UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY ANALYTICAL TABLES OF THB LAW OF EVIDENCE FOR USE WITH STEPHEN'S DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE BY GEORGE M. DALLAS, LL.D., AND HENRY WOLF BIKLE', A.M., LL.B. PHILADELPHIA : T. &. J. W. JOHNSON & CO. 1903. D/fc/S a. I 30j COPYRIGHT, 1903, EY T. & J. W. JOHNSON & Co. In the preparation of the following Tables the effort has been made to present a methodical outline of the Rules of Evidence, as set forth in Stephen's Digest. Primarily they are designed for the use of students, but the busy practitioner may occasionally find it convenient to refer to- them. The general purpose of the accompanying notes is merely to make the Tables more nearly complete and readily intelligi- ble. Where they depart from the text of the Digest, or extend beyond it, they are but suggestive; and the suggestions made are not fully discussed, nor the authorities in their support ex- haustively cited. The references, where not otherwise indicated, are to the Articles of Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence. The notes occasionally referred to, are those contained in the Second American Edition (from the sixth English edition) with annotations and references to American cases, by George Chase, LL.B. TABLE OF CONTENTS. IN THREE PARTS. FIRST PART. RELEVANCY. TABLE RULES CONCERNING RELEVANCY I-XXIII I Of Inclusion i-vm I I Applicable generally I III j> Any fact in issue I ^ Facts relevant to any fact in issue .... I > Res Gestae II ^ Facts necessary to be known Ill Applicable specifically IV VIII Where there is a question whether any act was done by any person IV Where a person's conduct is in issue, or is relevant IV I Where the existence of a conspiracy is in issue, or is relevant V Where a right of or over property is in question vr Where the existence of any custom is in question VII Where the proceeding is a criminal case of rape VTii ^ Of Exclusion ix-xxm \ Facts not connected with any fact in issue ... IX V TABLE } Hearsay x Admissions xi Confessions XII S tat cm cuts of persons since deceased . . . xm Evidence previously given xiv ' Statements of Acts of State or of facts of a public nature XV Statements made for public reference . . . xvi Statements of general history or geography xvn } Statements contained in a book of original entry xvm ^ Judgments xix Opinion xx Of experts xxi Of others as to whether two persons are or are not married xxi . Character xxn I Exceptions in criminal and in civil cases respectively xxni ! SECOND PART ON PROOF. TABLE RULES CONCERNING PROOF XXIV-XXXIV v Proof otherwise than by evidence . xxiv I f By judicial notice xxv ^ By agreed admissions xxvi proof by evidence xxiv By oral evidence xxvn * By documentary evidence xxvm Proof of execution of documents .... xxix Proof of contents of documents xxx Proof of contents of public documents . . xxxi ( Presumptions as to documents xxxn Of the exclusion of oral by documentary evidence xxxm By real evidence xxxiv THIRD PART PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE. TABLE RULES CONCERNING THE PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE XXXV-XLIII - The Burden of Proof xxxv Affected by presumption xxxvi Affected by estoppel xxxvn ' Persons not competent to testify xxxvm Persons not compellable to testify .... xxxix I- Persons not permitted to testify XL j > Taking oral evidence in Court or out of Court, upon oath, etc XLI Examination of witnesses XLII New trial when not granted for improper admission or rejection of evidence XLIII FIRST PART. RELEVANCY. iz TABLE I. First Rule of Inclusion. [Applicable generally.] Art. 2. EVIDENCE MAY BE GIVEN Of any fact in issue. 1 Of any fact relevant to any fact in issue.* 1 If the issue be a triable one, evi- dence of the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue may always be given. " I know of no case in which a fact in issue, or relevant to an issue, which the Court is bound to try can be excluded merely be- cause it would pain some one who is a stranger to the action." S. Dig., Note II. *For definition of the word " relevant " see Art. 1. In this rule it is affirmed broadly that evidence may be given of any fact which is relevant. The Tables which follow relate to the relevancy or irrele- vancy of particular facts. The distinction indicated by Stephen, between facts which are relevant or irrelevant, and facts which are deemed to be the one or the other, will not be re- garded in any of these Tables. What is deemed by the law is, in the study of the law, to be accepted as unquestionable. The proviso of Art. 2 really modifies the definition of relevancy (Art. 1) ; for any fact which is " too remote to be material" which furnishes but a fanciful analogy or conjectural inference (1 Taylor Ev., Sec. 298-239), may, practically speaking, be said to be irrelevant. TABLE II. Second Rule of Inclusion. [Applicable generally.] Arts. 3, 8. EVIDENCE MAY BE GIVEN Of facts which form part of the same transaction as the facts in issue. 1 Of facts which form part of any fact which may be proved. 8 i The last paragraph of Art. 3 is omitted from this Table, because the decisions cited by Stephen, though they support its statement of the law, do not appear to be founded on the doctrine of rea gestce. Jones v. Williams, 2 M. & W., 326 ( 1837) ; Doe v. Kemp, 2 Bing. N. C., (29 Eng. C. L, 102), (1835). See Table IX, note 2. 1 The first paragraph of Art. 8 is here brought into association with Art. 3, in order more fully to present the res gestce rule. The principle, which Art. 3 applies only to facts in issue, is qualifiedly extended by that paragraph of Art. 8 to any act which may be proved ; but it is thought that for the word " act " in Art. 8, the word " fact " may properly be substituted, and that the doctrine of ret gestce is applicable to evi- dential facts as well as to those in issue although where the main fact is merely a provable one the admissibility of other facts as subsidiary to it is subject to special limitation. Art. 8 and Note V. It is requisite only that there shall be "some main fact or act, which is itself admissible in evidence." Lund . Tyngsborough, 9 Gush., 44, (1851). "Where any facts are proper evidence upon an issue, all oral or written declarations which can ex- plain such facts may be received in evi- dence." Wright v. Doe, 4 Bing. N. C., 548 (33 Eng. C. L., 852), (1838). " De- clarations which are the immediate accom- paniments of an act are admissible as part of the res gestcR." Wharton Ev., Sec. 262. See Note to Table III. TABLE III. Third Rule of Inclusion. [Applicable generally.] Art. 9. EVIDENCE MAY BE GIVEN facts which are necessary to be known and in so far as they are necessary to be known. 1 To iniroditce or explain any fact in issue or relevant to the issue. To support or rebut an inference suggested by any such fact. To establish the identity of any person or thing whose identity is in issue or is relevant. To fix the lime or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened. To show that any document produced is genuine or otherwise. >. To show the relation of the parties by whom any fact in issue or relevant fact was transacted. >. To show opportunity for the occurrence or transaction of any such, fact. To show the relevancy of other facts. 1 Article 2 states the general proposition poses enumerated in this Table are rele- th at " evidence may be given . . . of any vant. In like manner, Arts. 3 and 8 fact relevant to any fact in issue." And (Table II) specify that facts which form in this Article (9) we have the more part.ot the same transaction as the facts particular statement that facts which are in issue, or of a provable fact, are relevant, necessary to be known for any of the pur- TABLE IV. Fourth Rule of Inclusion. [Applicable specifically.] Arts. 7, 8. 1 EVIDENCE MAY BE GIVEN > When there is a question whether any act was done by any person. Art. 7. > Of any fact which supplies a motive for such an act. Of any fact which constitutes preparation for it. > Of any fact which shows subsequent conduct of such person ap- parently influenced by the doing of it. * Of any fact which shows any act done in concequence of the act by, or by authority of, such person. When a person's conduct is in issue or is relevant to the issue. Art. 8. I ^ Of any statements made in the presence and hearing of such person by which his conduct is likely to have been affected. lf The obvious similarity of "a question duct." (Art. 8 last paragraph) has sug- whether any act was done by any person " gested their joinder in this Table. (Art. 7) to an issue as to "a person's con- TABLE V. Fifth Rule of Inclusion. [Applicable specifically.] Art. 4. EVIDENCE MAY BE GIVEN ^ In cases in which the existence of a conspiracy is in issue or is provable ^ Of everything said, done, or written by any one of several conspirator i in the execution or furtherance of their common pur- pose as against each of them. 1 1 But statements as to measures taken (i. e. narratives of things past) in the exe- cution or furtherance of any such common purpose (not in effecting it, but in conse- quence of, or arising out of it, R. v. Blake, 6 Ad. & El., N. S., 137 (51 Eng. C. L.), (1844) ,) are not relevant as such against any conspirators, except those by whom or in whose presence such statements are made. The judge must first be satisfied apart from such acts and statements, that there are prima facie grounds for believing in the existence of the conspiracy to which they relate. Art. 4. TABLE VI. Sixth Rule of Inclusion. [Applicable specifically.] Art. 5. EVIDENCE MAY BE GIVEN v In cases in which the existence of any right of or over property is in question > Of every fact which constitutes the title of the person claiming the right. 1 > Of every fact which shows that he, or any person through whom he claims, was in possession. 2 Of every fact which constitutes an exercise of the right, or which shows that its exercise was disputed ; or -which is inconsistent with its existence or renders its existence improbable. * 1 Facts in issue. See Table I. existence, of the right the existence of which is alleged upon the one side and de- 1 Facts relevant to the issue. Ibid. They nied on the other. See definition of re- render probable the existence or the non levant. Art. 1. 11 TABLE VII. Seventh Rule of Inclusion. [Applicable specifically.] Art. 6. EVIDENCE MAY BE GIVEN In cases in which the existence of any custom is in question ^ Of every fact which shows how, in particular instances, the custom was understood and acted upon by the parties then interested. * l SeeBlackstoneCom., Book I (Share. burgh Ins. Co., 95 Pa. St., 348-356, Ed.), 79, note 21 ; and Adams v. Pitta- (1880). 13 TABLE VIII. Eighth Rule of Inclusion. [Applicable specifically.] Art. 8. 1 EVIDENCE MAY BE GIVEN v- In criminal cases of rape. v Of the conduct of the person against whom the offence is said to have been committed, and, in particular of the fact that soon after the offence, she made a complaint (but not the terms thereof ') to persons to whom she would naturally complain. * 1 Second paragraph. 'See, however, Note V., of Stephen's Appendix, and also the note of the Ameri- can Editor on the second paragraph of Art. 8. * And of her generally immoral charac- ter, etc. See Art. 134, and note 4 to Table XLII. 15 TABLE IX. First Rule of Exclusion. Art. 10. EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE GIVEN I Of a fact which renders the existence or non- existence of any fact in issue probable by reason of its general resemblance thereto, and not by reason of its being connected therewith in any of the ways specified in the rules of inclusion, except in cases where some permissible infer- ence relevant to the issue may be drawn from such fact. 1 a *The so-called exceptions to this rule are not fully presented in Articles 11, 12 and 13 ; but the principle upon which they all rest is here stated, and may be illus- tratively indicated thus: The rule "Res inter alias acta," etc., does not include any fact from which a material inference is permissible, as when there is a question (a) Whether a person said or did some- thing. The fact that he said or did something of the same sort on a different occasion, if it shows the existence on the occasion in question of any state of mind or of body or bodily feeling, the exist- ence of which is in issue or is relevant. Art. 11. (b ) Whether an act was accidental or in- tentional. The fact that such act formed part of a series of similar circumstances, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned. Art. 12. (c) Whether a particular act was done. The fact that a course of office or busi- ness existed according to which it natur- ally would have been done. Art. 13. [It is under this head that Taylor, in his work, on Evidence (Chap. 12, Sees. 709- 641), mentions that in the United States entries made by the party himself iu his own shop books are, subject to well set- tled restrictions and conditions, received in evidence. We, however, deem it more exact to treat the admission of such entries as an exception to that part of Hearsay Rule which excludes statements contained in any book, etc., and accord- ingly, it has been classed as one of the exceptions to that rule, and is dealt with in Table XVIII.]. (d) Whether a particular person held a particular public office. The fact that he acted in that office. Art. 13. (e) Whether one person acted as agent for another on a particular occasion. The fact that he so acted on other occasions. Art. 13. 1 The decisions upon which the last par- agraph of Art. 3 (See Table II. n. 1) is based, seem not to be founded. on the doctrine of res gestce, but upon the prin- ciple stated above (n. 1), that the rule pre- sented in this Table does not exclude any fact from which a material inference is permissible. 17 TABLE X. Second Rule of Exclusion. Art. 14. EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE GIVEN I Of the fact that a statement was made by a person not called as a witness. 1 Of the fact that a statement is contained or re- corded in any book, document, or record what- ever, proof of which is not admissible on other grounds. 3 1 The exceptions to this part of the Hear- lf The exceptions to this part of the Bay Rule are separately presented in Table* Hearsay Rule are separately presented in XI, XII, XIII and XIV. Tables XV, XVI, XVH, XVIII and XIX. 19 TABLE XI. First Exception to Second Rule of Exclusion. 1 Arts. 15-20. THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT EXCLUDE I ^Admissions 2 made on behalt of the real party to any proceeding. 3 i By any nominal party thereto.* By any person who has a substantial interest in the event. 6 By any person who is privy in law, in blood or in estate to any party to the proceeding. 6 By any agent authorized to make them, either expressly or by the conduct of his principal* 1 Table X. 1 An admission is a statement, oral or written, suggesting any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant ... to any such fact, made by or on behalf of any party to any proceeding ; Art. 15. 8 An admission made at any time by the real party himself is, of course, admissible, unless he is suing or sued in a represen- tative character only, in which case the statement must have been made whilst he sustained that character. Art. 16. State- ments by strangers to a proceeding are not relevant as against the parties ; but see Art. 18. No admission is relevant in any civil action if made without prejudice or under duress. Art. 20. * Where the assignee of a chose in action may and does sue in his own name, he is not aflected by statements of the assignor made after assignment ; and the rule in the United States seems to be generally the same even where the assignee is required to sue in the name of the assignor. 5 If made during the continuance of the interest which entitles him to make it. Art. 16. 6 Including partners and joint contractors, with respect to partnership transactions, or joint contracts ; and lawyers in the actual management of their clients' causes. Art. 17. And also any person expressly referred to for information. Art. 19. 21 TABLE XII. Second Exception to Second Rule of Exclusion. 1 Arts. 21-24. THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT EXCLUDE s Confessions 3 made without inducement, threat or promise 3 proceeding directly or indirectly from a person in authority, including } The prosecutor. ( Officers of justice having the prisoner in custody. Magistrates, and other persons in similar position*. i Table X. ' A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed that crime ; Art. 21. s Having reference to the charge against the accused person, and giving him reason- able grounds for supposing that by making a confession he would gain some advantage or avoid some evil in reference to the proceedings against him. A confession made after the complete removal of the impression produced by any inducement, threat or promise is provable ; and facts discovered in consequence of confessions improperly obtained, and so much of such confessions as distinctly relates to such facts, may be proved. Art. 22. As to confessions admissible though made upon oath, etc., see Art. 23 ; or though obtained by promise of secrecy, or by decep- tion, etc-, see Art. 24. 23 TABLE XIII. Third Exception to Second Rule of Exclusion. 1 Arts. 25-31. THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT EXCLUDE S Statements a written or verbal of facts in issue or relevant to the issue, if the person who made the statement 3 is dead. Art. 25. When the declaration was as to the cause of the declarant's death t or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death. * Art. 26. When the declaration was made in the ordinary course of the declarant's business, or in the discharge of a professional duty. 6 Art. 27. When the declaration was opposed to the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant. 9 Art. 28. When the declaration was as to the declarant's testamentary inten- tions, or as to the contents of his will. 7 Art. 29. When the declaration related to the existence of any public or general right or custom or matter of public or general interest. 6 Art. 30. ' When the declaration related to the existence of any relationship between persons, whether living or dead, or to the birth, marriage, or death of any person, by which such relationship was con- stituted, or to the time or place at which any tuch fact occurred, or to any fact immediately connected with its occurrence. 9 Art. 31. i Table X. 'Hereafter called the "declarant." 1 Hereafter called " declarations." Such declarations may be contradicted, and 24 the credit of the declarant may be im- peached or confirmed, in the manner stated in Art. 135. * Only in trials for the murder or man- slaughter of the declarant ; and only when he is shown to have been in actual danger of death, and to have given up all hope of recovery at the time of making the declara- tion. Art. 26. 6 Such declarations must have been made at or near the time when the matter stated occurred, and of the declarant's own knowledge; and are relevant in so far only as they relate to the matter which the declarant stated in the ordinary course of his business or duty. Art. 27. 6 If the declarant had peculiar means of knowing the matter stated, and had no interest to misrepresent it. The whole of any said declaration, and of any other statement referred to in it, is relevant, although matters may be stated which were not against such interest; but state- ments not referred to in, or necessary to explain, such declarations, though made at the same time, or recorded in the same place, are not relevant. Art. 28. For special applications of this Article, see its paragraphs following the first. The final one but repeats, in negative form, that the interest of the declarant to which the dec- laration is opposed must be a pecuniary or proprietary one. 7 In the following cases : (a) When his will has been lost, and there is a question as to what were its contents. (6) When the question is whether an ex- isting will is genuine or was improperly obtained. (c) When the question is whether any and which of more existing documents than one constitute his will. In all these cases it is immaterial whether the decla- rations were made before or after the making or loss of the will. Art. 29. 8 Such declarations may be made in any form and manner. Art. 30. They must have been made before the question to which they are related had arisen, but they may have been made to prevent its arising. Art. 31. Declarations as to particular facts from which the existence of any such right or matter may be inferred are irrele- vant. Art. 30. Declarations as to public rights are relevant whoever made them. As to general rights it must appear or be shown that the declarant had competent means of knowledge. A public right, and a general right or custom denned. Art. 30. 'Such declarations may express either the personal knowledge of the declarant, or information given to him by others, pro- vided those others were themselves quali- fied to be declarants. They may be made in any form and in any document or upon any thing in which statements as to rela- tionship are commonly made. Art. 31. Pedigree must be in issue. [But see In- surance Co. v. Rosenagle, 77 Pa., 507 (1875)]. The declarant must be legitim- ately related by blood [or marriage, Tay- lor Ev., Sec. 635-571 ; Ins. Co. . Schwenck, 94 U. S., 598 (1876) ], to the person to whom the declaration rela es, or to the husband or wife of such a person. Such declarations must have been made before the question to which they are re- lated had arisen, but they may have been made to prevent iu arising. Art. 31. 25 TABLE XIV. Fourth Exception to Second Rule of Exclusion. 1 Art. 32. THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT EXCLUDE Evidence given by a witness in a previous pro- ceeding, or in* an earlier stage of the same proceeding. When the witness is dead, or is mad, or it so ill that he will probably never be able to travel. When he is kept out of the way by the adverse party. When he w out of the jurisdiction of the Court. * When he cannot be found. 8 Provided, in all cases, that the person against whom the evidence is to be given had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant \vhen he was examined as a witness ; and that the questions in issue were substantially the same in the first as in the second proceeding. Provided, in civil cases, that the proceeding was between the same parties or their representatives in interest. Provided, in criminal cases, that the same person ia accused upon the same facts. i Table X. * In civil, but not, it seems, in criminal cases. Art. 32. Perhaps in civil, but not in criminal cases. Ibid. These notes ( 2 and 3 ) are in the words of Stephen, but, as is remarked by his American Editor in a note to this article, there is much difference of decision by the courts of the several States upon the general subject of the disabilities, other than the death or insanity of the witness, which will admit his former testi- mony. See the cases there cited. 27 TABLE XV. Fifth Exception to Second Rule of Exclusion. 1 Art. 33. THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT EXCLUDE I Statements of any act of state or of any fact of a public nature which is in issue or relevant. I | When made in a recital contained in a public statute, y When contained in any proclamation of the Executive. [When contained in State papers communicated by the Executive to the Legislature, or published under public authority. When contained in legislative journals or resolutions ' law, the note of the Editor, which refers 1 Table X - to Gr. Ev. 1, Sec. 491, and to several re- * In adapting this article to American ported cases, has been followed. 29 TABLE XVI. Sixth Exception to Second Rule of Exclusion. 1 Art. 34. THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT EXCLUDE v Statements of facts in issue or relevant, made for the purpose of being referred to by the public. ^ When contained in any record, official book or register kept in the United States, or in any country subject to the jurisdiction thereof t or at sea, or in any of the States, or in any foreign country- * > Provided the entry thereof was made in proper time by a person in the discharge of a duty imposed upon him by the law of the place in which such record, book or register is kept. 1 Table X. from only for the purpose of adapting his J The text of Stephen has been departed statement of the law to this country. 31 TABLE XVII. Seventh Exception to Seconu Rule of Exclusion. 1 Art. 35. THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT EXCLUDE ^ Statements as to matters (a) of general history, or (b) of geography, in issue or relevant to the issue. (a) When made in accredited historical books * (7>) When made in maps or charts published for public sale. * i Table X. * Only as to matters of public notoriety, 1 But statements in such works as to and such as are usually represented in such private rights or customs are irrelevant. maps or charts and likely to be accurately Art. 35. stated. Ibid. 33 TABLE XVIII. Eighth Exception to Second Rule of Exclusion. 1 (Inserted.) THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT EXCLUDE L Statements contained in a properly authenticated book of original entries. 2 When they consist of entries of goods sold and delivered. 8 When they consist of entries of work done 3 1 Table X. 'See American Editor's note to Art. 27, and cases cited. The form or name of the book is immaterial, if it be in fact a book of original entry. Hoover t;. Gehr, 62 Pa., 136 (1869); and entries promptly made from a blotter, from memorandum slips, or from a slate, are to be considered original, Barker v. Haskell, 9 Gush. 218 (1852). The authorities are not harmon- ious as to the time within which the en- tries must be made from the memorandum slips, etc. In Forsythe v. Norcross, 5 Watts, 432 (1836), entries were held inad- missible where it appeared that they had been transcribed from a slate, four, five or six days after they had been made ; while, on the other hand, they have been held admissible where the transcribing was done four weeks after they had been made on a slate; Hall v. Glidden, 39 Me., 445 (1855); Redlich r. Bauerlee, 98 Ills., 134 (1881). 8 The entries must be made at or near the time, but not before, the delivery of the goods, or the doing of the work ; Laird v. Campbell, 100 Pa., 165 (1882). They may have been made by the party himself in his own book, and are admissible, although he be living at the time of the trial. But when he is a competent witness the book is regarded as merely supplement- ary to his own testimony; Nichols v. Haynes, 78 Pa., 174 (1875). The amount for which such an entry is admissible must, it is said, be reasonable, but no precise limit has been established j Corr v. Sellers, 100 Pa., 169 (1882). 35 TABLE XIX. Ninth Exception io Second Rule of Exclusion. 1 Arts. 39-47. THE HEARSAY RULE DOES NOT EXCLUDE I Judgments 3 of the Courts of the United States, or of any of the States or Territories, or of the District of Columbia, or such of the judgments of Courts of foreign countries as can by law be enforced in this country, and so far as they can be enforced. 3 They are conclusive proof Of any state of things which they actually effect, when the existence of the state of things so effected is a fact in issue or is relevant. * Art. 40. Of facts directly in issue in the case in which the judg- ment was rendered, actually decided by the Court, and appearing from the judgment itself to he the ground on which it was based. 5 Art. 41. Of the facts on which the condemnation of a ship as prize is plainly stated upon the face of the sentence of the Court of Admiralty to have proceeded. 6 Art. 42. ^ Of the facts stated in the judgment, 7 when any action is brought against any person for anything done by him in a judicial capacity. 8 Art. 45. are evidential. If not pleaded by way of estoppel.9 Art. 43. If the judgment is an admission. 10 Art. 44. > If it relates to a matter of public or general interest so as to be a statement under Article 30. (See Table XIII.) 10 Art. 44. 36 1 Table X. 2 "Judgment" here means any final judgment, order or decree, as to which the party against whom it is offered as evi- dence does not prove that the court which gave it had no jurisdiction, or that it has been reversed, or, if he is a stranger to it, that it was obtained by any fraud or col- lusion, to which neither he nor any per- son to whom he is privy was a party. Arts. 39 and 46. 8 In Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S., 113 (1895), the general subject of the effect to be given to judgments, domestic or foreign, was quite fully considered, and a number of questions pertaining thereto were elabo- rately discussed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The decision, however the judgment there involved being a per- sonal and executory one, rendered by a French Court was made to turn upon the fact that the courts of France do not accord conclusive effect to judgments of the courts of this country ; and it was held (four jus- tices dissenting) that because of this lack of "reciprocity," a judgment of a French Court would not be given such effect in the United States. See also Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S., 235 (1895). 4 As against all persons. Art. 40. 6 As against parties and privies. Art. 41. Stephen adds to this statement : " Un- less evidence was admitted in the action in which the judgment was delivered which is excluded in the action in which that judgment is intended to be proved,'' citing R. v. Hutchins, L. R..5Q. B. D., 353 (1880) as a recent illustration of this principle ; but Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S., 113, casts some doubt upon its ac- ceptance, at least in all cases, by the courts of this country. In the opinion of the court in that case (p. 204) it was said : " It is next objected that in those courts one of the plaintiffs was permitted to testify nat under oath, and was not subjected to cross-examination by the opposite party, and that the defendants were, therefore, deprived of safeguards which are by our law considered essential to secure honesty and to detect fraud in a witness ; and also that documents and papers were admitted in evidence, with which the defendants had no connection, and which would not be admissible under our system of juris- prudence. But it having been shown by the plaintiffs, and hardly denied by the defendants, that the practice followed and the method of examining witnesses were ac- cording to the laws of France, we are not prepared to hold that the fact that the procedure in these respects differed from that of our own courts is, of itself, a suffi- cient ground for impeaching the foreign j udgment. ' ' 6 As against all persons. But statements contained in judgments other than those of courts ot Admiralty condemning a ship as prize, as to the facts upon which the judgment is based are irrelevant as be- tween sti angers, or as between a party or privy and a stranger. Art. 42. 7 And the proceedings antecedent thereto. Art. 45. 8 Whether the facts therein stated are or are not necessary to give the defendant jurisdiction, if, assuming them to be true, they show that he h:id jurisdic- tion. Art. 45. As between parties and privies, when- ever any matter which was or might have been decided in the action in which it was given is in issue, or is relevant, in any subsequent proceeding. Art. 43. Stephen adds: "Such a judgment is conclusive proof of the facts which it decides or might have decided, if the party who gives evi- dence of it had no opportunity of pleading it as an estoppel;" but the American Edi- tor correctly states that it is held in a number of the States of this country that a judgment is equally conclusive when given in evidence, as if pleaded, even though there was an opportunity to plead it ; and to this eftect, see Southern Pac. R. R. v. U. S., 168 U. S., 1 (1897), at page 59. 10 Even as between strangers. But judg- ments are not relevant as rendering pro- bable facts which may be inferred from their existence, but which they neither state nor decide, either as between stran- gers, or as between parties and privies in suits where the issue is different, or in favor of strangers against parties or privies. Art. 44. 37 TABLE XX. Third Rule of Exclusion. Arts. 48-54. EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE GIVEN * Of the fact that any person is of opinion that a fact in issue, or relevant, does or does not exist. 1 Art. 48. 'This is the rule, but it is subject to Stephen are connectedly presented in Table several exceptions. Those mentioned by XXI and the notes thereto. 39 TABLE XXI. Exceptions to Third Rule of Exclusion/ Arts. 49-54. THE RULE THAT OPINION IS GENERALLY IRRELEVANT DOES NOT EXCLUDE The opinions of persons specially skilled in any matter of science or art 3 as to which there is a point in question. Art. 49. ^ The facts that two persons there being a ques- tion whether they are or are not married co- habited and were treated by others as man and wife. 3 Art. 53. i Table XX. J Such persons are called experts, and the opinions to which they testify are called expert testimony. The judge in each instance decides whether the witness is entitled to be con- sidered as an expert. His opinion as to the existence of the facts on which his opinion is to Le given is irrelevant. Art. 49. But facts properly proved, though not otherwise relevant, if they support or are inconsistent with his opinion, are relevant Art. 50. And the grounds on which the opinion of any living person (when relevant) is based are also relevant. Art. 54. When there is a question as to a foreign law, the opinion of experts, who in their profession [or who, though not of the pro- fession, are, by reason of special study or experience] acquainted with such law are the only admissible evidence thereof; but they may produce books of authority, etc. The words "science or art " as here used, include, indeed, all subjects on which a course of study or experience is necessary to the formation of an opinion, and amongst others the examination of handwriting. Art. 49. The opinion of any person (though not an expert) who is acquainted with the handwriting of the supposed writer of any document, that it was or was not written or signed by that person is relevant ; and as to what is deemed suffi- cient to constitute acquaintance with the handwriting of another person, see Art 51. The law respecting the comparison of hand- writings is, in Pennsylvania, established by 40 statute. Act of May 15, 1895, P. L. 69. In cutions for bigamy, proceedings for divorce, the Courts of the United States and of actions of crim. con., etc.; but, whilst several of the States, where this has not Stephen has been followed in presenting been done, the rule differs in one or more this principle as an exception to the rule particulars, from the English rule as stated excluding opinions it is submitted that it by Stephen. In some of the States, how- is not the opinion of witnesses as to the ever, the English rule is followed. Art. 52. existence of marriage, but their testimony 3 It is well settled that proof of cohabi- to the facts of cohabitation and repute, tation and of repute unitedly, do raise a which give rise to the presumption, presumption of marriage, except in prose- 41 TABLE XXII. Fourth Rule of Exclusion. Arts. 55-57. EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE GIVEN V Of the fact that a person respecting whose con- duct there is any inquiry, is of a particular character. 1 Art. 55. 1 The exceptions to this rule are connectedly presented in Table XXIII and the notes thereto 43 TABLE XXIII. Exceptions to Fourth Rule of Exclusion. 1 Arts. 56, 57. THE RULE THAT CHARACTER IS GENERALLY IRRELEVANT DOES NOT EXCLUDE 1 In criminal proceedings i The fact that the person accused has a good character. 9 In civil cases (generally) I { The fact that the character of any party to the action is such as to affect the amount of damages which he ought to receive. 3 1 Table XXII. 1 But the fact that he has a bad char- acter is irrelevant, unless it is itself a fact in issue, or unless evidence has been given that he has a good character, in which case evidence that he has a bad character is admissible. The word " character," as here used, means reputation as distin- guished from disposition, and evidence may be given only of general reputation not of particular acts. Art. 56. 8 In some civil, as well as criminal cases, the character (reputation) of a party is an obviously material subject of inquiry, and where this is so, evidence therof is, of course, admissible. In actions for seduc- tion and the like, it has repeatedly been held that evidence of the woman's reputa- tion for lack of chastity may be given ; and in actions for defamation and for mali- cious prosecution, in which the injury for which redress is sought, is the reputation of the plaintiff, evidence of his bad repu- tation is, with manifest propriety, received in mitigation of damages. See notes to Art. 57. 45 SECOND PART. ON PROOF, 47 TABLE XXIV. First Rule Concerning Proof. 1 Arts. 58-92. RELEVANT FACTS MAY BE PROVED Otherwise than by evidence. > Judicial Notice. Arts. 58, 59. ^ Admissions agreed to at the hearing, or before the hearing and with reference thereto, or by the pleadings. Art. 60. By evidence. f Oral Evidence. Arts. 61, 62. I Documentary Evidence. Arts. 63-92. Real Evidence (added). 1 This rule, like the first rule of relev- XXV; "Admissions agreed to," etc., ancy (Table I), is stated in general terms. Table XXVI ; " Oral Evidence," Table It leaves for more particular statement the XXVII; "Documentary Evidence," Ta_ specific rules relating, especially, to each of bles XXVIII-XXXIII ; and "Real Evi- the here indicated methods of proof. Ac- dence," Table XXXIV. cordingly, see "Judicial Notice," Table 49 TABLE XXV. Second Rule Concerning Proof. Arts. 58, 59. RELEVANT FACTS MAY BE PROVED By judicial notice * Of matter* relating to the governments of the United States and of the States respectively. The public law of the United States or of any State whose law is applicable to the proceeding. 3 The political constitution and seal of the United States and of the several States. 3 The accession, status and, in some instances, the signa- tures of the principal officers of the United States and of the several States. 4 ' The existence of Congress and of the State Legislatures, and the respective times and places of their ses- sions. 4 . The public Executive proclamations and messages, and the treaties of the United States. 5 The days of general political elections. Of matters relating to the particular court or to other courts. The particular court's own seal, rules, records and officers, and the official status and signatures of those officers. The existence of the other United States courts, the extent of their jurisdiction, their seals and their judges. 8 The courts of last resort of the respective States. 7 60 - Of matters relating to -foreign nations. The Law of Nations. The status of the United States with respect to foreign countries, as of war, peace, amnesty, etc. The existence and title of every State and Sovereign recognized by the government of the United States, and its government, system of courts, etc. The public seals of recognized foreign states when at- tached to public official documents, and the existence and seals of their admiralty and maritime courts. Of matters of a general character. The chief geographical facts and features of the United States and of the several States. 8 The occurrence of things which must have occurred according to the ordinary course of nature. > The general customs observed in the transaction of business. Matters of common knowledge and experience within their jurisdiction, or of such general and public notoriety that every one may be fairly presumed to know them. Matters which any statute of the United States requires them to notice. 9 1 In adapting Articles 58 and 59 to the law of this country, ihe American notes have been generally followed. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to present a list of all things which should be judicially noticed. Those mentioned in this Table are amongst the more important. The general principle upon which proof of certain facts is dispensed with is that they have been already authoritatively estab- lished, or that they are of such character that the Court's knowledge of them may properly be assumed, or are so notorious that everyone may fairly be supposed to 51 know them. This principle may readily be related to each of the several matters enumerated in this Table, and maybe ap- plied in determining, in each instance, what others might properly be added to the list. Tlie Table has been prepared with especial reference to the Federal Courts; the modifications necessary to make it conform to the requirements of the State Courts, are noted below. J The State Courts do not judicially notice the law of any other of the States. 8 The State Courts require proof of the constitution, as well as of the law, of the other States. 4 The Plate Courts require proof of these matters as respects the other Suites. 5 The State Courts judicially notic executive proclamations, etc., of the United States and of the particular State itself, but not of the other States- 6 The State Courts judicially notice the other Courts, etc., of the same State, and of the United States, but not of the other States. 7 Not applicable to State Courts. But all Appellate Courts will take judicial notice of the rules and methods of inferior Courts when rendering their judgments. 8 To adapt to State Courts, substitute for " and of the several States," the words, " and of the particular State." 9 To adapt to State Courts, substitute for the words " Statute of the United States," the words, " Statute of the State." 52 TABLE XXVI. Third Rule Concerning Proof. Art. 60. RELEVANT FACTS MAY BE PROVED By admissions agreed to at the hearing, or before the hearing and with reference thereto, or by the pleadings. 1 J The difference between such admissions sive, whilst those dealt with in Table XI, (sometimes called judicial or solemn ad- are merely evidential. In a trial for fel- missions) and those which, notwithstand- ony, the prisoner can make no conclusive ing the hearsay rule, are provable, is that admission, though a confession (Table XII) the admissions here referred to are conclu- may be proved against him. Art. 60. 53 TABLE XXVII. Fourth Rule Concerning Proof. Art. 61, 62. RELEVANT FACTS MAY BE PROVED By oral evidence. 1 i All facts may be so proved, subject to the requirements of law as to proof of documents. (Tables XXVIII-XXXIII), Art. 61. Oral evidence must iu all cases whatever be direct ; that is to say, if it be of a fact alleged to have been perceived by any sense (ex gr. of sight or of hearing), or in any other manner, it must be the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in that manner. If it be of an opinion, or of the grounds on which that opinion is held, it must be the evidence of the person who holds that opinion on those grounds. Art. 62. 55 TABLE XXVIII. Fifth Rule Concerning Proof. Arts. 63-92. RELEVANT FACTS MAY BE PROVED By documentary evidence. 1 i* 1 Several matters auxiliary to this rule, of public documents, Table XXXI ; Pre- are separately presented as follows: Proof sumptions as to documents, Table XXXII, of the execution of documents, Table and the parol evidence rule, Table XXIX ; Proof of the contents of docu- XXXIII. ments, Table XXX ; Proof of the contents 57 TABLE XXIX. First Auxiliary of the Fifth Rule Concerning Proof. 1 Arts. 66-69. THE EXECUTION OF DOCUMENTS MUST BE PROVED a I 1 Where there is an attesting witness alive, sane and subject to process. 3 ^ By calling at least one such witness.*- 5 - * Art . 66. Where there is one or more attesting witnesses, but none who is alive and can be found. 3 *> By }>roof of the signature of at least one such witness. * ' 7 Art. 66. L Where there is no attesting witness. 8 I * By proof of the signature of the person who executed the document. Art. 69. 1 Table XXVIII. *This applies to all private documents. For -methods of identification and proof of genuineness of Public Documents, see notes to Table XXXI. 8 The distinction made by Stephen be- tween documents required by law to be at- tested and documents not required by law to be attested, is based upon English statutory provisions which have not been generally enacted in this country, though similar statutes exist in some of the States, and where they do, they of course must be 58 followed. But by the common law which is still in force in most of the States, the manner of proving the execution of a doc- ument is made to depend upon the actual presence, or absence, of attestation, and not upon the existence or non-existence of any requirement of law upon the subject ; and to this common law rule, the present Table conforms. * But the person seeking to prove the execution of a document is not bound to call for that purpose either the party who executed it or any attesting witness, or to prove the handwriting of any such party or attesting witness. (1) When (but see American note) an admissible admission of its contents has been proved, Art. 64 ; (2) When (but see American note) he is entitled to give secondary evidence of its contents because the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the adverse party, who, after notice, does not produce it. (Table XXX) ; (3) When his opponent produces it when called upon, and claims an interest under it in reference to the subject matter of the suit; (4) When the person against whom the document is sought to be proved is a public officer bound by law to procure its due execution, and who has dealt with it as a document duly executed ; (5) When the document is an " ancient " one (see Table XXXII) Art. 67. 5 For cases to which this rule extends, see Art. 66. 6 If the attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, its execution may be proved by other evi- dence. Art. 68. 'Stephen adds (Art. 66): " And that the signature of the person executing the document is in the handwriting of that person," but generally in this country, this is not requisite. TABLE XXX. Second Auxiliary of the Fifth Rule Concerning Proof. 1 Arts. 63-65, 70-72. THE CONTENTS OF DOCUMENTS- MAY BE PROVED I By primary evidence. 3 } The document itself. Art. 64. } Each jtart of a document which is executed in several parts. Art. 64. > Each counterpart of a document severally executed by one or some of the parties only. * Art. 64. Each of a number of documents all made by any process 6 which secures uniformity in the copies. Art. 64. . By secondary evidence. 2 Examined copies, exemplifications, office copies, and certified copies. Art. 70. Other copies made from the original and proved to be correct. Art. 70. Counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not exe- cute them. Art. 70. Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it. Art. 70. i Table XXVIII. The contents of documents must be * For proof of contents of public docu- proved by primary evidence, except in the raents, see Table XXXI. following cases, where secondary evidence 60 may be given (Arts. 65, 71). When the original (a) is in the possession or power of the adverse party, who, after due notice (see below), does not produce it ; (b) is in the possession or power of a stranger not legally bound to produce it, and who refuses to do so after service of subpoena, etc. ; (e) has been destroyed or lost, and proper search has been made for it ; (d) is of such a nature as not to be easily movable, or is in a country from which it is not permitted to be removed ; (e) has been taken from the party by fraud, so that it cannot be procured ; (/) consists of numerous documents which cannot conveniently be examined in court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of the whole collection ; (g} is a document for the proof of which special provision is made by statute ; (h) is a public document. Art. 71. In case (a) secondary evidence is not ad- missible, unless reasonably sufficient notice to produce the original has been given, except in the following cases: (1) When the document to be proved is itself a no- tice; (2) When the action is founded upon the assumption that the document is in the possession or power of the adverse party, and requires its production; (3) When it appears or is proved that the adverse party has secured possession of the original from a person subpoenaed to produce it ; (4 ) When the adverse party or his agent has the original in court. In case ( b) a subpoena duces tecum must have been served; if a stranger who has been so served, or who, after having been sworn as a witness, admits that the docu- ment is in court, refuses to produce it without lawful justification, secondary evidence may not be given. Arts. 71, 72. (See also, as to notice to produce, etc. Table XLII, note 1). Case (e) is inserted by the American editor and authorities are cited by him in its support. In case (/) evidence may be given as to the general result of the documents by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled in the examination of such documents. Art. 71.. As to case (g) it is, of course, that where there is a statutory provision prescribing (or permitting) any special method of' proving the contents of any document, such provision must (or may) be followed. Statutes of this kind are not uncommon ; but they generally concern public docu- ments (case h) and are more distinctly re- ferred to in Table XXXI, which relates especially to public documents. In all cases, questions as to the existence of facts rendering secondary evidence admissible are to be decided by the judge, unless in deciding such a question the judge would in effect decide the matter in issue. Art. 71. 4 Each counterpart is primary evidence as against the parties executing it. Art. 64. 6 E. g. by printing, lithography, or pho- tography. Art. 64. e Each is primary evidence of the con- tents of the rest ; but where they are all copies of a common original, no one of them is primary evidence of the contents of the original. Art. 64. 61 TABLE XXXI. Third Auxiliary of the Fifth Rule Concerning Proof. 1 Arts. 73-84. THE CONTENTS OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS MAY BE PROVED 3 I r By production, from proper custody, and identifi- cation of the original. 3 Art. 74. - By an examined copy.* " Art. 75. j> By an exemplification. 5 " Art. 77. ^ By compliance with statutory provisions. 6 - 7 - Arts. 76, 79-82. 1 Table XX VIII. 8 Not strictly speaking, by secondary evidence as indicated in Art 71 and in the note to table XXX, which follows that article, but in some one or other of the several substituted ways which are here stated. s This is really primary evidence: The contents of the document are proved by production of the original ; though in- stead of accompanying its production, as in the case of a private document, with proof of execution, it is to be shown that it has com* from proper custody, and must be identified as being what it professes to be. Art. 74. And whenever any book or other document is of such a public nature as to be admissible in evidence on its mere production from the proper custody, and no statute exists which renders its contents provable by means of a copy, any copy thereof or extract therefrom is admissible in proof of its contents, provided it pur- ports to be signed and certified as a true copy or extract by the officer to whose cus- tody the original is intrusted. Art. 79. 4 An examined copy is a copy proved by oral evidence to have been examined with the original and to correspond therewith. Art. 75. 6 An exemplification is a copy of a record set out either under the Great Seal or under the Seal of a Court. It is equiva- lent to the original ; and a copy made by an officer of the Court bound by law to make it, is an exemplification ; but if such officer is authorized by a rule of court, but not required by law to make it, it is 62 regarded as equivalent to an exemplifica- which prescribes (or permits) any par- tion only in the same cause and Court. ticular method of proof, it must (or may) Arts. 77, 78. be followed. Several such statutes, State 6 For mode of proof of foreign written and Federal, are referred to in Arts. 76, 79- laws, acts of state and judicial records, 84; but it is not deemed desirable, and see Art. 84. would scarcely be practicable to advert to i As already remarked in the note to them with any particularity here. Table XXX, where there is a statute 63 TABLE XXXII. Fourth Auxiliary of the Fifth Rule Concerning Proof. 1 Arts. 85-89. IT IS PRESUMED > When any document bearing a date has been proved ^ That the document was made on Hie day on which it bears date, and if more than one bear the same date, that tJiey were executed in the order necessary to effect their intended object. 9 Art. 85. When any document is not produced after due notice and call ^ That the document had been duly stamped. * Art. 86. When any document purporting to be a deed has been signed and has a seal upon it 6 ^ TJiat this is the seal of the party signing it. 4 " Art. 87. 6 > When any document purporting or proved to be thirty years old is produced from proper custody 7 ^ That the handwriting of the signature and every other part of the document is genuine, and in the case of a document executed* or attested, that it was duly executed and attested. Art. 88. . When any document produced appears to have been altered or interlined 8 That the alterations or interlineations, if the document is a deed, were made before the deed was completed. Art. 89. * 64 I That the alterations or interlineations, if the document is a will were made after the execution of the will. 1Q Art. 89. Table XXVIII. * But independent proof of the correct- ness of the date will be required if the circumstances are such that collusion as to the date might be practised, and would, if practised, injure any person, or defeat the object of any laws. Art. 85. 8 Unless it be shown to have remained unstamped for some time after its execu- tion. Art. 86. 4 In a form recognized as valid by the law of a particular State ; and in Penn- sylvania and others of the States a scroll is all that is necessary ; Miller r. Binder, 28 Pa. 439 (1857\ And upon proof of the signatures it is presumed that the instrument was duly and regularly sealed, and, when found in the possession of the grantee, that it was delivered ; Pringle r. Pringle, 59 Pa. 289 (1868); and also from due acknowledg- ment and recording delivery is presumed ; McCurdy's Appeal, 65 Pa. 296 (1870) Ingles v. Ingles, 150 Pa. 397 (1892). 6 It has been found necessary to depart from Stephen's statement of the rule in order to adapt this table to the law as it exists in this country. 7 The judge decides whether or not docu- ments are produced from proper custody, and they are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom they would naturally be ; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. Art. 88. 8 And in the absence of all evidence relating to such alterations or interlinea- tions. No person producing any document which upon its face appears to have been altered in a material part can claim under it the enforcement of any right created by it, unless the alteration was made before the completion of the document or with the consent of the party to be charged under it or his representative in interest. An alteration is said to be material when, if it had been made with the consent of the party charged, it would have affected his interest or varied his obligations in any way whatever. An alteration which in no way affects the rights of the parties or the legal effect of the instrument is imma- terial. The above rule extends to cases in which the alteration was made by a stranger, whilst the document was in the custody of the person, producing it, but without his knowledge or leave. Art. 89. There is no presumption as to the time when alterations or interlineations appear- ing on the face of writings not under seal were made, except that it is presumed that they were so made that the making would not constitute an offense. Ibid. See in general the note of the American Editor to Art. 89. 9 Stephen's rule cannot be fully accepted as law in this country. Thus when the alteration is beneficial to the party offer- ing the instrument the burden is upon him to explain the alteration to the satisfaction of the jury ; Jordan v. Stewart, 23 Pa. 248 ff. (1854) ; Brady v. Berwind- White Co., 106 Fed. 824 (1901). 10 But see Wikoffs Appeal, 15 Pa. 281 (1850). At page 290 Mr. Chief Justice Gibson says: ''The presumption is that they [interlineations in a will] were made at or before the time when the will was pre- pared for the final act [execution]." 65 TABLE XXXIII. Fifth Auxiliary of the Fifth Rule Concerning Proof. 1 Arts. 90-92. WHEN ANY JUDGMENT OF ANY COURT OR ANY OTHER JUDI- CIAL OR OFFICIAL PROCEEDING, OR ANY CONTRACT OR GRANT, OR ANY OTHER DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY, HAS BEEN REDUCED TO THE FORM OF A DOCUMENT, NO EVI- DENCE MAY BE GIVEN OF ANY SUCH JUDGMENT OR PRO- CEEDING, OR OF THE TERMS OF SUCH CONTRACT, GRANT, OR OTHER DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY, EXCEPT THE DOCUMENT ITSELF; 3 NOR MAY THE CONTENTS OF ANY SUCH DOCUMENT BE CONTRADICTED, ALTERED, ADDED TO, OR VARIED BY ORAL EVIDENCE. I But evidence may be given For testing the validity of a document, or of any part of it, or to entitle to a judgment or decree relating to it <- Of fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execu- tion, want of capacity in any contracting party, the fact that it is wrongly dated, want or failure of con- sideration, or mistake in fact or law. * Art. 90. For modification or evidence of a document Of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which the document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its tesmr. 5 Art. 90. Of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property. 6 Art. 90. Of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of pro- perty. 7 Art. 90. 66 ^ Of any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are annexed to contracts of that description. 8 Art. 90. For putting a construction upon a document 9 Of the meaning of illegible or not commonly intelligible characters, of foreign, obsolete, technical, local and provincial expressions, of abbreviations, and of com- mon words which from the context, appear to have been used in a peculiar sense. 10 Art. 91. Of the circumstances of the case. " Art. 91. Of the circumstances of the author of the document and his habitual use of language or names for par- ticular persons or things. ia Art. 91. Of statements made by any party to the document as to his intentions in reference to the matter to which the document relates. 13 Art. 91. Of facts to show that the document was in fact executed with its apparent intention. 14 t Table XXVIII. "Or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible (see Table XXX). Art. 90. 'Applies only to parties to documents, and their representatives in interest, and only to cases in which some civil right or civil liability depend upon the terms of a document are in question. Art. 92. *Or any other matter which, if proved, would produce any effect upon the validity of the documents, or of any part of it, or which would entitle any person to any judgment, decree, or order relating thereto. Art. 90. 67 8 If, from the circumstances of the case, the court infers that the parties did not intend the documents to be a complete and final statement of the whole of the trans- action between them. Art. 90. And oral evidence of a transaction is not excluded by the fact that a documentary memorandum of it (not intended to have legal effect as a contract, etc.,) was made. Ibid. Nor is oral evidence of the existence of a legal re- lation, as distinguished from the terms thereof, excluded by the fact that it has been created by a document ; and the fact that a person holds a public office need not be proved by the production of his written or sealed appointment thereto, if he is shown to have acted on it. Ibid. 6 In Pennsylvania, where the parol evi- dence rule has been less strictly applied than in England, and elsewhere in this country, it is held that a separate oral agreement constituting the inducement for entering into a 'written contract may be proved. T Provided that such agreement is not invalid under the Statute of Frauds, or otherwise. Art. 90. 8 Unless the annexing of such incident to such contract would be repugnant to or inconsistent with the express terms of the contract. Art. 90. 'Means ascertaining the meaning of the signs or words made upon it, and their rela- tion to facts. Art. 91. 10 But evidence may not be given to show that common words, the meaning of which is plain, and which do n< t appear from the context to have been u ed in a particular sense, were in fact so used ; and if the words of a document are, on the other hand, so defective or ambiguous as to be unmeaning, no evidence can be given to show what the author of the document intended to say. Art. 91. 11 This is for the purpose of ascertaining the relation of tl.e words of the document to facts (see note 9) ; and to this end every fact may be proved to which the document refers, or mny probably have been intended to refer, or which identifies any person or thing mentioned in it. Art. 91. [See this article for application of the circumstances of the case to the construction of a docu- ment having a proper legal meaning and also a less proper meaning ; for the rult where a document has one distinct mean- ing in reference to the circumstances ol the case ; and for the course which may be pursued if the document applies in par^ but not with accuracy, or not completely to the circumstances of the case]. 12 These facts are admissible only where the document applies in part but not with accuracy, or not completely to the circum- stances of the case (see note 11) ; and, even in such cases, no evidence can be given of statements made by the author as to his intentions in reference to the matter to which the document relates. (But see notea 13 and 14). Art. 91. "Such statements are admissible only where the language of the document, though plain in itself, applies equally well to more objects than one, but in such cases evidence may be given both of the circum- stances of the case (see note 11) and of such statements. Art. 91. 14 If the document is of such a nature that the court will presume that it was executed with any other than its apparent intention. For instance, ad> pting Stephen's illustration, where A leaves two legacies of the same amount to B, assigning the same motive for each legacy, one being given in his will, the other in a codicil, the court presumes that they are not meant to be cumulative, but the legatee may show, either by proof of surrounding circum- stances, or of declarations by the testator, that they were. Such proof is called evi- dence to rebut an equity. TABLE XXXIV. Sixth Rule Concerning Proof. (Added.) RELEVANT FACTS MAY BE PROVED I I By real evidence * The persons of individuals, a and things animate 3 or inanimate which have a material relation to the case. * ^ The locus in quo. 5 ^ Pictures of persons or of places, and maps or charts, made in such manner as to secure accuracy of representation. 8 1 Real Evidence may be said to com- prise any object the inspection whereof, either taken by itself, or in connection with other facts, proves or renders proba- ble the past, present or future existence or non-existence of any relevant fact, and the term, no doubt, is inclusive of some ob- jects which are not specifically enumerated in this table. See, in general, note of the American Editor to Art. 62. 2 Comm. v. Emmons,98 Mass. 6 (1867); Indiana Car Co. vs. Parker, 100 Ind. 181 (1884). Whether a person suing for per- sonal injuries can be compelled by the court to submit his person to examination either by the jury or by physicians, is a question upon which the authorities are not agreed. Such power has been denied in Pettit v. Brewer, 8 W. N. C. 253 (1880) and in Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250 (1891) ; on the other hand it has been held to exist in Atchison, etc., R. R Co. v. Thul, 29 Kans. 466 (1883). 3 Line v. Taylor, 3 F. & F. 731 (1862) : Ferocious dog brought into court to prove his disposition. *Ex. gr. The weapon or instrument used to commit a crime, bloody garments, etc. Wynne v. State, 56 Ga. 113 (1876); People v. Fernandez, 35 N. Y. 49 (1866). 5 May, in the discretion of the court be visited by the jury: Vane v. Evanston, 150 Ills. 616 (1894). 6 Ex. gr. Photographs, If properly veri- fied, Udderzook v. Comm., 76 Pa. 352 flf. (1874), sketches made by an artist who swears to their accuracy, People v. John- son, 140 N. Y. 350 (1893), etc. THIRD PART. 71 TABLE XXXV. First Rule Concerning the Production and Effect of Evidence. 1 Arts. 93-97. THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES AT FIRST ON THAT PARTY AGAINST WHOM THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT WOULD BE GIVEN IF NO EVIDENCE AT ALL WERE PRODUCED ON EITHER SIDE. 2 Art. 95. But may be relieved or shifted I V By presumption 3 By estoppel* 1 Under this head, viz. the Production and Effect of Evidence, Stephen treats of "Burden of Proof" (Arts. 93-97), of "Presumptions and Estoppels" (Arts. 98- 105), of " The competency of witnesses " (Arts. 106-122), of "Taking oral evi- dence, and of the examination of wit- nesses" (Arts. 123-139), of "Deposi- tions" (Arts. 140-142), and of "Improper admission and rejection of evidence" (Art. 143). These subjects are covered by Tables XXXV-XL1I and the accom- panying notes; but are there presented and dealt with in a manner somewhat dif- ferent from that of the Digest. 1 "Whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence or non-exist- ence of facts which he asserts or denies to exist, must prove that those facts do or do not exist (Art. 93), unless as to any par- ticular fact, it is provided by law that the burden of proving that fact shall lie on any particular person. Art. 96. Jf the commission of a crime is directly in issue in any proceeding, criminal or civil, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (As to civil cases see American Editor's note). The burden of proving that any person has been guilty of a crime or wrongful act is on the person who asserts it, whether the commission of such act is or is not directly in issue in the action. Art. 94. The burden of proving any fact necessary to be proved in order to enable any person to give evidence of any other fact is on the person who wishes to give such evidence. Art. 97. 3 See Table XXXVI, which is auxiliary to this one. 4 See Table XXXVII, which is auxiliary to this one. 73 TABLE XXXVI. First Auxiliary of the First Rule Concerning the Production and Effect of Evidence. 1 Arts. 98-101. THE BURDEN OF PROOF MAY BE RELIEVED OR SHIFTED 3 By presumption Of legitimacy from the fact that the person to whom the question relates was born during the continuance of a, valid marriage be- tween his mother and any man, or ivithin a competent time there- after. 3 Art. 98. Of death from the fact that the person to whom the question relates has not been heard of for seven years by those (if any) who if he had been alive would naturally have heard of him. 4 Art. 99. Of lawful origin of any proprietary right from the fact that a person has, for a long period of time, exercised it. s Art. 100. Of compliance with formal requisites for the validity of any judicial or official act where it is shown to have been done in a manner substantially regular. Art. 101. Of the execution of every instrument whicn, to perfect the title of a person in possession of any property and entitled to the beneficial ownership thereof, it was the duty of his trustees to execute. 8 Art. 101. 1 Table XXXV. See also notes to Table XXXVII. 1 A presumption which appears upon the pleadings may relieve the party on whom it would otherwise at first lie, of the bur- den of proof (see Table XXXV), or as the proceeding goes on the party on whom it rested at first may prove facts which raise a presumption in his favor, and in such case the burden of proof is "shifted" 74 to the other party. In considering the amount of evidence necessary to shift the burden of proof, the court has regard to the opportunities of knowledge with respect to the fact to be proved which may be pos- sessed by the parties respectively. Arts. 95, 96. 3 A competent time thereafter is within such a time after the dissolution of the marriage and before the celebration of another valid marriage, that his mother's husband could have been his father. The presumption is conclusive, unless it can be shown either that his mother and her hus- band had no access to each other when he could have been begotten, regard being had both to the date of the birth and to the physical condition of the husband, or that the circumstances of their access (if any) were such as to render it highly im- probable that sexual intercourse took place. Art. 98. As to incompetency of the mother and the husband as witnesses, etc., Ibid. 4 Unless the circumstances of the case are such as to account for his not being heard of without assuming his death. There is no presumption as to the time when he died, or as to the age at which a person died who is shown to have been alive at a given time, or as to the order in which two or more persons died who are shown to have died in the same accident, shipwreck, or battle. Art. 99. 5 If it might have had a lawful origin by grant or license from the government, or from a private person, and its exercise might and naturally would have been pre- vented by the persons interested if it had not had a lawful origin. It is presumed that it was created by a proper instrument which has been lost. Art. 100. 6 It will be assumed that they have done what they should have done. There are several presumptions in addi- tion to those mentioned by Stephen, which may relieve from or shift the burden of proof. For instance, sanity is presumed, and the burden lies upon him who alleges insanity ; but while there is some conflict of decision in the State Courts upon the question, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently held that in criminal cases the defendant is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt of his sanity, pro- duced by a proper consideration of all the evidence. Davis v. United States, 165 U. 8., 373 (1897); 16 Sup. Court Rep., 353. For presumption of innocence, see Art. 94. TABLE XXXVII. Second Auxiliary of the First Rule Concerning the Production and Effect of Evidence. 1 Arts. 102-105. THE BURDEN OF PROOF MAY BE RELIEVED OR SHIFTED By estoppel " I Precluding any person, or his representative in interest, from deny- ing a the truth of anything which such person, by doing or saying, or abstaining from doing or saying, has intentionally caused or permitted another person to believe to be true, and to act upon such belief.' Art. 102. Precluding any person from denying that he acted in the manner in which another person has been led to believe he acted by a fraud of which the neglect of a legal duty " owing by the person whose act is in question was in the natural course of things the proximate cause. Art. 102. Precluding any tenant 7 of any land or hereditament 8 from deny- ing that the landlord had a title thereto. 10 Art. 103. Precluding any acceptor of a bill of exchange from denying the signature of the drawer or his capacity to draw, or if the bill is payable to the order oj the drawer, his capacity to endorse the bill, 11 or if the bill be drawn by procuration, the authority of the agent to draw in the name of the principal, 12 or if the bill is accepted in blank, that the drawer endorsed it. Art. 104. Precluding any bailee, agent, or licensee from denying that the bailor, principal, or licensor, by whom any goods were entrusted to any of them respectively, was entitled to those goods at the time when they were so entrusted. 13 Art. 105. 76 1 Table XXXV. See also notes to Table XXXVI. * Presumptions may be either conclusive or disputable, but an estoppel is always conclusive. The party estopped is pre- cluded from denying the existence of the fact to which the estoppel applies, and therefore when the circumstances giving rise to the estoppel are shown or appear, the existence of such fact is, in effect, conclusively established. 8 In any suit or proceeding between either of them and sucli other person as is next referred to. Art. 102. 4 Otherwise than he would have acted except for that belief. Art. 102. 5 To exercise reasonable caution in the transaction of any business. Ibid. 6 And when the person to whom the duty is owing alters his position for the worse because he is misled as to the con- duct of the negligent person by the fraud. Ibid. T And any person claiming through any tenant. Art. 103. 8 Of which he ha* been let into posses- sion, or for which he has paid rent, till he has given up possession. Ibid. 9 At the time when the tenant was let into possession or paid the rent. Ibid. 10 A iid no person who came upon any land by the license of the person in pos- session thereof, is, whilst he remains on it, permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such license was given. Ibid. u Though he may deny the fact of the endorsement. Art. 104. 12 Though he may deny his authority to endorse it. Ibid. 13 For what such bailee, agent or licensee may show, and as to the law of estoppel as related to bills of lading, see the last two paragraphs of Art. 105, and the njtes thereto. 77 TABLE XXXVIII. Second Rule Concerning the Production and Effect of Evidence. Arts. 106-109. NO PERSON IS COMPETENT TO TESTIFY 1 I Who is 3 prevented by extreme youth, disease affecting his mind, or any other cause of the same kind, from recollecting the matter on which he is to testify, from understanding the questions put to him, from giving rational answers to those questions, or from knowing that he ought to speak the truth. 3 Art. 107. Who (in criminal cases) is the accused person or is the wife or husband of such person, or is a person, or the wife or husband of a person, jointly indicted with him. Art. 108.* Who (in civil cases) is the lawful husband or wife of a party, or of a person whose interests are directly involved in the suit. 5 Art. 109. 1 The rule of the modern law is that all and by many of the State Legislatures, persons are competent to testify in all cases For the Acts of Congress, see U. 8. Rev. (Art. 106), and it seems to be the tendency St. \ 858; 20 U. S. St. at Large, 30 ; and of the courts liberally to apply this rule as examples of State legislation, see the and to avoid a too ready allowance of the Pennsylvania Statutes, Acts of May 23, exceptions to it. The general subject of 1887, P. L. 158 ; June 11, 1891, P. L. 287 ; competency, compulsion and prohibition June 8, 1893, P. L. 344; 'June 18, 1895, P. to testify, has been dealt with by Congress L. 195 ; April 11, 1899, P. L. 41. Stephen 78 does nut mention as disqualifying the fact that the witness does not believe in a future state of rewards and punishments, or has committed treason, felony, or the crimen falsi, but these disqualifications are still generally recognized in this country. See American note to Art. 107. 2 In the opinion of the judge. 8 A witness unable to speak or hear is net incompetent, if he can give his evidence intelligently by writing, signs, or other- wise. Ait. 107. 4 But in any criminal proceeding against a husband or wife for any bodily injury or violence inflicted upon his or her wife or husband, such wife or husband is compe- tent and compellable to testify. Art. 108. And see statutory provisions referred to in note 1 to this Table. When the only proof against a person charged with a criminal offence is the evi- dence of an accomplice, uncorroborated in any material particular, it is the duty of the j udge to warn the jury that it is unsafe to convict any person upon such evidence, though they have a legal right to do so. Art. 121. If upon a trial for perjury the only evidence against the defendant is the oath of one witness contradicting the oath on which perjury is assigned, and if no cir- cumstances are proved which corroborate such witness, the defendant is entitled to be acquitted. Art. 122. As to number of witnesses requisite in trials for treason, see the same article, and the Constitution of the United States, Art. 3. Sec. 3, and the similar provisions of the State Con- stitutions. 5 Even after dissolution of the marriage, neither party can testify as to facts learned through the confidence of the marital re lation, but may as to other facts. Art. 109. See statutory provisions referred to in note 1 to this Table. 79 TABLE XXXIX. Third Rule Concerning the Production and Effect of Evidence. Arts. 110-113, 116, 120. NO PERSON IS COMPELLABLE TO TESTIFY 1 L As to any communication made to the witness by his or her wife or husband during the marriage.* Art. no. As to anything which came to the knowledge of the witness in court as a judge. 3 Art. in. As to any affairs of State, or as to official com- munications between public officers upon public affairs, except with the permission of the officer at the head of the department concerned. Art. 112. As to the names of persons by or to whom infor- mation was given as to the commission of offences.* Art. 113. As to any communication between the witness and his legal adviser. 5 Art. 116. As to any question put to the witness, the answer to which would 6 have a tendency to expose him or her (or his or her wife or husband) to any criminal charge, or to any penalty or forfeiture which the judge regards as reasonably likely to be preferred or sued for. 7 Art. 120. 80 iSee also Tables XXXVIII and XL. 'See statutory provisions referred to in note 1 to Table XXXVIII. Doubtful. Art. 111. It seems that a lawyer cannot be compelled to testify as to what he said in court in his character of a lawyer. Ibid. 4 Applies to cases in which the govern- ment is immediately concerned. Art. 113. In ordering criminal prosecutions it is for the judge to decide whether the permission of any such question would or would not, under the circumstances of the particular case, be injurious to the administration of justice. Ibid. 6 Which his legal adviser could not dis- close without his permission (Table XL). Art. 116. 6 In the opinion of the judge. Art. 120. i No witness who is not a party to a suit can be compelled to produce his title-deeds to any property, or any document the pro- duction of which might tend to criminate him, or expose him to any penalty or for- feiture ; and no solicitor, trustee, or mort- gagee can be compelled to produce (except for the purpose of identification ) documents in his possession as such, which his client, cestui que trust, or mortgagor would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession ; nor can any one who is entitled to refuse to produce a document, be compelled to give oral evidence of its contents. Arts. 118, 119. 81 TABLE XL. Fourth Rule Concerning the Production and Effect of Evidence. Arts. 114, 115. NO PERSON IS PERMITTED TO TESTIFY' I As to what passed between the jurymen in the discharge of their duties in any case in which the witness was a petty juror or a grand juror. 2 Art. 114. As to any communication, oral or documentary, made to the witness as an attorney at law by or on behalf of his client, or as to any advice given by him to his client. 3 Art. 115. iSee also Tables XXXVIII and XXXIX. 2 It is doubtful whether a grand juror may give evidence as to what any witness said when examined before the grand jury. Art. 114. 'The legal adviser is not permitted to make such disclosures either during or after the termination of his employment as such, unless with his client's express consent. The rule applies to communica- tions made and advice given during, in the course, and for the purpose of his em- ployment, whether in reference to any matter as to which a dispute has arisen or otherwise ; and it is immaterial whether the client is or is not a party to the action in which the question is put to the legal adviser. Art. 115. For a statement of communications and facts to which the rule does not extend, and of those whom the expression "legal adviser" includes, see the same Article. Medical men and (probably) clergymen may be compelled to disclose communications made to them in professional confidence. Art. 117. But as to physicians and surgeons, see statutory provisions referred to in note 1 to Table XXXVIII ; e. g. the Pennsylvania Statute of June 18, 1895, P. L. 195. 83 TABLE XLI. Fifth Rule Concerning the Production and Effect of Evidence. Arts. 123-125. ALL ORAL EVIDENCE GIVEN IN ANY PROCEEDING MUST BE GIVEN UPON OATH OR SOLEMN AFFIRMATION, 1 AND MAY BE TAKEN I 1" In open court upon a final or preliminary hearing. Art. 125. ^ Out of court for future use in court. Art. 125. Upon affidavit. 2 Art. 125. Under a commission. 3 s Art. 125. Before any person appointed by the court or a judge, or selected by agreement of the parties. 4 " s Art. 125. 1 Affirmation is permitted only when the witness is, from conscientious motives, un- willing to be sworn, and the judge is satisfied of the sincerity of his objection. Art. 123. Oaths are binding which are administered in such form and with such ceremonies as the person sworn declares to be binding. Every person now or here- after having power by law or by consent of parties to hear, receive, and examine evi- dence, is empowered to administer an oath to all such witnesses as are lawfully called before him. Art. 124. 'Affidavits are received upon prelimin- ary and ex parte applications in common law proceedings, e. g. upon a motion for the postponement of trial, for a rule to show cause, etc. In equity they are re- ceived upon similar applications, and on motions for interlocutory orders, e. g. for an injunction pendente lite, etc. As to affidavits upon information and belief, etc. See Art. 125, and the American note thereto. 'Oral evidence must be taken in the manner prescribed by the commission. Art. 125. See American note to Art. 125. *Oral evidence must be taken in the same manner as if it were taken in open court (Table XLII) ; but the person taking it has no right to decide on the validity of objections taken to particular questions [unless authorized, as in the case of a master in equity], but must record the questions, the fact that they were objected to, and the answers given. Art. 125. 6 As to the time for raising objections to a deposition or to evidence taken under a commission, see American note to Art. 125. 86 TABLE XLII. Sixth Rule Concerning the Production and Effect of Evidence. Arts. 126-142. WITNESSES EXAMINED IN OPEN COURT 1 MUST BE ) First examined in chief. 3 - * Then cross-examined.* I Then re-examined. 3 * 'The examination of witnesses out of court proceeds in the same order, and even where evidence is taken under a commis- sion, the manner of taking it is, so far as practicable, generally the same as if it were taken in open court. See notes 3 and 4 to Table XLI. As to a witness refreshing his memory by referring to a writing, see Art. 136 ; and as to the right of the adverse party to see any writing so used, and to cross-ex- amine upon it, see Art. 137. As to the requirement that a party who calls for a document and, upon its production inspects it, must give it in evidence, see Art. 138 ; and that a party who refuses to produce a document on notice, may not afterwards use it as evidence without the consent of the other party, see Art. 139. As to statu- tory provisions relating to depositions, see Arts. 140-142. * As to the right of the opposite party to cross-examine a witness who has been ex- amined in chief, or has been intentionally sworn or affirmed; as to recalling a wit- ness for further examination or for further cross-examination ; as to the effect of the death or incapacity of a witness at any stage of his examination ; and as to the practice where in the course of a trial a witness who was supposed to be competent appears to be incompetent, see Art. 126, and the American notes. 1 Leading questions, if objected to, must not be asked, except with the permission of the court. Art. 128. 4 Leading questions may be put. Art. 128. The cross-examination need not be con- fined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination in chief. Art. 127. [But see American notes]. In ad- dition to questions relating to facts in issue or relevant thereto, the witness, when un- der cross-examination, may be asked any questions which tend to test his accuracy, veracity, or credibility, or to shake his credit by injuring his character. Art. 129. 86 As to how far a witness may be compelled to answer such questions, see Art. 129, and notes, and as to questions tending to crim- inate, etc., see Table XXXIX. When a witness under cross-examination hns answered any question which is relevant only in so far as it tends to shake his credit by injuring his character, no evidence can be given to contradict him, except where he denies or does not admit that he has been convicted of any felony or misde- meanor, or answers aiiy question tending to show that he is not impartial, by deny- ing the facts suggested. Art. 130. He may be asked whether he has made any former statement relative to the subject- matter of the action and inconsistent with his present testimony, the circumstances of the supposed statement being referred to sufficiently to designate the particular occasion, and if he does not distinctly admit that he has made such a statement, proof may be given that he did, in fact, make it. Art. 131. The same course may be taken with a witness under examination in chief, if the judge is of opinion that he is ad- verse. Ibid. As to previous statements made by the witness in writing, or reduced into writing, see Art. 132; and as to im- peaching the credit of a witness by the evidence of other persons who, from their knowledge of him, believe him to be un- worthy of credit upon his oath, see Art. 133. When a man is prosecuted for rape or an attempt to ravish (Table V11I), the woman may be asked whether she has had connec- tion with other men, but her answer cannot be contradicted. She may also be asked whether she has had connection on other occasions with the prisoner, and if she denies it, she may be contradicted. Art. 134. 5 The re-examination must be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination ; and if new matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter. Art. 127. 87 TABLE XLIII. Seventh Rule Concerning the Production and Effect of Evidence. Art. 143. A NEW TRIAL, WILL NOT BE GRANTED IN ANY CIVIL ACTION l ON THE GROUND OF THE IMPROPER ADMISSION OR REJEC- TION OF EVIDENCE, UNLESS SOME SUBSTANTIAL WRONG OR MISCARRIAGE HAS BEEN THEREBY OCCASIONED IN THE TRIAL OF THE ACTION. ART. 143. criminal cases, the English rule, as presented by Stephen, is different; but, as noticed by the American editor, " in this country, it is a general rule in criminal cases that a new trial will not be granted for the erroneous admission or rejection of evidence, when it clearly appears that the defendant could not have been prejudiced thereby." 89 DC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A 000 684 365