UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF LAW LIBRARY Lawrence CASES ON EDITED BY CARL 'E ' PH.D CHICAGO: CALLAGHAN & COMPANY, PUBLISHERS, 1898. T v i r? Entered according to Act. of Congress, in the year 1898, By CA1.LAGHAN & COMPANY, In the Office of the Librarian Af. Congress, at Washington, D. lUt/v^ Composition by The Brown-Cooper Typesetting Co. Chicago. PREFACE. In making this collection of cases, it was not my purpose to at- tempt to rival the notable collection of Professor Thayer. I have had the more modest design o'f bringing together within the com- pass of a single volume a sufficient number of the leading decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on constitutional law to form the basis of a course in that subject. The so-called "case system" of study is applied to almost all branches of the law, but its application to constitutional law has been retarded by the obvious impracticability of referring a class to tae original reports and by the want of a suitable ease book o? moderate size. It is to meet such requirements tnat th ; s collection has- been formed. A work of this kind is, necessarily a ccm;yornise between the de- sirable and the attainable. The exigencies of space have compelled me to exclude numerous instructive decisions which many persons may expect to find and which I would have been glad to print. For the further economy of space, arguments have been omitted and the notes are few. It seemed that the pages required for these features could be more profitably devoted to decisions which must otherwise be excluded. As to the text of the cases, all the decisions from December Term, 1855, (18 Howard), have been taken from the official reports. Cases decided before 18 Howard are taken from Curtis' Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The cases are re- printed verbatim et literatim except that certain parts, particularly statements of facts, have been shortened, and matter not necessary iii iV PREFACE. to the elucidation of the constitutional question involved has been omitted. These changes have been indicated in the usual manner. The date which has been assigned to each decision is, as a rule, the year in which the term began at which the decision was made. This applies to all the cases decided prior to October Term, 1882, (108 U. S.), except the Dred Scott case, the Prize Cases, Hepburn v. Griswold, and the Legal Tender Cases. The relation of these decisions to contemporary affairs made their exact date important. It is to be regretted that the Reports of the Supreme Court prior to 1882 do not indicate the day on which each decision was rendered. Professor Thayer has greatly facilitated my work by permitting me to use the sheets of his Cases as manuscript for the printer. It is also due to him to say that I was familiar with his comprehensive collection long before I began making this one. How far this fact may have influenced my selection of cases and my method of treating them cannot be determined. A general acknowledgment of indebtedness must therefore suffice. In this connection, I would also express my oblfgajions for the many helpful suggestions which I have received, from*. Head Professor Judson and Dr. Ernst Freund of the l T hivers,rtA)f.Cliieagfc>..* /* .."*"*/. /* ;\; .CARL EVANS BOYD. Chicago, April 25,.^^ ..*.'* v> //vV .* TABLE OF CONTENTS. I. THE VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION Marbury v. Madison 17 II. TAXATION Hylton v. United States 2G McCuIloch y. Maryland 32 Weston v. Charleston 41 License Tax Cases 45 Crandall v. Nevada -. 49 Veazie Bank v. Fenno 5i> The Collector v. Day G 1 State Tonnage Tax Cases 60 Loan Association v. Topeka 78 Springer vrTThitecT StlaTesT 85 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co 91 III. MONEY Craig v.^Mis&ouri 101 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky 108 Hepburn v. Griswold 113 LegalJEender Cases 138 Juilliard y. Greenmau 157 IV. COMMERCE Gibbons v. Ogden , 172 Brown v. Maryland 192 License Cases 294 Passenger Cases 210 Cooley v. Wardens of the Port 235 Case of the State Freight Tax 24G Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.. 255 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania 259 Leisy" v. Hardin 2!>9 Minnesota v. Barber 231 V. THE POLICE POWER Munn_ v\_Illinois 289 Escanaba Co. v. Chicago 299 VI. GENERAL (IMPLIED) POWERS McCulloch v. Maryland 308 v vi TABLE OF CONTENTS. vii. EXECUTIVE POWERS- EX parte Garlara 324 In re Neagle 325 VIII. WAR. MARTIAL LAW Martin v. Mott 338 The Prize Cases 342 Ex parte Milligan 351 IX. EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER CaJdBE_4^-Sull 372 Cummings v. Missouri 381 X. IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS Fletchor v. Peck ....... , .................................. 395 Sturges v. Crowninshield .................................. 405 College v. Woodward ......................... 412 Ogden v. Saunders ........................................ 431 Charles__River Bridge y. Warren Bridge ................... 451 XI. CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS Barren v. Baltimore ...................................... 467 Scott v. Sandford ......................................... 471 Slaughter House Cases .................................... 491 Straudsr v. West Virginia ................................. 511 Civil Rights Cases ........................................ 518 Hurtado v. California ..................................... 534 United States v. Kagama ................................. 543 XII. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES Texas v. White. .......................................... 552 Tarble's Case ............................................ 563 Ex parte Siebold .......................................... 571 XIII. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. INDIAN AFFAIRS American Insurance Co. v. Canter ........................ 583 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia ............................... 584 Worcester v. Georgia ..................................... 590 Fong Yuc Ting v. United States ........................... 595 XIV. JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS Chisholm v. Georgia ................. ; .................... 603 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee ................................ 616 Cohens v. Virginia ........................................ 627 United States v. Texas .................................... 637 XV. POLITICAL QUESTIONS Luther v. Bcrden ......................................... 647 Mississippi v. Andrew Johnson ............................ 652 XVI. ENFORCEMENT OF EXECUTIVE POWER BY JUDICIAL PROCESS Inre_Debs ...................... . 659 TABLE OF CASES. Ableman v. Booth 565, 568 Alabama v. Georgia 640 Aldnutt v. Inglis 292 Alexander v. Railroad 71, 75 Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay 81 Almy v. California 253 American Ins. Co. v. Canter. . 547, 583 Amy Warwick, The 342 Apsden v. Austin 151 Assignees of Topham v. Chap- man 446 Austria v. Day 168 Baker v. Wheaton Ballantine v. Golding Bank v. Supervisors of Columbia v. Okely of Commerce v. New York City of Kentucky v. Wistar. . . . of U. S. v. Planters' Bank. Banks v. Mayor Bank Tax Case Barbier v. Connolly Barrington v. Potter Barron v. Baltimore Bartemeyer v. Iowa Bayard v. Singleton Beaty v. Lessee of Knowles... Beer Co. v. Massachusetts Benedict v. Vanderbilt Bolt v. Stennett Bonham's Case Bowman v. C. & N. W. Rail- way Co 273, 276, Bowman v. Middleton Boyle v. Reading R. R. Co Brilliante, The Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky. 108, 155, 169 Bronson v. Rodes 120, 122 Brown v. Houston 271, 278 v. Levee Commissioners.. 542 v. Piper 283 v. Maryland ....54, 76, 192, 206, 208, 210, 220, 270, 272, 273, 279 v. United States 31V Burrows v. Jamineau 447 Butler v. Horwitz 120 446 Calder v. Bull 372 445 Camden v. Allen 84 166 Chae Chan Ping v. United 537 States 596, 601 Charles River Bridge v. War- 247 ren Bridge 451 117 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 117 547, 549, 584, 638, 639 166 Chirac v. Chirac 217 247 Chisholm v. Georgia 603 307 City of New York v. Miln 151 216, 220, 224, 495 467 Civil Rights Cases 518 278 Clarke v. P. W. & B. R. R. Co. 249 24 Coffin v. Landis 151 459 Cohens v. Virginia 139, 239, 278 356, 595, 627, 642 75 Collector v. Day 61 292 Commonwealth v. Alger 494 539 v. Caton 24 v. Smith 137 279 Cook v. Pennsylvania 277 24 Cooley v. Board of Wardens 248 52, 75, 235, 252, 271, 307, 572 342 Corfield v. Coryell 505 vii viii TABLE OF CASES. Craig v. Missouri. 101,110, 116, 164, 169 Crandall v. Nevada 49, 252, 253, 507 Crenshaw, The 342 Cumberland Valley R. R. Co.'s Appeal 248 Cummings v. Missouri 381 Daniel Ball, The 302 Dartmouth College v. Wood- ward 412 Davidson v. New Orleans 540 Dobbins v. Brown 152 v. Commissioners of Erie County 64, 65, 67 Dooley v. Smith 160 Dred Scott v. Sandford 471, 503 Dunn v. Sayles 151 Eakin v. Raub 24 Edye v. Robertson 600 Eilenbaker v. District Court of Plymouth County 278 Escacaba Co. v. Chicago. .277, 299 Ex parte Bollman 354 Crew Dog 549 Garland 324, 394 Milligan 351 Siebold 331, 571, 661 Virginia 522, 525 Watkins 354 Yarbrough 600 Faw v. Marsteller 151 Fellows v. Blacksmith et al. . . 551 Fisher v. Blight 143 Fletcher v. Peck.. 138, 386, 389, 395 v. Rhode Island 204 Florida v. Georgia 640 Fong Yue Ting v. U. S 595 Foster v. Davenport 72 v. Kansas 278 v. Neilson 600, 638, 658 Fowler v. Lindsey 645 Fcx v. Ohio.. . 575 Gaines v. Buford 388 Garcia v. Lee 638, 639 Gelston v. Hoyt 657 Georgia v. Stanton 658 Gibbons v. Ogden. . .72, 93, 153, 172, 201, 213, 216, 217, 220, 222, 226, 232, 252, 255, 265, 267', 270, 273, 274, 280, 495, 665. Gilman v. Philadelphia 252, 303, 664, 665 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Penn- sylvania 259 Groves v. Slaughter 227 Hanson v. Vernon 81, 82, 84 Hans v. Louisiana 643, 644 Harrison v. Sterry 446 Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co 263, 265 Henderson v. Mayor of New York.... 265, 270, 277, 282, 304 Hepburn v. Griswold. .118, 144, 155, 160, 166 & Dundas v. Ellzey 561 Hiawatha, The 342 Holmes v. Jennison 220, 356 v. Walton 24 Houston v. Moore 217, 220, 239 Howell v. Maryland 71. Hunt v. Knickerbocker 107 Hunter v. Potts 445 Hurtado v. California 534 Hyde v. Continental Trust Co. 91 Hylton v. United States 26, 61, 87, 89, 90, 93 Indiana v. Kentucky 640 In re Adam 1 602 Debs 659 Neagle 325 Rapier 600 Jackson v. Lamphire 459 Jenkins v. Andover 83 Jones v. Robbing 535 v. United States.. . 658 TABLE OF CASES. ix Juilliard v. Greenman 157, 323, 600 Kalloch v. Superior Court 535 Kansas Indians, The 551 Kellogg v. Union Co 266 Kendall v. Stockton & Stokes. 655 Kennard v. Louisiana 540 Kentucky v. Dennison 576 Kidd v. Pearson 278 Kimmish v. Ball 278 Knox v. Lee 136, 156, 323, 597 Lane County v. Oregon 65, 120, 555, 661 Lau Ow Bew v. United States. 602 Lee Joe v. United States 595 Legal Tender Cases... 136, 160, 166, 169, 170, 597 Leisy v. Hardin 269, 807 License Cases 204, 275, 276, 279, 307 License Tax Cases 45, 307, 495 Loan Association v. Topeka78, 542 Logan v. United States 600 Lowell v. Boston 81 Luther v. Borden 369, 559, 647 Marbury v. Madison .. 17, 654, 655 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 138, 239, 616 v. Mott 338, 650 Maryland v. Railroad Co 160 Matter of Keeler 569 Mayor of New York 84 Severy 569 Turner 500 McConnell v. Hampden 369 McCulloch v. Maryland 32, 42, 45, 54, 64, 68, 76, 84, 92, 126, 138, 143, 146, 161, 163, 166, 171, 228, 263, 308, 496, 600, 644, 661. M'Millan v. M'Neil 432 McReynolds v. Smallhouse 266 Minnesota v. Barber 281, 307 Mississippi v. Johnson 652 Missouri v. Iowa 640 v. Kentucky 640 v. Lewis 541 Mobile v. Kimball 261, 271, 277, 301 v. Yuille 293 Moore v. Illinois 575 Morgan Steamship Co. v. La. Board of Health 278 Morgan v. Parham 263, 265 Mugler v. Kansas 278, 282, 307 Munn v. Illinois 289, 540 Murphy v. Ramsey 547 Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Imp. Co 537 Nashville, &c. Railway Co. v. Alabama 278 Nathan v. Louisiana 71, 76 National Bank v. United States 167 Nebraska v. Iowa 640 New Jersey v. New York 640 New Jersey Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank 293 New York Indians, The 551 Nishimura Ekiu v. United States 596, 600 Norris v. Boston 219, 230, 231 North Carolina v. Temple 643 Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church 84 Ogden v. Saunders 431 Olcott v. Supervisors 83 Osborn v. United States Bank 166 Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule 61, 89, 90 Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg 269 v. Keokuk 268 v. St. Louis 269 Palmer v. Commissioners of Cuyahoga Co 306 Parker v. Davis 136 Parsons v. United States 337 Passenger Cases, The... 51, 52, 54, 72, 219, 250, 252 Patterson v. Kentucky 278, 286 Patton v. Nicholson . . .107 TABLE OF CASES. Paul v, Virginia 261, 506 Pearson v. International Dis- tillery 279 Peirce v. New Hampshire. .204, 276 Pennsylvania v. Standard Oil Co 263 Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co 255 People v. Compagnie G6nerale Transatlantique 282 v. Salem 83 Permoli v. First Municipality. 305 Perry v. Torrence 72 Phillips v. Detroit 283 v. Hunter 446 Podndexter v. Greenhaw 98 Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan 305 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co 91 Pound v. Turck 303 Pray v. Northern Liberties... 84 Prigg v. Pennsylvania 239, 517 Prize Cases, The 342 Providence Bank v. Billings & Pittman 459 Provident Bank v. Massachu- setts 247 Railroad Co. v. Husen 270, 277 v. Johnson 160 v. Pennsylvania 263 Reading Railroad Co. v. Penn- sylvania 246, 265 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts 640, 645 Robbins v. Shelby Taxing Dis- trict 270, 271, 277, 286 Robinson v. Memphis & Char- leston R. R. Co... 518, 519, 533 Rowan v. The State 535 Rutgers v. Waddington 24 Santissima Trinidad, The 346 Satterlee v. Matthewson 454 St. Louis v. The Ferry Co 263 Scholey v. Rew 89, 90 Searight v. Calbraith 170 Sennot v. Davenport 72 Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila- delphia 81, 82, 84 Slaughter-House Cases. .. .307, 491, 513, 516 Smith v. Alabama 278 v. Shaw 369 v. Turner 219, 231 Society for Saving v. Coite.76, 247 Soon Hing v. Crowley 282 Spraigue v. Thompson 98 Springer v. United States 85 Springfield Bank v. Merrick.. 107 State Freight Tax Case... 246, 277, 286 State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts 298 State Tonnage Tax Cases 9 State v. Charleston 75 v. Starling 536 v. Wapello Co 82 Steamship Co. v. Port Ward- ens 74, 265 Stourbridge Canal v. Wheeling 457 Strader v. Graham 483, 484, 486 Strauder v. West Virginia 511 Stuart v. Laird 239 Sturges v. Crowninshield. .164, 217, 220, 243, 405, 432, 434, 439, 444 Tarble's Case 563 Tennessee v. Davis 331, 517 Texas v. White 156, 552 Thames Bank v. Lovell 266 Thorpe v. Rutland & Burling ton R. R. Co 290, 495 Thurlow v. Massachusetts 204 Towboat Co. v. Bordelon 75 Transportation Co. v. Parkers- burg 269, 278 Trevett v. Weeden 24 Turner v. Maryland 274 United States v. Arredondo... 459, 638, 639 v. Bell Telephone Co 664 TABLE OF CASES. xi United States v. Booth 565, 568 v. Cruikshank 522, 576 v. Daniel 355 v. DeWitt 495 v. Fisher 162 v. Harris 527 v. Holliday 657 v. Hughes 335 v. Kagama 543 v. Marigold 142,148, 575 v. Nichols 518, 519 v. North Carolina 642 v. Reese 517 v. Rogers 547 v. Ryan .518, 519, 533 v. San Jacinto Tin Co. 334, 664 v. Singleton 518, 519 v. Stanley 518, 519 v. Texas 637 Bank v. Bank of Georgia. 166 Vanderbilt v. Adams 266 Vanderheyden v. Young 341 Veazie Bank v. Fenno 56, 68, 89, 147, 166, 167 Vicksburg v. Tobin 269 Virginia v. Rives 522 v. West Virginia 640 Wabash, St. Louis, &c., Rail- way v. Illinois 271, 277 Walker v. Savinet 540 Walling v. Michigan. .270, 278, 285 Ward v. Maryland 505 v. Smith 166 Warren v. Charlestown 98 Watson v. Bourne 445 v. Mercer 455 Webber v. Virginia. 278 Wells v. Nickles 334 Welton v. Missouri.. .261, 278, 304 Westervelt v. Gregg.' 536 Weston v. Charleston. . .41, 54, 64, 76, 166, 358 Whiting v. Fond du Lac... 81, 82, 83, 84 Whitney v. Robertson 601 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co 658 Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co 216, 217, 220, 239, i>J3 Winney v. Whitesides 488 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co. 640, 643 Wong Quan v. United States.. 595 Woodruf v. Parham 253 Worcester v. Georgia. .549, 551, 590 Workman v. Mifflin.. . 152 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 1 We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, pro- vide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. ARTICLE I. SECTION I. 2 All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of i;he United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. SECTION II. 8 The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requi- site for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legis- lature. 4 No person shall be a Representative who shall not have at- tained the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen. 5 Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration 1 g THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Caro- lina five, and Georgia three. 6 When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. 7 The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment. SECTION III. 8 The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. 9 Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year; of the second class, at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class, at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one-third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen by resignation or otherwise during the recess of the legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies. 10 No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States^ and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen. 11 The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided. 12 The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a Presi- dent pro tempore in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States. 13 The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirma- tion. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. 14 Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. any office of honor, trust, or' profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law. SECTION IV. 15 The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Sen- ators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators. 16 The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day. SECTION V. 17 Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties, as each house may provide. 18 Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member. 19 Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy, and the yea and nays of the mem- bers of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one- fifth of those present, be entered on the journal. 20 Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, with- out the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. SECTION VI. 21 The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensa- tion for their services, to be ascertained by law and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall, in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house they shall not be questioned in any other place. 22 No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emolu- ments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and i THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office. SECTION VII. 23 All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. 24 Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representa- tives and the Senate shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two-thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that house it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law. 25 Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, accord- ing to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. SECTION VIII. 26 The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; 27 To borrow money on the credit of the United States; 28 To regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; 29 To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States; To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures; 31 To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securi- ties and current coin of the United States; THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 5 32 To establish post-offices and post-roads; 33 To promote the progress of science and useful arts by secur- ing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries; 34 To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; 35 To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations; 36 To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; 37 To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer time than two years; 38 To provide and maintain a navy; 39 To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; 40 To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; 41 To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States respect- ively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of train- ing the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Con- gress; 42 To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legis- lature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful build- ings; and 43 To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. SECTION IX. 44 The migration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit shall not be pro- hibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person. 45 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus- pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. 46 No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. 4T No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken. 6 . THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 48 No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. 49 No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another. 50 No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in conse- quence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time. 51 No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign State. 52 No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confedera- tion; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. 53 No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be abso- lutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. 54 No State, shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. ARTICLE II. SECTION I. 65 The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows: 58 Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative, or THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 7 person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. 57 [The electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and trans- mit sealed to the seat of government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors ap- pointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Repre- sentatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing the President the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice-President.] 1 68 The Congress may determine the time of choosing the elect- ors and the day on which they shall give their votes, which day shall be the same throughout the United States. 69 No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States. 60 In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-Presi- dent, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of re- moval, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-president, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be re- moved or a President shall be elected. 61 The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished i This clause of the Constitution has been superseded by the Twelfth Amendment. 8 THE CONSTITUTION OP THE UNITED STATES. during the period for which he may have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States or any of them. 62 Before he enter on the execution of his office he shall take the following oath or affirmation: . "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States." SECTION II. * 3 The President shall be Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices, and he shall have power to grant re- prieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. 64 He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. 65 The President shall have power to fill all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session. SECTION III. 66 He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them, and in case of disagreement between them with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States. SECTION IV. * 7 The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 9 and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and mis- demeanors. AETICLE III. SECTION I. 68 The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their con- tinuance in office. SECTION II. 69 The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and con- suls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to con- troversies to which the United States shall be a party; to contro- versies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. 70 In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Su- preme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate juris- diction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make. . 71 The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. SECTION III. 72 Treason against the United States shall consist only in levy- ing war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. 78 The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted. 10 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. AETICLE IV. SECTION I. 74 Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof. SECTION II. 75 The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. 76 A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime. 77 No person held to service or labor in one Staite, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due. SECTION III. 78 New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within -the jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress. 79 The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular State. SECTION IV. 80 The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence. ARTICLE V. 81 The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 11 on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress, provided that no amendments which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. ARTICLE VI. 82 All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the confederation. 83 This Constitution, and the laws of the United States wliich shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. 84 The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Con- stitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualifi- cation to any office or public trust under the United States. ARTICLE VII. 85 The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same. \ NX ^ Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the States present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the independence of the United States of America the twelfth. In witness whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names. George Washington, President, and Deputy from Virginia. New Hampshire John Langdon, Nicholas Oilman. Massachusetts Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus King. Connecticut William Samuel Johnson, Roger Sherman. New York Alexander Hamilton. New Jersey William Livingston, David Brearly, William Pat- terson, Jonathan Dayton. 12 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. Pennsylvania Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Mifflin, Kobert Mor- ris, George Clymer, Thomas Fitzsimons, Jared Ingersoll, James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris. Delaware George Read, Gunning Bedford, Jr., John Dickinson, Richard Bassett, Jacob Broom. Maryland James McHenry, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, Daniel Carroll. Virginia John Blair, James Madison, Jr. North Carolina William Blount, Richard Dobbs Spaight, Hugh Williamson. South Carolina John Rutledge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney, Pierce Butler. Georgia William Few, Abraham Baldwin. Attest: William Jackson, Secretary. AMENDMENTS. ARTICLE I. 87 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. ARTICLE II. 88 A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. ARTICLE III. 89 No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. ARTICLE IV. 90 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon prob- able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly, de- THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 13 scribing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized. ARTICLE V. 91 No person shall be held to answer for a capital or other- wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be de- prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. ARTICLE VI. 02 In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con- fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assist- ance of counsel for his defense. ARTICLE VII. 93 In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. ARTICLE VIII. 94 Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im- posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. ARTICLE IX. 95 The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. ARTICLE X. 96 The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con- stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people. 14 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. ARTICLE XI. 97 The judicial power of the United States shall not be con- strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prose- cuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State. ARTICLE XII. 98 The electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with them- selves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice- President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each; which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of -the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons hav- ing the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Presi- dent the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall con- sist of a member or members from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President when- ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President. 99 The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-Presi- dent shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the pur- pose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 15 ARTICLE XIII. 100 Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place sub- ject to their jurisdiction. 101 Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. ARTICLE XIV. 102 Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 103 Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 104 Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each house, remove such disability. 105 Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 16 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 106 Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. ARTICLE XV. 107 Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi- tude. 108 Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. I. THE VALIDITY OF LEGISLATION. MAEBUEY v. MADISOK 1 Cranch., 137. Decided 1803. At the last term, namely, December term, 1801, William Mar- bury, Dennis Eamsey, Eobert Townsend Hooe, and William Har- per, by their counsel, Charles Lee, Esq., late Attorney-general of the United States, severally moved the court for a rule to James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, to show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding him to cause to be delivered to them respectively their several commissions as justices of the peace in the District of Columbia. This motion was supported by affidavits of the following facts: that notice of this motion had been given to Mr. Madison; that Mr. Adams, the late President of the United States, nominated the applicant to the senate for their advice and consent to be appointed justices of the peace of the District of Columbia; that the senate advised and consented to the appointments; that commissions in due form were signed by the said president appointing them justices, etc., and that the seal of the United States was in due form, affixed to the said commissions by the secretary of state; that the applicants have requested Mr. Madison to deliver them their said commis- sions, who has not complied with that request; and that their said commissions are withheld from them; that the applicants have made application to Mr. Madison, as secretary of state of the United States, at his office, for information whether the commis- sions were signed and sealed as aforesaid; that explicit and satis- factory information has not been given in answer to that inquiry, either by the secretary of state or any officer in the department of state; that application has been made to the secretary of the senate for a certificate of the nomination of the applicants, and of the advice and consent of the senate, who has declined giving such a certificate; whereupon a rule was laid to show cause on the fourth day of this term. This rule having been duly served, Mr. Lee read the affidavit of Dennis Eamsey, and the printed journals 2 17 18 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of the senate of 31st January, 1803, respecting the refusal of the senate to suffer their secretary to give the information requested. He then called Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent, who had been summoned to attend the court, and who had, as it is understood, declined giving a voluntary affidavit. They objected to being sworn, alleging that they were clerks in the department of state, and not bound to disclose any facts relating to the business or transactions in the office. The court ordered the witnesses to be sworn, and their answers taken in writing, but informed them that when the questions were asked they might state their objections to answering each par- ticular question, if they had any. Mr. Lincoln, attorney-general, having been summoned, and now called, objected to answering. He requested that the questions might be put in writing, and that he might afterwards have time to determine whether he would answer. On the one hand he respected the jurisdiction of this court, and on the other he felt himself bound to maintain the rights of the executive. He was acting as secretary of state at the time when the transaction hap- pened. He was of opinion, and his opinion was supported by that of others whom he highly respected, that he was not bound, and ought not to answer, as to any facts which came officially to his knowledge while acting as secretary of state. The questions being written, were then read and handed to him. He repeated the ideas he had before suggested, and said his objec- tions were of two kinds. 1st. He did not think himself bound to disclose his official transactions while acting as Secretary of State; and, 2d. He ought not to be compelled to answer anything which might tend to criminate himself. Mr. Lincoln thought it was going a great way to say that every Secretary of State should at all times be liable to be called upon to appear as a witness in a court of justice, and testify to facts which came to his knowledge officially. He felt himself delicately situated between his duty to this court and the duty he conceived he owed to an executive department; and hoped the court would give him time to consider the subject. The court said that if Mr. Lincoln wished time to consider what answers he should make, they would give him time; but they had no doubt he ought to answer. There was nothing confidential required to be disclosed. If there had been he was not obliged to answer it; and if he thought that anything was communicated to him in confidence he was not bound to disclose it; nor was MARBURY v. MADISON. 19 he obliged to state anything which would criminate himself; but that the fact whether such commissions had been in the office or not, could not be a confidential fact; it is a fact which all the world have a right to know. If he thought any of the questions improper, he might state his objections. Mr. Lincoln then prayed time till the next day to consider of his answers under this opinion of the court. The court granted it, and postponed further consideration of the cause till the next day. At the opening of the court on the next morning, Mr. Lincoln said he had no objection to answering the questions proposed, excepting the last, which he did not think himself obliged to answer fully. The question was, what had been done with the commissions? He had no hesitation in saying that he did not know that they ever came to the possession of Mr. Madison, nor did he know that they were in the office when Mr. Madison took possession of it. He prayed the opinion of the court whether he was obliged to disclose what had been done with the commissions. The court were of opinion that he was not bound to say what had become of them; if they never came to the possession of Mr. Madison it was immaterial to the present cause what had been done with them by others. Afterwards, on the 24th February, the following opinion of the court was delivered by the CHIEF JUSTICE. At the last term on the affidavits then read and filed with the clerk, a rule was granted in this case, requiring the Secretary of State to show cause why a mandamus should not issue, directing him to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia. No cause has been shown, and the present motion is for a mandamus. The peculiar delicacy in this case, the novelty of some of its circumstances, and the real difficulty attending the points which occur in it, require a complete exposition of the prin- ciples on which the opinion to be given by the court is founded.. . The first object of inquiry is, 1st. Has the applicant a right to the commission he demands? . . . [The court holds that, having been duly appointed, he has a right to his commission.] This brings us to the second inquiry, which is, 2dl.y. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy? . . . [The court finds that they do.] It remains to be inquired whether, 20 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 3dly. He is entitled to the remedy for which he applies. This depends on, 1st. The nature of the writ applied for; and, 2dly. The power of this court. 1st. The nature of the writ. . . . This, then, is a plain case for a mandamus, either to deliver the commission, or a copy of it from the record; and it only remains to be inquired, Whether it can issue from this court. The act to establish the judicial courts of the United States authorizes the supreme court "to issue writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States." . . . The constitution vests the whole judicial power of the United States in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. . . . In the distribution of this power it is declared that "the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affect- ing ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction." .... If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the legislature to appor- tion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body, it would certainly have been useless to have proceeded further than to have defined the judi- cial power, and the tribunals in which it should be vested. The subsequent part of the section is mere surplusage, is entirely with- out meaning, if such is to be the construction. ... To enable this court, then, to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction. . . . It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create that cause. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and, therefore, seems not to belong to appellate, but to original jurisdiction. Neither is it necessary in such a case as this, to enable the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. The authority, therefore, given to the supreme court, by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States, to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, appears not to be warranted by the constitution; and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be exercised. MARBURY v. MADISON. 21 The question whether an act repugnant to the constitution can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain prin- ciples, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it. That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent. This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments. The government of the United States is of the latter descrip- tion. The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the con- stitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be con- tested, that the constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution by an ordinary act. Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions con- template them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the theory of every such govern- 22 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ment must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void. This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered, by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not, therefore, to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject. If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart- ment to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particu- lar cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution, or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law, the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the con- stitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. Those, then, who controvert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law. This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions. It would declare that an act which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that if the legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, not- withstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the legislature a practical and real omnipotence, with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure. That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the great- MARBURY v. MADISON. 23 est improvement on political institutions, a written constitution, would of itself be sufficient, in America, where written constitu- tions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favor of its re- jection. The judicial power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution. Could it be the intention of those who gave this power, to say that in using it the constitution should not be looked into? That a case arising under the constitution should be decided without examining the instrument under which it arises? This is too extravagant to be maintained. In some cases, then, the constitution must be looked into by the judges. And if they can open it at all, what part of it are they forbidden to read or to obey? There are many other parts of the constitution which serve to illustrate this subject. It is declared that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles ex- ported from any State." Suppose a duty on the export of cotton, of tobacco, or of flour; and a suit instituted to recover it. Ought judgment to be rendered in such a case? ought the judges to close their eyes on the constitution, and only see the law? The constitution declares "that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." If, however, such a bill should be passed, and a person should be prosecuted under it, must the court condemn to death those victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve? "No person," says the constitution, "shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court." Here the language of the constitution is addressed especially to the courts. It prescribes, directly for them, a rule of evidence not to be departed from. If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction, must the constitutional principle yield to the legisla- tive act? From these, and many other selections which might be made, it is apparent that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument as a rule for the government of courts, as well as of the legislature. Why otherwise does it direct the judges to take an oath to sup- port it? This oath certainly applies in an especial manner to their 24 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. conduct in their official character. How immoral to impose it on them, if they were to be used as the instruments, and the knowing instruments, for violating what they swear to support! The oath of office, too, imposed by the legislature, is completely demonstrative of the legislative opinion on this subject. It is in these words: "I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent on me as , according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the constitution and laws of the United States." Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the constitution of the United States, if that constitution forms no rule for his government if it is closed upon him, and cannot be inspected by him? If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe, or to take this oath, becomes equally a crime. It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitu- tion, have that rank. Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other de- partments, are bound by that instrument. The rule must be discharged. NOTE. The principle that the courts have authority to pass upon the validity of legislation had been asserted in at least five States before the adoption of the Constitution, viz., in Holmes v. Walton, in New Jersey, 1780; in Commonwealth v. Caton, in Virginia, in 1782; in Eutgers v. Waddington, in New York, in 1784; in Trevett v. Weeden, in Ehode Island, in 1786; and in Bayard v. Singleton, in North Carolina, in 1787. All these cases save the first are printed in Thayer's Cases, I, 55-80. In 1792 the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in the case of Bowman v. Mid- dleton (1 Bay., 252), declared that an act passed by the Colonial Legislature in 1712, which took away the freehold of one man and vested it in another without any compensation or even a trial by the jury of the country, was "against common right, as well as MARBURY v. MADISON. 25 against Magna Charta," and "therefore ipso facto void/' For a valuable discussion of these early constitutional cases, see an article on "The Eelation of the Judiciary to the Constitution," by W. M. Meigs, in American Law Review, xix, 175 (1885). See also Coxe, The Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, 219-271. A most admirable discussion of the whole question is found in an article on "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," by Prof. James B. Thayer, in Harvard Law Eeview, vii, 129 (1893). For an adverse view of the power of the courts over unconstitutional legislation, see Eakin v. Raub, 12 Sergeant and Rawle (Pennsylvania), 330, also printed in Thayer's Cases, I, 133. A list of cases in which the Federal Supreme Court has declared statutes or parts of statutes invalid is given in 131 U. S. Appendix, ccxxxy. The list is incomplete, one of the mpst conspicuous omissions being the Dred Scott case. "The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar prov- ince of the courts. A Constitution is, in fact, and must be re- garded by the Judges as a fundamental law. It must therefore belong to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred: in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statutes, the intention of the people to the in- tention of their agents." Hamilton, in The Federalist, No. 78. "If they [the government of the United States] were to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be considered by the judges as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard. They would not consider such a law as coming under their jurisdiction. They would declare it void." John Marshall, in the Virginia Convention of 1788, Elliot's De- bates, III, 553. "To control the power and conduct of the legislature, by an overruling constitution, was an improvement in the science and practice of government reserved to the American states." James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania Convention of 1787, Elliot's De- bates, II, 432. II. TAXATION. HYLTON v. THE UNITED STATES. 3 Dallas, 171. Decided 1796. This was a writ of error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Virginia. The question raised, and all the facts necessary to be adverted to, appear in the opinions of the members of the court. . . . The court delivered these opinions seriatim, in the following terms. 1 CHASE, J. By the case stated, only one question is submitted to the opinion of this court: Whether the law of congress of the 5th of June, 1794 (1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 373), entitled, "An act to lay duties upon carriages for the conveyance of persons/' is unconstitutional and void? The principles laid down to prove the above law void, are these: That a tax on carriages is a direct tax, and therefore, by the con- stitution, must be laid according to the census directed by the con- stitution to be taken, to ascertain the number of representatives from each State. And that the tax in question, on carriages, is not laid by that rule of apportionment, but by the rule of uni- formity, prescribed by the constitution in the case of duties, im- posts, and excises; and a tax on carriages is not within either of those descriptions. . . . The constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only such as congress could lay in proportion to the census. The rule of apportionment is only to be adopted in such cases where it can reasonably apply; and the subject taxed must ever determine the application of the rule. If it is proposed to tax any specific article by the rule of appor- tionment, and it would certainly create great inequality and injus- tice, it is unreasonable to say that the constitution intended such tax should be laid by that rule. i The Chief Justice, Ellsworth, whole of the argument, he declined was sworn into office in the morn- taking any part in the decision of ing; but not having heard the this cause. 26 HYLTON v. UNITED STATES. 27 It appears to me that a tax on carriages cannot be laid by thg rule of apportionment, without very great inequality and injustice. For example, suppose two States, equal in census, to pay eighty thousand dollars each, by a tax on carriages of eighty dollars on every carriage, and in one State there are one hundred carriages and in the other one thousand. The owners of carriages in one State would pay ten times the tax of owners in the other. A, in one State, would pay for his carriage eight dollars; but B, in the other State, would pay for his carriage, eighty dollars. It was argued that a tax on carriages was a direct tax, and might be laid according to the rule of apportionment, and, as I under- stood, in this manner: Congress, after determining on the gross sum to be raised, was to apportion it according to the census and then lay it in one State on carriages, in another on horses, in a third on tobacco, in a fourth on rice, and so on. I admit that this mode might be adopted to raise a certain sum in each State, ac- cording to the census, but it would not be a tax on carriages, but on a number of specific articles; and it seems to me that it would be liable to the same objection of abuse and oppression, as a selec- tion of any one article in all the States. I think an annual tax on carriages for the conveyance of persons, may be considered as within the power granted to congress to lay duties. The term duty, is the most comprehensive, next to the general term tax; and practically in Great Britain, whence we take our general ideas of taxes, duties, imposts, excises, customs, &c., embraces taxes on stamps, tolls for passage, &c., &c., and is not confined to taxes on importation only. It seems to me that a tax on expense is an indirect tax; and I think an annual tax on a carriage for the conveyance of persons, is of that kind; because a carriage is a consumable commodity, and such annual tax on it, is on the expense of the owner. I am inclined to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opin- ion, that the direct taxes contemplated by the constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation or poll tax, simply without regard to property, profession, or any other circumstance.; and a tax on land. I doubt whether a tax, by a general assessment of personal prop- erty, within the United States, is included within the term direct tax. As I do not think the tax on carriages is a direct tax, it is un- necessary at this time for me to determine whether this court constitutionally possesses the power to declare an act of congress void, on the ground of its being made contrary to, and in violation 28 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of the constitution; but if the court have such power, I am free to declare, that I will never exercise it but in a very clear case. I am for affirming the judgment of the circuit court. PATERSOX, J. . . . What are direct taxes within the mean- ing of the constitution? The constitution declares that a capita- tion tax is a direct tax; and both in theory and practice, a tax on land is deemed to be a direct tax. In this way, the terms direct taxes, and capitation and other direct tax, are satisfied. It is not necessary to determine, whether a tax on the product of land be a direct or indirect tax. Perhaps the immediate product of land, in its original and crude state, ought to be considered as the land itself; it makes part of it, or else the provision made against tax- ing exports would be easily eluded. Land, independently of its produce, is of no value. When the produce is converted into a manufacture it assumes a new shape; its nature is altered, its orig- inal state is changed, it becomes quite another subject, and it will be differently considered. Whether direct taxes, in the sense of the constitution, comprehend any other tax than a capitation tax, and tax on land, is a questionable point. If congress, for instance, should tax, in the aggregate or mass, things that generally pervade all the States in the Union, then perhaps the rule of apportionment would be the most proper, especially if an assessment was to inter- vene. This appears, by the practice of some of the States, to have been considered as a direct tax. Whether it be so under the con- stitution of the United States is a matter of some difficulty; but as it is not before the court, it would be improper to give any decisive opinion upon it. I never entertained a doubt that the principal, I will not say the only objects, that the framers of the constitution contemplated as falling within the rule of apportion- ment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land. Local considera- tions, and the particular circumstances and relative situation of the States, naturally lead to this view of the subject. The pro- vision was made in favor of the southern States. They possessed a large number of slaves; they had extensive tracts of territory, thinly settled and not very productive. A majority of the States had but few slaves, and several of them a limited territory, well settled, and in a high state of cultivation. The Southern States, if no provision had been introduced in the constitution, would have been wholly at the mercy of the other States. Congress in such case might tax slaves, at discretion or arbitrarily, and land in every part of the L T nion after the same rate or measure; so much a head in the first instance, and so much an acre in the second. HYLTON v. UNITED STATES. 29 To guard them against imposition, in these particulars, was the reason of introducing the clause in the constitution which directs that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the States according to their respective numbers. . . . All taxes on expense or consumption are indirect taxes. A tax on carriages is of this kind, and of course is not a direct tax. In- direct taxes are circuitous modes of reaching the revenue of indi- viduals, who generally live according to their income. In many cases of this nature the individual may be said to tax himself. I shall close this discourse with reading a passage or two from Smith's Wealth of Nations. "The impossibility of taxing people in proportion to their rev- enue by any capitation, seems to have given occasion to the inven- tion of taxes upon consumable commodities; the State not know- ing how to tax directly and proportionably the revenue of its sub- jects, endeavors to tax it indirectly by taxing their expense, which it is supposed in most cases will be nearly in proportion to their revenue. Their expense is taxed by taxing the consumable com- modities upon which it is laid out." Vol. iii, 331. "Consumable commodities, whether necessaries or luxuries, may be taxed in two different ways; the consumer may either pay an annual sum on account t>f his using or consuming goods of a cer- tain kind, or the goods may be taxed while they remain in the hands of the dealer, and before they are delivered to the consumer. The consumable goods, which last a considerable time before they are consumed altogether, are most properly taxed in the one way; those of which the consumption is immediate, or more speedy, in the other; the coach tax and plate tax are examples of the former method of imposing; the greater part of the other duties of excise and customs, of the latter." Vol. iii, p. 341. I am, therefore, of opinion that the judgment rendered in the circuit court of Virginia ought to be affirmed. IEEDELL, J. I agree in opinion with my brothers, who have al- ready expressed theirs, that the tax in question is agreeable to the constitution; and the reasons which have satisfied me can be de- livered in a very few words, since I think the constitution itself affords a clear guide to decide the controversy. The congress possess the power of taxing all taxable objects, without limitation, with the particular exception of a duty on exports. There are two restrictions only on the exercise of this authority 30 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 1. All direct taxes must be apportioned. 2. All duties, imposts and excises must be uniform. If the carriage tax be a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution, it must be apportioned. If it be a duty, impost, or excise, within the meaning of the constitution, it must be uniform. If it can be considered as a tax, neither direct within the mean- ing of the constitution, nor comprehended within the term duty, impost, or excise; there is no provision in the constitution, one way or another, and then it must be left to such an operation of the power, as if the authority to lay taxes had been given generally in all instances, without saying whether they should be apportioned or uniform; and in that case, I should presume, the tax ought to be uniform; because the present constitution was particularly in- tended to affect individuals, and not States, except in particular cases specified; and this is the leading distinction between the articles of confederation and the present constitution. As all direct taxes must be apportioned, it is evident that the constitution contemplated none as direct but such as could be apportioned. . If this cannot be apportioned, it is, therefore, not a direct tax in the sense of the constitution. That this tax cannot be apportioned is evident. Suppose ten dollars contemplated as a tax on each chariot, or post chaise, in the United States, and the number of both in all the United States be computed at one hundred and five, the number of representatives in congress, this would produce in the whole one thousand and fifty dollars; the share of Virginia, being 19-105 parts, would be one hundred and ninety dollars; the share of Connecticut, being 7-105 parts, would be seventy dollars; then suppose Virginia had fifty carriages, Connecticut two, the share of Virginia being one hundred and ninety dollars, this must of course be collected from the owners of carriages, and there would therefore be collected from each carriage three dollars and eighty cents; the share of Connecticut being seventy dollars, each carriage would pay thirty- five dollars. If any State had no carriages, there could be no apportionment at all. This mode is too manifestly absurd to be supported, and has not even been attempted in debate. But two expedients have been proposed of a very extraordinary nature to evade the difficulty. 1. To raise the money a tax on carriages would produce, not by laying a tax on each carriage uniformly, but by selecting different articles in different States, so that the amount paid in each State may be equal to the sum due upon a principle of apportionment. HYLTON v. UNITED STATES. 31 One State might pay by a tax on carraiges, another by a tax on slaves, &c. I should have thought this merely an exercise of ingenuity, if it had not been pressed with some earnestness; and as this was done by gentlemen of high respectability in their profession, it deserves a serious answer, though it is very difficult to give such a one. 1. This is not an apportionment, of a tax on carriages, but of the money a tax on carriages might be supposed to produce, which is quite a different thing. 2. It admits that congress cannot lay an uniform tax on all car- riages in the Union, in any mode, but that they may on carriages in one or more States. They may therefore lay a tax on carriages in fourteen States, but not in the fifteenth. 3. If congress, according to this new decree, may select carriages as a proper object, in one or more States, but omit them in others, I presume they may omit them in all, and select other articles. Suppose, then, a tax on carriages would produce $100,000, and a tax on horses a like sum, $100,000, and $100,000 were to be apportioned according to that mode; gentlemen might amuse themselves with calling this a tax on carriages, or a tax on horses, while not a single carriage, nor a single fyorse was taxed throughout the Union. 4. Such an arbitrary method of taxing different States differ- ently, is a suggestion altogether new, and would lead, if practised, to such dangerous consequences that it will require very powerful arguments to show that that method of taxing would be in any manner compatible with the constitution, with which at present, I deem it utterly irreconcilable, it being altogether destructive of the notion of a common interest, upon which the very principles of the constitution are founded, so far as the condition of the United States will admit. The second expedient proposed was, that of taxing carriages, among other things, in a general assessment. This amounts to saying that congress may lay a tax on carriages, but that they may not do it unless they blend it with other subjects of taxation. For this, no reason or authority has been given, and in addition to other suggestions offered by the counsel on that side, affords an irrefragable proof, that when positions plainly so untenable are offered to counteract the principle contended for by the opposite counsel, the principle itself is a right one; for, no one can doubt, that if better reasons could have been offered, they would not have escaped the sagacity and learning of the gentlemen who of- fered them. 32 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. There is no necessity or propriety in determining what is, or is not a direct or indirect tax in all cases. Some difficulties may occur which we do not at present foresee. Perhaps a direct tax, in the sense of the constitution, can mean nothing but a tax on something inseparably annexed to the soil, something capable of apportionment under all such circum- stances. A land or a poll tax may be considered of this description. The latter is to be considered so particularly under the present constitution, on account of the slaves in the southern States, who give a ratio in the representation in the proportion of three to five. Either of these is capable of apportionment. In regard to other articles, there may possibly be considerable doubt. It is sufficient, on the present occasion, for the court to be satis- fied that this is not a direct tax contemplated by the constitution, in order to affirm the present judgment; since, if it cannot be ap- portioned, it must necessarily be uniform. I am clearly of opinion this is not a direct tax in the sense of the constitution, and, therefore, that the judgment ought to be affirmed. [WILSON, J., had rendered an opinion in this case in the Cir- cuit Court of Virginia, and now merely expressed his concurrence in the opinion of the court. GUSHING, J., not having heard the arguments, did not deliver an opinion.] BY THE COUET. Let the judgment of the circuit court be affirmed. McCULLOCH v. THE STATE OF MARYLAND ET AL. 4 Wheaton, 316. Decided 1819. ERROR to the court of appeals of the State of Maryland. . . . [In April, 1816, Congress incorporated the Bank of the United States. In February, 1818, the general assembly of Maryland, imposed "a tax on all banks, or branches thereof, in the State of Maryland, not chartered by the legislature." McCulloch, the cash- ier of the branch of the Bank of the United States established in the city of Baltimore, violated the latter act by issuing notes upon unstamped paper. The question submitted to the court for their decision in this case is as to the validity of the said act of the McCULLOCH v. STATE OF MARYLAND. 33 general assembly of Maryland, on the ground of its being repug- nant to the constitution of the United States, and the act of con- gress aforesaid, or one of them.] MAKSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign state, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the Union; and the plaintiff, on his part, contests the validity of an act which has been passed by the legislature of that State. The constitution of our country, in its most interesting and vital parts, is to be considered; the conflicting powers of the govern- ment of the Union and of its members, as marked in that consti- tution, are to be discussed; and an opinion given, which may essentially influence the great operations of the government. No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of its importance, and of the awful responsibility involved in its decision. But it must be decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of hostility of a still more serious nature; and' if it is to be so decided, by this tribunal alone can the decision be made. On the supreme court of the United States has the con- stitution of our country devolved this important duty. The first question made in the cause is, has congress power to incorporate a bank? . . . [This part of the opinion is given infra, page 308.] It being the opinion of the court, that the act incorporating the bank is constitutions ;, &nd c that" the p'ov;er of establishing a branch in the State of Maryland might be properly exercised by the bank itself, we, proceed ,'tc.' inquire :.-T%~^ 2. Whether, the Sta'te "of " M?rylafi and e\30i/r?e to continue, the bank, was the subject of tire "preceding, part of this opinion; and is no longer to be considered as questionable. That the power of taxing it by the States may be exercised so as to destroy it, is too obvious to be denied. But taxation is said to be an absolute power, which acknowledges no other limits than those expressly prescribed in the constitution, and like sovereign power of every other description, is trusted to the discretion of those who use it. But the very terms of this argument admit that the sovereignty of the State, in the article of taxation itself, is subordinate to, and may be controlled by, the constitution of the United States, How far it has been controlled by that instrument must be a question of construction. In making this construction, no principle not declared, can be admissible, which would defeat McCULLOCH v. STATE OF MARYLAND. 35 the legitimate operations of a supreme government. It is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to its action within its own sphere, and so to modify every power vested in sub- ordinate governments, as to exempt its own operations from their own influence. This effect need not be stated in 'terms. It is so involved in the declaration of supremacy, so necessarily implied in it, that the expression of it could not make it more certain. We must, therefore, keep it in view while construing the constitution. The argument on the part of the State of Maryland, is, not that the States may directly resist a law of congress, but that they may exercise their acknowledged powers upon it, and that the consti- tution leaves them this right in the confidence that they will not abuse it. Before we proceed to examine this argument, and to subject it to the test of the constitution, we must be permitted to bestow a few considerations on the nature and extent of this original right of taxation, which is acknowledged to remain with the States. It is admitted that the power of taxing the people and their property is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legiti- mately exercised on the objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to which the government may choose to carry it. The only security against the abuse of this power, is found in the structure of the government itself. In imposing a tax the legisla- ture acts upon its constituents. This is in general a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. The people of a State, therefore, give to their government a riglvf of taxmg themselves and their property, and as the exigencies of government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the influence of the constituents over their rep- resentatives, to guard them against its abuse. But the means employed by the government of the Union have no such security, nor is the right of a State to tax them sustained by the same "theory. Those means are not given by the people of a particular State, not given by the constituents of the legislature, which claim the right to tax them, but by the people of all the States. They are given by all, for the benefit of all and upon theory, should be subjected to that government only which belongs to all. It may be objected to this definition, that the power of taxation is not confined to the people and property of a State. It may be exercised upon every object brought within its jurisdiction. This is true. But to what source do we trace this right? It is obvious, that it is an incident of sovereignty, and is co-extensive 36 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. with that to which it is an incident. All subjects over which the sovereign power of a State extends, are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest prin- ciples, exempt from taxation. This proposition may almost be pro- nounced self-evident. >* The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists jby its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those means which are employed by congress to carry into execution powers conferred on-4hat body by_ the people of the United States? We think it demonstrable that it tloesciot. Those powers are not given by the people of a single State. They are ! given by the people of the United States, to a government whose 1 laws, made in pursuance of the constitution, are declared to be , supreme. Consequently, the people of a single State cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend over them. If we measure the power of taxation residing in a State, by the extent of sovereignty which the people of a single State possess, and can confer on its government, we have an intelligible stand- ard, applicable to every case to which the power may be applied. We have a principle which leaves the power of taxing the people and property of a State unimpaired; which leaves to a State the command of all its resources, and which places beyond its reach, all those powers which are conferred by the people of the United States on the government of the Union, and all those means which are given for the purpose of carrying those powers into exe- cution. We have a principle which is safe for the States, and safe for the Union. We are relieved, as we ought to be, from clashing sovereignty; from interfering powers; from a repugnancy be- tween a right in one government to pull down what there is an acknowledged right in another to build up; from the incompati- bility of a right in one government to destroy what there is a right in another to preserve. We are not driven to the perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial department, what degree of tax- ation is the legitimate use, and what degree may amount to the abuse of the power. The attempt to use it on the means em- ployed by the government of the Union, in pursuance of the con- stitution, is itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power, which the people of a single State cannot give. We find, then, on just theory, a total failure of this original right to tax the means employed by the government of the Union, for the execution of its powers. The right never existed, and the question whether it has been surrendered, cannot arise. But, waiving this theory for the present, let us resume the in- McCULLOCH v. STATE OF MARYLAND. 37 quiry, whether this power can be exercised by the respective States, consistently with a fair construction of the constitution? That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to cre- ate; that there is a plain repugnance, in conferring on one gov- ernment a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied. 'But all inconsistencies are to be reconciled by the magic of the word confidence. Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To carry it to the excess of destruction would be an abuse, to presume which, would banish that confidence which is essential to all government. But is this a case of confidence? Would the people of any one State trust those of another with a power to control the most insignificant operations of their state government? We know they would not. Why, then, should we suppose that the people of any one State should be willing to trust those of another with a power to control the operations of a government to which they have confided their most important and most valuable interests? In the legislature of the Union alone, are all represented. The legislature of the Union alone, therefore, can be trusted by the people with the power of controlling measures which concern all, in the confidence that it will not be abused. This, then, is not a case of confidence, and we must consider it as it really is. If we apply the principle for which the State of Maryland con- tends, to the constitution generally, we shall find it capable of changing totally the character of that instrument. We shall find it capable of arresting all the measures of the government, and of prostrating it at the foot of the States. The American people have declared their constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, to be supreme; but this principle would trans- fer the supremacy, in fact, to the State. If the States may tax one instrument, employed by the govern- ment in the execution of its powers, they may tax any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house; the may tax judicial process; they may tax all the means employed by the government, to an excess which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the American people. They did not design to make their govern- ment dependent on the States. Gentlemen say, they do not claim the right to extend State 38 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. taxation to these objects. They limit their pretensions to prop- erty. But on what principle is this distinction made? Those who make it have furnished no reason for it, and the principle for which they contend denies it. They contend that the power of taxation has no other limit than is found in the 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution; that, with respect to every- thing else, the power of the States is supreme, and admits of no control. If this he true, the distinction between property and other subjects to which the power of taxation is applicable, is merely arbitrary, and can never be sustained. This is not all. If the controlling power of the States be established; if their supremacy as to taxation be acknowledged; what is to restrain their exercising this control in any shape they may please to give it? Their sovereignty is not confined to taxation. That is not the only mode in which it might be displayed. The question is, in truth, a question of supremacy; and if the right of the States to tax the means employed by the general government be conceded, the declaration that the constitution, and the laws made in pur- suance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, is empty and unmeaning declamation. In the course of the argument, the Federalist has been quoted; and the opinions expressed by the authors of that work have been justly supposed to be entitled to great respect in expounding the constitution. No tribute can be paid to them which exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions to the cases which may arise in the progress of our government, a right to judge of their correctness must be retained; and, to understand the argu- ment, we must examine the proposition it maintains, and the objections against which it is directed. The subject of those numbers, from which passages have been cited, is the unlimited power of taxation which is vested in the general government. The objection to this unlimited power, which the argument seeks to remove, is stated with fullness and clearness. It is "that an in- definite power of taxation in the latter (the government of the Union) might, and probably would, in time, deprive the former (the government of the States) of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of the Union are to be- come the supreme law of the land; as it is to have power to pass all laws that may be necessary for carrying into execution the authorities with which it is proposed to vest it; the national government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State objects, upon the pretense of an interference with its own. McCULLOCH v. STATE OF MARYLAND. 39 It might allege a necessity for doing this, in order to give effi- cacy to the national revenues; and thus all the resources of tax- ation might, by degrees, become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire exclusion and destruction of the state governments." The objections to the constitution which are noticed in these numbers, were to the undefined power of the government to tax, not to the incidental privilege of exempting its own measures from State taxation. The consequences apprehended from this unde- fined power were, that it would absorb all the objects of taxation, "to the exclusion and destruction of the state governments." The arguments of the Federalist are intended to prove the fallacy of these apprehensions; not to prove that the government was in- capable of executing any of its powers, without exposing the means it employed to the embarrassments of State taxation. Argu- ments urged against these objections, and these apprehensions, are to be understood as relating to the points they mean to prove. Had the authors of those excellent essays been asked, whether they contended for that construction of the constitution, which would place within the reach of the States those measures which the government might adopt for the execution of its powers; no man, who has read their instructive pages, will hesitate to admit, that their answer must have been in the negative. It has also been insisted, that, as the power of taxation in the general and state governments is acknowledged to be concurrent, every argument which would sustain the right of the general gov- ernment to tax banks chartered by the States, will equally sustain the right of the States to tax banks chartered by the general government. But the two cases are not on the same reason. The people of all the States have created the general government, and have con- ferred upon it the general power of taxation. The people of all the States, and the States themselves, are represented in congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When they tax the chartered institutions of the States, they tax their constitu- ents; and these taxes must be uniform. Jluijdifin- a State taxes the operations of the government of the United States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the meas- ures of a government created by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common with themselves. The difference is that which always exists, and always must exist, between the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the whole between the laws of a government declared to be supreme, 40 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. and those of a government which, when in opposition to those laws, is not supreme. But if the full application of this argument could be admitted, it might bring into question the right of congress to tax the state banks, and could not prove the right of the States to tax the Bank of the United States. The court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate con- sideration. The result is a conviction that the States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable conse- quence of that supremacy which the constitution has declared. We are unanimously of opinion, that the law passed by the legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, is unconstitutional and void. This opinion does not deprive the States of any resources which they originally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the other real property within the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common with other property of the same description throughout the State. Birtjthis is a tax on the operations of the bank, and is, consequently, a tax on the operation of an instrument employed by the government of the Union to carry its powers into execution. Such a tax must be unconstitutional. JUDGMEXT. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record of the court of appeals of the State of Maryland, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court that the act of the legislature of Maryland is contrary to the constitution of the United States, and void. NOTE. "A case could not be selected from the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, superior to this one of Mc- Culloch v. Maryland, for the clear and satisfactory manner in which the supremacy of the laws of the Union have been main- tained by the court, and an undue assertion of State power over- ruled and defeated." Kent's Commentaries, I., 428. .WESTON ET AL v. CITY OF CHARLESTON. 41 WESTON ET AL. v. THE CITY COUNCIL OF CHARLESTON. 2 Peters, 449. Decided 1829. Error to the constitutional court of South Carolina. By an ordinance of the city of Charleston, "stock of the United States" was, among other things, made taxable. The plaintiffs, as owners of such stock, applied to the court of common pleas of the Charles- ton district for a prohibition to restrain the city council from taxing that stock, on the ground that the tax would be incon- sistent with the constitution of the United States. The prohi- bition having been granted, the proceedings were removed into the constitutional court, where four of the seven judges being of opinion that the tax would be valid, reversed the order for a prohibition, and thereupon this writ of error was brought. . . . MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. . . . . . . This brings us to the main question. Is the stock issued for loans made to the government of the United States liable to be taxed by States and corporations? Congress has power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States." The stock it issues is the evidence of a debt created by the exercise of this power. The tax in question is a tax upon the contract subsisting between the government and the individual. It bears directly upon that contract, while subsist- ing and in full force. The power operates upon the contract the instant it is framed, and must imply a right to affect that con- tract. If the States and corporations throughout the Union, pos- sess the power to tax a contract for the loan of money, what shall arrest this principle in its application to every other contract? What measure can government adopt which will not be exposed to its influence? But it is unnecessary to pursue this principle through its di- versified application to all the contracts, and to the various op- erations of government. No one can be selected which is of more vital interest to the community than this of borrowing money on the credit of the United States. No power has been conferred by the American people on their government, the free and unburdened exercise of which more deeply affects every member of our repub- lic. In war, when the honor, the safety, the independence of the nation are to be defended, when all its resources are to be strained to the utmost, credit must be brought in aid of taxation, and the 42 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. abundant revenue of peace and prosperity must be anticipated to supply the exigencies, the urgent demands of the moment. The people, for objects the most important which can occur in the progress of nations, have empowered their government to make these anticipations, "to borrow money on the credit of the United States." Can anything be more dangerous, or more injurious, than the admission of a principle which authorizes every State and every corporation in the Union which possesses the right of taxa- tion, to burden the exercise of this power at their discretion? If the right to impose the tax exists, it is a right which in its nature acknowledges no limits. It may be carried to any extent within the jurisdiction of the State or corporation which im- poses it, which the will of each State and corporation may pre- scribe. A power which is given by the whole American people for their common good, which is to be exercised at the most critical periods for the most important purposes, on the free exercise of which the interests certainly, perhaps the liberty of the whole may depend; may be burdened, impeded, if not arrested, by any of the organized parts of the confederacy. In a society formed like ours, with one supreme government for national purposes, and numerous state governments for other purposes, in many respects independent, and in the uncontrolled exercise of many important powers, occasional interferences ought not to surprise us. The power of taxation is one of the most essential to a State, and one of the most extensive in its opera- tion. The attempt to maintain a rule which shall limit its exer- cise, is undoubtedly among the most delicate and difficult duties which can devolve on those whose province it is to expound the supreme law of the land in its application to the cases of individ- uals. This duty has more than once devolved on this court. In the performance of it we have considered it as a necessary conse- quence from the supremacy of the government of the whole, that its action in the exercise of its legitimate powers, should be free and unembarrassed by any conflicting powers in the possession of its parts; that the powers of a State cannot rightfully be so exer- cised as to impede and obstruct the free course of those meas- ures which the government of the States united may rightfully adopt. This subject was brought before the court in the case of Mc- Culloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316, when it was thoroughly argued and deliberately considered. The question decided in that case bears a near resemblance to that which is involved in this. It was discussed at the bar in all its relations, WESTON ET AL V. CITY OF CHARLESTON. 43 and examined by the court with its utmost attention. We will not repeat the reasoning which conducted us to the conclusion thus formed, but that conclusion was that "all subjects over which the sovereign power of a State extends, are objects of taxation; but those over which it does not extend, are upon the soundest principles exempt from taxation." "The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own authority, or is introduced *by its permission;" but not "to those means which are employed by congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the people of the United States." "The attempt to use" the power of taxation "on the means employed by the gov- ernment of the Union in pursuance of the constitution, is itself an abuse, because it is the usurpation of a power which the people of a single State cannot give." The court said in that case, that "the States have no power by taxation, or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operation of the constitutional laws enacted by congress, to carry into execution the powers vested in the gen- eral government." We retain the opinions which were then expressed. A con- tract made by the government in the exercise of its power, to borrow money on the credit of the United States, is undoubtedly independent of the will of any State in which the individual who lends may reside, and is undoubtedly an operation essential to the important objects for which the government was created. It ought, therefore, on the principles settled in the case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, to be exempt frcm state taxation, and consequently from being taxed by corporations deriving their power from States. \It is admitted that the power of the government to borrow money cannot be directly opposed, and that any law directly ob- structing its operation would be void; but a distinction is taken between direct opposition and those measures which may conse- quentially affect it; that is, that a law prohibiting loans to the United States would be void, but a tax on them to any amount is allowable. It is, we think, impossible not to perceive the intimate con- nection which exists between these two modes of acting on the subject. It is not the want of original power in an independent sovereign State, to prohibit loans to a foreign government, which restrains the legislature from direct opposition to those made by the United States. The restraint is imposed by our constitution. The Amer- 44 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ican people have conferred the power of borrowing money on their government, and by making that government supreme, have shielded its action, in the exercise of this power, from the action of the local governments. The grant of the power is incompatible with a restraining or controlling power, and the declaration of supremacy is a declaration that no such restraining or controlling power shall be exercised. The right to tax the contract to any extent, when made, must operate upon the power to borrow before it is exercised, and have a sensible influence on fhe contract. The extent of this influence depends on the will of a distinct government. To any extent, however inconsiderate, it is a burden on the operations of govern- ment. It may be carried to an extent which shall arrest them entirely. It is admitted by the counsel for the defendants, that the power to tax stock must affect the terms on which loans will be made; but this objection, it is said, has no more weight when urged against the application of an acknowledged power to government stock, than if urged against its application to lands sold by the United States. The distinction is, we think, apparent. When lands are sold, no connection remains between the purchaser and the government. The lands purchased become a part of the mass of property in the country with no implied exemption from common burdens. All lands are derived from the general or particular government, and all lands are subject to taxation. Lands sold are in the condition of money borrowed and repaid. Its liability to taxation in any form it may then assume is not questioned. The connection be- tween the borrower and the lender is dissolved. It is no burden on loans, it is no impediment to the power of borrowing, that the money, when repaid, loses its exemption from taxation. But a tax upon debts due from the government, stands, we think, on very dif- ferent principles from a tax on lands which the government has sold. "The Federalist" has been quoted in the argument, and an elo- quent and well-merited eulogy has been bestowed on the great statesman who is supposed to be the author of the number from which the quotation was made. This high authority was also relied upon in the case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, and was considered by the court. "Without repeating what was then said, we refer to it as exhibiting our view of the sentiments expressed on this subject by the authors of that work. It has been supposed that a tax on stock comes within the LICENSE TAX CASES. 45 exceptions stated in the case of McCulloch v. The State of Mary- land. We do not think so. The bank of the United States is an instrument essential to the fiscal operations of the government, and the power which might be exercised to its destruction was denied. But property acquired by that corporation in a State was supposed to be placed in the same condition with property acquired by an individual. The tax on government stock is thought by this court to be a tax on the contract, a tax on the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and consequently to be repugnant to the constitution. We are, therefore, of opinion that the judgment of the constitu- tional court of the State of South Carolina, reversing the order made by the court of common pleas, awarding a prohibition to the city council of Charleston, to restrain them from levying a tax imposed on six and seven per cent, stock of the United States, under an ordinance to raise supplies to the use of the city of Charleston for the year 1823, is erroneous in this; that the said constitutional court adjudged that the said ordinance was not repugnant to the constitution of the United States; whereas, this court is of opinion that such repugnancy does exist. We are, there- fore, of opinion that the said judgment ought to be reversed and annulled, and the cause remanded to the constitutional court for the State of South Carolina, that further proceedings may be had therein according to law. [JUSTICES JOHNSON and THOMPSON delivered dissenting opin- ions.] LICENSE TAX CASES. 5 Wallace, 462. Decided 1866. [By the internal revenue act of 1864, subsequently amended, Congress enacted that all persons intending to engage in certain occupations, including the selling of lottery tickets and the retail- ing of liquors, should first obtain a license from the United States. (See 13 Stat. at Large, 248, 249, 252, 472, 485; 14 Id., 113, 116, 137, 301.) In New York and New Jersey, the selling of lottery tickets, and in Massachusetts, the retailing of liquors (except in certain specified cases), were strictly forbidden. 46 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. In this condition of statute law, national and State, seven cases were brought before the Supreme Court. All of them arose under the provisions of the- internal revenue acts relating to licenses for selling liquors and dealing in lotteries, and to special taxes on the latter business. In five of the cases the general question was: Can the defend- ants be equally convicted upon the several indictments found against them for not having complied with the acts of Congress by taking out and paying for the required licenses to carry on the business in which they were engaged, such business being wholly prohibited by the laws of the several States in which it was car- ried on? In the other two cases the general question was: Could the de- fendants be legally convicted upon an indictment for being en- gaged in a business on which a special tax is imposed by acts of Congress, without having paid such a special tax, notwithstanding that such business was, and is wholly prohibited by the laws of New York?] The CHIEF JUSTICE, having stated the case, delivered the opin- ion of the court. In the argument of all the cases here before the court, it was strenuously maintained by counsel for the defendants that the imposition of penalties for carrying on any business prohibited by State laws, without payment for the license or special tax required by Congress, 'is contrary to public policy. . . . This court can know nothing of public policy except from the Constitution and the laws, and the course of .administration and decision. It has no legislative powers. It cannot amend or modify any legislative acts. It cannot examine questions as expedient or inexpedient, as politic or impolitic. Considerations of that sort nrnst, in general, be addressed to the legislature. Questions of policy determined there are concluded here. . . . We come now to examine a more serious objection to the legisla- tion of Congress in relation to the dealings in controversy. It was argued for the defendants in error that a license to carry on a par- ticular business gives an authority to carry it on; that the deal- ings in controversy were parcel of the internal trade of the State in which the defendants resided; that the internal trade of a State is not subject, in any respect, to legislation by Congress, and can neither be licensed nor prohibited by its authority; that licenses for such trade, granted under acts of Congress, must therefore be absolutely null and void; and, consequently, that penalties for LICENSE TAX CASES. 47 carrying on such trade without such license could not be constitu- tionally imposed. This series of propositions, and the conclusion in which it ter- minates, depends on the postulate that a license necessarily con- fers an authority to carry on the licensed business. But do the licenses required by the acts of Congress for selling liquor and lot- tery tickets confer any authority whatever? It is not doubted that where Congress possesses constitutional power to regulate trade or intercourse, it may regulate by means of licenses as well as in other modes; and, in case of such regula- tion, a license will give to the licensee authority to do whatever is authorized by its terms. Thus, Congress having power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, may, without doubt, provide for granting coasting licenses, licenses to pilots, licenses to trade with the Indians, and any other licenses necessary or proper for the exercise of that great and extensive power; and the same observation is applicable to every other power of Congress, to the exercise of which the granting of licenses may be incident. All such licenses confer authority, and give rights to the licensee. But very different considerations apply to the internal com- merce or domestic trade of the States. Over this commerce and trade Congress has no power of regulation nor any direct control. This power belongs exclusively to the States. No interference by Congress with the business of citizens transacted within a State is warranted by the Constitution, except such as is strictly inci- dental to the exercise of powers clearly granted to the legislature. The power to authorize a business wtthin a State is plainly repug- nant to the exclusive power of the State over the same subject. It is true that the power of Congress to tax is a very extensive power. It is given in the Constitution, with only one exception and only two qualifications. Congress cannot tax exports, and it must impose direct taxes by the rule of apportionment, and indirect taxes by the rule of uniformity. Thus limited, and thus only, it reaches every subject, and may be exercised at discretion. But it reaches only existing subjects. Congress cannot authorize a trade or business within a State in order to tax it. If, therefore, the licenses under consideration must be regarded as giving authority to carry on the branches of business which they license, it might be difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the granting of them with the Constitution. But it is not necessary to regard these laws as giving such author- 48 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ity. So far as they relate to trade within State limits, they give none, and can give none. They simply express the purpose of the government not to interfere by penal proceedings with the trade nominally licensed, if the required taxes are paid. The power to tax is not questioned, nor the power to impose penalties for non- payment of taxes. The granting of a license, therefore, must be regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax, and of implying nothing except that the licensee shall be subject to no penalties under national law, if he pays it. This construction is warranted by the practice of the govern- ment from its organization. As early as 1794 retail dealers in wines or in foreign distilled liquors were required to obtain and pay for licenses, and renew them annually, and penalties were im- posed for carrying on the business without compliance with the law. 1 In 1802 these license-taxes and the other excise or internal taxes, which had been imposed under the exigencies of the time, being no longer needed, were abolished. 2 In 1813 revenue from excise was again required, and laws were enacted for the licensing of retail dealers in foreign merchandise, as well as to retail dealers in wines and various descriptions of liquors. 3 These taxes also were abolished after the necessity for them had passed away, in 1817. 4 No claim was ever made that the licenses thus required gave authority to exercise trade or carry on business within a State. They were regarded merely as a convenient mode of imposing taxes on several descriptions of business, and of ascertaining the par- ties from whom such taxes were to be collected. With this course of legislation in view, we cannot say that there is anything contrary to the Constitution in these provisions of the recent or existing internal revenue acts relating to licenses. Nor are we able to perceive the force of the cither objection made in argument, that the dealings for which licenses are required be- ing prohibited by the laws of the State, cannot be taxed by the National government. There would be great force in it if the licenses were regarded as giving authority, for then there would be a direct conflict between National and State legislation on a subject which the Constitution places under the exclusive con- trol of the States. But, as we have already said, these licenses give no authority. They are mere receipts for taxes. And this would be. true had the internal revenue act of 1864, like those of 1794 and 1813, been 1 1 Stat. at Large, 377. 3 3 Id., 72. 2 Id.. 148. 4 id., 401. CRANDALL v. STATE OF NEVADA. 49 silent on this head. But it was not silent. It expressly provided, in section sixty-seven, that no license provided for in it should, if granted, be construed to authorize any business with any State or Territory prohibited by the laws thereof, or so as to prevent the taxation of the same business by the State. This provision not only recognizes the full control by the State of business carried on within their limits, but extends the same principle, so far as sucli business licensed by the national government is concerned, to the Territories. There is nothing hostile or contradictory, therefore, in the acts of Congress to the legislation of the States. What the latter pro- hibits, the former, if the business is found existing notwithstand- ing the prohibition, discourages by taxation. The two lines of legislation proceed in the same direction, and tend to the same result. It would be a judicial anomaly, as singular as indefensi- ble, if we should hold a violation of the laws of the State to be a justification for the violation of the laws of the Union. These considerations require an affirmative answer to the first general question, whether the several defendants, charged with carrying on business prohibited by State laws, without the licenses required by acts of Congress can be convicted and condemned to pay the penalties imposed by these acts? . . . CRANDALL v. STATE OF NEVADA. 6 Wallace, 35. Decided 1867. Error to the Supreme Court of Nevada. In 1865, the legislature of Nevada enacted that "there shall be levied and collected a capitation tax of one dollar upon every per- son leaving the State by any railroad, stage-coach, or other vehicle engaged or employed in the business of transporting passengers for hire," and that the proprietors, owners, and corporations so engaged should pay the said tax of one dollar for each and every person so conveyed or transported from the State. For the pur- pose of collecting the tax, another section required from per- sons engaged in such business, or their agents, a report every month, under oath, of the number of passengers so transported, and the payment of the tax to the sheriff or other proper officer. With the statute in existence, Crandall, who was the agent of a 4 50 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. stage company engaged in carrying passengers through the State of Nevada, was arrested for refusing to report the number of pas- sengers that had been carried by the coaches of his company, and for refusing to pay the tax of one dollar imposed on each passen- ger by the law of that State. He pleaded that the law of the State under which he was prosecuted was void, because it was in con- flict with the Constitution of the United States; and his plea being overruled, the case came into the Supreme Court of the State. That court considering that the tax laid was not an impost on "exports," nor an interference with the power of Congress "to regulate commerce among the several States" decided against the right thus set up under the Federal Constitution. Its judg- ment was now here for review. . . . MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. The, question for the first time presented to the court by this record is one of importance. The proposition to be considered is the right of a State to levy a tax upon persons residing iu the State who may wish to get out of it, and upon persons not residing in it who may have occasion to pass through it. It is to be regretted that such a question should be submitted to our consideration, with neither brief nor argument on the part of plaintiff in error. But our regret is diminished by the reflection, that the principles which must govern its determination have been the subject of much consideration in cases heretofore decided by this court. It is claimed by counsel for the State that the tax thus levied is not a tax upon the passenger, but upon the business of the carrier who transports him. If the act were much more skillfully drawn to sustain this hy- pothesis than it is, we should be very reluctant to admit that any form of words, which had the effect to compel every person travel- ing through the country by the common and usual modes of public conveyance to pay a specific sum to the State, was not a tax upon the right thus exercised. The statute before us is not, however, embarrassed by any nice difficulties of this character. The lan- guage which we have just quoted is, that there shall be levied and collected a capitation tax upon every person leaving the State by any railroad or stage-coach; and the remaining provisions of the act, which refer to this tax, only provide a mode of collecting it. The officers and agents of the railroad companies, and the proprie- tors of the stage-coaches are made responsible for this, and so be- come the collectors of the tax. CRANDALL v. STATE OF NEVADA. 51 "We shall have occasion to refer hereafter somewhat in detail, to the opinions of the judges of this court in The Passenger Cases, 1 in which there were wide differences on several points involved in the case before us. In the case from New York then under consid- eration, the statute provided that the health commissioner should be entitled to demand and receive from the master of every vessel that should arrive in the port of New York, from a foreign port, one dollar and fifty cents for every cabin passenger, and one dollar for each steerage passenger, and from each coasting vessel, twenty- five cents for every person on board. That statute does not use language so strong as the Nevada statute, indicative of a personal tax on the passenger, but merely taxes the master of the vessel ac- cording to the number of his passengers; but the court held it to be a tax upon the passenger, and that the master was the agent of the State for its collection. Chief Justice Taney, while he differed from the majority of the court, and held the law to be valid, said of the tax levied by the analogous statute of Massa- chusetts, that "its payment is the condition upon which the State permits the alien passenger to come on shore and mingle with its citizens, and to reside among them. It is demanded of the cap- tain; and not from every separate passenger, for convenience of collection. But the burden evidently falls upon the passenger, and he, in fact, pays it, either in the enhanced price of his passage or directly to the captain before he is allowed to embark for the voyage. The nature of the transaction, and the ordinary course of business, show that this must be so." Having determined that the statute of Nevada imposes a tax upon the passenger for the privilege of leaving the State, or pass- ing through it by the ordinary mode of passenger travel, we pro- ceed to inquire if it is for that reason in conflict with the Con- stitution of the United States. In the argument of the counsel for the defendant in error, and in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Nevada, which is found in the record, it is assumed that this question must be decided by an exclusive reference to two provisions of the Constitution, namely: that which forbids any State, without the consent of Congress, to lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, and that which confers on Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States. The question as thus narrowed is not free from difficulties. Can a citizen of the United States traveling from one part of the Union 17 Howard, 283. 52 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. to another be called an export? It was insisted in The Passenger Cases, to which we have already referred, that foreigners coming to this country were imports within the meaning of the Constitu- tion, and the provision of that instrument that the migration or importation of such persons as any of the States then existing should think proper to admit, should not be prohibited prior to the year 1808, but that a tax might be imposed on such impor- tation, was relied on as showing that the word import, applied to persons as well as to merchandise. It was answered that this latter clause had exclusive reference to slaves, who were property as well as persons, and therefore proved nothing. While some of the judges who concurred in holding those laws unconstitu- tional, gave as one of their reasons that they were taxes on im- ports, it is evident that this view did not receive the assent of the majority of the court. The application of this provision of the Constitution to the proposition which we have stated in regard to the citizen, is still less satisfactory than it would be to the case of foreigners migrating to the United States. But it is unnecessary to consider this point further in the view which we have taken of the case. As regards the commerce clause of the Constitution, two prop- ositions are advanced on behalf of the defendant in error. 1. That the tax imposed by the State on passengers is not a regula- tion of commerce. 2. That if it can be so considered, it is one of the powers which the State can exercise, until Congress has so legislated as to indicate its intention to exclude State legislation on the same subject. The proposition that the power to regulate commerce, as granted to Congress by the Constitution, necessarily excludes the exercise by the States of any of the powers thus granted, is one which has been much considered in this court, and the earlier discus- sions left the question in much doubt. As late as the January Term, 1849, the opinions of the judges in The Passenger Cases show that the question was considered to be one of much impor- tance in those cases, and was even then unsettled, though previous decisions of the court were relied on by the judges themselves as deciding it in different ways. It was certainly, so far as those cases affected it, left an open question. In the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 1 four years later, the same question came directly before the court in reference to the local laws of the port of Philadelphia concerning pilots. 112 Howard, 299. CRANDALL v. STATE OF NEVADA. 53 . . . Perhaps no more satisfactory solution has ever been given of this vexed question than the one furnished by the court in that case. . . . It may be that under the power to regulate commerce among the States, Congress has authority to pass laws, the operation of which would be inconsistent with the tax imposed by the State of Nevada, but we know of no such statute now in existence. Inasmuch, therefore, as the tax does not itself institute any regu- lation of commerce of a national character, or which has a uniform operation over the whole country, it is not easy to maintain, in view of the principles on which those cases are decided, that it violates the clause of the Federal Constitution which we have had under review. But we do not concede that the question before us is to be de- termined by the two clauses of the Constitution which we have been examining. The people of these United States constitute one nation. They have a government in which all of them are deeply interested. This government has necessarily a capital established by law, where its principal operations are conducted. Here sits its legislature, composed of senators and representatives, from the States and from the people of the States. Here resides the President, direct- ing, through thousands of agents, the execution of the laws over all this vast country. Here is the seat of the supreme judicial power of the nation, to which all its citizens have a right to resort to claim justice at its hands. Here are the great executive de- partments, administering the offices of the mails, of the public lands, of the collection and distribution of the public revenues, and of our foreign relations. These are all established and con- ducted under the admitted powers of the Federal government. That government has a right to call to this point any or all of its citizens to aid in its service, as members of the Congress, of the courts, of the executive departments, and to fill all its other offices; and this right cannot be made to depend upon the pleas- ure of a State over whose territory they must pass to reach the point where these services must be rendered. The government also, has its offices of secondary importance in all other parts of the country. On the sea-coasts and on the rivers it has its ports of entry. In the interior it has its land offices, its revenue offices, and its sub-treasuries. In all these it demands the services of its citizens, and is entitled to bring them to those points from all quarters of the nation, and no power can exist in a State to obstruct 54 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. this right that would not enable it to defeat the purposes for which the government w r as established. The Federal power has a right to declare and prosecute wars, and, as a necessary incident, to raise and transport troops through and over the territory of any State of the Union. If this right is dependent in any sense, however limited, upon the pleasure of a State, the government itself may be overthrown by an obstruction to its exercise. Much the largest part of the transportation of troops during the late rebellion was by railroads, 'and largely through States whose people were hostile to the Union. If the tax levied by Xevada on railroad passengers had been the law of Tennessee, enlarged to meet the wishes of her people, the treasury of the United States could not have paid the tax nec- essary to enable its armies to pass through her territory. But if the government has these rights on her own account, the citizen also has correlative rights. He has the right to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that government, or to transact any business he may have with it. To seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are con- ducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it. The views here advanced are neither novel nor unsupported by authority. The question of the taxing power of the States, as its exercise has affected the functions of the Federal government, has been repeatedly considered by this court, and the right of the States in this mode to impede or embarrass the constitutional op- erations of that government, or the rights which its citizens hold under it, has been uniformly denied. . . . [Here follows a discussion of McCulloch v. Md., 4 Wheat.., 316; Brown v. Md., 12 Wheat., 419; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet., 449.] In all these cases, the opponents of the taxes levied by the States were able to place their opposition on no express provision of the Constitution, except in that of Brown v. Maryland. But in all the other cases, and in that case also, the court distinctly placed the invalidity of the State taxes on the ground that they interfered with an authority of the Federal government, which was itself only to be sustained as necessary and proper to the exercise of some other power expressly granted. In The Passenger Cases, to which reference has already been CRANDALL v. STATE OF NEVADA. 55 made, Justice Grier, with whom Justice Catron concurred, makes this one of the four propositions on which they held the tax void in those cases. Judge Wayne expresses his dissent to Judge Grier's views; and perhaps this ground received the concurrence of more of the members of the court who constituted the majority than any other. But the principles here laid down may be found more clearly stated in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice in those cases, and with more direct pertinency to the case now before us than anywhere else. After expressing his views fully in favor of the validity of the tax, which he said had exclusive reference to foreigners, so far as those cases were concerned, he proceeds to say, for the purpose of preventing misapprehension, that so far as the tax affected American citizens it could not in his opinion be maintained. He then adds: "Living as we do under a common government, charged with the great concerns of the whole Union, every citizen of the United States from the most remote States or territories, is entitled to free access, not only to the principal departments established at Washington, but also to its judicial tribunals, and public offices in every State in the Union. . . . For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same com- munity must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. And a tax imposed by a State, for entering its territories or harbors, is inconsistent with the rights which belong to citizens of other States as members of the Union, and with the objects which that Union was intended to attain. Such a power in the States could produce nothing but discord and mutual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it/' Although these remarks are found in a dissenting opinion, they do not relate to the matter on which the dissent was founded. They accord with the inferences which we have already drawn from the Constitution itself, and from the decisions of this court in exposition of that instrument. Those principles, as we have already stated them in this opinion, must govern the present case. . . . Judgment reversed, and the case remanded to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, with directions to discharge the plaintiff in error from custody. 56 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. iVEAZIE BANK v. FENNO. 8 Wallace, 533. Decided 1869. ON certificate of division for the Circuit Court for Maine. The Constitution ordains that: "The Congress shall have power "To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. "To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin." It also ordains that: "Direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective numbers." "N"o capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in pro- portion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be made." "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti- tution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." With these provisions in force as fundamental law, Congress passed, July 13th, 1866, 1 an act, the second clause of the 9th section of which enacts: "That every National banking association, State bank, or State banking association, shall pay a tax of ten per centum on the amount of notes of any person, State bank, or State banking asso- ciation, used for circulation and paid out by them after the 1st day of August, 1866, and such tax shall be assessed and paid in such manner as shall be prescribed by the commissioner of internal revenue." Under this act a tax of ten per cent, was assessed upon the Veazie Bank, for its bank notes issued for circulation, after the day named in the act. The Veazie Bank was a corporation chartered by the State of Maine, with authority to issue bank notes for circulation, and the notes on which the tax imposed by the act was collected, were issued under this authority. There was nothing in the case show- 1 14 Stat. at Large, 146. VEAZIE BANK v. FENNO. 57 ing that the bank sustained any relation to the State as a financial agent, or that its authority to issue notes was conferred or exer- cised with any special reference to other than private interests. The bank declined to pay the tax, alleging it to be unconstitu- tional, and the collector of internal revenue, one Fenno, was pro- ceeding to make a distraint in order to collect it, with penalty and costs, when, in order to prevent this, the bank paid it under protest. An unsuccessful claim having been made on the com- missioner of internal revenue for reimbursement, suit was brought by the bank against the collector, in the court below. The case was presented to that court upon an agreed statement of facts, and, upon a prayer for instructions to the jury, the judges found themselves opposed in opinion on three questions, the first of which the two others differing from it in form only, and not needing to be recited was this: "Whether. the second clause of the 9th section of the act of Congress of the 13th of July, 1866, under which the tax in this case was levied and collected, is a valid and constitutional law." The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court. The necessity of adequate provision for the financial exigencies created by the late rebellion, suggested to the administrative and legislative departments of the government important changes in the systems of currency and taxation which had hitherto prevailed. These changes, more or less distinctly shown in administrative recommendations, took form and substance in legislative acts. We have now to consider, within a limited range, those which relate to circulating notes and the taxation of circulation. At the beginning of the rebellion the circulating medium con- sisted almost entirely of bank notes issued by numerous independ- ent corporations variously organized under State legislation, of various degrees of credit, and very unequal resources, administered often with great, and not unfrequently, with little skill, prudence, and integrity. The acts of Congress, then in force, prohibiting the receipt or disbursement, in the transactions of the National government, of anything except gold and silver, and the laws of the States requiring the redemption of bank notes in coin on demand, prevented the disappearance of gold and silver from cir- culation. There was, then, NO national currency except coin; there was no general 2 regulation of any other by National legisla- 2 See the act of December 27th, the District of Columbia, 10 Stat. 1854, to suppress small notes in at Large, 599. 58 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. tion; and no national taxation was imposed in any form on the State bank circulation. The first act authorizing the emission of notes by the Treasury Department for circulation was that of July 17th, 1861. 2 The notes issued under this act were treasury notes, payable on demand in coin. The amount authorized by it was $50,000,000, and was increased by the act of February 12th, 1862 3 to $60,000,000. On the 31st of December, 1861, the State banks suspended specie payment. Until this time the expenses of the war had been paid in coin, or in the demand notes just referred to; and for some time aftenvards, they continued to be paid in these notes, which, if not redeemed in coin, were received as coin in the payment of duties. Subsequently, on the 25th day of February, 1862, 4 a new policy became necessary in consequence of the suspension and of the condition of the country, and was adopted. The notes hitherto issued, as has just been stated, were called treasury notes, and were payable on demand in coin. The act now passed authorized the issue of bills for circulation under the name of United States notes, made payable to bearer, but not expressed to be payable on demand, to the amount of $150,000,000; and this amount was in- creased by subsequent acts to $450,000,000, of which $50,000,000 were to be held in reserve, and only to be issued for a special pur- pose, and under special directions as to the withdrawal from circu- lation. 5 These notes, until after the close of the war, were always convertible into, or receivable at par for bonds payable in coin, and bearing coin interest, at a rate not less than five per cent, and the acts by which they were authorized, declared them to be law- ful money and a legal tender. This currency, issued directly by the government for the dis- bursement of the war and other expenditures, could not, obviously,, be a proper object of taxation. But on the 25th of February, 1863, the act authorizing Na- tional banking associations 6 was passed, in which, for the first time during many years, Congress recognized the expediency and duty of imposing a tax upon currency. By this act a tax of two per cent annually was imposed on the circulation of the associa- tions authorized by it. Soon after, by the act of March 3d, 1863, 7 a similar but lighter tax of one per cent annually was imposed on 2 12 Stat. at Large, 259. Act of March 3d, 1863, Ib., 710. Ib., 338. e Act of March 3d, 1863, 12 Ib., 4 Ib., 345. 670. B Act of July llth, 1862, Ib., 532; ^ Ib., 712. VEAZIE BANK v. FBNNO. 59 the circulation of State banks in certain proportions to their cap- ital, and of two per cent, on the excess; and the tax on the Na- tional associations was reduced to the same rates. Both acts also imposed taxes on capital and deposits, which need not be noticed here. At a later date, by the act of June 3d, 1864, 8 which was substi- tuted for the act of February 25th, 1863, authorizing National banking associations, the rate of tax on circulation was continued and applied to the whole amount of it, and the shares of their stockholders were also subjected to taxation by the States; and a few days afterwards, by the act of June 30th, 1864, 9 to provide ways and means for the support of the government, the tax on the circulation of the State banks was also continued at the same annual rate of one per cent., as before, but payment was required in monthly installments of one-twelfth of one per cent., with monthly reports from each State bank of the amount in circulation. It can hardly be doubted that the object of this provision was to inform the proper authorities of the exact amount of paper money in circulation, with a view to its regulation by law. The first step taken by Congress in that direction was by the act of July 17, 1862, 10 prohibiting the issue and circulation of notes under one dollar by any person or corporation. The act just re- ferred to was the next, and it was followed some months later by the act of March 3d, 1865, amendatory of the prior internal rev- enue acts, the sixth section of which provides, "that every National banking association, State bank, or State banking association, shall pay a tax of ten per centum on the amount of the notes of any State bank, or State banking association, paid out by them after the 1st day of July, 1866." The same provision was re-enacted, with a more extended appli- cation, on the 13th of July, 1866. in these words: "Every Na- tional banking association, State bank, or State banking associa- tion, shall pay a tax of ten per centum on the amount of notes of any person, State bank, or State banking association used for cir- culation, and paid out by them after the first day of August, 1866; and such tax shall be assessed and paid in such manner as shall be prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue." 12 The constitutionality of this last provision is now drawn in ques- tion, and this brief statement of the recent legislation of Congress s 13 Ib., 111. 11 13 Ib., 484. o Ib., 277. 12 14 Ib., 146. 10 Act of March 3d, 1863, 12 Ib., 592. 60 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. has been made for the purpose of placing in a clear light its scope and bearing, especially as developed in the provisions just cited. It will be seen that when the policy of taxing bank circulation was first adopted in 1863, Congress was inclined to discriminate for, rather than against, the circulation of the State banks; but that when the country had been sufficiently furnished with a Na- tional currency by the issues of United States notes and of National bank notes, the discrimination was turned, and very decidedly turned, in the opposite direction. The general question now before us is, whether or not the tax of ten per cent., imposed on State banks or National banks paying out the notes of individuals or State banks used for circulation, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. In support of the position that the act of Congress, so far as it provides for the levy and collection of this tax, is repugnant to the Constitution, two propositions have been argued with much force and earnestness. The first is that the tax in question is a direct tax, and has not been apportioned among the States agreeably to the Constitution. The second is that the act imposing the tax impairs a franchise granted by the State, and that Congress has no power to pass any law with that intent or effect. The first of these propositions will be first examined. . . . Much diversity of opinion has always prevailed upon the ques- tion, what are direct taxes? Attempts to answer it by reference to the definitions of political economists have been frequently made, but without satisfactory results. The enumeration of the different kinds of taxes which Congress was authorized to impose was proba- bly made with little reference to their speculations. . . . We are obliged therefore to resort to historical evidence, and to seek the meaning of the words in the use and in the opinion of those whose relations to the government, and means of knowledge, war- ranted them in speaking with authority. And considered in this light, the meaning and application of the rule, as to direct taxes, appears to us quite clear. It is, as we think, distinctly shown in every act of Congress on the subject. In each of these acts, a gross sum was laid upon the United States, and the total amount was apportioned to the several States, according to their respective numbers of inhabitants, as ascertained by the last preceding census. Having been apportioned, pro- vision was made for the imposition of the tax upon the subjects specified in the act, fixing. -its total sum. . . . In each instance, the total sum was apportioned among the States, by the constitu- VEAZIE BANK v. FENNO. 61 tional rule, and was assessed at prescribed rates, on the subjects of the tax. These subjects, in 1798, 1 1813, 2 1815, 3 1816, 4 were lands, improvements, dwelling-houses, and slaves; and in 1861, lands, improvements, and dwelling-houses only. Under the act of 1798, slaves were assessed at fifty cents on each; under the other acts, according to valuation by assessors. This review shows that per- sonal property, contracts, occupations, and the like, have never been regarded by Congress as proper subjects of direct tax. . . . [After a discussion of Hylton v. U. S., the court continues:] It may be safely assumed, therefore, as the unanimous judgment of the court, that a tax on carriages is not a direct tax. And it may further be taken as established upon the testimony of Pater- son, that the words direct taxes, as used in the Constitution, com- prehended only capitation taxes, and taxes on land, and perhaps taxes on personal property by general valuation and assessment of the various descriptions possessed within the several States. It follows necessarily that the power to tax without apportion- ment extends to all other objects. Taxes on other objects are in- cluded under the heads of taxes not direct, duties, imposts, and excises, and must be laid and collected by the rule of uniformity. The tax under consideration is a tax on bank circulation, and may very well be classed under the head of duties. Certainly it is not, in the sense of the Constitution, a direct tax. It may be said to come within the same category of taxation as the tax on incomes of insurance companies, which this court, at the last term, in the case of Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule, 5 held not to be a direct tax. Is it, then, a tax on a franchise granted by a State, which Con- gress, upon any principle exempting the reserved powers of the States from impairment by taxation, must be held to have no authority to lay and collect? We do not say that there may not be such a tax. It may be admitted that the reserved rights of the States, such as the right to pass laws, to give effect to laws through executive action, to administer justice through the courts, and to employ all necessary agencies for legitimate pur- poses of State government, are not proper subjects of the taxing power of Congress. But it cannot be admitted that franchises granted by a State are necessarily exempt from taxation; for franchises are property, often very valuable and productive prop- i Act of July 9th, 1798, 1 Stat. at Id., 166. Large, 586. * id., 255. 2 Act of July 22d, 1813, 3 Ib., 26. 6 7 Wallace, 434. 62 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. erty; and when not conferred for the purpose of giving effect to some reserved power of a State, seem to be as properly objects of taxation as any other property. But in the case before us the object of taxation is not the fran- chise of the bank, but property created, or contracts made and issued under the franchise, or power to issue bank bills. A railroad company, in the exercise of its corporate franchises, issues freight receipts, bills of lading, and passenger tickets; and it cannot be doubted that the organization of railroads is quite as important to the State as the organization of banks. But it will hardly be ques- tioned that these contracts of the company are objects of taxation within the powers of Congress, and not exempted by any relation to the State which granted the charter of the railroad. And it seems difficult to distinguish the taxation of notes issued for cir- culation from the taxation of these railroad contracts. Both de- scriptions of contracts are means of profit to the corporations which issue them; and both, as we think, may properly be made contributory to the public revenue. It is insisted, however, that the tax in the case before us is ex- cessive, and so excessive as to indicate a purpose on the part of Congress to destroy the franchise of the bank, and is, therefore, beyond the constitutional power of Congress. The first answer to this is that the judicial cannot prescribe to the legislative department of the government limitations upon the exercise of its acknowledged powers. The power to tax may be exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected. So if a particular tax bears heavily upon a corporation, or a class of corporations, it cannot, for that reason only, be pronounced contrary to the Constitution. But there is another answer which vindicates equally the wisdom and the power of Congress. It cannot be doubted that under the Constitution the power to provide a circulation of coin is given to Congress. And it is set- tled by the uniform practice of the government and by repeated decisions, that Congress may constitutionally authorize the emis- sion of bills of credit. It is not important here, to decide whether the quality of legal tender, in payment of debts, can be constitu- tionally imparted to these bills; it is enough to say, that there can be no question of the power of the government to emit them; to make them receivable in payment of debts to itself; to fit them for use by those who see fit to use them in all the transactions of com- merce; to provide for their redemption; to make them a currency, VEAZIE BANK v. FENNO. 63 uniform in value and description, and convenient and useful for circulation. These powers, until recently, were only partially and occasionally exercised. Lately, however, they have been called into full activity, and Congress has undertaken to supply a cur- rency for the entire country. The methods adopted for the supply of this currency were briefly explained in the first part of this opinion. It now consists of coin, of United States notes, and of the notes of the National banks. Both descriptions of notes may be properly described as bills of credit, for both are furnished by the government; both are issued on the credit of the government; and the government is responsi- ble for the redemption of both; primarily as to the first descrip- tion, and immediately upon default of the bank, as to the second. When these bills shall be made convertible into coin, at the will of the holder, this currency will, perhaps, satisfy the wants of the community, in respect to a circulating medium, as perfectly as any mixed currency that can be devised. Having thus, in the exercise of undisputed constitutional powers, undertaken to provide a currency for the whole country, it cannot be questioned that Congress may, constitutionally, secure the ben- efit of it to the people by appropriate legislation. To this end, Con- gress has denied the quality of legal tender to foreign coins, and has provided by law against the imposition of counterfeit and base coin on the community. To the same end, Congress may restrain, by suitable enactments, the circulation as money of any notes not issued under its own authority. Without this power, indeed, its attempts to secure a sound and uniform currency for the country must be futile. Viewed in this light, as well as in the other light of a duty on contracts or property, we cannot doubt the constitutionality of the tax under consideration. The three questions certified from the Circuit Court of the District of Maine must, therefore, be an- swered Affirmatively. [MR JUSTICE NELSON rendered a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE DAVIS concurred.] 64 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. THE COLLECTOR v. DAY. 11 Wallace, 113. Decided 1870. ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts. [The case grew out of an attempt of a collector of the internal revenue of the United States to collect a tax on the salary of a judge of the State of Massachusetts levied in accordance with certain acts of Congress passed in 1864, '65, '66, and '67.] MR. JUSTICE NELSON delivered the opinion of the court. The case presents the question whether or not it is competent for Congress, under the Constitution of the United States, to im- pose a tax upon the salary of a judicial officer of a State? In Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie County, 1 it was de- cided that it was not competent for the legislature of a State to levy a tax upon the salary or emoluments of an officer of the United States. The decision was placed mainly upon the ground that the officer was a means or instrumentality employed for carry- ing into effect some of the legitimate powers of the government, which could not be interfered with by taxation or otherwise by the States, and that the salary or compensation for the service of the officer was inseparably connected with the office; that if the officer, as such was exempt, the salary assigned for his support or main- tenance while holding the office was also, for like reasons, equally exempt. The cases of McCulloch v. Maryland, 2 and Weston v. Charles- ton, 3 were referred to as settling the principle that governed the case, namely, "that the State governments cannot lay a tax upon the constitutional means employed by the government of the Union to execute its constitutional powers." . . . [Here follow cita- tions from these cases.] It is conceded in the case of McCulloch v. Maryland, that the power of taxation by the States was not abridged by the grant of a similar power to the government of the Union; that it was re- tained by the States, and that the power is to be concurrently exercised by the two governments; ajnd also that there is no ex- press constitutional prohibition upon the States against taxing the means or instrumentalities of the general government. But it was 1 16 Peters, 435. s 2 Peters, 449. 2 4 Wheaton, 316. THE COLLECTOR v. DAY. 65 held, and we agree properly held, to be prohibited by necessary implication; otherwise, the States might impose taxation to an extent that would impair, if not wholly defeat, the operations of the Federal authorities when acting in their appropriate sphere. These views, we think, abundantly establish the soundness of the decision of the case of Dobbins v. The Commissioners of Erie, which determined that the States were prohibited, upon a proper construction of the Constitution, from taxing the salary or emolu- ments of an officer of the government of the United States. And we shall now proceed to show that, upon the same construction of that instrument, and for like reasons, that government is prohib- ited from taxing the salary of the judicial officer of a State. It is a familiar rule of construction of the Constitution of the Union, that the sovereign powers vested in the State governments by their respective constitutions remained unaltered and unim- paired, except so far as they were granted to the government of the United States. That the intention of the framers of the Consti- tution in this respect might not be misunderstood, this rule of interpretation is expressly declared in the Tenth Article of the amendments, namely: "The powers not delegated to the United States are reserved to the States respectively, or, to the people." The government of the United States, therefore, can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication. The general government, and the States, although both exist within the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sover- eignties, acting separately and independently of each other, within their respective spheres. The former in its appropriate sphere is supreme; but the States within the limits of their powers not granted, or, in the language of the Tenth Amendment, "reserved," are as independent of the general government as that government within its sphere is independent of the States. The relations existing between the two governments are well stated by the present Chief Justice in the case of Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wallace, 76. "Both the States and the United States," he observed, "existed before the Constitution. The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union, by substituting a national government, acting with ample powers di- rectly upon the citizens, instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers greatly restricted, only upon the States. But, in many of the articles of the Constitution, the necessary existence of the States, and within their proper spheres, the inde- 5 66 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. pendent authority of the States, are distinctly recognized. To them nearly the whole charge of interior regulation is committed or left; to them, and to the people, all powers, not expressly dele- gated to the national government, are reserved." Upon looking into the Constitution, it will be found that but few of the articles in that instrument could be carried into practical effect without the existence of the States. Two of the great departments of the government, the executive and legislative, depend upon the exercise of the powers, or upon the people of the States. The Constitution guarantees to the States a republican form of government, and protects each against invasion or domestic violence. Such being the separate and inde- pendent condition of the States in our complex system, as recog- nized by the Constitution, and the existence of which is so indis- pensable, that, without them, the general government itself would disappear from the family of nations, it would seem to follow, as a reasonable, if not a necessary consequence, that the means and instrumentalities employed for carrying on the operations of their governments, for preserving their existence, and fulfilling the high and responsible duties assigned to them in the Constitution, should be left free and unimpaired, should not be liable to be crippled, much less defeated, by the taxing power of another government, which power acknowledges no limits but the will of the legislative body imposing the tax. And, more especially, those means and instrumentalities which are the creation of their sovereign and re- served rights, one of which is the establishment of the judicial department, and the appointment of officers to administer their laws. Without this power, and the exercise of it, we risk nothing in saying that no one of the States under the form of government guaranteed by the Constitution could long preserve its existence. A despotic government might. We have said that one of the reserved powers was that to establish a judicial department: it would have been more accurate, and in accordance with the exist- ing state of things at the time, to have said the power to maintain a judicial department. All of the thirteen States were in the pos- session of this power, and had exercised it at the adoption of the Constitution; and it is not pretended that any grant of it to the general government is found in that instrument. It is, therefore, one of the sovereign powers vested in the States by their constitu- tions, which remained unaltered and unimpaired, and in respect to which the State is as independent of the general government as that government is independent of the States. The supremacy of the general government, therefore, so much THE COLLECTOR V. DAY. 67 relied on in the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff in error, in respect to the question before us, cannot be maintained. The two governments are upon an equality, and the question is whether the power "to lay and collect taxes" enables the general govern- ment to tax the salary of a judicial officer of the State, which officer is a means or instrumentality employed to carry into exe- cution one of its most important functions, the administration of the laws, and which concerns the exercise of a right reserved to the States? We do not say the mere circumstance of the establishment of the judicial department, and the appointment of officers to admin- ister the laws, being among the reserved powers of the State, dis- ables the general government from levying the tax, as that de- pends upon the express power "to lay and collect taxes," but it shows that it is an original inherent power never parted with, and, in respect to which, the supremacy of that government does not exist, and is of no importance in determining the question; and further, that being an original and reserved power, and the judicial officers appointed under it being a means or instrumentality employed to carry it into effect, the right and necessity of its unim- paired exercise, and the exemption of the officer from taxation by the general government stand upon as solid a ground, and are maintained by principles and reasons as cogent, as those which led to the exemption of the Federal officer in Dobbins v. The Com- misisoners of Erie from taxation by the State; for, in this respect, that is, in respect to the reserved powers, the State is as sovereign and independent as the general government. And if the means and instrumentalities employed by that government to carry into operation the powers granted to it are, necessarily, and, for the sake of self-preservation, exempt from taxation by the States, why are not those of the States depending upon their reserved powers, for like reasons, equally exempt from Federal taxation? Their unimpaired existence in the one case is as essential as in the other. It is admitted that there is no express provision in the Constitu- tion that prohibits the general government from taxing the means and instrumentalities of the States, nor is there any prohibiting the States from taxing the means and instrumentalities of that government. In both cases the exemption rests upon necessary implication, and is upheld by the great law of self-preservation; as any government, whose means employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control of another and distinct gov- ernment can exist only at the mercy of that government. Of what avail are these means if another power may tax them at discretion? 68 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. But we are referred to the Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wallace, 533, in support of this power of taxation. That case furnishes a strong illustration of the position taken by the Chief Justice in McCulloch v. Maryland, namely, "That the power to tax involves the power to destroy." The power involved was one which had been exercised by the States since the foundation of the government, and had been, after the lapse of three-quarters of a century, annihilated from excessive taxation by the general government, just as the judicial office in the present case might be, if subject at all to taxation by that gov- ernment. But, notwithstanding the sanction of this taxation by a majority of the court, it is conceded, in the opinion, that "the reserved rights of the States, such as the right to pass laws; to give effect to laws through executive action; to administer justice through the courts, and to employ all necessary agencies for legiti- mate purposes of State government, are not proper subjects of the taxing power of Congress." This concession covers the case be- fore us, and adds the authority of this court in support of the doc- trine which we have endeavored to maintain. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, dissenting. I dissent from the opinion of the court in this case, because it seems to me that the general government has the same power of taxing the income of officers of the State governments as it has of taxing that of its own officers. It is the common government of all alike; and every citizen is presumed to trust his own govern- ment in the matter of taxation. No man ceases to be a citizen of the United States by being an officer under the State government. I cannot accede to the doctrine that the general government is to be regarded as in any sense foreign or antagonistic to the State governments, their officers, or people; nor can I agree that a pre- sumption can be admitted that the general government will act in a manner hostile to the existence or functions of the State gov- ernments, which are constituent parts of the system or body politic forming the basis on which the general government is founded. The taxation by the State governments of the instruments em- ployed by the general government in the exercise of its powers, is a very different thing. Such taxation involves an interference with the powers of a government in which other States and their citizens are equally interested with the State which imposes the taxation. In my judgment, the limitation of the power of taxation in the general government, which the present decision establishes, will be found very difficult to control. Where are we to stop in .' STATE TONNAGE TAX CASES 69 enumerating the functions of the State governments which will be interfered with by Federal taxation? If a State incorporate a railroad to carry out its purposes of internal improvement, or a bank to aid its financial arrangements, reserving, perhaps, a per- centage on the stock or profits, for the supply of its own treasury, will the bonds or stock of such an institution be free from Federal taxation? How can we now tell what the effect of this decision will be? I cannot but regard it as founded on a fallacy, and that it will lead to mischievous consequences. I am as much opposed as any one can be to any interference by the general government with the just powers of the State governments. But no concession of any of the just powers of the general government can easily be recalled. I, therefore, consider it my duty to at least record my dissent when such concession appears to be made. An extended discussion of the subject would answer no useful purpose. STATE TONNAGE TAX CASES. 12 Wallace, 204. Decided 1870. ERROB to the Supreme Court of Alabama. These were two cases, which, though coming in different forms, involved one and the same point only; and at the bar where the counsel directed attention to the principle involved, separated from the accidents of the case were discussed together as pre- senting "precisely the same question." The matter was thus: The Constitution ordains that "no State shall without the con- sent of Congress lay any duty of tonnage." "With this provision in force as superior law, the State of Alabama passed, on the 22d of February, 1866, a revenue law. By this law, the rate of taxation for property generally was the one-half of one per cent; but "on all steamboats, vessels, and other water crafts plying in the naviga- ble waters of the State," the act levied a tax at "the rate of $1 per ton of the registered tonnage thereof," which it declared should "be assessed and collected at the port where such vessels are regis- tered, if practicable; otherwise at any other port or landing within the State where such vessel may be." The tax collector was directed by the act to demand, in each year, of the person in charge of the vessel, if the taxes had been paid. If a receipt for the same was not produced, he was to immediately 70 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. assess the same according to tonnage, and if such tax was not paid on demand he was to seize the boat, &c., and, after notice, proceed and sell the same for payment of the tax, &c., and pay the surplus into the county treasury for the use of the owner. If the vessel could not be seized, the collector was to make the amount of the tax out of the real and personal estate of the owner, &c. Under this act, one Lott, tax collector of the State of Alabama, demanded of Cox, the owner of the Dorrance, a steamer of 321 tons, and valued at $5,000, and of several other steamers, certain sums as taxes; and under an act of 1867, identical in language with the one of 1866, just quoted, demanded from the Trade Company of Mobile certain sums on like vessels owned by them; the tax in all the cases being proportioned to the registered tonnage of the vessel. The steamboats, the subject of the tax, were owned exclusively by citizens of the State of Alabama, and were engaged in the navigation of the Alabama, Bigbee, and Mobile rivers, carrying freight and passengers between Mobile and other points of said rivers, altogether within the limits of that State. These waters were navigable from the sea for vessels of "ten or more tons' bur- den;" and it was not denied that there were ports of delivery on them above the highest points to which these boats plied. The owners of the boats were not assessed for any other tax on them than the one here claimed. The boats were enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade. Though running, therefore, between points altogether within the limits of the State of Alabama, the boats were, as it seemed, 1 of that sort on which Congress lays a tonnage duty. Cox, under compulsion and protest, paid the tax demanded of him, and then brought assumpsit in one of the inferior State courts of Alabama, to get back the money. The Trade Company refused to pay, and filed a bill in a like court, to enjoin the collector from proceeding to collect. The ground of resistance to the tax in each case was this, that being laid in proportion to the tonnage of the vessel, the tax was laid in a form and manner which the State was prohibited by the already quoted section of the Constitution from adopting. The right of the State to lay a tax on vessels according to their value and as property was not denied, but on- the contrary conceded. 2 Judgment being given in each case against the validity 1 See Act of July 18th, 1866, 28; fense to the tax was taken, in the 14 Stat. at Large, 185. fact that by the act of Congress 2 It is barely necessary to note admitting Alabama into the Un- that an additional ground of de- ion, it is declared, "that all navi- STATE TONNAGE TAX CASES. 71 of the tax, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court of Ala- bama, which decided that it was lawful. To review that judgment the case was now here. . . . MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the judgment of the court, giving an opinion in each of the cases. I. IN THE FIRST CASE. . . . Congress has prescribed the rules of admeasurement and computation for estimating the ton- nage of American ships and vessels. 3 Viewed in the light of those enactments, the word tonnage, as applied to American ships and vessels, must be held to mean their entire internal cubical capacity, or contents of the ship or vessel expressed in tons of one hundred cubical feet each, as estimated and ascertained by those rules of admeasurement and of com- putation. 4 Power to tax, with certain exceptions, resides with the States, independent of the Federal government, and the power, when con- fined within its true limits, may be exercised without restraint from any Federal authority. They cannot, however, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, nor can they levy any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing their inspection laws, as with- out the consent of Congress they are unconditionally prohibited from exercising any such power. Outside of those prohibitions the power of the States to tax extends to all objects within the sovereign power of the States, except the means and instruments of the Federal government. But ships and vessels owned by indi- viduals and belonging to the commercial marine are regarded as the private property of their owners, and not as the instruments or means of the Federal government, and as such, when viewed as property, they are plainly within the taxing power of the States, as they are not withdrawn from the operation of that power by any express or implied prohibition contained in the Federal Consti- tution. 5 . . . gable waters within the said state s 13 stat. at Large, 492, 70; Ib., shall forever remain public high- 444. ways, free to the citizens of said 4 Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How- state, and of the United States, ard, 82; Howell v. Maryland, 3 without any tax, duty, impost, or Gill, 14. toll therefor, imposed by the said 5 Alexander v. Railroad, 3 Strob- state." This ground not being hart, 598. passed upon by this court, need not be adverted to further. 72 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Taxes levied by a State upon ships and vessels owned by the citi- zens of the State as property, based on a valuation of the same as property, are not within the prohibition of the Constitution, but it is equally clear and undeniable that taxes levied by a State upon ships and vessels as instruments of commerce and navigation are within that clause of the instrument which prohibits the States from levying any duty of tonnage, without the consent of Congress; and it makes no difference whether the ships or vessels taxed belong to the citizens of the State which levies the tax or the citi- zens of another State, as the prohibition is general, withdrawing altogether from the States the power to lay any duty of tonnage under any circumstances, without the consent of Congress. 6 Annual taxes upon property in ships and vessels are continually laid, and their validity was never doubted or called in question, but if the States, without the consent of Congress, tax ships or vessels as instruments of commerce, by a tonnage duty, or indi- rectly by imposing the tax upon the master or crew, they assume a jurisdiction which they do not possess, as every such act falls directly within the prohibition of the Constitution. 7 . . . Tonnage duties are as much taxes as duties on imports or exports, and the prohibition of the Constitution extends as fully to such duties if levied by the States as to duties on imports or exports, and for reasons quite as strong as those which induced the f ramers of the Constitution to withdraw imports and exports from State taxation. Measures, however, scarcely distinguishable from each other may flow from distinct grants of power, as, for example, Congress does not possess the power to regulate the purely internal commerce of the States, but Congress may enroll and license ships and vessels to sail from one port to another in the same State; and it is clear that such ships and vessels are deemed ships and vessels of the United States, and that as such they are entitled to the privileges of ships and vessels employed in the coasting trade. 8 Steamboats, as well as sailing ships and vessels, are required to be enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade, and the record shows that all the steamboats taxed in this case had conformed to all the regulations of Congress in that regard, that they were duly enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade and were engaged in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 7 Passenger Cases, 7 Howard, 202; Sennot v. Davenport, 22 How- 447, 481. ard, 238; Foster v. Davenport, Ib., I Stat. at Large, 287; Id., 305; 245; Perry v. Torrence, 8 Ohio, 3 Kent (llth ed.), 203. 524. STATE TONNAGE TAX CASES. 73 the transportation of passengers and freight within the limits of the State, upon waters navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden. Tonnage duties, to a greater or less extent, have been imposed by Congress ever since the Federal government was organized under the Constitution to the present time. They have usually been exacted when the ship or vessel entered the port, and have been collected in a manner not substantially different from that prescribed, in the act of the State legislature under consideration. Undisputed authority exists in Congress to impose such duties, and it is not pretended that any consent has ever been given by Congress to the State to exercise any such power. If the tax levied is a duty of tonnage, it is conceded that it is illegal, and it is difficult to see how the concession could be avoided, as the prohibition is express, but the attempt is made to show that the legislature, in enacting the law imposing the tax, merely re- ferred to the registered tonnage of the steamboats "as a way or mode to determine and ascertain the tax. to be assessed on the steamboats, and to furnish a rule or rate to govern the assessors in the performance of their duties." Suppose that could be admitted, it would not have much tend- ency to strengthen the argument for the defendant, as the sug- gestion concedes what is obvious from the schedule, that the taxes are levied without any regard to the value of the steamboats. But the proposition involved in the suggestion cannot be admitted, as, by the very terms of the act, the tax is levied on the steamboats wholly irrespective of the value of the vessels as property, and solely and exclusively on the basis of their cubical contents as ascertained by the rules of admeasurement and computation pre- scribed by the act of Congress. By the terms of the law the taxation prescribed is "at the rate of one dollar per ton of the registered tonnage thereof," and the nine- tieth section of the act provides that the tax collector must, each year, demand of the person in charge of the steamboat whether the taxes have been paid, and if the person in charge fails to produce a receipt therefor by a tax collector, authorized to collect such taxes, the collector having the list must at once proceed to assess the same, and if the tax is not paid on demand he must seize such steamboat, &c., and after twenty days' notice, as therein prescribed, shall sell the same, or so much thereof as will pay the taxes and expenses for keeping and costs. 9 Sess. Acts, 1866, pp. 7, 31. 74 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Legislative enactments, where the language is unambiguous, cannot be changed by construction, nor can the language be divested of its plain and obvious meaning. Taxes levied under an enactment which directs that a tax shall be imposed on steam- boats at the rate of one dollar per ton of the registered tonnage thereof, and that the same shall be assessed and collected at the port where such steamboats are registered, cannot, in the judg- ment of this court, be held to be a tax on the steamboat as prop- erty. On the contrary, the tax is just what the language imports, a duty of tonnage, which is made even plainer when it comes to be considered that the steamboats are not to be taxed at all unless they are "plying in the navigable waters of the State," showing to a demonstration that it is as instruments of commerce and not as property that they are required to contribute to the revenues of the State. Such provision is much more clearly within the' prohibition in question than the one involved in a recent case decided by this court, in which it was held that a statute of a State enacting that the wardens of a port were entitled to demand and receive, in addition to other fees, the sum of five dollars for every vessel arriv- ing at the port, whether called on to perform any service or not, was both a regulation of commerce and a. duty of tonnage, and that as such it was unconstitutional and void. 10 Speaking of the same prohibition, the Chief Justice said in that case that those words in their most obvious and general sense de- scribe a duty proportioned to the tonnage of the vessel a certain rate on each ton which is exactly what is directed by the provision in the tax act before the court, but he added that it seems plain, if the Constitution be_ taken in that restricted sense, it would not fully accomplish the intent of the framers, as the prohibition upon the States against levying duties on imports or exports would be ineffectual if it did not also extend to duties on the ships which serve as the vehicles of conveyance, which was doubtless intended by the prohibition of any duty of tonnage. "It was not only a pro rata tax which was prohibited, but any duty on the ship, whether a fixed sum upon its whole tonnage, or a sum to be ascertained by comparing the amount of tonnage with the rate of duty." Assume the rule to be as there laid down, and all must agree that "the levy of the tax in question is expressly prohibited, as the schedule shows that it is exactly proportioned ' to the registered tonnage of the steamboats plying in the navigable waters of the State." . . . 10 Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wallace, 34. STATE TONNAGE TAX CASES. 75 Taxes in aid of the inspection laws of a State, under special cir- cumstances, have been upheld as necessary to promote the inter- ests of commerce and the security of navigation. 11 Laws of that character are upheld as contemplating benefits and advantages to commerce and navigation, and as altogether distinct from imposts and duties on imports and exports and duties of ton- nage. Usage, it is said, has sanctioned such laws where Congress has not legislated, but it is clear that such laws bear no relation to the act in question, as the act under consideration is emphatically an act to raise revenue to replenish the treasury of the State and for no other purpose, and does not contemplate any beneficial service for the steamboats or other vessels subjected to taxation. Beyond question the act is an act to raise revenue without any corresponding or equivalent benefit or advantage to the vessels taxed or to the ship-owners, and consequently it cannot be upheld by virtue of the rules applied in the construction of laws regulating pilot dues and port charges. 12 Attempt was made in the case of Alexander v. Eailroad to show that the form of levying the tax was simply a mode of assessing the vessels as property, but the argument did not prevail, nor can it in this case, as the amount of the tax is measured by the tonnage of the steamboats and not by their value as property. Reference is made to the case of the Towboat Company v. Bordelon, 13 as asserting the opposite rule, but the court is of a different opinion, as the tax in that case was levied, not upon the boat, but upon the capital of the company owning the boat, and the court in delivering their opinion say the capital of the com- pany is property, and the Constitution of the State requires an equal and uniform tax to be imposed upon it with the other prop- erty of the State for the support of government. For these reasons the court is of opinion that the State law levying the taxes in this case is unconstitutional and void, that the judgment of the State Court is erroneous and that it must be reversed, and having come to that conclusion, the court does not find it necessary to determine the other question. Judgment reversed with costs, and the cause remanded for fur- ther proceedings in conformity to the opinion of the court. II. IN THE SECOND CASE. . . . Power to tax for the sup- port of the State governments exists in the States independently "Cooley v. Port Wardens, 12 S. C., 286; Benedict v. Vanderbilt, Howard, 314. 1 Robt. N. Y., 200. 12 State v. Charleston, 4 Rich., is 7 Louisiana An., 195. T6 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of the Federal government, and it may well be admitted that where there is no cession of jurisdiction for the purposes speci- fied in the Constitution, and no restraining compact between the States and the Federal government, the power in the States to tax reaches all the property within the State which is not properly denominated the instruments or means of the Federal govern- ment. 14 Concede all that and still the court is of opinion that the tax in this case is a duty of tonnage, and that the law imposing it is plainly unconstitutional and void. Taxes, as the law provides, must be assessed by the assessor in each county on and from the following subjects and at the following rates, to wit: "On all steam- boats, &c., plying in the navigable waters of the State, at the rate of one dollar per ton of the registered tonnage thereof," which must be assessed and collected at the port where such steamboats are registered, &c. 15 ^Copied as the provision is from the enactment of the previous year, it is obvious that it must receive the same construction, and as the tax is one dollar per ton, it is too plain for argument that the amount of the tax depends upon the carry- ing capacity of the steamboat and not upon her value as property, as the experience of every one shows that a small steamer, new and well built, may be of much greater value than a large one, badly built or in need of extensive repairs. Separate lists are made for the county and school taxes, but the two combined amount exactly to one dollar per ton, as in the levy for the State tax, and the court is of the opinion that the case falls within the same rule as the case just decided. Evidently the word tonnage in commercial designation means the number of tons burden the ship or vessel will carry, as estimated and ascertained by the official admeasurement and com- putation prescribed by the public authority. ^Regulations upon the subject are enacted by Parliament in the parent country and by Congress in this country, as appears by several acts of Con- gress. 16 Tonnage, says a writer of experience, has long been an official term intended originally to express the burden that a ship would carry, in order that the various dues and customs which are levied upon shipping might be levied according to the size of the vessel, or rather in proportion to her capability of carry- i* Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How- 448; Weston,v. Charleston, 2 Pet- ard, 82; McCulloch v. Maryland, ers, 467. 4 Wheaton, 429; Society for Sav- " Revised Code, 169. ings v. Coite, 6 Wallace, 604; i 1 Stat. at Large, 305; 13 Id., Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 444. STATE TONNAGE TAX CASES. 77 ing burden. Hence the term, as applied to a ship, has become almost synonymous with that of size. 17 Apply that interpreta- tion to the word tonnage as used in the tax act under considera- tion, a^fl it is as clear as anything can be in legislation that the tax imposed by that provision is a tonnage tax, or duty of ton- nage, as the phrase is in the Constitution. State authority to tax ships and vessels, it is supposed by the respondent, extends to all cases where the ship or vessel is not employed in foreign commerce or in commerce between ports or places in different States. He concedes that the States cannot levy a duty of tonnage on ships or vessels if the ship or vessel is employed in foreign commerce or in commerce "among the States," but he denies that the prohibition extends to ships or vessels employed in commerce between ports and places in the same State, and that is the leading error in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the State. Founded upon that mistake the proposition is that all taxes are taxes on property, although levied on ships and vessels duly enrolled and licensed, if the ship or vessel is not employed in foreign commerce or in commerce among the States. Ships or vessels of ten or more tons burden, duly enrolled and licensed, if engaged in commerce on waters which are navigable by such vessels from the sea, are ships and vessels of the United States entitled to the privileges secured to such vessels by the act for enrolling or licensing ships or vessels to be employed in the coasting trade. 18 Such a rule as that assumed by the respondent would incor- porate into the Constitution an exception which it does not con- tain. Had the prohibition in terms applied only to ships and ves- sels employed in foreign commerce or in commerce among the States, his construction would be right, but courts of justice cannot add any new provision to the fundamental law, and, if not, it seems clear to a demonstration that the construction assumed by the respondent is erroneous. Decree reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceed- ings in conformity to the opinion of this court. IT Roman's Com. and Nav. Ton- is 1 stat. at Large, 205; Ib., 287. mage. 78 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. LOAN ASSOCIATION v. TOPEKA. 20 Wallace, 655. Decided 1874. EKROB to the Circuit Court for the District of Kansas. The Citizens' Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland brought their action in the court below, against the city of Topeka, on coupons for interest attached to bonds of the city of Topeka. The bonds on their face purported to be payable to the King Wrought-Iron Bridge Manufacturing and Iron- Works Company, of Topeka, to aid and encourage that company in establishing and operating bridge shops in said city of Topeka, under and in pursu- ance of section twenty-six of an act of the legislature of the State of Kansas, entitled "An act to incorporate cities of the second class," approved February 29, 1872; and also of another "Act to authorize cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, aiding railroads, water-power, or other works of internal improvement," approved March 2, 1872. The city issued one hundred of these bonds for $1,000 each, as a donation (and so it was stated in the declaration), to encourage that company in its design of establishing a manufactory of iron bridges in that city. The declaration also alleged that the interest coupons first due were paid out of a fund raised by taxation for that purpose, and that after this payment the plaintiff became the purchaser of the bonds and the coupons on which suit was brought for value. A demurrer was interposed by the city of Topeka to this declara- tion. The section of the act of February 29, on which the main reli- ance was placed for the authority to issue these bonds, reads as follows: "SECTION 76. The council shall have power to encourage the establishment of manufactories and such other enterprises as may tend to develop and improve such city, either by direct appro- priation from the general fund or by the issuance of bonds of such city in such amounts as the council may determine; Provided, That no greater amount than one thousand dollars shall be granted for any one purpose, unless a majority of the votes cast at an elec- tion called for that purpose shall authorize the same. The bonds thus issued shall be made payable at any time within twenty years, and bear interest not exceeding ten per cent, per annum." LOAN ASSOCIATION v. TOPEKA. 79 It was conceded that the steps required by this act prerequisite as to issuing the bonds were regular, as were also the other details, and that the language of the statute was sufficient to justify the action of the city authorities, if the statute was within the consti- tutional competency of the legislature. The single question, therefore, for consideration raised by the demurrer was the authority of the legislature of the State of Kansas to enact this part of the statute. The court below denied the authority, placing the denial on two grounds: 1st. That this part of the statute violated the fifth section of Article XII of the Constitution of the State of Kansas; a sec- tion in these words: "SECTION 5. Provision shall be made by general law for the organization of cities, towns, and villages; and their power of tax- ation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loan- ing their credit, shall be so restricted as to prevent the abuse of such power." [The argument here was that the section of the act of February 29, 1872, conferring the power to issue bonds, contained no re- striction as to the amount which the city might issue to aid man- ufacturing enterprises, and that the failure of the legislature to limit and restrict the power so as to prevent abuse, violated the fifth section of Article XII of the Constitution above referred to.] 2d. That the act authorized the towns and other municipalities to which it applied, by issuing bonds or lending its credit, to take the property of the citizen under the guise of taxation to pay these bonds, and use it in aid of the enterprises of others which were not of a public character; that this was a perversion of the right of taxation, which could only be exercised for a public use, to the aid of individual interests and personal pur- poses of profit and gain. The court below accordingly, sustaining the demurrer, gave judgment in favor of the defendant, the city of Topeka, and to its judgment this writ of error was taken. . . . MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. Two grounds are taken in the opinion of the circuit judge and in the argument of counsel for defendant, on which it is insisted that the section of the statute of February 29, 1872, on which the main reliance is placed to issue the bonds, is unconstitutional. 80 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The first of these is, that by section five of article twelve of the Constitution of that State it is declared that provision shall be made by general law for the organization of cities, towns, and villages; and their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, shall be so re- stricted as to prevent the abuse of such power. The argument is that the statute in question is void because it authorizes cities and towns to contract debts, and does not con- tain any restriction on the power so conferred. But whether the statute which confers power to contract debts should always con- tain some limitation or restriction, or whether a general restric- tion applicable to all cases should be passed, and whether in the absence of both the grant of power to contract is wholly void, are questions whose solution we prefer to remit to the State courts, as in this case we find ample reason to sustain the demur- rer on the second ground on which it is argued by counsel and sustained by the Circuit Court. That proposition is that the act authorizes the towns and other municipalities to which it applies, by issuing bonds or loaning their credit, to take the property of the citizen under the guise of tax- ation to pay these bonds, and use it in aid of the enterprises of others which are not of a public character, thus perverting the right of taxation, which can only be exercised for a public use, to the aid of individual interests and personal purposes of profit and gain. The proposition as thus broadly stated is not new, nor is the question which it raises difficult of solution. If these municipal corporations, which are in fact subdivisions of the State, and which for many reasons are vested with quasi- legislative powers, have a fund or other property out of which they can pay the debts which they contract, without resort to taxation, it may be within the power of the legislature of the State to authorize them to use it in aid of projects strictly private or personal, but which would in a secondary manner contribute to the public good; or where there is property or money vested in a corporation of the kind for a particular use, as public wor- ship or charity, the legislature may pass laws authorizing them to make contracts in reference to this property, and incur debts payable from that source. But such instances are few and exceptional, and the proposi- tion is a very broad one, that debts contracted by municipal cor- porations must be paid, if paid at all, out of taxes which they may lawfully levy, and that all contracts creating debts to be paid LOAN ASSOCIATION v. TOPEKA. 81 in future, not limited to payment from some other source, imply an obligation to pay by taxation. It follows that in this class of cases the right to contract must be limited by the right to tax, and if in the given case, no tax can lawfully be levied to pay the debt, the contract itself is void for want of authority to make it. If this were not so, these corporations could make valid prom- ises, which they have no means of fulfilling, and on which even the legislature that created them can confer no such power. The validity of a contract which can only be fulfilled by a resort to taxation depends on the power to levy the tax for that purpose. 1 It is, therefore, to be inferred that when the legislature of the State authorizes a county or city to contract a debt by bond, it intends to authorize it to levy such taxes as are necessary to pay the debt, unless there is in the act itself, or in some general statute, a limitation upon the power of taxation which repels such an / inference. With these remarks and with the reference to the authorities i which support them, we assume that unless the legislature of Kan- f sas had the right to authorize the counties and towns in that State to levy taxes to be used in aid of manufacturing enterprises, con- ducted by individuals, or private corporations, for purposes of \ gain, the law is void, and the bonds issued under it are also void. ) We proceed to the inquiry whether such a power exists in the legis- lature of the State of Kansas. We have already said the question is not new. The subject of the aid voted to railways by counties and towns has been brought to the attention of the courts of almost every State in the Union. It has been thoroughly discussed and is still the subject of dis- cussion in those courts. It is quite true that a decided prepon- derance of authority is to be found in favor of the proposition that the legislatures of the States, unless restricted by some special provisions of their constitutions, may confer upon these munici- pal bodies the right to take stock in corporations created to build railroads, and to lend their credit to such corporations. Also to levy the necessary taxes on the inhabitants, and on property within their limits subject to general taxation, to enable them to pay the debts thus incurred. But very few of these courts have decided this without a division among the judges of which they i Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila- Jay, 60 Maine, 127; Lowell v. delphia, 21 Pennsylvania State, Boston, Massachusetts (MS.); 147, 167; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis- lowa, 28; Allen v. Inhabitants of consin, 188. 6 82 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. were composed, while others have decided against the existence of the power altogether. 2 In all these cases, however, the decision has turned upon the question whether the taxation by which this aid was afforded to the building of railroads was for a public purpose. Those who came to the conclusion that it was, held the laws for that purpose valid. Those who could not reach that conclusion held them void. In all the controversy this has been the turning point of the judgments of the courts. And it is safe to say that no court has held debts created in aid of railroad companies, by counties or towns, valid on any other ground than that the purpose for which the taxes were levied was a public use, a purpose or object which it was the right and the duty of State governments to assist by money raised from the people by taxation. The argu- ment in opposition to this power has been, that railroads built by corporations organized mainly for purposes of gain the roads which they built being under. their control, and not that of the State were private and not public roads, and the tax assessed on the people went to swell the profits of individuals and not to the good of the State, or the benefit of the public, except in a remote and collateral way. On the other hand, it was said that roads, canals, bridges, navigable streams, and all other highways had in all times been matter of public concern. That such channels of travel and of the carrying business had always been established, improved, regulated by the State, and that the railroad had not lost this character because constructed by individual enterprise, aggregated into a corporation. We are not prepared to say that the latter view of it is not the true one, especially as there are other characteristics of a public nature conferred on these corporations, such as the power to obtain right of way, their subjection to the laws which govern common carriers, and the like, which seem to justify the proposition. Of the disastrous consequences which have followed its recognition by the courts and which were predicted when it was first estab- lished there can be no doubt. We have referred to this history of the contest over aid to rail- roads by taxation, to show that the strongest advocates for the validity of these laws never placed it on the ground of the un- limited power in the State legislature to tax the people, but con- ceded that where the purpose for which the tax was to be issued, 2 The State v. Wapello Co., 9 21 Pennsylvania State, 147; Whit- Iowa, 308; Hanson v. Vernon, 27 ing v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wisconsin, Id., 28; Sharpless v. Mayor, etc., 188. LOAN ASSOCIATION v. TOPEKA. 83 could no longer be justly claimed to have this public character, but was purely in aid of private or personal objects, the law au- thorizing it was beyond the legislative power, and was an un- authorized invasion of private right. 1 It must be conceded that there are such rights in every free government beyond the control of the State. A government which recognized no such rights, which held the lives, the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all times to the absolute disposi- tion and unlimited control of even the most democratic depository of power, is after all but a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the many, of the majority, if you choose to call it so, but it is none the less a despotism. It may well be doubted if a man is to hold all that he is accustomed to call his own, all in which he has placed his happiness, and the security of which is essential to that happiness, under the unlimited dominion of others, whether it is not wiser that this power should be exercised by one man than by many. The theory of our governments, State and na- tional, is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the 'legislative, and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited and defined powers. There are limitations on such power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name. No court, for instance, would hesitate to declare void a statute which enacted that A and B, who were husband and wife to each other, should be so no longer, but that A should thereafter be the husband of C, and B the wife of D. Or which should enact that the homestead now owned by A should no longer be his, but should henceforth be the property of B. 4 Of all the powers conferred upon government that of taxation is mosOiaBle~to~ abuse. Given a purpose or object for which tax- ation may be lawfuly used, and the extent of its exercise is in its very nature unlimited. It is true that express limitation on the amount of tax to be levied or the things to be taxed may be im- posed by constitution or statute, but in most instances for which taxes are levied, as the support of government, the prosecution of a Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wai- * Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 lace, 689; People v. Salem, 20 Wisconsin, 188; Cooley on Consti- Michigan, 452; Jenkins v. Andov- tutional Limitations, 129, 175, 487; er, 103 Massachusetts, 94; Dillon Dillon on Municipal Corporations, on Municipal Corporations, 587; 587. 2 Redfield's Laws of Railways, 398, rule 2. 84 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. war, the national defense, any limitation is unsafe. The entire resources of the people should in some instances be at the disposal of the government. The power to tax is therefore, the strongest, the most pervad- ing of all the powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people. It was said by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, 5 that the power j to tax is the power to destroy. A striking instance of the truth i of the proposition is seen in the fact that the existing tax of ten ! per cent., imposed by the United States on the circulation of all j other banks than the National banks, drove out of existence every State bank of circulation within a year or two after its passage. This power can as readily be employed against one class of indi- viduals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is no i implied limitation of the uses for which the power may be exer- cised. To lay with one hand the power of the government on the prop- erty of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private enterprises and build up private for- tunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms. / Nor is it taxation. A "tax," 'says Webster's Dictionary, "is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen j by government for the use of the nation or State." "Taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the legislature upon persons or [property to raise money for public purposes." 6 Coulter, J., in Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 7 says, very forcibly: "I think the common mind has everywhere taken in the understanding that taxes are a public imposition, levied by au- thority of the government for the purpose of carrying on the gov- ernment in all its machinery and operations that they are imposed for a public purpose." We have established, we think, beyond cavil that there can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose. It may not be easy to draw the line in all cases so as to decide what is a public purpose in this sense and what is not. B 4 Wheaton, 431. York, 11 Johnson, 77; Camden v. e Cooley on Constitutional Limi- Allen, 2 Butcher, 398; Sharpless v. tations, 479. Mayor of Philadelphia, supra; 7 13 Pennsylvania State, 104; see Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa, 47; also Pray v. Northern Liberties, Whiting v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis- 31 Id., 69; Matter of Mayor of New consin, 188. SPRINGER v. UNITED STATES. 85 It is undoubtedly the duty of the legislature which imposes' or authorizes municipalities to impose a tax to see that it is not to be used for purposes of private interest instead of a public use, and the courts can only be justified in interposing when a violation of this principle is clear and the reason for interference cogent. And in deciding whether, in the given case, the object for which the taxes are assessed falls upon the one side or the other of this line, they must be governed mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes have been customarily and by long course of legislation levied, what objects or purposes have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the government, whether State or municipal. Whatever lawfully pertains to this, and is sanctioned by time and the acqui- escence of the people, may well be held to belong to the public use, and proper for the maintenance of good government, though this may not be the only criterion of rightful taxation. But in the case before us, in which the towns are authorized 1 ^ to contribute aid by way of taxation to any class of manufacturers, ' there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public pur- pose as we have been considering. If it be said that a benefit results to the local public of a town by establishing manufactures, the same may be said of any other business or pursuit which em- ploys capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic, the inn- keeper, the banker, the builder, the steamboat owner are equally promoters of the public good, and equally deserving the aid of the citizens by forced contributions. No line can be drawn in favor of the manufacturer which would not open the coffers of the pub- lic treasury to the importunities of two-thirds of the business men of the city or town. ... Judgment affirmed. [Ms. JUSTICE CLIFFOKD delivered a dissenting opinion.] SPRINGER v. UNITED STATES. 102 U. S., 586. Decided 1880. [Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the South- ern District of Illinois. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.] MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court. 86 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The central and controlling question in this case is whether the tax which was levied on the income, gains, and profits of the plaint- iff in error, as set forth in the record, and by pretended virtue of the acts of Congress and parts of acts therein mentioned, is a direct tax. . . . If it was, not having been laid according to the requirements of the Constitution,, it must be admitted that the laws imposing it, and the proceedings taken under them by the assessor and collector for its imposition and collection, were all void. Many of the provisions of the Articles of Confederation of 1777 were embodied in the existing organic law. They provided for a common treasury and the mode of supplying it with funds. The latter was by requisitions upon the several States. The delays and difficulties in procuring the compliance of the States, it is known, was one of the causes that led to the adoption of the present Con- stitution. This clause of the articles throws no light on the ques- tion we are called upon to consider. Nor does the journal of the proceedings of the constitutional convention of 1787 contain any- thing of much value relating to the subject. It appears that on the llth of July, in that year, there was a debate of some warmth involving the topic of slavery. On the day following, Gouverneur Morris, of New York, submitted a propo- sition "that taxation shall be in proportion to representation." It is further recorded in this day's proceedings, that Mr. Morris hav- ing so varied his motion by inserting the word "direct," it passed nem. con., as follows: "Provided always, that direct taxes ought to be proportioned to representation." 2 Madison Papers, by Gil- pin, pp. 1079-1081. On the 24th of the same month, Mr. Morris said that "he hoped the committee would strike out the whole clause. . . . He had only meant it as a bridge to assist us over a gulf; having passed the gulf, the bridge may be removed. He thought the principle laid down with so much strictness liable to strong objec- tions." Id. 1197. The gulf was the share of representation claimed by the Southern States on account of their slave popula- tion. But the bridge remained. The builder could not remove it, much as he desired to do so. All parties seem thereafter to have avoided the subject. With one or two immaterial exceptions, not necessary to be noted, it does not appear that it was again ad- verted to in any way. It was silently incorporated into the draft of the Constitution as that instrument was finally adopted. It does not appear that an attempt was made by any one to define the exact meaning of the language employed. SPRINGER v. UNITED STATES. 87 In the twenty-first number of the Federalist, Alexander Ham- ilton, speaking of taxes generally, said: "Those of the direct kind, which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule of apportionment. Either the value of the land, or the number of the people, may serve as a standard." The thirty-sixth number of that work, by the same author, is devoted to the subject of internal taxes. It is there said, "They may be subdivided into those of the direct and those of the indirect kind." In this con- nection land-taxes and poll-taxes are discussed. The former are commended and the latter are condemned. Nothing is said of any other direct tax. In neither case is there a definition given or at- tempted of the phrase, "direct tax." The very elaborate researches of the plaintiff in error have fur- nished us with nothing from the debates of the State conventions, by whom the Constitution was adopted, which gives us any aid. Hence we may safely assume that no such material exists in that direction, though it is known that Virginia proposed to Congress an amendment relating to the subject, and that Massachusetts, South Carolina, New York, and North Carolina expressed strong disapprobation of the power given to impose such burdens. 1 Tucker's Blackstone, pt. 1, app., 235. Perhaps the two most authoritative persons in the convention touching the Constitution were Hamilton and Madison. The lat- ter, in a letter of May 11, 1794, speaking of the tax which was adjudicated upon in Hylton v. United States (3 Dall., 171), said, "The tax on carriages succeeded in spite of the Constitution by a majority of twenty, the advocates of the principle being reinforced by the adversaries of luxury." 2 Mad. Writings (pub. by Con- gress), p. 14. In another letter, of the 7th of February, 1796, re- ferring to the case of Hylton v. United States, then pending, he remarked: "There never was a question on which my mind was better satisfied, and yet I have very little expectation that it will be viewed in the same light by the court that it is by me." Id., 77. Whence the despondency thus expressed is unexplained. Hamilton left behind him a series o'f legal briefs, and among them one entitled "Carriage tax." See vol. vii., p. 848, of his works. This paper was evidently prepared with a view to the Hylton case, in which he appeared as one of the counsel for the United States. In it he says: "What is the distinction between direct and indirect taxes? It is a matter of regret that terms so uncertain and vague in so important a point are to be found in the Constitution. We shall seek in vain for any antecedent set- tled legal meaning to the respective terms. There is none. We 88 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. shall be as much at a loss to find any disposition of either which can satisfactorily determine the point." There being many car- riages in some of the States, and very few in others, he points out the preposterous consequences if such a tax be laid and collected on the principle of apportionment instead of the rule of uniformity. He insists that if the tax there in question was a direct tax, so would be a tax on ships, according to their tonnage. He suggests that the boundary line between direct and indirect taxes be set- tled by "a species of arbitration," and that direct taxes be held to be only "capitation or poll taxes, arid taxes on lands and buildings, and general assessments, whether on the whole property of indi- viduals or on their whole real or personal estate. All else must, of necessity, be considered as indirect taxes." The tax here in question falls within neither of these categories. It is not a tax on the "whole . . . personal estate" of the in- dividual, but only on his income, gains, and profits during 'a year, which may have been but a small part of his personal estate, and in most cases would have been so. This classification lends no sup- port to the argument of the plaintiff in error. The Constitution went into operation on the 4th of March, 1789. It is important to look into the legislation of Congress touching the subject since that time. The following summary will suffice for our purpose. We shall refer to the several acts of Congress to be examined, according to their sequence in dates. In all of them the aggregate amount required to be collected was apportioned among the several States. The act of July 14, 1798, c. 75, 1 Stat. 53. This act imposed a tax upon real estate and a capitation tax upon slaves. The act of Aug. 2, 1813, c. 37, 3 Id. 53. By this act the tax was imposed upon real estate and slaves, according to their respect- ive values in money. The act of Jan. 19, 1815, c. 21, Id. 164. This act imposed the tax upon the same descriptions of property, and in like manner as the preceding act. The act of Feb. 27, 1815, c. 60, Id. 216, applied to the District of Columbia the provisions of the act of Jan. 19, 1815. The act of March 5, 1816, c. 24, Id. 255, repealed the two pre- ceding acts, and re-enacted their provisions to enforce the collec- tion of the smaller amount of tax thereby prescribed. The act of Aug. 5, 1861, c. 45, 12 Id. 294, required the tax to be levied wholly on real estate. The act of June 7, 1862, c. 98, Id. 422, and the act of Feb. 6, 1863, c. 21, Id. 640, both relate only to the collection, in insurrec- SPRINGER v. UNITED STATES. 89 tionary districts, of the direct tax imposed by the act of Aug. 5, 1861, and need not, therefore, be more particularly noticed. It will thus be seen that whenever the government has imposed a tax which it recognized as a direct tax, it has never been applied to any objects but real estate and slaves. The latter application may be accounted for upon two grounds: 1. In some of the States slaves were regarded as real estate (1 Hurd, Slavery, 239; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533); and, 2. Such an extension of the tax lessened the burden upon the real estate where slavery existed, while the result to the national treasury was the same, whether the slaves were omitted or included. The wishes of the South were, therefore, allowed to prevail. We are not aware that the question of the validity of such a tax was ever presented for adjudication. Slavery having passed away, it cannot hereafter arise. It does not appear that any tax like the one here in question was ever re- garded or treated by Congress as a direct tax. This uniform practical construction of the Constitution touching so important a point, through so long a period, by the legislative and executive departments of the government, though not conclusive, is a con- sideration of great weight. There are four adjudications by this court to be considered. They have an important, if not a conclusive, application to the case in hand. . . . [Here follows a discussion of Hylton v. United States, 3 Dallas, 171.] In Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule (7 Wall., 433), the taxes in question were upon the receipts of such companies from premiums and assessments, and upon all sums made or added, during the year, to their surplus or contin- gent funds. This court held unanimously that the taxes were not direct taxes, and that they were valid. . . . [Here follows an extract from Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wallace, 533.] In Scholey v. Eew (23 Wall., 331), the tax involved was a succession tax, im- posed by the acts of Congress of June 30, 1864, and July 13, 1866. It was held that the tax was not a direct tax, and that it was constitutional and valid. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Clifford, after remarking that the tax there in ques- was not a direct tax, said: "Instead of that, it is plainly an excise tax or duty, authorized by sect. 1, art. 8, of the Constitution, which vests the power in Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare." He said further: "Taxes on houses, lands, and other permanent real estate have always been deemed to be direct taxes, and capitation taxes, by the express words of the Constitution, are within the same category; but it has never 90 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. been decided that any other legal exactions for the support of the Federal government fall within the condition that unless laid in proportion to numbers the assessment is invalid." All these cases are undistinguishable in principle from the case now before us, and they are decisive against the plaintiff in error. The question, what is a direct tax, is one exclusively in Ameri- can jurisprudence. The text-writers of the country are in entire accord upon the subject. Mr. Justice Story says all taxes are usually divided into two classes, those which are direct and those which are indirect, and that "under the former denomination are included taxes on land or real property, and, under the latter, taxes on consumption." 1 Const., sect. 950. Chancellor Kent, speaking of the case of Hylton v. United States, says: "The better opinion seemed to be that the direct taxes con- templated by the Constitution were only two, viz., a capitation or poll tax and a tax on land." 1 Com., 257. See also Cooley, Taxation, p. 5, note 2; Pomeroy, Const. Law, 157; Sharswood's Blackstone, 308, note; Rawle, Const., 30; Sergeant, Const., 305. We are not aware that any writer, since Hylton v. United States was decided, has expressed a view of the subject different from that of these authors. Our conclusions are, that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes, as expressed in that in- strument, and taxes on real estate; and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error complains is within the category of an excise or duty. Pomeroy, Const. Law, 177; Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, and Scholey v. Kew, supra. Against the considerations, in one scale, in favor of these propo- sitions, what has been placed in the other, as a counterpoise? Our answer is, certainly nothing of such weight, in our judgment, as to require any special reply. The numerous citations from the writings of foreign political economists, made by the plaintiff in error, are sufficiently answered by Hamilton in his brief, before referred to. Judgment affirmed. POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST CO. 91 POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY. (Rehearing.) HYDE v. CONTINENTAL TRUST COMPANY. (Rehearing.) 158 U. S., 601. Decided 1895. [This was a bill filed by Charles Pollock, a citizen of the State of Massachusetts, on behalf of himself and all other stock-holders of the defendant company similarly situated, against the Farmers' Loan -and Trust Co., a corporation of the State of New York. The bill alleged that the defendant claimed authority under the provisions of the act of Congress of August 15, 1894, to pay to the United States a tax of two per centum on the net profits of said company, including the income derived from real estate and bonds of the City of New York owned by it. The bill further alleged that such a tax was unconstitutional, null, and void, in that it was a direct tax with respect to the income from real estate, and in that the income from stocks and bonds of the States of the United States and counties and municipalities therein is not subject to the taxing power of Congress. The bill prayed that the provisions known as the income tax incorporated in the act of Con- gress of August 15, 1894, might be adjudged unconstitutional, null, and void, and that the defendants might be restrained from voluntarily complying with such provisions. On April 8, 1895, the Court, one justice being absent, decided: "A tax on the rents or income of real estate is a direct tax, within the meaning of that term as used in the Constitution of the United States. "A tax upon incomes derived from the interest of bonds issued by a municipal corporation is a tax upon the power of the State and its instrumentalities to borrow money, and is consequently repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. "Upon each of the other questions argued at bar, to wit: 1. Whether the void provision as to rent and income from real estate invalidates the whole act? 2. Whether as to the income from personal property as such, the act is unconstitutional, as lay- ing direct taxes? 3. Whether any part of the tax, if not consid- ered as a direct tax, is invalid for want of uniformity on either of the grounds suggested? the Justices who heard the argument are equally divided, and, therefore, no opinion is expressed." (157 U. S., 429.) Inasmuch as the cases had not been heard by a full court, and 92 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. since the question upon which the court was equally divided still lacked authoritative determination, the appellants were granted a rehearing. The cases were re-argued before the full bench, and on May 20, 1895, the following opinion was rendered.] ME. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLEB delivered the opinion of the court. Whenever this court is required to pass upon the validity of an act of Congress as tested by the fundamental law enacted by the people, the duty imposed demands in its discharge the utmost de- liberation and care and invokes the deepest sense of responsibility. And this is especially so when the question involves the exercise of a great governmental power and brings into consideration, as vitally affected by the decision, that complex system of govern- ment so sagaciously framed to secure and perpetuate "an inde- structible union composed of indestructible States." We have, therefore, in anxious desire to omit nothing which might in any degree tend to elucidate the questions submitted, and aided by further able arguments embodying the fruits of elaborate research, carefully re-examined these cases, with the re- sult that, while our former conclusions remain unchanged, their scope must be enlarged by the acceptance of their logical conse- quences. The very nature of the constitution, as observed by Chief Justice Marshall in one of his greatest judgments, "requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those ob- jects be deducted from the nature of the objects themselves." "In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a Constitution that we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 407. As heretofore stated, the Constitution divided Federal taxation into two great classes, the class of direct taxes and the class of duties, imposts, and excises and prescribed two rules which qual- ified the grant of power as to each class. The power to lay direct taxes, apportioned among the several States in proportion to their representation in the popular branch of Congress, a representation based on population as ascertained by the census, was plenary and absolute, but to lay direct taxes without apportionment was forbidden. The power to lay duties, imposts, and excises was subject to the qualification that the im- position must be uniform throughout the United States. Our previous decision was confined to the consideration of the validity of the tax on the income from real estate and on the in- come from municipal bonds. The question thus limited, was POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST CO. 93 whether such taxation was direct or not, in the meaning of the Constitution, and the court went no further as to the tax on the incomes from real estate than to hold that it fell within the same class as the source whence the income was derived, that is, that a tax upon the realty and a tax upon the receipts therefrom were alike direct; while as to the income from municipal bonds, that could not be taxed, because of want of power to tax the source, and no reference was made to the nature of the tax being direct or indirect. We are now permitted to broaden the field of inquiry and deter- mine to which of the two great classes a tax upon a person's entire income, whether derived from rents or products or otherwise, of real estate, or from bonds, stocks or other forms of personal prop- erty, belongs; and we are unable to conclude that the enforced subtraction from the yield of all the owner's real or personal prop- erty, in the manner prescribed, is so different from a tax upon the property itself that it is not a direct but an indirect tax in the meaning of the Constitution. The words of the Constitution are to be taken in their obvious sense and to have a reasonable construction. In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall, with his usual felicity, said: "As men, whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our Constitution and the people who adopted it must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense and to have intended what they have said." 9 Wheat., 1, 188. . . . We know of no reason for holding otherwise than that the words "direct taxes" on the one hand, and "duties, imposts, and excises" on the other, were used in the Constitution in their natural and obvious sense, nor, in arriving at what those terms embrace, do we perceive any ground for enlarging them beyond, or narrowing them within, their natural and obvious import at the time the Constitution was framed and ratified. . . . [Here follows a discussion of the views of Hamilton and Madison and of the Hylton case.] What was decided in the Hylton case was, then, that a tax on carriages was an excise, and, therefore, an indirect tax. The con- tention of Mr. Madison in the House was only so far disturbed by it, that the court classified it where he himself would have held it constitutional, and he subsequently as President approved a simi- lar act. 3 Stat., 40. The contention of Mr. Hamilton in the Fed- 94 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. eralist was not disturbed by it in the least. In our judgment, the construction given to the Constitution by the authors of the Fed- eralist (the five numbers contributed by Chief Justice Jay related to the danger from foreign force and influence, and to the treaty- making power) should not and cannot be disregarded. . . . Whatever the speculative views of political economists or rev- enue reformers may be, can it be properly held that the Constitu- tion, taken in its plain and obvious sense, and with due regard to the circumstances attending the formation of the government, au- thorizes a general unapportioned tax on the products of the farm and the rents of real estate, although imposed merely because of ownership and with no possible means of escape from payment, as belonging to a totally different class from that which includes the property from whence the income proceeds? There can be only one answer, unless the constitutional restric- tion is to be treated as utterly illusory and futile, and the object of its framers defeated. We find it impossible to hold that a funda- mental requisition, deemed so important as to be enforced by two provisions, one 'affirmative and one negative, can be refined away by forced distinctions between that which gives value to property and the property itself. _iJer-can we conceive any ground why the same reasoning does not apply to capital in personalty held for the purpose of income or ordinarily yielding income, and to the income therefrom. All the real estate of the country, and all its invested personal property, are open to the direct operation of the taxing power if an appor- tionment be made according to the Constitution. The Constitu- tion does not say that no direct tax shall be laid by apportionment on any other property than land; on the contrary, it forbids all unapportioned direct taxes; and we know of no warrant for ex- cepting personal property from the exercise of the power, or any reason why an apportioned direct tax cannot be laid and assessed, as Mr. Gallatin said in his report when Secretary of the Treasury in 1812, "upon the same objects of taxation on which the direct taxes levied under the authority of the State are laid and assessed." Nor are we impressed with the argument that because in the four instances in which the power of direct taxation has been exercised, Congress did not see fit, for reasons of expediency, to levy a tax upon personalty, this amounts to such a practical con- struction of the Constitution that the power did not exist, that we must regard ourselves bound by it. We should regret to be compelled to hold the powers of the general government thus re- POLLOCK V. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST CO. 95 etricted, and certainly cannot accede to the idea that the Consti- tution has become weakened by a particular course of inaction under it. The stress of the argument is thrown, however, on the assertion that an income tax is not a property tax at all; that it is not a real estate tax, nor a crop tax, nor a bond tax; 'that it is an assess- ment upon the taxpayer on account of his money-spending power as shown by his revenue for the year preceding the assessment; that rents received, crops harvested, interest collected, have lost all connection with their origin, and although once not taxable have become transmuted in their new form into taxable subject-matter; in other words, that income is taxable irrespective of the source whence it is derived. This was the view entertained by Mr. Pitt as expressed in his celebrated speech on introducing his income-tax law of 1799, and he did not hesitate to carry it to its logical conclusion. The Eng- lish loan acts provided that the public dividends should be paid "free of all taxes and charges whatsoever;" but Mr. Pitt success- fully contended that the dividends for the purposes of the income tax were to be considered simply in relation to the recipient as so much income, and that the holder had no reason to complain. And (this, said Mr. Gladstone fifty-five years after, was the rational con- struction of the pledge. Financial Statements, 32. . . . We have unanimously held in this case that, so far as this law operates on the receipts from municipal bonds, it cannot be sus- tained, because it is a tax on the power of the States, and on their instrumentalities to borrow money, and consequently repugnant to the Constitution. But if, as contended, the interest when re- ceived has become merely money in the recipient's pocket, and taxable as such without reference to the source from which it came, the question is immaterial whether it should have been originally taxed at all or not. This was admitted by the Attorney General with characteristic candor; and it fallows that, if the revenue derived from municipal bonds cannot be taxed because the source cannot be, the same rule applies to revenue from any other source not subject to the tax; and the lack of power to levy any but an apportioned tax on real estate and personal property equally exists as to the revenue therefrom. Admitting that this act taxes the income of property irre- spective of its source, still we cannot doubt that such a tax is nec- essarily a direct tax in the meaning of the Constitution. . . . Being direct, and therefore to be laid by apportionment, is there any real difficulty in doing so? Cannot Congress, if the necessity 96 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. exist of. raising thirty, forty, or any other number of million dollars for the support of the government, in addition to the revenue from duties, imposts,, and excises, apportion the quota of each State upon the basis of the census, and thus advise it of the payment which must be made, and proceed to assess that amount on all the real or personal property and the income of all persons in the State, and collect the same if the State does not in the meantime assume and pay its quota and collect the amount according to i-ts own system and in its own way? Cannot Congress do this as respects either or all these subjects of taxation, and deal with each in such man- ner as might be deemed expedient, as indeed was done in the act of July 14, 1798 (C., 75, 1 Stat., 597)? Inconveniences might possibly attend the levy of an income tax, notwithstanding the listing of receipts, when adjusted, furnishes its own valuation; but that it is apportionable is hardly denied, although it is asserted that it would operate so unequally as to be undesirable. In the disposition of the inquiry whether a general unappor- tioned tax on the income of real and personal property can be sus- tained, under the Constitution, it is apparent that the suggestion that 'the result of compliance with the fundamental law would lead to the abandonment of that method of taxation altogether, because of the inequalities alleged to necessarily accompany its pursuit could not be allowed to influence the conclusion; but the suggestion not unnaturally invites attention to the contention of appeHants' counsel, that the want of uniformity and equality in this act is such as to invalidate it. Figures drawn from the census are given, showing that enormous assets of mutual insurance com- panies; of building associations; of mutual savings banks; large productive property of ecclesiastical oragnizations; are exempted, and it is claimed that the exemptions reach so many hundred millions that the rate of taxation would perhaps have been reduced one-half, if they had not been made. We are not dealing with the act from that point of view; but, assuming the data to be sub- stantially reliable, if the sum desired to be raised had been appor- tioned, it may be doubted whether any State, which paid its quota and collected the amount by its own methods, would, or could under its Constitution, have allowed a large part of the property alluded to to escape taxation. If so, a better measure of equality would have been attained than would be otherwise possible, since, "according to the argument for the government, the rule of equality is not prescribed by the Constitution as to Federal taxation, and the observance of such a rule as inherent in all just taxation is purely a matter of legislative discretion. POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST CO. 97 Elaborate argument is made as to the efficacy and merits of an income tax in general, as on the one hand, equal and just, and on the other, elastic and certain; not that it is not open to abuse by such deductions and exemptions ds might make taxation under it so wanting in uniformity and equality as in substance to amount to deprivation of property without due process of law; not that it is not open to fraud and evasion and is inquisitorial in its methods; but because it is pre-eminently a tax upon the rich, and enables the burden of taxes on consumption and of duties on imports to be sensibly diminished. And it is said that the United States, as "the representative of an indivisible nationality, as a political sov- ereign equal in authority to any other on the face of the globe, to all emergencies, foreign or domestic, and having at its command for offense and defense and for all governmental purposes all the resources of the nation," would be "but a maimed and crippled creation after all," unless it possesses the power to lay a tax on the income of real and personal property throughout the United States without apportionment. The power to tax real and personal property and the income from both, there being an apportionment, is conceded; that such a tax is a direct tax in the meaning of the Constitution has not been, and, in our judgment, cannot be successfully denied; and yet we are thus invited to hesitate in the enforcement of the mandate of the Constitution which prohibits Congress from laying a direct tax on the revenue from property of .the citizen without regard to State lines, and in such manner that the States cannot intervene by payment in regulation of their own resources, lest a govern- ment of delegated powers should be found to be, not less powerful, but less absolute, than the imagination of the advocate had sup- posed. We are not here concerned with the question whether an income tax be or be not desirable, nor whether such a tax would enable the government to diminish taxes on consumption and duties on imports and to enter upon what may be believed to be a reform of its fiscal and commercial system. Questions of that character belong to the controversies of political parties, and cannot be set- tled by judicial decision. In these cases our province is to deter- mine whether this income tax on the revenue from property does or does not belong to the class of direct taxes. If it does, it is, being unapportioned, in violation of the Constitution, and we must so declare. . . . We have considered the act only in respect of the tax on income 7 98 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. derived from real estate, and from invested personal property, and have not commented on so much of it as bears on gains or profits from business, privileges, or employments, in view of the instances in which taxation on business, privileges, or employments has as- sumed the guise of an excise tax and been sustained as such. Being of opinion that so much of the sections of this law as lays a tax on income from real and personal property is invalid, we are brought to the question of the effect of that conclusion upon these sections as a whole. It is elementary that the same statute may be in part constitu- tional and in part unconstitutional, and if the parts are wholly in- dependent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. And in the case before us there is no question as to the validity of this act, ex- cept sections twenty-seven to (thirty-seven, inclusive, which relate to the subject which has been under discussion; and as to them we think that the rule laid down by Chief Justice Shaw in Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84, is applicable, that if the different parts "are so mutually connected with and dependent on each other, as conditions, considerations, or compensations for each other, as to warrant the belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that, if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, and some paTts^arejm- eonstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, condi- tional or connected, must fall with them." Or, as the point is put by Mr. Justice Matthews in Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S., 270, 304: "It is undoubtedly true that there may be cases where one part of a statute may be enforced as constitutional, and an- other be declared inoperative and void, because unconstitutional; but these are cases where the parts are so distinctly separable that each can stand alone, and where the court is able to see, and to declare, that the intention of the legislature, was that the part pronounced valid should be enforcable, even though the other part should fail. To hold otherwise would be to substitute, for the law intended by the legislature, one they may never have been willing by itself to enact." And again, as stated by the same emi- nent judge in Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S., 90, 95, where it was urged that certain illegal exceptions in a section of a statute might be disregarded, but that the rest could stand: "The insuper- able difficulty with the application of that principle of construction to the present instance is, that by rejecting the exceptions intended by the legislature of Georgia the statute is made to enact what POLLOCK v. FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST CO. 99 confessedly the legislature never meant. It confers upon the stat- ute a positive operation beyond the legislative intent, and beyond what any one can say it would have enacted in view of the illegality of the exceptions." According to the census, the true valuation of real and per- sonal property in the United States in 1890 was $65,037,091,197, of which real estate with improvements thereon made up $39,- 544,544,333. Of course, from the latter must be deducted, in ap- plying these sections, all unproductive property and all property whose net yield does not exceed four thousand dollars; but, even with such deductions, it is evident that the income from realty formed a vital part of the scheme for taxation embodied therein. If that be stricken out, and also the income from all invested personal property, bonds, stocks, investments of all kinds, it is obvious that by far the largest part of the anticipated revenue would be eliminated, 'and this would leave the burden of the tax to be borne by professions, trades, employ ments, or vocations; and in that way what was intended as a tax on capital would remain in substance a tax on occupations and labor. We cannot believe that such was the intention of Congress. We do not mean to say that such an act laying by apportionment a direct tax on all real estate and personal property, or the income thereof, might not also lay excise taxes on business, privileges, employments, and vocations. But this is not such an act; and the scheme must be considered as a whole. Being invalid as to the greater part, and falling, as the tax would, if any part were held valid, in a direction which could not have been contemplated except in connection with the taxation considered as an entirety, we are constrained to conclude that sections twenty-seven to thirty-seven, inclusive, of the act which became a law without the signature of the President on August 28, 1894, are wholly inoperative and void. Our conclusions may, therefore, be summed up as follows: First. We adhere to the opinion already announced, that, taxes on real estate being indisputably direct taxes, taxes on the rents or incomes of real estate are equally direct taxes. Second. We are of opinion that taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal property, are likewise direct taxes. Third. The tax imposed by sections twenty-seven to thirty- seven, inclusive, of the act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income of real estate and of personal property, being a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution, and, therefore, unconstitutional and void because not apportioned according to representation, all 100 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. those sections, constituting one entire scheme of taxation, are nec- essarily invalid. The decrees hereinbefore entered in this court will be vacated; the decrees below will be reversed, and the cases remanded, with instructions to grant the relief prayed. [Dissenting opinions were delivered by JUSTICES HABLAN, BEOWN, JACKSON, and WHITE.] III. MONEY. CRAIG ET AL. v. THE STATE OF MISSOURI. 4 Peters, 410. Decided 1830. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. . . . MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, Justices Thompson, Johnson, and McLean dissenting. This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered in the court of last resort, in the State of Missouri, affirming a judgment ob- tained by the State in one of its inferior courts, against Hiram Craig and others, on a promissory note. . . . The declaration is on a promissory note, dated on the first day of August, 1822, promising to pay to the State of Missouri, on the 1st day of November, 1822, at the loan office in Chariton, the sum of $199.99, and the two per cent, per annum, the interest ac- cruing on the certificates borrowed from the 1st of October, 1821. This note is obviously given for certificates loaned under the act, "for the establishment of loan offices." That act directs that loans on personal security shall be made of sums less than $200. This note is for $199.99. The act directs that the certificates issued by the State shall carry two per cent, interest from the date, which interest shall be calculated in the amount of the loan. The note promises to repay the sum with the two per cent, interest accruing on the certificates borrowed from the 1st day of October, 1821. It cannot be doubted that the declaration is on a note given in pursuance of the act which has been mentioned. Neither can it be doubted that the plea of non-assumpsit al- lowed the defendants to draw into question at the trial the validity of the consideration on which the note was given. Everything which disaffirms the contract, everything which shows it to be void, may be given in evidence on the general issue in an action of assumpsit. The defendants, therefore, were at liberty to question the validity of the consideration which was the foundation of the contract, and the constitutionality of the law in which it orig- inated. . . . 101 102 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. This brings us to the great question in the cause: Is the act of the legislature of Missouri repugnant to the constitution of the United States? The counsel for the plaintiffs in error maintain that it is re- pugnant to the constitution, because its object is the emission of bills of credit, contrary to the express prohibition contained in the tenth section of the first article. The act under the authority of which the certificates loaned to the plaintiffs in error were issued, was passed on the 26th of June, 1821, and is entitled "an act for the establishment of loan- offices/' The provisions that are material to the present inquiry are comprehended in the third, thirteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, twenty-third, and twenty-fourth sections of the act, which are in these words: Section the third enacts, "that the auditor of public accounts and treasurer, under the direction of the governor, shall, and they are hereby required to issue certificates, signed by the said auditor and treasurer, to the amount of $200,000, of denominations not exceeding ten dollars, nor less than fifty cents, (to bear such devices as they may deem the most safe,) in the following form, to wit: 'This certificate shall be receivable at the treasury, or any of the loan-offices of the State of Missouri, in the discharge of taxes or debts due to the State, for the sum of $ , with interest for the same, at the rate of two per centum per annum from this date, the day of , 182.' " The thirteenth section declares, "that the certificates of the said loan-offices shall be receivable at the treasury of the State, and by all tax-gatherers and other public officers, in payment of taxes or other moneys now due to the State, or to any county or town therein, and the said certificates shall also be received by all officers, civil and military, in the State, in the discharge of sala- ries and fees of office." The fifteenth section provides, "that the commissioners of the said loan-offices shall have power to make loans of the said cer- tificates, to citizens of this State,. residing within their respective districts only, and in each district a proportion shall be loaned to the citizens of each county therein, according to the number thereof," &c. Section sixteenth. "That the said commissioners of each of the said offices are further authorized to make loans on personal securities, by them deemed good and sufficient, for sums less than two hundred dollars; which securities shall be jointly and sever- CRAIG ET AL. v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 103 ally bound for the payment of the amount so loaned, with interest thereon," &c. Section twenty-third. "That the general assembly shall, as soon as may be, cause the salt springs and lands attached thereto, given by congress to this State, to be leased out; and it shall always be the fundamental condition in such leases, that the lessee or lessees shall receive the certificates hereby required to be issued, in payment for salt, at a price not exceeding that which may be prescribed by law; and all the proceeds of the said salt springs, the interest accruing to the State, and all estates purchased by officers of the said several offices, under the provisions of this act, and all the debts now due or hereafter to be due to this State, are hereby pledged and constituted a fund for the redemption of the certifi- cates hereby required to be issued, and the faith of the State is hereby also pledged for the same purpose." Section twenty-fourth. "That it shall be the duty of the said auditor and treasurer to withdraw annually from circulation, one- tenth part of the certificates which are hereby required to be issued," &c. The clause in the constitution which this act is supposed to violate is in these words: "No State shall . . . emit bills of credit." What is a bill of credit? What did the constitution mean to forbid? In its enlarged, and perhaps its literal sense, the term "bill of credit" may comprehend any instrument by which a State engages to pay money at a future day; thus including a certificate given for money borrowed. But the language of the constitution itself, and the mischief to be prevented, which we know from the history of our country, equally limits the interpretation of the terms. The word "emit" is never employed in describing those contracts by which a State binds itself to pay money at a future day for services actually received, or for money borrowed for present use; nor are instruments executed for such purposes, in common lan- guage, denominated "bills of credit." To "emit bills of credit," conveys to the mind the Jdea of issuing paper intended to circulate through the community for its ordinary purposes, as money, which paper is redeemable at a future day. This is the sense in which the terms have been always understood. At a very early period of our colonial history, the attempt to supply the want of the precious metals by a paper medium was made to a considerable extent; and the bills emitted for this pur- pose have been frequently denominated bills of credit. During 104 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. the war of our Kevolution, we were driven to this expedient; and necessity compelled us to use it to a most fearful extent. The term has acquired an appropriate meaning; and "bills of credit" signify a paper medium, intended to circulate between individuals, and between government and individuals, for the ordinary pur- poses of society. Such a medium has been always liable to con- siderable fluctuation. Its value is continually changing; and these changes, often great and sudden, expose individuals to immense loss, are the sources of ruinous speculations, and destroy all confi- dence between man and man. To cut up this mischief by the roots, a mischief which was felt through the United States, and which deeply affected the interest and prosperity of all, the people declared in their constitution, that no State should emit bills of credit. If the prohibition means anything, if the words are not empty sounds, it must comprehend the emission of any paper medium, by a State government, for the purpose of common cir- culation. What is the character of the certificates issued by authority of the act under consideration? What office are they to perform? Certificates signed by the auditor and treasurer of the State, are to be issued by those officers to the amount of two hundred thou- sand dollars, of denominations not exceeding ten dollars, nor less than fifty cents. The paper purports on its face to be receivable at the treasury, or at any loan office of the State of Missouri, in discharge of taxes or debts due to the State. The law makes them receivable in discharge of all taxes, or debts due to the State, or any county or town therein; and of all salaries and fees of office, to all officers civil and military within the State; and for salt sold by the lessees of the public salt works. It also pledges the faith and funds of the State for their re- demption. It seems impossible to doubt the intention of the legislature in passing this act, or to mistake the character of these certificates, or the office they were to perform. The denominations of the bills, from ten dollars to fifty cents, fitted them for the purpose of or- dinary circulation; and their reception in payment of taxes, and debts to the government and to corporations, and of salaries and fees, would give them currency. They were to be put into circu- lation; that is, emitted by the government. In addition to all these evidences of an intention to make these certificates the or- dinary circulating medium of the country, the law speaks of them in this character; and directs the auditor and treasurer to with- draw annually one-tenth of them from circulation. Had they CRAIG ET AL. V. STATE OF M1SSOUKI. 105 been termed "bills of credit," instead of "certificates," nothing would have been wanting to bring them within the prohibitory words of the constitution. And can this make any real difference? Is the proposition to be maintained, that the constitution meant to prohibit names and not things? That a very important act, big with great and ruin- ous mischief, which is expressly forbidden by words most appropri- ate for its description, may be performed by the substitution of a name? That the constitution, in one of its most important pro- visions, may be openly evaded by giving a new name to an old thing? We cannot think so. We think the certificates emitted under the authority of this act are as entirely bills of credit as if they had been so denominated in the act itself. But it is contended, that though these certificates should be deemed bills of credit, according to the common acceptation of the term, they are not so in the sense of the constitution; because they are not made a legal tender. The constitution itself furnishes no countenance to this distinc- tion. The prohibition is general. It extends to all bills of credit, not to bills of a particular description. That tribunal must be bold, indeed, which, without the aid of other explanatory words, " could venture on this construction. It is the less admissible in this case, because the same clause of the constitution contains a substantive prohibition to the enactment of tender laws. The constitution, therefore, considers the emission of bills of credit, and the enactment of tender laws, as distinct operations, inde- pendent of each other, which may be separately performed. Both are forbidden. To sustain the one, because it is not also the other; to gay that bills of credit may be emitted, if -they be not made a tender in payment of debts, is, in effect, to expunge that distinct independent prohibition, and to read the clause as if it had been entirely omitted. We are not at liberty to do this. The history of paper money has been referred to, for the pur- pose of showing that its great mischief consists in being made a tender; and that therefore the general words of the constitution may be restrained to a particular intent. Was it even true, that the evils of paper money resulted solely from the quality of its being made a tender, this court would not feel itself authorized to disregard the plain meaning of words, in search of a conjectural intent to which we are not conducted by the language of any part of the instrument. But we do not think that the history of our country proves either, that being made a tender in payment of debts is an essential quality of bills 106 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of credit, or the only mischief resulting from them. It may, indeed, be the most pernicious; but that will not authorize a court to convert a general into a particular prohibition. We learn from Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts, vol. i., p. 402, that bilk of credit were emitted for the first time in that colony in 1690. An army returning unexpectedly from an expedi- tion against Canada, which had proved as disastrous as the plan was magnificent, found the government totally unprepared to meet their claims. Bills of credit were resorted to, for relief from this embarrassment. They do not appear to have been made a tender; but they were not on that account the less bills of credit, nor were they absolutely harmless. The emission, however, not being considerable, and the bills being soon redeemed, the experi- ment would have been productive of not much mischief, had it not been followed by repeated emissions to a much larger amount. The subsequent history of Massachusetts abounds with proofs of the evils with which paper money is fraught, whether it be or be not a legal tender. Paper money was also issued in other colonies, both in the North and South and whether made a tender or not, was productive of evils in proportion to the quantity emitted. In the war which commenced in America in 1755, Virginia issued paper money at several successive sessions, under the appellation of treasury notes. This was made a tender. Emissions were afterwards made in 1769. in 1771, and in 1773. These were not made a tender; but they circulated together; were equally bills of credit; and were pro- ductive of the same effects. In 1775 a considerable emission was made for the purposes of the war. The bills were declared to be current but were not made a tender. In 1776 an additional emis- sion was made, and the bills were declared to be a tender. The bills of 1775 and 1776 circulated together; were equally bills of credit; and were productive of the same consequences. Congress emitted bills of credit to a large amount; and did not, perhaps could not, make them a legal tender. This power resided in the States. In May, 1777, the legislature of Virginia passed an act for the first time making the bills of credit issued under the authority of congress- a tender so far as to extinguish interest. It was not until March, 1781, that Virginia passed an act making all the bills of credit which had been emitted by congress, and all of which had been emitted by the State, a legal tender in payment of debts. Yet they were in every sense of the word bills of credit, previous to that time; and were productive of all the consequences of paper money. We cannot then assent to the proposition, that CRAIG ET AL. v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 107 the history of our country furnishes any just argument in favor of that restricted construction of the constitution, for which the counsel for the defendant in error contends. The certificates for which this note was given, being in truth "bills of credit" in the sense of the constitution, we are brought to the inquiry: Is the note valid of which they form the con- sideration? It has been long settled, that a promise made in consideration of an act which is forbidden by law is void. It will not be ques- tioned, that an act forbidden by the constitution of the United States, which is the supreme law, is against law. Now the consti- tution forbids a State to "emit bills of credit." The loan of these certificates is the very act which is forbid<}en. It is not the mak- ing of them while they lie in the loan offices; but the issuing of them, the putting them into circulation, which is the act of emission, the act that is forbidden by the constitution. The con- sideration of this note is the emission of bills of credit by the State. The very act which constitutes the consideration, is the act of emitting bills of credit, in the mode prescribed by the law of Missouri; which act is prohibited by the constitution of the United States. Cases which we cannot distinguish from this in principle have been decided in state courts of great respectability; and in this court. . . . [Here follow statements of Springfield Bank v. Merrick et al., 14 Mass. Eep., 322; Hunt v. Knickerbocker, 5 Johns., 327, and Patton v. Nicholson, 3 Wheaton, 204.] A majority of the court feels constrained to say that the consid- eration on which the note in this case was given, is against the highest law of the land, and that the note itself is utterly void. In rendering judgment for the plaintiff, the court for the State of Missouri decided in favor of the validity of a law which is repugnant to the constitution of the United States. In the argument, we have been reminded by one side of the dignity of a sovereign State, of the humiliation of her submitting herself to this tribunal, of the dangers which may result from inflicting a wound on that dignity; by the other, of the still superior dignity of the people of the United States, who have spoken their will in terms which we cannot misunderstand. To these admonitions, we can only answer: that if the exercise of that jurisdiction which has been imposed upon us by the con- stitution and laws of the United States, shall be calculated to bring on those dangers which have been indicated; or if it shall be in- dispensable to the preservation of the Union, and consequently 108 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of the independence and liberty of these States; these are con- siderations which address themselves to those departments which may with perfect propriety be influenced by them. This depart- ment can listen only to the mandates of law, and can tread only that path which is marked out by duty. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri for the first judicial district is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to enter judgment for the defendants. [JUSTICES JOHNSON, THOMPSON, and McLEAN delivered dis- senting opinions.] JOHN BEISCOE AND OTHEKS v. THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTORS OF THE BANK OF THE COMMON- WEALTH OF KENTUCKY. 11 Peters, 257. Decided 1837. The case is stated in the opinion of the court. -. . . J., delivered the opinion of the court. This case is brought before this court, by a writ of error from the court of appeals of the State of Kentucky, under the 25th section of the Judiciary act of 1789. 1 An action was commenced by the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, against the plaintiffs in error, in the Mercer Circuit Court of Kentucky, on a note for $2,048.37, payable to the president and directors of the bank; and the defendants filed two special pleas, in the first of which oyer was prayed of the note on which suit was brought, and they say that the plaint- iff ought not to have, &c., because the note was given on the renewal of a like note, given to the said bank; and they refer to the act establishing the bank, and allege that it never received any part of the capital stock specified in the act; that the bank was authorized to issue bills of credit, on the faith of the State, in violation of the constitution of the United States. That, by various statutes, the notes issued were made receivable in dis- charge of executions, and if not so received, the collection of the money should be delayed, &c.; and the defendants aver that the note was given to the bank on a loan of its bills, and that the consideration, being illegal, was void. 1 1 Stat. at Large, 85. BRISCOE ET AL. v. BANK OF KENTUCKY. 109 The second plea presents, substantially, the same .facts. To both the pleas a general demurrer was filed; and the court sus- tained the demurrer, and gave judgment in favor of the bank. This judgment was removed, by appeal, to the court of appeals, which is the highest court of judicature in the State, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed; and being brought before this court by writ of error, the question is presented whether the notes issued by the bank are bills of credit, emitted by the State, in violation of the constitution of the United States. This cause is approached, under a full sense of its magnitude. Important as have been the great questions brought before this tribunal for investigation and decision, none have exceeded, if they have equaled, the importance of that which arises in this case. The amount of property involved in the principle is very large; but this amount, however great, could not give to the case the deep interest which is connected with its political aspect. . . . The definition of the terms bills of credit, as used in the con- stitution, is the first requisite in the investigation of this subject. . . . The terms bills of credit in their mercantile sense, com- prehend a great variety of evidence of debt, which circulate in a commercial country. In the early history of banks, it seems their notes were generally denominated bills of credit; but in modern times they have lost that designation; and are now called, either bank bills, or bank notes. But the inhibition of the constitution applies to bills of credit, in a more limited sense. It would be difficult to classify the bills of credit which were issued in the early history of this country. They were all designed to circulate as money, being issued under the laws of the respective colonies, but the forms were various in the different colonies, and often in the same colony. In some cases they were payable with interest, in others with- out interest. Funds arising from certain sources of taxation were pledged for their redemption, in some instances; in others they were issued without such a pledge. They were sometimes made a legal tender, at others not. In some instances, a refusal to receive them operated as a discharge of the debt; in others, a postpone- ment of it. They were sometimes payable on demand; at other times, at some future period. At all times the bills were receivable for taxes, and in payment of debts due to the public; except, perhaps, in some,instances, where they had become so depreciated as to be of little or no value. 110 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. These bills were frequently issued by committees, and sometimes by an officer of the government, or an individual designated for that purpose. The bills of credit emitted by the States, during the Revolution, and prior to the adoption of the constitution, were not very dis- similar from those which the colonies had been in the practice of issuing. There were some characteristics which were common to all these bills. They were issued by the colony or State, and on its credit. For in cases where funds were pledged, the bills were to be redeemed at a future period, and gradually as the means of redemption should accumulate. In some instances, congress guaranteed the payment of bills emitted by a State. They were, perhaps, never convertible into gold and silver, im- mediately on their emission; as they were issued to supply the pressing pecuniary wants of the government, their circulating as money was indispensable. The necessity which required their emission precluded the possibility of their immediate redemption. In the case of Craig et al. v. The State of Missouri, 4 Peters, 410, this court was called upon, for the first time, to determine what constituted a bill of credit, within the meaning of the Con- stitution. A majority of the judges in that case, in the* language of the Chief Justice, say, that "bills of credit signify a paper medium, intended to circulate between individuals, and between government and individuals, for the ordinary purposes of society." A definition so general as this would certainly embrace every description of paper which circulates as money. Two of the dissenting judges, on that occasion, gave a more defi- nite, though, perhaps, a less accurate meaning, of the terms bills of credit. By one of them it was said, "a bill of credit may, therefore, be considered a bill drawn and resting merely on the credit of the drawer, as contradistinguished from a fund constituted or pledged for the payment of the bill." And in the opinion of the other, it is said, "to constitute a bill of credit, within the meaning of the constitution, it must be issued by a State, and its circulation, as money, enforced by statutory provisions. It must contain a promise of payment by the State generally, when no fund has been appropriated to enable the holder to convert it into money. It must be circulated on the credit of the State; not that it will be paid on presentation, but that the State, at some future period, on a time fixed or resting in its own discretion, will provide for the payment." These definitions cover a large class of the bills of credit issued BRISCOE ET AL. v. BANK OF KENTUCKY. Ill and circulated as money, but there are classes which they do not embrace; and it is believed that no definition, short of a descrip- tion of each class, would be entirely free from objection; unless it be in the general terms used by the venerable and lamented chief justice. The definition, then, which does include all classes of bills of credit emitted by the colonies or States, is a paper issued by the sovereign power, containing a pledge of its faith, and designed to circulate as money. Having arrived at this point, the next inquiry in the case is whether the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth were bills of credit within the meaning of the constitution. The first section of the charter provides, that the bank shall be established in the name and behalf of the commonwealth of Kentucky, under the direction of a president and twelve directors to be chosen by joint ballot of both houses of the general assembly, &c. . . . [The second section provides for the incorporation of these persons with the usual powers.] In the third section it is declared, that the stock of the bank shall be exclusively the prop- erty of the commonwealth of Kentucky, and that no individual shall own any part of it. The fourth section authorizes the presi- dent and directors to issue notes, &c.; and in the fifth section it is declared, that the capital stock shall be $2,000,000, to be paid as follows: "All moneys hereafter paid into the treasury for the purchase of the vacant land of the commonwealth; all moneys paid into the treasury for the purchase of land wai rants; all moneys received for the sale of vacant lands west of the Tennes- see Eiver, and so much of the capital stock owned by the State in the Bank of Kentucky;" and as the treasurer of the State re- ceived these moneys from time to time, he was required to pay the same into the bank. . . . Certain limitations were im- posed on loans to individuals, and the accommodations of the bank were to be apportioned among the different counties of the State. The president was required to make a report to each session of the legislature. The notes were to be made payable in gold and silver, and were receivable in payment of taxes and other debts due to the State. All mortgages executed to the bank, gave *o it a priority. By a supplementary act it was provided that the presi- dent and directors might issue $5,000,000. In 1821, an act was passed authorizing the treasurer of the State to receive the divi- dends of the bank. The notes issued by the bank were in the usual form of bank notes, in which the Bank of the Commonwealth promised to pay CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. to the bearer on demand the sum specified on the face of the note. There is no evidence of any part of the capital having been paid into the bank; and as the pleas, to which the demurrers were filed, aver that no part of the capital was paid, the fact averred is admitted on the record. It is to be regretted that any technical point arising on the pleadings should be relied on in this case, which involves princi- ples and interests of such deep importance. Had the bank pleaded over and stated the amount actually paid into it by the State, under the charter, the ground on which it stands would have been strengthened. . . . On the part of the plaintiffs in error, it is contended, that the provisions in the constitution that "no State shall coin money," "emit bills of credit," or "make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts," are three distinct powers which are inhibited to the State; and that if the bills of the Bank of the Commonwealth were substantially made a tender, by an act of the legislature of Kentucky, it must be fatal to the action of the bank in this case. . . . But the main grounds on which the counsel for the plaintiffs rely is that the Bank of the Commonwealth, in emitting the bills in question, acted as the agent of the State; and that, conse- quently, the bills were issued by the State. That, as a State is prohibited from issuing bills of credit, it cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly. That the constitution intended to place the regulation of the currency under the control of the federal government; and that the act of Kentucky is not only in violation of the spirit of the constitution, but repugnant to its letter. These topics have been ably discussed at the bar and in a printed argument on behalf of the plaintiffs. That by the constitution the currency, so far as it is com- posed of gold and silver, is placed under the exclusive control of congress is clear; and it is contended from the inhibition on the States to emit bills of credit, that the paper medium was intended to be made subject to the same power. If this argument be cor- rect, and the position that a State cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly be a sound one, then it must fol- low, as a necessary consequence, that all banks incorporated by a State are unconstitutional. And this, in the printed argument, is earnestly maintained, though it is admitted not to be neces- sary to sustain the ground assumed for the plaintiffs. The coun- sel of the plaintiffs, who have argued the case at the bar, do not carry the argument to this extent. BRISCOE ET AL. v. BANK OF KENTUCKY. 113 This doctrine is startling, as it strikes a fatal blow against the State banks, which have a capital of near four hundred millions of dollars, and which supply almost the entire circulating medium of the country. But let us for a moment examine it dispassion- ately. The federal government is one of delegated powers. All powers not delegated to it, or inhibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people. A State cannot emit bills of credit; or, in other words, it cannot issue that description of paper to answer the purposes of money, which was denominated, before the adop- tion of the constitution, bills of credit. But a State may grant j acts of incorporation for the attainment of those objects which are /; essential to the interests of society. This power is incident toll sovereignty; and there is no limitation in the federal constitution! on its exercise by the States, in respect to the incorporation off banks. At the time the constitution was adopted, the Bank of North America, and the Massachusetts Bank, and some others, were in operation. It cannot, therefore, be supposed that the notes of these banks were intended to be inhibited by the constitution, or that they were considered as bills of credit within the meaning of that instrument. In fact, in many' of their most distinguishing char- acteristics, they were essentially different from bills of credit, in any of the various forms in which they were issued. If, then, the powers not delegated to the federal government, nor denied to the States, are retained by the States or the people, and by a fair construction of the terms bills of credit, as used in the constitution, they do not include ordinary bank notes, does it not follow that the power to incorporate banks to issue these notes may be exercised by a State? A uniform course of action, involving the right to the exercise of an important power by the State governments for half a century, and this almost without question, is no unsatisfactory evidence that the power is rightfully exercised. But this inquiry, though embraced in the printed argument, does not belong to the case, and is abandoned at the bar. A State cannot do that which the federal constitution declares it shall not do. It cannot coin money. Here is an act inhibited in terms so precise that they cannot be mistaken. They are sus- ceptible of but one construction. And it is certain that a State cannot incorporate any number of individuals, and authorize them to coin money. Such an act would be as much a violation of the constitution as if the money were coined by an officer of the State, 8 11-i CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. under its authority. The act, being prohibited, cannot be done by a State either directly or indirectly. And the same rule applies as to the emission of bills of credit by a State. The terms used here are less specific than those which relate to coinage. Whilst no one can mistake the latter, there are great differences of opinion as to the construction of the former. If the terms in each case were equally definite and were susceptible of but one construction, there could be no more difficulty in applying the rule in the one ease than in the other. The weight of the argument is admitted, that a State cannot, by any device that may be adopted, emit bills of credit. But the question arises, what is a bill of credit within the meaning of the constitution? On the answer to this must depend the constitu- tionality or unconstitutionality of the act in question. A State can act only through its agents; and it would be absurd to say that any act was not done by a State which was done by its authored agents. To constitute a bill of credit within the constitution, it must be issued by a State, on the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate as money. It must be a paper which circulates on the credit of the State; and is so Deceived and used in the ordi- nary business of life. The individual or committee who issue the bill must have the power to bind the State; they must act as agents; and of course do not incur any personal responsibility, nor impart, as individ- uals, any credit to the paper. These are the leading characteris- tics of a bill of credit, which a State cannot emit. . . . Were these notes issued by the State? Upon their face, they do not purport to be issued by the State, but by the president and directors of the bank. They promise to pay to bearer on demand the sums stated. Were they issued on the faith of the State? The notes contain no pledge of the faith of the State in any form. They purport to have been issued on the credit of the funds of the bank, and must have been so received in the community. But these funds, it is said, belonged to the State; and the prom- ise to pay on the face of the notes was made by the president and directors as agents of the State. They do not assume to act as agents, and there is no law which authorizes them to bind the State. As in, perhaps, all bank charters, they had the power to issue a certain amount of notes; but they determined the time and circumstances which should regulate these issues. When a State emits bills of credit, the amount to be issued is BRISCOE ET AL. v. BANK OP KENTUCKY. 115 fixed by law, as also for the fund out of which they are to be paid, if any fund be pledged for their redemption; and they are issued on the credit of the State, which in some form appears upon the face of the notes, or by the signature of the person who issues them. As to the funds of the Bank of the Commonwealth, they were, in part only, derived from the State. The capital, it is true, was to be paid by the State; but in making loans, the bank was re- quired to take good securities; and these constituted a fund, to which the holders of the notes could look for payment, and which could be made legally responsible. In this respect the notes of this bank were essentially different from any class of bills of credit which are believed to have been issued. The notes were not payable in gold and silver on demand, but there was a fund, and, in all probability, a sufficient fund, to redeem them. This fund was in possession of the bank, and under the control of the president and directors. But whether the fund was adequate to the redemption of the notes issued or not, is im- material to the present inquiry. It is enough that the fund ex- isted, independent of the State, and was sufficient to give some degree of credit to the paper of the bank. The question is not whether the Bank of the Commonwealth had a large capital or a small one, or whether its notes were in good credit or bad, but whether they were issued by the State, and on the faith and credit of the State. The notes were received in payment of taxes, and in discharge of all debts to the State; and this, aided by the fund arising from notes discounted, with prudent management, under favorable circumstances, might have sustained, and it is believed did sustain to a considerable extent, the credit of the bank. The notes of this bank which are still in circulation are equal in value, it is said, to specie. But there is another quality which distinguished these notes from bills of credit. Every holder of them could not only look to the funds of the bank for payment, but he had in his power the means of enforcing it. The bank could be sued; and the records of this court show that while its paper was depreciated, a suit was prosecuted to judgment against it by a depositor, and who obtained from the bank, it is admitted, the full amount of his judgment in specie. . . . [Here follows a description of bills issued by Maryland and South Carolina.] If the leading properties of the notes of the Bank of the Com- monwealth were essentially different from any of the numerous 116 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. classes of bills of credit, issued by the States or colonies; if they were not emitted by the State, nor upon its credit, but on the credit of the funds of the bank; if they were payable in gold and silver on demand, and the holder could sue the bank; and if to constitute a bill of credit, it must be issued by a State, and on the credit of the State, and the holder could not, by legal means, compel the payment of the bill, how can the character of these two descriptions of paper be considered as identical? They were both circulated as money; but in name, in form, and in sub- stance, they differ. It is insisted that the principles of this case were settled in the suit of Craig et al. v. The State of Missouri. . . . In that case the court decided that the following paper, issued under a legislative act of Missouri, was a bill of credit within the meaning of the constitution: "This certificate shall be receivable at the treasury, or any of the loan offices of the State of Missouri, in the discharge of taxes or debts due to the States, in the sum of dollars, with interest for the same, at the rate of two per cent, per annum from the date." . . . It is only necessary to compare these certificates with the notes issued by the Bank of the Commonwealth to see that no two things which have any property in common could be more unlike. They both circulated as money, and were receivable on public account; but in every other particular they were essentially dif- ferent. If to constitute a bill of credit either the form or substance of the Missouri certificate is requisite, it is clear that the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth cannot be called bills of credit. To include both papers under one designation would confound the most important distinctions, not only as to their form and sub- stance, but also as to their origin and effect. There is no principle decided by the court in the case of Craig v. The State of Missouri which at all conflicts with the views here presented. Indeed the views of the court are sustained and strengthened by contrasting the present case with that one. The State of Kentucky is the exclusive stockholder in the Bank of the Commonwealth: but does this fact change the character of the corporation? Does it make the bank identical with the State? And are the operations of the bank the operations of the State? Is the bank the mere instrument of the sovereignty to effectuate its designs; and is the State responsible for its acts? The answer to these inquiries will be given in the language of this court, used BRISCOE ET AL. v. BANK OF KENTUCKY. 117 in former adjudications. . . . [Here follow extracts from Bank of the United States v. The Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat., 904, and Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Wistar, 3 Peters, 431.] These extracts cover almost every material point raised in this investigation. They show that a State, when it becomes a stock- holder in a bank, imparts none of its attributes of sovereignty to the institution; and that this is equally the case, whether it own a whole or a part of the stock of the bank. It is admitted by the counsel for the plaintiffs that a State may become a stockholder in a bank; but they contend that it cannot become the exclusive owner of the stock. They give no rule by which the interest of a State in such an institution shall be grad- uated, nor at what point the exact limit shall be fixed. May a State own one-fourth, one-half, or three-fourths of the stock? If the proper limit be exceeded, does the charter become unconsti- tutional; and is its constitutionality restored if the State recede within the limit? The court are as much at a loss to fix the supposed constitutional boundary of this right as the counsel can possibly be. If the State must stop short of owning the entire stock, the precise point may surely be ascertained. It cannot be supposed that so important a constitutional principle as contended for exists without limitation. If a State may own a part of the stock of a bank, we know of no principle which prevents it from owning the whole. As a stockholder, in the language of this court, above cited, it can exercise no more power in the affairs of the corpora- tion than is expressly given by the incorporating act. It has no more power than any other stockholder to the same extent. This court did not consider that the character of the incorpora- tion was at all affected by the exclusive ownership of the stock by the State. And they say that the case of the Planters' Bank pre- sented stronger ground of defense than the suit against the Bank of the Commonwealth. That in the former the State of Georgia was not only a proprietor but a corporator; and that in the latter the president and directors constituted the corporate body. And yet in the case of the Planters' Bank the court decided the State could only be considered as an ordinary corporator, both as it regarded its powers and responsibilities. If these positions be correct, is there not an end to this con- troversy? If the Bank of the Commonwealth is not the State, nor the agent of the State; if it possess no more power than is given to it in the act of incorporation; and precisely the same as 118 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. if the stock were owned by private individuals, how can it be .con- tended that the notes of the bank can be called bills of credit in contradistinction from the notes of other banks? If, in becom- ing an exclusive stockholder in this bank the State imparts to it none of its attributes of sovereignty; if it holds the stock as any other stockholder would hold it, how can it be said to emit bills of credit? Is it not essential to constitute a bill of credit within the constitution that it should be emitted by a State? Under its charter the bank has no power to emit bills which have the impress of the sovereignty or which contain a pledge of its faith. It is a simple corporation, acting within the sphere of its corporate powers, and can no more transcend them than any other banking institution. The State, as a stockholder, bears the same relation to the bank as any other stockholder. The funds of the bank and its property, of every description, are held responsible for the payment of its debts, and may be reached by legal or equitable process. In this respect, it can claim no exemption under the prerogatives of the Slates. And, if in the course of its operations its notes have depreciated like the notes of other banks under the pressure of circumstances, still it must stand or fall by its charter. In this its powers are defined; and its rights, and the rights of those who give credit to it, are guar- anteed. And even an abuse of its powers, through which its credit has been impaired and the community injured, cannot be considered in this case. We are of the opinion that the act incorporating the Bank of the Commonwealth was a constitutional exercise of power by the State of Kentucky, and, consequently, that the- notes issued by the bank are not bills of credit within the meaning of the federal constitution. The judgment of the court of appeals is, therefore, affirmed, with interest and 1 costs. . . . [MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON delivered a concurring opinion, and MR. JUSTICE STORY a dissenting one.] HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 8 Wallace, 603. Decided 1870. Error to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, the case being this: On the 20th of June, 1860, a certain Mrs. Hepburn made a promissory note, by which she promised to pay to Henry Gris- HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 119 wold on the 20th of February, 1862, eleven thousand two hun- dred and fifty "dollars." At the time when the note was made, as also at the time when it fell due, there was, confessedly, no lawful money of the United States, or money which could lawfully be tendered in payment of private debts, but gold and silver coin. Five days after the day when the note by its terms fell due, that is to say, on the 25th of February, 1862, in an exigent crisis of the nation, in which the government was engaged in putting down an armed rebellion of vast magnitude, Congress passed an act authorizing the issue of $150,000,000 of its own notes, 1 and enacted in regard to them, by one clause in the first section of the act, as follows: "And such notes, herein authorized, shall be receivable in pay- ment of all taxes, internal duties, excises, debts, and demands of every kind due to the United States, except duties on imports, and of all claims and demands against the United States of every kind whatsoever, except for interest upon bonds and notes, which shall be paid in coin; and shall also be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except duties on imports and interest as aforesaid." The note given by Mrs. Hepburn not being paid at maturity, interest accrued on it. And in March, 1864, suit having been brought on the note in the Louisville Chancery Court, she ten- dered in United States notes issued under the act mentioned $12,720, the amount of principal of the note with the interest accrued to the date of tender, and some costs in satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. The tender was refused. The notes were then tendered and paid into court; and the chancellor, "resolv- ing all doubts in favor of Congress," declared the tender good and adjudged the debt, interest and costs to be satisfied accordingly. The case was then taken by Griswold to the Court of Errors of Kentucky, which reversed the chancellor's judgment, and remand- ed the case with instructions to enter a contrary judgment. From the judgment of the Court of Errors of Kentucky, the case was brought by Mrs. Hepburn here. . . % The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court. The question presented for our determination by the record in this case is, whether or not the payee or assignee of a note, made before the 25th of February, 1862, is obliged by law to i For the general form of the notes, see 7 Wallace, 26. 120 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. accept in payment United States notes, equal in nominal amount to the sum due according to its terms, when tendered by the maker or other party bound to pay it? And this requires, in the first place, a construction of that clause of the first section of the act of Congress passed on that day, which declares the United States notes, the issue of which was authorized by the statute, to be a legal tender in payment of debts. The clause has already received much consideration here, and this court has held that, upon a sound construction, neither taxes imposed by State legislation, 2 nor demands upon contracts which stipulate in terms for the delivery of coin or bullion, 3 are included by legis- lative intention under the description of debts public and private. We are now to determine whether this description embraces debts contracted before as well as after the date of the act. It is an established rule for the construction of statutes, that the terms employed by the legislature are not to receive an inter- pretation which conflicts with acknowledged principles of justice and equity, if another sense, consonant with those principles, can be given to them. But this rule cannot prevail where the intent is clear. Except in the scarcely supposable case where a statute sets at naught the plainest precepts of morality and social obliga- tion, courts must give effect to the clearly ascertained legislative intent, if not repugnant to the fundamental law ordained in the Constitution. Applying the rule just stated to the act under consideration, there appears to be strong reason for construing the word debts as having reference only to debts contracted subsequent to the enactment of the law. For no one will question that the United States notes, which the act makes a legal tender in payment, are essentially unlike in nature, and, being irredeemable in coin, are necessarily unlike in value, to the lawful money intended by par- ties to contracts for the payment of money made before its pas- sage. The lawful money then in use and made a legal tender in payment, consisted of gold and silver coin. The currency in use under the act, and declared by its terms to be lawful money and a legal tender, consists of notes or promises to pay impressed upon paper, prepared in convenient form for circulation, and protected against counterfeiting by suitable devices and penalties. The former possess intrinsic value, determined by the weight and fineness of the metal; the latter have no intrinsic value, but a purchasing value, determined by the quantity in circulation, by 2 Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wai- Bronson v. Rodes, 7 Id., 229; lace, 71. Butler v. Horwitz, Ib., 258. HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 121 general consent to its currency in payments, and by opinion as to the probability of redemption in coin. Both derive, in different degrees, a certain additional value from their adaptation to cir- culation by the form and impress given to them under national authority, and from the acts making them respectively a legal tender. Contracts for the payment of money, made before the act of 1862, had reference to coined money, and could not be discharged, unless by consent, otherwise than by tender of the sum due in coin. Every such contract, therefore, was, in legal import, a con- tract for the payment of coin. There is a well-known law of currency, that notes or promises to pay, unless made conveniently and promptly convertible into coin at the will of the holder, can never, except under unusual and abnormal conditions, be at par in circulation with coin. It is an equally well known law, that depreciation of notes must in- crease with the increase of the quantity put in circulation and the diminution of confidence in the ability or disposition to redeem. Their appreciation follows the reversal of these conditions. No act making them a legal tender can change materially the opera- tion of these laws. Their force has been strikingly exemplified in the history of the United States notes. Beginning with a very slight depreciation when first issued, in March, 1862, they sank in July, 1864, to the rate of two dollars and eighty-five cents for a dollar in gold, and then rose until recently a dollar and twenty cents in paper became equal to a gold dollar. Admitting, then, that prior contracts are within the intention of the act, and assuming that the act is warranted by the Con- stitution, it follows that the holder of a promissory note, made be- fore the act, for a thousand dollars, payable, as we have just seen, according to the law and according to the intent of the parties, in coin, was required, when depreciation reached its lowest point, to accept in payment a thousand note dollars, although with the thousand coin dollars, due under the contract, he could have pur- chased on that day two thousand eight hundred and fifty such dollars. . Every payment, since the passage of the act, of a note of earlier date, has presented similar, though less striking features. Now, it certainly needs no argument to prove that an act, com- pelling acceptance in satisfaction of any other than stipulated pay- ment, alters arbitrarily the terms of the contract, and impairs its obligation, and that the extent of impairment is in the proportion of the inequality of the payment accepted under the constraint of the law to the payment due under the contract. Nor does it 122 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. need argument to prove that the practical operation of such an act is contrary to justice and equity. It follows that no construc- tion which attributes such practical operation to an act of Congress is to be favored, or indeed to be admitted, if any other can be reconciled with the manifest intent of the legislature. What, then, is that manifest intent? Are we at liberty, upon a fair and reasonable construction of the act, to say that Con- gress meant that the word "debts" used in the act should not in- clude debts contracted prior to its passage? In the case of Bronson v. Rodes, we thought ourselves war- ranted in holding that this word, as used in the statute, does not include obligations created by express contracts for the payment of gold and silver, whether coined or in bullion. This conclusion rested, however, mainly on the terms of the act, which not only allow, but require payments in coin by or to the government, and may be fairly considered, independently of considerations belonging to the law of contracts for the delivery of specified articles, as sanc- tioning special private contracts for like payments; without which, indeed, the provisions relating to government payments could hardly have practical effect. This consideration, however, does not apply to the matter now before us. There is nothing in the terms of the act which looks to any difference in its operation on different descriptions of debts payable generally in money, that is to say, in dollars and parts of a dollar. These terms, on the contrary, in their obvious import, include equally all debts not specially expressed to be payable in gold or silver, whether arising under past contracts and already due, or arising under such con- tracts and to become due at a future day, or arising and becoming due under subsequent contracts. A strict and literal construc- tion indeed would, as suggested by Mr. Justice Story (1 Story on the Constitution, 921), in respect to the same word used in the Constitution, limit the word "debts" to debts existing; and if this construction cannot be accepted because the limitation sanctioned by it cannot be reconciled with the obvious scope and purpose of the act, it is certainly conclusive against any interpretation which will exclude existing debts from its operation. The same conclusion results from the exception of interest on loans and duties on imports from the effect of the legal tender clause. This exception affords an irresistible implication that no description of debts, whenever contracted, can be withdrawn from the effect of the act if not included within the terms or the reasonable in- tent of the exception. And it is worthy of observation in this con- nection, that in all the debates to which the act gave occasion in HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 123 Congress, no suggestion was ever made that the legal tender clause did not apply as fully to contracts made before as to contracts made after its passage. These considerations seem to us conclusive. We do not think ourselves at liberty, therefore, to say that Congress did not intend to make the notes authorized by it a legal tender in payment of debts contracted before the passage of the act. We are thus brought to the question, whether Congress has power to make notes issued under its authority a legal tender in payment of debts, which, when contracted, were payable by law in gold and silver coin. The delicacy and importance of this question has not been over- stated in the argument. This court always approaches the con- sideration of questions of this nature reluctantly; and its constant rule of decision has been, and is, that acts of Congress must be regarded as constitutional, unless clearly shown to be otherwise. But the Constitution is the fundamental law of the United States. By it the people have created a government, defined its powers, prescribed their limits, distributed them among the dif- ferent departments, and directed, in general, the manner of their exercise. No department of the government has any other powers than those thus delegated to it by the people. All the legislative power granted by the Constitution belongs to Congress; but it has no legislative power which is not thus granted. And the same ob- servation is equally true in its application to the executive and judicial powers granted respectively to the President and the courts. All these powers differ in kind, but not in source or in limitation. They all arise from the Constitution, and are limited by its terms. It is the function of the judiciary to interpret and apply the law to cases between parties as they arise for judgment. It can only declare what the law is, and enforce by proper process the law thus declared. But, in ascertaining the respective rights of parties, it frequently becomes necessary to consult the Consti- tution. For there can be no law inconsistent with the funda- mental law. No enactment not in pursuance of the authority conferred by it can create obligations or confer rights. For such is the express declaration of the Constitution itself in these words: "The Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges of every State shall 124 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." Not every act of Congress, then, is to be regarded as the su- preme law of the land; nor is it by every act of Congress that the judges are bound. This character and this force belong only to such acts as are "made in pursuance of the Constitution." When, therefore, a case arises for judicial determination, and the decision depends on the alleged inconsistency of a legislative provision with the fundamental law, it is the plain duty of the court to compare the act with the Constitution, and if the former cannot, upon a fair construction, be reconciled with the latter, to give effect to the Constitution rather than the statute. This seems so plain that it is impossible to make it plainer by argu- ment. If it be otherwise, the Constitution is not the supreme law; it is neither necessary or useful, in any case, to inquire whether or not any act of Congress was passed in pursuance of it; and the oath which every member of this court is required to ta,ke, that he "will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and the rich, and faithfully perform the duties incumbent upon him to the best of his ability and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States," be- comes an idle and unmeaning form. The case before us is one of private right. The plaintiff in the court below sought to recover of the defendants a certain sum expressed on the face of a promissory note. The defendants in- sisted on the right, under the act of February 25th, 1862, to acquit themselves of their obligation by tendering in payment a sum nom- inally equal in United States notes. But the note had been exe- cuted before the passage of the act, and the plaintiff insisted on his right under the Constitution to be paid the amount due in gold and silver. And it has not been, and cannot be, denied that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment according to his claim, unless bound by a constitutional law to accept the notes as coin. Thus two questions were directly presented: Were the defend- ants relieved by the act from the obligation assumed in the con- tract? Could the plaintiff be compelled, by a judgment of the court, to receive in payment a currency of different nature and value from that which was in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made? The Court of Appeals resolved both questions in the negative, and the defendants, in the original suit, seek the reversal of that judgment by writ of error. It becomes our duty, therefore, to determine whether the act of HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 125 February 25, 1862, so far as it makes United States notes a legal tender in payment of debts contracted prior to its passage, is constitutional and valid or otherwise. Under a deep sense of our obligation to perform this duty to the best of our ability and understanding, we shall proceed to dispose of the case presented by the record. We have already said, and it is generally, if not universally, con- ceded, that the government of the United States is one of limited powers, and that no department possesses any authority not granted by the Constitution. It is not necessary, however, in order to prove the existence of a particular authority, to show a particular and express grant. The design of the Constitution was to establish a government competent to the direction and administration of the affairs of a great nation, and, at the same time, to mark, by sufficiently definite lines, the sphere of its operations. To this end it was needful only to make express grants of general powers, coupled with a further grant of such incidental and auxiliary powers as might be required for the exercise of the powers expressly granted. These powers are neces- sarily extensive. It has been found, indeed, in the practical ad- ministration of the government, that a very large part, if not the largest part, of its functions have been performed in the exercise of powers thus implied. But the extension of power by implication was regarded with some apprehension by the wise men who framed, and by the intelli- gent citizens who adopted, the Constitution. This apprehension is manifest in the terms by which the grant of incidental and auxil- iary powers is made. All powers of this nature are included under the description of "power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers expressly granted to Congress or vested by the Constitution in the government or in any of its departments or officers." The same apprehension is equally apparent in the tenth article of the amendments, which declares that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or the people." We do not mean to say that either of these constitutional provi- sions is to be taken as restricting any exercise of power fairly war- ranted by legitimate derivation from one of the enumerated or express powers. The first was undoubtedly introduced to exclude all doubt in respect to the existence of implied powers; while the words "necessary and proper" were intended to have a "sense,", to use the words of Mr. Justice Story, "at once admonitory and 126 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. directory," and to require that the means used in the execution of an express power "should be bona fide appropriate to the end." 1 The second provision was intended to have a like admonitory and directory sense, and to restrain the limited government established under the Constitution from the exercise of powers not clearly delegated, or derived by just inference from powers so delegated. It has not been maintained in argument, nor indeed, would any one, however slightly conversant with constitutional law, think of maintaining that there is in the Constitution any express grant of legislative power to make any description of credit currency a legal tender in payment of debts. We must inquire then whether this can be done in the exercise of an implied power. The rule for determining whether a legislative enactment can be supported as an exercise of an implied power was stated by Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the whole court, in the case of McCullough v. The State of Maryland, 2 and the statement then made has ever since been accepted as a correct exposition of the Constitution. His words were these: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." And in another part of the same opinion the practical application of this rule was thus illustrated: "Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the Constitution, or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accom- plishment of objects not intrusted to the government, it would be the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the govern- ment, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial depart- ment, and tread on legislative ground." 3 It must be taken then as finally settled, so far as judicial deci- sions can settle anything, that the words "all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution" powers expressly granted or vested, have, in the Constitution, a sense equivalent to that of the words, laws, not absolutely necessary indeed, but appropriate, plainly adapted to constitutional and legitimate ends; laws not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Consti- i 2 Story on the Constitution, p. 24 Wheaton, 421. 142, 1253. 3 4 Wheaton, 423. 4 HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 127 tution; laws really calculated to effect objects intrusted to the government. The question before us, then, resolves itself into this: "Is the clause which makes United States notes a legal tender for debts contracted prior to its enactment, a law of the description stated in the rule?" It is not doubted that the power to establish a standard of value by which all other values may be measured, or, in other words, to determine what shall be lawful money and a legal tender, is in its nature, and of necessity, a governmental power. It is in all coun- tries exercised by the government. In the United States, so far as it relates to the precious metals, it is- vested in Congress by the grant of the power to coin money. But can a power to impart these qualities to notes, or promises to pay money, when offered in discharge of pre-existing debts, be derived from the coinage power, or from any other power expressly given? It is certainly not the same power as the power to coin money. Nor is it in any reasonable or satisfactory sense an appropriate or plainly adapted means to the exercise of that power. Nor is there more reason for saying that it is implied in, or incidental to, the power to regulate the value of coined money of the United States, or of foreign coins. This power of regulation is a power to determine the weight, purity, form, impression, and denomina- tion of the several coins,, and their relation to each other, and the relations of foreign coins to the monetary unit of the United States. Nor is the power to make notes a legal tender the same as the power to issue notes to be used as currency. The old Congress, under the Articles of Confederation, was clothed by express grant with the power to emit bills of credit, which are in fact notes for circulation as currency; and yet that Congress was not clothed with the power to make these bills a legal tender in payment. And this court has recently held that the Congress, under the Consti- tution, possesses, as incidental to other powers, the same power as the old Congress to emit bills or notes; but it was expressly declared at the same time that this decision concluded nothing on the question of legal tender. Indeed, we are not aware that it has ever been claimed that the power to issue bills or notes has any identity with the power to make them a legal tender. On the contrary, the whole history of the country refutes that notion. The States have always been held to possess the power to author- ize and regulate the issue of bills for circulation by banks or indi- viduals, subject, as has been lately determined, to the control of 128 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Congress, for the purpose of establishing and securing a National currency; and yet the States are expressly prohibited by the Con- stitution from making anything but gold and silver coin a legal tender. This seems decisive on the point that the power to issue notes and the power to make them a legal tender are not the same power, and that they have no necessary connection with each other. But it has been maintained in argument that the power to make United States notes a legal tender in payment of all debts is a means appropriate and plainly adapted to the execution of the power to carry on war, of the power to regulate commerce, and of the power to borrow money. If it is, and is not prohibited, nor inconsistent with the letter or spirit of the Constitution, then the act which makes them such legal tender must be held to be con- stitutional. Let us, then, first inquire whether it is an appropriate and plain- ly adapted means for carrying on war? The affirmative argument may be thus stated: Congress has power to declare and provide for carrying on war; Congress has also power to emit bills of credit, or circulating notes receivable for government dues, and payable, so far at least as parties are willing to receive them, in discharge of government obligations; it will facilitate the use of such notes in disbursements to make them a legal tender in payment of exist- ing debts; therefore Congress may make such notes a legal tender. It is difficult to say to what express power the authority to make notes a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts may not be upheld as incidental, upon the principles of this argument. Is there any power which does not involve the use of money? And is there any doubt that Congress may issue and use bills of credit as money in the execution of any power? The power to establish post-offices and post-roads, for example, involves the collection and disbursement of a great revenue. Is not the power to make notes a legal tender as clearly incidental to this power as to the war power? The answer to this question does not appear to us doubtful. The argument, therefore, seems to prove too much. It carries the doctrine of implied powers very far beyond any extent hitherto given to it. It asserts that whatever in any degree promotes an end within the scope of a general power, whether, in the correct sense of the word, appropriate or not, may be done in the exercise of an implied power. Can this proposition be maintained? It is said that this is not a question for the court deciding a HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 129 cause, but for Congress exercising the power. But the decisive answer to this is that the admission of a legislative power to de- termine finally what powers have the described relation as means to the execution of other powers plainly granted, and, then, to exercise absolutely and without liability to question, in cases in- volving private rights, the powers thus determined to have that relation, would completely change the nature of American gov- ernment. It would convert the government, which the people ordained as a government of limited powers, into a government of unlimited powers. It would confuse the boundaries which sep- arate the executive and judicial from the legislative authority. It would obliterate every criterion which this court, speaking through the venerated Chief Justice in the case already cited, established for the determination of the question whether legislative acts are constitutional or unconstitutional. Undoubtedly among means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated, the legislature has unrestricted choice. But there can be no implied power to use means not within the description. Now, then, let it be considered what has actually been done in the provision of a National currency. In July and August, 1861, and February, 1862, the issue of sixty millions of dollars in United States notes, payable on demand, was authorized. 1 They were made receivable in payments, but were not declared a legal tender until March, 1862, 2 when the amount in circulation had been greatly reduced by receipt and cancellation. In 1862 and 1863 3 the issue of four hundred and fifty millions in United States notes, payable, not on demand, but, in effect, at the convenience of the government, was authorized, subject to certain restrictions as to fifty millions. These notes were made receivable for the bonds of the National loans, for all debts due to or from the United States, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt, and were also declared a legal tender. In March, 1863, 4 the issue of notes for parts of a dollar was authorized to an amount not exceeding fifty millions of dollars. These notes were not de- clared a legal tender, but were made redeemable under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury. In February, 1863, 5 the issue of three hundred millions of dollars in notes of the National banking associations was authorized. These notes were made receivable to the same extent as United States notes, i 12 Stat. at Large, 259, 313 and s ib., 345, 532 and 7C9. 338. * Ib., 711. 2 Ib., 370. s Ib., 669. 130 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. and provision was made to secure their redemption, but they were not made a legal tender. The several descriptions of notes have since constituted, under the various acts of Congress, the common currency of the United States. The notes which were not declared a legal tender have circulated with those which were so declared without unfavorable discrimination. It may be added as a part of the history that other issues, bear- ing interest at various rates, were authorized and made a legal tender, except in redemption of bank notes, for face amount ex- clusive of interest. Such were the one and two years five per cent, notes and three years compound interest notes. 6 These notes never entered largely or permanently into the circulation; and there is no reason to think that their utility was increased or di- minished by the act which declared them a legal tender for face amount. They need not be further considered here. They serve only to illustrate the tendency remarked by all who have investi- gated the subject of paper money, to increase the volume of irre- deemable issues, and to extend indefinitely the application of the quality of legal tender. That it was carried no farther during the recent civil war, and has been carried no farther since, is due to circumstances, the consideration of which does not belong to this discussion. "We recur, then, to the question under consideration. No one questions the general constitutionality, and not very many, perhaps, the general expediency of the legislation by which a note currency has been authorized in recent years. The doubt is as to the power to declare a particular class of these notes to be a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts. The only ground upon which this power is asserted is, not that the issue of notes was an appropriate and plainly adapted means for carrying on the war, for that is admitted; but that the making of them a legal tender to the extent mentioned was such a means. Now, we have seen that of all the notes issued those not de- clared a legal tender at all constituted a very large proportion, and that they circulated freely and without discount. It may be said that their equality in circulation and credit was due to the provision made by law for the redemption of this paper in legal tender notes. But this provision, if at all useful in this respect, was of trifling importance compared with that which made them receivable for government dues. All modern history testifies 6 13 Id., 218, 425. HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 131 that, in time of war especially, when taxes are augmented, large loans negotiated, and heavy disbursements made, notes issued by the authority of the government, and made receivable for dues of the government, always obtain at first a ready circulation; and even when not redeemable in coin, on demand, are as little and usually less subject to depreciation than any other description of notes, for the redemption of which no better provision is made. And the history of the legislation under consideration is, that it was upon this quality of receivability, and not upon the quality of legal tender, that reliance for circulation was originally placed; for the receivability clause appears to have been in the original draft of the bill, while the legal tender clause seems to have been intro- duced at a later stage of its progress. These facts certainly are not without weight as evidence that all the useful purposes of the notes would have been fully answered without making them a legal tender for pre-existing debts. It is denied, indeed, by eminent writers, that the quality of legal tender adds any thing at all to the credit or usefulness of government notes. They insist, on the contrary, that it impairs both. How- ever this may be, it must be remembered that it is as a means to an end to be attained by the action of the government, that the implied power of making notes a legal tender in all payments is claimed under the Constitution. Now, how far is the government helped by this means? Certainly it cannot obtain new supplies or services at a cheaper rate, for no one will take the notes for more than they are worth at the time of the new contract. The price will rise in the ratio of the depreciation, and this is all that could hap- pen if the notes were not made a legal tender. But it may be said that the depreciation will be less to him who takes them, from the government, if the government will pledge to him its power to compel his creditors to receive them at par in payments. This is, as we have seen, by no means certain. If the quantity issued be excessive, and redemption uncertain and remote, great depre- ciation will take place; if, on the other hand, the quantiy is only adequate to the demands of business, and confidence in early re- demption is strong, the notes will circulate freely whether made a legal tender or not. But if it be admitted that some increase of availability is de- rived from making the notes a legal tender under new contracts, it by no means follows that any appreciable advantage is gained by compelling creditors to receive them in satisfaction of pre-exist- ing debts. And there is abundant evidence, that whatever benefit is possible from that compulsion to some individuals or to the 132 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. government, is far more than outweighed by the losses of property, the derangement of business, the fluctuations of currency and val- ues, and the increase of prices to the people and the government, and the long train of evils which flow from the use of irredeemable paper money. It is true that these evils are not to be attributed altogether to making it a legal tender. But this increases these evils. It certainly widens their extent and protracts their con- tinuance. We are unable to persuade ourselves that an expedient of this sort is an appropriate and plainly adapted means for the execution of the power to declare and carry on war. If it adoVs nothing to the utility of the notes, it cannot be upheld as a means to the end in furtherance of which the notes are issued. Nor can it, in our judgment, be upheld as such, if, while facilitating in some degree the circulation of the notes, it debases and injures the currency in its proper use to a much greater degree. And these considerations seem to us equally applicable to the powers to regulate commerce and to borrow money. Both powers necessarily involve the use of money by the people and by the government, but neither, as we think, carries with it as an appropriate and plainly adapted means to its exercise, the power of making circulating notes a legal tender in payment of pre-existing debts. But there is another view, which seems to us decisive, to what- ever express power the supposed implied power in question may be referred. In the rule stated by Chief Justice Marshall, the words appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated, are qualified by the limitation that the means must be not prohibited, but con- sistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Nothing so prohibited or inconsistent can be regarded as appropriate, or plainly adapted, or really calculated means to any end. Let us inquire, then, first, whether making bills of credit a legal tender, to the extent indicated, is consistent with the spirit of the Constitution. Among the great cardinal principles of that instru- ment, no one is more conspicuous or more venerable than the estab- lishment of justice. And what was intended by the establishment of justice in the minds of the people who ordained it is, happily, not a matter of disputation. It is not left to inference or conjec- ture, especially in its relations to contracts. When the Constitution was undergoing discussion in the Con- vention, the Congress of the Confederation was engaged in the consideration of the ordinance for the government of the territory northwest of the Ohio, the only territory subject at that time to its regulation and control. By this ordinance certain fundamental HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 133 articles of compact were established between the original States and the people and States of the territory, for the purpose, to use its own language, "of extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, whereon these republics" (the States united under the Confederation), "their laws and constitutions are erected." Among these fundamental principles was this: "And in the just preservation of rights and property it is understood and declared that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall in any manner whatever interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements bona fide and with- out fraud previously formed." The same principle found more condensed expression in that most valuable provision of the Constitution of the United States, ever recognized as an efficient safeguard against injustice, that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts." It is true that this prohibition is not applied in terms to the government of the United States. Congress has express power to enact bankrupt laws, and we do not say that a law made in the execution of any other express power, which, incidentally only, impairs the obligation of a contract, can be held to be unconstitu- tional for that reason. But we think it clear that those who framed and those who adopted the Constitution, intended that the spirit of this prohi- bition should pervade the entire body "of legislation, and that the justice which the Constitution^ was ordained, to .establish was not thought by them to be compatible 'with Tegisl^tion of an opposite tendency. In otter words, we cannot dotib't thai a law not made in pursuance of an express poVver^ J which necessarily and in its direct operation impairs t'he obligation of contracts, is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution? ' Another provision, found ihine fifth amendment, must be con- sidered in this connection. We refer to that which ordains that private property shall not be taken for public use without com- pensation. This provision is kindred in spirit to that which for- bids legislation impairing the obligation of contracts; but, unlike that, it is addressed directly and solely to the National govern- ment. It does not, in terms, prohibit legislation which appropri- ates the private property of one class of citizens to the use of an- other class; but if such property cannot be taken for the benefit of all, without compensation, it is difficult to understand how it can be so taken for the benefit of a part without violating the spirit of the prohibition. But there is another provision in the same amendment, which, 134 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. in our judgment, cannot have its full and intended effect unless construed as a direct prohibition of the legislation which we have been considering. It is that which declares that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." It is not doubted that all the provisions of this amendment op- erate directly in limitation and restraint of the legislative powers conferred by the Constitution. The only question is, whether an act which compels all those who hold contracts for the payment of gold and silver money to accept in payment a currency of inferior value deprives such persons of property without due process of law. It is quite clear, that whatever may be the operation of such an act, due process of law makes no part of it. Does it deprive any person of property? A very large proportion of the property of civilized men exists in the form of contracts. These contracts al- most invariably stipulate for the payment of money. And we have already seen that contracts in the United States, prior to the act under consideration, for the payment of money, were contracts to pay the sum specified in gold and silver coin. And it is beyond doubt that the holders of these contracts were and are as fully entitled to the protection of this constitutional provision as the holders of any other description of property. But it may be said that the holders of no description of property are protected by it from legislation which incidentally only im- pairs its value. And it may, he. ^ urged in illustration that the hold- ers of stock in a turnpike, a bridge, or a manufacturing corpora- tion, or an insurance, company, or a -bank, cannot invoke its pro- tection against legislation, ^ T hicn by, authorizing, similar works or corporations, reduoes.it a price in t^ie market, But all this does not appear to meet the ie,al difficulty, la -the cases mentioned the injury is purely contingent and ^incidental. In the case we are considering it is direct and inevitable. If in the cases mentioned the holders of the stock were required by law to convey it on demand to any one who should think fit to offer half its value for it, the analogy would be more obvious. No one probably could be found to contend that an act enforcing the acceptance of fifty or seventy-five acres of land in satisfaction of a contract to convey a hundred would not come within the prohi- bition against arbitrary privation of property. "VVe confess ourselves unable to perceive any solid distinction be- tween such an act and an act compelling all citizens to accept, in satisfaction of all contracts for money, half or three-quarters or any other proportion less than the whole of the value actually due, according tc their terms. It is difficult to conceive what act would HEPBURN v. GRISWOLD. 135 take private property without process of law if such an act would not. We are obliged to conclude that an act making mere promises to pay dollars a legal tender in payment of debts previously con- tracted, is not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, really cal- culated to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress; that such an act is inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution; and that it is prohibited by the Constitution. It is not surprising that amid the tumult of the late civil war, and under the influence of apprehensions for the safety of the Re- public almost universal, different views, never before entertained by American statesmen or jurists, were adopted by many. The time was not favorable to considerate reflection upon the constitu- tional limits of legislative or executive authority. If power was assumed from patriotic motives, the assumption found ready justi- fication in patriotic hearts. Many who doubted yielded their doubts; many who did not doubt were silent. Some who were strongly averse to making government notes a legal tender felt themselves constrained to acquiesce in the views of the advocates cf the measure. Not a few who then insisted upon its necessity, or acquiesced in that view, have, since the return of peace, and under the influence of the calmer time, reconsidered their conclusions, and now concur in those which we have just announced. These conclusions seem to us to be fully sanctioned by the letter and spirit of the Constitution. We are obliged, therefore, to hold that the defendant in error was not bound to receive from the plaintiffs the currency ten- dered to him in payment of their note, made before the passage of the act of February 25, 1862. It follows that the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky must be affirmed. It is proper to say that Mr. Justice Grier, who was a member of the court when this cause was decided in conference, 1 and when this opinion was directed to be read, 2 stated his judgment to be that the legal tender clause, properly construed, has no applica- tion to debts contracted prior to its enactment; but that upon the construction given to the act by the other judges he con- curred in the opinion that the clause, so far as it makes United States notes a legal tender for such debts, is not warranted by the Constitution. Judgment affirmed. [MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICES SWAYNE and DAVIS concurred.] i November 27, 1869. 2 January 29, 1870. 136 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. LEGAL TENDER CASES. KNOX v. LEE. PAEKER v. DAVIS. 12 Wallace, 457. Decided 1871. These were two suits; the first a writ of error to the Circuit Court for the Western District of Texas, the second an appeal from a decree in equity in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa- chusetts. . . . MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the court. The controlling questions in these cases are the following: Are the acts of Congress, known as* the legal tender acts, constitutional when applied to contracts made before their passage; and, sec- ondly, are they valid as applicable to debts contracted since their enactment? These questions have been elaborately argued, and they have received from the court that consideration which their great importance demands. It would be difficult to overestimate the consequences which must follow our decision. They will affect the entire business of the country, and take hold of the possible continued existence of the government. If it be held by this court that Congress has no constitutional power, under any circum- stances, or in any emergency, to make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of all debts (a power confessedly possessed by every independent sovereignty other than the United States), the government is without those means of self-preservation which, all must admit, may, in certain contingencies, become indispensable, even if they were not when the acts of Congress now called in question were enacted. It is also clear that if we hold the acts invalid as applicable to debts incurred, or transactions which have taken place since their enactment, our decision must cause, throughout the country, great business derangement, widespread distress, and the rankest injustice. The debts which have been contracted since February 25th, 1862, constitute, doubtless, by far the greatest portion of the existing indebtedness of the coun- try. They have been contracted in view of the acts of Congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender, and in reliance upon that declaration. Men have bought and sold, borrowed and lent, and assumed every variety of obligations contemplating that payment might be made with such notes. Indeed, legal tender treasury notes have become the universal measures of value. If now, by our decision, it be established that these debts and obligations can LEGAL TENDER CASES. 137 be discharged only by gold coin; if, contrary to the expectation of all parties to these contracts, legal tender notes are rendered unavailable, the government has become an instrument of the grossest injustice; all debtors are loaded with an obligation it was never contemplated they should assume; a large percentage is added to every debt, and such must become the demand for gold to satisfy contracts, that ruinous sacrifices, general distress, and bankruptcy may be expected. These consequences are too obvious to admit of question. And there is no well-founded distinction to be made between the constitutional validity of an act of Con- gress declaring treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of debts contracted after its passage and that of an act making them a legal tender for the discharge of all debts, as well those incurred before as those made after its enactment. There may be a differ- ence in the effects produced by the acts, and in the hardship of their operation, but in both cases the fundamental question, that which tests the validity of the legislation, is, can Congress consti- tutionally give to treasury notes the character and qualities of money? Can such notes be constituted a legitimate circulating medium, having a defined legal value? If they can, then such notes must be available to fulfill all contracts (not expressly ex- cepted) solvable in money, without reference to the time when the contracts were made. Hence it is not strange that those who hold the legal tender acts unconstitutional when applied to contracts made before February, 1862, find themselves compelled also to hold that the acts are invalid as to debts created after that time, and to hold that both classes of debts alike can be discharged only by gold and silver coin. The consequences of which we have spoken, serious as they are, must be accepted, if there is a clear incompatibility between the Constitution and the legal tender acts. But we are unwilling to precipitate them upon the country unless such an incompatibility plainly appears. A decent respect for a co-ordinate branch of the government demands that the judiciary should presume, until the contrary is clearly shown, that there has been no transgression of power by Congress all the members of which act under the obli- gation of an oath of fidelity to the "Constitution. Such has always been the rule. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 1 the language of the court was: "It must be remembered that, for weighty reasons, it has been assumed as a principle, in construing constitutions, by the Supreme Court of the United States, by this court, and by i 4 BInney, 123. 138 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. every other court of reputation in the United States, that an act of the legislature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the Constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable doubt;" and, in Fletcher v. Peck, 2 Chief Justice Marshall said, "It is not on slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have transcended its powers and its acts to be considered void. The opposition between the Con- stitution and the law should be such that the judge feels a clear and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other." It is incumbent, therefore, upon those who affirm the unconstitu- tionally of an act of Congress to show clearly that it is in viola- tion of the provisions of the Constitution. It is not sufficient for them that they succeed in raising a doubt. Nor can it be questioned that, when investigating the nature and extent of the powers conferred by the Constitution upon Con- gress, it is indispensable to keep in view the objects for which thoee powers were granted. This is a universal rule of construc- tion applied alike to statutes, wills, contracts, and constitutions. If the general purpose of the instrument is ascertained, the lan- guage of its provisions must be construed with reference to that purpose, and so as to subserve it. In no other way can the intent of the framers of the instrument be discovered. And there are more urgent reasons for looking to the ultimate purpose in exam- ining the powers conferred by a constitution than there are in construing a statute, a will, or a contract. We do not expect to find in a constitution minute details. It is necessarily brief and comprehensive. It prescribes outlines, leaving the filling up to be deduced from the outlines. In Martin v. Hunter, 3 it was said, "The Constitution unavoidably deals in general language. It did not suit the purpose of the people in framing this great charter of our liberties to provide for minute specifications of its powers, or to declare the means by which those powers should be carried into execution." And with singular clearness it was said by Chief Jus- tice Marshall, in McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, 4 "A con- stitution, to contain an accurate detail of all subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which it may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a political code, and would scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be 2 6 Cranch, 87. * 4 Id., 405. 3 1 Wheaton, 326. LEGAL TENDER CASES. 139 marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingre- dients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." If these are correct principles, if they are proper views of the manner in which the Constitution is to be understood, the powers conferred upon Congress must be regarded as related to each other, and all means for a common end. Each is but a part of a system, a constituent of one whole. No single power is the ultimate end for which the Constitution was adopted. It may, in a very proper sense, be treated as a means for the ac- complishment of a subordinate object, but that object is itself a means designed for an ulterior purpose. Thus the power to levy and collect taxes, to coin money and regulate its value, to raise and support armies, or to provide for and maintain a navy, are instruments for the paramount object, which was to establish a government, sovereign within its sphere, with capability of self- preservation, thereby forming a union more perfect than that which existed under the old Confederacy. The same may be asserted also of all the non-enumerated powers included in the authority expressly given "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execu- tion the specified powers vested in Congress, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." It is impossible to know what those non-enumerated powers are, and what is their nature and extent, without considering the purposes they were intended to subserve. Those purposes, it must be noted, reach beyond the mere execution of all powers definitely intrusted to Congress and mentioned in detail. They embrace the execution of all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. It certainly was intended to confer upon the government the power of self-preser- vation. Said Chief Justice Marshall, in Cohens v. The Bank of Virginia, 5 "America has chosen to be, in many respects and to many purposes, a nation, and for all these purposes her govern- ment is complete; for all these objects it is supreme. It can then, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American territory." He added, in the same case, "A constitution is framed for ages to come, and is de- signed to approach immortality as near as mortality can approach it. Its course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed to storms and tempests, and its framers must be unwise statesmen indeed, if 5 6 Wheaton, 414. 140 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. they have not provided it, as far as its nature will permit, with the means of self-preservation from the perils it is sure to en- counter." That would appear, then, to he a most unreasonable construction of the Constitution which denies to the government / created by it, the right to employ freely every means, not pro- hibited, necessary for its preservation, and for the fulfilment of j its acknowledged duties. Such a right, we hold, was given by the last clause of the eighth section of its first article. The means or instrumentalities referred to in that clause, and authorized, are not enumerated or defined. In the nature of things enumeration and specification were impossible. But they were left to the dis- cretion of Congress, subject only to the restrictions that they be not prohibited, and be necessary and proper for carrying into exe- tion the enumerated powers given to Congress, and all other powers vested in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. And here it is to be observed it is not indispensable to the existence of any power claimed for the Federal government that it can be found specified in the words of the Constitution, or clearly and directly traceable to some one of the specified powers. Its existence may be deduced fairly from more than one of the sub- stantive powers expressly defined, or from them all combined. It is allowable to group together any number of them and infer from them all that the power claimed has been conferred. Such a treatment of the Constitution is recognized by its own provisions. This is well illustrated in its language respecting the writ of habeas corpus. The power to suspend the privilege of that writ is not expressly given, nor can it be deduced from any one of the particularized grants of power. Yet it is provided that the privi- leges of the writ shall not be suspended except in certain defined contingencies. This is no express grant of power. It is a restric- tion. But it shows irresistibly that somewhere in the Constitution power to suspend the privilege of the writ was granted, either by some one or more of the specifications of power, or by them all combined. And, that important powers were understood by the people who adopted the Constitution to have been created by it, powers not enumerated, and not included incidentally in any one of those enumerated, is shown by the amendments. The -first ten of these were suggested in the conventions of the States, and pro- posed at the first session of the first Congress, before any com- plaint was made of a disposition to assume doubtful powers. The preamble to the resolution submitting them for adoption recited that the "conventions of a number of the States had, at the time LEGAL TENDER CASES. 141 of their adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further de- claratory and restrictive clauses should be added." This was the origin of the amendments, and they are significant. They tend plainly to show that, in the judgment of those who adopted the Constitution, there were powers created by it, neither expressly specified nor reducible from any one specified power, or ancillary to it alone, but which grew out of the aggregate of powers con- ferred upon the government, or out of the sovereignty instituted. Most of these amendments are denials of power which had not been expressly granted, and which cannot be said to have been necessary and proper for carrying into execution any other powers. Such, for example, is the prohibition of any laws respecting the establishment of religion, prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. And it is of importance to observe that Congress has often ex- ercised, without question, powers that are not expressly given nor ancillary to any single enumerated power. Powers thus exercised are what are called by Judge Story, in his Commentaries on the Constitution, resulting powers, arising from the aggregate powers of the government. He instances the right to sue and make con- tracts. Many others might be given. The oath required by law from officers of the government is one. So is building a capitol or a presidential mansion, and so also is the penal code. This last is worthy of brief notice. Congress is expressly authorized "to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States, and to define and punish pira- cies and felonies committed on the high seas and offences against the laws of nations." It is also empowered to declare the pun- ishment of treason, and provision is made for impeachments. This is the extent of power to punish crime expressly conferred. It might be argued that the expression of these limited powers implies an exclusion of all other subjects of criminal legislation. Such is the argument in the present cases. It is said because Congress is authorized to coin money and regulate its value, it cannot declare anything other than gold and silver to be money, or make it a legal tender. Yet Congress, by the act of April 30, 1790, entitled "An act more effectually to provide for the punish- ment of certain crimes against the United States," and the sup- plementary act of March 3, 1825, defined and provided for the punishment of a large class of crimes other than those mentioned in the Constitution, and some of the punishments prescribed are manifestly not in aid of any single substantive power. No one 142 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. doubts that this was rightfully done, and the power thus exercised has been affirmed by this court in United States v. Marigold. This case shows that a power may exist as an aid to the execution of an express power, or an aggregate of such powers, though there is another express power given relating in part to the same subject but less extensive. Another illustration of this may be found in connection with the provisions respecting a census. The Consti- tution orders an enumeration of free persons in the different States every ten years. The direction extends no further. Yet Congress has repeatedly directed an enumeration not only of free persons in the States, but of free persons in the Territories, and not only an enumeration of persons but the collection of statistics respecting age, sex, and production. Who questions the power to do this? Indeed, the whole history of the government and of congres- sional legislation has exhibited the use of a very wide discretion, even in times of peace and in the absence of any trying emergency, in the selection of the necessary and proper means to carry into effect the great objects for which the government was framed, and this discretion has generally been unquestioned, or, if ques- tioned, sanctioned by this court. This is true not only when an attempt has been made to execute a single power specifically given, but equally true when the means adopted have been appropriate to the execution, not of a single authority, but of all the powers created by the Constitution. Under the power to establish post- offices and post-roads Congress has provided for carrying the mails, punishing theft of letters and mail robberies, and even for trans- porting the mails to foreign countries. Under the power to regu- late commerce, provision has been made by law for the improve- ment of harbors, the establishment of observatories, the erection of lighthouses, break-waters, and buoys, the registry, enrollment, and construction of ships, and a code has been enacted for the government of seamen. Under the same power and other powers over the revenue and the currency of the country, for the con- venience of the treasury and internal commerce, a corporation known as the United States Bank was early created. To its capital the government subscribed one-fifth of its stock. But the corpora- tion was a private one, doing business for its own profit. Its in- corporation was a constitutional exercise of congressional power for no other reason than that it was deemed to be a convenient instrument or means for accomplishing one or more of the ends 9 Howard, 560. LEGAL TENDER CASES. 143 for which the government was established, or, in the language of the first article, already quoted, "necessary and proper" for carry- ing into execution some or all the powers vested in the govern- ment. Clearly this necessity, if any existed, was not a direct and obvious one. Yet this court, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 7 unan- imously ruled that in authorizing the bank, Congress had not transcended its powers. So debts due to the United States have been declared by acts of Congress entitled to priority of payment over debts due to other creditors, and this court has held such acts warranted by the Constitution. 8 This is enough to show how, from the earliest period of our ex- istence as a nation, the powers conferred by the Constitution have been construed by Congress and by this court whenever such action by Congress has been called in question. Happily the true mean- ing of the clause authorizing the enactment of all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the express powers con- ferred upon Congress, and all other powers vested in the govern- ment of the United States, or in any of its departments or officers, has long since been settled. In Fisher v. Blight, 9 this court, speak- ing by Chief Justice Marshall, said that in construing it "it would be incorrect and would produce endless difficulties if the opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power. Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose it might be said with respect to each that it was not necessary because the end might be obtained by other means." "Congress," said this court, "must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution. The government is to pay the debt of the Union, and must be authorized to use the means which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has, conse- quently, a right to make remittances by bills or otherwise, and to take those precautions which will render the transaction safe." It was in this case, as we have already remarked, that a law giving priority to debts due to the United States was ruled to be consti- tutional for the reason that it appeared to Congress to be an eligi- ble means to enable the government to pay the debts of the Union It was, however, in McCulloch v. Maryland that the fullest consideration was given to this clause of the Constitution granting auxiliary powers, and a construction adopted that has ever since T 4 Wheaton, 416. o 2 Cranch, 358. s Fisher v. Blight, 2 Cranch, 358. 144 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. been accepted as determining its true meaning. . . . [Here follows a consideration of McCulloch v. Maryland.] It is hardly necessary to say that these principles are received with universal assent. Even in Hepburn v. Griswold, 10 both the majority and minority of the court concurred in accepting the doctrines of Mc- Culloch v. Maryland as sound expositions of the Constitution, though disagreeing in their application. With these rules of constitutional construction before us, settled at an early period in the history of the government, hitherto uni- versally accepted, and not even now doubted, we have a safe guide to a right decision of the questions before us. Before we can hold the legal tender acts unconstitutional, we must be convinced they were not appropriate means, or means conducive to the execution of any or all of the powers of Congress, or of the government, not appropriate in any plain degree (for we are not judges of the de- gree of appropriateness), or we must hold that they were prohib- ited. This brings us to the inquiry whether they were, when en- acted, appropriate instrumentalities for carrying into effect, or executing any of the known powers of Congress, or of any depart- ment of the government. Plainly to this inquiry, a consideration of the time when they were enacted, and of the circumstances in which the government then stood, is important. It is not to be denied that acts may be adapted to the exercise of lawful power, and appropriate to it, in seasons of exigency, which would be inap- propriate at other times. We do not propose to dilate at length upon the circumstances in which the country was placed, when Congress attempted to make treasury notes a legal tender. They are of too recent oc- currence to justify enlarged description. Suffice it to say that a civil war was then raging which seriously threatened the over- throw of the government and the destruction of the Constitution itself. It demanded the equipment and support of large armies and navies, and the employment of money to an extent beyond the capacity of all ordinary sources of supply. Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly empty, and the credit of the govern- ment, if not stretched to its utmost tension, had become nearly exhausted. Moneyed institutions had advanced largely of their means, and more could not be expected of them. They had been compelled to suspend specie payments. Taxation was inadequate to pay even the interest on the debt already incurred, and it was impossible to await the income of additional taxes. The necessity 108 Wallace, 603. LEGAL TENDER CASES. 145 was immediate and pressing. The army was unpaid. There was then due to the soldiers in the field nearly a score of millions of dollars. The requisitions from the War and Navy Departments for supplies exceeded fifty millions, and the current expenditure was over one million per day. The entire amount of coin in the country, including that in private hands, as well as that in bank- ing institutions, was insufficient to supply the need of the gov- ernment three months, had it all been poured into the treasury. Foreign credit we had none. We say nothing of the overhanging paralysis of trade, and of business generally, which threatened loss of confidence in the ability of the government to maintain its con- tinued existence, and therewith the complete destruction of all re- maining national credit. It was at such a time and in such circumstances that Congress was called upon to devise means for maintaining the army and navy, for securing the large supplies of money needed, and, indeed, for the preservation of the government created by the Constitu- tion. It was at such a time and in such an emergency that the legal tender acts were passed. Now, if it were certain that noth- ing else would have supplied the absolute necessities of the treas- ury, that nothing else would have enabled the government to maintain its armies and navy, that nothing else would have saved the government and the Constitution from destruction, while the legal tender acts would, could any one be bold enough to assert that Congress transgressed its powers? Or if these enactments did work these results, can it be maintained now that they were not for a legitimate end, or "appropriate and adapted to that end," in the language of Chief Justice Marshall? That they did work such results is not to be doubted. Something revived the droop- ing faith of the people; something brought immediately to the government's aid the resources of the nation, and something en- abled the successful prosecution of the war, and the preservation of the national life. What was it, if not the legal tender enact- ments? But if it be conceded that some other means might have been chosen for the accomplishment of these legitimate and necessary ends, the concession does not weaken the argument. It is urged now, after the lapse of nine years, and when the emergency has passed, that treasury notes without the legal tender clause might have been issued and that the necessities of the government might thus have been supplied. Hence it is inferred there was no necessity for giving to the notes issued the capability of paying private debts. At best this is mere conjecture. But admitting it to be 10 146 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. true, what does it prove? Nothing more than that Congress had the choice of means for a legitimate end, each appropriate, and adapted to that end, though, perhaps, in different degrees. What then? Can this court say that it ought to have adopted one rather than the other? Is it our province to decide that the means se- lected were beyond the constitutional power of Congress, because we may think that other means to the same ends would have been more appropriate and equally efficient? That would be to assume legislative power, and to disregard the accepted rules for constru- ing the Constitution. The degree of the necessity for any con- gressional enactment, or the relative degree of its appropriate- ness, if it have any appropriateness, is for consideration in Con- gress, not here. Said Chief Justice Marshall, inMcCulloch v. Maryland, as already stated, "When the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judi- cial department, and to tread on legislative ground." It is plain to our view, however, that none of those measures which it is now conjectured might have been substituted for the legal tender acts could have met the exigencies of the case, at the time when those acts were passed. We have said that the credit of the government had been tried to its utmost endurance. Every new issue of notes which had nothing more to rest upon than government credit, must have paralyzed it more and more, and rendered it increasingly difficult to keep the army in the field, or the navy afloat. It is an historical fact that many persons and in- stitutions refused to receive and pay those notes that had been issued, and even the head of the treasury represented to Congress the necessity of making the new issues legal tenders, or rather, declared it impossible to avoid the necessity. The vast body of men in the military service was composed of citizens who had left their farms, their work-shops, and their business, with families and debts to be provided for. The government could not pay them with ordinary treasury notes, nor could they discharge their debts with such a currency. Something more was needed, some- thing that had all the uses of money. And as no one could be compelled to take common treasury notes in payment of debts, and as the prospect of ultimate redemption was remote and con- tingent, it is not too much to say that they must have depreciated in the market long before the war closed, as did the currency of the Confederate States. Making the notes legal tenders gave them LEGAL TENDER CASES. 147 a new use, and it needs no argument to show that the value of things is in proportion to the uses to which they may be applied. It may be conceded that Congress is not authorized to enact laws in furtherance even of a legitimate end, merely because they are useful, or because they make the government stronger. There must be some relation between the means and the end; some adapted- ness or appropriateness of the laws to carry into execution the powers created by the Constitution. But when a statute has proved effective in the execution of powers confessedly existing, it is not too much to say that it must have had some appro- priateness to the execution of those powers. The rules of con- struction heretofore adopted, do not demand that the relation- ship between the means and the end shall be direct and imme- diate. Illustrations of this may be found in several of the cases above cited. The charter of a bank of the United States, the prior- ity given to debts due the government over private debts, and the exemption of Federal loans from liability to State taxation, are only a few of the many which might be given. The case of Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 1 presents a suggestive illustration. There a tax of ten per cent, on State bank notes in circulation was held constitutional, not merely because it was a means of raising reve- nue, but as an instrument to put out of existence such a circula- tion in competition with notes issued by the government. There, this court, speaking through the Chief Justice, avowed that it is the constitutional right of Congress to provide a currency for the whole country; that this might be done by coin, or United States notes, or notes of National banks; and that it cannot be ques- tioned Congress may constitutionally secure the benefit of such a currency to the people by appropriate legislation. It was said there can be no question of the power of this government to emit bills of credit; to make them receivable in payment of debts to itself; to fit them for use by those who see fit to use them in all the transactions of commerce; to make them a currency uniform in value and description, and convenient and useful for circula- tion. Here the substantive power to tax was allowed to be em- ployed for improving the currency. It is not easy to see why, if State bank notes can be taxed out of existence for the purposes of indirectly making United States notes more convenient and useful for commercial purposes, the same end may not be secured directly by making them a legal tender. Concluding, then, that the provision which made^treasury notes i 8 Wallace, 533. 148 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. a legal tender for the payment of all debts other than those ex- pressly excepted, was not an inappropriate means for carrying into execution the legitimate powers of the government, we proceed to inquire whether it was forbidden by the letter or spirit of the Constitution. It is not claimed that any express prohibition exists, but it is insisted that the spirit of the Constitution was violated by the enactment. Here those who assert the unconsti- tutionally of the acts mainly rest their argument. They claim that the clause which conferred upon Congress power "to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin," contains an implication that nothing but that which is the subject of coin- age, nothing but the precious metals can ever be declared by law to be money, or to have the uses of money. If by this is meant that because certain powers over the currency are expressly given to Congress, all other powers relating to the same subject are impliedly forbidden, we need only remark that such is not the manner in which the Constitution has always been construed. On the contrary it has been ruled that power over a particular subject may be exercised as auxiliary to an express power, though there is another express power relating to the same subject, less com- prehensive. 2 There an express power to punish a certain class of crimes (the only direct reference to criminal legislation con- tained in the Constitution), was not regarded as an objection to deducing authority to punish other crimes from another sub- stantive and defined grant of power. There are other decisions , to the same effect. To assert, then, that the clause enabling Con- gress to coin money and regulate its value tacitly implies a denial of all other power over the currency of the nation, is an attempt to introduce a new rule of construction against the solemn deci- sions of this court. So far from its containing a lurking prohi- bition, many have thought it was intended to confer upon Con- gress that general power over the currency which has always been an acknowledged attribute of sovereignty in every other civilized nation than our own, especially when considered in connection with the other clause which denies to the States the power to coin money, emit bills of credit, or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. We do not assert this now, but there are some considerations touching these clauses which tend to show that if any implications are to be deduced from them, they are of an enlarging rather than a restraining char- acter. The Constitution was intended to frame a government as 2 United States v. Marigold, 9 Howard, 560. LEGAL TENDER CASES. 149 distinguished from a league or compact, a government supreme in some particulars over States and people. It was designed to provide the same currency, having a uniform legal value in all the States. It was for this reason the power to coin money and regulate its value was conferred upon the Federal government, while the same power as well as the power to emit bills of credit was withdrawn from the States. The States can no longer de- clare what shall be money, or regulate its value. Whatever power there is over the currency is vested in Congress. If the power to declare what is money is not in Congress, it is annihilated. This may indeed have been intended. Some powers that usually belong to sovereignties were extinguished, but their extinguishment was not left to inference. In most cases, if not in all, when it was in- tended that governmental powers, commonly acknowledged as such, should cease to exist, both in the States and in the Federal government, it was expressly denied to both, as well TO the United States as to the individual States. And generally, when one of such powers was expressly denied to the States only, it was for the purpose of rendering the Federal power more com- plete and exclusive. . Why, then, it may be asked, if the design, was to prohibit to the new government, as well as to the States, that general power over the currency which the States had when the Constitution was framed, was such denial not expressly ex- tended" to the new government, as it was to the States? In view of this it might be argued with much force that when it is con- sidered in what brief and comprehensive terms the Constitution speaks, how sensible its framers must have been that emergencies might arise when the precious metals (then more scarce than now) might prove inadequate to the necessities of the government and the demands of the people when it is remembered that paper money was almost exclusively in use in the States as the medium of exchange, and when the great evil sought to be remedied was the want of uniformity in the current value of money, it might be argued, we say, that the gift of power to coin money and reg- ulate the value thereof, was understood as conveying general power over the currency, the power which had belonged to the States, and which they surrendered. Such a construction, it might be said, would be in close analogy to the mode of construing other substantive powers granted to Congress. They have never been construed literally, and the government could not exist if they were. Thus the power to carry on war is conferred by the power to "declare war." The whole system of the transportation of the mails is built upon the power to establish post-offices and post- 150 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. roads. The power to regulate commerce has also been extended far beyond the letter of the grant. Even the advocates of a strict literal construction of the phrase, "to coin money and regulate the value thereof," while insisting that it defines the material to be coined as metal, are compelled to concede to Congress large dis- cretion in all other particulars. The Constitution does not ordain what metals may be coined, or prescribe that the legal value of the metals, when coined, shall correspond at all with their intrinsic- value in the market. Nor does it even affirm that Congress may declare anything to be a legal tender for the payment of debts. Confessedly the power to regulate the value of money coined, and of foreign coins, is not exhausted by the first regulation. More than once in our history has the regulation been changed withj- out any denial of the power of Congress to change it, and it seems to have been left to Congress to determine alike what metal shall be coined, its purity, and how far its statutory value, as money, shall corespond, from time to time, with the market value of the same metal as bullion. How then can the grant of a power to coin money and regulate its value, made in terms so liberal and unre- strained, coupled also with a denial to the States of all power over the currency, be regarded as an implied prohibition to Con- gress against declaring treasury notes a legal tender, if such declara- tion is appropriate, and adapted to carrying into execution the ad- mitted powers of the government? We do not, however, rest our assertion of the power of Congress to enact legal tender laws upon this grant. We assert only that the grant can, in no just sense, be regarded as containing an implied prohibition against their enactment, and that, if it raises any implications, they are of complete power over the currency, rather than restraining. We come next to the argument much used, and, indeed, the main reliance of those who assert the unconstitutionality of the legal tender acts. It is that they are prohibited by the spirit of the Constitution because they indirectly impair the obligation of contracts. The argument, of course, relates only to those con- tracts which were made before February, 1862, when the first act was passed, and it has no bearing upon the question whether the acts are valid when applied to contracts made after their pas- sage. The argument assumes two things, first, that the acts do, in effect, impair the obligation of contracts, and second, that Congress is prohibited from taking any action which may indi- rectly have that effect. Neither of these assumptions can be ac- cepted. It is true, that, under the acts, a debtor, who became LEGAL TENDER CASES. 151 such, before they were passed, may discharge his debt with the notes authorized by them, and the creditor is compellable to re- ceive such notes in discharge of his claim. But whether the obli- gation of the contract is thereby weakened can be determined only after considering what was the contract obligation. It was not a duty to pay gold or silver, or the kind of money recognized by law at the time when the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay money of equal intrinsic value in the market. (We speak now of contracts to pay money generally, not contracts to pay some specifically denned species of money.) The expectation of the cred- itor and the anticipation of the debtor may have been that the contract would be discharged by the payment of coined metals, but neither the expectation of one party to the contract respecting its fruits, nor the anticipation of the other constitutes its obliga- tion. There is a well-recognized distinction between the expecta- tion of the parties to a contract and the duty imposed by it. 1 Were it not so the expectation of results would be always equiva- lent to a binding engagement that they should follow. But the obligation of a contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be made. If there is anything settled by decision it is this, and we do not understand it to be controverted. 2 No one ever doubted that a debt of one thousand dollars, contracted before 1834, could be paid by one hundred eagles coined after that year, though they contained no more gold than ninety-four eagles such as were coined when the contract was made, and this, not because of the intrinsic value of the coin, but because of its legal value. The eagles coined after 1834 were not money until they were authorized by law, and had they been coined before, without a law fixing their legal value, they could no more have paid a debt than uncoined bullion, or cotton, or wheat. Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever that power may be, and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that power. Nor is this singular. A covenant for quiet enjoyment is not broken, nor is its obligation impaired b}~ the government's taking the land granted in virtue of its right of eminent domain. The expectation of the covenantee may be dis- appointed. He may not enjoy all he anticipated, but the grant i Apsden v. Austin, 5 Adolphus 2 Davies, 28; Harrington v. Pot- & Ellis, N. S., 671; Dunn v. Sayles, ter, Dyer, 81, b. fol. 67; Faw v. Ib., 685; Coffin v.' Landis, 10 Marsteller, 2 Cranch 29. Wright, 426. 152 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. was made and the covenant undertaken in subordination to the paramount right of the government. 3 We have been asked whether Congress can declare that a contract to deliver a quantity of grain may be satisfied by the tender of a less quantity. Undoubtedly not. But this is a false analogy. There is a wide distinction be- tween a tender of quantities, or of specific articles, and a tender of legal values. Contracts for the delivery of specific articles belong exclusively to the domain of State legislation, while con- tracts for the payment of money are subject to the authority of Congress, at least so far as relates to the means of payment. They are engagements to pay with lawful money of the United States, and Congress is empowered to regulate that money. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the legal tender acts impaired the obligation of contracts. Nor can it be truly asserted that Congress may not, by its action, indirectly impair the obligation of contracts, if by the expression be meant rendering contracts fruitless, or partially fruitless. Di- rectly it may, confessedly, by passing a bankrupt act, embracing past as well as future transactions. This is obliterating contracts entirely. So it may relieve parties from their aparent obliga- tions indirectly in a multitude of ways. It may declare war, or, even in peace, pass non-intercourse acts or direct an embargo. All such measures may, and must operate seriously upon existing contracts, and may not merely hinder, but relieve the parties to such con- tracts entirely from performance. It is, then, clear that the powers of Congress may be exerted, though the effect of such exertion may be in one case to annul, and in other cases >to impair the obligation of contracts. And it is no sufficient answer to this to say it is true only when the powers exerted were expressly granted. There is no ground for any such distinction. It has no warrant in the Constitution, or in any of the decisions of this court. We are accustomed to speak for mere convenience of the express and implied powers conferred upon Congress. But in fact the auxiliary powers, those necessary and appropriate to the exe- cution of other powers singly described, are as expressly given as is the power to declare war, or to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy. They are not catalogued, no list of them is made, but they are grouped in the last clause of section eight of the first article, and granted in the same words in which all other powers are granted to Congress. And this court has recog- nized no such distinction as is now attempted. An embargo sus- 3 Dobbins v. Brown, 2 Jones (Pennsylvania), 75; Workman v. Mifflin, 6 Casey, 362. LEGAL TENDER CASES. 153 pends many contracts and renders performance of others impos- sible, yet the power to enforce it has been declared constitutional. 4 The power to enact a law directing an embargo is one of the aux- iliary powers, existing only because appropriate in time of peace to regulate commerce, or appropriate to carrying on war. Though not conferred as a substantive power, it has not been thought to be in conflict with the Constitution, because it impairs indirectly the obligation of contracts. That discovery calls for a new read- ing of the Constitution. If, then, the legal tender acts were justly chargeable with im- pairing contract obligations, they would not, for that reason, be forbidden, unless a different rule is to be applied to them from that which has hitherto prevailed in the construction of other powers granted by the fundamental law. But, as already inti- mated, the objection misapprehends the nature and extent of the contract obligation spoken of in the Constitution. As in a state of civil society property of a citizen or subject is ownership, sub- ject to the lawful demands of the sovereign, so contracts must be understood as made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority of the government, and no obligation of a con- tract can extend to the defeat of legitimate government authority. Closely allied to the objection we have just been considering is the argument pressed upon us that the legal tender acts were prohibited by the spirit of the fifth amendment, which forbids taking private property for public use without just compensa- tion or due process of law. That provision has always been under- stood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not to con- sequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any bearing upon, or to in- hibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals. A new tariff, an embargo, a draft, or a war may inevitably bring upon individuals great losses; may, indeed, render valuable property almost valueless. They may destroy the worth of contracts. But who ever supposed that, because of this, a tariff could not be changed, or a non-intercourse act, or an embargo be enacted, or a war be declared? By the act of June 28, 1834, a new regula- tion of the weight and value of gold coin was adopted, and about six per cent, was taken from the weight of each dollar. The effect of this was that all creditors were subjected to a corresponding loss. The debts then due became solvable with six per cent, less gold than was required to pay them before. The result was thus 4 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1. 154 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. precisely what it is contended the legal tender acts worked. But was it ever imagined this was taking private property without com- pensation or without due process of law? Was the idea ever ad- vanced that the new regulation of gold coin was against the spirit of the fifth amendment? And has any one in good faith avowed his belief that even a law debasing the current coin, by increasing the alloy, would be taking private property? It might be im- politic and unjust, but could its constitutionality be doubted? Other statutes have, from time to time, reduced the quantity of silver in silver coin without any question of their constitutionality. It is said, however, now, that the act of 1834 only brought the legal value of gold coin more nearly into correspondence with its actual value in the market, or its relative value to silver. But we do not perceive that this varies the case or diminishes its force as an illustration. The creditor who had a thousand dollars due him on the 31st day of July, 1834 (the day before the act took effect), was entitled to a thousand dollars of coined gold of the rate and fineness of the then existing coinage. The day after, he was entitled only to a sum six per cent, less in weight and in market value, or to a smaller number of silver dollars. Yet he would have been a bold man who had asserted that, because of this, the obligation of the contract was impaired, or that private property was taken without compensation or without due process of law. No such assertion, so far as we know, was ever made. Admit it was a hardship, but it is not every hardship that is unjust, much less that is unconstitutional; and certainly it would be an anomaly for us to hold an act of Congress invalid merely because we might think its provisions harsh and unjust. We are not aware of anything else which has been advanced in support of the proposition that the legal tender acts were forbidden by either the letter or 'the spirit of the Constitution. If, therefore, they were, what we have endeavored to show, appropriate means for legitimate ends, they were not transgressive of the authority vested in Congress. Here we might stop; but we will notice briefly an argument pre- sented in support of the position that the unit of money value must possess intrinsic value. The argument is derived from assim- ilating the constitutional provision respecting a standard of weights and measurer to that conferring the power to coin money and regulate its value. It is said there can be no uniform standard of weights without weight, or of measure without length or space, and we are asked how anything can be made a uniform standard of value which has itself no value? This is a question foreign to the LEGAL TENDER CASES. 155 subject before us. The legal tender acts do not attempt to make paper a standard of value. We do not rest their validity upon the assertion that their emission is coinage, or any regulation of the value of money; nor do we assert that Congress may make any- thing which has no value money. What we do assert is, that Congress has power to enact that the government's promises to pay money shall be, for the time being, equivalent in value to the representative of value determined by the coinage acts, or to mul- tiples thereof. It is hardly correct to speak of a standard of value. The Constitution does not speak of it. It contemplates a standard for that which has gravity or extension; but value is an ideal thing. The coinage acts fix its unit as a dollar; but the gold or silver thing we call a dollar is, in no sense, a standard of a dollar. It is a representative of it. There might never have been a piece of money of the denomination of a dollar. There never was a pound sterling coined until 1815, if we except a few coins struck in the reign of Henry VIII., almost immediately debased, yet it has been the unit of British currency for many generations. It is, then, a mistake to regard the legal tender acts as either fixing a standard of value or regulating money values, or making that money which has no intrinsic value. But, without extending our remarks further, it will be seen that we hold the acts of Congress constitutional as applied to contracts made either before or after their passage. In so holding, we over- rule so much of what was decided in Hepburn v. Griswold, 1 as ruled the acts unwarranted by the Constitution so far as they apply to contracts made before their enactment. That case was decided by a divided court, and by a court having a less number of judges than the law then in existence provided this court shall have. These cases have been heard before a full court, and they have re- ceived our most careful consideration. The questions involved are constitutional questions of the most vital importance to the government and to the public at large. We have been in the habit of treating cases involving a consideration of constitutional power differently from those which concern merely private right. 2 We are not accustomed to hear them in the absence of a full court, if it can be avoided. Even in cases involving only private rights, if convinced we had made a mistake, we would hear another argu- ment and correct our error. And it is no unprecedented thing in courts of last resort, both in this country and in England, to over- i 8 Wallace, 603. 2 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 8 Peters, 118. 156 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. rule decisions previously made. "We agree this should not be done inconsiderately, but in a case of such far-reaching consequences as the present, thoroughly convinced as we are that Congress has not transgressed its powers, we regard it as our duty so to decide and to affirm both these judgments. The other questions raised in the case of Knox v. Lee were sub- stantially decided in Texas v. White. 3 Judgment in each case affirmed. MB. JUSTICE BRADLEY, concurring. . . . The Constitution of the United States established a government, and not a league, compact, or partnership. . . . The United States is not only a government, but it is a National government, and the only gov- ernment in this country that has the character of nationality. . . . Such being the character of the General government, it seems to be a self-evident proposition that it is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions. If this proposition be not true, it certainly is true that the government of the United States has express authority, in the clause last quoted, to make all such laws (usually regarded as inherent and implied) as may be necessary and proper for carry- ing on the government as constituted, and vindicating its authority and existence. Another proposition equally clear is, that at the time the Con- stitution was adopted, it was and had for a long time been, the practice of most, if not all, civilized governments, to employ the public credit as a means of anticipating the national revenues for the purpose of enabling them to exercise their governmental functions, and to meet the various exigencies to which all nations are subject, and that the mode of employing the public credit was various in different countries, and at different periods some- times by the agency of a national bank, sometimes by the issue of exchequer bills or bills of credit, and sometimes by pledges of the public domain. . . . These precedents are cited without reference to the policy or impolicy of the several measures in the particular cases; that is always a question for the legislative discretion. They establish the historical fact that when the Constitution was adopted, the employment of bills of credit was deemed a legitimate means of meeting the exigencies of a regularly constituted government, and a 7 Wallace, 700. JUILLIARD v. GREENMAN. 157 that the affixing to them of the quality of a legal tender was re- garded as entirely discretionary with the legislature. . . . In view, therefore, of all these facts, when we find them estab- lishing the present government, with all the powers before re- hearsed, giving to it, amongst other things, the sole control of the money of the country and expressly prohibiting the States from issuing bills of credit and from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender, and imposing no such restriction upon the General government, how can we resist the conclusion that they intended to leave to it that power unimpaired, in case the future exigencies of the nation should require its exercise? . . . In my judgment the decrees in all the cases before us should be affirmed. [The CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICES CLIFFORD and FIELD each delivered dissenting opinions. MR. JUSTICE NELSON also dis- sented.] NOTE. Compare the language of Justice Bradley with the following sentences from James Wilson's Considerations on the Power to Incorporate the Bank of North America, Works (Andrews' Edition), I., 558: "To many purposes, the United States are to be considered as one undivided, independent nation, and as possessed of all the rights, and powers, and properties, by the law of nations incident to such. Whenever an object occurs, to the direction of which no particular state is competent, the management of it must, of neces- sity, belong to the United States in congress assembled. There are many objects of this extended nature." * LEGAL TENDEE CASE. JUILLIARD v. GREENMAN. 110 U. S., 421. Decided 1884. JUILLIARD, a citizen' of New York, brought an action against Greenman, a citizen of Connecticut, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, alleging that the plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendant, at his spe- 158 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. cial instance and request, one hundred bales of cotton, of the value and for the agreed price of $5,122.90; and that the defendant agreed to pay that sum in cash on the delivery of the cotton, and had not paid the same or any part thereof, except that he had paid the sum of $22.90 on account, and was now justly indebted to the plaintiff therefor in the sum of $5,100; and demanding judgment for this sum with interest and costs. The defendant in his answer admitted the citizenship of the parties, the purchase and delivery of the cotton, and the agreement' to pay therefor, as alleged; and averred that, after the delivery of the cotton, he offered and tendered to the plaintiff, in full payment, $22.50 in gold coin of the United States, forty cents in silver coin of the United States, and two United States notes, one of the denomination of $5,000, and the other of the denomina- tion of $100, of the description known as United States legal tender notes, purporting by recital thereon to be legal tender, at their respective face values, for all debts, public and private, except duties on imports and interest on the public debt, and which after having been presented for payment, and redeemed and paid in gold coin, since January 1st, 1879, at the United States sub-treasury in New York, had been reissued and kept in circulation under and in pursuance of the act of Congress of May 31st, 1878, ch. 146; that at the time of offering and tendering these notes and coin to the plaintiff, the sum of $5,122.90 was the entire amount due and owing in payment for the cotton, but the plaintiff declined to receive the notes in payment of $5,100 thereof; and that the defendant had ever since remained, and still was, ready and willing to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $5,100 in these notes, and brought these notes into court ready to be paid to the plaintiff, if he would accept them. The plaintiff demurred to the answer, upon the grounds that the defense, consisting of new matter., was insufficient in law upon its face, and that the facts stated in the answer did not con- stitute any defense to the cause of action alleged. The Circuit Court overruled the demurrer and gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. MB. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court. The amount which the plaintiff seeks to recover, and which, if the tender pleaded is insufficient in law, he is entitled to recover, is $5,100. There can, therefore, be no doubt of the jurisdiction JUILLIARD v. GRBENMAN. 159 of this court to revise the judgment of the Circuit Court. Act of February 16th, 1875, ch. 77, 3; 18 Stat, 315. The notes of the United States, tendered in payment of the defendant's debt to the plaintiff, were originally issued under the acts of Congress of February 25th, 1862, ch. 33, July llth, 1862. ch. 142, and March 3d, 1863, ch. 73, passed during the war of the rebellion, and enacting that these notes should "be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States," except for duties on imports and interest on the public debt. 12 Stat., 345, 532, 709. The provisions of the earlier acts of Congress, so far as it is necessary, for the understanding of the recent statutes, to quote them, are re-enacted in the following provisions of the Revised' Statutes: "Sec. 3579. When any United States notes are returned to the Treasury, they may be reissued, from time to time, as the exigencies of the public interest may require. "Sec. 3580. When any United States notes returned to the Treasury are so mutilated or otherwise injured as to be unfit for use, the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to replace the same with others of the same character and amounts. "Sec. 3581. Mutilated United States notes, when replaced ac- cording to law, and all other notes which by law are required to be taken up and not reissued, when taken up shall be destroyed in such manner and under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe. "Sec. 3582. The authority given to the Secretary of the Treas- ury to make any reduction of the currency, by retiring and can- celling United States notes, is suspended." "Sec. 3588. United States notes shall be lawful money and a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private, within the United States, except for duties on imports and interest on the public debt." The act of January 14th, 1875, ch. 15, "to provide for the re- sumption of specie payments," enacted that on and after January 1st, 1879, "the Secretary of the Treasury shall redeem in coin the United States legal tender notes then outstanding, on their pre- sentation for redemption at the office of the Assistant Treasurer of the United States in the City of New York, in sums of not less than fifty dollars," and authorized him to use for that pur- pose any surplus revenues in the Treasury and the proceeds of the sales of certain bonds of the United States. 18 Stat., 296. 160 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The act of May 31st, 1878, ch. 146, under which the notes in question were reissued, is entitled "An act to forbid the further retirement of United States legal tender notes," and enacts as follows: "From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful for the Secretary of the Treasury or other officer under him to cancel or retire any more of the United States legal tender notes. And when any of said notes may be redeemed or be received into the Treasury under any law from any source whatever and shall belong to the United States, they shall not be retired, cancelled,' or destroyed, but they shall be reissued and paid out again and kept in circulation: Provided, That nothing herein shall prohibit the cancellation and destruction of mutilated notes and the issue of other notes of like denomination in their stead, as now provided by law. All acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed." 20 Stat., 87. The manifest intention of this act is that the notes which it directs, after having been redeemed, to be reissued and kept in circulation, shall retain their original quality of being a legal tender. The single question, therefore, to be considered, and upon the answer to which the judgment to be rendered between these par- ties depends, is whether notes of the United States, issued in time of war, under acts of Congress declaring them to be a legal tender in payment of private debts, and afterwards in time of peace redeemed and paid in gold coin at the Treasury, and then reissued under the act of 1878, can, under the Constitution of the United States, be a legal tender in payment of such debts. Upon full consideration of the case, the court is unanimously of opinion that it cannot be distinguished in principle from the cases heretofore determined, reported under the names of the Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 457; Dooley v. Smith, 13 Wall., 604; Eailroad Company v. Johnson, 15 Wall., 195; and Maryland v. Railroad Company, 22 Wall., 105; and all the judges, except Mr. Justice Field, who adheres to the views expressed in his dissent- ing opinions in those cases, are of opinion that they were rightly decided. The elaborate printed briefs submitted by counsel in this case, and the opinions delivered in the Legal Tender Cases, and in the earlier case of Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall., 603, which those cases overruled, forcibly present the arguments on either side of the question of the power of Congress to make the notes of the United States a legal tender in payment of private debts. JUILLIARD v. GREENMAN. 161 out undertaking to deal with all those arguments, the court has thought it lit that the grounds of its judgment in the case at bar should be fully stated. No question of the scope and extent of the implied powers of Congress under the Constitution can be satisfactorily discussed without repeating much of the reasoning of Chief Justice Marshall in the great judgment in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, by which the power of Congress to incorporate a bank was demon- strated and affirmed, notwithstanding the Constitution does not enumerate, among the powers granted, that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. The people of the United States by the Constitution established a national government, with sovereign powers, legislative, execu- tive, and judicial. "The government of the Union," said Chief Justice Marshall, "though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action;" "and its laws, when made in pursuance of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land." "Among the enumerated powers of government, we find the great powers to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and navies. The sword and the purse, all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation, are intrusted to its government." 4 Wheat., 405, 406, 407. A constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring fundamental principles, and creating a national, sovereignty, anc intended to endure for ages and to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs, is not to be interpreted with the strictness of a private contract. The Constitution of the United States, b} apt words of designation or general description, marks the out- lines of the powers granted to the national legislature; but it does not undertake, with the precision and detail of a code of laws, to enumerate the subdivisions of those powers, or to specify all the means by which they may be carried into execution. Chief Justice Marshall, after dwelling upon this view, as required by the very nature of the Constitution, by the language in which it is framed, by the limitations upon the general powers of Con- gress introduced in the ninth section of the first article, and by the omission to use any restrictive term which might prevent its receiving a fair and just interpretation, added these emphatic words: "In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." 4 Wheat., 107. See also page 415. The breadth and comprehensiveness of the words of the Con- 11 162 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. stitution are nowhere more strikingly exhibited than in regard to the powers over the subjects of revenue, finance, and currency, of which there is no other express grant than may be found in these few brief clauses: "The Congress shall have power "To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general wel- fare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States; "To borrow money on the credit of the United States; "To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; "To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures." The section which contains the grant of these and other prin- cipal legislative powers concludes by declaring that the Congress shall have power "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carry- ing into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." By the settled construction and the only reasonable interpreta- tion of this clause, the words "necessary and proper" are not limited to such measures as are absolutely and indispensably nec- essary, without which the powers granted must fail of execu- tion; but they include all appropriate means which are conducive or adapted to the end to be accomplished, and which in the judg- ment of Congrer: will most advantageously effect it. That clause of the Constitution which declares that "the Con- gress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States," either embodies a grant of power to pay the debts of the United States, or presupposes and assumes that power as inherent in the United States as a sovereign government. But, in whichever aspect it be considered, neither this nor any other clause of the Constitution makes any mention of priority or preference of the United States as a creditor over other creditors of an individual debtor. Yet this court, in the early case of United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358, held that, under the power to pay the debts of the United States, Congress had the power to enact that debts due to the United States should have that priority of payment out of the estate of an insolvent debtor, which the law of England gave to debts due the Crown. JUILLIARD v. GREENMAN. 163 In delivering judgment in that case, Chief Justice Marshall expounded the clause giving Congress power to make all neces- sary and proper laws, as follows: "In construing this clause, it would be incorrect, and would produce endless difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained that no law was authorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified power. Where various systems might be adopted for that pur- pose, it might be said with respect to each, that it was not nec- essary, because the end might be obtained by other means. Con- gress must possess the choice of means, and must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by the Constitution. The government is to pay the debt of the Union, and must be authorized to use the means which appear to itself the most eligible to effect that object." 2,. Cranch, 396. In McCulloch v. Maryland, he more fully developed the same view, concluding thus: "We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discre- tion, with respect to the means by which the powers it con- fers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appro- priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro- hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." 4 Wheat., 421. The rule of interpretation thus laid down has been constantly adhered to and acted on by this court, and was accepted as express- ing the true test by all the judges who took part in the former discussions of the power of Congress to make the treasury notes of the United States a legal tender in payment of private debts. The other judgments delivered by Chief Justice Marshall con- tain nothing adverse to the power of Congress to issue legal tender notes. By the Articles of Confederation of 1777, the United States in Congress assembled were authorized "to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States;" but it was declared that "each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not by this confed- eration expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assem- bled." Art. 2; art. 9, 5; 1 Stat., 4, 7. Yet, upon the question 164 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. whether, under those articles, Congress, by virtue of the power to emit bills on the credit of the United States, had the power to make bills so emitted a legal tender, Chief Justice Marshall spoke very guardedly, saying: "Congress emitted bills of credit to a large amount, and did not, perhaps could not, make them a legal tender. This power resided in the States." Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet., 410, 435. But in the Constitution, as he had before observed in Mc- Culloch v. Maryland, "there is no phrase which, like the Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the Tenth Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word 'expressly/ and declares only that the powers 'not delegated to the United States, nor prohib- ited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people;' thus leaving the question, whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one government or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair con- struction of the whole instrument. The men who drew and adopted this amendment had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word in the Articles of Confederation, and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments." 4 Wheat., 406, 407. The sentence sometimes quoted from his opinion in Sturges v. Crowninshield had exclusive relation to the restrictions im- posed by the Constitution on the powers of the States, and espe- cial reference to the effect of the clause prohibiting the States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, as will clearly appear by quoting the whole paragraph: "Was this gen- eral prohibition intended to prevent paper money? We are not allowed to say so, because it is expressly provided that no State shall 'emit bills of credit;' neither could these words be intended to restrain the States from enabling debtors to discharge their debts by the tender of property of no real value to the creditor, because for that subject also particular provision is made. Noth- ing but gold and silver coin can be made a tender in payment of debts." 4 Wheat., 122, 204. Such reports as have come down to us of the debates in the Con- vention that framed the Constitution afford no proof of any gen- eral concurrence of opinion upon the subject before us. The adoption of the motion to strike out the words "and emit bills" from the clause "to borrow money and emit bills on the credit of the United States" is quite inconclusive. The philippic delivered JUILLIARD v. GREENMAN. 165 before the Assembly of Maryland by Mr. Martin, one of the dele- gates from that State, who voted against the motion, and who de- clined to sign the Constitution, can hardly be accepted as satis- factory evidence of the reasons or the motives of the majority of the Convention. See 1 Elliot's Debates, 345, 370, 376. Some of the members of the Convention, indeed, as appears by Mr. Madison's minutes of the debates, expressed the strongest opposi- tion to paper money. And Mr. Madison has disclosed the grounds of his own action, by recording that "this vote in the affirmative by Virginia was occasioned by the acquiescence ' of Mr. Madison, who became satisfied that striking out the words would not dis- able the government from the use of public notes, so far as they could be safe and proper; and would only cut off the pretext for a paper currency, and particularly for making the bills a tender, either for public or private debts." But he has not explained why he thought that striking out the words "and emit bills" would leave the power to emit bills, and deny the power to make them a tender in payment of debts. And it cannot be known how many of the other delegates, by whose vote the motion was adopted, intended neither to proclaim nor to deny the power to emit paper money, and were influenced by the argument of Mr. Gorham, who "was for striking out, without inserting any prohibition," and who said: "If the words stand, they may suggest and lead to the emission." "The power, so far as it will be necessary or safe, will be involved in that of borrowing." 5 Elliot's Debates, 434, 435, and note. And after the first clause of the tenth section of the first article had been reported in the form in which it now stands, forbidding the States to make anything but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, or to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, when Mr. Gerry, as reported by Mr. Madison, "entered into observations inculcating the importance of public faith, and the propriety of the restraint put on the States from impairing the obligation of contracts, alleging that Congress ought to be laid under the like prohibitions," and made a motion to that effect, he was not seconded. Ib., 546. As an illustration of the danger of giving too much weight, upon such a question, to the debates and the votes in the Convention, it may also be observed that propositions to authorize Congress to grant charters of incorporation for national objects were strongly opposed, espe- cially as regarded banks, and defeated. Ib,, 440, 543, 544. The power of Congress to emit bills of credit, as well as to incorporate national banks, is now clearly established by decisions to which we shall presently refer. 166 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The words "to borrow money/' as used in the Constitution, to designate a power vested in the national government, for the safety and welfare of the whole people, are not to receive that limited and restricted interpretation and meaning which they would have in a penal statute, or in an authority conferred, by law or by con- tract, upon trustees or agents for private purposes. The power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States" is the power to raise money for the public use on a pledge of the public credit, and may be exercised to meet either present or an- ticipated expenses and liabilities of the government. It includes the power to issue, in return for the money borrowed, the obliga- tions of the United States in any appropriate form, of stock, bonds, bills, or notes; and in whatever form they are issued, being instru- ments of the national government, they are exempt from taxa- tion by the governments of the several States. Weston v. Charles- ton City Council, 2 Pet., 449; Banks v. Mayor, 7 Wall., 16; Bank v. Supervisors, 7 Wall., 26. Congress has authority to issue these obligations in a form adapted to circulation from hand to hand in the ordinary transactions of commerce and business. In order to promote and facilitate such circulation, to adapt them to use as currency, and to make them more current in the market, it may provide for their redemption in coin or bonds, and may make them receivable in payment of debts to the government. So much is settled beyond doubt, and was asserted or distinctly admitted by the judges who dissented from the decision in the Legal Tender Cases, as well as by those who concurred in that decision. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 548; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall., 616, 636; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 543, 544, 560, 582, 610, 613, 637. It is equally well settled that Congress has the power to incor- porate national banks, with the capacity, for their own profit as well as for the use of the government in its money transactions, of issuing bills which under ordinary circumstances pass from hand to hand as money at their nominal value, and which, when so current, the law has always recognized as a good tender in pay- ment of money debts, unless specifically objected to at the time of the tender. United States Bank v. Bank of Georgia, 10 Wheat., 333, 347; Ward v. Smith, 7 Wall., 447, 451. The power of Con- gress to charter a bank was maintained in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, and in Osborn v. United States Bank, 9 Wheat., 738, chiefly upon the ground that it was an appropriate means for carrying on the money transactions of the government. But Chief Justice Marshall said: "The currency which it circulates, JUILLIARD v. GREENMAN. 167 by means of its trade with individuals, is believed to make it a more fit instrument for the purposes of government than it could otherwise be; and if this be true, the capacity to carry on this trade is a faculty indispensable to the character and objects of the institution." 9 Wheat., 864. And Mr. Justice Johnson, who concurred with the rest of the court in upholding the power to incorporate a bank, gave the further reason that it tended to give effect to "that power over the currency of the country, which the framers of the Constitution evidently intended to give to Congress alone." Ib., 873. The constitutional authority of Congress to provide a currency for the whole country is now firmly established. In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall., 533, 548, Chief Justice Chase, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It cannot be doubted that under the Constitution the power to provide a circulation of coin is given to Congress. And it is settled by the uniform practice of the govern- ment, and by repeated decisions, that Congress may constitutionally authorize the emission of bills of credit." Congress, having under- taken to supply a national currency, consisting of coin, of treasury notes of the United States, and of the bills of national banks, is authorized to impose on all State banks, or national banks, or pri- vate bankers, paying out the notes of individuals or of State banks, a tax of ten per cent, upon the amount of such notes so paid out. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, above cited; National Bank v. United States, 101 U. S., 1. The reason for this conclusion was stated by Chief Justice Chase, and repeated by the present Chief Justice, in these words: "Having thus, in the exercise of undisputed consti- tutional powers, undertaken to provide a currency for the whole country, it cannot be questioned that Congress may, constitution- ally, secure the benefit of it to the people by appropriate legisla- tion. To this end, Congress has denied the quality of legal tender to foreign coins, and has provided by law against the imposition of counterfeit and base coin on the community. To the same end, Congress may restrain, by suitable enactments, the circulation as money of any notes not issued under its own authority. Without this power, indeed, its attempts to secure a sound and uniform currency for the country must be futile." 8 Wall., 549; 101 U. S., 6. By the Constitution of the United States, the several States are prohibited from coining money, emitting bills of credit, or making anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. But no intention can be inferred from this to deny to Congress either of these powers. Most of the powers granted to Congress are described in the eighth section of the first article; the 168 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. limitations intended to be set to its powers, so as to exclude certain things which might otherwise be taken to be included in the gen- eral grant, are defined in the ninth section; the tenth section is addressed to the States only. This section prohibits the States from doing some things which the United States are expressly pro- hibited from doing, as well as from doing some things which the United States are expressly authorized to do, and from doing some things which are neither expressly granted nor expressly denied to the United States. Congress and the States equally are express- ly prohibited from passing any bill of attainder or ex post facto law, or granting any title of nobility. The States are forbidden, while the President and Senate are expressly authorized, to make treaties. The States are forbidden, but Congress is expressly au- thorized to coin money. The States are prohibited from emitting bills of credit; but Congress, which is neither expressly author- ized nor expressly forbidden to do so, has, as we have already seen, been held to have the power of emitting bills of credit, and of making every provision for their circulation as currency, short of giving them the quality of legal tender for private debts even by those who have denied its authority to give them this quality. /It appears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary conse- / quence, that Congress has the power to issue the obligations of the / United States in such form, and to impress upon them such quali- ties as currency for the purchase of merchandise and the payment of debts, as accord with the usage of sovereign governments. The power, as incident to the power of borrowing money and issuing bills or notes of the government for money borrowed, of impress- ; ing upon those bills or notes the quality of being a legal tender I for the payment of private debts, was a power universally under- stood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing and adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The governments of Europe, acting through the monarch or the legislature, according to the distribution of powers under their respective constitutions, had and have as sovereign a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin. This power has been distinctly recognized in an important modern case, ably argued and fully considered, in which the Emperor of Austria, as King of Hun- gary, obtained from the English Court of Chancery an injunction against the issue in England, without his license, of notes pur- 1 porting to be public paper money of Hungary. Austria v. Day, 2 Giff., 628, and 3 D. F. & J., 217. The power of issuing bills of credit, and making them, at the discretion of the legislature, a JUILLIARD v. GREENMAN. 169 tender in payment of private debts, had long been exercised in this country by the several Colonies and States; and during the Revo- lutionary War the States, upon the recommendation of the Con- gress of the Confederation, had made the bills issued by Congress a legal tender. See Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet., 435, 453; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet., 257, 313, 334-336; Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall., 557, 558, 622; Phillips on American Paper Cur- rency, passim. The exercise of this power not being prohibited to Congress by the Constitution, it is included in the power expressly granted to borrow money on the credit of the United States. This position is fortified by the fact that Congress is vested with the exclusive exercise of the analogous power of coining money and regulating the value of domestic and foreign coin, and also with the paramount power of regulating foreign and interstate commerce. Under the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, and to issue circulating notes for the money bor- rowed, its -power to define the quality and force of those notes as currency is as broad as the like power over a metallic currency under the power to coin money and to regulate the value thereof. Under the two powers, taken together, Congress is authorized to establish a national currency, either in coin or in paper, and to make that currency lawful money for all purposes, as regards the national government or private individuals. The power of making the notes of the United States a legal tender in payment of private debts, being included in the power to borrow money and to provide a national currency, is not defeated or restricted by the fact that its exercise may affect the value of private contracts. If, upon a just and fair interpretation of the whole Constitution, a particular power or authority appears to be vested in Congress, it is no constitutional objection to its existence, or to its exercise, that the property or the contracts of individuals may be incidentally affected. The decisions of this court, already cited, afford several examples of this. Upon the issue of stock, bonds, bills, or notes of the United States, the States are deprived of their power of taxation to the extent of the property invested by individuals in such obligations, and the burden of State taxation upon other private property is correspondingly increased. The ten per cent, tax, imposed by Congress on notes of State banks and of private bankers, not only lessens the value of such notes, but tends to drive them, and all State banks of issue, out of existence. The priority given to debts due to the United States over the private debts of an insolvent 170 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. debtor diminishes the value of these debts, and the amount which their holders may receive out of the debtor's estate. So, under the power to coin money and to regulate its value, Congress may (as it did with regard to gold by the act of June 28th, 1834, c. 95, and with regard to silver by the act of February 28th, 1878, c. 20), issue coins of the same denominations as those already current by law, but of less intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less weight of the precious metals, and thereby enable debtors to discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less real value. A contract to pay a certain sum in money, without any stipulation as to the kind of money in which it shall be paid, may always be satisfied by payment of that sum in any currency which is lawful money at the place and time at which payment is to be made. 1 Hale P. C., 192-194; Bac. Ab. Tender, B. 2; Pothier, Contract of Sale, No. 416; Pardessus, Droit Com- mercial, Nos. 204, 205; Searight v. Calbraith, 4 Dall., 324. As observed by Mr. Justice Strong, in delivering the opinion of the court in the Legal Tender Cases, "Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever that power may be, and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed with refer- ence to that power." 12 Wall., 549. Congress, as the legislature of a sovereign nation, being ex- pressly empowered by the Constitution, "to lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States," and "to borrow money on the credit of the United States," and "to coin money and regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin;" and being clearly authorized, as in- cidental to the exercise of those great powers, to emit bills of credit, to charter national banks, and to provide a national currency for the whole people, in the form of coin, treasury notes, and national /bank bills; and the power to make the notes of the government a /legal tender in payment of private debts being one of the powers I belonging to sovereignty in other civilized nations, and not ex- [ pressly withheld from Congress by the Constitution; we are irre- sistibly impelled to the conclusion that the impressing upon the treasury notes of the United States the quality of being a legal tender in payment of private debts is an appropriate means, con- ducive and plainly adapted to the execution of the undoubted powers of Congress, consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and therefore, within the meaning of that instru- ment, "necessary and proper for carrying into execution the pow- JUILLIARD v. GREENMAN. 171 ers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States." Such being our conclusion in matter of law, the question wheth- er at any particular time, in war or in peace, the exigency is such, by reason of unusual and pressing demands on the resources of the government, or of the inadequacy of the supply of gold and silver coin to furnish the currency needed for the uses of the gov- ernment and of the people, that it is, as matter of fact, wise and expedient to resort to this means, is a political question, to be de- termined by Congress when the question of exigency arises, and not a judicial question, to be afterwards passed upon by the courts. To quote once more from the judgment in McCulloch v. Maryland: "Where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any one of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground." 4 Wheat., 423. It follows that the act of May 31st, 1878, c. 146, is constitutional and valid; and that the Circuit Court rightly held that the tender in treasury notes, reissued and kept in circulation under that act, was a tender of lawful money in payment of the defendant's debt to the plaintiff. Judgment affirmed. [MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered a dissenting opinion.] NOTE. See articles in American Law Keview, IV., 768, by Jus- tice 0. W. Holmes, and in Harvard Law Eeview, I., 73, by Prof. James B. Thayer. IV. COMMERCE. GIBBONS v. OGDEN. 9 Wheaton, 1. Decided 1824. EREOR to the court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors of the State of New York. Aaron Ogden filed his bill in the court of chancery of that State, against Thomas Gibbons, set- ting forth the several acts of the legislature thereof, enacted for the purpose of securing to Kobert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive navigation of all the waters within the jurisdiction of that State, with boats moved by fire or steam, for a term of years which has not yet expired; and authorizing the chancellor to award an injunction, restraining any person whatever from navigating those waters with boats of that description. The bill stated an assignment from Livingston and Fulton to one John R. Livingston, and from him to the complainant, Ogden, of the right to navigate the waters between Elizabethtown, and other places in New Jersey, and the city of New York; and that Gibbons, the defendant below, was in possession of two steamboats, called The Stoudinger and The Bellona, which were actually employed in running between New York and Elizabethtown, in violation of the exclusive privilege conferred on the complainant, and praying an injunction to restrain the said Gibbons from using the said boats, or any other propelled by fire or steam, in navigating the waters within the territory of New York. The injunction having been awarded, the answer of Gibbons was filed, in which he stated that the boats employed by him were duly enrolled and licensed, to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, under the act of con- gress, passed the 18th of February, 1793, c. 8 (1 Stats, at Large, 305), entitled, "An act for enrolling and licensing ships and ves- sels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same." And the defendant insisted on his right, in virtue of such licenses, to navigate the waters between Eliza- bethtown and the city of New York, the said acts of the legislature 172 GIBBONS v. OGDEN. 17 of the State of New York to the contrary notwithstanding. At the hearing, the chancellor perpetuated the injunction, being of the opinion that the said acts were not repugnant to the consti- tution and laws of the United States, and were valid. This decree was affirmed in the court for the trial of impeachments and correc- tion of errors, which is the highest court of law and equity in the State, before which the cause could be carried, and it was there- upon brought to this court by writ of error. . . . MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court, and, after stating the case, proceeded as follows: The appellant contends that this decree is erroneous, because the laws which purport to give the exclusive privilege it sustains are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States. They are said to be repugnant, 1. To that clause in the constitution which authorizes congress to regulate commerce. 2. To that which authorizes congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts. The State of New York maintains the constitutionality of these laws; and their legislature, their council of revision, and their judges, have repeatedly concurred in this opinion. It is supported by great names, by names which have all the titles to considera- tion that virtue, intelligence, and office can bestow. No tribunal can approach the decision of this question without feeling a just and real respect for that opinion which is sustained by such author- ity; but it is the province of this court, while it respects, not to bow to it implicitly; and the judges must exercise, in the exam- ination of the subject, that understanding which Providence has bestowed upon them, with that independence which the people of the United States expect from this department of the government. As preliminary to the very able discussions of the constitution which we have heard from the bar, and as having some influence on its construction, reference has been made to the political situa- tion of these States, anterior to its formation. It has been said that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is true. But, when these allied sovereigns, converted their league into a govern- ment, when they converted their congress of ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend meas- ures of general utility, into a legislature; empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the States appear underwent a change, the extent of which must be 174 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected. This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so constructed? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumer- ated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, congress is authorized "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used, is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the consti- tution, which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction, which would extend words be- yond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow con- struction, which would cripple the government, and render it un- equal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it com- petent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict con- struction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded. As men whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are ex- pressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an GIBBONS v. OGDEN. 175 investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose; which power can never be exer- cised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the pur- poses for which they were conferred. The words are: "Congress shall have power to regulate com-" merce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more, it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between nations which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and selling, or of barter. If commerce does not include navigation, the government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what shall constitute American vessels, or requir- ing that they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this power has been exercised from the commencement of the govern- ment, has been exercised with the consent of all, and has been understood by all to be a commercial regulation. All America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word "commerce" to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution was framed. The power over commerce, including navigation, was one of the primary ob- jects for which the people of America adopted their government, and must have been contemplated in forming it. The convention must have used the word in that sense, because all have under- stood it in that sense; and the attempt to restrict it comes too late. If the opinion that "commerce," as the word is used in the con- 176 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. stitution, comprehends navigation also, requires any additional confirmation, that additional confirmation is, we think, furnished by the words of the instrument itself. It is a rule of construction acknowledged by all, that the exceptions from a power mark its extent; for it would be absurd, as well as useless, to except from a granted power that which was not granted, that which the words of the grant could not comprehend. If, then, there are in the constitution plain exceptions from the power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the exercise of that power in a particular way, it is a proof that those who made these exceptions, and prescribed these inhibitions, understood the power to which they applied as being granted. The 9th section of the 1st article declares that "no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another." This clause cannot be understood as applicable to those laws only which are passed for the purposes of revenue, because it is expressly applied to com- mercial regulations; and the most obvious preference which can be given to one port over another, in regulating commerce, relates to navigation. But the subsequent part of the sentence is still more explicit. It is, "nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another." These words have a direct reference to navigation. The universally acknowledged power of the government to im- pose embargoes must also be considered as showing that all Amer- ica is united in that construction which comprehends navigation in the word "commerce.*' Gentlemen have said, in argument, that this is a branch of the war-making power, and that an embargo is an instrument of war, not a regulation of trade. That it may be, and often is, used as an instrument of war, cannot be denied. An embargo may be imposed for the purpose of facilitating the equip- ment or manning of a fleet, or for the purpose of concealing the progress of an expedition preparing to sail from a particular port. In these, and in similar cases, it is a military instrument, and par- takes of the nature of war. But all embargoes are not of this de- scription. They are sometimes resorted to without a view to war, and with a single view to commerce. In such case an embargo is no more a war measure than a merchantman is a ship of war, be- cause both are vessels which navigate the ocean with sails and seamen. When congress imposed that embargo which, for a time, engaged the attention of every man in the United States, the avowed ob- ject of the law was the protection of commerce and the avoiding GIBBONS v. OGDEN. 177 of war. By its friends and its enemies it was treated as a commer- cial, not as a war, measure. The persevering earnestness and zeal with which it was opposed, in a part of our country which supposed its interests to be vitally affected by the act, cannot be forgotten. A want of acuteness in discovering objections to a measure to which they felt the most deep-rooted hostility, will not be imputed to those who were arrayed in opposition to this. Yet they never sus- pected that navigation was no branch of trade, and was, therefore, not comprehended in the power to regulate commerce. They did, indeed, contest the constitutionality of the act, but on a principle which admits the construction for which the appellant contends. They denied that the particular law in question was made in pur- suance of the constitution, not because the power could not act directly on vessels, but because a perpetual embargo was the an- nihilation, and not the regulation, of commerce. In terms, they admitted the applicability of the words used in the constitution to vessels; an'd that, in a case which produced a degree and an extent of excitement calculated to draw forth every principle on which legitimate resistance could be sustained. No example could more strongly illustrate the universal understanding of the American people on this subject. The word used in the constitution, then, comprehends, and has been always understood to comprehend, navigation within its mean- ing; and a power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word "commerce." To what commerce does this power extend? The constitution informs us, to commerce "with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." It has, we believe, been universally admitted that these words comprehend every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country and any other to which this power does not extend. It has been truly said that commerce, as the word is used in the con- stitution, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term. If this be the admitted meaning of the word, in its application to foreign nations, it must carry the same meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, unless there be some plain intelligible cause which alters it. /" The subject to which the power is next applied is to commerce / "among the several States." The word "among" means inter- j mingled with. A thing which is among others is intermingled \ with them. Commerce among the States cannot stop at the ex- V 12 178 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ternal boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior. It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that com- merce which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient and is certainly unnecessary. Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the power was to be ex- tended would not have been made had the intention been to extend the power to every description. The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a Staite. The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal con- cerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other Staites, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the pur- pose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be con- sidered as reserved for the State itself. But, in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the power of congress does not stop at the jurisdictional lines of the several States. It would be a very useless power if it could not pass those lines. The commerce of the United States with foreign nations is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our country in every direction pass through the interior of almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means of exercising this right. If congress has the power to regulate it, that power must be exer- cised whenever the subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a foreign voyage may commence or terminate at a port within a State, then the power of Congress may be .exercised within a State. This principle is, if possible, still more clear when applied to commerce "among the several States." They either join each other, in which case they are separated by a mathematical line, or they are remote from each other, in which case other States lie GIBBONS v. OGDEN. 179 between them. What is commerce "among" them; and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading expedition between two adjoining States commence and terminate outside of each? And if the trad- ing intercourse be between two States remote from each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably , pass through a third? Commerce among the States must., of neces- / sity, be commerce with the States. In the regulation of trade with the Indian tribes, the action of the law, especially when the consti- tution was made, was chiefly within a State . The power of congress, then, whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States. The sense of the nation on this subject is unequivocally manifested by the provisions made in the laws for transporting goods by land between Baltimore and Provi- dence, between New York and Philadelphia, and between Phila- delphia and Baltimore. We are now arrived at the inquiry, what is this power? It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in congress as ab- solutely as it would be in a single government, having in its consti- tution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the Constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the discretion of congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative governments. The power of congress, then, comprehends navigation withii the limits of every State in the Union, so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with "commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes." It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New York,) and act upon the very waters to which the prohibition now undei consideration applies. But it has been urged with great earnestness that, although the 180 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. power of congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, be co-extensive with the subject itself, and have no other limits than are prescribed in the constitution, yet the States may severally exercise the same power within their respective jurisdictions. In support of this argument, it is said *h a * they possessed i a final decision on the questions presented ought not to be made, because the parties who were directly concerned in the arrest and detention of Milligan, were not before the court; and their rights might be prejudiced by the answer which should be given to those questions. But this court cannot know what return will be made to the writ of habeas corpus when issued; and it is very clear that no one is concluded upon any question that may be raised to that return. In the sense of the law of 1802 which authorized a certifi- cate of division, a final decision means final upon the points certified; final upon the court below, so that it is estopped from any adverse ruling in all the subsequent proceedings of the cause. But it is said that this case is ended, as the presumption is, that Milligan was hanged in pursuance of the order of the President. Although we have no judicial information on the subject, yet the inference is that he is alive; for otherwise learned counsel would not appear for him and urge this court to decide .his case. It can never be in this country of written constitution and laws, with a judicial department to interpret them, that any chief magistrate would be so far forgetful of his duty, as to order the execution of a man who denied the jurisdiction that tried and con- victed him; after his case was before Federal judges with power to decide it, who, being unable to agree on the grave questions involved, had, according to known law, sent it to the Supreme Court of the United States for decision. But even the suggestion is injurious to the Executive, and we dismiss it from further con- sideration. There is, therefore, nothing to hinder this court from an investigation of the merits of this controversy. The controlling question in the case is this: Upon the facts stated in Milligan's petition, and the exhibits filed, had the mili- tary commission mentioned in it jurisdiction, legally, to try and sentence him? Milligan, not a resident of one of the rebellious States, or a prisoner of war, but a citizen of Indiana for twenty years past, and never in the military or naval service, is, while at his home, arrested by the military power of the United States, im- prisoned, and, on certain criminal charges preferred against him, tried, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged by a military commis- sion, organized under the direction of the military commander of EX PARTE MILLIGAN. 361 the military district of Indiana. Had this tribunal the legal power and authority to try and punish this man? No graver question was ever considered by this court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of the whole people; for it is the birthright of every American citizen when charged with crime, to be tried and punished according to law. The power of punishment is alone through the means which the laws have pro- vided for that purpose, and if they are ineffectual, there is an im- munity from punishment, no matter how great an offender the individual may be, or how much his crimes may have shocked the sense of justice of the country, or endangered its safety. By the protection of the law human rights are secured; withdraw that protection, and they are at the mercy of wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people. If there was law to justify this mili- tary trial, it is not our province to interfere; if there was not, it is our duty to declare the nullity of the whole proceedings. The decision of this question does not depend on argument or judicial precedents, numerous and highly illustrative as they are. These precedents inform us of the extent of the struggle to preserve liberty, and to relieve those in civil life from military trials. The founders of our government were familiar with the history of that struggle, and secured in a written Constitution every right which the people had wrested from power during a contest of ages. By that Constitution and the laws authorized by it this question must be determined. The provisions of that instrument on the admin- istration of criminal justice are too plain and direct to leave room for misconstruction or doubt of their true meaning. Those applica- ble to this case are found in that clause of the original Constitution which says, "That the trial of all crimes, except in case of im- peachment, shall be by jury;" and in the fourth, fifth, and sixth articles of the amendments. The fourth proclaims the right to be secure in person and effects against unreasonable search and seizure; and directs that a judicial warrant shall not issue "with- out proof of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation." The fifth declares "that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on presentment by a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." And the sixth guarantees the right of trial by jury, in such manner and with such regulations that with up- right judges, impartial juries, and an able bar, the innocent will be saved and the guilty punished. It is in these words: "In all 362 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." These securities for personal liberty thus embodied, were such as wisdom and experience had demonstrated to be nec- essary for the protection of those accused of crime. And so strong was the sense of the country of their importance, and so jealous were the people that these rights, highly prized, might be denied them by implication, that when the original Constitution was pro- posed for adoption it encountered severe opposition; and, but for the belief that it would be so amended as to embrace them, it would never have been ratified. Time has proven the discernment of our ancestors; for even these provisions, expressed in such plain English words, that it would seem the ingenuity of man could not evade them, are now, after the lapse of more than seventy years, sought to be avoided. Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise, when rulers and people would become restive under re- straint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that the principles of consti- tutional liberty would be in peril, unless established by irre- pealable law. The history of the world had taught them that what was done in the past might be attempted in the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its pro- tection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circum- stances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of govern- ment. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved "by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority. Have any of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution been violated in the case of Milligan? and if so, what are they? Every trial involves the exercise of judicial power; and from what source did the military commission that tried him derive EX PARTE MILLIGAN. 3G3 their authority? Certainly no part of the judicial power of the country was conferred on them; because the Constitution ex- pressly vests it "in one supreme court and such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish," and it is not pretended that the commission was a court ordained and established by Congress. They cannot justify on the mandate of the President, because he is controlled by law, and has his appro- priate sphere of duty, which is to execute, not to make, the laws; and there is "no unwritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source of jurisdiction." But it is said that the jurisdiction is complete under the "laws and usages of war." / It can serve no useful purpose to inquire what those laws and ^usages "are, whence they originated, where found, and on whom they operate; they can never be applied to citizens in States which have upheld the authority of the government, and where the courts are open and their process unobstructed. This court has judicial knowledge that in Indiana the Federal authority was always un- opposed, and its courts always open to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances; and no usage of war could sanction a mili- tary trial there for. any offense whatever of a citizen in civil life, in nowise connected with the military service. Congress could grant no such power; and to the honor of our national legislature be it said, it has never been provoked by the state of the country even to attempt its exercise. One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan was tried by a court not ordained and established by Congress, and not com- posed of judges appointed during good behavior. Why was he not delivered to the Circuit Court of Indiana to be proceeded against according to law? No reason of necessity could be urged against it; because Congress had declared penal- ties against the offenses charged, provided for their punishment, and directed that court to hear and determine them. And soon after this military tribunal was ended, the Circuit Court met, peacefully transacted its business, and adjourned. It needed no bayonets to protect it, and required no military aid to execute its judgments. It was held in a State, eminently distinguished for patriotism, by judges commissioned during the Eebellion, who were provided with juries, upright, intelligent, and selected by a marshal appointed by the President. The government had no right to conclude that Milligan, if guilty, would not receive in that court merited punishment; for its records disclose that it was constantly engaged in the trial of similar offenses, and was 364 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. never interrupted in its administration of criminal justice. If it was dangerous, in the distracted condition of affairs, to leave Mil- ligan unrestrained of his liberty, because he "conspired against the government, afforded aid and comfort to rebels, and incited the people to insurrection," the law said, arrest him, confine him closely, render him powerless to do further mischief; and then present his case to the grand jury of the district, with proofs of his guilt, and, if indicted, try him according to the course of the common law. If this had been done, the Constitution would have been vindicated, the law of 1863 enforced, and the securi- ties for personal liberty preserved and defended. Another guarantee of freedom was broken when Milligan was denied a trial by jury. The great minds of the country have dif- fered on the correct interpretation to be given to the various pro- visions of the Federal Constitution; and judicial decision has been often invoked to settle their true meaning; but until recently no one ever doubted that the right of trial by jury was fortified in the organic law against the power of attack. It is now as- sailed; but if ideas can be expressed in words, and language has any meaning, this right one of the most valuable in a free country is preserved to every one accused of crime who is not attached to the army, or navy, or militia in actual service. The sixth amendment affirms that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury," language broad enough to embrace all persons and cases; but the fifth, recognizing the necessity of an indict- ment, or presentment, before any one can be held to answer for high crimes, "excepts cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or public danger;" and the framers of the Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by jury, in the sixth amendment, to those persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth. The discipline necessary to the efficiency of the army and navy required other and swifter modes of trial than are furnished by the common-law courts; and, in pursuance of the power con- ferred by the Constitution, Congress has declared the kinds of trial, and the manner in which they shall be conducted, for offenses committed while the party is in the military or naval service. Every one connected with these branches of the public service is amenable to the jurisdiction which Congress has created for their government, and, while thus serving, surrenders his right to be tried by the civil courts. All other persons, citizens of States EX PARTE MILLIGAN. 3G5 where the courts are open, if charged with crime, are guaranteed the inestimable privilege of trial by jury. This privilege is a vital principle, underlying the whole administration of criminal jus- tice; it is not held by sufferance, and cannot be frittered away on any plea of State or political necessity. When peace prevails, and the authority of the government is undisputed, there is no difficulty of preserving the safeguards of liberty; for the ordinary modes of trial are never neglected, and no one wishes it other- wise; but if society is disturbed by civil commotion if the pas- sions of men are aroused and the restraints of law weakened, if not disregarded these safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of those intrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution and laws. In no other way can we transmit to pos- terity unimpaired the blessings of liberty, consecrated by the sacrifices of the Eevolution. It is claimed that martial law covers with its broad mantle the proceedings of this military commission. The proposition is this: that in a time of war the commander of an armed force (if, in his opinion, the exigencies of the country demand it, and of which he is the judge) has the power, \vithin the lines of his military district, to suspend all civil rights and their remedies, and subject citizens as well as soldiers to the rule of his will; and in the exercise of his lawful authority cannot be restrained, except by his superior officer or the President of the United States. If this position is sound to the extent claimed, then when war exists, foreign or domestic, and the country is subdivided into military departments for mere convenience, the commander of one of them can, if he chooses, within his limits, on the plea of necessity, with the approval of the Executive, substitute mili- tary force for, and to the exclusion of, the laws, and punish all persons, as he thinks right and proper, without fixed or certain rules. The statement of this proposition shows its importance; for, if true, republican government is a failure, and there is an end of liberty regulated by law. Martial law, established on such a basis, destroys every guarantee of the Constitution, and effectually renders the "military independent of, and superior to, the civil power," the attempt to do which by the King of Great Britain was deemed by our fathers such an offense, that they assigned it to the world as one of the causes which impelled them to declare their independence. Civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure together; the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or the other must perish. 366 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. This nation, as experience has proved, cannot always remain at peace, and has no right to expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers, sincerely attached to the principles of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln; and if this right is conceded, and the calamities of war again befall us, the dangers to human 'lib- erty are frightful to contemplate. If our fathers had failed to provide for just such a contingency, they would have been false to the trust reposed in them. They knew the history of the world told them the nation they were founding, be its existence short or long, would be involved in war; how often or how long continued, human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power, wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to freemen. For this, and other equally weighty reasons, they secured the inheritance they had fought to maintain, by incor- porating in a written Constitution the safeguards which time had proved were essential to its preservation. Not one of these safe- guards can the President, or Congress, or the Judiciary disturb, except the one concerning the writ of habeas corpus. It is essential to the safety of every government that in a great crisis, like the one we have just passed through, there should be a power somewhere of suspending the writ of habeas corpus. In every war, there are men of previously good character, wicked enough to counsel their fellow-citizens to resist the measures deemed necessary by a good government to sustain its just author- ity and overthrow its enemies; and their influence may lead to dangerous combinations. In the emergency of the times, an im- mediate public investigation according to law may not be pos- sible; and yet the peril to the country may be too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large. Unquestionably, there is then an exigency which demands that the government, if it should see fit, in the exercise of a proper discretion, to make arrests, should not be required to produce the persons arrested in answer to a writ of habeas corpus. The Constitution goes no further. It does not say after a writ of habeas corpus is denied a citizen, that he shall be tried otherwise than by the course of the common law; if it had intended this result, it was easy by the use of direct words to have accomplished it The illustrious men who framed that instrument were guarding the foundations of civil liberty against the abuses of unlimited power; they were full of wisdom, and the lessons of history informed them that a trial by an estab- lished court, asisted by an impartial jury, was the only sure way EX PARTE MILLIGAN. 3G7 of protecting the citizen against oppression and wrong. Know- ing this, they limited the suspension to one great right, and left the rest to remain forever inviolable. But, it is insisted that the safety of the country in time of war demands that this broad claim for martial law shall be sustained. If this were true, it could be well said that a country, preserved at the sacrifice of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of preserva- tion. Happily, it is not so. It will be borne in mind that this is not a question of the power to proclaim martial law, when war exists in a community and the courts and civil authorities are overthrown. Nor is it a ques- tion what rule a military commander, at the head of his army, can impose on States in rebellion to cripple their resources and quell the insurrection. The jurisdiction claimed is much more extensive. The necessities of the service, during the. late Eebel- lion, required that the loyal States should be placed within the limits of certain military districts and commanders appointed in them; and, it is urged, that this, in a military sense, constituted them the theatre of military operations; and, as in this case, Indiana had been and was again threatened with invasion by the enemy, the occasion was furnished to establish martial law. The conclusion does not follow from the premises. If armies were collected in Indiana, they were to be employed in another locality, where the laws were obstructed and the national authority dis- puted. On her soil there was no hostile foot; if once invaded, that invasion was at an end, and with it all pretext for martial law. Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administra- tion. It is difficult to see how the safety of the country required mar- tial law in Indiana. If any of her citizens were plotting treason, the power of arrest could secure them, until the government was prepared for their trial, when the courts were open and ready to try them. It was as easy to protect witnesses before a civil as a military tribunal; and as there could be no wish to convict, except on sufficient legal evidence, surely an ordained and estab- lished court was better able to judge of this than a military tribunal composed of gentlemen not trained to the profession of the law. It follows, from what has been said on this subject, that there are occasions when martial rule can be properly applied. If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and 3G8 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its dura- tion; for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war. Because, during the late Rebel- lion it could have been enforced in Virginia, where the national authority was overturned and the courts driven out, it does not follow that it should obtain in Indiana, where that authority was never disputed, and justice was always administered. And so in the case of a foreign invasion, martial rule may become a neces- sity in one State, when, in another, it would be "mere lawless violence." We are not without precedents in English and American his- tory illustrating our views of this question; but it is hardly neces- sary to make particular reference to them. From the first year of the reign of Edward the Third, when the Parliament of England reversed the attainder of the Earl of Lancaster, because he could have been tried by the courts of the realm, and declared, "that in time of peace no man ought to be adjudged to death for treason or any other offense with- out being arraigned and held to answer; and that regularly when the king's courts are open it is a time of peace in judgment of law," down to the present day, martial law, as claimed in this case, has been condemned by all respectable English jurists as contrary to the fundamental laws of the land, and subversive of the liberty of the subject. During the present century, an instructive debate on this ques- tion occurred in Parliament, occasioned by the trial and convic- tion by court-martial, at Demerara, of the Rev. John Smith, a missionary to the negroes, on the alleged ground of aiding and abetting a formidable rebellion in that colony. Those eminent statesmen, Lord Brougham and Sir James Mackintosh, partici- pated in that debate; and denounced the trial as illegal; because it did not appear that the courts of law in Demerara could not try offenses, and that "when the laws can act, every other mode of punishing supposed crimes is itself an enormous crime." EX PARTE MILLIGAN. 369 So sensitive were our Revolutionary fathers on this subject, although Boston was almost in a state of siege, when General Gage issued his proclamation of martial law they spoke of it as an "attempt to supersede the course of the common law, and instead thereof to publish and order the use of martial law." The Virginia Assembly, also, denounced a similar measure on the part of Governor Dunmore "as an assumed power, which the king himself cannot exercise; because it annuls >the law of the land and introduces the most execrable of all systems, martial law." In some parts of the country, during the war of 1812, our officers made arbitrary arrests and, by military tribunals, tried citizens who were not in the military service. These arrests and trials, when brought to the notice of the courts, were uniformly condemned as illegal. The cases of Smith v. Shaw, and McCon- nell v. Hampden (reported in 12 Johnson,) 1 are illustrations, which we cite, not only for the principles they determine, but on account of the distinguished jurists concerned in the decisions, one of whom for many years occupied a seat on this bench. It is contended, that Luther v. Borden, decided by this court, is an authority for the claim of martial law advanced in this case. The decision is misapprehended. That case grew out of the at- tempt in Ehode Island to supersede the old colonial government by a revolutionary proceeding. Ehode Island, until that period, had no other form of local government than the charter granted by King Charles II in 1663; and as that limited the right of suffrage, and did not provide for its own amendment, many citi- zens became dissatisfied, because the legislature would not afford the relief in their power; and without the authority of law, formed a new and independent constitution, and proceeded to assert its authority by force of arms. The old government re- sisted this; and as the rebellion was formidable, called out the militia to subdue it, and passed an act declaring martial law. Bor- den, in the military service of the old government, broke open the house of Luther, who supported the new, in order to arrest him. Luther brought suit against Borden; and the question was, whether, under the constitution and laws of the state, Borden was justified. This court held that a state "may use its mili- tary power to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by the civil authority;" and, if the legislature of Ehode Island thought the peril so great as to require the use of its military forces and the declaration of martial law, there was no i Pages 257 and 234. 24 370 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ground on which this court could question its authority; and as Borden acted under military orders of the charter government, which had been recognized by the political power of the coun- try, and was upheld by the state judiciary, he was justified in breaking into and entering Luther's house. This is the extent of the decision. There was no question in issue about the power of declaring martial law under the Federal Constitution, and the court did not consider it necessary even to inquire "to what extent nor under what circumstances that power may be exercised by a state." We do not deem it important to examine further the adjudged cases; and shall, therefore, conclude without any additional refer- ence to authorities. To the third question, then, on which the judges below were opposed in opinion, an answer in the negative must be returned. It is proper to say, although Milligan's trial and conviction by a military commission was illegal, yet, if guilty of the crimes imputed to him, and his guilt had been ascertained by an estab- lished court and impartial jury, he deserved severe punishment. Open resistance to the measures deemed necessary to subdue a great rebellion, by those who enjoy the protection of government, and have not the excuse even of prejudice of section to plead in their favor, is wicked; but that resistance becomes an enormous crime when it assumes the form of a secret political organiza- tion, armed to oppose the laws, and seeks by stealthy means to introduce the enemies of the country into peaceful communities, there to light the torch of civil war, and thus overthrow the power of the United States. Conspiracies like these, at such a junc- ture, are extremely perilous; and those concerned in them are dangerous enemies to their country, and should receive the heav- iest penalties of the law, as an example to deter others from sim- ilar criminal conduct. It is said the severity of the laws caused them; but Congress was obliged to enact severe laws to meet the crisis; and as our highest civil duty is to serve our country when in danger, the late war has proved that rigorous laws, when necessary, will be cheerfully obeyed by a patriotic people, strug- gling to preserve the rich blessings of a free government. The two remaining questions in this case must be answered in the affirmative. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter of course; and on the return made to it the court decides whether the party applying is denied the right of pro- ceeding any further with it. EX PARTE MILLIGAN. 371 If the military trial of Milligan was contrary to law, then ne was entitled, on the facts stated in his petition, to be discharged from custody by the terms of the act of Congress of March 3, 1863. The provisions of this law having been considered in a previous part of this opinion, we will not restate the views there presented. Milligan avers he was a citizen of Indiana, not in the military or naval service, and was detained in close confinement, by order of the President, from the 5th day of October, 1864, until the 2d day of January, 1865, when the Circuit Court for the District of Indiana, with a grand jury, convened in session at Indianapolis; and afterwards, on the 27th day of the same month, adjourned without finding an indictment or presentment against him. If these averments were true (and their truth is conceded for the purposes of this case), the court was required to liberate him on taking certain oaths prescribed by the law, and entering into recognizance for his good behavior. But it is insisted that Milligan was a prisoner of war, and, there- fore, excluded from the privileges of the statute. It is not easy to see how he can be treated as a prisoner of war, when he lived in Indiana for the past twenty years, was arrested there, and had not been, during the late troubles, a resident of any of the states in rebellion. If in Indiana he conspired with bad men to assist the enemy, he is punishable for it in the courts of Indiana; but, Avhen tried for the offense, he cannot . plead the rights of war; for he was not engaged in legal acts of hostility against the gov- ernment, and only such persons, when captured, are prisoners of war. If he cannot enjoy the immunities attaching to the charac- ter of a prisoner of war, how can he be subject to their pains and penalties? This case, as well as the kindred cases of Bowles and Horsey, were disposed of at the last term, and the proper orders were entered of record. There is, therefore, no additional entry re- quired. [The CHIEF JUSTICE, for himself and MESSRS. JUSTICES WAYNE, S WAYNE, -and MILLER, delivered an opinion in which he differed from the court in several important particulars, but con- curred in the order made in the case.] IX. EX POST FACTO LAWS AND BILLS OF ATTAINDER. CALDER v. BULL. 3 Dallas, 386. Decided 1798. IN error from the State of Connecticut. The cause was argued at the last term (in the absence of the chief justice), and now the court delivered their opinions seriatim. CHASE, J. The decision of one question determines, in my opinion, the present dispute. I shall, therefore, state from the record no more of the case than I think necessary for the con- sideration of that question only. The legislature of Connecticut, on the second Thursday of May, 1795, passed a resolution or law, which, for the reasons assigned, set aside a decree of the court of probate for Hartford, on the 21st of March, 1793, which decree disapproved of the will of Normand Morrison, the grandson, made the 21st of August, 1779, and re- fused to record the said will; and granted a new hearing by the said court of probate, with liberty of appeal therefrom, in six months. A new hearing was had, in virtue of this resolution, or law, before the said court of probate, who, on the 27th of July, 1795, approved the said will, and ordered it to be recorded. At August, 1795, appeal was then had to the superior court at Hart- ford, who, at February term, 1796, affirmed the decree of the court of probate. Appeal was had to the supreme court of errors of Connecticut, who, in June, 1796, adjudged that there were no errors. More than eighteen months elapsed from the decree of the court of probate, on the 1st of March, 1793, and thereby Caleb Bull and wife were barred of all right of appeal, by a statute of Connecticut. There was no law of that State whereby a new hearing, or trial, before the said court of probate might be ob- tained. Calder and wife claim the premises in question, in right of his wife, as heiress of N. Morrison, physician; Bull and wife claim under the will of N. Morrison, the grandson. The counsel for the plaintiffs in error contend that the said 372 CALDER v. BULL. 373 resolution or law of the legislature of Connecticut, granting a new hearing in the above case, is an ex post facto law, prohibited by the constitution of the United States; that any law of the federal government, or of any of the state governments, contrary to the constitution of the United States, is void; and that this court possesses the power to declare such law void. It appears to me a self-evident proposition, that the several state legislatures retain all the powers of legislation delegated to them by the state constitutions, which are not expressly taken away by the constitution of the United States. The establish- ing courts of justice, the appointment of judges, and the making regulations for the administration of justice within each State, according to its laws, on all subjects not intrusted to the federal government, appear to me to be the peculiar and exclusive prov- ince and duty of the state legislatures. All the powers delegated by the people of the United States to the federal government are defined, and no constructive powers can be exercised by it, and all the powers that remain in the state governments are indefinite, except only in the constitution of Massachusetts. The effect of the resolution or law of Connecticut above stated, is to revise a decision of one of its inferior courts, called the court of probate for Hartford, and to direct a new hearing of the case by the same court of probate that passed the decree against the will of Normand Morrison. By the existing law of Connecticut, a right to recover certain property had vested in Calder and wife (the appellants) in consequence of a decision of a court of jus- tice, but, in virtue of a subsequent resolution or law, and the new hearing thereof, and the decision in consequence, this right to recover certain property was divested, and the right to the property declared to be in Bull and wife, the appellees. The sole inquiry is, whether this resolution or law of Connecticut, hav- ing such operation, is an ex post facto law within the prohibition of the federal constitution? Whether the legislature of any of the States can revise and cor- rect, by law, a decision of any of its courts of justice, although not prohibited by the constitution of the State, is a question of very great importance, and not necessary now to be determined, because the resolution or law in question does not go so far. I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of a state legislature, or that it is absolute and without control, although its authority should not be expressly restrained by the constitution, or fundamental law of the State. The people of the United States erected their constitutions, or forms of government, to establish justice, to pro- 374 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. mote the general welfare, to secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their persons and property from violence. The pur- poses for which men enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. This fundamental principle flows from the very nature of our free republican governments, that no man should be compelled to do what the laws do not require, nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit. There are acts which the federal or state legislature cannot do, without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital principles in our free repub- lican governments which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take away that security for per- sonal liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the government was established. An act of the legislature (for I can- not call it a law), contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legis- lative authority. The obligation of a law in governments estab- lished on express compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by the nature of the power on which it is founded. A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for an act which, when done, was in violation of no existing law; a law that destroys, or impairs, "the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A, and gives it to B. It is against all reason and justice for a people to intrust a legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit of our state governments amount to a prohibition of such acts of legislation; and the general prin- ciples of law and reason forbid them. The legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid and punish; they may Declare new crimes, and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in future cases; they may command what is right, and prohibit what is wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private con- tract; or the right of private property. To maintain that our federal or state legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained, would, in my opinion, be a political heresy altogether inadmissible in our free republican governments. All the restrictions contained in the constitution of the United CALDER v. BULL. 375 States, on the power of the state legislatures, were provided in favor of the authority of the federal government. The prohibi- tion against their making any ex post facto laws was introduced for greater caution, and very probably arose from the knowledge that the parliament of Great Britain claimed and exercised a power to pass such laws, under the denomination of bills of attainder, or bills of pains and penalties; the first inflicting capital, and the other less punishment. These acts were legislative judgments; and an exercise of judicial power. Sometimes they respected the crime, by declaring acts to be treason which were not treason when committed; 1 at other times they violated the rules of evidence, to supply a deficiency of legal proof, by admitting one witness, when the existing law required two; by receiving evidence without oath; or the oath of the wife against the husband; or other tes- timony which the courts of justice would not admit; 2 at other times they inflicted punishments where the party was not by law liable to any punishment; 3 and in other cases they inflicted greater punishment than the law annexed to the offense.* The ground for the exercise of such legislative power was this, that the safety of the kingdom depended on the death, or other punish- ment, of the offender; as if traitors, when discovered, could be so formidable, or the government so insecure. With very few exceptions, the advocates of such laws were stimulated by ambi- tion, or personal resentment and vindictive malice. To prevent such, and similar acts of violence and injustice, I believe the federal and state legislatures were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder, or any ex post facto law. The constitution of the United States, art. 1, s. 9, prohibits the legislature of the United States from passing any ex post facto law; and in sec. 10 lays several restrictions on the authority of the legislatures of the several States; and among them, "that no State shall pass any ex post facto law." It may be remembered that the legislatures of several of the States, to wit, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and North and South Carolina, are expressly prohibited, by their state constitutions, from passing any ex post facto law. I shall endeavor to show what law is to be considered an ex post facto law, within the words and meaning of the prohibition 1 The case of the Earl of Straf- endon, 1667, 19 Car., 2, c. 10; and ford, in 1640. of Bishop Atterbury, in 1723, 9 2 The case of Sir John Fenwick, Geo. I., c. 17. in 1696. 4 The Coventry Act, in 1670, 22 s The banishment of Lord Clar- & 23 Car., 2, c. 1. 376 . CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. in the federal constitution. The prohibition, "that no State shall pass any ex post facto law," necessarily requires some explana- tion; for naked and without explanation it is unintelligible, and means nothing. Literally it is only that a law shall not be passed concerning, and after the fact, or thing done, or action commit- ted. I would ask, what fact; of what nature or kind; and by whom done? That Charles I, king of England, was beheaded; that Oliver Cromwell Avas protector of England; that Louis XVI, late king of France, was guillotined, are all facts that have hap- pened, but it would be nonsense to suppose that the States were prohibited from making any law after either of these events, and with reference thereto. The prohibition in the letter is not to pass any law concerning and after the fact, but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is this, that the legislatures of the several States shall not pass laws after a fact done by a subject, or citizen, which shall have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it. The prohibition, considered in this light, is an additional bulwark in favor of the personal security of the subject, to protect his person from punish- ment by legislative acts, having a retrospective operation. I do not think it was inserted to secure the citizen in his private rights, of either property or contracts. The prohibitions not to make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts, and not to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, were inserted to secure private rights; but the restriction not to pass any ex post facto law, was to secure the person of the subject from injury or punishment, in consequence of such law. If the prohibition against making ex post facto laws was intended to secure personal rights from being affected or injured by such laws, and the prohibition is sufficiently extensive for that object, the other restraints I nave enumerated were unnecessary, and there- fore improper, for both of them are retrospective. I will state what laws I consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition. 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punish- ment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. All these and similar laws are C ALDER v. BULL. 377 manifestly unjust and oppressive. In my opinion, the true dis- tinction is between ex post facto laws and retrospective laws. Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective, but every retrospective law is not an ex post facto law; the former only are prohibited. Every law that takes away or impairs rights vest- ed, agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective, and is generally unjust, and may be oppressive; and it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in which laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community, and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to their commence- ment; as statutes of oblivion, or of pardon. They are certainly retrospective, and literally both concerning, and after, the facts committed. But I do not consider any law ex post facto, within the prohibition, that mollifies the rigor of the criminal law; but only those that create, or aggravate, the crime; or increase the punishment, or change the rules of evidence, for the purpose of conviction. Every law that is to have an operation before the making thereof, as to commence at an antecedent time, or to save time from the statute of limitations, or to excuse acts which were unlawful, and before committed, and the like, is retrospective. But such laws may be proper or necessary, as the case may be. There is a great and apparent difference between making an un- lawful act lawful, and the making an innocent action criminal, and punishing it as a crime. The expressions "ex post facto laws" are technical; they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an appropriate meaning by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated and judicious Sir William Black- stone, in his Commentaries, considers an ex post facto law pre- cisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his successor, Mr. Wooddeson, and by the author of the Federalist, whom I esteem superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles of government. I also rely greatly on the definition, or explanation of ex post facto laws, as given by the eonventions of Massachusetts, Mary- land, and North Carolina, in their several constitutions, or forms of government. In the declaration of rights, by the convention of Massachusetts, part first, section 24th, "Laws made to punish actions done be- fore the existence of such laws, and which have not been declared crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, &c." In the declaration of rights, by the convention of Maryland, article 15th, "Retrospective laws punishing facts committed before 378 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. the existence of such laws, and by them only declared criminal, are oppressive, &c." In the declaration of rights by the convention of North Caro- lina, article 24th, I find the same definition, precisely in the same words as in the Maryland constitution. In the declaration of rights by the convention of Delaware, ar- ticle llth, the same definition was clearly intended, but inaccu- rately expressed; by saying, "laws punishing offenses (instead of actions, or facts) committed before the existence of such laws, are oppressive, &c." I am of opinion, that the fact, contemplated by the prohibi- tion, and not to be affected by a subsequent law, was some fact to be done by a citizen or subject. In 2 Lord Raymond, 1352, Raymond, J., called the stat. 7 Geo. 1, stat. 2, pt. 8, about registering contracts for South Sea stock, an ex post facto law; because it affected contracts made be- fore the statute. In the present case, there is no fact done by Bull and wife, plaintiffs in error, that is in any manner affected by the law or resolution of Connecticut; it does not concern, or relate to, any act done by them. The decree of the court of probate of Hartford, on the 21st March, in consequence of which Calder and wife claim a right to the property in question, was given before the said law or resolution, and in that sense was affected and set aside by it; and in consequence of the law allowing a hearing and a decision in favor of the will, they have lost what they would have been entitled to, if the law or resolution, and the decision in con- sequence thereof, had not been made. The decree of the court of probate is the only fact on which the law or resolution operates. In my judgment the case of the plaintiffs in error is not within the letter of the prohibition; and, for the reasons assigned, I am clearly of opinion, that it is not within the intention of the pro- hibition; and if within the intention, but out of the letter, I should not, therefore consider myself justified to continue it within the prohibition, and therefore that the whole was void. It was argued by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error, that the legislature of Connecticut had no constitutional power to make the resolution, or law, in question, granting a new hear- ing, &c. Without giving an opinion, at this time, whether this court has jurisdiction to decide that any law made by congress, con- trary to the constitution of the United States, is void, I am fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction to determine that any CALDER v. BULL. 379 law of any state legislature, contrary to the constitution of such State, is void. Further, if this court had such jurisdiction, yet it does not appear to me, that the resolution, or law, in question, is contrary to the charter of Connecticut, or its constitution, which is said by counsel to be composed of its charter, acts of assembly, and usages and customs. I should think that the courts of Con- necticut are the proper tribunals to decide whether laws contrary to the constitution thereof are void. In the present case they have, both in the inferior and superior courts, determined that the reso- lution, or law, in question, was not contrary to either their State or the federal constitution. To show that the resolution was contrary to the constitution of the United States, it was contended that the words, ex post facto law, have a precise and accurate meaning, and convey but one idea to professional men, which is, "by matter of after fact; by some- thing after the fact." And Co. Litt., 241; Fearne's Cont. Eem. (old ed.), 175 and 203; Powell on Devises, 113, 133, 134, were cited; and the table to Coke's Reports (by Wilson), title ex post facto, was referred to. There is no doubt that a man may be a trespasser from the beginning, by matter of 'after fact; as where an entry is given by law, and the party abuses it; or where the law gives a distress, and the party kills, or. works the distress. I admit, an act unlawful in the beginning may, in some cases, become lawful by matter of after fact. I also agree that the words "ex post facto" have the meaning contended for, and no other, in the cases cited, and in all similar cases where they are used unconnected with, and without relation to, legislative acts, or laws. There appears to me a manifest distinction between the case where one fact relates to, and affects another fact, as where an after fact, by operation of law, makes a former fact either lawful or unlawful; and the ease where a law made after a fact done, is to operate on, and to affect such fact. In the first case both the acts are done by private persons. In the second case the first act is done by a private person, and the second act is done by the legislature to affect the first act. I believe that but one instance can be found in which a British judge called a statute that affected contracts made before the statute, an ex post facto law; but the judges of Great Britain always considered penal statutes, that created crimes, or increased the punishment of them., as ex post facto laws. If the term ex post facto law is to be construed to include and to prohibit the enacting any law after a fact, it will greatly re- 380 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. strict the power of the federal and state legislatures; and the consequences of such a construction may not be foreseen. If the prohibition to make no ex post facto law extends to all laws made after the fact, the two prohibitions, not to make any- thing but gold and silver coin a tender in- payment of debts, and not to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, were improper and unnecessary. It was further urged, that if the provision does not extend to prohibit the making any law after a fact, then all choses in action, all lands by devise, all personal property by bequest or distribu- tion, by elegit, by execution, by judgments, particularly on torts, will be unprotected from the legislative power of the States; rights vested may be divested at the will and pleasure of the state legislatures; and, therefore, that the true construction and mean- ing of the prohibition is, that the States pass no law >to deprive a citizen of any right vested in him by existing laws. It is not to be presumed that the federal or state legislatures will pass laws to deprive citizens of rights vested in them by exist- ing laws; unless for the benefit of the whole community; and on making full satisfaction. The restraint against making any ex post facto laws was not considered, by the framers of the con- stitution, as extending to prohibit the depriving a citizen even of a vested right to property; or the provision, "that private prop- erty should not be taken for public use, without just compensa- tion," was unnecessary. It seems to me that the right of property, in its origin, could only arise from compact express, or implied, and I think it the better opinion, that the right, as well as the mode or manner of acquiring property, and of alienating or transferring, inheriting or transmitting it, is conferred by society, is regulated by civil in- stitution, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by posi- tive law. When I say that a right is vested in a citizen, I mean, that he has the power to do certain actions, or to possess certain things, according to the law of the land. If any one has a right to property, such right is a perfect and exclusive right; but no one can have such right before he has acquired a better right to the property than any other person in the world; a right, therefore, only to recover property cannot be called a perfect and exclusive right. I cannot agree, that a right to property vested in Calder and wife, in consequence of the decree of the 21st of March, 1783, disapproving of the will of Morrison, the grandson. If the will was valid, Mrs. Calder could have no CUMMINGS v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 381 right, as heiress of Morrison, the physician; but if the will was set aside, she had an undoubted title. The resolution, or law, alone had no manner of effect on any right whatever vested in Calder and wife. The resolution, or law, combined with the new hearing, and the decision in virtue of it, took away their right to recover the property in question. .But when combined they took away no right of property vested in Calder and wife; because the decree against the will, 21st March, 1783, did not vest in or transfer any property to them. I am under a necessity to give a construction, or explanation of the words, "ex post facto," because they have not any certain meaning attached to them. But I will not go further than I feel myself bound to do; and if I ever exercise the jurisdiction, I will not decide any law to be void, but in a very clear case. I am of the opinion that the decree of the supreme court of errors of Connecticut be affirmed, with costs. [JUSTICES PATERSON, IREDELL, and GUSHING delivered con- curring opinions.] CUMMINGS v. THE STATE OF MISSOUEI. 4 Wallace, 277. Decided 1866. [The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.] ME. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court. This case comes before us on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Missouri, and involves a consideration of the test oath imposed by the constitution of that State. The plaintiff in error is a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, and was indicted and convicted in one of the circuit courts of the State of the crime of teaching and preaching as a priest and minister of that relig- ious denomination without having first taken the oath, and was sentenced to pay a fine of five hundred dollars, and to be com- mitted to jail until the same was paid. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State, the judgment was affirmed. The oath prescribed by the constitution, divided into its sep- arable parts, embraces more than thirty distinct affirmations or tests. Some of the acts against which it is directed, constitute offenses of the highest grade, to which, upon conviction, heavy penalties are attached. Some of the acts have never been classed as offenses in the laws of any State, and some of the acts, under 382 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. many circumstances, would not even be blameworthy. It requires the affiant to deny not only that he has ever "been in armed hos- tility to the United States, or to the lawful authorities thereof," but, among other things, that he has ever, "by act or word," man- ifested his adherence to the cause of the enemies of the United States, foreign or domestic, or his desire for their triumph over the arms of the United States, or his sympathy with those en- gaged in rebellion, or has ever harbored or aided any person en- gaged in guerilla warfare against the loyal inhabitants of the United States, or has ever entered or left the State for the pur- pose of avoiding enrolment or draft in the military service of the United States; or, to escape the performance of duty in the militia of the United States, has ever indicated, in any terms, his disaffec- tion to the government of the United States in its contest with the Rebellion. Every person who is unable to take this oath is declared incapa- ble of holding, in the State, "any office of honor, trust, or profit under its authority, or of being an officer, councilman, director, or trustee, or other manager of any corporation., public or private, now existing or hereafter established by its authority, or of act- ing as a professor or teacher in any educational institution, or in any common or other school, or of holding any real estate or other property in trust for the use of any church, religious so- ciety, or congregation." And every person holding, at the time the constitution takes effect, any of the offices, trusts, or positions mentioned, is re- quired, within sixty days thereafter, to take the oath; and, if he fail to comply with this requirement, it is declared that his office, trust, or position shall ipso facto become vacant. No person, after the expiration of the sixty days, is permitted, without taking the oath, "to practice as an attorney or counsel- lor-at-law, nor after that period can any person be competent, as a bishop, priest, deacon, minister, elder, or other clergyman, of any religious persuasion, sect, or denomination, to teach, preach, or solemnize marriages." Fine and imprisonment are prescribed as a punishment for holding or exercising any of "the offices, positions, trusts, profes- sions, or functions" specified, without having taken the oath; and false swearing or affirmation in taking it is declared to be perjury, punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. The oath thus required is, for its severity, without any prece- dent that we can discover. In the first place, it is retrospective; it embraces all the past from this day; and, if taken years hence, CUMMINGS v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 383 it will also cover all the intervening period. In its retrospective feature we believe it is peculiar to this country. In England and Trance there have been test oaths, but they were always limited to an affirmation of present belief, or present disposition towards the government, and were never exacted with reference to particu- lar instances of past misconduct. In the second place, the oath is directed not merely against overt and visible acts of hostility to the government, but is intended to reach words, desires, and sympathies, also. And, in the third place, it allows no distinction between acts springing from malignant enmity and acts which may have been prompted by charity, or affection, or relationship. If one has ever expressed sympathy with any who were drawn into the Rebellion, even if the recipients of that sympathy were con- nected by the closest ties of blood, he is as unable to subscribe to the oath as the most active and the most cruel of the rebels, and is equally debarred from the offices of honor or trust, and the posi- tions and employments specified. But, as it was observed by the learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the State of Missouri, this court cannot decide the case upon the justice or hardship of these provisions. Its duty is to determine whether they are in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. On behalf of Missouri, it is urged that they only prescribe a qualification for holding certain offices, and prac- ticing certain callings, and that it is therefore within the power of the State to adopt them. On the other hand, it is contended that they are in conflict with that clause of the Constitution which forbids any State to pass a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law. We admit the propositions of the counsel of Missouri, that the States which existed previous to the adoption of the Federal Con- stitution possessed originally all the attributes of sovereignty; that they still retain those attributes, except as they have been sur- rendered by the formation of the Constitution, and the amend- ments thereto; that the new States, upon their admission into the Union, became invested with equal rights, and were thereafter sub- ject only to similar restrictions, and that among the rights re- served to the States is the right of each^ State to determine the qualifications for office, and the conditions upon which its citizens may exercise their various callings and pursuits within its juris- diction. These are general propositions, and involve principles of the highest moment. But it by no means follows that, under the form of creating a qualification or attaching a condition, the States 384 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. can in effect inflict a punishment for a past act which was not punishable at the time it was committed. The question is not as to the existence of the power of the State over matters of internal police, but whether that power has been made in the present case an instrument for the infliction of punishment against the inhibi- tion of the Constitution. Qualifications relate to the fitness or capacity of the party for a particular pursuit or profession. Webster defines the term to mean "any natural endowment or any acquirement which fits a person for a place, office, or employment, or enables him to sus- tain any character, with success. It is evident from the nature of the pursuits and professions of the parties, placed under dis- abilities by the constitution of Missouri, that many of the aots, from the taint of which they must purge themselves, have no possible relation to their fitness for those pursuits and professions. There can be no connection between the fact that Mr. Cummings entered or left the State of Missouri to avoid enrolment or draft in the military service of the United States and his fitness to teach the doctrines or administer the sacraments of his church; nor can a fact of this kind or the expression of words of sympathy with some of the persons drawn into the Rebellion constitute any evidence of the unfitness of the attorney or counsellor to prac- tice his profession, or of the professor to teach the ordinary branches of education, or of the want of business knowledge or business capacity in the manager of a corporation, or in any di- rector or trustee. It is manifest upon the simple statement of many of the acts and of the professions and pursuits, that there is no such relation between them as to render a denial of the commission of the acts at all appropriate as a condition of allow- ing the exercise of the professions and pursuits. The oath could not, therefore, have been required as a means of ascertaining whether parties were qualified or not for their respective callings or the trusts with which they were charged. It was required in order to reach the person, not the calling. It was exacted, not from any notion that the several acts designated indicated unfit- ness for the callings, but because it was thought that the several acts deserved punishment, and that for many of them there was no way to inflict punishment except by depriving the parties, who had committed them, of some of the rights and privileges of the citizen. The disabilities created by the constitution of Missouri must be regarded as penalties they constitute punishment. We do not agree with the counsel of Missouri that "to punish one is to de- CUMMINGS v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 385 prive him of life, liberty, or property, and that to take from him anything less than these is no punishment at all." The learned counsel does not use these terms life, liberty, and property as comprehending every right known to the law. He does not in- clude under liberty freedom from outrage on the feelings as well as restraints on the person. He does not include under property those estates which one may acquire in professions, though they are often the source of the highest emoluments and honors. The deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this fact. Disqualification from office may be punishment, as in cases of conviction upon im- peachment. Disqualification from the pursuits of a lawful avocation, or from positions of trust, or from the privi- lege of appearing in the courts, or acting as an execu- tor, administrator, or guardian, may also, and often has been, imposed as punishment. By statute 9 and 10, William III, chap. 32, if any person educated in or having made a profession of the Christian religion, did "by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking," deny the truth of the religion, or the divine authority of the Scriptures, he was for the first offense rendered incapable to hold any office or place of trust; and for the second, he was rendered incapable of bringing any action, being guar- dian, executor, legatee, or purchaser of lands, besides being sub- jected to three years' imprisonment without bail. 1 By statute 1 George I, chap. 13, contempts against the king's title, arising from refusing or neglecting to take certain pre- scribed oaths, and yet acting in an office or* place of trust for which they were required, were punished by incapacity to hold any public office; to prosecute any suit; to be guardian or execu- tor; to take any legacy or deed of gift; and to vote at any elec- tion for members of Parliament; and the offender was also sub- ject to a forfeiture of five hundred pounds to any one who would sue for the same. 2 "Some punishments," says Blackstone, "consist in exile of ban- ishment, by abjuration of the realm or transportation; others in loss of liberty by perpetual or temporary imprisonment. Some extend to confiscation by forfeiture of lands or movables, or both, or of the profits of lands for life; others induce a disability of holding offices or employments, being heirs, executors, and the like." 3 1 4 Black, 44. a id., 377. 2 Id., 124. 25 386 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. In France, deprivation or suspension of civil rights, or of some of them, and among these of the right of voting, of eligibility to office, of taking part in family councils, of being guardian or trustee, of bearing arms, and of teaching or being employed in a school or seminary of learning, are punishments prescribed by her code. The theory upon which our political institutions rest is, that all men have certain inalienable rights that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that in the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all positions, are alike open to every one, and that in the protection of these rights all are equal before the law. Any deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punishment, and can be in no otherwise defined. Punishment not being, therefore, restricted, as contended by counsel, to the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, but also embracing deprivation or suspension of political or civil rights, and the disabilities prescribed by the provisions of the Missouri constitution being in effect punishment, we proceed to consider whether there is any inhibition in the Constitution of the United States against their enforcement. The counsel for Missouri closed his argument in this case by presenting a striking picture of the struggle for ascendancy in that State during the recent Kebellion between the friends and the enemies of the Union, and of the fierce passions which that struggle aroused. It was in the midst of the struggle that the present constitution was framed, although itt was not adopted by the people until the war had closed. It would have been strange, therefore, had it not exhibited in its provisions some traces of the excitement amidst which the convention held its deliberations. It was against the excited action of the States, under such in- fluences as these, that the framers of the Federal Constitution intended to guard. In Fletcher v. Peck, 4 Mr. Chief Justice Mar- shall, speaking of such action, uses this language: "Whatever re- spect might have been felt for the State sovereignties, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the Constitution viewed with some apprehension the violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and that the people of the United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested a determina- tion to shield themselves and their property from the effects of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed. The * 6 Cranch, 137. CUMMINGS v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 387 restrictions on the legislative power of the States are obviously founded in this sentiment; and the Constitution of the United States contains what may be deemed a bill of rights for the peo- ple of each State." "No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts." A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial. If the punishment be less than death, the act is termed a bill of pains and penalties. Within the meaning of the Constitution, bills of attainder include bills of pains and penalties. In these cases the legislative body, in addition to its legitimate functions, exer- cises the powers and office of judge; it assumes, in the language of the text-books, judicial magistracy; it pronounces upon the guilt of the party, without any of the forms or safeguards of trial; it determines the sufficiency of the proofs produced, whether con- formable to the rules of evidence or otherwise; and it fixes the degree of punishment in accordance with its own notions of the enormity of the offense. "Bills of this sort," says Mr. Justice Story, "have been most usually passed in England in times of rebellion, or gross subserv- iency to the crown, or of violent political excitements; periods, in which all nations are most liable (as well the free as the en- slaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights and liberties of others." 5 These bills are generally directed against individuals by name; but they may be directed against a whole class. The bill against the Earl of Kildare and others, passed in the reign of Henry VIII, 6 enacted that "all such persons which be or heretofore have been comforters, abettors, partakers, confederates, or adherents unto the said" late earl, and certain other parties, who were named, "in his or their false and traitorous acts and purposes, shall in like- wise stand, and be attainted, adjudged, and convicted of high treason;" and that "the same attainder, judgment, and convic- tion against the said comforters, abettors, partakers, confeder- ates, and adherents, shall be as strong and effectual in the law against them, and every of them, as though they and every of them had been specially, singularly, and particularly named by their proper names and surnames in the said act." These bills may inflict punishment absolutely, or may inflict it conditionally. s Commentaries, 1344. 28 Henry VIIL, chap. 18; 3 Stats, of the Realm, 694. 388 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The bill against the Earl of Clarendon, passed in the reign of Charles the Second, enacted that the earl should suffer perpetual exile, and be forever banished from the realm; and that if he returned, or was found in England, or in any other of the king's dominions, after the first of February, 1667, he should suffer the pains and penalties of treason; with the proviso, however, that if he surrendered himself before the said first day of February for trial, the penalties and disabilities declared should be void and of no effect. 7 "A British act of Parliament," to cite the language of the Su- preme Court of Kentucky, "might declare, that if certain individ- uals, or a class of individuals, failed to do a given act by a named day, they should be deemed to be, and treated as convicted felons or traitors. Such an act comes precisely within the definition of a bill of attainder, and the English courts would enforce it with- out indictment or trial by jury." 8 If the clauses of the second article of the constitution of Mis- souri, to which we have referred, had in terms declared that Mr. Cummings was guilty, or should be held guilty, of having been in armed hostility to Ihe United States, or of having entered that State to avoid being enrolled or drafted into the military service of the United States, and, therefore, should be deprived of the right to preach as a priest of the Catholic Church, or to teach in any institution of learning, there could be no question that the clauses would constitute a bill of attainder within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. If these clauses, instead of mentioning his name, had declared that all priests and clergymen within the State of Missouri were guilty of these acts, or should be held guilty of them, and hence be subjected to the like deprivation, the clauses would be equally open to objection. And, further, if these clauses had declared that all such priests and clergymen should be so held guilty, and be thus deprived, provided they did not, by a day designated, do certain specified acts, they would be no less within the inhibition of the Federal Constitution. In all these cases there would be the legislative enactment cre- ating the deprivation without any of the ordinary forms and guards provided for the security of the citizen in the administra- tion of justice by the established tribunals. The results which would follow from clauses of the character mentioned do follow from the clauses actually adopted. The dif- 7 Printed in 6 Howell's State Gaines v. Buford, 1 Dana, 510. Trials, p. 391. CUMMINGS v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 389 ference between the last case supposed and the case actually pre- sented is one of form only, and not of substance. The existing clauses presume the guilt of the priests and clergymen, and ad- judge the deprivation of their right to preach or teach unless the presumption be first removed by their expurgatory oath in other words, they assume the guilt and adjudge the punishment condi- tionally. The clauses supposed differ only in that they declare the guilt instead of assuming it. The deprivation is effected with equal certainty in the one case as it would be in the other, but not with equal directness. The purpose of the lawmaker in the case supposed would be openly avowed; in the case existing it is only disguised. The legal result must be the same, for what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Consti- tution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was lev- eled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceed- ing. We proceed to consider the second clause of what Mr. Chief Justice Marshall terms a bill of rights for the people of each State the clause which inhibits 'the passage of an ex post facto law. By an ex post facto law is meant one which imposes a punish- ment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then pre- scribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to convict than was then required. In Fletcher v. Peck, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall defined an ex post facto law to be one "which renders an act punishable in a manner in which it was not punishable when it was committed." "Such a law," said that eminent judge, "may inflict penalties on the person, or may inflict pecuniary penalties which swell the public treasury. The legislature is then prohibited from passing a law by which a man's estate, or any part of it, shall be seized for a crime, which was not declared by some previous law to render him liable to that punishment. Why, then, should violence be done to the natural meaning of words for the purpose of leaving to the legislature the power of seizing for public use the estate of an individual, in the form of a law annulling the title by which he holds the estate? The court can perceive no sufficient grounds for making this distinction. This rescinding act would have the 390 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. effect of an ex post facto law. It forfeits the estate of Fletcher for a crime not committed by himself, but by those from whom he purchased. This cannot be effected in the form of an ex post facto law, or bill of attainder; why, then, is it allowable in the form of a law annulling the original grant?" The act to which reference is here made was one passed by the State of Georgia, rescinding a previous act, under which lands had been granted. The rescinding act, annulling the title of the grantees, did not, in terms, define any crimes, or inflict any pun- ishment, or direct any judicial proceedings; yet, inasmuch as the legislature was forbidden from passing any law by which a man's estate could be seized for a crime, which was not declared such by some previous law rendering him liable to that punishment, the chief justice was of opinion that the rescinding act had the effect of an ex post facto law, and was within (the constitutional prohi- bition. The clauses in the Missouri constitution, which are the subject of consideration, do not, in terms, define any crimes, or declare that any punishment shall be inflicted, but they produce the same result upon the parties, against whom they are directed, as though the crimes were defined and the punishment was declared. They assume that there are persons in Missouri who are guilty of some of the acts designated. They would have no meaning in the constitution were not such the fact. They are aimed at past acts, and not future acts. They were intended especially to operate upon parties who, in some form or manner, by action or words, directly or indirectly, had aided or countenanced Kebellion, or sympathized with parties engaged in the Kebellion, or had en- deavored to escape the proper responsibilities and duties of a citizen in time of war; and they were intended to operate by de- priving such persons of the right to hold certain offices and trusts, and to pursue their ordinary and regular avocations. This de- privation is punishment; nor is it any less so because a way is opened for escape from it by the expurgatory oath. The framers of the constitution of Missouri knew at the time that whole classes of individuals would be unable to take the oath prescribed. To them there is no escape provided; to them the deprivation was intended to be, and is, absolute and perpetual. To make the enjoyment of a right dependent upon an impossible condition is equivalent to an absolute denial of the right under any condition, and such denial, enforced for a past act, is nothing less than pun- ishment imposed for that act. It is a misapplication of terms io call it anything else. GUMMING S v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 391 Now, some of the acts to which the expurgatory oath is di- rected were not offenses at the time they were committed. It was no offense against any law to enter or leave the State of Missouri for the purpose of avoiding enrollment or draft in the military service of the United States, however much the evasion of sucii service might be the subject of moral censure. Clauses which prescribe a penalty for an act of this nature are within the terms of the definition of an ex post facto law "they impose a punish- ment for an act not punishable at the time it was committed." Some of the acts at which the oath is directed constituted high offenses at the time they were committed, to which, upon convic- tion, fine and imprisonment, or other heavy penalties, were at- tached. The clauses which provide a further penalty for these acts are also within the definition of an ex post facto law "they impose additional punishment to that prescribed when the act was committed." And this is not all. The clauses in question subvert the pre- sumptions of innocence, and alter the rules of evidence, which heretofore, under the universally recognized principles of the common law, have been supposed to be fundamental and un- changeable. They assume that the parties are guilty; they call upon the parties to establish their innocence; and they declare that such innocence can be shown only in one way by an inqui- sition, in the form of an expurgatory oath, into the consciences of the parties. The objectionable character of these clauses will be more ap- parent if we put them into the ordinary form of a legislative act. Thus, if instead of the general provisions in the constitution the convention had provided as follows: Be it enacted, that all per- sons who have been in armed hostility to the United States shall, upon conviction thereof, not only be punished as the laws pro- vided at the time the offenses charged were committed, but shall also be thereafter rendered incapable of holding any of the offices, trusts, and positions, and of exercising any of the pursuits men- tioned in the second article of the constitution of Missouri; no one would have any doubt of the nature of the enactment. It would be an ex post facto law, and void; for it would add a new punishment for an old offense. So, too, if the convention had passed an enactment of a similar kind with reference to those acts which do not constitute offenses. Thus, had it provided as fol- lows: Be it enacted, that all persons who have heretofore, at any time, entered or left the State of Missouri, with intent to avoid enrollment or draft in the military service of the United States, 392 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. shall, upon conviction thereof, be forever rendered incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit in the State, or of teaching in any seminary of learning, or of preaching as a min- ister of the gospel of any denomination, or of exercising any of the professions or pursuits mentioned in the second article of the constitution; there would be no question of the character of the enactment. It would be an ex post facto law, because it would impose a punishment for an act not punishable at the time it was committed. The provisions of the constitution of Missouri accomplish pre- cisely what enactments like those supposed would have accom- plished. They impose the same penalty, without the formality of a judicial trial and conviction; for the parties embraced by the supposed enactments would be incapable of taking the oath pre- scribed; to them its requirement would be an impossible condi- tion. Now, as the State, had she attempted the course supposed, would have failed, it must follow that any other mode producing the same result must equally fail. The provision of the Federal Constitution, intended to secure the liberty of the citizen, can- not be evaded by the form in which the power of the State is exerted. If this were not so, if that which cannot be accom- plished by means looking directly to the end, can be accom- plished by indirect means, the inhibition may be evaded at pleasure. No kind of oppression can be named, against which the framers of the Constitution intended to guard, which may not be effected. Take the case supposed by counsel that of a man tried for trea- son and acquitted, or, if convicted, pardoned the legislature may nevertheless enact thait, if the person thus acquitted or par- doned does not take an oath that he never has committed the acts charged against him, he shall not be permitted to hold any office of honor or trust or profit, or pursue any avocation in the State. Take the case before us; the constitution of Missouri, as we have seen, excludes, on failure to take the oath prescribed by it, a large class of persons within her borders from numerous positions and pursuits; it would have been equally within the power of the State to have extended the exclusion so as to deprive the parties, who are unable to take the oath, from any avocation whatever in the State. Take still another case: suppose that in the progress of events, persons now in the minority in the State should obtain the ascendancy, and secure the control of the government; noth- ing could prevent, if the constitutional prohibition can be evaded, the enactment of a provision requiring every person, as a condi- tion of holding any position of honor or trust, or of pursuing any CUMMINGS v. STATE OF MISSOURI. 393 avocation in the State, to take an oath thai he had never advo- cated or advised or supported the imposition of the present expur- gatory oath. Under this form of legislation the most flagrant in- vasion of private rights, in periods of excitement, may be enacted, and individuals, and even whole classes, may be deprived of polit- ical and civil rights. A question arose in New York, soon after the treaty of peace of 1783, upon a statute of that State, which involved a discussion of the nature and character of these expurgatory oaths, when used as a means of inflicting punishment for past conduct. The subject was regarded as so important, and the requirement of the oath such a violation of the fundamental principles of civil liberty, and the rights of the citizen, that it engaged the attention of eminent lawyers and distinguished statesmen of the time, and among others of Alexander Hamilton. We will cite some passages of a paper left by him on the subject, in which, with his characteristic full- ness and ability, he examines the oath, and demonstrates that it is not only a mode of inflicting punishment, but a mode in viola- tion of all the constitutional guarantees, secured by the Kevolu- tion, of the rights and liberties of the people. "If we examine it" (the measure requiring the oath), said this great lawyer, "with an unprejudiced eye, we must acknowledge, not only that it was an invasion of the treaty, but a subversion of one great principle of social security, to wit: that every man shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. This was to invert the order of things; and instead of obliging the State to prove the guilt, in order to inflict the penalty, it was to oblige the citizen to establish his own innocence to avoid the penalty. It was to excite scruples in the honest and conscientious, and to hold out a bribe to perjury. ... It was a mode of inquiry [as to] who had committed any of those crimes to which the penalty of disqualification was annexed, with this aggravation, that it deprived the citizen of the benefit of that advantage, which he would have enjoyed by leaving, as in all other cases, the burden of the proof upon the prosecutor. "To place this matter in a still clearer light, let it be supposed that, instead of the mode of indictment and trial by jury, the legis- lature was to declare that every citizen who did not swear he had never adhered to the King of Great Britain should incur all the penalties which our treason laws prescribe. Would this not be a palpable evasion of the treaty, and a direct infringement of the Constitution? The principle is the same in both cases, with only this difference in the consequences that in the instance already 394 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. acted upon the citizen forfeits a part of his rights; in the one supposed he would forfeit the whole. The degree of punishment is all that distinguishes the cases. In either, justly considered, it is substituting a new and arbitrary mode of prosecution to that ancient and highly esteemed one recognized by the laws and con- stitution of the State. I mean the trial by jury. "Let us not forget that the Constitution declares that trial by jury, in all cases in which it has been formerly used, should re- main inviolate forever, and that the legislature should at no time erect any new jurisdiction which should not proceed according to the course of the common law. Nothing can be more repugnant to the true genius of the common law than such an inquisition as has been mentioned into the consciences of men. ... If any oath with retrospect to past conduct were to be made the condition on which individuals, who have resided within the Brit- ish lines, should hold their estates, we should immediately see that this proceeding would be tyrannical, and a violation of the treaty; and yet, when the same mode is employed , the municipal law of the State retires, and gives place to the foreign law. . . . It has been supposed, in the argument on the part of the plaintiff, that the eighth section of the act of Congress passed March 6, 1820 (3 St. at Large, p. 544), which prohibited slavery north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes, within which the plaintiff and his wife temporarily resided at Fort Snelling, pos- sessed some superior virtue and effect, extra-territorially, and with- in the State of Missouri, beyond that of the laws of Illinois, or those of Ohio in the case of Strader et al. v. Graham. A similar ground was taken and urged upon the court in the case just men- tioned, under the ordinance of 1787, which was enacted during the time of the Confederation, and re-enacted by Congress after the adoption of the Constitution, with some amendments adapting it to the new Government. (1 St. at Large, p. 50). SCOTT v. SANDFORD. 487 In answer to this ground, the Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, observed: "The argument assumes that the six articles which that ordinance declares to be perpetual, are still in force in the States since formed within the territory, and ad- mitted into the Union. If this proposition could be maintained, it would not alter the question; for the regulations of Congress, under the old Confederation or the present Constitution, for the government of a particular Territory, could have no force beyond its limits. It certainly could not restrict the power of the States, within their respective territories, nor in any manner interfere with their laws and institutions, nor give this court control over them. "The ordinance in question," he observes, "if still in force, could have no more operation than the laws of Ohio in the State of Ken- tucky, and could not influence the decision upon the rights of the master or the slaves in that State." This view, thus authoritatively declared, furnishes a conclusive answer to the distinction attempted to be set up between the extra- territorial effect of a State law and the act of Congress in question. It must be admitted that Congress possesses no power to regu- late or abolish slavery within the States; and that, if this act had attempted any such legislation, it would have been a nullity. And yet the argument here, if there be any force in it, leads to the result, that effect may be given to such legislation; for it is only by giving the act of Congress operation within the State of Mis- souri, that it can have any effect upon the question between the parties. Having no such effect directly, it will be difficult to maintain, upon any consistent reasoning, that it can be "made to operate indirectly upon the subject. . . . It is perhaps not unfit to notice, in this connection, that many of the most eminent statesmen and jurists of the country enter- tain the opinion that this provision of the act of Congress, even within the territory to which it relates, was not authorized by any power under the Constitution. . . . Upon the whole, it must be admitted that the current of author- ity, both in England and in this country, is in accordance with the law as declared by the courts of Missouri in the case before us, and we think the court below was not only right, but bound to follow it. ... Our conclusion is, that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed. [Justices Wayne and Daniel concurred entirely in the opinion 488 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of the Chief Justice. Justice Grier concurred with Justice Nel- son "on the questions discussed by him." He did not mention the plea in abatement. Justice Campbell did not consider the plea in abatement, but concurred with the Chief Justice as to the other points involved. Justice Catron concurred with the Chief Justice as to the Missouri Compromise and with Justice Xelson as to the effect of residence in Illinois. He held that the plea in abatement was not before the court. Of the two dissenting justices, McLean denied and Curtis admitted that the plea in abatement was open. MR. JUSTICE MCLEAN and MR. JUSTICE CURTIS dissented. JUSTICE McLEAN held, 1. As to the locality of slavery, that it was a mere municipal regulation, founded upon and limited to the range of territorial laws. 2. Slavery is emphatically a State institution. In the formation of the Federal Constitution, care was taken to confer no power on the Federal Government to inter- fere with this institution in the States. In the provision respeet- ing the slave trade, in fixing the ratio of representation, and providing for the reclamation of fugitives from labor, slaves were referred to as persons, and in no other respect are they considered in the Constitution. 3. As to the power of Congress to establish Territorial Governments, and to prohibit the introduction of slav- ery therein, Congress has power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States. If Congress should deem slaves or free colored persons injurious to the population of a free Terri- tory, on any ground connected with the public interest, they have the power to prohibit them from becoming settlers in it. 4. As to the effect of taking slaves into a State or Territory, and so hold- ing them, where slavery is prohibited, how can the slave be coerced to serve in a State or Territory, not only without the authority of law, but against its express provisions? Where no slavery exists, the presumption, without regard to color, is in favor of freedom. In 1824, in the case of Winny v. Whitesides (1 Missouri Rep., 473), the Missouri Supreme Court held, that if a slave be detained in Illi- nois until he be entitled to freedom, the right of the owner does not revive when he finds the negro in a slave State. 5. As to whether the status of slavery attached to the plaintiff and wife, on their return to Missouri, this doctrine is not asserted in the late opinion of the Supreme Court of Missouri, and up to 1852 the contrary doctrine was uniformly maintained by that court. SCOTT v. SANDFORD. 489 JUSTICE CUETIS held that the plea in abatement was before the court. To determine whether any person of African descent whose ancestors were sold as slaves in the United States can be a citizen of the United States, it may be inquired who were citizens of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Citizens at that time can have been no other than the citizens of the United States under the Confederation. These included free persons descended from Africans held in slavery. At the time of the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, all free native- born inhabitants of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina., though descended from African slaves, were not only citizens of those States, but such of them as had the other necessary qualifications possessed the franchise of electors, on equal terms with other citizens. He con- cluded therefore, 1. That the free-born citizens of each State are citizens of the United States. 2. That as free colored persons born within some of the States are citizens of those States, such persons are also citizens of the United States. 3. That every such citizen, residing in any State, has the right to sue and is liable to be sued in the Federal courts, as a citizen of that State in which he resides. 4. That as the plea to the jurisdiction in this case shows no facts, except that the plaintiff was of African descent, and his ancestors were sold as staves, and as these facts are not inconsistent with his citizenship of the United States, and his residence in the State of Missouri, the plea to the jurisdiction was bad, and the judgment of the Circuit Court overruling it, was correct. As to the effect of Scott's residence in the Territory in which slavery was prohibited, the judge held that the laws of the United States in operation there changed his status to that of a free man. Fur- thermore the consent of the master that his slave, residing in a country which does not tolerate slavery, may enter into a lawful contract of marriage, attended with the civil rights and duties which belong to that condition, is an effectual act of emancipation. The Act of Congress of March 6, 1820, was a regulation respecting the territory of the United States, and was a constitutional and valid law.] NOTE. The court consisted at this time of nine judges, seven of whom concurred in the judgment rendered. Of these seven, only three, viz., Taney, Wayne and Daniel, held that the plea in abatement was open, and hence that the question of the status of free negroes was before the court. Justice Catron held that the 490 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. plea was not open. Justices Nelson and Campbell took such views of the case that they did not pass upon it, and Justice Grier seemed to avoid the question. Six members of the court, viz., Taney, Wayne, Daniel, Grier, Campbell, and Catron, concurred in pro- nouncing the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional. Justice Nelson did not pass upon it. It is important in this case to distinguish the opinion of the court from the judgment of the court. What is called in the re- port the opinion of the court is in reality only the opinion of the Chief Justice, which he delivered before announcing the judg- ment of the court. The distinction appears clearly in the opinions of Justices Campbell and Catron, who concurred in the judgment of the Chief Justice, but expressly dissented from certain parts of his opinion. The opinion of Justice Nelson was the only one in which all the justices of the majority concurred. It was orig- inally prepared to stand as the opinion of the court. See Thayer's Cases, I, 480, note. Scott's first case is reported in 15 Mo., 682. "Had the supreme court confined its action to a denial of juris- diction in this case on the ground taken by the Missouri state su- preme court, the decision would probably have been accepted generally as law, however harsh, in the case of slaves removed tem- porarily from state jurisdiction and then brought back. But, im- pelled, as has been charged, by a superserviceable desire to forward the interests and designs of slave-holders in the territories, or as is much more probable, by the wide sweep taken by counsel on both sides in their arguments, the chief justice and the assenting jus- tices proceeded to deliver a course of individual lectures on history, politics, ethics and international law, the exact connection of which with the legal subject matter in hand it was in many cases difficult for the justices themselves to make perfectly clear. In these addi- tions to the denial of jurisdiction lay the interest, importance and far-reaching consequences of the Dred Scott decision. . . . The Dred Scott decision was the last attempt to decide the con- test between slavery extension and slavery restriction by form of law." Alexander Johnston in Lalor's Cyclopedia, I, 839, 841. "It is noticeable that the sting of the decision lay rather in the obiter dicta than- in the determination of the main question in- volved." Bryce, American Commonwealth (3d Ed.), I, 263, note. "While Chief Justice TANEY has always in the public estimation borne the brunt of this decision, it is nevertheless to be considered that of the nine judges of the court six concurred with him in SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 491 holding that the plaintiff was a slave, and that the judgment of the court should be affirmed. Of these six (Catron, Daniel, Wayne, Campbell, Nelson, and Grier) two not the two least strong were respectively from the States of New York and Pennsylvania, and had both held important judicial positions in those States be- fore reaching the bench of the Federal Supreme Court. They must all share and doubtless had none of them any desire to avoid it the responsibility of this judgment of the court. The opinion in dissent of Justice CURTIS, ... is profound in its examination of the sources of the law upon the subject; luminous and learned in its consideration of the political and judicial his- tory of the country; and convincing in the conclusions to which it arrives. Hardly too much can be said in praise of this masterly effort." George W. Biddle in Constitutional History as seen in American Law, 180-181. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 16 Wallace, 36. Decided 1873. [The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.] MR. JUSTICE MILLER now, April 14, 1873, delivered the opinion of the court. These cases are brought here by writs of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. They arise out of the efforts of the butchers of New Orleans to resist the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company in the exercise of certain powers conferred by the charter which created it, and which was granted by the legislature of that State. . . . The records show that the plaintiffs in error relied upon, and as- serted throughout the entire course of the litigation in the State courts, that the grant of privileges in the charter of defendant, which they were contesting, was a violation of the most important provisions of the thirteenth and fourteenth articles of amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The jurisdiction and the duty of this court to review the judgment of the State court on those questions is clear and imperative. The statute thus assailed as unconstitutional was passed March 8, 1869, and is entitled, "An act to protect the health of the city 492 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of Xew Orleans, to locate the stock-landings and slaughter-houses, and to incorporate the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Company." The first section forbids the landing or slaughtering of animals whose flesh is intended for food, within the city of New Orleans and other parishes and boundaries named and defined, or the keep- ing or establishing any slaughter-houses or abattoirs within those limits, except by the corporation thereby created, which is also lim- ited to certain places afterwards mentioned. Suitable penalties are enacted for violations of this prohibition. The second section designates the corporators, gives the name to the corporation, and confers on it the usual corporate powers. The third and fourth sections authorize the company to estab- lish and erect within certain territorial limits, therein defined, one or more stock-yards, stock-landings, and slaughter-houses, and im- pose upon it the duty of erecting, on or before the first day of June, 1869, one grand slaughter-house of sufficient capacity for slaughtering five hundred animals per day. It declares that the company, after it shall have prepared all the necessary buildings, yards, and other conveniences for that pur- pose, shall have the sole and exclusive privilege of conducting and carrying on the live-stock landing and slaughter-house business within the limits and privilege granted 'by the act, and that all such animals shall be landed at the stock-landings and slaughtered at the slaughter-houses of the company, and nowhere else. Penalties are enacted for infractions of this provision, and prices fixed for the maximum charges of the company for each steamboat and for each animal landed. Section five orders the closing up of all other stock-landings and slaughter-houses after the first day of June, in the parishes of Or- leans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard, and makes it the duty of the company to permit any person to slaughter animals in their slaughter-houses under a heavy penalty for each refusal. Another section fixes a limit to the charges to be made by the company for each animal so slaughtered in their building, and another provides for an inspection of all animals intended to be so slaughtered, by an officer appointed by the governor of the State for that purpose. These are the principal features of the statute, and are all that have any bearing upon the questions to be decided by us. This statute is denounced not only as creating a monopoly and conferring odious and exclusive privileges upon a small number of SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 493 persons at the expense of the great body of the community of New Orleans, but it is asserted that it deprives a large and meritor- ious class of citizens the whole of the butchers of the city of the right to exercise their trade, the business to which they have been trained and on which they depend for the support of themselves and their families; and that the unrestricted exercise of the busi- ness of butchering is necessary to the daily subsistence of the popu- lation of the city. But a critical examination of the act hardly justifies these asser- tions. It is true that it grants, for a period of twenty-five years, exclu- sive privileges. And whether those privileges are at the expense of the community in the sense of a curtailment of any of their fundamental rights, or even in the sense of doing them an injury, is a question open to considerations to be hereafter stated. But it is not true that it deprives the butchers of the right to exercise their trade, or imposes upon them any restriction incompatible with its successful pursuit, or furnishing the people of the city with the necessary daily supply of animal food. The act divides itself into two main grants of privilege, the one in reference to stock-landings and stock-yards, and the other to slaughter-houses. That the landing of live-stock in large droves, from steamboats on the bank of the river, and from railroad trains, should, for the safety and comfort of the people and the care of the animals, be limited to proper places, and those not numerous, it needs no argument to prove. Nor can it be injurious to the general community that while the duty of making ample prepara- tion for this is imposed upon a few men, or a corporation, they should, to enable them to do it successfully, have the exclusive right of providing such landing-places, and receiving a fair com- pensation for the service. It is, however, the slaughter-house privilege, which is mainly relied on to justify the charges of gross injustice to the public, and invasion of private right. It is not, and cannot be successfully controverted, that it is both the right and the duty of the legislative body the supreme power of the State or municipality to prescribe and determine the localities where the business of slaughtering for a great city may be conducted. To do this effectively it is indispensable that all per- sons who slaughter animals for food shall do it in those places and nowhere else. The statute under consideration defines these localities and for- 494 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. bids slaughtering in any other. It does not, as has been asserted, prevent the butcher from doing his own slaughtering. On the contrary, the Slaughter-House Company is required, under a heavy penalty, to permit any person who wishes to do so, to slaughter in their houses; and they are bound to make ample provision for the convenience of arl the slaughtering for the entire city. The butcher then is still permitted to slaughter, to prepare, and to sell his own meats; but he is required to slaughter at a specified place and to pay a reasonable compensation for the use of the accommo- dations furnished him at that place. The wisdom of the monopoly granted by the legislature may be open to question, but it is difficult to see a justification for the assertion that the butchers are deprived of the right to labor in their occupation, or the people of their daily service in preparing food, or how this statute, with the duties and guards imposed upon the company, can be said to destroy the business of the butcher, or seriously interfere with its pursuit. The power here exercised by the legislature of Louisiana is, in its essential nature, one which has been, up to the present period in the constitutional history of this country, always conceded to belong to the States, however it may now be questioned in some of its details. "Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam-power to propel cars, the building with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead, may all," says Chancellor Kent, 1 "be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general and rational principle, that every person ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors; and that private interests must be made subservient to the general interests of the community." This is called the police power; and it is declared by Chief Justice Shaw, 2 that it is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of it than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its exercise. This power is, and must be from its very nature, incapable of any very exact definition or limitation. Upon it depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. "It ex- 1 2 Commentaries, 340. 2 Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cushing, 84. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 495 tends," says another eminent judge, 3 "to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the State; . . . and persons and prop- erty are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. Of the perfect right of the legislature to do this no*question ever was, or, upon acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned." The regulation of the place and manner of conducting the slaughtering of animals, and the business of butchering within a city, and the inspection of the animals to be killed for meat, and of the meat afterwards, are among the most necessary and frequent exercises of this power. It is not, therefore, needed that we should seek for a comprehensive definition, but rather look for the proper source of its exercise. . . . [Here follows an extract from Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 203], The exclusive authority of State legislation over this subject is strikingly illustrated in the case of the City of New York v. Miln. 4 In that case the defendant was prosecuted for failing to comply with a statute of New York which required of every master of a vessel arriving from a foreign port, in that of New York City, to report the names of all his passengers, with certain particulars of their age, occupation, last place of settlement, and place of their birth. It was argued that this act was an invasion of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate commerce. And it cannot be de- nied, that such a statute operated at least indirectly upon the com- mercial intercourse between citizens of the United States and of foreign countries. But notwithstanding this it was held to be an exercise of the police power properly within the control of the State, and unaffected by the clause of the Constitution which con- ferred on Congress the right to regulate commerce. To the same purpose are the recent cases of The License Tax, 5 and United States v. DeWitt. In the latter case an act of Con- gress which undertook as a part of the internal revenue laws to make it a misdemeanor to mix for sale naphtha and illuminating oils, or to sell oil of petroleum inflammable at less than a pre- scribed temperature, was held to be void, because as a police regu- lation the power to make such a law belonged to the States, and did not belong to Congress. 3 Thorpe v. Rutland and Burlington Railroad Co., 27 Vermont, 149. 4 11 Peters, 102. * 5 Wallace, 471. 6 9 Id., 41. 496 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. It cannot be denied that the statute under consideration is aptly framed to remove from the more densely populated part of the city the noxious slaughter-houses, and large and offensive collec- tions of animals necessarily incident to the slaughtering business of a large city, and to locate them where the convenience, health, and comfort of the people require they shall be located. And it must be conceded that the means adopted by the act for this pur- pose are appropriate, are stringent, and. effectual. But it is said that in creating a corporation for this purpose, and conferring upon it exclusive privileges privileges which it is said constitute a mo- nopoly the legislature has exceeded its power. If this statute had imposed on the city of New Orleans precisely the same duties, accompanied by the same privileges, which it has on the corpora- tion which it created, it is believed that no question would have been raised as to its constitutionality. In that case the effect on the butchers in pursuit of their occupation and on the public would have been the same as it is now. Why cannot the legislature con- fer the same powers on another corporation, created for a lawful and useful public object, that it can on the municipal corporation already existing? That wherever a legislature has the right to accomplish a certain result, and that result is best attained by means of a corporation, it has the right to create such a corpora- tion, and to endow it with the powers necessary to effect the de- sired and lawful purpose, seems hardly to admit of debate. The proposition is ably discussed and affirmed in the case of McCulloch v. The State of Maryland, 7 in relation to the power of Congress to organize the Bank of the United States to aid in the fiscal operar tions of the government. It can readily be seen that the interested vigilance of the corpo- ration created by the Louisiana legislature will be more efficient in enforcing the limitation prescribed for the stock-landing and slaughtering business for the good of the city than the ordinary efforts of the officers of the law. Unless, therefore, it can be maintained that the exclusive privi- lege granted by this charter to the corporation is beyond the power of the legislature of Louisiana, there can be no just exception to the validity of the statute. And in this respect we are not able to see that these privileges are especially odious or objectionable. The duty imposed as a consideration for the privilege is well de- fined, and its enforcement well guarded. The prices or charges 7 4 Wheat., 316. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 497 to be made by the company are limited by the statute, and we are not advised that they are on the whole exorbitant or unjust. The proposition is, therefore, reduced to these terms: Can any exclusive privileges be granted to any of its citizens, or to a corpo- ration, by the legislature of a State? The eminent and learned counsel who has twice argued the nega- tive of this question, has displayed a research into the history of monopolies in England and the European continent, only equalled by the eloquence with which they are denounced. But it is to be observed, that all such references are to monopo- lies established by the monarch in derogation of the rights of his subjects, or arise out of transactions in which the people were un- represented, and their interests uncared for. The great Case of Monopolies, reported by Coke, and so fully stated in the brief, was undoubtedly a contest of the commons against the monarch. The decision is based upon the ground that it was against com- mon law, and the argument was aimed at the unlawful assump- tion of power by the crown; for who ever doubted the authority of Parliament to change or modify the common law? The discussion in the House of Commons cited from Macaulay clearly establishes that the contest was between the Crown, and the people represented in Parliament. But we think it may be safely affirmed, that the Parliament of Great Britain, representing the people in their legislative functions, and the legislative bodies of this country, have from time immem- orial to the present day continued to grant to persons and corpora- tions exclusive privileges, privileges denied to other citizens, privileges which come within any just definition of the word mo- nopoly, as much as those now under consideration; and that the power to do this has never been questioned or denied. Nor can it be truthfully denied, that some of the most useful and bene- ficial enterprises set on foot for the general good, have been made successful by means of these exclusive rights, and could only have been conducted to success in that way. It may, therefore, be considered as established, that the authority of the legislature of Louisiana to pass the present statute is ample, unless some restraint in the exercise of that power be found in the constitution of that State or in the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, adopted since the date of the decisions we have already cited. If any such restraint is supposed to exist in the constitution of the State, the Supreme Court of Louisiana having necessarily 498 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. passed on that question, it would not be open to review in this court. The plaintiffs in error accepting this issue, allege that the statute is a violation of the Constitution of the United States in these sev- eral particulars: That it creates an involuntary servitude forbidden by the thir- teenth article of amendment; That it abridges the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; That it denies to the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws; and, That it deprives them of their property without due process of law; contrary to the provisions of the first section of the fourteenth article of amendment. This court is thus called upon for the first time to give construc- tion to these articles. We do not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which this duty devolves upon us. No qiiestions so far-reaching and per- vading in their consequences, so profoundly interesting to the peo- ple of this country, and so important in their bearing upon the rela- tions of the United States, and of the several States to each other and to the citizens of the States and of the United States, have been before this court during the official life of any of its present members. We have given every opportunity for a full hearing at the bar; we have discussed it freely and compared views among our- selves; we have taken ample time for careful deliberation, and we now propose to announce the judgments which we have formed in the construction of those articles, so far as we have found them necessary to the decision of the cases before us, and beyond that we have neither the inclination nor the right to go. Twelve articles of amendment were added to the Federal Consti- tution soon after the original organization of the government under it in 1789. Of these all but the last were adopted so soon after- wards as to justify the statement that they were practically con- temporaneous with the adoption of the original; and the twelfth, adopted in eighteen hundred and three, was so nearly so as to have become, like all the others, historical and of another age. But within the last eight years three other articles of amendment of vast importance have been added by the voice of the people to that now venerable instrument. The most cursory glance at these articles discloses a unity of SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 499 purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the times, which cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt concerning their true meaning. Nor can such doubts, when any reasonably exist, be safely and rationally solved without a refer- ence to that history; for in it is found the occasion and the necessity for recurring again to the great source of power in this country, the people of the States, for additional guarantees of human rights; additional powers to the Federal government; additional restraints upon those of the States. Fortunately that history is fresh within the memory of us all, and its leading features, as they bear upon the matter before us, free from doubt. The institution of African slavery, as it existed in about half the States of the Union, and the contests pervading the public mind for many years, between those who desired its curtailment and ultimate extinction and those who desired additional safeguards for its security and perpetuation, culminated in the effort, on the part of most of the States in which slavery existed, to separate from the Federal government, and to resist its authority. This con- stituted the war of the rebellion, and whatever auxiliary causes may have contributed to bring about this war, undoubtedly the overshadowing and efficient cause was African slavery. In that struggle slavery, as a legalized social relation, perished. It perished as a necessity of the bitterness and force of the con- flict. When the armies of freedom found themselves upon the soil of slavery they could do nothing less than free the poor victims whose enforced servitude was the foundation of the quarrel. And when hard pressed in the contest these men (for they proved them- selves men in that terrible crisis) offered their services and were accepted by thousands to aid in suppressing the unlawful rebellion, slavery was at an end wherever the Federal government succeeded in that purpose. The proclamation of President Lincoln expressed an accomplished fact as to a large portion of the insurrectionary districts, when he declared slavery abolished in them all. But the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-establishing the authority of the Federal government were not content to permit this great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest or the proclamation of the Executive, both of which might have been questioned in after times, and they determined to place this main and most valuable result in the Constitution of the re- stored Union as one of its fundamental articles. Hence the thir- teenth article of amendment of that instrument. Its two short 500 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. sections seem hardly to admit of construction, so vigorous is their expression and so appropriate to the purpose we have indicated. "1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pun- ishment for crime, whereof the party shall have heen duly con- victed, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction. "2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro- priate legislation." To withdraw the mind from the contemplation of this grand yet simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race within the jurisdiction of this government a declaration de- signed to establish the freedom of four million of slaves and with a microscopic search endeavor to find in it a reference to servitudes, which may have been attached to property in certain localities, re- quires an effort, to say the least of it. That a personal servitude was meant is proved by the use of the word "involuntary," which can only apply to human beings. The exception of servitude as a punishment for crime gives an idea of the class of servitude that is meant. The word "servitude" is of larger meaning than slavery, as the latter is popularly understood in this country, and the obvious purpose was to forbid all shades and conditions of African slavery. It was very well understood, that in the form of appreticeship for long terms, as it had been practiced in the West India Islands, on the abolition of slavery by the English government, or by reducing the slaves to the condition of serfs attached to the plantation, the purpose of the article might have been evaded, if only the word "slavery" had been used. The case of the apprentice slave, held under a law of Maryland, liber- ated by Chief Justice Chase, on a writ of habeas corpus under this article, illustrates this course of observation. 1 And it is all that we deem necessary to say on the application of that article to the statute of Louisiana, now under consideration. The process of restoring to their proper relations with the Fed- eral government and with the other States those which had sided with the rebellion, undertaken under the proclamation of President Johnson in 1865, and before the assembling of Congress, devel- oped the fact that, notwithstanding the formal recognition by those States of the abolition of slavery, the condition of the slave race would, without further protection of the Federal government, be almost as bad as it was before. Among the first acts of legislation adopted by several of the States in the legislative bodies whioh i Matter of Turner, 1 Abbott United States Reports, 84. SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 501 claimed to be in their normal relations with the Federal govern- ment, were laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value, while they had lost the protection which they had received from their former owners from motives both of inter- est and humanity. They were in some States forbidden to appear in the towns in any other character than menial servants. They were required to re- side on and cultivate the 'soil without the right to purchase or own it. They were excluded from many occupations of gain, and were not permitted to give testimony in the courts in any ca,se where a white man was a party. It was said that their lives were at the mercy of bad men, either because the laws for their pro- tection were insufficient or were not enforced. These circumstances, whatever of falsehood or misconception may have been mingled with their presentation, forced upon the statesmen who* had conducted the Federal government in safety through the crisis of the rebellion, and who supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the result of their labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much. They accordingly passed through Congress the proposition for the fourteenth amendment, and they declined to treat as restored to their full participation in the government of the Union the States which had been in insurrection, until they ratified that article by a formal vote of their legislative bodies. Before we proceed to examine more critically the provisions of this amendment, on which the plaintiffs in error rely, let us com- plete and dismiss the history of the recent amendments, as that history relates to the general purpose which pervades them all. A few years' experience satisfied the thoughtful men who had been the authors of the other two amendments that, notwithstanding the restraints of those articles on the States, and the laws passed under the additional powers granted to Congress, these were inade- quate for the protection of life, liberty, and property, without which freedom to the slave was no boon. They were in all those States denied the right of suffrage. The laws were administered, by the white man alone. It was urged that a race of men dis- tinctively marked as was the negro, living in the midst of another and dominant race, could never be fully secured in their person and their property without the right of suffrage. 502 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Hence the fifteenth amendment, which declares that "the right of a citizen of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by any State on account of race, color, or previous condi- tion of servitude." The negro having, by the fourteenth amend- ment, been declared to be a citizen of the United States, is thus made a voter in every State of the Union. We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination of the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one per- vading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm estab- lishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had for- merly exercised unlimited dominion over him.lt is true that only the fifteenth amendment, in terms, mentions the negro by speak- ing of his color and his slavery. But it is just as*true that each of the other articles was addressed to the grievances of that race, and designed to remedy them as the fifteenth. We do not say that no one else but the negro can share in this protection. Both the language and spirit of these articles are to have their fair and just weight in any question of construction. Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If Mexican peonage or the Chinese cooly labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall within the protection of these articles, that protection will apply, though the party inter- ested may not be of African descent. But what we do say, and what we wish to be understood is, that in any fair and just con- struction of any section or phrase of these amendments, it is necessary to look to the purpose which we have said was the per- vading spirit of them all, the evil which they were designed to remedy, and the process of continued addition to the Constitution, until that purpose was supposed to be accomplished, as far as constitutional law can accomplish it. The first section of the fourteenth article, to which our atten- tion is more specially invited, opens with a definition of citizenship not only citizenship of the United States, but citizenship of the SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 503 States. No such definition was previously found in the Constitu- tion, nor had any attempt been made to define it by act of Congress. It had been the occasion of much discussion in the courts, by the executive departments, and in the public journals. It had been said by eminent judges that no man was a citizen of the United States except as he was a citizen of one of the States composing the Union. Those, therefore, who had been born and resided always in the District of Columbia or in the Territories, though within the United States, were not citizens. Whether this proposition was sound or not had never been judicially decided. But it had been held by this court, in the celebrated Dred Scott case, only a few years before the outbreak of the civil war, that a man of African descent, whether a slave or not, was not and could not be a citizen of a State or of the United States. This decision, while it met the condemnation of some of the ablest statesmen and constitutional lawyers of the country, had never been overruled; and if it was to be accepted as a constitutional limitation of the right of citizenship, then all the negro race who had recently been made freemen, were still, not only not -citizens, but were incapable of becoming so by anything short of an amend- ment to the Constitution. To remove this difficulty primarily, and to establish a clear and comprehensive definition of citizenship which should declare what should constitute citizenship of the United States, and also citizen- ship of a State, the first clause of the first section was framed. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." The first observation we have to make on this clause is, that it puts at rest both the questions which we stated to have been the subject of differences of opinion. It declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase, "subject to its jurisdiction" was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States. The next observation is more important in view of the arguments of counsel in the present case. It is, that the distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State is clearly 504 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. recognized and established. Not only may a man be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a State, but an im- portant element is necessary to convert the former into the latter. He must reside within the State to make him a citizen of it, but it is only necessary that he should be born or naturalized in the United States to be a citizen of the Union. It is quite clear, then, that there is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circum- stances in the individual. We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section, which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks only of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those of citizens of the several States. The argument, however, in favor of the plaintiffs rests wholly on the assumption that the citizenship is the same, and the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the clause are the same. The language is, "Xo State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." It is a little remarkable, if this clause was intended as a protection to the citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State, that the word citizen of the State should be left out when it is so carefully used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the United States, in the very sentence which precedes it. It is too clear for argument that the change in phraseology was adopted understandingly and with a purpose. Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they respectively are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only the former which are placed by this clause under the protection of the Federal Constitu- tion, ancl that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amend- ment. If, then, there is a difference between the privileges and immuni- ties belonging to a citizen of the United States as such, and those belonging to the citizen of the State as such, the latter must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested; for they are not embraced by this paragraph of the amendment. The first occurrence of the words "privileges and immunities" SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 505 in our constitutional history, is to be found in the fourth of the articles of the old Confederation. It declares "that the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, , shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, im- positions, and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively." In the Constitution of the United States, which superseded the Articles of Confederation, the corresponding provision is found in section two of the fourth article, in the following words: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and im- munities of citizens of the several States." There can be but little question that the purpose of both these provisions is the same, and that the privileges and immunities in- tended are the same in each. In the article of the Confederation we have some of these specifically mentioned, and enough perhaps to give some general idea of the class of civil rights meant by the phrase. Fortunately we are not without judicial construction of this clause of the Constitution. The first and the leading case on the subject is that of Corfield v. Coryell, decided by Mr. Justice Wash- ington in the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania in 1823. 1 "The inquiry," he says, "is, what are the privileges and immuni- ties of citizens of the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may prescribe for the gen- eral good of the whole." [The court then cites Ward v. The State i 4 Washington's Circuit Court, 371. 506 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of Maryland^ 12 Wallace, 430, and Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wallace, 180]. The constitutional provision there alluded to did not create those rights, which it called privileges and immunities of citizens of the States. It threw around them in that clause no security for the citizen of the State in which they were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its own citizens. Its sole purpose was to declare to the several States, that what- ever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citi- zens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction. It would be the vainest show of learning to attempt to prove by citation of authority, that up to the adoption of the recent amend- ments, no claim or pretense was set up that those rights depended on the Federal government for their existence or protection, beyond the very few express limitations which the Federal Constitution imposed upon the States such, for instance, as the prohibition against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts. But with the exception of these and a few other restrictions, the entire domain of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States, as above denned, lay within the constitutional and legislative power of the States, and without that of the Federal government. Was it the purpose of the four- teenth amendment, by the simple declaration that no State should make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, to transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights which we have mentioned, from the States to the Federal government? And where it is de- clared that Congress shall have the power to enforce that article, was it intended to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States? All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plaintiffs in error be sound. For not only are these rights subject to the control of Congress whenever in its discretion any of them are supposed to be abridged by State legislation, but that body may also pass laws in advance, limiting and restricting the exercise of legislative power by the States, in their most ordinary and usual functions, as in its judgment it may think proper on all such sub- jects. And still further, such a construction followed by the SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 507 reversal of the judgments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases, would constitute this court a perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights, as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment. The argument, we admit, is not always the most conclusive which is drawn from the consequences urged against the adoption of a particular construction of an instrument. But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; when in fact it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence of language which expresses such a pur- pose too clearly to admit of doubt. We are convinced that no such results were intended by the Con- gress which proposed these amendments, nor by the legislatures of the States which ratified them. Having shown that the privileges and immunities relied on in the argument are those which 'belong to citizens of the States as such, and that they are left to the State governments for security and protection, and not by this article placed under the special care of the Federal government, we may hold ourselves excused from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which no State can abridge, until some case involving those privileges may make it necessary to do so. But lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those we have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws. One of these is well described in the case of Crandall v. Nevada. 1 It is said to be the right of the citizen of this great country, pro- tected by implied guarantees of its Constitution, "to come to the seat of government to assert any claim he may have upon that gov- ernment, to transact any business he may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in administering its functions. He has the right of free access to its*seaports, through i 6 Wall., 36. 508 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, land offices, and courts of justices in the several States." And quoting from the language of Chief Justice Taney in another case, it is said "that for all the great purposes for which the Federal government was established, we are one people, with one common country, we are all citizens of the United States;" and it is, as such citizens, that their rights are supported in this court in Crandall v. Nevada. Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty, and property when on the high seas or within the juris- diction of a foreign government. Of this there can be no doubt, nor that the right depends upon his character as a citizen of the United States. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The right to use the navigable waters of the United States, how- ever they may penetrate the territory of the several States, all rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations, are dependent upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizen- ship of a State. One of these privileges is conferred by the very article under consideration. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State. To these may be added the rights secured by the thirteenth and fifteenth articles of amendment, and by the other clause of the fourteenth, next to be considered. But it is useless to pursue this branch of the inquiry, since we are of opinion that the rights claimed by these plaintiffs in error, if they have any existence, are not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States within the meaning of the clause of the fourteenth amendment under consideration. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub- ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws." The argument has not been much pressed in these cases that the defendant's charter deprives the plaintiffs of their property without due process of law, or that it denies to them the equal SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES. 509 protection of the law. The first of these paragraphs has been in the Constitution since the adoption of the fifth amendment, as a restraint upon the Federal power. It is also to be found in some form of expression in the constitutions of nearly all the States, as a restraint upon the power of the States. This law, then, has prac- tically been the same as it now is during the existence of the government, except so far as the present amendment may place the restraining power over the States in this matter in the hands of the Federal government. We are not without judicial interpretation, therefore, both State and National, of the meaning of this clause. And it is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible, can the restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana upon the exercise of their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of that provision. "Nor shall any State deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." In the light of the history of these amendments, and the per- vading purpose of them, which we have already discussed, it is not difficult to give a meaning to this clause. The existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden. If, however, the States did not conform their laws to its require- ments, then by the fifth section of the article of amendment Con- gress was authorized to enforce it by suitable legislation. We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emer- gency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other. But as it is a State that is to be dealt with, and not alone the validity of its laws, we may safely leave that matter until Congress shall have exercised its power, or some case of State op- pression, by denial of equal justice in its courts, shall have claimed a decision at our hands. We find no such case in the one before us, and do not deem it necessary to go over the argument again, as it may have relation to this particular clause of the amendment. In the early history of the organization of the government, its statesmen seem to have divided on the line which should separate 510 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. the powers of the National government from those of the State governments, and though this line has never been very well defined in public opinion, such a division has continued from that day to this. The adoption of the first eleven amendments to the Constitution so soon after the original instrument was accepted, shows a prevail- ing sense of danger at that time from the Federal power. And it cannot be denied that such a jealousy continued to exist with many patriotic men until the breaking out of the late civil war. It was then discovered that the true danger to the perpetuity of the IJnion was in the capacity of the State organizations to combine and con- centrate all the powers of the State, and of contiguous States, for a determined resistance to the General Government. Unquestionably this has given great force to the argument, and added largely to the number, of those who believe in the necessity of a strong National government. But, however pervading this sentiment, and however it may have contributed to the adoption of the amendments we have been con- sidering, we do not see in those amendments any purpose to destroy the main features of the general system. Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the war, our statesmen have still believed that the existence of the States with powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights the rights of person and of property was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government, though they may have thought proper to impose additional limitations on the States, and to confer additional power on that of the Nation. But whatever fluctuations may be seen in the history of public opinion on this subject during the period of our national existence, we think it will be found that this court, so far as its functions required, has always held with a steady and even hand the balance between State and Federal power, and we trust that such may con- tinue to be the history of its relation to that subject so long as it shall have duties to perform which demand of it a construction of the Constitution, or any of its parts. The judgments of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in these cases are affirmed. [CHIEF JUSTICE CHASE and JUSTICES FIELD, SWAYNE, and BKADLEY dissented. The last three delivered opinions.] NOTE. In 1887 Mr. Justice Miller made the following statement in the nature of a defense of his opinion in this case: STRAUDER v. WEST VIRGINIA. 511 "Although this opinion did not meet the approval of four out of nine of the judges on some of the points on which it rested, yet public sentiment, as found in the press and in the universal acquiescence which it received, accepted it with great unanimity; and although there were intimations that in the legislative branches of the Government the opinion would be reviewed and criticised unfavorably, no such thing has occurred in the fifteen years which have elapsed since it was delivered. And while the question of the construction of these amendments, and particularly the Fourteenth, has often been before the Supreme Court of the United States, no attempt to override or disregard this elementary decision of the effect of the three new constitutional amendments upon the rela- tions of the State governments to the Federal government has been made; and it may be considered now as settled that, with the exception of the specific provisions in them for the protection of the personal rights of the citizens and people of the United States, and the necessary restrictions upon the power of the States for that purpose, with the additions to the powers of the General Govern- ment to enforce these provisions, no substantial change has been made. The necessity of the great powers, conceded by the Consti- tution originally to the Federal Government, and the equal necessity of the autonomy of the States and their power to regulate their domestic affairs, remain as the great features of our complex form of government." Miller, Lectures on the Constitution of the United States, 411. STEAUDEE v. WEST VIRGINIA. 100 U. S., 303. Decided 1879. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. . . . MR. JUSTICE STROXG delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiff in error, a colored man, was indicted for murder in the Circuit Court of Ohio County, in West Virginia, on the 20th of October, 1874, and upon trial was convicted and sentenced. The record was then removed to the Supreme Court of the State, and there the judgment of the Circuit Court was affirmed. The present case is a writ of error to that court, and it is now, in sub- 512 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. stance, averred that at the trial in the State court the defendant (now plaintiff in error) was denied rights to which he was entitled under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In the Circuit Court of the State, before the trial of the indict- ment was commenced, the defendant presented his petition, verified by his oath, praying for a removal of the cause into the Circuit Court of the United States, assigning, as ground for the removal, that, "by virtue of the laws of the State of West Virginia no colored man was eligible to be a member of the grand jury or to serve on a petit jury in the State; that white men are so eligible, and that by reason of his being a colored man and having been a slave, he had reason to believe, and did believe, he could not have the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings in the State of West Virginia for the security of his person as is enjoyed by white citizens, and that he had less chance of enforcing in the courts of the State his rights on the prosecution, as a citizen of the United States, and that the probabilities of a denial of them to him as such citizen on every trial which might take place on the indictment in the courts of the State were much more enhanced than if he was a white man." This petition was denied by the State court, and the cause was forced to trial. Motions to quash the venire, "because the law under which it was issued was unconstitutional, null, and void," and successive motions to challenge the array of the panel, for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment were then made, all of which were overruled and made by exceptions parts of the record. The law of the State to which reference was made in the petition for removal and in the several motions was enacted on the 12th of March, 1873 (Acts of 1872-73, p. 102), and it is as follows: "All white male persons who are twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as herein provided." The persons excepted are State officials. In this court, several errors have been assigned, and the con- trolling questions underlying them all are, first, whether, by the Constitution and laws of the United States, every citizen of the United States has a right to a trial of an indictment against him by a jury selected and impanelled without discrimination against his race or color, because of race or color; and, second, if he has such a right, and is denied its enjoyment by the State in which he is indicted, may he cause the case to be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States? It is to be observed that the first of these questions is not whether STRAUDER v. WEST VIRGINIA. 513 a colored man, when an indictment has been preferred against him, has a right to a grand or a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race or color, but it is whether, in the com- position or selection of jurors by whom he is to be indicted or tried, all persons of his race or color may be excluded by law, solely because of their race or color, so that by no possibility can any colored man sit upon the jury. . . . This [the Fourteenth Amendment] is one of a series of constitu- tional provisions having a common purpose; namely, securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race enjoy. The true spirit and meaning of the amendments, as we said in the Slaughter-House Cases (16 Wall., 36), cannot be under- stood without keeping in view the history of the times when they were adopted, and the general objects they plainly sought to accom- plish. At the time when they were incorporated into the Consti- tution, it required little knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those who had long been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and positive dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to perpetuate the distinctions that had before existed. Discriminations against them had been' habit- ual. It was well known that in some States laws making such discriminations then existed, and others might well be expected. The colored race, as a race, was abject and ignorant, and in that condition was unfitted to command the respect of those who had superior intelligence. Their training had left them mere children, and as such they needed the protection which a wise government extends to those who are unable to protect themselves. They especially needed protection against unfriendly action in the States where they were resident. It was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was framed and adopted. It was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever *it should be denied by the States. It not only gave citizenship and the privileges of citizenship to persons of color, but it denied to any State the power to withhold f rom them the equal protection of the laws, and authorized Congress to en- force its provisions by appropriate legislation. . . . [Here follow citations from the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wallace, 36]. If this is the spirit and meaning of the amendment, whether it 514 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. means more or not, it is to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes of its framers. It ordains that no State shall make or enforce any laws which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States (evidently referring to the newly made citizens, who, being citizens of the United States, are declared to be also citizens of the State in which they reside). It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any person within its juris- diction the equal protection of the laws. What is this but declar- ing that the law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race, the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored, exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race. That the West Virginia statute respecting juries the statute that controlled the selection of the grand and petit jury in the case of the plaintiff in error is such a discrimination ought not to be doubted. Nor would it be if the persons excluded by it were white men. If in those States where the colored people constitute a majority of the entire population a law should be enacted excluding all white men from jury service, thus denying to them the privilege of participating equally with the blacks in the administration of justice, we apprehend no one would be heard to claim that it would not be a denial to white men of the equal protection of the laws. Nor if a law should be passed excluding all naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of the amendment. The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully quali- fied, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an asser- tion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice STRAUDER v. WEST VIRGINIA. 515 which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others. The right to a trial by jury is guaranteed to every citizen of West Virginia by the Constitution of that State, and the constitu- tion of juries is a very essential part of the protection such a mode of trial is intended to secure. The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds. Blackstone, in his Commentaries, says, "The right of trial by jury, or the country, is a trial by the peers of every Englishman, and is the grand bulwark of his liberties, and is secured to him by the Great Charter." It is also guarded by statutory enactments intended to make impossible what Mr. Ben- tham called "packing juries." It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that pro- tection which others enjoy. Prejudice in a local community is held to be a reason for a change of venue. The framers of the con- stitutional amendment must have known full well the existence of such prejudice and its likelihood to continue against the manu- mitted slaves and their race, and that knowledge was doubtless a motive that led to the amendment. By their manumission and citizenship the colored race became entitled to the equal protection of the laws of the States in which they resided; and the apprehen- sion that through prejudice they might be denied that equal pro- tection, that is, that there might be discrimination against them, was the inducement to bestow upon the national government the power to enforce the provision that no State shall deny to them the equal protection of the laws. Without the apprehended exist- ence of prejudice that portion of the amendment would have been unnecessary, and it might have been left to the States to extend equality of protection. In view of these considerations, it is hard to see why the statute of West Virginia should not be regarded as discriminating against a colored man when he is put upon trial for an alleged criminal offence against the State. It is not easy to comprehend how it can be said that while every white man is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his own race or color, or, rather, selected without discrimination against his color, and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected by the law with the former. Is 516 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. not protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice a right, a legal right, under the constitutional amendment? And how can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to submit to a trial for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has expressly excluded every man of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in other respects, is not a denial to him of equal legal protection? We do not say that within the limits from which it is not ex- cluded by the amendment, a State may not prescribe the qualifi- cations of its jurors, and in so doing make discriminations. It may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to per- sons within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifi- cations. We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit this. Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose. Its aim was against discrimination because of race or color. As we have said more than once, its design was to protect an emancipated race, and to strike down all possible legal discriminations against those who belong to it. To quote further from 16 Wall., supra: "In giving construction to any of these articles [amendments], it is necessary to keep the main purpose steadily in view." "It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other." We are now called upon to affirm or deny that it had other purposes. The Fourteenth Amendment makes no attempt to enumerate the rights it designed to protect. It speaks in general terms, and those are as comprehensive as possible. Its language is prohibitory; but every prohibition implies the existence of rights and immuni- ties, prominent among which is an immunity from inequality of legal protection, either for life, liberty, or property. Any State action that denies this immunity to a colored man is in conflict with the Constitution. Concluding, therefore, that the statute of West Virginia, dis- criminating in the selection of jurors, as it does, against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put upon trial for an alleged offense against the State, it remains only to be con- sidered whether the power of Congress to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate legislation is sufficient to justify, the enactment of sect. 641 of the Eevised Statutes. A right or an immunity, whether created by the Constitution or only guaranteed by it, even without any express delegation of STRAUDER v. WEST VIRGINIA. 517 power, may be protected by Congress. Prigg v. The Common- wealth of Pennsylvania, 16 Pet., 539. So in United States v. Eeese (92 U. S., 214) it was said by the Chief Justice of this court: "Rights and immunities created by or dependent upon the Consti- tution of the United States can be protected by Congress. The form and manner of the protection may be such as Congress in the legitimate exercise of its legislative discretion shall provide. These may be varied to meet the necessities of the particular right to be protected." But there is express authority to protect the rights and immunities referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment, and to enforce observance of them by appropriate congressional legislation. And one very efficient and appropriate mode of extend- ing such protection and securing to a party the enjoyment of the right or immunity, is a law providing for the removal of his case from a State court, in which the right is denied by the State law, into a Federal court, where it will be upheld. This is an ordinary mode of protecting rights and immunities conferred by the Federal Constitution and laws. Sec. 641 is such a provision. , . . This act puts in the form of a statute what had been substantially ordained by the constitutional amendment. It was a step toward enforcing the constitutional provisions. Sec. 6-11 was an advanced step, fully warranted, we think, by the fifth section of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have heretofore considered and affirmed the constitutional power of Congress to authorize the removal from State courts into the circuit courts of the United States, before trial, of criminal prosecutions for alleged offenses against the laws of the State, when the defense presents a Federal question, or when a right under the Federal Constitution or laws is involved. Tennessee v. Davis, supra, p. 257. It is unnecessary now to repeat what we there said. That the petition of the plaintiff in error, filed by him in the State court before the trial of his case, made a case for removal into the Federal Circuit Court, under sect. 641, is very plain, if, by the constitutional amendment and sect. 1977 of the Revised Statutes, he was entitled to immunity from discrimination against him in the selection of jurors, because of their color, as we have endeavored to show that he was. It set forth sufficient facts to ex- hibit a denial of that immunity, and a denial by the statute law of the State. There was error, therefore, in proceeding to the trial of the in- dictment against him after his petition was filed, as also in over- 518 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ruling his challenge to the array of the jury, and in refusing to quash the panel. The judgment of the Supreme Court of West Virginia will be reversed, and the case remitted with instructions to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Ohio County; and it is So ordered [JUSTICE FIELD and JUSTICE CLIFFORD dissented.] CIVIL EIGHTS CASES. UNITED STATES v. STANLEY. UNITED STATES v. KYAN. UNITED STATES v. NICHOLS. UNITED STATES v. SINGLETON. EOBINSON AND WIFE T. MEMPHIS AND CHAELESTON EAILEOAD COMPANY. 109 U. S., 3. Decided 1883. These cases are all founded on the first and second sections of the Act of Congress, known as the Civil Eights Act, passed March 1st, 1875, entitled "An Act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights." 18 Stat., 335. Two of the cases, those against Stanley and Nichols, were indictments for denying to persons of color the accommodations and privileges of an inn or hotel; two of them, those against Eyan and Singleton, were, one an informa- tion, the other an indictment, for denying to individuals the privi- leges and accommodations of a theater, the information against Eyan being for refusing a colored person a seat in the dress circle of Maguire's theatre in- San Francisco; and the indictment against Singleton was for denying to another person, whose color was not stated, the full enjoyment of the accommodations of the theatre known as the Grand Opera House in New York, "said denial not being made for any reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servi- tude." The case of Eobinson and wife against the Memphis & Charleston E. E. Company was an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee, to recover the penalty of five hundred dollars given by the second section of the act; and the gravamen was the refusal by the con- ductor of the railroad company to allow the wife to ride in the ladies' car for the reason as stated in one of the counts, that she was a person of African descent. The jury rendered a verdict for CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. 519 the defendants in this case, upon the merits, under a charge of the court to which a bill of exceptions was taken by the plaintiffs. The case was tried on the assumption by both parties of the validity of the act of Congress; and the principal point made by the ex- ceptions was, that the judge allowed evidence to go to the jury tending to show that the conductor had reason to suspect that the plaintiff, the wife, was an improper person, because she was in company with a young man whom he supposed to be a white man, and on that account inferred that there was some improper con- nection between them; and the judge charged the jury, in sub- stance, that if this was the conductor's bona fide reason for exclud- ing the woman from the car they might take it into consideration on the question of the liability of the company. The case was brought here by writ of error at the suit of the plaintiffs. The cases of Stanley, Nichols, and Singleton, came up on certificates of division of opinion between the judges below as to the consti- tutionality of the first and second sections of the act referred to; and the case of Ryan, on a writ of error to the judgment of the Circuit Court for the District of California sustaining a demurrer to the information. The Stanley, Ryan, Nichols, and Singleton cases were sub- mitted together, by the Solicitor-General at the last term of court, on the 7th day of November, 1882. There were no appearances and no briefs filed for the defendants. The Robinson case was submitted on the briefs at the last term, on the 29th day of March, 1883. ... MB. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. After stating the facts in the above language he continued: It is obvious that the primary and important question in all the cases is the constitutionality of the law: for if the law is unconsti- tutional none of the prosecutions can stand. The sections of the law referred to provide as follows: "SEC. 1. That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the ac- commodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theatres, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations estab- lished by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude. "SEC. 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of every race and color, and regardless of any previous 520 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the. accom- modations, advantages, facilities, or privileges in said section enum- erated, or. by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for every such offense forfeit and pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the per- son aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an action of debt, with full costs; and shall also, for every such offense, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year: Provided, That all persons may elect to sue for the penalty afore- said, or to proceed under their rights at common law and by State statutes; and having so elected to proceed in the one mode or the other, their right to proceed in the other jurisdiction shall be barred. But this provision shall not apply to criminal proceedings, either under this Act or the criminal law of any State: And pro- vided further, That a judgment for the penalty in favor of the party aggrieved, or a judgment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively." Are these sections constitutional? The first section, which is the principal one, cannot be fairly understood without attending to the last clause, which qualifies the preceding part. The essence of the law is, not to declare broadly that all per- sons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the ac- commodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances, and theatres; but that such enjoyment shall not be subject to any conditions applicable only to citizens of a particular race or color, or who had been in a previous condition of servitude. In other words, it is the purpose of the law to declare that, in the enjoyment of the accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, theatres, and other places of public amusement, no distinction shall be made between citizens of different race or color, or between those who have, and those who have not, been slaves. Its effect is to declare, that in all inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement, colored citizens, whether formerly slaves or not, and citizens of other races, shall have the same accommoda- tions and privileges in all inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement as are enjoyed by white citizens; and vice versa. The second section makes it a penal offense in any person to deny to any citizen of any race or color, regardless of previous servitude, any of the accommodations or privileges mentioned in the first section. Has Congress constitutional power to make such a law? Of course, no one will contend that the power to pass it was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last three amend- CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. 521 ments. The power is sought, first, in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the views and arguments of distinguished Senators, advanced whilst the law was under consideration, claiming authority to pass it by virtue of that amendment, are the principal arguments ad- duced in favor of the power. We have carefully considered those arguments, as was due to the eminent ability of those who put them forward, and have felt, in all its force, the weight of authority which always invests a law that Congress deems itself competent to pass. But the responsibility of an independent judgment is now thrown upon this court; and we are bound to exercise it ac- cording to the best lights we have. The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment (which is the one relied on), after declaring who shall be citizens of the United States, and of the several States, is prohibitory in its character, and prohibitory upon the States. It declares that: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with- out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic- tion the equal protection of the laws." It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws. It not only does this, but, in order that the national will, thus declared, may not be a mere brutum fulmen, the last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting, the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render them effectually null, void, and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and this is the whole of it. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amend- 522 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of pro- hibition against State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect: and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their operation and effect. A quite full discussion of this aspect of the amendment may be found in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 542; Virginia v. Eives, 100 U. S., 313; and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., 339. An apt illustration of this distinction may be found in some of fthe provisions of the original Constitution. Take the subject of contracts, for example. The Constitution prohibited the States from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. This did not give to Congress power to provide laws for the general enforcement of con-tracts; nor power to invest the courts of the United States with jurisdiction over contracts, so as to enable parties to sue upon them in those courts. It did, however, give the power to provide remedies by which the impairment of contracts by State legislation might be counteracted and corrected: and this power was exercised. The remedy which Congress actually provided was that contained in the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat., 85, giving to the Supreme Court of the United States jurisdiction by writ of error to review the final decisions of State courts whenever they should sustain the validity of a State statute or authority alleged to be repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States. By this means, if a State law was passed impairing the obligation of a contract, and the State tribunals sus- tained the validity of the law, the mischief could be corrected in this court. The legislation of Congress, and the proceedings pro- vided for under it, were corrective in their character. No attempt was made to draw into the United States courts the litigation of contracts generally; and no such attempt would have been sus- tained. We do not say that the remedy provided was the only one that might have been provided in that case. Probably Congress had power to pass a law giving to the courts of the United States direct jurisdiction over contracts alleged to be impaired by a State law; and under the broad provisions of the act of March 3d, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat., 470, giving to the circuit courts jurisdiction of all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, it is possible that such jurisdiction now exists. But under that, or any othe^ law, it must appear as well by allegation, as CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. 523 proof at the trial, that the Constitution had been violated by the action of the State legislature. Some obnoxious State law passed, or that might be passed, is necessary to be assumed in order to lay the foundation of any federal remedy in the case; and for the very sufficient reason, that the constitutional prohibition is against State laws impairing the obligation of contracts. And so liL.the present case, until some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers OT agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment nor any proceeding under such legislation, can -b&-ea44*d into activity: for the prohibitions-of the amendment are against State laws and acts done- under State authority. -Of course, legislation may, and should be, provided- in- advance to meet the exigency when it arises; but it_sho.uld be-adapted'to the mischief and wrong which the amendment was intended to pro- vide against; and that is, S>tate laws, or State action of some kind, adverse to the rights of the citizen secured by the amendment. Such legislation cannot properly cover the whole domain of rights appertaining to life, liberty and property, defining them and pro- viding for their vindication. That would be to establish a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between man and man in society. It would be to make Congress take the place of \ the State legislatures and to supersede them. It is absurd to affirm | that, because the rights of life, liberty and property (which include all civil rights that men have), are by the amendment sought to ( be protected against invasion on the part of the State without due process of law, Congress may therefore provide due process of law for their vindication in every case; and that, because the denial by a State to any persons, of the equal protection of the laws, is\ prohibited by the amendment, therefore Congress may establish j laws for their equal protection. In fine, the legislation which Con- gress is authorized to adopt in (this behalf is not general legislation 1 upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making or enforcing, or such acts and proceedings as the States may commit or take, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from committing or taking. It is not necessary for us to state, if we could, what legislation would be proper for Congress to adopt. It is sufficient for us to examine whether the law in question is of that character. An inspection of the law shows that it makes no reference what- 524 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ever to any supposed or apprehended violation of the Fourteenth Amendment on the part of the States. It is not predicated on any such view. It proceeds ex directo to declare that certain acts com- mitted by individuals shall be deemed offenses, and shall be prose- cuted and punished by proceedings in the courts of the United States. It does not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by the States; it does not make its operation to depend upon any such wrong committed. It applies equally to cases arising in States which have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those which arise in States that may have violated the prohibition of the amendment. In other words, it steps into the domain of local jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals in society towards each other, and imposes sanctions for the enforcement of those rules, without refer- ring in any manner to any supposed action of the State or its authorities. If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the prohibitions of the amendment, it is difficult to see where it is to stop. Why may not Congress with equal show of authority enact a code of laws for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, lib- erty, and property? If it is supposable that the States may deprive persons of life, liberty, and property without due process of law (and the amendment itself does not suppose this), why should not Congress proceed at once to prescribe due process of law for the protection of every one of these fundamental rights, in every possi- ble case, as well as to prescribe equal privileges in inns, public conveyances, and theatres? The truth is, that the implication of a power to legislate in this manner is based upon the assumption- that if the States are forbidden to legislate or act in a particular way on a particular subject, and power is conferred upon Congress to enforce the prohibition, this gives Congress power to legislate generally upon that subject, and not merely power to provide modes of redress against such State legislation or action. The assumption is certainly unsound. It is repugnant to the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, which declares that powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people. We have not overlooked the fact that the fourth section of the act now under consideration has been held by this court to be constitutional. That section declares "that no citizen, possessing all other qualifications which are or may be prescribed by law, CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. 525 shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and any officer or other person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid, shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a mis- demeanor, and be fined not more than five thousand dollars." In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S., 339, it was held that an indictment against a State officer under this section for excluding persons of color from the jury list is sustainable. But a moment's attention to its terms will show that the section is entirely corrective in its character. Disqualifications for service on juries are only created by the law, and the first part of the section is aimed at certain dis- qualifying laws, namely, those which make mere race or color a disqualification; and the second 'clause is directed against those who, assuming to use the authority of the State government, carry into effect such a rule of disqualification. In the Virginia case, the State, through its officer, enforced a rule of disqualification which the law was intended to abrogate and counteract. Whether the statute-book of the Sta/te actually laid down any such rule of disqualification, or not, the State, through its officer, enforced such a rule: and it is against such State action, through its officers and agents, that the last clause of the section is directed. This aspect of the law was deemed sufficient to divest it of any unconstitu- tional character, and makes it differ widely from the first and sec- ond sections of the same act which we are now considering. These sections, in the objectionable features before referred to, are different also from the law ordinarily called the "Civil Eights Bill," originally passed April 9th, 1866/ 14 Stat., 27, ch. 31, and re-enacted with some modifications in sections 16, 17, and 18, of the Enforcement Act, passed May 31st, 1870, 16 Stat., 140, ch. 114. That law, as re-enacted, after declaring that all persons with- in the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses and exactions, of every kind, and none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding, proceeds to enact, that any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or cus- tom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any rights secured or pro- 526 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. tected by the preceding section (above quoted), or to different punishment, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be deemed guilty of a misde- meanor, and subject to fine and imprisonment as specified in the act. This law is clearly corrective in its character, intended to counteract and furnish redress against State laws and proceedings, and customs having the force of law, which sanction the wrongful acts specified. In the Revised Statutes, it is true, a very important clause, to wit, the words "any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding," which gave the de- claratory section its point and effect, are omitted; but the penal part, by which the declaration is enforced, and which is really the effective part of the law, retains the reference to State laws, by making the penalty apply only t6 those who should subject parties to a deprivation of their rights under color of any statute, ordi- nance, custom, etc., of any State or Territory: thus preserving the corrective character of the legislation. Rev. St., 1977, 1978, 1979, 5510. The Civil Rights Bill here referred to is analogous in its character to what a law would have been under the original Constitution, declaring that the validity of contracts should not be impaired, and that if any person bound by a contract should refuse to comply with it, under color or pretence that it had been rendered void or invalid by a State law, he should be liable to an action upon it in the courts of the United States, with the addi- tion of a penalty for setting up such an unjust and unconstitutional defense. In this connection it is proper to state that civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, can- not be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, un- supported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is true, whether they affect his person, his property, or his reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or not done under State authority, his rights remain in full force, and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of the State for redress. An individual cannot deprive a man of his right to vote, to hold property, to buy and sell, to sue in the courts, or to be a witness or a juror; he may, by force or fraud, interfere with the enjoyment of the right in a particular case; he may commit an assault against the person, or commit murder, or use ruffian vio- CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. 527 lence at the polls, or slander the good name of a fellow-citizen; but, unless protected in these wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority, he cannot destroy or injure the right; he will only render himself amenable to satisfaction or punishment; and amenable therefor to the laws of the State where the wrong- ful acts are committed. Hence, in all those cases where the Con- stitution seeks to protect the rights of the citizen against dis- criminative and unjust laws of the State by prohibiting such laws, it is not individual offenses, but abrogation and denial of rights, which it denounces, and for which it clothes the Congress with power to provide a remedy. This abrogation and denial of rights, for which the States alone were or could be responsible, was the great seminal and fundamental wrong which was intended to be remedied. And the remedy to be provided must necessarily be predicated upon that wrong. It must assume that in the cases provided for, the evil or wrong actually committed rests upon some State law or State authority for its excuse and perpetration. Of course, these remarks do not apply to those cases in which Congress is clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject, accompanied with an express or implied denial of such power to the States, as in the regulation of com- merce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes, the coining of money, the establishment of post- offices and post-roads, the declaring of war, etc. In these cases Congress has power to pass laws for regulating the subjects specified in every detail, and the conduct and transactions of individuals in respect thereof. But where a subject is not submitted to the gen- eral legislative power of Congress, but is only submitted thereto for the purpose of rendering effective some prohibition against par- ticular State legislation or State action in reference to that subject, the power given is limited by its object, and any legislation by Congress in the matter must necessarily be corrective in its char- acter, adapted to counteract and redress the operation of such pro- hibited State laws or / proceedings of State officers. If the principles of interpretation which we have laid down are correct, as we deem them to be (and they are in accord with the principles laid down in the cases before referred to, as well as in the recent case of United States v. Harris, 106 U. S., 629), it is clear that the law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of legislative power made to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. That amendment prohibits the States from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws, and declares that Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions 528 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW of the amendment. The law in question, without any reference to adverse State legislation on the subject, declares that all persons shall be entitled to equal accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, and places of public amusement, and imposes a penalty upon any individual who shall deny to any citizen such equal accommodations and privileges. This is not corrective legis- tion; it is primary and direct; it takes immediate and absolute pos- session of the subject of the right of admission to inns, public con- veyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes and displaces State legislation on the same subject, or only allows it permissive force. It ignores such legislation, and assumes that the matter is one that belongs to the domain of national regulation. Whether it would not have been a more effective protection of the rights of citizens to have clothed Congress with plenary power over the whole subject, is not now the question. What we have to decide is, whether such plenary power has been conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment; and, in our judgment, it has not. We have discussed the question presented by the law on the assumption that a right to enjoy equal accommodation and privi- leges in all inns, public conveyances, and places of public amuse- ment, is one of the essential rights of the citizen which no State can abridge or interfere with. Whether it is such a right, or not, is a different question which, in the view we have taken of the validity of the law on the ground already stated, it is not necessary to examine. We have also discussed the validity of the law in reference to cases arising in the States only; and not in reference to cases arising in the Territories or the District of Columbia, which are subject to the plenary legislation of Congress in every branch of municipal regulation. Whether the law would be a valid one as applied to the Territories and the District is not a question for consideration in the cases before us: they all being cases arising within the limits of States. And whether Congress, in the exer- cise of its power to regulate commerce amongst the several States, might or might not pass a law regulating rights in public convey- ances passing from one State to another, is also a question which is not now before us, as the sections in question are not conceived in any such view. But the power of Congress to adopt direct and primary, as dis- tinguished from corrective legislation, on the subject in hand, is sought, in the second place, from the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolishes slavery. This amendment declares "that neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. 529 crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction;" and it gives Congress power to enforce the amendment by appro- priate legislation. This amendment, as well as the Fourteenth, is undoubtedly self-executing without any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any existing state of circumstances. By its own unaided force and effect it abolished slavery, and established uni- versal freedom. Still, legislation may be necessary and proper to meet all the various cases and circumstances to be affected by it, and to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or spirit. And such legislation may be primary and direct in its character; for the amendment is not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United States. It is true that slavery cannot exist without law, any more than property in lands and goods can exist without law: and, therefore, the Thirteenth Amendment may be regarded as nullifying all State laws which establish or uphold slavery. But it has a reflex char- acter also, establishing and decreeing universal civil and political freedom throughout the United States; and it is assumed, that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article by appropriate leg- islation, clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States: and upon this assumption it is claimed, that this is sufficient authority, for declaring by law that all persons shall have equal accommodations and privileges in all inns, public con- veyances, and places of amusement; the argument being, that the denial of such equal accommodations and privileges is, in itself, a subjection to a species of servitude within the meaning of the amendment. Conceding the major proposition to be true, that Congress has a right to enact all necessary and proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its badges and inci- dents, is the minor proposition also true, that the denial to any person of admission to the accommodations and privileges of an inn, a public conveyance, or a theatre, does subject that person to any form of servitude, or tend to fasten upon him any badge of slavery? If it does not, then power to pass the law is not found in the Thirteenth Amendment. In a very able and learned presentation of the cognate question as to the extent of the rights, privileges and immunities of citizens which cannot rightfully be abridged by State laws under the Four- Si 530 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. teenth Amendment, made in a former case, a long list of burdens and disabilities of a servile character, incidental to feudal vassalage in France, and which were abolished by the decrees of the National Assembly, was presented for the purpose of showing that all ine- qualities and observances exacted by one man from another were servitudes, or badges of slavery, which a great nation, in its effort to establish universal liberty, made haste to wipe out and destroy. But these were servitudes imposed by the old law, or by long cus- tom, which had the force of law, and exacted by one man from another without the latter's consent. Should any such servitudes be imposed by a State law, there can be no doubt that the law would be repugnant to the Fourteenth, no less than to the Thir- teenth Amendment; nor any greater doubt that Congress has ade- quate power to forbid any such servitude from being exacted. But is there any similarity between such servitudes and a denial by the owner of an inn, a public conveyance, or a theatre, of its accommodations and privileges to an individual, even though the denial be founded on the race or color of that individual? Where does any slavery or servitude, or badge of either, arise from such an act of denial? Whether it might not be a denial of a right which, if sanctioned by the Stale law, would be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, is another question. But what has it to do with the question of slavery? It may be that by the Black Code (as it was called), in the times when slavery prevailed, the proprietors of inns and public convey- ances were forbidden to receive persons of the African race, be- cause it might assist slaves to escape from the control of their mas- ters. This was merely a means of preventing such escapes, and was no part of the servitude itself. A law of that kind could not have any such object now, however justly it might be deemed an invasion of the party's legal right as a citizen, and amenable to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The long existence of African slavery in this country gave us very distinct notions of what it was, and what were its necessary incidents. Compulsory service of the slave for the benefit of the master, restraint of his movements except by the master's will, dis- ability to hold property, to make contracts, to have a standing in court, to be a witness against a white person, and such like burdens and incapacities, were the inseparable incidents of the institution. Severer punishments for crimes were imposed on the slave than on free persons guilty of the same offenses. Congress, as we have seen, by the Civil Eights Bill of 1866, passed in view of the Thir- teenth Amendment, before the Fourteenth was adopted, under- CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. 531 took to wipe out these burdens and disabilities, the necessary inci- dents of slavery, constituting its substance and visible form; and to secure to all citizens of every race and color, and without regard to previous servitude, those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the s'ame right to make and en- force contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. Whether this legislation was fully authorized by the Thirteenth Amendment alone, without the support which it after- ward received from the Fourteenth Amendment, after the adoption of which it was re-enacted with some additions, it is not necessary to inquire. It is referred to for the purpose of showing that at that time (in 1866) Congress did not assume, under the authority given by the Thirteenth Amendment, to adjust what may be called the social rights of men and races in the community; but only to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential distinction between freedom and slavery. We must not forget that the province and scope of the Thir- teenth and Fourteenth Amendments are different; the former simply abolished slavery: the latter prohibited the States from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; from depriving them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and from denying to any the equal protection of the laws. The amendments are different, and the powers of Congress under them are different. What Congress has power to do under one, it may not have power to do under the other. Under the Thirteenth Amendment, it has only to do with slavery and its incidents. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it has power to counteract and render nugatory all State laws and proceedings which have the effect to abridge any of the privileges or immuni- ties of citizens of the United States, or to deprive them of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or to deny to any of them the equal protection of the laws. Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the legislation, so far as necessary or proper to erad- icate all forms and incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by State legislation or not; under the Four- teenth, as we have already shown, it must necessarily be, and can only be, corrective in its character, addressed to counteract and afford relief against State regulations or proceedings. The only question under the present head, therefore, is, whether 532 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. the refusal to any persons of the accommodations of an inn, or a public conveyance, or a place of public amusement, by an individ- ual, and without any sanction or support from any State law or regulation, does inflict upon such persons any manner of servitude, or form of slavery, as those -terms are understood in this country? Many wrongs may be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Four- teenth Amendment which are not, in any just sense, incidents or elements of slavery. Such, for example, would be the taking of private property without due process of law; or allowing persons who have committed certain crimes (horse-stealing, for example) to be seized and hung by the posse comitatus without regular trial; or denying to any person, or class of persons, the right to pursue any peaceful avocations allowed to others. What is called class legislation would belong to this category, and would be obnoxious to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment, but would not necessarily be so to the Thirteenth, when not involving the idea of any subjection of one man to another. The Thirteenth Amend- ment has respect, not to distinctions of race, or class, or color, but to slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment extends its protection to races and classes, and prohibits any State legislation which has the effect of denying to any race or class, or to any individual, the equal protection of the laws. Now, conceding, for the sake of the argument, that the admis- sion to an inn, a public conveyance, or a place of public amuse- ment, on equal terms with all other citizens, is the right of every man and all classes of men, is it any more than one of those rights which the States by the Fourteenth Amendment are forbidden to deny to any person? And is the Constitution violated until the denial of the right has some State sanction or authority? Can the act of a mere individual, the owner of the inn, the public convey- ance or place of amusement, refusing the accommodation, be justly regarded as imposing any badge of slavery or servitude upon the applicant, or only as inflicting an ordinary civil injury, properly cognizable by the laws of the State, and presumably subject to redress by those laws until the contrary appears? After giving to these questions all the consideration which their importance demands, we are forced to the conclusion that such an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involun- tary servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is to be sought under the laws of the State; or if those laws are adverse to his rights and do not protect him, his remedy will be found in the corrective legislation which Congress has adopted, or may adopt, for counteracting the effect of State laws, or CIVIL RIGHTS CASES. 533 State action, prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business. Innkeepers and public carriers, by the laws of all the States, so far as we are aware, are bound, to the extent of their facilities, to furnish proper accommodations to all unobjectionable persons who in good faith apply for them. If the laws themselves make any unjust discrim- ination, amenable to the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amend- ment, Congress has full power to accord a remedy under that amendment and in accordance with it. When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of benefi- cent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty and property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that it was any invasion of his per- sonal status as a freeman because he was not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because he was subjected to discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns, pub- lic conveyances and places of amusement. Mere discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery. If, since that time, the enjoyment of equal rights in all these re- spects has become established by constitutional enactment, it is not by force of the Thirteenth Amendment (which merely abolishes slavery), but by force of the Thirteenth [Fourteenth?] and Fif- teenth Amendments. On the whole, we are of opinion, that no countenance of au- thority for the passage of the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution; and no other ground of authority for its passage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared void, at least so far as its operation in the several States is concerned. This conclusion disposes of the cases now under consideration. In the cases of the United States v. Michael Ryan, and of Richard A. Robinson and Wife v. The Memphis & Charleston Railroad Company, the judgments must be affirmed. In the other cases, 534 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. the answer to be given will be that the first and second sections of the act of Congress of March 1st, 1875, entitled "An Act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights," are unconstitu- tional and void, and that judgment should be rendered upon the several indictments in those cases accordingly. And it is so ordered- [MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered a dissenting opinion.] HURTADO v. CALIFORNIA. 110 U. S., 516. Decided 1884. The Constitution of the State of California, adopted in 1879, in Article I, section 8, provides as follows: "Offences heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment shall be prosecuted by information, after examination and com- mitment by a magistrate, or by indictment without such examina- tion and commitment as may be prescribed by law. A grand jury shall be summoned at least once a year in each county/' . . . [Hurtado, having been charged with murder by an information filed with the District Attorney, was tried by jury, convicted, and sentenced to be hanged. Thereupon he filed certain objections to the execution of the sentence, one of which recited "that the said plaintiff in error had been held to answer for the said crime of murder by the district attorney of the said county of Sacramento, upon an information filed by him, and had been tried and illegally found guilty of said crime, without any presentment or indictment of any grand or other jury, and that the judgment rendered upon the alleged verdict of the jury in such case was and is void, and if executed would deprive the plaintiff in error of his life or liberty without due process of law/'] MR. JUSTICE MATTHEWS delivered the opinion of the court. After reciting the facts in the foregoing language, he continued: It is claimed on behalf of the prisoner that the conviction and sentence are void, on the ground that they are repugnant to that clause of the Fourteenth Article of Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which is in these words: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." HURTADO v. CALIFORNIA. 535 The proposition of law we are asked to affirm is that an indict- ment or presentment by a grand jury as known to the common law of England, is essential to that "due process of law," when applied to prosecutions for felonies, which is secured and guaranteed by this provision of the Constitution of the United States, and which accordingly it is forbidden to the States respectively to dispense with in the administration of criminal law. . . . [Here follow citations from Kalloch v. Superior Court, 56 Cal., 229, and Eowan v. The State, 30 Wis., 129.] On the other hand, it is maintained on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the phrase "due process of law" is equivalent to "law of the land/' as found in the 29th chapter of Magna Charta; that by immemorial usage it has acquired a fixed, definite, and technical meaning; that it refers to and includes, not only the general prin- ciples of public liberty and private right, which lie at the founda- tion of all free government, but the very institutions which, ven- erable by time and custom, have been tried by experience and found fit and necessary for the preservation of those principles, and which, having been the birthright and inheritance of every English sub- ject, crossed the Atlantic with the colonists and were transplanted and established in the fundamental laws of the State; that, having been originally introduced into the Constitution of the United States as a limitation upon the powers of the government, brought into being by that instrument, it has now been added as an addi- tional security to the individual against oppression by the States themselves; that one of these institutions is that of the grand jury, an indictment or presentment by which against the accused in cases of alleged felonies is an essential part of due process of law, in order that he may not be harassed or destroyed by prosecutions founded only upon private malice or popular fury. This view is certainly supported by the authority of the great name of Chief Justice Shaw and of the court in which he pre- sided, which, in Jones v. Eobbins, 8 Gray, 329, decided that the 12th article of the Bill of Eights of Massachusetts, a transcript of Magna Charta in this respect, made an indictment or present- ment of a grand jury essential to the validity of a conviction in cases of prosecutions for felonies. In delivering the opinion of the court in that case, Merrick, J., alone dissenting, the Chief Justice said: "The right of individual citizens to be secure from an open and public accusation of crime, and from the trouble, expense, and anxiety of a public trial before a probable cause is established by the presentment and indictment of a grand jury, in case of high 536 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. offenses, is justly regarded as one of the securities to the inno- cent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive public prosecutions, and as one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty." . . . "It having been stated," he continued, "by Lord Coke, that by the 'law of the land' was intended a due course of proceeding according to the established rules and practice of the courts of common law, it may, perhaps, be suggested that this might include other modes of proceeding sanctioned by the com- mon law, the most familiar of which are, by informations of dif- ferent kinds, by the officers of the crown in the name of the King. But, in reply to this, it may be said that Lord Coke himself explains his own meaning by saying 'the law of the land,' as ex- pressed in Magna Charta, was intended due process of law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men. And fur- ther, it is stated on the authority of Blackstone, that informations of every kind are confined by the constitutional law to misde- meanors only. 4 Bl. Com., 310." . . . This view of the meaning of Lord Coke is the one taken by Merrick, J., in his dissenting opinion in Jones v. Bobbins, 8 Gray, 329, who states his conclusions in these words: "It is the forensic trial, under a broad and general law, operat- ing equally upon every member of our community, which the words the 12th of January, 1865. On the 12th of March, 1865, White ami Chiles received from the military board one hundred and thirty- five of these bonds, none of which were indorsed by any governor of Texas. Afterward, in the course of the years 1865 and 1866, some of the same bonds came into the possession of others of the defendants, by purchase, or as security for advances of money. Such is a brief outline of the case. It will be necessary here- after to refer more in detail to some particular circumstances of it. The first inquiries to which our attention was directed by coun- sel, arose upon the allegations of the answer of Chiles (1) that no sufficient authority is shown for the prosecution of the suit in the name and on the behalf of the State of Texas; and (2) that the State, having severed her relations with a majority of the States of the Union, and having by her ordinance of secession at- tempted to throw off her allegiance to the Constitution and gov- ernment of the United States, has so far changed her status as to be disabled from prosecuting suits in the National courts. The first of these allegations is disproved by the evidence. A letter of authority, the authenticity of which is not disputed, has been produced, in which J. W. Throckmorton, elected governor under the constitution adopted in 1866, and proceeding under an act of the State legislature relating to these bonds, expressly ratifies and confirms the action of the solicitors who filed the bill, and empowers them to prosecute this suit; and it is further proved by the affidavit of Mr. Paschal, counsel for the complainant, that he was duly appointed by Andrew J. Hamilton, while provisional governor of Texas, to represent the State of Texas in reference to the bonds in controversy, and that his appointment has been renewed by E. M. Pease, the actual governor. If Texas was a State of the Union at the time of these acts, and these persons or either of them, were competent to represent the State, this proof leaves no doubt about the question of authority. The other allegation presents a question of jurisdiction. It is not questioned that this court has original jurisdiction of suits by States against citizens of other States, or that the States entitled 554 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. to invoke this jurisdiction must be States of the Union. But, it is equally clear that no such jurisdiction lias been conferred upon this court of suits by any other political communities than such States. If, therefore, it is true that the State of Texas was not at the time of filing this bill, or is not now, one of the United States, we have no jurisdiction of this suit, and it is our duty to dismiss it. It [the word state] describes sometimes a people or community of individuals united more or less closely in political relations, inhabiting temporarily or permanently the same country; often it denotes only the country or territorial region, inhabited by such a community; not unfrequently it is applied to the government under which the people live; at other times it represents the combined idea of people, territory, and government. . . . In the Constitution the term state most frequently expresses the combined idea just noticed, of people, territory, and govern- ment. A State, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of de- nned boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and established by the con- sent of the governed. It is the union of such states, under a com- mon constitution, which forms the distinct and greater political unit, which that Constitution designates as the United States, and makes of the people and states which compose it one people and one country. . . . In all respects, so far as the objects could be accomplished by ordinances of the convention, by acts of the legislature, and by votes of the citizens, the relations of Texas to the Union were broken up, and new relations to a new government were established for them. The position thus assumed could only be maintained by arms, and Texas accordingly took part, with the other Confederate States, in the war of the rebellion, which these events made inevitable. Dur- ing the whole of that war there was no governor, or judge, or any other State officer in Texas, who recognized the National author- ity. Nor was any officer of the United States permitted to exer- cise any authority whatever under the National government within the limits of the States, except under the immediate protection of the National military forces. Did Texas, in consequence of these acts, cease to be a State? Or, if not, did the State cease to be a member of the Union? It is needless to discuss, at length, the question whether the right TEXAS v*. WHITE. 555 of a State to withdraw from the Union for any cause, regarded by herself as sufficient, is consistent with the Constitution of the United States. The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbi- trary relation. It began among the Colonies, and grew out of com- mon origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar inter- ests, and geographical relations. It was confirmed and strength- ened by the necessities of war, and received definite form, and character, and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared to "be perpetual." And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained "to form a more perfect Union." It is difficult to convey the idea of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words. What can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not? But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union, by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of self-government by the States. Under the Articles of Confed- eration, each State retained its sovereignty, freedom, and inde- pendence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right not expressly delegated to the United States. Under the Constitution, though the powers of the States were much restricted, still, all powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. And we have already had occasion to remark at this term, that "the people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and en- dowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence," and that "without the States in union, there could be no such political body as the United States." 1 Not only therefore can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their union and under the Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and gare of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all of its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States. When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of per- petual union and all the guarantees of republican government in the Union, attached at once, to the State. The act which con- i County of Lane v. The State of Oregon, 7 Wallace, 76. 556 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. summated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or through consent of the States. Considered therefore as transacted under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legisla- ture intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United States, remained perfect and unim- paired.' It certainly follows that the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union. If this were otherwise, the State must have become foreign, and her citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased to be a war for the sup- pression of rebellion, and must have become a war for conquest and subjugation. Our conclusion therefore is, that Texas continued to be a State, and a State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the National government, but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations since the first outbreak of the rebellion. But in order to the exercise, by a State, of the right to sue in this court, there needs to be a State government, competent to represent the State in its relations with the National government, so far at least as the institution and prosecution of a suit is con- cerned. And it is by no means a logical conclusion, from the premises which we have endeavored to establish, that the governmental relations of Texas to the Union remained unaltered. Obligations often remain unimpaired, while relations are greatly changed. The obligations of allegiance to the State, and of obedience to her laws, subject to the Constitution of the United States, are binding upon all citizens, whether faithful or unfaithful to them; but the relations which subsist while these obligations are performed, are essentially Different from those which arise when they are disre- garded and set at nought. And the same must necessarily be true of the obligations and relations of States and citizens to the Union. TEXAS v. WHITE. 557 No one has been bold enough to contend that, while Texas was con- trolled by a government hostile to the United States, and in affilia- tion with a hostile confederation, waging war upon the United States, senators chosen by her legislature, or representatives elected by her citizens, were entitled to seats in Congress; or that any suit, instituted in her name, could be entertained in this court. All admit that, during this condition of civil war, the rights of the State as a member, and of her people as citizens of the Union, were suspended. The government and the citizens of the State, refusing to recognize their constitutional obligations, assumed the character of enemies, and incurred the consequences of rebellion. These new relations imposed new duties upon the United States. The first was that of suppressing the rebellion. The next was that of re-establishing the broken relations of the State with the Union. The first of these duties having been performed, the next necessarily engaged the attention of the National government. The authority for the performance of the first had been found in the power to suppress insurrection and carry on war; for the performance of the second, authority was derived from the obliga- tion of the United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government. The latter, indeed, in the case of a rebellion which involves the government of a State, and for the time excludes the National authority from its limits, seems to be a necessary complement to the former. Of this, the case of Texas furnishes a striking illustration. When the war closed there was no government in the State except that which had been organized for the purpose of waging war against the United States. That government immediately disappeared. The chief functionaries left the State. Many of the subordinate officials followed their example. Legal responsibilities were an- nulled or greatly impaired. It was inevitable that great confusion should prevail. If order was maintained, it was where the good sense and virtue of the citizens gave support to local acting magis- trates, or supplied more directly the needful restraints. A great social change increased the difficulty of the situation. Slaves, in the insurgent States, with certain local exceptions, had been declared free by the Proclamation of Emancipation; and whatever questions might be made as to the effect of that act, under the Constitution, it was clear, from the beginning, that its practical operation, in connection with legislative acts of like tendency, must be complete enfranchisement. Wherever the Na- tional forces obtained control, the slaves became freemen. Sup- port to the acts of Congress and the proclamation of the President, 558 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. concerning slaves, was made a condition of amnesty 1 by President Lincoln, in December, 1863, and by President Johnson, in May, 1865. 2 And emancipation was confirmed, rather than ordained, in the insurgent States, by the amendment to the Constitution prohibiting slavery throughout the Union, which was proposed by Congress in February, 1865, and ratified, before the close of the following autumn, by the requisite three-fourths of the States. 3 The new freemen necessarily became part of the people, and the people still constituted the State; for States, like individuals, retain their identity, though changed to some extent in their constituent elements. And it was the State, thus constituted, which was now entitled to the benefit of the constitutional guarantee. There being then no government in Texas in constitutional re- lations with the Union, it became the duty of the United States to provide for the restoration of such a government. But the restora- tion of the government which existed before the rebellion, without a new election of officers, was obviously impossible; and before any such election could be properly held, it was necessary that the old Constitution should receive such amendments as would con- form its provisions to the new conditions created by emancipation, and afford adequate security to the people of the State. In the exercise of the power conferred by the guarantee clause, as in the exercise of every other constitutional power, a discretion in the choice of means is necessarily allowed. It is essential only that the means must be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the power conferred, through the restoration of the State to its constitutional relations, under a republican form of government, and that no acts be done, and no authority exerted, which is either prohibited or unsanctioned by the Constitution. It is not important to review, at length, the measures which have been taken, under this power, by the executive and legislative departments of the National government. It is proper, however, to observe that almost immediately after the cessation of organ- ized hostilities, and while the war yet smouldered in Texas, the President of the United States issued his proclamation appointing a provisional governor for the State, and providing for the assem- bling of a convention, with a view to the re-establishment of a republican government, under an amended constitution, and to the restoration of the State to her proper constitutional relations. A convention was accordingly assembled, the constitution amended, 1 13 Stats, at Large, 737. s Ib., 774-775. 2 Ib., 758. TEXAS v. WHITE. 559 elections held, and a State government, acknowledging its obliga- tions, to the Union, established. Whether the action then taken was, in all respects, warranted by the Constitution, it is not now necessary to determine. The power exercised by the President was supposed, doubtless, to be derived from his constitutional functions, as commander-in-chief ; and, so long as the war continued, it cannot be denied that he might insti- tute temporary government within insurgent districts, occupied by the National forces, or take measures, in any State, for the restora- tion of State government faithful to the Union, employing, how- ever, in such efforts, only such means and agents as were author- ized by constitutional laws. But the power to carry into effect the clause of guarantee is pri- marily a legislative power, and resides in Congress. "Under the fourth article of the Constitution, it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For, as the United States guarantee to each State a republican government, Congress must necessarily decide what government is established in the State, before it can determine whether it is republican or not." This is the language of the late Chief Justice, speaking for this court, in a case from Ehode Island, 4 arising from the organization of opposing governments in that State. And we think that the principle sanctioned by it may be applied, with even more pro- priety, to the case of a State deprived of all rightful government, by revolutionary violence; though necessarily limited to cases where the rightful government is thus subverted, or in imminent danger of being overthrown by an opposing government, set up by force within the State. The action of the President must, therefore, be considered as provisional, and, in that light, it seems to have been regarded by Congress. It was taken after the term of the 38th Congress had expired. The 39th Congress, which assembled in December, 1865, followed by the 40th Congress, which met in March, 1867, pro- ceeded, after long deliberation, to adopt various measures for reor- ganization and restoration. These measures were embodied in proposed amendments to the Constitution, and in the acts known as the Eeconstruotion Acts, which have been so far carried into effect, that a majority of the States which were engaged in the re- bellion have been restored to their constitutional relations, under forms of government, adjudged to be republican by Congress, * Luther v. Borden, 7 Howard, 42. 560 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. through the admission of their "Senators and Representatives into the councils of the Union." Nothing in the case before us requires the court to pronounce judgment upon the constitutionality of any particular provision of these acts. But it is important to observe that these acts themselves show- that the governments, which had been established and had been in actual operation under executive direction, were recognized by Congress as provisional, as existing, and as capable of continuance. By the act of March 2, 1867, 5 the first of the series, these gov- ernments were, indeed, pronounced illegal and were subjected to military control, and were declared to be provisional only; and by the supplementary act of July 19, 1867, the third of the series, it was further declared that it was the true intent and meaning of the act of March 2, that the governments then existing were not legal State governments, and if continued, were to be continued subject to the military commanders of the respective districts and to the paramount authority of Congress. We do not inquire here into the constitutionality of this legislation so far as it relates to military authority, or to the paramount authority of Congress. It suffices to say, that the terms of the acts necessarily imply recog- nition of actually existing governments; and that in point of fact, the governments thus recognized, in some important respects, still exist. What has thus been said generally describes, with sufficient ac- curacy, the situation of Texas. A provisional governor of the State was appointed by the President in 1865; in 1866 a governor was elected by the people under the constitution of that year; at a subsequent date a governor was appointed by the commander of the district. Each of the three exercised executive functions and actu- ally represented the State in the executive department. In the case before us each has given his sanction to the prosecu- tion of the suit, and we find no difficulty, without investigating the legal title of either to the executive office, in holding that the sanction thus given sufficiently warranted the action of the solicitor and counsel in behalf of the State. The necessary conclusion is that the suit was instituted and is prosecuted by competent authority. The question of jurisdiction being thus disposed of, we proceed to the consideration of the merits as presented by the pleadings and the evidence. . . . On the whole case, therefore^ our conclusion is that the State of 5 14 Stats, at Large, 428. TEXAS v. WHITE. 561 Texas is entitled to the relief sought by her bill, and a decree must be made accordingly. ME. JUSTICE GRIER dissenting. I regret that I am compelled to dissent from the opinion of the majority of the court on all the points raised and to be decided in this case. The first question in order is the jurisdiction of the court to entertain this bill in behalf of the State of Texas. The original jurisdiction of this court can be invoked only by one of the United States. The Territories have no such right con- ferred on them by the Constitution, nor have the Indian tribes who are under the protection of the military authorities of the gov- ernment. Is Texas one of these United States? Or was she such at the time this bill was filed, or since? This is to be decided as a political fact, not as a legal fiction. This court is bound to know and notice the public history of the nation. If I regard the truth of history for the last eight years, I cannot discover the State of Texas as one of these United States. I do not think it necessary to notice any of the very astute arguments which have been advanced by the learned counsel in this case, to find the definition of a State, when we have the subject treated in a clear and common-sense manner by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey. 6 As the case is short, I hope to be excused for a full report of it, as stated and decided by the court. He says: "The question is, whether the plaintiffs, as residents of the Dis- trict of Columbia, can maintain an action in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Virginia. This depends on the act of Congress describing the jurisdiction of that court. The act gives jurisdiction to the Circuit Courts in cases between a citi- zen of the State in which the suit is brought, and a citizen of an- other State. To support the jurisdiction in this case, it must appear that Columbia is a State. On the part of the plaintiff, it has been urged that Columbia is a distinct political society, and is, therefore, a 'State' according to the definition of writers on general law. This is true; but as the act of Congress obviously uses the word 'State' in reference to that term as used in the Constitution, it be- comes necessary to inquire whether Columbia is a State in the sense of that instrument. The result of that examination is a con- viction that the members of the American Confederacy only are the 36 62 Cranch, 452. 562 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. States contemplated in the Constitution. The House of Repre- sentatives is to be composed of members chosen by the people of the several States, and each State shall have at least one repre- sentative. 'The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each State.' Each State shall appoint, for the election of the executive, a number of electors equal to its whole number of senators and representatives. These clauses show that the word 'State' is used in the Constitution as designating a mem- ber of the Union, and excludes from the term the signification attached to it by writers on the law of nations." Now we have here a clear and well-defined test by which we may arrive at a conclusion with regard to the questions of fact now to be decided. Is Texas a Slate, now represented by members chosen by the people of that State and received on the floor of Congress? Has she two senators to represent her as a State in the Senate of the United States? Has her voice been heard in the late election of President? Is she not now held and governed as a conquered province by mili- tary force? The act of Congress of March 2d, 1867, declares Texas to be a "rebel State," and provides for its government until a legal and republican State government could be legally established. It constituted Louisiana and Texas the fifth military district, and made it subject, not to the civil authority, but to the "military authorities of the United States." It is true that no organized rebellion now exists there, and the courts of the United States now exercise jurisdiction over the peo- ple of that province. But this is no test of the State's being in the Union; Dakota is no State, and yet the United States admin- ister justice there as they do in Texas. The Indian tribes, who are governed by military force, cannot claim to be States of the Union. Wherein does the condition of Texas differ from theirs? Now, by assuming or admitting as a fact the present status of Texas as a State not in the Union politically, I beg leave to protest against any charge of inconsistency as to judicial opinions hereto- fore expressed as a member of this court, or silently assented to. I do not consider myself bound to express any opinion judicially as to the constitutional right of Texas to exercise the rights and privi- leges of a State of this Union, or the power of Congress to govern her as a conquered province, to subject her to military domination, and keep her in pupilage. I can only submit to the fact as de- cided by the political position of the government; and I am not disposed to join in any essay to prove Texas to be a State of the Union, when Congress have decided that she is not. It is a question TARBLE'S CASE. 563 of fact, I repeat, and of fact only. Politically, Texas is not a State in this Union. Whether rightfully out of it or not is a question not before the court. . . . MR. JUSTICE S WAYNE: I concur with my brother Grier as to the incapacity of the State of Texas, in her present condition, to maintain an original suit in this court. The question, in my judg- ment, is one in relation to which this court is bound by the action pf the legislative department of the government. Upon the merits of the case, I agree with the* majority of my brethren. I am authorized to say that my brother MILLER unites with me in these views. TAEBLE'S CASE. 13 Wallace, 397. Decided 1871. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. This was a proceeding on habeas corpus for the discharge of one Edward Tarble, held in the custody of a recruiting officer of the United States as an enlisted soldier, on the alleged ground that he was a minor, under the age of eighteen years at the time of his enlistment, and that he enlisted without the consent of his father. The writ was issued on the 10th of August, 1869, by a court com- missioner of Dane County, Wisconsin, an officer authorized by the laws of that State to issue the writ of habeas corpus upon the peti- tion of parties imprisoned or restrained of their liberty, or of per- sons on their behalf. It was issued in this case upon the petition of the father of Tarble, in which he alleged that his son, who had enlisted under the name of Frank Brown, was confined and re- strained of his liberty by Lieutenant Stone, of the United States army, in the city of Madison, in that State and county; that the cause of his confinement and restraint was that he had, on the 20th of the preceding July, enlisted, and been mustered into the mili- tary service of the United States; that he was under the age of eighteen years at the time of such enlistment; that the same was made without the knowledge, consent, or approval of the peti- tioner; and was, therefore, as the petitioner was advised and be- lieved, illegal; and that the petitioner was lawfully entitled to the custody, care, and services of his son. . . . 564 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. [The commissioner held that the prisoner was illegally detained by Lieutenant Stone, and ordered his discharge. Afterward? Lieu- tenant Stone had the proceedings taken to the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, where the order of the commissioner discharging the prisoner was affirmed. That judgment was then brought before the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error prosecuted by the United States.] ME. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court, as follows: The important question is presented by this case, whether a State court commissioner has jurisdiction, upon habeas corpus, to inquire into the validity of the enlistment of soldiers into the mili- tary service of the United States, and to discharge them from such service when, in his judgment, their enlistment has not been made in conformity with the laws of the United States. The question presented may be more generally stated thus: Whether any judicial officer of a State has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus, or to continue proceedings under the writ when issued, for the dis- charge of a person held under the authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States, by an officer of that govern- ment. For it is evident, if such jurisdiction may be exercised by any judicial officer of a State, it may be exercised by the court commissioner within the county for which he is appointed; and if it may be exercised with reference to soldiers detained in the mili- tary service of the United States, whose enlistment is alleged to have been illegally made, it may be exercised with reference to per- sons employed in any other department of the public service when their illegal detention is asserted. It may be exercised in all cases where parties are held under the authority of the United States, whenever the invalidity of the exercise of that authority is affirmed. The jurisdiction, if it exist at all, can only be limited in its appli- cation by the legislative power of the State. It may even reach to parties imprisoned under sentence of the National courts, after regular indictment, trial, and conviction, for offenses against the laws of the United States. As we read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in this case, this is the claim of authority as- serted by that tribunal for itself and for the judicial officers of that State. It does, indeed, disclaim any right of either to interfere with parties in custody, under judicial sentence, when the National court pronouncing sentence had jurisdiction to try and punish the offenders, but it asserts, at the same time, for itself and for each of TARBLE'S CASE. 565 those officers, the right to determine, upon habeas corpus, in all cases, whether that court ever had such jurisdiction. . . . It is evident, as said by this court when the case of Booth was finally brought before it, if the power asserted by that State court ever existed, no offense against the laws of the United States could be punished by their own tribunals, without the permission and according to the judgment of the courts of the State in which the parties happen to be imprisoned; that if that power existed in that State court, it belonged equally to every other State court in the Union where a prisoner was within its territorial limits; and, as the different State courts could not always agree, it would often happen that an act, which was admitted to be an offense and justly punishable in one State, would be regarded as innocent and even praiseworthy in another, and no one could suppose that a govern- ment, which had hitherto lasted for seventy years, "enforcing its laws by its own tribunals, and preserving the union of the States, could have lasted a single year, or fulfilled the trusts committed to it, if offenses against its laws could not have been punished with- out the consent of the State in which the culprit was found." . . . [Here follows an extended discussion of Ableman v. Booth and The United States v. Booth, 21 Howard, 506.] It is in the consideration of this distinct and independent char- acter of the government of the United States, from that of the government of the several States, that the solution of the question presented in this case, and in similar cases, must be found. There are within the territorial limits of each State two governments, re- stricted in their spheres of action, but independent of each other, and supreme within their respective spheres. Each has its sep- arate departments; each has its distinct laws, and each has its own tribunals' for their enforcement. Neither government can intrude within the jurisdiction, or authorize any interference therein by its judicial officers with the action of the other. The two gov- ernments in each State stand in their respective spheres of action in the same independent relation to each other, except in one par- ticular, that they would if their authority embraced distinct ter- ritories. That particular consists in the supremacy of the authority of the United States when any conflict arises between the two governments. The Constitution and the laws passed in pursuance of it, are declared by the Constitution itself to be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of every State are bound thereby, "any- thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not- withstanding." Whenever, therefore, any conflict arises between the enactments of the two sovereignties, or in the enforcement of 566 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. their asserted authorities, those of the National government must have supremacy until the validity of the different enactments and authorities can be finally determined by the tribunals of the United States. This temporary supremacy until judicial decision by the National tribunals, and the ultimate determination of the conflict by such decision, are essential to the preservation of order and peace, and the avoidance of forcible collision between the two .governments. "The Constitution/' as said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, "was not framed merely to guard the States against danger from abroad, but chiefly to secure union and harmony at home; and to accomplish this end it was deemed necessary, when the Constitution was framed, that many of the rights of sovereignty which the States then possessed should be ceded to the General government; and that in the sphere of action assigned to it, it should be supreme and strong enough to execute its own laws by its own tribunals, without interruption from a State, or from State authorities." And the judicial power conferred extends to all cases arising under the Constitution, and thus embraces every legis- lative act of Congress, whether passed in pursuance of it, or in disregard of its provisions. The Constitution is under the view of the tribunals of the United States when any act of Congress is brought before them for consideration. Such being the distinct and independent character of the two governments, within their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude with its judicial process into the domain of the other, except so far as such intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National government to preserve its rightful su- premacy in cases of conflict of authority. In their laws, and mode of enforcement, neither is responsible to the other. How their respective laws shall be enacted; how they shall be carried into execution; and in what tribunals, or by what officers; and how much discretion, or whether any at all shall be vested in their officers, are matters subject to their own control, and in the regula- tion of which neither can interfere with the other. Now, among the powers assigned to the National government, is the power "to raise and support armies," and the power "to provide for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." The execution of these powers falls within the line of its duties; and its control over the subject is plenary and exclusive. It can determine, without question from any State authority, how the armies shall be raised, whether by voluntary enlistment or forced draft, the age at which the soldier shall be received, and the period for which he shall be taken, the compensation he shall TARBLE'S CASE. 567 be allowed, and the service to which he shall be assigned. And it can provide the rules for the government and regulation of the forces after they are raise;d, define what shall constitute military offenses, and prescribe their punishment. No interference with the execution of this power of the National government in the formation, organization, and government of its armies by any State officials could be permitted without greatly impairing the effi- ciency, if it did not utterly destroy, this branch of the public ser- vice. Probably in every county and city in the several States there are one or more officers authorized by law to issue writs of habeas corpus on behalf of persons alleged to be illegally restrained of their liberty; and if soldiers could be taken from the army of the United States, and the validity of their enlistment inquired into by any one of these officers, such proceeding could be taken by all of them, and no movement could be made by the National troops without their commanders being subjected to constant annoyance and embarrassment from this source. The experience of the late rebellion has shown us, that, in times of great popular excitement, there may be found in every State large numbers ready and anxious to embarrass the operations of the government, and easily per- suaded to believe every step taken for the enforcement of its authority illegal and void. Power to issue writs of habeas corpus for the discharge of soldiers in the military service, in the hands of parties thus disposed, might be used, and often would be used, to the great detriment of the public service. In many exigencies the measures of the National government might in this way be entirely bereft of their efficacy and value. An appeal in such cases to this court, to correct the erroneous action of these officers, would afford no adequate remedy. Proceedings on habeas corpus are summary, and the delay incident to bringing the decision of a State officer, through the highest tribunal of the State, to this court for review would necessarily occupy years, and in the mean- time, where the soldier was discharged, the mischief would be ac- complished. It is manifest that the powers of the National govern- ment could not be exercised with energy and efficiency at all times, if its acts could be interfered with and controlled for any period by officers or tribunals of another sovereignty. It is true similar embarrassment might sometimes be occasioned, though in a less degree, by the exercise of the authority to issue the writ possessed by judicial officers of the United States, but the ability to provide a speedy remedy for any inconvenience following from this source would always exist with the National legislature. State judges and State courts, authorized by laws of their States 568 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. to issue writs of habeas corpus, have undoubtedly a right to issue the writ in any case where a party is alleged to be illegally confined within their limits, unless it appear upon his application that he is confined under the authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States, by an officer of that government. If such fact appear upon the application the writ should be refused. If it do not appear, the judge or court issuing the writ has a right to inquire into the cause of imprisonment and ascertain by what authority the person is held within the limits of the State; and it is the duty of the marshal, or other officer having the custody of the prisoner, to give, by a proper return, information in this respect. His return should be sufficient, in its detail of facts, to show distinctly that the imprisonment is under the au- thority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States, and to exclude the suspicion of imposition or oppression on his part. And the process or orders, under which the prisoner is held, should be produced with the return and submitted to inspection, in order that the court or judge issuing the writ may see that the prisoner is held by the officer, in good faith, under the authority or claim and color of the authority, of the United States, and not under the mere pretence of having such authority. This right to inquire by process of habeas corpus, and the duty of the officer to make a return, "grows necessarily," says Mr. Chief Justice Taney, "out of the complex character of our government and the existence of two distinct and separate sovereignties within the same territorial space, each of them restricted in its power, and each within its sphere of action, prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, independent of the other. But, after the re- turn is made, and the State judge or court judicially apprised that the party is in custody under the authority of the United States, they can proceed no further. They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus nor any other process issued under State authority can pass over the line of division be- tween the two sovereignties. He is then within the dominion and ' exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. If he has committed an offense against their laws, their tribunals alone can punish him. If he is wrongfully imprisoned, their judicial tribunals can release him and afford him redress." Some attempt has been made in adjudications, to which our at- tention has been called, to limit the decision of this court in Able- man v. Booth, and The United States v. Booth, to cases where a prisoner is held in custody under undisputed lawful authority of TARBLE'S CASE. 5G9 the United States, as distinguished from his imprisonment under claim and color of such authority. But it is evident that the deci- sion does not admit of any such limitation. It would have been unnecessary to enforce, by any extended reasoning, such as the Chief Justice uses, the position that when it appeared to the judge or officer issuing the writ, that the prisoner was held under undis- puted lawful authority, he should proceed no further. No Federal judge even could, in such case, release the party from imprison- ment, except upon bail when that was allowable. The detention being by admitted lawful authority, no judge could set the pris- oner at liberty, except in that way, at any stage of the proceeding. All that is meant by the language used is, that the State judge or State court should proceed no further when it appears, from the application of the party, or the return made, that the prisoner is held by an officer of the United States under what, in truth, pur- ports to be the authority of the United States; that is, an author- ity, the validity of which is to be determined by the Consitution and laws of the United States. If a party thus held be illegally imprisoned it is for the courts or judicial officers of the United States, and those courts or officers alone, to grant him release. This limitation upon the power of State tribunals and State officers furnishes no just ground to apprehend that the liberty of the citizen will thereby be endangered. The United States are as much interested in protecting the citizen from illegal restraint under their authority, as the several States are to protect him from the like restraint under their authority, and are no more likely to tolerate any oppression. Their courts and judicial officers are clothed with the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus in all cases, where.a party is illegally restrained of his liberty by an officer of the United States, whether such illegality consist in the char- acter of the process, 'the authority of the officer, or the invalidity of the law under which he is held. And there is no just reason to believe that they will exhibit any hesitation to exert their power, when it is properly invoked. Certainly there can be no ground for supposing that their action will be less prompt and efficient in such cases than would be that of State tribunals and State officers. 1 It follows, from the views we have expressed, that the court commissioner of Dane County was without jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus for the discharge of the prisoner in this case, it appearing, upon the application presented to him for the writ, that the prisoner was held by an officer of the United States, i In the matter of Severy, 4 Clifford. In the matter of Keeler, Hemp- stead, 306. 570 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. under claim and color of the authority of the United States, as an enlisted soldier mustered into the military service of the National government; and the same information was imparted to the com- missioner by the return of the officer. The commissioner was, both by the application for the writ and the return to it, apprised that the prisoner was within the dominion and jurisdiction of another government, and that no writ of habeas corpus issued by him could pass over the line which divided the two sovereignties. The conclusion we have reached renders it unnecessary to con- sider how far the declaration of the prisoner as to 'his age, in the oath of enlistment, is to be deemed conclusive evidence on that point on the return to the writ. Judgment reversed. The CHIEF JUSTICE, dissenting. I cannot concur in the opinion just read. I have no doubt of the right of a State court to in- quire into the jurisdiction of a Federal court upon habeas corpus, and to discharge when satisfied that the petitioner for the writ is restrained of liberty by the sentence of a court without jurisdiction. If it errs in deciding the question of jurisdiction, the error must be corrected in the mode prescribed by the 25th section of the Judiciary Act; not by denial of the right to make inquiry. I have still less doubt, if possible, that a writ of habeas corpus may issue from a State court to inquire into the validity of im- prisonment or detention, without the sentence of any court what- ever, by an officer of the United States. The State court may err; and if it does, the error may be corrected here. The mode has been prescribed and should be followed. To deny the right of State courts to issue the writ, or, what amounts to the same thing, to concede the right to issue and to deny the right to adjudicate, is to deny the right to protect the citizen by habeas corpus against arbitrary imprisonment in a large number of cases; and, I am thoroughly persuaded, was never within the contemplation of the Convention which framed, or the people who adopted, the Constitution. That instrument expressly declares that "the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it." EX PARTE SIEBOLD. Ex PARTE SIEBOLD. 100 U. S., 371. Decided 1879. PETITION for writ of habeas corpus. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. . ... ME. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. The petitioners in this case, Albert Siebold, Walter Tucker, Martin C. Burns, Lewis Coleman, and Henry Bowers, were judges of election at different voting precincts in the city of Baltimore, at the election held in that city, and in the State of Maryland, on the fifth day of November, 1878, at which representatives to the Forty-sixth Congress were voted for. At the November Term of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Maryland, an indictment against each of the petitioners was found in said court, for offenses alleged to have been committed by them respectively at their respective precincts whilst being judges of election; and upon which indictments they were severally tried, convicted, and sentenced by said court to fine and imprisonment. They now apply to this court for a writ of habeas corpus to be relieved from imprisonment. . . . These indictments were framed partly under Sect. 5515 and partly under Sect. 5522 of the Eevised Statutes of the United States; and the principal questions raised by the application are, whether those sections, and certain sections of the title of the Revised Statutes relating to the elective franchise, which they are intended to enforce, are within the constitutional power of Con- gress to enact. If they are not, then it is contended that the Cir- cuit Court has no jurisdiction of the cases, and that the convic- tions and sentences of imprisonment of the several petitioners were illegal and void. . . . The peculiarity of the case consists in the concurrent authority of the two sovereignties, State and National, over the same sub- ject-matter. This, however, is not entirely without a parallel. The regulation of foreign and interstate commerce is conferred by the Constitution upon Congress. It is not expressly taken away from the States. But where the subject matter is one of a national char- acter, or one that requires a uniform rule, it has been held that the power of Congress is exclusive. On the contrary, where neither of these circumstances exist, it has been held that State regulations are not unconstitutional. In the absence of congressional regula- tion, which would be of paramount authority when adopted, they 572 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. are valid and binding. . . . [Here follows a discussion of Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How- ard, 299.] So in the case of laws for regulating the elections of repre- sentatives to Congress. The State may make regulations on the subject; Congress may make regulations on the same subject, or may alter or add to those already made. The paramount character of those made by Congress has the effect to supersede those made by the State, so far as the two are inconsistent, and no farther. There is no such conflict between them as to prevent their form- ing a harmonious system perfectly capable of being administered and carried out as such. As to the supposed conflict that may arise between the officers appointed by the State and national governments for superintend- ing the election, no more insuperable difficulty need arise than in the application of the regulations adopted by each respectively. The regulations of Congress being constitutionally paramount, the duties imposed thereby upon the officers of the United States, so far as they have respect to the same matters, must necessarily be paramount to those to be performed by the officers of the State. If both cannot be performed, the latter are pro tanto superseded and cease to be duties. If the power of Congress over the subject is supervisory and paramount, as we have seen it to be, and if officers or agents are created for carrying out its regulations, it follows as a necessary consequence that such officers and agents must- have the requisite authority to act without obstruction or interference from the officers of the State. No greater subordina- tion, in kind or degree, exists in this case than in any other. It exists to the same extent between the different officers appointed by the State, when the State alone regulates the election. One officer cannot interfere with the duties of another, or obstruct or hinder him in the performance of them. Where there is a disposi- tion to act harmoniously, there is no danger of disturbance be- tween those who have different duties to perform. When the rightful authority of the general government is once conceded and acquiesced in, the apprehended difficulties will disappear. Let a spirit of national as well as local patriotism once prevail, let un- founded jealousies cease, and we shall hear no more about the impossibility of harmonious action between the national and State governments in a matter in which they have a mutual interest. As to the supposed incompatibility of independent sanctions and punishments imposed by the two governments, for the en- forcement of the duties required of the officers of election, and for EX PARTE SIEBOLD. 573 their protection in the performance of those duties, the same con- siderations apply. While the State will retain the power of en- forcing such of its own regulations as are not superseded by those adopted by Congress, it cannot be disputed that if Congress has power to make regulations it must have the power to enforce them, not only by punishing the delinquency of officers appointed by the United States, but by restraining and punishing those who attempt to interfere with them in the performance of their duties; and if, as we have shown, Congress may revise existing regulations, and add to or alter the same as far as it deems expedient, there can be as little question that it may impose additional penalties for the prevention of frauds committed by the State officers in the elec- tions, or for their violation of any duty relating thereto, whether arising from the common law or from any other law, State or na- tional. Why not? Penalties for fraud and delinquency are part of the regulations belonging to the subject. If Congress, by its power to make or alter the regulations, has a general supervisory power over the whole subject, what is there to preclude it from imposing additional sanctions and penalties to prevent such fraud and de- linquency? It is objected that Congress has no power to enforce State laws or to punish State officers, and especially has no power to punish them for violating the laws of their own State. As a general propo- sition, this is undoubtedly true; but when, in the performance of their functions, State officers are called upon to fulfill duties which they owe to the United States as well as to the State, has . the former no means of compelling such, fulfilment? Yet that is the case here. It is the duty of the States to elect representatives to Congress. The due and fair election of these representatives is of vital importance to the United States. The government of the United States is no less concerned in the transaction than the State government is. It certainly is not bound to stand by as a passive spectator, when duties are violated and outrageous frauds are com- mitted. It is directly interested in the faithful performance, by the officers of election, of their respective duties. Those duties are owed as well to the United States as to the State. This neces- sarily follows from the mixed character of the transaction, State and national. A violation of duty is an offense against the United States, for which the offender is justly amenable to that govern- ment. No official position can shelter him from this responsibility. In view of the fact that Congress has plenary and paramount juris- diction over the whole subject, it seems almost absurd to say that an officer who receives or has custody of the ballots given for a 574 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. representative owes no duty to the national government which Congress can enforce; or that an officer who stuffs the ballot-box cannot be made amenable to the United States. If Congress has not, prior to the passage of the present laws, imposed any penalties to prevent and punish frauds and violations of duty committed by officers of election, it has been because the exigency has not been deemed sufficient to require it, and not because Congress had not the requisite power. The objection that -the laws and regulations, the violation of which is made punishable by the acts of Congress, are State laws, and have not been adopted by Congress, is no sufficient answer to the power of Congress to impose punishment. It is true that Congress has not deemed it necessary to interfere with the duties of the ordinary officers of election, but has been content to leave them as prescribed by State laws. It has only created additional sanctions for their performance, and provided means of supervision in order more effectually to secure such performance. The im- position of punishment implies a prohibition of the act punished. The State laws which Congress sees no occasion to alter, but which it allows to stand, are in effect adopted by Congress. It. simply demands their fulfillment. Content to leave the laws as they are, it is not content with the means provided for their enforcement. It provides additional means for that purpose; and we think it is entirely within its constitutional power to do so. It is simply the exercise of the power to make additional regulations. That the duties devolved on the officers of election are duties which they owe to the United States as well as to the State, is further evinced by the fact that they have always been so regarded by the House of Representatives itself. In most cases of contested elections, the conduct of these officers is examined and scrutin- ized by that body as a matter of right; and their failure to per- form their duties is often made the ground of decision. Their conduct is justly regarded as subject to the fullest exposure; and the right to examine them personally, and to inspect all their proceedings and papers, has always been maintained. This could not be done, if the officers were amenable only to the supervision of the State government which appointed them. Another objection made is, that, if Congress can impose penal- ties for violation of State laws, the officer will be made liable to double punishment for delinquency, at the suit of the State, and at the suit of the United States. But the answer to this is, that each government punishes for violation of duty to itself only. Where a person owes a duty to two sovereigns, he is amen- EX PARTE SIEBOLD. 575 able to both for its performance; and either may call him to account. Whether punishment inflicted by one can be pleaded in bar to a charge by the other for the same identical act, need not now be decided; although considerable discussion bearing upon the subject has taken place in this court, tending to the conclusion that such a plea cannot be sustained. In reference to a conviction under a State law for passing coun- terfeit coin, which was sought to be reversed on the ground that Congress had jurisdiction over that subject, and might inflict punishment for the same offense, Mr. Justice Daniel, speaking for the court, said: "It is almost certain that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the State and Federal systems are administered, an offender who should have suffered the penalties denounced by the one would not be subjected a second time to punishment by the other for acts essentially the same, unless, indeed, this might occur in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety demanded extraordinary rigor. But, were a contrary course of policy or action either probable or usual, this would by no means justify the conclusion Ihat offenses falling within the competency of different authorities to restrain or punish them would not properly be subjected to the conse- quences which those authorities might ordain and affix to their perpetration." Fox v. The State of Ohio, 5 How., 410. The same judge, delivering the opinion of the court in the case of United States v. Marigold (9 How., 569) where a conviction was had under an act of Congress for bringing counterfeit coin into the country, said, in reference to Fox's Case: "With the view of avoiding conflict between the State and Federal jurisdictions, this court, in the case of Fox v. State of Ohio, have taken care to point out that the same act might, as to its character and tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an offense against both the State and Federal governments, and might draw to its commission the penalties denounced by either, as appro- priate to its character in reference to each. We hold this dis- tinction sound;" and the conviction was sustained. The subject came up again for discussion in the case of Moore v. State of Illinois (14 id., 13), in which the plaintiff in error had been con- victed under a State law for harboring and secreting a negro slave, which was contended to be properly an offense against the United States under the fugitive-slave law of 1793, and not an offense against the State. The objection of double punishment was again raised. Mr. Justice Grier, for the court, said: "Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or a Ter- 576 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ritory. He may be said to owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either. The same act may be an offense or transgression of the laws of both." Substantially the same views are expressed in United States v. Cruikshank (92 U. S., 542), referring to these cases; and we do not well see how the doctrine they contain can be contro- verted. A variety of instances may be readily suggested, in which it would be necessary or proper to apply it. Suppose, for example, a State judge having power under the naturalization laws to admit aliens to citizenship should utter false certificates of naturaliza- tion, can it be doubted that he could be indicted under the act of Congress providing penalties for that offense, even though he might also, under the State laws, be indictable for forgery, as well as liable to impeachment? So, if Congress, as it might, should pass a law fixing the standard of weights and measures, and im- posing a penalty for sealing false weights and false measures, but leaving to the States the matter of inspecting and sealing those used by the people, would not an offender, filling the office of sealer under a State law, be amenable to the United States as well as to the State? If the officers of election, in elections for representatives, owe a duty to the United States, and are amenable to that government as well as to -the State, as we think they are, then, according to the cases just cited, there is no reason why each should not establish sanctions for the performance of the duty owed to itself, though referring to the same act. To maintain the contrary proposition, the case of -Common- wealth of Kentucky v. Dennison (24 How., 66) is confidently relied on by the petitioners' counsel. But there, Congress had imposed a duty upon the governor of the State which it had no authority to impose. The enforcement of the clause in the Constitution requiring the delivery of fugitives from service was held to belong to the government of the United States, to be effected by its own agents; and Congress had no authority to require the governor of a State to execute this duty. We have thus gone over the principal reasons of a special char- acter relied on by the petitioners for maintaining the general proposition for which they contend; namely, that in the regula- tion of elections for representatives the national and State gov- ernments cannot co-operate, but must act exclusively of each other; so that, if Congress assumes to regulate the subject at all, it must assume exclusive control of the whole subject. The more general reason assigned, to wit, that the nature of sovereignty EX PARTE SIEBOLD. 577 is such as to preclude the joint co-operation of two sovereigns, even in a matter in which they are mutually concerned, is not, in our judgment, of sufficient force to prevent concurrent and harmonious action on the part of the national and State governments in the election of representatives. It is at most an argument ab incon- veniente. There is nothing in the Constitution to forbid such co- operation in this case. On the contrary, as already said, we think it clear that the clause of the Constitution relating to the regula- tion of such elections contemplates such co-operation whenever Congress deems it expedient to interfere merely to alter or add to existing regulations of the State. If the Iwo governments had an entire equality of jurisdiction, there might be an intrinsic dif- ficulty in such co-operation. Then the adoption by the State government of a system of regulations might exclude the action of Congress. By first taking jurisdiction of the subject, the State would acquire exclusive jurisdiction in virtue of a well-known principle applicable to courts having co-ordinate jurisdiction over the same matter. But no such equality exists in ihe present case. The power of Congress, as we have seen, is paramount, and may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and no farther, the regu- lations effected supersede those of the State which are incon- sistent therewith. As a general rule, it is no doubt expedient and wise that the operations of the State and national governments should, as far as practicable, be conducted separately, in order to avoid undue jealousies and jars and conflicts of jurisdiction and power. But there is no reason for laying this down as a rule of universal ap- plication. It should never be made to override the plain and manifest dictates of the Constitution itself. We cannot yield to such a transcendental view of State sovereignty. The Constitu- tion and laws of the United States are the supreme laws of the land, and to these every citizen of every State owes obedience, whether in his individual or official capacity. There are very few subjects, it is true, in which our system of government, com- plicated as it is, requires or gives room for conjoint action between the State and national sovereignties. Generally, the powers given by the Constitution to the government of the United States are given over distinct branches of sovereignty from which the State governments, either expressly or by necessary implication, are ex- cluded. But in this case, expressly, and in some others, by im- plication, as we have seen in the case of pilotage, a concurrent jurisdiction is contemplated, that of the State, however, being 37 578 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. subordinate to that of the United States, whereby all questions of precedency is eliminated. In what we have said, it must be remembered that we are deal- ing only with the subject of elections of representatives to Con- gress. If for its own convenience a State sees fit to -elect State and county officers at the same time and in conjunction with the election of representatives, Congress will not be thereby deprived of the right to make regulations in reference to the latter. We do not mean to say, however, that for any acts of the officers of election, having exclusive reference to the election of State or county officers, they will be amenable to Federal jurisdiction; nor do we understand that the enactments of Congress now under consideration have any application to such acts. It must also be remembered that we are dealing with the ques- tion of power, not of the expediency of any regulations which Congress has made. That is not within the pale of our jurisdic- tion. In exercising the power, however, we are bound to presume that Congress has done so in a judicious manner; that it has endeavored to guard as far as possible against any unnecessary interference with State laws and regulations, with the duties of State officers, or with local prejudices. It could not act at all so as to accomplish any beneficial object in preventing frauds and violence, and securing the faithful performance of duty at the elections, without providing for the presence of officers and agents to carry its regulations into effect. It is also difficult to see how it could attain these objects without imposing proper sanctions and penalties against offenders. The views we have expressed seem to us to be founded on such plain and practical principles as hardly to need any labored argu- ment in their support. We may mystify anything. But if we take a plain view of the words of the Constitution, and give to them a fair and obvious interpretation, we cannot fail in most cases of coming to a clear understanding of its meaning. We shall not have far to seek. We shall find it on the surface, and not in the profound depths of speculation. The greatest difficulty in coming to a just conclusion arjses from mistaken notions with regard to the relations which sub- sist between the State and national governments. It seems to be often overlooked that a national constitution has been adopted in this country, establishing a real government therein, operating upon persons and territory and things; and which, moreover, is, or should be, as dear to every American citizen as his State gov- ernment is. Whenever the true conception of the nature of this EX PARTE SIEBOLD. 579 government is once conceded, no real difficulty will arise in the just interpretation of its powers. But if we allow ourselves to regard it as a hostile organization, opposed to the proper sov- ereignty and dignity of the State governments, we shall continue to be vexed with difficulties as to its jurisdiction and authority. No greater jealousy is required to be exercised towards this gov- ernment in reference to the preservation of our liberties, than is proper to be exercised towards the State governments. Its powers are limited in number, and clearly defined; and its action within the scope of those powers is restrained by a sufficiently rigid bill of rights for the protection of its citizens from oppression. The true interest of the people of this country requires that both the national and State governments should be allowed, without jealous interference on either side, to exercise all the powers which re- spectively belong to them according to a fair and practical con- struction of the Constitution. State rights and the rights of the United States should be equally respected. Both are essential to the preservation of our liberties and the perpetuity of our institutions. But in endeavoring to vindicate the one, we should not allow our zeal to nullify or impair the other. Several other questions bearing upon the present controversy have been raised by the counsel of the petitioners. Somewhat akin to the argument which has been considered is the objection that the deputy marshals authorized by the act of Congress to be created and to attend the elections are authorized -to keep the peace; and that this is a duty which belongs to the State* authorities alone. It is argued that the preservation of peace and good order in so- ciety is not within the powers confided to the government of the United States, but belongs exclusively to the States. Here again we are met with the theory that the government of the United States does not rest upon the soil and territory of the country. We think that this theory is founded on an entire misconception of the nature and powers of that government. We hold it to be an incontrovertible principle, that the government of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent. This power to enforce its laws and to execute its functions in all places does not derogate from the powers of the State to execute its laws at the same time and in the same places. The one does not exclude the other, except where both cannot be 580 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. executed at the same time. In that case, the words of the Con- stitution itself shoAV which is to yield. "This Constitution, and all laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land." This concurrent jurisdiction which the national government necessarily possesses to exercise its powers of sovereignty in all parts of the United States is distinct from that exclusive power which, by the first article of the Constitution, it is authorized to exercise over the District of Columbia, and over those places within a State which are purchased by consent of the legislature thereof, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings. There its jurisdiction is absolutely exclusive of that of the State, unless, as is sometimes stipulated, power is given to the latter to serve the ordinary process of its courts in the precinct acquired. Without the concurrent sovereignty referred to, the national government would be nothing but an advisory government. Its executive power would be absolutely nullified. Why do we have marshals at all, if they cannot physically lay their hands on persons and things in the performance of their proper duties? What functions can they perform, if they cannot use force? In executing the processes of the courts, must they call on the nearest constable for protection? Must they rely on him to use the requisite compulsion, and to keep the peace whilst they are soliciting and* entreating the parties and bystanders to allow the law to take its course? This is the necessary conse- quence of the positions that are assumed. If we indulge in such impracticable views as these, and keep on refining and re-refining, we shall drive the national government out of the United States, and relegate it to the District of Columbia, or perhaps to some foreign soil. We shall bring it back to a condition of greater help- lessness than that of the old confederation. The argument is based on a strained and impracticable view of the nature and powers of the national government. It must exe- cute its powers, or it is no government. It must execute them on the land as well as on the sea, on things as well as on person?. And, to do this, it must necessarily have power to command obedi- ence, preserve order, and keep the peace; and no person or power in this land has the right to resist or question its authority, so long as it keeps within the bounds of its jurisdiction. Without specifying other instances in which this power to preserve order and keep the peace unquestionably exists, take the very case in hand. The counsel for the petitioners concede that Congress may, EX PARTE SIEBOLD. 581 if it sees fit, assume the entire control and regulation of the elec- tion of representatives. This would necessarily involve the ap- pointment of the places for holding the polls, the times of voting, and the officers for holding the election; it would require the regu- lation of the duties to be performed, the custody of the ballots, the mode of ascertaining the result, and every other matter relating io the subject. Is it possible that Congress could not, in that case, provide for keeping the peace at such elections, and for ar- resting and punishing those guilty of breaking it? If it could not, its power would be but a shadow and a name. But, if Con- gress can do this, where is the difference in principle in its making provision for securing the preservation of the peace, so as to give to every citizen his free right to vote without molestation or injury, when it assumes only to supervise the regulations made by the State, and not to supersede them entirely? In our judg- ment, there is no difference; and, if the power exists in the one case, it exists in the other. The next point raised is, that the act of Congress proposes to operate on officers or persons authorized by State laws to perform certain duties under them, and to require them to disobey and dis- regard State laws when they come in conflict with the act of Congress; that it thereby of necessity produces collision, and is therefore void. This point has been already fully considered. We have shown, as we think, that, where the regulations of Congress conflict with those of the State, it is the latter which are void, and not the regulations of Congress; and that the laws of the State, in so far as they are inconsistent with the laws of Congress on the same subject, cease to have effect as laws. . . . The doctrine laid down at the close of counsel's brief, that the State and national governments are co-ordinate and altogether equal, on which their whole argument, indeed, is based, is only partially true. The true doctrine, as we conceive, is this, that whilst the States are really sovereign as to all matters which have not been granted to the jurisdiction and control of the United States, the Consti- tution and constitutional laws of the latter are, as we have already said, the supreme law of the land; and, when they conflict with the laws of the States, they are of paramount authority and obli- gation. This is the fundamental principle on which the author- ity of the Constitution is based; and unless it be conceded in prac- tice, as well as theory, the fabric of our institutions, as it was con- templated by its founders, cannot stand. The questions involved have respect not more to the autonomy and existence of the States, 582 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. than to the continued existence of the United States as a govern- ment to which every American citizen may look for security and protection in every part of the land. We think that the cause of commitment in these cases was law- ful, and that the application for the writ of habeas corpus must be denied. Application denied. MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD and MR. JUSTICE FIELD dissented. NOTE. Questions as to the relation of the Federal Govern- ment and the States have arisen most frequently in connection with the judicial power, taxation, and the regulation of com- merce. On this point the cases included in chapters IV and XIV should be consulted, as well as the following cases under taxation (chap. II): McCulloch v. Maryland, Weston v. Charles- ton, License Tax Cases, and The Collector v. Day. Under the executive power see In re Neagle, and for a general discussion see Barren v. Baltimore. Among the many valuable discussions in periodicals the following are noteworthy: "The American Commonwealth: Changes in Its Kelation to the Nation," by Prof. John W. Burgess, Political Science Quarterly, I, 9 (1886); "Are the States Equal Under the Constitution?" by Prof. Wm. A. Dunning, Ibid., Ill, 425 (1888); "Recent Centralizing Tendencies in the Supreme Court," by F. P. Powers, Ibid., V, 389 (1890); "A New Nation," by H. R. Bailey, Harvard Law Review, IX, 309 (1895). XIII. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. INDIAN AF- FAIRS In THE AMEBICAN INSURANCE COMPANY v. CAXTEB, 1 Peters, 511 (1828), CHIEF JUSTICE MAESHALL said: "The course which, the argument has taken, will require that, in deciding this question, the court should take into view the relation in which Florida stands to the United States. "The constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union the powers of making war and of making treaties; conse- quently, that government possesses the power of acquiring terri- tory, either by conquest or by treaty. "The usage of the world is, if a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupation, until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded 'territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed, either on the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession, or on such as its new master shall impose. On such transfer of terri- tory, it has never been held that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are created be- tween them and the government which has acquired their terri- tory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law, which may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, re- mains in force until altered by the newly created power of the state. "On the 2d of February, 1819, Spain ceded Florida to the United States. The 6th article of the treaty of cession, 1 contains the fol- lowing provision: "The inhabitants of the territories which his Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States by this treaty, shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, as soon as may i 8 Stats, at Large, 252. 583 584 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. be consistent with the principles of the federal constitution, and admitted to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizens of the United States." "This treaty is the law of the land, and admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights, and immu- nities of the citizens of the United States. It is unnecessary to inquire whether this is not their condition, independent of stipu- lation. They do not, however, participate in political power; they do not share in the government till Florida shall become a State. In the meantime, Florida continues to be a territory of the United States, governed by virtue of that clause in the constitution which empowers congress "to make all needful rules and regulations re- specting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." "Perhaps the power of governing a territory belonging to the United States, which has not, by becoming a State, acquired the means of self-government, may result necessarily from the facts that it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular State, and is within the power and jurisdiction of the United States. The right to govern may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory. Whichever may be the source whence the power is derived, the possession of it is unquestioned. In execution of it, congress, in 1822, passed "an act for the establishment of a terri- torial government in Florida/' 2 and on the 3d of March, 1823, passed another act to amend the act of 1822. Under "this act, the territorial legislature enacted the law now under consideration. THE CHEEOKEE NATION" v. THE STATE OF GEOKGIA. 5 Peters, 1. Decided 1831. This was an original bill filed in this court by the Cherokee Nation against the- State of Georgia, and also a supplemental bill by the same complainant against the same defendant, upon which the complainant moved for a subpoena to the State, and also for a temporary injunction to restrain the State from enforcing the laws of Georgia within the territory alleged to belong exclusively to the complainants. As the decision of the court rested solely on the ground of want of jurisdiction, it is not deemed necessary to 2 3 Stats, at Large, 654. CHEROKEE NATION v. GEORGIA. 585 state the contents of the bills, any further than they bear on that question. The bill set forth the complainants to be "the Cherokee Nation of Indians, a foreign state, not owing allegiance to the United States, nor to any State of this Union, nor to any prince, poten- tate, or state, other than their own." "That from time immemorial, the Cherokee Nation have com- posed a sovereign and independent state, and in this character have been repeatedly recognized, and still stand recognized, by the United States, in the various treaties subsisting between their nation and the United States." And it proceeds to state when these were made, and their substance, and shows how certain laws of Georgia are repugnant thereto. On the day appointed for the hearing, the counsel for the com- plainants filed a supplemental bill, which states that since their bill, now submitted, was drawn, acts, demonstrative of the deter- mination of the State of Georgia to enforce her assumed authority over the complainants and their territory, property, and jurisdic- tion, have taken place, and it sets out those acts. . . . No counsel appeared for the State of Georgia. MAESHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. This bill is brought by the Cherokee nation, praying an injunc- tion to restrain the State of Georgia from the execution of certain laws of that State, which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a political society, and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to them by the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force. . . . Before we can look into the merits of the case, a preliminary in- quiry presents itself. Has this court jurisdiction of the cause? The 3d article of the constitution describes the extent of the judicial power. The 2d section closes an enumeration of the cases to which it is extended, with "controversies" "between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, or subjects." A subsequent clause of the same section gives the supreme court orig- inal jurisdiction in all cases in which a State shall be a party. The party defendant may, then, unquestionably be sued in this court. May the plaintiff sue in it? Is the Cherokee nation a for- eign state in the sense in which that term is used in the consti- tution? The counsel for the plaintiffs have maintained the affirmative of this proposition with great earnestness and ability. So much 586 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of the argument as was intended to prove the character of the Cher- okees as a state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, has, in the opinion of a majority of the judges, been completely successful. They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made by them with the United States recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts. A question of much more difficulty remains. Do the Cherokees constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution? The counsel have shown conclusively that they are not a State of the Union, and have insisted that individually they are aliens, not owing allegiance to the United States. An aggregate of aliens composing a state must, they say, be a foreign state. Each indi- vidual being foreign, the whole must be foreign. This argument is imposing, but we must examine it more closely before we yield to it. The condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence. In the general, nations not owing a common allegiance are foreign to each other. The term foreign nation is, with strict propriety, applicable by either to the other. But the relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal distinctions which exist nowhere else. The Indian territory is admitted to form a part of the United States. In all our maps, geographical treatises, histories, and laws, it is so considered. In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our commercial regulations, in any attempt at intercourse between Indians and foreign nations, they are considered as within the juris- dictional limits of the United States, subject to many of those re- straints which are imposed upon our own citizens. They acknowl- edge themselves in their treaties to be under the protection of the United States; they admit that the United States shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and managing all their affairs as they think proper; and the Chero- kees in particular were allowed by the treaty of Hopewell, 1 which preceded the constitution, "to send a deputy of their choice, when- i 7 Statutes at Large, 18. CHEROKEE NATION v. GEORGIA. 587 ever they think proper, to congress." Treaties were made with some tribes by the. State of New York, under a then unsettled construction of the confederation, by which they ceded all thei) lands to that State, taking back a limited grant to themselves, ir which they admit their dependence. Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable and, therefore, unquestioned right to the land they occupy, unti that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our gov- ernment; yet it may be doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which *we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupil- age. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kind- ness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and ad- dress the President as their great father. They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our terri- tory, and an act of hostility. These considerations go far to support the opinion that the framers of our constitution had not the Indian tribes in view, when they opened the courts of the Union to controversies between a State or the citizens thereof and foreign states. In considering this subject, the habits and usages of the Indians, in their intercourse with their white neighbors, ought not to be entirely disregarded. At the time the constitution was framed, the idea of appealing to an American court of justice for an asser- tion of right or a redress of wrong, had, perhaps, never entered the mind of an Indian or his tribe. Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or -to the government. This was well understood by the statesmen who framed the constitution of the United States, and might fur- nish some reason for omitting to enumerate them among the par- ties who might sue in the courts of the Union. Be this as it may, the peculiar relations between the United States and the Indians occupying our territory are such, that we should feel much difficulty in considering them as designated by the term foreign state, were there no other part of the constitution which might shed light on 588 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. the meaning of these words. But we think that in construing them, considerable aid is furnished by that clause in the 8th sec- tion of the 1st article, which empowers congress to "regulate com- merce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." In this clause they are as clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate to themselves, from foreign nations, as from the sev- eral States composing the Union. They are designated by a distinct appellation; and as this appellation can be applied to neither of the others, neither can the appellation distinguishing either of the others be in fair construction applied to them. The objects, to which the power of regulating commerce might be directed, are divided into three distinct classes foreign nations, the several States, and Indian tribes. When forming this article, the conven- tion considered them as entirely distinct. \Ve cannot assume that the distinction was lost in framing a subsequent article, unless there be something in its language to authorize the assumption. The counsel for the plaintiffs contend that the words "Indian tribes" were introduced into the article empowering congress to regulate commerce, for the purpose of removing those doubts in which the management of Indian affairs was involved by the lan- guage of the 9th article of the confederation. Intending to give the whole power of managing those affairs to the government about to be instituted, the convention conferred it explicitly, and omitted those qualifications which embarrassed the exercise of it as granted in the confederation. This may be admitted without weakening the construction which has been intimated. Had the Indian tribes been foreign nations, in the view of the convention, this exclusive power of regulating intercourse with them might have been, and most probably would have been, specifically given, in language indicating that idea, not in language contradistinguishing them from foreign nations. Congress might have been empowered "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the Indian tribes, and among the several States." This language would have suggested itself to statesmen who considered the Indian tribes as foreign nations, and were yet desirous of mentioning them par- ticularly. It has also been said that the same words have not necessarily the same meaning attached to them when found in different parts of the same instrument; their meaning is controlled by the con- text. This is undoubtedly true. In common language, the same word has various meanings, and the peculiar sense in which it is used in any sentence is to be determined by the context. This may CHEROKEE NATION v. GEORGIA. 589 not be equally true with respect to proper names. Foreign na- tions, is a general term, the application of which to Indian tribes, when used in the American constitution, is at best extremely questionable. In one article, in which a power is given to be exercised in regard to foreign nations generally, and to the Indian tribes particularly, they are mentioned as separate in terms clearly contradistinguishing 'them from each other. We perceive plainly that the constitution, in this article, does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term "foreign nations;" not, we presume, be- cause a tribe may not be a nation, but because it is not foreign to the United States. When, afterwards, the term "foreign states" is introduced, we cannot impute to the convention the intention to desert its former meaning, and to comprehend Indian tribes within it, unless the context force that construction upon us. We find nothing in the context, and nothing in the subject of the arti- cle, which leads to it. The court has bestowed its best attention on this question, and, after mature deliberation, the majority is of opinion that an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state, in the sense of the constitution, and cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United States. A serious additional objection exists -to the jurisdiction of the court. Is the matter of the bill the proper subject for judicial inquiry and decision ? It seeks to restrain a State from the forcible exercise of legislative power over a neighboring people, asserting their independence; their right to which the State denies. On several of the matters alleged in the bill, for example on the laws making it criminal to exercise the usual powers of self-government in their own country by the Cherokee nation, this court cannot interpose; at least in the form in which those matters are pre- sented. That part of the bill which respects the land occupied by the Indians, and prays the aid of the court to protect their possession, may be more doubtful. The mere question of right might, perhaps, be decided by this court in a proper case with proper parties. But the court is asked to do more than decide on the title. The bill requires us to control the legislature of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion of its physical force. The propriety of such an interposition by the court may be well questioned. It savors too much of the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the judicial department. But the opinion on the point respecting parties, makes it unnecessary to decide this question. If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is not 590 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which can redress the pa^t or prevent the future. The motion for an injunction is denied. [JUSTICES JOHNSON and BALDWIN delivered long concurring opinions. JUSTICE THOMPSON delivered a dissenting opinion, in which JUSTICE STORY concurred.] NOTE. "The political importance of the Cherokee case lay in the fact that its result was the first successful nullification, in its modern sense, of the laws of the United States." Alexander John- ston in Lalor's Cyclopedia, I, 394. WORCESTER v. THE STATE OF GEOEGIA. 6 Peters, 515. Decided 1832. Error to the superior court for the county of Gwinnett in the State of Georgia. . . . [The plaintiff in error, a missionary from Vermont, residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation by permission of the United States, was arrested and sentenced to imprisonment under a law of the State of Georgia forbidding such residence without a license from the State.] MARSHALL, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The defendant is a State, a member of the Union, which has exercised the powers of government over a people, who deny its jurisdiction, and are under the protection of the United States. The plaintiff is a citizen of the State of Vermont, condemned to hard labor for four years in the penitentiary of Georgia under color of an act which he alleges to be repugnant to the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States. The legislative power of a State, the controlling power of the constitution and laws of the United States, the rights, if they have any, the political existence of a once numerous and powerful people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved in the subject now to be considered. . . . [The first part of the opinion consists WORCESTER v. GEORGIA. 591 of a consideration of the jurisdiction of the court and a discussion of the relations of the Indian tribes with the governments of Great Britain, the Colonies and the United States.] The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the In- dian territory as completely separated from that of the States; and provide that all intercourse with them shall be carried on ex- clusively by the government of the Union. Is this the rightful exercise of power, or is it usurpation? While these States were colonies, this power, in its utmost ex- tent, was admitted to reside in the crown. When our revolutionary struggle commenced, congress was composed of an assemblage of deputies acting under specific powers granted by the legislatures, or conventions of the several colonies. It was a great popular movement, not perfectly organized; nor were the respective pow- ers of those who were intrusted with the management of affairs accurately defined. The necessities of our situation produced a general conviction that those measures which concerned all must be transacted by a body in which the representatives of all were assembled, and which could command the confidence of all: con- gress, therefore, was considered as invested with all the powers of war and peace, and congress dissolved our connection with the mother country, and declared these united colonies to be independ- ent States. Without any written definition of powers, they em- ployed diplomatic agents to represent the United States at the several courts of Europe; offered to negotiate treaties with them, and did actually negotiate treaties with France. From the same necessity, and on the same principles, congress assumed the man- agement of Indian affairs; first in the name of these united col- onies; and, afterwards, in the name of the United States. Early attempts were made at negotiation, and to regulate trade with them. These not proving successful, war was carried on under the direction, and with the forces of the United States, and the efforts to make peace, by treaty, were earnest and incessant. The confederation found congress in the exercise of the same powers of peace and war, in our relations with Indian nations, as with those of Europe. Such was the state of things when the confederation was adopted. That instrument surrendered the powers of peace and war to con- gress, and prohibited them to the States, respectively, unless a State be actually invaded, "or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of delay till the United States in congress assembled can be consulted." This 592 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. instrument also gave the United States in congress assembled the sole and exclusive right of "regulating the trade and managing all the affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States: provided, that the legislative power of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated." The ambiguous phrases which follow the grant of power to the United States were so construed by the States of North Carolina and Georgia as to annul the power itself. The discontents and confusion resulting from these conflicting claims, produced repre- sentations to congress, which were referred to a committee, who made their report in 1787. The report does not assent to the con- struction of the two States, but recommends an accommodation, by liberal cessions of territory, or by an admission, on their part, of the powers claimed by congress. The correct exposition of this article is rendered unnecessary by the adoption of our existing constitution. That instrument confers on congress the powers of war and peace; of making treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians. They are not limited by any restrictions on their free actions. The shackles im- posed on this power, in the confederation, are discarded. The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, in- dependent political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time im- memorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the In- dians. The very term "nation," so generally applied to them, means "a people distinct from others." The constitution, by de- claring treaties already made, as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land, has adopted and sanctioned the pre- vious treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties. The words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well-understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same sense. Georgia, herself, has furnished conclusive evidence that her former opinions on this subject concurred with those entertained WORCESTER v. GEORGIA. 593 by her sister States, and by the government of the United States. Various acts of her legislature have been cited in the argument, in- cluding the contract of cession made in the year 1802, all tending to prove her acquiescence in the universal conviction that the Indian nations possessed a full right to the lands they occupied, until that right should be extinguished by the United States, with their consent; that their territory was separated from that of any State within whose chartered limits they might reside, by a boun- dary line, established by treaties; that, within their boundary, they possessed rights with which no State could interfere; and that the whole power of regulating the intercourse with them, was vested in the United States. A review of these acts, on the part of Georgia, would occupy too much time, and is the less necessary, because they have been accurately detailed in the argument at the bar. Her new series of laws, manifesting her abandonment of these opinions, appears to have commenced in December, 1828. In opposition to this original right, possessed by the undisputed occupants of every country; to this recognition of that right, which is evidenced by our history, in every change through which we have passed; is placed the charters granted by the monarch of a distant and distinct region, parcelling out a territory in possession of others whom he could not remove and did not attempt to re- move, and the cession made of his claims by the treaty of peace. The actual state of things at the time, and all history since, ex- plain these charters; and the king of Great Britain, at the treaty of peace, could cede only what belonged to his crown. These newly asserted titles can derive no aid from the articles so often repeated in Indian treaties; extending to them, first, the protec- tion of Great Britain, and afterwards that of the United States. These articles are associated with others, recognizing their title to self-government. The ve^ry fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence its right of self-government, by associating with a stronger, and tak- ing its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, with- out stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state. Examples of this kincl are not wanting in Europe. "Trib- utary and feudatory states," says Vattel, "do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self-government and sovereign and independent authority are left in the admin- istration of the state." At the present day, more than one state 38 594 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LA\V. may be considered as holding its right of self-government under the guarantee and protection of one or more allies. The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Qsorgmjmve no right to enter, but with the assent QJLthe Chero- kees themselves, or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States. The act of the State of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity. Can this court revise and reverse it? If the objection to the system of legislation, lately adopted by the legislature of Georgia, in relation to the Cherokee nation, was confined to its extra-territorial operation, the objection, though complete, so far as respected mere right, would give this court no power over the subject. But it goes much further. If the review which has been taken be correct, and we think it is, the acts of Georgia are repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. They interfere forcibly with the relations established between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our constitution, are committed exclusively to the government of the Union. They are in direct hostility with treaties, repeated in a succes- sion of years, which mark out the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from Georgia, guarantee to them all the land within their boundary, solemnly pledge the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it, and recog- nize the pre-existing power of the nation to govern itself. They are in equal hostility with the acts of congress for regu- lating this intercourse, and giving effect to the treaties. The forcible aeizura and abduction of the plaintiff in error, who was residing in the nation with its permission, and by authority of the President of the United States, is also a violation of the acts which authorize the chief magistrate to exercise this authority. Will ithese powerful considerations avail the plaintiff in error? We think they will. He was seized, and forcibly carried away, while under guardianship of treaties guaranteeing the country in which he resided, and taking it under the protection of the United States, He was seized while performing, under the sanction of the chief magistrate of the Union, those duties which the humane FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES. 595 policy adopted by congress had recommended. He was appre- hended, tried, and condemned, under color of a law which has been shown to be repugnant to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. Had a judgment, liable to the same objections, been rendered for property, none would question the jurisdiction of this court. It cannot be less clear when the judgment affects personal liberty, and inflicts disgraceful punishment, if punish- ment could disgrace when inflicted on innocence. The plaintiff in error is not less interested in the operation of this unconstitu- tional law than if it affected his property. He is not less entitled to the protection of the constitution, laws, and treaties of his country. This point has been elaborately argued and, after deliberate consideration, decided, in the case of Cohens v. The Common- wealth of Virginia, 6 Wheat., 264. It is the opinion of this court that the judgment of the superior court _for the county of Gwinnett, in the State of Georgia, con- demning Samuel A. Worcester to hard labor, in the penitentiary of the State of Georgia, for four years, was pronounced by that court under color of a law which is void, as being repugnant to the constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States, and ought, therefore, to be reversed and annulled. [JUSTICES MCLEAN and WASHINGTON delivered concurring opinions, and JUSTICE BALDWIN rendered a dissenting opinion.] FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES. WONG QUAN v. UNITED STATES. LEE JOE v. UNITED STATES. 149 U. S., 698. Decided 1893. These were three writs of habeas corpus, granted by the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New York, upon petitions of Chinese laborers, arrested and held by the marshal of the district for not having certificaites of residence, under section 6 of the act of May 5, 1892, c. 60, which is copied in the mar- gin. . . . Each petition alleged that the petitioner was arrested and de- tained without due process of law, and that section 6 of the act of 596 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. May 5, 1892, was unconstitutional and void. [The section com- plained of required Chinese laborers within the limits of the United States at the time of the passage of the act to take out certificates of residence. Those who neglected to do so within one year without good cause were made liable to deportation.] In each case, the Circuit Court, after a hearing upon the writ of habeas corpus and the return of the marshal, dismissed the writ of habeas corpus, and allowed an appeal of the petitioner to this court, and admitted him to bail pending the appeal. . . . MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court. The general principles of public law which lie at the foundation of these cases are clearly established by previous judgments of this court, and by the authorities therein referred to. In the recent case of Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S., 651, 659, the court, in sustaining the action of the execu- tive department, putting in force an act of Congress for the ex- clusion of aliens, said: "It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sov- ereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe. In the United States, this power is vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of inter- national relations, in peace as well as in war. It belongs to the political department of the government, and may be exercised either through treaties made by the President and Senate, or through statutes enacted by Congress." The same views were more fully expounded in the earlier case of Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S., 581, in which the validity of a former act of Congress, excluding Chinese laborers from the United States, under the circumstances therein stated, was affirmed. In the elaborate opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Field, in behalf of the court, it was said: "Those laborers are not citizens of the United States; they are aliens. That the government of the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power." "The FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES. 597 United States, in their relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute independence and se- curity throughout its entire territory." 130 U. S., 603, 604. It was also said, repeating the language of Mr. Justice Bradley in Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall., 457, 555: "The United States is not only a government, but it is a national government, and the only government in this country that has the character of nationality. It is invested with power over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all of which are forbidden to the state governments." 130 U. S., 605. And it was added: "For local interests the several States of the Union exist; but for international purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one peo- ple, one nation, one power." 130 U. S., 606. The court then went on to say: "To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character, or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. The government, pos- sessing the powers which are to be exercised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its determination, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, is necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and officers. If, therefore, the govern- ment of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war does not exist, and the same authority which adjudges the neces- sity in one case must also determine it in the other. In both cases, its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary. If the gov- ernment of the country of which the foreigners excluded are sub- jects is dissatisfied with this action, it can make complaint to the executive head of our government, or resort to any other measures which, in its judgment, its interests or dignity may demand; and 598 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW. there lies its only remedy. The power of the government to ex- clude foreigners from the country, whenever, in its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in re- peated instances, and never denied by the executive or legislative departments." 130 U. S., 606, 607. This statement was sup- ported by many citations from the diplomatic correspondence of successive Secretaries of State, collected in Wharton's Interna- tional Law Digest, 206. The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country. This is clearly affirmed in dispatches referred to by the court in Chae Chan Ping's Case. In 1856, Mr. Marcy wrote: "Every society possesses the undoubted right to determine who shall com- pose its members, and it is exercised by all nations, both in peace and war. A memorable example of the exercise of this power in time of peace was the passage of -the alien law of the United States in the year 1798." In 1869, Mr. Fish wrote: "The control of the people within its limits, and the right to expel from its territory persons who are dangerous to the peace of the State, are (too clearly within the essential attributes of sovereignty to be seriously con- tested." Wharton's International Law Digest, 206; 130 U. S., 607. . . The right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, being an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence, and its welfare, the question now before the court is whether the manner in which Congress has exercised this right in sections 6 and 7 of the act of 1892 is consistent with the Constitution. The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are vested by the Constitution with the entire control of interna- tional relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain that control and to make it effective. The only gov- ernment of this country, which other nations recognize or treat with, is the government of the Union; and the only American flag known throughout the world is the flag of the United States. The Constitution of the United States speaks with no uncertain sound upon this subject. That instrument, established by the people of the United States as the fundamental law of the land, has conferred upon the President the executive power; has made FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES. 599 him the commander-in-chief of the army and navy; has author- ized him, by and with the consent of the Senate, to make treaties, and to appoint ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls; and has made it his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully exe- cuted. The Constitution has granted to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, including the entrance of ships, the importation of goods, and the bringing of persons into the ports of the United States; to establish a uniform rule of naturalization; to define and punish piracies and felonies com- mitted on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations; to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water; to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; and to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution these powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof. And the several States are expressly forbidden to enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; to grant letters of marque and reprisal; to enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power; or to engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. In exercising the great power which the people of the United States, by establishing a written constitution as the supreme and paramount law, have vested in this court, of determining, when- ever the question is properly brought before it, whether the acts of the legislature or of the executive are consistent with the Con- stitution, it behooves the court to be careful that it does not under- take to pass upon political questions, the -final decision of which has been committed by the Constitution to the other departments of the government. As long ago said by Chief Justice Marshall, and since constantly maintained by this court: "The sound construction of the Con- stitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be car- ried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of ithe Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist- ent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitu- tional." "Where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated 600 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. to effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to under- take here to inquire into the degree of its necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 421, 423; Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U. S., 421, 440, 450; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S., 651, 658; In re Rapier, 143 U. S., 110, 134; Logan v. United States, 144 U. S., 263, 283. The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting international relations, is vested in the political departments of the government, and is to be regulated by treaty or by act of Con- gress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so established, except so far as the judicial depart- ment has been authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law of the Constitution, to intervene. In Nishimura Ekiu's Case, it was adjudged that, although Con- gress might, if it saw fit, authorize the courts to investigate and ascertain the facts upon which the alien's right to land was made by the statutes to depend, yet Congress might intrust the final determination of those facts to an executive officer, and that, if it did so, his order was due process of law, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, was at liberty to re- examine the evidence on which he acted, or to controvert its suf- ficiency. 142 U. S., 660. The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and the same power. The power of Congress, therefore, to expel, like the power to exclude aliens, or any specified class of aliens, from the country, may be exercised entirely through executive officers; or Congress may call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien's right to be in the country has been made by Congress to depend. Congress, having the right, as it may see fit, to expel aliens of a particular class, or to permit them to remain, has undoubtedly the right to provide a system of registration and identification of the members of that class within the country, and to take all proper means to carry out the system which it provides. . . . In our jurisprudence, it is well settled that the provisions of an act of Congress, passed in the exercise of its constitutional author- ity, on this, as on any other subject, if clear and explicit, must be upheld by the courts, even in contravention of express stipulations FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES. 601 in an earlier treaty. As was said by this court in Chae Chan Ping's Case, following previous decisions: "The treaties were of no greater legal obligation than the act of Congress. By the Con stitution, laws made in pursuance thereof and treaties made unde/ the authority of the United States are both declared to be th supreme law of the land, and no paramount authority is given tc one over the other. A treaty, it is true, is in its nature a contraci between nations, and is often merely promissory in its character requiring legislation to carry its stipulations into effect. Sucb legislation will be open to future repeal or amendment. If the treaty operates by its own force, and relates to a subject within the power of Congress, it can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at the pleasure of Congress. In either case, the last expression of the sovereign will must control." "So far as a treaty nmde by the United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modifica- tion, or repeal." 130 U. S., 600. See also Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet, 253, 314; Edye v. Kobertson, 112 U. S., 580, 597-599; Whit- ney v. Kobertson, 124 U. S., 190. By the supplementary act of October 1, 1888, c. 1064, it was enacted, in section 1, that "from and after the passage of this act, it shall be unlawful for any Chinese laborer, who shall at any time heretofore have been, or who may now or hereafter be, a resident within the United States, and who shall have departed or shall depart therefrom, and shall not have returned before the passage of this act, to return to, or remain in, the United States;" and in section 2, that "no certificates of identity, provided for in the fourth and fifth sections of the act to which this is a supple- ment, shall hereafter be issued; and every certificate heretofore issued in pursuance thereof is hereby declared void and of no effect, and the Chinese laborer claiming admission by virtue thereof shall not be permitted to enter the United States." 25 Stat., 504. . . . [Here follows a statement and discussion of Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S., 581.] By the law of nations, doubtless, aliens residing in a country, with the intention of making it a permanent place of abode, ac- quire, in one sense, a domicil there; and, while they are per- mitted by the nation to retain such a residence and domicil, are subject to its laws, and may invoke its protection against other nations. This is recognized by those publicists who, as has been seen, maintain in the strongest terms the right of the nation to 602 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. expel any or all aliens at its pleasure. Vattel, lib. 1, c. 19 213; 1 Phillimore, c. 18 321; Mr. Marcy, in Koszta's Case, Wharton's International Law Digest, 198. See also Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S., 47, 62; Merlin, Kepertoire de Jurisprudence, Domicile, 13, quoted in the case, above cited, of In re Adam, 1 Moore, P, C., 460, 472, 473. Chinese laborers, therefore, like all other aliens residing in the United States for a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so long as they are permitted by the government of the United States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the Constitution, and to the protection of the laws, in regard to their rights of person and of property, and to their civil and criminal responsibility. But they continue to be aliens, having taken no steps towards be- coming citizens, and incapable of becoming such under the natural- ization laws; and therefore remain subject to the power of Congress to expel them, or to order them to be pemoved and deported from the country, whenever in its judgment their removal is necessary or expedient for the public interest. . . . The question whether, and upon what conditions, these aliens shall be permitted to remain within the United States being one to be determined by the political departments of the government, the judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy or the justice of the measures enacted .by Congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the Con- stitution over this subject. Upon careful consideration of the subject, the only conclusion which appears to us to be consistent with the principles of inter- national law, with the Constitution and laws of the United States, and with the previous decisions of this court, is that in each of these cases the judgment of the Circuit Court, dismissing the writ of habeas corpus, is right and must be Affirmed. [CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, JUSTICE BEEWEE, and JUSTICE FIELD rendered dissenting opinions.] XIV. JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURTS. CIIISHOLM, EXECUTOR, v. GEORGIA. 2 Dallas, 419. Decided 1793. [Chisholm, executor, brought an action of assumpsit against the State of Georgia. Return having been made, Attorney-General Randolph moved that unless the State of Georgia should cause an appearance to be made in its behalf, judgment should be entered against the said State and a writ of inquiry of damages be awarded. When the case came before the court for consideration, the counsel for the State of Georgia made a protest in writing against the court's taking jurisdiction of the case, but declined to take any part in arguing the question. The judges delivered their opinions seriatim. ] WILSON, J. This is a case of uncommon magnitude. One of the parties to it is a State; certainly respectable, claiming to be sovereign. The question to be determined is, whether this State, so respectable, and whose claim soars so high, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States? This question, important in itself, will depend on others more impor- tant still; and may perhaps be ultimately resolved into one no less radical than this "Do the people of the United States form a Nation?" A cause so conspicuous and interesting, should be carefully and accurately viewed from every possible point of sight. I shall exam- ine it, 1st. By the principles of general jurisprudence. 2d. By the laws and practice of particular states and kingdoms. From the law of nations little or no illustration of this subject can be expected. By that law the several states and governments spread over our globe are considered as forming a society, not a nation. It has only been by a very few comprehensive minds, such as those of Elizabeth and the Fourth Henry, that this last great idea has been even contemplated. 3dly, and chiefly, I shall examine the important question before us, by the constitution of the United 603 604 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. States, and the legitimate result of that valuable instrument. III. I am, thirdly and chiefly, to examine the important ques- tion now before us, by the constitution of the United States, and the legitimate result of that valuable instrument. Under this view the question is naturally subdivided into two others. 1. Could the constitution of the United States vest a jurisdiction over the State of Georgia? 2. Has that constitution vested such jurisdic- tion in this court? . . . Concerning the prerogative of kings, and concerning the sover- eignty of States, much has been said and written; but little has been said and written concerning a subject much more dignified and important, the majesty of the people. . . . The well- known address used by Demosthenes, when he harangued and animated his assembled countrymen, was, "0 men of Athens." With the strictest propriety, therefore, classical and political, our national scene opens with the most magnificent object which the nation could present. "The people of the United States" are the first personages introduced. Who were those people? They were the citizens of thirteen States, each of which had a separate con- stitution and government, and all of which were connected to- gether by articles of confederation. To the purposes of public strength and felicity that confederacy was totally inadequate. A requisition on the several States terminated its legislative author- ity; executive or judicial authority it had none. In order, there- fore, to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, to insure domestic tranquillity, to provide for the common defense, and to secure the blessings of liberty, those people, among whom were the people of Georgia, ordained and established the present con- stitution. By that constitution legislative power is vested, execu- tive power is vested, judicial power is vested. The question now fairly opens to our view, could the people of those States, among whom were those of Georgia, bind those States, and Georgia among the others, by the legislative, execu- tive, and judicial power so vested? If the principles on which I have founded myself are just and true, this question must, un- avoidably, receive an affirmative answer. If those States were the work of those people, those people, and that I may apply the case closely, the people of Georgia, in particular, could alter, as they pleased, their former work; to any given degree, they could dimin- ish as well as enlarge it. Any or all of the former State powers they could extinguish or transfer. The inference which necessarily results is, that the constitution ordained and established by those CHISHOLM, EXECUTOR, v. GEORGIA. 605 people, and still closely to apply the case, in particular by the people of Georgia, could vest jurisdiction or judicial power over those States and over the State of Georgia in particular. The next question under this head, is, Has the constitution done so? Did those people mean to exercise this their undoubted power? These questions may be resolved, either by fair and con- clusive deductions, or by direct and explicit declarations. In order, ultimately to discover whether the people of the United States intended to bind those States by the judicial power vested by the national constitution, a previous inquiry will naturally be, did those people intend to bind those States by the legislative power vested by that constitution? The articles of confederation, it is well known, did not operate upon individual citizens; but oper- ated only upon States. This defect was remedied by the national constitution, which, as all allow, has an operation on individual citizens. But if an opinion, which some seem to entertain, be just, the defect remedied on one side was balanced by a defect intro- duced on the other; for they seem to think that the present con- stitution operates only on individual citizens, and not on States. This opinion, however, appears to be altogether unfounded. When certain laws of the States are declared to be "subject to the revision and control of the Congress," 1 it cannot, surely, be contended that the legislative power of the national government was meant to have no operation on the several States. The fact uncontrovertibly established in one instance, proves the principle in all other in- stances to which the facts will be found to apply. We may then infer that the people of the United States intended to bind the several States by the legislative power of the national govern- ment. In order to make the discovery, at which we ultimately aim, a second previous inquiry will naturally be, Did the people of the United States intend to bind the several States by the executive power of the national government? The affirmative answer to the former question directs, unavoidably, an affirmative answer to this. Ever since the time of Bracton, his maxim, I believe, has been deemed a good one "Supervacuum esset leges condere, nisi esset qui leges tueretur. " 2 "It would be superfluous to make laws, unless those laws, when made, were to be enforced." When the laws are plain, and the application of them is uncontro verted, they are enforced immediately by the executive authority of government. When the application of them is doubtful or intricate, the inter- i Art. 1, s. 10. 2 1 Brae., 107. 606 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. position of the judicial authority becomes necessary. The same principle, therefore, which directed us from the first to the second step, will direct us to the third and last step of our deduction. Fair and conclusive deduction, then, evinces that the people of the United States did vest this court with jurisdiction over the State of Georgia. The same truth may be deduced from the declared objects and the general texture of the constitution of the United States. One of its declared objects is, to form a union more perfect than, before that time, had been formed. Before that time the Union possessed legislative, but unenforced legisla- tive power over the States. Nothing could be more natural than to intend that this legislative power should be enforced by powers executive and judicial. Another declared object is "to establish justice." This points, in a particular manner, to the judicial au- thority. And when we view this object in conjunction with the declaration, "that no State shall pass a law impairing the obliga- tion of contracts," we shall probably think that this object points, in a particular manner, to the jurisdiction of the court over the several States. What good purpose could this constitutional pro- vision secure if a State might pass a law impairing the obligation of its own contracts, and be amenable, for such a violation of right, to no controlling judiciary power? We have seen, that on princi- ples of general jurisprudence, a State, for the breach of a con- tract, may be liable for damages. A third declared object is, "to insure domestic tranquillity." This tranquillity is most likely to be disturbed by controversies between States. These consequences will be most peaceably and effectually decided by the establishment and by the exercise of a superintending judicial authority. By such exercise and establishment, the law of nations the rule be- tween contending States will be enforced among the several States in the same manner as municipal law. Whoever considers, in a combined and comprehensive view, the general texture of the constitution, will be satisfied that the people of the United States intended to form themselves into a nation for national purposes. They instituted, for such purposes, a na- tional government complete in all its parts, with powers legisla- tive, executive and judiciary; and in all those powers extending over the whole nation. Is it congruous that, with regard to such purposes, any man or body of men, any person, natural or artificial, should be permitted to claim successfully an entire ex- emption from the jurisdiction of the national government? Would not such claims, crowned with success, be repugnant to our very existence as a nation? When so many trains of deduction, coming CHISHOLM, EXECUTOR, v. GEORGIA. 607 from different quarters, converge and unite at last in the same point, we may safely conclude, as the legitimate result of this con- stitution, that the State of Georgia is amenable to the jurisdic- tion of this court. But, in my opinion, this doctrine rests not upon the legitimate result of fair and conclusive deduction from the constitution; it is confirmed, beyond all doubt, by the direct and explicit declara- tion of the constitution itself. "The judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies between two States." 1 Two States are supposed to have a controversy between them; this controversy is supposed to be brought before those vested with the judicial power of the United States; can the most consum- mate degree of professional ingenuity devise a mode by which this "controversy between two States" can be brought before a court of law, and yet neither of those States be a defendant? "The judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies between a State and citizens of another State." Could the strictest legal language; could even that language which is peculiarly appropriated to an act, deemed by a great master to be one of the most honorable, laudable, and profitable things in our law; could this strict and appropriated language describe with more precise accuracy the cause now depending before the tribunal? Causes, and not parties to causes, are weighed by justice in her equal scales; on the former, solely, her attention is fixed; to the latter she is, as she is painted, blind. I have now tried this question by all the touchstones to which I proposed to apply it. I have examined it by the principles of general jurisprudence; by the laws and practice of States and kingdoms; and by the constitution of the United States. From all, the combined inference is, that the action lies. CUSHIXG, J. The grand and principal question, in this case, is whether a State can, by the federal constitution, be sued by an individual citizen of another State. The point turns not upon the law or practice of England, although perhaps it may be in some measure elucidated thereby, nor upon the law of any other country whatever; but upon the constitution established by the people of the United States; and particularly upon the extent of powers given to the federal judiciary in the 3d section of the 3d article of the constitution. It is declared that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the con- stitution, the laws of the United States, or treaties made or which shall be made under their authority: to all cases affecting ambassa- i Art. 3, s. 2. 608 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. dors or other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of ad- miralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States, and citizens of another State; between citizens of dif- ferent States; between citizens of the same States claiming lands under grants of different State's; and between a State and citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects." The judicial power, then, is expressly extended to "controversies between a State and citizens of another State." When a citizen makes a demand against a State of which he is not a citizen, it is as really a con- troversy between a State and a citizen of another State, as if such State made a demand against such citizen. The case then seems clearly to fall within the letter of the constitution. It may be suggested that it could not be intended to subject a State to be a defendant, because it would affect the sovereignty of States. If that be the case, what shall we do with the immediate preceding clause: "controversies between two or more States," where a State must of necessity be a defendant? If it was not the intent, in the very next clause also, that a State might be made defendant, why was it so expressed as naturally to lead to and comprehend that idea? Why was not an exception made if one was intended? Again, what are we to do with the last clause of the section of judicial powers, namely, "controversies between a State or the citi- zens thereof and foreign States or citizens"? Here, again, States must be suable or liable to be made defendants by this clause, which has a similar mode of language with the two other clauses I have remarked upon. For if the judicial power extends to a controversy between one of the United States and a foreign State, as the clause expresses, one of them must be defendant. And then what becomes of sovereignty of States, as far as suing affects it? But although the words appear reciprocally to affect the State here and a foreign State, and put them on the same footing as far as may be, yet ingenuity may say that the State here may sue, but cannot be sued; but that the foreign State may be sued, but cannot sue. We may touch foreign sovereignties, but not our own. But I conceive the reason of the thing as well as the words of the constitution, tend to show that the federal judicial power extends to a suit brought by a foreign State, against any one of the United States. One design of the general government was for managing the great affairs of peace and war, and the general de- fense, which were impossible to be conducted by the States sep- arately. Incident to these powers, and for preventing controversies between foreign powers, or citizens from rising to extremities and CHISHOLM, EXECUTOR, v. GEORGIA. 609 to an appeal to the sword, a national tribunal was necessary, amic- ably, to decide them, and thus ward off such fatal public calamity. Thus States at home and their citizens, and foreign States and their citizens, are put together without distinction upon the same footing, as far as may be, as to controversies between them. So also with respect to controversies between a State and citizens of another State at home, comparing all the clauses together the remedy is re- ciprocal; the claim to justice equal. As controversies between State and State, and between a State and citizens of another State might tend gradually to involve States in war and bloodshed, a disinterested civil tribunal was intended to be instituted to decide such controversies, and preserve peace and friendship. Further: if a State is entitled to justice in the federal court, against a cit- izen of another State, why not such citizen against the State, when the same language equally comprehends both? The rights of individuals and the justice due to them are as dear and pre- cious as those of States. Indeed the latter are founded upon the former, and the great end and object of them must be to secure and support the rights of individuals, or else vain is government. But still it may be insisted that this will reduce States to mere corporations, and take away all sovereignty. As to corporations, all States whatever are corporations or bodies politic. The only question is, what are their powers? As to individual States and the United States, the constitution marks the boundary of powers. Whatever power is deposited with the Union by the people for their own necessary security, is so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of the States. This is, as it were, a self-evident prop- osition; at least it cannot be contested. Thus the power of de- claring war, making peace, raising and supporting armies for public defense, levying duties, excises, and taxes, if necessary, with many other powers, are lodged in Congress, and are a most essential abridgement of State sovereignty. Again, the restrictions upon the States. "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, coin money, emit bills of credit, make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, pass any law impair- ing the obligation of contracts; these, with a number of others, are important restrictions of the power of States, and were thought necessary to maintain the Union, and to establish some funda- mental uniform principles of public justice throughout the whole Union. So that I think no argument of force can be taken from {he sovereignty of States. Where it has been abridged, it was thought necessary for the greater indispensable good of the whole. If the constitution is found inconvenient in practice in this or 39 610 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. any other particular, it is well that a regular mode is pointed out for amendment. But while it remains, all offices, legislative, executive, and judicial, both of the States and of the Union, are bound by oath to support it. One other objection has been suggested; that if a State may be sued by a citizen of another State, then the United States may be sued by a citizen of any one of the States, or, in other words, by any of their citizens. If this be a necessary consequence, it must be so. I doubt the consequence from the different word- ing of the different clauses, connected with other reasons. When speaking of the United States, the constitution says, "controversies to which the United States shall be a party," not controversies between the United States and any of their citizens. When speak- ing of States, it says, "controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another State." As to reasons for citizens suing a different State which do not hold equally good for suing the United States, one may be, that as controversies between a State and citizens of another State might have a ten- dency to involve both States in contest, and perhaps in war, a common umpire to decide such controversies may have a tendency to prevent the mischief. That an object of this kind was had in view by the framers of the constitution, I have no doubt, when I consider the clashing interfering laws which were made in the neighboring States before the adoption of the constitution, and some affecting the property of citizens of another State in a very different manner from that of their own citizens. But I do not think it necessary to enter fully into the question, whether the United States are liable to be sued by an individual citizen, in order to decide the point before us. Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the constitution warrants a suit against a State by an individual citizen of another State. . . . JAY, C. J. . . . Let us now proceed to inquire whether Georgia has not, by being a party to the national com- pact, consented to be suable by individual citizens of another State. This inquiry naturally leads our attention, 1st. To the design of the constitution. 2d. To the letter and express declara- tion in it. Prior to the date of the constitution, the people had not any na- tional tribunal to which they could resort for justice; the dis- tribution of justice was then confined to State judicatories, in whose institution and organization the people of the other States had no participation, and over whom they had not the least con- CHISHOLM, EXECUTOR, v. GEORGIA. 611 trol. There was then no general court of appellate jurisdiction by whom the errors of State courts, affecting either the nation at large or the citizens of any other State, could be revised and corrected. Each State was obliged to acquiesce in the measure of justice which another State might yield to her or to her citizens; and that even in cases where State considerations were not al- ways favorable to the most exact measure. There was danger that from this source animosities would in time result; and as the transition from animosities to hostilities was frequent in the his- tory of independent States, a common tribunal for the termina- tion of controversies became desirable, from motives both of jus- tice and of policy. Prior also to that period the United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the laws of nations, and it was their interest as well as their duty to provide that those laws should be respected and obeyed; in their national character and capacity the United States were re- sponsible to foreign nations for the conduct of each State, relative to the laws of nations, and the performance of treaties; and there the inexpediency of referring all such questions to State courts, and particularly to the co-urts of delinquent States, became appar- ent. While all the States were bound to protect each and the citizens of each, it was highly proper and reasonable that they should be in a capacity not only to cause justice to be done to each, and the citizens of each, but also to cause justice to be done by each, and the citizens of each, and that, not by violence and force, but in a stable, sedate, and regular course of judicial pro- cedure. These were among the evils against which it was proper for the nation, that is, the people of all the United States, to provide by a national judiciary, to be instituted by the whole nation, and to be responsible to the whole nation. Let us now turn to the constitution. The people therein declare that their design in establishing it comprehended six objects. 1st. To form a more perfect union. 2d. To establish justice. 3d. To insure domestic tranquillity. 4th. To provide for the com- mon defense. 5th. To promote the general welfare. 6th. To secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity. It may be asked, what is the precise sense and latitude in which the words "to establish justice," as here used, are to be under- stood? The answer to this question will result from the provi- sions made in the constitution on this head. They are specified 612 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. in the second section of the third article, where it is ordained that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to ten descriptions of cases, namely: 1st. To all cases arising under this constitution; because the meaning, construction, and operation of a compact ought always to he ascertained hy all the parties, or by authority derived only from one of them. 2d. To all cases arising under the laws of the United States; because as such laws, con- stitutionally made, are obligatory on each State, the measure of obligation and obedience ought not to be decided and fixed by the party from whom they are due, but by a tribunal deriving author- ity from both the parties. 3d. To all cases arising under treaties made by their authority; because, as treaties are compacts made by, and obligatory on the whole nation, their operation ought not to be affected or regulated by the local laws or courts of a part of the nation. 4th. To all cases affecting ambassadors, or other public ministers and consuls; because, as these are officers of foreign nations, whom this nation are bound to protect and treat according to the laws of nations, cases affecting them ought only to be cognizable by national authority. 5th. To all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; because, as the seas are the joint property of nations, whose right and privileges relative thereto are regulated by the laws of nations and treaties, such cases necessarily belong to national jurisdiction. 6th. To controversies to which the United States shall be a party; because, in cases in which the whole people are interested it would not be equal or wise to let any one State decide and measure out the justice due to others. 7th. To controversies between two or more States; because domestic tranquillity requires that the contentions of States should be peaceably terminated by a common judicatory; and, because, in a free country, justice ought not to depend on (the will of either of the litigants. 8th. To controversies between a State and citizens of another State; because, in case a State (that is, all the citizens of it) has demands against some citizens of another State, it is better that she should prosecute their demands in a national court, than in a court of the State to which those citizens belong; the danger of irritation and criminations arising from apprehensions and suspicions of partiality being thereby ob- viated; because, in cases where some citizens of one State have demands against all the citizens of another State, the cause of liberty and the rights of men forbid that the latter should be the sole judges of the justice due to the latter; and true repub- lican government requires that free and equal citizens should have free, fair, and equal justice. 9th. To controversies between citi- CHISHOLM. EXECUTOR, v. GEORGIA. 613 zens of the same State, claiming lands under grants of different States; because, as the rights of the two States to grant the land are drawn into question, neither of the two States ought to decide the question. 10th. To controversies between a State or the cit- izens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects; because, as every nation is responsible for the conduct of its citizens towards other nations, all questions touching the justice due to foreign nations, or people, ought to be ascertained by, and depend on, national authority. Even this cursory view of the judicial powers of the United States leaves the mind strongly impressed with the importance of them to the preservation of the tranquillity, the equal sovereignty, and the equal right of the people. The question now before us renders it necessary to pay particular attention to that part of the second section which extends the judicial power "to controversies between a State and citizens of another State." It is contended that this ought to be construed to reach none of these controversies, excepting those in which a State may be plaintiff. The ordinary rules for construction will easily decide whether those words are to be understood in that limited sense. This extension of power is remedied, because it is to settle con- troversies. It is, therefore, to be construed liberally. It is politic, wise, and good, that not only the controversies in which a State is plaintiff, but also those in which a State is defendant, should be settled; both cases, therefore, are within the reason of the remedy; and ought to be so adjudged, unless the obvious, plain, and lit- eral sense of the words forbid it. If we attend to the words, we find them to be express, positive, free from ambiguity, and with- out room for such implied expressions: "The judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies between a State and citizens of another State." If the constitution really meant to extend these powers only to those controversies in which a State might be plaintiff, to the exclusion of those in which citizens had demands against a State, it is inconceivable that it should have attempted to convey that meaning in words not only so incom- petent, but also repugnant to it; if it meant to exclude a certain class of these controversies, why were they not expressly excepted; on the contrary, not even an intimation of such intention appears in any part of the constitution. It cannot be pretended that where citizens urge and insist upon demands against a State, which the State refuses to admit and comply with, that there is no contro- versy between them. If it is a controversy between them, then it clearly falls not only within the spirit, but the very words of the 614 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. constitution. What is it to the cause of justice, and how can it affect the definition of the word controversy, whether the demands which cause the dispute are made by a State against citizens of another State, or by the latter against the former? When power is thus extended to a controversy, it necessarily, as to all judicial purposes, is also extended to those between whom it subsists. We find the same general and comprehensive manner of express- ing the same ideas in a subsequent clause, in which the constitu- tion ordains that "in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction." Did it mean here party plaintiff? If that only was meant, it would have been easy to have found words to express it. Words are to be under- stood in their ordinary and common acceptation, and the word party being in common usage applicable both to plaintiff and de- fendant, we cannot limit it to one of them in the present case. We find the legislature of the United States expressing themselves in the like general and comprehensive manner; they speak, in the thirteenth section of the judicial act, of controversies where a State is a party, and as they do not impliedly or expressly apply that term to either of the litigants in particular, we are to understand them as speaking of both. In the same section they distinguish the cases where ambassadors are plaintiffs, from those in which ambassadors are defendants, and make different provisions respect- ing those cases; and it is not unnatural to suppose that they would, in like manner, have distinguished between cases where a State was plaintiff and where a State was defendant, if they had in- tended to make any difference between them, or if they had appre- hended that the constitution had made any difference between them. I perceive, and therefore candor urges me to mention, a circum- stance, which seems to favor the opposite side of the question. It is this: The same section of the constitution which extends the judi- cial power to controversies "between a State and the citizens of an- other State," does also extend that power to controversies to which the United States are a party. Now it may be said, if the word party comprehends both plaintiff and defendant, it follows that the United States may be sued by any citizen, between whom and them there may be a controversy. This appears to me to be fair reasoning; but the same principles of candor which urge me to mention this objection, also urge me to suggest an important differ- CHISHOLM, EXECUTOR, v. GEORGIA. 615 ence between the two cases. It is this: In all cases of actions against States or individual citizens the national courts are sup- ported in all their legal and constitutional proceedings and judg- ments by the arm of the executive power of the United States; but in cases of actions against the United Slates, there is no power which the courts can call to their aid. From this distinction im- portant conclusions are deducible, and they place the case of a State, and the case of the United States, in very different points of view. . . . For the reasons before given, I am clearly of opinion that a State is suable by citizens of another State; but lest I should be under- stood in a latitude beyond by meaning, I think it necessary to sub- join this caution, namely, That such suability may nevertheless not extend to all the demands, and to every kind of action; there may be exceptions. For instance, I am far from being prepared to say that an individual may sue a State on bills of credit issued before the constitution was established, and which were issued and received on the faith of the State, and at a time when no ideas or expectations of judicial interposition were entertained or con- templated. . . . [JUSTICE IEEDELL delivered a dissenting opinion. JUSTICE BLAIR rendered a concurring opinion.] NOTE. "The question, in short, was, whether the Constitution was a bond of national unity, or such federal league only as would be dis- soluble at the pleasure of any party to it. ... Justice Wilson, the ablest and most learned of the associates, took the national view and was supported by two others. The Chief Justice was thus enabled to declare as the opinion of the court, that under the Constitution of the United States, sovereignty belonged to the people of the United States. . . . The doctrine of an indis- soluble Union, though not in terms declared, is nevertheless in its elements at least contained in the decision. The qualified sov- ereignty, national and State, the subordination of State to nation, the position of the citizen as at once a necessary component part of the federal and of the State system, are all exhibited. It must logically follow that a nation as a sovereignty is possessed of all those powers of independent action and self-protection which the successors of Jay subsequently demonstrated were by implication conferred upon it." Cooley in Constitutional History as seen in American Law, 48, 49. "It is not rational to suppose that a sovereign power shall be dragged before a court. The intent is to enable States to recover 616 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. claims of individuals residing in other States." John Marshall in the Virginia Convention of 1787, Elliot's Debates, III, 555. A similar opinion is expressed by Hamilton in The Federalist, No. 81. "The decision was pronounced on the 18th of February, 1793; two days afterward the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution was proposed to Congress." Carson, The Supreme Court of the United States, 177. For an adverse criticism of the judgment rendered in this case, see the opinion of the court in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S., 1. MAKTIN", HEIK AT LAW AND DEVISEE OF FAIRFAX, v. HUNTEK'S LESSEE. 1 Wheaton, 304. Decided 1816. THIS case is fully stated in the opinion of the court. . . . STORY, J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error from the court of appeals of Virginia, founded upon the refusal of that court to obey the mandate of this court, requiring the judgment rendered in this very cause, at February term, 1813, to be carried into due execution. The fol- lowing is the judgment of the court of appeals rendered on the mandate: "The court is unanimously of opinion, that the appel- late power of the supreme court of the United States does not extend to this court, under a sound construction of the constitution of the United States; that so much of the 25th section of the act of congress to establish the judicial courts of the United States, as extends the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court to this court, is not in pursuance of the constitution of the United States; that the writ of error in this cause was improvidently allowed under the authority of that act; that the proceedings thereon in the supreme court were coram nonjudice, in relation to this court, and that obedience to its mandate be declined by the court." . . . Before proceeding to the principal questions, it may not be unfit to dispose of some preliminary considerations which have grown out of the arguments at the bar. The constitution of the United States was ordained and estab- lished, not by the States in their sovereign capacities, but emphat- ically, as the preamble of the constitution declares, by "the people of the United States." There can be no doubt that it was com- MARTIN v. HUNTER'S LESSEE. 617 petent to the people to invest the general government with all the powers which they might deem proper and necessary; to extend or restrain these powers according to their own good pleasure, am to give them a paramount and supreme authority. As little doub' can there be, that the people had a right to prohibit to the State : the exercise of any powers which were, in their judgment, incom patible with the objects of the general compact; to make th powers of the state governments, in given cases, subordinate if those of the nation, or to reserve to themselves those sovereigr authorities which they might not choose to delegate to either. The constitution was not, therefore, necessarily carved out of existing state sovereignties, nor a surrender of powers already existing in state institutions, for the powers of the States depend upon their own constitutions; and the people of every State had the right to modify and restrain them, according to their own views of policy or principle. On the other hand it is perfectly clear that the sov- ereign powers vested in the state governments, by their respective constitutions, remained unaltered and unimpaired, except so far as they were granted to the government of the United States. These deductions do not rest upon general reasoning, plain and obvious as they seem to be. They have been positively recognized by one of the articles in amendment of the constitution, which declares that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The government, then, of the United States, can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the constitution, and the powers actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication. On the other hand, this instru- ment, like every other grant, is to have a reasonable construction, according to the import of its terms; and where a power is ex- pressly given in general terms, it is not to be restrained to par- ticular cases, unless that construction grows out of the context expressly, or by necessary implication. The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense, and not in a sense unreasonably restricted or enlarged. The constitution, unavoidably, deals in general language. It did not suit the purposes of the people, in framing this great charter of our liberties, to provide for minute specifications of its powers, or to declare the means by which those powers should be carried into execution. It was foreseen that this would be a perilous and difficult, if not an impracticable, task. The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years, but 618 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. was to endure through a long lapse of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable purposes of Providence. It could not be foreseen what new changes and modifications of power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of the charter; restrictions and specifications, which at the present might seem salutary, might, in the end, prove the overthrow of the system itself. Hence its powers are expressed in general terms, leaving to the legislature, from time to time, to adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to mould and model the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom and the public interests should require. With these principles in view, principles in respect to which no difference of opinion ought to be indulged, let us now proceed to the interpretation of the constitution, so far as regards the great points in controversy. The third article of the constitution is that which must princi- pally attract our attention. . . . This leads us to the consideration of the great question as to the nature and extent of the appellate jurisdiction of the United States. We have already seen that appellate jurisdiction is given by the constitution to the supreme court in all cases where it has not original jurisdiction, subject, however, to such exceptions and regulations as congress may prescribe. It is, therefore, capable of embracing every case enumerated in the constitution, which is not exclusively to be decided by way of original jurisdiction. But the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited by the terms of the constitution to the supreme court. There can be no doubt that congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each of which it may vest appellate as well as original jurisdic- tion. The judicial power is delegated by the constitution in the most general terms, and may, therefore, be exercised by congress under every variety of form, of appellate or original jurisdiction. And as there is nothing in the constitution which restrains or limits this power, it must, therefore, in all other cases, subsist in the utmost latitude of which, in its own nature, it is susceptible. As, then, by the terms of the constitution, the appellate jurisdic- tion is not limited as to the supreme court, and as to this court it may be exercised in all other cases than those of which it has original cognizance, what is there to restrain its exercise over state tribunals in the enumerated cases? The appellate power is not limited by the terms of the third article to any particular courts. The words are, "the judicial power (which includes appellate power) shall extend to all cases," &c., and "in all other cases be- MARTIN v. HUNTER'S LESSEE. 619 fore mentioned the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction." It is the case, then, and not the court, that gives the jurisdiction. If the judicial power extends to the case, it will be in vain to search in the letter of the constitution for any qualifications as to the tribunal where it depends. It is incumbent, then, upon those who assert such a qualification to show its existence by necessary implication. If the text be clear and distinct, no restriction upon its plain and obvious import ought to be admitted, unless the in- ference be irresistible. If the constitution meant to limit the appellate jurisdiction to cases pending in the courts of the United States, it would neces- sarily follow that the jurisdiction of these courts would, in all the cases enumerated in the constitution, be exclusive of state tribunals. How otherwise could the jurisdiction extend to all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, or to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction? If some of these cases might be entertained by state tribunals, and no appellate jurisdiction as to them should' exist, then the appellate power would not extend to all, but to some, cases. If state tribunals might exercise concurrent jurisdiction over all or some of the other classes of cases in the constitution without control, then the appellate jurisdiction of the United States, might, as to such cases, have no real existence, contrary to the manifest intent of the constitution. Under such circumstances, to give effect to the judi- cial power, it must be construed to be exclusive; and this not only when the casus feeder is should arise directly, but when it should arise, incidentally, in cases pending in state courts. This construc- tion would abridge the jurisdiction of such court far more than has been ever contemplated in any act of congress. On the other hand, if, as has been contended, a discretion be vested in congress to establish, or not to establish, inferior courts at their own pleasure, and congress should not establish such courts, the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court would have noth- ing to act upon, unless it could act upon cases pending in the state courts. Under such circumstances, it must be held that the appellate power would extend to state courts; for the constitution is peremptory that it shall extend to certain enumerated cases, which cases could exist in no other courts. Any other construc- tion, upon this supposition, would involve this strange contradic- tion, that a discretionary power vested in congress, and which they might rightfully omit to exercise, would defeat the absolute in- junctions of the constitution in relation to the whole appellate power. 620 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. But it is plain that the framers of the constitution did contem- plate that cases within the judicial cognizance of the United States not only might but would arise in the state courts, in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction. "With this view the sixth article declares, that "this constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution, or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." It is obvious that this obligation is imperative upon the state judges in their official, and not merely in their private, capacities. From the very nature of their judicial duties they would be called upon to pronounce the law applicable to the case in judgment. They were not to decide merely according to the laws or constitution of the State, but according to the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, "the supreme law of the land." A moment's consideration will show us the necessity and pro- priety, of this provision in cases where the jurisdiction of the state courts is unquestionable. Suppose a contract for the payment of money is made between citizens of the same State, and per- formance thereof is sought in the courts of that State; no person can doubt that the jurisdiction completely and exclusively attaches, in -the first instance, to such courts. Suppose, at the trial, the defendant sets up in his defense a tender under a state law, mak- ing paper money a good tender, or a state law, impairing the obliga- tion of such contract, which law, if binding, would defeat the suit. The constitution of the United States has declared that no State shall make anything but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, or pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts. If congress shall not have passed a law providing for the removal of such a suit to the courts of ihe United States, must not the state court proceed to hear and determine it? Can a mere plea in defense be of itself a bar to further proceedings, so as to pro- hibit an inquiry into its truth or legal propriety, when no other tribunal exists to whom judicial cognizance of such cases is con- fided? Suppose an indictment for a crime in a state court, and the defendant should allege in his defense that the crime was created by an ex post facto act of the State, must not the state court, in the exercise of a jurisdiction which has already rightfully attached, have a right to pronounce on the validity and sufficiency of the defense? It would be extremely difficult, upon any legal principles, to give a negative answer to these inquiries. Innumer- MARTIN v. HUNTER'S LESSEE. 621 able instances of the same sort might be stated in illustration of the position; and unless the state courts could sustain jurisdiction in such cases, this clause of the sixth article would be without meaning or effect, and public mischiefs, of a most enormous mag- nitude, would inevitably ensue. It must, therefore, be conceded that the constitution not only contemplated, but meant to provide for cases within the scope of the judicial power of the United States, which might yet depend before state tribunals. It was foreseen that in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction, state courts would incidentally take cog- nizance of cases arising under the constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States. Yet to all these cases the judicial power, by the very terms of the constitution, is to extend. It can- not extend by original jurisdiction if that was already rightfully and exclusively attached in the state courts, which (as has been already shown) may occur; it must therefore extend by appellate jurisdiction, or not at all. It would seem to follow that the appellate power of the United States must, in such cases, extend to state tribunals; and if in such cases, there is no reason why it should not equally attach upon all others within the purview of the constitution. It has been argued that such an appellate jurisdiction over state courts is inconsistent with the genius of our governments, and the spirit of the constitution. That the latter was never designed to act upon state sovereignties, but only upon the people, and that, if the power exists, it will materially impair the sovereignty of the States, and the independence of their courts. We cannot yield to the force of this reasoning; it assumes principles which we cannot admit, and draws conclusions to which we do not yield our assent. It is a mistake that the constitution was not designed to operate upon States, in their corporate capacities. It is crowded with pro- visions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the States in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives. The tenth sec- tion of the first article contains a long list of disabilities and pro- hibitions imposed upon the States. Surely, when such essential portions of state sovereignty are taken away, or prohibited to be exercised, it cannot be correctly asserted that the constitution does not act upon the States. The language of the constitution is also imperative upon the States, as to the performance of many duties. It is imperative upon the state legislatures to make laws prescribing the time, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, and for electors of president and vice-president. 622 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. And in these, as well as in some other cases, congress have a right to revise, amend, or supersede the laws which may be passed by state legislatures. When, therefore, the States are stripped of some of the highest attributes of sovereignty, and the same are given to the United States; when the legislatures of the States are, in some respects, under the control of congress, and in every case are, under the constitution, bound by the paramount authority of the United States; it is certainly difficult to support the argu- ment that the appellate power over the decisions of state courts is contrary to the genius of our institutions. The courts of the United States can, without question, revise the proceedings of the execu- tive and legislative authorities of the States, and if they are found to be contrary to the constitution, may declare them to be of no legal validity. Surely, the exercise of the same right over judicial tribunals is not a higher or more dangerous act of sovereign power. Nor can such a right be deemed to impair the independence of state judges. It is assuming the very ground in controversy to assert that they possess an absolute independence of the United States. In respect to the powers granted to the United States, they are not independent; they are expressly bound to obedience by the letter of the constitution; and if they should unintention- ally transcend their authority, or misconstrue the constitution, there is no more reason for giving their judgments an absolute and irresistible force, than for giving it to the acts of the other co-ordinate departments of state sovereignty. The argument urged from the possibility of the abuse of the revising power, is equally unsatisfactory. It is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse. It is still more difficult, by such an argu- ment, to engraft upon a general power, a restriction which is not to be found in the terms in which it is given. From the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last resort, must rest somewhere wherever it may be vested it is susceptible of abuse. In all questions of jurisdiction the inferior, or appellate court must pronounce the final judgment; and common-sense, as well as legal reasoning, has conferred it upon the latter. It has been further argued against the existence of this appellate power, that it would form a novelty in our judicial institutions. This is certainly a mistake. In the articles of confederation, an instrument framed with infinitely more deference to state rights and state jealousies, a power was given to congress, to establish "courts for revising and determining, finally, appeals in all cases of captures." It is remarkable, that no power was given to enter- MARTIN v. HUNTER'S LESSEE. 623 tain original jurisdiction in such cases; and, consequently, the ap- pellate power (although not so expressed in terms) was altogether to be exercised in revising the decisions of state tribunals. This was, undoubtedly, so far a surrender of state sovereignty; but it never was supposed to be a power fraught with public danger, or destructive of the independence of state judges. On the contrary, it was supposed to be a power indispensable to the public safety, inasmuch as our national rights might otherwise be compromised, and our national peace be endangered. Under the present consti- tution the prize jurisdiction is confined to the courts of the United States; and a power to revise the decisions of state courts, if they should assert jurisdiction over prize causes, cannot be less impor- tant, or less useful, than it was under the confederation. In this connection, we are led again to the construction of the words of the constitution, "the judicial power shall extend," etc. If, as has been contended at the bar, the term "extend" have a relative signification, and mean to widen an existing power, it will then follow, that, as the confederation gave an appellate power over state tribunals, the constitution enlarged or widened that ap- pellate power to all the other cases in which jurisdiction is given to the courts of the United States. It is not presumed that the learned counsel would choose to adopt such a conclusion. It is further argued, that no great public mischief can result from a construction which shall limit the appellate power of the United States to cases in their own courts: first, because state judges are bound by an oath to support the constitution of the United States, and must be presumed to be men of learning and integrity; and, secondly, because congress must have an unques- tionable right to remove all cases within the scope of the judicial power, from the state courts to the courts of the United States, at any time before final judgment, though not after final judgment. As to the first reason admitting that the judges of the state courts are, and always will be, of as much learning, integrity, and wis- dom, as those of the courts of the United States (which we very cheerfully admit), it does not aid the argument. It is manifest that the constitution has proceeded upon a theory of its own, and given or withheld powers according to the judgment of the Amer- ican people, by whom it was adopted. We can only construe its powers, and cannot inquire into the policy or principles which induced the grant of them. The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state attach- ments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or con- 624: CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. trol, the regular administration of justice. Hence, in controver- sies between States; between citizens of different States; between citizens claiming grants under different States; between a State and its citizens, or foreigners, and between citizens and foreigners, it enables the parties, under the authority of congress, to have the controversies heard, tried, and determined before the national tribunals. No other reason than that which has been stated can be assigned, why some, at least, of those cases should not have been left to the cognizance of the state courts. In respect to the other enumerated cases the cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States, cases affecting ambassadors and other public ministers, and cases of admiralty and maritime juris- diction reasons of a higher and more extensive nature, touch- ing the safety, peace, and sovereignty of the nation, might well justify a grant of exclusive jurisdiction. This is not all. A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with the most sincere respect for state tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions. That motive is the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions through- out the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution. Judges of equal learning and integrity, in different States, might differently interpret a statute, or a treaty of the United States, or even the constitution itself. If there were no revising authority to control these jarring and discordant judgments, and harmonize them into uniformity, the laws, the treaties, and the constitution of the United States would be differ- ent in different States, and might perhaps never have precisely the same construction, obligation, or efficacy, in any two States. The public mischiefs that would attend such a ^tate of things would be truly deplorable; and it cannot be believed that they could have escaped the enlightened convention which formed the constitu- tion. "What, indeed, might then have been only prophecy has now become fact; and the appellate jurisdiction must continue to be the only adequate remedy for such evils. There is an additional consideration, which is entitled to great weight. The constitution of the United States was designed for the common and equal benefit of all the people of the United States. The judicial power was granted for the same benign and salutarj purposes. It was not to be exercised exclusively for the benefit of parties who might be plaintiffs, and would elect the national forum, but also for the protection of defendants who might be entitled to try their rights, or assert their privileges, before the same forum. Yet, if the construction contended for be correct, MARTIN v. HUNTER'S LESSEE. 625 it will follow, that as the plaintiff may always elect the state court, the defendant may be deprived of all the security which the con- stitution intended in aid of his rights. Such a state of things can, in no respect, be considered as giving equal rights. To obviate this difficulty, we are referred to the power which it is admitted congress possess to remove suits from state courts to the national courts; and this forms the second ground upon which the argu- ment we are considering has been attempted to be sustained. This power of removal is not to be found in express terms in any part of the constitution; if it be given, it is only given by implication, as a power necessary and proper to carry into effect some express power. The power of removal is certainly not, in strictness of language; it presupposes an exercise of original juris- diction to have attached elsewhere. The existence of this power of removal is familiar in courts acting according to the course of the common law in criminal as well as civil cases, and it is exercised before as well as after judgment. But this is always deemed in both cases an exercise of appellate, and not of original jurisdiction. If, then, the right of removal be included in the appellate jurisdic- tion, it is only because it is one mode of exercising that power, and as congress is not limited by the constitution to any particular mode, or time of exercising it, it may authorize a removal either before or after the judgment. The time, the process, and the man- ner, must be subject to its absolute legislative control. A writ of error is, indeed, but a process which removes the record of one court to the possession of another court, and enables the latter to inspect the proceedings, and give such judgment as its own opinion of the law and justice of the case may warrant. There is nothing in the nature of the process which forbids it from being applied, by the legislature, to interlocutory as well as final judg- ments. And if the right of removal from state courts exists be- fore judgment, because it is included in the appellate power, it must, for the same reason, exist after judgment. And if the appellate power by the constitution does not include cases pend- ing in state courts, the right of removal, which is but a mode of exercising that power, cannot be applied to them. Precisely the same objections, therefore, exist as to the right of removal before judgment as after, and both must stand or fall together. Nor, indeed, would the force of the arguments on either side materially vary, if the right of removal were an exercise of original jurisdic- tion. It would equally trench upon the jurisdiction and inde- pendence of state tribunals. The remedy, too, of removal of suits would be utterly inadequate 40 626 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. to the purposes of the constitution, if it could act only on the parties, and not upon the state courts. In respect to criminal prosecutions, the difficulty seems admitted to be insurmountable; and, in respect to civil suits, there would, in many cases, be rights without corresponding remedies. If state courts should deny the constitutionality of the authority to remove suits from their cog- nizance, in what manner could they be compelled to relinquish the jurisdiction? In respect to criminal cases, there would at once be an end of all control, and the state decisions would be para- mount to the constitution; and though in civil suits the courts of the United States might act upon the parties, yet the state courts might act in the same way; and this conflict of jurisdictions would not only jeopardize private rights, but bring into imminent peril the public interests. On the whole, the court are of opinion, that the appellate power of the United States does extend to cases pending in the state courts; and that the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, which authorizes the exercise of this jurisdiction in the specified cases, by a writ of error, is supported by the letter and spirit of the con- stitution. We find no clause in that instrument which limits this power; and we dare not interpose a limitation where the people have not been disposed to create one. Strong as this conclusion stands upon the general language of the constitution, it may still derive support from other sources. It is an historical fact, that this exposition of the constitution, extending its appellate power to state courts, was, previous to its adoption, uniformly and publicly avowed by its friends, and ad- mitted by its enemies, as the basis of their respective reasonings, both in and out of the state conventions. It is an historical fact, that at the time when the Judiciary Act was submitted to the deliberations of the first congress, composed, as it was, not only of men of great learning and ability, but of men who had acted a principal part in framing, supporting, or opposing that consti- tution, the same exposition was explicitly declared and admitted by the friends and by the opponents of that system. It is an his- torical fact, that the supreme court of the United States have, from time to time, sustained this appellate jurisdiction in a great variety of cases, brought from the tribunals of many of the most impor- tant States in the Union, and that no state tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the subject, or declined to obey the mandate of the supreme court, until the present occasion. This weight of contemporaneous exposition by all parties, this acquies- cence of enlightened state courts, and these judicial decisions of COHENS v. VIRGINIA. 627 the supreme court through so long a period, do, as we think, place the doctrine upon a foundation of authority which cannot be shaken, without delivering over the subject to perpetual and ir- remediable doubts. . . . It is the opinion of the whole court, that the judgment of the court of appeals of Virginia, rendered on the mandate in this cause, be reversed, and the judgment of the district court, held at Winchester, be, and the same is hereby affirmed. [MR. JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered a concurring opinion.] COHENS v. THE STATE OF VIRGINIA. 6 Wheaton, 264. Decided 1821. [The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.] MARSHALL, C. J._, delivered the opinion of the court. This is a writ of error to a judgment rendered in the court of Hustings, for the borough of Norfolk, on an information for sell- ing lottery tickets, contrary to an act of the legislature of Vir- ginia. In the state court, the defendant claimed the protection of an act of congress. A case was agreed between the parties, which states the act of assembly on which the prosecution was founded, and the act of congress on which the defendant relied, and concludes in these words: "If upon this case the court shall be of opinion that the acts of congress before mentioned were valid, and, on the true construction of those acts, the lottery tickets sold by the defendants as aforesaid, might lawfully be sold within the State of Virginia, notwithstanding the act or statute of the general assembly of Virginia prohibiting such sale, then judgment to be entered for the defendants. And if the court should be of opin- ion that the statute or act of the general assembly of the State of Virginia, prohibiting such sale, is valid, notwithstanding the said acts of congress, then judgment to be entered that the defend- ants are guilty, and that the commonwealth recover against them one hundred dollars and costs." Judgment was rendered against the defendants; and the court in which it was rendered being the highest court of the State in which the cause was cognizable, the record has been brought into this court by writ of error. G28 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The defendant in error moves to dismiss this writ, for want of jurisdiction. In support of this motion, three points have been made, and argued with the ability which the importance of the question merits. These points are: 1. That a State is a defendant. 2. That no writ of error lies from this court to a state court. 3. The third point has been presented in different forms by the gentlemen who have argued it. The counsel who opened the cause said that the want of jurisdiction was shown by the subject- matter of the case. The counsel who followed him said that juris- diction was not given by the Judiciary Act. The court has be- stowed all its attention on the arguments of both gentlemen, and supposes that their tendency is to show that this court has no jurisdiction of the case, or, in other words, has no right to review the judgment of the state court, because neither the constitution nor any law of the United States has been violated by that judg- ment. The questions presented to the court by the first two points made at the bar are of great magnitude, and may be truly said vitally to affect the Union. They exclude the inquiry whether the constitution and laws of the United States have been violated by the judgment which the plaintiffs in error seek to review; and maintain that, admitting such violation, it is not in the power of the government to apply a corrective. They maintain that the nation does not possess a department capable of restraining peace- ably, and by authority of law, any attempts which may be made, by a part, against the legitimate powers of the whole; and that the government is reduced to the alternative of submitting to such attempts, or of resisting them by force. They maintain that the constitution of the United States has provided no tribunal for the final construction of itself, or of the laws or treaties of the nation; but that this power may be exercised in the last resort by the courts of every State in the Union. That the constitution, laws, and treaties, may receive as many constructions as there are States; and that this is not a mischief, or, if a mischief, is irre- mediable. These abstract propositions are to be determined; for he who demands decision without permitting inquiry, affirms that the decision he asks does not depend on inquiry. If such be the constitution, it is the duty of the court to bow with respectful submission to its provisions. If such be not the constitution, it is equally the duty of this court to say so; and COHENS v. VIRGINIA. 629 to perform that task which the American people have assigned to the judicial department. 1. The first question to be considered is, whether the jurisdic- tion of this court is excluded by the character of the parties, one of them being a State, and the other a citizen of that State? The 2cT section of the third article of the constitution defines the extent of the judicial power of the United States. Jurisdiction is given to the courts of the Union in two classes of cases. In the first, their jurisdiction depends on the character of the cause, whoever may be the parties. This class comprehends "all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority." This clause extends the jurisdiction of the court to all the cases described, without making in its terms any exception whatever, and without any regard to the condition of the party. If there be any exception, it is to be implied against the express words of the article. In the second class, the jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the parties. In this are comprehended "controversies between two or more States, between a State and citizens of an- other State," "and between a State and foreign states, citizens, or subjects." If these be the parties, it is entirely unimportant' what may be the subject of controversy. Be it what it may, these par- ties have a constitutional right to come into the courts of the Union. The counsel for the defendant in error have stated that the cases which arise under the constitution must grow out of those pro- visions which are capable of self -execution; examples of which are to be found in the second section of the fourth article, and in the tenth section of the first article. A case which arises under a law of the United States must, we are likewise told, be a right given by some act which becomes necessary to execute the powers given in the constitution, of which the law of naturalization is mentioned as an example. The use intended to be made of this exposition of the first part of the section, defining the extent of the judicial power, is not clearly understood. If the intention be merely to distinguish cases arising under the constitution, from those arising under a law, for the sake of precision in the application of this argument, these propositions will not be controverted. If it be to maintain that a case arising under the constitution, or a law, must be one in which a party comes into court to demand something conferred on him by the constitution or a law, we think the construction 630 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. too narrow. A case in law or equity consists of the right of the one party, as well as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends on the construction of either. Congress seems to have intended to give its own construction of this part of the constitution, in the 25th section of the Judiciary Act; and we perceive no reason to depart from that construction. The jurisdiction of the court, then, being extended by the letter of the constitution to all cases arising under it, or under the laws of the United States, it follows that those who would withdraw any case of this description from that jurisdiction, must sustain the exemption they claim on the spirit and true meaning of the constitution, which spirit and true meaning must be so apparent as to overrule the words which its framers have employed. The counsel for the defendant in error have undertaken to do this; and have laid down the general proposition, that a sover- eign independent State is not suable, except by its own consent. This general proposition will not be controverted. But its con- sent is not requisite in each particular case. It may be given in a general law. And if a State has surrendered any portion of its sovereignty, the question whether a liability to suit be a part of this portion, depends on the instrument by which the surrender is made. If upon a just construction of that instrument, it shall appear that the State has submitted to be sued, then it has parted with this sovereign right of judging in every case on the justice of its own pretensions, and has intrusted that power to a tribunal in whose impartiality it confides. The American States, as well as the American people, have be- lieved a close and firm Union to be essential to their liberty and to their happiness. They have been taught by experience, that this Union cannot exist without a government for the whole; and they have been taught by the same experience that this government would be a mere shadow, that must disappoint all their hopes, unless invested with large portions of that sovereignty which be- longs to independent States. Under the influence of this opinion, and thus instructed by experience, the American people, in the conventions of their respective States, adopted the present consti- tution. If it could be doubted whether, from its nature, it were not supreme in all cases where it is empowered to act, that doubt would be removed by the declaration that "this constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the COHENS v. VIRGINIA. G31 authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any- thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary not- withstanding." This is the authoritative language of the American people; and, if gentlemen please, of the American States. It marks with lines too strong to be mistaken, the characteristic distinction between the government of the Union and those of the States. The gen- eral government, though limited as to its objects, is supreme with respect to those objects. This principle is a part of the constitu- tion; and if there be any who deny its necessity, none can deny its authority. To this supreme government ample powers are confided; and if it were possible to doubt the great purposes for which they were so confided, the people of the United States have declared that they are given "in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common de- fense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity." With the ample powers confided to this supreme government, for these interesting purposes, are connected many express and important limitations on the sovereignty of the States, which are made for the same purposes. The powers of the Union on the great subjects of war, peace, and commerce, and on many others, are in themselves limitations of the sovereignty of the States; but in addition to these, the sovereignty of the States is surrendered in many instances where the surrender can only operate to the benefit of the people, and where, perhaps, no other power is con- ferred on congress than a conservative power to maintain the prin- ciples established in the constitution. The maintenance of these principles in their purity is certainly among the great duties of the government. One of the instruments by which this duty may be peaceably performed is the judicial department. It is author- ized to decide all cases, of every description, arising under the constitution or laws of the United States. From this general grant of jurisdiction, no exception is made of those cases in which a State may be a party. When we consider the situation of the government of the Union and of a State, in relation to each other; the nature of our constitution, the subordination of the state gov- ernments to the constitution; the great purpose for which juris- diction over all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, is confided to the judicial department, are we at liberty to insert in this general grant, an exception of those 632 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. cases in which a State may be a party? Will the spirit of the con- stitution justify this attempt to control its words? We think it will not. We think a case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the courts of the Union, who- ever may be the parties to that case. . . . It is most true that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty. In doing this on the present occasion, we find this tribunal invested with appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States. We find no exception to this grant, and we cannot insert one. . . . We think, then, that as the Constitution originally stood, the appellate jurisdiction of this court, in all cases arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, was not ar- rested by the circumstance that a State was a party. This leads to a consideration of the llth amendment. It is in these words: "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity com- menced or prosecuted against one of the United States, by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign State." It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the con- stitution, all the States were greatly indebted; and the apprehen- sion that these debts might be prosecuted in the federal courts, formed a very serious objection to that instrument. Suits were instituted; and the court maintained its jurisdiction. The alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions that were so exten- sively entertained, this amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted by the State legislatures. That its motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance before the tribunal of the na- tion, may be inferred from the terms of the amendment. It does not comprehend controversies between two or more States, or be- tween a State and a foreign state. The jurisdiction of the court COHENS v. VIRGINIA. 633 still extends to these cases; and in these a State may still be sued. We must ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State. There is no difficulty in finding this cause. Those who were inhibited from commencing a suit against a State. or from prosecuting one which might be commenced before the adoption of the amendment, were persons who might probably be its creditors. There was not much reason to fear that foreign or sister States would be creditors to any considerable amount, and there was reason to retain the jurisdiction of the court in those cases, because it might be essential to the preservation of peace. The amendment, therefore, extended to suits commenced or prose- cuted by individuals, but not to those brought by States. The first impression made on the mind by this amendment is, that it was intended for those cases, and for those only, in which some demand against a State is made by an individual in the courts of the Union. If we consider the causes to which it is to be traced, we are conducted to the same conclusion. A general in- terest might well be felt in leaving to a State the full power of consulting its convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it; but no interest could be felt in so changing the relations between the whole and its parts, as to strip the gov- ernment of the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its courts, the constitution and laws from active violation. . . . Under the Judiciary Act, 1 the effect of a writ of error is simply to bring the record into court, and submit the judgment of the inferior tribunal to re-examination. It does not in any manner act upon the parties; it acts only on the record. It removes the record into the supervising tribunal. Where, then, a State obtains a judgment against an individual, and the court rendering such judgment overrules a defense set up under the constitution or laws of the United States, the transfer of this record into the supreme court for the sole purpose of inquiring whether the judgment vio- lates the constitution of the United States, can, with no propriety, we think, be denominated a suit commenced or prosecuted against the State whose judgment is so far re-examined. Nothing is de- manded from the State. No claim against it of anv description is asserted or prosecuted. The party is not to be restored to the possession of anything. . . . He only asserts the constitu- tional right to have his defense examined by that tribunal whose province it is to construe the constitution and laws of the Union. . . . 1 1 Stats, at Large, 73. 634 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The point of view in which this writ of error, with its citation, has been considered uniformly in the courts of the Union, has been well illustrated by a reference to the course of this court in suits instituted by the United States. The universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the United States; that the Judiciary Act does not authorize such suits. Yet writs of error, accompanied with citations, have uni- formly issued for the removal of judgments in favor of the United States into a superior court, where they have, like those in favor of an individual, been re-examined, and affirmed or reversed. It has never been suggested that such a writ of error was a suit against the United States, and therefore not within the jurisdic- tion of the appellate court. It is, then, the opinion of the court, that the defendant who removes a judgment rendered against him by a state court into this court, for the purpose of re-examining the question whether that judgment be a violation of the constitution or laws of the United States, does not commence or prosecute a suit against the State, whatever may be its opinion where the effect of the writ may be to restore the party to the possession of a thing which he demands. But should we in this be mistaken, the error does not affect the case now before the court. If this writ of error be a suit in the sense of the llth amendment, it is not a suit commenced or prose- cuted "by a citizen of another State, or by a citizen or subject of any foreign state." It is not then within the amendment, but is governed entirely by the constitution as originally framed, and we have already seen that, in its origin, the judicial power was ex- tended to all cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, without respect to parties. 2. The second objection to the jurisdiction of the court is, that its appellate power cannot be exercised, in any case, over the judg- ment of a state court. This objection is sustained chiefly by arguments drawn from the supposed total separation of the judiciary of a State from that of the Union, and their entire independence of each other. The argument considers the federal judiciary as completely foreign to that of a State; and as being no more connected with it, in any respect whatever, than the court of a foreign State. If this hypothesis be just, the argument founded on it is equally so; but if the hypothesis be not supported by the constitution, the argu- ment fails with it. This hypothesis is not founded on any words in the constitu- COHENS v. VIRGINIA. 635 .tion, which might seem to countenance it, but on the unreason- ableness of giving a contrary construction to words which seem to require it; and on the incompatibility of the application of the appellate jurisdiction to the judgments of state courts, with that constitutional relation which subsists between the government of the Union and the governments of those States which compose it. Let this unreasonableness, this total incompatibility, be ex- amined. That the United States form, for many, and for most impor- tant purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are one people. In all commercial regulations, we are one and the same people. In many other respects, the American people are one; and the govern- ment which is alone capable of controlling and managing their interests, in all these respects, is the government of the Union. It is their government, and in that character they have no other. America has chosen to be, in many respects, and to many pur- poses, a nation; and for all these purposes her government is com- plete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people have de- clared, that in the exercise of all powers given for these objects, it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting these objects, legiti- mately control all individuals or governments within the American territory. The constitution and laws of a State, so far as they are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States, are absolutely void. These States are constituent parts of the United States. They are members of one great empire, for some purposes sovereign, for some purposes subordinate. In a government so constituted, is it unreasonable that the ju- dicial power should be competent to give efficacy to the constitu- tional laws of the legislature? That department can decide on the validity of the constitution or law of a State, if it be repugnant to the constitution or to a law of the United States. Is it unrea- sonable that it should also be empowered to decide on the judg- ment of a state tribunal enforcing such unconstitutional law? Is it so very unreasonable as to furnish a justification for controlling the words of the constitution? We think it is not. "We think that in a government acknowl- edgedly supreme, with respect to objects of vital interest to the nation, there is nothing inconsistent with sound reason, nothing incompatible with the nature of government, in making all its departments supreme, so far as respects those objects, and so far as is necessary to their attainment. The exercise of the appellate power over those judgments of the state tribunals which may con- 636 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. travene the constitution or laws of the United States, is, we believe, essential to the attainment of those objects. The propriety of intrusting the construction of the constitution, and laws made in pursuance thereof, to the judiciary of the Union, has not, we believe, as yet, been drawn into question. It seems to be a corollary from this political axiom, that the federal courts should either possess exclusive jurisdiction in such cases, or a power to revise the judgments rendered in them by the state tribunals. If the federal and state courts have concurrent juris- diction in all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States; and if a case of this description brought in a state court cannot be removed before judgment, nor revised after judgment, then the construction of the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States is not confided particularly to their judicial department, but is confided equally to that de- partment and to the state courts, however, they may be consti- tuted. "Thirteen independent courts," says a very celebrated statesman (and we have now more than twenty such courts), "of final jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra of government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed." Dismissing the unpleasant suggestion, that any motives which may not be fairly avowed, or which ought not to exist, can ever influence a State or its courts, the necessity of uniformity, as well as correctness in expounding the constitution and laws of the United States, would itself suggest the propriety of vesting in some single tribunal the power of deciding, in the last resort, all cases in which they are involved. We are not restrained, then, by the political relations between the general and state governments, from construing the words of the constitution, defining the judicial power, in their true sense. We are not bound to construe them more restrictively than they naturally import. They give to the supreme court appellate jurisdiction in all cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States. The words are broad enough to comprehend all cases of this description, in whatever court they may be decided. . . . Let the nature and objects of our Union be considered; let the great fundamental principles on which the fabric stands be ex- amined; and we think the result must be that there is nothing so extravagantly absurd in giving to the court of the nation the power of revising the decisions of local tribunals, on questions which UNITED STATES v. TEXAS. 637 affect the nation, as to require that words which import this power should be restricted by a forced construction. . . . Motion Denied. The cause was thereupon argued on the merits. . . . Judgment Affirmed. UNITED STATES v. TEXAS. 143 U. S., 621. Decided 1892. [The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.] ME. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court. This suit was brought by original bill in this court pursuant to the act of May 2, 1890, providing a temporary government for the Territory of Oklahoma. The 25th section recites the existence of a controversy between the United States and the State of Texas as to the ownership of what is designated on the map of Texas as Greer County, and provides that the act shall not be construed to apply to that county until the title to the same has been adjudi- cated and determined to be in the United States. In order that there might be a speedy and final judicial determination of this controversy the Attorney-General of the United States was author- ized and directed to commence and prosecute on behalf of the United States a proper suit in equity in this court against the State of Texas, setting forth the title of the United States to the country lying between the North and South Forks of the Red Eiver where the Indian Territory and the State of Texas adjoin, east of the one hundredth degree of longitude, and claimed by the State of Texas as within its boundary. 26 Stat., 81, 92, c. 182, 25. The State of Texas appeared and filed a demurrer, and, also, an answer denying the material allegations of the bill. The case is now before the court only upon the demurrer, the principal grounds of which are: That the question presented is political in its nature and character, and not susceptible of judicial deter- mination by this court in the exercise of its jurisdiction as con- ferred by the Constitution and laws of the United States; that it is not competent for the general government to bring suit against a State of the Union in one of its own courts, especially when the right to be maintained is mutually asserted by the United States and the State, namely, the ownership of certain designated terri- tory; and that the plaintiff's cause of action, being a suit to recover 638 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. real property, is legal and not equitable, and, consequently, so much of the act of May 2, 1890, as authorizes and directs the prosecution of a suit in equity to determine the rights of the United States to the territory in question is unconstitutional and void. . . . [Here follows a history of the conflicting claims of the United States and Texas.] The bill alleges thait the State of Texas, without right, claims, has taken possession of, and endeavors to extend its laws and juris- diction over, the disputed territory, in violation of the treaty rights of the United States; that, during the year 1887, it gave public notice of its purpose to survey and place upon the market for sale, and otherwise dispose of, that territory; and that, in consequence of its proceeding to eject bona fide settlers from certain portions thereof, President Cleveland, by proclamation issued December 30, 1887, warned all persons, whether claiming to act as officers of the county of Greer, or otherwise, against selling or disposing of, or attempting to sell or dispose of, any of said lands, or from exercis- ing or attempting to exercise any authority over them, and "against purchasing any part of said territory from any person or persons whatever." 25 Stat., 1483. The relief asked is a decree determining the true line between the United States and the State of Texas, and whether the land constituting what is called "Greer County" is within the boundary and jurisdiction of the United States or of the State of Texas. The government prays that its rights, as asserted in the bill, be established, and that it have such other relief as the nature of the case may require. In support of the contention that the ascertainment of the boundary between a Territory of the United States and one of the States of the Union is political in its nature and character, and not susceptible of judicial determination, the defendant cites Fos- ter v. Neilson, 2 Pet., 253, 307, 309; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet., 1, 21; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet., 691, 711; and Garcia v. Lee, 12 Pet., 511, 517. In Foster v. Neilson, which was an action to recover certain lands in Louisiana, the controlling question was as to whom the country between the Iberville and the Perdido rightfully belonged at the time the title of the plaintiff in that case was acquired. The United States, the court said, had perseveringly insisted that by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, made O.ctober 1, 1800, Spain ceded the disputed territory as part of Louisiana to France, and that France by the treaty of Paris of 1803 ceded it to the United States. Spain insisted that the cession to France comprehended only the territory UNITED STATES v. TEXAS. 639 which was at that time denominated Louisiana. After examining various articles of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, Chief Justice Mar- shall, speaking for the court, said: "In a controversy between two nations concerning national boundary, it is scarcely possible that the courts of either should refuse to abide by the measures adopted by its own government. There being no common tribunal to de- cide between them, each determines for itself on its own rights, and if they cannot adjust their differences peaceably, the right remains with the strongest. The judiciary is not that department of the government to which the assertion of its interests against foreign powers is confided; and its duty commonly is to decide upon individual rights, according to those principles which the political departments of the nation have established. If the course of the nation has been a plain one, its courts would hesitate to pronounce it erroneous." Again: "After these acts of sovereign power over the territory in dispute, asserting the American con- struction of the treaty, by which the government claims it, to maintain the opposite construction in its own courts would cer- tainly be an anomaly in the history and practice of nations. If those departments which are trusted with the foreign intercourse of the nation, which assert and maintain its interests against for- eign powers, have unequivocally asserted its rights of dominion over a country of which it is in possession, and which it claims under a treaty; if the legislature has acted on the construction thus asserted, it is not in its own courts that this construction is to be denied. A question like this respecting the boundaries of nations, is, as has been truly said, more a political than a legal question; and, in its discussion, the courts of every country must respect the pronounced will of the legislature." In United States v. Arredondo the court, referring to Foster v. Neilson, said: "This court did not deem the settlement of boun- daries a judicial but a political question that it was not its duty to lead, but to follow the action of the other departments of the government." The same principles were recognized in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Garcia v. Lee. These authorities do not control the present case. They relate to questions of boundary between independent nations, and have no application to a question of that character arising between the General Government and one of the States composing the Union, or between two States of the Union. By the Articles of Confed- eration, Congress was made "the last resort on appeal in all dis- putes and differences" then subsisting or which thereafter might arise "between two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdic- 640 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. tion, or any other cause whatever;" the authority so conferred to be exercised by a special tribunal to be organized in the mode pre- scribed in those Articles, and its judgment to be final and con- clusive. Art. 9. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution, there existed, as this court said in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet., 657, 723, 724, controversies between eleven States, in re- spect to boundaries, which had continued from the first settle- ment of the colonies. The necessity for the creation of some tri- bunal for the settlement of these and like controversies that might arise, under the new government to be formed, must, therefore, have been perceived by the framers of the Constitution, and, con- sequently, among the controversies to which the judicial power of the United States was extended by the Constitution, we find those between two or more States. And that a controversy between two or more States, in respect to boundary, is one to which, under the Constitution, such judicial power extends, is no longer an open question in this court. The cases of Ehode Island v. Massachu- setts, 12 Pet., 657; New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet., 284, 290; Mis- souri v. Iowa, 7 How., 660; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How., 478; Alabama v. Georgia, 23 How., 505; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall., 39, 55; Missouri v. Kentucky, 11 Wall., 395; Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S., 479; and Nebraska v. Iowa, ante, 359, were all original suits, in this court, for the judicial determination of dis- puted boundary lines between States. In New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet., 284, 290, Chief Justice Marshall said: "It has then been settled by our predecessors, on great deliberation, that this court may exercise its original jurisdiction in suits against a State, under the authority conferred by the Constitution and existing acts of Congress." And in Virginia v. West Virginia, it was said by Mr. Justice Miller to be the established doctrine of this court, "that it has jurisdiction of questions of boundary between two States of this Union, and that this jurisdiction is not defeated, because in deciding that question it becomes necessary to examine into and construe compacts or agreements between those States, or because the decree which the court may render, affects the territorial limits of the political jurisdiction and sovereignty of the States which are parties to the proceeding." So, in Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S., 265, 287, 288: "By the Constitution, therefore, this court has original jurisdiction of suits brought by a State against citizens of another State, as well as of controversies between two States. ... As to 'controversies between two or more States.' The most numerous class of which this court has enter- tained jurisdiction is that of controversies between two States as UNITED STATES v. TEXAS. 641 to the boundaries of their territory, such as were determined be- fore the Kevolution by the King in Council, and under the Articles of Confederation (while there was no national 'judiciary) by com- mittees or commissioners appointed by Congress." In view of these cases, it cannot, with propriety, be said that a question of boundary between a Territory of the United States and one of the States of the Union is of a political nature, and not susceptible of judicial determination by a court having jurisdic- tion of such a controversy. The important question therefore is, whether this court can, under the Constitution, take cognizance of an original suit brought by the United States against a State to determine the boundary between one of the Territories and such State. Texas insists that no such jurisdiction has been con- ferred upon this court, and that the only mode in which the pres- ent dispute can be peaceably settled is by agreement, in some form, between the United States and that State. Of course, if no such agreement can be reached and it seems that one is not probable and if neither party will surrender its claim of authority and juris- diction over the disputed territory, the result, according to the defendant's theory of the Constitution, must be that the United States, in order to effect a settlement of this vexed question of boundary, must bring its suit in one of the courts of Texas that State consenting that its courts may be open for the assertion of claims against it by the United States or that, in the end, there must be a trial of physical strength between the government of the Union and Texas. The first alternative is unwarranted both by the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Mr. Justice Story has well said: "It scarcely seems possible to raise a reasonable doubt as to the propriety of giving to the national courts jurisdiction of cases in which the United States are a party. It would be a perfect novelty in the history of national jurisprudence, as well as of public law, that a sovereign had no authority to sue in his own courts. Unless this power were given to the United States, the enforcement of all their rights, powers, contracts and privileges in their sovereign capacity would be at the mercy of the States. They must be enforced, if at all, in the State tribunals." Story Const., 1674. The second alternative, above mentioned, has no place in our constitutional system, and cannot be contemplated by any patriot except with feelings of deep concern. The cases in this court show that the framers of the Constitution did provide, by that instrument, for the judicial determination of all cases in law and equity between two or more States, including those involving questions of boundary. Did they omit to provide 41 642 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. for the judicial determination of controversies arising between the United States and one or more of the States of the Union? This question is in' effect answered by United States v. North Caro- lina, 136 U. S., 211. That was an action of debt brought in this court by the United States against the State of North Carolina, upon certain bonds issued by that State. The State appeared, the case was determined here upon its merits, and judgment was ren- dered for the State. It is true that no question was made as to the jurisdiction of this court, and nothing was therefore said in the opinion upon that subject. But it did not escape the attention of the court, and the judgment would not have been rendered except upon the theory that this court has original jurisdiction of a suit by the United States against a State. As, however, the question of jurisdiction is vital in this case, and is distinctly raised, it is proper to consider it upon its merits. . . . [Here follows a recital of art. 3, 2, of the Constitution, and the llth amend- ment.] It is apparent upon the face of these clauses that in one class of cases the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union depends "on the character of the cause, whoever may be the parties," and, in the other, on the character of the parties, whatever may be the subject of controversy. Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., 26-i, 378, 393. The present suit falls in each class, for it is, plainly, one arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, and, also, one in which the United States is a party. It is, there- fore, one to which, by the express words of the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends. That a Circuit Court of the United States has not jurisdiction, under existing statutes, of a suit by the United States against a State, is clear; for by the Revised Statutes it is declared as was done by the Judiciary Act of 1789 thait "the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdic- tion of all controversies of a civil nature where a State is a party, except between a State and its citizens, or between a State and citizens of other States or aliens, in which latter cases it shall have original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction.' 5 Rev. Stat., 687; Act of September 24, 1789, c. 20, 13; 1 Stat., 80. Such exclusive jurisdiction was given to this court, because it best comported with the dignity of a State, that a case in which it was a party should be determined in the highest, rather than in a subordinate judicial tribunal of the nation. Why then may not this court take original cognizance of the present suit involving a question of boundary between a Territory of the United States and a State? The words in the Constitution, "in all cases ... in which UNITED STATES V. TEXAS. 643 a State shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original juris- diction/' necessarily refer to all cases mentioned in the preceding clause in which a State may be made, of right, a party defendant, or in which a State may, of right, be a party plaintiff. It is ad- mitted that these words do not refer to suits brought against a State by its own citizens or by citizens of other States, or by citi- zens or subjects of foreign Stages, even where such suits arise under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, because the judicial power of the United States does not extend to suits of individuals against States. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S., 1, and authorities there cited; North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S., 22, 30. It is, however, said that the words last quoted refer only to suits in which a State is a party, and in which, also, the opposite party is another State of the Union or a foreign State. This cannot be correct, for it must be conceded that a State can bring an original suit in this court against a citizen of another State. Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S., 265, 287. Be- sides, unless a State is exempt altogether from suit by the United States, we do not perceive upon what sound rule of construction suits brought by the United States in this court especially if they be suits the correct decision of which depends upon the Consti- tution, laws or treaties of the United States are to be excluded from its original jurisdiction as defined in the Constitution. That instrument extends the judicial power of the United States "to all cases," in law and equity, arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, and to controversies in which the United States shall be a party, and confers upon this court original jurisdiction "in all cases" "in which a State shall be party," that is, in all cases mentioned in the preceding clause in which a State may, of right, be made a party defendant, as well as in all cases in which a State may, of right, institute a suit in a court of the United States. The present case is of the former class. We cannot assume that the framers of the Constitution, while extending the judicial power of the United States to con- troversies between two or more States of the Union, and between a State of the Union and foreign States, intended to exempt a State altogether from suit by the General Government. They could not have overlooked the possibility that controversies, capable of judi- cial solution, might arise between the United States and some of the States, and that the permanence of the Union might be en- dangered if to some tribunal was not intrusted the power to deter- mine them according to the recognized principles of law. And to what tribunal could a trust so momentous be more appropriately 644 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. committed than to that which the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice and insure domestic tranquillity, have constituted with authority to speak for all the people and all the States, upon questions before it to which the judicial power of the nation extends? It would be difficult to suggest any reason why this court should have jurisdiction to determine questions of boundary between two or more States, but not jurisdiction of controversies of like character between the United States and a State. . . . [Here is given an extract from Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S., 1.] That case and others in this court relating to the suability of States, proceeded upon the broad ground that "it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent." The question as to the suability of one government by another government rests upon wholly different grounds. Texas is not called to the bar of this court at the suit of an individual, but at the suit of the government established for the common and equal benefit of the people of all the States. The submission to judicial solution of controversies arising between these two governments, "each sovereign, with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the other," McCulloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 400, 410, but both subject to the supreme law of the land, does .no violence to the inherent nature of sovereignty. The States of the Union have agreed, in the Constitution, that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, without regard to the character of the parties (excluding, of course, suits against a State by its own citizens or by citizens of other States, or by citizens or subjects of foreign States), and equally to con- troversies to which the United States shall be a party, without regard to the subject of such controversies, and that this court may exercise original jurisdiction in all such cases, "in which a State shall be party," without excluding those in which the United States may be the opposite party. The exercise, therefore, by this , court, of such original jurisdiction in a suit brought by one State against another to determine the boundary line between them, or in a suit brought by the United States against a State to deter- mine the boundary between a Territory of the United States and that State, so far from infringing, in either case, upon the sov- ereignty, is with the consent of the State sued. Such consent was UNITED STATES v. TEXAS. 645 given by Texas when admitted into the Union upon an equal foot- ing in all respects with the other States. We are of opinion that this court has jurisdiction to determine the disputed question of boundary between the United States and Texas. It is contended that, even if this court had jurisdiction, the dis- pute as to boundary must be determined in an action at law, and that the act of Congress requiring the institution of this suit in equity is unconstitutional and void, as, in effect, declaring that legal rights shall be tried and determined as if they were equitable rights. [Here follows a discussion of Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall., 411, and Ehode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet., 657.] In view of these precedents, it is scarcely necessary for the court to exam- ine this question anew. Of course, if a suit in equity is appropriate for determining the boundary between two States, there can be no objection to the present suit as being in equity and not at law. It is not a suit simply to determine the legal title to, and the ownership of, the lands constituting Greer County. It involves the larger question of governmental authority and jurisdiction over that territory. The United States, in effect, asks the specific execution of the terms of the treaty of 1819, to the end that the disorder and public mischiefs that will ensue from a continuance of the present condition of things may be prevented. The agree- ment, embodied in the treaty, to fix the lines with precision, and to place landmarks to designate the limits o*f the two contracting nations, could not well be enforced by an action at law. The bill and amended bill make a case for the interposition of a court of equity. Demurrer overruled. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, dissenting. MR. JUSTICE LAMAR and myself are unable to concur in the decision just announced. This court has original jurisdiction of two classes of cases only, those affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party. The judicial power extends to "controversies between two or more States;" "between a State and citizens of another State;" and "between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects." Our original jurisdiction, which depends solely upon the character of the parties, is confined to the cases 646 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. enumerated, in which a State may be a party, and this is not one of them. The judicial power also extends to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, but such controversies are not in- cluded in the grant of original jurisdiction. To the controversy here the United States is a party. We are of opinion, therefore, that this case it not within the original jurisdiction of the court. XV. POLITICAL QUESTIONS. LUTHEE v. BORDEN. 7 Howard, 1. Decided 1848. THE first of these cases came up by a writ of error, the second upon a certificate of division of opinion by the judges of the cir- cuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island. The first case is stated in the opinion of the court. The second requires no statement, as it went off, for want of jurisdiction. . . . TANEY, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. This case has arisen out of the unfortunate political differ- ences which agitated the people of Rhode Island in 1841 and 1842. It is an action of trespass brought by Martin Luther, the plaint- iff in error, against Luther M. Borden and other defendants, in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island, for breaking and entering the plaintiff's house. The de- fendants justify upon the ground that large numbers of men were assembled in different parts of the State for the purpose of over- throwing the government by military force, and were actually levying war upon the State; that, in order to defend itself from this insurrection, the State was declared by competent authority to be under martial law; that the plaintiff was engaged in the in- surrection; and that the defendants, being in the military service of the State, by command of their superior officer, broke and entered the house and searched the rooms for the plaintiff, who was supposed to be there concealed, in order to arrest him, doing as little damage as possible. The plaintiff replied, that the tres- pass was committed by the defendants of their own proper wrong, and without any such cause; and upon the issue joined on this replication, the parties proceeded to trial. . . . The existence and authority of the government under which the defendants acted, was called in question; and the plaintiff insists, that, before the acts complained of were committed, that government had been dis- 647 648 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. placed and annulled by the people of Rhode Island, and that the plaintiff was engaged in supporting the lawful authority of the State, and the defendants themselves were in arms against it. . . The fourth section of the fourth article of the constitution of the United States provides that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on the applica- tion of the legislature or of the executive, (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence. Under this article of the constitution it rests with congress to decide what government is the established one in a State. For as the United States guarantee to each State a republican govern- ment, congress must necessarily decide what government is estab- lished in the State before it can determine whether it is republican or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the gov- ernment under which they are appointed, as well as its republican character, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its decision is binding on every other department of the gov- ernment, and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal. It is true that the contest in this case did not last long enough to bring the matter to this issue; and as no senators or representatives were elected under the authority of the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, congress was not called upon to decide the con- troversy. Yet the right to decide is placed there, and not in the courts. - So, too, as relates to the clause in the above-mentioned article of the constitution, providing for cases of domestic violence. It rested with congress, too, to determine upon the means proper to be adopted to fulfill this guarantee. They might, if they had deemed it most advisable to do so, have placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had happened which re- quired the federal government to interfere. But congress thought otherwise, and no doubt wisely; and by the act of February 28, 1795, provided that, "in case of an insurrection in any State against the government thereof, it shall be lawful for the Presi- dent of the United States, on application of the legislature of such State or of the executive, when the legislature cannot be con- vened, to call forth such number of militia of any other State or States, as may be applied for, as he may judge sufficient to sup- press such insurrection." By this act, the power of deciding whether the exigency had arisen upon which the government of the United States is bound LUTHER V. BORDEN. 649 to interfere, is given to the President. He is to act upon the appli- cation of the legislature, or of the executive, and consequently he must determine what body of men constitute the legislature, and who is the governor, before he can act. The fact that both parties claim the right to the government, cannot alter the case,. for both cannot be entitled to it. If there is an armed conflict, like the one of which we are speaking, it is a case of domestic violence, and one of the parties must be in insurrection against the lawful gov- ernment. And the President must, of necessity, decide which is the government, and which party is unlawfully arrayed against it, before he can perform the duty imposed upon him by the act of congress. After the President has acted and called out the militia, is a circuit court of the United States authorized to inquire whether his decision was right? Could the court, while the parties were actually contending in arms for the possession of the government, call witnesses before it, and inquire which party represented a ma- jority of the people? If it could, then it would become the duty of the court (provided it came to the conclusion that the President had decided incorrectly) to discharge those who were arrested or detained by the troops in the service of the United States, or the government which the President was endeavoring to maintain. If the judicial power extends so far, the guarantee contained in the constitution of the United States is a guarantee of anarchy, and not of order. Yet if this right does not reside in the courts when the conflict is raging if the judicial power is, at that time, bound to follow the decision of the political, it must be equally bound when the contest is over. It cannot, when peace is restored, pun- ish as offenses and crimes the acts which it before recognized, and was bound to recognize, as lawful. It is true that in this case the militia were not called out by the President. But upon the application of the governor under the charter government, the President recognized him as the executive power of the State, and took measures to call out the militia to support his authority, if it should be found necessary for the general government to interfere; and it is admitted in the argument that it was the knowledge of this decision that put an end- to the armed opposition to the charter government, and pre- vented any further efforts to establish by force the proposed con- stitution. The interference of the President, therefore, by an- nouncing his determination, was as effectual as if the militia had been assembled under his orders. And it should be equally au- thoritative. For certainly no court of the United States, with a 650 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. knowledge of this decision, would have been justified in recogniz- ing the opposing party as the lawful government, or in treating as wrong-doers or insurgents the officers of the government which the President had recognized, and was prepared to support by an armed force. In the case of foreign nations, the government ac- knowledged by the President is always recognized in the courts of justice. And this principle has been applied by the act of congress to the sovereign States of the Union. It is said that this power in the President is dangerous to liberty, and may be abused. All power may be abused if placed in un- worthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to point out any other hands in which this power would be more safe, and at the same time equally effectual. When citizens of the same State are in arms against each other, and the constituted authorities unable to execute the laws, the interposition of the United States must be prompt, or it is of little value. The ordinary course of proceedings in courts of justice would be utterly unfit for the crisis. And the elevated office of the President, chosen as he is by the people of the United States, and the high responsibility he could not fail to feel when acting in a case of so much moment, appear -to furnish as strong safeguards against a wilful abuse of power as human prudence and foresight could well provide. At all events, it is conferred upon him by the constitution and laws of the United States, and must, therefore, be respected and en- forced in its judicial tribunals. A question very similar to this arose in the case of Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat., 29-31. The first clause of the first section of the act of February 28, 1795, of which we have been speaking, author- izes the President to call out the militia to repel invasion. It is the second clause in the same section which authorizes the call to suppress an insurrection against a state government. The power given to the President in each case is the same, with this differ- ence only, that it cannot be exercised by him in the latter case, except upon the application of the legislature or executive of the State. The case above mentioned arose out of a call made by the President, by virtue of the power conferred by the first clause; and the court said that "whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of cer- tain facts, it is a sound rule of construction that the statute con- stitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those facts." The grounds upon which that opinion is maintained are set forth in the report, and, we think, are conclusive. The same principle applies to the case now before the court. Undoubtedly, LUTHER v. BORDEN. 651 if the President, in exercising this power, shall fall into error, or invade the rights of the people of the State, it would be in the power of congress to apply the proper remedy. But the courts must administer the law as they find it. ... The remaining question is, whether the defendants, acting under military orders issued under the authority of the government, were justified in breaking and entering the plaintiff's house. In rela- tion to the act of the legislature declaring martial law, it is not necessary in the case before us to inquire to what extent, nor under what circumstances, that power may be exercised by a State. Un- questionajbly, a military government, established as the perma- nent government of the State, would not be a republican govern- ment, and it would be the duty of congress to overthrow it. But the law of Rhode Island evidently contemplated no such govern- ment. It was intended merely for the crisis, and to meet the peril in which the existing government was placed bv the armed resist- ance to its authority. It was so understood and construed by the state authorities. And unquestionably, a State may use its mili- tary power to put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The power is essential to the existence of every government, essential to the preservation of order and of free institutions, and is as necessary to the States of this Union, as to any other government. The State itself must determine what degree of force the crisis demands. And if the government of Ehode Island deemed the armed opposition so for- midable, and so ramified throughout the State as to require the use of its military force and the declaration of martial law, we see no ground upon which this court can question its authority. It was a state of war, and the established government resorted to the rights and usages of war to maintain itself, and to overcome the unlawful opposition. And in that state of things, the officers engaged in its military service might lawfully arrest any one, who, from the information before them, they had reasonable grounds to believe was engaged in the insurrection, and might order a house to be forcibly entered and searched, when there were reason- able grounds for supposing he might be there concealed. Without the power to do this, martial law and the military array of the government would be mere parade, and rather encourage attack than repel it. No more force, however, can be used than is neces- sary to accomplish the object. And if the power is exercised for the purposes of oppression, or any injury wilfully done to person or property, the party by whom, or by whose order, it is commit- ted, would undoubtedly be answerable. . . . 652 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Much of the argument on the part of the plaintiff turned upon political rights and political questions, upon which the court has been urged to express an opinion. We decline doing so. The high power has been conferred on this court of passing judgment upon the acts of the state sovereignties, and of the legislative and execu- tive branches of the federal government, and of determining whether they are beyond the limits of power marked out for them respectively by the constitution of the United States. This tribunal, therefore, should be the last to overstep the boundaries which limit its own jurisdiction. And while it should always be ready to meet any question confided to it by the constitution, it is equally its duty not to pass beyond its appropriate sphere of action, and to take care not to involve itself in discussions which properly belong to other forums. Xo one, we believe, has ever doubted the propo- sition, that, according to the institutions of this country, the sov- ereignty in every State resides in the people of the State, and that they may alter and change their form of government at their own pleasure. But whether they have changed it or not, by abolishing an old government, and establishing a new one in its place, is a question to be settled by the political power. And when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its decision, and to follow it. The judgment of the circuit court must, therefore, be affirmed. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI v. JOHXSOX, PBESIDEXT. 4 Wallace, 475. Decided 1866. THIS was a motion made by Messrs. Sharkey and E. J. Walker, on behalf of the State of Mississippi, for leave to file a bill in the name of the State praying this court perpetually to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson, a citizen of the State of Tennessee and President of the United States, and his officers and agents appointed for that purpose, and especially E. 0. C. Ord, assigned as military commander of the district where the State of Missis- sippi is, from executing or in any manner carrying out two acts of Congress named in the bill, one "An act for the more efficient government of the rebel states," passed March 2d, 1867, not- withstanding the President's veto of it as unconstitutional, and MISSISSIPPI v. JOHNSON. 653 the other an act supplementary to it, passed in the same way March 23d, 1867; acts commonly called the Reconstruction Acts. The former of these acts, reciting that no legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property now exists in the rebel States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Missis- sippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas, and that it was necessary that peace and good order should be enforced in them until loyal and republican State governments could be legally established, divided the States named into five military districts, and made it the duty of the President to assign to each one an officer of the army, and to detail a sufficient military force to enable him to perform his duties and enforce his authority within his district. It made it the duty of this officer to protect all persons in their rights, to suppress insurrection, disorder, vio- lence, and to punish, or cause to be punished, all disturbers of the public peace and criminals, either through the local civil tribunals or through military commissions, which the act authorized. It provided, further, that on the formation of new constitutions and certain conditions which the act prescribed, the States respectively shall be declared entitled to representation in Congress and the preceding part of the act become inoperative; and that until they were so admitted any civil governments which might exist in them should be deemed provisional only, and subject to the paramount authority of the United States, at any time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede it. The second of the two acts related chiefly to the registration of voters who were to form the new constitutions of the States in question. The bill set out the political history of Mississippi so far as related to its having become one of the United States; and "that forever after it was impossible for her people, or for the State in its corporate capacity, to dissolve that connection with the other States, and that any attempt to do so by secession or otherwise was a nullity;" and she "now solemnly asserted that her connec- tion with the Federal government was not in anywise thereby de- stroyed or impaired;" and she averred and charged "that the Con- gress of the United States cannot constitutionally expel her from the Union, and that any attempt which practically does so is a nullity." . . . [Here follows an extract from the bills.] It then charged that, from information and belief, the said Andrew Johnson, President, in violation of the Constitution, and in violation of the sacred rights of the States, would proceed, not- withstanding his vetoes, and as a mere ministerial duty, to the 654 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. execution of said acts, as though they were the law of the land, which the vetoes prove he would not do if he had any discretion, or that in doing so he performed anything more than a mere ministerial duty; and that with the view to the execution of said acts he had assigned General E. 0. C. Ord to the command of the States of Mississippi and Arkansas. Upon an intimation made a few days before by Mr. Sharkey, of his desire to file this bill, the Attorney-General objected to it in limine, as containing matter not fit to be received. The Chief Justice then stated that while as a general thing a motion to file a bill was granted as of course, yet if it was suggested that the bill contained scandalous or impertinent matter, or was in other re- spects improper to be received, the court would either examine the bill or refer it to a master for examination. The only matter, therefore, which would now be considered was the question of leave to file the bill THE CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court. . . . A motion was made, some days since, in behalf of the State of Mississippi, for leave to file a bill in the name of the State, praying this court to perpetually enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, and E. 0. C. Ord, general commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas, from executing, or in any manner carrying out, certain acts of Con- gress therein named. The acts referred to are those of March 2d, and March 23d, 1867, commonly known as the Keconstruction Acts. The Attorney-General objected to the leave asked for, upon the ground that no bill which makes a President a defendant, and seeks an injunction against him to restrain the performance of his duties as President, should be allowed to be filed in this court. This point has been fully argued, and we will now dispose of it. We shall limit our inquiry to the question presented by the objection, without expressing any opinion on the broader issues discussed in argument, whether, in any case, the President of the United States may be required, by the process of this court, to perform a purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held amenable, in any case, otherwise than by impeachment for crime. The single point which requires consideration is t^ i>c * Can the President be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an act of Congress alleged 'to b^MinconstitutionaT? MISSISSIPPI v. JOHNSON. 655 It is assumed by the counsel for the State of Mississippi, that the President, in the execution of the Reconstruction Acts, is re- quired to perform a mere ministerial duty. In this assumption there is, we think, a confounding of the terms ministerial and executive, which are by no means equivalent in import. A ministerial duty, the performance of which may, in proper cases, be required of the head of a department, by judicial process, jjLjrne in respect, to which nothing is left to discretion. It _is_a simple, definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed by law. The case of Marbury v. Madison, Secretary of State, 1 furnishes an illustration. A citizen had been nominated, confirmed, and appointed a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia, and his commission had been made out, signed, and sealed. Nothing remained to be done except delivery, and the duty of delivery was imposed by law on the Secretary of State. It was held that the performance of this duty might be enforced by mandamus issuing from a court having jurisdiction. So, in the case of Kendall, Postmaster-General, v. Stockton & Stokes, 2 an act of Congress had directed the Postmaster-General to credit Stockton & Stokes with such sums as the Solicitor of the Treasury should find due to them; and that officer refused to credit them with certain sums, so found due. It was held that the crediting of this money was a mere ministerial duty, the per- formance of which might be judicially enforced. In each of these casesjotbing was lefj to discrptirm. There was no room for the exercise of judgment. The law required the per- formance of a single specific act; and that performance, it was heldjjnight be required by mandamus. Very, different is the duty of the President in the exercise of the power to see that the laws are faithfully, executed, and among these laws the acts named in Hxa-bill. By the first of these acts he is required to assign generals to command in the several mili- tary districts, and to detail sufficient military force to enable such officers to discharge their duties under the law. By the sup- plementary acts, other duties are imposed on the several command- ing generals, and these duties must necessarily be performed under the supervision of the President as commander-in-chief. The_duty thus imposed on the President is in no just sense ministerial. It is purely executive and political. An attempt on the part of thg_ jndim'al department of., the gov- ernment to enforce the performance of such duties by the Presi- 1 1 Cranch, 137. - 12 Peters, 527. 656 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. dent mighLJbe justly characterizecL-in the language of Chief Jus- tice Marshall, as "anjibsurd and It is true that in the instance before us the interposition of the court is not sought to enforce action by the Executive under con- stitutional legislation, but to restrain such action under legisla- tion alleged to be unconstitutional. But we are unable to per- ceive that this circumstance takes the case out of the general principles which forbid judicial interference with the exercise of Executive discretion. It was admitted in the argument that the application now made to us is without a precedent; and this is of much weight against it. Had it been supposed at the bar that this court would, in any case, interpose, by injunction, to prevent the execution of an un- constitutional act of Congress, it can hardly be doubted that appli- cations with that object would have been heretofore addressed to it. Occasions have not been wanting. The constitutionality of the act for the annexation of Texas was vehemently denied. It made important and permanent changes in the relative importance of States and sections, and was by many supposed to be pregnant with disastrous results to large interests in particular States. But no one seems to have thought of an ap- plication for an injunction against the execution of the act by the President. And yet it is difficult to perceive upon what principle the appli- cation now before us can be allowed and similar applications in that and other cases have been denied. The fact that no such application was ever before made in any case indicates the general judgment of the profession that no such application should be entertained. It will hardly be contended that Congress [the courts?] can interpose, in any case, to restrain the enactment of an unconsti- tutional law; and yet how can the right to judicial interposition to prevent such an enactment, when the purpose is evident and the execution of that purpose certain, be distinguished, in prin- ciple, from the right to such interposition against the execution of such a law by the President? The Congress is the legislative^ department of the government; the President is the executive department. Xeither can be re- strained in its action by the judicial department; though the acts of both, when performed^-are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance. The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its possible consequences. MISSISSIPPI v. JOHNSON. 657 Suppose. JJie_ bill filed and_ the injuncjiaiL^piayed for allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court and refuses to execute the acts of Congress, is it not clear that a col- lision may occur between the executive and legislative departments of the government? May not the House of Representatives im- peach the President for such refusal? And in that case could this\ court interfere, in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public world of an a/ttempt by this court to arrest proceedings in that court? These questions answer themselves. It is true that a State may file an original bill in this court. And it may be true, in some cases, that such a bill may be filed against the United States. But we are_ fully satisfied- that. this- court has no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the per- formance of his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be received by us. It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer that, if the relief sought cannot be had against Andrew Johnson, as Presi- dent, it may be granted against Andrew Johnson as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is plain that relief as against the execution of an act of Congress by Andrew Johnson, is relief against its execu- tion by the President. A bill praying an injunction against the execution of an act of Congress by the incumbent of the presi- dential office cannot be received, whether it describes him as Presi- dent or as a citizen of a State. The motion for leave to file the bill is, therefore, Denied. NOTE. Whether any particular class of Indians are still to be regarded as a tribe, or have ceased to hold the tribal relation, is primarily a question for the political departments of the govern- ment, and if they have decided it, this court will follow their lead. United States v. Holliday, 3 Wallace, 407. It belongs exclusively to the government to recognize the polit- ical existence of new foreign states, and until it does so, courts must consider the old state of things as remaining. Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheaton, 246. In a controversy between the United States and a foreign sov- ereign as to boundary, this court must follow the decision of that department of the government intrusted by the constitution with 42 658 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. the care of its foreign relations, especially if sanctioned by the legislative power. Foster v. Neilson, 2 Peters, 253. A bill in equity filed by one of the United States to enjoin the Secretary of War and other officers who represent the Executive authority of the United States from carrying into execution cer- tain acts of Congress, on the ground that such execution would annul and totally abolish the existing State government of the State and establish another and different one in its place in other words, would overthrow and destroy the corporate existence of the State by depriving it of all means and instrumentalities whereby its existence might, and otherwise would, be maintained calls for judgment upon a political question, and will therefore not be entertained by this court. State of Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wal- lace, 50. The President, in a message to congress, and in the correspond- ence carried on with the government of Buenos Ayres, having denied the jurisdiction of that country over the Falkland Islands, the courts must take the fact so to be. Williams v. Suffolk Insur- ance Co., 13 Peters, 415. Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any government con- clusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of that government. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S., 203. XVI. ENFORCEMENT OF EXECUTIVE POWER BY JUDICIAL PROCESS. IN EE DEBS, PETITIONER. 158 U. S., 564. Decided 1895. [On July 2, 1894, the district attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, acting under the direction of the Attorney-General of the United States, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois against these petitioners and others. The bill averred that the twenty-two railroads named therein were engaged in the business of inter- state commerce and also that each of them was under contract to carry the United States mails; that four of the defendants were officers of the American Eailway Union; that these four offi- cers combined with others to compel an adjustment of a dispute between the Pullman Palace Car Company and its employes by boycotting the cars of the company; that to make the boycott effective, they had prevented certain of the railroads running out of Chicago from operating their trains, and were combining to extend such boycott against the Pullman cars by causing strikes among employes of all ro.ads attempting to haul the same; that the defendants and others unknown proceeded by collecting to- gether in large numbers, by threats, intimidation, force and vio- lence, to prevent the said railways from employing other persons to fill the vacancies aforesaid; that the defendants and others unknown did with force and violence obstruct, derail, and wreck the engines and trains of the said railways, both passenger and freight, engaged in interstate commerce and in carrying the United States mails. Following these allegations was a prayer for an in- junction. The court thereupon ordered an injunction command- ing the defendants "and all persons combining and conspiring with them, and all other persons whomsoever absolutely to desist and refrain from" doing the unlawful acts specified in the bill. The injunction was served on those of the defendants who are here as 659 660 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. petitioners. On July 17 the district attorney filed an informa- tion for an attachment against the four defendants, and on August 1 a similar information against the other petitioners. A hearing was had before the Circuit Court, and on December 14, these peti- tioners were found guilty of contempt and sentenced to imprison- ment in the county jail for terms varying from three to six months. Having been committed to jail, they on January 14, 1895, applied to this court for a writ of error and also a writ of habeas corpus. The former was denied on the ground that the order of the Circuit Court was not a final judgment or decree. The latter is now to be considered.] MR. JUSTICE BEEWEE ... delivered the opinion of the court. The case presented by the bill is this: The United States, finding that the interstate transportation of persons and property, as well as the carriage of the mails, is forcibly obstructed, and that a combination and conspiracy exists to subject the control of such transportation to the will of the conspirators, applied to one of their courts, sitting as a court of equity, for an injunction to re- strain such obstruction and prevent carrying into effect such con- spiracy. Two questions of importance are suggested: First. Are the relations of the general government to interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails such as to authorize a direct inter- ference to prevent a forcible obstruction thereof? Second. If authority exists, as authority in government implies both power and duty, has a court of equity jurisdiction to issue an injunction in aid of the performance of such duty? First. What are the relations of the general government to interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails? They are those of direct supervision, control, and management. While under the dual system which prevails with us the powers of gov- ernment are distributed between the State and the Nation, and while the latter is properly styled a government of enumerated powers, yet within the limits of such enumeration it has all the attributes of sovereignty, and, in the exercise of those enumerated powers, acts directly upon the citizen, and not through the inter- mediate agency of the State. "The government of the Union, then, is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exer- cised directly on them, and for their benefit." "No trace is to be found in the Constitution of an intention to IN RE DEBS, PETITIONER. 661 create a dependence of the government of the Union on those of the States, for the execution of the great powers assigned to it. Its means are adequate to its ends, and on those means alone was it expected to rely for the accomplishment of its ends. To impose on it the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot control, which another government may furnish or withhold, would render its course precarious, the result of its measures uncertain, and cre- ate a dependence on other governments, which might disappoint its most important designs, and is incompatible with the language of the Constitution." Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 405, 424. "Both the States and the United States existed before the Con- stitution. The people, through that instrument, established a more perfect union by substituting a national government, acting, with 'ample power, directly upon the citizens, instead of the confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly restricted, only upon the States." Chief Justice Chase in Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall., 71, 76. "We hold it be an incontrovertible principle, that the govern- ment of the United States may, by means of physical force, exer- cised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil the powers and functions that belong to it. This necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence the power to keep the peace to that extent. "This power to enforce its laws and to execute its functions in all places does not derogate from the power of the State to execute its laws at the same time and in the same places. The one' does not exclude the other, except where both cannot be executed at the same time. In that case, the words of the Constitution itself show which is to yield. 'This Constitution, and all laws which shall be made in pursuance thereof, . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.' " Mr. Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S., 371, 395. . . . Among the powers expressly given to the national government are the control of interstate commerce and the creation and man- agement of a post office system for the nation. . . . [Here follows a consideration of the statutes passed in the exercise of these powers.] Obviously these powers given to the national government over interstate commerce and in respect to the transportation of the mails were not dormant and unused. Congress had taken hold of these two matters, and by various and specific acts had assumed and exercised the powers given to it, and was in full discharge 662 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. of its duty to regulate interstate commerce and carry the mails. The validity of such exercise and the exclusiveness of its con- trol had been again and again presented to this court for consider- ation. It is curious to note the fact that in a large proportion of the cases in respect to interstate commerce brought to this court the question presented was of the validity of state legislation in its bearings upon interstate commerce, and the uniform course of de- cision has been to declare that it is not within the competency of a State to legislate in such a manner as to obstruct interstate r commerce. If a State with its recognized powers of sovereignty is impotent to obstruct interstate commerce, can it be that any mere voluntary association of individuals within the limits of that State has a power which the State itself does not possess? As, under the Constitution, power over interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails is vested in the national govern- ment, and Congress by virtue of such grant has assumed actual and direct control, it follows that the national government may prevent any unlawful and forcible interference therewith. But how shall this be accomplished? Doubtless, it is within the com- petency of Congress to prescribe by legislation that any interference with these matters shall be offenses against the United States, and prosecuted and punished by indictment in the proper courts. But is that the only remedy? Have the vast interests of the nation in interstate commerce, and in the transportation of the mails, no other protection than lies in the possible punishment of those who interfere with it? To ask the question is to answer it. By article 3, section 2, clause 3, of the Federal Constitution it is provided: "The trial of all crimes except in cases of impeachment shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crime shall have been committed." If all the inhabitants of a State, or even a great body of them, should combine to obstruct interstate commerce or the transporation of the mails, prosecutions " for such offenses had in such a community would be doomed in advance to failure. And if the certainty of such failure was known, and the national government had no other way to enforce the free- dom of interstate commerce and the transportation of the mails than by prosecution and punishment for interference therewith, the whole interests of the nation in these respects would be at / the absolute mercy of a portion of the inhabitants of that single j State. V But there is no such impotency^ in the national government. The \ entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of Vhe land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the IN RE DEBS, PETITIONER. 6G3 security of all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care. The strong arm of the national government may be put forth to brush away all obstructions to the freedom of interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails. If the emergency arises, the army of the Nation, and 'all its militia, are at the service of the Ration to compel obedience to its laws. But passing to the second question, is there no other alternative than the use of force on the part of the executive authorities when- ever obstructions arise to the freedom of interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails? Is the army the only instrument by which rights of the public can be enforced and the peace of the nation preserved? Grant that any public nuisance may be forcibly abated either at the instance of the authorities, or by any individ- ual suffering private damage therefrom, the existence of this right of forcible abatement is not inconsistent with nor does it destroy /the right of appeal in an orderly way to the courts for a judicial determination, and an exercise of their powers by writ of injunc- tion and otherwise to accomplish the same result. . . . So, in the case before us, the right to use force does not exclude the right of appeal to the courts for a judicial determination and f or the exercise of all their powers of prevention. Indeed, it is more to the praise than to the blame of the government, that, instead of determining for itself questions of right and wrong on the part of these petitioners and their associates and enforcing that determination by the club of the policeman and the bayonet of the soldier, it submitted all those questions to the peaceful determina- tion of judicial tribunals, and invoked their consideration and judgment as to the measure of its rights and powers and the cor- relative obligations of those against whom it made complaint. And it is equally to the credit of the latter that the judgment of those tribunals was by the great body of them respected, and the troubles which threatened so much disaster terminated. Neither can it be doubted that the government has such an interest in the subject-matter as enables it to appear as party plaintiff in this suit. It is said that equity only interferes for the protection of property, and that the government has no property interest. A sufficient reply is that the United States have a prop- erty in the mails, the protection of which was one of the purposes of this bill. . . . We do not care to place our decision upon this ground alone. Every government, entrusted, by the very terms of its being, with powers and duties to be exercised and discharged for the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts for any proper assist- 664 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other, and it is no sufficient answer to its appeal to one of those courts that it has no pecuniary interest in the matter. The obligation which it is under to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the wrong- doing of one resulting in injury to the general welfare, is often of itself sufficient to give it standing in the court. [Here fol- lows a discussion of United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S., 273, 285, and United States v. Bell Telephone Company, 128 U. S., 315, 367.] It is obvious from these decisions that while it is not the prov- ince of the government to interfere in any mere matter of private controversy between individuals, or to use its great powers to enforce the rights of one against another, yet, whenever the wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in respect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation, and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all the citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts, or prevent it from taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional duties. The national government, given by the Constitution power to regulate interstate commerce, has by express statute assumed juris- diction over such commerce when carried upon railroads. It is charged, therefore, with the duty of keeping those highways of interstate commerce free from obstruction, for it has always been recognized as one of the powers and duties of a government to remove obstructions from the highway under its control. As said in Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 713, 724: "The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by Con- gress. This necessarily includes the power to keep them open and free from any obstruction to their navigation, interposed by the States or otherwise; to remove such obstructions when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as they may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil and for the punish- ment of the offenders. For these purposes, Congress possesses all the powers which existed in the States before the adoption of the national Constitution, and which have always existed in the Parliament of England." . . . IN RE DEBS, PETITIONER. 665 It is said that the jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the na- tional government over highways has been in respect to water-' ways the natural highways of the country and not over artifi- /cial highways such as railroads; but the occasion for the exercise f by Congress of its jurisdiction over the latter is of recent date. / Perhaps the first act in the course of such legislation is that here- tofore referred to, of June 14, 1866, but the basis upon which y rests its jurisdiction over artificial highways is the same as that \which supports it over the natural highways. Both spring from the power to regulate commerce. The national government has no separate dominion over a river within the limits of a State; its jurisdiction 'there is like that over land in the same State. Its control over the river is simply by virtue of the fact that it is one of the highways of interstate and international commerce. The great case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat., 1, 197, in which the control of Congress over inland waters was asserted, rested that control on the grant of the power to regulate commerce. The argument of the Chief Justice was that commerce includes naviga- tion, "and a power to regulate navigation is as expressly granted as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce.' }: In order to fully regulate commerce with foreign nations it is essen- tial that the power of Congress does not stop at the borders of the nation, and equally so as to commerce among the States: "The power of Congress, then, comprehends navigation within the limits of every State in the Union, so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.' It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New York, and act upon the very wafers to which the prohibition now under consideration applies." See also Oilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall., 713, 725, in which it was said: "Wherever 'commerce among the States' goes, the power of the nation, as represented in this court, goes with it to protect and enforce its rights." Up to a recent date commerce, both interstate and international, was mainly by water, and it is not strange that both the legislation of Congress and the cases in the courts have been principally con- cerned therewith. The fact that in recent years interstate com- merce has come mainly to be carried on by railroads and over artificial highways has in no manner narrowed the scope of the constitutional provision, or abridged the power of Congress over such commerce. On the contrary, the same fullness of control 666 CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. f exists in the one case as in the other, and the same power to / remove obstructions from the one as from the other. V. Constitutional provisions do not change, but their operation extends to new matters as the modes of business and the habits of life of the people vary with each succeeding generation. The law of the common carrier is the same today as when transportation on land was by coach and wagon, and on water by canal boat and sailing vessel, yet in its actual operation it touches and regulates transportation by modes then unknown, the railroad train and the steamship. Just so is it with the grant to the national gov- ernment of power over interstate commerce. The Constitution has not changed. The power is the same. But it operates today upon modes of interstate commerce unknown to the fathers, and it will operate with equal force upon any new modes of such commerce which the future may develop. . . . "We have given to this case the most careful and anxious atten- tion, for we realize that it touches closely questions of supreme importance to the people of this country. Summing up our con- clusions, we hold that the government of the United States is one having jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly upon each citizen; that while it is a govern- ment of enumerated powers, it has within the limits of those powers all the attributes of sovereignty; that to it is committed power over interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail; that the powers thus conferred upon the national government are not dormant, but have been assumed and put into practical exer- cise by the legislation of Congress; that in the exercise of those powers it is competent for the nation to remove all obstructions upon highways, natural or artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce or the carrying of the mail; that while it may be com- petent for the government (through the executive branch and in the use of the entire executive power of the nation) to forcibly remove all such obstructions, it is equally within its competency to appeal to the civil courts for an inquiry and determination as to the existence and character of any alleged obstructions, and if such are found to exist, or threaten to occur, to invoke the powers /of these courts to remove or restrain such obstructions; that the / jurisdiction of courts to interfere in such matters by injunction I is one recognized from ancient times and by indubitable author- i ity; that such jurisdiction is not ousted by the fact that the ob- y structions are accompanied by or consist of acts in themselves vio- lations of the criminal law; that the proceeding by injunction is of a civil character, and may be enforced by proceedings in con- IN RE DEBS, PETITIONER. 667 tempt; that such proceedings are not in execution of the crim- inal laws of the land; that the penalty for a violation of injunc- tion is no substitute for and no defense to a prosecution for any criminal offenses committed in the course of such violation; that the complaint filed in this case clearly showed an existing obstruc- tion of artificial highways for the passage of interstate commerce and the transmission of the mail an obstruction not only tem- porarily existing, but threatening to continue; that under such complaint the Circuit Court had power to issue its process of injunction; that it having been issued and served on these de- fendants, the Circuit Court had authority to inquire whether its orders had been disobeyed, and when it found that they had been, then to proceed under section 725, Revised Statutes, which grants power "to punish by fine or imprisonment, . . . disobedi- ence, ... by any party ... or other person, to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command," and enter the order of punishment complained of; and, finally, that, the Circuit Court, having full jurisdiction in the premises, its finding of the fact of disobedience is not open to review on habeas corpus in this or any other court. . . . The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is Dewed. NOTE. See articles by F. J. Stimson on The Modern Use of In- junctions, Political Science Quarterly, X. 189 (1895), and by Wil- liam H. Dunbar on Government by Injunction, Law Quarterly Ee- view, XIII., 347 (1897). The latter has been reprinted by the American Economic Association in Economic Studies, Vol. III., No. I. INDEX. Adams, Charles Francis, Life of Richard Henry Dana, 351. Adams, President John, 17. Aliens, Exclusion of, 596, 598, 600. Amendments of U. S. Constitution, 498, 510. Fourth, 361. Fifth, 133, 153, 290, 361, 468, 471, 482, 509, 540. Sixth, 361. Tenth, 125, 164, 310, 524. Eleventh, 616, 632, 634. Twelfth, 498. Thirteenth, 491, 498, 499, 528, 531, 558. Fourteenth, 290, 298, 307, 491, 501, 513, 516, 519, 523, 527, 531, 534, 540. Fifteenth, 502. Articles of Confederation, 86, 127, 163, 323, 480, 505, 555, 591, 622, 639, 640. Compared with Constitution, 30. Government under, 173, 200, 201, 604, 610. Atterbury, Bishop, 375 n. Attorney General, 334, 335. Austria, Emperor of, 168. Baldwin, Justice, 549, 590, 595. Cited, 639. Bank of the United States, 32, 33, 142. Power of Congress to incorporate, 308. Bankruptcy, 217, 405, 406, 408, 410, 432, 433, 438, 439, 448, 450. In England, 446. Bates, Chancellor, 249. Belligerents, 343, 349. Biddle, George W., Constitutional History as Seen in American Law, 491. Bills of Attainder, 372, 383, 387, 403, 440. Bills of Credit, 102, 103, 106, 107, 109-118, 127, 131, 156, 164, 166-169. Legal tender not an essential quality, 105, 128. Prohibition on States to issue, 112. See Legal Tender, Money. Bill of Rights, 469, 470, 539. Black Code, 530. Blackstone, Sir William, 377, 385, 402, 418, 515, 543. Blair, Justice, 615. Blockade, Effect of, 347. Power of President to institute, 342, 348. Relation of neutrals to, 343. Bracton, 605. 669 670 INDEX. Bradley, Justice, 510. Cited, 285, 597, 660. Opinions by, 68, 156, 519, 571. Brewer, Justice, 280, 602. Opinion by, 660. Bridges, 303, 304. Brougham, Lord, 368. Brown, Justice, 100. Bryce, American Commonwealth, 323, 490. Burke, Edmund, 540. Campbell, Justice, 488, 490, 491. Capture, Right of, 343. Carson, The Supreme Court of the United States, 351, 616. Catron, Justice, 55, 219, 275, 350, 488-, 489, 490, 491. Census, Power to take, 142. Charges, Regulation of, 291, 293, 294. Chase, Chief Justice, 254, 371, 394, 500, 510. Cited, 65, 167, 660. Opinions by, 46, 57, 119, 552, 570, 654. Chase, Justice, Opinions by, 26, 372. Cherokee Nation, 585. Chicago, 300. Chicago River, 302. Chinese cases, 595. Citizens of United States, 473, 475, 478, 489, 502. Privileges and immunities of, 54, 477, 497, 504, 507, 508, 509, 529. Distinguished from citizens of the States, 474, 503. See Negro. Civil rights, 467, 472, 479, 518, 526. Clarendon, Lord, 375 n., 388. Cleveland, President, 638. Clifford, Justice, 85, 254, 350, 518, 582. Cited, 89. Opinion by, 71. Coasting trade, 187. Coke, Sir Edward, 497, 536. Commerce, 46, 47, 52, 173, 175, 179, 185, 191, 193, 200, 201, 210, 215, 223, 227, 229, 240, 241, 243, 246, 250, 253, 255, 259, 267, 270, 272, 275, 276, 302, 312, 528, 546, 665. Concurrent or exclusive control of, 52, 180, 210, 242, 244, 245, 252, 261, 270, 271. Control of Congress over, 179, 188, 205, 210, 213, 220, 232, 240, 244, 245, 255, 261, 266, 298, 303. Control of States over, 215, 232, 254, 270, 275, 278, 280, 304. Foreign commerce, 178. Includes intercourse, 255, 261. navigation, 175, 177, 188, 234. passenger traffic, 189, 219, 222, 225, 232, 252, 254, 260. transportation, 249, 250, 252-254, 260, 273, 660. Regulation of charges not an interference with, 267, 293. INDEX. G71 Commerce, continued. Internal commerce, 47, 205, 221, 251, 254, 261, 270, 278, 298. Interstate commerce, 178, 186, 249, 252, 253, 260, 261, 265, 269, 271, 285, 286, 660, 661, 664, 666. Common law, 297, 538. Confederate States of America, 146. Conflict of laws, 444. Congress, Powers, of, 162, 309, 344, 406, 527, 577, 600. Limitations on, 168, 325. Connecticut, Constitution of, 379, 542. Constitution of United States, 139, 538, 598, 611, 624. Adoption of, 309. Objections to, 39, 362. Source of, 309, 616. Supremacy of, 34, 37, 205, 310, 620. Constitutionality of legislation, 20, 21, 27, 120, 123, 126, 379, 397, 465, 481, 519. Effect of invalidity of part of statute, 98. Presumption in favor of validity, 137, 193, 289. See Judicial Power. Construction of Constitution, 138, 148, 149, 161, 163, 174, 175, 194, 217, 244, 282, 312, 320, 540, 617, 626, 636. Loose construction, 174. Strict construction, 174, 318. of legislative grants, 457, 460. of statutes, 120, 138, 175, 341, 357, 458. Contract, Impairment of obligation of, 121, 133, 150, 152, 153, 164, 376 V 395, 401-403, 405, 406, 414, 423, 424, 428, 429, 432, 433, 435, 436, 440, 454, 522. Is a charter a contract, 414, 416, 423, 424, 461, 464. Convention of 1787, 86, 164, 408, 411, 570, 588. Cooley, Thomas M., Constitutional History as Seen in American Law, 615. Constitutional Limitations, 83 n., 84 n., 267, 537. On Taxation, 90. Corporations, 419. of one State may do business in another, 258. Liability of foreign corporations, 263. Power of Congress to create, 314, 320, 322. Power of States to tax, 264. Coulter, J., cited, 84. Coxe, Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, 24. Crime, Punishment of, 141, 148, 317. Currency, Power of Congress to provide, 62, 167. Curtis, Justice, 488, 489, 491. Cited, 537. Opinion by, 235. Gushing, Caleb, 478. Cushing, Justice, 32, 381. Opinion by, 607. 672 INDEX. Dana, R. H.. Jr., 350. Daniel, Justice, 219, 246, 487, 489, 491. Cited, 575. Dartmouth College, 413, 416, 422. Dartmouth, Earl of, 416, 417. Davis, Justice, 63, 135, 254, 394. Opinion by, 351. Declaration of Independence, 476, 480. Delaware, Constitution of, 375, 378. Demosthenes, 604. Denio, J., cited, 536. Dillon, Municipal Corporations, 83 n. Domicil, 601. Dorr's Rebellion, 647. Due process of law, 80, 498, 535, 537, 540, 541, 542. Dunbar, William H., Article by, 667. Dunmore, Governor, 369. Duvall, Justice, 431, 434, 450. Eleemosynary institutions, 416, 419, 420, 422, 425. Elevator charges, 289, 295. Elizabeth, 603. Ellsworth, Chief Justice, 26 n. Emancipation Proclamation, 499, 557. Embargo, 153. 176. Enemies' property, 348, 350. Error, Writ of, 625, 633. Executive power, 324, 332, 335, 345, 579, 655, 659. Enforcement of by judicial process, 659. Exports, 200. Ex post facto laws, 372, 375, 376, 379, 383, 389, 391, 403, 440. See Retrospective Laws. Expurgatory oath, 390, 391, 393. Federalist, The, 24, 38, 44, 87, 93, 243, 271, 377, 616. Federal Government and the States, 65, 66, 182, 184, 203, 243, 322, 553, 564, 568, 571, 575, 578, 635. Fenwick, Sir John, 375 n. Ferris, 260. 267, 292. Field, Justice, 160, 171, 259, 273, 299, 510, 518, 582, 602. Cited, 276, 596, 601. Opinions by, 260, 299, 324, 381, 564. Fish, Secretary of State, 598. Florida, Acquisition of, 583. Foreign Affairs, 583. See International Relations. Forests of United States, Protection of, 333. France, 383, 386, 481, 529, 638. Freight tax, 246, 247. Fuller, Chief Justice, 602. Opinions by, 92, 270, 645. INDEX. 673 Gage, General, 369. Gallatin, 94. Georgia, Constitution of, 395, 396. Gerry, 165. Gladstone, 95. Gorham, 165. Government of the United States distinct from State governments, 565, 568. extent of its jurisdiction, 257, 660, 666. of limited powers, 21, 83, 113, 125, 310, 320, 617, 631, 660, 666. organization of, 20, 125, 139, 468. supreme in its sphere, 310, 565, 571, 572, 581, 631, 666. Gray, Justice, 273, 280. Cited, 640. Opinions by, 158, 596. Grier, Justice, 55, 219, 488, 490, 491. Cited, 575. Opinions by, 342, 561. Habeas corpus, Writ of, 330, 352, 354, 358, 567. Suspension of, 140, 357, 366, 370. Hale, Lord Chief Justice, 292. Hamilton, Alexander, 24, 87, 93, 271, 323, 377, 393, 616. Harbor regulations, 212, 214, 222, 235, 238, 245, 263, 266, 270. Harlan, Justice, 100, 273, 280, 534, 543. Cited, 278. Opinions by, 281, 637. Henry IV, 603. Holmes, Justice O. W., cited, 157. Huberus, 446. Hunt, Justice, 259. Kurd, Slavery, 89. Hutchinson, History of Massachusetts, 106. Illinois Territory, 305. Implied powers, 67, 125, 128, 140, 142, 156, 157, 161, 163, 167, 170, SOS, 313, 323, 330, 577. Imports, 194, 200, 202, 207. When States may tax, 197, 207, 208. Imposts, 193, 238. Indians, 544, 592, 594, 657. Not a State or nation, 547, 586, 589. Power of Congress over, 546, 548, 551, 586, 591. Indictment by grand jury, 535. Injunction, Government by, 660, 667. Injunction, Writ of, 654, 656, 657, 658, 660, 666, 667. Inspection laws, 181, 183, 194, 199, 213, 221, 227, 270, 274, 281, 284. International relations, 445, 583, 639, 657, 658. Insolvency laws. See Bankruptcy. Iredell, Justice, 381, 615. Opinion by, 29. 674: INDEX. Jackson, Justice, 100. Jay, Chief Justice, 94, 615. Opinion by, 610. Johnson, Justice, 45, 101, 108, 167, 192, 405, 431, 444, 590, 627. Cited, 280, 537. Opinion by, 444. Johnson, President, 500, 558, 652, 653, 654. Johnston, Alexander, 472, 490, 590. Judicial power, 21, 22, 24, 331, 335, 353, 363, 375, 378, 397, 445, 566, 585, 599, 607, 612, 618, 623, 626, 628, 632, 663, 666. Judiciary, Power of to pass upon validity of legislation, 21, 22, 25, 123, 322, 598, 656. to be exercised with great care, 92, 123, 155, 381, 396, 413. relation of Federal and State, 329, 449, 450, 564. Jurisdiction of United States courts, 404, 467, 472, 512, 517, 522, 544, 553, 561, 603, 616, 618, 626, 629, 634, 635, 637, 640, 644, 657. Jury trial, 361, 364, 394, 515. Justice, Department of. See Attorney General. Justice, Establishment of, 132, 611. Kent, Chancellor, 192. Commentaries, 40, 72 n., 90, 494, 536. Kenyon, Lord, 292. Kildare, Earl of, 387. Koszta, Martin, 334, 602. Lamar, Justice, 645. Lancaster, Attainder of Earl of, 368. Legal tender, 105, 120, 128, 130-132, 136, 145, 146, 152, 154, 155, 167, 169, 170, 376. Acts of 1862, 1863, 1878, 119, 159, 160. Constitutionality of, 125, 130, 135, 137, 144, 155, 160. Necessary and appropriate means of carrying on war, 128, 132, 135, 144, 146. Legislative power, 373, 374, 399, 401, 403, 497, 559. Licenses, 46, 47, 48, 187, 188, 192, 204. may confer authority, 46, 47. a form of taxation, 48, 263. Lincoln, Attorney-General, 18, 19. Lincoln, President, 499, 558. Liquors, Sale of, 208, 209, 271, 275, 278, 280. Livingston, Justice, 431. Macaulay, 497. Mackintosh, Sir James, 368, 538. Madison, James, 17, 18, 19, 87, 93, 165. Magna Charta, 290, 535, 537, 539. Marcy, Secretary of State, 333. 598, 602. Marshall, Chief Justice, 84, 161, 163, 267, 272, 354, 389, 432, 434, 444, 450, 496, 549. INDEX. 675 Marshall, continued. Cited, 68, 92, 93, 110, 126, 138, 139, 143, 145, 146, 161, 163, 164, 166, 171, 216, 222, 226, 228. 263, 354, 355, 356, 386, 389, 437, 439, 459, 547, 549, 599, 639, 640, 644, 656, 660, 665. Opinions by, 19, 33, 41, 101, 173, 191, 308, 395, 406, 412, 467, 561, 583, 585, 590, 627. Speech in Virginia Convention, 25, 615. Marshals of United States, Powers of, 336. Martial law, 338, 360, 363, 365, 367, 651. Martin Luther, 165. Maryland, Constitution of, 375, 377. Massachusetts, Constitution of, 290, 375, 377. Matthews, Justice, 98, 273. Cited, 274. Opinion by, 534. McLean, Justice, 101, 108, 219, 246, 466, 488, 595. Cited, 306. Opinions by, 108, 219, 488. Meigs, W. M., Article by, 24. Merlin, 602. Merrick, J., 535. Cited, 536. Migration or importation of persons, 183, 189, 227, 232, 233. Militia, Power of Congress over, 217, 338. Miller, Justice, 135, 371, 394, 563. Cited, 516, 640. Lectures on the Constitution, 323, 431, 510. Opinions by, 50, 79, 325, 491, 543. Ministerial duties, 655. Missouri Compromise, 480, 483, 486, 488. Missouri, Constitution of, 381, 386, 388, 390, 392. Money, Contracts to pay, 151, 152. Money, Power of United States to borrow, 41, 43, 166, 312. Power of United States to coin, 127, 149, 150, 170. Paper money issued by colonies, 103, 106, 109. issued by Congress, 106, 127. United States notes, 120, 129. Depreciation in value, 121. See Bills of Credit, Legal Tender. Monopoly, 492, 497. Morris, Gouverneur, 86. Municipal Corporations, 80. National banking associations, 56, 58, 166. Taxes imposed on, 58-60. Naturalization, 217, 477. Navigation, 240, 305, 306. "Necessary and proper" defined, 126, 162, 163, 315, 319. laws, 139, 147, 314, 315. Negro, 475-478, 501, 503, 512. Can he become a citizen, 473, 480, 489. 676 INDEX. Nelson, Justice, 63, 219, 350, 490, 491. Opinions by, 64, 484. Neutrality, 346. North Carolina, Constitution of, 375, 378. Officer, obligation to testify as to his official acts, 18. right to his commission, 20. Ordinance of 1787, 132, 304, 186, 487. Original package, 269, 272, 273, 279. Paper Money. See Bills of Credit, Legal Tender, Money. Pardoning power, 324. Parliament of Great Britain, 423, 539, 664. Paterson, Justice, 381. Opinion by, 28. Pennsylvania, Constitution of, 375. Phillimore, 602. Pilots, 240, 241, 244, 245. See Harbor Regulations. Pitt, 95. Police power, 183, 185, 199, 214, 215, 221, 225, 229, 234, 252, 266, 267, 270, 275, 276, 278, 281, 286, 289, 291, 303, 307, 494. Pomeroy, Constitutional Law, 90. Political questions, 46, 62, 97, 107, 146, 171, 346, 548, 559, 562, 578, 596, 597, 599, 600, 602, 637, 638, 639, 647, 650, 652, 655, 657, 658. Political rights, 652. Post-offices and post roads, 255, 318, 660, 661, 666. President, 654. Military powers of, 339, 340, 341, 342, 345, 357. Powers and duties of, 332, 335, 337, 339, 345, 649, 655. Private property, not to be taken without compensation, 133, 380. not to be taken without due process of law, 80, 84. 134, 289, 290. protection of, 482, 483. Prize, Right of, 343. Property, Right of, 380. Public interest in private business, 292, 293, 294, 296. Public purpose, 85. Rawle, Constitution, 9Q. Raymond, J., 378. Rebellion, 567. financial condition at outbreak, 57. financial measures adopted during, 58. Reconstruction, 558, 559, 562, 652. Redfield, Law of Railways, 83 n. Reeve, History of English Law, 536. Regulation of charges, 267, 289, 293, 295. Republican government guaranteed to each State, 557, 558, 648, 651. Reserved powers of the States, 67, 68. Retrospective laws, 377, 441, 454. Rhode Island, 369. Rights of life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, 385, 386. INDEX. 677 San Ildefonso, Treaty of, 638, 639. Secession, 554, 556. Sergeant, Constitution, 90. Servitude, Involuntary, 498, 500, 529 Sharswood, Blackstone, 90. Shaw, C. J.. 98, 494. Cited, 535. Slaves and Slavery, 476, 482, 484, 487, 488, 498, 528, 532, 557. Effect of residence in free territory, 483, 485, 488, 489. See Servitude, Involuntary. Slave trade, 227. Smith, Wealth of Nations, 29. South Carolina, Constitution of, 375. Specie payments, Act for resumption of, 159. Standard of value, 440. States of the Union, 554, 561. Position of before adoption of Constitution, 173, 383, 474, 611. Powers of, 290, 309, 373, 401, 406, 407, 428, 468, 474, 506, 617. Restrictions on, 168, 195, 375, 440, 469, 521, 609. Sovereignty of, 65, 577, 603, 608, 621, 632. Suability of, 404, 585, 603, 607, 609, 613, 615, 630, 632, 637, 643. Statutes of limitations, 411, 436, 438. /"' Stimson, F. J., Article by, 667. Story, Justice, 118, 220, 431, 444, 450, 590. Cited, 138, 346, 347, 455, 466, 650. Commentaries on the Constitution, 90, 122, 125, 141, 249, 272, 387, 641. Opinions by, 338, 616. Stowell, Lord, cited, 345. Stratford, Earl of, 375 n. Strong, Justice, 299. Cited, 170. Opinions, 136, 246, 511. Suffrage, Right of, 478. Swayne, Justice, 135, 371, 394, 510. Cited, 664, 665. Opinions by, 85, 254, 563. Swift's Digest, 542. Taney, Chief Justice, 276, 350, 489, 490. Cited, 51, 55, 74, 291, 356, 487, 508, 548, 559, 566, 568. Opinions by, 204, 451, 472, 647. Taxation, 26, 3$ 34, 79, 80, 83, 84, 86, 147, 170, 180, 181, 192, 193, 196, 197, 199, 203, 206, 207, 214, 221, 223, 227, 228, 229, 233, 237, 246, 247, 250, 259, 263, 264, 269, 312, 459. direct, 26-28, 30, 32, 60, 8.6, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 99. duties, 27, 193, 197, 199, 221, 226. Federal power of, 38, 39, 61. in aid of inspection laws, 75. in aid of private enterprises, 81. indirect, 27, 29. 678 INDEX. Taxation, continued. must be for public purposes, 84. of agencies and contracts of United States by the States, 33, 36, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 54, 64, 166, 169, 322. of exports by States, 51, 52, 195, 238, 246. of incomes, 95, 97. of national banks, 58-60. of passenger traffic by States, 50, 51. of State agencies by United States, 64, 95. of State banks, 56, 63, 167. of State franchises by United States, 61. of tonnage by States, 71-73, 76, 238. State power of, 35, 36, 39, 75, 196, 197, 224, 247, 251, 264. Telegraph, 256. Territory of United States, 481, 488, 547, 584. Power to acquire, 583. Test oath, 382, 384, 390. Texas, Constitution of, 656. Thayer, J. B., Articles by, 24, 157. Cases on Constitutional Law, 24, 490. Thompson, Justice, 45, 101, 108, 118, 204, 444, 450, 466, 590. Tonnage duties, 76, 221, 237. Treaty-making power, 583. Trimble, Justice, 444, 450. Union, The, 555, 562, 630, 661. Valuation of real and personal property in United States in 1890, 99. Vattel, 344, 445, 593, 602. Waite, Chief Justice, 273. Cited, 517. Opinions by, 255, 289. War, 312, 338, 342, 343, 363, 566, 583, 597. Civil War, 344, 349, 557. Washington, Justice, 431, 450, 595. Cited, 454, 505. Opinion by, 432. Wayne, Justice, 55, 246, 371, 487, 489, 490, 491. Opinion by, 231. Webster, Noah, 355, 541. Weights and measures, 154. Wharton, Digest of International Law, 598, 602. White, Justice, 100. Wilson, Justice, 32, 615. Opinion by, 603. Speech in Pennsylvania Convention, 25. Works, 157, 323. Wirt, William, 478. Woodbury, Justice, 219. Wooddeson, 377. Dne FOR REFERENCE NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM LIBRARY UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A 000 688 286 4