5 
 
 O -"^jr 
 
 m 
 

 
 I ACCUSE! 
 
 (/' ACCUSE!) 
 
 BY 
 
 A GERMAN 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 ALEXANDER GRAY 
 
 "A pitiable wretch is he 
 Who knows the truth and yet can silent be^ 
 
 NEW YORK 
 GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY
 
 Copyright, 1915, 
 Bt Geoege H. Doran Compani'
 
 D5 I I 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 /'Accuse, a work recently published anonymously in 
 Lausanne, has deservedly attracted much attention on 
 the Continent on account of the independent standpoint 
 of the author, the penetration shown in his analysis of 
 the critical events of last year, and the vigour and 
 clarity which characterise his presentation of the case. 
 
 The German edition is prefaced by the following 
 note : — ■ 
 
 "The book J' Accuse, written by a German patriot, 
 and entrusted to me, is herewith presented to the public. 
 "I regard this work as an act which can only confer 
 a blessing on the German people and on humanity, 
 and I accordingly assume responsibility for its publi- 
 cation. 
 |2 "Dr. Anton Suter. 
 
 ^ "Lausanne, April 20th, 191 5." 
 
 A further note is added in the following terms : — 
 
 TC 
 
 C3 "Having regard to the situation arising from the 
 
 c war and the conditions of the censorship, certain pas- 
 sages in the manuscript have for the present been 
 omitted. These passages are indicated by blank 
 spaces." 
 
 In the present translation the censored passages have 
 been indicated in the same way. 
 
 The very few explanatory footnotes added in the 
 course of translation arc indicated by square brackets. 
 
 I desire to express my indebtedness to Mr. T. Lindsay 
 for his assistance in the work of revision and correction 
 of proofs. 
 
 July, 19 1 5. A. G. 
 
 3454 J 2
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 I 
 
 GERMANY AWAKE 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Can the Victory of Germany and Austria be expected? — 
 The economic position of belligerent countries — The po- 
 litical and military position of the belligerent countries — 
 The situation in France — Partie Remise — The question 
 of guilt 11—34 
 
 II 
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 
 
 Our Imperialists : Bernhardi and Co. — Have we been attacked 
 or were we going to be attacked? — The head of the War 
 Party — The Imperial War — The place in the sun — The 
 chosen people — Germany's brilliant development — In- 
 crease of population and the colonics — Our true colonies 
 — ^What advantage has France drawn from her colonies? 
 — The Germans abroad: France, England, America — The 
 place in the sun for us, the place in the shadow for the 
 others — The fear of Germany — Diplomatic success of the 
 Triple Alliance — Austria's Balkan policy — The Crown 
 Prince and the war party — The policy of encirclement — 
 England and Germany : The first Hague Conference — Be- 
 tween the first and second Hague Conferences : The 
 English Liberal Government — Second Hague Conference : 
 England and Germany — English proposals for a political 
 understanding and for a naval agreement with Germany 
 — What are we fighting for? — The freedom which they 
 mean — The end of peace: Security? — Did France mean 
 to attack us? — Did Russia mean to attack us? — The 
 Triple Entente a defensive alliance — Giolitti's revelations 
 —The change of front in Berlin ; the war party . 26— 141
 
 viii CONTENTS 
 
 III 
 
 THE CRIME 
 
 PAGE 
 
 A. Austria „ . , 146 
 
 B. Germany 170 
 
 C. England 24S 
 
 D. Russia 289 
 
 E. France 295 
 
 F. Appendix: The Austrian Red Book 31S 
 
 IV 
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 
 
 How beautiful to die for the Fatherland! — Prestige — Prole- 
 tarians of all countries, massacre each other ! — Political 
 morality — Moral politics — Quidquid dclirant rcges, plec- 
 tuntur Achivi — Dreams of world power — Who will pay 
 the cost of the war? — Quousque tandem f . . 353 — 3^5 
 
 V 
 
 THE FUTURE 
 
 What should peace bring us? — The system of armed peace — 
 A covenant of peace between free nations — Is this a 
 Utopia? — The coercive force — What will peace bring us? 
 — Should it happen otherwise — The twilight of the Gods 
 
 386—419 
 
 EPILOGUE 420—423 
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann-HoUweg, August 
 
 4th, 1914 424' 
 
 Speech delivered by Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 
 
 2nd, 1914 430 
 
 Circular note of Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, December 24th, 
 
 1914 " • 440
 
 1 ACCUSE*
 
 I ACCUSE! 
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 
 
 La viRITE EST EN MARCHE. 
 
 If there were in Prussian-Germany a system of minis- 
 terial responsibility, such as exists in all other countries 
 with effective Parliamentary Government, and such as 
 has been held out with many other fair promises to 
 the Prussian people for more than sixty-four years, the 
 Imperial Chancellor and President of the Prussian 
 Council, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, would have to be 
 arraigned and 
 
 condemned. 
 
 It might be allowed in his favour, as an extenuating 
 circumstance, that he was not the driving force of the 
 war, but that he was driven to it — driven from above 
 and from below. But a Minister, who yields himself 
 as the tool of those who instigate war, who covers those 
 who are irresponsible with his responsibility, who ac- 
 cepts the despicable task of representing to his nation 
 and to all the world as a war of defence the 
 
 offensive war which was prepared long in advance, 
 who by this falsehood unchains the most fearful disaster 
 which has ever fallen upon our globe, and which is 
 inflicting on his Fatherland, whether victorious or de- 
 feated, wounds which will be incurable for generations 
 to come; who delivers over to death and to mutilation 
 
 IX
 
 12 I ACCUSE! 
 
 hundreds of thousands of his countrymen in the flower 
 of their age, annihilates at a stroke the arduous labour 
 of half a century, suddenly wrenches asunder the bonds 
 of culture between civilised nations, and transforms 
 prosperous regions of Europe into ruinous wastes — such 
 a man must bear the punishment which is due to his 
 crime. 
 
 In gathering together in the following pages the vari- 
 ous points in the indictment which reveal the exclusive 
 guilt of Germany and her ally, Austria-Hungary, in 
 provoking the universal war, I am well aware of the 
 fact that I will expose myself to the disapproving criti- 
 cism of a large section of the German public, which 
 proclaims it to be a patriotic duty to shut one's eyes to 
 the truth, or if the truth be recognised, to conceal it 
 in silence for the duration of the war. 
 
 Only by bearing in mind these two points of view is 
 it possible to understand the present frame of mind 
 of such a highly intelligent people as the German nation. 
 The "State of War" {Kriegszustand), proclaimed on 
 the 31st July, which placed the intellectual life of Ger- 
 many under the supervision of Generals, and which even
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! IS 
 
 to-day, after more than six months have elapsed, care- 
 fully keeps watch on the frontiers lest there should pene- 
 trate into the country so much as a suggestion of the 
 intellectual life or of the views of foreign countries 
 which might disturb the unity of Germany, or of foreign 
 information or evidence which might illumine the Ger- 
 man people — this "state of war" has produced the result 
 that nine-tenths of the whole German people have blindly 
 followed the dexterously coined phrases about the "state 
 of defence which is forced upon us," about "the strug- 
 gle for our freedom and culture against aggression and 
 oppression." "The French and the Russians have al- 
 ready pressed over our frontiers"; "The Fatherland is 
 in danger" ; "They mean to humiliate us" ; "In the midst 
 of peace the enemy falls upon us"; "The existence of 
 our Empire is at stake"; "We are called upon to de- 
 fend our holiest possessions, our Fatherland, our very 
 hearths against an unscrupulous attack" ; "We are fight- 
 ing for the fruits of our works of peace, for the in- 
 heritance of a great past and for our future." These 
 and similar phrases (all taken from official documents) 
 have been used with the conscious intention of deceiv- 
 ing the German people, of inflaming its patriotism, and 
 of inspiring it to unutterable and incalculable sacrifices 
 in wealth and in life. 
 
 "The few, who here have aught of Truth divined, 
 Yet foolishly revealed their inner heart. 
 Who showed the mob their feeling and their mind — 
 The cross, the stake have always been their part." ^ 
 
 The few who, after the first days of intoxication, 
 gradually returned to their senses, and who were able 
 
 ^"Die wenigen, die was davon erkannt, 
 
 Die töricht g'nug ihr volles Herz nicht wahrten, 
 Dem Pöbel ihr Gefühl, ihr Schauen offenbarten 
 Hat man von Je gekreuzigt und verbrannt."
 
 14 I ACCUSE! 
 
 to procure foreign documents and representations behind 
 the backs of the military censors, and by careful study 
 and comparison of these slowly arrived at the truth, — 
 these had to shut the truth within them, since it was 
 and is considered unpatriotic to give expression to it, 
 since every utterance in word or in writing would be 
 suppressed by the military authorities, and the offender 
 would expose himself to the risk of punishment. 
 
 It is to escape this fate that those who know the facts 
 have kept, and still keep, silence. Those, however, who 
 do not know the truth, or do not wish to know it, cry 
 out all the more loudly, and as a work of illumination 
 scatter broadcast the foolish products of their minds 
 throughout the world, where no one believes them, even 
 if they were to repeat the German lies a million times. 
 What are we to say when Germans of the highest emi- 
 nence, from Bode to Dehmel,^ from Haeckel to Haupt- 
 mann/ from Liszt to Sudermann, from Laband to Lie- 
 bermann,^ (in all nearly a hundred of them), distribute 
 in foreign countries an appeal, which immediately after 
 the opening words contains the following sentence : — 
 
 "Germany on the other hand made every effort to avoid 
 war. The incontestable evidence in support of this fact 
 
 ^Decorated on the Emperor's birthday 1915, Fourth Class of the 
 Red Eagle. 
 
 ^Wilhelm von Bode, General Director of the Royal Museum, Ber- 
 lin, a leading authority on art, Richard Dehmel a distinguished poet, 
 Ernst Haeckel, the celebrated Professor of Zoology at Jena; Ger- 
 hardt Hauptmann, perhaps the most eminent of contemporary 
 poets; Franz von Liszt, Professor of Jurisprudence at Berlin, a 
 leading criminologist; Hermann Sudermann, the novelist; Paul 
 Laband, Professor of Jurisprudence at Strassburg; Max Lieber- 
 mann, a distinguished painter.
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 15 
 
 are open to all the world. . . . Only when the overwhelm- 
 ing forces of the enemy, who had long been lying in am- 
 bush on our frontiers, fell into our country from three 
 sides (!), only then did the German people rise like one 
 man." 
 
 And with such robber-stories as these about the enemy 
 lurking in ambush — one thinks involuntarily of Leder- 
 strumpf and Ali Baba — they dare to humbug such highly 
 educated, cultured nations as, for instance, the Italians 
 (among whom even a street-porter has to-day a better 
 knowledge of the historical truth about the war than a 
 Harnack has among us), among a people whose Gov- 
 ernment, with the approval of tlie whole country, de- 
 clared that the war was an offensive war on the part 
 of Germany and Austria, and rightly and of necessity so 
 declared unless it wished to charge itself with faithless- 
 ness and the breach of its own word. 
 
 It is to these men a self-evident fact that we are the 
 leading culture-people of the world, and consequently 
 (such is the logic of these gentlemen!) we are called 
 upon to impose our culture forcibly on the other inferior 
 races and even on neutrals by means of bombs and 
 grenades, by fire and devastation. Such is the mission 
 which Providence has pointed out to us, as it called 
 upon the Crusaders to fight against the Crescent (which 
 now we have gained as an ally in the struggle against 
 Christian nations), and as it instigated the Catholics in 
 the Thirty Years' War to cast out of the Protestants by 
 fire and sword their new-won faith. In the view of our 
 leading spirits, in place of the wars of religion there has 
 suddenly arisen since the ist August, 19 14, a culture- 
 war, in which the nations are fighting for the equal 
 privileges or the supremacy of the various "hostile cul- 
 tures." Has ever a greater madness than this been con- 
 ceived? In 1870 when France was defeated and crushed.
 
 16 I ACCUSE! 
 
 did we suppress, did we so much as touch, the culture 
 of that country? Did the foreign domination of Na- 
 poleon wipe out even a trace of our German spiritual cul- 
 ture, which just then had reached an incomparable 
 height? When the Romans conquered Greece did they 
 at the same time overthrow Greek culture? Precisely 
 the opposite took place. The captor was made captive. 
 The mind of Greece, the art of Greece, subdued Rome. 
 And we find the same thing in the history of Christian- 
 ity. In the end was it not the small province of Galilee 
 that imposed its spirit on the world-empire of Rome? 
 How indeed is it possible for anyone to speak of the 
 present struggle as a struggle of cultures when what 
 we really have before us is merely a struggle of anti- 
 cultures, of barbarisms, against each other, — a struggle 
 which from day to day becomes more bitter, more cruel, 
 and more murderous, — a struggle in which all the prin- 
 ciples of international law and of humanity are more 
 and more forgotten, if indeed it is still possible to speak 
 of humanity in face of this inhuman massacre? What 
 has all this got to do mith culture f Do we intend in 
 any way to suppress the culture of England and France, 
 of Russia and Belgium? Do we mean to renounce 
 Shakespeare, Darwin, Newton, and Spencer, Tolstoy and 
 Dostoiewsky, Voltaire, Rousseau, Zola, Goncourt, Ru- 
 bens, Van Eyck, Meunier, and Maeterlinck, or do we 
 mean to rid the world of their achievements? With 
 what right, then, do we impute to the others intentions 
 against us which we do not have against them, and to 
 which we could not give effect even if we entertained 
 them? If we had not read it daily in print, we would 
 not have believed that the intellectuals of Germany could 
 have persuaded themselves and the German people that 
 Gennan culture is in danger, and that it must be de- 
 fended with Zeppelins and with 42-centimetre artillery. 
 The "neurosis of war" has indeed become epidemic,. 

 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 17 
 
 like St. Vitus's dance or flagellantism in the Middle 
 Ages. As the Dervishes in the East for hours at a time 
 utter the same formulae of prayer and go through the 
 same contortions with their arms and legs and their 
 bodies until at last they fall down foaming at the mouth 
 and overpowered, so now we have seen the learned men 
 of Germany repeating for months past the same patri- 
 otic litanies, the same unproved assertions (assertions 
 indeed of which the contrary is proved) ; at all times 
 reaching upwards with their arms and their legs and 
 indeed their whole body, until in their opinion they and 
 their people surpass all other nations of the earth, and 
 if they do not become like to God, they at least be- 
 come the chosen people of God. They overpower them- 
 selves with their own phrases, until they foam at the 
 mouth from sheer patriotism and fall down in adoration 
 of themselves. . . . But they will in time awake from 
 their stupefaction, and the wild intoxication will be fol- 
 lowed by the terrible discomfort of returning sobriety. 
 
 The purpose of this book is to hasten this awakening. 
 This / regard as a patriotic duty ; for the longer the in- 
 toxication lasts, the worse will be the consequences for 
 the German people, and the process of awakening will 
 be more difficult and more terrible. It is only a better 
 knowledge of the origins and objects of this war, a 
 recognition of the guilt and responsibility for this war, 
 that can bring about a change for the better.
 
 18 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Can the Victory of Germany and Austria Be 
 Expected? 
 
 the economic position of belligerent countries 
 
 To-day it is no longer permissible to imagine the pos- 
 sibility of the victory of the Allied Empires. The finan- 
 cial and military superiority of the countries allied 
 against them is so great that they cannot be counter- 
 balanced by military efficiency on the part of Germany, 
 nor even by the greatest sacrifices in life and well-being. 
 No declamatory statements about "holding out till the 
 last breath," no false and dazzling promises about the 
 economic resisting power of Germany can in any way 
 alter this fact. The balance of gold in the imperial bank 
 is no proof that the economical position is still tolerable ; 
 for indeed nearly all the gold in circulation has flowed 
 to the bank, and the notes for the hundred and fifty 
 million pound sterling issued by the loan fund have been 
 covered not by gold but by unrealisable goods and ef- 
 fects. Manufactures find employment only in so far 
 as they are engaged for the internal needs of the coun- 
 try and for military purposes. The money required for 
 the supply of military stores is, however, raised from 
 the German taxpayer, and as it represents an unpro- 
 ductive investment it must be entered in the books as 
 a pure loss. One class at least has nothing to complain 
 of; I mean the agrarian class. It is they who have 
 sounded the call to the battle, who have stirred up war, 
 the imperialists and the chauvinists, whom the German 
 people have to thank for this hideous war. From their 
 ranks come the colonels and the generals, the Bernhardis 
 and the Frobeniuses, who prescribe to the German Em- 
 pire its historical mission, "world-power or downfall," 
 and who announce to it its "hour of destiny." These 
 
 I
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 19 
 
 are the men who possess the ear of the highest in the 
 country, and who instil into them the poison of their 
 selfish ideas. These are the men who at the same time 
 are making the best profit out of the war. They and 
 their comrades must of course also bleed, but what they 
 lose in blood flows back to them in gold, gold in the 
 form of gold-lace and in glittering coins. They are 
 also making a career for themselves, and the more of- 
 ficers fall, so much the better for the younger men. They 
 are, too, succeeding in business more brilliantly than 
 they could ever have done in time of peace. The prices 
 of their produce, grain, potatoes, and cattle, would have 
 risen immeasurably if the Government had not in the 
 end seen the necessity of fixing maximum prices. But 
 even these maximum prices are already enormously 
 above the prices ever paid in times of peace.^ 
 
 The workmen and the middle classes however perish 
 and decay. The longer the war lasts, the more surely 
 will German trade, the German system of finance and 
 German manufactures, be deprived of their connections 
 with foreign countries. The seas of the world are open 
 to our enemies, England and France, as well as to 
 neutral States, and it would be a surprising fact if they 
 did not gradually usurp our place in markets abroad. 
 The exports and imports of Italy and of Holland must 
 necessarily show an upward tendency after Germany 
 is ruled out of account. The longer the war lasts, the 
 more successful will be the efforts of England to drive 
 our trade out of America, Asia, and Africa, and in any 
 case decades will pass before we again reach the position 
 we occupied before the war. And while the economic 
 life of Germany is thus advancing to a stage at which 
 it will slowly bleed to death, this process can only 
 
 ' Brend has meanwhile become constantly scarcer, and the mo- 
 nopoly of grain and the distribution of bread by the State has al- 
 ready been introduced.
 
 20 I ACCUSE! 
 
 be accelerated by tbe necessity of producing the enor- 
 mous stores of materials required for the maintenance 
 of our annies of millions, and for the conduct of the 
 war. It has been estimated by an expert that the cost 
 of maintenance per man per day may be reckoned at 
 lo marks, and this estimate takes no account of the 
 wear and tear of materials, the ammunition used up (a 
 single shot from our 42-centimetre guns is said to cost 
 thousands of marks), or the loss of all kinds of instru- 
 ments of war. If we maintain five million soldiers under 
 arms, the war will cost us in ready money paid out of 
 our pockets two and a half million pounds sterling a day; 
 it will cost monthly 75 million pounds, it will cost in a 
 year 900 million pounds sterling. If we include in our 
 estimate the sums indicated above, for ordinary wear 
 and tear, for material used up or lost, it will be impos- 
 sible to estimate the yearly cost of the war at anything 
 less than 1,250 million pounds sterling, that is to say 
 250 millions more than the sum-total of the debts of 
 the German Empire and of the individual States in 1912. 
 
 Further, the justice of this calculation is more or less 
 confirmed by the war-loans which so far have been 
 asked and approved in the German Empire, amounting 
 to 500 million pounds, to which the war contribution 
 of 19 1 3 amounting to 50 millions must be added. These 
 war loans were intended to reach until somewhere about 
 the end of the financial year, that is to say until about 
 31st March, 19 15, but doubtless they are not intended, 
 and are not sufficient to provide for a complete current 
 renewal of the material of the war which has been lost 
 or used up. If we add the sums necessary for this 
 purpose we will arrive more or less at the sum estimated 
 above, as that required for the conduct of the war for a 
 year, that is to say 1,250 million pounds sterling. 
 
 The countless millions of pounds which the war is 
 costing and has already cost our economic life, surpasses
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 21 
 
 all estimation. The Exchanges are closed. No one 
 knows to-day what he possesses. In any case nearly 
 all effects are as good as unrealisable ; and without the 
 cunningly devised system of loan-funds, a system in 
 essence supported on feet of clay, without the protective 
 laws of the 4th August and all the other conceivable 
 measures which were passed, intended partly to stave 
 off the malady and partly to conceal it, the collapse of 
 our German economic life would within a short time 
 become an accomplished fact 
 
 At the same time England is abused in every key 
 because she avails herself of the advantages conferred 
 on her by her geographical and economical position. 
 Had we been in England's place would we have behaved 
 otherwise? ''A la guerre comme ä la guerre." Every- 
 one defends himself to the best of his ability, and if the 
 English, apart from their land forces and their navy, 
 can make use of their economic superiority to defeat us, 
 who has any right to reproach them with the fact? 
 Are we not speculating on the possibility of Mohamme- 
 dan risings in English colonies, behind which we stand 
 as Spiritus rector? Are we not levying from the 
 wretched and desolate Belgium, the prey of penury and 
 soon to be the prey of famine, — a country which after 
 all is only defending its independence and freedom (a 
 war of liberation in the true sense!) — ^are we not levying 
 from this exhausted country and from its wholly or 
 partly devastated cities many hundreds of millions of 
 marks as a so-called "war contribution"? From my 
 own points of view the economic war which England 
 is waging against us is far preferable to the warfare of 
 blood which we have brought upon the world. The war 
 of blood involves the loss both of human life and of 
 economic values; the war of trade demands only eco- 
 nomic sacrifices, but spares that which in the end has 
 the greater value, the life of men. In this it to a certain
 
 22 I ACCUSE! 
 
 extent approaches the conditions of peace which exist 
 between countries whose relations are not regulated by 
 treaties of commerce; in this case also we find economic 
 struggle without loss of life. Here there is indeed 
 opened to our vision a prospect of the form which strug- 
 gles will assume in the future configuration of human 
 society. It will no longer be a struggle with weapons 
 forged of steel and of iron, but a struggle of the nerves 
 and of the brain, a more refined struggle between civil- 
 ised men, who will become more and more removed from 
 the brutal bodily struggle of wild beasts and of barbaric 
 nations, among whom Europe to-day assumes the first 
 place. 
 
 It is of course a feeble consolation that the other belli- 
 gerent countries are also exhausting themselves. A 
 country so economically undeveloped as Russia, whose 
 exports and imports, in spite of her i8o million inhabi- 
 tants, amounted in 19 12 only to 300 million pounds 
 sterling, need scarcely be considered in such a compari- 
 son. The more developed the economic life of a coun- 
 try is, the more extensive its trade and its industries, 
 the more sensible is it to the effects of war. So far 
 as England and France are concerned, these countries 
 are in the first place much more wealthy than Ger- 
 many, and in the second place, as we have already ob- 
 served, after the disappearance of the few German com- 
 merce raiders all the seas of the world are open to them, 
 so that they can export their produce and bring back 
 again from foreign countries the necessary raw ma- 
 terial, the means of subsistence and any other articles 
 that may be required. It is at once foolish and per- 
 nicious when the German Press and the public opinion 
 of Germany seek to deceive themselves and others on 
 this point. 
 
 The credit of the countries at war with us, so far as 
 France and England are concerned, has so far scarcely
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 2S 
 
 suffered in any way. In foreign countries French and 
 English notes have maintained their rate of exchange 
 ahnost unaltered, whereas German notes are constantly 
 sinking in value. A loo-mark note can already be pur- 
 chased abroad for 112 francs (instead of nominally 
 125 fr.), whereas English £1 notes cost at the same time 
 26 francs (instead of nominally 25 fr.). 
 
 The German 5 per cent, war-loan was issued at 97 
 per cent, whereas the English 3^ per cent, war-loan 
 was issued at 95 per cent. If the wealth and credit of 
 the German Empire were equal to that of England, the 
 German 5 per cent, imperial loan would have been about 
 40 per cent, more valuable than the English 3>^ per 
 cent., and instead of being issued at 97>4 per cent, it 
 could have been issued somewhere about 135 per cent. 
 
 In this enormous difference there is clearly revealed 
 the comparative economic strength and the power of 
 resistance possessed by the two countries. No patriotic 
 talk, no stifling of the truth, will help us here. Hard 
 facts are the best arguments. The more we ignore the 
 facts, the worse will it be for us. We do not succeed in 
 throwing sand into the eyes of others, but in lying to 
 ourselves, we lull ourselves in hopes impossible of ful- 
 filment, we become ever more stiff-necked in the pursuit 
 of the unholy struggle, and in the end we will accom- 
 plish our own destruction. 
 
 THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITION OF THE 
 BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES 
 
 The political and military aspect of affairs is precisely 
 similar to the economic aspect. 
 
 The whole of our Colonies, built up by the expendi- 
 ture of many hundreds of millions of marks, and tended 
 with something of a mother's love, have been lost. Aus- 
 tria has lost Galicia and part of Bukovina, and Hun-
 
 24 I ACCUSE! 
 
 gary is in danger of being overrun by the Russians. On 
 the other side, Belgium and the eastern corner of France 
 are occupied by the Germans and a small part of east- 
 ern Poland is occupied by the allied German and Austrian 
 forces. But we must not forget that French troops are 
 still in Upper Alsace and that until a few days ago 
 Russian troops were still in East Prussia.^ 
 
 Thus we see that both sides have in their possession 
 a number of objects of barter which at the end of the 
 war should be mutually returned as is done in the case 
 of prisoners. The longer the war lasts and the more 
 extensive it becomes, the more other countries unite 
 themselves to the belligerent parties, the more will the 
 number of these objects of barter increase. While the 
 Turks are pressing forward towards the Suez Canal, the 
 English are making progress in Persia, Mesoptomia, and 
 Arabia ; here also it may be presumed that territory will 
 be seized on both sides, which on the conclusion of peace 
 will have to be exchanged. 
 
 The world-war, notwithstanding the fearful daily im- 
 pacts and loss of blood, is, as it were, being conducted 
 in such a way that the opponents pass each other by, 
 and it would be the best, because the most humane so- 
 lution, if the impacts were to become constantly less, 
 and, on the other hand, the possession of territory be- 
 longing to the other side were to become constantly more 
 extensive. The result would be the same as now, only 
 with less loss of blood. For from the military, just as 
 little as from the economic, point of view no one can 
 still entertain the illusion that the war may end with a 
 victory of the allied empires. 
 
 To-day the possibility of such an issue must already 
 be regarded as completely excluded. The battles in the 
 
 * This book was completed in February, and cannot therefore 
 take account of later events; these, however, cannot affect the 
 final result of the war.
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 25 
 
 East are essentially no more than a defensive, unsnc- 
 cess fully conducted so far as Austria is concerned, but 
 hitherto maintained with success by Germany after the 
 first blows fell. What does the occupation of Lodz, 
 and even, so far as I am concerned, the conquest of 
 Warsaw mean against such a colossus as the Russian 
 Empire? Will Russia be defeated when we get posses- 
 sion of the half or the whole of Poland? It will be 
 nothing but a new object of barter given into our hands, 
 but will it mean the conquest of Russia? Not in the 
 slightest. 
 
 And what about the situation in France ? What diffi- 
 culties have we to overcome to gain possession of even 
 the small north-western corner of Belgium! What un- 
 speakable sacrifices does that involve ! How many thou- 
 sands of poor, deluded, heroic soldiers have miserably 
 perished in snow and in ice, in the trenches and in the 
 canals, in mud and in mire, on their lips a last whisper 
 of farewell to wife and child and mother, in their hearts 
 a last thought of peace and home! And why? To gain 
 possession of a few square metres of inundated and 
 impoverished country with ruined towns and villages, 
 and then on to the pursuit of the great illusion: on to 
 Calais! on to England! All this reminds me of a pic- 
 ture by Spangenberg entitled "The Pursuit of Happi- 
 ness," which thirty years ago was rightly the subject 
 of much admiration in the Berlin Art Exhibition. A 
 beautiful naked woman was represented hovering over 
 a shining iridescent ball of glass before a troop of wild 
 horsemen who, with gestures of passion, are seeking to 
 reach the crown of laurels which she holds aloft in 
 her right hand. She entices them on with her ensnaring 
 eyes ; her golden yellow hair flutters in the wind, almost 
 reaching the horsemen who are nearest to her. But the 
 crown, the object of their passionate desires, ever eludes 
 their longing grasp. An abyss yawns in front, crossed
 
 26 I ACCUSE! 
 
 only b}' a narrow bridge, just broad enough to ensure 
 a passage for the Ball of happiness and the goddess 
 who hovers above it, but which means inevitable death 
 for the warriors in pursuit. The first is already tot- 
 tering into the chasm, the others will follow, and the 
 vision of happiness dissolves, never to be seen again. 
 
 So will it be, I fear, with the invasion of England, 
 which since the beginning of the war has been held out 
 to the German people as a seductive magic picture. Near 
 as the other side may appear, we will not succeed in 
 getting over, "the water is much too deep." Hundreds 
 of thousands of men might perish in the effort, were 
 the venture risked, and even if we were over there, 
 a war of the people would be let loose, and our troops, 
 deprived of their connections with the home country, 
 would be crushed by the enemy. What every German 
 for months back has been whispering to his neighbour 
 in desire and in hope appears to me to be nothing but 
 a daring flight of the imagination, which wilt break 
 miserably on England's unbroken sea power. 
 
 Notwithstanding all the admiration we may feel for 
 the achievements of our heroic navy, it would be foolish 
 to close our eyes to the fact that the gigantic superiority 
 of the English fleet cannot be equalised by means of 
 Zeppelins and submarines — of which latter, be it ob- 
 sei-ved, England possesses a greater number than we 
 do (in 1912, 85, to which must be added 90 French). 
 And in all this we have to bear in mind the fact that 
 the English fleet would be the assailant; the German 
 fleet would be the fleet assailed, in so far as it man- 
 aged to press forward to the Channel. The German 
 fleet would, however, have to protect not only itself, 
 but also clumsy cargo-boats, incapable of self-defence, 
 on which there would have to be transported to England 
 a number of army corps, with the appropriate light and 
 heavy artillery, cavalry, trains, pioneer troops, automo-
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 27 
 
 biles, and air-craft material. Is such an attempt at 
 all conceivable? Is it possible that there are human 
 beings who are prepared to expose to destruction at a 
 blow, on such a scale as this, hundreds of thousands of 
 their fellow men, 
 
 It should be enough for us to have those mountains of 
 corpses and of mutilated bodies which to-day already 
 cover the battle-fields of Europe, Asia and Africa, and 
 which for centuries, in virtue of their fertilising proper- 
 ties, will be an advantage to agriculture. Must even 
 the bottom of the sea also be covered with human 
 bodies ? Are the thousands of brave mariners, who have 
 already found death in a watery grave, not sufficient? 
 Must whole army-corps at one stroke be swallowed up 
 in the waves? 
 
 And even assuming that we were on the other side, 
 would the war then in any sense be won, would England 
 thereby be defeated? Will the English nation allow 
 terms of peace to be dictated to them by the Germans 
 in London, as one can daily hear from every babbler 
 and every seer of visions in Gennany? Will the English 
 colonies then fall into our possession? Nothing of the 
 sort will happen, I should like to see how Canada, 
 India, Australia, and New Zealand would acclaim the 
 German conqueror, who, as the Chancellor has so beauti- 
 fully expressed it to an American journalist, is des- 
 tined to bring freedom to the world. Charity begins 
 at home. He who imposes bondage in his own house 
 cannot bring freedom to the world. What country
 
 28 I ACCUSE! 
 
 politically is so undeveloped and so gagged as Prussian 
 Germany, if we except Russia and our illustrious ally 
 Austria-Hungary? What country has as little under- 
 standing as Germany of the art of assimilating to itself 
 foreign nationalities, of allowing them to live according 
 to their own habits and customs, according to their own 
 culture and language, of making them happy and there- 
 fore making them faithful? Our policy towards the 
 Poles and the Danes, and towards Alsace-Lorraine, 
 speaks volumes on this point. All opposition to this 
 species of Germanisation has exhausted itself without 
 fruitful result. Zabern is the illuminating zenith of this 
 policy in the West. The Polish laws with their compul- 
 sory expropriation of land possessed by inheritance, 
 laws which have uselessly cost us hundreds of millions 
 of marks, and which have only produced the opposite 
 effect of that intended, will remain a perpetual memorial 
 of this policy in the East. In the North against Den- 
 mark things are no better. At present, of course, in 
 the necessity of war, this vexatious policy is being miti- 
 gated. The Poles have now suddenly become the good 
 child of the family. If formerly they protested that 
 they had no sympathy with efforts hostile to Prussia, 
 and that they were only urged to join the opposition 
 in defence of their speech and of their nationality, their 
 protests were constantly answered by new coercionary 
 measures, and by an extension of the Polish laws. Since 
 there cannot be a Parliamentary opposition in the mis- 
 erable Junker-Parliament of Prussia, all warnings of 
 the left wing were constantly scattered to the wind, and 
 a courageous advance was made along the false and 
 the costly path of Germanisation. 
 
 And is it supposed that this Germany, conducted on 
 Prussian principles, is endowed with the gifts neces- 
 sary to assume England's position as a world-power, the 
 position of England which owes its world-power not
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 29 
 
 merely to the cold pursuit of her interests in the course 
 of the centuries, but above all to her genius in under- 
 standing how to link foreign nations to her world em- 
 pire, without oppressing them, without even wishing 
 to assimilate them? 
 
 The English language does not know the word "An- 
 glicisation," because the idea is absent in English poli- 
 tics, as indeed language, at least in politics, ever halts 
 behind the ''thing," and only gives expression to what 
 already is. Here the saying of Goethe does not hold: 
 
 For where the understanding falters 
 A word steps in to take its place.^ 
 
 In politics the reverse is the case. The word is dis- 
 covered, when the idea exists. The word culture-strug- 
 gle (Kulturkampf) arose only when this struggle had 
 already broken out. 
 
 And so the English colonies will fly to us and hail us 
 as liberators, should we ever succeed in penetrating to 
 England? Far from it. They also will defend them- 
 selves to the last ship and the last man, before they 
 give up English freedom and independence, and sur- 
 render to German bondage and oppression. 
 
 THE SITUATION IN FRANCE 
 
 So far as can be foreseen, the war in France also will 
 lead to no result which could be regarded as a victory 
 for Germany. A war of ofYence which ends in the 
 trenches has in advance failed in its purpose — in trenches 
 whose amenities have been enjoyed by our brave troops 
 for more than five months, in wind and weather, in rain 
 and in snow, in a monotony destructive of the body and 
 
 *Denn eben wo BegrifTe fehlen, 
 Da stellt ein Wort zur rechten Zeit sich eim.
 
 30 I ACCUSE! 
 
 of the soul, a monotony however agreeably interrupted 
 from time to time by bombs, shells, and airmen's darts. 
 On the eastern frontier of France the line of fortifi- 
 cations Verdun, Toul, Nancy, Epinal, and Belfort still 
 stands almost unshaken, so little affected by the be- 
 sieging German arniies that the French ministers and 
 the President can undertake continuous tours of in- 
 spection from one fortress to the other. Fortunately 
 for a long time nothing has been heard of the victor of 
 Longwy, the "heroic son," as the Emperor Francis Jo- 
 seph called him in his telegram to the Emperor William. 
 The famous saying of Count Häseler, passed from mouth 
 to mouth in Berlin, that he intended to breakfast on 
 Sedan day in the Cafe de la Paix in the Place de I'Opera 
 has not proved true. Perhaps the Field Marshal has 
 postponed his breakfast until next Sedan day, unless in- 
 deed, as I fear, he has had to postpone it ad calendas 
 teiitonicas. The French Government and the entire dip- 
 lomatic circle are back again in Paris, and it does not 
 look as if they had any intention of making a speedy 
 return to Bordeaux. As every honest observer of the 
 situation must admit, the v^ar with France has come 
 to a standstill, and here, if anywhere, a standstill 
 amounts to a withdrawal. 
 
 The plans of our General Staff, weighed and matured 
 for years in advance, contained as the cardinal point of 
 the long-intended European war the rapid overthrow of 
 France, followed by a violent attack on the Russian 
 Colossus, with our liberated forces united with those of 
 Austria. Providence — almost involuntarily one falls into 
 the jargon of the German despatch — providence has 
 ruled otherwise. After seven months of fearful conflict 
 France is not overthrown. Our victorious career has 
 been unexpectedly checked by the brilliant strategy of 
 Joffre, tlie French Moltke — (the uncle, be it observed, 
 not the nephew, who at present is being medically
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 31 
 
 treated at Homburg for biliousness) — and our conquer- 
 ing army has been forced to a fortification war in the 
 trenches. The fluctuations of this fortification war, 
 which for the most part oscillate over advances or with- 
 drawals of kilometres or half-kilometres, are so insig- 
 nificant that a decisive turn of events is scarcely to be 
 expected, unless our leaders resolve to throw aside every 
 consideration for human life, unless they call our brave 
 German soldiers from the trenches and expose them in 
 frontal attacks to the devastating fire of the hostile 
 rifles, machine-guns, and artillery. In a few places this 
 has already happened,^ and to judge from the views 
 and sentiments of those in our leading circles (has not 
 the telegram of the Gemian Crown Prince to Colonel 
 Reuter, so full of wit and taste, "hammer away," be- 
 come the catchword and the watchword of the nation 
 of poets and thinkers?) the generals will soon lose all 
 patience 
 
 And if these further incalculable hecatombs in human 
 blood and human happiness are sacrificed, shall we then 
 have gained the victory? In no way. Even if we should 
 succeed with all these sacrifices in making a consider- 
 
 ^Just before this book went to press I read the official report 
 of the General Staff of January 15th, 1915, in which it is pointed 
 out with pride that in the battles around Soissons from 4,000 to 
 5,000 French bodies had been found on the field of battle. And 
 how many German bodies were there? And how many wounded 
 on both sides? The Germans as the attacking party will certainly 
 have suffered as severely as the defenders. So altogether there 
 would be 10,000 dead. To this, as experience has shown, there 
 must be added at least three times as many wounded. There 
 would thus be 40,000 soldiers sacrificed in one battle!
 
 32 I ACCUSE! 
 
 able advance, we shall only have gained what in the 
 war of 1870 we had achieved in four weeks. Without 
 doubt the French have made use of the five months' 
 standstill to increase still more the strength of their 
 fortifications and their possible lines of retreat. Con- 
 stant reinforcements of English and French Colonial 
 troops, of which the end cannot be foreseen, fill up the 
 gaps and increase the number of the troops in the field. 
 With every week which passes in the indecisive trench 
 warfare, the difficulties of our victorious advance are 
 increased. Even in the Boer war the English showed 
 how many troops they could raise in the event of war, 
 in spite of their small standing army. Then they carried 
 out the long-distance transport of troops to South 
 Africa; to-day they have only to cross the narrow Chan- 
 nel. Our opponents continue to increase, and to-day we 
 have with luck already got as far as the second levy of 
 the Landsturm. 
 
 PARTIE REMISE 
 
 How is it to endf In the most favourable circum- 
 stances as partie remise, — ^with a conclusion of hostili- 
 ties which for both sides will mean a complete exhaus- 
 tion in men and in wealth, but which will mean for 
 neither side a victory. 
 
 According to my sure and earnest conviction that is 
 the most favourable result which Germany can still ex- 
 pect. The possibility of an issue which could more or 
 less be designated as a victory, I regard as wholly ex- 
 cluded. And the longer the war lasts the less chance 
 will there be of this relatively favourable issue, the 
 greater will be the probability of a development, which 
 if not a decisive defeat of Germany, would yet represent 
 an overwhelming exhaustion of her resources in com- 
 parison with those of her opponents, and which would 
 therefore inevitably lead to the conditions of peace being
 
 GERMANY AWAKE! 88 
 
 framed on less favourable lines than would now be 
 granted. 
 
 Austria has already reached the limits of her strength. 
 In the case of Germany it is not yet possible to speak 
 of any decisive weakening. We still stand erect; we 
 can still offer everywhere a bold forehead to the enemy. 
 Our resources in men and in money are not yet ex- 
 hausted. But this condition of "not yet" cannot now 
 endure for long. It is foolish to pursue an ostrich 
 policy. No matter how dexterously, following the 
 watchword that has been issued, we hide our head in 
 the sand, the enemy still sees the weaknesses which 
 shake the body of our people, they still see the seeds 
 of that malady which must lead to our destruction. 
 
 We can still ask for an honourable peace. If we 
 from our side freely ask it we will atone for a small part 
 of the wrong which we have committed by conjuring 
 up this world catastrophe, the wrong which has drawn 
 upon us the hatred and the loathing of the whole civ- 
 ilised world, not of our enemies merely, but also of 
 neutral nations. 
 
 The Question of Guilt 
 
 That we have forfeited the sympathies of the world is 
 not due to malevolence, envy, and lies ; our own actions 
 must bear the responsibility for this. Foreign countries, 
 and above all those which are neutral, know better than 
 the German nation the development of events, they know 
 who bears the guilt of the world catastrophe. Foreign 
 neutral countries know well enough our political con- 
 ditions. They know that under a mask of constitution- 
 •alism we are in fact ruled absolutely. Recently they 
 observed how an Imperial Chancellor of Germany, 
 against whom Parliament by a three-fifths majority 
 passed a vote expressive of its lack of confidence, could
 
 34 I ACCUSE! 
 
 yet continue to hold office unshaken, secure in the sup- 
 port of the Court and the miHtary circles, — an occur- 
 rence which, apart from Russia, is no longer possible in 
 any other civilised country. They know that the Prus- 
 sian people are politically without rights, and that they 
 are governed by a small clique of Junkers who have 
 taken in fee all the high offices in the Government and 
 in the army. 
 
 Above all neutral countries know — and now I come 
 to the cardinal points in what I have to say — 
 
 that the plans and the preparations for this war have 
 long been made by Germany and Austria not only from 
 a military but also from a political point of view; 
 
 that for long it had been resolved to represent this 
 offensive war to the German people as a war of libera- 
 tion, because it was known that only thus coidd the 
 necessary popular enthusiasm be awakened; 
 
 that the object of this war is an attempt to establish 
 a hegemony on the continent and, as a later sequel, the 
 acquisition of England's position of power in the world 
 according to the principle "otc-toi de la que je m'y 
 mette." 
 
 For these facts and endeavours there is in existence 
 evidence of so convincing a character written by our- 
 selves in the German language, that it is a task as in- 
 fatuated as it is hopeless to try to combat the convic- 
 tion of the whole world by the untenable publications of 
 those who take it upon themselves to "enlighten" the 
 world about Germany.
 
 II 
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OE THE CRIME 
 
 OUR IMPERIALISTS : BERNHARDI AND CO. 
 
 The writings of Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 
 of Frobenius, The German Empire's Hour of Destiny, 
 the books of Treitschke, German History and Politics, 
 are as well known abroad as in Germany, and they have 
 in part been translated into foreign languages. The im- 
 perialistic tendencies of a political clique have never been 
 more distinctly expressed than in these writings, and, 
 in the view of their originators, justified. 
 
 A few quotations from Bernhardi may suffice. This 
 man is a Prussian Cavalry General, and, if I am not mis- 
 taken, has been entrusted with a command in the East, 
 and he has already been decorated with the Iron Cross 
 of the First Class. That he is competent and authorised 
 to give expression to the views of authoritative German 
 circles can scarcely be disputed. 
 
 On page 255 of his book we find ^ : 
 
 "The Government will never be able to count upon a well- 
 armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger or 
 necessity, if it calmly looks on while the war-like spirit is 
 being systematically undermined by the Press and a feeble 
 peace policy preached, still less if it allows its own organs to 
 join in with the same note, and continually to emphasise the 
 maintenance of peace as the object of all policy. It must 
 rather do everything to foster a military spirit, and to make 
 the nation comprehend the duties and aims of an imperial 
 policy, 
 
 ^[References are to the English translation (popular edition). 
 Edward Arnold, London.] 
 
 35
 
 86 I ACCUSE! 
 
 "It must continually point to the significance and the 
 necessity of war as an indispensable agent in policy and 
 civilisation together with the duty of self-sacrifice and de- 
 votion to State and country." 
 
 Page 257 : 
 
 "The soul of our nation is not reflected in that part of 
 the Press with its continual dwelling on the necessity of up- 
 holding peace, and its denunciation of any bold and com-- 
 prehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness. 
 
 "On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place 
 among the Poivers and for manly action fills our nation. 
 Every vigorous utterance, every bold political step of the 
 Government, finds in the soul of the people a deeply felt 
 echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all their forces. 
 In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again 
 and again found noble expression. But the statesman who 
 could satisfy this yearning, which slumbers in the heart 
 of our people undisturbed by the clamour of parties and 
 the party Press, would carry all spirits with him." 
 
 Page 258 : 
 
 "Such a policy (i.e., a military policy) is also the best 
 school in which to educate a nation to great military achieve- 
 ments. When their spirits are turned towards high aims 
 they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, 
 and to prepare their minds to it: 
 
 " 'The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims.' "... 
 
 . . . "We Germans have a far greater and more urgent 
 duty towards civilisation to perform than the Greek Asiatic 
 Power. We, like the Japanese, can only fulfil it by the 
 szvord. 
 
 "Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, 
 the most effective means with which we can prepare our 
 people for its military duty?" 
 
 On page 275 : 
 
 "A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed with- 
 out taking chances and facing risks. It must be conscious
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 37 
 
 of its goal, and keep this goal steadily in view. It must 
 press every change of circumstances and all unforeseen 
 occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Above all 
 things, it must be ready to seize the psychological moment, 
 and take bold action if the general position of affairs indi- 
 cates the possibility of realising political ambitions or of 
 tvaging a necessary ivar under favourable conditions," 
 
 Pages 275-6 : 
 
 " 'Old Fritz' must be our model in this respect {i.e., in 
 disregarding historical rights), and must teach us with re- 
 morseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of 
 the political world may be favourable for us, and that we do 
 not miss the golden opportunity. 
 
 "It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries 
 to stigmatise that energetic policy which pursued positive 
 aims as an adventurist policy." 
 
 On page 277 the author points out that the military 
 and political preparation for war must go hand in hand 
 in order to make it possible to strike at the moment 
 zvhich from the military point of view is the most un- 
 favourable. 
 
 "The obligation imposed on the General to stand aloof 
 from politics in peace as well as in war only holds good in a 
 limited sense. The War Minister and the Head of the 
 General Staff must be kept au courant with the all-fluctu- 
 ating phases of policy ; indeed, they must be allowed a cer- 
 tain influence over policy, in order to adapt their measures 
 to its needs, and are entitled to call upon the statesman to 
 act if the military situation is peculiarly favourable." 
 
 Page 280 : 
 
 "The disadvantages of such a situation (i.e., the war on 
 two fronts) can only be avoided by a policy which makes it 
 feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, to overthrow 
 the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. 
 
 345112
 
 38 I ACCUSE! 
 
 On this initiative our safety now depends just as it did in the 
 days of Frederick the Great. We must look this truth 
 boldly in the face." 
 
 On the same page our diplomacy is entrusted with 
 the task of so "shuffling the cards that we may be at- 
 tacked by France." The author then continues : 
 
 "This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must 
 not hope to bring about this attack by waiting passively. 
 Neither France nor Russia nor England need to attack in 
 order to further their interests. So long as we shrink from 
 attack they can force us to submit to their will by diplomacy, 
 as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows, and as the 
 issue of the Balkan crisis will probably also demonstrate. 
 
 "If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, 
 we tnust initiate an active policy, which, without attacking 
 France, will so prejudice her interests or those of England, 
 that both these States would feel themselves compelled to 
 attack us. Opportunities for such procedure are offered 
 both in Africa and in Europe." 
 
 That is plain enough, is it not? Not only the ten- 
 dencies of German policy are revealed without any dis- 
 guise, but the manner in which these tendencies are to 
 be realised is prescribed with the minutest detail. The 
 Chancellor, it must be admitted, has been an apt pupil 
 of the General and has fulfilled in a masterly fashion 
 his task of so shuffling the cards that out of the offen- 
 sive war there has been created a war of liberation. At 
 least that is how it appears in the eyes of the simple 
 Michael,^ for the rest of the world has long ago seen 
 through the gigantic fraud. 
 
 But let us hear further how Mr. Bernhardi chatters 
 out of school. 
 
 '[Michael, a name commonly given to the German people, some- 
 what analogous to John Bull. The chief features of the German 
 Michael are simplicity and honesty, amounting almost to stupidity.]
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 39 
 
 Page 286: 
 
 "The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, un- 
 doubtedly the deep rift which has been formed in conse- 
 quence between the Government and the mass of the na- 
 tionalist party, the loss of confidence among large sections 
 of the nations, extending even to classes of society which, in 
 spite of their regular opposition to the Government, had 
 heartily supported it as the representative of the Empire 
 abroad. In this weakening of public confidence, which is 
 undisguisedly shown both in the Press and in the Reichstag, 
 lies in my opinion the great disadvantage of the Franco- 
 German understanding." 
 
 Bernhardi would naturally have preferred that we 
 should even have allowed a European war to break out 
 on account of the Morocco dispute, but he consoles 
 himself with the thought that all chances are not yet 
 past. 
 
 Page 285 : 
 
 "We need not, therefore, regard this convention as defin- 
 itive. It is as liable to revision as the Algeciras treaty, and 
 indeed offers, in this respect, the advantage that it creates 
 new opportunities of friction with France." 
 
 That is the Record: an International treaty which 
 has prevented a world-war, meets with the conditional 
 approval of the author, only because it offers new sources 
 of friction, and so, it may he hoped, will soon lead to 
 the world-war which he desires. 
 
 Particularly instructive is his discussion of our rela- 
 tions to England and of the negotiations then being 
 conducted in Berlin by Lord Haldane. These negotia- 
 tions along with the previous and subsequent English 
 proposals with a view to arriving at a political and 
 naval understanding with Germany deserve a special 
 chapter, in which it will be clearly shown that England
 
 40 I ACCUSE! 
 
 constantly and in the most earnest mariner took the in- 
 itiative in these negotiations, but that these were al- 
 ways wrecked on the refusal of Germany or on the 
 impossible conditions which she sought to impose. Per- 
 haps on this point also they were following the pre- 
 scription of Bernhardi, which runs : 
 
 Page 287 : 
 
 "Even English attempts at a rapprochement must not 
 blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them 
 to delay the necessary inevitable war, until we may fairly 
 imagine we have- some prospect of success." 
 
 In the concluding apostrophe of his book the author 
 emphatically exclaims: 
 
 Pages 287-8 : 
 
 "If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it 
 was necessary in the present circumstances to avoid war, 
 still the situation in the world generally shows there can 
 only be a short respite, before we once more face the ques- 
 tion zvhether we will draw the szvord for our position in 
 the world or renounce such position once and for all. We 
 must not in any case wait. . . . The political situation of- 
 fers many points on which to rest our lever. England, too, 
 is in a most difficult position. . . . The disturbances in the 
 Far East will probably fetter Russia's forces, and Eng- 
 land's interests will suffer in sympathy. These are all con- 
 ditions which an energetic and far-sighted German policy 
 can utilise in order to influence the general political situa- 
 tion in the interests of our Fatherland. 
 
 "If people and Government stand together, resolved to 
 guard the honour of Germany and make every sacrifice of 
 blood and treasure to insure the future of our country and 
 our State ... we need not fear to fight for our position in 
 the world, but we may, with Ernst Moritz Arndt, raise our 
 hands to heaven and cry to God:
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 41 
 
 'From the height of the starry sky- 
 May thy ringing sword flash bright; 
 Let every craven cry 
 Be silenced by thy might !' " 
 
 In conclusion I should further like merely to draw 
 attention to the headings of the chapters of Bernhardi's 
 book, which afford so clear an insight into the tendencies 
 of the author, that it might appear almost superfluous 
 to read his work. 
 
 Chapter i. The right to make war. 
 
 Chapter 2. The duty to make war. 
 
 Chapter 3. A brief survey of Germany's historical 
 development. 
 
 Chapter 4. Germany's historical mission. 
 
 Chapter 5. World power or downfall. 
 
 Chapter 6. The character of our next war. 
 
 Chapter 7. The next naval war, &c. 
 
 I wish once more in as emphatic a manner as possible 
 to draw attention to the fact that Bernhardi expressly 
 excludes an offensive war on the part of the Triple En- 
 tente, and he indicates that the only method of arriv- 
 ing at the desired world-war, and at the same time at 
 world-dominion, is that Germany must act as an agent 
 provocateur and must so shuffle the cards that the other 
 side will be compelled to attack. 
 
 This of course does not prevent Bernhardi and his 
 comrades in the faith, especially Frobenius, from speak- 
 ing elsewhere of the aggressive intentions of the Triple 
 Entente, and from depicting the dangers to which Ger- 
 many is exposed, unless she anticipates these intentions. 
 
 HAVE WE BEEN ATTACKED OR WERE WE GOING TO BE 
 ATTACKED? 
 
 This is the same logic as we hear to-day in every 
 corner of Germany, if indeed what is heard in Germany
 
 42 I ACCUSE! 
 
 can still be designated as logic. The official version 
 states that the Triple Entente has attacked us. "We 
 have to protect our holiest possessions, the Fatherland 
 and our own hearths against a sudden ruthless attack." 
 (The appeal of the Emperor on the 6th August to the 
 German army. "The sword must then decide. In the 
 midst of peace the enemy falls upon us, therefore to 
 arms! Every hesitation, every delay, would be treach- 
 ery to the Fatherland. The existence of our empire 
 is at stake — the existence of German power and German 
 character." 
 
 Such is the official version which crops up in a thou- 
 sand various forms from the Chancellor down to the 
 last street-sweeper. 
 
 Semi-officially however and in the confidence of 
 secrecy many Germans can be heard asserting that we 
 were not, it is true, attacked, but that we would have 
 been attacked later, if we had not now begun the war 
 at a moment favourable for us. Should we then ask 
 for evidence in support of this hypothesis, most of 
 those who maintain this view have nothing to say, or 
 else they declare that the intention of the enemy to 
 attack us was so obvious that any proof would be 
 superfluous. "What did they mean by their enormous 
 preparations?" is what they most frequently say. And 
 what about our preparations? I reply, which were 
 certainly greater and more comprehensive than in any 
 other country in the world. Did ever any country in 
 time of peace act as we did in 19 13 when we suddenly 
 raised the strength of our army on a peace footing by 
 140,000 men, that is to say, from 720,000 to 860,000, 
 and when we rose to an extraordinary war tax of 
 £50,000,000? "What was the meaning of the Entente, 
 the celebrated policy of 'encirclement' {Einkreisung), 
 if they did not mean to attack us?" is what they next 
 say. And what, I reply, was the meaning of the Triple
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDI^NTS OF THE CRIME 43 
 
 Alliance which involved even stricter obligations than 
 the Entente, and in spite of this, according to our as- 
 sertions, was defensive in its nature? "Yes, but think 
 of the Pan-Slavs!" is urged as an objection against me. 
 And what about the Pan-Germans? I venture to an- 
 swer. Are our "Alldeutschen," our national party, our 
 Pan-Germans of the school of Treitschke and Bernhardi, 
 in any way better or less aggressive than the Pan-Slavs? 
 Such "Pan-tendencies" are to be found in all coun- 
 tries. They are harmless, so long as they do not ad- 
 vance to action. The decisive act was however taken 
 by our Pan-Germans, when they drove us into this 
 horrible war — a war desired and openly proclaimed by 
 them. 
 
 The Head of tpie War Party 
 
 And they had and still have friends and patrons in 
 high places. They have gradually acquired more Influ- 
 ence in our authoritative circles than ever the Pan-Slavs 
 exercised at the Russian court. I need not mention by 
 name the person who for years has been the influential 
 head and the battering-ram of this movement against 
 the originally peace-loving mind of the Emperor. Every- 
 one knows to whom I refer. The Zabern telegram, 
 the message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars, the open 
 demonstration from the tribune of the Reichstag against 
 our Morocco policy, which was at the time still peaceful 
 in intention — these and countless other occurrences and 
 suggestions leave not the slightest room for doubt as to 
 the quarter and the camp from which the inciters to 
 war have discharged their destructive missiles over Ger- 
 many. One has but to wander along the streets of Ber- 
 lin to see in all bookshops the work of Frobenius en- 
 titled The German Empire's Hour of Destiny, with the 
 commendatory telegram of the exalted gentleman on 
 the outside. In his recommendation he expresses the
 
 44 I ACCUSE! 
 
 desire that this "distinguished book" which he has "read 
 with the greatest interest" will find the widest circula- 
 tion among the German people. And this Frobenius is 
 a comrade in thought of Bernhardi, and the whole pur- 
 port of his book is that we should strike before it is 
 too late; since the others mean to attack us, we must 
 anticipate them and attack them. Of course no proof, 
 not the shadow of a proof, is advanced in support of 
 this premise, which in reality is but a pretext, and which 
 is denied by Bernhardi himself in the passage quoted 
 above (page 280)* 
 
 But that does not inconvenience these great minds; 
 they do not recognise the defects of their logic. They 
 do not see that of the two assertions only one can be 
 true. Either we have been attacked, in which case we 
 are conducting a defensive war, or else we were going to 
 be attacked, and in that case we are conducting a pre- 
 ventive war. If the second statement is true the first 
 must be untrue; and in that case all official utterances 
 from the Imperial speech from the Palace on the 31st 
 July down to the speech of the Chancellor on the 2nd 
 December are branded as lies. 
 
 If the assertion that it is a defensive war is true, the 
 idea of a preventive war is at once put completely aside, 
 and it is superfluous to discuss further whether the 
 presuppositions of a preventive war in fact existed, or 
 whether such a preventive war politically and morally 
 can be defended. Bismarck, who after all knew some- 
 thing about politics, emphatically answered this latter 
 question in the negative, in stating that "even victori- 
 ous wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon 
 one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence 
 far enough ahead to anticipate historical development 
 according to one's own calculation." ^ 
 
 * Bismarck Gedanken und Erinnerungen [Vol. IL p. 102 of the 
 English translation. Smith, Elder and Co.]
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 45 
 
 This dictum of the great man of the past appears to 
 have fallen into oblivion. While monument after monu- 
 ment has been erected to his memory, this sentence might 
 have been inscribed in brass and in marble in the walls 
 of the palaces of kings and of governments in places 
 where it would at all times have been visible; then per- 
 haps the German people and the world might have been 
 spared this most terrible of evils. Bismarck also after 
 1870 was repeatedly urged by Generals and by the in- 
 stigators of war to undertake a new campaign against 
 France in order to crush once for all and to make harm- 
 less for all time the country that was again raising its 
 head. All such efforts he constantly rejected with un- 
 yielding energy, and the idea of initiating a war because 
 it must come sooner or later, he declared to be "criminal" 
 and "insane." 
 
 The saying is apposite, and those whom it fits will not 
 be able to escape its application. 
 
 The Imperial War 
 the place in the sun 
 
 It will be obvious from all that I have so far said 
 that I regard the present war neither as a defensive nor 
 as a preventive war. This war is purely a war of con- 
 quest, born of imperialist ideas and serving imperialist 
 ends. It is nothing else. 
 
 It is a war for the celebrated "Place in the sun/* 
 which it is supposed is being refused us, and which we 
 must take forcibly with the sword in our hand. 
 
 What is the meaning of the "Place in the sun"? No 
 one says clearly what it is, and everyone understands 
 the phrase in a different sense. 
 
 The idea is so alien to the people that it may be pre- 
 sumed that they would not have allowed themselves to
 
 46 I ACCUSE! 
 
 have been sacrificed, if it had been said to them : "You 
 must gain for us a place in the sun." 
 
 For the initiated however it is the magic spell which 
 unites their imperialistic desires. "Only thus relying on 
 the sword, can we gain the place in the sun, which is our 
 due, but which is not voluntarily accorded to us" (Crown 
 Prince Wilhelm). With this inscription, and with the 
 motto "pro patria et gloria," the photograph of the 
 German Crown Prince is sold in German bookshops. 
 
 THE CHOSEN PEOPLE 
 
 The place in the sun is the world-power which is due 
 to us, as to the chosen people of God. From the point 
 of view of the psychology of the nation it is remark- 
 able how the old Jewish idea has mastered the good, 
 Christian, Protestant, anti-semitic Empire, and how it 
 has ousted the true teaching of Christ, that all men art 
 brothers. 
 
 We change our religious ideas, like our uniforms, 
 according to our needs and our circumstances. 
 
 The God, whom in war we invoke every day, whom 
 we entreat to grant that we may destroy as many of the 
 enemy as possible, and to whom we give thanks when 
 he fulfils our prayers is the old Jewish God, Jehovah, 
 the God of battles and of vengeance, to whom no sacri- 
 fice appears too great, if it is to serve the power and 
 the dominion of his chosen people. The Christian God, 
 however, and his "only-begotten Son," who wandered 
 about on earth preaching love and sacrifice, whose king- 
 dom is not of this world — they have nothing to do with 
 this shedding of blood, which is entirely contradictory 
 to the doctrine they taught.
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 47 
 
 The observations of Kant in his essay on Everlasting 
 Peace are entirely in the spirit of the Christian religion. 
 
 "On the conclusion of peace at the end of the war it 
 might not be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of 
 humiliation, after the festival of thanksgiving, on which 
 to invoke the mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which 
 the human race are guilty of, in their continued unwilling- 
 ness to submit (in their relations with other States) to a 
 law-governed constitution, preferring rather in the pride 
 of their independence to use the barbarous method of war, 
 which after all does not really settle what is wanted, namely, 
 the right of each State in a quarrel. The feasts of thanks- 
 giving during a war for a victorious battle, the hymns which 
 are sung — to use the Jewish expression — 'to the Lord of 
 Hosts,' are not in less strong contrast to the ethical idea of 
 a father of mankind ; for, apart from the indifference these 
 customs show to the way in which nations seek to establish 
 their rights — sad enough as it is — these rejoicings bring in 
 an element of exultation that a great number of lives, or at 
 least the happiness of many, has been destroyed." ^ 
 
 That is true Christianity, and at the same time it is 
 the true crown of German culture. Those same people, 
 however, who profess that they are drawing the sword 
 on behalf of this culture trample its finest products In 
 the dust, and rattle over it with their cannons. 
 
 If it were known in certain places in Germany how 
 educated men and religious people throughout the whole 
 world judge these continual blasphemous appeals to God, 
 
 * [Perpetual Peace. English translation by Miss Campbell Smith 
 (George Allen and Unwin), p. 136-7. Later references to Kant's 
 essay are also adapted to this edition.]
 
 48 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Luigi Luzzatti, one of the most distinguished pohti- 
 cians and most important thinkers in Italy, who, as is 
 well known, has more than once been Prime Minister 
 (be it observed a strict Jew — this I mention as an ex- 
 ample to Germany whose mission is to "bring free- 
 dom," although in time of peace it does not go so far 
 as to promote a Jew to be a Second Lieutenant), Luigi 
 Luzzatti has recently published in the Corriere delta 
 Sera a remarkable article bearing the title "The abuse 
 of the name of God," from which I quote some sen- 
 tences : 
 
 "From the day on which this fearful war broke out 
 Princes (not the people, it must be said) have bored every- 
 one by the use and abuse of the name of God. In the tele- 
 grams which were recently exchanged between the Austrian 
 Emperor and the Sultan the Almighty makes his appear- 
 ance. The matter would take on an ironical tinge if up in 
 Heaven the conquerors and the defeated of Lepanto and the 
 soul of John Sobicski were to hear of it. One could have 
 wished that at least on this occasion they might have felt 
 enough shame to induce them to leave heaven in peace out 
 of the question ! . . . Fortunately God has not yet appeared
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CREME 49 
 
 in the telegrams exchanged between the monarchs of Eng- 
 land and Japan. And indeed it would have been a difficult 
 matter to reconcile in the same fearful uproar of war Jesus 
 and Buddha, a religion without God and a religion which 
 rests on a personal God and Saviour. We are reminded 
 of a bitterly ironical saying of Voltaire, who observed 
 'Since God created man in his own image, how often has 
 man endeavoured to render a similar service to God.' . . . 
 Let us save God from such profanation ! Let us leave in 
 peace the Father of all mankind who punishes guilt and re- 
 wards virtue, and who gives no one the right to represent 
 Him on earth, and to claim for himself His omnipotence 
 in this tragedy of war." 
 
 Such is the judgment of serious men abroad on certain 
 German peculiarities and on the presumption of Ger- 
 many to be the chosen people of God. 
 
 The place in the sun which is due to us as the chosen 
 people, thus represents the true object of this war, even 
 if it is not admitted to the nation that this is the object. 
 
 GERMANY S BRILLIANT DEVELOPMENT 
 
 If anyone seeks a place in the sun, and seeks it sword 
 in hand, it must be assumed that hitherto he has stood 
 in the shadow. Is this so in the case of Germany? I 
 maintain that the opposite is the case, and in support 
 of this assertion I rely on those very people, who have 
 pressed the sword into our hand to enable us to seek 
 a place in the sun. In the chapter entitled "Financial 
 and Political Preparation for War" (p. 260 ct seq.) 
 Bernhardi gives a comprehensive view of the brilliant 
 and unprecedented economic development of Germany 
 since the Franco-Prussian war. He points out, and 
 supports his assertion freely with statistics, that the 
 increase of wealth continues on an ascending scale, and 
 that the advance in trade and industry since the founda-
 
 60 I ACCUSE! 
 
 tion of the Empire has been extraordinary. He quotes 
 a lecture dehvered by Professor Dade before a general 
 meeting of the Finance and Tax-Reformers held on the 
 22nd February, 19 10, from which we gather that the 
 value of German imports and exports in the last years 
 before 19 10 had increased from 300 million pounds 
 sterling to between 725 million pounds and 800 million 
 pounds. In 19 12 German imports and exports reached 
 a value of approximately 1,200 million pounds sterling. 
 The value of the import of raw material for industrial 
 purposes rose from 75 million pounds in 1879 to 225 
 million pounds; the import of manufactured goods rose 
 from 30 million pounds in 1879 to 62 >4 million pounds 
 in 1908, and the export of manufactured goods during 
 the same period rose from 50 million pounds to over 
 200 million. The amount of coal raised in 1879 was 
 only 42 million tons; in 1908 it was I48>< million tons, 
 and the value of the coal raised increased from 5 mil- 
 lion pounds to 75 millions. The production of iron 
 ore rose from 6 million to 27 million tons, and in value 
 it rose from £1,350,000 to £5,950,000. From 1888 to 
 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germany increased 
 by 127 per cent., as against only 59 per cent, in Eng- 
 land. The production of pig iron in Germany in the 
 twenty years mentioned above rose 172 per cent., as* 
 against only 27 per cent, in England. Similar figures, 
 according to Dade and Bernhardi, can be adduced in all 
 other spheres. 
 
 At the same time there took place a continued growth 
 in revenue and a progressive capitalisation. From 1892 
 to 1905 an increase in national wealth of about 100 mil- 
 lion pounds sterling has taken place annually in Prussia 
 alone. In the grades of the Property Tax ranging 
 from £300 to £5,000 the number of those taxed and the 
 number of properties on which taxes are paid has in- 
 creased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent., whereas
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 51 
 
 from 1905 to 1908 the increase was 11 per cent., that 
 is to say, in the first period the yearly increase was 
 2 per cent., but in recent years 3 per cent. 
 
 An even greater increase has taken place in the case 
 of the large fortunes. In the grades of the property 
 tax ranging from £5,000 to £25,000 the increase in the 
 numbers paying, and the properties on which payment 
 is made has been about 44 per cent., that is, on an 
 average of the fourteen years, 3 per cent, annually ; in 
 the last three years however it has been 46 per cent. 
 The higher the grades of the tax, the greater is the 
 increase; in the grades from £300 to £5,000 the in- 
 crease per head of the population has been £32 
 los. ; in the grades from £5,000 to £25,000 there 
 was an increase per head of £320, and in the grades 
 above £25,000 there was an increase of £3,5223/2 per 
 hear per year. 
 
 Emphasis is further laid on the increase of wages, on 
 the decrease of unemployment and of emigration as 
 signs of our economic prosperity, and statistics are ad- 
 duced in support of these contentions. In 1908 only 
 20,000 emigrants left our country, whereas in the same 
 year 336,000 persons emigrated from Great Britain. 
 The investment of capital in State railways amounted 
 at the end of March, 1908, in Prussia to £494,400,000 
 and at the end of 191 1 to £552,500,000. 
 
 This brilliant picture of our industrial development, 
 which could be supported by a series of other figures, is 
 naturally of use to General Bernhardi, only in so far as 
 it enables him to represent as tolerable a further in- 
 crease of military burdens. He forgets, however, that 
 in thus demonstrating our continuous increase of na- 
 tional wealth, and in particular in emphasising our in- 
 creasing advantage over England, he cuts from under 
 his own feet the ground on which there should be erected 
 the edifice of his Imperialism. If we already have
 
 52 I ACCUSE! 
 
 such a sunny corner in the sun, what is still lacking? 
 What more do we want? 
 
 If in many respects we, the most recent industrial 
 State in the world, the growth of scarcely more than 
 two generations, are already placing England, the old- 
 est industrial State, in the shadow, we certainly cannot 
 complain of any deficiency of sunshine. 
 
 What about extension of territory? What about 
 Colonies? Does the happiness of nations depend on the 
 number of square miles which they possess, or does it 
 depend on their Colonies? If that were the case, small 
 countries like Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, 
 Sweden, and Norway would necessarily be poor in com- 
 parison with Great States, whereas as a matter of fact 
 the opposite is the case. The highest figures for im- 
 ports and exports per head of the population are shown 
 by Holland, followed by Belgium, Switzerland, and Den- 
 mark, and then only after these the great Powers. The 
 Belgian 3 per cents, stood at 96 when the German stood 
 at 83 per cent. The Norwegian 3^ per cents, stood 
 at 102, when the Russian could be had at 81. Similar 
 figures may be adduced in every sphere of economic life. 
 The greatness of a country, and in particidar the extent 
 of its Colonial possessions, has no relation to the pros- 
 perity of a country. 
 
 The best proof for this fact is found in Germany 
 Itself. No one, not even the most fanatical nationalist, 
 will or can dispute the fact that the increase in pros- 
 perity of Germany in the last forty years, and in par- 
 ticular in the twenty-six years which have elapsed since 
 the present Emperor ascended the throne, has been with- 
 out precedent in the history of the world. On the oc- 
 casion of the celebration of the twenty-fifth anniver- 
 sary of the accession of William II. a compilation ap- 
 peared under the title, Social Culture and the Well- 
 being of the People during the first 25 Years of the
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 53 
 
 Reign of William II. This work describes, and supports 
 with statistics, the prosperity of Germany in all branches 
 of human culture during this period. It is superfluous 
 to reproduce here these well-known figures. Only a few 
 need here be cited. The population has increased from 
 forty-eight millions in 1888 to sixty-seven millions in 
 19 14. The yearly increase due to births amounted In 
 191 1 to ii°3 per thousand inhabitants, and was only 
 exceeded by Russia with 17 per thousand. The produc- 
 tion of pig-iron (estimated in thousands of tons) rose 
 from 4,024 in 1887 to 17,853 in 1912, that is to say, by 
 343'6 per cent., whilst the production of Great Britain 
 in the same time only increased by 17*6 per cent., namely, 
 from 7,681 to 9,031. The production of America in 
 pig-iron increased in the same time by 363*2 per cent., 
 that is, from 6,520 to 30,203, and thus America still 
 takes the first place in this field of production, while 
 Germany has advanced from the third place in 1887 to 
 the second place in 19 12, thereby outstripping England 
 and attaining a percentage of increase twenty times as 
 great. 
 
 A development on exactly similar lines is shown in 
 the production of steel, which (also estimated in thou- 
 sands of tons) has risen from 1163*9 in 1887 to 17,302 
 in 19 12. Here also we have advanced from the third 
 place to the second in the production of the world, and 
 have considerably outstripped England, whose produc- 
 tion has only increased from 3,196*8 in 1887 to 6,563*3 
 in 191 1. Estimating the increase by percentages, Ger- 
 many here takes the first place, and leaves far behind 
 both of her competitors, America and England. The 
 increase in percentage amounted in the twenty-five years 
 mentioned in Germany to no less than 1,377 per cent., 
 in America 835 per cent., and in England only 105 
 per cent. 
 
 The net tonnage of our German mercantile fleet has
 
 54 I ACCUSE! 
 
 increased from 1,240,182 in 1888 to 3,153,724 in 1913, 
 and at the same time it is specially to be noted that the 
 commercial value of the individual vessels has been 
 enormously increased by the transformation from sail- 
 ing ships into steamships. The net tonnage of steam- 
 ships alone has almost increased six-fold in the period 
 mentioned; it has risen from 470,364 in 1888 to 2,655,- 
 496 in 1913. 
 
 The increase of the national income and the national 
 wealth correspond to the commercial and industrial de- 
 velopment of Germany. Dr. Karl Helfferich, Director 
 of the German Bank,^ in his contribution to the compila- 
 tion mentioned above, summarises his conclusions in 
 the following words: 
 
 "The German national income amounts to-day to 2,150 
 million pounds annually as against from 1,150 to 1,250 mil- 
 lion pounds in 1895. 
 
 "Of these 2,150 millions about 350 millions, that is to say 
 a bare sixth, are applied annually for public purposes ; from 
 1,350 to 1,450 million pounds are used privately, and about 
 400 to 425 millions, which may be raised by the automatic 
 increase in value of wealth now in existence to 500 million 
 pounds, grow as an increase of the wealth of the nation as 
 against a sum of from 225 to 250 millions 15 years ago. 
 
 "The wealth of the German people amounts to-day to 
 more than 15,000 million pounds, as against about 10,000 
 million pounds about the middle of the 'nineties of last 
 century. 
 
 "These solid figures summarise, expressed in money, the 
 result of the enormous economic labour, which Germany 
 has achieved under the government of our Emperor." 
 
 That is the place in the sun which we occupy, which 
 no one has disputed, can dispute, or means to dispute, a 
 place in the sun for which we are indebted to the spirit 
 
 ^ Now Secretary of the Treasury.
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 55 
 
 of enterprise, the pertinacity and the skilful methods of 
 our merchants and our manufacturers, but not to the 
 braggart company of our nationalists, and just as little 
 to the sword of our Generals or the plans of campaign 
 of our General Staff. 
 
 It is exclusively the work of the German merchant 
 and his motto "My field is the world," exclusively the 
 result of the long-enduring condition of peace, which, 
 to judge from the experience of the past, the longer it 
 lasted would have more and more promoted the pros- 
 perity of the German people. 
 
 INCREASE OF POPULATION AND THE COLONIES 
 
 The objection is advanced that it is indeed precisely 
 the increase of the German people, the yearly accession 
 to our population of about 800,000 souls, which neces- 
 sarily demands such an extension of territory. Where, 
 It is asked, are all these new people to find sustenance 
 and a home? The objection is as insecurely founded 
 as all the others. If Germany were too small to support 
 its increasing population, the emigration statistics would 
 show a constant rise. The opposite, however, is the case. 
 The number of emigrants from 188 1 to 1890 amounted 
 yearly to 134,200, from 1891 to 19 10 to only 52,800 
 yearly, and in 19 12 only 18,500 people emigrated from 
 Germany. 
 
 On the other hand, the number of immigrants has 
 increased. Whereas, formerly, immigrants were con- 
 siderably fewer than emigrants, in the last fifteen years 
 or so they have exceeded the latter so that the stream 
 of emigration is on the point of flowing towards instead 
 of away from Germany. 
 
 From these figures it may be deduced that Germany, 
 so far from not being in a position to give employment 
 and nourishment to its increasing population, offers, on
 
 56 I ACCUSE! 
 
 the contrary, increasing opportunities of employment 
 and nourishment, not only for its own population, but 
 also for those persons who stream to it from abroad. 
 At the same time wages show a constant, although by 
 no means a sufficient, rise. 
 
 And this fabulous development took place at a time 
 when other countries, and particularly France, were 
 substantially extending their Colonial possessions, while 
 our Colonial possessions remained limited to the few 
 places in Africa, East Asia, and in the Pacific which 
 could still be acquired by a Germany which arrived too 
 late on the scene. What has the importance of these 
 Colonies been in connection with our economic develop- 
 ment in the last forty years? In this they have played 
 no part, not the slightest. If we add together the sums 
 which our Colonies have cost us directly and indirectly 
 (in the indirect cost we must allow for the increase of 
 the fleet abroad rendered necessary for their protection), 
 and if on the other side we reckon the financial advan- 
 tages obtained from these Colonies, we shall find as the 
 result that we have made a miserable bargain. 
 
 In this respect also Bismarck saw much further than 
 his successors. He resolved on the first steps towards 
 a colonial policy, only when subjected to strong pressure 
 and almost against his will, and he constantly remained 
 aware of the fact that this policy is one that cuts both 
 ways; he realised that it would afford our enemies new 
 points of attack, while furnishing us with no correspond- 
 ing advantages. 
 
 The present occurrences have proved the justice of his 
 foresight. Our Colonies have delivered into our ene- 
 mies' hands objects of exchange, which are indeed ma- 
 terially of no value to us, but in our imagination, seeing 
 that we have once possessed them, they have for us 
 a certain worth, which our enemies will make us pay dear 
 for on the conclusion of peace.
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 57 
 
 Materially they have no value for us. Will anyone 
 venture to assert that our economical prosperity (which 
 I have supported with figures quoted above) would have 
 been diminished by one iota if we had never possessed 
 either South West or East Africa, Kiao-chau, or Samoa? 
 The total white population of our Colonies amounted in 
 1913 to something over 27,000, that is to say, about 
 3*5 per cent, of the annual increase of the population 
 of Germany. Would there have arisen in our country 
 any question of over-population or of a scarcity of food 
 if these 27,000 people had remained in Germany? Would 
 this increase, or rather this non-withdrawal, have ex- 
 ercised the slightest effect on our economic life, on the 
 life of 67 million people? 
 
 Further, the entire commercial intercourse of Ger- 
 many with her Colonies in imports and exports amounts 
 to-day to something over £5,000,000. The total imports 
 and exports of Germany in 19 12 amounted in round 
 figures to £1,000,000,000. The trade with the Colonies 
 thus amounts to 0*5 per cent, of our total foreign trade. 
 If this o"5 per cent, fell away, would Gennany economi- 
 cally so much as feel the effect? But indeed this per- 
 centage would not fall away, if we did not possess these 
 Colonies. If the Colonies need our products they would 
 buy them just as much if they were not our possessions, 
 but were either independent, or were subject to the rule 
 of another people. We have indeed no monopoly of 
 trade with our Colonies, but they belong to the territory 
 of the German Empire, and are bound to the commercial 
 treaties concluded by Germany. In spite of the fact 
 that we possess our Colonies, we meet within them the 
 competition of all industrial countries, regulated by com- 
 mercial treaties; it follov/s that even if we were not the 
 owners, they would still buy from us those of our wares 
 which we could deliver better and at a cheaper rate than 
 others could.
 
 58 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Our True Colonies 
 
 Onr best customers are in fact precisely those conn- 
 tries which -we have never possessed, and which we never 
 can possess: England, Russia, France, Italy, America, 
 Brazil, the Argentine — these are our true Colonies ; these 
 are the countries which, in the enormous developments 
 of exchange in the modern world of trade, make us rich 
 by the purchase of our manufactures, while we draw 
 from them as an equivalent the raw material which we 
 need, as well as manufactures of foreign origin. These 
 are the countries which open to the German merchant 
 inexhaustible fields of activity, where in free competition 
 with the trading nations of the world he can spread 
 his pinions and can make his efficiency felt. These are 
 the gigantic sponges which absorb millions in the form 
 of German produce transferred thither by German mer- 
 chants settled abroad, and there distributed through all 
 the industrial channels. Throughout the whole world 
 huge German trading firms, either enjoying a position 
 of independence or acting as the branches of the central 
 house, may be seen flourishing and developing their 
 strength in the struggle with English and American com- 
 petition. That is the biological struggle for existence 
 which to-day rules the zvorld, not the armed struggle 
 of barbaric times. That is the struggle that will always 
 remain, the struggle of efficiency against inefficiency, the 
 struggle of skill against stupidity, the struggle of en- 
 durance against slackness, above all the struggle which 
 in reality produces the flower of the higher modern type 
 of humanity, the spiritually higher which on the firm 
 basis of a wellbeing embracing all circles of the people 
 can rise even to higher levels of morality and of culture. 
 
 Those who speak for our imperialist party naturally 
 know nothing of this struggle; for them the merchant 
 will always remain a term of contempt, no matter how
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME ö9 
 
 glad they may be to take home in marriage to their 
 noble castles the daughters of wealthy merchants. The 
 officers and the junkers still remain the highest caste 
 in the country. They remain the props of the throne 
 and of the altar, of discipline and of morals. They 
 would not care a brass button if, as a consequence of 
 their militant undertakings, all that the merchant has 
 through long generations built up as a result of arduous 
 daily labour should perish at a stroke. For them the 
 economic prosperity of a country exists only in so far 
 as it prepares the means for military undertakings : 
 these are the true aims of national existence, and its 
 prosperity is of use only in so far as it assists in the 
 fulfilment of this end. 
 
 WHAT ADVANTAGE HAS FRANCE DRAWN FROM HER 
 COLONIES? 
 
 Let US however come back to the question of colonies. 
 We have seen that the lack of important colonies has 
 not injured Germany; it has not hindered our enormous 
 boom of prosperity. What is the position in the case of 
 Franccf Has the acquisition of her North African 
 Colonial Empire, of her East Asian possession, of Mada- 
 gascar yielded her any profit or furnished her with any 
 advantage over the German Empire? None whatever; 
 the reverse is indeed the case. The economic develop- 
 ment of France has in some branches remained at a 
 complete standstill ; on others it has shown a progress 
 which is out of all proportion less than in the case of 
 Germany. The entire foreign trade of France amounted 
 in 1912 to only 580 million pounds sterling, although 
 her foreign possessions contain more than four times the 
 superficial area of those of the German Empire. Her 
 population of about forty millions has, as is well known, 
 remained almost stationary. Above all we should ex-
 
 60 I ACCUSE! 
 
 pect, according to the theory of our imperiahsts, that 
 the estabhshment of a great Colonial Empire would 
 result in an enormous increase in the mercantile navy. 
 Nothing of all this has taken place. The tonnage of 
 French commercial vessels has indeed fallen (expressed 
 in thousands of tons) from 1,492 tons in 1885 to i,462'6 
 in 191 1, whereas in the same period, as shown above, 
 the tonnage of German vessels has risen from 1,275*5 
 to 3,0237. 
 
 The production of pig-iron which, as shown above, 
 rose in Germany in twenty-five years by 3436 per cent., 
 rose in France in the same period only 210*7 P^'* cent. 
 The production of steel in the same twenty-five years 
 rose in Germany by 1,377 P^^ cent, on 17,302 (estimated 
 in thousands of tons), whereas the French production 
 rose by only 727 per cent, on 4,078*4 (in thousands of 
 tons). 
 
 Similar figures can be adduced in nearly all branches 
 of economic life. Where, then, I ask, is the advantage 
 which France has drawn from her Colonial Empire f 
 She would probably have done better if she had left 
 the yellow and the black and the brown inhabitants of 
 her Colonial possessions to themselves, and if she had 
 kept in her own pocket the enormous expenditure in- 
 volved in the military acquisition and the civil admin- 
 istration of these wide territories. Above all, she would 
 then have had no Morocco dispute, no Agadir incident, 
 and in consequence no foaming of the imperialistic beast 
 in Germany, and very probably no war to-day. After 
 all, the dead Archduke has only had to wipe out the 
 "discomfiture" of Agadir. 
 
 The French people were instinctively right when they 
 constantly moved their Colonial conquerors on a step and 
 threw them into the lumber-room. So it happened to 
 Jules Ferry the man of Tonkin, so it happened to Jo- 
 seph Caillaux the man of Morocco. This is indeed a
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 61 
 
 peculiar irony of history! The French drive away in 
 disgrace those who have gained for them their Colonies, 
 and in our country the national party spits out fire and 
 destruction because France has snapped up these won- 
 derful Colonies from under her nose. In this the French 
 gentlemen have at least the excuse that they have ac- 
 complished their extension of territory without drawing 
 the sword in Europe (the modern man scarcely speaks 
 of the lives of the natives), whereas we consider these 
 same seductive corners of the world of sufficient value 
 to pour out on their account oceans of the best blood 
 of Europe and to pile up for their sake hecatombs of 
 corpses. 
 
 Truly, we may exclaim with Ulrich von Hütten, "It 
 is a pleasure to be alive," or better still with Nunne in 
 Ulk ^ : "Nowhere do things happen so funnily as in this 
 world." 
 
 THE GERMANS ABROAD! FRANCE, ENGLAND, AMERICA 
 
 When on the occasion of the Agadir incident someone 
 observed to a witty Parisian: "Have you heard that 
 the Germans are at Agadir?" he replied quite coolly, 
 "I don't care; they are in the heart of Paris, at the 
 Champs Elysees ; that is what matters." 
 
 And in fact, that is what matters. Not only in 
 countries beyond the ocean, but above all even in Euro- 
 pean countries, in those now neutral as well as in those 
 which are now at war with us, everywhere the Ger- 
 mans sat in the heart of trade and commerce until the 
 outbreak of this fearful war — in Germany it is called the 
 "Dawn of the Great Time." Everywhere they conducted 
 important undertakings of their own, or represented 
 German firms, or they managed banks, manufactories, 
 
 ^ [ Ulk, a weekly humorous paper, published by the Berliner Tagc- 
 blat.]
 
 62 I ACCUSE! 
 
 or trading concerns which belonged to foreigners. The 
 Paris Bourse, the high finance of Paris, is full of Ger- 
 man names; Rothschild, Heine, Seligmann, Porges, 
 Schickler, and all the rest of them control the French 
 money-market. German breweries have effected a revo- 
 lution in the restaurant life of France, and with their 
 sumptuous beer-palaces have driven out more and more 
 the fine intimacy of the French eating-house in honour 
 of which we older people may at least shed many a 
 tear of joyful-sorrowful remembrance. The same holds 
 good of countless other fields of activity in France, in 
 which Geraians play an authoritative role. 
 
 This holds, however, with even greater truth in the 
 case of England. It is well known how great a section 
 of the trade and the industry of Manchester, Liverpool, 
 Binningham and other industrial centres is in German 
 hands, and how Germans occupy a leading position in 
 leading English firms as well. Anyone who is ignorant 
 of this should read the reports of the Parliamentaiy 
 Committee of Enquiry which was appointed to devise 
 measures against the threatened dispossession of Eng- 
 lishmen in their own country, not forcible measures, it 
 is true, for the Englishman is far too much a practical 
 man of business not to know that any forcible measure 
 would cut into his own flesh. Measures were aimed at 
 whereby the young Englishmen would acquire German 
 education, German methods, Gemian adaptability — ■ 
 qualities which it was supposed would enable them to 
 withstand the competition of young Germans in their 
 own country. 
 
 not to speak of North or South America. 
 The difference between the two Americas consists chiefly 
 in the fact that the Germans in the United States to a 
 large extent assume a new nationality, whereas those in 
 South America for the most part hold firm to their Ger-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 63 
 
 man nationality. Both are of use to the Fatherland, and 
 it is one of the many conventional lies to assert, as is 
 repeatedly done, that the German who assumes a new 
 nationality is a loss for the German Fatherland. The 
 opposite is nearer the truth. The German who is nat- 
 uralised in the United States does not by any means 
 lose his German character. He remains German in 
 blood, in language, in culture, and in thought. Who 
 will dispute this fact? Are not the artists, writers, and 
 learned men of Germany who tour the American towns 
 received everywhere with enthusiasm by millions of 
 German colonists — indeed, often with most exaggerated 
 and unjustifiable enthusiasm? Even the minores gentcs, 
 who in Germany have fallen more or less out of the 
 running, endeavour to rehabilitate themselves by the 
 na'ive undistinguishing national enthusiasm (which of 
 course they promptly telegraph home). 
 
 The Germans in North America, whether naturalised 
 or not, are politically and economically an enonnous gain 
 for our Fatherland. The intimate political relations be- 
 tween the two countries rest in no small degree on the 
 strong percentage of naturalised Germans included in 
 the American population. The whole American culture 
 may be designated as a German-Anglo-Saxon mixture. 
 A section of the American newspapers, which is not 
 without influence on public opinion, appears in the Ger- 
 man language. The export of German books to Amer- 
 ica is enonnous. As in democratically-governed coun- 
 tries the representatives in Parliament and the Govern- 
 ment must consider the views of the electors more than 
 in our countr}'^, a policy directed in principle against 
 Germany would over there be impossible. 
 
 We are ourselves to blame for the fact that we have 
 destroyed the favourable attitude of the American peo- 
 ple by this war, the blame for which is rightly put upon 
 us by all Americans, almost without exception, from
 
 64 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Roosevelt down to the last newspaper scribbler; and 
 this fact represents a new and important entry in the 
 negative side of our books, in balancing the results of 
 the war. 
 
 The economical advantages which Germanism in 
 America creates for us is so obvious and so universally 
 known that a more detailed discussion may be regarded 
 as superfluous. In the high finance of New York, as in 
 that of Paris, naturalised Germans play a distinguished 
 part. We need but mention the names of Ladenburg, 
 Thalmann, Warburg, Speyer, Ellissen, Kuhn, Loeb and 
 Co., Schiff, &c. The enormous imports and exports of 
 the two countries, which in union with England occupy 
 the leading place in the trade of the world, is to a large 
 extent conducted over there by German merchants who 
 almost without exception have assumed American na- 
 tionality — presumably because the political conditions 
 there suit them better than those in our country, a fact 
 which indeed is not to be wondered at. The greatest 
 American breweries are in the possession of Germans, 
 for example, the brewery of Pabst in Milwaukee, and 
 of Peter Dölger in New York. In connection with the 
 brewery of Pabst there are benevolent institutions on a 
 large scale as well as schools in which the children of 
 the employees receive, along with the children of the 
 proprietors, instruction in the German and English lan- 
 guage. The greatest toyshops, for example, those of 
 Schwarz in New York, are in German hands and they 
 naturally obtain their goods from Germany, A very 
 considerable section of American doctors are German 
 by birth, and thus they not merely spread German science 
 in America, but also obtain from Germany their in- 
 struments and their medicinal supplies. 
 
 The greatest warehouses in New York, the American 
 Gorringe or Peter Robinson, are in German hands. They 
 bear such names as Altmann, Strauss, Gimbel, Blumen-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 65 
 
 daal, &c. It is natural that all these German "captains 
 of industry" should make use of their knowledge of 
 Gemian sources of supply which they took over with 
 them, and should thus take their wares from the Ger- 
 man contractor, so long as he is in a position to com- 
 pete with the foreigner. The German contractor thus 
 learns, in his turn, to know the requirements of the 
 market there, he adapts himself to the circumstances, 
 and thus there naturally arises from the German origin 
 of the American firm a lasting connection between the 
 German producers and the German-American customer. 
 
 Whether the latter remains a German or becomes an 
 American is naturally a matter of complete indifference. 
 It is part of the complete ignorance of our nationalist 
 brawlers that they constantly repeat the foolish asser- 
 tion — false assertions as is known do not become more 
 true by frequent repetition — that Germans who are nat- 
 uralised abroad are lost to the Fatherland. 
 
 The exact opposite may be maintained and proved by 
 reference to the example of South America. Whereas in 
 North America the transition to foreign nationality 
 represents the rule, it is in South America the excep- 
 tion. The Germans in Brazil, in the Argentine, in Chile 
 only in exceptional cases become Brazilians, Argentiners, 
 Chilians; in most cases they remain Gennans. They 
 are thus subject even in times of peace to the disadvan- 
 tage that they must return to Germany for military 
 training — many of them are officers of the reserve and 
 of the Landwehr — and thus they are obliged to interrupt 
 their mercantile activities. When however a war breaks 
 out as has now occurred, and suddenly calls them with- 
 out any preparation to the home country, they have 
 frequently to pay for their adherence to German 
 nationality by the complete ruin of their business, even 
 if they should return alive and unmutilated. This ruin 
 is accelerated by the fact that, as is well known, the
 
 66 I ACCUSE! 
 
 South American people, like the rest of the neutral 
 world, brand us as the disturbers of the peace, and 
 rightly hold us responsible for the severe blow sustained 
 by their economic life, and thus they are without excep- 
 tion sympathetic to the other side. Owing to the ex- 
 citable temperament of the Spanish population of South 
 America this attitude against Germany manifested itself 
 so strongly against Germans living there, that frequently 
 even those who were not called to arms packed up their 
 knapsacks and returned to Europe. 
 
 This judgment is based not on newspaper reports but 
 on my personal observations. About the end of August 
 while travelling from America to Germany I had an 
 opportunity of speaking to many Germans returning by 
 Genoa from Brazil, Argentine and Chile. They painted 
 to me the condition of affairs in these countries in the 
 manner indicated above; they were naturally glowing 
 with patriotic enthusiasm (they could not be expected, 
 in South America in the month of August, to guess at 
 the gigantic lie about the war, which to-day professors 
 in Germany have as yet failed to recognise), yet they all 
 admitted that everything which they had laboriously 
 built up in the course of many years, in many cases in 
 the course of decades, had been destroyed at a blow 
 by the outbreak of war. Young men, who had crossed 
 at an early age, and who had slowly worked their way 
 up by industry and efficiency in the great German ex- 
 port-houses, had been obliged to leave their situations 
 to defend their Fatherland "threatened" by Russians and 
 Frenchmen, to defend the freedom and existence of the 
 German people. 
 
 But even without the order of recall they would 
 probably have lost their situations, since their firms 
 under the effects of the war, which in these countries 
 has produced an almost universal condition of bank- 
 ruptcy, would have had either to close their doors, or at
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME* 67 
 
 least to restrict their business as far as possible. Older 
 people who through many trials and difficulties had ac- 
 quired a position of independence were obliged to give 
 up the conduct of their business in consequence of the 
 war and the antipathy felt towards them by the popu- 
 lation, and had to struggle back to the homeland with 
 wife and child. These also were the innocent victims 
 of their adherence to their German nationality. On 
 the long fifty- two-hours' railway journey from Ala to 
 Munich it was moving to listen to all these stories of 
 broken existences, of shattered hopes, and to observe the 
 quiet spirit of surrender with which all these active 
 pioneers of Germanism abroad, yielding themselves to 
 the inevitable, laid down on the altar of the Fatherland 
 their success and their hopes, built up with so much 
 labour. 
 
 The inevitable ! So they believed these good, trusting 
 people. If they had but known, and if they only knew 
 how little there was of the inevitable in all this! If 
 they only knew that they were but the marionettes, di- 
 rected by invisible wire-pullers, to pay with their lives 
 and fortunes for the selfish interests and the insane 
 dreams of world-power and Pan-Germanism which these 
 men entertain; if they had but known that all this was 
 arranged and prepared by criminal and ignorant men, 
 who seek to achieve by fire and blood, by murder and 
 devastation, what can only be obtained by the patient, 
 peaceful labour continued through generations of the 
 merchant and the manufacturer, the man of science 
 and the man of knowledge — if these vigorous men had 
 but known all that — men who even across the sea had 
 not forgotten German dreams and German idealism, 
 and who had not lost the confidence that the cause for 
 which the German draws the sword must necessarily 
 be a just cause — ^had they but known the truth, they 
 would scarcely have crossed the sea; they would not
 
 68 I ACCUSE! 
 
 have left the soil, which had given to them and their 
 families a second home. 
 
 They were all agreed that the thought of rebuilding 
 their existence in South America could not be enter- 
 tained, and that the years and decades laboriously spent 
 by them there were merely thrown away. 
 
 Which German then is of most use to the Fatherland? 
 He who assumes a foreign nationality, as in North 
 America, or he whp remains by nationality a German, as 
 in South America? The former, in my opinion. If we 
 survey the collapse into which our business relations 
 with South America have fallen, and if we transfer this 
 phenomenon to the gigantic proportions of North Amer- 
 ica, we may congratulate ourselves on the fact that the 
 Germans of North America have for the most part not 
 remained Germans, but have become Americans. What 
 would have been the result if the effects of the war had 
 revealed themselves in North America in a way similar 
 to that in which they have been manifested in South 
 America, if nearly all Germans, those subject to mili- 
 tary service as well as those exempt from service, had 
 had to leave North America, their adopted Fatherland, 
 their positions and their business? An irreparable eco- 
 nomic disaster for Germany would have resulted. As 
 we shall in any case gradually bleed to death if the war 
 endures for any length of time, in consequence of the 
 breach in our business relations with belligerent coun- 
 tries which must remain for many years, such a blow 
 from the neutral country of North America might well 
 have been for us the finishing stroke. Thank God that 
 our Gennan-Americans have always been more sober 
 and more reasonable in their thoughts than our Pan- 
 Germans. By giving up their German nationality they 
 have rendered Germany the best service. 
 
 This again disposes of one of the theories on which 
 territorial expansion is supported, one of the theories
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 69 
 
 productive of constant friction between civilised peoples. 
 Our true colonies lie where we do not possess a square 
 metre of territory: in North and South America, in 
 England, Prance, Russia, and Italy, in North and South 
 Africa, in Canada, and Australia.^ 
 
 Our commercial intercourse with England amounts 
 to about 185 million pounds sterling, with France about 
 77^/2 million pounds sterling, with both countries to- 
 gether about 262 1/2 million pounds sterling, that is to 
 say, to more than a quarter of our total foreign trade. 
 At the same time we sell more to these countries than 
 we buy from them. We sell to them in round figures 
 to the extent of 162^ million pounds, and we buy 
 from them 100 million pounds. The value of our ex- 
 ports thus amounts to more than 50 per cent, above our 
 imports. About 44 per cent, of German foreign trade, 
 that is to say, about 425 million pounds, is accounted 
 for by all our enemy countries taken together. What is 
 the significance of these figures when we contrast them 
 with the miserable scraps of country — in part wild and 
 unfertile, uninhabitable by Europeans — over which 
 diplomatists wrangle, nations are incited against each 
 other, money is uselessly squandered in gigantic arm- 
 aments, and for which in the end, since the bomb must 
 explode sooner or later, the bloodiest of all wars has 
 been conjured up? 
 
 When will the peoples of the world at last compre- 
 hend the madness of this situation? When at last will 
 they call aloud to their rulers, and above all when will 
 the Germans exclaim to the rulers of Germany: ^'We 
 have indeed already got the place in the sun. Only 
 leave us alone in peace and quietness to warm ourselves 
 in the sunshine and to do our work. Do not for ever 
 oppress us with burdens too grievous to be borne. Free 
 
 * These ideas are developed in an admirable manner in The Great 
 Illusion, by Norman Angell (William Heinemann, London).
 
 70 I ACCUSE! 
 
 yourselves at last from the geographical monomania, 
 whose ambition is to devour square miles, but which 
 has already almost devoured us poor nations." 
 
 THE PLACE IN THE SUN FOR US — THE PLACE IN 
 THE SHADOW FOR THE OTHERS 
 
 In reality our imperialists are seeking to achieve some- 
 thing quite different. They also know, even if they do 
 not say it to the stupid people (and Bernhardi's book 
 proves that this is so) that we have indeed the place 
 in the sun, that no one seeks to dispute it, and that if 
 anyone were to seek to do so, he would necessarily fail. 
 But it is something else that they want. They want 
 the exclusive place in the sun; they are striving for the 
 world-dominion of Germany, and that at any rate is 
 what the others are not prepared to yield to them. 
 
 The German Wehr-Verein, in a meeting held in the 
 House of Representatives, has quite recently expressed 
 this with all the lucidity that can be desired. In this 
 manifesto we find the following words: 
 
 "We need room and air for the further development of 
 our German nationality. The time for moderation is past. 
 Relentlessly thinking only of our interests, we must and we 
 will dictate peace. Only one peace can be thought of, a 
 peace which assures the permanent leading world-position 
 of Germany. . . .The criminal breakers of the peace , . . 
 England, France and Russia, must be so weakened that in 
 future they will cease to be a danger to the peace of the 
 world." 
 
 Thus we find, on the one side, breakers of the peace, 
 and on the other a permanent leading world-position! 
 Explain this to me, Count Oerindur ! Here we find truth 
 and falsehood mingled in a most dexterous manner. 
 On the one side the true aims of the war-party are
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 71 
 
 openly proclaimed, and yet on the other the pretence 
 that the peace was broken by the other party is boldly 
 maintained. Nevertheless, these gentlemen do not suc- 
 ceed in their sommersault over logic. If to extend our 
 nationality we must obtain for Germany the permanent 
 leading position in the world, that is equivalent to say- 
 ing in other words that we must compel the others to 
 subject themselves to our leadership, since to-day we 
 already enjoy equal privileges with others, but not a 
 leadership. If, however, we do this, it is we who are 
 the breakers of the peace, and not the others. 
 
 In reality that is the position of affairs, as I will 
 point out in the second section of this book. It is none 
 the less of great value that these gentlemen, even while 
 they attempt to deny this, yet admit it against their will. 
 
 THE FEAR OF GERMANY 
 
 It is leadership that we seek, not merely equal privi- 
 leges with others. It would be nonsense to say that 
 we seek the latter, since we already possess in the fullest 
 measure such equal privileges. If we are not, as a Ger- 
 man professor has expressed it, "morally and intellec- 
 tually beyond all comparison superior to all other na- 
 tions," ^ there is at least one superiority which has will- 
 ingly been granted to our Prussian Germany by the 
 rest of the world for a century and a half. I refer to 
 our military superiority. While we need only fear God, 
 but nothing else in the world, Germany has been feared 
 by all — almost more than God Himself. Even Tacitus 
 long ago pointed out that the defectiveness of the Ger- 
 man frontiers was made good by fear of the Teutons : 
 "A Sarmatio Dacisque mutuo metu aut montibus separa- 
 tur." The fear of Germany produces the effect that 
 our word weighs heavily in the council of the nations 
 * Professor Lasson.
 
 72 I ACCUSE! 
 
 despite all "encirclement," and despite the wretchedness 
 of our diplomacy. 
 
 On a certain occasion recently the most important 
 conditions of peace were being discussed in a lively con- 
 versation. Frenchmen, Germans, and Englishmen living 
 abroad were taking part in the discussion seated round 
 the common table, and in the end they almost arrived 
 at an agreement as to the terms of peace. Then, how- 
 ever, the German observed in jest, "One more condi- 
 tion; you French must take over en bloc our German 
 diplomatists." The Frenchman sprang up in indigna- 
 tion and broke off the peace negotiations, exclaiming, 
 "Ah ga, non! Ca c'est trop. Nous continuerons ä com- 
 battre." And with these words he left the restaurant. 
 
 DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 
 
 The lack of dexterity shown by our diplomacy — ■ 
 where could all the high-born Borussen and Saxo- 
 Borussen be expected to learn skill in business! — the 
 defects of our diplomacy are constantly made good by 
 the weight of the amiy, standing in the background. 
 For long the Triple Alliance was indeed only a sham, 
 but it looked quite well from the outside, and it worked 
 almost like a being of flesh and blood. 
 
 Thus in all the conflicts of recent years Germany, in 
 union with Austria and Italy, has come out quite well 
 in the end, and her allies, relying on the power of Ger- 
 many, have been able to bear home spoil, with which 
 it would scarcely be proper to compare the acquisi- 
 tions of the Triple Alliance. Was Austria not able in 
 1908 to bag Bosnia and Herzegovina, a fat morsel of 
 more importance than twenty Moroccos ? Was Italy not 
 able to appropriate without a European conflict Tripoli 
 and the ^gean islands — acquisitions which it can 
 scarcely be expected to disgorge again? In addition to
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 73 
 
 the open door in Morocco, which is o£ more value than 
 any costly rights of possession demanding the expendi- 
 ture of blood, have we not got into the bargain a con- 
 siderable piece of the French Congo — an exchange which 
 cost Caillaux, the Minister responsible for it, his pres- 
 tige and his position, and which almost cost his wife 
 her life? Did we not, acting with our ally Austria, 
 achieve in her interests the great feat of gracefully 
 turning the Montenegrins out of Scutari, which they 
 had purchased with streams of blood, and of introduc- 
 ing there an international garrison? Was not the crea- 
 tion of that mannikin-kingdom of Albania, that "vile 
 abortion of filth and fire," ^ accomplished exclusively in 
 the interests of our allies Austria and Italy? Were we 
 not able to complete with England and Turkey an agree- 
 ment that was favourable to us in connection with Asia 
 Minor and the Bagdad line ? 
 
 This list of successes could be considerably lengthened. 
 I need not emphasise the fact that, from my point of 
 view, many — indeed nearly all — of these diplomatic 
 bickerings, these alterations and annexations of terri- 
 tory have not the slightest connection with the real 
 interests of the nations. When we reflect that a Euro- 
 pean war, like that raging to-day, almost broke out in 
 19 1 2 on the question whether Serbia should receive her 
 celebrated "window on the Adriatic" — when we reflect 
 that nearly every one of the questions mentioned above 
 brought Europe for the time being to the verge of an 
 armed conflict, while these so-called "vital questions" 
 frequently had not in any way decisive importance for 
 the well-being, in the true sense of the word, of the 
 States immediately concerned, we are constantly con- 
 strained to admire anew the lamb-like patience of the 
 nations and the craziness of the diplomatists, and to 
 concur in the saying of the good Oxenstjerna in con- 
 ^ Spottegeburt aus Dreck und Feuer — Faust.
 
 74 I ACCUSE! 
 
 soling his son who professed himself unfit for the post 
 of Swedish Ambassador, "An nescis, mi fili, quantilla 
 prudentia mundus regatur?" 
 
 Austria's balkan policy 
 
 What advantage has Austria derived from her an- 
 nexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina? — One more worry 
 added to the many by which she was already plagued. 
 Would it not have been better for Austria and for the 
 whole world if the Empire had remained content with 
 an occupation such as had existed since 1878 on the 
 basis of the Treaty of Berlin ? The Great-Serbian move- 
 ment was fanned into more vigorous life than ever be- 
 fore by the formal annexation in 1908, and notwith- 
 standing the propitiatory declaration of Serbia in March, 
 1909, it continued to take its course. National move- 
 ments in fact cannot be suppressed. The practical poli- 
 tician must deal with them as facts, and if he desires 
 to conduct them in the desired direction, he must en- 
 deavour as far as possible to satisfy their demands 
 which rest on community of race, of language, and often 
 of religion, demands which are thus healthy and justi- 
 fied. Therein lies the skill of the English, and the true 
 basis of the colonial greatness of this people. They 
 subdued the South African republics, but almost imme- 
 diately after their subjection they gave them self-gov- 
 ernment within the framework of the great South 
 African Union, and placed at the head of the Union 
 General Botha, their most distinguished military leader. 
 They have acted in the same way towards all their other 
 colonies throughout the world as soon as these were 
 sufficiently far developed for self-government. Under 
 the flexible suzerainty of Britain, Canada and Australia 
 are independent States enjoying merely the advantages 
 which spring from their connection with the world-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 75 
 
 empire, while suffering no disadvantage from this con- 
 nection. This is the source of the attachment shown 
 by all these colonies to the Mother Country, even by the 
 one most recently acquired by force of arms. This 
 explains the complete failure of Germany's speculations 
 on rebellions or secessions, which might create difficul- 
 ties for the English, and drive their colonies into the 
 arms of the Germans, — these same Germans who even 
 to-day, before they have yet annexed Belgium, can find 
 nothing better to do than banish the French language 
 from the streets of Brussels and Antwerp and from 
 public life by command of the military authorities. 
 
 If Austria, instead of annexing Bosnia and Herze- 
 govina to the accompaniment of the rattling sabre of 
 her German ally, had accepted the Serbian national 
 movement as a natural fact, and had made reasonable 
 concessions to it on the principle "naturam expellas 
 furca, tamen usque recurret," we would to-day — this 
 can be definitely asserted — we would to-day have had 
 no world-war. But clearly the Austrians understand 
 these things better. They consider it right to treat all 
 their foreign nationalities, Italians, Croats, Slavonians, 
 Rumanians, Serbians, according to the principle: 
 
 "A brother's love, sir, ere too late ! 
 Or with this stick I'll break your pate." ^ 
 
 How far they have got with this we see to-day, not 
 only on the Serbian, but also on the Italian side, and 
 how long will it be until we see, on the Rumanian 
 frontier as well, the effects of this extreme reactionary 
 policy of oppression! 
 
 But the worse Austrian policy has been, the more as- 
 tonishing are the diplomatic successes which in recent 
 
 ^ "Und willst du nicht mein Bruder sein 
 So schlag ich dir den Schädel ein."
 
 76 I ACCUSE! 
 
 years she has everywhere been able to gain, relying on 
 the armed force of Germany. Germany and Austria 
 have indeed no reason to complain that European 
 diplomatists have constantly trodden on their corns. 
 Apart from the Morocco question, the questions which 
 have cropped up in recent years were all what are called 
 "vital questions" for Austria, if indeed It is possible 
 to speak of vital questions in the case of a corpse. With 
 this corpse the dexterity of German diplomacy has linked 
 for weal or for woe (unfortunately more for woe than 
 for weal) the German national organism, in itself 
 healthy and vigorous. This is in the interest of the 
 "Germanic races in central Europe," to use the beauti- 
 ful expression of our White Book. Does anyone feel 
 inclined to laugh at this? Austria, as is well known, 
 consists only so far as a fourth part is concerned of 
 inhabitants of the Germanic race, yet with this idea of 
 "race-protection" we have fortunately advanced so far 
 that these Eastern questions, which to a Bismarck were 
 not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, are 
 likely to cost us the bones of many hundreds of thou- 
 sands of our countrymen in the prime of their life, and 
 rob us of the labour of many generations. 
 
 This is indeed a sorry transaction, yet it is one which 
 would have succeeded brilliantly, if it had been left in 
 the field of diplomacy, like all similar transactions in 
 recent years, and if it had not been transplanted to the 
 battlefield. The diplomatic success which was attained 
 on the evening of the 25th July in the Serbian answer 
 to the Austrian Note was one of the most brilliant in 
 the whole diplomatic history of Europe. Austria had 
 gained everything of importance which she had de- 
 manded apart from a few points, and these not decisive, 
 on which Serbia expressed her readiness to negotiate 
 further; moreover, what she had won exceeded anything 
 that ever one State had obtained from another inde-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 77 
 
 pendent State by diplomatic means in time of peace. 
 Further, the humiliation of Serbia was at the same time 
 a humiliation of Russia, and the prestige of Austria 
 at the moment when she insolently and without any 
 grounds recalled her ambassador from Belgrade, stood 
 higher in the Balkans than it had ever done before, 
 and certainly higher than it will ever stand hereafter. 
 This success she owed entirely to the unflinching sup- 
 port of her German ally. 
 
 Why, notwithstanding this, the situation was allowed 
 to lead to war, or rather why war was intentionally 
 produced, can only be explained by reference to German 
 policy and the tendencies in Berlin, as I will demon- 
 strate by documentary evidence in the second section of 
 this work. For the present discussion it is enough to 
 establish the fact that the assertion constantly repeated 
 in Germany that the Triple Alliance was always left 
 in the cold or beaten over the ears by the diplomacy 
 of the Entente, rests on a falsehood, and that on the 
 contrary the policy of the Triple Alliance on all occa- 
 sions — even at the very last in July, 19 14 — was bril- 
 liantly victorious. 
 
 THE CROWN PRINCE AND WAR PARTY 
 
 Everyone in Germany constantly speaks about the 
 "policy of encirclement" {Einkreisung s p olitik) , to which 
 the present catastrophe is attributed. Here also we 
 naturally meet with the same phenomenon as in the 
 whole campaign of justification, which seeks to repre- 
 sent Germany as the innocent lamb and England as 
 the ravening wolf. Those who are initiated, however, 
 know quite well how the matter stands, and if the 
 Crown Prince were to meet Bernhardi or Frobenius in 
 the field, these comrades in the faith would smile to 
 each other like Roman augurs. They know quite well
 
 78 I ACCUSE! 
 
 that it is no foreign policy but our own will — or rather 
 their will — that has urged us into this war, and if they 
 were to deny it, now that they see the fearful conse- 
 quences, their own writings would rise up against them 
 as bloody witnesses. 
 
 What do we find in the introduction to the Crown 
 Prince's book, Germany in Arms? 
 
 "To-day, indeed, we live in a time which points with 
 special satisfaction to the proud height of its culture, which 
 is only too willing to boast of its international cosmopoli-* 
 tanism, and flatters itself with visionary dreams of the pos- 
 sibility of an everlasting peace throughout the world. This 
 view of life is un-German and does not suit us. The Ger- 
 man who loves his people, who believes in the greatness and 
 the future of our homeland, and who is unwilling to see its 
 position diminished, dare not close his eyes in the indul- 
 gence of dreams such as these, he dare not allow himself to 
 be lulled into indolent sleep by the lullabies of peace sung 
 by the Eutopians. . . . Germany has behind her since the 
 last great war a period of economic prosperity, which has 
 in it something almost disconcerting. Comfort has so in- 
 creased in all circles of our people, that luxury and claims to 
 a certain style of life have undergone a rank development. 
 Now certainly we must not thanklessly deny that a wave of 
 economic prosperity brings with it much that is good. But 
 the shady side of this too rapid development often mani- 
 fests itself in a painful and threatening manner. Already 
 the appreciation of wealth has gained in our country an 
 importance, which we can only observe with anxiety. . . . 
 The old ideals, even the position and the honour of the 
 nation, may be sympathetically affected; for peace, peace 
 at any price, is necessary for the undisturbed acquisition of 
 money. But the study of history teaches us that all those 
 States which in the decisive hour have been guided by 
 purely commercial considerations have miserably come to 
 grief. The sympathies of civilised nations are to-day, as in 
 the battles of antiquity, still with the sturdy and the bold
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 79 
 
 fighting armies ^ ; they are with the brave combatants who, 
 in the words which Lessing puts in the mouth of Tellheim, 
 are soldiers for their country, and out of the love which 
 they bear to the cause for which they are fighting. . . . 
 Certainly diplomatic dexterity can, and should, postpone the 
 conflict for a time, and at times disentangle the difficulties. 
 Certainly all those in authority must and will be fully con- 
 scious of their enormous responsibility in the grave hour 
 of decision. They must make it clear to their own minds 
 that the gigantic conflagration, once enkindled, cannot be 
 so easily or so quickly extinguished. As, however, lightning 
 is an adjustment of the tension between two differently 
 charged strata of the atmosphere, so the sword will always 
 be and remain until the end of the world the decisive fac- 
 tor. . . . And therefore everyone, to whom his country is 
 dear, and who believes in a great future for our nation, 
 must joyfully do his part in the task of seeing that the old 
 military spirit of our fathers is not lost, and that it is not 
 sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. For the sword 
 alone is not decisive, but the arm steeled in exercise which 
 bears the sword. Each of us must keep himself fit for arms 
 and also prepared in his mind for the great solemn hour 
 when the Emperor calls us to the standard — the hour when 
 we no longer belong to ourselves, but to the Fatherland with 
 all the forces of our mind and our body ; for all these facul- 
 ties must be brought to the highest exertion, to that 'will 
 to victory' which has never been without success in his- 
 tory." 
 
 That should be sufficient, but there is something better 
 to come. The royal author describes a regimental 
 manoeuvre of the guards on the field at Döberitz: 
 
 "The steel helmets glitter in the sunshine ; in the galloping 
 exercises every individual horseman endeavours to keep on 
 to the man in front, and to keep the right direction — no easy 
 matter when there is dust, and the ground is rough. Many 
 a one stumbles, and away past him gallops the company of 
 
 ^ This has now been shown to be true.
 
 80 I ACCUSE! 
 
 riders. What does it matter ! When you plane wood, shav- 
 ings must fall. . . . And there the call resounds over the 
 field, clear and quivering amid the uproar of the galloping 
 inass, 'Front !' The reins whirl round, and as if by a stroke 
 of magic, the line is formed again, with a front of five 
 impetuous squadrons of the guards, — and then comes the 
 signal 'Charge.' Then the last ounce is taken out of the 
 horses, and with bodies strained forward and with lances 
 in rest with a 'hurrah' we ride to the attack. . . . For any- 
 one who has taken part in such attacks, there is nothing 
 fairer in the world! . . . And yet to the true horseman 
 there is one thing which appears more beautiful: if all 
 that were the same, but if only at the end of the rapid 
 charge, the enemy were to ride out against us, and the 
 struggle for which we have been drilled and trained, the 
 struggle for life and death, were to begin. How often dur- 
 ing such attacks have I heard the yearning call of a comrade 
 riding behind : 'Donnezvetter! if that were only the real 
 thing!' . . . O horseman's spirit ! All who are true soldiers 
 must know and feel : 'Duke et decorum est pro patria 
 mori.' " 
 
 The same spirit of the attack finds expression in the 
 message of farewell to the Danzig Hussars. The young 
 war-hero becomes sentimental, because he can no longer 
 ride through life at the head of his Hussars. Already 
 he is "bearing his youth to its grave," but he is con- 
 soled by the thought: 
 
 "It is indeed possible for me to be separated from you; 
 but my heart and my spirit remain yours. H some day the 
 King calls, and the bugle sounds the signal 'Charge,' then I 
 ask you to think on him whose most ardent wish it has al- 
 ivays been to be allowed to share at your side this, the su- 
 preme moment of a soldier's happiness." 
 
 This moment has now come. It is now, donnerwetter ! 
 the real thing. The deathhead-hussars have charged 
 into death; they have been mown down like stalks of
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 81 
 
 corn. But where at this moment was the gallant colonel 
 of cavalry? Why did he, who still to-day wears the 
 effective unifonn of his hussars, not put himself at their 
 head with a "hurrah" against the enemy? Why did 
 he allow to pass ungarnered the supreme moment of a 
 soldier's happiness? 
 
 "What are the real merits of this young gentleman?" 
 asked Bebel in the Reichstag on the occasion of a discus- 
 sion on the Crown Prince's demonstration, and this 
 young gentleman might be left quietly to himself, to his 
 conscience, and to his further self-education, had he not 
 unfortunately been advanced to the position of a na- 
 tional hero in the course of this war for which he and 
 bis friends bear the chief load of guilt. 
 
 For long he has been the undisputed head of the 
 German nationalist party and of the chauvinists, and his 
 views give the key to the German National Orchestra. 
 Great is the Crown Prince, and Liman is his prophet.^ 
 In fighting against him we are fighting against the 
 tendency which without any provocation, without any 
 practical attainable end, has dragged Germany into this 
 unfortunate war, and which, if we do not repent in time, 
 will irredeemably lead to our destruction. 
 
 It is the misfortune of kings that they are unwilling 
 to hear the truth. But Truth is stronger than they. 
 With stern finger it knocks at their doors. With rever- 
 berating sound it pierces their ears, and if Germany, 
 as the Chancellor says, cannot be crushed, still less is 
 Truth capable of being thus dealt with. It tears asunder 
 the veil, with which it is sought to shroud it, and in 
 triumphant nakedness it advances to meet the light of 
 day. 
 
 "^The Crown Prince: Thoughts on Germany's Future by Dr. Paul 
 Liman (Wilhelm Köhler, Minden).
 
 82 I ACCUSE! 
 
 THE POLICY OF ENCIRCLEMENT (EinkreisungspoHHk) 
 
 The policy of encirclement is one of the veils with 
 which it is sought to shroud the truth. What do we 
 mean by the phrase: a policy of encirclement? Every- 
 one uses the expression, and no one connects with it 
 any clear idea. If it is supposed to have any meaning, 
 it can only mean a policy which seeks to enclose Ger- 
 many and Austria, the central Powers, by an opposing 
 alliance of the peripheral Powers. That is to say it is 
 a geographical idea. 
 
 What specially aggressive tendency is to be found in 
 the fortuitous geographical situation of the Powers of 
 the Entente? Are aggressive intentions in any way 
 determined or proved by geographical situation? Would 
 it not have been equally dangerous, or perhaps even 
 more dangerous, for Germany and Austria, if Italy in 
 place of one or other of the Entente Powers had be- 
 longed to the opposing alliance? Or perhaps even 
 America might have been a member. In the case of 
 Italy or America could we have spoken of an "inten- 
 tion to encircle"? At the most we could have done so 
 in the sense in which Fusilier Kutschke maintained that 
 "he had alone and without assistance surrounded a 
 whole company of the enemy." 
 
 It is clear that geography has nothing to do with the 
 danger of war or with the intention to make war. Just 
 as the Triple Entente is called an encirclement, the 
 Triple Alliance could be called an "excirclement" 
 (Auskrcisung) , since indeed Germany, Austria, and 
 Italy form a sort of central block, from which the 
 Powers of the Entente are excluded. The one is just 
 as much defensive or aggressive as the other. The 
 geographical constellation is a mere fortuitous conse- 
 quence of the chronological development of the alliance. 
 Had Italy still been free when King Edward trans-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 83 
 
 formed the Victorian policy of splendid isolation into 
 a policy of alliances, he would probably have introduced 
 Italy rather than Russia into his system of alliances. 
 Without doubt he would have preferred the democratic 
 Italy, with which he had no conflicting interest, but 
 merely interests in common, to an ally whose political 
 backwardness as well as her conflicting interests in 
 Asia must necessarily make her a very unwelcome friend 
 for England. The grouping of the six Powers in 
 Europe has arisen from historical circumstances and 
 from communities of interest. Their geographical 
 position is purely accidental, and ha? nothing to do 
 with the character and the tendency of these two 
 groups. 
 
 It is thus as false as it is superficial to regard the 
 circumferential situation of the Powers of the Entente 
 as merely in itself a danger for the Empires. He who 
 asserts that aggressive intentions exist is imder an obli- 
 gation to prove their existence, and further to do so 
 on grounds other than the geographical situation of the 
 Powers concerned. These other grounds, however, are 
 completely lacking. In Germany no matter how much 
 we inquire, no one is in a position to give a definite 
 answer. England is said to have been envious of our 
 commercial development. Envy is an attitude of mind, 
 but not an action. Just as I can compel no one to love, 
 so I cannot forcibly drive out of anyone envy and ha- 
 tred. I must rest content if he does not transform his 
 evil thoughts into actions, just as I also on my side 
 would not submit to be called to account by my neigh- 
 bour merely on account of my disposition. Thoughts 
 indeed are duty-free, and even in reactionary Prussia 
 every citizen, according to the constitution, has the right 
 not only to think as he will, but to give expression to his 
 thoughts "in word, writing or printing." Criminal law 
 punishes not the mere will to do the act, but (with few
 
 84. I ACCUSE! 
 
 exceptions) only the attempt to do the act, which it 
 defines as the "first step in the commission of it." 
 
 Where, how and when has England ever attempted to 
 transform her envy of Germany into action? In other 
 words, when has she sought to attack Germany ? Never 
 at any time. Not one action of England can be pointed 
 out, from which the intention to make a military at- 
 tack, in common with her Allies, on Germany could be 
 deduced. You may say that she gave diplomatic sup- 
 port to France on the occasion of the Morocco dispute. 
 But England had a right to do so and indeed a duty, 
 based on the Anglo-French agreement with regard to 
 Egypt and Morocco. And did our ally Austria not 
 adhere to us in this conflict? Have we not adhered 
 to Austria in all Eastern questions? Why should diplo- 
 matic support extended to a friendly or an allied power 
 in the one case be defensive, in the other aggressive? 
 Is England not free in diplomatic negotiations to judge 
 of her own interests and obligations according to her 
 own standard, as we ourselves do with regard to our 
 interests and obligations ? Again I ask : where is the 
 proof of aggressive intentions on the part of England 
 against us? 
 
 Objection will be taken to what I have said on the 
 ground of the military and naval agreements which Eng- 
 land had concluded with France, and which she was 
 on the point of concluding with Russia. Have we then 
 concluded no military agreements with Austria regulat- 
 ing the support to be given on either side in a European 
 war down to the last cannon and company? Have not 
 visits and conferences constantly been taking place be- 
 tween the two General Staffs? If our much stricter 
 military agreement with Austria had no aggressive 
 character, why should there be an aggressive character 
 in the much looser adjustments between English and 
 French experts, which scarcely extended beyond the
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 85 
 
 scope of a discussion?^ These discussions were, as 
 is documentarily established, entirely of a noncommittal 
 character, because they did not rest on any obligation 
 imposed by the terms of an alliance to afford to each 
 other mutual military support. The Anglo-French En- 
 tente did not contain such obligations, but left it to 
 each party in any given case to decide freely according 
 to her own judgment whether she should or should 
 not afford military support to the other. ^ Even in 
 the event of an unprovoked attack by a third Power 
 this freedom remained, and it was only in the case 
 where both Powers freely decided to co-operate that the 
 discussions of the military experts were intended to have 
 practical consequences. 
 
 The relations between England and Russia were, so 
 far as general European poHtics are concerned, much 
 looser even than those between England and France. 
 The adjustments between Russia and England were 
 concerned exclusively with territorial interests in Asia, 
 and contained no obligations with regard to Europe. 
 England had so little concern in the Franco-Russian 
 Alliance that it was not even acquainted with the word- 
 ing of the terms of the Alliance.^ 
 
 Apart from any obligation or intention to attack us 
 there was also, so far as England was concerned, a com- 
 plete absence of any inducement to do so. What advan- 
 tage could England hope to gain from a war against 
 iisf We who constantly have on our lips "the English 
 shopkeeper-spirit," and contrast the cold calculating 
 business-sense of the Englishman with our patriotic en- 
 thusiasm, should really not attribute to this nation of 
 shopkeepers the insanity of desiring to kill their best ciis- 
 
 "■ See Grey's speech in the House of Commons of August 3rd, 1914. 
 *See Grey's letter to Cambon, November 22nd, 1912. English 
 Blue Book, No. 105. 
 ^ See Grey's speech August 3rd, 1914.
 
 86 I ACCUSE! 
 
 tomer in order to improve their business. Such a hare- 
 brained course of action is indeed possible in a nation 
 in which cavalry-colonels and generals and the oppo- 
 nents of the trading classes have the decisive word, 
 but not in a nation of merchantmen in which even the 
 leading politicians in part have their origins in the world 
 of trade, and in any case are without exception fully 
 acquainted with the ideas of the modern commercial 
 spirit. 
 
 The fact is that England has never had aggressive 
 intentions against us; she has never concluded an al- 
 liance with aggressive intentions against us, and she has 
 never done anything whatever to urge on others to at- 
 tack us. 
 
 Anyone who maintains the contrary is obliged, ac- 
 cording to general rules of procedure, to prove it. I 
 have hitherto looked in vain in German speeches and 
 writings for the submission of this evidence. Every- 
 where there is the empty assertion, without the shadow 
 of a proof. 
 
 So far, however, as this assertion is advanced in our 
 country by official quarters, that is by people who are 
 acquainted with the diplomatic history of the last fifteen 
 years, the assertion is made against their better knowl- 
 edge, that is to say it is a lie. 
 
 These last fifteen years, since the first Hague Confer- 
 ence of 1899, are nothing but a continuous series of 
 attempts on the part of England to arrive at a political 
 entente with Germany, and on the basis of this to effect 
 a limitation of naval armaments on both sides — attempts 
 which on every occasion have been wrecked on the lack 
 of judgment or on the evil will of the German Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 It is well known, and does not here require any de- 
 tailed demonstration, that England on the occasion of 
 the Fashoda incident, when her relations to France were
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 87 
 
 becoming ever more strained and were almost impelling 
 her to a conflict of arms, endeavoured to give up her 
 "splendid isolation," and to conclude an entente with 
 us. Our far-seeing politicians, as so often happens, did 
 not seize the opportunity. They allowed to slip past 
 them the favourable moment in which, without ruinous 
 preparations, without drawing the sword, and in the 
 enjoyment of a lasting security, they might have pro- 
 moted our further prosperity in industry and in culture, 
 and gained for the world an enduring peace. 
 
 England and Germany 
 the first hague conference 
 
 On the 28th of August, 1898, there appeared in the 
 Petrograd Official Journal the celebrated Peace Mani- 
 festo of the Tsar. On the mention of this manifesto our 
 war-brawlers smile and point in contempt to the "Tsar 
 of blood" who has now let loose the second fearful war 
 since that message of peace. 
 
 We shall see later how far Russia is concerned in 
 letting loose the present war. How far Russia was to 
 blame for the Japanese war is a chapter by itself, which 
 should scarcely be allowed to end with the condemna- 
 tion of Russia alone. The intention of the manifesto 
 was in any case correct and honourable, and the aims 
 proposed to the nations of Europe: true and enduring 
 peace, and the limitation of armaments which even in 
 peace slowly lead nations to their economic destruction, 
 — these aims will be, and must continue to be, the un- 
 alterable rule of conduct governing the efforts of all who 
 guide the destinies of European States. Even the pres- 
 ent war, unless it is to be nothing but an insane and 
 purposeless shedding of blood, can have no other aim 
 than this.
 
 88 I ACCUSE! 
 
 What was the attitude of England towards this mani- 
 festo? What was the attitude of Germany? While in 
 England public opinion in harmony with the Govern- 
 ment hailed the manifesto with the greatest sympathy, 
 and the English Foreign Minister could report to Petro- 
 grad this unanimous approval, there developed in Ger- 
 many also a popular movement in favour of the ideas 
 expressed by the Tsar. But the Government maintained 
 a frigid attitude, and only the social democratic party 
 recognised the epoch-making significance of these ideas 
 — ideas which they had constantly advocated, but which 
 now for the first time received expression in high places. 
 That the idea was Utopian, that it was but a chim?era 
 — these were the least reproaches thrown at the origina- 
 tor of the manifesto. In conformity with the customary 
 tactics which have since been constantly followed, many 
 rose to the crazy heights of asserting that Russia only 
 desired to entice other States to a limitation of arma- 
 ments in order that she herself might be able to pile 
 up in secret still greater armaments and thus with greater 
 security pursue her Pan-Slav efforts. 
 
 The record in malicious attacks was naturally achieved 
 even then by a German professor, Stengel, the lecturer 
 in international law at Munich, who prophesied in ad- 
 vance the most dismal results of the Conference which 
 at the time had not yet assembled. In recognition of 
 this, he was straightway sent by the Foreign Office to 
 the Hague Conference as one of Germany's representa- 
 tives. 
 
 After the epoch-making memorials of the Russian 
 Councillor Von Bloch, the Conference owed its origin 
 chiefly to English influences. As early as 1891 the 
 English Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, had had a state- 
 ment of the cost of European military preparations com- 
 piled, and had transmitted this confidential document to 
 the German Emperor without, it is true, achieving any
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 89 
 
 success. The efforts of Lord Salisbury met with suc- 
 cess only when they were emphasised by the inter-par- 
 liamentary conference of 1896. On that occasion Lord 
 Salisbury in a remarkable speech in the Guildhall re- 
 gretted the ruinousness of constantly increasing arm- 
 aments, and in the end, through the instrumentality of 
 Count Lambsdorf, laid the whole of the material bearing 
 on the question before the Tsar.^ 
 
 The preludes played by Germany and by England were 
 in harmony with the performances given by these two 
 States at the Conference itself, which in spite of all 
 hostility assembled at the Hague on the i8th of May, 
 1899, under the participation of twenty-six States. 
 Throughout the whole proceedings of the Conference we 
 find the same picture, that, namely, of England leading 
 in all efforts the aim of which was to diminish the in- 
 tolerable burdens of armaments and, in an ever-widening 
 degree, to place the differences arising between civilised 
 nations on a legal basis. On the side of England there 
 were France, Russia, America, and naturally all the 
 smaller States. On the other side, however, there con- 
 stantly stood Germany with her true ally, Austria-Hun- 
 gary. 
 
 The opposition of Germany to all progressive efforts 
 was at times so pronounced that if the others had not 
 repressed their desires, the whole Conference would have 
 broken up. So it was on the question of armaments ; so 
 also on that of arbitration. 
 
 By way of introduction to the discussion on arma- 
 ments the German Emperor delivered a speech in 
 Wiesbaden in which he declared that the best pledge 
 of peace was the "sharp, gleaming sword." In the 
 course of this discussion we shall have occasion to ob- 
 serve that it is a part of the German system to furnish 
 on every occasion an introd uction to the concert of the 
 
 ^ See Fried. Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, Vol. I, p. 204.
 
 90 I ACCUSE! 
 
 European pipes of peace by blowing a war-fanfare on 
 the Prussian bugle. 
 
 The Russian proposal was to the effect that the 
 strength of the Army on a peace basis and the military 
 estimates should not be increased in the next five years, 
 and that in the case of the navy this respite should be 
 fixed for three years. This proposal, which was bril- 
 liantly defended by the Russian military plenipotentiary 
 — (he emphasised above all the incontestable fact that 
 the competition in armaments was futile, since the rela- 
 tive strength between the various States still remained 
 constant) — was energetically rejected by the German 
 military plenipotentiary General Gross von Schwarzhof. 
 If the French plenipotentiary Leon Bourgeois, who rep- 
 resented the restriction of armaments as a requirement of 
 civilisation and a duty imposed on all States, had not 
 succeeded in uniting the votes of the commission in sup- 
 port of a resolution formulated by him (a resolution, it 
 is true, wholly without effect in practice) the negotia- 
 tions of the Conference on this point would have been 
 completely wrecked. 
 
 The resolution ran: "The Conference is of opinion 
 that the restriction of military charges, which are at 
 present a heavy burden on the world, is extremely desir- 
 able for the increase of the material and moral welfare 
 of mankind." 
 
 The recognition of this fact has not prevented Euro- 
 pean Governments, under the leadership of the German 
 Empire, from inflating their armaments to such an extent 
 that in the end the balloon, distended to the bursting- 
 point, was bound to explode and set the whole world 
 in flames. 
 
 Even worse was the fate of the Russian proposal for 
 the establishment of international arbitration. This pro- 
 posal, indeed, was modest enough in what it contem- 
 plated; obligatory arbitration on principle was, it is true,
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 91 
 
 to be introduced, but this was to be excluded in all cases 
 affecting vital interests or the honour of a State. As 
 each State was to remain its own judge as to what it 
 should regard as a cjuestion of honour or of vital inter- 
 ests, the Russian proposal cannot be said to have had a 
 revolutionary character, a matter to be regretted, for the 
 most important steps forward in the history of mankind 
 are achieved by revolutions and not by warfare as is 
 maintained by those who pay homage to war. The pro- 
 posal, then, secured the approval of almost all taking 
 part in the Conference; on this point also Germany alone 
 raised objection on the ground that subjection to a court 
 of arbitration was not, as Professor Zorn maintained, 
 "in conformity with the traditions of the Bismarckian 
 policy." 
 
 The opposition of Germany was so violent that nego- 
 tiations came to a dead stop, and they had to be post- 
 poned for a period of fourteen days to enable Professor 
 Zorn to receive new instructions from Berlin. The Con- 
 ference very nearly proceeded without the co-operation 
 of Germany. But here again, rather than allow the 
 whole proposal to be wrecked, it was resolved in the 
 end to yield to the will of Germany and in all cases 
 to allow optional in place of compulsory jurisdiction. 
 
 Here again Germany had the undisputed merit of hav- 
 ing barred the way to a decisive step forward in the 
 peaceful organisation of the nations. 
 
 The establishment of a perpetual court of arbitration 
 at the Hague was similarly refused by Germany from 
 the outset, and it was admitted only when it was made 
 optional and not compulsory to summon this court. 
 Thus the first Hague conference ended, in spite of Ger- 
 many and Austria, and owing to the active exertions of 
 France and England in support of the efforts of Russia 
 for peace, with a final result which after all represented 
 a first important step towards the aim of an organisa-
 
 92 I ACCUSE! 
 
 tion of States based on law and of a gradual liberation 
 of the nations from the intolerable oppression of their 
 armaments. 
 
 BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCES : 
 THE ENGLISH LIBERAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Between the first and the second Hague Conferences 
 — the second was held from July to October, 1907 — 
 the development of events in the different European 
 countries was highly characteristic of the attitude of 
 these countries and of their governments towards the 
 problems of the Hague, and the occurrences during this 
 period serve to emphasise in the sharpest manner the 
 difference between England and Germany. 
 
 Even before the first Conference was held, Goschen, 
 the First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking on behalf of 
 the English Conservative Government, made a definite 
 declaration on March 9th, 1899, in favour of a regulation 
 by treaty of the system of armaments. This declaration 
 was confirmed in July, 1903, by Mr, Chamberlain, a 
 member of the Government, with the observation that 
 it was still regarded as binding on the English Cabinet.^ 
 
 When in 1905 the Liberal party came into power and 
 Campbell-Bannerman, a convinced pacifist, became 
 leader of the Ministry, the English Government at once 
 began to display an energetic and untiring activity on 
 the same lines as the efforts which at the first Hague 
 Conference had, chiefly in consequence of the opposition 
 of Germany, produced only very modest results. 
 
 This activity of the English Liberal Government was 
 on so large a scale and was so comprehensive that it 
 is impossible within the limits of this work to emphasise 
 all their individual acts. In Parliament, at inter-Parlia- 
 mentary Conferences, in speeches at clubs and at the 
 ^ See Fried. Handbuch der Friedensbewegung, II, p. 767.
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 93 
 
 Guildhall, in diplomatic negotiations with other Powers, 
 in newspaper and magazine articles, English Ministers 
 never grew weary of laying stress on the perniciousness 
 for all nations of the competition in armaments by land 
 and by sea, and never flagged in their efforts to devise 
 remedial measures for this ruinous situation. These 
 same men who are to-day represented to the deluded and 
 infatuated German people as men refined in the prepara- 
 tion and instigation of war, whose personal honour Ger- 
 man historians dare to deny, men like Grey. Haldane, 
 Lloyd George, Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, and the 
 others, these men devoted themselves with the utmost 
 zeal to these problems, which, as they well saw, affected 
 the vital nerve not only of England, but of all European 
 states. "A policy of huge armaments," exclaimed Camp- 
 bell-Bannerman in his programme, "keeps alive and 
 stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, if 
 not the only, solution of international differences." ^ 
 
 "I wish," Haldane, then Minister for War, declared 
 in the House of Commons on March 8th, 1906, "we were 
 near the time when the nations would consider together 
 the reduction of armaments . . . only by united action 
 can we get rid of the burden which is pressing so heavily 
 on all civilised nations." ^ 
 
 On the occasion of a banciuet on September 26th in 
 the same year the Prime Minister expressed the hope 
 that the understanding then reached with regard to 
 Morocco (the Algeciras Convention had been completed 
 on April 7th) would lead to a possibility of reducing the 
 oppressive military expenditure, and he declared that 
 England would put itself at the head in this matter. 
 
 To this intention the English Government gave effect. 
 The outline of the Russian programme for the second 
 Hague Conference, publishe d in spring, 1906, contained 
 
 ^ [Albert Hall speech December 21st, 1905.] 
 * [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 153, 8, 674.]
 
 94 I ACCUSE! 
 
 nothing on the problem of armaments, presumably be- 
 cause the Russian Government had gathered from the 
 attitude of Germany at the first Conference that any dis- 
 cussion of this question would be useless. The English 
 Liberal Government now made the most determined 
 efforts to secure the inclusion in the programme of the 
 Conference of the question of armaments as well as the 
 question of arbitration. A proposal on this point, put 
 forward in the House of Commons by the Labour mem- 
 ber, Mr. Vivian, was accepted unanimously amid ap- 
 plause, and the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, 
 associated himself with the resolution on behalf of the 
 Government. 
 
 *T do not believe," said Grey, "that at any time has 
 the conscious public opinion in the various countries 
 of Europe set more strongly in the direction of peace 
 than at the present time, and yet the burden of military 
 and naval expenditure goes on increasing. . . . No 
 greater service could it (the Hague Conference) do, 
 than to make the conditions of peace less expensive than 
 they are at the present time. ... It is said we are wait- 
 ing upon foreign nations in order to reduce our expen- 
 diture. As a matter of fact, we are all waiting on each 
 other. Some day or other somebody must take the first 
 step. ... I do, on behalf of the Government, not only 
 accept, but welcome such a resolution as this as a whole- 
 some and beneficial expression of opinion." ^ 
 
 When in July, 1906, the Interparliamentary Union, 
 including 620 representatives from twenty-three coun- 
 tries, met in London, the Prime Minister, Campbell-Ban- 
 nerman, made a memorable speech in opening the pro- 
 ceedings : "Insist, in the name of humanity," he ex- 
 claimed to the members, "that your Government should 
 go to the Conference at the Hague with the firm inten- 
 tion with which we ourselves are going, with the inten- 
 ^ [Hansard, 1906, Vol. 156, 78, 1414-5.]
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 95 
 
 tion of diminishing the burdens of the Army and Navy 
 Estimates." 
 
 The American pohtician, William Jennings Bryan, 
 who also was present, expressed himself in the same 
 sense. A resolution, corresponding to the views then 
 expressed, was carried unanimously. 
 
 In the following year, some months before the open- 
 ing of the Conference, Campbell-Bannerman spoke even 
 more strongly in a meeting of the House of Commons 
 on March 5th, 1907, in support of the idea of a common 
 restriction of armaments. He declared that it was the 
 duty of England to bring this matter forward for dis- 
 cussion before the second Hague Conference, "holding 
 the opinion that there is a great movement of feeling 
 among thinking people in all the nations of the world 
 in favour of . . . some restraint on the enormous ex- 
 penditure involved in the present system so long as it 
 exists. . . . We have desired and still desire to place 
 ourselves in the very front rank of those who think that 
 the warlike attitude of Powers as displayed by the ex- 
 cessive growth of arviainents is a curse to Europe, and 
 that the sooner it is checked, in however moderate a de- 
 gree, the better." ^ 
 
 The leading men in the other countries of Europe and 
 of America also gave expression to views similar to 
 those of the English Ministers. Leon Bourgeois in Paris, 
 Tittoni, then Foreign Minister in Rome, Roosevelt in 
 his message to Congress, all expressed themselves in 
 favour of an agreement with regard to armaments, and 
 a discussion of this question at the Hague Conference. 
 
 Only Austria and Germany made once again a vain- 
 glorious exception. Li reply to an inquiry on the sub- 
 ject Count Gulochowski gave in the Austrian Delega- 
 tions only an evasive answer. In Germany the mere 
 idea of an international discussion of these questions 
 ' ' [Hansard, 1907, Vol. 170, 78, 675.]
 
 96 I ACCUSE! 
 
 was at once enough to let loose the devil of nationalism. 
 Behind the efforts of the other Powers they scented, as 
 usual, a cunning trick to deprive Germany of her de- 
 fences, and they professed to see the danger of war 
 threatening them in the inclusion of such a point in the 
 Hague programme. "The nearer the Peace Conference 
 approaches," so wrote the Tägliche Rundschau in a lead- 
 ing article on April 9th, 1907, "the clearer it becomes 
 that it is expressly characterised by tendencies inimical 
 to peace." Herr Bassermann, a representative in the 
 Reichstag, did not venture to hope for a more peaceful 
 situation until after the Hague Conference had been 
 safely got over. The Prussian Minister of War osten- 
 tatiously emphasised Germany's readiness for war. 
 Liebermann von Sonnenberg, a representative in the 
 House, concluded a patriotic Pan-German speech in the 
 Reichstag with the courageous words : "Let them come." 
 And last, but not least. Prince Bülow did not allow 
 himself to hope for any results from the discussion of 
 the problem at the Hague, and publicly expressed his 
 intention of "leaving the discussion to be conducted by 
 those Powers alone who hoped that any success might 
 result from it." 
 
 That was the answer which Gennany gave to the Eng- 
 lish proposal for an international agreement on arma- 
 ments. 
 
 SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE: ENGLAND AND GERMANY 
 
 The negotiations which took place at the Conference 
 corresponded to the very promising way in which it 
 began. Matters took pretty much the same course as 
 at the first Conference. England wanted a discussion 
 of the problem of armaments; Germany, however, de- 
 clined it. To avoid a conflict a way out was sought and 
 found. The first representative of England, the Lord
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 97 
 
 Chief Justice, Sir Edward Fry, delivered a speech in 
 which he elucidated the problem from every point of 
 view, and proposed a resolution which declared that it 
 was eminently desirable that Governments should re- 
 sume their study of the question. This resolution was 
 unanimously adopted, since according to the arrange- 
 ment made no discussion could take place. 
 
 Once more we see that Germany scored a brilliant 
 success; once again a pathway to progress was barri- 
 caded ! 
 
 When a member of the House, Bebel, interpellated 
 Prince Biilow in the sitting of the Reichstag of Novem- 
 ber 2 ist, 1907, with regard to the attitude of the German 
 delegates, the Imperial Chancellor could truthfully reply 
 that the German delegates had taken no part in a dis- 
 cussion on the question of armaments, because such a 
 discussion had not taken place. But he forgot to add 
 that this exclusion of a debate had been dictated by 
 Germany. 
 
 In England there was naturally universal disappoint- 
 ment over the failure of the noble-minded efforts of 
 leading Liberal Ministers, A few months before his 
 death Campbell-Bannerman gave expression to this dis- 
 appointment in the words : "We had hoped that a great 
 step forward might be made in the direction of putting 
 a stop to the increasing competition of armaments. We 
 were disappointed." 
 
 They were disappointed but not disheartened. After 
 this failure to arrive at the desired end along the path of 
 international agreement the method of private negotior- 
 tions with Germany was adopted. We shall see later 
 with what success. 
 
 Apart from the problem of armaments the question 
 which chiefly engaged the attention of the second Hague 
 Conference was naturally that of international arbitra- 
 tion. The problem before them was to give to the torso
 
 98 I ACCUSE! 
 
 of 1889 a firmer and more harmonious form. It was in- 
 tended that the compulsory element, which had miscar- 
 ried owing to Germany, should be inserted in the earlier 
 resolutions. In order not to encounter once more the 
 opposition of Germany a very complicated proposal had 
 been prepared, which, it is true, made it compulsory for 
 the contracting Powers to submit to arbitration, but only 
 subject to the exclusion of all questions which affected 
 important interests or the independence of the parties 
 to the dispute. 
 
 Even this limited element of compulsion encountered 
 the determined resistance of Germany. The proposal 
 was remodelled in every direction in order to meet Ger- 
 many; but not even this watery proposal gained the ap- 
 proval of Germany, which voted against it along with 
 Austria, while the great majority of States, Including 
 England, France, and Russia, accepted the proposal by 
 32 votes to 9. 
 
 But even then the path of tribulation of international 
 arbitration was not ended. The proposal was put for- 
 ward that the agreement accepted by so great a majority 
 should be binding at least on those Powers which had 
 concurred in it. But the German representative, Frei- 
 herr von Marschall, protested against this as a violation 
 of the principle of unanimity, and no other course was 
 open to the Conference than to be content on this ques- 
 tion also with a declaration which, indeed, expressed the 
 platonic inclination of the Powers to the principle of 
 compulsory arbitration, but, in practice, "preserved for 
 each of the Powers represented the maintenance of its 
 own standpoint." 
 
 Thus the number of Germany's successes increase! 
 Our title of glory, that of being everywhere a drag on 
 the peaceful understanding between the nations, will 
 remain undisputed, but it can scarcely contribute to mak- 
 ing us loved throughout the world.
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 99 
 
 ENGLISH PROPOSALS FOR A POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING 
 AND FOR A NAVAL AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY. 
 
 Scarcely had the sound of the peaceful concluding 
 words of the President of the Conference died away in 
 the Rittersaal at the Hague when the English Ministers 
 began to turn their attention to devising new ways 
 whereby they could attain the object that hovered be- 
 fore them — an end equally advantageous to all the na- 
 tions. After all outstanding questions between England 
 and France had been disposed of by the Convention of 
 April, 1904, and the conflicts of interest between Eng- 
 land and Russia had likewise been overcome by the 
 Agreement of 1907, the Liberal Government, which, 
 after the death of Campbell-Bannerman, was now under 
 the leadership of Asquith, regarded it as the most impor- 
 tant task of its foreign policy to establish its relations 
 with Germany on a basis calculated to exclude, as far as 
 possible, the occurrence of conflicts. There were no real 
 conflicting interests or occasions of friction between 
 England and Germany, or at most these only existed 
 to a very small extent. The difficulties in East Africa 
 had been regulated by the treaty concluded in 1890 by 
 Salisbury and Caprivi whereby Heligoland was handed 
 over to Germany, and in return concessions were made 
 to England in East Africa. Questions arising in Asia 
 Minor scarcely offered enough material for a serious con- 
 flict, and the treaty concluded in the early summer of 
 1914, notwithstanding the tension in the political situa- 
 tion, shows that the peaceful demarcation of spheres 
 of interest between England and Germany involved no 
 particular difficulty where there was mutual good will. 
 
 "What, then, is the object of this competition in naval 
 armaments, which constantly grows more fatal for both 
 sides?" — this was the question which the English Gov- 
 ernment and English public opinion was bound to ask.
 
 100 I ACCUSE! 
 
 If both countries desired peace, why should they ruin 
 each other in armaments? If, however, one side pro- 
 poses limitation of armament by treaty, as England did 
 at the Hague in 1889 and 1907, and the other side con- 
 stantly declines any such limitation, is it not, in these 
 circumstances, a justifiable suspicion that the party which 
 declines entertains unconfessed intentions against the 
 party which makes the proposal? 
 
 The English public were logically bound to propound 
 such questions to themselves, and they might quite rightly 
 put the further question : What would Germany, what 
 would the whole of Europe say, if England, the leading 
 Power on sea, zvere suddenly to begin to create a force 
 by land, which sooner or later might become equal to the 
 German in strength ? Would not this rightly be regarded 
 as a threat against the Power competing against her 
 on the Continent ? The German naval law and the con- 
 stant increases in naval strength effected at short inter- 
 vals of time, whereby Gennany, in the course of twenty 
 years, has become the second naval Power in the world, 
 was bound to place the English Government before the 
 alternative of either answering Germany's naval arma- 
 ments by a corresponding increase in their own or em- 
 barking on the attempt to make good, by a private agree- 
 ment between Germany and England, the general ar- 
 rangements which had been wrecked at the Hague. Mr. 
 Asquith's Government chose in the first place the latter 
 way, which was thorny enough in view of Germany's 
 opposition in principle to restrictions of armaments of 
 any kind, imposed by way of a treaty. 
 
 This disinclination must, indeed remain entirely in- 
 comprehensible to the ordinary man. It is probably a 
 part of the superior insight of those who govern by the 
 grace of God to be in a position to dispute the correct- 
 ness of the following simple calculations. The English 
 say to the Germans : "We consider that the present re-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 101 
 
 lation in strength of our two fleets, sixteen to ten, is a 
 suitable one, and in any case, since we do not possess an 
 army of any importance, we consider ourselves under 
 an obligation to stick to this proportion for the main- 
 tenance of our power and for the protection of our 
 trade and of our over-sea possessions. If you, Germany, 
 agree to this proportion being fixed, so much the better 
 for both of us ; further construction will then be useless, 
 for the relative strength of the one compared to the 
 other will always remain the same. If, however, you do 
 not agree, so much the worse for you. We on our side 
 will then lay down two ships for every ship which you 
 lay down; the relation of sixteen to ten will thus be 
 at once changed to your disadvantage, absolutely as 
 well as relatively. When you have built ten new ships, 
 that is to say, when you have got as far as twenty, we 
 will have built twenty new ships, and will have reached 
 thirty-six, etc. The absolute distance between our two 
 fleets will thus constantly increase, and the relative posi- 
 tion will constantly become more unfavourable for you. 
 In the end we will ruin each other, and will be like the 
 Kilkenny cats which ate each other up until only the 
 tails were left. It is for you to choose. If you decide 
 on our first proposal, in ten years' time you will be in as 
 safe a position as you are to-day, and you will have 
 spared your money and your people. If you choose the 
 second proposal your security will be diminished every 
 year, and at the same time you will be gradually ruining 
 yourself; and it will be but a small consolation to you 
 that you are at the same time bringing us to the verge 
 of ruin also. 
 
 One would have thought that a ragged schoolboy, who 
 had just learned the first elements of the multiplication 
 table, would have understood this calculation, and would 
 have been overjoyed to accept the first proposal. The 
 German Imperial Government could not rise to this
 
 102 I ACCUSE! 
 
 height, and so the wearisome negotiations constantly re- 
 newed from the side of England — they might be called 
 the seven years' armaments war of 1907-14 — collapsed 
 without result. Indeed, it may be asserted that the fail- 
 ure of the negotiations, the constant increase of arma- 
 ments caused thereby, and the increasing tension In the 
 political situation due to the increased armaments, are 
 to a considerable extent responsible for the fact that a 
 real war has at last grown out of the war of arma- 
 ments. 
 
 The responsibility for this is exclusively Germany's, 
 as a short account of the relevant events will reveal. 
 
 At the seventeenth World Peace Congress, which met 
 in London in July and August, 1908, the Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer, Mr. Lloyd George, advocated with pas- 
 sionate words an understanding between England and 
 Germany, and lamented "that it should be necessary in 
 the twentieth century of the Christian Era to hold a 
 meeting in a civilised country to protest against the ex- 
 penditure by Christian communities of 400 millions a 
 year upon preparing one nation to kill another." Mr. 
 Asquith, the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the Lord 
 Mayor's banquet in 1908, gave the assurance that Eng- 
 land would "not be reluctant to grasp any hand that is 
 extended to us in good will and in good faith." On 
 March i6th in the following year Mr. Asquith stated to 
 the House of Commons that the question of a mutual 
 reduction of expenditure for naval purposes had more 
 than once formed the subject of communications between 
 the two Governments, but unfortunately without result.^ 
 This utterance of the English Prime Minister led, in the 
 last days of March, to a discussion in the German Reich- 
 stag, in the course of which various speakers urgently 
 besought the Government to grasp somewhat more ener- 
 getically the hand offered by England. Bassermann, a 
 ^ [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 72, 8, i,459]
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 103 
 
 member of the House, felt, of course, all kinds of 
 scruples, and prepared the way for Prince Biilow, who 
 in the first place denied that any definite proposal had 
 been made by England, and on the general question "held 
 out no hope of any effective results from negotia- 
 tions with reference to the limitation of naval con- 
 struction." 
 
 These utterances of Biilow occasioned a new discus- 
 sion in the English House of Commons, in the course 
 of which the Foreign Secretary, Sir E. Grey, delivered a 
 highly Important speech on the naval competition be- 
 tween England and Germany. For England, declared 
 the Foreign Secretary, the Navy was what the Army was 
 to Germany. The superiority of the English Navy must 
 be maintained, but on the basis of this superiority an 
 understanding might very well be arranged between the 
 two countries. Grey let it be seen that England might 
 be prepared to alter her attitude with regard to the ques- 
 tion of the capture of an enemy's private property at 
 sea, if this would be accepted as a starting-point for 
 a diminution of naval expenditure.^ 
 
 In introducing the Navy Estimates in 1909 Mr. Mc- 
 Kenna, then First Lord of the Admiralty, speaking in 
 the House of Commons on July 26th, declared that "the 
 British Government not only expressed its desire, but by 
 something much stronger than words showed its deter- 
 mination to give the lead in restricting armaments, and 
 for three successive years the British Government did 
 its utmost to convince the world of the futility of Its 
 race in armaments, and of the desirability of curtailing 
 construction." ^ After enumerating all the previous en- 
 deavours of England, which unfortunately had proved 
 fruitless, Mr. Asquith also declared that even then the 
 door was still open and that they were anxious and even 
 
 ^ [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 3, 61.] 
 ' [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 859.]
 
 104 I ACCUSE! 
 
 eager to come to some arrangement with other PoAvers.^ 
 Every indication that the German Government dasired 
 to enter into such an agreement would meet with the 
 heartiest reception from the English Government. In 
 answer to a question of a member Mr. Asquith answered 
 shortly and definitely: "We have taken the initiative." 
 
 The more the English Ministers revealed their en- 
 deavour to arrive at an understanding with Germany on 
 the question of naval armaments, the more did they be- 
 come an object of attack and suspicion to the German 
 chauvinist press. On July 14th, 19 10, Mr. Asquith was 
 obliged to declare that the German Government had 
 evaded further inquiries, stating that they were bound 
 by a law, and that a modification of this law would not 
 have the support of public opinion in Germany.^ On 
 the following day Mr, Lloyd George, speaking at a ban- 
 quet, denounced in passionate words **the epidemic of 
 prodigality which seems to be sweeping over the world 
 and sweeping to destruction." 
 
 In reply to these earnest and uninterrupted efforts of 
 the English Ministry the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann 
 Hollweg, offered in December, 19 10, a few platonic ob- 
 servations which must have acted like a stream of cold 
 water: England, he said, had indeed made suggestions, 
 but had submitted no positive proposals ; Gennany in the 
 pourparlers had constantly started from the idea that an 
 open and unrestrained discussion leading to an under- 
 standing with regard to their interests on both sides was 
 the surest means of overcoming any distrust due to 
 their relative strength by land and by water. "The mere 
 continuance of a free and unrestrained exchange of 
 thought on all questions connected with these matters is 
 a guarantee for the friendly intention , . ." &c. 
 
 As Thoas says in "Iphige nie" : ^ 
 
 - [Hansard, 1909. Vol. 8, 879.] 
 ^ [Hansard, 1910. Vol. 19, 645.]
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 105 
 
 "A flood of words is useless in refusing; 
 The other hears in all the one word : 'No.' " * 
 
 This "No!" resounds again with full distinctness in 
 the following year. In the House of Commons on 
 March 13th, 191 1, Grey had once more emphasised the 
 necessity of arriving at an agreement with Germany and 
 of restricting the continuing increase of the expenditure 
 on armaments. He foresaw that if this tremendous ex- 
 penditure on, and rivalry of, armaments continued, it 
 must in the long run break civilisation down. The bur- 
 den of armaments was a greater danger than war itself, 
 since it involved a bleeding to death in time of peace.^ 
 
 This speech of Grey formed the subject of the debate 
 in the Reichstag on March 30th, 191 1, in which the 
 Imperial Chancellor — ^now quite plainly and without any 
 concealment — declared that the question of an agreement 
 as to armaments was insoluble so long as men were men 
 and States were States. 
 
 Thus the decisive word was now spoken, and in view 
 of Parliamentary conditions in Germany little signifi- 
 cance could be attached to the fact that the Reichstag 
 passed a resolution calling upon the Chancellor to enter 
 into negotiations with other Powers wath regard to the 
 limitation of armaments should the occasion arise. Ac- 
 cording to German political law of the Bismarckian tra- 
 dition the Imperial Chancellor is, as is well known, 
 merely the servant of his lord, and is not obliged to pay 
 any attention to Parliamentary resolutions. 
 
 But the English did not yet relax their efforts. Events 
 in Morocco had led to the dispatch of a German warship 
 to Agadir, and to negotiations arising out of this be- 
 tween the Powers affected — negotiations which put a 
 
 ^ "Man spricht vergebens viel, um zu versagen 
 
 Der andere hört in allem nur das Nein." 
 "[Hansard, 191 1. Vol. 22, 1,985-6.]
 
 106 I ACCUSE! 
 
 severe strain on the peace of Europe. In the autumn 
 of 191 1, the negotiations at last arrived, through many 
 perils, at the goal, with the result that the disputes be- 
 tween France and Germany with regard to Morocco 
 were finally composed, and as an equivalent for France's 
 freedom of action in Morocco a portion of French Congo 
 was ceded to the German Empire. Scarcely had this 
 cloud passed away from the political horizon when Sir 
 Edward Grey emphasised anew, in the English Parlia- 
 ment on November 27th, 191 1, England's urgent desire 
 for the establishment of better relations with Germany. 
 The existing friendships of England did not constitute 
 a hindrance to the conclusion of new friendships. Eng- 
 land had co-operated in securing a peaceful solution of 
 the Morocco crisis, the air was now purified, and he 
 would gladly welcome any wish on the part of Ger- 
 many for better relations with England.^ 
 
 In the beginning of February, 19 12, the English Gov- 
 ernment sent Lord Haldane to Berlin, not as an official 
 plenipotentiary, but with the task of sounding the ground 
 in conversations with the Chancellor and the Emperor, 
 with whom Haldane was a persona gratissima, and if 
 possible of preparing the way for the political and naval 
 agreement which had been so long sought. The prelude 
 to Lord Haldane's activity was not exactly encouraging; 
 two days before his arrival in Berlin the Emperor, in 
 opening the Reichstag, had announced great increases 
 both in the Army and in the Navy. The increase in the 
 Navy was to extend to no less than three capital ships, 
 many submarines, and fifteen hundred men. On this 
 Lord Haldane put to the Chancellor and to Admiral 
 von Tirpitz the very proper question : What would be 
 the use of negotiations aiming at friendly relations be- 
 tween the two Powers, if Germany was going at the 
 same moment to increase her battle fleet as a precaution 
 
 ^[Hansard, 191 1. Vol. 32, 43-65.]
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 107 
 
 against England, and thereby compel England to a cor- 
 responding increase on her side? Negotiations with a 
 view to friendly relations accompanied by increases in 
 the Navy would provoke worldwide derision. The Ger- 
 man representatives indicated that a naval agreement 
 without a simultaneous political Entente was purposeless, 
 but they also at once emphasised that even in the event 
 of a political understanding, there could be no question 
 of a reduction in the naval programme, but that at the 
 most a certain retardation in carrying it out might be 
 approved.^ The promise of a possible retardation in 
 naval construction was even further limited in that it 
 was to be an "understanding and not a written agree- 
 ment." 
 
 Thus, while on the one hand the aim pursued with un- 
 tiring zeal by the Liberal English Government for seven 
 years, the aim of arriving at a cessation of naval arma- 
 ments on both sides, remained unachieved — since the pro- 
 posed retardation, which was not even of a binding na- 
 ture, would result neither in such a cessation nor in a 
 saving of expenditure — Germany, on the other hand, 
 demanded, as an equivalent for these so-called conces- 
 sions, political conditions which it was simply impossible 
 for England to fulfil. The attitude assumed by the Ger- 
 man Government in connection with all Anglo-German 
 negotiations is in itself sufficiently remarkable, namely, 
 that an equivalent could justifiably be demanded in re- 
 turn for a concession, which, after all, did not repre- 
 sent a sacrifice on one side, but was a duty implicit in 
 the vital interests of both. With just as much right an 
 equivalent could have been demanded by England, who 
 was equally ready to bind herself. 
 
 ^ These and the following facts are taken from Sir Edward Cook's 
 pamphlet entitled : How Britain Strove for Peace. A Record of 
 Anglo-German Negotiations 1898-1914. Told from authoritative 
 sources. (Macmillan and Co., London, 1914.)
 
 108 I ACCUSE! 
 
 But, to pursue the question, what was the equivalent 
 demanded by Germany? Germany demanded neither 
 more nor less — and here it revived a demand already 
 formulated in previous years by the Chancellor, Beth- 
 mann Hollweg — than the obligation for Britain of un- 
 conditional neutrality in the event of any European con- 
 flict in which Germany might be involved. England was 
 thus to free herself from her engagements to the En- 
 tente and was to withhold herself from every co-opera- 
 tion in European questions. In view of the close alliance 
 with Austria it was scarcely possible to conceive a con- 
 flict in which Germany might not be involved, either 
 on account of her own interests or on account of those 
 of Austria, yet everywhere England was expected to re- 
 main an inactive spectator, and to allow Germany and 
 her ally full freedom to rule the roast on the Continent. 
 Even treaty-obligations to protect neutrals would have 
 been abolished had England concurred in the German 
 proposal of an unconditional neutrality in all disputes 
 affecting Germany. 
 
 It is, therefore, not surprising that this suggestion, 
 which had already been rejected between 1909 and 191 1, 
 should again have been rejected in 19 12 after Haldane's 
 visit; indeed, it amounted to no more than a demand 
 that England shoidd simply renounce her position as a 
 European great Power. This demand would in any case 
 have been monstrous, even if its fulfilment had been 
 sought to be purchased at a high price. But what was 
 the price offered by Herr von Bethmann Hollweg? An 
 unbinding, unwritten, temporary retardation, which in- 
 volved no reduction in naval construction on the basis 
 of the most recent increase of the fleet in 19 12. 
 
 This suggestion was really rather strong, and postu- 
 lated a high degree of simplicity on the part of the 
 shrewd English men of business. What, indeed, would 
 German diplomacy have said if it had been suggested 
 
 I
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 109 
 
 that Germany should sell the birthright of her position 
 as a great Power in Europe in exchange for the mess 
 of pottage of an English retardation in naval construc- 
 tion ? 
 
 Sir Edward Grey was obliged to decline the German 
 proposal; he did not, however, content himself with 
 merely declining it, but he repeated again on this occa- 
 sion what he had said in previous years in public as well 
 as in diplomatic negotiations; that is to say: 
 
 1. That England could not agree to an unconditional 
 obligation to observe neutrality, such as Germany de- 
 manded, but, on the other hand, she would always be 
 ready, as she had hitherto been, to work in common with 
 Germany in the interests of the peace of Europe ; 
 
 2. That the Triple Entente was not based on general 
 political formulas, but on a settlement of specific ques- 
 tions affecting the interests of the Entente Powers, and 
 that only indirectly by the settlement of these questions 
 and by the removal of causes of friction had relations 
 of friendship resulted ; 
 
 3. That these relations had neither an exclusive nor 
 an offensive character against Germany and that there 
 was no reason why Germany should not enter into simi- 
 lar relations with England. 
 
 In order to give as precise a fonii as possible to these 
 ideas the English Cabinet resolved to express them in 
 a short formula, which was handed by Sir Edward Grey 
 to the German Ambassador, Count Metternich, and 
 which was intended to serve as a basis for further naval 
 negotiations. The formula ran as follows : — 
 
 "The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing 
 peace and friendship between them, England declares 
 that she will neither make, nor join in, a/ny unprovoked 
 attack upon Germany. Aggression upon Germany is 
 not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, under- 
 standing, or combination to which England is now a
 
 110 I ACCUSE! 
 
 party, nor will she become a party to anything that has 
 such an object." 
 
 England thus promised that she would, for herself, 
 make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and that she 
 would not share in any such venture; she further de- 
 clared that an attack upon Germany was neither contem- 
 plated nor permitted by any treaty or convention to 
 which she was a party. Lastly, England promised that 
 she would never be a party in any such treaty or agree- 
 ment. This was thus a promise of non-aggression in 
 the widest sense of the word. What more could Ger- 
 many reasonably ask? Germany was secured against 
 every attack on the part of England, and with this se- 
 curity any reason or pretence for naval competition col- 
 lapsed, unless — and there's the rub! — unless Germany 
 herself had aggressive intentions against her neighbours, 
 England's friends in the Entente, and thus indirectly 
 against England. Here we have the salient point, on 
 which the year-long negotiations between the two coun- 
 tries constantly and necessarily came to grief, 
 
 England oifered the assurance that she would not 
 attack. Germany, however, asked for security to he 
 able to attack undisturbed. The English offer had little 
 value for Germany, since the German Government knew 
 quite well from the attitude of the English Liberal Cabi- 
 net since 1905 that there was no ground to fear an at- 
 tack from the side of England. The only point that mat- 
 tered to Germany was that she should be able to count 
 on English neutrality, under all circumstances, in all 
 Continental conflicts, even if they were provoked by Ger- 
 many or her ally, and even if they affected the inde- 
 pendence of neutral countries, and thereby directly or 
 indirectly affected English interests. By isolating Eng- 
 land, Germany desired to make her path secure, in the 
 first place, to a hegemony on the Continent, in order 
 later on to rise from this advantageous position to the
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 111 
 
 perpetual leadership of the world at the cost of England. 
 This idea also dominates, as we shall see, German's dip- 
 lomatic preparations for the war in the last days of July, 
 1914. 
 
 "The thought is clever — devilishly so! 
 Apart from that, it might be called damned silly." ^ 
 
 Neither at an earlier nor at a later date did the English 
 allow themselves to be entrapped by this lime. The 
 negotiations of 19 12 failed, like all other negotiations 
 before and after this, on Germany's demand for neu- 
 trality. 
 
 But one last English attempt, again along different 
 lines, was still to be made. After the new German navy 
 increase of 19 12, after Haldane's visit had passed with- 
 out results, and after the last negotiations between Grey 
 and Metternich, the British Government resumed an at- 
 tempt — already undertaken under Campbell-Bannerman 
 in 1906 — to induce in the other side a better insight into 
 the interests of both parties through the measures actu- 
 ally adopted by them in connection with the Navy, with- 
 out having recourse to any diplomatic negotiations. Al- 
 though in spring, 1906, the German navy programme of 
 1900 had again been increased by six large cruisers, the 
 English Government announced in July of the same 
 year that the programme laid before Parliament in 
 March for the construction of new ships would be re- 
 duced by 25 per cent, in the case of battleships, by 60 
 per cent, in the case of destroyers, and by 33 per cent, 
 in the case of submarines. The reason for this one- 
 sided voluntary reduction was, as the Government ex- 
 pressly declared, on the one hand, to announce to the 
 whole world, before the meeting of the second Hague 
 
 '■ "War' der Gedank' nicht so verwünscht gescheit, 
 Man war' versucht, ihn herzlich dumm zu nennen."
 
 112 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Conference, England's firm intention to reduce the bur- 
 den of armaments, and, on the other, to induce other 
 Powers to follow the same procedure. This second 
 object was of course not realised in the case of Germany ; 
 rather the contrary effect was produced. On three dif- 
 ferent occasions — to the English Ambassador, Sir F. 
 Lascelles, to the English Under Secretary of State, Sir 
 Charles Hardinge, who accompanied King Edward to 
 Germany, and to the English Minister of War, Mr. 
 Haldane — the Kaiser in the late summer and in the 
 autumn of the same year personally expressed strong 
 disapprobation of any attempt to bring the question of 
 armaments before the Hague Conference, and declined 
 to allow the German delegates to take any part in this 
 superfluous and futile discussion. There could, as a 
 matter of course, be no question of the English example 
 being followed on the part of Germany. 
 
 In spite of this failure a similar attempt was made In 
 19 1 2-1 91 3 by Mr. Churchill, the First Lord of the Ad- 
 miralty. New negotiations with Germany after recent 
 experiences appeared futile, but as an alternative method 
 Churchill declared, in introducing the estimates in the 
 two years mentioned, that he pledged himself that any 
 retardation or reduction in German construction should 
 be followed by this country in fidl proportion. If Ger- 
 many decided to take a naval holiday and build no ships 
 in any given year, England would at once follow suit 
 and drop her programme for the year likewise. In this 
 way "without negotiations, bargainings, or the slightest 
 restriction upon the sovereign freedom of either power" 
 relief might be obtained for both nations. 
 
 This declaration of Churchill, which as we have ob- 
 served was officially repeated on two different occasions, 
 remained unanswered and unreciprocated by Germany, 
 presumably because here also she was awaiting "positive 
 proposals," which would then of course have been an-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 113 
 
 swered or reciprocated to no greater purpose than had 
 been done on previous occasions. 
 
 This is the history of the Anglo-German negotiations 
 extending over many years, of the vain wooing of Eng- 
 land for Germany's favour — a wooing which was un- 
 attended by success, since the coy beauty would sell 
 her favour only at a price which the wooer could not 
 pay unless he were prepared to sacrifice himself. Once 
 more it appeared, as if in this case also circumstances 
 were stronger than the will of man. The work of peace 
 pursued in common throughout the Balkan crisis, the 
 success achieved in maintaining peace, attributable exclu- 
 sively to the co-operation of the two Empires, had quite 
 automatically given a more friendly form to the re- 
 lations of the two countries to each other. The delimi- 
 tation of the spheres of interest in Asia Minor held 
 out the promise of a further favourable development of 
 these relations, but unfortunately this did not touch the 
 kernel of the question; the constantly increasing danger 
 involved in the competition in naval amiaments, occa- 
 sioned by Germany's infatuated refusal of every agree- 
 ment. 
 
 What would the world have looked like to-day if Ger- 
 many had accepted the last proposal put forward by 
 Grey in 1912? The security from every attack on the 
 part of England and her Allies would not indeed have 
 diverted Germany from her imperialistic ambitions, 
 which in their nature were bound to be aggressive, but 
 it would have deprived the German Government of the 
 pretext which has enabled them to represent their war 
 of prestige and expansion as a war of defence, and with- 
 out this pretext it would have been impossible to have 
 urged into so fearful a war the Gennan people, the 
 great majority of whom are attached to peace. The 
 truce in naval armaments would in addition have created 
 a more friendly atmosphere between Geniiany and Eng-
 
 114 I ACCUSE! 
 
 land, and as a consequence between the Triple Alliance 
 and the Triple Entente. It may be presumed that in 
 GeiTnany the last enormous increase in the army and 
 the measure providing for the raising of millions of 
 pounds would not have come into being. France would 
 not have introduced her system of three-year service, 
 and the Austro-Serbian dispute — which, as we shall see 
 later, any child could have solved — would not have led 
 to the universal war. 
 
 What Are We Fighting for? 
 
 If Germany really had no other objects than those 
 constantly advanced in all Imperial and princely speeches 
 and in all speeches by the Chancellor, "Security from at- 
 tack, free development for her forces, unhampered at- 
 tention to her culture," how could all these possessions 
 have been obtained more surely or more cheaply than 
 by accepting the English proposals ? 
 
 "We will persevere until we have the assurance that 
 no one will again disturb our peace, a peace in which 
 we will care for and develop German character and Ger- 
 man strength as a free nation," — with these words the 
 Imperial Chancellor concluded his speech on the 2nd of 
 December. A few days later the Emperor delivered an 
 address on the Eastern scene of war to the delegates 
 of the German and Austrian divisions : "We are fight- 
 ing," he exclaimed, "for a just cause, for freedom, for 
 the right of our nation to exist, for a long future peace." 
 His Majesty might have been respectfully answered in 
 these words, "May it please your Majesty, what we are 
 supposed to be fighting for wc had before the war began. 
 We had our freedom, the right to our national existence, 
 which no one disputed, and we had had a long undis- 
 turbed peace. Why then, your Majesty, are we fight- 
 ing?" And one might have added: If Germany be-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 115 
 
 lieved herself to be imperilled — which is not proved, and 
 which cannot be proved — why then did she not gain for 
 herself the greater security ofifered by England? The 
 security, which was then offered in peace, can never 
 again be achieved by victory on the battlefield. It could 
 not only have been obtained at less expense — for then 
 it would have cost neither life nor treasure — it would 
 also have been more enduring and more tenable. Ac- 
 cording to the dictum of Sallust, Kingdoms can only be 
 maintained by the means by which they were created, 
 and in the same way an international treaty, which is 
 intended to regulate the relations of nations in peace, is 
 more surely cemented by peaceful than by military 
 means. Treaties of Peace after war always contain the 
 tacit clause, rebus sic stantibus, which Kant, in his first 
 preliminary article of his work On Perpetual Peace, re- 
 gards as a hindrance to an enduring condition of peace. 
 Treaties of peace, however, established in time of peace, 
 which arise out of common interests and which do not 
 bear on their forehead the remembrance of death and 
 destruction, of hatred and vengeance, like the mark of 
 Cain, such treaties hold acre percnnins, and like all good 
 things carry in them the seeds of further good. 
 
 So I again say that what we are supposed to be fight- 
 ing for, zve already possessed. We possessed it more se- 
 curely than we will possess it for generations even after 
 a victorious war, and anything that we lacked we could 
 have obtained without war by a treaty in peace. 
 
 The Freedom Which "They" Mean.^ 
 
 But as we have said the questions at stake are quite 
 different from security, freedom, and the right to exist. 
 The word "freedom" is to-day very often heard in the 
 
 ^ [The title of this section is an adaptation of Max von Schenken- 
 dorf's song: "Freiheit, die ich meine."]
 
 116 I ACCUSE! 
 
 mouths of men who formerly crossed themselves thrice 
 on hearing the forbidden word from any other quarter. 
 We have all, without exception, become lovers of free- 
 dom over night, — above all those who previously ex- 
 tolled the "state of dependence willed by God." We 
 have become so enamoured of freedom that we mean to 
 bring it not only to our nation, but also to all the other 
 nations in the world. (See the explanation of the Im- 
 perial Chancellor to the American people.) We simply 
 no longer know how far the impulse to freedom will 
 carry us. . . . 
 
 "Be embraced, ye countless millions ! 
 With the wide world's ardent kiss." ^ 
 
 Social democrats, clericals, progressives, Poles, Danes, 
 Alsatians — all who were formerly enemies of the Empire 
 are now pressed by the Prussian Junker to his sensitive 
 heart — that is, on the assumption that they' keep the 
 "peace within" - which, as is known, consists in think- 
 ing, speaking, and writing as the Junkers think, speak, 
 and write. The transaction, however, is not a mutual 
 one, it is a societas leonina in the worst sense of the 
 word. Anyone who allows himself to think, or write, or 
 speak otherwise than is pleasing to the governing class 
 is suppressed, punished, or if need be, shot dead. That 
 is the freedom which they mean. 
 
 The German people will in time realise to what bond- 
 age these apostles of freedom are leading them. After 
 every period of exaltation of the German people a period 
 of bitterest bondage has always followed. It was so 
 after 1813, after 1848, and after 1870, when the first 
 years of the intoxication of victory had passed away. 
 
 ' ["Seid umschlungen, Millionen Diesen Kuss der ganzen Welt."] 
 ^[Burgfrieden. The jurisdiction of a castle, the peace within the 
 castle, hence almost equivalent to the "civil truce."]
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 117 
 
 It will be precisely the same after 19 14. The soldiers 
 and the Junkers, who in essential matters form one class, 
 feel themselves entirely in their element in war! It is 
 quite to their liking to suppress the freedom of the Press, 
 to suppress the right of free assembly, to throttle trade 
 and industry — the representatives of which had already 
 taken up too much room at the Imperial Court. "Cer- 
 tain barriers of Court etiquette" — we find in Liman, the 
 apostle of the Crown Prince — "still make inaccessible 
 to wealth certain pathways which are only open to the 
 sons of the old agnati of the kingdom and to officers; 
 otherwise the millionaire has carried off the victory, and 
 the society of the Court jostles in the salons of lucky 
 speculators or their heirs. The nobility of wealth grows 
 up, a new Junkerdom, which never saw a battlefield; it 
 is even spreading to the country, and already the capital 
 of the Empire is surrounded with a golden girdle of 
 luxurious estates. The list of guests invited to accom- 
 pany the Emperor on his northern tours shows the names 
 of numerous financial magnates. The new aristocracy 
 carries instead of the sword the dividend warrant, in- 
 stead of the shield the company prospectus, and it bears 
 as its weapon the bill of exchange. The nobility of the 
 sword, however, withdraws into the background; the 
 sons of those men who once won the battles of the 
 Hohenzollerns sit embarrassed on their fathers' acres. 
 And capital increases in the hands of a few until it as- 
 sumes gigantic proportions, and with it respect for 
 money whether it has been inherited or graspingly ac- 
 quired." 
 
 These are the thoughts of authoritative circles in 
 Prussia and in Germany on the subject of trade and in- 
 dustry. The dividend warrant and the bill of exchange 
 are for them the contemptible emblems of these ranks 
 of the nation on which Germany's greatness and her 
 position in the world are built, and which in the end
 
 118 I ACCUSE! 
 
 must provide the means of satisfying the military mega- 
 lomania of her "nobility of the sword." And is it likely 
 that those who entertain these thoughts will bring to the 
 German people freedom and equal privileges? When 
 the Moor has done his duty, he will be allowed to go/ 
 just as after 1813, 1848, and 1870. Even to-day, dur- 
 ing the war, the smelling-out of demagogues has begun. 
 Everywhere good Prussians are ferreting about for sus- 
 picious people who do not think like good Prussians or 
 good Germans. This can be seen at home, and even 
 more among Germans abroad. A military and a Junker 
 reaction will set in after the war such as the present 
 generation has never seen. And that is called fighting 
 for freedom, for German culture! 
 
 The End of Peace. Security? 
 
 The trend of thought of these circles will be notice- 
 able and will make itself felt on the conclusion of peace. 
 While German professors are bending over their maps 
 at their study-tables and are elaborating international 
 plans for the future formation of Europe, these men of 
 action are laughing at the crazy ideas of the Utopians, 
 just as they described the negotiations of the Hague 
 Conference as "chatter about everlasting peace" (Gen- 
 eral-Major von Deimling) and the English proposals 
 for agreement as lies and deception. For them there 
 is only one end of peace: oppression and security — 
 security, with the same brilliant success as has been se- 
 cured for us by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine; that 
 annexation which, so far, has brought us only difficulties 
 and no advantages either of a political or of an economi- 
 cal nature, which has, indeed, from a military point of 
 view, been directly injurious to us, since it led to the 
 
 ^ ["The Moor has done his work, — the Moor may go." — 
 
 — Schiller, Fiesco.]
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 119 
 
 creation of that new, and apparently impregnable, line 
 of fortresses, before which we have now been sitting for 
 more than five months. Security of our frontiers: be- 
 yond this the train of thought of our authoritative cir- 
 cles does not go, but with security they include, of course, 
 expansion in and outside Europe. They mean security 
 at any cost, without respect to the rights of nationalities, 
 the free destinies of nations, which after all we pretend 
 that we are defending, and without respect to the fact, 
 revealed by experience, that such a brutal policy of se- 
 curity constantly bears with itself the germs of new wars. 
 This security we could have had at a cheaper rate 
 and with a better prospect of permanence by an agree- 
 ment with England. France and Russia were as far 
 from entertaining aggressive intentions against Germany 
 as England was. He who maintains that such inten- 
 tions existed is bound to produce evidence to prove their 
 existence. He who denies their existence is not obliged 
 to prove the contrary. 
 
 Did France Mean to Attack Us? 
 
 So far as England is concerned I have been able to 
 produce conclusive rebutting evidence. With regard to 
 France I may be allowed to deal with the matter briefly, 
 since there is scarcely anyone in Germany — apart, of 
 course, from the Government — who seriously maintains 
 the assertion that France intended to attack us. That 
 France is not abused, but that, on the contrary, regret is 
 expressed that she was drawn into the war, innocently 
 and against her will, is one of the few remaining sympa- 
 thetic traits in the public life of Germany of to-day. As 
 a matter of fact, anyone who should advance the asser- 
 tion that the French Republic of 19 14 entertained even 
 the remotest idea of reconquering Alsace-Lorraine by 
 force of arms, would merely prove that he knows nothing
 
 UO I ACCUSE! 
 
 of the history or of the tendency of thought of modern 
 France, and that his judgment is based on impressions, 
 which may have been correct forty-four years ago, per- 
 haps even thirty-rour or twenty-four years ago, but 
 which in the last twenty years have more and more 
 faded into a phantom. 
 
 In framing this judgment I do not rely on newspaper 
 articles, but on personal impressions gained in France 
 during many periods of residence there, extending over 
 many years. Until about the middle of the 'nineties 
 the wound of Alsace-Lorraine still ached ; from that time 
 it healed more and more, and about the beginning of 
 the new century scarcely a trace of the old wound re- 
 mained. The end of Boulangism rang in the end of 
 the revanche idea; the worst of the noisy patriots, De- 
 roulede at their head, were condemned or banished from 
 France. The result of the Dreyfus affair, with the vic- 
 tory of the party of illumination, purified the atmosphere 
 from the powers of darkness, from the forces of political 
 and clerical reaction, which in France were favourable 
 to a policy of war, as they are to-day in Germany. Con- 
 vinced friends of peace like Jules Simon, Frederick 
 Passy, the Senator Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, 
 and, above all, Jaures, gained more and more influence 
 on serious public opinion, and pressed into the back- 
 ground the noisy patriots of the Boulevard. The intel- 
 lectual relations between France and Gennany constantly 
 became more intimate. Politicians, writers, actors and 
 actresses of distinction, learned men and artists, brought 
 about this exchange in matters of the mind on this side 
 and on that, and by the reciprocation of visits succeeded 
 in establishing personal relations between the countries. 
 Coquelin and Sarah Bernhardt were honoured in Ger- 
 many and were received by the Emperor with marks of 
 distinction. In the summer of 190 1 two French officers 
 of high rank paid an official visit to Berlin, and were in-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 121 
 
 vited by the Emperor to a military banquet at which 
 one of these officers, General Bonnal, proposed the toast 
 of the German Army and their soldier-Emperor. In- 
 numerable other phenomena could be cited to show the 
 increasing understanding and friendship between the 
 two nations. The speech of Jaures in the French Cham- 
 ber of Deputies, in June, 1902, was, however, epoch- 
 making ; in this speech expression was, for the first time, 
 given, in clear words and from a responsible quarter, 
 to the thought that it was at last time to forget the ideas 
 of revanche, to become reconciled with history, and to 
 free the nations of Europe from the intolerable burden 
 of armaments. The speech of Jaures found almost 
 unanimous approval in the French Chamber and in the 
 whole of the serious-minded Press. Certain chauvinistic 
 rags, of course, which, like similar papers in our coun- 
 try, earn their daily bread by stirring up passion, ex- 
 pressed their discontent with Jaures, but they could not 
 alter the fact that the .Socialist leader had given ex- 
 pression to the views of the overwhelming majority of 
 the industrious and thrifty French nation. In a speech 
 in November, 1904, Jaures developed his train of thought 
 and held up an alliance with Germany based on a renun- 
 ciation of all retaliation by force as an end worthy of 
 pursuit. A few months later the Morocco dispute began, 
 when, in March, 1905, the Emperor William landed in 
 Tangier, and in an address to the Envoys of the Sultan 
 ran counter to French policy in Morocco. Was France 
 to blame for the tension which now arose? Must France 
 be held responsible for the fact that this challenging 
 action on the part of Germany produced — as in the case 
 of the Krüger telegram previously, and the ship sent to 
 Agadir later — the opposite effect from what was in- 
 tended? These theatrical coups are indeed no proper 
 instrument for use in foreign policy. They are irri- 
 tating rather than impressive, and since it is more diffi-
 
 122 I ACCUSE! 
 
 cult to effect an understanding between people In a state 
 of irritation than between people who are not so irri- 
 tated, it would be advisable to discontinue such theatrical 
 coups and to convey our wishes to foreign Governments 
 in a normal, business-like way. The atmosphere of irri- 
 tation which since then has almost continuously governed 
 our diplomatic relations with France must accordingly 
 be attributed to us and not to France. 
 
 Notwithstanding all this it was, as is known, possible 
 to arrive at a definite settlement of the Morocco con- 
 fusion by means of three treaties in 1905, 1909, and 
 191 1. France, again, is not to blame if we came out 
 of this worse than France did. Success in diplomatic 
 negotiations depends not solely on military strength, 
 but even more on the diplomatic dexterity of the Govern- 
 ments negotiating. There can be no doubt that, from a 
 military point of view, we are stronger than France. 
 There can be equally little doubt that we are diplomati- 
 cally the weaker. And this, indeed, need cause no sur- 
 prise when we consider the manner in which we recruit 
 and train the scions of our diplomacy. In the list of 
 French representatives at European Courts the names 
 which occur are those of middle-class families only; in 
 the list of German representatives there are exclusively 
 Barons, Counts, and Princes. This, of course, does not 
 imply that a nobleman may not be as competent in busi- 
 ness as an ordinary citizen. Since, however, the percen- 
 tage of the nobility among the German people is quite 
 insignificant, whereas the members of the nobility claim 
 100 per cent, of the diplomatic representatives, the sus- 
 picion is justified that it is not their competence in busi- 
 ness, but their title of nobility which is the decisive 
 consideration in filling appointments in our diplomatic 
 service. Diplomacy is a business, like any other; if it 
 differs from others, it differs only in the exceptional re- 
 sponsibilities involved, and in the most stupendous con-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 123 
 
 sequences which may be entailed by errors committed. 
 If even a merchant chooses a clerk without regard to 
 whether he is of high birth or an officer in a cavalry 
 regiment, how much more is the State in filling these 
 responsible offices under obligation to ignore these qual- 
 ities, which may be decoratively beautiful, but which 
 are practically worthless. If the German Empire had 
 acted from this point of view, the Morocco negotiations, 
 which, indeed, in the view of our opponents, were not 
 entirely unfavourable to us, might have borne even 
 richer fruit. Those who are not satisfied with the result 
 should seek for the cause where it really is to be found, 
 not in England or in France, or in anyone beyond the 
 German frontier. They may beat the breast and cry 
 aloud "Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa!" In any case, 
 however, the German people does not appear to me 
 to be under any obligation to pay for the failures of its 
 diplomatists by the sacrifice of its blood and its well- 
 being. Here there appears to me to be clearly a lack of 
 proportion between the offence and the expiation, espe- 
 cially since it is not the guilty but the innocent who Is 
 called upon to bear the punishment. Let us make bet- 
 ter diplomatists, voila tout! That is the only practical 
 conclusion which a reasonable nation can draw from any 
 diplomatic checks which it may have suffered. There 
 is, however, not the slightest occasion for patriotic 
 anguish and for bellicose shrieks for revenge. 
 
 Where, then, is the evidence for the assertion that 
 France was evilly disposed towards us? What evidence 
 is there for supposing that, apart from the alleged dip- 
 lomatic defeats, she intended to inflict on us military de- 
 feats as well? I seek, but I find none. 
 
 Did Russia Mean to Attack Us? 
 
 The position is similar in the case of Russia. For a 
 century and a half there have been no conflicts of in-
 
 124 I ACCUSE! 
 
 terests between Germany and Russia, and such conflicts 
 could, indeed, scarcely arise, since the pressure exercised 
 by the two countries follows quite different lines which 
 nowhere intersect. As we have no ambitions, or at least 
 have hitherto had none, on the Russian Baltic Provinces 
 — a Prussian Irredentism fortunately does not exist — 
 so Russia never thought of appropriating East Prussia, 
 West Prussia, or Posen. Russia is large enough to be 
 able to do without our provinces. The pressure of her 
 expansion follows a direction which touches neither our 
 property nor our interests. 
 
 The tension between Russia and Austria I here leave 
 intentionally out of the question. It was we who de- 
 clared war against Russia while she was still living in 
 full peace with Austria, and was, indeed, still conduct- 
 ing her negotiations which held out a rich prospect of 
 success. The war between Austria and Russia only 
 broke out on August 6th, whereas we delivered the 
 declaration of war at Petrograd on August ist. We 
 began the war asserting that Russia meant to attack tis, 
 and we have succeeded in persuading the German people 
 that she had already attacked us. 
 
 I am, then, justified in asking: Why did Russia at- 
 tack us? What end did she have in view? What did 
 she want from us? It is no sufficient answer to this ques- 
 tion to refer to Pan-Slav efforts. Did Russia wish to 
 make us Slavonic? Did she wish to suppress German 
 culture in favour of Slavonic culture? No one will 
 seriously maintain such a foolish assertion. Russian cul- 
 ture in the last generations has, quite apart from this, 
 exercised a strong influence on our German spiritual 
 life; it would be difficult to mention a German poet of 
 the last fifty years who has given an impulse to the 
 literature and to the intellectual tendencies of Germany 
 similar to that received from Tolstoi. On the other 
 hand, not merely the intellectual but also the political
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 125 
 
 and military life of Russia was everywhere permeated 
 by German elements, and everywhere in Russia men 
 of German name occupied leading positions. This, 
 moreover, need cause no astonishment, for the Romanovs 
 are themselves of German blood and their wives have 
 nearly always been of German stock. It may, indeed, 
 be asserted that there were scarcely any other two Eu- 
 ropean countries which were more intimately connected 
 than Germany and Russia by means of peaceful pene- 
 tration on both sides, thus constituting a league of peace 
 which was crowned by the traditional friendship of the 
 two ruling houses, and sealed by the comradeship in arms 
 of a hundred years ago. 
 
 What, then, is the source from which there has sud- 
 denly sprung "the hatred of Germany nourished on Pan- 
 Slav ambitions," of which the Chancellor spoke on De- 
 cember 2nd? Do we suffer from Russophobia? Had 
 this hatred of Germany not to be expressly constructed 
 in order to give a psychological basis for the alleged 
 Russian attack? What facts are adduced in support of 
 this hatred of Germany? Out with them! I fear we 
 may have long to wait before these facts are produced. 
 
 In any case, the hatred of Germany entertained in 
 Russia does not appear to be insuperable. Already we 
 begin to hear the views of well-meaning people who 
 speak of peace at an early date with Russia, and who 
 are anxious to gather all our forces against the chief 
 enemy, England. On the other hand, there are those 
 who declare that Muscovitism and the absolutism of the 
 Tsar are our chief enemies, and who emphasise our com- 
 munity of culture with Western Nations. Where is the 
 truth to be founds What are we really aiming at? 
 Against whom, and for what are we -fighting? These 
 are all questions which are answered differently by dif- 
 ferent people, producing a gigantic confusion of the 
 mind, an ocean of lies and of perversions, an ocean.
 
 126 I ACCUSE! 
 
 unfortunately, dyed in blood, which threatens completely 
 to sweep away German happiness and well-being. 
 
 This confusion is to be attributed to the fact that 
 there is, among those who know, a tacit conspiracy not 
 to speak the truth, but that they have overlooked the 
 necessity of arriving at a complete agreement as to 
 what is to be established in the place of truth. So every- 
 one tells lies on his own, and the lies impinge on each 
 other, like the electric sparks from two stations which 
 are differently charged; one saying cancels the other; 
 one lie drives another out of the field. Swift, in his 
 old age, was indeed right when he said : "As universal 
 a practice as lying is, and as easy a one as it seems, 
 it is astonishing that it has been brought to so little 
 perfection even by those who are most celebrated in that 
 faculty." 
 
 The Triple Entente a Defensive Alliance 
 
 Not only is there thus a complete absence of evidence 
 in support of the assertion that the Triple Entente in- 
 tended to attack Germany, but the exact opposite has 
 been proved in the preceding discussion. The leading 
 spirit in the Entente was undeniably England. We hear 
 this asserted daily in every possible key, and quite re- 
 cently it was emphatically advanced by the Chancellor 
 in the meeting of the Reichstag on December 2nd; the 
 statement, moreover, rests on the truth. If, however, 
 this leading spirit has for almost a decade striven only 
 for peace and an understanding with Germany, if the 
 other two Entente Powers have never in the slightest 
 degree shown, by word or by action, their intention to 
 hamper or suppress the initiative taken by their political 
 friend in the direction of peace, if, on the contrary, they 
 also have given unmistakable expression to their desire 
 for peace by conciliatory behaviour on great and small
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 127 
 
 diplomatic conflicts (Morocco, the Balkan War, the 
 Potsdam Agreements of 191 1, etc.), it would not be a 
 bold conclusion to infer that the Triple Entente has been 
 a defensive alliance, and that it has in no way whatever 
 had aggressive intentions. He who asserts the contrary- 
 must submit proofs in support of his statement. These 
 proofs the Chancellor himself was unable to submit in 
 his two speeches in the Reichstag. The Entente Powers 
 are reproached on account of their evil disposition 
 towards Germany, but no actions are instanced which 
 have proceeded from such a disposition. We celebrate 
 in our enemies such beautiful qualities of the heart as 
 envy, hatred, race antipathy, the lust of vengeance, but 
 they cannot be reproached with a single action in which 
 they have endeavoured to translate these dispositions into 
 deeds. So long as Germany is not recognised as the 
 educator of the world — something after the style of 
 "Rembrandt as the educator" of the Germans — we must 
 be content to leave other people in possession of their 
 dispositions, as, indeed, they on their side have neither 
 the wish nor the power to suppress ours. 
 
 We must rest satisfied with combating their disposi- 
 tions only when these manifest themselves as actions. 
 We are not the rulers of foreign nations as Ahlwardt 
 was the ruler of all the Germans. We are scarcely 
 called upon to give moral instructions to others so long 
 as we ourselves need such instruction more than they 
 do. The hatred, the envy, and rage for revenge which 
 has been produced in our country — formerly by a small 
 section of the people of no intellectual standing, but 
 since the beginning of the war by the greatest and 
 best part of the German nation — surpass in volume and 
 intensity all that has been produced in the three other 
 countries taken together. 
 
 But if there were no aggressive intentions, what was 
 it that brought the Entente together and cemented them
 
 128 I ACCUSE! 
 
 more and more closely to each other? It was the fear 
 of Gemiany and the distrust of Germany's imperiahstic 
 efforts. It was this fear that united them and gave in- 
 creasing compactness to their alHance. The more they 
 saw Germany increasing — not our trade nor our well 
 being, which indeed benefited their trade and prosperity 
 also, but our military power and our warlike dispo- 
 sition — the more they saw the danger of German na- 
 tionalism raising her head and appearing above the steps 
 of the throne, the more distrustful and apprehensive they 
 became, and the more closely did they draw together 
 for the purpose of common defence. 
 
 Everything combined in recent years to increase their 
 apprehensions : the enormous naval armaments which, 
 in spite of English proposals for agreement, were piled 
 up with constantly increasing acceleration, the sudden 
 increase of our land army, quite unprecedented in mili- 
 tary history, the policy of the mailed fist, which in all 
 international questions affecting the interest of Germany 
 or Austria struck on the table and compelled the others 
 to give way, above all, however, certain facts, which did 
 not take place in public, but which were well known 
 to European Governments, These facts have only re- 
 cently received publicity, but must, at an earlier date, 
 already have received from the Entente Powers the 
 attention they merited. 
 
 GioLiTTi's Revelations 
 
 It is known that, soon after the annexation of Bosnia 
 and Herzegovina, the Austrian Government proposed 
 to take military measures against the growing Great- 
 Serbian movement, which had been produced as a result 
 of the annexation. This was an act of criminal insanity 
 on the part of Austria; it was a crime, because here the 
 violator intended to punish the violated because he re-
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 129 
 
 sisted violation; it was insane, because national ten- 
 dencies cannot be suppressed by force of arms. But the 
 wise men of Austria thought otherwise. Serbia was 
 threatened with war, and only through the submission 
 of Russia and the mediation of England and Germany 
 was it possible to prevent, by means of a propitiatory 
 declaration on the part of Serbia, the European war 
 which even then threatened to break out. That was in 
 March, 1909, and is known to everyone. What, how- 
 ever, was not known, and has only become known by 
 the revelations of Giolitti on December 5th, 1914, in 
 the Italian Chamber, is the fact that Austria entertained 
 in August, 19 13, the same intentions as in 1909, and 
 was prevented from giving effect to these intentions only 
 by the opposition of Italy. 
 
 These revelations of Giolitti have rightly been re- 
 garded in the whole of the foreign Press as epoch-mak- 
 ing, because they revealed in an incontestable manner 
 the aggressive intentions of Austria. But precisely for 
 these reasons the German and Austrian Governments 
 have preserved, with regard to these revelations, a silence 
 as of death. There is therefore all the more reason 
 why I should in this place once more awaken the dead 
 to life. 
 
 In midsummer, 19 13, after the second Balkan War, 
 the relations in the Balkans between those States im- 
 mediately concerned were regulated by the Treaty of 
 Bucharest. Austria-Hungary was not satisfied with the 
 arrangement to which effect was given, since in her view 
 Serbia had got too much and Bulgaria too little. She 
 aimed at accomplishing a revision of the Treaty and 
 in view of Serbia's opposition resolved to give effect to 
 her desires by arms. For this purpose she naturally 
 required the support of the Powers of the Triple Al- 
 liance and above all of Italy, who had always claimed 
 the right to make her influence felt in the settlement
 
 130 I ACCUSE! 
 
 of the Balkan question. The concurrence of the allied 
 Powers in military action against Serbia was, however, 
 regarded as necessary by Austria chiefly, because the 
 Austrian Government was even then fully aware of 
 the fact that a war with Serbia must lead to a European 
 struggle. Austria consequently addressed inquiries to 
 Italy with a view to ascertaining what her attitude 
 would be in view of her duties under the Triple Al- 
 liance in the event of a Serbian, and, should it arise, a 
 European war. As a result of the Austrian inquiry the 
 following exchange of telegrams took place between 
 the Foreign Minister, Di San Giuliano, and the Prime 
 Minister, Giolitti, who was then absent : "Austria has 
 communicated to us and to Germany her intention of 
 taking action against Serbia, and defines such action 
 as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the casus 
 foederis of the Triple Alliance, which, on the contrary, 
 I believe to be inapplicable. I am endeavouring to ar- 
 range for a combined effort with Germany to prevent 
 such action on the part of Austria, but it may become 
 necessary to state clearly that we do not consider such 
 action, if it should be taken, as defensive, and that, 
 therefore, we do not consider that the casus foederis 
 arises. Please telegraph to me at Rome if you ap- 
 prove." 
 
 Giolitti replied to this: "If Austria intervenes against 
 Serbia it is clear that a casus foederis cannot be estab- 
 lished. It is a step which she is taking on her own 
 account since there is no question of defence inasmuch 
 as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary 
 that a declaration to this effect should be made to Aus- 
 tria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for 
 action on the part of Germany to dissuade Austria from 
 this most perilous adventure (pericolosissima awen- 
 tura)." 
 
 On this occasion success, in fact, attended the task of
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 131 
 
 restraining Austria from a war against Serbia, but 
 whether this was due to Germany's efforts or to Italy's 
 opposition is not known. What, however, is to-day of 
 the highest interest is the fact that, even a year before 
 the outbreak of the present war, Austria was finnly 
 resolved to initiate, without any urgent reason, a mili- 
 tary conflict with Serbia, for there was then no ques- 
 tion of the death of an Archduke, nor had a specially 
 dangerous Serbian propaganda been developed against 
 Austria, since Serbia had been sufficiently engrossed by 
 the war against the Turks, and later against her own 
 ally, Bulgaria. 
 
 This fact is of the greatest importance in judging the 
 question of guilt in the present war. But there is one 
 other point which may be learned from the events of 
 1913; first, that the danger of a European war as a 
 consequence of an Austro-Serbian war was even at that 
 time clear to the minds of the politicians of the Triple 
 Alliance, and, secondly, that it was possible to exorcise 
 this danger by dissuading Austria from the perilous ad- 
 venture, and by refusing to furnish her with assistance. 
 If these lessons of the past had been observed a year 
 later the present war would not have broken out. Italy 
 has observed these lessons, and her attitude is morally 
 and legally incontestable. Germany, however, did not 
 desire to do so, and she cannot, therefore, object if 
 her attitude is described in terms which are exactly 
 opposite to those applied to Italy. The fact that Ger- 
 many in July, 19 14, neglected to exercise on Austria 
 the moderating influence which she had successfully 
 brought to bear on her a year before is capable of a 
 simple explanation. Germany at that time did not de- 
 sire a European war, or more correctly expressed, she 
 did not yet desire it, whereas in 1914 she did desire 
 this war.
 
 132 I ACCUSE! 
 
 The Change of Front in Berlin. The War 
 
 Party 
 
 The tendencies in Berlin which led to this change of 
 front are placed in a most interesting light by the French 
 Yellow Book.^ 
 
 If these French Reports were the only sources of in- 
 formation available for this period of contemporary 
 history they might be regarded with distrust. As, how- 
 ever, they are in accordance with all the facts, which 
 have been distinctly manifested in the political life and 
 in the politico-military literature of Germany,^ these 
 French Reports on the state of opinion in Germany 
 must be recognised as entirely accurate, and, indeed, 
 the clear analysis of German conditions contained in 
 them can only evoke admiration. 
 
 I have already in an earlier passage dealt with the 
 dangers involved in the efforts of the war party whose 
 exercising ground was exclusively in North Germany 
 and whose headquarters were situated at the Court of 
 Berlin. The leaders of this party were for the most 
 part Generals who devoted the pensioned leisure of their 
 retirement to the creation of something approaching a 
 military organisation of their forces, and both by the 
 spoken and the written word prepared the German peo- 
 
 * Report of the French Ambassador, Cambon, dated the 17th 
 March, 1913, enclosing two reports of the MiHtary and Naval At- 
 taches; further, a report of Etienne, the Minister of War, to Jon- 
 nard, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated the 2nd April, 1913, 
 with enclosure; a report of Cambon to Pichon, the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, dated 6th May, 1913, a report to the same Minister 
 dated 30th July, and a report of Cambon dated 22nd November, 1913. 
 
 'After this book was finished a very interesting dissertation came 
 to my notice, entitled "Der deutsche Chauvinismus," by Professor 
 Dr. O. Nippold, Stuttgart, 1913. The book contains a survey of the 
 chauvinistic literature of recent years, and earnestly points out the 
 dangers of this movement.
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 133 
 
 pie for the war, which they, because they wished it, de- 
 clared to be inevitable. In addition to the existing naval 
 league they founded, in 1912, a "Wehrverein," the ob- 
 ject of which was to combat the tendencies in favour 
 of peace to be found in the German nation, to create a 
 public opinion in favour of an increase in the land 
 forces, and gradually to accustom the nation to the 
 thought of a European war. The natural auxiliary 
 forces of these gentlemen were their social and profes- 
 sional companions, the territorial and the military no- 
 bility who from remote times have controlled the Prus- 
 sian State, and have regarded the King of Prussia as 
 their supreme head. The increasing democratisation of 
 Germany, which had already advanced so far as to pass 
 a vote of no confidence in an Imperial Chancellor and 
 a Prussian First Minister, and to extend protection to 
 the civil powers in Alsace against the military authori- 
 ties, the constant increase in the vote of the social 
 democratic party, and of their representatives in Parlia- 
 ment, the increasing industrialisation of Germany, which 
 threatened more and more to repress the economic and 
 the social importance of the territorial nobility — all these 
 phenomena were an abomination to the Prussian 
 Junkers, and had produced in the circles which they 
 frequented a state of mind which can be expressed in 
 the thought: "Things cannot go on like this in Ger- 
 many, and since an amelioration in the sense we desire 
 cannot be achieved in peace, we must be assisted in our 
 need by a lively and jolly war" {ein frischer, fröhlicher 
 Krieg). 
 
 At all times the Junkers have formed the kernel of 
 the Prussian war-party. More recently, however, they 
 have been joined by various auxiliary forces, colonial 
 enthusiasts who pursued the foolish madness of terri- 
 torial expansion as an outlet for our economic and hu- 
 man surplus, ideologists in whose narrow outlook Ger-
 
 134 I ACCUSE! 
 
 many marches at the head of clvihsation and who there- 
 fore consider that German culture has a claim to rule 
 the world, diplomatists still grieving over their own 
 failures and calling aloud for revenge for Algeciras and 
 Agadir, but chiefly, as a matter of course, the cannon 
 kings and the manufacturers of armour plate, who with 
 the wealth at their disposal can support the venomous 
 Press not only at home but abroad. All these elements, 
 some of them interested and some deluded, the deceivers 
 and the deceived, formed a compact force which, under 
 military leadership, fell into line with true Prussian dis- 
 cipline on the word of command, and steadfastly ad- 
 vanced to the end in view. The war-party formed only 
 a minority of the German people. The great majority 
 was distinctly devoted to peace. The great mass of the 
 labouring population, the industrious middle classes, the 
 banking and manufacturing circles, the national groups 
 of Poles, Alsatians, etc., the South of Germany not 
 yet entirely Prussianised, all these sections of the Ger- 
 man people without doubt desired peace and quiet prog- 
 ress along the path by which Germany had arrived at 
 her present height. But these, fJie forces of peace, were 
 not organised. They were merely individuals; they did 
 not form a compact body. They did not consider it 
 necessary to organise themselves as a peace-party to 
 oppose the war-party, because until midsummer of this 
 year the latter were regarded as a quantite negligeahle; 
 a European war with all its horrors was regarded as 
 an impossibility; no one realised how far the instigators 
 of war with their powerful patronage had already un- 
 dermined the ground of peace. In the middle of July 
 any one who had asserted in Germany that on August 
 ist we would be face to face with a European war 
 would have been in danger of being shut up in an asy- 
 lum. The people of rabid views were known, but their 
 outpourings were looked upon as harmless, and any
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 135 
 
 counter-organisation for the protection of peace was 
 regarded as a superfluity. 
 
 It is true that disappointment over the Morocco agree- 
 ment had affected even wider circles. The supposed 
 diplomatic defeat was regretted, but this was not re- 
 garded as a reason for crying aloud for vengeance in 
 blood. The diplomatists were criticised, but Generals 
 were not demanded. Criticism was naturally directed 
 in the first place against the Imperial Chancellor, Herr 
 von Bethmann Hollweg, who bore the sole responsibil- 
 ity; it did not, however, stop there, but ascended as 
 far as the Emperor himself. The policy of peace, which 
 the Emperor William had taken as the guiding line of 
 his conduct after the first stormy days of his youth, 
 had for long ceased to find favour in certain circles. 
 He was not merely criticised, but the attempt was made 
 — not without success — ^to procure for him what was 
 nothing short of unpopularity. 
 
 A zealous and well-organised Press praised the son at 
 the expense of the father and increased the dissensions 
 between the two which had found open expression in 
 a number of well-known serious disputes. With diabolic 
 dexterity they succeeded in playing upon the most sen- 
 sitive chords in the Emperor's soul, his personal vanity, 
 his thirst for popularity, his ambition to be the first 
 amongst his people, living in no man's shadow, the con- 
 sciousness he had of his authority, which had led him 
 to adopt as his motto the dictum suprcma lex regis vohin- 
 tas. Like the poison poured into the ear of Hamlet's 
 father the poisonous thought was instilled into him that 
 the times demanded deeds, not words, that only a puri- 
 fying war could drive away the sultry heat and restore
 
 136 I ACCUSE! 
 
 to the German Empire and to its Emperor the old pres- 
 tige within and without. 
 
 In the end a continual dropping will wear out a stone. 
 It is interesting to observe the gradual change in the 
 Emperor's views during the last three years, from 191 1 
 to 1914. In 1910 the Emperor William could still dis- 
 cuss with the French Minister, Pichon, the idea of a 
 union of all civilised States and express his approval 
 of the idea. In the previous year, in 1909, speaking 
 at Cuxhaven, he emphasised that peace was needed in 
 equal measure by all civilised nations "to enable them 
 to discharge undisturbed the great tasks of culture in- 
 volved in their economic and commercial develop- 
 ment." ^ In 191 1 he emphasised, in a speech delivered 
 in Hamburg, that economic competition between nations 
 could not be fought out by one party striking at the 
 other, but only by each nation straining their capacity 
 to the highest point. On New Year's Day, 191 1, in an 
 address to the diplomatists, he still eulogised the peace- 
 ful understanding existing between the nations, which 
 was more in accordance with their interests than the 
 conduct of dangerous wars. But in his speech at Ham- 
 burg on June i8th, 19 12, a different note is already 
 sounded: "Not inconsiderately must we raise the 
 standard where we are not sure that we shall be able 
 to defend it." This speech was delivered six months 
 after the Morocco Convention, and anyone who can 
 read between the lines may already detect the influence 
 which the criticism of the Emperor's peaceful policy 
 had begun to exercise on the thoughts of the Emperor; 
 he no longer rejects war under all circumstances, but 
 if war must come, it is to be, according to the saying 
 of Clausewitz, a continuation of policy by other means 
 — that is, of course, on the assumption that the stand- 
 ard can be defended, in other words, that we are 
 ^ Fr. Fried : Der Kaiser und der Weltfriede, Berlin, 1910.
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 137 
 
 stronger than the other side. In the next year, at the 
 boisterous banquets in commemoration of the War of 
 Liberation of 1813, this military note more and more 
 suppressed the notes of peace. An intoxication ap- 
 peared to have seized the whole of Germany — a new 
 intoxication of freedom — from what bondage no one 
 knew. This drunkenness was artificially produced by 
 the fiery beverages which an unscrupulous patriotic 
 Press had for many a year and day poured out to the 
 German nation. Even those occupying the highest po- 
 sitions were unable to escape this condition of intoxi- 
 cation. A true epidemic of patriotism broke out, set- 
 ting high and low, young and old, in a fever of ecstasy. 
 No one any longer inquired as to the grounds or the 
 object of this popular movement prepared long in ad- 
 vance and skilfully staged by the Nationalist wire-pull- 
 ers, a movement in which the Emperor and the Chan- 
 cellor were at first victims carried away by the stream, 
 a movement in which later they were voluntary partici- 
 pators, and of which in the end they became the con- 
 scious directing leaders. 
 
 Herr von Bethmann certainly made a long resist- 
 ance before capitulating to the war-party. But in the 
 end he was obliged to yield, that he might not fall a 
 victim to the Camarilla of the Crown Prince and to 
 the company of Generals. Even in 1910 and 191 1 he 
 vigorously defended himself against his opponents, who 
 more and more were digging the ground from under 
 his feet. When he was accused in the Mannesmann 
 afifair of showing excessive pliability towards foreign 
 countries he exclaimed to his critics in the Reichstag: 
 "I will never make myself a party to a policy of break- 
 ing treaties." When the great debate took place in the 
 Reichstag on March 30th, 191 1, on the question of arm- 
 aments, Bethmann turned almost in supplication to tlie 
 representatives of the German people and urged them
 
 138 I ACCUSE! 
 
 to protect the German people against Irresponsible Press 
 agitations, to which, unfortunately, it often weakly suc- 
 cumbed. "A counterpoise against all these and similar 
 influences," exclaimed the Chancellor, "cannot be other- 
 wise than desirable, and if international labour succeeds 
 in creating such a counterpoise, I will be the first to 
 extend it a hearty welcome." But, as we have said, 
 the elements which might have formed such a counter- 
 poise against the war-movement were too few. The 
 opposition of the Chancellor, as previously that of the 
 Emperor, was soon borne down, and the great military 
 law of 19 1 3 was the first beacon-signal of the victory 
 of the enemy along the whole line. 
 
 That war was not, in accordance with Austria's de- 
 sires, brought about as early as the summer of 191 3, 
 rested no longer on grounds of principle, but merely 
 on motives of opportunism. The occasion for striking 
 the blow which Austria believed, or professed, that she 
 had — a regulation of the frontier between Bulgaria and 
 Serbia, and similar matters — was too threadbare to jus- 
 tify to the German people a murder of the European 
 nations, and too little designed to enkindle patriotic 
 enthusiasm. "Wars which are not supported by popular 
 sentiment are no longer possible in our time" — ^to this 
 extent the political thought even of these reactionaries 
 had already advanced. The question whether this or 
 that place with an unpronounceable name situated some- 
 where in the south-east of Europe should be governed 
 by Serbian or Bulgarian officials was of too little im- 
 portance for the German people to permit of it being 
 stamped as a war for the holiest possession of the 
 nation. Thus the word went from Berlin to Vienna: 
 "Not yet." 
 
 Moreover, military considerations were clearly de- 
 cisive in favour of this "Not yet." We were not yet 
 sufficiently prepared. W^e were, it is true, considerably
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 139 
 
 superior to all others, but this superiority had to be 
 increased still further by bringing into force the new 
 law of defence, which had just received preliminary 
 approval from the Reichstag. The extension of the 
 Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, which was intended to provide 
 unhampered movement from the North Sea to the Baltic 
 for even the largest ships of war, was not yet ready. 
 The newest instruments of death were probably still 
 awaiting the hour of their birth. Zeppelins and sub- 
 marines had still to be built, and in many other ways 
 our military preparations had still to be carried to the 
 stage of perfection. In a word, we were not yet ripe 
 for striking the blow, which in principle had even then 
 been decided upon. We were only waiting for the next 
 favourable opportunity, and for a condition of perfect 
 preparedness, to be able to make use of this opportunity 
 with success. Meanwhile, the change in the views of 
 the Emperor made further progress ; his entourage, with 
 von Moltke, the head of the General Staff, as their 
 leader, the Minister of War, the Crown Prince, and his 
 influential adherents, all laboured — although still to a 
 certain extent in opposition to the Chancellor, who had, 
 it is true, taken part in the whole development, and 
 covered it with his responsibility, but who was now 
 still shrinking from the decisive step — all laboured for 
 the one end — that of bringing about the ''inevitable" 
 war as speedily as possible, and of gaining the entire 
 support of the Emperor for their efforts. "We must put 
 on one side," said General von Moltke on one occasion, 
 "all commonplaces as to the responsibility of the ag- 
 gressor. When war has become necessary it is essen- 
 tial to carry it on in such a zvay as to place all the 
 chances in one's favour. Success alone justifies war." ^ 
 What success had attended the activity of the War 
 Party is seen in Cambon's rep ort of November 22nd. 
 ^French Yellow Book, No. 3.
 
 140 I ACCUSE! 
 
 1913, to the Minister, Pichon. Cambon tells of a con- 
 versation which the Emperor William had in the pres- 
 ence of the Chief of the General Staff with King Al- 
 bert, an account of which was communicated to the 
 French Ambassador "from an absolutely reliable 
 source." King Albert found a complete change in the 
 Emperor, whom he had formerly known as an honour- 
 able lover of peace. He had given up his pacific ten- 
 dencies, and had made the ideas of the war-party his 
 own. War now appeared to him inevitable, and he 
 agreed with his Chief of the Staff when the latter de- 
 clared that this time the matter must be settled, and 
 that the Emperor could be sure that his people would 
 follow him with irresistible enthusiasm. The thoughts 
 of the Emperor were directed chiefly against France, 
 and King Albert made fruitless efforts to convince him 
 of the peaceful intentions of the French Government 
 and of the French people. Cambon also confirmed from 
 his own observation the altered train of thought of the 
 Emperor, which he attributed to the increasing impa- 
 tience of the soldiers, to the influence of the Pan-Ger- 
 man ists, and to a certain extent to jealousy at the popu- 
 larity acquired by his son in these circles. "The Em- 
 peror is becoming used to an order of ideas which were 
 formerly foreign to him"; with these words Cambon 
 concludes his report. It is impossible to deny that the 
 shrewd Frenchman was a careful observer. Scarcely 
 eight months later the consequences of the change in 
 the views of the Emperor were revealed. But even in 
 the critical days which preceded the outbreak of the 
 European War, the forces of good and of evil, of 
 Ormuzd and Ahriman, still struggled with each other 
 in the soul of the Emperor. Now that the portentous 
 decision had to be taken which was to set the world in 
 flames and bring upon mankind unprecedented evils, 
 now that the project which had been so long prepared
 
 HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE CRIME 141 
 
 and resolved upon was at last to be transformed into 
 an act, the Imperial hand shrank from the decisive stroke 
 of the pen, and as in a mist the old ideals of peace and 
 of the happiness of nations once more arose in the soul 
 of the monarch. To this must be attributed the oscil- 
 lations of the last days, the continual change in the 
 actions of the Emperor, fluctuating to and fro between 
 the desire for peace and the threat of war, between 
 intimidation and sincerity, pursuing so long the policy 
 of the mailed fist, until gradually all policy disappeared 
 and only the mailed fist was left.
 
 Ill 
 
 The Crime 
 
 The detailed discussion in the previous chapter of the 
 antecedents of the war was necessary in order to un- 
 derstand the rapid development of events which in the 
 ten short days from July 23rd to August ist, 1914, led 
 to the greatest war in the history of the world. 
 
 The whole attitude of Germany from the first Hague 
 Conference onwards, her consistent refusal of all restric- 
 tions of naval or military armaments, her opposition to 
 the formation of a court of compulsory arbitration, her 
 constantly renewed efforts to secure for herself the neu- 
 trality of England, without on her part giving up in any 
 way her own freedom of action, the gigantic increase 
 in her land and naval forces, the toleration shown for 
 years to a criminal chauvinist movement, and the ap- 
 proval extended to this movement at a later date — these 
 all .indicate that for long Germany had reckoned on the 
 European war as a matter of fact, and that she had re- 
 solved to bring about the "inevitable" in the moment 
 most favourable for her. 
 
 The antecedents of the war down to 19 14 must give 
 rise to what in criminal proceedings would be called a 
 prima facie case, that Germany, in common with her 
 ally Austria, desired a European war sooner or later — 
 Germany, in order to give effect to her plans of world 
 power; Austria, in order to improve her position in the 
 Balkans. 
 
 Such a prima facie case, however, does not amount 
 to a certainty. The probability which may be inferred 
 
 142
 
 THE CRIME 143 
 
 from the antecedents of the war Is not in itself a proof 
 of guilt. This proof of guilt can only be deduced from 
 the circumstances of the case, that is to say, from the 
 diplomatic documents which place before us the histori- 
 cal origins of the war. 
 
 The indictment to be brought against the Empires of 
 Germany and Austria is that in the summer of 1914 
 they intentionally brought about the war which they 
 had long prepared and desired, because they thought 
 that the moment was specially favourable for striking 
 the blow. This time the occasion of the dispute was 
 not, as in previous years, a paltry territorial question 
 in the Balkans, a squabble about a harbour or a stretch 
 of sea-shore, questions which could neither arouse public 
 interest nor kindle the enthusiasm of nations. The issue 
 raised on this occasion related to the murder of an Arch- 
 Duke and his Consort, a tragic event which was bound 
 to awaken the indignation of the whole world, and, so 
 they calculated, could not fail to enlist universal sym- 
 pathy on behalf of the Powers who appeared as the 
 avengers of such a crime. 
 
 Thus, in the first place, the moral advantage was on 
 their side. But they believed that they could also rely 
 on a similar military advantage. Certain matters just 
 about this time had come to light which were regarded 
 as proving the disorganisation of the French and the 
 defective preparation of the Russian army. The revela- 
 tions of Senator Humbert had just made public the ex- 
 istence of serious defects in the French Arniy, and it 
 was believed that the Russian Army, quite apart from its 
 defective equipment, was still required to cope with in- 
 ternal unrest and weakened by civil dissensions. Eng- 
 land's neutrality was still hoped for, in spite of previous 
 failures in this direction, and the Italians were thought 
 to be foolish enough to draw the chestnuts out of the 
 fire in the Balkans for the hated Austrian, and to risk
 
 144 I ACCUSE! 
 
 their whole national existence "pour le roi de Prusse." 
 All this was a complete miscalculation. But as the 
 art of calculation was not understood in Berlin and 
 Vienna, it was thought that the moment was favour- 
 able for striking — and they struck. 
 
 This is the accusation which is now to he proved. 
 
 * * 
 
 The events connected with the assassination of the 
 Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort are in 
 their main features universally known, and do not here 
 require any detailed discussion. For my purpose it will 
 be sufficient to examine critically the diplomatic trans- 
 actions, and to emphasise those points which are of de- 
 cisive importance in considering the question of the guilt 
 and the responsibility for this war. The demonstra- 
 tion which I will submit will rest only on official docu- 
 ments, and reference will chiefly be made to the five 
 volumes of diplomatic correspondence which have been 
 published in white, blue, yellow, orange, and grey by 
 Germany, England, France, Russia, and Belgium re- 
 spectively. A book in red has not yet appeared; it is 
 left to the nations to write this volume in blood. 
 
 Other diplomatic documents which have appeared 
 apart from these books will also be considered. 
 
 At the very outset surprise is occasioned by the meagre 
 contents of the German White Book and by the fact 
 that Austria, unlike all the other belligerent countries, 
 has not considered it advisable to publish a volume of 
 diplomatic correspondence. The telegrams exchanged 
 between the German and the Austrian Governments are, 
 further, almost completely absent from the German 
 White Book, whereas those between the Entente Powers 
 are reproduced in their publications with the utmost 
 detail. The German White Book contains only 36 docu- 
 ments; tlie English Blue Book, on the contrary, contains
 
 THE CRIME 145 
 
 i6i; the Russian Orange Book, 79; the French Yellow 
 Book, 161; and the Belgian Grey Book, 79. The state- 
 ments of our opponents are thus far more detailed than 
 those of the two allied Empires, one of which has until 
 to-day maintained a complete silence. This fact is in 
 itself very illuminating.^ 
 
 The historical investigator is frequently obliged to 
 complete the gaps revealed in the German White Book 
 by reference to the comprehensive accounts of the En- 
 tente Governments. There is, however, general agree- 
 ment between the various publications in their reports 
 as to fact, and it is only from the spirit of the narrator 
 that they assume varying complexions. In my critical 
 discussion I will completely ignore these different com- 
 plexions. It will be sufficient if I restrict myself to the 
 bare facts reported by all parties alike, facts which 
 indeed are in themselves eloquent enough. One cannot, 
 of course, assert that of the various publications some 
 are more deserving of credence than others. Diplomatic 
 documents are merely documents, and they are all 
 equally credible. Moreover, they are mutually supported 
 by each other, and taken together they form so complete 
 a chain, each link so fits into the other, that the truth 
 appears clear and incontestable. 
 
 I will deal in succession with the various points which 
 are decisive on the question of guilt, and I will take 
 each State separately. Each State will receive its own 
 debit and credit account, and each account will be closed 
 with a balance which will show the guilt or the inno- 
 cence of the State in question. 
 
 ^An Austrian book has just appeared in the beginning of Febru- 
 ary when this work was in the press, that is to say, six months after 
 the beginning of the war. I will discuss this book in a separate 
 appendix.
 
 146 I ACCUSE! 
 
 A 
 
 AUSTRIA 
 
 At 6 o'clock on the evening of July 23rd the Austro- 
 Hungarian Government handed to the Serbian Govern- 
 ment a Note, in which the Government presented a 
 series of demands, with reference to the Great Serbian 
 propaganda which it was suggested had reached its high- 
 est point in the assassination of the Grand Ducal couple, 
 intended to bring about the suppression of these ef- 
 forts which, as was alleged, were tolerated by the Ser- 
 bian Government. There were contained among the 
 ten demands made by Austria some (and, indeed, a con- 
 siderable number) of a character such as had never be- 
 fore been presented to an independent State, and such 
 as hitherto had only been imposed on subject nationali- 
 ties. The Serbian Government were required to pub- 
 lish on a certain day on the first page of their official 
 journal a declaration, the wording of which was pre- 
 scribed. This declaration had in view the most rigor- 
 ous suppression of every form of Great Serbian prop- 
 aganda, and threatened with severe punishment the 
 whole population, but more particularly those officers 
 and officials who should in future take part in this move- 
 ment. This threat was simultaneously to be communi- 
 cated by the King to the Army as an order of the day, 
 and published in the official bulletin of the Army. A 
 series of detailed demands followed : the suppression of 
 publications; dissolution of societies and the prevention 
 of the formation of similar societies; elimination from 
 school-books of all statements hostile to Austria; re- 
 moval of all officers and functionaries guilty of the prop- 
 aganda mentioned ; arrest of certain persons compro- 
 mised by the inquiry into the assassination; prevention
 
 THE CRIME 147 
 
 of illicit traffic in arms across the frontier; explanation 
 regarding unfriendly utterances of high Serbian officials, 
 &c. Under numbers 5 and 6 of the Austrian Demands 
 it was exacted of the Serbian Government that they 
 should "accept the collaboration in Serbia of represen- 
 tatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the 
 suppression of the subversive movement directed against 
 the Territorial integrity of the Monarchy," and further, 
 that they should "take judicial proceedings against ac- 
 cessories to the plot of June 28th who are on Serbian 
 territory." "Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Gov- 
 ernment," it is further stated, "will take part in the in- 
 vestigation relating thereto," 
 
 A memorandum on certain conclusions of the inquiry 
 at Serajewo on points 7 and 8 was added to the Note, 
 and an answer was required within forty-eight hours, 
 that is to say, before 6 o'clock in the evening of July 
 25th. 
 
 The Note was communicated to the European Powers 
 on July 24th — ^without the addition of the evidence in 
 support of the accusations — and on July 25th it was 
 published in the European Press. It is well known that 
 the unusual contents and the abrupt form of the Note 
 created excitement everywhere, not only in Govern- 
 mental circles, but also among the general public. Every- 
 one expected an abrupt refusal on the part of Serbia, 
 followed by a war between Austria and her neighbour- 
 ing kingdom, the intervention of Russia in the conflict, 
 and in further sequence a European war. Ever since a 
 Balkan question had existed the close relations between 
 Russia and Serbia were known to everyone. From time 
 immemorial community of race and religion, political 
 traditions and interests, had united the two countries, 
 and had created a kind of relationship extending far 
 beyond the framework of the usual "spheres of in- 
 terest." Russia had during and after the Balkan War
 
 148 I ACCUSE! 
 
 officially declared that any attack by Austria on Serbia 
 would lead to her intervention.^ On this occasion also 
 it was announced in the official journal that Russia 
 could not remain indifferent to military action on the 
 part of Austria.^ 
 
 At the same time, however, Russia, England, and 
 France made the most urgent endeavours: 
 
 ( 1 ) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meet- 
 ing the demands of Austria.^ 
 
 (2) To obtain an extension of the time limit from 
 Austria, which would enable the Powers to study the 
 documentary material promised by Austria, and thus ^to 
 exercise a moderating influence in Belgrade.'* 
 
 The extension of the time limit was sharply refused 
 by Austria,^ although England and Russia rightly 
 pointed out that the communication of the Note to the 
 Powers was purposeless and contradictory to interna- 
 tional usages if they were not allowed time and oppor- 
 tunity to study the documents, and to intervene at Bel- 
 grade. Herr von Jagow had from the beginning ex- 
 pressed "doubts" as to whether Austria could concur 
 in the extension of the time-limit.^ Count Berchtold 
 was at Ischl. No grounds were given for the refusal 
 
 Nevertheless, Anglo-Russian influence in Belgrade 
 succeeded in obtaining from the Serbian Government an 
 answer which caused throughout Europe even greater 
 astonishment than the Austrian Note itself. Serbia con- 
 curred in nearly all the demands of the neighbouring 
 monarchy. She declared herself ready to hand over for 
 
 ^ Blue Book, No. 139, and p. v. [popular edition.] 
 'Orange Book, No. 10. 
 
 • Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 22, 30. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 25, 40, 92. 
 Yellow Book, No. 26. 
 
 *Blue Book, Nos. 13, 17, 26. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 16. 
 "Orange Book, No. 12. 
 
 • Orange Book, No. 14. Blue Book, No. 18.
 
 THE CRIME 149 
 
 trial, without regard to his situation or rank, anyone 
 whose complicity in the assassination should be proved. 
 She pledged herself to publish the desired declarations 
 in the official journal and to the Army, to introduce 
 new criminal laws and an amendment of the Constitu- 
 tion to facilitate the prosecution and confiscation of 
 hostile utterances in the Press. She promised to dis- 
 solve hostile societies, to revise the instruction in schools 
 in the sense desired by Austria, to punish guilty officers 
 and officials, to prevent the illicit traffic of arms, &c. 
 
 Only on two points did the Serbian Government per- 
 mit itself in all submissiveness — the tone of the whole 
 Note is, in fact, that of a subject to his over-lord, not 
 that of one independent State to another — only on two 
 points (5 and 6 of the Austrian Note) did the Serbian 
 Government permit itself to raise a few modest objec- 
 tions. In reply to point 5 it observed: 
 
 "The Royal Government must confess that they 
 do not clearly grasp the meaning of the scope of 
 the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Gov- 
 ernment that Serbia shall undertake to accept the 
 collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and 
 Royal Government upon their Territory, but they 
 declare that they will admit such collaboration as 
 agrees with the principle of international law, with 
 criminal procedure, and with good neighbourly re- 
 lations." 
 
 In reply to point 6: 
 
 "It goes without saying that the Royal Gov- 
 ernment consider it their duty to open an inquiry 
 against all such persons as are, or eventually may 
 be. implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and 
 who happen to be within the territory of the king- 
 dom. As regards the participation in this inquiry
 
 150 I ACCUSE! 
 
 of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities ap- 
 pointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal 
 Government, the Royal Government cannot accept 
 such an arrangement, as it would be a violation 
 of the Constitution and of the law of criminal pro- 
 cedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases, communi- 
 cations as to the results of the investigation in 
 question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian 
 agents." 
 
 The conclusion of the Serbian Note runs as follows : — 
 
 "If the Imperial and Royal Government are not 
 satisfied with this reply, the Serbian Government, 
 considering that it is not to the common interest 
 to precipitate the solution of this question, are 
 ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, 
 either by referring this question to the decision 
 of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to 
 the Great Pozuers which took part in the drawing 
 up of the declaration made by the Serbian Gov- 
 ernment on the 1 8th (31st) March, 1909." 
 
 The Serbian Note was handed to the Austrian Am- 
 bassador at Belgrade on the afternoon of July 25th. 
 Two hours later the Ambassador with his staff had left 
 the Serbian capital. The Serbian answer appeared to 
 the Austrian Government to be insufficient. Diplomatic 
 relations with the neighbouring country were broken off 
 by Austria, 
 
 Why? European diplomacy — apart, of course, from 
 that of Germany — was confronted with a riddle for 
 which only one solution was possible, the assumption 
 that Austria, under all circumstances, desired war with 
 Serbia. And as the Austrian Note was unique in its 
 exorbitant demands, both in form and substance, so the 
 Serbian Note also was unique in its essential and formal
 
 THE CRIME 151 
 
 submissiveness. Never in time of peace had an inde- 
 pendent State allozved itself to he dictated to in this way; 
 never had an independent State submitted to similar 
 intrusions in its internal life. Education, the army, ad- 
 ministration, justice, the Press, the right of association 
 — all were to be trimmed to meet the wishes of Austria, 
 and even where it was not possible to comply with these 
 wishes to the last iota without being debased to the 
 position of a vassal State — even then Serbia did not re- 
 solve on a bare refusal, but humbly asked for further 
 explanations, and professed herself ready to go to the 
 limits permitted by international law, and in these few 
 points still in dispute she submitted herself to the de- 
 cision of the International Tribunal at the Hague or of 
 the Great Powers. 
 
 What more could Austria desire? Why did she refuse 
 to give the explanations asked for? Why did she not 
 accept decision by arbitration in questions which, ac- 
 cording to the transactions and the resolutions of the 
 Hague Conference, were in a peculiar sense suitable for 
 reference to the Court of Arbitration — questions, 
 namely, of law and of interpretation? 
 
 On July 27th the Austrian Government published the 
 Serbian answer with observations in such a form that 
 the text of the Serbian Note is throughout broken up 
 by the Austrian observations. Even the Norddeutsche 
 Allgemeine Zeitung only published the text broken up 
 in this way. The intention of this mutilation was obvi- 
 ously to preclude an appreciation of the submissive form 
 and the extremely conciliatory contents of the Serbian 
 answer by the insertion of the Austrian observations. 
 The pedantic nature of these observations was described 
 by the Italian Minister, Di San Giuliano, as "quite child- 
 ish." ^ The expression is indeed much too mild, when 
 one reflects that the fate of Europ e, and indeed of the 
 ' Blue Book, No. 64.
 
 152 I ACCUSE! 
 
 world, depended on these discussions. A hedge-lawyer 
 would be ashamed to produce in the paltriest case quib- 
 bles such as those to which Austria descended in order 
 to find grounds to justify her dissatisfaction with the 
 Serbian answer. It is not worth while to discuss the 
 details of this composition, which is miserable even 
 in style. In part, the Austrian observations amount to 
 an assertion that misunderstandings, more or less inten- 
 tional, existed on the side of Serbia. Point 5, for ex- 
 ample, was said to have nothing to do with international 
 law or criminal procedure ; it was rather "purely a mat- 
 ter of State police which must be settled by way of a 
 separate agreement." Point 6, it was stated, was con- 
 cerned only with the collaboration of Austrian officials 
 at the preliminary police investigations, not in the ju- 
 dicial proceedings. In these two points then, the only 
 ones in which Serbia had made any reservations — all 
 the other points were in essence agreed to — in these, 
 the only points still at issue, there were, according to 
 the assertion of the Austrian Government itself, mis- 
 understandings (due to the want of clearness in the 
 Austrian Note), but these misunderstandings were of 
 such a nature that they could have been removed in 
 half-an-hour's discussion between experts, or, at the 
 worst, they could have been submitted to the decision 
 of a court of arbitration. Why did Austria not take 
 steps to bring about such a discussion or such a decision? 
 Why did she at once have recourse to a measure as 
 sharp as any that could have been adopted in the event 
 of a flat refusal of her demands — to a rupture of diplo- 
 matic relations? 
 
 This was the third incomprehensibility in the course 
 of three days — an incomprehensibility, that is to say, 
 except on the assumption that Austria intended under 
 all circumstances to begin a war against Serbia, even 
 at the risk of a European war. The Note itself was in
 
 THE CRIME 15S 
 
 reality nothing but a declaration of war in disguise. No 
 one, least of all Austria herself, could have expected 
 from Serbia that she should give to demands so humili- 
 ating as those contained in the Note more careful at- 
 tention than she did in fact devote to them. That Ser- 
 bia, nevertheless, considered these suggestions, and, in- 
 deed, concurred in most of the Austrian demands, was 
 a sign of an extraordinary devotion to peace on the 
 part of this country, exhausted by two wars, and was at 
 the same time the effect of the energetic summons to 
 assume a compliant attitude issued by the Entente 
 Powers with Russia at their head. The appeal for help 
 which Alexander, the Prince Regent of Serbia, addressed 
 on July 24th to the Czar Nicholas emphasised the readi- 
 ness of Serbia to accept everything that was compatible 
 with her position as an independent State, and asked 
 Russia for advice as to the course to be pursued.^ The 
 advice thus elicited led to the Serbian Note of July 25th, 
 that is to say, to a humiliation unprecedented in the 
 history of diplomacy. This in itself is enough to prove 
 beyond all doubt the desire for peace which animated 
 Serbia and Russia. On the other hand, the facts that 
 Austria regarded the Serbian Note as a negligible quan- 
 tity, and that she did not even consider it of sufficient 
 value to be accepted as the basis of further discussion, 
 and flatly broke off diplomatic relations, prove that Aus- 
 tria under all circumstances desired war. Her inten- 
 tion to provoke a war is manifest in the first three acts 
 of the tragedy: in the Austrian Note, in the refusal to 
 extend the time-limit, and in the recall of the Ambas- 
 sador. 
 
 The compliance of Serbia which the whole world 
 longed and hoped for, and which the diplomacy of 
 Europe — again, of course, with the exception of Ger- 
 many — had endeavoured to bring about by all possible 
 ^ Orange Book, No. 6.
 
 154» I ACCUSE! 
 
 means, was for Austria the greatest of disappointments. 
 In Vienna they had desired and hoped for a flat refusal, 
 which would have justified a breach of diplomatic re- 
 lations and a declaration of war. It was precisely for 
 this reason that the Note had been couched in such 
 sharp tenns, in order that it might provoke a refusal. 
 These expectations were disappointed because the love 
 of peace on the part of Serbia and Russia was greater 
 than the desire for war on the part of Austria. The 
 authorities in Vienna thus found themselves in straits, 
 since the expected ground for war had failed, and they 
 saw themselves obliged to construct artificially a ground 
 for war by seeking to transform the patent submission 
 into a refusal by means of pettifogging and sophistical 
 quibbles. 
 
 Until the Serbian Note was known to the public, 
 everyone believed in a Serbian refusal, which was uni- 
 versally regarded as the only possible answer to the 
 veiled declaration of war made by Austria. When, how- 
 ever, the European chancellories and the general public 
 became acquainted with the Serbian Note on the 26th 
 and 27th of July everyone was amazed at the attitude 
 of Austria, for which no other explanation could be 
 found than that she intended unconditionally to provoke 
 a war, and everyone looked with horror to the approach- 
 ing danger of a European war. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey was the first who sought to meet 
 this danger. He proposed a conference of the ambassa- 
 dors of Germany, France, and Italy under his presi- 
 dency in London with the object of devising ways and 
 means of arriving at a settlement of the differences be- 
 tween Austria and Serbia. France and Italy at once 
 accepted the proposal of Grey with great alacrity, and 
 Russia also declared without hesitation that she regarded 
 a conference of the ambassadors of the four Powers not 
 directly concerned as the best method of maintaining
 
 THE CRIME 155 
 
 peace, and that she herself would accept the decision of 
 this conference.^ In fact, the composition of a confer- 
 ence consisting of two representatives of the Alliance 
 and two of the Entente guaranteed an impartial exami- 
 nation of the questions at issue, which, in view of the 
 Serbian answer, were reduced to a minimum, and were 
 easily capable of solution in the shortest possible space 
 of time. If it is borne in mind how incomparably more 
 difficult problems had been successfully solved by the 
 Conference of Ambassadors at London during the Bal- 
 kan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement be- 
 tween the Austrian demands and the Serbian conces- 
 sions in July, 19 14, was child's play compared with the 
 previous achievements of the London conference, which, 
 apart from arriving at a decision on many other ques- 
 tions affecting land and sea, race and nationality, had 
 to undertake the task of bringing into the world nothing 
 less than a whole kingdom. 
 
 But the idea of a conference of ambassadors encoun- 
 tered the opposition of Germany and Austria, precisely 
 because it would have been such an easy matter to ar- 
 rive in this way at a solution of the questions at issue. 
 If the representatives of the four Powers not directly 
 affected had sat down round a table in London to com- 
 pare the verbal differences of the two Notes and to 
 explain the misunderstandings, it was absolutely certain 
 that they would have been successful in arriving at a 
 solution, and Austria could not then have withdrawn 
 from the proposals decided on by the ambassadors when 
 Russia, speaking both for herself and on behalf of Ser- 
 bia, had in advance expressed her readiness to accept 
 these suggestions. Such a course would have frus- 
 trated the war, and for this reason it was unaccept- 
 
 ^Blue Book, Nos. 17, 24, 35, 36, 42, Si. 53 (Russia would be quite 
 ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, 
 France, Germany, and Italy).
 
 156 I ACCUSE! 
 
 able to Austria. For this reason Germany was in the 
 first place entrusted with the task of stepping forward 
 with the objection that they "could not call Austria 
 before a European tribunal." ^ And when this objection 
 was reduced by Grey to an absurdity with the observa- 
 tion that "it would not be an arbitration, but a private 
 and informal discussion to ascertain what suggestion 
 could be made for a settlement," ^ Austria came out 
 with the flat declaration that she must decline the Eng- 
 lish proposal.^ 
 
 This was the fourth action within five days whereby 
 Austria, with the support of Germany, had brought to 
 failure the efforts of the other Powers to preserve peace. 
 The Austrian refusal was all the more glaring inasmuch 
 as it was expressly intended that the conference should 
 only discuss those points which affected Serbian sov- 
 ereignty and independence, and since Austria had from 
 the very beginning given assurances that she did not 
 desire to touch the sovereignty or the independence of 
 Serbia. The proposal thus, in fact, related only to an 
 investigation from the point of view of public law into 
 the question of the extent to which the Austrian de- 
 mands, especially those in Articles 5 and 6 of the Note, 
 were compatible with the sovereignty of the neighbour- 
 ing State. The voluntary acceptance of the result of 
 such an inquiry — which was not in any way an arbitra- 
 tion — could have done as little damage to the prestige 
 of Austria as is done to the honour of a private citizen 
 when in a civil action he accepts a compromise on ex- 
 pert advice. But Austria did not desire any settlement, 
 and thus the idea of a conference failed. 
 
 'White Book, p. 409 [The references to the White Book are 
 adapted to the reprint in the Collected Diplomatic Documents relat- 
 ing to the outbreak of the European War], 
 
 ' Blue Book, No. 67. 
 
 ' White Book, p. 409.
 
 THE CRIME 157 
 
 Simultaneously with her objections to the conference 
 of ambassadors, Germany had proposed direct discus- 
 sions between Austria and Russia as the best method of 
 preventing the Serbian question from developing ^ to a 
 European conflict. This proposal was readily concurred 
 in by England, Russia, and France, and Grey was at 
 once prepared to withdraw his proposal for a confer- 
 ence of the four Powers until the direct discussions 
 between Vienna and Petrograd had led to a result, 
 whether positive or negative.^ If the result were posi- 
 tive, the conference would then be superfluous. If it 
 were negative, the conference could still seek to attain 
 what direct discussions had been unable to achieve. 
 
 So here again there was a new ray of hope! But 
 unfortunately here again they reckoned without Aus- 
 tria. It is scarcely credible, yet it is true — the docu- 
 ments incontrovertibly prove it — Austria declined the 
 direct discussions with Russia, proposed by her ally 
 Germany, and Count Berchtold declared to the Russian 
 ambassador Schebeko, who had impressed upon him 
 in the most friendly manner the desirability of a free 
 discussion in Petrograd, that Austria could neither "re- 
 cede nor enter into any discussion about the terms of 
 the Austro-Hungarian Note." ^ 
 
 Here there is either a lack of harmony between Berlin 
 and Vienna, or else we have an instance of preconcerted 
 collusion. Since a lack of harmony, for the existence of 
 which there is no evidence, cannot be accepted, there 
 only remains the other alternative, that of preconcerted 
 collusion. The matter is all the more suspicious because, 
 as already observed, the correspondence between Berlin 
 and Vienna has not so far been published, and may 
 
 ^Blue Book, No. 43. White Book, p. 409. 
 'Blue Book, No. 45- 
 
 ' Blue Book, Nos. 61, 74, 75, 78- 81, 93- Orange Book, Nos. 45, 50. 
 White Book, p. 409.
 
 158 I ACCUSE! 
 
 therefore be presumed to contain things which it is de- 
 sired to keep silent. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg, who 
 every day of his Hfe publishes all possible kinds of un- 
 official documents — extracts from the archives of Brus- 
 sels, intercepted letters, and so on — would certainly have 
 published long ere now his correspondence with Vienna 
 if it had contained any confirmation of the truth of 
 his ever-repeated but ever-unproved assertions, that he 
 earnestly pressed for moderation in Vienna and car- 
 ried this labour to the "utmost point." 
 
 In any case the fact remains that the direct under- 
 standing between Austria and Russia, proposed by Ger- 
 many, came to nothing in consequence of Austria's re- 
 fusal. On July 28th, the same day as that on which 
 the decisive conversation between Berchtold and 
 Schebeko took place, Austria declared war against Ser- 
 bia, and on the next day the bombardment of Belgrade 
 began. 
 
 This declaration of war made the European sittiation 
 almost desperate. Austria's intention to crush under all 
 circumstances the inconvenient neighbouring State, re- 
 gardless of the European conflagration which must re- 
 sult, had now revealed itself in action, and it appeared 
 that all further attempts to quench the fire or to prevent 
 its extension would be void of any prospect of success. 
 Austria had mobilised, not only against Serbia, which 
 could be regarded as a matter of course, but against 
 Russia as well. The views vary as to the extent of her 
 mobilisation towards the north and north-east. The Rus- 
 sian reports maintain that more than half of the Aus- 
 trian army had been mobilised,^ whereas the Chancellor, 
 von Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of August 4th 
 admits the mobilisation of only tzvo army corps "against 
 the north." ^ In any case it is clear that on July 28th 
 
 * Orange Book, No. 49. 
 
 'The Collected Documents, p. 937.
 
 THE CRIME 159 
 
 Austria was the only great Power which had mobilised, 
 and that its mobilisation was directed, not only against 
 her small neighbour, but also against the great Russian 
 Empire. 
 
 This fact was bound to compel Russia to take counter- 
 measures, the necessity for which was based not merely 
 on the military measures taken by Austria, but even 
 more on her systematic frustration of all attempts to 
 bring about an understanding. The Russian Govern- 
 ment on the 29th of July officially communicated to 
 foreign Governments that they had ordered mobilisation 
 in the army districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow, and 
 Kasan, and that this was designed as a protective meas- 
 ure against Austria's mobilisation and without any ag- 
 gressive intentions against Austria or Germany.^ 
 
 Simultaneously with these events, renewed efforts 
 were being made by Russia and England to find a for- 
 mula whereby a settlement could be arrived at between 
 the conflicting interests of Austria on the one hand 
 and of Russia on the other. War had now broken 
 out. The question to be discussed was no longer that 
 of inducing Austria to withdraw, but only that of bring- 
 ing about a cessation of military operations, of leaving 
 to Austria as a pledge any Serbian territory which she 
 had meanwhile occupied, and of making an attempt on 
 this basis to satisfy as far as possible the demands of 
 Austria. 
 
 In this direction Grey and Sazonof showed indefati- 
 gable activity, and were most energetically supported by 
 Viviani, the French Prime Minister. The first formula 
 in this sense was proposed on July 29th by Grey to the 
 German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. It amounted 
 to the suggestion that Austria should express herself as 
 satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neigh- 
 bouring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory 
 ~"~*~White Book, p. 409. Orange Book, No. 51. Blue Book, No. 78-
 
 160 I ACCUSE! 
 
 settlement of her demands, and should allow the other 
 Powers thne and opportunity to mediate between Aus- 
 tria and Russia.^ 
 
 This proposal of Grey was insistently urged on the 
 Emperor in the telegram despatched on July 30th by 
 King George to Prince Henry of Prussia, and the hope 
 was expressed that the Emperor would apply: — 
 
 "his great influence in order to induce Austria to 
 accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that 
 Germany and England are working together to 
 prevent what would be an international catastrophe. 
 Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and 
 will continue to do all that lies in my power, to 
 maintain the peace of Europe." 
 
 The Secretary of State, Sir E. Grey, exerted himself 
 with the same zeal as the King to move the Powers to 
 the acceptance of his proposal, which, in fact, offered 
 satisfaction to all, and a way of escape from the dan- 
 gerous confusion which had resulted. 
 
 Meanwhile the Russian Minister, Sazonof, had also 
 dictated to the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, a 
 formula as the basis of a settlement, which was directed 
 to the same objects as Grey's proposal. The formula 
 runs : — 
 
 *Tf Austria, recognising that the Austro-Serbian 
 question has assumed the character of a question of 
 European interest, declares herself ready to elimi- 
 nate from her ultimatum points which violate the 
 sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop 
 her military preparations." ^ 
 
 This proposal of Sazonof dates from July 30th, that 
 is to say, two days after the Austrian declaration of 
 
 ^ * Blue Book, Nos. 76, 88, 90, 98. White Book, 410. 
 * Orange Book, No. 60.
 
 THE CRIME 161 
 
 war against Serbia, and after the bombardment of Bel- 
 grade and the invasion of Serbian territory had already 
 begun. The proposal contained no obligation on the part 
 of Austria to cancel the military action taken by her; 
 it merely imposed on Austria the requirement that she 
 should leave untouched the sovereign rights of Serbia, 
 that is to say, an obligation which could well be accepted 
 by Austria, if she desired honourably to observe the 
 declaration given by her at the beginning of the crisis. 
 
 What, however, took place? The Russian Ambassa- 
 dor at Berlin, Swerbeiev, on July 30th handed to von 
 Jagow, the Foreign Secretary, the proposal made by 
 Sazonof, which had simultaneously been telegraphed to 
 the Foreign Office through the German Ambassador, 
 Count Pourtales. The answer of Jagow was a Hat re- 
 fusal: "it was impossible for Austria to accept the pro- 
 posal." 1 This refusal, be it noted, was given at once,' 
 without any previous inquiry in Vienna. Herr von 
 Jagow obviously regarded himself as the guardian or 
 man of business of the Austrian Government, which, 
 since the declaration of war against Serbia and her 
 refusal of any kind of discussion, no longer stood in 
 any direct relation with Petrograd. 
 
 One more attempt thus ended in failure! But even 
 this further failure did not deter the English and Rus- 
 sian Governments from making renewed attempts to 
 bring about an understanding. There were two formulae 
 in the field, that of Grey of the 29th of July and that of 
 Sazonof of the 30th of July. The latter had been re- 
 fused by Jagow without any reasons being given, 
 whereas the former was still awaiting an answer. The 
 English Ambassador in Berlin constantly pressed for 
 an answer, and was repeatedly put off with empty 
 phrases. Owing to the Austrian refusal of all direct 
 discussions, diplomatic intercourse was rendered ex- 
 ^ Orange Book, No, 63.
 
 162 I ACCUSE! 
 
 traordinarily difficult. All inquiries had to go via Ber- 
 lin, and Berlin was never able to give a positive answer, 
 since, as was professed, an answer had not been received 
 from Vienna. Whether the agent in this case was hon- 
 est or dishonest cannot be proved with full certainty. 
 But in any case the suspicion in favour of the second 
 alternative is overwhelming — a point with which we 
 shall deal in greater detail later in stating the grounds 
 for the indictment against Germany. The peacemakers 
 were put off from day to day. On one occasion Jagow 
 had received no answer from Vienna; on another, Beth- 
 mann regrets that he had pressed the button so vigor- 
 ously in Vienna that he had perhaps gone too far and 
 produced the opposite effect from what was intended. 
 On a third occasion, when Goschen was still urging that 
 an answer should be given and was recommending that 
 an even more violent pressure should be applied to the 
 button in Vienna, the only answer which he got from 
 Bethmann was that Count Berchtold would . take the 
 wishes of the Emperor Francis Joseph in the matter 
 next morning.^ 
 
 Thus three complete days, from the 29th to the 31st 
 of July, glided unprontably into the past mithotit any 
 answer being received from Austria in reply to Grey's 
 proposal which the English King had so fervently urged 
 on the Emperor William. Three days glided unprofit- 
 ably into the past while Europe in suspense and in horror 
 watched the approach of the dreaded catastrophe. The 
 diplomatists of Germany and Austria were in no haste. 
 They knew what they wanted, and with complete com- 
 posure they prepared the drama behind the scenes, while 
 in front everyone was running to and fro in agitation, 
 calling aloud in terror for the fire brigade. 
 
 Grey, Sazonof, and Viviani persevered, notwithstand- 
 ing all their failures, in the earnest endeavour to prevent 
 '"Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, Ii2.
 
 THE CRIME 163 
 
 the outbreak of the conflagration. Scores of telegrams 
 flew backwards and forwards between London, Paris, 
 and Petrograd. Night and day men laboured in the 
 Chancellories of the Entente Powers to preserve peace. 
 Since Sazonof's proposal had been declined, and no 
 answer had been sent in reply to Grey's proposal — even 
 to-day no answer has been received — an attempt was 
 made to devise a third formula which would represent 
 a middle way between the first two formuLx. This third 
 formula — the result of the zealous action taken by Vi- 
 viani in the cause of mediation ^ — went even further to 
 meet the wishes of Austria than the first proposal of 
 Sazonof, and thus appeared to offer every prospect of 
 a favourable result. It was communicated by Sazonof 
 to the Great Powers of Europe on the 31st of July, 
 and runs as follows : — 
 
 "If Austria consents to stay the march of her 
 troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognising that 
 the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the char- 
 acter of a question of European interest, she admits 
 that the Great Powers may examine the satisfac- 
 tion which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hun- 
 garian Government without injury to her rights 
 as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia 
 undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." ^ 
 
 This formula, which now represented the utmost ex- 
 tent to which it was possible to go in meeting Austria's 
 wishes, and could only have been suggested by Russia's 
 decisive desire for peace, has never received an anszver 
 from Austria or Germany. While Sazonof in a des- 
 patch to London still expressed the hope that a peaceful 
 issue to the situation had been f ound,^ while Grey in 
 
 ^Yellow Book, No. 112. 
 ^Orange Book, No. 67. 
 "Orange Book, Nos. 69, 71.
 
 164 I ACCUSE! 
 
 his despatches to Berlin most urgently recommended 
 the acceptance of the second formula of Sazonof/ Ger- 
 many and Austria maintained an unbroken silence. In 
 place of the Serbian question, which was in danger of 
 being amicably settled, another c^uestion was put for- 
 ward, which was bound to lead inevitably to war — the 
 question of the Russian mobilisation. Germany ap- 
 peared no longer as Austria's man of business, but took 
 her place as a party to the case in her own name. The 
 understudy assumed the leading role. Austria's book of 
 guilt was closed, and a new book of guilt for Germany 
 was opened. 
 
 The Russian general mobilisation undoubtedly took 
 place on July 31st. On this all the diplomatic publica- 
 tions agree. ^ It was, however, occasioned by the previ- 
 ous Austrian general mobilisation. This fact requires 
 to be decisively emphasised, since in Germany an in- 
 tentional silence has been preserved on this point of- 
 ficially and unofficially. This silence is only natural, for 
 the guilt of Russia would hopelessly collapse like a house 
 of cards if it were proved that the Russian mobilisation 
 not only followed the Austrian in point of time, but was 
 also its necessary consequence; not merely because of 
 the military measures of Austria, but equally because 
 of the whole diplomatic attitude of the two Empires in 
 the days between July 23rd and 31st, 
 
 I have already shown that the first of all the mobilisa- 
 tions was the Austrian partial mobilisation against Ser- 
 bia and against the Russian frontier. This mobilisation, 
 according to Russian and French reports, comprised 
 against Russia more than a half of the entire Austrian 
 army, and according to Bethmann's admission at least 
 two army corps. The precise time of the complete 
 mobilisation of Austria is differentl y given; according 
 
 ^Blue Book, Nos. in, 120, 121, 131, 132. 
 * White Book, p. 412.
 
 THE CRIME 165 
 
 to the report of the Russian Ambassador in Vienna it 
 had already taken place on July 28th.i According to 
 French and English reports it took place at i o'clock 
 in the morning on July sist.^ To be on the safe side, I 
 will assume that the latter date only is proved. Of the 
 correctness of this date there can be no doubt in view 
 of the reports of Dumaine, the French Ambassador in 
 Vienna, of de Bunsen, the English Ambassador in Vi- 
 enna, and Bertie, the English Ambassador in Paris. 
 
 The Russian general mobilisation was ordered, at the 
 earliest, towards midday on July 31st, that is to say, 
 after the Austrian mobilisation. 
 
 On the same day — the exact hour is unknown — the 
 "threatening danger of war" {drohende Kriegsgefahr') 
 was proclaimed in Germany, In the evening about 7 
 o'clock the ultimatum to France was delivered in Paris, 
 and about midnight the ultimatum to Russia was de- 
 livered in Petrograd. 
 
 An eventful day! But the most remarkable occur- 
 rence was contributed by Austria, when, in the course of 
 the same day, unperturbed by general mobilisation, the 
 state of war {Krieg saust and), and ultimata, she sud- 
 denly gave simultaneous expression in Paris and Petro- 
 grad to her readiness to enter into negotiations with 
 Russia and the other Powers -with regard to the contents 
 of her ultimatum to Serbia. Austria thus at last de- 
 clared herself ready at the eleventh hour to do some- 
 thing which up till then she had most energetically re- 
 fused to do, that is to say, "to discuss the grounds of 
 her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers."^ 
 In Paris, London, and Petrograd this final apparent con- 
 version of Austria was received with feelings of in- 
 tensely pleasant surprise. Everyone hailed what was 
 
 * Orange Book, No. 44, 47. 
 
 * Yellow Book, No. 115. Blue Book, Nos. 113, 118, 126, 134. 
 
 * Yellow Book, No. 120. Orange Book, No. 73.
 
 166 I ACCUSE! 
 
 regarded as a new ray of hope. Grey and Sazonof at 
 once seized the opportunity of guiding the apparent 
 goodwill of Austria into paths which held out the guar- 
 antee of a happy^ issue. 
 
 As a shopkeeper spreads out before a fastidious cus- 
 tomer all his available wares in the hope that she will 
 in the end find something to suit her taste, so Grey and 
 Sazonof submitted to Austria, even at the eleventh hour, 
 every possible proposal in the hope that at least one 
 would gain the approval of this fastidious customer. 
 Grey promised to support in the capitals of the other 
 Powers any reasonable proposal of peace put forward 
 by Germany and Austria. He ofifered to support in 
 Petrograd a proposal which would satisfy all Austrian 
 demands without exception, in so far as the sovereignty 
 and integrity of Serbia were not thereby impaired.^ In 
 answer to the Austrian overture, Sazonof not only de- 
 clared himself ready to discuss with Austria the sub- 
 stance of the Austrian ultimatum, but he made the fur- 
 ther proposal — in order to guarantee as far as possible 
 that the discussion would have a chance of success — that 
 the proceedings should take place in London under the 
 "participation" of the Great Powers. He added that 
 it would be very important if Austria, during the nego- 
 tiations in London, were to put a stop provisionally to 
 her military action on Serbian territory.^ "It would 
 be very important," be it observed; it was not made a 
 conditio sine qua non. This represents a further sub- 
 stantial concession to Austria as compared with previous 
 proposals which had made the cessation of military 
 action a condition. 
 
 But all these proposals made in the last hour re- 
 mained without success. They were bound to be fruit- 
 less, because the assumption underlying them, namely, 
 
 *Blue Book, No. in. 
 
 *Blue Book, No. 133. Orange Book, No. 69.
 
 THE CRIME 167 
 
 that Austria was honestly prepared to come to an un- 
 derstanding, was illusory. Why did Austria in the criti- 
 cal days between the 23rd and 31st of July refuse all 
 discussions on the facts of the Serbian dispute? Why 
 did she with unyielding obstinacy constantly declare only 
 what she did not intend against Serbia, but never fur- 
 nish any explanation as to what she really did intend? 
 She did not intend to touch the integrity and inde- 
 pendence of Serbia. This negative declaration she con- 
 stantly repeated. But what did she mean to do posi- 
 tively f Even to-day we have no information on this 
 point. The German Emperor himself did not know 
 when he telegraphed to the Tsar on July 29th: — 
 
 ^'According to my opinion the action of Austria- 
 Hungary is to be considered as an attempt to re- 
 ceive full guaranty that the promises of Serbia are 
 effectively translated into deeds." 
 
 Herr von Schoen also, the German Ambassador at 
 Paris, knew just as little as his Imperial Master how to 
 furnish Viviani with a positive answer to the question 
 as to what Austria really did want.^ 
 
 What precisely was the nature of the guaranties of 
 which the Emperor William speaks, and of which the 
 German White Book is constantly making mention? 
 Were they contained In the Austrian Note, or did they 
 go beyond the Austrian Note? If they were contained 
 in it, then they were conceded, apart from the demands 
 contained In Articles 5 and 6, with regard to which 
 Serbia was prepared to negotiate. If, however, they 
 were not contained in the Note, then they extend still 
 further the scope of the Austrian demands, which apart 
 from this were in all conscience sufficiently far-reaching. 
 If this extension of the Austrian demands were to be 
 
 * Orange Book, No. 55.
 
 168 I ACCUSE! 
 
 made the subject of negotiations, it should clearly have 
 been stated in precise language; but until the evening 
 of the 31st of July this had not been done, and even 
 to-day we are no further forward. 
 
 How then, I ask again, are we to explain this sudden 
 cliange on the part of Austria? I can find no other 
 explanation than this, that the readiness of Austria to 
 negotiate, which if expressed at an earlier date would 
 without doubt have led to a peaceful settlement, was, in 
 the moment when it was finally expressed, completely 
 harmless. A peaceful solution was no longer to be 
 dreaded; by the independent lead assumed by the Cabinet 
 of Berlin war was already completely assured. 
 
 Here, again, the question arises whether there was a 
 divergence between Berlin and Vienna, or whether the 
 events which took place are to be attributed to precon- 
 certed duplicity. The paths followed by the two Cabi- 
 nets apparently led in opposite directions on the evening 
 of July 31st. Austria, in virtue of her readiness to 
 negotiate, was moving in the direction of peace. Ger- 
 many with her "threatening danger of war," with her 
 Imperial speeches,^ and the speeches of the Chancellor 
 to the people of Berlin, advanced consciously and in- 
 tentionally in the direction of war. It is impossible to 
 believe that there was any divergence between the two 
 Cabinets. Had such a divergence existed it must have 
 revealed itself at an earlier date than the 31st of July. 
 The coincidence in time between the two apparently 
 opposed actions, the sudden overnight conversion of 
 Austria as though by an illumination — in individuals 
 as in States such sudden illuminations are highly sus- 
 picious, and only slow conversions inspire confidence 
 — the conversion of Austria calculated to take effect at 
 the moment when it could no longer lead to salvation — 
 all these circumstances raise to a certainty the suspicion 
 that here there was preconcerted duplicity between the
 
 THE CRIME 169 
 
 two Governments intended to shift the guilt of the war 
 from themselves to Russia. 
 
 It must and had to come to war. The further discus- 
 sion of the question will completely convince anyone 
 who has so far been able to entertain doubts of the truth 
 of this assertion. All diplomatic negotiations were thus 
 bound to remain fruitless even if they resulted in the 
 whole of Europe being forced to her knees before Ger- 
 many and Austria. It was not enough to achieve a 
 diplomatic victory; a military victory had to be added 
 in order to assure the supremacy of Austria in the Bal- 
 kans and to pave for Germany a path to the stars where 
 she dreamed that her destiny was written. 
 
 The indictment which I bring against Austria may be 
 summarised in the following sentences : 
 
 (i) Austria, after having already planned an attack' 
 on Serbia in August, 1913, presented to Serbia in July, 
 1914, a Note containing demands of such an exorbitant 
 nature that a war with Serbia, and as a further conse- 
 quence a European war, was to be expected. 
 
 (2) She refused the prolongation of the forty-eight 
 hours' time-limit which was sought for by the Entente 
 Powers. 
 
 (3) She recalled her Ambassador, and declared war 
 against Serbia, although the Serbian Government had 
 submissively conceded nearly all the Austrian demands, 
 and so far as the others were concerned declared her- 
 self ready to negotiate and to submit the outstanding 
 points to arbitration. 
 
 (4) She flatly refused every discussion with Russia 
 and with the other Powers on the contents of the Ser- 
 bian Note, and only expressed her readiness to take 
 part in such discussions on July 31st when it was too 
 late. 
 
 (5) She refused the proposal of Grey to accept media- 
 tion, or at least advice, from the four Powers not di-
 
 170 I ACCUSE! 
 
 rectly concerned, although Russia had agreed to this 
 proposal. 
 
 (6) Notwithstanding repeated urgent requests from 
 England, she left unanswered the formula of agreemenf 
 proposed by Grey. 
 
 (7) She declined, through Herr von Jagow, the first 
 formula of agreement proposed by Sazonof. 
 
 (8) She gave no answer to the second formula of 
 agreement proposed by Sazpnof. 
 
 (9) The last proposals for an agreement made by 
 Grey and Sazonof were also not considered worthy of 
 an answer by Austria. 
 
 (10) In so far as she furnished any explanations, she 
 restricted herself to saying what she did not wish, but 
 she never said what she did wish. 
 
 (11) She was the first of all the Great Powers to be- 
 gin mobilisation and military operations; she preceded all 
 the other Powers, first with her partial and then with 
 her general mobilisation. 
 
 These points in the indictment are proved, and jus- 
 tify the judgment: 
 
 ^'Austria is guilty, either alone or in common with 
 others, of having provoked the European war." 
 
 We shall now see who the others are. 
 
 B 
 
 GERMANY 
 
 The guilt of Germany is even easier to prove than that 
 of Austria, since Germany has composed her own bill 
 of indictment. Properly read, the German White Book 
 contains almost the whole of the accusations which can 
 be brought against Germany, and I will undertake to
 
 THE CRIME 171 
 
 '• produce overwhelming proof of guilt bj means of the 
 contents of the German White Book taken along with 
 the complementary official documents, so that it will be 
 unnecessary for me to do more than emphasise her self- 
 accusations. 
 
 These confessions are, of course, unintentional. They 
 do not have the purifying intention and the force of 
 self-accusations as known to Christianity, and as repre- 
 sented on the stage by the most Christian of all mod- 
 ern poets, Tolstoi. They are confessions arising from 
 imprudence; he who is confessing believes that he is 
 justifying himself, whereas he is really accusing him- 
 self. He believes that he is defending himself, and he 
 delivers into the hands of his accuser priceless material 
 for his condemnation. 
 
 Let us begin at the very opening passage in the White 
 Book. After depicting the position of the Austrian 
 Government towards the Serbian agitation and the 
 impossibility of "viewing any longer this agitation across 
 the border," the White Book continues: — 
 
 "With all our heart we were able to agree with 
 our ally's estimate of the situation, and assure him 
 that any action considered necessary to end the 
 movement in Serbia directed against the conserva- 
 tion of the monarchy would meet with our ap- 
 proval. We were perfectly aware that a possible 
 warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia 
 might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might 
 therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with 
 our duty as allies. We could not, however, in these 
 vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at 
 stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude 
 not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our 
 assistance in these trying days. . . . We, therefore, 
 permitted Austria a completely free hand in her
 
 172 I ACCUSE! 
 
 action towards Serbia, but have not participated in 
 her preparations." ' 
 
 What does this amount to? It means: — 
 (i) That the German Government gave the Austrian 
 Government a completely free hand to take against Ser- 
 bia whatever action might appear to her to be suitable 
 in the circumstances, whether the means adopted were 
 diplomatic or military in their nature. 
 
 (2) That Germany intentionally refrained from par- 
 ticipating in the preparations for action in either of 
 these ways; that is to say, she was prepared, in conse- 
 quence of her duty as an ally, to follow blindly the 
 lead taken by Austria. 
 
 (3) That Germany was perfectly well aware that mili- 
 tary action on the part of Austria against Serbia might 
 bring Russia into the field, and might therefore involve 
 Germany also in the war, which, in consequence of the 
 obligations imposed by alliances on both sides, was 
 bound to assume the character of a European war. 
 
 Thus the German Government acknowledges that it 
 hears the responsibility (dolus) for the European War, 
 the ultimate responsibility {dolus eventualis) which, ac- 
 cording to juridical and moral ideas, is placed on the 
 same footing as the direct responsibility {dolus purus). 
 
 At the same time she further admits that she herself 
 from the beginning regarded her effort to localise the 
 military conflict between Austria and Serbia as having 
 had no prospect of success. It follows that, in reject- 
 ing the promising proposals for arriving at an under- 
 standing put forward by the other Powers and in seeking 
 to substitute for them one for localisation, Germany 
 was proposing an expedient which, in her own view, 
 could not lead to a successful issue. In other words, 
 her desire was to produce the appearance that she was 
 anxious to prevent the European conflict, but she re-
 
 THE CRIME 173 
 
 fused every method calculated effectively to prevent it, 
 and in their place proposed a method which in her own 
 opinion was completely unfitted to achieve this end. 
 
 The view that Russia would be brought into the field 
 by an Austro-Serbian war, to which free expression is 
 given in the White Book, was but too well founded. 
 One can only be amazed that Germany did not credit, 
 or pretended not to credit, the other Powers with the 
 foresight with which she was herself endowed. Had it 
 not become a commonplace in European diplomacy, and 
 indeed a commonplace to everyone in Europe who 
 thought about politics, that Russia, in view of the in- 
 timate bonds of blood and of faith and of the two 
 hundred years of history by which she was linked with 
 Serbia, could never be a silent witness of the establish- 
 ment of an Austrian hegemony over that country, that 
 she could never consent to it being crushed by arms, 
 but would come to the assistance of her weaker 
 brother ? ^ Russia's interest in the Balkans was known 
 to all, and had been confirmed by the Russian Gov- 
 ernment in countless declarations and actions. After the 
 first and the second Balkan War the opposition between 
 the interests of Austria and Russia had once more, as 
 on so many previous occasions, stood out in full relief. 
 Russia's interest on behalf of Serbia and Austria's in- 
 terest against Serbia had come into such violent col- 
 hsion that even then they almost occasioned a European 
 war. The same danger existed in August, 19 13, when 
 Austria planned the attack on Serbia which has been 
 disclosed by Giollitti. Even at that time the interven- 
 tion of Russia was looked upon as a matter of course; 
 otherwise the inquiry addressed by Austria to her ally 
 Italy would have had no meaning. As late as May, 
 1914, the Russian Forei gn Minister, Sazonof, in a speech 
 
 ^ See Blue Book, p. v. Grey called this "a commonplace in Euro- 
 pean diplomacy" in a speech in Parliament in March, 1913.
 
 IT* I ACCUSE! 
 
 in the Duma, professed his adhesion to a policy of "the 
 Balkans for the Balkan people," that is to say, to a 
 policy which opposed any intention on the part of Aus- 
 tria to establish a hegemony, and which promised the 
 support of Russia in the maintenance of the indepen- 
 dence of the Balkan peoples. The question here was 
 not a political one pure and simple ; it was rather a ques- 
 tion of national sentiment and of blood-relationship. 
 This link between Russia and Serbia was an ancient his- 
 torical fact, with which European diplomacy was bound 
 to reckon, and with which it always had reckoned.^ Ger- 
 many and Austria also reckoned with it, as the White 
 Book testifies, 
 
 Atid was it now supposed that these bonds were sud- 
 denly to be wrenched asunder? Was it expected that 
 Russia would be a placid spectator while Austria crushed 
 the small State connected with Russia by blood? Was 
 Russia baldly to renounce her interests in the Balkans 
 and her prestige among the Balkan nations in favour 
 of Austria? This was a strong suggestion to make, 
 if it were seriously meant. But the suggestion was in- 
 deed so strong that it cannot have been seriously 
 meant. 
 
 Germany herself never believed, and never could have 
 believed, in the possibility of localisation from the mo- 
 ment the conflict assumed a military aspect. My little 
 brother annoys a strong man, who is on the point of 
 striking him dead. I interv^ene to protect the little one 
 against the superior strength of the big man. A third, 
 who is even bigger, bars my way, saying that the conflict 
 between the small boy and the big man must remain 
 localised. Would I therefore restrain myself from 
 protecting my brother? This was Russia's position. 
 
 Certainly it would have been a good thing if the con- 
 flict could have remaine d localised, and this would also 
 "^———^ 1 ggg gjyg Book, p. V.
 
 .^ THE CRIME 175 
 
 have been quite possible if it had remained on a diplo- 
 matic basis. On this basis the great man had already 
 obtained a complete victory over the small. But it was 
 really too much to ask that the little one should be 
 crushed after he had tendered copious apologies, and 
 had humbly promised to behave better in future. It 
 was impossible to ask this of Russia, and if such a 
 demand were made it was known from the outset that 
 it could not be satisfied. 
 
 Thus the only title to glory which Germany claims 
 for herself in this diplomatic tragi-comedy falls to the 
 ground. No one believed in the possibility of localisa- 
 tion, least of all Germany herself. 
 
 After this, the only proposal made by Germany, a 
 proposal advanced by her in the full knowledge that it 
 had no prospect of success, had, as a matter of course, 
 failed, Germany's whole attitude during the critical days 
 was one of perpetual passivity; if in any way she aban- 
 doned this attitude, she restricted herself to the frus- 
 tration of all attempts to arrive at an understanding. 
 The more the German Government assures us that it 
 earnestly laboured "shoulder to shoulder with Eng- 
 land" in the interests of mediation, the less support do 
 these assurances find in the facts. The impartial in- 
 quirer sees only the one shoulder, that of England, press- 
 ing in the direction of peace, while the German shoulder, 
 butting against the English, is seen pushing in the 
 opposite direction. 
 
 Why did the German Government allow the Austrian 
 Note to be despatched without being acquainted with 
 its contents, without previously submitting these to ex- 
 amination? Among foreign Governments the suspicion 
 had made itself manifest that Germany had already 
 had a hand in the game when the Note was drafted. 
 In particular, the Italian Government adduced as one of 
 the grounds for her resolution to remain neutral that she
 
 176 I ACCUSE! 
 
 had not been informed of Austria's intentions and of 
 the contents of the Note — in contrast to Germany, the 
 other member of the Triple Alliance. The German 
 Government promptly denied this. It assured foreign 
 Governments that it had received no information with 
 regard to the Note before the time of its delivery, and 
 this assurance is repeated in the White Book.^ It is 
 open to anyone to believe or disbelieve this assurance. 
 If it is true, it reveals an unprecedented levity, for which 
 there is no adjective in the German language sufficiently 
 severe. Here we have a Note which in itself almost 
 amounted to a declaration of war, which would almost 
 certainly lead to a Serbian, and in the sequel to a Eu- 
 ropean war; are we to suppose that the German Gov- 
 ernment did not require such a Note as this to be laid 
 before it previous to its delivery that it might have 
 the opportunity of examining it, and of abating any ex- 
 cessive harshness which it might contain? If, however, 
 Herr von Bethmann had knowledge of the Note, and 
 notwithstanding allowed it to be delivered without de- 
 mur, this affords proof that he saw clearly the possibil- 
 ity of war, and intentionally did nothing to prevent it. 
 Thus levity, irresponsible levity, or the commission of 
 a crime, are the alternatives which must be placed before 
 Herr von Bethmann. It may be left to him to make the 
 choice. 
 
 At the other stages of the negotiations the same alter- 
 natives have to be placed before him. 
 
 Why did the German Government not support the re- 
 quest of England and Russia for an extension of the 
 time-limit? Why did Herr von Jagow content himself 
 here, as on so many other occasions, with the platonic 
 promise that he would transmit this request to Vienna, 
 without being able to support it? Why did he at once 
 express doubt whether Austria would be able to meet 
 VWhite Book, p. 406.
 
 n 
 
 THE CRIME 177 
 
 this request ? ^ Was it not entirely reasonable that the 
 Powers concerned in the cause of peace, who only re- 
 ceived knowledge of the Austrian Note on July 24th, 
 should have sought for a somewhat longer time-limit in 
 order that they might be able successfully to exercise 
 their influence on Serbia in the direction of securing 
 compliance? Was it not reasonable that they should 
 first of all desire to become acquainted with the Austrian 
 documentary evidence, which was not annexed to the 
 copy of the Note communicated to them, and which was 
 only made accessible to the English Government on 
 August 7th, that is to say, long after the outbreak of 
 war? 2 What objection could Germany raise against 
 the extension of the time-limit, a course which could 
 only be serviceable to the interests of peace, if like the 
 others she also desired peace? 
 
 If the Serbian answer, as up to the evening of July 
 25th there was reason to fear had amounted to a re- 
 fusal, would not Germany have had to reproach herself 
 with the fact that her failure to support the request for 
 an extension of the time-limit had in part to bear the 
 responsibility for the unfavourable answer? 
 
 The Serbian answer became known, and the whole 
 world breathed more freely. No one had expected that 
 Serbia would have so humiliated herself. Whereas the 
 Austrian Note is rightly characterised in the English 
 Blue Book in the statement that "No independent na- 
 tion had ever been called upon to accept a greater hu- 
 miliation," ^ the Serbian answer is accorded the well- 
 merited testimony that "The reply went far beyond any- 
 thing which any power, Germany not excepted, had ever 
 thought probable." ^ Russia and France were equally 
 
 ' Blue Book, No. 18. 
 'Blue Book, p. v. 
 " Blue Book, p. vi. 
 *Blue Book, p. vii.
 
 178 I ACCUSE! 
 
 satisfied with the attitude assumed by Serbia. In a cir- 
 cular telegram of July 27th Sazonof describes the Ser- 
 bian answer as follows : — ' 
 
 "It exceeds all our expectations in its modera- 
 tion and in its desire to afford the fullest satisfac- 
 tion to Austria. We do not see what further de- 
 mands could be made by Austria, unless the Vienna 
 Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with 
 Serbia." ^ 
 
 All were agreed that just as the Austrian Note had 
 surpassed the limits of what was permissible and had 
 violated all precedents, so the Serbian answer surpassed 
 in its spirit of compliance and submissiveness every- 
 thing of which there was previous record. Germany 
 alone was of a different opinion. The Austrian demands 
 appeared to her moderate and justifiable; the Serbian 
 answer, on the contrary, appeared insufficient, as it 
 "showed in all essentials the endeavour through pro- 
 crastination and new negotiations to escape from the 
 just demands of the Monarchy." ^ The German Gov- 
 ernment undertook to "pass on" to Vienna the request of 
 Grey that Germany would use her influence in Vienna 
 in support of a favourable reception of the Serbian Note, 
 but they did not see their way to identify themselves 
 with the request.^ 
 
 Why was it impossible to support this request? Why 
 was it not possible for Germany to exert her whole influ- 
 ence in Vienna in order to secure that negotiations on the 
 basis of the Serbian answer would at least take place? 
 Were the few reservations made, in the most conciliatory 
 form, by Serbia of so great importance that on their 
 account the whole answer had to be rejected, diplomatic 
 
 * Orange Book, No. 33. 
 
 'White Book, p. 406. 
 
 ' Blue Book, p. viii and No. 34.
 
 THE CRIME 179 
 
 relations broken off, and a war declared, the further con- 
 sequences of which were distinctly foreseen by Germany? 
 Did the Serbian answer really have the appearance of 
 quibbling and procrastination? Was it not full of posi- 
 tive promises, the non-fulfilment of which had first to 
 be waited for before the answer could be rejected as in- 
 sufficient? What else could Serbia do within forty-eight 
 hours than promise everything — everything with a few 
 exceptions — asked of her? The intention to procrasti- 
 nate could only manifest itself later, in the event of there 
 being an undue delay in giving effect to the promises. 
 Why, then, did Germany tolerate the recall of the Aus- 
 trian Ambassador, and later the Declaration of War? 
 
 If the objection is raised that Germany could not have 
 prevented it, I answer that she could, but that she 
 was unwilling to do so. That she was unwilling to do 
 this, or indeed anything else, in the service of peace 
 may already be inferred from the preceding events, and 
 is confirmed by all that follows. To assert, however, 
 that she was unable to exercise a decisive influence on 
 Austria's action is so ridiculous an evasion that it does 
 not need to be seriously contradicted. With regard to 
 Austria, Germany was in a position to give effect to 
 her every wish. Austria was a cipher in the European 
 international concert, in which Germany played the first 
 fiddle. Only if Germany stood behind her could Austria 
 run the risk of a conflict with Russia, which was bound 
 to arise out of the Serbian conflict. A nod from Ger- 
 many would have been enough, and Austria would have 
 left her Ambassador in Belgrade, and continued to dis- 
 cuss the Serbian Note. It was unnecessary for Beth- 
 mann to say a word. A frown would have been enough 
 to restrain Austria from declaring war against Serl^ia, 
 an action which no Austrian statesman could have taken 
 unless he had had in his pocket the previous concurrence 
 of Germany.
 
 180 I ACCUSE! 
 
 All that England might have prevented by a timely 
 declaration of neutrality in Petrograd and in Paris is 
 constantly emphasised in the German Press, as also 
 in the Chancellor's speech of December 2nd. This ques- 
 tion I will deal with later in discussing the attitude of 
 England. The other question, which lies nearer home, 
 is, however, never raised : What might not Germany 
 have prevented if at the right time she had checked the 
 impetuosity of her Austrian ally, if she had moderated 
 the terms of the Note, required that negotiations should 
 take place on the basis of the Serbian answer, and had 
 thus prevented the declaration of war? This is the 
 crucial point in the whole question. Here lies the germ 
 of the whole tragedy. Austria, blindly and without so 
 much as the quiver of an eyelash, did whatever Germany 
 wished. All the sugary phrases used by Bethmann and 
 Jagow, that they could not expect this or that of Austria; 
 that they feared that they had already gone too far in 
 their suggestions ; that they had pressed the button too 
 violently, and that in so doing the opposite from what 
 was intended might be produced ; that they had gone to 
 the utmost limit in Vienna, and so on, all these state- 
 ments are hut empty falsehood and deceit. I repeat, a 
 frown would have been enough to restrain Vienna from 
 measures not desired in Berlin. The question again re- 
 duces itself simply to this : What was and what was not 
 desired in Berlin? I have already given the answer to 
 this question. 
 
 Thus with Berlin's concurrence matters advanced to 
 a declaration of war for which, as has been shown above, 
 not the slightest ground could be advanced; with Ber- 
 lin's concurrence, also, all the further developments took 
 place. The attitude of Germany in the days between 
 July 28th and August ist was in conformity with that 
 during the preceding days. The English proposal for 
 a conference of Ambassadors in London was, as we have
 
 THE CRIME 181 
 
 already seen, rejected by Germany on formal grounds 
 without any inquiry being addressed to Austria.^ The 
 direct negotiations between Austria and Russia, proposed 
 by Germany, in which Sazonof was ready to participate, 
 wero rejected by Austria with the observation that the 
 suggestion, ''after the opening of hostilities by Serbia 
 and the subsequent declaration of war . . . appears be- 
 lated," ^ Here, again, is another charming expression : 
 "Serbia had opened hostilities," and not Austria. The 
 declaration of war against Serbia which had wantonly 
 proceeded from Austria prevents this same Austria from 
 negotiating with Russia in the interests of the mainte- 
 nance of European peace! All this Germany passively 
 endures, except in so far as she herself abandons her 
 passivity in favour of an attitude of active rejection, as 
 in the case of the conference of the four Powers. In 
 essential matters Germany contents herself with the role 
 of a postman, merely handing on the English proposals 
 to Vienna, and with the muteness proper to a postman 
 takes no further interest in the fate of these proposals. 
 "We further declared ourselves ready ... to transmit 
 a second proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna." ^ 
 "We even as late as July 30th forwarded the English 
 proposal to Vienna" * — such are the expressions we find 
 everywhere in the White Book. It is indeed in general 
 maintained that the proposals which were handed on re- 
 ceived support, but nothing is adduced to prove the as- 
 sertion. The correspondence between Berlin and Vienna 
 on which the proof of this rests is lacking. The luke- 
 warm observations uttered by Messrs. von Bethmann and 
 von Jagow to Goschen, the English Ambassador, on the 
 reception of each new English proposal do not indicate 
 
 '■"White Book, p. 409. 
 
 "White Book, p. 409 and Exhibit 16. 
 
 'White Book, p. 409. 
 
 * White Book, p. 410.
 
 182 I ACCUSE! 
 
 that they felt any very lively interest in these proposals. 
 The negative results achieved in Vienna, however, in- 
 controvertibly prove that they not only did not support 
 the English proposals, but that in all probability they 
 thwarted them. Any course which they earnestly sup- 
 ported in Vienna was bound to have been accepted there. 
 If it was not accepted, this affords proof that they did 
 not earnestly support it. 
 
 The evil intention of the German Government is clearly 
 shown by the following occurrence. When on July 27th 
 Sir Edward Goschen laid before von Jagow, the Foreign 
 Secretary, Grey's proposal of the conference of the four 
 Powers, Herr von Jagow, as is well known, at once de- 
 clined this "court of arbitration," and persisted in his 
 refusal, even when Goschen explained to him that the 
 question was not one of "arbitration," but that the object 
 was merely "to discuss and suggest means for avoiding 
 a dangerous situation." ^ But Grey refused to be dis- 
 couraged. He inferred from Jagow's answer and from 
 a declaration made by Lichnowsky that Germany did not 
 in principle refuse his proposal, but that difficulties were 
 being advanced only against the form of a Conference. 
 He therefore commissioned his Ambassador to request 
 Herr von Jagow himself to suggest the form which 
 would be agreeable to the German Government.^ Viviani 
 made the same suggestion to Baron von Schoen, and 
 Sazonof to Count Pourtales. All three Governments ex- 
 pressed themselves as ready to accept any form of medi- 
 ation which Germany might propose, and Viviani, as 
 well as Grey, emphatically added that the European situ- 
 ation had now become so serious that they dared not 
 allow formalities or quibbles to wreck the peace of Eu- 
 rope.^ 
 
 ^Blue Book, No. 43. 
 
 ' Blue Book, Nos. 46, 60, 68. Yellow Book, No. 81. Orange Book, 
 No. 54. 
 'Blue Book, No. 78. Orange Book, No. 55.
 
 THE CRIME 183 
 
 To-day Europe is still waiting in vain for Jagozv's 
 attswer. Grey did not desist; he reminded Mr. von 
 Jagow of the matter, and returned to it again and again, 
 urging on him the desirabihty of at length suggesting 
 the form agreeable to him, which had already been ac- 
 cepted by all in advance. It was all in vain. No answer 
 came from the Wilhelmstrasse. The White Book ex- 
 pressly confirms the fact that the idea of Grey's proposal 
 was approved.^ It intentionally passes over in silence 
 the fact that this idea could have been realised in any 
 form desired by Germany, if Germany had put forward 
 any proposals on the subject. These proposals were 
 never made. Is not this an overwhelming proof of 
 guilt? The fact is that the diplomatists of Germany, as 
 I have already pointed out, had no wish to sit round 
 a table in London with the diplomatists of other coun- 
 tries. It was known how easy it would be to find a solu- 
 tion of the Serbian question, and how much more diffi- 
 cult questions had been solved in London in 19 12 and 
 1913. It was feared that a peaceful solution might again 
 be arrived at in London, and for this reason, whatever 
 might happen, the London Conference had to be pre- 
 vented. 
 
 We now come to the history of the various formulae 
 proposed by Grey and Sazonof which aimed at bring- 
 ing about a peaceful understanding between Russia and 
 Austria with or without the participation of the Powers. 
 I have already dealt with the fate of these proposals in 
 the previous section relating to Austria, and I have also 
 pointed out the role played by Germany in these nego- 
 tiations. In the German White Book only one of all 
 these proposals and negotiations, that of Grey, is men- 
 tioned, and this is done in such a supei"ficial and ambigu- 
 ous manner that without reference to the telegram from 
 the English King to Prince Henry of Prussia one could 
 ^ White Book, p. 409.
 
 184 I ACCUSE! 
 
 scarcely realise how far-reaching and how rich in pros- 
 pect was the peace proposal in question. Here, again, 
 Germany restricted herself to the discharge of a post- 
 man's duties. She handed on the English proposal to 
 Vienna. The White Book contains not a word of recom- 
 mendation, nor even of criticism.^ It contents itself with 
 adding, "we had to assume that Russia would accept this 
 basis," and in another place it speaks of a proposal of 
 mediation "whose tendencies and basis must have been 
 known in Petrograd." ^ That is all that is said. Noth- 
 ing is told us with regard to the fate of the proposal, 
 and it is only from the English Blue Book that we learn 
 that Grey's proposal, like so much else that was calcu- 
 lated to serve the cause of peace, was simply buried in 
 silence. In this case also events took exactly the same 
 course as had previously been followed with regard to 
 the question of the form of the conference of the four 
 Powers, the only difference being that on that occasion 
 Germany alone was responsible for the failure to give an 
 answer, whereas here the responsibility for the absence 
 of an answer was pushed on to Vienna. "He has up 
 till now received no reply"; "they had not had time to 
 send an answer yet" ; "no answer had yet been re- 
 turned." ^ Such were the answers given by Jagow to 
 Goschen in the critical days in which the fate of Europe 
 depended on hours, and indeed on minutes. 
 
 The sentence in the White Book which speaks of the 
 
 ^ White Book, p. 410. [The translation of the White Book used 
 in the text is that officially published by the German Government, 
 reproduced in the Collected Diplomatic Documents. There is, how- 
 ever, a slight difference in the meaning between the official transla- 
 tion of this passage: "We thought that Russia would accept this 
 basis," and the original German which has here been followed in 
 the text : "Wir mussten annehmen dass Russland diese Basis akzep- 
 tiren würde."] 
 
 'White Book, p. 411. 
 
 *Blue Book, Nos. 28, 107, 112.
 
 THE CRIME 186 
 
 consent of Russia to Grey's proposal as an indefinite 
 assumption only, and which is thereby designed to make 
 it appear as if the fate of this proposal was uncertain on 
 the other side also — this sentence can only rest on mala 
 ßdes. The German Government knew quite well that 
 Sazonof also, as well as Grey, had energetically sought 
 for a formula to serve as the basis of agreement, that a 
 first formula of this kind, as I have already stated, had 
 been dictated by Sazonof himself to Count Pourtales on 
 July 30th,^ that Germany had refused this proposal on 
 the ground that it was ''impossible for Austria to accept 
 it," ^ and that Sazonof, at Grey's suggestion, had for- 
 warded to the German Government an even more con- 
 ciliatory formula.^ All this was, and is, known to the 
 German Government. It is, however, hidden in silence 
 from the German public. It may be said generally that 
 the German Government has, consciously and inten- 
 tionally, maintained silence with regard to all the ef- 
 forts for peace made by Russia and France, because these 
 do not suit their case and would lead to the collapse 
 of the whole of the laboriously constructed edifice of the 
 Russian-French attack. The second formula of Sazonof 
 experienced the same fate as Grey's proposal. No answer 
 has in fact been given. And the last desperate efforts of 
 Russia and England on July 31st and August ist have 
 also not been considered worthy of any kind of an an- 
 swer from Germany.* 
 
 Germany acted according to the principle : 
 "Words, words, enough have now been bandied 
 At last the time has come for deeds." ^ 
 
 ' Orange Book, No. 60. 
 " Orange Book, No. 63. 
 * Orange Book, No. 67. 
 
 *Blue Book, Nos. iii, 120, 121, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 139. Orange 
 Book, Nos. 69, 71, 72- 
 
 ' Der Worte sind genug gewechselt 
 Nun lasst uns endlich Taten sehen.
 
 186 I ACCUSE! 
 
 The decision to act had already been taken on July 
 29th, on the third day after the return of the Emperor 
 from his tour in the north. To judge from the telegrams 
 exchanged between the Emperor and the Tsar there ap- 
 pears to me to be no doubt — justice requires that this 
 should be placed on record — that the Emperor at the mo- 
 ment of his return had not yet personally resolved on 
 war. His first telegrams to the Tsar despatched on July 
 28th and 29th,^ and especially the former, strike a tone 
 of friendship and of an inclination to peace which scarcely 
 leaves room for doubt that they were honourably in- 
 tended. I have already shown that a large and powerful 
 party at the Court and in the country had for long 
 striven for war. I have also endeavoured to prove that 
 the Emperor had in principle been won over to these 
 efforts. But there is a long step between entertaining a 
 conviction on principle and translating this conviction 
 into action. The step is greater the more responsibility 
 attaches to the act, the more serious the consequences 
 to which it may give rise. It need, therefore, cause no 
 surprise that days of inner and of outer struggle had to 
 pass before the resolution to act came to fruition. The 
 inner struggles are reflected, easily recognisable by the 
 psychologist, in the telegrams which were sent by the 
 Emperor between July 28th and August ist to the Tsar 
 and the King of England.^ 
 
 At the outset the Emperor recognises the difficulties 
 for the Tsar and his Government of "stemming the tide 
 of public opinion in Russia." On the other hand, he 
 defends the action taken by Austria against Serbia, and 
 promises to use all his influence in bringing about a direct 
 understanding between Austria and Russia. As the ex- 
 change of telegrams advances we see more and more the 
 
 ^ White Book, Exhibits 20 and 22. 
 
 * White Book, pp. 412, 413, pp. 431, 432; Collected Documents, pp. 
 539, 540.
 
 THE CRIME 187 
 
 original subject of negotiation — the substantial difference 
 between Austria and Russia — disappear, and the formal 
 question of the menace involved in military prepara- 
 tions takes its place. In the telegram sent by the Em- 
 peror on the afternoon of July 29th there can be heard 
 the first ominous notes of the menace of military prepa- 
 rations.^ References to this question constantly increase 
 until in the end the only subject of discussion is that of 
 military preparations. On July ßoth all discussion of the 
 
 ^ It is surprising that in the German White Book there is no 
 answer from the Tsar to this telegram. The White Book inserts 
 immediately after the Emperor William's telegram of the 29th July 
 (Exhibit 22), a further telegram of the Emperor of the 30th July 
 (Exhibit 23). This gap has now been filled by an official publica- 
 tion of the Russian Government. The Tsar, in fact, answered on 
 the 29th of July, in reply to the Emperor's telegram of the same 
 day, in the following words : — "Thanks for your telegram which is 
 conciliatory and friendly whereas the official message presented 
 to-day by your ambassador to my Minister was conveyed in a very 
 different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be 
 right to give over the Aiistro-Serhian problem to the Hague tri- 
 bunal, I trust in your wisdom and friendship." This telegram of 
 the Tsar was omitted by the German Government, obviously because 
 it contains the simplest and most natural proposal in the world — 
 already made by Serbia in her reply — namely, that the question at 
 issue should be submitted to the Hague Tribunal. The excuse put 
 forward by the Norddeutsche Allgetneine Zeitung, that the telegram 
 had been omitted on account of its unimportance, is adapted to the 
 present intellectual level of the German newspaper reader. It was 
 omitted because, along with many other things, it was of decisive 
 importance for the formation of a judgment on the attitude of the 
 Tsar. The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have 
 led to peace, and for this reason it was declined. As, however, it 
 was impossible to give reasons for this refusal, the Emperor Wil- 
 liam was induced simply to ignore the Tsar's proposal, and to put 
 forward in place of the Austro-Serbian problem the question of 
 military preparation by means of which war could be brought about 
 at will. The German Government is led by evil conscience to omit 
 from the White Book the Tsar's telegram of the 29th of July. Tlie 
 telegram itself and its suppression affords a new proof that Russia 
 desired peace, but that Germany desired war.
 
 188 I ACCUSE! 
 
 substantial Issue had already completely ceased, and 
 everything turned on the question as to which of the 
 three Emperors had been compelled to mobilisation by 
 the others. On July 30th the Emperor William main- 
 tains that Austria had only mobilised against Serbia — in 
 opposition to the Chancellor, who admits that there had 
 also been a mobilisation against Russia, The Emperor 
 Nicholas, on the other hand, maintains that the partial 
 mobilisation of Russia which took place on July 29th 
 was only decided upon "for the reason of defence against 
 the preparations of Austria." He promises to send 
 "Tatisheff with instructions to-night to Berlin." ^ In his 
 telegram of July 31st the Tsar announces that the discon- 
 tinuance of military preparations "made necessary by the 
 Austrian mobilisation" was "technically impossible," but 
 he gives his solemn word that no provocative action will 
 be taken so long as negotiations continue. The Em- 
 peror William again demands unconditional discontinu- 
 ance of the military preparations of Russia, whereupon 
 the Tsar submits that he may take the same measures 
 without war necessarily following. The Emperor Wil- 
 liam, however, mobilises, and declares war. 
 
 This rapid development of events can only be ex- 
 plained by the fact that there must have taken place in 
 the authoritative circles in Berlin a change of front lead- 
 ing from the oscillation which characterised the earlier 
 days to a firm resolution to embark on war. In all prob- 
 ability this change of front took place on the evening of 
 July 29th, on the occasion of the Interview which the 
 Chancellor had with the Emperor in Potsdam. The in- 
 fluences which drove the still-hesitating Emperor to re- 
 
 * What happened to this mission of Tatisheff? Did he arrive in 
 Berlin? What message did he bring? Why did Berlin not delay 
 her ultimatum until the arrival of the special envoy of the Tsar, 
 who could not arrive at the earliest until the ist of August? These, 
 among other questions, will suggest themselves to the reader.
 
 THE CRIME 189 
 
 solve on war cannot be proved, but it is possible to guess 
 at them. People who are in a position to know say that 
 those occupying the leading military positions, supported 
 by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the 
 Emperor with their resignation en bloc if war were not 
 resolved on.^ 
 
 What is certain is that the Chancellor on the same eve- 
 ning, after his return to Berlin, summoned Sir Edward 
 Goschen, the English Ambassador, and fervently sub- 
 mitted to him a proposal that England in the event of 
 a European conflict should under certain conditions re- 
 main neutral? The conditions which Herr von Beth- 
 mann offered were as follows : — 
 
 (i) Germany in the event of a victorious war would 
 aim at no territorial acquisitions in Europe at the ex- 
 pense of France. The Chancellor said he was unable 
 to give a similar assurance with regard to the French 
 Colonies. 
 
 (2) The neutrality of Holland would be respected by 
 Germany so long as it was respected by Germany's ad- 
 versaries. 
 
 (3) With reference to Belgium it would depend on 
 the action of France what operations Germany might 
 be forced to undertake against Belgium, but in any case, 
 
 ^We have less difficulty in understanding these events in Berlin 
 when we bear in mind an observation which Count Pourtales made, 
 in passing, to Sazonof : measures of mobilisation were, he said, 
 highly dangerous nowadays, "for in that event the purely military 
 consideration of the question by the general staffs would find ex- 
 pression, and if that button were once touched in Germany the situ- 
 ation would get out of control." The German Government takes 
 very good care not to include in its White Book this self-confession, 
 which throws a very characteristic light on the occurrences in Berlin 
 in the last day before the outbreak of war. The Austrian Govern- 
 ment, however, with less prudence reports the observation of Pour- 
 tales in No. 28 of the Red Book. 
 
 "Blue Book, No. 85.
 
 190 I ACCUSE! 
 
 when the war was over, Belgium's integrity would be 
 respected if she had not sided against Germany. 
 
 This proposal for neutrality made on July 29th is in 
 the highest degree surprising, and is very illuminating. 
 
 What so far had happened, we may ask, to awake in 
 Herr von Bethmann this urgent fear of a European war? 
 Austria had opened hostilities against Serbia, and had 
 partially mobilised against Russia. Russia had there- 
 upon answered with a mobilisation of four southern 
 army districts. At that time there was absolutely no 
 question of a mobilisation against Germany. The White 
 Book itself only dates this from July 31st. All the diplo- 
 matic forces of Europe — at any rate, with the exception 
 of Germany and Austria — were active in endeavouring 
 to relieve the tension between Austria and Russia. The 
 proposal of the conference of the four Powers was still 
 hanging in the air. Grey's formula of agreement had 
 just been proposed to Lichnowsky, the German Ambassa- 
 dor. Russia was then, as she had been previously, ready 
 to treat directly with Austria, and was waiting to begin 
 negotiations. France was supporting in the most ener- 
 getic manner the efiforts for peace made by Grey and Saz- 
 onof. In short, all forces were labouring at the task 
 of maintaining peace, and it only required that Germany 
 should energetically intervene to move Austria to adopt 
 the conciliatory attitude demanded by the European situa- 
 tion, and peace would have been assured. And in such 
 a moment as this, when everything depended on the 
 peaceful intentions of Germany alone, the Chancellor 
 was thinking merely of how best to make his position se- 
 cure in the event of war! There is only one explana- 
 tion for this bid for neutrality made at this juncture. 
 The Chancellor regarded peace as in danger, and could 
 not do otherwise than regard it as in danger, because 
 he knew, as the other Governments could not then know, 
 that war had been decided on in Berlin. The war was
 
 THE CRIME 191 
 
 bound to come, since this was the wish of Germany. And 
 since it was bound to come, only one thing gave Herr 
 von Bethmann cause for anxiety, the task, namely, of 
 fashioning the chances of war as favourably as possible 
 for Germany, and of excluding England for the present 
 from the ranks of her enemies, in order to be in a more 
 secure position to defeat her on the next favourable 
 opportunity. The "policy of the free hand on the Con- 
 tinent," which the Chancellor had unsuccessfully pur- 
 sued with regard to England in 19 12 forms the basis of 
 the bid for neutrality of July 29th, 19 14. 
 
 The English answer was as negative in its nature as 
 that given two years previously. The significant impor- 
 tance of Bethmann's overtures were at once realised in 
 London. In return for the prospect of a future agree- 
 ment of neutrality with Germany, vaguely held out, the 
 English Government refused to allow itself to be elimi- 
 nated for the present from European politics and to be 
 obliged to stand aside an inactive spectator while France 
 was crushed or Belgian neutrality violated. In the opin- 
 ion of Grey (and it must be admitted that in this he is 
 right) such a bargain would be bound to break the 
 friendly relations existing between England and France, 
 would be inconsistent with the duty of protecting Bel- 
 gium imposed on every signatory of the guarantee of 
 neutrality of 1839, and would imperil, not merely the 
 interests, but also the good name of England. Grey in- 
 structed his Ambassador to add most earnestly to this 
 refusal of the German proposal that the one way of 
 maintaining the good relations between England and 
 Germany was that they should continue to work to- 
 gether to preserve the peace of Europe; if this were 
 successful, the relations between the two countries would 
 be, ipso facto, improved and strengthened. The English 
 Government in any case was ready to work in that way 
 with all sincerity and goodwill. It is impossible to omit
 
 192 I ACCUSE! 
 
 reference to the concluding paragraph in Grey's instruc- 
 tions to his Ambassador, a passage which must be re- 
 garded as of the deepest significance in arriving at a 
 judgment with regard to the attitude of England and 
 Germany in this struggle. The Ambassador was to com- 
 municate with the Chancellor in the fellowing sense: — 
 
 "If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the 
 present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will 
 be to promote some arrangement to which Germany 
 could be a party, by which she could be assured 
 that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pur- 
 sued against her or her allies by France, Russia, 
 and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired 
 this and worked for it, as far as I could, through 
 the last Balkan crisis, and, Gennany having a cor- 
 responding object, our relations sensibly improved. 
 The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the 
 subject of definite proposals, but if this present 
 crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe 
 has gone through for generations, be safely passed, 
 I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will 
 follow may make possible some more deßnite rap- 
 prochement between the Powers than has been pos- 
 sible hitherto."^ 
 
 The significance of this declaration of Grey is obvious. 
 It contains a moving appeal to common action in the 
 cause of peace, such as had been maintained throughout 
 the Balkan crisis to the advantage of the world and of 
 the two countries, who in pursuing the same high aim 
 had without compulsion approached each other and be- 
 come more intimately connected. The vision of the 
 future outlined by the English Minister nevertheless 
 went far beyond anything attained in the past; an agree- 
 ment was to be concluded, with the participation of Ger- 
 
 ^Blue Book, No. loi.
 
 THE CRIME 193 
 
 many, which would afford Germany and her allies formal 
 guarantees against any aggressive or even hostile policy 
 on the part of the Entente Powers — in other words, 
 a Treaty which would guarantee the peace of Europe, 
 which could draw together the Triple Entente and the 
 Triple Alliance, and would have substituted for the dan- 
 gerous system of the balance of power a general alliance 
 of peace. 
 
 How did the Chancellor receive this proposal ? When 
 Goschen had read to him Grey's words in the form of a 
 memorandum he received the communication "without 
 comment," and only expressed a desire to receive a copy 
 in order that he might reflect upon the matter at leisure. 
 The copy was handed to him. No answer has ever been 
 given} 
 
 What would Europe have looked like to-day if Herr 
 von Bethmann had concurred in Grey's proposal? It 
 is superfluous, and indeed too painful, to allow our 
 imagination to conjure up such a picture to-day. Every- 
 thing that Germany is supposed to be struggling to 
 achieve in this war — the security of her existence, free- 
 dom for her development, unhampered progress in cul- 
 ture and wellbeing — all these things were magnani- 
 mously offered. In reality these possessions had never 
 been in danger, but Grey's offer destroyed every possi- 
 bility of believing that they were in danger and every 
 pretext for persuading others to this belief. The alliance 
 of peace proposed by Grey was merely a first step out of 
 the atmosphere of enmity, distrust, and tension towards 
 that of friendship, confidence, and composure. This 
 first step would certainly have led to other advances. 
 The feeling of confidence thus revived and strengthened 
 would have rendered it possible to diminish the costly 
 precautionary measures, which based merely on uni- 
 versal and mutual distrust. Agreements on the subject 
 ^Blue Book, No. 109.
 
 194 I ACCUSE! 
 
 of the cessation and gradual diminution of armaments 
 would have become possible on the basis of an agree- 
 ment of friendship. In short, the way was opened to a 
 new and a better Europe, if Germany had but grasped 
 the hand offered by England. 
 
 But Herr von Bethmann thought otherwise. Having 
 placed the memorandum in a pigeon-hole, he quietly 
 chuckled to himself at the stupidity of the Englishman 
 who, with his insular restricted vision, still believed in 
 the peaceful intentions of Germany. We have over 
 again the same performance as in 1912. England desires 
 the peace of Europe; Germany, however, desires the neu- 
 trality of England, in order to be able to disturb this 
 peace at her own sweet will. And this same Chancellor, 
 who knows this and innumerable other similar occur- 
 rences of an earlier and of a later date, dares to burden 
 the English Government with the "inner responsibility 
 for the European war" ! We shall see later that in mak- 
 ing this statement he comes into violent conflict, not 
 merely with facts, but also with his own official publica- 
 tions. For the present inquiry it is sufficient to make 
 it clear that the resolution to go to war had already been 
 taken in Berlin on the evening of July 29th. Only on 
 this assumption is it possible to explain Bethmann's bid 
 for English neutrality and his failure to take any notice 
 of Grey's proposal. 
 
 On the same day on which Herr von Bethmann re- 
 ceived without comment Grey's proposal for a perma- 
 nent European state of peace, the "threatening danger 
 of war" was proclaimed in Germany, and the Am- 
 bassadors in Petrograd and Paris were instructed to 
 deliver ultimata to the Governments to which they were 
 accredited. From Russia it was demanded that she 
 should "stop every measure of war against us and 
 against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and notify 
 us definitely to this effect." From France a declaration
 
 THE CRIME 195 
 
 was required within eighteen hours "whether she would 
 remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war." 
 The ultimatum was delivered in Petrograd about mid- 
 night; that in Paris about 7 o'clock In the evening. 
 
 When the news of these ultimata became known in 
 and outside Germany, the report was at first generally 
 disbelieved, since no one could adduce any ground for 
 such drastic action at that precise moment. The diplo- 
 matists were even more astonished than the public. 
 What, then, could have taken place to drive Gennany 
 to this extreme step, which without doubt would inevit- 
 ably lead to war? Was it not just on July 31st that the 
 diplomatic negotiation between the Powers had appar- 
 ently reached so favourable a point that the whole world 
 once more began to entertain hope, and looked forward 
 to a peaceful settlement at an early date? On July 30th 
 Count Berchtold had expressed in the most friendly tone 
 to the Russian Ambassador, Schebeko, his willingness 
 to agree to a resumption In Petrograd of the negotia- 
 tions which had for some time been discontinued between 
 Austria and Russia.^ These negotiations had, in fact, 
 begun on July 31st between Sazonof and the Austrian 
 Ambassador, Szapary, and this time they promised a 
 greater measure of success than on any previous occa- 
 sion, since Austria for the first time had professed her 
 readiness to submit for discussion the contents of the 
 Note addressed to Serbia. Sazonof himself, in a com- 
 munication addressed to London, expressed the hope 
 that a peaceful issue out of the crisis might yet be 
 found. The French and the English Governments were 
 agreeably surprised at the final change in the attitude 
 of Austria, and Grey expressed the hope that it "may 
 lead to a satisfactory result." - In Grey's despatch to 
 
 * Yellow Book, No. 104. Blue Book, No. 96. 
 'Blue Book, No. in. Orange Book, Nos. 66, 69, "jz. Yellow 
 Book, Nos. 114, 120.
 
 196 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Goschen it is possible to trace in every word the sincere 
 satisfaction which he felt in consequence of the new 
 turn of events. He at once redoubled his efforts to 
 shorten the pains of childbirth, and to bring speedily into 
 the world a healthy child of peace. Austria was to 
 receive "full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia/* 
 all Powers were at once to suspend further military 
 preparations, Germany and Austria had only to make 
 "any reasonable proposal," and he would support it. 
 If, however, Russia and France would not accept such 
 a reasonable proposal, the British Government would 
 have nothing more to do with the consequences. Saz- 
 onof at once outlined a formula of agreement which 
 went further to meet Austria than that first fonnu- 
 lated.^ He proposed a discussion in London, under the 
 participation of the Powers, in which he represented 
 a cessation of Austrian operations in Serbia, not as a 
 condition, but merely as "very important." ^ Every- 
 where there was activity, hope, and the zeal to save. 
 Then suddenly the German ultimata exploded like a 
 bombshell, and at a stroke all hopes were annihilated. 
 
 What induced Germany to take this step? Profes- 
 sedly it was due to the Russian mobilisation. What 
 are the facts bearing on this point? I have already 
 pointed out that the Russian mobilisation was merely 
 the consequence of two facts; firstly, the Austrian mob- 
 ilisation which had preceded it, and secondly, the more 
 than equivocal attitude assumed by Germany and Aus- 
 tria throughout the crisis. 
 
 Both grounds were completely sound, as I believe that 
 I have proved. The Russian mobilisations were in no 
 way kept secret; they were carried out with complete 
 publicity, the partial mobilisation in the four southern 
 
 ^Orange Book, No. 6y. Blue Book, No. 120. Yellow Book, Nos. 
 113, 120. 
 * Yellow Book, No. 120. Blue Book, No. 133.
 
 THE CRIME 197 
 
 Governmental districts on July 29th, the general mobi- 
 lisation on the morning of July 3ist.^ The Austrian 
 partial mobilisation had already taken place before the 
 declaration of war against Serbia, that is to say before 
 July 28th. The general mobilisation was ordered at the 
 latest at i o'clock on the morning of July 2)^st; in- 
 deed, according to the report of the Russian Ambas- 
 sador at Vienna, it took place as early as July 28th. ^ 
 The Russian partial mobilisation was officially communi- 
 cated to Berlin on July 29th, and the general mobilisa- 
 tion was publicly proclaimed in Petrograd on July 31st. 
 
 The story of the false Russian words of honour is 
 itself a falsehood. According to the account given in the 
 German White Book, no fewer than two Russian gentle- 
 men are assumed to have broken their word of honour, 
 the Russian Minister of War and the Chief of the Gen- 
 eral Staff. In addition to these, it is known that the Rus- 
 sian Emperor, the "most sincere and devoted friend and 
 cousin" of the Emperor William, also broke his word 
 ("betra3'ed Germany's confidence," as it is expressed in 
 the official English edition of the German White Book). 
 These insinuations of broken words constitute, along 
 with many other features, a pleasant method of distin- 
 guishing between the German publication and those of 
 other countries. This also provides for people abroad a 
 "culture-barometer" indicating a position which is in 
 no way specially favourable for Germany. 
 
 But If only the assertions were at least true! They 
 are, however, untrue. The Russian Minister of War 
 declared on July 27th to the German Military Attache 
 that no order to mobilise had as yet been issued, but 
 that preparatory measures only were being taken; if 
 Austria were to cross the Serbian frontier the four mili- 
 tary districts directed towards Austria would be mobi- 
 
 * White Book, pp. 409, 412. 
 
 ^Yellow Book, No. 115. Orange Book, Nos. 47, 49.
 
 198 I ACCUSE! 
 
 lised, but not those on the German frontier, since "peace 
 with Germany was desired very much." ^ This com- 
 munication of the Minister for War was in full accord- 
 ance with the truth. The alleged "declaration of the 
 state of war" in Kovno referred to in the telegram 
 from the Imperial Consulate on July 27th, ^ is not the 
 same as mobilisation. This should be known in Ger- 
 many at least, since we also expressly distinguish be- 
 tween a "state of war" and "mobilisation." 
 
 The mobilisation of Kiev and Odessa, which is pre- 
 sumed to have taken place on July 26th, is reported by 
 the German military attache only in a very vague form, 
 and cannot therefore be regarded as established. The 
 military attache "deems it certain that mobilisation has 
 been ordered" in the two districts.^ His assumption 
 may, however, be false, and may be based on the re- 
 ceipt of erroneous information, not an improbable oc- 
 currence in view of the great distance between these 
 two districts and Petrograd. Nevertheless, it is possi- 
 ble (and indeed it would have been more than reason- 
 able) that Russia on July 26th, that is to say, on the 
 day after the rupture of diplomatic relations between 
 Austria and Serbia, should have made preparations for 
 mobilisation. The Minister for War expressly acknowl- 
 edges this. It is thus as audacious as it is unjust to 
 reproach the Russian Minister of War with a breach of 
 his word of honour on the ground of such evidence. 
 
 The second guilty person is the Chief of the General 
 Staff, and the accuser is again the military attache. In 
 this case the conversation took place on July 29th, and 
 the statement made by the Chief of the General Staff 
 is reported to have been to the effect that "everything 
 had remained as the Secretary had informed me two 
 
 nVhite Book, Exhibit ii. 
 * White Book, Exhibit 8. 
 'White Book, Exhibit 7.
 
 THE CRIME 199 
 
 days ago," that nowhere had there been mobilisation. 
 For this he gave his word of honour in the most solemn 
 manner, but he ''could not assume a guarantee for the 
 future." 1 
 
 The Chief of the General Staff did not say this, and 
 cannot have said this, for on the same day, July 29th, 
 the Russian Government officially informed Berlin that 
 they had mobilised four army districts. It will be seen 
 how much the love of truth is involved in the composi- 
 tion of the German White Book. On the same page, 
 page 10,^ there is printed, at the top the official com- 
 munication of the mobilisation, and below the official 
 denial. What purpose is the Chief of the General Staff 
 supposed to have had in view when he uttered this lie, 
 seeing that at the same moment the Russian Ambassa- 
 sador was informing Berlin of the truth? What, on the 
 other hand, must we think of a Government which in a 
 matter of life and death manifests such levity in the 
 compilation of official documents? 
 
 What the Chief of the General Staff really said is 
 indeed quite clear. He confirmed the mobilisation 
 against Austria, and denied that against Germany. This 
 agrees with the official communication made in Berlin, 
 and also with a report despatched on July 30th by 
 Paleologue, the French Ambassador.^ The military at- 
 tache had either failed to understand the Chief of the 
 General Staff, or else he intentionally reported what was 
 not true. 
 
 Notwithstanding a diligent study of the evidence it is 
 not clear to me in what point the Russian Emperor is 
 supposed to have lied. The whole of these cjuestions of 
 
 '■ White Book, p. 410. 
 
 ' [Pages 409 and 410 in the collected English correspondence.] 
 
 'Yellow Book, No. 102: "gave him his word of honour that the 
 
 mohilisation ordered this morning was exclusively directed against 
 
 Austria."
 
 200 I ACCUSE! 
 
 mobilisation and of mutual recrimination stand for the 
 most part on such an uncertain foundation that it is 
 hazardous to utter censorious judgments in this matter. 
 The Emperor William, for example, telegraphs on July 
 30th to the Tsar: "Austria has mobilised only against 
 Serbia." In opposition to this, the Imperial Chancellor 
 admits in his speech of August 4th that Austria had 
 also mobilised against Russia. It is impossible to as- 
 certain the truth with regard to this or that mobilisa- 
 tion, since measures of mobilisation are different in dif- 
 ferent countries, and, since further, even without an 
 official mobilisation it is possible to carry out a secret 
 mobilisation. In French reports, for example, it is 
 maintained, and the assertion is supported by facts, 
 that Germany had begun to mobilise as far back as the 
 recall of the Austrian Ambassador from Belgrade.^ The 
 proclamation of the "danger of war" is a German spe- 
 cialty, which, as a matter of fact, conceals the most 
 serious measures of mobilisation. 
 
 Where and when, however, is the Russian Emperor 
 supposed to have lied on the subject of his mobilisa- 
 tion? In his telegram of July 30th he acknowledges 
 "the military measures now taking form," which were 
 being carried out "for the reason of defence against 
 the preparations of Austria." In his telegram of July 
 31st he declares that a discontinuance of his military 
 preparations was "technically impossible" — an expres- 
 sion which it is remarkable to note occurs in almost the 
 same words in the telegram of the Emperor William to 
 the King of England on August ist: "For technical 
 reasons the mobilisation which I have already ordered 
 this afternoon on two fronts — east and west — must pro- 
 ceed according to the arrangement made." In his last 
 telegram of August ist the Tsar in no way denies the 
 mobilisation on the German frontier, with which he is 
 ^ Blue Book, No. 105 (Enclosure 3).
 
 THE CRIME gOl 
 
 reproached by the German Emperor, but, on the con- 
 trary, he leaves it open to the latter to mobilise also, ask- 
 ing only that the Emperor should give the same guar- 
 antee as he himself had given, namely, that "these meas- 
 ures do not mean war," and that both rulers should 
 continue to negotiate in the interests of peace. 
 
 I do not find anything in these telegrams which can 
 even in the slightest degree throw doubt on the honour 
 of the Russian Emperor. On the contrary, I see in 
 the whole exchange of telegrams — above all, in the sup- 
 pressed telegram of July 29th — the most honourable in- 
 clination to peace on the part of the Tsar, as contrasted 
 with the ultimatum-policy of Germany which, in spite 
 of all the German Emperor's peaceful assurances, was 
 necessarily bound to lead to war. 
 
 The conclusion at which I arrive is, then, that the 
 Russian mobilisation was justified, since it was occa- 
 sioned by the Austrian mobilisation. It was not kept 
 secret, but was officially communicated to foreign coun- 
 tries, and was publicly proclaimed within the country. 
 There is no manner of proof for the assertion that it 
 was aggressive in character. With as much reason, and 
 indeed with more reason, an aggressive character could 
 be ascribed to the previous Austrian mobilisation and 
 the German mobilisation concealed under the name of 
 the "State of War," The attitude of the various Gov- 
 ernments up to the moment of mobilisation, and their 
 subsequent behaviour, can alone show these military 
 acts in their true character. Erom this point of view 
 the Austro-German mobilisations which were in full 
 swing even before the proclamation of the "state of 
 war," have a much more aggressive character than the 
 Russian, because the Austro-German mobilisation served 
 an aggressive policy, whereas the policy which called 
 forth the Russian mobilisation was defensive in its na- 
 ture.
 
 202 I ACCUSE! 
 
 The aggressive character of the German attitude is 
 in particular confirmed by certain events which took 
 place on the western frontier against France, before the 
 despatch of the two ultimata. As early as July 30th 
 German troops were concentrated at Thionville and 
 Metz. Garrison troops from Metz were pushed up to 
 the frontier, reinforced by troops from Treves and 
 Cologne. The frontier-defences were strengthened and 
 fortified. From July 25th railway stations were occu- 
 pied by the military classes of the reserve (1903-1911) 
 recalled by individual summons, roads on the frontier 
 were barricaded, and the circulation of motor-cars for- 
 bidden. Most important of all, as early as July 29th 
 German patrols had in two instances penetrated into 
 French territory. The French Government had officially 
 announced that, in order to avoid collisions on the fron- 
 tier, a zone of territory extending to 10 kilometres 
 would be left unoccupied. The German Government 
 did not issue a similar declaration, but pushed- forward 
 their advance-posts to the French frontier. We shall 
 later have occasion to notice other occurrences, even 
 more provocative, which took place between the ist and 
 3rd of August. 
 
 From the political and military events previous to 
 the despatch of the ultimata one thing emerges with 
 certainty, namely, that the Franco-Russian military 
 preparations furnished no support for the view that ag- 
 gressive intentions existed on the part of these States, 
 and that if aggressive intentions existed anywhere it 
 can only have been on the side of Germany. 
 
 What right, then, had Germany to demand that Rus- 
 sia should demobilise? This demand was in itself un- 
 justified, and, when addressed to a Great State, was 
 a departure from the conventions usually governing in- 
 ternational relations; the situation was, however, ren- 
 dered more difficult by the conditions imposed by Ger-
 
 THE CRIME 203 
 
 many, specifying the manner in which it was to be car- 
 ried out. The discontinuance of Russia's military 
 measures was to take place : — 
 
 (a) Within twelve hours, and 
 
 (b) not only against Germany, but also against Aus- 
 tria. 
 
 The first request was "technically impossible/' since 
 a great State covering an enormous superficial area 
 cannot within twelve hours put a stop to measures of 
 mobilisation which have been initiated (see the telegrams 
 of the Emperor Nicholas of July 30th and 31st, and 
 that of the Emperor William to the King of England 
 of August ist). 
 
 The second demand, however, that demobilisation 
 should take place against Austria as well, was so mon- 
 strous that one is almost tempted to doubt the sanity 
 of the people who dared to propose it. Was Russia 
 really expected to cancel her mobilisation against 
 Austria, while Austria herself had been partially mobi- 
 lised for over eight days, and had been completely 
 mobilised against Russia and against Serbia since the 
 early morning of July 31st, perhaps even from July 
 28th? Could Russia be expected to lay down her arms 
 before Austria? This suggestion is all the more remark- 
 able inasmuch as Austria herself had no idea of ad- 
 dressing such a suggestion to Russia, but, on the con- 
 trary, she renewed negotiations with Russia on July 
 31st, the same day on which both States carried out a 
 general mobilisation. 
 
 Germany thus was "more Austrian than the Aus- 
 trians." Speaking generally, what right had she to 
 make demands on behalf of Austria f Did she intervene 
 as Austria's guardian, was she clothed with the powers 
 of a plenipotentiary, or on what other legal title did 
 she rely? In any case, the situation which arose from 
 this arrogant tutelage was — I can find no other word
 
 I ACCUSE! 
 
 for it — an abortion of madness. Austria found noth- 
 ing to astonish or inconvenience her in carrying on 
 negotiations with Russia under arms. And, as a mat- 
 ter of fact, it was not the first time that negotiations 
 had taken place between the two countries under these 
 circumstances. During the Balkan crisis both Powers 
 had remained mobilised for months at a time, and never- 
 theless negotiations had been successfully carried on. 
 Germany, however, whose interests were not involved 
 in the present negotiations, who participated in the 
 whole dispute merely as the ally of Austria, believed it 
 to be her duty to afford more protection to Austria 
 than Austria herself considered that she required, and 
 she demanded from Russia a demobilisation to which the 
 Double Monarchy attached no importance whatever. 
 
 The complete madness of the whole situation may be 
 gathered from the following hypothesis. If Russia — • 
 as, indeed, theoretically might have happened — had 
 agreed to demobilise so far as Germany was concerned, 
 but had declined to do so with regard to Austria — what 
 would have been the position? The German ultimatum 
 would then have partially complied with and partially 
 declined, and Germany would have declared war against 
 Russia because Russia had not demobilised against 
 Austria. But Austria had in no way asked her to de- 
 mobilise ! 
 
 We see by what kind of men Germany is governed. 
 How long will the people still submit to this condition 
 of affairs? 
 
 But to go further. Is then mobilisation in itself a 
 hostile or a threatening act against which a neighbour- 
 ing country is justified in taking action by means of an 
 ultimatum? In no way. Mobilisation in itself is noth- 
 ing else than the process by which the military forces 
 of a country are prepared against the contingency of 
 a conflict arising with another country. It is a meas-
 
 THE CRIME a05 
 
 ure of security and foresight, which can only assume 
 a threatening character by simultaneous or antecedent 
 political measures taken by the Power mobilising. What 
 political measures had Russia taken which could attach 
 to her mobilisation the suspicion of aggressive inten- 
 tions? None. The aggression, the general initiative 
 to the whole conflict had issued from Austria, with the 
 approval and support of Germany. Russia was politi- 
 cally acting on the defensive when she gave expression 
 to her legitimate interests in the Balkans. She was 
 bound to support this political defensive by military 
 measures of security, since the aggressor also had made 
 military preparations. 
 
 This is the situation viewed from the abstract stand- 
 point of international law. In the concrete case before 
 us we have seen that Russia up to and even beyond 
 the day of her general mobilisation had, in union with 
 England and France, done everything to maintain peace, 
 whereas Austria and Germany had done everything to 
 disturb it. Thus the concrete circumstances of the case 
 also prove that the Russian mobilisation — which in the- 
 ory was no menace to Germany — could also in this prac- 
 tical case contain no such menace. To this must be 
 added that Russia, as we have already seen, had no 
 recognisable interest in attacking Germany or Austria. 
 Her interest was exclusively confined to guarding her- 
 self against being checkmated by Austria in the Bal- 
 kans; the cjuestion was one of defence, not defiance. 
 
 That mobilisation In Itself Is In no way a hostile act 
 can be proved even from the testimony of an Austrian 
 witness. Count Forgach, the Austrian Foreign Under- 
 Secretary, declared, on July 31st, to de Bunsen, the 
 English Ambassador, that "mobilisation was not to be 
 regarded as a necessarily hostile act on either side." ^ 
 
 Nevertheless, it suited Germany to represent the Rus- 
 "■^ 'Blue Book, No. 118. "
 
 Ä06 I ACCUSE! 
 
 sian mobilisation as a menace, and, indeed, as a menace 
 against Austria and Germany alike. What was an- 
 nounced as the consequence which would fall upon Rus- 
 sia if she did not comply with the demands contained 
 in the ultimatum? Mobilisation in Germany was also 
 to take place. In the telegram sent by the Chancellor 
 to Count Pourtales on July 31st we read: "On ac- 
 count of these Russian measures we have been forced, 
 for the safety of the country, to proclaim the 'threat- 
 ening state of war,' which does not yet imply mobilisa- 
 tion. Mobilisation, however, is bound to follow if Rus- 
 sia does not," ^ &c., &c. Up to this point the matter 
 is still quite logical if it is admitted that the despatch 
 of the ultimatum was justifiable or necessary (which is, 
 however, an erroneous assumption). 
 
 If this is madness, there is, at any rate, method in it. 
 Germany says to Russia: "You have mobilised; if you 
 do not draw back, I will mobilise also." This is, in- 
 deed, the course which the Tsar advised the -Emperor 
 William to adopt : that there should be mobilisation on 
 both sides, but without war or intention to make war, 
 and that negotiations with the view of arriving at a 
 peaceful understanding should go quietly forward. That 
 such a course is possible requires no proof. That it 
 has happened countless times is a historical fact. What 
 reason was there for supposing that it could not hap- 
 pen on this occasion? Indeed, there were now stronger 
 reasons than ever before, since greater interests were 
 at stake, and greater composure and prudence was there- 
 fore required on the part of all concerned. If Germany 
 had remained content with the mobilisation which she 
 threatened, and had given full scope to the apparently 
 hopeful negotiations taking place in Vienna and Petro- 
 grad, if she had only waited for a day or two — mobilised 
 like the others — it is certain that Europe would have 
 ^ White Book, Exhibit 24.
 
 THE CRIME 207 
 
 been preserved from the gravest of all catastrophes. 
 As de Btinsen, the English Ambassador, states in his 
 report to the English Government ^ : ''A few days' 
 delay might in all probability have saved Europe from 
 one of the greatest calamities in history." 
 
 The mobilisation of Germany would indeed have given 
 a new impulse to the negotiations; for everyone feared 
 us. Up till then there was no one who had seen us 
 in arms; no one would have dared to quarrel with a 
 Germany ready for battle. 
 
 The fact that it is possible to be mobilised and that 
 negotiations may nevertheless be carried on without war 
 resulting is confirmed, quite apart from countless his- 
 torical incidents, by the events which took place in the 
 beginning of August, 1914. Germany and France mobi- 
 lised on the afternoon of August ist; notwithstanding 
 this, the Emperor William and the Chancellor in their 
 telegrams to London on August ist expressed their 
 readiness to delay crossing the French frontier until 7 
 o'clock in the evening of August ßrd.^ As a matter 
 of fact, war was only then declared against France; 
 the two countries were thus mobilised for three days 
 without being at war with each other. 
 
 A much more striking and even humorous example 
 of this kind is presented by the relations between 
 Austria and Russia. These, the two leading parties in 
 the quarrel, had been mobilised since July 31st, and 
 war did not break out between them until August 6th, 
 when the state of peace was ended by the declaration 
 made by Austria. For days after the outbreak of the 
 war between Russia and Germany the Austrian and 
 Russian Ambassadors remained quietly in the capital 
 of their enemies, and, who knows, may even have con- 
 tinued negotiations. In any case the mobilised condi- 
 
 ' White Book, No. 161. 
 
 * Collected Diplomatic Correspondence, p. 54a
 
 208 I ACCUSE! 
 
 tion of their armies did not disturb them in the enjoy- 
 ment of the comforts of peace. Surely nothing equally 
 insane — I can again find no other expression which is 
 applicable, and there is no reason why I should refrain 
 from calling a spade a spade — has ever occurred in 
 diplomatic history. The two chief duellists have not 
 yet crossed swords, but the second of one party has 
 already attacked the other. If in the six days between 
 the ist and the 6th of August Austria and Russia had 
 after all succeeded in arriving at an agreement — a con- 
 summation which at the time was still hoped for by the 
 whole of Europe, and which could easily have been 
 realised but for the provocative intervention of Gemiany 
 — where in that case would have been the sense of 
 Germany's war against Russia? It would have been a 
 sort of war in the air, a tilting against windmills in the 
 manner of Don Quixote, a war without any substantial 
 ground. I will again merely ask : How long will the 
 nation continue to tolerate such a Government? 
 
 An answer to this peculiar ultimatum does not appear 
 to have been received from the Russian Government, 
 although a reply was received personally from the Tsar 
 in the telegram despatched by him about noon on 
 August ist, and received in Berlin about 2 o'clock in 
 the afternoon.^ This is the telegram quoted above, in 
 which the Tsar states that he regards the German coun- 
 ter-mobilisation as reasonable, but expresses anew the 
 desire and the hope that it will not lead to war, but that 
 "with the aid of God it must be possible to our long- 
 tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood." 
 
 Three hours later the declaration of war was handed 
 over in Petrograd by the German Ambassador, Count 
 Pourtales. 
 
 Never in the history of the world has a greater crime 
 than this been committed. Never has a crime after its 
 ^ White Book, p. 413.
 
 THE CRIME 209 
 
 commission been denied with greater effrontery and hy- 
 pocrisy. 
 
 "The Russian Government destroyed through its 
 mobihsation, menacing the security of our country, the 
 laborious action at mediation of the European Cabinets, 
 just as it was on the point of succeeding. The Russian 
 mobilisation, in regard to the seriousness of which the 
 Russian Government was never allowed by us to enter- 
 tain a doubt, in connection with its continued denial 
 shows clearly that Russia wanted war" {see the German 
 White Book, page 412). 
 
 Nothing of this is true: 
 
 The Russian Government did not menace the security 
 of the German Empire by its mobilisation. 
 
 It did not destroy the action at mediation of the Euro- 
 pean Cabinets just as it was on the point of succeeding. 
 
 It did not deny its measures of mobilisation. 
 
 It did not want war. 
 
 Everything that is here flung as a reproach at the 
 Russian Government was, in fact, committed by Ger- 
 many. 
 
 Germany wanted war, and brought it about by her 
 ultimatum and by her declaration of war. 
 
 This declaration of war is a Cabinet paper in a class 
 by itself, both in substance and in style. We have 
 already considered the view that must be taken of the 
 "part of mediator" played by Germany, and of "the 
 grave and imminent danger" threatened from the side 
 of Russia. The contents of the document would not 
 merit any special discussion, if it were not necessary to 
 emphasise a point which is as yet completely unknown 
 in Germany. Gennany — it Is Incredible, but true! — 
 delivered the declaration of war with an alternative text 
 In the passage of most importance, leaving It to Russia,
 
 210 I ACCUSE! 
 
 so to speak, to choose which she preferred, and thus 
 acknowledging that she herself did not know why she 
 declared war against Russia. In the German White 
 Book the words in question run: "Russia having re- 
 fused to comply with this demand, and having shown by 
 this refusal," &c. On the other hand, in the declara- 
 tion of war as delivered in Petrograd the words run: 
 "Russia having refused to comply with (not having 
 considered it necessary to answer) this demand, and 
 having shown by this refusal (this attitude) that her 
 action," &c. You can see how they must have sweated 
 in the Wilhelmstrasse in the dog days to concoct a 
 formula for the declaration of war which would sound 
 fairly well. As it was not known whether Russia would 
 have to be reproached with a direct refusal or only with 
 having ignored the demands contained in the ultimatum, 
 as obviously no one knew very definitely by what name 
 they were to call the gorgon child with snakes for hair 
 and breath of fire, whom they were bringing into the 
 world, they left it to the addressee to whom the monster 
 was despatched to make the choice of his "name and 
 description." 
 
 Why was war declared against Russia f According 
 to the words used in the declaration of war, it was be- 
 cause Russia had declined or ignored the demands con- 
 tained in the ultimatum. According to the memorial 
 contained in the White Book it was because Russia had 
 begun the war against us} This last point is particu- 
 larly to be noted because the assertion that Russia and 
 France had attacked us forms the basis on which has 
 been constructed the flimsy edifice of German popular 
 enthusiasm. "Gentlemen, we are now in a state of 
 defence {Notwehr),'' exclaimed the Chancellor on 
 August 4th, "and necessity {Not) knows no law." It 
 is not only the war against our real opponents that is 
 
 ^ White Book, p. 413.
 
 THE CRIME 211 
 
 justified on the grounds of necessity, but also the vio- 
 lation of the neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium. 
 "He who is menaced as we are, and is fighting for his 
 highest possession, can only consider how he is to hack 
 his way through." ^ 
 
 Menace and defence; these, then, arc the watchwords. 
 It is indeed quite true that even the highwayman is in 
 a certain sense menaced, and in a state of defence, when 
 he attacks a traveller and suddenly becomes aware that 
 other well-armed men are hurrying to help the traveller 
 who had looked so lonely. In such a case the highway- 
 man also is fighting a life and death struggle for his 
 freedom and his existence. In this sense Germany also 
 was in a state of defence. She would not, however, 
 have found herself in such a position of constraint if 
 she had not herself begun the attack. To get rid of 
 this disagreeable fact and to construe for the use of the 
 people a real state of defence other facts were adduced 
 which were supposed to fulfil this end, apart from the 
 menace involved in mobilisation — which it was realised 
 was insufficient to serve as a basis for this purpose. 
 
 It is asserted with regard to Russia and France alike 
 that they had begun the war, that they had ''opened 
 hostilities." ^ 
 
 How did Russia begin the war? One single fact is 
 cited in the memorandum. Russian troops had "already 
 in the afternoon of August ist" crossed our frontier 
 and "marched into German territory." Be it observed; 
 already on the afternoon of August ist. Is there any- 
 thing remarkable about this? Did we not at 5 o'clock 
 on the same afternoon hand over a declaration of war 
 in Petrograd? Was there not in consequence a state 
 of war between Germany and Russia as from 5 o'clock 
 in the afternoon f Were not Russian troops, therefore, 
 
 ' Collected Documents, p. 43S. 
 * White Book, p. 413.
 
 ai2 I ACCUSE! 
 
 perfectly entitled to cross our frontiers after 5 o'clock? 
 If the Chancellor wished to construe an attack which 
 would have been in violation of international law he 
 should at least have been sufficiently astute to insert 
 after the words "in the afternoon of August ist" the 
 further words "before 5 o'clock." Only in such a case 
 would it have been possible to speak of an attack, and 
 consequently of a state of defence. If the frontier was 
 crossed only after the declaration of war, it was no 
 longer an attack, but a natural and justifiable conse- 
 quence of the state of war which we had brought about. 
 
 On this point also we can again dispose of the Chan- 
 cellor by means of his own memorial. What he asserts, 
 even if it were true — which is still to be proved — in no 
 way supports the conclusions which he draws, and the 
 theory of defence collapses miserably like a house of 
 cards. 
 
 And in arriving at this conclusion I have left com- 
 pletely aside the question whether it is in any way pos- 
 sible from such collisions on the frontier to draw the 
 conclusion that attacks have been intentionally made by 
 the neighbouring State. Such inferences cannot, of 
 course, be drawn. When nations are opposed to each 
 other in arms, and, indeed, even in time of peace without 
 mobilisation when there is merely a state of tension 
 between neighbouring States, experience shows that 
 crossings of the frontier, collisions between advance- 
 posts, and similar incidents constantly take place. These 
 are occurrences which reasonable men view as they de- 
 serve to be viewed, as unimportant incidents for which 
 neither of the States concerned can be held responsible. 
 The supreme military command is, in such a case, in 
 no way responsible, for incidents of this nature invari- 
 ably arise through the arbitrary action of subordinate 
 officers without — indeed in most cases contrary to — the 
 instructions of their superior officers. This is, indeed.
 
 THE CRIME 213 
 
 the first occasion in the history of war in which such a 
 frontier incident has been interpreted as an intentional 
 attack by a neighbouring State and the people have 
 been deluded into the idea that they are in a state of 
 defence. The most remarkable feature in the whole 
 business is, however, as we have said, that there was 
 not even an illegitimate passage of the frontier, if this 
 only took place after 5 o'clock on the afternoon of 
 August 1st. 
 
 Equally threadbare are the assertions which are ad- 
 vanced with the object of construing an attack from 
 the side of France. 
 
 The declaration of war against France took place on 
 August 3rd at 6.45 p.m. The letter from Herr von 
 Schoen, containing the declaration of war, bases it on 
 the following grounds : "A certain number of flagrantly 
 hostile acts committed on German territory by French 
 military aviators, several of these have openly violated 
 the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory 
 of that country; one has attempted to destroy buildings 
 near Wesel; others have been seen in the district of the 
 Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carls- 
 ruhe and Nuremburg." ^ 
 
 French military aviators who had "openly" passed 
 over Belgium are thus in this case alleged to be the 
 guilty persons. In the case of France it was impossible 
 to suggest that the mobilisation amounted to a menace, 
 since the White Book itself is obliged to admit that 
 France mobilised at the same time as we did.^ Since 
 it was then of no avail to assert here, as in the case of 
 Russia, the existence of a menace, it was necessary for 
 the Government to restrict themselves, in the case of 
 France, to saying that Germany had actually been at- 
 tacked. According to the declaration of war, the actual 
 
 * Yellow Book, No. 147. 
 'White Book, p. 413.
 
 '214 I ACCUSE! 
 
 attack was effected by military aviators, who were fur- 
 ther perceived to have crossed over Belgium. How 
 anyone can tell by looking at an aviator who drops 
 bombs on Wesel, Carlsruhe, or Nuremburg that he came 
 from Belgium remains a secret locked in the breasts of 
 the gentlemen in the Wilhelmstrasse. It is, however, 
 very interesting to observe how Herr von Schoen's 
 bomb-throwing aviators are transfomied by Herr von 
 Below-Saleske into "dirigibles" (see the memorandum 
 of his interview on August 3rd with the Belgian Foreign 
 Office^), and how further in the Chancellor's speech 
 of August 4th they become "cavalry patrols and French 
 infantry detachments" breaking into the territory of the 
 Empire.^ 
 
 What, wc may ask, really took place? Did the French 
 merely send across aviators, as Herr von Schoen main- 
 tains, or dirigibles as Herr von Below-Saleske says, or 
 companies and cavalry patrols as the Chancellor asserts ? 
 An English proverb which the Empress Frederick was 
 in the habit of quoting tells us that "A liar should 
 have a good memory." The German diplomatists lie, 
 but unfortunately they have a bad memory. The con- 
 tradiction between the statements of these three gentle- 
 men is sufficient to prove that all these French attacks 
 are imaginary. It is, in fact, the Germans who were 
 the aggressors, not merely because they declared war 
 against France — which even if a crime was, at any rate, 
 within their rights under international law — ^but also 
 because they had violated French territory days before 
 the declaration of war. This fact is proved, not only 
 by French assertions, the credibility of which might be 
 disputed, but also by German confessions, which are 
 of course unintentional. As early as July 30th and 
 again on August 2nd the French Government lodged 
 
 ^ Grey Book, No. 21. 
 
 * Collected Documents, p. 438.
 
 THE CRIME 215 
 
 complaints in Berlin with regard to quite definite oc- 
 currences of this nature ^ : at Delle, near Bel fort, the 
 French custom house was twice fired upon by German 
 soldiers; north of this town two patrols of mounted 
 Jägers crossed the frontier and advanced as far as the 
 villages of Joncherey and Baron; their officer shot a 
 French soldier in the head, and his men carried off some 
 French horses. On the same day, August 2nd, German 
 troops violated French territory at Ciry and Longwy, 
 and marched against Fort Longwy, &c. 
 
 These are some of the French complaints. That there 
 must be some truth in all this is clear from the Chan- 
 cellor's speech of August 4th. Herr von Bethmann ex- 
 pressly admits one of the French complaints (crossing 
 of the frontier by a patrol, and the occurrence of a con- 
 flict) on the ground of the report of the German General 
 Staff.^ One may reasonably suspect that other viola- 
 tions of the frontier "against express orders," as Herr 
 von Bethmann puts it, also took place. This suspicion 
 appears all the more reasonable, and indeed becomes a 
 certainty, when we read the concluding sentence of the 
 telegram sent on August ist by the Emperor William 
 to King George : "I hope that France will not be nerv- 
 ous. The troops on my frontier are at this moment 
 being kept back by telegraph and by telephone from 
 crossing the French frontier." ^ This telegram proves 
 two things : — 
 
 (i) that France on August ist had not yet become 
 nervous ; 
 
 (2) that the German troops on August ist, that is 
 to say tzvo days before the declaration of war, would 
 have crossed the French frontier, if they had not been 
 kept back by telegraph and by telephone. 
 
 * Yellow Book, Nos. 106, 136, 139. 
 " Collected Documents, p. 438. 
 " Collected Documents, p. 510.
 
 216 I ACCUSE! 
 
 The fact that they were thus kept back was caused 
 by the negotiations which took place at the last hour 
 with England. Thus had it not been for these negotia- 
 tions German troops zvould have penetrated into France 
 en masse forty-eight hours before the declaration of war. 
 
 What then becomes of the assertion of the Chan- 
 cellor that France broke the peace, and that, in fact, 
 she attacked us? The statement does not deserve 
 credence because of the triple contradiction between the 
 various statements constituting the charge, and in any 
 case it remains unproved. On the other hand, the coun- 
 ter-assertion of France, that we were the aggressors 
 and the violators of the frontier, is credible because it 
 is in itself free from contradiction, because it specifies 
 in the most detailed manner the time, the place, and 
 the circumstances of the cases cited, because the Ger- 
 man General Staff itself admits one of these frontier 
 violations, and because the telegram of the Emperor 
 admits that even violations of the frontier en masse were 
 contemplated. 
 
 The French Government, on the other hand, have 
 strictly denied the charges brought against them, and, 
 above all, by fixing the ten-kilometre zone they gave 
 proof of their sincere intention to avoid violations of 
 the frontier. 
 
 In my opinion the objective investigation of the facts 
 can lead only to the acquittal of France and to the 
 condemnation of Germany. And this view is strength- 
 ened if the previous course of diplomatic negotiations 
 and the attitude of the two parties is taken into con- 
 sideration. May we not assume that perhaps the doc- 
 trine of Bernhardi was followed in the measures taken 
 by Germany, that the cards had to be so shuffled that 
 their opponents would be so provoked that a declaration 
 of war was bound to come from their side? May it 
 not be assumed that it was hoped in this way to achieve
 
 THE CRIME 217 
 
 the double advantage of moving the odium on to the 
 shoulders of their opponents, and of bringing the case 
 under the terms of the alliance with Italy? 
 
 One thing, at any rate, is certain : the assertion that 
 we were attacked by France, and were therefore in a 
 state of defence, is an invention fit to be placed along- 
 side of the corresponding assertion made with regard 
 to Russia. No one attacked us. No one placed us in 
 a state of defence. This war is hut a pseudo-war of 
 liberation. 
 
 What took place now, after the outbreak of war with 
 Russia and France, has no connection with the central 
 question: "Who is responsible for the European^ war?" 
 The European war was there, as soon as Germany and 
 Austria on the one side stood opposed to France and 
 Russia on the other. No one can become guilty of an 
 act after it is committed. Guilt can, however, be in- 
 creased in so far as the act committed may involve in 
 its train the commission of other acts. The more por- 
 tentous these further acts are, the greater and heavier 
 will be the load of guilt. 
 
 THE VIOLATION OF BELGIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE 
 PARTICIPATION OF ENGLAND IN THE WAR 
 
 After having presented to Belgium on the evening of 
 August 2nd an ultimatum in which a free passage 
 through this neutral country was demanded and receiv- 
 ing a refusal, Germany invaded Belgian territory on the 
 morning of August 4th. 
 
 The neutrality of Belgium was established by the 
 Treaty of London of 1839, and guaranteed for all time 
 by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 
 Article 7 of the Treaty of London provides that Belgium 
 shall be an independent and perpetually neutral State, 
 and that it shall maintain its neutrality against all other
 
 gl8 I ACCUSE! 
 
 States. The first and most obvious duty of a neutral 
 State is to refuse to belligerent parties a right of passage 
 through its territory. This is one of the fundamental 
 principles of international law, and it has been again 
 formally confinned, with the concurrence of all the 
 Powers, by the Hague Conference of 1907. Article 5 
 of the Hague Convention on the rights and duties of 
 neutral States prescribes that "A neutral State ought 
 not to allow on its territory any of the acts referred to 
 in Articles 2 to 4." Article 2 provides that "Belligerents 
 are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral 
 Power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war or 
 of supplies." Lastly, Article 10 of the same Convention 
 declares that the fact of a neutral Power repelling, even 
 by force, attacks on its neutrality cannot be regarded 
 as a hostile act. 
 
 This is the legal position. Herr von Bethmann seeks 
 to avoid the consequences which flow from the legal 
 position by constructing in this case also the case of 
 Defence, which he has already advanced against France 
 and Russia. 
 
 I believe that I have proved that as against France 
 and Russia the state of defence did not arise, but that 
 it is merely a German invention. If this is correct, then 
 there can also have been no state of defence against 
 Belgium, for here at least it is not asserted that Belgium 
 had attacked us by military aviators, infantry, and 
 cavalry. The state of defence against Belgium stands 
 and falls with the state of defence against the other 
 countries already mentioned, and is thus to be denied 
 on grounds of fact. 
 
 But even if Gennany had in fact been in a state of 
 defence against France and Russia, the wrong done to 
 Belgium would not thereby have been diminished. The 
 state of defence {Notwehr) against enemies in war 
 would, it is true, in general justify an act of defence
 
 THE CRIME 219 
 
 (Verteidigung), but under no circumstances would it 
 justify an act of defence involving injury to a third 
 party, that is to say, a breach of neutrality. 
 
 The criminal code defines a state of defence as "that 
 defence (Verteidigung) which is necessary to ward off 
 from oneself or from another an actual attack in viola- 
 tion of the law." A transgression of the limits thus 
 indicated can only claim Immunity from punishment if 
 the actor "in consternation, alami, or terror exceeded 
 the limits of defence (Verteidigung)." As this defi- 
 nition of the state of defence is the only one which we 
 possess in our laws, and as, moreover, it corresponds to 
 all logical requirements, we may be permitted to apply 
 the principles so enunciated to the actions for which 
 the German Chancellor bears the responsibility. Thus 
 even if we assume that Germany was in a state of de- 
 fence, it was nevertheless open to her to take only such 
 actions in her defence as were unconditionally necessary, 
 not, however, such actions as were convenient or advan- 
 tageous for her. Under no circumstances can the pas- 
 sage through Belgium be said to have been necessary 
 for her, for indeed the whole of the eastern frontier 
 of France from Verdun to Bel fort stood at the dis- 
 posal of the German army. It was, of course, more 
 advantageous and convenient to avoid this strong line 
 of fortresses, and to fall into France from the north. 
 But advantage and convenience do not form the stand- 
 ard by which the limits of the state of defence are de- 
 termined; on the contrary% the only test is necessity. If 
 anyone wishes to maintain that we were in a condition 
 of consternation, alarm, or terror, then the transgres- 
 sion of the limits of the state of defence would be for- 
 given to us. But I was under the impression that 
 we Germans fear only God, and not the French. So 
 that even this objection does not excuse us. 
 
 To this there must be added the further ground a)-
 
 UW I ACCUSE! 
 
 ready pointed out, which must unconditionally lead to 
 our condemnation : the state of defence never excuses 
 the violation of the rights of a third party. The state 
 of defence against France could not excuse the viola- 
 tion of the rights of Belgium. 
 
 From every point of view then we are In the wrong, 
 on grounds both of fact and of law. Viewed from the 
 political point of view, the matter is even worse for 
 us. What is the meaning and the purpose of the neu- 
 tralisation of a small State which an unrighteous Provi- 
 dence has planted in the middle of great States and made 
 the natural cock-pit for their struggles? The purpose 
 can only be to protect this State in war, not in peace, 
 when it needs no protection. If, however, when war 
 comes each of the neighbouring States is justified in 
 falling into the neutral State, on the ground that it is 
 in a state of defence — in a general sense, although not 
 in a juridical sense, every war is a state of defence — 
 then the whole process of neutralisation has no longer 
 any purpose, and is, in fact, nothing but a *'scrap of 
 paper," as the Chancellor said to Sir E. Goschen. The 
 dictum that "necessity knows no law" may he used to 
 justify any crime. The precise purpose of a treaty 
 of neutrality is, however, that of making necessity sub- 
 ject to the commands of law. Its object is to replace 
 the maxim: "La force prime le droit" by the contrary 
 maxim: "Le droit prime la force." 
 
 Now it is true that the attempt has been made to 
 justify the violation of Belgian neutrality on two 
 grounds. It is maintained : — 
 
 (i) that France would have invaded Belgium if we 
 had not anticipated her, and 
 
 (2) that Belgium long ago concluded military agree- 
 ments with France and England with the view of tak- 
 ing common action against Germany. 
 
 Both these arguments are entirely unsupported. There
 
 THE CRIME 221 
 
 is a complete absence of any proof that France intended 
 to invade Belgium. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey is known to have addressed on July 
 31st an inquiry in identical terms to France and to Ger- 
 many with a view to ascertaining whether, in the event 
 of a war, they would respect the neutrality of Belgium 
 so long as no other Power violated it.^ The answer of 
 France was received without delay, and was an uncon- 
 ditional affirmative.^ The answer of Herr von Jagow, 
 on the other hand, was one of the many awkward ex- 
 cuses which this child of misfortune had throughout 
 the whole affair to produce by command from above. 
 He had to consult the Emperor and the Chancellor 
 before he could possibly answer. He was very doubtful 
 whether they would return any answer at all, since any 
 reply they might give could not but disclose a certain 
 amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war 
 ensuing.^ Herr von Jagow did not neglect even on this 
 occasion to draw attention to a presumed hostile act 
 of Belgium, namely, an embargo on a consignment of 
 corn for Germany — an incident which is explained as 
 perfectly correct by the Belgian Government in their 
 Grey Book.* 
 
 This early hint on the part of Jagow of the hostility 
 of Belgium was merely the prelude to the campaign 
 which was later systematically pursued, and which 
 reached its culminating point in the assertion of the 
 Chancellor that a violation of neutrality had not in fact 
 taken place, since Belgium, in consequence of military 
 conventions with England and France had already sacri- 
 ficed her neutrality before the German invasion. This 
 campaign was opened after the conquest of Belgium, 
 
 'Blue Book, No. 114. 
 "Blue Book, No. 125. 
 ' Blue Book, No. 122. 
 *Grey Book, No. 79, Enclosures.
 
 222 I ACCUSE! 
 
 and even to-day it is being continued with unabated 
 energy. 
 
 On what is this charge based? It is, in the first 
 place, a matter for surprise that the Chancellor in his 
 speech in the Reichstag on August 4th had not the 
 slightest information about the sale of Belgium's soul. 
 In this speech the violation of Belgian neutrality was 
 explained exclusively by reference to the intended in- 
 vasion on the part of France, and against Belgium her- 
 self not the shadow of a reproach was raised. On the 
 contrary, Herr von Bethmann declared that the invasion 
 of Belgium was a "wrong" which they would endeavour 
 to make good later on. If the facts now asserted were 
 true, is it not remarkable that they so completely escaped 
 the notice of our Ambassador in Brussels? At least a 
 suspicion ought to have arisen, and should have been 
 conveyed to Berlin through the Brussels Embassy. Had 
 this happened, the Chancellor would certainly not have 
 failed to bring forward as early as August 4th this 
 weighty argument in favour of our violation of Bel- 
 gian neutrality; for in other matters he was certainly 
 free enough with unproved assertions. 
 
 We may then assume as a certainty that in Berlin 
 nothing was known of treacherous agreements of this 
 character. It was necessary to ferret about among the 
 Belgian archives after the capture of Brussels before it 
 was possible to get on the track of the treachery of the 
 Belgians. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was 
 then in a position to publish some documents from the 
 archives of the Belgian General Staff which, in the view 
 of the German Government, were supposed to reveal 
 the fact that a plan of war against Germany had been 
 concluded between Belgium and England. If the docu- 
 ments are authentic and complete — which has yet to be 
 proved — it is true that they show that certain conver- 
 sations took place between Belgian officers and English
 
 THE CRIME 223 
 
 military attaches on the co-operation which might ulti- 
 mately take place between England and Belgium; on 
 the other hand, they incontestably prove that this co- 
 operation would only take place in the event of Ger- 
 many violating Belgian neutrality. The Norddeutsche 
 Allgemeine Zeitung does not publish in extenso the 
 documents which were found, in itself a suspicious cir- 
 cumstance, but only gives extracts from their contents. 
 But even these extracts cannot conceal the fact that 
 the disembarkation of English troops in Belgium was 
 only to take place after the violation of her neutrality 
 by Germany. An official Note of the Belgian Govern- 
 ment issued from Le Havre on December 9th, 19 14, 
 incontrovertibly establishes the truth of this assertion.^ 
 The same procedure is thus adopted in this case as was 
 done with reference to the military discussions between 
 England and France; discussions to meet the case of an 
 attack from Germany are denounced as a conspiracy for 
 a common attack, defensive intentions are falsely repre- 
 sented as offensive. Germany, whose plans were known 
 and feared by all, is represented as the innocent victim 
 of the evil designs of others, whereas in fact the others 
 were only concerned that they themselves should not 
 fall a victim to German plans of aggression. ^ 
 
 ' This note, which has been passed over in complete silence by the 
 German Press, has been published everywhere in the press of for- 
 eign countries. The document of April loth, 1906, published in the 
 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, is entirely consistent with the 
 contents of this note. It contains the express remark : "The entry 
 of the English into Belgium zvoiild only take place after the viola- 
 tion of our neutrality by Gernmny." This in itself at once con- 
 futes all reproaches to the effect that an offensive agreement against 
 Germany existed between England and Belgium. 
 
 ^The Dutch "Agence Van Diaz" of November 17th, 1914, quotes 
 the words of a speech which Broqueville, the Belgian Minister for 
 War, delivered in January, 1913, in a secret session of the Belgian 
 Chamber, and in which the German plans for the invasion of Bel-
 
 2U I ACCUSE! 
 
 Why did similar discussions not take place between 
 Belgium and Germany to provide for the case of a 
 French attack? The answer is quite simple. It was 
 confidently felt that there was no need to fear a French 
 attack. Experience has proved that the view so formed 
 was correct, and that a just estimate both of France 
 and of Germany had been framed. 
 
 The English Foreign Office has published a letter of 
 Sir Edward Grey's addressed to his Ambassador at 
 Brussels on April 7th, 191 3, in which Grey dismisses 
 every idea of being the first to violate the neutrality of 
 Belgium. No British Government would do so, and 
 public opinion in England would never approve of this 
 step. The violation of Belgian neutrality by England 
 would be not only a wrong, but a great folly, since it 
 would afford Germany a motive and a justification for 
 following the same procedure. So long as the neutral- 
 ity of Belgium or any other neutral countries was not 
 violated by any other Power, England would never send 
 troops into their territory. This letter was written 
 fifteen months before the outbreak of war, and was 
 therefore not written with the express purpose of cre- 
 ating a favourable position for England in the present 
 controversy. It therefore deserves credence in every 
 respect, and is, moreover, confirmed by the events of 
 the last months.^ 
 
 After the German ultimatum had been handed to 
 the Belgian Foreign Minister at 7 o'clock in the evening 
 of August 2nd, the French Government on the morning 
 
 gium were revealed in full detail and put forward as the ground 
 for new military requirements. 
 
 * For this and for all other matters affecting the Belgian question 
 reference should be made to the work written by M. Emile Wax- 
 weiler, Member of the Royal Belgian Academy, La Belgique neutre 
 et loyale — a volume distinguished both by its detail and its scientific 
 objectivity. (Lausanne. Payot, 1915.)
 
 THE CRIME 225 
 
 of August 3rd offered to the Belgian Government, 
 through her mihtary attache, the support of five French 
 Army Corps. Belgium, nevertheless, declined this offer 
 of support, although she had already rejected the de- 
 mands of Germany, and must have been expecting every 
 moment the violent entry of German forces. Particular 
 interest attaches to one passage in the answer of Belgium 
 to Germany. The German Government had explained 
 their demand for a free passage by reference to the 
 intention of France to attack Germany through Bel- 
 gian territory. The Belgian Government decisively re- 
 jects the reasons thus assigned, and adds thereto: 
 
 "The intentions attributed to France by Germany 
 are in contradiction to the formal declarations made 
 to us on August ist in the name of the French 
 Government. 
 
 "Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Bel- 
 gian neutrality should be violated by France, Bel- 
 gium intends to fulfil her international obligations, 
 and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous 
 resistance to the invader" (Belgian Grey Book, No. 
 22), 
 
 Belgium thus declares that she is prepared to defend 
 her neutrality against France zvith the same resolution 
 as against Germany, but that she considers that the 
 possibility of a French attack is excluded in view of the 
 tormal declaration given by France. Does that sound 
 like a secret alliance? Further, on August 3rd King 
 Albert addressed to the King of England a telegram in 
 which he made an appeal for diplomatic, not for mili- 
 tary, intervention. Does that sound like a secret mili- 
 tary convention ? ^ Sir Francis Villiers, the English 
 Ambassador, handed on August 4th to Davignon, the 
 Belgian Minister, a Note, in which England declared 
 
 ' Grey Book, No. 25.
 
 226 I ACCUSE! 
 
 herself ready in the event of a German attack to render 
 Belgium joint assistance with France and Russia, 
 "should Belgium so desire." ^ 
 
 Should Belgium so desire! In making this limitation 
 ^England indeed fell short of her international rights 
 and duties. It is a recognised principle in international 
 law, and is, moreover, a principle based on logic, that 
 in the case of a collective guarantee, such as the Belgian 
 treaty, each guarantor, in the event of neutrality being 
 violated by another State, is at once entitled, in her 
 own right, to assume protection of the neutral State, 
 and indeed has a duty towards the other guaranteeing 
 Powers to adopt this course (Bluntschli, Völkerrecht, 
 VI., Nos. 432 and 440). Even without awaiting an 
 expression of the desire of Belgium, England was en- 
 titled to intervene with armed force for the protection 
 of the violated neutrality. In making her intervention 
 dependent on the desire of Belgium, England manifested 
 a measure of circumspection to which she .was not 
 pledged in international law, and she proved beyond 
 dispute that there was no kind of previous agreement 
 between England and Belgium directed against Germany. 
 
 It was not until August 5th that the Belgian Govern- 
 ment Issued to the Great Powers a fomial appeal which 
 led to their actual Intervention.^ 
 
 The weakness of the Gemian reproach that Belgium 
 had already sold her neutrality Is thus completely proved. 
 But even If the reproach were in itself justified, it would 
 furnish no manner of excuse for Germany. The defence 
 of the German Government is suggestive of that of a 
 thieving murderer who seeks to excuse his action by 
 asserting that the murdered man was a bad lot who 
 had himself gained by theft the property which he had 
 stolen. True, If he was aware of the depravity of his 
 
 ' ' Grey Book, No. 28. " 
 
 'Grey Book, No. 42.
 
 THE CRIME g27 
 
 victim before he committed the murder he might be 
 allowed, not immunity, but the benefit of mitigating 
 circumstances. But if he only learns afterwards what 
 sort of a man he has murdered, his act morally remains 
 the same, whether his victim was a devil or an angel. 
 Germany invaded a neutral country. Later, she pro- 
 fesses to have learned that this country was no longer 
 entirely neutral ; she cannot on these grounds be allowed 
 the advantage of mitigating circumstances. 
 
 This is the moral aspect of the question. Let us now 
 consider the practical side. Let us for the moment as- 
 sume that Belgium, so far as the obligations of neu- 
 trality imposed upon her are concerned, had been "a 
 child, no angel is so pure" ; let us assume that she had 
 never entered into even the slightest military defensive 
 discussions with her neighbours. Would this in any 
 way have prevented our inzmsion of Belgium f Would 
 this have induced us to leave in their despatch-boxes 
 the plans of our General Staff which had been ready for 
 years? Would we in this case have felt constrained to 
 take up our position in front of the impregnable line 
 of fortresses from Verdun to Belfort? No one will 
 venture to maintain this. All the declamations and pub- 
 lications on the crimes committed by Belgium thus 
 merely represent so much waste of paper and printer's 
 ink. We were resolved to overrun Belgium, either in 
 kindness or by force of arms, whether she behaved well 
 or ill towards us. That is the essential point. From this 
 reproach no rain will ever wash us clean, and the more 
 we blacken our victim after the event, the more damning 
 will be the judgment which the world will pass upon us. 
 
 It would appear that the effect which our behaviour 
 towards Belgium has exercised on the public opinion of 
 the whole world, and is still exercising in a daily in- 
 creased measure, is not yet properly realised in Ger- 
 many. It is necessary to live abroad in order to see
 
 228 I ACCUSE! 
 
 and grasp this effect. It shows itself even more strongly 
 in neutral foreign countries than in those countries 
 which are at war with us. In particular, the small coun- 
 tries which are adjacent to great States, Switzerland, 
 Holland, and Denmark, feel that the fate which befel 
 the unfortunate Belgium might have been, or may In 
 future be, theirs. The great neutral countries, how- 
 ever, throughout every rank of society, are seized with 
 deep commiseration when they read of the devastations 
 brought upon this prosperous small country, on these 
 ancient and glorious homes of art, on these diligent and 
 laborious centres of industry, when they see in their illus- 
 trated papers the fearful pictures of fire and destruc- 
 tion, of misery and homelessness, of smoking villages 
 and towns, when they see families wandering about on 
 the streets, who in hunger and penury beg for bread 
 from the German soldiers. The innocent country has 
 fallen a victim to the barbarians. That is how the world 
 views the facts, and it only becomes more incensed 
 when the authors of all this horror seek to excuse their 
 actions by saying that once upon a time a Belgian officer 
 had a consultation with an English military attache 
 with regard to the steps which might ultimately be taken 
 to defend the country in the event of a German in- 
 vasion. 
 
 And to commiseration there is added admiration — 
 admiration for this small, heroic nation who, with sword 
 in hand, courageously defends her independence and 
 her honour against the superior forces of the intruder. 
 "Belgium," we read in the answer to the German ulti- 
 matum, "has always been faithful to her international 
 obligations; she has carried out her duties in a spirit of 
 loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to 
 maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality. 
 
 "The attack upon her independence with which the 
 German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant
 
 THE CRIME 
 
 violation of international law. No strategic interest jus- 
 tifies such a violation of law. 
 
 "The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the 
 proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the hon- 
 our of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe. 
 
 "Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for 
 more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, 
 they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium 
 can only be preserved at the price of the violation of 
 her neutrality. 
 
 "If this hope is disappointed, the Belgian Government 
 are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their 
 power, every attack upon their rights" (Belgian Grey 
 Book, No. 22). 
 
 These are the proud words with which a free nation 
 defends its honour and its independence. 
 
 Even Germany is not without an understanding of 
 such heroism when it shows itself against the other side. 
 When, on the same day as that on which German troops 
 invaded Belgium, the Swiss Government informed the 
 Governments of belligerent countries of its resolution 
 to defend by all possible means Its neutrality and the 
 inviolability of its territory, the German Government 
 in their acknowledgment expressed their sincere satis- 
 faction and their confidence that the Confederation, 
 "thanks to its strong army and the unconquerable de- 
 termination of the whole Swiss people, will repel any 
 violation of Its neutrality." ^ What in the case of Bel- 
 gium was a crime worthy of death, because it was di- 
 rected against Germany, was in the case of Switzerland 
 a highly meritorious proposal, because if ever the mo- 
 ment should come to give it effect, it could only be 
 directed against France. 
 
 The attitude of the Belgian Army and the Belgian 
 people was in conformity with the proud words in which 
 ^ Waxweiler, p. 52.
 
 230 I ACCUSE! 
 
 the Belgian Government had rejected the dishonouring 
 suggestion of Germany. 
 
 The Belgians have defended their country and their 
 fortresses with unconquerable courage and with gigantic 
 sacrifices. To-day in the extreme west corner of Flan- 
 ders they still continue to offer a desperate resistance, 
 under the personal leadership of a King of German 
 blood, married to a German princess — a King who ex- 
 poses himself to all the dangers of the struggle. It is 
 not surprising that such heroism should enkindle the 
 admiring enthusiasm of the whole world. This is the 
 true struggle for freedom and independence; not the 
 counterfeit struggle which is instilled into the deluded 
 German people. 
 
 To what has this German nation come — a nation 
 which in the past, before the present corruption, had 
 some understanding and enthusiasm for noble and heroic 
 actions? Did not the work of liberation achieved by 
 the Swiss franc-tireur William Tell inspire our greatest 
 poet to his noblest drama? Were we not brought up 
 in the admiration of the courage of the small against 
 the great, of the struggle of the Spartans against the 
 Persians, of the struggle against the Spaniards carried 
 on by the Dutch, whose rising Schiller described with' 
 such deep sympathy and whom Goethe immortalised in 
 Egmont? And what are we doing now, we Germans 
 of 19 1 4, who see and experience the same heroic strug- 
 gle of the same people against us the oppressors? Not 
 a word of sympathy is heard, not a word of admira- 
 tion, not even of understanding. Instead of this we 
 utter slanders and accusations intended to justify our 
 crime. Let any one read the appeal issued to the civil- 
 ised world signed by all Germans of distinction. Apart 
 from the falsehood that Belgium had entered into a con- 
 spiracy with France and England, there is nothing but 
 purely unproved assertions about the acts of franc-
 
 THE CRIME 231 
 
 tireurs, the mutilation of the wounded, the murder of 
 doctors, and so on. 
 
 In the eyes of those gentlemen who, a few years 
 ago, were stirred to enthusiasm — and rightly so — at the 
 sight of the heroic struggle of the small Boer nation 
 against the might of England, those Belgians who are 
 now defending their Fatherland, if they do not happen 
 to have uniforms, are but common criminals, who may 
 be shot like mad dogs.^ Have you quite forgotten, 
 you leaders of the German spirit, our heroes of 1813 in 
 whose honour you were still holding banquets and de- 
 livering enthusiastic speeches a year ago? Were not 
 the men whom you celebrated like the Belgians of to- 
 day, the nation in arms throwing themselves with and 
 without uniforms against the intruder? Who will ex- 
 plain to the man from among the people the difference 
 between a soldier and a defender of the Fatherland, 
 between civilians and men in uniform, when the enemy 
 is in the land, devastating farmyards and crops, driving 
 away cattle and provisions, making women and children 
 roofless? The man of the people sees only the enemy, 
 the housebreaker, and when he seizes his rifle he does 
 not care a brass farthing whether he is wearing a coat 
 with shining buttons or the blue smock of a peasant. 
 This is a point one ought to understand, and it is a 
 point which we did understand in the past while we 
 were still capable of enthusiasm in a good sense, so long 
 as our enthusiasm had not been diverted into the cor- 
 
 ' Cardinal Mercicr, the Archbishop of Malines, in his pastoral 
 letter addressed to the Belgian people on Christmas, 1914, states 
 after "careful investigation" that in his diocese 13 priests, and in 
 the dioceses of Namur, Tournai, and Liege, 30 priests were shot, 
 and in all cases he gives their names, and their place of residence. 
 In Aerschot, according to the findings of Cardinal Mercicr, 91 civil- 
 ians, and in Louvain and the surrounding district, 176 civilians were 
 shot or burnt. These include men and women, people of advanced 
 years, as well as children.
 
 232 I ACCUSE! 
 
 nipt morass of national pride and megalomania, which 
 is constantly associated with contempt and barbarism 
 towards others. Especially must this point be kept in 
 view in thinking of a people like the Belgians who had 
 never anticipated a war, had never believed themselves 
 menaced by a war, and for a hundred years had never 
 witnessed a war within their frontiers. These facts 
 have to be grasped, bearing in mind that men are men, 
 and that our actions must be framed accordingly. 
 
 The German soldiers were certainly free to protect 
 themselves against underhand attacks, but they should 
 have kept constantly before them the fact that their as- 
 sailants were defending the highest things on earth, 
 their house and their hearth, their home and their 
 Fatherland. It was on this fact that they ought to have 
 based their counter-measures, not on the so-called law 
 of war, which they fashioned for themselves, which is 
 nowhere committed to writing, and nowhere recognised. 
 If in a village of a few thousand inhabitants and a few 
 hundred houses some shots are fired from the windows, 
 perhaps by concealed soldiers and not by civilians, by 
 what right do we burn down the whole village, and 
 place a number of the male inhabitants, innocent and 
 guilty, against the wall and shoot them dead? If you 
 believe it necessary for your protection — I cannot ad- 
 mit in this case a right of punishment — burn down if 
 you like the individual houses, punish the individual 
 civilians whom you recognise as guilty, but spare the 
 village and spare the innocent. That is the least de- 
 manded by justice, if indeed we can speak of justice, 
 in favour of the assailant and against the defender. 
 What they are opposing to you is the true state of de- 
 fence, the state of defence of the French and the Bel- 
 gian citizens against the German, against the German 
 intruder — the state of defence of Belgium and France 
 against Gemiany. Here it may be said with justice.
 
 THE CRIME Ä3S 
 
 "Necessity knows no law. He who is fighting for his 
 highest possession can only consider how he is to hack 
 his way through." This sentence of the Chancellor, in 
 itself correct, but wrongly applied to Germany, is ap- 
 plicable to our opponents. Only, when applied to them, 
 it is unfortunately inverted : he who is fighting for his 
 highest possession is placed against the wall and shot 
 dead. 
 
 I was able to observe in a picture palace in Berlin 
 shortly after the outbreak of war the unspeakable con- 
 fusion of thought which has spread throughout Ger- 
 many, Since the military censor allowed only patriotic 
 subjects, two war dramas were thrown on the screen 
 one after the other. The first represented the rising of 
 the Tyrolese in 1809 under Andreas Hofer, and the 
 second franc-tireur scenes from the war of 1870. In 
 the Tyrolese drama the whole nation was in arms against 
 the French conqueror. Andreas Hofer himself, the 
 leader and the hero (no general, but an innkeeper), and 
 all the others were peasants, craftsmen, and servants, even 
 the wives and daughters were armed, playing their part 
 in the struggle, the whole nation kindled to a war of 
 liberation. The sympathies of the author of this drama 
 were, of course, entirely on the side of the Tyrolese. 
 The French were shot down from hiding places, from 
 behind houses, trees, and blocks of rock. And it ended, 
 of course, with a victorious liberation of the nation. 
 Then there followed the franc-tireur drama of 1870, 
 and behold "the scene was changed !" The French de- 
 fenders of the Fatherland have now suddenly become 
 knaves and criminals. Their very visages reveal their 
 evil instincts. They also shoot from ambuscades as did 
 the Tyrolese in 1809, but what was then a fight for free- 
 dom is now crime and treachery. Punishment, conse- 
 quently, does not fail to be meted out. German re- 
 inforcements rush into the village, fire is laid to the walls,
 
 234 I ACCUSE! 
 
 and amidst the lamentations of the women and children 
 a dozen men and boys are placed against the church wall 
 and, as it is beautifully expressed, shot according to 
 martial law. Yes, indeed, that was cjuite a different 
 story! Against the French we are shown a nation in 
 arms ; against the Germans they are gallow-birds ! The 
 same confusion of ideas is met everywhere from the 
 highest summits of German intelligence down to the 
 last producer of cinema films. 
 
 The effect of this intellectual perversion abroad may 
 be imagined; it is the reverse of what is intended. In 
 these six months of war the Gennan professor has be- 
 come a comic figure abroad, or rather a figure of tragi- 
 comedy as the Prussian Junker and lieutenant have been 
 in the past. The sympathies which were formerly ours 
 have been buried under ridicule and aversion, and have 
 turned to our opponents, above all to the unhappy Bel- 
 gians. Karl Spitteler, who is certainly not anti-German 
 in sentiment, writes in his pamphlet Our Swiss Stand- 
 point ^ : "Belgium in herself does not concern us, but 
 her fate concerns us very intimately. That a wrong 
 was done to Belgium was originally openly confessed by 
 the perpetrator. As an afterthought, in order to ap- 
 pear whiter, Cain blackened Abel. In my opinion it 
 was a spiritual blunder to rummage for documents in 
 the pockets of the quivering victim. It was amply suf- 
 ficient to throttle the victim. To calumniate her in ad- 
 dition is really too much." These are the words of a 
 Swiss. And everyone abroad, everyone without excep- 
 tion, writes and thinks to the same effect. Belgian ar- 
 tists, poets, and politicians are received with enthusi- 
 asm in Italy and America, in Switzerland and in Hol- 
 land. They are acclaimed in gigantic assemblies such as 
 we accorded in 1902 to Oom Paul and the Boers who 
 accompanied him. Belgium to- day is trump through- 
 
 * Published by Rasher & Co., Zürich, 1915.
 
 THE CRIME 235 
 
 out the world. And woe to us if, after the war, we so 
 much as touch a hair of a Belgian head! This trump 
 card in the hands of our enemies will defeat us morally, 
 even if we gain the victory In arms. 
 
 A part of the devastation we have accomplished in 
 Belgium we explain by reference to the state of defence. 
 The state of defence meets us everywhere; there is a 
 state of defence when we invade Belgium, a state of 
 defence when we set fire to the ancient cities of art. I 
 will accept it as proven that shots were fired on German 
 soldiers from the houses in Louvain. Does that justify 
 us in destroying whole districts of the city by fire? Does 
 that justify us in exposing the celebrated Town Hall 
 and the Cathedral to the flames, and in doing them at 
 least serious damage? Where is it written that shots 
 from a rifle must be answered by arson? Where and 
 when was such a law of war codified? That is the 
 Prussian law of war, but it is not international law. 
 When the Cossacks act in this way in East Prussia we 
 speak of wild Muscovite hordes, but these hordes have 
 at least this excuse, that in Stallupönen and in Neiden- 
 burg no centres of culture and of art are ruined. What, 
 however, is the world to say of our handiwork in Bel- 
 gium, the ancient land of culture and of art — in Belgium 
 where every hamlet contains artistic jewels, Gothic 
 cathedrals and town-halls and market-places surrounded 
 by gorgeous patrician houses, with luxurious old-Ger- 
 man Renaissance fagades, adorned with gold? All these 
 flowers of the creative power of man, which have af- 
 forded instruction and enjoyment to unnumbered gen- 
 erations and which should have served as a glory and 
 as an example to generations yet to come — these have 
 been ruined, destroyed, burned, because, owing to a state 
 of defence^ Germany was obliged to invade Belgium, 
 and owing to a state of defence was obliged to apply 
 the torch to the walls.
 
 236 I ACCUSE! 
 
 But let that pass. Let us assume that these things 
 had to be. But is it also due to the state of defence 
 that we have imposed contributions amounting to more 
 than £25,cxDO,ooo on the State, the towns and the 
 provinces of Belgium? How are we to excuse this act 
 of violence? How are we to justify the enormous fines 
 recently imposed on Belgian citizens, who, availing them- 
 selves of their right of free locomotion, preferred resi- 
 dence abroad to life under the German occupation? 
 What justification have we for burdening the exhausted, 
 impoverished country with further exorbitant sacrifices 
 in money? What crime on the part of Belgium has 
 merited this punishment? Was it the crime of having 
 defended themselves against us, or, so far as I am con- 
 cerned, even the crime of having prepared this defence 
 with others? In either case we can allege only defence, 
 not attack, for that Belgium meant to attack us no one 
 in Germany has yet maintained. 
 
 I therefore ask again how do you expiain and justify 
 the contributions, amounting to a sum which you keep 
 concealed in the silence of shame, but which, when every- 
 thing is taken into account, considerably exceeds half a 
 milliard marks (£25,000,000). Here your pretext of 
 the state of defence no longer holds good. The accused 
 who pleads in excuse a state of defence, but is found 
 to be in possession of his opponent's purse, will plead 
 in vain for immunity. Give back the contributions! 
 That is the least that can be required of you, and is 
 without doubt, when peace returns, the least that will be 
 required of you. 
 
 The objection will be raised, and has in fact been 
 raised : Why did Belgium not allow us a free passage, 
 for then she would have been spared all the horrors of 
 war? This is a noble question, worthy of the new Ger- 
 man national psychology. "Why did you not submit to 
 the insult?" exclaims the slanderer to the slandered;
 
 THE CRIME 237 
 
 ''now you get in addition a blow on the head." Why 
 did not Germany submit to the Napoleonic occupation? 
 If she had remained quiet she would have been spared 
 much bloodshed and the horrors of war. Why did not 
 Leonidas and his Spartans allow the Persians to pass 
 through Thermopylae? If they had done so they would 
 all have remained alive. These and similar qucrstiones 
 Domitiancc might be asked without number. They 
 are not more foolish than the reproach which is raised 
 against Belgium in Germany to-day. Belgium defended 
 herself for the quite simple reason that her honour, 
 her independence, and her international obligations com- 
 pelled her to offer a defence. In summoning Belgium 
 to allow Germany a free passage, the demand addressed 
 to her was that she should sacrifice her honour and 
 her independence, and scatter to the wind her inter- 
 national obligations. 
 
 These obligations rested on a basis not merely moral, 
 but also to a very considerable extent practical. As 
 soon as Belgium, by showing preference to Germany, 
 took sides on her behalf, she would have destroyed for 
 ever her neutral position, and would never again have 
 been in a position to regain it. The other Powers could 
 never again have trusted Belgium to remain neutral if 
 on this occasion she had light-heartedly been faithless 
 to the duties imposed by neutrality. Belgium would 
 thus have fallen into a kind of dependence on her great 
 neighbour Germany, who, it is true, promised to respect 
 her independence, but certainly offered less security for 
 the observance of this independence than was furnished 
 by the guarantee of the collective Great Powers. Ger- 
 many's designs on Belgium were not unknown in the 
 world. Our politico-military literature had copiously 
 contributed to the dissemination of this knowledge. Gen- 
 eral von Bernhardi expressed in general terms the view 
 that the "conception of permanent neutrality is entirely
 
 238 I ACCUSE! 
 
 contrary to the essential nature of the State," and in 
 particular he was of the opinion that Belgium, in adding 
 to her small territory the vast Congo State, had al- 
 ready violated her own neutrality.^ There was therefore 
 a certain danger involved in trusting her voracious neigh- 
 bour, in confiding in her grace alone, and in pushing 
 aside all other protectors. The lamb can indeed feel 
 no great confidence when the wolf promises to respect 
 his independence. 
 
 Thus the attitude assumed by Belgium is attributable 
 not merely to an idealistic point of view, but to extremely 
 tangible and practical interests, and for these at least 
 there should be some understanding in Germany, even 
 if the nose is turned up in scorn at the idealism — of 
 other people. 
 
 Precisely the same considerations which were bound 
 to lead to Belgium's refusal to accord Germany a free 
 passage through her territory would have caused her 
 to reject any suggestion made by France or England 
 that she should make common cause with them against 
 Germany. No one in Germany takes the trouble to re- 
 flect for a moment what could have induced Belgium 
 to give up her neutrality, and to sell herself body and 
 soul to the Entente Powers. What advantage could she 
 expect from such behaviourf Did Belgium entertain 
 any designs to conquer the Rhine provinces? Did she 
 wish to round off her territory towards Aix-la-Chapelle 
 or Treves ? What in the world could she gain by assum- 
 ing a hostile attitude towards Germany? Clearly she 
 could gain nothing. On the contrary, by siding with the 
 Entente Powers she would have exposed her position in 
 Europe to the gravest danger. So long as Belgium con- 
 tinued neutral and discharged the duties imposed by her 
 neutrality, she would have been quite independent of 
 the issue of the war, and could have awaited the result 
 ^Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, pp. no, in. 

 
 THE CRIME 239 
 
 with composure, indifferent whether Germany or France 
 emerged as victor from the struggle. The moment she 
 sided with one of the parties, her whole future fate be- 
 came dependent on her ally's success in war, and her 
 fate would have been sealed with this ally's defeat. Why 
 should Belgium Imve run this risk? Why should she 
 have exposed herself to the vengeance of her powerful 
 German neighbour, and make herself liable in the event 
 of a defeat to be the first to pay the piper? For there 
 could be no doubt that if Belgium were the ally 
 of France, with obligations imposed on her by treaty, 
 she would certainly have been annexed by Gemiany 
 in the event of a defeat — a fate which, even as things 
 are, is held over her head on the ground of her merely 
 imaginary alliance. I therefore again ask : What reason- 
 able ground could Belgium have had to expose herself 
 needlessly to this danger, instead of awaiting the issue of 
 events with a calm conscience under the sure shield of 
 neutrality? No one can give a plausible answer to 
 this question. Thus by the application of the simplest 
 logic it is possible to demonstrate how weak is the 
 foundation of the German accusations against Bel- 
 gium. 
 
 As against Germany, Belgium has exercised her rights, 
 fulfilled her duties, and protected her interests as she 
 would have done had a breach of her neutrality been 
 demanded from any other quarter. It is Germany that 
 has acted wrongly, contrary to her duty, and against 
 her true interests. 
 
 The imponderabilia which a Bismarck kept in mind in 
 all his political measures count for naught with the lead- 
 ers of the Germany of to-day, who "have exactly caught 
 his manner of clearing his throat and spitting," ^ but 
 have not caught even a breath of his spirit. The im- 
 ponderabilia in the case of Belgiu m were the respect due 
 [' Schiller. Wallenstcin's Lager.]
 
 240 I ACCUSE! 
 
 to the rights of others and regard for the moral judg- 
 ment of the world. The neglect of these imponderabilia 
 will be bitterly avenged on Germany. It has already 
 been avenged in so far as it has influenced the atti- 
 tude of England in this war, and has thereby increased 
 the coalition of our enemies to our disadvantage. 
 
 After this section was finished a manifesto of the 
 Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, issued on Decem- 
 ber 24th, came to my notice. This document, written 
 in answer to a speech of Viviani, once more achieves the 
 utmost limits in perversion and in falsification, in order 
 to shift the clearly-proven guilt of Germany on to the 
 Entente Powers.^ We should be doing this production 
 too much honour if we were to bestow upon it any 
 special consideration. Everything contained in it is con- 
 tradicted by the diplomatic correspondence, by the Ger- 
 man White Book itself, and by the earlier speeches of 
 the Chancellor. The great feat whereby Herr von Beth- 
 mann endeavours to wash himself clean consists in con- 
 fusing the sequence of events in time, in suppressing 
 everything that does not suit his case, in advancing as- 
 sertions which are in contradiction with the proved facts, 
 and in ascribing to the Entente Powers motives which 
 are inconsistent with their actions. 
 
 A few test examples may illustrate the love of truth 
 which inspires Herr von Bethmann, and may at the same 
 time indicate the shortness of his memory. He now 
 maintains that, to begin with, Austria had only mobilised 
 against Serbia, whereas on August 4th he himself ad- 
 mitted that a partial mobilisation — and that before the 
 Russian partial mobilisation — had taken place against 
 Russia as well. To take a further instance, this time 
 of his tactics of suppression : he admits that Germany 
 
 ^ See Appendix III.
 
 THE CRIME 241 
 
 raised objections only against the form of a conference, 
 but passes over in silence the important fact that Ger- 
 many, notwithstanding repeated pressure from the En- 
 tente Powers, did not consent to suggest a form in 
 which the Conference would be agreeable to her. 
 Amongst much more that is ignored, he keeps silence 
 with regard to the fact that up to the last moment (July 
 31st), when in consequence of the German ultimatum 
 it was then too late, Austria declined the direct negotia- 
 tions with Petrograd which Germany herself had recom- 
 mended in place of the Conference. The whole of the 
 document is thus, as is shown by these examples, nothing 
 more than a continuous series of falsifications and sup- 
 pressions of the truth. 
 
 I should only like to draw attention to one more asser- 
 tion, which also deserves no other designation — an asser- 
 tion which now appears for the first time, and which, for 
 the sake of variety, ascribes to England the guilt of 
 being the first to mobilise, a guilt which has hitherto 
 been supposed to fall on Russia alone. What is the 
 ground for this terrible accusation, which, even if it were 
 true, would not dispose of Grey's continuous efforts for 
 peace ? It is based on the fact that the English Fleet was 
 not disbanded on the conclusion of their nonnal ma- 
 noeuvres near Portland, but was kept together (July 
 27th). As a matter of fact, this had nothing to do with 
 a "mobilisation," a "collection of the Fleet at Portland," 
 a "military preparation on a great scale," as Herr von 
 Bethmann asserts against his better knowledge; it was 
 merely a kccping-togcthcr, a non-dispersal of the ma- 
 noeuvre-fleet, caused by the state of tension in the Eu- 
 ropean situation, by the recall of the Austrian Ambassa- 
 dor from Belgrade, and the refusal of Austria and Ger- 
 many to enter with the other Powers into any negotia- 
 tions on the Serbian questio n.^ Grey openly communi- 
 ^Blue Book, p. xi. No. 48. Yellow Book, No. 66.
 
 242 I ACCUSE! 
 
 cated to Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador, the 
 reason for not dispersing the Fleet, adding that there 
 was no menace in what had been done but that it was 
 merely a measure of security owing to the possibility that 
 a European conflagration might be brought about by the 
 incomprehensible manner in which Austria treated the 
 conciliatory answer of Serbia as a blank negative. Eng- 
 land took no other measure of security on sea or on 
 land. Herr von Bethmann, however, makes out of this 
 a "mobilisation on a great scale," which aimed at a "hu- 
 miliation of the two Powers in the Triple Alliance," and 
 which produced a militant frame of mind in France and 
 Russia. Who is deceived by this? No one, Herr von 
 Bethmann. 
 
 Turn over the Yellow Book and the Blue Book,^ and 
 you will find that from the morning of July 26th — ^that 
 is to say, immediately after the expiration of the Aus- 
 trian ultimatum — Germany had prepared her mobilisa- 
 tion, the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine were concentrated, 
 the fortresses on the frontier were put in a state of de- 
 fence, reservists were called in by individual summons, 
 German ships were called back from Norway, officers 
 on leave were summoned from Switzerland, and private 
 automobiles were reserved in Baden for military pur- 
 poses, &c. You will there find that Germany in Alsace- 
 Lorraine, in Strassburg, and in Metz, and that Austria 
 in Hungary and Galicia were already fully, if secretly, 
 engaged on mobilisation as early as July 29th. 
 
 Read further on July 30th — that is to say, before the 
 official announcement of the "state of war" — the Gemian 
 provinces on the frontier were already in fact in the last 
 stage before mobilisation; how on the previous day the 
 frontier had already been crossed by German patrols; 
 how the whole i6th Army Corps, reinforced by part of 
 
 ' Yellow Book, Nos. 58, 59, 60, 88, 90, 91, 106, loS. Blue Book, No. 
 105 (Enclosure 3).
 
 THE CRIME 243 
 
 the 8th from Treves and Cologne, had already occupied 
 the frontier from Metz to Luxemburg. 
 
 All this took place on July 30th, although France had 
 voluntarily given an obligation to keep her own troops 
 ten kilometres from the frontier/ and had observed this 
 condition to the detriment of her own strategic interest. 
 Compare these German military measures with the assur- 
 ances of peace which the hapless Herr von Schoen had 
 daily to deliver at the Quai d'Orsay. Read and compare 
 all these things, and then on the strength of this soli- 
 tary fact of the non-dispersion of the English Fleet, 
 openly acknowledged by the English Government, dare 
 if you still can, to draw the conclusion that England in- 
 tended to break the peace. No, Herr von Bethmann, 
 you would have shown greater wisdom if you had kept 
 silent : si tacuisses, philosophus manstsses. You would 
 have shown more consideration for your reputation as a 
 "philosopher" if you had patiently borne the fate which 
 you have brought upon yourself and your country in- 
 stead of clutching nervously at straws which, after all, 
 will not save you from plunging in the depths of uni- 
 versal damnation. Keep silence — for your own sake 
 and for our sake — and rest content with the well-sound- 
 ing testimonial which Professor Lasson has bestowed 
 upon you, that you are "by far the most eminent among 
 living men, knowing no motive other than those of 
 truth, fidelity, and right." 
 
 The points in the indictment against Germany I sum- 
 marise in the following sentences : — 
 
 I. Germany gave Austria a free hand against Serbia, 
 although she was well aware that a European conflict 
 must arise out of that between Serbia and Austria. 
 
 ' Yellow Book, No. 106. Chancellor's Speech, 4th August. Blue 
 Book, No. 105.
 
 244 I ACCUSE! 
 
 2. She allowed Austria to address to Serbia an ulti- 
 matum with exorbitant demands and, notwithstanding 
 an almost complete compliance with these demands, she 
 allowed her to recall her Ambassador and to declare 
 war. 
 
 3. By suggesting a localisation of the war she sought 
 to create the appearance of mediating in the interests of 
 peace, but that this proposal had no prospect of success 
 must have been known to her from the history of diplo- 
 macy, and from the recent evidence of the Balkan crisis ; 
 that as a matter of fact it was known to her is clear 
 from the confessions contained in the White Book. 
 
 4. She declined the proposal for a conference of the 
 four Powers. 
 
 5. She herself then advanced the proposal for direct 
 discussions between Vienna and Petrograd, but at the 
 same time she suffered Austria to decline to take part in 
 these discussions, and instead to declare war against 
 Serbia. 
 
 6. She left unanswered the frequently repeated re- 
 quest of the other Powers that she should herself pro- 
 pose an alternative method of mediation in place of 
 the proposal of a conference which she had declined. 
 
 7. She left unanswered and undiscussed the various 
 formulae for agreement proposed by Grey. 
 
 8. In part she refused and in part she left unanswered 
 the formulae of agreement proposed by Sazonof. 
 
 9. In spite of all inquiries, she never said what Aus- 
 tria wanted, but constantly restricted herself to saying 
 what Austria did not want. 
 
 10. She made to England a bid for neutrality, and 
 thus announced her intention of making war at a time 
 when the Entente Powers were still zealously labouring 
 in the interests of peace. 
 
 11. When at last negotiations on the Serbian Note 
 were opened with a prospect of success in Petrograd
 
 THE CRIME ^45 
 
 between Austria and Russia, she upset these negotia- 
 tions by her ultimata to France and Russia, and made 
 war inevitable. 
 
 12. In the ultimatum to Russia she demanded that 
 demobilisation should also be carried out as against 
 Austria, although Austria herself had mobilised the 
 whole of her forces. 
 
 13. In place of the counter-mobilisation which she 
 had threatened to carry out, she at once declared war 
 without any ground, first on Russia and then on 
 France. 
 
 14. As an afterthought she based these declarations 
 of war on the fact that the powers opposed to her had 
 begun the war, whereas, on the contrary, the first acts 
 of war were committed by Germany. 
 
 15. She violated the neutrality of Belgium, and thus 
 in addition brought about war with England. 
 
 These points in the indictment are proved, and justify 
 the judgment: Germany is guilty, along with Austria, 
 of hamng brought about the European war. 
 
 ENGLAND 
 
 The attitude of England, up to the moment when the 
 question of Belgian neutrality arose, is so clear from 
 what I have already said that it would be a vain repeti- 
 tion to deal with it again in this connection. From the 
 beginning of the conflict Sir Edward Grey, the English 
 Foreign Minister, took the leading part in all efforts to 
 preserve peace, and did everything within the power of 
 man to prevent war: — 
 
 I. He urged the Serbian Government to assume an
 
 246 I ACCUSE! 
 
 attitude of moderation, and in this succeeded in his 
 efforts.^ 
 
 2. He endeavoured, although in this case without 
 success, to obtain from the Austrian Government an 
 extension of the time-Hmit.^ 
 
 3. He thereupon put forward the proposal for a con- 
 ference of the four Powers, which was accepted by 
 France, Italy, and Russia, but was declined by Austria 
 and Germany.^ 
 
 4. He repeatedly called upon the German Govern- 
 ment to propose, in place of the conference declined by 
 them, any other form of co-operation of the four Powers 
 not directly concerned. His request, however, remained 
 unanswered.* 
 
 5. He endeavoured to promote the direct conversa- 
 tions between Vienna and Petrograd which were pro- 
 posed by Germany, but which, after the declaration of 
 war against Serbia, were declined by Austria.^ 
 
 6. He then proposed a formula of agreement, accord- 
 ing to which Austria should occupy Serbian territory, 
 including Belgrade, and should from there dictate her 
 conditions. These conditions were to be communicated 
 to the Powers, and in so far as they did not affect the 
 integrity and sovereignty of Serbia, they were to be 
 recommended to Serbia for acceptance. To this pro- 
 posal no answer was ever received either from Austria 
 or from Germany.^ 
 
 7. He supported the first proposal of agreement ad- 
 vanced by Sazonof, and as it was declined by Ger- 
 many as unacceptable, he obtained the consent of Saz- 
 
 ^ Blue Book, Nos. 12, 15, 16, 22, 27. 
 
 * Blue Book, Nos. 13, 26. 
 
 'Blue Book, Nos. 17, 35, 36, 27, 4^, 43, Si, 53, m. 
 
 *Blue Book, Nos. 60, 68, 80, 84, 88. 
 
 'Blue Book, Nos. 45, 74, 75, 78, 93, 106. 
 
 ' Blue Book, Nos. 88, 98, 103.
 
 THE CRIME 247 
 
 onof to a second formula of agreement, which went 
 even further to meet the views of Austria. This pro- 
 posal remained unanswered.^ 
 
 8. On July 31st he promoted with the utmost energy 
 the negotiations which had begun between Austria and 
 Russia, and sought to guide them to a successful issue 
 by further proposals which contained full satisfaction 
 for Austria. All his proposals contained the stipulation 
 that further military preparation should be stopped on 
 all sides.^ 
 
 9. He ultimately declared himself ready to support in 
 Petrograd and Paris any reasonable proposal of Ger- 
 many or Austria which might serve to preserve peace, 
 and, in the event of such a proposal not being accepted 
 by France or Russia, he declared that he would withdraw 
 from the negotiations. No such proposal was made, 
 since in the meantime Germany had despatched her two 
 ultimata and declined further negotiations on the sub- 
 ject.'"^ 
 
 10. On August ist, the day of the German declara- 
 tion of war against Russia, he despatched proposals, 
 representations, and warnings to all the capitals in order 
 to arrive at an agreement between the Powers even at 
 the last moment before the outbreak of hostilities.^ The 
 English Blue Book contains no fewer than seventeen 
 telegrams from and to the various capitals dated August 
 1st, sixteen of July 31st, and thirty-three of July 29th 
 and 30th. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey deserves more than any other the 
 name of the "peacemaker of Europe," if there is still 
 any meaning in the saying in inagnis voluisse sat est. 
 
 ^Blue Book, Nos. 97, 103, 120, 13T, 132, 139. Orange Book, Nos. 
 60, 63, 67. 
 
 'Blue Book, Nos. no, in, 131, 133, 135, 137. 
 
 'Blue Book, Nos. in, 112, 121. 
 
 *Blue Book, Nos. 126, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 137, 138, 139, 141.
 
 248 I ACCUSE! 
 
 His efforts were in vain, hut his merit in having served 
 the cause of peace with indefatigable zeal, with skill and 
 energy will remain inextinguishable in history. 
 
 Even Herr von Bethmann Hollweg will be unable to 
 contradict this judgment of history. I mean the Herr 
 von Bethmann of August 4th, not him of December 2nd. 
 
 What did he of August 4th say? Let us hear the 
 White Book : 
 
 "On July 26th Sir Edward Grey had made the pro- 
 posal to submit the differences between Austria-Hun- 
 gary and Servia to a conference of the Ambassadors of 
 Germany, France, and Italy under his chairmanship" 
 (p. 408). 
 
 "We further declared ourselves ready, after failure 
 of the conference idea, to transmit a second proposal of 
 Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna in which he suggested 
 Austria-Hungary should decide that either the Serbian 
 reply was sufficient or that it be used as a basis for 
 further negotiations" (p. 409). 
 
 "Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured in- 
 cessantly and supported every proposal," &c. (p. 411). 
 
 "We even as late as the 30th of July forwarded the 
 English proposal to Vienna, as basis for negotiations, 
 that Austria-Hungary should dictate her conditions in 
 Serbia, i. e., after her march into Serbia" (p. 410). 
 
 "During the interval from July 29th to July 31st 
 whilst these endeavours of ours for mediation were 
 being continued with increasing energy, supported by 
 English diplomacy," &c. (p. 411). 
 
 "Nay, even before the reply from Vienna regarding 
 the Anglo-German mediation . . . could possibly have 
 been received," &c. (p. 411). 
 
 "In the meantime, Great Britain tried to mediate be- 
 tween Vienna and Petrograd," &c. (Chancellor's speech 
 of August 4th, p. 436). 
 
 These quotations from the German memorandum are
 
 THE CRIME 249 
 
 in agreement with the telegrams annexed to it, and in 
 particular to the exchange of telegrams between the 
 King of England and Prince Henry and the Emperor 
 William. The most interesting point, however, is that 
 even the solemn declaration of war against Russia con- 
 tains an equally solemn testimony to the efforts for peace 
 made by England in the following words : — 
 
 "His Majesty the German Emperor had under- 
 taken in concert with Great Britain the part of 
 mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and Pet- 
 rograd." ^ 
 
 So spake and so thought Herr von Bethmann Hollweg 
 on August 4th. 
 
 But how did he speak and what were his thoughts — 
 or, rather, what did he pretend that his thoughts were — 
 on December 2nd ? 
 
 "Where the responsibility rests for the greatest of all 
 wars is to us clear. The external responsibility is borne 
 by those men in Russia who inspired and carried out 
 the mobilisation of the entire army. The inner responsi- 
 bility lies on the Government of Great Britain. The 
 Cabinet of London could have made this war impossible 
 by declaring without ambiguity in Petrograd that Eng- 
 land was not prepared to allow a continental war in 
 Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria 
 and Serbia. . . . England did not do so. . . . England 
 saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke 
 the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace Lon- 
 don gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she was 
 taking her stand on the side of France and Russia." 
 
 As many lies as words! 
 
 In the first place the Chancellor is contradicted by 
 himself. In the case of Bethmann v. P)ethmann the 
 Chancellor of December 2nd is knocked out by the Chan- 
 ' White Book Exhibit, 6.
 
 250 1 ACCUSE! 
 
 cellor of August 4th. All the events which preceded the 
 outbreak of war had taken place before August 4th, that 
 is to say, before the day on which Herr von Bethmann 
 laid his documentary evidence before the Reichstag. If 
 England had in fact played the role which is ascribed to 
 her by the Bethmann of December 2nd, the Bethmann 
 of August 4th was bound to have known of it, and he 
 could not have delivered his eulogies on England's serv- 
 ices in the cause of peace. He praised England because 
 she was worthy of this praise. He knew that she was 
 worthy of this praise, because as the supreme conductor 
 of foreign policy he had personally taken part in all 
 that had happened. The account he gave on August 4th 
 corresponded to the truth, and the only reproach, if any, 
 which can be urged against it is that it does not disclose 
 the truth in its full extent, and that it expresses in too 
 moderate a form the praise due to the English Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Is it possible that the man who, under specious pre- 
 tences, declined all the proposals for agreement ad- 
 vanced by England, or failed to answer them, or did not 
 even send them on to Austria, who on July 31st when 
 agreement between Austria and Russia appeared to be 
 at hand, forced war by despatching ultimata to Russia 
 and France, who on July 29th had already resolved on 
 war, and gave expression to this resolution in his bid 
 for England's neutrality, who, however, received from 
 Grey in reply that noble manifesto of peace which would 
 have brought to the nations of Europe a sure prospect 
 of a lasting condition of peace — is it possible that this 
 man had the effrontery in contradiction of his own 
 printed testimony to hold England responsible for this 
 world-catastrophe, for which he alone bears the fearful 
 responsibility? It is possible, for it has happened. But 
 the world knows what view to take of his statements, and 
 the lie goes home to roost.
 
 THE CRIME 251 
 
 According to the assertion of the Chancellor the Eng- 
 lish Blue Book itself proves the guilt of the English 
 Government. It is supposed to show that England sup- 
 ported the war party in Petrograd, and that she declared 
 at the outset that ''She was taking her stand on the side 
 of Russia and France." 
 
 What, in fact, does the Blue Book prove? The exact 
 opposite. 
 
 What Is true is merely that Russia and France, cor- 
 rectly recognising Gennany's aggressive intentions, en- 
 deavoured to induce Sir Edward Grey to assume, in 
 the event of the conflict becoming acute, a decisive at- 
 titude in favour of her friends in the Entente. It was 
 hoped in Paris and in Petrograd that by such an atti- 
 tude on the part of England Germany would be re- 
 strained from her intentions to make war. 
 
 It was thus Intended that England, in assuming this 
 attitude, was to use her influence, not in promoting war, 
 hilt in preventing war. Sir Edward Grey declined the 
 suggestion, and in reply to their repeated endeavours he 
 emphasised afresh that England was, and desired to 
 remain, free from obligations. He even went further; 
 he most earnestly warned his friends in the Entente 
 not to rely on England making a declaration of solid- 
 arity with them. 
 
 As early as July 24th Sazonof, along with the French 
 Ambassador in Petrograd, had represented to Sir G. 
 Buchanan,^ the British Ambassador, that in view of the 
 provocative attitude of Austria, which could only be 
 explained by assuming that she was supported by Ger- 
 many, a declaration of solidarity of England with France 
 and Russia was the best and the only means of prevent- 
 ing a European conflict ; the tone of the Austrian Note, 
 the exorbitant demands, the short period of time allowed, 
 everything indicated that Austria desired war against 
 'Blue Book, No. 6.
 
 «5Ä I ACCUSE! 
 
 Serbia, and this in itself constituted a danger that a 
 European conflict would arise. Only by England tak- 
 ing common action with France and Russia could the 
 European war which was threatening be prevented. The 
 English Ambassador at once replied that, while reserving 
 until a later date the official declarations of his Govern- 
 ment on the subject, he personally saw no reason to ex- 
 pect any declaration of solidarity from England; direct 
 British interests in the Serbian question were nil, and a 
 war on account of such a question would never be sanc- 
 tioned by British public opinion. The only promise which 
 Buchanan made was to endeavour to induce Austria to 
 extend the time-limit. 
 
 Sir Edward Grey In his telegram of July 25th sent 
 in reply to Buchanan ^ fully approved the declaration 
 of his ambassador: *T entirely approve what you said 
 as reported in your telegram of yesterday, and I cannot 
 promise more on behalf of the Government." In place 
 of the desired declaration of solidarity, Grey at once 
 proposed the exact opposite, namely, mediation by the 
 four Powers not directly concerned — England, Germany, 
 Prance, and Italy. During the whole of the further 
 negotiations the English Government emphatically main- 
 tained this attitude against all wishes that they should 
 act otherwise. On July 27th Buchanan explained the 
 English point of view to M. Sazonof as follows ^ : It 
 would be a mistake to assume that the cause of peace 
 could be promoted if England placed herself on the side 
 of France and Russia against Germany. The attitude 
 of Germany would merely be stiffened by such a menace; 
 only in the capacity of a friend who was anxious to pre- 
 serve peace could England approach Germany, and en- 
 deavour to exercise a moderating influence in Vienna 
 through Germany. 
 
 ^Blue Book, No. 24. 
 *Blue Book, No. 44.
 
 THE CRIME 253 
 
 On July 27th Grey declared to Prince Lichnowsky 
 (still with reference to the four-Power proposal) that so 
 long as Germany would work to keep the peace he would 
 keep closely in touch with Germany.^ 
 
 On July 29th Grey had a lengthy discussion with the 
 French Ambassador, Cambon,^ in which he clearly 
 pointed out the difference between the Morocco ques- 
 tion and the existing Serbian difficulty. In the Morocco 
 question the dispute was one in which France was pri- 
 marily interested, and the dispute turned about mat- 
 ters which were regulated by a special treaty between 
 England and France. None of this applied to the con- 
 flict between Austria and Serbia, Even if this conflict 
 should extend to one between Austria and Russia, Eng- 
 land would not feel called upon to take a hand in it. 
 The question whether Teutons or Slavs should hold su- 
 premacy in the Balkans had always been of so little in- 
 terest to England that she had never allowed herself 
 to be drawn into a war on account of it. But Grey went 
 still further in refusing an expression of England's 
 solidarity ; even if France and Germany became involved 
 in the struggle the fact still remained that it was not 
 France's own interests, but in the first place her duties 
 under her alliance towards Russia which had been de- 
 cisive in determining her action. Ez/en in this case Eng- 
 land was free from any engagement, and her action 
 would only be decided by what British interests re- 
 quired her to do. 
 
 As the European situation, notwithstanding all the 
 efforts for peace made by the Entente Powers, became 
 constantly more strained. President Poincare himself in 
 a discussion with Bertie,^ the British Ambassador, on 
 July 30th, returned to the proposal that England might 
 
 ' Blue Book, No. 46. 
 ' Blue Book, No. 87. 
 "Blue Book, No. 99.
 
 254. I ACCUSE! 
 
 avert the danger of war by an unambiguous declaration 
 to the effect that she would support France in the event 
 of a conflict with Germany. France was pacific, and 
 did not desire war ; Germany, however, could only be re- 
 strained from her intention to go to war if England were 
 to assume a decisive attitude.^ Even Di San Giuliano, 
 the Italian Minister, shared the opinion of Poincare, and 
 also suggested the effectiveness of an intervention by 
 England on behalf of the Entente Powers.^ 
 
 Once more Grey decisively rejected every obligation 
 to intervene on behalf of Russia and France. In view of 
 the importance of the declarations of Grey in forming a 
 complete judgment on the attitude of England, I give 
 at length a few sentences from the telegrams addressed 
 by Grey on July 31st to Bertie, his Ambassador in 
 Paris : — 
 
 "Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it 
 has yet gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. 
 Feeling is quite different from what it was during the 
 Morocco question. That crisis involved a dispute di- 
 rectly involving France, whereas in this case France is 
 being drawn into a dispute which is not hers. . . . We 
 cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. 
 I have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged 
 His Majesty's Government to reconsider this decision." ^ 
 
 ^ Poincare advanced the same reasons for a declaration of solidar- 
 ity of England with France and Russia in a letter addressed directly 
 to the King of England on the 31st July, and only published in 
 February, 1915. Even this step of Poincare was without success. 
 The answer of King George avoided giving any precise answer on 
 the chief point in the French letter, and the attitude of England, 
 which was still continuously striving for peace, was made contin- 
 gent on the development of events. The most sincere pacific inten- 
 tions of the two Powers appear in both the letters, even if there 
 were a divergency of opinion as to the path by which the goal could 
 be reached. 
 
 'Blue Book, No. 106. 
 
 »Blue Book, No. 116.
 
 THE CRIME 255 
 
 "Mr. Cambon referred to-day to a telegram that had 
 been shown to Sir Arthur Nicholson this morning from 
 the French Ambassador in Berlin, saying that it was 
 the uncertainty with regard to whether we would inter- 
 vene which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and 
 that, if we would only declare definitely on the side of 
 Russia and France, it would decide the German attitude 
 in favour of peace. ... I said that we had come to the 
 conclusion in the Cabinet to-day that we could not give 
 any pledge at the present time. . . . Up to the present 
 moment we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, 
 that any treaties or obligations of this country were in- 
 volved. . . . Mr. Cambon repeated his question whether 
 we would help France if Germany made an attack on 
 her. I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, 
 as far as things had gone at present, we could not take 
 any engagement." ^ 
 
 On the same day, July 31st, Grey, as he had already 
 so frequently done in the preceding days, directed to 
 Prince Lichnowsky an urgent request that if Germany 
 and Austria "could get any reasonable proposal put 
 forward" he would support it at Petrograd and Paris, 
 and if Russia and France would not accept the proposal, 
 he would have nothing more to do with the conse- 
 quences.^ 
 
 This is the documentary evidence found in the Eng- 
 lish Blue Book, which according to Herr von Beth- 
 mann's assertion is supposed to prove "clearly and in- 
 controvertibly" that London had given it to be under- 
 stood that "she was taking her stand on the side of 
 France and Russia." The assertion of the Chancellor is 
 exactly the reverse of the truth, and we can but admire 
 the courage of a man who asserts in the face of the 
 whole world facts which, as is clear to everyone, are 
 
 *Blue Book, No. 119. 
 "Blue Book, No. iii.
 
 256 I ACCUSE! 
 
 diametrically opposed to the truth, and who appeals to 
 documents which prove the reverse of his assertions. 
 
 Everything contained in the English Blue Book with 
 regard to the attitude of England during the diplomatic 
 negotiations is confirmed by the Russian and French 
 publications. The refusals of Grey were directed, as 
 we have seen, simultaneously to France and to Russia. 
 The declarations made to the one Power held good as a 
 matter of course for the other, and through the Em- 
 bassies were conveyed to the other capital. 
 
 Parallel with Grey's line of conduct towards the En- 
 tente Powers was the attitude he assumed towards Ger- 
 many. It is highly interesting to study this double ac- 
 tion of Grey's which bears testimony to as much skill 
 as integrity and true love of peace. When I read this 
 series of documents, so dramatically tense, there always 
 comes before me the picture of the old councillor of the 
 district court. F., who thirty years ago used to preside 
 in a court of minor jurisdiction in the Jüdenstrasse, in 
 Berlin. As it was highly distasteful to him to proceed 
 to a judgment he sought in every way, in season and out 
 of season, to effect compromises, which would reduce 
 his work. He used the most diverse means to attain 
 this end. If he did not succeed in moving the parties 
 to a pliable attitude by keeping them waiting for hours 
 beside a baking fire in his office, he had resort to the fol- 
 lowing stratagem: he dismissed the defendant for a few 
 minutes, and pointed out to the plaintiff the weakness 
 of his case, which could only be expected to lead to its 
 dismissal. Then he called the defendant before him and 
 pointed out to him the weakness of his reply, and im- 
 pressed upon him that he would almost certainly lose 
 the case. When he had worn each of them out in this 
 way by separate advice, he called them both before the 
 bench, and, presto! in nearly every case a compromise 
 was arrived at. Precisely similar was the course pursued
 
 THE CRIME 257 
 
 by Sir Edward Grey with regard to the European par- 
 ties with the object of moving them to a peaceful com- 
 promise, and of preventing an armed conflict. He said 
 to the French and the Russians : "Give way ; do not 
 count on my help !" And he said to the Germans and the 
 Austrians : "Give way, do not count on my neutrality!" 
 
 As the former expected his help — not, be it observed, 
 for war, but against war — so the latter sought his 
 neutrality, the consideration of which naturally postu- 
 lated the outbreak of war. 
 
 Grey never wearied in the task of warning the German 
 Government against the delusion that England would, 
 in any circumstances, remain neutral in a European con- 
 flict. He warned Prince Lichnowsky; he warned Herr 
 von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow through Sir E. Gos- 
 chen, the English Ambassador. The English Blue Book 
 is full of proofs for these statements.^ The warnings 
 continued throughout the whole of the critical days be~ 
 tween July 27th and 31st, and reached their culminat- 
 ing point in the answer of Grey on the 30th of July, 
 already mentioned on several occasions, a distinguished 
 document which will always remain a title to glory for 
 English diplomacy and an ignominy for German diplo- 
 macy. "We will have nothing to do with a neutrality 
 which would only increase your lust for war, since it 
 would make it more easy for you to succeed in war! 
 Instead of this we propose a joint-labour in the cause of 
 peace, now and for ever, a labour directed to the protec- 
 tion of Europe against all further catastrophes. We will 
 have nothing to do with guarantees such as you offer; 
 even if these guarantees were more far-reaching than 
 they really are, England will have nothing to do with 
 such guarantees, which would only protect you in your 
 delight in war. England zuants peace for all, and if 
 you, break th e peace, do not count on our standing aside!" 
 'Blue Book, Nos. 87, 89, loi, 102, iii, 116, 119, 123.
 
 258 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Such are the thoughts which Grey in his Note of July 
 30th expressed so passionately and so convincingly. 
 
 Even on July 31st, immediately before the outbreak 
 of war, he threatened both sides ; he called on both sides 
 to make reasonable proposals, and threatened each of 
 them that he would leave them in the lurch if they de- 
 clined the reasonable proposals of the ojffer.^ 
 
 We know that all his efforts were in vain — not through 
 any blame attaching to France and Russia, but owing to 
 Germany and Austria. The European war was there, 
 as soon as Germany had declared war against Russia. 
 All further developments were bound to follow mechani- 
 cally according to the treaties of alliance. 
 
 The assertion of the Chancellor that England bears 
 the responsibility for the European war is not supported 
 by the English publication, as Herr von Bethmann be- 
 lieves, but is flatly contradicted by it. But there is an- 
 other piece of evidence which the Chancellor has at his 
 disposal: the celebrated letter from the Belgian charge 
 d'affaires in Petrograd to the Minister Davignon, which 
 was seized in Berlin on July 31st and was opened at a 
 later date. This letter is supposed to contain incon- 
 trovertible proof of the guilt of England. What does 
 it really show? 
 
 The history of this letter and of its discovery is so 
 remarkable, and there is such an air of Sherlock Holmes 
 about the whole story, that some doubts as to its au- 
 thenticity may well be allowed. It is extraordinary that 
 the Berlin Government has always the luck to get pos- 
 session at the right moment of documents which are 
 compromising for others ! The Belgian charge d'affaires 
 in Petrograd writes to his Minister under a covering ad- 
 dress, and posts the letter, not in Petrograd, but through 
 an intermediary in Berlin. All this is strange, passing 
 strange! There is no official confirmation of the au- 
 'Blue Book, No. in. ^
 
 THE CRIME 259 
 
 thenticity of the letter. The signature of the letter- 
 writer has neither been acknowledged nor proved to be 
 genuine. In a civil action at law this document would 
 not be admitted to have any force as evidence. 
 
 But let us assume for the moment that the letter is 
 genuine; it contains the observations of the charge d'af- 
 faires of a small State on events in which he played 
 no part, and which he only knows from hearsay. The 
 fact that the witness only reports de auditu, and not 
 from his own direct observations, deprives his testimony 
 of any value as evidence as against those witnesses 
 who report de facto, that is to say, in the case now under 
 consideration, against the official documents which give 
 an account of the diplomatic events themselves. If the 
 man who has been robbed testifies before the judge 
 to all the details of the theft, and confirms his evidence 
 by oath, the judge will from the outset refuse to listen 
 to any witness who proposes to report from hearsay that 
 the theft never took place at all. He refuses to accept 
 his evidence, let alone give it credence. 
 
 From this it follows in the case we are considering 
 that the facts proved by the diplomatic publications of 
 England, France, and Russia, and also by those of 
 Germany, cannot be disposed of by the evidence of the 
 Belgian cJtarge d'affaires. Where there is a contradic- 
 tion between the official publications and the Belgian 
 report we must decide in favour of the former and 
 against the latter. 
 
 Are there, however, contradictions of such importance 
 between the official books and the Belgian report that 
 the whole edifice consistently constructed out of the dip- 
 lomatic publications may thereby be at once overthrown? 
 No such contradictions exist. The report gives her due 
 to each of the States concerned, like an old gossip who 
 abuses everyone. The writer himself ofifers his apologies, 
 so to speak, in saying at the very outset that the most
 
 360 I ACCUSE! 
 
 contradictory reports were circulated without it being 
 possible to distinguish what was true and what was 
 false as regards the intention of the "Imperial (Rus- 
 sian) Government." He then praises Germany, which 
 has indubitably laboured in Petrograd as in Vienna to 
 find some means of avoiding a general conflict. He 
 then blames Austria, which has shown the firm deter- 
 mination "not to draw back a step" ; he refers to the 
 declaration of Sazonof that the mobilisation of Russia 
 was not directed against Germany; he mentions that 
 the Reservists have been called to the colours only in 
 certain governmental districts, but maintains "quietly" 
 as his own personal impression that mobilisation is go- 
 ing on everywhere. England, he says, has proposed 
 arbitration; Sazonof has done the same. Austria, how- 
 ever, has rejected both proposals. To the proposal for 
 a conference Germany had answered by a counter-pro- 
 posal for a direct understanding between the Cabinets. 
 With all these proposals and counter-proposals "one 
 might in truth ask whether the whole world does not 
 wish for war, and is not merely attempting to postpone 
 the declaration of war to some extent in order to win 
 time." England had at first openly declared that she 
 would not allow herself to be drawn into a conflict. To- 
 day, however, people in Petrograd were convinced, in- 
 deed they had assurances, that England would stand by 
 France. "This support has an extraordinary influence, 
 and has done not a little to gain the upper hand for the 
 war-party." The Russian Army felt itself strong, but 
 her navy could hardly be counted; this was the reason 
 why the assurance of English support has acquired such 
 great importance. 
 
 This document, to which greater importance is at- 
 tached by the German Government than to their own 
 White Book, was published by the Norddeutsche All- 
 gemeine Zeitung with particular passages emphasised
 
 THE CRIME 261 
 
 by heavy type. As a matter of fact, in appraising this 
 document the result is entirely dependent on the pas- 
 sages chosen for emphasis in heavy type; according to 
 the emphasis attached to the various phrases, this hotch- 
 potch of tittle-tattle, which the writer must have gathered 
 in the corridors of the various embassies, for he him- 
 self stood apart from all the negotiations, can be used 
 to incriminate any of the great Powers. If we emphasise 
 with heavy type that the Cabinet of Vienna had shown 
 the firm determination not to draw hack a step, that 
 Austria and Germany had rejected all proposals for a 
 conference, arbitration, &c., that apparently the whole 
 world wished for war and only sought to gain time for 
 preparation, Germany and Austria will be revealed as the 
 guilty parties. If, on the other hand, we rely on the ob- 
 sei'vation that England had assured France that she 
 would stand by her, and had thereby strengthened the 
 war-party in Petrograd, the responsibility will fall at 
 least in part upon England. The document thus proves 
 as much against one side as against the other — only with 
 the great difference that the observations directed against 
 Germany and Austria are confirmed by all the diplo- 
 matic publications, and, above all, by the German White 
 Book itself, whereas the observations against England 
 are contradicted by all the publications of the European 
 Governments, and especially by the Gennan White Book. 
 I have already collected elsewhere the meed of praise 
 which the German White Book accords to England's love 
 of peace, and the efforts by her in the cause of peace. 
 The White Book was closed on August 2nd, and contains 
 all the diplomatic occurrences up to that date — only, of 
 course, in so far as their publication was considered ex- 
 pedient. If England had comported herself in Paris and 
 in Petrograd as the Belgian letter-writer reports from 
 hearsay on July 30th, Germany as the party chiefly con- 
 cerned was bound to have known this on August 2nd,
 
 262 I ACCUSE! 
 
 and could not have maintained the contrary in the White 
 Book. If there had been so much as a grain of truth 
 in these Belgian back-stair stories the German Govern- 
 ment would have seized upon it with joy, and would have 
 mentioned the relevant facts in their memorandum. 
 England's participation in the war was directly immi- 
 nent when the Chancellor on August 4th laid his White 
 Book before the German Reichstag. We were at war 
 with England the same evening. The Chancellor had 
 every interest in saddling the responsibility in advance 
 as far as possible on England, of whose participation in 
 the war there could no longer be any doubt on the morn- 
 ing of August 4th after the violation of Belgian neu- 
 trality. If he did not do so, but contrariwise lavished 
 praise on England, and indeed even emphasised in the 
 declaration of war against Russia the efforts made by 
 England in the cause of peace, we may regard it as fully 
 proved that he had nothing before him which could in- 
 criminate England. The proof of this, as we have seen, 
 can also be incontrovertibly deduced from the diplo- 
 matic publications of the Entente States, and it can never 
 be disposed of by the unauthenticated gossiping tales of 
 a charge d'aif aires w^ho took no part in the proceedings. 
 What Grey in fact did to preserve peace before and after 
 July 30th, the date of this Belgian letter, is a historical 
 fact proved by public documents; he promised support 
 neither to France nor to Russia, but, on the contrary, 
 in reply to repeated invitations from these Powers, he 
 definitely and decidedly refused to give any promise on 
 the subject. The Chancellor knows this as well as we 
 do, and if, disregarding all authentic diplomatic occur- 
 rences and rejecting his own previous utterances, he 
 cites a non-authentic, highly suspicious document in order 
 unjustly to incriminate England, he is not acting like 
 a gentleman, and speaks against his better knowledge. 
 The truth is contained in the sentences in the Eng-
 
 THE CRIME 263 
 
 lish Blue Book ^ : "Sir E. Grey had consistently de- 
 clined to give any promise of support to either of our 
 present allies. He maintained that the position of Great 
 Britain was that of a disinterested party whose influence 
 for peace at Berlin and Vienna would be enhanced by 
 the knowledge that we were not committed absolutely 
 to either side in the existing dispute. He refused to 
 believe that the best road to European peace lay through 
 a show of force. . . , We gave no pledge to our present 
 allies, but to Germany we gave three times — on the 30th 
 July, the 31st July, and the ist August — a clear warning 
 of the effect which would be produced on our attitude 
 and on the sentiment of the British people by a violation 
 of the neutrality of Belgium." 
 
 That England acted as is here represented, and not in 
 accordance with the knowledge professed by the \vriter 
 of the Belgian letter, is proved by all the diplomatic docu- 
 ments. That, however, Germany, as is equally asserted 
 in the letter, exerted herself in Vienna in the cause of 
 peace, is not proved by anything since, as I have already 
 pointed out, no correspondence between Vienna and Ber- 
 lin has been published. We are referred to the unproved 
 assertions of Germany, which deserve no belief, if only 
 because the sincere intention of Germany to move Vienna 
 to moderation was bound to have been unconditionally 
 successful. 
 
 The Chancellor in his speech of December 2nd stated : 
 "The Cabinet of London could have made this war im- 
 possible by declaring in Petrograd without ambiguity 
 that England was not prepared to allow a Continental 
 war in Europe to develop out of the conflict between 
 Austria and Serbia. . . . England did not do this. . . . 
 England saw how things were moving, but did nothing 
 to spoke the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace, 
 London gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she 
 ' Blue Book, p. xi.
 
 264. I ACCUSE! 
 
 was taking her stand on the side of France and Russia." 
 These sentences arc untrue from beginning to end. 
 They become true if everywhere in place of England 
 we read Germany, and in place of Petrograd we read 
 Vienna. The truth then runs as follows : — 
 
 The Cabinet of Berlin could have made this war im- 
 possible by declaring in Vienna without ambiguity that 
 Germany was not prepared to allow a continental war in 
 Europe to develop out of the conflict between Austria 
 and Serbia. . . . Germany did not do this. . . . Ger- 
 many saw how things were moving, but did nothing to 
 spoke the wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace 
 Berlin gave it to be understood in Vienna that she was 
 taking her stand on the side of Austria." 
 
 The events between the ist and 4th August, between 
 the German declaration of war against Russia and the 
 English declaration of war against Germany, require a 
 special discussion. The question to be answered in this 
 discussion is no longer "Who brought about the Euro- 
 pean War?" For this already had broken out with the 
 German declaration of war against Russia, which neces- 
 sarily entailed a war between France and Germany and 
 a war between Russia and Austria. In these cases there 
 were binding treaties of alliance which made war inevit- 
 able between the four Powers mentioned. 
 
 I have already indicated the attitude assumed by 
 Italy. The obligations of this country extended only to 
 participation in a defensive war, and she declined to 
 take part on the express ground that this war was on 
 the part of Germany and Austria an aggressive war — 
 a reason, be it observed, to which special weight must be 
 attached in the mouth of an ally, and precisely for this 
 reason it appears to have been taken very airily by Herr 
 von Bethmann ; for in his writings and speeches he glides 
 over it in silence.
 
 THE CRIME 265 
 
 England was the only country which was not con- 
 strained by any kind of treaty obligations to take part 
 in a war. I have already indicated in an earlier passage 
 that England, it is true, had concluded special treaties 
 with France and Russia on definite questions affecting 
 their Interests, but that she had not concluded any gen- 
 eral treaty of alliance with either of these parties, and 
 that consequently she was also not a party to the Franco- 
 Russian Alliance. On the basis of these special treaties 
 which had overcome the friction existing between Eng- 
 land and the two other States, a political approximation 
 had arisen which established a relation of friendship 
 without treaty obligations. 
 
 England was thus free, and had to decide according 
 to her own point of view whether she would or would 
 not take part in the European War. The question of her 
 participation or non-participation had not the slightest 
 connection with the other and far more important cjues- 
 tion, both from a moral and historical point of view, 
 the question of the responsibility for this war. In this 
 respect, as in so many others, the logic of the German 
 people, and especially of its leading men, has completely 
 disappeared ; they will not, or cannot, understand that 
 what England did after the outbreak of war has nothing 
 to do with what she had done previously. The one is en- 
 tirely distinct from the other, and must be measured by 
 an entirely different standard. 
 
 I will prove that, just as England before the outbreak 
 of war had done everything to prevent it, so afterwards 
 she did nothing to extend the war by participation in it, 
 but rather that she was compelled to do so, owing to the 
 action taken by Germany. But even supposing, as 1 
 will assume for the moment, that this could not be 
 proved, it would not be demonstrated in the slightest 
 degree that England was responsible for the outbreak 
 of the European War. It is theoretically quite possible
 
 ^66 I ACCUSE! 
 
 that England may have caused the war and nevertheless 
 later remained neutral, and, on the other hand, it is 
 equally possible that she did not cause the war and yet 
 later on took part in it. There is no logical connection 
 between the two points involved in causing and parti- 
 cipating in the war. 
 
 This private lecture on logic is directed in the first 
 place to the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, 
 who in his speech of December 2nd treats all these things 
 as being identical. An assurance given by England to 
 France on August 2nd, that is to say, after the outbreak 
 of war, a reason advanced in explanation of the English 
 declaration of war on August 4th, these subsequent 
 occurrences are for him so many proofs that the war 
 was intentionally instigated by England. These proofs 
 are defective, if only because they are contrary to the 
 simplest logic. Acts which prove guilt can never be 
 subsequent in time to the decisive event; they must 
 precede it, or at least happen contemporaneously 
 with it. 
 
 For this reason it is difficult to understand the purpose 
 of these interminable and constantly repeated discus- 
 sions in Germany on the ground which moved England 
 to take part in the war. These grounds are exclusively 
 England's own business. They may be more or less 
 tenable, they may be more or less hypocritical, but they 
 will not because of that remove one jot of the guilt and 
 the responsibility which rests on Germany for having 
 provoked the war. The question whether England should 
 take part or should remain neutral in the war only arose 
 in consequence of the war. The party then which bears 
 the blame for the war is also responsible for its conse- 
 quences, that is, for the participation of England in the 
 war, even if he did not directly provoke this participa- 
 tion. This responsibility is, however, doubled if it can 
 be proved that in addition to being the prime originator
 
 THE CRIME 267 
 
 of the war this party is also the originator of the par- 
 ticipation of England in the war. 
 
 I summarise, then, as follows : — ■ 
 
 (i) Germany and Austria are responsible for the 
 world war; their guilt has been proved. 
 
 (2) Their guilt cannot be lessened by actions taken 
 by England after the outbreak of war. 
 
 (3) Their guilt will be increased if they themselves 
 provoked these actions. 
 
 Let us examine the facts in the light of these guiding 
 principles. 
 
 England declared war against Germany on the evening 
 of August 4th because Germany had furnished a negative 
 reply to her demand to refrain from a further violation 
 of Belgian neutrality. On the morning of August 4th 
 German troops penetrated into Belgian territory after 
 Belgium had refused to comply with the German request 
 for a free passage.^ England, as one of the guarantors 
 of the Treaty of London of 1839, had the right and the 
 duty to intervene, on the appeal made by the Belgian 
 King on August 3rd, on behalf of the neutrality of Bel- 
 gium, which it had guaranteed in common with Prussia 
 and other Powers. Such a step on the part of England 
 could surprise no one who had even a superficial knowl- 
 edge of the history of Belgian neutrality. Herr von 
 Bethmann was, however, so enraged at the action of 
 England that on the last visit of the Ambassador, Sir E. 
 Goschen, on August 4th, he was unable to control his 
 agitation, and spoke in a contemptuous manner of the 
 word "neutrality," which is so often disregarded, and of 
 the "scrap of paper" on account of which England was 
 about to begin a war.^ 
 
 Herr von Bethmann appears to be badly informed in 
 the history of his own country. Was he not aware of 
 
 ^ Grey Book, No. 22. 
 'Blue Book, No. 160.
 
 268 I ACCUSE! 
 
 the fact that Belgian neutrality had in 1870 been the 
 subject of one of the finest diplomatic manoeuvres of the 
 Bismarckian statecraft? Did he not know that then 
 also England intervened at the beginning of the war 
 as the protector of Belgian neutrality, just as on the 
 present occasion, only with the different result that Bis- 
 marck not only promised that he would respect Belgian 
 neutrality, but also denounced the Intended disregard of 
 it by France, and thus brought England on to his side? 
 Shortly before the beginning of the war, as is well 
 known, he published an outline of a treaty drawn up by 
 Benedetti, the French Ambassador, in which France 
 claimed the annexation of Belgium as a return for com- 
 pensation to Prussia in North Germany. The result of 
 this astute move was nothing more nor less than the neu- 
 trality of England, and the conclusion of identical trea- 
 ties between England on the one hand and Germany 
 and France on the other (August, 1870), in which Eng- 
 land expressly declared that, if either of the belligerent 
 Powers violated Belgian territory, she would associate 
 herself with the other in defence of Belgium. The treaty 
 was so strictly observed and interpreted that Ger- 
 many after the Battle of Sedan was obliged to give 
 up the idea of transporting wounded troops through 
 Belgium. 
 
 Is Herr von Bcthmann completely ignorant of all these 
 events?. Or, if he knows anything of them, does he 
 believe that he, the dwarf on whose shoulders the mantle 
 of the mighty has fallen, can scatter to the winds the 
 considerations to which his great predecessor, the giant 
 Bismarck, willingly and profitably submitted? Was he 
 not bound to have said to himself, when he allowed the 
 General Staff to include in their plans the march through 
 Belgium, that there would result from this strategic ad- 
 vantage political and military disadvantages for Ger- 
 many incomparably greater? Had he learned nothing
 
 THE CRIME 269 
 
 from the past? Did he not know, as Bismarck knew 
 quite well, that it had been from time immemorial one 
 of the elementary principles of English policy to main- 
 tain and to protect the inviolability of the neutral small 
 States in Northern Europe? Did no one remind him 
 of the passionate words with which Granville and Glad- 
 stone — Liberal Ministers like those now in power — had 
 intervened in August, 1870, for the inviolability of Bel- 
 gium, and had described an attack on this country as 
 "the direst crime that ever stained the pages of his- 
 tory"? 
 
 Herr von Bethmann appears to have been ignorant 
 of all this when, in his speech in the Reichstag on De- 
 cember 2nd, he described the violation of Belgian neu- 
 trality, as not the ground, but the pretext for the Eng- 
 lish declaration of war. It was, in fact, the real ground 
 to such an extent that England would have declared war 
 against us forty-four years ago if we had dared to vio- 
 late Belgium. What is not permitted to a Bismarck is 
 certainly not allowed to a Bethmann — or else we must 
 invert the well-known phrase, and say : ''Quod licet 
 hovi, lion licet Jovi." 
 
 What purpose is served by inquiring — as the present- 
 day German professors love to do — whether the protec- 
 tion of Belgium was for England a moral question or a 
 question of interests? Probably it is simultaneously a 
 question of morals and of interests; in observing her 
 pledged word England is at the same time protecting 
 her own interests, which, as has always been openly ad- 
 mitted, imply in the nature of things that the coast of the 
 North Sea lying opposite England should be in the pos- 
 session of small neutral States. The man who acts hon- 
 estly is not obliged to render to anyone an account of 
 the extent to which his action corresponds to his own. in- 
 terests. Qui jure suo utitur, neminem laedit. We can- 
 not scrutinise the souls of men, much less the souls of
 
 270 I ACCUSE! 
 
 States, which, indeed, as collective bodies, do not possess 
 souls. 
 
 In any case, having regard to historical experience as 
 well as to the earnest and repeated warnings communi- 
 cated to the German Government, there could not be the 
 slightest doubt that a violation of Belgian neutrality 
 would so strongly affect the feelings of the English 
 people and English interests that England could not 
 stand aside in silence. In the course of his conversa- 
 tions Sir Edward Grey repeatedly drew the attention of 
 Prince Lichnowsky to the consequences which would 
 follow the violation of Belgian neutrality which had 
 been brought into ominous propinquity by the evasive 
 answer which Herr von Jagow gave to the English in- 
 quiry of July 31st. Grey had particularly drawn atten- 
 tion to the fact that ''the neutrality of Belgium affected 
 feeling in this coiintry." ^ The German Government 
 then endeavoured to assure the English Gpvernment 
 that they had in no circumstances any intention of an- 
 nexing Belgian territory ^ — a soothing pill which, as a 
 matter of course, England could not swallow; for neu- 
 trality is not the same as "not being annexed," but signi- 
 fies that the country which is neutral shall be spared the 
 effects of war in every respect, and shall not be used 
 even as a passage for troops. The demand for a right 
 of passage as an innocent act was, in fact, more than 
 naive; the passage of German troops would also have 
 justified France in entering the country, and Belgium 
 would thus have fallen into as evil a plight as can be con- 
 ceived; if she had yielded to the German ultimatum she 
 would have run the risk of being obliged to surrender her 
 country as a battlefield for the combatant Powers, and 
 she herself would not have been in a position to do any- 
 thing for the protection of her soil. She would have 
 
 ^Elue Book, No. loi, 123, p. x, 
 *Blue Book, No. 157.
 
 THE CRIME 271 
 
 been crushed between the two armies, and would have 
 been lost, no matter which side had been victorious. 
 
 It need therefore cause no surprise that England was 
 not satisfied with the soothing assurances of Germany, 
 but demanded unconditional respect for Belgian neutral- 
 ity. Germany, however, was not in a position to give an 
 assurance in this sense, since the long-prepared plans 
 of the General Staff made the passage through Belgium 
 an imperative requirement. 
 
 As late as August 4th, when the German troops had 
 already crossed the Belgian frontier. Sir Edward Gos- 
 chen, acting on the instructions of his Government, in- 
 quired of Herr von Jagow whether it was not possible 
 even then to desist from breaking into Belgium and to 
 withdraw the troops. When this inquiry was answered 
 in the negative, the English Ambassador entreated the 
 Secretary of State to consider the matter further, and to 
 give him a satisfactory answer before 12 o'clock at mid- 
 night. Herr von Jagow replied that his answer must 
 remain the same, even if twenty- four hours or more were 
 given him for reflection; thereupon Goschen asked for 
 his passports. 
 
 H we survey the whole behaviour of German diplo- 
 macy in this question of Belgian neutrality, there is 
 only one possible explanation of the inexplicable, namely, 
 that diplomacy had completely resigned in favour of the 
 chiefs of the army. The military situation was without 
 doubt improved by marching through Belgium; the dip- 
 lomatic situation, however, and in consequence of this 
 the military also in its turn, was enormously worsened 
 by the danger that to the two enemies in the field there 
 might be added a third, the most dangerous. Taken al- 
 together, the disadvantages greatly outweighed the ad- 
 vantages. It was the duty of the statesman who was 
 controlling the destinies of the Empire to balance these 
 advantages and disadvantages against each other, and if
 
 I ACCUSE! 
 
 the calculation yielded an unfavourable result, he should 
 have preferred to give up his office rather than bring his 
 country Into a deeper danger. 
 
 In the Germany of to-day it is not, however, possible 
 to find men capable of decisions such as these demand- 
 ing such strength of character. The Chancellor has 
 failed either in character or in insight; either he failed 
 to recognise the consequences which would flow from the 
 violation of Belgian neutrality, or he did not possess the 
 energy to give effect to the political point of view against 
 the view of the military authorities, if need be at the 
 sacrifice of his office. Now that the disaster has occurred 
 he endeavours, supported by his faithful followers, to 
 excuse himself with many "ifs" and "buts." "If we 
 had not violated Belgian neutrality, France would have 
 done so." I have already shown that there is nothing 
 to indicate that this is the case. If, however, France in 
 fact also intended to enter Belgium, the best course 
 which Germany could have adopted was to wait for this 
 to happen and allow the fatal consequences to ensue for 
 France. There can be no doubt that England would 
 have opposed an invasion of Belgium by France just as 
 she did in the case of Germany; this may be definitely 
 inferred from the treaties concluded in August, 1870, 
 and from the identical inquiry addressed to France and 
 Germany on July 31st. The situation of France with re- 
 gard to England would have been morally still more un- 
 favourable than ours, since France on July 31st had 
 given a definite promise, whereas Germany had declined 
 to do so. If a few days later France had broken her 
 word, England, if she had not sided with Germany, 
 would, at any rate, have remained neutral. 
 
 If, further, it is maintained in exoneration of our 
 diplomacy that England would have taken the field 
 against Germany, even apart from the violation of Bel- 
 gian neutrality, it can only be observed that this asser-
 
 THE CRIME 875 
 
 tion is so completely untenable and unsupported that it 
 does not even deserve consideration. What England 
 did to maintain peace is a historical fact. What England 
 would have done if this or that had happened or had not 
 happened, is a mere supposition, which is not amenable 
 to serious discussion. 
 
 To prove that it was not on account of the violation 
 of Belgian neutrality that England took part in the war, 
 but in order that she might under all circumstances lend' 
 assistance to France, the Chancellor invokes in his speech 
 of December 2nd an occurrence which took place in Lon- 
 don on August 2nd between Sir Edward Grey and Cam- 
 bon, the French Ambassador.^ What is the object of 
 this demonstration? It is supposed, as Herr von Beth- 
 mann explains, to prove that England was now, as al- 
 ways, the perfidious Albion, and under the mask of moral 
 action was pursuing only her naked interests. These in- 
 terests, however, were said to be comprised in the de- 
 struction of the vital nerve of her greatest industrial 
 competitor : 'Thus England and Russia bear the respon- 
 sibility for this world war." 
 
 A similar jumble of defective logic and of the perver- 
 sion of truth has seldom been emitted in so pregnant a 
 moment by anyone in such an authoritative position. 
 We clutch our heads and seek in vain to follow the 
 meanderings of this mind. What does it all mean? 
 England is responsible for the world-war because she 
 adhered to one of the two combatant parties after the 
 outbreak of the war, which she did not cause, but which, 
 on the contrary, she sought to prevent by all the forces 
 at her disposal. Even if this adhesion took place with- 
 out any reason, out of mere caprice on the part of Eng- 
 land, it would be impossible to deduce any responsibility 
 for the war. To make the antithesis comprehensible, 
 
 ^Blue Book, No. 148.
 
 274 I ACCUSE! 
 
 even for the dullest intellect, I formulate it in six Latin 
 words : — • 
 
 Culpa — ante bellum : 
 
 Participatio — post bellum. 
 
 England was in no way obliged to adduce to anyone 
 grounds for her participation in the war. The grounds 
 which she has adduced may be believed or disbelieved; 
 in any case they are, and must remain, grounds for the 
 participation of England after the war was begun; in 
 no case can they be reasons which lay on England's 
 shoulders the responsibility for beginning the war. 
 
 Certainly there was, as the Chancellor rightly empha- 
 sised, "no fraternal duty, no compulsion, not even any 
 menace of their own country." No fraternal duty! So, 
 then, fraternal duties justify an intervention in the 
 struggle ! Why, then, Herr von Bethmann, did you not 
 recognise the fraternal duties of Russia to intervene on 
 behalf of Serbia? Why did you seek to prevent Russia 
 from fulfilling such a fraternal duty by advancing your 
 proposal for localisation? Now that you recognise that 
 fraternal duties may constrain to armed intervention, 
 will you still try to persuade us that your attempt to keep 
 back the big brother from the protection of the small was 
 intended to be seriously taken? 
 
 There is said to have been nothing which compelled 
 England to war. True, there was no material compul- 
 sion. But in what case is there really material com- 
 pulsion except In a true, genuine war of liberation, not 
 the counterfeit presentment of it? On the other hand, 
 there was a moral compulsion, a solemn duty imposed 
 by treaty, to which greater importance attached, inas- 
 much as its object was the protection of the small against 
 the great, a treaty signed by all the Powers, the ag- 
 gressor included, and at a later date sealed again by a 
 new treaty. A duty imposed by treaty — a scrap of
 
 THE CRIME 275 
 
 paper! says Herr von Bethmann. Indeed, what has in- 
 duced us to intervene on behalf of Austria in a con- 
 flict as remote from our own interests as any Albanian 
 kingdom? Only a treaty, a scrap of paper, which im- 
 posed upon us obligations as allies. What is right for 
 us must surely be allowed in the case of England. If 
 in our case the scrap of paper w^as enough to justify 
 us in setting the whole world in flames with this paper- 
 lighter, why should it not be enough in the case of Eng- 
 land to justify her in bringing further combustible ma- 
 terial to extend the fire which had already broken out? 
 
 If, however, anyone urges against me the arguments 
 in the White Book : "Yes, but our interests also were 
 at stake — the Germanic races in Central Europe. . . . 
 (please don't laugh!). — ^We dare not allow Austria to 
 be weakened, &c." — I reply that England also had her 
 own interests to safeguard, for England also the Treaty 
 of London of 1839 was not only a moral tie, but also a 
 guarantee of her interests, a hundred times more impor- 
 tant for England than all south-eastern questions taken 
 together are for us. 
 
 We also could have remained neutral in a zvar be- 
 tween Austria and Russia. Had we remained neutral 
 the war would have been really localised, localised be- 
 tween Russia and Austria, and neither France nor Eng- 
 land would have been drawn into the struggle. 
 
 We could not remain neutral, and did not wish to do 
 so, because we were bound by a Treaty of Alliance, and 
 the fulfilment of our duties under the Treaty was at 
 the same time in agreement with our interests. 
 
 The position was precisely the same in the case of 
 England. England could not remain neutral, and did 
 not wish to do so when confronted with a violation of 
 Belgian neutrality, because she was by the treaty obliged' 
 to the protection of Belgium, and this protection was at 
 the same time in agreement with her interests. The roles
 
 Ä76 I ACCUSE! 
 
 are thus equally shared. Germany and England from 
 the standpoints proper to each adopted the same course 
 of action for the same reasons. The fundamental dif- 
 ference is to be found merely in the fact that England 
 interv^ened on behalf of an innocent small State, whereas 
 Germany took under her wings a guilty great State ; that 
 Germany thus provoked the world-war, whereas Eng- 
 land sought to prevent it by every possible means. 
 
 But let us just make the attempt to follow the logic 
 of Bethmann and examine the fact which is supposed to 
 prove that Belgium neutrality was only a mask. Sir 
 Edward Grey on August 2nd gave to Cambon, the 
 French Ambassador, the following assurance based on a 
 resolution of the Cabinet : — 
 
 "If the German Fleet comes into the Channel or 
 through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations 
 against French coasts or shipping, the British Fleet will 
 give all the protection in its power. 
 
 "This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy 
 of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of 
 Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Maj- 
 esty's Government to take any action until the above 
 contingency of action by the German Fleet takes place." ^ 
 
 In explanation of this declaration Grey expressly 
 pointed out that even in the event of a war breaking out 
 between France and Germany England could not bind 
 herself to declare war upon Germany. Only in the case 
 expressly foreseen, that is, if the German Fleet should 
 come into the Channel or through the North Sea and 
 undertake hostile operations against French coasts or 
 shipping, only in this case would the British Fleet come 
 to the help of France — all this, of course, being depen- 
 dent on the approval of Parliament. 
 
 This is the latest missile by means of which Herr von 
 Bethmann endeavours to des patch English statesmen 
 'Blue Book, No. 198.
 
 THE CRIME 277 
 
 from life to death (moral death, that Is to say). He 
 attaches special hnportance to the fact that this declara- 
 tion of Grey's was given before the ultimatum was sent 
 to Belgium, and he infers from this that England, even 
 before the violation of Belgian neutrality, had taken the 
 field as a belligerent, and in consequence that this viola- 
 tion was not the true ground for England's participa- 
 tion in the war. To all this I answer in popular phrase- 
 ology: "I don't think." 
 
 Even if the whole of this deduction were just, it would 
 be entirely superfluous. The decisive question, ''Who is 
 to blame for the European war?" is neither answered 
 nor influenced by the events of August 2nd. On August 
 2nd the war was there, owing to the guilt of Germany 
 and Austria and against the will of England. It could 
 no longer be prevented. Its extension to France was in- 
 evitable, and in fact had already taken place, even if 
 the declaration of war was not delivered at Paris until 
 the following day. The ultimatum to France had expired 
 at I o'clock on the afternoon of August ist, and had been 
 answered by France by a refusal. The declaration of 
 war between Austria and Russia was a formality which 
 was bound to take place at any moment, but which — ■ 
 mirahUe dictu! — to increase the madness of the whole 
 affair, was delayed until August 6th. In short, the war 
 between the four Powers had come, and England was 
 free to act as her interests required. If her interests 
 required her to support France in general or in certain 
 cases, well and good, she was free to act in accordance 
 with these interests. If her interests required her to 
 take part in the war only in the event of the violation 
 of Belgian neutrality, she was free to act in this way 
 also. In either case not the slightest reproach can be 
 made against England. If we took our stand beside 
 Austria, England also could stand by France. 
 
 The fact that there existed between England and
 
 278 I ACCUSE! 
 
 France no alliance which imposed obligations did not pre- 
 vent England from promising assistance to France on 
 the ground of the friendly relations between them, and, 
 above all, on the ground of her own interests. We also 
 acted exclusively in accordance with our own interests, 
 which, when occasion required, following the celebrated 
 example of Austria, we designated as "questions of life 
 and death." Thus the invasion of Belgium was for us 
 a question of life and death (see the despatch of Jagow 
 to Lichnowsky of August 4th ^), or, more modestly ex- 
 pressed, a question of our military interest. So also the 
 neutrality of England, if not a question of life and death, 
 was at any rate for us a question of far-reaching impor- 
 tance, and for this reason we endeavoured in every pos- 
 sible way to secure this neutrality both before and after 
 the outbreak of war. And earnestly as we desired peace 
 with England, with equal earnestness and persistence 
 we sought for war with Russia and France. In the first 
 place, our desire was to be lords on the Continent, and 
 then — everything else would follow. 
 
 What, then, I again ask, is the object of this entirely 
 superfluous discussion as to this or that reason which 
 may have moved England to war ? Is Europe a court of 
 moral jurisdiction to pass condemnation on hypocrites 
 and Pharisees? Woe to us, if such a court existed! 
 How should we stand before such a tribunal? We 
 should be unmasked, the conquerors in the mask of lib- 
 erators, the aggressors in the mask of the attacked, the 
 wolf clothed in sheepskin! 
 
 Yes, indeed, if we had only enough honesty to con- 
 fess the unspeakable crime! If like the great conquerors 
 of the past who took the world by storm, like Alexander 
 the Great, or the Romans, or Napoleon the First, we 
 openly proclaimed our right to possess and to rule the 
 world, because we were better, more valiant, and stronger 
 ^Blue Book, No. 157.
 
 THE CRIME 279 
 
 than the others! There would be something great in 
 that, something fascinating, something which would com- 
 pel respect, for everything that is great captures the 
 imagination, even if it is in the service of pernicious ends. 
 A Rinaldo Rinaldini, a Richard III., a Cesare Borgia 
 are monsters, but they are great in their kind, and awake 
 admiration like every human type which has achieved 
 perfection. But we, how petty we are! In our writings 
 and our speeches at home we preach a policy of world- 
 power, of conquest, and of world-dominion — of course, 
 only among the initiated — but to the stupid people and 
 to foreign countries we profess that it is we who have 
 been attacked and fallen upon, that we are the victims 
 of treacherous enemies. We also "secretly preach wine 
 and publicly drink water." In the intimate circle of our 
 Junkers, our courtiers, and our Generals we raise the 
 intoxicating wine of enthusiasm for war, but in public 
 before the people and beyond the frontier we drink 
 the water of peace fulness, of meekness, and of inno- 
 cence. 
 
 It therefore does not become us to reproach the Eng- 
 lish Government with double-speaking and with hypoc- 
 risy. In this case also we seek the mote in another's 
 eye and do not see the beam in our own. 
 
 How complete a master Germany is of all the arts 
 of hypocrisy is proved, apart from the events of 19 14, 
 by a series of declarations made by German diplomatists 
 between the years 191 1 and 1913 on the subject of Bel- 
 gian neutrality. As far back as 191 1, in connection with 
 the discussion of the Dutch scheme for the fortification 
 of Flushing, the fear was frequently expressed in the 
 Belgian Press that Germany would violate Belgian neu- 
 trality in the event of a Franco-German war. In the 
 interests of good neighbourly relations with Germany 
 the Belgian Minister gave expression in Berlin to the 
 desire that the Imperial Government might dispel these
 
 280 I ACCUSE! 
 
 fears by a public declaration in the Reichstag. Through 
 Herr von Flotow, who was then Ambassador, Herr von 
 Bethmann conveyed his warm thanks for the friendly 
 sentiment of the Belgian Government, but replied that he 
 could not make the desired public declaration for fear 
 of weakening the military situation of Germany with re- 
 gard to France. If she were assured against an attack 
 from the north, France could concentrate all her energy 
 on the eastern frontier, and thereby render invasion by 
 Germany a more difficult undertaking.^ This evasive 
 answer of Bethmann is to-day comprehensible. It is 
 clear that even then the plans for the invasion of Bel- 
 gium were ready, and the Chancellor had in consequence 
 scruples about declaring publicly in the Reichstag that 
 he would respect a neutrality, the violation of which had 
 already been decided upon. 
 
 Less prudence was, at any rate, shown by Herr von 
 Jagow, who, in the financial committee of the Reichstag 
 on April 29th, 1913, did not shrink from making the 
 untrue declaration that the neutrality of Belgium was 
 established by treaty, and that Germany intended to 
 respect this treaty.^ The utmost limit in unscrupulous- 
 ness was, however, reached by Herr von Below-Saleske, 
 who, as late as August 2nd, some hours before handing 
 over the German ultimatum, gave to Davignon, the Bel- 
 gian Foreign Minister, the most quietening assur- 
 ances with regard to the intention of her German neigh- 
 bour. When M. Davignon expressed his satisfaction 
 on this point, but notwithstanding stated that, for the 
 purpose of reassuring his country, he would be glad to 
 receive from the German Government an official declara- 
 tion such as France had already formally given on July 
 31st, Herr von Below contented himself with declaring 
 that he had not yet received any instructions in this 
 
 ^ Grey Book, No. 12. 
 ^ Grey Book, No. 12.
 
 THE CRIME 281 
 
 sense.* On the same evening about 7 o'clock he handed 
 over the ultimatum. This certainly is a model of "fair 
 play" which cannot be excelled! But it is only in keep- 
 ing with the whole. 
 
 In this chapter mention should also be made of a fact 
 which is still quite unknown in Germany. In the sum- 
 mer of 1913 the Belgian King and Queen with their 
 children paid an official visit to Liege on the occasion of 
 some celebration or other. The Emperor William — ■ 
 — made use of this opportunity to send 
 a special envoy to greet the royal couple and to convey 
 to the Royal Family an assurance of his sincere friend- 
 ship. The envoy was not, as is usual in such cases, a 
 General attached to the Court, but General von Emrnichy 
 zvho was later the conqueror of Liege. 
 
 Let us, however, return to the reproaches directed 
 against England. England, it is suggested, by the assur- 
 ance given on August 2nd had already abandoned her 
 neutrality, and had placed herself on the side of France. 
 The violation of Belgian territory is, in consequence, 
 supposed to have been a negligible factor in moulding 
 her decisions. What, then, in reality was the assurance 
 given to the French Government? It did not extend be- 
 yond a conditional and restricted protection. The pro- 
 tection was linked to the condition that the German 
 Fleet should come into the Channel or through the North 
 ^Grey Book, No. 19.
 
 282 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Sea to undertake hostile operations against French 
 coasts or shipping. The protection was further subjected 
 to the restriction that it should be given only by the Eng- 
 lish Fleet. It was expressly pointed out that this protec- 
 tion was not to be taken as being equivalent to a declara- 
 tion of war against Germany. 
 
 This conditional and restricted promise on the part of 
 England did not issue from the free will of the English 
 Government, but from a treaty obligation which she had 
 assumed with regard to France. The two countries had 
 for a long time agreed that France should concentrate 
 almost the whole of her Fleet in the Mediterranean for 
 the protection of the common interests of France and 
 England, and that England in return for this should as- 
 sume the protection of these interests in northern waters. 
 This agreement was not based upon any kind of military 
 designs against any other Power, least of all against 
 Germany. Had any aggressive tendency against Germany 
 been influential in forming this naval agreement, the two 
 fleets would probably not have been separated, but at 
 least the greater part of their combined forces would 
 have been united in northern waters. The Anglo-French 
 agreement had as its exclusive object the protection of 
 the commercial interests of the two countries. 
 
 The actual position, however, now was that the French 
 Fleet, with the exception of a few units, was in the 
 Mediterranean, where it was of service, not only to 
 French interests, but also to the interests of England. 
 The north and west coasts of France were consequently 
 unprotected. In these circumstances it was the duty of 
 England, in the imminent war between France and Ger- 
 many which had already become inevitable on August 
 2nd, to take over the protection of the French coast, 
 which France with her Fleet tied to the Mediterranean 
 could not in fact assume. This was the meaning and 
 the reason of Grey's promise of August 2nd.
 
 THE CRIME 283 
 
 In making this promise, England had not in the slight- 
 est degree departed from her neutrality, for it depended 
 on the free will of Germany to refrain from attacking 
 the coasts and the shipping of France, and thereby to 
 avoid any ground for an intervention on the part of the 
 British Fleet. It was open to the German Government 
 to make the English promise to France ineffective, and 
 Prince Lichnowsky, in fact, negotiated in London on 
 August 3rd on the question whether England would re- 
 main neutral should Germany refrain from attacking the 
 northern coasts and the shipping of France.^ Had this 
 been the only question which concerned England these 
 negotiations might perhaps have been completely success- 
 ful, but England had other and more important interests 
 to defend which Germany could not, or would not, sat- 
 isfy. These interests were of two kinds : — 
 
 1. the maintenance of France as a great Power in 
 Europe and as a Colonial Power, and 
 
 2. the non-violation of Belgian neutrality. 
 
 On the question whether these English interests were 
 legitimate or not, no one apart from England herself 
 has the right to pronounce judgment. As we made it 
 our task to maintain Austria-Hungary, so it was open 
 to England to consider the maintenance of France and 
 her Colonies as serviceable to her interests. Every great 
 Power has the right to form an independent judgment 
 as to what course it may or may not be expedient for 
 her to adopt, and she is entitled to reject any tutelage 
 from any other quarter. The interests of States also 
 are in no way static, but vary according to time and 
 circumstance. What to-day appears profitable may 
 appear to-morrow to be disadvantageous or indifferent. 
 Until the agreement of 1904 the maintenance of France 
 as a Colonial Power was, at any rate, not more than a 
 matter of indifference to England. After that agree- 
 ^ Grey's speech of 3rcl August.
 
 284. 
 
 I ACCUSE! 
 
 merit it became an element in English policy, and formed 
 the central point in the Anglo-French agreement. This 
 explains the question put by Goschen to the Chancellor 
 when the latter made, on July 29th, his well-known bid 
 for the neutrality of England, and offered in return for 
 this to guarantee the integrity of French territory — the 
 question whether this guarantee also extended to the 
 French Colonies. From the negative answer of Beth- 
 mann it appeared that Germany intended to make Co- 
 lonial acquisitions at the expense of France.^ But even 
 apart from any such intention England could not but 
 fear that the crushing of France from a military point 
 of view would profoundly shake her position as a great 
 Power, her well-being, and independence. 
 
 If even in this case England's interests were imperilled, 
 they were still more deeply involved in the question of 
 Belgian neutrality. From the beginning of the negotia- 
 tions the English Government had never left room for 
 the slightest doubt that the violation of Belgian neutrality 
 would he a casus bcili for England. This was the only 
 ciuestion which was bound certainly, unconditionally, 
 and completely, to lead to a war between Germany 
 and England, whereas the French question admitted of 
 accommodation up to a certain point. In the Belgian 
 question popular sentiment in England played a decisive 
 part, whereas in the French question this was not the 
 case. // Germany had respected Belgian neutrality, and 
 had at the same time refrained from an attack on the 
 coasts and on the shipping of France, peace between 
 Germany and England would have been maintained. 
 These conditions, however, Germany would not and 
 could not fulfil, since in order to comply with them she 
 would have had to renounce a naval war with France, 
 and would have encountered insuperable difficulties by 
 land. 
 
 ^ Blue Book, No. 85.
 
 THE CRIME 285 
 
 War became inevitable when German troops crossed 
 the Belgian frontier, and the German Government re- 
 jected the EngHsh summons to withdraw them. That 
 was on the evening of August 4th. 
 
 The war, however, could still have been avoided when 
 the English Government on August 2nd gave the well- 
 known assurance to the French Government. It could 
 have been avoided by the passivity of the German Fleet 
 against the coasts and the shipping of France, as this 
 course would have excluded any intervention by the 
 English Fleet. It is therefore untrue, as is maintained 
 by the Chancellor, that England had already departed 
 from her neutrality on August 2nd. England's res- 
 olutions had at that time not yet crystallised, and 
 depended on circumstances which, it is true, were 
 then Immediately imminent, but which had not yet oc- 
 curred. 
 
 How prudent the English Government was, and how 
 imprudent the German, appears clearly from a consider- 
 ation of the situation on August 2nd. England could 
 have definitely decided as to her course of action on 
 August 2nd had she not, up to the very last moment, 
 cHmg to the hope that she would not be involved in the 
 war; for there was then no longer the slightest possible 
 doubt that the German Army would invade Belgium. 
 The Chancellor attaches special importance to the fact 
 that the assurance of August 2nd was given on the 
 afternoon of that day, whereas the ultimatum to Belgium 
 was only delivered in Brussels at 7 o'clock in the evening. 
 Still starting from the false assumption that the English 
 assurance amounted in itself to a participation in the war 
 — which is not the case — the Chancellor draws the 
 naive conclusion that expression had already been given 
 to this participation in the war at a time when noth- 
 ing was or could be known in London of the intended 
 violation of Belgian neutrality. This is indeed the
 
 S86 I ACCUSE! 
 
 height of naivete! Ever since July 31st, when Jagow 
 so evasively answered the English inquiry, indeed ever 
 since July 29th, when Herr von Bethmann made his 
 bid for English neutrality, ever since the tortuous decla- 
 rations of German diplomatists in Berlin and London, 
 a blind man must have seen how matters stood with re- 
 gard to the neutrality of Belgium. In addition to this, 
 there was the entrance of German troops into Luxem- 
 burg early in the morning of Sunday, August 2nd, which 
 put beyond all doubt the further advance towards Bel- 
 gium. 
 
 When the English Government gave its assurance to 
 France, it could therefore no longer have any doubt that 
 the neutrality of Belgium would be Infringed by Ger- 
 many, as indeed was done a few hours later by the de- 
 livery of the ultimatum. If Germany regarded Russian 
 mobilisation as in itself a casus belli, how much m.ore 
 justification was there for England regarding the posi- 
 tion existing on August 2nd as a menace to Belgium. 
 Had England sent an ultimatum to Germany as early as 
 August 2nd her behaviour would not have been different 
 from that of Germany on July 31st with regard to 
 Russia. Instead of the sentence of Bethmann: "No 
 mention was made of Belgian neutrality," we ought, if 
 we are to conform with the truth, to say : "Belgian neu- 
 trality was even then mortally menaced." 
 
 From this it follows — in opposition to what is said 
 by Herr von Bethmann — that even an unconditional 
 promise of English assistance by land and by sea would 
 at this moment have been already justified by the menace 
 to Belgian neutrality; much more then was there justi- 
 fication for the conditional promise of assistance by sea 
 to which Sir Edward Grey restricted himself. 
 
 I summarise, then, as follows : — 
 
 I. It is untrue that England had already departed 
 from her neutrality on August 2nd. The promise given
 
 THE CRIME 287 
 
 on August 2nd is not equivalent to a declaration of war 
 against Germany. 
 
 2. It is, on the contrary, true that England only de- 
 parted from her neutrality on August 4th after the actual 
 violation of Belgian neutrality. 
 
 3. Even if the assurance given on August 2nd had 
 connoted a departure from English neutrality, this would 
 have been justified by the certainty then existing that 
 the neutrality of Belgium would be violated by Ger- 
 many. 
 
 If England then asserts that it was the violation of 
 Belgian neutrality which caused her to take part in the 
 war, she merely speaks the truth. 
 
 The truth of this is in particular confirmed by the 
 fact that Sir E. Goschen, the English Ambassador, asked 
 on August 4th merely for the withdrawal of German 
 troops from Belgium, and it was only when this was 
 refused that he declared that England must take those 
 steps imposed upon her by her treaty obligations. It 
 was thus possible for Germany as late as the evening of 
 August 4th to avoid war zvith England. This is the best 
 proof which can be furnished that she cannot already 
 have been in a state of war with England on August 2nd. 
 
 All the conclusions which the Chancellor believes that 
 he can deduce from the incident of August 2nd are thus 
 refuted. On the contrary, there is another conclusion 
 which is justified, and which / will take the liberty of 
 stating: the conditional and restricted promise of con- 
 tingent naval support is a convincing argumentum e 
 contrario in support of the fact that up to August 2nd 
 more extensive promises of military support had not been 
 given to France by England. For this reason the Eng- 
 lish declaration was greeted with great satisfaction in 
 Paris as "a first assistance which is most valuable to 
 us." ^ The first promise of assistance was thus the con- 
 ' 'Yellow Book, No. 138.
 
 288 I ACCUSE! 
 
 ditional and restricted promise given on August 2nd! 
 This is a striking proof that the assertion of the Chan- 
 cellor that England had promised France her assistance 
 even before the outbreak of war is a lie. 
 
 In concluding these observations I again desire to point 
 out with the utmost emphasis that all these discussions 
 on the participation of England in the war and the causes 
 for her action do not touch the centre of the question, 
 which is: "Who is guilty of the European warf" The 
 object of these discussions is precisely to divert atten- 
 tion from the central question. The participation of 
 England is a consequence of the war, with its own spe- 
 cial reasons. It could not have occurred if war had 
 not broken out. He who provoked the war is also re- 
 sponsible for its consequences. We are thus led back 
 to the question : Who did provoke the war ? and to this 
 question there can only be one answer: Germany and 
 Austria. 
 
 I am unable to frame any points in an indictment 
 against England, because there are none. I can only 
 summarise her defence in the sentences which I formu- 
 lated at the beginning of this section. Without doubt 
 history will concur in the words used by Mr. Asquith 
 on August 6th in speaking in the British Parliament in 
 honour of his colleague. Sir Edward Grey: "I am 
 certain that this House and this country — and I will 
 add, posterity and history — will accord to him what is, 
 after all, the best tribute that can be paid to any 
 statesman : that, never derogating for an instant or by 
 an inch from the honour and interests of his own coun- 
 try, he has striven, as few men have striven, to maintain 
 and preserve the greatest interests of all countries — 
 universal peace."
 
 THE CRIME 289 
 
 D 
 
 RUSSIA 
 
 The attitude of Russia in the European conflict has 
 been indicated with sufficient clearness in the account 
 already given to make it possible to form a judgment 
 on Russia's guilt or innocence. 
 
 What is the reproach which Germany throws against 
 Russia f 
 
 I. Russia is supposed to have intervened without any 
 reason and without any right in the conflict between 
 Austria and Serbia, and is supposed thereby to have 
 occasioned the European conflagration. I have already 
 explained at length that Russia acted reasonably and 
 within her rights in so intervening, and I have nothing 
 to add to what I have said. No one in Europe could 
 have been surprised at this intervention, which during 
 the Balkan crisis had been clearly announced by Sazonof 
 as inevitable in the event of an attack being made by 
 Austria upon Serbia. The interest which Russia felt in 
 Serbia was a fact with which European diplomacy was 
 bound to reckon, and always has reckoned ; above all, 
 German diplomacy, as the White Book shows. It was 
 "a commonplace in European diplomacy." ^ 
 
 II. It is further asserted that the Russian military 
 party from the beginning wished for war and pressed 
 for it. If such a party really exists in Russia, which is 
 still to be proved, it is at least certain that it encoun- 
 tered at the hands of the Russian Foreign Minister a 
 more successful resistance than the German war party 
 met in Herr von Bethmann. From the beginning to the 
 end of the crisis Sazonof served the cause of peace in 
 the most zealous manner: — 
 
 ^ Blue Book, p. v. White Book, p. 406.
 
 290 I ACCUSE! 
 
 1. He advised Serbia to assume an attitude of mod- 
 eration, and his success may be seen in the submissive 
 Serbian Note.^ 
 
 2. In common with England and France he endeav- 
 oured to obtain an extension of the time-limit prescribed 
 in the Austrian ultimatum, but here he was unsuccess- 
 ful.2 
 
 3. When the conflict began to assume a more acute 
 form owing to the recall of the Austrian Ambassador, 
 he claimed the assistance of Italy, in the hope that by 
 refusing Austria support she might assist in moving her 
 from her unaccommodating attitude.^ 
 
 4. Notwithstanding the rupture in the relations be- 
 tween Austria and Serbia, he entered into friendly dis- 
 cussions with the Austrian Government. He pointed 
 out in detail to Szäpäry, the Austrian Ambassador, the 
 points in the Austrian Note which could be accepted by 
 Serbia, but he also indicated those which could not be 
 accepted by any independent State, at any rate, in the 
 form desired.* 
 
 5. He gave urgent expression to the desire to diminish 
 by further direct negotiations the tension existing 
 between Austria and Russia, and he pleaded in Vienna 
 that the Austrian Ambassador in Petrograd should re- 
 ceive the authority necessary for this purpose. This 
 was on July 26th. The answer to this was the Austrian 
 declaration of war of July 28th, and the strict refusal 
 of Count Berchtold to enter into any discussion what- 
 ever on the Austrian Note.^ 
 
 ^ Orange Book, Nos. 4, 25, 33, 40, 42. Blue Book, No. 55. 
 
 * Orange Book, Nos. 4, 5, 11, 12. 
 'Orange Book, No. 23. 
 
 * Orange Book, No. 25. 
 
 "Orange Book, Nos. 38. 45, 50, 54, yy. On the 28th July Berch- 
 told declared to the Russian ambassador that he could "no longer 
 recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the 
 Austro-Hungarian note."
 
 THE CRIME 291 
 
 6. After the failure of this attempt Sazonof supported 
 in every possible way Grey's proposal for a conference 
 of the four Powers.^ 
 
 7. He expressed himself as ready to stand aside, and 
 submit to the proposals of the Powers.^ 
 
 8. He induced the Emperor Nicholas to send to Prince 
 Alexander of Serbia on July 27th a telegram urging 
 upon him any solution designed to avoid the horrors 
 of war.^ 
 
 9. After the declaration of war against Serbia he 
 urgently asked the English Government to use their 
 influence in Berlin so that Austria might at least be 
 induced to take part in further negotiations.^ 
 
 10. He repeatedly and with increasing urgency sought 
 the mediation of England in the sense of the proposal 
 for a conference of the four Powers, and simultaneously 
 he constantly expressed his readiness to take part in 
 direct negotiations with Austria. The refusal of both 
 these proposals in Vienna and Berlin did not deter him 
 from constantly renewing them.^ Particularly urgent 
 were the attempts made by Sazonof in a conversation 
 with Count Pourtales on July 29th,^ in which he en- 
 deavoured to obtain the support of Germany in one or 
 other of these directions. He emphasised the expedi- 
 ency of parallel discussions on the principle of having 
 two strings to his bow, that is to say, a conference in 
 London of the four Powers not directly concerned and 
 simultaneously direct conversations in Petrograd be- 
 tween Austria and Russia. He drew attention to the 
 
 * Orange Book, Nos. ;i2, 49, 55, 77. 
 
 'Blue Book, Nos. 55, 78. Orange Book, No. 32. 
 "Orange Book, No. 40. 
 
 * Orange Book, No. 43. 
 
 'Orange Book, Nos. 25, 32, 34, 38, 39, 43, 45, 48 ("that Great 
 Britain should take instant mediatory action"), 77. 
 ° Orange Book, No. 49.
 
 292 I ACCUSE! 
 
 favourable results which had followed such a double 
 action during the last Balkan crisis, and he added that 
 after the concessions made by Serbia it should not be 
 difficult to arrange a settlement of the other points which 
 still remained outstanding, if there were only the least 
 goodmill on the part of Austria, and if all the Powers 
 used their influence in the direction of conciliation. In 
 reply to the earnest appeal of Sazonof, Pourtales could 
 only reply that Germany had exerted a "moderating in- 
 fluence" in Vienna, and that she would continue to do 
 so. In Petrograd, London, and in Paris alike it was 
 impossible to obtain more from Germany than such 
 pretended efforts to exercise a moderating influence on 
 Vienna ; it was impossible to elicit from her any posi- 
 tive concurrence in the practicable proposals of peace 
 put forward by the Entente Powers. 
 
 11. Sazonof, along with the other Entente Powers, 
 repeatedly urged the German Government, which raised 
 apparently only formal objections against the confer- 
 ence proposal, that she should herself propose a form 
 which would be agreeable to her, and he accepted in 
 advance any proposal of this nature.^ 
 
 12. On July 29th he prompted the Tsar to propose 
 in a telegram to the Emperor William that the Austro- 
 Serbian conflict should be submitted to the Hague court 
 of arbitration. 
 
 13. On July 30th he dictated to the German Ambas- 
 sador a formula of agreement, which aimed only at the 
 protection of Serbia's sovereign rights, and which 
 pledged Russia to stop her military preparations.'^ 
 
 14. After this formula had been rejected by Germany, 
 he outlined, at the request of Grey, a new formula which 
 went even further to meet Austria. This formula, in- 
 deed, permitted Austrian troops to remain on Serbian 
 
 ^ Orange Book, Nos. 53, 55, 64. 
 ' Orange Book, No. 60.
 
 THE CRIME Ä93 
 
 territory during the further negotiations, and obliged 
 Russia to maintain a waiting attitude.^ 
 
 15. On July 31st, when Austria at length declared 
 herself ready to enter into discussions on the subject- 
 matter of the Serbian question, Sazonof at once began 
 these conversations in Petrograd, and in a telegram to 
 London expressed the hope that a peaceful issue might 
 yet be found. ^ 
 
 16. Even on August ist, on the day of the Gennan 
 declaration of war, he declared himself ready to conclude 
 an agreement in the sense of his second formula, pro- 
 vided that German troops had not previously crossed 
 the Russian frontier. In no case, he added, would Rus- 
 sia begin hostilities first.^ 
 
 17. Even at the last moment Sazonof moved the Tsar 
 to give his solemn word to the Emperor William that 
 the Russian troops would undertake no provocative ac- 
 tion, so long as the negotiations on the Serbian question 
 (resumed on July 31st) should continue with Austria.* 
 
 18. Even on the day of the declaration of war he 
 moved his monarch to give a renewed assurance that the 
 Russian mobilisation did not mean war, and to urge 
 that the negotiations for the welfare of both countries 
 and for universal peace should be continued.^ 
 
 These were the exertions of the leader of Russian 
 policy. Any impartial person may judge whether these 
 exertions were directed to peace or to war. That these 
 untiring efforts for peace had their origin in Petrograd 
 proves that the so-called Russian war-party was power- 
 less as against the responsible Minister. It is now a 
 common reproach of all belligerent States to accuse their 
 
 ^ Orange Book, No. 6j. 
 
 ^Orange Book, Nos. 69, 73, Blue Book, Nos. no, in. 
 
 'Blue Book, No. 139. 
 
 * White Book, p. ^11. 
 
 "White Book, p. 413.
 
 294. I ACCUSE! 
 
 enemies of having been under the influence of a war- 
 party; each denies his own, and places the responsibility 
 on those of foreign countries. Here also it is true that 
 by their fruits ye shall know them. The efforts of the 
 Russian war-party — if such a party existed — remained 
 fruitless; it was unable to influence the peace policy of 
 the Tsar. The efforts of the German war-party, on the 
 contrary, have yielded fruit only too abundantly — poison- 
 ous fruit — which they succeeded in concealing under a 
 charm of guile and seduction so that the deluded peo- 
 ple in their intoxication reached out their eager hands; 
 now they must devour the fruit in all its bitterness, 
 even though it may bring with it the bitterness of death. 
 III. A further reproach urged by the German Govern- 
 ment against Russia is in effect that Russia by her mili- 
 tary measures frustrated the negotiations for peace. 
 This reproach also is without justification, for two rea- 
 sons : — 
 
 1. because Russia concurrently with her military meas- 
 ures of security, maintained uninterruptedly diplomatic 
 efforts for peace,^ and 
 
 2. because these measures were merely measures of 
 security, which, according to the solemn assurances given 
 by the Tsar and his Government, had no aggressive 
 character. It was impossible that they coidd have had 
 an aggressive character, since, as I have already ex- 
 plained, they served only to support a defensive policy, 
 and there was no reason whatever for aggressive action 
 on the part of Russia. The partial mobilisation of July 
 29th, as well as the general mobilisation of the 31st, 
 were the answer to previous mobilisations on the part 
 of Austria, the dates of which I have already established 
 from the documentary evidence.^ Moreover, Russia 
 was compelled to adopt military measures of security, 
 
 ^ Orange Book, Nos. 77, 78. 
 
 * Orange Book, Nos. 47, 49, 58, 77, 78.
 
 THE CRIME 295 
 
 not only on account of Austrian mobilisation, but still 
 more owing to the diplomatic attitude assumed by Aus- 
 tria and Germany. The unaccommodating behaviour of 
 Austria, and the frustration by Germany of all attempts 
 at mediation, could not fail to arouse the overwhelming 
 suspicion — which was, in fact, later confirmed — that Ger- 
 many and Austria desired war under all circumstances. 
 Against this menace Russia was bound to provide for 
 her security, and the reproach, inferred from the Rus- 
 sian mobilisation, is also shown to be baseless. 
 
 The tales of the broken words of honour and of the 
 crossing of the frontier before the declaration of war 
 I have already characterised elsewhere by their proper 
 terms. 
 
 There is thus no charge to be brought against Russia, 
 and I can only conclude this section with the regret, 
 which is certainly comprehensible in a German, that 
 Russia is ivholly blameless of the European war, and 
 that the guilt rests exclusively on Germany and Austria. 
 
 E 
 
 FRANCE 
 
 German utterances, spoken and written, on the re- 
 sponsibility of France for the war are surprisingly re- 
 strained, and are supported on very scanty material. The 
 German White Book accuses France merely of "mili- 
 tary preparations" during the diplomatic negotiations, 
 and asserts at the conclusion of the account which it 
 contains that France on the morning of August 2nd, 
 that is to say, before the German declaration of war, had 
 "opened hostilities." 
 
 The Chancellor adheres to this reproach in his speech
 
 296 I ACCUSE! 
 
 of August 4th, and cites in support of his assertion al- 
 leged French incursions into German territory. In his 
 speech of December 2nd he rides off on the old revanche 
 idea, but here also he is unable to produce anything 
 more substantial against France. 
 
 I have already estimated the proper value of all these 
 reproaches, and pointed out their flimsiness. In particu- 
 lar I was able to prove that the most serious violations 
 of the frontier before the German declaration of war 
 were committed by German troops, that these were of 
 frequent occurrence, and resulted in bloodshed, whereas 
 the counter-accusations of Germany against France are 
 not only improbable but self -contradictory, and are there- 
 fore unworthy of credence. 
 
 A new accusation against France has been given cur- 
 rency for the first time in the recently published Note 
 of the Chancellor dated December 24th, in which the 
 participation of France in the diplomatic negotiations is 
 subjected to criticism. We can only be grateful to the 
 Chancellor that he has at length formulated a charge to 
 which it is possible to submit a defence. This accusa- 
 tion is supported on the following assertions : — 
 
 1. France did not trust Gemian assurances, and re- 
 ceived all the steps of the German Ambassador with 
 mistrust. 
 
 2. Germany's wish for mediating influence in Petro- 
 grad was not regarded. 
 
 3. The French Government did not take a single posi- 
 tive step in the interest of peace. 
 
 What is the truth with regard to these accusations? 
 
 It is true that the demarches of Herr von Schoen were 
 received in Paris with a certain mistrust. This mistrust 
 was, however, only too well founded. Herr von Schoen 
 was called upon to play in Paris the same miserable 
 role as fell to the lot of Herr von Jagow in Berlin. It 
 was his task to thwart all the attempts of the Entente
 
 THE CRIME 297 
 
 Powers to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict, 
 and to put forward threadbare reasons in defence of the 
 astonishing and ambiguous behaviour of the German 
 Government. He dared not associate himself with the 
 endeavours of France to obtain an extension of the time- 
 limit allowed in the ultimatum, but, on the contrary, he 
 had to offer to the French Government a blind defence 
 of the Austrian Note, and of all the later actions taken 
 by Austria.^ Grey's proposal for a conference of the 
 four Powers, which had been immediately accepted by 
 France, and was agreeable to all the other Powers, he 
 was bound to reject, and in place of this it was his duty 
 to recommend as a panacea the impossible German pro- 
 posal for localisation.^ He was bound to assert the in- 
 sufficiency of the Serbian Note, which had conceded all 
 the material demands of Austria, and he had to repre- 
 sent as justifiable the recall of the Austrian Ambassador; 
 indeed, in compliance with Bethmann's instructions, he 
 had to impress on the French Goveniment the desirabil- 
 ity of common Franco-German pressure on the Petro- 
 grad Cabinet, whereas, on the other hand, he was bound 
 to decline any kind of pressure from Gennany on Vi- 
 enna. He had to listen in silence or could give only 
 inconsequent answers during his frequent visits to the 
 Quai d'Orsay, when M. Bienvenu-Martin, the French 
 Acting Foreign .Minister, pointed out to him the illogi- 
 cal nature of this proposal ; for, as M. Bienvenu-Martin 
 indicated, Austria, had in nearly every point achieved 
 her will, but had nevertheless begun a military action 
 against Serbia ; a cessation might therefore be asked for 
 from Austria, but not from Russia; pressure might be 
 exercised on Vienna, not on Petrograd.^ Russia was 
 indeed ready to negotiate, either directly with Austria 
 
 ' Yellow Book, Nos. 28, 36. 
 'Yellow Book, Nos. 56, 57, 61. 
 'Yellow Book, Nos. 61, 62, 77, 78.
 
 298 I ACCUSE! 
 
 or by the mediation of the four Powers not directly 
 concerned. Russia was ready to accept any proposal' 
 made by the conference of the four Powers. What fur- 
 ther pressure did he suggest shoidd still be exercised 
 on Russia f Austria, however, was not ready either for 
 direct negotiations or to accept proposals made by the 
 four Powers. If, therefore, pressure had to be exercised 
 in any quarter It must be in Vienna, and Berlin alone 
 was in a position to accomplish this. An Ambassador, 
 charged with the task of upholding the opposite view, 
 is an object calculated rather to inspire compassion than 
 to evoke condemnation.^ 
 
 But he had to go even further in revealing his naked- 
 ness. When in place of mediation he proposed direct 
 negotiations between Vienna and Petrograd, and was 
 asked by the French Ambassador what was really the 
 aim of the Austrian operations in Serbia (July 29th), 
 he had to give the mortifying answer that the German 
 Government did not know, but that it hoped to learn 
 from Austria.^ This answer also, as is known, must be 
 laid at the door, not of the wretched Paris Ambassador, 
 but of his Government, which up to the present day 
 has not explained to the world what Austria really 
 wanted from Serbia. Meanwhile the Serbians have given 
 the answer which Austria was asked in vain to furnish : 
 they have driven the Austrians out of their country, and 
 presumably this was what the Austrians wanted. 
 
 Thus the whole action of Herr von Schoen in Paris 
 is nothing but a continuous series of discomfitures which 
 he personally had not merited. The constantly repeated 
 request that he should indicate the form of conference 
 agreeable to the German Government, which in principle 
 had apparently been approved, he was obliged to leave 
 unanswered, since no instructions in this sense had been 
 
 'Yellow Book, No. 85. 
 ^Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 97.
 
 THE CRIME 299 
 
 sent to him from Berlin.^ He had to maintain a passive 
 attitude towards all Anglo-French attempts to arrive 
 at a settlement between the conflicting standpoints of 
 Austria and Russia by devising a formula of agree- 
 ment, since his Government did not consider that such 
 attempts were even worthy of a discussion.^ 
 
 The worst role, however, did not fall to him until 
 after the fruitless expiration of the ultimata; he had 
 then to submit to further discomfiture at the hands of 
 M. Viviani, who held up to him the criminal madness of 
 the action taken by Germany, which shortly before the 
 solution of the dispute had, without any reason, driven 
 Europe into the most fearful of wars. Herr von Schoen 
 was obliged to limit his answer to saying that he had 
 received no official communication with regard to the 
 favourable position of the negotiations, but that he was 
 going to get information.^ Two days later he had to 
 hand to M. Viviani a declaration of war based on the 
 fact that France had begun hostilities and also that she 
 had violated Belgian neutrality * — assertions which he, 
 more than anyone, knew to be false : had he not himself 
 witnessed the sincere efforts made by France for peace? 
 Wretched Ambassador! The mistrust with which he 
 was received in France was certainly excelled by the 
 mistrust which he felt towards his own actions. 
 
 The further reproach put forward by Bethmann that 
 the French Government had disregarded Germany's de- 
 sire for mediating influence in Petrograd has already 
 been deprived of all force by the previous discussion. 
 Germany refused to exercise any influence on Austria, 
 presumptuous beyond all measure and scoffing all con- 
 siderations of European peace, and she demanded, on 
 
 * Orange Book, No. 55. 
 
 * Yellow Book, Nos. loi, 114. 
 "Yellow Book, No. 125. 
 
 * Yellow Book, No. 147.
 
 300 I ACCUSE! 
 
 the other side, that pressure should be exercised by 
 France on Russia, which had already shown in the good 
 advice proffered to Serbia an extraordinary conciliatory 
 attitude, and which was ready to take any further step 
 necessary to meet her opponent.^ 
 
 The demands addressed by Germany to France, and 
 thus indirectly to Russia, were thus somewhat stiff, but 
 nevertheless they were complied with by France up to a 
 certain point. The French Yellow Book and the English 
 Blue Book both bear witness to this. In a despatch 
 of July 29th ^ Bienvenu-Martin declared it to be essen- 
 tial that the Cabinet of Petrograd, whose peace inten- 
 tions were manifest, should immediately give their ad- 
 herence to the English proposal for a conference of the 
 four Powers. This French initiative was at once at- 
 tended by success. The French Ambassador in Petro- 
 grad telegraphed on the same day to his Minister that 
 Sazonof accepted the proposal for a conference of the 
 four Powers without attaching any importance to the 
 title officially given to the discussions, and that he would 
 acquiesce in any measures taken by England in order 
 to maintain peace.^ 
 
 Another and much more striking instance of French 
 influence on Russian decisions in the sense of modera- 
 tion may be given. On July 30th, when the Russian 
 partial mobilisation against Austria had taken place, and 
 Germany was already threatening to carry out a counter- 
 mobilisation, Viviani emphatically pressed for prudence 
 in Petrograd; it would be well, he said, even in taking 
 measures for security and defence, that Russia should 
 take no step which might offer Germany a pretext for 
 a counter-mobilisation.* Here also his efforts were 
 
 ^Yellow Book, Nos. yy, 78. 
 = Yellow Book, No. 85. 
 ^Yellow Book, Nos. 86, gi. 
 * Yellow Book, No. loi.
 
 THE CRIME 301 
 
 crowned with success : Russia suspended further meas- 
 ures of mobilisation ^ until she was compelled to act by 
 Austria's general mobilisation. 
 
 A further instance of the success of French influence 
 in Petrograd was seen on July 31st, when the efforts of 
 the Entente Powers were directed to finding a middle 
 path between the formuLie of Grey and Sazonof, in 
 order to gain Austria's consent even at the last moment. 
 In a Note,^ distinguished by its penetration and inspired 
 by a sincere desire for peace, Viviani proposed such a 
 middle path, which could not fail to be equally accept- 
 able to Austria and Russia, and authorised his Ambassa- 
 dor at Petrograd to make the following communication 
 to Sazonof : 
 
 "Please infomi M. Sazonof urgently that the sugges- 
 tion of Sir E. Grey appears to me to furnish a useful 
 basis for conversation between the Powers, who are 
 equally desirous of working for an honourable arrange- 
 ment of the Austro-Serbian conflict, and of averting In 
 this manner the dangers which threaten general peace." 
 
 There then follows a more detailed explanation of the 
 modifications In the proposal of Grey and Sazonof, and 
 he adds In conclusion : — 
 
 "I would ask you carefully to be guided by the fore- 
 going considerations in earnestly pressing M. Sazonof 
 to give his adherence without delay to the proposal of 
 Sir E. Grey, of which he will have been himself In- 
 formed." 
 
 The French Ambassador, Paleologue, was able to re- 
 port on the same day that Sazonof had accepted the pro- 
 posals of VivianI, and that he had modified his original 
 fonnula In the manner suggested by Grey.^ This new 
 proof of French intervention for peace and of Russia's 
 
 ^ Yellow Book, No. 104. 
 ^Yellow Book, No. 112. 
 'Yellow Book, No. 113.
 
 302 I ACCUSE! 
 
 conciliatory disposition was furnished, although during 
 the preceding night and day Belgrade had been bom- 
 barded by Austria and the whole of Russia had been 
 brought to a high pitch of excitement by Austria's pro- 
 vocative and unaccommodating action. 
 
 Even after the Gemian ultimatum was delivered in 
 Paris on July 31st Viviani directed an urgent appeal 
 to the Imperial Government in Petrograd that in the 
 highest interests of peace they would do everything on 
 their part to avoid anything that might render inevit- 
 able or precipitate the crisis (Je ne doute pas que le 
 Gouvernement Imperial dans I'interet superieur de la 
 paix n'evite pour sa part tout ce qui pourrait rendre in- 
 evitable ou precipiter la crise ^). 
 
 Many similar examples could be cited from the diplo- 
 matic correspondence. But Herr von Bethmann says 
 that France did not exert her influence in Petrograd for 
 peace, and that in fact she did nothing in the interests 
 of peace, and — Bethmann is an honourable man. 
 
 When we survey the activity of French diplomatists 
 during these critical days and compare them with those 
 of other European Governments, it is impossible to avoid 
 the conclusion that their utterances, as given in the Yel- 
 low Book, excel the achievements of all other diplo- 
 matists in elegance of form and in plastic strength of 
 representation. To English diplomacy fell the leadership 
 in the negotiations, and it discharged this task with the 
 sober quietness and clarity which is peculiar to the Eng- 
 lishman in all situations. Russian diplomacy also kept 
 itself within the limits of fact, and expressed itself with 
 moderation up to the last moment until the morning of 
 August ist, immediately before the German declaration 
 of war. In this critical moment, however, Sazonof could 
 not refrain from pouring out his heart to his French 
 and English colleagues, and characterising in Its true 
 ^Yellow Book, No. 117.
 
 THE CRIME 303 
 
 light, without any varnish, the policy of Austria and 
 Germany;^ the policy of Austria had been both tor- 
 tuous and immoral, that of Germany had been equivocal 
 and double-faced, and she had been specially unfortunate 
 in her representatives in Vienna and Petrograd. The 
 former was a violent Russophobe, who constantly poured 
 oil on the flame; the latter an ignorant person, who al- 
 lowed his Government to believe that Russia would never 
 go to war, no matter how much they trod on her feet. 
 
 In contrast to these diplomatists of Russia and Eng- 
 land, who, with few exceptions, remain sober in their 
 views and confine themselves within the limits of fact, 
 the genius of the French, their grace in form, their 
 adaptability in ideas, their resource in devising new ways 
 out of difficult situations, appears all the more brilliant. 
 It is a pure pleasure for the literary connoisseur to read 
 the French Yellow Book. What a brilliant type is repre- 
 sented by the two Cambons! How dexterous and fas- 
 cinating is the Prime Minister Viviani! And even 
 Bienvenu-Martin, who appears less in the foreground, 
 how precise are his antitheses, how effective his refuta- 
 tion of German sophisms, how penetrating is his vision 
 in framing a judgment on the tendencies of Austria and 
 Germany ! 
 
 And the diplomatists of Germany? O du lieber Gott! 
 This is not a subject to speak about. Herr von Schoen 
 was not the only one who was condemned to a tragic 
 role. Herr von Tschirschky in Vienna, the Russophobe, 
 Count Pourtales in Petrograd, Herr von Flotow in Rome 
 — what a miserable part they all had to play ! There was 
 Herr von Flotow, who knew so litde of the mind of the 
 Italian people and of the views of the Italian Govern- 
 ment that he considered it possible that Italy might par- 
 ticipate in an offensive war against Serbia and share 
 in its further consequences — a view which one dared not 
 ^Blue Book, No. 139.
 
 804 I ACCUSE! 
 
 have attributed to the most inexperienced German com- 
 mercial traveller in Italy without running the risk of 
 an action for personal libel. There was Count Pourtales, 
 who thought that a few manifestations of labour unrest 
 in Russia was sufficient to cause the Russian Govern- 
 ment to give way to Austrian efforts to establish a 
 hegemony on the Balkans, and who had the thankless 
 task of defending in Petrograd the ingenious theory of 
 Bethmann that the conference of four Powers "required 
 of the Austrian Empire just what they had not been 
 willing to suggest to Serbia, namely, that she should 
 give way under military pressure." This is a theory 
 which affords Herr von Bethmann so much pleasure that 
 he exhibits it once more in his most recent circular note, 
 which, however, unfortunately, forgets two things: 
 firstly, that Serbia had already given way beforehand, 
 so that military pressure was an irresponsible piece of 
 presumption, and secondly, that the conference of four 
 Powers did not aim at any kind of pressure or any 
 military measures, but that — as even the thickest head 
 must have begun to realise after the countless explana- 
 tions which were given — its intention was merely to ob- 
 tain the friendly advice of the four Powers unconcerned. 
 Herr von Tschirschky-Bogendorf in Vienna had also 
 a truly thankless role to play, in that he had in appear- 
 ance and outwardly to press for moderation at the Ball- 
 platz; inwardly, however, in the room where Count 
 Berchtold laboured, he could give free reins to the se- 
 cret instructions of Herr von Bethmann, which at the 
 same time corresponded to his own personal inclinations, 
 and could there press for war. Sir Maurice de Bunsen 
 was right when he saw through this double play of our 
 Ambassador at Vienna, and from all the acts of omission 
 and commission of Herr von Tschirschky — especially 
 from his industrious and suspicious refusal of all com- 
 mon action for peace with the Ambassadors of the En-
 
 THE CRIME 805 
 
 tente Powers — drew the certain conclusion that our Am- 
 bassador at Vienna had from the beginning worked for 
 war.^ 
 
 Of Prince LIchnowsky in Lx)ndon — the only one 
 among our Ambassadors — ^we must say this in his hon- 
 our, that he earnestly desired peace, and that he was 
 only the innocent victim of those above him. He also 
 had to resort to a hundred evasions in order to con- 
 ceal the intentions of Germany on Belgium, and so keep 
 England neutral, if this could in any way be achieved; 
 he had to discuss with Sir Edward Grey the hypothesis 
 that we might respect Belgian neutrality,^ although he 
 knew that our troops were already almost at the Bel- 
 gian frontier, and that there was no longer any possi- 
 bility of Belgian neutrality being respected. Again, two 
 days later, after the ultimatum had been presented to 
 Belgium, he had to run after Sir E. Grey — just as the 
 latter was on the point of going to the decisive meeting 
 of the Cabinet on the morning of August 3rd — and had 
 to plead with him insistently to be so good as to be willing 
 to remain neutral even if we should violate Belgian 
 neutrality.^ Even at the very last moment he attempted 
 to make an impression on public opinion in England 
 by an article in the Press, in which he emphasised Ger- 
 many's readiness to refrain from making the Belgian 
 coast a point d'appiii for naval operations.* In all these 
 desperate efforts at the eleventh hour the good will of 
 our London Ambassador may indeed be observed, but 
 even his best intentions could not prevent the representa- 
 tive of a bad policy from necessarily appearing in a bad 
 light. 
 
 And now to come to the highest of all, to Plerr von 
 
 ' Blue Book, Nos. 141, 161. 
 ^Blue Book, No. 123. 
 
 * Grey's speech of 3rd August, Yellow Book, No. 144. 
 
 * Yellow Book, No. 144.
 
 306 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Jagow! From this portrait gallery I omit the Chan- 
 cellor, whom I have already sufficiently characterised. 
 But Herr von Jagow! What a lamentable picture of 
 pitiable helplessness! It is sufficient to observe how 
 miserable he appears against his two chief opponents, 
 the Englishman Goschen and the Frenchman Cambon; 
 how he was constantly reduced to straits by their su- 
 periority, like a mouse in a trap seeking in vain for a 
 way of escape. It is true that in his case, as in that of 
 his German colleagues, we must make allowance for the 
 fact that they had to defend a bad cause, and their 
 opponents a good one. They had to resort to loopholes 
 and ambiguities, whereas the others could advance openly 
 and honourably to the end in view. But the worse 
 their cause was, the more skill and efficiency was needed 
 to defend it. Anyone who defends a bad cause with dex- 
 terity can at least, as they say in the East, "save his 
 face." He, however, who by his inefficiency draws spe- 
 cial attention to the weaknesses of his position makes 
 his bad cause even worse, and forfeits all claim to per- 
 sonal respect. On a big merchant being asked why he 
 retained two barristers for his cases, and why he paid 
 one better than the other, he answered with a sly smile, 
 "The good one is for the bad cases, and the bad one 
 for the good," The badness of our case demanded 
 that we should have the best diplomatists, not to win, 
 but at least to avoid revealing it publicly to the whole 
 world in all its hideousness. 
 
 In order not to appear unjust, I must support my 
 judgment by a few examples from the diplomatic corre- 
 spondence, although the whole course of the negotia- 
 tions in its main features justifies in the fullest measure 
 the most unfavourable judgment being passed upon our 
 diplomacy. The present diplomatic publications give 
 us for the first time an accurate insight into the activity 
 of our Chancellories, which for the profanum vulgus
 
 THE CRIME 307 
 
 has hitherto been a book with seven seals. Now for 
 the first time we reahse why we have suffered diplomatic 
 discomfitures, when the rattling sabre did not make 
 good what the pen had corrupted. Formerly we saw 
 only the effects; now we see the causes. Foniierly we 
 saw the gentlemen only in their gold-laced uniforms; 
 now they stand naked before us, and their failures and 
 weaknesses are seen with appalling clarity. 
 
 Let us take at random one of the conversations be- 
 tween Herr von Jagow and M. Cambon. On July 27th 
 Cambon supported, in the presence of Herr von Jagow, 
 Grey's proposal for a conference of the four Powers. 
 Jagow gave expression to the well-known view, which 
 is even yet disseminated by Herr von Bethmann, that it 
 was impossible to subject Austria against her will to the 
 decisions of a conference. M. Cambon replied that the 
 matter was too serious to allow it to be wrecked on any 
 question of form. The question here was of a work of 
 peace, which could be restricted to common demarches 
 by the four Powers at Petrograd and Vienna. Herr von 
 Jagow had often expressed to him his regret at seeing 
 the two allied groups always opposed to one other. Here 
 there was an opportunity of proving that there was a 
 European spirit (esprit europccn), if the four Powers 
 belonging to the two groups succeeded in preventing a 
 European conflict. Herr von Jagow, who was unable 
 to make any reply to this illuminating explanation, took 
 refuge in the vapid assertion that Gennany had engage- 
 ments with Austria. To this Cambon promptly replied 
 that these obligations were no closer than those existing 
 between France and Russia. Jagow attempted a new 
 line of retreat: He was not refusing to act in keeping 
 off an Austro-Russian dispute, but he could not inter- 
 vene in the Serbian dispute. Whereupon Cambon ob- 
 served : "The one is the consequence of the other, and 
 it is a question of preventing the appearance of a new
 
 308 I ACCUSE! 
 
 factor of such a nature as to lead to intervention by 
 Russia." Jagow emphasised anew his engagements 
 towards Austria. Thereupon Cambon asked him if these 
 engagements were so far-reaching that he was bound to 
 follow Austria everywhere with his eyes blindfolded? 
 Had he, he asked, taken note of the reply of Serbia? 
 "I have not yet had time to read it," replied Jagow on 
 July 27th. (The answer had been handed to the Aus- 
 trian Ambassador in Belgrade as early as July 25th.) 
 "I regret it," said Cambon. ''You would see that, ex- 
 cept on some points of detail, Serbia has yielded entirely. 
 It appears, then, that since Austria has obtained the satis- 
 faction which your support has procured for her, you 
 might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine 
 with Serbia the terms of her reply." Jagow, driven 
 more and more into difficulties, was unable to give any 
 clear reply. Whereupon Cambon asked him point blank 
 zvhcther Germany wished for war. On Jagow pro- 
 testing energetically, Cambon answered: "You must 
 then act consistently. When you read the Serbian reply, 
 / entreat you, in the name of humanity, to weigh the 
 terms in your conscience, and do not personally assume 
 a part of the responsibility for the catastrophe which 
 you are allowing to be prepared." In the end the Ger- 
 man Secretary of State condescended to return to the 
 original subject of the conversation, the proposal of 
 Grey; he considered, however, that it was necessary to 
 find another "form" which he could accept. He based 
 his hopes more on the "direct conversations between 
 Vienna and Petrograd," which Cambon urged on him to 
 further accelerate by appropriate pressure in Vienna. 
 
 The direct negotiations between Vienna and Petro- 
 grad proposed by Jagow were, as is well known, de- 
 clined by Austria. It is, as I have already pointed out, 
 open to serious doubt whether Berlin exercised any pres- 
 sure on Vienna in the sense of these negotiations. The
 
 THE CRIME 309 
 
 conference thus remained as the only expedient. Cam- 
 bon put forward this proposal again on July 28th/ with 
 the support of the English and Italian Ambassadors. 
 Jagow, however, was even more inaccessible than on 
 the previous day, and even the representations of his 
 Italian ally could not prevent him from absolutely re- 
 fusing the conference, although, as will have been gath- 
 ered from what I have already said, he had meanwhile 
 been clearly informed by Goschen (as had also Prince 
 Lichnowsky by Grey) as to the true meaning and in- 
 tention of the conference. M. Cambon was so much 
 disconcerted by the passivity of Herr von Jagow that he 
 again asked him if by any chance he wished for war. 
 Renewed protest by Jagow, but also renewed passivity. 
 After this ineffective conversation Cambon proposed an 
 ingenious method of drawing Herr von Jagow out of 
 his reserve by "putting him in a dilemma by asking him 
 to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by the 
 Powers to avoid war could be brought about." This 
 proposal was, as is known, taken up by Grey, and was 
 zealously pushed by the Entente Powers as well as by 
 Italy, but it came to nothing, since the proposal which it 
 was expected that Jagow would make, notwithstanding 
 all the pressure put upon him, zuas never put forward. 
 
 It is interesting to observe how Herr von Jagow had 
 recourse to all possible subterfuges in the endeavour to 
 avoid the moral obligation of making such a proposal. 
 In most cases he took refuge behind inquiries in Vienna 
 to which an answer had not yet been received.^ This 
 performance was constantly repeated like a musical 
 theme with variations. Above all, Herr von Jagow was 
 never in a position to answer any question as to what 
 Austria really wanted after the opening of hostilities 
 against Serbia. Until that was known it was, howe ver, 
 
 * Yellow Book, No. 81. 
 'Yellow Book, Nos. 92, 109.
 
 310 I ACCUSE! 
 
 in his opinion impossible to think of a "mediation" in 
 any form.^ Every time when he was closely pressed on 
 the question he took refuge behind the Austrian screen, 
 or to express the matter in what is perhaps a more 
 appropriate metaphor, he withdrew from one trench to 
 another, until finally he disappeared behind the fortress 
 of the "Russian mobilisation," never to be seen again. 
 For the quintessence of Berlin tactics consisted in post- 
 poning as long as possible all proposals for peace until 
 they could come out with the bogey of Russian mobili- 
 sation, and were thus saved the trouble of giving any 
 reason or answer to proposals for peace. 
 
 The conversation between Jagow and Cambon on 
 July 30th is characteristic of these tactics.- Cambon 
 again inquired how the matter stood with regard to the 
 formula of mediation which Germany desired to pro- 
 pose. Jagow's answer was that "to gain time" he had 
 acted directly, and "had asked Austria to tell him the 
 ground on which conversations might be opened with 
 her" (de dire sur quel terrain on ponrrait causer avec 
 eile). In other words, under the pretence of gaining 
 time he pushed aside the Powers which were striving for 
 peace, and commissioned the instigator of war, Herr von 
 Tschirschky, to ask the Austrian Government on what 
 grounds she could be treated with. Can anyone believe, 
 can anyone regard it as possible, that the German Secre- 
 tary of State on July ^oth did not even then know what 
 Austria really wanted? Is it not sJiameful to see the 
 diplomatic representatives of the German Empire play- 
 ing such a part in an event which concerned the life 
 and death of European civilisation, and indeed the fate 
 of mankind? 
 
 But to go further; scarcely had the proposal for a 
 conference come to nought when Herr von Jagow, in the 
 ^Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 109. Blue Book, Nos. 98, 107, 112. 
 * Yellow Book, Nos. 94, 109.
 
 THE CRIME 311 
 
 course of the same conversation of July 30th, trotted 
 out the Russian mobilisation, stating that it would lead 
 as a consequence to German mobilisation, and in answer 
 to an objection advanced by Cambon that the Russians 
 had mobilised only against Austria, he replied that this 
 was indeed quite true, but that the heads of the Army 
 were insisting on German mobilisation, for every delay 
 was a loss of strength. This last observation is very 
 significant, although in the mouth of the Secretary of 
 State, at any rate, it was highly imprudent. It certainly 
 proves, as is indeed apparent from many other facts, 
 that the resolution to mobilise, which in the case of 
 Germany was known to be "equivalent to war," had 
 already been taken on July 29th in the meeting of the 
 Council held at Potsdam under the presidency of the 
 Emperor, in which the Generals had taken part.* The 
 General Staff was indeed in a hurry. This also explains 
 the special edition of the Lokalan:;eiger, which an- 
 nounced the mobilisation as early as July 30th, but was 
 seized because it was not considered expedient that the 
 mobilisation should be made known on that day.- Hinc 
 ilia lacrimcu. Hence the subterfuges and the retreats 
 of Herr von Jagow, who in a spirit of self-sacrifice threw 
 himself, like a second Curtius, into the abyss which the 
 military party had dug for him. 
 
 Mention must still be made of an earlier episode, 
 because it illustrates in an interesting way the intellec- 
 tual and moral qualities of the diplomatists concerned. 
 On July 29th 3 Cambon ventured to allow himself to 
 make a modest inquiry as to the position of affairs with 
 regard to direct conversations between Vienna and Petro- 
 grad on which Herr von Jagow had built so great hopes. 
 
 'Yellow Book, No. 105. Cf. the remark quoted above of Count 
 Pourtales to Sazonof. Red Book, No. 28. 
 'Yellow Book, No. 105. Orange Book, No. 62. 
 'Yellow Book, No. 92.
 
 312 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Jagow was in a position to give confirmation of the 
 gratifying fact that Petrograd seemed well disposed, 
 but that from Vienna "he was awaiting the reply." 
 Meanwhile he had at least read the Serbian Note, and 
 saw in it a basis for possible negotiation. Why, then, 
 did Austria not negotiate, but break off relations in an 
 incomprehensible manner? asked M. Cambon. "Be- 
 cause, with Eastern nations," such was the view ex- 
 pressed by Jagow, "one could never obtain sufficient 
 guarantees for carrying out their promises." (This was, 
 as is known, the only important point at issue between 
 Austria and Serbia: the co-operation of Austrian or- 
 gans in Serbian police and judicial investigations.) M. 
 Cambon at once dexterously suggested the establish- 
 ment of an International Commission — such as fre- 
 quently exists in Balkan countries — charged with the 
 duty of controlling the Serbian police inquiry. The 
 Serbian answer, as he rightly held, was on this point 
 also a suitable basis for negotiation. Herr von Jagow 
 was unable to make any reply to this proposal of Cam- 
 bon's, which was certainly ingenious and practicable. 
 Had he accepted this proposal and followed it up — 
 there was no room to doubt but that Russia and Serbia 
 would concur — we would not to-day have been involved 
 in a European war. 
 
 Like master, like man! On the day on which the 
 above conversation took place between Jagow and Cam- 
 bon the same performance was being transacted between 
 Herr von Bethmann and Sir E. Goschen.^ There were 
 peaceful assurances in abundance, but the idea of a con- 
 ference was declined ; no declaration was given with re- 
 gard to the intentions of Austria ; "efforts" to induce 
 the Government of Vienna to direct conversations with 
 Russia were mentioned — be it observed it is never more 
 than efforts with ineffective means which Herr von 
 ^Blue Book, No. 75. Yellow Book, No. 92.
 
 THE CRIME 313 
 
 Bethmann "poussait aiitant qu'il pouvait" — but above 
 everything else there is a threatening reference to the 
 Russian mobiHsation. 
 
 Even as late as the night between July 31st and 
 August ist ^ Goschen, the English Ambassador, made a 
 pressing appeal to Herr von Jagow's feelings of hu- 
 manity, to which the latter coldly replied that the mat- 
 ter had then gone too far, and that they must now wait 
 for the Russian answer to the German ultimatum. In 
 reply to Goschen, who asked in astonishment why they 
 had made their ultimatum completely impossible of ac- 
 ceptance by asking that they should demobilise against 
 Austria as well, Herr von Jagow gave the memorable 
 answer "that it was in order to prevent Russia from 
 saying all her mobilisation was only directed against 
 Austria." Thus in order to bar the possibility of Rus- 
 sia advancing an impossible objection — impossible be- 
 cause the general mobilisation had been publicly an- 
 nounced and admitted by the Tsar himself in his 
 telegrams — they demanded the impossible, that is to say, 
 demobilisation against a State which had itself already 
 mobilised. 
 
 On August 1st Goschen had again a long and pressing 
 conversation with Jagow. ^ He pointed out to him, in 
 concert with Cambon, the incomprehensible fact that 
 Germany, a Power not directly interested in the whole 
 dispute, had made war inevitable by despatching an ulti- 
 matum, although Austria and Russia, the parties to the 
 dispute, had just entered into negotiations with a view 
 to effecting a settlement. In reply to this Jagow merely 
 let it be seen that he considered that that was all very 
 fine, but that since Russia had mobilised, war must 
 come if the demand contained in the German ultimatum 
 was not complied with. 
 
 ^Blue Book, No. 121. Yellow Book, No. 121. 
 ^Blue Book, No. 138. Yellow Book, No. 121.
 
 314 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Thus we find the mohilisation as such put forward as 
 the ground for war! We have already seen elsewhere 
 how matters really stood with regard to the Russian 
 mobilisation, by what it was occasioned and justified. 
 In France and Russia, at any rate, a view different from 
 that current in Germany prevailed with regard to the 
 significance of the mobilisation on both sides. Neither 
 of these countries would ever have declared war on 
 account of German mobilisation, as they had not, in 
 fact, done on account of Austrian mobilisation. ^'Mobi- 
 lisation is not war" we find in a communication of Vivi- 
 ani to Paul Cambon (Yellow Book, No. 127). "In 
 the present state of affairs it is the best means for 
 France of safeguarding peace, and . . . the Government 
 of the Republic will redouble their efforts to bring the 
 negotiations to a conclusion. . . . We shall not cease to 
 work towards an agreement. . . . We will, in co-opera- 
 tion with England, continue to work for the success of 
 these pourparlers." These words we find elsewhere in 
 the writings of Viviani on August ist, that is to say, 
 after the ultimatum, and after the French mobilisation.^ 
 
 This is but a brief epitome of the history of French 
 efforts for peace. All the diplomatic books are full of 
 them, only Herr von Bethmann remains in ignorance. 
 He has — if we may use his own words — "had the cour- 
 age as the responsible statesman" to accuse the French 
 Government of not having taken a single positive step 
 in the interests of peace. We, however, and impartial 
 history will concur, throw this reproach back on Ger- 
 many, on the shoulders of the statesman who, whether 
 driving or driven — the guilt remains the same — did noth- 
 ing for peace, and did everything that was bound to 
 make this war inevitable. While others hastened to the 
 
 ^ Yellow Book, Nos. 125, 127. I have already elsewhere pointed 
 out that Austrian diplomatists also did not regard mobilisation as 
 equivalent to war (Blue Book, No. 118).
 
 THE CRIME 315 
 
 spot with fire engines and water-buckets to extinguish 
 the beginnings of the conflagration, he poured oil on the 
 flames and collected brushwood so that the smouldering 
 spark might develop into a holocaust. And now that 
 the fire of hell has broken loose, and the author of it 
 all sees horror-struck the consequences of his fearful 
 deed, he writes and talks and he talks and writes in 
 order to charge others with his misdeed, like the burglar 
 who runs down the street shouting out "Stop, thief." 
 Fortunately no one in the whole world believes him, 
 and the more excuses he offers the more does he in fact 
 accuse himself. With all his sophisms and perversions 
 he cannot abolish the facts which lie patent to all eyes. 
 And the eyes of even the German people, who now de- 
 ceived and deluded patiently submit to the unspeakable 
 horrors of war, will gradually be opened. Over the 
 trenches and across the frontiers it will reach out its 
 hand to the neighbouring nation whose president said 
 with truth: "The German Empire will bear before 
 history the crushing responsibility for the war." 
 
 E 
 
 APPENDIX 
 
 The Austrian Red Book 
 
 In the beginning of February, after the pages of this 
 book were completed, there appeared an Austrian Red 
 Book, which, consisting of an introduction and sixty-nine 
 documents, gives an account of events from the murder 
 of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand down to the outbreak 
 of the European war. This book offers no surprises, but 
 only a confirmation of the conclusions which could not
 
 316 I ACCUSE! 
 
 but be drawn from the previously published diplomatic 
 correspondence. It is a meritorious work, in so far as it 
 unveils, by open self-confessions and with an appalling 
 lucidity, the Austrian attitude, which hitherto could only 
 be inferred indirectly from foreign publications. 
 
 What the Austrian book yields in the way of positive 
 facts confirms the conclusion that Austria-Hungary was 
 guilty of the outbreak of the war in a way which must 
 leave even for the well-disposed no further room for 
 doubt. What it conceals in silence proves that the Aus- 
 trian Government is completely aware of its guilt, but 
 that it still endeavours — though vainly — ^to conceal it 
 from the eyes of the world. 
 
 As before the publication of this book, there is still 
 a complete absence of any kind of evidence that the 
 German Government, as is constantly emphasised in the 
 White Book, pressed the Viennese Government to as- 
 sume an attitude of moderation and conciliation. In 
 the interval between July 28th and 30th, when all rela- 
 tions between Vienna and Petrograd were completely 
 broken off, the German Government, as I have already 
 indicated, "handed on" to Vienna individual proposals 
 of the Entente Powers ; they even got so far as to bring 
 them before the Vienna Cabinet "for their considera- 
 tion," ^ but they never defended them, or gave them 
 energetic support. The German Government, in the 
 name of Austria and without any previous consultation 
 with her ally, straightway declined certain other propo- 
 sals. Others again she simply kept to herself without 
 deigning an answer, and without transmitting them to 
 Vienna. 
 
 The proposals which did arrive at Austria were col- 
 lectively so long refused by the Government in Vienna 
 that in the end it was too late, and thus all the efforts 
 
 ' Red Book, No. 43.
 
 THE CRIME 317 
 
 of the Entente Powers to keep the peace of Europe 
 failed. 
 
 I will now take up the various points in the Red Book 
 which deserve discussion, and first I will deal with what 
 the Red Book contains, and then with what it does not 
 contain. 
 
 What the Red Book contains 
 
 I. It is now demonstrated by the Red Book itself 
 that Austria under all circumstances desired war against 
 Serbia — a fact already proved by the revelations of 
 Giolitti, and by many other circumstances which have 
 already been indicated. In the report from the Austrian 
 Ambassador in Belgrade, Freiherr von Giesl, dated July 
 2ist,^ that is to say, before the presentation of the Aus- 
 trian Note, the Ambassador expresses his conviction : 
 
 "that a reckoning with Serbia, a war for the posi- 
 tion of the Monarchy as a Great Power, even for 
 its existence as such, cannot he permanently avoided. 
 If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia 
 we shall share the responsibility for the difficulties 
 and the unfavourable situation in any future war, 
 which must, however, sooner or later be carried 
 through. . . . Half-measures, the presentation of 
 demands, followed by long discussions and ending 
 only in an unsound compromise, would be the hard- 
 est blow which could be directed against Austria- 
 Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her position in 
 Europe." 
 
 'Red Book, No. 6.
 
 318 I ACCUSE! 
 
 This embodies the programme which governed all fur- 
 ther developments. 
 
 2. As early as July 23rd, simultaneously with the de- 
 livery of the ultimatum to Serbia, Count Berchtold ex- 
 plains in instructions sent to Count Mensdorff, his Am- 
 bassador in London, that the short time-limit allowed in 
 the ultimatum was necessary in order to make impos- 
 sible the "dilatory arts" of Serbia, and that the Aus- 
 trian demands ''could not be made the subject of negO' 
 tiations and compromise."^ 
 
 The Entente Powers only received information of the 
 Austrian Note on July 24th, and then without the addi- 
 tion of the documentary evidence. Their representa- 
 tions that the period of time allowed in the ultimatum 
 might at least be lengthened, to afford them an oppor- 
 tunity of studying the evidence and of bringing influence 
 to bear on the Serbian Government, were flatly refused. 
 It was indicated that an examination of the data was 
 superfluous, and that the Austrian communication 
 "merely bore the character of a statement for informa- 
 tion" which was regarded "as a duty laid upon them 
 by international courtesy," and that the Austrian action 
 was one which concerned the monarchy and Serbia alone, 
 on which the Powers were not invited "to make known 
 their own views on the subject." Count Berchtold dis- 
 appeared from Vienna in the critical days between July 
 23rd and 25th, and issued his unaccommodating decla- 
 rations from Lambach and Ischl.^ 
 
 3. In an instruction despatched on July 25th to Count 
 Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd, Berch- 
 told already counted on the refusal of his demands by 
 Serbia, and on the settlement of the conflict by force 
 of arms at a time when the Serbian Note had not even 
 
 'Red Book, No. 9. 
 
 ' Red Book, Nos. 20, 21.
 
 THE CRIME 319 
 
 been received.* In another Note of the same day to 
 Szapary he explains Point 5 of the Serbian Note in the 
 sense that the collaboration in Serbia of Austrian of- 
 ficials in the suppression of the subversive movement 
 was intended to mean the "collaboration" of a "bureau 
 de sürete" in Belgrade,^ but he omits to give any ex- 
 planations on Point 6, which was much more important 
 (participation of Austrian officials in judicial proceed- 
 ings against accessories to the plot). Explanations on 
 the latter point were only given on July 27th in the 
 declaration published by the Austrian Government after 
 the recall of the Austrian Ambassador; it was then stated 
 that the intention was that Austrian officials should take 
 part, not in the Serbian judicial proceedings, but in 
 the preliminary police investigations leading up to such 
 proceedings (recherche as opposed to enquete judici- 
 air e). 
 
 This raises the question why these explanations which 
 were transmitted on July 25th to Petrograd, and were 
 published on July 27th, could not have been included 
 in the ultimatum, or at least communicated to Serbia, 
 after the reception of the Serbian answer. It would 
 certainly have been possible, and in view of the sub- 
 missive attitude assumed by Serbia it was more than 
 probable, that the Serbian Government, on the ground 
 of these explanations, might have gone still further to 
 meet the Austrian demands; since Points 5 and 6 were 
 almost the only reservations made by Serbia, Austria 
 might have received full satisfaction in the further nego- 
 tiations, and the peace of Europe might have been main- 
 tained. Explanations were, however, omitted because 
 war with Serbia was regarded as necessary, as so neces- 
 sary, in fact, that they were resolved, if need be, to ac- 
 cept a European war into the bargain. Austria acted 
 
 'Red Book, No. 26. 
 'Red Book, No. 27.
 
 S20 I ACCUSE! 
 
 according to the prescription of the man who, to get 
 rid of bugs, burnt down his house. 
 
 4. The answer of Serbia produced, as is well known, 
 the greatest disappointment in Vienna. It had not been 
 expected that the influence of the Entente Powers in 
 Belgrade could induce an independent State to accept 
 such a humiliation. At a stroke all hopes of the desired 
 war appeared to have vanished. A Government which 
 can condescend to a public apology in its official gazette 
 inserted in a prescribed phraseology^ at a prescribed 
 place on a prescribed day — a King who allows an order 
 of the day to his army to be dictated by a neighbour- 
 ing State — a Sovereign State which subjects its public 
 education to the control of another State, which dis- 
 misses and even arrests officers and officials at the com- 
 mand of its neighbour, which dissolves national unions, 
 and suppresses the liberty of the Press, &c., &c. — such 
 a State and such a Government had never before been 
 seen in the history of the world. Truly it required 
 great dexterity (such as Austrian statesmen did not have 
 at command) or an extraordinary evil will (such as they 
 certainly did have at command) to deduce a reason for 
 war from such an attitude on the part of their small 
 neighbour. 
 
 On July 27th, before he knew the Serbian answer, 
 Sazonof himself in the course of a conversation with 
 Count Szäpäry, held that at least three of the ten points 
 in the Austrian Note could not be accepted, namely, 
 points 4, 5, and 6, and there can be no doubt that he 
 was much surprised when he learned later that point 4 
 (removal of officers and officials) had been accepted by 
 Serbia, and also that the two other points had not been 
 flatly refused, but that it was suggested that they should 
 be submitted for decision to arbitration.^ 
 
 5. I have already dealt in an earlier passage with the 
 * ' ' Red Book, No. 31.
 
 THE CRIME 321 
 
 process whereby the submissive Serbian reply was arti- 
 ficially transformed by means of miserable quibbles into 
 a Note of refusal. In Berchtold's Note of July 28th 
 intended for the English Government the Serbian sub- 
 mission was represented as being worthless, and as in- 
 tended to deceive: "Serbia accepted a number of our 
 demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to im- 
 press public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would 
 not be required to fulfil her promises." ^ This is sup- 
 posed to justify the action of Austria in ignoring the 
 Serbian answer. I have already suggested the question: 
 What else, beyond making promises, could Serbia do in 
 forty-eight hours? Was it expected that the fulfilment 
 of the promises should also be carried out in forty-eight 
 hours? After all, the Austrian Government had only 
 demanded from the Serbian Government an obligation 
 that she would perform certain actions. This obliga- 
 tion was given in eight points, and in two points was 
 made subject to further discussion. Clearly, in the 
 first place, it was necessary to wait and see whether 
 Serbia would fulfil her promises. 
 
 Guarantees in the form that Austria should herself col- 
 laborate in the fulfilment of the Serbian promises were 
 asked for only in points 5 and 6. If Austria could have 
 brought herself to discuss these points, these guarantees 
 would presumably have been provided for in one form 
 or another ; they could, for example, have been provided, 
 as proposed by Jules Cambon, in the form of an Inter- 
 national Commission of investigation and control,^ and 
 guarantees in this form would have been much more 
 practicable and far more effective than in the form de- 
 manded by Austria. The whole of this idea of collab- 
 oration of Austrian officials in Serbian investigations 
 was, in view of the strained relations between Austria 
 
 *Red Book, No. 39. 
 * Yellow Book, No. 92.
 
 322 I ACCUSE! 
 
 and Serbia, an intellectual efflorescence, such as could 
 only spring from the soil of Austrian diplomacy. Was 
 it supposed that in this way peace could be established 
 between Austria and Serbia? A perpetual daily state 
 of feud would have arisen between Austrian and Serbian 
 officials, numberless irritating incidents, perhaps involv- 
 ing bloodshed, would have taken place; in short, there 
 would have been a situation which would indubitably 
 have led in the sequel to war (this was also the view of 
 Sazonof, Red Book, No. 14). 
 
 But notwithstanding all this, the alleged untrust- 
 worthiness of Serbia had to suffice to make valueless the 
 answer which in fact had conceded nearly all the de- 
 mands. This untrustworthiness, in the opinion of Aus- 
 tria, was supposed to be particularly confirmed by the 
 fact that Serbia, as early as 3 o'clock on the afternoon 
 of July 25th, had ordered a general mobilisation, that 
 is to say, three hours before the answer was handed 
 over to the Austrian Ambassador.^ We find here that 
 Austria, in connection with the question of mobilisation, 
 plays the same game so successfully put into operation 
 by Germany. Austria presented to Serbia demands 
 which could not be complied with, and thereby gavi 
 expression to her indubitable intention to make war. Ser~ 
 bia concurred in the greatest part of these demands, but 
 feared, not without reason, that the few reservations 
 made by her would furnish the Austrian Government 
 with a pretext for war, and took steps to protect her- 
 self against this possibility by timeous mobilisation, 
 which had been carried out by Austria also, simultane- 
 ously with the presentation of the ultimatum. This de- 
 fensive mobilisation on the part of Serbia was then 
 treated by Austria as trickery and as an offensive action, 
 whereby Serbia "publicly proclaimed her hostility," and 
 showed that she had "no inclination for a peaceful so- 
 'Red Book, No. 39- "*
 
 THE CRIME 323 
 
 lution," and thus Austria construed the desired ground 
 for war.^ 
 
 6. But the Austrian Government did not rest satisfied 
 with this; she even raised the further reproach against 
 Serbia — again in imitation of a celebrated example — ■ 
 that her opponent had been the first to begin hostihties. 
 In the telegram sent by Berchtold on July 28th to his 
 Ambassadors in Petrograd and London it is expressly 
 asserted that Serbia had opened hostilities on the Hun- 
 garian frontier as early as July 27th, that is to say, 
 before the Austrian declaration of war.- This assertion 
 is, of course, unsupported by any facts or by any kind 
 of evidence, and it is further much more incredible than 
 the similar assertion which was later advanced by Ger- 
 many against Russia and France. Why, indeed, should 
 a small and weak country like Serbia intentionally pro- 
 voke a war with Austria? The facts reported by Giesl, 
 the Austrian Ambassador (removal of gold from the 
 National Bank, withdrawal of troops from Belgrade, 
 removal of official papers from the Foreign Office, &c.) 
 prove — as, indeed, is in accordance with logic and rea- 
 son, and requires no proof — that there was nothing 
 which Serbia had less in her mind than an attack upon 
 Austria; on the contrary, that it would have been glad 
 if only her great neighbour would leave her in peace. ^ 
 But it appears to be the recognised custom in this war 
 for the aggressor to accuse his victim of having fallen 
 upon him. 
 
 All these pretexts furnished the Austrian Government 
 with priceless material to justify the negative position 
 which they assumed with regard to .the peaceful pro- 
 posals of the Entente Powers. The grounds of these 
 refusals may be summarised as follows : — 
 
 * Red Book, Introduction p. 444, No. 29. 
 ' Red Book, Nos. 39, 40. 
 •Red Book, No. 22.
 
 I ACCUSE! 
 
 (a) Our dispute with Serbia concerns no one, and 
 must remain localised. 
 
 (b) Serbia, by her unsatisfactory answer, by her 
 mobilisation, and by opening hostilities has herself 
 provoked the war. 
 
 7. I have already dealt in the previous sections of this 
 book with the question of localisation. This subject, 
 however, reappears in the Austrian Red Book with such 
 definiteness and at the same time with so much naivete 
 that a further short discussion appears necessary. 
 Austria simply took as her starting point the thoii*ght 
 which Count Mensdorff had openly expressed to Sir Ed- 
 ward Grey on July 29th that Serbia belonged to the Aus- 
 trian sphere of interest (Blue Book, No. 91). The fact 
 that Russia, by a hundred years of history, by links of 
 blood and religion, and also by her own interests was 
 connected with Serbia by bonds more intimate than those 
 between any other two allies, such, for example, as Ger- 
 many and Austria, was intentionally ignored by the two 
 Empires, and the ingenious distinction was constantly 
 drawn that while they were quite prepared to negoti- 
 ate with Russia on questions arising between Russia and 
 Austria, they must be allowed to regulate the Austro- 
 Serbian dispute as they thought fit. This artificial and 
 meaningless interpretation is as if one party to a law- 
 suit were to say to the other: "I am quite prepared 
 to come to an understanding with you and have no evil 
 intentions whatever against you, but we must absolutely 
 refrain from speaking to each other about the subject 
 in dispute; let us, therefore, talk about something else. 
 What do you think about Russia ? Fine weather to-day ; 
 very fine day to-day, indeed." The Serbian question 
 was precisely the question at issue between Austria and 
 Russia, and not, indeed, for the first time; it had been 
 so for many years. Russia regarded her interests as
 
 THE CRIME 325 
 
 being identical with those of Serbia, and declared that, 
 in the interests of Serbia as well as of her own prestige, 
 she could not tolerate that the Slavonic brother State, 
 after the deep diplomatic humiliation she had under- 
 gone, should also be crushed by Austria by force of 
 arms and should be degraded into a kind of vassal 
 State. -^ On this occasion the conflict had broken out 
 more violently than ever, and threatened not merely to 
 divide Austria from Russia, but also to set the whole of 
 Europe in flame. Only this question was at stake — no 
 other. If they were prepared to negotiate at all, it had 
 to be on the Serbian question; if they were not prepared 
 to discuss this question, it was superfluous and purpose- 
 less to suggest further negotiations. In reality the Aus- 
 trian proposal that they were willing to negotiate with 
 Russia on Russian interests was nothing but a pretext 
 in order to avoid negotiations which could serve any 
 purpose. 
 
 It was in vain that Grey and Sazonof endeavoured 
 to convince the Austrian Government of their sophisms 
 — sophisms which might be attended by the gravest con- 
 sequences. Even Count Szapfiry, the Austrian Ambas- 
 sador in Petrograd, could not refrain from observing 
 that the instructions of Berchtold moved in a vicious 
 circle.^ All representations were in vain. Austria, sup- 
 ported by Germany, stood firm in her refusal until it 
 was too late and war had become inevitable. 
 
 8. Proceeding from the fundamental principle that no 
 one had any right to be heard in the Austro-Serbian 
 dispute, Austria, in the first place, declined to permit 
 any discussion of the contents of her ultimatum or of 
 the Serbian answer. On July 27th a conversation, main- 
 tained in a friendly tone, took place between Sazonof 
 and Szapary, in which the former gave expression to the 
 
 * Red Book, No. 47. Blue Book, Nos. 48, 91. 
 *Red Book, No. 47-
 
 326 I ACCUSE! 
 
 desire to discuss the Serbian Note with the Ambassador. 
 Szapary explained that he was ready to receive the ob- 
 serv'ations of Sazonof, but pointed out that he was not 
 authorised either to discuss the text of the Note or to 
 interpret it.^ On July 28th Schebeko, the Russian Am- 
 bassador, made a formal proposition to Count Berchtold 
 asking him to furnish Count Szapary with instructions 
 to continue with Sazonof the exchange of thought, and 
 thus, if it were possible, to arrive at a direct under- 
 standing with the Russian Government ; the latter would 
 gladly meet them half-way with this object in view. 
 Count Berchtold emphatically declined the proposal of 
 the Russian Ambassador: No one in Austria could un- 
 derstand negotiations with reference to the Serbian an- 
 swer, which had been designated as unsatisfactory, and, 
 moreover, war had already been declared against Serbia 
 on the same day. By way of providing a further ground 
 for the declaration of war, Berchtold did not fail to 
 refer to the Serbian mobilisation and to the hostilities 
 alleged to have been begun by Serbia.^ 
 
 Thus, all connections between Austria and Russia were 
 broken off until further notice. All attempts to effect 
 an understanding could reach Austria only indirectly 
 by the mediation of the Entente Powers and of Ger- 
 many. 
 
 9. On the same day on which Berchtold declined 
 Sazonof's proposal for a direct understanding, he also 
 rejected Grey's proposal for a conference of the four 
 Powers. As is known, this proposal had already been 
 declined by Germany, without previous consultation with 
 Austria, under the threadbare pretext that she could not 
 summon her ally before a "European Tribunal." Aus- 
 tria declined this proposal, which was simultaneously 
 submitted by Grey to Count Mensdorff and by Bunsen 
 
 '■ Red Book, No. 31. 
 
 *Red Book, No. 40. Orange Book, No. 45.
 
 THE CRIME 327 
 
 to Count Berchtold (July 28th) on quite different 
 grounds, namely, that the proposal came too late, and 
 that in view of the state of war which had arisen it 
 had been "outstripped" by events.^ This certainly is a 
 remarkable procedure ! Germany, as Austria's guardian, 
 considers that Grey's proposal is, so to speak, incon- 
 sistent with her dignity. Austria, however, the party 
 chiefly concerned, is not sensible of this violation of 
 her dignity, but only objects that the proposal was re- 
 ceived too late, and apparently, therefore, she would 
 not have been disinclined to consider it had it been sub- 
 mitted earlier. This, again, furnishes an indication of 
 the incredible confusion which reigned in the minds of 
 German and Austrian diplomatists and in the Chancel- 
 lories of the Empires. Both the reasons urged against 
 the conference, that expressed by Berlin and that by 
 Vienna, were, of course, merely pretexts. But it would, 
 at any rate, have been more astute, in the first place, to 
 have come to an agreement as to the reasons which 
 they were to put forward to bring to naught one after 
 the other the proposals of the Entente Powers for peace. 
 It would then have been less easy to see through the 
 game, and more difficult to establish guilt. 
 
 10. In an earlier passage I have already pointed out 
 how Germany answered Grey's proposal for a conference 
 with the counter-proposal of a direct discussion between 
 Vienna and Petrograd — ^a discussion which was then de- 
 clined by Vienna. The German White Book naturally 
 endeavours to conceal this position of affairs, which in 
 itself offers a complete proof of the guilt of the two 
 Empires; it was, however, possible to establish this fact 
 beyond all doubt by reference to the other diplomatic 
 books. The Red Book now presents us with the self- 
 confession of Austria on this question in the crassest 
 form, and, moreover, the statement contains highly ag- 
 " "■ Red Book, Nos. 38, 41. ~
 
 328 I ACCUSE! 
 
 gravating amplifications. Not only did the Government 
 of Vienna decline on July 28th to discuss the Serbian 
 question directly with Russia as proposed by Germany, 
 but they had already given expression to this refusal 
 with the utmost definiteness as early as July 2'^rd (Red 
 Book, No. 9). This fact must have been, and was, 
 known to the German Government. The Government 
 of Berlin thus declined, with full knowledge of the facts, 
 a promising proposal put forward by the English Gov- 
 ernment in order to set in its place another, which, in 
 view of the declaration made by Austria as far back 
 as July 23rd, was known to them to be futile. Up till 
 now it was possible only to show that the Berlin counter- 
 proposal was, in fact, futile, and to infer that there 
 was criminal collusion between the two Empires. Now 
 — thanks to the Austrian publication — this collusion is 
 proved, and the guilty are unmasked. // of the hundred 
 proofs of guilt only this one existed, it would suMce to 
 lay upon Germany and Austria alone the responsibility 
 for the war. 
 
 II. On July 30th Count Berchtold, as we know, at 
 last resolved, in view of the increasingly dangerous 
 aspect of the dispute, to discuss with Sazonof the details 
 of the Austrian Note. With this object he sent on July 
 30th two instructions to his Ambassador at Petrograd 
 (Red Book, Nos. 49 and 50), and thereupon on July 31st 
 negotiations in fact began oiUcially for the first time in 
 Petrograd on the contents of the Note. The conversa- 
 tion of July 27th between Sazonof and Szapary was, as 
 explained above, only an unoMcial acceptance of Sazo- 
 nof's observations. 
 
 Even in this critical moment Berchtold could not re- 
 frain from speaking of the Note as having been already 
 "outstripped" by the outbreak of war, from describing 
 the conversations in Petrograd as "subsequent explana- 
 tions," and from emphasising that it had never been
 
 THE CRIME 329 
 
 Austria's intention "to depart in any way from th*^ points 
 contained in the Note." 
 
 The phrase about being "outstripped by the outbreak 
 of war," which is ridden to death in the Red Book, de- 
 serves special consideration. What is it really supposed 
 to mean? A insults B; A offers humble and plaintive 
 apologies ; nevertheless, B raises his sword to run A 
 through. A third, C, a near relation of A, intervenes 
 to restrain the lethal blow, and points out in A's favour 
 that he has already offered apologies. B, however, depre- 
 cates this intervention with the observation that the 
 discussion of the insult has been outstripped by events, 
 and that the state of war which was produced by raising 
 his sword must now pursue its course. 
 
 This is the point of view of the Austrian Government. 
 It is incredible, but true! But even if this point of view 
 were as logical and reasonable as it is illogical and un- 
 reasonable, it would not lead to the conclusion drawn 
 by the Government of Vienna, that all attempts at medi- 
 ation by third parties — which were promoted in the in- 
 terest, not of Serbia, but of European peace — must give 
 way. The state of war had been brought about by Aus- 
 tria alone (the Serbian hostilities are, of course, an in- 
 vention). This state of war, however, like every war, 
 could and must sooner or later come to an end. The 
 Entente Powers desired to bring about this end sooner 
 rather than later, in order to prevent an extension of 
 the conflagration throughout Europe. How, then, was 
 it possible to urge as an objection against these efforts 
 for peace that war had already broken out? It was 
 precisely because war had broken out that efforts were 
 made in the cause of peace. One is almost ashamed to 
 have to devote so much space to matters which are so 
 obvious, but when we find constantly repeated in all the 
 Notes contained in the Red Book from July 28th on- 
 wards the same idiotic ideas that all the efforts for peace
 
 330 I ACCUSE! 
 
 made by the Powers had been outstripped by the Serbian 
 war, needlessly and criminally brought about by Austria 
 — as may be expected the German White Book also (page 
 9)^ is guilty of this idiocy — it is impossible to shirk 
 the task of characterising such senselessness by its true 
 name, as a criminal gamble with the highest interests 
 of the unhappy nations whose destiny is entrusted to such 
 men as these. 
 
 The worst feature in the whole business is, however, 
 that the assertion that the peace proposals were out- 
 stripped by the outbreak of war is not even in fact true. 
 The peace proposals — the Russian request for a direct 
 understanding as well as Grey's proposal for a confer- 
 ence of the four Powers — were in reality made and com- 
 municated to the Government at Vienna before the out- 
 break of the Austro-Serbian war. As early as July 24th, 
 immediately after being informed of the Austrian Note, 
 Sazonof expressed the wish that the period of time al- 
 lowed in the ultimatum should be extended, and that 
 he should receive the Austrian evidence in support of 
 their charges in order that the Austrian complaints 
 might be examined, pressure brought to bear on Serbia, 
 and negotiations opened with Vienna with a view to 
 arriving at an understanding. In the following days 
 this desire was constantly repeated by the Russian Min- 
 ister to Count Szapary, on the final occasion as late as 
 July 27th.^ As war was only declared against Serbia 
 on July 28th, the assertion that the Russian proposal 
 for an understanding was "outstripped" by the declara- 
 tion of war is stamped as a lie. 
 
 The same holds true of Grey's proposal for a confer- 
 ence. The conference of the four Powers was recom- 
 mended by Grey from the beginning of the crisis, as 
 early as July 24th, and from that time the proposal 
 
 [^ Collected Documents, p. 409.] 
 'Red Book, No. 31-
 
 THE CRIME 331 
 
 was constantly renewed.^ As early as July 26th the 
 proposal was submitted to the German Government, 
 and was rejected under the well-known pretext that she 
 could not call Austria before a European tribunal.^ On 
 July 27th Count Mensdorff reported at length on this 
 proposal made and urgently pressed upon him by Grey.^ 
 How, then, does Count Berchtold arrive at the conclusion 
 that the proposal for a conference, which dated from 
 July 24th, and which had since then been constantly re- 
 newed, was "outstripped" by the declaration of war, 
 which took place on July 28th? This assertion also is 
 a conscious lie, intended to hush up Austria's unswerv- 
 ing intention to make war. I resume as follows : — 
 
 (a) even if the Austrian assertion that the pro- 
 posals for peace only arrived after the declaration 
 of war were correct, this would not, in logic or in 
 reason, constitute any ground for rejecting these 
 proposals ; 
 
 {h) it is, however, proved that these proposals 
 reached Austria before the declaration of war; there 
 is thus no support in fact for the premises on which 
 is based the conclusion — in itself false — drawn by 
 the Vienna Government. 
 
 12. On July 29th Sazonof rightly complained to 
 Szapary that Austria had flatly refused any further ex- 
 change of thought. This, however, did not prevent 
 Count Berchtold from assuming a "stupid" air in con- 
 versation with M. Schebeko on July 30th, and from 
 speaking of a "misunderstanding" on the part of Sazo- 
 nof, as he and Schebeko "had discussed the practical 
 questions two days before," and Schebeko had reported 
 this to Petrograd (Red Book, N o. 50). The exchange 
 
 ^Blue Book, Nos. 10, n, 24, 25, 36, 42, 43, etc. 
 
 'White Book, p. 409. 
 
 •Red Book, No. 38. Blue Book, No. 48.
 
 332 I ACCUSE! 
 
 of thought of which Berchtold speaks consisted in the 
 fact that Schebeko, in the name of Sazonof, desired the 
 official continuation of the negotiations in Petrograd, 
 whereas Berchtold ßatly declined to concur in these. 
 This is what Berchtold calls ''discussing the practical 
 question" ! 
 
 13. The question of mobilisation was naturally also 
 among the subjects discussed in the conversation on 
 July 30th. Berchtold complained about the mobilisa- 
 tion of the four southern Russian army-districts, which 
 had taken place on the previous day, and repeated again 
 the false assertion that Austria had only mobilised 
 against Serbia (three army corps), but against Russia 
 "not a single man." M. Schebeko could have answered 
 to this : "Not a man, it is true, but a 'Beth-mann.' " 
 For Bethmann in his simplicity had chattered in the 
 Reichstag on August 4th to the effect that Austria had 
 mobilised, not only against Serbia, hut also two army- 
 corps against Russia at a time when Russian mobilisa- 
 tion was not even spoken of. 
 
 Noteworthy is the admission made by Berchtold in the 
 conversation in question that Austria was now obliged 
 "to extend her mobilisation too" — an admission which 
 confirms the Austrian general mobilisation reported by 
 the Ambassadors of the Entente Powers as taking place 
 on the night from the 30th to the 31st July. That the 
 Austrian mobilisation against Russia was, in fact, car- 
 ried out during this night is also expressly admitted 
 in the telegram sent by Count Berchtold on July 31st 
 to his diplomatic representatives abroad (Red Book, 
 No. 53). 
 
 Both States — Austria and Russia — were, however, as 
 I have pointed out elsewhere, at one in the view that 
 inohilisation was in no way equivalent to war. Although 
 both States had ordered general mobilisation on July 
 31st, Berchtold telegraphed as follows to his diplomatic
 
 THE CRIME 333 
 
 representatives : "Pourparlers between the Cabinets at 
 Vienna and Petrograd appropriate to the situation are 
 meanwhile being continued, and from these we hope 
 that things will quieten down all round." They did, in 
 fact, continue, or rather they only began at the moment 
 when mobilisation on both sides had already taken place. 
 They took place in Petrograd on July 31st and August 
 1st, even after the German ultimatum, and were only 
 finally broken off in consequence of the German declara- 
 tion of war.^ On an earlier occasion also, in a telegram 
 of July 24th to Count Mensdorff, Berchtold expressly 
 pointed out that Austria had already mobilised twice 
 (1908 and 1912) because of Serbia.^ Russia also had 
 mobilised on each of these instances, and, nevertheless, 
 peace had been maintained on both occasions by diplo- 
 matic negotiations. This is a confession on the part 
 of her own ally which is damaging to Germany! In 
 spite of all mobilisations, peace could have been main- 
 tained on this occasion also if Germany had desired to 
 maintain it. 
 
 14. In connection with the question of mobilisation 
 there is one charming episode which I should not like 
 to keep from the reader as it throws a ray of comedy 
 into the dark tragedy; I refer to the history of Sazonof's 
 broken word of honour which is dished up for us by 
 Austrian diplomacy. Hitherto we have had knowledge 
 of only three broken words of honour: the Russian 
 Minister of War, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, 
 and the Russian Emperor were the breakers of their 
 word (see the German White Book). That was not 
 enough for the Austrian gentlemen ; they felt constrained 
 to add a fourth breaker of his word, M. Sazonof. Count 
 Szögyeny, who appears in part to misunderstand all im- 
 portant occurrences, and in part to slumber through 
 
 'Red Book, Nos. 55, 56. 
 ''Red Book, No. 17.
 
 334 I ACCUSE! 
 
 them, as we shall see later, reported from Berlin on 
 July 27th that Sazonof had given the German Ambassa- 
 dor a "guarantee" that as yet no mobilisation had taken 
 place, but only certain necessary military precautions 
 (Red Book, No. 33). I have already shown that this 
 declaration was in conformity with the truth. The 
 declaration, however, was given, not by Sazonof, but 
 by the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof (White 
 Book, page 8).^ It is amusing to obsei*ve how the 
 imaginary declaration of Sazonof (of July 27th) de- 
 velops in the Note of Berchtold (of July 28th) into a 
 broken word of honour on the part of Sazonof, and in 
 the Note of July 29th it is generously recognised that M. 
 Sazonof "now no longer denies" what, in fact, he never 
 had denied (Red Book, Nos. 42 and 48). Who can tell 
 how many broken Russian words of honour might have 
 been constructed had not the outbreak of war put an end 
 to this criminal activity! 
 
 15. The telegram sent by Berchtold to his Ambassa- 
 dors at London and Petrograd on July 31st deserves 
 special consideration (Red Book, No. 51). As the two 
 telegrams of July 30th to Count Szapary (Nos. 49 and 
 50) appeared at last to pave the way for the acceptance 
 of direct negotiations with Russia, so the telegram of 
 July 31st appeared at last to reveal a certain readiness 
 to accept Grey's mediation. The superficial observer 
 who does not keep sufficiently in view the secret connec- 
 tions between Berlin and Vienna — and even the Entente 
 Powers were such superficial observers until the be- 
 haviour of Berlin opened their eyes — is, in fact, com- 
 pelled to assume that Austria had at last, with the terror 
 of a European war in her heart, repented, and was en- 
 deavouring to maintain peace in both the ways proposed 
 by the Entente Powers, by means of direct negotiations 
 
 [^ Collected Documents, p. 408.]
 
 THE CRIME 336 
 
 with Russia and simultaneously by the mediatory action 
 of the Powers. 
 
 Accurately viewed, the position is quite different. 
 Austria was bound to know, and in fact did know, that 
 in consequence of the question of mobilisation intention- 
 ally pushed into the foreground by Germany the tension 
 between Berlin and Petrograd had meanwhile become 
 greater than that between Vienna and Petrograd, and 
 in consequence that even an apparent concurrence by 
 Austria in the peace proposals of the Entente Powers 
 could no longer prevent the coming of war. 
 
 This was one reason for Austria's sudden change of 
 front. It was harmless; Berlin had already provided 
 for all further developments. 
 
 The other reason, however — and this explanation is 
 given us for the first time by the Red Book — was that 
 the Austrian declarations themselves were so restricted 
 and limited that even without the ultimatum-policy of 
 Berlin they could not lead to a peaceful settlement. 
 From this side of the question Vienna herself provided 
 for all further developments. I have already pointed 
 out the reservations which the Government at Vienna 
 made in resuming negotiations with Petrograd. When 
 a negotiating party declares from the outset that she is 
 only prepared to give "subsequent explanations," and 
 that she had no "intention to depart" from her position, 
 negotiations are superfluous and futile. 
 
 Similar reserv^ations were made by the Government 
 of Vienna with regard to the English proposal of media- 
 tion. This proposal had its origin in Sazonof's tele- 
 gram of July 29th, which, having regard to the cate- 
 gorical refusal of the Vienna Cabinet on the previous 
 day to take part in further negotiations, asked the Eng- 
 lish Government for mediation in the interests of peace 
 in any form that appeared advisable.^ In the Note from 
 ^Orange Book, No. 50. Blue Book, No. 84.
 
 336 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Vienna of July 31st we find the following surprising 
 passage: "Sazonof has informed the British Govern- 
 ment that after the declaration of war by Austria-Hun- 
 gary against Serbia he is no longer in a position to deal 
 directly with Austria-Hungary." Is the phraseology 
 here used in any way intended to indicate that Sazonof, 
 for his part, had refused to enter into further negotia- 
 tions? Such an implication would have been a gross 
 falsification, refuted by the Austrian Red Book itself, 
 as well as by all the other diplomatic publications. 
 Sazonof was, in fact, no longer in a position to negotiate 
 with Vienna, not through any fault of his^ but because 
 Vienna had since July 28th refused to take part in any 
 further negotiations. Whom did they really expect to 
 deceive by this ambiguous phraseology? 
 
 Grey at once communicated Sazonof's request to 
 Prince Lichnowsky, and again put forward the proposal 
 of a conversation ä quatre in London, the form of which 
 he left entirely to the German Government. The ob- 
 vious presupposition of this, and of all other proposals 
 for mediation, was naturally the preliminary suspension 
 of hostilities against Serbia; it should, however, be ob- 
 sen^ed that what was asked was only a cessation of op- 
 erations, and not a withdrawal of Austrian troops from 
 Serbia. 
 
 What attitude did Count Berchtold assume with re- 
 gard to this proposal? Now on July 31st he for the 
 first time declared himself "quite prepared to entertain 
 the proposal of Sir E. Grey to negotiate between us and 
 Serbia," only, however, under the following condi- 
 tions : — 
 
 (a) the military action against Serbia should mean- 
 while continue to take its course; 
 
 (b) the Russian mobilisation must be brought to a 
 standstill, whereupon the Austrian counter-measures in 
 Galicia would also be cancelled.
 
 THE CRIME 337 
 
 Was this an acceptance or a refusal of Grey's media- 
 tion? It was a refusal in the form of an acceptance. 
 Could it be seriously asked of the Russian Government 
 that it was for them to begin demobilisation while Aus- 
 tria was prepared to cancel partially in Galicia the gen- 
 eral mobilisation which she had ordered in the previous 
 night, only after the Russian mobilisation had been 
 brought to a standstill? Could it be seriously asked of 
 Russia that, during the proposed conference of Am- 
 bassadors in London, of which neither the beginning 
 nor the term could yet be determined, she should allow 
 Austria to proceed with her measures against Serbia, 
 and thus in the meantime crush the tiny State? In 
 addition to this, Austria had merely expressed in gen- 
 eral terms her readiness to "entertain" {näherzutreten) 
 Grey's mediatory action, but had not accepted a confer- 
 ence in this form or in that. Events might thus follow 
 the same course as in Berlin during the preceding six 
 days, that is to say, the Government of Vienna, on go- 
 ing more closely into the question, might raise on their 
 side all manner of difficulties as to the form, while neg- 
 lecting, just as Berlin had done, to propose any practical 
 or acceptable form. In short, the Austrian answer to the 
 proposal of Grey which Herr von Tschirschky "com- 
 municated in accordance with instructions," without in 
 any way supporting it — this answer was so ambiguous 
 and restricted that it was equivalent to a refusal of the 
 proposal. 
 
 The Allied Governments could thus feel sure on both 
 sides that the desired war could not escape them. There 
 was as little hope of a peaceful issue of the negotiations 
 with Russia as of the success of the English mediatory 
 action, in consequence of the clauses and reservations 
 attached by the Government of Vienna to their accept- 
 ance of both proposals. If, however, there was any 
 danger of a peaceful issue, Berlin, by its ultimatum-
 
 338 I ACCUSE! 
 
 policy, was taking the necessary measures to secure that 
 under all circumstances war was bound to come. The 
 cards were, in fact, shuffled with such dexterity that the 
 game could not be lost — the game of war which had so 
 often been played in peace, and which now they wished 
 to carry through in earnest. 
 
 So far our discussions have had reference to what is 
 contained in the Austrian Red Book, and these have 
 confirmed anew the points in the indictment framed 
 against Austria. 
 
 Austria criminally provoked the Serbian war, and, as 
 a consequence of that, the European war: — 
 
 by addressing to Serbia demands which were im- 
 possible of fulfilment, 
 
 by refusing an answer which accorded her almost 
 complete satisfaction, 
 
 by the recall of her Ambassador, and by the decla- 
 ration of war against Serbia, 
 
 by concealing her real objects in making war, 
 
 by categorically declining all negotiations and all 
 actions of mediation up to the last moment, when 
 it was too late, 
 
 by imposing conditions on her final consent which 
 were necessarily bound to exclude from the out- 
 set the possibility of success. 
 
 II 
 
 What the Red Book does not contain 
 
 The above accusations may be inferred from the con- 
 tents of the Red Book itself. 
 
 Much more serious, however, are the accusations
 
 THE CRIME 339 
 
 which may be inferred from what is not contained in 
 the Red Book, accusations against Austria and Germany 
 alike. The Red Book contains nothing, not so much as 
 a syllable: 
 
 (a) of the alleged pressure which Berlin is sup- 
 posed to have exercised on Vienna in the sense of 
 peace ; 
 
 (b) of all the proposals for mediation which were 
 made by the Entente Powers, apart from the con- 
 ference of the four Powers. 
 
 I. The White Book and the Blue Book are, as I have 
 elsewhere shown, full of the emphatic assurances of the 
 German Imperial Government that it had made every 
 efifort to exert a moderating influence on Vienna in the 
 sense of arriving at a peaceful understanding. "Faithful 
 to our principle that mediation should not extend to the 
 Austro-Serbian conflict, which is to be considered as a 
 purely Austro-Hungarian affair, but merely to the rela- 
 tions between Austria-Hungary and Russia (this is the 
 famous distinction dealt with above), we continued our 
 endeavours to bring about an understanding between 
 these two Powers. We further declared ourselves ready, 
 after failure of the conference idea, to transmit a second 
 proposal of Sir Edward Grey's to Vienna. . . ." &c. *Tn 
 spite of this we continued our attempts to the utmost, 
 and we advised Vienna to show every possible advance 
 compatible with the dignity of the monarchy. . . ." 
 "Shoulder to shoulder with England we laboured inces- 
 santly, and supported every proposal in Vienna," &c. 
 "During the interval from July 29th to July 31st, whilst 
 these endeavours of ours for mediation were being con- 
 tinued with increasing energy, supported by English 
 diplomacy," &c. — passages such as these are to be found 
 everywhere in the White Book. In his speech of August 
 4th the Chancellor assured his hearers that he had car-
 
 840 I ACCUSE! 
 
 ried his task of mediation at Vienna "to the utmost 
 point which was compatible with our position as an ally." 
 
 Similar assurances were given in unfaltering succes- 
 sion to the English diplomatists in Berlin and London. 
 It is everywhere said, especially by the Chancellor him- 
 . self, that he had pressed the button in Vienna as hard 
 as he could, that he had energetically preached peace 
 and moderation, and that perhaps he had already gone 
 too far.^ Herr von Jagow even gives expression to the 
 fear that the strong pressure which he had exercised on 
 Vienna in favour of negotiations on the Serbian answer 
 might have produced a contraiy effect and hastened the 
 Austrian declaration of war.^ In short, Herr von Jagow 
 and Herr Bethmann-Hollweg bubbled over with peace- 
 ful assurances and alleged efforts in the cause of peace in 
 Vienna, and posed before the German people and the 
 English Government as angels of peace constantly flut- 
 tering to and fro between Vienna and Berlin bearing 
 the palm in their hand. 
 
 Even in reading the German White Book one cannot 
 fail to be surprised that these efforts for peace remained 
 always and everywhere completely unsuccessful. It is 
 everywhere the same story : Vienna had refused on this 
 or that ground. Either Vienna was not prepared to 
 negotiate, or it was too late to do so, or the Russian 
 mobilisation had intervened, and so on. Everywhere 
 the total result was nil. 
 
 I have already pointed out that this negative result 
 has in the highest degree a suspicious appearance; if 
 Berlin had seriously wished, Vienna was bound to give 
 way in everything without demur, for Vienna by herself 
 was powerless in Europe. There was here a mysterious 
 point in the relations between Vienna and Berlin which 
 urgently called for an explanation. The assurances that 
 
 * Blue Book, Nos. 107, 108. 
 'Blue Book, No. 76.
 
 THE CRIME 341 
 
 efforts were made for peace must be clearly proved if 
 they are to command credence. The failure of the ef- 
 forts alleged to have been made by Berlin was so sur- 
 prising that the efforts themselves became in a high 
 measure unworthy of belief. 
 
 The matter assumed a more suspicious air in view of 
 the personality of our Ambassador in Vienna, Herr von 
 Tschirschky-Bögendorf. He had the reputation of being 
 an outspoken enemy of Russia and Serbia, who, instead 
 of advising moderation at the Ballplatz, goaded on to 
 war. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the English Ambassador, 
 openly expressed the view that Herr von Tschirschky 
 desired war from the first, and that he allowed his strong 
 personal bias to colour his actions, that he was constantly 
 dealing in secret with the Austrian Government, and that 
 he never invited the co-operation of the Ambassadors 
 of the Entente Powers. Sazonof also emphasised the 
 strongly marked attitude of hostility towards Russia 
 shown by the German Ambassador, who was suspected 
 of having known the Austrian Note before it was de- 
 spatched, and who openly declared to anyone who cared 
 to listen that he endorsed every word of the Note, and 
 regarded the Serbian answer as a sham.^ When an 
 Ambassador of this character receives instructions which 
 in more than platonic form "transmit" English proposals, 
 but neither support these proposals nor counsel energetic 
 pressure, we can understand how matters stood with re- 
 gard to the urgent efforts for peace of the Berlin Govern- 
 ment in Vienna, and what the action of mediation looked 
 like "which was carried to the utmost point which was 
 compatible with our position as an ally." 
 
 All these indications and, above all, the unconditional 
 failure of the alleged efforts of Berlin, compel us to 
 entertain doubts as to the veracity of the Berlin assur- 
 ances. The certainty, however, that these assurances 
 ^Blue Book, Nos. 32, 95, 139, 141, 161.
 
 342 I ACCUSE! 
 
 are untrue, and consciously untrue, has for the first time 
 been furnished by the Austrian Red Book. It contains 
 nothing, not so much as a syllable, about all that Beth- 
 mann and Jagow so volubly claim to have done ; it con- 
 tains in all only a few communications from Herr von 
 Tschirschky to Count Berchtold which took place "in 
 accordance with instructions," and which only rise on 
 one occasion to the observation that a British proposal 
 "was brought before the Vienna Cabinet for their con- 
 sideration." ^ The question at issue here was the im- 
 portant and urgent proposal put forward by Grey on 
 July 27th (Blue Book, No. 46) to the effect that after 
 Russia, by the exercise of her conciliatory influence in 
 Belgrade, had obtained so favourable an answer from 
 Serbia, Austria should at least accept the Serbian an- 
 swer as a basis for discussion, seeing that it went far 
 beyond all expectation in meeting the Austrian demands. 
 Let anyone read this urgent request addressed by Grey 
 to Prince Lichnowsky on such firm grounds, his wann 
 appeal to Germany's love of peace, his desire to keep 
 closely in touch with Germany, his emphasis on the fact 
 that after the success which had attended Russia's ad- 
 vice and the concessions made by Serbia it was now the 
 turn of Vienna to show some spirit of accommodation, 
 and that Berlin, in the first instance, could, and must, act 
 in this direction. Let anyone read this, and compare it 
 with the completely frigid manner in which Herr von 
 Tschirschky brings Grey's proposal "before the Vienna 
 Government for their consideration." No one will then 
 be surprised that the proposal was declined with equal 
 frigidity by the Government of Vienna on the ground 
 that "after the opening of hostilities by Serbia and the 
 subsequent declaration of war the step appears belated." - 
 Such is the appearance of the efforts wJiich Berlin 
 
 ^ Red Book, Nos. 43, 44, 51. 
 ''White Book, p. 409; Exhibit 16.
 
 THE CRIME 343 
 
 made in Vienna in the interests of peace. Until to-day 
 no instruction, no telegram, no note has been printed 
 which offers the slightest proof that: any such efforts 
 were made in the cause of peace. The expectation that 
 evidence on this point would be contained in the Austrian 
 Red Book has been disappointed. Where are the proofs 
 — we have the right to ask Herr von Bethmann — what 
 evidence is there for your assertion that you earnestly 
 used your influence in Vienna in the direction of peace? 
 The German and the Austrian publications are silent on 
 the question, if, indeed, they do not support a view di- 
 rectly opposed to your assertions. A communication is 
 no recommendation. To bring forward a matter for 
 consideration is not the same as giving it support. Where 
 is the pressure which you say you asserted at Vienna? 
 When your printing press gives us a proof of the pres- 
 sure yon imprinted at Vienna we will believe you. Until 
 then we will give to these assertions, as to so many 
 others for which you are responsible, the name which is 
 properly theirs, and declare them to be falsifications of 
 the truth which have sprung from your guilty conscience 
 in the hope of concealing your crime. 
 
 2. I now come to a much more serious point. Where 
 are the proposals for arriving at an agreement put for- 
 ward by Grey and Sazonof which ought to have reached 
 Vienna by way of London and Berlin, but which never 
 elicited an answer from Vienna? 
 
 Let us recapitulate briefly the position of affairs before 
 we formulate the charge on this point. On July 29th, 
 after the outbreak of the Austro-Serbian war and the 
 rupture of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petro- 
 grad, Grey proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the German 
 Ambassador, the well-known formula for agreement, 
 which was to allow Austria to retain possession of Bel- 
 grade and the neighbouring territory as a pledge for a 
 satisfactory settlement of her demands, and from there
 
 344 I ACCUSE! 
 
 announce to the four Powers not directly concerned the 
 conditions under which she was prepared to arrive at an 
 understanding.^ This proposal of Grey's was forwarded 
 to Berlin by Prince Lichnowsky, and from there it was 
 alleged to have been transmitted to Vienna.^ To this 
 proposal, however, no answer was ever made either by 
 Germany or by Austria. The Berlin Government was 
 repeatedly urged for an answer by Grey and Goschen, 
 but it was constantly asserted that no reply had yet been 
 received from Vienna.^ The most varied reasons, or 
 rather evasions, were produced to explain the absence of 
 an answer, although the time was pressing and the fate 
 of Europe hung on every hour. Grey's proposal, which 
 represented the utmost conceivable point to which it was 
 possible to go to meet Austria, which secured for her in 
 the fullest measure her diplomatic and her military- 
 prestige — this proposal received no answer, and is not 
 so much as mentioned in the Red Book. The actual ne- 
 gotiations, so far as they are mentioned in the Red Book, 
 come to an end with the conversation between Grey and 
 Prince Lichnowsky on the morning of July 29th (Blue 
 Book, No. 84), to which Berchtold's telegram of July 
 31st (Red Book, No. 51) has reference. Later events 
 are not mentioned in the Red Book, apart from the two 
 conversations which Count Szapary had with Sazonof 
 on July 31st and August ist. 
 
 Now there were two conversations between Grey and 
 Lichnowsky on July 29th, the first in the morning — to 
 which Berchtold's telegram of July 31st relates — ^and 
 the second on the afternoon of the same day (Blue Book, 
 No. 88). The Red Book comes to an end with the dis- 
 cussion of the first conversation (Blue Book, No. 84), 
 
 ^ Blue Book, No. 88. Telegram of King George, 30 July [Col- 
 lected Documents, p. 538]. 
 ^ White Book, p. 411. 
 *Blue Book, Nos. 98, 103, 107, 108, 112.
 
 THE CRIME 345 
 
 and not even a word is said of the second, or, for that 
 matter, of any later events. The significance of this may 
 be gathered in figures from the fact that the Enghsh 
 Blue Book contains i6i documents, of which only about 
 a half, that is to say 84, are considered by the Austrian 
 Government to be worthy of consideration or even of 
 mention. All the events of decisive importance which 
 took place between England, Russia, and Germany be- 
 tween the afternoon of July 29th and August ist, that 
 is to say, during the four critical days of the Euro- 
 pean conflict, have no existence for the Austrian Gov- 
 ernment — apart from the two repeatedly mentioned con- 
 versations between Szapary and Sazonof on July 31st 
 and August ist. The interchange of diplomatic tele- 
 grams between the European capitals in these exciting 
 days does not appear to have disturbed the composure 
 of the gentlemen in the Ballplatz. They know nothing, 
 or at least they wish to know nothing, of the untiring 
 efforts of Grey, Sazonof, and Viviani to marshal whole 
 series of formulae, each going further than its predeces- 
 sor in the direction of meeting the wishes of Austria, 
 and all intended to preserve the peace of Europe even at 
 the last moment. The gentlemen in Vienna continue 
 their slumbers, or at least affect a slumbering posture, 
 and this drowsiness is so infectious, even on their for- 
 eign representatives, that it is possible for Count 
 Szögyeny, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, to report 
 to Vienna on August 2nd that "the Secretary of State 
 has just informed me that no answer has been received 
 from Russia to the German demand ; Russian troops 
 have crossed the German frontier; Russia has thus at- 
 tacked Germany. Germany, therefore, regards herself 
 as at war with Russia." ^ This communication, remark- 
 able both for its logic and style, was sent by the Aus- 
 trian Ambassador to Vienna on August 2nd as the latest 
 'Red Book, No. 57.
 
 346 I ACCUSE! 
 
 sensational news, twenty- four hours after the delivery in 
 Petrograd of the German declaration of war, which, how- 
 ever, was not in any way based on an attack by Russia, 
 but on her failure to give an answer to the ultimatum. 
 This is the only sign of life manifested by Berlin since 
 the communication of the conversation between Grey and 
 Lichnowsky on the morning of July 29th — ^this comedy 
 of buffoonery lagging twenty-four hours behind the 
 tragedy. This is the only proof of the superhuman ef- 
 forts of the Imperial Chancellor to move Vienna to an 
 attitude of compliance — the only proof of the strong 
 pressure on the button which went to the utmost point 
 compatible with an ally's position, which was, however, 
 unfortunately insufficient to awaken the Austrian Am- 
 bassador in Berlin from his righteous slumbers. 
 
 3. Grey's formula of agreement was thus allowed to 
 slip under the table undiscussed. But where are the 
 formulce of agreement put forward by Sazonof? Were 
 they buried in Berlin, or transmitted to Vienna? If 
 the second of these courses was taken, what attitude 
 did Vienna adopt towards them? Were they ignored, 
 refused, or amended? Nothing whatever is known on 
 this point. Neither the German White Book nor the 
 Austrian Red Book contains one iota about them. We 
 are obliged to refer to the publications of the Entente 
 Powers to trace the history of these formulae. This 
 history always leads as far as Berlin; of the further path 
 from Berlin to Vienna we know nothing. 
 
 With regard to Grey's proposal, there is at least this 
 much reported in the White Book, that it had been 
 "forwarded to Vienna," and that Russia, as they "as- 
 sumed," had accepted the proposal.^ We are not told 
 what attitude was assumed by Vienna towards this pro- 
 posal; we only know from the publications of the En- 
 tente Powers that up to the last moment Berlin main- 
 ^ White Book, p. 411 [See footnote on p. .]
 
 THE CRIME 347 
 
 talned that no answer had yet been received from 
 Vienna. 
 
 The White Book and the Red Book, however, make 
 no mention whatever of the proposals of Sasonof; they 
 simply do not exist for them. The first proposal of 
 Sazonof (Orange Book, No. 60) was, as is known, 
 verbally dictated to the German Ambassador on July 
 30th ; it was transmitted to the Berlin Government by 
 their own and the Russian Ambassador; it was sup- 
 ported by England and France, but was declined by 
 Jagow without consulting Vienna on the ground that it 
 was unacceptable to Austria. Among other points 
 raised, we have a right to ask for a definite answer. 
 Yes or No, to the question whether the Government of 
 Vienna were informed of this formula of Sazonof which 
 satisfied all their wishes. If so, what attitude did it 
 assume? Why did not Austria accept the proposal, 
 which required of her only what she had herself already 
 promised, namely, that she should respect the sovereign 
 rights of Serbia, and which, on the other hand, granted 
 to her everything that she could in any way desire of 
 Russia, namely, that Russia should stop her military 
 preparations (La Russie s'engage ä cesser ses preparatifs 
 militaires). 
 
 If, however, the Government of Vienna received no 
 communication with regard to the proposal of Sazonof, 
 how is the German Government to justify this, their 
 omission f By what right does Herr von Jagow take it 
 upon him to keep to himself and to decline in the name 
 of Austria, without giving any reasons, a proposal which 
 would assuredly have guaranteed peace? What reasons 
 had he for this refusal, what inner grounds, if the rea- 
 sons he had were not such as could be admitted to the 
 world ? Out with them ! This is a serious, a desperately 
 serious business. We are no longer dealing with a diplo- 
 matic puppet play, but with the fatal game of dice in
 
 348 I ACCUSE! 
 
 which the stakes are the destinies of nations. The White 
 Book and the Red Book are silent, but the public con- 
 science cries aloud, and calls on the guilty to give an 
 account of their actions. 
 
 4. The fate of the second proposal of Sazonof's was 
 even worse than that of the first. We have seen that, 
 after unending trouble and the despatch of countless 
 telegrams, the diplomacy of the Entente Powers suc- 
 ceeded in approximating to each other Grey's formula of 
 July 29th and that of Sazonof of July 30th. The result 
 was a second formula outlined by Sazonof on July 31st 
 which, "in accordance with the English suggestion," 
 expressly permitted Austria to leave her forces on Ser- 
 bian territory, and only required her to stay the march 
 of her troops (arrctcr la marche). In return for this, 
 Russia undertook to maintain her waiting attitude {con- 
 server son attitude expectante), and the Great Powers 
 would examine the satisfaction which Serbia could ac- 
 cord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without in- 
 jury to her rights as a Sovereign State or her inde- 
 pendence.-^ This formula was at once telegraphed to 
 the Russian Ambassadors accredited to all the Great 
 States, including the Ambassador at Vienna, and re- 
 ceived the most energetic support both from Grey and 
 from Viviani. 
 
 I have already pointed out that this proposal for 
 agreement safeguarded in every way the military pres- 
 tige of Austria, inasmuch as it allowed her, during the 
 whole further course of negotiation with the Great 
 Powers, to leave her troops in Serbia, and thus to retain 
 the occupied territory as a pledge for the fulfilment of 
 her demands. The proposal, in fact, contains precisely 
 what the Austria/i Government ask of the Entente 
 Powers in the introduction to the Red Book (page 4),^ 
 
 'Orange Book, No. 67. Blue Book, Nos. 120, 132. 
 * [Collected Documents, p. 445.]
 
 THE CRIME 349 
 
 namely, that they should assume a ''waiting attitude." 
 This waiting attitude was expressly provided for in the 
 various formulae of agreement; indeed, it represented the 
 essential foundation of these proposals. 
 
 Between the second formula of Sazonof and the form 
 in which Austria on July 31st declared her readiness to 
 negotiate (Red Book, No. 51), there was only one dif- 
 ference, namely, that Austria desired to continue her 
 military action against Serbia, whereas Sazonof desired 
 that it should be brought to a standstill — a desire which, 
 as is known, he later expressed in even more moderate 
 form in stating that he regarded it only as "very im- 
 portant that Austria should meanwhile put a stop pro- 
 visionally to her military action." ^ Thanks to the Rus- 
 sian spirit of compliance, the difference between the two 
 points of view had been reduced to so trifling dimen- 
 sions that with the least good will a settlement could 
 not fail to be brought about if — and that is the question 
 — if this good will in fact existed. In this, however, 
 Germany and Austria were defective. We know noth- 
 ing of the fate of the Russian proposal in Berlin and 
 Vienna. The White Book and the Red Book again main- 
 tain an attitude of silence on this point. Without doubt, 
 the proposal got as far as Vienna and Berlin, but there 
 is equally no doubt that in both places it remained un- 
 answered. Only in one way can this silence be ex- 
 plained ; it would have been impossible to accept the pro- 
 posal, or even to discuss it, without bringing about the 
 peace which they did not desire. It was, however, equally 
 impossible to refuse the proposal, since it was much too 
 conciliatory to make it possible to justify a refusal. 
 And so it was decided that the proposal should simply 
 be ignored, both then and now — then because peace 
 was not desired, and to-day because they do not wish it 
 to be recognised how criminally they avoided peace. 
 ^Blue Book, Nos. 133, 139.
 
 350 I ACCUSE! 
 
 • •••••• 
 
 These are the facts revealed by the Austrian publica- 
 tion, the acts of commission and omission which are 
 chargeable to the allied Empires. 
 
 The Red Book and the White Book taken together 
 constitute the gravest indictment which could be written 
 against Germany and Austria; they confirm anew the 
 judgment pronounced on the ground of the earlier pub- 
 lications : that Germany and Austria are alone and ex- 
 clusively guilty of having consciously and intentionally 
 brought about the European war. 
 
 These things being so, it ill becomes the Austrian 
 Government to take the field with the heavy artillery 
 of their moral indignation against the "self-seeking 
 policy of Great Britain" and the "desire for a revanche 
 of the French Republic," and the unscrupulousness of 
 Russia, and to reproach the Entente Powers with the fact 
 that they provoked the European war by "ranging them- 
 selves beside the (Serbian) Kingdom with its load of 
 
 guilt;; 
 
 It is untrue that the Triple Entente intervened exclu- 
 sively on the side of Serbia. The opposite is the case, 
 and this fact is confirmed, not only by the publications 
 of the Entente Powers, but also by the Red Book itself. 
 From the very beginning the Governments of England, 
 France, and Russia did not restrain their sympathy for 
 Austria's justifiable demand for satisfaction, nor did 
 they fail to express their deep horror at the assassination 
 of Serajevo. At the same time, after the unprecedented 
 humiliation of Serbia they could not, and dared not, omit 
 to urge on the Government of Vienna precepts of modera- 
 tion, and to warn them of the consequences which would 
 ensue from the continuance of an unaccommodating at- 
 titude. The Entente Powers, by their moderating in- 
 
 I
 
 THE CRIME 351 
 
 fluence in Belgrade, had already elicited the submissive 
 Serbian answer. They were ready at the conference 
 proposed by Grey to do everything in their power to 
 accord satisfaction, even to those wishes of Austria 
 which were of a more far-reaching character. Bimsen 
 and Grey, Sazonof and Schebeko repeatedly assured the 
 Government of Vienna of their readiness to give effect 
 at the conference to the justifiable wishes of Austria 
 by every means in their power.^ Where, then, is the 
 political selfishness of the Entente Powers? Where 
 is the one-sided participation on behalf of Serbia? 
 Where Is the effort to humiliate the Austrian monarchy? 
 The history and the antecedents of the European con- 
 flict clearly reveal which side was guilty of political 
 selfishness, who it was who for her own interests gam- 
 bled with the well-being of all civilised nations. Did not 
 Austria annex Bosnia and Herzegovina in violation of 
 the solemn obligations contained in the Treaty of Ber- 
 lin, and thereby stir into full flame the Great Serbian 
 national movement? Did not Austria, in pursuit of her 
 selfish interests, push to such an extreme length the ques- 
 tion of Skutari, the question of the Serbian harbour, 
 the Albanian question, that on two or three occasions 
 in the last ten years a European war, on account of 
 Austria, was imminent? In August, 1913, was not Aus- 
 tria prepared to begin a war against Serbia, without 
 any regard for the European consequences, and would 
 have done so had not Italy refused to give her support? 
 Austria, the accomplice and the tool of Germany in the 
 present world-war, has indeed no reason to reproach the 
 Entente Powers with the violation of "public morality 
 and humanity." The accusation which the Austrian Gov- 
 ernment brings against the Entente Powers : "It is they 
 who must be made answerable before history for the 
 
 ^ See Blue Book, Nos. 5, 12. Orange Book, Nos. 4, 40, 42, 43. 
 Yellow Book, Nos. 26, 27, 30. Red Book, Nos. 41, 47, 50.
 
 352 I ACCUSE! 
 
 immeasurable suffering which has come upon the human 
 race" — the full weight of this accusation falls back on 
 Austria and Germany. To bring about a European war 
 in order to rid herself of an inconvenient neighbour was 
 at once a crime and a folly. The war against Serbia, 
 whatever its issue, could only worsen Austria's position 
 in the Balkans; it could in no way improve it. The 
 European war, however, which Austria, at Germany's 
 instigation and with her support, conjured up along with 
 the Serbian war, could only be for Austria a case of 
 driving out the Devil by Beelzebub, of decapitation as 
 a cure for toothache ; c'etait plus qu'un crime, c'etait line 
 faiite. 
 
 Like a bull with lowered horns, the Austrian Govern- 
 ment plunged on against the red cloth of Serbia, with- 
 out looking to the right or the left, without troubling 
 about the consequences, which a blind man could not 
 avoid foreseeing. 
 
 And now the consequences have come — ^npw already, 
 before the war is decided. With the blood oozing from 
 her heavy wounds the double eagle is lying on the 
 ground. Serbia is free. But Galicia and part of Buko- 
 wina are in the hands of the enemy. On all the fron- 
 tiers of the many-tongued empire the neighbouring peo- 
 ples are stirring to draw over to them their oppressed 
 kindred by peaceful pressure, or, if need be, by force of 
 arms. In every joint the decayed building of the Haps- 
 burg Monarchy is creaking, and already the process of 
 decomposition is beginning, which, but for the suicidal 
 policy of the Government of Vienna, might have been 
 deferred for generations to come. With the cry of war: 
 "Vivat Austria, pereat miindiis," the struggle began; 
 with the cry of peace, "Vivat mimdus, pereat Austria," 
 it will come to an end.
 
 IV 
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 
 
 I HAVE arrived at the end of my task. The terrible 
 thing, which for long hovered before the eyes of the 
 nations of Europe, but which was never regarded as 
 possible, has come to pass. Prosperous seats of the old 
 civilisation of Europe have been transformed into heaps 
 of rubbish and ruin. The earth, covered with the snow 
 of winter, has drained the blood of millions of the chil- 
 dren of men in the prime of life. In common graves, 
 far from their wives, their children, and their mothers, 
 hundreds of thousands are laid to rest together without 
 cross and without memorial — friend and foe united in 
 death. Unending trains, filled with wounded, traverse 
 the country from east to west and from west to east, 
 and inside there they lie, the poor men with mangled 
 limbs, with bruised bodies, with disfigured countenances, 
 moaning and sighing in their pains, many disfigured 
 beyond recognition, with arms or limbs wrenched 
 off; those denied the light of truth have lost the light 
 of day; they still live whom death has claimed. 
 They form one vast bleeding wound in the body of hu- 
 manity. 
 
 Millions of women and children weep out their eyes 
 day and night for the dear ones whom they have lost, 
 for the dear ones whom they receive back helpless and 
 crippled for life. Countless dwelling-places of peaceful 
 men, countless centres of industrial activity, countless 
 memorials of the art of man have been burned down 
 
 353
 
 354. I ACCUSE! 
 
 and destroyed ! The labour of generations, of centuries, 
 is transformed into dust and ashes. The fields are tram- 
 pled, the corps annihilated, the castles of the great and 
 the cottages of peasants are levelled with the earth; the 
 unfortunate inhabitants, women and children, grey- 
 headed men and women, wander along the country- 
 roads without shelter, without a home, in rain and in 
 wind, in snow and in hail, onward anywhere in the hope 
 that somewhere there may be a corner where they may 
 still their hunger and obtain a wretched shelter in their 
 misery. 
 
 And still onward goes the struggle and the task of 
 murder. Like the ebb and the flow of the tide, the 
 armies of millions move backwards and forwards, and 
 every step forward and every step backward costs new 
 hecatombs of human lives, inflicts new wounds and new 
 pains, creates new widows and new orphans. 
 
 And what sort of a life do they lead who are still 
 living? They are buried in holes in the ground, day 
 and night, weeks and months, like cave-dwellers of pre- 
 historic times ; indeed, their lot is worse than theirs ! 
 The water is up to their knees, often they are days on 
 end without food, crouching down before the bullets of' 
 the enemy, overwhelmed by shrapnel and shells, which 
 at a stroke destroy their earth-dwellings reared with so 
 much labour, and cast them down in the trenches dead 
 and wounded. And then from time to time there is the 
 signal to attack! Out of the trenches! Fix bayonets! 
 Then there is the rush across the open field, while ex- 
 posed to the blattering machine-guns, which, the scythe- 
 man of these days, mow down those who are advancing 
 to the attack. And then comes the struggle of man to 
 man! Then they throw themselves at each other with 
 blows, with kicks, and thrusts with their sabres or with 
 the butt-end of their guns, one peaceful man against 
 another — peaceful, that is, until they have been turned
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 355 
 
 to beasts under the influence and the incitement of their 
 leaders, 
 
 under the roll of the drums, the fanfare of trumpets, 
 under the encouraging summons 
 
 "How beautiful to die the death of a hero for the Father- 
 land." 
 
 And they die like flies. Hundreds, thousands of 
 bodies fill up the trenches, and furnish a support across 
 which those who are following may advance to the at- 
 tack. And there are wounded lying among the dead. 
 And the battle rolls past over their heads. And the 
 horsemen tramp on them. And the cannons tear them 
 to pieces. And there is no help. Often for hours and 
 for days they must lie in the mud, exposed to the fire 
 of the shrapnel, poor men who cannot move, to whom 
 no help can be brought. How many bleed to death 
 there! How many are there who are only lightly 
 wounded, but who, in their helplessness, are delivered 
 over to death! 
 
 All reports agree that it is impossible to picture in 
 words the horrors of modern battles. I have spoken to 
 doctors, to people, that is, who are certainly, by their 
 profession, accustomed to what is horrible, and they 
 told me that the impression made by a battlefield and 
 by a hospital behind the Front is enough to drive any- 
 one mad. It can only be compared with a gigantic 
 slaughter-house, many thousand times larger than the 
 largest slaughter-houses in the world. It is impossible 
 to give correct treatment to each of the thousands of 
 wounded who are brought in at the same time, impos- 
 sible on account of their gigantic number, impossible 
 also on account of the interruption caused by the shells 
 which constantly imperil those hospitals situated in the
 
 356 I ACCUSE! 
 
 neighbourhood of the battlefield. What descriptions I 
 received from other doctors who have received the 
 wounded at the base hospitals or on their return home! 
 How many wounds, in themselves slight, end fatally or 
 at least involve amputation because they cannot in time 
 receive aseptic treatment! 
 
 In a report of Surgeon-General Körte we find : — 
 
 "In the recent fights on the Yser, on the canals as well 
 as round about Ypres, the most of the wounds, often even 
 those wounds caused by rifle-fire, are infected. The sol- 
 diers lie in wet trenches, and in consequence of the violent 
 artillery fire they can in many cases be picked up only after 
 days have elapsed ; some have lain five or six days in turnip- 
 fields or in deserted trenches before it was possible to bring 
 them to the field hospital. Serious infections are then not 
 uncommon, such as phlegmon and tetanus. ... I have 
 seen some recover who have been lying for days (6-8) in 
 stables, barns, or hay sheds in the most wretched external 
 conditions. There was one who had been lying helplessly 
 for five days in a turnip field and had kept himself alive by 
 eating turnips. . . . The roads are broken up, and the 
 villages have been so knocked to pieces in the battles which 
 have been going on for weeks that we have difficulty in 
 finding suitable rooms for hospital purposes." {Berliner 
 Tageblatt, 13th December.) 
 
 Another report, also from a doctor, says: — 
 
 "It is a depressing rainy morning; in the bottom of the 
 oozy bed of the canal there is the dirty water-channel and in 
 the slime and the gurgling water lie our brave men, who 
 died the death of heroes for the Fatherland. This picture 
 has imprinted itself too deeply in our souls for it ever to 
 be obliterated. I have them constantly before my eyes as 
 they lay down below us in their neat uniform, stiff and pale 
 with their bodies in the attitude in which death surprised 
 them, down below in the muddy canal-bed with its miry 
 clay." {Berliner Tageblatt, 24th December.)
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 35T 
 
 Life in the trenches is described in one report as fol- 
 lows : — ■ 
 
 "One has to be listening all the time until at last we 
 reach our own section of the trenches ; on the left and the 
 right, before and behind, there is the terrible roar of artil- 
 lery. Lucky for you if none of the shells burst in the 
 trenches. Quite close to me two of my chums were lying 
 quietly together under a blanket in the shelter. One was 
 hit in the stomach by shrapnel : — dead ! The explosion was 
 very defective; the other was only burned in the face and 
 the hands, . . . Some days ago we stormed and took a 
 village ; in the fields around about many of my chums are 
 still lying unburied. They are within reach of the enemies' 
 fire and we cannot get to them by day or by night. . . . 
 Among our fallen chums there are heaps of dead cattle 
 which are now swollen. In the farmyard the sows are eat- 
 ing their own young; two children are lying among them, 
 a boy and a girl. Everywhere the holes caused by the 
 shells are gaping in the ground, some are so big that 30 to 
 40 men could find room in them." {Berliner Tageblatt, 
 23rd December.) 
 
 A member of the Landwehr writes from Russian Po- 
 land : — 
 
 "Necessity knows no law, and our provisions could not 
 always be got after us quick enough in the country. But 
 it was not only their victuals, etc., but often also the pro- 
 tection of their roof and their cattle as well that the in- 
 habitants lost when we advanced. The military flooded into 
 the needy houses and into barns and lofts like a wild 
 stream, and took possession of their rooms and their fire- 
 sides, and often the population with all their youngsters 
 wandered about outside in the pouring rain. ... I never 
 learned what the family did that night, but for long I have 
 been unable to forget that impression, for I have myself 
 got children at home and I thought with horror that they 
 also might some day be in the same position, unless we sue-
 
 358 I ACCUSE! 
 
 ceeded in protecting the frontier. As though by chance the 
 words turn up in my brain with an ironic sound : 'War is 
 glorious, war is beautiful.' If I could only catch a sight of 
 the writer of these lines, I would soon drive his theory out 
 of him." {Vorwärts, 8th December.) 
 
 A First Lieutenant in the Resen^e describes what hap- 
 pened in the beautiful church at Becelaere, in Belgium: — 
 
 "On the evening of the same day I was lying in this beau- 
 tiful Church along with hundreds of other wounded men. 
 A bullet fired by English Infantry had gone through my 
 breast and my lungs, broken some ribs, and pierced the 
 pelvic bone. Mattresses were ranged alongside of each 
 other on the stone floor of the Church, and on each there 
 lay a wounded soldier. The doctors were binding up and 
 examining the wounded. More and more came in, and by 
 nightfall the Church was quite full. All night long there 
 could be heard a subdued groaning and moaning and quiet 
 prayers and supplication to God from every corner and 
 from every shady nook. ..." A wounded man has just 
 been bandaged by a doctor when a shell finds its way 
 through the open Church door. The head of the wounded 
 man sinks back, the shot has penetrated his forehead and 
 killed him. "Two severely wounded soldiers are lying to- 
 gether ; both have wounds in their stomach and neither will 
 come through with his life; the shadow of death already 
 flits over their faces." The chaplain gives them the Holy 
 Communion. The setting sun breaks with gentle radiance 
 through the stained church windows and illumines the fea- 
 tures of both the soldiers dying of their wounds. Then 
 suddenly there is a deafening uproar. The walls fall down 
 upon the wounded men. "Fragments of shells come whis- 
 tling down. . . . Shrieking and groaning is heard. , . . 
 There is a hopeless tangle of men, debris and mattresses 
 . . . those who are slightly wounded creep out of the 
 chaos on all fours ; those who are severely wounded are 
 brought into the open air by people belonging to the Med- 
 ical Corps. Some of the dead are recovered. . . . The
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 359 
 
 Church of Becelaere is left standing, lonely and deserted, 
 a picture of desolation." (Berliner Tageblatt, of the 19th 
 of December.) 
 
 From a letter from the front written by an infantry 
 officer : — 
 
 "We suffered very serious losses in men, but also in offi- 
 cers and in non-commissioned officers. It tugs at one's 
 heart to remember all our dear comrades with whom we 
 have so often been happy together. Often the bodies of 
 those who fell could be buried only after many days, on one 
 occasion not until 12 days after being hit. You can im- 
 agine the condition in which they were then. But the enemy 
 gave us no time and no peace to collect the bodies. Lieu- 
 tenant S., with whom in our careless days we drank together 
 in beautiful K. — you remember him, — and Lieutenant W. 
 fell two weeks ago. They were found only a few days ago 
 in a little wood, and their bodies were already completely 
 decayed. . . . The harvest which death has reaped here 
 from us and from our enemies reminds one of the fearful 
 time which Ypres and the surrounding country experienced 
 five hundred years ago, when the plague reduced the popu- 
 lation from 200,000 to a tenth of that number." {Berliner 
 Tageblatt, 14th December.) 
 
 A soldier of the Landwehr from Charlottenburg re- 
 ports as follows with regard to a fight at close quarters 
 on the Yser Canal : — 
 
 "The horrible groans of the zvounded resounded through 
 the night. In hunger and in cold we awaited the morning. 
 One detachment lay in the trenches ; the rest of us were 
 standing in the entrance hall. In the grey of the morning 
 a Belgian Major came out of the house with his bicycle. 
 . . . He had just gracefully lit his cigarette, when a shot 
 from the trenches put an end to his life. This was the 
 signal for the fight in the streets. . . . We were only four 
 metres distant from the enemy. The enemy wanted to press 
 us back into the canal. The leaders of our company and the
 
 860 I ACCUSE! 
 
 other officers soon fell. The command passes from one of 
 us to the other. The enemy threw sulphur bombs, which lit 
 up the whole canal, and poisoned the air for us. Our men 
 fell one after the other. It was an unending struggle of 
 man against man. The enemy pressed us more and more 
 closely. It zvas no longer a Ught, it was a mutual butcher- 
 ing. . . . With the butt-end of the rifles we beat the 
 enemy out of the trenches, and made the dust fly. The rage 
 was indescribable. Every centimetre of ground was here 
 bought with blood. . . . The dead and the wounded lay 
 together in heaps ; those who could still walk sought to get 
 back to the hospital over the bridge, but it was a sorrowful 
 business for the poor fellows who had been shot in the legs, 
 and who could not go with them. They had to put up 
 with the heavy shrapnel fire of the enemy." (Vorwärts, 
 24th December.) 
 
 Here is a little genre picture from the Wiener 
 Arbeiterzeitung : — 
 
 A Reservist born in Warnsdorf had had both his feet 
 frostbitten in the Carpathians ; he was brought back, and he 
 asked his wife to meet him at the station at Reichenberg. 
 As his wife was about to go up the stairs at the station she 
 saw "an old, broken-down man with white hair painfully 
 coming along the platform, supported on two sticks with a 
 bundle in his arm. Out of pity she was going to take the 
 bundle from the man and help him to walk." In this mo- 
 ment she recognised him: "it was her own husband; the 
 woman collapsed unconscious." 
 
 A very interesting contribution to the solution of the 
 question Avhether war "develops the noblest virtues of 
 man" (Field-Marshal Moltke) or whether conversely, 
 "it makes more bad people than it takes away" 
 (Kant), is furnished by a report of a battle published 
 in the Jaucr'sche Tageblatt of October i8th, 1914. The 
 writer of this report is the subordinate officer Klemt, of
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 361 
 
 the First Company of the 154th Regiment, and his state- 
 ment is expressly confirmed at the conclusion by his 
 Lieutenant and the leader of the Company, von Niem. 
 The heading of the article is "A Day of Honour for Our 
 Regiment, September 24th, 19 14." As a human, or 
 rather as a bestial, document the report deserves to be 
 reproduced in extenso; I regret that for reasons of space 
 I must content myself with an extract : — 
 
 "The first Frenchmen were already discovered; we 
 brought them down like squirrels, and gave them a waim 
 reception with blows of the butt and bayonet : they no 
 longer needed doctors ; we are no longer fighting loyal ene- 
 mies, but treacherous brigands. By leaps and bounds we 
 got across the clearing. They were here, there, and every- 
 where hidden in the thicket. Now it is down with the 
 enemy! And we will give them no quarter. Every one 
 shoots standing, a few, a very few, fire kneeling. No one 
 tries to take shelter. We reach a little depression in the 
 ground : here the red trousers dead or wounded lie in a 
 heap on the ground. We knock dozvn or bayonet the 
 wounded, for we know that those scoundrels fire at our 
 backs when we have gone by. There was a Frenchman 
 there stretched out, full length, face down, pretending to 
 be dead. A kick from a strong fusilier soon taught him that 
 we were there. Turning round, he asked for quarter, but 
 we answered: "Is that the way your tools work, you — ," 
 and he was nailed to the ground. Close to me I heard odd 
 cracking sounds. They were blows from a gun on the bald 
 head of a Frenchman, which a private of the 154th was 
 dealing out vigorously ; he was wisely using a French gun 
 so as not to break his own. Tender-hearted souls are so 
 kind to the French wounded that they finish them with a 
 bullet, but others give them as many thrusts and blows as 
 they can. Our adversaries had fought bravely, we had to 
 contend with picked men ; they let us get within thirty, even 
 ten metres of them — too near. ... At the entry into the 
 screen of branches they lay groaning and crying for quarter,
 
 862 I ACCUSE! 
 
 but whether wounded slightly or severely the brave fusiliers 
 spare their country the cost of caring for many enemies." ^ 
 
 The report concludes with a description of how the 
 tired troops, after their labour of blood, lay down in 
 slumber. "The god of dreams paints for one or the 
 other a pleasing vision. With a prayer of thanks on 
 our lips we slumbered on to the coming day." 
 
 What makes this report so horrible is not so much the 
 occurrences which it narrates as the brutal naivete wüth 
 which they are represented as glorious actions of hero- 
 ism, specially attested by their leader, and published in 
 the most prominent place of the official newspaper of 
 the district. It may be that brutalities have also been 
 committed by the other side — when the beast is let loose 
 in man it need cause no wonder if bestialities occur — 
 but I have looked in vain for the publication of such 
 "heroic" deeds in the foreign Press. That anyone should 
 sit down in cold blood after his work of murder is 
 over and vaingloriously narrate in glowing colours hor- 
 rors of this sort to his townsmen at home, his friends, 
 his own wife and children, makes the matter much more 
 pitiful even than it is in itself. The "prayer of thanks" 
 to God could not, of course, be wanting in a German 
 report of battle. His Royal Highness Prince Oscar of 
 Prussia is also quoted by the under-officer Klemt as an 
 admirer of the heroic deeds narrated : "With these 
 Grenadiers and with the 154th we could take hell by 
 storm," exclaimed the Prince, and he assured both the 
 regiments that they were worthy of the name of "Royal 
 Brigade." 
 
 The report in the Jauer newspaper unites in itself — 
 like the horse afflicted with every conceivable malady 
 of which a picture appears in veterinaiy schools — all the 
 
 ^ [As translated in the English edition of M. Bedier's German 
 Atrocities.]
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 363 
 
 "noblest virtues" which war can and must produce : 
 bestiahty, boastfulness, false piety, and so on. Whether 
 the world "would stagnate and lose itself in Material- 
 ism," if these qualities remained undeveloped, I leave 
 to be decided by people who are cleverer than I am. 
 
 The Russian poet Valerij Brjussow describes as fol- 
 lows his impressions of the battlefield at Lowitz : — 
 
 "The trenches are empty, but near them lie here and there 
 the bodies of German soldiers on their backs, face down- 
 wards, or on their side, their arms stretched out or held 
 tight to their breasts, with strangely peaceful faces. The 
 most of them are wearing their dark-grey uniforms, some, 
 however, are in their soldiers' cloaks, which have clearly 
 been used to protect them against the cold. Among the dead 
 I see young men with soft faces, with the first down on 
 their cheeks, but I also see older, graver men who have 
 entered the forties, who have probably long ago established 
 their life on a firm basis, and certainly never thought that 
 it would be their fate to close their life on a snow-covered 
 field in foreign lands, in far-off distant Russia. . . . Our 
 soldiers accompany us in our walk along the side of the 
 trenches, and look at the faces of the dead in solemn thought 
 and contemplation. In war one becomes accustomed to the 
 appearance of death. Death is so constantly before one's 
 vision that it ceases to awake a feeling of terror." (Vor- 
 wärts, 1 6th December.) 
 
 An infantry soldier thus describes the fearful battles 
 in Flanders in which he took part: — 
 
 "The soldiers were standing up to their ankles in water 
 in their protected positions when they received the order to 
 attack. The enemy belched against us their destructive 
 shells from 20 mouths of fire. Many were literally torn 
 to pieces. . . . All the time our rage grows more terrible. 
 . . . There was a thick black powder smoke ; we thought 
 we should choke; scarcely anything could be seen of the
 
 364 I ACCUSE! 
 
 men. These were the shells from the English Navy, which 
 was taking part in the battle. . . . Across the middle of 
 the field eight horses were galloping, still attached to the 
 gun-carriage, when a shell burst in the middle of them. A 
 heartrending shriek followed from the animals, and then 
 there was nothing to be seen but a quivering, tangled mass 
 weltering in a puddle of blood. . . . Listen, what is that? 
 A trumpet signal. The sound quivers, as if it also felt the 
 pain. 'Fix bayonets.' The clean steel now shines on the 
 barrels of the gun which spits out fire. ... A shell burst 
 beside the third man on my right ; he was killed, my neigh- 
 bour was thrown out and severely wounded. The same 
 thing happened on my left. The drummer beat his drum. — 
 Up ! Charge ! Hurrah ! I believe that our cheer drowned 
 the thunder of the artillery. Then we went for the enemy 
 with the bayonet. I will not describe to you the bayonet 
 charge. // was a butchery. Twice we had to retreat ; on 
 the third attack we won. When you at home hear of the 
 victory: 'Fall of Dixmuiden!' will you shout hurrah? We 
 thought of the sacrifices ; many, many were lying on the 
 field bleeding." (Vorwärts, nth December.) 
 
 How Beautiful to Die for the Fatherland 
 
 That is what war looks like, as it is, and as it is felt 
 by those who are taking part in it. I seek in vain in 
 all the hundreds of letters from the front, and in the 
 war correspondence which daily fills the columns of the 
 newspapers, for any expression of the sentiment: "How 
 beautiful it is to die for the Fatherland." I find repre- 
 sented everywhere merely the unspeakable horror and 
 the barbarity of the struggle between men, who nourish 
 against each other no sentiment of hostility, who have 
 all left mothers at home; many, very many, wives and 
 children ; and who are all filled with the one thought : 
 "Oh, that it were peace again! Oh, that you were but 
 home among your dear ones, caressed and nourished by
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 365 
 
 your children, in the arms of your wife and mother, free 
 for ever from this horrible task of murder." 
 
 The great men behind the front have, of course, dif- 
 ferent views on the subject. Their bones are not broken. 
 Their houses are not burnt down. Their wives and 
 children are not driven out of house and home. Their 
 castles and their domains are not destroyed. They hun- 
 ger not, neither do they thirst. They sleep in their beds, 
 not in holes in the earth like wild beasts. When they 
 have a pain in their heart or their liver they can go 
 home and get cured by a course at the springs or the 
 baths; their wives and fathers and children can hasten 
 to them, tenderly embrace and care for them, until after 
 weeks and months they can return once more with re- 
 newed vigour to their posts of security behind the battle- 
 front. 
 
 While in front of the enemy death and destruction are 
 sweeping away the flower of the youth of all countries, 
 the prosperity of many generations, the great men sit 
 far behind 
 
 * Kant in Perpetual Peace (p. 145) censures as illogical and 
 blasphemous the common conception of a co-operation or a con- 
 currence (concursns) on the part of the Deity, as, for example, 
 when we say that the physician has restored the sick with the help 
 of God. "God created the physician as well as his means of heal- 
 ing, and we must ascribe the result wholly to him." [This foot- 
 note appears to refer to the censored passage.]
 
 366 I ACCUSE! 
 
 "Forward! forward! Up and at them!" is the call 
 . And those at the front answer with 
 moaning and groaning, with pains and torments, with 
 longing thoughts of peace and home, which still illumine 
 their last faltering look. "Gee up! gee up!" calls the 
 driver, and lashes the poor horses who are straining to 
 move the heavy wagons forward on the clammy roads. 
 They sink in the mud, but he knows no pity. Only 
 forward, forward! Hold on! No slackening! And he 
 would drive the poor brutes to death if there were not 
 a league for the protection of animals which shields the 
 wretched beasts against their tormentors. But where is 
 the league for the protection of men? It is high time 
 that such a league were founded. 
 
 Prestige 
 
 What does a war mean to the great men of the earth? 
 A new emotion added to countless others. A drama of 
 chivalry played out in earnest, a question of ambition 
 and of vanity, which they designate by the word "pres- 
 tige"; a "great event in their life," ^ like the victory 
 of their colours at the Hoppegarten or of their yachts 
 at the Kiel Regatta. "The glory of the ruler consists in 
 this, that, without his requiring to expose himself to 
 danger, thousands stand at his command ready to let 
 themselves be sacrificed for a matter of no concern to 
 them. The difference between the savages of Europe 
 and those of America lies chiefly in this, that, while 
 many tribes of the latter have been entirely devoured 
 
 ^ See the telegram of the Crown Princess Cecilia to the Govern- 
 mental President in Danzig after the battle of Longwy: "Please 
 tell all our dear people in Danzig and West Prussia of my hus- 
 band's victory north of Metz, knowing how much interest the 
 Province which is so near to us will take in this great event in 
 his life. God protect you all." 
 
 I
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 367 
 
 by their enemies, Europeans know a better way of using 
 the vanquished than by eating them; and they prefer to 
 increase through them the number of their subjects, 
 and so the number of instruments at their command 
 for still more widely spread war} 
 
 To sacrifice many thousands for a matter of no con- 
 cern to them! That is the true meaning of this and of 
 most other wars. What does prestige mean to these mil- 
 lions of poor devils who are to-day called upon to lay 
 down their lives on the battlefield of Europe? They do 
 not even know the word, let alone the idea. Prestige is 
 a luxury for him who is already surfeited with all the 
 other gifts of life. It is the obstinacy which refuses 
 to give way even when one feels oneself in the wrong, 
 because one is strong enough not to need to give way. 
 For the common citizen, however, for the peasant and 
 the labourer, prestige is the daily bread which he must 
 bitterly earn in the sweat of his face, his health which 
 renders it possible for him to achieve his labour, his 
 family which brings sweetness and light into his hours 
 of his leisure. That is his prestige, and for it he would 
 fight voluntarily and with enthusiasm if these blessings 
 were imperilled. 
 
 It is for this reason that they try to persuade him that 
 they are in danger. The "cunning of a policy that shuns 
 the light" exercises the arts of Probabilismus: it "at- 
 tributes evil intentions to others, or even the probability 
 of their possible superiority." 
 
 "It will be well to put an end to this sophistry, and 
 to bring the false advocates of the might of the earth 
 to confess that it is not right but might in whose in- 
 terest they speak. ... In order to do this, we must 
 first expose the delusion by which they deceive them- 
 selves and others" (Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 174, 175). 
 
 Does that not read as if it had been written to-day? 
 
 ^Kant: Perpetual Peace, p. 130.
 
 368 I ACCUSE! 
 
 Is not every word applicable to our position to-da)'' and 
 to our present-day leaders? And if the gentlemen who 
 signed the "Appeal to the civilised world" do, in fact, 
 "hold the inheritance of Kant as sacred as their hearth 
 and their soil," then they should read this wonderful 
 essay on Perpetiml Peace, which, amid all the storms of 
 the French revolutionary wars and under the dominance 
 of a Prussian military autocracy, dared to utter revo- 
 lutionary truths which to-day would be suppressed as 
 seditious, and exposed to the persecution of blood at the 
 hands of the supreme commanders in the Mark of Bran- 
 denburg. 
 
 It is for a phantom that millions to-day are bleeding, 
 that millions are hungering, and that inestimable wealth 
 is being destroyed. It is for the phantom of prestige, 
 of world-power, which has been tricked out in the guise 
 of the deliverer of the Fatherland. The gesta Dei per 
 Francos are from now to be transformed into the gesta 
 Dei per Teiitones. The "worshipful" German people — 
 as a privatdocent writes (how will he express himself 
 when he becomes a professor?) — is, in fact, to be wor- 
 shipped by all others as the super-nation. The Germans 
 are to advance "to the front of the world," and all 
 these hallucinations of an endemic swollen-headedness 
 are then designated "defence against the enemy's attack," 
 in order thereby to make them palatable to the sound 
 sense of the simple people. 
 
 Proletarians of All Countries, Massacre Each 
 
 Other! 
 
 To beguile the labouring classes to change their peace- 
 ful battle-cry, "Proletarians of all countries, combine 
 with each other!" into the bloody battle-cry, ''Prole- 
 tarians of all countries, massacre each other!" is a po- 
 litical tour de force which demands careful preparation,
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 369 
 
 great dexterity, and a fabulously brazen forehead. I 
 must admit that our leading men possess these qualities 
 in the fullest measure. Here, indeed, their achievement 
 is brilliant, unsurpassable. 
 
 The attitude of the Social Democratic party on August 
 4th in approving the first war credit of £250,000,000 has 
 rightly been subjected to sharp criticism abroad, and 
 especially by allied international parties. It ought to 
 be emphasised that in the meeting of the party, which 
 decided on concurring in the war-credit, there was a 
 minority distinguished, not in numbers, but by the im- 
 portance of its members. The attitude of the majority 
 is explicable by reference to those reasons which have 
 been active in drawing the whole of the German people 
 into this war, to the false illusion produced by the Gov- 
 ernment that this is a war of defence, and not of of- 
 fence. Ever since July 31st Germany has been barred 
 from all communication with foreign countries. No 
 one knew what took place in the world, and especially 
 in Germany, in the four days between July 31st and 
 August 4th. The German White Book which was laid 
 before the members of the House maintained that the 
 Russians and French had fallen upon us from the east 
 and the west, and that they had already penetrated into 
 Germany. The same assertion recurred in the speeches 
 of the Emperor and the Chancellor. No one was in a 
 position to establish what was true and what was false. 
 Under the impression that Germany was compelled to 
 fight for her security and her independence, the major- 
 ity of the Social Democratic Party supported the war- 
 credit, and, according to the statutory regulations of the 
 party, compelled the minority to adhere to this de- 
 cision. 
 
 The second approval, given on December 2nd, was 
 merely the consequence of the first, and since "it is the 
 curse of evil deeds, That to all time they still engender
 
 370 I ACCUSE! 
 
 evil," the group in the party which had approved the 
 first credit again secured a majority. Nevertheless, the 
 struggle within the party was more violent, and the 
 minority had grown stronger. As is well known, Lieb- 
 knecht alone had the courage and the strength of char- 
 acter to refuse to subject himself to Party-discipline and 
 to record his dissentient vote in the sitting of the 
 Reichstag. 
 
 This action has very properly met with the approval 
 of all comrades in the whole world, with the unfortunate 
 exception of the Social Democratic Party in the Reich- 
 stag. I regard as extremely regrettable the vote of cen- 
 sure passed by the Party on February 2nd. It is uni- 
 versally regarded abroad, not as a disciplinary measure 
 due to an offence against the internal order of the party, 
 but as a condemnation of the substantial point involved 
 in the dissension of Liebknecht, and therefore as an 
 emphatic approval of the war-credit and of the whole 
 war policy of the Government. As a matter of fact, it 
 would have been more expedient, having regard to the 
 future reconstruction of the international party, if in 
 this fundamental question party discipline had been ig- 
 nored ; such a course would have avoided the appearance 
 that it was unworthy of a member of the German So- 
 cial Democratic Party to vote against the war-credit. 
 
 It would appear that in Berlin no account was taken 
 of the effect which such a party resolution was bound to 
 exercise on their comrades abroad. Above all, they do 
 not appear to realise that the sympathy of all foreign 
 comrades are on Liebknccht's side, and not on the side 
 of the nationalist majority of the Social Democratic 
 Party. By his action on December 2nd Liebknecht has 
 become the most popular German socialist abroad, and 
 in saying this I have in mind neutral countries rather 
 than enemy countries, whose approval might appear sus- 
 pect. The reconstruction of the International Party
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 371 
 
 will be built on the attitude of Liebknecht, not on the 
 attitude of those members of the house who, once de- 
 ceived, were not possessed of the insight or the courage 
 to acknowledge or confess their error, and who have 
 gradually rolled down the slippery slope of opportunism 
 into the camp of the Nationalists and the Imperialists. 
 They have entangled themselves so strongly with the 
 "National," that they will not again find their way back 
 to the "International," and the International Party her- 
 self will not, as I hope and trust, later on spread out 
 her motherly arms and exclaim : "Bring back my bonny 
 to me." The prodigal sons — and it is better so — ^vill 
 hereafter also remain in a far country. 
 
 It is, however, necessary to compliment the German 
 Government on the fact that they have understood in 
 a masterly manner — at least for the present, the conse- 
 quences will be revealed later — how to put in operation 
 the policy of "divide et impera." "That is to say, if 
 there are certain privileged persons among the people 
 . . . bring about a quarrel among them, and make mis- 
 chief between them and the people" (Kant, p. 171). 
 They have succeeded in bringing about a quarrel among 
 these leaders, but it is to be hoped that the people will 
 be one when the day of the great reckoning comes, the 
 "day of judgment," when all guilt will be uncovered, 
 and every crime will find its expiation. 
 
 Political Morality — Moral Politics 
 
 As in matters of foreign policy the German Govern- 
 ment appears to have taken the instructions of Bern- 
 hardi as their guiding principle, so, in internal affairs, 
 they have chosen as their model Kant's description of 
 what a politician should not he. Where moral politics 
 cease, says the sage of Königsberg, political morality 
 begins. Political morality, however, which is equivalent
 
 37« I ACCUSE! 
 
 to non-morality, acts according to the following "So- 
 phistical maxims" : — 
 
 "i. Fac et excusa. Seize the most favourable oppor- 
 tunity for arbitrary usurpation — either of the authority 
 of the State over its own people or over a neighbouring 
 people; the justification of the act and extenuation of 
 the use of force ^N\\\ come much more easily and grace- 
 fully when the deed is done than if one has to think out 
 convincing reasons for taking this step, and first hear 
 through all the objections which can be made against 
 it. . . . Besides, this show of audacity in a statesman 
 even lends him a certain semblance of inward conviction 
 of the justice of his action; and once he has got so far 
 the god of success {bonus eventns) is his best advocate." 
 
 "2. Si fecisti, nega. As for any crime you have com- 
 mitted, such as has, for instance, brought your people 
 to despair and thence to insurrection, deny that it has 
 happened owing to any fault of yours. Say, rather, 
 ... in the case of your having usurped a neighbouring 
 State, that human nature is to blame; for if a man is 
 not ready to use force and steal a march upon his neigh- 
 bour, he may certainly count on the latter forestalling 
 him and taking him prisoner." ^ 
 
 Is that not a photographically true, almost prophetic, 
 picture of Bethmann's method of action, which, more- 
 over, has been characterised, not merely by the philos- 
 opher in his chair, but also by the philosopher on the 
 throne? "When Princes desire war they begin it, and 
 then summon an industrious lawyer to prove that they 
 were right" (Frederick II). You begin a war and then 
 prove that the other side began it, or at least that he 
 was on the point of beginning it, and that it was neces- 
 sary to anticipate him. In adopting such a course your 
 external honour can never be injured — that is, if you 
 are believed — for either you are compelled to be the 
 ^Kant, p. 170.
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 378 
 
 defender of the Fatherland or else you are the prudent 
 guardian of the peace, who anticipated the certain at- 
 tack. Morality, however, which ought to govern the 
 actions of States as well as of individuals, thereby comes 
 to grief, and no words appear to the philosopher of 
 Königsberg to be sufficiently strong to characterise the 
 perniciousness of such politicians. "But it seems that 
 by no theodicy or vindication of the justice of God can 
 we justify Creation in putting such a race of corrupt 
 creatures into the world at all. . . . Politics in the real 
 sense cannot take a step forward without first paying 
 homage to the principles of morals. And, although 
 politics, per se, is a difficult art, in its union with morals 
 no art is required." He who subordinates moral poli- 
 tics to political morals, that is to say, the principles to 
 the end, puts the cart before the horse, and acts against 
 the categorical Imperative.^ 
 
 That is the "inheritance" of Kant, and anyone who 
 exalts this inheritance thereby utters a condemnation of 
 the policy which has led to this, the most horrible of 
 all wars, a policy which has perhaps acted according to 
 "political morality," but which certainly has not been 
 an instance of moral politics. 
 
 Meanwhile, however, the work of blood, the hated 
 task, goes on, and the life blood of our nation is being 
 sucked dry as though by gigantic leeches, and drained 
 in the insatiable vengeance of the moloch of war. "To 
 visit a battlefield is a horrible business," wrote the Em- 
 peror Frederick HI. "It is impossible to describe the 
 fearful wounds presented to the eye. War is, in spite 
 of everything, a terrible affair, and those who, sitting 
 round a council table, conjure it up by a stroke of the 
 pen, do not know what they are doing." "The most 
 horrible side of war should, however, be seen by those 
 who have frivolously brought it about, by those diplo- 
 ^Kaut, pp. 182, 175.
 
 374 I ACCUSE! 
 
 matists who regard it as a factor in their calculations, 
 with the same lightness of heart with which a merchant 
 allows in his calculations for the possibility of a chance 
 of gain ; these men should themselves help to storm such 
 a canal-bridge exposed to the enemy's shell fire"; these 
 are the words of a doctor writing from the scene of 
 operations.^ 
 
 How do you feel, Herr von Bethmann, when you read 
 such things as these? How did you express it in your 
 last circular note?^ The "idea of a conference," you 
 say, was not "sympathetic" to you; the "form" of a 
 conference was "disagreeable." And now — are the fear- 
 ful consequences which have sprung from your refusal 
 more sympathetic to you? Do you find them less dis- 
 agreeable? Do you still dare, even to-day, to speak 
 of your sympathies and your antipathies, of your scruples 
 as to this or that form, when your antipathies and your 
 scruples have plunged Europe in a sea of blood, and 
 have made our famous European civilisation the laughter 
 of savage nations? "We savages are, after all, the better 
 men!" may be the rightful boast of the Red Indian to- 
 day. And if, as I recently saw in an allegorical picture, 
 all the yellow, black, and brown primitive nations were 
 to assemble on the edge of Europe, and, seeing the 
 scenes of murder and destruction, the smoking villages 
 and towns, were to exclaim in derision: "Voila voire 
 celebre civilisation/' Europe could only hide her head 
 in shame, and in justice admit the higher culture of 
 savage peoples. Have we, the nations of Europe, still 
 any legal title — such a title has, indeed, never been recog- 
 nised by morally thinking men — to embark on colonial 
 conquests when the only pretence that we can advance 
 for our predatory excursions, that we are the bearers 
 
 ^Berliner Tageblatt, 24th Sept. 
 
 ^^See Circular Note of the Chancellor of 24th December (Ap- 
 pendix III).
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 375 
 
 of culture and civilisation, has so miserably come to 
 nought ? 
 
 It is to you, Herr von Bethmann, that we owe all 
 this. Partiiriunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. The 
 mountains are in travail, and a little mouse is born. 
 Here it is the other way about; from the little mouse 
 of your antipathies and scruples there have arisen gi- 
 gantic mountains of human unhappiness. Go to the 
 battlefields, go to the hospitals; see the wounded, the 
 dead, and the dying; go into the wasted cities, and pray 
 before the ruined altars, entreating your Saviour for 
 forgiveness, that you, in place of the words "Peace on 
 earth, goodwill to men," have brought about "Murder 
 on earth, and for men fire and destruction." Then beat 
 your breast and confess aloud and in public, so that all 
 the world may hear it : "I am the guilty, I alone!" This 
 would not bring you righteousness, but it would be the 
 first step towards it — the penitence which in itself is 
 half atonement. 
 
 H the Emperor had not found a Chancellor to make 
 this "war of liberation," Germany would have 
 
 remained unliberated, that is to say, peaceful, molested 
 by none, developing her culture and her well-being in 
 the labour of peace. And what is now our position? 
 
 still happy if we can keep 
 from our frontiers the enemy, whom we ourselves called 
 into being; we should be fortunate if we could to-day 
 occupy the position we held half a year ago, possessed 
 of our colonies, our wealth, and the youth of our coun- 
 try, now murdered, and daily wasting away.
 
 376 I ACCUSE! 
 
 QUIDQUID DELIRANT REGES, PLECTUNTUR ACHIVI 
 
 But just for this purpose men are needed, 
 not courtiers; men full of character, who can oppose 
 the royal will, who can take the side of the Achaeans 
 against the King, "Immunity from punishment is a 
 special privilege of the kingly dignity, but it in no way 
 excludes the possibility of deserving punishment." The 
 task of men who stand beside kings as their responsible 
 advisers is to keep them from deserving punishment. 
 "Nor can there be a worse service either to the prince 
 or his people than enabling a monarch to rule in his 
 own person, dictating the commands of his own violence 
 or caprice through servants who disapprove of his meas- 
 ures, and yet suffer themselves to be made instruments 
 for carrying them into execution." ^ 
 
 What in the case of a prince is, at any rate, explic- 
 able becomes in the 
 case of a responsible statesman an unpardonable crime. 
 The prince who from his early youth is brought up in 
 the mystery of statecraft by the grace of God is sur- 
 rounded by flatterers and panderers, by courtiers and 
 parasites, who are apparently his servants, but are in 
 reality his masters, a prince who seldom hears the truth, 
 and who never desires to hear it, notwithstanding the 
 words of Mirza Schaffy : — 
 
 "The sage needs not the smile of those in high estate, 
 The wise man's sage advice is needed by the great."* 
 
 — a prince who regards the constrained silence of the 
 people as a token of unprecedented harmony, because 
 no one tells him what is living and stirring in the depths 
 of the nation's soul — such a prince is more easily ex- 
 
 * Brougham. Statesmen [Essay on Lord North]. 
 ' "Der Weise kann des Mächtigen Gunst entbehren, 
 Doch nicht der Mächtige des Weisen Lehren."
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 377 
 
 cused than a Chancellor, if he confuses his ambition for 
 wider fields of conquest for fame and glory with the 
 well-being and the happiness of his people. The coun- 
 sellors of a prince exist, however, for the express purpose 
 of protecting bim against the consequences of his own 
 passions, and of reminding him in the words of Junius: 
 "Before your Majesty subdues the hearts of your sub- 
 jects, you must gain a noble victory over your own."'^ 
 
 They must be, not the servants of their lord, but 
 the first servants of the State. A personal attachment 
 to the monarch can furnish no reason or defence for the 
 public behaviour of a minister; for the former rests on 
 sentiment, but the latter on duty, on the categorical 
 imperative. In the choice between sentiment and duty 
 the latter only must be decisive. The alternative, "se 
 soumettre ou se demettre/' can only be decided in favour 
 of the latter resolution. 
 
 Worst of all, however, is when a minister, not only 
 covers with his shield the 
 
 actions of his monarch, but endeavours to justify them 
 by Machiavellian manoeuvres. We have become almost 
 more Machiavellian than Machiavelli himself, and we 
 have quite forgotten that our great ancestor Frederick 
 II. wrote the Antimachiavel. "The promise given was 
 a necessity of the past; the broken word is a necessity 
 of the present." Does it not sound as if the clever 
 Florentine had expressly coined this phrase for the Bel- 
 gian question? "A Prince must have no other object, 
 and no other thought, and he must make nothing else 
 his study than war, its preparation and conduct." Has 
 this not been from time immemorial the policy of the 
 Kings of Prussia? "Let the Prince take care to con- 
 quer and to maintain his domination; the means will 
 always be declared honourable, and praised by every- 
 one." Is that not the thread of Ariadne, by which we 
 ^ [Letter 35. 19th December, 1769.]
 
 378 I ACCUSE! 
 
 hope to escape out of the labyrinth of our present situa- 
 tion, that we may not fall victims to the Minotaur of 
 universal condemnation? Machiavelli has usurped the 
 place of Kant, and in our case also the end justifies the 
 means. 
 
 Dreams of World Power 
 
 What is the object and the aim of this war? I have 
 already repeatedly pointed out that the object of our 
 rulers is the establishment of a new dominium mundi. 
 
 The Prussian Eagle is to spread his pinions over every 
 sea; a new age in history is to dawn; the Roman, the 
 Spanish, and the English world-empires are now to be 
 followed by the German.^ The saying of Virgil is 
 adapted for German use: ''T^i regere imperio populos 
 Germane memento." As Aristotle expected a trans- 
 
 * Now, of course, when the grapes have become sour, everyone 
 denies the existence of these plans of world power; here again 
 "it was nobody." On the same day, however, on which it was 
 declared from a high quarter that the supposed intention to found 
 a world-empire was "nonsense," an "Imperial Journal of the East- 
 ern Army" was issued by the Press Authorities of the German 
 Military Government in Lodz, in celebration of the Emperor's 
 birthday. In this we find the following: — 
 
 A victorious war — and God be thanked, no one in our Ger- 
 man Fatherland, from the oldest Field Marshal down to the 
 youngest cobbler's apprentice, has any doubt that such will 
 be the issue — will create for us a German Colonial Empire by 
 the annexation of Belgian and French Congo, and if Portugal 
 should transform into action her hostile attitude towards us, 
 the Portuguese Colonies on the East and West Coasts of 
 Africa as well. This will be an empire such as our fathers 
 who sneered in laughter at our first colonial beginnings could 
 never have imagined. . . . The most important point, however, 
 in this not improbable division of the African Continent is 

 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 379 
 
 formation of the Eastern world, a domination of Hel- 
 lenic culture, as a result of the expedition of Alexander 
 the Great, so we expect from this war the transforma- 
 tion of the Western world, a domination of German 
 culture. What a childish, unhistoric view! If wars in 
 long forgotten ages, wars between civilised nations and 
 barbarians, may at times have been the means of bring- 
 ing culture, their effect to-day among peoples of equal 
 culture is precisely the opposite; they are destroyers of 
 culture, promoters of atavistic barbarism. The future 
 of the human race to-day can lie only in the nations 
 of the world living peacefully together. All plans of 
 world-domination, which even in earlier times bore 
 within them the seeds of their own destruction, must 
 to-day, even before they achieve realisation, be wrecked 
 on the feeling of equality among all nations, on the 
 common consciousness that all are striving after the 
 same ends in culture and well-being, on the intimate re- 
 lations which bind corresponding classes of different 
 nations with each other. As geological strata and veins 
 of iron and mineral are not directed to the surface ac- 
 cording to the dividing lines between properties, but un- 
 
 that we shall thereby have given the final stroke to English 
 efforts to establish a sole dominion in Africa, from the Cape 
 to Cairo ; for between Egypt and East Africa and the Anglo- 
 Boer South Africa (which to-day are still English), there will 
 then lie the unending girdle of our gigantic colonial positions 
 from the Indian Ocean to the Central African Lakes, and from 
 the Congo to the Atlantic. Of North-East and South Africa 
 we say that to-day these are still English ; but who knows 
 what will happen if the word of the poet is fulfilled : "For 
 the world will one day find Healing in the German niind." 
 (Denn es muss am deutschen Wesen, einmal noch die Welt 
 genesen.) 
 
 The Newspaper which contains the foregoing remark is oMcially 
 published by the military authorities as a birthday-present for the 
 Emperor: sapienti sat.
 
 380 I ACCUSE! 
 
 derneath these boundaries pass from one property to 
 another, so the strata of modern human society are not 
 broken up by territorial frontiers, but pass from one 
 country to another. Horizontal interdependence has 
 taken the place of the vertical line of division. And \i 
 there is only one truly organised International, there 
 exist beside it a hundred others unorganised, held to- 
 gether by equally firm internal bonds. Of such are the 
 Internationals of trade, of industry, of the technical 
 and moral sciences, and of literature and art, all of 
 which constitute the indestructible spiritual bond con- 
 necting the nations; we may say that even crime has 
 become international. Wars may loosen, but they can- 
 not destroy these bonds. Nature itself, as Kant once 
 said, "through the natural course of human propensi- 
 ties guarantees the coming of perpetual peace, the future 
 of which we are not, indeed, enabled to prophesy, but 
 for which it is the duty of mankind to labour." The 
 path to perpetual peace lies, not in the domination of 
 one over others, but in a life lived together with equal 
 rights. 
 
 The dreams of our world-dominion will thus remain 
 dreams, even if we had the power to subject other 
 nations to our will. The aims which a Bismarck kept 
 in view were reasonable and attainable, because they 
 lay within the limits of the historical development of 
 our age. The formation of national States must first 
 be achieved before humanity is ripe for other more 
 comprehensive formations. The effort of the German 
 people to attain unity was a logical historical develop- 
 ment, and was therefore successful. The effort of recent 
 Germany, however, to attain world-dominion represents 
 historical retrogression, a falling away from the aims 
 set before civilised nations, and is, therefore, neces- 
 sarily bound to end in failure. 
 
 Our aim is therefore unattainable, and the means
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 381 
 
 adopted to attain it are criminal. Military success alone, 
 even if it were probable (which it is not), would not 
 bring us nearer to our aim by so much as a hairbreadth. 
 In the twentieth century there can no longer he a world- 
 dominion, and if one were possible we would be the last 
 to be recognised as rulers of the world. Any peace 
 which might more or less accord to us such a dominion 
 would be but an armed truce, and, as in the case of the 
 treaties of peace between Greeks and Persians, would 
 be concluded only with the clause "for the time being." 
 One war would continuously give birth to another, and 
 Europe unrestrainably and inevitably would be driven 
 into the abyss. 
 
 There is still time to avoid the worst fate; it is still 
 possible to 
 
 "Bind up the wounds inflicted on your country, 
 
 Rebuild the devastated homes of men. 
 
 And raise once more the pride of lofty towns 
 
 From smoky ruins. Spring will return again 
 
 And clothe the wasted fields with lushy green. 
 
 But they who fell the victims of your quarrel. 
 
 The dead, rise up no more ; the bitter tears 
 
 Shed in the issue of your controversy 
 
 Will be for ever shed. Another race 
 
 In God's own time will prosper, but the past 
 
 Will still remain the prey of misery. 
 
 The joys of generations still unborn 
 
 Cannot recall to life the long-gone dead."* 
 
 * "Des Landes tiefe Wunden heilen 
 Die Dörfer, die verwüsteten, die Städte 
 Aus ihrem Schutt sich prangender erheben, 
 Die Felder decken sich mit neuem Grün — 
 Doch die das Opfer eures Zwist's gefallen 
 Die Toten stehen nicht mehr auf ; die Thränen 
 Die eurem Streit geflossen sind, sie bleiben 
 Geweint ! Das kommende Geschlecht wird blühen 
 Doch das Vergangene war des Elends Raub, 
 Der Enkel Glück erweckt nicht mehr die Väter."
 
 I ACCUSE! 
 
 The dead rise up no more. But even the wounds 
 which have been inflicted on the economic Hfe of all 
 nations will only be slowly healed in many decades. 
 
 Who Will Pay the Cost of the War? 
 
 The cost and the damage caused by the war during 
 the first six months have been estimated by authorita- 
 tive writers at more than four thousand million pounds, 
 apart from all private expenditure and losses, apart 
 from the value to the nation of the dead and the muti- 
 lated, and apart from the labour lost to the State repre- 
 sented by the soldiers who are under arms. There 
 can be no question of compensation being paid for these 
 costs and losses of war by the defeated party to the 
 conqueror — if, indeed, a victory of one side or the other 
 is conceivable. In Germany, apart from the Empire, 
 the individual States and communes have also incurred 
 millions of debts. Who is to pay these gigantic sums? 
 Who is to labour and pay even the interest on them? 
 "When I see Princes and States fighting and quarrel- 
 ling, it always brings to my mind a match of cudgel- 
 playing fought in a china-shop" (Hume).^ The fellows 
 with the cudgels are the belligerent nations; the china- 
 shop is the economic organisation of the world, and it 
 will not be long before all the china in the world is 
 broken into fragments. 
 
 QuousQUE Tandem ? 
 How is it to go on? How is it to end? 
 
 ' [In the Essay Of Public Credit.]
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 383 
 
 Every victory is a Pyrrhic victory. "One more such 
 victory and I am lost." Among the sixty-seven millions 
 of Germans is there not a single soul who will dare 
 to brave the thunderbolts of Jupiter and exclaim, as 
 Themistocles did to Eurybiades : "Strike, but listen !" 
 Must subservient newspaper writers continue to let their 
 scandalous reports run through the Press, 
 
 — while outside on the snow-covered fields, in the damp 
 earth-huts, the children of their country perish and 
 bleed to death, while the widow and the fatherless pour 
 forth a rising flood of tears? 
 
 How long will all this still go on? How is it to end?' 
 The nations are not advantaged if after peace the "right 
 trusty cousins" fall into each other's arms in emotion, 
 embrace each other, and once more assume each other's 
 uniforms which they have discarded in the interval. 
 The nation is not advantaged by solemn entrances 
 through the Brandenburger Tor, 
 
 with crowns of laurel and the blare of trumpets. 
 
 It is peace the people want ; peace they are craving 
 for, peace for which they hunger and thirst. There 
 are enough dead and mutilated; there is enough mis- 
 ery and ruin. The conscience of the world is stirring; 
 the words now being raised in accusation will find the 
 sword of fulfilment if the stern accents of the voice of 
 the people remains unheard. Vivos voco, mortiios 
 plango, fidgura frango; I call the living, I lament the
 
 384 I ACCUSE! 
 
 dead, I defy the lightning — such is the call of the bell 
 of the world's conscience to the mighty ones. 
 
 And on your head 
 Turns he the widows' tears, the orphans' cries, 
 The dead men's blood, the pining maidens' groans 
 For husbands, fathers and betrothed lovers, 
 That shall be swallow'd in this controversy.^ 
 
 They have suffered enough, the Achaeans 
 
 The nations have never been 
 enemies. From all letters written at the front it is 
 clear that the feelings of hatred and of revenge are 
 unknown in the trenches. These are the dragon's eggs 
 which are hatched at home at the writing-tables in the 
 coziness of editors' rooms. From trench to trench 
 friendship and brotherhood are concluded. They visit 
 each other, make each other small presents, and shake 
 hands in friendship. And then they return to the 
 trenches, and shoot at each other on commands from 
 above. Is that not unspeakable, incredible? 
 
 If we had not known long ago that none of the bellig- 
 erent nations desired war, that a few hundred, at the 
 most a few thousand, criminal men had desired and 
 engineered this murder of the nations, the fraternisa- 
 tion between the trenches would prove that between the 
 nations no enmity exists. But just because it proves 
 this, just because it might be prejudicial to the energy 
 of murder, and gradually make it clear to those who 
 are fighting that they are fighting for nothing which 
 concerns them, that they are urged on against each 
 other by higher powers who are pursuing their interests 
 — for this reason, just as I am writing these lines, a 
 strong prohibition against these scenes of fraternisation 
 has been issued by the supreme German Command. 
 
 '^ Shakespeare, Henry V.
 
 THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEED 385 
 
 There must be no fraternisation, no hand-shaking, there 
 must be no pause in the firing, for God's sake, no ! The 
 task of murder must go on without loss of time. Nulla 
 dies sine linea, there must be no day without murder 
 and arson. 
 
 But all army commands will be of no avail. La 
 verite est en marche. Every hour, every day, brings 
 the illumination nearer. And if they will not — the gen- 
 tlemen behind the front — in the end they must. 
 
 Peace will come — soon, as quickly as possible, for it 
 must come. Woe to the generals who still throw their 
 sword into the balance — woe to those rulers who will 
 still refuse to hear the subdued, forcibly restrained voice 
 of the nations! Under the placid surface of internal 
 peace ^ the seething waters are in agitation, boiling and 
 bubbling. Woe to those who refuse to hear the subter- 
 ranean noises, and who still confide their bark to the 
 treacherous waters. They will be devoured by the 
 waves! — Discite moniti! Learn, you have been warned! 
 
 ^ [Burgfrieden.]
 
 THE FUTURE 
 
 What should Peace bring us? 
 
 The matter is not ended on the mere conclusion of 
 peace. What should peace bring us? What will peace 
 bring usf 
 
 It ought to bring what for centuries has been the 
 object striven after by most enhghtened minds : not an 
 armed truce, but an enduring state of peace, founded 
 on a sure basis of law. The system hitherto in force 
 whereby peace was balanced on the bayonet's point has 
 gone bankrupt, bankrupt for ever. The insanity of mili- 
 tary preparation, which in 1910 cost the States of 
 Europe, in direct expenditure alone, provided for in 
 the Budgets — apart, that is to say, from indirect expen- 
 diture not so provided — a sum of approximately 500 
 million pounds, and which since then has become at 
 least 20 per cent, more costly each year, this insanity 
 has not fulfilled the purpose which was supposed to 
 justify its existence. The fact that the States of Europe 
 endeavoured to outbid each other in an unholy emula- 
 tion in armaments by land and by water, in the air and 
 under the sea, constituted a menace to peace, not a se- 
 curity against war. A perpetually increasing feeling of 
 distrust has sprung from this iron seed. All diplomatic 
 negotiations became to the nations of Europe an object 
 of fear and anxiety on account of the distant clang of 
 arms, and everyone was swayed by the oppressive feel- 
 
 386
 
 THE FUTURE 387 
 
 ing that this condition of affairs could not continue, 
 that at length we would be compelled to alter our course 
 or be driven to disaster. 
 
 The catastrophe has now arrived, the catastrophe 
 which has been so long the object of prophecy and of 
 dread. But it has dragged into its whirlpool not merely 
 the life and the well-being of nations; it has engulfed 
 also the system, which, it was imagined, afforded to the 
 nations a deceptive security. 
 
 THE SYSTEM OF ARMED PEACE 
 
 On the system of armed peace judgment has been 
 passed. In peace it devoured the marrow of nations, 
 and it has failed in preventing war. The system of 
 European equilibrium has revealed itself to be even 
 more fatal than the previous system, when individual 
 States, armed to the teeth, confronted each other. The 
 Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was mere child's play in 
 comparison with the struggle of the nations in 19 14. 
 A mistaken system cannot be corrected by being drawn 
 on a large, instead of a small, scale. On the contrary, 
 the weaknesses and the defects inherent in it must thereby 
 be made more patent. The guarantee of peace supposed 
 to be afforded by military armaments must work with 
 more fatal effect the greater the numljer of States allied 
 with each other in the two scales of the balance. What 
 in the ratio of i : i was already unreasonable and per- 
 nicious must be thrice as unreasonable and pernicious 
 in the ratio of 3 : 3 — pernicious in peace, even worse 
 in war. By the concatenation of alliances and ententes 
 a position has now been reached which enormously sur- 
 passes all the visions of horror foretold by far-seeing 
 sociologists. 
 
 The prophecies of Johann von Bloch with regard to 
 the character, the extent, and the horror of a future
 
 S88 I ACCUSE! 
 
 European war have all been realised — only the realisa- 
 tion is far worse than the gifted Russian statesman 
 could possibly have foreseen. He could not have imaged 
 to himself the development of aeronautics, of subma- 
 rines, of the gigantic siege-artillery, and of all the other 
 recent triumphs of culture. But in his monumental 
 work of 1899 he already prophesied that on the occa- 
 sion of the next European war there would be shown 
 to have taken place in the years since 1870 a greater 
 progress in the mechanism of war than that represented 
 by the development from the age of bows and arrows 
 down to the Franco-Prussian War. Even then he had 
 prophesied that the new artillery would exercise such 
 a murderous effect that it would scarcely be possible 
 to speak of a battle in the former sense of the word or 
 of personal bravery, and that war must develop into 
 a continuous fortification-war between trenches. He 
 characterised in all its details the horror and the terror 
 of the modern war of machinery, and he, expressed 
 doubts — ^and his doubts have to-day been frequently 
 confirmed — whether modern civilised Europeans could 
 bear all these fearful impressions on their mind, on 
 their senses of seeing and hearing, without giving way to 
 insanity. In such a war — so prophesied Bloch — there 
 would no longer be a conqueror and a conquered, there 
 would no longer be any possibility of giving proper at- 
 tendance to the gigantic number of the wounded, unless 
 the Army Medical Service was made almost as strong 
 numerically as the combatants. There would be no pos- 
 sibility of obtaining sufficient supplies in the exhausted 
 countries in which the battles took place. There would 
 be no possibility of the belligerent States raising for 
 any length of time even the bare daily cost involved in 
 the maintenance of such enormous armies. All this was 
 foreseen by the pacifist Johann von Bloch, not in virtue 
 of any special gift of second sight, but merely by rea-
 
 THE FUTURE 889 
 
 son of his profound study for many years of these 
 questions of so vital importance to the civilisation of 
 Europe. 
 
 And now we are experiencing what he foresaw — a 
 swaying backwards and forwards of these armies of 
 twenty million men — without end, without result, with- 
 out even the possibility of a final decision, notwithstand- 
 ing all the inspiring appeals of kings and of the leaders 
 of armies. Forwards! Backwards! Backwards and 
 forwards! Such are the constantly changing rallying 
 cries. Only for the dead is there no retreat. A village, 
 a farmyard, a trench, a hillock demands thousands of 
 sacrifices. A single well-directed shrapnel can — with 
 luck — kill or mutilate a hundred men. The worst of 
 all, however, is that this massacre en masse represents 
 a suicide of the nations, which must gradually perish 
 from loss of blood and from exhaustion ; it has but one 
 favourable consequence, in so far as it is at the same 
 time a suicide of the political system out of which the 
 war was born — a suicide of this system, not only in 
 internal, but also in foreign affairs. 
 
 After the war it will not be possible — as even the most 
 infatuated militarist will admit — to effect an increase in 
 armaments. Even in the past the burden of European 
 armaments had become an intolerable weight. Emile 
 de Girardin was right when he said forty years ago : 
 "Misery could be abolished with the half of present-day 
 European expenditure on war." The insanity of this 
 system may be illustrated by the following example : In 
 the primitive ages of human society, two neighbouring 
 occupiers of the soil, when each had to provide his own 
 protection, become suspicious of each other. Each fears 
 that he will be attacked by the other, whereas in reality 
 neither entertains evil intentions against his neighbour. 
 Instead of tilling their fields and increasing their herds, 
 they call upon all their people, their women and chil-
 
 390 I ACCUSE! 
 
 dren, their peasants and servants, to devote their whole 
 time, day after day, month after month, year after year, 
 to the preparation of entrenchments and barricades 
 against their neighbour, to the forging of arms, to the 
 creation of bows and arrows and sHngs. Their suppHes 
 are gradually used up. The means of obtaining such 
 supplies elsewhere are exhausted. Both are on the verge 
 of starvation. At last, in the moment of supreme need, 
 the distrusting neighbours resolve to discuss matters with 
 each other, and, behold! neither of them has ever had 
 any intention of attacking the other, and all the time 
 each has dreaded only that the other was going to 
 attack him. At a stroke the shadows of distrust dis- 
 appear. But the dark shadows of the insane dissipa- 
 tion of their strength will long hover about their house 
 and their home, and for long years to come will prevent 
 them from regaining their former state of prosperity. 
 
 The nations of Europe have not been able to discover 
 in time the pathway to reason, and consequently in 
 the nature of things the other solution of the intolerable 
 tension was bound to come about — the solution of un- 
 reason, the substitution of an open for a latent state 
 of war. We have already seen in the course of this 
 discussion who is responsible for the fact that this so- 
 lution by force had to come, that all attempts to bring 
 about an enduring state of peace were bound to fail. 
 But even the guilty party will now realise that all his 
 military preparations, all his opposition to every pro- 
 posal to bring about an understanding, have brought him 
 no advantage, and that there has to come to pass what 
 we pacifists have always prophesied : the relative strength 
 of the various nations — notwithstanding the ruin of 
 them all — ^has in essential matters remained unaltered. 
 
 And so judgment is passed on the system. The possi- 
 bility of resuming or strengthening this condemned sys- 
 tem is excluded, and — ^after the final wreck of anarchy
 
 THE FUTURE 391 
 
 based on force — the only course open to the European 
 system of States is to return to the thought which for 
 centuries the most distinguished minds in Europe have 
 preached as the only means of salvation, whereby the 
 old world of our culture can be preserved from complete 
 destruction. 
 
 That thought is: 
 
 A COVENANT OF PEACE BETWEEN FREE NATIONS 
 
 based on a mutual recognition of their rights and on 
 mutual confidence — a federation of free States, as Kant 
 calls it. This would be a federation of nations, not a 
 State of nations {Ein Völkerbund, kein Völkerstaat), a 
 covenant which would leave to the States enjoying mem- 
 bership their full sovereignty with only the one limita- 
 tion, that they should not abuse this sovereignty by mak- 
 ing war against any of the covenanting States. This 
 federation would be based, not on force, but on mutual 
 confidence, on the feeling of duty, on the categorical 
 imperative. The sage of Königsberg considered that 
 even in his time such a covenant of peace between Euro- 
 pean States was possible, without internal political or- 
 ganisation, without a supreme law-giving power, since 
 it corresponded to the interests of all alike, and since it 
 was for all alike a command of duty. True, the higher 
 and stronger unity, the positive idea of a world-republic, 
 hovered before his vision as an ideal worthy to be pur- 
 sued, but, seeing that the world was not ripe for that 
 great ideal, the man of "practical reason" contented him- 
 self with the "negative substitute for it, a federation 
 averting war, maintaining its ground, and ever extend- 
 ing over the world," Kant had no doubt about the 
 practicability of this Covenant of Peace (fa^diis paciß- 
 cum), and he only longed for the moment when a "pow- 
 erful and enlightened people" would make themselves
 
 392 
 
 I ACCUSE! 
 
 the central point of such a federal union, and by the 
 further adhesion of other nations would extend this 
 federation more and more among civilised nations.^ 
 
 This Kantian thought, apparently so simple, is the 
 most profound ever conceived on the subject of the for- 
 mation of a European family of States on a basis of 
 international law. This is not the offspring of an ideolo- 
 gist dwelling in the clouds, but of one who knew his 
 fellow-men and looked with undimmed vision on the 
 world around him, drawing practical conclusions from 
 the experiences of history and from the conditions of 
 his own time — the references to contemporary political 
 affairs may often be traced ironically between the lines. 
 He expressly states that he is not concerned with theo- 
 retical constructions, but he only desires that the philoso- 
 pher should be heard by the King, because "the pos- 
 session of power is inevitably fatal to the free exercise 
 of reason." He is, it is true, content with the role which 
 statesmen, with their worldly skill, commonly assign to 
 philosophy — the role of a handmaid — but he indicates 
 that this handmaid's role should be to bear the torch be- 
 fore her mistress, not to carry the train behind her. 
 For the time being he renounces his more far-reaching 
 ideal, and contents himself, in the first place, with ends 
 which are practically attainable.^ 
 
 These ends are to-day infinitely more desirable than 
 they then were, and at the same time they are infinitely 
 more easy of attainment. They are infinitely more de- 
 sirable because the condition of lawlessness and anarchy 
 which Kant even then deplored must necessarily involve 
 to-day much more fatal consequences, in view of the 
 present-day greatness and the development of strength 
 of the States of Europe. H the consequences of war 
 could imperil the existence even of States of a few mil- 
 
 ^Kant, p. 134. 
 'Kant, p. 160.
 
 THE FUTURE S93 
 
 lion inhabitants, such as then existed, economically or- 
 ganised in essential matters on a national basis, with 
 production and consumption of goods taking place for 
 the most part within the territorial limits of the country, 
 what suicidal catastrophes await the European States 
 of to-day involved in the war, comprising as they do, 
 within and without Europe, a population of 890 million 
 souls, or 53 per cent, of the whole population of the 
 world, indissolubly linked together as they are like the 
 organs of a vast body by thousands of the finest nerves 
 and sinews of a spiritual and material nature! What 
 Kant regarded as necessary for the world of his time 
 to preserve it from gradual destruction is to-day a mil- 
 lion times more necessary ; for then each of the belliger- 
 ent nations could at need still continue to pursue its own 
 independent life — like the separate sections of a lizard 
 — whereas to-day the gigantic body of modern civilised 
 humanity is struck to the heart by a world-war, and the 
 whole organism perishes. 
 
 While it is thus true, on the one hand, that the con- 
 dition of the modern world infinitely increases the evils 
 of war, it must, on the other hand, be remembered that 
 it offers infinitely more possibilities, in comparison with 
 the past, of meeting these evils. To-day preparations 
 have already been made in very great measure in all 
 fields of international relations for the realisation of 
 the Kantian federation of free States. Apart from what 
 are properly regarded as treaties between States, there 
 exist innumerable international organisations in all 
 spheres of intercourse, trade, agriculture, and learning, 
 ranging from the Postal Union to the agreement for 
 the protection of seals in the Behring Sea ; and there are 
 innumerable international institutions for carrying out 
 and supervising the agreements in question. Arbitra- 
 tion treaties in very great number are already in exist- 
 ence, with and without the obligatory duty of summon-
 
 395. I ACCUSE! 
 
 ing the court of arbitration, and these are in part so 
 far-reaching that even so-called questions of life and 
 honour have to be submitted to the decision of arbitra- 
 tion. There exists in the Hague an international court 
 of arbitration, the constitution, procedure, and jurisdic- 
 tion of which have been approved by the signatures of 
 all civilised States in the world. In short, in every 
 possible sphere the bonds of international community 
 are already being drawn more closely together; only 
 in one province, the most important of all, affecting all 
 vital interests of the nations alike, only on the one 
 question of war and peace between the great States of 
 Europe, Anarchy and Lawlessness still hold sway; here 
 Dame Diplomacy still rules with her out-worn methods, 
 with her tricks and intrigues of unregenerate days,^ witH 
 her antiquated devotees, who instead of keeping in view 
 the common interests of all, seek only by all the means 
 of political morality — that is to say, immorality — to make 
 petty profits for those from whom they receive their in- 
 structions. This diplomacy is a fossil from long-gone 
 ages of history, an anachronism which is as much at 
 home in these present times as an Indian medicine man 
 is in a modern hospital. As the medicine man stands 
 helplessly before the sufferer with his hocus-pocus (not- 
 withstanding that he may perhaps create the appearance 
 of being able to help him), so the diplomatists, as has 
 again been proved, stand helplessly before the danger- 
 ous malady of the nations, incapable of preventing the 
 outbreak of the fatal evil. This is unaffected by the 
 personal efficiency of many individuals in diplomatic 
 circles (belonging to foreign nations!); it is a conse- 
 quence of the system on which diplomacy is based. 
 
 For hundreds of years now, from the Outline of Per- 
 petual Peace (1713), written by the Abbe d e Saint 
 
 ' [aus vorm'drslicher Zeit: before the Revolution of March, 1848, 
 hence reactionary.]
 
 THE FUTURE 395 
 
 Pierre, down to Rousseau and Kant, and on to the 
 voluminous modern literature of peace, an organisation 
 of modern States has been sought for, which would, in 
 effect, render superfluous the activity of diplomacy in 
 the former sense. When the possessions of the contract- 
 ing States are mutually guaranteed, when their spheres 
 of interest are apportioned by friendly agreements, 
 when their commercial relations are regulated by treaties, 
 and when international intercourse is ordered in accord- 
 ance with the march of progress, and when any dis- 
 putes that may arise are submitted to arbitration — when 
 mutual confidence takes the place of former distrust, and 
 on this sure basis military preparations are first brought 
 to a standstill, and then gradually reduced in all na- 
 tions alike — all points which in the interests of all par- 
 ties concerned are desirable and attainable — then the 
 old diplomacy may be peacefully allowed to rest in the 
 cabinet of curiosities, and in its place a new diplomacy 
 can be established, corresponding to the needs of the 
 time, a diplomacy which needs no secret arts, no spies 
 in uniform, no palace and back-stairs-intrigues, to ful- 
 fil its useful purposes. Then diplomatists will discharge 
 almost the same functions as those fulfilled to-day by the 
 plenipotentiaries to the Bundesrat in Berlin. In saying 
 this, however, I desire expressly to guard against any 
 misunderstanding which would be involved in the as- 
 sumption that I consider that the Covenant of Peace of 
 Free Nations should in any way be comparable with the 
 political organisation of the German Empire. This Cove- 
 nant of Peace is to be nothing more than a kind of 
 union for an end, a union whose end is the maintenance 
 of peace and the promotion of common interests, but 
 without tJie slightest sacrifice of sovereign rights.^ 
 Common interests are already in existence to-day. 
 
 ^ See also Fried : Kurse Ahifklärungen über Wesen und Ziel 
 des Pazifismus (Berlin, 1914).
 
 396 I ACCUSE! 
 
 They are regulated by international agreements, and 
 protected by international Commissions. The circle of 
 common interests will automatically extend ever wider 
 under the logical compulsion of the development of civili- 
 sation, of technical science, of the conquest of time and 
 space, in spite of the present world-war, and in spite of 
 those of limited vision who shriek themselves hoarse in 
 acclaiming Germany as the mistress of the universe in 
 the realms of intellect and of science, or those who de- 
 sire to repress Germany into an antediluvian national 
 State. The international relations between the nations 
 may be for a time interrupted by the criminal short- 
 sightedness of their leaders and rulers, but they will 
 again revive like the earth in spring-time when the snow 
 has melted and the storms of winter have passed away. 
 The links which already exist to-day between the 
 nations, and which after peace will sooner or later be 
 strengthened anew by the might of facts, can only be 
 extended in one direction; the contracting Powers must 
 pledge themselves to the maintenance of peace and to 
 mutual respect for the independence and the possessions 
 of each other. 
 
 Is This a Utopia? 
 
 Is this impracticable f Is this a Utopia? 
 
 Bertha von Suttner once said : "There are three 
 phases through which every spiritual movement has to 
 pass ; in the first men scoff at it, in the second they fight 
 against it, in the third the reproach is hurled at it that 
 it is forcing an open door." 
 
 If anyone 400 years ago had said to the Italians of 
 the sixteenth century : "The day will come when there 
 will be a united Italian Fatherland, no longer Florence 
 nor Pisa, nor Genoa, nor Venice," they would have 
 scoffed at the speaker as a Utopian, or would probably 
 have shut him up in an asylum. If anyone had said in
 
 THE FUTURE 397 
 
 the Middle Ages to those living in the fortresses or cities 
 of Germany that there would come a time in which they 
 would no longer possess the right to look after their in- 
 terests according to their own strength and their own 
 caprice, they would with a shrug of the shoulders have 
 left the foolish visionary to his own dreams. But if any- 
 one had gone further and said that not only they, the 
 lords of the castle and the town, but even the lords 
 of wide territories, of whole kingdoms, would one day 
 lose their right of declaring war, and that only the whole 
 German Empire would possess such a right as against 
 foreign countries, they would have had doubts as to the 
 sanity of the speaker, or, what is even more probable, 
 they would have chopped ofif his head for high treason. 
 What! Were they one day to lose the right of declar- 
 ing war, the most important and the most essential part 
 of their sovereignty? Would they have to lay aside their 
 darling plaything, their soldiers, or place them under 
 the command of a supreme lord? Impossible! Such a 
 thing could not possibly be. Sovereignty without the 
 right of arms does not exist. 
 
 And yet it has come to pass, and the world has not 
 perished in the process. And the small and the great 
 lords in Italy and Germany and elsewhere are all still 
 in existence — except in so far as they have disappeared 
 for other reasons. And they lead a better and happier 
 existence than they did then, when they were obliged to 
 expend a large part of their income on their personal 
 security, and, notwithstanding this, were constantly 
 threatened by the presumptuous pride of evilly-disposed 
 neighbours. The community of peace in which they have 
 taken their place has afforded them greater security and 
 increased well-being, and what they have lost in sovereign 
 rights is abundantly outweighed by what they have 
 gained. The Utopia has become a commonplace, and if 
 the prophet who saw these things afar off would then
 
 398 I ACCUSE! 
 
 have been the object of mockery and condemnation, 
 to-day the laudator tcmporis acti would be regarded as 
 a person of irresponsible judgment. 
 
 Countless instances of similar cases of development 
 may be found in history. It may, indeed, be said that 
 history is in reality nothing more than a continuous chain 
 of evidence that the impossibilities of yesterday become 
 the possibilities and the realities of to-day. 
 
 Why, then, should a Covenant of Peace, corresponding 
 to the interests of all nations alike, he regarded as an 
 impossibility f If it was possible for the States included 
 in the present German confederation, after being opposed 
 to each other in 1866 in an embittered civil war, to 
 conclude four years later "a perpetual alliance in de- 
 fence of their territory, and of the law in force within 
 their frontiers, and for the promotion of the well-being 
 of the German people," why should it be impossible to 
 fashion a league of nations with much more restricted 
 ends, without any organisation between the States, only 
 with the external aim of preserving the peace? Is such 
 a league not reasonable? Does it not correspond to the 
 vital interests of all the nations concerned, of all in 
 equal measure? Is a league resting on the immovable 
 foundation of the need for peace, common to all after so 
 fearful a world-war, not infinitely more tenable than any 
 organisation based on force? What would be sacrificed 
 by the signatories to a treaty establishing such a cove- 
 nant of peace? They would lose merely the right to 
 wage war amongst each other, nothing more. They have 
 truly allowed this right sufficient exercise in the course 
 of the present war, and have become acquainted with 
 its unspeakable consequences. Has this right brought 
 them, or any one of them, any advantage whatever? 
 Has it not brought them all, conqueror and conquered 
 ahke, to the verge of ruin, and inflicted on them wounds 
 which will not be healed for generations to come? What,
 
 THE FUTURE 399 
 
 then, do they surrender in renouncing this right? They 
 surrender the possibility of ruining themselves and 
 others — nothing more. 
 
 And what do they gain in exchange? In the first place, 
 vn return for the surrender of his right, each one will re- 
 ceive a corresponding duty from the other parties. 
 Rights and duties are compensatory, and to this extent, 
 then, a balance is effected. But now comes the credit 
 side. Everyone will be secure from hostile attack. For 
 an unlimited time each nation will be able to allow full 
 play to its energies in trade and commerce, in art, litera- 
 ture, and science; it will be able to develop without re- 
 striction and without opposition all the capacities given to 
 it by nature ; in common with the allied States it will be 
 able gradually to reduce expenditure for military pur- 
 poses, which can no longer serve for attack and is no 
 longer needed for defence; and it will be able to apply 
 the money so economised to education, the general well- 
 being, and to social purposes. A new world woidd arise 
 within the old. Millions of pounds will gradually be 
 liberated each year for the struggle against poverty, to 
 ameliorate the condition of the working classes, to dis- 
 seminate well-being and happiness on all sides ; and thus 
 by the creation of a general spirit of contentment, Eu- 
 ropean society would be assured against inner catas- 
 trophes. 
 
 It is impossible to describe the measure of the bless- 
 ings which such a league of nations would pour out on 
 all peoples. With material well-being, with the feeling 
 of security against a repetition of such fearful events 
 as this war has brought in its train, with the enormous 
 means which would be set free for the objects of culture 
 and social reform, a nightmare would simultaneously be 
 removed from the spirits of our European world of 
 culture. In every country a new day of spiritual life
 
 400 I ACCUSE! 
 
 would dawn. Hatred and revenge would disappear from 
 the hearts of men, and all nations, sharing in what would 
 now have become a true community of European cul- 
 ture, reconciled and made brothers, would go forward 
 to meet their future lot with pride in their eyes and with 
 gladness in their hearts. 
 
 I hear myself hailed as a Utopian, as a visionary. 
 Naturally; the Utopian of to-day is the realist of to- 
 morrow. There is nothing Utopian in my proposal, 
 which has the advantage that it is merely a revival and 
 an extension of Kantian ideas; even then it was no 
 Utopia; to-day it is more practicable than ever. 
 
 A treaty of peace which rejects every idea of annexa- 
 tion, of security based on force! The fulfilment of this 
 condition will come about automatically, since the war 
 will remain indecisive, and in the most favourable issue 
 will lead only to the exchange of the objects pledged 
 on both sides; each side will be glad if it can only get 
 back its former possessions. Thank God that it is so; 
 for if a decisive victory of the one side or the other 
 — but especially of the one! — were conceivable, the vic- 
 tor would certainly merely annex as much territory as 
 possible inside and outside Europe, crush his enemies 
 to the utmost extent from a military, political, and eco- 
 nomic point of view, and on the ruins of the other 
 States rear a hegemony based on force. Such a result 
 would inevitably contain the germs for constantly re- 
 newed wars; such a treaty of peace would be con- 
 cluded with the stipulation "until later," and then — 
 Farewell, League of Nations! Adieu, Guarantee of 
 Peace ! 
 
 Fortunately, however, for the blessing of mankind 
 such a result cannot ensue. The struggle will end with 
 a noil liquet. And what reason would not have dictated 
 to the great the power of circumstances will force upon 
 them. It will be impossible for them — for any of them
 
 THE FUTURE 401 
 
 — to dictate the conditions of peace, and thus the record 
 of the treaty will at least not place in the way of Euro- 
 pean peace obstacles on which it could not but stumble 
 straightway. 
 
 This result, however, is unfortunately, only a negative 
 one. If nothing more than this is attained, the whole 
 tale of tribulation will recur. Armaments and distrust, 
 distrust and armaments in a perpetual vicious circle — 
 further exhaustion of the nations, already completely 
 anaemic, a renewal of diplomatic tricks and dodges, to 
 enable each to get by stealth as many fat scraps as 
 possible out of the great soup-dish of the world. There 
 will be new conflicting interests, new causes of friction, 
 and in the end new explosions, each worse than its 
 predecessor. 
 
 In the event of the victory of one side, the policy of 
 force and oppression would lead to the new explosion. 
 In the event of the struggle being indecisive, the revival 
 of competing interests, the renewal of the competition 
 in armaments will result in a new state of tension and 
 new discharges. 
 
 The result will remain the same, unless one thing is 
 added. In addition to a renunciation of any new order 
 of things based on force, there must be a focdns pacificum, 
 a covenant of peace of free nations, honourably and sin- 
 cerely intended, and as the most important consequence 
 of this Covenant there must be a gradual proportionate 
 reduction in the strength of the existing armies and 
 navies so far as is compatible with an assurance of 
 the requisite security against those nations still standing 
 outside the Covenant of peace. The more this Covenant 
 is externally extended and internally strengthened, the 
 more possible will it be to make progress with the dimi- 
 nution of annaments, and to take in hand the transforma- 
 tion of the standing armies into militias. The develop- 
 ment in this direction will take place with logical neces-
 
 402 I ACCUSE! 
 
 sity. Since the league will correspond to the interests of 
 all, without doing violation in any way to the character 
 of their sovereignty, since the sovereignty of each in- 
 dividual member will remain absolutely unimpaired in 
 its true and essential content, and thus all the advantages 
 of the league of peace would be bought gratuitously b> 
 each, it is logically inevitable that the league should be- 
 come more intimately knit together, that confidence In 
 its existence should constantly increase, and that the 
 good example thus given should more and more evoke 
 imitation throughout the world. 
 
 The only right given up on every side, the right to 
 wage war against others, appears in the new organisa- 
 tion as a Right to commit Wrong, and cannot, there- 
 fore, be regarded as a true right, and thus its loss can- 
 not be regarded as a true loss. Thus the league with 
 every year of its existence will become stronger inter- 
 nally and more comprehensive externally. From a league 
 of four or five it will grow to be a league of six or seven, 
 and finally a multiple-entente, embracing the whole civil- 
 ised world. What the wise men have dreamed, what the 
 nations have constantly striven after, will at last become 
 the Truth — not at a stroke, but in the consciously directed 
 course of historical development, and a new golden age, 
 which has hitherto appeared to us only as the dream of 
 a distant past, will blossom into reality in a future, which 
 it may be hoped is not far removed from us. 
 
 The pathway to this beneficent goal is neither new nor 
 difficult. If it has hitherto been possible to conclude such 
 a league of peace between two or three States, it must 
 also be possible to do so between four or five or more 
 States. That the hitherto existing alliances have only 
 served the purpose of creating an enormous war ap- 
 paratus for common use is entirely due to the fact that 
 they were not sufficiently comprehensive, and that the 
 allied groups as collective communities were opposed to
 
 THE FUTURE 403 
 
 each other in a hostile, or, at least, in a distrusting atti- 
 tude. The moment this opposition disappears and the 
 groups as such become members of a greater community, 
 every ground for further military preparations disap- 
 pears, just as it has already ceased to exist within the 
 various groups. 
 
 If we assume that Germany and Austria, closely allied 
 with each other, had existed alone in the world without 
 having the Triple Entente or any other group of Powers 
 in opposition to them, further military preparations on 
 the part of these two empires would have been void of 
 purpose even from the military point of view, since 
 neither of the allies had any reason to expect that she 
 would be attacked by the other. The same holds good 
 in the case of the Powers of the Triple Entente, if we 
 assume that Germany and Austria had not been opposed 
 to them. Thus if all five Powers had been united to- 
 gether in a league of peace, such as now exists within 
 the two groups, competition in armaments would have 
 been deprived of all reason and purpose, and in the logic 
 of things would have automatically ceased. German 
 principalities and kingdoms, so long as they were not 
 united to the "perpetual league" of the German Empire, 
 were obliged to be armed against each other. With the 
 creation of the German Empire this military preparation 
 disappeared at a stroke, and now only exists in so far as 
 it is directed against the outside world in the interests of 
 the protection of the German Empire and of its various 
 constituent members. Italy also has passed through' the 
 same development in various stages in the course of its 
 transition from the sovereignty of the individual city- 
 territories to the more comprehensive sovereignty of the 
 individual kingdoms, and finally to the all-comprehensive 
 kingdom of Italy. The same process can be traced in 
 Switzerland and in the United States of America. 
 
 In this discussion it is irrelevant whether the alliances
 
 404 I ACCUSE! 
 
 concluded led to a unified State, to a federate State, or 
 only to a federation of States. It is equally irrelevant 
 whether such an alliance remains at the stage represented 
 by the loosest form of a union which would serve to pre- 
 vent war. The central point, which we are here dis- 
 cussing, is everywhere the same : the exclusion by treaty 
 of every war between the allied States. Whether be- 
 yond this immediate object the league should fulfil a 
 greater or smaller number of other objects as well, or 
 whether it will even develop into a unified State, depends 
 on innumerable factors, which vary according to the vari- 
 ous forms of the league, and which will thus lead to dif- 
 ferent results. It is unnecessary here to discuss these fac- 
 tors (community of speech, of race, of historical de- 
 velopment, of culture, &c.). Our idea of a union in the 
 service of peace represents a minimum, which appears 
 worthy of our endeavour, and appears also attainable, 
 even if all the other factors which lead to a more in- 
 timate union may not be present. This minimum is 
 attainable, no matter how greatly the various States as- 
 sociated in the union may differ in race, language, de- 
 velopment of culture, and historical growth. For this 
 minimum of an international union all modern civilised 
 nations are ripe, no matter how greatly they may di- 
 verge from each other in the character of their civilisa- 
 tion. 
 
 The more limited the aim and content of such a league 
 of peace, the more easy must it be to call it into being. 
 If il has been found possible to weld together sovereign 
 States into unified States, confederated States, and fed- 
 erations of States, and if in this process they were obliged 
 to make a greater or less sacrifice of their sovereign 
 rights, it follows that it must be a much easier matter 
 to unite sovereign States into a union created with a 
 certain end, in v/hich, apart from the right to wage war 
 against each other, they are not required to make any
 
 THE FUTURE 405 
 
 surrender of their sovereign rights. Quod erat demon- 
 strandum. 
 
 In my opinion these are all practical considerations 
 which it may be hoped are not diminished in value be- 
 cause they are firmly supported by logic. And let no 
 one again speak to me here of Utopias and perpetual 
 peace, and so on. The question is not of perpetual 
 peace, since the idea of perpetuity is not applicable to hu- 
 man things, but is a reservation of God himself. Even 
 the German Imperial Constitution, which is designated as 
 a perpetual alliance, will succumb to the fate of human 
 transitoriness. The question is to create human insti- 
 tutions which as far as possible will avoid human evils. 
 The institution represents the ideal postulate; human life 
 furnishes the exceptions. It is no argument against the 
 necessity or the usefulness of a political constitution that 
 a king may indulge in a coup d'etat, or that the people 
 may carry out a revolution. It is no argument against 
 the necessity of a criminal code that crimes are com- 
 mitted. The prevalence of immorality is no contradiction 
 of the moral law. Hygiene does not signify the abolition 
 of death; education does not imply the production of 
 saints and angels. 
 
 The Covenant of Peace between the nations, then, is 
 not intended to guarantee, and cannot guarantee, per- 
 petual peace ; it should, and can, prevent wars as far as 
 possible, and it will exercise this effect because abstinence 
 from war corresponds, not only to a moral requirement, 
 but also to the true vital interests of the nations. 
 
 The Coercive Force. 
 
 This at once disposes of the usual question as to the 
 coercive force which is to bind the league together. This 
 coercive force is in the first place, duty, and in the sec-
 
 406 I ACCUSE! 
 
 ond place, interest. What is the coercive force which 
 keeps the German Empire together? Who could prevent 
 Prussia from overrunning Bavaria and putting it in her 
 pocket? Could the other States in the federation, in 
 union with Bavaria, by any chance prevent her from 
 doing so? What these States could accomplish against 
 Prussia was seen in 1866, when Prussia, moreover, had 
 to fight against Austria, her present ally, as well. If, 
 therefore, the King of Prussia observes the Treaty of 
 German Federation, he does so, not because he is con- 
 strained by any force, but because his duty and his 
 interest demand that he should do so. On the same 
 grounds all treaties between States or nations, howso- 
 ever wide or restricted be their subject-matter, are ob- 
 served so long as duty and interest alike demand that 
 they should be respected — interest, not, indeed, in the 
 base sense of a mom'entary gain, but in the higher sense 
 of a permanent advantage, such as can spring only from 
 respect for Right and Morality. Who could prevent the 
 strong and prosperous cantons of German Switzerland 
 from falling upon and annexing the weaker Italian can- 
 tons, which, further, belong to another community in 
 race and speech, and therefore, in the ''nationalist" view, 
 are inferior, and therefore destined to subjection? No 
 physical force would stand in the way of such an un- 
 dertaking; nevertheless, only a madman would entertain 
 such an idea, since reason, duty, and interest impose 
 on the Swiss people the necessity of remaining true to 
 their Treaty of Federation. Why are commercial, cus- 
 toms, and shipping treaties observed, even in those cases 
 in which they run counter to the interests of one of the 
 contracting parties? Why does not the stronger party 
 denounce a treaty which is unfavourable to him instead 
 of waiting till it expires or is terminated? Because the 
 duty of fidelity to engagements demands it, and be- 
 cause even a transitory loss would not outweigh the
 
 THE FUTURE 407 
 
 greater disadvantage involved in the fact that no one 
 would ever again conclude a treaty with one who had not 
 observed his engagements. Such examples could be mul- 
 tiplied indefinitely. Analogous cases are further to be 
 found, not only in the external, but also in the internal 
 life of a State. If a private citizen gains his case 
 against the authorities in an administrative action, what 
 physical force compels the authorities to submit to the un- 
 favourable verdict? There is none. The authorities 
 alone possess the physical force, but the moral power of 
 the verdict, and the higher interest of the State, the in- 
 terest of a State based on law, compel acquiescence in 
 the judgment. 
 
 Exactly the same will hold in the case of the obliga- 
 tions imposed on its members by the League of Peace. 
 Duty and interest will impose on the members the neces- 
 sity of observing their obligations, and if, notwithstand- 
 ing, these should be violated, the close relations existing 
 between modern States will offer innumerable means 
 whereby without having recourse to bloodshed the treaty- 
 breaker may be recalled to a sense of his duties. Among 
 such methods we may note the discontinuance of com- 
 mercial relations, boycott of wares, exclusion from the 
 existing international organisations; stoppage of post- 
 office, railway, and financial intercourse, &c. All these 
 means will not, however, be necessary; for the inter- 
 est of continuing to be a member of the league and of 
 enjoying its advantages, and, on the other hand, the 
 dread of the public stigma, which would make it im- 
 possible for the breaker of the peace to have ever again 
 any other relation of alliance, will prevent even the most 
 powerful member of the league from frivolously acting 
 contrary to his duties as a member. 
 
 The justice of this view is proved by what has actu- 
 ally happened in the case of awards of arbitration. Of 
 the 212 decisions in the course of the nineteenth cen-
 
 408 I ACCUSE! 
 
 ttiry, not one remained unobserved, although there was 
 no compulsion making it necessary to submit to these 
 awards, and although many of these decisions were only 
 accepted with disapprobation by the public opinion of the 
 country concerned,^ on no occasion has a State opposed 
 an arbitration award and refused to give effect to it. 
 Here, again, the moving considerations have been the 
 duty of submitting to the decision which had been vol- 
 untarily sought, and the interest of accepting an unfa- 
 vourable award rather than risking a war, and being 
 revealed to the world as a breaker of one's word. 
 
 So also the Covenant of Peace of Free Nations which, 
 after the horrors of this war, is intended to guarantee 
 a true and enduring peace and not merely a cessation of 
 hostilities, will rest securely and Immovably on the mu- 
 tual conßdence of the contracting nations, on the holi- 
 ness of the pledged word, and on the common interest 
 which has welded the league together. 
 
 What Will Peace Bring Us? ' 
 
 Is such a large-hearted peace policy to he expected of 
 Germany f Is it possible, having regard to the internal 
 conditions of Prussia and Germany? In my view it is 
 not. So long as Prussia continues to live under the most 
 reactionary constitution which is to be found in any 
 civilised country in the world, so long as a laborious, pa- 
 tient, and intelligent people still continues to be ruled as 
 it has been for centuries by reactionaries, Junkers, sol- 
 diers, and priests, who find their profit, not in peace- 
 ful development, but in military adventures, so long will 
 it be impossible to think of a sincere and upright peace 
 policy on the part of Prussian Germany. A family 
 of soldiers, like the Hohenzollerns, put in the equiv- 
 alent of I line, whose ris e was due to their 
 'Fried, Vol. i, p. 156.
 
 THE FUTURE 409 
 
 military efficiency, will be convinced only by a 
 strong counterpoise in the people that the age of mili- 
 tary conquests is past, and that to-day it is only in the 
 peaceful competition of the nations that laurels are to 
 be gained. As is known, this counterpoise in the peo- 
 ple does not exist. The absolutism which dominates in 
 Prussia, which is only imperfectly masked by an outworn 
 constitution — a constitution without even a lawful origin, 
 having merely been granted to the people — this Prus- 
 sian absolutism extends its influence even to the Ger- 
 man Empire, notwithstanding the democratic imperial 
 electoral law and the presence of confederated States 
 which are governed on democratic principles. The pre- 
 ponderance of Prussia in the Government of the Em- 
 pire and in the Bundesrat, the fact that the offices of 
 the Imperial Chancellor and the President of the Prussian 
 Ministry are held by one person, the exclusive military 
 power of the Prussian King in his capacity of German 
 Emperor, and, above all, his right to declare war and 
 conclude peace in the name of the Empire — in certain 
 circumstances even without the consent of the Bundes- 
 rat — all these facts operate in such a way as to make the 
 German Empire in reality only a branch-establishment 
 of the Prussian Kingdoin.} 
 
 ^ Amongst the minimum demands to be insisted on in the domain 
 of constitutional law must be included the amendment of Article 
 II of the Imperial constitution. In future it must be made impos- 
 sible for the fate of the German people to rest on the resolutions 
 of one individual man. Even if the concurrence of the Bundesrat 
 were required before war could be declared, this would be insuffi- 
 cient to guarantee a people, who are of full age, against a repeti- 
 tion of catastrophes such as we are now experiencing in horror. 
 Even to-day it has not become publicly known whether the Bun- 
 desrat was consulted with regard to the declaration of war against 
 Russia and France. Reasoning from the false assumption that an 
 attack on the territory of the Union had been committed, the con- 
 sent of the Bundesrat would not have been in any way required. 
 Nevertheless in future it will and must be arranged tltat war will
 
 410 I ACCUSE! 
 
 All the defects and the faults inherent in the Prussian 
 constitution exert their influence, like contagious dis- 
 eases, on the body politic of the Empire. The privileges 
 of the governing social classes, which from time imme- 
 morial have skimmed the cream from the milk in Prussia, 
 have been extended to the German Empire. Here, also, 
 the nobility is dominant in the military and official world ; 
 or if the crown of nobility is wanting, its place is taken 
 by those of trustworthy conservative views. The agra- 
 rian classes from the provinces east of the Elbe have 
 left their imprint on the laws of Germany dealing with 
 agriculture and taxation, and have most ruthlessly made 
 them subservient to their interests at the cost of the other 
 classes of the population. The Prussian land-councillors, 
 whose influence before 1870 was dominant only in 
 Prussia, have pressed over the Elbe, the Weser, and the 
 Rhein as far as the Vosges, and Herr von Koller and 
 Herr von Dallwitz ^ have been called to impart true 
 Prussian discipline and efficiency of thought to the in- 
 habitants of Alsace-Lorraine. The Chancellor shows to- 
 wards the resolutions of the Reichstag the same sovereign 
 indifference which Presidents of the Prussian Council, in 
 accordance with an ancient tradition, have always shown 
 towards Parliamentary resolutions — although they have 
 had no reason whatever to complain of Parliamentary 
 resolutions hi Prussia, at least since the time of the 
 conflict; here, also, the Chancellor means to be nothing 
 more than the faithful servant of his lord. 
 
 Thus, then, there is Ahsolutism in both cases — in Ger- 
 many, Absolutism ashamed; in Prussia, unashamed. 
 
 be declared in the name of the Empire only by an Imperial law, 
 that is to say, by concurrent resolutions of the Reichstag and of 
 the Bundesrat. 
 
 ^ [E. M. von Koller, a native of Pommern, Staatssecretaris for 
 Alsace-Lorraine 1901-8; Johann von Dallwitz, bom in Breslau, 
 became Minister of the Interior in 1910.]
 
 THE FUTURE 411 
 
 There is only this difference, that Prussian absokitism, 
 with its complaisant majority, achieves evil according to 
 its arbitrary will, whereas German absolutism, face to 
 face with a majority of a different character, is obliged 
 in most cases to restrict itself to preventing the good. 
 
 Equal rights of religious confessions is, in Prussia and 
 in Germany alike, merely a provision on paper, which 
 is daily violated ! 
 
 Ministerial responsibility in Prussia has not yet been 
 introduced, notwithstanding solemn promises for sixty- 
 four years; in Germany it has not even been prom- 
 ised! 
 
 The Prussian electoral law is still unaltered, nothwith- 
 standing a solemn promise in a speech from the throne ; 
 and no effective alteration can be hoped for, if we are 
 to judge from the most recent utterances of conservative 
 party-leaders and ministers ! On the other hand there is 
 the imperial electoral law, which is already undemocra- 
 tised by an atrociously unjust arrangement of constit- 
 uencies, and which is constantly in danger of being as- 
 similated to the Prussian law, so that in thi* respect also 
 Prussia and Germany may, as far as possible, pursue the 
 same paths ! 
 
 It is superfluous and impossible to enumerate here 
 all the points in which Prussia is behind the times ; they 
 are only too well known to all the world. The only 
 question which is of interest to us in this connection is 
 whether a State which is still politically in a primitive 
 condition is capable of grasping great aims, which ex- 
 tend far beyond its black and white frontier posts, and 
 are designed to bestow a blessing on the whole of civil- 
 ised humanity, and whether its leaders will be prepared 
 unerringly to pursue such aims as may be recognised as 
 true, in opposition to all the internal resistance of the 
 governing classes and cliques. 
 
 These aims could have been attained before now with-
 
 41« I ACCUSE! 
 
 out the policy of the mailed fist, without the insanity of 
 military preparations, and without the outbreak of the 
 present world-catastrophe. They could have been at- 
 tained by a radical change in those views which have 
 hitherto controlled Prussian-German policy. The Ger- 
 man Government had only to grasp the hand so often of- 
 fered by England — from the first Hague Conference 
 down to the last proposals of Grey at the end of July, 
 1914 — and all that we are to-day hoping, longing, and 
 striving for would have been gained before now without 
 shedding a drop of blood, without kindling a spark of 
 fire, without spreading death and destruction. Europe 
 would have stood in unity to-day, prosperous, wealthy, 
 and happy, with a brilliant present, a still more brilliant 
 future, if it had only pleased the German Chancellor to 
 listen to the English Minister's exhortations to peace, 
 and to consider that the proposed alliance of peace at 
 least merited a trial. 
 
 This alliance of peace which was proposed by Grey 
 was the embryo out of which the Kantian' League in 
 the service of peace would have issued, without the pains 
 and the dangers of travail, in the normal course of de- 
 velopment. 
 
 It was not to be so. The itch for world-power had 
 seized our leaders and governors; the aims of their am- 
 bition — which were at the same time the aims of our 
 privileged classes, since they held out to these classes a 
 prospect that their privileges, endangered through the 
 rise of new national forces, would be maintained intact 
 — these aims could only be achieved by force, and on this 
 *'rocher de bronze" all the barks of peace were bound to 
 encounter hopeless shipwreck. 
 
 Those, however, who by their lack of comprehension 
 or their evil will, by their madness or their criminality, 
 prevented the work of peace before the outbreak of this 
 war must take care, after the fearful storm is overpast, 
 
 I
 
 THE FUTURE 418 
 
 that they do not deny the sunshine of a lasting peace 
 to the nations panting for rest and happiness. Let 
 him who bears the responsibihty of having provoked 
 this w^ar, let him who has committed a crime for which 
 no punishment on earth or in heaven offers sufficient 
 reparation, be warned against taking upon his head the 
 further curse of having denied unhappy nations the bless- 
 ings of an enduring peace — a peace which, no matter who 
 is victorious or defeated, can never he built on force, hut 
 only on the free will of free peoples. 
 
 The man who treads this pathway to an enduring 
 peace cannot recall the past, but he can at least make 
 the unfading palm of peace spring from the blood- 
 drenched fields; he will not free himself from his guilt, 
 but many will think in extenuation of his offence that 
 he at least showed himself to be a "part of that force 
 which aye wills evil, but brings forth the good." 
 
 Should it Happen Otherwise 
 
 Should, however, it happen otherwise, should those 
 who counsel the German Emperor again fail, should the 
 hopes and expectations of the nation once more be de- 
 ceived and the reaction within begin anew, perhaps 
 stronger than ever — and of this there are already many 
 indications — should peace without once more be sup- 
 ported on cannons and bayonets, then — we may safely 
 say — as Bebel prophesied, the great general march will 
 be followed by the great crash, then the death-hnell will 
 have struck, not for the Government alone, hut also 
 for the monarchy. 
 
 "Destruction and blood have ne'er blessed a nation ! 
 The curse of the down-trodden vanquished — appalling — 
 Will rest on the victor, exalted in station, 
 His forehead adorned with the green laurel wreath.
 
 414 I ACCUSE! 
 
 But the strong arm of vengeance is not swift in falling, 
 To smite and destroy the misguided mortal ; 
 She waits long and watches, and stands at his portal 
 And appears to his eyes as he wrestles with death." ^ 
 
 The nations have long seen the horrible thing drawing 
 near, they have long urgently warned the mighty ones 
 of the earth against the crime of a European war of the 
 nations, which, for those guilty of the outrage, must 
 necessarily bring in its train the punishment of destruc- 
 tion. This warning was nowhere uttered so insistently 
 and so passionately as in the great peace manifesto of 
 the International Party, adopted at Basel on November 
 25th, 1912, in which it is stated: — ■ 
 
 "The great nations of Earope are constantly on 
 the point of being urged against each other, while 
 it is impossible to advance the slightest pretext of 
 national interests in justification of these attacks 
 against humanity and reason. 
 
 *'The Balkan crisis, which has already produced 
 such a terrible tale of horror, would, if extended 
 still further, constitute the gravest danger for civili- 
 sation and for the proletariate. It would also be the 
 greatest crime in history in view of the glaring 
 contrast between the magnitude of the catastrophe 
 and the insignificance of the interests involved. 
 
 "The Congress therefore notes with satisfaction 
 the complete unanimity of the Socialist Party and 
 of the working classes of all countries in conducting 
 
 ^ ["Kein Volk noch beglückten 
 Blut und Plünd'rung! der Fluch fällt entsetzlich, 
 Auf den mächtigen, lorbeergeschmückten 
 Sieger von dem Besiegten Zurück! 
 Wohl ergreift den Bethörten nicht plötzlich 
 Eh'rnen Armes die ewige Rache, 
 Doch sie wartet, sie folgt, sie hält Wache 
 Sie tritt ernst vor des Sterbenden Blick."]
 
 THE FUTURE 416 
 
 War against War. ... A war between the three 
 great leading civilised nations on account of the 
 dispute about a harbour between Serbia and 
 Austria would be an act of criminal madness. . . . 
 The Governments should not forget that in the pres- 
 ent condition of Europe, and in view of the attitude 
 of the working classes, they cannot, without danger 
 to themselves, embark on a war. ... It would be 
 madness if Governments should fail to realise that 
 the mere thought of the enormity of a world-war 
 must in itself arouse the horror and the indigna- 
 tion of the working classes. The proletariate feel 
 it as a crime to shoot against each other in the 
 interests of the profits of capitalists, the ambition 
 of dynasties, and for the greater honour of diplo- 
 matic secret treaties. 
 
 "If the governing powers cut off the possibility 
 of normal continued development, and thereby in- 
 cite the proletariate to desperate measures, they 
 would themselves have to bear the whole responsi- 
 bility for the consequences of the crisis provoked 
 by them." 
 
 The speeches delivered to the assembled multitude in 
 the venerable minister at Basel by the representatives 
 of the working classes of all countries, Germany, Austria, 
 England, France, with Jaures at their head, were in 
 agreement with the spirit of this manifesto. It was 
 not merely socialist leaders, but also strictly orthodox 
 preachers, and Swiss Government officials, who uttered 
 earnest words of warning against the folly of a Eu- 
 ropean war, against this inexpiable crime against hu- 
 manity. It was urged that no treaty of alliance could 
 oblige Germany to shed even a drop of German blood 
 for the foolish and ambitious policy of certain Austrian 
 cliques. All the consequences would recoil on the heads
 
 416 I ACCUSE! 
 
 of those guilty of engineering a butchery such as the 
 world had never seen. Jaures clearly prophesied that 
 the more terrible the European war, the greater and 
 more terrible would be the revolution which would 
 ensue. 
 
 The Twilight of the Gods 
 
 And now that has come to pass against which the 
 representatives of the people of all countries raised such 
 insistent warnings. Then the warning could still achieve 
 success; to-day, however, it must fail because their 
 tongues are paralysed, their hands are bound, their foot- 
 steps are hampered. It is not because of a squabble 
 between Austria and Serbia about a harbour, but 
 because of other trifles, which are far more petty in 
 character, that twenty million men in the flower of their 
 age are to-day rending each other's flesh. It is because 
 of a misunderstanding, a question of legal interpreta- 
 tion, which could have been solved by half an hour's 
 consultation between experts. Had we not experienced 
 all this, it would have been regarded as the insane product 
 of a brain in the last stages of advanced paralysis. 
 Whether it was to be an cnquete judiciaire or policiere, 
 whether the Austrian should be allowed to collaborate 
 in Serbia in judicial or police investigation — these and 
 similar world-shaking questions — according to the asser- 
 tion of the guilty parties themselves — for they do not 
 yet acknowledge their secret intentions to make war — ■ 
 it is such "vital" questions as these which have enabled 
 death to reap her harvest to-day and to pile up moun- 
 tains and mountains of bodies. Confronted with such 
 a situation, even the most placid of our "contempo- 
 raries" cannot fail to become revolutionary. Even a 
 Philistine must say that a political or social organisation 
 which leads to such results is ripe for destruction. Even 
 his love for the governing powers must be transformed 
 
 J
 
 THE FUTURE 417 
 
 into hatred; even in his atmosphere Herwegh's words 
 of a "Living Man" must penetrate : — 
 
 "Love cannot help us! Thrust behind 
 Love's vision of salvation ! 
 Hatred ! Break thou these chains that bind ; 
 Judge, and speak forth damnation ! 
 
 And if proud tyrants still hold sway. 
 We'll hurl them to disaster. 
 Love long enough has had her day; 
 Now, Hatred, be our master." ^ 
 
 From the International of Labour there was bound to 
 arise, and there must now arise, the International of 
 hatred, hatred against imperialism and the doctrine of 
 the blood, hatred against the policy of blood and con- 
 quest. The voices of the people are still paralysed and 
 suppressed, the sparks are still glowing under the ashes, 
 but the tongues will be released, the flames will leap up, 
 and the corrupt building of our present-day State will 
 perish in fire, like so many other glorious works of man 
 which have been less deserving of a fiery destruction. 
 The blessing will come, not, however, from above, but 
 from below, and there will pass into fulfilment Bebel's 
 prophetic word, the swan song which he uttered shortly 
 before his death : "They will reap what they have soivn, 
 the twilight of the gods of the ciml zvorld is breaking." 
 Once before in the history of mankind deliverance came 
 
 ^ ["Die Liebe kann uns helfen nicht. 
 Die Liebe nicht erretten; 
 Halt Du, O Hass, Dein jüngst Gericht, 
 Brich Du, O Hass, die Ketten! 
 
 Und wo es noch Tyrannen gibt. 
 Die lasst uns keck erfassen; 
 Wir haben lang genug geliebt 
 Und wollen endlich hassen."]
 
 418 I ACCUSE! 
 
 from the depths of the people in Jesus of Nazareth, the 
 Carpenter's son, the Preacher of Love and of Compas- 
 sion in a time of bloody conquest and oppression, the 
 protector of all the weary and heavy laden, the great 
 revolutiojtary of peace; to-day He also would have stood 
 in the ranks of those fighting for peace, and would have 
 turned away with sorrow and indignation from those 
 who call themselves by His name and yet so contemptu- 
 ously despise all His commands. 
 
 If the prophecy of Bebel has not yet been realised 
 to-day, will it be realised to-morrow? It will the more 
 certainly be realised the more our leaders con- 
 
 tinue to pursue, after the war is over, the criminal blind- 
 ness which has misled them to this war. Radical re- 
 pentance within, organised assurance of peace without, 
 these are the means which perhaps may even yet post- 
 pone the day of vengeance and of retaliation. But as 
 matters are with us in Germany it is impossible to im- 
 agine such a repentance or such a change. The system 
 which has led to the war, the consequences of which 
 were prophesied, not only by representatives of the la- 
 bouring classes, but also by many men of penetrating 
 vision from other social ranks — this system will be pur- 
 sued with increased energy, and will not end until the 
 people utters its word of might 
 
 Then, indeed, and only then, will an enduring condition 
 of peace be assured among the nations, as the presup- 
 position of which the sage of Königsberg stated a hun- 
 dred and twenty years ago that the civil constitution 
 in each State must be republican. For him the institu- 
 tion of a monarchy was necessarily and inevitably con- 
 nected with the danger of ever-renewed holy warfare. 
 The grounds for this thought hold to-day with undimin- 
 ished force: —
 
 THE FUTURE 419 
 
 "Now the republican constitution, apart from the 
 soundness of its origin, since it arose from the pure 
 source of the concept of right, has also the prospect of 
 attaining the desired result, namely, perpetual peace. 
 And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this 
 constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to 
 determine whether there shall be war or not, nothing is 
 more natural than that they should weigh the matter 
 well before undertaking such a bad business. For in 
 decreeing war they would of necessity be resolving to 
 bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This 
 implies: they must fight themselves; they must hand 
 over the costs of the war out of their own property ; 
 they must do their poor best to make good the devasta- 
 tion which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning 
 ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will 
 embitter even peace itself, and which they can never 
 pay off on account of the new wars which are always 
 impending. On the other hand, in a Government where 
 the subject is not a citizen holding a vote (i.e., in a 
 constitution which is not republican), the plunging into 
 war is the least serious thing in the world. For the ruler 
 is not a citizen, but the owner of the state, and does not 
 lose a whit by the war, while he goes on enjoying the 
 delights of his table or sport, or of his pleasure palaces 
 and gala days. He can, therefore, decide on war for the 
 most trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure 
 party. Any justification of it that is necessary for the 
 sake of decency he can leave without concern to the 
 diplomatic corps, who are always only too ready with 
 their services." 
 
 So said Kant. . . . 
 
 Was he right? It is for the German people to decide. 
 
 But if he was right, what follows?
 
 EPILOGUE 
 
 "They who do not feel the darkness will 
 never look for the light." — BucKLp. 
 
 The man who wrote this book is a German. 
 
 He is not a Frenchman, a Russian, or an EngHshman. 
 He is a German who is uncorrupted and incorruptible; 
 who is not bought, and is not for sale. 
 
 A German who loves his Fatherland like anyone else; 
 but, just because he loves it, he wrote this book. 
 
 Born on German soil, trained in German culture, 
 German in his ancestry, his speech and his thought, he 
 knows all the virtues of the German people, but he also 
 knows their failings and their weaknesses. In the Ger- 
 man people, as everywhere, virtues produce weaknesses. 
 From the virtue of fidelity there springs the blind con- 
 fidence which does not inquire whether the good faith 
 of the nation has been deceived, and from the virtue of 
 attachment there springs the unconditional adherence 
 which does not ask whether the path pointed out leads 
 to guilt and destruction. 
 
 The confidence of the German people has been basely 
 abused by its leaders and rulers. Their eyes, which once 
 saw so clearly, have been wrapped in the gloom of igno- 
 rance. Her citizens who loved peace have been trans- 
 formed into combatants full of hatred and vengeance; 
 the representatives of high culture and of intelligence 
 have feeen changed into blind and benighted worshippers 
 of success ; men whose vision comprehended the uni- 
 verse have become narrow-hearted, clinging to the soil 
 of their country; the lights of art and of science have 
 
 420
 
 EPILOGUE 421 
 
 been replaced by "the spirits of the barrack-yard tricked 
 out in academic freedom." 
 
 The German people has been corrupted and blinded 
 that it might be driven into a war which it has never 
 foreseen, never intended, and never desired. In order 
 that it might be liberated, it has been put in chains. 
 
 It was to break this charm, to liberate the people from 
 its "liberators," to fight against falsehood, that I wrote 
 this book of Truth. 
 
 From the poptdo male informato I appeal to the popu- 
 lum melius informandum. 
 
 A true son of Germania, I see my blinded Mother 
 tottering to the abyss; I leap forward to save her from 
 the fatal plunge. 
 
 May truth still be spoken in the Germany of to-day? 
 Or have things already advanced so far that it is counted 
 moral to utter falsehood, but immoral to speak the 
 truth? Does the good old song, which we used to sing 
 to the sound of the rapier, no longer hold: 
 
 "A pitiable wretch is he 
 Who knows the truth and yet can silent be." ^ 
 
 Has this ancient glory for ever departed? Should it 
 now read : 
 
 "A pitiable wretch is he 
 Who knows what's false and cannot silent be." ^ 
 
 Do you dispute what I have declared to be the truth? 
 First let me speak, and then disprove what I say. If 
 you can do so, so much the better for you ! But bear 
 this well in mind : the spoken word is sometimes dan- 
 
 *Wer die Wahrheit kennet und saget sie nicht 
 Der ist fürwahr ein erbärmlicher Wicht. 
 
 ' Wer die Lüge kennt und verheimlicht sie nicht 
 Der ist fürwahr ein erbärmlicher Wicht.
 
 422 I ACCUSE! 
 
 gerous; more dangerous at all times is the suppressed 
 word. 
 
 Your security within f ^ Must the peace within endure 
 until it becomes the peace of a churchyard? "Not now 
 — later," you exclaim. "Precisely now — only now," I 
 tell you. What is later but a word, an unavailing word, 
 is now an act, an act of salvation. Hundreds of thou- 
 sands could be saved from death, the German people 
 could be saved from destruction — even now, even at 
 this very moment — ^if Truth could but force her way into 
 the German people, for Truth would mean a pause, but 
 Falsehood is an advance on the path that leads to 
 destruction. 
 
 You say that the Truth helps our enemies? You great 
 children, who shut your eyes to escape danger. Long 
 ago the enemy knew the truth; there is no one in the 
 whole world who does not know it. It is everybody's 
 secret. 
 
 But you, Germany, you incorrigible, trusting dreamer, 
 you alone still slumber, you alone continue to sleep, in 
 all your unrighteousness, the sleep of the righteous. It 
 is long since the sun rose and spread her beams. But 
 you see it not, in the stillness of your night, behind the 
 closed shutters of your citadel.^ . . . How long must 
 Truth stand outside begging and shivering before the 
 doors of your castle, entreating in vain for admission, 
 while within Falsehood sits at the garish table? Open 
 the doors! Long enough has Truth been waiting. It 
 is time to admit her, and to prepare for her the place 
 of honour. In admitting such a guest, you would hon- 
 our yourself. 
 
 ^ [Burgfrieden. See footnote p. io8.] 
 * [Burgfrieden.]
 
 EPILOGUE 423 
 
 Make peace without, and within you will not need 
 peace. Open the doors to the free word, to the light 
 that it may illumine your darkness, to the air that it 
 may blow away the unclean vapours! You are choking 
 within. Throw open the doors ! 
 
 Do you believe that the sun would not rise if you were 
 to wall up your windows ? Do you believe that the day- 
 star would not shine, because your bat's eyes cannot 
 bear its radiance? Be sure that Truth, in spite of all 
 obstacles, will penetrate into your closed dwellings, 
 through chinks and crevices, like motes of dust ; she will 
 force her way into the house by the chimneys or the 
 keyholes ; she will gnaw the floor from under your feet ; 
 she will strike away the roof from over your head. Open 
 and let her in; thus at least your house will be saved. 
 
 If, however, you do not hear, if you mill not hear — 
 even now — ^your house will fall, and you will be buried 
 under the ruins. For I tell you that if Germany con- 
 tinues to gain ''victories" such as she has attained up 
 till now, her victories will lead to her death. . . . 
 
 To prevent this I wrote my book, a book of enlighten- 
 ment for the German people. 
 
 History, which weighs guilt and innocence in its iron 
 scales, will, I am firmly convinced, confirm the judg- 
 ment which, with pain and shame, I as a German have 
 been compelled to pass on Germans, in honour of truth 
 and for the well-being of the German people. History 
 also with letters of flame will inscribe the verdict: 
 weighed in the balance and found wanting. 
 
 So I finish my book as I began it, with a clean con- 
 science, with the sure feeling of having done a good 
 work, and, if justice is done, of having deserved the 
 thanks of my country.
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 I 
 
 Speech Delivered by the Chancellor, Dr. von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, in the Sitting of the 
 German Reichstag, on August 4th, 1914.^ 
 
 A stupendous fate is breaking over Europe. For 
 forty- four years, since the time we fought for and won 
 the German Empire and our position in the world, we 
 have Hved in peace and have protected the peace of 
 Europe. In the works of peace we have become strong 
 and powerful, and have thus aroused the envy of others. 
 With patience we have faced the fact that, under the 
 pretence that Germany was desirous of war, enmity has 
 been awakened against us in the East and the West, and 
 chains have been fashioned for us. The wind then 
 sown has brought forth the whirlwind which has now 
 broken loose. We wished to continue our work of peace, 
 and, like a silent vow, the feeling that animated every- 
 one from the Emperor down to the youngest soldier was 
 this : Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword 
 fly from its scabbard. 
 
 The day has now come when we must draw it, against 
 our wish, and in spite of our sincere endeavours. Russia 
 has set fire to the building. We are at war with Russia 
 and France — a war that has been forced upon us. 
 
 Gentlemen, a number of documents, composed during 
 * [As translated in Collected Diplomatic Documents.] 
 424
 
 APPENDICES 425 
 
 the pressure of these last eventful days, is before you. 
 Allow me to emphasise the facts that determine our 
 attitude. 
 
 From the first moment of the Austro-Serbian conflict 
 we declared that this question must be limited to Aus- 
 tria-Hungary and Serbia, and we worked with this end 
 in view. All Governments, especially that of Great 
 Britain, took the same attitude. Russia alone asserted 
 that she had to be heard in the settlement of this matter. 
 
 Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threat- 
 ening head. 
 
 As soon as the first definite information regarding the 
 military preparations in Russia reached us we declared 
 at Petrograd in a friendly but emphatic manner that mili- 
 tary measures against Austria would find us on the side 
 of our ally, and that military preparations against our- 
 selves would oblige us to take counter-measures; but 
 that mobilisation would come very near to actual war. 
 
 Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her 
 desire for peace, and declared that she was making no 
 military preparations against us. 
 
 In the meantime. Great Britain, warmly supported by 
 us, tried to mediate between Vienna and Petrograd. 
 
 On July 28th the Emperor telegraphed to the Tsar 
 asking him to take into consideration the fact that it was 
 both the duty and the right of Austria-Hungary to de- 
 fend herself against the pan-Serb agitation, which threat- 
 ened to undermine her existence. The Emperor drew 
 the Tsar's attention to the solidarity of the interests of 
 all monarchs in face of the murder of Serajevo. He 
 asked for the latter's personal assistance in smoothing 
 over the difficulties existing between Vienna and Petro- 
 grad. About the same time, and before receipt of this 
 telegram, the Tsar asked the Emperor to come to his aid 
 and to induce Vienna to moderate her demands. The 
 Emperor accepted the role of mediator.
 
 426 I ACCUSE! 
 
 But scarcely had active steps on these hnes begun 
 when Russia mobiHsed all her forces directed against 
 Austria, while Austria-Hungary had mobilised only those 
 of her corps which were directed against Serbia. To 
 the north she had mobilised only two of her corps, far 
 from the Russian frontier. The Emperor immediately 
 informed the Tsar that this mobilisation of Russian 
 forces against Austria rendered the role of mediator, 
 which he had accepted at the Tsar's request, difficult, if 
 not impossible. 
 
 In spite of this we continued our task of mediation 
 at Vienna and carried it to the utmost point which was 
 compatible with our position as an ally. 
 
 Meanwhile Russia of her own accord renewed her as- 
 surances that she was making no military preparations 
 against us. 
 
 We come now to July 31st. The decision was to be 
 taken at Vienna. Through our representations we had 
 already obtained the resumption of direct conversations 
 between Vienna and Petrograd, after they had been for 
 some time interrupted. But before the final decision 
 was taken at Vienna, the news arrived that Russia had 
 mobilised her entire forces, and that her mobilisation 
 was therefore directed against us also. The Russian 
 Government, who knew from our repeated statements 
 what mobilisation on our frontiers meant, did not notify 
 us of this mobilisation, nor did they even offer any ex- 
 planation. It was not until the afternoon of July 31st 
 that the Emperor received a telegram from the Tsar in 
 which he guaranteed that his army would not assume 
 a provocative attitude towards us. But mobilisation on 
 our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of 
 July 30th-3ist. 
 
 While we were mediating at Vienna in compliance with 
 Russia's request, Russian forces were appearing all along 
 our extended and almost entirely open frontier, and 
 
 II
 
 APPENDICES 427 
 
 France, though indeed not actually mobilising, was ad- 
 mittedly making military preparations. What was our 
 position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we had, 
 up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up a 
 single reservist. Were we now to wait further in pa- 
 tience until the nations on either side of us chose the 
 moment for their attack? It would have been a crime 
 to expose Germany to such peril. Therefore, on July 
 31st we called upon Russia to demobilise as the only 
 measure which could still preserve peace of Europe. The 
 Imperial Ambassador at Petrograd was also instructed 
 to inform the Russian Government that in case our 
 demand met with a refusal, we should have to consider 
 that a state of war (Kriegszustand) existed. 
 
 The Imperial Ambassador has executed these instruc- 
 tions. We have not yet learnt what Russia answered to 
 our demand for demobilisation. Telegraphic reports on 
 this question have not reached us even though the 
 wires still transmitted much less important infomia- 
 tion. 
 
 Therefore, the time-limit having long since expired, 
 the Emperor was obliged to mobilise our forces on 
 August 1st at 5 p.m. 
 
 At the same time we had to make certain what atti- 
 tude France would assume. To our direct question, 
 whether she would remain neutral in the event of a 
 Russo-German War, France replied that she would do 
 what her interests demanded. That was an evasion, if 
 not a refusal. 
 
 In spite of this, the Emperor ordered that the French 
 frontier was to be unconditionally respected. This or- 
 der, with one single exception, was strictly obeyed. 
 France, who mobilised at the same time as we did, as- 
 sured us that she would respect a zone of 10 kilometres 
 on the frontier. What really happened? Aviators 
 dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry
 
 428 I ACCUSE! 
 
 detachments appeared on the territory of the Empire! 
 Though war had not been declared, France thus broke 
 the peace and actually attacked us. 
 
 Regarding the one exception on our side which I men- 
 tioned, the Chief of the General Staff reports as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 "Only one of the French complaints about the cross- 
 ing of the frontier from our side is justified. Against 
 express orders, a patrol of the 14th Army Corps, ap- 
 parently led by an officer, crossed the frontier on August 
 2nd. They seem to have been shot down, only one man 
 having returned. But long before this isolated instance 
 of crossing the frontier had occurred, French aviators 
 had penetrated into Southern Germany and had thrown 
 bombs on our railway lines. French troops had at- 
 tacked our frontier guards on the Schlucht Pass. Our 
 troops, in accordance with their orders, have remained 
 strictly on the defensive." This is the report of the 
 General Staff. 
 
 Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (Not- 
 wehr), and necessity (Not) knows no law. Our troops 
 have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already en- 
 tered Belgian territory. 
 
 Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It 
 is true that the French Government declared at Brussels 
 that France would respect Belgian neutrality as long as 
 her adversary respected it. We knew, however, that 
 France stood ready for an invasion. France could wait, 
 we could not. A French attack on our flank on the 
 lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were 
 forced to ignore the rightful protests of the Govern- 
 ments of Luxemburg and Belgium. The wrong — I speak 
 openly — the wrong we thereby commit we will try to 
 make good as soon as our military aims have been at- 
 tained. 
 
 He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his
 
 APPENDICES 429 
 
 highest possession can only consider how he is to hack 
 his way through {durchhauen) . 
 
 Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Aus- 
 tria-Hungary. 
 
 As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made 
 by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons yester- 
 day show the standpoint assumed by the British Gov- 
 ernment. We have informed the British Government 
 that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, our fleet 
 will not attack the northern coast of France, and that 
 we will not violate the territorial integrity and inde- 
 pendence of Belgium. These assurances I now repeat 
 before the world, and I may add that, as long as Great 
 Britain remains neutral, we would also be willing, upon 
 reciprocity being assured, to take no warlike measures 
 against French commercial shipping. 
 
 Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words 
 of the Emperor: "With a clear conscience we enter the 
 lists." We are fighting for the fruits of our works of 
 peace, for the inheritance of a great past and for our 
 future. The fifty years are not yet past during which 
 Count Moltke said wc should have to remain armed to 
 defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now the 
 great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with 
 clear confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is 
 in the field, our navy is ready for battle — behind them 
 stands the entire German nation — the entire German na- 
 tion united to the last man. 
 
 Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. 
 The proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask 
 you to pass them quickly.
 
 430 I ACCUSE! 
 
 II 
 
 Speech Delivered by the Chancellor, Dr. von 
 Bethmann-Hollweg, in the sitting of the 
 German Reichstag on December 2nd, 1914. 
 
 Gentlemen, His Majesty the Emperor, who is at the 
 front with the Army, has requested me to convey his 
 best wishes and heartiest greetings to the representa- 
 tives of the German people, with whom he knows that 
 he is at one until death, in storm and danger, and in 
 the common care for the well-being of the Fatherland, 
 and he has asked me at the same time to express to the 
 whole nation in his name and from this place his thanks 
 for the unexampled sacrifice and devotion, for the stu- 
 pendous task which is being achieved at the front and at 
 home, and will still further be achieved, by all ranks 
 of the nation without distinction. Our first thought, also, 
 turns to the Emperor, to the Army, and the Navy, to 
 our soldiers who on the battlefield and on the high seas 
 are fighting for the honour and the greatness of the 
 Empire. We look upon them full of pride and with firm 
 confidence, but at the same time we look upon our Aus- 
 tro-Hungarian brothers in arms, who faithfully united 
 with us fight the great fight with brilliantly maintained 
 bravery. In the struggle which has been forced upon 
 us we have recently been joined by a new ally, who 
 knows quite well that with the destruction of the Ger- 
 man Empire her political independence also will come 
 to an end; I refer to the Ottoman Empire. If our ene- 
 mies have summoned up against us a powerful coali- 
 tion, it is to be hoped that they will also have learned 
 that the arm of our courageous allies reaches to the 
 weak points in their world-position. On August 4th 
 the Reichstag showed the unyielding will of the whole
 
 APPENDICES 431 
 
 people to take up the struggle forced upon us, and to 
 defend our independence to the uttermost. Since then 
 great things have happened. Who will count the acts 
 of glory and of heroism of the armies, the regiments, 
 the squadrons, and the companies, of the cruisers and 
 the submarines, in a war which flings its battle-line 
 over the whole of Europe and over the whole world? 
 Only a later age will be able to tell of these things. For 
 to-day it must suffice that in spite of the enormous su- 
 periority of our enemies, the war is being carried on 
 in the enemies' country, thanks to the unconquerable 
 bravery of our troops. There we stand firm and strong, 
 and we may with all confidence look to the future. But 
 the enemy's power of resistance is not broken. We 
 are not yet at an end of our sacrifices. The nation will 
 continue to bear these further sacrifices with the same 
 heroism which it has hitherto shown, for we must, and 
 we will, conduct to a happy end the struggle which, 
 surrounded as we are by enemies, we are waging for 
 right and freedom. Then, also, we will remember the 
 wrongs, some of which have been in violation of all the 
 dictates of civilisation, done to those of our defence- 
 less countrymen living abroad, for, Gentlemen, the 
 world must learn that no one can touch unavenged so 
 much as a hair of a German. 
 
 When the meeting of August 4th was at an end, the 
 British Ambassador appeared here to deliver to us an 
 ultimatum from England, and, in the event of a refusal, 
 a declaration of war. I was not then able to express 
 myself on the position finally assumed by the British 
 Government, and I propose to-day to offer some obser- 
 vations on the point. 
 
 Where the responsibility rests for this, the greatest 
 of all wars, is, for us, clear. The external responsibility 
 is borne by those men in Russia who inspired and car- 
 ried out the mobilisation of the entire Russian Army.
 
 43S I ACCUSE! 
 
 The inner responsibility, however, lies on the Govern- 
 ment of Great Britain. The Cabinet of London could 
 have made this war impossible by declaring without 
 ambiguity in Petrograd that England was not prepared 
 to allow a continental war in Europe to develop out of 
 the conflict between Austria and Serbia. By speaking 
 thus, France would also have been compelled energeti- 
 cally to advise Russia to desist from measures of war. 
 This would have smoothened the path for our action 
 of mediation. England did not do so. England knew 
 the intrigues for war of a small clique, of an irrespon- 
 sible but powerful group about the Tsar. England saw 
 how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the 
 wheel. In spite of all protestations of peace London 
 gave it to be understood in Petrograd that she was 
 taking her stand on the side of France and Russia. This 
 is proved clearly and incontestably by the publications 
 of the various Cabinets, and especially by that of the 
 English Blue Book itself. Then, indeed, it was impos- 
 sible to hold things back in Petrograd. 
 
 On this question we possess a witness who is entirely 
 above suspicion, the report of the Belgian charge 
 d'affaires in Petrograd, written on July 30th. He re- 
 ports : "To-day in Petrograd the people are firmly con- 
 vinced, indeed they have assurances, that England will 
 stand by France. This support has an extraordinary in- 
 fluence, and has done not a little to gain the upper hand 
 for the war party." 
 
 Up to this summer the English statesmen have re- 
 peatedly assured Parliament that there was no treaty, 
 no convention, no alliance which bound the freedom of 
 action of the English Government in the event of war 
 breaking out. England could freely decide whether it 
 would or would not take part in such a war. It was, 
 then, no fraternal obligation, no compulsion, not even 
 a menace to their own country, which caused the Eng-
 
 APPENDICES 433 
 
 lish statesmen to stir up war and then participate in it 
 themselves. There thus remains only one other possi- 
 bility: the Cabinet of London allowed this world-war, 
 this enormous world-war, to arise because it appeared 
 a favourable opportunity, with the help of her comrades 
 in the Entente, to destroy the vital nerve of her greatest 
 economic competitor. Thus, then, England and Russia 
 bear the responsibility for this world-war, for this catas- 
 trophe which has broken over Europe and over the world. 
 And Belgian neutrality, which England professed to pro- 
 tect, is a mask. At 7 o'clock in the evening on August 
 2nd we communicated in Brussels the fact that the 
 French plans of war, which were known to us, com- 
 pelled us in self-defence to march through Belgium. 
 But even on the afternoon of the same day, August 
 2nd, that is to say, before our demarche was or could be 
 known in London, England had promised France her 
 support, unconditionally promised it in the event of an 
 attack by the German Fleet on the French coast. There 
 was no mention of Belgian neutrality. This fact is es- 
 tablished by the declarations made by Sir Edward Grey 
 on August 3rd in the House of Commons, and which was 
 not known to me on August 4th. This fact is confirmed 
 by the English Blue Book itself. 
 
 How could England maintain that she had seized the 
 sword because Belgian neutrality was violated by us? 
 This is said by English statesmen to whom the past his- 
 tory of Belgian neutrality was known. When on August 
 4th I spoke of the wrong that we were doing in invading 
 Belgium, it was not then clear whether the Govern- 
 ment in Brussels might not in the hour of need agree 
 to spare their country, and to withdraw under protest 
 to Antwerp. You will remember that after Liege was 
 taken, on the proposal of the Army Authorities, a re- 
 newed request in this sense was directed to Brussels. 
 On military grounds the possibility of such a develop-
 
 434 
 
 I ACCUSE! 
 
 ment had, in all circumstances, to be kept open on August 
 4th. We had, indeed, indications that the neutrality of 
 Belgium had fallen to pieces, but positive proof in writ- 
 ing was lacking. English statesmen, however, knew 
 these proofs quite well. As a result of the documents 
 found in Brussels it has been established how and how 
 far Belgium gave up her neutrality in favour of England, 
 and two facts, consequently, are now well known to 
 all the world. When our troops marched into Belgium 
 in the night of August 3rd to 4th they were in a coun- 
 try which had long ago riddled its neutrality, and the 
 further fact is clear that it was not on account of Bel- 
 gian neutrality, which she had herself broken long ago, 
 that England declared war against us, but because she 
 believed that with the help of two great military con- 
 tinental Powers she could become our master. Since 
 August 2nd, since she promised to support France in 
 war, England was no longer neutral, but was, as a mat- 
 ter of fact, in a state of war against us. The reasons 
 advanced by English statesmen for this declaration of 
 war were of the nature of a spectacular show, intended 
 to confuse their own country and neutral States with 
 regard to the true grounds of the war. Now that the 
 Anglo-Belgian plans of war have been unveiled in all 
 their details, the policy of English statesmen is char- 
 acterised for all time in the history of the world. Eng- 
 lish diplomacy has, indeed, accomplished one other 
 achievement. On her summons, Japan tore from us 
 the heroic Tsingtau, and thereby violated Chinese neu- 
 trality. Did England take any steps with regard to the 
 violation of this neutrality? Has she shown in this 
 case her concern for the maintenance of the rights of 
 neutral States? Gentlemen, when I was called to my 
 present office live years ago, the Triple Entente stood 
 firmly opposed to the Triple Alliance. This was the 
 work of England, intended to assist in giving effect to
 
 APPENDICES 435 
 
 the fundamental principle of English policy, pursued for 
 centuries, that is, to oppose the strongest Power on the 
 continent for the time being. In this fact lay from the 
 outset the aggressive character of the Triple Entente 
 as opposed to the purely defensive significance of the 
 Triple Alliance; for a nation as great and as strong as 
 the German cannot be hampered in the free develop- 
 ment of its forces. In view of this political constellation 
 the way to be followed by German policy was clearly 
 indicated. We had to endeavour, by arriving at an un- 
 derstanding with the individual Powers of the Entente, 
 to banish the danger of war; we had at the same time so 
 to strengthen our defensive forces that, if war should 
 come, we would be strong enough to carry it through. 
 As you know, we have done both. In the case of France 
 we always encountered the old thoughts of revenge. 
 Nourished by ambitious politicians, these thoughts 
 showed themselves to be stronger than the desire for 
 neighbourly relations with us which was doubtless en- 
 tertained by a part of the French people. In the case 
 of Russia it is true that we arrived at particular agree- 
 ments, but the firm alliance between Russia and France, 
 the opposition of Russia to our ally Austria-Hungary, 
 and a hatred of Germany nourished on Pan-Slav am- 
 bitions prevented any understanding designed to avoid 
 the danger of war. The freest position, comparatively 
 speaking, was occupied by England. Speaking in Par- 
 liament, English statesmen have again and again with 
 the greatest emphasis defended and boasted of the free- 
 dom enjoyed by the British Government in arriving at a 
 decision. This was the first place in which an under- 
 standing could be sought, which would then, in fact, 
 have guaranteed the peace of the world. In this di- 
 rection I was bound to exert my efforts, and I did so. 
 The way was strait, as I well knew. In the course of 
 centuries the insular manner of English thought has es-
 
 436 I ACCUSE! 
 
 tablished a political principle with the force of an ax- 
 iomatic dogma, the principle that an arhitrium mundi 
 belongs to England, which can only be maintained by 
 the uncontested control of the seas on the one hand, 
 and on the other by the balance of power on the con- 
 tinent, which has been so often mentioned. I never 
 hoped to be able to break this ancient English princi- 
 ple by force of persuasion. What appeared to be possible 
 was that the increasing strength of Germany, the increas- 
 ing risk involved in a war, would have enabled England 
 to see that this principle, so long represented by Eng- 
 lish policy, had become out of date, and was no longer 
 practicable, and that a peaceful settlement with Germany 
 was to be preferred. This dogma was, however, so 
 firmly rooted that it paralysed all efforts to arrive at a 
 decisive understanding. The negotiations received a new 
 impulse in the crisis of 191 1. The English people recog- 
 nised overnight that it had been standing before the 
 abyss of a European war. Compelled by popular sen- 
 timent, the English statesman desired to approach Ger- 
 many. By long and painful labour it was possible to 
 arrive at agreements with regard, to economic int>erests, 
 which, in the first place, affected Asia Minor and Africa, 
 and were intended to diminish possible sources of politi- 
 cal friction. The world is wide, it has room enough for 
 the free development of both nations side by side, if 
 only the attempt is not made to hinder and restrict them 
 in their free development. That is the principle which 
 our policy has always defended. But, Gentlemen, while 
 we were so negotiating, England was incessantly intent 
 on drawing closer her relations to Russia and France. 
 The most decisive point in this is that, apart from the 
 sphere of politics, closer military agreements were being 
 concluded to meet the case of a continental war, Eng- 
 land conducted these negotiations as far as possible in 
 secret. When anything of this nature trickled through
 
 APPENDICES 437 
 
 to the public, as has happened more than once, the Eng- 
 lish Government endeavoured to represent the matter to 
 Parliament and in the Press as entirely innocent. We 
 did not remain ignorant of these agreements of England. 
 I have laid papers on the subject. The whole situation 
 was, in fact, that England was ready to come to an 
 und»erstanding with us on particular questions, but the 
 chief and the first principle of English policy remained 
 unaltered : in the free development of her powers Ger- 
 many had to be kept in check by the balance of power. 
 That represents the frontier line of friendly relations 
 with Germany. For this purpose the Triple Entente was 
 elaborated to the utmost. As her friends desired mili- 
 tary assurances, the English were at once ready to give 
 them. The ring was thus completed. England is sure 
 of France's adherence, and therefore of Russia's also. 
 But as a result of all this, England also binds her will. 
 If France or Russia, where the existing chauvinistic 
 circles find their strongest support in the military con- 
 nivance of England, if France or Russia desire to strike, 
 England is morally delivered into the hands of her 
 friends. And what is the object of all this? Germany 
 must be kept down. We have not been remiss in warn- 
 ing the English Government. Even at the beginning of 
 July of this year I indicated to the English Government 
 that their secret negotiations with Russia with regard 
 to a naval convention were known to me. I drew their 
 attention to the serious dangers which this policy on the 
 part of England involved for the peace of the world. 
 Fourteen days later my prophecies were fulfilled. From 
 all these facts bearing on the general situation of affairs 
 we drew the consequences. In rapid sequence I brought 
 before you the greatest defence proposals known in Ger- 
 man history, and in full knowledge of the dangers which 
 surrounded us you have willingly and in a spirit of self- 
 sacrifice granted to our country what was needed for
 
 438 I ACCUSE! 
 
 her defence. As soon as the war had broken out, Eng- 
 land threw aside all external show. It was openly and 
 loudly proclaimed that England would fight until Ger- 
 many was crushed economically and by force of arms. 
 The hatred of Germany nourished by the Pan-Slavs 
 exultingly applauds the sentiment; France, with the 
 whole strength of an old soldierly nation, hopes to be 
 able to wipe out the stain of 1870, Gentlemen, on this 
 we have only one answer to give to our enemies: Ger- 
 many cannot be annihilated. 
 
 Like our military forces, our financial forces also have 
 given a brilliant account of themselves, and have with- 
 out any reservations placed themselves in the service 
 of our country. Our economic life has been maintained; 
 unemployment is relatively small. Germany's power and 
 skill in organisation constantly seek in new ways to avoid 
 coming evils, and to wipe out existing injuries. No man 
 and no woman seeks to avoid sharing in the common 
 and voluntary task ; no recruiting drums need to be beat 
 for this purpose. Everything in life and in wealth is 
 surrendered for the only, and the great object, for the 
 land of our fathers, for the hope of our children and 
 descendants. A spirit is being manifested, a moral great- 
 ness of the nation, such as has hitherto never been known 
 in the history of the world. If this spirit of sacrifice 
 shown by millions of our nation in arms against a world 
 of enemies is despised by our opponents as militarism, 
 if they abuse us as Huns and barbarians, if they scatter 
 cursed lies throughout the whole world — we are proud 
 enough to remain unconcerned. This wonderful spirit, 
 which glows through the hearts of Germany in unprec- 
 edented unity, in the unquestioning surrender of each 
 to each, this must and will be victorious. When a glori- 
 ous and a happy peace has been achieved, we will main- 
 tain this spirit as the holiest inheritance from this fear- 
 fully earnest and great time. As if by the power of
 
 APPENDICES 439 
 
 magic the barriers have disappeared which during a bar- 
 ren and dull age have separated the various parts of our 
 nation — the barriers which we reared together in mis- 
 understanding, in envy, and distrust. It brings a sense 
 of freedom and of bliss that at last the whole of this 
 rubbish and trash has been swept away, that only the 
 man counts, each equal to the other, each holding out 
 his hand to the other in a single and a holy cause. I 
 again use the words of the Emperor on the outbreak of 
 war : "I no longer know any parties. I know only Ger- 
 mans." Gentlemen, when the war is past parties will 
 return; for without parties, without political struggle, 
 there can be no political life, even for the freest and 
 the happiest nation; but. Gentlemen, we will struggle to 
 see — and I for my part promise to do so — ^that in these 
 struggles there may be only Germans. 
 
 I bring to a conclusion my few observations; — this is 
 no time for words — I cannot discuss all the questions 
 which move most profoundly the nation and myself. 
 One word more: faithfully and with a feeling of warm 
 gratitude we think of the sons of Germany who on the 
 battlefields in the east and the west, on the high seas, 
 on the shores of the Pacific, and in our colonies have 
 given up their life for the Fatherland. Before their 
 heroism, which is now stilled, we unite ourselves in the 
 vow to endure till the last breath, in order that our de- 
 scendants and our sons may be able to labour in the 
 service of the greatness of the Empire in a stronger 
 Germany, free and assured from foreign menace and 
 force. This vow will ring out to our sons and brothers 
 who are still fighting against the enemy, to the heart- 
 blood of Germany which springs up in countless and 
 nameless acts of heroism, for which we are prepared to 
 give up all that we have ; it will ring out to our country- 
 men abroad, to those kept back, to those in peril, to 
 those who care for us afar ofif, to those who are in prison
 
 440 I ACCUSE! 
 
 and to those abused. We will persevere, Gentlemen, 
 and I ask you to confirm this by accepting these meas- 
 ures. We will persevere, until we have the assurance 
 that no one will again disturb our peace, a peace in 
 which we mean as a free nation to tend and develop our 
 German character and our German strength. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Circular Note of the Chancellor, Dr. von Beth- 
 man-hollweg, to the imperial ambassadors, 
 DATED December 2dTH, 1914.^ 
 
 Headquarters, 
 
 December 24th, 1914. 
 In the speech made by Minister President Viviani in 
 the French Chamber is contained a passage that France 
 and Russia had on July 31st agreed to the English pro- 
 posal to stop military preparations and to begin negotia- 
 tions in London. If Germany had given her assent, 
 peace could have been maintained even at this last hour. 
 
 As I cannot at the present moment contradict from 
 the Tribune of the German Reichstag this false state- 
 ment made in the French Parliament, I see myself com- 
 pelled to send the following exposition to you with the 
 request to make an extensive use of it. 
 
 The British proposal for a conference which is printed 
 in the English Blue Book, No. 36, arises on July 26th. 
 
 Its contents say that representatives of Germany, 
 France, and Italy should meet with Sir Edward Grey 
 in London for the purpose of discovering an issue from 
 the difficulties which had arisen in the Serbian matter. 
 
 ' [As translated in the Appendix to Mr. J. W. Headlam's His- 
 tory of Twelve Days.]
 
 APPENDICES 441 
 
 From the beginning Germany took its stand on the point 
 that the Serbo-Austrian conflict was an affair which 
 only concerned the two States immediately indicated. 
 Sir Edward Grey himself also later recognised this point 
 of view. 
 
 Germany was obliged to reject the English proposal 
 for a conference, for it could not allow that Austria- 
 Hungary should be subjected to a tribunal of the Great 
 Powers in a question which concerned its national exist- 
 ence and which only concerned Austria-Hungary. It is 
 clear from the German White Book that Austria-Hun- 
 gary looked on the proposal for a conference as unac- 
 ceptable. By the declaration against Serbia it gave evi- 
 dence of its firm will to regulate the Serbian question 
 alone without the intervention of the Powers. At the 
 same time, however, it declared, in order to satisfy all 
 just claims of Russia, its complete territorial disinterest- 
 edness as regards Serbia. As Russia was not satisfied 
 with this assurance, European questions sprang out of 
 the Serbian question, and this first found its expression 
 in a difference between Austria-Hungary and Russia. 
 In order to prevent a European conflict developing out 
 of this difference, it was necessary to find a new basis 
 upon which immediate action of the Powers could be 
 begun. It was Germany to whom belongs the merit of 
 having first trod this ground. 
 
 The Secretary of State, von Jagow, in his conversa- 
 tion with the British Ambassador on July 27th pointed 
 out that in the wish of Russia to negotiate directly with 
 Austria-Hungary he saw an improvement of the situa- 
 tion and the best prospect for a peaceful solution. From 
 the day on which it was first expressed, Germany sup- 
 ported in Vienna with all the energy which stood at its 
 command this desire by which the English conference 
 idea was according even to the Russian opinion for the 
 time put aside. No State can have striven more honestly
 
 4,42 I ACCUSE! 
 
 and with more energy to maintain the peace of the world 
 than Germany had. 
 
 England also now gave up the idea of pursuing her 
 conference idea and on her side supported the concep- 
 tion of direct negotiations between Vienna and Petro- 
 grad (Blue Book, No. 67). 
 
 These negotiations, however, met with difficulties, and 
 difficulties which did not arise from Germany and Aus- 
 tria-Hungary, but from the Entente Powers. 
 
 If Germany's endeavour was to be successful, it re- 
 quired good will on the part of the Powers who were 
 not immediately engaged; it required also that those 
 who were principally engaged should hold their hand, 
 for if either of the two Powers between whom mediation 
 was to be made interrupted by military operations, ac- 
 tion which was proceeding, it was from the beginning 
 clear that this action could never attain its end. 
 
 Now how did it stand with the good will of the 
 Powers? The attitude of France is clearly shown in the 
 French Yellow Book. She did not trust German assur- 
 ances. All the steps of the German Ambassador, 
 Freiherr von Schoen, were received with mistrust. His 
 wish for mediating influence of France at Petrograd 
 was not regarded, for they believed that they must as- 
 sume that the steps taken by Herr von Schoen were 
 intended "ä compromettre la France au regard de la 
 Russie." The French Yellow Book shows that France 
 did not take a single positive step in the interest of peace. 
 
 What attitude did England take in the diplomatic 
 conversation ? She gave the appearance of mediating up 
 to the last hour, but her external actions were directed 
 to a humiliation of the two Powers of the Triple Al- 
 liance. England was the first Great Power which or- 
 dered military preparations on a great scale and thereby 
 created a feeling, particularly in Russia and France, 
 ^hich was in the highest degree adverse to mediatory
 
 APPENDICES 443 
 
 action. From the report of the French Charge d af- 
 faires in London on July 22nd (Yellow Book, No, 66), 
 it follows that as early as July 24th the Commander 
 of the English Fleet had discreetly taken steps for the 
 collection of the Fleet at Portland. Great Britain, there- 
 fore, mobilised sooner even than Serbia. Moreover, 
 Great Britain refused just what France did, to act in a 
 moderating and restraining manner at Petrograd. 
 
 On the warning from the English Ambassador at 
 Petrograd from which it was clearly to be seen that 
 only a warning to Russia to hold back her mobilisation 
 could save the situation. Sir Edward Grey did nothing 
 but let matters go their own way. 
 
 At the same time, however, he believed that it would 
 be useful to point out to Germany and Austria-Hun- 
 gary, if not quite clearly, still sufficiently so, that Eng- 
 land could also take part in a European war. At the 
 same time, therefore, when England, though letting drop 
 the idea of a conference, gave the appearance of wish- 
 ing that Austria-Hungary should show itself conciliatory 
 under the mediation of Germany, Sir Edward Grey di- 
 rects the attention of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador 
 in England to the mobilisation of the English Fleet 
 (Blue Book, 48), gives the Russian Ambassador to un- 
 derstand that England also could take part in a war, and 
 at once informs the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente 
 of this warning which he had addressed to Germany, by 
 which action the victory of the war-party in Petrograd 
 was sealed. 
 
 This was just the attitude, which according to the 
 better informed opinion of the English Ambassador 
 Buchanan was the worst adapted for bringing about good 
 feeling between the Powers. 
 
 Under these difficulties it would be regarded as a spe- 
 cial success that Germany succeeded in making Austria- 
 Hungary inclined to follow the wish of Russia and enter
 
 444 I ACCUSE! 
 
 into separate conversations. Had Russia, without on 
 her side taking mihtary measures, continued the negotia- 
 tions with Austria-Hungary which had only mobiHsed 
 against Serbia, the complete prospect of maintenance of 
 the world's peace would have been maintained. Instead 
 of this Russia mobilised against Austria-Hungary, by 
 which Sazonof was quite clear (see Blue Book, 78) that 
 with this all direct understanding with Austria-Hungary 
 fell to the ground. The laborious result of the German 
 negotiations for mediation was thereby overthrown by a 
 single blow. 
 
 What happened now on the part of the Entente 
 Powers in order to preserve peace at this last hour ? 
 
 Sir Edward Grey again took up his conference pro- 
 posal. In accordance also with the view of M. Sazonof, 
 the suitable moment had now come in order, under the 
 pressure of Russian mobilisation against Austria-Hun- 
 gary, again to recommend the old English idea of quad- 
 ruple conversation (German White Book, page 7). 
 
 Count Pourtales did not leave the Minister in doubt, 
 that according to his view the Entente Powers thereby 
 were requiring from Austria-Hungary just what they 
 had not been willing to suggest to Serbia, namely, that 
 she should give way under military pressure. 
 
 Under these circumstances the conference idea could 
 not possibly be sympathetic to Germany and Austria- 
 Hungary. Notwithstanding this, Germany declared in 
 London that she accepted in principle the proposal for 
 the intervention of the four Powers, but that it was 
 merely the form of the conference which was disagree- 
 able to her. At the same time the German Ambassador 
 at Petrograd pressed Sazonof on his side also to make 
 concessions in order to render a compromise possible. 
 It is well known that these efforts remained fruitless. 
 
 Russia herself seemed to take no more interest in the 
 further mediatory activity of Germany at Vienna, which
 
 APPENDICES 445 
 
 was continued until the last hour. She ordered the 
 mobilisation of all her forces in the night between July 
 30th and 31st, which must have the mobilisation of Ger- 
 many and the later declaration of war as its consequence. 
 
 In view of this course of events it cannot be under- 
 stood how a responsible statesman can have the courage 
 to maintain that Germany, who found herself confronted 
 by Russian mobilisation, military preparations of France, 
 and the mobilisation of the English Fleet, could on July 
 31st still have saved peace by the acceptance of a con- 
 ference which was to be conducted under the arms of the 
 Entente Powers. 
 
 It was not Germany, who continued to mediate up 
 Vienna up to the last hour, who made the idea of media- 
 tion by four Powers impossible; it was the military 
 measures of the Entente Powers who spoke words of 
 peace while they determined to make war. 
 
 V. Bethmann-Hollweg.
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT LOS ANGELES 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
 This book is DUE on the last date stamped below 
 
 8^*07 0,338 
 
 m fl'JG-4»i97^ 
 
 ft I ! •- 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 ■URL 
 
 1978 
 
 Form L-9 
 
 20m-l, '11(1122)
 
 D511 
 cop. 2 
 
 f» 
 
 3 1158 00316 795c 
 
 UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY 
 
 AA 000 751 540 6