RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARY OF PURE REASON, IMMANUEL KANT, PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF KONIGSBERG, MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, BERLIN, &C. &C. &C. &C. TRANSLATED OUT OF THE ORIGINAL GERMAN, BY J. W. SEMPLE, Advocate, AUTHOR OF AN ENGLISH VERSION OF KANt's ETHICAL SYSTEM. EDINBURGH : THOMAS^CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET J. B. BAILLIERE, 219 REGENT STREET, LONDON ; NESTLER & MELLE, HAMBURGH. M.DCCC. XXXVIII. ^<^^tJZ^tX^ EDINBURGH : Printed by Thomas Allan & Co. 2G5 High Street. '3Z769 CONTENTS. Translator's Advertisement to the Reader, KANT'S THEORY OF RELIGION. Kant's Preface to the First Edition, Second Edition, BOOK I. OF INDWELLING SIN. Exordium. Of the Principles of Good and Evil, . 17 Explanatory Scholion, ... 21 Section I. Of Mankind's Originary Predisposition toward Good, ..... 26 Section II. Of the Bias to Evil in Human Nature, 30 Section III. Man is by nature evil, . , .35 Section IV. Of the Origin of Evil in Human Nature, 45 Geneva! Scholion. Of Divine Grace, . 51 BOOK 11. OF THE ENCOUNTER BETWIXT THE GOOD AND THE EVIL PRINCIPLE FOR THE DOMINION OVER MANKIND. Exordium. On a certain Difference obtaining betwixt the Ethic of the Stoa and the Ethic of the Church, . . 67 535 IV CONTENTS. APOTOME I. Page Of the Title of the Good Principle to rule ovek Mankind. Section A. Imj)ersonated Idea of the Good Principle, 72 Section B. On the Objective Reality of the above Idea, 74 Section C. Difficulties standing in the way of the alleged reality of the above Idea, together with their re- solution, ..... 80 APOTOME II. Of the Title of the Evil Principle to Rule over Mankind, ..... 96 General Scholion. Of Miracles, . . . 103 BOOK III. OF THE OVERTHROW OF THE EVIL BY THE GOOD PRINCIPLE. Exordium. The thorough conquest of the Evil by the Good Principle is only to be achieved by the coming and founding of a Kingdom of God on Earth, . 115 APOTOME I. Philosophical Account of the Victory of the Good Principle. Section I. Of the Ethical State of Nature, . 119 Section II. Mankind ought to quit their Ethical State of Nature, in order to become members of an Ethic Commonwealth, .... 121 Section III. The Idea of an Ethical Comnaonwealth is the Idea of a People of God combined under Ethic Laws, 124 Section IV. The Idea of a People of God is only to be rea- lized by forming a Church, . . 127 CONTENTS. V Page Section V. A Church is best founded on a Holy Writ, and the thence arising Faith Ecclesiastical, . 130 Section VI. Ethical Science is the Supreme Interpreter, and the only Infallible Expounder of all Ecclesias- tical Creeds whatsoever, . . • 140 Section VII. When the Kingdom of God may be said to be at hand, .... 148 APOTOME II. Historical Account of the Founding of a Kingdom OF THE Good Principle on Earth, . . . 163 General Scholion. Of Holy Mysteries, ... 183 BOOK IV. OF RELIGION AND CLERIARCHY. Exordium. Of Ecclesiastical Despotism, . . 199 APOTOME I. Of the Religious Worship of the Deity, . 203 Section I. Of Christianity considered as Natural Religion, 208 Section II. Of Christianity considered as a Learned Re- ligion, ..... 217 APOTOME II. Of the Superstitious Worship of the Deity, 224 Section I. Of Delusions in Religion generally, . 225 Section II. Of the guard furnished by Ethic against all Delusions in Religion, . . . 228 Section III. Of Cleriarchy and Sacerdotal Despotism, 234 Section IV. That Conscience is at all times her own Guide, 251 General Scholion. Of Means of Grace, . . 259 C. CORNELIUS TACITUS De Mobibps Germanorum. HaUD DEFUIT ACDENTIA GERMANICO: 8ED OBSTITIT OcEANCS IN SE, 8IMUI. ATQUE IN HeRCULEM INQUrRI. MoX NEMO TENTAVIT. SaNCTIUSQUE AC BEVERENTIUS VIStTJI, DE ACTIS DEORUM CREDERE QUAM SCIRE. THE TRANSLATOR TO THE READER. During the six-and-forty years that Frederick THE Great reigned over Prussia, his subjects enjoy- ed unrestricted liberty of the press. But upon the death of that illustrious monarch in 1786, and the ac- cession of F. William II., a different order of affairs began. An edict was published shortly after (in 1788), greatly hampering, or even suppressing, freedom of de- bate, especially in matters theological ; and this edict had very nearly the effect of stifling Kant's work on religion. Kant had sent the first book to the Edi- tor of the Berlin Monthly Magazine, and this part was allowed by the philosophical censor, Mr G. R. Hillmer, to pass to the public, when it appeared in April 1792. Book II. was forwarded to Berlin, with the view of being published in some subsequent number. Upon reading it, however, Mr Hillmer considered the treatise theological, not philosophical, and therefore sent it for inspection to Mr O. C. R. Hermes, the theologic censor, who most unhesi- tatingly refused his imprimatur, and took Book II. VIII THE TRANSLATOR TO THE READER. into custody, as illicitly poaching on the preserves of theology. In Germany, the ancient universities pos- sess several immunities and many important privileges and jurisdictions of their own. Some of them have even rights of appellate jurisdiction. To this latter class belongs the university at Konigsberg ; and before the university of KonigslJerg Kant resolved to bring his case. He completed his Philosophical Theory of Re- ligion, and sent it to the theological faculty, contend- ing that the investigation did not fall under their jurisdiction, as it was merely a philosophical specula- tion upon theology. After mature deliberation, the theological faculty of Konigsberg found that the vo- lume was not one that could fall under their cogni- zance, and remitted it to the philosophical faculty, who at once sanctioned its publication. Thus a work suppressed by the royal censorship at Berlin, was printed notwithstanding in the same year at Konigs- berg, with the express consent both of the theological and philosophical faculties. This account of the present volume I have thought it necessary to prefix, to enable readers to understand the allusions in the Preface, and also some expres- sions in the text. The preposterous behaviour of Mr Hermes furnishes us with a very satisfactory scale by which to estimate the justness of the lash- ing inflicted by Kant in Book IV. on churchmen bigoted, superstitious, and despotic. It must be ad- THE TRANSLi\TOR TO THE READER. IX m it ted, Hermes had aflPorded ample room for even a severer reprimand. The pointed passage at p. 24-2, where the Author complains of churchmen attempt- ing to give the go-by at once to biblical learning and to reason, — thinking that they need only to command, but not convince, — I understand as a direct allusion to Mr Hermes. Touching the Treatise itself, the Germans hold that this volume is the most important disquisition that ever appeared upon religion generally, and upon the Christian religion in particular ; an opinion in which I think every person must concur, whether he accept or decline tjie singularities and originalities of Rationalism. That it concerns us islanders to know the religious or quasi-religious opinions entertained by our next-door neighbours on the Continent, no sane man, I apprehend, can doubt. Journeys are made to China and Hindostan to learn the metaphysical and ethical speculations there pre- valent. Even the books of Con-fu-tszee are trans- lated, and deemed not unworthy of sifting comment. How much more nearly are we called upon to study opinions which, to use the words of Sir James Mac- intosh, " have now exclusive possession of Europe to " the north of the Rhine — have been welcomed by " the French youth with open arms — have roused in " some measure the languishing genius of Italy ; but " are still little known, and unjustly estimated, by X THE TRAXSI-ATOn TO THE READER. " the mere English reader ;"j — more especially when we reflect that those opinions are the cherished and valued sentiments of a race who, both by speech and blood, are our nearest kinsfolk. To contribute in some measure, however slender, toward removing the ignorance so justly lamented by the polished writer whose words I have quoted above, is the humble aim of the few following sheets, as well as of the volume which I previously ventured to lay before the public. I have only yet farther, before concluding, to thank my readers, both on this and the other side of the Atlantic, for the very cour- teous reception with**vhich they have deigned to coun- tenance my labours. Edinburgh^ \st November 1838. f Prelim. Disscrtat. to 7tli cd. of Encyc. Brit. p. 412. KANT'S THEORY OF RELIGION; SHEWING, IN FOUR BOOKS, THE NECESSARY HARMONY AND IDENTITY OF THE NOTICES OF REASON WITH THOSE OF ANY POSSIBLE REVELATION WHATSOEVER. AUTHOR'S PREFACE. Ethic, in so far as founded on the Idea of Humanity as a free Agent, binding himself, by virtue of that very Freedom, to an unconditionate Law of Reason, is by itself complete and entire ; so that mankind neither requires the idea of any Superior Person to enable him to investigate his duty, nor does he need any incentive or spring to its execution other than the law itself. At least it must be his own fault if there exist any such want or need ; a de- fect, however, quite without remedy from any foreign sources ; since, whatsoever is not originated by himself from his own freedom, cannot supply or make up the want of his own morality. A System of Ethics, therefore, needs no Religion, neither objectively to aid man's will, nor subjectively, as respects his ability, to aid his power ; but stands, by force of pure practical reason, self-sufficient and independent : for, since its decrees have ethical virtue to oblige by the bare form of that universal legality wherewith all maxims must co- incide, such formal fitness for law universal, being the su- preme and unconditionate condition of the intent of all ac- A 2 author's preface. tions whatsoever, it results that Ethic needs no material determinator of choice, i. e. requires no ulterior end, either to recognise what is duty, or to excite toward its execu- tion, but, on the contrary, can and ought, in a question regarding duty, to abstract from all ends whatsoever. To take an instance, suppose I wish to know, if I should (or can) speak truth in the witness-box, or re-deliver a deposite intrusted to my care, then I require to make no inquiry concerning any end or purpose which my e^^- dence or re-dclivery may accomplish ; for he who in such a case should cast about for some ulterior motive, would show by doing so that he is a villain. But although Ethics require no representation of an end, as a condition antecedent to the determination of the will, yet it is possible that it may have a necessary refer- ence to an end ; not, indeed, as the groundwork, but as the sequent of maxims adopted in harmony with the law : for no determination of will can exist in man entirely de- void of all reference to ends, since no volition can re- main without effect; the representation of which eflFect will no doubt not be the determinator of the choice, nor yet an end extant in the formal intent how to act ; but which effect must be adopted by the will, as an end emerg- ing in consequence of its determination by the law, apart from which a will could not satisfy itself; for, being left destitute of every, whether objectively or subjectively, as- signed end, in an intended action, the will would be com- manded how,hut not wkitkcrwards, it had to act. Thus, for morality no end is required, only the law, which is the formal condition of the use of freedom ; but Ethic gives birth to an end : nor can reason remain indifferent to the question, What is to be the result of all her right AUTHOR S PREFACE. ^ ACTING ? toward which final result as a goal (even sup- posing that goal beyond our reach) she might direct all her actions, as toward a common centre. This end is no more than the idea of an object which comprises in itself, 1. The formal condition of the ends we ought to have (duty) ; and, 2. Also the thereby con- ditioned aggregate of the ends we actually have (the hap- piness proportioned to our observance of the former) ; that is, in other words, the idea of the Summum Bonum, to realize which best possible world {Summum Bonum), we must postulate a Supreme, Moral, Most Holy, and All- mighty Being, as he who is alone able to unite these two elements. But this idea is practically not void, for it aids the need we feel to figure to ourselves some last end as the final scope and aim of our exertions ; — the absence of which end would be an impediment to ethical determina- tions. But the main point observable is, that the idea takes its rise from Ethic, and is not its groundwork ; for to adopt this end, pre-requires ethic principles in the person who does so. It is therefore nowise indifferent to the mo- ralist whether he frame to himself the notion of a final scope and chief end of all things or not (to harmonize with which does not increase the number of his duties, but supplies a common point where all his exertions are ultimately to terminate and coincide) ; for it is only by force of this idea, that objective practical reality can be given to our notion of the conjungibility of the formal symmetry of actions originated by freedom, with the mate- rial symmetry of objects in the physical system; a con- junction which is an indispensable postulate of reason. Let us figure to ourselves an Intelligent, a reverer of the moral law, revolving in thought what kind of world he 4 AUTHOR S PREFACE. would create if guided singly by practical reason (a co- gitation man can hardly avoid), of which world he him- self should be a part; then he would not only choose (sup- posing a wish only were left to him) just such a world as that ethical idea of the summum bonum brings along with it, but he would likewise will (had he the power) such a world into existence, because the moral law ordains that he effectuate the highest good possible by his exertions, even although he would see himself in great danger of losing his own personal h.appiness, by the hazard he might run, of not being found adequate to that idea to which, as a condition, reason restrains the distribution of happiness. This judgment would be impartial as if passed by ano- ther, and yet his reason would force him to recognise it as his own too ; by all which the Intelligent would evince his ethical need, to figure to himself a final or last end, as the sequent of his duties. * Ethic issues, then, inevitably in Religion, by extend- ing itself to the idea of an Omnipotent Moral Lawgiver, in whose will, that is the end of the creation, which at the same time can and ought to be likewise mankind's chief end.* • The position there is a God, consequently there is a Summum Bonum, in the universe, if it as a belief is to rest on pure morals, is a synthetic a priori proposition, which, although adopted singly for a prac- tical behoof, extends beyond the notion duty (which notion supposes no matter of choice, only its formal (negative) laws), and consequently cannot be evolved analytically from it : coincidence with the mere Idea of a Moral Lawgiver of Mankind, is no doubt identic with the ethical con- ception duty; and to this extent a proposition ordaining such coinci- dence were atiah/tic : but to assume ms existence, says more than is ex- pressed by the bare idea of the i)ossibility of such an object. The Lev to the unfolding of this matter, I can only here sketch in skeleton, with- out applying it to the intricacies of the wards. An end, or aim willed, is always the object of affection, i.e. of AUTHOR S PREFACE. 5 If Ethic recognise in the Holiness of its Law an object of the greatest veneration, it doth fartlier, when on the immediate desire to possess something by means of an action, in the same waj as the law is always an object of reverence : an objective end (j. e. one whicli we ought to have), is one objected to the mind (as such by reason). That end, which is the indispensable and sufficient condi- tion of all other ends, is the last end or scope : proper happiness is the subjective end of finite intelligents (wliich end all have by force of their sensitive economy, and of which end it were contradictory to say that they OUGHT to have it), and all propositions which rest on this ground are synthetic, and a posteiiori. Jiut that every person should make the HIGHEST GOOD possible in the world, his last end and aim, is a synthe- tic practical proposition a priori ; and further, is an objective!3' practical one, proposed by reason ; for it is a position which goes beyond the con- ception of the duty to be performed in this world, and superadds to it a sequent, i. e. an effect not invoWed or contained in the moral law, and which, consequently, cannot be evolved analytically from it. The law commands categorically, be the effect what it may ; nay, it necessitates man to abstract altogether from such effect, when it calls for any given act ; and does, by this very circumstance, make duty an object of the highest veneration, that it assigns neither end nor scope which might re- commend it, or become an incentive towards the performance of duty. All men would find mobile enough, in the law, if they adhered (as they should) to the decrees of pure Reason. AVhat need have they to know whac issue of their exertions the course of things may bring about ? for them it is enough that they have done their duty, whether all things expire with this earthly existence, and although happiness and desert never coincide. It happens, however, to be one of the limits put to man's reason, that he always casts about for some effect resulting from his actions, in order to find in this effect an end and aim such as may prove the purity of his will, which end, although last in execution, was, notwithstanding, first in his intention. In this end, even when assigned by reason, mankind seeks something that he can love. Consequently the law, which be- gets REVERENCE Only, and cannot recognise the need or want of the lat- ter, does nevertheless extend itself for the behoof of this want, so as to adopt the ethical scope of reason among its determinators, i. e. the posi- tion, " MAKE the highest good possible in the wori,d by tht EXERTIONS, THY LAST END AND SCOPE," is a Synthetic a priori propo- sition, introduced by the moral law itself, although, by doing so, reason extends itself beyond its law ; and the synthetical extension is possible, by the law's being applied to that physical predisposition of man's na- b AUTHOR S PREFACE. grade of religion, it exhibits as an object of Adoration — a Supreme Cause, executive and upholder of the Law — enrobe itself with majesty, and appear in state. But every thing, even the most exalted, dwindles to insignificance in the hands of man, when its idea is applied to use. Even that which can only be truly venerated, in so far as the reverence bestowed on it is free, is necessitated to accom- modate itself to such shapes and forms as co-active laws ordain ; and that which offers itself to the free unreserved critique of every man, is constrained to yield to a cri- tique par force, i. e. to a censorship. Nevertheless, since the commandment, " Obey the Government !" is also of moral obligation ; and since its observance may, as indeed may that of every other duty, be reckoned under the head of religion ; it is but seemly that a treatise devoted to the investigation of this latter idea, should itself exemplify this ordained obedience — a thing not to be accomplished by observing merely one single statutable decree of the state, but only by devoting a united reverence to them all. Now, a Theologian who sits in judgment on a book may be invested with a post where he is merely intrusted with the cure of souls, or ture, whereby he is forced to think an end out of, and beyond, the law (which physical property makes man an object of experience), and is, in fact (like the speculative synthetic propositions a priori), only thut pos- sible, viz. by containing the a priori principle, whereby we know the ma- terial conditions of freedom as exhibited in practice, so far forth as expe- rience and observation, exhibiting in their results the effects of morality, procure objective though only practical reality to the idea morality, as a causality acting in upon the world, liut if the rigid observance of the law is to be considered as the cause of the production of that end, the Summtnn Bunum, then must we (man's power being inadequate to that effect) assume an Omnipotent Moral Being as Governor of the World, luuk-r whose Providence this conjunction of felicity with desert is effect- ed, i. r. Ethic issuei necessarily in Religion. AUTHOR S PREFACE. 7 else witli one, where lie is also concerned with the ad- vancement of the sciences : the former judge is only a clergyman, the second is at the same time one of the learned. As a member of a learned institution {caUed a University), where the sciences are nurtured, and guard- ed against hurt, it is incumbent upon the latter to curb the excessive Censorship of the former, so far, at least, as to prevent the sciences from receiving any damage. Sup- pose, now, that both censors are Biblical Theologians ; then will to the latter, as member of that Academic Fa- culty which has pre-eminently to deal with University Theology, belong the right of appellate jurisdiction : for, so far forth as the cure of souls is at stake, both being clergymen, are equally concerned ; but as for the inte- rest of the sciences, the Theological Teacher at the Uni- versity has a yet farther and peculiar province to admi- nister. If this rule be set aside, then we shall ultimately come to that pass (which in the days of Galileo really happened), that the Biblical Theologian, in order to humble the pride of the sciences, and to save himself the trouble of learning them, will, by a crusading ini'oad against physical astronomy, ancient geology, or whatever else the science may be (just like those savage hordes who, to defend themselves against the dreaded attacks of an enemy, lay waste beforehand whole territories around them), endeavour to blockade every outlet against the forthcoming operations of the human understanding. Moreover, in the field of the sciences there stands over against biblical theology, a philosophical theology, as a good intrusted to a particular faculty. Now, so long as this branch of philosophic speculation remains " within THE BOUNDS OF NAKED REASON," and uses toward the 8 author's preface. confirmation and establishment of its positions, history, languages, the old writings of various nations — the Bible not excepted, — without, however, attempting to intrude its opinions into biblical theolog}', or to alter those pub- lic doctrines which stand under the privileged guardian- ship of the clergy ; then must it have full freedom to ex- tend itself as far as its scientific grasp can reach : and should it perchance even happen that the philosopher had wandered beyond his boundary, and invaded unawares the domain of the biblical theologian, then would this last, in his capacity of clergyman, be entitled to subject the in- truder to his cognizance. But were it at all doubtful whether or not the due boundary really had been over- stepped, and question arose if such trespass actually had been committed, whether by writing or by any spoken lecture, then would the supreme or appellate censorship devolve on that biblical theologian alone, who might be likewise member of an academical faculty; for then only would he have the ulterior interests of the common- wealth to study, — holding his appointment from the state, in order that he might attend to the sciences, and their growth. Unquestionably, in such a ease as is here supposed, the Censorship would devolve, in the last resort, on the Theo- logical, not on the Philosophical Faculty; for the former alone can claim a monopoly of certain doctrines, whereas the latter always leaves its tenets open to general debate, and can consequently never complain that any new specu- lation diminishes the traffic of the guild. Any doubt, how- ever, as to a territorial invasion, is, notwithstanding the approximation of the two doctrines, and apprehended tres- pass on the part of Philosophical Theolog)', very easily author's preface. 9 removed, when we consider that the mischief arises, not from the Philosopher's borrowing any thing from Bibli- cal Theology, but from his thrusting speculations upon Divinity, whereby this last is bent to ends foreign to her established constitution. Thus no one would ever think of saying, that Teachers of International Law, when citing classical passages or formulae out of the Code or Digest, for the behoof of a philosophical theory of their subject, are guilty of invading or violating the majesty of the Corpus Juris, although those passages be accommodated and understood in a sense slightly varying from that in which Justinian and Ulpian may have employed them ; nor could they, with any colour of reason, be accused of tampering with, or trespassing on, the Civil Law, provided they did not insist that the Bench and Bar should receive their gloss as the strict and proper meaning of the words. For, were not each faculty entitled to borrow occasionally from the other, then, conversely, we might accuse the Biblical Theologian, or the Statutable Jurist, of making innumerable inroads into the territory of philosophy (see- ing that neither can dispense with reason, nor, where a scientific pre-exercitation is required, with philosophy), and bearing hence treasures for their own use. And yet were the first-named faculty to aim at having nothing to do with reason or philosophy in religious matters, soon would it appear which party suffered the greater damage; for a religion which should declare and wage an uncom- promising war against reason, must, in the long run, be worsted. I would even venture to ask, if it were not ad- visable that the student should, after completing his stu- dies in the Hall, hear a course on the Philosophy of Bib- lical Theology, or, indeed, of any other Theology, in or- 10 author's preface. tier to give the last finish to his preparation for his work? In truth, the sciences advance only when elaborated se- parately, so far forth as each constitutes a whole by itself, and when subsequently an architectonic survey is made in order to arrange and display them in systematic har- mony. It is immaterial whether the Biblical Theologian agree or differ with the Philosopher, and so deem it need- ful to confute his tenets, provided that he only hear and know them ; for thus alone can he become thoroughly fore-armed against all difficulties, open or latent, strown by the philosopher in his path ; whereas, to conceal ob- jections, or which, if possible, is worse, to decry them as impious, is a wretched stratagem, that can only fail : while, on the other hand, to weld both parts together, and only occasionally exhibit an amalgam of philosophy, betrays want of intellectual depth, and brings the public at length to such a pass that they cannot well di^dne where Theology is going, or what it is about. Of the following four books, — where, in order to make perceptible the relation obtaining betwixt religion and hu- manity, affected as it is, in part with good, in part with evil, predispositions, I have represented the Good and the Evil Principles as two self-subsistingcauses,operatingout- side of, and bearing in upon man, — the first has already appeared in the Berlin Montlily Magazine for April 1792. I was, liowever, under the necessity of republishing it now, on account of its intimate connection with the remaining three, which, indeed, contain the development and appli- cation of the notions therein set abroach. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. In this edition no alterations have been made ; only the misprints, and some few faulty expressions, have been amended. One or two additional notes have been sub- joined to the text. They are indicated by a star, thus*. Those in the old edition bore a cross f . Touching the title of the book (Religion within the Bounds of Naked Reason, for it seems I have been ac- cused of some latent design), I beg leave to say in expla- nation, that since a Revelation may comprehend inter alia as its object-matter the doctrines of Natural Reli- gion, while, conversely, this last cannot possibly contain the historical details of the former, it may be permitted us to regard the one as a larger sphere of belief, containing within it the other as a less (J,, e. as orbs concentric, con- sequently not without and outside of one another). With- in the bounds of this last — the smaller sphere — may the philosopher, as an inquirer into pure reason, proceeding singly upon principles a prio?i, confine himself; where, consequently, he must abstract from all experience and observation. Leaving this position, he may make the 12 AUTHOR S PREFACE farther experiment of beginning at any supposed revela- tion (abstracting in the meanwhile from pure natural Re- ligion, as an independent and self-subsisting system), and of holding it, as a historical system, bit by bit, up to the moral notions, for the purpose of comparison ; in order to see if it do not lead back eventually to the self-same system of Natural Theology, which, though incomplete in itself in a theoretical point of view (for it would require to embrace and contain a tcchnico-practical part, for the purpose of instruction), is, nevertheless, for every ethico- practical purpose, complete, and quite sufficient for reli- gion properly so called ; which, as a notion a priori (re- maining after abstraction has been made from every a pos- teriori part), has significancy only when understood in this reference. Should this turn out really to be the case, then may it be said that reason and revelation are not only in harmony, but identic ; so that whoever should, under guidance of ethical notions, follow the one, would find himself eventually at the same goal with the other. And were it not so, then would there exist either two re- ligions in the same person, which is absurd, or there would be OJie religion and one ceremonial worship; and since the latter is not, like religion, an end-in-itself, but has value only as a mean, then they might, no doubt, like heterogeneous elements, be for a while confounded, but would, as oil from water, soon become separate — pure ethic, the religion of nature, floating above, while the ce- remonials are precipitated. That this union, or attempt to bring it about, is a task quite allowed to one who makes a philosophical scrutiny into Religion, and no inroad into the province of Bib- lical Theology, was shown in the preface to the first edi- TO THE SECOND EDITION. 13 tion. Since then, I have seen my assertion quoted by the celebrated Michaelis in his Morals (Part. I. p. 5-11), — a man equally conversant with either faculty. In fact, this principle pervades his whole work ; and yet the Theo- logical Faculty have not complained, so far as I know, of finding in his book any thing prejudicial to their rights. Writings by the learned, whether named or innominate, arrive so tardily at this farther corner of the globe, that I have not been enabled to notice in this second edition, the reviews which I understand have been passed upon this my Philosophical Theory of Revelation. It was my anxious wish to have replied to the celebrated Dr Storr of Tiibirgen, who, in his " Annotationes qucedam Theologicoi^^ &c., has subjected my opinions to a very sifting scrutiny, conducted at the same time with such extreme attention and candour as to have earned my warmest thanks. Some intention of answering him I even yet entertain, but ven- ture not to promise a rejoinder, on account of the impedi- ments which gi-eat age now throws in my way, especially vi'hen engaged in elaborating abstract ideas. One Critique^ namely, that published in " iS/b. 29 of the Greifswald New Critical Reporter" I may discuss with that curt brevity wherewith my Reviewer has handled me. According to his judgment, the present treatise is merely an attempt to solve, for my own satisfaction, a self-proposed problem, viz. *' How, UPON GROUNDS OF PURE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL REASON, ARE THE NOTIONS AND POSITIONS CONTAINED IN THE ARTICLES OF THE CHURCH CREED POSSIBLE ?" " This, consequently," says he, " is an investigation wherewith they cannot be concerned who know his (Kant's) system as little as they care about it. The question, in fine, is for them inexistent." — Upon this I 14 AUTHOR S PREFACE. remark — there are needed for comprehending the sub- stance of the present book, only the most ordinary notices of Ethic, without the slightest acquaintance with the " in- quiry INTO THE WILL," and still less without any re- ference to the Critique of Speculative Reason. True, I sometimes speak of virtue, when understood as a readiness in performing actions outwardly in harmony with the law, as virtus phcEnomenon, and contradistinguish it from virtue as a steadfast moral mindedness or intent, of exe- cuting those acts out of duty, called virtus noumenon ; but then these expressions are used merely for the sake of scholastic uniformity. The thing indicated by those terms is stated daily in every child's catechism or sermon, and, be the vocables what they may, is easily understood. Would to heaven as much could be said in praise of the mysteries touching the Godhead, reckoned by the church integi'ant parts of our religion, which, as were they on a level with every one's common sense, are thrust into ca- techisms for the young; although eventually they must, by a metempsychosis, pass into the form of moral notions, if they are ever to become generally intelligible. Konigsberg, 26//e Jamutry ] 794. HARMONY AND IDENTITY OF THE NOTICES OF REASON WITH THOSE OF ANY POSSIBLE REVELATION, SHEWN IN FOUR BOOKS. BOOK L OF INDWELLING SIN. BOOK I. ON THE RADICAL EVIL OF HUMAN NATURE. EXORDIUM. That the wokld lieth in wickedness, is a complaint as ancient as any historic record, or even as that still older VOLUME, the fictions of the poets — nay, it is equally old with that oldest of all figments, the fabulous mythi- cal religions of priestcraft. All three concur in giving the world at its outset a good beginning : be it a golden age — a life in Paradise — or one still more happy — commu- nion with Celestials. But this welfare speedily disappears. A lapse into evil immediately hurries mankind from bad to worse with accelerated speed.* So that we now {which m)w^ however, is as old as either history or fable) live in the latter times. The last day and destruction of the world lie even at the door, so much so that Siva, the De- stroyer and future Judge of the earth, is already in some parts of Hindustan, worshipped as the God to whom all power in heaven and earth has been delegated; Vishnu having in fatigue thrown up, some centuries ago, the post * ^tas parentum, pejor avis, tulit Nos nequiores, mox daturos Progeniem vitiosiorem— Hohat. 18 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL of governor of the world, which in the beginning he re- ceived from the Creator Brahma. A contrary opinion has obtained in modern times. It is, however, far less prevalent, being confined mainly to philosophers and pedagogues, viz. that the world is moving in the opposite direction, being constantly, though imper- ceptibly, on the advance from bad to better. At least it is contended that the predispositions of human nature are ori- ginally so constituted as to tend that way. But this as- sumption was certainly never taken from experience and observation ; for, so long as question is made of moral GOOD AND EVIL, and not merely of the refinements of civi- lization, authentic history in every age declares against it. Probably, therefore, it is only a good-natured hypothe- sis, first started by Seneca, and handed down from him through intervening Moralists to Rousseau, in order by its means, to goad mankind on, to the unwearied culture and development of every latent germ, that may perchance one day bring forth good fruit. And, indeed, since man comes into the world usually hale and sound in body at his birth, it is not easy to imagine why the inner man — his soul — should not be deemed by parity of reason just as healthy. Upon this view, nature herself is waiting and ever ready to assist the efforts made for forwarding our moral growth. " Sanabilibus agrotamus malis, nosque in RECTUM GENITOS, tiatura si sajiari velimus, adjuvat" So Seneca of this matter, and so others. Since, however, nothing is more likely than that both poets and philosophers are in the wrong, it would at once occur to any bystander to inquire, if no medium could be found betwixt the two extremes, and if there were not room to sav, that mankind as a race are neither good nor ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 19 bad ; or otherwise, that man is as much the one as the other, being in part good and in part evil. But a person is call- ed evil, not merely because he performs actions that are bad, i. e. illegal ; but only then, when his actions are of such a stamp, as to enable and entitle us to conclude upon the evil maxims of his will. Now, though experience and observation may make us acquainted with actions repug- nant to the law, and may even {at least in our own case) teach knowledge of illegal acts, perpetrated with the full consciousness that they are so ; still the regulating- maxims of the will are no object of possible experience (not always even the maxims of one's own will); whence, by consequence, the judgment, that an agent is an evil PERSON, never can, with certainty, be rested on experience and observation. We must, therefore, from sundry, or even one evil act, done with the consciousness of its being so, be able to conclude a priori upon an evil maxim giving it birth ; and from thence yet farther, upon a general ground of every particular morally-evil maxim extant in the thinking Subject ; which universal ground is again it- self a maxim, before we can deem ourselves entitled to predicate of a person that he is by nature evil. That no occasion of stumbling may be furnished by the word NATURE, which, when used to signify the Physical System, is the veriest anti-part of a ground of acting out of freedom, and wherewith the predicates good and evil would stand in open contradiction : it is to be observed, that by the nature of man we here mean only that subjec- tive ground of the use of his freedom precedent to any act falling under sense — let this ground be what it may. Far- ther, this subjective ground must be figured to be an act OF FREEDOM ; for if otherwise, neither the use nor abuse 20 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL made by man of his free clioice could be imputed to him as his deed ; and his indwelling good or evil would not be moral. Consequently the ground of moral evil can lie in no OBJECT determinative of the will through the in- tervention of an appetite ; neither can it lie in any physi- cal instinct, but only in a rule^ i. e. in a maxim self-ap- pointed by choice to its own freedom. But what now may be the subjective ground of adopting such a maxim, and discarding its contrary, is an ulterior question, that cannot be resolved. For were this last ground, con- cerning which question is made, no longer a general maxim, but a mere physical determination, then would the use of our freedom be explicable upon mere natural causes, which, however, is repugnant to the very idea of a supersensible causality. When, therefore, it is said, " Man- kind is by Nature Good," or " He is by Nature Evil," those positions merely mean " he contains within him an unsearchable last ground* of adopting good or of adopting bad maxims;" which ground, unfathomable even by his own reason, pervades and tinges so universally the species, as to serve for an exponent whei'eby to indicate the cha- racter of the whole race. We shall also farther say, of one or other of those ethic characters, and that, too, with the view of distinguishing • That the last subjective ground of adopting moral maxims must be inscrutable (by man), is already self-evident from this consideration, viz. that since the ir appointment is free, the ground of such a choice can- not be sought in any physical spring. It can lie only in a maxim. Now, since this maxim must have its ground, and since out of and be- yond maxims no deteuminatives of fiee choice can be assigned, it is manifest that we may recede backwards in iiiJiHitum along this subjective chain, witliout ever urrivi^^' at the last link, i.e. without ever fathom- ing a maxim's absolutely lust ground. ALONG WITH THE PKINCIPLE OF GOOD. 21 mankind from other possibly-existing intelligents, that with him it is congenite. Notwithstanding, nature is not chargeable with his guilt (should man be evil), nor with his good-desert (should he turn out good) : for the man himself is at all times the sole author of his character ; but, because the last ground whereby we appoint to our- selves our maxims, seeing that they must always emanate from our free choice, never can be an event given in expe- rience and observation, upon that account it is that man's good or evil (as a good or evil last ground of adopting this or that maxim in harmony with, or militating against the law) is said to be born with him, so far forth as at his birth it is already a ground extant, and precedent of all experimental exercise of his freedom. And since this is the case, even from the earliest acts of youth backward to his birth, this ground must be cogitated as co-existing with and in man, even at his birth, — which, however, does not mean that his birth is the cause of it. EXPLANATORY SCHOLION. At the bottom of the two just stated hypotheses there lies a disjunctive proposition, " man is by nature either MORALLY GOOD OR MORALLY EVIL ;" and it will imme- diately occur to every one to ask if this disjunction be correct ? Some one might say, that there is room for maintaining that " man is by nature neither one nor other;" and a third party might contend that " he is both at once," namely, good in some points, and in others evil. Experience and observation would even seem to declare for this intermediary betwixt the extremes. 22 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL Ethic, however, admits only unwillingly of moral media, either in actions or in characters : since, were such ambi- guity to prevail, all maxims would be in danger of losing both fixity and precision. Those who profess severer senti- ments are usually called rigorists, a name which, though intended to convey censure, does in fact praise: their adversaries are styled latitudinarians, who again are divided into latitudinarians of neutrality and of coalition. We may call the one indifferentists ; the other syn- CRETISTS.* The answer to that disjunctive interrogatory, if it is to fall out agreeably to a rigorous f method of deciding, bot- * If GOOD = a, then is its contradictory the not-good ; and this again results either from a mere absence of a ground impelling towards good = 0, or from tlie positive presence of a ground the antipodes of good = — a. In this latter case the not-good may be spoken of as posi- tive evil. ("With respect to pleasure and pain, there can be assigned an intermediate state, so that pleasure = a pain = — a, and that state wherein neither is felt, viz. a state' of indifference, = 0.) This would also be the case in ethics, were not the law itself the spring of will ; for then the moral good [}. e. the harmony of the will with the law) would be = a, the not-good = ; which last, however, would only be the con- sequence of the want of any moral spring = a x 0. But because the law is a moral spi'ing = a, it follows that = the want of the will's har- mony with tlie law is the effect of a contrary and opposite determina- tion of choice, i. c. of a counteracting of the law = — a; that is, can only happen through a positively evil will. Wherefore, betwixt a good and !in evil vioral-mindcdness ( inward principle of maxims), according to which an act's morality must be judged, no intermediate cast or bent of volition can be found. A morally-indifferent action ( Adiaphoron Morale) would be an act brought about simply by physic causes, and would stand, upon that account, unrelated to the INIoral Law as the liUW of Freedom. An ACT of this sort would not be a deed ; and regarding it there could neither bo command nor phohibition, nor yet i'ehmission. -)• Schiller, in that exquisite masterpiece '' on Grace and Dig- nity," disapproves highly of my vigorous rej)rcsentation of obligation, and maintains (vol. xvii. p. 221-4, 1«20) that such tenets, if acted on, can only legct manners fitted for the cloister. l?iit since I find that we ALONG WITH THE PKINCIPLE OF GOOD. 23 toius itself on this remark, which is of the most vital mo- ment in ethics, viz. that the freedom of the will is en- dowed with this peculiar property, that it never can he determined hy any spring to any act, except in so far as are at one on every other point, even in the most weighty principles, I am unwilling to allow that there can be here any discrepancy, provided only we can mutually understand each other. I at once admit that I cannot associate grace with the dignity of the Idea Duty ; for this idea imports co-action, i. e. unconditionate necessitation, wherewith the ease of grace is quite inconjungible. The INIajesty of the Law (like that on Sinai) inspires aave (not dread that daunts, nor yet charms that invite), i, e. ueveuence felt by a subject towards his Governor; which, however, in the present case, since the Commander lies within our- selves, is A FEELING OF THE SUBLIMITY OF OUR OWN DESTINY, trans- fixing and transporting the mind far more intensely than any beauty. And yet virtue, i. e. the well-grounded intent of invariably discharging all one's duties, is productive of most beneficial effects, more so than all that nature or art in the world can accomplish ; and soTair, or even glori- ous, a portraiture of humanity admits very well of being accompanied by the Graces, who, so long as mere duty is concerned, stand revei'ently aside. When regard is had to the physical grace wherewithal virtue would en- robe the world, were it universally pursued ; then does moral legislative reason call on fancy and the powers of sense for aid. But it is only after having overcome the Hydra that Hercules can attend the Muses — a toil from which the graceful sisters shrink. So that, were the question put, what ^esthetic character, or, as it were, what temfeuament be- LONGS TO VIRTUE ? — valiant, and by consequence joyous, or anxious and dejected? scarce any answer would be needed. The latter slavish tone of soul never can be where there is not a latent hatred of the Law ; and the joyous heart, in discharging duty (not complacency in recog- nising it), betokens that the virtuous sentiments are genuine, nay, is the test that piety is real — piety consisting not in the self-reproachivgx of a ■whining sinner (a State of mind I look upon as exceedingly equivocal, and which is for the most part the man's inward upbraidings at having erred against a dictate of prudential expediency), but in the steadfast unfaltering determination to make the matter better in all time to come ; and this purpose gaining in life and force by the constancy wherewith the ethical ascetic knows he has adhered to his predeterminate resolves, must needs beget a joyful disposition, apart from which no one can be certain that he loves the moral good, i, e. has adopted it into his maxims. 24 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL MANKIND HAVE HIMSELF ADOPTED, AND TAKEN UP THAT SPRING INTO HIS MAXIM, i. €. have transformed it into a universal rule, according to which he wills to conduct himself. In no other manner can a spring, be it what it may, consist with the absolute spontaneity of a free choice. Again, the moral law is, — our own reason being judge, — itself the originary spring, and whoso makes it his maxim, is mo rally good. But if, notwithstanding, the law does not determine a person's choice, then some contrary spring must influence the will; and since, by hypothesis, this can only happen by a man's adopting this spring, and along with it its necessary effect, viz. the swerving from the Law, into his maxim (in which latter case the man is evil), it follows that his inward mindedness to observe or depart from the law is never in a state of equilibrious in- difference, and that mankind never can be neither good nor evil. Neither can man be in some points good, and at the same time in others morally evil. For is he in any one point morally good, then has he made the Moral Law his maxim ; but should he at the same time be in some other points bad, then would, — since the Moral Law is but one and yet universal, — the maxim referring to it, be at once a general and a particular maxim, which is a contradic- tion.* • The ]Moral Philosophers of AntiquiU', who nearly exhausted every question that can be raised in ethic, did not forget to discuss the branches of the above dilemma. The first query was worded thus : " Must vir. TUE BE LEARNED ?" i. e. Is man by nature indifferent alike to vice or itt opposite 9 the second, "Can there be more than one virtue?" i. e. Can virtue subsist fragmcntarihj in the mind, and man be virtuous and vicious by halves? Both were denied with peremptory and rigoristical precision, and rightly ; for they considered virtue as it is in the idea of ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 25 To have one or other of those sentiments, as a con- nate property by nature, does not mean to say that the man vvlio entertains them is not their author, i. e. has not himself acquired them, but signifies that they have not been acquired in time, so that he must be regarded as one or other of them, from youth up continually. The turn of mind (called its sentiment or mindedness), i. e. the last subjective ground of adopting maxims, can be but one, and goes universally to the whole use of freedom. Farther, this ground must itself have been adopted by one's own free choice, otherwise it could not be imputed. Again, the ulterior subjective ground or inward cause of such adoption cannot be known, although it is impos- sible not to inquire after it ; since, to account for it, all that could be done, would be to assign another maxim, into which that sentiment had been adopted, and which maxim, again, must have had a farther ground ; where- fore, seeing that this sentiment, or rather its last ground, cannot be deduced nor explained from any act of choice, as & first act in time, we call it a property of Will, belong- ing by Nature to the appetitive faculty, although, in point of fact, it arises from the Will's own Freedom. Moreover, when we say of mankind that he is by Nature good or evil, those moral properties are not predicated of him in- dividually, as if some particulars were by nature good, and only others evil; although, to become entitled to un- reason. And yet, on the other hand, when we contemplate this moral being as a phenomenon, i. e. according to what experience and obser- vation teach, then may either question be answered in the affirmative ; for then he is not weighed in the balance of pure reason {before a Divine Tribunal)^ but measured by an a posteriori standard {before a Human Court)y of which more anon in the sequel. 26 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL dei'stand those tei'ms as applicable generally to the whole race, can take place only then, when anthropological in- vestigations show, that the grounds entitling us to ascribe to one single man, either of those characters, are such as to leave no room for excepting any from their influence. SECTION I. OF MANKIND S ORIGINARY PREDISPOSITION TOWARD GOOD. This aboriginal substratum may be fitly brought all un- der review, when classed according to the three following heads : I. The substratum of man's animality as a living being. II. The substratum of his humanity as a lixdng, and at the same time intelligent being. III. The substratum of his personality as an intelli- gent and accountable being.* * The third predisposition cannot be regarded as already exhausted by either or both of the two former ; for although an animal may have rea- son, it follows not, from that circumstance alone, that his intellect should possess the ability of determining unconditionally his will, and that too by the mere representing of the fitness of a maxim for universal legisla- tion ; i. f. it does not follow, because man has reason, that reason should be self-practical, at least not so far as we can see. How intelligent soever a creature might be, it might very possibly still stand in need of certain springs taken from desired objects, in order to determine its volitions ; nay, it wight bestow the most prudent and deliberate judgment both on the springs and means of action, so as thereby most commodiously to reach the end willed, without ever awaking to the reality, or even dreaming the pos- sibility, of such a thing as a moral unconditionally-commanding law, which should announce itself at once as the detcrminator and supreme spring. ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 27 1. The predisposition for mankind's Animality may be stated under the general denomination of mechanical or instinctive self-love, i. e. such self-love as needs no ex- ercise of reason, and is threefold ; Jirst, the appetite for self-preservation ; second, toward the propagation of one's species by means of the connubial affections, and toward rearing whatever progeny may he procreated by inter- sexual coramixtion ; third, the taste for society, and gene- ral intercourse with one's fellow-men. Upon these, vari- ous sorts of vices may be ingrafted, though they spi-ing not spontaneously from those predispositions as a root. They are the vices of an unpruned and uncultivated sen- sory, and may, when swerving farthest from the ends pro- posed by nature in giving man those appetites, be called beastly vices, viz. those of gluttony, drunkenness, vo- luptuousness, and that savage contempt of law exhibit- ed in the life of systematic freebooters, pirates, and the like. 2. Man's Humanity may be all classed under the ge- neral title of comparative self-love, for which theoretic reason is required, whereby we deem ourselves happy or the reverse, when compared with others as a standard. Hence springs the appetite for being thought to be some one in the eyes of others ; this appetite, at first no more than a wish to be deemed their equal, so as not to allow to any one a superiority over us, attended, however, with the continual apprehension that others may seek to sub- AVere not this law really given within us, never could we have quibbled into existence such a legislation by any stretch of reason, much less have wheedled our will into the belief of its authority. This law alone it is, that convinces us of the independency of our will on every outward and foreign determinative, and, along with this, of the imputability of all our actions. 28 OF THE INDWELLING OF a'pRINCIPLE OF EVIL ject US to their sway, passes at last into a state of mind where we cherish an unjust desire of lording it over others. Upon this spirit of rivalry and emulation may he grafted the most enormous vices, bursting out into ani- mosities, open or concealed, against all whom we look upon as strangers. And yet those vices do not sprout na- turally from the soil of our humanity, but are re-agent vices, occasioned by our anxiety lest others should obtain a hateful authority over us, and impelling us, as a measure of precaution, to anticipate them, by usurping to ourselves the power we dread may be employed against us. Whereas nature, in implanting within us an emulous spirit — (a thing by no means inconsistent with mutual love) — aimed only at supplying a spur towards self-culture. Vices en- graffed on this appetite may therefore be called civilized VICES, and are, when luxuriant in wickedness, known by the name of the devilish vices, — envy; ingratitude ; and malice. 3. Man's predisposition for personality consists in his susceptibility for such reverence toward the moral law as is of itself sufficient to make the law the immediate spring of will. Mere susceptibility for reverence toward the law is the moral sense ; but this in itself would not justify us in taking it for any particular predisposition pointing to any particular end ; it can be held so only so far forth as it is an original spring of will. Again, since reverence can only be constituted such a spring by the wilTs freely adopting it into its maxim, which, when done, imparts to the person whose choice is so regulated, a good charac- ter, and this, like every character belonging to a free choice, is something that must always be acquired ; it follows that for the possibility of such acquisition a pre- ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 29 disposition of some sort or other, in our ethical econo- my, is demanded, whereupon nothing that is evil can be grafted. The naked idea of the moral law, even with the reverence inseparably attaching to it, cannot with pro- priety be looked upon as the substratum of man's person- ality — on the contrary, it is itself his personality — is the very idea of a man's humanity considered quite intellec- tually. That we are able to adopt this reverence into our maxims, thereby making it a spring, must rest upon some subjective ground ; and this would seem to be somewhat additional, superinduced on our personality, and this sur- plus is what may be fitly termed a predisposition toward, and for behoof of, our moral personality. Recapitulating the three aforesaid aboriginal substrata according to the conditions of their possibility, it is appa- rent that the first needs no raticnal power of any sort ; that the second does indeed require a practical exercise of reason, but only in subservience to physical springs ; while the third alone is self -practical, i. e. has unconditionally- legislative reason working at the root. All these predis- positions of humanity are not only negatively good, i. e. so far forth as they are in no wise repugnant to the moral law ; but they even tend positively toward good, so far forth as they actually advance and assist in its execution. They are all origin ary; for human nature would be im- possible without them, and though the two former may be abused and perverted, none of them can be extirpated. The term predisposition, applied to any being, must be un- derstood to mean not only the elements essential to its constitution, but also that form of their arrangement whereby the agent is made what he is. Such elements are originary when they are of necessity pre-required 30 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL toward the possibility of a creature's being precisely what be is : contingent could the Being still be essentially the same without them. Finally, let it be remaiked, that in this section no predispositions have been spoken of, except such as immediately refer to the faculty of appeti- tion, and the determinableness of its cboice. SECTION II. OF THE BIAS TO EVIL IN HUMAN NATL'RE. By the term bias {propensity or proneness), I under- stand the subjective ground of the possibility of acquiring all at once inveterate habits, so far forth as such habitual desire is in itself only adventitious, and casually superin- duced upon human nature. A Bias* must not be con- founded with a predisposition ; for though both may be brought by mankind into the world with liim at his birth, • Bias (Hang) is, strictly speaking, the susceptibU'ity of so liking an ob- ject of desire, as that when once the Subject has tasted the enjoyment, a permanent appetite toward it is thereby forthwith established. Thus all savages carry about with them a Bias toward intoxicating liquors ; for though there he many among them who know not the excitement of inebriation, and so by consequence entertain no desire for those things which produce it, still it is only necessary to allow them this gratifica- tion for a tingle time, in order to found an almost ineradicable appetite for spirits. Midway betwixt appetite and bias (both which presup- pose acquaintance with the object desired) lies instinct, a want felt to do or enjoy sometiiing yet unknown {e.g. the plastic instincts of ani- mals or our own for sex). I^aslly, there is a stage of desire above appe- tite, viz. VASsiON (not emotion, for emotions, whttiier aifectionate or dis- affected, belong to the feelings of pain and pleasure), which is an appe- tite that excludes and takes away all self-command [Compare Kant's In. traduction to th' Elementology o/Ethict, § xvi. and Anthrojidogie, § 77. Tr. ) ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 31 still the bias must not be regarded as congenite or innrte ; but must — be the bias to good or to evil — be looked upon as matter of acquisition, and entailed by the man upon himself. At present we speak only of a Bias to Moral Evil ; and since evil can arise only from a perverse de- termination of one's free choice, which choice again can only be deemed good or evil when regard is had to the maxims it has adopted, it follows that the bias to evil can only consist in the subjective ground of the possibility of an Agent-Intelligent's maxims sv/erving from the Moral Law; and if this bias can be predicated of mankind univer- sally, i. e. as marking and making part of the character of the race, then may it be fitly called a natural bias of mankind to evil. To all which is to be added, that the hence arising ability or disability of the choice to make the Moral Law its maxim, is what is called the having of a good or evil heart. We may figure to ourselves three different degrees of this badness of heart : First, it is the general weakness of man's heart in not adhering to good maxims originally de- termined on, or, in other words, the frailty of our na- ture. Second, the tendency to mix up immoral with the moral springs, which, even although this admixture should take place with a good intention, and from {sup- posed? Tr.) maxims of good, must nevertheless be called impurity. Lastly, the bias to adopt merely evil maxims, which is the depravity of man's nature, or of his heart. First, the frailty of human nature afforded matter of complaint even to an Apostle : " What I would, that I do not." Willing I am, but the execution follows not, i. e. I adopt the good (tlTe law) into the maxim of my choice ; but this, which is objectively in idea {in thesi) an irresisti- 32 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL ble spring, is notwithstanding subjectively (in hypothesi), when the maxim is to be acted on, the weaker, when com- pared with the appetitive springs. Second, The impurity of the human heart consists in this : The maxim is very likely, in regard of its nature and end aimed at (viz. the intended observance of the law) good, and even a sufficiently powerful mobile to action ; but then it is not purely moral, i. e. the law is not, as it should be, stated in the maxim as of itself alone the suf- ficient spring, but there are required at times [perhaps at all times) other springs diflFerent from the law to assist in bending the choice toward that which duty would de- mand. In other words, conduct, although dutiful, has not been performed purely out of duty. Third, the depravity, or, if the term be preferred, the CORRUPTION, of the Human Heart, is the bias whereby the choice leans to maxims that postpone the spring afforded by the Moral Law in favour of other and immoral springs. It may be likewise called the perversity of the Human Heart, inasmuch as it inverts or perverts the ethical order of a free will's springs ; and although legally good actions may still be exhibited notwithstanding that inward disor- der, the cast of thinking is {so far as the moral-mindedness of the Agent is concerned) corrupted at its root, and the man must upon that account be characterized as evil. The reader will have observed that the bias to evil is here charged upon all men, even the best in outward actions, which moreover must be done, if the universality of a bias to evil is to be proved as extant among all men, or, which says the same thing, if we are to show that the bias is interwoven with the nature of man. There is, however, betwixt a man of good morals {bene ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 33 moralus) and a morally good man {moi-aliter bonus) no dif- ference, so far at least as the harmony of their actions with the law is concerned, except this, that wiili tlie one th.e law is not always, perhaps never, whereas with the other it is AT ALL TIMES, the alouc and supreme spring. Of the first we may say, he observes the letter of the laav {i. e. so far forth as regards the act commanded by the law), of the other, however, he has observed its spirit; (the spirit of the law consists herein, that it be alone and by itself a sufficient spring) and that whatever is not OF this faith, is sin {in respectofthe Formalof the intent). For whenever ulterior sprii'gs arc required to determine the choice to make its election of Icgi-conform acts, such, for instance, as ambition, self-love, a good-natured instinct, or sympathy, all which obviously differ from the law, then is it merely accidental that these coincide in any given conjuncture with the same ; and they might possibly just as easily invite to transgression. The maxim according to whose worth all moral value of the person must be es- timated, is notwithstanding itself illegal ; and the man re- mains, in the midst of merely good deeds all the while evil. Farther explanation may be needful to clear up the no- tion of a BIAS. Every bias is either physical, i. e. belongs to man's choice as an organized product of the physical system, or it is ethical, i. e. affects his choice as a Moral Agent. In the former sense, there can be no bias to moral evil, for a bias of this sort must arise from free- dom ; and a physical bias (resting upon sensitive excite- ment) toward any use of freedom — be it good or bad — is a contradiction. An indwelling bias toward evil can therefore cleave only to the moral faculty of choice. Again, nothing can be morally («. e. imputably) evil that 34 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL is not our own deed. Contrariwise, however, is under- stood by a bias, a subjective determinator of choice ante- cedent to every deed, wliich bias, therefore, is not yet itself a deed. The bare representation of a bias to evil, would, by consefjuence, contain a contradiction, were not the expression taken in a twofold sense, either adapting itself to the idea freedom. Now, the term " deed " or " act^' may signify that ])rimordial use of freedom where- by the supreme and ruling maxim — contrary to, or in harmony with, the law — was determined on, or it may equally well denote that derived exercise of will whereby outward actions themselves (^. e. acts materially consider- ed, so far forth as they are objects of choice), are actually brought forth, conformably to such maxim. The in- dwelling bias toward evil is a deed in the former sense [peccatum originarium), and at the same time the formal ground of every illegal deed in the second sense (peccatum derivativum), when it is called vice. The guilty demerit of the first subsists even while that of the second is most carefully and successfully eschewed by dint of springs differing from the law. The one act is a deed cogitable^ patent to reason a priori, independently of all conditions of time ; the other is a deed sensible, a posteriori, exhibited in time [Factum Phenomenon). It is the former, as more particularly contradistinguished from the latter, that is a bias, and held connate, chiefly because it never can be ex- tirpated (whicli uprooting would demand a supreme maxim morally good, a thing impossible, since, owing to the pre- sence of the bias, the uppermost and ruling] bent is al- ready figured as morally evil) ; and also because the ques- tion, why evil should have corrupted our dominant and last maxim of choice ? is as unanswerable (although the ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 35 corruption be our own deed) as is the inquiry after the causes of any other fundamental property, now once for all belonging to our being. What has just been here ad- vanced assigns the ground, why in this section we at once sought the three sources of moral evil only there, where, agreeably to laws of freedom, was to be sought the ulti- mate ground of choosing or of observing our practical maxims, — overlooking the sensory as mere receptivity. SECTION III. MAN IS BY NATURE EVIL. Vitiis nemo sine nascitur. Horat. The position, man is evil, can consequently signify nothing more than this : He is inwardly aware of the authority of the moral law, and has, notwithstanding, adopted the intent of occasionally swerving from it into his maxim. To say that by nature he is evil, imports that evil can be predicated of him, considered as a race ; not however as if such wicked quality could be concluded upon from the general notion of humanity, for in this lat- ter event his indwelling evil would be necessary, i. e. maii- kind, as known by us from observation and experience, cannot be otherwise judged of; or thus — we may pre-sup- pose this evil as subjectively-necessary, in every, even the best man. Again, since the bias must itself be regarded as morally evil, consequently as no gift of nature, but as something that may be imputed, it must consist in ille- gal maxims of choice. Farther, since this illegality must, — 36 OF THK INDWELLING 01' A PRINCIPLE OV EVIL the will being free, — be regarded as fortuitous ; which con- tingency, however, would seem to be at variance and in- compatible with this evil's universality, unless the first subjective ground of appointing maxims be interwoven, somehow or other, and, as it were, rooted, iu the substra- tum of humanity : we shall therefore call this bent a na- tural bias to evil ; and since it is self-demerited, we shall moreover call it a radical evil, inborn in tlie nature of man, and yet nevertheless entailed by him upon him- self. That such a corrupt bias must really be rooted in man- kind, scarce needs a regular proof, when we reflect on the multitude of crying instances, thrown by the observed ac- tions of man into our hands. Do we prefer examples from that state of society philosophers have eulogized as setting forth the primeval good-natured dispositions of the race? then we need only to contrast with this hypothesis the scenes of wanton and unprovoked cruelty in the murder- ous dramas enacted on the stage of Tofoa, New Zea- land, and the Navigators' Islands, or the ceaseless feuds* that devastate {according to Captain Hearne) whole tracts • Like the perpetual war betwixt the Arathavesqwa, and the dog- ribbed Indians, — a war having no other end in view than mutual murder. In their opinion, martial valour is the chief virtue of savage life. Even in civilized states, warlike intrepidity is an object of admiration, and the ground of an especial regard expected by that profession who deem courage their only boast ; and not without reason : for, that mankind can propose to himself something as his end, prized by him even higher than life (honour), and where he divests himself of every interested aim, demonstrates a certain sublimity in his internal predispositions. And yet the conij)laccncy wherewith conquerors extol their mightv feats of destruction and implacable deatli, shows but too clearly, that mere vio- lent superiority, and tiie havock they can eifect, even apart from every other view is precisely that whereon they most plume themselves. ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. ST of North- West America, — from which deadly havock not one individual derives the smallest gain, — and wc have vices of the savage more than enough to make us abandon that assumption. Think we, on the other hand, to find a more favourable portrait of human nature among civilized na- tions (where their faculties are better and more fully de- veloped), and we shall straightway hear a long melancho- ly litany, whose stanzas contain nothing but indictments against humanity : we shall hear of a secret guile betwixt even the most cordial friends, so that a certain moderation and reserve of confidence is recommended even in friend- ship, as an indispensable rule of prudence; of a propen- sity to hate those who have obliged us, and for which re- turn every benefactor must be prepared ; of a hearty good-will, which still leaves room for the remark, that there is something in the misfortunes of a very dear friend not altogether displeasing to us, of many other vices cloaked with a specious and dissembled mantle of virtue ; to say nothing of those open faults which disdain all se- crecy ; and we shall have enough of the civilized vices (the most mortifying of all) to cause us to avert our view from the faulty conduct of our fellows, lest we su- perinduce upon us a still farther, and perhaps more hate- ful vice, that of misanthropy. Should this catalogue, however, not yet sufiice, then let any one attend to the vices curiously compounded out of both at once, obtain- ing betwixt states in tlieir outward international i-ela- tions, where countries, although civilized, place them- selves to one another in the relation of savage hordes, i. e. into a state of continual readiness for war, and that, too, with such forethought obstinacy, that they seem to have taken up the rooted opinion, that standing armies never 38 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL are to be abandoned ; and he will immediately perceive, that those great societies called NATioNsf proceed upon principles diametrically contrary to their professed ob- jects — principles whereof they know not how to divest themselves, — which no philosopher lias yet been able to bring into harmony with morality, nor (which is worst) in exchange for which has he been able to propose any better, that would be in unison with human nature; from whence it has happened, that the pliilosophical millen- nium, which expects a period of perpetual peace, ground- ed on a universal league of nations, constituting them- selves into a grand cosmical republic, is— just like the the- ological, which tarries for the complete moral amend- ment of the whole human race, — universally derided as a fanatical delusion. The ground of this evil cannot be placed (first), as is t Looking at the historical progress of states as the phenomenal exhi- bition of those internal predispositions of our humanity that are for the most i)art hidden from our oivn view, we become aware of a certain me> chanical precession, whereby nature advances her own ends, even while defeating and disappointing nations of theirs. Every state endeavours to enlarge its territories by oven-unning all adjacent whom it hopes to conquer, and so, if possible, to erect a universal monarchy ; a state of matters where all freedom, and along wilh it its fruits, viz. virtue, taste, and science, must expire. But the monster, after having de- voured all its neighbours, explodes by and by of "itself,— its laws losing by degrees all co-active power,_and becoming broken up by insurrec- tion and revolt into several lesser states. These, instead of combining in a dvitm viaxhna (i. c. a conmionweallli of free confederate peoples), begin in turn the same game of new, lest war (that scourge of our species) should cease; a thing, which, although by no means so incurably evil as the deadly sepulture of a universal empire (or even as a uoly al- i.iANct, to guarantee to Despots their respective Despotisms for ever), does, nevertheless, ns was reumrked by one of the ancients, make ftr more wicked men than it rcimm$. ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OV GOOD. 39 commonly clone, in the human sensory, and the thence arising natural appetites and wants ; for not only have the appetites no immediate reference to evil (on the contrary, by allowing the moral sentiment to appear in its force, they afford opportunity to good) ; but farther, we are not accountable for their existence (neither can we impute them to ourselves; for, as con-created, we are not their au- thor) ; but what we are by all means accountable for, is the bias to evil, which, as it affects the morality of our own subject, i. e. that wherein and whereby we are free agents, must, as self-demerited, by all means be imputed to us, notwithstanding the deep inrooting of that bias into our choice ; upon account of which bias, we must say that evil is by nature indwelling in man. Neither can {second- ly) the ground of this evil be placed in a corruption of moral-legislative reason, as if reason had abrogated and defaced within itself the authority of the law, and rebel- led against the obligation founded on it ; for this last is ab- solutely impossible. An agent, free, and at the same time absolved from his corresponding Moral Law of Liberty, is a manifest contradiction, and tantamount to fancying a cause in operation without efficient laws. So then, to ex- plain the ground of moral evil in man, the sensory con- tains too little; for the sensory, by itself alone, and ab- stractedly from those springs originated by fi-eedom, low- ers man merely to an animal ; whereas the hypothesis of an absolutely wicked will, and a reason renouncing the government of its own laws, contains too much ; since, in this latter case, a principle of antagonism against the law would be constituted the ruling spring, and the person would be transformed to a Devil. Neither of these cha- racters, however, can properly be applied to mankind. 40 or THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL Altliougli the existence of a bias to evil can be suffi- ciently set forth by the proved collision of man's choice with the law, still such phenomena, experienced and ob- served in time, do not acquaint us with the inward na- ture nor the true ground of this enmity; for, since this antagonism obtains betwixt free choice (?'. e. such a choice as can only be cogitated by an a priori notion), and the moral law, so far forth as it is a spring (where, again, we have still to deal with a pure intellectual conception), it follows, that it must be cognisable a priori, and be dedu- ced from the idea evil, so far as such evil is possible accord- ing to freedom's laws of obligation and imputability. What follows is the evolution of this idea. No man (not even the worst) does in any maxim state a rebellion against the moral law by a studied renuncia- tion, and, as it were, disclamation of his due obedience. On the contrary, the law does, by force of liis moral na- ture, thrust itself irresistibly upon him ; and Avere no oilier spring astir in the mind, he would adopt it as a suf- ficient dctcrminator into his uppermost maxim, i. e. he would be morally good. But, by means of his physical nature, although equally harmless with the other, he leans toward the springs of sense, and, agreeably to the subjective principles of self love, adopts these also into his maxims of life. But were he to do so irrespectively of the law, and make them by themselves alone, the sing- ly-sufficient determinators of his acts, then he would be morally evil. Since now he naturally adopts both into his maxims, and since either, when alone, would be found quite enough to alford a ground of voluntary determina- tion ; he would, — if the moral difference of maxims de- pended only on the difference of their contained springs ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 41 (i. e. on the matter of those maxims), viz. whether the law, or an impulse of sense, were such matter, — be at once both morally good and evil, which, however agreeably to what was laid down in the exordium, is a contradiction. Con- sequently, that whereby a man is morally good or evil, cannot depend on the difference of the springs adopted by him into his maxims {not on their matter), but on their subordination (on their form), namely, which one he CHOOSES TO MAKE THE CONDITION OF THE OTHERS. Hence it appears that mankind is only evil so far forth as he inverts the ethical order of those springs which he adopts into his maxims. In choosing his principles of life, he begins by attempting to place self-love and the moral law alongside of one another ; and on becoming aware that they cannot subsist as co-ordinates, but that one must necessarily be subordinated to the other as its condition, he makes the selfish spring condition his ob- servance of the law ; whereas the latter it is that ought to be the condition precedent of his gratifying the former, and stated as the alone and exclusively prior spring in his supreme and most universal maxim. Notwithstanding this invertedness of the will's springs, contrary to their legitimate ethical ordei-, actions may outwai*dly be as much in liarmony with the law as if they had sprung from genuine motives ; so long as reason lends to the appetitive springs, when integrated as great- est-happiness principles, that unity which would other- wise belong to the moral law — a case where a man's out- ward and observed character is good, although his intelli- gible remain all the while evil. If, now, there be in human nature a proneness to this inverting of the proper order of the will's springs, then 42 OF THE IKDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL is there iu mau a natural bias toward evil ; and such bias is itself morally evil, for it must be regarded as seated in the will's free causality, and consequently as imputable. This evil is radical, for it corrupts man's maxims in their last ground. Moreover, as a natural bias, it never can be extirpated by any exertions of the human subject, for this could only take place by force of good maxims, which, when the supreme subjective ground of all max- ims is already corrupt, never can occur ; nevertheless it can be outweighed, being met with in mankind who are free agents. The vitiosity of human nature is, therefore, not so much WICKEDNESS — this word being understood in its severest sense, namely, as an inward wickedness, or intent of choosing evil as evil (for that were diabolical), — as rather PERVERSITY of heart, which, on account of the conse- quences flowing from it, is called an evil heart. This, however, is not inconsistent with a state of Will that may generally and on the whole be good, and arises from the infirmity of human nature, which is not sufficiently strong to adhere to the good principles it may once for all have adopted ; coupled, however, with the impurity (insince- rity) of not duly sifting and arranging the springs accord- ing to their ethic content, and of having an eye mainly to this, that actions quadrate with the Law, although they have not been originated by it. Now, although from such a state of matters vice may not immediately arise, still the cast of thinking, whereby the absence of vice is look- ed upon as virtue, is already a radical perversity of the human heart. This guilt, called connate, because it shows itself as early as the first utteraikccs of Mankind's Freedom, though ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD 43 sprung from it and imputable, may, in its two first stages of frailty and impurity, be regarded as uninten- tional (culpa)y and only in the third as forethought crime (dolus) ; for it bears the character of a certain guile (do- lus malusj of heart, whereby we deceive ourselves as to the state of our own good or evil sentiments, and, instead of troubling ourselves about our moral or immoral mind- edness, deem ourselves rather justified before the Law, so long as our actions draw after them no bad effects — a case which, for any thing that the maxims are worth, might very well happen. Hence comes the peace of conscience of many who think themselves religious : in the midst of actions where no consideration was had of the Law, or, however, where the Law had not preponderating sway, they luckily escape from all unpleasant sequents, and hence have not only a tranquil mind, but perhaps even a self-opinion of their own merit, by feeling themselves guiltless of those transgressions wherewith they obserA'^e others to be stained. Nor do they think it needful to in- quire whether this exemption be owing merely to the bounty of fortune, or whether the very same vices might not have been committed by them, had not imbecility, con- stitutional temperament, education, or circumstances of time and place (all things quite unimputable), led them to refrain. This insincerity, shrouding our real inward character from our view, prevents the founding of genuine moral principles within, and spreads, after having deceiv- ed ourselves, so as next to beguile and impose upon others, which, if not w;ickedness, is at least worthlessness, ' and proceeds from the radical evil of human nature, which, by distorting and untuning our moral understanding in regard of what a man is to be taken for, renders slippery 44 OF THE INDMELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL and uncertain all ethical imputation, and constitutes that rotten spot in humanity, which, until entirely severed, keeps back the germ of* good from unfolding itself, as it otherwise infallibly would do. A member of the British Parliament once, in the heat of debate, threw out the remark, " Every one has a price, for which he is certainly to be had." Should this indeed be true (and let each determine for himself), and if there is absolutely no virtue for which a grade of temptation can- not be assigned sufficient for its overthrow ; and if our enlisting under the banners of the good or the evil prin- ciple depend on the highest bidder and quickest payment; then may that be universally true of all men, once taught by an Apostle, " There is liere no difference^ fur all are gone astray. There is none that doeth good (according to the spirit of the Law) ; no, not 07ie."* • Of lliis condemnatory sentence of morally judginj^ reason, the proof is contained, not in this, but in the former section ; the above confirms only by experience the accuracy of the previous deduction. But expe- rience and observation cannot unveil the original of this evil, I3 ing, as it does, in the u])j)ermost maxim regulating our free choice, the ajipoint- ment or adopting of wiiich governing princijjle is an intelligible act, anterior to all exj)erience. Hence, likewise, viz. from the incomplex unity of the uppermost maxim and the similarly uncompounded unity of the standard law, we comprehend why the pure intellectual judgment of mankind's morality proceeds on the principle of excluding any interme- diary betwixt good and evil ; altiiough, when judging of actions nicrchj as deals cxhihUcd to sense, the position is quite admissible that tbcrc may be a mean betwixt the moral extremes. Thus, wc may hold ncgathc/t/, that, prior to any education, man is indifferent to both good and evil ; or positivcti/, that his moral actions arc mixed, being partly good and partly bad. Hut these cxjierimental judgmcnls speak of the character of man so far forth only as it is a sensihie hjienomenon, and must give place to the pure a priori intellectual decision when a final and conclusive ad- judication of the whole case is rcfjuired. ALONCi WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 45 SECTION IV. OF THE ORIGIN OF EVIL IN HUMAN NATURE. A FIRST BEGINNING is that Origination of an effect by a cause, where the cause is not itself the effect of any other cause of the like kind. A commencement may be con- sidered as being either a cogitable or a sensible original. In the former respect, we consider only the existence of the effect; but in the latter, the happening of the effect, where consequently the effect is as an event referred to its CAUSE IN TIME. When an effect is referred to a cause wherewith it stands connected agreeably to the laws of freedom, as is the case with moral evil, then is the deter- mination of choice toward its production, viewed in con- nection, not with its determining grounds in time, but with those in pure a priori reason only, and can consequent- ly not be deduced from any antecedent state ; although this last must always be done when an evil action is as an EVENT in the external world referred to its efficient cause in the physical system. To search for an origin in time, of free actions as such, is a contradiction ; and it is equally a contradiction to inquire after any such origin of the moral peculiai-ities of man so far forth as these last are regarded as contingent ; the last ground of the use of freedom must, like every determinative of free choice whatsoever, be sought for exclusively in intellectual representations. Whatever the origin of the moral evil of humanity may be, assuredly, of all representations, the most improper and inept is that whereby its propagation over the race is 46 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL figured as if it descended to us by inheritance from our first parents ; for of moral evil we may well say what the poet affirms of mankind's good-desert, " Genus, et proa- vos, et quce nanfecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco."* Farther, it is to be noted, that in investigating the origin of evil, we do not at first take into consideration the bias toward it {as peccatwn in potentia) ; but sift only the internal pos- sibility of the true and actual evil of given actions, and those conditions of choice that must concur and co-operate with that possibility, before such evil can be perpetrated. Every wicked action whatsoever must, when we consi- der its cogitable original, be so depictured to the mind as if the person had fallen directly into it, out of a state of innocence : for, let a man's previous deportment have been what it may, and whatsoever may have been the physical force bearing in upon him ; nay, whether those physic forces be entirely without, or, moreover, also within the * The three academical faculties would make intelligible, each after its own fashion, this hereditary transmission, viz. as hereditary dis- ease, as A HERITABLE DEBT, Or 33 INHERITED DEPRAVITY. (1.) The medical faculty would figure to themselves this heir-loom of evil as some- thing like a tape-worm, concerning which many natural historians are of opmion, that since nothing like it is found elsewhere, not even in any other animal, this insect must have been pre-existent in our first parents. (2.) Lawyers would regard it as the legal consequence of our succeeding to a patrimony burdened severely with sundry casualties of superiority, or other monstrous dehUa fundi. (To be born is nothing else than to acquire possession of the goods of the earth, in so far as those are indis- pensably requisite to our support.) We must now discharge (suffer for) those obligations, and are notwithstanding eventually torn by death from our possessions. (.3.) Theologians regard this evil as the personal par- ticipation of our first parents in the apostacy of an outcast rebel, and that we either then (although now no longer aware of il) joined his party, or that, born at present under his dominion, we take more plea- sure in the Prince of this World's goods than in the sovereign behest of our Heavenly Lawgiver ; by which breach of allegiance, however, we can only expect hereafter to share his destiny. ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 4T man ; nevertheless his act is free and undetermined by any one of those invading causes; and hence such deed not only C071, but in truth must, be held an originary use of CHOICE. He ought to have eschewed it, in what conjunc- tures and circumstances soever he may have been placed ; for by no cause in the world can he ever cease to be a free, i. e. a spontaneously acting being. Farther, we rightly say, that we impute to evei-y man the coNSEgUENCES aris- ing from his former free immoral acts, and by this we obviate an evasion that might otherwise be attempted, by inquiring whether those sequents themselves be not be- yond our control ; because in the primary free act giving them birth, there is already extant sufficient ground of im- puting them likewise. What although an intelligent may have been never so inveterately wicked, even up to his pre- sent and immediately instant act ? what though his evil habits, long a second nature, should have grown into a first ? still, notwithstanding, it has not only been all along incumbent on him to act otherwise, but it is likewise even NOW his immediate duty to amend ; consequently such in- debted change must be fully within his power, and he is, in the very moment of not altering his inner man, as open to an imputation of transgressing, as if endowed with a natural predisposition toward good — (a thing inseparable from freedom) — he Avere now, by an original lapse, falling from his pristine state of innocence into evil. We cannot therefore raise any question as to such deed's origin in time {i. e. its chronic origin) , but can investigate only its origin in reason {i. e. its cogitable origin), when we wish to look into, and, if possible, explain the bias, i. e. the gene- ral subjective ground whereby we adopt into our maxim an intent of transgressing. 48 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL. Quite analogous to what is here advanced is the repre- sentation of this matter given by tlic Scripture, wlien it describes the origin of evil as chronologically/ BEGimn'SG in the human race, and narrates what in the nature of things must have gone first (apart from all conditions of time) as a commencement in time only. Agreeably to this an- cient Chronicle, evil commences not from any indwelling bias toward it, for then its rise and spring would not be from the causality of freedom, but takes its origin from sin, i. e. from the transgression of the Moral Law qtia Divine Commandment. Again, the state of mankind antecedent to all bias toward evil is called the state of innocence. In this state the Moral Law first announced itself to man- kind by its veto (Genesis, ii. 16, 17), as indeed it must do in the case of every agent not altogether pure, but ex- posed to the solicitations of appetite. But instead of ex- clusively giving ear to this law as the only nncondition- ately good spring, mankind began to beat about for sun- dry other springs (Ibid. iii. 6), w^hich are no more than hypothetically good (viz. so far forth as they encroach not on the law), and made it his maxim (if we cogitate the act as emanating with full consciousness from freedom) to obey the Law of Duty, not singly out of Duly, but per- chance with a view to some ulterior ends. Hence he be- gan to quibble* away the severity of that commandment • All homage demonstrated toward the law, so long as we give it not, as hy and for itself the sufficient spring, preponderating weight over every other determinative of choice, is hvpocriticai,, and the bias to pay such abortive homage inwaiid guile, ». e. a bias to self-deceit, when quadrating ourselves with the moral law ; upon which account it is that the Rible calls the Author of Evil (who, however, resides in our- selves) THE MAR rnoM THE HEGiNNiNci ; and thus characterizes man- kind by what seems the main ground of his evil conduct. ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD, 49 which secludes the influence of every other spring. By and by he degraded obedience to the rank of a mere mean or condition subservient to principles of self-love ; thus final- ly an undue weight of sensitive impulses became intro- duced into the maxims of life, the springs arising from the law were overbalanced, and so mankind sinned. Mutato nomine de tefabiila narratur. That \ve daily and hourly do just so; and that consequently " in Adam all have siwied" and " still sin" is self-evident from our pre- vious remarks; with this difference, however, that we come into the world with a connate bias to transgression, whereas in the first created pair no such bias — only inno- cence — is conceivable; wherefore a transit into evil is in their case spoken of as a fall — in us as proceeding from the already extant and ingenite depravity of our nature. This bias, however, signifies nothing farther, than that when we endeavour to unravel and retrace the chronic ORIGIN of evil, we must, for the cause of every predeter- minate transgression, recede toward the sources of evil, along the links of time, backwards to that period when our rational faculties were as yet undeveloped; for the groundwork of which development we must assume a bias somewhere as a natural bent toward evil, called upon that account connate — a mode of figuring to ourselves the mat- ter, that, since our first parents are held to have been created with, and instated in, the complete possession of all their faculties, is in their case quite impracticable. For had our progenitors brought with them into the world any such indwelling bias, then it would have been, not in- deed connate, but, what is far worse, concreated, and part of their aboriginal subsistency; whereas, as it is, their SIN is proposed to us as a fall out of innocence. — Of a D 50 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLF OF EVIL moral propeity imputable to our account, no origin in time is therefore to be sought, although it is quite inevit- able not to attempt such an investigation when we wish to EXPLAIN to ourselves its contingent presence with our race. Whence perhaps also the Scripture, in condescension to our frailty, may have thought fit thus to represent the matter. The cogitable origin of this disjointing of our choice, whereby subordinate springs have come to be uppermost, is inscrutable; for this bias to evil must itself be imputed to us, and consequently the ground of choosing evil max- ims would itself need to be accounted for by pre-suppos- ing some ulterior maxim to adopt such evil ground. Evil can only take its rise from what is morally bad, and can- not have the bounds of our finite nature for its source ; and yet, since the originary predispositions of humanity (which, if this corruption is to be imputed to him, no one save mankind himself could destroy) are all substrata toward good, there remains no assignable ground whence moral evil can at first have flowed. This incomprehen- sibility, together with the more exact specifying of the grade of mankind's wickedness, is what is suggested by Holy Writ,* when it sets forth evil as coeval with the ' What is here said is not to be understood as if it were intended for Scriptural exegesis, — a thing quite beyond the legitimate boundary of pure reason. People may come to a general understanding as to the best mode of making available, for purposes of moral instruction, any historic document, without undertaking to say whether the interpre- tation is really the writer's meaning, or only one we put upon him ; provided only that such interpretation contain what is in itself true, even independently of all historic evidence, and be moreover the only sense by dint of which we can extract from a passage somewhat condu- cive to moral edification ; — since otherwise the narrative could be no more than a fruitless augmentation of our historical knowledge. People ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 51 beginning of the world, though not yet to be met with in man, but pre-existent in a spirit once of a most excel- lent and lofty nature; whereby is foreshadowed to us just this FIRST beginning of all evil as utterly unfathomable : for whence can have come the evil of this spirit ? — as also farther, that since 'twas only by his seduction that mankind lapsed into evil, we are not out-and-out corrupt- ed, but still capable of amendment, and thereby contradis- tinguished from a seducing spirit, in whose favour no fleshly appetites can be counted as an alleviation of his guilt ; whereas with us, amid the ruin of our hearts there are remains of a good will, and consequently room for the not ungrounded hope of our return to that good from which we have swerved. GENERAL SCHOLION. OF RE-INSTATING THE PREDISPOSITION TOWARD GOOD, INTO ITS ORIGINARY POWER. Whatever, in a moral sense, man is, or ought to be, whether good or evil, that must he either have made, or have still to make, out of himself ; either product must ought not needlessly to dispute about a document, and its historical au- thority, when that document's contents, how multiform soever they may be, tend in nowise to make us better men, or when, if they have that tendency, they can be known aliunde without documentary proof, and indeed mtist be so cognizable. Historical knowledge, which cannot have any inward reference to morality, nor validity for every one, falls under the class of ethical adiapTiora, whereof each may take just as much as he finds editying. 52 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL be the effect of his own free choice, since, if otherwise, it could not be imputed, and the man himself would conse- quently be MORALLY neither good nor evil : When it is said " mankind was created good," that can mean no more than that he was destined for good by his Creator, and that his originary predispositions are good. Man is not, by force of these, already good, but only so far forth as he rejects or adopts the thence arising good springs into his maxims of conduct (which must be left entirely to his option) does he bring it about that he becomes either good or evil. Even admitting that toward his be- coming good or better, supernatural co-operation were in- dispensable, then, whether this aid consist in withdraw- ing hinderances, or in lending him some positive help, mankind must nevertheless first of all make himself wor- thy to receive it, and must, by adopting this principle of intensifjang strength into his maxim, lay hold on and appropriate it — which assuredly is no small matter : thus aUme can such superadded good be adjudged to his ac- count, and the man himself be reckoned morally well-de- serving and of ethical desert. How it is possible that one naturally and radically bad should come to make out of himself a man good — tran- scends all our information ; for how can an evil tree bring forth good fruit ? But since a tree confessedly good has, agreeably to our foregoing investigation, brought forth bad fruit ;* and since the lapse from good into evil (when * A tree predisposed by its constitution toward good is no more than possibly good, not yet really so ; for, were it actually good, then it could not bring forth bad fruit. It is only when mankind avails himself of the latent springs whereby he can act upon the law, that he becomes trulj good (the tree an absolutely good tree.) ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 53 we bethink ourselves that it must arise from freedom) is not more comprehensible than a return from that evil to- ward good, the possibility of this latter transformation cannot be denied. Notwithstanding our fall, the com- mandment, " it behoves us to become better men" resounds unintermittently throughout our soul ; consequently we can amend, even were our own endeavour insufficient, and only rendering us susceptible of an unsearchable higher aid. In this assertion, we no doubt assume that a germ of good still subsists in its entire purity, alike un- corrupted and indestructible, which most certainly cannot be self-love;* for this last, when made a ruling principle of choice, is precisely the rise and source of every evil. * Words that admit of a double sense not unfrequently prevent even the clearest grounds of reason from begetting a full and permanent con- viction. As LOVE, so may self-love be divided into that of benevo- lence and COMPLACENCY. Both are quite consistent with reason. To make the former a principle of conduct is quite natural, for who would not wish for perpetual welfare ? And yet this selfish good-will is only reasonable in so far as it proposes to itself those ends singly which may consist with the highest and most lasting happiness, and then chooses the fittest and most appropriate means for reaching those elements of well-being. In such circumstances, reason acts merely as a handmaid in the service of our ordinary appetites, and the systematic maxims that may be adopted for appeasing them stand quite unrelated to mora- lity, or do rather, when made the unconditioned principles of volition, ut- terly subvert it. A reasonable love of self-complacency may also be understood in a twofold manner : firsts that we are well-pleased with ourselves in consequence of our gaining the aforementioned ends, and then such complacential self-love is identic with the love of a selfish good-will toward one's self. We take pleasure in ourselves, just as a tradesman, whose mercantile speculations turn out well, congratulates himself on his foresight and skill. Or, second^ we may mean the self- love of an unconditioned complacency, and this latter self-com- placency would not depend on whatever gain or losses might flow from our actions, but on the inward principle of such self-approbation as can alone spring from the subordination of all our maxims to the moral law. No one to whom morality is not indifferent, can be well-pleased with 54 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL The redintegration of our aboriginal predisposition to- ward good, is consequently not the re-acquisition of a lost ethic spring; for this consisting in reverence toward the mo- ral law, we never could by any possibility have forfeited ; and could such forfeiture at all occur, then never could we again have resuscitated such a feeling within. The renova- tion of mankind's moral character, is therefore the reviving of reverence in its primitive purity, as a condition pre- cedent, that must qualify every maxim ; agreeably to which reverence, the law, — not merely conjunctly with other springs, or perhaps postponed to them — but in its naked integrity, is re-established as of itself the sufficient spring determining our choice. The original good consists in that sanctity of intent, which proposes to itself the execution of all duty, whereby whoso entertains such pure maxims, though not yet himself holy (for betwixt intent and act there lies a mighty gap), is notwithstanding on the road himself while conscious of sentiments militating against the law ; on the contrary, such inward warfare can only leave room for a feeling of the most bitter self-dislike. Hence we may speak of a practical SELr-LOVE, which disdains all admixture of foreign elements of happi. ness, and seeks satisfaction only in the pure a priori spring of choice. Since, however, this last is neither more nor less than iuunediate reve- rence toward the law, it is difficult to understand why people embarrass themselves by talking of a reasonaule and of a moral self-love, seeing tbat ethically mankind can only like himself so far forth as he is aware of having made reverence for tiie law his ruling motive. Happi- ness is, agreeably to our sensitive nature, the first object that we uncon- ditionally desire ; although, when viewed in connection with our whole rational and free economy, it is neither the first nor yet unconditioned ob. ject of choice. This last is odr worthiness of being rendered HAPPY ; ». c. the harmony o. all our maxims with the moral law. That this be made the objective condition, under which alone our wish for hap- j)incss can be brought into unison with legislative reason, is the dritl and upshot of every ethic rescript ; and a moral cast of thought just consists in iiarbouring only such conditioned wishes. ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF QOOD. 55 thitherward, and approximating his goal by endless pro- gression. Readiness in performing dutiful actions is how- ever called VIRTUE, when regard is had merely to the le- gality of a person's character, so far forth as it can be known from experience and observation ( Virtus PhcBno- menon). Such virtuous character is in permanent posses- sion of maxims, whence actions outwardly in harmony with the law arise — only the springs employed for this purpose are borrowed indifferently fi-ora any quar- ter. In this sense, virtue is acquired bit-by-bit, and is defined by many to be a long habit of observing the law, whereby mankind passes, as he gradually re- forms his conduct, from a proneness to vice, into a contrary bias toward virtue ; for all which, no change OF HEART is needed, only a change of manners. Mankind deems himself virtuous when he feels his habits confirmed of performing what outwardly is du- ty, although his actions flow not from the supi-erae prin- ciple of morality. On the contrary, the intemperate grows sober for the sake of health : the liar betakes himself to truth, on account of his reputation ; the fraudulent returns to municipal honesty from a view to repose or gain ; all in conformity with the lauded greatest-happiness-prin- ciples. But for any one to become not merely a legal- ly, but, moreover, a morally-good man {i. e. acceptable to God), that is, virtuous according to his intelligible character (Virtus Noumenon), and to make himself one who, when he recognises any thing to be his duty, needs no other or farther motive than just this very represen- tation duty, that cannot be effected by any gradual re- forms, so long as the basis of his maxims remains im- pure ; but can only be accomplished by a transvolu- 56 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL TION of the sentiments of the inner man (an instant transit to maxims of holiness), and he becomes a new man only through a sort of regeneration, as it were by a new- creation {John, iii. 5 ; Genesis, i. 2), and change of heart. But if man is depraved at the bottom of his heart, how is it possible that he, by his own strength, can bring about this revolution within, and become, of his own accord, a good man ? Nevertheless, duty thus enjoins; but the law ordains nothing impracticable, wherefore we must hold that the revolving takes place in the cast of thinking ; and that the gradual reform affects the bent of the sensory so far forth as this last throws obstacles before the first : that is to say, — when by one single inflexible determination, mankind retroverts his will's perverted bias for choosing evil maxims, he then puts on a new man, and becomes, in regard of his principles and inward-mindedness, placed in a capacity for good : while, perceptibly, it is only through a long track of conduct that he can be seen even by him- self to have grown into a good man. In a siugle word, it is to be hoped, that this purity of principle, now chosen as his dominant rule of life, will suflice to keep him un- swervingly steady, along the good though narrow rail- way of a perpetual progression from bad to better. This progression is for him to whom the unknown depths of the heart are patent, and in whose All-Seeing eye the mo- ments of the series are envisaged in their sum, an integral unity, i. e. is before God tantamount to being already a really good man, and acceptable in his sight : wherefore, thus far forth the change may be regarded as a finished and entire conversion of the heart. But for mankind, who can only estimate themselves, and the strength of their adopted maxims, by the upperhand they gradually gain ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 57 through time over the sensory, the transition can never he regarded otherwise, than as an ever-enduring striving after what is better, consequently, as no more than a gi-adual reformation of the bias to evil. Hence it follows, that the moral education cf man can- not begin with correcting his manners, but must take its rise from a transvolving of his cast of thinking, and must set to work by endeavouring to beget and found a cha- racter. Commonly, however, people set about this mat- ter otherwise, fighting against singular vices, and leaving the common root, whence they sprout, untouched. And yet mankind, even when gifted with the most scanty intellectuals, is just so much the more readily awaken- ed to deeper feelings of reverence for duty, the more he is taught to withdraw therefrom all foreign motives that self-love might otherwise thrust into the maxims of con- duct ; even children are quite in a condition to detect any, aye ! the smallest vestige, of an admixture of spurious with the genuine springs ; whereupon actions, how seemly so- ever, lose straightway in their eyes all moral worth. This susceptibility for receiving impressions of the unadulterat- ed moral good, admits of being so wonderfully cultiv^ated, as to become stamped indelibly on the heart, when we propose to their youthful notice examples of the illustrious dead, and make them sit in judgment on the ethical purity or impurity of their maxims, so far as that can be clearly gathered from the record of their actions; — an occupation of the understanding that soon gives to the naked idea DUTY preponderating weight. Contrariwise, to allow one's ethic pupils to wonder at deeds of virtue, even though accomplished with the greatest sacrifices, is far from being the right key to which the mind should be attuned, in 58 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL order to bring it to a moral pitch. It is a mistake to' suppose that any good, mankind may do, can surpass his duty. Discliarging duty, however, is only that regularity which is of the essence of a moral order of things, and is consequently nothing that deserves to be wondered at. Such wonder is rather mischievous in its effect, and un- strings the reverential chords of duty, by representing its performance, as something meritorious and extraordinary- One thing, however, there is, which, when rightly ap- prehended, never ceases to transfix the soul with the highest possible admiration, and where such admiration is not only just, but does likewise clarify and exalt the soul — and that is the originary substratum for morality it- self. What is that (mankind may well ask himself) where- by he, dependent by so many wants on the physical system, is, notwithstanding, at the same time raised so far above it, by force of the idea of an original susceptibility with- in, that all those wants shrink to nothing, and he him- self is judged unworthy even to live, if, overcome by pain, or defiled by pleasure, he incline to an enjoyment of them (which yet alone can render life desirable), doing despite to a law whereby Reason mightily commands, though annex- ing to that behest neither bribe nor threat ? The weight of this question even the most unlettered must right inly feel, if at all aware of the sanctity attaching to the idea Duty ; though as yet unacquainted with that amazing pro- perty of our nature — Freedom* — unfolded singly from the • The idea of our freedom is not antecedent to our consciousness of the moral law, but is inferentiallv deduced from its unconditioned sway over the determinableness of our choice. This any one may speedily become convinced of, by merely asking himself if he is immediately certain of possessing a power of vanquishing the greatest seductions to transgression by dint of a forethought steadfastness of resolve, ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 59 representing of the law. And it is just the incomprehen- sible of this godlike susceptibility, announcing to man his celestial descent, that does, by breaking on the mind with a force that cannot be resisted, swell and transfix the soul with reverential emotions of the deepest and most enrap- tured admiration, thereby strengthening him for whatever sacrifices the awe of duty may demand. Again and again to arouse this feeling of the excellent and sublime of our moral destination is especially to be recommended, as the chief mean of begetting moral sentiments, inasmuch as this feeling directly counteracts our inborn bias to pervert the order of our springs of choice ; so that, by restoring the Phalaris licet imperet ut sis Falsus, et admoto dictet perjuria tauro ; and the answer must at once be, that he cannot tell whether, m such event, he might not be shaken from his purpose. But duty demands that he adhere inviolably faithful to its decrees ; hence he rightly infers that he can do so, i. c. that his will is free. They who maintain that this unsearchable property of our nature is quite comprehensible, de- lude themselves with the word determinism {the Principie of the W"M's DeterininatioH by sufficient inward grounds) ; as if the difficulty consisted in combining this principle with freedom ; whereas the difficulty is, how Predeterminism — whereby our voluntary actions, as events, have their sufficient ground in antecedent times that are no longer within our power — can consort with freedom, which last retjuires that both act and its contrary be at the instant of my acting fully within my own con- trol. That is what people fain would, but never will, comprehend. There is, however, no difficulty in combining the idea freedom with that of God as a necessary Being. For freedom does not consist in the contingency of an act {i. e. in its being undetermined by any grounds), (j. e. such a principle of ixdetekminissi as might represent good and evil as equally possible divine acts, if those last are to be free), but in absolute spontaneity, and thus is endangered by predeterminism alone, in as much as there the determinative ground is contained in time by- gone, is consequently not in my power, but in the hand of nature, and so drives me irresistibly on to act. But since in the case of the Deity no sequences sf time are cogitable, this difficulty entirely falls away. 60 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL unconditioned reverence for the Law as the supreme condition of all maxims we adopt, the originary moral order may be reintroduced among the heart's ravelled springs, and therewith, that the predisposition toward good, at first implanted in the heart of man, may be re- suscitated in its pristine purity and vigour. But is not this redintegration of character by one's own exertions, diametrically opposed by the inborn depravity of man, whereby he is unfitted for good ? Doubtless ! so far as the comprehensibility of such a change is con- cerned ; and as for any insight into its possibility, the present case is quite on a par with every other event in time (change), which is itself necessary when regard is had to the Physical System, and whose antipart is never- theless figured, agreeably to the Moral Law, to be possi- ble and realizable by freedom. Tiie position of man- kind's indwelling radical evil does therefore preclude only our seeing into the ground of the possibility of this self- reform. It is not inconsistent with the possibility of a return to good itself; for, so long as the Moral Law com- mands, " Thou SHALT become a better maiii^ the conclu- sion is inevitable " that thou CANST." The heart's con- nate evil is a statement of no practical import in the theory, i. e. neither in the elementology, nor in the di- dactic of morals ; for the duties imposed by the Law remain the same, and retain the same obligatory force, whetlier a bias to evade them be co-extant with the Will or not. But in the ascetic of morals the position does say something, and yet no more than this, viz. that in cultivating our concreated ethical predispositions toward good, we caimot so begin, as were we by nature innocent, but are constrained to set to work by counteracting a vi- ALONG WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD. 61 tiosity of choice, subverting our primeval ethical condi- tion, and, because this bias is inei-adicable, by unremit- tingly wrestling, and so making stand against it. Since now this issues in an endless progress from bad to better, it results that the converting of the sentiments of the wicked, into those of the good, takes place by so changing the innermost and last ground whereupon maxims of life are determined on, that those last become henceforward conformable to the Law, so far forth at least as this new ground (the new heart) is itself immutable. A convic- tion of this immutability cannot be attained by man, nei- ther from the immediate witness of his conscience, nor yet from proofs gathered from his experienced and ob- served life, inasmuch as the depths of his heart (the last subjective ground of choosing maxims) are impenetrable. But upon the road leading thither, i. e. to such immutabi- lity^ he must hope to get by his own exertions, whither- ward indeed he is directed by his bettered sentiment, now grounded and rooted in good. It behoves him to be- come a good man ; and he can only be deemed morally good, in regard of whatever, as done by himself, can be im- puted to his account. Against this proposal of self-amelioration. Reason, now naturally disinclined to the irksomeness of any moral task, seeks refuge by screening itself under the allega- tion of mankind's natural imbecility, and there shield- ing itself by all sorts of impure religious ideas (amongst which is to be reckoned the ascribing to God greatest-hap- piness-principles as the condition of his Law). Again, all religions may be divided into those of mere worship and THE RELIGION OF A MORAL LIFE. Agreeably to the former, mankind either flatters himself that God will 62 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL provide for liis everlasting welfare, quite apart from his becoming a morally better man (by remitting his sins) ; or, should this last appear to him incredible, that God may perhaps straightway make him better, and that too independently of his own exertions, provided he only earnestly beseech it by instant prayers and supplications ; whereby since, in the eye of an all-seeing person, praying can be nothing else than tantamount to wishing, nothing need at all be done; for indeed if a wish could accom- plish such a transformation, then would every one be good. But upon the principles of moral religion (which, amid all public ones that have hitherto appeared, the Christian religion alone is), this is the unalterable de- cree, " that every one must do as much as in him lies in or- der to render himself a better man, and only then, when he has not buried his connate talent, nor tied it up in a napkin (Luke, xix. 12-20) i. e. when he has unfolded the germs latent in his aboriginal susceptibilities for good, may he hope, that what lies beyond his power nuiy be supplied by a higher cooperation." Neither is it absolutely necessary that an individual should know wherein this aid consists, nor how it is afforded ; perhaps it is inevitable, that even were all this revealed at some former period, other people should not at some other and future period, come to frame to themselves different opinions, and that too with the greatest possible sincerity, about the matter. But if this be so, then would this farther principle validly apply. " It is not essential, and consequently not necessary, for every ONE to know what God does, or may already have done for his salvation ; but it is undoubtedly requisite that all should know WHAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE TO DO in order to render themselves worthy of his aid." ALONG WITH THfc I'KlWClfl.E OF GOOD. G3 This general scholion is the first of those four remarks that are appended, one to each book, of the present treatise, and that might be superscribed respectively, (I.) Works of Grace ; (2.) Miracles ; (3.) Mysteries ; (4.) Means of Grace. They are the outworks (pare7'ga) of a religion within the bounds of NAKED REASON ; they do not inwardly belong to it, but they are immediately adjoining. Reason, conscious of its inability to satis- fy all the mind's moral needs, extends itself to transcendent ideas, hoping that they may make up for this defect, without however vindicating any claim of possession to such more extensive ter- ritorj\ Reason impugns neither the possibility nor yet the EXISTENCE of objects corresponding to those ideas, but is unable to adopt any motives from them either into its maxims of think- ing or acting. Nay, reason rather holds, that if there be in the unsearchable fields of the supersensible, anything more than it can comprehend, but which were nevertheless needful to eke out and fulfil our moral shortcoming, then this would stand us in stead, and be made available to a good will, though all the while unacquainted with the matter ; and this it trusts with a faith (touching such unknown and inaccessible supersensible supply) which we may call reflective ; for the dogmatical belief, which gives out these pa7-ergfa as points of knowledge, appears in its eye chargeable with either iiisincerify or temerity. Tlie re- moval of difficulties withstanding what has its practical estab- lishment in itself, is, when those difficulties give rise to transcen- dent questions, no more than a very secondary affair. Again, as to the detriment accruing from those worally-trajiscendent \deas, when incorporated with religion, the baneful results following the above-named four classes, are, (1.) the Fanaticism of sup- posed inward experiences ( Works of Grace) ; (2.) the Super- stition of alleged outward experience (Miracles); (3.) the ILLUMINATISM of a supposcd enlightening of the eyes of the imderstanding in regard of the preternatural (Mysteries) — the 64 OF THE INDWELLING OF A PRINCIPLE OF EVIL. whimseys of Adepti in search of the great secret ; (4.) the Thau- MATURGY of endeavouring to act upon the supersensible {Means of Grace) — all wanderings of an understanding that has strayed beyond its legitimate boundar}', and that too with the fancied moral view of becoming acceptable to God. Touching the above general scholion to our first book, every one perceives that to bring about within himself a work of grace, is just such an attempt to bestride the supernatural, — a project that never en- ters into the maxims of reason so long as it remains within its own limits ; since the moment we have to deal with the preter- natural, all use of understanding comes at once to an end. To assign theoretically a test whereby to ascertain that any inward mental experience is a work, not of nature, but of grace, is im- possible, because our notions of cause and effect cannot be ex- tended beyond what we have experienced and observed, conse- quently not beyond the operations of nature, without or within ourselves. Again, the hypothesis of a practical application of this idea is no less self-contradictory ; for, to make any use of this conception, would render pre-requisite a rule fixing what we ourselves had to do in order to acquire some ulterior good. A work of grace, however, signifies the very contrary, viz. that the moral good is not our deed, but that of some other person, and is therefore, by the very idea of it, something only to be got by DOING NOTHING, which is absurd. We can therefore admit such works of grace as somewhat incomprehensible ; but never can they afford the groundwork of any maxims, whether regulating the theoretical or practical conduct of the mind. HARMONY AND IDENTITY NOTICES OF REASON WITH THOSE OF ANY POSSIBLE REVELATION, SHEWN IN FOUR BOOKS. BOOK H. OF THE COMBAT BETWIXT THE GOOD AND THE EVIL PRINCIPLE, FOR THE DOMINION OVER MAN. BOOK IL OF THE COMBAT BETWIXT THE GOOD AND THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. EXORDIUM. That, id order to become morally good men, it is not enough to allow the germs of good implanted in our race to develope themselves with unimpeded force, but that it is further requisite for us to encounter an opposing cause of evil, — is a matter that the Stoics did pre-eminently be- yond all Moralists of Antiquity declare loudly by their watchword virtue, which alike in Greek and Latin signi- fies FORTITUDE or VALOUR, and does consequently remind us that there is an enemy to be overcome. Regarded in this point of view, virtue is a most praiseworthy name, notwithstanding its having been often boastfully abused, and, more lately still, sneeringly derided. For, to summon up to valour, is almost tantamount to infusing it; as, on the other hand, a lazy self-distrusting reason, pusillani- mously waiting for exterior aids in points of ethic and religion, not only unnerves every energy of the mind, but even renders man unworthy of such help. But those sturdy Sages mistook their enemy, who is not to be sought in the natural, and, though undisciplined. 68 OF THE COMBAT BETWIXT Still openly displayed and undisguised, appetites of tlio sensory ; for the inward foe is an invisible occult enemy, lurking behind the ambushes of reason, and upon that account just so much the more dangerous and deadly. Theyf called on wisdom to make a stand against folly, which allows itself unawares to be inveigled and worsted by the sensory, instead of calling upon her to wage war ■f- These philosophers derived their supreme moral principle from the Dignity of Human Nature, viz freedom, or the mind's independency on the force of appetite ; and one better or more noble they could not have proceeded on. The laws of morality they then immediately deduced from reason, thus alone legislatory, and by them unconditionally com- manding. Here everything was properly adjusted, not only objective/;/, as regards the rule, but likewise subjectively, with respect to the spring, of action : provided only we ascribe to man the incorrupted will to adopt without delay those laws into his maxims. But in this latter supposi- tion lay their cardinal error ; for, however early we may throw our in- quiring eye over man's moral state, we immediately perceive that with his affairs it is no longer res Integra ; but that a beginning must be made by dislodging evil from possessions it has usurped (a usurpation that never could have taken place, had we not ourselves willingly received it into our maxims), i. e. that the first real good we can do, is to come forth out of an evil estate, extant not in our appetites and wants, but in a ])erverse maxim chosen by freedom. Appetites do no more than throw difficulties in the way of executing maxims that may happen to thwart them : whereas evil consists properly herein, vis. that mankind wills not to withstand those appetites when these last invite to transgression ; which evil-mindedness it is strictly that is the true inward enemy. Ap- petites are merely opposed to fixt principles generally, indifferently whether those principles be good or evil, and hence that generous sys- tem of antiquity is as a pre-exercitory discipline of aj)petite whatso- ever, useful toward the moderating and self-government of the indi- vidual by stable maxims. But, in so far as there ought to be specific PRINCIPLES of the moral good within, which as yet are not, then must a very different enemy be pre-supposed, whom virtue has to encounter, —apart from which sustained warfare, all virtues are not indeed, as the Church-Father had it, »7<»n»M^'- sins, but dazzliiitr frailties ; since thereby tiic uproar itself is only sometimes hushed, while the Heads of the sedi- tioii remain unquclled and at large. THE GOOD AND THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 69 upon the wickedness of the human heart, which, by soul-destroying principles, secretly saps and undermines the moral fortresses of the soul. Our natural appetites are considered in themselves good, i. e. irreproachable, and it is not only fruitless, but even hurtful and blame- worthy, to attempt to extirpate them ; they need only to be tamed, lest they encroach upon or overthrow each other, and so be prevented from harmonis- ing toward ttieir whole and common last end — happiness. Reason, when administering this physical interest of well- being, is called prudence. Only the morally illegal is in itself bad, absolutely objectionable, and to be eradicat- ed. Reason, when teaching how this is to be done, and, still more fitly, when exerting this information into act, deserves and obtains the name of wisdom, in comparison wherewith vice may certainly be termed folly; but only then, when reason finds herself strong enough not merely to HATE and arm herself against it as an object of terror, but thoroughly to despise its charms and artful entangle- ments. When, consequently, the Stoics painted to themselv^es man's ethical Olympiad as a mere wrestle or gymnastic with his (otherwise harmless) desires and aversions, so far forth as these latter hinderances of his inward freedom were to be overthrown ; then, since they assumed no par- ticular positively evil principle, the cause of transgres- sion could only be placed in reason's neglecting to meet them on the battle-field. But since, farther, this omission is itself contrary to duty {i. e. transgression), its ground cannot (without explaining in a circle) be again placed in the appetites and wants, but only therein, where will's free choice is determinable {i. e. in the inmost last ground of 70 OF THE COMBAT BETWIXT appoiutiug rules of life, which rules are observed to have conspired with the incJinatious). This being the case, we easily understand how an inevitable though unwelcome explanation, whose last ground must remain perpetually shrouded within the veil of the impenetrable,! should in- duce philosophers to mistake the actual enemy of good, against wiiom they thought a contest was to be main- tainiid. None need, therefore, be surprised that an Apostle should have represented this unseen soul-devastatiiig enemy, known only by his effects upon us, as external to our frame, and more particularly as an evil spirit. ^^ For we wrestle not against flesh and blood {our NJTVRAL in- clinations), but against the principalities and powers of spiritual wickedness ; — that we may be able to stand againM the wiles of the devil" (Ephes. vi. 12 and 11) ; an expres- sion that does not appear designed to extend our knowledge beyond the barriers of the world of sense, but to assist us to envisage, for a practical behoof, a notion of the unfathom- able supersensible. For, to all practical ends it is quite the ■f Moral philosophers commonly imagine that the existence of evil in our race admits of easy explication, from the violence of the sensitive springs on the one haiul, and the impotency of the rational springs {rcte. reKce) on the other; i. e. is to be accounted for from the fraii.tt or weak- ness of our nature. But then the Moral Good (as to its last ground in the ethical predisposition of our personality) ought to be still more easily explicable ; for the comprehensibility of the one, apart from that of the other, is absolutely incogitable, whereas Reason's power of mastering all opposing springs by the naked idea of a law is utterly inexplicable ; and it is equally incomprehensible how the springs of the sensory ever could gain the ascendency over a preceptive faculty invested with such autho- rity. And, indeed, if every one acted agreeably to the requirements of the law, then it would be said that all followed a common order, neither would it occur to any one to inquire into the cause of this uniformitv. THE GOOD AND THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 71 same whether we place our Seducer within or also at tlie same time without us. Our guilt is the same in either *vent, in as much as we could not fall by his extraneous seduction were we not already secretly banded and in league with him ;f an affair we shall consider under the two following heads. •j- It is a distinguishing characteristic of the ethic of Christianity, that it represents Moral Good as distant from Moral Evil, not as heaven from EARTH, but as heaven from hell ; a mode of speech figurative, no doubt, and as such revolting, but which is nevertheless, in its spirit and intendment, philosophically correct. It serves to prevent us from regardinggood and evil — the kingdoms of light and darkness — as conter- minous, and as merging gradually into one another, through impercep- tible shades of perpetually decreasing or increasing luminosity, and sug- gests to us, that those realms are disjoined by an immeasurable gulf. The total dissimilarity and repugnancy of the maxims whereby man is rendered a subject in one or other of these kingdoms, viewed in connec- tion with the danger run of imagining any cognationship betwixt the properties that fit mankind for one or other of those abodes, entitle us to employ these symbolical representations, which are at once dreadful, and at the same time exceedingly sublime. 72 OF THE COMBAT BETWIXT \ APOTOME r. OF THE TITLE OF THE GOOD PRINCIPLE TO RULE OVER MANKIND. A. Impersonated Idea of the Good Principle. Mankind (^. e. Agent-IntelHgents generally), in his ENTIRE MORAL PERFECTION, is that alonc wliicli can ren- der a universe tlie object of a divine decree, and be tbe end of its creation ; to which morality as a supreme con- dition, liappiness is immediately attached by the Will of the Most High. This Intelligent is the only-beloved of God — " the same was in the beginning with God.''* The idea of such Person emanates from God's very essence, and is therefore no created thing, but his only-begotten Son. *' The Word (the Fiat !) whereby all things were made, and without which was not amj thing made that is made." For his sake, i. e. for the sake of Intelligents, cogitated agreeably to the fulfilment of their moral destiny, every thing has been created. " He is the brightness of his Fa- ther's glory" — " In him God loved the world ;" and only through him, and by adopting his sentiments, can we hope to become " children of God.'' Self-elevation to this ideal of moral perfection, i. e. to the archetype of moral sentiments in their entire pu- rity, is obviously a duty incumbent upon all men, to which ascent, the idea itself, as objected to us by reason for our imitation, gives power. But since we are not the THE GOOD AND THE EVIL PRINCIPLE. 73 authors of this ideal (and since, on the contrary, it lias taken up its abode in human nature without our being able to explain our susceptibility for the indwelling of such an occupant), it may perhaps be more appropriately said, that that archetype has come down from heaven to us, and assumed our humanity (for it is not so easy to figure to ourselves how man, who is by nature bad, should strip off his evil, and raise himself to a conformity with the Ideal of Holiness, as it is to hold that the latter has invested itself with humanity {a thing not in itself evil), and condescended unto it). This union with us may thei'efore be regarded as a state of humiliation of the Son of God, when we figure to ourselves such a godlike-minded person as may be our archetype, taking upon him a multitude of sorrows, although himself holy, and therefore exempt from their sufferance, merely with the view of advancing our Sovereign Good ; whereas man- kind, who never is free from guilt, must, even after he has adopted the sentiments of that ideal, regard whatever sorrows may afflict him, in whatever way, as his merited desert (i. e. as no undue humiliation? Tr.), and must con- sequently deem himself unworthy of entering into an al- liance with such an idea, although this last serves for his archetype. The ideal of humanity as acceptable to God {i. e. the idea of an ethical perfection, so far forth as this last may be possible for finite Agent-Intelligents shackled by wants and appetites) can only be cogitated by the representation of a person ready and willing to discharge all the offices of humanity, who not only by doctrine and example spreads abroad the utmost amount of good, but does fur- ther, although assaulted by the highest temptations, un- 74 OF THE COMBAT BETWIXT dergo for the sake of the whole world, his enemies not ex- cepted, the greatest miseries, even an ignominious death. Thus would the matter seem to he figured; for we can frame to ourselves no notion of the degree and momentum of a force, such as is the vis insita of a moral sentiment, except by observing it warring against antagonists, and standing, amid the greatest possible invasions and extre- mities, unvanquished and victorious. Through a practical faith in this Son of God (fi- gured as having taken upon him our nature), mankind may hope to become acceptable to God {and so to enter into everlasting bliss), i. e. he who is conscious of such moral sentiments within, as enable him to believe and to place in himself a well-grounded trust, that he could, un- der any similar temptations and griefs (considered as the test and touchstone of the genuineness of that idea), ad- here unchangeably to the archetype of humanity, and re- main true to the exemplar by a steady following of his footsteps — such a person, I say, and he alone, is entitled to look upon himself as one who may be an object not un- worthy of the Divine complacency. B. Objective Reality of this Idea. This idea's reality is, in a practical point of view, con- tained completely in itself, for it has its rise and spring from our morally legislative Reason. We ought to con- form ourselves to it ; consequently we can. Needed we first of all to prove the possibility of our bec