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 WOMEN'S SUFFBAG-E AND 
 NATIONAL DANGBE: 
 
 A PLEA FOR THE ASCENDENCY OF MAN. 
 
WOMEN'S SUFFKAGE AND 
 NATIONAL DANGER: 
 
 A PLEA FOR THE ASCENDENCY OF MAN. 
 
 BY 
 
 HEBER L. HAET, LL.B., 
 
 OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW. 
 
 " Where there is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much 
 arguing, much writing, many opinions ; for opinion in good men is but 
 knowledge in the making." MILTON. 
 
 Zoirton : 
 ALEXANDER AND SHEPHEARD, 
 
 21 & 22, FURNIVAL STREET, HOLBORN, E.C. ; 
 
 SIMPKIN, MARSHALL, & CO. 
 
 STATIONERS' HALL COURT 
 
LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY ALEXANDER AND SHEPHEARD, 
 27, CHANCERY LANE, W. C. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE vii 
 
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 
 
 PART I. 
 
 THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION OF THE EXTENSION OF THE 
 FRANCHISE TO WOMEN. 
 
 INTRODUCTION 10 
 
 SECTION I. THE CURRENT ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF 
 
 WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE 13 
 
 SECTION II. THE THRESHOLD OF THE CASE AGAINST 
 
 WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE 40 
 
 PART II. 
 
 THE LARGER QUESTION OF THE EQUALISATION OF THE SEXES 
 INVOLVED IN THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION. 
 
 INTRODUCTION . 89 
 
 SECTION I. THE ARGUMENT FROM RELIGION ... 93 
 
 SECTION II. THE ARGUMENT FROM CUSTOM . . . 112 
 
 SICTION III. THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPEDIENCY . . 120 
 
 CONCLUSION 189 
 
 761849 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 POSSIBLY it is now rather late in the history 
 of the Women's Suffrage movement for the 
 appearance of a treatise upon the subject. Yet 
 I cannot but think that, great as is the bulk of 
 the literature wherein the arguments of those 
 who favour the movement are set forth, the 
 comprehensive exposition of those reasons 
 which may be fairly suggested as justifying 
 opposition has been comparatively neglected. 
 Notwithstanding the brilliant speeches which 
 have been delivered by some of those who 
 have in Parliament resisted the claims on 
 behalf of women, so complete has been the 
 omission to systematise and aggressively cir- 
 culate the leading outlines of their case, that 
 I very much doubt whether the majority 
 of judicially-minded citizens are sufficiently 
 in possession of them. I am, therefore, con- 
 strained to think it well to submit the following 
 
viii Preface,. 
 
 pages to the consideration of readers who may 
 still be inclined to the study of the question. 
 That ray views are those of the side which 
 not only lacks organisation, but which is 
 apathetic to the last degree that, indeed, 
 they seem likely to become positively un- 
 popular may suggest that their statement is 
 impolitic. I conceive, however, that the 
 almost unparalleled importance of the subject, 
 when regarded in connection with what it 
 necessarily involves, in comparison with which 
 the other questions which are now agitated 
 among politicians should seem of limited 
 concern, and the consequently peculiar desir- 
 ability in this instance of adequate discussion 
 before legislative change, render it manifestly 
 the duty of all whose conscientious convictions 
 with regard to the matter are the result of 
 careful deliberation to proclaim them with 
 respectful temperateness, but undisguised 
 through fear of disapproval. 
 
 H. L. H. 
 
 3, BRICK COURT, TEMPLE. 
 March, 1889. 
 
WOMEN'S SUFFBAGE 
 
 AND 
 
 NATIONAL DANGEB: 
 
 A PLEA. FOR THE ASCEflDENCy QF MAN, 
 
 GENERAL INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THE subject of the rights of the female sex has now been 
 before the country for several years. The advocates of the 
 most advanced claims on behalf of women have met with a 
 success which cannot be described as other than extra- 
 ordinary, and which we may well be disposed to think 
 must have exceeded their most sanguine anticipations. For 
 not only have the numbers of those who support such 
 claims, and particularly that for the political franchise, 
 increased with remarkable rapidity, but there is observable 
 on the part of those who really adhere to the old ideas a 
 singular disposition to smother their opinions, and to 
 practically give up their case as if hopelessly doomed to a 
 not far-distant failure. The revolutionary claims of the 
 Women's Suffrage Journal seem to be regarded as merely 
 the crest of a tremendous wave of opinion, against which it 
 
 would be vain to strive to stand, since it must soon bear 
 
 1 
 
Women's Suffrage and National Danger, 
 
 away every vestige of opposition and submerge the 
 unhappy wights who have been too slow in shaping their 
 course so as to take advantage of the irresistible, or 
 even to escape into a position of comparatively safe neu- 
 trality. If anyone doubts that this is so, let me point him 
 to the occasions when these claims are the subject of debate, 
 either in a deliberative assembly or in the columns of a 
 journal. Does not the opposition too frequently degenerate 
 either into -dogmatic senti.tientalisin or unseemly pleasantry, 
 and is not a feeble attempt"" t'o ridicule the movement very 
 general] y-'suJbstiiU^ed 'for- seripusrand* painstaking argument, 
 supporte'd 'by 'the honest statement of well-considered 
 evidence? As a consequence, we find that the most extrava- 
 gantly sophistical arguments and the most hollow asser- 
 tions of the other side are confidently swallowed by the 
 unsuspicious Briton, as if he were imbibing the very nectar 
 of unadulterated philosophy. 
 
 On the side of the leaders of the attacking force, however, 
 there has been comparatively little disposition to treat the 
 matter as one of pure sentiment, or which may be decided 
 by natural intuition, albeit they may show a tendency to 
 demand for their propositions the character of fundamental 
 principles, whose self-evident excellence is only to be 
 supported by arguments in the nature of an unnecessary 
 and entirely voluntary concession. Their case has, at least 
 once, been stated with all the calmness of the experienced 
 sage, the power of a masterly logician, and the confident 
 temperateness of a veteran certain of success. Whether we 
 read essays or listen to speeches on the subject, we may 
 well arrive at the conclusion that, allowing for imperfections 
 necessarily incident to human effort, the treatise of Mr. 
 
General Introduction. 
 
 John Stuart Mill on the " Subjection of Women " contains 
 the sum and substance of the whole matter from the new 
 point of view, and placed in the most favourable light 
 possible. Yet the gauntlet thus openly thrown down, not- 
 withstanding that it is the challenge of a most doughty 
 champion with whom conflict itself might be considered an 
 honour, can hardly be said to have been satisfactorily taken 
 up by any earnest warrior on the other side. Possibly the 
 very renown of Mill may have deterred his bravest opponents 
 from entering the lists where he was wielding the lance of 
 the combatant. I cannot, however, but think that even on 
 the part of one who was himself doubtful, not only of the 
 issue of the battle, but even of the strength of his case, 
 some serious effort to put the matter before the public from 
 an opposite point of view would have been a service to the 
 cause of truth, which all lovers of justice, whatever their 
 opinions as to the merits of this particular case, should have 
 esteemed. A lesser man than Mill might naturally 
 have suffered in personal reputation at his hands ; but, in 
 weighing the arguments of each, the judicious reader could 
 have been trusted to make fitting allowance for the com- 
 parative weakness of one of the advocates. 
 
 Considering that it is beyond the possibility of doubt that 
 the issue which has been raised is of immense importance, 
 and also that it is almost certain that there must be some- 
 thing worthy of consideration which may be said on the 
 side of the defence, and which is capable of systematic 
 statement, I hope it is not too late to make an attempt, 
 though possibly feeble, at a substantial answer to the 
 arguments and assertions of Mill and those who have 
 followed in his path. For though it be considered certain 
 
4 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 that the contention of the latter will prevail, I venture to 
 submit that it is desirable, in the interest of the formation 
 of a sound and stable opinion upon the matter, that those 
 facts and arguments which tend, or which are supposed to 
 tend, in an opposite direction should be temperately, though 
 fearlessly stated. It must not be imagined that in such an 
 attempt there is involved anything like the faintest aspira- 
 tion on the part of him who makes it to a comparison with 
 the intellectual power or the literary style of Mill. The 
 wisest man may be, and perhaps generally is, wrong upon at 
 least one important point, and it is, therefore, conceived 
 quite possible to present an intrinsically better case than 
 this extremely able logician without the slightest presumption 
 at anything like an effort to remove the verdant laurels of 
 his wide-reaching philosophy. 
 
 To those who may be inclined to weary of the topic, it 
 may be well to emphasise the fact, that of all problems 
 which must be solved by this or any future age, few, if any, 
 can be imagined of such essential and extensive importance 
 as that which concerns the proper position and rights of the 
 entire female sex. I feel that it is hardly possible to 
 adequately state it is almost certainly not possible to 
 exaggerate the tremendously momentous nature of the 
 issue which has at length been raised. For not only are the 
 interests of one-half of the human race directly and 
 immediately concerned, but with these is necessarily and 
 obviously implicated the well-being of the other half. That 
 which is of cardinal importance to the female sex throughout 
 the world cannot be intelligently treated as of other than 
 the greatest importance to men also. I therefore contend 
 that, whatever may be our present views, or in whichever 
 
General Introduction. 5 
 
 direction our opinions may at present incline, we ought not 
 to hesitate, for several years hence, to continually re-open our 
 minds for the study of the question, apart, as far as may be 
 possible, from all determined feelings but those of regard 
 for the claims of reason in the decision of this as of every 
 other question. Meanwhile let us be cautious of taking any 
 steps which it may be difficult to retrace, in case their 
 direction be found wrong. 
 
 Now, seeing that, with certain possible local and temporary 
 exceptions, the general rule of practice in all ages and among 
 all nations has been against the equality, political or otherwise, 
 of women with men, one might have been inclined to regard 
 it as an indisputable proposition that the onus of proving 
 that a contrary rule ought to be adopted lies upon those who 
 are desirous of change, and that it is not the duty of those 
 who incline to the principle of immemorial practice to stand 
 otherwise than on the defensive, in contending that such 
 practice is to any extent justifiable. Mill, however, is of a 
 contrary opinion. But I do not propose to pursue this point 
 of difference, because I feel that in a case where reply may 
 follow reply ad infinitum, and where, moreover, as is the 
 fact before the tribunal of the intelligent citizen's mind, 
 the party who would succeed must make out his own case, 
 the question is probably rather in the nature of an interesting 
 preliminary measuring of swords than of the actual 
 combat of opponents who are using the best weapons that 
 they can respectively procure. 
 
 Before entering upon a consideration of the arguments 
 and allegations in favour of the legal recognition of the abso- 
 lute equality of the two sexes, it may be well to briefly draw 
 attention to the history of the movement in this direction. 
 
6 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 It appears, then, that the views of Mill and his con- 
 temporaries are by no means entitled to the merit of 
 originality. For, as Mr. Bouverie, then member for Kil- 
 marnock, pointed out in Parliament some eighteen years ago, 
 this subject was treated in a very advanced manner as far 
 back as the year 1825 by a certain Mr. W. Thompson. This 
 person is characterised by Mr. Bouverie as of the same 
 school of opinion as Mr. Owen, the notorious socialist, who 
 was apparently opposed to all religion, as well as to all 
 ordinary conceptions of morality and law. The title of his 
 work, which may be seen in the British Museum, is " An 
 appeal of one half the human race against the pretensions 
 of the other half " ; and the following is an extract there- 
 from : 
 
 " Even under the present arrangements of society, founded as they 
 all are on the basis of individual competition, nothing could be more 
 easy than to put the rights of women, political and civil, on a perfect 
 equality with those of men. It is only to abolish all prohibitory and 
 exclusive laws statute, or what are called ' common,' the remnants of 
 the barbarous customs of our ignorant ancestors, particularly the 
 horrible and obvious inequality and indissolubility of that disgrace of 
 civilisation the present marriage code." 
 
 We may easily form an estimate of the moral and 
 intellectual constitution of this writer, and it is both 
 interesting and important to observe how close an associa- 
 tion has continued from his time to subsist between the 
 principles which he advocated and the morality and bent of 
 mind which he illustrated. It is not intended to present 
 anything like a list of writers and statesmen, Continental, 
 American, or English, who have dealt with this subject in a 
 conspicuous manner. The names, and a superficial know- 
 ledge of the character, of many of these are widely 
 
General Introduction. 7 
 
 known ; and one can hardly be expected to be specific in so 
 delicate a matter. My present point, indeed, may be 
 made in a very simple way. I ask the reader to recall to 
 mind all the prominent English men and women who have 
 eminently identified themselves with this movement, ever 
 since it became seriously considered by a large number of 
 the electors of the country, that is to say, since Mill 
 devoted his powers to its advocacy. Let it, then, be con- 
 sidered how many of these, either by their entire want of 
 religion or their piecemeal profession thereof, or, according 
 to the present public morality of England, the immoral 
 tendencies of their direct attacks upon, or thinly disguised 
 contempt for, marriage and other institutions and principles 
 which are happily still regarded by a majority of those who 
 have our social welfare in their keeping, as absolutely 
 fundamental and necessary to the highest possible civili- 
 sation ; or by their want of a generally healthy frame of 
 mind, have shown themselves barely worthy of the real 
 confidence of those who, being merely average though 
 honest citizens themselves, stand in need of guidance from 
 others whose opportunities for reflection have been better, 
 and whose abilities are greater, than their own. In spite of 
 not improbable general censure for so doing, I respectfully 
 press this point as one which ought by no means to 
 be neglected. It is replete with suggestions of dangers 
 unobserved, of rocks and shifting sands ; and should help 
 to concentrate the attention of those whose heads are 
 hot with anticipations of new joys and wonders when the 
 old landmarks of their fathers have been left behind, upon 
 the faintest indication of a threatening cloud, which may 
 perchance develop into a mighty tempest, through which, 
 
8 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 not shunned in time, the seamen of the vessel of our State 
 may find it hard to ride. Undoubtedly, as a rule, anything 
 like personal attack upon political opponents may., with 
 good reason, be considered both useless and discreditable ; 
 yet where we have both an abnormally exceptional case 
 under discussion and sufficient homogeneity of character 
 among its leading supporters to challenge attention and 
 invite generalisation, or at least remark, it seems justifiable 
 to studiously inquire as to the significance of the position. 
 If, further, there be a prima facie case for supposing that a 
 large majority of the men and women who have led a move- 
 ment in favour of a change of the most vast importance to 
 the human race have shown themselves strikingly defective 
 in the attributes of those who are generally recognised as at 
 once of superior intelligence, moral goodness, and religious 
 belief, it is submitted that their speculations, suggestions, 
 and anticipations, as distinguished from the facts which 
 they adduce and the arguments which they put forward, 
 should be treated with the utmost caution, and by no means 
 readily accepted where apparently discordant with principles 
 which have been tested by experience and found good. Of 
 course, I do not for one moment pretend that there is 
 anything conclusive in this line of argument. Its force lies 
 principally in the warning conveyed to the minds of the 
 cautious, by the discovery if such it prove that a new 
 idea which is being pressed upon them was first conceived 
 by, and has subsequently more particularly recommended 
 itself to, men and women who have not been such good 
 specimens of the English character, considered at once in 
 its moral and intellectual aspect as to be safely imitated, 
 or even followed, without sufficient reason independent of 
 
General Introduction. 
 
 the peculiarities of their teaching. Later on, we may find 
 distinct reason in the nature of the case for the character- 
 istics of the advocates of the movement. 
 
 As somewhat relevant and worthy of remark in this place, 
 the curious and suggestive fact may be mentioned, that the 
 new order of ideas seems to gain greater ground with Con- 
 servative than with Liberal politicians. In view of the 
 almost unparalleled revolution which these ideas foreshadow, 
 surely there must be a startling significance in such a fact. 
 This is not, however, a party treatise, and I will not, there- 
 fore, dwell upon this circumstance. 
 
 With a view to convenience, it seems to me desirable to 
 divide my argument into two branches, although the subject 
 of either is logically involved in that of the other.. In the 
 first part I deal with the immediate political question of 
 the day concerning the extension of the suffrage to women, 
 and in the second part with the inseparably connected, 
 though apparently wider, question of the complete equalisa- 
 tion of the sexes, more particularly in relation to the 
 condition of marriage. 
 
PART I. 
 
 THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION OF THE EXTEN- 
 SION OF THE FRANCHISE TO WOMEN. 
 
 "Die Politik 1st Sache des Mannes." BLUNTSCHLI. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 I NOW pass to the consideration of the leading arguments 
 and assertions by which it is attempted to show that the 
 Parliamentary Franchise ought to be extended to women. 
 And here I may at once observe that it would be clearly 
 unwise to limit my remarks to the case of single women. 
 For though many simple-minded people are induced to 
 favour the extension of the voting power to single women, 
 under the delusion that the force of the movement will be 
 spent when this is accomplished, it is but too clear to those 
 who have followed the contentions of the leading men and 
 women who have identified themselves with the claim on be- 
 half of women to vote, that these advocates have no idea of 
 stopping at the enfranchisement of spinsters and widows. 
 The extension of the suffrage to the latter is but regarded as 
 a step in the desired direction, which our opponents are very 
 anxious should be taken, since it is clearly one which it will 
 not only be difficult to retrace, but which will render the 
 further step of extending the suffrage to married women 
 possessing a property or occupation " qualification " almost 
 inevitable. The spinsters and the widows to whom the 
 voting power shall have been extended may well be trusted 
 
The Extension of tJie Franchise to Women. 11 
 
 to bind down their would-be representatives to a measure 
 which shall take cognizance of their sex as a whole, and 
 which shall not allow the vote of women to be lost through 
 their alliances with men who, from the nature of the case, 
 have shown no special appreciation of the spinsters and the 
 widows themselves. However, there ought to be little need 
 of argument to establish this contention, as those who are 
 sustaining the present agitation make no secret of their 
 ultimate intentions. In support of this I will only insert 
 one quotation, which is from a speech by Mr. Jacob Bright, 
 delivered in the House of Commons, and reported at 
 column 703 of the 281st volume of " Hansard." "I have 
 never," says he, " concealed my opinion on this subject, or 
 that of the Women's Suffrage Associations throughout the* 
 kingdom . . . Their principle is electoral equality, and 
 when they say that, they mean that any qualification 
 established by Parliament which gives a vote to a man 
 should give a vote to a woman, and they do not ask the 
 question whether she is married or unmarried." That this 
 is so ought, I think, to be far more insisted upon than is the 
 case, for it is conceived that there are thousands of men and 
 women who are now supporting in one way or another this 
 movement, who would at once cease to do so if they realised 
 what is quite clear to anyone who has sufficiently observed 
 the position. It may well be said that we cannot in reason 
 draw the line at single women, even if women as a sex 
 would be contented therewith. But it is only too clear that 
 they will not. It is not conceivable that women having 
 been qualified to vote as spinsters would be content to lose 
 their votes on marriage, particularly if their husbands lived 
 with them in the very houses by viitue of their occupation 
 
12 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 or ownership of which they enjoyed the right to vote before 
 marriage. Let anyone, therefore, who really has any fears 
 as to the larger extension bestir his wits ere he takes a step 
 which will make it a mere matter of course. For it is to be 
 remembered that when a woman has the right to go to the 
 poll we have no longer the opinion of men alone to reckon 
 with, and therefore anything like organisation among the 
 women of an electoral district in the present state of party 
 strife would present a phalanx which might well awe the 
 most courageous. 
 
 The bulk, however, of what follows in this branch of my 
 observations is equally applicable to the case of single 
 women considered alone. 
 
SECTION I. 
 
 THE CURRENT ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF 
 WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE. 
 
 FOBEMOST among the reasons which I am about to com- 
 bat, both in respect of the frequency with which it is urged 
 and the importance which is attached to it, is, I take it, the 
 proposition that it is the ownership or occupation of property 
 which alone gives the right to vote ; or, in other words, that 
 the vote is attached to the property owned or occupied, 
 and that therefore all consideration of sex is irrelevant. 
 Whoever has studied the speeches or writings of eminent 
 advocates of the extension of the suffrage to women, or has 
 argued the question in private conversation with their 
 followers, will probably admit that this contention is very 
 generally considered by them as the most important, or, 
 at least, one of the most important, of their arguments. 
 
 But surely of all methods of proving a case current in the 
 present age of education and intelligence, this is an illustra- 
 tion of one of the most extraordinary. Those who have 
 formulated it have done so by grasping at statutory enact- 
 ments, dragging them away from the previously existing law 
 to which they were added, and twisting them into a 
 distorted meaning both inaccurate and misleading, but yet 
 sufficiently plausible to gull our countrymen by millions, and 
 then founding a so-called argument on a basis so utterly 
 worthless. That this process should deceive many not 
 unused to controversy, is no less a matter for astonishment 
 
14 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 than for regret. For whether we consider the statement 
 under examination in the light of history, or of our present 
 law, we shall find that it is totally incorrect. Property or 
 occupation alone never did, and certainly does not now, and 
 probably never will, give anyone a right to vote. But even 
 if the ownership or occupation of property did now give a 
 vote, this could not possibly be the basis of an argument in 
 favour of the case for women, in consideration of a condition 
 of affairs to which we are not improbably tending. 
 
 Now it must be remembered that in the reign of Henry 
 IV. it was expressly enacted probably in pursuance of a 
 custom which had existed at some previous time that all 
 freemen present in the county court on the day of election 
 should enjoy the right of voting for a representative of the 
 county. Therefore, the elector, speaking of the counties 
 only it is unnecessary to complicate the matter by dealing 
 also with the boroughs enjoyed the Franchise by virtue of 
 being (1) a man, (2) free, and (3) present in the county 
 court on the day of election. Subsequently, disfranchising 
 statutes, dating from the eighth year of the reign of Henry 
 VI., were passed, taking away the right of voting from those 
 ivho previously enjoyed it, and restricting it to those who 
 owned or occupied property of a certain value. The 
 tendency of recent statutes has, of course, been to lower the 
 value which was prescribed by the restricting statutes. 
 From this it is perfectly clear that the statute in which the 
 subject of property was first introduced did not purport to 
 give the Franchise to those who owned property, for they 
 already enjoyed it, but took away the right from others who 
 had previously enjoyed it. Subsequent statutes upon the 
 subject were merely modifications of the first disfranchising 
 
Current Arguments for Women s Suffrage. 15 
 
 statute, ameliorating the harshness of the latter, and pro 
 tanto restoring the electorate to that position which it 
 occupied in earlier times. How then is it possible to 
 contend that, either by any statute or otherwise, the owner- 
 ship or occupation of property really gives the right of 
 voting to anyone ? We must bear in mind the far more 
 elementary conditions of (1) manhood, (2) freedom, and (3) 
 a disposition to exercise the Franchise, which have always 
 existed as the basis of the voting power. What inference, 
 indeed, is possible, as to the theory or principle of our 
 constitution, other than that the requirement of a property 
 qualification, as it is somewhat inaccurately termed, was 
 superadded as an additional test of fitness to the already 
 existing conditions of manhood and freedom ? And if we 
 press back into the records of times prior to those to which 
 allusion has been made, we shall find ourselves in the 
 regions of obscurity, but quite unable to discover any 
 vestige of foundation for the supposition that the ownership 
 or occupation of land or household property ever gave the 
 right to the electoral Franchise. So much, then, as to the 
 historical aspect of the matter. 
 
 Let us now briefly glance at the principle of the existing 
 law, and see whether any countenance is lent by it to the 
 extraordinary proposition with which we are dealing. Is 
 it then possible to say with any shadow of accuracy, even 
 with exclusive reference to the present day, that ownership 
 or occupation in any case gives the right to vote ? In order 
 to arrive at a decided answer to this question, it is only 
 necessary to bear in mind a very few facts of the easily 
 apprehended character of the following. Lunatics and 
 idiots of all ages, as well as infants of sound mind, both own 
 
16 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 and occupy land and household property, but they do not 
 enjoy the right of voting. How then is it contended that 
 ownership or occupation, apart from other considerations of 
 fitness, gives the right of voting ? If it were so, how is it 
 that these subjects do not enjoy it ? Again, A. owns one 
 house in an electoral district in which B. owns 100 houses. 
 If the fact of owning a house gave the right to vote, would 
 not B. have exactly a hundred votes to A.'s single vote ? 
 And if, on the other hand, occupation of a house is the 
 foundation of the right to vote, how is it that any save 
 occupiers enjoy the franchise ? In short, if ownership, 
 occupation, payment of rates, residence, all, or any of then? , 
 give the right to vote, is it possible to explain the present 
 position of the franchise ? Further, pressing the matter 
 more closely, the statement under consideration, at least in 
 its usual bare form, is grossly absurd. For property, 
 inanimate as it is, cannot of itself be endowed with rights, 
 or give rights to others, except by the most palpable fictions. 
 The law can only attach rights to the ownership or occupa- 
 tion of property, by fastening upon certain human beings, 
 and providing that with regard to them, and them only, the 
 ownership or occupation of property shall give rise to certain 
 rights in them as being previously objects of its considera- 
 tion, as subjects potentially capable of such rights. Apart 
 from a capable owner or trustee, property is absolutely 
 impotent to confer the right to exercise a discretionary 
 power. Indeed, if Parliament were to accept in their com- 
 plete fulness the dogmas of our opponents on this point, I am 
 not sure that we should not find unoccupied property as 
 well as property whose owners were beneath full age or 
 non compotes mentis, furnished with automatic voting 
 
Current Arguments for W omens Suffrage. 17 
 
 machines, constructed on a principle somewhat similar to that 
 of those silent repositories of sweetmeats and cigarettes 
 which have now become familiar in our streets. I 
 venture, then, to arrive at the conclusion that the right to 
 vote never has been, and never could be, given by, enjoyed 
 exclusively through, identified with, or necessarily incidental 
 to, the ownership or possession of property, considered apart 
 from the fitness or capability of some human being. In 
 other words, ownership or occupation of property does not, 
 and never will, qualify anyone to vote. 
 
 It is possible, however, if need be, to go much further 
 than we are taken by the above attempted exposition. Let 
 us assume for one moment that the statement under discussion 
 is accurate at the present time. Even upon this assumption 
 is it in the least degree probable that this statement will 
 always, or even for very long, have any application or, 
 indeed, possess the faintest semblance of truth ? It is far 
 from my desire to make any assertion of an unfounded or 
 unwarrantable character, or to express in this place any 
 opinion as to the merits of the tendency to which I allude ; 
 but is there not ample ground for supposing that the 
 tendency of modern thought and legislation is in the 
 direction of the institution of practically universal, or, to 
 be more exact, with a view to our present topic, manhood 
 suffrage, or, putting it perhaps more accurately, in the 
 direction of an extension of the franchise to all who are not 
 subject to some disqualification, and not merely to all who 
 have some particular so-called qualification, or at all events 
 to all who can pro ye that they are gaining a respectable 
 livelihood and settled in a particular locality ? If this be 
 so, when the tendency becomes consummated, what will 
 
18 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 become of the contention that, since property gives the 
 vote, the same relation to property which " qualifies " a 
 man ought also to " qualify " a woman ? The law con- 
 sidering the individual, and, instead of demanding a pro- 
 perty or occupation " qualification," insisting merely on the 
 absence of disqualification, there will no longer remain, 
 even in the intelligences of the very simple-minded, the 
 slightest scope for the sophistical, though plausible, theory we 
 are now considering. It will obviously cease to be capable 
 of impressment into the service of the advocates of women's 
 so-called rights. Nay more and here lies " the rub " what 
 will be the logical result of dealing equally with the sexes 
 under the present system, requiring the ownership or 
 occupation of property on the part of voters ? Surely, 
 beyond all possibility of doubt, the contention must follow, 
 and follow with unimpeachable force and reason, that, inas- 
 much as women have been treated identically with men when 
 a property or occupation qualification was required, they 
 must also be treated identically when that qualification is no 
 longer necessary. It is to be remembered, moreover, that 
 such a contention would presumably have for its support 
 the vote of the women who already possessed the franchise. 
 Indeed, would it be possible, with any show of consistency 
 or propriety, to retain a property or occupation qualification 
 in the case of women, while dispensing with it in the case of 
 men ? Who so subtle that he could invent a rationale for 
 such a proceeding ? Thus there would naturally follow the 
 result that, as the adult women of the United Kingdom are 
 more numerous than the adult men, the female voters would 
 actually outnumber the male. The wish of the former must, 
 therefore, supposing the existence among them of a quite 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 19 
 
 possible organisation and unity of purpose, in every matter 
 prevail, even to the extent of the exclusion, if desired, of 
 all save women from the Houses of Parliament and every 
 office of State. Da the advocates of the feoiale sex seriously 
 contemplate a condition of affairs in which such a result 
 would be within the bounds of possibility ? Do the 
 responsible English citizens, to whom the future history 
 of the most glorious Empire of the world is largely com- 
 mitted, venture to contemplate, with even momentary 
 indifference, so staggering a consummation of the rapidly 
 progressing views of the followers of Mill ? For the appreci- 
 ation of my suggestion, it is by no means necessary to 
 imagine the most extreme position involved by the supposi- 
 tion of organisation between the whole female sex. Stopping 
 far short of that, we have sufficient cause for well-founded 
 dismay in the inevitably vast weight of the opinion of the 
 sex, when constituting the majority of the electorate. And 
 let it never be forgotten, particularly by those who are 
 for drawing the restrictive line far short of the climax 
 suggested, that the vote once given to any number of women, 
 and necessarily forming an instrument for their operations in 
 the direction of an extended suffrage for their sex, can only 
 be recalled, when once the Parliament that gives it is 
 dissolved, with great and growing difficulty. For in every 
 constituency the candidate who would be successful would 
 of necessity be compelled to reckon with this vote, which, 
 on no hypothesis, would be of a very inconsiderable extent ; 
 and, in the present evenly - balanced state of parties, 
 the effect of the power of women when formulating a 
 demand for their sex will probably hardly be exaggerated. 
 Let this consideration " give us pause " ere we take one step, 
 
 2* 
 
20 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 the logical consequences of which it requires the sang-froid of 
 the most consummate philosophy or stupidity to seriously 
 contemplate without an intellectual shudder of dismay. 
 
 It is, however, said, with a somewhat greater show of 
 reason, that taxation without representation is tyranny, and 
 that this maxim of constitutional justice applies to the case 
 of women as forcibly as to that of men. 
 
 Now we must bear in mind that maxims of the constitu- 
 tion, like maxims of the law, are not to be taken as ultimate 
 truths of legislative philosophy or morality. They are 
 verbal formulae sometimes convenient, but often misleading 
 and they are not necessarily more. They are, moreover, 
 to be considered with reference to their historical origin and 
 development, and their existing constitutional significance 
 and importance. But they are not in the nature of ultimate 
 principles to which we are bound to see that all our consti- 
 tutional rules conform, or by which the worth of these rules 
 is to be tested. In other words, in the absence of extraneous 
 reason to the contrary, the application of these maxims 
 cannot safely be extended beyond the orbit of cases ejusdem 
 generis with those for the regulation of which they have 
 been originated and maintained. 
 
 Is it, then, true, as a universal proposition admitting of 
 no exceptions, that taxation without representation is 
 tyranny ? It is easily shown that it is not. The British 
 Government, for example, taxes millions of its subjects 
 without the consent of their elected representatives. Yet, 
 as the large majority of the people of England believe that, 
 at all events at present, such fellow- subjects are not fit or 
 adapted for the exercise of a political suffrage, it is not con- 
 tended, except possibly by a few of peculiar opinions, that 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 21 
 
 their taxation is necessarily an act of tyranny. And it is 
 worth while observing in this place that, on almost every 
 conceivable hypothesis, there is as truly a difference I do 
 not say as great or as little, but as truly "a difference 
 between a man and a woman, as between an Englishman and 
 one of his own sex but of a different race, who is still 
 taxed although not represented in any assembly which con- 
 sents to his taxation. 
 
 Again, confining our attention to the United Kingdom, we 
 find that every full-aged man, outside of the workhouse, even 
 though not enjoying the Franchise, as well as every infant 
 and lunatic in the kingdom of ordinary habits, pays taxes in 
 some way or other, though no more represented than women 
 now are. The revenue from tobacco and alcoholic liquors 
 would be far smaller than it now is, if such men and boys 
 did not feel the incidence of the taxes thereon. Indeed, to 
 put the matter in a fair light, let me point out that, of the 
 direct taxes which bear principally, no doubt, on those 
 males who have the right to vote, the Income-Tax, for the 
 year 1887, was estimated as bringing in about sixteen 
 millions, and the Land and House Tax only about three 
 millions. The total of the death duties amounted to about 
 seven millions and a half. As against these figures, we find 
 that of the indirect taxes paid by all, absolutely in- 
 dependently of enjoyment of the suffrage, the customs were 
 estimated at more than twenty millions, the excise duties at 
 more than twenty- five millions, and the profits of the Post 
 Office at nearly three millions. Thus we see, upon a con- 
 sideration of the principal general taxes, that those which 
 are paid by all, irrespectively of the voting power, and, to a 
 vast extent, actually paid by those who, though males, have 
 
22 Women 's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 not the Franchise, are considerably more important than 
 those which are almost exclusively paid, so far as males are 
 concerned, by those who have a share in the choice of the 
 representatives who sanction them. We may thus clearly 
 see that, though it is a rule of our constitution that taxation 
 without consent of Parliament is illegal, it is not, as a fact, 
 a rule which is even approximately followed, that taxation 
 without representation is tyranny. It is also to be observed 
 that lunatics and infants, though not possessing the 
 Franchise, are, of course, subject to direct taxation, if of 
 sufficient means, as well as to indirect taxation. 
 
 It being, therefore, clear that it is an obvious absurdity 
 to assert that it is tyrannical to tax anyone who is not 
 represented, or, in other words, that the maxim that taxation 
 without representation is tyranny, is not a truth of universal 
 application, does not the argument in favour of the 
 extension of the suffrage to tax-paying women, which is 
 based upon it, fall hopelessly to the ground ? For as it is 
 clear that many existing cases cannot be brought within the 
 range of its application, how is it possible, without 
 extraneous proof, to validly assert that a case, not hitherto 
 recognised as within that range, ought, henceforth, to be so 
 considered ? 
 
 Putting the matter in a slightly different form, there is an 
 easily detected fallacy in attempting to prove from the 
 alleged, or even admitted, fact, that taxation without 
 representation is tyranny, except in certain cases hitherto 
 undefined, that taxation without representation is tyranny 
 in a case which is not independently proved not to be one of 
 those which are excepted. 
 
 Indeed the maxim in question can hardly be said to be 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 23 
 
 more than a convenient modfe of expressing the right of 
 Englishmen who are actually in enjoyment of the Franchise 
 to exercise a legitimate influence in the particular phase of 
 government specified, as well as in others generally. There 
 is no indissoluble or essential connection between the right 
 to join in electing a representative and the liability to be 
 taxed, even in the case of fully qualified male citizens. For 
 if we imagine a state of affairs in which taxation should be 
 unnecessary, we shall not surely come to the conclusion 
 that representative institutions would be without any logical 
 foundation ? For the logical basis of political representation 
 is but the basis of political liberty, which philosophically 
 lies in the advantage to the community at large, which is 
 derived from the participation of men of mature years and 
 general fitness in the direction of its public affairs. There 
 is no natural right in any man or woman to vote by virtue 
 merely of paying taxes. The sole foundation in reason for 
 the claim of anyone to political power or freedom is the 
 advantage to the community generally which is consequent 
 upon the admission of such claim. 
 
 I may here refer to the hardship which has been pointed 
 out somewhat unimportant surely in female ratepayers 
 being compelled to pay a rate caused by the corruption of 
 the politicians of an electoral division. Assuming, without 
 admitting, that this is illogical while they have no right to 
 exercise the Franchise, it is sufficiently obvious that the 
 anomaly would be remedied more simply by an Act 
 exempting women from contribution to such rates and 
 any analogous rates, if such there be than by the mo- 
 mentous revolution of extending to them the same Franchise 
 as men now exercise. And what valid reason is there, upon 
 
24 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 the above assumption, why such an Act should not be 
 passed ? 
 
 I now proceed to the argument that since women are as 
 much interested in good legislation and government as men are, 
 they ought, therefore, to have a similar voice in choosing 
 those who assist in making the laws by which the commu- 
 nity is regulated. 
 
 It is of course quite clear that women are vitally interested 
 in good legislation and government. This may safely be at 
 once admitted. Possibly, however, it would be difficult to 
 show that their interest in good legislation generally, using 
 the words in a comprehensive sense, though vital, is quite 
 as direct and immediate as is that of men, who are as a rule 
 more actively engaged in business and professional pursuits, 
 as well as practically exclusively liable to take part in 
 belligerent operations. It is nevertheless sufficient for the 
 purpose of the adequate consideration of the above argu- 
 ment, that their interest in good legislation is vital and 
 essential. Is, then, the conclusion which is drawn, one 
 which is capable of being supported ? 
 
 We must again bear in mind that millions of our fellow 
 subjects, to whom there is DO suggestion that the Franchise 
 ought to be extended, are quite as undeniably interested in 
 good legislation as are women. I allude to members of both 
 sexes beneath the age of majority, and to persons of 
 defective mental power. A consideration of this fact at 
 once shows that no necessary connection either now exists, 
 or ought, upon any intelligent hypothesis, to be made to 
 exist, between interest in good legislation, and a share in 
 the choice of legislators. But may we not go farther, and 
 say that no connection, even of an unessential character, can 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 25 
 
 in reason be said to exist between the individual interest in 
 question, and the right to vote as a consequence of that 
 interest ? It is, indeed, submitted that it is not in harmony 
 with the soundest principles of political science to allow a 
 merely personal interest in legislation to materially weigh 
 in favour of any member of the State in the matter of the 
 extension of the Franchise. For if it be otherwise, are we 
 not led to the conclusion that the greater the interest, the 
 greater should be the political Franchise enjoyed ; so that, 
 for example, the man who owns vast landed estates or 
 millions in the funds or English stocks ought to have an 
 immensely larger number of votes than the man of very 
 moderate means who is contemplating emigration to a 
 colony? But who is prepared to accept such a conse- 
 quence of the theory, as to a so-called " stake in the 
 country " ? Indeed, I venture to suggest that if any such 
 principle of the association of interest and the Franchise be 
 admitted, we shall be pointed to applications of the same 
 from which all save old-fashioned Tories would shrink. If 
 we once deny that the foundation of the right to vote lies 
 in ihejltness of the voter in point of moral and intellectual 
 capacity, and the consequent advantage to, or at least 
 compatibility with, the highest good of the State as a whole, 
 of the influence in its sovereign assembly of his opinion as 
 an elector ; and, instead, base our political arrangements 
 upon theories of selfishness or intolerant demagogy, we are 
 but too likely to live to regret the now visible inception of 
 the golden age of Liberalism, and, in place of continual 
 delight in renewed applications of the glorious principle 
 that we ought, in the decision of all political questions, to 
 regard the greatest happiness of the greatest number, to 
 
26 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 remember with painful remorse the days when so- termed 
 modem Radicalism had not only not departed from the 
 lines of its talented inventors, but had never been seriously 
 cherished in the bosom of a responsible English politician. 
 For when once we dispense with the requirement of fitness 
 in the members of our governing body, however large, then 
 do our democratic views become a hideous delusion and a 
 very slaughterhouse of happiness and worth. Such a con- 
 summation is indeed to be both feared and avoided ; and it 
 is our part to diligently remember that, while the principles 
 of philosophical Eadicalism will never lead to national 
 disaster, they are, nevertheless, eminently liable to be 
 rudely seized on by untutored hands, and, by plausible and 
 easy fallacies of the leaders of the mob, to be degraded into 
 the abstract weapons of irresponsible rowdyism. 
 
 Somewhat similar to the argument with which we have 
 been dealing is the contention that the Franchise should be 
 extended to women because it is necessary in order that they 
 may obtain just legislation. 
 
 Now, if we consider the existing law regulating the 
 position of single women and the relation of the sexes in 
 marriage, and examine it, not superficially, but in connection 
 with the actual facts of human existence, I contend that, 
 with the possible exception of the provisions as to the 
 grounds upon which divorce can be obtained by members of 
 the two sexes respectively, and some few others of less 
 importance, it is by no means clear that it does not err in 
 favour of women. Is it fair, for instance, to the husband 
 that, while his wife is all her life practically entitled, though 
 somewhat indirectly, to a suitable provision out of his 
 means, yet if she succeeds to a large fortune she should be 
 
Current Arguments for Women s Suffrage. 27 
 
 able to claim every farthing of this, to the entire exclusion 
 of all right on the part of the man who may have worked 
 for her during many years, diminishing to a large extent, 
 through his connection with her, the wealth available for 
 his own personal expenses, except in the extreme event of 
 his becoming a pauper ? I do not, however, for one 
 moment desire to suggest that the present state of the law 
 relating to women is perfect, except so far as it errs in their 
 favour. Changes in this branch of the whole law are, of 
 course, necessary or desirable, just as truly as they are in 
 that which relates to men. The real question is, admitting 
 the desirability of some changes in favour of women, 
 whether they are, as a sex, less likely to achieve a fair 
 legal position without the Franchise than with it. 
 
 Are, then, men as a clans organised in opposition to the 
 just claims of women? Are they, indeed, inattentive to 
 the requirements and welfare, as distinguished from the 
 claims, of women? In endeavouring to arrive at a fair 
 answer to these questions we ought to bear in mind some 
 very simple facts. Of these not the least noteworthy is 
 this. The large majority of our present legislators and voters 
 have more closely at heart the interests of one or more 
 women with whose lives their own are indissolubly asso- 
 ciated than that of any man or class of men who are, or can 
 possibly come, within the range of their consideration. 
 The average Englishman endowed with political power has 
 of necessity constantly present to his mind the interests of 
 women at large, as represented by his wife, his daughters, 
 his mother, or his sisters. As, moreover, the men in ques- 
 tion are of varying position in life so are the objects of 
 this consideration ; and therefore the interests of women 
 
28 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 of all the classes to which in the case of men political power 
 is given are continually present to the minds of those who 
 have a share either in legislation or the election of legis- 
 lators. Whether, therefore, it be in considering a legislative 
 change, or the election of a representative to assist in legisla- 
 tion, I submit that the average member of Parliament and 
 voter respectively are preserved from greater avoidable 
 injustice to women than to men, by a study or contem- 
 plation of what is the most correct answer to the 
 self-examining question, " How should I regard the 
 proposed enactment if I thought that my wife or other 
 female relatives would be among the women whom it 
 affected?" 
 
 But further, is it possible to reasonably suppose that any 
 law which would appear to the best representatives of men 
 which the times afforded as advantageous to their own sex 
 generally, would be capable of being shown by women or 
 their representatives as unjust to the female sex ? On the 
 contrary, it is suggested as incontrovertible, that the interests 
 of the two sexes are so perpetually, and indeed inevitably, 
 blended, that legislation which appears to the best obtainable 
 representatives of men as advantageous to their sex, would 
 appear to the best contemporary representatives of women 
 as advantageous to women also. We cannot safely treat the 
 two sexes as being two distinct classes, or deal with them 
 with that separate intention with which we should regard 
 two classes of men and women combined, or of men only, 
 or women only. The entire constitution of the human race 
 rests upon the man and the woman as creatures of common 
 interests, as being jointly the unit of human happiness, 
 ability, power and aptitude, as well as of the fertilising 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 29 
 
 vitality, as the result of which the destinies of mankind are 
 not bounded by the narrow limits of a single generation. 
 
 In addition to the above, I refer to ordinary experience 
 for a refutation of the assertion under consideration. In 
 this connection I contend that, far as we may now be from 
 a perfect regulation of human affairs and ordinary conduct, 
 the sum of the power which is exercised over women by 
 men is tempered by more consideration and more generosity 
 than that which is exercised over women by members of 
 their own sex. It is, however, sufficient for the present 
 purpose if equality between the two sexes be admitted in 
 this matter. No doubt, glaring exceptions to the suggested 
 rule may exist, but let me ask the reader to carefully ponder 
 over the cases within his own knowledge, in which men and 
 women have respectively regulated the existences of women, 
 not being members of their own families, and then to 
 attempt, so far as practicable, to estimate in whose favour, if 
 either, has been the average merit in the exercise of power. 
 If inquiry be extended into historical records, the treatment 
 administered by Roman matrons to their slaves, and female 
 Russian proprietors to their serfs, may, among other 
 instances, prove both interesting and instructive, however 
 painful to readers of ordinary sensibility. 
 
 And though I confess to some weariness of repetition, I 
 must again refer to the legislation with regard to infants and 
 others who have not the Franchise at present, and obviously 
 never will. Is it not generally true, that in all States where 
 legislation is known, such persons receive a legislative treat- 
 ment which, in the light of the prevalent morality, is as 
 good as it is possible for any class of men not specially 
 privileged to receive at the hands of the legislature ? Or, 
 
30 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 going further, is not the legislative morality of the State 
 
 almost invariably found as high with regard to the infant as 
 
 with regard even to the average elector of the State? It 
 
 may occur to some to answer these questions in the negative, 
 
 on the strength of a reference to one or more legal systems. 
 
 The Roman institution of the patria potestas, for instance, 
 
 may be treated as an illustration to the contrary. But we 
 
 must remember that a Roman's idea, not only of what was 
 
 due to the father, but of what was good for the child, was 
 
 very different from ours. We must consider, too, the 
 
 barbarity of many other branches of the law, which applied 
 
 to those who were themselves either in the enjoyment of 
 
 political power, or who only ceased to be so when they fell 
 
 under the operation of the branch of the law in question. 
 
 I point to the treatment of insolvent debtors and convicted 
 
 criminals. Were the legislators less benevolent, or more 
 
 harsh towards the children of the nation, of deliberate 
 
 intention, than to those in the possession of political power? 
 
 Indeed, it is a fact of importance in this matter, that long 
 
 after women had ceased to become subject to a similar 
 
 marital power, without having participated in any political 
 
 franchise whatever, the severity of the patria potestas still 
 
 existed in what we consider a barbarous vigour. Surely we 
 
 may from this infer that sons and daughters were not treated 
 
 better than they were because the level of general legislative 
 
 morality did not suggest this to the people of the times. 
 
 Otherwise, why did women cease to be treated with similar 
 
 harshness ? Because of their influence on their husbands 
 
 and sons ? Very likely ; but this influence, as I have said 
 
 above, remains unimpaired, and is probably greatly increased 
 
 at the present hour. If, again, the tenderness to the wife be 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 31 
 
 urged to explain the amelioration of her position, the counter- 
 part existing in the parental feelings towards the son and 
 daughter must be remembered. Indeed, I am not aware that 
 there is anything in the volumes of Latin authors, from the 
 earliest days of Roman literature until the decline of Roman 
 law after Justinian, which have been preserved to us, indicat- 
 ing that female opinion generally with regard to parental 
 power was materially different from that which was held by 
 the men of the times. 
 
 I therefore submit, on this branch of the subject, that 
 there is some reason for doubting whether the treatment 
 by the sovereign one or number of the male sex, of the 
 women subject to his or their authority, has not, at all 
 events in advanced stages of civilisation, been generally the 
 fair expression of the opinion or sentiments of men and 
 women indiscriminately of the rank of the sovereign one or 
 number ; and that no bias of men as a class, against women 
 as a class, has operated, in the main, to render the treatment 
 of women worse according to the philosophy of the time, 
 than that which was accorded to men. If, however, it be 
 considered otherwise, then I rest upon the safer ground that 
 there is no evidence in the present day that the English 
 Parliament is biassed against women, or even inclined to 
 neglect to pay a due regard to their interests, sufficient to 
 justify their admission to the Franchise as a means of 
 securing legislative fairness towards their sex. We must 
 not omit to give due regard to the inevitable, and, perhaps, 
 humanly unrivalled, influence of his female relatives over 
 the elector and the legislator respectively, as a guarantee 
 that the best intelligence of the age shall be fairly applied 
 for the benefit of women equally with that of men. To 
 
32 Women's Buff rage and National Danger. 
 
 preserve this safeguard, it is entirely unnecessary to disturb 
 the established order of things as to the political position of 
 women, 
 
 Indeed, in this connection, one fact may be mentioned as, 
 in itself, absolutely conclusive against our opponents. At 
 present, men have the power to refuse to extend the 
 Franchise. In order that they may grant it, they must 
 evidence a disposition to show the greatest fairness to 
 women. This disposition would be a then existing fact, 
 which would completely demonstrate the unnecessary 
 character of its result. For how can it be contended that 
 those men who would grant women the Franchise, are not 
 disposed to treat women generally with fairness in legis- 
 lation ? Thus, on the hypothesis that those who wish to 
 extend the Franchise to women, wish to do so as an act of 
 justice to women, or as a measure for the benefit of women, 
 their argument, in justification of their contention, would 
 reach its most complete breakdown at the moment of its 
 success. The very fact of the extension of the suffrage 
 would, of itself, show the totally unnecessary character of 
 the measure. It must not, however, be supposed that none 
 save those who advocate the movement in question are 
 disposed to treat women fairly. For who are the men who 
 would not, at once, throw into it the weight of their 
 support, if they believed its success necessary in order to 
 obtain fair treatment for women ? 
 
 There is, however, one argument in favour of the claim 
 which I am endeavouring to combat that is apparently 
 more difficult to satisfactorily answer than any other. It is 
 said, certainly with considerable probability, but whether 
 correctly or not it is not for me to say, that whatever may be 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 
 
 said or done by the opponents of the movement under con- 
 sideration, it will inevitably be successful before long. 
 
 This view seems to have a remarkably staggering effect 
 upon an immense number of men. It is not surprising that 
 it should disarm the timid, and more particularly those 
 aspirants to Parliamentary honours who believe they will 
 one day depend upon the suffrages of women. Yet I doubt 
 whether honest intelligence ought not to indignantly 
 repudiate the slightest potency to silence or convince in 
 a plea of so vaguely principled a character. Possibly some 
 may think that it is inexpedient to attempt the refutation of 
 a contention of so closure-like a nature, and which has 
 possibly more of the meanly creeping than of the trans - 
 cendently dignified in its character. It may, however, be 
 well to say a little upon the point. 
 
 We ought, then, to remember that the assertion upon 
 which this argument is based cannot, from the most sanguine 
 point of view, be placed higher than that the Franchise 
 will in all human probability be extended to women. It 
 cannot be absolutely certain that such will be the case. For 
 though a Bill in this behalf had been introduced into the 
 House of Commons by Mr. Smith, and supported by Mr. 
 Gladstone and Lord Hartington through its first and second 
 reading and its committee stage, and Lords Salisbury, 
 Granville, and Selborne were notoriously in favour of its 
 passage through their House, one's imagination need not be 
 particularly strong to conceive possible events, the happen- 
 ing of which would relegate the Bill to a position in which 
 success would be improbable. However this may be, the 
 earnest politician must look, not only to the determination 
 of an issue by the present geaeration, but to the effect of his 
 
34 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 efforts upon the intelligence of the future, in the legislation 
 of which there is no finality but that of the perfect age. 
 And even though we should be unsuccessful in our resist- 
 ance now, our action may render the duration of the reign of 
 the new ideas shorter and less disastrous than it might 
 otherwise be. The greater the influence and the numbers of 
 the defeated minority, the easier is its return to the position 
 whence it has fallen. We dare not, moreover, attempt to 
 justify ourselves in non-resistance to that which we believe 
 is wrong, by pleading the inutility of withstanding that 
 which is inevitable, until there is no room for reasonable 
 doubt that it is as a fact inevitable. Even then I very 
 much doubt the satisfactory nature of the excuse. Happily, 
 anarchy and the scaffold do not now stare the patriot in the 
 face, disturbing the normal operations of conscience or 
 warping the understanding of the timid. 
 
 Indeed, if the argument in question were generally 
 admitted as valid, would there not soon be an end to the 
 rationale, not only of all Conservatism, but of all political 
 contention or effort which was not made on the side con- 
 sidered sure of success ? 
 
 Many, however, without risking confusion in the mazes of 
 elaborate controversy are content to assert, tersely and posi- 
 tively, with all the oracular pomp of the untutored mind, that 
 the voting power is the right of women, whose position with 
 regard to property is similar to that of those men who are 
 at present electors, and that therefore it is unjust to with- 
 hold the power from them. 
 
 It ought to be hardly necessary to point out that we have 
 before us in this contention a very bare specimen of the 
 petitio principii. Yet, as it is so very common, it may be 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 35 
 
 well to demonstrate its utter want of logical force. By what 
 authority, then, has the alleged right been established? 
 For the electors of England must be put in mind of the 
 fact, though possibly it is rather regrettably late in the 
 history of philosophy for this to be needed, that a right 
 of any kind necessarily owes its existence to the institution 
 of some power other than that of the person in whom it 
 resides. The possible sources of rights have thus been 
 determined to be either (1) the law of God or nature, 
 ascertained by Revelation, the application of the principle 
 of utility, or conscience ; (2) the law or bent of opinion or 
 custom ; and (3) the law of a particular State. 
 
 Now, I doubt whether anyone has ever attempted with 
 any approach to success to prove that the alleged right to 
 the Franchise is given by the Law of God as expressly 
 revealed by Him. Whether the correct application of the 
 principle of utility makes it proper to extend the Franchise* 
 and so confers a right thereto on women, is obviously the 
 very point which has to be settled by all who are not 
 content merely to follow with unquestioning mind, the lead 
 of others. And we can hardly appeal to conscience or a moral 
 sense in such a matter, for surely this is pre-eminently a 
 case in which the individual conscience may be well sup- 
 posed to stand in need of enlightenment from extraneous 
 sources before it can itself become a teacher. Some, 
 however, may assert that the alleged right is of the 
 so-called " natural" order. But I could hardly dispose by 
 argument of this opinion without running the risk of un- 
 necessarily wearying the reader with a mere repetition of 
 the now long-standing refutation of the theory of the 
 existence of such rights, as distinguished from the others of 
 our series, by the pens of the analytical jurists. 
 
 3* 
 
36 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 Further, if Parliament be taken to represent the male 
 opinion of the country, it is obviously impossible to say that 
 a right to the Franchise is awarded by this, so long as no 
 Act is passed in its favour. If, however, the opinion of 
 women is relied on, I think we are entitled, at least in this 
 connection, to wait for a little clearer expression thereof than 
 we have yet heard. As to custom, the nature of the case 
 excludes its operation in favour of the alleged right. 
 
 That the third source of rights cannot be relied upon in 
 this case is self-evident. 
 
 If, then, those who tell us simpliciter that the suff- 
 rage is the right of women, or that it is our duty to 
 give it to them, are really begging the question at issue, 
 it is clear that those who tell us that the extension of 
 the Franchise to them is required as an act of justice are in 
 no better position. For since justice consists in consonance 
 to some law, or in discharging one's own duties and 
 observing the rights of others, it is manifest that if it 
 remains to be proved that there is any right on the part of 
 women to the Franchise, or any duty on our part to accord 
 it to them, the justice of acceding to the claim which we 
 are considering must also be a matter for proof. 
 
 However, the expression which we have considered is pro- 
 bably hardly supposed to be worthy of attentive examination, 
 even by those who use it. It is probably often, if not generally, 
 intended to form an assertion that, for reasons not stated, 
 the claim to the Franchise for women ought to be admitted. 
 There is probably also present, in many cases, to the mind 
 of the person who uses the expression, a supplementary 
 opinion, to the effect that a failure to perceive its truth can 
 only result from insufficient or perverted understanding. 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 37 
 
 In connection with this branch of the subject, we find the 
 following startling language used by Mill : " Let me here 
 begin by marking out one function broadly distinguished 
 from all others, their right (i.e., the right of women) to 
 which is entirely independent of any question which can be 
 raised concerning their faculties. I mean the suffrage." 
 Now I will not affect to suppose that by the word " right " 
 this eminent thinker has any meaning less distinct than that 
 of valid claim based upon considerations of expediency or 
 justice. But what of the assertion that thousands, or rather 
 millions, of human beings are to be admitted to the 
 Franchise on the ground of right, or from motives of 
 expediency or justice, or otherwise, apart from any con- 
 sideration of their faculties ? When such an expression as 
 I have quoted is used by such a man as Mill, ought not 
 lesser minds than his to pause before giving way to the in- 
 fluence of what would seem to be an intellectually devastating 
 prejudice, by which one of the most renowned of modern 
 logicians has been apparently extraordinarily led astray from 
 the paths of political wisdom ? Not inquire concerning the 
 faculties of those on behalf of whom votes are being claimed 
 which may affect the destinies of the entire human race ? We 
 might as reasonably supplant our present Constitution of the 
 Queen, the Lords and the Commons, by a Republican Govern- 
 ment liberally recruited by infants from the hospital for found- 
 lings, and swayed by the eloquence of Bedlam. If we do 
 not demand from the ultimate constitutional repositories of 
 sovereign power some reasonable certificate of presumptive 
 fitness, ought we not, in consistency, to abolish Parliament, 
 and submit ourselves henceforth to the uncontrolled disposi- 
 tion of the most addle-pated hereditary sovereign whom all 
 
38 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 the royal houses of the globe have yet to propagate for the 
 curse of nations ? 
 
 Indeed, it would seem but too obvious that the whole 
 rationale of democracy must disappear if we repudiate 
 presumable intellectual and moral fitness as the basis of the 
 electoral Franchise. The cardinal object of such a form of 
 government is surely that the greatest amount of ability and 
 integrity possible shall be brought to bear upon the deter- 
 minations of the legislative body. We are not, in undiscern- 
 ing reliance upon meaningless dogmas, to open the door of 
 the Constitution to those as to whose fitness no reasonable 
 presumption can be raised. But instead of amplifying this 
 topic in my own words, I prefer to quote the language of 
 Bentham. Speaking of national representation and kindred 
 topics, he says : " In deciding these same questions accord- 
 ing to the principle of utility, it will not do to reason upon 
 words ; we must look only at effects. In the election of a 
 legislative assembly, the right of suffrage should not be 
 allowed except to those who are esteemed by the nation fit 
 to exercise it ; for a choice made by men who do not possess 
 the national confidence will weaken the confidence of the 
 nation in the assembly, so chosen. Men who would not 
 be thought fit to be electors, are those who cannot be pre- 
 sumed to possess political integrity, and a sufficient degree 
 of knowledge. Now we cannot presume upon the political 
 integrity of those whom want exposes to the temptation of 
 selling themselves ; nor of those who have no fixed abode ; 
 nor of those who have been found guilty in the courts of 
 justice of certain offences forbidden by the law. We cannot 
 presume a sufficient degree of knowledge in women, whom 
 their domestic condition withdraws from the conduct of 
 
Current Arguments for Women's Suffrage. 39 
 
 public affairs; in children and adults beneath a certain 
 age ; in those who are deprived by their poverty of the first 
 elements of education, &c., &c. It is according to these 
 principles, and others like them, that we ought to fix the 
 conditions necessary for becoming an elector." * 
 
 But Mill does not, of course, leave the matter with the 
 statement I have quoted. His contention may, I think, be 
 fairly summarised as follows. Women are, as a fact, quite 
 as fit to exercise the political Franchise as are men, or, if 
 they are not so at present, they will become so when their 
 position has been made thoroughly equal to that of men in 
 all respects, as it ought to be. This brings us to what is, I 
 contend, the only reasonable basis of the claim on 
 behalf of women to the voting power. I now proceed to 
 examine the accuracy of the assertion of fact, and, in 
 doing so, to consider the leading and more obvious reasons 
 against the claim which rests thereupon. 
 
 * " Theory of Legislation," compiled from the MSS. of Bentham, 
 by M. Duraont, and translated into English "by Mr. Hildreth, page 81. 
 
SECTION II. 
 
 THE THRESHOLD OF THE CASE AGAINST 
 WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE. 
 
 WE are now face to face with the reasons against the move- 
 ment. I have endeavoured to marshal the arguments of a 
 representative sort which are generally urged in some way 
 or another by our opponents, either in their barest form or 
 somewhat concealed by a drapery of plausible assertions. 
 It is now time to state expressly and clearly the leading 
 reasons why it is here contended that the Franchise should 
 not be extended to women. Of course, except so far as the 
 reader may be satisfied with the non-proof of our opponents' 
 case, it is for me to endeavour to show that, for some reason 
 or other, it would be inexpedient to do so. 
 
 I venture, then, setting aside, as one is entitled to do in 
 the serious consideration of so important a matter, all 
 equivocation arising from gallant delicacy, to submit, as a 
 proposition of general truth, that women are not fit to 
 exercise the political Franchise. It is here contended that 
 the average woman is, and probably will always remain, in 
 one respect or other, unadapted for political power. At 
 the outset of this topic I suggest unfitness of a kind as to 
 which there is very wide and possibly well-founded doubt, 
 namely, that which is owing to their general inferiority in 
 intellectual power as compared with men. This point is 
 not placed here because considered as one of the strongest 
 in my favour. On the contrary, it is, perhaps, the one, of all 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 41 
 
 those which I urge, as to which there is the greatest room 
 for reasonable doubt. Nor is it in any way essential to my case. 
 I would endeavour to lead the reader up from the region of 
 doubt as we progress, not by inviting him to make stepping- 
 stones of possibly weak arguments, as if they were the 
 solid rock of unimpeachable good sense, but by preparing 
 him, by means of a bird's-eye view of the whole aspect of 
 the question, to wend his way to the secure summit of a 
 philosophical determination. 
 
 Some may consider that much of what is here said is rude 
 to women; as, indeed, so many attempt to "bounce" this 
 terribly vast and important question by terming anything 
 but an answer in favour of the ill-considered claims of 
 women's so-called advocates, an affront to the sex. With 
 such trifling, however, I have little concern. It is 
 sufficiently plausible for those who regard every woman as a 
 natural subject for deception, to attempt to curry fleeting 
 favour by a gallantly simulated approval of a social change 
 which women are so far more likely to bitterly rue than 
 men. But those who fear no censure in the advocacy of 
 an honest cause, and who are looking to the future as well 
 as to the present day, can well afford to risk whatever 
 danger there may be in puny censures of this kind. 
 
 Is there, then, sufficient reason for believing that women 
 are intellectually inferior to men, or that their minds are 
 less adapted to the consideration of subjects of public 
 importance requiring careful deliberation and a power of 
 generalisation ? 
 
 It may, perhaps, be fairly observed, that the fact that 
 this question is really capable of being seriously raised that 
 it Las not long ago been settled in the negative is 
 
42 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 cogent evidence that we ought now to give an affir- 
 mative answer. For we might reasonably have antici- 
 pated that if women are intellectually equal to men, they 
 would, long ere this, have demonstrated their equality 
 beyond the possibility of intelligent doubt. This, however, 
 can hardly be said to have been done. 
 
 Looking, then, at the unquestionable evidence before us, 
 we find that, regarding only those avocations in which 
 women might have distinguished themselves, there is not 
 one in which they have ever attained the foremost position. 
 There are no female names among the few leading lights of 
 literature, science, or art. In this country, as well as in 
 others where mental power can most easily assert itself, 
 women have been often distinguished, but they have 
 invariably fallen short of pre-eminence. 
 
 We are told by Mill that the fact that there has been no 
 female Shakespeare proves nothing, sinck women have been 
 trained away from all occupations and objects which would 
 naturally lead to the attainment of transcendent literary 
 eminence. This explanation of the matter is considered as 
 sufficient to prevent any arguments against intellectual 
 equality based thereon from obtaining credit. But it is 
 respectfully submitted that there is, in this contention of 
 Mill and others, a striking superficiality and want of 
 soundness. For it cannot be maintained that Shakespeare 
 became the prince of authors as a result of the circumstances 
 in which he was placed, or of the inducements held out to 
 him, or the culture afforded to him. If we consider 
 what is known of him and other illustrious authors, 
 we shall almost certainly arrive at the conclusion that 
 it was not what they received from the world which 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 43 
 
 rendered them remarkable, but what came from them, 
 as a vital stream of intellectual power, which no difficulty 
 or counter- training could effectually hamper, and which 
 no discouragement could destroy. And surely there is 
 but slight ground for the assertion that the English 
 women of Shakespeare's class in his own or any other 
 succeeding age were, or have been, subject to any restric- 
 tion or blighting education sufficient to prevent the assertion 
 of an equally mighty intellect if they had possessed it. If 
 we consider well the teaching of biography we shall, it is 
 submitted, assuredly arrive at the conclusion that, where 
 genius has existed, neither the want of education, nor a 
 cramping or perverting education, has been sufficient to 
 prevent its discovery. In other words, genius provides her 
 own education, and creates her own opportunities. Indeed 
 the assertion of the existence of extraordinarily stringent 
 restrictions upon women seems almost incapable of support. 
 For I question very much whether the dislike of the fathers 
 of Shakespeare and other great authors for the budding 
 signs of literary greatness, and the consequent aversion from 
 the paternal shambles or workshop on the part of their sons, 
 has not fully equalled, in its restrictive and antagonistic force, 
 anj r influence which has usually restrained or opposed in 
 England the blossoming of the first-fruits of female power. 
 The burgess who would have burnt his son's effusions might 
 well have been ready to spare the products of his frailer 
 offspring, for the satisfaction of a selfish pride without the 
 pecuniary loss incident to such clemency in the case of the 
 apprenticed son. And the opportunities of women would 
 probably be even more marked among the higher classes. 
 But whether we regard our own most illustrious writer, or 
 
44 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 the darling of our northern fellow-countrymen, can it be 
 seriously said that these men, while sheering sheep, holding 
 the bridles of horses, or following the plough, had any 
 advantages for the development of greatness which have not 
 been almost equally possessed by ordinary English girls. 
 Perhaps the argument might to some extent avail if 
 women had hardly ever dabbled in the realms of literature. 
 The fact, however, is that, whether with genius or without, 
 women of various stations in life have attempted literary 
 work, and have succeeded to a great degree, but not, it is 
 suggested, to such a degree as is consistent with the theory 
 of the absolute intellectual equality of the sexes. For why 
 should not Sappho have been as great as Homer, or Mrs. 
 Browning be as lofty as Shelley or Lord Tennyson ? Indeed 
 the very fact of the great place of George Elliot in the 
 inferior region of the novelist speaks strongly against the 
 theory under discussion. Of course it may be said that the 
 mere fact that a larger number of women engage in literary 
 work now than formerly is owing to the change in our ideas 
 upon the subject of women's sphere, and proves the con- 
 tention of Mill. But the truth seems rather to be that, 
 though increased opportunities and encouragements have 
 brought a number of women into the field of the class of 
 professional writers, it has hardly demonstrably brought a 
 single woman to such literary excellence as indicates great 
 genius, who would not in all probability have been equally 
 distinguished before the new ideas came into vogue. The 
 crowd of small literary people, men and women, go for 
 nothing in the argument which I present. And it is well 
 worthy of observation in this connection, that in the Dorian 
 States no woman approaching Sappho in intellect is known to 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 45 
 
 have lived. This great authoress was trained among the 
 Ionic States, where the intellectual development of women 
 was comparatively neglected. 
 
 The inferiority of women in the fine arts is explained by 
 Mill by reference to the purely amateur or unprofessional 
 nature of their devotion to such studies until recently. One 
 may be tempted to suppose our logician hard pressed when 
 he resorts to such a refuge. Did Raphael achieve his 
 eminence through the love of gain, or did he not rather get 
 pecuniary reward as the result of a natural devotion to the 
 brush, which would have caused him to paint even at the 
 sacrifice of a more remunerative avocation ? Because the 
 male artist finding his work remunerative has adopted it as 
 a profession, surely we are not to infer that if he had 
 indulged no greater hope of gain than a female artist was 
 at liberty to do, he would not have pursued his natural taste 
 with the glittering crown of a perennial reputation before his 
 eyes. When once genius has popularised an art, crowds of 
 second-rate imitators will be sure to follow it for gain or 
 otherwise ; but what possible reason is there to suppose that 
 if women had possessed the talent, not only to follow others, 
 but to create the regular study of an art, they would not 
 have been readily permitted and sufficiently encouraged to 
 do so ? On the contrary, the very fact that Avomen have 
 been able to pursue the arts at their leisure, and have been, 
 indeed, by conventionality very largely, and somewhat 
 exclusively, encouraged so to do, would seem to indicate that, 
 if the genius had existed, the opportunities for its assertion 
 would have been at least equal to those existing in the case 
 of men. The political economist may imagine that the love 
 of gain was the strongest and indispensable motive to the 
 
46 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 composition of the " Messiah " ; but will the musician, with 
 the sublime enthusiasm of the spirit of Handel or Mozart 
 welling up within his soul, admit that he would not have 
 composed his masterpiece had he been secure of a com- 
 petence independently of the expected gains from the 
 pursuit of his favourite theme ? 
 
 It is said, however, by Mill, that in the only art followed 
 by women as a profession, namely, the histrionic, they have 
 proved themselves equal, if not superior, to men. Now, 
 whether the alleged equality or superiority is to be con- 
 sidered an established fact or not, I do not think it is 
 important to consider. For if it be so, I should contend 
 that we are justified in concluding that this art has been 
 followed by women as a profession for the simple reason 
 that they have had the capacity to excel therein. I should 
 then suggest that it might be added, with considerable force, 
 that if a similar capacity on their part had existed with 
 regard to other arts, women would also have followed them 
 professionally. We can hardly treat the accession of 
 women to the theatrical avocation as a mere accident. The 
 art of dramatic performance does not, by any means, stand 
 alone in the respect that people prefer to see it well, rather 
 than badly, executed ; and, if other arts would have been 
 largely benefited by the fact of women professing them, 
 surely such profession would have been an ordinary matter 
 of experience. The observation, however, of Mill, upon 
 this point, which had certainly occurred to myself before 
 perusing his work, seems to fairly give rise to pertinent 
 remarks by no means favourable to the contentions 
 which he endeavours to support by it. For dramatic 
 talent is strikingly independent of that originality which is 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 47 
 
 the great characteristic of the highest intellectual power. 
 It is not, moreover, without significance, that this one art 
 stands almost alone in the peculiarity of its position, as an 
 avocation, the moral advantages of which are still a matter 
 of controversy among people of great intelligence and high 
 principles. That the profession of this art should be the 
 one sphere of women ? s alleged demonstrated equality is, to 
 say the least, prima fade remarkable, and pregnant with 
 suggestive indications. 
 
 The admitted inferiority of women in literature and the 
 arts generally is further accounted for by our illustrious 
 logician. He tells us that women, when first encouragement 
 was not wanting for their efforts, found a highly advanced 
 literature already created, and that thus their powers of 
 originality have been subdued by precedent. This does not, 
 however, apply in the least degree to the time when, as I 
 have contended, though encouragement might not have 
 existed, active suppression was not exercised, nor does the 
 principle of the contention at all apply to the still open 
 field for discovery and invention in the regions of applied 
 science. Again, we are told that very few women have 
 sufficient time for the pursuit of studies which require 
 systematic application, and that, therefore, what they do 
 must be done at odd times. That this is to a certain extent 
 true I do not dispute, but let me appeal to biography and 
 personal experience. Have the greatest men been born 
 in circumstances in which the achievement of greatness 
 would appear natural have they, as it were, had " greatness, 
 thrust upon them " or has it not rather continually ap- 
 peared that their greatness was achieved in spite of the 
 difficulties of their position and the demands of their 
 
48 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 bread-winning career ? How many, indeed, like George 
 Stephenson, have, under peculiar disadvantages, and while 
 experiencing the fatigues of manual labour, successfully 
 educated themselves in the knowledge necessary for the 
 development of their renowned discoveries ! What of the 
 master-strokes of genius conceived by the flickering light of 
 a hardly-bought taper, while snatching the last hours of a 
 day of wearing toil? " Slow rises worth by poverty 
 oppressed," yet rise it surely does. Indeed, have not 
 women enjoyed unrivalled opportunities for inventions of 
 the class of the most famous of James Watt, whose observa- 
 tion of a kettle has seemed to his French biographer 
 the early prelude to the discoveries which have crowned him 
 with the lustre of a human benefactor's fame. In common 
 experience, again, who are found to have the most spare 
 time, the men who are making their thousands a year by 
 the use of their brains, or the idlers who are dreaming 
 through the existence which is made laboriously luxurious 
 with the wealth accumulated by men of the former stamp ? 
 And when do men, as a fact, feel at their best for abstract 
 thought when seated during whole days of leisure in a 
 room whose very comfort makes them fidgety, or when 
 seizing the golden moments from a busy life ? 
 
 Still further, we are in effect told that women have seldom 
 eagerness for fame, and that they merely desire to receive 
 favourable consideration from their male relatives. If this 
 be so at present, whose is the ruthless hand that shall 
 disturb so excellent a disposition for domestic life ? But 
 since we see, indeed, that genius rarely exists apart from 
 love or desire of fame in some shape or another, should we 
 not well infer that where love of fame does not exist, neither 
 does the genius which must give it raison d'etre. 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 49 
 
 The matter seems summarised, from Mill's point of view 
 in these words : " Whoever is in the least capable of 
 estimating the influence on the mind of the entire domestic 
 and social position and the whole habit of a life, must easily 
 recognise in that influence a complete explanation of nearly 
 all the apparent differences between women and men, 
 including the whole of those which imply any inferiority." 
 Now, in considering this passage, one naturally thinks of 
 the many instances of women whose careers have been 
 totally unlike those of their sex generally, and of the little 
 countenance which such cases lend to the contention which 
 is contained in it. Probably most of us have many times 
 come across girls who have been brought up with, and 
 practically educated, as far as possible, like boys ; but I doubt 
 whether we have been uniformly struck with the superior 
 force of their intelligence. The "henpecking" matron, 
 too, is not wholly unknown in modern times, yet it may 
 be fairly questioned whether, save by her husband, she is 
 generally regarded as of a particularly remarkable wisdom 
 and breadth of intelligence. But, apparently with cases of 
 exceptional position and education in his mind, Mill tells us 
 that the ability of the ladies of reigning families who have 
 alone been allowed to develop their qualities has, in propor- 
 tion as their capacities for government have been tried, 
 been found adequate. In considering, however, the much- 
 vaunted benefits of female regime, we must remember that 
 very much is attributed to the Sovereign which would be 
 more properly imputed to the Minister, so much so that, the 
 more thoroughly a good Minister is trusted, the happier as a 
 rule are the results of the government. Nor must we over- 
 look the fact that we have been educated in a country of 
 
 4 
 
50 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 constitutional rule, and that, therefore, the qualities which 
 we admire in a Sovereign are hardly those which are most 
 nearly associated with mental strength, or the fitness for the 
 exercise of direct political power. The reign of women 
 has been very generally approved by constitutional poli- 
 ticians, because free institutions have had a better chance of 
 development thereunder, owing to the personal weakness of 
 the monarch, than under the reign of men. 
 
 But let us scan the most notable instances in English 
 history which are so frequently relied upon, and consider 
 whether they are really inconsistent with the general 
 principles for which I am contending. I suppose the list of 
 such instances begins with Boadicea. With reference to her, 
 however, it is to be observed that, in harmony with the 
 passage cited below from Bentham, her heroic action did 
 not, it seems, result from a public motive or the desire of the 
 general welfare of her nation, but from the particularly private 
 instigation of her maternal feelings, prompting her to 
 revenge an outrage which had been committed by the 
 Romans upon her own daughters. And, pursuing her 
 career, we observe that, as if her enthusiasm had over- 
 stepped the limits of her natural qualifications for severe 
 activity, and the anxiety of government in troublous times, 
 the balance of her mind seems to have been upset by the 
 abnormal engrossments of her brilliant heroism, and disap- 
 pointment was followed, not by continued fortitude and 
 perseverance, but by despair and the administration to 
 herself of poison by her own hand. Looking, indeed, at the 
 matter seriously, can we consider that a pyrotechnical-like 
 display of enthusiastic courage and short-lived resolution, 
 wrought up by her maternal wrath against the injurers of 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 51 
 
 her own offspring, and soon followed by inglorious suicide, 
 constitute any very strong argument in favour of the capacity 
 of women generally for State government and the adminis- 
 tration of public affairs 1 
 
 I am not aware that the differences of the Empress Maud 
 and King Stephen have ever been thought to furnish any 
 argument to my opponents, and therefore it is unnecessary 
 to pause at this point of our history. We come next to 
 Mary I. With her historians have dealt in so very decidedly 
 severe a manner, linking her name with an extremely 
 unpleasant epithet, that it is presumably unnecessary for 
 me to say anything in order to prove that she is hardly a 
 forcible illustration of the height of combined greatness and 
 worth to which the ladies of royal families may be supposed 
 wont to attain. 
 
 But Elizabeth is now reached, and no doubt a triumphant 
 glow suffuses her champion's brow. Possibly she alone 
 will furnish to the minds of many an argument so convinc- 
 ing as to be incapable of answer. Yet it is to be observed 
 that, in order that an exampleTmay be clearly in favour of 
 the advocates of women's claims, I venture to think that its 
 subject must have demonstrated the compatibility of female 
 greatness with female goodness. And as to the greatness 
 of Elizabeth it may be fairly urged that she was peculiarly 
 favoured by the circumstances of her times. Following 
 upon a persecuting Papist, she has naturally been regarded 
 with favour by Protestant historians. Surrounded also as 
 she was by gifted statesmen, in whom her shrewdness taught 
 her to place confidence, her reign has certainly by no means 
 unnaturally been regarded as illustrious. Nor were the 
 
 adverse winds which helped to scatter the Armada without 
 
 4* 
 
52 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 .their benign influence upon the glory of the reigning queen. 
 But admitting that she was a strong-willed and clear-headed 
 woman, and, at all events for the purposes of the argument, 
 that she constitutes the one example in our history of a 
 really able female ruler, was not her greatness so marred by 
 a lack of goodness as to render her character such that the 
 fewer women of her kind the world shall know, the happier 
 shall be the history of our race ? Smithfield fires did not 
 smoke so much in her reign as in that of her unhappy 
 sister, it is true ; but were not Protestant Dissenters, as 
 well as Roman Catholics, most atrociously persecuted by the 
 express desire of this renowned woman? What of her 
 mercy to Mary Stuart, among others ? What of her modesty 
 and her general virtue ? Depicting her as she lay upon her 
 bed of mortal pain, with the overbearing vixen in her 
 nature barely mastered by the grim, damp hand of death, 
 looking into her most unlovely visage, and remembering the 
 history of her life and the general traits of her character, is 
 it possible to say that she Wits a woman who can be held up 
 to the admiration of either sex ? 
 
 It is almost in the nature of a pleasant relief to speak of 
 Mary II. For apparently we find in her a good woman and 
 a devoted wife. Not possessing by law any share in the 
 Government while her husband was in England, it is not, sa 
 far as I am aware, known that this admirable woman sought 
 in any way to acquire reputation otherwise than as the 
 helpmeet of her illustrious husband. 
 
 The name of Queen Anne is, however, probably frequently 
 relied upon as an example of female excellence. But we 
 must not be led away by old-world traditions. Apparently, 
 for the times in which she lived, she was a fairly good woman, 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 53 
 
 of moderate intelligence, among whose more conspicuous 
 characteristics were an addiction to over-eating, followed by 
 consequent dyspepsia, and an over- weening confidence in 
 unworthy favourites. The actual course of events in her 
 reign is quite worthy of our attention in this connection. 
 For is it not true that, by her incapacity for government and 
 her natural womanly tenderness for a worthless brother, the 
 beneficial results of the Glorious Revolution were on the 
 very point of subversion, and that our country would have 
 been reduced again beneath the blighting sway of ribald 
 Stuarts, had not the patriotism and courage of the 
 Duke of Argyll, under Providence, averted the threatened 
 catastrophe ? This is surely not a slight thing for our 
 consideration, and, even if Anne had been a woman of 
 more than moderate intelligence, might well have sufficed 
 to obliterate all trace of true glory from her personal 
 history. 
 
 We now arrive at the name of a woman against whom 
 there has been probably said and thought as little evil 
 as against any one who has ever been as much before the 
 mind of a nation and the world. It is no sickly 
 sentiment of spaniel-like loyalty which induces me to 
 see in her present majesty a lady who commands, of 
 necessity, the admiration of good and wise people of all 
 classes. But let us consider the actual reason why the 
 people of England admire and, in many cases, almost love 
 their Queen, and have sympathised, with personal solicitude 
 and tenderness, in her many afflictions. Surely, it may be 
 suggested, with sufficient reason, that it is chiefly because they 
 believe that she was a consistently good wife, and continues 
 to be a consistently good mother because, in short, she 
 
54 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 exhibits the distinctly female virtues in all the irresistible 
 charm of their natural display. If, moreover, we consider 
 why it is that the constitutional statesmen of all phases of 
 political opinion regard her reign with peculiar equanimity, 
 our difficulty in ascertaining the reason is apparently not 
 great. It is not, as I suggest, because anyone has claimed 
 for her the glory of a transcendent intellect or a peculiar 
 capacity for command, or because they attribute to her 
 innate powers the ability, or the results of the educating 
 influence, of the greatest statesmen of her reign, but rather 
 because, from her natural indisposition to affect the real 
 control of public affairs, she has allowed, more completely 
 than her predecessors, the actual executive authority of the 
 State to be wielded, and legislation to be initiated, by men 
 whose training and abilities have rendered them fitted for 
 their exercise ; and has thus, with the qualities on her own 
 part of moral excellence and the good sense of a well- 
 balanced mind, succeeded, possibly somewhat unconsciously, 
 in bringing our present Constitution, more thoroughly than 
 was the case before, into harmony with the feelings and 
 opinions of an enlightened people. 
 
 It is therefore submitted that a candid and well-informed 
 mind will find nothing in the characters of the conspicuous 
 females of English history inconsistent with a recognition 
 of the truth of the view that, both in respect of intellectual 
 strength and natural disposition, women are generally less 
 fitted for political power than men. Indeed, the compara- 
 tively rare cases where great intellect and great authority 
 have been possessed by women who have left behind a 
 reputation for goodness as well as for greatness, seem to 
 warrant no inference inconsistent with the contention that, 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 55 
 
 primarily and generally, the appropriate sphere of women is 
 domestic privacy. 
 
 Probably, however, every one will be more influenced in 
 the formation of his opinion on this subject by the observa- 
 tions which he has himself made in the course of his 
 personal experience than by general history. But the 
 nature of these observations, and the direction in which 
 they point, must evidently be left to the individual observer, 
 and can hardly be expected to be dealt with by a writer who 
 is a stranger to his person and his history. 
 
 Now, it is, of course, to be borne in mind that many 
 women, not only of royal, but of very humble families also, 
 have been in the past, and are at the present day, often 
 clearly above the average man in point of mental power and 
 general intelligence. This fact seems to weigh very power- 
 fully with many, but any difficulty to which it may give 
 rise is very simply removed by Mrs. Jamieson in these 
 words : " The intellect of woman bears the same relation to 
 that of man as her physical organisation ; it is inferior in 
 power, and different in kind. That certain women have 
 surpassed certain men in bodily strength or intellectual 
 energy, does not contradict the general principle founded in 
 nature." As, moreover, such exceptions exist, so, on the 
 other hand, we find many men, in prominent as well as in 
 private positions, who are conspicuously deficient in 
 intelligence and efficiency. With regard to such men, the 
 words of Mr. (now Baron) Dowse, the Attorney- General for 
 Ireland in Mr. Gladstone's first Administration, may well be 
 quoted. " He was quite aware that many a judge had been 
 an old woman ; but that was no reason why every old 
 woman ought to be a judge." 
 
56 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 Perhaps a few words ought also to be said with regard to 
 the recent successes of ladies at the Universities. In esti- 
 mating the weight of these we should remember that 
 established examinations do not generally test the highest 
 forms of intellectual strength, such as originality. Many, 
 further, who attain the highest University honours are 
 subsequently found to have reached with them the summit 
 of their intellectual success. We must also bear in mind 
 that, under the present circumstances, the sons of opulent 
 parents present themselves for our University ordeals almost 
 entirely irrespectively of a perception on the part of anyone 
 of their special aptitude for success ; whereas, in the case of 
 the other sex, it may probably be fairly said that no one is, 
 as a rule, encouraged to study for examinations of a high 
 order, unless she has in some way formed the opinion that 
 she is above the average of her sex in mental faculties, or 
 has given to others the impression that such is the case. 
 
 In generalising the effect upon the understanding of Mill's 
 arguments upon this subject, one can hardly fail to be 
 struck by the prevailing uncertainty, and almost depressingly 
 speculative and hesitating character, of the opinions which 
 he expresses. Almost everything is left to the determination 
 of future generations, who shall enjoy opportunities for 
 comparison which are beyond the range of our attainment. 
 "We are, indeed, apparently asked to act as if the equality of 
 the sexes were proved, while, at the same time, we are told 
 that it is impossible for us to adequately determine the 
 matter. 
 
 According to Mill, it is even doubtful whether the brain 
 of a woman is smaller than that of a man. His doubtfulness, 
 indeed, extends so far upon the general question that one 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 57 
 
 may well despair of the probability of its being ever 
 effectually displaced by certainty, or, at all events, for 
 several generations. "The knowledge," says he, " which 
 men can acquire of women, even as they have been and 
 are, without reference to what they might be, is wretchedly 
 imperfect and superficial, and always will be so, until 
 women themselves have told all that they have to tell." 
 But may we not fairly observe that if the matter is so very 
 doubtful it is both dangerous and improper to act as if it 
 were proved in favour of women ? If their equality be still 
 unshown, ought we not to wait until it is shown before we 
 act as if it were an established fact ? If, indeed, before our 
 doubts are dispelled, we must wait until women have told us 
 all that they have to tell on the subject, and this they will 
 never be induced to do until they have been treated upon 
 the assumption that it has been done, surely the position of 
 those who advocate the movement we are discussing 
 involves the recognition of a very remarkable and a very 
 unsound principle. As a general observation, I venture to 
 submit that the true course of the reformer is to alter existing 
 institutions only when, and so far as, they have been 
 demonstrably shown to be unsuitable to existing facts, or 
 when, at least, overwhelming reason has been adduced in 
 favour of the existence of such facts as would clearly, 
 either from their present condition or their almost certain 
 consequences under an altered state of the law, justify the 
 contemplated change. 
 
 It cannot be admitted that until women are treated in the 
 same manner as men they will have had no opportunity of 
 proving their equality. It seems, if I may venture to say 
 so, to somewhat swour of sophistry in dealing with this 
 
58 Women's Sit.fr age and National Danger. 
 
 branch of the subject to continually harp upon the general 
 condition and education of women. For we ought always to 
 bear in mind that women are not a hereditary class. Every 
 woman is as much the offspring of her father as of her 
 mother, and does not exclusively inherit the alleged stunted 
 intelligence of her maternal ancestors. And, briefly re- 
 suming much of what has been said above, we are bound to 
 take into consideration the fact that thousands of our 
 countrywomen have been abnormally educated, and that the 
 entire number have by no means been imprisoned by the 
 impenetrable walls of a sex hedged round with unvarying 
 conditions of disadvantage. The opportunity of proving 
 their equality has existed, and if it cannot be maintained 
 that the opportunity has already been so availed of as to 
 leave no room for reasonable doubt of the general existence 
 of potential equality, I suggest that no case has been made 
 for the subversion of ideas and customs which are based 
 upon the assumption of the general inferiority in point of 
 mental power of their sex to that of men. 
 
 It is worth while observing, as an incentive to caution, 
 that Mill is barely content with the theory of the equality 
 of women. He seems inclined to at least suggest their 
 superiority. For, as to the quality of their brains, he tells 
 us that the indications point to a greater average fineness in 
 theirs than in those of men, due, as he suggests, to a 
 possibly quicker cerebral circulation in their case. This, it 
 is surmised, may render them superior to men in matteis 
 requiring promptitude of decision. It is true that he is not 
 apparently indisposed to admit the superiority of the male 
 in cases demanding prolonged attention. The general 
 tendency, however, of his observations seems to point to the 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 59 
 
 not unlikely existence of general superiority. If this can 
 correctly be said to be his view it is indeed important ; for, 
 if it be not improbable that one sex is superior to the 
 other, many arguments against the existence of that 
 superiority on the part of men are at once disposed of, as 
 against this writer as well as very many others. When, 
 indeed, we are pointed to the value of women as an aid to 
 the speculative philosopher, we might be tempted to 
 imagine that our study was being relieved by a jest, if our 
 author were another man than Mill. It ought, perhaps, to 
 be added in this connection that the suggestion that 
 women, while superior to men in quickness of perception, 
 are inferior to men in matters requiring prolonged investiga- 
 tion, seems to point with considerable power in the direction 
 of the view that, while women are better adapted by their 
 nature for the speedy determination of the affairs of family 
 life, men have the superior capacity for the intelligent 
 exercise of the electoral Franchise with regard to a delibera- 
 tive assembly. 
 
 Before quitting the subject of the general intellectual 
 position of women, I must deal briefly with the marked 
 differences between the general bent of male and female 
 intelligence and morals respectively. For there may be 
 differences which do not necessarily imply absolute inferiority, 
 but which, nevertheless, do render women relatively to the 
 exercise of political power and influence less capable than 
 men. 
 
 The leading outline of the differences suggested seems to 
 be well drawn by Jeremy Bentham. I feel considerable 
 satisfaction in quoting his words, because in doing so I am 
 not drawing upon the authorities of old-fashioned Toryism, 
 
60 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 or even of Conservative philosophy, iior upon the teaching 
 of a man whose Radicalism was unrestrained by the 
 conception of a definite principle. In the whole range of 
 political writers one can hardly cite a higher authority than 
 his, if indeed we can find one which is as high. Compara- 
 tively few, perhaps, are aware nowadays how much we, 
 in fact, owe to his extraordinary genius. Indeed, by far the 
 larger portion of the more important legislative reforms of 
 this century are traceable to his puissant influence. 
 Radicalism and very advanced ideas in law or politics seem 
 without a secular rationale apart from his philosophy. The 
 words quoted are found on page 39 of the work mentioned 
 above. " The sensibility of women seems to be greater 
 than that of men. Their health is more delicate. They are 
 generally inferior in strength of body, knowledge, the 
 intellectual faculties, and firmness of soul. Their moral and 
 religious sensibility is more lively; sympathies and antipathies 
 
 have a greater empire over them The religion 
 
 of a woman more easily deviates towards superstition ; that 
 is, towards minute observances. Her affections for her own 
 children are stronger during their whole life, and especially 
 during their early youth. Women are more compassionate 
 for those whose sufferings they see ; and the very pains they 
 take to relieve them form a new bond of attachment. But 
 their benevolence is locked up in a narrower circle, and is 
 less governed by the principle of utility. It is rare that they 
 embrace in their affections the well-being of their country, 
 much less that of mankind ; and the interest which they 
 take in a party depends almost always upon some private 
 sympathy. There enters into all their attachments and 
 antipathies more of caprice and imagination ; while men 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 61 
 
 have more regard to personal interests or public utility. 
 Their habitual amusements are more quiet and sedentary. 
 On the whole, woman is better fitted for the family, and 
 man for matters out of doors. The domestic economy is 
 best placed in the hands of the women; the principal 
 management of affairs in those of the men." Again, en 
 page 81, speaking of fitness for the electoral Franchise, he 
 says, in the words quoted above : " We cannot presume a 
 sufficient degree of knowledge in women, whom their 
 domestic condition withdraws from the conduct of public 
 affairs." 
 
 It might well be considered both wearisome and un- 
 satisfactory to continue the citation of opinions of this kind. 
 I should hardly have cared to lay very much stress upon the 
 above words if they had proceeded from a lesser man than 
 Bentham. But since they are his, I claim for them the 
 weight due in this matter to the utterances of one whose 
 entire works show him to have been as completely 
 emancipated from every prejudice and restraint of time- 
 honoured custom as human nature could well be. As, 
 moreover, the business of his life was to formulate and 
 support totally new ideas, such as appeared to the vast 
 majority of those who first heard them extravagant and 
 unsafe, we can hardly suppose that he would have hesitated 
 to launch out into the advocacy of the alleged rights of 
 women with regard to the Franchise, if it had occurred to 
 him possible in reason to do so. 
 
 Let me, therefore, request my readers to seriously ponder 
 over, and test by their own observation, the passage which 
 has been quoted. Will it not be found that the exceptions 
 to its general truth are comparatively rare, and the majority 
 
62 Women's Suffrage and National Danyer. 
 
 of these by no means examples which it would be desirable 
 to multiply ? Who does not know the worth of womanly 
 affection? Who has not marked the unconquerable for- 
 bearance and generosity of the mother and the wife 
 especially towards undeserving objects ? One is almost 
 guilty of becoming a bore in even alluding to themes so often 
 and so deservedly descanted upon by those vast numbers 
 who have been competent to form an accurate opinion on 
 the subject. But who, of average intelligence, can say that 
 the woman is not rare who carries the vigour of her 
 sympathy, the mildness of her sentiments, and the un- 
 selfishness of her disposition, beyond the narrow circle of 
 her family and friends ? How often have we been grieved 
 to hear the matron, whose words upon the topics of her 
 family life have been wont to be, with justice, regarded as 
 the oracular and self-evident declarations of a modern 
 Minerva, degenerate into the comparatively unheeded 
 trifler, when joining in a conversation upon public questions! 
 Our opponents probably, to a certain extent, acknowledge 
 that there is force in such questions and remarks as these, 
 but they tell us that when women have obtained the vote 
 they will cultivate the knowledge which shall give them the 
 power to intelligently exercise it. But not only is it clear 
 that the occupation by women of the position in which they 
 are alone essential will always more or less exclude them from 
 that active participation in business life which qualifies 
 for the intelligent exercise of the Franchise, but, as is 
 suggested in this treatise, their nature is formed for different 
 purposes, and cannot be advantageously, or, indeed, possibly, 
 distorted into that of the now governing portion of the race. 
 Further, I appeal, as I have said above, to the only practice 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 63 
 
 sanctioned by wisdom or experience, when I say that those 
 who wish for what they do not possess ought to show, or 
 others ought to show for them, beyond reasonable doubt, 
 that they are already, or, within a short and measurable period 
 of time, will become, fit for its possession. 
 
 It is also relevant in this place to revert to the often 
 commented upon tyranny of women towards those who 
 claim no alliance of blood or marriage relationship, or of 
 friendship with them. Thackeray does but echo a very 
 prevalent complaint, when he says that women and priests 
 are the worst tyrants in the world. Who has not, in the 
 course of his reflections, compared the bearing of the 
 average man to his dependents, male as well as female, with 
 that of women to their domestic servants and other assistants ? 
 Indeed, one is almost tempted sometimes to revolt against 
 the platitudes with regard to the tenderness of the gentle 
 sex as meaningless cant, when he reflects upon the ceaseless 
 tyranny, untempered by delicacy or sympathy of bearing, of 
 some ladies towards the strangers in their power. In truth, 
 however, those platitudes have not been formed to meet such 
 cases as these, to which they have, indeed, no serious 
 application. If attempted to be enforced beyond the range 
 of her conduct towards those whom her nature has pro- 
 claimed to be 'her world, they are apt to jar like the 
 impious gallantry of a roue of Southern Europe. It may 
 be pleasant, when steeped with gratitude to a few good 
 women, to speak of their entire sex as if they were in truth 
 terrestrial angels ; but, when we are considering legislative 
 action, it behoves us to dispense with fictions, however poetic ; 
 and if we must needs perceive the angelic essence in their 
 character, let us not overlook the distinctly fallen element. 
 
64 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 It may, too, be worth observing that the reason why there 
 is no more said of the injustice of women than is the case, 
 is probably because we find, as a fact, that it quite as often 
 tells in our favour as against us. Indeed, it is probably on 
 this account that we are apt to indulge in generalisations of 
 a character very dangerous to political excellence. But we 
 ought to remember that, when people are considering an 
 entire community, it is impossible, setting aside international 
 questions, to be unjust in favour of all of its members. For 
 that decision which errs in favour of over lenience or 
 indulgence to some, will necessarily disturb the balance of 
 justice, and militate unfairly against others. 
 
 Again, the power of intuitive, and, consequently, quick 
 perception, peculiar, as generally alleged, to the female cast 
 of mind, is well worthy of consideration in this connection. 
 According to an observation of Mill, which was referred to 
 above, this is likely to prove a permanent characteristic 
 of women. If it be admitted that this is so, the case for the 
 defence would seem very considerably strengthened. For 
 though the faculty in question has undoubtedly its own. 
 peculiar advantages, that of carefully reasoning out a 
 decision has no less certainly advantages peculiar to itself. 
 One might well suppose that the rough and ready justice 
 which is meted out within the family, and the quick 
 decisions in other respects which are arrived at as the result 
 of this intuitive perception, are replete with significant 
 suggestions that, according to the natural order of mundane 
 affairs, the family is the realm appointed as the woman's 
 sphere. For what if the intellectual process if process it 
 can be called by which the conclusion is arrived at, or 
 seized upon, in the hurry of domestic bustle, that of two 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 65 
 
 infant combatants one has been the aggressor and the other 
 the party aggrieved, be applied to the settlement of the 
 disputes of nations or the government of an Empire? 
 Just as this faculty is peculiarly adapted to the life of the 
 family, so, it is submitted, is the more slowly operating 
 faculty by which men are considered to arrive, through 
 observation and reason, at the determination of the questions 
 which are submitted to them, appropriate to the sphere of 
 public and international concerns. If the suggested 
 difference of mental constitution does exist, it ought not to 
 be overlooked that, in applying themselves to public ques- 
 tions, women cannot be supposed able to set aside the 
 natural method by which they habitually form their deci. 
 sions. These will often, therefore, in particular cases, be 
 too hastily reached, and will not easily be changed by the 
 maturity of knowledge or deliberation. The " will " having 
 been determined, the futility of an attempt, however philo- 
 sophical and able, to convince the mind against this will is 
 too well known to need a laboured proof. 
 
 The devotion to individuals which is characteristic of 
 women has also claims to our attention in respect of its politi- 
 cal operation. They are essentially creatures who love, and 
 whose love or hate is the major part of their existence, 
 or else they are as planets wandered from their sphere. 
 As beings of love, they hold a sacred place in the heart of 
 every honest man ; and unhappy is he who shall attempt to 
 rival them therein. As a consequence of this very beautiful 
 disposition of their character, the reverse of the maxim 
 " measures not men," is almost uniformly, though perhaps 
 unconsciously, the maxim of good women. Their opinions 
 
 radiate round the centre of some honoured man, and to 
 
 5 
 
6fi Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 him, though perhaps long since deceased to his wisdom or 
 to his folly they constantly and faithfully adhere. The 
 real question with them thus too often becomes, not " what is 
 right ? " but " what did So-and-So say ? " or " would he have 
 said?" They cannot and happy is it that such should be 
 the case emancipate their intellects, any more than they 
 can their hearts, from one whom they have loved and 
 honoured in his life. Possibly this one is not always a man 
 whom they have personally known familiarly, but probably 
 such is generally the case. When it is otherwise, a family 
 virtue is, as it were, transplanted to another soil, and, if 
 accompanied with the power of giving effect to its sug- 
 gestions, is but too likely to be followed by all the conse- 
 quences of a native vice. As a consequence of, or at least 
 intimately connected with, the proclivity considered, we 
 find the gregarious propensity very strongly developed 
 among women, Suppose the question of Free Trade or 
 Protection discussed at a meeting exclusively composed of 
 females. A locally popular politician has pronounced that 
 the principles of the former are folly, and that Fair Trade 
 is the only panacea for the capitalist and the labourer 
 throughout the world. A resolution in favour of the latter 
 is not improbably put after but slight discussion, and 
 carried without a single dissentient among the numerous 
 assembly, out of which not one lady has probably ever read 
 a volume of Mill except, perhaps, that on the " Subjection 
 of Women" or has ever bought or bartered, save for the 
 purpose of supplies for person, household, or private 
 charity. 
 
 We have also to observe the distinctively female charac- 
 teristic which consists in a disposition to pay undue regard 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 67 
 
 to mere social prestige and the magnificence of the golden 
 calf. With how many women is it sufficient that a cause is 
 royally approved, or is that of the aristocratic classes that 
 its opposite is espoused by the commonalty or that it is 
 one the advocacy of which is particularly likely to assist 
 the ascent towards the pleasing heights of the Delectable 
 Mountains ? A handsome and ribald Stuart, or rather 
 his modern counterpart or nearest likeness, may be faith- 
 fully supported by the men, but the women will outdo them 
 in the ardour of their devotion to his person and almost 
 worshipping admiration of his imaginary virtues. Yet " a 
 brave man struggling with the storms of fate," a politician 
 with an unpopular programme, albeit based upon the noblest 
 foundation whereon a man can build, is possibly regarded 
 by his wife or mother by some one woman more deeply 
 sympathetic with him than others of her sex as a true, 
 though unappreciated, hero ; but in all probability he is 
 considered by the large majority of his female relatives and 
 friends as being, with regard to the main purposes of 
 life, indisputably foolish, or, at all events, sadly deficient in 
 his intellectual or moral constitution. To trace this charac- 
 teristic way of estimating public worth by personal success, 
 the smiles of monarchs, and the embraces of society, into 
 the ordinary ramifications of its practical working, might 
 be tedious. Common experience is probably sufficient to 
 bear out its alleged existence, and ordinary good sense to 
 point its importance in this connection. 
 
 Much of what I have recently said is admitted by Mill. 
 He tells us that while the standard of women is higher than 
 that of men in spirit and generosity, it is lower in the 
 quality of justice ; and he is "afraid" (is this the imparti- 
 
68 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 ality of the judge, or the tenderness of the ancient gallant ?) 
 " that it must be said that disinterestedness in the general 
 conduct of life the devotion of the energies to purposes 
 which hold out no promise of private advantages to the family 
 is very seldom encouraged or supported by women's 
 influence." But he lays stress here, as elsewhere, upon the 
 change which he anticipates under altered conditions. For 
 example, their charity which, according to him, is now so 
 largely mischievous, would be directed into a better channel. 
 But may it not be effectually contended that the same cause 
 which shall prevent their charity continuing to be, accord- 
 ing to him, often mischievous, will render them like men in 
 not being so charitable in any respect as they are now? 
 Indeed, how can it be anticipated that altered conditions 
 will only develop good qualities, and only suppress bad 
 qualities ? Let it be seriously considered whether it is not 
 probable that, if we succeed in making women resemble men 
 in respect of those qualities wherein men have now the 
 advantage, we shall also cause them to grow like men in 
 respect of those qualities wherein men are now inferior to 
 them. In other words, if we unsex women, so far as the fail- 
 ings now considered incident to the sex are concerned, shall 
 we not unsex them also of their now characteristic virtues ? 
 We all know what we should anticipate as the result of 
 rendering men effeminate ; why should we not contemplate 
 equal disaster as the result of the opposite process with 
 regard to women ? Surely it is begging the whole question to- 
 say that the equalisation of the sexes, or the giving women 
 free scope, as it is called, for the development of their 
 faculties, will cause women to acquire all the virtues which 
 belong pre-eminently to men, and that, at the same time,. 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 69 
 
 they will retain all the virtues which are at present as con- 
 spicuously their own. 
 
 I have now viewed the unfitness of women for the 
 Franchise in various aspects. But one practical remark is 
 still necessary upon this subject. There is no doubt much 
 force in the contention that the present unfitness would at 
 all events diminish as a consequence of the concession of the 
 right to vote. Women would probably endeavour to 
 educate themselves for the proper discharge of a function 
 which had been accorded to them. Yet, and this is the 
 point upon which I venture to lay especial stress, the very 
 reason which Bentham gives for their unfitness for its 
 exercise must always remain so long as society is constituted 
 on the basis of family life so long, in fact, according to 
 present information, as national happiness and worth endure. 
 The average mother must pass the greater part of her 
 existence in the midst of her home, withdrawn by insur- 
 mountable necessity from that contact with the business 
 world the world in which men meet and settle those affairs 
 which constitute the relations of family to family and of 
 state to state which gives fitness for the discharge of 
 functions which, like the electoral franchise, are public and 
 extrafamilial in their character. 
 
 Moreover, the contention that the differences between 
 men and women may be educated away, or removed by the 
 alteration of the conditions of women's lives, may be met in 
 another way. Whatever may be thought of the mental 
 powers of women, there is no room for doubt as to their 
 present inferiority with regard to physical strength, or as 
 to the difference which exists between them and men in 
 respect of bodily conformation. There may possibly be 
 
70 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 some who will contend that in process of time their bodily 
 strength will become equal to that of men. However this 
 may be, it is perfectly clear that for a very considerable 
 period of time their inferiority in point of physical strength 
 will remain, and their difference from men in respect of 
 conformation must always continue so long as the race 
 exists. It is certainly difficult to imagine that, on any 
 reasonable supposition, the majority of women would ever 
 be permanently in a condition of physical strength equal to 
 that of men. Now as long as government or political 
 institutions are necessary, so long will that force, by its 
 possession of which government is possible, be absolutely 
 essential. It, therefore, follows that, both for the support 
 of the internal administration and defence from external 
 interference, a male citizen will always be liable to be called 
 upon for his assistance in the way of physical effort. One 
 of his essential duties will always continue to be the 
 provision of forcible assistance to the State authority. But 
 this by no means unimportant duty cannot be equally well 
 fulfilled by women. They cannot fight so well, or maintain 
 internal order so effectually as men. What then? They 
 are incapable of discharging to the full one of the cardinal 
 and most onerous duties of citizenship. Have they, there- 
 fore, any real grievance if their rights are subject to 
 incompleteness as well us their duties ? The obligation of 
 bearing arms is quite as truly a part of the liabilities of a 
 citizen as the voting power is of his rights. If, therefore, 
 in no case a woman can be regarded by the law as his equal in 
 the former respect, it is hardly clear that she has a primd 
 facie ground of complaint agsinst a difference in the latter, 
 even on this comparatively low ground. I venture, indeed, 
 
The Case against Women s Suffrage. 71 
 
 to lay it down as a general proposition that, since there must 
 always, while representative institutions are necessary, be a 
 difference of duty between men and women, it cannot be 
 considered sufficient to say that no difference of right ought 
 to exist, or, in considering the propriety of maintaining 
 any such difference, to say that it lies upon those who defend 
 it to show good cause for the existence of any difference at 
 all, beyond that which is found in this simple reference to 
 undoubted facts. 
 
 But before quitting the subject of the difference of physical 
 conformation between the sexes, let me ask whether this 
 difference does not lead to others ? In other words, can it 
 be seriously contended that the sole difference between a man 
 and a woman is in respect of bodily form ? On the contrary, 
 it seems to me demonstrably clear that other differences of 
 heart or mind exist, some as the consequences of the former, 
 some collaterally. And if the fact is, that there actually are 
 differences which can never be obliterated, is it truly 
 philosophical to press too closely the theory that the two 
 sexes should be treated similarly by the law ? Mill seems 
 to see no greater difference between a boy and a girl 
 than between a white man and a black man. Bub 
 even if this were admitted as accurate now, it must be 
 observed that it is quite conceivable that, in the course of 
 time, the sharp dividing line between the latter will 
 disappear, as the consequence of the intermarriage and 
 general association of their respective races ; and, though 
 such line should not entirely disappear, it will almost 
 inevitably become less noted and less important, as closer 
 intimacy induces greater similarity. On the other hand, 
 neither by intermarriage, nor intimacy, nor otherwise, can 
 
72 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 the distinction between men and women be obliterated. It 
 is permanent, unmistakable, and, at least beyond a certain 
 now undefined limit, incapable of ever being diminished. 
 Surely this distinction must be recognised by the law. 
 
 Some politicians, however, seem to imply that we are now, 
 in a manner, estopped from raising the point of the unfitness 
 of women for the electoral Franchise, since we have 
 admitted women to the Throne, the Municipal and County 
 Franchise, the School Board, the County Council, the office 
 of Churchwarden, the Tribunal of the Manorial Court, and 
 so forth. Yet, unless it be admitted that the capacity so 
 conferred on women has been beneficial to the nation at 
 lirge, and this beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt, 
 or, in other words, that our institutions in this respect are 
 almost infallibly good, there are clearly no premises here on 
 which to base a sound conclusion. But I do not suggest the 
 contrary as a matter of experience, though I doubt whether 
 the immense advantages anticipated from the presence of 
 women on the School Board have been fully realised. The 
 basis, however, of my objection to this argument is, that 
 it is sought to transplant the conclusion from alleged 
 experience of one class of cases to another totally different 
 class. As to the often harped-on case of the Crown, I refer 
 to what is said above at page 50. But I may here observe 
 that the analogy completely breaks down on the point where 
 it is necessary for the purpose of the argument. For, so 
 far is intellectual fitness from being required by the 
 Constitution in the case of the sovereign, that a lunatic may 
 wear the crown, as, indeed, has actually been exemplified 
 more than once in our history. Yet I am not aware that it 
 is proposed, even by the most advanced thinkers, to extend 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 73 
 
 the Franchise in this direction. It, therefore, obviously 
 follows that if the fact that a lunatic may be the sovereign 
 is no reason why a lunatic should have the power of voting, 
 the fact that a woman may be the sovereign is no reason 
 why she should have the power of voting. Of course it 
 may be rejoined that a lunatic ought not to be allowed to 
 be a sovereign. If, however, the question of what ought to 
 be the rule is admitted, it will be open to us to say 
 though I do not say so, the entire matter being foreign to 
 my argument that a woman ought not to be the sovereign. 
 The clear position is simply this. If we are to argue 
 merely on existing institutions, as if they were un- 
 questionably good, we must take them as we find them, 
 and we shall consequently probably be led into absurdity ; 
 but if we are to argue upon grounds of expediency, we 
 camiot base any conclusion merely on analogy to existing 
 institutions. 
 
 But the vote for a member of Parliament differs in its 
 nature toto ccelo from any other vote whatever. For so 
 long as the former is withheld from women, Parliament can 
 admit women to places and Franchises according to its 
 wisdom, while denying admission in its discretion to other 
 places and other Franchises. While increasing, so far as 
 may seem desirable, from time to time, the sphere of women, 
 Parliament can draw the line, as it were, between those 
 privileges which may be safely accorded to women and 
 those which cannot. It can, indeed, recognise and give 
 effect to those fundamental and immutable differences in 
 human nature between men and women which it may 
 consider as properly attended by differences of position 
 before the law, thus adapting existing institutions to new 
 
74 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 views of the unchanging conditions of the relation between 
 man and woman. Once, however, let the Parliamentary 
 Franchise be accorded to women and the case is entirely 
 altered. There is no longer the power to withhold, or the 
 power to distinguish. Everything, in short, which human 
 legislative means can give to woman she will have attained, 
 and nothing but illegal force will be able to stay the com- 
 plete equalisation of her position before the law to that of 
 man, even though she do not aspire to positive superiority. 
 For the Franchise is the ultimate human legal power by 
 wt\ich everything in the region of human law is con- 
 trolled. This is certainly not recognised, as it clearly ought 
 to be, by many of our present Legislature. For have we 
 not known it contended in their assembly that it will be 
 quite possible for Parliament still to distinguish between the 
 sexes, even to the closing of its own doors against women ? 
 As an instance, I cite the words of Baron Henry de Worms : 
 " I do not think it in any way follows that, because a 
 woman exercises the right to vote for a member of Parlia- 
 ment, she would, as a natural sequitur, claim a right to sit 
 in the House of Commons." The same politician supports 
 his opinion by a reference to the case of beneficed clergy- 
 men, who are excluded from the House of Commons 
 although they possess the voting power. But with regard 
 to this attempted proof, it is sufficiently clear that the only 
 reason why such subjects do not claim and obtain admission 
 to that House is because it is generally considered by them- 
 selves, as well as by others, that they are adequately 
 represented in the Lords' House by the Bishops. I do not 
 say that this is actually a sufficient reason; my point is merely 
 that it passes as such. In addition, however, to this, we 
 
The Case against Women s Suffrage. 75 
 
 must observe that the number of clergymen is totally 
 insufficient to make their votes of very substantial import- 
 ance, and therefore it is quite possible to exclude them 
 from further political power, while admitting them to the 
 electoral Franchise. But so far from the case of women 
 being similar in this respect, the number of those who will 
 acquire the Franchise on the success of any scheme in this 
 behalf which has ever been before Parliament will not by 
 any means be inconsiderable, but will constitute an amply 
 sufficient lever for the opening of the doors of Parliament 
 to their sex. 
 
 We must not consider the question of the Parliamentary 
 Franchise in the same way as that of the right of voting at a 
 municipal election, or indeed that of any other function 
 whatsoever. For the political Franchise potentially contains 
 in itself all other legal power. As I have said, if the 
 suffrage be conceded to the spinster and the widow, it is 
 hardly likely to be withheld from the wife. Indeed if once 
 the former be recognised as properly enjoying the vote, we 
 shall be hard pressed to show good reason for distinguishing 
 their case from that of the wealthy spouse. And when the 
 Franchise has been conceded to women generally, their 
 exclusion from the Houses of Parliament and the offices of 
 State can only continue for a limited time. The politician 
 above quoted, in disputing this, asks whether, because Miss 
 Florence Nightingale was permitted to perform her work with 
 the British army, it follows that a woman should be a general 
 commanding in the field ? It certainly does not. But her 
 woik is to be compared to that of a lady who, under existing 
 circumstances, pins a rosette to a candidate's breast, or in 
 any way cheers or helps one side by her encouragement 
 
76 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 and her labours as a volunteer. If it were competent for a 
 woman to be part of the regular military force as nurse, 
 medical attendant, or private soldier, it would obviously be 
 emphasising the distinction between the sexes, in a way 
 almost unexampled in the present days, to withhold from 
 her the capacity of becoming head nurse, surgeon-general, 
 or general of the forces in the respective cases. Being then 
 established in Parliament, it is unlikely that women those 
 of the kind who would go there would tolerate any legal 
 inequality between men and women, even though linked 
 together in that institution which is the foundation of our 
 civilised life. 
 
 If, however, it be admitted that, as a general rule, it is 
 undesirable to admit to the Franchise a class considered unfit 
 for its intelligent exercise, and, further, that women are as a 
 class unfit for such exercise thereof, it is still possible to urge 
 that, rather than so large a class as women should be 
 entirely unrepresented, and their interests consequently 
 selfishly neglected by men, it would be better to make an 
 exception in their case. Now, I have above pointed out that 
 there is no such hardship in the present position of women 
 no such disposition on the part of men to treat them unfairly 
 and to neglect their interests as to justify such a contention. 
 But, in addition to this, it cannot be too carefully observed 
 that it is misleading and unsound to speak of women as a 
 class. Classes in the community are severally composed of 
 men and women considered together. We cannot compare 
 women to an unrepresented class of men. For the woman 
 of the higher classes is not of the same class as the woman 
 of the middle or lower classes, any more than are men of these 
 various classes men of the same class. So long as the 
 
The Case against Women s Suffrage. 77 
 
 institution of marriage is not attacked, a woman will continue 
 to take the rank, not of any class of women, but of her 
 husband, unless her own be higher than his, and, together with 
 him, she forms as it were the complete unit of a particular 
 class the molecule, as distinguished from the atom, of per- 
 manent human society and the consideration of the legislator. 
 Apparently but little attempt is made in the direction of a 
 specification or forecast of the probable benefits which 
 would ensue from the extension of the Franchise to women 
 considered, I mean, as a question apart from the complete 
 equalisation of the sexes. Of course broad generalisations 
 are frequently indulged in, but few carefully considered 
 probabilities are presented as benefits. If we ask in what 
 way the greatest happiness of the greatest number of men, 
 women, and children will be furthered by the extension of the 
 Franchise, we are unlikely to gain very substantial information. 
 There is, however, one exceptional instance. We are pointed 
 to the value of the assistance of women in the detailed 
 control of expenditure. A small matter, indeed, as against 
 the uncertainty which attends the whole subject ! Financial 
 skill and judicious economy are, doubtless, highly desirable, 
 but even a political economist will scarcely elevate them 
 into greater importance than the evils which are suggested 
 below. It is not, however, by any means admitted that even 
 this alleged benefit would be really likely to ensue ; but 
 considering the matter somewhat trifling in comparison 
 with others here treated, I leave it to those who may think 
 it of cardinal importance, particularly to the Lords Randolph 
 Churchill and Charles Beresford, who may possibly detect 
 in the assertion a somewhat daring invasion of their own 
 peculiar province. 
 
78 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 Let me now briefly advert to the more conspicuous evils 
 which would probably result immediately from the extension 
 of the Franchise to women, as distinguished from the more 
 remote consequences of attempted equalisation of the sexes 
 in every respect. The claim for the Franchise and the 
 claim for equality are practically inseparable, and logically 
 the consequences of either are the consequences of the other 
 or of both. Yet, for convenience' sake, we may consider 
 apart the evil consequences more immediately connected 
 with the extension of the suffrage. As above shown, we 
 must in reason regard the present claim as practically one for 
 universal female suffrage. It is this in its results, or it has 
 no solid foundation, according to the reasoning of its most 
 powerful and acknowledged advocates. But whatever harm 
 would ensue from the recognition of the larger claim would 
 probably appear in a very much lower degree from the 
 admission to the Franchise of only spinsters and widows 
 occupying or owning certain property. 
 
 It is sufficiently clear that, if it be true that women are 
 not fit, that is to say, not intellectually or otherwise adapted, 
 for the proper exercise of political power, the consequence 
 of the exercise by them of such power must be evil. This 
 is practically a mere truism. If good government and 
 legislation is the result of political wisdom, and bad govern- 
 ment and legislation is the result of the want of political 
 wisdom and the plentifulness of political folly, it is obvious 
 that the larger is the element of unfitness and intellectual 
 incapacity which is introduced into our political constitution, 
 the worse will be the government and legislation which is 
 thereby produced. Apparently, however, very many do not 
 realise this, for it is often said that, since agricultural 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. 79 
 
 labourers have been admitted to the Franchise, there is no 
 longer any reason for keeping women out of the pale. Such 
 a view evidently proceeds upon a totally erroneous estimate 
 of the facts and probabilities of the case. It may be shown 
 to be untenable, quite apart from the truths that education is 
 improving among the labourers in question, and that there 
 is a fundamental difference between a want of capacity 
 which is the result of the want of education, which may 
 easily be obtained by the particular individual whose 
 capacity is in question, and which is consequently at the 
 most inevitable during one generation, and a want of capacity 
 which is natural and immutable, or, at all events, neces- 
 sarily or usually incident to the position in life in which an 
 individual is of necessity placed. For the contention under 
 consideration could only have any real force upon the sup- 
 position that the number of agricultural labourers these 
 being apparently the only class of male voters whose unfit- 
 ness is prominently before the minds of such reasoners 
 would in every constituency in the kingdom be precisely 
 equal to that of the women to whom it is proposed to 
 extend the Franchise, and that the latter would to a woman 
 always vote directly against the latter to a man, so that the 
 one section of the present electorate, which, it is contended 
 is incapable, would be neutralised by those whom it is pro- 
 posed to admit. If this supposition could be reasonably 
 entertained, I readily admit that there would be considerable 
 force in the contention ; but it is too obviously unfounded, 
 for the fact is that there would be no such precise equality 
 in numbers ; and the overwhelming probability is that, since 
 ignorance of the knowledge required for the due exercise of 
 a function whether arising from one cause or another 
 
80 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 and natural incapacity for its proper exercise, both alike 
 lead to an exercise of the function which is wrong, and, 
 therefore, not right, in the case of political questions or 
 elections, when the real issue is between aye or no, or 
 Smith and Jones that is, where there is only one right side 
 and only one wrong side the wrong side, or, in other 
 words, the same side, would be chosen by the large majority 
 of both the classes we are considering. Thus assuming, 
 merely for the purposes of the present argument, and 
 without expressing any opinion upon the matter, that the 
 admission of the agricultural labourer to the Franchise has 
 been a bad thing, the consequent evil will not be counter- 
 acted, but can only be increased, by the admission thereto 
 of another incompetent body. In simple language, " two 
 wrongs don't make one right." Were this a party treatise, 
 moreover, I could easily point to a well-known moral 
 certainty, not only relevant, but of great practical import- 
 ance, in respect to this matter. As, however, I am writing 
 upon a subject upon which it is pre-eminently desirable 
 that every member of the Legislature, as \v ell as every voter, 
 should, if he be able to do so, make up his mind, apart from 
 simply party considerations, I forbear from more specific 
 allusion to the matter in this place. 
 
 Descending very briefly into fragmentary particulars, we 
 come to the transcendently important question as to the 
 probable influence of the vote of women upon the bellicose 
 proclivities of the national statesmen. Now, it is a very 
 easily observed fact that, both with boys at school and with 
 men, in whatever avocation or circle of the world they move, 
 the knowledge that certain rudeness and impropriety of 
 conduct on their part will probably be followed by the 
 
The Case against Women s Suffrage. 81 
 
 necessity of standing their own champions in a bout of 
 fisticuffs or an affray of a more serious, or even of a different, 
 character, operates as a wholesome restraint upon excessive 
 provocativeness of bearing, on all save the unsubduable, 
 gigantic and asinine bully. I question very strongly 
 whether A. would be as much restrained as he is from giving 
 offence to B., if it were practically impossible that anyone 
 but C., or the rest of the alphabet, exclusive of himself, 
 would have to bear the principal brunt of the battle due to 
 his own conduct. I suppose, further, that no one not even 
 the most excited and infatuated advocate of equality- 
 seriously contends that women ought to march side by side 
 with men to battle. I do not mean behind as part of the 
 commissariat or hospital department, but side by side to the 
 hottest fire, submitting to precisely equal danger. As voters, 
 then, they will have the privilege of making quarrels which 
 will be left to others to fight out. Indeed, should the time 
 of Universal Suffrage come, and women be in the majority 
 as voters, it is conceivable, though I do not think it at all 
 probable, that they might determine upon a war in the very 
 teeth of the opposition of every one who would have to 
 carry arms therein, and order the refractory males to be 
 shot as deserters from the field of duty by the hands of 
 those of the male sex who survived such treatment suffi- 
 ciently long to be able to administer it. Improbable as such 
 a suggested consummation may be, who can believe 
 that the manhood of England will ever tolerate for long a 
 condition of affairs in which its realisation would be constitu- 
 tionally possible ? Nor can it be cogently argued that women 
 might be debarred from voting on a question of peace or war; 
 
 for this would be clearly impracticable. If they are to have 
 
 6 
 
82 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 the right of electing representatives, the influence upon the 
 latter of their opinion must bear in all directions. And 
 whoever has in Parliament a vote upon one question has 
 potentially, as has been pointed out in recent times, to a 
 large extent, the power of voting upon every other, so long 
 as party Government continues; since a Government can be 
 ejected from office on one question as well as another, and 
 consequently can be compelled by those who are able to 
 vote upon one subject to take their opinion into consideration 
 upon every other. Thus, though, so far only as what has 
 been recently said is concerned, the voting power might be 
 entrusted to women when international arbitration or other 
 arrangements have completely and finally superseded war, 
 and women can discharge all the liabilities in these respects 
 to which their votes may give rise, the probable result of 
 the extension of the Franchise to them before the lapse of 
 very many years would, it is submitted, be fraught with 
 somewhat of the grave dangers above indicated. 
 
 But let us regard the matter in the light of ordinary 
 experience, in a strictly practical manner. It cannot, then, 
 be denied that national prestige and gunpowder glory have 
 an influence upon female opinion which might, with great 
 probability, be dangerous, if the decision of international 
 questions were committed to their votes. I do not suggest 
 that they would usually directly cry " war " ; what I contend 
 is, that they would uphold the hands of a favourite states- 
 man in a career of bombastic folly which would frequently 
 end in war. Imagine Lord Beaconsfield descanting upon 
 the ascendency of England in the councils of Europe to an 
 audience of female electors ! One may almost in imagination 
 smell the gunpowder and hear the roar of the cannon, as- 
 
The Case against Women's Suffrage. S3 
 
 the passion of the hour k ' cries ' havock ' ! and lets loose the 
 dogs of war." Do my readers remember the famous jingo 
 song, and its effect upon the ladies of an audience when 
 well rendered by a good-looking male vocalist ? I fancy the 
 man who should argue for peace before listeners similarly 
 influenced, when some petty international squabble was on 
 hand, would run considerable risk of being denounced by 
 the fair as a sordid poltroon who begged for " peace at any 
 price." We all know that the ladies greatly admire 
 courage ; some, indeed, seem to know from experience that, 
 even in private life, the fair provoke many quarrels which 
 their male relatives have to settle it may be vi et armis 
 and which would be fewer if they had to fight them out in 
 their own persons. Let us not under- estimate the importance 
 of such facts or suggestions as these. 
 
 It may perhaps occur to some that the notorious and 
 admitted tenderness of women would prevent them from 
 encouraging wars, as I have suggested. But we must 
 observe that the large majority of wives and mothers and 
 sisters would hope their husbands, sons, and brothers would 
 escape the severity of the war, or would possibly have no 
 relatives likely to be specially endangered thereby. It 
 would, indeed, as has before been pointed out, be quite 
 unsafe to suppose that their tenderness in the matter would 
 extend generally to strangers, as a quality of practical 
 value. Theoretically, no doubt, it would, and practically so 
 far as distressed cases came under their personal cognisance. 
 But it is suggested that their tenderness and timidity would 
 not, as often as desirable, have the effect of shaking their 
 confidence in the propriety of the war proposed. A refer- 
 ence to history will, it is submitted, be found to support 
 
 6* 
 
84 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 this view. Even, indeed, in the matter of the infliction of 
 the punishment of death, does not Queen Philippa stand 
 out in striking and honourable conspicuousness as an ex- 
 ception in respect of the ordinary bent of womanly tender- 
 ness ? But the main strength of my position lies in the 
 suggestion that the influence of women would operate 
 through the channel of a darling statesman. 
 
 Most Englishmen, moreover, although they may be 
 sincerely religious themselves, and anxious for the spread of 
 Christianity, have considerable aversion to the increase to 
 undue proportions of the direct influence of priests, and 
 other ministers of religion, upon politics, as distinguished 
 from their influence in religious and moral matters. They 
 see in various parts of the world the baneful results of a too 
 widely pervading ecclesiasticism, and they learn from their 
 own history to how great an extent the liberty and other 
 advantages which their nation now enjoys are due to the 
 resistance of their ancestors to the encroachments of priest- 
 craft. It is easily observable that, in proportion as the 
 order of teachers of religion gains temporal power, its 
 spirituality declines, by reason partly of the intrusion into 
 its ranks of really irreligious men, and partly by the 
 corrupting influence of power improperly possessed and 
 unbecomingly exerted. And it requires but little discern- 
 ment to perceive that confidence in men, begotten by 
 appreciation of the religious advantages of which they have 
 been the channel or the means of realisation, is pre-eminently 
 liable to form an altogether unwarrantable submission to 
 their opinion in matters which are not directly concerned 
 with faith. Now it is a subject of common remark that the 
 devotion to, or weakness for, their minister whether he be 
 
The Case against Women s Suffrage. 85 
 
 a Romanist priest, an Anglican clergyman, or a Noncon- 
 formist pastor which is felt by a vast number of women is 
 excessive, and leads to an unreasoning confidence in his 
 opinion and direction in matters of which he is by no means 
 peculiarly qualified to judge. Under existing circumstances, 
 this fact does not appear to produce very alarming results ; 
 it is the theme of pleasantries, and, perhaps, of occasionally 
 serious mischief, but it does not rauk as a recognised source 
 of national danger. If, however, women are to be accorded 
 political power especially in these days of aggressive 
 ecclesiasticism will not the danger of the undue influence 
 of the priest be very real ? The personal attachments must 
 continue ; and we can hardly anticipate that women will 
 suddenly develop the capacity of drawing the distinctions, 
 in point of the province of the respected teacher, which are 
 easily perceived and acted upon by men. 
 
 I am under the impression that it is rather less necessary 
 to press the importance of this danger than that of many 
 others. For apparently it stands almost alone in respect of 
 the manner, in which it weighs with the bulk of reflecting 
 men, as an alarming and probable consequence of the move- 
 ment under consideration. I will, therefore, only add the 
 expression of my anxiety that no jealousy on my part of 
 the increase of the religious element in political discussion 
 should be inferred. So far from such an inference being 
 justifiable, the ultimate basis of my dislike to the increase 
 of the influence of the priest, as priest, in politics, is the 
 harm to religion itself which, I believe, would be the 
 consequence. 
 
 In treating above of the differences of men and women I 
 have indirectly pointed to some of the probable and disastrous 
 
86 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 consequences which would follow the admission of women 
 to the Franchise. It would be almost an endless task to 
 attempt to minutely and particularly describe them. One 
 would have to imagine, according to my position, every evil 
 consequent upon bad electors and bad representatives, to 
 form a correct and complete conception of the probable 
 consequences of the presence in the electorate of a body 
 either unfit intellectually, or in point of education and 
 contact with the world of business and international affairs, 
 or owing to insufficient responsibility for the consequences of 
 their votes. I have alluded to the topics of war and 
 ecclesiasticism on account of their vast and easily realised 
 importance in this connection, but I should not probably do 
 well to attempt to specify many particular directions in 
 which evil would probably be experienced. 
 
 There is, however, one other very important matter to be 
 mentioned in this place. I readily admit that the com- 
 plexion of the whole case would be entirely different if we 
 had to take into consideration the denial of an expectation 
 grounded upon custom, or the disappointment of wide- 
 spread and reasonable hopes. If women already had the 
 vote, it would be an entirely different matter to take it away 
 from them. A much stronger case than justifies the with- 
 holding it from them would be required to upset the 
 opinions, the calculations, and the habits which would then 
 have been formed. It is therefore, as well as for other 
 reasons, that an experiment is so eminently undesirable in 
 this case. But not only has no right grounded on 
 possession, or expectation founded upon custom, yet arisen, 
 but there are no anticipations which we need consider in the 
 least degree. For the women who want the power to vote 
 
The Case ayainst Women's Suffrage. 87 
 
 are, for the most part, the very women who have no special 
 claims upon the consideration of anyone save themselves 
 in political matters. During many years it was simply the 
 <k shrill voice of a small minority " the noisy clamour of a 
 discontented few who demanded the Franchise for their 
 sex. The women of England, generally, were naturally 
 silent ; the voices of the former were alone heard. And these, 
 empty of the virtues and the wisdom of their sex, 
 reverberated long with but a slight effect ; but in process 
 of time, it is true, others, seeing good and able men 
 espousing the cause, have been persuaded that there is 
 something worthy of their notice in the agitation. But 
 there is this to be observed. It remains now as true as it 
 ever was, that the vast majority of the women of England, 
 comprising almost every female worthy of consideration in 
 the matter, do not want the vote, or, in other words, do not 
 wish for it. Many of these a vast number, possibly 
 amounting to a majority have been persuaded that it is 
 " the right " of women owning or occupying houses to have 
 a vote, because they are told that it is the property that 
 gives the vote. But even if they wished us to acknowledge 
 this, they would be satisfied that we acted no further on our 
 admission. For the rest, the women the happily rare 
 specimens of our spinsters and our widows who really 
 desire the Franchise, so far from deriving satisfaction there- 
 from, will merely find their appetite whetted by the exciting 
 taste of what is for them but a small instalment of the 
 substantial object of their unwholesome and degrading 
 ambition. 
 
 No doubt there may be legitimate aspirations on the part 
 of women, either fully developed or still latent, which 
 
88 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 remain to be satisfied in the future. But is there one, 
 which will remain to grieve their sex, or the suppression 
 of which will retard the progress of our race, which cannot 
 be amply satisfied without their possession of the political 
 Franchise ? What then ? Shall we allow ourselves to be 
 led into a dangerous, or, at least, an unknown and un- 
 necessary course, without requiring stronger reasons than 
 are now forthcoming? If the Franchise is ever to be 
 granted to women, let us wait until the expediency of its 
 concession shall be shown, and not rely upon arguments 
 which are based upon a piltry fallacy as to the qualifying 
 virtue of property or its occupation. At present, it is 
 submitted, there is but little said or written in favour of 
 such a concession which does not rest either on puerile 
 gallantry, speculative generalisation, unfounded assertion, 
 or dogmatic declaration of purely imaginary rights. 
 
PART II. 
 
 THE LARGER QUESTION OF THE EQUALI- 
 SATION OF THE SEXES INVOLVED IN THE 
 IMMEDIATE QUESTION. 
 
 " Happiest of all, is, that her gentle spirit 
 Commits itself to yours to be directed, 
 As from her lord, her governor, her king." 
 
 SHAKESPEAKE. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 WE have now arrived at the real issue which is raised by the 
 present movement in favour of women's suffrage an issue 
 of which the importance is probably unparalleled in political 
 history namely, whether any difference whatever of 
 position or capacity is to be recognised by law or custom as 
 properly existing between the members of the two sexes, or, 
 which in effect is very much the same question, whether any 
 subordination on the part of the wife to the husband is to 
 be maintained under the authority of law or custom. 
 
 Of course, the logician Mill, as well as probably all his 
 followers who have really dealt with the subject in an 
 exhaustive manner, go to the entire length to which they are 
 led by their immediate contention, and proji ounce in favour 
 of the abolition of every vestige of inequality between the 
 
90 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 sexes, even in the married state itself. Are we then 
 prepared for this larger movement, or shall we pause if 
 for no other reason, at least for the sake of avoiding its 
 consummation ere we concede the apparently minor point 
 of the political Franchise as a matter of small moment, or as a 
 means of quieting an importunate clamour ? Let us not forget 
 that, in considering the question of the justice or expediency 
 of the latter step, we cannot properly confine our attention 
 to those facts which are clear to all at a single glance, but 
 are bound to determine, as far as we may be able, what it in 
 reality is, from a comprehensive point of view, which we are 
 told is just or expedient. And I would here respectfully add, 
 that an adequate regard for justice or expediency never 
 shattered the happiness of an empire or impaired its 
 example to the world. We shall do well to look to con- 
 sequences, when we are endeavouring to ascertain the 
 position in respect of justice or expediency of a proposed 
 course of political action. 
 
 But, ere we trust ourselves in the regions of reason 
 supernaturally unaided, there is one source of authority 
 the validity of which does not depend upon our approval, 
 to which I could hardly do well, on any assumption, to omit 
 to appeal. It is on several grounds that I justify a reference 
 to the authority of religion as foremost among the sources of 
 information and instruction upon our subject which are open 
 to us. Many, for instance, of our countrymen who will be 
 called upon to decide the question under consideration are 
 sincere adherents of the Christian religion. As such, the ulti- 
 mate motive of all their political action can properly be no 
 other than a desire to faithfully serve the Divine Head of 
 that religion, and the test, of every proposition which they 
 
Equalisation of the Sexes. 91 
 
 have to consider is the best perception of His will at which 
 they are able to arrive. As, moreover, it is now no mere 
 matter of temporary expediency which is in question, but 
 the universally important matter of the proper relation of 
 the sexes is raised, it is hardly likely that revelation, in 
 whatever light we view it, can be without express teaching, 
 or at least indication, on the point. While, therefore, by 
 no means unmindful of the extreme undesirability of 
 attempting to supply the defects in a weak argument by the 
 citation of irrelevant texts, or of unnecessarily importing so 
 sacred a subject as religion into a controversy of a nature 
 which may well be settled without direct verbal reference 
 thereto, I am clear that to the enlightened Protestant, upon 
 any matter upon which he believes the Bible speaks, it is an 
 authority from which there is no appeal, being a revelation 
 emanating from the Source and Judge of truth. Upon this 
 I unhesitatingly rely at the present branch of my argument. 
 It may, indeed, be well added that, as women admittedly 
 owe to Christianity an immense improvement in their 
 position, it can hardly be considered as unfair to appeal to 
 this authority to prevent a contemplated further alteration 
 in their position, notwithstanding many may consider it 
 would be a further elevation. Having been often relied 
 upon in their favour, it ought hardly to be repudiated, even 
 on the lowest ground, when considered of course, wrongly 
 so as urged against their advantage. But while Christianity 
 exercises so powerfully beneficial an influence over other 
 relations, who would exclude its consideration from the 
 subject of the marriage state ? Indeed, Mill himself does 
 not exclude it from his treatise. I shall subsequently advert 
 more particularly to his remarks upon this matter. 
 
92 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 I must, therefore, now invite the " courteous reader" to 
 bear with me while I endeavour to satisfy him that the 
 subordination of the wife to the husband is (1) inculcated 
 by religion ; (2) supported by the authority of universal 
 practice ; and (3) obviously expedient in the interests of 
 both. If this be established, and it be acknowledged that 
 the possession of the Franchise by women is inconsistent 
 therewith, it clearly ought not to be extended to them, 
 whether they are intellectually fit for its exercise or not. 
 
SECTION I. 
 
 THE ARGUMENT FROM RELIGION. 
 
 LET me now introduce what seems to me the correct outline 
 of the Scriptural teaching upon the matter. 
 
 I take it that, in endeavouring to estimate the real force 
 of the present argument, we ought not to be contented with 
 the consideration of a few texts from the writings of the 
 Apostles, but that we should try, as far as posible, to 
 appreciate what is the real import of the whole teaching of 
 revelation upon the subject, what, in other words, is the 
 view of the relation between the sexes which appears from 
 the tenor of the Bible, from Genesis to Revelation, to be of 
 Divine appointment. Then, whether we base our opinion upon 
 the letter, or rely in preference upon the spirit or underlying 
 meaning, I suggest that we cannot, with candour and intelli- 
 gence, arrive at any other conclusion than that it is part of 
 the Divine will revealed to us, that the wife should live in a 
 state of obedience to her husband. 
 
 Let attention be first fixed upon the Biblical description 
 of the Creation, *and the condition of our great ancestor and 
 ancestress before the Fall. Is not the plain inference from 
 this record that, putting it shortly, the woman was made for 
 the benefit of the man, and not the man for the benefit of 
 
94 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 the woman, nor the woman primarily for the same immediate 
 purpose as man, or, in other words, that, whereas the 
 creation of man was for inscrutable reasons of the Divine 
 pleasure, that of woman was more immediately for the 
 perfecting of the existence of man ? To weary the reader by 
 the repetition of words which presumably are of almost 
 life-long familiarity to him would possibly be unwise. 
 I therefore merely appeal to a recollection of, or a reference 
 to, the early chapters of Genesis, without further comment 
 or gloss. 
 
 If, however, we go a step further, and come to the time 
 when Adam, having hearkened to the voice of his wife, has 
 with her brought about the degradation of the human race, 
 we are on ground which, for the present purpose, seems 
 still firmer than the above. For the consequent punishment 
 pronounced upon our progenitors, so far as it related to the 
 woman, had two specific branches, the latter of which is 
 expressed in these words : " Thy desire shall be to thy 
 husband, and he shall rule over thee." 
 
 To follow the nature of the relation of the sexes 
 through the entirety of the Old Testament Scriptures would 
 probably be both tedious and superfluous. For it must 
 be sufficiently obvious to all who possess even a super- 
 ficial acquaintance with these, that the nature of the 
 relation instituted by the words I have cited is uniformly 
 treated as subsisting from beginning to end. We find, 
 indeed, the matrimonial condition continually regarded from 
 the husband's point of view, if I may so express it. Yet the 
 condition of the wife does not by any means appear to have 
 been so far from what it at present is as the language of 
 some may imply. The good wife was then, as she is now, 
 
The Argument from Religion. 95 
 
 the most precious of earthly possessions which a man could 
 enjoy; but still she was clearly the possession and help- 
 meet of the husband, in a sense distinctly different from 
 that in which the husband was the possession and help- 
 meet of the wife. Let a few landmarks suffice. 
 
 In the Decalogue, then, we find the law, " Thou shalt not 
 covet thy neighbour's wife .... nor anything that is thy 
 neighbour's." But there is no corresponding provision as 
 to the coveting of a husband. I do not for one moment 
 mean that the latter would not have been wrong beyond all 
 doubt. My contention is merely that the wife is treated as 
 a being existing for the benefit of her husband. He is 
 subject to certain duties to her, but not to duties of the 
 engrossing nature of her's to him. It can hardly be validly 
 objected that, in the commandment cited, the converse case 
 is included, for the sexes are expressly distinguished in 
 other of the commandments as well as in another clause of 
 the commandment from which I have quoted. 
 
 Again, we find repeatedly the expression " to take a 
 wife, "as well as others, clearly referring to the woman as 
 one the most valuable, doubtless of the man's possessions. 
 The constant phraseology places it beyond doubt that a 
 man by marriage becomes entitled to a self-renouncing 
 helpmeet, who is the desirable complement of himself, and 
 whom, in return, he is bound to affectionately cherish and 
 respect, but in whom he is not reciprocally merged. In other 
 words, a wife is regarded as an addition of a most important 
 kind to her husband's possessions. "He that smiteth 
 Kiriath-sepher, and taketh it, to him will I give Achsah 
 my daughter to wife." ** House and riches are an inherit- 
 ance from fathers : but a prudent wife is from the Lord." 
 
96 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 It is, however, probably superfluous to say anything in 
 support of the assertion that the dispensation with regard to 
 the position of a wife which commenced in the person of 
 Eve continued throughout the whole of the period covered 
 by the Old Testament Scriptures. 
 
 But some, while admitting that this is so, nevertheless 
 contend that the relation of the sexes was clanged by Our 
 Lord, and that one of the results of His redeeming work 
 was the equalisation of women to men. , Yet I doubt 
 whether a single passage or fact can be cited from the 
 Scriptures which in any way establishes this view. It is, 
 however, broadly laid down by some that, as a matter of 
 truth, the punishment inflicted upon women -_a the person 
 of Eve was revoked. This is a sweeping proposition, and 
 one would apparently be justified, before admitting it, in 
 requiring very clear proof. But far from anything of the 
 kind being forthcoming, we know, beyond all doubt, that in 
 the punishment of men, so far as relates to their temporal 
 condition in this world, which is all that is relevant to the 
 present argument, no change whatever has been made. 
 Spiritual and intellectual blessings have marvellously 
 ameliorated the suffering which is naturally incident to the 
 fallen lot, yet it is still, as much as ever, a truth of nature, 
 that in toil or sorrow man eats of the ground all the days of 
 his life, that thorns and thistles are brought forth by the 
 ground to him, that he eats the herb of the field, and that 
 in the sweat of his face he eats bread till he returns unto 
 the ground, for that dust he is and unto dust does he 
 return. The earthly paradise, with its ambrosial fruits and 
 its perfect loveliness, unchequered by an uncongenial 
 .growth, is not restored, but a celestial habitation of wholly 
 
The Argument from Eeligion. 97 
 
 unimaginable glory is discovered as a sphere which may be 
 reached by man, when the unremitted penalty of bodily 
 dissolution, which was first decreed to Adam, has been 
 tasted by his spiritually restored descendants. But more 
 than this, we know, as an unquestionable physiological fact, 
 that the first of the two specific branches of the punishment 
 of the woman exists to this day nay, more, that its con- 
 tinuance was expressly recognised by the language of Our 
 Lord Himself (John xvi. 21). How, then, is it possible to 
 contend that the other branch of the punishment of the 
 woman, if punishment it really be, has been revoked as a 
 matter of inference ? Knowing that neither were expressly 
 altered, and ^eing, further, that the one, the existence of 
 which is in its nature obvious to the senses at this moment, 
 was not revoked, is it not clearly a wilful, or, at least, an 
 inexcusable, distortion of the meaning of the Scriptures to 
 pretend that the other, which is not in the same way as the 
 former a fact the existence of which is in its nature per- 
 ceptible to the senses, and which, therefore, would stand 
 incomparably more in need of clear and express revocation, 
 were revocation intended, has been impliedly revoked ? 
 
 But who will seriously contend that the truth is really left 
 to inference, either one way or the other ? Is there really any 
 lack of express teaching upon the subject which places the 
 matter beyond the possibility of any reasonable doubt ? It 
 is somewhat regrettable to be obliged to cite certain partially 
 well-known passages, but for the completeness of the present 
 argument it seems eminently necessary to do so. 
 
 From Peter, then, who, as the marriage service of the 
 Church of England so aptly remind3 us, was himself a 
 married man, we have the following : " In like manner, ye 
 
 7 
 
98 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 wives, be in subjection to your own husbands. . . . For 
 after this manner aforetime the holy women also, who hoped 
 in God .... being in subjection to their own husbands : a& 
 Sarah obeyed Abraham, calling him lord: whose children 
 ye now are, if ye do well" (1 Peter iii. 1, 5, 6). Could 
 anything be more significant with regard to the contention 
 that no fundamental change in the relation of the sexes was 
 brought about by the new dispensation. A woman who 
 faithfully fulfilled her duties towards her husband under the 
 old dispensation is held up as an example in this very respect, 
 for the imitation of women under the new dispensation. 
 
 From the Epistles of Paul," wherein," as Peter says in his 
 Second Epistle (iii. 16), "are some things hard to be under- 
 stood, which the ignorant and unstedfast wrest, as they do 
 also the other Scriptures, unto their own destruction," we 
 may cite the following teaching. " I would have you know 
 that the head of every man is Christ; and the head of the 
 woman is the man. . . . Man .... is the image and 
 glory of God : but the woman is the glory of the man. For 
 the man is not of the woman ; but the woman of the man : 
 for neither was the man created for the woman ; but the 
 woman for the man " (1 Corinth, xi. 3, 7, 8, 9). " Wives 
 be in subjection to your husbands, as is fitting in the Lord" 
 (Colossians iii. 18). " But speak thou the things which 
 befit the sound doctrine .... that aged women .... 
 may train the young women to love their husbands. . . . 
 being in subjection to their own husbands, that the 
 word of God be not blasphemed" (Titus ii. 1, 3, 4, 5). 
 " Let the women keep silence in the churches . . . .let 
 them be in subjection, as also saith the law. And if they would 
 learn anything, let them ask their own husbands at home " 
 
The Argument from Religion. 
 
 (1 Corinth, xiv. 34, 35). " Wives, be in subjection unto your 
 own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the 
 head of the wife, as Christ also is the Head of the church, 
 being Himself the Saviour of the body. But as the church 
 is subject to Christ, so let the wives also be to their husbands 
 in everything .... Let the wife see that she fear her 
 husband" (Ephes. v. 22, 23, 24, 33). 
 
 It is well to carefully bear in mind, as of pre-eminent 
 importance in this matter, the sublime and enduring 
 metaphor, by which, in the last of the above passages, the 
 relation between Our Saviour and the Church is portrayed 
 as that of the bridegroom and the bride. This metaphor 
 seems to be foreshadowed in Isaiah (liv. 5, 6), in the words, 
 " Thy Maker is thine husband .... and the Holy One of 
 
 Israel is thy Redeemer For the Lord hath called 
 
 thee as a wife." It is apparently adopted by John the 
 Baptist, in the words, " He that hath the bride is the bride- 
 groom : but the friend of the bridegroom, which standeth 
 and heareth him, rejoiceth greatly because of the bride- 
 groom's voice : this my joy therefore is fulfilled " (John 
 iii. 29) ; and by Our Lord in the words, " Can the sons of 
 the bridechamber mourn as long as the bridegroom is with 
 them?" (Matthew ix. 15); as also in the parable of the 
 ten virgins (Matthew xxv. 1-13). In the Revelation it seems 
 still preserved, in the passage commencing with the 
 words, " Come hither, I will shew thee the bride, the wife 
 of the Lamb " (xxi. 9) ; and in the words, " The Spirit and 
 the bride say, Come" (xxii. 17). Now, if this metaphor 
 stood alone, would it not be fraught with instruction upon 
 our subject, but, applied as it is by Paul, is it not absolutely 
 conclusive ? The Church being immeasurably inferior to 
 
100 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 her Head, can the relation between the two be adequately 
 represented by a figure which denotes equality? It is, 
 moreover, to be remembered that this metaphor is naturally 
 studied in connection with the remainder of the Scriptures, 
 and can hardly fail to convey to a candid reader an impres- 
 sion consonant to the effect produced by the literal teaching 
 of the kind which I have cited. And it is clearly a sign of 
 a want of religion or of piety to treat, a figure of revelation 
 as imprcper or misleading. 
 
 There are some, however, who seem to suppose that, 
 though the letter of the Scriptures may apparently be 
 against the equality of the sexes in marriage, yet since the 
 effect of Christianity has, as a matter of fact, been to greatly 
 raise the position of women, its spirit must be in favour of 
 absolute equality. This is a somewhat curious argument. 
 In the face of the actual authorities which I have cited, it 
 may appear unnecessary to grapple with it. But as many 
 are extremely hard to convince where the issue turns upon 
 textual authority, it may be well to point out that, though it 
 may be admitted that the tendencies of Christianity are in 
 the direction of the equality of men, it is not contended by 
 many serious and able thinkers that all power and in- 
 equality is contrary to Christian teaching. Government is 
 necessary ; the institution of property, under proper regula- 
 tions, is apparently desirable. And the facts of sex, that 
 the woman is, in some way, the weaker vessel, and the man 
 the stronger, remain just as truly as the other facts of infancy 
 and immaturity in both boys and girls. Surely we ought to 
 recognise in the effect of Christianity upon the position of 
 woman, not her emancipation from a position of natural 
 subjection, but the amelioration of that position by virtue of 
 
The Argument from Religion. 101 
 
 the government of the husband having been so largely 
 converted from a bad into a good form of rule. The subjec- 
 tion of Englishmen to our Parliament, restrained as it is by 
 the principles of Christianity, is very far better than the 
 subjection of the Romans to their Caesar. Yet, as we know 
 from, juristic science, the one government is as absolute as the 
 other, and the facts of government aid subjection remain 
 unimpaired. And just as ths ordinary well-disposed citizen 
 except, perhaps, in the matter of taxation- -ffecls^s .Tt has 
 been well said, the burden of State control as little as he 
 does the enormous pressure of the atmosphere, so little does 
 a Christian wife feel the burden of a Christian husband's 
 rule. But the fact of the relation of headship and subjec- 
 tion ought, it is submitted, in point of religious righteous- 
 ness, to exist as much in the one case as in the other. The 
 removal of the sense of the painful pressure of the rule, by 
 the improvement in the mode of regulating its imposition, 
 is the true result of Christianity in either case. 
 
 But the entire statement with regard to the effect of 
 Christianity on the position of women, which is so much relied 
 upon, seems to be inaccurate, or, at least, misleading. For 
 the tendency of Christianity b as not been to place women on 
 an equality with men, or, indeed, to allow them the position 
 which heathenism has, in at least one very conspicuous 
 instance, assigned them. We must throw aside the influence 
 of Christianity upon the unprogressive races, and confine 
 our attention to those nations which have shown a capacity 
 for advanced civilisation, for otherwise we might attribute to 
 religion that which was owing to human intelligence. Again, 
 we must leave out of our consideration the present movement 
 in England, not only because it is the case which has to 
 
102 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 be made out, but because it cannot be said that it has 
 originated with, or been principally sustained by, Christians 
 or Christianity. If, then, we trace the effect of the reception 
 of our religion by the progressive and civilised races, I doubt 
 if it can be said with general truth that its effect has been 
 to raise the position of the wife relatively to her husband. 
 If we compare the. position o? the Roman matron which is 
 treated of below,* or possibly Jhat of the wives of Grecian 
 race, ar the time ot their reception of Christianity, with 
 their position immediately afterwards, and as inculcated by 
 Christian teachers, I do not think it is by any means clear 
 that the subjection of the wife was not either formulated 
 anew, or, at all events, additionally emphasised. Certainly 
 the position of the Roman wife, when Constantino declared 
 Christianity the religion of the Empire, was not, in the eye 
 of the law, that of one who was bound to permanently 
 honour and obey her husband. Indeed, the truth seems 
 rather to be that the real effect of Christianity has been to 
 raise the wife from a servile condition, where it has 
 existed, but to restrain her from equality, or the too 
 near approach thereto, which has existed among heathens, 
 and is, in fact, consistent only with ignorance or repudia- 
 tion of its teaching. 
 
 Let me now call the reader's attention to Mill's argument 
 on this aspect of the subject. Considering that his work 
 extends over some 188 pages, and that less than one page 
 and a half are devoted to the religious argument, it will not 
 probably be thought unreasonable to say that he treats the 
 subject very lightly perhaps I might say that he handles it 
 with a somewhat cavalier deportment. Touching this 
 matter at all, and affecting to answer the objections to his 
 
The Argument from Religion. 103 
 
 views based upon the Bible, he might naturally have been 
 expected to deal with these rather more explicitly and 
 amply than he does. Possibly those who estimate the 
 importance of this aspect of the question more highly than 
 he, may be inclined to draw an inference from this fact 
 unfavourable to the cause which he advocates. 
 
 As the only passage in his work which deals directly with 
 this matter is so short, it may be well, in the interests of the 
 formation of a sound opinion upon the point, to set it forth 
 verbatim. " We shall," he says, " be told, perhaps, that 
 religion imposes the duty of obedience ; as every established 
 fact which is too bad to admit of any other defence, is 
 always presented to us as an injunction of religion. The 
 Church, it is very true, enjoins it in her formularies, but it 
 would be difficult to derive any such injunction from 
 Christianity. We are told that St. Paul said, ' Wives, obey 
 your husbands ' : but he also said, 4 Slaves, obey your 
 masters/ It was not St. Paul's business, nor was it 
 consistent with his object, the propagation of Christianity, 
 to incite any one to rebellion against existing laws. The 
 Apostle's acceptance of all social institutions as he found 
 them, is no more to be construed as a disapproval of 
 attempts to improve them at the proper time, than his 
 declaration, * The powers that be are ordained of God,' 
 gives his sanction to military despotism, and to that alone, 
 as the Christian form of political government, or commands 
 passive obedience to it. To pretend that Christianity was 
 intended to stereotype existing forms of government and 
 society, and protect them against change, is to reduce it to 
 the level of Islamism or of Brahmanism. It is precisely 
 because Christianity has not done this, that it has been the 
 
104 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 religion of the progressive portion of mankind, and Islamism, 
 Brahmanism, &c., have been those of the stationary 
 portions ; or rather (for there is no such thing as a really 
 stationary society) of the declining portions. There have 
 been abundance of people, in all ages of Christianity, who 
 tried to make it something of the same kind ; to convert us 
 into a sort of Christian Mussulmans, with the Bible for a 
 Koran, prohibiting all improvement : and great has been 
 their power, and many have had to sacrifice their lives in 
 resisting them. But they have been resisted, and the 
 resistance has made us what we are, and will yet make us 
 what we are to be." 
 
 Now the sneer contained in the opening sentence of this 
 passage is hardly to the present point ; for the sole question 
 when dealing with the religious argument is this : Is the 
 submission of the wife to the husband an injunction of 
 religion, or is it not ? It is quite beside the matter whether 
 the old-fashioned idea is incapable of any other defence or 
 not. Indeed, one who is endeavouring to convince a 
 Christian to his own views without repudiating the authority 
 of his religion, is under the necessity of showing, either 
 that the matter in question is not explicitly dealt with by 
 the authorities of his religion, or that those authorities are 
 not against him. For consistency requires that if he should 
 fail to do this, his would-be proselyte should be estopped 
 by the precepts of his religion, so long as he believes they 
 are against the views pressed upon him, from all hesitation 
 or need of further disputation in the matter. 
 
 That the visible Church, moreover, in probably almost 
 every one of its branches down to the time of the spread of 
 the new ideas by Mill and his contemporaries, has apparently 
 
The Argument from Religion. 105 
 
 always been of opinion that the relation of the wife to her 
 husband approved by the authorities of the Christian 
 religion was really such as I contend is the case, can hardly 
 be taken as of no evidentiary value at all, from any reasonable 
 point of view. It is, indeed, both interesting and instructive 
 to observe how the ministers of the dissenting communities, 
 of all men on the earth, in their gallant efforts to escape 
 from the imagined unpleasantness of the word " obey " in the 
 marriage service, resort to curious substitutions, which are 
 either practically synonyms, or fall short of the meaning 
 desired by them. Coming, however, to the really important 
 part of the above passage, the reader may be somewhat 
 struck with the fact that there is little citation from the 
 Sacred Writings ; but, attempting to answer that which is 
 quoted, apparently the writer feels that he has disposed of 
 the whole matter. Let it not be forgotten that, in the 
 argument presented above, I rested, not on a single 
 text, or on one or many only, but on the whole weight of 
 Scriptural teaching, from the first to the last chapter of 
 the Bible. 
 
 But let us take the argument as we find it. The word 
 which Mill translates as slave may, it is submitted, well be 
 held to apply to many cases of service as to which no widely 
 entertained objection has yet been raised. This is, however, 
 a mere matter of observation, on which I do not by any 
 means rely. We must look at the reasoning closely, for it 
 is excessively sophistical, and may well puzzle us to answer 
 for awhile. Now, a slave or other servant is one who ex vi 
 termini is legally bound to serve. To such an one the 
 Apostle in effect says, " Perform your legal duty, and do 
 not let it be said that because you are a Christian you are a 
 
106 Women's Suffrage, and National Danger. 
 
 refractory slave or servant." But what is a wife ? One 
 who is bound to perform wifely duties. What are wifely 
 duties not merely in Rome, or any particular locality when 
 the Apostle wrote, but everywhere and always ? It is 
 precisely upon this point that Paul, as well as the other 
 authorities of Scripture, inform us. " The husband is the 
 head of the wife, as Christ also is the head of the Church, 
 being Himself the saviour of the body." In Ephesus only, 
 and there only for a time ? On the contrary, just as the 
 relation to which the conjugal is compared is eternal, so, 
 apparently, is the latter as enduring as the nature of men 
 and women. But further, " For this cause," says the 
 Apostle, " shall a man leave his father and mother, and 
 shall cleave to his wife ; and the twain shall become one 
 flesh." Was this the law of Colossae, or of any of the cities 
 to which the Epistle to the Ephesians was sent, and 
 obedience to which is all that is enjoined ? or is it not 
 rather part of an entire lesson to husbands and wives which 
 was to endure, not only until ColossaB and other cities of St. 
 Paul's time and their laws no longer existed, but until the 
 last pair should have quitted this present world ? And, let 
 it be noted, the Apostle is not merely addressing wives, but 
 husbands also. He is not merely saying to the former, 
 "Perform your legal duties," and to the latter, "I do 
 not ask you, by freeing your wife, to diminish your 
 temporal assets." He declares the duties of both by a 
 reference to the eternal relation between Christ and the 
 Church. 
 
 Again, though he who is actually a slave is exhorted to 
 obey his master, it would be impossible to contend that there 
 is any Biblical injunction in favour of the continuance of 
 
The Argument from Religion. 107 
 
 the institution of slavery ; indeed, such continuance is clearly 
 against the golden rule of the 12th verse of the 
 7th chapter of Matthew. And some may consider that 
 the words of Paul to Philemon with reference to 
 Onesimus, the slave of the latter, amount to express 
 teaching that the relation of master and slave is inconsistent 
 with the bond of Christian fellowship between the two. If 
 this be so, as the object of the Apostle's labours was the 
 increase of the Church on earth that is, of the body 
 between whose members Christian fellowship exists it 
 must evidently follow that the abolition of slavery was 
 regarded by him as properly commensurate with the spread 
 of Christianity among slave owners and their slaves. But 
 the relation of husband and wife is not only not opposed to 
 Christianity, but is obviously both approved by it and 
 essential to the well-being of the human race. Therefore 
 we must assume that, while the Apostle not improbably 
 regarded slavery as a temporary institution, he must have 
 regarded marriage as a permanent condition. The fact that 
 he merely tells both slaves and wives to obey their masters 
 and husbands respectively would seem to show that, just as 
 he regarded it as self-evident that a slave was, and while 
 slavery existed would continue to be, one who was bound 
 to obey, so he regarded a wife as one who was, and 
 always would continue, till the end of the world, 
 bound to obey her husband. While slavery exists under 
 any system the slave must be legally bound to obey. 
 Without such obligation the institution cannot possibly 
 exist. While marriage continues the wife must be bound to 
 obey, and it is submitted that without such obligation this 
 institution also cannot permanently exist. 
 
108 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 I submit, then, that, in the light of all of the passages 
 from Paul's epistles to which I referred, we cannot safely 
 regard his words as merely discouraging rebellion against 
 existing laws. They seem rather to be written for the 
 eJification of the Church during the entire duration of its 
 militant state. Nor does there seem to be any necessarily 
 temporary character in the words, " The powers that be are 
 ordained of God," and those which follow them. Surely no 
 one pretends that in endeavouring to understand an apostolic 
 direction we are to bid adieu to our intelligence and 
 knowledge. I certainly did not suggest that this was so in 
 gathering together the arguments against Mill's ideas from 
 the Scriptural point of view. Seeing, then, that when the 
 Apostle wrote the words last cited, the Emperor Nero was 
 on the Roman throne, it would seem obvious that the Apostle 
 is speaking rather of the necessary fact of some form of 
 government government in any form being necessarily 
 absolute than of any particular and temporary instance of 
 it. We may take into consideration the possibility that he 
 had some patriotic weakness for the Roman constitution, 
 retaining as it did, even ia his time, to a considerable extent 
 the forms, though not the essence, of a republican government 
 or a limited monarchy. But this will not explain away the 
 words, " Rulers are not a terror to the good work, but to 
 the evil." If this were a statement of fact referring to 
 particulars, it would clearly be inaccurate ; and surely Paul 
 must have been quite as well aware of this, from his personal 
 experience, as are we. It is, therefore, evident that this 
 passage does not amount to a justification for any particular 
 form of government other than the best. What then does 
 it mean ? I do not pretend to speak with any remarkable 
 
The Argument from Religion. 109 
 
 jucidity upon the matter, but I would suggest that its 
 meaning can hardly be anything but this. Christianity 
 teaches men to love one another, it favours approximation 
 towards equality. But its highly spiritual character which, 
 to some extent, places its sincere adherents in a manner 
 above the world, does not prevent it from being a practical 
 religion adapted to the natural condition of men in this 
 life. The new convert, burning with enthusiastic concep- 
 tions of the kingship of the Divine Head of his Church, may 
 be apt to despise all authority of worldly princes as an 
 unwarrantable usurpation over his freedom. A modus vivendi 
 is necessary, and the Apostle tells such men that their duty 
 to God is not necessarily incompatible with their legal duty to 
 a secular government. Just as God is the Supreme Ruler of 
 the universe, and His power is necessary for its ordering, so 
 .-an earthly government is necessary for the control of the 
 people of the State in which it exists. There is no stumbling- 
 block to religious life in this fact, for power is a Divine 
 institution, and it is necessary for the avoidance of continual 
 anarchy that the secular power should be habitually obeyed. 
 Government is not necessarily a source of terror to well-doers. 
 And it must be carefully remembered that the powers of every 
 supreme government, whether monarchical or republican, 
 are precisely the same, from a juristic point of view. But 
 the repositories of the powers differ in every different form 
 of government. I suggest that the former are " the 
 powers that be," in the sense of the Apostle; the latter 
 are but the occasional and accidental possessors of the 
 same. 
 
 The matter may possibly be made somewhat clearer by a 
 reference to a similar passage of Peter (1st Epistle, chap. 
 
110 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 ii.13-17). We see that Christians are exhorted to be subject 
 to every ordinance of man " for the Lord's sake." It is as if 
 the Apostles told their followers to avoid bringing un- 
 necessary reproach upon their body; that because they were 
 Christians they ought not to be bad citizens, but that they 
 should see that, by being known as law-abiding and upright 
 men, their personal reputations did not retard the progress 
 of their missionary work. 
 
 In short, it is not here suggested for one moment that 
 Christianity was intended to stereotype existing forms of 
 government and society. On the contrary, the inevitable 
 effect of the reception of its doctrines was to radically 
 change existing political and social institutions. Everyone 
 knows the difference between an honest reformer and one 
 who simply agitates because he despises all authority except 
 his own. And what the Apostles tell us is to remember 
 that the institution of government is necessary. So, it 
 may be added, though this is an a fortiori case, the institu- 
 tion of marriage is necessary, and being, like a state, an 
 association of more than one person, government is necessary 
 for its existence. But, as I have said, in speaking of 
 marriage, I submit that the Apostles go further, and tell us 
 with considerable amplification, not only what it in their 
 day necessarily was, but what in its best regulated state it 
 ought to be. 
 
 We must, then, remember the immense importance of the 
 proper regulation of the relation between the sexes, and the 
 consequent improbability that this is left unindicated in the 
 Scriptures, otherwise than by the general teaching of the 
 Golden Rule. But, as a fact, is express teaching, or at all 
 events sufficient ground for safe inference, wanting ? If not, . 
 
The Argument from Eeligion. Ill 
 
 what is that inference ? I submit that both the language 
 and the spirit of revelation from beginning to end point us 
 to this conclusion, and to this alone : the wife cannot, 
 without pro tanto defying the authority of the Christian 
 religion, claim equality with her husband; but, living 
 according to the manner inculcated in the Bible, she will 
 live for the benefit of her husband, submitting her will in 
 obedience to him. 
 
SECTION II. 
 
 THE ARGUMENT FROM CUSTOM. 
 
 HAVING now endeavoured to appreciate the religious 
 argument, it is time to advert to other sources of information 
 upon our subject. For it would be unsatisfactory in 
 political discussion to forget that there are those to whom 
 Biblical authority is insufficient, and who therefore require 
 arguments founded upon another basis. Moreover, it is 
 possible that there are some who still think that the matter is 
 left open by the Scriptures for the decision of every age and 
 nation, according to their own particular views of expediency 
 or justice. 
 
 I now, therefore, appeal to the authority of custom. In 
 doing so, my meaning must not be understood as being that 
 any weighty reason in favour of the continuance of the 
 existing state of things in England arises from the fact of 
 the custom of England hitherto. For this custom is now 
 impeached, and if it be supported at all, it must be supported 
 on other grounds than that of its own existence. It is, 
 however, conceived to be a permissible course to appeal for 
 the support of a particular custom to the authority of a 
 universal custom which has, so far as our information ex- 
 tends, existed among every nation and in every age down 
 
The Argument from Custom. 113 
 
 to the present time, or at least with a few doubtful excep- 
 tions. This custom of the marital headship has, of course, 
 presented very many shades of variation in the degree in 
 which it has been limited. But the fact of the headship, 
 whether existing in an extravagant or in a moderate form, 
 has very generally remained. And it is reserved for the 
 latter half of the nineteenth century to discover, if so 
 discover it will, that the whole human race, or at least the 
 male portion of it, from the earliest times until now, has 
 laboured under a miserable misapprehension, and, in so 
 fundamental a matter as that under discussion, has not 
 only uniformly erred, but has practically always done so on 
 the same side. This fact is surely worthy of very careful con- 
 sideration. It is easy to underestimate its importance. Some 
 may think that, as we are still progressing in other respects, 
 there is no reason why we should not also be doing so in this. 
 By such ideas my contention may be obscured. The point 
 is, that in the case under consideration we have practically 
 no basis of experience except on one side, and we know as 
 a fact that the physical differences between the sexes 
 renders absolute equality in every respect impossible. We 
 are being invited to attempt to evolve by legal institutions 
 a factitious and technical equality. The world has existed 
 up to the present time without any considerable portion of 
 its inhabitants apparently considering this desirable or 
 practicable. We have no precedents on which to rely. A 
 totally new path is before us, and its dangers are conse- 
 quently unknown. 
 
 On the other hand, in ordinary questions of political 
 reform, we have either experience or analogy to help us to 
 a safe determination. Republics have alternated with 
 
 8 
 
114 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 empires, and various intermediary forms of government 
 have been known for thousands of years. So anarchy, that 
 is to say a condition in which there is no government at all, 
 and highly centralised states, where the force and influence 
 of the supreme power are everywhere observable, as well as 
 innumerably varied forms of government between these two 
 extremes, have long afforded either danger-marks or patterns 
 to the race. 
 
 It is argued, however, by Mill that " custom, however 
 universal it may be, affords in this case no presumption, and 
 ought not to create any prejudice, in favour of the arrange- 
 ments which place women in social and political subjection 
 to men." " This dependence, as it exists at present, is not 
 an original institution, taking a fresh start from considera- 
 tions of justice and social expediency it is the primitive 
 state of slavery lasting on through successive mitigations 
 and modifications occasioned by the same causes which have 
 softened the general manners and brought all human rela- 
 tions more under the control of justice and the influence of 
 humanity. It has not lost the taint of its brutal origin. 
 No presumption in its favour, therefore, can be drawn from 
 the fact of its existence." In answer, further, to the 
 assertion that the government of the male sex, unlike other 
 forms of power, is natural, he asks, " Was there ever any 
 domination which did not appear natural to those who 
 possessed it ?" Now if it be intended that originally the 
 position of the wife was practically no other than that of the 
 ordinary slave, it is sufficiently clear, as, indeed, was 
 contended by Mr. Goldwin Smith some years ago, that 
 historical support for the position is entirely lacking. The 
 condition of the wife may have f reqently approached that of 
 
The Argument from Custom. 115 
 
 the slave, especially in savage or semi-savage nations, but 
 inquiries into the primitive condition of human institutions 
 have yet to show that the two were originally identical, 
 or, indeed, that they were not clearly distinguished. 
 
 If, indeed, we carefully examine the condition of women 
 in early times, we shall find that just as certainly as to call the 
 matron of the present day " a slave " is to use the language 
 of exaggeration, so there is no solid foundation for this asser- 
 tion as to the origin of marital power. I do not propose to 
 trouble the reader with an examination of the condition of 
 women among the unprogressive races of the world, for it 
 cannot be shown that we have derived our institutions from 
 them. The fact that we find that among them the women 
 are often practically in a somewhat servile state is not the 
 least in favour of the assertion under consideration. On the 
 contrary, since there is strong reason to believe that the 
 races which we call unprogressive are better described as 
 declining, the more just inference would seem to be that the 
 state of women, as being that of the weaker portion of human- 
 ity, has among such r^ces declined to its present state of 
 humiliation, rather than continued from such an original 
 condition. But whatever be the fact as to this point, we are 
 amply justified in attempting to establish the general truth 
 by a reference to the antiquities of the progressive races. 
 If, then, we study the Old Testament Scriptures, in what- 
 ever light we may regard them, no foundation can be found 
 for the suggestion either that the wife was confused with 
 the bondwoman, or that her condition was other than well 
 defined as distinct from that of a servile member of the 
 household. And if we turn to Greece, so far from finding 
 
 that in the earliest ages the wife was regarded as little better 
 
 8* 
 
116 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 than a slave, or, indeed, any evidence that such was her 
 original position, the fact appears to be that women occupied 
 a better position, and were more respected in the heroic 
 age described by Homer than at any subsequent period of 
 the history of free Greece. Instead of observing the restric- 
 tions upon the freedom of women amounting to something very 
 like imprisonment, and the apparently general opinion of men 
 in their disfavour, which characterise the subsequent history of 
 the Ionian States, we find that women are pictured, as every- 
 one knows who has studied the Iliad and Odyssey, as not only 
 worthy of respectful con sideration and capable of moral emin- 
 ence, but as actually held in well-deserved respect, and not 
 unfrequently attaining to magnificent virtue and heroism. 
 Nay, more, the sex and nature of the woman are thought 
 worthy of the gods, and, with the exception of Zeus or 
 Jupiter, the female objects of Grecian imagination and 
 worship were regarded and described as no less powerful 
 than the male. Is it, then, possible to conceive, inasmuch 
 as in the earliest condition of the Grecian woman of which 
 we can obtain any information they were not only treated as 
 worthy and highly respected companions of the greatest 
 heroes, but their peculiar characteristics vicious as well as 
 virtuous were embodied in the persons of the national gods, 
 that the primitive Grecian woman was a slave ? The 
 condition, indeed, of the heroic ages continued in a large 
 measure among the Dorians during historical times. And 
 it has been pointed out that the decline in the state of 
 women among the lonians was not apparently due to 
 indigenous causes, but seems to have resulted from the 
 influence of the Eastern races. It may be added that during 
 the decline of Greece a revulsion of feeling with regard to 
 
The Argument from Custom. 117 
 
 women seems to have taken place, similar to that which was 
 experienced in Rome, and which is now observable in 
 England. From a condition of stringent restraint they seem 
 to have emerged into dissolute license. 
 
 Again, in Rome, though we mount up to the earliest sources 
 of our information, no trace of the wife's slavery can be 
 found. The materfamilias is nowhere, and in no degree, 
 confused or classed with the serva. True, the marital 
 power is said to have been probably unlimited at first, but 
 so is that of the British Parliament over every subject in 
 the land. But Britons, as every one knows, are not slaves, 
 neither was the Roman matron a serva. The paterfamilias 
 may have had the same power of disposition over his wife as 
 over his herds, but the position and condition of a woman 
 were not those of the horse, the ox, or the swine. On the 
 contrary, so far as we have any indications of the truth, 
 the Roman wife occupied a position of respect and honour. 
 Of the subsequent position of women I shall say more later 
 on ; but it may be well to point out in this place that what 
 is called the emancipation of women, or the nearest approach 
 thereto which was seen in Greece and Rome, took place 
 concurrently with the decline of their national greatness. 
 
 But does it follow, even assuming for the purposes of 
 argument that the power of the husband over the wife had 
 its origin in force, that this power, like that of the master 
 over the slave, which also had its origin in force, is bad, or, 
 indeed, that its origin was sufficiently brutal to prevent the 
 ordinary presumption from immemorial custom from 
 arising ? The cases are evidently separated by a broad 
 difference, which apparently renders all inference from the 
 origin or history of the one to those of the other improper 
 
118 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 and misleading. For the power exercised by men over 
 other men was, as a rule, possible merely because of the 
 superior education, organisation, or equipment in point of 
 arms, or other accidental circumstances, on the part of the 
 former. Thus the slave of one day might, if emancipated, be 
 without difficulty the slave owner of the next. The difference 
 was not of innate capacity, but of the circumstances of the 
 career in life of the individual. With the dependence of 
 women the case is entirely different. The power of men 
 with regard to them is irremovable, it is a permanent fact 
 of human nature. It is not that it merely seems natural to us. 
 The fact upon which it is based is indisputably natural. If, 
 then, it be no matter of variable circumstances, but the 
 result of immutable conditions of relative capacity, how 
 can we say that the marital power has been arbitrarily 
 assumed ? The ordinary husband cannot, and never could, 
 avoid possessing the power. He has not assumed it : it has 
 existed as a consequence of the natures and constitutions of 
 the two sexes. True, he need not exercise the power ; but, 
 notwithstanding this, he cannot emancipate his wife there- 
 from. We ought, indeed, to bear in mind that the relation 
 of the man to the woman is in some respects midway 
 between that of the father and the child and that of equals. 
 The paternal authority is clearly based upon power, but 
 upon power the necessity of which is obvious to the most 
 obtuse as well as the most philosophical. It therefore 
 escapes the designation of arbitrary control. The marital 
 headship is, however, no less necessary, both from natural 
 causes and from motives of expediency, but from the superior 
 capabilities of the woman as compared with the child its 
 necessity is not so conspicuously clear. 
 
The Argument from Custom. 119 
 
 But we may handle the matter somewhat differently. 
 Probably no one would dispute that the universality of 
 government in civilised countries raises a presumption in 
 favour of the institution. Yet, I suppose, it is undeniable 
 that government had its origin in force. And if it be 
 answered that in the case of this institution mankind have 
 been enabled from observation of anarchy to arrive at an 
 opinion upon its utility, after the institution of an instructive 
 comparison, it may surely be rejoined that the many 
 individual cases where the headship of the husband has not 
 existed, furnish material for a similar process in the case of 
 this institution. 
 
 Considerations such as the above seem also to furnish a 
 sufficient reply to arguments based upon the course of history 
 and the tendencies of progressive society in the direction of 
 equality of rights, and to the idea that this " relic of the 
 past" the social and political subjection of women to 
 men " is discordant with the future,!' and must therefore 
 necessarily disappear. 
 
 Upon this branch of my subject, then, I will content 
 myself with saying that reasons of prudence must compel 
 us, in a matter of the most wide- reaching and obvious 
 importance, to attach considerable weight to the fact that 
 the inequality, in some respect or other, of women to men 
 has been practically recognised in all ages and among all 
 nations ; and that the consequent superiority, political or 
 marital, of men I am speaking of its actual existence as 
 distinguished from the abuses by which it may have been 
 characterised has been unopposed down to the latter half 
 of the nineteenth century of the Christian era, by any 
 extensively believed religion, by any widely approved 
 morality, philosophy or poetry, by custom, or by law. 
 
SECTION III. 
 
 THE ARGUMENT FROM EXPEDIENCY. 
 
 IT is now my task to consider the matter in the light of 
 reason, unaided by Revelation, and also apart from custom 
 as a distinct source of authority independent of the 
 evidentiary materials which it furnishes for speculation as to 
 the future. We are, therefore, now shut up to the question 
 of expediency a sufficiently wide field of consideration 
 indeed in other words, we have to consider whether the 
 equality or the inequality of the sexes tends to the greatest 
 happiness of the greatest number. What is expedient for 
 men and women indiscriminately, attaching equal importance 
 to the happiness of both sexes ? In endeavouring to answer 
 this question we may neglect all thought of the differences, 
 real or supposed, between the intellectual powers of the 
 sexes. Let the reader for the present suppose them equal, 
 if he will. The argument following is independent of any 
 consideration of the kind. 
 
 Marriage is evidently a desirable institution. If direct 
 proof of this statement were needed, it would be sufficiently 
 easy to give it ; but as it is conceived that no very leading 
 politician impugns the accuracy of this, it would hardly be 
 occupying attention well to treat it as a debatable matter. 
 Now my contention here is that this institution cannot 
 
The Argument /rom Expediency. 121 
 
 extensively exist where equality between the parties thereto 
 is legally and morally recognised and insisted upon, or, at 
 all events, that the parties cannot attain their highest 
 possible happiness by it where such is the case. In other 
 words, equality between man and woman is not only incon- 
 sistent, but is, generally speaking, absolutely incompatible, 
 with the marriage state. 
 
 By marriage I must be understood to mean, using the 
 words of Lord Penzance, in the case of Hyde v. Hyde, 
 which is reported at page 130 of the first volume of the 
 " Law Reports, Probate, Divorce and Matrimonial Causes," 
 " the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to 
 the exclusion of all others." That union called marriage 
 which is capable of dissolution, bona gratia, as it is called, 
 that is to say, at the will of the parties, seems to me to be 
 merely an intercourse short of marriage, though subject to 
 certain regulations and consequences during its continuance. 
 Sufficient reason why the institution of marriage should, in 
 the interests of women, be indissoluble, except for one 
 cause, will appear later ou. 
 
 In support of the above contention it is submitted that in 
 the case of every permanent relation between two or more 
 human beings by which intimate association is involved, the 
 right to command and the power of enforcing obedience is 
 necessarily possessed by one or some number less than all. 
 And it must be remembered that a woman has a will, and is 
 subject to inclinations of her own, just as is the case with a 
 man. In the union of every husband and wife we have, 
 therefore, two distinct sources of volition ; and, as we are 
 speaking of people as they are and will continue until the 
 millenial year, and not of people as we might wish them to 
 
122 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 be, it is obvious that the dispositions and inclinations of 
 desire controlling these two sources must often differ, and, 
 in the absence of constraint, a difference of will must ensue. 
 What then ? Assuming equality to be not only inculcated 
 by law but demanded in practice, can anything but anarchy 
 on a small scale ensue ? And anarchy, moreover, attended 
 with the supreme inconvenience of its consequences on the 
 minds and hearts of the pair, being consequences from which 
 there is practically no escape in separation for honourable 
 people. It is quite inadequate to say that well-disposed 
 couples will give and take, and bear and forbear. " The 
 law was added because of transgressions." If couples were 
 all well disposed, we should have small need of marriage 
 laws at all. Their only raison d'etre, as laws, is based upon the 
 fact that couples are not necessarily well-disposed. Some, 
 however, may contend that, rather than the woman should 
 have any special motive for giving way in case of a 
 disagreement, the bitter end should be pressed on, and the 
 parties, while remaining married, should live apart. But 
 with men and women of normal feelings this contention 
 ought to have a very scanty weight. For is it possible to 
 strike a more staggering blow at morality, in the specific 
 sense of the term, than to bring about a state of things in 
 which people under middle age should live apart from a con- 
 jugal companion, while incapacitated from second marriage 
 by the subsistence of a link from which they were unable 
 to break free ? And, surely, the offspring of the curiously 
 regulated union approved by our opponents are entitled to 
 some consideration. Parodying, then, some words of Mill 
 which are quoted below, I contend that there is nothing to 
 be said in favour of anarchy and lawlessness in the family, 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 123 
 
 which cannot be said, mutatis mutandis, for anarchy and 
 lawlessness in the State. For supreme power is just as truly 
 necessary between man and wife, while they are not in a 
 condition of perfect excellence, as similar power is necessary 
 in a State, so long as its members are not all in a condition 
 of such excellence. 
 
 On referring to Bentham (pages 230-231 of the work 
 mentioned above) we find the following : " There may at 
 any moment arise a contradiction between the wills of two 
 persons who pass their lives together. The good of peace 
 requires that a pre-eminence should be established which 
 may prevent or end these contests. But why should the 
 man govern? Because he is the stronger. In his hands 
 the power maintains itself. Give the authority to the 
 woman, and every moment a revolt would break out on the 
 part of her husband. This reason is not the only one. It 
 is probable that the man, by his kind of life, has acquired 
 more experience, more aptitude for affairs, more steadiness 
 of mind. In these respects there are exceptions ; but there 
 
 are exceptions to every general rule Those .... 
 
 who out of some vague notion of justice and generosity 
 wish to give to the woman an absolute equality, only spread 
 for her a dangerous snare. To absolve her by law, as far as 
 possible, from the necessity of pleasing her husband, would 
 operate to weaken her empire instead of strengthening it." 
 
 That the occasions for the exercise of power by the 
 husband over his wife may not be so conspicuous or fre- 
 quent, even regarding numerical proportion, as by the 
 sovereign power over the State is easily accounted for. 
 Among other possible reasons, the fact exists that in a vast 
 number, and in probably a majority, of the cases of marriage 
 
124 Women'* Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 in England, the parties are agreeable objects to one another, 
 whereas in the State the repository of power is not neces- 
 sarily the choice of all of its members, and generally not 
 completely so of any, and is certainly not the object of the 
 extreme and unparalleled affection or passion which often 
 exists between, or at least on the part of one of, those who 
 are first betrothed sweethearts and subsequently man and 
 wife. Mill, indeed, tells us that " things never come to an 
 issue of downright power on one side, and obedience on the 
 other, except where the connection altogether has been a 
 mistake and it would be a blessing to both parties to be 
 relieved from it." I do not, however, think it by any means 
 safe to go so far as this. For, even setting apart the last 
 clause, this passage can probably only be supported according 
 to the view of those who regard marriage as a state for 
 which only a minority of the human race are adapted. If it 
 be admitted, as I contend it must by all true moral philo- 
 sophers, that, in the interests of morality, it is well that 
 people should not be so extremely scrupulous in the selec- 
 tion of a spouse as to stickle for almost absolute identity 
 of tastes ; or, in other words, that it is eminently desirable, 
 and, indeed, if morality is not to be a virtue very rare, even 
 necessary, that marriage should be the condition of the large 
 majority of the adults of both sexes, the passage can hardly 
 be assented to, except so far as it contains the element of 
 the undoubted truth that, even as matters at present are, 
 the conjugal union is not a condition of human beings in 
 which one party is perpetually fulminating lordly mandates, 
 which are obeyed by the other merely through the fear of 
 the consequences of the displeasure of the former in the 
 contrary event. 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 125 
 
 But Mill asserts that " it is not true that in all voluntary 
 association between two people one of them must be abso- 
 lute." I am not aware that anyone has ever said otherwise 
 where the association is deter minable either at the will of 
 both parties or for the simple reason that serious disagree- 
 ment between them exists. Indeed, if the word " volun- 
 tary" applies to the time subsequent to the entering upon 
 the association, as well as to the entering thereupon itself, 
 so as to signify that either party is at liberty to withdraw 
 from the association, the statement is, if it may respectfully 
 be so said, very much in the nature of a meaningless truism, 
 In support of this statement, and also of the contention 
 totally unconnected in point of reason where marriage is, 
 understood as above described that the case of marriage is 
 similar in this respect, the renowned logician points us to 
 the case of partnership. Partners are often equals ; and yet 
 we know that their association is not only possible but very 
 usual in commercial countries. Therefore, as well as because 
 it is part of the common warfare of our less cultured adver- 
 saries to tell us flatly tliat marriage is a partnership, it is 
 evidently well to attempt to minutely refute the view which 
 is suggested in this reasoning. 
 
 Is there, then, any substantial analogy between partnership 
 and marriage, such as to justify the above view ? The answer 
 ought indeed to be clear to any one who, although not a 
 lawyer, has a tolerably clear perception of the principles 
 which govern the two cases respectively. In the first place, 
 the object of a partnership is not the pleasure or gratification 
 of the heart or mind, contemplated from the association of 
 the members, but it is the acquisition of one thing pecuniary 
 gain as a consequence of combined effort. The object of 
 
126 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 marriage, on the other hand, if, at least, we consider the 
 case from the point of view of buth parties, is certainly not 
 generally this, and probably is hardly ever this alone. 
 What the objects in reality are, it would be rather late in 
 the day for me to attempt to inform those who are more 
 particularly acquainted with the facts of their own cases 
 than I can be reasonably expected to be. Let it suffice for 
 me to point out that the pleasure or advantage to be 
 derived from the association, not as a means to an end, but 
 as the very end itself, is generally the motive of marriage, 
 at least on the part of one of the parties concerned, so far 
 as the motive is at all clearly denned, or aught but an un- 
 reasoning passion. Some of the consequences of this 
 cardinal difference between marriage and partnership may 
 be easily worked out by the reader. 
 
 But again, a fundamental principle of partnership is the 
 rule that MI re communi potior est conditio prohibentis. This 
 rule, working together with that as to the power of 
 majorities, where there are more than two partners, renders 
 the institution of partnership thoroughly consistent with 
 the approved principles of sovereignty as opposed to 
 anarchy, and therefore no exception to the rule above laid 
 down from any point of view. For just as government may 
 go on where one magistrate can veto the actions of an 
 equal, and^?r0 tanto, become in a sense the sovereign of the 
 other, so a partner who can veto his associate's desire, 
 occupies momentarily a similar relation towards the latter. 
 Where there is a. possibility of a majority, a clear case of 
 the capacity for the exercise of controlling power exists. 
 But in the case of marriage, no majority is possible in 
 monogamous states. And if the rule of the preservation of 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 1 27 
 
 the status quo, in case of difference of opinion as to a pro- 
 posed course of action, were applied to the ordinary life of 
 a family, it hardly needs the pen of a humourist to describe 
 the inevitable disaster which would ensue. For marriage is 
 a relation dominating almost every phase and every moment 
 of the existence of the parties, and which is not, like 
 partnership, confined to one aspect of the life of mortals. 
 
 The foregoing considerations are, however, small in com- 
 parison with the following. The essential principle which 
 renders partnership a relation which is frequently adopted 
 is, that it can at any time be dissolved, either at the 
 will of any one partner, or, where this has been excluded 
 by the contract and the partnership is for a term, at the 
 joint will of all the partners, or at the instance of one 
 partner only, where circumstances have arisen which render 
 its continuance no longer desirable in the immediate interests 
 of all the partners, or putting it more simply, where the true 
 object of the partnership relation is no longer likely to be 
 obtained. For example, the Court will dissolve a partner- 
 ship before the expiration of the term of its continuance 
 agreed upon, where the business of the partnership can 
 only be carried on at a pecuniary loss (pecuniary gain 
 being always the only legally recognised object of a 
 partnership) ; where a partner, other than the one desiring 
 a dissolution, so conducts himself in matters relating to the 
 partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable for 
 the other partner or partners to carry on the business in 
 partnership with him ; and where a partner, other than the 
 partner seeking dissolution, becomes of permanently unsound 
 mind, or in any way permanently incapable of performing 
 Ms part of the partnership contract; or even when he 
 
128 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 becomes liable to a criminal prosecution. Now the essence of 
 the marriage relation, as at present regulated in our country, 
 is precisely the reverse. The parties accept one another for 
 better or for worse perhaps it may be added that they very 
 often find one another a little worse than they expected. 
 What of a marriage which could be dissolved where it could 
 only be carried on at what is the appropriate counterpart or 
 equivalent of pecuniary loss in the case of partnership, or 
 where one of the parties so conducts himself or herself in 
 matters relating to the marriage concerns as to render it not 
 reasonably practicable that the marriage should be continued 
 so as to obtain the objects for which it was entered into, or 
 where one of the parties becomes incapable of discharging 
 his or her part of the innumerable duties of married life, or 
 for any other reason which is the counterpart or equivalent 
 of those enumerated above, as sufficient to obtain a dissolu- 
 tion of a partnership ? Once allow the possibility of dissolu- 
 tion on such grounds, and the opportunity for anyone to 
 obtain a dissolution would hardly appear difficult, at all events 
 if the other party were not disposed to submit to the most 
 irritating and systematic tyranny. The phrase, " Matters 
 relating to the partnership business," is capable of a practi- 
 cal application, being necessarily of limited import. But in 
 the case of marriage, the question would be not as to what 
 matters do relate to the marriage concerns or objects, but as 
 to what conceivable matters do not. And what would be 
 the limits of the scope of admissible allegations that from 
 circumstances of disagreement it was no longer practicable 
 to continue the marriage relation with advantage ? 
 
 In short, the institutions of marriage and partnership as 
 at present recognised are widely and essentially different. 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 129 
 
 They are different in their nature, their objects, and the 
 rules by which they are regulated and without which 
 they would cease to be what they now are ; and, above all, 
 marriage is primarily a permanent relation, partnership is 
 primarily a temporary relation. We see, therefore, owing 
 to the rules which I have set forth, partnership is no excep- 
 tion to the fundamental condition of human relations : that 
 where there is a union between two persons, the effects of which 
 pervade their entire existence, and which is also permanent, 
 or not capable of dissolution if found disadvantageous, one 
 of the two is necessarily subject to the other, unless anarchy 
 and unhappiness are the normal condition of the parties, 
 so far as there is any necessity for law or custom in the 
 case. 
 
 Many, however, while agreeing with me that in the case 
 of a practically indissoluble marriage a marriage from 
 which there is no escape but with the greatest dishonour 
 one of the parties must be subject to the other, will perhaps 
 consider that this constitutes no reason why this subjection 
 should exist, because the marriage may well be made disso- 
 luble on easy terms. Since this is so, as well as for the 
 completion of the argument which has been entered upon, 
 it now becomes desirable that I should attempt to establish 
 that indissoluble marriage, by which I mean marriage only 
 capable of being dissolved on the one ground now recog- 
 nised by our law, is necessary in the interests primarily of 
 women, and secondarily of the whole race. It should, then, 
 be made to appear that not only, as it has been already 
 attempted to be shown, would such a marriage, if entered 
 into when equality between the sexes was recognised, 
 bring about discord and misery to both parties, but as a 
 
130 Women's {suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 matter of practical certainty, or at least great probability, 
 if equality were recognised, such a marriage would be very 
 rarely entered into. If these positions be established, it will 
 necessarily follow that it is undesirable to recognise the 
 equality of the sexes. 
 
 I do not intend again to trouble the reader with a lengthy 
 religious argument, but it may be well to remind him on the 
 point of the in dissolubility of marriage, of the express 
 teaching of the Central Authority of religion. 
 
 Now it must probably almost always be the case, that a 
 woman will be more intensely interested in entering the mar- 
 riage condition than is a man. " Marriage,' ' according to that 
 prominent advocate of the suffrage movement, Miss Lydia 
 Becker, amongst others, " is the natural and honourable 
 profession in which the majority of women maintain 
 themselves." Without by any means assenting to this 
 manner of expressing the female view of marriage, we may 
 agree, as is presumably implied by the words, that marriage 
 is the natural avocation of women, in a sense more distinctly 
 emphatic than is the case with men. The main duties, for 
 instance, of a married woman's life are limited to the 
 immediate consequences of the marriage relation, whereas 
 this is obviously not the case with the husband, who has to 
 adopt a distinct path of duty in order to provide a com- 
 petence, by the wife's manipulation of which the family 
 duties may be fulfilled. It cannot be said that marriage i& 
 of the same essential and immediate importance to man. It 
 is highly desirable, no doubt ; but it is quite in accord with 
 experience that the life of an average male can be fairly 
 comfortably passed through without the exclusive devotion 
 of a monogamous wife. With woman it is otherwise. As- 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 131 
 
 Miss Becker has also said, " Every woman regards marriage 
 either from the side of experience oi\of expectation." And 
 Bentham says, at page 216, that "Marriage has drawn 
 woman from the severest and most humiliating servitude. " 
 To the average member of her sex we may say that it is not 
 merely a condition but almost an existence, outside of which 
 she cannot be imagined really useful and happy. The 
 exclusive devotion of one man to her through life is a 
 matter of vital importance. Without such devotion, which 
 is seldom experienced from any save a husband, the world 
 and its pleasures are to a large extent a sphere from which, 
 by the very conditions of her nature, she is excluded. 
 Setting apart the subject of a pecuniary competence, which 
 might conceivably sink into the background under altered 
 conditions of national customs and opinion restrictive of 
 female enterprise and increased general prosperity, we shall 
 do well to concentrate attention upon facts which no 
 legislation can alter and no philosophy or subtlety can 
 explain away. Without a husband the wells of latent 
 maternal affection in the woman are either destined to 
 perpetual suppression through want of an appropriate 
 object, or she is associated with offspring who,, from 
 the absence of marital assistance in their government and 
 support, even if for no other reason, become a burden 
 rather than a blessing to her. Let us, indeed, rather 
 live and die in the unreasoning prejudice of old-fashioned 
 Toryism than be led away by the plausible but empty 
 and sophistical rant of the pseudo - philosophy of the 
 modern gallant. Men and women are separated in their 
 natural position by an abyss of difference which, however 
 
 formed, can never be bridged over by the wisdom or the 
 
 9* 
 
132 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 foolishness of men. However we may alter the conditions 
 of human existence,* however much we may speculate 
 upon the future development of women, what imaginable 
 process can ever turn the man into the mother, or give him 
 the same inevitable interest in life-long association with the 
 mother, which she of necessity must have in such association 
 with him ? Until we have done this, we can never achieve the 
 equalisation of the sexes ; but we can irritate the man into a 
 tyrant, and substitute savage ascendency for the headship which 
 is regulated by law. 'Legislate and blunder as we may, there 
 is a curse or a blessing it matters not which it may be 
 called there is a crucial fact which can never be sur- 
 mounted or removed, though every woman be dubbed an 
 Empress, and every man be fettered as a slave. The in- 
 feriority in point of independence of marriage and otherwise, 
 which is inevitably, indubitably, and unalterably associated 
 with the woman's lot, will still endure, for the simple 
 reason, did not a single other remain, that, unlike the man, 
 she is not only capahle of the affections of the mother, but 
 is, and always will be, as a general rule, the actual mother 
 of a family, with an undying affection for her offspring. 
 Thus also it is that she is necessarily incomparably more 
 interested in the indissolubility of marriage than the ordinary 
 man can ever be. He would too often, finding his wife 
 other than he had thought her, and having grown tired 
 of her attractions, be but too glad, if it were possible 
 by law, to be set free to live alone, or find another and a more 
 congenial sharer of his home. But as for her, the first few 
 years of marriage being past, her charms would, perchance, 
 have faded, she would be the object of no one's desire, and, 
 to make use of the repulsive phraseology of Miss Becker, 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 133 
 
 another professional engagement would not be likely to be 
 easily obtained. In short, man is primarily interested in, 
 and marries for, the first few years of married life, and 
 would very often, speaking of him as he is, be better pleased 
 with a union in proportion to the brevity of its duration, 
 down to the limit of a few short months ; whereas woman 
 is primarily interested in, and, so far as prudence must be 
 taken to enter into the matter, marries for, the later years 
 of marriage. It is all-important to her that the husband 
 should be bound to live with, and provide for, her and her 
 children, when the first brief years of married life have 
 passed. In different language, speaking of this hallowed 
 institution in terms rendered necessary by some modern 
 political philosophers if so these soulless, passionless, religion- 
 bereft, and self-asserting speculators are aptly styled we are 
 compelled to say that the woman lives with the man for the 
 first few years, in consideration of his undertaking to live 
 with her indefinitely when these have passed away. What, 
 then, is the position of those who tell us of the benefit to 
 women of the recognition of their so-called natural rights ? 
 The sexes always have, and always will, live together, 
 either permanently or temporarily. It is the women who 
 are peculiarly and vitally interested in the permanence of 
 the association. Make, then, marriage a relation of equality, 
 and you must make it comparatively easily dissoluble. 
 Make it so dissoluble, and men will take care that its dura- 
 tion shall be short ; and, when marriages are of short dura- 
 tion, then have the honour, the self-respect, and the 
 happiness of women been sacrificed upon the altar of 
 modern thought, and the human race is urged back to the 
 vice of promiscuity and inevitably consequent barbarism. 
 
134 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 These are no trifling considerations. The race, males as 
 well as females, are vitally interested in averting the 
 suggested consummation, but the interest of the men of one 
 generation will never be so immediately and essentially 
 against it as must always and invariably be that of 
 women. 
 
 Indeed, observations which frequently occur in the 
 writings of those who hold the new ideas upon the subject 
 of the relation between the sexes which ought to exist, seem 
 to point to the necessity for somewhat emphasising the 
 importance of marriage. But let it suffice here for me to 
 quote the words of Bentham. " Under whatever point of 
 view the institution of marriage is considered, nothing can 
 be more striking than the utility of that noble contract, the 
 tie of society, and the basis of civilisation. Marriage, con- 
 sidered as a contract .... has distributed the mass of the 
 community into distinct families ; it has created a domestic 
 magistracy ; it has formed citizens ; it has extended the 
 views of men to the future, through affection for the rising 
 generation ; it has multiplied social sympathies. To perceive 
 all its benefits, it is only necessary to imagine for a moment 
 what men would be without that institution " (pages 21 5, 21 6). 
 
 At the present moment, owing to the reactionary extremity 
 of the recent legislation in supposed favour of women, we 
 are in a transition state with regard to the benefit of 
 marriage from the point of view of men. Probably it is 
 still very beneficial to those who are in a position to 
 comfortably afford its expenses. But how long will this be 
 so ? Already by marriage a man sacrifices more than can 
 well be adequately described. A comfortable and unanxious 
 home, with the intimate society of affectionate relatives, is 
 
The Argum ent from Expediency. 135 
 
 often renounced ; the kindly services of female friends 
 generally is to a large extent forfeited ; liberty of associa- 
 tion with the fairer half of creation is greatly circumscribed ; 
 the income available for immediate personal comfort is 
 practically halved or quartered, or further divided as the 
 family increases ; the anxieties and responsibilities of the 
 man, from being limited to the due pursuit of his 
 avocation, and the consequent acquisition of a compe- 
 tence, are swelled to all the varied trials of a house 
 which must be kept in good repair, and from which, in the 
 majority of cases, he cannot easily scuttle out into a 
 luxurious hotel, and a family who for a large portion of the 
 year are under the doctor's supervision, and who must 
 always be considered, and whose sorrows and troubles are 
 his own ; absolute freedom, so long as income be not 
 stopped, to change from one avocation to another, and one 
 country or one district to another, is limited by the necessity 
 that the mill which supplies some half-a-dozen should never 
 cease to grind in such a way that the supply should be regu- 
 larly kept up ; the man's liberty to change his views, his 
 habits and his friends, is hampered by the consideration of 
 the pleasure of his wife and adult children ; his choice of 
 companionship is limited by a necessary association with a 
 woman who may prove very different from what he thought 
 her ere passion died away before experience, and who, in 
 many cases, even under existing regulations, is willing to 
 thwart and contradict him when opportunity allows ; his 
 patriotism and his charity are largely subordinated to the 
 more immediate claims of his family ; in short, almost every 
 kind of freedom and the bulk of his relative wealth are gone, 
 &c., &c. Extend the Franchise to women, and subsequently 
 
136 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 complete the consequent equalisation before the law 
 of the sexes, and the husband's losses will become too 
 great to adequately depict. To say that he will then be 
 liable to have his political power neutralised by his wife r 
 and his political influence, so far as the propagation of 
 opinion is concerned, perhaps outweighed by her, seeing that 
 she will not unlikely have more leisure for conversation 
 than himself; and that he will be subject to have his self- 
 respect continually outraged by the defiance of spoiled 
 children ever screening themselves behind the rival authority 
 of an indulgent mother ; and that he will nevertheless be 
 linked to, and bound to provide for, his useless rival and the 
 destroyer of his peace and self respect, is to depict but a 
 small portion of the entire aspect of the union. 
 
 And what does the husband gain as the quid pro quo from 
 his point of view, or, rather, what will he gain if the new 
 ideas should ever be acknowledged as correct by our law 
 and custom ? The pleasure of so much association with one 
 woman as he may desire and she may see fit to concede, 
 together with whatever advantages he may be able to derive 
 from a progeny who are either reduced to order by the 
 usurpation of sole authority over them by himself or his 
 wife, or, in default of this, are practically rendered an 
 anarchical community on account of the attempted regime of 
 two independent and opposing powers. Would he also gain 
 a housekeeper ? By no means, for the wife under such a 
 system would keep house or not at the pleasure of her own 
 unforced and unforceable will. True, she might be incited 
 by reward, though not compelled by authority; but the 
 husband's power of reward would probably be vastly less than 
 hers, for almost every benefit of the marriage to him would 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 137 
 
 be capable of being conferred as a voluntary favour on the 
 part of the wife. 
 
 Now it cannot be cogently objected that the above is a 
 mere abstraction. Laws, as I have said, are made for those 
 who need them, and not for those who are so well disposed 
 that they would perform their duty in the absence of any 
 human sanction or compulsion. If we were all thorough 
 Christians we could very well dispense with the greater 
 part, if not the whole, of the labours of Parliament. The 
 chief object of legislation is to compel, by the intervention 
 of State power, the performance of those moral duties of 
 which the compu^ory fulfilment is expedient in the interests 
 of the community, but which many would neglect if left to the 
 free exercise of their own discretion. True, indeed, human 
 nature would revolt before ever custom had arrived at the 
 extreme pitch foreshadowed above as the legally possible 
 result of the proposed legislation. Nevertheless, that ex- 
 tremity is apparently the direction in which our laws are 
 tending, and in which every assertion of the propriety of the 
 legal equality of the sexes as now understood must tend. Its- 
 consummation will undoubtedly never be reached, but and 
 this is the important point will be avoided, if legislation 
 gives effect to the new ideas, by a process which must bring, 
 disaster upon our nation. For how, indeed, will it be 
 avoided otherwise than by the practical disuse of the 
 institution of marriage ? 
 
 Already marriage seems to be commonly relegated to a 
 later period of life than used to be the case ; and as love's 
 young dream is, generally speaking, rather out of date after 
 about twenty-five, the blinding operations of Cupid are less 
 frequent, and the lover is beginning to contract with his 
 
138 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 eyes well open. Probably, at the present day, the majority 
 of marriages are not arranged under the influence of an 
 entirely unreflecting passion. The voice of reason is listened 
 to, and the cost of the step is counted. And when once it 
 is found that men are calculating the consequences of 
 marriage, that they are inquiring whether in this, as in 
 other contracts into which they enter, the advantages are an 
 adequate compensation for the consideration which they 
 have to give, what conceivable motive, other than that of 
 religion, the operation of which must not be assumed in 
 these days to be probable in the case of the majority, can 
 induce them to enter into a practically indissoluble marriage 
 upon terms of absolute equality ? 
 
 In short, my contention is, that where the absolute 
 equality of the sexes is recognised by law and custom, 
 concubinage may, and will, exist; but marriage will cease to 
 be common, at least except among religious people. Let it 
 be remembered, as a solemn warning, that every law making 
 marriage less attractive to men is a staggering blow struck 
 at the foundations of morality. 
 
 Now the statements above made are not based upon merely 
 a priori reasoning; they are supported by historical 
 evidence. We cannot, however, reasonably expect a very 
 large amount of such testimony, seeing that the nature of the 
 relations of the sexes all over the world has very generally 
 excluded it. "Women have never, so far as we can learn 
 upon any reliable authority, been treated on a footing of 
 absolute equality with men, and, therefore, we are, of course, 
 unable to point to any historical evidence as to the effects of 
 such treatment. Moreover, as we have seen, the inequality 
 between the two sexes has for the most part been strongly 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 139 
 
 marked. All, therefore, we can hope to learn from the 
 teaching of history would appear to be the record of the 
 apparent results of the nearest approach to general 
 equality between the parties to the marriage relation which 
 has ever to our knowledge been made, and of the greatest 
 facility of dissolving the matrimonial tie which has been 
 permitted, and of institutions to some considerable extent 
 resembling those which we are now asked to establish. In 
 this connection I propose rather to suggest matter for 
 further inquiry and study than to attempt academic 
 profundity. 
 
 Those who are even superficially acquainted with later 
 Roman law and history will hardly be surprised that I turn 
 with confidence to the lessons to be gathered from these. 
 The ancient jus civile, in its provisions with regard to 
 marital power, exhibited the barbarous austerity which 
 characterised it throughout. The wife on her marriage 
 passed, as it was termed, into the manus of her husband, and 
 became, like his children, theoretically subject to his unre- 
 strained and unregulated potestas. In practice, however, it 
 seems doubtful whether, in historical times, the power over 
 the wife was quite as extensive and free from customary 
 limitations as that which was exercised over the son or 
 daughter. Naturally, as civilisation advanced, a marital 
 power which in theory extended to the infliction of death, 
 and in practice stopped little short of this, became quite 
 unsuited to the current opinion and morality. But the 
 manus was to the Roman lawyer a form of potestas, and 
 potestas, whether existing over sons, or slaves, or cattle, or 
 inanimate objects, was legally incapable of limitation in 
 favour of the person or thing over which it was exercised. 
 
140 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 There was apparently no analogous institution to assist the 
 reformer. The manus, which was in the eyes of the Roman 
 an institution which would have ceased to exist if tampered 
 with, just as a balloon collapses if it is pricked, either 
 existed in its full extent or it did not exist at all, and the 
 relations of the man and the woman were outside it. 
 Enlightened reformers were thus driven to the clumsy and 
 dangerous expedient of cutting the knot which they 
 encountered. Devices were resorted to by which the wife 
 was saved from coming under the manus of her husband at 
 all ; and, from being the exception, became ere long the 
 rule, until the institution of manus became merely an 
 obsolete recollection of the past. Thus anything like 
 marriage seemed in danger of temporary suspension, for the 
 old form was cast away, and no new and adequate institu- 
 tion was ready for adoption in the religion or the custom 
 of the nation. Every legal result, therefore, of the fact of 
 marriage, which consisted simply of the parties living 
 together with the intention of regarding one another as 
 husband and wife, with the exception of the father's power 
 over the issue, had now to be anticipated in a contract. 
 Everything had to be positively stipulated for, and 
 beyond was the region of ordinary law. By the dotai 
 contract the husband, if so he may be rightly called, 
 acquired certain enjoyment of a part of his wife's 
 property, and later on, by a corresponding institution 
 called the donatio ante (or, subsequently, propter] nuptias, 
 the wife acquired certain advantages in a portion of the 
 property coining from the husband or his relatives. To this 
 compact with regard to the property of the parties, no 
 religious rites were superadded, nor were civil rites by any 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 141 
 
 means essential. A custom, however, apparently grew up 
 of leading the wife to the house of her husband ; but her 
 delivery there was quite as effectual in the eyes of the law 
 and custom if her husband were absent, the contract 
 partaking, in this respect, of the nature of the contracts re, 
 of deposit, loan, and pledge, rather than of the so-called 
 consensual contracts of sale, hiring, partnership, or man- 
 date. It could hardly be anticipated that such unions as 
 then became common were of a very stable character. 
 Gibbon, who will not be suspected of religious bias, puts 
 the matter in the following words, at page 395 of his fifth 
 volume : " When the Roman matrons became the equal and 
 voluntary companions of their lords, a new jurisprudence 
 was introduced, that marriage, like other partnerships, 
 might be dissolved by the abdication of one of the associates. 
 In three centuries of prosperity and corruption, this 
 principle was enlarged to frequent practice and pernicious 
 abuse. Passion, interest, or caprice suggested daily 
 motives for the dissolution of marriage ; a word, a sign, a 
 message, a letter, the mandate of a freedman, declared the 
 separation ; the most tender of human connections was 
 degraded to a transient society of profit or pleasure. 
 According to the various conditions of life, both sexes 
 alternately felt the disgrace and injury : an inconstant 
 spouse transferred her wealth to a new family, abandoning 
 a numerous, perhaps a spurious, progeny to the paternal 
 authority and care of her late husband ; a beautiful virgin 
 might be dismissed to the world, old, indigent, and 
 friendless; but the reluctance of the Romans, when they 
 were pressed to marriage by Augustus, sufficiently marks 
 that the prevailing institutions were least favourable to the 
 
142 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 males. A specious theory is confuted by this free and 
 perfect experiment, which demonstrates that the liberty of 
 divorce does not contribute to happiness and virtue. The 
 facility of separation would destroy all mutual confidence, 
 and inflame every trifling dispute : the minute difference 
 between a husband and a stranger, which might so easily be 
 removed, might still more easily be forgotten ; and the 
 matron, who in five years can submit to the embraces of 
 eight husbands, must cease to reverence the chastity of her 
 own person." In a note, this author quotes the words of 
 Juvenal (Satir. vi., 20), 
 
 " Sic fiunt octo mariti 
 Quinque per autumnos," 
 
 and adds, " A rapid succession, which may yet be credible, 
 as well as the non consulum numero, sed maritorum annos 
 suos computant, of Seneca (De Bene/iciis^ iii., 16). Jerom 
 saw at Rome a triumphant husband bury his twenty- first 
 wife, who had interred twenty-two of his less sturdy 
 predecessors (Opp., torn, i., p. 90, 'ad Gerontiam')." " In- 
 sufficient steps," he adds, " followed the rapid progress of 
 the evil. . . . Augustus, who united the powers of both 
 magistrates (that is to say, the censor and the praetor), 
 adopted their different modes of repressing or chastising the 
 license of divorce. The presence of seven Roman witnesses 
 was required for the validity of this solemn and deliberate 
 act : if any adequate provocation had been given by the 
 husband, instead of the delay of two years (that is, for the 
 recovery by his wife of her marriage portion), he was com- 
 pelled to refund immediately, or in the space of six months : 
 but if he could arraign the manners of his wife, her guilt or 
 levity was expiated by the loss of the sixth or eighth part of 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 143 
 
 her marriage portion. The Christian princes were the first 
 who specified the just causes of a private divorce ; their 
 institutions, from Constantine to Justinian, appear to 
 fluctuate between the custom of the empire and the wishes of 
 the church, and the author of the " Novels' ' (i.e., Justinian) 
 too frequently reforms the jurisprudence of the Code and 
 Pandects (which also had previously been compiled by the 
 authority of Justinian). . . . The successor of Justinian 
 yielded to the prayers of his unhappy subjects, and restored 
 the liberty of divorce by mutual consent : the civilians were 
 unanimous, the theologians were divided." 
 
 At page 399 of the same volume we find a brief record of 
 what has been above suggested as the effect of a marriage 
 law which is unfavourable to men. " A concubine, in the 
 strict sense of the civilians, was a woman of servile or 
 plebeian extraction, the sole and faithful companion of a 
 Roman citizen who continued in a state of celibacy. Her 
 modest station, below the honours of a wife, above the 
 infamy of a prostitute, was acknowledged and approved by 
 the laws : from the age of Augustus to the tenth century, 
 the use of this secondary marriage prevailed both in the 
 West and the East, and the humble virtues of a concubine 
 were often preferred to the pomp and insolence of a noble 
 matron. In this connection, the two Antonines, the best of 
 princes and of men, enjoyed the comforts of domestic love : 
 the example was imitated by many citizens impatient of 
 celibacy, but regardful of their families. If at any time 
 they desired to legitimate their natural children, the con- 
 version was instantly performed by the celebration of their 
 nuptials with a partner whose fruitfulness and fidelity they 
 had already tried." Thus do we see the degrading means. 
 
144 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 by which men escaped from the injustice, or, as our 
 opponents would perhaps rather call it, the justice of the 
 marriage law of Rome. I am not concerned here to labour 
 the point of the abstract merits of that law ; my object is 
 to convey clearly the simple truth, that though women may 
 marry, however harsh towards them the law may be, men, 
 if the law be such as to discourage them, will take the easy 
 course of avoiding it by keeping themselves outside of the 
 range of its operation. 
 
 Again, Mommsen, as we find at the 432nd page of Vol. II. 
 of Dickson's translation of his history, speaking of the 
 revolution which the degenerate Hellenism of the sixth 
 century of the existence of Rome accomplished in the modes 
 of life and thought among the Romans, uses the following 
 expressions. " Celibacy as to which grave complaints 
 were made as early as 520 (A.U.C.) and divorces naturally 
 increased in proportion [i.e., to the amount of the immorality 
 described by him]. Horrible crimes were perpetrated in 
 the bosom of families of the highest rank ; for instance, the 
 Consul Gaius Calpurnius Piso was poisoned by his wife and his 
 step-son, in order to occasion a supplementary election to the 
 consulship and so to procure the supreme magistracy for 
 the latter a plot which was successful (574). Moreover 
 the emancipation of women began. . . . Now women 
 began to aspire to independence in respect to property ; and, 
 getting quit of the guardianship of their agnati by evasive 
 lawyers' expedients particularly through mock marriages 
 they took the management of their property into their own 
 hands, or, in the event of being married, sought by means 
 not much better to withdraw themselves from the marital 
 power, which, under the strict letter of the law, was neces- 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 145 
 
 sary.* ... In like manner the family jurisdiction over 
 women, which was connected with that marital and tutorial 
 power, became practically more and more antiquated. Even 
 in public matters women already began to have a will of 
 their own and occasionally, as Cato thought, ' to rule the 
 rulers of the world ; ' their influence might be traced in the 
 comitia, and already statues were erected in the provinces 
 to Roman ladies. Luxury prevailed more and more in dress, 
 ornaments, and furniture, in buildings and at table. Espe- 
 cially after the expedition to Asia Minor in 564 Asiatic o- 
 Hellenic luxury, such as prevailed at Ephesus and Alexandria, 
 transferred its empty refinement and its petty trifling, de- 
 structive alike of money, time, and pleasure, to Rome. Here 
 too women took the lead." Again, he speaks of the time 
 of Julius Cresar as follows (vol. iv., p. 546) : " An equally 
 characteristic feature in the brilliant decay of this period was 
 the emancipation of women. ... It was not merely 
 from the economic guardianship of father or husband that 
 women felt themselves emancipated. Love intrigues of all 
 sorts were constantly in progress. . . . Liaisons in the first 
 houses had become so frequent, that only a scandal altogether 
 exceptional could make them the subject of special talk ; a 
 judicial interference seemed now almost ridiculous. An 
 unparalleled scandal, such as Publius Clodius produced in 
 693 at the women's festival in the house of the Pontifex 
 Maximus, although a thousand times worse than the 
 
 * I think it would be more correct to say that women avoided 
 falling under the marital power. In other words, they refused to 
 pass into the manus of their husbands by joining either in a con- 
 farreatio or coemptio, or remaining for any entire year in his possession, 
 which were the only three ways in which the marital power arose. 
 
 10 
 
146 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 occurrences which fifty years before had led to a series of 
 capital sentences, passed almost without investigation and 
 wholly without punishment. The watering-place season 
 in April, when political business was suspended and the 
 world of quality congregated in Baiae and Puteoli derived 
 its chief charm from the relations, licit and illicit which, 
 along with music and song and elegant breakfasts on board 
 or on shore, enlivened the gondola voyages. There the 
 ladies held absolute sway ; but they were by no means 
 content with this domain which rightfully belonged to 
 them; they also acted as politicians, appeared in party 
 conferences, and took part with their money and their 
 intrigues in the wild coterie-proceedings of the time. Any 
 one who beheld these female statesmen performing upon 
 the stage of Scipio and Cato and saw at their side the young 
 fop as with smooth chin, delicate voice, and mincing gait, 
 with head-dress and neckerchiefs, frilled robe, and women's 
 sandals, he copied the loose courtesan might well have a 
 horror of the unnatural world, in which the sexes seemed as 
 though they wished to change parts. . . . Celibacy 
 and childlessness became more and more common, especially 
 among the upper classes. While among these marriage 
 had for long been regarded as a burden which people took 
 upon them at the best in the public interest, we now 
 encounter even in Cato and those who shared Cato's 
 sentiments the maxim to which Polybius a century before 
 traced the decay of Hellas, that it is the duty of a citizen 
 to keep great wealth together and therefore not to beget 
 too many children. Where were the times, when the 
 designation "children-producer" ( proletarius) had been 
 a^ term of honour for the Roman ? In consequence of 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 147 
 
 such a social condition the Latin stock in Italy underwent 
 an alarming diminution, and its fair provinces were over- 
 spread partly by parasitic immigrants, partly by sheer 
 desolation." I may well add one more extract from page 
 605 of the same volume : " The female world also took a 
 lively part in these literary pursuits ; the ladies did not confine 
 themselves to dancing and music, but by their spirit and 
 wit ruled conversation and talked excellently on Greek and 
 Latin literature." 
 
 In connection with the foregoing, it may be well to 
 observe that of the forms of power kindred to that of the 
 husband in early times, the patriapotestas, or paternal power, 
 and the dominica potestas, or power of the master over his 
 slave, continued to exist down to the last days of Roman 
 greatness, subject only to very moderate modifications, 
 introduced at a comparatively late period ; all of legal im- 
 portance, in fact, having been introduced by the Emperors. 
 
 Now I venture to think that the historical evidence 
 above furnished is very strong in support of the propositions 
 which I have laid down. We see that where the marriage 
 laws were practically similar in their operation upon each 
 sex, men were slow to marry, and took refuge from an 
 unattractive condition in concubinage. We see, more- 
 over, that marriage was necessarily regarded as easily 
 dissolved, and the liberty of divorce was abused with 
 disgusting generality. Nor do we fail to notice the natural 
 lowering of general morals, consequent upon this state of 
 affairs. With the so-called emancipation of women we 
 meet the collapse of high-toned morality, the loss of the 
 characteristic manliness of the free Roman people, and their 
 degradation to a luxurious and corrupt servitude under a 
 
 10* 
 
148 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 series of infamous Emperors. There is little that is really 
 glorious and permanently progressive in the history of the 
 Roman people after the attempted equalisation of the sexes 
 in matrimony. 
 
 I would further call the attention of the reader to the 
 fact that I am not merely referring to the history of one 
 among many similar States. In citing Roman experience, 
 
 fall back upon the history of the only State which can be 
 compared with our own, which was the great and all- 
 influencing race of antiquity in Europe, as ours has been in 
 a vast portion of the modern world. Indeed, the laws 
 which have been cited from the records of Rome form part 
 of the one legal system which has practically given law to 
 almost all parts of the civilised world of to-day, except 
 those which have been supplied from the fountains of 
 English law itself. 
 
 The force of the teaching under consideration will hardly 
 be exaggerated. My present contention is in the nature of 
 the answer given by a character in a fictitious anecdote, to 
 one who asked him how it was he knew that " honesty was 
 the better policy than its opposite." " Because," said he, " I 
 have tried both." So I maintain the world has tried both 
 the system of the inequality of the sexes in marriage and 
 the system of approximate legal equality, and that it has 
 reason for concluding that the first is the only system under 
 which a nation can develop and maintain her full energies, 
 and be permanently prosperous and progressive. 
 
 The Common Law of England, like the^'ws civile of ancient 
 Rome, may have been very much too unfavourable to the 
 wife. The reaction against the latter was, as we have seen, 
 violent and disastrous. Modification and amelioration were 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 149 
 
 not attempted, or, if attempted, did not succeed ; but 
 emancipation from a bad regime was childishly sought in 
 the freedom of anarchy. We, in England, are now in the 
 midst of the reactionary period. Shall we complete the 
 Roman process in this respect, and, consequently, assume the 
 role of a State whose sun has set, and whose nocturnal 
 darkness having once begun, will never see the dawn of day 
 again? Or shall we not rather be content with rational, 
 moderate, and abiding reform ? 
 
 In order, however, that we may leave no important feature 
 of our subject un considered, let us assume that there would 
 be no very grievous wrong in the equalisation of the sexes, 
 and that, when this was effected, marriage would still be an 
 institution generally prevalent among the race. Is there 
 then, even on this assumption, anything that can be seriously 
 urged against a general headship on the part of the 
 husband, limited by well-defined legal restraints upon its 
 arbitrary exercise ? 
 
 Our opponents seem to create a considerable amount of 
 confusion, and, consequently, to work great mischief, by 
 abusing such a headship as if it were necessarily a tyranny, 
 and by various other extravagant ways of describing the 
 present condition of affairs. For instance, Mill makes use 
 of such expressions as the following. " This dependence " 
 [of the female sex] . . . . " has not lost the taint of its 
 brutal origin." " The possessors of the power have 
 facilities in this case, greater than in any other, to prevent 
 any uprising against it." " In the case of women, each 
 individual of the subject class is in a chronic state of 
 bribery and intimidation combined." *' If ever any system of 
 privilege and enforced subjection had its yoke tightly 
 
150 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 riveted on the necks of those who are kept down by it, this 
 has." " All men, except the most brutish, desire to have, 
 in the woman most nearly connected with them, not a forced 
 slave but a willing one, not a slave merely but a favourite. 
 They have, therefore, put everything in practice to enslave 
 their minds. The masters of all other slaves rely, for 
 maintaining obedience, on fear ; either fear of themselves, 
 or religious fears. The masters of women wanted more 
 than simple obedience, and they turned the whole force of 
 education to effect their purpose." " What is now called 
 the nature of women is an eminently artificial thing the 
 result of forced repression in some directions, unnatural 
 stimulation in others. It may be asserted without 
 scruple, that no other class of dependents have had 
 their character so entirely distorted from its natural 
 proportions by their relation with their masters." " The 
 wife is the actual bondservant of her husband : no 
 less so, as far as legal obligation goes, than slaves commonly 
 so called." " I am far from pretending that wives are in 
 general no better treated than slaves ; but no slave is a slave 
 to the same lengths, and in so full a sense of the word, as 
 a wife is." " To those to whom nothing but servitude is 
 ill owed, the free choice of servitude is the only, though a 
 most insufficient, alleviation. Its refusal completes the 
 assimilation of the wife to the slave and the slave under 
 not the mildest form of slavery." " I have described the 
 wife's legal position, not her actual treatment. . . . 
 But the mitigations in practice, which are compatible with 
 maintaining in full legal force this or any other kind of 
 tyranny, instead of being any apology for despotism, only 
 serve to prove what power human nature possesses of 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 151 
 
 reacting against the vilest institutions, and with what 
 vitality the seeds of good as well as those of evil in human 
 character diffuse and propagate themselves. Not a word 
 can be said for despotism in the family which cannot be 
 said for political despotism. Every absolute king does not 
 sit at his window to enjoy the groans of his tortured 
 subjects, nor strips them of their last rag and turns them 
 out to shiver in the road. . . . If an appeal be made to 
 the intense attachments which exist between wives and 
 their husbands, exactly as much may be said of domestic 
 slavery." " The law of servitude in marriage is a monstrous 
 contradiction to all the principles of the modern world, 
 and to all the experience through which those principles 
 have been slowly and painfully worked out. 
 Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our law. 
 There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress [sic'] of 
 every house." 
 
 I have avoided quoting references to laws which have 
 been altered since the above expressions were published. 
 It would seem that Mill would have thought the above 
 opinions little less applicable to the present state of the law 
 than they were before the passing of the Married Women's 
 Property Acts and other recent statutes; for there is no 
 limitation of his remarks to the case of property, nor, 
 indeed, does he by any means appear to lay chief stress upon 
 the rules relating to it. So far, however, as the condition 
 of the wife has been improved, it would seem that there is 
 less urgent need of further change, even from his point of 
 view. But what of the value and accuracy of the method 
 of regarding the position of the wife conveyed in the 
 passages cited ? 
 
152 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 Tyranny ! slavery ! and these of the worst kind ! 
 Matrons of England, with your " at homes " and your 
 receptions, your outward majesty and your ever-increasing 
 tribute of respect, ushered by your husbands, flattered by 
 your friends of the male sex, and envied by your sisters 
 from China to Peru ; ye oracles of the wisdom of the 
 drawing-room, is it possible that you are living in a state of 
 stupefaction or of sleep ? How is it that, if the clear 
 eye of the logician or the socialist had not discerned it, the 
 vast majority of your sex had never even dreamt of this 
 degrading and life-wearing slavery ? Well, indeed, may 
 such disturbers of your peace, with the excited ardour of 
 true discoverers, bid you " awake, arise, or be for ever 
 fallen." Alas ! such has been the ignorance of most of us, 
 if we are to accept the view of the eminent Mill, that, 
 whether we have reflected upon our matron relatives or 
 friends, or have observed the demeanour of the "better 
 halves" whom we have encountered in the course of our 
 general experience, whether it has been amid the stately 
 artificialities of the well-to-do, or in the narrow and over- 
 crowded alleys where the poor are found, and where for 
 every bully who is abusing his wife there not unlikely issues 
 forth the sound of several shrill syrens of the gentler sex 
 passing free comments on their sturdier spouses wherever 
 indeed observation has been made or imagination allowed to 
 roam this alleged prevalent state of slavery has not only 
 been unmarked, but even unsuspected. If we are to believe 
 that there is any element of truth in the observation of Mr. 
 Bumble, that " the law is a ass a idiot," and, indeed, " a 
 bachelor," when it supposes that the wife acts under the 
 direction of her husband, what must be our opinion of that 
 
1 he Argument from Expediency. 153 
 
 philosophy which tells us that the man is a tyrant and the 
 woman is a slave ? Surely we must feel that we are pre- 
 sented with the results of that marvellous intellectual power 
 which can give " to airy nothing a local habitation and a 
 name." One would have thought, and surely with strong 
 2irima facie reason, that, were marriage really the worst 
 form of slavery, the bewitching blushes of maidens would 
 have been rather indicative of alarm than, as is so often 
 supposed to be the case, of gratified modesty ; that their 
 accomplishments would have been less adapted to fascinate 
 and charm, their dress and adornments less captivating, and 
 their conquests vastly less numerous nay more, one might 
 have well thought that they alone would have had need to 
 be on their guard against being drawn into the matrimonial 
 state, by too unwary taking of the baits which are set to 
 allure the unsuspecting heart of ardent youth. 
 
 But let us seek for the vestige, or scintilla of truth, in 
 these extraordinary announcements as to slavery in our 
 midst. Probably, then, one or two men, in the course of 
 the personal experience of each of us speaking for a 
 moment of the upper and middle classes only have, more 
 or less, cruelly domineered, over their respective wives. 
 But what are the further probabilities ? One of the wives 
 in question, perhaps, released herself by a separation, and 
 the other was emancipated with a good term of life before 
 her, by the apoplectic termination of her husband's mortal 
 career. Among the lower classes, no doubt, bad cases of the 
 kind are more numerous. Perhaps one wife in every thickly 
 populated street is habitually kicked and cursed. I yield to 
 no one in my pity for such an one, unless she has provoked 
 this savage treatment by a habit of unwomanly nagging, 
 
154 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 unmatronly slovenliness, intemperance, or neglect. But 
 why does she stay, since by the 4th section of the 41 Viet., 
 c. 19, if a husband is convicted of an aggravated assault on 
 his wife, the Court or magistrate before whom he is con- 
 victed, may order that she be no longer bound to live with 
 him, and such order has the effect of a decree for judicial 
 separation. If, indeed, there be any unnecessary difficulties 
 in obtaining such an order, by all means let them be satis- 
 factorily removed. Let no one have to live in dread of 
 extreme personal violence, or, indeed, of any severities 
 exceeding a reasonable limit. But some may say, that by 
 doing as I suggest, the woman would lose her home and her 
 support. Yet, if the treatment be excessively bad and 
 cruel, the house where she experiences it can hardly be 
 aptly described as her home, and the ruffian who is con- 
 tinually knocking her down, is hardly felicitously referred 
 to as her support. By the above-mentioned Act, moreover, 
 in the circumstances described, the Court or magistrate may 
 order the husband to pay weekly alimony to his wife. In 
 addition to the exaction of this periodical payment from her 
 husband, she has her own efforts to rely upon ; and if both 
 of these sources of income fail her and the children, whom 
 she may have to consider, she can look to her relations or 
 her friends, if she has any, just as if any other pecuniary 
 calamity had befallen her. If, however, all these fall short of 
 furnishing her with means of support, the State either 
 does, or it is submitted ought to, provide her with a tolerably 
 comfortable abode, while it temporarily lodges her spouse, 
 according to the degree of his failings, under circumstances 
 of a considerably less agreeable character. 
 
 But we must not overlook this fact. After all that can be 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 155 
 
 said upon such cases as above described, not only do they 
 remain comparatively rare exceptions, but they seem totally 
 irrelevant to the case we are discussing. For they are outside 
 the region of law, being already illegal outrages. Neither the 
 matrimonial law of the present or of the future can be 
 considered as capable of regulating them, for they are 
 subjects of a different portion of the corpus juris, to wit, 
 the criminal department. How then will the legal equalisa- 
 tion of the sexes affect this matter ? Murder, robbery, and 
 theft are forbidden under heavy penalties, but they are of 
 frequent occurrence. Kicking a wife is forbidden, but it is 
 still occasionally resorted to. And inasmuch as men kill, 
 rob, and steal from their equals, how can we say that they 
 would cease to kick their equals ? Abnormal deviations 
 from the standard of right conduct, owing to drunkenness, 
 debauchery, and so forth, will still occur as incident to the 
 condition of our race. 
 
 Even, however, if we consider the cases of cruelty of 
 husbands towards their wives which are not forbidden by 
 the law, still we are able, not only to characterise them as 
 exceptions, but to put them outside the orbit of the effect 
 of the present law, by pointing to what Mill calls the 
 " counter-tyranny " of the wife. Who is so inexperienced 
 as not to have observed a number of cases in which the 
 husband is habitually crushed, and wearied, and tormented 
 by either a fierce, a wilful, or an otherwise unpleasant 
 woman, who has acquired an ascendency over him. Perhaps 
 I may do well to ask whether the cases of ill-treatment of 
 husbands by wives are not, after all, almost as numerous as 
 the cases of the opposite class. But whether this be so or 
 not, the undoubted fact of their by no means extremely rare 
 
156 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 existence would seem to demonstrate that the law which 
 does not render them impracticable can hardly be the cause 
 of the existence of cases of the opposite class. Are we 
 then to turn the happy homes of England upside down 
 because theorists are wont to generalise from a comparatively 
 few exceptional cases of any kind ? Surely such a course is 
 uncalled for, and would be unwise. Unless it can be shown 
 that the average English wife is a slave, but little force 
 remains in the general assertion that a wife is a slave ; and 
 unless, further, the slavery, if it exist, can be traced to the 
 provisions of the law, all arguments based upon the assertion 
 of its existence which are directed towards a legal change 
 must fall hopelessly to the ground. 
 
 But what can really be urged in favour of the ex- 
 traordinary process of abstraction by which the conclusions 
 of Mill are arrived at? Religion, morality, custom, the 
 restraints of affection, and a regard for decency and the 
 opinion of others, as well as the restraint of law, must all be 
 thrown aside to gratify the clear discernment of our 
 logician. Where, then, is the practical value of such a 
 process ? If every law ought to be adapted to the customs 
 of a people, what of a law which should be enacted on 
 assumptions so glaringly at variance with fact as those 
 which have been stated ? For in spite of the modification 
 introduced in the extracts I have made, the arguments of 
 Mill seem based upon the broad assertion of the actual 
 slavery of wives. In considering, indeed, an English 
 institution, we must remember that we are dealing with a 
 country where the general teaching of Christianity, whether 
 believed in as a religion or not, by the particular individual 
 whose conduct may be in question, is, as an indisputable fact, 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 157 
 
 largely acted upon, even where not expressly recognised, 
 and where this teaching, has, as it were, permeated the very 
 fibres of national feeling. Moreover, though it cannot be 
 treated as distinct, there is a highly civilised and humane 
 morality and public opinion to be taken into consideration. 
 And, in dealing with married life, it were absurd to forget 
 that, as a matter of common observation and knowledge, the 
 large majority of men I say nothing in this place as to 
 women do,' as a fact, speak kindly to, and of, and feel 
 delicately towards, their wives, with whom their lives are 
 largely spent, and with whose destinies their own are gladly 
 linked. Let us guard against the danger, particularly great 
 in the case of those whose ordinary life or education 
 precludes them from a habit of contemplation and study at 
 once far-reaching and minute, of forming a hasty and 
 general conclusion from the observation of instances which, 
 though exceptional, are very prominently before the eye. 
 
 I have now dealt with the most striking feature of the 
 above extracts from the work of Mill. It remains for me 
 to glance briefly at a few others. 
 
 It is apparently objected to the marriage relation as at 
 present regulated that it is the " one case of a social relation 
 grounded on force." But though it should be admitted that 
 the relation is so grounded, it does not follow that it is bad. 
 The parental power over children is founded, in a similar 
 way, and to a certain degree, on force, and is, moreover, 
 the result, not of parental merit, but of the fact of birth ; 
 yet it is not capable of being denounced, in general terms^ 
 as bad and tyrannical. Government^again, is necessary ; yet, 
 in the most thorough democracy that has ever been attained 
 to, it is grounded upon force upon the power of the 
 
158 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 majority. So far, indeed, from it following that government 
 is tad, it is sufficiently clear that its existence constitutes 
 the most marked difference between a European State and a 
 tribe of savages. And why should the word " despotism " be 
 used when speaking of the general principle of the case ? 
 All sovereign power, it is true, however wisely ordered and 
 temperately administered, in the United States and in 
 England, as well as in Russia or Turkey, is unrestricted by 
 any legal limitation, and is in that sense capable of being 
 termed, by a distorting use of the word, despotism. But the 
 term is generally used to denote monarchical power badly 
 exercised. It would, therefore, seem unfair to apply it to 
 the marital power generally, considering the usually 
 temperate method of its exercise. More than this, the 
 husband's power is not, like that of a sovereign government, 
 legally unrestrained. For it is at present, and in a civilised 
 community always will be, subject to considerable limi- 
 tation. How, then, can it, in any sense, be called a 
 despotism, except by those who would " darken counsel by 
 words without understanding " ? The origin, too, of the 
 marital power would seem little to the purpose. Assuming, 
 which of course cannot be admitted by one who accepts the 
 account of the early history of our race given in the Book 
 of Genesis, that it had its origin in force, precisely the same 
 must be said of other government ; and just as the progress 
 of the latter institution has been from bad government 
 exercised by one, or a few, the majority of whose subjects 
 had exercised no choice in the matter, to good government 
 exercised by few or many, some of them being chosen by 
 the people governed, the institution of government itself 
 remaining unimpaired, so has the regime of a savage 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 159 
 
 husband, who seized or bought his wife without her own 
 consent, been exchanged for the comparatively good regime 
 of a husband chosen by his wife. 
 
 It may, however, not unlikely be said that, though it may 
 be desirable that women should, as a rule, recognise the 
 headship of their husbands, yet many men are clearly 
 unfit for the position of the head of a family. We may be 
 pointed to the injustice of subordinating an excellent and 
 able woman to the dominion of a man of inferior disposition 
 and ability, and who perhaps would gladly recognise her 
 supremacy did the law allow him to do so. But the cardinal 
 truth remains that we must look to the general rule. And 
 as, further, men have to submit in the ordinary course of 
 life to much that is not reasonable, considered by itself, 
 so there is no peculiar hardship in the fact of many 
 women having to submit to husbands who are inferior to 
 them in point of moral and intellectual excellence. Such 
 inconveniences are part of the common lot of our race. The 
 patience of both sexes is tried throughout life by the neces- 
 sity of submitting to many courses which are not approved, 
 and to persons whose authority does not commend itself, 
 considered alone, to their judgment. But a still more 
 practical answer to the contention consists in the mention 
 of a simple fact. The influence of superior women is a 
 powerful instrument in righting the balance of power where 
 it legally inclines to the less competent person. And, among 
 other possible arguments in reference to this subject, may be 
 well mentioned the discretion which pertains to the woman 
 in choosing whether or not she will marry the man who 
 invites her to do so. 
 
 Is there not, moreover, assumed in the sentences ]of Mill, 
 
100 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 the existence of a combination of men against women which 
 is a mere imagination in these days, and which I have above 
 endeavoured to refute ? I will not again examine the 
 subject here, nor deal further with the phraseology which 
 has been quoted, beyond observing that the comparison of 
 the attachments of slaves to their masters to those of wives 
 to their husbands, appears to point to a well-grounded 
 conclusion that the mysterious love which exists between 
 the sexes, and which is the foundation, and probably still a 
 cardinal portion of the rationale of marriage, was outside, 
 not only the personal experience, but the imaginative 
 powers of the author of this comparison. 
 
 But, while taking into consideration the many particular 
 cases of hardship which exist under the present law, it 
 must surely be worthy of remark that, in spite of the gloomy 
 pictures of women's lot which are presented to us, it is by 
 no means clear that women are less happy than men, or that 
 as a rule they pass their lives in a less congenial manner 
 than is the case with men. Certainly their sorrows do not 
 cause them to be shorter-lived than men; and perhaps the 
 fact of the greater duration of their existence should be 
 considered some evidence that their cares are rather less 
 than those of men. I am aware of the many dangers to 
 which men are exposed from which women are exempt, 
 which, to a certain extent, diminishes the significance of 
 the point ; but, perhaps, this circumstance is in some degree 
 counterbalanced by the general principle which might lead 
 us to expect greater length of years in men, owing to the 
 fact that they arrive more slowly at maturity than do women. 
 Nor should we overlook the fact that, owing to physical 
 reasons, women are less fitted for the exercise of power than 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 161 
 
 men, even considering the matter merely from the point 
 of view of their own advantage. Whether it is over a state 
 or a family that it exists, power is necessarily accompanied 
 by responsibilities and cares. A nd whom do we now find 
 are the happiest of their sex, leading the most useful lives, 
 and who will go down in the fulness of years to an honoured 
 grave ; whose children will rise up and call them blessed ? 
 I suggest that they are those who have no desire to dispute 
 the headship of the family with their husbands. On the 
 other hand, where we observe a woman head de facto of her 
 husband and her children, ruling the family and ordering 
 its concerns, is her power exercised with happiness, peace 
 of mind, or contentment ? Does it not usually appear that 
 the burden of supreme command is unsuited to her nature 
 and her powers ? A woman may be, and is, happy as a 
 subject, with a wise or moderately good head in her husband, 
 but she has a chequered and harrassing career with herself 
 as the head of her husband and family. Of course it is the 
 rule which is here spoken of, to which there may exist 
 numerous exceptions. But men are naturally adapted to be 
 the repositories of power. The moderate scope for its 
 exercise within the family does not, in the normal case, 
 corrupt or spoil their characters and dispositions, nor, in its 
 ordinary discharge, does its prematurely wear them out, 
 at all events not so soon as is the case with the physically 
 weaker sex. I appeal, therefore, in this case, as throughout 
 my observations, on behalf of women themselves, as being 
 quite as immediately concerned in the retention of marital 
 supremacy as are men ; indeed, so far as any difference in 
 this respect exists, as still more interested than are men. 
 
 The words of Frederick Denison Maurice seem peculiarly 
 
 11 
 
162 Women s Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 appropriate in this connection, which he used in answer to 
 a bride, who, at her wedding breakfast, exclaimed to him, 
 *' I call you, Doctor, to witness that I have no intention of 
 obeying my husband." "Ah! madam," said he, "you 
 little know the blessedness of obedience." 
 
 Probably it will be very extensively thought that Mill 
 is rather inaccurate in dealing with the present influence of 
 women in certain classes of society upon their husbands. 
 " Whoever," he says, " has a wife and children has given 
 hostages to Mrs. Grundy." May we not more correctly and 
 fairly express the truth of the ordinary case by saying that 
 " whoever has a wife and children has given pledges to the 
 State for his good conduct ? " But Mill adds : " So people 
 are kept down in that mediocrity of respectability which is 
 becoming a marked characteristic of modern times." It is 
 submitted that the more potent and important effect of the 
 family upon its head may be expressed, in far more 
 euphemistic language, as an influence restraining him from 
 deviations from morality and that social respectability which 
 is one of the most glorious features of our national life. No 
 doubt occasionally the conscientious bent of a man's inclina- 
 tions may be diverted by the influence of his family, but 
 probably in such cases the world of politics or public affairs 
 sustains a merely trifling loss, for the true man will surely 
 break free from attempted control of his conscientious public 
 action, while he will be sweetly fettered in the former way 
 as securely as if restrained by adamantine bonds. 
 
 Before quitting the consideration of the existing condition 
 of the marriage relation, it should be clearly pointed out 
 that, even according to Mill, in spite of the present law, the 
 wife sometimes establishes a control over her husband. 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 163 
 
 " The wife's power of being disagreeable," says he, 
 " generally only establishes a counter- tyranny, and makes 
 victims in their turn chiefly of those husbands who are least 
 inclined to be tyrants. . . . The wife frequently 
 exercises even too much power over the man." Thus it 
 would seem that even under the proposed system cases of 
 hardship will arise, and if even nowadays some women are 
 able to tyranise, surely the great probability is that many 
 more would do so if the new ideas were established as law. 
 If, indeed, there will be many cases under such a system of 
 the outrageous assumption of a domineering authority by wives 
 over their husbands, surely the cases of hardship on the part 
 of wives which now exist can constitute not the slightest 
 reason in favour of the proposed change. 
 
 To sum up. The present system does not give rise, in the 
 course of its ordinary working, to marital tyranny. The 
 man who is a tyrant now would not cease to be so on the 
 legal equalisation of the sexes ; but, so far as he escaped the 
 operation of the criminal law, would be a tyrant still, owing 
 to the means of tyranny inseparably incident to the strong- 
 minded and robust man living habitually with a woman. 
 On the other hand, the present system, by giving legal 
 recognition to the headship of the husband, which is in 
 reality part of an immutable condition of human nature, 
 while it induces the wife to refrain from giving avoidable 
 offence, influences the husband to abstain from unnecessary 
 exercise of his power, by means of assuring him of its legal 
 existence. His chivalry is successfully appealed to, and his 
 power is diverted from selfish dictation into the channel of 
 benevolent protection; and the woman, far from being 
 injured by the legal recognition of her subordination, is in 
 
164 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 practice benefited thereby. The inevitable natural ascen- 
 dency of man is beneficently tempered by its absorption into 
 the system of our law. Moreover, just as bad government in 
 the State is better than no government at all, so the bad 
 exercise of marital power is no argument in favour of 
 attempting its abolition. Nor does its even frequently 
 unwise exercise point to any hardship peculiar to women. 
 So long as our race falls short of perfection, so long will men 
 as well as women occasionally be subject to bad control of 
 some kind or other. We may continually endeavour to 
 minimise the evil which thence ensues, but we ought to do 
 so without attacking the institution of government in the 
 one case, and of headship in the other. 
 
 Let us glance briefly at Mill's ideas upon the married life 
 of the future. " What marriage," he says, " may be in the 
 case of two persons of cultivated faculties, identical in 
 opinions and purposes, between whom there exists that best 
 kind of equality, similarity of powers and capacities with 
 reciprocal superiority in them so that each can enjoy the 
 luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately 
 the pleasure of leading and of being led in the path of 
 development I will not attempt to describe, ... I 
 maintain, with the profoundest conviction, that this, and 
 this only, is the ideal of marriage ; and that all opinions, 
 customs, and institutions which favour any other notion of 
 it, or turn the conceptions and aspirations connected with it 
 into any other direction, by whatever pretences they may 
 be coloured, are relics of primitive barbarism." 
 
 Probably the luxury of looking up to one another is at 
 the present day enjoyed by the parties to most marriages 
 which can be called happy. It does not seem to me that 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 165 
 
 we need alter our institutions to obtain thus much of the 
 ideal of marriage. Ordinary life teems with examples of 
 the respect of husbands for their wives, and the appreciation 
 for, and almost final importance which they attach to, the 
 opinions of their wives in matters which they consider within 
 their province. And, apart from an altogether independent 
 improvement of the race, can we really hope for more 
 reciprocity of veneration or respect than exists at present ? 
 Identity in opinions and purposes seems, indeed, an 
 exaggerated conception. If marriage were a condition into 
 which only two in every thousand of the population were to 
 enter, we might encourage the desire of an approach on 
 their part to such identity. But if, as I submit is the case, 
 marriage ought to be the condition of almost every one, to 
 look for such identity seems wholly disconsonant with sober 
 judgment. 
 
 While acknowledging, however, that it would be extreme 
 folly to suppose that differences of feeling and inclination 
 between the sexes only exist because women are brought up 
 differently from men, and that there would not be differences 
 of taste under any imaginable circumstances, Mill tells us 
 that " there is nothing beyond the mark in saying that the 
 distinction in bringing - up immensely aggravates those 
 differences, and renders them wholly inevitable." He 
 considers that the " totally different bringing-up " of the two 
 sexes makes it next to an impossibility to form a really well- 
 assorted union. " Were this remedied, whatever differences 
 there might still be in individual tastes, there would at least 
 be, as a general rule, complete unity and unanimity as to 
 the great objects of life." But is not much attributed to 
 the effect of education in this view which would more 
 
166 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 properly be ascribed to nature ? For we find in common 
 experience that, far from brothers who have been similarly 
 brought up having complete unity and unanimity as to the 
 great objects of life, their tastes and opinions are often so 
 radically different that intimate association is impracticable. 
 And it is to be remembered that the contention of Mill is 
 that there does not appear sufficient reason for assuming 
 that there is very much difference between the two sexes 
 generally. But, further, do we not also know that it is at 
 least as common to find a brother and sister living happily 
 together, as two brothers or two sisters ? If this be so, the 
 inference would seem to be that difference of bringing-up 
 in the case of the two sexes, so far from rendering intimate 
 association impracticable, renders it interesting and agreeable, 
 provided, of course, the difference be not greater than such 
 as we now contemplate in this respect. 
 
 Indeed, one can hardly believe that Mill had anything 
 approaching to a correct conception of what marriage 
 ordinarily is, or of the nature of that mysterious attraction 
 which probably leads to the majority of marriages. This 
 consideration seems to me to be of great practical importance, 
 and to indicate the danger of placing great confidence in 
 the theoretical view of the matter which he places before 
 us. Men do not now, and, as far as there is any ground 
 upon which to form an opinion on the subject, we are 
 justified in saying they probably never will, as a rule, enter 
 upon the marriage relation as the result primarily of a 
 deliberate scrutiny of the intellectual and general moral 
 endowments of particular women, independently of an 
 inexplicable fascination which is exercised over them, and 
 which renders the critical faculties to a large extent 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 167 
 
 blunted ar.d dulled. To omit from our consideration of the 
 subject of marriage the element of love or passion, or 
 whatever it may be called, which most men and women 
 experience, but which they cannot adequately describe to 
 those who do not seems as unphilosophical as it would 
 be to omit the subject of the heart in a treatise upon human 
 physiology. 
 
 We must remember, in considering the new ideas upon 
 marriage, the admission that " there are, no doubt, women, 
 as there are men, whom equality of consideration will not 
 satisfy ; with whom there is no peace while any will or 
 wish is regarded but their own. Such persons are a proper 
 subject for the law of divorce." This is really the necessary 
 keystone of the whole fabric of our opponents. Without 
 it, as it has been attempted to show above, it is clearly 
 incapable of standing. But the important point to observe 
 in this connection is, that the great advantage of the present 
 system consists in the fact that, while the headship of the 
 husband does no harm where both parties are of excellent 
 disposition, it provides a modus vivendi where the case is 
 otherwise, and their views and inclinations conflict It 
 renders permanent marriage possible. Without it, as it is easy 
 to see, and as appears almost to be indicated in the passage 
 last cited, marriage must be easily dissoluble. And if 
 this be so, as I have said above, even if men would enter 
 upon the new kind of marriage, the duration of marriages in 
 England, as was the case in Rome, would be not unlikely 
 extremely uncertain, and very frequently extremely short. 
 We are, therefore, brought back to the dilemma above- 
 mentioned. If marriage be made legally equal in respect of 
 both parties, either it must be easily capable of dissolution, 
 
168 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 which in itself is an immense evil, or men would avoid 
 entering upon it, which is also an equal or greater evil. 
 
 In connection with this branch of the subject I pass 
 
 to the consideration of the following expression of Mill : 
 
 " Men," he says, " are not required, as a preliminary to the 
 
 marriage ceremony, to prove by testimonials that they are 
 
 fit to be trusted with the exercise of absolute power." Now 
 
 it is quite clear, as I have before indicated, that absolute 
 
 power on the part of men does not now exist. What power 
 
 they, have is limited by law. But is the rest of the assertion 
 
 well founded in fact ? It will hardly be disputed that a 
 
 man who wishes to marry has ordinarily to prove to the 
 
 satisfaction of at least two people, namely, the woman whom 
 
 he wishes to be his wife, and her father, mother, or other 
 
 protector, that he is likely to prove a desirable husband. 
 
 At all events, such satisfaction on the part of one person is 
 
 necessary in all but exceptional cases. Moreover, this proof 
 
 is not of the shadowy character of the mere production of 
 
 testimonials, but consists of conduct and language, in which 
 
 it is very difficult to consistently dissimulate. We must 
 
 remember that the amplest freedom in practice exists on the 
 
 part of the woman to break off even the engagement to 
 
 marry up to the last moment before the actual marriage, 
 
 seeing the slight probability, however capricious the ground 
 
 of her conduct, that a jury will mulct her in damages for so 
 
 doing. If entire practical freedom in this matter does not 
 
 exist if any impediment be thrown by law or custom in the 
 
 way of the free exercise of her discretion in this respect by all 
 
 means let such alterations be made as are necessary to secure 
 
 such freedom on her part. The interval between the first 
 
 acquaintance of the parties and their marriage is clearly, in 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 169 
 
 every sense of the words, a period of probation, the possible 
 severity of which might perhaps be correctly termed un- 
 rivalled. For intimacy exists, restraints are thrown off in 
 unguarded moments, patience and good-nature are tested ; 
 and if the man is not known fairly well before marriage, 
 he is an exceptional character who will probably defy legis- 
 lative efforts in the direction of the regulation of the marriage 
 state, and whom it would be therefore unsafe to adopt as 
 the norma upon which to shape our schemes of legislative 
 reform. I am aware that it is said that very soon after 
 marriage a little friction is caused by the wife's observation 
 of the diminished gallantry of her spouse. This is, however, 
 nothing to the point. I have been speaking of the oppor- 
 tunity of gauging the general character of the man. The 
 maiden who imagines that the foolish compliments and eager 
 anticipations of her slightest wish, which she receives from 
 the infatuated lover, will continue when he has settled down 
 into a sensible citizen, is sadly deficient in womanly good 
 sense. 
 
 Of course one very large feature of my subject is the 
 question whether the general recognition of women " as the 
 equals of men in all that belongs to citizenship the opening 
 to them of all honourable employments, and of the 
 training and education which qualifies for those em- 
 ployments " is desirable. But, from my point of view, this 
 is a subordinate matter, and apart from the two great 
 principles for which I am contending first, that the 
 Parliamentary Franchise ought never to be extended to 
 women, and, secondly, that the subordination of the wife '' 
 to the husband should be legally maintained. Though 
 I should not contemplate with equanimity the complete 
 
170 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 realisation of Mill's wish, as expressed in the above words, 
 yet, acknowledging the probability that the condition of 
 women, as well as that of men, will improve as civilisation 
 advances, I by no means contend that no employment or 
 occupation which is not at present open to women should 
 ever, in the future, be opened to them. But it is submitted 
 that every particular movement in the direction of increased 
 scope for women should be considered upon its own merits, 
 and that we ought not to leap to a general consummation of 
 extreme contentions. While, therefore, not considering it 
 consistent with the general objects of this treatise to argue 
 questions of detail as to what particular branches of activity 
 should at once be opened to women, I will venture to 
 suggest a few practical limitations to the theory of equality 
 in this direction. 
 
 At the outset of our consideration of this subject, it 
 should be borne in mind, that, whereas there is hardly any 
 employment of very great importance except those incident 
 to the position of the wife and the mother, which cannot be 
 as well, or nearly as well, carried on by men as by women, 
 women are the only people who are competent to be wives 
 and mothers. Rather, therefore, than divert the necessary 
 supply from the discharge of the pre-eminently necessary 
 functions incident to such positions, we may well 
 incur considerable risk of occasionally shutting out 
 women who would be neither mothers nor wives from 
 employments in which they would personally be useful. 
 Neither our law nor our custom should point women 
 away from marriage, and marriage under the con- 
 ditions which have been indicated as proper, since the preva- 
 lence of marriages is far more important to the race than the 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 171 
 
 performance by women of functions which, can be sufficiently 
 well discharged by men. No doubt we have to consider the 
 cases of those women who constitute the excess in number of 
 their sex over males. But this class must continually 
 diminish with the disuse of war and the diminution of the 
 dangers incident to many now frequently destructive employ- 
 ments, consequent upon the progress of civilisation and 
 science. The true means, I take it, of finding employment 
 for women is to render marriage both easy and advantageous 
 to men. For the rest, there are obviously several remunera- 
 tive duties, which need not be specified, which women 
 discharge even better, or, at all events, with more apparent 
 appropriateness than men, and possibly there are some which 
 the average woman discharges neither better nor worse than 
 the average man. It is for each generation to settle the 
 question as to which employments these are in its own way. 
 But there will remain the abnormal woman, not content to 
 be the helpmeet and complement of one man, and not content 
 with the employments which her sex generally perform as 
 well as, or better than, men. Such an one may well have no 
 unnecessary restriction thrown in the way of the develop- 
 ment of her powers, provided proper care be taken by the 
 framers of our laws and the leaders of our customs that no 
 undue temptation be placed in the way of ordinary women 
 to relinquish the path for which they are best adapted. 
 
 Mill apparently thinks that if marriage continue unequal 
 and other honourable avocations be opened to women, they 
 will not marry. This, however, I very much doubt, because, 
 amongst many reasons, women are probably sufficiently 
 shrewd to see that the so-called inequality of marriage, as 
 against themselves, is amply compensated for by the con- 
 
172 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 siderably greater, or rather more urgently required, 
 advantages which they derive therefrom than men. 
 
 But we must not be led away by the fact that it may 
 be desirable to open up certain employments, and to give 
 certain kinds of education, to women, which are now 
 forbidden to them, to suppose that it is well or possible, to 
 acknowledge the absolute equality of the sexes, even apart 
 from the question of marriage. For whatever conclusion we 
 may reach as to the comparative strength of mind of men 
 and women, it is beyond any doubt that at present, and 
 certainly for a very long time it will remain so, the 
 inferiority of women in respect of physical strength cannot 
 be disputed. This difference between the sexes must be 
 accompanied by a difference in the capacity for the exercise, 
 not only of manual functions, but of duties requiring mental 
 effort, for in these there is involved exertion, which is really 
 physical, and the capacity for which is dependent upon 
 bodily strength. We ought, therefore, to avoid any appear- 
 ance of encouraging the unsexing of women by their 
 general entry into open competition with men. For the 
 inevitable result of such a course would seem to be, primarily, 
 the complete demonstration, in a manner heretofore almost 
 entirely unknown, of the actual general inferiority of 
 women, either considered as wealth-making machines, or in 
 respect of any matter of general competition, by reason of 
 their inferior bodily strength, if for no other reason. No 
 longer would a woman be recognised as a different creature 
 of a lovelier order than man, to be honoured and admired by 
 him as the weaker vessel, replete with tender and unselfish 
 thoughts, but she would tend to rank as an inferior being of 
 the same kind as man a female man, and consequently an 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 
 
 inferior sort of man. As a woman, it is evident that no 
 woman need be ashamed of her difference from man, but, as 
 an attempted rival in the arenas of life, she becomes dis- 
 feminated in our minds, and her points of difference from 
 man cease to be valuable, and become mere marks of lesser 
 worth. There is ample room in the world, as everyone 
 knows, for the woman as well as for the man, while one is 
 the complement or completion of the other, but I suggest 
 that the man who endeavours to effeminate himself into a 
 woman, and the woman who attempts to reverse the process, 
 will not only fail to become good specimens of their adopted 
 sexes, but will be winnowed out by the practice of common life, 
 as being neither marketable nor precious, neither retaining the 
 virtues of one sex nor acquiring the advantages of the other. 
 
 Now, the benefits which are anticipated from the 
 equalisation of the sexes are somewhat indefinite in their 
 description, and fraught with the greatest uncertainty. 
 Before it can be worth while to gauge them, it ought, 
 perhaps, to be ascertained that they are reasonably likely to 
 ensue. I have already said somewhat to throw doubt upon 
 the sequence of many alleged advantages, but it may, never- 
 theless, be well to specially allude to some of those which 
 are prominently treated by Mill. 
 
 He points us, then, to the advantage of having the most 
 universal and pervading of all human relations regulated by 
 justice instead of injustice. " The vast amount of this 
 gain," he says, " to human nature, it is hardly possible, by 
 any explanation or illustration, to place in a stronger light 
 than it is placed by the bare statement, to anyone who 
 attaches a moral meaning to words. All the selfish 
 propensities, the self-worship, the unjust self-preference, 
 
17-4 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 which exist among mankind, have their source and root in, 
 and derive their principal nourishment from, the present 
 constitution of the relation between men and women." 
 We are then directed to the demoralising effects on a boy 
 of his growing up to manhood in the belief that by the 
 mere fact of being born a male he is by right the superior of 
 all and every one of an entire half of the human race, 
 including, probably, some whose real superiority to himself 
 he has daily and hourly occasion to feel ; and even if in 
 his whole conduct habitually following a woman's guidance, 
 still, if he is a fool, thinking that of course she is not, and 
 cannot be, equal in ability and judgment to himself ; and if 
 he is not a fool, doing worse seeing that she is superior to 
 him, and believing that, notwithstanding her superiority, 
 he is entitled to command and she is bound to obey. Here, 
 as elsewhere, it is acknowledged by Mill that among the 
 cultivated classes the evil is somewhat modified. But in 
 amplifying his conclusions he says : " All that education 
 and civilisation are doing to efface the influences on 
 character of the law of force, and replace them by those of 
 justice, remains merely on the surface, as long as the citadel 
 of the enemy is not attacked. The principle of the modern 
 movement in morals and politics, is that conduct, and conduct 
 alone, entitles to respect : that not what men are, but what 
 they do, constitutes their claim to deference ; that, above 
 all, merit, and not birth, is the only rightful claim to power 
 and authority." " So long as the right of the strong to 
 power over the weak rules in the very heart of society, the 
 attempt to make the equal right of the weak the principle 
 of its outward actions will always be an uphill struggle ; for 
 the law of justice, which is also that of Christianity, will 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 175 
 
 never get possession of men's inmost sentiments ; they will 
 be working against it, even when bending to it." 
 
 Now it was above attempted to show that it is not unjust 
 for the man to enjoy the headship of the family, inasmuch 
 as under any other system he would lose far more, and 
 gain far less, by marriage than the woman. In order that 
 the respective advantages of the marriage condition may as 
 nearly approach equality as is possible, the marriage relation 
 must invest the husband with a right to the obedience of 
 the wife. It is useless for us to quarrel with the facts of 
 nature. We may allege that they are not immutable ; but 
 while they continue such as they are, we must frame our 
 laws in appreciation of their existence. No philosophy 
 and no law can render woman, for many generations at all 
 events, the full equal of man, because, if for no other 
 reason whatever, she is physically less powerful than he, 
 and she alone is habitually weighted with the various cares 
 of indisputable maternity. This constitutes a cardinal truth 
 for the legislator's remembrance, and it should be coupled 
 with another. Man, having the advantage of being a 
 more powerful wealth-producer than woman, it is possible 
 to place the principal burden of hard work upon his 
 shoulders, and to gain from his efforts the main necessities 
 of individual and State existence. From the very fact of 
 his greater capacity for hard work, he will generally find 
 that a greater portion of such work falls to his share. It is, 
 therefore, both from the point of view of personal superiority, 
 and as being the harder worker, that men always will 
 have superiority over women, and will always, as a rule, 
 claim its recognition. Positive laws cannot upset this order, 
 and by weighting women with legal rights depress the 
 
1 76 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 balance in their favour. It can irritate men, and change 
 their good feeling and forbearance towards women into 
 contempt, and a disposition to exact whatever it is in their 
 power to obtain, but it cannot, although theoretically sup- 
 ported by the supreme power of a great nation, defeat the 
 inequality of power existing between the sexes which has 
 its foundation in the nature of the human race. Human 
 justice may be the creature of human law, but human 
 nature is beyond the range of the creative power of that 
 law, by which, though it may be distorted, its more 
 cardinal features cannot be altered or destroyed. 
 
 In studying the passages which have been quoted, it 
 would seem, if so it may be respectfully said, that we are 
 face to face with the one underlying fallacy of the entire 
 argument of Mill and his followers. It is apparently 
 assumed that the political and social principles which 
 apply between the citizens of a State, as such, can and 
 ought to be applied within the narrow limits of the family 
 circle. But law can never so fully regulate action within 
 the family as without. Partnership, hiring and service, co- 
 operation in companies, and all purely contractual relations, 
 are subject to the complete control of the law. Marriage 
 and paternity, on the other hand, are on an entirely different 
 footing. The relation of husband and wife, and of father and 
 child, existed long anterior to human law ; they are natural, 
 not artificial relationships ; they may be regulated, but can 
 never be completely ordered by positive human law. We 
 cannot apply within the circle of the family those maxims 
 which are of important truth concerning the general 
 relations of mankind. Whether we rely upon the Scriptural 
 records, or upon the researches of jurists, like the late Sir 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 177 
 
 Henry Maine, we find that the family has almost everywhere 
 been the unit of the primitive national life of progressive races, 
 or, in other words, that it is the " primary cell" from which 
 society appears to have sprung. Enterprising speculators 
 may endeavour to subvert this natural order to an undue 
 degree, as did the authorities of Sparta and Crete ; and 
 intelligent legislation will always limit the flagrant excesses 
 of any one of the members of the family towards another. 
 Yet we must still regard the family as entirely different 
 from a petty nation, or a mere contractual union of several 
 equal citizens, and as still maintaining somewhat of its former 
 character of a unit in the social system of an imperium in 
 imperio. True, as Maine has so ably pointed out, in the 
 movement of progressive societies, the individual is steadily 
 substituted for the family as the unit of which civil laws 
 take account, and gradually the relations of persons formerly 
 determined by status are becoming settled for themselves by 
 contract. But this movement has its impassable limits. The 
 law may deny the father the power of life and death over 
 his child, but the power of moderate control cannot be safely 
 withheld. And here, if nowhere else, the theories of equality 
 break down. There is at least obviously one case in which 
 men must be allowed to claim formal respect, and exercise 
 control, apart from personal merit or voluntary submission. 
 And if there is one case, why may there not be two ? Indeed, 
 the very existence of the one case forms the link which binds 
 the parents in the irrevocable bond which renders the 
 power of the one over the other inevitable in point of ex- 
 pediency. Whatever the law may say, the family, in quite 
 a different sense from contract, is still, and must ever remain, 
 
 the basis of all civilised society. And we must beware of 
 
 12 
 
178 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 mistaking the truecharacter of marriage calling it a contract 
 merely. It is such, simply, only in its inception, for 
 it is " a contract by which one enters into a status" and 
 thus the old system of law is linked with the new. When 
 marriage is called, and understood merely as, a contract, all 
 manner of misconceptions ensue. It is, indeed, a word signi- 
 fying two things : the one contractual, and the other a natural 
 state the act of marrying, and the condition of married 
 people. Just as there is an entire difference between a 
 contract for the sale and purchase of land, followed by con- 
 veyance, and the condition of being a landed proprietor, so 
 there is a similar difference between the engagement to marry, 
 followed by the marriage ceremony, on the one hand, and the 
 consequent condition of a married person on the other. This con- 
 dition, like that of the appropriates of the soil, existed before 
 positive laws of men were framed, and it exists just as truly 
 now, the main difference from its former state being that at 
 present it is the consequence of a contract, and not of force 
 or other involuntary inception. Over the contractual part 
 of the matter law has ample dominion ; but, as to the latter 
 part, though it may studiously regulate it, law cannot 
 absolutely engross it in its own forms and rules. Thus the 
 family, consisting of husband, wife, and children, has, up to 
 the present time, remained largely exempt from the sphere 
 of the operation of law, and it will so continue as long as 
 civilisation endures. And as the application of law to the 
 family is limited in a manner quite different from the appli- 
 cation of law to contractual and other relations of citizens 
 generally, so are the philosophical principles of liberty in a 
 large measure excluded from the hallowed precincts of the 
 domestic hearth. 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 179 
 
 Returning briefly to the citations from the work of Mill, 
 it is submitted that if it be acknowledged that the marital 
 power, though very properly regulated and largely controlled 
 by law, is still a fact of human nature which our legislation 
 can never efface, it cannot be fairly contended that it 
 necessarily leads to any balance of evil at all, much less to 
 all the bad consequences suggested by Mill. Moreover, it 
 must surely be clear to all that it is by no means a fact that 
 stupid men consider themselves superior to more gifted 
 women. We may well believe that the average man is 
 superior to the average woman, and properly her head if 
 united to her in marriage ; while, at the same time, it would 
 be impossible to deny that a particular woman is sometimes 
 found who is not only superior to a particular man, but to 
 the average man. But is it not generally observable in 
 common experience that the husband is only too ready to 
 acknowledge the superiority of his wife in cases wher* 
 ordinary people might consider the matter doubtful? In 
 practice he often allows the wife to lead ; and she, if right- 
 minded, endeavours to study his comfort and wishes, while 
 inducing him without thwarting him, and habitually obeying 
 his mandates without inconvenience to herself, as being, in 
 fact, the result of her own suggestion. If he is not very 
 stupid, or, in the language of Mill, not a fool, the case is 
 & fortiori in favour of my contention. 
 
 Yet one more observation in this connection. What is 
 meant by the equal right of the weak ? Formerly, I take it, 
 the phrase signified the equal right of all men, whether already 
 in possession of power or not, and whether belonging to the 
 wealthy, well armed, and educated classes, or to the poor, the de- 
 fenceless, and the ignorant. A man was to be considered with 
 
 12* 
 
180 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 regard, not to his attainments or possessions, but to his capa- 
 bilities. So far the phrase is the motto of sound Liberalism. 
 But can we go further, and place power in the hands of those 
 whose natural weakness cannot, in Bentham's language, 
 support it ? Can we say to the physically or intellectually 
 weaker sex, " We will treat you as we have formerly treated 
 classes physically and intellectually equal to the most favoured, 
 so far as natural capacity goes, but depressed on account of 
 poverty, exclusion from the Franchise, or other removable 
 causes " ? Manifestly the rationale of equality of absolute 
 equality breaks down. We can so clothe the beggar with 
 the robes of legal capacity as to make him potentially the 
 prince, but we cannot alter the condition of our species so 
 as to convert a woman into a man. We can throw around 
 her the protection of the law from abuse of her position ; 
 we can chivalrously compensate her in private for any 
 disadvantages of her sex ; but we cannot alter her natural 
 capabilities, and, therefore, we cannot judiciously thrust rights 
 upon her which will weigh her down from a position of 
 difference to one of demonstrated and patent inferiority, of 
 neglect, of actual humiliation, and of misery. The law 
 mu*t so order the legal surroundings of marriage that the 
 greater sacrifices which it necessarily entails upon the man 
 in the ordinary case, shall be compensated by advantages of 
 the relation apparently peculiar to himself, but, in reality 
 and ultimately, for the benefit of both himself and his wife. 
 The general benefits anticipated from opening to women 
 the same field of occupation, and the same prizes and 
 encouragements as are open to other human beings, are 
 hardly sufficiently important to my present object to justify 
 me in occupying the attention of the reader by specific 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 181 
 
 reference to their description. Moreover, the mere perusal 
 of this will probably suggest many objections which will 
 considerably diminish, if not efface, its effect. But in this 
 matter my contention is, as I have indicated, not that no occu- 
 pation which is not now open to women should be opened, 
 but that each particular case of suggested alteration should 
 be considered and decided upon its own merits. If this be 
 acknowledged, as it is submitted it clearly must be, at least 
 in practice, it will be quite time enough to consider the 
 suggested advantages of a proposed change when a specific 
 agitation to obtain it has commenced. At present the 
 question of opening all avocations to women is entirely 
 outside the range of practical politics. 
 
 It may, however, be conveniently observed here that, in 
 giving the nature of women free scope for its development, 
 we shall not be under the necessity of rendering their position 
 in marriage that of the equals of their husbands. Indeed, 
 as I have endeavoured to show, we should never practically 
 succeed in doing this, whatever laws we were to enact, or 
 whatever intentions we were to form. But, in addition to 
 this, we have to bear in mind the simple fact that the entire 
 sum of the capabilities of a woman, taking into consideration 
 bodily as well as mental power, being less than that of a 
 man, by allowing their development we shall not place her 
 in a position of equality to man. To even attempt the latter 
 would necessarily involve far more than the permission of 
 free natural development ; we should be obliged to assist her 
 efforts by conferring upon her legal advantages greatly 
 superior to those of men. To render, even in appearance, 
 the positions of the two sexes equal, we should have to add 
 legal rights to the natural capacities of women over and 
 
182 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 above the legal rights of men, or, which would practically 
 be the same thing, to handicap men by the imposition of 
 legal duties from which women were left free. 
 
 Now as the practical equalisation of the sexes in marriage 
 may be seen to be impossible, it follows that the advantage 
 which Mill expects from giving women an equal chance of 
 ordinary employments with men, namely, the rendering the 
 marriage relation just according to his view, cannot ensue. 
 But not only for this reason will the contemplated advantage 
 never be realised. For as the sum of men's abilities renders 
 them more valuable in most employments than are women, and 
 equally valuable in almost all, the full pressure upon men, 
 compelling them to offer^the advantages of equality to 
 women as wives, which Mill anticipates, can never come 
 into operation. 
 
 I must not omit to mention the second great advantage 
 which Mill anticipates from the reception of the new ideas. 
 It has already been partly considered in dealing with the 
 influence of wives of the kind contemplated by him in the 
 future, but its generality and full scope deserve specific 
 notice. In his language, it is "the advantage of doubling 
 the mass of mental faculties available for the higher service 
 of humanity." Now this seems to me a singularly specious 
 and misleading expression. We must remember that the 
 main force of one person's mental energy cannot be bent in 
 two entirely different directions at the same time. Is it 
 then true that the utility of female intelligence is now 
 practically nil, so that by making it equal in magnitude to 
 that of men we can double the total utility of human 
 intelligence as it now exists. By elaborately educating 
 women, and by investing them with new powers, we may 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 183 
 
 change the form of their utility, but we cannot develop an 
 entirely new kind of value except at the expense of some 
 surrender of what we have hitherto enjoyed. Let us not be 
 deceived by the consideration of statistics, and other 
 prominent and easily stated facts, into imagining that the 
 new forms of the utility of women which are anticipated by 
 our opponents will, if realised, be in the nature of a pure 
 gain to the race. There is something, not clearly denned, 
 not recorded in secretarial reports, which, being lost, must be 
 deducted from the gains. Maternal culture, and the influence 
 of women, so sweetly undefined that it is hardly recognised as 
 power albeit of humanly unequalled might must be 
 lessened and impaired. We may easily underestimate the 
 importance of this fact. It is a trite saying that every 
 great man has had a clever or a good mother ; and no doubt 
 there is a general truth in this, which we may discover in 
 the biographies of illustrious men, from Julius Csosar 
 downwards. But there is a humbler truth than this for our 
 digestion, for it is sufficiently clear that the average steady- 
 going Englishman has a great reverence for the memory and 
 teaching of his mother. As, morever, the average matron 
 who is the mother of a family, is naturally interested in the 
 maintenance of the cardinal principles of virtue by those 
 around her, it can hardly be doubted that the glorious 
 stability and respectability which are the backbone of 
 our national character are very largely and vitally 
 associated with the training and influence under con- 
 sideration. I feel that it would be scarcely respectful 
 to the intelligence of the reader to labour this point. But, 
 to use a simple and childish phrase, which, however, is in- 
 disputably sound, " we cannot eat our cake and have it 
 
184 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 too." If the intelligence and virtue of the best women of 
 England is to be attracted by other calls than those of 
 maternal duty, the latter must remain unanswered to a 
 considerable extent, or, perhaps, to speak more correctly, be 
 pro tanto non-existent. It is but too clear that the active 
 man does not ordinarily train his children to the same 
 extent as their mother does, or gain anything like the same 
 amount of affection as she ; not simply because a woman 
 seems naturally a more lovable being than a man though 
 doubtless this is true to a certain extent, she being formed, 
 as it were, as an object of the love of the man but because 
 from the nature of his other duties his opportunities in 
 respect of these matters are fewer. But not only would 
 the influence of the mother be lessened, and her offspring 
 consequently less morally healthy, as well as less physically 
 sound, for reasons as to which the evidence, medical and 
 otherwise, is too strong and easily perceived to demand 
 comment, under the contemplated system ; the actual 
 number of mothers must be fewer. For as the cares of the 
 spouse and of maternity, even in the limited degree of the 
 future, would be a fretting hindrance to the intellectual 
 woman of its times, it would seem, were not nature happily 
 against the consummation of the modern views, that the 
 number of clever mothers would be small the dolts, or less 
 able of the sex, being relegated to the maternal position. 
 Where, then, should we find our great men and women of 
 the next generation, for it is well worthy of notice that 
 even women themselves emancipated to any conceivable 
 degree are, like men, equally dependent upon their 
 mothers ? 
 Keeping, however, closely to the immediate point, without 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 185 
 
 indulging in speculation as to the distant future, it would 
 surely be very much to be regretted if, in our calculations 
 and our reflections upon the present subject, we should, 
 from any cause, inadequately estimate the present value 
 of the influence of the mother. Let us, indeed, be careful 
 how we disturb that mighty source of good, that human 
 fountain-head of virtue. Let us hesitate to lay rash 
 hands upon that sacred shrine. Is it not a truth which 
 we must now acknowledge, that, so far as our experience 
 goes, of every ten men who have been a blessing to their 
 day and generation, nine have traced the foundation 
 principles, which have been dearer to them than life itself, 
 and incorruptible by fire, famine, pestilence, and the sword, 
 and the remembrance of which the " witching voice" of 
 temptation has never succeeded in obliterating, to that 
 cherished authority from which, under God, their nascent 
 consciences have first assimilated the simple formulas of 
 right and wrong? If the bend of the sapling foreshows the 
 inclination of the oak, surely that force which gently gives 
 the former its direction must be that from which the latter 
 takes its shape. I say nothing, of course, against free will 
 in men, but who can possibly doubt the mighty influence on 
 the character of the adult of her who first inclined his will 
 from its own unaided course ? Hers are the first words 
 which fall upon his newly-opened ear ; her God, her nation, 
 and her home are always his at first. His mind is first 
 enlightened by the rays which come from her ; his heart is 
 first enraptured by the good which she bestows. Let us 
 avoid the foolish supposition that, because the adult man 
 and his mother may be at issue upon almost every specific 
 public question which comes prominently into their con- 
 
186 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 versation, the former has derived but little of permanent 
 value from the latter. For the highest influence consists in 
 instilling the principles which are the foundation of a faith, 
 an 1 upon which integrity and intelligence are built. It is 
 not in the application of a principle that its professors 
 will in all cases necessarily, or even naturally, agree. 
 Every Christian believes in the Golden Rule of the 
 New Testament, and every Utilitarian in its politically 
 formulated equivalent as enunciated by Bentham. Yet, 
 do any two Christians, or any two Utilitarians, agree in 
 the application of these principles ? And if not, are these 
 principles of little value ? By no means. It is the mould 
 of mind, the disposition of the heart, the foundation 
 principles of worthy life, upon which subsequently acquired 
 information and wisdom form the superstructure, which are 
 of primary value and importance, and it is these which are 
 owed so often to the influence and the teaching of the 
 mother. It is these which contain in themselves the vital 
 kernel of our happiness or woe, of our well-doing or the 
 curses that we work. But it' we change the sphere and 
 habits of the mother, we must change the operation of that 
 force which she now wields like " an angel's power" for 
 good. Nay, more, would the mother, as conceived by Mill 
 and his followers, be the woman to spend her time in the 
 functions to which I have alluded, sublime though they 
 may appear to some, contemptible, or servile, or undignified 
 as they may appear to them ? They would, forsooth, increase 
 woman's influence and her capacity for good ! But to do 
 this they must increase the number of her children and the 
 intimacy of her relation with her own. Let us, for the 
 sake of all the good upon the earth, be very wary lest we 
 
The Argument from Expediency. 187 
 
 dimmish the scope of that beneficent love, which there is 
 but small reason to believe it is in the power of mortals to 
 enlarge. 
 
 I do not intend to fully recapitulate the disadvantages of 
 conceding the principle of the equality of the sexes in mar- 
 riage. The subject is vast, and, indeed, so great is the connec- 
 tion between each branch of the subject with which I have 
 been dealing that it is difficult to preserve a particular order 
 in treating it, or to sharply distinguish the various 
 arguments which may be adduced against the contemplated 
 changes. As I have said, the equalisation of the sexes in 
 marriage, which is the chief danger to which I point, is itself 
 a probable consequence of the extension of the Franchise to 
 women. Some of the more immediate consequences of the 
 latter have been noticed above, as also the probable result 
 of complete assimilation of the sexes in respect of their 
 addiction to even mental pursuits. But the disadvantages 
 of the equalisation of the sexes in marriage have been treated 
 in the course of the main argument. The result, whatever 
 it be, must be vast and indefinite ; but I would so far repeat 
 myself as to point to the following disasters. First in im- 
 portance, in the not far distant future, there is the suggested 
 practical cessation of marriages to contemplate, attended 
 immediately and inevitably by unregulated relations between 
 the sexes, the extinction of morality in its specific sense, 
 and the immeasurable degradation of morality in its general 
 sense. Nothing, indeed, but a confidence in religion could 
 well enable any one who goes with me in the contemplation 
 of the disuse of marriage, to shut out from his imagina- 
 tive perspective a return to a state little better than one 
 of barbarism. For without the prevalence of the institution 
 
188 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 of marriage there can be no true civilisation. But far more 
 immediately in the future, we see the ruin of the domestic 
 happiness which has so long been England's national glory, 
 and the degradation of women to a state of servitude 
 comprehensible by the ordinary mind, and not merely by 
 that of the philosopher. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 I VENTURE to think that shadowy views of progress are apt to 
 lead astray even those who are most accustomed to reflection. 
 Grandiloquent phrases as to the future of the human race 
 seem often to warp the independence of the mind, and to 
 confine its freedom in a way no less dangerous than a 
 bondage to antiquated dogma and prejudice. But, in truth, 
 the static, no less than the dynamic, element in the genius of a 
 nation, is essential to its permanent greatness. We are 
 surely bound to cling to a fundamental principle of human 
 relations, which has existed compatibly with order and 
 stability, until we are moved to work for change by valid 
 reasons, not founded upon mere speculation, but upon 
 inference from existing facts. Probably in these days of 
 all-pervading party rivalry, when one body of men are so 
 often striving to be before another with reform, this truth 
 cannot be too clearly and too often driven home to the 
 minds of the electorate. Knowing from experience what 
 vast improvements have been achieved through emancipa- 
 tion from ignorant and selfish prejudice and attention to 
 the voice of reason, many men seem apt to form their 
 opinions upon the assumption that they are bound to follow a 
 notorious political leader who adopts a programme sufficiently 
 
190 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 startling, and ornamented with sufficient reference to the 
 capabilities of the human race in the future. Indeed, it is 
 possible to work oneself up into such an excessive infatuation 
 with the name, as distinguished from the substance and essence, 
 of Liberty, as to almost begin to look upon the condition of 
 the child as one of abnormal, and consequently improper, 
 restriction upon freedom and natural development, and the 
 authority of the father, or even of the mother, as a 
 *' citadel of the enemy of justice and equality." 
 
 We shall do well to bear in mind that a time comes in 
 the history of most progressive nations when the desire for 
 improvement becomes too much associated with the habit of 
 unnecessary, or, at all events, too sudden and too violent 
 change; when the spirit of the reformer is insufficiently 
 tempered by a regard for the stability of the order which is 
 embodied by the institutions which he attacks. How other- 
 wise can we satisfactorily and completely account for the 
 undeniable fact, that nations which have enjoyed a high 
 state of prosperity during a condition of comparatively 
 primitive ignorance and prejudiced conservatism, instead of 
 maintaining their pristine greatness, after the desire for in- 
 telligent improvement has operated for some considerable 
 time, have so often sunk into absolute decay, emaciated, as 
 it were, by the feverish effort of continual restlessness for 
 change, for which their organisms were not adequately 
 prepared. 
 
 Of course, it is clear that a nation, like an individual, may 
 perish through inertia,or through insufficient desire and capaci- 
 ty to adapt itself to the changing circumstances of its existence. 
 But while bearing clearly in mind this truth, it is wholesome 
 to remember that the progress of the world has not gone 
 
Conclusion. 191 
 
 on in an unbroken sequence. More than once the race has 
 had, as it were, to begin almost over again. If it had been 
 otherwise, it might have been found difficult to resist a 
 proposal for change of any kind. It is, however, sufficiently 
 obvious that some changes of opinion and law have not only 
 been disastrous, but, as far as superficial appearances are 
 considered, seem, to a large extent, to have operated 
 in throwing the race back. I understand, for instance, 
 that Egyptologists tell us that the nation of their study had, 
 in the far distant past, arrived at a state of civilisa- 
 tion approaching in many respects that to which we have 
 but comparatively recently attained. If, then, this people 
 had progressed from a primitive state to the condition which 
 is described to us, how is it that their onward march was 
 stopped ? It is submitted that it would be unsatisfactory to 
 adopt, as a complete explanation, any merely physical or 
 external cause. Assuming this to be so, we are driven to the 
 supposition that either some change was not adopted which 
 circumstances rendered necessary, or that some change was 
 adopted which proved incompatible with stability and 
 progress. As the bulk and functions of the State in- 
 crease and alter, so, doubtless, must custom and law also 
 change, if permanent progress is to be made by its 
 people. But though this is true, it is equally indisputable 
 that a nation flushed with triumphs over primitive ignorance, 
 and the success of many bold enterprises in politics, may 
 adopt laws or customs which are inconsistent with the 
 continued vitality of its organism. I will not by any means 
 presume to say that the latter was the case in the decline of 
 Egypt. Nevertheless, in considering the case in question, 
 or that of Greece or Rome, or any other great nation, we must 
 
192 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 recognise the fact that it endured for a long period under 
 certain laws and customs which were compatible with its 
 deyelopment and strength. It may be that these speaking 
 of them in their fundamental characteristics became 
 utterly incompatible with further national energy. But it 
 would seem equally probable, pr ima facie, that the actually 
 ruinous mistake consisted of some undesirable and pernicious 
 change. If this be so, or if there be any element whatever 
 of truth in the suggestion, is it not replete with warning 
 against an overweening confidence in theories which do not 
 rest upon the foundation either of religion, or of any clearly 
 apprehended experience, or of any well-approved principle, 
 but which are mainly the outcome of scientific speculation ? 
 On one thing we may surely depend : whatever mistaken 
 courses were entered upon by these nations, after intelligent 
 consideration, were pointed out by their advocates as paths 
 of progress, or of whatever was the verbal counterpart of 
 the word progress in the days of their decline. My suggestion, 
 therefore, is, that in considering demands for changes which 
 practically deal with fundamental matters, and the con- 
 sequences of which must necessarily be largely unforeseen, 
 and the subject of simple speculation, however much such 
 demands may be glossed over with the name of progress, 
 it behoves us to exercise the utmost caution, lest we be 
 enticed by a phantom of thought to an abyss from which 
 we may never, as a nation, reascend. 
 
 I have now briefly indicated the desirability of careful and 
 scrutinising consideration of the great question which has 
 been discussed above, where it has been attempted to set 
 forth cogent reasons against the adoption of the changes 
 which are proposed. I might well appeal in aid of reason 
 
Conclusion. 193 
 
 to the sentiment of my countrymen in favour of the 
 retention of the main features of that condition which has 
 secured the innumerable charms and graces of the fair 
 which are still so dear to men, and which must, in a con- 
 siderable degree, vanish like the floral glory of a summer's 
 growth before the withering blast of noisy rivalry, and the 
 chilling influence of the indifference of manly hearts no 
 longer warmed by sympathy and love. But I do not urge 
 a selfish view, for it is to the highest good of women that I 
 firmly point. It is, however, too late to return in this place 
 to subjects which have been adverted to above. 
 
 Yet, in conclusion, let me ask my readers not to allow 
 themselves to be led away by appeals to the gallant or 
 weaker part of human nature, into a course pre-eminently 
 dangerous, and the necessity of which is wholly unestab- 
 lished. Let me caution them by reference to the examples 
 of the great in every age and nation who have abdicated 
 the dignity of manhood and subjugated intelligence 
 to the charms and influence of women. Since the time 
 of Adam, where manly wisdom has been put aside to 
 please the weaker vessel, and the stronger has renounced 
 his rights in gentle dalliance with the fair, has aught but 
 disaster and decline ensued ? Far be it from me to speak 
 against the natural and due influence of women. I combat 
 the subjugation of the mind of man, as distinguished from 
 attention to the voice of reason, from whatever quarter it 
 may come. And if the intellect of the wisest man of 
 history was defeated and degraded by the wiles and blandish- 
 ments of the other sex, we may be certain that there is 
 need ior us to be vigilant, when claims which are dignified 
 by association with the rights of women are set forth for 
 
 13 
 
194 Women's Suffrage and National Danger. 
 
 our review. Rather than the Samson strength of Britain 
 should be shorn in the lap of the Delilah, who courts us in 
 the guise of polished dogmas and the reasoning of the age, 
 let every honest man valiantly determine to encounter in 
 his own career all the conceivable inconveniencies which are 
 consequent upon the displeasure of the fair. 
 
 For, by the sacred name of Religion, by the light of reason, 
 
 by the teaching of experience, and by common sense, I 
 
 exhort my readers to think carefully and long, ere from 
 
 fear, from uxoriousness, or from indifference, they cast away 
 
 that crown of lordship which was placed upon the head of 
 
 their ancestor by the decree of the Almighty Himself, which 
 
 his descendants have never forfeited, and which has never 
 
 been removed, and which, in the present day, as in the past, 
 
 the imperative necessity of their position both justifies and 
 
 explains. To intelligent Liberals, in particular, I say : You 
 
 are deeply committed, it is true, to the cause of progress 
 
 and reform, and " forward " is the watchword of your ranks. 
 
 You are ever looking, as is right, into thefuture for your golden 
 
 age, and I would by no means point you back. But if you would 
 
 maintain your character as the tried and faithful servants of 
 
 the nation, whose interests are very largely committed to 
 
 your care ; if you would be dissociated from the character 
 
 of men having a desire for change which reason does not 
 
 warrant nor necessity demand it behoves you to remember 
 
 that there are cases in the present, as in every other age, 
 
 when to an invitation to pursue a path which the authorities 
 
 you have been wont to revere, and which your intelligence, 
 
 your patriotism, and the prudence tempering the courage of 
 
 your manly zeal, pronounce improper, unnecessary, and 
 
 unsafe, you have but one answer to make but one answer 
 
Conclusion. 195 
 
 by which to stoutly stand and that, an unconquerable 
 "No " To the Conservatives of the kingdom it is strange 
 to have to appeal in the matter of so extreme a change. 
 Yet, let me say to such : If you have ever seriously believed 
 in one tittle of the principles which you pro r ess, now, if 
 ever, is the time to show the value of the policy which you 
 proclaim, and to save from the most utter contempt your 
 very raison d'etre^ by clinging to the order of the past, amid 
 the agitation for a fundamental change, by which all that 
 has been good therein is threatened with subversion and 
 decay. 
 
 Whatever, indeed, may be our general political bias, or 
 our ordinary methods of investigation and decision, let us 
 not refuse to listen to the warning voices of the past, or 
 fail to calmly look into the long vista of the uncertain 
 future. And until we can discover one nation which has 
 attempted the equalisation of the sexes before the period 
 of its visible decay ; until we can discern one spark of 
 illuminating experience to guide us on; or until one solid 
 argument, based upon facts ascertained and substantial 
 benefits to come, induces effort for this mighty change let us 
 not array ourselves, like puny Titans, against high Heaven's 
 decree, which conscience witnesses is just and reason, 
 declares to us is wise. 
 
 ALEXANDER & SHEPIIEAKD, Printers, 27, Chancery Lane, London, W.C. 
 
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