, 60.
Menzies, A., 105.
Metaphysics and philosophy, task
of, 210.
Mill, J. S., 188.
Minor nature-worship, 113; rela-
tion to greater, 114.
Monarchism, 137, 138.
Monotheism, 137-139.
Moral obligation, and freedom, 64.
Morality, growth of, 73 ff. ; sub-
jective side of, 74, 75.
National religion, rise of, 129 ff.
Natural religion, 296, 297.
Natural sciences, their dispute
with Church, 42 ; method of,
55 ff. ; do not disprove freedom,
64, 65.
Necessity, scientific notion of, 57.
Nietzsche, 237 n.
Nirvana, 264.
Occam, 295.
Odin, 133.
Ontological proof, 239, 240.
Ontology of religion, its problem
and method, 217-219.
Index.
327
Organic growth, idea as applied to
religion, 146 ff.
Origen, 294.
Osiris, 133.
Pantheism, 136, 137, 160.
Parmenides, 197.
Pascal, 25.
Paulsen, F., 202 n., 248 n.
Percepts and concepts, 184, 185.
Personality, its part in religious
development, 279 ff.
Personality of God, its relation to
religion, 284-286.
Pfleiderer, 0., his 'Philosophy of
Religion,' 10 ff. ; his view of
ontological argument, 239, 240.
Philosophy and Religion, differ-
ences between, 212 ff.
Philosophy of Religion, its relation
to Philosophy, 92, 93 ; to Reve-
lation, 281, 282 ; its standpoint,
211, 212.
Plato, and sciences, 50, 51 ; 86, 98,
283, 287.
Pluralism, arguments against, ex-
amined, 195 ff.
Polytheism, growth of, 131, 132.
Pragmatism, 33, 301.
Psychology, and religious develop-
ment, 101, 102, 158 ff.
Ra, 134.
Rationalism, 160.
Rauwenhoff, his ' Philosophy of
Religion,' 19 ff.
Reason and Religion, 36, 37.
Religion, and moral ideal, 82-84 ;
origin of, 103 ; a definition of,
105 ; factors involved in, 106 ;
implies a personal relation, 213.
Religious bond, meaning of, 276,
277.
"Religious consciousness," am-
biguity in, 163.
Religious development, its psycho-
logical key, 101, 102 ; an
endeavour after harmony, 164,
165, 274.
Reville, A., 113, 114.
Rita, 136.
Ritschl, A., his attitude to philo-
sophy, 17, 18, 306 ff. ; to ecclesi-
astical dogma, 304 ; his theo-
logy, 302 ff. ; view of value-
judgment, 312.
Ritual, reaction against, 142.
Rohde, E., 117 n.
Royce, J., 33, 228.
Sabatier, A., his 'Philosophy of
Religion,' 22 ff.
Sayce, A., 135.
Schelling, 107.
Schleiermacher and Romantic
School, 6, 33, 298.
Scholasticism, 295, 296.
Science and Religion, 41 ff.
Self, in relation to character, 68 ff.
Self -consciousness, importance of,
241, 242.
Self-realisation, 76 ff.
Sentiment, conservative force of,
129, 130.
Siebeck, H., his 'Philosophy of
Religion,' 16, 17 ; 285.
Sin, 272, 273.
Smith, W. R., 127 n.
Soul, and Absolute, 203, 204, 231.
Space and time, nature of, 192 ff. ;
not applicable to God, 257,
258.
Speculative theology, 298-300.
Spencer, H., 115.
Spinoza, 25, 26, 213.
Spiritism, 111 ff.
Statius, 107.
Stout, G. F., 173 n., 238 n.
Substances, idea of, 191, 202 ;
ground of their interaction,
224 ff.
Supreme Being, idea of, in early
culture, 122 ff.
Teleology, in nature and conduct,
63, 64.
Tertullian, 37.
Thales, 112.
Theism, and value- judgment, 265,
266.
Theistic proofs, 238 ff.
Theology, nature of, 320.
' Thing in itself,' 189, 235.
Things and their qualities, 195,
196.
Thought, and reality, 198, 236 ff.;
328
Index.
and the religious consciousness,
34-37.
Tian, 133.
Tiele, 98, 153, 156.
Totemism, 117-119.
Transsubjective, nature of, 188 if.
Tribal religion, features of, 124 ff.
Tylor, E. B., 98, 99, 116.
Tyndall, 45.
Unconscious will, 242 ff.
Unity and experience, 204, 205.
Universal religion, 145.
Universal self, 246 ff.
Usener, H., 108, 109, 126 n.
Value -judgment, 38, 91, 262 ff.
Vid. also Lotze, Ritschl.
Varuna, 133.
Veda, 137.
Vedanta, 137.
Ward, J., 60 n., 65, 171, 200.
Will, in relation to the organism,
232, 233 ; does not create
thought, 242-244.
World, religious view of, 88-90.
World-ground, compared to soul,
231 ; as will, 233-236 ; as self-
conscious, 241 ; not purely im-
manent, 246 ff.
Wundt, 202, 221, 260 n.
Xenophanes, 47, 135.
Zeus, 134, 138.
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