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 ELEMENTS 
 
 OF THK 
 
 CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 CONtAlNlNa 
 
 A CONCISE ACCOUNT OF ITS ORIGIN AND TENDSNCY J 
 A VIEW OF ALL THE WORKS PUBLISHED BT ITS FOUNDER, 
 
 PROFESSOR IMMANUEL KANT; 
 
 AND A GLOSSARY FOR THE EXPLANATION OF TERMS AND PHRASES^ 
 
 I 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED *. 
 
 THREE PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS; 
 
 Chiefly tranflated from the German of 
 John Christopher Aceluno j 
 
 AliUc Counfellor and Firft Librarian to the £ledor of Saxony. 
 B y 
 
 A. F. M. WILLI CH, M, D. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printid FOR T. N. LONGMAN, 
 No. 39. Paternoster-Row. 
 
 1798*
 
 €ntmi in Statfonetjer !&att.
 
 b 
 
 To 
 
 The Right Honourable 
 SIR WILLIAM MILLER of Glenlee, Bart. 
 One of the Senators of the 
 , College of Jufticc 
 }n Scotland : 
 
 x<>
 
 To • 
 
 The REV. JAMES FINLAYSON, F. R. S. ^. 
 
 Prof, of Logic and Metaphyfics 
 in th^ Univerfity of Edinburgh ; 
 
 And 
 fte REV. JAMES MILNE, 
 
 ProfelTor of Moral Philofophy 
 in the Univerfity of Glafgow ; 
 TheJfe Elements 
 
 are 
 yery refpedlfully infcrihcd 
 
 Their moft obliged and humble Servanfc 
 
 Ttie AUTHOR and TRANSLATOR.
 
 P R E F A C £j 
 
 HE talk of writing prefaces is none of the moft 
 grateful ; efpccially when a variety of circumftances con- 
 cur, to impofe it as a duty upon one, who is in a man- 
 ner, partly the author, and partly the franflator of a 
 new work, on a new fubjeft. 
 
 It has now become the frequent pradice of certain 
 tranflators, to ifTue their mangled produ£tions into the 
 world as their own manufadture ; though, upon com- 
 parifon, they do not even deferve the charader of being 
 accurate tranflations from the German ; a language, 
 with which our modern tranflators, in general, are but 
 very imperfectly acquainted. 
 
 To obviate a charge of this nature, and to acknow- 
 ledge my obligations to thofe meritorious friends of 
 literature in Germany, from whofe labours I have de- 
 rived very confiderable affiftance in the compofition of 
 this work, I mud mention, in the firfl place, the Rev. 
 Dr. Staeudlin, Professor of Divinity at Goet- 
 TiNGEN. His claflical performance, " On the Spirit and 
 Hijiory of Scepticifm, in two Volumes, octavo, 1794/' has 
 afforded me the materials of the ' Hi-storical Intro-' 
 dDction/ — In reliance upon a charader of fo much 
 
 worth
 
 ^ PREFACE. 
 
 worth and eminence, as that of Dr. Staeudlin, I have fiot 
 hefitated, pp. 23 and 24, to record, with due praife and 
 refpect, a work written by Mr. Adam Weishaupt. 
 Without entering upon an inquiry into Mr. Weishaupt*s 
 moral charafter, I can fafely aver, that his literary works 
 have been received, upon the Continent, with almoft uni- 
 Verfal approbation. In this aflertion, I am fupported by 
 the Condudors of the firft German Reviews in gene- 
 ral, and particularly by the refpedlable evidence of Prof. 
 Staeudlin himfelf, as well as by that of the celebrated Prof. 
 Eberhard of Halle; both of whom have ranked Mr. 
 "Weishaupt*s writings ampng the firft philofophical com- 
 pbfitions of Germany. And as he has lately publiflied, 
 the third volunie of his work ** On Truth and Motal 
 Perfe£lion; Regensburgj 1796;" as likewife another 
 work entitled, " On the fecret Art of Governing; 
 Frankfort on the Main, 1795 ;" I muft leave Mr Weia- 
 haupt to defend his private charafter in Britain, as well 
 as he has done it to the fatisfaftion of his learned friends 
 in Germany. 
 
 For the coTicifenefs of the ' Synopsis,* which con- 
 tains the ftatement and general folution of Five connected 
 Problems^ I need riiake no apology ; as the terms oc- 
 curring in this part of the ' Elements* are, I hope, fuf- 
 ficiefjtly explained in the Glossary. Without this expe- 
 dient, I might have extended the Synopfis alone to a 
 length, far exceeding the whole of the prefent work. 
 
 In the ' Chronological Analysis,' perhaps, I have 
 been in fomfe parts too prolix, while others might have 
 
 bceii
 
 J» R E F A C fi. ia 
 
 been enlarged upon with "iadvantage. But it is not an 
 eafy matter to keep within proper bounds, in the difcuf- 
 fion of abftrad metaphyfical fubjeds. Nor dare I flatter 
 myfelf, that I am fufficiently acquainted with the idiom 
 of the Englifli language, to exhibit the moft abftrufe in- 
 quiries of the human mind, in a kiminous point of view. 
 In this refped, 1 can offer no better apology than that 
 given by my great mafter, whofe own words I have 
 quoted in page 9. o£the Introduction. — Althotigh I had 
 the good fortune to attend Prof. Kant's Ledures be- 
 tween the years 1778 and 1781, during my refidence at 
 the Univerfity of Koenigfberg ; and again heard feveral 
 of his Ledures in furamer 1792, when Irevifited my na- 
 tive country ; yet I mufl confefs, that my other profef- 
 fional labours have not permitted me to devote, to the 
 ftudy of the Critical Syflem of Philofophy, that portion 
 of time and clofe application, which, in more favourable 
 circumflances, I fhould have been happy to bellow upon 
 this important branch of human knowledge. 
 
 Relying, howev^, on the candour and impartiality of 
 the learned in this country, I truft they will not decide 
 upon a work offo comprehenfive a nature as the prefent, 
 from partial views ; nor do I entertain the lead appre- 
 henfion, that they will be deterred from a thorough exa- 
 mination of it, by any paradoxical ^pofnions, or eVen appa^ 
 rent contradidlions, that may occur in the^r/r perufal>— 
 A nation, which has produced a Bacon, a Newton, a 
 Locke, a Hume, and fo many other profotrnd inquirers, 
 cannot be fuppofed to have a tafle merely for the lighter, 
 
 (or
 
 iv PREFACE. 
 
 (or what are vulgarly czWed) popular purfults of litera- 
 ture. Valuable and ufeful as thefe are to the commu- 
 nity at large, no man of any penetration will deny, that 
 metaphyfical fpeculations, or inquiries vnXofirJi truths^ 
 are equally beneficial and honourable ; though they mufl 
 ever remain the property of the few, whofe genius leaves 
 the beaten track, and fearches for higher principles than, 
 fuch, as are barely deduced from the world of fenfe, or 
 experience. 
 
 To thofe, therefore, who are both able and difpofed to 
 become acquainted with the fpirit of the Critical Syflem, 
 I beg leave to addrefs myfelf in the words of the worthy 
 Professor Will of Altdorf, who gives his pupils the 
 following excellent advice : 
 
 I. " Not to prejudge and decry the works of Kant, as 
 being too fubtle and abflrufe, as being couched in unin- 
 telligible terms, as breathing innovation, and produdive 
 ofconfufionin philofophy : 
 
 2, " Not to complain of the want of that plainnefs, 
 which is neceffary to render a book palatable to popular 
 readers ; fmce difficulty of apprehenfion appears to be 
 peculiar to the inquiries, that form the objed of the 
 ' Critique ;* 
 
 3, " Not to appeal, according to the prevailing fafhion 
 of the age, to the decifion of the multitude, whenever an 
 abftra^t proportion occurs, which cannot, at firft view, 
 be clearly underftood from the fimple operations of Com- 
 mon Senfe i"* for Metaphyfics do not acknowledge the 
 exchifive competency of this tribunal : 
 
 4.
 
 PREFACE. V 
 
 "4, To abftracl from all other Metaphyfical Syftems, in 
 ftudying the Critical, i. e. not to make any other Syftem 
 the ftandard, by which the merits of the prefent are to 
 be tried : 
 
 5, To ftudy/r/? the general aim of the work, by fuc- 
 ceflively examining every foluticn, which the Critique of 
 Kant affords in regard to the five principal problems 
 (contained in the ' Synopfis') : and laftly, 
 
 6, As the inquiries forming the objeft of Kant's Cri- 
 tique are merely of a fpeculative nature, to proceed like- 
 wife in theprofecution of them merely upon fpeculative 
 grounds, and to abflain carefully from all partial views 
 of any intereft whatever. For the refult of found fpecu- 
 lation can never be prejudicial to the true interefls of 
 human nature.'* 
 
 With refpedl to the Glossary, I muft refer the read- 
 er to the few obfervations premifed at the head of it ; 
 and if I have not fucceeded in rendering the fubje£t it- 
 felf mere intelligible, by the definitions given of thofe 
 terms, in the ufe of which Kant differs from his cotem- 
 poraries, I can only plead the good intention, and the 
 patient induftry, with which I colle^ed and arranged the 
 materials. 
 
 The ' Three Philological Essays* have been ad- 
 ded to thefe * Elements* by way of Appendix ; in or- 
 der to relieve the reader, in fome degree, from the ar- 
 duous tafk — and fuch it undoubtedly is — of reflefting 
 upon fo great a variety of abftrad fubjecls. And as thefe 
 Effays are, in a manner, unconnected with the Philofophy 
 
 of
 
 vi PREFACE. 
 
 of Kant, they have been at the fame time feparately 
 printed, in a form fomewhat different from the prefent ; 
 in order to accommodate thofe, who might wifh to pof- 
 fefs them as a dilHndl work. 
 
 Finally, the flyle and compofitlon of this work, I am 
 fenfible, require more than common apology. Unfortu- 
 nately, however, it is a matter of no fmall difficulty to 
 make good apologies, efpecially in a foreign language, 
 Whatever the execution may be, ibr the anjsiety of my 
 wifhes I can confidently appeal to the teftimony of thofe 
 literary friends, who have occafionally lent me their aid 
 in correding the grammatical part of both the Elements 
 and the EiTays. They well know my eager and fincere 
 defire of improvement in Englifti compofuion ; and if 
 any material errors fhould occur in the courfe of fuch a 
 diverfity of fubjeds as the prefent, I befeech the judicious 
 reader and the candid critic to confider, that I have' ven- 
 tured into a field of inquiry, of which but a fmall p^rt 
 has hitherto been explored. 
 
 The indulgence, which I claim, will not be withheld- 
 jby thofe, who have tried their flrength in tranflating 
 from a foreign into their own language : and I appre- 
 hend ilil] lefs feverity from the few individuals, who have 
 attempted to write, or to tranflate into, a foreign lan- 
 guage, which they had an opportunity pf acquiring, 
 merely by reading and converfation. 
 
 I:TovEMB.je;R, 1797- 
 
 • CONTENfS
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 Ifijlorical IntroduBion^ containing a fuccinB account 
 
 efthe origin and tendency of the Critical Philofophy, i 
 
 Elementary View of the Philosophy of Kant : 
 Preparatory Remarks , - . . 24 
 
 I. Synopsis, 
 
 A. Definition and Divijion of Philofophy J - 38 
 
 B. Problems and Solutions : Exordium, « 43 
 
 Problem Firft, - - - 43 
 
 Problem Second, - - - 44 
 
 Problem Third, •< - ■ - - 4^ 
 
 Problem Fourth, - • i* » 49 
 
 Problem Fifth, - - - - 51 
 
 II. Chronological Analysis : Exordium, 53 
 I, Refleftions upon the true computation of living 
 
 powers ; 1746, - - - 55 
 
 II. — XVI. A Lift of fifteen different works, which the 
 author has J)ublifhed between the years 
 1755 and 1764, - - - 60 
 
 XVII. (i) i)^ Mundi fenjihilis at que intelligihilis forma 
 
 et principiis i I'j'jo, - - - 62 
 
 XVIII. (2) Critique of Pure Reafon ; lySi,- - 64 
 XIX. (3) Introdu£tory obfervations with refpeft to 
 
 every future Syftem of Metaphyfics &.c. 1784, 80 
 XX. (4) Refleftions upon the foundation of the powers 
 
 and methods &c. 1784, - 83 
 
 XXI. (5) Fundamental Principles of the Metaphyfics 
 
 of Morals; 1785, - - ibid. 
 
 XXII. (6) Metaphyfical Principles of Natural Philo- 
 
 fophy j 1786, - - - 93 
 
 xxni.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 XXIII. (7) Fundamental Principles of the Critique of 
 
 Tafte; 1787, - - - 99 
 
 XXIV. (8) Critique of Praaical Reafon ; 1788, ibid. 
 XXV. (9) Critique of the Judging Faculty ; 1790, 103 
 
 XXVI. On a certain difcovery, &c. 1790, - I13 
 
 XXVII. (10) Religion confidered within the bounds of 
 
 mere Reafon ; 1793, - - 114 
 
 XXVIII. Project for a Perpetual Peace ; 1795, 121 
 XXIX. (11) Metaphyfical Elements of Jurifprudence ; 
 
 1797, - - - 127 
 
 XXX. (12) Metaphyfical Elements of Ethics; 1797, 134 
 A Lift of fourteen Eflays, on various fubje6ts, pub- 
 liflbedby the author, between the years 1777 and I794» ^3^ 
 
 GLOSSARY : from 139, to 183 
 
 *^5>* 
 
 Corrigenda. 
 
 p. 16, 1. 11 for dlrefts, read deferts. 
 
 p. 19, 1. i/[,for Propedeutic, read Propaedeutic. 
 
 p. 32, 1. 2^, for clofe, read thofe. 
 
 p. 83, 1. i^,for inherent to, read inherent in. 
 
 Note : The terms intuition and intuitive have, by inadvert- 
 ency, fometimes been ufed inftead of the words, cog- 
 nition and cognitive, particularly in No. XVIII. (2) 
 of Kant's works, or between pp. 64. and 80.-— The 
 reader is therefore requefted tp attend to this clr- 
 cumftance, efpecially in places, where the promif- 
 cuous ufc of thefe terms might occafion feme am- 
 biguity. 
 
 Elements
 
 ELEMENTS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, &c. 
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 j^N Germany, two circumftances in particular have contri- 
 buted to bring about a revolution in philofophy, and to di- 
 minifli the eftimation in which the dogmatical fyjiem of WoLF 
 was formerly held : the ftudy of the writings of the later 
 Englifli and French philofophers ;, and the appearance of a 
 philofophic prince upon the throne of Pruffia.J 
 
 The former circumftance made the German philofophers 
 acquainted with many objeftions that had been ftarted againft 
 the dogmatical fyftem of Metaphyfics, gave rife to a turn for 
 popularity in philofophical inquiries, and awakened a fpirit of 
 emulation among them. Seleftions were made from various 
 fyftems ; and the learned, now for the firft time, began to con- 
 vey information with elegance and tafte. There arofe a fort 
 of EcleBicifniy which difcouraged party-fpirit, and recommend- 
 ed philofophical difcretion ; but which was, at the fame time, 
 attended with fome injurious efFefts ; for incoherent fyftems 
 were thus formed, inconfiftent fyftems were mingled together, 
 and philofophy became ftill more wavering and flimfy, and 
 was ftill farther removed from the perfedion of a fcience. 
 
 The hiftory of philofophy was now inveftigated with great- 
 er attention, and more generally ftudied than it had formerly 
 
 A been ;
 
 a HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 been : With many, the fludy of philofophy was converted in- 
 to that of its hiftory ; — a clear proof, how much the turn 
 for dogmatifm had declined, and how little hope was enter- 
 tained of forming a fyftem, at once ftable and fuited to the 
 fpirit of the age. 
 
 Frederic the Great coUefled a number of foreign philo- 
 fophers round him, who, in a great meafure, merely to pay 
 adulation, and from felfifli views, openly profeffed, like him, 
 infidelity and fcepticifm. This circumftance, from the novelty 
 of the thing, and from the admiration in which the charafter 
 of Frederic was held, had an almoft magical influence on all 
 the opinions of the age. It would, however, be equal to ingra- 
 titude towards the manes of this furprifing monarch, to o- 
 mit mentioning in this place, that the fyftem of his own prafti- 
 cal philofophy has been held out, both by divines and laymen, 
 as complete and downright Atheifm j wheieas it is now clear 
 and uniformly admitted by found and unprejudiced inquirers, 
 that it amounted to nothing more than limple Deifm. 
 
 Among the philofophers who furrounded Frederic, no one 
 declared hinifelf fo exprefsly, and fo openly, in favour of fcep- 
 ticifm as d'ARGENS, the author of the " Philofophy of good 
 ** fenfe," which is written in a fuperficial manner, with a 
 view of gaining popularity, but which is not even calculated 
 for the Fair Sex and Gentlemen of fafhion, for whofe ufe it 
 was originally deligned ; though it abounds in erudition and 
 abftrad fpeculation. D'Argens there endeavours to fhow the 
 uncertainty of Hiftory, (and this is the beft part of the work) 
 of Logic, of Phyfics, of Metaphyfics, and of Aftronomy, with- 
 out advancing, in oppofition, any new, or genuine, philofo- 
 fhical principles. It does him, neverthelefs, fome honour 
 that, with regard to the morality of life, he obferves a refped- 
 ful fUence. His fcepticifm is diredted more againft the ufual 
 
 pre-
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. ^ 
 
 pretcfifions of the fchools, and the learned in particular, than 
 againft human knowledge in general. 
 
 It is more remarkable, though lefs known> that, in the fame 
 country, a celebrated and profound Divine declared himfelf in 
 favour of an almoft unlimited Pyrrhonifm^ — M.de Beausobre, 
 in his "Pyrrhonifme raifonablc," called it rational, becaufe he 
 allowed certain probabilities, both in kind and in degree, and 
 maintained certain firll principles, which did not admit of 
 doubt. The work is written in a lively fceptical humour, and 
 affords pleafure in the perufal. It contains, indeed, many new 
 and unexpefted remarks ; for it is an alFault upon all fyftems, 
 efpecially upon that of Wolf. " Aristotle," the author fome- 
 where fays, "had numerous followers for many centuries. The 
 ** time'of his fall is now come ; and Descartes has given him 
 *' the laft blow. The fame of the French philofopher was of 
 " fhorter duration, becaufe people now poffefled more un- 
 '* derftanding and lefs pedantry. Leibnitz came ; Wolf 
 ** was his fucceffor : At prefent philofophers are in a fort of 
 ** anarchy ; they wait for a man who is bold enough to build 
 ** upon the ruins of former Syftems, new opinions, and confe- 
 ** quently new errors." No where does Beaufobre attack re- 
 ligion and revelation, but rather refpedtfully affirms their 
 certainty. The following paffage is worthy of attention : ** Al- 
 ** though it be difficult to prove the exiftence of GoD by the 
 *' light of reafon, yet even this light is fufficient to convince 
 " us, that the proof of the contrary is impoffible. How can 
 ** we fatisfaftorily prove the oppofite, if we have no clear idea 
 ** of the fubjeft which we wifh to call in queftion ? Although 
 " I could bear in my mind no fufficient proof of the exiftence 
 " of God, yet the advantage which attends the belief of this 
 " truth, the impoffibility of comprehending the nature of an 
 " infinite Being, and the reflexion that this truth is both the 
 " moft rational and ufeful of all others, would be fufficient to 
 
 A J <* induce
 
 4 [HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION'. 
 
 ** induce any thinking perfon to give his aflent, nay even t«- 
 " determine me." 
 
 But after this we are aftonilhed to find him confidering aU 
 morality as uncertain. His chief reafon is, " that the good- 
 *' nefs of a£lions depends upon their confequences, which man 
 *' cannot forefee, nor accurately afcertain." This argument, 
 maturely confidered, is obvioufly Ihallow, becaufe it proceeds 
 upon falfe ideas of morality : But the following objeftions 
 are of greater importance : " That we are fo little acquainted 
 ** with the motives from which we ad, and in general with 
 ** our paffions, that we know not how far our prejudices, 
 '* and our weaknefs, can juftify our adlions ; and that the in- 
 " terference and eollifions of our different duties are inexpli- 
 ** cable to moft men, nay fome of them inexplicable to all." 
 The remark at the end of this work is not lefs ftriking. '* The 
 ** uncertainty of our knowledge Ihould not render us diflatis- 
 *' fied ; its advantage, or difadvantage, will not thereby be 
 " much affe£led. Certainty, with refpeft to usi is not even 
 ** the moft ufeful quality of our knowledge. The difficulty 
 ** of acquiring accurate knowledge, is an admonition of nature, 
 ** which reminds man of his weaknefs, and of the caution he 
 " ought to obferve." 
 
 The inclination to Scepticifm fhowed itfelf alfo in other 
 parts of Germany, in different writings. It appeared mani- 
 feftly, for inftance, in the ** Phyfical Caufes of Truth," by 
 Lossius, and in the firft edition of Platner's " Philofophical 
 *' Aphorifms." In the fyftems of Logic and elementary books 
 alfo, much more regard was paid to it than formerly j in proof 
 of which I fliall only mention the excellent difcuffions in 
 " Lambert's Organum," and in the elementary publications 
 of Feder. 
 
 But no author had, on the one hand, paid more attention to 
 the objections of the Scepticsi and the diftinguiftiing charafter- 
 
 iftic
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. j 
 
 iftie of the poffible fyflems ; and on the other, inveftigated more 
 profoundly the faculties of the Human Underftanding, and, 
 indeed, of the whole Human Conflitution, than Tetens, in his 
 *' Philofophical Inquiries concerning Human Nature, and the 
 ** developement of it," which were publiflied in two volumes, 
 in the year 1777. It is not our bufinefs here to mark mi- 
 nutely the excellencies or defefts of this work; we take 
 notice of it on this account chiefly, becaufe that profound 
 philofopher was the firft among the Germans, who examined 
 fome of the ideas of Hume, with an acutenefs worthy of fuch 
 an opponent ; and he has inveftigated the doftrines of ohJ'Bive 
 truth, and of the objedive exiftence of things, more deeply 
 and more precifely than had been done before. Againft the 
 explanation given by Hume, of the idea of Caufation, he ob- 
 jefted with juftice, that it did not exhauft the fubje<3: ; for 
 we underftand by it not merely a connexion, but alfo a de- 
 pendence of one thing upon another. He remarked that we 
 perceive in ourfelves ideas in a neceflary fucceffion, and that 
 this is properly our notion of a caufe, or connexion : he 
 pointed out inftances, in which the fubje£live connexion of 
 ideas arifes from a neceflary operation of the underftanding, 
 and, aftually, has another foundation than the aflbciation of 
 ideas formed by experience ; — cafes where we explain a 
 compound effe6l from compound caufes ; and where the idea 
 of the complex effetS; has never been before aflbciated with 
 that of the complex caufe, but where the comieftion is the 
 work of reflexion : in fine, he has pointed out the operations 
 of the mind, by which we deduce one truth from another. 
 He maintained, therefore, that the idea of Caufation is ab- 
 ftraflied from certain aflbciations of ideas, in which we remark 
 fomething more than mere fucceflion and combination. 
 
 Although this explanation is not altogether fatisfaftory, yet 
 it, in a great mcafure, holds good againft Hume's idea. Tetens 
 
 admits
 
 6 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 admits that fenfations afford the materials for all ideas ; but 
 he contends that their form depends upon the mind, or the 
 power of thinking. After having, in a very profound manner, 
 illuftrated the origin of our knowledge, from the objedive ex- 
 iHence of things, he next examines the truth of objedive 
 knowledge. According to his acceptation of the terms, our 
 knowledge is called objedivcly true, in fo far as obje£ts muft 
 be perceived bj every other being, in the fame manner in 
 which we reprefent them to ourfelves ; — a being who has fuch 
 a mind as we have : and in lo far as the relations, which we 
 remark in our external perceptions, correfpond with thofe of 
 every other being, whofe uuderftanding is fo conftituted, that 
 it thinks of the objeds in queftion, as we do. . The neceifary 
 rules of thought, according to which the mind proceeds, are, 
 with him, not only fuhJeSiive rules of our thinking faculty, 
 but of every reilcding principle ; and the general truths of 
 reafon are not only truths with refpedt to us, but to every 
 reafoning being. We cannot conceive an underftanding which 
 is capable of thinking againft the principle of contradiftion, or 
 in other words, of difputing the admiffibility of that principle : 
 hence this Is juftly confidered as an objedive principle. 
 
 Tetenshere contradids whatLoflius had laid down; and what 
 Defcartes had indeed, pretty dillin£lly before explained : That 
 truth is only a relation with refped to the being who thinks of 
 it, and that the contradidion is incapable of being an object 
 of thought, only with refped to our underftanding. Thus 
 Tetens, with many others, proceeded in reafoning upon fub- 
 jedive neceffary principles. He appealed to the fad, that 
 when we apply theories to real qbjeds, we always fuppofc 
 that the reality is fo conftituted, as the general ideas repre- 
 fent it. But here, argues he, the mind proceeds according to 
 laws which we muft confider as the laws of every reafoning 
 
 being j .
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 7 
 
 being ;-— confequentlj the truths which are here admitted, or 
 fuppofed, are objedlive truths. 
 
 With refpeft to the objefts of fenfe, the knowledge of them, " 
 indeed, is often only an objective appearance ; but the necef- 
 farjjaws of thought lead to this conclufion, that other think- 
 ing beings, in finiilar circumftances, reprefent thefe objefts to 
 themfelves in a fimilar manner ; that thefe objeds, with cer- 
 tain conformations, exift without us, and that certain proper- 
 ties of the impreffions which we experience, are alfo the pro- 
 perties of the objeds themfelves. — A Sceptic, however, with- 
 out going out of his way in quell of far-fetched arguments, 
 might eafily find a good deal to obje£l againfl this deduftion. 
 
 The work of Tetens had not the effed: of promoting a folid 
 philofophic fpirit, and of bringing about a falutary revolution 
 in the ftudy of philofophy, wKich might other wife have been 
 expefted. But this was not merely the confequence of the 
 circumftances of the times ; — but alfo of a ftile, not fo much 
 ' obfcure, as languid, prolix and alFefted ; as well as of a flavifli 
 dependence upon the Empiricifm of Locke, which is infufficient 
 for the explanation of the moft important problems. 
 
 What this work did not accomplifh, another did. — Kant, 
 who by various compofitions upon philofophical fubjeftsj had 
 long ago announced himfelf as an original genius, and an ex- 
 cellent philofopher, publifhed in the year 1781, the " Critique 
 of Pure Reafon," which promifed a total and beneficial reform 
 in every philofophical department. For a long time, however, 
 after its publication, it had been unaccountably negledled, or, 
 at leaft, mifun^erftood. This was furely not in confequence 
 of the difficulties, with which the ftudy of it, as well as of 
 every metaphyfical fubjeft, is neceflarily attended ; but of a 
 certain indifference to philofophy, and of a rooted tafte for 
 iliallow and popular difcuflions, which Kant dircftly oppo- 
 fed. But as foon as the work was more ftudied and invefti- 
 
 gated
 
 S HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 gated, and had found feveral fuccefsful Conimentators, at once 
 a, revolution in philofophj commenced. It foon met with 
 numerous admirers and friends, and even its opponents could 
 not with-hold their admiration from this mafterly produftion. 
 The J faw themfelves^ every where, driven from their ftrong 
 holds, and obliged to ere6t new fortifications for the defence of 
 thofe philofophical tenets which they wiflied to maintain. 
 Nay, many of the enemies of this fyftem became its friends ; 
 and the invaluable part of it, which treats of morals, met 
 with an almoll univerfal approbation. All the different 
 branches of Philofophy were examined with greater ardour, 
 and new fources of knowledge, which formerly had fcarcely 
 been conceived, were now expofed to view. The limits of 
 the fcience were more accurately defined, and the laudable 
 * refearches after flable and fimple principles, and after a rigid 
 ; method, gave to philofophical inquiries a certainty, and an in- 
 tereft, which for a long time they had not poflefTed. Long be- 
 fore this period doubts had arifen, in reflefting minds, con- 
 cerning the fyllems of Leibnitz, Wolf and Locke ; but thefe 
 had never been unfolded with fufficient clearnefs, nor a better 
 fyftem fubftituted in the place of that which was to be re- 
 linquiihed. Here all fyftems were examined with critical 
 acumen, and a folid foundation was laid for a new one. This 
 New Philofophy, in a fhort time, was attended with an almoft 
 magical influence upon all the Sciences. It found friends and 
 adherents, even among ranks of people who had not devoted 
 thcmfelves to Science, or leaft of all, to Metaphyfics. It excited 
 in Germany, a found, philofophic fpirit of inquiry, of which 
 the prefent age was fcarcely deemed capable. It contains fuch 
 an immenfe ftore of new ideas and views that, hitherto, only 
 a fmall part of thefe materials can be confidered as digefted, 
 and even, in a diftant age, new branches of knowledge may 
 ihoot forth from it. 
 
 The
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 9 
 
 The work itfelf is arranged with alyftematicfpirit, and writ- 
 ten with a noble philofophic impartiality. Tlie ftjle is ibme- 
 what obfcure *, the conftruftion and arrangement of the pe- 
 riods, in many places, ungraceful, heavy, and over-loaded ; but 
 a reader who has a tolerable underllanding, and an interell for 
 truth, is fufliciently recompenfed by the originality of thought, 
 and by the new 'and ftriking images in which it abounds. The 
 celebrated author difcovers all the talents requifite to a re- 
 former of philofophy, efpecially in our age : — not merely an 
 admirable acutenefs, and a rare talent of making himfelf the 
 objeft oiljis refle£lion, but alfo a knowledge in^Mathematics and 
 Natural Philofophy, of which he had formerly given proofs : 
 a nice fenfibility of the Beautiful and Sublime ; and in ge- 
 neral, a cultiv*ted manly tafte, a thorough acquaintance with 
 the different Syfteras of philofophy that prevailed before his 
 time ; and a refinement of feeling, which is truly honourable. 
 
 It is not my defign hercy to defcribe minutely the fyftem of 
 this phllofopher, which, befides the work already mentioned, 
 is explained in the " Prolegomena to every future Syftem of 
 Metaphyfics," publifhed in 1783 ; in the ** Fundamental Prin- 
 ciples of the Metaphyfics (Theory) of Morals," in 1785 ; in 
 the " Metaphyfical Principles of. Natural Philofophy," in 
 1786; in the *' Critique on Pra6lical Reafon," in 1788 ; in 
 the " Critique on Judgment," in 1790 ; and in the " Religion 
 within the limits of Pure Reafon," in 1793: And which 
 Syftem has found in Reinhold, Schulz, Schmid, and others, 
 friends and commentators, — men who themfelves were quali- 
 
 B fied 
 
 * " I am not very confclous," fays Kant, in his preface to the ad edition of the 
 Critique of Pure Reafon, p. 43 .« that I poffefs the talent of exliibiting an abftraA 
 philofophical fubjcft in a luminous point of view : I trUfl that the occafional de- 
 fed of ftyle will be further fupplied by the writings of thofe dcforving charadlers 
 who, together with a folid judgment, are In the pofleflion of that talent. For, 
 this being the cafe, there ia no danger of being refuted, but rather of being mtf , 
 vnierfwd%
 
 xo HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 fied to advance fcience. The following abftra6l will be fuffi- 
 cient for our prefent purpofe. 
 
 Kant begins with doubting, whether Metaphyfics, in gene- 
 4 ral, be capable of being fludied as a fcience. He remarked 
 that, hitherto, this branch of knowledge could not lay claim 
 to the appellation of a fcience ; although it was older than all 
 the others, and befides, by the intereft it excited, always ^ 
 obtruded itfelf upon our attention. Two circumflances led 
 him to difcoveries, which were to bring about a revolution in 
 Metaphyfics,. and fecure to them the rank of a fcience ; — the 
 obfervation, by what means Mathematics and Natural Philo- 
 fophy had become fciences ; and Hume's inquiries concerning 
 the idea of caufation. We begin with the latter, and fhall 
 make Kant himfelf give the account of it. 
 
 *' Since the Eflays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather fince 
 ** the origin of Metaphyfics, as far as their hifl:ory extends, no 
 *' circumilance has occurred, which might have been more 
 ** decifive of the fate of this fcience, than the attack which 
 ** David Hume made upon it. He brought, indeed, no light 
 *' into this department of knowledge, but he ilruck a fpark 
 " which, if it had fallen among combuftible materials, and had 
 ** been carefully fanned, ipight have been eafily kindled in- 
 ** to a blaze. Hume proceeded upon a fingle but important 
 *» idea in Metaphyfics, the conne£lion of caufe and efFed, and 
 *' the concomitant notions of power and aftion : he challenged 
 " reafon to anfwer him, what title flie had to imagine, that any 
 *' thing may be fo conftituted as that, if it be given, fomething 
 ** elfe is alfo thereby inferred : for the idea of caufe denotes 
 ** this. He proved beyond contradidlion, that it is impoffible for 
 *' reafon to think of fuch a connection a priori, and out of 
 *' its own ideas ; for it contains neceffity ; but it is not pof- 
 " fible to perceive how, becaufe fomething is, fomething elfe 
 
 *' mull
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. n 
 
 " mull alfo neceffarilj be ; nor how tlte idea - of fuch a con- 
 ** nedlion can be introduced a priori." — 
 
 '* Hence he concluded, that reafon entirely deceives herfelf 
 " with this idea, and that flie erroneoufly confiders it as her own 
 ** child, when it is only the fpurious offspring of imagination, 
 *' which imagination, impregnated by experience, has brought 
 *• certain ideas under the law ' of affociation, and fubftituted a 
 ** fubjedive neceffity, thence arifing, that is habit, for an ob- 
 " jeftive one derived from perception. Hence, again, he con- 
 " eluded that reafon had no title to think of fuch connexions, 
 " even in a general manner ; becaufe then all her general ideas 
 ** would be merely fiftions, and all her pretended notions, 
 *' ftamped a priori, would be nothing elfe than counterfeited 
 *' ordinary leiTons of experience : which is juft faying, there is 
 " no fcience of Metaphylics at all, and there can be none." 
 
 " However hally and unwarrantable Hume's conclulion 
 ** might appear, yet it was founded upon inveftigation, and this 
 ** inveftigation well deferved, that fome of the philofophers of 
 " his time fliould have united to ' folve more happily, if pof- 
 ** fible, the problem in the fenfe in which he delivered it : a 
 *' complete reform of thfc fcience might have refulted from 
 *' this folution. But it appears to have been the unavoidable 
 ** deftiny of Metaphyfics, that he fliould not be underftood by 
 *' his cotemporaries. For it is a mortifying reflection, that his 
 " opponents, Reid, Beattie, Oswald, and laftly Priestley 
 ** himfelf, totally mifunderftood the tendency of his problem. 
 ** Always admitting as granted, what he never had called in 
 " queftion, they fo mifunderftood his aim at improvement, that 
 ** every thing remained in the fame ftate,as if nothing had been 
 ** done. — The queftion was not, whether the idea of caufe be in 
 •* itfelf proper, and indifpenlible to the illuftration of all natural 
 " knowledge ; for this Hume had never doubted ; but whe- 
 5* ther this idea 13 *n objeft of thought through reafoning a 
 
 B a priori ;
 
 1% HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 <' priori ; and whether, in this manner, it poflefs internal evi- 
 " dence, independently of all experience ; confequentlj, whe- 
 " ther it be of fuch -extenlive utility, as is not limited to objects 
 ** of fenfe alone — It was upon this point Hume expelled an 
 ** explanation. 
 
 *' The opponents of this celebrated man, in order fatisfac- 
 «* torily to folve his problem, would have been under the ne- 
 ^ ** ceffity of penetrating more profoundly into the abftraft na- 
 ** ture of reafon, in fo far as it is employed in finre thought ; 
 *' an inquiry to which they were little, if at all, difpofed. — 
 *' Hence they contrived a more convenient method of difplay- 
 ** ing their malignity, without fubjefting themfelves to the 
 *' trouble of making further refearches ; namely, the appeal 
 ** to the common fen/e oj" mankind. — It is indeed a great gift of 
 ** Heaven, to poflefs a plain and unbiaffed underftanding ; — 
 *' but we muft manifeft it, and eftablifh ourfelves in this pof- 
 *' feiHon, by fa61s, by reflexion, and by reafon, by what we 
 *' do and fay ; not by appealing to it as an oracle, when we 
 ** can produce no rational arguments to juftify the claim.— 
 ** When obfervation and fcience aie put to the laft fliift, then, 
 *' and not fooner, is it time to appeal to common fenfe. — ■ 
 *' This is one of the fubtle contrivances of modern times, by 
 ** which the Ihallow prattler aflumes a right, boldly to chal- 
 •' lenge a man of profound erudition, and frequently main- 
 <* tains the conteft. As long, however, as there is any roon;i 
 ** left for difcovery, we fliall do well to beware of having re- 
 ^* courfe to this laft expedient. And, in truth, this appeal is 
 <' nothing elfe than a fubmiffion to the judgment of the mul- 
 ** titude, a reference at which the Philofopher blulhes, but in 
 *' which the filly witling triumphs and exults. — I Ihould 
 *< think, too, Hume might have laid claim to a found un- 
 f^ derflanding, as well as Beattie ; and befides, to what the 
 <f Jfttter certainly did not poffefs, to a critical acquaintance with 
 
 « that
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 << that fpecies of reafoaing, which keeps common fenfe within 
 *' due bounds, and prevents it from loiing itfelf in fpecula- 
 *' tions ; or what is more to the prefent purpofe, which hin- 
 *-* ders it from deciding upon any fubjecl, becaufe it knows not 
 ** how to juftify its mode of proceeding upon its own pfin- 
 ** ciples ; a reflraint, without which -an underllanding will 
 
 ♦' not long remain found -The chiffel and the mallet may do 
 
 " well enough for lliaping a piece of timber, but the ra- 
 ** dius-needle, a nicer inftrument, muft be employed. for en- 
 it graving. — In the fame manner, a found and plain under- 
 ** {landing, as well as a fpeculative one, are each of ufe in 
 f* their turn ; the former, when we are converfant about 
 *' judgments that are immediately applicable to experience ; 
 *' the latter, when we are about forming general judgments 
 " from m^ere abflraft ideas, as in Metaphyfics, where the un- 
 " derftanding, termed found or plain, but often erroneoufly fo 
 ** denominated, cannot afford any affiftance. 
 
 ** I freely own, the fuggeftions of David Hume were, what 
 *' firil, many years ago, roufed me from my dogmatical flum- 
 ** ber, and gave to m^ inquiries quite a different direction in 
 *' the field of fpeculative Philofophy. — I was far from be- 
 ** ing carried away by his conclufions, the fallacy of which 
 " chiefly arofe from his not forming to himfelf an idea of the 
 " whole of his problem j but merely invefligating^i part of it, 
 ** the folution of which was impoffible, without a comprehen- 
 *' five view of the whole. — ^When we proceed upon a well 
 <* founded, though not thoroughly digefted thought, we may 
 " exped, by patient and continued reflection, to profecute it 
 *' farther, than the acute genius had done, to whom we are in- 
 ** debted for the firft fpark of this light. — I firft enquired, 
 ** therefore, whether Hume's objeftion might not be a general 
 ** one, and foon found, that the idea of caufe and effe£t is far 
 •♦ from being the only one, by which the underflanding a 
 
 priori
 
 14 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 *• priori thinks of the connexion of things ; but rather, that 
 *' the fclence of Metaphyfics is altogether founded upon thefe 
 *' conneiElions. — I endeavoured to afcertain their number, and 
 ** as I fucceeded in this attempt, upon ^Jingle principle y I pro- 
 *' ceeded to the dedudlon of thofe general Ideas which," I was 
 ** now convinced, are not, as Hume apprehended, derived 
 ** from experience, but aiife out of the pure underftanding. 
 ** This deduftlon, which feemed impoffible to my acute pre- 
 " deceflbr, and which nobody beiides him had ever conceived, 
 " although every one makes ufe of thefe ideas, without aiking 
 " himfelf, upon what theii objeftlve validity Is founded ; this 
 " dedudlon was, I.fay, the moft difficult which could have been 
 " undertaken for the behoof of Metaphyfics. And what was 
 ** ftill more embarraffing, Metaphyfics could not here offer mc 
 " the fmalleil affiftance, becaufe that dedu£lion ought firft to 
 «' eftablifh the poflibility of a fyftem of Metaphyfics. As I 
 *' had now fucceeded in the explanation of Hume's problem, 
 ** not merely in a particular inftance, but with a view of the 
 ** whole power of pure reafon, I could advance with fure, 
 •* though tedious fl.eps, to determine completely, and upon 
 '* general principles, the compafs of pure reafon, both what 
 *' is the fphere of its exertion, and what are its limits : which 
 " was all that was required for eredtlng a fyftem of Meta« 
 ** phyfics upon a proper and folld foundation," 
 
 Kant remarked, that Mathematics and Natural Phllofophy 
 had properly become fciences by the difcovery, that reafon 
 a priori attributed certain principles to objefts ; and he in- 
 quired, whether we could not alfo fucceed better in Meta- 
 phyfics by taking it for granted, that objeds muft be accommo- 
 dated to the conftitutlon of our mind, than by the common 
 fuppofition, that all our knowledge muft be regulated accord- 
 ing to external obje£ls. The following are the elements of his 
 »* Critique of pure reafon," — the firft of Kant's fyftematical 
 
 works,
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 1 5 
 
 tTOrks, and the moft remarkable for profound reafoning, and 
 the flriking illuftrations, with which it throughout abounds. 
 
 " We are in poffeffion of certain notions a priori, which 
 " are abfolutely independent of all experience, although the 
 ** objedls of experience correfpond with them ; and which are 
 " diftinguifhed by neceffitj and ilrift univerfalitj. To thefc 
 " are oppofed empirical notions, or fuch as are onlj pollible a 
 *^ polleriori, that is, through experience. Befides thefe, wc 
 " have certain notions, with which no objedls of cxpe- 
 ** rience ever correfpond, which rife above the world of 
 ** fenfe, and which we confider as the moft fublime, fuch as 
 
 *' God, Liberty, Immortality There zre analytical s.ndjyn- 
 
 *' tbetical judgments a priori; the former are merely illuftra- 
 " tive, and depend upon the principle of contradiction ; the 
 ** latter are amplijicatory, i. e. they enlarge our knowledge, 
 ** and are eftablifhed upon another (aflertoryj principle. The 
 *' laft are peculiar to the fcience of Metaphyfics ; although it 
 " alfo contains analytical judgments. Befides, there are con- 
 " tained in all theoretical fciences of reafoning, purely fyn- 
 " thetical judgments a priori as principles, namely, fuch as 
 ** amplify, or enlarge our knowledge of objcdts, without im- 
 *' mediate perception. — Mathematical judgments are altoge- 
 •* ther fynthetical. The Mathematician may by his pofition 
 ** always give fomething material, or empirical ; but there is 
 " always fuppofed in it a pure perception a priori, a form of 
 ** the fenfitive faculty, viz. Space and Time. This form firft 
 " renders every adlual appearance of objefts poffible. Thus 
 *' pure Mathematics are poffible, and can be i*educed to a fci- 
 " entific form — Natural Philofophy alfo contains fynthetical 
 ** judgments a priori, as its principles. — By the fenfitive 
 " faculty we are able to form perceptions : by the under- 
 ** ftanding we form general ideas. By the fenfitive faculty 
 *' we experience imprcflions, and objects are given to us : by 
 
 the
 
 i6 HISTORICAL TNTRODUCTIOTsT. 
 
 " tiie underftanding we bring reprefentations of thefe objeclis 
 *< before us ; we think of them. Perceptions and general 
 ** ideas are the elements of all oxlv knowledge. Without the 
 " fenfitive faculty, no obje£t could be given (propofed to) 
 '* us : without the underftanding, none could be thought of 
 *' bj us. Thefe two powers are really, diftin£t from one ano- 
 ** ther ; but neither of the two, without the other, can pro- 
 ** duce a notion^ (Erienntm/s) In order to obtain a diftintEl 
 ** notion of any one thing, we mud prefent to our general ideas, 
 *' objects in perception, and reduce our perceptions to, or con- 
 ** ne£l them with, thefe general ideas. — As the fenfitive fa- 
 " culty has its determ^ined forms ; fo has our underftanding, 
 ** likewife, forms a priori. Thefe may be properly termed 
 *' Categories. ; they are pure ideas of the underftanding, which 
 " relate, a priori, to the objedls of perception in general. The 
 ** objeils of experience, therefore, are in no other way pof- 
 ** fible ; they can in no other way be thought of by us ; 
 ** and their multiplied diverfity can only be reduced to 
 ** one a6l of judgment, or to one aft of confcioufnefs, by 
 *• means of thefe Categories of fenfe. Hence, the Catego- 
 
 " ties have objective reality. They are either Catego- 
 
 *' ries of I. Quantity ; as unity, number, totality: or 2. oT 
 '* Quality \ as reality, negation, limitation : or 3. of Rela- 
 ** tion, as fubftance and accident, caufe and eiFed: ; or the re- 
 ** ciprocal operation between agent and fufFerer : or 4. of 
 ** Modality ; as poflibility and impoffibility, exiftence and 
 *' non exiftence, neceflity and contingency. — The judgm^t is 
 ** the capacity of applying the general ideas of the under- ^ 
 " ftanding to the information of experience. *) The objects of 
 " experience are regulated according to thefe ideas j not, vice 
 
 *', verfa 
 
 ■^ ' * Hence we obferve in thofe who are deprived of, or deficient in, this important 
 faculty, that they are unable to determine between good and bad, between danger 
 and fafety, and fo forth.
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 17 
 
 ♦* verfa, our ideas according to the obje£ls. We can attain no 
 ** knowledge of an objeft, as a thing in itfelf, but only fo far 
 *' as it is an objed of our fenfitive perception, or a phenome- 
 •* non ; though we mull be capable of conceiving objedls as 
 ** fubftances, and likewife of admitting their reality ; becaufe 
 ** our internal experience, the confcioufnefs of our own ex- 
 ** iflence, is only poffible on the fuppofition of 'external expe- 
 ** rience, or by the perception of other things without us. 
 " As foon as we pretend to confider the objedls of fenfe, as 
 ** things in themfelves, reafon falls into a contradidion v^ith 
 *' itfelf, into oppolite principles which it cannot unravel, fo 
 ** that as much can be faid for one pofition, as for its oppofite. 
 *• Our knmvledge, then, is wholly confined to the obje6ls of 
 ** experience, without which the pure abftraft ideas of the 
 •* u,nder{landing are of no value, and consequently they are 
 •* no longer of ufe, when we abandon the regions of thefenji- 
 *' ble world. Liberty, God, and Immortality are ideas which 
 ** are exalted above all fenfitive faculties ; they are not ob- 
 " je£ls of fenfitive knowledge, nor of objeftive certainty, but 
 *' of necejfary thought and belief. Speculative reafon, when it 
 *' confiders any thing, as to what it is in itfelf, direfts us here, 
 ** or leads us into conje£lure and contradidtion ; but praBical 
 •' reafon, when it confiders that which ^«// hcy by clear ex- 
 i* preflions announces to us truths, than which nothing can 
 *' be more important. It declares us, as moral beings, to be 
 *♦ free agents, who are not fubjedled to the mechanifm of na- 
 '* ture : it holds out to us an ideaj., moral perfe61ion, which 
 ** we ought to attain, but which we can attain only by an 
 ** endlefs progreflion, and therefore enjoins us to chej"ifli a be- 
 « lief in immortality. By the idea of a moft perfeft ftate, it 
 " fatisfies that inflindive defire of happinefs, which is a con- 
 ** ftituent part of our fenfitive nature ; and while it holds out 
 <* to us the idea of 9.11x0^ perfeB harmony, in which liappineTs 
 
 G «' and
 
 i8 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 " and virtue mull one day be united ; it teaches us to believe 
 *' in the exillence of that Being, who alone can eilablifh this 
 ** harmony," 
 
 This imperfect account will, at lead, ferve the purpofe of 
 fliewing, how this fyftem^ on the one hand, fets limits to the 
 Scepticifm of Huine ; while it refutes and overturns Mate- 
 rialifniy Fatalifniy jitheifntj as well as Fanaticifm and Infidelity, 
 — Kant does not attack the dogmatical procefs of reafon em- 
 ployed in pure (abftraft) notions, but rather enjoins fo far a 
 more ftridl dogmatifm than formerly prevailed, while he raifes 
 Metaphyfics to the rank and folidity of a fcience : he combats 
 that arrogant dogmatifm, which fets out with its hypothetical 
 notions, without previous enquiries, whether, and how far 
 reafon is intitled, by its peculiar judging powers, either to ad- 
 mit, or to rejedt, thefe notions. "This critical work of mine," 
 he fays, ** is not written with a view of encouraging prat- 
 " tling fhallownefs, under the arrogant name of popularity, 
 " nor for the purpofe of fupporting fcepticifm which, as well 
 *' as the former, is rather an excrefcence, than an ornament of 
 " the fciences. The Critique is the previous preparation for 
 ** the advancement of a well-founded fyftem of Metaphyfics, 
 " as a fcience which, neceflarily dogmatical, and in the ftridl- 
 ** eft fenfe fyllematic, muft be formed according to fcientific 
 ** rules, not merely adapted to the vulgar." — Upon Scepticifm, 
 its value, its limits, its relation to the Critical Philofophy, 
 Kant, in another part of his inquiry, has made excellent re- 
 marks. — Jacob, another German Philofopher, has fince, in a 
 Hiore direfl; and comprehenfive manner than Kant himfelf, em- 
 ployed the Critical Philofophy for the confutation of Scep- 
 ticifm in general, and that of Hume in particular. 
 
 Not long after Kant's Critique, there appeared a <work, by 
 an ingenious and liberal author, *' upon the dodrine of Spi- 
 noza, in Letters to Mofes Mendelffohn, 1785^ which accidental-
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 19 
 
 ly, in many inftances, confirmed the dodrines of the Critique, r 
 The author defined belief to be immediate certainty, which f 
 required no fupport by arguments, fuperfeded all proofs, as it ; 
 relied upon a revelation, and contained the elements of human 
 knowledge ; he maintained, that reafoh only leads to doubts 
 and errors in the mofi; important objefts of thought, that Spi- 
 nozifm is ftill the moll coherent fyflem of reafoning, but it ef- 
 tablilhes downright atheifm ; and that in general, according 
 to the expreffion of Paschal, " Reafon expofes the Dogmati/i 
 tojhamdy and nature itfclf refutes the Sceptic.''^ — As little how- 
 ever, as his do£lrines of belief agree with the principles of 
 Kant, fo much were his opinions, of Scepticifm and Spinozifm, 
 a ftrong corroboration of Kant's afl*ertions ; that fpeculative 
 reafon teaches us nothing y with demonllrative certainty, upon 
 the exillence of God, and the objedls beyond the world of fenfe. 
 —Soon after this, in 1787, the worthy fon of a truly philofo- 
 phical father, Joh. Albr. Heinr. Reimarus of Hamburgh^ 
 publiflied a work " upon the foundation of human knowledge, 
 and natural religion," in which he examines the different doc- 
 trines of Jacob and Kant, and which here deferves honourable 
 mention, as it contains many valuable hints, together with 
 happy illuftrations of interefting, though abllrufe, fubjedls. 
 In the mean time Kant's fyflem, or rather his elementary 
 Propedeutic for a fyllem, acquired ftill greater reputation, and 
 gained every where friends notwithftanding feveral accidents 
 of fo ferious a nature, as to threaten its fubverfion. The fyf- 
 tem of Locke, that of Leibnitz, a fpecies of Ecle6licifm, and 
 finally the Philofophy of Common Senfe, were alternately op- 
 pofed to it. Some imagined they faw in it a concealed infidelity ; 
 others an over credulous religious and moral Myjlicifm ; a 
 third party maintained, that it led to Scepticifm j and a fourth, 
 that it contained nothing new. All thefe obftacles could not 
 retard the rapid progrefs it was daily making, almoft without 
 exception, in the Protellant Univerfities of Germany : in ma- 
 
 C a Tij
 
 so HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ny of the Catholic [Schools, too, it obtained decifive vidorie^ 
 over the fjftems of Ariftotle and Defcartes. 
 
 But however much, from convi^lion, enlightened minds 
 were inclined to befriend this philofophy, yet with a mode- 
 rate acquaintance with the hiftory of Ethics, it was eafy to 
 forefee, that' even Kant's Syilem, notwithftanding all the evi- 
 dence and ilrength of its priticiples, could fcarcely withftand 
 tlie furious attacks of Pyrrhonifm, or rather the pyrrhonic 
 art, by which, without difcrimination, every thing is called 
 in queftion ; Mathematics and Natural Philofophy itfelf not 
 excepted. Without doubt, many of the opponents of the New 
 Philofophy, long ago rematked this ; but they hefitated to 
 make the pyrrhonic experiment with Kantianifm ; becaufe 
 every other poffible fyftem, that could be fubftituted in the 
 room of the Critical, might in like manner be rendered wa- 
 vering and uncertain ; and becaufe fuch a pyrrhonifm, in ge- 
 neral, either leads to no end at all, or it is attended with con- 
 fequences detrimental to morality and happinefs. — Further,, 
 this attack would only have ferved to place the ftrength of the 
 fyftem attacked, in a more ftriking point of view. — But a 
 more moderate fcepticifm might have been eafily and advan- 
 tageoufly employed againft certain principles of the- Critical 
 Philofophy, if its opponents had been aware of denying, or 
 calling in queftion, fome fa£l;s of confcioufnefs, to which Kant 
 neceflarily appeals. It was not, therefore, a matter of fur- 
 prlfe that, after repeated attacks in our times, this fpecles of 
 fcepticifm alfo fliould be employed againft the Critical Philo- 
 fophy. 
 
 The author of '< Aenefidemns," or, on the foundation of the 
 *' Elements of Philofophy, publiflied by Prof. Reinhold, in 
 *' Jena ; together wkh a defence of Scepticifm, againft the 
 " preteniions of the Critical Philofophers, 1792," has en- 
 deavoured to prove, that the fceptical dbdrines of Hume are 
 
 not
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 41 
 
 tlot in the leaft confuted bj the Critique of Pure Reafon. The 
 work, here mentioned, is written with uncomjnon perfpicuity, 
 acuteaefs, and refped towards the Father of the Critical Phi- 
 lofophy. The anonymous author direcls his obje6tions againft 
 the chief pillars of Kant's Syftem, the derivation of necefTary 
 fynthetical judgments from the mind, and the reference of 
 thefe to the perception of empirical objefts. He allows, that 
 there are necefTary fynthetical judgments in human knowledge, 
 that they form an indifpenfible part in it, and that the neceffity 
 which takes place in the connexion of the predicate with the 
 fubjeft, in thefe judgments, can be derived neither from pre- 
 exiftence, from frequent repetition, nor from the conformity 
 of a certain number of fafts. But he maintains, that, in the 
 i* Critique of Pure Reafon," the mind is held out as the real 
 ground of thefe neceffary judgments, that from our being able 
 to think only of the power of re^refentation (or conception) as 
 the foundation of neceffary fynthetical judgments, a conclufion 
 is drawn, that the miruJ imijl aBually he the foundation of thefe. 
 Now, argues he, what Hume called in queftion, is here plain- 
 ly taken for granted ; namely, ill, that for everything we per- 
 ceive, there is objeftively pre-exifting a real ground, and a 
 really diftinft caufe of it, fo that the pofition of the fuf- 
 ficient ground, in general, depends not only upon the reprefen- 
 tations and their fubjeftive affociation, but dlfo upon things in 
 themf elves y and their objective connexion : adly, that we are 
 intilled, from the conftitution of a fomething in our conception, 
 to form conjedlures refpeding the conftitution of that fome- 
 thing without us — Kant, continues this Sceptic, has not pro, 
 yed, that our mind alone can be the ground of fynthetical 
 judgments ; for the confcioufnefs of neceffity, which accompa- 
 nies thefe judgments, is not an infallible criterion of their 
 
 origin a priori, and from the mind That we cannot now 
 
 think of, pr explain fomething otherv/ife but in a certain man, 
 
 ner I
 
 12 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ner ; this circumftance by no means proves, that we cou/d not 
 have thought of it in any other way. Another origin of thefe 
 judgments is conceivable, than from the mind ; namely, from 
 the operation of real objefts, and their various modes of af- 
 feding us. It might, therefore, be eafily conceived, that re- 
 prefentations and general ideas, which exill in us a priori, are 
 ftill in another way referable to real objeds, than merely by 
 the circumftance, that they exhibit to us the conditions and 
 forms of the obje£ls. Thefe reprefentations and ideas a priori, 
 might ^o relate to the obje6live conftitution of things with- 
 out lis, by means of a pre-eftablifhed harmony between thefe, 
 and the operations of our underftanding ; and agreeably to 
 this harmony, fomething might be reprefented to the mind by 
 means of perceptions and general ideas a priori, which ftiould 
 not only have objeclive validity in our underftanding, but alfo 
 correfpond with the conftitutions of things in themfelves, and 
 be the means of reprefenting them. — The Critical Philofophy, 
 he adds, proves the origin of neceflary fynthetical judgments 
 from the mind, by making fuch ufe of the principle of caufa- 
 tion, as is contrary to its own principles in the application of 
 the Categories ; whether we underftand by mind a Nou^ 
 
 menon, a thing in itfelf, or a tranfcendental idea To thefe 
 
 doubts, feveral of which were formerly propofed by Flatt 
 and Brastberger, the friends of the Critical Philofophy 
 have already anfwered. Whether^the fcepticifm of this author 
 agrees with that of Hume,'""whether it does not contain in fome 
 refpedts more, in others lefs than the laft, I fliall not venture 
 to determine. 
 
 Plattner, that excellent Anthropologijiy .who, in a rare in- 
 ftance, to a profound knowledge of medicine, joins extenfive 
 erudition in philofophy, and peculiar penetration, and who de- 
 ferves to be ranked among the firft philofophers of Germany, 
 has employed rational fcepticifm againft the Kantian Syftem, 
 
 ia
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 23 
 
 in an elementary treatlfe, defigned chiefly for academical in- 
 ftrudlions, and has even declared himfelf in favour of this mode 
 of thinking in general, with refpeft to all philofophical fub- 
 jefts. *' Would not a well underilood fcepticifm," fays 
 he among other things, " be the moft natural way to a- 
 *' void all metaphyfical controverfy, and at the fame time the 
 " moll rational means for calming all dogmatical and critical 
 ** paffions ? What can be our aim under the titles of Logic, 
 " Metaph3r{ics, Critic of Reafon ; what elfe can be our objefb 
 ** under the general title of Philofophy than, after admitting 
 " the vinqueftionable reality of our reprefentations, to Iketch 
 " faithfully the hiftory of them ; and then to prove what 
 *' is true and certain with refped: to them ; and what in the 
 ** human mind (whether it be the lower, or more exalted part 
 *' of it) carries the conviction of truth and certainty along 
 ** with it ?" — ^This philofopher wiflies the wholeof his work 
 to be confidered merely as the Juhje&ive conviction of a Sceptic, 
 and defcribes the fceptical mode of thinking more accurately 
 than has been done by any of his predeceffors. In oppofition to 
 the Critique of Kant, he has llartied a number of queftions, fome 
 of which are completely in the fpirit of the old Pyrrhonifts. 
 —Upon thefe doubtful points, likewife, anfwers have already 
 been publifhed by the friends of the Critical Syftem. However 
 conclufive fuch refutations may appear to the party, on whofe' 
 behalf they were attempted, it Hill remains to be willied, 
 though there is now little hope left for this profpeft, that the 
 aged Father of Rational and Critical Dogmatifm may deign to 
 ' defend himfelf againft the attacks of Plattner, and thofe of the 
 New Aencfidemus. 
 
 With pleafure I proceed, by oppofing to thefe fceptical 
 writings a work written with noble intentions. Although it • 
 deviate in fome refpeds from the principles of Kant, yet it 
 fupports, [with energy, the truth and certainty of human 
 
 knowledge.
 
 44 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 knowledge, and at die fame time places the intereflmg nature 
 of thefe queftions in a'^clear point of view. — The treatife, here 
 alluded to, is " On Truth and moral perfection j by Adam 
 Weisiiaupt, 1793." 
 
 All the writings of Sceptics, it is lincerely to be hoped, will 
 never totally deprive man of the belief in objeftivc truth ; and 
 the Sceptic himfelf will never be capable of abandoning it com- 
 pletely. For it is of the utmoft importance, that we fhould 
 admit fomething objedtive, for the fake of morality and reli- 
 gion, both of which muft lofe their value, and their exiftence, 
 as foon as they are confidered merely as fomething fubjedtive 
 and relative. Philofophers ought, therefore, rather to juftify 
 the belief in objedtive reality, than reprefent to us, that there 
 is no'other but fubjedlive conviction, which they hold out as 
 the higheft ftep of philofophical and confiftent thought — We 
 cannot, indeed, proceed beyond the power of comprehenfion,- 
 and all conviClioa merely rells on our ftate of mind ; but 
 could it be otherwife ?— It is fufficient that, in our confciouf- 
 nefs, clear traces are, given us of objedtive truth j that it is 
 in our power to diHinguifti objedive and fubjedlive truth from 
 one another ; and that from the whole mode of our thought 
 and adlion, and from the ideas of duty exalted above all ne- 
 ceflity, we muft reafonably z^Axmt fo?nething obje&ively true. 
 
 Philofophical Scepticifm, which is not merely pretended, or 
 •affefted, and which does not flow from an impure fource, has 
 as yet found, and ever will find, but a few genuine fupporters : 
 but when it is taught and extolled in writings, and in public 
 places of inftrudtion, it may, in a great number of individuals, 
 gradually produce a fhallow mode of fceptical realoning, de- 
 jftroy the fpirit of .inquiry, and ultimately promote immora- 
 lity. Perhaps, Philofophy would foon fall into difrepute, and 
 the public fpirit among mankind, as well as the general utility 
 »f the learned; would fuffer extr£mely, were our attention con- 
 * fined
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 25 
 
 fined merely to the defcription of the phenomena that occur 
 in the mind, and to the limited confideration, of what is fub- 
 jeftive alone, without placing any value upon what is ob- 
 jedive. — It would be rafli and irrational, to obtrude our 
 maxims, opinions, and conviftions upon others ; though eve- 
 ry one wiflies to cultivate what alone is liable in us, our 
 reafon ; and to try by gentle and fuitable means, to bring to 
 the clear confcioufnefs and conviftion of others, what our fair 
 and candid examination teaches us to be uniformly true and 
 good. We wifh not, individually, to confider ourfelves as in- 
 fulated creatures that live, each of us, in our own world of 
 ideas ; but to believe, that we all have a claim upon a certain 
 number of truths, and that it depends upon our own exertions, 
 to get poffeffion of thefe. 
 
 In our times, it might be more dangerous than many ima- 
 gine, to reprefent the Scepticifm of Hume as incontrovertible, 
 or incapable of folution ; for the greater number of fuperficial 
 readers might thus be induced to furrender their weak minds 
 to the mofl dangerous apathy, to fhun every mental exertion, 
 to fearch for no further difcoveries in the department of philo- 
 fophy, and — ^by gradually returning to the age of barbarifm — 
 to leave every thing in this deplorable fituation, in which they 
 themfelves ultimately fall vi<Elims to infidelity, or fanaticifm. 
 
 There prevails at prefent, in almoft every civilized country, 
 a very fhallow and dangerous fcepticifm, extending its influence 
 over the mofl important obje£ls. It has alTumed a fyllematic 
 form, to which people readily fubfcribe ; becaufe it is more 
 difcreet, and lefs intolerable, than the profejfed mode of think- 
 ing, which charadlerizes almoU every philofophic fe£l. This 
 fpecies of fcepticifm, in the greater number of individu- 
 als, aflumes the appearance of an indolent and irrefolute 
 difpofitioa of mini j and in many, that of a wild, fanatical 
 
 D ficklcnefj
 
 !25 HISTORICAL INTRdDUCTIdN". 
 
 •ficklenefs ; a ficklenefs, with which one partj, by way of ir-* 
 taliation, ufuallj reproaches the other. 
 
 The caufes of this lingular propenfitj, it is not difficult to 
 trace : an inclination for fenfual indulgence is every where 
 •ihanifeft ; the intereft in pure intelleBual truth is univerfally 
 weakened ; the old philofophical and theological fyftems have 
 been fhaken in their foundations, while the new ones have as 
 yet been able to procure but little public reputation. 
 
 Prof. Sxj^iUDLiN diftinguifhes with accuracy the dliFerent 
 fpecies of fcepticifm, and he endeavours to afcertain their true 
 origin. — As a fpecimen of his mafterly method of inquiry, I 
 conclude this IntroduBion^ with a faithful extract from his 
 Treatife " On the Sources and Origin of Scepticifm." 
 
 ** There is," fays he, " a certain kind of fcepticifm which 
 deferves to be ftiled the/)Z>z7«>/o^,6/fa/, and which arifes near- 
 ly in the following manner. Men of vigorous minds, in 
 whom a lively intereft for every important truth is joined to 
 an uncommon degree of penetration and aftivity, begin to 
 think, and to inquire for themfelves : fuch men diveft them- 
 felves of their juvenile opinions and prejudices, at a much 
 earlier period of life, than others. Their propenfity to pecu- 
 liar and original ideas exhibits every thing in a fufpicious 
 light, which formerly, either from mere cuftom or authority, 
 had formed a part of their creed. The conftant defire of dif- 
 covering truth j the ftrong confcioufnefs of their own powers 
 to fearch for it ; the bold profpedl of opening, perhaps, new 
 views in philofophy, continually induce them to inquire into 
 every fource, from which truth may be derived: — thas they, 
 are impelled by a kind of philofopbic enthufiafm." 
 
 " That remarkable epoch of human life, in which fome- 
 times the painter, fometimes the poet, as if by infpiration, 
 feels in himfelf the genius of his art ; this epocha has been 
 frequently obferved by men whom nature had defigned for ce- 
 lebrity.
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 27 
 
 iebrltj. The philofophic genius, not unfrequentlj, difcovers 
 a fimilar period, in which the views he dire£i;s to his intellec- 
 tual nature, the manner in which he refleds upon the whole 
 created fabric, and the refearches he makes into the writings 
 of the ancient philcfophers, fill his mind with a pleafing anxie- 
 ty, with a livelj energy, and lead him to augur his future 
 deftiny : but this exertion of evolving talents not rarely termi- 
 nates infcepticifm. His mind trefpaffes upon regions unknown, 
 and far remote from human conception ; he is firftinduce-i, and 
 that moll frequently, to flart queftions which, to men, are al- 
 together uaanfwerable. Unfortunately, tod, he begins with 
 the mofl difficult fubje£ls of inquiry ; for the more eafy pro- 
 poiitions appear to him beneath his dignity. The latter he 
 treats with contempt ; and grafping principally at the 
 former, he is continually difappointed by the tranfient hopes 
 of difcovering myfteries, which lie concealed behind ^an im- 
 penetrable gloom. The unfuccefsful efforts made upon tliat 
 which is difficult, foon render him fufpicious of what is 
 both eafy, and within his horizon. He wanders from one 
 fyftem to another in order to find the philofopher's Hone ; 
 (or, as it is very forcibly exprefled in the original) to folvs 
 the riddle of the world. He alternately pays homage to the 
 different fyftems, which engage his attention ; fo that at one 
 time the adherents of Locke, at another thofe of Leibnitz, 
 at another thofe of Descartes, and at length thofe of 
 Rousseau are, with him, the reprefentatives of truth. Some- 
 V times, he creates fyftems of his own ; but they are as quick- 
 ly dellroyed, as they were erefted.*' 
 
 *' He is, finally, led to inveftigate the foundation of all hu- 
 man knowledge and evidence, as well as to inquire into the 
 poffibility of an ohjcEiivc truth. Here, where he was in 
 fearch of aceitain refting point, a boifterous ocean ofuncer- 
 ^aiatie?, at once, appears in view. In vain he attempts, af- 
 
 D:r ter
 
 ^8 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ter the moft accurate fcrutiny of his intelleftvial powers, t© 
 difcover the general and neceflary characters of truth. His 
 fenfations, every where, appear to inform him of things, 
 not in unifon with his reafon ; and upon the moll important 
 concerns, which infpire his heart with hopes and deiires, his 
 reafon is filent ; or it torments him with fuch doubts and ap- 
 prehenfions, as are fufficient to blaft his moft fanguine ex- 
 peftations. In vain he endeavours to reconcile that at Icaft, 
 in which the opinions of all men coincide, with the general 
 characters of truth. With indignation he obferves the con- 
 tradictory opinions of the greateft philofophers of all ages j 
 with furprife he fees, how frequently he had already imagin- 
 ed himfelf in the pofleffion of truth ; and how frequently he 
 had alfo been obliged to reje£l it, as illufory. The moft op- 
 pofitc judgments of men, even in common life ; the operation 
 of phyfical caufes ; the influence of the paflions, of authority, 
 and of the moft incidental circumftances, as aiFe£ting thefe 
 judgments, — now excite the whole of his ■ attention. The ob- 
 fervaticn, that innumerable multitudes had from the begin- 
 ning of time lived happy, and found the moft complete con- 
 viction in fpeculative fancies and errors ; this obfervation 
 makes him defpair of difcovering certainty in any fubjeCl 
 whatever. With a compaffionate fmile he beholds the dog- 
 matift, bold and decifive, proud and felf-fuflicient, propofing 
 his opinions, in which he difcovers little more, than proofs 
 of ignorance, or of arrogance and diffimulation. At laft, he 
 forms the refolution of renouncing all difcoveries tending to 
 eftablifh abfolute truth ; of deducing in every inftance no 
 other than doubtful refults ; and of obtruding his judgments 
 as little upon any man, as he would be inclined to adopt them 
 from others. But as he feels in himfelf an irrefiftible pro- 
 penfity, ft ill to adopt /ow/^' things, and to lay down for himfelf 
 
 fome rules of conduCl, not being able to aCt altogether with- 
 out
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 29 
 
 entjixed principles ; there is no wonder that he bellows his ap- 
 probation upon fome fentiments and judgments ; yet he does 
 this with the conllant reftridion, that theje are by no means 
 ahfolutCy and that they are true only as to himfelf.'''' 
 
 ** The philofophical fcepticifm, the origin and progrefs of 
 which we have here defcribed, is, however, extremely rare. 
 We meet more frequently, particularly in the prefent age, 
 with other fpecies of it, which arife from very different fources, 
 and which may with more juftice be termed premeditated pyr- 
 rhonifmy or a decided propenfity of the mind to univerfal 
 doubt." 
 
 ** Scepticifm, alfo, frequently derives its oiigin from in- 
 dolence and ignorance. Some people acquire a fuperficial 
 knowledge of the hiftory of philofophical opinions ; they are 
 perhaps informed, that there has been a fet of men who doubt- 
 ed every thing ; they are fond of claiming the name of philo- 
 fophers, who are not blind followers of others, and who rife 
 above the common fet of men. Inftead of inftitutiag profound 
 inquiries into the nature of the human faculties for acquiring 
 knowledge ; inftead of calmly and patiently comparing the 
 opinions of philofophers ; they raife a hoft of doubts upon 
 every fubjeft, that requires acute refledion : thus they ftudy 
 the art of contriving endlefs objeftions." 
 
 ** It is, indeed, much eafier and more convenient to frame 
 objedlions againft every conclufion, than to draw the refult 
 from laborious refearches, and to defend this refult againft the 
 cbjedlions of others.* — When a fubjeft is only in part under- 
 ftood, doubts muft fpontaneoully arife, which may confound 
 
 the 
 
 * Bayle, in his letter to Minutelm ; " Oeuvret dh. IF. p. 537." very 
 ju.flly remarks : " En vcrite, il ne faut pas trouver etrange, que tant de g^ns 
 " aient doiine dans le Pyrihonifme : car c'eft la chofe du moude la plus commode. 
 " Vous pouvez jmpunement difputer centre tous venans, et fans craindrects 
 " ar;';umens ad honiinem, qui font quelque-fois tant de peine. Vous craigncs! 
 '*' point la retorfion ; puifque ne Ibutcnant rien vous abandonnez ds boa coeur a 
 
 " tou«
 
 50 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the cleareft propofition. Among this clafs of ignorant and 
 ftiallow fceptics, we frequently meet with the ftrangeft com- 
 pounds of fcepticifm, credulity and dogmatifm. They are 
 apt to believe the grofTelt abfurdities, provided that the ob- 
 je6ts be very contiguous tc their light, and require no acute 
 inveftigation : bv>.t they entertain doubts concerning the dc- 
 Hion/lrative evidence of mathematics, and the reality of moral 
 law." 
 
 ** Ambition^ a fondnefs for paradoxes and novelty, are, 
 with many, the principal fprings of fcepticifm. It is feme- 
 thing fo very uncommon to doubt every thing ; it difcovers 
 fo much boldnefs, fuperiority, acutenefs and liberality, fo 
 much art, to combat every opinion that enters into the common 
 creed. On the other hand, it appears fo very modell, when 
 in imitation of Socrates — the fceptical genius pretends to 
 know nothing ; nay, he goes even farther, in confeffing, that 
 he is not quite certain of this ! Such is his modelly, produced 
 by a ftill greater impulfe of felf-denial." 
 
 Nil fciriquifquis putat, id quoque riefcit 
 
 An fciii poflit quo fc nil fcire fatetur. ^ 
 
 LucRET. IV. 471. 
 
 ^' It is a peculiar fatisfadlion, to triumph over that pedan- 
 tic dogmatifm, which arifes fometimes from ignorance, fome- 
 times from an abundance oi knowings but not of real knowledge. 
 It is a pleafing reflexion, to behold the ardent conteft of opi- 
 nions, and to look on this dangerous and tempeftuous paflage 
 upon the fea of human uncertainties, vvith a calm, perhaps af- 
 fected, relignation." 
 
 Suave marl magno turbantibus sequora ventis 
 E terra magnum alterius fpedlare laborem, 
 Non quia vexan quemquam, eft jucunda voluptas, 
 Scd quibus ipfe malis cureas, quia ccrnere fuave eft. 
 
 *' We 
 
 . «' tous les fophifmes et a tous les raifonnemens de la terre quelque opinion que ce 
 «' loit. En un mot vous conteftez et vous daubez fur toutes chofes tout votrc 
 ' ' iaoul, fans craindre de peine du taiion."
 
 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 51 
 
 « We find, in the records of philofopliical hiftory, many 
 celebrated charadlers who were profefled fceptics, atid who, irt 
 that hiftorj ftill fhine as Tuminaries : though, by the moderns, 
 configned to obfcurity. Is it not honourable, to rank among 
 men of fuch celebrity ? — This atnbitious fcepticifm, certainly, 
 arifes froin immoral fources : it is produftive of frequent 
 mifchief, both in the moral charadler of thofe who profefs it, 
 and of thofe who liften to this deception. Its progrefs, in the 
 prefent age, is very coniiderable. — As the modern fyftem of 
 toleration is frequently the moll intolerant, this modern fcep- 
 ticifm alfo frequently appears in the highcft degree fanatical 
 and magiflerial. By means of this delufive art, men of a cer^ 
 tain defcription endeavour to render every thing doubtful, 
 which is believed by the generality of mankind ; to deflroy 
 without mercy, all the antiquated forms and fpecies of belief, 
 and to impofc upon us the inventions of their own brain, in 
 the inoft infinuating and decifive tone. Unhappily, they find 
 cafy accefs, through the vices and paffions of naan, fo that 
 great moral and political revolutions have been frequently pro- 
 duced, in confequence of metaphyfical fpeculations which, at 
 finr, feemed to have little, or no influence, upon the practice of 
 life." 
 
 '' Avoid thofe — fays the Vicar of Savoy to the young man, 
 to whom he delivers his* confeffion of faith — " who, under 
 *' the pretext of expounding nature, fill the heart of men with 
 ** inert dotlrines, and whofe apparent fcepticifm is infinitely 
 ** more decifive and dogmatical, than the pofitive tone of their 
 ** adverfaries. Under the ambitious pretence, that they alone 
 *' are enlightened, veracious and fincere, they imperioufly 
 ** fubjeft us to their dellru£live decifions, v/hile they afFedl 
 " to communicate to us the true principles of things, by 
 *' means of thofe unintelligible fyitems which are the produc- 
 ** tions of their own fancy. Hence, they fubvert, dellroy, and 
 
 *' trample
 
 32 HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 <« trample under foot, everj thing that is venerable to man 
 *« in fociety ; they deprive the afflifted of the laft comfort in 
 *' their calamities ; the rich and powerful of the only bridle 
 *' of their paffions ; they fnatch the llings of confcience from 
 ** the receffes of the heart ; their propitious hopes from the 
 ** virtuous ; and withal, they Hill boaft of having been the 
 " benefaftors of the human race. Never, they fay, is truth 
 " pernicious to man. I believe this, as well as they ; but 
 ** this very circumftance is, in eny opinion, a flrong proof, 
 ** that their doctrines cannot claim the character of truth." 
 , Luxury and degeneracy of manners are perfeftly confif- 
 tent, as well with each other, as with a partial illumination 
 and improvement of the mind. If we negledt to unfold the 
 mental faculties ; if the iutereft which ties us to the intellec- 
 tual and invifible (not, vifionary) world gradually vanilhcs ; 
 then this immoral and Ihallow fcepticifm eafily arifes, and in- 
 fefts even numerous clafTes of fociety. It carries along with 
 it the appearance of cultivation and enlargement of mind ; 
 but, at the fame time, it opens an extenfive field to every fel- 
 fifii defire. 
 
 Legion is the number of the deluded, who are in fearch of 
 illumination of mind, chiefly by difputing and cavilling upon 
 clofe lubjedls of intelleftual inquiry,^- which were formerly 
 held to be mofl true and worthy of veneration. Thofe for- 
 tunate travellers, whofe obje(3:, in vifiting the reputed Capitals 
 of Europe, was not amufement alone ; they mull have the clear- 
 eft proofs, how much that flimfy mode of reafoning now pre- 
 vails, and how certain it is, that it arifes from the fourccs 
 here mentioned. The authors of the moft enlightened nations 
 of Europe agree that, many new philofophical produc- 
 tions, as they are called, are nothing but the offspring of 
 
 this crude and unphilofophical fcepticifm.* 
 
 Many , 
 
 * Vid. for inftance " Letters of Literature, by Robert Hcfon ; London, 1785." 
 —a ftrang niediey of undigefted thoughts.
 
 Historical introduction. 33 
 
 iylanj remarkable events of the prefent age may be fconfi- 
 dered as the confequences of a philofophy — without having 
 the leaft claim to that dignified name — which undermines the 
 pillars of every ufefiil inftitution, but rears no fabric ; which 
 leaves man in a ftate of indolence and indifference with rdpedl 
 to his moil important concerns j and which converts him in- 
 to a fenfual and felfifh being, that is determined folelj by 
 time, accident, and circumftances ; and that is toffed, to and 
 fro, on this fea of life, without a rudder or compafs, without 
 a fure rule for his conduft or belief, without any fixed objedt, 
 to which his future profpeds and hopes can be rationally di- 
 rected. 
 
 Placed on this Ifthmus of a middle ftate, 
 A being darkly wife and rudely great : 
 With too much knowledge for the fceptic fide, 
 With too much weaknefs for the Stoics pride, 
 He hangs between ; in doubt to a6l, or reft j 
 In doubt to deem himfelf a God or beaft j 
 In doubt, his mind or body to prefer ; 
 Born but to die, and reas'ning but to err j 
 Alike in ignorance, his reafon fuch. 
 Whether he thinks too little, or too much : 
 Chaos of thought and pafilon, all confus'd. 
 Still by himfelf abus'd, or difabus'd ; 
 Created half to rife, and half to fall ; 
 Great lord of all things, yet a prey to all ; 
 Sole judge of truth, in endlefs error hurl'd : 
 The glory, jeft, and riddle of the world. 
 
 Pope. 
 
 E ELEMENTARY
 
 ELEMENTARY VIEW 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF KANT. 
 
 »«4»«o{-<ie2S^3^i^^<9*«" 
 
 Preparatory Remarks, 
 
 Jt>EFORE we enter upon this arduous tafk, It maj be of fome 
 importance to premife a few necelfarj obfervations on the me- 
 thod which has been adopted in the execution of it ; and on 
 the various obllacles which the ftudent of every new Syftem, 
 particularly of Ethics, muft unavoidably encounter. 
 
 It appeared to me, at a very early period of my ftudies, that 
 the principal diirenCons, and fubfequent divifions in. philo- 
 fophy, have arifen chiefly from the following obvious fources. 
 — Every fyilematic writer on fubje6ls, which, from their na- 
 ture, do not admit of demonftrative certainty, nor of any fuch 
 proofs as are manifell from ohjeBive reality^ is almoll invo- 
 luntarily led to employ new terms and phrafes, in order to 
 exprefs the different opinions he broaches among his cotem- 
 poraries. It is of little confequence to hirriy whether the ideas, 
 which gave rife to thefe opinions, be alfo new. For, though 
 the latter may be already germinating in the feeds fown by his 
 great predecefibis, or may only have been differently explain- 
 ed, he is equally certain of finding yonf adherents, who pride 
 themfelves upon difcovering a new fenfe, or perhaps a new ap- 
 plication pf the fenfe, in which his terms, the definitions of 
 them, or the fcientliic divifions, are now more clearly, or more 
 obfcurely, underxlood. This has uniformly hip pen ed, I could 
 
 almofl
 
 ELEMENTARY VIEW, Sec. 35, 
 
 almofl fay, fince the beginning of philofophlcal fpeculations : 
 hence the abfolute neceffitj- of giving, in every inftance, the 
 clearefl pofllble definitions of words, muft be obvious to every 
 novice in philofophy. But this I confider as a taik, xh&Jiri& 
 performance of which, from the very imperfeft ftate of lan- 
 guage, has been (and probably will never ceafe to be) oni of 
 the many human deftderata. Hence, the immortal Bacon, when 
 the fame, or at leail a fimilar idea pervaded his comprehenflve 
 mind, was induced to exprefs himfelf upon this fubjed:, in the 
 following excellent words : " Prceterea ut bene /per ent, Injlau-' 
 rationem nojlram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant^ 
 et animo concipiont ; cum reverafit infiniti err oris finis et ter- 
 minus legitimusy 
 
 Were it, however, poflible to define all philofophlcal terms 
 with that degree of precifion which we, fometimes, obferve 
 in the works of a Bacon, a Newton, and a Kant ; yet we 
 could alfo fuggeil the remark — a remark which is by no means 
 in favour of human perfeftion — that.even thefe illuftiious cha- 
 radlers, in their own elementary works, not rarely deviate 
 fi*om the original, or primary, definitions of terms. Thofe, 
 who are converfant in fpeculative inquiries, will readily, and 
 within proper limits, underfland this aflertion ; and fuch read- 
 ers as might extend the meaning of it further than I am incli- 
 ned to admit, I only remind of the /o^rVa/ difficulties attending 
 every long demonftratlon. It would, therefore, be rafli in the 
 extreme to charge thefe eminent charadlers with incongruity 
 of thought, or rcafoning ; as the viore minute deviations, in 
 terms y are chiefly owing to the unfettled ftate of language in 
 general ; and as the very term, perfe£iiony when Ipeaking 
 of human beings provided with human organs, is only ;v/a- 
 tive. 
 
 A long and dear-bought experience in teaching has firft in- 
 duced me to entertain thoughts upon this important theme, 
 
 E 2 which
 
 3^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 which may not find manj fupportcrs. Yet I think myfelf 
 juftified in afferting, that the moft, if not all, Syftems of 
 Grammar and Rhetoric, as well as the Diftionaries of lan- 
 guages, are compiled upon mechanical, wavering and un* 
 tenable principles ; * for they are, more or lefs, liable to the 
 following ferious objeftions : 
 
 ill. That the rules contained in Grammars, generally ad- 
 mit of a greater number of exceptions^ th^tn oi pojitive deter- 
 minations, 
 
 2d. That the infledlions of nouns and verbs are not accom- 
 modated to the etymology of words, but are chiefly taken from 
 analogy ; — a circumftance productive of endlefs miftakes and 
 confufion in the grammars of modern languages. 
 
 3d. That fo far from improving the phrafes and idioms of 
 languages, grammarians feem to labour hard to render them, 
 if poffible, more perplexed and inconfiftent ; \ — by daily 
 adopting new idioms in one language, which are borrowed 
 from another ; by ufing words in a figurative fenfe, which 
 cannot be thus employed without impropriety ; by transferring 
 words from the phyfical to the moral fenfey and vice verfa, 
 when there is no other neceffity for this outrage upon good 
 
 * whether the Elementary Grammar of the German Language, which I propofe 
 to publifh, together with an Identical DiBionary of the German, Englijb, French 
 and Latin languages, will be liable to the charges which my predeceffors have in- 
 curred, I am not confident enough to aver. The fhort fpecimen given of the latter 
 ut the end of this work) which accompanies the third " Eflay, On the merits and 
 demerits of Johnson's Jilnglifti Diilionary, on language in general, &c. by Ade - 
 lUNG," will ferve as a tolerable criterion of the execution of the whole. 
 
 •)• If it be obje6ted,that this is no fault of Grammarians, lince language is form- 
 ed and modelled by a whole people, I lliall briefly' anfwer ; that tradition and 
 cuftom alone do not appear to have any fuch tendency, as to make a whole nation 
 fpeak and write jargon, or nonfenfe, for ever ; and confequently, that errors and 
 ijiiftakct ought not to be perpetuated in eUmentary books of inftrudion.
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 73 
 
 fenfe^ than tlie fancy or caprice of the fpeaker,and fubfequent- 
 Ij, that of the writer *. 
 
 4th. That inftead of giving a fjntax of fpeech, or fentences 
 arranged in the moft natural order, and ftill conformable to 
 the premifes, as well as to the fubfequent conclufions, they 
 adhere to the oppofite extieme ; by negleding the general ^ 
 and giving Xhefpecial conflruftion of the individual parts. — 
 This, indeed, is of itfelf a ufeful piece of labour, if the rules 
 were not too jnuch crowded upon the tyro ; but it by no means 
 deferves the name of 2ifyntax, for its objedt is merely the in- 
 jleBion of nouns and verbs, as preparatory to a Ge?teral Syn~ 
 tax f . 
 
 5th. That no Grammarian, or Lexicographer, excepting 
 perhaps Adelung, has accurately and uniformly diftinguilhed, 
 both the moral and phyfical fenfe of words — however eafy this 
 may appear at firll fight — nor the ohjeBive ^Xid. fubJeBive ap- 
 plication of terms and phrafes J. 
 
 As 
 
 , * This change cannot, in juftice, be levelled at the captivating effufions of 
 Poetry ; an art which, from its nature, and the frequent good effecfts it produces 
 in roufing, like mufic, the palfied organs of mortals, deferves more deference, than 
 any of the liberal arts ; as it is likewrife underftood to poflefs a much greater la- 
 titude, than all the fifter-arts. 
 
 f Upon accurate inveftigation, it muft flrike even the novice in grammar, that 
 there can be only two parts in the nature of fpeech, which being the regulators of 
 all the Data involved in the reft, produce that change of place, or fituation, which 
 we exprefs by the term Syntax : thefe ttvo unqueftionably are the nominative of 
 the Noun, with its corrcfponding Ferb. — All other parts of fpeech arc, in my 
 opinion, liable to the fame modifications, or changes, which charadlerize a nu- 
 merous progeny, whofe father and mother alone are liable and fixed. 
 
 ^ The immortal author of the " Critique of Pure Reafon" was, among the 
 Germans, without exception the firft, who perceived the abfolute neceffity of this 
 diftindlion in philofophical inquiries — In juftice to the high rank held by the 
 F.nglifii ^nd French philofophers, however, I muft franlily own, (what I have, in 
 j>art, already declared in the Preface) that I have not been fo happily fituated r.s 
 IQ examine, with critical accuracy, their r^fpedive mmsnclatures. Eut if I may 
 
 rtly
 
 3? ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 As Kant's Critique of Pure Reafon is the principal ele- 
 mentary work, upon the pillars of which the whole of his 
 Syftem, together with all the works that illuftrate it, muft 
 either Hand, or fall, we Ihall firft explain its aim and moral 
 tendency J bj giving Kant's peculiar definition and divifion of 
 philofophy, accompanied with Jive conneBed problems ; and 
 in the next place, it will be ufeful to laj down the particular 
 contents oialDaxs works. The former we fliall exhibit in the 
 Synopjis : * the latter muft be the feeble eflPort of a literal^ not 
 elegant, tranflation ; and we propofe to comprife them in the 
 fubfequent Chronological Analyjis. 
 
 I. Synopsis. 
 
 A. Definition and Division of Philosophy. 
 
 Philofophy is the fyftem of all philofophical, i. e. difcurjive 
 
 knowledge derived from bare ideas, or notions This is the 
 
 fcholaftic definition ; but, in a cofmological fenfe, it is the 
 fcience concerning the relation of all our knowledge to the 
 cflcntial purpofes of human reafon, (teleologia rationis hu- 
 manae) and the philofopher is not an architeft of reafon, but 
 <» the 
 
 rely upon the information of that learned and fagacious pupil, who conde- 
 fcended to tranilate the Synoptical Problems here ftated, with their folutions, as a 
 fpecimen of his progrcfs in the German,-- — .Dr Run, of Glafgow, was the 
 firfl among the Britifh Philolophers, who diftinguiflied clearly between the objec- 
 iive ^rxAfubjeSlive ufe of the words, which axe employed to exprefs the immediate 
 obje(5ls oifenfation and perception. 
 
 * Originally digefted by Mr John SciiuLzt, an eminent Divine and Court- 
 Chaplain at Koeniglberg ; a particular friesd of Kant's who, on that octafion, 
 congratulated him i^pon having/uZ/y entered into the fpiiit of the CRiTiqujc ; and 
 beftowed upon him every vavik. of approbation,
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 39 
 
 the law-giver of it. We cannot, hence, learn philofophy it- 
 felf ; it is philofophizing which ought to be our ftudy. 
 
 I. Philofophical Knowledge 
 
 a.} is dijcurjive, as derived from ideas, and oppofgd to ma- 
 thematical intuitive knowledge, derived from the con- 
 ftrui^ion of ideas. 
 b.) isito be underftood objeSiively : 
 
 I. — as the prototype for judging upon all the attempts 
 
 of philolophizing. 
 2. — as a bare idea of a poffible fcience, which is no 
 where given in concreto : for where is it ? who is in 
 the pofTeflion of it ? and by what means may it be 
 diftinguiflied from others ? 
 c.) confiders particulars only in the general ; while mathe- 
 matical knowledge confiders general fubjefts in the par- 
 ticular, nay, even in the individual. — Thofe who pre- 
 tend, that quality is the obje£l of philofophy, quantity 
 the obje£l of mathematics, have erroneoufly adopted the 
 efFedl, inftead of the caufe. 
 
 2. Thi& fcholajlic definition of philofophy denotes a fyflem of 
 knowledge, which we puifue only with a view of reducing 
 it to fcientific rules, without any other aim, than that of 
 attainingto a logical perfeftion of knowledge. — 'Thus philo- 
 fophy is merely confidered as one of th6fe arts, which may 
 be applied to certain arbitrary purpofes ; and in this fenfe 
 the philofopher Is an architeft of reafon. 
 
 3. The cofmological idea of philofophy implies that, which ne- 
 cefTarily concerns every individual. — In this view the phi- 
 lofopher is the legiflator o|" human reafon. 
 
 4. Among the effential purpofes of human reafon^ one is the 
 
 final
 
 40 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 final purpofe, and this is the complete deftination of tnaf>. 
 The philofophy which has this puipofe for its object, is cal- 
 led Ethics. Hence the ancienis always underftood by the 
 name philofopher, at the fame time, and principally, the 
 Moralift, the Stoic, or him who can govern himfelf. 
 c. To Ph'ilofophi%ey means to exercife, by certain plain expe- 
 riments, the talent which reafon difplays in judging con- 
 formably to its general principles. — According to Kant's 
 Syftem, philofophy is divided into, and confidered as 
 ift. formal (methodiczV) pbilofophjf, which concerns merely 
 the form of the underftanding and reafoning faculties, as well 
 as the general rules of thought, throughout independent of the 
 obje£ls : hence Logic, Canon for underftanding and reafoning. 
 2d. material philofophy, fuch as is employed in reflefting 
 upon any one obje61, and again is 
 
 A. the pure, or the philofophy of pure reafon, which de- 
 pends upon fundamental principles and notions a priori. 
 This is, '^■' 
 
 a. Propadeutic, or Critique, which inquires into the fa- 
 culty of reafon with refpeft to all its pure know- 
 ledge a priori •, 
 
 b. Metaphyfics in a more extenfive fenfe, the fyftem of 
 pure reafon ; or the colle£live philofophical know- 
 ledge from pure reafon, in fyftematic connexion, 
 whether real, or imaginary. — This again compre- 
 hends 
 
 a.) MetaphyfiCS of Nature ; Metaphyfics in a more 
 
 limited fenfe, that of the fpeculative ufe of pure 
 reafon, which confines its inquiries to what ac- 
 tually is, or exifts. Its component parts are the 
 following four : 
 
 aa. Ontology, the fyftem of all ideas and princi- 
 ples
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 41 
 
 pies, which relate to fubje£ls In general, with- 
 out propofmg any obje£ls of perception, 
 bh. Rational Phyjlology ^ which invelligates na- 
 ture, i. e. the complexus (compafs) of fub- 
 jefts ; whether they be exhibited to the fenfes, 
 or to any other perceptive faculty. It 
 comprepcnds ill. Rational (not empirical) 
 Phyjicsj treating of material objects, and in- 
 cluding every thing that may be known by 
 means of the external fenfes ; — 2d, Rational 
 Pfychology^ which coniiders the fubjeft of 
 the internal fenfe, mind ; and, according to its 
 ' fundamental notions, the reflefting capacity 
 in general, 
 cc. Rational Cofmologyy which employs itfelf with 
 the internal combination of the objefts of ex- 
 perience ; but which proceeds beyond the 
 poffibllity of experience ; general hiowledge 
 of the world, by which nature is confidered as 
 ^n abfolute Univerfum. 
 ddi Rational T^beology, which invefligates the 
 connexion fubfifting between Nature and a 
 Supreme Being, 
 b.) Metaphyjics of Morals, • or the pra6tical ufe of 
 pure reafon, which attends to the laws, according 
 to which every thing happens in this, and no o- 
 ther, manner ; — pure morals. Ethics. 
 B. The experimental, praBical Philofophy, which is altoge- 
 ther ellablilhed upon experience, and again confifts of 
 three principal divifions, viz. 
 
 1. Phyjics, the experimental doftrine of the material 
 
 world. 
 
 2, Pf^chology, the experimental doftrine of mind. 
 
 F 3.
 
 '2i ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 3. Anthropology, the praclical doftVine of free-afting 
 man, derived from experience. / 
 
 Corrolaria, 
 
 I. Material Philofophy is, therefore, divided like Mathematics, 
 
 ~ into pure and applied (praftical). 
 
 1. There are, originally, only two principal divifions of phi- 
 lofophy, Logic and Metaphyjlcs ; or, according to the plan 
 of the ancient Greeks, three; namely. Logic, Phjfics^ and 
 Ethics. 
 
 B. Problems and Solutions. 
 
 , Exordium. 
 
 Tlie aim of Kant's Critique is no lefs, than to lead Rcafoii 
 to the true knowledge of itfelf ; to examine the titles, upon 
 which it founds the fuppofed poffellion of its m^etaphyfical 
 knowledge, and by means of th'is examination to miark the 
 true limits, beyond which it cannot venture to fpeculate, 
 without wandering into the empty region of pure fancy ; — 
 an attempt, the bare idea of which fufficiently difcoverg the 
 philofophic fpirit of its author. 
 
 In order to acquire a corred: notion of the term Purt 
 ReafoTiy we muft cortlider it in this point of view.— Every 
 adl of judgment, which is not mingled with any heterogeneous 
 ingredients, is called pure. But particularly every piece of 
 comparative knowledge, which is unmixed with any expe- 
 rience, or fenfation, and which confequently is poflible altoge- 
 ther a priori, defer ves the name oi ahjolutely pure ; v. g. Liberty, 
 (jod, Lmmortality Reafon, then, is that faculty, which af- 
 fords to us the principles of comparative knowledge a priori. 
 
 HencG
 
 KANT'S WORKS. ^^ 
 
 Hence pare reafon contains the principles of judging upon nnj 
 thing ahfolutcly a priori. The whole compafs of thofe prin- 
 ciples^ conformably to which all pure judgments a priori can 
 be acquired and carried into efFeft, might be called an Orga- 
 non of pure reafon.— The whole Critique of pure reafon, 
 therefore, is eftabliftied upon this principle, (not pojlulatey 
 nor petitio princlpiiy but the refult of an appeal to a£is of 
 confcioufnefs) that there is a free xfiafon independent of nil ex^ 
 perience and fenfation *. 
 
 Reafon, as the organ of mind in concreto, muft be confidered, 
 both fubjedively, and objedively. SuhjeBive reafon is capable 
 of perpetual increafe, bj approximation to the ohjeBive ftate 
 of it, viz. to the perfeft model, (llandard). 
 
 Problem FiRst. 
 
 "To determine the nature of the Senftive Faculty and its di- 
 flinBion from Underjtanding. 
 
 1. The Senftive Faculty confifts in the capacity of our Soul 
 to receive immediate reprefentations of objects, merely fron^ 
 being affefted by them in this or that way. 
 
 ^. The reprefentations, which the Senlltive fdculty affords 
 to us, are therefore referred to the object which affedls us, i. e. 
 they VLxe Perceptions. 
 
 * Although M. Sell E, one of Kant's opponents, has endeavoured to prove, 
 in an Effay publiftied in the Berlin Monthly Magazine, for December 1784, " that 
 there are no pure ideas of the reafoning faculty, independent of experience ;" yet I think 
 it neceflary to remind the reader, that all fuch negaiitie proofs, as arife from the 
 fuhjeSiiiie convidion of an individual, fay as little againft the validity, or liability, 
 of a philofophical propofition which altogether depends on the manner of exlii- 
 biting it to the mind, as the failure of converting the Turks and Jews to the 
 Chriftian Religion, can furnilh any argimient to the diladvantage of the latter.
 
 44 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 3. All our Perceptions have a twofold> form, Space and 
 Time, as reprefentations which relate to objefts, and which 
 are theipfelres Perceptions, pure Perceptions that, a priori, 
 previous to all a£tual fenfation, are difcoveiable originally in 
 the reprefeating capacity of our Soul, and lie already at the 
 foundation of all our actual fenfations, as neceffary conditions 
 of their pollibility. 
 
 4. Hence Space and Time are not fomething attached to ob- 
 je6ls themfelves, but mere fubjeftive reprefentations in us. 
 The Being in Space and Time, confequently extenfion, impe- 
 netrability, fucceflion, change, motion, &.c. are therefore not 
 qualities which belong to objects hi themfelves, but reprefen- 
 tations in our minds, which attach barely to the nature of our 
 Senfitlve Faculty. In other words, the motion of matter does 
 not produce reprefentations in us, but is itfelf mere reprefen- 
 tation. 
 
 5. Hence alfo we know things merely as they appear to us ; 
 that is, we know only the impreffions which they make on 
 our Senfitlve Faculty ; but what they may be in themfelves, 
 and for other reafonable Beings, is altogether unknown to us. 
 
 i 
 
 Problem Second. 
 
 To t?ivejligate the whole Jlore of original notions difcoverahle 
 in our Underjlandingy and which lie at the foundation of all our 
 knowledge ; and at the fame time to authenticate their true de~ 
 fcenty by fjjowing that they are not derived from experience^ hut 
 are pure produStio?is of the underflanding. 
 
 I. The perceptions of objects contain, indeed, the matter of 
 knowledge, but are in themfelves blind and dead, and not 
 knowledge : and our foul is merely paffive in regard to them. 
 
 1. If thefe perceptions are to furniih knowledge, the Under- 
 funding mull think of them, and this is poilible only through 
 notions (conceptions), which are the peculiar Form of our 
 
 Under-
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 45 
 
 Underflanding, in the fame manner, as Space and time ate the 
 Form of our Senfitlve Faculty. 
 
 3. Thefe notions are aftive reprefentations of our iinder- 
 ftanding-f acuity ; and as they regard immediately the percep- 
 tions of obje£ls, they refer to the objeds themfelves only me- 
 diately. 
 
 4. They lie in our Underflanding, as pure notions a pri- 
 ori, at the foundation of all our knowledge : they are necefla- 
 ry forms, radical notions, Categories, (Predicaments) of which 
 all our knowledge muft be compounded : and the Table of 
 them follows. 
 
 ^tantity : Unity, Plurality, Totality. 
 ^lality : Reality, Negation, Limitation. 
 Relation : Subftance, Caufe, Reciprocation. 
 Modality : Poflibility, Exiftence, Necei3ity. 
 
 5. Now to think znd. to judge is the fame thing; confe- 
 quently every notion contains a particular form of jndgment 
 concerning objefts There are four principal genera oi judg- 
 ments : they are derived from the above four poffible funftions 
 of the Underftanding, each of which contains under it three 
 
 fpecies, namely with refpedl to 
 
 Quantity y they are univeflal, particular, lingular '\ 
 
 Quality J affirmative, negative, infinite j g, 
 
 Relationy « — cathegorical, hypothetical, disjun61:ive . % 
 Modality y problematical, aflertory, apodifliical J ? 
 
 6. And thus not only the whole power of our underftand- 
 ing is fathomed out of its own nature, and therefore per- 
 fe£lly a priori ; but alfo, at the fame time, the pure defcent of 
 our notions from the Underftanding ; and their perfe6l inde- 
 pendence on all experience, is proved. 
 
 PrPblem Third. 
 
 ToJJjew in what mannsr we are entitled to afcribe ohjeBive 
 
 reality
 
 46 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 reality to thofe notions^ which are merely fomething fuhjeSiive 
 in us ; or in other words ^ tojhew how the underjlanding is juf- 
 
 ' tijied in goitigt as it were, out of it/elf, and in transferring its 
 notions to things which are external to ity that is, to refer theni 
 to ohjeBs. 
 
 I . Space and time are, as pure perceptions a priori, merely 
 
 fuhje£iive ; but %% forms of our Senftive Faculty ^ they have a 
 neceflarj relation to objeds of fenfe, — are neceffar j Predicates 
 of whatever can be an obje£t of fenfation ; and therefore the 
 following fynthetical principles a priori are eftabliflied : 
 
 a. Every thing that can be an obje<9; of our exernal fenfes^ 
 fo as to be perceived or felt, is in Space ; and all the pre- 
 dicates of fpace, extenfion, divifibility, &c. neceffarily be- 
 long to it. 
 
 b. Every thing that can be an objeft of our fenfes in gene- 
 ral, whether external or internal, is in '^ime ; and there- 
 fore, all the predicates of time, limultancity, fucceffion, Sec. 
 alfo of necefjity belong to it. 
 
 3. In like manner, all pure notions a priori are, indeed^ 
 fomething merely fuhjeBive in our Underflanding ; but as 
 forms of our Thought (of the Thinking Faculty), they mull 
 likewife relate to all objefts of our Senfitive Faculty. Hence 
 the following univerfal fynthetical maxim, a priori, is efta- 
 .blifhed. 
 
 Every thing which can be an objeft of polTible experi- 
 ence, mull not only be in Space and Time ; but to it alfo 
 mud belong one of each clafs of the pure notions of the un- 
 derllandln;^;. 
 
 3. Our notions, therefore, receive relation to objects, or 
 ohjeSiive reality, only through a third mediating reprefenta- 
 tion a priori, which has fomething in common with the per- 
 ception, as well as with the notion, and by means of which, 
 therefore, the union of the Notion with the Obje£l becomes 
 
 poflibl".
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 47 
 
 ■ poffible. This, in reality, is Time^ which Kant calls the 
 Schema of Notions * ; for it has fomething common with ^ 
 
 per- 
 
 V 'A M' \ . 
 
 * The Schemata are indetermined fenfualized reprefentations luhicl^k 
 the imagination places under pure notions of the Underjianding j and 
 conformably to the Number of the Categories, they maybe exhibit- 
 ed in the following Table : 
 
 1. QiTANTiTY, i. e. Series of time. 
 
 Number, 
 
 2. QnALiry, i. e. things contained in time. 
 
 Reality^ i. e. exiftence, fenfation in time, time filled. 
 Negation, i. e. non-exiftence, abfence of feeling, va- 
 cuum in time. 
 Limitation, i. c. tranfition from feeling through its va- 
 rious degrees, till it has vanifhed, or vice 
 verfa. 
 
 3. Relation, i. e. arrangement in time, relation of feelings to 
 
 each other in time. 
 Suhjlantiality, i. e. the real, in fo far as it is permanent 
 
 in, and with, time— the fubftratum of all 
 
 changes : and accidents, i. e. the real io fo 
 
 far as it changes. 
 Cafuality, i. c. fucceflion of different feelings in time, 
 
 conformably to a rule. 
 Community, 1. c. fimultaneity of feeling, according to 
 
 rule. 
 
 4. MoDALiTT, i. e.the modes, in which an objefl: belongs to 
 
 time. 
 PoJJibility, i. -e. the reprefentation of a thing, con- 
 formably to the conditions of any one time 
 --in general, 
 ABuality, i. e. the reprefentation of a thing, in a de- 
 terminate time. 
 Necejfity, i. e. the reprefentation of a thing at all 
 times. 
 : (Finis)
 
 48 ELEMENTARY VIEW OT" 
 
 perceptions, becaufe it is itfelf a perception a priori, and it lias 
 fomething common with all notions a priori ; becaufe it is 
 a Form of all Senfations and Reprefentations a priori. The 
 uniting of a pure Notion with an objedt is, therefore, poflible 
 merely through time as its Schema. 
 
 4. Through means of this Schema, according to the Table 
 given in the preceeding note, all fjnthetical axioms may now 
 be exactly detenaified a priori, and they are the following : 
 Axiom of Quantity, (or of perception). " All phenomena in 
 perception are exhibited under the notion of exten- 
 fion." 
 Axiom of^^uality^ (or of the anticipation of obfervation), 
 ** In all phenomena, fenfation, and the reality which 
 correfponds to it in the objeft, have inten/ive quantum^ 
 or a degree ; that is, evary reality can, through in- 
 finite gradations, become lefs and lefs, till it be ■=. o." 
 Axioms of Relation y (or Analogies of experience). 
 
 a. " In all phenomena there is fomething perma- 
 
 nent, i. e. Subftance •, and fomething fliifting, or 
 accidents.'* 
 
 b. Every event has a caufe. 
 
 c. All fubftances, fo far as they are co-exiftent, fland 
 in reciprocation with each other. 
 
 Axioms of Modality y (or Poftulates). 
 
 a. That which agrees with the form of experience 
 (according to Perception and Notion) is poflible 
 really, not merely logically. 
 
 b. That which is conne£led with the matter of expe- 
 rience, i. e, with fenfation, is a£lual. 
 
 c. That which is connected with what is aftual, a- 
 greeably to the univerfal conditions of experience, 
 is (exills) neceflary. 
 
 Problem
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 4^ 
 
 Problem Fourth. 
 
 'To determine by thefe means the true hounds of human reafon^ 
 confequently to explain pojiti'vely y how far our reafon can reach 
 through mere fpeculation^ where ; on the contrnry^ our proper 
 knowledge ceafes, and nothing hut faith a?id hope remain. 
 
 1. All the elementary notions, of which our Underftanding 
 is capable, are exaftlj thofe which the foregoing Table of 
 them indicates, fo that there are neither more nor lefs of them 
 in number. 
 
 ?. All thefe elementary notions are applicable merely to 
 fenfible objedls, and hence they ferve only for determining the 
 neceffary predicates of every poflible perception. From this 
 the following confequences refult. 
 
 a. We cannot apply our notions to the moil perfe£l 
 Being ; ponfequently we cannot prove that he has cxteu- 
 fion, or qualities ; that he is a fubllance, a caufe of other 
 things ; that he is poffible or actual, or neceffary. 
 
 b. Even as to the objefls of our fenfitive faculty, all our 
 elementary notions can teach us none of the predicates that 
 belong to them in th^mfelves, that is, to their Effence 5 
 but all predicates which, through thefe notions, can be 
 afcribcd to them, concern merely their ^perception, and the 
 union of the Varieties in it, confequently the -way merely, 
 in which they appear to us. Things in refpe<fl: of what 
 they are in themiblves, are no obje£ls, either of our fenfes 
 or of our underllaading. 
 
 c. Hence the three cofmological queftions are mere chi- 
 meras, viz. " V 
 
 Whether the world, in point of fpace, be finite or in- 
 finite ? 
 
 Whether it has had a beginning, or has exifted from 
 eternity ? 
 
 . G Whether
 
 50 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 Whether the number of parts, of which matter con- 
 fills, be finite or infinite ? 
 
 d. But as the underftanding cannot aflert, or prove, any 
 thing of obje<Els that come not under the cognizance of the 
 fenfes, as little can it deny, or refute them, by any argu- 
 ment that has even the appearance of validity. And hence 
 arifes the (fublim^) prefuppofition and belief of a Supreme 
 Being, and of an immortality of the Soul ; becaufe there 
 are certain neceflary purpofes of human nature, moral 
 laws, which require this prefuppofition. 
 
 e. Yet though we have fufficient fiihjeBive grounds for 
 prefuppofing and determining certain fuperfenfible objefts ; 
 we have not, through fuch grounds, the leafi: knowledge, 
 how thefe obje6ts may be fconfl:ituted in themfelves ; but 
 we try to determine them, only by analogy. 
 
 3. All the Synthetical Axioms of our Underfl;anding, by 
 means of which we are able to judge of objedls, are exaBly 
 thofe which the foregoing Table of them indicates, and we 
 know, therefore, a priori, the whole foundation of all the 
 knowledge of which our Underftanding is capable. 
 
 4. But all thefe axioms of cur Underftanding have objective 
 validity, only fo far as the pofiibility of experience depends oil 
 them ; and they ferve merely to determine the neceflary con- 
 nexion of fenfible things with each other. It may hence be 
 juftly faid, that our Underftanding, inftead of firft learning its 
 axioms from nature, rather through them, a priori, prefcribes 
 laws to nature ; and that on this account it is the true legijla" 
 ture of Tiature, fo that, without thefe axioms of our Under- 
 ftanding, all regularity and order among the obje£ls of fenfe, 
 confequently the pofiibility of experience itfelf, would ceafe. 
 Hence, too, as foon as we wifli to rife with the axioms of our 
 Underftanding to fuperfenfible objefts beyond nature, we al- 
 ways make an unjuftifiable ufe of them, 
 
 5-
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 51 
 
 5 . And as our Underjlanding can neither form a notion of 
 fuperfenfible obje£ls, nor judge of them ; as little can our 
 Reafon difcover bj inference any fuperfenfible objedt ; confe- 
 quentlj, no Syllogifm can lead us to new objects, which lie 
 without the fphere of poflible experience. 
 
 6. All notions which our reafon can form of fomething, that 
 is abfolutelj unconditioiiatey are therefore mere IdeaSy whofe 
 objeftive validity can be proved through no fpecies of Syl- 
 logifm. 
 
 7. Hence the Axiom, '* If the conditionate thing be given, 
 the abfolutely unconditionate thing is alfo given," is nothing 
 but a fubjeftive logical Maxim of Reafon, i. e. a Maxim which 
 regulates the train of reafoning in the Mind itfelf. 
 
 8. As now the whole of fpeculative Cofmology, Pfychology 
 and Theology entirely refts on this Axiom ; thefe three Sciences, 
 as far as concerns their fpeculative parts, are nothing but Syf- 
 tems of fallacies *. Ontology, alfo, completely fails, and muft be 
 changed into a bare Analysis of the notions of our Underftand- 
 ing. — The whole body of Metaphyfics, then, muft be confined 
 to the Metaphyfics of Nature. 
 
 Problem Fifth. 
 
 ^ofolve the riddle, why our Reafon is fo irrejijiibly inclined. 
 
 to "Denture with its fpeculations beyond the bounds of pojjible 
 
 G 2 knowledge ,• 
 
 • From what is here faid, the reader may be led to fuppofe, that Kant alto- 
 gether denies the pofliibiUty of proving the exiftence of a Supreme Being, the im- 
 mortality of the Soul, &c. This fuppofition, however, would be ill-founded ; for 
 Kant diftindlly and repeatedly admits the exiftence of thefe fuperfenfible ob- 
 jc(fts ; but maintains, that we arrive at the knowledge of them through a procefs 
 of pra<5lical, not fpeculative, Reafon. This procefs he endeavours to vindicate and 
 illuftrate, by the moft appropriate examples, in his Critique of PraSiical Reafon^ the 
 contents of which the Reader will find in our Chronological Anai.ysis.
 
 5^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 hnowledge ; and hence to deteB the fallacy y by which it is in 
 this vcfpeB involuntarily deceived. 
 
 1. The ground of this irrefiflible bias lies in the nature of 
 of our Reafon itfelf . Reafon cannot, be fatisiied with the ori- 
 ginal Notions and Axioms of the Underftanding alone ; but 
 through categorical, hypothetical and disjunftive conclufions, 
 it attains to the Idea of a fimple fubftance, of an abfolute 
 Univerfum, of an abfolute exiflent perfection in the nunaber 
 of real parts of matter, of an abfolute perfe£lion in the feries 
 of caufes, of an abfolute neceflarj Being, and of a Subflancc 
 that poflefles all realities. 
 
 2. Confequentlj the Idea of the abfolutely unconditionate 
 thing has indeed -^^xi^di fuhjeBive validity, and is in no man- 
 ner an arbitrary lidlion : Reafon forces it on us neceflarily. 
 But hence it does not follow, that this Idea has alfo objeBive 
 validity. Reafon commits a very concealed, indeed, but un- 
 deniable fophifm, when from mere Notions it forms the fyn- 
 thetical Axiom, *' that, if the conditionatc thing be given, fo 
 mufl be alfo the abfolutely unconditionate." 
 
 3. As the Idea of abfolutely unconditionate obje£ls is in- 
 difpenlibly required by our Reafon, it is very natural, that 
 even the acuteft philofopher fhould not only feel in himfelf an 
 unavoidable bias to fuch fallacious conclufions ; but alfo, that 
 it mull be very difficult for him to difencumber himfelf froin 
 them completely, though lie be fortunate enough to difcover 
 the deception. 
 
 Scholion* 
 
 Thus, through the Critique of Kant, all thefe five pro- 
 blems, concerning the poffibilityand the limits of pure rational 
 difcoveries, have been thoroughly folved, but in a way which 
 perhaps no j^hilofopher had fuppofed. According to the refult
 
 KANT'S WORKS. S3 
 
 of this Critique f the poffibility of pure lational knowledge, 
 fuch as Metaphyfics can furnifh, has been eftabliihed. Eut 
 that kncywledge extends no further, than to the world of fenfe, 
 confequentlj only to the univerfal and iieceffary laws of nature. 
 A demonftrably certain Syftem of Metaphyfics is indeed pof- 
 fible, but a very different one from what we have had hither- 
 to, which, as its name indicates, fets out with propofitions for 
 judging dogmatically upon things difcoverable beyond the 
 
 region of Phyfics, i. e. without the limits of Nature. If 
 
 the principles above delineated be juft, the oiily pojjlhle Me- 
 taphyfics, fo far as we are entitled to proceed dogmatically, 
 are the Metaphyfics of Nature — Confequently the Critique 
 of Kant confiders all the Metapnyfical Syftems, which have 
 been hitherto propofed, as falfe ware, and maintains that we 
 have as yet no juft Metaphyfics. His own work is important 
 and profound, and deferves to be carefully examined by thofe 
 who are converfant in fuch ftudies. Whatever the refult 
 of this examination may be, philofophy will undoubtedly gain 
 by it : aud although the Critique of Kant fhould not ftand the 
 teft of future, perhaps more fuccefsful refearches, it will ne- 
 verthelefs form a remarkable epoch in the hiftory of Meta- 
 phy ileal Science. 
 
 II. Chronological Analysis. 
 
 Exordium, 
 
 In venturing upon this elTential part of the Elements, which 
 are defigned to afford a concife, though comprehenfive view of 
 the diverfified labours of Kant, I deem it a duty incumbent 
 upon me to ft ate that, both his fyftematic works *, as well as 
 
 thofe 
 
 * That thcfe may be more eafily diftinguiflied from Others, I have arranged 
 Uiem by a fccond number catlofed in ( ).
 
 54 
 
 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 thofe which treat upon general fubjedls of philofoph j, are here 
 fuccejfivcly fubmitted to the confideration of the reader. 
 
 I n\uft however remark that, confiftent with the plan and 
 extent of thefe Elements^ the review of fo great a variety of 
 fubje6ls cannot abound in Criticifm ; but I hope it will be 
 found the more complete in the analytical part of it, compre- 
 hending every fubjedt * treated by the illuftrious author, during 
 a period now exceeding half a century. 
 
 Though my abilities — the limited compafs of which is bell 
 known to myfelf — were adequate to do the works of Kant 
 that juftice in reviewing them critically, to which they are 
 certainly entitled ; I would ftill helitate to engage upon an 
 undertaking, obviouily not the moll grateful, and in my rela- 
 tive fituation, as a former pupil to the moil renowned Pro- 
 feflbr in Europe, perhaps unbecoming. Hence I ihall content 
 myfelf with the humble province of briefly commenting upon 
 the aim of every individual publication, and then of exhibiting 
 the contents of each through a precife tranflation. 
 
 The difficulty of underftanding the peculiar terms and ex- 
 preffions of Kant mufl, 1 have reafon to hope, in great mea- 
 fure vaniih ; if the reader, in every inilance, with patient and 
 diligent application, reforts to the GloJJary. 
 
 In order to characterize the early genius of the author, 
 who, in the twenty-fecond year of his age, publilhed an Eflay 
 upon one of the moil abllrufe fubjedls of inquiry, I Ihall con- 
 clude thefe preliminaries with the lingular Motto prefixed to 
 this juvenile production : 
 
 Nihil 
 
 * Thofe Efiays, which have not been feparately printed, and the moft of which 
 were publifhed in the Monthly Magazine of Berlin, I could not procure from Ger- 
 many ; but I have ftiil introduced them in this review, merely for the fake of com- 
 pletenefsjTipon the authority of Prof. Witi. of Altdorf and Prof. Schmid of ^ena.
 
 KANTs WORKS- 55 
 
 Nihil magis praeftandum eft, quam ne pecorum ritu fequa- 
 mur antecedentium gregem, pergentes, non qua eundum 
 eft, fed qua itur, 
 
 Seneca de vita heata ; Cap. I. 
 
 I. Gedanken von der voahren Schat%ung der lehcndigen 
 Krdfte. — Reflcftions upon the true computation of I'ving 
 (moving) powers. Konigfberg, 2,20 pp. large 8vo. with 
 two plates, 1746, 
 
 After having paid handforae and due compliments to his me- 
 ritorious countrymen Leibnitz, Wolf, Herrmann, Bernoulli, 
 BuLLFiNGER, and many other eminent philofophers, the young 
 author examines the different theories and proofs advanced " on 
 the living (inherent) powers of bodies," and endeavours to fliew, 
 that their notions on this intricate fubjeft were far fi;om being cor- 
 ^ reft, and that the dilTentions prevailing among them arofe chiefly 
 from having, each of them, confidered thefubjedl in adiffercnt point 
 of view. Thus their underftandings were mifled by paying an undue 
 regard, partly to the abbacies overcome by lueight ; partly to matter as 
 aEied upon, or moved, by weight j partly to the prejfure fuffered by 
 elajiic bodies j and finally to the velocities arijing from compound mo- 
 tion. — He attacks Leibnitz moft feverely, while he enters upon a 
 fundamental inquiry infj the origin of his theory concerning the mo- 
 ving powers. It appears obvious to Kant, that Leibnitz had been 
 led to this theory, by implicitly proceeding on the known rule 
 from which Descartes explains the nature of the lever. Prior 
 to Leibnitz, the world had admitted the fimple propofition 
 of Descartes, " that the mere velocity of bodies, even fuch as are 
 in a6):ual motion, ferves as a rule for afcertaining their power." 
 But Leibnitz fuddenly roufed the reafoning powers of man, by 
 propofing a new law which, fince that period, has offered rich 
 materials for difcuflion to the moft learned and acute. Descartbs 
 had computed the powers of bodies in motion by mere velocity. 
 But Leibnitz adopted thtfquare of velocities in this computation. 
 
 Whatever
 
 SG ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 WJjatever merit may be due, from this Chronological Analysis, 
 to the Recorder of Kant's Collective Works, and from ha- 
 ving engaged in' a tafk — perhaps the moji toilfome in life ; — / 
 have fill to lament the impo^bility, or rather the impraElicahility 
 of giving the refpeciive contents of each work at full length ; efpe- 
 cially when I conjtder, both the limited f'ze of thefe Elements, and 
 the ahnofl boundlefs region of Y^pi.fi-\'^%f peculations. 
 
 Nothing, therefore, but the well founded hope, that no reafonable 
 tnan luill expeEl to fitfd tn thsfe Contents more, or lefs, than I have 
 promifed, — canfupport me in this laborious undertaking.— 
 
 Contents, 
 
 Chapter First. Of the petver of bodies , in general. § l. Every mechanical 
 body poflelFes an ef^ntial power, a. This power of bodies Leibnitz expreffed 
 by the common name, effeSiive poiver. 3. It ought to be called vis matrix (moving 
 power). 4. On -the method of explaining motion from the effeftive powers in 
 general. J. Of the difhculties arifing from the theory of reciprocal operation of 
 body and mind, if vsre attribute to the former no other power, than the vis matrix. 
 6. Of the obftacle* thence arifing in the explanation of the manner, in which the 
 mind afrc<9:s the body ; of the method of removing them, if we adopt a common 
 nyis aSii-ua. 7. There may exift things, the prefence of which cannot be at all de- 
 monftrated. 8. It is not improbable, in a ftridb metaphylical fenfe, that there may 
 be more than one world, 9. If bodies, or fubftancei, had no power to operate exter- 
 ?>a//y, there would be neither extenjion nor fpace. 10. The triple dimenfion of fpace 
 is probably derived from the law, according to which the powers of fubftances af- 
 feft each other. 11. Of the condition which renders the exiftence of a plurality of 
 worlds probable. la. Some Aletaphyficians maintain, that bodies, by means of their 
 (peculiar) powers, incline towards motion in all diredlions, 13, 14. Two objec- 
 tions againft this opmion : a.) That the ifloving body does not advance in an equal 
 ratio with the body moved ; b.) That the effort towards motion, which fubftancc» 
 manifeft in all dire(5lions, muft have a certain degree of intenfity ; for it cannot be 
 infinite, and a finite (limited) exertion, without a certain degree of effort, involves a 
 contradiction. 15. Motion muft be confidered to be of tivo different kinds. 16. 
 Motion o{ thefif kind is analogous to dead (inert) preffure. 17. 18. 19. Mo- 
 tion of the fecond kind prefuppofes a power, which correfponds with the fquare of 
 velocity. 
 
 Chapter Secojjd, Inquiry into the principles^ upon 'which tl>e adherents tfLtit- 
 kiTZ explain the' living pozvers, § 20, 21 Buelfinger's advice in fettling dif- 
 ferences between parses 22 Leibnitz's and Dicscam e»'s method of computing 
 powers. 23. i^/^ error of Leibnitz, in aflcrting "if a body is in a(Stual motion, 
 
 it!
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 57 
 
 lis power is equal to the fquare of its velocity." 24. AAual motion Is that, which 
 is not merely at the point of beginning, but during which a certain time has 
 elapfed. This intermediate time, between the beginning of motion and the mo- 
 ment in which the body moves, properly conftitutes what is called a^iual motion^ 
 aj. Second error of Leibnitz, " that the time confumed during motion is the true 
 and only charaifter of hving power, and that from this alone the difference of com- 
 puting dead and living powers muft refult." a6. ^Further proof againft Leibnitz, 
 from the law of continuity. 27. The time elapfed during motion, confequently 
 the reality of motion, is not the true criterion of computing the living power of 
 bodies. a8, Z<). Mathematics cannot prove the reality of living powers. 30, 
 Leibnitz was firft mifled in the computation of living powers, by Defcartes's ex- 
 planation of the lever. 31. Herrmann's affertion, that the powers are in pro- 
 portion to the heights, to which they may rife. 3a. Refutation of this affertion. 
 33. The followers of Defcartes commit the fame error. 34, ^s. Lichtscheid's 
 doubts upon this head removed. 36. 37. 38. An inftance which proves, that in 
 the computation of power arifing from weight, time muft be neceffarily taken in- 
 to account. 39. Summary of all the proofs derived from the motion of elaftic 
 bodies. 40. The Leibnitz ians refute their own conjedlures, through the Syflems 
 of Mechanics which they eftablifh. 41. Herrmann's ftatement, refpedling 
 the repulfion of three elaftic bodies, examined. 4a, 43. The origin of the 
 fallacy .in the reafoning, by which he eftablilhed his conclufion. 44. This 
 conclufion was unknown to Mad. de Chastelet. 45, 46, 47. Jurin's objeftion 
 concerning the reciprocal pullion of two elaftic and unequalbodies ; — Be r nouilli's 
 anfwer to this objedtion, in comparing it with the preffure fuffered by elaftic bo- 
 dies ; — his ideas on the fubjed are refuted by his oivn premifes, which con- 
 firm Kant's opinion. 48. Defence of the living powers, fupported by the con- 
 ftant balance of power in the world. 49, 50. Two different ways of explaining 
 this affertion. 51. The fource of Leibnitz's hypothefis relative to the preferva- 
 tion of a uniform power, with propofals for fettling this contrbverfy, and a con- 
 clufive anfwer to bis affertion. 5a. According to the law eftablilhed by Leib- 
 nitz, the power exercifed in the touch, between a fmall and a larger elaftic 
 body, is the fame before as after this contad:. 5 2. The fallacy of this obfervation 
 itfelf reiutes the theory of the living powers, as maintained by the Leibnitzians. 
 54. Tliis appears ftill more obvious, by inverting the cafe ; if, namely, a lirgcr 
 elaftic body is bfought into contadl with a fmaller one. 55- Calculation affords 
 proofs of the Cartefian law, that " if a larger body touches a fmaller one, there re- 
 mains an equal proportion of power." 56. The power, with which a fmaller bo- 
 dy recoils from a larger one, is called minus. 57. Mad. de Chastelet has very 
 improperly ridiculed this determination, which M. de Mairan firft propofed. 
 58. The Leibnitzians fhrink from the inquiry into the living powers, by means 
 of the pulfion obferved in unelajlic bodies. 59. The latter is more decifive in de- 
 termining the living powers, than the refiftance of elaftic bodies. 60, 61. Ths 
 Leibnitzians give a frivolous anfwer to thefe objedlions, by faying, that " in the 
 repulfion of unelaftic bodies, one half of the power is confumed in the impreflion 
 
 H made
 
 58 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 made upon the parts of thefe bodies." 6a. Reply firfl : betaufe this is a mechant 
 cal, not a mathematical cffetft of bodies. 63. Reply yfiroW: becaufe we have 
 right to call a body unelaftic, tho' it be perfedly hard. 64. Reply third: the im- 
 preffion made upon the parts, oflFcrs no argument for afferting, that a. part of the 
 power of unciaflic bodies is loft by the refillance exerted on their fide. 65. Re- 
 ply ybvr/i ; the degree of hardnefs in unelaftic bodies, and the degree of power 
 exerted in the contaft, muft yet be determined by the Leibnitzians. 66. The re- 
 fiftance of unelaftic bodies entirely deftroys'the living powers. 67 — 70. General 
 proof, that the concuflion of elaftic bodies muft, in every inftance, evince the fal- 
 fity of fuppofing living powers ; — that in the percuflion of elaftic bodies v/e odght 
 to confider only the incipient velocity of the body percu fed. 71=77. Examina- 
 tion of the proofs of the living powers derived from compound motion : particu- 
 larly BuEi finger's, which is refuted in feveral ways. 78. The ftraight power irf 
 the diagonal line does not correfpond with the amount of power exerted towards 
 the lateral parts. 79. In the computation of power by Leibnit?,, the amount of 
 it, in an oblique direftion, is equal to the diagonr.l power ; but in that by Descar- 
 tes,, the former frequently is infinitely greater than the latter. 80=83. A nevr 
 cafq towards the refutation of living powers; viz. " that a body moving in- a 
 circle produces the fame effeft, with refpeifi to gravity, as if it reclined upon an 
 oblique furface^ — and that a circular moving body, in every finite meafure of 
 riarf, produces the effecfl: of a finite /xjw^r, even againft the ohdacles oi gravity. 
 84. Descartes removes this difficulty by his method of computing power. 85. 
 Another contradiction in this computation by the fquare ; for every one agrees 
 " that the computed power of velocity refulting from the multiplication with it- 
 felf, according to the right angle, muft have infinitely more force, than that which 
 i« fimply exprefl'ed by the, meafure of velocity; and that it has the fonic relation 
 to this, as the fiirface- has to the line." 86. The cafe ftated by Bernouilli, 
 concerning the eiajtic ^ower of /our ftmilar fprings, is here refuted. 87==90. 
 Mairan's objedion agaiuft the ftafement of Herrmann; the utility of the me- 
 thod adopted by the former ; its tendency to prevent certain palpable miftakes, 
 which have long remained concealed. 91. Buhlfinger's diftincllons, by which 
 he endeavours to elude the objc<5lion of Mairan, afe fettled by this method. 
 92,^3. A fin^ular compound cafe by Leibnitz, which refts upon fallacious 
 reafonlng. ■• 
 
 " As Bernoujlli, Htrrsiann and Wolf, the admirers of Leibnitz, have 
 " not, in the ufual manner, informed us — that nothing equals this proof in point of 
 " invention and (apparent) ftrength.— I am inclined to think, ' fays Kant," that 
 " fo great a man as Leieniti could not err, without gaining reputation by the 
 ^ very idea, that miflcd hun into 'this error." I cannot, upon this octafion, forget 
 " the words of Hhctor iil Virgil : 
 
 Si Pergama dextra 
 
 Defend: pofitnt, ctiani hac defcnfa fuiffent. 
 
 Virg. AenriJ. 
 9.«, 9;. The power, which the body A has acquired by the arrangen[>ent of a' 
 
 machine
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 59 
 
 «»achine,-is not the efTciSi; of power produced by the body B. 96. The fame is con- 
 firmed from the law of continuity, 97. The whole extent of the fujjicient reafon in 
 tlic preceding poGtion. 98. The only difficulty, that Hill preyails in the Leib- 
 nitzian argument, is anfwered. 99. Papjn's evafive objeAion is weak and unte- 
 fiable, viz. " §uomodo autem per tranjlationtm totius putcntia corporis A in corpus B, 
 .■uxia Cartejium, aitineri pajpt motus perpetuus emdcntijfime danonjirat, atque ita Carte* 
 fianos ad abjurdum reduBos arhitratur. Ego autem et ixoium perpduum abfurJum eJJ'e 
 fateor, ct CI. Vir. defnonjirationem ex fuppofita tranjlatione effe legltimam.'^ And af- 
 ter having, in this /o/J/iV manner, declared himfelf again ft that important pofltion 
 of Descartes, he feeks for fhelter, in difputing the premifes of his adverfary ; 
 and in challenging him, to folve this Gordian knot. Thfi following words difcover 
 his opinion : Sed Hypothefts ipfius pcjftbilitatem tranjlationis nimirum totius potentijs 
 fxcorpare A in corpus B pcrnego, etc. ( ASl. Erudit. l6^l. page 9 )^— IOO=IOI. 
 Leibnitz's reply to Papin is equally inconfiftent, and Ka n t believesthat the 
 former has written thefe words in good earneft : " Cum florentia ej/ivi, dedi amlco 
 mliam ndhvc demonjlraiioncm-, pro pojjibiltiate tranjlationis virium dotalium, l^c. cotport 
 majore in virus quiefcens., prorfns affinem lis ipfis, quo CI. Papinus inger.uofsjftme pro tne 
 juvandd ci'Knifitamt^pro quibus gratias dcbeo, imo et agOyfinceritate ejus dignas." — Proof, 
 that a quadruple body may communicate to a fmgle body four degrees of velocity 
 by means of percuffioh upon a lever ; — how Pa pin ought to have reafoned againft 
 JuEiBNiTz ; all the arguments for proving the entity of living powers agalnft the 
 computation of Defcartes have failed ; no hopes are left to to reconcile them, 
 loa. The principal arguments of the Leibnitzians refuted 103, 104. Woi.r'f 
 argument, and his principai axiom : " if a body has jf.iffed through the fame fpactij 
 it has alfo produced the fame innocuous effcfi" 105. Another a::ijm of the Wol- 
 jjan Schediafma : " As fpacts (objects of fpace), in the a«5l of uniform motion, 
 bear a compound relation to the velocities and times ; fo the innocuous effeffs cor- 
 refpond with the maffts, times, and velocities of bodies." Upon this axiom, Wolb 
 eftablifhes the following erroneous theorem : A^iones quibxs idem eJfeBus prcdu- 
 citur^funt et celeritates. 106. We are not yet in the polLllion of a Syfrm of Dynw 
 micks, IQJ, 108. Th< argum<snt of Muschenuroek examined; 109. Anew 
 cafe for ihe confirmation of the Cartefian method of computing powers, no. 
 The doubts of Leibnitz felved by Jurin. ili, 112. Mad.de Chaftelet's frivo- 
 lous obje<Sion agalnft Jurin's argument expofed. 113. Richier's objeAions 
 fhare the fame fate. — The author concludes this Chapter withfomc fupplemtntary 
 notes and illuftrations, in which he unfolds the following particulars : (a) Why 
 the undetermined idea of finite time, alfo includes the portion of time infinitely 
 fmall .'' (b) Leibnitz's meihad of computing powers cannot even be admitted mi- 
 der the condition of finite (limited) velocity, (c) Why time mult nccellarily en- 
 ter into the computation of the obftacles occafioned by gravity. 
 
 CHaPT Elt 'I'niRD. A -vietu cf a neiv ttt(}hod of computing tie living poiv^'rs ; ie- 
 itig the UHly tnii tHiafufe of natureii povuiYs.-^—^ 1 14. That law, which has been fotuid 
 inapplicable in Mathematics, may neverthclefs apply to Natural Philofophy. iij. 
 piftiuiitifln b^^ween mathematical and natural bodies, and between the la-yvs relative 
 
 Hi to
 
 6o ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 to both. ii6. Velocity affords no juft idea of power. 117. There would be no 
 power, if there were no effort to preferve the JIutus in fe ; illuftration of the idea 
 oiinUnfton. 118. If intenfjon be comparable with a point, power refembles a 
 line, namely that of velocity. 119. If intenfion be finite, i. e. like a line, poiuer is 
 comparable with i^fquare. no. A body, that manifefts an internal effort to pre- 
 ferve its motion free and conftant, has a power analagous to the fquare of velocity. 
 ill. A body cannot acquire its living power from without. 122. There is an 
 infinite number of intermediate degrees between dead and living power ; — the 
 latter can arife or^y in a finite time, after the beginning of motion. 113. That 
 flate, in which the power of bodies is not yet liming (evolvedy,.but is in a pro- 
 greffive crifis, Kant terms the vi-vijication. 124, 125. According to a new eftima- 
 ,tion of powers, a body that preferves its velocity, in free motion, in infnitum undi- 
 miniflied, poffeffes living power, i. e. fuch a power as can be eftimated by the fquare 
 of velocity. 126. As there arc free motions, there are likewife living powers. — Ma- 
 thematics admit no free motions. 127. Aneafier method of applying thefe re- 
 flexions to advantage. 128. Bernocilli was not unacquainted with thefe ideas, 
 " Vii vi-vay[ fays he, " eft aliquid reale et fubftantiale, quod per fefubfjl'it, et quantum 
 in fe rft, non dependit ab alio : —— — ■ F'is mortua noH eft aliquid abfolutum et 
 
 P> er fe di'rdns , &c. 129". The living powers are of an accidental nature. ' 130, I31. 
 Experience confirms the ixicctSivt-vivifcation. 132, 133. Vivification is not ap- 
 plicable to all vielocities in general ; — application of this rule to motion, in a re- 
 filling medium. 134, 135. Whether vivification and free motion, in all the higher 
 degrees of velocity, are poffible /■« infinitum. 136-^138. The living power may 
 in part vanifh, without having produced any effeft. 139, 140. The phenomena 
 of thofe bodies which overcome gravity, neither manifeft any living power, nor 
 do they militate againft it. 141. Soft bodies do not operate with their collective 
 power. 142, 143. Query : whether the effed: of bodies, without diftindlion, is 
 proportional to the mafs of their living power. 144, 145. The mafs, in. which a 
 body can produce effedls proportional to its living power, muft be determined ; 
 fmaller maffes, imdera certain fize, cannot produce that effeft. 146, 147. Fluid 
 bodies operate in proportion to the fquare of velocity. 148 — -IJI. '■ The motions 
 of elalUc bodies are inconfiftent with the computation of Leibnitz, but they agree 
 with that of Kant. '152, 153'. Mechanical proof of the living powers, by Mus- 
 CHENBRbEK.ij4, 155. A fpririg of equal elafticity comrriunicates a greater de- 
 gree of power to a larger body than to a fmaller one. 156 — 158. Whence the 
 fquares of velocities of cylinders are in an inverfe ratio to the maffes. 159 — 161. 
 In the effe<5t of gravity, time ought te be computed ; — ^foft fubftances are of a very 
 different nature. 162. The force of refiftance of foft matter takes place with finite 
 velocity; 
 
 p. Allgemeine NaturgefchichtCf oder Theorie des Himmels, 
 nach Newtonifchen Grundsdtzen. A general hiftory of na- 
 ture, or theory of the heavens, upon Newtonian principles. 
 8vo. Koenigjberg. 1 755.
 
 KANT'S WORICS. §t 
 
 }.\l. Principiorum metaphyjicorum nova dilucidatio. 4to. 1 755. 
 |V. DiJJertatio de principiis primis cognitionis humanae. 4to. 
 Regiomonti' 1755. 
 
 V. Monadologia phyjzca. 4 to. 1756. 
 
 VI. Ge/chicbte der merkwurdigsten VorfdlU des Krdhehens, 
 welches am Ende dcs 1755 sten Jahres einen groffen 'Theil der 
 
 Erde erfchuttert hat Hiftorj of the mofl remarkable e- 
 
 vents produced by the earthquake, which convulfed a great 
 part of the globe, towards the end of the year 1755. 4to. 
 Koenigsherg, ly^S. 
 
 Vil. Neiier Lehrhegriff der Bewegung und Ruhe, und der da~ 
 mit verhiupften Erfahrungen in der Naturwijfcnfchaft. — 
 New theory of motion and reft, together with an account of 
 the experiments relative to them in Natural Philofophy, 
 4to. Koenigsherg. 1758, 
 
 VIII. Betrachtungen iiber den Optimifmus Reflexions upon 
 
 Optimifm. 4to. 1759. 
 
 IX. Entwurf uiid Ank'undigung eines Collegii der phyfifchen 
 G eographie, nchjl einer Unterfiichung : oh die Wejlwinde in 
 vnjern Gegenden darum feucht Jtndy weil Jie iiber ein grojjes 
 Mee^Jireichcn ." — A Iketch and annunciation of a courfe of 
 lectures on phyfical geography ; together with an inquiry 
 whether the weflerly winds are for this reafon moift in our 
 climate, becaufe they blow over a great fea, 4to. Koenigs~ 
 herg. 1739. 
 
 X. Eriveis der falfchcn Sipit^findighcit der vier fyllogijlifchen 
 Figuren. — 'fhefalfe fubtleties of the four fyllogiftical figures 
 proved. 8vo. 1762. 
 ^I. Verfuchy den Begriff der negativen Grojfcn in die IVelt- 
 weijjjeit ein'^ufiihren. — An attempt towards introducing the 
 idea of negative magnitudes into philofophy. 1763. 
 ^I» Einzig moglicher Beweisgrund 'zu einer Demonjiration 
 
 des
 
 6% ELEMEtSTTARY VIEW OF 
 
 des Dafeyns Gottes. The only poflible method of proving 
 the exiftence of the Deitj. 8vo. Koenigjberg. I'jS'^. 
 
 XIII. Beobachtungen iiber das Gefiibl des Schonen und Erha- 
 bcnen. Obfervations upon the eiFedl of the Beautiful and 
 Sublime. 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1764. ad Edit. 1 770. 
 
 XIV. Traume eines Geisterfehers, erl'duUrt durch "Traume der 
 Metaphyjlk. Dreams of a Fanatic, illuftrated by dreams in 
 Metaphyfics. 8vo, 1764. 
 
 XV. Abhandlung i'tb^r die Evident in Metaphyjischen Wijpn-' 
 fchaften ; die bey der K'6f}iglichen Ahademie der Wijjfenjchaf- 
 ten das AcceJJit erhalten haty und mit Mofes Mendelfohn's 
 Preifscbrift %ugleich erjchienen iji. A Treatife on Evidence 
 in Metaphyfical Sciences, &.C. Svo. Berlin. 1764. 
 
 XVI. Anmerkungen %iir Erlduterung der 'Theorie der Winde. 
 Remarks ferving to illuftrate the theory of the winds. 4to. 
 
 1765- 
 
 Of thefe work*, the reader will fcarcely require a detailed ac^ 
 count J for the moft of them, though feveral times reprinted, have 
 become very fcarce. They are indeed, in fome degree, connefted 
 with the following fyflematic works of the author j but as Pro- 
 feffor Kant has not llriftly adopted that method of demonftration, 
 which he^A)? propofed in the publication ftated under No. XII. 
 viz. ** The only poflible method of proving the exiftence of the 
 !Peity," I confide^ed it as an unprofitable talk to tranflate the In- 
 dexes belong^g to thefe refpe^ive works j though it were in my 
 power to procure them from Germany. For the fame reafon, I 
 prefume, Mr. Nitsch has remarked in his late excellent publica- 
 tion, " A general and introductory view of Prof. Kant's principle^ 
 concerning man, the world, and the Deity j" that the work above 
 alluded to, No. XII, does not conftitute any part of the Kantean 
 Syftem, as the firft edition of it was publilhed ten years(^ or frorn 
 the fir ft Edition of it, eighteen years) before that fyftem was com- 
 pleted. 
 
 XVII. (i) De Mundi fen/tbilis at que intelligibilis forma et 
 principiis. Diflertatio pro loco profeffionis Log. et Me- 
 
 taph.
 
 KANT'S WORKS. «| 
 
 taph. ordlnariaj rite fibi ' vindicando ; quam exlgentibus 
 
 ftatutis academicis publice tuebitur Immanuel Kant 
 
 Regiomonti ; in auditori maximo, horis matutinis et po- 
 meridianis confuetis ; Die XX. Aug. MDCCLXX. 
 
 Sectio I. Denotione mundi generatim.-~-M.Qmtniz^ in mundlde- 
 finitione attendenda, haec funt : i Materia (\x\ scnfu tranfcenden- 
 tali) h. e. partes^ quae hie fumuntur effe fubjlantics. 2. Forma 
 quae corififtit in fubftantiarum coordinatione, non fubordinatione. 3. 
 Univerjitas quae eft omnitudo compartium abfoluta. 
 
 Sectio II. De fenfibUium atque inteUigibUium dlfdrimine getter a- 
 tim. — Senfualitas eft receptivitas fubjefti, per quaftj poflibilc eft, ut 
 ftatus ipfius repraefentativus objedH alicujus przfentia certo modo 
 afficiatur. Intclligentia (rationalitas) eft facultas fubje£li, per 
 quam, quae in fenfus iplius per qualitaterft fuam, incurrere non pof- 
 funt, fibi repraefentare valet. 
 
 Sectio III. De pr'incipiis formce Mundifenjlbilis. — 2)* Tempore. 
 I. Idea Temporif non oritur {^Afupponitur a fenfibus. 2. Idea Tem- 
 poris eft Jingularis^ non generalis : Tempus eriim quodlibet non 
 cogltatur, nifi tanquam pars unius ejufdem temporis iramenfi. 3. 
 Idea itaque tcmporis eft inluitus, et quoniam ante ononem fenfa- 
 tionem concipitur, tanquam conditio refpcftuum in fenfibilibus ob- 
 viorum, eft intuitusy non fenfualis, {eApurus. 4. Tempus tilguaa' 
 turn continuum et leguro continui in mutationibus univerfi princi- 
 pium. 5. fcmpUi non ejl objeSivum cMquid et reale^ nee fubftantia, 
 nee accidens, nee relatio, fed fubjedliva conditio per naturam men- 
 tis httmanse neceffaria, quaelibet fenfibilia, certa lege fibi coordinan- 
 dl, et intuitui purus. 6. Tempus eft conceptus veriffimus, et, per 
 omnia poffibilia fenfuum objefta, ia infinitum patens, intuitivae re- 
 prsefentationis conditio. 7. Tempus iX^v^ti ^^ principium formale 
 Mundi fenfibilis abfoiute primura. — -De Spatio. A. Conceptus 
 fpatii non abftrahitur a fenfationibus externis. B. Conceptus fpa- 
 tii eft ftngularis reprefentatio omnia in fe comprehendens, non fub 
 fe continens notio abftra^a et communis. C. Conceptus fpatii 
 itaque eft intuitus purus j cum lit conceptus ftngularis, fenfationi- 
 bus non conflatus, fed omnis fenfationis externae forma fundamen- 
 tals. D. Spatium non ejl aliquid objeEiivi et realis, nee fubftan- 
 tia, nee accidens, nee relatio ) fed fiAbje(3ivum et idcale et a na- 
 
 tura
 
 64 ' ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 tura mentis flabill lege proficifccns, veluti fcheoia, omnia ommiid 
 
 externe fcnfa fibi coordinandi. E. Qaanquam conceptus f^atii^ ut 
 
 objeftivi alicujus et realls entis vel aiFeftionis, fit imaginarius, ni- 
 
 hilo tamen fecius, refpeBive ad fenjtbiCia quceciinque^ non folum eft 
 
 verlffimus,ied etomnis vetitatis in fenfualitate externa fundamentum. 
 
 Sectio IV. De princ'tpio for nice mundi intelligibills. 
 
 Sectio V. Dc msthodo circa fen/itiva et intelleBualia in Meia- 
 
 phyficis. 
 
 Concerning the laft two Se^rions, I cannot omit mentioning^ 
 that an abftraft of them could not be rendered inteHiglble to the 
 reader, without ftatiriglikewife the illuftratlons of the different po- 
 iltions, at full length. Of this detail, the prefent fketch will 
 not admit j efpecially as the principles, refulting from the difqui- 
 iitions contained in thefe two Se6lions,hai'e been already expound- 
 ed in the ^^>^^ro^Z?7«j-, which conftitute the principal part of the 
 prefent Elements j and which, I have rcafon to hope, will afford 
 a comprehenfive, though fuccinft, view of Kant's GaiTKiUE. — No 
 further apology will be required by the learned, that the preceding 
 extract from the author's Inaugural Diftertation has been given in 
 his own words, in the original Latin } for, to tranflatc this into 
 Englifh, might be confidered as an infult offered to the literati of 
 this country. — V^ith ref )e6l to the fubfequent works, it muft be 
 remembered, that our objcdl is merely to exhibit the contents of 
 thofe, which could be procured from Germany, during the limited 
 intercourfe with that country, and to define the mof: difficult and 
 abftrufe terms in tire Glojfury, which concludes this publication. 
 
 XVIII. (2) Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Critique of Pure 
 Reafon. Svo. Riga. I'jSi. Second Edition improved, 17S7. 
 Third Edition 1790. Fourth Edition, 1794. pp. 884, and. 
 xliv pages Preface. 
 
 "Tahle of Contents. 
 
 Introduction. I. Of the diftinclion between pure and empiiicai 
 knowledge. II. We are in the poffeffion of certain intuitions 
 (truths) o priori, and even common fenfe never is without them. 
 III. Philofophy demands a fcience, which may determine the pof- 
 fibility, the principles, and the extent of our intuitions a priori. 
 
 IV,
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 65 
 
 IV. Of the diflinftlon between analytical and fynthetical judg- 
 ments. V. In all the theoretical fciences of reafoning we meet 
 with fynthetical judgments a priori, which are contained In them 
 as principles. VI. General problem of Pure Reafon. VII. Plan 
 and divifion of a particular fcience, under the name of a Critique 
 of Pure reafon. 
 
 I. Transcendental elementary Doctrine. Pari I. Tranfcen- 
 
 dental Aefthetic. SeSi.l. Of fpace. II. Of time Part II. Tran- 
 
 fcendental Logic. Introd. X)efinition of tranfcendental Logic, r. 
 Of Logic in general. 2. Of tranfcendental Logic. 3. Of the 
 divifion of general Logic, into Analyfis and Dialefllc. 4. Of the 
 diviiiou of tranfcendental Logic, into tranfcendental Analyfis and 
 Dialeflic. 
 
 Division I. Tranfcendental Analyfis. — Book I. Analyfis of no- 
 tions. Chap. I. Of the method of difcovering all purely intellec- 
 tual notions. ScB. I. Of the ufe of Logic in general. II. Of the 
 logical funftion of the intelle£l, in judgments. III. Of the pure- 
 ly intelle£lual notions or Categories. Chap. II. Of the dedu^fllon 
 of the purely intelleftual notions. SeEi. I. Of the principles of 4 
 tranfcendental dcdudion in general. II. Tranfcendental deduc* 
 tion of the purely Intelledlual notions. Book. II. Analyfis of 
 principles (tranfcendental doftrine of the judging faculty). — hf- 
 Irod. Of the tranfcendental judging faculty in general. Chap. I. Of 
 the fchema of the pure notions of the intellcft. II. Syftem of all 
 the principles of the pure intelled. SeB. I. Of the fupreme prin- 
 ciple of all analytical judgments. II. Of the fupreme principle 
 of all fynthetical judgments. III. Syftematic exhibition of al| 
 fynthetical principles of the pure intelleft. i. Axioms of per- 
 ception. 2. Anticipations of apperception (obfervation). ^. 
 Analogies of experience, a.) The principle of continuity of fub- 
 ftance. b.) The principle of fucceffion in time, c.) The princi- 
 ple of coexiflence. — 4. Poftulates of empirical thought in general. 
 Chap. I. Of the ground of diftlmSlion between all objefls in gene- 
 ral, into phenomena and noumena. — Of the ambiguity arlfing in the 
 ideas of refleftion, by confounding the empirical ufe of the intel- 
 left with thatof the tranfcendental. 
 DiTisio» II. tranfcendental DialeBic, introd. I. Of tranfcen- 
 
 I ' dental
 
 66 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 Rental illufion. II. Of Pure Reafon being the feat of tranfcen- 
 dental illufion. a.) Of Reafon in general, b.) Of the logical 
 ufe of reafon. c.) Of the pure ufe of reafon. Book I. Of the 
 ■ notions afforded by Pure Reafon. Se&. I. Of ideas in general. 
 II. Of tranfcenuental ideas. III. Syftem of tranfcendental ideas. 
 Book II. Of the dialeftic conclufions of Pure Reafon. Chap. I. Of 
 the faife CQncluuons of Pure Reafon, refpecling their form {para- 
 logifmi). Of the antinomy of Pure Reafon. SeSl. I. Syftem of the 
 col'mological ideas. II. Antithefis of Pure Reafon. Ill, Of the 
 intereft of reafon in this conteft with itfelf. IV. Of the tranfcen- 
 dental problems of Pure Reafon, in fo far as they muft neceffarily 
 be folvcd. V. Sceptical exhibition of the cofmological queftions, 
 through all four tranfcendental ideas. VI. Tranfcendental Idea- 
 lifm, being the key to the folution of cofmological DialeiSlic. VIT. 
 Critical decifion of the cofmological conteft, into which reafon 
 falls with itfelf. VIII. Regulative principle of Pure Reafon, with 
 refpe£l to the cofmological ideas. IX. Of the empirical ufe of 
 the regulative principle of reafon, vfith refpedl to all cofmological 
 ideas. — I. Solution of the cofmological idea refpefting the totali- 
 ty of the corapofition of the phenomena of a whole univerfe. 2. 
 Solution of the cgfrnological idea refpefting the totality of divllion 
 <»f a given lyhole in perception. — Concluding remark on the folu- 
 tion of the tranfcendental ideas in Mathematics ; and previous 
 remark on the folution of the tranfcendental ideas in Dynamics. 
 3. Solution of the cofmological ideas refpedling the totality of de- 
 riving the events of the world from their caufes. — On the pof- 
 Cbility of caufaliiy by the idea of liberty, as combined with the 
 general law of phyfical neceffity.i — Illuftration of the cofmological 
 idea of a liberty, that is connefled with the general laws of pliyfi- 
 cal neceffity. 4. Solution of the cofmological idea refpe£ling the 
 totality of the dependence of the phenomena, according to the 
 reality of their exiftence in general. Chap. III. The Prototype of 
 Pure Reafon, i. e. an idea of reafon in concrete, Seci. I. Of the 
 prototype in general. II. Of the tranfcendental prototype. III. 
 Of the arguments of fpeculative reafon, to conclude the exiftence 
 of a higheft Being. IV. Of the impofiTibility of an ontological 
 proof of ths ejiiftcace of God. V. Of the irr.pofilhility of a cof- 
 mological
 
 KANT'S WORICS. 6i 
 
 tnologtcal proof of the exiftence of God. VI. Of the impofllbility 
 of a phyflco-theological proof. VII. Critique of all Theology 
 from fpeculative principles of reafon. — -Of the final purpofe of the 
 natural Dialeflic of human reafon. 
 
 II. Transcendental Doctrinb of Method. CBa/>. I. The Dif- 
 clpline of Pure Resfon. Se!?. I. With refpe6l to its dogmatical 
 ufe. II. With refpeft to its polemical ufe. III. With refpeft 
 to its hypothcfes. IV. With refpeft to its ptoofs. Chaji. II. The 
 Canon of Pure Reafon. St'SJ. I. Of the ultimate purpofe of the 
 pure ufe of Reafon. II. Of the prototype of the higheft good, as 
 being the fundamental caufe of determining the ultimate purpofe of 
 pure reafon. III. On the exprefiionS, " to be of opinion j to 
 know J and to believe." Chap. III. Of the Archite^onic of Pure 
 Reafon. Chnp. IV. The hiftory of Pure Reafon. 
 
 Although we have already given the fubftance of this work in 
 the Prob/emi, which ate exhibited in the foregoing part of ihefe 
 Elements } yet in a matter of fuch importance as the prefent at- 
 tempt of Kant aftually is, we do not hefitate to infert here ano- 
 ther expoHtion of his principlesj fo that the reader may acquire a 
 complete analytical view of their origin. 
 
 In order to trace the principles of all human knowledge and 
 judgment, frooi what fource both may arife, Kant deemed it in- 
 cumbent upon the enquirer, to inftitute an accurate analyfis of the 
 ihtuitive faculty of man. The chief objefk of this inquiry was, i, 
 to feparate the notion we have of the intuitive f acuity ^ from all other 
 notions connefted with it j 2, to lay afide, or to abftradlfroraj the 
 concomitant and accidental charaders of it, and to retain in this 
 notion merely thofe charafters^ without which no intuitive faculty 
 can at all be conceived : thus he obtained a general notion of the 
 intuitive faculty of man, i. e. fuch as confills of no foreign 
 ingredients. This faculty is the attribute of every man, it is given 
 him in his own pcrfooal confcioufnefs, and the reality of it cannot 
 be proved otherwife than by an appeal to this confcioufnefs. 
 The exiftence of fuch a fiiculty has never been called in queftloo, 
 it is fjranted by all parties, and hence it is to be confidered as a 
 fair point, from which the philofopher ihay begin his inquiries. — 
 To premife a deHniuoa of the intuitive faculty, is by no means ne- 
 
 I a cefiary j
 
 68 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 ceffary ; for Its reality will be fufficlently proved, if the con- 
 ftltuent parts and cnarafters produced of it, be of fuch a nature z$ 
 can be difcovered in every individual, who has the requifite capa- 
 city and inclination of reflefting upon the fucceflive operations of 
 his mind. Of infinitely greater importance we ftxall find the conj- 
 j'lete analyfis of this faculty ; fince the definition of fomething, 
 the truth of which cannot be difcovered otherwife than by the 
 preceding operation, can be of no pofitive advantage^ 
 
 Kant ferioufly difcovered, that the intuitive faculty of man is a 
 Compound oi very diflimilar ingredients j or, in other words, that 
 it conlifts of parts very diflferent in their nature, andcach of which 
 performs fun6lions peculiar to itfelf 5 namely the Senfitive Faculty ^ 
 and the Underjianding. The former reprcfents the matter of things, 
 fo as it is affedled by them ; the latter connefts the variety of 
 thefe materials into a whole. Thefe two operations muft always' 
 precede, if there fliall take place a reprefcntation or intuition of a 
 determined object. Both, therefore, are effential conftituents of 
 the intuitive faculty of man, and both muft be aftive, at the fame 
 <irae, in every intuition. 
 
 Leibnitz, indeed, had likevrife remarked the diftin6lion fubfifting 
 between the Senfitive Faculty and the Underftanding j but he en- 
 tirely overlooked the effential difference between their fundions, 
 and was of opinion, that both faculties were different from one 
 another only in degree, while he fuppofed the Senfitive Faculty 
 to be only a vvcaker degree of the Intuitive, %vhich, when opera- 
 ting in a ftronger degree, was called the Underilanding : both, ac- 
 cording to him, rcprefented the fame objefts, fave that the Senfitive 
 Faculty exhibited thofe obje£ts in a confufed and obfcure manner, 
 which the Underftandipg precifely and clearly apprehended. Eut 
 this diftinftion is altogether falfe and vcithout foundation. The 
 Uiidexftanding, as far as we can explore this faculty, ftill remains, 
 even in its weakfcfl d«gree, effentially different from the Senfitive 
 Faculty, and the moft perfeft functions of the latter can never fup- 
 j.]y the funclions of the Underftanding. For, while the fenfes re- 
 ceive the matter of the obje£is, the Underftanding combines the 
 variety in that matter, and forms a determined reprefcntation of 
 -;i ohjeft, or an Intuition. The former may receive clear or ob- 
 fcure
 
 , KANT'S WORKS. 6^ 
 
 fcure impreflions j the latter may alfo combine in a diftin£l or con* 
 fufed manner. Clearnefs and obfcurity, diftinftnefs and confufion, 
 may, therefore, be common to both j nay, what is clearly per- 
 ceived by the fenfes,' may yet be obfcurely apprehended by the 
 Underftanding ; and what the former exhibit in a confufed and ob- 
 fcure manner, may neverthelefs be very clearly conceived by the 
 latter. The Underftanding may even form a clear notion of things, 
 that never can become objefts of fenfe ; and vice ver/a, the fenfes 
 may perceive things, which the underftanding cannot reprefent, 
 either clearly or obfcurely j although it is impoflible to have an 
 intuition of any one objeft, unlefs both faculties are aSively con- 
 cerned in the fame object. For inftance, to think of God, liberty, 
 virtue, and immortality, cannot yet be called to recognife or toi 
 have an intuition of the objects, different from their ideas j and 
 to perceive fpaces and tiroes, and fenfible objefts of all kinds, can 
 likewhfe not be faid to have intuitions of them. For, to acquire 
 the latter, we muft reduce the obje£ls to ideas, and combine them 
 according to certain laws. The fenfes can do nothing further 
 than perceive, i. e. reprefent the given thing immediately ; and 
 tha underftanding only can think of it, i. e. combine the thing per^ 
 ceived, or exhibit the given thing by mediately connedling it into 
 one. The reality of the obje(ft, that is conceived by us in an idea, 
 can be reprefented only by the fenfes, fince the objeft itfelf is ei- 
 ther perceived through the fenfation occafioned by it, or it muft 
 neceffarily be combined with any one perception, according to the 
 laws of pofTible experience. 
 
 In the works of the Englifh and French phllofophers, we find 
 this effential diftin6tion between the fenfitive and the intelleSual 
 faculties, and their combination towards producing one fynthetical 
 intuition, fcarcely mentioned. Locke only alludes to the acciden- 
 tal limitations of both faculties ; but to inquire into the effential 
 difference prevailing between them, does not at all occur to him. 
 It is, however, obvious, that from this negle£l there have arlfen 
 many fallacious conclufions, which for a long time, at leaft in-thcir 
 confequences, have been hurtful to found philofophy. 
 
 This diftlntflion then, between the fenfitive and intellcftual fa- 
 jcultles, forms an effential feature in the philofophy of Kant 5 it is 
 
 . the
 
 70 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 tte bafis, upon which the moll of the fubfequent Inquiries are efta- 
 biifhed. It muft neverthelefs be remembered, that Kant, in dif- 
 tingulfhing thefe two faculties, does not fpeak of real fubftances, 
 different from one another. His intention merely is, to point out 
 ■what every refle£\ing mind may eafily obferve within himfelf, if he 
 att&nds to what precedes an intuition, and how the underflanding 
 combines every aft of perception. Now, fince the ground or 
 fource of thefe two faculties obvioufly difcovers two diftinft pow- 
 ers, it is both rational and necefTary, to denote their functions by 
 diftindl names j though their effentially different operations ihould 
 bs formed in one and the fame fubftance. We cannot attend here to 
 an inference, that may be drawn from this Identity of origin, againfl; 
 the difcriminatlon of powers, that are in themfelves as dilllnft as 
 the motion of a clock is from that of the hammer, which ftrikes 
 the bell, though by the fame mechanifm, that moves the pendulum 
 and the hands. In this very contrivance, we may find the moft con- 
 vincing inftance of the aftual difference between the exercife of 
 the fenfltive and Intelleftual faculties, if we confider it both, in an 
 objeBive ^ndt-fubjedlive view. In the former, we behold no more 
 than a machine that moves, at certain equal diftances, the hands 
 which are attached to it j and he, who is unacquainted with the 
 purpofe for which it is defigned, will view it with the aftonifhment 
 and fear of the Swifs peafant, who formerly deflroyed a time-piece 
 dropped by a traveller, becaufe he apprehended mifchief from the 
 noife that accompanitd its motion. But, if this untutored fon of 
 nature had been Informed of the great utility of that machine, by 
 the conftru£lIon of which mankind have contrived to meafure time 
 apparent, his Intelleftual faculty might thus have been enlarged, 
 and he would have acquired lh.tfuhje6iive view of a watch. With- 
 out having had any previous experience of the defign, with which 
 the motions of a time-piece are arranged in/paces^ he could now 
 conceive, a priori^ the neceffary refult of this arrangement, by di- 
 viding the duration of the day into hours, minutes, and fecondi j 
 although experience would a pofler'wri confirm this intuitive no- 
 tion, and give it ohjcBive reality. This, indeed, cannot be obtain- 
 ed in any other way than by means of the fenfes 5 for the queftlon, 
 here, is not of the laft and abfulute ground or fabftance of the 
 intuitive faculty, but concerning the iatui'.lve faculty as an apptal 
 
 to
 
 KANTs WORI^. 71 
 
 to this lafl fubftratum, that is determined by its operations. — Thu« 
 Copernicus acquired demonftrativc certainty upon what he, at firft, 
 had conceived only as an hypothefis j for the central laws of the 
 motions of celeftial bodies at the fame time proved the jreality of 
 that invifible power of attraftion, which fupports the fabric of the 
 univerfe, and which Newton never could have difcovered, if the 
 former had not ventured to go beyond the limits of poflible ex- 
 perience, and to fearch for the ground or caufe of the motions ob- 
 ferved, not in the objcfts of the celeftial bodies, but in the eyes of 
 the fpeflator, 
 
 Kant, therefore, previoufly analyfed the SenGtive Faculty, and 
 endeavoured to difcover the neceffary conditions, without which 
 our Senfitlve Faculty cannot perceive any objefls whatever. Af- 
 ter having cautioufly feparated all that, which, in the phenomena 
 exhibited by the fenfes, either is merely accidental, or is owing to 
 the fun£lion of the intelleft, he difcovered, that two conditions only 
 remain, without which, every where, neither our Senfitive Facul- 
 ty, nor its objefts, are conceivable. Thefe conditions are, Space 
 and Time. They have ever been the ftumbling block of all me- 
 taphylicians, and the fource of endlefs difputes. Kant conGders 
 them in fuch a manner as will aflPord fatisfaflion to every cool and 
 unbiaffed enquirer after truth, fince none but the moft inveterate 
 Sceptic, or the obftinate Syftematic, can withhold their affcnt. He 
 fhows namely, 
 
 I, That both thefe reprcfentations are the immediate produc- 
 tions of the fenfes, and confequently admit of no further deriva- 
 tion. Hence it was a fruitlefs attempt of Lfibnitz, who endea- 
 voured to explain their origin from intelleftual notions. The Un- 
 derftanding has, indeed, the power of arranging Space and Time 
 with their modifications, under the ideas of order, unity, and fo 
 forth, but it cannot derive either of them from thefe ideas j it can 
 unfold and explain their contents, but it cannot conceive the pof- 
 fibility of their origin, any further than that they are fomething 
 given us by the Senfitive Faculty itfclf. 
 
 2, They muft be thought of as the fubftratum of all fenfible ob- 
 jefts, i. e. as the forms of all phenomena. But they are not real 
 pbjefts and felf-fubfiftent, as Clarke imagined : their reality 
 
 wholly
 
 ^a ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 wholly depends upon thofe things, which can be obfcrved in them : 
 abftraftly confidered, they are the bare forms of our Senfitive Fa- 
 culty } forms, through i^ich we are enabled to determine, that 
 all real obje£ls of fenfe arc conformable to them, or that thefe 
 objefts muft of ueceiTity be given in them.-7-It is by this manner 
 of reprefentation, that we can explain all the predicates of Space 
 and Time, as that of infinity, continuity, uniformity, &c. without 
 incurring thofe difficulties, which have been produftive of the 
 greatefl oonfufion in philofophy, and which have involved Mathe- 
 matics and Metaphyfics into perpetual diiTenfions, 
 
 3, Finally, Kant alfo fhows, that fpace and time, being the 
 forms of our Senfitive Faculty, muft confequently be conceived as 
 the forms of thofe objefts only, of which we can attain intuitions : 
 thus they are merely forms of phenomena, and not the forms of all 
 things in general, that are the objefls of knowledge. Nay, it is 
 even conceivable, that the things exhibited to us in fpace and 
 time, abflraflly confidered, may be viewed or perceived by other 
 thinking bangs, under very different forms j although it is not in 
 pur power, either to determine more precifely this difference, or 
 to afcertain the real ppffibility of it, by any arguments favourable 
 to this conjeclure. 
 
 From the preceding flatement, the reader will be able to form 
 a general idea of the manner, in which the univerfal truths of Ma- 
 thematics may be demonftrated upon the principles of the Critical 
 phllofopher, and how thefe principles may be employed, to deter- 
 jnine thereby the objefts of the world of fenfc. For, fince fpace 
 and time are apprehended immediately through the nature of our 
 fenfitive faculty. It is now conceivable j how we can perceive all 
 their relations, compare them with one another through the under- 
 flandlng, and deduce general principles from thefe fpurces. And 
 ss all the objefts of fenfe neceffarily appear in thefe forms, the ex- 
 planation is felf-evident, that all the relations apprehended a pri- 
 ori^ muft alfo neceffarily be difcovered in all thefe phenomena. It 
 likewlfe follows from this illuftratlon, that all Mathematics con- 
 fift in ^a fcience, relating only to objcfls of fenfe, and admitting 
 of no application whatever, to thofe of an oppofite nature. 
 
 Aftsr having fatisf^£lorily proved, that there are neither more 
 
 DOT
 
 KANTs WORKS. . 73 
 
 nor fewer of the neceffary conditions of perception in the SenfitiVe 
 Faculty, than Space and ^ime, Kant proceeds to the inveftiga- 
 tion of tiie Underftartding, as the fecond principal conftituent o£ 
 the intuitive Faculty. He remarks, that all the operations of the 
 underftanding may be ultimately reduced to the aSi of judging, and 
 he concludes from this, that the different modifications in a judg- 
 ment, in general, are the principles, according to which the pure 
 notions of the intelleft muft be determined. Upor this ground, 
 he previoufly unfolds all the fimplc and pure notions of the intel- 
 le£t, and exhibits them, in a complete and fyflematic manner, as 
 the ultimate elements of all judgments. — It is well known, how 
 much the fimple notions or firft principles have interefted the Mc- 
 taphyficians of all ages ; it is alfo known, Uiat they never could 
 agree with refpeft to their number ; whether, among the fimple 
 or primary notions, tbere had not been included fome of a com- 
 pound nature j whether thofe confidered as original ones were not 
 at the bottom merely derivatives j whether there is no chance of 
 difcovering in future a greater number of fimple notions, or of re- 
 ducing thofe already difccvered to a fmaller number. All thefe 
 doubts and difputes, Kant has now terminated, by difcovering a 
 principle, from xvhich it appears evident, that there can be nei- 
 ther more nor fewer than tiuehe * originally pure notions of the 
 underftanding. 
 
 The way, in which Kant difcovers thefe Categories or primary- 
 notions, and how he proves their completenefs and validity, can- 
 not be detailed nor abridged in this general retrofpeft of the Cri- 
 tique J but I (hall briefly remark, that the categories exafHy com- 
 prife thofe notions, without which the underftanding is unable to 
 conceive any obj efts whatever, i. e. to judge of them. Hence 
 fhey exprefs nothing furthet than the mode or manner, how the 
 Underftanding, by the laws of its conftitutlon, muft neccffarily 
 combine the varities in perception, whenever it attempts to judge 
 upon objects. But the forms of objefts naturally lie in the under- 
 ftanding, and as fuch they have always been inveftigated and de- 
 
 K termine4 
 
 * See the Categtries, p. 45, and compare them with the definitions in the Ghf\. 
 
 ary.
 
 74 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 tertnined in Logic. Thus the Logicians have long ago taught us, 
 from the nature of the Underftanding, that every judgment muft 
 be determined by its extent and compafs, as well as by its relation 
 to fynthetlc unity and confcioufnefs ', or that it muft have a certain 
 quantity, quality, relation, and modality. But that, through this 
 procefs alone, the conceivable objefts are determined, that con* 
 fequently the forms of judgment are carried over to the objeAs of 
 thought, and can be predicated of them a priori, this neceffary in- 
 ference has been lefs attended to, by former philofophers. For, 
 though they have not failed to make ufe of the notions thus a- 
 rifing, in order to determine the objefts a priori, yet the peculiar 
 fource of thefe notions has hitherto remained undifcovered. 
 
 From this fource, Kant derives all our notions a priori, and 
 jnakes them the predicates of general principles, which through- 
 out, become the laws relative to objects of experience a priori ; for 
 they do not contain aftual experience itfelf, but the general con- 
 ditions, that render experience poflible, between the nature of man 
 and things. Thefe laws are fyftematically exhibited in the Cri- 
 tique, agreeably to one principle, fo that the reader is convinced, 
 that there are neither more nor fewer of the general, neceffary, 
 and elementary principles, than are unfolded thi;ough this inquiry. 
 But thefe principles are likewife the axioms of a phyfical fcience, 
 fo far as nature confifts of nothing elfe but the whole complex of 
 experimental objefts j and confequently, from this idea of nature, 
 we not only conceive, very perfeftly, the pofllbillty of reducing 
 Phyfics to a fcientific fyftem, but likewife this fyftem itfelf is, in 
 its pure or tranfcendental part, thus actually formed. 
 
 Having ftated In the preceding outlines, how our Underftandin|f 
 muft reprefent to itfelf given objefts, or how an intuition of them 
 becomes poffible through it, I can now proceed to the particular 
 analyfis of the intelleftual faculty in forming conclufions, which 
 Kaqt denominates theoretical reafon. This branch of the Intellec- 
 tual faculty, by virtue of its conftitutlon, produces certain notions, 
 to which no objefts whatever correfpond in experience, although 
 they are conne£led with it in fucceflion, and are both Influenced 
 and determined by experience. It is namely, in general, the idea 
 of the nnconditionai or ahfolute^ that is immediately conDC(fted with 
 
 the
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 73! 
 
 ttic AatUre of Rcafon, and through which, according to the differ- 
 ent form of rational cOnClufions, the ideas of an abfolute fubjeft or 
 tnind^ of an abfolute caufe or liberty, and of an abfolute totality of 
 all that is pofTible, i. e. the idea of God, take their refpeftive ori- 
 gin. The further dedudion of thefe notions, abftrafled from pure 
 Reafon, muft be ftudied from Kant's Critique^ it forms one of the 
 moft excellent parts of that work. We learn from it, not only to 
 underftand completely^ how all mankind, immediately after the 
 evolution of their mental faculties, attain thefe ideas j but we 
 likewife conceive, how the reprefentations formed concerning the 
 objcfts of thefe ideas^ appear under fo great a variety of afpefts, 
 as fooh as we venture to determine the objefts beyond the nature 
 of the ideas founded upon human reafon : nay> we can even ge- 
 nerally underftand, how varioufly thefe determinations may be mo- 
 dified. We further learn, that thofe, who endeavour to derive 
 every thing concerning religion, from habit, education) and other 
 accidental circumftanccs, judge with the partiality and fallacy of 
 others, who confider their incidental opinions as incontrovertible 
 principles, which are deduced froto the effence of tranfcendental 
 objcfts thcmfelves, or to which they fondly would give the ap- 
 pearance of infallibility, by appealing to the authority of a divine 
 infpiration. We alfo fee, how eafily the accidental may be con- 
 founded with the necejfary, the fubjcBive with the ohjeBive^ the 
 natural with the artificial \ unlefs we are acquainted with the 
 fources, from which all thefe objedls flow, not only fo far as their 
 primary origin extends, but alfo with their minuteft difference.— 
 Without being enraged againft thofe writers, who, from their af- 
 fcrtions, appear to have formed the artful defign of depriving man 
 of every thing, that is valuable andinterefting tohim as a rational 
 being, we can without difficulty conceive, that it is only a different 
 intereft or motive of our reafon^ which incites men to propagate 
 irreligious doftrines \ that it is not entirely their immoral will, 
 but rather their too extenfive views, encouraged by the weak- 
 ncfs of thefr adverfaries, that induce them to expofe the argu- 
 ments employed in favour of the moft interefting principles of re- 
 ligion, while they flatter themfelves with the profpeft of contro- 
 verting all the opinions of their opponents. 
 
 K2 The
 
 7^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 The Critique of Kant holds out the profpeft of a moft com- 
 plete victory overjall the enemies of Religion, and I flball now ftatc, 
 in what manner the principles of Religion are fecured againft all 
 the attacks of its adverfaries, and how religion is fortified againft 
 ar')itrary and accidental additions. After having fhowny that the 
 ground of the idea concerning Mind, Liberty, and the Deity, is 
 to be met with in the nature of Rcafon itfelf, and that every ra- 
 tional being Is involuntarily led to the formation of thefe ideas, 
 the author endeavours to prove, and he does this very fatisfa£lo- 
 lily, " that the Intuitive Taculty of man has vot the power of appre- 
 hending ohjeBs in a determined manner^ or of pointing out chara&ers 
 of theniy which are derived from immediate perception.'''' He de- 
 monltrates, that we can indeed think the objects ef thefe ideas, 
 but that, at no time whatever, we are able to apprehend thenft 
 theoretically. For, to acquire a theoretical id«a of things, we 
 muft not only predicate of them, that they arc conformable to the 
 laws of our Underftanding, or that they are not fomething con- 
 trary to them, but we muft likewife be enabled to point out de- 
 terminate and real predicates, which are taken from the thing it- 
 felf under apprehenfion. But the real predicates of a thing can- 
 jnot be conceived in any other manner, than through fenfible per- 
 ception j whether this take place by immediately perceiving the 
 thing itfelf, or mediately through fome other obje<tt^ which has 
 certain real properties, in common with that to be apprehended. 
 Hence it follows, that we are unqualified to apprehend the real 
 predicates, or the tranfcendental properties of thofe things, which, 
 by their n,ature, neither ip part nor in the whole, can ever become 
 objects of fenfible pcideption. We are altogether deficient in a 
 faculty defigned for that purpofc j hence we are, for inftance, un- 
 able to determine pofitively the nature of mind, according to its 
 internal conftitution. We can Indeed predicate of it^ with cer- 
 tainty, that it is not of itfelf an obje£l of fenfe, confequently, not 
 i phenomenon j but whatever predicates of reality may, in other' 
 refpefts, belwng to it •, how its cxiftence may be conftitutcd, whe- 
 ther it be a firaple fubftance, and different fiom the internal ab- 
 folute grounds of matter j how the Idea of liberty is evolved j 
 what properties belong to the Deity la a tranrceadental view, aiid 
 
 the
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 1l 
 
 tiie like J all thefe problems could be folved only tHrou^ the jJer- 
 teptlon of fuperfenfible objcfts. And as we arc provided with no 
 faculty for the cxerclf* of fuch a funftlon, we cannot 3t all deter- 
 mine the real charaaecs of thefe things-, nay we do not even un- 
 derfland the real importance of the term " exifterice^^'* when we 
 apply it to fuperfenfible objefts. I^or, with refpeft to the objefts 
 of fenfe, the exprcflion, " forhelhin^ exijls;'' fignifics no more than 
 that it afFefts our fcnfcs, by producing a fenfation, as foon as it is 
 placed in proper connexion with them. But the idea of exifteace 
 cannot imply the fame meaning with refpeft to fuperfenfible ob- 
 jefts \ for the term " exiftence" is not to be defined in Its bare 
 relation to our Intuitive Faculty, but as an inttrnal property. Yet 
 the impoflibility of giving fuch a definition is obvious, not rnerely 
 from the failure of all the attempts hitherto made for that pur- 
 pofe, but likcwife from the inveftigation of the fources, from: which 
 fuch a determination ought to be derived. ' 
 
 Although we cannot comprehend, through perception, the ob- 
 je6ls of thofe ideas, which, in their nature, He beyond the world of 
 fenfe j and though we cannot, on that account, obtain any thca- 
 rttical intuition of them j we can difcover another fource, front 
 which, however, we derive no intuitive knowledge of the objefti 
 themfelves, but a pradical and fubje6ll;e knowledge of their re- 
 lations to the nature of man. Though our views of the nature of 
 thefe objects be not thereby enlarged, that knowledge affords us 
 fufficient grounds, upon which we may fafely cftabli(h rules for 
 our conduft, and convince ouvfelvesof the reality of that ultimate 
 defign, which our Rcafon cannot confillently call In queftion. 
 
 The chief point of this inquiiy is, to difcover a fufficient ground 
 for the reality of thofe ideas, and to open a fource, from which thfc 
 determinations of their objeds, relative to our pradllcal advantage, 
 (liall be derived with fafety and without ambiguity. This fource, 
 then, according to Kant, lies in the nature of our own fubjeft, 
 1. e. the mind, and is actually that, which we underftand by the 
 term moral fenfe. This alone is a fafe intuitive ground for deter- 
 mining the reality of the ideas concerning Liberty, God, and Iu>. 
 mortality j and this alone eftabllflies the true relations, in which 
 we can form dignified conceptions of the Deity. 
 
 Kant
 
 ^8 ' ELEMENTARY VltW OF 
 
 Kant admits it as a matter of fa£l, that we are ttioral beings, and 
 confequently this moral fenfc it an eflential part of human nature ; 
 that reafon places the higheft value of man, folely and exclufively, 
 in his moral feelings j and that it reduces all his power and pro- 
 fperity to thefe feelings, and values thfe whole of the former ac- 
 tbrding to effe£ls produced upon the latter. After having de- 
 monftrated the eflential difference fubfifting between the moral and 
 fenfitive nature of man, and having analyzed the different laws, by 
 which both are governed refpe^lively j he now proceeds to prove, 
 J, That the reality of Liberty is neceflarily conne£led with the 
 xnoral nature of man, and that the latter is wholly inconceivable 
 without the former j that confequently our Reafon forces us to ac- 
 knowledge Liberty as a certain, though unaccountable, fadl rela- 
 tive to ntan J becaufcj without doing this, we would be obliged to 
 renounce all claims to Reafon, and to confider It as perfeftly ufe - 
 lefs J 2, That the reality of a being, which contains the fuflicient 
 ground of a thorough moral order, muft be conceived equally com- 
 bined with the Deity, as it is with the moral nature of man, fo that 
 the immortality of the foul mufl be confidered as a necefTary con- 
 ftituent of this moral order. Reafon, however, being the fupreme 
 tribunal, to which man may appeal, perfuades us to receive, not 
 only thefe ideas, but alfo their objefts as founded upon truth j we 
 are therefore juftified in relying upon the juftnefs of our Reafon, 
 provided that we do not prefume to determine with regard to the 
 internal nature and eflence of thefe objefts j a determination, 
 which can be made only through the immediate, though impoffi- 
 ble, perception of them. Hence we are utterly incapable of af- 
 certainingthe nature of a free fubje6l,as an independent fubftance j 
 the politive conftitution of mind, by which immortality be- 
 comes pofTible 5 and finally, the manner in which the Deity has 
 accomplifhed a moral connexion between man and the world. 
 We only know, that thofe objeds, which we conceive, through 
 general ideas, at the caufes of certain effefts, are reclaimed by 
 our reafon as the necefTary conditions of our moral deftination j 
 and that ground, on which we muft admit them, or believe their 
 reality, lies in our fubjeft, namely in our moral fenfe, which partly 
 VIS an intuitive principle, partly as a practical motive, generates 
 
 and
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 79 
 
 and fupports the belief in the fandamental truths of religion. 
 Since, then, the Intuitlve'principle refpefting the reality of thefe 
 tranfcetwlental obje£ls, or of religious truths, is perfeftly confident 
 with Reafon, not from the immediate perception of objefts (the 
 reality of which requires no proof), but from a certain qualifica- 
 tion of our own fubjeft, as connefted with the real llate of thefe 
 objefts J a ftate, the exiftcnce of which Is far from being imagi- 
 nary only J Kant, confequently, calls this a fubje£iiv» ground of 
 conviftion, in contradiftinftion to an objeBive ground, which is 
 derived from the perception of the objefts themfelves. 
 
 In reprefenting the Kantian dodrine of morals, every thing de- 
 pends upon our being cbnfcious of a moral law, confcious of right 
 and wrong, of good and bad, fo that the intuitive ground of moral 
 principles be rendered independent on all theology j for the, doc- 
 trines of the Deity and Immortality muft be deduced from pure 
 morals j or the latter muft be the intuitive ground of all religion. 
 And this Is litewife the aftual and neceflary refulliof his princi- 
 ples. Morality refts upon its own bafis j and, in the fublime view 
 which Kant prefents of it, all other things relative to man, muft 
 be decided by that ftandard. It is principally in Ethics, we learn, 
 to confidcr the things of this world as purpofes ) and by colle£live- 
 ly employing them as the means of attaining one ultimate pur- 
 pofc, we introduce unity among them. Thus we difcover their 
 fubordlnate laws, agquire fyftematic unity, and produce a pcrfeft 
 harmony throughout the whole fphere of the intuitive knowledge 
 of man. Yet, through all the illuftrations afforded by EthicS| we 
 do not learn to comprehend the poflibillty of the things them- 
 felves J we only acquire intelligence refpeding the poflibillty of 
 our deftination in general. Hence the intuitions, which we de- 
 rive from morals, do not enlarge our penetration into the nature 
 of the things themfelves, but they render our reafon confiftent 
 with itfelf, and reftore harmony between the moral laws and other 
 intuitions and thoughts ; an operation, which is attended with 
 no theoretical, but certainly with great praftical, advantage. 
 
 This view of morals, however, if it fltall ferve as the bafis of 
 religion, muft be extremely diiferent from that, which we find Iq 
 the " Syfleme de la Naturcy in the writings of Helvstids, and fe-» 
 
 verai
 
 8o ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 vera] otlier reputed phllofophers, who fpeak indeed mucH of Hu- 
 man Nature, but have penetrated lefs into its effence than they 
 themfelves affure us : and though thefe inquiries conftantly appeal 
 to experience, they make ufe of principles very diflferent from 
 thofe, which experience can furnifli.— To dcfcribe, at length, the 
 Moral Syftem of Kant, which affords, at once, folldity and con- 
 fiilency in that oi Religion, would require a feparate publication. 
 But we fliall exhibit the outlines of this fyftem in reviewing ano- 
 ther work of Kant's, treating particularly of that fubjefl, Vvhich 
 the reader will find mentioned under No. XXI. (5) of this ana- 
 lytical retrofpeft. 
 
 XIX. (3) Prolegomena zu einer jeden hunftigeit Metaph^i, 
 die ah Wi£enfchaft vjird auftreten konneii. Introduftory 
 obfervations with refpcft to every future Sjflem of Meta- 
 phyfics, that may deferve the name of a fcience. 8vo. Riga^ 
 
 In the preface to this work, the author explains his aim at con- 
 vincing thofe who employ themfelves in metaphyfical inquiries j 
 that it is indifpenfdbly neceffary to fufpend their labours for fome 
 time, to confidcr every thing hitherto done as undone, and above 
 all thing? to propofe the queilion, " whether tlierc is any profpedi 
 of eftablifliing every where fuch a fcience as Metaphyfics ?" 
 
 * If it is a fcience already, how does it happen, that it has not, 
 like other fciences, obtained general and laRing reputajion ? If it 
 is none, how is it permitted continually to boaft of the illufory 
 name of a fcience, and to uphold the human underftanding with 
 hopes equally permanent and unaccompliftied ? — Let us therefore 
 demonftrate, either our knowledge or our ignorance j the nature 
 of this pretended fcience ought to be thoroughly inveftigated; 
 for it is impoflible to leave things any longer upon the old foot- 
 irg. It appears almoft ridiculous, while every other fcience is 
 making inceffp.nt progrefs, that in this one, which afpires to the 
 charatler of being the oracle of wlfdom itfelf, man continually 
 turns round upon the fame fpot, without advancing a fingle ftep. 
 3t is even obferved, that the number of its votaries is much de- 
 creafing, and that thofe, who feel themfelves fuificiently able ta 
 
 gaia
 
 KANT^s WORKS. 8i 
 
 gain credit in other fciences, do not choofe to venture their repu- 
 tation in this. On the other handj it is equally certain, that every 
 tyro, who is ignorant in all other branches of knowledge, here 
 claims the right of pronouncing a df fcifive opinion ; bedaufe in this 
 territory there exifts in facl no fettled meafure and weight, by 
 which the rational inquirer can be difcerned from the fhallow 
 prattler;' 
 
 ' To make plans, is frequently a luxuriant and oflentatious em- 
 ployment of the mind, by which fome people acquire the appear- 
 ance of inventive genius 5 while they demand what they cannot 
 furnifli themfelves, cenfure what they cannot improve, and propofe 
 what they themfelves do not know where to difcover it : — though 
 it may be eafily conjeftured, that a little more than a declamation 
 of pious wifhes will be requifite, to forih a juft plan of " a general 
 Critique of Reafon." But Pure Renfon is a fphere fo infulated and 
 fo thoroughly connefted with itfclf, that we can approach^ no part 
 of it without touching all the reft, and that we can do no good, 
 without having affigned each part its proper place and influence upon 
 the other. For, fince without Reafon there is nothing that could 
 corre£l our judgment, the validity and ufe of every part depends 
 upon the relation, in which it ftands towards the others, within the 
 bounds of Reafon itfelf ; as in the ftruifture of an organized body 
 the purpofe of every member can be deduced only from thfe com- 
 plete idea of the whole. Hence we may fay of fuch a Criii^ue, 
 that no dependence can be placed upon it, unlefs it be entire and 
 complete^ even extending to the minutcft elements of Pure Reafonj 
 and that we mud be enabled to determine either the whole or nj- 
 thing, that relates to the fphere of this faculty.' 
 
 • Although the bare plan of fuch a fcience, had it been pie- 
 niifed to the " Critique of Pure Reafon," might have been unin- 
 telligible, fufpicious, and ufelefs j it will, on the contrary, become 
 the more advantageous, when it appears in illuftration of that 
 work. For, by this plan, we ihall be enabJ^ to take a view of 
 the whole, to inveftigatc the principal points, upon the folidity of 
 which this fcience is eredled, and to und-erftand irioie clearly the 
 principles, which at firft appeared obfcure.' 
 
 * 'i'iiefc Prolcgo.Ticna then contain fuch a plan as ought to hr.
 
 82 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 flated in an analytical method, fince the preceding work neceffa- 
 tily required a fynthethical arrangement : in order that this fcience 
 might be exhibited in its individual parts, and as the ftrufture of 
 a very peculiar faculty in the acquiiition of knowledge, which pre- 
 fents itfelf in its natural connexion. Thofe who fliould find this 
 plan as obfcure as the Critique itfelf, muft confider that the ftudy 
 of Metaphyfics is not the bufinefs of all ; that there are many in- 
 genious men, who make confiderable proficiency in fcicnces, that 
 lie more v^'ithin the bounds of fenfible perception, and who do not 
 fucceed In inquiries carried on through pure abftraft notions. 
 Such individuals muft employ their mental faculties upon other ob- 
 jefts. Thofe, however, v^ho venture to judge upon Metaphyfics, 
 or even attempt to frame fyftems of their own, muft previoufly fa- 
 tisfy the demands made in this work. Whether this be done by 
 approving of the method, in which I have folved the diflferent 
 problems j or by refuting this folution, upon well eftabllfiied prin- 
 ciples, and giving another in its place ; in either cafe they will do 
 juftice to the caufe. For, to rejeft a plan without trying its me- 
 rits, is equally frivolous and illiberal. I confefs I did not expe<5l 
 to hear philofophers complaining, that my works were deficient in 
 popular, entertaining, and eafy language ; when the queftion re- 
 lates to the exiftence of a fource of know^ledge, which is highly 
 valuable and indifpenfable to man, but which cannot be demon- 
 ftrated, without obferving the ftri6left rales of fcicntific deduc- 
 tion. Popularity, indeed, will in its turn attend thefe invefliga- 
 tions, but to aim at it in the beginning, would be a filly and fruit- 
 lefs attempt. — That. very obfcurity, which is fo much decried, 
 and which is frequently ufed as a cloak for the cqnveniency and 
 mental weaknefs of its adverfaries, is not without relative advan- 
 tage ;"for all thofe, who obferve a cautious filence in other fciences, 
 enjoy an opportunity of fpeaking and deciding In a maglllerial 
 tone upon metaphyfical fubjedlsj becaufe their ignorance, heie, 
 does not form fo remarkable a contraft, when compared with the 
 knowledge of others, as it does in oppofition to genuine critical 
 principles, of which we may juflly fay with the Roman poet, 
 Ignavum,fucos,J>ecus a prccfepihus arcent.'' 
 
 ViRG.
 
 KANT'S WORKS. S3 
 
 As thefe Prolegomena are a concife and perfpicuous abftraft 
 trom the preceding Critique, in an analytical method, which the 
 author employs, as it were, to go back again the fame path, upon 
 which he had fynthetically advanced in the Critique •, we could 
 only repeat that deduftion of Kant's principles, which we have al- 
 ready premifed at fufficicnt length. 
 
 XX. {^^,)Betrachtmgen iiber das Fundament der Krafte undMe- 
 thoden^ ivelche die Vernunft anwenden kann^ daruber %u ur- 
 iheilen. Reflexions upon the foundation of the powers and 
 methods, which Reafon is entitled to employ in judging 
 upon their validity. 8vo. Koenigsherg, I'jS^. 
 
 Of this fmall work, 1 know little more than its title, not having 
 been able to procure a copy of it; and as, from the German Re- 
 views, it appears to be a further deduftion of the principles laid 
 down in the preceding two works, I (hall Immediately, and at con- 
 llderable length, review the following, which Is uniformly confider- 
 ed as the moll perfpicuous and valuable produftion of Kant. 
 
 XXI. (5) Grundlegung %ur Metaphyjik der Sitten. Funda- 
 mental principles of the Metaphyllcks (Theory) of Morals. 
 8vo. Riga. 1785. — 2d Edit. 1792, pp. ia8 and 14 pp. 
 Preface. 
 
 The outlines of Kant's Syftem of Morals, I {hall endeavour to 
 exhibit, as clearly as poffible, in the following analyfis of his prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 The defire of happlnefs Is inherent to human nature : all the 
 inftlnftlve propenfities of man are direfted to that purpofe. But 
 our reafon ftill reftrains that defire, and confiders only fuch a pof- 
 feflion of happinefs as worthy of our exertions, which Is perfedly 
 confilient with morality, or rather, which Is the reward of moral 
 a^llons. Morality and happinefs, therefore, are two different but 
 efTentlal determinations originating in human nature j which, when 
 united by the diftates of reafon, render the deilination of man per- 
 fe£V. This union, however, cannot be better conceived by reafon, 
 than that morality Itfelf contains the oaufe, through which the 
 
 L 2 hap
 
 84 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 liapplnefs of man is accomplillied. If we ourfelves are the pur- 
 pofes and not the bare means in tbe hands of nature or any other 
 Being ; it follows, that the neceffary attributes of our conftitution 
 muft likewife be conceived as poflible : there muft exift fuch an 
 arrangement of things, as contributes to realize our moral dedina^ 
 tion. The former part of this deftination, namely morality, de- 
 pends on ourfelves, and on the degree of fclf-aftivity, with which 
 we praftife the moral law. This faculty of praftifing what the 
 moral law commands, we prefuppofe in every rational being 5 for 
 oiherWife it would be highly abfurd, to impofe upon ourfelves a 
 law, obedience to which Reafon could not acknowledge as 
 practicable. It muft confequently be in our power, to be morally 
 good, if Rcafon commatids us to adl in conformity to the moral 
 law. In whatever fubjeft then Reafon actually exifts, it muft alfo 
 be poftible, that it manifeft itfelf by aftlons : whoever has the abi- 
 lity to apprehend what is good as a thing abfolutely neceffary, on its 
 own account, he muft likewife be provided with the facnlty of per- 
 forming it. But it is not phyfically neceffary to do it ; for we nowhere 
 difcover ourReafon fubject to this fpecies of neceffity. Why Rea- 
 fon very frequently does not pra£life what it muft acknowledge to 
 be morally good y why our feufitive nature is not always vanqulili- 
 ed, but frequently prevails in this cpnteft \ thefe problems we are 
 unable to folve j becaufe we do not in any manner comprehend that, 
 which forms the moral nature of man, as an objeft of percep- 
 tion J and becaufe we can only derive the moral faculty of man 
 from the idea of the poflibility of morality in general. We know 
 only this much with certainty, that we judge upon the moral va- 
 lue of man, merely and entirely, by the degree of moral motives, 
 which v\e obferve in his aflions or fentiments. If, therefore, the 
 phyfical energy is properly arranged in a man, fo that the ufe of 
 Reafon, in general, is poflible to him j wc prefuppofe, that the per- 
 formance of morally good adions is really entrufted to his will : 
 and if we did not prefuppofe this inclination, we would in faft de- 
 ny all the influence which Reafon excrcifes over human aft'airs, 
 and thus be obliged to declare the general laws of morality, af- 
 forded by this faculty, as mere phantoms of the brain. Our moral 
 perftdlion depends upon our own exertions, and it is from this 
 v^narter, that we may more and more approach our deftination. 
 
 "\Vhat
 
 KANT'S "WORKS. 8f 
 
 "What, on the othtr hand, relates to the fecond part of our def- 
 tinatian, namely to our happinefs ; this depends on the inftitutioa 
 of the things in nature, as well thofe of our own fubjeft as the ex- 
 ternal objefts, and their influence upon us. By means of Rcafon 
 and its inherent liberty, we can indeed make fuch a ufe of the 
 things in nature, as to produce certain degrees or parts of hap- 
 pinefs. But the rules calculated to produce thefe efifedls, Reafou 
 cannot derive from its own nature a priori^ as is the cafe with tlie 
 moral law j becaufe experience rauft be confulted firft, that we 
 may learn, how the nature of man, and that of individual fubjefts, 
 is conftituted, and in what relation the things are to human happi- 
 nefs. The laws by which happinefs is attained, are founded upon 
 the nature of phenomena : man may apply them to his advantage, 
 but he cannot determine them j he may regulate, in a certain de- 
 gree, the influence of fhe things upon himfclf j but he muft 
 ftill fubrait to their laws. If, then, we were to confult Reafon, and 
 to afk, by what laws happinefs ought to be diftributed in the 
 world J it could give no other anfwer, but that the moral law 
 ought to decide this. Morality fliould always be atteiuled wish a 
 proportionate fliare of happinefs j whetlier it of iticif produced 
 that happinefs as its real caufe (according to phyfical influence), 
 or that a third being allotted to every individual, fuch a portion of 
 happinefs as he deferved through the degree of his moral aiSivity : 
 — here tve would admit an /rftW influence, in which a third being 
 had fo regulated the courfe of nature, that her laws were in perfect 
 harmony with the demands of Reafon, relative to ihe happinefs of 
 moral beings. 
 
 , But if we confult experience, we by lio means karn, that fuch 
 a moral order really fubfifts in the world j fince we frequently ob- 
 fcrve men of bad morals, and of a depraved charafter, apparently 
 happy, while good and virtuous men are afTli6led by misfortunes. 
 For, though the confcioufnefs of juft and good adions be accom- 
 panied with agreeable feelings, this alone does, not conftitute hu- 
 man happinefs 5 fincc the mofl: excellent man muft be called un- 
 happy, if he is labouring under fuch calamities as are the perma- 
 nent caufe of painful fenfations. The wants of human nature are 
 very numerous I Many of them are independent on our will : the 
 
 ftiJurc
 
 86 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 failorie In fatbfying urgent neccflities, is unavoidably accompanied 
 with pain, frequently the raoft acute j nay, even a great number 
 of the voluntary or artificial wants are, by degrees and through 
 incidental circumftances, fo intimately interwoven with the well- 
 being of man, that he rauft always feel unhappy, when he is de- 
 prived of thofe means, by which he was accuftomed to fatisfy 
 them. Befides, there is a great number of accidents, which ren- 
 der him who is expofcd to them alw^ays unhappy j and experience 
 does not teach us, that any diftinftlon prevails here between the 
 good and bad. Difeafes, war, famine, and all phyfical evils, op- 
 prefs the honeft man with equal, "and frequently with much great- 
 er, rigour than the diftioneft ; the former, as well as the latter, is 
 placed in unhappy fituations, without the means of evading thefe 
 evils. It requires, upon the whole, no proof that in the diftribu- 
 tion of phyfical goods, though a neceffary part of human happi- 
 nefsj no moral order at all can be difcovcred In experience j and 
 that, if the latter alone could decide the queftion, we muft explain 
 all the agreement between happinefs and virtue, entirely by the 
 law of chance. What happens in nature according to phyfical 
 laws, is equally different from what ought to happen according 
 to the laws of moral order, as the ufual aftions of man differ from 
 their duties. 
 
 Eut although we obferve in this world no fuch moral order, as 
 exhibits happinefs and morality in conftant proportion j our Rea- 
 fon fllll preferves an uncommon propenfity to maintain, that fuch 
 an order mufl aftually exifl. This, however, Is a prefuppofition, 
 which can be juftified, neither by argument nor demonftration, nor 
 through the real cxpofition of fuch an order ; but which is efta- 
 blifhed merely upon a ground contained in our own mind. This 
 ground refts on the neceffary internal obligation of being morally 
 good, or on the moral feelings common to all mankind, and acknow- 
 ledged by all good men. The a6^ual cxiftence of a moral order is fb 
 intimately connefled with thefe feelings, that the confcioufnefs of 
 them continually impels us to prefuppofe this order. And the more 
 eageily we cultivate morality, by difplaying much vigour in the 
 obfervation of Its laws ; the more firmly and thoroughly we be- 
 come convinced, that there muft cxift a complete moral order. 
 
 The
 
 KANrs WORI^. 87 
 
 The train of thought, by which Reafon forms and jaftlfies this 
 
 conclufion, is nearly the following. 
 
 Reafoii acknowledges it as indlfpenfably necefiTary, that maa 
 ought to afl: conformably to moral laws. As long as man enjoys 
 the ufe of Reafon, no iltuation or relation in life can be conceived, 
 in Vvhich he is exempted from the obligation of acting as a moral 
 being. To a£l morally right, is therefore the higheft objeft, at 
 ■which every man ought to aim : Reafon cannot, upon any condi- 
 tion whatever, reverfe this judgment, without falling into an ob- 
 vious contracliftion with itfelf. Now, we find, in human nature, 
 at the fame time, a defire of happinefs, which is not always gra- 
 tified. Our nature, however, is fo conflituted, that we muft feci 
 a ncceffary defire of happinefs ; and thi« natural wirti is a fufficient 
 ground for exerting ourfelves, to realize It by all the means in our 
 power. The rules, in confequence of which men attain to real 
 happinefs, are folely and exclnfively learned from experience ; 
 while the moral laws are derived a priori ixom Reafon : ancf thus 
 it happens, that many rules for procuring happinefs are contrary 
 to morality ; or that they weaken the force of the moral law. 
 Neverthelefs, Reafon places a much higher value on morality, and 
 commands us to wifli for no other happinefs, but fuch as is in per- 
 fect harmony Vvith moral feelings. Upon this very occafion we 
 learn, that the happinefs of men is connected with conditions and 
 circumftances, fo various and incidental, that we cannot always at- 
 tain it, by pra<^ifing either the law? cf morality or prudence. 
 For, the moral conduct does not, as far as experience informs us, 
 neceffarily produce happinefs ; fince we obferve no phyfical con- 
 nexion between them j and fince the afibciation of good fortune 
 with a moral conduft appears to be merely accidental. Even the 
 utmoft prudence of man cannot rear the fabric of felicity, though 
 he (hould aft in defiante of morality, and endeavour to make 
 happinefs his only and unconditional cbjeft. For the latter de- 
 pends on too many circumftances, over which man has no power 
 of controul, and through which frequently the wifeA plans may be 
 rendered abortive. 
 
 The happinefs of a moral being, in a moral order of things, can 
 properly be faid to confift in no other maxim than the following :
 
 83 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 ** every thing that happens, is in fl;ri£l harmony with the getieral 
 laws of morality." Even the good marr can wifli and deliie no- 
 thing fnrther. If he now admit a moral principle or a God, he 
 mud likewi/c expect, that every thing Qiall really correfpond with 
 moral purpofes j and confequently, if a man aft virtuoufly, he can 
 expect; nothing elfe, in a moral world, but real happinefs. In faft, 
 therefore, man awaits his profperity from good fortune, the dif- 
 penfation of which is entrufted to a wife Providence. This hope 
 is entirely fupported by the belief in God, and it is equally con- 
 Itant and fafe as the latter. 
 
 Since man poffeffes no p6wcr over all thofe things, which relate 
 to his ultimate deftination, no other condition of attaining this rc- 
 jrains for the virtuous, but to confidcr the whole world fubjeft to 
 a moral order j that is, to look upon moral beings as abfolute 
 and ultimate purpofes, to which every thing relates, that is real in 
 the world ; or to confider thefe beings as containing the calife, on 
 account of which every thing is thus conftituted, and not other- 
 wife. For, If thefe contain the ground of the conflltution of the 
 world, there muft exill: a certain order in it, conformably to which 
 the effentlal purpofes of moral beings can be attained. Allowing, 
 therefore, that happinefs is a part of the effentlal deftination of 
 human nature, and that men thcmfelves belong to the clafs of mo- 
 ral beings ; nature itfelf muft be fo conftituted, that their 
 happinefs can be effe£led by her aid. But the deftination of hu- 
 man nature Is not completed by the attainment of that hap- 
 pinefs alone, which confifts in mere enjoyment, but by mora- 
 lity, in union with happinefs, and indeed fo modified, that the lat- 
 ter be in proportion to the former. Morality muft determine the 
 meafure of happinefs allotted to> every individual, and not vice ver- 
 fa. If thus we ftiall conceive the attainment of our deftination, 
 as a poflible event j we muft admit a thorough moral order as real- 
 ly fubfifting, though it be not In our power to produce an obje&ive 
 proof of It. The ground, on vfhich we admit it, lies merely la 
 our own mind, and indeed in the conviftion, that we are moral be- 
 ings defigned for ultimate purpofes. To conceive thefe beings ih 
 conneftlon with other things, Is altogether impoffible, unlefs we 
 granr, that the latter relate to the former, and facilitate the atJ- 
 
 talnmeDC
 
 KANT'S WORICS. 89 
 
 talnment of their deftination. It is, confequently, the refle(5\i6n 
 made upon our own moral nature, which induces us to admit the 
 exiftence of a moral order. 
 
 Though we cannot difcover this moral order in experience, the 
 truth of it is not thereby in the lead degree affefted, nor can it be 
 difputed from that fource. For experience could no where prove the 
 exiftence of a thorough moral order, although all the phenomena, 
 that we obferve, (hould correfpond with the idea of it. It would 
 ever remain doubtful, whether this correfpondence be general and 
 conllant, unlefs a very different manner of reprefenting it, afforded 
 certainty to the conclufions thus arifing. For, to comprehend the 
 reality of fuch an order a pojieriori, there would be required a 
 complete view of all things and their relations to one another j a 
 view, that is unattainable by beings fo conftituted as we are. And 
 the circumftance of our finding virtue frequently accompanied by 
 misfortune, is by no means inconliftent with the idea of a moral 
 order. This idea does not imply the neceflity, that every moral 
 a£lion (hall be immediately attended with a certain portion of hap- 
 pinefs, or that the latter be phyfically produced : it involves only 
 this^much, that the lot of man, upon the whole, is in a certain 
 harmony with his moral character. In this way it is not difficult 
 to conceive, that one or feveral periods of his exiftence are parti- 
 cularly defigned for the purpofe of improving his moral nature, and 
 that good and bad fortune may be fo diftributed during thefe pe- 
 riods, that they can be ufed rather as the'means of improvement, 
 than to ferve as the fcale of afcertaining the moral excellence of 
 the individual. Neverthclefs, the regulations in the world may 
 be fo made, that fuch a fliare' of happinefs arifes from them for 
 each moral being, as it has merited b^ its conduct. We elevate 
 man above the confideration of his being a paffive inftrument in 
 the hands of nature, when we reprefent him as facrificing a part 
 of that happinefs, of which his fenfitive nature is fufceptible ; in 
 order to contribute his fliare, that other rational beings may like- 
 wife attain their deftination ; provided that he does not negledt his 
 own. For, Reafon itfelf muft approve of fuch a regulation. If 
 now, from this point of view, we confider the events and the vi- 
 tifliiudes of human life, which we obferve by experience in the 
 
 M world
 
 6o ■ ELEMENTARY VIE W OF 
 
 world of fenfe j all the fads thus obtahied are perfedlly confiHenfc 
 with the poffibility qf a moral order. We muft however not at- 
 tempt to make fuch ufe of them, as if they were abfolute proofs j 
 lince they can be ufed only as arguments for difproving the con- 
 trary of a moral order. But if we reprefent the queftion upon 
 this foundation, that moral aftions ougbi to produce happinefs con- 
 formably to the laws of nature j then the inftances, by which we 
 prove that virtue and misfortune are in certain cafes accompanied 
 by one another, would not only be irrefutable, but they would 
 likewife prove the nullity of this complete moral order. 
 
 In the J^antian phllofophy, it is a matter of no importance, and 
 wholly undetermined, /jow. fuch an order is really poflible. The 
 reality, of it, Kant does not attempt to demonftrate from a pre- 
 tended view of its caufes j he rather grants, that thefe are to us 
 altogether inconceivable. He only admits this moral order, on ac- 
 count of the ftrong and conftant demands of Reafon ; a faculty, 
 that thinks or judges of moral beings as abfolute and ultimate, to 
 whom every thing eife relates, and who confequently muft deter- 
 mine the order of all other things, -and their relations to the mo- 
 ral beings therafelves. 
 
 Thus we prefuppofe a moral order, while we confidently rely 
 upon our Reafon an^ our moral nature; becaufe the reality of it 
 muft be conceived from its being fo intimately united with our 
 moral feelings. It is certain, that we are moral agents, confequent- 
 ly the conditions muft alfo be certain, without which our moral 
 nature, in the eyes of our own Reafon, would be a nonentity. Ac- 
 cording to Reafon, however, our moral nature cpnfills in this, 
 that man is an abfolute purpofe, to which all other things are fu- 
 bordinate means. Yet morality and happinefs, united to one pur- 
 pofe, compofe the deftination ofraan, fo that the former determines 
 the latter. Without a moral order, this is impoflible. And as, 
 agreeably to Reafon, moral beings rnuft have it in their power to 
 contribute towards the attaimnent of their deftination ; the reality 
 of a moral order muft likewife be admitted j becaufe it is the only 
 condition-, upon which this inference can be juftified. If we then 
 allow the exiftence of a moral order, w^e muft ajfo fubmit to thofc 
 conditions, without which it is wholly impoftlble. Though we
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 91 
 
 cannot comprehend the real poflibility of this order, we muft nc- 
 verthelefs grant, that thofe conditions are real, without which ^ 
 fuch an order cannot at all be conceived. But it is inconceiva- 
 ble, if we do not admit, l, that the laws of the world of feufe are 
 hot the only ones, by which all events are determined : that the 
 world itfelf is fubje^l to ftiil higher laws, and upon the whole, re- 
 lates to fomething, which is independent on the world, or exter- 
 nal to it, and to which the world is rtierely fubfervient ; 2, that 
 there exifts a caufe, through which every thing is detemined ac- 
 cording to the laws of a moral order, to which confequently every 
 thing is fiibjeft, and upon which every thing in the world depends ; 
 and laftly, 3, that the perfonality or individual exiftence of mart 
 continues, in- order that through him the moral order may be ac- 
 compHftied. 
 
 It is eafy to perceive, that the firll of thefe poftulates leads to 
 the idea of a fuperfenflble world, which is independent on the lav^s 
 fubfifting in the world of fenfe, y.- e. which is /"ree. The fecond 
 ide^involves the conception of a £)(?/{}'. For, if we feparate every 
 arbitrary and adventitious matter from the idea of the Deity, and 
 preferve that alone, upon which a reprefentation worthy of fo fa- 
 blime a Being can be eftablilhed j nothing further remains than 
 the thought of a connexion or relation, by means of which that 
 Being muft be the foundation of a thorough moral order. No 
 other idea, however, but that of an intelligent power could entitle 
 or even induce us to entertain a notion like that of moral order j 
 hence it is conceivable, how in this idea alone wc meet with fome 
 analogy, that ferves to diftinguifh fo fublime\a Being, and, toge- 
 ther with the moft perfect will, to attribute to it all thofe proper- 
 ties, through which only fo facrcd a will can be exerted; Laftly j 
 that the third principle before ftatcd, lead* to the immorla/uy of 
 t/^e/ou/, is now a very rational inference^ 
 
 The idea of Liberty^ or the faculty of determining our adlions 
 uninfluenced by fenfual motives, and felf a£llvc, through the con- 
 fcioufnefs of the moral law alone ; this idea is involved in that of 
 morality. We therefore undoubtedly poiTefs that liberty, as we 
 are moral agents •, and the conception of liberty m general has 
 been perfe,5lly juftified b^ (ho-Ving, that the phjdcal world is not 
 
 M 2 the
 
 9i ELEMENTARY VIEW OF. 
 
 the only one, which influences the nature of man j that it is con- 
 nedled with beings of a very different kind, whofe a£lions are de- 
 termined by very different laws. The idea of a moral order Hands 
 in the fame relation to that of our being moral agents, whofe de- 
 jftination is certainly attainable j as the former is connefted with 
 the idea of God and Immortality 5 fo that if we admit the truth 
 of the one, the relation of the others mull likewife be granted. 
 Thus we are fufficiently and perfeftly authorited to believe in 
 God and Immortality, as the two effential pillars of all Religion j 
 though the arguments for this belief, are not taken from the per- 
 ception of objecls, but arc derived from the more permanent na- 
 ture of our mind. 
 
 Upon a curfory view of the ftatement here given, it might per- 
 haps appear to feme readers, as if in Kant's procefs of reafoning, 
 firH morality is reprefented gs the ground-work of Religion, and 
 afterwards Religion again is called an aid, to fupport the idea of a 
 moral law< But, upon a mature confideration of the fubjeft, this 
 appearance will very foon vaniih. For, the ground of difcovcring 
 a moral law, lies merely and exclufively in our Reafon, which pre- 
 fents to us this law, as foon as it is conceived in a praftical or ac- 
 tive ienfe ; and which, independent on all Religion, impofcs upon 
 us the obligation of obferving the precepts of morality.. But if, 
 with this moral obligation, "we compare nature and her relations 
 to the dcftination of man, Reafon requires, that nature fhould 
 likewife agree with the deftinatlon of moral beings ; bccaufe, in 
 the contrary cafe, that value which Reafon places upon its facul- 
 ties and operations, and which is to be computed much higher 
 than Nature itfelf, would not be real, but altogether imaginary. 
 Thus convinced of a moral order, man may certainly make ofe of 
 It, in order to remove thofe difficulties, which prefent themfelves 
 in the practice of the moral law. Thedoubts and uncertainties, 
 ■which may arife againft the reality of a moral order of things, are 
 thereby fuppreffed ; the fenfual appetites, too, are through this 
 ccnvlftlcn fo modified, and regulated, that they Ihall be indulged 
 only with a view of fuch an happinefs as is coftfiftent with virtue, 
 while they gradually become familiar with the order, that is ma- 
 nifefi throughout all nature, BeHdes, this mode of reprefenting a 
 
 fvftem
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 
 
 93 
 
 iyftcm contains a great number of arguments, from wliich even the 
 fenfitive facility derives fome confolation, if its purpofes fliould be 
 occafionally defeated, and itfi neceflities too much limited ; for 
 there ftill remains a ftate, in which this alfo may "be fatisfied ; pro- 
 vided that man perfeveres in obeying the diftatfes of moraliiy. 
 Thus Religion certainly contains arguments in favour of morality, 
 and on this very account it is calculated to remove many obftaclcs, 
 which may occur in the pra6lice of the moral law. Religion, 
 therefore, offeis no intuitive ground of difcovering moral precepts, 
 though it can be employed as an excellent pfychological aid of 
 ftrengthening the moral faculty of human nature ; lince it over- 
 comes thofe difficulties, which frequently arife from falfe reflec- 
 tions, and which obftruft the due exercife of that faculty. 
 
 XXII. (6) Mctaphyjifche Anfcuigsgrunde der NaturiviJJen- 
 fchaft. Metapliyfical Principles of Natural Philofophy. 
 8vo. RigOj 1786. 2d Edit. 1787, pp. 15B, and xxiv pages 
 Preface. 
 
 This is, without exception, the moft profound of Kant's works 5 
 and in order to afford the reader a conclfe view of the author's 
 aim, I fliall firfl give an abftraft from the elaborate Preface to 
 this publication, and then exhibit the principles of this new fcience, 
 In a clofe tranflaiion. 
 
 * It is of the. greateft importance to the progrefs of the fclences, 
 " fays Kant," to feparate diflimilar principles from one another, 
 tp reduce each fet of them to a particular fyftem, that they may 
 form a fcience of a peculiar kind. Thus we (hall prevent that uncer- 
 tainty in fclences, which arifes from confounding them, and in con- 
 fcquence of which we cannot eafily diftinguifh the limits, which, 
 in a doubtful cafe, are to be afligned to each of them j nor can _we 
 difco^er the fourcc of the errors, that may attend the praftical ap- 
 plication of them. On this account, I have deemed it neceflary, 
 to exhibit fyftematically the pure part of Natural Philofophy 
 (^Phyftca generalis)^ in which metaphyfical and mathematical con- 
 ftru*51ions of ideas occur promifcuoufly ; and, in treating of the 
 former, to fliow at the fimc time the priociples of that conflruftion, 
 
 and
 
 94 . ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 and confequently to prove the poflibillty of a Syflem of Natural 
 Phllofophy, deduced from mathematical demonftratlons. This di- 
 vifion of fciences, befide the advantage already ftated, is attended 
 with the particular fatisfa«5lion, which the unify and harmony of 
 knowledge afford, when we can prevent the limits of the fciences 
 from interferiijg with one another.* 
 
 * As a fccond reafon of recommending this procefs, it may be 
 urged, that in every department of Metaphyfics we may hope to 
 attain to abfolute completenefs^ fuch as we cannot expeft in any o- 
 ther fpecies of knowledge j confequently, the completcnefs di 
 the Metaphyfics of material nature may te expe6led,here, with the* 
 fame confidence as in tbe Metaphyfics of nature in general. Forj 
 in Metaphyfics, the obje6l is merely confidered, agreeably to the 
 general laws of thought, while in other fciences it rauft be repre- 
 fented according to the different data of perception, whether this 
 tie pure or empirical. In Metaphyfics, too, we acquire a deter- 
 mined number of cognitions, which can be completely exhaufted j 
 becaufe, here, the obje6l mull be continually compared with all the 
 neceffary laws of thought : while in the other fciences, on account 
 of the infinite variety of perceptions, or objefts of thought, which 
 they prefent to the mind, we never can attain to abfolute coniplete- 
 nefs, but may extend them In infinitum, as is the cafe with pure 
 Mathematics arid experimental Phyfics. I likewife believe, that 
 I have completely ftated th'efe metaphyfical principles of Natural 
 Philofophy, to their utmoft extent j but though I have fucceeded 
 in this attempt, I do not flatter myfelf with having performed any 
 extraordinary talk.' 
 
 ' To complete, however, a metaphyfical fyftem, whether that 
 of nature in general, or that of the material world, the Table of 
 the Categories * mull ferve as its Schema. For there arc in rea- 
 lity no more nor fewer pure Intelleflual notions concerning the 
 nature of things, than I have Hated in that Table. All the de- 
 terminations relative to the general notion of matter, confequent- 
 ly all that can be conceived of it a priori^ that can be exhibited 
 in nrathcmatical conllruflion, or that can be propofed as a deter- 
 mined objeft of experience, mufl admit of being reduced to the 
 , • four 
 
 " Vid. \.\\i ('j.'-v'j/'j, p. 4j, olid thtu Schsinata^'^ i^l.
 
 KANT'S WORKS. . 9j 
 
 four clafles of the Categories, viz. that of Quantity, Quality, Re- 
 lation, and Modality. There remains nothing to be difcovered or 
 added here ; but if imperfeftions fhould occur, with refped to 
 perfpicuity and order, the fyftem in this refpeft may be occafional- 
 ly improved.' 
 
 * The idea of matter mufl, therefore, be examined through all 
 the four mentioned functions of the intelleft (in four Sedions),- in 
 each of which a new determination of that idea occurs. The pri- 
 mary attribute of fomething, that reprefents an obje6l of the ex- 
 ternal fenfes, muft be motion j for by that only can thefe fenfes 
 ,be affefted. To this, the Underllanding reduces all other pre- 
 dicates of matter, that relate to^its nature j and thus Natural Phi- 
 lofophy is, throughout, either a pure or applied theory of motion^ 
 The metaphyfical principles of this fcience muft, confe^uently, be, 
 divided into four Sedlions : in the^r>^ of which, motion is confi- 
 ^ered as a pure quantum, according to its compofition, without 
 any quality of that which is moveable, and hence n.ay be called 
 Phoronomy j in \.\\^fecondy motion is inveftigated in its relation to 
 the quantity of matter, under the name of an originally moving 
 power, and is therefore called Dynamics j in the third, matter is 
 examined in reciprocal relation to this quantity, by its peculiar 
 motion, and appears under the title of Mechanics ; and in the 
 fourth Se6lion, the motion or reft of matter is determined merely 
 in relation to the mode of reprefcnting it, or Modality^ confe- 
 quently as phenomenon of external fenfes, on \yhich account is i^ 
 palled Phenomenology.' 
 
 Contents. 
 
 Sect. I. Metaphyjical principles of VaoKOtion-i. 
 
 Position i. Matter is that which is moveable in fpace. That 
 fpace, which itfelf is moveable, is called the material^ or likewife 
 relative fpace \ that, in which all motiorr muft be ultimately con- 
 ceived (and which confequently in its own nature is abfolutely 
 immoveable), is called the pure, or likewife, aBfoIute fpac;. 
 
 Po/it. 2. The motion of a thing is the change of its external re- 
 htions to given fpace. 
 
 Pofit.
 
 90 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 Foftt. 3. Kejl Is the permanent prel'ence (^prcvfentia perdurab'iUi) 
 in the fame place j permanent however is that ivhlch exifts, i. e. 
 continues for a certain time. 
 
 Pojit. 4. To conJlruEi the idea of compound motion, means to 
 reprefent motion a priori in the perceptive (acuity, as far as the 
 former arifes from two or feveral joint motionsjn one moveable 
 fpacc. 
 
 Theorem. Every motion, as objedl of experience, maybe con- 
 sidered, either as the motion of a body in a refting fpace, or as 
 the reft of a body and, on the other hand, motion of fpace in 
 oppoUte diredion with equal velocity. 
 
 Fojit. 5. The combination of motion Is the reprefentation of the 
 motion of 3 point, as being homologous with two or feveral mo- 
 tions of it united together. 
 
 Sect. II. Metaphysical principles of "D-^tiXi/iics. 
 Posit, I, Matter is that which is moveable, fo far as it f lis a 
 fpace. To f II a fpace, is to refift all that is moveable and that 
 makes an effort, by its motion, to penetrate Into a certain fpace. 
 A fpace that is not filled, is a vacuum. 
 
 Theorem^ 1. Matter fills a fpace, not by Its mere exigence, 
 but by a particular moving power. 
 
 Posit. 2. The power of attraSiion is that moving power, by which 
 one matter may be the caufe of the approach of others towards it ; 
 or, in other words, by which it refifts the removal of others from 
 it. — 'Yh.e. power of repulsion is that, by which one matter may be 
 the caufe of removing others from it ; or, in other words, by which 
 it refifts the approach of others towards it. 
 
 Theorem 2d< Matter fills its fpaces by the repulfive power of 
 all its parts, I. e. by a peculiar power of extcnfion, that has a 
 determined degree, beyond which fmaller or greater degrees 
 may be conceived in infinitum. 
 
 Posit 3. One matter, in its vaoliorx, penetrates another, when, by 
 means of comprcflion, it completely removes the fp:ice of its ex- 
 tenfion. 
 
 Theorem 3d. Matter may \y^ comprejfed m'ln^aiiVim, but It ne- 
 ver can hepemlrafedhy matter, however great its preffing power 
 . -m^ybe. 
 
 Posif^
 
 KANT'S WORICS* 97 
 
 Posit. 4. That impenetrability of matter, which depends upon 
 the refiftance proportionally increafing with the degrees of com- 
 preflion, is called relative j as on the contrary that, which refts 
 upon thtfuppo/ition^ that matter, as fuch, is not liable to any com- 
 preflion whatever, is here called abfolute impenetrability .-~The 
 filling oifpace with abfolute impenetrability may ,be called mathi- 
 maticaly while that of relative impenettability receives the name 
 of dynamical. 
 
 Pqfit. 5. Material fubfiance is that in fpace, which is moveable 
 of itfelf, i. e, feparate from every other thing that exifts without 
 it in fpace. The motion of a part of matter, by which it ceafes to 
 he a part, hfeparation. The feparation of the part? of matter is 
 the phyjtcal divifion. 
 
 Theorem 4th. Matter is divisible in infinitum^ and indeed into 
 parts, each of which is again matter. 
 
 Theorem. 5th. The poflibility of matter renders a power of at- 
 traftion neceffary j thi^ being the fecond effcntial and funda- 
 mental power of it. 
 
 Theorem 6th. By the mere power of attraftion, without that of 
 rfcpulfion, we cannot conceive the poflibility of any matter. 
 Pqfit. 6. Conta£i, in a phyfical fenfe, is immediate action and 
 teaftion of impenetrability. The aftion of one matter upon ano- 
 ther, without <;pnta£l, is the aBion at difiance {aBio in diftam). 
 This aftion at diftance, which is poflible even without the aid of 
 intervenicnt matter, is called the immediate aBion of matter upon 
 tmtter, through empty fpace. 
 
 Theorem 7th. The attrailion ejfential to all matter, is the im- 
 mediate a£lion of it upon another matter, through empty 
 fpace. 
 
 Pofit. yth. A moving power, by which matters can immediately 
 ■61 upon one another only in a common furface of contaft, is called 
 a/uperficial poiver'j but that, by which one matter can immedi- 
 ately aft -upon the parts of another, even beyond the furface of 
 contaft, may be called 2^ penetrating power. 
 
 Theortm 8th. The original power of attraflion, upon which 
 the poffibiHty of matter itfclf, as fuch, muft depend, extends in 
 
 N the
 
 ^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 the univerfe Immediately from every part of it to another ad m- 
 linitum. 
 
 Sect III. Metaphyjical principles of M^cnk-sica. 
 Posit. I. Matter is that which is moveable^ fo far as it (as fuch) 
 poffeffes ihoving power. 
 
 Posit. 2. Thc-quantity of matter is the amount of that which li 
 moveable in a determined fpacfe. This, fo far as all its parts arc 
 confidered in their motions as operating (moving) at the fame 
 time, is cilled c6nge'ries 5 and we fay, that a matter a£ts in a con- 
 geries, when all its parts, moved in the fame direftion, exercife 
 their moving power externally, and at the fame time. A congeries 
 confining of a determined fha'pe is called a body (in a mechanical 
 fenfe). The magnitude oi tnotion (mechanically computed) is that 
 which is eftimated both by the quantity of matter movied, and its 
 velocity : vihtn phoronomically confideted, it confifts liierely in the 
 degree of velocity. 
 
 TA^for^wi ift. The quantity of ^ I^ec'e 'of mattet, in compa- 
 yifon with enj other, can be eftimated only by the quantity of 
 motion in a given velocity. 
 
 Theorem 2d. Firfl law of Mechanics. In all the changes of cor- 
 poreal nature, the quantity of matter rctttatns, upon the wTiole^ 
 without increafing or diminifhing. 
 
 Theorem ■^^. Second laio of Me&hatttcs. Every change of mat- 
 ter has an external caufe. (Every materiat body remains in its 
 ilate of"^rett or motion, in the fatne direflion, and with the fame 
 velocity, unlcfs it be compelled by fome e;?ternal caufe, to change 
 this ftate.) 
 
 Theorem ^ih.. Third Mechanical laiu. In every communicated 
 motion, the aflion and reaSion always corrcfpond with one ano- 
 ther. 
 
 SitCT. IV. Metaphysical principles o/" Phenomenology. 
 'Posit. Matter IS that which is moveable , as far as in'tliat refpe'(3; 
 it can be an objeft df'expcrience. 
 
 Theorem ift. The motion of matter, in a ftraight line, is,'with 
 refpeftto an empirical fpace, merely ^ poffble predicate, in con- 
 *.radiIlia(9.ion to the oppolite naotion qf fpace. I'he very ifarae 
 
 predicate
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 99 
 
 prtdicftte is impojjlble, if we conceive It in no external relatlop 
 tomaXtcrfi. e. as ab/o/yiemott'oa.. , 
 
 Theorem 2d. The circular- motion of matter, in contradiftinc- 
 tion to the oppofite motioa of fpace, Is a real predicate of it j 
 whereas the oppofite motion of.a reJative fpace, if fubftuuted for 
 the motion of the bod^, is no teal motion q£ the lat;ter, ^©4 if 
 confidered as fuch, is a raere^illufion. 
 
 Theorem 3d. In every moUou of a body, by which k is.mo,- 
 vlng, with refpeft to another body, an oppollte e^ual motioo. o^ 
 the latter is necejfary. 
 
 XXIII.(7) Grundlegung %ur Critik des Ge/chmacks. Fuoda- 
 mental principles of the Critlq^ue of Tafle. 8vo. ^j^a, 
 1787. 
 
 Though we have not fuccecded in procuring a copy of this pu- 
 blication, we fhall find an opportunity of ftating the outlines of 
 Kant's ideas upon this interefting fubjeft, in a fubfequent work, 
 under No. XXY. (pX in which heconfidcrs the vditions judgmentx 
 refulting from Tqfle j the modes, In which they take place in the 
 mind j and their refpeaive peculiarities. 
 
 XXIV. (8.) Critik der praBifchen Vernunft. Critique of 
 Practical Reaf on. 8vo. i^/g-a. 1788. ad Edit. ^ 792. 
 
 If wc abftraft fsQm the empirical part of experience, or if we 
 . conceive experience as a general idea, without attending to any 
 variety that may be contained undei; this idea j we then acquire 
 a priori the conditions of it. The empirical or experimental 
 knowledge obtained by experience formed the matter of it j but 
 thofe conditions, without which experience cannot be reduced to 
 the rulej of thought, w«' have called the form of it. — We mud 
 proceed iu a fimilar manner, when we re£e6l upon the various 
 operations of our will, I will, for inftance, any one objefl, and I 
 immediately become confcious of the idea relating to fome ex- 
 pelled pleafure j an idea, which is connefted with this will. The 
 reprefentation of that pleafure, which the poffeflion of the objeft 
 might afford, is the empirical part of the will, that conftitutes its 
 matter. If we abllra^ from the latter, there is produced the idea 
 
 N2 of
 
 jco ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 o"" a free will, the condition as it were of: every thing that is eni' 
 pirical. If, further, we lay afide in thought every thing that re- 
 fers to experience, and ftill fuppofe a will completely determined 
 towards afting ; there remains at laft nothing but the faculty of 
 reafon itfelf, which determines this will to afl. In this manner 
 arifes in us the idea of a PraBical Reafon j a faculty, which direfts 
 the will, independent of any impulfe of the fenfes. The " Critique 
 of Praftical Reafon," therefore, fets out with the defign of in- 
 ycftigating this faculty. 
 
 CpjJTtNTS. 
 
 Book I. Analysis of pure practical Reasqn, 
 Sect. I. Of the principles of pure praBical Reafon. 
 
 Illujlration. Pradical principles are fuch as contain a general 
 determination of the will, which again has a variety of fubordi- 
 nate pradical rules. They are fubjeftive principles or maxims^ 
 when the condition is confidered as- applicable only to the will 
 of the fubjeft j but they are objeBive principles or praftical /ourr, 
 when that condition is acknowledged as objeftlve, i. e. applica-, 
 ble to the will of every rational being. 
 
 Theorem ift. All praSical principles, which prefuppofe an 
 ohjeB (matter) of the defiring faculty as the caufe of determining 
 the will, are wholly empirical, and cannot furnlfti praflical laws. 
 
 Theorem 2d. All the praftical principles relating to 'material 
 objefts, arc, as fuch, without exception, of one and the fame 
 kind, and originate from the general principle of feli-love or 
 perfonal happinefs. 
 
 Theorem 3d. If a rational being (hall conceive Its maxims as 
 ^ praftical general laws j it can confider them only as principles, 
 which contain the ground of determining the will,>not according 
 ^Qthe matter, but merely according to the form. 
 
 Fundamental law of pure praBical Reafqn. 
 
 " Let fuch be your conduft, that the maxim of your will 
 *' may, in every Inftance, be admitted a,s the principle of a 
 ** general law ; — or In other words : 
 
 ^ AQl in fuch a manner, as to confider and to employ hyi- 
 
 ^* manityj
 
 KANT'S WORKS. loi 
 
 *■' manity, in your own as well as in every other perfon, al- 
 
 " ways as the purpofe^ but never as the means of obtaining your 
 
 " objea." 
 
 Theorem 4th. The autonomy of the will is the only principle 
 of all moral laws, and -of the duties conformable to them : all 
 heteronomy of choice, therefore, not only eftablifhes no obligation 
 whatever, but is likewifc contrary to the principles of it, and to 
 the moral purity of the will . The fole principle of morality 
 confiils in the independence, namely of all matter of the law 
 (i. e. the obje£t defired), and at the fame time in the determi- 
 nation of the choice by the pure general legiflativc forms, of 
 which a maxim muft be fufceptible. That independence^ how- 
 ever, is liberty in a negative fenfe j whereas X\u.s peculiar legijla- 
 tive power of pure, and as fuch praftical, Reafon is liberty in a 
 pojitive fenfe. Hence the moral law expreffes nothing elfe but 
 the autonomy of pure praftical Reafon, i. e. of liberty, and this 
 itfelf is the formal condition of all maxims, under which alone 
 they can correfpond with the fupreme pra^ical law. If, there- 
 fore, the matter of volition, which can be nothing elfe but the 
 objeft of a defire that is connefted with the law, enters into the 
 condition of its pojjibllity j there arifes from it the heteronomy of 
 choice, namely, the dependence on the law of nature, to follow 
 any one impulfe or inclination 5 and the will does not give itfelf 
 the law, but only the precept for a rational obfervance of patho- 
 logical laws. But the maxim, which in this way never can con- 
 tain the general legiflative form, upon the fame ground efta- 
 blilhes not only no obligation, but is Hkewife contrary to the 
 principle oi z pure praftical Reafon, confequently alfo to moral 
 fentiment, although the aftion thus arifing (hould be lawful. 
 
 Sect II. Of the idea concerning the ohjeB of pure praBical 
 Reafon. 
 
 Table 
 
 Of the Categories of Libert,^ relative to the cognitions ine 
 pojfefs of the Good and Bad. 
 
 , I'
 
 loa ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 1. 
 
 Of Quantity. 
 
 SuhjeBivCy In confequence of maxims : (opinions depending upon 
 
 the will of the individual ;) 
 OhjeBivey in confequence of principles : {precepts j) 
 ^priori objedlve as well as fubjeflive principles of liberty : 
 
 (laws.) 
 
 2. . 
 
 Of Quality : 
 practical rales af oppetition^ (praceptiva,^ 
 praftical rules of omi^ony (prohtbitivce,) 
 praSical rules of exceptioHS^ (exceptivce,^ 
 
 3- 
 Of Relation : 
 To perfonalityy 
 
 To the condition of the perfon, 
 Reciprocally of one perfon to the condition of another. 
 
 . I ' - • 4. 
 
 I Of Modality ; 
 
 Permifted znd nonpermitted a&ionSf 
 Duty and contrary to duty, 
 perfe{i and imperfeB duty. 
 
 Sect. III. Of the motives of pure praBical Reafon. 
 
 Critical illuftration of the analyfis of pure pra£lical Reafon. 
 
 Book II. Dialectic of pure practical Reason. 
 I. Antinomy of pure praftical Reafon. 
 II. Critical folution of this antinomy. 
 
 III. Of the principal advantage of pure pra^ical Reafon, in its 
 
 connexion with the fpeculative. 
 
 IV. On the immortality of the foul, as a poflulate of pure prac- 
 
 tical Reafon. 
 V. On the exiftence of a God, as a firijilar poftulate. 
 VI. On the poftulates of pure praftical Reafon in general. 
 VII. In what manner aa exteniive improvement of pure praftical 
 
 Reafon
 
 itANT's WORKS. X03 
 
 Reafon is conceivable in a particular view, without increa- 
 litig at the fame time its fpeculative knowledge. 
 VIII. Of fuppofed truths, being a ncceffary refultof pure Reafon. 
 IX. Of the cognofcible faculties of man, being wifely proportion- 
 ed to his praftical deftination. 
 Methodical dodrine of pure praftical Reafon. \ 
 
 XXV. (9) Crkiider Unleikkraft — Critique of the Judging 
 Faculty. %vo,JAhau^ 1790. 2d Edit. Berlin, I793>pp. 482, 
 «nd lix pp, preface and Introdudion. 
 
 The author's principal aimin this work is to inquire,* whether the 
 ^udgingFaculty^v;\i\c\^^ in the order of our cognofcible powers, forms 
 an intermediate capacity between the Uhderftanding and Reafon, 
 has llkewife Its own principles aj>rtori\ whether thefe are confii- 
 tutive or merely regulative j and whether that faculty of judg- 
 ing aflFords a pnCri the rule for the fenfatlons of pleafure and dif- 
 pleafure, which again are the intermediate degrees between the 
 cognofcible and appetitive faculties.' 
 
 ' A Critique of pure Reafon, I. e. of our capacity of judging con- 
 formably to principles a priori^ would be incomplete, if the Judging 
 Faculty, which llkewife claims thefe principles, were not treated as 
 a feparate part of that Critique j although, in a fyftem of pure 
 philofophy, the principles of judgment muft not be confidered as a 
 feparate part, belonging either to the theoretical or practical de- 
 partment of the fyftem j but, in cafes of emergency, they may be 
 occafionally connefted with either. For, if fuch a fyftem fliali 
 once be eftabliftied under the general name of Metaphyfics (a 
 work, the complete attainment of which is by no means impofllble, 
 and which would be of the firft importance to the general ufe of 
 Reafon') j the Critique muft have previoufly inveftigated the 
 ground, on which this ftrufture Is to be erected, as well as the fo- 
 lidity of the bafis of this faculty, that deduces its principles inde- 
 pendent on experience : and if any one part of this fabric (hould 
 be found to ftand upon a flight foundation, the downfal of the 
 whole would be the inevitable confequence. 
 
 • But we may eafily perceive from the nature of the Judging 
 Faculty, that the difcOvcfy of the peculiar principle of it, muft be 
 
 attended
 
 104 fiLEMEMTARY VIEW OF 
 
 attended with great diiEculties ; for this faculty muft neceffarii/ 
 contain forae fuch principle a priori j becaufc, in the contrary cafe, 
 it could not be fubjeft to the moft common critique as a particular 
 faculty of acquiring knowledge j and becaufe the proper ufe of it 
 is To neceffary, and fo univerfally admitted, that every body is ac- 
 quainted with its influence. That principle, however, muflr not 
 be derived from notions a priori^ fince thefe are the property of the 
 Underftanding, and the application of them only belongs to the 
 Judging Faculty. Hence the latter muft furnifh an idea, through 
 which indeed we obtain no intuition of any objeft, but which' 
 ferves as a rule to that faculty itfelf. This rule, however, is not 
 of an objeBive nature, -fo that we could compare the judgment 
 with it in concreto j for to do this, there would be required a fe* 
 cond Judging Faculty, in order to enable us to diftinguifh, whe- 
 ther the cafe applies to the rule or not. 
 
 • ' This perplexity on account of a principle (whether a fubjcc- 
 tive or objective one) chiefly manifefts itfelf in thofe judgments, 
 which are called aejlheticaly which relate to the Beautiful and the 
 Sublime, whether that of nature or art. And yet is the critical 
 inveftigation of a principle of the Judging Faculty, refpefting' 
 thofe obje£ls, the moft important part of the Critique of this 
 power. For, though the aefthetical judgments, of themfelves, 
 contribute nothing to the knowledge we obtain of things, they ne- 
 vertheless belong exclufively to the cognofcible faculty, and evince 
 the immediate relation of this faculty to the fenfations of pleafure 
 and difpleafure, in confequence of fome one principle a priori, 
 without confounding it with that, which may be the caufe of de- 
 termining the appetitive faculty j becaufc this has its principles a 
 priori in notions, which are the produce of Reafon.' 
 
 Having preraifed this extraft from the author's preface to the 
 work under confideration, I ftiall only add the refult of Kant's in« 
 quiry refpe£ting the final purpofes of nature, as exhibited in the 
 Second Book, of this publication ; though, in my opinion, this in- 
 veftigation forms the moft interefting and eflential part of the 
 whole. It is as follows. 
 
 In conformity to our Reafon, we are obliged to afTume a certain 
 connection fubfifting between the final purpofes of nature, in the 
 
 fa Hie
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 105 
 
 manner as our Underftanding, in confequence of Its conftItution,is 
 impelled to combine things according to their efficient caufes. 
 As foon as we obferve a certain pofitive relation among things to 
 one another j as foon as we can reprcfent to ourfelves one thing as 
 poflible only through the idea we poffefs of another j we can re- 
 duce fuch a combination to no other idea than that of final caufes, 
 or of means and purpofes. Although we are not able to perceive 
 and to determine the ground, on which that connexion rcfts, as a 
 thing independent on our fenfes j we may ftill conceive it, in a 
 general manner, as the ground of fuch a combination as can be 
 reprefented by us under the idea of connefting final caufes j we 
 may thus think of it under the only fymbol, which can properly de- ' 
 note the bgfis of this affociation, namely that of Reafon. In this 
 way, however, we have no title to refer the modes and aftidhs we 
 obferve in our Reafon, to that being (fubftratum) Itfelf j but we 
 rouft make ufe of them only a& a fymbol, which at lead expreffes 
 fimilar relations. 
 
 We muft, therefore, juflly confider the world, as if every, thing 
 were arranged in it by the higheft Underftanding ; and we mufl:, 
 with the greateft attention, endeavour to difcover in experience 
 thofe traces, that are every where fcattered for the fupport o£ 
 this couclufion j in order to prepare our minds for the conviftion 
 arifing from a very confiderable number of individual cafes. In 
 this, we (hall the better fucceed, if, as the ground-work of this in< 
 quiry, we exhibit that fyftematic order, which is already deter- 
 mined by our Reafon a priori, and in confequence of which deter- 
 mination the moral beings compofe the laft and abfolute purpofe, 
 to which all other things ultimately and^^neceffarily refer as the 
 means of the former. But fince we can recognize no other moral 
 being than man, we muft accordingly regulate our inveftigations 
 relative to final purpofes, and particularly attend to v.hat is con- 
 nefted with his nature. Plere, however, we muft abandon the 
 nption hitherio enoneoufly maintained by many Theologians, 
 that every thir.g\i^% a nece^ary relation to man. For, as the world 
 of moral beings certainly confifts of more claffes than we are ac- 
 quainted with, we may indeed prefuppofe, that men are abfolute 
 furpofes, yet far from being exclufivdy fo j and that nature has 
 
 O ot
 
 io6 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 not been conftituted for the fake of men alone, but that, at the 
 fame time, other moral beings have not been difregarded. We may 
 therefore fafely admit, that nature has been fo formed, that the ef- 
 fential purpofes concerning man can be certainly attained, not- 
 v/ithflanding that the accidental purpofes muft occafionally remain 
 unaccoraplifhed, on account of others that are more important and 
 neceflary. For this affertion, which is fuppoirted merely upon the 
 principles of our moral nature, and not by any intuitive knowledge 
 of the world itfelf, experience only furnirties us with arguments, 
 which this order of the world difplays in individual cafes. But the 
 greateft number of phenomena muft neceffarily remain inexplicable 
 to us, who are acquainted only with the fmalleft part of the world, 
 and fron^ whom' the extenfive territoiy of moral beings is almoft 
 wholly concealed : whereas a complete knowledge of their rela- 
 tions to purpofes would prefuppofe not only a thorough knowledge 
 of the world of fenfe, but likewife that of moral beings. We de- 
 rive from the contemplation of the woild no proofs (bowing a re- 
 gular order of moral purpofes, but we invelligate the cafes corre- 
 fponding with that order, fo as to afcertatn it in the individual, 
 and to ftrengthen our knowledge upon what we had already pre- 
 fuppofed, in confequence of our moral nature. For, that which 
 affords fome knowledge in a general way, gives but a flight degree 
 of convlftion j while that which animates this conviiSlion and ren- 
 ders it applicable to particular cafes, i. e, our fenfation of it, is 
 produced only by individual inftances. 
 
 According to thefe principles, we (hall be able to difcover 
 traces of divine wifdom in a great number of phenomena, without 
 neglefting on that account our inquiries into nature, which alone 
 can extend our knowledge of things ; which previoufly unfolds the 
 matter of knowledge j and which points out the relations, where- 
 in divine ^vifdom is evident. The field of phyfics is immenfe j 
 and by an appeal to the Deity, who has produced nature itfelf 
 conformably to (inal caufes, we can fet no limits to that field. 
 For, to obtain a complete view of final caufes, and to apply them 
 to the explanation of phenomena, is entirely out of our power : 
 we can only mark them as the refults arifing from our intuitive 
 knowledge of nature, with this limitation > tha*, when we obtain a 
 
 more
 
 KANTs WORKS. 107 
 
 hlore accurate knowledge of the nature of thefe things, we fliall 
 likewife difcover a greater variety of final caufes, and (o on in in- 
 finitum. 
 
 The contemplation of nature, agreeably to final purpofcs, is 
 therefore fully eftabliflied in the conftitution of our Reafon j al- 
 though we have no intuition of the being that is the bafis of this 
 order. We can conceive this being merely by the idea of Reafon 
 in general, as the only poffiblc way of apprehending it : thus,- how- 
 ever, our knowledge of the nature of that being is not increafed j 
 and we only fatisfy a fubjeftive, but neceifary claim of our Reafon. 
 For fuch an order of things as depends upon a regular fucccflion 
 of final caufes, can be thought of by no other relation but that of 
 a caufality conformably to ideas j a refult, which exadly corrc- 
 iponds with the general idea of an efficient Reafon* 
 
 Contents. 
 
 Jntroduciion. — I. Of the divifion of philofophy into theoretical 
 and praftlcal. 
 II. Of the extent of philofophy in general. 
 
 III. Of the Critique of the Judging Faculty, being 
 
 the mediuni of combining the two paits of 
 philofophy into one fyftera. 
 
 IV. Of the Judging Faculty being a legiflative power 
 
 apriori, 
 V. The principle of formal conformation {jLvoeck- 
 tnajpgheit) of nature is a tranfcendental princi- 
 ple of the Judging Faculty. 
 
 VI. Of the connexion between the fenfation of 
 
 pleafurc and the idea of the conforination of 
 nature. 
 
 VII. On the aeflhetical method of reprefenting this 
 conformation. 
 
 VHI. On the logical method of exhibiting the fame. 
 IX. On the conneftions formed between the le- 
 giflative a6>s of the Underftanding and Reafon, 
 by means of the Judging Faculty. 
 
 O 2 The
 
 108 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
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 .<4^
 
 KANT^s WORKS. loc^ 
 
 Division I. Critique of the aesthetical Faculty of 
 Judging. 
 
 Sect. I. Analysis of the Aesthetical JtrDGiNG Faculty. 
 
 '&oovi\, Analyjis of the Beautiful. 
 
 FiRtT modification oftbe Judgment ofToJle according to its qualitt. 
 
 § I. The judgment of tafte is ae/Ihetical. 2. The approbation 
 cetermined by this judgment is not influenced by any felf-intc- 
 left relative to the objed. 3. The approbation, or the fatisfac- 
 tion wc exprefs upon what is agreeable^ is conneAed with fclf- 
 intcreft. 4. The fame is the cafe with regard to what is j-ooa'. 
 5. Comparifon of the three fpecifically different kinds of fatis- , 
 faftlon. 
 
 Second modification of the Judgment of Tojle^ namely according to 
 its qjjantity. 
 
 § 6. That which Is repreftnted as an objedl of univerfal approba- 
 tion, independent on collateral notions, is called Beautiful. 7. 
 Comparifon of the Beautiful, the Agreeable, and the Good, by 
 .the above ftated charafler. 8. The univerfality of approba- 
 tion, in a judgment of tafte, is reprefented only in a fubjeftive 
 fenfe. 9. Inveftigation of the queftion : whether in a judgment 
 of tafte the fenfe of pleafure precede the aft of judging upon 
 the objedt, or follow it. 
 
 Third modification of the Judgments of Tafe, according to their 
 
 RELATION to purpofes . 
 \ 10. Of Conformation in general. 11. The judgment of tafte is 
 wholly founded upon theyir/w or the nexus finalis of an objedt, 
 (or on the manner of rcprefenting that obje£l to the mind). 
 
 12. The judgment of tafte depends upon principles a priori. 
 
 13. 14. This- judgment is not related to any emotion of the 
 mind. 15. It is equally unconnefted with the idea of perfedlion. 
 i6. That judgment of tafte, by which an objeft is-declared to be 
 beautiful only under a certain condition, cannot be called a 
 
 pure judgment, i 7. On the prototype of Beauty. ' 
 
 YovKcviMomviCKTioii of the Judgment ofTa/Ie, according to the 
 
 MODALITY cf the fatisfa&ion in iheol'jecl. 
 
 § 10. This modality of an acflhetical jndgment is not a neceflary, 
 
 but:
 
 no ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 but an exemplary determination of all Individuals, refpcfting s 
 judgment, that is conlidered as an example of a general rule, the 
 particulars of which cannot be defined. 19. The fubjedive 
 neceflity, which we attribute to an aefthetical judgment, is con- 
 ditional. 20. The condition of the neceflity, which a judgment 
 of tafte fuppofes, is the idea of a common fcnfe. 21. Whether 
 we have grounds, on which we may conclude the reality of a 
 common fenfe. 22. The neceflity of tlie general approbation, 
 %vhich is conceived in an aefthetical judgment, is a fubjeftivc 
 neceflity, which, under the fuppofition of a common fenfe, is te- 
 prtfentcd as objeiflive. 
 
 CORROLLARIES FROM THESE FOUR MODIFICATIOIS. 
 
 I. Tajle Is tile faculty of judging of an objcft, or of reprefen^- 
 ing it by means of approbation or difapprobation, unconnefted 
 with any felf' inter ejl. The objeft of fuch approbation is cal- 
 led Beautiful. 
 
 II. Beautiful li that which affords univerfal fatisfaftion, without 
 reducing it to a certain idea. 
 
 III. Beauty is the conformation or nexus finalis of an objeft, fo* 
 far as it is obferved in it, without the reprefentation of a pur- 
 
 IV. Beautiful is that which Is recognized as an obje£l o{ ne- 
 cejfary fatisfaftlon, without combining with it a particular idea. 
 
 Book II. Analyfis of the Suhlime. 
 
 § 23. Tranfition from the judging power of the Beautiful to that 
 of the Sublime. 24. Of the divifion of an inquiry into the 
 fenfation of the Sublime. A. On the mathematical SubTime. 
 25. Definition of the Sublime : " Sublime^ in general, is that 
 which is abfolutely great, which admits of no coraparlfon, to 
 think of which only proves a faculty of the mind, which is not 
 fubjeft to any fcale of the fenfes, &c." 26. Of the mathema- 
 tical computation of natural obje(5ls, which Is requifite to pro- 
 duce the idea of the Sublime. 27. Of the quality of the 
 f:ilisfa£l:ion we receive in judging of the Sublime. B. On the 
 dynamical Sublime of nature. 28. Natirte confidered as might 
 i^potentia'). 29. On the modality of the judgment refnedting 
 
 the
 
 KANT'S WORKS. iii 
 
 tlie Sublime of nature. — DeduBion of the pure ojlhcticcl judg- 
 ments. — 30. The dedudion of aefthetical judgments upon the 
 obje6ts of nature muft not be direfted to what we call fublime 
 in the latter, but to the Beautiful only. 31. On the proper 
 method of this dedudion. 32. T'lrjl peculiarity of an aefthetical 
 judgment : " that It determines its objedl with refpeft to the 
 fatisfafllon found in it, at the fame time claiming the approba- 
 tion oi every body, 33 if it were ohjeElive^'' 33. Second •^tcxsXiZ' 
 rity : " that It cannot at all be determined by argumental proofs, 
 as if It were vaextXy fubjeBiveJ*^ 34. No objeftlve principle of 
 tafte can be difcovered. 35. The principle of tafte is the 
 fubjedlve principle of the judging faculty In general. ^6. How 
 the deduftlon of aefthetical judgments muft be carried on. 37. 
 What is properly afferted a priori, in this judgment, concerning 
 the objefl. 38. DeduAIon of aefthetical judgments. 39. How 
 a fenfation can be communicated. 40. Of Tafte, as a fpecies 
 oifenfus communis, 41. Qf the empirical Intcreft in the Beau- 
 tiful. 42. Of the intelleftual intexeft. 43. Of art in general. 
 *' /Irt Is diftlnguifned from Nature^ like doing {faccre) from 
 acting or operating in general ((Jgere) ; and the produclion of 
 the former, i. e. work {o/)Uj^ is diftlnguiftied from the latter as 
 operation {^effc&us^. — Art^ as human ingenuity. Is fuither dif- 
 tinguiftied from Science, like the practical from the theoretical 
 part of geometry ; for to be acquainted with the principles of 
 navigation, for inftance, does not yet form a pra6lical naviga- 
 tor : hence the Sciences imply the knowledge of things, and 
 the Arts teach us the practical application of that knowledge. — 
 Laftly, Ait is diftingulflied from handicraft ; the former may be 
 calledyrrf, the latter, mercenary art.'''' 44. Of the fine arts. 
 45. By fine art? is undcrftood any art, fo fnr as it, at the fame 
 time, Is imitative of nature. 46, 47. The fine arts are the ef- 
 forts of genius. 48. Of the diftinftion fubfifting between ge- 
 nius and tafte. ** To Judge of beautiful obje£ls, as fuch, re- 
 quires tajie y but the art of producing fuch objefts, fuppofes gc- 
 ftius.^^ 49. Of the faculties of the mind, which compofe what 
 is called genius. 50. Tafte and genius muft be combined in the 
 produdions of the fine aits. 51. Of the divifion of fine the arts : 
 
 *• 1.)
 
 iia ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 *' I.) tlie arts of language, viz. Oratory and Poetry; 2.) tlie 
 arts of fenfible imitation, which are cither thofe of true or of 
 illufory exhibitions, the former are called Piq/llc^ the latter 
 Painting : — Plqftlc includes Statuary and ArchitcBure; paint- 
 ing conlifts either in copying beauteous nature, or in beau- 
 ti-'ully arranging her produftions ; i. e. in the lefpeftive arts of 
 Painting ox Pleafurc-gardening ; — 3.) the beautiful combination 
 of external fenfations, viz. the arts of Mujic and Dying.'''' 
 52. Of the combination of the fine arts in one and the fame 
 produftion. 53. Comparifon of the fine arts with one another, 
 with regard to their aefthetical value. 
 
 Sect. II. Dialectic of the Aesthetical Jcdging Faculty. 
 f IJ5 — 57, Reprefentation and Solution of the Antinomy of Tafte. 
 
 58. On the Idealifm of conformation in nature as well as art, 
 being the only principle of the aefthetical faculty of judging. 
 
 59. Of Beauty as the fymbol of Morality, 60. Append. Of 
 the methodical do6lrine of Tafle. 
 
 Division II. Critiqjte of the Teleoi^ogical Faculty of 
 Judging. 
 
 § 61. Of the obje£live conformation of nature. 
 
 SeCl. I. Analyfis of the teleological faculty of fudging, 
 
 § 62. Of the objective conformation, which is merely formal, in 
 diftindion frojn what is material. 63. Of the relative con- 
 formation of nature, in diftinftion from the internal. 64. Of 
 the peculiar charafter of things, as purpofes of nature, d^. 
 Things, as natural purpofes, are organized beings. dG. Of the 
 principle of judging of the internal conformation of organized 
 beings. 67.- Of the teolological principle of judging of Nature 
 in general, as a fyftem of purpofes. 68. Of the principle of 
 
 ' Teleology, as an internal principle of Natural Philofophy. 
 
 ZeB. II. DialeElic of the teleologichl,Faculty of fudging. 
 
 § 69. The antinomy of the Judging Faculty. 70, 71. Repre- 
 fentption and folution of this antinomy. 72. Of the various 
 
 fvftem'J
 
 KANT's WORICS. 113 
 
 lyftems refpefting the conformation of nature. 73. None of 
 thefe fyftcms is fati'sfaftory. 74. The caufe of the impoflibility 
 of treating this ijiea,''' that nature is technically arranged," in a 
 dogmatical manner, lies in our incapacity of explaining the de- 
 ffgn or aim of nature. 75. The idea of an objective conforma- 
 tion of nature is a critical principle of Reafon, belonging to the 
 reflex Faculty of Judging. 76. Illuflrating remarks. 77. Of 
 the peculiarity of the human underftanding, from which the 
 idea of the purpofes of nature arifes. 78. On the principle of 
 the univcrfal mechanifm of matter, united vvith the teleological 
 principle in the technical (architeftonjc) arrangement of na-. 
 tu^e. 
 
 Ap?endix. Methodical doBrine of the teleological Faculty of Judging. 
 
 j 79. Whether Teleology ought to be treated as a branch of 
 Phyfics, 80. Of the ncceflity of clafllng the principle of me- 
 chanifm under that of teleology, when wc attempt to explain a 
 thing as a defign of nature, 8x. On the aflbciation of mecha- 
 nifm with the teleological principle, accounting for natura,! pur- 
 pofes, as being the productions of nature, 82. Of the teleolo- 
 gical fyftcm in the external relations of organized beings. 83. 
 Of the laft purpofe (defign) of nature as a teleological fyftern. 
 8^. Of the final purpofes of the exjftence of a world, i. e. of the 
 creation itfelf. 85. Of phyfico-theology. 86. Of ethlpo-theology. 
 87. Of the moral proof ofth* exiftence of God. 881 The validity 
 of this moral proof is limited. 89. Qf the ufe of the moral argu- 
 ment. 90. Of the manner of admitting things as true, in amoral 
 proof of the exiftence of God. 91. Of the manner ofconfidering 
 tilings as true, by means of a pradical belief, 
 
 XXVI. Uebey eine Entdeckung^ nach der alle Critik der retnen 
 Vernunft durch elne Hltere entbehrlich gemacht iverden foil. 
 On a certain difcoverj, bj means of which every (new) 
 Critique of pure Reafon is faid to be rendered unneceflary 
 by an earlier one. 8vo. Koenigsberg. I'jgo. 
 
 We merely take notice of this publication, here, for the fake of 
 completeu^fs. It can fcarctly be coniidcrcd. as forming a dillind
 
 114 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 part of Kant^ fyftematic works j it Is neither mentioned as fiich» 
 by the numerous German commentators upon the Critical Philo- 
 fophy, nor has Mr Nitsch of London availed himfelf of this (ap- 
 parently polemic) produ£lion, in his late view of the Kantian 
 principles. — For this reafon, we do not hefitate to pafs it over in 
 iilence, and to devote a confiderable degree of attention to the 
 following work, on Religion, Vfhich is of infinitely greater import- 
 ance. 
 
 XXVIL (lo.) Die Religion innerhalb den Gnn^en derblojjen, 
 Vernunft. Religion confidered within the bounds of meie 
 Reafon. Koenigsberg. 1793. ad Edit, enlarged. 1 794, pp. 
 314, and xxvi pp. Preface. 
 
 It cannot be a matter of indifference to a philofopher, to know 
 what relation the prevailing religion of the age bears to the fpe- 
 culative notions of Reafon, that are propagated in the philofophic 
 fyftems of his cotemporaries. Although the inquiries of this na- 
 ture be condu(Sled independently of any pofitivc religious creed, 
 we may yet congratulate ourfelves upon the difcovery, when that 
 pofitivc religion, which guides a very confiderable part of man- 
 kind, and which has produced fo many excellent moral effedls, is 
 not found to be altogether inconfiftent wirh the principles, main- 
 tained by the moft profound and eminent philofophers. We may 
 at the fame time learn, to give a more practical explanation upon 
 thofe fymbolical points, that have hitherto met with no ufeful ap- 
 plication, and that have occafioned many fruitlefs and bloody con« 
 tells. 
 
 No man of candour and impartiality will cenfure the deCgn of a 
 writer, who employs his philofophic maxims (if they be otherwife 
 well eftabliflied upon a critical baCs), in order to ferve as priiv 
 ciples, for explaining ambiguous doQrines and pofitive inftitutions. 
 For, if the Deity has immediately intrufted man with fo valuable 
 a gift as religion aftually is, it muft have been corrupted by men 
 themfelves, who have delivered it to their pofteyity, with fuch ad- 
 ditions as are inconfiftent with the principles of Reafon j and the 
 true original fenfe of fuch traditions can be difcover^d only 
 
 through
 
 fcAOT's WORKS. 115 
 
 through the proper exercife of Reafon. Every attempt, there- 
 fore, of reftoring harmony between the pofitive tenets of Religion 
 and thofe of philofophyj muft be confidered as highly beneficial to 
 mankind j becaufe, in this manner only, the defign of that revela- 
 tion can be confillently attained. 
 
 Our fatisfaftion, too, muft be the more complete, when we have 
 an opportunity of obferving, that fuch a revelation has not only 
 been preferved in its purity during the courfe of many centuries, 
 but likcwife has been the means of exercifing the rational facul- 
 ties of man, upon the moft profound fubjefts of inquiry. — If we 
 compare the principal tenets of the Chriftian Religion with the 
 principles of the Kantian fyftem, we (hall be agreeably furprifed 
 to find, that the former are perfeftly confiftent with the lattery 
 and that this author fatisfies all the claims, which can be made oa 
 philofophy, to eftablifti a pure religious doftrine. For the refult 
 of Kant's inveftigations, upon this head, is nearly the following : 
 
 ift, That Chriftianity is throughout a moral Religion^ fuch as Rea- 
 fon requires of every religious efteblifhment whatever. It is, 
 among the numerous religions in the world, the only one, which 
 derives its principles from pure morals, and which reprefents to 
 man" his defiination as attainable only by moral means. It indeed 
 prefuppofes, that he has the power and ability of doing, what 
 the law of philanthropy commands him j though, at the fame 
 time, Religion apprizes him of that refiftance, which natural 
 inclinations or carnal defires oppofe to the exercife of Reafon. 
 It further appropriates to him, in exprefs terms, the capacity of 
 overcoming thefe diiEculties ; and as the human underftanding 
 can arrive at no obje6\ive knowledge of fuch a power. Scrip- 
 ture lays the foundation of it In fomething beyond the reach of 
 the fenfes, while it gives man the affurance, that the Deity may 
 alfo endow him with faculties, which materially differ from 
 thofe of mere fenfitive beings j in order to accomplifh, by the 
 jpower of his will, whatever he judges to be morally right and 
 and falutary. In this manner alone, Reafon can form a com- 
 plete and clear notion, that the moral power is a fuperfenftbU 
 agent, whofe origin or, in the language of Kant, whofc poffibility 
 wc cannot by any means conceive. 
 
 Pa 2d
 
 ii6 ELEMENTARY ViEW OV 
 
 2d. The true deflination of man is, conformably to the principle* 
 of Chrlftlanity, not fought for in the fenfible, but in the fupcr- 
 fenfible part of nature. Man muft acquire happinefs by his rtio- 
 ral conduct, but he ought not to expedl the former in this world ; 
 not to derive his hopes of it from his fenfitive, but from his 
 moral nature. For, according to the Chriftian doflrine, his fole 
 bufiaefs hefe confifts in prepaiing and making himfclf worthy o£ 
 it, through a purely moral life. 
 
 ^d. The ChriUian Religion throughout prefuppofes a moral go- 
 vernment of the worlds ahd the idea of the moral order of things 
 ferves as its bafls : this orderj however, can be realized or ac- 
 compHflied only in relation to the whole exiftence of rational 
 beings. Exaftly in the fame manner is this propofition deter- 
 mined by our Reafon. 
 
 4th. The Religion of Chrift enjoins us to confider good will to all 
 mankind as the fupreme principle of all our aftions. It enjoins us 
 to unite felf-love, in equal proportion with univerfal benevolence, 
 or rather to make the forrajr fubfervient to the purpofes of the 
 latter : and this is precifely the didate of Reafon, and what Kant 
 afferts to be the fiift moral precept. Through this practical 
 law alone, the Chriftians determine the attributes of the Deity, 
 lince they reprefent him as the luoral creator, prefervcr, and 
 , ruler of the world. 
 
 5th. Thus, in the religion of Chrift, morality is laid down as the 
 cogiVofeible ground, on which we eftabllfti our knowledge of the 
 Deity. We can boaft, indeed, of no perceptive cognition of 
 that Being ; yet we are not contented with a mere fpeculative 
 notion of him, whofe attribuj^ we can clearly exhibit in the 
 idea of a moral intelligent power. Laftly, 
 
 6tb. The whole aim of the Chri^ian Religion is the moral im- 
 provement and perfeftlon of man^ The whole purpofe of Re- 
 ligion, when contemplated by ReafDn, can be no oth'^r than to 
 ; render ipan morally better, or to improve his moral worth. It 
 .rauft admit of being employed as the means of ftrengthening his 
 moral faculties, of removing the obftacles that frequently occur 
 in the pra£lice of morality, and of fortifying the powers of f 
 Reafon.
 
 KANT'S WORKS. »i7 
 
 Even the dogmatical part of the Chriftian doftrlne Is of fuch a 
 nature as to difplay, in the greater number of inftances, a relative 
 application to morals j and the principal tenets of it, have a ma- 
 nifeft tendency to folve moral difficulties. Thefe appear at fo early 
 a period among men, that attempts to account for them very foon 
 follow. Such explanations, in general, are extremely ludicrous, 
 efpecially in the infancy of Reafon, when fancy fupplies its place, 
 and before experience has been made our guide. Imagination 
 fearcely liftens to thefuggellions of Reafon j and, in this fituation, 
 men are eafily pleafed with any plauHble.anfvver, which their ancef- 
 tors have contrived from the rich ftores of ndythology. Though their 
 knowledge of objefts is not thereby increafed, yet the hypothefes 
 thus contrived are ufually ingenious, fo that they might afford 
 fome fatisfaftion, if they were founded upon any thing but fancy. 
 
 This infant age of reafoning, if it may be called fo, is attended 
 •with the advantage, that it docs not conceal the difficulties, for 
 which it cannot account. Reafon, being gradually enlightened 
 by philofophy, is confclous of this chimerical method of explairt> 
 ing things j but as it imagines any other explanation to be ira^ 
 poflible J it rather confiders the difficulty itfelf as fiflitious, in or-^ 
 der to ffiow, that all attempts at explaining it muft be difpenfed- 
 with. 
 
 By graidual advances, Reafon difcovers that fuch difficulties 
 really exift, and that ali fophifticaldifputes upon them 31*6 of no' 
 avail. At the fame time, we find that the former are of fuch a 
 nature, as to admit of no other folutlon than that by prafticat 
 ideas, and that thefe ideas are expreffed in thofe fanciful explana- 
 tions of mythology, by the reprefentation oifenjible objefts. 
 
 Now, fince every thing connedcd with morals, as well as every 
 conclufion drawn from that fource^ is juftly denominated by the 
 •pithet * divine j' it is eafy to perceive, how thofe mythological 
 objefls, together with the fiftitious produftions of fancy, could be 
 called divine revelations. For there really is a moral text or 
 meaning at the foundation of them, but which can be dlfclofed 
 only in a more Improved ftate of Reafon. 
 
 From this deduftion, it becomes perfe^ly evldent,^in what man- 
 utx wcmett with two very differtnt explanations of fuch books, aff 
 
 contdti>
 
 %ih ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 contain the like folations of lAoral propofitiotls, under ibe title of 
 Revelation. One of thefe explanations namely boafts of ftatingt 
 the literal fenfe of the Writ, and is ftyled the grammatical inter- 
 pretation : the other tracer the ideas, that may originally have oc- 
 cafioned thofe fi61ions, and confiders the fubjefts of mythology as 
 the fymbols of thofe ideas. And this is juftly called x\it moral in- 
 terpretation. If now each of the two purfues its own method of 
 inquiry, difputes may eafily arife among the different interpreters ', 
 for they will frequently find oppofite meanings in one and the 
 famie paffage. 
 
 Thefe diflenfions irt the interpretation of Scripture, daily dif- 
 jjiay their baneful efFedls, however eafily they might be fettled, if 
 the interpreters Were not averfc to enter into ^proper agreement 
 upon certain points. For, no man will deny, that all Revelation; 
 refts upon the inward ftate of t)ur mind ; that all pofitive Religions 
 are more or lefs perfe£l expreflions of Revelation j and that, there- 
 fore, the "true interpretation of it can be difcovered only by our* 
 own fubjeftive Operations. Hence it is, that thofe only, who are 
 well acquainted with the nature of the human miild, can find the 
 true fenfe of Revelations. Reafon is here liliewife the fupreme 
 tribunal, from which no further appeal can be made. The doftrines 
 of the original evil, of reconciliation, and many other principles, 
 peculiar to the Chriftian Religion, are founded on a bafis, that ad- 
 mits of very excellent and ufeful refleiRions, upt»n the moral con- 
 flitutiotl of man, and upon the manner in which his deilination has 
 been provided for. Nay, from thefe dodlrines, it is evident, how 
 thofe opinions, which appear to have a common origin in human 
 liature,have evet been reprcfented through certain narratives and al- 
 legories J and how the minds of men in all ages reforted to them, as 
 if they had been condafted by an invilible hand, without being uni- 
 formly confcious of their ttUe meaning. And is there any greater 
 fcrvice, which the philofopbic inquirer can render mankind, than 
 to invcHigate thefe traces of Reafon, which, by their facred anti- 
 quity, have fo important an influence on human affairs ; though 
 their origin be, for the mod part, involved in obfcurity. From this 
 inveftigation, the only explanation muft refult, which can contri- 
 bute to th«^ attainment of that ultimate end, for which man is ori- 
 ginally
 
 KANT'S WOI^IiS. ,ti^ 
 
 gliially defigned. If, in this way of explaining fymbols, we fearch 
 merely for figns of fuch truths, as are previously difcovercd by our 
 mind, the errors or miftakes cannot be fo detrimental, as if we aija- 
 ed at finding the truth itfelf, by means of thefe fymbols. For, in 
 the former cafe, imagination can merely miflead us to denote a 
 true thing by a falfe fymbol j whereas, in the latter cafe, we arc 
 f xpofed to the danger of confounding, a fymbol (to which our fancy 
 is but too fondly attached) with the truth itfelf, and thus of falling 
 into mere chimerical notions. Let, us therefore fearch in the re- 
 gions of truth J and, direfting our views to the monuments of anti- 
 quity. Inquire, whether among them we can difcovcr no figns 
 correfponding with our moral attainmcHts. Thus we may faci- 
 litate the accefs to the fan6luary of truth, in as much as our new 
 method of explaining will afcertain, whether we have fucceeded 
 in exploring the juft chara6ler of religious truths, and whether the 
 true fcnfe of the rpfpcdive fymbols has ever been clearly under- 
 ftQod. 
 
 • Contents. ' 
 
 Sect. I. On t^e coNjONgrioN qr league between the bad aki> 
 
 • GOOD principle J OR. ON THE RADICAL EVIL IN HUMAN NATURE. 
 
 1. Of the original difpofition (inclination) towards the good in 
 human nature. 
 
 2. Of the propenfity to, vice. 
 
 3. Whether man is naturally vicious. 
 
 4. Of the origin of evil in hupaan nature. 
 
 General Remarks. On the manner of reftoring to its vigour thk 
 or/jf/«tf/ difpofition towards the good. 
 
 Sect. II. On the contest between the good principle And thi 
 
 BAD, FOR THE DOMINION OVER MANKIND. 
 
 1. Of the legal claim of the gopd principle to the dominion 
 over mankind. 
 
 2. Of the legal claim of the bad principle to that dominion, and 
 the conteft between the two principles.
 
 A20 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 Sect^ IIL On the victory of the good principle over the BAt>, 
 
 AND THE FOUNDATION OF A KINGDOM OF GoD UPON EarTH. 
 
 Cbaj>. I. Philofophical exhibition of the viBory of the good principle, 
 - hy the foundation of a kingdom of God upon JSarth. 
 
 J. Of tlie ethical ftate of nature. 
 
 2. Man mud leave the ethical ftate of nature, in order to be- 
 come a member of an ethical commonxveahb. 
 
 3. The idea of an ethical commonwealth is that oi 9. people of 
 Gody under ethical laws. 
 
 4. The idea 0/ a people of God is (through human regula- 
 tions) no othcrwife to be exhibited in pradlice, but by the 
 formation of a Church. 
 
 5. The conftitution of every church uniformly begins with fome 
 or other hiftorical belief (revelation) which may be called the 
 church-rbclief, and this is mod fuitably founded on a Holy 
 
 ., Writ. 
 
 0. The pure religious b?}ief is the (wpremc interpreter of church- 
 belief. 
 
 7. The gradual tranfition of church-belief, to the excluflve pre- 
 valence of the pure religious belief^ indicates the approach 
 . qf a kingdom of God. 
 
 Chap. n. llijlorical exhibition of the gradual foundation of the pre- 
 
 dominance of the good principle upon Earth. 
 Sect IV. Of tije worship and spurious worship vkder the domi- 
 
 nion OF THE good principle, OR OF RELIGION AND PIi,IESTHOOD 
 
 * 
 
 A. Ofihe divine fervice in Religion in general. 
 
 1. The Chriftian Religion confidered as a Natural Religion. 
 
 2. The Chriftian Religion confidered as a Learned Religion- 
 
 B. Of the fpurious war (hip of God t in a flatutary Religion eflablifhed 
 by men. 
 
 J I. Of the general fubjecSlive ground ol religious fancy^ 
 
 2. 
 
 * Pfoff^nt^'ii'^i in German, is not literally ' priefthood,' nor does it fignify ' prieft- 
 craft ;' but it exprefl'es the ufurped dominion of the clergy, by which they pre- 
 tend to be in the exdufive pofleffion of the means of difpfhfing abfolution from 
 ^s and diYice grace.
 
 KANT'S WORKS 121 
 
 2- Tke moral principles of Religion, confidcred In oppofitlon 
 to religious fancy. 
 
 3. Of Priejihood, as being an order of men engaged In tbc 
 fpurious worflilp of the good principle. 
 
 4. Of the guide afforded by confcicnce, in matters of belief. 
 
 3JXVIII. 2.um ezuigen Frieden, &c. Project: for a perpetual 
 peace. A philofophical Ellay. 104 pp. 8vo. Konigshcrgy 
 
 1795- 
 
 Of this original work, which is fo muc!l and juftly admired on 
 the continent, we already poffefs an Englidi trarflation. And if 
 the appearance of this produ6lion in foreign verilons could efta- 
 blifii any proof of its merits, I might add, that " Kant's projecl fo^ 
 a perpetual peace" has been likewife tranilated into French, and 
 Indeed \vith the fan£lion of the author, who has furnlflied the 
 French tranflator with a fiew Supplement, which contains, " ^yi-- 
 f ret arilck for ^perpetual peace.'''' 
 
 Many of our political readers muft reroerKber, that the Idea of 
 a perpetual pc?.ce has fornierly employed the pen of the good 
 Abbot DE St. Pierre ; and that, at a ftill earlier period, the moft 
 patriotic King of whom France can boaft, Henry IV, was ferlouf- 
 ]y engaged in modelling this beneficent plan, which he propofed to 
 fubmit to the confidcratlon of his cotemporary. potentates, if an 
 untimely death had not fruftrated that phllaothropic dcfign. — 
 Though pur fage politicians have always confidcred plans of this 
 kind as the fanciful produ6lions of good-natured fanatics. It may 
 on the other hand be obferved, that by difputing on the poflibllity 
 of a perpetual peace, the neceflity of a perpetual warfare mufl; be 
 admitted as a maxim y bccaufp, without b?Ing continually prepa- 
 red for war, the different ftates of Europe could not long exift to- 
 gether. This maxim, however, is as abominable In theory, as it 
 is praftically deftruclive of every principle of morality. For, If 
 ^//independent ftates adopt or continue to prafllce fuch a maxim, 
 and if their views be conftantly dirc£led to the" execution of it, 
 t.heir political exiftence itfelfmuft be extremely precarious. Froni 
 jhis fource, I am Inclined to derive the frequent revolutions in the 
 
 Q^ poll tic a]^
 
 j2i ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 political world, the frequent returns from a ftate of intelle£lua]| 
 and moral improvement to their former barbaiifm, and the per- 
 petual animofities (emphatically called, «fl/«rd/ enmities) between 
 man and man, which are fo induftriouily tranfmitted from one ge- 
 neration to another y efpecially in the frontier-provinces of differ- 
 ent nations.— Man \s a fighting animal ! is the general outcry of 
 all thofe who are interefted, whether dire£lly or Indire£lly, in 
 propagating this abfurd and pernicious dodlrine. Even admitting, 
 that man is naturally prone to exercife his phyfical powers j that 
 ■ he has this propenfity in commqn with the lower animals j that he 
 occafionally manifefts the defire of revtnge and conqueft, not un- 
 like the rapacious tyger or the viftorious lion j and that he cannot 
 cafily overconae thefe natural inclinations, as long as his inhuman 
 feats are rnore admired and encouraged than the dignified, though 
 lefs amiring, exertions of his intellefl j — ^does it follow from thef<f 
 primitive difpofitions of favage man, that perpetual vv'arAre is a ne- 
 csffary evil in x\it prefent ftate of fociety ? I hope for the honour 
 of humanity, that none but the callous financiers of deluded na- 
 tions, or the avaricious contraftors of armies and navies, with their 
 numerous train of connexions, will be hardy enough to draw fo 
 falfe a conclufion. 
 
 "When we confider thofe, who dirc^ the affairs of nations, in a. 
 moral as well as legiflative caj)acity, it is rather furprifing, that 
 thfe important plan of a perpetual peace has never been duly weigh- 
 ed : while many fubjefts of lefs confequence, and comparatively 
 trifling jnatters, daily occupy their attention. Nobody will deny, 
 that the ideas of right and wrong, of juft and unjuft, are equally 
 applicable to a plurality of ftates^ as to different individuals of 
 one or feveral countries^ The only obllacle to the jufi app]ica» 
 tion of thefe ideas muft, therefore, lie in the diverfity of opinions, 
 arifing among thofe corrif/>;<?// fervants of the ftate, to whom the 
 management of external affairs is intrufted. Why, therefore, do 
 the rulers of nations rot agree upon a general federation of ftates ? 
 — ^Why do they not, like every other reqfonable being, fubmit to 
 arbitration, by chooCng the arbiters from the bofom of difinterefted 
 ftates •, in order to fettle fuch differences as their own minifters 
 cannot determine? This would be the only rational and proper 
 
 method i
 
 KANT'S WORKS 123 
 
 method j a method^ which is dally pradifed In private life, by 
 thofc very men, wh<) feem to oppofe its introdudlion in diplonaatic 
 tranfaftions. Nay, if the arm of violence and rapacity were per- 
 mitted to decide the quarrels of individuals, all civil inftitutions 
 and focial compafls would fodn be diffolvcd. And does not the 
 fame reafoniiig apply to every government, whether mdnarchical; 
 ariftrocratic, or democratic ? — have we not fufficient teftimonies 
 upon hiftorical record, that diffolutioh and annihilation have hi- 
 therto been their ultimate fate ? 
 
 Induced by fuch confideratlons, the venerable Kant, after ha- 
 ving obferved the political changes of Europe, for upwards of half 
 a century, fteps forward with a plan drawn up in a diplomatic 
 form. His noble defign of Hopping the prodigal effulion of human 
 blood, and his aim at convincing the governors of nations, that the 
 prafticability of this plan merely depends upon the exertions of 
 their moral will, are equally confpicuous. The great modern 
 improvements in Ethics throughout fociety, particularly in the 
 highei ranks j the view of the innumerable fufferings and exter- 
 minations accompanying the prefent ftate of warfare in Europe ; 
 and finally the convi£lion, that his " Projed" is truly praflicable 
 and morally unexceptionable j thefe were fufficient motives to roufe 
 the " hoary philofopher of the North," and to animate him with 
 new vigour for this grand and benevolent attempt. 
 
 The author exhibits the Preliminary ^m^L J)efinitive Articles for 
 a perpetual peace, in two Seftions, which he accompanies with , 
 proper illuftrations. The preliminary articles are as follows ; 
 
 1. ** No treaty of peace ftiall be confidered as valid, that has been 
 cortduded with a fecret referve of matters for a future war. 
 
 2. " No independent ftate fhall ever be permitted to be transferred 
 to the dominion of another ftate, whether by inheritance, ex- 
 change, purchafe, or donation. 
 
 3. " Standing armies (miles perpetuus) ftiall in time be entirely 
 difcharged. 
 
 4. " No national or ftate debts (hall be contrafted, that relate to 
 the external or foreign affairs of the ftate. 
 
 5. " No ftate {hall, by force of arms, interfere with either the con- 
 ftitotion or government of other ftates.
 
 124 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 6. " No flate, at war with another, (hall make ufe of fftch hofti- 
 litles, as rauft deftroy their reciprocal confidence in a future 
 peace' j for inftance, the employing of affafljns, poifoners, the 
 violation of cartels, the inftigation of tfeafonable pradices, re- 
 bellion in the inimical flate, &c." 
 
 The conclufion of a definitive peace prcflippofes it as a poflulate : 
 " that ail men, who are able to produce reciprocal efiefts upon 
 each other, mufl: neceffarily be fubjedi to fome civil inftitutiohs." 
 All civil inftitutioils, however, as far as regards the /)fr/o/7j fub- 
 mittlng to them', may be reduced to three claffes : i.) thofe con- 
 cerning the right of the citizen in the ftate ; 2.) thofe relative to 
 the right of natioiis j and 3.) thofe afcertaining the rights of the 
 citizen of the world (cofmopolite'). Conformably to this intro- 
 dufiion, the author propofes three Definitive Articies. 
 
 I. The civil conjiiiution of every ^ate ouoht to be republican. — By a 
 republlcaa conftitution is here underftood fuch a one, as is 
 founded upon the principles of libcf-ty^ dependence, and equality. 
 By means of that liberty, acquired by the conltitutional law, 
 all the members of a Hate muft be entitled to the privilege of 
 obeying no other external or bye-laws than thofe, to which 
 they have given their confent. By virtue of their legal ^/^/)f«</« 
 iv/c^, all members of a fociety are fubjedl to only one common 
 legiflation. And by their legal equality, among men as citizens 
 of the ftate, there mull fubfift fuch a relation, that none of them 
 can lawfully oblige the other, without fubjefting himfelf to the 
 law, by which the other p^rty may reciprocally compel him in 
 H fimilar inftance. This^ therefore, is the only constitution, 
 which forms the balls pf every other in civil fociety j and it is 
 lillo the only one, that Can lead to a perpetual peace. For, in 
 a government, where the confent of the citizens of the state is 
 required for declaring war, they will be very cautious in giving 
 their approbation to thofe horrid meafiires, in confequence of 
 which they themfelvcs muft bear all the calamities of a bloody 
 conteft. 
 
 In order to prevent any mifconftrudion of terms, Kant dif- 
 tinguifties a republican from a democratic conftitution, by dlf- 
 criicinating benveen iht formi of government {imperii)^ and thofe 
 
 of
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 125 
 
 of adminijlration [regimlnis) j the former of which are deter- 
 mined by the diftindion oiperfoTHy who hold thefupremc power 
 of the ftate, but the latter, by the mode of governing the people 
 by a fupremc head, whoever this may be. The forms of go- 
 vernment, or thofc of the former kind, are, autocrafy or Uic 
 power of the prince, arijiocracy or the power of the nobles, and 
 democracy or the power of the people : thofe of the latter kind, 
 namely the forms of adminiftration, are republicantfm and defpa- 
 tifnt. The former of thefe again confifls, according to the eflen- 
 tial charafters above defcribed, in the feparation of the execu- 
 tive power from the legiflative j the latter, namely defpotilin, 
 is the arbitrary execution of the laws, which tliefovereign him- 
 felf has enafted j fo that his private will becomes the public 
 law of the nation. — Concerning democracy then, Kant affirms, 
 that it necejjhrily leads to defpotifth j becaufe it eftablifhes a 
 legiflative and executive power, by which all have a (hare ia 
 forming refolutions relative to one^ and even agalnft this one, 
 who confequcntly would not agree with them, fo that all zxc fald 
 to partake of the legiflation, when in faft they do not fo ; which 
 is in contradiftion to the general will itfelf and to liberty. 
 II. *rhe rights of nations ought to be founded upon a federation of in' 
 dependent Pates. — The author's ideas in this article are expreffed 
 with equal boldnefs, energy, and truth. The refult of them is 
 this : In the relative condition of ftates to one another, there 
 can be rationally no other method of extricating tliemfelves 
 from the lawlefs condition, that engenders continual wars, than 
 to imitate individual man in the rcfignation of his wild (uncon- 
 ftiained) liberty \ to accomodate themfelves to public com- 
 pulfory lavvs j and thus to form a fate of n^//o«j-, gradually in- 
 creafing, and at length comprehending all the nations of the 
 earth. Since, however, according to their notions of the right 
 of nations, they are averfe to fubmit like individuals to the lavvs 
 of corapulfion j and fince they rejeft in hypothesi what is jull 
 ia thesi; let them at leaft adopt the negative fubftitute of a fe- 
 deration (congrefs) for the prevention of war, inflead of the 
 pofui-iit cftablifhmcnt of an univsrfal republic. Such a congrefs 
 may at Icaftfaveus from total ruin, by checking that hof- 
 
 tile
 
 i%6 kLEJVIENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 tile difpofttion of man, -which (huns the operation of the law ; it 
 may gradually fpread its beneficent influence to diftant nations ; 
 though it will neverthelefs be in conftant danger of being inter- 
 rupted, by the capricious oppofition of a lawlefs monarch. 
 
 III. Tbe cofmopolitical right Jhall be limited to conditions ofuniverfal 
 hofpitality. — The cofitiopolitical right is that of a ftranger, by 
 ■which he is intitled tO a friendly reception at his arrival upon 
 foreign ground. It is not ftri6^1y the light of hofpitality, but 
 that of vifiting one another, which belongs to all men^ in offer- 
 ing their company, by virtue of their common inhabitation 
 of the furface of the earth. The inhofpitality of ifea-coafts, for 
 inftance that of Barbary, and the inhofpitable conduct of cul- 
 tivated and chiefly of comniercial nations of our quarter of the 
 globe^ who change their vijtts into conque/is, is confequently 
 againil the law of nature. As, liowever, the means of commu- 
 nication among the nations of the eatth are fo much improved, 
 that the violation of a right on one fpot of the globe is now felt 
 in all countries j it hence follows, that the idea of a cofraopoli- 
 tical law is not a whimfical or extravagant reprefentation of a 
 Hght, but a negcffary fupplement to a code, that remains to be 
 Written, and that relates to the rights of ftates and nations, as 
 ■well as to the rights of man in general. Under this condition 
 only, we may flatter ourfelves witTi the hopes of a continual, 
 though gradual, approximation to a perpetual peace. , 
 
 In the further iliuftrations annexed to thefe articles, the 
 author maintains, that both morals and politics^ fo far from 
 being in oppofition to this plaOj rather tend to confirm and to 
 render it univerfal j " for, ' fays he,' the guarantee of this 
 compaft is the grand and ingenious artift, nature herfelf, who by 
 her mechanical courfe evidently manifefts her purpofed aiin of 
 reftoring harmony among men, even againft their will, and in 
 the very bofom of their contentions. The provifional difpofi- 
 tions made by nature for this purpofe,ftre the following: i) that 
 ihe has provided for the fubfiftence of man in all climates j 
 ^) that (he has difpcrfed them, through wars, in every dlrcftlon, 
 even to the moft inhofpitable countries, in order to people 
 thcjn ) and 3) that fl\e has thus compelled them to enter into re- 
 
 ' I ciprockl
 
 KANPs WORKS. t%f 
 
 ciprocal engagements, which are more or lefs eftablilhed "by 
 law." 
 
 The many valuable hints and philofophical refleftlons, con- 
 tained in this little work, it is impoflible to abridge. And dSt 
 we poffefs an Englifh tranflation of it, I muft refer the curiousj 
 reader to the book itfelf j at the fame time affuring him, that 
 he will find the ^rts of courts and the juggles of ftatefemen ex- 
 pofcd, in a matiner altogeihcT original. 
 
 XXIX. (ii*) Metaphyjifche Atifangsgrunde der Rechtslehi^e. 
 Mctaphjfical Eleme;its of Jurifpnidence. Svo. Konigsherg^ 
 1797. xii pp. Preface ; Lll. pp. IntroduSion j and 235 
 pp. Text. 
 
 This work affords another proof of the very cxtenfive applica- 
 tion, of which the Kantian philofophy is fufceptible. Having 
 in his former publications eftabliflied, on a critical bails (that of «» 
 pure and praftical Reafon), the principles of Phyfics, of Tafte, o£ 
 Morality, and of rational Religion, the author proceeds in the 
 prefent, to deduce from the fame fource the elements of Jurifpni- 
 dence J and not only lays down the private rights of individuals^ 
 but unfolds alfo the principles, which ought to determine the in- 
 ternal arrangements of Civil Society, and regulate the intercourfe 
 of nations. 
 
 The mode, in which Prof. Kant treats tbe fubjeft, will ap- 
 pear from the following obfervation : " A Syftem of Jurifprudencc, 
 the firft part of the Science of Morals, derived from Reafon, and 
 which might be termed the Metaphyfics of Law, is dill a defidc- 
 ratum in philofophy. But as the idea of law, though pure, has a 
 relation to praftice j i. c. is applicable to the cafes occurring in ex- 
 perience, a metaphyfical fyilem of it, in its divifion, muft alfo have 
 a reference to the empirical variety of thofe cafe"!, in order to 
 make the divifion complete, which is an indifpenfable requifite in 
 the formation of a Syftem of Reafon. Completenefs of divifion, 
 however, in what is empirical, is impoflible •, and where it is at- 
 tempted, or at leafl an approximation to it, fuch ideas cannot be 
 confidercd as integral parts in a Syftem, but merely as examples. 
 
 The.
 
 ji^ ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 Thtt only proper appellation, therefore, for the firft part of the 
 Metaphyfics'Of Morals, Is ' Mctaphyfical Elements ofjurifprudenee-y 
 Jbccaufe, with rcfpec^ to the application to thefe cafes, there can 
 only be an approxinjation to a Syftcm, not a Syftem itfelf." 
 
 Having, in a general introduftion developed the principles of 
 the Moral Science, and having (hown the npceflity of a Mctaphy- 
 fical Syftem of Morals, i.e. of jj praftlcal phllofophy derived from 
 ideas a priori merely, and which has not nature, but the freedom 
 cf the human will, for its objeft ; the author makes the following 
 diftiflftion between Juftice and the other virtues, between Ethics 
 aad Jurifprudence. — " All leglflation, ho/.ever it may agree with 
 refpe^tothe adlions, being in every c^fe external, may yet be dif- 
 tinguiftifid with regard to the motives. That legiflation, which 
 conftitutes an aftion a duty, and at the fame time makes this duty 
 the motive, is Ethical. But th?t, which does not include in the 
 rule the idea pf duty, which on the contrary admits another mo- 
 tive than this idea, is Juridical. With refpe£l to the latter, it is 
 eafy to perceive, that this motive, different from the idea of duty, 
 xnuft be derived. fronj the pathological grounds, by which the will 
 is determined, viz. inclination and difincljnation, and among thefe 
 from thofe of the latter kind ; becaufe it is a legiflation which is 
 corapulfory, and doies not influence the condu6l by the allurements 
 of reward. — The mere conformity of ^n aSion to the rule, with- 
 out regard to the motive, is called its legality \ but that, in whicfi 
 the idea of duty, arifing from the rule, is at thiS fame time the mo-' 
 live of the aftion, is its morality. The duties, according to a J14- 
 ridical legiflatioji, can only be external, becaufe this legiflation 
 does not re<juirf , that the idea of duty, which is internal, fliould^p 
 in itfelf the principle, by which the will of the agent Is deter- 
 mined J and as a proper motive for the rule is neverthelefs pecef- 
 fary, it can only be externally connei^led with that rule. Ethical 
 legiflation, on the other; hand, makes our internal a£lions alfo du- 
 ties, not as it were excluding the external, but proceeding on 
 what is duty In general. And as Ethical legiflation includes in its 
 rule the internal motive of a^ion, the idea of duty, which deter- 
 mination can by no means be introduced into an external legifla- 
 tion p fo this Ethical legiflation cannot be external, not even that 
 ' of
 
 KANTs WORK. 129 
 
 of a Divine wlllj although indeed it affumes for motives, aj ^«>/g- 
 duties, thofe duties which d-epcnd upon another, namely an exter- 
 nal leglflation. It is not a duty of virtue to keep one's promlfe, 
 but an obligation of juftice, of law, to the performance of which 
 one may be compelled. Yet to do this, where no compullion Is 
 to be apprehended, is a virtuous aftion, a proof of virtue. Jurif- 
 prudence and Ethics then arc diftinguifhed, not fo much by the 
 different duties they enjoin, as by the difference of the leglflation, 
 which conneSs with the rule the one or the other motive." 
 
 Next follows a particular ' IniroduBion to "jur if prudence^ la 
 tfhich the following fubjedls are difcuflcd. 
 
 Sect. I, § A. Of Jurifprudence. B. .Of Jujice.— i:\it idea of 
 ■what is juft or right, fo far as it refers to a correfponding obligation, 
 includes firft, the merely external and praftical relation of one per- 
 fon to another, in fo far as their aftions, as fafts, can have medi- 
 ately or immediately an influence on each other. But fecondly, 
 it does not imply the relation of the will of one individual to the 
 wijh or mere luaytt of another, as in the anions of charity or in- 
 fenfibility, but merely to the wi/l of that other. Thirdly, in this 
 reciprocal relation of wills, the matter of the will, i. e. the end, 
 which every body has in view with the objeft, which he wills, does 
 not come under confideratioa. For inftance, the queflion is not, 
 whether one gains or lofes by the commodities, which he purchafed 
 from me for the exercife of his trade, but merely according to the 
 form in the relation of each will, fo far only as it is confidered as 
 free, whether the aftion of the one be confiflent with the freedom 
 of the other, according to a general law. — C. General principles 
 of Juftice. — Every a<ftion is juft or right, according to the maxim 
 of which the freedom of will of one individual is compatible with 
 the freedom of another, agreeably to a general law. D. Jujlice or 
 law, necefTarily prefuppofes compulfion or force.— -E. 5'//-/c5Z juftice 
 or law, may alio be reprefented as the pofTibility of a reciprocally 
 exerted force, confiftent with the freedom of every man, and with 
 general rules or lavvs. 
 
 Sect. II. i. Of Equity. l.Of the lawqf necefjuy. 
 Sect. III. Division ot }vM%?K.VDi.iicz.~— A. General divi/ion of the 
 duties of juftice.'&. General divifton of I anas apd right t, i.) Law, as 
 
 R a
 
 13« ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 a fyftematic do£liIne Is divided Into the Law of Nature, whlcli de^ 
 pends entirely on principles a priori^ and pofitlve or ftatutary law, 
 wlilch proceeds from the will of a legiflator. 2.) Of rights, as 
 the moral power of laying others under an obligation, the chief 
 divifion is into the original and acquired'., the former of which eve- 
 ry man inherits by nature, independent of any legal aft j the lat^ 
 ter cannot be attained without fuch an aft. — The only original 
 right, that is born with man, is freedom or Independence on any 
 other arbitrary will,, fo far as It is confiftent with the liberty of 
 every individual, according to a general law. 
 
 Further Contents of the wori. 
 
 Part L Of the private right of property in general. 
 
 Chap. I. Of the mode of pojjejjing fomething external as property. 
 
 § I. My pro^ierty is that, with which I am fo connefted, that 
 the ufe, which another might make of it againft my will, would 
 injure me. The fubjeftive condition of the pofllbillty of ufe, in 
 general, is pqffejjioa. §. 2, — -3. Juridical poftulate of praftical 
 reafon. It Is poflible to have every external objeft of my will as 
 my property j i. e. the maxim is contrary to juftice, according to 
 vvhich, if it were a law, an external objeft of the will behoved to 
 be In itfelf without an owner (res nullius). § 4. Expofitlon of 
 the idea of external property. Of the external objefts of ray will 
 there can be only three : i.) a corporeal thing without me ; 2.) 
 the will of another to a determined aft (praeftatlo) j 3. the fitua- 
 tlon of another in relation to me, according to the Categories of 
 Subftance, Caufality, and Community between me and external 
 objefts, agreeable to the laws of freedom. § 5. Definition of the, 
 idea of external property. External property is that without me, 
 to hinder me from ufing which, as I chufe, would be unjuft, or an 
 injury. § 6. Deduftion of the idea of the mere legal or civil 
 poffeflion of an external objeft. § 7, Application of the principle 
 of the poffibllity of external property to the objefts of experience. 
 § 8. To have fomething external as property, is only poflible in a 
 juridical ftate, under a public legiilative power, I. e. in civil fo- 
 ciety. § 9. In the ftate of nature, nothing but a mtxtly provifiona I ^ 
 though real external, property can take place. 
 
 Chap.
 
 kANT's WORKS. 13* 
 
 bHAP. II. Of the mode of acquiring external property > 
 \ 10. General principles of external acquifition. — I afcquire 
 lomething originally, when I caufe that to become mine, which 
 formerly was the property of no other perfon. — Divifion of the 
 acquifition of external property : i.) according to the matter (the 
 tobjefl) I acquire either a corporeal thing (fubftance), or the per- 
 formance of another perfon (caufality), or this other perfon, i. e. 
 bis or her (late, fo far as I obtain a right to rule over that perfon j 
 2.) according tcf the forth or ihodfe of acquifition, I have either a 
 f-eal right, or aperfonal right, ot both real and perfonal right to the 
 poffeflion, hot the ufe, of another perfon or thing* 
 
 SeB. t. Of real rights. § tl. A real right is the ri^ht to the 
 private life of a thing, in the cOmraoti poflefllon of which (whether 
 original or acquired) I am with all others. § 12. The firft acquU 
 Ction of a thing can be no other than that of the foil. § 13. Every 
 part of the foil may be originally acquired, and the ground of thd 
 pofTibillty of this acquifition is, that the foil in general was ori- 
 ginally common. $ 14. The legal aft of this acquifition is eccU' 
 pancy. § 15. It is In civil fociety alone, that ?Xiy peremptory ac- 
 quifition can be made : in a ftate of nature it can only be provi- 
 Jtonal. § 16. Explanation of the idea of an original acquifition of 
 the foil. § 17. Dcduftlon of this ide?; 
 
 Seci. II. Of perfonal rights. § 18. A perfonal right is the pof- 
 feflion of the will of another, as the power of determining that will 
 through mine to a certain aftion, according to the laws offrecdom. 
 — Of the transference of will by contraft. § 19. Of the confti- 
 tuents of a contradt. § 20. Of the caufality of the will of another^ 
 ^hicb Is acquired. § 21. In a contraft, a thing Is not acquired by 
 the acceptance of the promlfe, but by the delivery of what has 
 been promjfed. 
 
 SeB.Wl. Of real— 'perfonal right. § 22.This right Is that of the 
 poffeflion of an external objeft as a things and of the ufe of it as » 
 perfon. § 23, Of the right of the Family-Society. § 24, — 27. 
 Title firjl: of the right of marriage. §28 — i^.li\\\tfecond'. of 
 the rights of parentage. § 30. Title third', of the rights of a 
 Maflcr of a Family. §31, 32. Dogmatical divifion of all the rights 
 
 R 2 acr;i;uirabi0
 
 132 ELEMENTARY VIEW OV 
 
 acquirable by contra6!s. I. Of Money. II. Of literary ptoperty. 
 SeSi. IV. O/tl^e ideal acquifttion of an external objeEl of the wilL 
 I. § ^^. Of prcfcription, or the mode of acquiring property by 
 length of poffefllon. II. § 34. Of acquifition by Inheritance. III. 
 § $$y^6, Ofpoftbumous reputation. 
 
 Chap, III. Of the fubjeBhely conditioned acquifttion^ by the fentence 
 
 of a Public Court of Juflice. 
 
 A. § 37. Of the contraft of Donation. B. § 38. Of the con- 
 trail of Loan (commodatum). C. § 39. Of the re-acquifition or 
 reclaiming af property lo'.l ("vindicatio). D. S 40. Of the acqui- 
 fition of fecurity by oath (cautio juratotia). § 41, 42^. Tranfition 
 from property in a ftate of nature, to that in a juridical date, or. 
 civil fociety in general. 
 
 Part II. Of Public Law. 
 
 SeB. I. § 43, 44. Of the Con/1 itutional Law of a State. § 45 — 47. 
 Of a State as a coUe^lion of men. — Of the powers in a State, Le- 
 giflative, Executive, and Judicial. " The only rational plan of 
 government is that, in which the combined will of the people de- 
 termines the law." § 48, 49. Of co-ordinate and fubordinatc 
 powers. — General Remarks. — j4. Of the fupreme power j of the 
 focial compaft, and the duty of obedience. Of redrefs of grie- 
 vances. Offedition and rebellion. — According to the principles 
 eftablifhed by Kant, *' A change in the Conftitution of a State, 
 " which Its faults may fometimes render neceffary, can only in 
 *' juflice be accomplifhed by the Sovereign, by means oi reform 'y 
 *' not by the people, by means of a revolution j and if it take place, 
 *' it can only afiFeft the executive, not the legiflative power. At 
 ** the fame time, if a revolution has once been brought about, and 
 ** a new conftitution eftablifhed, the inju^ice of this- revolution in 
 *' its beginning and accomplifhraent, does not free the fubjefts 
 ** from the obligation to accommodate themfelves, as good citf- 
 " zens,.to the new order of things." B. Of the rights of the fo- 
 vereign power to the territory of the State. Of the rights of 
 taxation. Of Fin; nee and Police. C. 0/ the maintenance of the 
 poor J of FoundlinT Hofpitals j of a religious eftablifhment. D. Of 
 
 tfcc
 
 KANT^s WORKS 13J 
 
 the diftribution of offices j of rank In the State ; of Nobility. E. 
 Of criminal law, and a penal code 5 of the right of punifhing and 
 pardoning. § 50. Of the relation of a citizen to his native and 
 other countries, in point of right and 'obligation. §51. Of the 
 different forms of government. § 52. Of the attainment of that 
 rational form, which the fpirit of an original compaft requires, 
 tvhich mzkes freedom alone \kt principle, i. c. the bafis, and con- 
 dition of all ^rc^. — Of the reprefentative Syftem. 
 
 Seil. II. Of the law of Nations^ or infernatidnal law. § 55, 54, 
 Nations, in their external relation to each other, are in a ftate of 
 nature, not unlike lawlefs favages, among whom the right of the 
 ftrongeft is eftablifhed j confequently, a confederacy of Hates be- 
 comes neceffary, in order to prote£l one another againft external at- 
 tacks, conformably to the idea of an original focial compaft, 
 § ^^ — 58. Of the right of making war, both with regard jto the 
 fubjefls of a State, and foreign nations. § 59, 60. Of the right of 
 peace. § 6t. Of the injurtlce of a ftatc of warfare. " there Jh all 
 be no war, is the irrefiftible veto of morally-pra£Hcal Reafon,"— 
 Of the mode of bringing nations, like individuals, firom a ftate of 
 nature to & Juridical Hale. — Of the eftablifliment and maintenance 
 of a perpetual peace, by means of a permanent Congrefs of States, 
 
 Seci. III. Cf Cofmopolitical law, or the rights of the citizeti of the 
 world. § ^1. Of the right of mutual intercourfe and commerce, 
 as belonging to all mankind. 
 
 Concluftori, 
 
 This ufftion of the whole human race, under certain unlverfal 
 laws, it may be faid, is not the partial, but the total and complete 
 attainment of the grand aim, the final purpofe of Jurifprudence 
 within the boundaries of mere Reafon. For, that the prototype of 
 a juridical federation of men, according to public laws In general, 
 mull be derived from Reafon a/r/or», is no%v obvious j fince all the 
 Examples, taken from experience, can indeed ferve the purpofe of 
 illuflrating, but not of eftablifhing, the necefTity of a metaphyflcal 
 decifion of this important queflion. Thofe very men, who fmlle 
 •ttbe novelty of this In'^ulry, Incautioufly betray therafelves, when 
 
 they
 
 S34 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 they admit, and even make ufe of the common-place affcrtiori^ 
 *' that that is the beft conftitution, in which the laws govern, not 
 Tneni" And what, * fays the author,' can be more fublimc than 
 this idea, which is evidently applicable to praftice, and capable or 
 being realized in experience, and which alone — provided it is not 
 attempted to be brought about by means of revolutions, or the 
 forcible overthrow of all erroneous eftablifhraents (for that would 
 be the annihilation of all law and juftlce), but by gradual reform, 
 according to fixed principles — leads by continual approximation 
 to the fupreme political good, a perpetual peace. 
 
 XXX. (i2.) Metaphyjtfche Anfangsgrunde der Tugendlehre. 
 Metaphjfical Elements of Ethics. 8vo. Koenigsberg. 1797.' 
 
 With this publication Prof. Kant will probably conclude hisi 
 fyftematic labours in the field of the Critical Philofophy. Though, 
 on account of its very recent appearance, I have not yet obtained 
 a copy of this work, among the; bbol^s lately received from Ger- 
 many J I can in fome degree fatisfy the curiofity {of the reader, by 
 flating the objeft of it, as. abftrafled from the general Introduc- 
 tion, which is premifed to the preceding " Elements of Jurif- 
 prudence-" 
 
 * Moral laws can only be fo far valid as rules, if they can be 
 eftabliQied a priori, fo that the neceffity of them becomes evident. 
 For the conceptions and judgments, relative to our aftions and o* 
 mifiions, have no moral application at all, if they contain nothing 
 further than what is learned from experience. And if we fhould 
 even be milled to affume any data, from the latter fource, as moral 
 principles, we cannot avoid falling into the groffert and moft de- 
 flru£live errors. 
 
 ' If the doftrine of morals had no other aim than that of per- 
 fonal happinefs, it would be abfurd to fearch for principles apriori^ 
 in order to eftablifti fuch a doftrine. For, however plaufible it 
 may appear, that Reafon can perceive previous to experience, by 
 what means man may arrive at the permanent enjoyment of the 
 true pleafures of life, yet every propofition of this kind, a priori^ 
 JK cither tautological, or it refts upon groundlefshypothefes. Ex- 
 pedience
 
 KANT'S WORKS. 135 
 
 penence alone can inform us of what is attended with pleafure. 
 The natural Inftinft for nourifliment, the fexual ioipulfe, reft, mo- 
 tion, and](afler developing the difpofitions of nature) the ftruggles 
 for honour, the enlargement of our knowledge, and the like, caa 
 iptimate to every individual in particular, how he may ejlimate 
 his pleafures, and at the fame time inform him of- the means, by 
 which he is to attain \}s\tm.. All plaufible reafoning a priori is^ 
 here, in reality nothing elfe but experience, which, by indu6lion, 
 has received a general charadler. This generality, far from being 
 univerfal, is fo very limited, that an indefinite number of excep- 
 tions muft be granted to every individual, in order to adopt that 
 choice in the mode of life, to his particular inclination, and to his 
 fufceptibility of pleafures j — fo that, in the end, he can profit and 
 ^row wifer only from his own detriment, or that of others. 
 
 * The doftrines of morality, however, have a very different 
 prigtn. They are imperative to every individual, without regard- 
 ing his inclinations j for this rcafon merely, becaufe he is a free 
 fubjeft, and is capable of reafoning pradlically. Inftruflion, 
 in the laws of morality, is not derived from reflc6lion upon 
 ourfelves and our animal nature, nor from the obfervation of the 
 courfe of the world, namely from events and a£lions ; but Reafon 
 itfelf commands us, how to a£l, though we (hould find no j^nalogy 
 or example in experience, corrcfponding wilh the prefent cafe. 
 Reafon, further, in this injundlion, docs not attend to the ad- 
 vantage or difadvantage, which may accompany our a6lions , for 
 experience alone could give us any information upon this point. 
 \Ve are indeed entitled to purfue our advantage in every poflible 
 manner, provided that we aft confiftently with both Reafon an4 
 prudence j for the former enjoins, while the latter only advifei 
 jhat, upon the whole, we fhall derive greater advantages, if wc 
 follow, than if wc tranfgrefs the diftates of Reafon.*
 
 ts6 ELEMENTARY VIEW OF 
 
 ^be following EJfays^ written by Prof, Kant, were 
 publifhed in differ ent periodical works of Germany^ 
 in the chronological order here fated. 
 
 I. Von den verfchiedenen Ra^en der Menfchen. Of the dif- 
 ferent races of man. Publiflied in Engel's Philofopher of the 
 nvorld : firfl Edit. 8yo. Leipzig^ I777> fromp.,4 25 to p. 164. 
 
 3. Briefwechfel zwijchen Kant und de7n 'vetifiorbenen Lamm 
 hert, Correfpondence between Kant and the late Lambert., — 
 Publifhed in Bernouilli's Literary Correfpondence between 
 learned Germans. Vol,{L from p. 333 to 368. — 1781. 
 
 3. Idee %u einer allgemeinen GefchicJote in welthurgerlicher 
 Ahficht. — ^Plan of a general hiftorj in a cofmopolitical view. 
 Publifhed in the Berlin Monthly Magazine^ for November, 
 1784, ^ . 
 
 4. Beantivortung der Frage : ivas ifl Aufkldrung ? — Reply 
 to the queflion, what is underflood bj illumination (of mind). 
 Ihid. for December, 1784, 
 
 5. XJeler die Vulhane im Monde, — On the Volcanos in the 
 moon. Ibid, for March, 178 5. 
 
 6. Von der Unrechtm'dJJigkeit des Biichernachdrucks . — On the 
 injuftice of printing fpurious editions of books.— -/^/V. for 
 May, 1785.
 
 KANTs WORICS tsl 
 
 7. Befiimmung des Begriffs einer Menfchenrace. — Definition 
 of the idea conneded with the cxpreffion " a race Qf men."— 
 Ibid, for November, 1785. 
 
 8. MuthmafsUcher Anfang der Menfchengefchichte — On 
 t^e probable Origin of Human Hiilory. Ibid, for January, 
 1786. 
 
 This Effay the author himfelf confiders as the moft fuccefs- 
 ful of his popultr produftions, or minor works. And though I 
 have not been able to procure a copy of that number, in which 
 it appeared in the Berlin Monthly Magazine, without ordering the 
 whole fet for tbe year 1786, I can give the following charafler of 
 this treatife, upon the authority of Prof. Will of Alidorf^ as ex- 
 trafted from his " LeBures on the Kantian Philofophy^ 8vo. 200 
 pages J 1788," In which he fays, p. 32 :— ' This mafterly perfor- 
 
 * mance contains a philofophical explanation, which certainly is bet- 
 
 * ter founded than upon mere conjefture (as the title modeftly ex- 
 
 * preffes). Though it apparently deviates from the Mofaic nar- 
 ^ ratlve, it neverthelefs forms an ufeful addition to the Bible, and 
 ^ affords illuftrations of its hiftorical truth.^ 
 
 9. Was heifst : Jich im Heiiken orientiren ? — What is under- 
 ftood by the expreffion, " to familiarize onefelf in thinking j" 
 
 ). e. to trace the ideas of our own mind to their fource. Ibid, 
 
 for Oftober, 1786. 
 
 10. Ahhandlung von dem Gebrauche teleohgifcher Principien 
 in der Philofophie. — A Treatife concerning the application of 
 teleological principles in philofophy. — Publifhed in the Ger- 
 man Mercury f for January and February, 1788. 
 
 xz.
 
 ?38 
 
 1 1 . Ueher das Mifslingen aller philofophifchen Verfuche in der 
 Tbeodicee. — On the failure of all philofophical attempts made 
 in the Theodicea (by Leibnit^). — Berlin Monthly Magazine 
 for September, 1 791. 
 
 1 3 . Ueher das radikale Bofe in der menfchlichen Nntur-— -On 
 the radical evil in human nature — Ibid, for April, 179a. 
 
 13. Ueber den Qemeinfpruch : Das mag In dit Theorie rich-, 
 tig fey n^ taugt aber nicht Jur die Praxis — On the common- 
 place aflertion, " that may be true in theory, but is not ap- 
 plf cable to praftice." Ibid, for September, 1793. 
 
 14. Etwas aber den Einflufs des Mondes auf die Witter ung. 
 Some Remarks relative to the influence of the Moon on the 
 Weather. Ibid, for May 1794. 
 
 9= 
 
 GLOSSARY
 
 »39 
 
 GLOSSARY. 
 
 V^bofe termfy which explain them/elves from the context of 
 the Elements^ are here omitted. 
 
 Such phrafeSy as have only one definition attached to them^ 
 muji he underjiood in a general fenfe. 
 
 If any words occur in thefe definitions, which appear oh- 
 fcure or paradoxical, or do not fiifficiently explain the meaning 
 of the term under confideration, the reader is requejled to have 
 recourfe to the further explanations offuch words y in the alpha- 
 hetical order of this Gloffary. 
 
 'To render this nomenclature fuhfervient id the purpofe of 
 oltaining a more general view of Kant'* s Philofophyy than could 
 he given in the preceding ElementSy I have added explanations of 
 many terms, which, though not occurring in this concife account^ 
 are ufed hy the author in d peculiar fenfe. 
 
 Aesthetic 
 commonly fignifies the Critique of Tafte, but with Kant, the 
 fcience containing the rules of fenfation, in contradiilinc- 
 tion to Logic^ or the doftrine of the Underftanding. 
 
 To AFFECt 
 
 ineans, to mike immediate impreffions on tne Sdnfitire Facili- 
 ty, i. e. to occafion reprefentations and defires. 
 
 Affirmative, See Judgments. 
 Agreeable, (jucundum) angenehmy . . 
 
 is an objeft of the Senfitive Faculty, fo far as it influences the 
 will ; or what pleafes the fenfes in relation to feelings ; or 
 Si ^ what
 
 I40 GLOSSARY. 
 
 what affords us- pleafure. The agreeable is nat foraething a^- 
 Jolutely goody i. e. good in the eftimation of every rationai 
 being ; becaufe it does not immediately depend on Reafon it- 
 felf, but on the relative ftate of the mind, fenlitive inclina- 
 tions, and the like. The good, on the contrary, is an objeft 
 of pure Reafon, fomething that is conformable to the fubjeft 
 of all rational beings. 
 
 Analysis — Zergllederungy 
 
 I ) of an idea, is the reduftion of it to thofe charaders, of which 
 it is compounded, in order to render the cognition of it 
 clearer, though we cannot by this procefs make it more 
 complete : hence it does not furnifli us with additional 
 knowledge, but merely arranges what we already pollefs. 
 
 a) confidcred in z general J} jife \ Analyfis is the fcience, treat- 
 ing of the form of real knowledge, and of the rules, by 
 which we can examine that knowledge. It is a part of ge- 
 neral Logic, and the negative criterion of truth j in this 
 fenfe it is oppofed to DialeSiic. 
 
 3) Tiratifcendental Analyjis is the decompofition of the ptire 
 intelleftual faculty into the elements, through which all the 
 operations of thought are carried on. 
 
 4) of pure pr'a£iical Reafon^ i. e. of the pure practical faculty 
 of Reafon, or of the pure will, into its elements. 
 
 ■Analytical, See Judgments, 
 
 Anthropology 
 fignifies in general the experimental doftrine of the nature of 
 man ; and is divided, by Kant, into 
 1) theoretical or empirical doftrine of mind, which is a branch 
 
 of N atural Philofophy j 
 3) praEiicaly applied, and empirical Philofophy of Morals ; , 
 Ethics — the confideration of the moral law in relation to 
 the human will, its inclinations, motives, and to the ob- 
 "*ilacles in pra^lifmg that law. 
 
 ANTHRa-
 
 GLOSSARY, ,141 
 
 ^ Anthropomorphismus 
 is the art of attributing properties, obferved ini the world o£ 
 fenfe, to a being remote from that world ; or the fenfualiza- 
 tion of an idea of Reafon : for inftance, if we think of the 
 Deitj bj human predicates. 
 
 Anticipation 
 
 of experience, is a cognition of objeds liable to obfefvation 
 a priori^ previous to the obfervation itfelf, i. e. according to 
 the pure ,form of perception, in confequence of which all phe- 
 nomena are in Space and T^ime. 
 
 AjfTiNOMY OF Reason 
 
 1 . in general ; a contradiction between two laws ; 
 
 2. in particular, 
 
 a} oi pure fpeculative Reafon^ is the contradidlion in the re- 
 fults of it,, in the application of its fubjeftive idea rela- 
 tive to the unconditional thing, as well as in the applica- 
 tion of its law, to the world of fenfe j a law, bj which 
 we form conclufions from the given (perceived) condi- 
 tional thing, to what is unconditional. 
 
 b} oi pure praQical Reafon^ which occurs in the inquiry 
 into the higheft gdod j where, on the one hand, pradiical 
 Reafon prefuppofes a neceflary combination between vir- 
 tue and happinefs ; but, on the other hand, there is no 
 poffibility of perceiving this combination analytically or 
 fynthetically, neither a priori nor a pojleriori. — ^This an- 
 tinomy is folved by Ihowing the real cotmeftion between 
 our good conduft and wellbeing ; though this conneftiori 
 be concealed in the world of fenfe, yet it is really ex* 
 ifting throughout the whole of it, and founded on the 
 Xuperfenfible exiftence of ourfelves, in connexion with o- 
 ther things. 
 
 Apodicticas
 
 i4i GLOSSARY. 
 
 Apodictical 
 or abfolute, and attended with the confciottfnefs of neceffityj 
 
 A POSTEEIORI, 
 
 L e. through fenfation, experience — The diftinftion between 
 our knowledge obtained a pojieriori^ may be rendered more 
 clear bj its oppofite, a priori. This diiliri£kion, in the philo- 
 fophy of Kant, does not relate to th&feries oftimcy in which, 
 but to the fource^ from which we receive knowledge or cog- 
 nitions. Every reprefentation or cognition is a pojieriori^ 
 that is not founded merely on the original faculty of the mind^ 
 but in fome one or other modification, which that faculty has 
 received. Such reprefentations or cognitions are therefore 
 called empirical. 
 
 A PRIORI 
 
 originally does not fignify, with Kant, a cognition or repre-i 
 fentation which, in order of time, precedes experience ; of 
 which we could become confcious independent of all fenfations j 
 and which, at the fame time with the reprefenting faculty^ 
 could be prefent in our mind as a real reprefentation. Such 
 are the " innate notions or ideas," which Kant exprefsly re^. 
 jeiEls throughout his works. But by the term " a priori'''' he 
 underllands thofe reprefentations, which we acquire through 
 the exertions of our own mind, or the thinking fubjedl ; and 
 not through obfervation and fenfation {a pojleriori) ; not 
 through given objeds and from them, hutfrom our faculty of 
 cognition ; though this latter mull be rendered a£live by 
 means of fenfible imprefEons ; and though the origin or pro- 
 duftion of fuch a reprefentation caa in this manner only be 
 accompliflied. Further, all that is a priori^ which lies in the 
 6riginal conformation of the thinking fubje£l, and is not 
 founded on the operation of objefts, which confequently is 
 tiot firft introduced inti> the mind^ but is evolved from it, by 
 
 i-LS
 
 GLOSSARY. 143 
 
 its peculiar faculties. All thcfe reprefentations neverthelefs 
 prefuppofe experience, i. e. materials of application, if we are 
 to become confcious of them, and refer them to objefts. With-, 
 out experience, they are non-entities. They do not precede 
 experience as real reprefentations, but as the conditions, that 
 render experience itfelf poffible. All objedive reality of thepx 
 is founded merely on experience. 
 
 Afperception 
 
 or confeioufnefs, or the faculty of becoming confcious, fig-* 
 
 nifies 
 
 i) in general,the farpe as reprefentation, or the faculty of re- 
 
 prefenting ; 
 a) in particular, the reprefentation as diftinft from the fub- 
 je£t that reprefents, and from the object that isi reprefented. 
 3) f elf -confeioufnefs^ for which we have two faculties, 
 
 a — the empiricaly the internal fenfe, i. e, the confeioufnefs 
 of our ft ate at any time, of our obfervations. This is as 
 fubjeft to change, as the obfervations themfelves ; con- 
 fidered in itfelf, it is not confined to any one place, and 
 does not relate to the identity of the fubjeft. 
 b~the tranfcendentaly pure, original, i. e. the confeioufnefs 
 of the identity of ourfelves, with all the variety of empi- 
 rical confeioufnefs. It is that felf- confeioufnefs, which 
 generates the bare idea « /," or <* / think,^ as being the 
 fimple correlate of all other ideas, and the condition 0^ 
 their unity and neceflary connedlion. 
 
 There occurs a remark in Kant's Critique of pure 
 Reafon, which is very humiliating in the tranfcendental 
 doftrine of mitid. He fays upon this occafion : " Though 
 *' confeioufnefs has no extenliv^ magnitude, and there- 
 *• fore is not divifible, it certainly has intenfive magni- 
 ** tude, and we may well conceive a ceflation of it, by a 
 f* rmijion of power. — For there is a certain degree pf 
 
 *f con-
 
 144 GLOSSARY. 
 
 .** confcloufnefs even in obfcure reprefentatlons, fave that 
 " it does not always fuffice to diftinguifh one idea from 
 f^ another, i. e. to make it clear and evident." 
 
 Appetitive Faculty, or Faculty of Desiring, 
 ^Begehrungsvermogefi) 
 an the mod general fenfe, is the power inherent in a living 
 being, to become through his reprefentations the real caufe of 
 obtaining the objects correfponding with them ; although the 
 phyfical powers fliould not be adequate to the real produdion 
 of the ob]e£l defired : v, g. to wifh for the great prize in the 
 lottery-, and the like. 
 
 Apprehension 
 
 is an aft of the mind, by which the variety of individual per- 
 ceptions is collefted, combined with one another, and images 
 ?re produced. We may diilinguifli, 
 
 1. xk\& purs fynthejis of apprehcnjion, which compounds the va- 
 riety of perceptions a priori, of Space and Time, and produ- 
 ces pure images, fuch as reprefentations of numbers, geo- 
 metrical figures, '&c. 
 
 2. empirical apprehfnjionj which combines the pure percep- 
 tions together with their matter, i, e. with fenfible impref- 
 fions, and produces the images of phenomena ; v. g. wh§n 
 I obferve a houfe, the freezing of water, &p. 
 
 Approbation, See Satisfaction, 
 
 Architectonic 
 
 IS the art of conftrufting Syftems. The Archite£lonic of ptire 
 
 Reafon is, therefore, the plan for a Syftem of pure philofo- 
 
 Art, (KunJ) 
 1, in the mofl extenfive fenfe, is arbitrary produftipn, in con- 
 fequence of preceding reprefentations j 
 
 2»
 
 GLOSSARY; 14J 
 
 2, in a more limited fenfe, Is produdion through LIbertj, i. e. 
 
 through a free will, which adopts Reafon as the ground o^ 
 
 its adlions. 
 
 Articulation 
 is the flrudure of the members of a fclenoe, or the fyftematic 
 unity of it. 
 
 Assertory, See Imperative arid Judgments. 
 Attribute 
 or property f is a charafter belonging to the exiftence of a thing 
 conceived, as to its internal poffibility ; which chara£Ver can 
 be derived from things, or beings, as the neceflary, i; e. fuf- 
 ficiently eilabliflied confequence of them. 
 
 AUTONOMT, 
 
 a peculiar legiflation of the willj is that conftitution of a ra- 
 tional will, by which it is a law to itfelf, by which it deter- 
 mines itfelf, uninfluenced hj inclinations. It is the indepen- 
 dence of the will on all matter of it, i. e. on fenfitive defires and 
 their obje6is ; the dependence on a rational will, merely on it- 
 felf, i. e. upon the form of Reafon. This is a pra6lically ne- 
 ceflary idea, in order to comprehend In this manner the poflS^ 
 billty of aft unconditional Imperative, and a goodnefs (mora- 
 lity) of adions independent on external intereft. 
 
 Axiom 
 is a fynthetical principle a priori, which contains immediati& 
 or intuitive certainty ; i. e. derived from objefts of pure per- 
 ception, and which does not admit of proof, and of the truth 
 of which, we can point out no more accurate charaftcr, than 
 what it itfelf exprefles. 
 
 Bad — Bofes 
 is that which, according to a rational principle, is a neceflary 
 bbje£l of deteftation. In diftindion from the difagreeabhy i. tt 
 Iwrhat occafion* an immediate fenfatien of pain. 
 
 T Beah2
 
 i46 GLOSSARY. 
 
 Beautiful — Sc^dn 
 is that, which excites pleafure and claims our approbation^ 
 without fatisfying any wants : which pleafes us by the har- 
 monious employment of our reprefenting faculty, unconnetSldd 
 with animal defires ; and which we are fond of communicat- 
 ing to others ; for inftance, a witty idea, an acute or boldrc- 
 fledion, a ftrong pifture, and the like. 
 
 Beauty—" — Schdnheit 
 13 the regular conformation of an objeft, fo far as we obferve 
 this in it, without reprefenting to ourfelves any delign or pur- 
 pofe ; th6 Regular JuhjeBive conformation of an objed of na* 
 ture or art ; the expreffion of aefthetical ideas. 
 
 BeIng - " Wefenj Ding 
 fignifies i) a conception with its conftituent parts ; logically^ 
 2ifuhje£ium quod. The term ' being' is diftinguifhed from the 
 word * nature i' in as much as the former is the internal prin- 
 ciple of all thofe determinations, which relate to the pbjjibilitj^ 
 of a thing; and the latter, nature, is the internal piinciple of 
 all the determinations, relating to the e±ijlence of- a thing : — > 
 2) a real hting, fubjeBum quoy the nature of a thing. 
 
 Belief — Glaube 
 
 1, fignifies the aB of taking fomething for true, on account of 
 fuificient fubjedive, without any obje£tive, reafons for do- 
 
 (. ing fo ; or, in other words, to conceive things as lubje6ls of 
 cognition, or to admit their poffible exiflence ; becaufe Rea- 
 fon enjoins it. Thefe fubjedive grounds are a certain in- 
 tereft, certain purpofes ; — 
 
 2, the hahit, the moral way of thinking, by which Reafon con- 
 fiders as true, what is inacccffible to our theoretical cog- 
 nition of things ; — 
 
 3, in particular, ^^f J facra ; the adoption cf leligious prin% 
 ciples. 
 
 Canon",
 
 GLOSSARY. 147 
 
 Canon, 
 in general, means * a fcience treating of the proper ufe of our 
 faculty of cognition:' it is therefore oppofed to * DifcipHne,^ 
 which is a guide, direfting us to prevent the improper ufe of 
 that faculty. 
 
 Categorical, See Judgments. 
 Categories 
 I, in general, are original notions or intelleftual conceptions, 
 which correfpond with the fimple form of a j ndgment j lo- 
 gical funftions applied to objedls in general ; — 
 3, in particular, and according to their twofold ufe, they are^ 
 
 a) Categories of theoretical Reafon^ or of Nature ; fo far 
 namely, as they are referred to the variety of fenfible 
 perceptions, in older to give it unity of apperception in 
 a judgment of experience, or a cognition of nature ; 
 hence they are conceptions of unity in this cognition ; 
 
 b) Categories of praSiical Reafon y fO far as the fame func- 
 tions of the Underflanding are referred to the variety of 
 defires, in order to obtain for it unity in the rational idea, 
 of morality. 
 
 Causality — Causation, 
 
 dependencCj caufal connexion, fignifies 
 
 1^ logically y the function of the Underflanding in a hypotheti- 
 tical judgment ; the reprefentation concerning the logical 
 relation of caufe and eflfeft to one another ; 
 
 3, as the pure category correfponding with this funftion, it ex- 
 prefles the notion of a real relation of different objects to 
 one another ; the neceflary determination of the exiftence 
 oC a fomething through fomething of a different kind, whe- 
 ther this be homogeneous or not j— a fpecies of fynthefis, 
 Ta in
 
 148 , G«L O S S A R Y. 
 
 in which^ according to, and by means of, fomething A 
 (caiife) we neceflarily admit fomething very different, B 
 (effe6l_), and this in confequence of an abfolutely general 
 rule, fo that we can conclude the exiflence of A, from the 
 exiftence of B. 
 
 Certainty — Gcivifshek 
 is the confcioufnefs ariling from fuflicient objeclive reafons, 
 which are valid with rcfpeft to every body. 
 
 C HAN GE — VerHnderu?igy 
 accidens, is the fucceffion of different Hates, tranfition of a 
 thing from one flate to another ; the co- exiflence of what is 
 Handing and Heady in time, with that which changes ; the 
 connedtion of oppofite predicates in one and the fame obje6l, 
 but at different times, v. g. motion, i. e. a being and not-being 
 of^ the fame, things in the fame plape, but at different pe^-iods 
 of time. 
 
 Cognition, — Erkenntnifsy 
 in general, is a whole of connected reprefentations in one aft 
 of confcioufnefs ; or the determinate reference of given repre- 
 fentations to one objedt. — Every cognition has i) mattery fub- 
 ilance, i. c. fomething obje6live, which arifes frorii the ob- 
 jects reprefented ; the variety of given perceptions, objcfts ; 
 2^ form y i. e. a determinate way or mode, in which the given 
 matter is received, modified, and comb nod by the reprefent- 
 ing facility ; that, which relates to the operation of mind in 
 our cognitions ; that, which depends upon the conftitution of 
 the thinking fubjeft, or of the Underflanding and Reafon, 
 
 Common Sense — Gemeinfinn 
 
 is the faculty of determining what pleafes or difpleafes, not 
 
 through conceptions, but merely through feelings ; yet this 
 
 determination has general validity. 
 
 Tq
 
 GLOSSARY. 14^ 
 
 To Conceive — Begreifen 
 
 Jo a fundion of Reafon, as " to underjland^'' i. e. to think of au 
 objeil, is an aft of the Underftanding. 
 
 Conception — Begriff^ 
 
 1, in the mod extenfive fenfe ; is every produdlion of the ac- 
 tive reprefenting faculty, by which variety, qr the multifari- 
 Qus, is cpnnefted into unity : 
 
 2, in a more deterpained fenfe ; is a general reprefentation ab- 
 flradted from a variety of intuitions, and is oppofed tp a fingle 
 reprefentation or intuition. A conception of this kind is called 
 by K^nt, * difcurjive ;' becaufe it does not immediately refer 
 to the objeft, but only by the reprefentation of a charafter, 
 which may be common to an infinite variety of things, the re- 
 prefentation of which is contained under (not, in) a difcurjive 
 conception. 
 
 In CONCRETO, 
 
 j. e, in real nature, in real obje£ls of experience. Here, 
 many things may be differently conflituted, from what they 
 are *' /// ahJlraBoy'' i. e, when we refled: merely upon the 
 pure idea of a thing, without attending to what mfiy yet lieia 
 the fenfible perception of an objedl. 
 
 Condition — Bed'mgungy 
 the requifite, the ground, that which muft be prefuppofed, in 
 order to underftand or tp comprehend fome other datum, or 
 
 given thing Whatever prefuppofes a condition, is called 
 
 conditionate or conditional. 
 
 InpraQical philofophy, we mull diftjnguifli 
 jy that, which is praBically conditionate^ which Is determined 
 through natural inclinations and neceflities ; for inflance, the 
 imperatives of happiuefs are valid only under the condition, 
 
 that
 
 t5» GLOSSARY, 
 
 that a perfon feels an inclination for fomething, an impulfe tot- 
 wards fomething, a neceflit j of a certain kind j and not other- 
 wife: 
 
 s, that, which is praBically unconditionatey which depends 
 merely on Reafon itfelf, i. e. on the moral law, for inftanc© 
 a pure, difinterefted integrity, fidelity, and general utility, 
 
 Conformation — Zweckmcifsigkeit, 
 
 i. t.Jhrmaj Jive nexus Jinalisy is that conftltutlon of an objeil 
 (or even of a Hate of mind, or of an aftion), which can be 
 conceived, or thought of by us, as poffible only through 
 f caufality according to conceptions, that is, through a Will, 
 
 Conscience — Ge^ijferty 
 
 means i) the moral fenfe, relative to our own actions ; 
 l) the felf-determining moral faculty of judging ; that un- 
 conditionate confcioufnefs of duty, by which we can deter- 
 mine ^yithin ourfelves, whether an a£tion, we are about ta 
 perform, be juft or otherwife. 
 
 Consciousness — , — Bewufiseyn ; See Apperceftion, 
 
 Constitution of SrATE—^Staatsver/aJujig ; 
 
 the moft perfeft is that, in which the liberty of every indi- 
 vidual is thoroughly confiftent with the freedom of all mem- 
 l>ers of focicty. 
 
 Constitutive 
 
 principles are thofe, which refer to an objeft, fo as to deter- 
 mine fomething relative to it, i. e. to the reprefentation of it ; 
 namely either the intuition of an objeft, v. g, the mathema- 
 tical principles ; or the experimental conception of it, v. g. the 
 dynamical principles of the Underilanding. 
 
 Regulative principles, on the contrary, are th^fe, which 
 
 do
 
 GLOSSARY". i^i 
 
 do not determine the objefts themfelves, but which aiFord us 
 rules, i. e. determinations of the Underftanding, to fearch for 
 the objeQis in c[ueftion. 
 
 To Construct 
 an idea, means to determine an individual objeft, i. e. the per- 
 ception itfelf of that objeft, which is perfeftlj conformable to 
 the general idea. 
 
 An objeft requires perception ; an empirical perception^ 
 however, We cannot fpontaneoufly produce ; for the pure per- 
 ception only is poffible a priori. In this, namely Space and 
 Time, we can form certain determinations, and combine them 
 in the pure reprefenting faculty, for inftance an equilateral 
 triangle. In a fimilar manner, we can conftrud the intenfive 
 magnitude of the fenfations of the folar light, i. e. we can com- 
 pound them of about aoo,ooo times the quantity of the light 
 of the moon, and predicate them in a determined manner a 
 priori ; — of two given members of a proportion, we are able 
 to conftruft a third, fuch as 1 : 4 : 8, &c. 
 
 ConJlruBiony in a general fenfe, llgnifies every exhibition of . 
 a general idea, by means of the felf-a£live production of 2 
 perception, that correfponds with the idea. " 
 
 CoUTAct-^^Beriibrungf 
 I, in a mi^thematical fenfe, is the common boundary of two 
 ^fpaces, which is neither within the One nor the other, v. g. 
 two interfefting lines do not touch one another, becaufe their 
 common point belongs to each of them : 
 
 If in a phyjical fenfe, is the reciprocal effeft of the repelling 
 powers in the common boundary of two fpaces ; the im^ 
 mediate action and reaftion of impenetrability. It is diftin*- 
 guifhed from the a£lion at diliance, i, e. from the effect of one 
 matter upon the other, without the mediation of other inter- 
 veniem matters through the empty fpdfe, ▼. g. in the effen- 
 
 * t.ial
 
 X5* GLOSSARY. 
 
 tial attraftion. — The beginning of contaft in the approach of 
 one matter to another, is called * percuffion' (J^tofs) j the con- 
 tinuation of it, ' preflure' (^Druck). 
 
 C ONTiNUANCE, or Vekuaheucy— Beharrlicbiettf 
 is exiftence at all times, without origin and evanefcence. If, 
 in this manner, we reprefent to ourfelves the exiftence of phe- 
 nomena, we clafs them under the pure intelledlual conception, 
 or Category of Subftance. 
 
 CoyiTiavirf—Siattghiti 
 refers to that magnitude, no part of which Is the abfolutel;^ 
 fmalleft and moft limple, and in the folutioh of which we ne- 
 ver can arrive at determined laft unities ; for inftance. Space 
 and Time, together with ihe phenomenal that exift in them. 
 
 Contradiction — Widerfpruch ; 
 
 the principle of contradiftlon, i. e. ** no one thing admits of 
 being reprefented by contradictory predicates," is the nega- 
 tive criterion of all abftraft truth, and the fource of all our 
 analytical, but not of fynthetical, cognitions. 
 
 (^ONVICTION: See Proofs. 
 Cosmology; 
 the tronfcendentaly rational cofmology ; is either the Science 
 eihbracing the whole of the phenomena In nature, of the me- 
 taphyfical philofophy of the fuperfenfible properties of all ob- 
 jefts exifting. 
 
 GoSMO-TIIEOLOGt 
 
 is the cognition of a primitive Being, from the exiftence ci a 
 ■ Tvorld In general, and Its accidental Ity, as oppofed tofubftance^ 
 
 Criticism, 
 with Kant, fignifies a critical mode of proceeding ^doubts of 
 delay) i. e. the ma3Pfm of general diftruft with refped to atf 
 
 fynthetical
 
 GLOSSARY. 153 
 
 fynthetlcal judgments a prioriy until we have acquired a view 
 of the univerfal ground of their poffibility, in the eflentlal con-* 
 ditions of our faculties of cognition. 
 
 Critique of Pure Reason, 
 or tranfcendental Critique^ is the Science of the pur6 faculty 
 ©f Reafon ; the inquiry into thofe particulars, which Reafon 
 is able to know and to perform, from its own fources, and 
 independent of experience j — vid. the more ample definition, 
 pp. 42 and 43. 
 
 CuLTURfi^ 
 in a pojitvue fenfe, is ufcd By Kant^ to exprefs the promptnefa 
 we acquire in obeying rules ; to which he oppofes the term 
 * Difcipline, in a negative fenfe^ which weakens and deftroys 
 that readinefs, and makes us fufpend our judgment. Tha 
 whole Critique is a Difcipline, as to the contents of pure ra- 
 tional cognition ; but as to its intthod, only a particular part 
 of the Critique is Difcipline^ 
 
 Daemonology 
 is the doftrine of higher, but in other refpefts finite, beings 
 refembling man ; in oppofitlon to "Tfoeologyy the doctrine o£ 
 the higheft and infinite Being. I'hyficai Teleology leads us to 
 the former ; moral Teleology to the latter. 
 
 Deception — Betrugy 'Tduschung^ 
 is that illufion of the Jenfes^ tvhen we confider fomething, 
 which is obtained by conclufions, as the immediate obferva- 
 tion itfelf. This is no error of the fenfes, but of the Judging 
 Faculty or the Undei (landing.- — There is not only a deception 
 of the external fenfe y v. g. the optical, but alfo, an illufion of 
 the' internal fenfe, v. g. when the fanatic believes to feel fu- 
 pernatural influence, or when we cofnfound the fenfation, 
 which neceflarily accompanies a moral aftion or detei minatioa 
 of the will, with the caufe. of the adlion itfelf. 
 
 U DZDUCTION'
 
 iS-i GLOSSARY. 
 
 Deduction, 
 in general, is the pri^of of a legal claim, a right j but, in par- 
 ticixlar, Kant underflands bj it the eftablilhinent of a re- 
 prefentation ; the proof of the right we have to make ufe of 
 it ; the proof, that a reprefentation has fenfe, meaning, rea- 
 lity, objedive validity, that it is not vague or empty, but re- 
 lates to objeds. ' 
 
 ■ Demonstrable, 
 in Logic, are called thofe pofitions, which admit of immediate 
 proof; in oppolition to indemonftrable pofitions, that adinit of 
 Jib proof ; — in a critical fenfe, fuch cbnceptions or judgments 
 are dcmonftrable, as can be exhibited in perception, whether 
 pure or empirical ; in oppofition to the indcmorJitabUy which 
 cannot be thus exhibited. 
 
 DETERMlNATioN — Bejiimmujigy 
 l) as oppofed to fubftance ; accidens, a logical predicate of a 
 fubjeft : 2) a real predicate, which amplifies the conception > 
 itiQ determination of a thing : v. g. hard, elallic, &.c. and net 
 mere exillence. — ^The determinations of a thing are, according, 
 to the fource of cognition, empirical, when they afe derived 
 from experience ; tranjcendental, when they arife from the re- 
 prefenting fubjeftflj&rior/.* 
 
 Determinism 
 is the principle of determining the will from XoiEcient inter- 
 nal (fubje6i:ive) reafons. To combine this principle with 
 that of freedom, i. e, abfolute fpontaneity, occafions no dif- 
 ficulty. 
 
 Dialectic 
 is ufed by Kant in the following fignifications r 
 1) logical, ioTmz\ ', that Logic, which treats of the fources of 
 error and illulion, and the mode of detefting them: 
 
 i>
 
 GLOSSARY. 155 
 
 2) tranfcendentaly material DIaleftIc ; the exhibition and 
 judgment of that illufion, which arifes from the fubje^ive 
 conftitution of Reafon itfelf a priori. 
 
 DisciFLiNE — Zucht, See Culture. 
 
 Disjunctive j See Judgments. 
 
 To Dispute 
 
 upon any thing, means to decide it bj proofs, i. e. from ob- 
 jeftive conceptions, on which the judgment is founded — ^To 
 conteji (ftrelten) any thing, fignifies to claim the confent of 
 others to our judgment ; though we cannot always produce 
 objeftive reafons, and frequently have only fubjeftive grounds 
 to go upon, i. e. aefthetical grounds, feelings. 
 
 Distance: See Contact. 
 Divines — Geijiliche 
 are teachers of the pure moral Religion ; as being oppofed to 
 * prieftsyi. e. the confecrated minifters oi pious cuftoms and ce- 
 remonies. 
 
 Dogma, 
 
 or a dogmatical judgment, is a dired fynthetical decifion from 
 conceptions, and is diftinguifhed 
 
 1, from analytical judgments, which properly teach nothing ; 
 
 2, from experimental pofitions, which have no apodidic or 
 demonftrative certainty j 
 
 3, from mathematical principles, i. e. from fynthetical judg- 
 ments arifing from the conftruftion of ideas 5 and 
 
 4, from principles, i. e. indirect fynthetico-apodidlic judg- 
 ments, fuch as the principle of the * fufficient reafon.'' Spe- 
 culative pure Reafon contains no dogmas ; for its ideas 
 have no conftitutive, objeftive reality ; hence it aflraits of 
 x\a dogmatical method. < 
 
 U a Dog-
 
 %S^ GLOSSARY. 
 
 Dogmatism 
 
 or the dogmatical procefs of pure Reafon, is the prejudice of 
 maintaining and deciding metaphyfical propolitions according 
 to cuftomarj principles, and of determining uppn the exift- 
 ence or non-exiflence of fuperfenfible objeds and their pro- 
 perties, without having previoufly deduced the poffibility of 
 them from the faculties of Reafon : it is therefore, Metaphyfics 
 without a previous Critique. — Dogmatifm paves the way for 
 Scepticifm ; this compels us to have repourfe to a Critique ; 
 and this lailly couducls us to a folid fyftpm of fcience. 
 
 Duty — Pfiiclt^ 
 is the obedience of a law f lom a true regard for it j the ob- 
 jeftive neceffity of an aftion for the fake of the law, fo far as 
 this oblige ! the will, i. e. morally compels it ; though it may- 
 have fome other fubjeftive defires. 
 
 Dynamical 
 i) in general, is faid of things, fo far as we do not attend to 
 their quantity in perception, but to the ground or caufe of 
 thieir exiftence. Hence Kant calls, 2) in particular, ^fynthejis 
 dynamical, v^herc the things combine4 neceffarily belong to > 
 one another, but muil not neceffarily be of a homogenous na- 
 ture, becaufe they do not, (as in the mathematical fynthefis) 
 conftitute together One magnitude, quantum. The fynthefis| 
 of caufe and effeft, for inftance, is dynamical. 
 
 Effect : See Causality. 
 Empirical ; See A posteriori. 
 Epigenesis of pure Rea'sqn 
 has been called the Kantian explanation concerning the coin- 
 cidence of the pure intelle£lual conceptions (Categories) with 
 the objefts of experience ; according to which explanation, 
 
 by
 
 GLOSSARY. 157 
 
 "by thefe pure notions or conceptions, being the forms of 
 thought, experience itfelf and its objeds, as fuch, become pof- 
 fible, 
 
 Fid. the fourth Problem, p, 49 & feq. 
 
 Ethico-theology 
 is that fpecies ot Theologj, which is derived from pure moral 
 arguments, and admits no fjmbolical reprefentations. 
 
 Experience — Erfahrtmg 
 
 is, with Kant, an objeflive, i. e. univerfallj valid and neceflarj 
 fynthetical cognition of given obje£ls (phenomena) ; or, the 
 reprcfentation of obfervations in a neceffarily determined con- 
 nection ; cognition through combined obfervation ; the con- 
 peClion of fenfible reprefentations according to certain laws. 
 
 Extension — Ausdehnungy 
 
 in the moft comprehenlive fenfe, is the reprcfentation of a 
 whole, by means of its continued parts. If thefe are fimul- 
 taneous or coexiftent, it is Space : if they follow one another 
 in fucceffion, it is lime. According to this ufe of the word 
 *■ extenfion,* every magnitude is called extenjive, which is re- 
 prefented by the fucceffive connection of parts of time and 
 fpace, when the reprcfentation of the whole becomes poffible 
 only by the reprcfentation of the parts. In this fenfe exten- 
 fion ig ufed in Mathematics, and hence thtmathejts extenforum. 
 
 Extensive power 
 is, according to Kant, original elafticity or the power of ati 
 extended thing by means of the repulfion of all its parts. — It 
 fo far differs from what is commonly called elajlicityy as this 
 is the power of a matter,' to refume its form or magnitude 
 ichanged by another moving power, upon the remillion of the 
 latter. 
 
 Fancy
 
 153 GLOSSARY. 
 
 FancT— W^a^« 
 is that deception, in which we confider the mere reprefcnta- 
 tion of a thing as equivalent to the thing itfelf. Religious, 
 fancy manifefts itfelf in^this, when man confiders the ftatutory 
 belief and ceremonies as the fubftance of religion, and as the 
 fupreme condition, upon which he may obtain the approba- 
 tion of the Deity. 
 
 Fatalism 
 
 is that fjftem, in which the connexion of ptirpofes in the 
 world is confidered as accidental ; and in which this connec- 
 tion is yet derived from a Supreme Being, not indeed from his 
 rational nature, but from the neceflary conflitution of this 
 Being, and the unity of the world thence arifing. Such^ for 
 inftance, is the fyftem of Spinoza. 
 
 Final purpose — Endzweck 
 is, that, which requires no other purpofe as the condition of its 
 poffibility ; which contains in itfelf the determining caufe, the. 
 neceflary and fufficient condition of all other purpofes. 
 
 Form 
 is the determined mode of thinking fomething, or the manner 
 of its exiftence ; it is oppofed to matter ^ i. e. that which is 
 given and determinable. 
 
 Function 
 is the office, the adlvity, the form of an higher faculty of 
 ^ cognition : i) of the Underjianding — to think and to judge ; 
 2) of Reafon — ^to conclude. 
 
 FunBion is oppofed to affe&ion, as this implies a change, to 
 which our Senlitive Faculty is fubjeft. 
 
 Genius — ingenium 
 is the talent, the gift of nature, or the native difpofition of the 
 mind, from which nature prefcribes the rule to art. 
 
 . To
 
 GLOSSARY. 159 
 
 To Give — Geben 
 an obje6l. Is to perceive it, to obferve It ; to refer the concep- 
 tion of it to real or poflible experience. That an cbjefl: be 
 given, Is a neceflary condition for receiving a cognition of it, 
 but not fo, for thinking of It onlj. 
 
 Good — Gutes, 
 is that, of which reafon approves, and which It confiders as 
 praftically neceffarj j that, which according to a rational 
 principle is a neceflary objedt of the faculty of defiring ; which 
 has fome 'value. It is oppofed to the agreeable, which fatis- 
 fies the inclinations of the fenfes, or which affords us pleafure. 
 
 Gravitation 
 is called the effeft of univerfal attraftlon, which every part of 
 matter immediately exerts on all other parts, and at all dis- 
 tances Kant diilingulflies gravitation from gravity, i. e. the 
 
 effort of matter to move itfelf in the direftlon of the fuperior 
 gtavltation. 
 
 Ground of determination — Bejlimmungsgrund. 
 
 The grounds or caufes of determining our adlions, are called 
 formal (laws), fo far as they afcertain the way and manner, 
 in which we view an objeft ; material (maxims), fo far as 
 they determine the objedls, to which an aftion Is direfted , 
 fuhJeBive (laws), fo far as they depend upon pure rational con- 
 ceptions ; objeiiive (motives J, fo far as they affeft the Senfi- 
 rive Faculty ; praBical, fo far as the laft ground, which de- 
 termines the will Is an idea from pure Reafon ; aejlheti- 
 tat, when the laft grounds of volition are met with in certain 
 feelings of fenfe. The pure moral law Is the formal ground 
 of determining moral aftions ; hence the good and bad, i, e. 
 the objefts of moral defire and averfion, depend upon this law : 
 it is, therefore, likevvife the material ground of determina- 
 tion.
 
 i6o GLOSSARY. 
 
 tloa, and Is objedive, a$ being the form of practical Reafon 
 fe If. The moral fenfe is the fubjeftive ground of the fame 
 aftion ; but, as this fenfe or feeling itfelf is again produced 
 hy Reafon, it cannot be aefthetical. 
 
 Happiness — Gludfeligkeit 
 
 fignlfies, with Kant, the whole profperity of a finite, rational 
 being ; the confcioufnefs of the agreeable fituation, which un* 
 interruptedly accompanies the whole exiflence of fuch a being. 
 —It arifes from the fatisfaftion of all inclinations, from the 
 attainment of all ends, which the Senfitive Faculty propofes, 
 and is therefore a prototype of the imagination. 
 
 HETERONOMy, 
 
 or a foreign leglflation, is that, in which not the wiU itfelf, 
 but fomething elfe determines us to a6l in a certain manner ; 
 when not the adion itfelf, but merely its objeft, its eiFeft, 
 interefts us ; when, befide the idea of the action, another ex- 
 traneous allurement or compulfion, i. e. hope or fear muft 
 concur, in order to produce the action. 
 
 Highest Good — H'dchjles Gut 
 
 is the whole unconditionate objeft of pure pra£lical Reafon, 
 and confifts i) in virtue as the conftituent of being happy j 
 t)\&fiipreme good j 2) in happinefs itfelf, fo far as it is con- 
 ne£led with that worth ; Xh&perfeB good. 
 
 Hypothesis 
 
 is an explanation of fomething that Is real, by fomething elfe, 
 the reality of which is notdemonftrable or, at leaft, is not de-- 
 monft rated. 
 
 Hypothetical r See Judgments. 
 
 Idea. 
 
 "^his expfsflloa Kaat employs more deter xAinately (bor- 
 rowed
 
 GLOSSARY. i6i 
 
 rowed from Plato), than is commonly ufed in modern lar- 
 guages. According to Kant, it fignifies a neceflary conception 
 ofReafon, the objedl of which cannot b« perceived by the 
 fenfes, nor acquired by experience. 
 
 Idealism 
 is called that fyftem of philosophy, in which the external reali- 
 ty of certain intuitive reprefentations is difputed or doubted, 
 and fpace as well as external objefts are aflerted to be mere 
 fancies.— Such is the fyftem of the celebrated bifliop Berkley. 
 
 Illusion — Tdufihung^ Schem, 
 
 is a falfe judgment, in which we attribute a predicate to an 
 obje(El in itfelf, which predicate belongs to it merely in rela- 
 tion to the fubje6l. 
 
 Imagination — Einhlldungskraft 
 is the faculty of reprefenting an object, in perception, though 
 it jQiould pot be prefent. 
 
 Immanent 
 
 is ufed by Kant in oppofition to tranfcendantal : the former, 
 term is applied to conceptions or principles, v^hich are valid 
 in nature, and are ufed concerning objeft? of experience, phe- 
 nomena ; though the principles themfelves are not derived 
 from experience : v. g. the application of the principle of 
 . caufality is immafient^ when it is applied to the relation fub- 
 fifling among the plienomena of nature as fuch : it would be 
 tranfcendenty when we go with this principle beyond expe- 
 rience, and endeavour to prove from it the' exiftence of the 
 Deity. 
 
 Immortality — Vnsterblicbkeitf 
 of the foul, cannot be proved from fpeculative reafons, nor 
 from its felf- fubfiftence, fimplicity, and fo forth ;' hence it is.
 
 i6z G L O S S A R Y. 
 
 not properly an objefl: of knowledge, but it may yet be con- 
 cluded by analogy, partly from the difproportion of the great 
 talents of man to the confined duration of his prefent life ; and 
 partly for the fake of giving energy to the necelTary laws of 
 morality : in this manner it may be defended againft all thq 
 fpeculative objeftions of tbe rude materialifts. , 
 
 Imperative-t-G^^o/, 
 i) in general, is an objective practical law ; 
 ?) in a more determined fenfe, it is the formula or prefcribed 
 model of that law, by which it is referred to a will, as the ne- 
 ceffary precept of its aftions ; though this will may fubjec- 
 tively have fome other obje6; of its wifhesy becaufe it is not 
 purely rational, but alfo depends on inclinations, v. g. thofe 
 of the human fpecies. 
 
 Impression — Eindruck. 
 'i Objefts make; impreflions upon us,' fignifies with Kant, that 
 objects of the external fenfe, external phenomena, affect the 
 internal fenfe, and are real objefts of thought ; confequently, 
 that they are fufficiently diftinguiflied from the thoughts them- 
 felves, which never can be exhibited in Space* — The modus 
 operandi or the origin of this influence occafioned by fenfible 
 impreflions, cannot be explained by the principles of Kant, 
 nor of any other philofopher. 
 
 Inclination — Neigung 
 
 fignifies a fenfible impulfe, the dependence of the appetitiv^ 
 faculty on fenfations ; in oppofitjon to * intereji^ i. e. the de- 
 pendence of that faculty on rational ideas. — The amount of 
 all inclinations \sfelf-love ; the fatisfadlion or gratification of 
 an inclination is pleafure ; that of all inclinations, is happihefs^ 
 
 Indeterminism- 
 
 is' that inert lyftiem of philofophy, which imagines freedom^ to 
 
 confifl
 
 G L O is S A R Y. 163 
 
 ^onfift In the accldentalky (chance) of adions ; that the will 
 is not at all determined by arguments ; and that a free being 
 is equally liable, to commit good as well as bad aftions 
 
 Ind.ifferpntists 
 are called thofe latitudinarians of neutrality, who affert, that 
 there are indifferent or involuntary aftions, which are neither 
 morally good nor bad. 
 
 Inpivjdual : See JupcMEfl'i^; 
 
 Inducement — Bewegangsgrund, 
 is the obje£live ground of the will, fo far as it, being repr^/- 
 fented by Reafon, determines the will. — It is diftinguiflied 
 from the * motive,' 'Triebfedery which is fometl^ing fubje£live^ 
 i. e. an inclination^ which impels us to an aft ion. 
 
 Induction 
 
 is cognition of the whole or of the genus, by means of the 
 parts obferved or perceived : v. g. if we afcribe to bodies in 
 general, what we have hitherto every where difcovered in 
 them. From indil6lion there arifes only a comparative iini- 
 Verfaiity, or generality of an empirical rule. 
 
 •Infinite : See Judgments. 
 luTViTiON^^—Anfchauungt 
 
 i) in the moft extenfive fenfe, is every reprefentation of va- 
 riety or the multifarious, fo far only, as we confider the va- 
 riety, and liot the unity in the obje£t. In fo far, however, as 
 the reprefentation prefents variety, we may call every repre- 
 fentation a perception, and unfold it further as fuch ; 
 2) in a more confined and proper fenfe, an intuition is not a 
 bare reprefentation of fight, but every immediate reprefenta- 
 tion of the individual thing, a fingle reprefentation, which 
 
 X 2 imme*
 
 i64 GLOSSARY; 
 
 immediately refers to an objeft, and by which this is givefry 
 
 i. e. perceived. 
 
 To Judge — Urtheilen 
 
 fignifies to give unity to two reprefcntations, namely to the 
 reprefentation of an obje6l, v. g. of a mkn, and that of a cha- 
 i^dier, V. g. man is a rational being. 
 
 Judging Faculty — Urtheilskrafty 
 
 is the power of thinking of the particular, as contained under 
 the general or uftiverfal.-^Kant divides this Faculty into i ) the 
 deterinining (fubfuming) power of judging ; this again is a) 
 empirical, b) tranfcendental ; 2) the refleifling or reflex power 
 . of judging, which is further fubdivided into a) aefthetical, b) 
 
 teleological . The meaning of thefe terms may be found m 
 
 their refpe£live places in the alphabetical order. 
 
 [fuDGMENTS — Urtheiky 
 
 according to the ufual definition of Logicians, axe reprefenta- 
 tions of one relation lubiiftinglietween two notions or con- 
 ceptions. This explanation, however, applies only to the ca- 
 tegorical judgments, and does not determine the nature of this 
 relation. For, even by the laws of the reprefenting power, 
 there arifes likewife a relation among our conceptions, which 
 cannot with any propriety be called a judgment. According 
 to Kant, therefore, a judgment in general is the aft of com- 
 prehending a variety or the multifarious, reprefented by an 
 intuition, under objedlive unity. And as nothing elfe but in- 
 tuitions can b4 reprefented Under this unity, they mufl; ex- 
 hibit either properties of a thing, or efFedls of a thing, or' 
 parts of a whole. Hence the following Judgments will be 
 the refult cf all reprefcntations. 
 
 1. Judgments OF Quantity, which determine what can ba 
 
 comprehended under ohjedive unity. The three fpecies of 
 
 them are. 
 
 Individual,
 
 G L O S S A R Y< 165 
 
 i^idividaal or fmgular^ when one Individ- ^ 
 
 ual thing, J can be compre- " 
 
 n . , , >hended under ob- 
 
 Farticular. when many, i • a- 
 
 * •" I jective unity. 
 
 Umverfal, when all, J 
 
 •» II. Judgments of Quality, which afcdrtain the manner, in 
 which the aft of comprehending can be carried on. 
 Their fpecies are. 
 Affirmative t i. e. fo as really to unite an intuition with a con- 
 ception ; 
 Negativcy or fo as to exclude fomething from a conception ; 
 Infinitey or fo as to exclude a whole clafs of intuitions, without 
 determining thereby the conception in any degree. 
 
 III. Judgments of Relation, or fuch as exprefs the rela- 
 tions fubfifting between things and properties, caufes and 
 efFe£ts, parts and a whole. The fpecies of this clafs are. 
 Categorical^ when particular properties or things. 
 Hypothetical^ when particular effedts or caufes, 
 DisjunBivey when particular parts or wholes are compre- 
 hended under objeftive unity .*■ 
 
 IV. Judgments of Modality, are thofe which denote the 
 particular faculties of the mind, by means of which they 
 have been formed ; or determine .that place, where the 
 things judged of, or comprehended under obje£live unity, 
 have their refpeftlve feat. The fpecies of thefe are, 
 
 Froblematicaly when the things exilt in the Underftanding 
 alone, or are mere ideas, of which it is not cer-* 
 tain, whether they really exift without the mind j 
 
 AJJertoryf when the things comprehended under the objeftive 
 are in reality conceived, and believed to corre- 
 fpond with the conception we have of them ; and 
 
 j!ip(fdi£iical, or attended with the chara£ler of neceffity, when 
 the things are fo cortceived, as to carry along with 
 
 them
 
 t66 GLOSSARY. 
 
 them the eonvl^ion, that according to the con- 
 ilitutioa of the Underflanding^ they cannot be 
 otherwife conceived, whether in an affirmative or 
 negative inftance. 
 The three laft fpecies of Judgments have been reduced by 
 Kant to the clafs of * modality j' beeaufe they add nothing to 
 the contents of a judgment, as is the cafe with thofe of* quan- 
 tity,' * quality,' and * relation.' 
 
 The further divifion of Judgments, as to tji^ir Qrigirif 6hje6iSf 
 Jorm, ufe, &.c. cannot be detailed in an elementary treatife; 
 for this would require a feparate work, which Kant has ac- 
 tually published, and of which the reader will find f<Mn6 account, 
 in the preceding elementary view of his works, under Noi 
 XXV. (9). 
 
 To iLmvr—WiJJen, 
 
 obje(9:ively confidered, is to have apodidlieal or d^monftrative 
 Certainty. iThis is poffible only in eognitions, the origin of 
 which is a priori. 
 
 Knowledge : See Cognition^ 
 Law— G^^ss. 
 
 A Law is an objefiive neceflary rule^ or the teprefentatio n of 
 a general condition, according to which a variety or what is 
 multifarious mufl be uniformly applicable to all. 
 
 XEGAliiy, — GefetamaJJigkeity 
 
 t . . . 
 
 moral rcftitude, is predicable of every determination of the 
 
 will and fubfequent aftion, which agree wnth the moral law i 
 whether this adlion arife frtjm the repr^fentation of the law 
 itfeif, or from the inelination refulting from the view of the 
 fuccefs and advantage of the aftion — As to the morality, i. e, 
 rfie propei-ly moral value of the aftion, there is ftill required 
 4 virtuous fentiment, or the determination tp a lawful adlion 
 through the law independent of any profpeft of gain or lofs. j 
 
 LiBERxy '
 
 GLOSSARY. |6> 
 
 LiBERTT, FRUEDoyt-^Frejheif, 
 i? confidered as the attribute of an jntelligent being, fo £^t as 
 its anions are not determined by foreign caufes. Sueh a cau- 
 falitj and its atlion is called free. 
 
 Limitation 
 is a Category of Quality, which is conceived in things, by 
 connefting the predicate of reality with that of negation ; in a 
 fimilar manner as the judgments of quality (i. e. the fpecies of 
 thofe called by Kant, infiniti)^ have fomething common with 
 the form of both, affirmative and negative, 
 
 Man — Menfch 
 
 a moral being, fubjedl to moral laws by virtue of bis ratioaal 
 nature : hence it is highly improper to call him a fighting 
 animal, as fome of the modern court-philofophers are pleafed 
 to define him — A had man, is he who has adopted deviatibn 
 from the moral law as a maxim ; ^good man, who values the 
 moral law as his fupreme maxim ; — an accoinplijhed man, whoi 
 is both inclined and able to communicate his agreeable f«?eling5 
 to others ; — a man of good morals^ whofe adlions correfpond 
 with the moral law. 
 
 MaT£RIALISiU 
 
 in general, is the afiertion, that the whole of worldly beings 
 
 confift of matter ; — in particular, the ^;()/cAo/o^/Va/ mate rialifm, 
 
 or the doftrine, that the perfonality of man can fubfift only 
 
 under the condition of his being the fame body j — the cofmo'^ 
 
 logical, that the e:?iftence and prefence of the world can be 
 
 owing to other circumftances, than to that of its being ia 
 
 Space. 
 
 Matter, 
 
 j) as oppofed toform^ii the given, perceived thing in general ; 
 Xhat, which is determinable j the correlate of the detcrmina- 
 
 «i<in ;
 
 x68 GLOSSARY. 
 
 tibn : 2) in pppofition to mind, i. e. an objed of the internal 
 fenfe, matter is that, which is determined by the form of ex- 
 ternal perception 3 the fubftance of bodies. 
 
 Maxims -* 
 
 are fubjedlive principles of Reafon, relative to free aflions ; 
 whereas . /fliw are the neceflary objedlive rules, which applj 
 with equal force to ^very individual, whether morally difpo- 
 •fed to obey them, or not. 
 
 Mechanically 
 
 1) in general, is all that, which neceflarily happens in tiipe, 
 according to the law of caufality ; 2) in particular, the effefl, 
 which bodies in naotion produce upon one another by the com- 
 miunication of their motion (not by their internal powers,*as 
 in the chemical efFeflis tf bodies), v. g. mechanical feparation' 
 •]jy the wedge. 
 
 MEcriANisM OF Nature 
 13 the neceflary confequence of events in time, according to the 
 rjatural law of caufality. 
 
 Metaphysics 
 
 1, as defined by BaumgartEn, is the fcience treating of the 
 firft principles of human knowledge ; it has no fixed limits, 
 by which it is feparated from other fciences : 
 
 2, with Kant ; the whole fyflem of pure philofophy ; the 
 philofophy of things that are not the objeds of fenfe ; or the 
 Science of the hyperphyfical predicates of fenfible objects. 
 
 ^ Method 
 
 I, Theoretically f is the mode of teaching; the form of a 
 fcience ; that procefs of arranging the variety in our cogni- 
 tions under fyflematic unity, which is guided and determined 
 by rational principles :
 
 G L O S S A R Yi 16^ 
 
 Zy praBicallyt the mode and way of eftabliihlng genuine moral 
 principles. The methodital doEirine of praBical Reafon is, 
 therefore, that part of the * Critique of Reafon,' which teaches 
 this method from principles. 
 
 The tranfcendental doBrine of method is the fcience treating 
 •f the form of a raetaphjfical 1 jftem. 
 
 Mind— S^f/ff 
 
 fignifies i) the foul as phenomenon, as the objeft of the in- 
 ternal fenfe, with all the internal reflexions : it is thus con- 
 fidered in the experimental doctrine of mind ; 2) the tranfcen- 
 dental fubjeft of thoughts, which we can reprefent to our* 
 felves merely through the confcioufnefs accompanying all our 
 teprefentations ; 3) in particular, this felf-fame being, as the 
 Vital principle of matter. 
 
 Modality: See Judgments. 
 Motive — Triehfeder : See INDUCEMENT. 
 
 Mysticism — Schwarmerey 
 i) that ot fpeculative Reafon^ is Plato's dodrine of intellectual 
 |>erceptions, and the cognofcible reality of thofe pretended in- 
 nate conceptions of things beyond the world of fenfe ; v. f^. if 
 we attribute pofitive predicates to the Deity, and ftill difpute 
 their borrowed origin from j)hen6itiena : 
 i) that oi praBical Reafon^ is the moral lyflem, which does 
 not derive the material ground of human aftions from the world 
 of fenfe, and which confequently eftablifhes the morality of 
 them upon fuperfenfible perceptions.; v. g. if we admit fuch 
 divine laws, ks difFet from the efiential commands of Reafboi 
 
 J^ECESSARY : See Judgments. 
 Necessity — Nothiuendigkeii 
 i^ logical f formal ; the neceflary connedion of conceptions irt 
 
 Y a«
 
 I70 GLOSSARY. 
 
 an apodlftical Judgment ; that neceffity, according to which 
 certain predicates belong to a certain conception : 2) real, naa-<' 
 terial, phyfical neceflitjr of exiftence j the impoffibilit j of non- 
 exiftence : 3) moral, praftical neceffitj, which depends upon 
 praftical Reafon. 
 
 Negative: See Judgments. 
 
 Notion 
 
 is a pure intelleftual conception, which arifes from the zSt of 
 referring the form of a judgment to an obje^. — An original 
 (not, innate) notion is called a Category. 
 
 NouMENON — Ding anjich, 
 an objeft or thing in itfelf, i. e. without or external to the 
 mind in a tranfcendental fenfe j a thing excluiive of our repre- 
 fentation. It is generally oppofed to the term * phenomenon y 
 or the fenfible reprefentation of an objeft. 
 
 Number — Zahl, 
 is the reprefentation of unity, from the fucceffive addition of 
 One to One, which is of a fimilar fpeties. By the idea * num- 
 her,'* the Category of ^lantity is fenfualized, and the pure 
 fcheme of Quantity, or feries of time exhibited. 
 
 OfifjECT — Gegenjland 
 of a reprefentation, in general, is the indilridual thing, to which 
 the variety of given matter in a reprefentation is referred. 
 
 Objective 
 
 fignifies, in general, every thing which has objeftive reall^^ 
 which relates to an objefl of fenfe and experience. 
 
 Obligation — hbthigtmg 
 is amoral and practical determination of a will goverxied by 
 rational motives ; or the pradical neceffity of volition^ in. a 
 
 poffible
 
 GLOSSARY. 171 
 
 poffible eontradi<9:ion to natural inclinations. In a facred will, 
 therefore, no obligation takes place. 
 
 Ontology 
 i) as it is pretended ; a fjilematic doSrlne of fynthetical cog- 
 nitions a priori of things in general : 
 
 2) as it is poffible ; a complete analyfis of the pure Under- 
 flanding, or tranfcendental philofophy, i. e. the fcience of the 
 moll general conceptions and laws of all rational and moral 
 objefts colledively confidered ;— in oppolition to that part of 
 Metaphyfics, which treats of the particular objfids of the in- 
 ternal or external fenfe, 
 
 OnTo-theoloGT 
 is the cognition of a Supreme Being from bare conceptions, 
 
 Organon 
 e) In general, is tlje knowledge of thofe rules, by which a 
 fcientific fjllem can be conilruded ; 
 
 2) in particular, the Organon of pure Reafon; i. e. an Organon 
 for the purpofes of Metaphjfics. From the complete applica- 
 tion ot the Organon, arifes a fyftem of pure Reafo.i. 
 
 Origin — Urfprung^ 
 th.QjirJi origin is the derivation of an efFed from its firft caufe, 
 i. e. that caufe, which is not again the efFed of another caufc 
 of the fame kind. 
 
 Origin a ll y— ^ Urfprunglich, 
 'i. c, not derived ; for inftance, original adion : {See Causa- 
 lity) ; an original charader, which requires no derivation, 
 no proof. 
 
 Paralogism 
 1^ logical : a falfe concluiion of Reafon, as to its form : 
 %) tranfcendental : when the ground of the paralogifm de- 
 
 y % pends
 
 lya GLOSSARY. 
 
 pends upon the conftltution of the faculty of cognition itfelfj 
 for inllaoce, in the tranfcendental doftrine of mind. 
 
 Particular : See Judgments. 
 
 Pathological 
 
 is called, that, which depends upon the paflive part of humaij 
 
 nature, upon the fcnfitive faculty. It is oppofed to ^ praSiical^ 
 
 i, e. that, which depends upon the free aftivity of Reafon. 
 
 People of God 
 is a people, that live under the government of divine laws^ 
 
 PERCEPTION 
 
 generally fignifies the fame as * intuition ;' but, in particular, 
 it is ufed by Kant in a more limited fenfe, i. e. a reprefenta- 
 tion accompanied with confcioufnefs or apperception. 
 
 Permitted— jEr/att5i 
 
 i) is that, which correfponds with a barely poffible praftical 
 precept ; non-permitted^ what militates againft a problema- 
 tical Imperative : 2) that, which is conliftent with a general 
 law of morality, with the autononriy of the will ; the contrary 
 is unp^ri^iitted. In the former fignification, the non-permitted 
 is diftinguifhed from that, which is * contrary to duty^ or 
 what is againft a real, fubfifting law. In the latter fenfe, thefe 
 terms are equivalent to each other. 
 
 Phenomenon : See Nou.mki^on. 
 
 Philosopher — Weltweifer^ 
 in idea^ is he who renders all cognitions fubfervient to the ne- 
 ceflary purpofes of human Reafon ; alegiflator of that faculty j 
 a maftcr in th^ fcience of wifcipuv. 
 
 To
 
 GLOSSARY. 137 
 
 To Philosophize 
 ineans to exercife one*s peculiar talent in the philofophical ufe 
 of Reafon, i. e. in the explanation of that, which is explicable. 
 
 Physico-Theologt 
 or rather phyfico-teleological theology, is the cognition of the 
 Deity, as being the author of that order and perfeftion in the 
 aatural world of fenfe, which is every where difcoverable. 
 
 Phoronomy 
 h the pure do£lrIne of th^ magnitude of motion. 
 
 Possibility — Moglichkeit 
 
 ^) the form of 2i problematical judgment ; the conceivable con-* 
 letlion of two conceptions : 2) the correfponding pure Gate- 
 goryy i. e. the reference of a form of thought in a problema- 
 tical judgment, to perceptions in general, to an obje£l : 3) thQ 
 application of this Category to fcnfible perceptions ; the a- 
 greement of a conception with the general form of fcnfible 
 perceptions of time. — ilmpoffibilitj, therefore, fignifics the 
 difagreement, the inconfiilency with this form. 
 
 Practical 
 is that, which depends on freedom, on the felf-a£live faculty 
 of defii ing ; which relates to that faculty as the ground, con-f 
 fequence, gtc. ; for inflance, practical cognition, laws, princi- 
 ples, philofophy. 
 
 Pragmatical 
 
 is that, which is defigned for the promotion of general profpe. 
 rity. 
 
 Praying — Betent 
 is a mere declaration of wifhes towards the Divine "Being ; a 
 Being, that ftands in need of no explanation of the internal 
 fentiment of the wifhing perfon»— Praying confidered as the
 
 174 GLOSSARY. 
 
 means of produciirg efFedls upon God, is fuperflitlon. In or- 
 der to improve ourfelves, and to enliven our moral fentiment, 
 it is one of the moll falutary, but hy no means generally ne- 
 ceflarj- means. 
 
 Precept — Vorjchrift 
 
 means a praftical rule, in the moft extenfive fenfe, whether it 
 have an abfolute (lawful) or only a comparative univerfality. 
 
 Principle — Grundfotz 
 is every general cognition, from which others may be con* 
 iiflently derived and conceived. 
 
 Problematical : See Judgments. 
 
 Proofs — Beweife 
 
 i) in general, are objeftive grounds of convidion. To prove 
 fomething, is to demonftrate it fufficiently from objedive, lo- 
 gical reafons, to convince, or at lead, to prepare the mind for 
 conviftion, and not merely to perfuade, i. e. to caufe or pro- 
 duce our apptobation from fubje6live (aefthetical) grounds of 
 determination : 2) in particular ; proofs are either empirical^ 
 from real experience ; or a priori, from Reafon and independ- 
 ent of all matter gf experience. 
 
 Psychology, 
 
 is the doclrine of mind ; the phyfiology of the internal fenfe, 
 and a part of phyfics in general. 
 
 Pure — rein : See A priori. 
 
 Purpose— Zw^ci, 
 in general, is the conception of an objeft, fo far as it contains, 
 at the fame time, the ground of the reality of this objed.— 1 
 A purpofe is faid to be hypotheticalj ■\^hen it prcfents itfelf as 
 
 the
 
 GLOSSARY. trs 
 
 the means of attaining fome other objea ; categorical, when it 
 exhibits itfelf as final purpofe in the oppofite czi^.—Furpofe of 
 Nature is the exhibition of the idea of a real, objeaive con- 
 formity in nature. A thing exifts as a purpofe of nature, 
 •when it is of itfelf both caufe and efFeft. 
 
 The fcience or philofophy of all piirpofes is called Teleology, 
 
 ry, J 
 
 QUAMTY, 
 
 'See Judgments. 
 Quantity, 
 
 Reality — WirkUchkeit 
 is real, not merely ideal exigence ; and tliis is conceived i) 
 pure, through that Category, which is founded upon the form 
 of affertory judgments : i') fenfualized ; i. e. the ciicumftance 
 of being in a determined time. 
 
 Reason — Vernunft 
 
 A) generally implies the whole, fupreme, felf-adlive faculty of 
 cognition, in contradiftinaion to the low, merely paffive, fa- 
 culty of the fenfes ; and, in this view, the Underllanding I3 
 likcwife comprehended under it. Hence the whole faculty of 
 cognitions a priori is called pure Reafon ; which is divided 
 into the faculty of forming conceptions, i. e. the Underftand- 
 ing ; and into the faculty of forming conclufions, i. e. Reafon 
 in a more limited fenfe. 
 
 B) in particular : the power of conceiving fomething from 
 principles ; of apprehending the particular from the general j 
 of reducing the unity of the rules of the Underllanding to 
 principles ; of clafling particular conceptions under thofe, which 
 are general ; and finally, of exerting the higheft degree of ac- 
 tivity in the free operating faculty of cognition. — Thus de- 
 fined, Reafon is not only diftinguiflicd from the Senfitive Fa- 
 culty, but likewife from the Underllanding in a more limited 
 fenfe. 
 
 Re-
 
 i^4 GLbSSARY; 
 
 Receptivity, 
 
 the fufceptlbllity of impreffions ; the power of receiving rf^ 
 prefentations ; of being afFe£led by objedls ; the paj/ive faculty 
 of reprefentation ; fenfibility. This^ combined with fponta- 
 neity, forms the fubftance of the reprefenting power of man, 
 
 'KE¥LECTWS-*—Ueberkgung, 
 
 i) logical i the comparifon made between exifling conceptionaT 
 in general : 2) tranfcendental re/le£iionf the mode of compa- 
 ring representations with refpeft to the faculty of cognition, in 
 which they are compared } the a£l of reflecling upon the man- 
 ner, how and by what fubje£live conditions (ftates of mind) 
 we arrive at certain conceptions and judgments, whether 
 through inclination and cuftom, through the Senfitive Faculty, 
 the Underftanding, or through Reafon. 
 
 Regulative principles: See Oonstitutive* 
 
 Relation : See Judgments. 
 ReIigion 
 t ) fuhjeEiin)ely c6nfidered, is the reprefentatioii of the eft*entlai 
 laws of Reafon, as the refult of divine commands and of vir- 
 tue ; tlfe coincidence of the will of a finite being with that of 
 a facred and beneficent author of the world, who has both, 
 the will and power of ireallzing the mofl exaft proportion be- 
 tween the happinefs and the moral conduft of man. All Re- 
 ligion is founded upon morals. The Science of Religion is^ 
 therefore, called Moral Theology : 
 
 2) ohje&ively confidered, it is the whole compafs of thofe doc-^ 
 trlnes, which relate to the fubjeftive Religion. 
 
 Representation — Vorjlellung 
 is an internal determination, a modification of the mind. It is 
 converted into a cognition, as foon as it is referred to an 6bje(Jt. 
 
 RiJLE* 
 
 ^j
 
 GLOSSARY. 177 
 
 Rule — Kegel 
 is a conception or a judgment, fo far as the connexion of a 
 variety is fubjeded to a general condition.— As to their va- 
 lidity. Rules are either univerfal, which are necefTariljr valid, ■ 
 and admit of no exception , for inftance, the moral law, and 
 all the rules a priori : or they are general, when we freqaentf 
 ly obferve them to be advantageous and applicable to the pur- 
 pofes of life : fuch are, for inllance, the rules of prudence. 
 
 S^Tl5F ACT WiJ—^JVahlge/allen 
 is the correfponding relation of an objed to the fenfe of feeU 
 JCg, or to the fubjed itfelf, 
 
 ScEPTICISl^ 
 
 of pure Reafon, is the opinion, that we can form no decifion 
 upon the exiftence and non-exiftence of fuperfeufible things 
 and their properties, without pointing out with accuracy the 
 grounds of this impoflibility, which lie in the cognitive facul* 
 ty itfelf. 
 
 Schema 
 
 1) is the general determination of a perception according to 
 general ideas ; for inftance, the fenfible reprel'entation of a 
 man, a horfe, a houfe in general. It muft, therefore, not be 
 confounded with a * picture,' i. e. an example in concrete, 
 V. g. that of an individual or particular man, horfe, houfe, &.c. 
 
 2) the tranfcejidental fchema of a pure intelledual not on, ig 
 the pure and general fenfualiiation of fuch a notion ^ priori \ 
 the fenfible condition, under which the pure notions of the in- 
 
 telleft are ufod ; i. e. objedls can be clafled under it The 
 
 regular fucceffion of variety is apriori the .fchema of cau- 
 fality ; number in general is the fchema of quantity ; where- 
 as an individual number, as that of 5, 15, 8cc. is merely the 
 pifturc of it. 
 
 Leni
 
 1V8 G L O S S A R Y. 
 
 Sensation — Empjindung 
 Is fenfible reprefentation, impreffion of an adlually prefeut ob« 
 jeft upon the mind, modification of the Senfitive Faculty, 
 
 Sense, or Sensitive Faculty — Sinnlichkeity 
 according to Kant, is that faculty of the ^lind^, which is liable 
 to be modified and afFe6ted by things, and thereby to receive 
 imprefiions or reprefentations of things. It is, therefore, nei- 
 ther a bare modification of the Underftanding, as with Leib- 
 nitz, nor a mere activity or excitement of the corporeal 
 organs, the peculiar exiftence of which, if it is to become an 
 objeft of cognition, rather prefuppofes a receptivity in the 
 mind itfelf. 
 
 The * pure Senfitive Faculty a priori) implies the faculty in 
 itfelf; that, which belongs to it as a power of fufceptibility a 
 priori, which is not firft determined by the fenfible impref" 
 fion5> but which rather determines the latter themfelves, ac- 
 cording to Space and Time ; it is the fubjeftive condition of 
 all that, which receivea by it (namely the Senfitivfc Faculty a 
 priori) the charadter of reality. 
 
 Sensibility — Empjindbarieit 
 
 is fometimes, though rarely, ufed in thefe * Elements' inilead 
 of fenfation ; it exprefles rather the capacity of receiving fen>^ 
 fible impreffions. 
 
 Sensible and Sensitive 
 muft not be confounded with one another, as the former i^ 
 analogous to fenfibility, the latter to fenfation, • 
 
 Simultaneity — Zugleichseyn, 
 is the exiftence of a variety or the multifarious, at one and the 
 fame time. 
 
 Space — Raum 
 is the intuitive reprefentation of things being without and 
 
 npar one another, and of extenfion in general, 
 
 Spon-
 
 GLOSSARY; 179 
 
 Spontaneity 
 
 1) in general, is felf-a£live, imconditionate caufality ; 
 
 2) in particular, the fpontaneity of the reprefenting faculty 
 tonfiils in the a6livity or operation of the reprefenting fubjeft 
 upon the impreflions received. The reprefenting faculty is 
 called, Underftanding, Reafon in the moll extenfive fenfe, fo 
 far only, as it is felf-aftive and apprehends the impreffions re* 
 ceived, connects them into a wholcj and has the power of re- 
 producing them. 
 
 SpURidUS woRSHtP — Afterilenfl 
 ' is fuch a fanciful veneration of the Deity, as is contrary to 
 that true fervice, which he himfelf requires ; v. g. by penance, 
 mortification, pilgrimage, &.c. 
 
 Subject 
 1) logical ; that in gieneral, in which certain predicates are In- 
 herent : 2) the tranfcendental fubjeft in particular, the repre- 
 fenting, thinking being in relation to its own thoughts : 3) the 
 real fubjed, fubflance. 
 
 Subjective, 
 
 aa oppofed to ohjeBivey fignifies i) that, which belongs to the 
 fubjeft, i. e. all reprefentations : a) that, which in part at 
 leaft is determined by the nature of the fubjeft. This is like- 
 Wife the cafe in all our reprefentations : 3) that, which relates • 
 to no objedl correfponding with the reprefentation ; thofe con- 
 ceptions and judgments, that cannot be exhibited in percep- 
 tion, as the Deity, Liberty, Immortality : 4) in a praBical 
 fenfe, fuch pra£lical principles (maxims), which are not Imme- 
 diately founded upon Reafon itfelf, but upon the particular 
 conftitution of the ading fubjeft, upon thefenfible impulfe and 
 inclinations of it. 
 
 Substance 
 1) according to the pure Category ^ a fubjeflt in a categorical 
 
 - Z 2 judgment
 
 i89 GLOSSARY. 
 
 judgment ; all that, which is not confidered as predicate of 
 fomething elfe : in this fenfe the mind itfelf is called lub- 
 ilance : 2) fenfualized ; fubftance in a phenomenon, the con- 
 tinuance, perdurability in a perceived obje£V, which exifts at 
 all times ; that, which contains the ground of reality in the 
 accideiis, v. g matter is the fubftance of all external objeds, 
 without which no obje<3^ could be conceived in Space : 3) 
 Suhjlance in itfelf^ external to the phenomenon ; it is that un- 
 known fomething, bj which the diiFerent fenfations are pro- 
 duced, and neceflarilj cbnneded with one another in a pheno- 
 meho:^. 
 
 SUBSTUAIUM. 
 
 The fuperjenjihle fuhjlratum of nature is that objed, of 
 which we can determine nothing in an affirmative fenfe, fave 
 that it is a being in itfelf, of which we know merely the phe- 
 nomenon. 
 
 Stnthesis 
 
 1) in general, is the compofitlon or combination of various 
 reprefentations (whether intuitions or conceptions) into one' 
 cognition, which may be conception, judgment, &c. 2) in par-" 
 ticular: a) pure tranfcendental fynthefii a priori, is the aft of 
 combining the variety of Space and Time into One repre- 
 fcntation of Space and Time. This lies at the foundation of 
 pure Mathematics • — b) fw^iVy^/ fynjhefis, when any expe- 
 rimental varieties, i. e. fenfations, are connefted into unity, 
 Eachof thefe fpecies confifts 6f three varieties, namely, 
 
 1) the fynfhefis oi apprehenjlofi, when the affedlions of our in- 
 ternal and external fenfe are apprehended and arranged ; 
 
 2) the fjnthefis of reproduSiion when that, which has been 
 Collefled and conneded, is reproduced by the power of ima- 
 gination, in order that the preceding affeflions may be an- 
 nexed to thofe immediately fucceeding ; and 
 
 3) the fynthefis of recognition^ which forms One Intuition of 
 what has been apprehended and coniie£l^. 
 
 System
 
 GLOSSARY. i«i 
 
 System 
 is a whole, which is connefted bj one principle, and therefore 
 has neceffary unity. It is oppofed to * aggregate^* i. e. a whole, 
 which owes its origin to the occafional or accidental addition 
 of one part to another, and confequently has not the charader 
 of neceffary completenefs. 
 
 Technic 
 i) in a proper fenfe, means Art. caufality according to Ideas, 
 purpofes : a) in a general fenfe, the technic ofnature^ the cau-^ 
 fality of nature in relation to thofe produftlons, which cor- 
 refpond with our conceptions of a purpofe ; in oppofition to 
 * mechanifniy i. e. the determination of caufes according to the 
 laws of motion. 
 
 Teleology : See Purpose. 
 
 Theology: See Religion. 
 
 Theosopht 
 fignifies that theoretical cognition of the divine nature and ex- 
 ifteiice, which fatisfaftoiily explains the conftitution of the 
 world, as well as the moral laws. 
 
 Thing in itself : See Noumenon. 
 
 Time— ZrtV 
 
 is, according to Kant, the original perceptive reprefentation of 
 the polEbility of fimultaneity and fucceffion. 
 
 Totality — Allheitt 
 
 the reprefentation of the whole, (unlverfitas^; that funftlon 
 of the ijnderllanding, by which, when it is applied to con- 
 ceptions, a plurality of cognitons is comprehended and con- 
 neded into a general one ; when applied to perceptions, To- 
 tality
 
 iSi GLOSSARY, 
 
 tality is nothing elfe than plurality confidered in things as 
 unity, and forms afpecies of a Category, vii. that of Quantity; 
 
 Transcendent — UberfchwengUch : See Immanent. 
 
 Transcendental^ 
 in a general fenfe, fignifies a reprefentation (whether percep- 
 tion or conception), a judgment, a fcience a priori^ fo far as it 
 ilill refers to objects, and may be applied to them. For in- 
 ilance, it is a tranfcendental cognition, that Space is a percep- 
 tion a priori, and yet is applicable to fenfible objects. The 
 tranfcendental is oppofed to the empirical, which latter not only 
 relates to, but likewise arifes from, experience. 
 
 TK^3'Tli—'Wahrheii 
 is the igreerfient or coincidence of oilr (fognition, i) with 
 itfelf, i. e. its own charafters^ and with the general tules of 
 thought : 2) with its obje<fts ; and hence material, pofitive, 
 bljeBivCy real, fjmthetical truth, reality. It requires, that the 
 objeft be given ; the principle of contradiction is only a ne- 
 gative criterion of truth; 
 
 Unconditional or Unconditionate— -Z7/;fifim^f, 
 that, which is abfolutely and in itfelf, i. e. internally poffiblcj 
 which is exempt from thofe conditions, that circumfcribe a 
 thing in Time and Space. Such is the idea of human Reafoa 
 in the moft extenflve fenfe, as it is capable of continual im- 
 provement, which, although it cannot be realized in experience, 
 is unlimited ; thef fphere of the objefts of cognition being 
 boundlefs. And this circumllance ought not tc deter^ but ra- 
 ther to encourage us in our exertions for the attainment of 
 knowledge, which may be carried on in inde^niium.—iCom' 
 par* this Article with the term * Conditional.' 
 
 Under-
 
 GLOSSARY. 183 
 
 Understanding— n/^rjfflnrf 
 i) in the: moft extenfive fenfe, is the felf-aftive faculty of cog- 
 nition (^fpontaneitj), or the faculty of producuig reprefenta- 
 tions, of uniting the reprefentations given or perceived, of 
 thinking and judging upon objefts : 
 
 Qt) in particular ; the faculty of forniing conceptions and judg- 
 ments of objefts perceived ; the faculty of acquiring experi- 
 n^ental cognitions, i. e. of forming rules, as oppofed to laws. 
 In this fenf«, the Underftanding is (JiftinguifUcd ffom Reafon 
 in a more liniited fignification. 
 
 The Will 
 
 1) in general, is the arbitrary determination, the caufality o5 
 a living being, the power of producing objefts correfponding 
 tvith conceptions, or at leaft of determining onefelf as to the 
 attainment of them ; an appetitive faculty in general j 
 
 2) in particular, the caufality of Reafon with refpedt o its 
 aftions, practical Reafon and Liberty ; a faculty of ading con- 
 formably to principles, i. e. to the reprefentation of laws—to 
 produce fomething, that cprrefponds with ^n idea or purpofe. 
 
 Wisdom — Weisheit 
 
 \s the idea of the neceflary unity of all poffible purpofes. It . 
 is therefore i ) theoretically confidered, the cognition of the 
 highefl good: 'i) praBically : an attribute of that will, whiclj. 
 Realizes the higheft good, or at leaft exerts itfelf for that pur- 
 pofe. 
 
 FINIS.
 
 J
 
 THREE 
 
 PHILOLOGICAL ESSAYS, 
 
 CHIEFLY TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN 
 
 OF 
 
 JOHN CHRISrOPHER ADELUNG^B^o
 
 ESSAYFIRST. 
 
 A concife hifcory cf the Englijh Language, lafc. 
 
 J HE hiftory of the Englirti Language begins with the Art" 
 glo-Sa}cons ; for, though the old Br-itons, the Anceftors of the 
 modern Weljh, were the firfl inhabitants of this country, yet, 
 with refped to its language, they form no epoch in the hiftory 
 of it ; as_^ there are but a very fmall number of words, which 
 can be derived, with certainty and juft etymology, fromBritilh 
 roots. 
 
 It is, indeed, not very probable that the Anglo-Saxons, with 
 their irruption into a new country, Ihould have deftroyed, or 
 expelled, all the former inhabitants of it; and it is more rea- 
 fonable to fuppofe, that befides thofe, who fled to the moun- 
 tains of Wales, there muft Hill have remained behind a very 
 confiderable part of the nation, but who, according to the bar- 
 barous cuftom prevailing in thofe times, were reduced to a 
 fpecies of flavery, were obliged to cultivate the fields of their 
 mafters, and were gradually compelled, however unwilling, to 
 adopt the language of their conquerors. 
 
 Thus, the ancient tongue of the Britons, was completely 
 eradicated ; if we except a few fingle words, which have ftill 
 remained current among countrj^-p^ople. — Similar phenomena 
 liave occurred in Germany, and frequently too, in other coun- 
 tries. When the Sclavi and theVandals made themfelves mafters 
 of the Eaftern part of Germany, the/ did not deftroy all the 
 native Germans ; but they fubjugated and forced them to a- 
 dopt their language. Heiice, in Bohemia, there is fcarcely any 
 trace left of the ancient language of the country. When the 
 Germans, in facceeding ages, reconquered many of thefe pro- 
 vinces, and united th^m into a political body, they proceeded 
 in a fimilar manner ; and it is now very difficult to dcte£l any 
 veftiges of the ancient language of the Vandals, among the 
 country-people of thefe provinces. 
 
 The Anglo-Saxons, who began their Irruptions into Britain 
 aibout the year 450, came from the modern Frijia : hence their 
 language bears a clofcr rel^ion to the Frijian, than to any o- 
 {her. It is, however, to be much regretted, that the latter has 
 
 » not
 
 vl THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 not been- more accurately inveftigated hitherto by, any philo- 
 logift ; for it certainly might be of great advantage for the il- 
 lullration of the ancient Anglo-Saxon. 
 
 The hiflory of the Englifh language, from the firfl inroads 
 of the Anglo-Saxons, down to the prefent time, comprehends a 
 period of nearly fourteen centuries. As the nati6nj during 
 this long period, has undergone various great changes and 
 commotions, which were necelTarily attended with relative in- 
 fluence upon the language, it becomes therefore neceflary to 
 divide it into ceitain periodical Se6lions, correfponding with 
 thefe changes. I propofe to adopt this method ; although 
 Johnson, my predeceffor, has contented himfelf with giving 
 protnifcuous fpecimens of language, as prefixed to his large 
 Diftionary, in chronological order, without however attempt- 
 ing a true hiftorical diviiion. 
 
 The principal changes, which, pofterior to the Anglo-Sax- 
 ons, alFecled the Eiaglifh language, were, the incurlions of the 
 Danes ; the invaiion of the Normans ; and the adoption of 
 French phrafes and terms, together with the improvements 
 and manners of that people. Thefe collectively fuggpft to us 
 four periods, in tracing the hiftory of the Englifli . language : 
 viz. ill, the pure Anglo-Saxon, or the Britiih-Saxon period ; 
 id. the Danijh Saxon,' or Daniih Anglo-Saxon j 3d. the iVbrr- 
 mannic-Saxony or the Normannic Danifh-Saxon ; and 4th, the 
 French' Saxon, or the Normannic French-Saxon period, in 
 which laft the language gradually alTumed the form of the 
 modern Englifh. 
 
 I. British-Saxon Period. 
 
 This period begins with the firft invafion of the Anglos 
 Saxons, in the year 450 ; it terminates with the incurlions of 
 the Danes, about the year 780, and confequently comprehends 
 as era of 330 years. — It correfjjpnds with that period in the 
 hiftory of the German language, which extends from the emi- 
 gration of the Eaflern nations, to the reign of Charlemagne ; 
 and with refpecl to the ftate of improvement during this pe- 
 riod, both languages perfectly refemble one another. 
 
 The ^nglo- Saxons -were a rude, untutored people, not unlike 
 all the German and Northern nations of that age, whofe prin- 
 cipal improvements related to the art of war. People of this
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. rii 
 
 ■ . ^ 
 
 defcrlptlori do not ftand in need of letters, or a -written lan- 
 guage ; and it is very probable, that thej neither had, nor 
 knew, the alphabet. The increafe of population, in a limited 
 territory, compelled them, indeed, eaily to accuftom themfelves 
 to order and a more rigid civil conftitution ; but as they were 
 employed, for a confiderable time, in combating the natives 
 of conquered coimtries, this faint improvement was chiefly, 
 and proximately, deiigned for warlike purfuits.^ 
 
 A more remarkable degree of improvement was manifefl: 
 among the Anglo-Saxons about the year 570, when St Au- 
 gustine arrived from Rome, and inftrucled them in the be- 
 neficent principles of thfe Chriftian Religion. Thefe were the 
 more eagerly embraced, as the progrcfs of the mind, though 
 hitherto fmall and partial, enabled them to perceive the ne- 
 ceffity of abolifliing that rude and undigelled veneration for 
 their idols, which were calculated only to amufe the fancy of 
 a barbarous and unfettled people. 
 
 Together with the Chriftian Religion, the Anglo-Saxons 
 alfo acquired the firft rudiments of the arts and Cciences, and 
 a tafte for the literature of ancient Rome, which very rapid- 
 ly fpread among them. This may be eafily accounted for, as 
 it was chiefly promoted by the continual increafe of a numer- 
 ous people, who had eftablilhed themfelves upon a limited ter- 
 ritory. Thus prepared, they likewife adopted the Roman 
 alphabet, which had already been introduced as the current 
 fmall letter in their writings. But as they were accuftomed 
 to 2l found in their language, which was expreffed with a hif- 
 ling tone, fomewhat fimilar to both t and j, and which was 
 foreign to the Romans, who had no charafter for it in their 
 alphabet ; hence the Anglo-Saxon teachers of Religion were 
 obliged to borrow the (theta) from the Greek, which 
 therefore fupplied the place of the modern, Englifh th. The 
 other Anglo-Saxon charadlers are perfeftly fipoilar to the Ro- 
 man current letters of thofe times, and particularly of the fixth 
 Century ; and the vo of the former is clofely imitated from a, 
 compounded v of the latter. 
 
 If full credit be due to Warton, there is no frag- 
 ment extant from this period, but a fmall' metric compolitioa 
 oi \\\^ genuine Caedmon, which is infcrted in Alfred's tranf- 
 lation of the Ecclefiaftic Hiftory, by Bede * — As the only, 
 
 a 2 and 
 
 * Vol. IV' Chap. 24.(10/ Chap. 4. a» quoted by Warton).
 
 via 
 
 THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 and certainly a venerable piece of curiofity left of thefe re- 
 mote ages, it well deferves a place in this period of the Britifh 
 language. It is here offered in two different copies. One of 
 them is tranfcribed from HiCKEs's Grammat. Ancrlo-Saxon. 
 p. 187 ; the other ftill more ancient, is extratSied from Wan- 
 ley's Antiq, Litcrat. Septentr. Part II. p. 287 — -I have met 
 with a third Copy of this fragment in" Whelock's Anglo- 
 Saxon Bede ; Camhridge,i6:^'^ ; but the text in this differs from 
 both the former, and does not appear to me equally authentic. 
 
 H I c K. E s. 
 
 " Nu we fceolon hcrigean 
 Heofon rices weard 
 Metodes mihte. 
 And his mod gethanc. 
 Weorc wuldor faeder 
 Suua he wundra gehwaes. 
 
 Ece drihten ord pnfteald. 
 He aereft fcop 
 Eordan bearnum 
 Heofan to rofc 
 Halig fcippend. 
 
 Da middangeard 
 Moncynnes weard 
 Ece tliihte aefter teode. 
 Firum fold an. 
 Frea atlmihtig." 
 
 Englijh, 
 
 " Now we ought to praife the 
 author of the celeftial empire, 
 the might of tlie creator, and 
 his counfels, the deeds of the 
 father of honour ; how he be- 
 came the author of wonders. 
 
 And when the eternal God 
 firfl created heaven as the roof 
 for the children of man, and af- 
 terwards the earth, being an 
 omnipotent guardian of the hu- 
 man race." 
 
 W AN L K Y. 
 
 " Nu fcylun hergan 
 IJefaen ricaes uard 
 Metudaes maefti 
 End his mod gidanc 
 Verc uuldur fadur 
 Sue he uundra gihuaes. 
 
 Eci dri(51in 
 Ora fteh'dae. 
 He aerift fcopa 
 Elda harnum 
 Heben til hrofc 
 Halcg fcepen, 
 
 Tha middun geard 
 Moncynnaes uard 
 Ecy drydlin 
 Aefter tiadae 
 Firum foldu 
 Frca alme6lig. 
 
 German, ■ 
 
 *' Nun follen wir prcifen, den 
 Urheber des Himmelrelches, die 
 Macht des Schopfers, and feinen 
 Rath, die Thaten des Vaters der 
 Ehre \ wie er der Urlieber der 
 Wunder ward. 
 
 Und als der ewige Gott den 
 Menfchenkindern zuerft den 
 Himmel zum Dache, und her- 
 nach als allmuchtiger Hiiter des 
 menfchliehen Gefchlechts die 
 Erde fchuf. 
 
 Although
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. ,i* 
 
 Although Caedmon is faid to have miraculoufly compofed 
 this Song, when dreaming ; it neverthelefs appears ta be a 
 tranflation from tlie Latin, wliich then, and for feveral fuc- 
 ceeding centiiriesy was rendered fo very literally, that even 
 the article was left out, and the whole conilruclion of the La- 
 tin with the participles and ^any other peculiarities were ri- 
 goroufly obfcrved. It is for this reafon, we ought not to judge 
 of the fpirit of a language from the like tranflations ; and the 
 want of rhymes is very probably owing to the fame caufe. 
 
 II. Danish Saxon-Period. 
 (or, Danijh Anglo-Saxon.^ 
 
 This period begins from the incurfions of the Danes, about 
 the year 780, and continues as far as the invafion of the Nor- 
 mans m 1 066 ; it confequently includes nearly three centuries. 
 Two circumflanccs co-operated here, which produced remar- 
 kable changes in the Old Saxon language ; namely firll, the 
 domeftic improvements of the Anglo-Saxons, both in a phy- 
 sical and moral fenfe, from which the improvement, and con- 
 fequently the change of the language was infeparable ; and 
 fecondly, the mixture of the latter with the Danifh, which 
 being clofely related to the Anglo-Saxon, was more eafily 
 united into one language. 
 
 Many written fragments, from this period, are ftill extant ; 
 and all fuch as are commonly called Anglo-Saxon, properly 
 confift of a mixture of Danilh with the Anglo-Saxon. To this 
 number we may particularly refer two literal tranflations of 
 the four Evangelifts, the writings of King Alfred, and the 
 beautiful poetical paraphrafe of the Firji Book of Mofes^hy 
 t\ie.fpurious Caedmon. 
 
 As a fpecimen of the profc-languageof this period, Johnson 
 gives _the firfl Chapter of St Luke, extrafted from one of the 
 tranflations above mentioned ; but as fuch literal tranflations 
 aie by no means calculated to exhibit the fpirit of a language, 
 I have made choice of tlie Travels of Ohther and Wul'stan, 
 as King Alfred, who died in 901, defcribed them in his Pre- 
 face to the tranflation of Qrosius I have faithfully tranfcri- 
 
 bcd it from Sjye/man^s Vita Aclfvcdi \ Oxfprd, Fol. I.678 ; with 
 
 this
 
 THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 this difference onlj, that iaftead of giving the (very inaccurate) 
 Latin gf Spelman, I have fubjoined a German tranilation ; 
 and for the greatei convenience of readers, in general, I have 
 likewife exchanged the Anglo-Saxon for the common Latin 
 chara^ers. 
 
 This original piece, on account of the manj curious parti- 
 culars it contains, I make no doubt, will prove more accept- 
 able than any of thofe which are bare literal tranflations, and 
 confequentlj improper to ferve as fpecimens for difplaying the 
 genius of the language. 
 
 Ohthaere faede his hlaforde 
 Aelfrede de Kynincge thaet he 
 ealra Northmanna Northmeft 
 bude J he cwaetli thaet he bude 
 on thaem lande noithweardum 
 with tha waeft fae.he faede theah 
 thaet thaet land fy fwlthe north, 
 thanon' ao hit is eall wefte bu- 
 ton on feawum llowum' ftlce 
 maelum wiciath Finnas* on hun- 
 tathe on wintra* and on fumera 
 no fifcothe be thaere fae. 
 
 He faede tliaet he aet fumum 
 cyrrc woldc fandian hu lange 
 thaet land north rihte laege* 
 oth the hivaether aenig man 
 benortham thaem weftene bu- 
 de : tha for he north rihte be 
 thaem lande* let him ealne 
 weg thaet Vvefte lande on thaet 
 fteorbord' and tha wid fae on 
 baec bord thry dagas* tha wes 
 
 he 
 
 Ohther faid to his Lord, 
 King Alfred, that of all the 
 Normani. he refided the farthcft 
 towards the North ; he affirm- 
 ed, that he refided in that conn- 
 try which, in the North, borders 
 on the Weftern Ocean. This 
 country extends far to the North, 
 is a complete defert, excepting 
 a few places which are inhabit- 
 ed by the Finns, who live in 
 winter by the chace, but in fum- 
 raer by fifliing. 
 
 He related, that he had once 
 ■wiflted to examine, 'how far this 
 country extended to the North ; 
 or whether this defert was in- 
 habited in its northern paj;ts. 
 For this purpofe he had failed 
 three fucceffive days in a ftraight 
 northern line, having the defert^ 
 country on the -right, and the 
 open fea on the left hand j thus 
 
 he 
 
 Ohtiier fagte zu feinem Herrn, dem Koenige Aelfrfd, dafs er unter alien 
 Normannen ana weiteften gegen Norden wohne ; er fagte, er wohne in dem Lande, 
 ■welches nordwaerts an die Weftfee ftoefst. Diefes Land erftrecke fich welt gegen 
 Mitternacht, und fey voellig wuift, bis auf einige wenige Orte, wo einige Finnen 
 •wohnen,>welche im Winter von der Jagd, im Sommer aber von dem Fifchfange 
 leben. 
 
 Er fagte, er habe einmal unterfuchen wollen, wie weit fich diefes Land nadi 
 Norden erftreckte ; cder ob noch Menfchen inj Norden diefer Wuifte wohneten. 
 DesNvegen fey er drey Tagelanggerade nordwaerts gereifet, habe das wuifte Land 
 2ur recliten, und die ofFene See auf der Uoken Hand gehabt ; da er denn bis dahin 
 
 nord-
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. 
 
 XI 
 
 he fwa feor north fwa fvva hwael 
 huntan fyrreit farath:- tha for be 
 tha gyt north ryhte* ftva he 
 mihte on thaem othrum thrim 
 dagura gefeglian* tha beah thaet 
 land wer cart rihte* othrhe fio 
 fae in on thaet land' he nyfte 
 liwaether" baton he wyfte thet 
 he ther bad weftan windes oth- 
 the hwon northan* and fegled 
 thanon eaft be lande* fwa fwa 
 he mihte on feowor dagum ge- 
 feglian'thafceolde hebidan ryhte 
 northan windes* forthan thaet 
 land thaer beah futhrihte* oth- 
 the feo fac in onwaet land* he 
 nyfte hwaether* tha faegled he 
 thanon futhrihte ^e lande* fwa 
 fwa he mihte pn Ijf dagum gefe- 
 glian:. 
 
 Tha laeg thaer an micel ea 
 up in that land* wa cyrdon he 
 up in on tha ea" for thaem hy 
 ne thorfton forth be thaere ea 
 feglian* for unfrithe* for thaem 
 thaet land waes call gebun on 
 othre healfe thaere ea;- Ne met- 
 te he aer nan gebun land* fyth- 
 than he fram his agnum hame. 
 for* ac him waes eahie weg weft 
 land on thaet fteorbord butan 
 fifceran and fugeleran and hun- 
 tan* ^ 
 
 nordwaerts gekommpn fey, wohin die Wallfifchjaeger zu gehen pflegten.Von da fey 
 er nochdrey Tage lang weiter nordwaerts gel'egclt,da fich denn dasLand geradc nach 
 Often geftreckt habe. Ob aber innerhalb des Landes Meer fey, wiffe er nicht ; 
 er wiffe nur fo viel, dafs er fich dafelbft aufgehalten, und auf den Weft-oder Nord- 
 tvind gnvartet habe. Hierauf fey er vier Tage lang an deni Lande hiiigefcgelt, " 
 worauf er auf den Nordwind habe warten muiffen, weil fich das Land nach, 
 Suiden gefkeckt habe. Ob fich die See in diefes Land erftrecke, wiffe cr nicht. 
 Hierauf fey er fuinf Tage lang laengsder Kuifte fuidwaerts gefegelt. 
 
 Da bcfand fich ein groffer Flufs, welchcr weit in das Land ging, an dcffen 
 Muindung er fich aufhiclt, fich a^er aus Furcht vor den Einwohnern nicht den 
 Flufs hinauf wagte,- weil das Land aufdcr andern Seite des Fluffes ftark bc- 
 wohnt war. Er hatte auch, feitdem er aus feincr Hcimath abgereifet war, auffer 
 ^efem kcin bewoluites Laud angctroffcn, fcndern hatte zur Rcchten jcdcrzeit 
 
 wujftci 
 
 he had come to that northern 
 region, to which "the whale-filh- 
 ers were accullomed to refort. 
 From thence he hid failed, for 
 three days, further North, where 
 he found the country extending 
 due Eaft. But whether the fea 
 continue within the land, he 
 knew not ; he only knew this 
 much, that he had ilopped there, 
 waiting for wefterly or northerly- 
 winds. After this he failed four 
 days along the coaft, when he 
 was auain obliged to wait for a 
 northerly wind, as the country 
 extended to the South. Whe- 
 ther the fea continue within this 
 part of the land, he alfo knew 
 not. Then he failed five addi- 
 tional days along the Southern 
 coaft. 
 
 Here he met with a great 
 river that extended far up the 
 country, and on the" mouth of 
 which he flopped, but for fear 
 of the inhabitants, he did not 
 venture to fail up that river ; for 
 the country, on one bank of the 
 river, appeared fully inhabited. 
 He had met with no other inha- 
 bited country than this fince his 
 departure from home : the coun- 
 try on the right always appear- 
 
 insr
 
 xu 
 
 THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 t;\n' and thaet waeren ealle Fin- 
 nfti* and him waes a Widfac 
 on thact uaec bord;. 
 
 Tha Beorraas haefdon fwithe 
 well gebun hyra land* ac hi ne 
 dorfton thacw on cuman:- Ac 
 thara Terfin na land thaes call 
 wefte* butan waer huntan gewi- 
 codon* otlilhe fifceras.' oththe 
 fugeleras :. Fela fpella lilm fae- 
 don tha Beormas* aegthcr ge of 
 hyra agcnum lande ge of thaera 
 lande the ymbe hy utan waeran* 
 ac he nylte bwat thaes fothes 
 •tv^es" for thaem he hit fylf ne 
 gefeah :• Tha Fianas him thuhte 
 and tha Eeormas ipraccon qcah 
 aneetheode ;•. 
 
 Svvithofl: he for thider* to 
 eacan thaes landes fceawunge* 
 for thaem hoifwaelam* for thaem 
 hi habbath fwithe aethele ban on 
 hyra tothum :• Tha tew hy 
 brobion fume thaem cynincge' 
 and hyra hyd bith fwithe god to 
 fciprathum :• Se liwael bith 
 micle laefla than othre hwalas* 
 ne bith h^ lengra thonne fyfan 
 
 elna 
 
 ing a dcfcrt uninhabited, except 
 by a few fiihermen, fowlers and 
 hunters, who were all of Finnic 
 extraction. Eat on the left, he 
 always ohferved the open fea, ' 
 
 Many Biarmians reiided a- 
 mong them ; yet he was not in- 
 clined to venture a landing 
 there. But the country of the 
 Terfins was uninhabited, except 
 ' by fo:ne hunters, fiflierpaen or 
 fowlers who reiided there. 
 The Biarmians told him much 
 of their own country, as well 
 as of the neighbouring lands j 
 but how far their narratins 
 were true, he could not afcer- 
 tain, as he had not himfelf ictn 
 thefe countries. * He believed, 
 however, that the Finns and 
 Biarmians had one common lan- 
 guage. 
 
 His principal obje6t in tra- 
 velling thither had been, to ob- 
 tain the fe^-horfes, whofe teeth 
 were compofed of a very preci- 
 ous bone, and forae of which 
 teeth he likewife gave to the 
 King. Their fkins are of ex- 
 cellent ufe for tackle. This 
 fpecies of whale is much fmallcr 
 than any other, being never z- 
 
 bove 
 
 •wnllles Land gehabt, cinige wen:p;e Fifchcr, Vogelfaengcr und Jaeger ausgenom- 
 men, wc!che insjjefammt Finnen waren. Zur Linkcn aber hatte er jcderzeit 
 das'ofFene Tvleer. 
 
 Es wohnten viele B:armter in ihrem Lande ; allein er habe es nicht wagen 
 Wolien, dafcibft anzularlden. Das Land der Terfiunen aber fey unbewohnt, aufi«r 
 daf s einige Jaeger, Fifchcr, oder VogeHiienger dafelbft wohnten. Die Biarmier 
 haeSten ih;n vicks, fo wchl von. ihrem eigcnen Lande als von den benachbartcn 
 lyaendeni erzaehlet; aUein er wifle nicht was daran wahr fey, weil er fie felbft 
 nicht gefchen habe Er glaubte indelltn, dafs die Fj N n e N und Biakmii;r eine 
 tind cbea diefclb;; Sprache hacttcn. 
 
 V.ir fey aber vorn'j'.mlich r.ni der Wallroife willen dahin gereifet, we^heeinfehr 
 fchi'Xt shares Bein in ihren Zaehnen haetten, von welchen Zaehnen er aiich einige 
 iem Kotnige g^b. Jlire Felle find fehr gut zu^Schiffstauen zu gebrauclien. Dicfq 
 Art ^\'■allfilcl^e ill wcit kleincr als andere Arten., und nicht uiber CelK:n Ehlen 
 
 ~^ Ian?-
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. 
 
 Jtia 
 
 eina lange* ac on his agnum 
 lande iffe bedfta hwael huntuth. 
 tiia beth eachta and feowertiges 
 eina lange* and tha maeftan 
 fiiiges eina langf * thara he faede 
 thaet he fyxa lum ofsloge fyxtig 
 on twam dagum. 
 
 He waes fwithe fpaedig man 
 on thaem aethum the hoera fpe- 
 da on beoth" that is on wildrum :• 
 He haefde thagyf tha hethone 
 cyning fohte" tamra deora unbe- 
 bohtra fyx hund :• Tha theorhe 
 hatad hranas :• wara waeron fix 
 'ftaet hranas" Tha beoth fwithe 
 dyre mid Finnum* fof thaem hy 
 foth tha wildan hranas mid :• 
 He vvaes mid thaem fyrftum 
 mannum on thaem lande* naefde 
 he theah mathonne twentighry- 
 thera* and twentig fceapa* and 
 twentig fwina* and 'thaet lytle 
 thaet he erede he erede mid 
 horfan :• Ac hyra ar is maeft on 
 thaem gafole the tha Finnas him 
 Jnldath* thaet gafol bithon deora 
 i'ellum" and on fugela fetherum* 
 and hvvales bane* and on thaem 
 fciprapura the beoth of hwaeles 
 hyde 
 
 bove feven ells in length. But 
 good whales were alfo caught 
 in his native country, which 
 meafured upwaMs of forty-eight 
 yards, and fometiines above fifty 
 yards in length. He affirmed, 
 that he was the fixth among 
 thofe (i. e. in company with five 
 others) who had killed fixty 
 whales in two days'. 
 
 He was a very rich man in 
 thofe things which, with them, 
 were efteemed as riches, that is, 
 in cattle. He had, when he 
 came to the King, fix hundred, 
 unpurchafed, tame deer, which 
 he called rein-deer. Among 
 thtfe were fix highly cfteeraed. ' 
 by the Finns, as by means o£ 
 them they tamed the wild rein- 
 deer. He was one of the Chiefs 
 in the land, and yet he was pof- 
 feffed of no more than twenty 
 oxen, twenty fheep, and twenty 
 hogs. The fmall piece of foil, 
 v/hich he cultivated, was tilled 
 by horfes. The principal re- 
 venues (of the Chiefs) confifted 
 f in the tribute which the "Finns 
 paid them, viz. in fkins of ani- 
 mals, bird-feathers, whale-bone 
 and fiiip-ropes, which were ma- 
 nufaftured 
 
 lang. Es wuirden aber auch in feinerri Vaterlande gute Wallfifche gefangen, 
 welche uiber acht uiid vierzig, und zuweilen Uiber funfzig Ehlen lang waeren. 
 Er verficherte, dafs er feib fechfte (d. i. niit noch fuinfen) ihrer in ewey Tagea 
 il-chzig erleget haoe. 
 
 Er war ein fehr reicher Mann*an folchen Dingen, welche bey ihnen fuir 
 Reichthum gehalten warden, d. i. an Vieh. Er hatte, als er zu dem Koenige kam, 
 fechshundert ungekaiifte zahme Hirfche, welche er Rennthiere nannte. Darun- 
 tcr befanden fich fechs, welche bey den Finncn fehr hoch gefchaetzct werden 
 weil fie die wilden Rennthiere damir zahm machen. Er war einer der Vor- 
 nehmften in dem Lande, und hatte dennoch nicht mehr als zwanzig Ochfen,zwan- 
 zig Schafc, und zwanzig Schweine. Den wenigcn Acker, welchen er bauetc, 
 den bauetc er mit I'ferden. Jhrc vornehmftcn Einkuinfte bcflehen in dtm Tribute, 
 ■welchen die Finnen ihneu bezahlen, und welcher in ThierfeUen, io Yogclfedern, in 
 
 b Fischbein
 
 XIV 
 
 THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 liyde geworht and of feoles :. 
 
 Aeghwilc gylt be his gebyr- 
 duni" fe birdfta fceall gildan 
 fiftyne mearthes fell* and fif 
 hranes' and an beran fel* and 
 tyn ambra fethra* and berenne 
 kyitel oththe yterenne* and tvve- 
 gen fciprapas. aegwer fy fyxtig 
 eina lang* other fy of hwaeles 
 byde geworhtc* other of fioles :. 
 * * 
 
 Thaet EafHand (Wulfstan 
 facde^ is fwithe mycel' and thaer 
 bith fwithe manig burh* and on 
 aelcere byrig bith cyninge* and 
 thaer bith fu'ythe micel hunig 
 and fifcath* and fe cyning and 
 tha ricoftan men drincath myran 
 meocl* and tha uufpethigan and 
 
 tha 
 
 nufaftured of the fkins of thi 
 whale and fea-dog (feal). 
 
 Every one contributed in pro- 
 portion to his abilities. The 
 richeft generally gave fifteen 
 flcins of the marret, five of the 
 reindeer, one bear's fkin, teir 
 meafures of feathers, together 
 with a coat made of the {kins of 
 bears or otters, and two I'hip's- 
 cables, each of them fixty cUs 
 long, one of which mud be ma- 
 nufatlured of whale-lkins, and 
 
 the other of the fkins of feals. 
 
 * * 
 
 This Eaflern country -|-(Wulf- 
 STAN related) was very large and 
 contained many cities, each of 
 which had its king. Much ho- 
 ney and many fiflies were likewife 
 found there. The King and the 
 jrichert perfons drank horfe-milk, 
 but the poor and the fervants 
 drank 
 
 Fifchbein, und in Schifsfeilen beflehet, v^elche letztere aus Wallfifch-und See- 
 huudsfellen verfertiget werdcn. 
 
 Jeder giebt nach ieinem Vermoegen. Der Relchfle giebt gemeiiyglich funf- 
 zehn Marderftlle, fuinf Rennthiere, ein Baerenfeil, und zehn Maals pedern, nebft 
 einem Rocke von Baehren-oder Fifchotterfellen, und zweyen Schifsfeilcn, jede*> 
 ibchzig Ehlen iang, deren eines ausWallfifch — das andere aber aus Seehundsfellen 
 verfertiget feyn mufs. 
 
 Diefes Oeflliche Land (erzaehlte Wuifstan) ifl fehr grofs, und hat fehr viele 
 Staedte, dcren jede ihren Koeiiig hat. Aiich giebt es dafelbst vicl Honig und Fifche. 
 I>er Koenig dad die reichften Perfonen trinken Pferdemilch, die Armen und 
 
 Knechte 
 
 * jj * ITere follow Ohther's and Wv lb st Ait's Geografihlcal acc»unts of Nor- 
 vay, the adjacent countries to the Eaft, and the river Vijiula. They are, how- 
 ever, fo inaccurately ftated, and fo little intereiling in themfelves, that I thought 
 proper to fave the room for other more curious and attractive fpecimens. I have 
 fele(5led a few of that defcript ion from the works of Caxton, Harding, War- 
 TTON, &c. which appeared to me better calculated, to exhibit the true ftate and 
 progrefs of the Engliih language, cfpecially during the third ?ind fourth '^crlodicdX- 
 divifion^ here adopted. 
 
 f Speaking laft of the Viftula, the Ilfng (modern Elbing) the EaJSh'icn Lake 
 (modern frifch Haff) and tne adjacent country to the Eaft; Wulfsian relates, 
 thefe curious fadls concerning the different provinces, now inhabited by the Eall- 
 aad Wcft-Pniffians, who gained the vidorlc* of Frkderic II. W,
 
 ESSAYS, BY AD E LUNG. 
 
 XV 
 
 tha theowan drincath medo :• 
 Ther bith fvvithe mycel gewinn 
 betwconan him* and ne bith thaer 
 naenig ealo gebrowen mid Ef- 
 tum* ac thaer bith medo genoh :• 
 And thaer is mid Eftum 
 theaw thbnne thaer bith man 
 dead* thaet he lith inne unfor- 
 baerned mid his magum and 
 freondum monath* gewhilura 
 twegen* and tha Cyningas and 
 tha othre heah thungene men* 
 fwa micel lengc fvva hi maran 
 fpeda habbath* hwilura healf 
 gear* that hi beoth unforbaerned* 
 and lic^ath bufan eoaithan* on 
 hyra hufum* and ealle tha hwile 
 the thact lio bith inne* thaer 
 fceal beon gedrync and plega 
 oth thone daeg the hi hine for- 
 baerneth :. Thonne thy ylcan 
 daeg hi hine to thaem ade be- 
 ran wijlath* thonne to daelath 
 hi his feoh thaet thaer to lafe 
 bith aefter them gedrynce and 
 thaem plegan* on fif oththe fyx 
 hwilum on ma* fwa fwa thaes 
 feos andefn bith :• Aleogath hit 
 thonne fore hwaega on anre 
 mile* thone maeftan daele fram 
 thaem tune* thonne otherne* 
 thonne thaene thriddan* oththe 
 byt eal aled bith on thaere 
 anre 
 
 drank mead. They Ukewife had 
 much wine, but beer was not 
 brewed among the Eaftein in- 
 habitants, inrtead of which they 
 had plenty of mead. 
 
 The Eaftern inhabitants had 
 the (^Angular) cuftom of keeping 
 the bodies of their deceafed 
 friends and relations for a month, 
 fometimes for two months, ivith- 
 in theic houfes j but the kings 
 and other men of rank were 
 kept longer within the houfe, 
 in proportion to their riches. 
 Sometimes they were fuffered to 
 lie half a year above ground, in 
 their houfe?, without being 
 burnt. As long as the corps 
 remained there, they feafled and 
 played till the appointed day of 
 burning. On this day they re- 
 moved it to the funeral pile ; 
 they divided ;into five, fix, or 
 mjre parts, according to the 
 nature of the property, the 
 goods of the deceafed, if any 
 remained, after- feafting upon, 
 and playing for them. Then 
 they placed the greateft part of 
 them, at leaft one mile from the 
 village (of the deceafed), then 
 the fecond, and then the thiid. 
 part, until every thing was pla- 
 ced 
 
 Knechte aber trinkcn Meth. Es gieht auch vielen Weiii unter ihnen ; aber Bier 
 wird unter den Oillaendern nicht gcbrauct ; ,dagegen haben fie Meth genug. 
 
 Die Oftlaender haben den (fonderbaren) Gebrauch,dafswenrtjemand unter ihnen 
 ftirbt, derfelbe in deui Haufe unter den Freunden und Verwnndten einen Monath, 
 zuweilen auch zwey, liegen bleibt ; die Koenige aber und andero vomchme Maen- 
 ner bleiben dcfto lacnger liegen, je reichcr iio find. Zuweilen liegen fie ein halbcs 
 Jahr uiber der Erde in ihren Haeufern unverbrannt. So lange die Leichc fo h'egt 
 zechen und fpiclen fie bis zur Vcrbrcnnung. An demTage aber, da fie ihn auf den 
 Holzftofs bringen, theilen fie feineGuiter, fo viel nach dem Zechen und Spielen davon 
 iioch uibrig ist.in fuinf, oder fcchs, oder mehr Theile, nachdcm die Guiter bcftliaffch 
 find Dann legenfie den grocl'stcn Thcil derfelben wenigftens eine Meile von c'.em 
 Porfc (dcs Verftorbeiicn,) dann den zvve-yteu, dann den drittcu Thcil, bis alles inner- 
 fa z hi^
 
 XVI 
 
 THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 anre mile' and fccall beon fe 
 laefta dael nyhft thaem tune 
 the fe deada man onlith :• Thon- 
 nc fceolon beon gefamnode ealle 
 tha menn the fwyftofte hois hab- 
 bath on thaem lande* for hwaega 
 on fif milam oththe onfyx milum 
 fram thaem feo':- Thonne aer- 
 nath hy ealle toweard them feo* 
 thonne ^cymeth fe man fe thaet 
 Swifte hors hafath to thaem 
 aereftan daele and to thaem mae- 
 Han* and fwa elc aefter othrum' 
 oth hit bith eall genumen" and 
 fe nim.th thone laeftan dael. 
 fe nihft thaem tune thaet feoh 
 geaerneth* and thonne rideth 
 aelc his weges raid tha feo* and 
 hyt motan habban eall* and for- 
 thy~ thacr beoth tha Swiftan 
 tors ungefoge dyre :• And thon- 
 ne his geftreon beoth thus eail 
 afpe4ed* thonne byrth man hine 
 uf and forbaerneth mid his 
 waepnum and hraegle* und fwi- 
 thoft ealle his fpeda hy forfpen- 
 dath mid than langan legere 
 thaes deadan mannes inne* and 
 thaes the hy be thaem waegura 
 alecgath' the tha fremdon to 
 aernath and nimath :• And thaet 
 is mid Eftum theavv thaet thaer 
 fgeal aelces getheodes man beon 
 
 for- 
 
 ced within that mile. Tho 
 fnr.alleft part was upon this oc- 
 cafion always placed ueareil to 
 the village, in which the dt- 
 funfl had lived. This being 
 done, all the men pofleffed of 
 the fwifteft horfes, within five 
 or fix miles dillance from the 
 cftate of the deceafed, affembled 
 and rode with the greateftfpeed 
 to the places, where the goods 
 were depofited 5 fo that he who 
 had the fwifteft horfe arrived 
 firft at the beft fliare of the 
 property, and thus one after 
 another, till the whole was car- 
 ried away. But he who arrived 
 at the lot placed neareft to the 
 village, got the fmalleft fliare. 
 Upon this, each of them rode off 
 with his ftiare and kept it whol- 
 ly — as his property. — For this 
 reafon, too, fwift hoifes were 
 highly valued among them. Af- 
 ter having thus diftributed all 
 Tiis property, they carried ou-t 
 the deceafed (into the open air), 
 and burnt him, together with 
 his armour and cloaths. The 
 greateft part of the property was 
 fpent in the long keeping of the 
 corps, but whatever was expo- 
 fed on the road, was gained and 
 carried 
 
 halb diefer Meile gelegt ift. Der kleinfte Theii wird dabcy allemahl zunaechft an 
 das Dorf gelegt, wo der Verftorbene gewohnet hat. Alsdann verfammeln fich 
 alle Maenner aus dem Lande, welche die Ichnelleftsn Pferde haben, fuinf bis fechs 
 Meilen weit von den Guitern, und rennen fporenflreichs darauf zu ; da denn der, 
 welcher das fchnellefte Pferd hat, zu dem erllen und beflen Theil kommt, und l"o 
 einer nach dem andern bis alles weggenommen ift. Dcrjenigc bekommt aber den 
 tleinften Theil, der zu dem naechft an dem Dorfe gelegenen Theile gelanget. 
 Alsdann reitet ein jeder mit feinem Theile davon, imd bshaelt ihn ganz — ah lein 
 Eigenthum. — Dies macht auch, dais die fluichtigen Pferde bey Ihnen uiberaus theuer 
 find. W^enn nun alle Guiter verthcilet find, alsdann tragen fie den Vcrftorbenfen 
 hinaus (in die freye Luft), und verbrennen ihn mit feinen WafTen imd Kleideru. 
 Sein meiftes Vermoegen gehet bey dem langen Aufbehalten des VeTstorbenen 
 fiar auf ; was aber an dera Wege ausgefctzet ift, wird von Fremden gewonnen un4 
 
 ~ weg-i
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. 
 
 XYll 
 
 forbacrned' and gyf thar man 
 na ban findeth unforbaeined* hi 
 hit fceolan miclum gebetan :• 
 And thaer is mid Eaftum an 
 maeofti' thaet hi magon cyle 
 gcwyrcan* and thy thaer licgath 
 tha deadan men fwa lange* and 
 ne fuliath- that hi wyrcath thone 
 eylc hine on* and theah man 
 afette twegen faetels full ealath 
 oththe waetheres" hy gedoth* that 
 other bith ofer froren* faqi hit fy 
 fumraor am winter. 
 
 carried off by Grangers. It was 
 a prevailing ctiftom among the 
 FJtbians, to burn thtir dead ; 
 and if afterwards a Cngle bone 
 was found unbutnt, fuch an o- 
 miflion was feverely punilhed. 
 The inhabitants of the Eaft tverr 
 alfo acquainted with the art of 
 producing cold 5 hence the corps 
 could lie fo long without uiider- 
 going putrefaftion, becaufc they 
 introduced cold (fiigoriiic fub- 
 ftances) into it, And if tw» 
 veffels filled with beer or water 
 were expofed, they could make 
 both of them freeze, whetlier it 
 were in fummer or winter*. 
 
 vrcggcnommen. Es ill bey den EJlbea der Gebranch,. dafs jeder Verllorbcnc ver- 
 braiMt wird, und wenn hernach ein einiges Bein unvcrbrannt gefundeu v/ird, lb 
 wird Iblches fcharf geahfldet. Die Oftlaender haben auch die Kraft, dais fie Kaexte 
 machcn koenncn ; dahcr auch die Leichen. lb lange licgen und nicht f^ulen, wtul 
 man Kaelte (kaltmachende Koerper) in fie bringct. Und wcnu man zw<y 
 Gefaefle voll Bier oder Wafler hinfetzet, fo koenaen fie maclicn, dais beyde fricren, 
 cs fey im Somnier oder im Winter. la 
 
 * For fuch readers as may be only imperfediy acquainted with the Germam 
 language, I beg leave to add the following remarks : ill. that all Substuutires are 
 written with large initials ; 2d, that, according to the German idiom, the frefa* 
 tenfe is ufed, throughout this narrative, instead of the Englilh impcrfe^l ; 3d. tliat 
 though a fcntence in tlie German frequently begins witli tlie itnperfeil tenf:;, whea 
 introducing the fpeech of another, (v. g. Er fagte, er habcy, &c. pag. xiii ) yet by 
 the German idiom, the quotation itfelfis exprefl'cd ia the conjuniii'u^/irejl/it; — « 
 peculiarity, which is uniformly obferved by Adeluno himfdf, whole tronll itioir I 
 have here fubjoined, with fcarcely any alteration'; 4th, that the preceding Euglifi 
 tranflation deviates only from the German, where the construction of the for- 
 mer rendered it ncceflary. Finally; to prove, that the affinity of the Gi-rj^iiU* ta 
 the Anglo-Saxon is much stronger than to ths modem EngVp, I have bcrc iwlded 
 lomc examples. 
 
 German. AngloSaxon. , Mnglijh, 
 
 Tagen. (pi. dat. of Tag.) 
 
 Gcfegelt. (prct. oifegeln.) 
 
 W'uili'te. (impf.coiij of luijfen). 
 
 Vogelfangcr. 
 
 Gegeben. (participle oi geben) 
 
 Ihres (pofs. pron. neut. of ihr I 
 
 Eigenes (part of a pofs. prou.) 
 
 Hirfclien. pi. of Hirfcl) 
 
 Zuweilen, 
 
 lleivrf.ihren, 
 
 Unverhranm (prel. oi niehiverhmnenj \ 
 
 Mtistcntlivils 
 
 Dagum. 
 
 Gefeglian, 
 
 Wuiste. 
 
 Fugeleran. 
 
 Gebun. 
 
 Hyra. 
 
 Agenum. 
 
 Hryrethera. 
 
 Gewilum. 
 
 Oferferan 
 
 Unforbaemed. 
 
 Mdc»tanduck. 
 
 Days, (day) 
 Sailed, (to fail) 
 He might know. 
 Bird-catcher. 
 Given. 
 'I'iieir. 
 Own. 
 
 Stags (deer). 
 Sometimes. 
 
 To travel f ferry) prrr. 
 Unburnt (not to bum.) 
 Tor die ir.ob: ]*urt.
 
 xviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 In order to give likcwife a fpecimen of poetical composition, 
 I fhall fubftitute for the poem furniihed bj Johnson, another 
 original, which I found in Hickes's Gramm. Anglo-Saxon. 
 pag. 178 Though the age of it be not afcertained, it certain- 
 ly belongs to this period, and may be confidered as a concife 
 
 Topography of the City oj" Durham. 
 
 Is theos burch breome, 
 Geond Breoten rice, 
 
 Steopa gefla tholad. 
 
 Stanas ymb utan. 
 
 Wundrum gewaexen. 
 
 Weor ymb eornath. 
 
 En y'Lhuni ftrong. 
 
 And therinne wunath 
 
 Fifca feola kinn. 
 
 On floda gemong. 
 
 And there gewexen. 
 
 Wuda feftern mice!. 
 
 Wuniath in them wicum 
 
 Wilda deor monige. 
 
 In deopa dalum. 
 
 Deora ungerim. 
 
 Is ira there byri. 
 
 Eac bearnum gecithed 
 
 De arfefla eadig Cuthberht. 
 
 And 
 
 This city is celebrated 
 In the whole empire of th? 
 
 Britons. 
 The road to it is fleep, 
 It is furrounded wiih rocks, 
 And with curious plants. 
 The Wear flows round it, 
 A river of rapid wave?. 
 And there live in it, 
 Fiflies of various kinds 
 Mingling with the floods. 
 And there grow 
 Great forefl:s j 
 There live in the receffes 
 Wild animals of many forts, 
 In the deep valleys 
 Deer innumerable. 
 There is in this city 
 Alfo well known to men 
 The venerable St Cudberth, 
 
 And 
 
 Diefe Stadt ist beruihtnt. — In dem ganKen Reiche der Britten. — -DerWeg zu ihr 
 ist jaehe, — Sie ist mit Felfen umgebep, — Und fonderliaren Gewaechseii. — Die Were 
 unfliefst fie, — Ein Flafs von reiffenden Wellen. — Und darin wohnen, — Filche 
 vieler Arten — Die fich mit den Fluthen vermifchen. — Und daselbst wachsen — 
 Grofse Waelder ; — In den Auen Wohnen — Mancherley wilde Thiere, — In den 
 
 tiefen Thaelern — Unzaehlige Reiie, (Thiere). Es ist in dieser Stadt — 
 
 Auch den Menschen wohlbckannt — Dcr ehrwuirdige heil. Cudberth, — Und 
 ' des 
 
 And if it be objeded, that many of thefe words li]f ewife bear strong marks of 
 affinity to the modem Englifh, I must remind the reader of my aim, which is not to 
 deny this, but to prove, that contrary to the opinion of many Antiquaries, the 
 German very probably is the mother, and not 'Ajifer language of the AnglorSaxon, 
 Hence the manifest abfurdity, in Didlionaries, of giving references to either, as 
 two different languages, efpecialiy in words whofe origin cannot be well afcertained
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. 
 
 XIX 
 
 And thes claene cyuinges heo- 
 
 fud. 
 Ofualdes Engla leo 
 And Aidan bifcop 
 Aedberth and Aedfrid. 
 Aethele geferes 
 Is therinne mid heom 
 Aethelwold bifceop 
 And breoma bocera Beda^ 
 And Boifil abbet. 
 De claene Cuthberht. 
 On gichethe lerde luftum. 
 
 And he is lara uuel genom. 
 
 Eardiath aeth them eadigC. 
 In in them mynftre. 
 Vnarimeda reliqua 
 -Thaer raonige uundrum guuur- 
 
 thath 
 The uurita feggeth 
 Mid then drihtnes uuerdomes 
 
 bideth. 
 
 And the head of the chafte 
 
 king. 
 Ofwald, the lion of the Angli, 
 And Aidan, the bifhop, 
 Aedbert asd Aedfrid 
 The noble affociates. 
 There is in it alfo 
 Aethelwold, the bidiop. 
 And the celebrated writer Bedc 
 And the abbot Boifil, 
 By whom the chafte Cudberth 
 In his youth was gratis inftruc- 
 
 ted. 
 Who alfo well received thefe 
 
 inftrudtions. 
 There reft with thefe Saints, 
 In the inner part of the rainfier 
 Relicks without number, 
 Which perform many miracles, 
 
 As the Chronicles tell us. 
 And (which) await with them 
 the judgment of the Lord. 
 
 des keuschen Koeniges Haupt. — Oswald, der Angeln Loewe, — und der Bischof 
 Ai(Jan, — Aedbert und Aedfrid, — Die edleu Gefaehrten. — Es ist darin mit ihnen 
 — Der Bifchof Aethelwold. — Und der beruihmte Schriftsteller Bcda. — Und der 
 Abt Boifil^ — Der den keufchen Cuthberth — In der Jugend umsonst unterrichtcte, 
 — Welcher auch die l.ehre fehr gut annahm. — Es ruhen bey diefen Heiligen,— 
 hi dtm Innern dcs Muinsters, — Unzaehlige Reliquien, — Welche vicle Wunder 
 ■wirken, — Wie die Schril'ten I'agen — Und (welche) mit ihnen das Gericht des 
 Hcrrn erwarteu. 
 
 Of this period, we muft finally remark, that from the time of 
 Alfked, the old Anglo Saxon cliaraclers were gradually ex- 
 changed for the French letters of the Alphabet. There is 
 little doubt, that the nation had already made fuch progrefs in 
 tafte, or intelleftual difcernment, as to become fenfible of the 
 want of fymmetry in the Anglo-Saxon, when compared to 
 the Roman charaders ; and that they readily gave the pre- 
 ference to the French letters, in which thofe of Rome were 
 fomewhat more faithfully copied. 
 
 Ingulf *, as quoted by Spelman in the work above men- 
 tioned, 
 
 * Abbot of Croylandy and autb.or of the hiffory of that Abbey, was born in 
 London A. D. 1030— Tliis excellent Chronicler treats from the foundation of that 
 
 Abbey,
 
 3X 
 
 tHREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 tioned, expi-elTcs himfelf upon this adoption of foreign clia- 
 ra.(3;ers, in the following lines : '* Manus Saxonica ab omni- 
 *' bus Saxonibus et Merciis ufqiie ad tempora Regis Aelfrcdi^ 
 ** qui per Gallicanos Doftores omnibus chirographis ufitata a 
 •' tempore difti Domini Regis defuetudine viluerat (vilipen- 
 ** derat) ; et manus Gallicana quia magis Icgibilis, et afpedui 
 *' perdeledabilis praeceilebat, frequentius indies apud Anglos 
 **^ oniues complacebat." 
 
 Yet this was the cafe only in a verj gradual progreffion, 
 correfpoading with the improvement and difFulion of tafte ; 
 for long after Alfred's time, the Anglo-^axon characters 
 continued to be ufed, both in public and private writings. 
 
 III. NoRMANNic Saxon Period. 
 (Normannic Anglo-Saxoji.^ - 
 
 This aera extends from the invafion of the Normans, under 
 William the Conqueror, in the year 1066, to the beginning 
 ti the thirteenth century, beyond the reign of Henry II. 
 who died in 11 89 ; and confequently comprehends a feries of 
 about one hundred and fifty years. 
 
 The ftate of the Ergliih language, during this period, can- 
 not be better defcribed than in the words of the learned and 
 g-.-rfpieuous Warton, in his " Hijlory of EngliJJj Poetry yfro?n 
 the cloje of the eleventh^ to the conimencemeiit of the eighteenth 
 ^entiirf i" pag. 2. & feq. 
 
 " i he Norman Saxon diale£l formed a language extremely 
 fcarbarou*, irregular, and intraftable j and confequently piomifes 
 no very ftriking fpecimens iuiaiiy fpecies of compofition. Its fub- 
 ft•^nce was the Dani(h-Saxon adulterated with French. The Saxoil 
 indeed, a language fubfiiling on uniform principles, and polifh- 
 cd by poets and theologifts, however corrupted by the Danes, 
 
 had 
 
 Abbey, 664, to the year 1091 ; he introduces much ot the general hiflory of the 
 kingdom, v.'ith a variety of curious iinecdotes that are no where clie to be found.-— 
 Ingulf died of the _g-oi/, at his Albbey, A. D. 1109, in the 79th year of his age — 
 — It is a matter of much regret, that men of his found judgment and good fenfe 
 (in fpite of the fuperllitlous abfurdities which {lain the annals of that age) did not 
 themfelves commence writing and cultivating their native language ; inflead of 
 «Ludging in monafiic Latin. 'I'he certain progrefs of both language, and know- 
 Icilge, In the former cafe, is beyond every eakuiation^of the Mederns. W.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxi 
 
 had tnuch perfpicuity, ftrengtli, and harmony * : but the French, 
 imported by the Conqueror and his people, was a confufed jargon 
 of Teutonic, Gaulifli, and vitiated Latin. In this fludtuating ftate 
 of our national fpeech, the French predominated. Even before the 
 conqueft, the Saxon language began to fall into contempt, and the 
 French, or Frankifh, to be fubftituted in its ftead f : a circum- 
 ftance, which at once facilitated and foretold the Norman accef- 
 fion. In the year 652, it was the common praftice of the Anglo- 
 Saxons, to fend their youth to the monafteries of France for edu- 
 cation : and not only the language, but the manners of the French 
 were ertcemed the moil polite accomplidiments. In the reign of 
 Edward the Confeffor, the refort of Normans to the Englirti court 
 was fo frequent, that the affeftation of imitating the Frankifh cuf- 
 toms became almoft univerfal : and even the lower clafs of people 
 were ambitious of catching the Frankifh idiom %'. It was no dif- 
 ficult talk for the Norman lords to banilh that language, of which 
 the natives began to be abfurdly afhamed. The nevv invaders 
 comrtianded the laws to be adralniftered in French §. Many char- 
 ters of monafleries were forged in Latin by the Saxon monks, for 
 the prefent fecurity of their poffeffions, in confequence of that a- 
 verfioa which the Normans profeffed to the Saxon tongue ||. Even 
 
 c chil- 
 
 * Becaufe the Danifh was intimately related to the Old Saxon ; hence the lan- 
 guage, which had originated in a mixture of both, neceffarily preferved fomc 
 identity (i e. firailarity and uniformity of ftrudtUre.) A. 
 
 f Probably this was the cafe only among the higher ranks of focicty ; for 
 France, indeed, at this early period, was already confidered as the School of the 
 Sciences, and the legillatrix of t ifte to the reft of Europe. A. 
 
 ^ This ftrange. bias feems, at prefent, to have fhifted its ground, and to afFcA 
 principally the higher cluiVes of fociety ; — the highejl, or di(5latorial, order itfelf 
 /'/n(/;i;/Vaa/Afy' not excepted. Thus our ears are/?/ W<v/y annoyed with terms and 
 phrafes, which even the Germans, of late years, ftigmatize with the appellation ot 
 nuiv-frantijh. — The mai&re race of interpreters and tranflators, by profcflion, alfo 
 contribute thet'r fliare in corrupting the Englifh language with new modelled 
 words and idioms, the meaning of which they themfelves (not rarely) miftake and 
 mifapply ; but to what clafs of fociety thefe individuals muft be referred, I fliall, in 
 this place, not attempt to decide. And as I am not defirous of advancing ground- 
 lefs aflertions, or of extending them, if they be founded, to every refpe<ftive indi- 
 vidual, without exception ; I muft requeft the difpaflionate reader, to turn over 
 a few Numbers of the Monthly, the Analytical, the Critical, the Englijh or zny 
 other Review, in which the lateft tranflations from the French, form the objeiS of 
 criticifm ; and his curioiity will be frequently, and amply, gratified. 
 
 W. 
 
 § But there is a precept in Saxon from William the Firft, to the SheriiF of 
 Sommerfetlhire. Hides. Thcs. I. P.I. pag. 106. -Sec alfo Prafat. ibid. p. xv. 
 
 II The Normans, 'who pra«fli fed every fpccious expedient to plunder the monks, 
 demanded a fight of the written evidences of their lands. The monks well luiew, 
 that it would have been ufclefs or impolitic to have produced thcfe evidences, or 
 
 (bartcrij
 
 xxli THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 children at fchool were forbidden to read in their native language, 
 and inftiuded in a knowledge of the Norman only. In the mean 
 time, we fhould have fome regard to the general and political 
 ilate of the nation. The natives were fo univcrfally reduced to 
 the loweft condition of negleft and indigence, that theEr.gliJh name 
 became a term of reproach : and feveral generations elapicd, before 
 one family of Saxon pedigree was railed to any diftinguiihed ho- 
 nours, or could fo much as attain tne rank, of baronage. Among 
 other inftances of that abfolute and voluntary fubrailTion, with 
 which our Saxon ancellors received a foreign yoke, it appears 
 that they fuffered their hand-writing to fall into difcredit and 
 disufe, which, by degrees became fo difficult and ohfolete, that 
 few befide the oldeft men could underlland the charaSers. In 
 the year 1095, Wolstan, bifliop of Worcefter, was depofed by 
 the arbitrary No>mans: it was ohje£led againft him, that he was 
 " a fuperannualed Englijh ulioi, who could not /peak French *. It is 
 
 true, 
 
 charters, in the original Saxon ; as the Nornuins not only did not underftand^but 
 wou'lii have received with contempt, inllruments written in that language. Tiierc- 
 "fore the monks were compelled to the pious fraud of forging them in Latin ; and 
 great numbers of thefe forged Latin charters, till lately fuppofed original, are ftill 
 extant. Set: Spelman in Not. ad. Condi. Anglic p. lij ; Stillingfl. Ortg. Eccks. 
 Britann. p. 14 Mar sham, Prafut. ad Dugd. And WhartoN Angl. Sacr.WoL II. 
 ^Momijl. Prafiit p. ii. & feq — See alio Ingulpii, p. 51a, — Launoy and Mabil- 
 LON have treated this lubjcft with great learning and penetration. 
 
 * J\Iuit. Paris. fub ann. — ^as quoted by Warton ; p. 4. When in our 
 
 days tlie converfation turns upon the comparative excellence of languages, I 
 beg leave fo aik : '' are the tnodem rulers, tutors, or governeff.-s (of and from 
 France) aiiluated by a more difcreet, by a kl's haughty fpirit, than the Normans 
 were Eight HuNDK ED vears ago ? — This queflion is eaiily anfwered. For, 
 although it is fortunately not in their power to make us adopt in a mafs their 
 ncw-foiiglcd tongue, by the fame means which have induced its and other na- 
 tions to adopt inllruments, machines and expedients formerly unknown, or un- 
 p.-aSiifed, in the art of war ; yet we are already invaded by luch numbers of a race 
 (liowever different in degree, ftill of the fume kind) as renders the confequencts of 
 our cxcefiive indulgence every day more alarmhig. I am led to this reflcclion, 
 at a time, when I fee the legillaiure itlelf f.;rioufly employed in concerting mea- 
 fur<.s, to i,i)-viate thefe impending national ciiils — As a weli-wifher, and inhabitant, 
 of this country, I hope Providence will g;uide the councils of the nation, upon a 
 fubjcdc of the utmoll importance. Thofc who confider thefe fymptoms of an af>- 
 proaching nietamwpL'jJis as of iittie importance, plainly manifcft their unacquaintance 
 with the liillory of man and nations. They fecm to forget, that the Anglo- 
 Saxons^/w/ came to Britain widi n« hoftile intentions ; that they were invited, 
 only to aillft the o^rClTed Britons in repelling their rapacious cneniies ; and that 
 revolutions, if excited and aided by foreign allies, were; ahvays attended with con- 
 fequences, equally certain and fatal to the Natives -, however imperfeftly and 
 
 grtulually they were introduced. To return, from this involuntary digreffion, 
 
 to ti;e fubjed; of l.nnguage, I (hall conclude this Note with a remark made by a 
 veteran in t!ie philofophy of grammar : ' Tiiat the French, v,\th all its eale and 
 " verfatiiity, is a monotonous language ; and that thoie alone who underftand it, can 
 " difcover the greatL advantage the £ng/ijh_hdvfi over that iunr;;uage by their ac- 
 '\ cent, pwiicubrly m the arucie of vorlificatlon." W.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxIII 
 
 true, that in fome of the monafteries, particularly at Croyland 
 and Taviftocke, founded by Saxon princes, there were regular pre- 
 ceptors in the Saxon language : but this inftitution was fuffered 
 to remain after the conqueft, as a matter only of intereft and ne- 
 ceffity. The religious could not otherwife have underftood their 
 otiginal charters.' William's fuccelTur, Henry the Firft, gave an 
 inftrument of confirmation to William, Archbifliop of Canterbury, 
 which was written in the Saxon language and letters. Yet this 
 is almoft a fingle expmple. That monarch's motive was perhaps 
 political : and he feem's to have pradlifed this expedient with a 
 view of obliging his queen, who was of Saxon lineage ; or with a 
 defign of flattering his Engli(h fubjefts, and of fecuring his title, 
 already ftrengthened by a Saxon match, in confequence of fo fpe- 
 cious and popular an artifice," 
 
 " It was a common and indeed a very natural praflice, for the 
 tranfcribers of Saxon books, to change the Saxon orthography for 
 the Norman, and to fubditute in the place of the original Saxon, 
 Norman word> and phrafes. A remarkable inftance of this liberty, 
 which foraetimes perplexes and mifleads the critics in Anglo-Saxon 
 literature, appears in a voluminous colleftion of Saxon homilies, 
 preferved in the Bodleian library, and written about the time of 
 Henry the Second. It was with the Saxon charafters, as with 
 the fignature of the crofs in public deeds ; which were changed 
 into the Norman mode of feals and fubjcriptions.' 
 
 * Among the manufcripts of Digby in the Bodleian library at 
 Oxford, we find a religious or moral Ode, conlifling of one hun- 
 dred and ninety-one ilanzas, which the learned Hickes places juft 
 after the conqueft : but as it contains few Norman terms, I am 
 inclined to think it of rather higher antiquity. The following 
 ftanza is a fpecimen : 
 
 ' Sende God biforen him mnn 
 
 The while he may to hevene, 
 
 For betere is on elmelTe biforen 
 
 Thanne ben after fevene." 
 That is, " Let a man fend his good woiks before him to heaven 
 while he can 5 for one alms-giving before death is of more value 
 than feven afterwards." The verfes perhaps might have been thus 
 written as two /^lexatidrines: 
 
 * Send God biforen him man the while he may to hevene. 
 For betere is on elmeffe biforen, than ben after fevene.' 
 
 ' Yet alternate rhyming, applied without regularity, and as rhymes 
 accidentally prcfented themfelves, was not uncommon in our early 
 poetry.' 
 
 Hickes and Warton have printed a fatirical poem on mo- 
 
 c a naftic
 
 XXIV THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 naftic life, in which the Saxon is remarkably adulterated by 
 the Normannic, and which mufl have been written foon after 
 the incui-fions of the Normans, or at leafl prior to the reign of 
 Jlenrj II. The poet begins this Angular performance, with 
 defcribing the land of idolence or luxury : 
 
 Fur in fee, bl weft Spaynge, 
 
 Is a lend ihote Cokaygne : 
 
 Ther nis lond under hevenriche (i). 
 
 Of wel of godnis hit iliche. 
 
 Thoy paradis bi miri (2) and bilgt j 
 
 Cokaygn is of fairir fight. 
 
 What is ther in paradis 
 
 But grafs, and flure, and greneris ? 
 
 Thoy ther be joy, and gret dute (3), 
 
 Thernlsraet, bot frute. 
 
 Ther nis halle, bure (4), no bench j 
 
 Bot watir mauis thurft to quench, &.c. 
 * In the following lines,' fays Warton, * there is a vein of fatl- 
 ileal imagination and forae talent at defcription. The luxury of 
 the monks is reprcfented under the idea of a monaftcry conftrufted 
 of various kinds of delicious and coftly viands,' 
 
 Ther is a wel fair abbei. 
 
 Of white monkes and of grei, 
 
 Ther beth boures and halles ; 
 
 All of pafteus beth the walles, 
 
 Of rieis of fiffe, and a rich met, 
 
 The likefuUiil that man mai et. 
 
 Fluren cakes beth the fchingles (5^ alle, 
 
 Of church, clolfter, hours ?rid halle. 
 
 The pinnes (6) beth fat podinges 
 
 Rich met to princes and to kinges.-— • 
 
 Ther is a cloyfter fair and Hgt, 
 
 Brod and lang of fembli figt. 
 
 The pilers of that cloifter alle 
 
 Beth iturned of criftale, 
 
 With harlas and capital 
 
 Of grene jafpe and red coral, 
 
 In the praer is a tree 
 
 Swithe likeful for to fe, 
 
 The rote is gingeur and galingale, 
 
 The 
 
 I The celeftial empire, Sax. 2 Merry, chearful, «• Although Paradife is 
 fhearful and bright, Cokayue is a more beautiful place." 3 Pleafure. 4 Buttery ; 
 or the roem where provifions arc laid up. 5 Shingles. ♦' The tiles, or coTcring 
 ot the howfe, arc of rich cakes." 6 The pinnacles.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxt 
 
 The fiouns betli al fed wale. 
 l^Ie maces beth the flure, 
 The rind canel of fwete odure : 
 The frute gilofre of gode fmakke, 
 Of,cucubes ther nis no lakke. — 
 Ther beth iiii willis (^) in the abbei 
 Of trade and halwey. 
 Of baurae and eke piement, 
 Ever ernend (S) to rigt rent (9) j 
 Of thai ftrerais al the molde 
 Stonis pretiufe (10) and golde, 
 Ther is faphir, and uniune, 
 Carbuncle and afliune, 
 Smaragde, lugre, and praffjune, 
 Beril, onyx, topofiune, 
 Amethirte and crifolite, 
 Calcedun and epetite (ii). 
 Ther beth birddes mani and fale 
 Throftill, thruiffe, and nigtiogale, 
 Chalandre, and. wodwale, 
 And othir briddes without tale. 
 That ftinteth never bi her migt 
 Miri to fing dai and nigt, ^ 
 
 \Nonnul!a defunt.'] 
 Yite I do yow rao to witte. 
 The gees iroftid on the fpitte, 
 Fleey to that abbai, god hit wot, ' 
 
 And gredith (12), gees al bote al bote, &c, 
 
 * Our author then makes a pertinent tranlition to a convent of 
 nuns J which he fuppofes to be very commodioufly fituated at no 
 great diftance, and in the fame fortunate region of indolence, eafe 
 iind affluence.' 
 
 An other abbai is ther bl 
 
 For foth a gret nunnerie y . 
 
 Up a river of fwet milk 
 
 Whar is plente grete of filk. 
 
 When the fummeris dai is bote, 
 
 The yung nunnes takith a bote 
 
 And 
 
 7 Fountains. 8. Running. Sax. 9. Courfe. Sax. 10. The Arabian Philnfophy 
 imported into Europe, was full of the docftrine of precious ftones. 11. Our old 
 poets are never fo happy as when they can get into a catalogue of things or names* 
 ^Warton.) la. Crieth, Calk' franc.
 
 xxvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 And doth ham forth in that river 
 Both with oris and with ftere : 
 Whan hi beth fur from the abbei 
 Hi riiakith him nakid for to plei. 
 And ieith dune in to the brimme 
 And doth him fleilich for to fvvirame : 
 The yung monkes that hi feeth' 
 Hi doth ham up and forth he fleeth, 
 And comith to the nunnes anon, 
 And euch monk him takith on, 
 And fnellich (13) berith forth har prei 
 To the mochill grei abbei (14), 
 And techith the iiunnes an oreifun 
 With jamblcus (15) uj) and dun *. 
 
 * This poem was defigned to be fung at public fefllvals : a prac- 
 tice which was then very common j and concerning which it may 
 be fufficient to remark at prefent, that a Joculator, or Bard, was aa 
 officer belonging to the court of William the Conqueror.' 
 
 * Another Norman-Saxon poem cittd by the fame induftrioBS 
 antiquary (Hick.es), is entitled " The Life of St Margaret." 
 The ilrmfture of its verfification conliderably differs from that ia 
 the laft mentioned piece, and is like the French Alexandrines. 
 liut I am of opinion, that a paufe, or divifion, was intended in the 
 middle of every verfe 5 and in this refpeft, its verfification re- 
 fembles alfo that of Albion's England, or Drayton's Polyalbion, 
 which was a fpecies very common about the reign of Queen E!i- 
 fabeth. The rhymes are alfo continued to every fourth line. 
 It appears to have been written about the time of the crufades» 
 It begins thus : 
 
 Olde ant <» yonge I priet l ou, our foUes for to lete, 
 Thinketh on god thatyefou wite, our funnes to bete. 
 Here I mai tellen ou, wit wordes faire and fwete. 
 The vie '^ of one maiden was hoten '^ Margarete. 
 Hire fader was a patriae, as ic ou tellen may. 
 In Auntioge wif eches* I in the falfe lay, 
 Deve godes/ ant dombe, he fervid nit and day, 
 So deden mony othere that fingeth welaway. 
 Theodolius was is nome on Grille ne levede he noutt, 
 
 He 
 
 13, Q^ick, quickly. Gallo-Franc. 14. To the great Abbey of Grey Monks. 
 15 Lafcivious motioas. Gambols. Fr. Gambiller. 
 
 * HiCKES. Tbffaur. I. Part. I. p. 331. feq. 
 ' a And. h I direcSb. Fr. " I adviie you, our, &c. c Life. Fr. d Called 
 Saxon, e Chofe a wife. Sax. " He was married in Antioch. / Deaf gods, &c.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxvli 
 
 He levede on the falfe godes, that weren with honden wroutt, 
 Tho that child fculde criftine ben it com well in thoutt, 
 Ebed wen ^ it were ibore, to dethit were ibroutt, &c. 
 
 * In the fequel, Olibrius, lord of Antioch, who is called' a Sa- 
 racen, falls in love with Margaret : but flie being a chriftian, 
 and a candidate for canonization, rejefts his folicitations, and is 
 thrown into prifon.* . 
 
 Meiden Margarete one nitt In prifon lay 
 Ho com biforn Olibrius on that other dai. 
 Meiden Margarete, lef up upon my lay. 
 And Ihu that thou leveft on, thou do him al avvey. 
 Lef on me ant be my wife, ful wel the mai fpede. 
 Auntioge and Afie fcaltou han to mede : 
 Ciculauton h and purpel pall fcaltou have to wede : 
 With all the metes of my lond ful vel I fcal the fede* 
 
 * This piece was printed by Hickes, from a manufcript in 
 Trinity-college library at Cambridge. It feems to belong to the 
 manufcript metrical Lives of the Saints, which form a very con- 
 fiderable volume, and A'ere probably tranflated or paraphrafed 
 from Latin or French profe into Englifli rhyme, before the year 
 1200. We are fure that they were written after the year 1169, 
 as they contain the Life of Saint Thomas of Becket. In the 
 £odIeIan library are three manufcript copies of thefe Lives of 
 THE Saints, in each of which the life of St. Margaret occurs j 
 but It is not always exaftly the fame with this printed by Hickes. 
 And on the whole, the Bodleian Lives feem inferior in point of 
 antiquity*' 
 
 Towards the concluflon of this period, true poetry begins 
 to flouriHi in England as well as in Germany, fome features 
 of which are already difcoverable in the preceding poems. 
 Yet, withall, the Danifli-Saxon, and probably alfo the Britilla- 
 Saxon bards can claim little more merit than that of making 
 rhymes, and frequently only of w^riting abrupt fentences in 
 profe. To prove this, I fliall only quote (the two firll llanzas 
 of) a Normannic-Saxon Ballad *, which is full of alliteration, 
 and has a burthen or chorus : 
 
 Blow 
 
 g In bed. /j Checklaton. See Obf. Fair. Q^I. 194. (Warton.) 
 * Warton obferves in his " Hiftory of Englilh Poetry," that this is the 
 ^arliejl Englijh love-foiig, he could diicover ; that it is among the Harleian manu- 
 fcripts in the Britilh Mufeum; and that he wouW place it before, or about, the 
 y£ar laoo.
 
 xxviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 Blow northerne wynd, fent 
 
 Thou me ray fuetynge ; blow 
 
 Northerne wynd, blou, blou, blou. 
 
 Ich ot a burde in boure bryht 
 
 That fully femly rs on fyht, 
 
 Menfkful maiden of my lit, 
 
 Feire ant fre to fonde. 
 
 In all this wurhlichc won, 
 
 A bnrde of blod and of bon, 
 
 Nerer a zete y nufte b non, 
 
 Luffbmore in Londe. Blonv, &c. 
 
 With lokkes c lefliche and longe, 
 
 With front ant face feir to fonde ; 
 
 With murthes monie mote heo monge 
 
 That brid fo breme in boure j 
 
 With loffum eie grete and gode, 
 
 Weth browen blifstoll undirhode, 
 
 He that reft him on the rode 
 
 That leflych ]yf honoure. Eland &c. &c. 
 In a truly paftoral vein, a lover * thus addrefles his miftrefs, 
 ■whom he fuppofes to be the moil beautiful girl, *' Bituenc 
 Ljncolne and Ljndefeje, Northampton and Lounde f." 
 
 When the nytenhale finges the wodes waxen grene, 
 Lef, gras, and blofme, fpringes in Avril y wene. 
 And love is to rayn harte gon with one fpere fo kene 
 Nyht and day ray blod hit drynkes myn hart deth me tene. 
 
 * The following verfes have nearly the fame meafur«, and are 
 not unpleafing to the ear :'* 
 
 My deth y love, my lyf ich hate for a levcdy iliene, 
 Heo is brith fo daies liht, that is on me wel fene. 
 Al y falewe fo doth the lef in fomir when hit is grene, 
 Zef mi thoht helpeth me noht to whom sc^hal I mene ? 
 Ich have loved at this yere that y may love na more, 
 Ich have fiked moni fyh, lemon, for thin ore, 
 
 . ray love never the ner and thatme reweth fore j , 
 
 Suete lemon, thenck on me ich have loved thefore, 
 Suete lemon, I preye the, of love one fpeche. 
 While y iy ve in worlde fo wyde other niil I feche, J. 
 
 If 
 
 a Yet. b. Knew not. c Lively, d Sic. 
 
 * Probably of the reign of King John. 
 
 f London. J MSS. Harf. 225 ^- J^ol. ATemiran. {. ^ 2. h. — The pieces cited 
 from this manufcript, appear to be of the hand writing of the re^gn ci Euv."*id 
 t^ Firft, (Warton.)
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxH 
 
 If we attempt to trace the progrefs of a language, we fliall 
 always find it conne6led with ,the intelleclual improvement of 
 a people ; for language, in every inftanCe, is the firfl object, 
 in w^hich national cultivation becomes manifeft. To deter- 
 mine this, requires the mod accurate knowledge of the gra- 
 dual advances made by a people in manners, arts, and fciences, 
 together with a very intimate acquaintance with the more 
 ancient modes of fpeaking and writing, as well as with the 
 changes produced in them, by thefe refpeftive improvements. 
 In this progrefs, every nation keeps its peculiar path ; a path 
 marked by the colleiElive number of internal and external cir- 
 cumflances, the particular knowledge of which is indifpenfible 
 to a philological inquirer. 
 
 In Germany, the old unpolilhed language of the country 
 was improved through its own refources ; hence the progrefs 
 towards its refinement was neceffarily flow. In France, the 
 language of the natives was formed by a mixture with that 
 of the Romans, yet in fuch a manner, as made the latter pre- 
 vail in that mixture ; hence its improvement was uncommon- ' 
 ly rapid, becaufe the Roman was already a polifhed language. 
 In England, the native language received improvements by a 
 mixture with the French ; yet the former ftill remajned the 
 prevailing language : thus it made more rapid progrefs to- 
 wards its refinement than that of the Germ9,n, but flower 
 
 than that of the French Yet we poflefs no hiilory of any 
 
 language executed, nor even attempted, in this progreJJii}e 
 manner. And as the natives of Britain hare hitherto ne-- 
 gledled to trace the gradual improvements of their language;, it 
 can with lefs jufliice be expefted, that / flaould enquire into 
 the path, which they followed. Nor will it be reqirlred of me, 
 to point out minutely the various changes that have taken 
 place in the Englifli language, and to iiate the caufes, or the 
 origin, of thofe changes. 
 
 IV. French-Saxon ; or English Period. 
 
 This is not only the longefl;, but alfo the mofl: remarkable 
 period in the literary hiilory of England : it begins with the 
 thirteenth Century, and eittends to the prefent time. — The 
 Danifli-Saxon language, in the preceding period, being cor- 
 rupted by the Normannic, now begins to unite with the more 
 
 d modern
 
 XXX THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 modern French ; to adopt likewife, in confequence of this pre- 
 cedent, many words from the Latin, and to form bj the affif- 
 tance of both the prefent Englilh language. 
 
 The Normannic- Saxon language was fufFered to fall into 
 disufe and contempt, during the era, of which we have laft 
 treated ; the pure Normannic now became the falhionable 
 language of the court, and of poliflied fociety. This happen- 
 ed with the greater "facility, as the Norman barons and lords 
 ruled over England, and oppreffed its ancient inhabitants, with 
 unlimited fway. But as foon as the power of the barons, 
 during the thirteenth century, be^anto decline ; as foon as the 
 commofis, or the order of the citizens, acquired more autho- 
 rity and influence ; in fine, as foon as England, with gradual 
 fteps, approached to its prefent coniHtution ; — the popular 
 language,^ hitherto defpifed, reclaimed its due rank ; it was a- 
 gain introduced into the higher circles, and thus its cultiva- 
 tion was the more eafily and the more effeftually accomplifh- 
 ed. Still, however, the vernacular dialeft had been almoil 
 fupprefl'ed, among the higher clafles of the nation, by the 
 language of the haughty Normans ; a circumllance which fuf- 
 ficiently accounts for its ilrange mixture with the French. 
 And as in procefs of time, French manners and improve- 
 ments found a more general reception in Britain, this mixture 
 daily increafed, not only through the reception of new words, 
 but alfo in the terminations of old primitive words; and in the 
 various modes of exhibiting and combining them in phrafes. 
 In this manner, indeed, the ground-work of the language pre- 
 fervcd its Saxon origin ; but its progrefs, its cultivation, its 
 augmentation, and fubfequent refinement, were carried on 
 upon the pfinciple of the French. 
 
 Confillent with the limits of this Eflay, I cannot enlarge 
 upon the particular phenomena connefted with thefe multiplied 
 changes ; I muft, therefore, content myfelf with producing a 
 few fpecimens felected from the bed writers in ever-y century, 
 during vthis long and produ6live period. 
 
 In order to fill up n chaftn which both, Johnson and Adelung, 
 
 have left in this part of the hiftory of the Engliih Jansjiiage, by not' 
 
 • entering into the refpeifUve merits of the different writers, during 
 
 the middle ages, to whtjm we Hand fo juttly indebted ; — I have here 
 
 fele6led a number of paiTages relating to this fubjcct, from a work 
 
 , mucU
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxxl 
 
 much efleemed at liome, and ftill mote abroad, among the lo- 
 vers of Britifli literature. This work, on account of its hif|h— 
 though comparatively imail — price, is not in the hands of many 
 readers j as it already extends to a confiderable number of vo- 
 lumes, fince its beginning in 1780. It is the New Annual Re- 
 gister, to which I allude, and from which I have carefully ex- 
 tra6ted (and exemplified with a great variety of fpecimens) thofe 
 valuable and truly philological remarks, which the reader will 
 find ftated, at gretiter length, in \\\& fifth ^ f^xih , and following Vo- 
 lumes of this work, under the head of " A concife h'lftory of the 
 Jlate of knowledge^ literature end tqjle in Great Britain.'''' — It there- 
 fore only remains to add, X.\\^t X.\iQ principal part of this hifiory is 
 partly abftradled from the learned difquiiitions, partly founded 
 upon the hiftorical fafls, which we find very perfpicuoufly, though 
 fomewhat tedioufly, ftated in " Wartoh's Hi/lory of Englijh Poj- 
 
 ir)'," three Volumes, Quarto, London, 1770. & feq. 
 
 t 
 
 Having recounted the particular caufes, to which the great- 
 ell alteration and improvement of religious knowledge in 
 England was owing, from the acceffion of Edward I. to the 
 acceffion of Henry IV. ; and having juftly obferved that John 
 "WiCKLiFF * iirll opened the underftandings of the regular 
 clergy ; — the philofophic ann^lift thus • proceeds in illuftrating 
 the fubfequent effefts of thefe changes, with refpedl to the 
 ilate of language and literature in Britain. 
 
 , Divifijii Flrji ; from 1 27 2, to 1399?.' 
 From Edward I. to Henry IV. 
 
 * The literary revolution, v/nich took place in the reigns 
 of Edward III. and Richard II. with no fmall degree of 
 fplendour, was the appearance of poetry in our own tongue. 
 To this period was referved the honour of engaging the Mnfes 
 to fpeak in Englifh, with fuch dignity as to call for general 
 attention and admiration. We mull not, however, imagine 
 that before this time no attempts a-t veriification were made 
 in our native language. The poetical produftions of the age, if 
 
 d 2 > fuch 
 
 * This acute Divine oppofed the Pope's" fupremacy in 1377, and was forty 
 years after, bifriit for being a heretic, 
 
 f All pifiVges enclofed within fingle commas, belong to the Neiv Annual -5--'-
 
 xxxii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 fuch they may be called, were numerous, and our old libraries 
 abound in them.^ Previoufly to the cera, concerning which we 
 are treating, the Lives of the Saints were written in verfe, and 
 many parts of the Bible were tranilated in the fame manner.' 
 
 * A love-fong and fome compofitions of a mifcellaneoas na- 
 ture occur in -the reign of King John *. Our early poetical 
 efFufions appeared likewife, not unfrequently, in the form of 
 fatire ; and when this was clothed in allegory, it was fome- 
 times condu6led with fuccefs- The objedls, on which it was 
 exerted, were generally the lawyers and the clergy. But the 
 principal efforts of our yet untutored Mufes, were rhyming 
 chronicles and metrical ronances.' 
 
 Warton, in the fitft Volume, p. 43, of his Hiftory, enter- 
 tains us with a ballad, or a fatirical poem, compofed by a bard 
 devoted to tha court of Simon of Montfort, Earl of Lei- 
 cefler, a powerful Baron. It appeared foon after the famous 
 battle* of 1264, which had a very unhappy iffue for the king, 
 and which is defcribed as follows : 
 
 I. 
 
 Sittelh allc ftille, ant herkenetb to ml : 
 The kynge of Alemaii^ne, be mi leaute (^Loya/ly). 
 Thritti thoufent pound askede he 
 For to make the pees (fieace) in the countre 
 And fo To he dude more. 
 
 Kichard, thah ( th'cugh) thou be ever tricchard {treacherous) 
 Tn(!lhen ill all thou never more. 
 
 2. 
 
 Richard of Alemaigne, whil that he was kying, 
 He fpende all bis trefour opon fwyvyng, 
 Haveth he ncut of Walingford oferlyng (fnpertory 
 Let him habbe, ase he brew, bale {poifon) to dryng, 
 
 Maugre Wyndesore, 
 
 Richard thah thou, 6cc. 
 
 3- ' 
 The kyng of Alemaigne vvende do ful wel 
 He faifede de mulnc\for a caftel, 
 
 With 
 
 * A monarch of a vindidive and ufurping temper^ whom the Englifti Baront 
 compelled to confirm the M-'g"" Cbarta^ in ixij ; — he died at Newark, O^obw 
 8, IJ16,
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xrsUi 
 
 With hare fharpe fwerdes he grounde the del, 
 He wende that the fayles were mangonel 
 
 To help Wyndesore. 
 
 Richard thah thou, &c. &c. &c. 
 
 * In the reign of Edward I. *, the charafler of our poe- 
 tical compofitions was conliderably changed. The minflrels 
 either fubllituted fidlitious adventures for hiftorical traditio- 
 nary fa6ts, or reality was difgixifed by the reprefentations of 
 invention ; and a tafte for ornamental expreflion gradually 
 prevailed over the rude fimplicity of the native Englifh phra- 
 feology. Tliis change v^^as occafioned, among other caufes, 
 by the introdu<n:ion and increafe of the tales of chivalry. It 
 was in the reign of Edward II. f, when the metrical ro- 
 mances chiefly flourifhed ; and though the poetry of them 
 was, in general, very rude, imperfeft, and feeble, they oc- 
 calionallv exhibited gleams of imagination. One of them, en- 
 titled * Kyng of Tarsy has a warm.th of defcription in certain 
 paffages, that is not unlike the manner of Chaucer. From 
 ihe produtiions of which we now fpeak, this great poet and 
 his cotemporaries undoubtedly derived fome advantage ; but 
 it was their acquaintance vi'ith Italian literature which ftill 
 more enabled them to produce a literary revolution in their 
 own country. Surpriling eiFefts had been wrought in Italy y 
 by the genius and the writings of Dante (i)andPETRARCH(2). 
 Our Englifh poets were not equally happy in their endeavours 
 to enlighten the underftanding, and to retine the tafte of the 
 nation. They had greater difficulties to contend with, and 
 were far more unfavourably fituated for obtaining a conqueft 
 over them. Their ftyle was rough, and the harmony of their 
 poetical numbers was very defective. Neverthelefs we are 
 much indebted to them for affiduoufly applying to the ftudy 
 of their native language, and for contributing, in a confiderable 
 degree, to its enrichment and cultivation. The change ef- 
 
 fefted 
 
 * Bom, June i6, 1139 '■> Succeeded to the Crown, November 16, 1273 ; re- 
 duced Scotland 1299, died July 7, 1307; was buried at Weftminfter, where en 
 Maya. 1774, fome antiquaries examined his tomb, when they founl his corps 
 unconfumed, though buried 466 years. 
 
 f This unfortunate Monarch was born in 1284; wa» the first Prince of JVaLs 
 afcended the throne, 1307 ; was dethroned and murdered in 1327. 
 
 (i) Born, 1265; died, 1321, ^-(2) Fkahcis Petrarch, born at Jn^z-f 
 
 1304, died, 1347.
 
 xxxiv THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 fe£ted by them is, upon the whole, an important event in the 
 literary hillorj of this country.' 
 
 * When we look into the accounts of the Britijh writers, 
 which have been given us by Leland (3) and other bio- 
 graphers, and obferve the number of perfons whom thefe 
 biographers have refcued from oblivion, together with the 
 praifes they have bellowed upon them, as excelling in almoft 
 every branch of knowledge, and only defeftive with refpecl 
 to the elegance of their ftyle, we are ready to believe, that the 
 times preceding the Reformation were much more learned 
 than has ufually been imagined. Should v/e allow full -credit 
 to the encomiums, which our hiftorians have fo libeii 7 
 poured on a number of men whofe works are now either 
 totally loft, or totally neglefled, we might hence fee that li- 
 terature is of no avail (or is not duly valued) without tafte ; 
 and that, if fcience be communicated in barbarous language, 
 it will be treated with difregard and contempt by a polite aad 
 cultivated age. But the greateft part of our ancient monallic 
 authors, nptwithftanding the pompous eulogiums we read 
 concerning them, were as defpicable for the matter, as for the 
 exprelTion of their performances. In every view, therefore, 
 they were juftly config-.ied to dull and worms ; and though we 
 poilefs fomething of an antiquarian fpirit, we ai'e not endued 
 with fuch a portion of it, as to be~ extremely fpftd of things 
 which are recommended by nothing but their antiquity. Se- 
 veral perfons, however, may deferve a place in a hiftory of 
 the progrefs of knowledge, whofe compolitions are no longer 
 valuable ; and, as learning cannot be purfued, even in the 
 moft difadvantageotis manner, or in the moft unfavourable 
 circumftances, without producing good efFefts in certain in- 
 flanccs, a diligent enquirer will always find fome few names 
 that are worthy of being mentioned with particular efteem. 
 Where this is the cafe, there is a pleafure in paying the tri- 
 bute due to departed merit •, it is doing honour to our coun- 
 try, to let none be forgotten v.ho have a lawful title to re- 
 membrance and applaufe.' 
 
 * Though general light feemed rather to increafe during the 
 period, of which we are treating ; yet, excepting two or three 
 illuilrious men who appeared towards the conclufion of it, 
 
 this 
 
 2, John Lel/^kd, a celebrated antiquary, died IJJZ ; aged 45 :Vid, his work^ 
 £or further inforraatiou.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxxv 
 
 this sera did not produce a fet of writers equal in abilities and 
 charafter to thofe who flouriftied in the preceding.' 
 
 'Philological and Polite Liteiature, till it was revived at 
 the clofe of this aera, was in as low a Hate as Natural Philo- 
 fophj Though we have feen that fo much poetry was pro- 
 duced in the beginning of the period before us, it is remarka- 
 ble that the names of its writers are, for the mofl. part, buried 
 in oblivion. We know not to whom we owe far the greater 
 number of metrical romances, and other compofitions which 
 the age afforded. It is probable that they were the produc- 
 dufbions of monks who lived and died, unknown, in their 
 convents. The firft poet whofe name occurs, is Robert of 
 Gloucest^.r, who flourilhed about the year 1280. He was a 
 monk of the abbey of Glouccfter, and compofed a poem of 
 confiderable length, which is a Hillory of England, in verfe, 
 from Brutus to his own time. At the clofe of Edward the 
 Firft's reign, we meet with another poet named Robert 
 Manning, but more commonly, Robert de Brunne *, who 
 appeals neverthelefs only as atranflator. The work tranflated^or 
 rather paraphrafed by him, was originally written by Robert 
 GRoSTEsT,and was entitled Manual de Peche, or the Manual 
 of Sins. Among the authors of nietrical romances in the 
 I time 
 
 * Becaufe he refided in the monaftery of Brunne, or Bourne, in 
 Ltncolnjhire inhabited by the monks of the order of St Gilbert- 
 He tranllated many pieces, from the French and Latin, into Eng- 
 Ihh verfe ; among which " Ihe cajlle.of love, by biihop Grosse- 
 Teste," is not the leafl remarkable. It begins with the follow- 
 ing pious lines : 
 
 That good thinketh goo'd may do, 
 And God will help him thar to : ■ , 
 
 Ffor nas never good work wrought 
 With oute biginninge of good thougt. 
 Ne never was wrougt non vuel (well, good) thyng. 
 That vuel thoust nas the beginnyng. 
 God ffuder, and fone and holigofte 
 'J'hat alle thing on eorthe fixt and woft 
 That one God art and thrillihod (trinity) 
 And threo perfones in one hod, " 
 
 Withouten end and biginninge, 
 To whom we ougten over alle thinge, 
 Worshepe him with trewe love, 
 I'kat kine worthe king art us above, &c. &c.
 
 xxxvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 time of Edward II. Adam Davie (i)is the only peifon whofe 
 narae has defcended to pofterity. Robert Baston, (2) a poet 
 who attended this monarch in his expedition to Scotland, wrote 
 chiefly in Latin. It was not till the reign of Edward III. (3) 
 that the geniufles fprang up, who produced that poetic revo- 
 lution already mentioned, and which reflect s fo much honour 
 oil themfelves and on their country. Richard Hampoi.e, a 
 
 dodor 
 
 (i) Of this charafterno accounts appear to be extant refpefting 
 his merits as a b^ird, nor of the time when he flouriflied : at leaft I 
 have not been able to difcover any in Dr. Kippis' Eiographia Bri- 
 tatinica, in the Encyciofiedia Britann'ica, laft edition, and feyeral 
 other works I have purpofely, though vainly, confahed. — The 
 fame will apply to other authors mentioned in tliis Ilijlory, whofc 
 names are not accompanied with any biographical notes. 
 
 W. 
 
 (2) The gi-eater part of his poems are w^ritten in Za///;, of which 
 that " Z)f Sacerdotum Luxuriis'''' is not the leaft curious. — In l^ng- 
 11 fh he wrote " j4 Book of Foems^'' and " A Volume of Tragedies 
 and Comedies.'''' — Being poet laureat and public Orator at Oxford, 
 he accompanied Edward I. in his expedition into Scotland in 
 1304, to celebrate his vidlories over the Scots : but Robert Baf- 
 ton unluckily fell into the enemy's hands, and was obliged by tor- 
 ture to change his note and fing the fuccelTes of Robert Bruce, 
 who then claimed the crown of Scotland, This talk he reluftant- 
 ly complied with, as he intimates in the two firft lines ; 
 
 *' In dreery verfe my rhymes I make 
 Bewailing whilft fuch theme I take," &c. 
 Our author's poetry was expreflcd in fomewhat barbarous 
 llyle, but not contemptible for the age in which he lived. He 
 died about 13 lo. Kippis. 
 
 (3) Born at Windfor, 131a; proclaimed king and crowned at Weftminfter 
 1327 ; died in 1377.— ^Hi was undoubtedly one of the greatefl princes that ever 
 fwayed the fceptre in England ; whether we refped; him as a warrior or lawgiver, 
 a mcnarch, or a man. He pofiefled the courap-e and romantic fpirit of Alexander ; 
 the penetration, the fortitude, the polifhed manners, of Julius; the munificence, 
 the liberality, the wifdom of Auguftus C.-tfar. He was tail, majeftic, of an ele- 
 gant figure, with a piercing eye, and aquiline vifage. He excelled all his cotem- 
 poraries in feats of arms and perfonal addrefs. He was courteous, affable and 
 eloquent ; a conftitutional knight-errant ; and his example diffufed the Ipirit of 
 chivalry through the whole nation. In imitation of the youthful monarch who 
 delighted in tilts and tournaments, every individual betook himfelf to the exercifc 
 cf uniis ; ever)' breafl; glowed with emulation, every hcr.rt panted with the thirfl 
 
 of
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxxiL 
 
 doctor in divinity, of the order of St Auguiline, mufl not be 
 reckoned in the number of thefe geniuffes. Robert Lgng- 
 LANDE, who flourilhed about the year 1350, and who was the 
 author of the poem called " The Vifion of Pierce Flowrvan^'' 
 merits a far fuperior diilindlion. This poem contains a feries 
 of diftin£l vifions, i^n which the vices of almoft every profef- 
 fion, particularly of the clergy, and the abfurdities of fuper- 
 ftition, are ridiculed with much humour and fpirit. The fa- 
 tire is accompanied with a ftrong vein of allegorical invention. 
 The great defeat of Longlande, lies in his language. He has 
 adopted the ftyle of the Anglo-Saxon poets, and imitated them 
 in their alliterative verfification ; in confequence of which he 
 is remarkably uncouth, and fometimes obfcure. It is to be 
 lamented, that fo much genius and abilities ihculd be hidden 
 by fa unpleafant and ungracious a mode of compofition. Bad 
 as the model fet by Longlande was, he had a number of imi- 
 tators.' 
 
 Longland was a cotemporary of Mandeville, and his Vifion 
 before mentioned is one of the beft poems that appeared during 
 this sera. Under the fid:itious idea of vifions, or apparitions, 
 he laflies m a fatirical ftrain, the vices, of all ranks, and parti- 
 cularly thofe arifing from the abfurdities of fuperftition and 
 the corrupted manners of the clergy. — Inflead of the long paf- 
 ages quoted by Warton, a fhorter one will fnffice here, in 
 which Nature (Kynde) at the command of Confcience and its 
 companions, j4ge and Death, fends her difeafes from the pla- 
 nets. 
 
 Kynde Confcience then heard, and came out of the planetts. 
 And feat forth his-farriours Fevers, and Fluxe?, 
 
 e Coughes- 
 
 of glory ; and when he took the field, there was not a foldier in his army, who did 
 not ferve from fentiment and fight 'for reputation. The love of glory was certain- 
 ly the predominant paflion of-Edward, to the gratification, of which !'e did not 
 fcruple to facrifice the feelings of humanity, the lives of his fubjefts, and the in- 
 tcrcft of his country ; and nothing could have induced or enabled his people tcj 
 bear the load of taxps, with which they were encumbered in tliis reign, but the 
 love and adiniration of* his pcrlbn, the fame of his victories, and the excellent laws 
 and regulations which the parliament enaded with his advice and concurrence ; and 
 finally, the firfl diflindion was made between lords and commons in 1342, by 
 which the foundation was laid for the prcfent Englifh conflitution ; a fabric that is 
 believed to he capable of repairing and occafionally reproducing its worm-eaten pil- 
 lars, libwcv^r injured and preyed upon by the tooth of tmie. 
 
 W ai.d Barclay.
 
 xxxviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 Coughes, and Caidiacles, Crampes and Toth aches, 
 
 Reumes and Kadgondes, and ray nous Seniles, 
 
 Byles and Botches, and burnynge Agues 
 
 Frenefes, and foule Evill, foragers of Kynde. 
 
 Ther was " Harowe ! and Helpe ! here cometh Kynde ! 
 
 *' With Death that is dreadful, to unde us all !" 
 
 The lord that lyveth after luft tho aloud cried 
 
 Age the hoore, he was in the vaw-ward, 
 
 And bare the banner before Death : by ryght he is claimed. 
 
 Kynde came after, with many kene fores, 
 
 As Packes and Peftilences, and much people fhent. 
 
 So kynde through corruptions kylled full many : " 
 
 Death came dryvyng after and all to dufr pafhed 
 
 Kyngs and Kayfers, knightes and popes. 
 
 Many a lovely lady, and lemman of knyghtes, 
 
 Swoned and fwelted for forowe and Death's dyntes. 
 
 Confcience, of his courtefye to Kynde he befoght 
 
 To ceafe and fufire, of fe where they wolde, 
 
 Leave pride prively, and be perfite chriilen, 
 
 And Kynde ceafed tho, to fee the people amende. , 
 
 At length Good Fortune and Pride difpatcli a nun^ierous hofl 
 of enemies led on by Dejire^ to make an attack upon Confcience. 
 
 And gadered a great hoft, all agayne Confcience : 
 
 This Lechery led on, with a laughyng chere. 
 
 And with a privye fpeeche, and paynted wordes, 
 
 And armed him in idlenefs and in high bearyng. 
 
 He bare a bowe in his hand, and many bloudy arrowes, 
 
 Were fethered with faire behcfl, and many a falfe truth. 
 
 Upon this Confcience is befieged bj A?itichrifl who is aided 
 by the feven great giants (the feven mortal fins), in which ex- 
 pedition Idlenefs forms the order of the attack with an army 
 confining of upwards of a thoufand well-fed prelates, &.c. 
 
 * There was a Scottish poet in the prefent period, who 
 is entitled to diflinguiflied praifes. The perfon we have in view 
 is John Barbour, (4) Arch-deacon of Aberdeen. His poem 
 
 called 
 
 (4). Very litrle is known of this illuftrious character, one of the 
 earliefl Caledonian bards, except that he feems to have been born 
 about 1326 5 that he was Archdeacon of Aberdeen in 1357, in 
 which y«ar he travelled to Oxford, and was appointed by the 
 Bi{hop of Aberdeen, one of the commiffioners for the ranfom of 
 David |L king of Scotland > and that in 1365 he accompanied
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xxxix 
 
 called " Tlie Hijlory of Robert Bruce, King of the Scots,'' 
 allowance being made for the time in which it was written, is 
 eminent for the beauty of its ftyle. Another bard of the fame 
 country wrote a poem on the exploits of Sir William Wal- 
 lace, which abounds with fine paffages. Both thefe writers 
 rofe to a ftrain of verfification, expreffion, and poetical imagery, 
 greatly fuperior to the age and country in which they lived.* 
 
 e 2 We 
 
 fix knights to St Denis Hear Paris. In the year 1375, as he him- 
 felf informs us, he wrote a poem of confiderable length, which was 
 firft publiihed, in the oiiginal Scottifli verfe, from a MS. dated 
 1489, with Notes and a GJoffary ; by Mr Piukerton, in three Vo- 
 lumes i2mo. London, 1790 j .entitled, 7he Bruce; or the Hiftory 
 of Robert I. King of Scotland. — Mr P. the prefent editor fays 
 that " taking the total merits of this work together, he prefers it 
 to the early exertions of even the Italian mufe, to the melancholy 
 fublimity of Dante, and the amorous quaintnefs of Petrarca. The 
 reader will here find few of the graces of fine poetry, little of the 
 attic drefs of the mufe : but here are life< fpirit, eafe, plain fenfe, 
 piftures of real manners, perpetual incident, and entertainment. 
 The language is remarkably good for the time ; and far fuperior, 
 in neatnefs and elegance, even to that of Gawin Douglas, who 
 wrote more than a century after. But when we confider that our 
 author is not only the firft poet but the earlieft hiftorian of Scot- 
 land, who has entered into any detail, and from whom any view of 
 the real ftate and manners of the country can be had j and that 
 the hero, whofe life he paints fo minutely, was a monarch equal to 
 the greiitell of modern times ; let the hiftorical ' and poetical me- 
 rits of his work be weighed together ; and then oppofed to any 
 other early poet of the prefent nations in Europe." 
 
 " It is indeed pofterior in time to the earlieft poetry of the 
 moft modern nations j but it muft be confidered that Scotland 
 hardly had one writer in, the thirteenth century, land this poem was 
 written in the fourteenth." 
 
 The following (hort fpecimen of the poem will fuflicieritly prove 
 thefe affertions, and we have only to attend to the obfcrvation 
 which the editor has prefixed to his Gloffary y viz. *' The chief 
 obftacle in perufing this work arifes from the orthography, which 
 is extremely irregular. To underftand many words, it is only ne- 
 celTary to pronounce them aloud j and the meaning which is ob- 
 fcured by the fpelling, will be evident from the found." 
 
 A! fredome is a nobill thing I 
 Fredome mayfe man to haifflikingj (i) 
 
 ' Fredome 
 
 (l) lilakes man to have joy '
 
 xl THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 We are now arrived to Geoffrey Chaucer,(5) who claims 
 the higheft place of dillin£tion, on account of his pre-eminent 
 merit, and the more extenfive influence of his example. Into 
 the particulars of his life, which are raiirutelj difcuffed in the 
 
 Biographia 
 
 Fredome all folace to«man giffis : 
 
 He levys ai efe, that frely levys ! 
 
 A noble hart may haiff nane efe, 
 
 Na ellys nocht that may hlra plefe, (2) 
 
 Gyff fredome fallyhe : for fre liking (3) ^ 
 
 Is yharnyt our all otliir thing (4) 
 
 Na he, that ay h:)fe levyt fie, 
 
 May nocht knaw weill the piopyrte. 
 
 The angyr, na the wrechyt dome, (5) 
 
 That is cowplyt to foule thyrldome. 
 
 But gyff he had affayit it, 
 
 Than all perquer he fuld it wyt j (6) 
 
 And fuld think fredome mar to pryfe, 
 
 Than all the gold in varid that is. 
 As a fpecimen of Barbour's rural poetry, the following few lines 
 will confirm Mr Andrews's opinion, when he fays in his Hi/lor'v of 
 Great Britain^ conneBed with the Chronology of Europe ; ^c. ^tOy 
 Loitilo". J794, " That Barbour wrote the life and exploits of 
 Robert Bruce in good rhyme ; and in a ftyle mote like our mo- 
 dern Englifti, than the language of Chaucer." 
 
 This was in raidil of month of May, 
 When birdis fing on ilka fpray, 
 Melland (7) their notes, with feemly foun, 
 For foftnefs of the Avect fcafogn. 
 And leavis of the brarichis fpVeeds, 
 And bloomis bright, befide them, breeds. 
 And fieldis ftraA\'ed are with flow'rs 
 "Well favoring of feir (8) colours. 
 
 (^) Geoffrey Chaucer, juftly confidered as the father ofonr 
 Lnglifh poets, and the firit great improver and reformer of our 
 language, was born in the fecond year of Edward III. A. D. 1328. 
 He ftiidied firfl; at Cambridge where he compofcd his po.em called 
 '• Ithe Court of Love,'''' in the iSth yearof his age, which carries 
 in it very pregnant proofs of Hull and I'^arning as well as ; quick- 
 
 nefs 
 * • (i) Na ellys noc;;t; nor any thinadf.:, (.5) fee liking ; yiv.- tw.-V/. (4) yharnys: 
 r>\.\r ; d^finJ aLove, ( j j angyr ; qua;re, cflgyj,i. c. cz/ffi/J/i- ? (6^ pcic^'jer ; /■cr/tt?- 
 ly. wyt ; kua'u:. 
 
 (') Melland; r.lriJmg. (8) ftir ; their
 
 ESS AYS, B Y ADELUNG. ^li 
 
 Biographia, we fhall not enter. It may be fufficient ta fay, 
 that he was converfant with the court, and engaged in public 
 affairs ; that he was clofely connected with John of Gaunt, and 
 
 married 
 
 nefs of w'h, and great ftrength of genius. He compleated his 
 ftudies in the Univerfity of Oxford, or as fome fay, at Canterbury 
 College. — Leland informs us, that he Avas a ready logician, a 
 fmooth rhetorician, a pleafant poet, a grave pliilofopher, an inge- 
 nious mathematician, and a holy divine. He afterwards applied 
 himfelf to the ftudy of Law-, in the Middle-Temple j and was 
 made King's page, about the age of thirty, an office then very 
 honourable, as the EngliQi court was the moll fplendid in Europe. 
 He married Philippa Rouet, a favourite of the Duke and Duchefs 
 of Gaunt, about the year 1360 j, was fent by King Edward, as his 
 agent to Genoa, to hire fliips for the King's Navy j and having 
 accompliflied the objeft of this miflion to the fatisfadlion of his 
 inafter, the King granted him, in the 48th year of his reign, a 
 pitcher of wine daily in the port of London, to be delivered by the 
 Butler of England, and very foon after he was made Comptroller 
 of the cuftoms in the port of Loudon. Yet it is doubtful, how 
 long he remained in this lucrative office j for in the fecond year 
 of King Richard his affairs were in fuch confufion that he was 
 obliged to have recourfe to the King's protedion, in order to 
 fcreen hira from his creditors. — By»attaching himfelf to Wickliff, 
 and his followers, he w'as involved in great calamities, and became 
 equally fufpe61ed by the King, and difliked by the people. — la 
 1382, he was obliged to fly from London into Hainault, France, 
 and Zeeland, in which banilhment he almoft periffied by the bar- 
 barous ingratitude of his former friends in England, who inftead of 
 fending him any fupplies, rather hindered every attempt made by 
 others to relieve nhim. When almoft periffiing from want, he 
 privately came over to England, where he was difcovered, feized, 
 thrown into prifon, and upon difclofing all he knew of the king's 
 enemies, he at laft obtained his pardon. Yet he did hot take any 
 meafures to revenge himfelf againft his treacherous friends by the 
 confeffions extorted from him j though with regard to himfelf 
 they brought upon him an inexpreffible load of calumnies and flan- 
 ders. — The penflbn of 20 marks per annum, together with the 
 daily pitcher of wine granted him by King Edward, and forfeited 
 by his dereliftion of the court party, .w?re confirmed to him in the 
 reign of King Henry, from whom he obtained a licence on the i ith 
 of May 1389 to difpofe ot them to one Scalby. In this unexpeft- 
 ed and terrible reverfe of fortune, he very wifely refolved to quit 
 
 that
 
 xlii THREEPHILOLOGICAL 
 
 married the lifter of the famous Catherine Swynford ; that he 
 was involved in the misfortunes of his friend and mafter ; that 
 he was obliged to flee into Holland, when the Duke was difgrac- 
 
 ed ; 
 
 .that bufy fcene of life, in which he had met with fo many troubles, 
 and to feek a more lalling happinefs in retirement. He therefore 
 chofe Woodftock for his retreat ; a place which had been the 
 fweet fcene of fo much fatisfadlion to him in the days of his prof- 
 perity ; and here he employed part of his time in reviling and 
 corredling his writings, totally fecluded from the world, and 
 tafting only thofe calm and folid pleafures which are the refult of 
 a wife man's reflexions on the viciflitudes of human life. He re- 
 sided here in a fquare ftone houfe near the park gate, which flill 
 retains his name •, and it well deferves this honourable token, for, 
 being confecrated in his poems, the whole country round about is 
 become, to Engiiflimen, a kind ofClaflic ground. The Ihort time 
 he lived after the acceflion of Edward IV, was chiefly employed ia 
 regulating his private afl"ai,rs which had fulTered by the public dif- 
 orders : for all the public afts of the depofed King Richard, in 
 the 2Tft year of his reign, being declared void, Chaucer was forced 
 to quit his retirement, to come up to town to folicit his caufes, and 
 beginning now to bend under the weight of years, this unlucky ac- 
 ceflion of bufinefs, which obliged him to alter his ufual way of 
 living, might very poflibly haften his end, the near approach of 
 which he bore with Roman conftancy, or rather with chriftian pa- 
 tience. For there is flill extant a kind of Ode that he is faid to 
 have compofed in his la ft agonies, which very plainly proves, that 
 his fenfcs were perfeclly found, and the faculties of his mind not 
 in the leaft impaired. He died Oftober 25th 1400, in the full 
 pofleffion of that high reputation which his writings had deferved- 
 ]y acquired, and was buried in Weftminfler Abbey in the great 
 fouth crofs-ifle. — The fonnet or ode above alluded to confifls of 
 three ftanzas only, and as well for the beauty of the piece, as for 
 the extraordinary occaflon on which it was written, Dr Kippis has 
 defervtdly given it a place in his Biograpbia Brltannica. 
 
 Gode confaile of Chaucer : 
 - Attempted in modern Etig/ijh, 
 The Poats last Advice. 
 
 I. 
 
 Fly from the croud, and be to virtue true. 
 Content with what thou hafl, tho' it be fmall. 
 
 To
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xliii 
 
 ed; and that he afterwards returned into England, upon the re- 
 ftoration of hi's patron to power and favour — His literary cha- 
 rader was truly illuftrious j it has been lately, and with great 
 
 ability 
 
 To hoard brings hate ; nor lofty thoughts purfue, 
 He who climbs high endangers many a fall. 
 
 Envy's a (hade that ever waits on fame. 
 And oft the fun that rifes it will hidej 
 
 Trace not in life a vaft cxpenfive fcheme 
 But be thy wilhes to thy flatc ally'd. 
 
 Be mild to others, to thyfelf fevere ; 
 
 So truth (hall (liield thee, or from hurt or fear. 
 
 II. 
 
 Think not of bending all things to thy will, 
 
 Nor vainly hope that fortune (hall befriend j 
 Inconftant (lie, but be thou conflant ftill, 
 
 Whate'er betide unto an honed end. 
 Yet needlefs dangers never'madly brave. 
 
 Kick, not thy naked foot againll; a nail j 
 Or from experience the folution crave, 
 
 If wall and pitcher (Irive, which fliall prevail ; 
 Be in thy caufe, as in thy neighbour's clear. 
 So truth (hall (liield thee, or from hurt or fear. 
 
 Ill, 
 
 Whatever happens, happy in thy mind ' 
 
 Be thou, nor at thy lot in life repine. 
 He 'fcapes all ill, whofe bofom is refign'd. 
 
 Nor way, nor weather will be always fine. 
 Befide, thy home's not here, a journey this, 
 
 A pilgrim thou, then hie thee on thy way. ■ 
 
 Look up to God, intent on heavenly blifs. 
 
 Take what the road alFords and praifes pay ; 
 Shun brutal luft, and feek thy foul's high fphere j 
 So truth (hall (hield thee, or from hurt or fear. 
 In order to give likewife fome fpecimen of his original compo- 
 fition, Chaucer's humorous Addrefs to his empty purfe, and his laco- 
 jiic advice to his own amanuenjis, well deferve here to be recorded. 
 
 Chaucer to his emptie purfe. 
 To you my purfe, and to none othir wight, 
 Complain I, for ye be my ladie dere, 
 
 I am
 
 xllv THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 ability difplayedby fucli writers as bTyrwhit and aWARTOi^ : 
 hence it is the lefs neceflary, here, to enlarge upon it. Chau- 
 cer was ikilled in all the learning of the age, and efpecially in 
 
 aftronomy, 
 
 I am forie now that ye be fo light, 
 For certis ye now make me hevie cherc j 
 Me were as lefe be laide upon a here, 
 For whiche unto your mercy thus I crie, 
 Be hevy againe, or els mote I die. 
 
 Now vouchfafin this day or it be night » 
 That I of yow the blisful fowne m ly here, 
 Or fe your colour lyke the fonne bright. 
 That of yclovvneffe ne had nevir pere ; 
 Ye be my life, ye be my hert'is llefe j 
 Quene of comfort and of gode companye. 
 Be hevy againe, or els mote I die. 
 
 Nowe purfe, that art to me my liv'is light, 
 And fayvour, as downe in this worlde here, 
 Oute of this towne helpe me by your might, 
 Sithin that yow wol not be my trefoure, 
 For I am (have as nighe as any frere, 
 But I preyin unto your curtefye 
 Be hevy againe, or els mote I die, &c. 
 
 Chaucer's voordcs unto his ovjn Scrivenere. 
 
 Adam Scrivenere, yf ever it the befalle 
 BoECE or Troiles for to write new 
 Under thy longe lockes thou maift have the fcalle, 
 But after my makynge thou write more true. 
 So oft adaye I mote thy werke renew 
 It to corredle and eke to rubbe and fcrape. 
 And al is thorow thy negligence and rape. 
 The following lines are faid to have been anciently upon Chau- 
 cer's tomb-ftone. 
 
 Galfridus Chaucer, vates et fama Poesis 
 Matern^, hag sacra sum tumulatus homo. 
 -About the year 1555, Nicholas Brighraan, a gentleman of Ox- 
 ford ereSed a handfome monument for Chaucer. His pidure was 
 taken'from Occleve's book, together with the folio vying infcription 
 «'hich ftill remains : 
 
 M. S. 
 ^uifuit Anglorum vates ter maximus olim 
 Galfridus Chaucer conditur hoc turnulo : 
 
 Annum
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xlv 
 
 aftronomy, as appears from his AJlrolahe, in which he has 
 colledled whatever was valuable in the works of his predecef- 
 fors who applied to the ftudy of that fcience. He wrote in 
 Englifh profe as well as v^erfe, being perfuaded that it was the 
 duty of able men to cultivate their native tongue ; an opinion 
 correfponding with the fuccefsful efforts of Petrarch in Italy, 
 whofe example he found worthy of imitation.' 
 
 ' Chaucer is entitled to eminent praife as a poet. He was 
 endued with an uncommon genius, and fhone in very different 
 kinds of compofition. His Cqnterbury-tales are mafter- 
 pieces, which exhibit a wonderful variety of talents ; for they 
 abound with the fublime and the pathetic, with admirable fa- 
 tire, genuine humour, and an uncommon knowledge, of life. 
 The llories told by the feveral guefts are^exniftly fuited to 
 their characters, and clearly evince that the author, notwith- 
 ftanding the aid he derived from his acquaintance with Italian 
 literature, was poffeiTed of a noble invention and a fruitful 
 imagination. Whatever were the defeats ofhisftyle, they 
 were entirely the defers of the period in which he flourifhed. 
 At the fame time it has a claim to much higher praife tban it 
 has frequenily received. His verification has been cenfured 
 as deficient in harmony ; this charge has often proceeded from 
 our unacquaintance with the ftruifture of the language in that 
 age, and with the manner in which it was pronounced. Chau- 
 cer is ufually characterized as the Father of the Englifh poe- 
 
 f try, 
 
 Annum (i quceras Domini, Ji tempora vitcp, 
 Ecce notcE fubfunt quce tibi cunBa notunt. 
 25 OBobris, T4CO. 
 A. jEirumnarum requtes mors. 
 
 N. I^righam hos fecit Mufarum nomine fumptus . 
 
 In Knglif}} thus : 
 Of Englifh bards who fang the fweeteft ftrains, 
 Old Geoffrey Chaucer now this tomb contains : 
 For if death's date, If reader thou fliould'ft call, 
 Louk but beneath and it will tell thee ail. 
 25th of Oftober, 1400. 
 Death is the repofe of affliftions. 
 N. Brighmsn placed thefe in the name of the Mufes at his own 
 sxpence, JJj^-
 
 slvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 try : he was undoubtedly the firft perfon'in England, to |\'liofn 
 the title of a poet, in its genuine luftre, could be applied with 
 juftice. He not only enriched our native tongue in general, 
 but had the honour of edabliihing the EngliOi heroic verfe, 
 in which fo many beautiful compofitions have fincc appeared.' 
 
 * This illuftrious man was uncommonly free in his leligious 
 fentiments ; he employed his talents with equal fuccefs in 
 "lafhing the immoralities (jf the priefts, and in covertly attack- 
 ing fome of the doftrines of the Church of Rome : nor 
 has it been ima<;ined without reafon, that he was a great fa- 
 vourer, if not a dired follower of Wickliff.' 
 
 * Another poet of this cera, wlio is entitled to confiderable 
 applaufe, is John Gower (6). He was the intimate friend of 
 Chaucer, and co-operated W4th him in all his valuable defigns. 
 With refpeft to religion he was equally liberal in his fenti- 
 ments ; fo natural is the connection between genius and the 
 love of liberty. Though he was much inferior to Chaucer in 
 
 fpirit, 
 
 {6) Gawer's chief work in Englilli, is his ConfcJJio amantis, or 
 " The lover's confeffion •," it_was finilhed in the year '^93. It 
 is divided into eight books, firft printed by Caxton in 1483. He 
 wrote this poem at the defire of Richard II. who meeting our 
 poet roving on the Thames, near London, invited him into the 
 Royal barge, and nfrer much converfation requefted him to booh 
 fome new thing. On this piece Govver's charafter and reputation 
 as a poet, are almiDll entirely founded. It is a dialogue between 
 a lover'and his confeffor who is a prieft of Venus, and hke the 
 myftagogue in th^ Picture of Cebes, is called Genius.— What 
 Gower wanted in invention, he fupplied from his common-place 
 book, xvhich appears to ha'ye been ftored with an inexhauftible 
 fund of inftruclive maxims, pleafant narrations, and philofophical 
 definitions : hence his objedl to croud all his erudition into this 
 elaborate performance •, yet there \% often fome degree of con- 
 trivance and art in his manner of introducing and adapting fub- 
 je6ls of a very diftnnt nature, and which are tptaliy foreign to his 
 general defigns. (Kippis). That he was a man of judgment, appears 
 from the tircumilance of Chaucer's fubmitting his Troi/us and 
 Crejftda to Gower's cenfure. — His munificence and piety were 
 great^ he largely contributed to rebuild the conventual church of 
 St Mary Overee In Southwark, In its prcfent elegant form, and to 
 render it a beautiful pattern of the lighter Gothic archite<5lure ; at 
 the fame time he founded at his tomb a perpetual chantry, and 
 died in 1402.
 
 ESSAYS, BY A D E L U N G. xlvli 
 
 fj)!iit, imagination, and elegance, his language is not dellitute 
 of perfpicuity, and his verfification is frequently harmonious. 
 His erudition was very exteniive, and accompanied with a 
 knowledge of life. He critically cultivated his native tongue, 
 that he might reform its irregularities, and eftablifti an Eng- 
 liih ftyle. His poems are diftinguilhcd for their moral merit. 
 In fliort, if Chaucer had not exifted, Gower would alone have 
 been fufficient to refcue the age, in which he lived, from the 
 imputation of barbarifm,' 
 
 * In comparing the hiftorians of this age with their prede- 
 ceflbrs, we cannot allow them equal merit in the fame fpecies 
 of compofitJon. The Compendium of Thomas Wickes, 
 which begins with the Conquefl, and ends at the death of Ed« 
 ward I, is clear and full in its narration of feveral events. The 
 Chronicle that goes under the name of John Brumpton, is 
 copious in its account of the Saxons, and tranfcribes many of 
 their laws at large. Higden, though a plagiary, preferves 
 fome fads which would otherwife have been loft. Matthew 
 OF Westminster (';)concluded his Annals with the year 1307 ; 
 but his work was continued by other hands, aud particularly 
 b/ Adam de Merimuth, to 1380.' 
 
 ' This age alfo produced what was then extremely remark- 
 able, an exteniive and illuftrious traveller. Such was Sir. 
 John Mandeville, a peifon defcended from an ancient 
 and noble family. He had received bis education at the mo- 
 iiaftery of St. Albans, and applied himfelf -for fome time to 
 the common ftudies of the day, and efpecially to phyfic ; but 
 at length he was feized with an invincible deiire of vifiting 
 Alia and Africa. Having amply provided himfelf for the pur- 
 pofe, he fet out upoh his travels in 1332, and was abfentfrom 
 England thirty-four years. When he returned to his native 
 country, he was fcarcely known, as he had long been given up 
 for dead, by his relations and friends. He became acquainted 
 v.'ith many modern languages, in the coui-fe of his adventures, 
 and wrote his Travels in Latin, French, and Znglifli. Several 
 
 , f 2 falfe 
 
 (7) A EenediiSine monk and an accom^iliflied fcholar, who 
 wrote this liiftoiy from the beginning of the world, to the end of 
 the reign of Edward I, ui^der the title of Flores HiJIoriarum', he 
 
 died in 1380. Encyclop. Barr.
 
 xlviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 falfe and fanciful things are to be found in them, as he was 
 extremely credulous, and tells us not only what he faw, but 
 what he heard. In other refpefts, his accounts of the coun- 
 tries, which he vifited, deferve attention ; and, excepting 
 Paulus Venutqs, he was the firfl man who communicated, 
 to the Weilern Europeans, the knowledge of the remote parts 
 of the world (8). 
 
 Divi/ion Second ; froin 1399, to 1485. 
 
 Frqm Henry IV. to Henry VII. 
 
 * The period, in which Chaucer, Gower and Longlande 
 flourifhed, was fucceeded by an age that did not, in any to- 
 lerable degree, fuftaia the fame reputation. There was only 
 one poet in the reign of King Henry IV. and he contributed 
 nothing to the improvement of our verfification and language. 
 His real name was John Walton, though he is called 'Jo- 
 hannes Capellanus . He traoflated into Englifli verfe Boethius's 
 " 'Treatife on the Conjolation of Philofophyj a work of genius 
 and merit, which in the middle ages, was admired above eve- 
 ry other compofition.' 
 
 * Henry V. though faid to have been fond of reading, de- 
 rives no luflre from his patronage of the fine arts, but from 
 his charadler as a warrior. Although his coronation was at- 
 tended with harpers, who muft have accompanied their inftru- 
 ments with heroic rhymes, he was no great encourager of the 
 popular minftrelsy, then in a high (late of perfedlion. When, 
 on h]s entrance into the city of London in triumph, after the 
 battle of Agincourt, children had been placed to ling verfes as 
 he pafled, an edift was iffued by him, commanding that, for 
 the future, no fongs iliould be recited in praife of the late 
 victory. This humility perhaps was afiecled ; and, if it was 
 real, does not ai>pear to l;ave been the refult of true wifdom. 
 While his inclinations directed him to purfue his emi- 
 nent military atchievements, he ought to have cherilhed the 
 perfons who were befl able to do juflice to his prowefs. The 
 
 little 
 
 C8) His rainbiins; difpofltion did not ruffer him to refl ; for be 
 left his native country a fecond time, and died at Liej^e in the 
 Nctlicilands in 1372. Encyci-Op. Brit.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xlix 
 
 little regard, however, which Henry paid to the poets, could 
 not prevent them from celebrating his warlike a£tions. A- 
 mong other productions, a minftrel-piece was compofed on 
 the liege of Harfleur, and the battle of Agincourt. It was a- 
 dapted to the harp, and contained fome fpirited lines ; but the 
 fljle was barbarous, compared with that of Chaucer and 
 Gower. The improvement of our language was attended 
 to only by a few men, who had enjoyed the advantages of a 
 fuperior education, and made compolition their ftudy. As 
 to the minllrels, they were, in general, too illiterate to fearch 
 after the refinements of didlion.' 
 
 ^ Concerning Occlkve, though of fome note in the poeti- 
 cal hiflory of this period, nduch cannot be faid in his praife. 
 His principal poem is a tranllation of Egidtus on the Govern- 
 ment of Princes. Occleve did not excel in vigour of fancy, 
 and there is no energy in his writings. He had, how^ever, 
 the merit of contributing to the improvement of our language. 
 His pathetic lines on Chaucer, who was his model, and with 
 "whom he had probably formed a connection in eaily life, re- 
 flect honour upon the gratitude and fenlibility of his heart.* 
 
 * John Lydgate (9), a monk of the BenediCtine abbey of 
 Bury in Suffolk, was the poet whofe reputation ftands the 
 highefl among the Englifh bards of this age. He poflefled the 
 advantage of an education, not inferior to any that the times 
 could afford. After having ftudied at the univerfity of Ox- 
 ford, he travelled for improvement into France and Italy. 
 Here he acquired the knowledge, not only of the languages, 
 but of the literature of thefe countries, and paid particular at- 
 tention to the poetry of both nations. Befides obtaining an 
 acquaintance with all the polite learning which was then cul- 
 tivated, he was no inconiiderable proficient in the fafhidnable 
 
 philofophy 
 
 (9) At what time he retired to the convent of St. Edmund's- 
 Bury, does not appear ; but he was certainly there in 14 15. He 
 was h'ving in 1446, aged about dd ; but in what year he died, is not 
 knoiAn. — Lydgate, according to Pits, was an elegant poet, a per- 
 fuafive rhetorician, an expert mathematician, an acute phliofopher, 
 and a tolerable divine. He was a voluminous writer, and con- 
 fiderincr the age in which lie lived, an excellent poet. His lan- 
 guage is lefs obfolete, and his verfification much more harmonious, 
 than the language ?ind verfificatiou of Chaucer, who wrote about 
 half a century before him. Encycl.Bs.it.
 
 1 THREEPHILO LOGICAL 
 
 philofophy and theology of his cotemporaries. The vivacity 
 of his genius, and the veri'atility of his talents," enabled him to 
 write a great number of poems, extremely diverfified in .their 
 Jiibjefts, and in the nature of their compofition. His three 
 chief produdlions were the ** Fall of Princes,'''' the " Siege of 
 Thebes,^^ and the " DeJlruBion of T'roy.'''' — Lydgate alfo im- 
 proved the Englilli tongue ; for his language is uncommon- 
 ly perfpicuous for the times in which he lived, and his verfes 
 frequently excite furprife by their modern call. He feems to 
 have been ambitious, at leail in the llru6lure and modulation 
 of his ftyle, of rivalling Chaucer ; but undoubtedly he 
 v/as far "inferior to him in the grand requiiites of poetical ex- 
 cellence. His mode of writing is difFufe, and l>e is not diftin- 
 guilhed by animation or pathos. Neverthelefs, he is not def- 
 titute of beauties, and his Deftru6lion of Troy, in particular, 
 (difplays much power of defcription, in conjunftion with clear 
 and harmonious numbers.' 
 
 * If it were compatible v>'ith the nature of ourdefign to enu- 
 merate names only, other perfons might be added. We might 
 mention Hugh Campedi n, Thomas Chester, John Hard- 
 ing (ic), who v/rote a Chronicle in Verfe, and John Norton 
 and Gf-OiiGE Ripley, whofe poems are didaftic. It is fcarce- 
 Ij'' expreiling ourfelves with propriety, to fay that thefe men 
 were mere verfiiiers. While they are totally void of the 
 
 noble 
 
 (lo) As a fpecimen of this clironiclerV verfification, may ferve 
 tlie foUoving cuvious lines. 'which Spelman has quoted in his 
 *' Vita Aelfrediy p. 19 1. Append. 
 
 " Alfrede king was of this regioun 
 
 That brother was to the noble Elthride, 
 
 A perfe6l Clerk proved in opinion 
 
 As,Clcrks could difcern, and proved. 
 
 In knighthood alfo approved and notified 
 
 So plenerly, that no man knew his peer 
 
 So good a knight he xvas and fin^ulere. 
 
 In batails many in his father's daies 
 
 And alfo in his brethren tin|£ all three 
 
 He fouglit full ofte, and ba^ him wel alwales, 
 
 That for hisdedes and finguiaritee ^ 
 
 J-Tc was ccmraended among the emnitce 
 
 Within the land and out, as" well v;as know 
 
 His fame among the people hye was blowe."
 
 . E S S A Y S, B Y A D E L U N G. U 
 
 noble'q'jallties which conftitute genuine poetrj, their verfiC:.!- 
 tion is unpolifhed and barbarous. Harding fiiould therefore 
 be marked as an antiquary and an hiflorian, and Norton and 
 Ripley as chemical writers. The latter is underllood to have 
 been no mean proficient in the general literature of the times.* 
 
 * However deficient theminilrels of this age might be in the 
 excellencies of compofiflon, they were great favourites with 
 the nation at large. This is evident frotn the reward which 
 they received for their attendance on particular folemnitics. 
 Superilitious as the body of the people were, they manifelled 
 greater liberality towards the adminiftrators to their pleafures, 
 than towards the leaders of their devotion. During one feail, 
 while twelve prieils had only four pence each for finging a 
 dirge, the fame ntimber of minllrels were every one of them 
 rewarded with two fnillings and four pence, befides havmg en- 
 tertainment provided for themfelves and their horfes. At ano-' 
 tlier feftival two liiillings were given to the priefts, and four 
 to the minflrtss ; and the latter were treated with the moil 
 diilinguiilied marks of attention and refpeft.' 
 
 * It Is conjeftured that the office of poet laureat originated in 
 this period. An Italian wlio came into England and profeiTed 
 to be an imitator of tlie great Roman hiftorian, Livy, affumed 
 tlie name of Titus Livius, and was protefted by Humphrey, 
 Duke of Gloucefler. He wrote, indeed, a judicious Epitome of 
 Thomas de Elham's hiftory, but did not attain cither the ele- 
 vation of fentiment or dignity of (lyle, v/hich fo eminently dif- 
 iinguilhed the model he wiflied to follow. But the emplo5-ment 
 of a poet laureat, as held under the king, took it's rife in the - 
 reign of Edward IV. and the firft perfon thus appointed 
 was John Kay, of whom no compofition is extant, which can 
 be confidered as alTerting his claim to this chara6!:er. Tl:ie 
 only work that remains of him, is an Eagliili traiiilatiou in 
 profe of a Hljlory of the Siege of Rhodes. A crown of laurel 
 was fometlmes conferred, in univerfities, on' thofc who had 
 dillinguKhed themfelves by their abilities in Latin compofition, 
 and efpecially in Latin verfe. Hence the king's laureat might 
 be nothing more than a graduate of this kind, employed in his 
 majelly's fervice. The laureats appear originally. to ,have 
 written only in Latin, whicl^cuilom is fuppofed to have con- 
 tinued till the time of the Reformation.' 
 
 * If the difcoveries, profefledly made fome years ago at Brif- 
 tol, in 1768, are to be credited, wc mull introduce the name of 
 
 a poet
 
 lii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 a poet far more excellent than any, whom we have yet njention- 
 ed, and who would confer honcyiir on this age, infinitely great- 
 er than that to which hitherto it has eftabliflied its title. Our 
 readers mufl be fenfible that we allude to the poems which 
 Chatterton produced as the works of Thomas Rowley, 
 a fecular prieft in that city, in the fifteenth century. Tlie 
 full difcuffien of this fubjeft, which affords a very curious 
 literary problem, would be foreign to our defign. We know 
 that Chatterton, when little more than fifteen years of age, 
 brought to his friends certain manufcripta, and a great num- 
 ber of poems, faid to have been tranfcrib;;ci from manufcripts, 
 all of which were alleged to have been found in ah old cheft 
 in the bsllfrey of St Mtiry RedclifFe church, and to contain 
 the genuine productions of this Rowley. We know that thefe 
 poems are, in many refpe£ls, uncommonly beautiful ; and 
 that there is fomething very extraordinary irt them, if they 
 were the compofitions of a ilripling who had no other advan- 
 tages of education than what could be derived from the in- 
 ftruftion of a cottimon charity-fchool. We know that they 
 exhibit fuch marks of knowledge, and are otherwife accom- 
 panied with circumftances of fo furprifing a nature, that it has 
 been deemed not only a matter of ailonilliment, but even of 
 impoffibility, that they fhould be wriUen by Chatterton. We 
 know that the authenticity of them, and the exiftence of Row- 
 ley, have been maintained by fome able and learned men, with 
 no fmall degree of acutenefs and ingenuity. On the other 
 hand, very important arguments and authorities have been 
 urged to prove that they are of modern fabrication. That 
 there ever was fuch a perfon as Rowley, has been called in 
 queftion, and Hill more, that there could be any poet of that 
 name in the fifteenth century, who was capable of producing 
 the works afcribed to him. It is aflced, how he could poflibly 
 have been concealed till within thefe few years, and how he 
 could avoid being celebrated, in the higheft terms of applauie, 
 by his own cotemporaries, and by every fucceeding age. As 
 to the manufcripts aflerted to have been difcovered by Chat- 
 terton, doubts, which will not admit of an eafy folution, have 
 been raifed with regard to the truth of the fa<3:. Independent-. 
 ]y of all thefe confiderations, it is alleged, that the poems, 
 themfelves afford the mofl decifive Internal evidence of their 
 being recent productions. This has been argued, with great 
 force of rcj^foning, from a variety of concurring circum- 
 ftances,
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. liii 
 
 fiances. The ftjle, compofition, fentiments, and meafiire, 
 carry in them the marks of a refinement that was whollj un- 
 known at the period, in which they are profefTedly written. 
 In the abftra£lion of ideas, in the ftudied forms of diftion, in 
 the harmony of the verfification, we are conftantly reminded of 
 our lateft poets. The llania principally ufed was not known 
 in this country till the time of Prior. That fuch a regular 
 piece as the 'Tragedy of Ella fhould come from Rowley, at the 
 period pretended, is abfolutely contrary to every thing of the 
 dramatic kind, which exifted at ihat period. The fa£l feems 
 to have been that Chatterton originally wrote the poems in 
 the prefent Englifli language, and afterwards inserted the old 
 words from gloffaries and diftionaries. It is remarkable that 
 when we perufe Rowley with dean Mills's learned notes, the 
 moment we turn our eyes from the commentary to the text, 
 the modern air of the latter ftrikes us in fo forcible a manner^ 
 that the dean's elaborate arguments lofe all power of convic- 
 tion. It muft be added, that many undeniable proofs have 
 been exhibited of the moft direft imitation of recent poets, 
 even to the adoption of their very words. Thefe and other 
 confiderations have induced a large majority of our ableft an- 
 tiquaries and critics totally to deny the authenticity of the" 
 compofitions in queftion. Should it, however, be alio wed j 
 that certain ancient manufcripts were difcovered, and that 
 feme of them contained fragments in verfe, written in the age 
 pretended, Rowley, as we now have him, appears in too quef- 
 tionable a fhape to give the fifteenth century the honour of 
 the works publilhed under his name.* 
 
 * But while-i-Rowley being rejefted — it will be found that 
 Jittle true poetry flourifhed in England during the prefent pe- 
 riod , if we direft our view to the northern kingdom of Great 
 Britain, we fhall meet with diftinguiihed excellence in a per- 
 fon of the higheft llation, the fovereign of the country. It is 
 Jamhs 1. of Scotland, who introduced a new literary epocha 
 in the nation, over which he reigned. What originally was 
 a great misfortune to this prince, and a flagrant a6l of injuftice 
 towards him, turned out, in one refpeft, eminently to his own 
 fervice, and highly to the advantage of his countiy. When 
 he was only a youth of thirteen, he was treacheroufly taken 
 prifoner by the Englifh, and detained, during the term of 
 eighteen years in a confinement which was often very ftrift 
 and rigid* His education^ however^ good rudiments of which 
 
 g h«
 
 liv THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 he had received in Scotland, was not neglefted, but attended 
 to with the utraoft care. The perfon appointed to be his go- 
 vernor, was Sir John Pelham, a gentleman of worth and lite- 
 rature, who omitted nothing that could tend to form the 
 mind and manners of his royal charge. James, being blefled 
 with an admirable genius, and enjoying the ableft mafters of 
 the time, made an uncommon proficiency both in bodily exer- 
 cifes and in mental acquirements. To his knowledge of the 
 Greek and Latin languages, the laft of which he is reprc- 
 fented as having written with eafe, he added an acquaintance 
 nvith the philofophy of the age. But the ftudies, to which 
 he was more particularly devoted, were thofe of poetry and 
 mufic. Thefe liberal and pleafing arts formed, in his long and 
 clofe captivity, the principal confolation of his folitary hours, 
 "When he was rellored to the pofleffion of his throne, from 
 which he had been fo unjuftly withheld, his grand object was 
 to enlighten and civilize his countrymen. Many of his exer- 
 tions- to this purpofe were accompanied with fuch a degree of 
 fuccefs, that he may be faid to have given a new turn to the 
 genius of Scotland. His exertions and fuccefs would have 
 been ft ill greater and more illuftrious, if he had not been 
 cruelly murdered in the forty-fourth year of his age. Va- 
 rious works were written by him, both in profe and verfe, 
 Kxoft of which are unfortunately loft : thofe which ftill exift^ 
 are of a poetical nature ; and it is certain that feveral of his 
 eompoiitions of this kind are now no longer in being. Four 
 of James's pieces, which have happily efcaped the depreda- 
 tions of time, are a " Song pn his Miftrefs ;" " The King's 
 Quair ;" « Peblis to the Play ;" and « Chrift's Kirk on the 
 Green." The King's Quair is a poem of large extent, being 
 divided into fix cantos. Its theme is the royal author's love 
 to Jane, daughter to the Earl of Sommerfet ; a beautiful lady, 
 <)f whom he became enamoured while a prifoner at the caftle 
 of Windfor, and who was afterwards his queen. The misfor- 
 tunes of his youth, his early and long captivity, the incidents 
 which gave rife to his paffion, its purity, conftancy and happy 
 iflue, are all difplayed in the mode of allegorical vifion, a- 
 greeably to the reigning tafte of the age. That the merit of 
 the King's Quair is very great, cannot be denied. It is dis- 
 tinguiihed by its invention and fancy, by its genuine fimplici- 
 ty of fentiment. and by the felicity of its poetical defcriptions: 
 Several men of ingenuity and tafte have contended ; that James 
 
 is
 
 ESSAYS, BYADELUNG. Iv 
 
 is littk, if at all, inferior to Chaucer. If the former's ** Court 
 of Venus" be compared to the latter's ** Court of Love," the 
 royal author will lofe nothing by the comparifon. The Jane, 
 in particular, of King James, is painted \vith a beauty and 
 delicacy that are not equalled in Chaucer's Rofial. It is to be 
 lamented, that many of the graces of the King's Quair are 
 concealed, at Icaft from common view, in the antiquity of the 
 language.' 
 
 * Three other Scottifh poets are named in this period, but 
 they are, on the whole, contemptible, when compared with 
 the monarch of the country. Andrew Winton, a canon re- 
 gular of St AndrevC'^s, and Prior of the monaftery in Loch- 
 leven, and who preceded James I, wrote in verfe a very large 
 Chronicle of Scotland. His work, which is valuable, fo far 
 as it relates to his own country, and which contains materials 
 not to be met with in Fordun, whom he had never feen, has 
 not yet been publilhed. Its publication would be a defirable 
 acceffion to the hiitory of North Britain *. Holland was 
 the author of a poem entitled *' The Howlat," which appears 
 to have defcribed the poetical employments, and the mufical 
 entertainments of the age. Henry the Minftrel, who, on ac- 
 count of his being blind from his birth, is ufually called the 
 Blind Harry, compofed the " Life of Wallace." It is a 
 romance, like Barbour's Bruce, but not to be ranked with it 
 in point of excellence. At the fame time, it is not deilitute 
 of merit, and there are various things in it, which cannot fail 
 to gratify the curiofity of the antiquary and the critic' 
 
 * Caxton f comes before us in the character of an author, 
 .- ' g 3 as 
 
 * It has fince been publiflied at London, in 2 Vols. 8vo, 
 
 f William Caxton, a mercer of London, eminent for the 
 books he publifhed, and foi being reputed the firil who praftifed 
 the art of printing in England. He died at a very advanced age, 
 probably above eighty, in 1494. — Much cannot be faid in his 
 praife as an author ; for his language is rather uncouth j of which 
 tfee following is a fpecimcn, extracled from his Chronicle : 
 
 " King Alfred reigrned 30 years, and a good king he had been, 
 and wel coude chaftife his enemies, for he was a good Clerc and 
 let make many bokes. And a boke he made of Englifh of aven- 
 tures of Kings, and of batails that had ben done in the lond : 
 and many other bokes of jjeftes he let hem write that were of 
 
 grcte
 
 Ivi THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 as well as in that of a printer. He is reckoned among the 
 hiftorians of his age ; but in this relpeft he is entitled to a 
 very fmall degree of applaufe. His chief merit is that of a trans- 
 lator. The books printed bj him, were more than fifty in 
 number ; fome of them very large volumes ; and many of 
 them were verfions from foreign writers, made by himfel'f.' 
 
 * Among the patrons of learning, in this period, the name of 
 Humphrey, Duke of Gloucejier, flands foremoft ; a man of 
 an amiable chara£ler in our civil hiflory. He is celebrated 
 by Occleve as a Angular promoter of literature, a-»d the com- 
 mon patron of the fcholars of the times. Befides him two 
 other names ought to be mentioned, whofe merits were great 
 and eminent. John Tiptoft, Earl of Worcefiery and An- 
 thony WiDViLi-K, Karl Rivers, were not only protestors and 
 promoters of fcience, but writers themfelves. So emi- 
 nently was the former at the head of literature, and fo mafter- 
 ly an orator, that when, upon a vifit to Rome, he delivered 
 an oration before Pope Pius IT, he drew tears of joy and ad- 
 miration from that celebrated and learned pontiff. The light 
 in which he is now only known to us by his own works, is 
 that of a tranflator. Of his original productions no more than 
 a few letters and fmall pieces are remaining in manufcript. 
 Anthony Widville, greatly to his honour, was the friend of 
 Cnxton, whofe new art he patronized with zeal and liberality. 
 The fecond book printed in England was a work of Earl 
 Rivera's. He alfo employed himfelf principally m tranfla- 
 tions, according to thefalliion of the times, and what was thea 
 the beft mode of conveying inflruftion to the kingdom. Be- 
 fides thefe he wrote feveral ballads againft the feven deadly 
 fins. — Imperfedt as the writings of Tiptoft and Widville may 
 now be deemed, great prajfe is due to them for their zealous 
 endeavours to promote the caufe of learning, and to fpread a- 
 mong their countrymen a regard to mental accomplifhments. 
 The example -; of men fo illuftrious could not fail of producing 
 fome good effects. It muft ever be lamented that thefe two 
 eminent noblemen met with fo untimely and unhappy an 
 end; both of them having been beheadec^ when they were 
 little more than forty years of age.' 
 
 * Another 
 
 grete wifSom and good lerr.ing j thurgh which bokes many a raan 
 aaay him amende that will hem reade." 
 
 W.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. hH 
 
 ' * Another author deferves to be recorded at the conclufion 
 of this period, not indeed on account of great merit, but for 
 the fake of her fex. This was Juliana Bi-rners, prio- 
 refs of Sopewell Nunnery, near St. Albans. She did not em- 
 ploy herfelf altogether in penning devout meditations and 
 rules of holy living, but being a woman of rank and fpirit, 
 fhe wrote on hawking, hunting and filhing. That part which 
 relates to hunting is in rhyme. This lady is the fecond, at 
 leaft in point of time, of any of our female writers, and the 
 firft who appeared in print.' 
 
 * To the number of hiftorians of this age, whofe works 
 were compofed in Latin, we mufb add the name of Robekt 
 Fabian, who wrote in Englifh. He was a merchant and 
 alderman of London, and confequently a member of a corpo^ 
 ration which has produced few literary men, and in which 
 many learned charafters are not, in the nature of the thing, 
 to be expefted. His fituation» therefore, in life, efpecially 
 confidering the age in which he lived, may be regarded as 
 giving a certain degree of celebrity to his hiftorical charafter. 
 The Chronicle of his compofition is entitled by him the Con- 
 cordance of Sins ;" it is apparently written with fincerity, and 
 its language is intelligible. Befides the more public fa£ls*which 
 it includes, it contains a variety of particulars relative to the 
 city of London. As Fabian's work is carried down to the 
 twentieth year of the reign of Henry VH. he may in pai't be 
 confidered as belonging to the following period.' 
 
 In the manners ; in the political conititutions ; in the cuf- 
 toms ; and confequently alfo in the languages of almoft every 
 European nation, great changes are difcoverable during the 
 fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Thefe changes cannot be 
 explained otherwife than from the coiiflant increafe of popu- 
 lation. The order of knighthood, which hitherto had been 
 the only pride of nations, began much to decline ; on the o- 
 ther hand, the lower clafTes of the people, till then very much 
 oppreffed, recovered from their abjeft fervitude, and formed 
 a happy middle rank which foon became the feat of inventive 
 genius, of thriving commerce, of the arts, and the fciences. 
 The influence thus occafioned in language, will be eafily re- 
 cognized by him who is acquainted with the exadl relation 
 which languages bear to the whole circuit of ideas, and the de- 
 gree of tafte prevailing in a nation. The queftion, here, relates 
 only to the Englilh language, the progrefs of which, during 
 
 the
 
 lirm THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 the fourteenth century, particularly towar<is the end of it , 
 was indeed very remarkable. '1 he liock of words it contain- 
 ed, .had now become too fmall and infufficient to exprefs the 
 acceilion of many new ideas ; and therefore its continual aug- 
 mentation from the French, with which it had already frater- 
 aized in the preceding ages, may be without difficulty uader- 
 fiood. 
 
 Divijion Third ; from 1485 #o 1558: or 
 
 From Henry VII. to the end of Q^ Mart. 
 
 ' Of the Englifh poets in the reign of Henry VII, the 
 writer who befl deferved that name was Stlfhhn Hawes : 
 lie was patronized by this monarch. One of his principal 
 produdions was entitled the <* Temple of Glafle ;" which 
 was founded upon Chaucer's " Houfe of Fame." Previous 
 to Hawes, for almoft a century, nothing had appeared but Le- 
 gends, Homilies, and Chronicles in verfe; His capital per- 
 formance, however, was the ** Fajfetyvie of Pleufure.'*^ In 
 this poem there is an effort of imagination and invention ; and 
 it contains fome llriking inftances of romantic and allegoric 
 iidlioH. In point of verfification, be improved upon Lydgate, 
 and was fuperior to that poet in genius and fancy. In the 
 harmony of numbers, and clearnefs of expreffion he alfo ex- 
 celled his immediate predeceffors and cotemporaries.' 
 
 * Another poet who flouriihed in this reign was Alexander 
 Barclay. His principal work is the '* Ship of FoolesJ'^ It 
 tvas chiefly taken from a German original, and from two trans- 
 lations of that original, one in# French and the other in Latin. 
 Barclay made, however, fome additions of his own. — The 
 language of this writer is more cultivated than that of many 
 of his cotemporaries, and he had the honour of contributing 
 fomewhat to the improvement of the phrafeology of his coun- 
 try. Befides other pieces, Barclay was the author of five 
 Eclogues, which were the firfl of the kind in the Englifh 
 tongue. They were formed upon the plan of Petrarch and 
 Mantuan, being of a moral and fatirical nature, and containing 
 but few ftrokes of rural defcription and bucolic imagery.' 
 
 * John *Alcock, independently of his chara£ler as a divine 
 and a bilhop, was in many refpedls a man of diflinguifhed a- 
 i)ilities. And though he wrote upon the Penitential Pfalms in 
 Englifh. verfe, we cannot prefume to rank him as a poet.' 
 
 < Three
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ux 
 
 * Three verfifiers in this period, William Walter, Henrt 
 Medwall, and Lawrence Wade, fcarcelj deferve any no- 
 tice. — The dramatic entertainments called *' Moralities^'' ap- 
 pear to have been carried to their height about the clofe of 
 the prefent reign. A great contriver of them was John R as- 
 tall, a learned printer, and brother-in-law to Sir Thomas 
 More. This fort of fpeftacle had hitherto be«n confined, 
 either to moral allegory or to religion blended with buffoonery ; 
 but Raftall formed the defign of rendering it the vehicle of 
 fcience and philofophy.' 
 
 ' To Scotland we ftand indebted for names, in Henry the 
 Seventh's reign, which are unrivalled in England. That coun- 
 try produced writers who adorned the age with a degree of 
 fentiment and fpirit, a command of phrafeology, and a ferti- 
 lity of imagination, not, perhaps, to be found even in Chaucer 
 or Lydgate. Thefe writers exhibited ftriking fpecimens of 
 allegorical invention, a mode of compofition which for fome 
 time had been almoft totally extinguiihed in England. Wil- 
 liam Dunbar and Gawin Douglas are the vko principal 
 perfons to whom this high praife is due.' 
 
 * Dunbar, the chief of the ancient Scottifh poets, wrote a 
 eonfiderable number of poems, the two longeft of which, and- 
 the moft celebrated are '* The Thiftle and the Rofe," and 
 ** The Golden Terge." The former was occalioned by an 
 evenfwhich ultimately produced the union of the two crowns 
 and kingdoms ; namely the marriage of James IV of Scot- 
 land, with Margaret Tudor, the eldefl daughter of Henry 
 Vn of England. In the latter he endeavours to ihew the 
 gradual and imperceptible influence of love, when too far in- 
 dulged over reafon Dunbar unites in himfelf, and generally 
 
 furpafles, the qualities of the chief Englifh poets ; the morals 
 and fatire of Langlandj Chaucer's humour, poetry and know- 
 ledge of life ; the allegory of Gower ; the defcription of Lyd- 
 gate.' 
 
 * Douglas attained to great excellence in claffical learning. 
 This, in conjuration with the natural vigour of his mind, en- 
 abled him to fuftain a new character, that of a poetical tran- 
 ilator, not from the old French metrical romances, but from 
 the models of the Augullan age. In his early youth, he 
 tranflated Ovid's Art of Love ; but he afterwards raifed his 
 kthoughts to a much nobler and more difficult undertaking, 
 which was a complete tranflation in heroic verfe, of the iEneid 
 
 of
 
 Ix THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 of Virgil. The defign, which had long been entertained by 
 him, was accompliihed in the fpace of fixteen months, and it is 
 executed with equal fpirit and fidelitj Dr Johnfon repre- 
 fents Mr Pope's verfion of Homer, as a verj important ob- 
 je£l in the hiftorj of the literature of this country, though it 
 was performed at the time, when learning and tafte were in a 
 high ftate of cultivation in England. What, then, are we to 
 think of fuch a work, as that of Gawin Douglas's in a period 
 comparatively rude and unpoliflied ? No metrical tranflation 
 of a Claffic had yet appeared in Englifli, unlefs we are difpofed 
 to give that appellation to Boethius. Virgil was hitherto 
 generally known only by Caxton's romance on the fubjeft of 
 the ^neid ; concerning which Douglas affertedj that it no 
 more refemhled Virgil than the devil ivas like St Aujlin.'' 
 
 * Henry, Earl of Sinclair^ was the particular friend and 
 patron of Gawin Douglas ; for it was at the Earl's requeft 
 that Douglas undertook the tranflation of the -ZEneid ; though 
 he is eminent not only as a tranflator, but as an original wri- 
 ter. His allegorical poems, " King Hart," and '* Palice of 
 Honour" excel in the fame fpecies of compofition ; — the fe- 
 deral books of his tranflation of Virgil are introduced with 
 metrical prologues, which difplay a moll extraordinary degree 
 of poetical beauty. Milton's L' Allegro, and II Penferofo have 
 been reckoned the earlieft defcriptive poems in Englilh. If 
 that was the cafe, Scotland produced the fined examples of 
 this delightful fpecies of compofition, nearly a century and a 
 half before.' 
 
 * An illuftrious lady mu{l be mentioned as an author as well 
 as a patronefs of letters; Margaret, Countefs of Richmond 
 and Derby, the mother of Henry VII. In point of time, flie 
 fucceeds Julia Bergers, being the third female writer in Eng- 
 land. Her works were chiefly tranflations of the devotional 
 kind ; though fhe, likewife, at the defire of her fon the king, 
 drew up orders with regard to the precedence of great and 
 noble ladies, at public proceflions, and efpecially at funerals.' 
 
 * At the time when the nobility in general were imK^olved 
 in grofs ignorance, Algernon Percy, the fifth Earl bi Nor- 
 thumberland diilinguiflied himfelf by being the proteftor of 
 genius. Skflton was encouraged by him to write an elegy 
 »n the death of his father ; but what particularly plarked the 
 Earl's literary taft:e and his love for poetry, was a very fplen- 
 did manufcript tranfcvibed for his ufe, containing a large col- 
 
 jcction
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. txi 
 
 leftion of Englifh poems, finely engroffed on vellum and 
 fuperblj illuminated.^ 
 
 ' The prime glorj of the reign of Henry VIII, with 
 refpe£l to Polite Literature, was Sir Thomas More. 
 Though, according to Mr Hume, there was no man in this 
 age who had the leaft pietenfion to be ranked among our 
 claffics, he acknowledges that Sir Thomas feems to come near- 
 eft to that charafter : with all his religious weaknefles, he was, 
 indeed, one of the greateft ornaments of his time* " Sir Thomas 
 More," fays Mr Warton, " is reverenced by pofterity as the 
 fcholar who taught that erudition which civilized his country, 
 and as the philosopher who met the horrors of the block with 
 that fortitude which is equally free from oftentation and en- 
 thuiiafm : as the man whofe genius overthrew the fabric of 
 falfe learning, and whofe amiable tranquillity of temper tri- 
 umphed over the malice and injuftice of tyranny." His Uto- 
 pia may be regarded as an ethical as well as a political cona- 
 poiition. His hiftory of the reigns of Edward V. and Richard 
 III, is far from being efteemed among the beft of his produc- 
 tions. — ^The hiftorical works of JoHK Rastall, George Lil- 
 ly, and Edward Hall, have little claim to notice ; though 
 Hall is of fome ufe to the antiquary ; by the attention which 
 he pays to the variations of drefs and of fafhion.' 
 
 * This period was not unfruitful with regard to poetic* 
 writers. John Skelton * exceeded the lieentioufnefs of the 
 times, and was cenfured by his cotemporaries. His charafter- 
 iftic vein of humour is capricious ana extravagant ; his lub- 
 jefts are often ridiculous ; and his matter is fometimes de- 
 bafed by his verfiflcaliori. In a fhort ode, which was com- 
 pofed by him, he has exhibited a fpecimen of the ftrudure 
 and phrafeology of a love-fonnet, about the beginning of the 
 lixteenth century. Notv/ithftanding his fcuirility, he was a 
 claffical fcholar.' 
 
 ' Moralities ftill continued to hold their rank among the 
 principal entertainments of the times, and they were repre- 
 
 h fen ted 
 
 * The editor of the Mufcs Library (E. Cooper) calls Skelton 
 the reftorer of invention in Englijh poetry. Among- his numerous 
 performances,*' The Crown of Laurel," is one of the beft, and 
 he difplays in it confidrrab ft wit and humour j he died at Well- 
 jainfter Abbey, 1529.
 
 Ixii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 fented by different bodies of men. When more regular plays 
 eame to be compofed, fome of them were adted at the Inns of 
 Court. At thefe feminaries, mafques and interludes were oc- 
 cafionally performed, during feveral fucceeding reigns. The 
 firft inllance of this kind, that is particularly recorded, occurs 
 in 1527, when a comedy written by John Roos, a ferjeant at 
 law, was reprefented in the great hall of the fociety at Gray's 
 Inn.' ' 
 
 * Henry Howard *, Earl of Surrey, was a poet of a charac- 
 ter far fuperior to that of Skelton. This accomplifhed noble- 
 man led the way to great improvements in Englifli poetry. 
 Some of his ftanzas approach to the eafe and gallantry of 
 Waller, and exhibit fpecimens of correal verfification, ' polifli- 
 ed language, and mufical modulation. It is remarkable, that 
 his tranllation of the fecond and fourth books of Virgil's 
 ^neid is the firft compofition in blank verfe that occurs in the 
 Englifti language.' 
 
 * SiK Thomas Wyat's genius was of the ntioral and didadic 
 kind ; and his poems are more diftinguiftied by good fenfe^ 
 fatire and obfervations on life, than by pathos or imagination. 
 
 He may juftly be efteemed the firft poliihed Englifti fatirift 
 
 There was an inviolable friendftiip between Wyat and Surrey, 
 arifing perhaps chiefly from a fimilarity of ftudies. Befides 
 adopting the fame principal fubjeft for their poetry, the paf- 
 fion of love, they were alike anxious to improve their native 
 language, and to attain the elegancies of compofition.' 
 
 * Other poets of this period, and of high rank, were SiR 
 Francis Bryant, the friend of Wyat , George Boleyn, 
 Viscount Rochford, brother to Queen Ann Boleyn ; and 
 
 Nicholas Lord Vaux, an eminent ftatefman and foldier 
 
 In Tottel's colieftion of the poetical writings of this period, 
 is found the firft example, that is known in our language, of 
 the pure and unmixed paftoral. It is an example, likewife, 
 
 of 
 
 * He was the firft of the Englifh Noblemen, who diftinguiftied 
 himfrlf by a fellowftiip with the mufcs. In purity of language and 
 fweetnefs of found, he far furpaffed his cotemporaries and prede- 
 ceflbrs. (E. Gooper). His imprudence, in adding fome part of 
 the Royal arms to his own, being defcended from the heroic King 
 Edward I, coft him his head; though juftified by the Heralds. 
 He was executed January 19, 1547.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. IxlII 
 
 »f extraordinary merit. In eafe of numbers, elgance of rural 
 allufion, and fimplicity of imagery, there is nothing of the 
 kind equal to it in Spencer. The lame colledlion aiFords one 
 of the earlieft inftances of the pointed Englifh epigram ; and 
 it is fuppofed that it came fiom the pen of Sir Thomas More. 
 Several poems, which were chiefly the performances of his 
 youth, were written by Sir Thomas in his native tongue.' 
 
 * Nicholas Grimoald was the next Englifh poet, after the 
 Eail of Surrey, who wrote in blank verfe ; he gave to this 
 new mode of verlification, additional ftrength, elegance, and 
 modulation. Grimoald wrote, likewife in rhyme ; in which 
 refpedl he is inferior to none of his cotemporaries, for a maf- 
 terly choice of chafte expreffion, and the concife elegancies of 
 didactic verlification. Some of his couplets have the fmart- 
 nefs which marks the modern ftyle of fententious poetry.' . 
 
 * Andrew Borde, John Bale, Brian Ansley, Andrew 
 Chertsey, Wilfrid Holme, Charles Barnsley, and Ed- 
 Ty^ARD Haliwiull, were poets of a fubordinate clafs in this 
 period, of whom it is fufficient to mention their names.' 
 
 John Hetwood, commonly called the Epigrammatift, is re- 
 prefented by fome as the firil writer of comedies in England. 
 Though moralities and interludes were written and performed 
 long before the time of Heywood, it muft be allowed, that he 
 is among the firft of our dramatifts who drove the Bible from 
 the ftage, and introduced reprefentations of familiar life and 
 popular manners.' 
 
 * The poetry of Scotland during the reign of Henry VHI. 
 was much declining. The writings of Sir David Lindsat 
 were very numerous and extremely popular, on account of 
 ^heir being applied to the purpofes of the Reformation. 
 Another Scots poet of this period was Sir James Inglis.- His 
 principal performance, the " Complaint of Scotland" is well 
 written for the time, and difplays abundance of learning. In 
 one of his compofjtions , he mentions a number of poets of his 
 country as then living, that is, about the year 1530. Thefe 
 are, Culrose, Kyd, Stewart, Stewart of Lorn, Gal- 
 BREITH, Kinloch, ancl Ballentyne. Concerning four of 
 ■ftieie perfons, nothing is known. Lord Hailes has publifhed 
 fome pieces of the Stewarts ; and Ballentyne, muft mean John 
 Ballenden, the tranflator of Hedor Boethius's Hiftory of 
 Scotland, in which work he has interfperfed feveral poems, 
 and particularly ..one entitled " Virtue and Vyce," which has 
 
 h 2 been
 
 Ixiv THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 been reprinted. The author of the article concerning Bal- 
 lenden, in the Biographia Britannica, reprefents his writings 
 as diftingiiiihed hy that noble enthufiafm' which is the very 
 foul of poefy.' 
 
 * About this time was produced, by an unknown writer, 
 a comedy called Pbilotus, which is extremely valuable for its 
 curious pitSlures of life, manners, drcfs, and other circumftances 
 relative to the age in which it was compofed.' 
 
 * Among the nurnber of noble authors in the time of Henry 
 VIII, the names of Lord Morley, and John Bourchier, 
 Lord Berners, IHII deferve honourable mention. The former 
 appears to have been a multifarious writer, in profe and verfe ; 
 he chiefly dillinguifhed himfelf as a tranflator, and certainly 
 was one of the moll learned noblemen of that age. The lat- 
 ter alfo tranllated Froiffart's IJhronicle, by the command of 
 the king, befides which he was the tranflator of fome French, 
 Italian, and Spanifli novels The only circumftance that en- 
 titles John Lord Lumley to the appellation of an author, is 
 his having tranflated into Englilli, Erafmus's Inftitution of a 
 Chriilian Prince'.' 
 
 * This 32ra was likewife adorned with fome female authors 
 of high rank. The principal of thefe were, Catherine Parr, 
 the lafl; wife of Henry VIII, and Margaret Rcper, the fa- 
 vourite daughter of Sir Thomas More. The works of the 
 former, which were partly originals and partly tranflations, 
 are entirely of a religious nature : the compofitions ot the 
 latter were not confined to the Engliih language ; lor Ihe 
 wrote the Latin with no fmall degree of elegance.' 
 
 * Some idea of the literary charadterand tafle of an age may 
 be formed from the nature of its publications. The works 
 iffued by the prefs, were numerous ; and among thefe, contro- 
 verfial treatifes and devotional writings held a principal place. 
 It is furpriling what a number of law books appeared in this 
 period — Magna Charta was fo often reprinted that it may 
 hence be judged, that our anceftors were extremely attentive 
 to, »ad had a high value for that grand fecurity of Englifli 
 liberty.' 
 
 * Sir John Cheke can never be mentioned with too much 
 refpeft, as one of thofe who firll introduced genuine litera- 
 ture into this country. In a plan of" innovation, which he had 
 formed with regard to th« orthography of the Englifli language, 
 he \vai^ neither fo happy, nor fo fuccefsful, as he bad been 
 
 ia
 
 ESSAYS, BY AD E LUNG. Ixv 
 
 in reftoring the pronunciation of the Greek and Latin tongues.* 
 
 * Sir Thomas Smith alfo direfted his attention to his na- 
 tive language, which he wSs folicitous to refine and to polilh. 
 He publiflied a treatife, the obje£l of which was to promote 
 the correft writing of the Engliih tongue, and the true found- 
 ings of the letters and words. If he carried the matter to 
 fome degree of excefs, and propofed alterations that would not 
 be produ6live of much advantage, he has only erred in common 
 with other ingenious and learned men.' 
 
 * Roger Ascham was an excellent compofer in his own 
 tongue. Sir Thomas More excepted, he was perhaps the 
 fii ft of our fchoiars, who ventured to break the fhackles of 
 Latinity, by publifhing his Toxophilus in Englifh. This 
 he did with a view of giving a pure and eorreft model o£ 
 Englifh compofition, or rather of fliewing how a fubjeft might 
 be treated witji grace and propriety, in Engliih as well as in 
 Latin. His Vindication of his condud, in attempting fo great 
 an innovation, difplajs the fonndnefs and ftrength of his un- 
 derftanding. Dr. Johnfon obferves of Roger Afcham, that 
 his philological learning would have gained him honour in 
 any country ; and that among us it may juftly call for that 
 reverence which all nations owe to thofe who firft roufe them 
 from ignorance, and kindle among them the light of literature.* 
 
 * The poetical annals of Edward -VI. are marked with 
 metrical tranflations of various parts of Scripture. Of thefe 
 the chief is the verfification of the Pfalms by Sternhold and 
 Hopkins, a performance which is entitled to no regard from 
 its own merit. Wyat and Surrey had before tranllated fome 
 of the Pfalms into metre ; but Thomas Stehnhold was the 
 firft whofe metrical verfion of them was ufed in the church 
 of England. His co-adjutor, John Hopkins, was rather a 
 better poet than himfelf. His other affiftants were, Thomas 
 Norton, and William Wyttingham, afterwards Dean of 
 Durham. The fpiiit of verfifying the Pfalms, and other 
 parts of the Bible, was generally diffufed at the beginning of 
 the reformation ; and among the reft that employed them- 
 felves in this way, were William Hunis,William Baldwin, 
 Francis Seager, and Matthew Parker, afterwards aich- 
 biftiop of Canterbury. Another contributor to the metrical 
 theology was Robeh.t Crowley, an Oxford Divine ; and 
 another ftill more extraordinary one was Christopher Tye, 
 a Do6tor of Mufic at Cambridge. Tye projeded a tranflation 
 
 of
 
 xvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 of the Afls of the Apoflles into familiar metre, of which he 
 completed onlj the fii ii fourteen chapters. The Book of Kings 
 had before been verfified by another hand. Dr. Tje carried 
 his abfurdity fo far as to ft his verfion to mulic ; and his A£ls 
 of the Apoftles were fung for a time in the rojal chapel of 
 Edv/ard VI. Even this good kiig himfelf is to be ranked 
 among the religious poets of his reign.* 
 
 * Among the anonymous poems of this period, we maj 
 reckon the iirft drinking ballad of any^ merit, in the Englifli 
 language, which appeared in the yea.v 155 1. It has a vein of 
 
 , cafe and humour, fuperior to what might have been expe<5bed 
 i^n thofe times ; and it may be confidered as the parent of ma- 
 ny pleafing compolitions, which have highly contributed to 
 convivial entertainment. This ballad opens the fecond aft of 
 *■' Ganamer Gurton's Needle," a comedy written and printed 
 in the year juft mentioned, and which was foon .afterwards 
 ailed at Chriit's-'JoUege in Cambridge. It is the firll Eng- 
 lifli play which was neither myftery nor morality, and which 
 bandies a comic ftory with fome difpcfition of plot, and fome 
 difcrimination of charader. Earlier in the reign of Edward 
 VI, we find a poet of the name of Kelton, who wrote the 
 " Chronicle of the Brutes," in Englifh verfe.* 
 
 ' King Edward VI. ilands in the lift of royal authors^ 
 and he is juilly entitled to that diftindion. Confidering the 
 times in which he lived, and the early period of his death, 
 hia Journal of his own reign, his Remains, and his other 
 compofitions difplay fuch a promifcj, and indeed fuch a pof- 
 fcffion of abilities, as add greatly to the regret arifing from 
 liis premature deceafe The Duke of Somerset has obtain- 
 ed a place among the noble writers of the age. His principal 
 title to this honour is founded on one or two religious pieces, 
 ^vhich were penned during his troubles. — Edmund Lord 
 Sheffield is faid to have compofed a book of tSonnets in the 
 Italian manner. — Henry /Lord Stafford, and Francis 
 Hastings, fecond Earl of Huntingdon, exerted their talents 
 only as tranflators.' 
 
 * iThe female author^ belonging to this ihort period, are 
 coniiderable in number, and eminent for their ftation. The 
 principal of them are. Queen Mary, Lady Jane Grey, Ma- 
 ry Roper, and Lady Elizabeth Fane. Several other ladies 
 of high rank dillinguifhed themfelves as tranflators from, and 
 into, the Greek and Latin languages j among thefe we find 
 
 Ladj
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNC?. Ixvn 
 
 liady Joanna Lumley, and Lady Mary Howard, Dutshefs 
 of Norfolk.' :•- 
 
 • Under Qieen Mary, notwithftanding the wretched fitua- 
 tion of the piblic, arifing from the horrid perfecutions which 
 bigotry was carrying into execution, poetry aflumed a higher 
 tone. A poem was planned, though not fully completed, 
 which fiieds lo common luftre on the dark interval between. 
 Surrey and hpenser. This poem was entitled " A Mirrour 
 for Magiftrats," and in the compofition of it more writers 
 than one wee concerned. Its primary inventor, however, 
 and moft diflinguifhed contributor, was Thomas Sackville, 
 afterwards lord Buckhuril and Earl of Porfct, and who ia 
 the next reigi w'ill come before us as the author of the firft 
 genuine Engifh tragedy. The objed of the ** Mirrour for 
 Magift rates," was to make all the illuftrious but unfortunate 
 characters ir. our hiflory to pafs in reviev^ before the poet, 
 who defcends like Dante, into the infernal regions, and is con- 
 iluded by Sorow. A poetical preface called an " Induction," 
 and one Legaid, which is the life of Henry Stafibrd, Duke of 
 Buckingham, were the only parts executed by Sackville. The 
 completion o' the whple was recommended by him to Bald- 
 wyn, before nentioned, and George Ferrers, who carried it 
 into executioi, with the affiftance of Churchyard, Phayer, 
 SkeLTom, Se.gers, and Cavyl. Among thefe finifhers of 
 the '* Mirroir for Magiftrates," Ferrers was the moft emi- 
 nent in point »f abilities ; but he compoCed rro more than three 
 of the . Legencs, far the greater number of them having been 
 written by Bddwyn. As to the poetical merit of the work, 
 it refts almoft entirely with Lord Euckhurst, whofe Induftion 
 and Story of tie Duke of Bucki igham contain many proofs of 
 a vigorous fancy, and many fpleudid paffages.' 
 
 * Another joet of this period was Richard Edwards, 
 whofe principd work was the " Paradife of daintie Devifes." 
 What chiefly aititles him to notice is, that he was one of the 
 earlieft of our dramatic writers, after the reformation of the 
 Britifh ftage — In Thomas Tusser we meet with, perhaps, 
 the firft exhibi:ion of didadlic poetry in this country. He was 
 the author of a work in rhyme, the title of which was, " Five 
 Hundred points of good irlufbandrie," and which has more iu 
 it of the fimplicity of Heliod, than of the elegance of Virgil. 
 Indeed, it is h deftitute of poetical' ornamet:*:!, that its fole 
 value arifes from its being a genuine pi6lure of agriculture, 
 
 the
 
 Ixviil THREEPHILOLOGICAL 
 
 the rural arts,' and the domeftic oeconomy and •:uftoms of oar 
 anceftors. — WiifLLiAM Forrest brings up the rear of our 
 poets, but with no degree of fplendour. He compofed, in 
 oftave rhyme, a panegyrical hiflory of th6 life of Catherine, 
 the firfl Queen of Henry VHI. His other poens do not de- 
 fer ve a diftindl fpecification.' 
 
 * The only Scotch poet we fliall now take notict of, is Alex- 
 ander Scot, the Anacreon of his time and comtry. If the 
 age in which he livpd be confidered, his pieces an correft and 
 elegant. He wrote chiefly upon fubjefts of lovf, and Hands 
 at the head of the ancient minor poets of Scotlani.' 
 
 Divijion Fourth / from 1558, /o 1625 6r 
 
 During the reigns of Q^. Elizabeth and Kiig James I. 
 
 * In a fcene of great and unavoidable theolcgical difputa- 
 tion, the fcholars of England were obliged to dindl their prin- 
 cipal attention to objefts that were efteemed cf infinite im- 
 portance ; and confequently they had not mudi leifure for 
 refearches into the niceties of languages and liarning. We 
 have no names in Elizabeth's reign, that can be compared 
 with Sir John Cheke, Thomas Smith, and Riger Afcham, 
 ■whom, in the preceding Divifion of this Hiibry, we have 
 mentioned as eminent improvers of claffical taft«. Smith and 
 Afcham may in part be confidered as belonging to the reign 
 of Elizabeth ; for Smith's " Treatife on the proper mode of 
 writing the Englifli language," was not pubiflied till the 
 year 1568 ; and " Aicham's Schoolmaller" wis firft printed 
 in 1573.'^ 
 
 * One circumftance, which contributed to tie increafe of 
 knowledge in general, and to the' improvement of the Englifh 
 language in particular, was the multiplicity of tranflations. 
 This multiplicity conliitutes a ftriking feature in the literary 
 charafter of the age. On the benefits, which nay be derived 
 from tranflations, it is needlefs tc enlaicge. Bdides the great 
 ftore of materials, fcientific, literary, and entertaining, which 
 they import into a country, they promote a more accurate ac- 
 quaintance with the language from which they are made, and 
 enrich the tongue into which they are rendered. A much 
 fuperior advantage might have refulted from them, at the 
 time we are treating of, if our, writers had been better judges 
 
 of
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixix 
 
 of die fubjedl, and if they had tiot, in particular, moft of them, 
 entertained an opinion, that it was neceflary^or verfions to 
 be ftriftly literal.' 
 
 * The Greek authors, which now appeared in En^lifli trans- 
 lations, were briefly the following. Ten books of Homer's 
 Jliad, from a metrical French verfion of that work ; by Ar- 
 thur Hall : a complete and regular verfion of Homer, from 
 the original ; by George Chapman: Mufteus (according to 
 a poetical paffage of Drayton) ; by the fame author : the 
 Jocaila, or the Phasniflae of Euripides ; by George Gas- 
 coiGNE, and Francis Kinwelmersh : Arillotle's famous trea- 
 tife on the ten categories ; by Barnaby Googe ; feven ora- 
 tions of Demofthenes ; by Thomas Wilson: Heiodian's 
 Hiftory, from a Latin verfion of Angelus Politianus ; by 
 Nicholas Smith : Xenophon's Inftitution of Cyrus, from 
 the original ; by William Herchek, or as he is called in an- 
 other edition of the book, Wylliam Barkar : the Table of 
 Ccbes, from a Latin verfion ; by Sir Anthony Poyngz. It 
 js the firft tranflation of Cebes that appeared in the Englifb 
 language — Abraham Fleming, who was a frequent tranfla- 
 tor, among other works, produced in Englifh, Aelian's various 
 Hiftory. Something, likewife, of Ifocrates came from the 
 fame hand ; and alfo Synefius's Panegyric on Baldnefs, which, 
 had been brought into faibion by Erafmus's Encomium on 
 Folly. Fleming was of coiifiderable ferv ice to the literature 
 of his country, by rendering into Engliili many celebrated 
 books, which had beea written in Latin about the fifteenth 
 century, and at the reiloration of learning- — The only remain- 
 ing tranflation from the Greek, of which we are able to give 
 an 'account, is that of the ten books of Heliodorus's Ethiopic 
 Hiftory, by Thomas Underdowne. By the publication of 
 this work, a new field of romance was opened, which is fup- 
 pofed to have fuggefted to £ir Philip Sidney the fcheme of 
 his Arcadia.' 
 
 * The tranflations from the Latin poets were more numer^ 
 pus than from the Greek. Seneca's ten tragedies were trans- 
 lated by difterent poets, at diffeient times, and they were 
 printed together in 1 581. The Hyppolitus, the Medea, , the 
 Hercules Oeteus, and the Agamemnon were tranfl;ated by 
 John Studley ; the Odavia, by Thomas Nuce, or Newce ; 
 the Oedipus, by Alexander Nevyle, who, in the fixteenth • 
 year of his age^ produced the moft fpirited and elegant ver- 
 
 i fion
 
 Jxx THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 fion in the colledion ; the Hercules Furens, the Thjeftes and 
 the Troas of,^ Seneca, by Jasper HiYWood, foiji of John 
 Hejwood the Epigrammatift ; and laftl/. the Thebais, by 
 Thomas Newton, the publilher of the whole.' 
 
 * Early in Queen Elizabeth's reign, the firft four books of 
 Ovid's Mctamorphofis were tranflated by Arthur Golding j 
 and in a fliort time afterwards, he completed the whole His 
 ilyle is poetical and fpirited ; he excelled many of his cotem- 
 poraries as a tranflator and a poet ; his verlions of many 
 modern Latin writers were then of confiderable utility, as 
 being adapted to the condition and opinions of the times. 
 The Fafti of Ovid were rendered into Englifh verfe by an 
 author whofe name does not appear ; and Thomas UaDER- 
 powNE not only gave a tranflation of the Ibis, but illuftrated 
 It With annoti'tions.— Chhistopher MaRLOE was fo void of 
 principle and decency, as to tranflate the elegies of the fame 
 poet ; the elegant language of v/hicli can make no atonement 
 
 for their obfcenities Ovid's Remedy of Love met with an 
 
 anor.ymous tranflator. A verfion of the Heroical Epiftles was 
 publiihed by Thomas Tuberville,— There exifts, it is faid, 
 one of Ovid's Epiftles tranflated by the accompliflied Earl of 
 EfTex. But if it could be recovered, it is probable that it 
 would only be valued as a curioiity ; fince it is apparent, 
 frorn a few of his Sonnets, which are preferved in the Afli- 
 molean Mufeum, that he was not endued with a poetic ge- 
 nius — Filially. Ovid's three iirft books of his Triftia were 
 tranflated by Thomas Churchyard.' 
 
 * Great attention was alfo paid to the prince of Latin poets, 
 Virgil, riiomas Phayer, as mentioned in the prcceding Di- 
 viiion, had tranflated in the reign of Q^Mary, the feven tirll 
 books of the ^neid. He afterv.^ards tiniflied the eighth and 
 nir-th books, but died foon after he had begun the tenth. This 
 in perfect work, after a fpace of more than twenty years, 
 was completed by Thomas 'i wyne. To the four laft books 
 of Virgil, Twyne added a tranflation of Maphacus's fupple- 
 mejital book. The reafon of Phaser's undertaking this verfion, 
 according to his own account, was to infpire the young nobi- 
 lity, gentry, and ladies of this country with a fenfe of the 
 riches of their native tongue, and to fliew, that the Englifli 
 language was not, as too rna.iy thought, incapable of proprie- 
 ty and elegance. — Robert Stanyhukst. a native of Dublin, 
 alfo tranflated the four firft books of the ^neid into Englifli 
 
 hexameters.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxi 
 
 hexameters. He was more unfortunate In the meafure of 
 his verfification than his predeceflbrs, and he was not equal 
 to them in other refpefts. — The Bucolics and Georgics of 
 Virgil were tranflated as literal as poffible, by rendering verfe 
 for verfe, in the regular Alexandrine without ihjme, by A- 
 BR^HAM Fuming; he afterwaids publifhed feparatelj the 
 Alexis of Virgil, tranflated into Englifh hexameters, verfe 
 for verfe.-^EDMUND Spknser condefcended to tranflatej 
 though in a vague and paraph raftical manner, the Culex af- 
 cribed to Virgil.' 
 
 * Thomas Urant publifhed a tranflation of the two books 
 of Horace's Satires, which was followed bj the Epiflles, and 
 the Art of Poetry. The tranflator was at firft very paraphraf- 
 tical, but afterwards endeavoured to be fo literal as well 
 nigh to render word for word, and line for line. Timothy 
 Kr.NDALL did not obtain much glory by the fpecimons which 
 he exhibited of his application to claffical literature. His per- 
 formance cannot flriftly be called a tranflation of Martial. be« 
 icaufe it includes epigrams from many other writers, modern 
 as well as ancient. Martialj however^ forms the principal ba- 
 fis of thework.' 
 
 * Marloe gave a verfion in blank verfe of the firft book of 
 Lucan. His death prevented his carrying on the defiga, which, 
 in the reign of James I, was completed by GeorgI' Chap- 
 man but in a very inferior manner — The Thebais of Statius^ 
 was tranflated by Thomas Nkwton.' 
 
 * Befides the tranflation of the ancient Latin clafliic poetSj 
 verfions were not uncommon from fome of the modern poeti- 
 cal writers in the fame language. Among others, Mantuan, 
 who had acquired the rank of a claflic, was tranflated by 
 TuBERviLLE. — Another favourite author, among the Englifli 
 fcholars in this period, was Palingenius, whofe '* Zodiac'* 
 was rendered into Engliih verfe by Ba.N-BY Googe ; and 
 the tranflation had the good fortune of the original, to be ve- 
 ry much admired.' 
 
 * The tranflations from the ancient Latin profe writers 
 were not fo numerous as from the poets. Golding, whom 
 we have already mentioned with due refpe£l, enlairged the 
 knowledge of the treafures of antiquity, by his veiiions of 
 Jufl:in's Hifl:ory, Caefar's Commentaries, and Seneca's fine 
 moral treatife on Benefits. Works of lefs confequ ence, ren- 
 dered into Engliih by Golding, were Pomponius M.fcln's Geo-i 
 
 i 2 graph*,
 
 lixli THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 graphy, and the " Polyhiflory" of Solinus. — Cicero's Oration 
 for Archias was tranflatecl by Dkant — Abraham Fleming 
 puLlilhed a tranflation of certain feiedl epilUes of Cicero, and 
 afterwards gave a large colleftion from the fame author, to 
 which were added letters of Pliny, and of other writers. — 
 Tully's offices were tranflated by jSIicholas Grimald, a poet 
 of the age ; and fo adapted was the book, to general inft ruc- 
 tion, that it was feveral times reprinted. — One of the mofl 
 important tranflations of this period, was that of the four firit 
 books of Tacitus, and the life of Agricola, by Sir Henry Sa- 
 viLLE. This tranflation was accompanied with notes ; which 
 were deemed of fuch confequence, that they were afterwards 
 rendered into Latm by Gruther, and publilhed at Amfterdam.' 
 ' The books that were chiefly rendered mto Englifli from 
 Italian and French authors, were of the fiftitious and narra- 
 tive kind. Among the produftions of this nature, thofe of 
 Eoccace were the mofl; diftinguiflied favourites ; and the ver- 
 fions made from different parts of his works, were very nu- 
 merous. Indeed the Italian language now began to be fo 
 fafliionable, that Didionaries and Grammars of it, written in 
 Englifli, became common publications. The principal peifons 
 tvho figured as tr'anflatois, were GkoRGk Gascoigne, GlOf- 
 FRY Kent ojJ, Thomas TuUi rville, George Wh^ tstonf^ 
 Sir jAMr.s Hakrington, and Edward Fairfax. — One of 
 the works tranflated by Gafcoigne, is a comedy of Ariofto's 
 called '* Suppofiti." which was afted at Gray's Inn. This 
 tranflation is in pfofe ; and it is obfervable, that it was the 
 firfl: comedy in profe which was compofed in our language^ 
 
 and exhibited upon our flage The mofl: valuable of Fenton's 
 
 various ptrforqiances, was his verfion of the twenty books of 
 Guicciardin's Hiftory of Italy ; for in this he prefented to his 
 readers not fidion but truth ; and truth, too, of the lirft 
 importance — Sir James Harrington's tranflation of Ariofto's 
 Orlando F'uriofo, was a great undertaking ; and though it is 
 neither executed with fpirit nor with accuracy, it contributed 
 to enrich our poetry with bew llores for the imagination, 
 both of the romantic and comic fpecies. A wonderfiil union 
 was prefented to the reader of Gothic machinery and familiar 
 manners. — Edward Fairfax concludes the lift of poetical trans- 
 lators!, v?ith no fmall degree of eminence and celebrity. As 
 he lived till the year 163a, he is commonly reckoned amonjr 
 the poets -of James ihe Firft's time. The grand work, upon 
 \ which
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxiil 
 
 which his reputation wholly depends, the tranflation of TafTo's 
 " Jerufalem delivered," was performed by him in very early 
 life, and was publiflied in Queen Elizabeth's reign, to whom 
 it was aedicated. It undoubtedly Hands at the head of. the 
 poetical verfions of that aera. This tranflation is particularly 
 diflinguifhed by the harmony, of its verfification, in which 
 refpe(3: he ranks nearly, if not entirely, upon a level with 
 Spenfer. Waller acknowledged that he had learned his num- 
 bers from Fairfax.' 
 
 * In general it may be obferved, that the beft floriea of the 
 early and original novelties of Italy, in one form or other, were 
 given in an Englifh drefs. The verfions from French authors 
 were lefs frequent, and for the moll part of lefs importance. 
 With regard to tranflations from the ancient-, \ir Warton has 
 remarked, thatalmoft all the Greek and Roman claflics appear- 
 ed before the year 1600. 1 he remark we conlider as too 
 general. Were we to enter into an enumeration of them, it 
 would be feen, that many of the fineft claffic writers, both ia 
 proie and verfe, were left untranflated' 
 
 * Imperfeft as the multifarious tranflations of this period 
 were, they contributed, amonglt other caufes, to excite a fpi- 
 rit of criticifm, and an attention to the laws of compofition. 
 This fpirit, hovveverj had been previoufly difplayed by one of 
 the authors of the age, of whom little notice had been taken, till 
 Mr Warton drew him out of obfcurity. It is Thomas Wil- 
 son *, who in Q^ Mary's reign, (though he flouriflied chiefly 
 
 in 
 
 * This great improver of the EnglKh language was a native of 
 Lincolnfhire, and, in 154^, vvas admitted a fcholar of King's -Col- 
 Itjjc, in Cambridge. He became fellow of the College, and 
 vvhillt he refided at the Univerfity, was tutor to the two celebrated 
 youths, Henry Duke of Suffolk, and Lord Charles Brandon, his 
 brother. In due courfe, he took the degree of Do61or of Laws, 
 and was afterwards one of the ordinary mailers of requtlts, and 
 mailer of St Catherine's Hofpital near the Tower. Being a man 
 of bufinefs as well as learning, he was at times employed by Queen 
 iLlizabeth as ambaffador to Mary Queen of Scots, and into the 
 low countries. At length he rofe to be a fecretary of Hate, and a . 
 privy counfellor. In 1579 he was appointed Dean of Durham, 
 and died in ij8i. It b faid, that Dr Wiifon was endued with an 
 uncommon flrength of memory, and that this enabled him to aft 
 
 I with
 
 ixrir THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 in Elizabeth^s) publifhed an Art of Rhetoric in Englifli. — A 
 technical and elementary manual, in our own tongue, written 
 by Leonard Cox, had indeed appeared many years before ; 
 but Wilfon*s treatife is more liberal and dil'curfive. It has 
 the merit of having illuftrated the arts of eloquence by ex- 
 ample, and of having examined and afcertained the beauties of 
 compofition with the fpeculative (kill and fagacity of acritic : 
 fo that this work may juflly be confidered as the firil fyftem 
 of criticifm that appeared in our language. The four parts 
 belonging to elocution he ftates to be plainnefs, aptnefs, com- 
 poiition, and exornation, and has fome excellent obfervations 
 on fimplicity of llyle. Among other leflbns, this, he fays^ 
 Ihould be firfl learned, never to affect any llrange inkhora 
 terms, but to fpeak as is commonly received ; and he ftrong- 
 iy condemns thofe writers who feek fo far for outlandifli Eng- 
 liib, that they altogether forget their mother tongue. It ap- 
 pears from the work, that to write elegantly in Englifh novr 
 began to be falbionable, and to meet with the higheft ap- 
 plaufe.' 
 
 * Another compofition of a fimilar nature with Wilfon's 
 Art of Rhetoric, though more confined in its object, was PuT- 
 Tenham's '* Art of Englilh Poefy." Puttenham had right 
 notions of the true chara6ler of a poet, which is, to be pofleff- 
 ed of a creative genius. Accordingly, he commonly ufes the 
 word *• Maker" for poet ; and he was the firft author that 
 brought this exprefiion into fafcion, the fignificancy of which 
 has been much commended by Sir Philip Sidney and Ben John- 
 fon. IniperffciSt as Puttenham's work is upon the whole, it was 
 the only piece of poetical criticifm of any confequence, that 
 England produced for a long period. Indeed, nothing of im- 
 portaice appeared on the fubjed;, till Dryden began to write 
 liis prefaces.* 
 
 * During Eliz-abeth's reign, the Englifh language was car- 
 ried by fome writers to a high degree of perfection. There have 
 not been wanting perfons who have thought, that our native 
 tongue then rofe to the grcateft excellence which it has ever 
 
 attained; 
 
 v.ith remarkable difpatch in his negociations. He was the author 
 of Nsiious other works befides the two which we had occafion to 
 jneution, and was one of the moft accompliflied fcholars of his 
 lime. New xVnn. Reg.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxv 
 
 att lined ; and Dr Johnfon, we believe, has cxprelTed the fame 
 opinion. In this opinion, however, we do not agree, though. 
 we are fenfible of the extraordinary merit of a few individuals. 
 Amongft thefe, particular praifes are due to Richard Hookk ;, 
 a celebrated divine. He exhibited a fine model of the reafoning 
 llile in his famous " Ecclefiaftical Polity;" a work that re- 
 fledls high credit on his powers of reafonin^, and the extent 
 of his literature. In this admirable production he fet a nobis 
 example to his fuccsiTors ; an exainple which was fuccefsfullj 
 followed by a Chillin?!;worth, a Locke, and a Hoadlj — Sir 
 Walter Ral' igh afforded feveral proofs, in this reign, ci 
 that dignitj of compolition which he afterwards difplayed in 
 his diftory of the World William Perkins, an eminent Di- 
 vine at Cambridge, is faid to haA'-e written the bed languags 
 of any of that age or the next, and that many paflages in his 
 writings are equal to thofe of the bell authors in modern times.' 
 
 * Spme of the llatefmcn of Elizabeth's reign excelled in the 
 propriety, freedom, and flrength of their ftj'^le. This was the 
 cafe with Roblkt Dbvireux. Earl of EiTex ; Robert Dud- 
 ley, Earl of Leicefter ; and Thomas Ratcliffe, Earl of 8uf- 
 fex. Of all the illudrious charafters of this period, none, witli 
 refp^j'il to E i.^lili com ooruion, was equal to the Earl of i-^Tex, 
 the Queen's unfortunate favourite. In a variety of inftances 
 he gave ample proofs of his being both a vigorous and an 
 elegant writer. Indeed, public men may be inore likely to 
 excel in this refpe(5l than mere fcholars. The latter, being 
 confined to their clofets, contraft a formality and ftiffnefs 
 of ftyle ;' and this was particularly the cafe, when the learn- 
 ed by profeffion did not fo generally mix with the world, as 
 is cuftomary at prefent. But thofe who are engaged in the 
 grand fcenes of bufinefs, who have their talents called into 
 exercife by frequent and ftriking emergencies, and who follow 
 ths dictates of'tHeir immediate feelings, provided they have 
 had a tolerable education, acquire an eafe and variety of ex- 
 preffion, which the others cannot readily attain.* 
 
 * Englifli Poetry aiTumed a peculiar importance and cha- 
 rafter in the reign of Elizabeth. This v/a.s owing to a variety 
 
 of caufes and circuniftances The age we are treating of has 
 
 often been called the golden age of our poetry ; and, if this 
 may not be true in the llri£teft fenfe, it was certainly a very 
 poetical sera, and fev/ periods can be me^Joned in our hiftory, 
 which fhine ia that view with fuperior lultre. The principal 
 
 features.
 
 bcxvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 features, that ftrl|ce us in the poetry of the times, are the 
 predominancy of fables, fidion, and fancy, and a fondnefs for 
 interefting adventures and pathetic events. This chara£lerif, 
 tic diflinftion may be chiefly referred to the following prin- 
 ciples, which were fometimss blended, and fometimes had a 
 llngle operation. The principles we fpeak of were the revival 
 and vernacular verfions of the dailies ; the vifionary reveries 
 or rehnements of falfe philofophy ; a degree of fuperflition, 
 fufScient for the purpofes of poetry ; the adoption of the ma- 
 claioeries of romaace; and the frequency and improvement of 
 allegoric exhibitions in the popular fpedacles.' 
 
 * Many circumilances contributed to giVe a defcriptive, a 
 pi(5lurefque, and figurative call to the poetical language of our 
 country ; and even the.profe compofitions of Elizabeth's reign 
 took a tinfture from the fame caufes. In the mean while, 
 general knowledge was widely and rapidly incresrfing. Book? 
 began to be multiplied, and many ufeful and rational topics 
 had been difcufled in our own tongue. Science, at the fame 
 time, had not made fuch great advances as to damp the fpirit 
 of invention- (fiiStion). On the whole, we were now arrived 
 at a period that was eminently propitious to original and true 
 poetry. It- was a period in which genius was rather direfted 
 tlian governed by judgment ; and in which tafte and learning 
 had fo far only clifciplined imagination, as to fufFer its exceffes 
 to pafs without cenlure or controul, for the fake of the beau- 
 ties to which tliey were allied.' 
 
 * At the time when the objevSs pointed out by us were cal- 
 culated to have a powerful operation upon the nature and cha- 
 racter of our poetry, a genius of the firil order arofe, who was 
 animated with a fidl portion of the fpirit of the age, and capa- 
 ble of painting it in all its energy. This genius was Spenser, 
 and the produ6lion we allude to, his ** Faery ^ueeney — It 
 was not to Homer, or Virgil, or even to Taflo, that Spenfer 
 looked up for a model ; but to Arioflo : and it was confe- 
 quently his intention to produce a poem v/hich fhould con- 
 fift of allegories, enchantments, and romantic expeditions, con- 
 duced by knights, giants, magicians, and fi£titious beings. If 
 he was blameable in thi? refped^ the fault is not fo much to 
 be imputed to himfelf, as to the times in which he lived. It 
 was natural for him to follow the mode of compolition which 
 then was moll admired, and to adopt thofe laws of tafte, 
 which Italian critics had approved : for Italy, not France, 
 
 was
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxvii 
 
 was in Elizabeth's reign the arbiter of elegance ; and in Italy 
 Arioilo was greatlj preferred to Taflb. Whether this opinioa 
 Was juft or not, we are not here called upon to determine. It 
 is fufficient for our purpofe to obferve, that it was embraced 
 by Spenfer ; and that upon this principle, the plan of his 
 grand poem, the Fairy Queenv was framed.— In powers of 
 invention and richnefs of fancy, he has fcarcely ever been ex- 
 ceeded. To the difplay of thefe talents, the fubjeds he was 
 led to, by the faihionable reading of the times, were peculiarly 
 accommodated. There could not be more admirable inftru- 
 ments in the hands of a genuine poet, than the adventures and 
 manners of chivalry, and the fuperflitions and enchantments 
 of the dark ages. They gave fcope ■for all the wildnefs and 
 beauty of imagery, and for all the fplendour and majefty of 
 defcription ; circumftances, of which Spenfer has availed him- 
 felf in the higheft degree. As, therefore, his Fairy Queen 
 comes recommended to us by fo many excellencies, it may be 
 thought furprifing, that at prefent it Ihould, comparatiyelyj 
 have only a fmall number of readers. But this may be ac- 
 counted for from feveral caufes. The cuftoms and manners 
 defcribed by Spenfer are vanilhed away, and confequently are 
 little underftood by the bulk of mankind. His allufions, like- 
 wife, are often too abllrufe and learned fSr common apprehen- 
 fiori ; and fome degree of obfoletenefs hangs upon his language. 
 Nor is allegorical poetry adapted to the general underftanding. 
 Hence it is that Spenfer, with all his merit, can only be the 
 lafting favourite of the few, who, by reading and true tafte, 
 are fully qualified to appreciate, and to feel, his tranfcendent 
 beauties. By iuch perfons, he will be admired and applaud- 
 ed, fo long as poetry Ihall continue to be the objed of admira- 
 tion and applaufe. — Various other poems were written by 
 him, befides the Fairy Queen, amoftg which the " Shep- 
 herd's Calendar," has excited the greateft attention. By 
 the admirers of paftoral poetry it has always been held in 
 high eftimation, and it has no fmall merit of its kind. It has 
 been the fubjeft of imitation to fucceeding writers ; and the 
 fame has been the cafe with regard to his " Aftrophel," or 
 Elegy on the death of Sir Philip Sidney. It is a paftoral ele- 
 gy ; and we know that paftoral elegies have been fabricated in 
 this country, by a long train of verfifiers, till they have be- 
 come infignificant, and even difgufting. It need not be added, 
 that we except the Lycidas of Milton.' 
 
 k ' So
 
 bcxviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 * So flronglj was the age of Elizabeth devoted to poetiy, 
 that poetical pxiblications were more numerous than thole of 
 any other fpecies of compofition in our language. One effed of 
 this tafte in the nation was, that thei'e were two colle£lions of 
 *' Flowers" fele£led from the works of the moft fafhionable 
 poets. The iirft was entitled, " England's Parnaffus ;" and 
 the other, « Belvidere, or the Garden of the Mufes." The 
 former had the fuperiority, both in point of method and fe- 
 leftion. Thus a cuftom was begun, which in our own time, has 
 been carried to a blameable cxcefs. If fuch compilations are 
 not wholly deftitute of utility ,^ thej have the difadvantage of 
 contributing to the number of fuperficial readers, and of pre- 
 venting many authors from being entirely read, the whole of 
 v/hofe produdlions might juftly claim a diligent perufal.' 
 
 * It will not be expedled, that we fliould endeavour to recite 
 the names of all the writers of general poetry, that appeared 
 during the reign of Elizabeth. Several of them, though ap- 
 plauded by their cotemporaries, are now found to have been 
 
 entitled to no more than a fmall degree of praife George 
 
 Gascoigke, in addition to his merit as atranflator and a drama- 
 tift, may here be mentioned as having been efteemed one of the 
 bell love- poets of his time. He attained alfo fome reputation 
 as a fatirilh — Gabriel Harvey deferves to be remembered 
 with refpe£l, on account of a copy of verfes written by bim, 
 figned Hobbinol,and which is prefixed to Spenfer's Fairy Queen. 
 It has even been faid that tliis poem, if he had compofed 
 nothing elfe,^ would have rendered him immortal. George 
 Tuberville's compolitions, belides his tranflations, were of 
 various kinds j fuch as epitaphs, epigrams, fongs, and fonnets ; 
 and poems defcribing the places and manners of the country 
 of Ruilia, where he reiided for a time, afe fecretary to Sir Tho- 
 mas Randolph. He was one of thofe who endeavoured to re- 
 fine the Englilh ftyle. — Sir John Harrington deferves little 
 notice as a poet, independently of his tranflation of Ariofto. 
 His Epigrams, however, are not deftitute of wit — If, amidft 
 fo many claims to admiration and applaufe. Sir Walter 
 Raleigh is to be fpoken of as a poet, his title to that ap- 
 pellation belongs to the reign of Elizabeth ; for his poetical 
 pieces were entirely the amufements of bis youth, his attention 
 being foon directed to fuperior purfuits.' 
 
 * There is fome dilHculty in afcertaining the exaft propor- 
 tion of fame due to Sir Philip Sidney, as a poet. He was a 
 
 paffionate
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. IxxLx 
 
 paffionate admirer of the art of poetry, and his produ£lions in 
 this way were very numerous. It is univerfally allowed, that 
 he was unfortunate in his attempts to introduce the Roman 
 Hieafures of verfe into our language, thofe meafures not a- 
 greeing with the genius of the Englifh tongue.' 
 
 * Joseph -Hall, who, in procefs of time became fuccefllve- 
 ly Bilhop of Exeter and Norwich, is entitled to particular 
 diftintlion as a fatiric poet. At the beginning of his cele- 
 brated '* Virgidemiarum " he claims the honour of having led 
 the way in this fpecies of compofition ; 
 
 •*' I 6rft adventure, follow me who lift, 
 
 ■*' And be the fecond EngHlh fatyrift." 
 This affertion of our poet is not ftridlly true ; for there 
 were various fatlrical writings previoully to his appearance. 
 But he was the firll who diftinguifhed himfelf as a legitimate 
 fatirift, upon the claffic model of Juvenal and Perlius, with an 
 intermixture of fome flrokes in the manner of Horace. Suc- 
 ceeding authors have availed themfelves of the pattern (et 
 them hj Hall.' 
 
 * Sir Richard Maitland was the principal Scotch ver- 
 nacular poet of this period. His produftions were various, 
 and are read with pleafure by thofe who are competejrit maf- 
 ters of the local and obfolete language in which they are 
 written Alexander Arbuthnot, Alexander Mont- 
 gomery', and John Rolland, may be paffed over without 
 farther notice ;,nor is it merit, but rank, that induces us to 
 mention James VI. of Scotland. He publillaed in 1585, " The 
 Eflayes of a Prentife in the divine Arte of Poelie ;" and in 
 1 591, " His Majefties poetical Exercifes at vacant Houres." 
 King James acted the critic as well as the poet. At the end 
 of the firfl of thefe performances are, ** Rewlis and Cautelis 
 of Scottis Poefie," which, fays Mr Pinkerton, are curious, 
 though Itup.Id.' 
 
 * We clofe the fubjeft of the poetry of this period with 
 fome view of it, as difplayed in the dramatic form. The firft 
 regular tragedy which England produced was early in Eliza- 
 beth's reign ; and this was the Gorhoduc of Thomas Sack- 
 ville. Lord Buckhurft. It is written in blank verfe, divided 
 into afts and fcenes, and cloathed in all the formalities of the 
 legitimate drama. The firft exhibition of it was in the great 
 hall of the Inner Temple, by the ftudents of that Society, as 
 part of the entertainment of a grand Chriftmas ; and in Ja- 
 
 ic 2 nuary
 
 Ixxx THREE PHILOLOGICAL * 
 
 nuary, 1 561-2, it was again reprefented before the Q^een at 
 Whitehall. It was not intended for the prefs, but having 
 been furreptitioufly and carelef ly printed, a corre6l edition 
 was given in 1571. Though this tragedy never was a fa- 
 vourite, even among our anceftors, and has long fallen into ge- 
 neral oblivion, the language of it has great purity and per- 
 fpicuity, and it is entirely free from that tumid phrafeology 
 which afterwards took place aniong our dramatic poets. Eve- 
 ry fcene of the Gorboduc is marked with Sackville's charac- 
 teriftical manner, which confifts in a perfpicuity of ftyle, and 
 a command of numbers, fuperior to the tone of his times.' 
 
 * Christopher Marloe, whom we have mentioned as 
 a tranflator, appeared with greater luftre as a dramatic 
 poet. Six tragedies were written by him, and he began a fe- 
 venth, which was completed by another hand. It is remark- 
 able, and indicates the credulous ignorance of the age, that the 
 fubjeft of one of his pieces fliould be the Tragical Hiftory of 
 the Life and Death of Dr. John Fauftus. Marloe's chief fault 
 in defcription is an indulgence of the florid ftjle, and an ac- 
 cumulation of conceits, refulting, however, from a warm and 
 brilliant fancy. It has even been faid of him, that he bore 
 fome refemblance to the incomparable Shakefpeare. The tra- 
 gedy of Dido, left incomplete by Marloe, was finiihed by 
 by Thomas Nashe, who was likewife the author of a comedy. 
 — Gf.orge Whetstone was a writer upon various fubjefts 
 in profe ; but his poetical compoiitions were of too quaint 
 and pedantic a nature, to deferve the attention of poflerity. 
 His comedy, *' Promos and Caflandra," no otherwife deferves 
 to be noticed, than as it is faid, that Shakefpeare founded upon 
 it his " Meafure for Meafure." Befides other works, Whet- 
 ilone drew up a life of George Gascoigne, who claims a 
 place among our dramatic poets, not only as the tranflator of 
 the " jocalla" of Euripides, and the '< Suppofes" of Ariofto, 
 but as the author of a tragi-comedy, called the Glafs of Go- 
 vernment," and a Mafque, entitled, " The Princely Pleafures 
 of Kennelworth Caftle." This Mafque is compofed partly 
 in profe, and partly m rhyme ; and is a relation of the enter- 
 tainment given to Queen Elizabeth at Kennelworth, by Robert 
 Dudley, Earl of Leicefter, in the month of July, 1575 — 
 JoAn Lilly wrote a number of comedies, which were a£led 
 before the Queen, and feem to have been much applauded in 
 their day. He has been highly extolled as a reformer and 
 
 purifier
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxxi 
 
 purifier of the Englifli language ; but the afFe£ted' turn of his 
 competitions, and efpeciaily of his " Euphues," a romance, 
 does not give credit to fuch an encomium. — Another comic 
 writer of this reign was Robert Green. He was a man of 
 great humour and drollery, and by no means deficient in point 
 of wit ; which talents, however, were proftituted by him to 
 the bafe purpofes of vice and obfcenity. It is faid of him, 
 
 that he was the fir Ji author who wrote for bread George 
 
 Peele exercifed his abilities for the ftage in a different form. 
 His " Arraignment of Paris" was a dramatic Pailoral ; his 
 " Edward the Firft" an hiftorical play ; and his " King 
 David and Fair Bethfabe," a tragedy. He wrote, like- 
 wife, another tragedy, called " The Turkilh Mahomet, 
 and Hyren the fair Greek," which has not been printed. 
 The llory, no doubt, is the fame as that, upon which Dr. 
 Jphnfon's *' Irene" is founded. Other poems were written Ipj 
 Peele, and it has been admitted, that he was a good pailoral poet.' 
 
 * But all the dramatic authors, we have mentioned, and the 
 luftre they fhed on the reign of Queen Elizabeth, are of-little 
 lignificance,when compared with the glory, which was reflefted 
 upon it by its having produced Shaki speare, that mailer of 
 human nature and hunaan life ; that prodigy of invention and 
 imagination ; that commander of the fublime, the pathetic, and 
 the comic ; that painter of external paflions and external man- 
 ners ; that miracle of dffcription, moral wifdom, and deep pe- 
 netration ; and that treafure of pure poetry. It was in the 
 latter end of this period, that he v/rote forne of his tineft pieces, 
 and difplayed thelvonderful fources and energies of his mind. 
 We pretend not to give a minute chara£ler of Shakefpeare. 
 This it would be impoffible to do with jufticC; in many pages. 
 Befides, he chiefly flouriftied in the next reiga of James I^ fur- 
 rounded with his great competitors, but far furpaffing them 
 all." 
 
 * Among the mifcellaneous writers of the age. Sir Philip 
 Sidney deferves the firft place. His " Arcadia" was long high- 
 ly celebrated and greatly admired. What Sir Philip has ob- 
 ferved concerning " A madia de Gaule," may in fome degree 
 be applied to his own performance. *' Truly," fays he, " I 
 *' have known men^ that even with reading Amadis de Gaule, 
 " which God knows, wanteth much of a perfed poefie, have 
 ** found their hearts moved to the exercife of curtefie, libe- 
 f ralitie, and efpeciaily coiwage."— But there is another pro- 
 
 duft'ion,
 
 Ixxxii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 duflion, on account of which Sir Philip deferves to be record- 
 ed with honour as a mifcellaneous writer. This is his '* De- 
 fence of Poefie," which will probably long continue to be read 
 with pleafure, by perfons of true tafte and difcernment. It is 
 an ample and mallerly vindication of the art, and there are 
 many pafiages in it, which difplay great power of compofition.* 
 
 * Henry Cuff has here fome claim to remembrance, in 
 confequence of his " Treatife on the Differences of the Ages 
 of Man's Life." It is a curious and philofophical performance * 
 but the value of it is diminilhed by its partaking too much of 
 that uncouthnefs of language, which was generally prevalent. 
 Cuff was the unfortunate fecretary to the Earl of ElTex, and 
 had in his mailer a fupcrior model of Englilli llyle ; for the 
 former had habituated himfelf to write like a fcholar, while 
 the latter managed his pen with the freedom of a man of the 
 world. — To the names already given, may be added that of 
 Sir Geoffrey Fenton, fecretary of Itate in the kingdom of 
 Ireland. He chiefly figured in the capacity of a tranflator, 
 and his principal works were " Golden EpiiUes," gathered 
 from Latin, French, and Italian authors ; and a tranflation of 
 " The Hiftory of the Wars of Italy, by Francis Guicciardini, 
 in twenty Books." — Sir Geoffrey wrote with eafe, and his 
 ilyle reflefts credit on his judgment and tafte.' 
 
 * The mifcellaneous authors of eminent ftation were the 
 following: Lord Buckhurst ; Edward Vere, feventeenth 
 Earl of Oxford; William Poulett, Marquis of Winchef- 
 ter ; Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicefter ; William Cecil, 
 Lord Burleigh ; Henry Howard, Earl of Northampton -, 
 Lord Chancellor Hatton ; and Henry Cary, firft Lord Falk- 
 land. Among the female authors of this period, the il- 
 
 luftrious Queen El[2abeth: maintains the firft rank ; for fhe 
 was the moll learned woman of the age. Befides her tranfla- 
 tions into Greek and Latin, which are foreign to this hiftori- 
 cal view, Ihe tranfiated Plutarch de Curiofitate, Boethius's 
 Confolation of Philofophy, Sallaft's Jugurthine War, and part 
 of Horace's Art of Poetry, into her native language. — By her 
 cotemporaries Elizabeth has been highly extolled for her 
 poetry ; but this mull be attributed to the flattery of the age. 
 rhe beautiful, the unfortunate, and the imprudent Mary 
 QiJEEN OF Scots makes but a feeble comparifon with her 
 rival Elizabeth ; for llie was far inferior to her in profound eru- 
 dition, and rather excelled in thofe lighter parts of literature, 
 
 tl^at
 
 ESSAYS, BY A D E L U N G. Ixxxiit 
 
 that were falhionable at the Court, where flie had been edu- 
 cated. Befides the poems written by her in Latin, French, 
 and Scotch, ihe compofed alfo a •* Confolation of her long Im- 
 prifonment, and rojal Advice to her Son." Many of her 
 Letters occur in public libraries, and a^e frequently finding 
 their way to the prefs, in confequence of the minute attention 
 to hiftorical information, which is now fo generally prevalent. 
 Mary Sidney, Countefs of Pembroke, and fifter to Sir Philip 
 Sidney, was a very accomplilhed lady, and received ample tef- 
 timonies of her merit. The two works, which fhe publiihed, 
 were only tranflations ; one being " A Difcourfe of L fe and 
 Death ;" and the other, " The Tragedie of Antonie." — But 
 among the women of this period, who were devoted to the 
 fludy of literature, the principal place is due to the four 
 daughters of Sir Anthony Cooke. They were well acquaint- 
 ed with the ancient and modern languages, and tranflated fe- 
 veral works into their own. — Mildred, the eldeft of the four 
 lifters, was, for more than forty-two years, the wife of the il- 
 luftrious ftatefman William Cecil, Lord Burleigh. She tranf- 
 lated a piece of St Chryfoftom's, from the original, into the 
 Englifii language — Anne, the fecond daughter of Sir Anthonjr 
 Cooke, became the wife of the Lord-keeper, Sir Nicholas 
 Bacon, and was the mother of the illuftrious Francis Bacon. 
 She tranflated from the Italian into Englifli, twenty-five Ser- 
 mons written by Barnardine Ochine, a celebrated divine of that 
 age, concerning the predeftination and election of God. Not 
 long after her marriage. Lady Bacon gratified the curioiity of 
 the public, and contributed much to the inftruclion of her 
 countrymen, in religious matters, by tranflating from the La- 
 tin into Englifti, an *' Apology for the Church of England j" 
 originally written by the learned and eloquent Bifliop Jewel. — 
 Elizabeth, the third daughter of Sir Anthony, was firft mar- 
 ried to Sir Thomas Hobby, and fecondly to John, Lord Kuf- 
 fell, fou and heir to Francis Ruffell, Earl of Bedford. She 
 wrote epitaphs for her fon, daughter, brother, filler, both huf- 
 bands, and a venerable old friend, in the Greek, Latin, and 
 Englifti tongues. Befides thefe. Lady Ruftel tranflated, from 
 the French into Englifti, a trat^, entitled " A way of Recon- 
 ciliation of a good and learned Man, touching the true nature 
 and Subftance of the Body and Blood of Chrift." — Katherine, 
 the fourth daughter in this learned family, though llkewife 
 famous for her knowledge in the Hebrew, Gre-jk, and Latin 
 
 language,
 
 Ixxxiv THREE PlllLOLOGICAL 
 
 languages, and for her fkill In poetry, does not appear to have 
 been the author of any diftin£l treatife.' 
 
 * It muft, however, be remembered, that the literature of 
 the women of that period extended comparatively but to a few 
 perfons, and thofe only of conliderable rank ; the generality 
 of the female fex beifig in a ftate of .ignorance. There was 
 by no means that diffufion of knowledge, that cultivation of 
 mind, that ta;fte for books, with which we now meet, in al- 
 mofl every company of ladies. Neither do we find, that the 
 learned women of the lixteenth century produced fuch works 
 as have continued td be read much by pofterity. The moft 
 important produftion of any of Sir Anthony Cooke's 
 daughters, was Lady Bacon's tranflation of Bilhop Jewel's 
 Apology •, and yet, who but an antiquary will now feek for 
 it, or give himfelf the trouble of perufing it ? Not a fingle 
 poetefs, deferving to be mentioned, arofe in this country till 
 the feventeenth century. The Dutchess of • Newcastle- 
 Mrs Katherine Philips, and Mrs. Behn, appear to have 
 been the firft who could, in any degree, merit that appella- 
 tion. Independently of poetry, the learned women of Eliza- 
 beth's reign have been far exceeded by the ingenious ladies of 
 the prefent age, both in the general and exteniive utility of 
 their writings, and in the elegancies of compofition. There is 
 a remark to be made concerning the difference between the 
 literature of the ladles of the iixteenth century, and that of the 
 females of more recent times. The former entered deeply 
 into the fludy of the ancient languages ; whilft the latter, be- 
 sides acquiring a fkill in the modern tongues, efpecially the 
 French and the Italian, have paid their principal attention to 
 the cultivation of general knowledge ; though a few of them 
 have been no fmall proficients in the learning of antiquity.' 
 
 * Among the numerous Divines of this period, who have a 
 claim to peculiar and extraordinary difllntiion, both as men 
 of letters and as improvers of tlieir native language, we have 
 already mentioned Richard Hooker, to whom we fhall join 
 the name of Thomas Bilson, fuccefTively Bifhop of Worcef- 
 ter and Wincheflcr. This prelate was one of the final cor- 
 rectors of the Engliih tranllation of the Bible, in the reign of 
 J^Mf s I. For this ofHce he appears to have been particularly 
 qualified, as his fly!e is, in general, more eafy and harmonious 
 than was common among the ecclefiaftics of his time.' 
 
 * Amidft tlie endlefs theological produdions of the age, orl- 
 
 giftal
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxxv 
 
 ginal works in Ethics were almoft totally unknown among 
 us, till at length the public received ample gratification from 
 Francis Bacon's Effays, concerning which we need not fay, 
 that they opened a rich treafury of moral obfervation, and 
 that they were worthy of the great and comprehenlive mind, 
 from which they proceeded. The name of Effays was then 
 new to the world, and perhaps had been derived from Mon- 
 taigne. Thus Bacon introduced into England a fpecies of 
 writing, which has fince been largely cultivated, which has 
 produced a vaft number of beautiful compofitions, and which 
 conftitutes an elegant part of modern literature.' 
 
 The fpecimens of compofition quoted by Dr. Johnfon, in 
 his Hiftory of the Englifh language, extend only to the period, 
 in which I)r Wilfon wrote j a man whofe merits in refining 
 hfs native tongue we have ftated in page Ixxiii & feq. It would, 
 however, have been very ufeful, if Dr. Johnfon had produced 
 further fpecimens, * taken from the writers of the fixteenth 
 and feventeenth centuries, fo that the fubfequent tranfition, 
 from the Saxon-Normannic to the modern Englifh language, 
 might have been exhibited in an uninterrupted view. During 
 a period of two centuries and a half, a living language muft 
 undergo great changes. This is particularly obvious in the 
 German, when we compare the language of the modern Ger- 
 mans with that of Luther and his cotemporaries. I propofe, 
 therefore, to conclude this Effay with a few general remarks. 
 
 1. The cultivation of a language altogether depends upon 
 the progrefs, which a nation makes in tafte, and in philofophi- 
 cal acquirements. The latter enrich a language, while the for- 
 mer contribute to give it an agreeable form, and to regulate 
 its inflexion and harmony. Hence the hiflory of a language 
 cannot be properly exhibited, without giving a clofely eon- 
 nefted view of the refpeftive improvements of the people, that 
 make ufe of this language. 
 
 2. As in languages we find no arbitrary but conventional 
 
 1 arrange- 
 
 * If it were confiftent with the limits allotted to this publication, 
 many other fpecimens from later writers might have been inferted. 
 But as the works of the bed authors, during the feventeenth and 
 eighteenth centuries, are pretty generally known, this oraiflloa 
 cannot be confidered as material. 
 
 W.
 
 Ixxxvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 arrangements in every part of them ; hence the changes, 
 which a language from time to time undergoes, mull be de- 
 duced and explained from the particular circumftances, in 
 which a nation is placed. In order to ftx our attention here 
 e&clufivelj upon the Englifh language, we may obferve, 
 that though the conqueft of England by the Normans, points 
 out the caufe of the fubfequent mixture of the Saxon-Danifh 
 dialed: with the Notmannic ; yet as many nations have been 
 conquered by invaders, whofe languages were not introduced 
 into the vanquiihed countries, this mixture cannot be fatis- 
 fadlorily explained, unlefs we have recourfe to a variety of 
 concurrent circumftances. Among thefe, the relative fitua- 
 tion, in which the conquerors were placed towards the conquer- 
 ed, deferves particular attention. As long as the conquerors 
 ruled the natives with defpotic rigour, their language pre- 
 vailed, both at court and in common life ; they compelled the 
 fubjugated Britons to make ufe of the Normannic language, 
 as well in their mutual intercourfe as in all public tranfactions. 
 Thus this language fpread rapidly, even among the lower or- 
 ders of the people. Bjut as the dominion of the proud Norman 
 Barons <iid not continue lor^g enough, to fupprefs completely the 
 language of the country ; and as the lower claffes, under Henry 
 II, again acquired their former importance, the old popular 
 language likewife refumed its former authority. Befides this 
 circumftance, the nation at the fame time advanced in know- 
 ledge, tafte, and improvements of every l^ind, fo that the de- 
 ficiencies and imperfeftions of the ancient language were foon 
 difcovered. On this account, the more refined Normannic 
 tongue, with which the people were already acquainted, was 
 mingled v/ith the dialedl of the natives : and as England 
 lienceforth continued to improve in knowledge and tafte, by 
 its intercourfe with France, it happened, that the French lan- 
 guage difplayed its influence more and more upon that of the 
 Engiilli ; particularly as its kindred dialedl, the Normannic, 
 had already paved the way for this mixture. Hence, too, we 
 can explain the fmgular phenomenon, that of two names given 
 to the fame objeft, the, one of which is of Saxon-Daniih, and 
 the other of Normannic or French extraftion, the latter fliould 
 be more dignified than the former, or, at lealt, ufed more fre- 
 quently among the higher clafTes of fociety. The woi'ds ox, 
 >•-'•'■'/, 'wethcVf are derived from the DanifliSaxon ; but beef.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. Ixxxvli 
 
 •veal, and mutton * from the Normannlc-French. Many other 
 laflances of a fimilar nature occur in modern Englifti. 
 
 3. Befides the peculiarities found in every individual na- 
 tion, there are, in many languages of nations intimately cbn- 
 necled, always fome particulars, in which they all agree : and 
 as this is obfervable during one and the fame period of time, 
 it muft be explained from the prevailing fpirit of the age. , lit 
 order to give an example of this kind, we Ihall mention the 
 appearance of the foftening letter e, which, fince the fifteenth 
 century, has been prevalent in feveral languages of Europe. 
 The adoption of this letter appears to have arifen in confe- 
 quence of the progreffive refinement of talle, fo that fpeaker;^ 
 and writers of modern languages felt the neceffity of foftening 
 the harflinefs of the vernacular tongues, which were overload- 
 ed with confonantSi For this purpofe, the infertion or the 
 addition of the vowel e has been the moil ufual and the moft 
 general expedient ; by which, among other languages, the 
 French in particular has been much refined. The fame has 
 been adopted in the German, as the words, Bube, Kncibe, ^ 
 boy ; Kafey cheeic ; enge, narrow^ ; hlode, weak, timid ; Getreide^ 
 corn, and many others, were fince that period written and 
 fpoken with an additional e, inftead of the harder words, Baby 
 Knob, Kdsy engy blod, Gstreid. — A fimilar method has been 
 praclifed in the Engliih language, as is obvious from the fpe- 
 cimens given in the earlier periods of its' Hiftory. But the 
 limits of propriety, in this refpeft, were foon tranfgreffed in 
 all the modern languages, and this e was frequently annexed, 
 without neteffity, to many words, in which it ferved only to 
 obfcure their ftru6lure and inflexion, or at leaft to reader them 
 auk ward and heavy. Sudh are, in German, the words, die 
 Gefchwijlere, the brothers and fillers ; die Biirgermeijlere, the 
 Burgo-mafters ; o/Zi?, frequently ; reine, purely ; die Ahleitungey 
 the derivation ; and in Englifti, the words, ordering^ both f, 
 accotdyng^, fuch^, any^, and many others. Hence all the lan- 
 guages, as the people advanced in found talle and knowledge, 
 have, in latter times, reftrained this addition .within certain and 
 proper limits. 
 
 * The words here employed in illuftatrion of the remark, do not 
 appear to, have been diltindly underllood by Mr. Adelung ; for 
 theyare not ftriftly fynonytnous, and though they both refer to 
 the obje6l.s exprelTed by them, yet always in different ftates of 
 their exiftence, VV. 
 
 ) X ESSAY
 
 ESSAY SECOND. 
 
 ji Fh'tlofophical view of the. English Language ^ 
 
 IVhy called Philofophical ? 
 
 J.T has now become ufual in language, to call that method of 
 treating a fubjeft philofophical, where we not only defcribe the 
 phenomena as they exift, bat inquire alfo, how they came to 
 be what they are, and why they are fo. And it is merely in 
 this fenfe I make ufe of this expreffion here ; for the term 
 philofophical ftri£tly implies- nothing more than rational. It 
 would lead me too far, were I to ihow the fuperiority of this 
 rational method in languages, over the mechanical mode of 
 teaching, hitherto pra^ifed* It has already been introduced, 
 With fuccefs, in all the other fciences ; language alone is 
 behind in this refpeft : for which reafon grammar muft ftill 
 be contented with the contemptible appellation of a mere art, 
 however fufceptible it may be of a fcientific method. All I 
 intend here is merely an experimental inquiry, in which I 
 propofe to feleft a few ofc the more remarkable phenomena 
 occurring in the Englilh language ; fo that the reader mull 
 by no means expeft to find a grammar, in the common accep- 
 ^tation of that term. 
 
 Of the Enfrlijh Language. 
 
 What has been the origin of the Englifli language, and 
 By what means, by what intrinfic and extrinfic changes it 
 has been gradually improving, for upwards of a thoufanfl 
 years paft, has been fhewn in the preceding Eflay. — It is fpo- 
 ken in the greatefl part cf England, and in the Low-lands 
 of Scotland, while, on the contrary, in the mountainous parts 
 of Scotland, in Ireland, and in the Englifti provinces of Wales 
 and Cornwall, anothei language prevails, which is the offspring 
 of the oldell language of the country, the Britifh, and bears an 
 afiiifity CO that fpoken in the French" province of Britanny. 
 
 Of
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG IxaxIx 
 
 Of the EngJi/J} Written Language. 
 
 The Englifh, like every other living language, is a'gain di- 
 \'ided into various dialedls, which diiFer, partly according to 
 the diftridls of the country where they are fpoken, parth- ac- 
 cording to the degrees of cultivation acquired by thofe who 
 fpeak them. The moft improved of thefe diale£ls, as ia 
 every other language, is likewife the written language of the 
 nation, and in the llri6left fenfe termed the Engliih language. 
 The moft accompliftied part of the nation is here, 'as in many 
 other ftates, the court, and the higher claiTes of the inhabitants 
 of the Capital : for wealth and tafte are generally the attend- 
 ants of the court, and their natural influence on language is 
 here accordingly moft remarkable. Hence jt is this refined 
 ^iialeft, which all writers of tafte employ, and which, out of 
 the Capital, can be learned only from books. * 
 
 Divifiofi of Grammar. 
 
 Grammar is divided into two principal parts, of which the 
 firft and moft important relates to the art of fpeaking with 
 propriety, the fecond to the art of writing corre6lly, or ortho- 
 graphy. As one muft firft fpeak properly, before he can 
 write with accuracy, cJtthography ought, injuHice, to hold 
 the laft place in every grammar. Yet as no progrefs can be 
 made in fpeaking, without acquiring the elementary part of 
 the mode of writing, it is cuftomary to begin with the ortho- 
 graphy ; particularly in fuch languages as are fpoken dif- 
 ferently from what they are written. 
 
 Of the Englifh Written CharaBcrs, 
 
 There is every reafon to believe, that the ancient Britons 
 were as little acquainted with the art of writing, as any of 
 the rude and femi-barbarous nations of thofe times. The 
 Romans, indeetf, as foon as they cftablifhed thenrfelvea in 
 -Britain, likewife introduced their written characters ; but it 
 does not appear, that they were adopted by the natives : and 
 though this had been the cafe, they v/ould have been loft by 
 the fucceeding invafions of the Saxons, who, at their firft ap- 
 pearance in this country, were a more rude and favage people 
 than the ancient Britons As foon as the Saxons were con- 
 verted to Chriftianity, they received the Roman characters 
 
 r - ijom
 
 xc THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 from their Italian and Gallic teachers of religicm ; and thefe 
 charaders had been already transforjned, and adapted to the 
 runuing hand, then in ufe. 
 
 Of the Anglo-Saxon Alphabets 
 
 As the Saxons had certain founds In their wnpoliihed and 
 harfli language^ with which the Romans, as well as the culti- 
 vated Gauls were unacquainted, and which therefore could, 
 not be exprelTed by the com-mon written charafters of the lat- 
 ter, many of thefe were changed, and fome new ones adopted ; 
 fuch as that which reprefents the hilling thy and which was 
 borrowed from the Greek, e, theta. This alphabet, termed 
 the Anglo-Saxon, maintained its ground till the invafion ot 
 the Normans, and for a confiderable time after that event. 
 
 Of its difufe. 
 
 However much the ancient Roman charafters might have 
 been disfigured by the corrupted tafte of the middle ages, they 
 jElill retainied a certain affinity to their original form : but this 
 affinity was deltroyed by the peculiar Anglo-Saxon letters. 
 — In the Saxon and Saxo-Danllli periods, the national 
 tafte, notwithltanding the progrefs It had made, was ftill 
 much too rude, to exhibit this corruption, in a fenfible 
 manner. But when the Normans fubjetSted England to 
 their power, and began to fpread the higher degrees of im- 
 provement, that prevailed in France ; when the Saxo-Da- 
 lu'fli languTige itfelf was refined by the Normannic and later 
 French ; this aukward flate ot things became evident, the old 
 Anglo-Saxon characters were again abandoned, and the Roman 
 alphabet in its pure form, fuch 'as prevailed at that time In 
 France, was consequently adopted. In preference to the former. 
 This change, however^ was now attended with the Inconve* 
 nience, that the iimple hiffing middle-found, which had foi-- 
 mcrly been exprefled by the letter 0, borrowed from the 
 Greek, behoved now to be denoted by the compound //', 
 Avhich could exprefs it only In a very Imperfecl manner. But 
 if the improvements in a language be carried on with tafte, 
 of two inconveniences, that one is always preferred, which is 
 tlie leaft repugnant to the fenfe of beauty and propriety. The 
 old Anglo-Saxon figure difagreed altoge<lier with the fym- 
 
 metry
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xci 
 
 ^etry of the Roman letters ; an^ therefore proved more offen- 
 five to found tafte, than the th, although it be a compound 
 lign for a fimple found, becaufe it was ftill agreeable to the 
 Roman fafliion, at leafl with refpeft to its fhape. 
 
 OJ" angular Written CharaSiers. 
 
 To trace all the changes, which thefe charaflers have, from, 
 time to time, undergone in their figure, would be tedious, and 
 is not properly an pbjeft of this inquiry. I fliall remark only 
 one circumllance. In the latter centuries of the middle age, 
 when tafte and induftry began to revive, there arofe a mode of . 
 writing, which is properly denominated the ** Broken writ,'* 
 but which, in common life, is generally called the *' Monkiib. 
 writing," becaufe the monks, in particular, ufcd it in their 
 manufcripts. It is alfo frequently termed the *' Gothic cha- 
 rafter," not as if it had been invented and ufed by the Goths, 
 but in fo far only, as we are accullomed to call all that tafte 
 Gothic, which delights in angular, pointed, and curled orna- 
 ments. As this handwriting was certainly more beautiful 
 than the long and " waving" current handj formerly in ufe, 
 it afterv/ards became general over all Europe, and maintained 
 its place till the revival of the fciences\nd of good tafte, 
 when people returned to the beautiful Roman letters, as they 
 were formed, before the barbarous nations imprinted on them 
 the marks of their corrupted and uncultivated tafte. 
 
 Thefe charafters were firft difcontinued in Italy, where the 
 round Roman hand was foon revived, which is therefore term- 
 ed Italian ; and whence it was by degrees introduced into 
 feveral countries of Europe. But as the prevailing degree of 
 tafte was by no means uniform, either in all countries, or a- 
 mong all the clafles of qne and the fame nation, this change 
 happened in different ways, and with various modifications. 
 England, fince the preceding century, has been gradually a- 
 dopting the round Italian letter, in all writings defigned for 
 the higher and middle clafles ; while, on the contrary, in fucli 
 writings as are immediatelj- addrefled to the common people 
 (for inftance, in a^s of parliament, public deeds. Sec.) the old 
 angular chara£ler, generally called " engrofling," is ftill ufed ; 
 becaufe they have been long accuftomed to it, and have not 
 yet acquired a fufticient degree of tafte % tp perceive its in- 
 elegance. 'The. 
 
 * The author certainly alludes here to the Englifti lawyers only ; 
 . .. as
 
 xcii THREE PHILOLOGICAL, 
 
 The KngliJJ) write differently from what they fpeak. 
 
 The Eiglifh language confifts of a mixture of the old Saxoa 
 and Daniili, qf the Normannic and modern French, and of the 
 Latin. The Italian and Spauifli are often added to this num- 
 ber, but thefe two languages neither have had, nor could have 
 had, fo great an influence on the Englifh, as to form a conlli- 
 tuent part of it, although individual words may be derived 
 from them, which holds alfo with refpe£l to many other lan- 
 guages. And'as tlie languages before mentioned are fo differ- 
 ent from each other in their external and internal ftrudure, it 
 is eafy to fee, that this aflociation or combination of words 
 could not take place without great violence, and the deftruc- 
 tion of a great part of the peculiarities of each of the languages 
 thus combined in the Engiiih. Since, in all languages, a clofe 
 .adherence to etymology .preferves their peculiar form, and has 
 «. temlency to prevent thofe remarkable changes, which the 
 conftant progrefs of civilization, as well as the precipitate al- 
 terations of the people, would otherwife produce ; it is not 
 difficult to perceive, that, by this method of adopting and incor- 
 porating words, the proximate llru£lure of them, with refpe<3: 
 to the ear at leaft,mufl in a great variety of inftances be deftroy- 
 ed ; efpecially as this ftrufture, in general, is but very imper- 
 fectly known in fuch words, as are derived from a foreign lan- 
 guage, that forms a component part of the ancient language of 
 the country. The pronunciation, accordingly, in all fuch 
 mixed languages, is exceedingly variable ; becaufe the neareft 
 derivation, of the greater number of words, is unknown to the 
 people, who fpeak them ; and confequently tliere is no fixed 
 iinmoveable point, to which the ideas denoted by them, might 
 be attached, and which could guide the tongue and the ear. 
 This deficiency is obvious in .all thofe modern languages, 
 which have been formed hy a mixture with the Latin, as the 
 Italian, French, Spaniili, and Portuguefe, the pronunciation of 
 which is expofed to far more confiderable changes than fuch 
 languages, as have remained pure aud unmixed, like the Ger- 
 man 
 
 as the. continuation cf this barbarous charafter is produftive of 
 confiderable fees, while thedifufe of it wovjld materially .affieft theif 
 i.'iterell. 
 
 Noteoftbt Compojiter.
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. x.iil 
 
 man and her northern fifteis. Thofe mixed languages, too, 
 would in a few centuries be deprived of their uniformity, had 
 not the " latent perception" of neceflity furnished thefe nations 
 with a method of preferving, for a long time, the proximate 
 derivation of words, at leaft to the eye, though the ear raav 
 have loft it. 
 
 Explanation of this phenomenon. 
 
 The method of preferving the etymology of words, as a- 
 dopted by the nations above alluded to, is no other than this, 
 that people write diflFerently frorn. what they fpeak : a phe- 
 nomenon, which indeed has been hitherto leprefented, by 
 grammarians -and philoiophic linguifts, as the moft palpable 
 abfurdity that can be conceived ; although the agreement of 
 all the weftern nations of Europe, in what they have thus term-, 
 ed abfurdity, fhould have convinced them, that there mui^ be 
 fome realv>n for it, and which ought not to be overlook- 
 ed. This reafon then is no other, than to preferve, as long aa 
 ij neceffary, to the eye at leaft, the proximate derivation by 
 means of writing, although the pronunciation has loft it ; to 
 promote thereby that univerfal intelligibility, which is the 
 firft and principal obje£l of language ; and, at the fame time 
 to prevent the fwerving and fluftuating pronunciation, as 
 
 long as poflible, from further and ftill greater deviations , 
 
 An example or two will ferve to make the matter more evi- 
 dent. The following words, being borroi^ved from the French 
 and Latin languages, legality y legion, organ, orgies, are now 
 pronounced legallity, led'zhun, argun, ard%hy%. If they were 
 written in this manner, an Englifliman might, at length, learn 
 to underftand them tolerably well, but he would ftill find a dif- 
 ficulty, when thefe words occurred to him again in their ori- 
 ginal language, to recognize his own in them. The bond of 
 connexion between the Englifti language and its conftituent 
 parts would thus be diflblved, and the reciprocal intelligibili- 
 ty would thereby be rendered abfcure. Further, as the pro- 
 nunciation in all fuch mixed languages, from the caufes above 
 mentioned, is from time to time conliderably changed, many 
 words would foon become altogether obfcure and unintelli- 
 gible, did not the etymological way of writing them, ftill 
 maintain their true form, as long as is pradlicable and neceffary. 
 Befides, the adherence to the neareft derivation, and the pre- 
 fervation of the ©xiginal form of words, by accurate writing, 
 
 m ' ar«
 
 xciv THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 are likewife the means of preventing the extremely fluftuating 
 pronunciation from ftill greater deviations. This is the true 
 realon, why all the weftern Europeans, and confequentlj the 
 Englifh too, write differently from what they fpeak : and as 
 this phenomenon has been produced entirely by " the latent 
 perception of purpofe and means," which is involved in fo 
 much obfcurity, that, fo far as I know, their grammarians 
 have not yet been able to account for it ; hence we receive a 
 Icffon, not to cenfure the like regulations, if they are univer- 
 fally adopted by one or more nations, until the real foundation 
 of them has been difcovered. The difference of this mode of 
 writing from that of fpeaking, is indeed in itfelf an imperfec- 
 tion ; but in all thofe languages, that are fo thoroughly mixed, 
 it is a real perfeftion ; becaufe it preferves, at leafl to the eye, 
 the immediate derivation, and confequently furnifhes us with 
 the ealieft poffible method of underftanding words, while it 
 ferves to prevent any further deviations in the pronuncia-. 
 tion. 
 
 Of Orthography. 
 
 On the preceding doftrine of pronunciation, is alfo founde4 
 the greateft and nioft important part of the Englifh orthogra- 
 phy, or rather, the orthography of the Englifh language is the; 
 reverfed dodtrine of prpnunciation ; Ijecaufe it mufl fhew, how 
 every uttered found is to be written w:ith its proper charac- 
 ters. The lefs important parts of it are, the rules for ufing 
 initial capital letters, the divifion of fyllables, the fpelling of 
 ** compound words, the orthographical iigns, and the like. 
 
 Of the JiruBiire of words. 
 
 Neither orthography, nor the do£lrine of tone, nor any o- 
 ther part of grammar, can difpenfe with the elements pf the 
 JiruBure of words ^ or etymology in the flriftefl and mofl rigi4 
 fenfe ; however much this has been negledled in all the Eng- 
 lifh grammars, with which I am acquainted. Hence I pro- 
 pofe here, to make an attempt towards tracing and marking 
 the outlines of this do6lrine, which is fo little underflood in all, 
 languages. 
 
 Definition of words and fyllables. 
 
 Language is compofed of words. A word is the perceptl- 
 ple exprefEon of an idea, which is pronounced without fuf- 
 pcgding the voice. Words then are the names of particular 
 
 ideas
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. icv 
 
 ideas, and are confequently as various in their ftrufture, as 
 the ideas themfelves. In general, a word may confift of one 
 or more fyllables, and a fjUable is a perceptible found, which 
 is pronounced with a fingle emiffion from the mouth. Since, 
 therefore, the vowels are fimple founds, which are produced 
 by the mere opening of the mouth, and diphthongs are double 
 founds, namely tWo vowels, In which the voice paffes, with- 
 out fufpenfiou, from one opening to another, it follows from 
 this, fhat a word properly contains as many fyllables, as there 
 occur in it vowels or diphthongs. I have ufed the term " pro- 
 perly ;" for the pronunciation, in Englifh, occafions a variety 
 of exceptions, by fuppreffing many vowels, fo that for inftance 
 a word, which in writing confills of four fyllables, may in 
 pronunciation conlill only of three. 
 
 Divijion of words ^ according to their JlruBure. 
 All words, with refped to their ftrufture, are of three kinds j 
 they are either radicals^ or derivatives^ or compounds. Con- 
 trafted words might alfo be'added here ; but they belong for 
 the moft part to the language of low life ; for inftance, jra^r 
 for good father ; gammer^ for good mother ; or if they are at 
 all in general ufe, they are conlidered and treated as radicals* 
 
 DeJinitioTf of radicah. 
 
 Radical words are properly fuch, as exprefs the firft origi- 
 nal idea, of whatever kind, by a fingle etniffion from the 
 mouth ; and hence they are uniformly monofyllables, becaufe 
 every original idea is founded on a fingle tranfient and 
 undivided fenfation. Thefe radicals may again be divided in- 
 to various fpecies : but in grammar, this divifion is not at- 
 tended with any practical advantage ; for every word that is 
 a monofyllable, if it cannot be proved to be contracted. from 
 two others, is admitted there as a radical. In the following 
 part of this treatife we fliall find, that, in Englifh, the moft of 
 the words borrowed from the French, Latin, and other foreign 
 languages, are treated as radicals, of whatever number of fyl- 
 lables they may confift. 
 
 Among the radical words are likewife comprehended thofe, 
 which have adopted the final letter ^, for the fake of rendering 
 the harfh monofyllables fomewhat fofter, although they ac- 
 quire, by this procefs, an additional fyllable. In all the modern 
 European languages^ particularly in the Englilh, German, and 
 
 m 2 French,
 
 xcvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 French, this e has been an ufeful expedient, to foften the harfS* 
 nefs of the old languages, and to introduce into them fmooth- 
 nefs and harmony. Examples of this kind, in Englifli, occur 
 in the words ake^ alcov^ ale, anife, ape, to appeafe, bahcy bai^e, 
 to hake, &c. ; as likewife in the German words ^ffe, an ape \ 
 Biihe, Knabe, a boy, and many others. Upon a fuperficial pe- 
 rufal of Englifh works, written during the laft centuries, we 
 fiiall find, that this expedient, from an extravagant fondnefs 
 for refinement, has been carried to excefe, and thus the ftruc- 
 fure of words rendered obfcure. There is no doubt, that, 
 with increafing cultivation, the Englifh perceived this impro- 
 priety, and therefore rejefted this e, with which, in many 
 cafes, the words had been unneceffarily loaded : in thofe words, 
 however, where it was ftill preferved in writing, it was fup- 
 preffed in the pronunciation, and thus became a mute final e ; 
 hefice the above mentioned words are pronounced iihk, al- 
 kohv, ahl, annis, cihp, &c. But whether this alteration has 
 been accompliflied within proper limits, and whether the lan- 
 guage has not acquired, through this medium, much unnecef- 
 fary harflinefs, I Ihall not attempt to decide. I muft only ob- 
 ferve, that it is a very erroneous rule, by which, according 
 to the Englifh grammarians, this mute e makes the preceding 
 vowel uniforjnly long, if by the term long we are to under- 
 ft-and extended. Examples of the contrary occur in the words, 
 axe y fickle, badge ^ bottle, and a great many others ; befide the 
 words confining of three and four fyllables, in which the pre- 
 ceding fyllable is not at all accentuated, and much lefs ftiould 
 k be lengthened, as in artifice, concun'ence, perceptible, £cc. 
 
 Of Derivatives-. 
 
 The limits of the derived and compound words cannot, in 
 every individual cafe, be accurately afcertained ; although they 
 may be determined with fufhcient precifion, according to the 
 ideas conne£led with thcfe words. • In a grammatical fenfe,. 
 'Ji derived idea is formed by joining an obfcure collateral no- 
 tion to a principal, or radical idea, and by confidering both as 
 one fingle idea : and a derived uior^Jarifes from expreffing this 
 obfcure collateral notion, by means of a fyllable, which is no 
 longer ufed as a peculiar word, confequently is as obfcare as 
 the collateral notion itfelf. Such a fyllable is then called a 
 derived fyllable. 
 
 The derived fyllables novr are of two kinds ; they are placed 
 
 either
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. xcvii 
 
 either before or after the word : in the former cafe they may 
 be czlled prt^pojita, while in the latter, we fhall call them poji^ 
 pojita. Both, however, mull no longer be ufed as pecu- 
 liar words ; for in this cafe the new word is not a derivative, 
 but a compound. The prcepoJitUy as well as the pojipojita, are, 
 in Englifh, of two different forts : they originate either from 
 the Saxo-Danifli, or from the Latin and Fiench. The words 
 derived from the lall two languages are, indeed, confidered 
 as radicals, and are not fubjeft to any determined rules ; but 
 with the former, namely the Saxo-Danifli, he ought to be ac- 
 curately acquainted, who is defirous of acquiring z, thorough 
 knowledge of tl^e Englifh language, and of facilitating his 
 ftudy of the tone or accent of words ; a do6lrine, which with- 
 out this previous knowledge, would appear very perplexed. 
 
 The principal prapojitay from the Saxo-Danifh, are the fyl- 
 lables a, he^for^ (in fo far as it reprefents the GermaH ver) mis, 
 and un ; for inftance, away, aloud, abroad, above, anew, to a- 
 bet, to abide, abode ; before, to begin, beget, befall, befriend ; 
 to mifgive, miflead, mifbehave, miflruft, millake ; unaware, 
 
 unbelief, undone The chief French-Latin fyllables are the 
 
 following ; ac, com, coriy em, en, oh, op, pre ^ ^^ff^,/^^ and y^r. 
 
 The principal Saxo-Danifh pojipojita are thefe : ard, cow- 
 ard ; ed, for forming paflive participles ; as created, oppreffed, 
 animated ; el, fynonymous with the German el, as bowel ; er, 
 not only in fubftantives, where it correfponds with the German 
 er ; adder, anfwer, alder, angler, finger ; but likewife in 
 verbs, to Hammer, to waver ; and in prepofitions, as after ; — 
 the fy liable en, in adjcftives, as leaden, fudden, fullen ; in 
 verbs, to heighten, blacken, redden ; — efs, abbefs, dutchefs, 
 largefs ; — ey, agreeing with the German ey, as abbey, fur- 
 vey ; — ing, for forming the prefent participles, as well as fub- 
 ftantives, in both of which it correfponds with the German 
 ing and ung : feeding, breeding ; — ish, like the German ijch, 
 in apifh, foolifh ; — le, the fame as the German el, as idle, ancle,, 
 angle, apple ; — ly, as the German lich, particularly for form- 
 ing adverbs, as abfolutely, greatly, accordingly — nefs, for the 
 formation of abftrad ideas, like the German nifs, as goodnefs, 
 franknefs, abftemioufnefs •,—Jhip, not unlike the German 
 fchaft, as lordfhip, friendfhip — y, correfponding with the Ger- 
 man ig, in adverb?, and ey, in fubflantives, as already, ab- 
 bey. But far more numerous are the terminations form* 
 
 ed from the Latin-French fyllables, ance^ ant, ate, hie, hly, 
 
 cul.
 
 xcvili THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 caly cle, cy^ eer, ier^ en, ence^ ent^ ial^ tan, ic, j/?, ive^ iofti 
 Jioriy tion, ment, or, otiSy ple^ tive, ure, y, &.c. ] cannot enter 
 upon the fignification and the praftical ufe of all thefe derived 
 fj'-llables ; fince my purpofe, in this place, is merely directed 
 to excite the attention of future teachers of the Engliih lan- 
 guage, with refpe^l to them. Let nobody, however, imagine, 
 that the inveftigation of thefe particles is a mere illufion ; for 
 their utility, throughout the whole grammar, is very great, 
 particularly in the fubfequent doftrine of the accent. 
 
 All thefe derived fyllables, and efpecially the pojipojitay may 
 again be combined with one another in different ways ; as 
 coward, cowardly, cowardlinefs, or cowardice ; crafty, craftily^ 
 craftinefs, or craft ; yet to invelligate their peculiar flrufture, 
 would exceed the limits of this Effay. 
 
 Cbmpound words i 
 
 If two or more v^ords. Hill current by themfelves, are com- 
 bined into one, there arifes from this combination a compound 
 word. By means of derivation we conjoin an obfcure colla- 
 teral notion to a radical idea; but in compounding words, we 
 unite two radical ideas, or rather two clear notions, into one. 
 The defign of fuch an union is to determine a word and its 
 meaning, more accurately, by the medium of another ; but 
 frequently alfo to exprefs a metaphorical idea, by means of 
 both. That, V'/hieh is determined by another, or the cardinal 
 word, in Englifh as well as in German, is placed laft : while 
 the determining word, in both languages. Hands foremoft. 
 Thus in the examples, cherry-tree, child-birth, powerful, to 
 undergo, to fubdue, the latter words contain the principal idea, 
 that is more clofely determined by the words Handing fore- 
 moft. 
 
 The compound words are as various as there are parts of 
 fpeech, which can be mutually combined. The lubftantive 
 may in this manner be determined by another fubftantive, as 
 gold-fi'di ; or by an adjedive, as green-fifli ; or by a parti- 
 ciple, as looking-glafs ; or by a pronoun, as felf-conceit ; or 
 by a verb, as break-faft ; or by an adverb, as fore-noon ; — the 
 adjective and participle may be joined to a fubftantive, as 
 hand-full ; to another adjcclive, as big-bodied ; — the verb to 
 a fubftantive, as horfe-whip, bind- weed ; particularly by th6 
 particlesyorf, out, ah, ad, at, de, in, oh, e, ex, &.c. ; — .the adverb 
 to another adverb, as there-fore, whcre-ever, &.c. 
 
 it
 
 ESSAYS, BYADELUNG., xdx 
 
 It would lead me too far from my object, if I attempted to 
 define the nature of true compounds •, for this can be accom- 
 pliflied only by means of a minute and accurate inveltigatioti 
 of them, from which the general rules for the cempoundijig 
 of words mufl refult, and at the fame time the various modi- 
 fications, to which the determining word is liable, might be 
 difcovered and eflablilhed. 
 
 Of the tone or accent of words. 
 
 The rules for the tone or accentuation of words, in Eng- 
 lifti, are perhaps more variable and intricate than in any/ 
 other language. This v/ant of uniformity is owing, partly to 
 the whole genius and difpofition of the language, partly to the 
 carelefs method and confufed notions of grammarians. — i. On 
 account of the genius and difpofition of the language. The 
 Englifh tongue is a mixture of the Saxon, Danifli, French, and 
 Latin ; it has therefore loft a great lliare of its peculiarity, 
 while each of thefe foreign languages, being thoroughly mix- 
 ed with it, "have likewife communicated to it a confiderable 
 part of their analogical affinities. Among other parts of gram- 
 tnar, this deviation is obvious in the accentuation of words, 
 which is regulated by different analogies ; hence no general 
 or determined rules can be laid down for it. In the Ger- 
 man language, the tone is the moft regular and fettled part of 
 grammar ; hence it can be reduced to a few plain rules. — 2. 
 On account of the confufion prevailing among gramma- 
 rians, who, in Englifli, as well as in German, have always 
 confounded the profaic meafure of the accent with that of 
 the metrical, and theretbre conftantly fpeak of long -axi^Jljort 
 fyllables ; notions, which do not at all apply to this dodrine, 
 and which occafion great embarrafsment, 
 
 I am induced to cenfure, upon this head, not only the 
 grammarians and fchoolmafters of the common fort, but even 
 fuch teachers and writers as claim a fuperior rank, for 
 inftance a Johnson, Sheridan, and feveral others. . The 
 latter has publiffied '« A General Di6tionary of the Eng- 
 lifh language, in two Volumes, Quarto, London, 1780 ;" in 
 which he confines himfelf entirely to the accent, and the 
 pronunciation of words; but, with refpe6l to the for- 
 jner, he proceeds in the fame intricate, fluftuating, and unde- 
 terminid manner, as his other brethren of Prifcian's family. 
 * ■"'' ' - It
 
 o THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 It is therefore my aim in this Eflaj, to propofe a method, by 
 which rational teachers may, in a great meafure, explain this 
 obfcure doctrine concerning the accentuation of words, and 
 thus arrive at fome certainty, at leaft with re fpeft to a con- 
 fiderable number of Englifh words. Previoufly to this in- 
 quiry, however, it will be requifite to premife forne general 
 ideas, and to difmifs altogether, the former notions of long 
 icndijhort fyllables. 
 
 General Definitions of the accent. 
 
 The accent confifts in a particular elevation of the voice, 
 with which, in polyfyllables, the one fyllable is as it were 
 raifed above the others : thus in emergency, employment, the 
 fyllables mer and ploy are called accentuated Jyllahles. The 
 reafon of this mode of diftinguilhing one fyllable from ano- 
 ther, is properly contained in the nature of the word and the 
 intention of the fpeaker, who, by this elevation of the voice, 
 points out that fyllable, which exprefles the principal idea, 
 and to which he chiefly direfts the attention of the hearer. 
 Hence the two accentuated fyllables, above mentioned, (^on» 
 tain the principal ideas of the words, in which they occur, 
 and all the other fyllables denote only collateral ideas, or fur- 
 ther determinations, inflexions, and the like. I have faid, 
 that this, in the nature of the thing, is " properly" the in- 
 tention of the accent ; for this reafon in the German, and pro- 
 bably, too, in all other unmixed languages, we meet with the 
 general rule, that the radical fyllable, in fuch words as confift 
 of a plurality of fyllables, always receives the accent ; fince it 
 contains the principal idea of the word. In the German lan-ir 
 guage, this rule is fo general, that the few exceptions from it 
 fcarcely deferve any attention. But as the Engliih is a very 
 mixed language, this lule is liable here to a much greater num- 
 ber of exceptions ; efpecially with refpe£t to the words bor- 
 rowed from the Latin and French, in which the radical 
 fyllable has become obfcure, fo that it cannot in all in- 
 flances preferve its due accent. Since I propofe to refume 
 that fubjed in another part of this Eflay, I Ihall here only 
 remark, that thofe words from the Anglo-Saxon, which are 
 ilill current in the Englifli language, follow this rule, and per- 
 haps as uniformly as in the German. 
 
 DiJiinBion of the accent as to its force. 
 
 The tone or accent mufl, be diftinguilhed, both as to its 
 
 force
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. ci 
 
 force and duration. With refpeft to the former, it may be 
 divided into the principal and concurrent force of the accent,. 
 There are certain poljfjllables, in which two of the fyllables 
 are marked by the accent, when one of them, that requires 
 the ftrorigeft elevation of the voice, receives the principal 
 force ; while the other, in which the elevation of the voice is 
 weaker, is uttered with a concurrent force. Thus, in the word 
 horfe-courfer, the fyllable hor, as well as the fyllable cour^ 
 are both marked by the accent ; yet with this difference, that 
 the former is more llrongly pronounced, and the principal 
 force is laid upon it ; while in the latter, the elevation of the 
 voice is weaker, and confequently it is denoted only by a con- 
 current force, There is, however, a general rule, which de- 
 ferves to be remarked in this place, and according to which no 
 word can have more than one principal accent. But the cafes, 
 in which words, befide the principal one, may have a con- 
 current accent, are the two, following : i, in compound words, 
 where every word retains its accent, yet fo that, in one of the 
 words, this accent becomes the principal or predominant found^ 
 as will clearly appear from the fequel ; 2, in derivatives confift- 
 ing of polyfyllables, which require the principal accent to be 
 laid upon the fourth or fifth fyllable from the end ; in which 
 cafe, unlefs a fyllable be fupprefled, one of the derived fylla- 
 bles receives a fecondary or concurrent accent ; becaufe three 
 or four fyllables in fucceffion, without any diftinftion of tone, 
 would offend the ear. In the word degeneratenefs^ the ac- 
 cent refts upon the fyllable ge ; and though the e in the fyl- 
 lable te be fupprefled, there wouHftill follow three fyllables 
 in fucceffion, without any elevation of the voice, if the fylla- 
 ble ra were not pronounced with a fecondary accent ; by 
 which means this monotony is avoided. The fame occurs in, 
 the woxdiS) fdtherhnsfsy delicatenefsy dhjolutely, 8>cc. 
 
 Of the duration of the accent, 
 "Whether the accent be principal or fecondary, it is with re- 
 fpeft to its duration, either extended (long) or acute, (lliort). 
 It is extended, -whtn the voice dwells longer upon the vowel, 
 as in the words, fame, fate, father; acutc^when it quickly pafles 
 over the vowel and refts upoa the confonant, which then ac- 
 quires a double found, as in fan, when, mother, pen. Theie 
 diftinftions between the extended and acute accent, the gram- 
 rj^arians of the Englifh as well as the German and other lan- 
 
 n guages^
 
 cii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 guages, have endeavoured to exprefs by the terms long and 
 fjort; but as thej were under the neceffitj of cilling thofe 
 fyllables, which are pronounced with no accent whatever, 
 upon the fame plan, either long or fhort, thej involved them- 
 felves in perpetuallabyrinths, from which there was no efcape. 
 The fad is, that in profodj every accentuated fyllable is like- 
 wife long, whether the accent be extended or acute ; for here 
 
 the unaccentuated or neutral fyllables alone are Ihort In the 
 
 Diftiohary of the Englilli language, which I have publifliedin 
 two volumes, 8vo. Leipzig, 1783 and 1796, I have pointed 
 out the extended or long accent thus (a) and the acute or 
 Ihort accent with this (a) mark : yet as I was mifled at the 
 commencement of the work, by implicitly following Johnfon 
 as my guide in the accent, I began that diflindion only about 
 the middle of the letter A. 
 
 Difference hetnveen extended and acute fyllables. 
 From what has been faid in the preceding fe£lion, it is evi* 
 dent, that in tJie extended accen^ the voice dwells longer upon 
 the vowel ; thus the fucceeding confonant can have only 3 
 mild and fimple found : as on the contrary, in the acute accent 
 the voice quickly glides over the vowel and refts upon the 
 confonant, which confequently is pronounced with more ener- 
 gy, or like a double confonant. Hence, in German, we hnd 
 the excellent rule prevailing, by which only a fimple confon- 
 ant is ufed after a long or extended vowel^ but a double con- 
 fonant after a fhort or acute vowel \ excepting thofe cafes, 
 where two different confona-' 3 accompany the preceding vowel 9 
 for inflance, ich ham, I came ; Der Kdmrn, the comb ; die Mufe, 
 the Mufe ; %u muJTen^ to be obliged. This rule indeed is 
 liable to fome exceptions, but it forms neverthelefs one of the 
 mofl adrtiirable peculiarities of that language ; a peculiarity, 
 of which the modern innovators wifli to dcfpoil it ; as thefe 
 men are more fond of deflroying than of erefting. But in the 
 Englifh language, where the pronunciation is perpetually at 
 war with the orthography, that excellent rule cannot be 
 put in praflice, as the exceptions from it are more numerous 
 than the cafes "to which it applies. Thus the words, man, 
 mud, mug, mother, minion, &.c. have the fhort or acute ac- 
 cent, though only a fingle confonant follows the vowel , while 
 Ihe words, all, alms, mofl, call, fall, falfe, farm, &c. take the 
 lon<3^ or extended accent, notwithf^anding that the vowel is ac- 
 ' / com-
 
 ESSAYS, BY AD E LUNG. ciu 
 
 coiripanled by two confonants. Even the orthographical 
 diphthongs are not uniformly pronounced as fuch; for they 
 are very frequently uttered ihort or acute, as is obvious in the 
 words, dead, head, learn, lead, meadow, &c. Nay, it often 
 ^happens, that even double founds, according to orthography 
 at leaft, may occur in fyllables, which receive no accent ; 
 for inftance in the words, chaplain, pidgeon, forfeit. In thefe 
 circumflances, it mull be extremely difficult to l^y down fixed 
 rules, iA what cafes and Situations the accent is acute, and 
 where it muft be extended. 
 
 Of the accent of radicals. 
 
 All radicals are originally monofyllables, except in the cafes 
 already pointed out, where the harfli found of the monofylla- 
 ble has been foftened by the additional vowel e. As every 
 radical word is the fign of an idea, it likewifehas its peculiar 
 determined accent, but wliicli is perceivable only in combination 
 with other words ; for the accent itfelf is nothing elfe than 
 than a relative idea. There are however words, which in the 
 connexion of a fentence receive no accent, but throw it upon 
 the fucceeding word ; and thefe are commonly fuch words as 
 denote circumftances or unimportant modifications ; for in- 
 ftance, the article, feveral of the pronouns, and the particles. 
 In " the finger^ my houfe, on the eaji,'''' the determining words, 
 they mjy on the, throw their accent upon the fubflantives that 
 accompany them. AH thefe cafes ought to be determined with 
 precifion in an Englifh grammar ; it is fufficient here, to have 
 hinted at them — All the radical words, however, which fig- 
 nify principal ideas, fuch as fubflantives, verbs, adjeftives. 
 Sec. mufl necelTarily be accentuated. It is evident from thefe 
 remarks, that the accent, in monofyllables, as well as in po- 
 lyfyllables, wholly depends on the importance of the idea. 
 
 Of the accent of derivatives. 
 
 With refpea to the accent, the derivatives muft be divided 
 into two great clafTes ; namely into.fuch as are derived from 
 the Saxo-Danifli, and into thofe which have been adopted 
 from the French and Latin : both muft, in this refped, be fub- 
 je(ft to different rules. 
 
 The words derived from the Saxo-Danilh, follow that very 
 eafy and precife rule, according to whicl), in polyfyllables, 
 the principal accent is uniformly placed upon the original 
 
 or
 
 civ THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 or radical fyllable ; a rule, which in German is liable to fewer 
 .exceptions than any other^ and which X believe to be as gene- 
 ral in Englilh, fince it is fo deeply founded on the nature of 
 the thing, and the purpofe of language : for my part, I am 
 acquainted with no words, that can be confidered as exceptions* 
 A few inftances will fervc to illuflrate this affertion. The 
 following are derivatives with additional preceding fyllables ; 
 afdryawdy,behmd, beget, begin, besides ; — with fucceeding fyl- 
 lables are, acorn (from the Low Saxon Ecker, in which inftance 
 the fyllable orn correfponds with the German final fyllable 
 er), bdj'enefs, beggarlimfsy tdmenejsy father, mother, singer j 
 hofom, boi/leroiis, fiidden ; — with both preceding and fucceed- 
 ing fyllables are, ajlidmed, behoMen, behaviour, beginning, be- 
 comingly — Thofe, who pay proper attention to this eafy rule, 
 will find, that one half of the difliculties, in placing the ac- 
 cent on Englifh words, is thereby removed. 
 
 The words derived from the French and Latin, in fome in- 
 Hances, likewife follow this rule ; to abate, to abandon, abridge, 
 abominable, abjlemious &:c. ; but as the exceptions from it are 
 more numerous than the cafes to which it applies, it cannot be 
 confidered as a general rule ; for in the examples, avenue, bar- 
 tidrtty, bombardment, ccmmijfary, continent, coiitiniiity, inocu- 
 lation, &.C. the accent is throughout placed upon derived fyl- 
 lables. In addition to this difficulty of diftinguifliing the ac- 
 cent, we may oblerve, that the Englifh words very frequently 
 difplace the accent from the fyllable, which poflTefled it in 
 Latin or French. This is the cafe in the words, Eiirope^ db- 
 fence, ablative, dbrogate, dbfolute, academy, decent, ddage, dd- 
 vacate, afjlgnee, balloon, and a great many others. But even 
 here fome general rules may be formed, which would hold 
 good, at leaft with refpe£l to fome particular cafes. Ihus in 
 derived words, that terminate with the fyllables fan, tioiiyf 
 cious and tious, the accent refts upon the next-preceding fyl- 
 lable : this and fimilar rules we find already Hated in the com- 
 mon grammars. — The caufes, from which the placing of the 
 accent in Englifh words is fo precarious, are chiefly the fol- 
 lowing : I. becaufe thefe words had in their original lan- 
 guages, namely in Latin and French, already deviated from 
 the natural rule above mentioned ; the Latin words, imputdre, 
 impriuUntia, adequdtm, and the French words imputer, marine^ 
 marcher, opinion, hzve not preferved their accents upon the ra- 
 dical fyllables ; — -a. beca^iife in tlxe Englifh language thefe 
 
 words
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cv 
 
 words were frequently contrafted, fo that a change in the pla- 
 cing of the accent became neceflary ^ v. g. to opifte, from the 
 Latin opindri, or the French opiner:, although this accidental 
 change was frequently attended with the advantage of repla- 
 cing the accent upon the radical fyllable of the word ; in this 
 condition we find the verbs, to daire, from the French defirer ; 
 to defpdiry from the Latin dejperdre j to deteji, from deteftari. 
 
 Of the accent of compound words. 
 
 Although every wordy when compounded with another 
 preferves its peculiar accent (book-binder, back-bite) yet ias 
 there can be only one principal accent prono;inced in eacb. 
 word, this accent is ufually, " and according to rule," placed 
 upon the determining word, namely that which flands fore- 
 moft ; for inHance, dMer-man, axle-tree, hdck-hite, hack-ward,^ 
 bdne-ful, bdre-feot) bl6od-J}jed, codl-pit. I have faid, *' according, 
 to rule ;" for there are indeed many exceptions here, not only 
 with refpe£l to various particles, as in the v/6rds al-mtghty^ 
 another, afch-deacon,^ith-holdywith-out, vjhere-hy ^un-like , un~ 
 der-tdke, See. but likewife in the triple compound words, aT- 
 to-gether^ajh-ijoednei-dayy iuhat-fo-^i)er,here-to-jorey for which, 
 initances, however, many fixed rules might be difcovered, 
 
 ReJleSiions upon words as parts effpeech. 
 
 The rules concerning the letters and their pronunciation, 
 the ftrufture of words, and the accent founded upon thaa: 
 ftrufture, compofe the firft and etymological part of grammar ^ 
 after which follows the fecond divifion, treating of words as 
 parts of fpeech, and their inflexion. Werds are called parts 
 of fpeech y in fo far as they denote different modification^ of 
 ideas in the connexion of a fentence : and in order to underftand 
 a language thoroughly, we mull previoufly acquire clear no- 
 tions of this fubjeft, — Speech is the audible enunciation oi 
 our ideas, and thefe are (generally) produced by objefts 
 without us. In fo far as thefe objects affeft the leprefenta- 
 tions of the mind, they are of two kinds only ; namely, either 
 felf'fubfillent things, i. e. fuhjiances ; or thofe circumilances 
 and modification^ v/hich occur in fubllanees, i. e. the accidental. 
 If our fpeech were conformable to the nature of things, wc 
 iliould have no more than thefe two- parts of fpeech ; but as 
 we cannot comprehend a fubftance with all its relations, at on» 
 ^ -(riewj nqr conceive thefe in an uniform manner, various parts 
 
 ■of
 
 cvi T PI REE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 of fpeech mull heceflarilj refult, particularly with refped tO 
 the accidental. Belides, the degree of perfpicuitj in our con- 
 ceptions renders a new diftinftion neceffary ; fince the repre- 
 fentations of the mind are either fo obfcure, that they remain 
 mere fenfations, or aflume the form of clear notions. As, 
 therefore, with refpeft to the parts of fpeech, every thing de- 
 pends upon the method, in which they are exhibited to tht 
 mind ; and as this method is by no means uniform in ail na- 
 tions, confequently the number and difpofition of the p-irts 
 of fpeech do not correfpond with each other in all languages. 
 The Englifh, for example, have arranged their ideas and repre- 
 fentations in ^he manner as follows. 
 
 I. Abrtrufe reprefentations, or vatre fenfations , in an abftrad: 
 fenfe. The expreffion of thefe affords the interjeQions, or 
 words of fenfation, which denote mere abftra£t fenfations. 
 — Fromi the higher branches of etymology we learn, that 
 the interjections are the foundation of all language ; becaufc 
 our reprefentations muft be firil abilrufe, and confequently 
 mere fenfations, before they can be developed into clear no- 
 tions. 
 
 II. Diftinft Reprefentations or ideas, the expreffion of which 
 fumifhes us with words, in the moll concrete and peculiar 
 fenfe — The things, of which we have ideas, are of a two- 
 fold nature ; namely, 
 
 I. Self-fubfifient things or fuhflanceSy and everything that 
 is exhibited to the mind as independent. The lign or ex- 
 preffion of them is t\it fubfiantive. 
 
 1. Accidental things, among which We comprife all that 
 can be diftinguilbed in the felf-fublillent thing, and that re- 
 lates to it. In general, this is again of a twofold nature ^ 
 for it is either belonging to the thing itfelf, as red, great^ 
 beautiful; or it is. external to it, as fioiVy here, away: in 
 the former cafe, it is called a quality ; in the latter, a cir- 
 cumftance. But according to the manner of exhibiting it, 
 this accidental thing is again divided into different clalTesy 
 which afford an equal number of parts of fpeech. It is con- 
 fidered, 
 
 A. Independently, external to the felf-fublillent thing, and 
 and in immediate conne£lion with it; and then it is in the 
 aforefaid manner of two kinds ; njimely, 
 
 I. a qvaVttv \ lirncc arilcs the^ qualifying v.'ord, or the 
 
 adverb
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG cvii 
 
 adverb of quality, which can be predicated of the fubflantive, 
 onlj by means of a verb ; 
 
 2. ^circumjiancey which in grammar, is of three different 
 kinds ; viz. 
 
 a, an independent circumftance, the adverhium circiim- 
 Jiantiie, or a word expreffive of a circumftance, in the moft 
 
 concrete fenfe ; 
 
 b, the relation fubfifting between two felf-fubfiftent 
 things, the prepofition ; and 
 
 c, the relation between fentences and their members, 
 the conjimBion. 
 
 B. As compriled in the attribute, i. e. fomething accidental 
 refpedling the circumftance of time, number, &:c, predicated 
 of the felf-fubfiftent thing, viz, the 'verh. 
 
 C. As already attributed, or in immediate connexion with 
 the fubftantive. This is either 
 
 1. a predicated quality,!, e. a property, the name of 
 which is exprefTed by the adjeBive ; or 
 
 2. a circumftance ; and then again 
 
 a, of felf-fubfiftence, the article ; 
 
 b, of the accidental relation to the perfon, the *ro- 
 noun ; and laftly 
 
 c, of computation, the nuniber. 
 
 Farther refleBions upon words. 
 
 From the premifes laid (Jovf n, the following parts of fpeech 
 are the necefTary refult : 
 
 I . The fubflantive, or the fign of all things,which do not only 
 fabfift of themfelves, but which are likewife conceived as 
 fuch. It is either a proper name, nomen proprium ; or the 
 name of a certain clafs of things, nomen appellativmn. As the 
 latter appertains to feveral things of the fame fpecies (for in- 
 ftance, man^ horfe, houfe,') and thus again fufFers a great dimi- 
 nution of its felf-fubfiftence, certain words became neceffary, 
 in order to reftore this felf-fubfiftance, in ft^ch fituations as 
 required it. This was accomplifhed 
 
 2, by means of the articles ; 
 
 3, by Jiumbers, that exprefs the circumftance of computa- 
 tion ; and 
 
 4, by the pronouns ; which ferve to denote the immediate 
 lelatioa of the perfon, in conneafton with the fubftantive. 
 
 5,.
 
 «ri{i THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 5, Tke accidental thing, as conneaed with the fubftance it- 
 felf, is confidered, in the German language, in two difFeren? 
 ways, naraelj of itfelf {per fe), in which cafe it can be pre- 
 dicated of the fubftantive, bj means of a verb onlj, v. g. this 
 houfe is large ; or in immediate connexion with the fubftantive, 
 as the large houfe, a great houfe. In tlie former cafe it is called 
 adverhium qualitatis or a qualifying \vord\ but in the lattor, it 
 ss fimply an adjeBivum or a word of property : this is derived 
 from the former, by means of a peculiar method of infleding 
 ^^ '^J, grammarians called concretion. In Englifli, however, 
 this dilHndion does not prevail ; for the adjedives here are 
 nowife different from the adverbs of quality ; hence a peculiar 
 term of art would be requifite to denote, with precilion, the 
 idea combined in both cafes : God is almighty y and the almighty 
 God. — ^To this head alfo belong the participlesy which are 
 not confidered as particular parts of fpeech, but are either ad- 
 jedives or adverbs of quality derived from the verb ; fo that 
 they exprefs, in the fame word, the collateral idea of tirne. 
 
 6, The verby a part af fpeech, predicating of the fubftantive 
 that which is accidental, together with different collateral 
 ideas, combined in one and the fame word. 
 
 7, The prepojitions ; 8, conjunctions ; and 9, inter jeBions^ ha- 
 ving been confidered in the preceeding fedlion, require no fur- 
 tlier explanation* 
 
 Analyjis of the injleBions. 
 
 That which is accidental may be exprefled in a great va- 
 xiety of ways, as belonging to the felf-fubfiftent thing ; whence 
 a number of cafual relations arife, which would render our 
 fpeech extremely prolix, if we had not contrived means of 
 immediately denoting them in the compafs of every word 
 itfelf, through fimple radical founds, i. e. by inflefting the word. 
 The Germans have adopted the following modes of inflection. 
 1. The diftinftion of plurality in fubftantives, or the forma^ 
 iien of the plural, 1. 'The diftinftion of the relation fubfifting 
 between the fubftantive contained in the predicate, and the 
 fubje£t ; the declenfion, 3. The diftindion of the gender in the 
 words determining the fubftantive j the motion. 4. "The 
 change of an adverb of quality into an adjective ; the co«cr^- 
 tion. 5. The diftindlion between a higher and the higheil de- 
 gree exprefled in an adverb of tjuality, or adjedlive ; the degrees 
 ejcotnparifon. And finally, 6, the. diftindion of the different 
 
 relations.
 
 E S S A Y S, BY A D E L U N G. 
 
 ox 
 
 relations, which verbs denote,or the cc7ijugation. — The Eng.. 
 Itfh language is, with refped to the infledion of words, veiy 
 iimple, or rather defedive ; for, of the fix modes of inflecaiou 
 above fpecified, three only are known in Englifh ; namely, the 
 formation of the plural, the degrees of comparifon, and the 
 conjugation. As the adjedive here is in no manner different 
 from the adverb of quality, and as the fubftantives like wife 
 have no peculiar declenfion, there can be exhibited neither con^ 
 cretion nor motion in their form. 
 
 I. Further refle&iom on thefubflantive. 
 
 I. Divijlon of it. 
 
 Every part of fpeech muft be feparately confidered in granse- 
 mar ; it muft be divided into its different fpecies, and the ia- 
 Eedions, to which it is liable, muft there be exhibited. The 
 .fubftantive juftly occupies the firft place, as it is the moft im- 
 portant word in fpeech j in the next place, the words which 
 determine thefubflantive, namely the articles, adjedives, pro- 
 nouns, and numbers ought to follow ; after thefe the verbs, 
 and finally the adverbs and interjedions conclude the whole. 
 As it is not my intention to write a grammar in this Effay, 
 I fhall content myfelf with niaking a few remarks upon each 
 part of fpeech. 
 
 The fubftantive is the iign of a felf-fubfiftent thing, or a 
 fubftance. This is either really and independently fublifting ; 
 or it is not fubftantially exifting, atid only reprefented as 
 felf-fubfift.ent : the former is called a coKcretitniy the latter an 
 abJlraBum. The concrete thing is again divided into four claffes ; 
 for it reprefents either the name of an individual, the proper 
 name, nomen propriv/m ; or that of a whole clafs of fimilar in- 
 dividual things, nemen appeliati'uum ; or that of a multitude of 
 things, in which no individuality is diftinguifhed ; a colledive 
 name, nomen colleBivum ; or laftly, that of matter, nomem 
 materiale, fuch as iron, wood, ftone, bread. 
 
 a. The gender off tihfiantives. 
 
 Many languages divide all their fubftantives into certain 
 claffes, borrowed from the phyfical gender of the animal 
 kingdom, fo that ^1 their words of determination, i. e. the ar- 
 
 6 - ■ ' tides,
 
 ex THREEPHILOLOGICAL 
 
 tides, pronouns, adjedives, and fometimes alfo the numbers, 
 muft mark the gender peculiar to every fubftantive. The 
 queftion now arifes, whether this be likewife the cafe in Eng- 
 lifh. If we follow the common ftatement of grammarians, we 
 mull anfwer in ths affirmative : but if we refleft upon the 
 nature of the thing, we cannot allow the Englilh fubftantives 
 anj fuch gender as thefe words poffefs in the German, Latin, 
 and many other languages. The ftrongeft proof ot this is the* 
 abfenc« of all the genders in the determining words above 
 mentioned. The perfonal pronoun of the third perfon, indeed, 
 appears to prove the contrary.; for he^Jhc^ and it^ aipe really 
 infledled according to the three different genders. But there 
 is a great diifere,nce between marking the phyfical gender, 
 where this diftinftion becomes neceflary ; and between claffiag 
 ail fubfltantives according to the different genders, although 
 they might refer to inanimate things, and to abftradt ideas. 
 • All languages praftife the former expedient, though they do 
 not make ufe of the latter clafTification ; and this is alfo the 
 cafe in the Englifh language. The Englifli fubflantives, as 
 i'ubftantives, mark no particular gender ; for if they did fo, 
 their determining words likewife ought to .point it out ;^ 
 which however is not coniiftent with practice. Hence this 
 apparent deficiency greatly facilitates the acquifition of a 
 language, which does not impofe upon us the talk of fludying 
 the genders of nouns ; fince it is obvious, that this diflind:ion, 
 in our prcfent method of reprefenting objefts to the mind, is 
 not attended with the leaft advantage, that could in any de- 
 gree compenfate this inconvenience. 
 
 3. Of the formation of the Plural. 
 
 Since the words exprefTive of kind, or appellatives, may 
 either relate to one thing of the kind, or to a j:lurality of 
 things, the numbers ferve che purpofe of marking this double 
 diftinftipn. The formation of the plural, which in the Ger- 
 man, Latin, and other languages is very difficult, is remarka- 
 bly eafy in the Englifh ; as it is formed by adding the letter 
 s or the fyllable es to the lingular ; and the few exceptions, or 
 deviations from this rule, we find Hated in every grammar. 
 
 4. Of the Declenfion. 
 
 To decline a noun, is to denote certain relations of a felf- 
 -' ' ' ^ fubfiflent
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cxi, 
 
 r»ibfi{lent thing, hy means of fimple radical founds, which are 
 annexed to the word itfelf : for inflance, Haus, a houfe ; 
 Mau/es, of a houfe ; Hau/e, to. a houfe ; Hdufer, houfes ; 
 Hdufern^ to the houfes, &,c. The Engliih language does not 
 admit of thefe inflexions, and by rejefting them, faves much 
 trouble and inconvenience, which attend the many decleniions, 
 and the exceptions from them prevailing in other languages. In 
 Englifh, therefore, fome prepofitions are ufed, which exprefs 
 the infle£led cafes of other languages : and as two cafes only 
 are marked by the prepofitions, namely the genitive or ablative 
 of the Latin by the particle o/J and the dative by tOy bpth of 
 them are employed like all other prepofitions, without dif- 
 tindiion of numbers, ot any other circumftance. Yet there 
 is ftill a veilige of a true declenfion remaining , in Engliih, 
 which confills of what is called the genitivus pojfejjivus (more 
 properly pojipojitltms^, which is pointed out by the letter j-, 
 and made ufe.of, when tlie genitive flands before its fubftantive 
 without an article ; v, g. the king'' s fpeech, the queen'' s brother ; 
 inftead of " the fpeech of the king, the brocher of the queen." 
 - — It is not difficult to difcover, that this 'j is a veftige of the 
 German genitive, des K'miges Rede. And as the Engliih fub- 
 llantives have no variety of gender, this V confequently re- 
 mains unaltered, of whatever gender the word may be in other 
 languages. 
 
 11. Of the Article, 
 
 The article is a part of fpeech, which ferves to diilinguifh 
 different kinds of abfolutenefs in fubilantives, and is chiefly 
 ufed with appellati'ves. Thefe mark whole kinds of things of 
 the fame nature ; fuch as horfe, houfe, tree ; which, from their 
 very extenfive application, lofe a great ihar6 of their abfolute 
 identity ; or, in other words, as they are common to many 
 owners and places, the hearer could never know, which indi- 
 vidual horfe, houfe, or tree is meant, if this circumflance 
 were not determined by the article. / havefeen horfe, has a 
 very obfcure meanings whence the hearer is necefTarily indu- 
 ced to afk, whofe or what fort of a horfe I have feen — Tlie 
 pronouns and numbers, indeed, likewife ferve to determine the 
 bbjefts, but there is yet another determination requifite, to 
 which they are not adapted, namely that of abfolutenefs, 
 ■which is exprelTed by the articles. 
 
 o 2 In
 
 c.ii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 In the Englifh grammars, three articles are generally enu- 
 merated ; the indefinite^ which is faid to confift in the prepo- 
 lition ofm the genitive, and -^o in the dative cafe ,• the definite 
 expreffed by the word the ; and the article of unity, a 
 or rt/2. But this may be called true pedantry of the fchools,- 
 by which we are led from ohe abfurdity to another. For i, 
 who will allow himfelf to confider' the words q/and to as ar- 
 ticles, iince they are real prepofitions, which govern their re- 
 fpeftive cafes: i. If thefe particles of and to reprefent the 
 definite article, we muft likewife grant, that in the expref- 
 fions " of the king'^ and " to the king,'* two different articles 
 are ufed before the fubftantive,. viz. one that is indefinite or 
 imdetermined, and another that is definite or determined, fo 
 that one of them' neceffarily fuperfedes the other : this, how-r 
 ever, is a palpable contradidion. 3. The propofed article of 
 unity is incorreftly expreffed in its denomination, becaufe it 
 is liable to be confounded with the number o«^,' and has ac- 
 tually been confounded' with it, by feveral Englifli gramma- 
 rians — -The definitions and explanations of the articles, which' 
 appear in the ufual French grammars, are equally erroneous. 
 The Englilh language admits only df two articles ; the definite 
 — the, and the indefinite— «;? befoi'e a vowel or mutt h, ahd a 
 before a confonanf. The latter, no doubt, has likewife a ten- 
 dency to determine the felf-fubfiftent thing ; but as it does 
 this in a much weaker degree than the former, it has received 
 the name of the indefinite or undetermined article. T. The de- 
 finite article points out an individual of a kind or clafs, that 
 is already known and felf-fubfiilent : the emperor, fignifies, ac- 
 cording to the connexion of the fentence, either the prefent 
 reigning emperor, or that emperor, of whom we were fpeak- 
 ing laft 5 confequently this article denotes one individually de. 
 terrained perfon, which is fingled out from that clafs of indi- 
 viduals, who are or have been emperors. II. The indefinite^ 
 article ^3[;z of a ferves to mark ; 1, an indefinite felf-fubfiftent 
 thing belonging to a whole clafs, without pointing out a par- 
 ticular individual ; v. g. " an enemy is not to be trufted," i. e, 
 " no eneray whoever he be ;" 2, the fpecies or clafs, to which 
 a thing belongs, as an undetermined felf-fubfifting things, v. g. 
 *' he was killed by a fword," i. e, *' by one of the vsreapons 
 called fvvords." 
 
 Without any article may be ufed; i, proper nouns ; be- 
 caufe they are already more accurately ■ determined by means 
 
 of
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG cxiii 
 
 of the individual, to which they refer, than they could be 
 through the articles ; v. g. Cicero was an excellent orator ; 
 — all Europe is in confujion : excepting, however, when thefe 
 nouns again partake of the nature of appellatives, i. e. -when 
 they may be referred to more than one thing ; for inftance, 
 the elder Plinj, the little 'James. In like manner are the 
 names of rivers and fhips confidered as appellatives, and con- 
 ne£led with the definite article ;i — 2, if a -determined iingle 
 individual is meant, and the whole kind or clafs is underilood 
 by it, in which cafe the Germans make ufe of the definite 
 article ; v. g. der Menfch ijl verniinftig, " man is rational ;" 
 but in fuch expreffions, the Englilh make ufe of no article :— 
 3, if an indefinite number of fingle things, out of a whole 
 clafs, is to be expreiTed j or in fuch cafes as require the inde- 
 finite article in the Angular number ; — ** I want pens," in the 
 fingular, " I want a pen :" — and 4, if merely the clafs, kind, or/ 
 matter is to be denoted ; as " building is preciou* ; or, *< it is 
 fine cloth." In_ all thefe inilances, the oblique cafes of the 
 nouns are only marked by the prepofitions of and to in the 
 genitive and dative, and by the fenfe of the active verb itfelf 
 in. the accufative, without admitting any article. 
 
 III. Of the AdjeCiwe, 
 
 In the German language, that which is found to be change- 
 able in the thing itfelf, is confidered in two different ways^ 
 namely, i, as independent of the fubftantive or, at leaft, not 
 in immediate cannedlion with it, in which cafe it is enunciated 
 by the verb ; v. g. der Mann ijl gut, " the man is good ;" or 
 2, in immediate connedlion with the fubftantive, v. g. der ijl 
 ein guter Mann, " that is a good man," where the German 
 ^ adje(9:iv€ is regularly inflefted, according to the gender of the 
 noun : while in the former cafe, it is ufed adverbially, and 
 remains indeclinable. Hence arife two parts of fpeech, name-* 
 iy the adverb of quality, and the adjeQiive, or the woid ex- 
 preffive of the property of the thing, which is derived from 
 the former, by means of the concrete fyllables e for the fe- 
 minine, er for the mafculine, and es for the neuter gender, or 
 with the fimple vowel e for all the thi'ee genders, when the 
 definite article is connecled with the noun. And as the Ger-^ 
 man fubftantives not only mark different genders, but alfo the 
 ©bli^ue cafcs, it- may be eafily inferred, that the adjectives are 
 
 liable
 
 'cxiv THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 liable to fimilar inflexions ; a circumftance, which is attended 
 with confiderable difficulties to foreigners, who apply them- 
 felves to the fpeaking and writing of that language. In Eng- 
 lilh, a much eafier and Ihorter method is pradifed, fince the 
 adverb of quality is, in no refped, different from the adjedlive, 
 and may be combined with the fubftantive, without any in- 
 flexion : thus it remains uniformly in the fame termiuation, 
 Whether we fay, *' the prince is powerful," or " the power- 
 ful prince." Hence, too, the adjeXives diftinguifli no plural ; 
 and as the Engliffi fubftantives mark no gender, and are of 
 themfelves indeclinable, the adje£tives likewife cannot be in- 
 fleXed, and arc ill this refpeft throughout managed like ad- 
 verbs. 
 
 The only inflexions, of which adjeXives are capable, are 
 the degrees of comparifon, which are formed nearly upon the 
 plan of the German, by adding to the pofitive degree the fyl- 
 lable er^ in order to make the comparative ; and the fyllable 
 efiy to form the fuperlative : but very frequently thefe two 
 degrees are expreffed by prefixing to the fimple adjeXives the 
 fefpeXive adverbs more and moji. 
 
 IV. Of numerical words » 
 
 The words denoting numbers are rarely introduced into 
 Englifli grammars, as particular parts of fpeech, and frequent- 
 ly they are not at all mentioiied : we mull neverthelefs at- 
 tend to feveral peculiarities in the ufe of them. As, with re- 
 fpeX to the idea combined with them, they are remarkably 
 different from all other parts of fpeech, they certainly deferve 
 to be fe.parately treated. — Numbers denote nothing that is 
 difcoverable in the things themfelves, as is the cafe with the 
 preceding part of fpeech ; bu^ they eftablifti a circumftance^ 
 namely that of numerical computation. Befide this peculia- 
 rity, they are alfo diftinguifhed from the ufual words deno- 
 ting circumftances, by their immediate connexion with the 
 fubftantive, while the former can be predicated of fubftantives, 
 by means of verbs or£ly. Grammarians ought to diftinguifli 
 the different fpecies of numerical words, fince they fignify 
 either abfolute number without any collateral idea, viz. thft 
 radical or cardinal numbers, which may again be divided into 
 definite and indefinite ; or they are conneXed with the colla- 
 teral ideas of order or fucceffion, clafllfication, proportion, &c. 
 
 All
 
 ESSAYS, BY AD E LUNG. csv. 
 
 All thefe words are liable to many peculiar applications, whi^h, 
 liowever, properlj belong to the p^rovince of gra9iinar. 
 
 V. Of the Pronouns, ~ 
 
 Pronouns are words determining the fubftantlves, and de- 
 noting thofe changeable relations, which are indicated in the 
 very ad; of fpeaking, and the principa,l of which concerns the 
 relative condition of the perfon. They are as various as the 
 relations pointed out by them ; namely, 
 
 Xyperjonal^ which refer to perfons only. Thefe may be far- 
 ■~ ther I,) definite y which are again divided according to the 
 three perfons, and according as each of them is in the 
 fingular or plural number. The firft and fecond perfons are 
 fufficiently determined by the relation, in which they appear 
 in fpeech ; hence there is no farther neceffity foi: pointing 
 t)ut their gen-.ler. But the third perfon is, of itfelf, wholly 
 undetermined ; and for this reafon its gender is marked in 
 the Angular number, by diflerent words for each of the three 
 - genders. Yet as the Englifh fubflantives, in general, ex- 
 prefs no peculiar gender, the third perfonal pronoun ferves 
 only to denote t\ie phyfical gender of the perfon ; for this 
 reafon all fuch things, as cannot be diflinguiflied by being 
 phyfically of the mafculiue or feminine gender, receive the 
 imperfonal pronoun it ; ^,) indefinite^ among which this 
 undetermined fyllable it occupies the firft rank ; a fyllable, 
 which indicates a determined fubjeft in fo undecided ^. 
 manner, that it does not pofitiyely follow, whether a per- 
 fon or a thing is underftoodby it : v. g. " it is faid ; it was 
 Mr Pope ; it is I." -.-In like manner is ufed the improper 
 pronoun one, in as far as it correfponds with the German 
 pronoun man oi jemand,, *' fomebody ;" v. g. to love one. 
 
 2. Reciprocal ■^xoiiOM.ns, which properly /belong to the former 
 clafs, and are only ufed, when the predicate is again referred 
 to-the fubjeft : "I love myfelf," &c. 
 
 3. PoJJeJfive pronouns ferve to determine the relation of pof- 
 feffion, with refpeil to the perfon. They are either co?i- 
 
 junHive, when immediately combined with their fubftan- 
 tlves, *' my houfe, your father ;" or abfolute, when they 
 are predicated of fubftantives by means of a verb, as 
 likewife in anfwering a queftlon : v. g. *' this houfe is mine ; 
 — whofe father called ? — yours." The pcfleffive pronoun 
 • ■ .. " ■■.■-•''' 'of
 
 exvi THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 of the third perfon is, like the perfonal pronoun, again <lif- 
 tinguiftied according to its phyfical gender, fo that his and 
 her are ufed of things, which by the laws of nature are of 
 the mafculine or feminine gender ; and in all other cafes 
 the poffeffive pronoun its. 
 4. Demonjlrative pronouns, which denote the relation of the 
 place with refpe£t to the fpeaker, fo that the nearell place 
 is exprefled by the words, this in the fingular or tbefe in the 
 plural, and the moft remote, by the refpedive words that 
 or thofe. 
 " 5. Determinative pronouns, which afcertain the fubjeft, to 
 •which a fentence is referred by means of the fubfequent reci- 
 procal pronoun. To this number belong, partly the perfon- 
 :al pronouns he and Jhe, when they are ufed in a determi- 
 nate fenfe, v. g. ** he that, or who, fights with filver arms ;'' 
 partly the pronoun fuch^ in which cafe it is accompanied by 
 the particle a! : <^ fuch as are loyal, &,c." ; partly alfo the 
 ** pronoun of identity," the famey with its further deter- 
 minations, the very fame y the felffamey and the very. 
 -6. Relative pronouns, which bring back the fentence to a fub- 
 je£l, either previoufly pointed out, or conne£led with a de- 
 terminative pronoun ; of which clafs are, who, which, what, 
 and that. 
 7. Interrogative pronouns ferve to introduce a queflion, for 
 which purpofe we make ufe of the relative pronouns, whoy 
 which, and what. 
 
 The pronouns, in general, and the perfonal pronouns, in 
 particular, are very irregular in their inflexion. This pecu- 
 liarity is remarkable, not only in the Englilh, but likewife in 
 all the languages hitherto difcovered : for the pronouns may 
 be clafTed among the moft ancient words in fpeech ; their ori- 
 gin muft be traced in the primitive ages, when the language 
 of every nation was yet in its infant ftate. 
 
 A number of other pronouns are commonly enumerated in 
 grammars under the name of pronomina indejinita ; but z^ 
 they exprefs none of the relations denoted by pronouns, they 
 cannot be reduced to any of the claiTes before fpecified. Be- 
 fides, many of them are fc pointedly determined, that no ra- 
 tional being will confider them as indefinite ; for inflance, all, 
 whole, each, neither, every, &c. By far the greater part of 
 them rather belong to the clafs of general numbers, viz. all, 
 any,fome, hoth^ each, either ^ neither, every, few, mnchy no, none. 
 
 Some
 
 ESSAYS, BY ABELUNG. cxvii 
 
 Some again, as whole, certain, othstr, are with more propriety 
 ranked among the adje(3:ives ; aj4d others as ever and never, 
 arc in reality adverbs. 
 
 VI. Opheverh. 
 
 The verb is, in all languages, the nioil artificial ahd the moft 
 ^iiEcult part of fpeech ; becaufe men have contrived to point 
 out, in immediate connexion with it, very different and mul- 
 tiplied relations. To denote thefe relations properly, in the 
 various inflections of the verb, is called by grammarians, to 
 conjugate. The verbs are divided into different fpecies, arifing 
 partly from thtivjignification, partly from their use, and partly 
 alfo from their conjugation. 
 
 With refpeft to xhtii Jignijication, they attribute fomething 
 to an object, which can either be conceived immediately in it, 
 and in this cafe they are called intranjiti've, fometimes too, but 
 not very properly, neuter verbs ; or they imply fomething 
 that takes place externally to it, tranjitive verbs ; when two 
 felf-fubfiflent things are required, the one of which is in an 
 aftive, and the other in a palfive ftate. On this account, in 
 many languages, the tranfitive verbs have two different forms j 
 namely the aciive,- when the fubjeft is in an aftive ftate, and 
 the pajjive, when it is fuffering. The reciprocal verbs are true 
 tranfitives, with this exception only, that the pre4icate is 
 brought back to the fubjeft, by means of a pronoun. 
 
 With refpeft to the ufe, the verbs are €\l\\tx pej-fonal. When 
 their fubjetSt is determined, or impcrfdnal, when it cannot be 
 afcertained, and confequently is fomething unknown. Farther, 
 they are either perfeB, when they can be ufed in all the dif- 
 ferent relations, in which the predicate can be placed towards 
 the fubjedl ; or defeBive, when they are ufed only in fome o^f 
 thefe relatione. 
 
 With refpeft to the conjugation, the verbs are called regulaf, 
 when all their relative ftates can be exprelTed conformably to 
 one rule ; or irregular, when they deviate frorn the eftabliftied 
 rule. 
 
 The relations, circumflances, and collateral notions, which 
 mankind have contrived to exprefs by the verb, are very nu- 
 merous. 'J^he principal of them are as follows. 
 J. The. form of the word, whether a verb is tranjitive, or in- 
 
 tranfitive i and in the former cafe, whether it is aElive
 
 cxviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 2. The mood or the manner, in which the predicate is ftate4 
 concerning the fubje£l. This maybe done, a,) in a pofitive 
 m.anner, implying truth and certainty ; hence the indicative, 
 mood ; b,) in an uncertain and doubtful manner, the conjunc' 
 tiije \ c,) by way of command, tlie imperative ; and d,) 
 without any reference to the perfon, the infinitive. — The 
 participle, which is fometimes confidered as a peculiar 
 Twood, deferves no place here ; fince it is properly an adjec- 
 tive derived from the verb, and carrying with it the colla- 
 teral idea of time. 
 
 3. The time^ in which the predicate belongs to the fubjedl. 
 This ftriftly coniiils of thiee periods only, namely xhcprefentf 
 pajiy and future ; but as the two lall are fufceptible of a 
 great variety of farther determinations, not indeed arifmg 
 from their own nature, but from the various relations of 
 fpeech, many languages exprefs theie in the verb itfelf ; and 
 thus the paji time is again divided into three tenfes, the 
 imperfeB, perfect , and pluperfeB ; in a fimilar manner the 
 futurels again refolved into feveral fpecies. 
 
 4. The number of the perfons of the fubjedl ; and laftly, 
 
 5. The fpecies of the perfon itfelf, whether it is the firft, fe- 
 cond, or third. 
 
 To exprefs all thefe circumftances and relations in the vtrb 
 itfelf, agreeable to the method adopted in every language, is 
 by grammarians called, to conjugate. Under this expreflion, 
 however, we underhand only this much, that all the relations^ 
 above ftated, ought to be expreffed by means of proper fylla- 
 bles of inflexion, attached to the root of the verb itfelf ; and 
 in this procefs, the Englilh language is remarkably fimple and 
 eafy. It admits only of one form and one gender j for the w- 
 tranfitive verbs are likewife conjugated in the aBive form ; 
 in this there are only, three moods^ the indicative, the impera- 
 tive and the infinitive : in the indicative we make ufe of two 
 tenfes, viz. the prefent, and a fpecies of the paft, the imperfeSi ; 
 but in the imperative, and iniinitive, of one tenfe only : in 
 both tenfes of the indicative, there appear two numbers, and iti 
 each of thefe, three perfons, which however can be only im- 
 perfe6lly marked by the verb itfelf; a deficiency, which ren- 
 ders the prefixing of the pronouns neceffary. 
 
 To denote the remaining relations, the Englifh are obliged 
 to tnake ufe of circumlocution, or of indirect expreffions fur- 
 nilhed them by certain verbs, that generally in^ic-ate fome col- 
 lateral
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cxix 
 
 llateral circumftances, and on this account are called auxiliary 
 words; becaufe thfey ferve to exprefs thofe relations, in the fot- 
 mation of whicli the Englifh verbs are deficient. Thefe then 
 confift of the verbs, to be, for the paffive form ; I may, for the 
 conjun£live ; to have, for the pall ; arid IJhall, for the future 
 tenfes 5 — although feveral other auxiliary verbs are commonly 
 enumerated. But, as the whole of this periphrajlical conjuga- 
 tion has been formed merely upon the plan of the niore com- 
 plete Latin inflexion of verbs, thofe above fpecified willanfwer 
 the prefent purpofe ; lince any other method of conjugating 
 verbs, if carried on by auxiliary words, is in every refpe£l pe- 
 riphraftical. 
 
 I cannot here enter upon thfe extenfi-^e application and the 
 ufe of thefe auxiliary words ; and therefore I fliall only ob- 
 ferve, that the tranfitive verbs,- in the German language, are 
 divided into two clafles, according as the ideas exprelTed by 
 them partake more of the adlive or paflive meaning. In the 
 former cafe, they are accompanied by the auxiliary verb ha- 
 hen, " to have ;" in the latter, hy feyn, ♦♦ to be ;" v. g. er hat 
 gefchlafen, '* he has flept ;" but in another inftance, er iji ge- 
 ne/en, " he is recovered." This diiiinftlon, however, does not 
 prevail in Englifh, where all tranfitives are inflefted by the 
 auxiliary verb, to have, without attending to their lignifica- 
 tlon. — Regular verbs are fuch as preferve the radical fyllable 
 unchanged, and in which the infieftion is carried on, in an uni- 
 form manner, by means of fixed terminating fyllables. Irre- 
 gular verbs either deviate from th€ eftabliihed fyllable of in- 
 flexion, or they frequently want it altogether ; for inftance, 
 / htirjl ; imperf. / hiirji ; participle, lurjl or burjien ; or the in- 
 fleftion takes place in the radical fyllable itfelf ; I bleed-, im- 
 perf. / bled ; participle, bled ; or where both deviations Occur 
 in the fame verb; I befeech ; imperf. / bejought ; p&rtic^- 
 feeched cr hef ought. The irregular verbs are, in all languages, 
 the moft ancient and the moft original : in tracing the nature 
 and origin of them, we miift *efort to the higher branches of 
 etymology. In Engliih we find the irregular verbs through- 
 out derived from the Saxo-Danlfti, in which language they 
 llkewife appear in the irregular form ; as, on the other hand, 
 the verbs formed from the French and Latin uniformly follow 
 the regtlar inflexion. 
 
 pa VII.
 
 dx TH^EE PKtiLOtOGlCAL, &c. 
 VII. Of the F articles. 
 
 The particles furnifh a fubjeft of inquiry, that would be in- 
 coniiftent with the limits of this EfTay. They are throughout 
 confidered as advetbs ; fince they denote either a circumftance 
 in general, in which cafe the precife meaning of them refults 
 from thofe parts of fpeech, with which they are immediately 
 connefted ; or they point out a circumftance of itfelf, and in- 
 depend-nt of any other part of fpeech, in which fituation they 
 are called adverbs ; or they relate to particular kinds of circum- 
 fiances : thus the prepojttions denote the relation fubfifting be- 
 tween two fubftantives, in which relation they have been placed 
 by the verb ; as the conjunBions mark the relation between fen- 
 
 tences and their members The laft part of fpeech, with which 
 
 grammarians conclude their talk, comprifes the interjeBions, 
 They exprefs the various fenfations or emotions of the mind, 
 fimply as fuch, and may be divided according to the various 
 kinds of thefe emotions. There are however fome words, i. e. 
 expreffions of clear ideas, which are occafionally ufed to de- 
 note mere fenfations ; for inftance, " O fad ! well a day 1'* 
 and for this reafon they cannot^ with ft rift propriety, be called 
 interjections. 
 
 Conclujton, 
 
 Since my intention, throughout the whole of this treatife, 
 has been no other, but to lliew in a curfory manner, that 
 tlie Englifli grammar is lefs arbitrary, and more fufceptible of 
 rational treatment, than many philologers imagine, I muft 
 content myfelf, for the prefenf, with this ftiort fpecimen. 
 
 If teachers and learners fhould gradually adopt this method 
 of etymological reafoning, it will be eafy to apply it to the 
 fyntax ; which, independently of this confideration, is much 
 cafier and more concife in Engliflx than in other languages ; 
 becaufe the words, in the former, are deprived of nearly the 
 whole of their inflexion. Indeed, by far the moft eflisntial 
 bufinefs in the fyntax confifts, partly of a rational method of 
 eonftrucling the Jeries of words, in which the Engliflx language 
 much refembles the German ; partly of the proper ufe of the 
 participles, which difplay many peculiarities in the conftruc- 
 tion of that language. . 
 
 ESSAY
 
 CX£L 
 
 ESSAY THIRD. 
 
 On the relative merits and demerits of JohnforjL s 
 English Dinionary. 
 
 X HE Englifh are in poiTeffion of a very copious Di^ionary 
 of their language, with which the late Dr. Samuel Johnson" 
 has prefented them, and of which the fourth edition appear- 
 ed (London, 1773) with fome additions, in two large Folio 
 Volumes, compriling upwards of thirty Alphabets, or 716 
 Sheets of letter-prefs *. 1 
 
 As the completenefs of this work, together with the criti- 
 cal and philofophic manner, which the author follows, has 
 been frequently the fubjeft of great praife, not only in Eng- 
 land, but alfo in other countries, by recommending it as a mo- 
 del of a ufeful Didionary for any language ; I was induced 
 to think, that an accurate abridgment of this work might of 
 itfelf fuffice, to fupply fo important a defeft in German lite- 
 rature. Nor indeed had I directed my views further, when I 
 refolved upon publilhing an Englifh-German Didionary, de- 
 figned chiefly for the ufe of my countrymen. But upon a 
 more minute inquiry into the merits of Johnfon's work, I 
 very foon difcovered, that this performance, notwithftanding 
 the many advantages it pofleffes, is replete with great imper- 
 fe^lions. — As thefe impcrfeftions are of fuch a nature, as to 
 exhibit themfelves more remarkably in an abridgment, tran- 
 flated into German, than they perhaps do appear in the origi- 
 nal ; and as the principal utility, which the Germans expe£t 
 from fuch an undertaking, might thus have been much dimi- 
 nifhed, I was obliged to fubmit to a more arduous talk than 
 1 was, at firft, inclined to undertake. 
 
 This afTertion will not be confidered as unjuft, when I fliall 
 point out, individually, the principal requilites to a Diftion- 
 ary, and remark upon every point, how far yahnfon has per- 
 formed 
 
 * This computation is made from the firft Edition, Lond. 1755*
 
 fcjixu THREE PHILOLOGICAL, 
 
 formed his duty, and wherein / have endeavoured to improve 
 
 upon him. 
 
 1. In the number of words. 
 
 a. In the vahie and dignity of every word, whether it be 
 quite obfolete or current ; and in the latter cafe, whether 
 it is ufed in the more elevated, poetical, focial, or vulgar 
 flylc. 
 
 3. In the grammatical nature of the word, to which I alfo re- 
 fer the orthography, the mark of tRe accent, and the pro- 
 nunciation. 
 
 4. In the etymology or derivation. 
 
 5. In the decompofition of the principal idea denoted by the 
 word ; — either by means of a definition, or by a fynonymous 
 German word ;— ^and in the analyfis of the different figni- 
 fications. 
 
 6. In the ilhlftration of words by examples ; and, 
 
 7. In the grammatical combination, or the ufe of every word', 
 witli refped to the fyntax. 
 
 Conformable to this divifion of the fubje6l, IlTiall offer fome 
 remarks upon each of thefe particular points. 
 
 I. Concerning the number and the pratbical ufe of words 
 I expefted to find the work of Johnfon in its greateft perfec- 
 tion. In a book, conlifling of 2864 pages, large folio, and four 
 times reprinted, I hoped to meet with the whole treafure, 
 or at leall witli the mtofl neceffary and current words, of 
 the Engliih language. But, in this refpeft, my difappoint- 
 ment was great ; and thofe, who have confulted Johnfon's 
 Dictionary with the fame view, will agree with me, that 
 upon this very point he difplays his weakefi: fide. We mull 
 however do him the juftice to allow, that with refpeft to 
 terms of fcience, and written language, his work is very com- 
 |)lete ; but it is defec^tive in focial language, in the language 
 of civil life, and in the terms of arts and manufaftures. His 
 defeft in the laft-mentioned branches, the author himfelf ac- 
 knowledges in the preface, and makes this ftrange apology for 
 it, •* that he found it impoffible to frequent the work-lhops 
 of mechanics, the mines, magazines, fhip-yards, &c. in order 
 to inquire into the different terms and phrafes, which are pe- 
 culiar to thefe purfuits." Yet this is a great defideratum to 
 foreigners, and confiderably detradls from the merit of a work 
 of this nature ; for thefe are the precife cafes, in which they 
 have raoll frequent occafion for confulting a Didlionary. To 
 
 this
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cxxiii 
 
 this head we may refer the names of plants, fillies, birds, znd, 
 infe6ls^ frequently occurring in common life, of which a, 
 great number are wanting in the work of Johnfon ; though 
 this deficiency might have been moll eafily fupplied, as there 
 certainly is no want of botanical books and publications on 
 Natural Hiilory, in the Englilh language. In order to ihow 
 the extent of this deficiency, in a particular inftance, I lliall only 
 remark, that in the fingle work containing the lalt voyage of 
 Capt. Cook, in two moderate volumes, oftavo, (publilhed 
 17S2) there occur nearly one hundred vv^ords, relating partly 
 to navigation, partly to Natural Hiilory, that cannot be found 
 in Johnfon's or other Didionaries. 
 
 It will be admitted, that a dictionary of a langtiage ought 
 to poflefs the greatell poffible degree of completenei's, parti- 
 cularly with refpeft to nsimes and technical terms, which are 
 more rarely employed in common language, and the meaning 
 of which cannot be conjedlured from the context. As fuch words 
 frequently become an objedl of relearch, 1 have found myfelf 
 under the difagreeable neceflity of filling up thefe chafms, as 
 far as my time, my plan, and my fources of information would 
 admit. Thus I have increafed the Hock of words, occurring 
 in Johnfon's and other Englifh Diftionaries of di(linguilhe4 
 merit, with a great number (perhaps feveral thoufands) of 
 words which were wanting ; efpecially fuch as concern the 
 objects of the animal and vegetable kingdoms, of the Engliili 
 conllitution, and of various other departments. With regard 
 to the laws, manners, and culloms of England, I have availed 
 myfelf of the well known work of Entick. 
 
 The proper names of countries, places, and perfons, when 
 deviating from the genuine orthography, I have likewife moie 
 correflly Hated, and added fuch as have been omitted in John- 
 fon's and other diftionaries. 
 
 For the improvement of terms in focial language, I am 
 much indebted to Boyer's Englilli and French Dictionary. 
 But as I had, in this refpecl, placed more confidence in John- 
 fon than I could juftify after a careful examination of his 
 work ; and as, on this account, I did not bellow the portion 
 of time requifite to a clofe comparifon with other Diilionaries, 
 I readily confefs, that there remains much to be done yet, e- 
 fpecially with the aflillance of the latell Engliili productions 
 |n the department of Belles Lettres. Forj in latter times, the» 
 
 Engliftl
 
 cxxiv THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 Englifh language appears to have undergone the fame changes 
 as the French and German. 
 
 II. It is well known, that all the words of a language do ^ 
 not poffefs an equal value or degree of currency : fome of them 
 are entirely obfolete, but ftill occur in writings, which are Ilu- 
 died in modern times, for inflance, in the tranflation of the 
 Bible, in Shakefpeare, Spencer, Sec. ; others are peculiar to 
 poetical language ; again, others are current only in certain 
 provinces, or ii^ particular fituations of life ; and ftill others are 
 vulgar, and exploded from the more dignified written ftyle, as 
 well as from the polite circles of converfation. It is one of 
 Johnfon's great merits, that he has carefully attended to this 
 diftindlion ; I have likewife marked it, in my Englifh and 
 German Di£lionary, with equal attention ; and I have point- 
 ed out the moft neceflary of thefe diftindlions, by means of 
 particular figns or characters. 
 
 III. Next to the preceding, I confider the grammatical de- 
 signation of every word as the moft important part of a good 
 Diftionary : and under this head I place not only the ortho- 
 graphy, the accentuation, and pronunciation, but alfo the claf- 
 fification of a word, to whatever clafs it belongs as a part of 
 fpcech, and finally, its infleftion ; whether it be regularly or 
 irregularly declined or conjugated. Upon this point, alfo, 
 Johnfon is in moft inftances very correal ; excepting that he 
 does not always diftinguifti the fubftantive from the adverb, 
 and this again from the adjedive ; an imperfedion which, 
 with the aid of fome general ideas of grammar, I have had nO 
 
 great difiiculty to remedy In the fpelling of words, Johnfon 
 
 has adopted the method prevalent among aU fenfible people, and 
 configned the orthographic difputes to thofe, who, from want of 
 more important knowledge, have no other means of obtaining 
 reputation. For my part, I faw no reafon for differing from 
 
 Johnfon on this head The proper *^ accentuation is, in the 
 
 Englifti language, one of the moft difficult points. The caufes 
 of this diflUculty muft be obvious from the remarks upon the 
 accent, which I have premifed in the fecond EflUy. The great- 
 er number of Englifti Didionaries, therefore, have confidered 
 it as necefi^ary, to mark that fyUable, which is accentuated in 
 a word. Neverthelefs, they have committed the common er- 
 ror, that the reader is never certain, whether an accentuated 
 iyllable muft be pronounced with the grave i. e. extended, or 
 ©cute, i. e. Ihort tone of the voice j for inftance, blood and roomy 
 
 are
 
 ' ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cxxv 
 
 are marked with , the fame accent ; though the former be pro- 
 nounced fhort, and the latter long. In this matter I have fol- 
 lowed Johnfon, nearly as far as the middle of the letter A ; 
 but as the true pronunciation is thus very imperfeftly mark- 
 ed ; and as I was fuccefsful enough to difcoyer this common 
 error, I began very early to differ from him and his colleagues ; 
 and, confequently, from the middle of the firll letter, I have 
 endeavoured to diflinguifti carefully the length of an accentu- 
 ated fy liable by a mark drawn from the left towards the 
 right, and the Jhortnefs of it by a mark running from the 
 right towards the left In the remaining part of grammati- 
 cal determinations of words, I have followed Johnfon as my 
 guide, and carefully diftinguiflied the neuter from the adlive 
 form of verbs : though, in a few inftances,- 1 have been in- 
 duced to differ from him, when he had miilaken the neutral 
 life of an aftive verb for a neuter verb. 
 
 IV. The proximate derivation of a word is a matter of im- 
 portance in all languages ; for upon this circumftance depends 
 not only the full idea or intelligibility of words, but likewife 
 their orthography. Johnfon has fenlibly perceived this dif- 
 ficulty, and confequently has Ihortly pointed out the immediate 
 derivatives, " in cafes where he was acquainted with them ;'* 
 and I muft add, *' that he has done it in fuch a manner as ap-" 
 pearcd to him the moft proper." For, upon this particular 
 head, his Dictionary is very defective. When an Englilh word 
 is derived from the French or Latin, he does not eafily mil- 
 take its proximate root : in words, that are obvious deriva- 
 tives of familiar Anglo-Saxon tertas, he is equally fuccefsful. 
 But in mofh other cafes, he proves himfelf a fliallow etymo- 
 logift : and as his own notions of the origin of languages were 
 not very clear, he is frequently led into great errors. Thus 
 he confiders the words, with whofe origin he is unacquainted, 
 either as fortuitous and cant wordsy or he derives them fre- 
 quently in the abfurdeft manner from words nearly corief- 
 ponding in found,' while he aims at explaining them in three 
 or four different ways ; for inftance, " to chirps'' derived from, 
 ** to chear up, to make cheerful, &.c." yet this word obviouf- 
 ly comes from the vernacular German, tfchirpen or zirpen^ 
 ** to twitter like birds." This may ferve as a fpecimen of the 
 manner, in which he fearches for the fource of one river in 
 the mouth of another, which is altogether different from the 
 former. Here 1 have had frequent opportunities of correfting 
 
 q bim;
 
 cxxti THREE FHILdLOGlCAL 
 
 him ; particularly as Skinner was his principal hero in ety- 
 rinlogy, and as Johnfon himfelf was unacquainted with 
 the German and ether languages related to it. But in cafes, 
 where the derivation of a word required laborious refearcheSj 
 fuch as would have occupied much rodm to little purpofe, I 
 have rather pafled it over altogether, becaufe the like words 
 iii'c generally confidered as radicals, or as proper names. And 
 jis the objedl expreffed by a word of this kind muft be repre- 
 fented by a feftfible exhibition of ; the thing itfelf, the method 
 of rendering it intelligible, by a probable derivation, is but a 
 negative advantage ; though the etymology of it might be ef- 
 tabliftied by a far-fetched analogy with other words. 
 
 Upon this occafion, I cannot omit mentioning a ciicum- 
 flance of fome importance tothe philofophic inquirer into the 
 llrufture of languages. There are, in Englilh, as well as in 
 all other languages, a great number of wofdsy, which are pro- 
 nounced and written perfeftly analogous to one another ; al- 
 though it can be proved, that they are derived from very dif- 
 ferent roots. Such are, for inftance, the German words, Bar^ 
 Bock, Hundy Katze, &c. and the Englifh words, "arm, buxom, 
 cock, &c." To confider words of the fame found as of com- 
 mon origin, arid to treat them as fuch, difcovers a very fuper- 
 ficial knowledge in languages : befides, this method is attend- 
 ed with the fmgular effect of mifleading the ignorant, who" 
 form the ftrangeft; combinations of ideas, when they attempt 
 to derive the different fignifications and applications of a word 
 from one common root. Johnfon was aw^re of this impro- 
 priety, but he has not alwa^-s been fuccefsful enough in ob- 
 viating it. Hence we frequently meet with fuch a number of 
 iignifications crowded upon the fame word, that it is a matter of 
 aitonill)ment, how they happened to meet under the fame 
 head. For this reafon, I have fcparated the different fignifica- 
 tions of monotonous words by means of numbers, ar>d have 
 endeavoured to fliow the derivation of each, when I was ena- 
 bled to do this in a fatisfaftory manner. 
 
 V. To afcertain the principal and peculiar fignification of 
 a word, from which the others, if there be any, muft be de- 
 rived, has been my next employment. This, indeed, is af- 
 ways the moft diificult point in a Didionary ; a point, which 
 not only prefuppofes correal ideas of the origin of languages, 
 bu^ alfo the moft precife knowledge of every word, and of its 
 life from the earlieft peiicJds. The whole of this knowledge 
 
 muft
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cxxvij 
 
 m-ufl: be founded upon a fufficient number of works, wrltteni 
 by men who lived in the difFeren}: ages, in which the language 
 was fpoken. But as we poffefs no fuch number of works \x\. 
 any language, as is Jfufficient to make us acquainted with all 
 the words, that are or have' been current in it j it may be 
 cafily conjectured, that the primitive fignification of every 
 word cannot be pointed out with precilion. Bt^t even in caies 
 where this is poffible, it requires the moft careful" examina- 
 tion of all the ancient monuments of a language, that are ftill 
 preferved^ together with much found philofophy, in order to 
 avoid failing into dreams and fancies, and deriving, in an arbi- 
 trary manner, the words from one another. la etymology, ag 
 foon as it carried him beyond the proximate derivation of a 
 word, my predeceiTor has not been very fuccefsful. For, even 
 in the latter cafe, he relied too much upon the authority of 
 others ; and it evidently appears from his Dictionary, that the . 
 ftru6ture of language did not induce him to philofophical in- 
 quiries. On this account, we can form no great expectations, 
 and we mufl be fatisfied with his claffification of the different 
 meanings of words, fp as they in every jnftance appeared to 
 him moft proper. His want of knowledge in etymology^ 
 however, is attended with this advantage, that it has guardedi 
 him againft a thoufand follies, to which the pfeudo-ejymolo- 
 gifts, of all languages and climates, are very liable. 
 
 As a foreigner, I could not eafily remedy this deficiency in 
 the claffification of words, unlefs it had been my inclination to 
 proceed upon arbitrary principles, which ought not to be in- 
 troduced into the philofophy of language. Yet I have corr 
 refted another, perhaps more important, error. Jghnfon is 
 uncommonly liberal with a variety of fignincations, particu- 
 larly in fuch words as are frequently ufed j for in thefe, the 
 fignificatipns pointed out hy him^ are almofl endlefs. Thus he 
 has given fevgnty different figuifications of the verb, to go ; 
 Jixty-nine of the verb, tojiand ; &.c. and he might, without 
 great difficulty, have produced the double of that number, if 
 he had proceeded upon a fimilar plan. — In thefe verbs, as well 
 as in many hundred other cafes, Johnfon has obvioufly and 
 uniformly confounded the various applications of one and the 
 fame meaning, with the different figuifications themfelves. 
 Hence I found it neceffaiy, to reduce many of his fignifica-. 
 tions to one general idea, and thus to fave the rearler the 
 ^rouble olJearching for the accurate idea of the word in quefr
 
 cxxviii THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 tlon among a number of fimilar ideas, and of frequently mili>- 
 ing the true meaning of the word altogether. In order to 
 perceive this inconvenience, I requeft the reader to compare 
 with one another the words, ground, Jormy and many others of 
 a fimilar tendency.- 
 
 It is a very common practice among the compilers of Dic- 
 tionaries, to point out the fignification of a word, by means of a 
 fy nonymous expreffion ufed in another language. A fmall Ihare 
 of correal philological knowledge muft convince every one of 
 the impropriety and difad vantage of this praftice. There arc no 
 words completely fynonymous in any language ; nor can any 
 two words, from different languages, be confidered as fynony- 
 mous. And although in languages, that bear flrong marks of 
 affinity to one another, there Ihould be two words of common 
 origin, or even radically the fame, fuch as " ground'-'- with 
 the German Grund ; " to go," with the German gehen ; they 
 flill deviate in the indire£l iignifications, or, at leaft, in the ap^ 
 plication to individual cafes. The fafefl and moft rational me- 
 thod, therefore, is to refolve every fignification into other 
 words, or to gire a clear and, if poffible, concife definition of 
 it. I am fenfible, that in this manner the idea of a word can- 
 not be exhauftcd, nor is it pofilible to point out this idea with 
 all its fhades and fubtle modifications. I further admit, that 
 this developement of the idea is not in all inftances practicable ; 
 fince the meaning of a word, in many cafes, is fo obfcure that 
 it cannot be made perfpicuous. Yet, at the fame time, where 
 this expedient is applicable, it affords the moft certain method 
 of exhibiting a competent notion of every word and its figni- 
 fications ; while it ferves to promote a clear aud juft know- 
 ledge of things in general. This, therefore, is one of the moft 
 important advantages of Johnfon's Dictionary : for the author 
 polTcffed a very happy talent of difplaying the idea of a word 
 in a concife, intelligible, and pertinent manner. In this refpeft, 
 I have throughout followed him as my guide, except where I 
 was obliged to contraft the fignifications of words, which he 
 had unneceflarily accumulated, and confequently to fearch for 
 an appropriate and more comprehenfive idea. 
 
 Johnfon has not avoided the common error of lexicograph- 
 ers, who have either negleded to ftate the names of plants and 
 animals, or have done it in a very vague and undetermined 
 manner. He commonly difmifles the names of vegetables with 
 the addition, «< a plant, ''^ Thus be forfakes the reader, where
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG cxxlx 
 
 St guide is mofl anxloufly looked for. I have endeavoured to 
 fupply this deiiciency, by adding a number of names from the 
 three kingdoms of nature, together with the fyflematic name 
 of Linnaeus, to every plant, in order to prevent any miftakes. 
 As the Germans, according to the different provinces, make ufe 
 of a variety of names for one and the fame plant, the addition of 
 the Linnaan name v/as indifpenfable. It is now to be hoped, 
 that none of their numerous tramlators from the Englifh, 
 will, in future, be induced to tranflate the word*' pine-apple,'* 
 ananas, by the German exprelTions " 'Tannt2iapjen, or Fich- 
 tenapfa^,*^ which, fignify the refpeftive produftions of the fir- 
 and pine-trees ; Abies^ and Finns Lin. ; while the pine-apple 
 is the produce cf the Bromelia Ananas Lin. Such miftakes 
 have been frequently committed in German books on garden- 
 ing; and, in the imperfect ftate of the Englifh-Ger man Dic- 
 tionaries hitherto publiftied, it was not an eafy matter to 
 avoid them. 
 
 VI. In order to fupply the imperfe£l definitions of words, 
 the lignification of which cannot be fully colle£led from the 
 notion contained in the definition, it is a neceffary point in a 
 Dictionary, to illuftrate them by examples. From thefe il- 
 luftrations, this additional advantage refults, that the gramma- 
 tical ufe of a word, and its combination with other parts of 
 fpeech, can be rendered moie confpicuous. Johnfon is very 
 liberal with his examples, and not unfrequently prod'gal to 
 excefs. The greater number qf them, he has extra6ted from 
 poetical works, as he had employed much of his time in pub- 
 liihing the Englifh poets. \ have made it my fludy, to hold a 
 middle courfe, and to feledt from the rich ftore of Johnfon's 
 examples the mofl concife and pertinent, efpecially in fuch 
 cafes as appeared to require an example, to ihow the precife 
 meaning or the grammatical ufe of a word. As, however, his 
 examples and the whole ftock of hisj words principally relate 
 to the language of authors or ** written language ;" I have 
 endeavoured to fupply the obvious want of examples for the 
 pvirpofes of facial life, from the above quoted Engliflji and 
 French Dictionary, by Boyer ; a work, the phrafes and ex- 
 emplifications of which are principally of the latter kind. 
 
 VII. Concerning the pra6lical application of words, when 
 in connexion with others, Johnfon has beftowed great atten- 
 tion upon the moft important cafes, in which every word may 
 occur. His accuracy in this refpedt has induced me to adop: 
 
 ■ ■ ~ ■ hits
 
 bxxx THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 Jjiis examples, without attempting to change or improve them, 
 To conclude this account, I fliall add fome remarks, which 
 exclufively concern the publication of my own Didtionary. — 
 It is a common error of the moft, if not of all, Didionaries 
 which appear with German explanations, that the authors of 
 them not only pay no attention whatever to the propriety and 
 dignity oi the Getman expreffions and phrafes, but likewife 
 that they are very ftudious to find the moil abfurd and vulgar 
 words in the German, and to make ufe of them for the illuf- 
 tration of foreign words ; though the latter fliould not hold 
 out the lead inducement to this outrage. The injury thus oc- 
 calioned to inexperienced ftudents of languages, who moft fre- 
 quently ftand in need of fuch books, is much greater than is 
 commonly imagined ; becaufe their tafte or intelledual dif- 
 cernment is thereby for ever depraved. And what muil be 
 the ideas of foreigners, refpe£ting the German (as they can- 
 not avoid making ufe of fuch books), when they difeover in 
 them the effence of all that is obfcene and vulgar, in'ftead of the 
 more polifhed language of authors ? 'What muft an Engliih- 
 i?ian think of us, when he finds in eur Englifli German Didio- 
 caries, " gormandizer" tranflated Saumagen ; *' to gorman- 
 dize," an Saumagen Jejyn ,• *' gangrel," ein groffe lange Strun%e, 
 Similar indecencies occur in every page. A fmall degree of 
 common fenfe would have prevented the infertion of this trail). 
 into our Did;lonaries, while it would have taught the com- 
 pilers, to render the expreflion with becoming dignity. I have 
 exerted myfelf to fliun the like inelegant terms and phrafes, 
 even in thofe cafes where the Engllfli word might have afford- 
 ed an opportunity of lifing them ; for I have rather fubmitted 
 to the talk of circumlocution, than tp the propagation of mean 
 and indecent wo¥ds. 
 
 There is another remark to be made, relative to the ortho- 
 graphy of the Englifh. Johnfon ha? given a feparate analyfis 
 of every compound word, after having firft printed the words 
 in a combined ftate. In order to fave room and trouble, I 
 have thought proper to point out the compound words imme- 
 diately in the order of the alphabet. For thispurpofe 1 have 
 attnoft throughout the whole (for in fome inftances 1 may have 
 overlooked it) divided fuch words in the fpelling, as " hope- 
 
 lef^y
 
 ESSAYS, BY ADELUNG. cxxx? 
 
 lefs, black-fmith, &c. though tliefe words fhoiUd be read and 
 confidered as infeparable *. 
 
 The following Extraft fronr a Critical Effay originally piiblifiied in the Edin-' 
 burgh Review for 1755, will, it is hoped, be acceptable to the reader ; as the ideas 
 contained in it very nearly coincide with thofe advanced by Mr. Adeluno ; ana 
 a$ it is now underftood to be the prodinftion of the celelwated Dr. Adam Smith.- 
 
 * A Didionary of the Englilh language, however tifeful,or 
 rather nsceflary, has never been hitherto attempted with the 
 leaft degree of fuccefs. To explain hard words and terms of 
 art, feems to have been the chief purpofe of all the former 
 eompolitions, which have borne the title of Englilh didlionaries. 
 Mr Johnfon has extended his views much farther, and has 
 made a very full colleftion of all the different meanings of 
 each Englifli word, juftiiied by examples from authors of good 
 reputation. When we compare this book with other dic-» 
 tionaries, the merit of its author appears very extraordinary* 
 Thofe which in modern languages have gained the moft eftcem, 
 are that of the French academy, and that of the academy 
 Delia Crufca. Both thefe were compofed by a numerous fo- 
 ciety of learned men, and tooK. up a longer time in the com- 
 pofition, than the life of a lingle perfon could well have af- 
 forded. The Di(^ionary of the Englifh language is the work 
 of a fingle perfon, and compofed in a period of time very in- 
 confiderable, when compared with the extent of the work. 
 The colleftion of words appears to be very accurate, and muft. 
 be allowed to be very ample. Moft words, we belkve, are 
 to be found in the DidVionary, that ever were almoft fufpecled 
 to be Englifli ; but we cannot help wilhing, that the author 
 had trufted lefs to the judgment of thofe who may confult him, 
 and had oftener palled his own cenfure upon thofe words 
 which arc not of approved ufe^ though fometimcs to be met 
 
 with 
 
 * This method of pointing out compounded words is profefledly 
 contrived to favc room and the repetition of words ; yet, at the 
 fame time, it is unavoidably attended with this difadvantage, that 
 it may induce foreigners, to confider a// thofe words, which are' 
 printed with a fign of divifion, as feparable compounds. — Mr. 
 Adelung might have ealily obviated this inconvenience, by ufing 
 different marks of feparatlon for thofe compounds, the parts of 
 which are written fep«j:atcly, as " party-man j" and for thofe, that 
 are wontraded into one word, as ** %itc-ful.'*
 
 cxxxli THREE PHILOLOGICAL 
 
 with in authors of no mean name. — ^Where a work is ad« 
 mitted to be highly ufeful, and the execution of It i.ititled to 
 praife ; the adding, that It might have been niore uletul, can 
 fcarcely, we hope, be deemed a cenfure of It. The meiit oi 
 this Dlfticnary is fo great, that It cannot detraft from it, to 
 take notice of fome defeats, the fuppljing which, would, in 
 our judgment, add a conliderable fliare of merit to that whicli 
 it already poflefles. Thefe defefts confift chiefly In the plan, 
 which appears to us not to be fufficlently grammatical. The 
 different fignificatlons of -i word are Indeed collefted ; but 
 they are feldom digefted Into feveral clafTes, or langed under 
 the meaning which the word principally expreffes ; and fuf- 
 ficlent care has not been taken to diftingullh the words appar- 
 ently fynonymous.* 
 
 * It can import no refleftion upon Mr. Johnfon's Dlftlonary, 
 that the fubjedl has been view^ed In a different light by others ; 
 and it is at leafl: a matter of curloiity to confider the different 
 views, in which It appears . Any man who is about to com- 
 pofe a diftlonary, or rather a grammar of the Englifli lan- 
 guage, muil acknowledge himfelf indebted to Mr. J. for a- 
 bridging at leafl one half of his labour. All thofe who are 
 umder any difficulty, with refjje£t to a: particular word or 
 phrafe, are in the fame lituatlon. The DIdlonary prefents 
 them a full colleftion of examples ; from whence indeed they 
 are left to determine ; but by which the determination is 
 rendered eafy. In this country *, the ufefnlnefs of it will be 
 foon felt, as there Is no ftandard of correct language in con- 
 verfa^Ion. If our recommendation could in any degree Incite 
 to thd perufal of it, we would earneftly recomrilend it to all 
 thofe who are dcfirous to improve and correct their language, 
 frequently to confult the DIftionary. Its merits muft be de- 
 termined by the frequent rcfort, that is had to it. , This Is the 
 mofl unerring tefl of Its value : criticlfmsi may be falfe, pri- 
 vate judgments Ill-founded ; but if a work of this nature hd 
 tnuch In ufe, it has received the fan£lion of the public ap^. 
 JrobatioB,' 
 
 * Scotland, 
 
 F I N I S.
 
 SPECIMEN 
 
 IDENTICAL DICTIONARY 
 
 German, English, French, and Latin Languages. 
 
 Note. All thofe compounded words, which are eafily explained from 
 
 their conjlituent parts, are here purpojely omitted T^he vocables jirji 
 
 Jlatedy after the German, exprefs the mofi literal fenfe. — Subjlantives, 
 without a number referring to the declenfion, are indeclinable \ the num- 
 bers mark the five German declenfans Further, the ajlerijk (*) points 
 
 out thofe fubjlantives, which change their firft vowel into a diphthong, 
 when ufed in the plural number ;— a. 2.,Jlands for adverbial adjeBive ;— 
 adj /or adjeBive; — adv. /or adverb ;—conj. /or conjunBion ; — obj. /or 
 objeBively, or in a phyfcal fenfi ; — ixi!a\.for fubjeBively, or in a mental 
 fenfe ;— s. i. for fubjlantiva feminine ; — s. m. for fubjiantive mafculine ; 
 
 s. n.forfubjlantive neuter :, — v. a. r./or verb aBive, regular i — ir. 
 
 for irregular — v. n. for verb neuter ; — vulg. for vulgarly j or in low 
 life. 
 
 German. 
 
 Aal, s. m. z. 
 
 jias *, s. n. 5. 
 
 Ah, fyll of compounds. 
 
 Abiinderlicb, a. a. 
 
 Ab'dndern, v. a r. 
 
 Ab'dntJerumr, t. f. 3. 
 Abarbeiten, v. a. r. 
 
 ifich) recipr, 
 
 Abarten, V. n. r. 
 Ahartung, s. f. 3. 
 Abbeijfat, V. a. ir. 
 
 AbbeJItllen , V. a. r. 
 Abbiiden, v. a. r. 
 
 Abbildung. 8. f, 3. 
 
 English. 
 
 eel 
 
 carrion, carcafs 
 down, from, off 
 variable, changeable 
 to vary, change, fhift 
 
 alteration, variation 
 to work or labour for 
 
 to fatigue, or wear 
 
 onefelf out by labour 
 
 to degenerate 
 
 degeneration 
 
 to bite off or from 
 
 to countermand 
 
 to fafliion or portray 
 
 formation, pidurc 
 
 Feench. 
 
 anguille. 
 charogne, cadavre 
 de. du, &c. 
 ' variable 
 varier, changer, cor- 
 
 riger 
 alteration, variation , 
 travailler a compte de 
 cequ'ona regud'avance 
 cpuifer fes forces par 
 
 le traviil 
 idcgenerer, forligner 
 Idegeneration 
 mordre, arracher avec 
 
 les dents 
 contremander 
 reprefenter, tirer d'a- 
 
 pres nature 
 image, portrait. 
 
 Latin. 
 
 anguilla. 
 
 cadaver. 
 
 de 
 
 varians, mutabilis 
 
 mutare, immutarc 
 
 mutatio, immutatio 
 ahquid labore compen- 
 
 fare 
 laboribus frangi 
 
 dcgenerare, depravari 
 degeneratio, depravatit 
 demordere 
 
 renunciare, adimere. 
 jeffingere, exprimere 
 
 Iforraatio, cffi«3.io
 
 GtHUAit. 
 
 ^lHntien,v. a. if. 
 Miittc, 5. f. (fmg.only) 
 
 ^iiitien, V. n. ir. 
 
 Abborgeny V, n. t. 
 /ibbrecben, V. a. ir. 
 
 i 
 to untie or unloofe 'dclier, detacher 
 excufe, apology, excufe, apologie 
 
 to beg pardon, or to (demander pardon 
 
 apologize. ^ 
 
 to borrow. femprunteT 
 
 to break off 'rompre 
 
 to pull down labattre, demolir 
 
 to ftopfhort.in fpeakingis'arr^ter, paufer 
 
 — fjicbj recipr. 
 &ir. 
 
 Alhrennen,\.?i.T. 
 • V. n. 
 
 Abbrucb ^.4. (Cng.only ) 
 
 to dctra(ft,leflen. 
 to abftain from. 
 
 to burn down, or out 
 to confume by fire 
 
 ideduirc, rabattre 
 js'abftenir de qq. ch. 
 
 reduire en cendre 
 jconfumer par le fea 
 
 Abbriicbigy a. a. 
 Abbitjfen,^. a. X. 
 Abdanken^ V. a. r. 
 
 Abdankung,y s. f. 3. 
 Abdecien, V. a r. 
 
 Abdeticr, 8 m. I. 
 vulg. Schinder. 
 Ahdeckung, s, f. 3. 
 AbtUngen. v. n. r. 
 Abdriiigen, V.Z.ir. orl 
 W,\g^bd) iicksti (fubj.) 5 
 Abdruck * s. m. a. 
 Abdrucken,v. a. r, 
 
 Abdrucken,v. a. r.(obj.) 
 
 to give over burning jceffer de bruler 
 
 to difcharge a gun |tirer un canon ou un 
 
 i fufil 
 
 detradlion ^rabais 
 
 diminution, detriment diminution, detriment 
 lofs, damage perte, domraage 
 
 derogatory derogatoire 
 
 to expiate, or atone for'expier 
 to fay thanks or grace 'remercier 
 to difcharge jcongedier 
 
 ••ifcharge, difmiffal .conge, demif!ion 
 refignation, abdication jrefignation, abdication 
 to uncover (the roof) jd^couvrir 
 to ftrip off (the flcin) jecorcher 
 the Ikinner jecorcheur 
 
 the hangman (in office)' bourreau 
 uncovering, denudationjdenuement 
 to dedu\5l in bargaining defalquer 
 
 LkiiU, 
 
 Abend, S. m. 2. 
 Abtniheuer,%. n. I. '\ 
 or Ebenttver, — C 
 Abtntbeurer, s. m. I. adventtxrer 
 
 a copy, imprellion 
 
 to imprint, or to take 
 
 a copy 
 to let down the cock 
 
 of a fire-lock 
 the evening 
 
 adventure 
 
 jbut, ^'ct, however 
 ifuperftition 
 
 Ater, conj. — 
 ALerglauhi, S. m. 3. 
 
 (fing. only) 
 Aberfrlaubilcb, or ") L „. . 
 
 AbcglaMg.z.^, jlfuperftitious 
 AbiiktHnen, v. a. r & jto judge, pafs 
 
 ir. j upon 
 
 Abermal, or Abt»- 
 
 tndls, adv. 
 Abfrmalig, a a. 
 Aberivitz, s. m. 2. 
 
 (fing. only) 
 Ai'fritfitzig, a. a. 
 aJv. 
 
 once agam, anew 
 
 repeated 
 
 > idotage, delirium 
 
 diftradled, infane 
 jdiftratftcdly, foolilhly 
 
 extorquor 
 
 copie, empreinte 
 imprimer,tirer copie 
 
 preffer, feparer a force 
 
 foir, foirce 
 
 aventure 
 
 aventurier 
 
 mais, pourtant, or 
 fuperftition 
 
 fuperftltieux 
 fentence juger, decretcr 
 
 encore, de nouveau 
 
 nouveau, autre 
 
 folic, delire » 
 
 devenu fon 
 comme im fott 
 
 folvere, refolvere. 
 deprccatio ignofcendi 
 
 poftulatio. 
 deprecari, vcniam pe- 
 
 tere. 
 mutuari. 
 
 carpere, decerperc. 
 diruere demoliri. 
 abrumpere fermonem. 
 dctrahcre (de pretio ) 
 abilinere, fefe conti- 
 
 nere. 
 urere, comburere. 
 deflagrare, conflagrare 
 
 flammis. 
 defmere ardere. 
 itormentum vi pulveri* 
 
 igniferi mittere. 
 defradlum decerptio, 
 deminutiojdetrimentuiB 
 jadura, dairmum. 
 derogans. 
 lucre. 
 
 gratias agere. 
 dimittere. 
 miffio, dimiffio. 
 abdicatio munerig. 
 detegere (domum). 
 pellem detrahere. 
 pellium detrador. 
 carnifex, tortor. 
 dete(ftio nudatio. 
 detiaherepietio. 
 
 exprimere, extorqaer*^ 
 
 exemplar, impreflio, • 
 typis exfcribere. 
 
 premendo avellere, 
 folvere. 
 
 vefpera. 
 
 eventura, portentum; 
 
 qui tentat et periclita- 
 
 tur fortunam. 
 aft, ad, fed, vei6, &»> 
 fUperftitio, falfa 
 
 religio. 
 
 fuperftitiofus. 
 abjudicare. 
 
 itenun, ntrftts, denuo < 
 
 iteratus. 
 
 amentia, delirium. 
 
 amen«, delirus 
 dcmenter,mor e dcll- 
 rantis.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 ESSAY FIRST. 
 
 A concife hijiory of the Englijh language^ its changes, PAGE 
 
 and gradual irhpro'OemeHty - - v 
 
 I. Britiih-Saxon Period, - - ' . vi 
 
 II. Danifh. Saxon period, - - & ix 
 
 III. Normannic-Saxon Period j or Norinannic Anglo- 
 
 Saxon, - - - XX 
 
 IV. French-Saxon, or Englifti period, - xxix 
 Divilion firft : fronx 1272 to 1399 • °^ from Edward 
 
 I. to Henry IV. - - - xxxi 
 
 Divifion fecond : frona 1399 to 1485; or from 
 
 Henry IV. to Henry VII. - - xlviii 
 
 Divilion third : from 1485 to 1558; or from Henry 
 
 VII. to the end of Q^Mary. - Iviii 
 
 Diviiion fourth : from 1558 to 1625 ; or during the 
 
 reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I. - Ixviii 
 Concluding general remarks, - - Ixxxv 
 
 ESSAY SECOND. 
 
 A philofophical view of the Englijh language* 
 
 Why called philofophical ? Ixxxviii. Of the Englifli Lan- 
 guage, Ibid. Of the Englifh written Language^ Ixxxix. Di- 
 vifion of Grammar Ibid. Of the Englifh Written Characters, 
 /i/<f. Of the Anglo-Sakon Alphabet, xc. Of its difufe, ibid. 
 Of angular written characters, xci. The Englifli write dif- 
 ferently from what they fpeak, xcii. Explanation of this phe- 
 nomenon, iciii. Of orthography, xciv. Of the ftrufture of 
 words, ibid. Definition of words and fyllables, ibid. Divifion 
 of words according to their llrudure, xcv. Definition of 
 
 radicals
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 radicals, ibid. Of derivatives, xcvi. Compound words, xcviii. 
 Of the tone or accent of words, xcix. General definitions 
 of the accent, c. Diftinftion of the accent as to its force, 
 ibid. Of the duration of the accent, ci. Difference between ex- 
 tended and acute fjUables cii. Of the accent of radicals, ciii. 
 Of the accent of derivatives, ibid. Of the accent of compound 
 words, cv. Reflcftions upon words as parts of fpeech, ibid* 
 Further refleftions upon words, cvii, Analjfis of the inflec- 
 tions, cviii. (I.) Further refleftions on the fubftantive. (i.) 
 Divifion of it, cix. (a.) The gender of fubftantives, ibid. (3.) 
 Of the formation of the Plural, ex. (4.) Of the declenfion, 
 ibid. (IT.) Of the Article, cxi. (III.) Of the Adjeaive, cxiii. 
 (IV.) Of numerical words, cxi v. (V.) Of the Pronouns, 
 cxv. (VI.) Of the Verb, cxvii. (VII.) Of the Particles. 
 ixXk Conclufion, ibid. 
 
 ESSAY THIRD. 
 
 On tie relative merits and demerits of 'jfohnfon's Englijh 
 
 DiHionarff - - - - cxxi 
 
 I. Concerning the number of words, - cxxii 
 
 II. ■ the value and dignity of words, cxxiv 
 
 III. . the grammatical defignation of words, ibid. 
 
 IV. ■ the etymology of words, - cxxv 
 V. II. II the principal fignlfication of words, cxxvi 
 
 VI. ■ — the illuftration of words by examples, cxxix 
 
 VII. the praftical applicaton of words, ibid. 
 
 Extraft from a Critical Eflay ; by Dr Adam Smith, cxxxl 
 
 INDEX,
 
 N D 
 
 X, 
 
 Referring to the Names, which occur in ttefe Effhys *, 
 
 Alcock, John, 58. 
 
 Alfred, king, 7, 9, 10, 19. 
 
 Anfley, Brian, 63. 
 
 Arbuthnot, Alexander, 79. 
 
 Afcham, Roger. 65, 68. 
 
 Bacon, lady Anne, 83. 
 
 — — - lord Francis, 85. 
 
 Baldwin, William, 6$, 67. 
 
 Bale, John, 63. 
 
 Ballcnden, John, 63. 
 
 Barbour, John, 38. 
 
 Barclay, Alexander, 58. 
 
 Barnfley, Charles, 63. 
 
 Bafton, Robert, 36. 
 
 Bede, Vcner. 7. 
 
 Behn, Mrs. 84. 
 
 Bercher, William, 69. 
 
 Berners, Juliana, 57, 6a 
 
 BilsoD, Thomas, 84. 
 
 Boieyn, George, 6i. 
 
 Borde, Andrew, 63. 
 
 Bourchier, John, 64. 
 
 £righman, Nicholas, 44. 
 
 Bruce, Robert, 36, 39. 
 
 Brumpton, John, 47. 
 
 Bninne : V. — Robert de Brunnc, 35. 
 
 Bryant, Sir Francis, 63. 
 
 Buckhurft, Lord, 8». 
 
 Caedmon, 7, 9. 
 
 Campeden, Hugh, jo. 
 
 Cary, Henry, 8a. 
 
 Cavyl, 67. 
 
 Caxton, William, SS, 60. 
 
 Cecil, Mildred, 83, 
 
 — — William, 8a. 
 
 Chapman, George, 69, 71, 
 
 Charlemagne, 6. 
 
 Chatterton, ji. 
 
 Chaucer, Gcoffrcy,40,46^8, 
 
 Cheke, Sir John, 64, 68. 
 
 Chertfey, Andrew, 63. 
 
 Chefler, Thomas, 50.- 
 
 Churchyard, Thomas, 67, 70. 
 
 Cook, Catherine, 83. 
 
 Cox, Leonard, 74. 
 
 Crowley, Robert, 65. 
 
 CuflF, Henry, 83. 
 
 Culrofc, 63 
 
 Davie, Adam, 36. 
 
 Devercux, Robert, 75. 
 
 Digby, 43. 
 
 Douglas, Gawin, 39, 60, 
 
 Drant, Thomas, 71,7 a. 
 
 Drayton, a6. 
 
 Dudley, Robert, 75, 80, 8a. % 
 Dunbar, William, 59. 
 Edward III. 36. 
 
 IV. 51. 
 
 VI. 65. 66. 
 
 Edwards, Richard, 67. 
 
 Eiham, Thomas de, 51. 
 
 Elizabeth, Queen, 8a. 
 
 Entick, 1 33. 
 
 Fabian, Robert, 57. 
 
 Fairfax, Edward, 7a, 73. 
 
 Fane, Lady Elizabeth, 66. 
 
 Fenton, Sir Geoffrey, 7a, 8a^ 
 
 Ferrers, George, 67. 
 
 Fleming Abraham, 69, 71, 7a. 
 
 Forreft, William, 68. 
 
 Galbreith, 63. 
 
 Gafcoigne, George, 69, 7a, 78, 8c. 
 
 Gaunt, John of, 41. 
 
 Golding, Arthur, 70, 71. 
 
 Googe, Bamaby, 69, 71:. 
 
 Gower, John, 46, 47. 
 
 Green, Robert, 81. 
 
 Gray, Lady Jane, 66. 
 
 Grimoald, Nicholas, 63, 78* 
 
 Grofteft, Robert, 35. 
 
 Haliwell, Edward, 6^, 
 
 Hall, Arthur, 69. 
 
 Jofeph, 79. 
 
 Hampole, Richard, 36. 
 Harding, John, 50. 
 Harrington, Sir James, ya. 
 ■ ■' " Sir John, 78 
 Harvey, Gabriel, 78, 
 Haftings, Francis, 66. , 
 
 Hatton, Lord Chancellor, 8a. 
 Hawes, Stephen, 58. 
 Henry I. 33. 
 
 ^V. 48. 
 
 — — the Minftrel, 55. 
 
 Heywood, Jafper, 70, 
 
 — — — — John, 63. 
 
 Higden, 47. 
 
 Holland, 5$. 
 
 Holme, Wilfrid, 63. 
 
 Hooker, Richard, 75, 84 
 
 Hopkins, John, 6j. 
 
 Howard. Henry, Earl ofNorthampt. 8a, 
 
 — — ■ — — Surrey, 6», 63. 
 
 ' Lady Mary, 67. 
 
 Humphrey, Duke of Glouc. 51. 66. 
 Hunis, William, 65. 
 
 Jamec 
 
 In order to lave room, and to render the finding out of the Names eafier t« 
 the reader, vrc have reduced the RoHwa Nw^]?sr» w thofe \m (Mvam.*% nfc
 
 INDEX. 
 
 James of Scotland, 53. 
 
 VI. Do. 79. 
 
 Inglis, Sir James, 63. 
 
 Ingulf, Abbot, 19. 
 
 John, King, 32. 
 
 Johnfon. Dr. Sam. 6, 9, 60, 6j, 1 21. 
 
 Kay, John, 51. 
 
 Kelton, 66. 
 
 Kendall, Timothy, Ji. 
 
 Kinloch, 6^. 
 
 Kinwelmerfh, Francis, 69. 
 
 Kyd. 63. 
 
 Leland, 34,41. 
 
 Lilly, George, 6j. 
 
 John, 80. 
 
 Lindfay, Sir David. 63 . 
 Livius, Titus, 51, 
 Longlande, Robert, 37. 
 Lumley, Lady Joanna, 67. 
 
 . Lord John, 64. 
 
 Lydgate, John, 49, _j8. 
 
 Maitland, Sir Richard, 79. 
 
 Mandeville, Sir John, 37, 47. 
 
 Manning, Robert, 35. 
 
 Margaret, Coimtefs of Richmond, 60. 
 
 Marloe, Chriftopher, 70. 80. 
 
 Mary, Queen of England, 67. 
 
 Scots, 8a. 
 
 Matthew of VVeftminfter, 47. 
 Medwall, Henry, 59. 
 Merimuth, Adam de, 47. 
 Montfort, Simon of, 31. 
 Montgomery, Alexander, 79^ 
 More, Sir Thomas, 61, 63. 
 Morley. Lord, 64. 
 Nafhc, Thomas, So. 
 Nevyle, Alexander, 69. 
 Newcaftle, Dutcheh of, 84. 
 Newce, Thomas, 69. 
 Newton,,Thoma», 70, 71;. 
 Norton, John, 50. 
 
 •< Thomas, 65, 
 
 Occleve, 49, 56. 
 Parker, Matthew, 65., 
 Parr, Catherine, 64. 
 Peele, George, 81. 
 Pelham, Sir John, 54. 
 Percy, Algernon, 60, 
 Perkins, William, 75 
 Phayer, 67. 
 Philips, Catherine, 84. 
 Poulett, William. 82. 
 Poyngz, Sir Anthony, 69' 
 Puttenhara, 74. 
 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 75. 78^ 
 RaftaU, John, s<^, 61. 
 
 Ratcliffe, Thomas, 75, 
 Ripley, George, jp. 
 Robert de Brunne, 35. 
 
 of Gloucefter, ^S' 
 
 Rochford, Vifcount, 6x. 
 RoUand, John, 79. 
 Roos, John, '62. 
 Roper, Margaret, 64. 
 
 Mary, 66. 
 
 Rowley, Thomas, 52. 
 Ruffe!, Elizabeth, 83. 
 Sackville, Thomas, 67, 7f . 
 Savillc, Sir Henry, 72. 
 Scot, Alexander, 68. 
 Seager, Francis, 65, 67. 
 Shakefpeare, 81. 
 Sheffield, Lord Edmund, 66- 
 Sheridan, 99. 
 Sidney, Mary, 83. 
 
 Sir Philip, 69, 8r 
 
 Sinclair, Henry Earl of, 60. 
 Skelton, John, 60,61,67. 
 Skinner, 126. 
 Smith, Nicholas, 69. 
 
 Sir Thomas, 65, 68. 
 
 Somjnerfet, Duke of, 66 
 Spenfer, Edmund, 71, 76 
 Stafford, Lord Henry, 66 
 Stanyhurft, Robert, 70 
 Sternhold, Thomas, 6s 
 Stewart of Lorn, 63 
 Studley, John, 69 
 Swynford, Catherine, 42 
 Tiptoft, John, 56 
 Tuber ville, George. 71, 78 
 
 I- I'homas, 70, yr 
 
 Tuffcr, Thomas, 67 
 Tye, Chriftopher, 65 
 Twyne, Thomas, 70 
 Vaux, Lord Nicholas, 62 
 Vere, Edward. 82 
 Underdowne, Thomas, 69 
 Wade, Lawrence, S9 
 Waller, 73 
 
 Walter, William. 59 
 Walton, John, 48 
 Warton,'!, 19,23,27,31 
 Whctftone, George, 72, 80 
 Wickes, Thomas, 47 
 WicklifF, John 31, 41,46 
 Widville, Anthony, 56 
 Wilfon, Dr. Thomas, 69, 72 
 W^inton, Andrew, 55. 
 Wyat, Sir Thomas, 62 . 
 Wyttingham, William, 65 
 
 CATALOGUE
 
 CATALOGUE 
 
 Of References to the origvial publications, as well as tranfla^ 
 tions made into Englifhy and fome remarkable paffages. 
 
 Addrefs to his empty purfe, by Chau- 
 cer, 43 
 
 Aelian's various Hiftory, by Fleming, 69 
 
 Agamemnon, by Studley, 69 
 
 Agricola's Life, by Savilie, 7^ 
 
 Amadis de Gaule, 8 t 
 
 Arcadia, by Sidney, 81 
 
 Ariofto's Suppofiti, by Gafcoigne, 72, 
 80 
 
 Worlcs tranflated by Harring- 
 ton, 72, 78 
 
 Arirtotle, on the Ten Categories, by 
 Googe, 69 
 
 Arraignment of Paris, by Peele, 81 
 
 Art of Engliih Poelie, by Puttenham, 
 
 74 
 Art of Rhetoric, by Wilfon, 74 
 Aftrolabe, by Chaucer, 45' 
 Aftrophel, by Spencer, 77 
 Bard, IVilliam the Conqueror's. 26 
 Belvidere, or the Garden of the Mufes, 
 
 Boccace, Vifions of, 7* 
 Boethius's Confolation of Philofophy, by 
 Wahon, 48 
 
 by (^ Elizabeth, 
 
 8i 
 Book of Kings, 66 
 
 Caefar's Commentaries,by Golding, 71 
 Canterbury Tables, by Chaucer, 45 
 Caftle of Love, by Groffe-Tefte, 2>5 
 Cebes, Table of, by Poyngz, 69 
 Chrift's Kirk on the Green, by ICing 
 
 James, 54 
 Cicero's Offices, by Grimoald, 72 
 
 • Oration for Archias, by Drant, 
 
 72 
 ■ Seleft EpiQles by Fleming, 27 
 
 Complaint of Scotland, by Inglis, 63 
 Concordance of Sins, by Fabian, 57 
 Confcflio Amantis, by Gower, 46 
 Confolation of Q^ Mary's, &c 83 
 Court of Love, by Chaucer, 40, ^5 
 
 Venus, by K. James, 5 j 
 
 Pefence of Poelie, by Sidney, 82 
 
 Dcmofthenes's Seven^Orations, by Wn^ 
 
 fon, 69 
 Deftru(ftion of Troy, by Lydgate, 50 
 Dido, Tragedy of, by Nafhe, 80 
 Difcourle of Life and Death, by lyT. 
 
 Sidney, 83 
 F-Cclefiafiical Polity, by Hooker, 75 
 Edivard ibe Firjl, by Peele, 81 
 Egidius, on the Government of Pruices, 
 
 by Occleve, 49 
 Ella, Tragedy of, by Rowley, ^^ 
 Englijb Name dlfgraced, 22 
 England's ParndTus, 78 
 Erafmus's Inftitution, by Lumley, 64 
 Euphues, a Romance, by Lilly, 81 
 Euripides's PhoeniQae orjocalta, by Gaf- 
 coigne and Kinwelmerrh, 69, 80 
 Fairy Queen, by Spenfer, 76 
 Fall of Princes, by Lydgate, 50 
 Fauftus's, Dr, Tragical Hifiory.by Mar- 
 
 loe, 80 
 Froiffart's Chronicle, by Bourchier, 64 
 Gammer Gurton's Needle, 66 
 Glafs of Government, by Gafcoijnc, 
 
 80 
 Golden Epiftles, by Fenton, 82 
 — - Terge, by Dunbar, 59 
 Gorboduc, by Sackville, 79 
 Guicciardini's Hiftory of Italy, by Fen- 
 ton, 7a, 82 
 Hcliodorus'sHiftory.byUnderdowne, 69 
 Hercules Oeteus, by Studley, 69 
 Herodian's Hillory, by Smith, 69 
 Hiftory of the World, by Raleigh, 75 
 Homer's Iliad, by Hall, 69 
 Horace's Art of Poetry, by Qj Eliza- 
 beth, 8a 
 " . Satires, Epiftle* and Art of 
 
 Poetry, By Drant, 71 
 Hulbandrie, five himdred point* of 
 
 good ; — by Tuffer, 67 
 Hyppolitus. by Studley, 69 
 Jdiat, an epithet given to a Bijbop^ 21 
 Jewel's Apology for the Church of 
 England, 83 
 
 ir«crates
 
 CATALOGUE. 
 
 tfocrates, by Fleming, 69 
 Juftin's Hiilory. by Goldlng, 71 
 King- Dayld and Fair Bethfabe, by 
 
 Peek 81 
 King's Quair, by K. James I. 54 
 Kyng of Tars, 33 
 Jjaco/iie Advice, by Chaunr, 44 
 Li/e of St. Margaret, 26 
 Lucan's Firft Book, by Marlofi,7i 
 JUagna Charta often reprinted^ 64 
 Mantuan, tranll. by Tuberville, 71 
 Manual de Pcche, by R. de Brunne,35 
 Maphacus fupplement.book of Virgil, by 
 
 Twyne, 70 
 Martial's Epigrams, by Kendall, 71 
 Medea, by Studley, 69 
 Mirrour for Magiftra tes, by Sackville, 
 
 67 
 Moralities improved hy Rajiall, 59, 6l^ 
 Mufxus, by Chapman, 69 
 Ochine's Sermons, by A. Bacon, 83 
 Oftavia, by Newce, 69 
 Oedipus, by Nevyle, 69 
 Ovid's Art of Love, by Douglas, 59 
 — — Elegies, by Marloe, 70 
 — — Falti,70 
 ■ ■ Heroical Epiflles, by Tuber- 
 ville, 70 
 ■. I Ibis, by Underdowne, 70 
 . Metamorphofis, by Gelding, 70 
 
 — — Remedy of Love, 70 
 
 Triilia, by Churchyard, 70 
 
 Orofius's traanflation, by K. Alfred, lO 
 Palingenius's Zodiac, by Googe, 7 1 
 , Paradife of dainty dev. by Edwards, 67 
 PafTetyme of PIcafurc, by Hawes, 58 
 Peblis to the Play, by K. James I. 54. 
 Philotus, 64 
 
 Pliny's Letters, by Fleming, 7a 
 Plutarch de Curiolitate, by Q^ Eliza- 
 beth, 8a 
 Polyalbion, by Drayton, 26 
 Pompon. Mela's Geogr. byGolding, 71 
 Princ. Plcaf. of Kennelw. Caftle, by 
 
 Gafcoigne, 80 
 Promos and Caflandra, by Whetflone, 
 So 
 
 Reconciliation, way of, by E. Ruffel,? j 
 Rhodes, Hiilory of the Siege of by Kay, 
 
 Royal advice to her Son, by Q. Mary, 
 83 ' ><- ^ 
 
 Salluft's Jugurth. War, by Q^ Eliza- 
 beth, 82 
 Schoolmaller, by R, Ascham, 68 
 Seneca's Hercules Furens,Thyeftes, and 
 
 Troas, by Heywood, 7of 
 ' Thebais, by Newton, ibid. 
 
 On Benefits, by Golding, 71 
 
 — — Ten Tragedies, 69 
 Statius's Thebais, by Newton, 71 
 Shepherd's Calendar, by Spenfer, 77 
 Ship of Fools, by Barclay, 58 
 Siege of Thebes, by Lydgate,50 
 Solinus's Polyhirtory, by Golding, 74 
 Song of K. Jameson his Miftr. 54 
 Synefius's Panegyric, by Fleming, 69 
 Tacitus's Four Firft Books, by Saville, 7J 
 TafTo's Jerufalem deliv. by Fairfax, 73 
 Tragedie of Antonio, by M.Sidncy, 83 
 Thiltle and ELofe, by Dunbar, 59 
 Toxophilus, by R. Afcham, 65 
 Travels of Ohthcr and Wulfftan, by 
 
 King Alfred, 10=17 
 Treatife on the proper mode of writing 
 the Eng. Lang, by Smith, 65,68 
 ■ on the diflfcrence of the ages of 
 man's life, by CuflF, 82 
 Tutkifl^Mahomet, a Trag. by Peele, Zx 
 Virgid^iarum, by Hall, 79 
 Virgil's Aeneid, by Douglas 60 
 ■■ — — by Howard, 62* 
 ■ — by Phayer & Twyne, 70 
 
 ■ by Stanyhurft, 70 
 
 ■ — Alexis, by Fleming, 71 
 
 — ^— Bucolics & Georgics, Do. ibid. 
 
 Culex, by Spenfer, - Ibid. 
 
 Viitue and Vyce, by Ballendcn, 63 
 Vifion of P. Plowman, by Longlande, 37 
 Utopia, by Sir Thomas More, 61 
 Wallace, Sir William's Life Snd exploit!, 
 
 by Henry the Minftrel, 39, si 
 Writer, thefrjifor Bread, 8 1 
 
 Xenophon's htftitut. by Serchcr, 69. 
 
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